Query: rule covering Detects the use of Windows Defender MpCmdRun.EXE to download files
Matching passage: Sigma rule: Detects the use of Windows Defender MpCmdRun.EXE to download files. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: File Download Via Windows Defender MpCmpRun.EXE id: 46123129-1024-423e-9fae-43af4a0fa9a5 status: test description: Detects the use of Windows Defender MpCmdRun.EXE to download files references: - https://web.archive.org/web/20200903194959/https://twitter.com/djmtshepana/status/1301608169496612866 - https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/MpCmdRun/ author: Matthew Matchen date: 2020-09-04 modified: 2023-11-09 tags: - attack.stealth - attack.t1218 - attack.command-and-control - attack.t1105 logsource: category: process_creation product: windows detection: selection_img: - OriginalFileName: MpCmdRun.exe - Image|endswith: \MpCmdRun.exe - CommandLine|contains: MpCmdRun.exe - Description: Microsoft Malware Protection Command Line Utility selection_cli: CommandLine|contains|all: - DownloadFile - url condition: all of selection_* falsepositives: - Unknown level: high
Near-miss passage: Sigma rule: Detects execution of mshta.exe with file types that looks like they do not typically represent HTA (HTML Application) co. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: MSHTA Execution with Suspicious File Extensions id: cc7abbd0-762b-41e3-8a26-57ad50d2eea3 status: test description: 'Detects execution of mshta.exe with file types that looks like they do not typically represent HTA (HTML Application) content, such as .png, .jpg, .zip, .pdf, and others, which are often polyglots. MSHTA is a legitimate Windows utility for executing HTML Applications containing VBScript or JScript. Threat actors often abuse this lolbin utility to download and execute malicious scripts disguised as benign files or hosted under misleading extensions to evade detection. ' references: - http://blog.sevagas.com/?Hacking-around-HTA-files - https://0x00sec.org/t/clientside-exploitation-in-2018-how-pentesting-has-changed/7356 - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/dotnet/framework/data/xml/xslt/xslt-stylesheet-scripting-using-msxsl-script - https://medium.com/tsscyber/pentesting-and-hta-bypassing-powershell-constrained-language-mode-53a42856c997 - https://twitter.com/mattifestation/status/1326228491302563846 - https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/c1f27d9795a2eba630db8a043580a0761798f06370fb1317067805f8a845b00c author: Diego Perez (@darkquassar), Markus Neis, Swisscom (Improve Rule), Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems) date: 2019-02-22 modified: 2025-05-12 tags: - attack.stealth - attack.t1140 - attack.t1218.005 - attack.execution - attack.t1059.007 - cve.2020-1599 logsource: category: process_creation product: windows detection: selection_img: - Image|endswith: \mshta.exe - OriginalFileName: mshta.exe selection_cli: CommandLine|contains: - .7z - .avi - .bat - .bmp - .conf - .csv - .dll - .doc - .gif - .gz - .ini - .jpe - .jpg - .json - .lnk - .log - .mkv - .mp3 - .mp4 - .pdf - .png - .ppt - .rar - .rtf - .svg - .tar - .tmp - .txt - .xls - .xml - .yaml - .yml - .zip - vbscript condition: all of selection_* falsepositives: - False positives depend on scripts and administrative tools used in the monitored environment level: high