Query: write Sigma for Detects the loading of unsigned .node files. Adversaries may abuse a lack of .node integrity checking to execute arbitra
Matching passage: Sigma rule: Detects the loading of unsigned .node files. Adversaries may abuse a lack of .node integrity checking to execute arbitra. Logsource: windows / image_load. Rule: title: Unsigned .node File Loaded id: e5f5c693-52d7-4de5-88ae-afbfbce85595 status: experimental description: 'Detects the loading of unsigned .node files. Adversaries may abuse a lack of .node integrity checking to execute arbitrary code inside of trusted applications such as Slack. .node files are native add-ons for Electron-based applications, which are commonly used for desktop applications like Slack, Discord, and Visual Studio Code. This technique has been observed in the DripLoader malware, which uses unsigned .node files to load malicious native code into Electron applications. ' references: - https://www.coreycburton.com/blog/driploader-case-study - https://github.com/CoreyCBurton/DripLoaderNG - https://www.electronjs.org/docs/latest/tutorial/native-code-and-electron author: Jonathan Beierle (@hullabrian) date: 2025-11-22 tags: - attack.execution - attack.privilege-escalation - attack.persistence - attack.stealth - attack.t1129 - attack.t1574.001 - attack.t1036.005 logsource: category: image_load product: windows detection: selection_node_extension: ImageLoaded|endswith: .node selection_status: - Signed: 'false' - SignatureStatus: Unavailable filter_optional_vscode_jupyter: Image|endswith: \Code.exe ImageLoaded|contains: .vscode\extensions\ms-toolsai.jupyter- ImageLoaded|endswith: - \electron.napi.node - \node.napi.glibc.node condition: all of selection_* and not 1 of filter_optional_* falsepositives: - VsCode extensions or similar legitimate tools might use unsigned .node files. These should be investigated on a case-by-case basis, and whitelisted if determined to be benign. level: medium
Near-miss passage: Sigma rule: Detects threat actors proxy executing code and bypassing application controls by leveraging wmic and the `/FORMAT` argum. Logsource: windows / image_load. Rule: title: WMIC Loading Scripting Libraries id: 06ce37c2-61ab-4f05-9ff5-b1a96d18ae32 related: - id: 8d63dadf-b91b-4187-87b6-34a1114577ea type: similar - id: 05c36dd6-79d6-4a9a-97da-3db20298ab2d type: similar status: test description: 'Detects threat actors proxy executing code and bypassing application controls by leveraging wmic and the `/FORMAT` argument switch to download and execute an XSL file (i.e js, vbs, etc). It could be an indicator of SquiblyTwo technique, which uses Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) to execute malicious code. ' references: - https://securitydatasets.com/notebooks/atomic/windows/defense_evasion/SDWIN-201017061100.html - https://twitter.com/dez_/status/986614411711442944 - https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Wmic/ author: Roberto Rodriguez (Cyb3rWard0g), OTR (Open Threat Research) date: 2020-10-17 modified: 2022-10-13 tags: - attack.stealth - attack.t1220 logsource: category: image_load product: windows detection: selection: Image|endswith: \wmic.exe ImageLoaded|endswith: - \jscript.dll - \vbscript.dll condition: selection falsepositives: - The command wmic os get lastbootuptime loads vbscript.dll - The command wmic os get locale loads vbscript.dll - Since the ImageLoad event doesn't have enough information in this case. It's better to look at the recent process creation events that spawned the WMIC process and investigate the command line and parent/child processes to get more insights - The command `wmic ntevent` loads vbscript.dll level: medium