Query: rule covering Detects the deletion of all backups or system state backups via "wbadmin.exe". This technique is used by numerous ransom
Matching passage: Sigma rule: Detects the deletion of all backups or system state backups via "wbadmin.exe". This technique is used by numerous ransom. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: All Backups Deleted Via Wbadmin.EXE id: 639c9081-f482-47d3-a0bd-ddee3d4ecd76 related: - id: 89f75308-5b1b-4390-b2d8-d6b2340efaf8 type: derived status: test description: 'Detects the deletion of all backups or system state backups via "wbadmin.exe". This technique is used by numerous ransomware families and actors. This may only be successful on server platforms that have Windows Backup enabled. ' references: - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1490/T1490.md#atomic-test-5---windows---delete-volume-shadow-copies-via-wmi-with-powershell - https://github.com/albertzsigovits/malware-notes/blob/558898932c1579ff589290092a2c8febefc3a4c9/Ransomware/Lockbit.md - https://www.sentinelone.com/labs/ranzy-ransomware-better-encryption-among-new-features-of-thunderx-derivative/ - https://www.trendmicro.com/vinfo/us/security/news/cybercrime-and-digital-threats/ransomware-report-avaddon-and-new-techniques-emerge-industrial-sector-targeted - https://www.trendmicro.com/content/dam/trendmicro/global/en/research/24/b/lockbit-attempts-to-stay-afloat-with-a-new-version/technical-appendix-lockbit-ng-dev-analysis.pdf - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/wbadmin-delete-systemstatebackup author: frack113, Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) date: 2021-12-13 modified: 2024-05-10 tags: - attack.impact - attack.t1490 logsource: category: process_creation product: windows detection: selection_img: - Image|endswith: \wbadmin.exe - OriginalFileName: WBADMIN.EXE selection_cli: CommandLine|contains|all: - delete - backup CommandLine|contains: keepVersions:0 condition: all of selection_* falsepositives: - Unknown level: high
Near-miss passage: Sigma rule: Detects access to Signal Desktop's sensitive data files: db.sqlite and config.json. The db.sqlite file in Signal Desktop. Logsource: windows / security. Rule: title: File Access Of Signal Desktop Sensitive Data id: 5d6c375a-18ae-4952-b4f6-8b803f6c8555 status: experimental description: 'Detects access to Signal Desktop''s sensitive data files: db.sqlite and config.json. The db.sqlite file in Signal Desktop stores all locally saved messages in an encrypted SQLite database, while the config.json contains the decryption key needed to access that data. Since the key is stored in plain text, a threat actor who gains access to both files can decrypt and read sensitive messages without needing the users credentials. Currently the rule only covers the default Signal installation path in AppData\Roaming. Signal Portable installations may use different paths based on user configuration. Additional paths can be added to the selection as needed. ' references: - https://cloud.google.com/blog/topics/threat-intelligence/russia-targeting-signal-messenger/ - https://vmois.dev/query-signal-desktop-messages-sqlite/ author: Andreas Braathen (mnemonic.io) date: 2025-10-19 tags: - attack.credential-access - attack.t1003 logsource: product: windows service: security definition: 'Requirements: System Access Control List (SACL) policy with attributes List folder/read data on Objects' detection: selection: EventID: 4663 ObjectType: File ObjectName|contains: \AppData\Roaming\Signal\ ObjectName|endswith: - \config.json - \db.sqlite filter_main_signal: ProcessName|endswith: - \signal-portable.exe - \signal.exe condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_* falsepositives: - Unlikely, but possible from AV or backup software accessing the files. level: medium