Query: how to detect Relocate Malware
Matching passage: T1070.010 Relocate Malware. Tactics: stealth. Description: Once a payload is delivered, adversaries may reproduce copies of the same malware on the victim system to remove evidence of their presence and/or avoid defenses. Copying malware payloads to new locations may also be combined with [File Deletion](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1070/004) to cleanup older artifacts. Relocating malware may be a part of many actions intended to evade defenses. For example, adversaries may copy and rename payloads to better blend into the local environment (i.e., [Match Legitimate Resource Name or Location](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036/005)).(Citation: DFIR Report Trickbot June 2023) Payloads may also be repositioned to target [File/Path Exclusions](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1564/012) as well as specific locations associated with establishing [Persistence](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003).(Citation: Latrodectus APR 2024) Relocating malicious payloads may also hinder defensive analysis, especially to separate these payloads from earlier events (such as [User Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204) and [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566)) that may have generated alerts or otherwise drawn attention from defenders. Moving payloads into target directories does not alter the Creation timestamp, thereby evading detection logic reliant on modifications to this artifact (i.e., [Timestomp](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1070/006)).
Near-miss passage: T1070.003 Clear Command History. Tactics: stealth. Description: In addition to clearing system logs, an adversary may clear the command history of a compromised account to conceal the actions undertaken during an intrusion. Various command interpreters keep track of the commands users type in their terminal so that users can retrace what they've done. On Linux and macOS, these command histories can be accessed in a few different ways. While logged in, this command history is tracked in a file pointed to by the environment variable <code>HISTFILE</code>. When a user logs off a system, this information is flushed to a file in the user's home directory called <code>~/.bash_history</code>. The benefit of this is that it allows users to go back to commands they've used before in different sessions. Adversaries may delete their commands from these logs by manually clearing the history (<code>history -c</code>) or deleting the bash history file <code>rm ~/.bash_history</code>. Adversaries may also leverage a [Network Device CLI](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/008) on network devices to clear command history data (<code>clear logging</code> and/or <code>clear history</code>).(Citation: US-CERT-TA18-106A) On ESXi servers, command history may be manually removed from the `/var/log/shell.log` file.(Citation: Broadcom ESXi Shell Audit) On Windows hosts, PowerShell has two different command history providers: the built-in history and the command history managed by the <code>PSReadLine</code> module. The built-in history only tracks the commands used in the current session. This command history is not available to other sessions and is deleted when the session ends. The <code>PSReadLine</code> command history tracks the commands used in all PowerShell sessions and writes them to a file (<code>$env:APPDATA\Microsoft\Windows\PowerShell\PSReadLine\ConsoleHost_history.txt</code> by default). This history file is available to all sessions and contains all past history since the file is not deleted when the session ends.(Citation: Micros