Query: alert when Detects potential ClickFix malware execution patterns by monitoring registry modifications in RunMRU keys containing HTT
Matching passage: Sigma rule: Detects potential ClickFix malware execution patterns by monitoring registry modifications in RunMRU keys containing HTT. Logsource: windows / registry_set. Rule: title: Potential ClickFix Execution Pattern - Registry id: f5fe36cf-f1ec-4c23-903d-09a3110f6bbb related: - id: d487ed4a-fd24-436d-a0b2-f4e95f7b2635 type: similar status: experimental description: 'Detects potential ClickFix malware execution patterns by monitoring registry modifications in RunMRU keys containing HTTP/HTTPS links. ClickFix is known to be distributed through phishing campaigns and uses techniques like clipboard hijacking and fake CAPTCHA pages. Through the fakecaptcha pages, the adversary tricks users into opening the Run dialog box and pasting clipboard-hijacked content, such as one-liners that execute remotely hosted malicious files or scripts. ' references: - https://github.com/JohnHammond/recaptcha-phish - https://www.zscaler.com/blogs/security-research/deepseek-lure-using-captchas-spread-malware - https://www.threatdown.com/blog/clipboard-hijacker-tries-to-install-a-trojan/ - https://app.any.run/tasks/5c16b4db-4b36-4039-a0ed-9b09abff8be2 - https://www.esentire.com/security-advisories/netsupport-rat-clickfix-distribution - https://medium.com/@boutnaru/the-windows-foreniscs-journey-run-mru-run-dialog-box-most-recently-used-57375a02d724 - https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/preventing-clickfix-attack-vector/ - https://medium.com/@poudelswachchhanda123/preventing-lnk-and-fakecaptcha-threats-a-system-hardening-approach-2f7b7ed2e493 - https://www.scpx.com.au/2025/11/16/decades-old-finger-protocol-abused-in-clickfix-malware-attacks/ author: Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems) date: 2025-03-25 modified: 2025-11-19 tags: - attack.execution - attack.t1204.001 logsource: category: registry_set product: windows detection: selection_registry: TargetObject|contains: \SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\RunMRU\ selection_details: Details|contains: - http:// - https:// selection_susp_pattern: - Details|contains: - account - anti-bot - botcheck - captcha - challenge - confirmation - fraud - human - identification - identificator - identity - robot - validation - verification - verify - Details|contains: - '%comspec%' - bitsadmin - certutil - cmd - cscript - curl - finger - mshta - powershell - pwsh - regsvr32 - rundll32 - schtasks - wget - wscript condition: all of selection_* falsepositives: - Legitimate applications using RunMRU with HTTP links level: high
Near-miss passage: Sigma rule: Detects the creation of an ADS (Alternate Data Stream) that contains an executable by looking at a non-empty Imphash. Logsource: windows / create_stream_hash. Rule: title: Hidden Executable In NTFS Alternate Data Stream id: b69888d4-380c-45ce-9cf9-d9ce46e67821 status: test description: Detects the creation of an ADS (Alternate Data Stream) that contains an executable by looking at a non-empty Imphash references: - https://twitter.com/0xrawsec/status/1002478725605273600?s=21 author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), @0xrawsec date: 2018-06-03 modified: 2023-02-10 tags: - attack.stealth - attack.s0139 - attack.t1564.004 logsource: product: windows category: create_stream_hash definition: 'Requirements: Sysmon or equivalent configured with Imphash logging' detection: selection: Hash|contains: IMPHASH= filter_main_null: Hash|contains: IMPHASH=00000000000000000000000000000000 condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_* falsepositives: - This rule isn't looking for any particular binary characteristics. As legitimate installers and programs were seen embedding hidden binaries in their ADS. Some false positives are expected from browser processes and similar. level: medium