Query: detect Detects the load of RstrtMgr DLL (Restart Manager) by an uncommon process. This library has been used during ransomware in logs
Matching passage: Sigma rule: Detects the load of RstrtMgr DLL (Restart Manager) by an uncommon process. This library has been used during ransomware. Logsource: windows / image_load. Rule: title: Load Of RstrtMgr.DLL By An Uncommon Process id: 3669afd2-9891-4534-a626-e5cf03810a61 related: - id: b48492dc-c5ef-4572-8dff-32bc241c15c8 type: derived status: test description: 'Detects the load of RstrtMgr DLL (Restart Manager) by an uncommon process. This library has been used during ransomware campaigns to kill processes that would prevent file encryption by locking them (e.g. Conti ransomware, Cactus ransomware). It has also recently been seen used by the BiBi wiper for Windows. It could also be used for anti-analysis purposes by shut downing specific processes. ' references: - https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/windows-restart-manager-part-1/ - https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/windows-restart-manager-part-2/ - https://web.archive.org/web/20231221193106/https://www.swascan.com/cactus-ransomware-malware-analysis/ - https://taiwan.postsen.com/business/88601/Hamas-hackers-use-data-destruction-software-BiBi-which-consumes-a-lot-of-processor-resources-to-wipe-Windows-computer-data--iThome.html author: Luc Génaux date: 2023-11-28 modified: 2026-07-28 tags: - attack.impact - attack.defense-impairment - attack.t1486 - attack.t1685 logsource: category: image_load product: windows detection: selection: - ImageLoaded|endswith: \RstrtMgr.dll - OriginalFileName: RstrtMgr.dll filter_main_generic: Image|startswith: - C:\$WINDOWS.~BT\ - C:\$WinREAgent\ - C:\Program Files (x86)\ - C:\Program Files\ - C:\ProgramData\ - C:\Windows\explorer.exe - C:\Windows\SoftwareDistribution\ - C:\Windows\SysNative\ - C:\Windows\System32\ - C:\Windows\SysWOW64\ - C:\Windows\WinSxS\ - C:\WUDownloadCache\ filter_main_user_software_installations: Image|startswith: C:\Users\ Image|contains|all: - \AppData\Local\Temp\is- - .tmp\ Image|endswith: .tmp filter_main_admin_software_installations: Image|startswith: C:\Windows\Temp\ filter_optional_onedrive_1: Image|startswith: C:\Users\ Image|endswith: - \AppData\Local\Microsoft\OneDrive\OneDrive.exe - \AppData\Local\Microsoft\OneDrive\OneDriveStandaloneUpdater.exe filter_optional_onedrive_2: Image|startswith: C:\Users\ Image|contains: \AppData\Local\Microsoft\OneDrive\ Image|endswith: \OneDrive.Sync.Service.exe condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_* and not 1 of filter_optional_* falsepositives: - Other legitimate Windows processes not currently listed - Processes related to software installation level: low
Near-miss passage: Sigma rule: Detects the creation of a new named pipe using the "mkfifo" utility in a potentially suspicious location. Logsource: linux / process_creation. Rule: title: Potentially Suspicious Named Pipe Created Via Mkfifo id: 999c3b12-0a8c-40b6-8e13-dd7d62b75c7a related: - id: 9d779ce8-5256-4b13-8b6f-b91c602b43f4 type: derived status: test description: Detects the creation of a new named pipe using the "mkfifo" utility in a potentially suspicious location references: - https://dev.to/0xbf/use-mkfifo-to-create-named-pipe-linux-tips-5bbk - https://www.mandiant.com/resources/blog/barracuda-esg-exploited-globally author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) date: 2023-06-16 tags: - attack.execution logsource: category: process_creation product: linux detection: selection: Image|endswith: /mkfifo CommandLine|contains: ' /tmp/' condition: selection falsepositives: - Unknown level: medium