Query: alert when Detects the use of the "Get-ADComputer" cmdlet in order to identify systems which are configured for unconstrained deleg
Matching passage: Sigma rule: Detects the use of the "Get-ADComputer" cmdlet in order to identify systems which are configured for unconstrained deleg. Logsource: windows / ps_script. Rule: title: Potential Unconstrained Delegation Discovery Via Get-ADComputer - ScriptBlock id: cdfa73b6-3c9d-4bb8-97f8-ddbd8921f5c5 status: experimental description: Detects the use of the "Get-ADComputer" cmdlet in order to identify systems which are configured for unconstrained delegation. references: - https://pentestlab.blog/2022/03/21/unconstrained-delegation/ - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/activedirectory/get-adcomputer?view=windowsserver2022-ps author: frack113 date: 2025-03-05 tags: - attack.reconnaissance - attack.discovery - attack.credential-access - attack.t1018 - attack.t1558 - attack.t1589.002 logsource: product: windows category: ps_script definition: 'Requirements: Script Block Logging must be enable' detection: selection: ScriptBlockText|contains: - -Properties*TrustedForDelegation - -Properties*TrustedToAuthForDelegation - -Properties*msDS-AllowedToDelegateTo - -Properties*PrincipalsAllowedToDelegateToAccount - -LDAPFilter*(userAccountControl:1.2.840.113556.1.4.803:=524288) condition: selection falsepositives: - Legitimate use of the library for administrative activity level: medium
Near-miss passage: Sigma rule: Detects changes to "DsrmAdminLogonBehavior" registry value. During a Domain Controller (DC) promotion, administrators cr. Logsource: windows / registry_set. Rule: title: Directory Service Restore Mode(DSRM) Registry Value Tampering id: b61e87c0-50db-4b2e-8986-6a2be94b33b0 related: - id: 53ad8e36-f573-46bf-97e4-15ba5bf4bb51 type: similar status: test description: 'Detects changes to "DsrmAdminLogonBehavior" registry value. During a Domain Controller (DC) promotion, administrators create a Directory Services Restore Mode (DSRM) local administrator account with a password that rarely changes. The DSRM account is an “Administrator” account that logs in with the DSRM mode when the server is booting up to restore AD backups or recover the server from a failure. Attackers could abuse DSRM account to maintain their persistence and access to the organization''s Active Directory. If the "DsrmAdminLogonBehavior" value is set to "0", the administrator account can only be used if the DC starts in DSRM. If the "DsrmAdminLogonBehavior" value is set to "1", the administrator account can only be used if the local AD DS service is stopped. If the "DsrmAdminLogonBehavior" value is set to "2", the administrator account can always be used. ' references: - https://adsecurity.org/?p=1785 - https://www.sentinelone.com/blog/detecting-dsrm-account-misconfigurations/ - https://book.hacktricks.xyz/windows-hardening/active-directory-methodology/dsrm-credentials author: Nischal Khadgi date: 2024-07-11 tags: - attack.credential-access - attack.persistence - attack.defense-impairment - attack.t1556 logsource: category: registry_set product: windows detection: selection: TargetObject|endswith: \Control\Lsa\DsrmAdminLogonBehavior filter_main_default_value: Details: DWORD (0x00000000) condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_* falsepositives: - Unknown level: high