Query: detection rule: Detects execution of WinRAR in order to compress a file with a ".dmp"/".dump" extension, which could be a step in a proc
Matching passage: Sigma rule: Detects execution of WinRAR in order to compress a file with a ".dmp"/".dump" extension, which could be a step in a proc. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: Winrar Compressing Dump Files id: 1ac14d38-3dfc-4635-92c7-e3fd1c5f5bfc related: - id: ec570e53-4c76-45a9-804d-dc3f355ff7a7 type: similar status: test description: Detects execution of WinRAR in order to compress a file with a ".dmp"/".dump" extension, which could be a step in a process of dump file exfiltration. references: - https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/overwatch-exposes-aquatic-panda-in-possession-of-log-4-shell-exploit-tools/ author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems) date: 2022-01-04 modified: 2023-09-12 tags: - attack.collection - attack.t1560.001 logsource: category: process_creation product: windows detection: selection_img: - Image|endswith: - \rar.exe - \winrar.exe - Description: Command line RAR selection_extension: CommandLine|contains: - .dmp - .dump - .hdmp condition: all of selection_* falsepositives: - Legitimate use of WinRAR with a command line in which ".dmp" or ".dump" appears accidentally - Legitimate use of WinRAR to compress WER ".dmp" files for troubleshooting level: medium
Near-miss passage: Sigma rule: Detects Commandlet names from well-known PowerShell exploitation frameworks. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: Malicious PowerShell Commandlets - ProcessCreation id: 02030f2f-6199-49ec-b258-ea71b07e03dc related: - id: 89819aa4-bbd6-46bc-88ec-c7f7fe30efa6 type: derived - id: 7d0d0329-0ef1-4e84-a9f5-49500f9d7c6c type: similar status: test description: Detects Commandlet names from well-known PowerShell exploitation frameworks references: - https://adsecurity.org/?p=2921 - https://github.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/PowerSharpPack/tree/master/PowerSharpBinaries - https://github.com/BC-SECURITY/Invoke-ZeroLogon/blob/111d17c7fec486d9bb23387e2e828b09a26075e4/Invoke-ZeroLogon.ps1 - https://github.com/xorrior/RandomPS-Scripts/blob/848c919bfce4e2d67b626cbcf4404341cfe3d3b6/Get-DXWebcamVideo.ps1 - https://github.com/rvrsh3ll/Misc-Powershell-Scripts/blob/6f23bb41f9675d7e2d32bacccff75e931ae00554/OfficeMemScraper.ps1 - https://github.com/dafthack/DomainPasswordSpray/blob/b13d64a5834694aa73fd2aea9911a83027c465a7/DomainPasswordSpray.ps1 - https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/threat-assessment-black-basta-ransomware/ - https://research.nccgroup.com/2022/06/06/shining-the-light-on-black-basta/ - https://github.com/calebstewart/CVE-2021-1675 - https://github.com/BloodHoundAD/BloodHound/blob/0927441f67161cc6dc08a53c63ceb8e333f55874/Collectors/AzureHound.ps1 - https://bloodhound.readthedocs.io/en/latest/data-collection/azurehound.html - https://github.com/HarmJ0y/DAMP - https://github.com/samratashok/nishang - https://github.com/DarkCoderSc/PowerRunAsSystem/ - https://github.com/besimorhino/powercat - https://github.com/Kevin-Robertson/Powermad - https://github.com/adrecon/ADRecon - https://github.com/adrecon/AzureADRecon - https://github.com/sadshade/veeam-creds/blob/6010eaf31ba41011b58d6af3950cffbf6f5cea32/Veeam-Get-Creds.ps1 - https://github.com/The-Viper-One/Invoke-PowerDPAPI/ - https://github.com/Arno0x/DNSExfiltrator/ author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) date: 2023-01-02 modified: 2025-12-10 tags: - attack.execution - attack.discovery - attack.t1482 - attack.t1087 - attack.t1087.001 - attack.t1087.002 - attack.t1069.001 - attack.t1069.002 - attack.t1069 - attack.t1059.001 logsource: category: process_creation product: windows detection: selection: CommandLine|contains: - Add-Exfiltration - Add-Persistence - Add-RegBackdoor - Add-RemoteRegBackdoor - Add-ScrnSaveBackdoor - Check-VM - ConvertTo-Rc4ByteStream - Decrypt-Hash - Disable-ADIDNSNode - Disable-MachineAccount - Do-Exfiltration - Enable-ADIDNSNode - Enable-MachineAccount - Enabled-DuplicateToken - Exploit-Jboss - Ex