Query: Sigma rule for Detects the creation of a dMSASvc account using the New-ADServiceAccount cmdlet in certain OUs. The fact that the Cmdlet
Matching passage: Sigma rule: Detects the creation of a dMSASvc account using the New-ADServiceAccount cmdlet in certain OUs. The fact that the Cmdlet. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: New DMSA Service Account Created in Specific OUs id: 0ea8db81-2ff6-4525-9448-33bbe7effc13 related: - id: e15bc294-ae2a-45ad-b7d6-637b33868bde type: similar - id: 02122374-b74e-495c-b285-9e4da973f3d6 type: similar status: experimental description: 'Detects the creation of a dMSASvc account using the New-ADServiceAccount cmdlet in certain OUs. The fact that the Cmdlet is used to create a dMSASvc account in a specific OU is highly suspicious. It is a pattern trying to exploit the BadSuccessor privilege escalation vulnerability in Windows Server 2025. On top of that, if the user that is creating the dMSASvc account is not a legitimate administrator or does not have the necessary permissions, it is a strong signal of an attempted or successful abuse of the BaDSuccessor vulnerability for privilege escalation within the Windows Server 2025 Active Directory environment. ' references: - https://www.akamai.com/blog/security-research/abusing-bad-successor-for-privilege-escalation-in-active-directory author: Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems) date: 2025-05-24 tags: - attack.privilege-escalation - attack.initial-access - attack.persistence - attack.stealth - attack.t1078.002 - attack.t1098 logsource: category: process_creation product: windows detection: selection_img: - Image|endswith: - \powershell.exe - \pwsh.exe - \powershell_ise.exe - OriginalFileName: - powershell.exe - pwsh.dll - powershell_ise.exe selection_cli: CommandLine|contains|all: - New-ADServiceAccount - -CreateDelegatedServiceAccount - -path condition: all of selection_* falsepositives: - Unknown level: medium
Near-miss passage: Sigma rule: Detects creation of specific system DLL files that are usually not present on the system (or at least not in system dir. Logsource: windows / file_event. Rule: title: Creation Of Non-Existent System DLL id: df6ecb8b-7822-4f4b-b412-08f524b4576c related: - id: 6b98b92b-4f00-4f62-b4fe-4d1920215771 type: similar status: test description: 'Detects creation of specific system DLL files that are usually not present on the system (or at least not in system directories) but may be loaded by legitimate processes. Phantom DLL hijacking involves placing malicious DLLs with names of non-existent system binaries in locations where legitimate applications may search for them, leading to execution of the malicious DLLs. Thus, the creation of such DLLs may indicate preparation for phantom DLL hijacking attacks. ' references: - http://remoteawesomethoughts.blogspot.com/2019/05/windows-10-task-schedulerservice.html - https://clement.notin.org/blog/2020/09/12/CVE-2020-7315-McAfee-Agent-DLL-injection/ - https://decoded.avast.io/martinchlumecky/png-steganography/ - https://github.com/blackarrowsec/redteam-research/tree/26e6fc0c0d30d364758fa11c2922064a9a7fd309/LPE%20via%20StorSvc - https://github.com/Wh04m1001/SysmonEoP - https://itm4n.github.io/cdpsvc-dll-hijacking/ - https://posts.specterops.io/lateral-movement-scm-and-dll-hijacking-primer-d2f61e8ab992 - https://securelist.com/passiveneuron-campaign-with-apt-implants-and-cobalt-strike/117745/ - https://www.crowdstrike.com/en-us/blog/4-ways-adversaries-hijack-dlls/ - https://www.hexacorn.com/blog/2013/12/08/beyond-good-ol-run-key-part-5/ - https://www.hexacorn.com/blog/2025/06/14/wermgr-exe-boot-offdmpsvc-dll-lolbin/ - https://www.hexacorn.com/blog/2025/06/14/wpr-exe-boottrace-phantom-dll-axeonoffhelper-dll-lolbin/ - https://x.com/0gtweet/status/1564131230941122561 author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems), fornotes date: 2022-12-01 modified: 2026-01-24 tags: - attack.persistence - attack.privilege-escalation - attack.execution - attack.stealth - attack.t1574.001 logsource: product: windows category: file_event detection: selection: TargetFilename|endswith: - :\Windows\System32\axeonoffhelper.dll - :\Windows\System32\cdpsgshims.dll - :\Windows\System32\oci.dll - :\Windows\System32\offdmpsvc.dll - :\Windows\System32\shellchromeapi.dll - :\Windows\System32\TSMSISrv.dll - :\Windows\System32\TSVIPSrv.dll - :\Windows\System32\wbem\wbemcomn.dll - :\Windows\System32\WLBSCTRL.dll - :\Windows\System32\wow64log.dll - :\Windows\System32\WptsExtensions.dll - \SprintCSP.dll condition: selection falsepositives: - Unknown level: medium regression_tests_path: regression_data/rules/windows/fil