Query: detection rule: Detects a phishing attack which expands a ZIP file containing a malicious shortcut. If the victim expands the ZIP file v
Matching passage: Sigma rule: Detects a phishing attack which expands a ZIP file containing a malicious shortcut. If the victim expands the ZIP file v. Logsource: windows / file_event. Rule: title: Potential RipZip Attack on Startup Folder id: a6976974-ea6f-4e97-818e-ea08625c52cb status: test description: 'Detects a phishing attack which expands a ZIP file containing a malicious shortcut. If the victim expands the ZIP file via the explorer process, then the explorer process expands the malicious ZIP file and drops a malicious shortcut redirected to a backdoor into the Startup folder. Additionally, the file name of the malicious shortcut in Startup folder contains {0AFACED1-E828-11D1-9187-B532F1E9575D} meaning the folder shortcut operation. ' references: - https://twitter.com/jonasLyk/status/1549338335243534336?t=CrmPocBGLbDyE4p6zTX1cg&s=19 author: Greg (rule) date: 2022-07-21 modified: 2023-01-05 tags: - attack.privilege-escalation - attack.persistence - attack.t1547 logsource: category: file_event product: windows detection: selection: TargetFilename|contains|all: - \Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\Startup - .lnk.{0AFACED1-E828-11D1-9187-B532F1E9575D} Image|endswith: \explorer.exe condition: selection falsepositives: - Unknown level: high
Near-miss passage: Sigma rule: Detects modification of Windows Registry Classes keys used for persistence. Adversaries modify these autostart extensibi. Logsource: windows / registry_set. Rule: title: Classes Autorun Keys Modification id: 9df5f547-c86a-433e-b533-f2794357e242 related: - id: 17f878b8-9968-4578-b814-c4217fc5768c type: obsolete status: test description: 'Detects modification of Windows Registry Classes keys used for persistence. Adversaries modify these autostart extensibility points (ASEP) to execute malicious code when file types are opened or actions are performed. Various legitimate software also uses these keys. Currently, this rule only filters out known legitimate software paths, thus it is recommended to review and tune filters for your environment to reduce false positives before deploying to production. ' references: - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1547.001/T1547.001.md - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/downloads/autoruns - https://gist.github.com/GlebSukhodolskiy/0fc5fa5f482903064b448890db1eaf9d author: Victor Sergeev, Daniil Yugoslavskiy, Gleb Sukhodolskiy, Timur Zinniatullin, oscd.community, Tim Shelton, frack113 (split) date: 2019-10-25 modified: 2025-10-22 tags: - attack.privilege-escalation - attack.persistence - attack.t1547.001 logsource: category: registry_set product: windows detection: selection_classes_base: TargetObject|contains: \Software\Classes selection_classes_target: TargetObject|contains: - \Folder\ShellEx\ExtShellFolderViews - \Folder\ShellEx\DragDropHandlers - \Folder\Shellex\ColumnHandlers - \Filter - \Exefile\Shell\Open\Command\(Default) - \Directory\Shellex\DragDropHandlers - \Directory\Shellex\CopyHookHandlers - \CLSID\{AC757296-3522-4E11-9862-C17BE5A1767E}\Instance - \CLSID\{ABE3B9A4-257D-4B97-BD1A-294AF496222E}\Instance - \CLSID\{7ED96837-96F0-4812-B211-F13C24117ED3}\Instance - \CLSID\{083863F1-70DE-11d0-BD40-00A0C911CE86}\Instance - \Classes\AllFileSystemObjects\ShellEx\DragDropHandlers - \.exe - \.cmd - \ShellEx\PropertySheetHandlers - \ShellEx\ContextMenuHandlers filter_main_drivers: Image: C:\Windows\System32\drvinst.exe filter_main_empty: Details: (Empty) filter_main_null: Details: null filter_main_svchost: Image: C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe TargetObject|contains: \lnkfile\shellex\ContextMenuHandlers\ filter_optional_msoffice: Details: '{807583E5-5146-11D5-A672-00B0D022E945}' condition: all of selection_* and not 1 of filter_main_* and not 1 of filter_optional_* falsepositives: - Legitimate software automatically (mostly, during installation) sets up autorun keys for legitimate reason - Legitimate admi