Query: rule covering Detects ADDInternals Cmdlet execution. A tool for administering Azure AD and Office 365. Which can be abused by threat a
Matching passage: Sigma rule: Detects ADDInternals Cmdlet execution. A tool for administering Azure AD and Office 365. Which can be abused by threat a. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: AADInternals PowerShell Cmdlets Execution - ProccessCreation id: c86500e9-a645-4680-98d7-f882c70c1ea3 related: - id: 91e69562-2426-42ce-a647-711b8152ced6 type: similar status: test description: Detects ADDInternals Cmdlet execution. A tool for administering Azure AD and Office 365. Which can be abused by threat actors to attack Azure AD or Office 365. references: - https://o365blog.com/aadinternals/ - https://github.com/Gerenios/AADInternals author: Austin Songer (@austinsonger), Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems), Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems) date: 2022-12-23 modified: 2025-02-06 tags: - attack.execution - attack.reconnaissance - attack.discovery - attack.credential-access - attack.impact logsource: product: windows category: process_creation detection: selection_img: - Image|endswith: - \powershell.exe - \powershell_ise.exe - \pwsh.exe - OriginalFileName: - PowerShell.Exe - pwsh.dll selection_cli: CommandLine|contains: - Add-AADInt - ConvertTo-AADInt - Disable-AADInt - Enable-AADInt - Export-AADInt - Find-AADInt - Get-AADInt - Grant-AADInt - Initialize-AADInt - Install-AADInt - Invoke-AADInt - Join-AADInt - New-AADInt - Open-AADInt - Read-AADInt - Register-AADInt - Remove-AADInt - Reset-AADInt - Resolve-AADInt - Restore-AADInt - Save-AADInt - Search-AADInt - Send-AADInt - Set-AADInt - Start-AADInt - Unprotect-AADInt - Update-AADInt condition: all of selection_* falsepositives: - Legitimate use of the library for administrative activity level: high
Near-miss passage: Sigma rule: Detects PowerShell scripts that make use of the "Compress-Archive" Cmdlet in order to compress folders and files where t. Logsource: windows / ps_script. Rule: title: Zip A Folder With PowerShell For Staging In Temp - PowerShell Script id: b7a3c9a3-09ea-4934-8864-6a32cacd98d9 related: - id: 71ff406e-b633-4989-96ec-bc49d825a412 type: similar - id: daf7eb81-35fd-410d-9d7a-657837e602bb type: similar - id: 85a8e5ba-bd03-4bfb-bbfa-a4409a8f8b98 type: similar status: test description: 'Detects PowerShell scripts that make use of the "Compress-Archive" Cmdlet in order to compress folders and files where the output is stored in a potentially suspicious location that is used often by malware for exfiltration. An adversary might compress data (e.g., sensitive documents) that is collected prior to exfiltration in order to make it portable and minimize the amount of data sent over the network. ' references: - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1074.001/T1074.001.md - https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/cybersecurity-advisories/aa23-347a author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems), frack113 date: 2021-07-20 modified: 2023-12-18 tags: - attack.collection - attack.t1074.001 logsource: product: windows category: ps_script definition: 'Requirements: Script Block Logging must be enabled' detection: selection: ScriptBlockText|contains: - Compress-Archive -Path*-DestinationPath $env:TEMP - Compress-Archive -Path*-DestinationPath*\AppData\Local\Temp\ - Compress-Archive -Path*-DestinationPath*:\Windows\Temp\ condition: selection falsepositives: - Unknown level: medium