Query: write Sigma for This detection uses Windows security events to detect suspicious access attempts to the registry key values and sub-keys
Matching passage: Sigma rule: This detection uses Windows security events to detect suspicious access attempts to the registry key values and sub-keys. Logsource: windows / security. Rule: title: Azure AD Health Service Agents Registry Keys Access id: 1d2ab8ac-1a01-423b-9c39-001510eae8e8 status: test description: 'This detection uses Windows security events to detect suspicious access attempts to the registry key values and sub-keys of Azure AD Health service agents (e.g AD FS). Information from AD Health service agents can be used to potentially abuse some of the features provided by those services in the cloud (e.g. Federation). This detection requires an access control entry (ACE) on the system access control list (SACL) of the following securable object: HKLM:\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\ADHealthAgent. Make sure you set the SACL to propagate to its sub-keys. ' references: - https://o365blog.com/post/hybridhealthagent/ - https://github.com/OTRF/Set-AuditRule/blob/c3dec5443414231714d850565d364ca73475ade5/rules/registry/aad_connect_health_service_agent.yml author: Roberto Rodriguez (Cyb3rWard0g), OTR (Open Threat Research), MSTIC date: 2021-08-26 modified: 2022-10-09 tags: - attack.discovery - attack.t1012 logsource: product: windows service: security detection: selection: EventID: - 4656 - 4663 ObjectType: Key ObjectName: \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\ADHealthAgent filter: ProcessName|contains: - Microsoft.Identity.Health.Adfs.DiagnosticsAgent.exe - Microsoft.Identity.Health.Adfs.InsightsService.exe - Microsoft.Identity.Health.Adfs.MonitoringAgent.Startup.exe - Microsoft.Identity.Health.Adfs.PshSurrogate.exe - Microsoft.Identity.Health.Common.Clients.ResourceMonitor.exe condition: selection and not filter falsepositives: - Unknown level: medium
Near-miss passage: Sigma rule: Detects a CodePage modification using the "mode.com" utility to Russian language. This behavior has been used by threat. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: CodePage Modification Via MODE.COM To Russian Language id: 12fbff88-16b5-4b42-9754-cd001a789fb3 related: - id: d48c5ffa-3b02-4c0f-9a9e-3c275650dd0e type: derived status: test description: 'Detects a CodePage modification using the "mode.com" utility to Russian language. This behavior has been used by threat actors behind Dharma ransomware. ' references: - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/intl/code-page-identifiers - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/mode - https://strontic.github.io/xcyclopedia/library/mode.com-59D1ED51ACB8C3D50F1306FD75F20E99.html - https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/5e75ef02517afd6e8ba6462b19217dc4a5a574abb33d10eb0f2bab49d8d48c22/behavior author: Joseliyo Sanchez, @Joseliyo_Jstnk date: 2024-01-17 tags: - attack.stealth - attack.t1036 logsource: category: process_creation product: windows detection: selection_img: - Image|endswith: \mode.com - OriginalFileName: MODE.COM selection_cli: CommandLine|contains|all: - ' con ' - ' cp ' - ' select=' CommandLine|endswith: - =1251 - =866 condition: all of selection_* falsepositives: - Russian speaking people changing the CodePage level: medium