Query: rule covering Detects suspicious files created via the OneNote application. This could indicate a potential malicious ".one"/".onepkg"
Matching passage: Sigma rule: Detects suspicious files created via the OneNote application. This could indicate a potential malicious ".one"/".onepkg". Logsource: windows / file_event. Rule: title: Suspicious File Created Via OneNote Application id: fcc6d700-68d9-4241-9a1a-06874d621b06 status: test description: Detects suspicious files created via the OneNote application. This could indicate a potential malicious ".one"/".onepkg" file was executed as seen being used in malware activity in the wild references: - https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/hackers-now-use-microsoft-onenote-attachments-to-spread-malware/ - https://blog.osarmor.com/319/onenote-attachment-delivers-asyncrat-malware/ - https://twitter.com/MaD_c4t/status/1623414582382567424 - https://labs.withsecure.com/publications/detecting-onenote-abuse - https://www.trustedsec.com/blog/new-attacks-old-tricks-how-onenote-malware-is-evolving/ - https://app.any.run/tasks/17f2d378-6d11-4d6f-8340-954b04f35e83/ author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) date: 2023-02-09 modified: 2023-02-27 tags: - attack.stealth logsource: category: file_event product: windows detection: selection: Image|endswith: - \onenote.exe - \onenotem.exe - \onenoteim.exe TargetFilename|contains: \AppData\Local\Temp\OneNote\ TargetFilename|endswith: - .bat - .chm - .cmd - .dll - .exe - .hta - .htm - .html - .js - .lnk - .ps1 - .vbe - .vbs - .wsf condition: selection falsepositives: - False positives should be very low with the extensions list cited. Especially if you don't heavily utilize OneNote. - Occasional FPs might occur if OneNote is used internally to share different embedded documents level: high
Near-miss passage: Sigma rule: Detects the creation of a registry hive file (UsrClass.dat or NTUSER.DAT) outside of the standard user profile path. The. Logsource: windows / file_event. Rule: title: Registry Hive File Staged Outside Standard User Profile Path id: a7f3c891-2e4d-4b6a-9f8c-d5e2a1b04c73 status: experimental description: 'Detects the creation of a registry hive file (UsrClass.dat or NTUSER.DAT) outside of the standard user profile path. These files generally contain various user-specific registry settings and are typically located in the user''s profile directory. Staging these files outside of the standard path can be indicative of an attacker attempting to manipulate user registry settings for persistence, privilege escalation, or dump user registry hives for credential harvesting. ' references: - https://github.com/MSNightmare/LegacyHive - https://git.projectnightcrawler.dev/NightmareEclipse/LegacyHive author: Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems) date: 2026-07-23 tags: - attack.privilege-escalation - attack.t1548 - attack.credential-access - attack.t1003 logsource: category: file_event product: windows detection: selection: TargetFilename|endswith: - \UsrClass.dat - \NTUSER.DAT filter_main_usrclass: TargetFilename|endswith: \AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\UsrClass.dat filter_main_ntuser: TargetFilename|re|i: ^C:\\Users\\[^\\]+\\NTUSER\.DAT$ filter_main_system: TargetFilename|startswith: - C:\Windows\System32\config\ - C:\Windows\SYSVOL\ - C:\Windows\ServiceProfiles\ condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_* falsepositives: - Backup or profile migration software - Forensic acquisition tools level: high regression_tests_path: regression_data/rules/windows/file/file_event/file_event_win_susp_registry_hive_file_creation/info.yml