Query: Sigma rule for Detects attackers attempting to disable Windows Defender using Powershell
Matching passage: Sigma rule: Detects attackers attempting to disable Windows Defender using Powershell. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: Disable Windows Defender AV Security Monitoring id: a7ee1722-c3c5-aeff-3212-c777e4733217 status: test description: Detects attackers attempting to disable Windows Defender using Powershell references: - https://research.nccgroup.com/2020/06/23/wastedlocker-a-new-ransomware-variant-developed-by-the-evil-corp-group/ - https://rvsec0n.wordpress.com/2020/01/24/malwares-that-bypass-windows-defender/ - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1562.001/T1562.001.md author: ok @securonix invrep-de, oscd.community, frack113 date: 2020-10-12 modified: 2022-11-18 tags: - attack.defense-impairment - attack.t1685 logsource: category: process_creation product: windows detection: selection_pwsh_binary: - Image|endswith: - \powershell.exe - \pwsh.exe - OriginalFileName: - PowerShell.EXE - pwsh.dll selection_pwsh_cli: CommandLine|contains: - -DisableBehaviorMonitoring $true - -DisableRuntimeMonitoring $true selection_sc_binary: - Image|endswith: \sc.exe - OriginalFileName: sc.exe selection_sc_tamper_cmd_stop: CommandLine|contains|all: - stop - WinDefend selection_sc_tamper_cmd_delete: CommandLine|contains|all: - delete - WinDefend selection_sc_tamper_cmd_disabled: CommandLine|contains|all: - config - WinDefend - start=disabled condition: all of selection_pwsh_* or (selection_sc_binary and 1 of selection_sc_tamper_*) falsepositives: - Minimal, for some older versions of dev tools, such as pycharm, developers were known to sometimes disable Windows Defender to improve performance, but this generally is not considered a good security practice. level: high
Near-miss passage: Sigma rule: Detection of child processes spawned with SYSTEM privileges by parents with LOCAL SERVICE or NETWORK SERVICE accounts. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: Suspicious Child Process Created as System id: 590a5f4c-6c8c-4f10-8307-89afe9453a9d status: test description: Detection of child processes spawned with SYSTEM privileges by parents with LOCAL SERVICE or NETWORK SERVICE accounts references: - https://speakerdeck.com/heirhabarov/hunting-for-privilege-escalation-in-windows-environment - https://foxglovesecurity.com/2016/09/26/rotten-potato-privilege-escalation-from-service-accounts-to-system/ - https://github.com/antonioCoco/RogueWinRM - https://twitter.com/Cyb3rWard0g/status/1453123054243024897 author: Teymur Kheirkhabarov, Roberto Rodriguez (@Cyb3rWard0g), Open Threat Research (OTR) date: 2019-10-26 modified: 2024-12-01 tags: - attack.privilege-escalation - attack.stealth - attack.t1134.002 logsource: category: process_creation product: windows definition: 'Requirements: ParentUser field needs sysmon >= 13.30' detection: selection: ParentUser|contains: - AUTHORI - AUTORI ParentUser|endswith: - \NETWORK SERVICE - \LOCAL SERVICE User|contains: - AUTHORI - AUTORI User|endswith: - \SYSTEM - \Système - \СИСТЕМА IntegrityLevel: - System - S-1-16-16384 filter_rundll32: Image|endswith: \rundll32.exe CommandLine|contains: DavSetCookie condition: selection and not 1 of filter_* falsepositives: - Unknown level: high