Query: write Sigma for Detects the execution of a renamed binary often used by attackers or malware leveraging new Sysmon OriginalFileName data
Matching passage: Sigma rule: Detects the execution of a renamed binary often used by attackers or malware leveraging new Sysmon OriginalFileName data. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: Potential Defense Evasion Via Binary Rename id: 36480ae1-a1cb-4eaa-a0d6-29801d7e9142 related: - id: 0ba1da6d-b6ce-4366-828c-18826c9de23e type: similar status: test description: Detects the execution of a renamed binary often used by attackers or malware leveraging new Sysmon OriginalFileName datapoint. references: - https://mgreen27.github.io/posts/2019/05/12/BinaryRename.html - https://mgreen27.github.io/posts/2019/05/29/BinaryRename2.html - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/0f229c0e42bfe7ca736a14023836d65baa941ed2/atomics/T1036.003/T1036.003.md#atomic-test-1---masquerading-as-windows-lsass-process - https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/inno-setup-malware-redline-stealer-campaign.html author: Matthew Green @mgreen27, Ecco, James Pemberton @4A616D6573, oscd.community, Andreas Hunkeler (@Karneades) date: 2019-06-15 modified: 2026-06-05 tags: - attack.stealth - attack.t1036.003 logsource: category: process_creation product: windows detection: selection: OriginalFileName: - Cmd.Exe - CONHOST.EXE - 7z.exe - 7za.exe - 7zr.exe - WinRAR.exe - wevtutil.exe - net.exe - net1.exe - netsh.exe - InstallUtil.exe filter: Image|endswith: - \cmd.exe - \conhost.exe - \7z.exe - \7za.exe - \7zr.exe - \WinRAR.exe - \wevtutil.exe - \net.exe - \net1.exe - \netsh.exe - \InstallUtil.exe condition: selection and not filter falsepositives: - Custom applications use renamed binaries adding slight change to binary name. Typically this is easy to spot and add to whitelist level: medium regression_tests_path: regression_data/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_renamed_binary/info.yml
Near-miss passage: Sigma rule: Detects the start of a non built-in assistive technology applications via "Atbroker.EXE".. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: Uncommon Assistive Technology Applications Execution Via AtBroker.EXE id: f24bcaea-0cd1-11eb-adc1-0242ac120002 status: test description: Detects the start of a non built-in assistive technology applications via "Atbroker.EXE". references: - http://www.hexacorn.com/blog/2016/07/22/beyond-good-ol-run-key-part-42/ - https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Atbroker/ author: Mateusz Wydra, oscd.community date: 2020-10-12 modified: 2024-03-06 tags: - attack.stealth - attack.t1218 logsource: category: process_creation product: windows detection: selection_img: - Image|endswith: \AtBroker.exe - OriginalFileName: AtBroker.exe selection_cli: CommandLine|contains: start filter_main_builtin: CommandLine|contains: - animations - audiodescription - caretbrowsing - caretwidth - colorfiltering - cursorindicator - cursorscheme - filterkeys - focusborderheight - focusborderwidth - highcontrast - keyboardcues - keyboardpref - livecaptions - magnifierpane - messageduration - minimumhitradius - mousekeys - Narrator - osk - overlappedcontent - showsounds - soundsentry - speechreco - stickykeys - togglekeys - voiceaccess - windowarranging - windowtracking - windowtrackingtimeout - windowtrackingzorder filter_optional_java: CommandLine|contains: Oracle_JavaAccessBridge condition: all of selection_* and not 1 of filter_main_* and not 1 of filter_optional_* falsepositives: - Legitimate, non-default assistive technology applications execution level: medium