Query: write Sigma for Detect standard users login that are part of high privileged groups such as the Administrator group
Matching passage: Sigma rule: Detect standard users login that are part of high privileged groups such as the Administrator group. Logsource: windows / lsa-server. Rule: title: Standard User In High Privileged Group id: 7ac407cc-0f48-4328-aede-de1d2e6fef41 status: test description: Detect standard users login that are part of high privileged groups such as the Administrator group references: - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/identity/ad-ds/manage/understand-security-identifiers - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/security/credentials-protection-and-management/configuring-additional-lsa-protection - https://github.com/nasbench/EVTX-ETW-Resources/blob/7a806a148b3d9d381193d4a80356016e6e8b1ee8/ETWProvidersManifests/Windows11/22H2/W11_22H2_Pro_20221220_22621.963/WEPExplorer/LsaSrv.xml author: frack113 date: 2023-01-13 modified: 2023-05-05 tags: - attack.credential-access - attack.privilege-escalation logsource: product: windows service: lsa-server definition: 'Requirements: Microsoft-Windows-LSA/Operational (199FE037-2B82-40A9-82AC-E1D46C792B99) Event Log must be enabled and collected in order to use this rule.' detection: selection: EventID: 300 TargetUserSid|startswith: S-1-5-21- SidList|contains: - S-1-5-32-544 - -500} - -518} - -519} filter_main_admin: TargetUserSid|endswith: - '-500' - '-518' - '-519' condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_* falsepositives: - Standard domain users who are part of the administrator group. These users shouldn't have these right. But in the case where it's necessary. They should be filtered out using the "TargetUserName" field level: medium
Near-miss passage: Sigma rule: This detection uses Windows security events to detect suspicious access attempts to the registry key values and sub-keys. Logsource: windows / security. Rule: title: Azure AD Health Service Agents Registry Keys Access id: 1d2ab8ac-1a01-423b-9c39-001510eae8e8 status: test description: 'This detection uses Windows security events to detect suspicious access attempts to the registry key values and sub-keys of Azure AD Health service agents (e.g AD FS). Information from AD Health service agents can be used to potentially abuse some of the features provided by those services in the cloud (e.g. Federation). This detection requires an access control entry (ACE) on the system access control list (SACL) of the following securable object: HKLM:\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\ADHealthAgent. Make sure you set the SACL to propagate to its sub-keys. ' references: - https://o365blog.com/post/hybridhealthagent/ - https://github.com/OTRF/Set-AuditRule/blob/c3dec5443414231714d850565d364ca73475ade5/rules/registry/aad_connect_health_service_agent.yml author: Roberto Rodriguez (Cyb3rWard0g), OTR (Open Threat Research), MSTIC date: 2021-08-26 modified: 2022-10-09 tags: - attack.discovery - attack.t1012 logsource: product: windows service: security detection: selection: EventID: - 4656 - 4663 ObjectType: Key ObjectName: \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\ADHealthAgent filter: ProcessName|contains: - Microsoft.Identity.Health.Adfs.DiagnosticsAgent.exe - Microsoft.Identity.Health.Adfs.InsightsService.exe - Microsoft.Identity.Health.Adfs.MonitoringAgent.Startup.exe - Microsoft.Identity.Health.Adfs.PshSurrogate.exe - Microsoft.Identity.Health.Common.Clients.ResourceMonitor.exe condition: selection and not filter falsepositives: - Unknown level: medium