Query: detection rule: Detects successful logon from public IP address via RDP. This can indicate a publicly-exposed RDP port.
Matching passage: Sigma rule: Detects successful logon from public IP address via RDP. This can indicate a publicly-exposed RDP port.. Logsource: windows / security. Rule: title: External Remote RDP Logon from Public IP id: 259a9cdf-c4dd-4fa2-b243-2269e5ab18a2 related: - id: 78d5cab4-557e-454f-9fb9-a222bd0d5edc type: derived status: test description: Detects successful logon from public IP address via RDP. This can indicate a publicly-exposed RDP port. references: - https://www.inversecos.com/2020/04/successful-4624-anonymous-logons-to.html - https://twitter.com/Purp1eW0lf/status/1616144561965002752 author: Micah Babinski (@micahbabinski), Zach Mathis (@yamatosecurity) date: 2023-01-19 modified: 2024-03-11 tags: - attack.privilege-escalation - attack.persistence - attack.initial-access - attack.credential-access - attack.stealth - attack.t1133 - attack.t1078 - attack.t1110 logsource: product: windows service: security detection: selection: EventID: 4624 LogonType: 10 filter_main_local_ranges: IpAddress|cidr: - ::1/128 - 10.0.0.0/8 - 127.0.0.0/8 - 172.16.0.0/12 - 192.168.0.0/16 - 169.254.0.0/16 - fc00::/7 - fe80::/10 filter_main_empty: IpAddress: '-' condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_* falsepositives: - Legitimate or intentional inbound connections from public IP addresses on the RDP port. level: medium
Near-miss passage: Sigma rule: Detects potentially suspicious loading of the Offline Registry Library (offreg.dll). Offreg.dll enables direct read/writ. Logsource: windows / image_load. Rule: title: Potentially Suspicious Image Load of Offreg.dll id: c9e5f013-4a6f-4d8c-9b0e-f7a4c3d26e95 status: experimental description: 'Detects potentially suspicious loading of the Offline Registry Library (offreg.dll). Offreg.dll enables direct read/write access to offline registry hives without invoking the Windows Registry API, bypassing its associated audit logging and telemetry. Attackers may abuse this to stealthily modify registry hives while evading detection mechanisms that rely on standard registry event logs. ' references: - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/devnotes/about-the-offline-registry-library - https://github.com/MSNightmare/LegacyHive author: Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems) date: 2026-07-23 tags: - attack.defense-impairment - attack.persistence - attack.t1112 logsource: category: image_load product: windows detection: selection: ImageLoaded|endswith: \offreg.dll filter_main_system32: Image|startswith: - C:\Windows\System32\ - C:\Windows\SysWOW64\ - C:\Windows\WinSxS\ filter_main_program_files: Image|startswith: - C:\Program Files\ - C:\Program Files (x86)\ filter_main_appdata_local_programs: Image|startswith: C:\Users\ Image|contains: \AppData\Local\Programs\ filter_main_defender: Image|startswith: C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\Windows Defender\Platform\ Image|endswith: \MsMpEng.exe condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_* falsepositives: - Third-party backup or forensic software that performs offline registry parsing - Windows deployment tools (DISM, ADK) run from non-standard paths level: medium regression_tests_path: regression_data/rules/windows/image_load/image_load_susp_offreg_dll_load/info.yml