Query: detection rule: Detects a script interpreter process (like node.js or bun) spawning a known credential scanning tool (e.g., trufflehog,
Matching passage: Sigma rule: Detects a script interpreter process (like node.js or bun) spawning a known credential scanning tool (e.g., trufflehog,. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: Script Interpreter Spawning Credential Scanner - Windows id: 0f60b28c-64dd-4e2c-9a63-5334d3e3a6e6 related: - id: f0025a69-e1b7-4dda-a53c-db21fa2d4071 type: similar status: experimental description: 'Detects a script interpreter process (like node.js or bun) spawning a known credential scanning tool (e.g., trufflehog, gitleaks). This behavior is indicative of an attempt to find and steal secrets, as seen in the "Shai-Hulud: The Second Coming" campaign. ' references: - https://github.com/asyncapi/cli/blob/2efa4dff59bc3d3cecdf897ccf178f99b115d63d/bun_environment.js - https://www.stepsecurity.io/blog/sha1-hulud-the-second-coming-zapier-ens-domains-and-other-prominent-npm-packages-compromised - https://www.endorlabs.com/learn/shai-hulud-2-malware-campaign-targets-github-and-cloud-credentials-using-bun-runtime - https://semgrep.dev/blog/2025/digging-for-secrets-sha1-hulud-the-second-coming-of-the-npm-worm/ author: Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems) date: 2025-11-25 tags: - attack.credential-access - attack.t1552 - attack.collection - attack.execution - attack.t1005 - attack.t1059.007 logsource: category: process_creation product: windows detection: selection_parent: ParentImage|endswith: - \node.exe - \bun.exe selection_child: - Image|endswith: - trufflehog.exe - gitleaks.exe - CommandLine|contains: - trufflehog - gitleaks condition: all of selection_* falsepositives: - Legitimate pre-commit hooks or CI/CD pipeline jobs that use a script to run a credential scanner as part of a security check. level: high regression_tests_path: regression_data/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_susp_script_interpretor_spawn_credential_scanner/info.yml
Near-miss passage: Sigma rule: Detects the execution of the SharpDPAPI tool based on CommandLine flags and PE metadata. SharpDPAPI is a C# port of some. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: HackTool - SharpDPAPI Execution id: c7d33b50-f690-4b51-8cfb-0fb912a31e57 status: test description: 'Detects the execution of the SharpDPAPI tool based on CommandLine flags and PE metadata. SharpDPAPI is a C# port of some DPAPI functionality from the Mimikatz project. ' references: - https://github.com/GhostPack/SharpDPAPI author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) date: 2024-06-26 tags: - attack.privilege-escalation - attack.stealth - attack.t1134.001 - attack.t1134.003 logsource: product: windows category: process_creation detection: selection_img: - Image|endswith: \SharpDPAPI.exe - OriginalFileName: SharpDPAPI.exe selection_other_cli: CommandLine|contains: - ' backupkey ' - ' blob ' - ' certificates ' - ' credentials ' - ' keepass ' - ' masterkeys ' - ' rdg ' - ' vaults ' selection_other_options_guid: CommandLine|contains|all: - ' {' - '}:' selection_other_options_flags: CommandLine|contains: - ' /file:' - ' /machine' - ' /mkfile:' - ' /password:' - ' /pvk:' - ' /server:' - ' /target:' - ' /unprotect' condition: selection_img or (selection_other_cli and 1 of selection_other_options_*) falsepositives: - Unknown level: high