Query: detect An adversary may use legitimate desktop support and remote access software, such as Team Viewer, Go2Assist, LogMein, Amm in logs
Matching passage: Sigma rule: An adversary may use legitimate desktop support and remote access software, such as Team Viewer, Go2Assist, LogMein, Amm. Logsource: windows / file_event. Rule: title: GoToAssist Temporary Installation Artefact id: 5d756aee-ad3e-4306-ad95-cb1abec48de2 status: test description: 'An adversary may use legitimate desktop support and remote access software, such as Team Viewer, Go2Assist, LogMein, AmmyyAdmin, etc, to establish an interactive command and control channel to target systems within networks. These services are commonly used as legitimate technical support software, and may be allowed by application control within a target environment. Remote access tools like VNC, Ammyy, and Teamviewer are used frequently when compared with other legitimate software commonly used by adversaries. (Citation: Symantec Living off the Land) ' references: - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1219/T1219.md#atomic-test-4---gotoassist-files-detected-test-on-windows author: frack113 date: 2022-02-13 tags: - attack.command-and-control - attack.t1219.002 logsource: category: file_event product: windows detection: selection: TargetFilename|contains: \AppData\Local\Temp\LogMeInInc\GoToAssist Remote Support Expert\ condition: selection falsepositives: - Legitimate use level: medium
Near-miss passage: Sigma rule: Detects process access requests to LSASS process with potentially suspicious access flags. Logsource: windows / process_access. Rule: title: Potentially Suspicious GrantedAccess Flags On LSASS id: a18dd26b-6450-46de-8c91-9659150cf088 related: - id: 32d0d3e2-e58d-4d41-926b-18b520b2b32d type: similar status: test description: Detects process access requests to LSASS process with potentially suspicious access flags references: - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/procthread/process-security-and-access-rights - https://onedrive.live.com/view.aspx?resid=D026B4699190F1E6!2843&ithint=file%2cpptx&app=PowerPoint&authkey=!AMvCRTKB_V1J5ow - https://web.archive.org/web/20230208123920/https://cyberwardog.blogspot.com/2017/03/chronicles-of-threat-hunter-hunting-for_22.html - https://www.slideshare.net/heirhabarov/hunting-for-credentials-dumping-in-windows-environment - https://web.archive.org/web/20230420013146/http://security-research.dyndns.org/pub/slides/FIRST2017/FIRST-2017_Tom-Ueltschi_Sysmon_FINAL_notes.pdf author: Florian Roth, Roberto Rodriguez, Dimitrios Slamaris, Mark Russinovich, Thomas Patzke, Teymur Kheirkhabarov, Sherif Eldeeb, James Dickenson, Aleksey Potapov, oscd.community date: 2021-11-22 modified: 2026-06-29 tags: - attack.credential-access - attack.t1003.001 - attack.s0002 logsource: category: process_access product: windows detection: selection_target: TargetImage|endswith: \lsass.exe selection_access: - GrantedAccess|endswith: - '30' - '50' - '70' - '90' - B0 - D0 - F0 - '18' - '38' - '58' - '78' - '98' - B8 - D8 - F8 - 1A - 3A - 5A - 7A - 9A - BA - DA - FA - '0x14C2' - GrantedAccess|startswith: - '0x100000' - '0x1418' - '0x1438' - '0x143a' - '0x1f0fff' - '0x1f1fff' - '0x1f2fff' - '0x1f3fff' - '0x40' filter_main_generic: SourceImage|contains: - :\Program Files (x86)\ - :\Program Files\ - :\Windows\System32\ - :\Windows\SysWOW64\ filter_optional_malwarebytes: SourceImage|endswith: :\ProgramData\MALWAREBYTES\MBAMSERVICE\ctlrupdate\mbupdatr.exe filter_optional_vscode: SourceImage|endswith: \AppData\Local\Programs\Microsoft VS Code\Code.exe filter_main_windefend_1: SourceImage|contains: :\ProgramData\Microsoft\Windows Defender\ SourceImage|endswith: \MsMpEng.exe filter_main_windefend_2: CallTrace|contains|all: - '|?:\ProgramData\Microsoft\Windows Defender\Definition Updates\{' - '}\mpengine.dll+' GrantedAccess: '0x1418' filter_main_windefend_3: CallTrace|contains: - '|c:\program files\windows defender\mprtp.dll' - '|c:\program files\windows defender\MpClient.dll' filter_optional_vmwaretools: SourceImage|contains: :\ProgramData\VMware\VMware Tools\ SourceImage|endswith: \