Query: detection rule: Detects the execution of a renamed instance of the Remote Monitoring and Management (RMM) tool, MeshAgent. RMM tools suc
Matching passage: Sigma rule: Detects the execution of a renamed instance of the Remote Monitoring and Management (RMM) tool, MeshAgent. RMM tools suc. Logsource: macos / process_creation. Rule: title: Remote Access Tool - Renamed MeshAgent Execution - MacOS id: bd3b5eaa-439d-4a42-8f35-a49f5c8a2582 related: - id: b471f462-eb0d-4832-be35-28d94bdb4780 type: similar - id: 22c45af6-f590-4d44-bab3-b5b2d2a2b6d9 type: derived status: experimental description: 'Detects the execution of a renamed instance of the Remote Monitoring and Management (RMM) tool, MeshAgent. RMM tools such as MeshAgent are commonly utilized by IT administrators for legitimate remote support and system management. However, malicious actors may exploit these tools by renaming them to bypass detection mechanisms, enabling unauthorized access and control over compromised systems. ' references: - https://www.huntress.com/blog/know-thy-enemy-a-novel-november-case-on-persistent-remote-access - https://thecyberexpress.com/ukraine-hit-by-meshagent-malware-campaign/ - https://wazuh.com/blog/how-to-detect-meshagent-with-wazuh/ - https://www.security.com/threat-intelligence/medusa-ransomware-attacks author: Norbert Jaśniewicz (AlphaSOC) date: 2025-05-19 tags: - attack.command-and-control - attack.stealth - attack.t1219.002 - attack.t1036.003 logsource: category: process_creation product: macos detection: selection_meshagent: - CommandLine|contains: --meshServiceName - OriginalFileName|contains: meshagent filter_main_legitimate: Image|endswith: - /meshagent - /meshagent_osx64 condition: selection_meshagent and not 1 of filter_main_* falsepositives: - Unknown level: high
Near-miss passage: Sigma rule: Detects the execution of "Wlrmdr.exe" with the "-u" command line flag which allows anything passed to it to be an argume. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: Wlrmdr.EXE Uncommon Argument Or Child Process id: 9cfc00b6-bfb7-49ce-9781-ef78503154bb status: experimental description: 'Detects the execution of "Wlrmdr.exe" with the "-u" command line flag which allows anything passed to it to be an argument of the ShellExecute API, which would allow an attacker to execute arbitrary binaries. This detection also focuses on any uncommon child processes spawned from "Wlrmdr.exe" as a supplement for those that posses "ParentImage" telemetry. ' references: - https://twitter.com/0gtweet/status/1493963591745220608?s=20&t=xUg9DsZhJy1q9bPTUWgeIQ - https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Wlrmdr/ author: frack113, manasmbellani date: 2022-02-16 modified: 2025-10-31 tags: - attack.stealth - attack.t1218 logsource: category: process_creation product: windows detection: selection_parent: ParentImage|endswith: \wlrmdr.exe selection_child_img: - Image|endswith: \wlrmdr.exe - OriginalFileName: WLRMNDR.EXE selection_child_cli_flags_s: CommandLine|contains|windash: '-s ' selection_child_cli_flags_f: CommandLine|contains|windash: '-f ' selection_child_cli_flags_t: CommandLine|contains|windash: '-t ' selection_child_cli_flags_m: CommandLine|contains|windash: '-m ' selection_child_cli_flags_a: CommandLine|contains|windash: '-a ' selection_child_cli_flags_u: CommandLine|contains|windash: '-u ' filter_main_winlogon: ParentImage: C:\Windows\System32\winlogon.exe filter_main_empty: ParentImage: - '' - '-' filter_main_null: ParentImage: null condition: selection_parent or (all of selection_child_* and not 1 of filter_main_*) falsepositives: - Unknown level: medium