Query: rule covering Detects Windows shells and scripting applications that write files to suspicious folders
Matching passage: Sigma rule: Detects Windows shells and scripting applications that write files to suspicious folders. Logsource: windows / file_event. Rule: title: Windows Shell/Scripting Application File Write to Suspicious Folder id: 1277f594-a7d1-4f28-a2d3-73af5cbeab43 status: test description: Detects Windows shells and scripting applications that write files to suspicious folders references: - Internal Research author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems) date: 2021-11-20 modified: 2023-03-29 tags: - attack.execution - attack.t1059 logsource: category: file_event product: windows detection: selection_1: Image|endswith: - \bash.exe - \cmd.exe - \cscript.exe - \msbuild.exe - \powershell.exe - \pwsh.exe - \sh.exe - \wscript.exe TargetFilename|startswith: - C:\PerfLogs\ - C:\Users\Public\ selection_2: Image|endswith: - \certutil.exe - \forfiles.exe - \mshta.exe - \schtasks.exe - \scriptrunner.exe - \wmic.exe TargetFilename|contains: - C:\PerfLogs\ - C:\Users\Public\ - C:\Windows\Temp\ condition: 1 of selection_* falsepositives: - Unknown level: high
Near-miss passage: Sigma rule: Detects the creation of a named pipe matching a pattern used by CobaltStrike Malleable C2 profiles. Logsource: windows / pipe_created. Rule: title: CobaltStrike Named Pipe Pattern Regex id: 0e7163d4-9e19-4fa7-9be6-000c61aad77a related: - id: 85adeb13-4fc9-4e68-8a4a-c7cb2c336eb7 type: similar - id: d5601f8c-b26f-4ab0-9035-69e11a8d4ad2 type: similar status: test description: Detects the creation of a named pipe matching a pattern used by CobaltStrike Malleable C2 profiles references: - https://svch0st.medium.com/guide-to-named-pipes-and-hunting-for-cobalt-strike-pipes-dc46b2c5f575 - https://gist.github.com/MHaggis/6c600e524045a6d49c35291a21e10752 author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems) date: 2021-07-30 modified: 2026-06-18 tags: - attack.privilege-escalation - attack.stealth - attack.t1055 logsource: product: windows category: pipe_created definition: Note that you have to configure logging for Named Pipe Events in Sysmon config (Event ID 17 and Event ID 18). The basic configuration is in popular sysmon configuration (https://github.com/SwiftOnSecurity/sysmon-config), but it is worth verifying. You can also use other repo, e.g. https://github.com/Neo23x0/sysmon-config, https://github.com/olafhartong/sysmon-modular You can also use other repo, e.g. https://github.com/Neo23x0/sysmon-config, https://github.com/olafhartong/sysmon-modular. How to test detection? You can always use Cobalt Strike, but also you can check powershell script from this site https://svch0st.medium.com/guide-to-named-pipes-and-hunting-for-cobalt-strike-pipes-dc46b2c5f575 detection: selection: - PipeName|re: \\mojo\.5688\.8052\.(?:183894939787088877|35780273329370473)[0-9a-f]{2} - PipeName|re: \\wkssvc_?[0-9a-f]{2} - PipeName|re: \\ntsvcs[0-9a-f]{2} - PipeName|re: \\DserNamePipe[0-9a-f]{2} - PipeName|re: \\SearchTextHarvester[0-9a-f]{2} - PipeName|re: \\mypipe-(?:f|h)[0-9a-f]{2} - PipeName|re: \\windows\.update\.manager[0-9a-f]{2,3} - PipeName|re: \\ntsvcs_[0-9a-f]{2} - PipeName|re: \\scerpc_?[0-9a-f]{2} - PipeName|re: \\PGMessagePipe[0-9a-f]{2} - PipeName|re: \\MsFteWds[0-9a-f]{2} - PipeName|re: \\f4c3[0-9a-f]{2} - PipeName|re: \\fullduplex_[0-9a-f]{2} - PipeName|re: \\msrpc_[0-9a-f]{4} - PipeName|re: \\win\\msrpc_[0-9a-f]{2} - PipeName|re: \\f53f[0-9a-f]{2}$ - PipeName|re: \\rpc_[0-9a-f]{2} - PipeName|re: \\spoolss_[0-9a-f]{2} - PipeName|re: \\Winsock2\\CatalogChangeListener-[0-9a-f]{3}-0, condition: selection falsepositives: - Unknown level: critical