Query: Sigma YAML for windows / security
Matching passage: Sigma rule: Detects DCShadow via create new SPN. Logsource: windows / security. Rule: title: Possible DC Shadow Attack id: 32e19d25-4aed-4860-a55a-be99cb0bf7ed related: - id: 611eab06-a145-4dfa-a295-3ccc5c20f59a type: derived status: test description: Detects DCShadow via create new SPN references: - https://twitter.com/gentilkiwi/status/1003236624925413376 - https://gist.github.com/gentilkiwi/dcc132457408cf11ad2061340dcb53c2 - https://web.archive.org/web/20180203014709/https://blog.alsid.eu/dcshadow-explained-4510f52fc19d?gi=c426ac876c48 author: Ilyas Ochkov, oscd.community, Chakib Gzenayi (@Chak092), Hosni Mribah date: 2019-10-25 modified: 2022-10-17 tags: - attack.credential-access - attack.defense-impairment - attack.t1207 logsource: product: windows service: security definition: The "Audit Directory Service Changes" logging policy must be configured in order to receive events. Audit events are generated only for objects with configured system access control lists (SACLs). Audit events are generated only for objects with configured system access control lists (SACLs) and only when accessed in a manner that matches their SACL settings. This policy covers the following events ids - 5136, 5137, 5138, 5139, 5141. Note that the default policy does not cover User objects. For that a custom AuditRule need to be setup (See https://github.com/OTRF/Set-AuditRule) detection: selection1: EventID: 4742 ServicePrincipalNames|contains: GC/ selection2: EventID: 5136 AttributeLDAPDisplayName: servicePrincipalName AttributeValue|startswith: GC/ condition: 1 of selection* falsepositives: - Valid on domain controllers; exclude known DCs level: medium
Near-miss passage: Sigma rule: Detects the creation or update of a scheduled task to run with "NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM" privileges. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: Schtasks Creation Or Modification With SYSTEM Privileges id: 89ca78fd-b37c-4310-b3d3-81a023f83936 status: test description: Detects the creation or update of a scheduled task to run with "NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM" privileges references: - https://www.elastic.co/security-labs/exploring-the-qbot-attack-pattern - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/schtasks author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) date: 2022-07-28 modified: 2025-02-15 tags: - attack.privilege-escalation - attack.execution - attack.persistence - attack.t1053.005 logsource: product: windows category: process_creation detection: selection_root: Image|endswith: \schtasks.exe CommandLine|contains: - ' /change ' - ' /create ' selection_run: CommandLine|contains: '/ru ' selection_user: CommandLine|contains: - NT AUT - ' SYSTEM ' filter_optional_teamviewer: Image|endswith: \schtasks.exe CommandLine|contains|all: - /TN TVInstallRestore - \TeamViewer_.exe filter_optional_office: CommandLine|contains|all: - Subscription Heartbeat - \HeartbeatConfig.xml - \Microsoft Shared\OFFICE filter_optional_avira: CommandLine|contains: - '/Create /F /RU System /SC WEEKLY /TN AviraSystemSpeedupVerify /TR ' - :\Program Files (x86)\Avira\System Speedup\setup\avira_speedup_setup.exe - /VERIFY /VERYSILENT /NOSTART /NODOTNET /NORESTART" /RL HIGHEST condition: all of selection_* and not 1 of filter_optional_* falsepositives: - Unknown level: high