Query: detection rule: Detects modifications to Default Domain or Default Domain Controllers Group Policy Objects (GPOs). Adversaries may modif
Matching passage: Sigma rule: Detects modifications to Default Domain or Default Domain Controllers Group Policy Objects (GPOs). Adversaries may modif. Logsource: windows / security. Rule: title: Windows Default Domain GPO Modification id: e5ac86dd-2da1-454b-be74-05d26c769d7d related: - id: dcff7e85-d01f-4eb5-badd-84e2e6be8294 type: similar status: experimental description: 'Detects modifications to Default Domain or Default Domain Controllers Group Policy Objects (GPOs). Adversaries may modify these default GPOs to deploy malicious configurations across the domain. ' references: - https://www.trendmicro.com/en_us/research/25/i/unmasking-the-gentlemen-ransomware.html - https://adsecurity.org/?p=3377 - https://www.pentestpartners.com/security-blog/living-off-the-land-gpo-style/ - https://jgspiers.com/audit-group-policy-changes/ author: Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems) date: 2025-11-22 tags: - attack.privilege-escalation - attack.defense-impairment - attack.t1484.001 logsource: product: windows service: security definition: 'Enable ''Audit Directory Service Changes'' in the Default Domain Controllers Policy under: Computer Configuration -> Policies -> Windows Settings -> Security Settings -> Advanced Audit Policy Configuration -> Audit Policies -> DS Access -> Audit Directory Service Changes (Success). Additionally, proper SACL needs to be configured on the ''CN=Policies,CN=System,DC=<domain>,DC=<tld>'' container in Active Directory to capture changes to Group Policy Objects. ' detection: selection: EventID: 5136 ObjectClass: groupPolicyContainer ObjectDN|startswith: - CN={31B2F340-016D-11D2-945F-00C04FB984F9},CN=POLICIES,CN=SYSTEM - CN={6AC1786C-016F-11D2-945F-00C04FB984F9},CN=POLICIES,CN=SYSTEM condition: selection falsepositives: - Legitimate modifications to Default Domain or Default Domain Controllers GPOs level: medium
Near-miss passage: Sigma rule: Detects various command line and scripting engines/processes such as "PowerShell", "Wscript", "Cmd", etc. spawning a "re. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: Scripting/CommandLine Process Spawned Regsvr32 id: ab37a6ec-6068-432b-a64e-2c7bf95b1d22 related: - id: 8e2b24c9-4add-46a0-b4bb-0057b4e6187d type: obsolete status: test description: Detects various command line and scripting engines/processes such as "PowerShell", "Wscript", "Cmd", etc. spawning a "regsvr32" instance. references: - https://web.archive.org/web/20171001085340/https://subt0x10.blogspot.com/2017/04/bypass-application-whitelisting-script.html - https://app.any.run/tasks/34221348-072d-4b70-93f3-aa71f6ebecad/ author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) date: 2023-05-26 tags: - attack.stealth - attack.t1218.010 logsource: category: process_creation product: windows detection: selection: ParentImage|endswith: - \cmd.exe - \cscript.exe - \mshta.exe - \powershell_ise.exe - \powershell.exe - \pwsh.exe - \wscript.exe Image|endswith: \regsvr32.exe filter_main_rpcproxy: ParentImage: C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe CommandLine|endswith: ' /s C:\Windows\System32\RpcProxy\RpcProxy.dll' condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_* falsepositives: - Legitimate ".bat", ".hta", ".ps1" or ".vbs" scripts leverage legitimately often. Apply additional filter and exclusions as necessary - Some legitimate Windows services level: medium