Query: rule covering Detects access to Signal Desktop's sensitive data files: db.sqlite and config.json. The db.sqlite file in Signal Desktop
Matching passage: Sigma rule: Detects access to Signal Desktop's sensitive data files: db.sqlite and config.json. The db.sqlite file in Signal Desktop. Logsource: windows / security. Rule: title: File Access Of Signal Desktop Sensitive Data id: 5d6c375a-18ae-4952-b4f6-8b803f6c8555 status: experimental description: 'Detects access to Signal Desktop''s sensitive data files: db.sqlite and config.json. The db.sqlite file in Signal Desktop stores all locally saved messages in an encrypted SQLite database, while the config.json contains the decryption key needed to access that data. Since the key is stored in plain text, a threat actor who gains access to both files can decrypt and read sensitive messages without needing the users credentials. Currently the rule only covers the default Signal installation path in AppData\Roaming. Signal Portable installations may use different paths based on user configuration. Additional paths can be added to the selection as needed. ' references: - https://cloud.google.com/blog/topics/threat-intelligence/russia-targeting-signal-messenger/ - https://vmois.dev/query-signal-desktop-messages-sqlite/ author: Andreas Braathen (mnemonic.io) date: 2025-10-19 tags: - attack.credential-access - attack.t1003 logsource: product: windows service: security definition: 'Requirements: System Access Control List (SACL) policy with attributes List folder/read data on Objects' detection: selection: EventID: 4663 ObjectType: File ObjectName|contains: \AppData\Roaming\Signal\ ObjectName|endswith: - \config.json - \db.sqlite filter_main_signal: ProcessName|endswith: - \signal-portable.exe - \signal.exe condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_* falsepositives: - Unlikely, but possible from AV or backup software accessing the files. level: medium
Near-miss passage: Sigma rule: Detects potential sideloading of "mpclient.dll" by Windows Defender processes ("MpCmdRun" and "NisSrv") from their non-d. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: Potential Mpclient.DLL Sideloading Via Defender Binaries id: 7002aa10-b8d4-47ae-b5ba-51ab07e228b9 related: - id: 418dc89a-9808-4b87-b1d7-e5ae0cb6effc type: similar status: test description: Detects potential sideloading of "mpclient.dll" by Windows Defender processes ("MpCmdRun" and "NisSrv") from their non-default directory. references: - https://www.sentinelone.com/blog/living-off-windows-defender-lockbit-ransomware-sideloads-cobalt-strike-through-microsoft-security-tool author: Bhabesh Raj date: 2022-08-01 modified: 2023-08-04 tags: - attack.privilege-escalation - attack.persistence - attack.execution - attack.stealth - attack.t1574.001 logsource: product: windows category: process_creation detection: selection: Image|endswith: - \MpCmdRun.exe - \NisSrv.exe filter_main_known_locations: Image|startswith: - C:\Program Files (x86)\Windows Defender\ - C:\Program Files\Microsoft Security Client\ - C:\Program Files\Windows Defender\ - C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\Windows Defender\Platform\ - C:\Windows\WinSxS\ condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_* falsepositives: - Unlikely level: high