Query: alert when Detects the execution of a renamed instance of the Remote Monitoring and Management (RMM) tool, MeshAgent. RMM tools suc
Matching passage: Sigma rule: Detects the execution of a renamed instance of the Remote Monitoring and Management (RMM) tool, MeshAgent. RMM tools suc. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: Remote Access Tool - Renamed MeshAgent Execution - Windows id: b471f462-eb0d-4832-be35-28d94bdb4780 related: - id: bd3b5eaa-439d-4a42-8f35-a49f5c8a2582 type: similar - id: 2fbbe9ff-0afc-470b-bdc0-592198339968 type: derived status: experimental description: 'Detects the execution of a renamed instance of the Remote Monitoring and Management (RMM) tool, MeshAgent. RMM tools such as MeshAgent are commonly utilized by IT administrators for legitimate remote support and system management. However, malicious actors may exploit these tools by renaming them to bypass detection mechanisms, enabling unauthorized access and control over compromised systems. ' references: - https://www.huntress.com/blog/know-thy-enemy-a-novel-november-case-on-persistent-remote-access - https://thecyberexpress.com/ukraine-hit-by-meshagent-malware-campaign/ - https://wazuh.com/blog/how-to-detect-meshagent-with-wazuh/ - https://www.security.com/threat-intelligence/medusa-ransomware-attacks author: Norbert Jaśniewicz (AlphaSOC) date: 2025-05-19 tags: - attack.command-and-control - attack.stealth - attack.t1219.002 - attack.t1036.003 logsource: category: process_creation product: windows detection: selection_meshagent: - CommandLine|contains: --meshServiceName - OriginalFileName|contains: meshagent filter_main_legitimate: Image|endswith: \meshagent.exe condition: selection_meshagent and not 1 of filter_main_* falsepositives: - Unknown level: high
Near-miss passage: Sigma rule: Detects the loading of unsigned .node files. Adversaries may abuse a lack of .node integrity checking to execute arbitra. Logsource: windows / image_load. Rule: title: Unsigned .node File Loaded id: e5f5c693-52d7-4de5-88ae-afbfbce85595 status: experimental description: 'Detects the loading of unsigned .node files. Adversaries may abuse a lack of .node integrity checking to execute arbitrary code inside of trusted applications such as Slack. .node files are native add-ons for Electron-based applications, which are commonly used for desktop applications like Slack, Discord, and Visual Studio Code. This technique has been observed in the DripLoader malware, which uses unsigned .node files to load malicious native code into Electron applications. ' references: - https://www.coreycburton.com/blog/driploader-case-study - https://github.com/CoreyCBurton/DripLoaderNG - https://www.electronjs.org/docs/latest/tutorial/native-code-and-electron author: Jonathan Beierle (@hullabrian) date: 2025-11-22 tags: - attack.execution - attack.privilege-escalation - attack.persistence - attack.stealth - attack.t1129 - attack.t1574.001 - attack.t1036.005 logsource: category: image_load product: windows detection: selection_node_extension: ImageLoaded|endswith: .node selection_status: - Signed: 'false' - SignatureStatus: Unavailable filter_optional_vscode_jupyter: Image|endswith: \Code.exe ImageLoaded|contains: .vscode\extensions\ms-toolsai.jupyter- ImageLoaded|endswith: - \electron.napi.node - \node.napi.glibc.node condition: all of selection_* and not 1 of filter_optional_* falsepositives: - VsCode extensions or similar legitimate tools might use unsigned .node files. These should be investigated on a case-by-case basis, and whitelisted if determined to be benign. level: medium