Query: Sigma rule for Detects the execution of "whoami.exe" with the "/FO" flag to choose CSV as output format or with redirection options to
Matching passage: Sigma rule: Detects the execution of "whoami.exe" with the "/FO" flag to choose CSV as output format or with redirection options to. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: Whoami.EXE Execution With Output Option id: c30fb093-1109-4dc8-88a8-b30d11c95a5d status: test description: Detects the execution of "whoami.exe" with the "/FO" flag to choose CSV as output format or with redirection options to export the results to a file for later use. references: - https://brica.de/alerts/alert/public/1247926/agent-tesla-keylogger-delivered-inside-a-power-iso-daa-archive/ - https://app.any.run/tasks/7eaba74e-c1ea-400f-9c17-5e30eee89906/ - https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=DsJ9ByX84o4&t=6s author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) date: 2023-02-28 modified: 2023-12-04 tags: - attack.discovery - attack.t1033 - car.2016-03-001 logsource: category: process_creation product: windows detection: selection_main_img: - Image|endswith: \whoami.exe - OriginalFileName: whoami.exe selection_main_cli: CommandLine|contains: - ' /FO CSV' - ' -FO CSV' selection_special: CommandLine|contains: whoami*> condition: all of selection_main_* or selection_special falsepositives: - Unknown level: medium
Near-miss passage: Sigma rule: Detects execution of mshta.exe with file types that looks like they do not typically represent HTA (HTML Application) co. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: MSHTA Execution with Suspicious File Extensions id: cc7abbd0-762b-41e3-8a26-57ad50d2eea3 status: test description: 'Detects execution of mshta.exe with file types that looks like they do not typically represent HTA (HTML Application) content, such as .png, .jpg, .zip, .pdf, and others, which are often polyglots. MSHTA is a legitimate Windows utility for executing HTML Applications containing VBScript or JScript. Threat actors often abuse this lolbin utility to download and execute malicious scripts disguised as benign files or hosted under misleading extensions to evade detection. ' references: - http://blog.sevagas.com/?Hacking-around-HTA-files - https://0x00sec.org/t/clientside-exploitation-in-2018-how-pentesting-has-changed/7356 - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/dotnet/framework/data/xml/xslt/xslt-stylesheet-scripting-using-msxsl-script - https://medium.com/tsscyber/pentesting-and-hta-bypassing-powershell-constrained-language-mode-53a42856c997 - https://twitter.com/mattifestation/status/1326228491302563846 - https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/c1f27d9795a2eba630db8a043580a0761798f06370fb1317067805f8a845b00c author: Diego Perez (@darkquassar), Markus Neis, Swisscom (Improve Rule), Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems) date: 2019-02-22 modified: 2025-05-12 tags: - attack.stealth - attack.t1140 - attack.t1218.005 - attack.execution - attack.t1059.007 - cve.2020-1599 logsource: category: process_creation product: windows detection: selection_img: - Image|endswith: \mshta.exe - OriginalFileName: mshta.exe selection_cli: CommandLine|contains: - .7z - .avi - .bat - .bmp - .conf - .csv - .dll - .doc - .gif - .gz - .ini - .jpe - .jpg - .json - .lnk - .log - .mkv - .mp3 - .mp4 - .pdf - .png - .ppt - .rar - .rtf - .svg - .tar - .tmp - .txt - .xls - .xml - .yaml - .yml - .zip - vbscript condition: all of selection_* falsepositives: - False positives depend on scripts and administrative tools used in the monitored environment level: high