Query: Sigma rule for Detects execution of "csc.exe" to compile .NET code. Attackers often leverage this to compile code on the fly and use it
Matching passage: Sigma rule: Detects execution of "csc.exe" to compile .NET code. Attackers often leverage this to compile code on the fly and use it. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: Dynamic .NET Compilation Via Csc.EXE id: dcaa3f04-70c3-427a-80b4-b870d73c94c4 status: test description: Detects execution of "csc.exe" to compile .NET code. Attackers often leverage this to compile code on the fly and use it in other stages. references: - https://securityboulevard.com/2019/08/agent-tesla-evading-edr-by-removing-api-hooks/ - https://www.clearskysec.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/MuddyWater-Operations-in-Lebanon-and-Oman.pdf - https://app.any.run/tasks/c6993447-d1d8-414e-b856-675325e5aa09/ - https://twitter.com/gN3mes1s/status/1206874118282448897 - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/b27a3cb25025161d49ac861cb216db68c46a3537/atomics/T1027.004/T1027.004.md#atomic-test-1---compile-after-delivery-using-cscexe author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), X__Junior (Nextron Systems) date: 2019-08-24 modified: 2026-03-23 tags: - attack.stealth - attack.t1027.004 logsource: category: process_creation product: windows detection: selection_img: Image|endswith: \csc.exe selection_susp_location_1: CommandLine|contains: - :\Perflogs\ - :\Users\Public\ - \AppData\Local\Temp\ - \Temporary Internet - \Windows\Temp\ selection_susp_location_2: - CommandLine|contains|all: - :\Users\ - \Favorites\ - CommandLine|contains|all: - :\Users\ - \Favourites\ - CommandLine|contains|all: - :\Users\ - \Contacts\ - CommandLine|contains|all: - :\Users\ - \Pictures\ selection_susp_location_3: CommandLine|re: (?:[Pp]rogram[Dd]ata|%(?:[Ll]ocal)?[Aa]pp[Dd]ata%|\\[Aa]pp[Dd]ata\\(?:[Ll]ocal(?:[Ll]ow)?|[Rr]oaming))\\[^\\]{1,256}$ filter_main_programfiles: ParentImage|startswith: - C:\Program Files (x86)\ - C:\Program Files\ filter_main_sdiagnhost: ParentImage: C:\Windows\System32\sdiagnhost.exe filter_main_w3p: ParentImage: C:\Windows\System32\inetsrv\w3wp.exe filter_optional_chocolatey: ParentImage: - C:\ProgramData\chocolatey\choco.exe - C:\ProgramData\chocolatey\tools\shimgen.exe filter_optional_defender: ParentCommandLine|contains: \ProgramData\Microsoft\Windows Defender Advanced Threat Protection filter_optional_ansible: ParentCommandLine|contains: - JwB7ACIAZgBhAGkAbABlAGQAIgA6AHQAcgB1AGUALAAiAG0AcwBnACIAOgAiAEEAbgBzAGkAYgBsAGUAIAByAGUAcQB1AGkAcgBlAHMAIABQAG8AdwBlAHIAUwBoAGUAbABsACAAdgAzAC4AMAAgAG8AcgAgAG4AZQB3AGUAcgAiAH0AJw - cAewAiAGYAYQBpAGwAZQBkACIAOgB0AHIAdQBlACwAIgBtAHMAZwAiADoAIgBBAG4AcwBpAGIAbABlACAAcgBlAHEAdQBpAHIAZQBzACAAUABvAHcAZQByAFMAaABlAGwAbAAgAHYAMwAuADAAIABvAHIAIABuAGUAdwBlAHIAIgB9ACcA - nAHsAIgBmAGEAaQBsAGUAZAAiADoAdAByAHUAZQAsACIAbQBzAGcA
Near-miss passage: Sigma rule: Detects usage of cmdkey to look for cached credentials on the system. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: Potential Reconnaissance For Cached Credentials Via Cmdkey.EXE id: 07f8bdc2-c9b3-472a-9817-5a670b872f53 status: test description: Detects usage of cmdkey to look for cached credentials on the system references: - https://www.peew.pw/blog/2017/11/26/exploring-cmdkey-an-edge-case-for-privilege-escalation - https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc754243(v=ws.11).aspx - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/b27a3cb25025161d49ac861cb216db68c46a3537/atomics/T1003.005/T1003.005.md#atomic-test-1---cached-credential-dump-via-cmdkey author: jmallette, Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) date: 2019-01-16 modified: 2024-03-05 tags: - attack.credential-access - attack.t1003.005 logsource: category: process_creation product: windows detection: selection_img: - Image|endswith: \cmdkey.exe - OriginalFileName: cmdkey.exe selection_cli: CommandLine|contains|windash: ' -l' condition: all of selection* falsepositives: - Legitimate administrative tasks level: high regression_tests_path: regression_data/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_cmdkey_recon/info.yml simulation: - type: atomic-red-team name: Cached Credential Dump via Cmdkey technique: T1003.005 atomic_guid: 56506854-89d6-46a3-9804-b7fde90791f9