Query: detection engineering for Clear Network Connection History and Configurations
Matching passage: T1070.007 Clear Network Connection History and Configurations. Tactics: stealth. Description: Adversaries may clear or remove evidence of malicious network connections in order to clean up traces of their operations. Configuration settings as well as various artifacts that highlight connection history may be created on a system and/or in application logs from behaviors that require network connections, such as [Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021) or [External Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1133). Defenders may use these artifacts to monitor or otherwise analyze network connections created by adversaries. Network connection history may be stored in various locations. For example, RDP connection history may be stored in Windows Registry values under (Citation: Microsoft RDP Removal): * <code>HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Terminal Server Client\Default</code> * <code>HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Terminal Server Client\Servers</code> Windows may also store information about recent RDP connections in files such as <code>C:\Users\\%username%\Documents\Default.rdp</code> and `C:\Users\%username%\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Terminal Server Client\Cache\`.(Citation: Moran RDPieces) Similarly, macOS and Linux hosts may store information highlighting connection history in system logs (such as those stored in `/Library/Logs` and/or `/var/log/`).(Citation: Apple Culprit Access)(Citation: FreeDesktop Journal)(Citation: Apple Unified Log Analysis Remote Login and Screen Sharing) Malicious network connections may also require changes to third-party applications or network configuration settings, such as [Disable or Modify System Firewall](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1686) or tampering to enable [Proxy](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1090). Adversaries may delete or modify this data to conceal indicators and/or impede defensive analysis.
Near-miss passage: T1070.010 Relocate Malware. Tactics: stealth. Description: Once a payload is delivered, adversaries may reproduce copies of the same malware on the victim system to remove evidence of their presence and/or avoid defenses. Copying malware payloads to new locations may also be combined with [File Deletion](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1070/004) to cleanup older artifacts. Relocating malware may be a part of many actions intended to evade defenses. For example, adversaries may copy and rename payloads to better blend into the local environment (i.e., [Match Legitimate Resource Name or Location](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036/005)).(Citation: DFIR Report Trickbot June 2023) Payloads may also be repositioned to target [File/Path Exclusions](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1564/012) as well as specific locations associated with establishing [Persistence](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003).(Citation: Latrodectus APR 2024) Relocating malicious payloads may also hinder defensive analysis, especially to separate these payloads from earlier events (such as [User Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204) and [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566)) that may have generated alerts or otherwise drawn attention from defenders. Moving payloads into target directories does not alter the Creation timestamp, thereby evading detection logic reliant on modifications to this artifact (i.e., [Timestomp](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1070/006)).