Query: alert when Detects the use of reg.exe to disable the Event Tracing for Windows (ETW) Autologger session for Windows Defender API an
Matching passage: Sigma rule: Detects the use of reg.exe to disable the Event Tracing for Windows (ETW) Autologger session for Windows Defender API an. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: Disabling Windows Defender WMI Autologger Session via Reg.exe id: a1b2c3d4-e5f6-a7b8-c9d0-e1f2a3b4c5d6 related: - id: f37b4bce-49d0-4087-9f5b-58bffda77316 type: similar status: experimental description: 'Detects the use of reg.exe to disable the Event Tracing for Windows (ETW) Autologger session for Windows Defender API and Audit events. By setting the ''Start'' value to ''0'' for the ''DefenderApiLogger'' or ''DefenderAuditLogger'' session, an attacker can prevent these critical security events from being logged, effectively blinding monitoring tools that rely on this data. This is a powerful defense evasion technique. ' references: - https://research.splunk.com/endpoint/76406a0f-f5e0-4167-8e1f-337fdc0f1b0c/ - https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/etw/configuring-and-starting-an-autologger-session - https://thedfirreport.com/2021/10/18/icedid-to-xinglocker-ransomware-in-24-hours/ - https://blog.malwarebytes.com/malwarebytes-news/2021/02/lazyscripter-from-empire-to-double-rat/ - https://www.binarly.io/blog/design-issues-of-modern-edrs-bypassing-etw-based-solutions author: Matt Anderson (Huntress) date: 2025-07-09 tags: - attack.defense-impairment - attack.t1685 logsource: category: process_creation product: windows detection: selection_img: - Image|endswith: \reg.exe - OriginalFileName: reg.exe selection_reg_path: CommandLine|contains: - \Control\WMI\Autologger\DefenderApiLogger\Start - \Control\WMI\Autologger\DefenderAuditLogger\Start selection_reg_add: CommandLine|contains|all: - add - '0' filter_main_enable: CommandLine|contains: '0x00000001' condition: all of selection_* and not 1 of filter_main_* falsepositives: - Highly unlikely level: high
Near-miss passage: Sigma rule: Detects events from the Kernel-General ETW indicating that the access bits of a hive with a system like hive name locate. Logsource: windows / system. Rule: title: Critical Hive In Suspicious Location Access Bits Cleared id: 39f919f3-980b-4e6f-a975-8af7e507ef2b related: - id: 839dd1e8-eda8-4834-8145-01beeee33acd type: obsolete status: test description: 'Detects events from the Kernel-General ETW indicating that the access bits of a hive with a system like hive name located in the temp directory have been reset. This occurs when an application tries to access a hive and the hive has not be recognized since the last 7 days (by default). Registry hive dumping utilities such as QuarksPwDump were seen emitting this behavior. ' references: - https://github.com/nasbench/Misc-Research/blob/b20da2336de0f342d31ef4794959d28c8d3ba5ba/ETW/Microsoft-Windows-Kernel-General.md author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems) date: 2017-05-15 modified: 2024-01-18 tags: - attack.credential-access - attack.t1003.002 logsource: product: windows service: system detection: selection: EventID: 16 Provider_Name: Microsoft-Windows-Kernel-General HiveName|contains: - \Temp\SAM - \Temp\SECURITY condition: selection falsepositives: - Unknown level: high