Query: Sigma YAML for azure / auditlogs
Matching passage: Sigma rule: Detects when an account dumps the LAPS password from Entra ID.. Logsource: azure / auditlogs. Rule: title: Windows LAPS Credential Dump From Entra ID id: a4b25073-8947-489c-a8dd-93b41c23f26d status: test description: Detects when an account dumps the LAPS password from Entra ID. references: - https://twitter.com/NathanMcNulty/status/1785051227568632263 - https://www.cloudcoffee.ch/microsoft-365/configure-windows-laps-in-microsoft-intune/ - https://techcommunity.microsoft.com/t5/microsoft-entra-blog/introducing-windows-local-administrator-password-solution-with/ba-p/1942487 author: andrewdanis date: 2024-06-26 tags: - attack.privilege-escalation - attack.persistence - attack.t1098.005 logsource: product: azure service: auditlogs detection: selection: category: Device activityType|contains: Recover device local administrator password additionalDetails.additionalInfo|contains: Successfully recovered local credential by device id condition: selection falsepositives: - Approved activity performed by an Administrator. level: high
Near-miss passage: Sigma rule: Detects abusing Azure Browser SSO by requesting OAuth 2.0 refresh tokens for an Azure-AD-authenticated Windows user (i.e. Logsource: windows / image_load. Rule: title: Potential Azure Browser SSO Abuse id: 50f852e6-af22-4c78-9ede-42ef36aa3453 status: test description: 'Detects abusing Azure Browser SSO by requesting OAuth 2.0 refresh tokens for an Azure-AD-authenticated Windows user (i.e. the machine is joined to Azure AD and a user logs in with their Azure AD account) wanting to perform SSO authentication in the browser. An attacker can use this to authenticate to Azure AD in a browser as that user. ' references: - https://posts.specterops.io/requesting-azure-ad-request-tokens-on-azure-ad-joined-machines-for-browser-sso-2b0409caad30 author: Den Iuzvyk date: 2020-07-15 modified: 2023-04-18 tags: - attack.persistence - attack.privilege-escalation - attack.execution - attack.stealth - attack.t1574.001 logsource: category: image_load product: windows detection: selection: ImageLoaded: C:\Windows\System32\MicrosoftAccountTokenProvider.dll filter_main_bgtaskhost: Image|startswith: - C:\Windows\System32\ - C:\Windows\SysWOW64\ Image|endswith: \BackgroundTaskHost.exe filter_optional_devenv: Image|startswith: - C:\Program Files\Microsoft Visual Studio\ - C:\Program Files (x86)\Microsoft Visual Studio\ Image|endswith: \IDE\devenv.exe filter_optional_ie: Image: - C:\Program Files (x86)\Internet Explorer\iexplore.exe - C:\Program Files\Internet Explorer\iexplore.exe filter_optional_edge_1: - Image|startswith: C:\Program Files (x86)\Microsoft\EdgeWebView\Application\ - Image|endswith: \WindowsApps\MicrosoftEdge.exe - Image: - C:\Program Files (x86)\Microsoft\Edge\Application\msedge.exe - C:\Program Files\Microsoft\Edge\Application\msedge.exe filter_optional_edge_2: Image|startswith: - C:\Program Files (x86)\Microsoft\EdgeCore\ - C:\Program Files\Microsoft\EdgeCore\ Image|endswith: - \msedge.exe - \msedgewebview2.exe filter_optional_onedrive: Image|endswith: \AppData\Local\Microsoft\OneDrive\OneDrive.exe filter_optional_null: Image: null condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_* and not 1 of filter_optional_* falsepositives: - False positives are expected since this rules is only looking for the DLL load event. This rule is better used in correlation with related activity level: low