Query: Sigma rule for Detects the execution of wmic with the "qfe" flag in order to obtain information about installed hotfix updates on the s
Matching passage: Sigma rule: Detects the execution of wmic with the "qfe" flag in order to obtain information about installed hotfix updates on the s. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: Windows Hotfix Updates Reconnaissance Via Wmic.EXE id: dfd2fcb7-8bd5-4daa-b132-5adb61d6ad45 status: test description: Detects the execution of wmic with the "qfe" flag in order to obtain information about installed hotfix updates on the system. This is often used by pentester and attacker enumeration scripts references: - https://github.com/carlospolop/PEASS-ng/blob/fa0f2e17fbc1d86f1fd66338a40e665e7182501d/winPEAS/winPEASbat/winPEAS.bat - https://sushant747.gitbooks.io/total-oscp-guide/content/privilege_escalation_windows.html author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) date: 2022-06-20 modified: 2023-02-14 tags: - attack.execution - attack.t1047 logsource: category: process_creation product: windows detection: selection_img: - OriginalFileName: wmic.exe - Image|endswith: \WMIC.exe selection_cli: CommandLine|contains: ' qfe' condition: all of selection* falsepositives: - Unknown level: medium simulation: - type: atomic-red-team name: WMI Reconnaissance Software technique: T1047 atomic_guid: 718aebaa-d0e0-471a-8241-c5afa69c7414 regression_tests_path: regression_data/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_wmic_recon_hotfix/info.yml
Near-miss passage: Sigma rule: Detects cmd.exe executing commands with the "start" utility using "/b" (no window) or "/min" (minimized) flags. To reduc. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: Cmd Launched with Hidden Start Flags to Suspicious Targets id: 5a6b7c8d-9e0f-1a2b-3c4d-5e6f7a8b9c0d status: experimental description: 'Detects cmd.exe executing commands with the "start" utility using "/b" (no window) or "/min" (minimized) flags. To reduce false positives from standard background tasks, detection is restricted to scenarios where the target is a known script extension or located in suspicious temporary/public directories. This technique was observed in Chaos, DarkSide, and Emotet malware campaigns. ' references: - https://www.fortinet.com/blog/threat-research/evolution-of-chaos-ransomware-faster-smarter-and-more-dangerous - https://www.fortinet.com/blog/threat-research/newly-discovered-function-in-darkside-ransomware-variant-targets-disk-partitions - https://www.fortinet.com/blog/threat-research/ms-office-files-involved-in-emotet-trojan-campaign-pt-one - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/start tags: - attack.stealth - attack.t1564.003 author: Vladan Sekulic, Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems) date: 2026-01-24 logsource: category: process_creation product: windows detection: selection_cmd_img: - Image|endswith: \cmd.exe - OriginalFileName: Cmd.Exe selection_cmd_hidden_start_1: CommandLine|contains|windash: - 'start ' - start/b - start/min selection_cmd_hidden_start_2: CommandLine|contains|windash: - '/b ' - /b" - '/min ' - /min" selection_cli_uncommon_location: CommandLine|contains: - :\Perflogs\ - :\Temp\ - :\Users\Default\ - :\Windows\Temp\ - \AppData\Roaming\ - \Contacts\ - \Documents\ - \Downloads\ - \Favorites\ - \Favourites\ - \inetpub\ - \Music\ - \Photos\ - \Temporary Internet\ - \Users\Public\ - \Videos\ selection_cli_susp_extension: CommandLine|contains: - .bat - .cmd - .cpl - .hta - .js - .ps1 - .scr - .vbe - .vbs selection_cli_susp_pattern: CommandLine|contains: - ' -nop ' - ' -sta ' - .downloadfile( - .downloadstring( - '-noni ' - '-w hidden ' condition: all of selection_cmd_* and 1 of selection_cli_* falsepositives: - Legitimate administrative scripts running from temporary folders. - Niche software updaters utilizing hidden batch files in ProgramData. level: medium regression_tests_path: regression_data/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_cmd_launched_with_hidden_start_flag/info.yml