Query: SOC alert related to Cloud Instance Metadata API
Matching passage: T1552.005 Cloud Instance Metadata API. Tactics: credential access. Description: Adversaries may attempt to access the Cloud Instance Metadata API to collect credentials and other sensitive data. Most cloud service providers support a Cloud Instance Metadata API which is a service provided to running virtual instances that allows applications to access information about the running virtual instance. Available information generally includes name, security group, and additional metadata including sensitive data such as credentials and UserData scripts that may contain additional secrets. The Instance Metadata API is provided as a convenience to assist in managing applications and is accessible by anyone who can access the instance.(Citation: AWS Instance Metadata API) A cloud metadata API has been used in at least one high profile compromise.(Citation: Krebs Capital One August 2019) If adversaries have a presence on the running virtual instance, they may query the Instance Metadata API directly to identify credentials that grant access to additional resources. Additionally, adversaries may exploit a Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) vulnerability in a public facing web proxy that allows them to gain access to the sensitive information via a request to the Instance Metadata API.(Citation: RedLock Instance Metadata API 2018) The de facto standard across cloud service providers is to host the Instance Metadata API at <code>http[:]//169.254.169.254</code>.
Near-miss passage: T1552.004 Private Keys. Tactics: credential access. Description: Adversaries may search for private key certificate files on compromised systems for insecurely stored credentials. Private cryptographic keys and certificates are used for authentication, encryption/decryption, and digital signatures.(Citation: Wikipedia Public Key Crypto) Common key and certificate file extensions include: .key, .pgp, .gpg, .ppk., .p12, .pem, .pfx, .cer, .p7b, .asc. Adversaries may also look in common key directories, such as <code>~/.ssh</code> for SSH keys on * nix-based systems or <code>C:&#92;Users&#92;(username)&#92;.ssh&#92;</code> on Windows. Adversary tools may also search compromised systems for file extensions relating to cryptographic keys and certificates.(Citation: Kaspersky Careto)(Citation: Palo Alto Prince of Persia) When a device is registered to Entra ID, a device key and a transport key are generated and used to verify the device’s identity.(Citation: Microsoft Primary Refresh Token) An adversary with access to the device may be able to export the keys in order to impersonate the device.(Citation: AADInternals Azure AD Device Identities) On network devices, private keys may be exported via [Network Device CLI](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/008) commands such as `crypto pki export`.(Citation: cisco_deploy_rsa_keys) Some private keys require a password or passphrase for operation, so an adversary may also use [Input Capture](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1056) for keylogging or attempt to [Brute Force](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1110) the passphrase off-line. These private keys can be used to authenticate to [Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021) like SSH or for use in decrypting other collected files such as email.