Query: detect Detects usage of the "Set-Service" powershell cmdlet to configure a new SecurityDescriptor that allows a service to be h in logs
Matching passage: Sigma rule: Detects usage of the "Set-Service" powershell cmdlet to configure a new SecurityDescriptor that allows a service to be h. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: Abuse of Service Permissions to Hide Services Via Set-Service id: 514e4c3a-c77d-4cde-a00f-046425e2301e related: - id: a537cfc3-4297-4789-92b5-345bfd845ad0 type: derived - id: 953945c5-22fe-4a92-9f8a-a9edc1e522da type: similar status: test description: Detects usage of the "Set-Service" powershell cmdlet to configure a new SecurityDescriptor that allows a service to be hidden from other utilities such as "sc.exe", "Get-Service"...etc. (Works only in powershell 7) references: - https://twitter.com/Alh4zr3d/status/1580925761996828672 - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/microsoft.powershell.management/set-service?view=powershell-7.2 author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) date: 2022-10-17 tags: - attack.persistence - attack.privilege-escalation - attack.execution - attack.stealth - attack.t1574.011 logsource: category: process_creation product: windows detection: selection_img: - Image|endswith: \pwsh.exe - OriginalFileName: pwsh.dll selection_sddl: CommandLine|contains|all: - 'Set-Service ' - DCLCWPDTSD selection_cmdlet: CommandLine|contains: - '-SecurityDescriptorSddl ' - '-sd ' condition: all of selection_* falsepositives: - Rare intended use of hidden services level: high
Near-miss passage: Sigma rule: Detects loading of dbgcore.dll or dbghelp.dll from uncommon locations such as user directories. These DLLs contain the M. Logsource: windows / image_load. Rule: title: Suspicious Loading of Dbgcore/Dbghelp DLLs from Uncommon Location id: 416bc4a2-7217-4519-8dc7-c3271817f1d5 related: - id: 9f5c1d59-33be-4e60-bcab-85d2f566effd type: similar status: experimental description: 'Detects loading of dbgcore.dll or dbghelp.dll from uncommon locations such as user directories. These DLLs contain the MiniDumpWriteDump function, which can be abused for credential dumping purposes or in some cases for evading EDR/AV detection by suspending processes. ' references: - https://blog.axelarator.net/hunting-for-edr-freeze/ - https://www.zerosalarium.com/2025/09/EDR-Freeze-Puts-EDRs-Antivirus-Into-Coma.html - https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/you-bet-your-lsass-hunting-lsass-access.html author: Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems) date: 2025-11-27 modified: 2026-01-09 tags: - attack.credential-access - attack.defense-impairment - attack.t1003 - attack.t1685 logsource: category: image_load product: windows detection: selection_img: Image|contains: - :\Perflogs\ - :\Temp\ - :\Users\Public\ - \$Recycle.Bin\ - \Contacts\ - \Documents\ - \Favorites\ - \Favourites\ - \inetpub\wwwroot\ - \Music\ - \Pictures\ - \Start Menu\Programs\Startup\ - \Users\Default\ - \Videos\ selection_dll: ImageLoaded|endswith: - \dbgcore.dll - \dbghelp.dll condition: all of selection_* falsepositives: - Unknown level: high regression_tests_path: regression_data/rules/windows/image_load/image_load_win_susp_dbgcore_dbghelp_load/info.yml