Query: alert when Detects the execution of Sysinternals ADExplorer with the "-snapshot" flag in order to save a local copy of the active d
Matching passage: Sigma rule: Detects the execution of Sysinternals ADExplorer with the "-snapshot" flag in order to save a local copy of the active d. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: Suspicious Active Directory Database Snapshot Via ADExplorer id: ef61af62-bc74-4f58-b49b-626448227652 related: - id: 9212f354-7775-4e28-9c9f-8f0a4544e664 type: derived status: test description: Detects the execution of Sysinternals ADExplorer with the "-snapshot" flag in order to save a local copy of the active directory database to a suspicious directory. This can be used by attackers to extract data for Bloodhound, usernames for password spraying or use the meta data for social engineering. The snapshot doesn't contain password hashes but there have been cases, where administrators put passwords in the comment field. references: - https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/5743766-Global-Threat-Report-2019.html - https://learn.microsoft.com/de-de/sysinternals/downloads/adexplorer - https://github.com/c3c/ADExplorerSnapshot.py/tree/f700904defac330802bbfedd1d8ffd9248f4ee24 - https://www.packetlabs.net/posts/scattered-spider-is-a-young-ransomware-gang-exploiting-large-corporations/ - https://www.nccgroup.com/us/research-blog/lapsus-recent-techniques-tactics-and-procedures/ - https://trustedsec.com/blog/adexplorer-on-engagements author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) date: 2023-03-14 modified: 2025-07-09 tags: - attack.discovery - attack.t1087.002 - attack.t1069.002 - attack.t1482 logsource: category: process_creation product: windows detection: selection_img: - Image|endswith: - \ADExp.exe - \ADExplorer.exe - \ADExplorer64.exe - \ADExplorer64a.exe - OriginalFileName: AdExp - Description: Active Directory Editor - Product: Sysinternals ADExplorer selection_flag: CommandLine|contains: snapshot selection_paths: CommandLine|contains: - \Downloads\ - \Users\Public\ - \AppData\ - \Windows\Temp\ condition: all of selection_* falsepositives: - Unknown level: high
Near-miss passage: Sigma rule: Detects suspicious use of an .exe extension after a non-executable file extension like .pdf.exe, a set of spaces or unde. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: Suspicious Double Extension File Execution id: 1cdd9a09-06c9-4769-99ff-626e2b3991b8 related: - id: 5e6a80c8-2d45-4633-9ef4-fa2671a39c5c type: similar status: stable description: Detects suspicious use of an .exe extension after a non-executable file extension like .pdf.exe, a set of spaces or underlines to cloak the executable file in spear phishing campaigns references: - https://blu3-team.blogspot.com/2019/06/misleading-extensions-xlsexe-docexe.html - https://twitter.com/blackorbird/status/1140519090961825792 - https://cloud.google.com/blog/topics/threat-intelligence/cybercriminals-weaponize-fake-ai-websites author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), @blu3_team (idea), Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) date: 2019-06-26 modified: 2025-05-30 tags: - attack.initial-access - attack.t1566.001 logsource: category: process_creation product: windows detection: selection: Image|endswith: - ' .exe' - ______.exe - .doc.exe - .doc.js - .docx.exe - .docx.js - .gif.exe - .jpeg.exe - .jpg.exe - .mkv.exe - .mov.exe - .mp3.exe - .mp4.exe - .pdf.exe - .pdf.js - .png.exe - .ppt.exe - .ppt.js - .pptx.exe - .pptx.js - .rtf.exe - .rtf.js - .svg.exe - .txt.exe - .txt.js - .xls.exe - .xls.js - .xlsx.exe - .xlsx.js - ⠀⠀⠀⠀⠀⠀.exe CommandLine|contains: - ' .exe' - ______.exe - .doc.exe - .doc.js - .docx.exe - .docx.js - .gif.exe - .jpeg.exe - .jpg.exe - .mkv.exe - .mov.exe - .mp3.exe - .mp4.exe - .pdf.exe - .pdf.js - .png.exe - .ppt.exe - .ppt.js - .pptx.exe - .pptx.js - .rtf.exe - .rtf.js - .svg.exe - .txt.exe - .txt.js - .xls.exe - .xls.js - .xlsx.exe - .xlsx.js - ⠀⠀⠀⠀⠀⠀.exe condition: selection falsepositives: - Unknown level: high