Query: Sigma rule for Detects usage of bitsadmin downloading a file
Matching passage: Sigma rule: Detects usage of bitsadmin downloading a file. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: File Download Via Bitsadmin id: d059842b-6b9d-4ed1-b5c3-5b89143c6ede status: test description: Detects usage of bitsadmin downloading a file references: - https://blog.netspi.com/15-ways-to-download-a-file/#bitsadmin - https://isc.sans.edu/diary/22264 - https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Bitsadmin/ author: Michael Haag, FPT.EagleEye date: 2017-03-09 modified: 2023-02-15 tags: - attack.persistence - attack.execution - attack.stealth - attack.t1197 - attack.s0190 - attack.t1036.003 - attack.command-and-control - attack.t1105 logsource: category: process_creation product: windows detection: selection_img: - Image|endswith: \bitsadmin.exe - OriginalFileName: bitsadmin.exe selection_cmd: CommandLine|contains: ' /transfer ' selection_cli_1: CommandLine|contains: - ' /create ' - ' /addfile ' selection_cli_2: CommandLine|contains: http condition: selection_img and (selection_cmd or all of selection_cli_*) falsepositives: - Some legitimate apps use this, but limited. level: medium regression_tests_path: regression_data/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_bitsadmin_download/info.yml simulation: - type: atomic-red-team name: Windows - BITSAdmin BITS Download technique: T1105 atomic_guid: a1921cd3-9a2d-47d5-a891-f1d0f2a7a31b
Near-miss passage: Sigma rule: Detects process access events where WerFaultSecure accesses MsMpEng.exe with dbgcore.dll or dbghelp.dll in the call trac. Logsource: windows / process_access. Rule: title: Suspicious Process Access of MsMpEng by WerFaultSecure - EDR-Freeze id: 387df17d-3b04-448f-8669-9e7fd5e5fd8c related: - id: 8a2f4b1c-3d5e-4f7a-9b2c-1e4f6d8a9c2b type: similar - id: 1f0b4cac-9c81-41f4-95d0-8475ff46b3e2 type: similar status: experimental description: 'Detects process access events where WerFaultSecure accesses MsMpEng.exe with dbgcore.dll or dbghelp.dll in the call trace, indicating potential EDR freeze techniques. This technique leverages WerFaultSecure.exe running as a Protected Process Light (PPL) with WinTCB protection level to call MiniDumpWriteDump and suspend EDR/AV processes, allowing malicious activity to execute undetected during the suspension period. ' references: - https://blog.axelarator.net/hunting-for-edr-freeze/ author: Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems) date: 2025-11-27 tags: - attack.defense-impairment - attack.t1685 logsource: category: process_access product: windows definition: "Requires Sysmon Event ID 10 (ProcessAccess) with CallTrace enabled.\nExample sysmon config snippet with grouping,\ \ as logging individual ProcessAccess events can generate excessive logs:\n<ProcessAccess onmatch=\"include\">\n <Rule\ \ groupRelation=\"and\">\n <TargetImage condition=\"end with\">\\MsMpEng.exe</TargetImage>\n <SourceImage condition=\"\ end with\">\\WerFaultSecure.exe</SourceImage>\n </Rule>\n</ProcessAccess>\n" detection: selection: SourceImage|endswith: \WerFaultSecure.exe TargetImage|endswith: \MsMpEng.exe CallTrace|contains: - \dbgcore.dll - \dbghelp.dll condition: selection falsepositives: - Legitimate Windows Error Reporting operations level: high regression_tests_path: regression_data/rules/windows/process_access/proc_access_win_werfaultsecure_msmpeng_access/info.yml