Query: detect Detects suspicious and uncommon child processes of WmiPrvSE in logs
Matching passage: Sigma rule: Detects suspicious and uncommon child processes of WmiPrvSE. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: Suspicious WmiPrvSE Child Process id: 8a582fe2-0882-4b89-a82a-da6b2dc32937 related: - id: 692f0bec-83ba-4d04-af7e-e884a96059b6 type: similar - id: d21374ff-f574-44a7-9998-4a8c8bf33d7d type: similar - id: 18cf6cf0-39b0-4c22-9593-e244bdc9a2d4 type: obsolete status: test description: Detects suspicious and uncommon child processes of WmiPrvSE references: - https://thedfirreport.com/2021/03/29/sodinokibi-aka-revil-ransomware/ - https://github.com/vadim-hunter/Detection-Ideas-Rules/blob/02bcbfc2bfb8b4da601bb30de0344ae453aa1afe/Threat%20Intelligence/The%20DFIR%20Report/20210329_Sodinokibi_(aka_REvil)_Ransomware.yaml - https://blog.osarmor.com/319/onenote-attachment-delivers-asyncrat-malware/ - https://twitter.com/ForensicITGuy/status/1334734244120309760 author: Vadim Khrykov (ThreatIntel), Cyb3rEng, Florian Roth (Nextron Systems) date: 2021-08-23 modified: 2023-11-10 tags: - attack.execution - attack.stealth - attack.t1047 - attack.t1204.002 - attack.t1218.010 logsource: product: windows category: process_creation detection: selection_parent: ParentImage|endswith: \wbem\WmiPrvSE.exe selection_children_1: Image|endswith: - \certutil.exe - \cscript.exe - \mshta.exe - \msiexec.exe - \regsvr32.exe - \rundll32.exe - \verclsid.exe - \wscript.exe selection_children_2: Image|endswith: \cmd.exe CommandLine|contains: - cscript - mshta - powershell - pwsh - regsvr32 - rundll32 - wscript filter_main_werfault: Image|endswith: \WerFault.exe filter_main_wmiprvse: Image|endswith: \WmiPrvSE.exe filter_main_msiexec: Image|endswith: \msiexec.exe CommandLine|contains: '/i ' condition: selection_parent and 1 of selection_children_* and not 1 of filter_main_* falsepositives: - Unknown level: high
Near-miss passage: Sigma rule: Detects the use of reg.exe to disable the Event Tracing for Windows (ETW) Autologger session for Windows Defender API an. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: Disabling Windows Defender WMI Autologger Session via Reg.exe id: a1b2c3d4-e5f6-a7b8-c9d0-e1f2a3b4c5d6 related: - id: f37b4bce-49d0-4087-9f5b-58bffda77316 type: similar status: experimental description: 'Detects the use of reg.exe to disable the Event Tracing for Windows (ETW) Autologger session for Windows Defender API and Audit events. By setting the ''Start'' value to ''0'' for the ''DefenderApiLogger'' or ''DefenderAuditLogger'' session, an attacker can prevent these critical security events from being logged, effectively blinding monitoring tools that rely on this data. This is a powerful defense evasion technique. ' references: - https://research.splunk.com/endpoint/76406a0f-f5e0-4167-8e1f-337fdc0f1b0c/ - https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/etw/configuring-and-starting-an-autologger-session - https://thedfirreport.com/2021/10/18/icedid-to-xinglocker-ransomware-in-24-hours/ - https://blog.malwarebytes.com/malwarebytes-news/2021/02/lazyscripter-from-empire-to-double-rat/ - https://www.binarly.io/blog/design-issues-of-modern-edrs-bypassing-etw-based-solutions author: Matt Anderson (Huntress) date: 2025-07-09 tags: - attack.defense-impairment - attack.t1685 logsource: category: process_creation product: windows detection: selection_img: - Image|endswith: \reg.exe - OriginalFileName: reg.exe selection_reg_path: CommandLine|contains: - \Control\WMI\Autologger\DefenderApiLogger\Start - \Control\WMI\Autologger\DefenderAuditLogger\Start selection_reg_add: CommandLine|contains|all: - add - '0' filter_main_enable: CommandLine|contains: '0x00000001' condition: all of selection_* and not 1 of filter_main_* falsepositives: - Highly unlikely level: high