Query: rule covering Detects potentially suspicious CommandLine of electron apps (teams, discord, slack, etc.). This could be a sign of abuse
Matching passage: Sigma rule: Detects potentially suspicious CommandLine of electron apps (teams, discord, slack, etc.). This could be a sign of abuse. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: Potentially Suspicious Electron Application CommandLine id: 378a05d8-963c-46c9-bcce-13c7657eac99 related: - id: f26eb764-fd89-464b-85e2-dc4a8e6e77b8 type: similar status: test description: Detects potentially suspicious CommandLine of electron apps (teams, discord, slack, etc.). This could be a sign of abuse to proxy execution through a signed binary. references: - https://positive.security/blog/ms-officecmd-rce - https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Teams/ - https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Msedge/ - https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/msedgewebview2/ - https://medium.com/@MalFuzzer/one-electron-to-rule-them-all-dc2e9b263daf - https://chromium.googlesource.com/chromium/chromium/+/master/content/public/common/content_switches.cc author: frack113, Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) date: 2023-09-05 modified: 2023-11-09 tags: - attack.execution logsource: category: process_creation product: windows detection: selection_img: - Image|endswith: - \chrome.exe - \code.exe - \discord.exe - \GitHubDesktop.exe - \keybase.exe - \msedge_proxy.exe - \msedge.exe - \msedgewebview2.exe - \msteams.exe - \slack.exe - \Teams.exe - OriginalFileName: - chrome.exe - code.exe - discord.exe - GitHubDesktop.exe - keybase.exe - msedge_proxy.exe - msedge.exe - msedgewebview2.exe - msteams.exe - slack.exe - Teams.exe selection_cli: CommandLine|contains: - --browser-subprocess-path - --gpu-launcher - --renderer-cmd-prefix - --utility-cmd-prefix condition: all of selection_* falsepositives: - Legitimate usage for debugging purposes level: medium
Near-miss passage: Sigma rule: Detects the creation of a dMSA service account using the New-ADServiceAccount cmdlet in certain OUs. The fact that the c. Logsource: windows / ps_script. Rule: title: DMSA Service Account Created in Specific OUs - PowerShell id: 02122374-b74e-495c-b285-9e4da973f3d6 related: - id: e15bc294-ae2a-45ad-b7d6-637b33868bde type: similar - id: 0ea8db81-2ff6-4525-9448-33bbe7effc13 type: similar status: experimental description: 'Detects the creation of a dMSA service account using the New-ADServiceAccount cmdlet in certain OUs. The fact that the cmdlet is used to create a dMSASvc account in a specific OU is highly suspicious. It is a pattern trying to exploit the BadSuccessor privilege escalation vulnerability in Windows Server 2025. On top of that, if the user that is creating the dMSASvc account is not a legitimate administrator or does not have the necessary permissions, it is a strong signal of an attempted or successful abuse of the BaDSuccessor vulnerability for privilege escalation within the Windows Server 2025 Active Directory environment. ' references: - https://www.akamai.com/blog/security-research/abusing-bad-successor-for-privilege-escalation-in-active-directory author: Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems) date: 2025-05-24 tags: - attack.privilege-escalation - attack.initial-access - attack.persistence - attack.stealth - attack.t1078.002 - attack.t1098 logsource: category: ps_script product: windows detection: selection: ScriptBlockText|contains|all: - New-ADServiceAccount - -CreateDelegatedServiceAccount - -path condition: selection falsepositives: - Unknown level: medium