Query: detection rule: Detects a Chromium based browser process with the 'load-extension' flag to start a instance with a custom extension
Matching passage: Sigma rule: Detects a Chromium based browser process with the 'load-extension' flag to start a instance with a custom extension. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: Chromium Browser Instance Executed With Custom Extension id: 88d6e60c-759d-4ac1-a447-c0f1466c2d21 related: - id: 27ba3207-dd30-4812-abbf-5d20c57d474e type: similar status: test description: Detects a Chromium based browser process with the 'load-extension' flag to start a instance with a custom extension references: - https://redcanary.com/blog/chromeloader/ - https://emkc.org/s/RJjuLa - https://www.mandiant.com/resources/blog/lnk-between-browsers author: Aedan Russell, frack113, X__Junior (Nextron Systems) date: 2022-06-19 modified: 2023-11-28 tags: - attack.persistence - attack.t1176.001 logsource: category: process_creation product: windows detection: selection: Image|endswith: - \brave.exe - \chrome.exe - \msedge.exe - \opera.exe - \vivaldi.exe CommandLine|contains: --load-extension= condition: selection falsepositives: - Usage of Chrome Extensions in testing tools such as BurpSuite will trigger this alert level: medium regression_tests_path: regression_data/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_browsers_chromium_load_extension/info.yml
Near-miss passage: Sigma rule: Detects changes to environment variables related to ETW logging via the CommandLine. This could indicate potential adver. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: ETW Logging Tamper In .NET Processes Via CommandLine id: 41421f44-58f9-455d-838a-c398859841d4 status: test description: 'Detects changes to environment variables related to ETW logging via the CommandLine. This could indicate potential adversaries stopping ETW providers recording loaded .NET assemblies. ' references: - https://twitter.com/_xpn_/status/1268712093928378368 - https://social.msdn.microsoft.com/Forums/vstudio/en-US/0878832e-39d7-4eaf-8e16-a729c4c40975/what-can-i-use-e13c0d23ccbc4e12931bd9cc2eee27e4-for?forum=clr - https://github.com/dotnet/runtime/blob/ee2355c801d892f2894b0f7b14a20e6cc50e0e54/docs/design/coreclr/jit/viewing-jit-dumps.md#setting-configuration-variables - https://github.com/dotnet/runtime/blob/f62e93416a1799aecc6b0947adad55a0d9870732/src/coreclr/src/inc/clrconfigvalues.h#L35-L38 - https://github.com/dotnet/runtime/blob/7abe42dc1123722ed385218268bb9fe04556e3d3/src/coreclr/src/inc/clrconfig.h#L33-L39 - https://github.com/dotnet/runtime/search?p=1&q=COMPlus_&unscoped_q=COMPlus_ - https://bunnyinside.com/?term=f71e8cb9c76a - http://managed670.rssing.com/chan-5590147/all_p1.html - https://github.com/dotnet/runtime/blob/4f9ae42d861fcb4be2fcd5d3d55d5f227d30e723/docs/coding-guidelines/clr-jit-coding-conventions.md#1412-disabling-code - https://i.blackhat.com/EU-21/Wednesday/EU-21-Teodorescu-Veni-No-Vidi-No-Vici-Attacks-On-ETW-Blind-EDRs.pdf author: Roberto Rodriguez (Cyb3rWard0g), OTR (Open Threat Research) date: 2020-05-02 modified: 2022-12-09 tags: - attack.defense-impairment - attack.t1685 logsource: category: process_creation product: windows detection: selection: CommandLine|contains: - COMPlus_ETWEnabled - COMPlus_ETWFlags condition: selection falsepositives: - Unlikely level: high