Query: detection rule: Adversaries may establish persistence and/or elevate privileges by executing malicious content triggered by application
Matching passage: Sigma rule: Adversaries may establish persistence and/or elevate privileges by executing malicious content triggered by application. Logsource: windows / registry_set. Rule: title: Potential Persistence Via Shim Database Modification id: dfb5b4e8-91d0-4291-b40a-e3b0d3942c45 status: test description: 'Adversaries may establish persistence and/or elevate privileges by executing malicious content triggered by application shims. The Microsoft Windows Application Compatibility Infrastructure/Framework (Application Shim) was created to allow for backward compatibility of software as the operating system codebase changes over time ' references: - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1546.011/T1546.011.md#atomic-test-3---registry-key-creation-andor-modification-events-for-sdb - https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/05/fin7-shim-databases-persistence.html - https://andreafortuna.org/2018/11/12/process-injection-and-persistence-using-application-shimming/ author: frack113 date: 2021-12-30 modified: 2025-10-22 tags: - attack.privilege-escalation - attack.persistence - attack.t1546.011 logsource: category: registry_set product: windows detection: selection: TargetObject|contains: - \SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\AppCompatFlags\InstalledSDB\ - \SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\AppCompatFlags\Custom\ filter_main_empty_string: Details: '' filter_main_empty_value: Details: (Empty) filter_main_null: Details: null condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_* falsepositives: - Legitimate custom SHIM installations will also trigger this rule level: medium
Near-miss passage: Sigma rule: Detects the use of the `syslog` syscall with action code 5 (SYSLOG_ACTION_CLEAR), (4 is SYSLOG_ACTION_READ_CLEAR and 6 i. Logsource: linux / auditd. Rule: title: Clear or Disable Kernel Ring Buffer Logs via Syslog Syscall id: eca5e022-d368-4043-98e5-9736fb01f72f status: experimental description: 'Detects the use of the `syslog` syscall with action code 5 (SYSLOG_ACTION_CLEAR), (4 is SYSLOG_ACTION_READ_CLEAR and 6 is SYSLOG_ACTION_CONSOLE_OFF) which clears the kernel ring buffer (dmesg logs). This can be used by attackers to hide traces after exploitation or privilege escalation. A common technique is running `dmesg -c`, which triggers this syscall internally. ' references: - https://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man2/syslog.2.html - https://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man1/dmesg.1.html author: Milad Cheraghi date: 2025-05-27 modified: 2025-12-05 tags: - attack.defense-impairment - attack.t1685.006 logsource: product: linux service: auditd definition: 'Required auditd configuration: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S syslog -F a0=4 -k clear_dmesg_logs -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S syslog -F a0=5 -k clear_dmesg_logs -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S syslog -F a0=6 -k disable_dmesg_logs -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S syslog -F a0=4 -k clear_dmesg_logs -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S syslog -F a0=5 -k clear_dmesg_logs -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S syslog -F a0=6 -k disable_dmesg_logs ' detection: selection: type: SYSCALL SYSCALL: syslog a0: - 4 - 5 - 6 condition: selection falsepositives: - System administrators or scripts that intentionally clear logs - Debugging scripts level: medium