Query: rule covering Detects changes to "DsrmAdminLogonBehavior" registry value. During a Domain Controller (DC) promotion, administrators cr
Matching passage: Sigma rule: Detects changes to "DsrmAdminLogonBehavior" registry value. During a Domain Controller (DC) promotion, administrators cr. Logsource: windows / registry_set. Rule: title: Directory Service Restore Mode(DSRM) Registry Value Tampering id: b61e87c0-50db-4b2e-8986-6a2be94b33b0 related: - id: 53ad8e36-f573-46bf-97e4-15ba5bf4bb51 type: similar status: test description: 'Detects changes to "DsrmAdminLogonBehavior" registry value. During a Domain Controller (DC) promotion, administrators create a Directory Services Restore Mode (DSRM) local administrator account with a password that rarely changes. The DSRM account is an “Administrator” account that logs in with the DSRM mode when the server is booting up to restore AD backups or recover the server from a failure. Attackers could abuse DSRM account to maintain their persistence and access to the organization''s Active Directory. If the "DsrmAdminLogonBehavior" value is set to "0", the administrator account can only be used if the DC starts in DSRM. If the "DsrmAdminLogonBehavior" value is set to "1", the administrator account can only be used if the local AD DS service is stopped. If the "DsrmAdminLogonBehavior" value is set to "2", the administrator account can always be used. ' references: - https://adsecurity.org/?p=1785 - https://www.sentinelone.com/blog/detecting-dsrm-account-misconfigurations/ - https://book.hacktricks.xyz/windows-hardening/active-directory-methodology/dsrm-credentials author: Nischal Khadgi date: 2024-07-11 tags: - attack.credential-access - attack.persistence - attack.defense-impairment - attack.t1556 logsource: category: registry_set product: windows detection: selection: TargetObject|endswith: \Control\Lsa\DsrmAdminLogonBehavior filter_main_default_value: Details: DWORD (0x00000000) condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_* falsepositives: - Unknown level: high
Near-miss passage: Sigma rule: Detects the use of PowerShell modules and cmdlets to gather local group information. Adversaries may use local system pe. Logsource: windows / ps_module. Rule: title: Suspicious Get Local Groups Information id: cef24b90-dddc-4ae1-a09a-8764872f69fc related: - id: fa6a5a45-3ee2-4529-aa14-ee5edc9e29cb type: similar status: test description: 'Detects the use of PowerShell modules and cmdlets to gather local group information. Adversaries may use local system permission groups to determine which groups exist and which users belong to a particular group such as the local administrators group. ' references: - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1069.001/T1069.001.md author: frack113 date: 2021-12-12 modified: 2025-08-22 tags: - attack.discovery - attack.t1069.001 logsource: product: windows category: ps_module definition: 0ad03ef1-f21b-4a79-8ce8-e6900c54b65b detection: selection_localgroup: - Payload|contains: - 'get-localgroup ' - 'get-localgroupmember ' - ContextInfo|contains: - 'get-localgroup ' - 'get-localgroupmember ' selection_wmi_module: - Payload|contains: - 'get-wmiobject ' - 'gwmi ' - 'get-ciminstance ' - 'gcim ' - ContextInfo|contains|all: - 'get-wmiobject ' - 'gwmi ' - 'get-ciminstance ' - 'gcim ' selection_wmi_class: - Payload|contains: win32_group - ContextInfo|contains: win32_group condition: selection_localgroup or all of selection_wmi_* falsepositives: - Administrator script level: low