Query: Sigma YAML for windows / process_creation
Matching passage: Sigma rule: Detects the use of the Microsoft Windows Resource Leak Diagnostic tool "rdrleakdiag.exe" to dump process memory. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: Process Memory Dump via RdrLeakDiag.EXE id: edadb1e5-5919-4e4c-8462-a9e643b02c4b related: - id: 6355a919-2e97-4285-a673-74645566340d type: obsolete status: test description: Detects the use of the Microsoft Windows Resource Leak Diagnostic tool "rdrleakdiag.exe" to dump process memory references: - https://www.pureid.io/dumping-abusing-windows-credentials-part-1/ - https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/overwatch-exposes-aquatic-panda-in-possession-of-log-4-shell-exploit-tools/ - https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Rdrleakdiag/ - https://twitter.com/0gtweet/status/1299071304805560321?s=21 - https://news.sophos.com/en-us/2024/06/05/operation-crimson-palace-a-technical-deep-dive author: Cedric MAURUGEON, Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel, Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) date: 2021-09-24 modified: 2024-08-15 tags: - attack.credential-access - attack.t1003.001 logsource: category: process_creation product: windows detection: selection_img: - Image|endswith: \rdrleakdiag.exe - OriginalFileName: RdrLeakDiag.exe selection_cli_dump: CommandLine|contains|windash: - /memdmp - fullmemdmp selection_cli_output_process: CommandLine|contains|windash: - ' /o ' - ' /p ' condition: all of selection_* falsepositives: - Unlikely level: high
Near-miss passage: Sigma rule: Detects the usage of particular AttributeLDAPDisplayNames, which are known for data exchange via LDAP by the tool LDAPFr. Logsource: windows / security. Rule: title: Suspicious LDAP-Attributes Used id: d00a9a72-2c09-4459-ad03-5e0a23351e36 status: test description: Detects the usage of particular AttributeLDAPDisplayNames, which are known for data exchange via LDAP by the tool LDAPFragger and are additionally not commonly used in companies. references: - https://medium.com/@ivecodoe/detecting-ldapfragger-a-newly-released-cobalt-strike-beacon-using-ldap-for-c2-communication-c274a7f00961 - https://blog.fox-it.com/2020/03/19/ldapfragger-command-and-control-over-ldap-attributes/ - https://github.com/fox-it/LDAPFragger author: xknow @xknow_infosec date: 2019-03-24 modified: 2022-10-05 tags: - attack.t1001.003 - attack.command-and-control logsource: product: windows service: security definition: The "Audit Directory Service Changes" logging policy must be configured in order to receive events. Audit events are generated only for objects with configured system access control lists (SACLs). Audit events are generated only for objects with configured system access control lists (SACLs) and only when accessed in a manner that matches their SACL settings. This policy covers the following events ids - 5136, 5137, 5138, 5139, 5141. Note that the default policy does not cover User objects. For that a custom AuditRule need to be setup (See https://github.com/OTRF/Set-AuditRule) detection: selection: EventID: 5136 AttributeValue|contains: '*' AttributeLDAPDisplayName: - primaryInternationalISDNNumber - otherFacsimileTelephoneNumber - primaryTelexNumber condition: selection falsepositives: - Companies, who may use these default LDAP-Attributes for personal information level: high