alirezaaminzadeh/secembed-pairs huggingface dataset:
Query: Multiple failed authentications followed by DNS Server
Matching passage: T1583.002 DNS Server. Tactics: resource development. Description: Adversaries may set up their own Domain Name System (DNS) servers that can be used during targeting. During post-compromise activity, adversaries may utilize DNS traffic for various tasks, including for Command and Control (ex: [Application Layer Protocol](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1071)). Instead of hijacking existing DNS servers, adversaries may opt to configure and run their own DNS servers in support of operations. By running their own DNS servers, adversaries can have more control over how they administer server-side DNS C2 traffic ([DNS](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1071/004)). With control over a DNS server, adversaries can configure DNS applications to provide conditional responses to malware and, generally, have more flexibility in the structure of the DNS-based C2 channel.(Citation: Unit42 DNS Mar 2019)
Near-miss passage: T1583.004 Server. Tactics: resource development. Description: Adversaries may buy, lease, rent, or obtain physical servers that can be used during targeting. Use of servers allows an adversary to stage, launch, and execute an operation. During post-compromise activity, adversaries may utilize servers for various tasks, such as watering hole operations in [Drive-by Compromise](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1189), enabling [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566) operations, or facilitating [Command and Control](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0011). Instead of compromising a third-party [Server](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1584/004) or renting a [Virtual Private Server](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583/003), adversaries may opt to configure and run their own servers in support of operations. Free trial periods of cloud servers may also be abused.(Citation: Free Trial PurpleUrchin)(Citation: Freejacked) Adversaries may only need a lightweight setup if most of their activities will take place using online infrastructure. Or, they may need to build extensive infrastructure if they want to test, communicate, and control other aspects of their activities on their own systems.(Citation: NYTStuxnet)
Query: explain T1018 Remote System Discovery
Matching passage: T1018 Remote System Discovery. Tactics: discovery. Description: Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of other systems by IP address, hostname, or other logical identifier on a network that may be used for Lateral Movement from the current system. Functionality could exist within remote access tools to enable this, but utilities available on the operating system could also be used such as [Ping](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0097), <code>net view</code> using [Net](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0039), or, on ESXi servers, `esxcli network diag ping`. Adversaries may also analyze data from local host files (ex: <code>C:\Windows\System32\Drivers\etc\hosts</code> or <code>/etc/hosts</code>) or other passive means (such as local [Arp](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0099) cache entries) in order to discover the presence of remote systems in an environment. Adversaries may also target discovery of network infrastructure as well as leverage [Network Device CLI](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/008) commands on network devices to gather detailed information about systems within a network (e.g. <code>show cdp neighbors</code>, <code>show arp</code>).(Citation: US-CERT-TA18-106A)(Citation: CISA AR21-126A FIVEHANDS May 2021)
Near-miss passage: T1069.003 Cloud Groups. Tactics: discovery. Description: Adversaries may attempt to find cloud groups and permission settings. The knowledge of cloud permission groups can help adversaries determine the particular roles of users and groups within an environment, as well as which users are associated with a particular group. With authenticated access there are several tools that can be used to find permissions groups. The <code>Get-MsolRole</code> PowerShell cmdlet can be used to obtain roles and permissions groups for Exchange and Office 365 accounts (Citation: Microsoft Msolrole)(Citation: GitHub Raindance). Azure CLI (AZ CLI) and the Google Cloud Identity Provider API also provide interfaces to obtain permissions groups. The command <code>az ad user get-member-groups</code> will list groups associated to a user account for Azure while the API endpoint <code>GET https://cloudidentity.googleapis.com/v1/groups</code> lists group resources available to a user for Google.(Citation: Microsoft AZ CLI)(Citation: Black Hills Red Teaming MS AD Azure, 2018)(Citation: Google Cloud Identity API Documentation) In AWS, the commands `ListRolePolicies` and `ListAttachedRolePolicies` allow users to enumerate the policies attached to a role.(Citation: Palo Alto Unit 42 Compromised Cloud Compute Credentials 2022) Adversaries may attempt to list ACLs for objects to determine the owner and other accounts with access to the object, for example, via the AWS <code>GetBucketAcl</code> API (Citation: AWS Get Bucket ACL). Using this information an adversary can target accounts with permissions to a given object or leverage accounts they have already compromised to access the object.
Query: adversary uses Indicator Removal
Matching passage: T1070 Indicator Removal. Tactics: stealth. Description: Adversaries may selectively delete or modify artifacts generated to reduce indications of their presence and blend in with legitimate activity. Rather than broadly removing evidence, adversaries may target specific artifacts that appear anomalous or are likely to draw scrutiny, while leaving sufficient data intact to maintain the appearance of normal system behavior. Artifacts such as command histories, log entries, or file metadata may be altered in ways that align with expected user or system activity. Location, format, and type of artifact (such as command or login history) are often platform-specific, allowing adversaries to tailor modifications that minimize suspicion. These actions may not prevent detection entirely but can delay recognition of malicious activity or reduce the fidelity of alerts by making events appear benign or consistent with routine operations. Additionally, selectively removed or modified artifacts may still be recoverable through deeper forensic analysis, though their absence or alteration can complicate timeline reconstruction and attribution.
Near-miss passage: T1070.010 Relocate Malware. Tactics: stealth. Description: Once a payload is delivered, adversaries may reproduce copies of the same malware on the victim system to remove evidence of their presence and/or avoid defenses. Copying malware payloads to new locations may also be combined with [File Deletion](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1070/004) to cleanup older artifacts. Relocating malware may be a part of many actions intended to evade defenses. For example, adversaries may copy and rename payloads to better blend into the local environment (i.e., [Match Legitimate Resource Name or Location](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036/005)).(Citation: DFIR Report Trickbot June 2023) Payloads may also be repositioned to target [File/Path Exclusions](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1564/012) as well as specific locations associated with establishing [Persistence](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003).(Citation: Latrodectus APR 2024) Relocating malicious payloads may also hinder defensive analysis, especially to separate these payloads from earlier events (such as [User Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204) and [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566)) that may have generated alerts or otherwise drawn attention from defenders. Moving payloads into target directories does not alter the Creation timestamp, thereby evading detection logic reliant on modifications to this artifact (i.e., [Timestomp](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1070/006)).
Query: write Sigma for Detects the use of getsystem Meterpreter/Cobalt Strike command by detecting a specific service installation
Matching passage: Sigma rule: Detects the use of getsystem Meterpreter/Cobalt Strike command by detecting a specific service installation. Logsource: windows / security. Rule: title: Meterpreter or Cobalt Strike Getsystem Service Installation - Security id: ecbc5e16-58e0-4521-9c60-eb9a7ea4ad34 related: - id: 843544a7-56e0-4dcc-a44f-5cc266dd97d6 type: derived status: test description: Detects the use of getsystem Meterpreter/Cobalt Strike command by detecting a specific service installation references: - https://speakerdeck.com/heirhabarov/hunting-for-privilege-escalation-in-windows-environment - https://blog.cobaltstrike.com/2014/04/02/what-happens-when-i-type-getsystem/ author: Teymur Kheirkhabarov, Ecco, Florian Roth (Nextron Systems) date: 2019-10-26 modified: 2023-11-15 tags: - attack.privilege-escalation - attack.stealth - attack.t1134.001 - attack.t1134.002 logsource: product: windows service: security definition: The 'System Security Extension' audit subcategory need to be enabled to log the EID 4697 detection: selection_eid: EventID: 4697 selection_cli_cmd: ServiceFileName|contains|all: - /c - echo - \pipe\ ServiceFileName|contains: - cmd - '%COMSPEC%' selection_cli_rundll: ServiceFileName|contains|all: - rundll32 - .dll,a - '/p:' selection_cli_share: ServiceFileName|startswith: \\\\127.0.0.1\\ADMIN$\ condition: selection_eid and 1 of selection_cli_* falsepositives: - Unlikely level: high
Near-miss passage: Sigma rule: Detects suspicious process patterns found in logs when CrackMapExec is used. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: HackTool - CrackMapExec Process Patterns id: f26307d8-14cd-47e3-a26b-4b4769f24af6 status: test description: Detects suspicious process patterns found in logs when CrackMapExec is used references: - https://mpgn.gitbook.io/crackmapexec/smb-protocol/obtaining-credentials/dump-lsass author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems) date: 2022-03-12 modified: 2023-02-13 tags: - attack.credential-access - attack.t1003.001 logsource: product: windows category: process_creation detection: selection_lsass_dump1: CommandLine|contains|all: - 'tasklist /fi ' - Imagename eq lsass.exe CommandLine|contains: - 'cmd.exe /c ' - 'cmd.exe /r ' - 'cmd.exe /k ' - 'cmd /c ' - 'cmd /r ' - 'cmd /k ' User|contains: - AUTHORI - AUTORI selection_lsass_dump2: CommandLine|contains|all: - do rundll32.exe C:\windows\System32\comsvcs.dll, MiniDump - \Windows\Temp\ - ' full' - '%%B' selection_procdump: CommandLine|contains|all: - tasklist /v /fo csv - findstr /i "lsass" condition: 1 of selection* falsepositives: - Unknown level: high
Query: exploit Integer underflow in the png_check_keyword function in pngwutil.c in libpng 0.90 through 0.99, 1.0.x before 1.0.66, 1.1.x and 1.2.x before 1.2.56, 1.3.x and 1.4.x before 1.4.19, an
Matching passage: CVE-2015-8540. CWE: CWE-189. CVSS: 8.800000190734863. Integer underflow in the png_check_keyword function in pngwutil.c in libpng 0.90 through 0.99, 1.0.x before 1.0.66, 1.1.x and 1.2.x before 1.2.56, 1.3.x and 1.4.x before 1.4.19, and 1.5.x before 1.5.26 allows remote attackers to have unspecified impact via a space character as a keyword in a PNG image, which triggers an out-of-bounds read.
Near-miss passage: CVE-2015-1474. CWE: CWE-189. CVSS: 10.0. Multiple integer overflows in the GraphicBuffer::unflatten function in platform/frameworks/native/libs/ui/GraphicBuffer.cpp in Android through 5.0 allow attackers to gain privileges or cause a denial of service (memory corruption) via vectors that trigger a large number of (1) file descriptors or (2) integer values.
Query: alert when Detects usage of the "Set-Service" powershell cmdlet to configure a new SecurityDescriptor that allows a service to be h
Matching passage: Sigma rule: Detects usage of the "Set-Service" powershell cmdlet to configure a new SecurityDescriptor that allows a service to be h. Logsource: windows / ps_script. Rule: title: Abuse of Service Permissions to Hide Services Via Set-Service - PS id: 953945c5-22fe-4a92-9f8a-a9edc1e522da related: - id: 514e4c3a-c77d-4cde-a00f-046425e2301e type: similar status: test description: Detects usage of the "Set-Service" powershell cmdlet to configure a new SecurityDescriptor that allows a service to be hidden from other utilities such as "sc.exe", "Get-Service"...etc. (Works only in powershell 7) references: - https://twitter.com/Alh4zr3d/status/1580925761996828672 - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/microsoft.powershell.management/set-service?view=powershell-7.2 author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) date: 2022-10-17 tags: - attack.persistence - attack.privilege-escalation - attack.execution - attack.stealth - attack.t1574.011 logsource: product: windows category: ps_script definition: 'Requirements: Script Block Logging must be enabled' detection: selection: ScriptBlockText|contains|all: - 'Set-Service ' - DCLCWPDTSD ScriptBlockText|contains: - '-SecurityDescriptorSddl ' - '-sd ' condition: selection falsepositives: - Rare intended use of hidden services - Rare FP could occur due to the non linearity of the ScriptBlockText log level: high
Near-miss passage: Sigma rule: Detects potential DLL sideloading of an unsigned dbghelp.dll by the Sysinternals VMMap.. Logsource: windows / image_load. Rule: title: VMMap Unsigned Dbghelp.DLL Potential Sideloading id: 273a8dd8-3742-4302-bcc7-7df5a80fe425 related: - id: 98ffaed4-aec2-4e04-9b07-31492fe68b3d type: similar status: test description: Detects potential DLL sideloading of an unsigned dbghelp.dll by the Sysinternals VMMap. references: - https://techcommunity.microsoft.com/t5/sysinternals-blog/zoomit-v7-1-procdump-2-0-for-linux-process-explorer-v17-05/ba-p/3884766 author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) date: 2023-07-28 modified: 2023-09-05 tags: - attack.persistence - attack.privilege-escalation - attack.execution - attack.stealth - attack.t1574.001 logsource: category: image_load product: windows detection: selection: ImageLoaded|contains: C:\Debuggers\dbghelp.dll Image|endswith: - \vmmap.exe - \vmmap64.exe filter_main_signed: Signed: 'true' condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_* falsepositives: - Unknown level: high
Query: alert when Detects the use of WinAPI Functions via the commandline. As seen used by threat actors via the tool winapiexec
Matching passage: Sigma rule: Detects the use of WinAPI Functions via the commandline. As seen used by threat actors via the tool winapiexec. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: Potential WinAPI Calls Via CommandLine id: ba3f5c1b-6272-4119-9dbd-0bc8d21c2702 related: - id: 03d83090-8cba-44a0-b02f-0b756a050306 type: derived status: test description: Detects the use of WinAPI Functions via the commandline. As seen used by threat actors via the tool winapiexec references: - https://twitter.com/m417z/status/1566674631788007425 author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) date: 2022-09-06 modified: 2025-03-06 tags: - attack.execution - attack.t1106 logsource: category: process_creation product: windows detection: selection: CommandLine|contains: - AddSecurityPackage - AdjustTokenPrivileges - Advapi32 - CloseHandle - CreateProcessWithToken - CreatePseudoConsole - CreateRemoteThread - CreateThread - CreateUserThread - DangerousGetHandle - DuplicateTokenEx - EnumerateSecurityPackages - FreeHGlobal - FreeLibrary - GetDelegateForFunctionPointer - GetLogonSessionData - GetModuleHandle - GetProcAddress - GetProcessHandle - GetTokenInformation - ImpersonateLoggedOnUser - kernel32 - LoadLibrary - memcpy - MiniDumpWriteDump - ntdll - OpenDesktop - OpenProcess - OpenProcessToken - OpenThreadToken - OpenWindowStation - PtrToString - QueueUserApc - ReadProcessMemory - RevertToSelf - RtlCreateUserThread - secur32 - SetThreadToken - VirtualAlloc - VirtualFree - VirtualProtect - WaitForSingleObject - WriteInt32 - WriteProcessMemory - ZeroFreeGlobalAllocUnicode filter_optional_mpcmdrun: Image|endswith: \MpCmdRun.exe CommandLine|contains: GetLoadLibraryWAddress32 filter_optional_compatTelRunner: ParentImage|endswith: \CompatTelRunner.exe CommandLine|contains: - FreeHGlobal - PtrToString - kernel32 - CloseHandle condition: selection and not 1 of filter_optional_* falsepositives: - Some legitimate action or applications may use these functions. Investigate further to determine the legitimacy of the activity. level: high
Near-miss passage: Sigma rule: Detects the pattern of UAC Bypass using pkgmgr.exe and dism.exe (UACMe 23). Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: UAC Bypass Using PkgMgr and DISM id: a743ceba-c771-4d75-97eb-8a90f7f4844c status: test description: Detects the pattern of UAC Bypass using pkgmgr.exe and dism.exe (UACMe 23) references: - https://github.com/hfiref0x/UACME author: Christian Burkard (Nextron Systems) date: 2021-08-23 modified: 2024-12-01 tags: - attack.privilege-escalation - attack.t1548.002 logsource: category: process_creation product: windows detection: selection: ParentImage|endswith: \pkgmgr.exe Image|endswith: \dism.exe IntegrityLevel: - High - System - S-1-16-16384 - S-1-16-12288 condition: selection falsepositives: - Unknown level: high
Query: Encoded PowerShell / command-line abuse matching Systemctl
Matching passage: T1569.003 Systemctl. Tactics: execution. Description: Adversaries may abuse systemctl to execute commands or programs. Systemctl is the primary interface for systemd, the Linux init system and service manager. Typically invoked from a shell, Systemctl can also be integrated into scripts or applications. Adversaries may use systemctl to execute commands or programs as [Systemd Service](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/002)s. Common subcommands include: `systemctl start`, `systemctl stop`, `systemctl enable`, `systemctl disable`, and `systemctl status`.(Citation: Red Hat Systemctl 2022)
Near-miss passage: T1569.001 Launchctl. Tactics: execution. Description: Adversaries may abuse launchctl to execute commands or programs. Launchctl interfaces with launchd, the service management framework for macOS. Launchctl supports taking subcommands on the command-line, interactively, or even redirected from standard input.(Citation: Launchctl Man) Adversaries use launchctl to execute commands and programs as [Launch Agent](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/001)s or [Launch Daemon](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/004)s. Common subcommands include: <code>launchctl load</code>,<code>launchctl unload</code>, and <code>launchctl start</code>. Adversaries can use scripts or manually run the commands <code>launchctl load -w "%s/Library/LaunchAgents/%s"</code> or <code>/bin/launchctl load</code> to execute [Launch Agent](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/001)s or [Launch Daemon](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/004)s.(Citation: Sofacy Komplex Trojan)(Citation: 20 macOS Common Tools and Techniques)
Query: describe CVE-2015-0257
Matching passage: CVE-2015-0257. CWE: CWE-264. CVSS: 2.0999999046325684. Red Hat Enterprise Virtualization (RHEV) Manager before 3.5.1 uses weak permissions on the directories shared by the ovirt-engine-dwhd service and a plugin during service startup, which allows local users to obtain sensitive information by reading files in the directory.
Near-miss passage: CVE-2015-0761. CWE: CWE-264. CVSS: 7.199999809265137. Cisco AnyConnect Secure Mobility Client before 3.1(8009) and 4.x before 4.0(2052) on Linux does not properly implement unspecified internal functions, which allows local users to obtain root privileges via crafted vpnagent options, aka Bug ID CSCus86790.
Query: what is T1137.003
Matching passage: T1137.003 Outlook Forms. Tactics: persistence. Description: Adversaries may abuse Microsoft Outlook forms to obtain persistence on a compromised system. Outlook forms are used as templates for presentation and functionality in Outlook messages. Custom Outlook forms can be created that will execute code when a specifically crafted email is sent by an adversary utilizing the same custom Outlook form.(Citation: SensePost Outlook Forms) Once malicious forms have been added to the user’s mailbox, they will be loaded when Outlook is started. Malicious forms will execute when an adversary sends a specifically crafted email to the user.(Citation: SensePost Outlook Forms)
Near-miss passage: T1137.001 Office Template Macros. Tactics: persistence. Description: Adversaries may abuse Microsoft Office templates to obtain persistence on a compromised system. Microsoft Office contains templates that are part of common Office applications and are used to customize styles. The base templates within the application are used each time an application starts. (Citation: Microsoft Change Normal Template) Office Visual Basic for Applications (VBA) macros (Citation: MSDN VBA in Office) can be inserted into the base template and used to execute code when the respective Office application starts in order to obtain persistence. Examples for both Word and Excel have been discovered and published. By default, Word has a Normal.dotm template created that can be modified to include a malicious macro. Excel does not have a template file created by default, but one can be added that will automatically be loaded.(Citation: enigma0x3 normal.dotm)(Citation: Hexacorn Office Template Macros) Shared templates may also be stored and pulled from remote locations.(Citation: GlobalDotName Jun 2019) Word Normal.dotm location:<br> <code>C:\Users\&lt;username&gt;\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Templates\Normal.dotm</code> Excel Personal.xlsb location:<br> <code>C:\Users\&lt;username&gt;\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Excel\XLSTART\PERSONAL.XLSB</code> Adversaries may also change the location of the base template to point to their own by hijacking the application's search order, e.g. Word 2016 will first look for Normal.dotm under <code>C:\Program Files (x86)\Microsoft Office\root\Office16\</code>, or by modifying the GlobalDotName registry key. By modifying the GlobalDotName registry key an adversary can specify an arbitrary location, file name, and file extension to use for the template that will be loaded on application startup. To abuse GlobalDotName, adversaries may first need to register the template as a trusted document or place it in a trusted location.(Citation: GlobalDotName Jun 2019) An adversary may need to enable macros to execute unrestricted depending