Query: detect Detects the occurrence of numerous space characters in RunMRU registry paths, which may indicate execution via phishing in logs
Matching passage: Sigma rule: Detects the occurrence of numerous space characters in RunMRU registry paths, which may indicate execution via phishing. Logsource: windows / registry_set. Rule: title: Suspicious Space Characters in RunMRU Registry Path - ClickFix id: 7a1b4c5e-8f3d-4b9a-7c2e-1f4a5b8c6d9e related: - id: 3ae9974a-eb09-4044-8e70-8980a50c12c8 type: similar status: experimental description: 'Detects the occurrence of numerous space characters in RunMRU registry paths, which may indicate execution via phishing lures using clickfix techniques to hide malicious commands in the Windows Run dialog box from naked eyes. ' references: - https://expel.com/blog/cache-smuggling-when-a-picture-isnt-a-thousand-words/ - https://github.com/JohnHammond/recaptcha-phish author: Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems) date: 2025-11-04 tags: - attack.execution - attack.stealth - attack.t1204.004 - attack.t1027.010 logsource: category: registry_set product: windows detection: selection_key: TargetObject|contains: \Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\RunMRU\ Details|contains: '#' selection_space_variation: Details|contains: - - - - - - - - - - - - - ' ' condition: all of selection_* falsepositives: - Unlikely level: high
Near-miss passage: Sigma rule: Detects potential abuse of Active Directory Replication Service (ADRS) from a non machine account to request credentials. Logsource: windows / security. Rule: title: Active Directory Replication from Non Machine Account - DcSync Indicator id: 17d619c1-e020-4347-957e-1d1207455c93 related: - id: 611eab06-a145-4dfa-a295-3ccc5c20f59a type: similar status: test description: Detects potential abuse of Active Directory Replication Service (ADRS) from a non machine account to request credentials. references: - https://threathunterplaybook.com/hunts/windows/180815-ADObjectAccessReplication/notebook.html - https://threathunterplaybook.com/library/windows/active_directory_replication.html - https://threathunterplaybook.com/hunts/windows/190101-ADModDirectoryReplication/notebook.html author: Roberto Rodriguez @Cyb3rWard0g date: 2019-07-26 modified: 2026-07-30 tags: - attack.credential-access - attack.t1003.006 logsource: product: windows service: security definition: 'Requirements: A SACL must be configured on the domain NC root object (e.g. DC=domain,DC=com) to generate Event 4662. Add via ADSI Edit: navigate to the domain NC root → Properties → Security → Advanced → Auditing → add an ACE for Everyone, Type: Success, Applies to: This object only, rights: DS-Replication-Get-Changes and DS-Replication-Get-Changes-All. The OS audit subcategory must also be enabled: auditpol /set /subcategory:"Directory Service Access" /success:enable ' detection: selection: EventID: 4662 Properties|contains: - 1131f6ad-9c07-11d1-f79f-00c04fc2dcd2 - 1131f6aa-9c07-11d1-f79f-00c04fc2dcd2 - 9923a32a-3607-11d2-b9be-0000f87a36b2 - 89e95b76-444d-4c62-991a-0facbeda640c filter_main_machine_accounts: SubjectUserName|endswith: $ filter_optional_subject_domain: SubjectDomainName: Window Manager filter_optional_subject_usersid: SubjectUserName|startswith: - NT AUT - MSOL_ condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_* and not 1 of filter_optional_* falsepositives: - Unknown level: medium