Query: detect Detects tampering with attachment manager settings policies associations to lower the default file type risks (See refer in logs
Matching passage: Sigma rule: Detects tampering with attachment manager settings policies associations to lower the default file type risks (See refer. Logsource: windows / registry_set. Rule: title: Potential Attachment Manager Settings Associations Tamper id: a9b6c011-ab69-4ddb-bc0a-c4f21c80ec47 status: test description: Detects tampering with attachment manager settings policies associations to lower the default file type risks (See reference for more information) references: - https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/topic/information-about-the-attachment-manager-in-microsoft-windows-c48a4dcd-8de5-2af5-ee9b-cd795ae42738 - https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/2bcd5702a7565952c44075ac6fb946c7780526640d1264f692c7664c02c68465 author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) date: 2022-08-01 modified: 2023-08-17 tags: - attack.defense-impairment logsource: category: registry_set product: windows detection: selection_main: TargetObject|contains: \SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\Associations\ selection_value_default_file_type_rsik: TargetObject|endswith: \DefaultFileTypeRisk Details: DWORD (0x00006152) selection_value_low_risk_filetypes: TargetObject|endswith: \LowRiskFileTypes Details|contains: - .zip; - .rar; - .exe; - .bat; - .com; - .cmd; - .reg; - .msi; - .htm; - .html; condition: selection_main and 1 of selection_value_* falsepositives: - Unlikely level: high
Near-miss passage: Sigma rule: Detects potential abuse of Active Directory Replication Service (ADRS) from a non machine account to request credentials. Logsource: windows / security. Rule: title: Active Directory Replication from Non Machine Account - DcSync Indicator id: 17d619c1-e020-4347-957e-1d1207455c93 related: - id: 611eab06-a145-4dfa-a295-3ccc5c20f59a type: similar status: test description: Detects potential abuse of Active Directory Replication Service (ADRS) from a non machine account to request credentials. references: - https://threathunterplaybook.com/hunts/windows/180815-ADObjectAccessReplication/notebook.html - https://threathunterplaybook.com/library/windows/active_directory_replication.html - https://threathunterplaybook.com/hunts/windows/190101-ADModDirectoryReplication/notebook.html author: Roberto Rodriguez @Cyb3rWard0g date: 2019-07-26 modified: 2026-07-30 tags: - attack.credential-access - attack.t1003.006 logsource: product: windows service: security definition: 'Requirements: A SACL must be configured on the domain NC root object (e.g. DC=domain,DC=com) to generate Event 4662. Add via ADSI Edit: navigate to the domain NC root → Properties → Security → Advanced → Auditing → add an ACE for Everyone, Type: Success, Applies to: This object only, rights: DS-Replication-Get-Changes and DS-Replication-Get-Changes-All. The OS audit subcategory must also be enabled: auditpol /set /subcategory:"Directory Service Access" /success:enable ' detection: selection: EventID: 4662 Properties|contains: - 1131f6ad-9c07-11d1-f79f-00c04fc2dcd2 - 1131f6aa-9c07-11d1-f79f-00c04fc2dcd2 - 9923a32a-3607-11d2-b9be-0000f87a36b2 - 89e95b76-444d-4c62-991a-0facbeda640c filter_main_machine_accounts: SubjectUserName|endswith: $ filter_optional_subject_domain: SubjectDomainName: Window Manager filter_optional_subject_usersid: SubjectUserName|startswith: - NT AUT - MSOL_ condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_* and not 1 of filter_optional_* falsepositives: - Unknown level: medium