Query: rule covering Detects execution of "odbcconf" with the "-f" flag in order to load a response file with a non-".rsp" extension.
Matching passage: Sigma rule: Detects execution of "odbcconf" with the "-f" flag in order to load a response file with a non-".rsp" extension.. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: Suspicious Response File Execution Via Odbcconf.EXE id: 2d32dd6f-3196-4093-b9eb-1ad8ab088ca5 related: - id: 5f03babb-12db-4eec-8c82-7b4cb5580868 type: derived - id: 65d2be45-8600-4042-b4c0-577a1ff8a60e type: obsolete status: test description: Detects execution of "odbcconf" with the "-f" flag in order to load a response file with a non-".rsp" extension. references: - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/sql/odbc/odbcconf-exe?view=sql-server-ver16 - https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Odbcconf/ - https://www.trendmicro.com/en_us/research/17/h/backdoor-carrying-emails-set-sights-on-russian-speaking-businesses.html author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) date: 2023-05-22 modified: 2024-03-13 tags: - attack.stealth - attack.t1218.008 logsource: category: process_creation product: windows detection: selection_img: - Image|endswith: \odbcconf.exe - OriginalFileName: odbcconf.exe selection_cli: CommandLine|contains|windash: ' -f ' filter_main_rsp_ext: CommandLine|contains: .rsp filter_main_runonce_odbc: ParentImage: C:\Windows\System32\runonce.exe Image: C:\Windows\System32\odbcconf.exe CommandLine|contains: .exe /E /F "C:\WINDOWS\system32\odbcconf.tmp" condition: all of selection_* and not 1 of filter_main_* falsepositives: - Unlikely level: high
Near-miss passage: Sigma rule: Detects attempts to modify the registry using VBScript's CreateObject("Wscript.shell") and RegWrite methods embedded wit. Logsource: windows / ps_script. Rule: title: Registry Modification Attempt Via VBScript - PowerShell id: 2a0a169d-cc66-43ce-9ae2-6e678e54e46a related: - id: 921aa10f-2e74-4cca-9498-98f9ca4d6fdf type: similar - id: 7f4c43f9-b1a5-4c7d-b24a-b41bf3a3ebf2 type: similar status: experimental description: 'Detects attempts to modify the registry using VBScript''s CreateObject("Wscript.shell") and RegWrite methods embedded within PowerShell scripts or commands. Threat actors commonly embed VBScript code within PowerShell to perform registry modifications, attempting to evade detection that monitors for direct registry access through traditional tools. This technique can be used for persistence, defense evasion, and privilege escalation by modifying registry keys without using regedit.exe, reg.exe, or PowerShell''s native registry cmdlets. ' references: - https://www.linkedin.com/posts/mauricefielenbach_livingofftheland-redteam-persistence-activity-7344801774182051843-TE00/ - https://www.nextron-systems.com/2025/07/29/detecting-the-most-popular-mitre-persistence-method-registry-run-keys-startup-folder/ - https://detect.fyi/hunting-fileless-malware-in-the-windows-registry-1339ccde00ad date: 2025-08-13 author: Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems) tags: - attack.persistence - attack.execution - attack.defense-impairment - attack.t1112 - attack.t1059.005 logsource: category: ps_script product: windows detection: selection: ScriptBlockText|contains|all: - CreateObject - Wscript.shell - .RegWrite condition: selection falsepositives: - Some legitimate admin or install scripts may use these processes for registry modifications. level: medium