Query: Lateral movement indicators for Upload Malware
Matching passage: T1608.001 Upload Malware. Tactics: resource development. Description: Adversaries may upload malware to third-party or adversary controlled infrastructure to make it accessible during targeting. Malicious software can include payloads, droppers, post-compromise tools, backdoors, and a variety of other malicious content. Adversaries may upload malware to support their operations, such as making a payload available to a victim network to enable [Ingress Tool Transfer](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1105) by placing it on an Internet accessible web server. Malware may be placed on infrastructure that was previously purchased/rented by the adversary ([Acquire Infrastructure](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583)) or was otherwise compromised by them ([Compromise Infrastructure](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1584)). Malware can also be staged on web services, such as GitHub or Pastebin; hosted on the InterPlanetary File System (IPFS), where decentralized content storage makes the removal of malicious files difficult; or saved on the blockchain as smart contracts, which are resilient against takedowns that would affect traditional infrastructure.(Citation: Volexity Ocean Lotus November 2020)(Citation: Talos IPFS 2022)(Citation: Guardio Etherhiding 2023)(Citation: Bleeping Computer Binance Smart Chain 2023) Adversaries may upload backdoored files, such as software packages, application binaries, virtual machine images, or container images, to third-party software stores, package libraries, extension marketplaces, or repositories (ex: GitHub, CNET, AWS Community AMIs, Docker Hub, PyPi, NPM).(Citation: Datadog Security Labs Malicious PyPi Packages 2024) By chance encounter, victims may directly download/install these backdoored files via [User Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204). Masquerading, including typosquatting legitimate software, may increase the chance of users mistakenly executing these files.
Near-miss passage: T1608.006 SEO Poisoning. Tactics: resource development. Description: Adversaries may poison mechanisms that influence search engine optimization (SEO) to further lure staged capabilities towards potential victims. Search engines typically display results to users based on purchased ads as well as the site’s ranking/score/reputation calculated by their web crawlers and algorithms.(Citation: Atlas SEO)(Citation: MalwareBytes SEO) To help facilitate [Drive-by Compromise](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1189), adversaries may stage content that explicitly manipulates SEO rankings in order to promote sites hosting their malicious payloads (such as [Drive-by Target](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1608/004)) within search engines. Poisoning SEO rankings may involve various tricks, such as stuffing keywords (including in the form of hidden text) into compromised sites. These keywords could be related to the interests/browsing habits of the intended victim(s) as well as more broad, seasonably popular topics (e.g. elections, trending news).(Citation: ZScaler SEO)(Citation: Atlas SEO) In addition to internet search engines (such as Google), adversaries may also aim to manipulate specific in-site searches for developer platforms (such as GitHub) to deceive users towards [Supply Chain Compromise](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1195) lures. In-site searches will rank search results according to their own algorithms and metrics such as popularity(Citation: Chexmarx-seo) which may be targeted and gamed by malicious actors.(Citation: Checkmarx-oss-seo) Adversaries may also purchase or plant incoming links to staged capabilities in order to boost the site’s calculated relevance and reputation.(Citation: MalwareBytes SEO)(Citation: DFIR Report Gootloader) SEO poisoning may also be combined with evasive redirects and other cloaking mechanisms (such as measuring mouse movements or serving content based on browser user agents, user language/localization settings, or HTTP headers) in order to feed SEO inputs while avoiding scrutiny from de