Query: alert when Detects an initiated network connection by a non browser process on the system to "azurewebsites.net". The latter was of
Matching passage: Sigma rule: Detects an initiated network connection by a non browser process on the system to "azurewebsites.net". The latter was of. Logsource: windows / network_connection. Rule: title: Network Connection Initiated To AzureWebsites.NET By Non-Browser Process id: 5c80b618-0dbb-46e6-acbb-03d90bcb6d83 related: - id: e043f529-8514-4205-8ab0-7f7d2927b400 type: derived status: test description: 'Detects an initiated network connection by a non browser process on the system to "azurewebsites.net". The latter was often used by threat actors as a malware hosting and exfiltration site. ' references: - https://www.sentinelone.com/labs/wip26-espionage-threat-actors-abuse-cloud-infrastructure-in-targeted-telco-attacks/ - https://symantec-enterprise-blogs.security.com/threat-intelligence/harvester-new-apt-attacks-asia - https://www.ptsecurity.com/ww-en/analytics/pt-esc-threat-intelligence/higaisa-or-winnti-apt-41-backdoors-old-and-new/ - https://intezer.com/blog/research/how-we-escaped-docker-in-azure-functions/ author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) date: 2024-06-24 modified: 2024-07-16 tags: - attack.command-and-control - attack.t1102 - attack.t1102.001 logsource: category: network_connection product: windows detection: selection: Initiated: 'true' DestinationHostname|endswith: azurewebsites.net filter_main_chrome: Image: - C:\Program Files\Google\Chrome\Application\chrome.exe - C:\Program Files (x86)\Google\Chrome\Application\chrome.exe filter_main_chrome_appdata: Image|startswith: C:\Users\ Image|endswith: \AppData\Local\Google\Chrome\Application\chrome.exe filter_main_firefox: Image: - C:\Program Files\Mozilla Firefox\firefox.exe - C:\Program Files (x86)\Mozilla Firefox\firefox.exe filter_main_firefox_appdata: Image|startswith: C:\Users\ Image|endswith: \AppData\Local\Mozilla Firefox\firefox.exe filter_main_ie: Image: - C:\Program Files (x86)\Internet Explorer\iexplore.exe - C:\Program Files\Internet Explorer\iexplore.exe filter_main_edge_1: - Image|startswith: C:\Program Files (x86)\Microsoft\EdgeWebView\Application\ - Image|endswith: \WindowsApps\MicrosoftEdge.exe - Image: - C:\Program Files (x86)\Microsoft\Edge\Application\msedge.exe - C:\Program Files\Microsoft\Edge\Application\msedge.exe filter_main_edge_2: Image|startswith: - C:\Program Files (x86)\Microsoft\EdgeCore\ - C:\Program Files\Microsoft\EdgeCore\ Image|endswith: - \msedge.exe - \msedgewebview2.exe filter_main_safari: Image|contains: - C:\Program Files (x86)\Safari\ - C:\Program Files\Safari\ Image|endswith: \safari.exe filter_main_defender: Image|contains: - C:\Program Files\Windows Defender Advanced Threat Protection\ - C:\Program Files\Windows Defender\ - C:\Pro
Near-miss passage: Sigma rule: Detects when an attacker tries to modify an already existing scheduled tasks to run from a suspicious location Attackers. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: Suspicious Modification Of Scheduled Tasks id: 1c0e41cd-21bb-4433-9acc-4a2cd6367b9b related: - id: 614cf376-6651-47c4-9dcc-6b9527f749f4 type: similar status: test description: 'Detects when an attacker tries to modify an already existing scheduled tasks to run from a suspicious location Attackers can create a simple looking task in order to avoid detection on creation as it''s often the most focused on Instead they modify the task after creation to include their malicious payload ' references: - Internal Research - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/schtasks author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) date: 2022-07-28 modified: 2022-11-18 tags: - attack.privilege-escalation - attack.persistence - attack.execution - attack.t1053.005 logsource: product: windows category: process_creation detection: selection_schtasks: Image|endswith: \schtasks.exe CommandLine|contains|all: - ' /Change ' - ' /TN ' selection_susp_locations: CommandLine|contains: - \AppData\Local\Temp - \AppData\Roaming\ - \Users\Public\ - \WINDOWS\Temp\ - \Desktop\ - \Downloads\ - \Temporary Internet - C:\ProgramData\ - C:\Perflogs\ - '%ProgramData%' - '%appdata%' - '%comspec%' - '%localappdata%' selection_susp_images: CommandLine|contains: - regsvr32 - rundll32 - 'cmd /c ' - 'cmd /k ' - 'cmd /r ' - 'cmd.exe /c ' - 'cmd.exe /k ' - 'cmd.exe /r ' - powershell - mshta - wscript - cscript - certutil - bitsadmin - bash.exe - 'bash ' - scrcons - 'wmic ' - wmic.exe - forfiles - scriptrunner - hh.exe - 'hh ' condition: all of selection_* falsepositives: - Unknown level: high