Query: Suspicious Rogue Domain Controller execution detected on endpoint
Matching passage: T1207 Rogue Domain Controller. Tactics: defense impairment. Description: Adversaries may register a rogue Domain Controller to enable manipulation of Active Directory data. DCShadow may be used to create a rogue Domain Controller (DC). DCShadow is a method of manipulating Active Directory (AD) data, including objects and schemas, by registering (or reusing an inactive registration) and simulating the behavior of a DC. (Citation: DCShadow Blog) Once registered, a rogue DC may be able to inject and replicate changes into AD infrastructure for any domain object, including credentials and keys. Registering a rogue DC involves creating a new server and nTDSDSA objects in the Configuration partition of the AD schema, which requires Administrator privileges (either Domain or local to the DC) or the KRBTGT hash. (Citation: Adsecurity Mimikatz Guide) This technique may bypass system logging and security monitors such as security information and event management (SIEM) products (since actions taken on a rogue DC may not be reported to these sensors). (Citation: DCShadow Blog) The technique may also be used to alter and delete replication and other associated metadata to obstruct forensic analysis. Adversaries may also utilize this technique to perform [SID-History Injection](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1134/005) and/or manipulate AD objects (such as accounts, access control lists, schemas) to establish backdoors for Persistence. (Citation: DCShadow Blog)
Near-miss passage: T1685 Disable or Modify Tools. Tactics: defense impairment. Description: Adversaries may disable, degrade, or tamper with security tools or applications (e.g., endpoint detection and response (EDR) tools, intrusion detection systems (IDS), antivirus, logging agents, sensors, etc.) to impair or reduce visibility of defensive capabilities. This may include stopping specific services, killing processes, modifying or deleting tool configuration files and Registry keys, or preventing tools from updating. This may also include impairing defenses more broadly by disrupting preventative, detection, and response mechanisms across host, network, and cloud environments.(Citation: SCADAfence_ransomware) In addition to directly targeting tools, adversaries may block or manipulate indicators and telemetry used for detection. This includes maliciously disabling or redirecting sensors such as Event Tracing for Windows (ETW), modifying event log configurations (e.g., redirecting Security logs), or interfering with logging pipelines and forwarding mechanisms (e.g., SIEM ingestion).(Citation: Microsoft Lamin Sept 2017)(Citation: ETW Palantir) More advanced techniques include leveraging legitimate drivers or debugging mechanisms to render tools non-functional, bypassing anti-tampering protections, and targeting specific defenses such as Sysmon or cloud monitoring agents. Adversaries may also disrupt broader defensive operations, including update mechanisms, logging infrastructure (e.g., syslog), or event aggregation, further degrading an organization’s ability to detect and respond to malicious activity.(Citation: Cocomazzi FIN7 Reboot)