Query: detection rule: Detects the creation of a "privileged" container, an action which could be indicative of a threat actor mounting a conta
Matching passage: Sigma rule: Detects the creation of a "privileged" container, an action which could be indicative of a threat actor mounting a conta. Logsource: kubernetes / application / audit. Rule: title: Privileged Container Deployed id: c5cd1b20-36bb-488d-8c05-486be3d0cb97 status: test description: 'Detects the creation of a "privileged" container, an action which could be indicative of a threat actor mounting a container breakout attacks. A privileged container is a container that can access the host with all of the root capabilities of the host machine. This allows it to view, interact and modify processes, network operations, IPC calls, the file system, mount points, SELinux configurations etc. as the root user on the host. Various versions of "privileged" containers can be specified, e.g. by setting the securityContext.privileged flag in the resource specification, setting non-standard Linux capabilities, or configuring the hostNetwork/hostPID fields ' references: - https://microsoft.github.io/Threat-Matrix-for-Kubernetes/techniques/Privileged%20container/ - https://docs.aws.amazon.com/guardduty/latest/ug/guardduty_finding-types-kubernetes.html#privilegeescalation-kubernetes-privilegedcontainer - https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/kubernetes-pod-created-with-hostnetwork.html - https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/kubernetes-container-created-with-excessive-linux-capabilities.html author: Leo Tsaousis (@laripping) date: 2024-03-26 tags: - attack.t1611 - attack.privilege-escalation logsource: category: application product: kubernetes service: audit detection: selection: verb: create objectRef.resource: pods capabilities: '*' condition: selection falsepositives: - Unknown level: low
Near-miss passage: Sigma rule: Adversaries may establish persistence and elevate privileges by executing malicious content triggered by a Windows Manag. Logsource: windows / ps_script. Rule: title: Powershell WMI Persistence id: 9e07f6e7-83aa-45c6-998e-0af26efd0a85 status: test description: Adversaries may establish persistence and elevate privileges by executing malicious content triggered by a Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) event subscription. references: - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1546.003/T1546.003.md - https://github.com/EmpireProject/Empire/blob/08cbd274bef78243d7a8ed6443b8364acd1fc48b/data/module_source/persistence/Persistence.psm1#L545 author: frack113 date: 2021-08-19 modified: 2022-12-25 tags: - attack.persistence - attack.privilege-escalation - attack.t1546.003 logsource: product: windows category: ps_script definition: 'Requirements: Script Block Logging must be enabled' detection: selection_ioc: - ScriptBlockText|contains|all: - 'New-CimInstance ' - '-Namespace root/subscription ' - '-ClassName __EventFilter ' - '-Property ' - ScriptBlockText|contains|all: - 'New-CimInstance ' - '-Namespace root/subscription ' - '-ClassName CommandLineEventConsumer ' - '-Property ' condition: selection_ioc falsepositives: - Unknown level: medium