Query: rule covering Detects AdFind execution with common flags seen used during attacks
Matching passage: Sigma rule: Detects AdFind execution with common flags seen used during attacks. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: PUA - AdFind Suspicious Execution id: 9a132afa-654e-11eb-ae93-0242ac130002 related: - id: 455b9d50-15a1-4b99-853f-8d37655a4c1b type: similar - id: 75df3b17-8bcc-4565-b89b-c9898acef911 type: obsolete status: test description: Detects AdFind execution with common flags seen used during attacks references: - https://www.joeware.net/freetools/tools/adfind/ - https://thedfirreport.com/2020/05/08/adfind-recon/ - https://thedfirreport.com/2021/01/11/trickbot-still-alive-and-well/ - https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2021/01/20/deep-dive-into-the-solorigate-second-stage-activation-from-sunburst-to-teardrop-and-raindrop/ - https://social.technet.microsoft.com/wiki/contents/articles/7535.adfind-command-examples.aspx - https://github.com/center-for-threat-informed-defense/adversary_emulation_library/blob/bf62ece1c679b07b5fb49c4bae947fe24c81811f/fin6/Emulation_Plan/Phase1.md - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/0f229c0e42bfe7ca736a14023836d65baa941ed2/atomics/T1087.002/T1087.002.md#atomic-test-7---adfind---enumerate-active-directory-user-objects author: Janantha Marasinghe (https://github.com/blueteam0ps), FPT.EagleEye Team, omkar72, oscd.community date: 2021-02-02 modified: 2025-10-24 tags: - attack.discovery - attack.t1018 - attack.t1087.002 - attack.t1482 - attack.t1069.002 - stp.1u logsource: category: process_creation product: windows detection: selection: CommandLine|contains: - domainlist - trustdmp - dcmodes - adinfo - -sc dclist - computer_pwdnotreqd - objectcategory= - -subnets -f - name="Domain Admins" - '-sc u:' - domainncs - dompol - ' oudmp ' - subnetdmp - gpodmp - fspdmp - users_noexpire - computers_active - computers_pwdnotreqd condition: selection falsepositives: - Legitimate admin activity level: high regression_tests_path: regression_data/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_pua_adfind_susp_usage/info.yml simulation: - type: atomic-red-team name: Adfind - Enumerate Active Directory Computer Objects technique: T1018 atomic_guid: a889f5be-2d54-4050-bd05-884578748bb4 - type: atomic-red-team name: Adfind - Enumerate Active Directory Domain Controller Objects technique: T1018 atomic_guid: 5838c31e-a0e2-4b9f-b60a-d79d2cb7995e
Near-miss passage: Sigma rule: Detects suspicious powershell execution via a schedule task where the command ends with an suspicious flags to hide the. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: Potential Persistence Via Powershell Search Order Hijacking - Task id: b66474aa-bd92-4333-a16c-298155b120df related: - id: 6e8811ee-90ba-441e-8486-5653e68b2299 type: similar status: test description: Detects suspicious powershell execution via a schedule task where the command ends with an suspicious flags to hide the powershell instance instead of executeing scripts or commands. This could be a sign of persistence via PowerShell "Get-Variable" technique as seen being used in Colibri Loader references: - https://blog.malwarebytes.com/threat-intelligence/2022/04/colibri-loader-combines-task-scheduler-and-powershell-in-clever-persistence-technique/ author: pH-T (Nextron Systems), Florian Roth (Nextron Systems) date: 2022-04-08 modified: 2023-02-03 tags: - attack.privilege-escalation - attack.execution - attack.persistence - attack.t1053.005 - attack.t1059.001 logsource: product: windows category: process_creation detection: selection: ParentImage: C:\WINDOWS\System32\svchost.exe ParentCommandLine|contains|all: - -k netsvcs - -s Schedule CommandLine|endswith: - ' -windowstyle hidden' - ' -w hidden' - ' -ep bypass' - ' -noni' condition: selection falsepositives: - Unknown level: high