Query: detection rule: Detects attempts to create a DLL file to a known desktop application dependencies folder such as Slack, Teams or OneDriv
Matching passage: Sigma rule: Detects attempts to create a DLL file to a known desktop application dependencies folder such as Slack, Teams or OneDriv. Logsource: windows / file_event. Rule: title: Potential Initial Access via DLL Search Order Hijacking id: dbbd9f66-2ed3-4ca2-98a4-6ea985dd1a1c status: test description: Detects attempts to create a DLL file to a known desktop application dependencies folder such as Slack, Teams or OneDrive and by an unusual process. This may indicate an attempt to load a malicious module via DLL search order hijacking. references: - https://github.com/elastic/protections-artifacts/commit/746086721fd385d9f5c6647cada1788db4aea95f#diff-5d46dd4ac6866b4337ec126be8cee0e115467b3e8703794ba6f6df6432c806bc - https://posts.specterops.io/automating-dll-hijack-discovery-81c4295904b0 author: Tim Rauch (rule), Elastic (idea) date: 2022-10-21 tags: - attack.privilege-escalation - attack.persistence - attack.execution - attack.stealth - attack.t1566 - attack.t1566.001 - attack.initial-access - attack.t1574 - attack.t1574.001 logsource: product: windows category: file_event detection: selection: Image|endswith: - \winword.exe - \excel.exe - \powerpnt.exe - \MSACCESS.EXE - \MSPUB.EXE - \fltldr.exe - \cmd.exe - \certutil.exe - \mshta.exe - \cscript.exe - \wscript.exe - \curl.exe - \powershell.exe - \pwsh.exe TargetFilename|endswith: .dll TargetFilename|contains|all: - \Users\ - \AppData\ TargetFilename|contains: - \Microsoft\OneDrive\ - \Microsoft OneDrive\ - \Microsoft\Teams\ - \Local\slack\app- - \Local\Programs\Microsoft VS Code\ filter: Image|endswith: \cmd.exe TargetFilename|contains|all: - \Users\ - \AppData\ - \Microsoft\OneDrive\ - \api-ms-win-core- condition: selection and not filter falsepositives: - Unknown level: medium
Near-miss passage: Sigma rule: Detects remote RPC calls to modify the registry and possible execute code. Logsource: rpc_firewall / application. Rule: title: Remote Registry Lateral Movement id: 35c55673-84ca-4e99-8d09-e334f3c29539 status: test description: Detects remote RPC calls to modify the registry and possible execute code references: - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/openspecs/windows_protocols/ms-rrp/0fa3191d-bb79-490a-81bd-54c2601b7a78 - https://github.com/jsecurity101/MSRPC-to-ATTACK/blob/ddd4608fe8684fcf2fcf9b48c5f0b3c28097f8a3/documents/MS-RRP.md - https://github.com/zeronetworks/rpcfirewall - https://zeronetworks.com/blog/stopping-lateral-movement-via-the-rpc-firewall/ author: Sagie Dulce, Dekel Paz date: 2022-01-01 tags: - attack.lateral-movement - attack.defense-impairment - attack.t1112 - attack.persistence logsource: product: rpc_firewall category: application definition: 'Requirements: install and apply the RPC Firewall to all processes with "audit:true action:block uuid:338cd001-2244-31f1-aaaa-900038001003"' detection: selection: EventLog: RPCFW EventID: 3 InterfaceUuid: 338cd001-2244-31f1-aaaa-900038001003 OpNum: - 6 - 7 - 8 - 13 - 18 - 19 - 21 - 22 - 23 - 35 condition: selection falsepositives: - Remote administration of registry values level: high