Query: Sigma rule for Detects download of certain file types from hosts in suspicious TLDs
Matching passage: Sigma rule: Detects download of certain file types from hosts in suspicious TLDs. Logsource: proxy. Rule: title: Download From Suspicious TLD - Blacklist id: 00d0b5ab-1f55-4120-8e83-487c0a7baf19 related: - id: b5de2919-b74a-4805-91a7-5049accbaefe type: similar status: test description: Detects download of certain file types from hosts in suspicious TLDs references: - https://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/shady-tld-research-gdn-and-our-2016-wrap - https://promos.mcafee.com/en-US/PDF/MTMW_Report.pdf - https://www.spamhaus.org/statistics/tlds/ - https://krebsonsecurity.com/2018/06/bad-men-at-work-please-dont-click/ author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems) date: 2017-11-07 modified: 2023-05-18 tags: - attack.initial-access - attack.t1566 - attack.execution - attack.t1203 - attack.t1204.002 logsource: category: proxy detection: selection: c-uri-extension: - exe - vbs - bat - rar - ps1 - doc - docm - xls - xlsm - pptm - rtf - hta - dll - ws - wsf - sct - zip cs-host|endswith: - .country - .stream - .gdn - .mom - .xin - .kim - .men - .loan - .download - .racing - .online - .science - .ren - .gb - .win - .top - .review - .vip - .party - .tech - .xyz - .date - .faith - .zip - .cricket - .space - .info - .vn - .cm - .am - .cc - .asia - .ws - .tk - .biz - .su - .st - .ro - .ge - .ms - .pk - .nu - .me - .ph - .to - .tt - .name - .tv - .kz - .tc - .mobi - .study - .click - .link - .trade - .accountant - .cf - .gq - .ml - .ga - .pw condition: selection falsepositives: - All kinds of software downloads level: low
Near-miss passage: Sigma rule: Detects execution of commands via the run dialog box on Windows by checking values of the "RunMRU" registry key. This te. Logsource: windows / registry_set. Rule: title: Potentially Suspicious Command Executed Via Run Dialog Box - Registry id: a7df0e9e-91a5-459a-a003-4cde67c2ff5d related: - id: f9d091f6-f1c7-4873-a24f-050b4a02b4dd type: derived status: test description: 'Detects execution of commands via the run dialog box on Windows by checking values of the "RunMRU" registry key. This technique was seen being abused by threat actors to deceive users into pasting and executing malicious commands, often disguised as CAPTCHA verification steps. ' references: - https://medium.com/@ahmed.moh.farou2/fake-captcha-campaign-on-arabic-pirated-movie-sites-delivers-lumma-stealer-4f203f7adabf - https://medium.com/@shaherzakaria8/downloading-trojan-lumma-infostealer-through-capatcha-1f25255a0e71 - https://www.forensafe.com/blogs/runmrukey.html - https://redcanary.com/blog/threat-intelligence/intelligence-insights-october-2024/ author: Ahmed Farouk, Nasreddine Bencherchali date: 2024-11-01 tags: - attack.execution - attack.t1059.001 logsource: product: windows category: registry_set detection: selection_key: TargetObject|contains: \Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\RunMRU selection_powershell_command: Details|contains: - powershell - pwsh selection_powershell_susp_keywords: Details|contains: - ' -e ' - ' -ec ' - ' -en ' - ' -enc ' - ' -enco' - ftp - Hidden - http - iex - Invoke- selection_wmic_command: Details|contains: wmic selection_wmic_susp_keywords: Details|contains: - shadowcopy - process call create condition: selection_key and (all of selection_powershell_* or all of selection_wmic_*) falsepositives: - Unknown level: high