Query: Sigma YAML for windows / process_creation
Matching passage: Sigma rule: Detects the execution of a shell (powershell, bash, wsl...) via Visual Studio Code tunnel. Attackers can abuse this func. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: Visual Studio Code Tunnel Shell Execution id: f4a623c2-4ef5-4c33-b811-0642f702c9f1 status: test description: Detects the execution of a shell (powershell, bash, wsl...) via Visual Studio Code tunnel. Attackers can abuse this functionality to establish a C2 channel and execute arbitrary commands on the system. references: - https://ipfyx.fr/post/visual-studio-code-tunnel/ - https://badoption.eu/blog/2023/01/31/code_c2.html - https://code.visualstudio.com/docs/remote/tunnels author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) date: 2023-10-25 tags: - attack.command-and-control - attack.t1071.001 logsource: category: process_creation product: windows detection: selection_parent: ParentImage|contains: \servers\Stable- ParentImage|endswith: \server\node.exe ParentCommandLine|contains: .vscode-server selection_child_1: Image|endswith: - \powershell.exe - \pwsh.exe CommandLine|contains: \terminal\browser\media\shellIntegration.ps1 selection_child_2: Image|endswith: - \wsl.exe - \bash.exe condition: selection_parent and 1 of selection_child_* falsepositives: - Legitimate use of Visual Studio Code tunnel and running code from there level: medium
Near-miss passage: Sigma rule: Detects changes to "DsrmAdminLogonBehavior" registry value. During a Domain Controller (DC) promotion, administrators cr. Logsource: windows / registry_set. Rule: title: Directory Service Restore Mode(DSRM) Registry Value Tampering id: b61e87c0-50db-4b2e-8986-6a2be94b33b0 related: - id: 53ad8e36-f573-46bf-97e4-15ba5bf4bb51 type: similar status: test description: 'Detects changes to "DsrmAdminLogonBehavior" registry value. During a Domain Controller (DC) promotion, administrators create a Directory Services Restore Mode (DSRM) local administrator account with a password that rarely changes. The DSRM account is an “Administrator” account that logs in with the DSRM mode when the server is booting up to restore AD backups or recover the server from a failure. Attackers could abuse DSRM account to maintain their persistence and access to the organization''s Active Directory. If the "DsrmAdminLogonBehavior" value is set to "0", the administrator account can only be used if the DC starts in DSRM. If the "DsrmAdminLogonBehavior" value is set to "1", the administrator account can only be used if the local AD DS service is stopped. If the "DsrmAdminLogonBehavior" value is set to "2", the administrator account can always be used. ' references: - https://adsecurity.org/?p=1785 - https://www.sentinelone.com/blog/detecting-dsrm-account-misconfigurations/ - https://book.hacktricks.xyz/windows-hardening/active-directory-methodology/dsrm-credentials author: Nischal Khadgi date: 2024-07-11 tags: - attack.credential-access - attack.persistence - attack.defense-impairment - attack.t1556 logsource: category: registry_set product: windows detection: selection: TargetObject|endswith: \Control\Lsa\DsrmAdminLogonBehavior filter_main_default_value: Details: DWORD (0x00000000) condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_* falsepositives: - Unknown level: high