alirezaaminzadeh/secembed-pairs huggingface dataset:
Query: mitigate Encrypted Channel
Matching passage: T1573 Encrypted Channel. Tactics: command and control. Description: Adversaries may employ an encryption algorithm to conceal command and control traffic rather than relying on any inherent protections provided by a communication protocol. Despite the use of a secure algorithm, these implementations may be vulnerable to reverse engineering if secret keys are encoded and/or generated within malware samples/configuration files.
Near-miss passage: T1573.002 Asymmetric Cryptography. Tactics: command and control. Description: Adversaries may employ a known asymmetric encryption algorithm to conceal command and control traffic rather than relying on any inherent protections provided by a communication protocol. Asymmetric cryptography, also known as public key cryptography, uses a keypair per party: one public that can be freely distributed, and one private. Due to how the keys are generated, the sender encrypts data with the receiver’s public key and the receiver decrypts the data with their private key. This ensures that only the intended recipient can read the encrypted data. Common public key encryption algorithms include RSA and ElGamal. For efficiency, many protocols (including SSL/TLS) use symmetric cryptography once a connection is established, but use asymmetric cryptography to establish or transmit a key. As such, these protocols are classified as [Asymmetric Cryptography](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1573/002).
Query: rule covering Detects inline Windows shell commands redirecting output via the ">" symbol to a suspicious location. This technique is
Matching passage: Sigma rule: Detects inline Windows shell commands redirecting output via the ">" symbol to a suspicious location. This technique is. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: Potentially Suspicious CMD Shell Output Redirect id: 8e0bb260-d4b2-4fff-bb8d-3f82118e6892 related: - id: aa2efee7-34dd-446e-8a37-40790a66efd7 type: derived - id: 4f4eaa9f-5ad4-410c-a4be-bc6132b0175a type: similar status: test description: 'Detects inline Windows shell commands redirecting output via the ">" symbol to a suspicious location. This technique is sometimes used by malicious actors in order to redirect the output of reconnaissance commands such as "hostname" and "dir" to files for future exfiltration. ' references: - https://thedfirreport.com/2022/07/11/select-xmrig-from-sqlserver/ author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) date: 2022-07-12 modified: 2024-03-19 tags: - attack.stealth - attack.t1218 logsource: category: process_creation product: windows detection: selection_img: - Image|endswith: \cmd.exe - OriginalFileName: Cmd.Exe selection_cli_1: CommandLine|contains: - '>?%APPDATA%\' - '>?%TEMP%\' - '>?%TMP%\' - '>?%USERPROFILE%\' - '>?C:\ProgramData\' - '>?C:\Temp\' - '>?C:\Users\Public\' - '>?C:\Windows\Temp\' selection_cli_2: CommandLine|contains: - ' >' - '">' - '''>' CommandLine|contains|all: - C:\Users\ - \AppData\Local\ condition: selection_img and 1 of selection_cli_* falsepositives: - Legitimate admin or third party scripts used for diagnostic collection might generate some false positives level: medium
Near-miss passage: Sigma rule: Detects WerFault creating a dump file with a name that indicates that the dump file could be an LSASS process memory, wh. Logsource: windows / file_event. Rule: title: WerFault LSASS Process Memory Dump id: c3e76af5-4ce0-4a14-9c9a-25ceb8fda182 status: test description: Detects WerFault creating a dump file with a name that indicates that the dump file could be an LSASS process memory, which contains user credentials references: - https://github.com/helpsystems/nanodump author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems) date: 2022-06-27 tags: - attack.credential-access - attack.t1003.001 logsource: product: windows category: file_event detection: selection: Image: C:\WINDOWS\system32\WerFault.exe TargetFilename|contains: - \lsass - lsass.exe condition: selection falsepositives: - Unknown level: high
Query: what is T1546.010
Matching passage: T1546.010 AppInit DLLs. Tactics: privilege escalation, persistence. Description: Adversaries may establish persistence and/or elevate privileges by executing malicious content triggered by AppInit DLLs loaded into processes. Dynamic-link libraries (DLLs) that are specified in the <code>AppInit_DLLs</code> value in the Registry keys <code>HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Windows</code> or <code>HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Wow6432Node\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Windows</code> are loaded by user32.dll into every process that loads user32.dll. In practice this is nearly every program, since user32.dll is a very common library. (Citation: Elastic Process Injection July 2017) Similar to Process Injection, these values can be abused to obtain elevated privileges by causing a malicious DLL to be loaded and run in the context of separate processes on the computer. (Citation: AppInit Registry) Malicious AppInit DLLs may also provide persistence by continuously being triggered by API activity. The AppInit DLL functionality is disabled in Windows 8 and later versions when secure boot is enabled. (Citation: AppInit Secure Boot)
Near-miss passage: T1546.001 Change Default File Association. Tactics: privilege escalation, persistence. Description: Adversaries may establish persistence by executing malicious content triggered by a file type association. When a file is opened, the default program used to open the file (also called the file association or handler) is checked. File association selections are stored in the Windows Registry and can be edited by users, administrators, or programs that have Registry access or by administrators using the built-in assoc utility.(Citation: Microsoft Change Default Programs)(Citation: Microsoft File Handlers)(Citation: Microsoft Assoc Oct 2017) Applications can modify the file association for a given file extension to call an arbitrary program when a file with the given extension is opened. System file associations are listed under <code>HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\.[extension]</code>, for example <code>HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\.txt</code>. The entries point to a handler for that extension located at <code>HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\\[handler]</code>. The various commands are then listed as subkeys underneath the shell key at <code>HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\\[handler]\shell\\[action]\command</code>. For example: * <code>HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\txtfile\shell\open\command</code> * <code>HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\txtfile\shell\print\command</code> * <code>HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\txtfile\shell\printto\command</code> The values of the keys listed are commands that are executed when the handler opens the file extension. Adversaries can modify these values to continually execute arbitrary commands.(Citation: TrendMicro TROJ-FAKEAV OCT 2012)
Query: Sigma rule for Detects the expansion or decompression of cabinet files from potentially suspicious or uncommon locations, e.g. seen in
Matching passage: Sigma rule: Detects the expansion or decompression of cabinet files from potentially suspicious or uncommon locations, e.g. seen in. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: Potentially Suspicious Cabinet File Expansion id: 9f107a84-532c-41af-b005-8d12a607639f status: test description: Detects the expansion or decompression of cabinet files from potentially suspicious or uncommon locations, e.g. seen in Iranian MeteorExpress related attacks references: - https://labs.sentinelone.com/meteorexpress-mysterious-wiper-paralyzes-iranian-trains-with-epic-troll - https://blog.malwarebytes.com/threat-intelligence/2021/08/new-variant-of-konni-malware-used-in-campaign-targetting-russia/ author: Bhabesh Raj, X__Junior (Nextron Systems) date: 2021-07-30 modified: 2024-11-13 tags: - attack.stealth - attack.t1218 logsource: category: process_creation product: windows detection: selection_cmd: Image|endswith: \expand.exe CommandLine|contains|windash: '-F:' selection_folders_1: CommandLine|contains: - :\Perflogs\ - :\ProgramData - :\Users\Public\ - :\Windows\Temp\ - \Admin$\ - \AppData\Local\Temp\ - \AppData\Roaming\ - \C$\ - \Temporary Internet selection_folders_2: - CommandLine|contains|all: - :\Users\ - \Favorites\ - CommandLine|contains|all: - :\Users\ - \Favourites\ - CommandLine|contains|all: - :\Users\ - \Contacts\ filter_optional_dell: ParentImage: C:\Program Files (x86)\Dell\UpdateService\ServiceShell.exe CommandLine|contains: C:\ProgramData\Dell\UpdateService\Temp\ condition: selection_cmd and 1 of selection_folders_* and not 1 of filter_optional_* falsepositives: - System administrator Usage level: medium
Near-miss passage: Sigma rule: Detects suspicious parent processes that should not have any children or should only have a single possible child progra. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: Suspicious Process Parents id: cbec226f-63d9-4eca-9f52-dfb6652f24df status: test description: Detects suspicious parent processes that should not have any children or should only have a single possible child program references: - https://twitter.com/x86matthew/status/1505476263464607744?s=12 - https://svch0st.medium.com/stats-from-hunting-cobalt-strike-beacons-c17e56255f9b author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems) date: 2022-03-21 modified: 2022-09-08 tags: - attack.stealth - attack.t1036 logsource: category: process_creation product: windows detection: selection: ParentImage|endswith: - \minesweeper.exe - \winver.exe - \bitsadmin.exe selection_special: ParentImage|endswith: - \csrss.exe - \certutil.exe - \eventvwr.exe - \calc.exe - \notepad.exe filter_special: Image|endswith: - \WerFault.exe - \wermgr.exe - \conhost.exe - \mmc.exe - \win32calc.exe - \notepad.exe filter_null: Image: null condition: selection or ( selection_special and not 1 of filter_* ) falsepositives: - Unknown level: high
Query: detection rule: Detects usage of the netsh command to open and allow connections to port 3389 (RDP). As seen used by Sarwent Malware
Matching passage: Sigma rule: Detects usage of the netsh command to open and allow connections to port 3389 (RDP). As seen used by Sarwent Malware. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: RDP Connection Allowed Via Netsh.EXE id: 01aeb693-138d-49d2-9403-c4f52d7d3d62 status: test description: Detects usage of the netsh command to open and allow connections to port 3389 (RDP). As seen used by Sarwent Malware references: - https://labs.sentinelone.com/sarwent-malware-updates-command-detonation/ author: Sander Wiebing date: 2020-05-23 modified: 2023-12-11 tags: - attack.defense-impairment - attack.t1686.003 logsource: category: process_creation product: windows detection: selection_img: - Image|endswith: \netsh.exe - OriginalFileName: netsh.exe selection_cli: CommandLine|contains|all: - 'firewall ' - 'add ' - 'tcp ' - '3389' CommandLine|contains: - portopening - allow condition: all of selection_* falsepositives: - Legitimate administration activity level: high
Near-miss passage: Sigma rule: Detects various command line and scripting engines/processes such as "PowerShell", "Wscript", "Cmd", etc. spawning a "re. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: Scripting/CommandLine Process Spawned Regsvr32 id: ab37a6ec-6068-432b-a64e-2c7bf95b1d22 related: - id: 8e2b24c9-4add-46a0-b4bb-0057b4e6187d type: obsolete status: test description: Detects various command line and scripting engines/processes such as "PowerShell", "Wscript", "Cmd", etc. spawning a "regsvr32" instance. references: - https://web.archive.org/web/20171001085340/https://subt0x10.blogspot.com/2017/04/bypass-application-whitelisting-script.html - https://app.any.run/tasks/34221348-072d-4b70-93f3-aa71f6ebecad/ author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) date: 2023-05-26 tags: - attack.stealth - attack.t1218.010 logsource: category: process_creation product: windows detection: selection: ParentImage|endswith: - \cmd.exe - \cscript.exe - \mshta.exe - \powershell_ise.exe - \powershell.exe - \pwsh.exe - \wscript.exe Image|endswith: \regsvr32.exe filter_main_rpcproxy: ParentImage: C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe CommandLine|endswith: ' /s C:\Windows\System32\RpcProxy\RpcProxy.dll' condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_* falsepositives: - Legitimate ".bat", ".hta", ".ps1" or ".vbs" scripts leverage legitimately often. Apply additional filter and exclusions as necessary - Some legitimate Windows services level: medium
Query: write Sigma for Detects usage of the Get-ADComputer cmdlet to collect computer information and output it to a file
Matching passage: Sigma rule: Detects usage of the Get-ADComputer cmdlet to collect computer information and output it to a file. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: Computer Discovery And Export Via Get-ADComputer Cmdlet id: 435e10e4-992a-4281-96f3-38b11106adde related: - id: db885529-903f-4c5d-9864-28fe199e6370 type: similar status: test description: Detects usage of the Get-ADComputer cmdlet to collect computer information and output it to a file references: - http://blog.talosintelligence.com/2022/09/lazarus-three-rats.html - https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2022/10/18/defenders-beware-a-case-for-post-ransomware-investigations/ - https://www.cisa.gov/uscert/sites/default/files/publications/aa22-320a_joint_csa_iranian_government-sponsored_apt_actors_compromise_federal%20network_deploy_crypto%20miner_credential_harvester.pdf author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) date: 2022-11-10 modified: 2022-11-17 tags: - attack.discovery - attack.t1033 logsource: category: process_creation product: windows detection: selection_img: - Image|endswith: - \powershell.exe - \pwsh.exe - OriginalFileName: - PowerShell.EXE - pwsh.dll selection_cli: CommandLine|contains|all: - 'Get-ADComputer ' - ' -Filter \*' CommandLine|contains: - ' > ' - ' | Select ' - Out-File - Set-Content - Add-Content condition: all of selection_* falsepositives: - Legitimate admin scripts may use the same technique, it's better to exclude specific computers or users who execute these commands or scripts often level: medium
Near-miss passage: Sigma rule: Detects adversary creating screen capture of a desktop with Import Tool. Highly recommended using rule on servers, due t. Logsource: linux / auditd. Rule: title: Screen Capture with Import Tool id: dbe4b9c5-c254-4258-9688-d6af0b7967fd status: test description: 'Detects adversary creating screen capture of a desktop with Import Tool. Highly recommended using rule on servers, due to high usage of screenshot utilities on user workstations. ImageMagick must be installed. ' references: - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1113/T1113.md - https://linux.die.net/man/1/import - https://imagemagick.org/ author: Pawel Mazur date: 2021-09-21 modified: 2022-10-09 tags: - attack.collection - attack.t1113 logsource: product: linux service: auditd detection: import: type: EXECVE a0: import import_window_root: a1: -window a2: root a3|endswith: - .png - .jpg - .jpeg import_no_window_root: a1|endswith: - .png - .jpg - .jpeg condition: import and (import_window_root or import_no_window_root) falsepositives: - Legitimate use of screenshot utility level: low
Query: CWE for Obscured Security-relevant Information by Alternate Name
Matching passage: CWE-224 Obscured Security-relevant Information by Alternate Name. The product records security-relevant information according to an alternate name of the affected entity, instead of the canonical name.
Near-miss passage: CWE-591 Sensitive Data Storage in Improperly Locked Memory. The product stores sensitive data in memory that is not locked, or that has been incorrectly locked, which might cause the memory to be written to swap files on disk by the virtual memory manager. This can make the data more accessible to external actors.
Query: alert when Detects execution of "rundll32.exe" with a parent process of Explorer.exe. This has been observed by variants of Raspber
Matching passage: Sigma rule: Detects execution of "rundll32.exe" with a parent process of Explorer.exe. This has been observed by variants of Raspber. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: Rundll32 Spawned Via Explorer.EXE id: 1723e720-616d-4ddc-ab02-f7e3685a4713 status: test description: Detects execution of "rundll32.exe" with a parent process of Explorer.exe. This has been observed by variants of Raspberry Robin, as first reported by Red Canary. references: - https://redcanary.com/blog/raspberry-robin/ - https://thedfirreport.com/2022/09/26/bumblebee-round-two/ author: CD_ROM_ date: 2022-05-21 modified: 2023-08-31 tags: - attack.stealth logsource: category: process_creation product: windows detection: selection_parent: ParentImage|endswith: \explorer.exe selection_img: - Image|endswith: \rundll32.exe - OriginalFileName: RUNDLL32.EXE filter_main_generic: - CommandLine|contains: ' C:\Windows\System32\' - CommandLine|endswith: ' -localserver 22d8c27b-47a1-48d1-ad08-7da7abd79617' condition: all of selection_* and not 1 of filter_main_* falsepositives: - Unknown level: medium
Near-miss passage: Sigma rule: Identifies when an organization doesn't have the proper license for PIM and is out of compliance.. Logsource: azure / pim. Rule: title: Invalid PIM License id: 58af08eb-f9e1-43c8-9805-3ad9b0482bd8 status: test description: Identifies when an organization doesn't have the proper license for PIM and is out of compliance. references: - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/id-governance/privileged-identity-management/pim-how-to-configure-security-alerts#the-organization-doesnt-have-microsoft-entra-premium-p2-or-microsoft-entra-id-governance author: Mark Morowczynski '@markmorow', Gloria Lee, '@gleeiamglo' date: 2023-09-14 tags: - attack.initial-access - attack.stealth - attack.t1078 - attack.persistence - attack.privilege-escalation logsource: product: azure service: pim detection: selection: riskEventType: invalidLicenseAlertIncident condition: selection falsepositives: - Investigate if licenses have expired. level: high
Query: indicators of Weaken Encryption
Matching passage: T1600 Weaken Encryption. Tactics: defense impairment. Description: Adversaries may compromise a network device’s encryption capability in order to bypass encryption that would otherwise protect data communications.(Citation: Cisco Synful Knock Evolution) Encryption can be used to protect transmitted network traffic to maintain its confidentiality (protect against unauthorized disclosure) and integrity (protect against unauthorized changes). Encryption ciphers are used to convert a plaintext message to ciphertext and can be computationally intensive to decipher without the associated decryption key. Typically, longer keys increase the cost of cryptanalysis, or decryption without the key. Adversaries can compromise and manipulate devices that perform encryption of network traffic. For example, through behaviors such as [Modify System Image](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1601), [Reduce Key Space](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1600/001), and [Disable Crypto Hardware](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1600/002), an adversary can negatively effect and/or eliminate a device’s ability to securely encrypt network traffic. This poses a greater risk of unauthorized disclosure and may help facilitate data manipulation, Credential Access, or Collection efforts.(Citation: Cisco Blog Legacy Device Attacks)
Near-miss passage: T1600.001 Reduce Key Space. Tactics: defense impairment. Description: Adversaries may reduce the level of effort required to decrypt data transmitted over the network by reducing the cipher strength of encrypted communications.(Citation: Cisco Synful Knock Evolution) Adversaries can weaken the encryption software on a compromised network device by reducing the key size used by the software to convert plaintext to ciphertext (e.g., from hundreds or thousands of bytes to just a couple of bytes). As a result, adversaries dramatically reduce the amount of effort needed to decrypt the protected information without the key. Adversaries may modify the key size used and other encryption parameters using specialized commands in a [Network Device CLI](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/008) introduced to the system through [Modify System Image](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1601) to change the configuration of the device. (Citation: Cisco Blog Legacy Device Attacks)
Query: risk of Multiple cross-site scripting (XSS) vulnerabilities in Trend Micro Deep Discovery Inspector (DDI) on Deep Discovery Threat appliances with software before 3.5.1477, 3.6.x before 3.
Matching passage: CVE-2015-2872. CWE: CWE-79. CVSS: 4.300000190734863. Multiple cross-site scripting (XSS) vulnerabilities in Trend Micro Deep Discovery Inspector (DDI) on Deep Discovery Threat appliances with software before 3.5.1477, 3.6.x before 3.6.1217, 3.7.x before 3.7.1248, 3.8.x before 3.8.1263, and other versions allow remote attackers to inject arbitrary web script or HTML via (1) crafted input to index.php that is processed by certain Internet Explorer 7 configurations or (2) crafted input to the widget feature.
Near-miss passage: CVE-2015-7275. CWE: CWE-79. CVSS: 6.099999904632568. Dell Integrated Remote Access Controller (iDRAC) 6 before 2.85 and 7/8 before 2.30.30.30 has XSS.
Query: Encoded PowerShell / command-line abuse matching Netsh Helper DLL
Matching passage: T1546.007 Netsh Helper DLL. Tactics: privilege escalation, persistence. Description: Adversaries may establish persistence by executing malicious content triggered by Netsh Helper DLLs. Netsh.exe (also referred to as Netshell) is a command-line scripting utility used to interact with the network configuration of a system. It contains functionality to add helper DLLs for extending functionality of the utility.(Citation: TechNet Netsh) The paths to registered netsh.exe helper DLLs are entered into the Windows Registry at <code>HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Netsh</code>. Adversaries can use netsh.exe helper DLLs to trigger execution of arbitrary code in a persistent manner. This execution would take place anytime netsh.exe is executed, which could happen automatically, with another persistence technique, or if other software (ex: VPN) is present on the system that executes netsh.exe as part of its normal functionality.(Citation: Github Netsh Helper CS Beacon)(Citation: Demaske Netsh Persistence)
Near-miss passage: T1546.002 Screensaver. Tactics: privilege escalation, persistence. Description: Adversaries may establish persistence by executing malicious content triggered by user inactivity. Screensavers are programs that execute after a configurable time of user inactivity and consist of Portable Executable (PE) files with a .scr file extension.(Citation: Wikipedia Screensaver) The Windows screensaver application scrnsave.scr is located in <code>C:\Windows\System32\</code>, and <code>C:\Windows\sysWOW64\</code> on 64-bit Windows systems, along with screensavers included with base Windows installations. The following screensaver settings are stored in the Registry (<code>HKCU\Control Panel\Desktop\</code>) and could be manipulated to achieve persistence: * <code>SCRNSAVE.exe</code> - set to malicious PE path * <code>ScreenSaveActive</code> - set to '1' to enable the screensaver * <code>ScreenSaverIsSecure</code> - set to '0' to not require a password to unlock * <code>ScreenSaveTimeout</code> - sets user inactivity timeout before screensaver is executed Adversaries can use screensaver settings to maintain persistence by setting the screensaver to run malware after a certain timeframe of user inactivity.(Citation: ESET Gazer Aug 2017)