Query: Sigma rule for Detects attempts to disable Windows Credential Guard by deleting registry values. Credential Guard uses virtualization-b
Matching passage: Sigma rule: Detects attempts to disable Windows Credential Guard by deleting registry values. Credential Guard uses virtualization-b. Logsource: windows / registry_delete. Rule: title: Windows Credential Guard Related Registry Value Deleted - Registry id: d645ef86-2396-48a1-a2b6-b629ca3f57ff related: - id: c17d47b7-dcd6-4109-87eb-d1817bd4cbc9 type: similar status: experimental description: 'Detects attempts to disable Windows Credential Guard by deleting registry values. Credential Guard uses virtualization-based security to isolate secrets so that only privileged system software can access them. Adversaries may disable Credential Guard to gain access to sensitive credentials stored in the system, such as NTLM hashes and Kerberos tickets, which can be used for lateral movement and privilege escalation. ' references: - https://github.com/DambergC/SaveFolder/blob/90e945eba80fae85f2d54b4616e05a44ec90c500/Cygate%20Installation%20tool%206.22/Script/OSD/OSDeployment-CredentialGuardDisable.ps1#L50 - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/identity-protection/credential-guard/configure author: Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems) date: 2025-12-26 tags: - attack.defense-impairment - attack.t1685 logsource: category: registry_delete product: windows detection: selection: TargetObject|endswith: - \DeviceGuard\EnableVirtualizationBasedSecurity - \DeviceGuard\LsaCfgFlags - \DeviceGuard\RequirePlatformSecurityFeatures - \Lsa\LsaCfgFlags condition: selection falsepositives: - Unlikely level: high regression_tests_path: regression_data/rules/windows/registry/registry_delete/registry_delete_disable_credential_guard/info.yml
Near-miss passage: Sigma rule: Detects threat actors proxy executing code and bypassing application controls by leveraging wmic and the `/FORMAT` argum. Logsource: windows / image_load. Rule: title: WMIC Loading Scripting Libraries id: 06ce37c2-61ab-4f05-9ff5-b1a96d18ae32 related: - id: 8d63dadf-b91b-4187-87b6-34a1114577ea type: similar - id: 05c36dd6-79d6-4a9a-97da-3db20298ab2d type: similar status: test description: 'Detects threat actors proxy executing code and bypassing application controls by leveraging wmic and the `/FORMAT` argument switch to download and execute an XSL file (i.e js, vbs, etc). It could be an indicator of SquiblyTwo technique, which uses Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) to execute malicious code. ' references: - https://securitydatasets.com/notebooks/atomic/windows/defense_evasion/SDWIN-201017061100.html - https://twitter.com/dez_/status/986614411711442944 - https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Wmic/ author: Roberto Rodriguez (Cyb3rWard0g), OTR (Open Threat Research) date: 2020-10-17 modified: 2022-10-13 tags: - attack.stealth - attack.t1220 logsource: category: image_load product: windows detection: selection: Image|endswith: \wmic.exe ImageLoaded|endswith: - \jscript.dll - \vbscript.dll condition: selection falsepositives: - The command wmic os get lastbootuptime loads vbscript.dll - The command wmic os get locale loads vbscript.dll - Since the ImageLoad event doesn't have enough information in this case. It's better to look at the recent process creation events that spawned the WMIC process and investigate the command line and parent/child processes to get more insights - The command `wmic ntevent` loads vbscript.dll level: medium