Query: alert when Detects the loading of unsigned .node files. Adversaries may abuse a lack of .node integrity checking to execute arbitra
Matching passage: Sigma rule: Detects the loading of unsigned .node files. Adversaries may abuse a lack of .node integrity checking to execute arbitra. Logsource: windows / image_load. Rule: title: Unsigned .node File Loaded id: e5f5c693-52d7-4de5-88ae-afbfbce85595 status: experimental description: 'Detects the loading of unsigned .node files. Adversaries may abuse a lack of .node integrity checking to execute arbitrary code inside of trusted applications such as Slack. .node files are native add-ons for Electron-based applications, which are commonly used for desktop applications like Slack, Discord, and Visual Studio Code. This technique has been observed in the DripLoader malware, which uses unsigned .node files to load malicious native code into Electron applications. ' references: - https://www.coreycburton.com/blog/driploader-case-study - https://github.com/CoreyCBurton/DripLoaderNG - https://www.electronjs.org/docs/latest/tutorial/native-code-and-electron author: Jonathan Beierle (@hullabrian) date: 2025-11-22 tags: - attack.execution - attack.privilege-escalation - attack.persistence - attack.stealth - attack.t1129 - attack.t1574.001 - attack.t1036.005 logsource: category: image_load product: windows detection: selection_node_extension: ImageLoaded|endswith: .node selection_status: - Signed: 'false' - SignatureStatus: Unavailable filter_optional_vscode_jupyter: Image|endswith: \Code.exe ImageLoaded|contains: .vscode\extensions\ms-toolsai.jupyter- ImageLoaded|endswith: - \electron.napi.node - \node.napi.glibc.node condition: all of selection_* and not 1 of filter_optional_* falsepositives: - VsCode extensions or similar legitimate tools might use unsigned .node files. These should be investigated on a case-by-case basis, and whitelisted if determined to be benign. level: medium
Near-miss passage: Sigma rule: Detects suspicious script execution from suspicious directories or folders accessible by environment variables that may. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: Script Interpreter Execution From Suspicious Folder id: 1228c958-e64e-4e71-92ad-7d429f4138ba status: test description: 'Detects suspicious script execution from suspicious directories or folders accessible by environment variables that may indicate malware activity. Script interpreters (cscript, wscript, mshta, powershell) executing from folders like Temp, Public, or user profile directories may suggest attempts to evade detection or execute malicious scripts. ' references: - https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/91ba814a86ddedc7a9d546e26f912c541205b47a853d227756ab1334ade92c3f - https://symantec-enterprise-blogs.security.com/blogs/threat-intelligence/shuckworm-russia-ukraine-military - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/shell/csidl author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) date: 2022-02-08 modified: 2026-02-17 tags: - attack.execution - attack.t1059 logsource: category: process_creation product: windows detection: selection_proc_image: Image|endswith: - \cscript.exe - \mshta.exe - \wscript.exe selection_proc_flags: CommandLine|contains: - ' -ep bypass ' - ' -ExecutionPolicy bypass ' - ' -w hidden ' - '/e:javascript ' - '/e:Jscript ' - '/e:vbscript ' selection_proc_original: OriginalFileName: - cscript.exe - mshta.exe - wscript.exe selection_folders_1: CommandLine|contains: - :\Perflogs\ - :\Users\Public\ - \%Public% - \AppData\Local\Temp - \AppData\Roaming\Temp - \Temporary Internet - \Windows\Temp - \Start Menu\Programs\Startup\ - '%TEMP%' - '%TMP%' - '%LocalAppData%\Temp' selection_folders_2: - CommandLine|contains|all: - :\Users\ - \Favorites\ - CommandLine|contains|all: - :\Users\ - \Favourites\ - CommandLine|contains|all: - :\Users\ - \Contacts\ - CommandLine|contains|all: - :\Users\ - \Documents\ - CommandLine|contains|all: - :\Users\ - \Music\ - CommandLine|contains|all: - :\Users\ - \Pictures\ - CommandLine|contains|all: - :\Users\ - \Videos\ filter_optional_chocolatey_installer: ParentImage: - C:\Windows\System32\Msiexec.exe - C:\Windows\SysWOW64\Msiexec.exe Image|endswith: \powershell.exe CommandLine|contains|all: - -NoProfile -ExecutionPolicy Bypass -Command - AppData\Local\Temp\ - Install-Chocolatey.ps1 condition: 1 of selection_proc_* and 1 of selection_folders_* and not 1 of filter_optional_* falsepositives: - Various legitimate software have been observed to use similar techniques for installation or update purposes;thus, it is recommended to review and tune filters for your environme