Query: Sigma YAML for windows / process_creation
Matching passage: Sigma rule: Detects the execution of a renamed binary often used by attackers or malware leveraging new Sysmon OriginalFileName data. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: Potential Defense Evasion Via Binary Rename id: 36480ae1-a1cb-4eaa-a0d6-29801d7e9142 related: - id: 0ba1da6d-b6ce-4366-828c-18826c9de23e type: similar status: test description: Detects the execution of a renamed binary often used by attackers or malware leveraging new Sysmon OriginalFileName datapoint. references: - https://mgreen27.github.io/posts/2019/05/12/BinaryRename.html - https://mgreen27.github.io/posts/2019/05/29/BinaryRename2.html - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/0f229c0e42bfe7ca736a14023836d65baa941ed2/atomics/T1036.003/T1036.003.md#atomic-test-1---masquerading-as-windows-lsass-process - https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/inno-setup-malware-redline-stealer-campaign.html author: Matthew Green @mgreen27, Ecco, James Pemberton @4A616D6573, oscd.community, Andreas Hunkeler (@Karneades) date: 2019-06-15 modified: 2026-06-05 tags: - attack.stealth - attack.t1036.003 logsource: category: process_creation product: windows detection: selection: OriginalFileName: - Cmd.Exe - CONHOST.EXE - 7z.exe - 7za.exe - 7zr.exe - WinRAR.exe - wevtutil.exe - net.exe - net1.exe - netsh.exe - InstallUtil.exe filter: Image|endswith: - \cmd.exe - \conhost.exe - \7z.exe - \7za.exe - \7zr.exe - \WinRAR.exe - \wevtutil.exe - \net.exe - \net1.exe - \netsh.exe - \InstallUtil.exe condition: selection and not filter falsepositives: - Custom applications use renamed binaries adding slight change to binary name. Typically this is easy to spot and add to whitelist level: medium regression_tests_path: regression_data/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_renamed_binary/info.yml
Near-miss passage: Sigma rule: Detects the creation of a dMSASvc account using the New-ADServiceAccount cmdlet in certain OUs. The fact that the Cmdlet. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: New DMSA Service Account Created in Specific OUs id: 0ea8db81-2ff6-4525-9448-33bbe7effc13 related: - id: e15bc294-ae2a-45ad-b7d6-637b33868bde type: similar - id: 02122374-b74e-495c-b285-9e4da973f3d6 type: similar status: experimental description: 'Detects the creation of a dMSASvc account using the New-ADServiceAccount cmdlet in certain OUs. The fact that the Cmdlet is used to create a dMSASvc account in a specific OU is highly suspicious. It is a pattern trying to exploit the BadSuccessor privilege escalation vulnerability in Windows Server 2025. On top of that, if the user that is creating the dMSASvc account is not a legitimate administrator or does not have the necessary permissions, it is a strong signal of an attempted or successful abuse of the BaDSuccessor vulnerability for privilege escalation within the Windows Server 2025 Active Directory environment. ' references: - https://www.akamai.com/blog/security-research/abusing-bad-successor-for-privilege-escalation-in-active-directory author: Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems) date: 2025-05-24 tags: - attack.privilege-escalation - attack.initial-access - attack.persistence - attack.stealth - attack.t1078.002 - attack.t1098 logsource: category: process_creation product: windows detection: selection_img: - Image|endswith: - \powershell.exe - \pwsh.exe - \powershell_ise.exe - OriginalFileName: - powershell.exe - pwsh.dll - powershell_ise.exe selection_cli: CommandLine|contains|all: - New-ADServiceAccount - -CreateDelegatedServiceAccount - -path condition: all of selection_* falsepositives: - Unknown level: medium