Query: Sigma YAML for windows / process_creation
Matching passage: Sigma rule: Detects execution of "Diskshadow.exe" in script mode using the "/s" flag where the script is located in a potentially su. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: Diskshadow Script Mode - Execution From Potential Suspicious Location id: fa1a7e52-3d02-435b-81b8-00da14dd66c1 related: - id: 1dde5376-a648-492e-9e54-4241dd9b0c7f type: similar - id: 9f546b25-5f12-4c8d-8532-5893dcb1e4b8 type: similar - id: 56b1dde8-b274-435f-a73a-fb75eb81262a type: similar - id: 0c2f8629-7129-4a8a-9897-7e0768f13ff2 type: similar status: test description: Detects execution of "Diskshadow.exe" in script mode using the "/s" flag where the script is located in a potentially suspicious location. references: - https://bohops.com/2018/03/26/diskshadow-the-return-of-vss-evasion-persistence-and-active-directory-database-extraction/ - https://www.ired.team/offensive-security/credential-access-and-credential-dumping/ntds.dit-enumeration - https://medium.com/@cyberjyot/lolbin-execution-via-diskshadow-f6ff681a27a4 - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/diskshadow - https://www.lifars.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/01/GriefRansomware_Whitepaper-2.pdf - https://www.zscaler.com/blogs/security-research/technical-analysis-crytox-ransomware - https://research.checkpoint.com/2022/evilplayout-attack-against-irans-state-broadcaster/ author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) date: 2023-09-15 modified: 2024-03-05 tags: - attack.stealth - attack.t1218 logsource: category: process_creation product: windows detection: selection_img: - OriginalFileName: diskshadow.exe - Image|endswith: \diskshadow.exe selection_cli: CommandLine|contains|windash: '-s ' selection_paths: CommandLine|contains: - :\Temp\ - :\Windows\Temp\ - \AppData\Local\ - \AppData\Roaming\ - \ProgramData\ - \Users\Public\ condition: all of selection_* falsepositives: - False positives may occur if you execute the script from one of the paths mentioned in the rule. Apply additional filters that fits your org needs. level: medium
Near-miss passage: Sigma rule: Detects modification of autostart extensibility point (ASEP) in registry.. Logsource: windows / registry_set. Rule: title: CurrentControlSet Autorun Keys Modification id: f674e36a-4b91-431e-8aef-f8a96c2aca35 related: - id: 17f878b8-9968-4578-b814-c4217fc5768c type: obsolete status: test description: Detects modification of autostart extensibility point (ASEP) in registry. references: - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1547.001/T1547.001.md - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/downloads/autoruns - https://gist.github.com/GlebSukhodolskiy/0fc5fa5f482903064b448890db1eaf9d author: Victor Sergeev, Daniil Yugoslavskiy, Gleb Sukhodolskiy, Timur Zinniatullin, oscd.community, Tim Shelton, frack113 (split) date: 2019-10-25 modified: 2023-08-17 tags: - attack.privilege-escalation - attack.persistence - attack.t1547.001 logsource: category: registry_set product: windows detection: system_control_base: TargetObject|contains: \SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control system_control_keys: TargetObject|contains: - \Terminal Server\WinStations\RDP-Tcp\InitialProgram - \Terminal Server\Wds\rdpwd\StartupPrograms - \SecurityProviders\SecurityProviders - \SafeBoot\AlternateShell - \Print\Providers - \Print\Monitors - \NetworkProvider\Order - \Lsa\Notification Packages - \Lsa\Authentication Packages - \BootVerificationProgram\ImagePath filter_empty: Details: (Empty) filter_cutepdf: Image: C:\Windows\System32\spoolsv.exe TargetObject|contains: \Print\Monitors\CutePDF Writer Monitor Details: - cpwmon64_v40.dll - CutePDF Writer filter_onenote: Image: C:\Windows\System32\spoolsv.exe TargetObject|contains: Print\Monitors\Appmon\Ports\Microsoft.Office.OneNote_ User|contains: - AUTHORI - AUTORI filter_poqexec: Image: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe TargetObject|endswith: \NetworkProvider\Order\ProviderOrder filter_realvnc: Image: C:\Windows\System32\spoolsv.exe TargetObject|endswith: \Print\Monitors\MONVNC\Driver Details: VNCpm.dll condition: all of system_control_* and not 1 of filter_* falsepositives: - Legitimate software automatically (mostly, during installation) sets up autorun keys for legitimate reason - Legitimate administrator sets up autorun keys for legitimate reason level: medium