Query: SIEM correlation: stealth activity consistent with Hidden Users
Matching passage: T1564.002 Hidden Users. Tactics: stealth. Description: Adversaries may use hidden users to hide the presence of user accounts they create or modify. Administrators may want to hide users when there are many user accounts on a given system or if they want to hide their administrative or other management accounts from other users. In macOS, adversaries can create or modify a user to be hidden through manipulating plist files, folder attributes, and user attributes. To prevent a user from being shown on the login screen and in System Preferences, adversaries can set the userID to be under 500 and set the key value <code>Hide500Users</code> to <code>TRUE</code> in the <code>/Library/Preferences/com.apple.loginwindow</code> plist file.(Citation: Cybereason OSX Pirrit) Every user has a userID associated with it. When the <code>Hide500Users</code> key value is set to <code>TRUE</code>, users with a userID under 500 do not appear on the login screen and in System Preferences. Using the command line, adversaries can use the <code>dscl</code> utility to create hidden user accounts by setting the <code>IsHidden</code> attribute to <code>1</code>. Adversaries can also hide a user’s home folder by changing the <code>chflags</code> to hidden.(Citation: Apple Support Hide a User Account) Adversaries may similarly hide user accounts in Windows. Adversaries can set the <code>HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon\SpecialAccounts\UserList</code> Registry key value to <code>0</code> for a specific user to prevent that user from being listed on the logon screen.(Citation: FireEye SMOKEDHAM June 2021)(Citation: US-CERT TA18-074A) On Linux systems, adversaries may hide user accounts from the login screen, also referred to as the greeter. The method an adversary may use depends on which Display Manager the distribution is currently using. For example, on an Ubuntu system using the GNOME Display Manger (GDM), accounts may be hidden from the greeter using the <code>gsettings</code> command (ex: <code>sudo -u gdm gsettings se
Near-miss passage: T1564.014 Extended Attributes. Tactics: stealth. Description: Adversaries may abuse extended attributes (xattrs) on macOS and Linux to hide their malicious data in order to evade detection. Extended attributes are key-value pairs of file and directory metadata used by both macOS and Linux. They are not visible through standard tools like `Finder`, `ls`, or `cat` and require utilities such as `xattr` (macOS) or `getfattr` (Linux) for inspection. Operating systems and applications use xattrs for tagging, integrity checks, and access control. On Linux, xattrs are organized into namespaces such as `user.` (user permissions), `trusted.` (root permissions), `security.`, and `system.`, each with specific permissions. On macOS, xattrs are flat strings without namespace prefixes, commonly prefixed with `com.apple.*` (e.g., `com.apple.quarantine`, `com.apple.metadata:_kMDItemUserTags`) and used by system features like Gatekeeper and Spotlight.(Citation: Establishing persistence using extended attributes on Linux) An adversary may leverage xattrs by embedding a second-stage payload into the extended attribute of a legitimate file. On macOS, a payload can be embedded into a custom attribute using the `xattr` command. A separate loader can retrieve the attribute with `xattr -p`, decode the content, and execute it using a scripting interpreter. On Linux, an adversary may use `setfattr` to write a payload into the `user.` namespace of a legitimate file. A loader script can later extract the payload with `getfattr --only-values`, decode it, and execute it using bash or another interpreter. In both cases, because the primary file content remains unchanged, security tools and integrity checks that do not inspect extended attributes will observe the original file hash, allowing the malicious payload to evade detection.(Citation: Low GroupIB xattrs nov 2024)