Query: detection rule: Detects the load of RstrtMgr DLL (Restart Manager) by a suspicious process. This library has been used during ransomware
Matching passage: Sigma rule: Detects the load of RstrtMgr DLL (Restart Manager) by a suspicious process. This library has been used during ransomware. Logsource: windows / image_load. Rule: title: Load Of RstrtMgr.DLL By A Suspicious Process id: b48492dc-c5ef-4572-8dff-32bc241c15c8 related: - id: 3669afd2-9891-4534-a626-e5cf03810a61 type: derived status: test description: 'Detects the load of RstrtMgr DLL (Restart Manager) by a suspicious process. This library has been used during ransomware campaigns to kill processes that would prevent file encryption by locking them (e.g. Conti ransomware, Cactus ransomware). It has also recently been seen used by the BiBi wiper for Windows. It could also be used for anti-analysis purposes by shut downing specific processes. ' references: - https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/windows-restart-manager-part-1/ - https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/windows-restart-manager-part-2/ - https://web.archive.org/web/20231221193106/https://www.swascan.com/cactus-ransomware-malware-analysis/ - https://taiwan.postsen.com/business/88601/Hamas-hackers-use-data-destruction-software-BiBi-which-consumes-a-lot-of-processor-resources-to-wipe-Windows-computer-data--iThome.html author: Luc Génaux date: 2023-11-28 tags: - attack.impact - attack.defense-impairment - attack.t1486 - attack.t1685 logsource: category: image_load product: windows detection: selection_img: - ImageLoaded|endswith: \RstrtMgr.dll - OriginalFileName: RstrtMgr.dll selection_folders_1: Image|contains: - :\Perflogs\ - :\Users\Public\ - \Temporary Internet selection_folders_2: - Image|contains|all: - :\Users\ - \Favorites\ - Image|contains|all: - :\Users\ - \Favourites\ - Image|contains|all: - :\Users\ - \Contacts\ condition: selection_img and 1 of selection_folders_* falsepositives: - Processes related to software installation level: high
Near-miss passage: Sigma rule: Detects the execution of Winrs.exe where it is used to execute commands locally. Commands executed this way are launched. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: Winrs Local Command Execution id: bcfece3d-56fe-4545-9931-3b8e92927db1 status: experimental description: 'Detects the execution of Winrs.exe where it is used to execute commands locally. Commands executed this way are launched under Winrshost.exe and can represent proxy execution used for defense evasion or lateral movement. ' references: - https://cardinalops.com/blog/living-off-winrm-abusing-complexity-in-remote-management/ - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/winrs author: Liran Ravich, Nasreddine Bencherchali date: 2025-10-22 tags: - attack.lateral-movement - attack.stealth - attack.t1021.006 - attack.t1218 logsource: category: process_creation product: windows detection: selection_img: - Image|endswith: \winrs.exe - OriginalFileName: winrs.exe selection_local_ip: CommandLine|contains|windash: - /r:localhost - /r:127.0.0.1 - /r:[::1] - /remote:localhost - /remote:127.0.0.1 - /remote:[::1] filter_main_remote: CommandLine|contains|windash: - '/r:' - '/remote:' condition: all of selection_* or (selection_img and not 1 of filter_main_*) falsepositives: - Unlikely level: high