Query: alert when This method detects mimikatz keywords in different Eventlogs (some of them only appear in older Mimikatz version that ar
Matching passage: Sigma rule: This method detects mimikatz keywords in different Eventlogs (some of them only appear in older Mimikatz version that ar. Logsource: windows. Rule: title: Mimikatz Use id: 06d71506-7beb-4f22-8888-e2e5e2ca7fd8 status: test description: This method detects mimikatz keywords in different Eventlogs (some of them only appear in older Mimikatz version that are however still used by different threat groups) references: - https://tools.thehacker.recipes/mimikatz/modules author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), David ANDRE (additional keywords) date: 2017-01-10 modified: 2022-01-05 tags: - attack.s0002 - attack.lateral-movement - attack.credential-access - car.2013-07-001 - car.2019-04-004 - attack.t1003.002 - attack.t1003.004 - attack.t1003.001 - attack.t1003.006 logsource: product: windows detection: keywords: - dpapi::masterkey - eo.oe.kiwi - event::clear - event::drop - gentilkiwi.com - kerberos::golden - kerberos::ptc - kerberos::ptt - kerberos::tgt - Kiwi Legit Printer - 'lsadump::' - mimidrv.sys - \mimilib.dll - misc::printnightmare - misc::shadowcopies - misc::skeleton - privilege::backup - privilege::debug - privilege::driver - 'sekurlsa::' filter: EventID: 15 condition: keywords and not filter falsepositives: - Naughty administrators - AV Signature updates - Files with Mimikatz in their filename level: high
Near-miss passage: Sigma rule: Detects threat actors proxy executing code and bypassing application controls by leveraging wmic and the `/FORMAT` argum. Logsource: windows / image_load. Rule: title: WMIC Loading Scripting Libraries id: 06ce37c2-61ab-4f05-9ff5-b1a96d18ae32 related: - id: 8d63dadf-b91b-4187-87b6-34a1114577ea type: similar - id: 05c36dd6-79d6-4a9a-97da-3db20298ab2d type: similar status: test description: 'Detects threat actors proxy executing code and bypassing application controls by leveraging wmic and the `/FORMAT` argument switch to download and execute an XSL file (i.e js, vbs, etc). It could be an indicator of SquiblyTwo technique, which uses Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) to execute malicious code. ' references: - https://securitydatasets.com/notebooks/atomic/windows/defense_evasion/SDWIN-201017061100.html - https://twitter.com/dez_/status/986614411711442944 - https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Wmic/ author: Roberto Rodriguez (Cyb3rWard0g), OTR (Open Threat Research) date: 2020-10-17 modified: 2022-10-13 tags: - attack.stealth - attack.t1220 logsource: category: image_load product: windows detection: selection: Image|endswith: \wmic.exe ImageLoaded|endswith: - \jscript.dll - \vbscript.dll condition: selection falsepositives: - The command wmic os get lastbootuptime loads vbscript.dll - The command wmic os get locale loads vbscript.dll - Since the ImageLoad event doesn't have enough information in this case. It's better to look at the recent process creation events that spawned the WMIC process and investigate the command line and parent/child processes to get more insights - The command `wmic ntevent` loads vbscript.dll level: medium