Query: detect Detects binaries that use the same name as legitimate sysinternals tools to evade detection. This rule looks for the exe in logs
Matching passage: Sigma rule: Detects binaries that use the same name as legitimate sysinternals tools to evade detection. This rule looks for the exe. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: Potential Binary Impersonating Sysinternals Tools id: 7cce6fc8-a07f-4d84-a53e-96e1879843c9 status: test description: 'Detects binaries that use the same name as legitimate sysinternals tools to evade detection. This rule looks for the execution of binaries that are named similarly to Sysinternals tools. Adversary may rename their malicious tools as legitimate Sysinternals tools to evade detection. ' references: - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/downloads/sysinternals-suite author: frack113, Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems) date: 2021-12-20 modified: 2025-04-12 tags: - attack.execution - attack.stealth - attack.t1218 - attack.t1202 - attack.t1036.005 logsource: category: process_creation product: windows detection: selection_exe: Image|endswith: - \accesschk.exe - \accesschk64.exe - \AccessEnum.exe - \ADExplorer.exe - \ADExplorer64.exe - \ADInsight.exe - \ADInsight64.exe - \adrestore.exe - \adrestore64.exe - \Autologon.exe - \Autologon64.exe - \Autoruns.exe - \Autoruns64.exe - \autorunsc.exe - \autorunsc64.exe - \Bginfo.exe - \Bginfo64.exe - \Cacheset.exe - \Cacheset64.exe - \Clockres.exe - \Clockres64.exe - \Contig.exe - \Contig64.exe - \Coreinfo.exe - \Coreinfo64.exe - \CPUSTRES.EXE - \CPUSTRES64.EXE - \ctrl2cap.exe - \Dbgview.exe - \dbgview64.exe - \Desktops.exe - \Desktops64.exe - \disk2vhd.exe - \disk2vhd64.exe - \diskext.exe - \diskext64.exe - \Diskmon.exe - \Diskmon64.exe - \DiskView.exe - \DiskView64.exe - \du.exe - \du64.exe - \efsdump.exe - \FindLinks.exe - \FindLinks64.exe - \handle.exe - \handle64.exe - \hex2dec.exe - \hex2dec64.exe - \junction.exe - \junction64.exe - \ldmdump.exe - \listdlls.exe - \listdlls64.exe - \livekd.exe - \livekd64.exe - \loadOrd.exe - \loadOrd64.exe - \loadOrdC.exe - \loadOrdC64.exe - \logonsessions.exe - \logonsessions64.exe - \movefile.exe - \movefile64.exe - \notmyfault.exe - \notmyfault64.exe - \notmyfaultc.exe - \notmyfaultc64.exe - \ntfsinfo.exe - \ntfsinfo64.exe - \pendmoves.exe - \pendmoves64.exe - \pipelist.exe - \pipelist64.exe - \portmon.exe - \procdump.exe - \procdump64.exe - \procexp.exe - \procexp64.exe - \Procmon.exe - \Procmon64.exe - \psExec.exe - \psExec64.exe - \psfile.exe - \psfile64.exe - \psGetsid.exe - \psGetsid64.exe - \psInfo.exe - \psInfo64.exe - \pskill.exe - \pskill64.exe - \pslist.exe - \pslist64.exe - \psLoggedon.exe - \psLoggedon64.exe - \psloglist.exe - \psloglist64.exe - \pspasswd.exe - \pspasswd64.exe - \psping.exe - \psping64.exe - \psService.exe - \p
Near-miss passage: Sigma rule: Detects process access requests from hacktool processes based on their default image name. Logsource: windows / process_access. Rule: title: HackTool - Generic Process Access id: d0d2f720-d14f-448d-8242-51ff396a334e status: test description: Detects process access requests from hacktool processes based on their default image name references: - https://jsecurity101.medium.com/bypassing-access-mask-auditing-strategies-480fb641c158 - https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/you-bet-your-lsass-hunting-lsass-access.html author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems), Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel date: 2023-11-27 tags: - attack.credential-access - attack.t1003.001 - attack.s0002 logsource: category: process_access product: windows detection: selection: - SourceImage|endswith: - \Akagi.exe - \Akagi64.exe - \atexec_windows.exe - \Certify.exe - \Certipy.exe - \CoercedPotato.exe - \crackmapexec.exe - \CreateMiniDump.exe - \dcomexec_windows.exe - \dpapi_windows.exe - \findDelegation_windows.exe - \GetADUsers_windows.exe - \GetNPUsers_windows.exe - \getPac_windows.exe - \getST_windows.exe - \getTGT_windows.exe - \GetUserSPNs_windows.exe - \gmer.exe - \hashcat.exe - \htran.exe - \ifmap_windows.exe - \impersonate.exe - \Inveigh.exe - \LocalPotato.exe - \mimikatz_windows.exe - \mimikatz.exe - \netview_windows.exe - \nmapAnswerMachine_windows.exe - \opdump_windows.exe - \PasswordDump.exe - \Potato.exe - \PowerTool.exe - \PowerTool64.exe - \psexec_windows.exe - \PurpleSharp.exe - \pypykatz.exe - \QuarksPwDump.exe - \rdp_check_windows.exe - \Rubeus.exe - \SafetyKatz.exe - \sambaPipe_windows.exe - \SelectMyParent.exe - \SharpChisel.exe - \SharPersist.exe - \SharpEvtMute.exe - \SharpImpersonation.exe - \SharpLDAPmonitor.exe - \SharpLdapWhoami.exe - \SharpUp.exe - \SharpView.exe - \smbclient_windows.exe - \smbserver_windows.exe - \sniff_windows.exe - \sniffer_windows.exe - \split_windows.exe - \SpoolSample.exe - \Stracciatella.exe - \SysmonEOP.exe - \temp\rot.exe - \ticketer_windows.exe - \TruffleSnout.exe - \winPEASany_ofs.exe - \winPEASany.exe - \winPEASx64_ofs.exe - \winPEASx64.exe - \winPEASx86_ofs.exe - \winPEASx86.exe - \xordump.exe - SourceImage|contains: - \goldenPac - \just_dce_ - \karmaSMB - \kintercept - \LocalPotato - \ntlmrelayx - \rpcdump - \samrdump - \secretsdump - \smbexec - \smbrelayx - \wmiexec - \wmipersist - HotPotato - Juicy Potato - JuicyPotato - PetitPotam - RottenPotato condition: selection falsepositives: - Unlikely level: high