Query: rule covering Detects loading of known malicious drivers via the file name of the drivers.
Matching passage: Sigma rule: Detects loading of known malicious drivers via the file name of the drivers.. Logsource: windows / driver_load. Rule: title: Malicious Driver Load By Name id: 39b64854-5497-4b57-a448-40977b8c9679 status: test description: Detects loading of known malicious drivers via the file name of the drivers. references: - https://loldrivers.io/ author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) date: 2022-10-03 modified: 2023-12-02 tags: - attack.persistence - attack.privilege-escalation - attack.t1543.003 - attack.t1068 logsource: product: windows category: driver_load detection: selection: ImageLoaded|endswith: - \wfshbr64.sys - \ktmutil7odm.sys - \ktes.sys - \a26363e7b02b13f2b8d697abb90cd5c3.sys - \kt2.sys - \4748696211bd56c2d93c21cab91e82a5.sys - \malicious.sys - \a236e7d654cd932b7d11cb604629a2d0.sys - \spwizimgvt.sys - \c94f405c5929cfcccc8ad00b42c95083.sys - \fur.sys - \wantd.sys - \windbg.sys - \4118b86e490aed091b1a219dba45f332.sys - \gmer64.sys - \1fc7aeeff3ab19004d2e53eae8160ab1.sys - \poortry2.sys - \wintapix.sys - \daxin_blank6.sys - \6771b13a53b9c7449d4891e427735ea2.sys - \blacklotus_driver.sys - \air_system10.sys - \dkrtk.sys - \7.sys - \sense5ext.sys - \ktgn.sys - \ndislan.sys - \nlslexicons0024uvn.sys - \be6318413160e589080df02bb3ca6e6a.sys - \4.sys - \wantd_2.sys - \e29f6311ae87542b3d693c1f38e4e3ad.sys - \daxin_blank3.sys - \gftkyj64.sys - \daxin_blank2.sys - \wantd_4.sys - \reddriver.sys - \834761775.sys - \mlgbbiicaihflrnh.sys - \mjj0ge.sys - \daxin_blank.sys - \daxin_blank5.sys - \poortry1.sys - \msqpq.sys - \mimidrv.sys - \e939448b28a4edc81f1f974cebf6e7d2.sys - \prokiller64.sys - \nodedriver.sys - \wantd_3.sys - \lctka.sys - \kapchelper_x64.sys - \daxin_blank4.sys - \a9df5964635ef8bd567ae487c3d214c4.sys - \wantd_6.sys - \ntbios.sys - \wantd_5.sys - \pciecubed.sys - \mimikatz.sys - \nqrmq.sys - \2.sys - \poortry.sys - \ntbios_2.sys - \fgme.sys - \telephonuafy.sys - \typelibde.sys - \daxin_blank1.sys - \ef0e1725aaf0c6c972593f860531a2ea.sys - \5a4fe297c7d42539303137b6d75b150d.sys condition: selection falsepositives: - False positives may occur if one of the vulnerable driver names mentioned above didn't change its name between versions. So always make sure that the driver being loaded is the legitimate one and the non vulnerable version. - If you experience a lot of FP you could comment the driver name or its exact known legitimate location (when possible) level: medium
Near-miss passage: Sigma rule: Detects the execution of a binary from the Linux shared memory directory /dev/shm. This directory is a tmpfs mount backe. Logsource: linux / process_creation. Rule: title: Process Execution From Shared Memory Directory id: 5cd16c8f-44a6-4654-81e7-a84d6db507d4 status: experimental description: 'Detects the execution of a binary from the Linux shared memory directory /dev/shm. This directory is a tmpfs mount backed entirely by RAM and is abused by attackers for fileless malware staging because files written there never touch physical disk and may evade disk-based detection. ' references: - https://www.sysdig.com/blog/containers-read-only-fileless-malware - https://unfinished.bike/fun-with-the-new-bpfdoor-2023 - https://asiapacificdefencereporter.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/08/Final-CRWD-2023-Threat-Hunting-Report.pdf - https://www.crowdstrike.com/en-us/blog/how-to-hunt-for-decisivearchitect-and-justforfun-implant/ - https://www.linkedin.com/posts/avradeep_malware-apt-infostealer-activity-7373203959697719296-JR-7 - https://www.stormshield.com/news/orbit-analysis-of-a-linux-dedicated-malware/ author: Stan Beukers date: 2026-06-20 tags: - attack.stealth - attack.execution - attack.t1027.011 logsource: category: process_creation product: linux detection: selection: Image|startswith: /dev/shm/ condition: selection falsepositives: - Unlikely in production environments; some container runtimes or IPC frameworks may use /dev/shm for inter-process communication but should not spawn executables. level: high