Query: Sigma rule for Detects execution of the "esxcli" command with the "vm" flag in order to retrieve information about the installed VMs.
Matching passage: Sigma rule: Detects execution of the "esxcli" command with the "vm" flag in order to retrieve information about the installed VMs.. Logsource: linux / process_creation. Rule: title: ESXi VM List Discovery Via ESXCLI id: 5f1573a7-363b-4114-9208-ad7a61de46eb status: test description: Detects execution of the "esxcli" command with the "vm" flag in order to retrieve information about the installed VMs. references: - https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/hypervisor-jackpotting-ecrime-actors-increase-targeting-of-esxi-servers/ - https://developer.broadcom.com/xapis/esxcli-command-reference/7.0.0/namespace/esxcli_vm.html - https://www.secuinfra.com/en/techtalk/hide-your-hypervisor-analysis-of-esxiargs-ransomware/ - https://www.trendmicro.com/en_us/research/22/e/new-linux-based-ransomware-cheerscrypt-targets-exsi-devices.html author: Cedric Maurugeon date: 2023-09-04 tags: - attack.discovery - attack.execution - attack.t1033 - attack.t1007 - attack.t1059.012 logsource: category: process_creation product: linux detection: selection: Image|endswith: /esxcli CommandLine|contains: vm process CommandLine|endswith: ' list' condition: selection falsepositives: - Legitimate administration activities level: medium
Near-miss passage: Sigma rule: Detect suspicious Kerberos TGT requests. Once an attacer obtains a computer certificate by abusing Active Directory Cert. Logsource: windows / security. Rule: title: PetitPotam Suspicious Kerberos TGT Request id: 6a53d871-682d-40b6-83e0-b7c1a6c4e3a5 status: test description: 'Detect suspicious Kerberos TGT requests. Once an attacer obtains a computer certificate by abusing Active Directory Certificate Services in combination with PetitPotam, the next step would be to leverage the certificate for malicious purposes. One way of doing this is to request a Kerberos Ticket Granting Ticket using a tool like Rubeus. This request will generate a 4768 event with some unusual fields depending on the environment. This analytic will require tuning, we recommend filtering Account_Name to the Domain Controller computer accounts. ' references: - https://github.com/topotam/PetitPotam - https://isc.sans.edu/forums/diary/Active+Directory+Certificate+Services+ADCS+PKI+domain+admin+vulnerability/27668/ - https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/88d689fe8a055d8284337b9fad5d9152b42043db/detections/endpoint/petitpotam_suspicious_kerberos_tgt_request.yml author: Mauricio Velazco, Michael Haag date: 2021-09-02 modified: 2022-10-05 tags: - attack.credential-access - attack.t1187 logsource: product: windows service: security definition: The advanced audit policy setting "Account Logon > Kerberos Authentication Service" must be configured for Success/Failure detection: selection: EventID: 4768 TargetUserName|endswith: $ CertThumbprint|contains: '*' filter_local: IpAddress: ::1 filter_thumbprint: CertThumbprint: '' condition: selection and not 1 of filter_* falsepositives: - False positives are possible if the environment is using certificates for authentication. We recommend filtering Account_Name to the Domain Controller computer accounts. level: high