Query: Lateral movement indicators for Poisoned Pipeline Execution
Matching passage: T1677 Poisoned Pipeline Execution. Tactics: execution. Description: Adversaries may manipulate continuous integration / continuous development (CI/CD) processes by injecting malicious code into the build process. There are several mechanisms for poisoning pipelines: * In a <b>Direct Pipeline Execution</b> scenario, the threat actor directly modifies the CI configuration file (e.g., `gitlab-ci.yml` in GitLab). They may include a command to exfiltrate credentials leveraged in the build process to a remote server, or to export them as a workflow artifact.(Citation: Unit 42 Palo Alto GitHub Actions Supply Chain Attack 2025)(Citation: OWASP CICD-SEC-4) * In an <b>Indirect Pipeline Execution</b> scenario, the threat actor injects malicious code into files referenced by the CI configuration file. These may include makefiles, scripts, unit tests, and linters.(Citation: OWASP CICD-SEC-4) * In a <b>Public Pipeline Execution</b> scenario, the threat actor does not have direct access to the repository but instead creates a malicious pull request from a fork that triggers a part of the CI/CD pipeline. For example, in GitHub Actions, the `pull_request_target` trigger allows workflows running from forked repositories to access secrets. If this trigger is combined with an explicit pull request checkout and a location for a threat actor to insert malicious code (e.g., an `npm build` command), a threat actor may be able to leak pipeline credentials.(Citation: Unit 42 Palo Alto GitHub Actions Supply Chain Attack 2025)(Citation: GitHub Security Lab GitHub Actions Security 2021) Similarly, threat actors may craft pull requests with malicious inputs (such as branch names) if the build pipeline treats those inputs as trusted.(Citation: Wiz Ultralytics AI Library Hijack 2024)(Citation: Synactiv Hijacking GitHub Runners)(Citation: GitHub Security Labs GitHub Actions Security Part 2 2021) Finally, if a pipeline leverages a self-hosted runner, a threat actor may be able to execute arbitrary code on a host inside the organization’s network.(Citation: John Staw
Near-miss passage: T1675 ESXi Administration Command. Tactics: execution. Description: Adversaries may abuse ESXi administration services to execute commands on guest machines hosted within an ESXi virtual environment. Persistent background services on ESXi-hosted VMs, such as the VMware Tools Daemon Service, allow for remote management from the ESXi server. The tools daemon service runs as `vmtoolsd.exe` on Windows guest operating systems, `vmware-tools-daemon` on macOS, and `vmtoolsd ` on Linux.(Citation: Broadcom VMware Tools Services) Adversaries may leverage a variety of tools to execute commands on ESXi-hosted VMs – for example, by using the vSphere Web Services SDK to programmatically execute commands and scripts via APIs such as `StartProgramInGuest`, `ListProcessesInGuest`, `ListFileInGuest`, and `InitiateFileTransferFromGuest`.(Citation: Google Cloud Threat Intelligence VMWare ESXi Zero-Day 2023)(Citation: Broadcom Running Guest OS Operations) This may enable follow-on behaviors on the guest VMs, such as [File and Directory Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1083), [Data from Local System](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1005), or [OS Credential Dumping](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003).