Query: Sigma YAML for windows / process_creation
Matching passage: Sigma rule: An adversary may compress or encrypt data that is collected prior to exfiltration using 3rd party utilities. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: Compress Data and Lock With Password for Exfiltration With 7-ZIP id: 9fbf5927-5261-4284-a71d-f681029ea574 status: test description: An adversary may compress or encrypt data that is collected prior to exfiltration using 3rd party utilities references: - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1560.001/T1560.001.md author: frack113 date: 2021-07-27 modified: 2026-06-05 tags: - attack.collection - attack.t1560.001 logsource: category: process_creation product: windows detection: selection_img: - Description|contains: 7-Zip - Image|endswith: - \7z.exe - \7zr.exe - \7za.exe - OriginalFileName: - 7z.exe - 7za.exe - 7zr.exe selection_password: CommandLine|contains: ' -p' selection_action: CommandLine|contains: - ' a ' - ' u ' condition: all of selection_* falsepositives: - Legitimate activity is expected since compressing files with a password is common. level: medium
Near-miss passage: Sigma rule: Potential adversaries stopping ETW providers recording loaded .NET assemblies.. Logsource: windows / registry_set. Rule: title: ETW Logging Disabled In .NET Processes - Sysmon Registry id: bf4fc428-dcc3-4bbd-99fe-2422aeee2544 related: - id: a4c90ea1-2634-4ca0-adbb-35eae169b6fc type: similar status: test description: Potential adversaries stopping ETW providers recording loaded .NET assemblies. references: - https://twitter.com/_xpn_/status/1268712093928378368 - https://social.msdn.microsoft.com/Forums/vstudio/en-US/0878832e-39d7-4eaf-8e16-a729c4c40975/what-can-i-use-e13c0d23ccbc4e12931bd9cc2eee27e4-for?forum=clr - https://github.com/dotnet/runtime/blob/ee2355c801d892f2894b0f7b14a20e6cc50e0e54/docs/design/coreclr/jit/viewing-jit-dumps.md#setting-configuration-variables - https://github.com/dotnet/runtime/blob/f62e93416a1799aecc6b0947adad55a0d9870732/src/coreclr/src/inc/clrconfigvalues.h#L35-L38 - https://github.com/dotnet/runtime/blob/7abe42dc1123722ed385218268bb9fe04556e3d3/src/coreclr/src/inc/clrconfig.h#L33-L39 - https://github.com/dotnet/runtime/search?p=1&q=COMPlus_&unscoped_q=COMPlus_ - https://bunnyinside.com/?term=f71e8cb9c76a - http://managed670.rssing.com/chan-5590147/all_p1.html - https://github.com/dotnet/runtime/blob/4f9ae42d861fcb4be2fcd5d3d55d5f227d30e723/docs/coding-guidelines/clr-jit-coding-conventions.md#1412-disabling-code - https://blog.xpnsec.com/hiding-your-dotnet-complus-etwenabled/ - https://i.blackhat.com/EU-21/Wednesday/EU-21-Teodorescu-Veni-No-Vidi-No-Vici-Attacks-On-ETW-Blind-EDRs.pdf author: Roberto Rodriguez (Cyb3rWard0g), OTR (Open Threat Research) date: 2020-06-05 modified: 2023-08-17 tags: - attack.persistence - attack.defense-impairment - attack.t1112 - attack.t1685 logsource: product: windows category: registry_set detection: selection_etw_enabled: TargetObject|endswith: SOFTWARE\Microsoft\.NETFramework\ETWEnabled Details: DWORD (0x00000000) selection_complus: TargetObject|endswith: - \COMPlus_ETWEnabled - \COMPlus_ETWFlags Details: - 0 - DWORD (0x00000000) condition: 1 of selection_* falsepositives: - Unknown level: high