Query: write Sigma for Detects creation of new ".dll" files inside the plugins directory of a notepad++ installation by a process other than "g
Matching passage: Sigma rule: Detects creation of new ".dll" files inside the plugins directory of a notepad++ installation by a process other than "g. Logsource: windows / file_event. Rule: title: Potential Persistence Via Notepad++ Plugins id: 54127bd4-f541-4ac3-afdb-ea073f63f692 status: test description: Detects creation of new ".dll" files inside the plugins directory of a notepad++ installation by a process other than "gup.exe". Which could indicates possible persistence references: - https://pentestlab.blog/2022/02/14/persistence-notepad-plugins/ author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) date: 2022-06-10 modified: 2025-09-01 tags: - attack.persistence logsource: product: windows category: file_event detection: selection: TargetFilename|contains: \Notepad++\plugins\ TargetFilename|endswith: .dll filter_gup: Image|endswith: \Notepad++\updater\gup.exe filter_install: Image|startswith: C:\Users\ Image|contains: \AppData\Local\Temp\ Image|endswith: - \target.exe - Installer.x64.exe filter_main_installer: Image|contains: \npp. Image|endswith: .exe TargetFilename: - C:\Program Files\Notepad++\plugins\NppExport\NppExport.dll - C:\Program Files\Notepad++\plugins\mimeTools\mimeTools.dll - C:\Program Files\Notepad++\plugins\NppConverter\NppConverter.dll - C:\Program Files\Notepad++\plugins\Config\nppPluginList.dll condition: selection and not 1 of filter_* falsepositives: - Possible FPs during first installation of Notepad++ - Legitimate use of custom plugins by users in order to enhance notepad++ functionalities level: medium
Near-miss passage: Sigma rule: Detects the execution of a renamed instance of the Remote Monitoring and Management (RMM) tool, MeshAgent. RMM tools suc. Logsource: macos / process_creation. Rule: title: Remote Access Tool - Renamed MeshAgent Execution - MacOS id: bd3b5eaa-439d-4a42-8f35-a49f5c8a2582 related: - id: b471f462-eb0d-4832-be35-28d94bdb4780 type: similar - id: 22c45af6-f590-4d44-bab3-b5b2d2a2b6d9 type: derived status: experimental description: 'Detects the execution of a renamed instance of the Remote Monitoring and Management (RMM) tool, MeshAgent. RMM tools such as MeshAgent are commonly utilized by IT administrators for legitimate remote support and system management. However, malicious actors may exploit these tools by renaming them to bypass detection mechanisms, enabling unauthorized access and control over compromised systems. ' references: - https://www.huntress.com/blog/know-thy-enemy-a-novel-november-case-on-persistent-remote-access - https://thecyberexpress.com/ukraine-hit-by-meshagent-malware-campaign/ - https://wazuh.com/blog/how-to-detect-meshagent-with-wazuh/ - https://www.security.com/threat-intelligence/medusa-ransomware-attacks author: Norbert Jaśniewicz (AlphaSOC) date: 2025-05-19 tags: - attack.command-and-control - attack.stealth - attack.t1219.002 - attack.t1036.003 logsource: category: process_creation product: macos detection: selection_meshagent: - CommandLine|contains: --meshServiceName - OriginalFileName|contains: meshagent filter_main_legitimate: Image|endswith: - /meshagent - /meshagent_osx64 condition: selection_meshagent and not 1 of filter_main_* falsepositives: - Unknown level: high