Query: write Sigma for Detects a DNS query by a non browser process on the system to "azurewebsites.net". The latter was often used by threat a
Matching passage: Sigma rule: Detects a DNS query by a non browser process on the system to "azurewebsites.net". The latter was often used by threat a. Logsource: windows / dns_query. Rule: title: DNS Query To AzureWebsites.NET By Non-Browser Process id: e043f529-8514-4205-8ab0-7f7d2927b400 related: - id: 5c80b618-0dbb-46e6-acbb-03d90bcb6d83 type: derived status: test description: 'Detects a DNS query by a non browser process on the system to "azurewebsites.net". The latter was often used by threat actors as a malware hosting and exfiltration site. ' references: - https://www.sentinelone.com/labs/wip26-espionage-threat-actors-abuse-cloud-infrastructure-in-targeted-telco-attacks/ - https://symantec-enterprise-blogs.security.com/threat-intelligence/harvester-new-apt-attacks-asia - https://www.ptsecurity.com/ww-en/analytics/pt-esc-threat-intelligence/higaisa-or-winnti-apt-41-backdoors-old-and-new/ - https://intezer.com/blog/research/how-we-escaped-docker-in-azure-functions/ author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) date: 2024-06-24 tags: - attack.command-and-control - attack.t1219.002 logsource: product: windows category: dns_query detection: selection: QueryName|endswith: azurewebsites.net filter_optional_chrome: Image: - C:\Program Files\Google\Chrome\Application\chrome.exe - C:\Program Files (x86)\Google\Chrome\Application\chrome.exe filter_optional_firefox: Image: - C:\Program Files\Mozilla Firefox\firefox.exe - C:\Program Files (x86)\Mozilla Firefox\firefox.exe filter_optional_ie: Image: - C:\Program Files (x86)\Internet Explorer\iexplore.exe - C:\Program Files\Internet Explorer\iexplore.exe filter_optional_edge_1: - Image|startswith: C:\Program Files (x86)\Microsoft\EdgeWebView\Application\ - Image|endswith: \WindowsApps\MicrosoftEdge.exe - Image: - C:\Program Files (x86)\Microsoft\Edge\Application\msedge.exe - C:\Program Files\Microsoft\Edge\Application\msedge.exe filter_optional_edge_2: Image|startswith: - C:\Program Files (x86)\Microsoft\EdgeCore\ - C:\Program Files\Microsoft\EdgeCore\ Image|endswith: - \msedge.exe - \msedgewebview2.exe filter_optional_safari: Image|endswith: \safari.exe filter_optional_defender: Image|endswith: - \MsMpEng.exe - \MsSense.exe filter_optional_brave: Image|endswith: \brave.exe Image|startswith: C:\Program Files\BraveSoftware\ filter_optional_maxthon: Image|contains: \AppData\Local\Maxthon\ Image|endswith: \maxthon.exe filter_optional_opera: Image|contains: \AppData\Local\Programs\Opera\ Image|endswith: \opera.exe filter_optional_seamonkey: Image|startswith: - C:\Program Files\SeaMonkey\ - C:\Program Files (x86)\SeaMonkey\ Image|endswith: \seamonkey.exe filter_optional_vivaldi: Image|contains: \AppD
Near-miss passage: Sigma rule: Detects the execution of SharpMove, a .NET utility performing multiple tasks such as "Task Creation", "SCM" query, VBScr. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: HackTool - SharpMove Tool Execution id: 055fb54c-a8f4-4aee-bd44-f74cf30a0d9d status: test description: 'Detects the execution of SharpMove, a .NET utility performing multiple tasks such as "Task Creation", "SCM" query, VBScript execution using WMI via its PE metadata and command line options. ' references: - https://github.com/0xthirteen/SharpMove/ - https://pentestlab.blog/tag/sharpmove/ author: Luca Di Bartolomeo (CrimpSec) date: 2024-01-29 tags: - attack.lateral-movement - attack.t1021.002 logsource: category: process_creation product: windows detection: selection_img: - Image|endswith: \SharpMove.exe - OriginalFileName: SharpMove.exe selection_cli_computer: CommandLine|contains: computername= selection_cli_actions: CommandLine|contains: - action=create - action=dcom - action=executevbs - action=hijackdcom - action=modschtask - action=modsvc - action=query - action=scm - action=startservice - action=taskscheduler condition: selection_img or all of selection_cli_* falsepositives: - Unknown level: high