Query: detect Detects execution and usage of the DSInternals PowerShell module. Which can be used to perform what might be considered in logs
Matching passage: Sigma rule: Detects execution and usage of the DSInternals PowerShell module. Which can be used to perform what might be considered. Logsource: windows / ps_script. Rule: title: DSInternals Suspicious PowerShell Cmdlets - ScriptBlock id: 846c7a87-8e14-4569-9d49-ecfd4276a01c related: - id: 43d91656-a9b2-4541-b7e2-6a9bd3a13f4e type: similar status: test description: 'Detects execution and usage of the DSInternals PowerShell module. Which can be used to perform what might be considered as suspicious activity such as dumping DPAPI backup keys or manipulating NTDS.DIT files. The DSInternals PowerShell Module exposes several internal features of Active Directory and Azure Active Directory. These include FIDO2 and NGC key auditing, offline ntds.dit file manipulation, password auditing, DC recovery from IFM backups and password hash calculation. ' references: - https://github.com/MichaelGrafnetter/DSInternals/blob/39ee8a69bbdc1cfd12c9afdd7513b4788c4895d4/Src/DSInternals.PowerShell/DSInternals.psd1 author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) date: 2024-06-26 tags: - attack.execution - attack.t1059.001 logsource: product: windows category: ps_script definition: 'Requirements: Script Block Logging must be enabled' detection: selection: ScriptBlockText|contains: - Add-ADDBSidHistory - Add-ADNgcKey - Add-ADReplNgcKey - ConvertFrom-ADManagedPasswordBlob - ConvertFrom-GPPrefPassword - ConvertFrom-ManagedPasswordBlob - ConvertFrom-UnattendXmlPassword - ConvertFrom-UnicodePassword - ConvertTo-AADHash - ConvertTo-GPPrefPassword - ConvertTo-KerberosKey - ConvertTo-LMHash - ConvertTo-MsoPasswordHash - ConvertTo-NTHash - ConvertTo-OrgIdHash - ConvertTo-UnicodePassword - Disable-ADDBAccount - Enable-ADDBAccount - Get-ADDBAccount - Get-ADDBBackupKey - Get-ADDBDomainController - Get-ADDBGroupManagedServiceAccount - Get-ADDBKdsRootKey - Get-ADDBSchemaAttribute - Get-ADDBServiceAccount - Get-ADDefaultPasswordPolicy - Get-ADKeyCredential - Get-ADPasswordPolicy - Get-ADReplAccount - Get-ADReplBackupKey - Get-ADReplicationAccount - Get-ADSIAccount - Get-AzureADUserEx - Get-BootKey - Get-KeyCredential - Get-LsaBackupKey - Get-LsaPolicy - Get-SamPasswordPolicy - Get-SysKey - Get-SystemKey - New-ADDBRestoreFromMediaScript - New-ADKeyCredential - New-ADNgcKey - New-NTHashSet - Remove-ADDBObject - Save-DPAPIBlob - Set-ADAccountPasswordHash - Set-ADDBAccountPassword - Set-ADDBBootKey - Set-ADDBDomainController - Set-ADDBPrimaryGroup - Set-ADDBSysKey - Set-AzureADUserEx - Set-LsaPolicy - Set-SamAccountPasswordHash - Set-WinUserPasswordHash - Test-ADDBPasswordQuality - Test-ADPasswordQuality - Test-ADReplPasswordQuality - Test-PasswordQuality - Unlock-AD
Near-miss passage: Sigma rule: Detects the pattern of UAC Bypass using consent.exe and comctl32.dll (UACMe 22). Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: UAC Bypass Using Consent and Comctl32 - Process id: 1ca6bd18-0ba0-44ca-851c-92ed89a61085 status: test description: Detects the pattern of UAC Bypass using consent.exe and comctl32.dll (UACMe 22) references: - https://github.com/hfiref0x/UACME author: Christian Burkard (Nextron Systems) date: 2021-08-23 modified: 2024-12-01 tags: - attack.privilege-escalation - attack.t1548.002 logsource: category: process_creation product: windows detection: selection: ParentImage|endswith: \consent.exe Image|endswith: \werfault.exe IntegrityLevel: - High - System - S-1-16-16384 - S-1-16-12288 condition: selection falsepositives: - Unknown level: high