Query: actor TTPs: Audio-Visual Content
Matching passage: T1683.002 Audio-Visual Content. Tactics: resource development. Description: Adversaries may create or manipulate audio, image, and video content to support targeting and malicious operations. Adversaries may also use synthetic voice recordings, real-time altered audio or video during live interactions, fabricated profile photos and identity documents, or video content depicting fabricated or impersonated individuals.(Citation: Nov AI Threat Tracker) Content may be produced manually through editing tools, generated using AI-assisted tools, or produced using third-party synthetic services.(Citation: FBI 2025 AI Generate Content)(Citation: Europol Deepfakes) AI-assisted tools have enabled adversaries to produce synthetic media at scale and generate content that is more difficult to identify as inauthentic. Audio-visual content produced through these methods may be used in support of other techniques, such as [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1660), [Spearphishing via Service](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/003), [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598), [Internal Spearphishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1534), [Social Engineering](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1684), [Financial Theft](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1657), or [Establish Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1585).
Near-miss passage: T1683.001 Written Content. Tactics: resource development. Description: Adversaries may create or tailor written materials to support targeting and malicious operations. Content may include phishing lures, fraudulent financial communications, fabricated job postings, fabricated employment credentials and documentation, decoy documents, social media persona content, and supporting narratives used to sustain fabricated personas over time.(Citation: GenAI Phishing)(Citation: GTIG AI Threat Tracker) Content may be authored manually, commissioned through third parties, or produced using AI-assisted tools. Written materials may impersonate legitimate government correspondence, diplomatic communications, or internal organizational documents to support targeting efforts. AI-assisted tools may also be used to tailor content to specific targets, industries, or regions. For example, adversaries may leverage AI to translate content into a target's native language or mimic the communication style of trusted senders. Written content produced through these methods may be used in support of other techniques, such as [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1660), [Spearphishing via Service](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/003), [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598), [Internal Spearphishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1534), [Social Engineering](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1684), [Financial Theft](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1657), or [Establish Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1585). Written content does not include malicious code or scripts; for development of malicious code and scripts, see [Develop Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1587).