Query: alert when Detects when an attacker registers a new IFilter for an extension. Microsoft Windows Search uses filters to extract the
Matching passage: Sigma rule: Detects when an attacker registers a new IFilter for an extension. Microsoft Windows Search uses filters to extract the. Logsource: windows / registry_set. Rule: title: Register New IFiltre For Persistence id: b23818c7-e575-4d13-8012-332075ec0a2b status: test description: 'Detects when an attacker registers a new IFilter for an extension. Microsoft Windows Search uses filters to extract the content of items for inclusion in a full-text index. You can extend Windows Search to index new or proprietary file types by writing filters to extract the content, and property handlers to extract the properties of files. ' references: - https://persistence-info.github.io/Data/ifilters.html - https://twitter.com/0gtweet/status/1468548924600459267 - https://github.com/gtworek/PSBits/tree/master/IFilter - https://github.com/gtworek/PSBits/blob/8d767892f3b17eefa4d0668f5d2df78e844f01d8/IFilter/Dll.cpp#L281-L308 author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) date: 2022-07-21 modified: 2024-03-26 tags: - attack.persistence logsource: category: registry_set product: windows detection: selection_ext: TargetObject|contains|all: - \SOFTWARE\Classes\. - \PersistentHandler selection_clsid: TargetObject|contains|all: - \SOFTWARE\Classes\CLSID - \PersistentAddinsRegistered\{89BCB740-6119-101A-BCB7-00DD010655AF} filter_default_targets: TargetObject|contains: - \CLSID\{4F46F75F-199F-4C63-8B7D-86D48FE7970C}\ - \CLSID\{4887767F-7ADC-4983-B576-88FB643D6F79}\ - \CLSID\{D3B41FA1-01E3-49AF-AA25-1D0D824275AE}\ - \CLSID\{72773E1A-B711-4d8d-81FA-B9A43B0650DD}\ - \CLSID\{098f2470-bae0-11cd-b579-08002b30bfeb}\ - \CLSID\{1AA9BF05-9A97-48c1-BA28-D9DCE795E93C}\ - \CLSID\{2e2294a9-50d7-4fe7-a09f-e6492e185884}\ - \CLSID\{34CEAC8D-CBC0-4f77-B7B1-8A60CB6DA0F7}\ - \CLSID\{3B224B11-9363-407e-850F-C9E1FFACD8FB}\ - \CLSID\{3DDEB7A4-8ABF-4D82-B9EE-E1F4552E95BE}\ - \CLSID\{5645C8C1-E277-11CF-8FDA-00AA00A14F93}\ - \CLSID\{5645C8C4-E277-11CF-8FDA-00AA00A14F93}\ - \CLSID\{58A9EBF6-5755-4554-A67E-A2467AD1447B}\ - \CLSID\{5e941d80-bf96-11cd-b579-08002b30bfeb}\ - \CLSID\{698A4FFC-63A3-4E70-8F00-376AD29363FB}\ - \CLSID\{7E9D8D44-6926-426F-AA2B-217A819A5CCE}\ - \CLSID\{8CD34779-9F10-4f9b-ADFB-B3FAEABDAB5A}\ - \CLSID\{9694E38A-E081-46ac-99A0-8743C909ACB6}\ - \CLSID\{98de59a0-d175-11cd-a7bd-00006b827d94}\ - \CLSID\{AA10385A-F5AA-4EFF-B3DF-71B701E25E18}\ - \CLSID\{B4132098-7A03-423D-9463-163CB07C151F}\ - \CLSID\{d044309b-5da6-4633-b085-4ed02522e5a5}\ - \CLSID\{D169C14A-5148-4322-92C8-754FC9D018D8}\ - \CLSID\{DD75716E-B42E-4978-BB60-1497B92E30C4}\ - \CLSID\{E2F83EED-62DE-4A9F-9CD0-A1D40DCD13B6}\ - \CLSID\{E772CEB3-E203-4828-ADF1-765713D981B8}\ - \CLSID\{eec97550-47a9-11cf-b95
Near-miss passage: Sigma rule: Detects the usage of the 'SeLoadDriverPrivilege' privilege. This privilege is required to load or unload a device driver. Logsource: windows / security. Rule: title: Potential Privileged System Service Operation - SeLoadDriverPrivilege id: f63508a0-c809-4435-b3be-ed819394d612 status: test description: 'Detects the usage of the ''SeLoadDriverPrivilege'' privilege. This privilege is required to load or unload a device driver. With this privilege, the user can dynamically load and unload device drivers or other code in to kernel mode. This user right does not apply to Plug and Play device drivers. If you exclude privileged users/admins and processes, which are allowed to do so, you are maybe left with bad programs trying to load malicious kernel drivers. This will detect Ghost-In-The-Logs (https://github.com/bats3c/Ghost-In-The-Logs) and the usage of Sysinternals and various other tools. So you have to work with a whitelist to find the bad stuff. ' references: - https://web.archive.org/web/20230331181619/https://blog.dylan.codes/evading-sysmon-and-windows-event-logging/ - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-10/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4673 author: xknow (@xknow_infosec), xorxes (@xor_xes) date: 2019-04-08 modified: 2026-06-29 tags: - attack.defense-impairment - attack.t1685 logsource: product: windows service: security detection: selection_1: EventID: 4673 PrivilegeList: SeLoadDriverPrivilege Service: '-' filter_main_exact: ProcessName: - C:\Windows\explorer.exe - C:\Windows\HelpPane.exe - C:\Windows\ImmersiveControlPanel\SystemSettings.exe - C:\Windows\System32\Dism.exe - C:\Windows\System32\fltMC.exe - C:\Windows\System32\mmc.exe - C:\Windows\System32\rundll32.exe - C:\Windows\System32\RuntimeBroker.exe - C:\Windows\System32\ShellHost.exe - C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe - C:\Windows\System32\SystemSettingsBroker.exe - C:\Windows\System32\wimserv.exe filter_optional_others: ProcessName|endswith: - \AppData\Local\Microsoft\Teams\current\Teams.exe - \Google\Chrome\Application\chrome.exe - \procexp.exe - \procexp64.exe - \procexp64a.exe - \procmon.exe - \procmon64.exe - \procmon64a.exe filter_main_startswith: ProcessName|startswith: C:\Program Files\WindowsApps\Microsoft filter_optional_dropbox: ProcessName|startswith: - C:\Program Files (x86)\Dropbox\ - C:\Program Files\Dropbox\ ProcessName|endswith: \Dropbox.exe condition: selection_1 and not 1 of filter_main_* and not 1 of filter_optional_* falsepositives: - Other legimate tools loading drivers. Including but not limited to, Sysinternals, CPU-Z, AVs etc. A baseline needs to be created according to the used