alirezaaminzadeh/secembed-pairs huggingface dataset:
Query: write Sigma for Detects PAExec default named pipe
Matching passage: Sigma rule: Detects PAExec default named pipe. Logsource: windows / pipe_created. Rule: title: PUA - PAExec Default Named Pipe id: f6451de4-df0a-41fa-8d72-b39f54a08db5 status: test description: Detects PAExec default named pipe references: - https://github.com/microsoft/Microsoft-365-Defender-Hunting-Queries/blob/efa17a600b43c897b4b7463cc8541daa1987eeb4/Command%20and%20Control/C2-NamedPipe.md - https://github.com/poweradminllc/PAExec author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) date: 2022-10-26 tags: - attack.execution - attack.t1569.002 logsource: category: pipe_created product: windows definition: Note that you have to configure logging for Named Pipe Events in Sysmon config (Event ID 17 and Event ID 18). The basic configuration is in popular sysmon configuration (https://github.com/SwiftOnSecurity/sysmon-config), but it is worth verifying. You can also use other repo, e.g. https://github.com/Neo23x0/sysmon-config, https://github.com/olafhartong/sysmon-modular. How to test detection? You can check powershell script from this site https://svch0st.medium.com/guide-to-named-pipes-and-hunting-for-cobalt-strike-pipes-dc46b2c5f575 detection: selection: PipeName|startswith: \PAExec condition: selection falsepositives: - Unknown level: medium
Near-miss passage: Sigma rule: Identifies use of Fodhelper.exe to bypass User Account Control. Adversaries use this technique to execute privileged pro. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: Bypass UAC via Fodhelper.exe id: 7f741dcf-fc22-4759-87b4-9ae8376676a2 status: test description: Identifies use of Fodhelper.exe to bypass User Account Control. Adversaries use this technique to execute privileged processes. references: - https://eqllib.readthedocs.io/en/latest/analytics/e491ce22-792f-11e9-8f5c-d46d6d62a49e.html - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1548.002/T1548.002.md author: E.M. Anhaus (originally from Atomic Blue Detections, Tony Lambert), oscd.community date: 2019-10-24 modified: 2021-11-27 tags: - attack.privilege-escalation - attack.t1548.002 logsource: category: process_creation product: windows detection: selection: ParentImage|endswith: \fodhelper.exe condition: selection falsepositives: - Legitimate use of fodhelper.exe utility by legitimate user level: high
Query: SIEM correlation: defense impairment activity consistent with Network Provider DLL
Matching passage: T1556.008 Network Provider DLL. Tactics: defense impairment, persistence, credential access. Description: Adversaries may register malicious network provider dynamic link libraries (DLLs) to capture cleartext user credentials during the authentication process. Network provider DLLs allow Windows to interface with specific network protocols and can also support add-on credential management functions.(Citation: Network Provider API) During the logon process, Winlogon (the interactive logon module) sends credentials to the local `mpnotify.exe` process via RPC. The `mpnotify.exe` process then shares the credentials in cleartext with registered credential managers when notifying that a logon event is happening.(Citation: NPPSPY - Huntress)(Citation: NPPSPY Video)(Citation: NPLogonNotify) Adversaries can configure a malicious network provider DLL to receive credentials from `mpnotify.exe`.(Citation: NPPSPY) Once installed as a credential manager (via the Registry), a malicious DLL can receive and save credentials each time a user logs onto a Windows workstation or domain via the `NPLogonNotify()` function.(Citation: NPLogonNotify) Adversaries may target planting malicious network provider DLLs on systems known to have increased logon activity and/or administrator logon activity, such as servers and domain controllers.(Citation: NPPSPY - Huntress)
Near-miss passage: T1556.004 Network Device Authentication. Tactics: defense impairment, persistence, credential access. Description: Adversaries may use [Patch System Image](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1601/001) to hard code a password in the operating system, thus bypassing of native authentication mechanisms for local accounts on network devices. [Modify System Image](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1601) may include implanted code to the operating system for network devices to provide access for adversaries using a specific password. The modification includes a specific password which is implanted in the operating system image via the patch. Upon authentication attempts, the inserted code will first check to see if the user input is the password. If so, access is granted. Otherwise, the implanted code will pass the credentials on for verification of potentially valid credentials.(Citation: Mandiant - Synful Knock)
Query: detect Detects the creation of a file with the ".pdf" extension by the "RegEdit.exe" process. This indicates that a user is try in logs
Matching passage: Sigma rule: Detects the creation of a file with the ".pdf" extension by the "RegEdit.exe" process. This indicates that a user is try. Logsource: windows / file_event. Rule: title: PDF File Created By RegEdit.EXE id: 145095eb-e273-443b-83d0-f9b519b7867b status: test description: 'Detects the creation of a file with the ".pdf" extension by the "RegEdit.exe" process. This indicates that a user is trying to print/save a registry key as a PDF in order to potentially extract sensitive information and bypass defenses. ' references: - https://sensepost.com/blog/2024/dumping-lsa-secrets-a-story-about-task-decorrelation/ author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) date: 2024-07-08 tags: - attack.stealth logsource: category: file_event product: windows detection: selection: Image|endswith: \regedit.exe TargetFilename|endswith: .pdf condition: selection falsepositives: - Unlikely level: high
Near-miss passage: Sigma rule: Identifies two sign-ins originating from geographically distant locations, where at least one of the locations may also. Logsource: azure / riskdetection. Rule: title: Atypical Travel id: 1a41023f-1e70-4026-921a-4d9341a9038e status: test description: Identifies two sign-ins originating from geographically distant locations, where at least one of the locations may also be atypical for the user, given past behavior. references: - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/id-protection/concept-identity-protection-risks#atypical-travel - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/architecture/security-operations-user-accounts#unusual-sign-ins author: Mark Morowczynski '@markmorow', Gloria Lee, '@gleeiamglo' date: 2023-09-03 tags: - attack.stealth - attack.t1078 - attack.persistence - attack.privilege-escalation - attack.initial-access logsource: product: azure service: riskdetection detection: selection: riskEventType: unlikelyTravel condition: selection falsepositives: - We recommend investigating the sessions flagged by this detection in the context of other sign-ins from the user. level: high
Query: alert when Detection for when multi factor authentication has been disabled, which might indicate a malicious activity to bypass au
Matching passage: Sigma rule: Detection for when multi factor authentication has been disabled, which might indicate a malicious activity to bypass au. Logsource: azure / auditlogs. Rule: title: Disabled MFA to Bypass Authentication Mechanisms id: 7ea78478-a4f9-42a6-9dcd-f861816122bf status: test description: Detection for when multi factor authentication has been disabled, which might indicate a malicious activity to bypass authentication mechanisms. references: - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/active-directory/authentication/howto-mfa-userstates - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/identity/monitoring-health/reference-audit-activities#core-directory - https://research.splunk.com/cloud/482dd42a-acfa-486b-a0bb-d6fcda27318e/ - https://analyticsrules.exchange/analyticrules/65c78944-930b-4cae-bd79-c3664ae30ba7/ - https://www.elastic.co/docs/reference/security/prebuilt-rules/rules/integrations/azure/persistence_entra_id_mfa_disabled_for_user author: '@ionsor' date: 2022-02-08 modified: 2026-04-30 tags: - attack.credential-access - attack.persistence - attack.defense-impairment - attack.t1556 logsource: product: azure service: auditlogs detection: selection: operationName: Disable Strong Authentication properties.result: success condition: selection falsepositives: - Authorized modification by administrators level: medium
Near-miss passage: Sigma rule: Detects the use of KrbRelay, a Kerberos relaying tool. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: HackTool - KrbRelay Execution id: e96253b8-6b3b-4f90-9e59-3b24b99cf9b4 status: test description: Detects the use of KrbRelay, a Kerberos relaying tool references: - https://github.com/cube0x0/KrbRelay author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems) date: 2022-04-27 modified: 2023-02-04 tags: - attack.credential-access - attack.t1558.003 logsource: category: process_creation product: windows detection: selection_img: - Image|endswith: \KrbRelay.exe - OriginalFileName: KrbRelay.exe selection_cli_1: CommandLine|contains|all: - ' -spn ' - ' -clsid ' - ' -rbcd ' selection_cli_2: CommandLine|contains|all: - shadowcred - clsid - spn selection_cli_3: CommandLine|contains|all: - 'spn ' - 'session ' - 'clsid ' condition: 1 of selection_* falsepositives: - Unlikely level: high
Query: actor TTPs: Hijack Execution Flow
Matching passage: T1574 Hijack Execution Flow. Tactics: stealth, execution. Description: Adversaries may execute their own malicious payloads by hijacking the way operating systems run programs. Hijacking execution flow can be for the purposes of persistence, since this hijacked execution may reoccur over time. Adversaries may also use these mechanisms to elevate privileges or evade defenses, such as application control or other restrictions on execution. There are many ways an adversary may hijack the flow of execution, including by manipulating how the operating system locates programs to be executed. How the operating system locates libraries to be used by a program can also be intercepted. Locations where the operating system looks for programs/resources, such as file directories and in the case of Windows the Registry, could also be poisoned to include malicious payloads.
Near-miss passage: T1574.007 Path Interception by PATH Environment Variable. Tactics: stealth, execution. Description: Adversaries may execute their own malicious payloads by hijacking environment variables used to load libraries. The PATH environment variable contains a list of directories (User and System) that the OS searches sequentially through in search of the binary that was called from a script or the command line. Adversaries can place a malicious program in an earlier entry in the list of directories stored in the PATH environment variable, resulting in the operating system executing the malicious binary rather than the legitimate binary when it searches sequentially through that PATH listing. For example, on Windows if an adversary places a malicious program named "net.exe" in `C:\example path`, which by default precedes `C:\Windows\system32\net.exe` in the PATH environment variable, when "net" is executed from the command-line the `C:\example path` will be called instead of the system's legitimate executable at `C:\Windows\system32\net.exe`. Some methods of executing a program rely on the PATH environment variable to determine the locations that are searched when the path for the program is not given, such as executing programs from a [Command and Scripting Interpreter](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059).(Citation: ExpressVPN PATH env Windows 2021) Adversaries may also directly modify the $PATH variable specifying the directories to be searched. An adversary can modify the `$PATH` variable to point to a directory they have write access. When a program using the $PATH variable is called, the OS searches the specified directory and executes the malicious binary. On macOS, this can also be performed through modifying the $HOME variable. These variables can be modified using the command-line, launchctl, [Unix Shell Configuration Modification](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/004), or modifying the `/etc/paths.d` folder contents.(Citation: uptycs Fake POC linux malware 2023)(Citation: nixCraft macOS PATH variables)(Citation: Elastic Rules macOS launchctl 2022
Query: detect Detects the load of EvtMuteHook.dll, a key component of SharpEvtHook, a tool that tampers with the Windows event logs in logs
Matching passage: Sigma rule: Detects the load of EvtMuteHook.dll, a key component of SharpEvtHook, a tool that tampers with the Windows event logs. Logsource: windows / image_load. Rule: title: HackTool - SharpEvtMute DLL Load id: 49329257-089d-46e6-af37-4afce4290685 related: - id: bedfc8ad-d1c7-4e37-a20e-e2b0dbee759c type: similar status: test description: Detects the load of EvtMuteHook.dll, a key component of SharpEvtHook, a tool that tampers with the Windows event logs references: - https://github.com/bats3c/EvtMute author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems) date: 2022-09-07 modified: 2024-11-23 tags: - attack.defense-impairment - attack.t1685.001 logsource: category: image_load product: windows detection: selection: Hashes|contains: IMPHASH=330768A4F172E10ACB6287B87289D83B condition: selection falsepositives: - Other DLLs with the same Imphash level: high
Near-miss passage: Sigma rule: Detects suspicious PowerShell download patterns that are often used in malicious scripts, stagers or downloaders (make s. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: Suspicious PowerShell Download and Execute Pattern id: e6c54d94-498c-4562-a37c-b469d8e9a275 related: - id: 3b6ab547-8ec2-4991-b9d2-2b06702a48d7 type: derived status: test description: Detects suspicious PowerShell download patterns that are often used in malicious scripts, stagers or downloaders (make sure that your backend applies the strings case-insensitive) references: - https://gist.github.com/jivoi/c354eaaf3019352ce32522f916c03d70 - https://www.trendmicro.com/en_us/research/22/j/lv-ransomware-exploits-proxyshell-in-attack.html author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems) date: 2022-02-28 modified: 2022-03-01 tags: - attack.execution - attack.t1059.001 logsource: category: process_creation product: windows detection: selection: CommandLine|contains: - IEX ((New-Object Net.WebClient).DownloadString - IEX (New-Object Net.WebClient).DownloadString - IEX((New-Object Net.WebClient).DownloadString - IEX(New-Object Net.WebClient).DownloadString - ' -command (New-Object System.Net.WebClient).DownloadFile(' - ' -c (New-Object System.Net.WebClient).DownloadFile(' condition: selection falsepositives: - Software installers that pull packages from remote systems and execute them level: high
Query: vulnerability: Multiple SQL injection vulnerabilities in Web Reference Database (aka refbase) through 0.9.6 allow remote attackers to execute arbitrary SQL commands via (1) the where parameter to
Matching passage: CVE-2015-6009. CWE: CWE-89. CVSS: 7.5. Multiple SQL injection vulnerabilities in Web Reference Database (aka refbase) through 0.9.6 allow remote attackers to execute arbitrary SQL commands via (1) the where parameter to rss.php or (2) the sqlQuery parameter to search.php, a different issue than CVE-2015-7382.
Near-miss passage: CVE-2015-5023. CWE: CWE-89. CVSS: 5.400000095367432. SQL injection vulnerability in IBM Curam Social Program Management 6.1 before 6.1.1 allows remote authenticated users to execute arbitrary SQL commands via unspecified vectors.
Query: risk of Siemens RUGGEDCOM ROS 3.8.0 through 4.1.x permanently enables the IP forwarding feature, which allows remote attackers to bypass a VLAN isolation protection mechanism via IP traffi
Matching passage: CVE-2015-6675. CWE: CWE-284. CVSS: 4.300000190734863. Siemens RUGGEDCOM ROS 3.8.0 through 4.1.x permanently enables the IP forwarding feature, which allows remote attackers to bypass a VLAN isolation protection mechanism via IP traffic.
Near-miss passage: CVE-2015-1376. CWE: CWE-284. CVSS: 4.0. pixabay-images.php in the Pixabay Images plugin before 2.4 for WordPress does not validate hostnames, which allows remote authenticated users to write to arbitrary files via an upload URL with a host other than pixabay.com.
Query: hunt for LNK Icon Smuggling activity
Matching passage: T1027.012 LNK Icon Smuggling. Tactics: stealth. Description: Adversaries may smuggle commands to download malicious payloads past content filters by hiding them within otherwise seemingly benign windows shortcut files. Windows shortcut files (.LNK) include many metadata fields, including an icon location field (also known as the `IconEnvironmentDataBlock`) designed to specify the path to an icon file that is to be displayed for the LNK file within a host directory. Adversaries may abuse this LNK metadata to download malicious payloads. For example, adversaries have been observed using LNK files as phishing payloads to deliver malware. Once invoked (e.g., [Malicious File](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204/002)), payloads referenced via external URLs within the LNK icon location field may be downloaded. These files may also then be invoked by [Command and Scripting Interpreter](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059)/[System Binary Proxy Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218) arguments within the target path field of the LNK.(Citation: Unprotect Shortcut)(Citation: Booby Trap Shortcut 2017) LNK Icon Smuggling may also be utilized post compromise, such as malicious scripts executing an LNK on an infected host to download additional malicious payloads.
Near-miss passage: T1027.001 Binary Padding. Tactics: stealth. Description: Adversaries may use binary padding to add junk data and change the on-disk representation of malware. This can be done without affecting the functionality or behavior of a binary, but can increase the size of the binary beyond what some security tools are capable of handling due to file size limitations. Binary padding effectively changes the checksum of the file and can also be used to avoid hash-based blocklists and static anti-virus signatures.(Citation: ESET OceanLotus) The padding used is commonly generated by a function to create junk data and then appended to the end or applied to sections of malware.(Citation: Securelist Malware Tricks April 2017) Increasing the file size may decrease the effectiveness of certain tools and detection capabilities that are not designed or configured to scan large files. This may also reduce the likelihood of being collected for analysis. Public file scanning services, such as VirusTotal, limits the maximum size of an uploaded file to be analyzed.(Citation: VirusTotal FAQ)
Query: rule covering Rundll32 can be use by Cobalt Strike with StartW function to load DLLs from the command line.
Matching passage: Sigma rule: Rundll32 can be use by Cobalt Strike with StartW function to load DLLs from the command line.. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: CobaltStrike Load by Rundll32 id: ae9c6a7c-9521-42a6-915e-5aaa8689d529 status: test description: Rundll32 can be use by Cobalt Strike with StartW function to load DLLs from the command line. references: - https://www.cobaltstrike.com/help-windows-executable - https://redcanary.com/threat-detection-report/ - https://thedfirreport.com/2020/10/18/ryuk-in-5-hours/ author: Wojciech Lesicki date: 2021-06-01 modified: 2022-09-16 tags: - attack.stealth - attack.t1218.011 logsource: category: process_creation product: windows detection: selection_rundll: - Image|endswith: \rundll32.exe - OriginalFileName: RUNDLL32.EXE - CommandLine|contains: - rundll32.exe - 'rundll32 ' selection_params: CommandLine|contains: .dll CommandLine|endswith: - ' StartW' - ',StartW' condition: all of selection* falsepositives: - Unknown level: high
Near-miss passage: Sigma rule: Detects actions taken by Windows Defender malware detection engines. Logsource: windows / windefend. Rule: title: Windows Defender Threat Detected id: 57b649ef-ff42-4fb0-8bf6-62da243a1708 status: stable description: Detects actions taken by Windows Defender malware detection engines references: - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/defender-endpoint/troubleshoot-microsoft-defender-antivirus author: Ján Trenčanský date: 2020-07-28 tags: - attack.execution - attack.t1059 logsource: product: windows service: windefend detection: selection: EventID: - 1006 - 1015 - 1116 - 1117 condition: selection falsepositives: - Unlikely level: high
Query: what is T1127.001
Matching passage: T1127.001 MSBuild. Tactics: stealth, execution. Description: Adversaries may use MSBuild to proxy execution of code through a trusted Windows utility. MSBuild.exe (Microsoft Build Engine) is a software build platform used by Visual Studio. It handles XML formatted project files that define requirements for loading and building various platforms and configurations.(Citation: MSDN MSBuild) Adversaries can abuse MSBuild to proxy execution of malicious code. The inline task capability of MSBuild that was introduced in .NET version 4 allows for C# or Visual Basic code to be inserted into an XML project file.(Citation: MSDN MSBuild)(Citation: Microsoft MSBuild Inline Tasks 2017) MSBuild will compile and execute the inline task. MSBuild.exe is a signed Microsoft binary, so when it is used this way it can execute arbitrary code and bypass application control defenses that are configured to allow MSBuild.exe execution.(Citation: LOLBAS Msbuild)
Near-miss passage: T1127 Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution. Tactics: stealth, execution. Description: Adversaries may take advantage of trusted developer utilities to proxy execution of malicious payloads. There are many utilities used for software development related tasks that can be used to execute code in various forms to assist in development, debugging, and reverse engineering.(Citation: engima0x3 DNX Bypass)(Citation: engima0x3 RCSI Bypass)(Citation: Exploit Monday WinDbg)(Citation: LOLBAS Tracker) These utilities may often be signed with legitimate certificates that allow them to execute on a system and proxy execution of malicious code through a trusted process that effectively bypasses application control solutions. Smart App Control is a feature of Windows that blocks applications it considers potentially malicious from running by verifying unsigned applications against a known safe list from a Microsoft cloud service before executing them.(Citation: Microsoft Smart App Control) However, adversaries may leverage "reputation hijacking" to abuse an operating system’s trust of safe, signed applications that support the execution of arbitrary code. By leveraging [Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1127) to run their malicious code, adversaries may bypass Smart App Control protections.(Citation: Elastic Security Labs)