Query: detect Detects scenarios where system auditing (i.e.: Windows event log auditing) is disabled. This may be used in a scenario w in logs
Matching passage: Sigma rule: Detects scenarios where system auditing (i.e.: Windows event log auditing) is disabled. This may be used in a scenario w. Logsource: windows / security. Rule: title: Windows Event Auditing Disabled id: 69aeb277-f15f-4d2d-b32a-55e883609563 related: - id: ab4561b1-6c7e-48a7-ad08-087cfb9ce8f1 type: derived status: test description: 'Detects scenarios where system auditing (i.e.: Windows event log auditing) is disabled. This may be used in a scenario where an entity would want to bypass local logging to evade detection when Windows event logging is enabled and reviewed. Also, it is recommended to turn off "Local Group Policy Object Processing" via GPO, which will make sure that Active Directory GPOs take precedence over local/edited computer policies via something such as "gpedit.msc". Please note, that disabling "Local Group Policy Object Processing" may cause an issue in scenarios of one off specific GPO modifications - however, it is recommended to perform these modifications in Active Directory anyways. ' references: - https://docs.google.com/presentation/d/1dkrldTTlN3La-OjWtkWJBb4hVk6vfsSMBFBERs6R8zA/edit author: '@neu5ron, Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)' date: 2017-11-19 modified: 2023-11-15 tags: - attack.defense-impairment - attack.t1685.001 logsource: product: windows service: security definition: dfd8c0f4-e6ad-4e07-b91b-f2fca0ddef64 detection: selection: EventID: 4719 AuditPolicyChanges|contains: - '%%8448' - '%%8450' filter_main_guid: SubcategoryGuid: - '{0CCE9210-69AE-11D9-BED3-505054503030}' - '{0CCE9211-69AE-11D9-BED3-505054503030}' - '{0CCE9212-69AE-11D9-BED3-505054503030}' - '{0CCE9215-69AE-11D9-BED3-505054503030}' - '{0CCE9217-69AE-11D9-BED3-505054503030}' - '{0CCE921B-69AE-11D9-BED3-505054503030}' - '{0CCE922B-69AE-11D9-BED3-505054503030}' - '{0CCE922F-69AE-11D9-BED3-505054503030}' - '{0CCE9230-69AE-11D9-BED3-505054503030}' - '{0CCE9235-69AE-11D9-BED3-505054503030}' - '{0CCE9236-69AE-11D9-BED3-505054503030}' - '{0CCE9237-69AE-11D9-BED3-505054503030}' - '{0CCE923F-69AE-11D9-BED3-505054503030}' - '{0CCE9240-69AE-11D9-BED3-505054503030}' - '{0CCE9242-69AE-11D9-BED3-505054503030}' condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_* falsepositives: - Unknown level: low
Near-miss passage: Sigma rule: Detects usage of the "Import-Module" cmdlet to load the "Microsoft.ActiveDirectory.Management.dl" DLL. Which is often us. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: Potential Active Directory Enumeration Using AD Module - ProcCreation id: 70bc5215-526f-4477-963c-a47a5c9ebd12 related: - id: 9e620995-f2d8-4630-8430-4afd89f77604 type: similar - id: 74176142-4684-4d8a-8b0a-713257e7df8e type: similar status: test description: Detects usage of the "Import-Module" cmdlet to load the "Microsoft.ActiveDirectory.Management.dl" DLL. Which is often used by attackers to perform AD enumeration. references: - https://github.com/samratashok/ADModule - https://twitter.com/cyb3rops/status/1617108657166061568?s=20 - https://www.ired.team/offensive-security-experiments/active-directory-kerberos-abuse/active-directory-enumeration-with-ad-module-without-rsat-or-admin-privileges author: frack113 date: 2023-01-22 tags: - attack.reconnaissance - attack.discovery - attack.impact logsource: product: windows category: process_creation detection: selection_img: - Image|endswith: - \powershell.exe - \pwsh.exe - OriginalFileName: - PowerShell.EXE - pwsh.dll selection_cmdlet: CommandLine|contains: - 'Import-Module ' - 'ipmo ' selection_dll: CommandLine|contains: Microsoft.ActiveDirectory.Management.dll condition: all of selection_* falsepositives: - Legitimate use of the library for administrative activity level: medium