Query: Suspicious Security Account Manager execution detected on endpoint
Matching passage: T1003.002 Security Account Manager. Tactics: credential access. Description: Adversaries may attempt to extract credential material from the Security Account Manager (SAM) database either through in-memory techniques or through the Windows Registry where the SAM database is stored. The SAM is a database file that contains local accounts for the host, typically those found with the <code>net user</code> command. Enumerating the SAM database requires SYSTEM level access. A number of tools can be used to retrieve the SAM file through in-memory techniques: * pwdumpx.exe * [gsecdump](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0008) * [Mimikatz](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0002) * secretsdump.py Alternatively, the SAM can be extracted from the Registry with Reg: * <code>reg save HKLM\sam sam</code> * <code>reg save HKLM\system system</code> Creddump7 can then be used to process the SAM database locally to retrieve hashes.(Citation: GitHub Creddump7) Notes: * RID 500 account is the local, built-in administrator. * RID 501 is the guest account. * User accounts start with a RID of 1,000+.
Near-miss passage: T1003.001 LSASS Memory. Tactics: credential access. Description: Adversaries may attempt to access credential material stored in the process memory of the Local Security Authority Subsystem Service (LSASS). After a user logs on, the system generates and stores a variety of credential materials in LSASS process memory. These credential materials can be harvested by an administrative user or SYSTEM and used to conduct [Lateral Movement](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0008) using [Use Alternate Authentication Material](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550). As well as in-memory techniques, the LSASS process memory can be dumped from the target host and analyzed on a local system. For example, on the target host use procdump: * <code>procdump -ma lsass.exe lsass_dump</code> Locally, mimikatz can be run using: * <code>sekurlsa::Minidump lsassdump.dmp</code> * <code>sekurlsa::logonPasswords</code> Built-in Windows tools such as `comsvcs.dll` can also be used: * <code>rundll32.exe C:\Windows\System32\comsvcs.dll MiniDump PID lsass.dmp full</code>(Citation: Volexity Exchange Marauder March 2021)(Citation: Symantec Attacks Against Government Sector) Similar to [Image File Execution Options Injection](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546/012), the silent process exit mechanism can be abused to create a memory dump of `lsass.exe` through Windows Error Reporting (`WerFault.exe`).(Citation: Deep Instinct LSASS) Windows Security Support Provider (SSP) DLLs are loaded into LSASS process at system start. Once loaded into the LSA, SSP DLLs have access to encrypted and plaintext passwords that are stored in Windows, such as any logged-on user's Domain password or smart card PINs. The SSP configuration is stored in two Registry keys: <code>HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa\Security Packages</code> and <code>HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa\OSConfig\Security Packages</code>. An adversary may modify these Registry keys to add new SSPs, which will be loaded the next time the system boots, or when the AddSecurityPackage W