Query: rule covering Detects process access requests to LSASS process with potentially suspicious access flags
Matching passage: Sigma rule: Detects process access requests to LSASS process with potentially suspicious access flags. Logsource: windows / process_access. Rule: title: Potentially Suspicious GrantedAccess Flags On LSASS id: a18dd26b-6450-46de-8c91-9659150cf088 related: - id: 32d0d3e2-e58d-4d41-926b-18b520b2b32d type: similar status: test description: Detects process access requests to LSASS process with potentially suspicious access flags references: - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/procthread/process-security-and-access-rights - https://onedrive.live.com/view.aspx?resid=D026B4699190F1E6!2843&ithint=file%2cpptx&app=PowerPoint&authkey=!AMvCRTKB_V1J5ow - https://web.archive.org/web/20230208123920/https://cyberwardog.blogspot.com/2017/03/chronicles-of-threat-hunter-hunting-for_22.html - https://www.slideshare.net/heirhabarov/hunting-for-credentials-dumping-in-windows-environment - https://web.archive.org/web/20230420013146/http://security-research.dyndns.org/pub/slides/FIRST2017/FIRST-2017_Tom-Ueltschi_Sysmon_FINAL_notes.pdf author: Florian Roth, Roberto Rodriguez, Dimitrios Slamaris, Mark Russinovich, Thomas Patzke, Teymur Kheirkhabarov, Sherif Eldeeb, James Dickenson, Aleksey Potapov, oscd.community date: 2021-11-22 modified: 2026-06-29 tags: - attack.credential-access - attack.t1003.001 - attack.s0002 logsource: category: process_access product: windows detection: selection_target: TargetImage|endswith: \lsass.exe selection_access: - GrantedAccess|endswith: - '30' - '50' - '70' - '90' - B0 - D0 - F0 - '18' - '38' - '58' - '78' - '98' - B8 - D8 - F8 - 1A - 3A - 5A - 7A - 9A - BA - DA - FA - '0x14C2' - GrantedAccess|startswith: - '0x100000' - '0x1418' - '0x1438' - '0x143a' - '0x1f0fff' - '0x1f1fff' - '0x1f2fff' - '0x1f3fff' - '0x40' filter_main_generic: SourceImage|contains: - :\Program Files (x86)\ - :\Program Files\ - :\Windows\System32\ - :\Windows\SysWOW64\ filter_optional_malwarebytes: SourceImage|endswith: :\ProgramData\MALWAREBYTES\MBAMSERVICE\ctlrupdate\mbupdatr.exe filter_optional_vscode: SourceImage|endswith: \AppData\Local\Programs\Microsoft VS Code\Code.exe filter_main_windefend_1: SourceImage|contains: :\ProgramData\Microsoft\Windows Defender\ SourceImage|endswith: \MsMpEng.exe filter_main_windefend_2: CallTrace|contains|all: - '|?:\ProgramData\Microsoft\Windows Defender\Definition Updates\{' - '}\mpengine.dll+' GrantedAccess: '0x1418' filter_main_windefend_3: CallTrace|contains: - '|c:\program files\windows defender\mprtp.dll' - '|c:\program files\windows defender\MpClient.dll' filter_optional_vmwaretools: SourceImage|contains: :\ProgramData\VMware\VMware Tools\ SourceImage|endswith: \
Near-miss passage: Sigma rule: Detects wscript/cscript/mshta executions of scripts located in user directories. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: Potential Dropper Script Execution Via WScript/CScript/MSHTA id: cea72823-df4d-4567-950c-0b579eaf0846 related: - id: 1e33157c-53b1-41ad-bbcc-780b80b58288 type: similar status: test description: Detects wscript/cscript/mshta executions of scripts located in user directories references: - https://thedfirreport.com/2023/10/30/netsupport-intrusion-results-in-domain-compromise/ - https://redcanary.com/blog/gootloader/ - https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2025/03/06/malvertising-campaign-leads-to-info-stealers-hosted-on-github/ author: Margaritis Dimitrios (idea), Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), oscd.community, Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems), Dave Johnson date: 2019-01-16 modified: 2026-02-17 tags: - attack.execution - attack.t1059.005 - attack.t1059.007 logsource: category: process_creation product: windows detection: selection_exec: Image|endswith: - \wscript.exe - \cscript.exe - \mshta.exe selection_paths: CommandLine|contains: - :\Perflogs\ - :\Temp\ - :\Tmp\ - :\Users\Public\ - :\Windows\Temp\ - \AppData\Local\Temp\ - \AppData\Roaming\Temp\ - \Start Menu\Programs\Startup\ - \Temporary Internet - \Windows\Temp - '%LocalAppData%\Temp\' - '%TEMP%' - '%TMP%' selection_ext: CommandLine|contains: - .hta - .js - .jse - .vba - .vbe - .vbs - .wsf - .wsh condition: all of selection_* falsepositives: - Some installers might generate a similar behavior. An initial baseline is required level: medium