Query: alert when Detects the execution of a renamed binary often used by attackers or malware leveraging new Sysmon OriginalFileName data
Matching passage: Sigma rule: Detects the execution of a renamed binary often used by attackers or malware leveraging new Sysmon OriginalFileName data. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: Potential Defense Evasion Via Binary Rename id: 36480ae1-a1cb-4eaa-a0d6-29801d7e9142 related: - id: 0ba1da6d-b6ce-4366-828c-18826c9de23e type: similar status: test description: Detects the execution of a renamed binary often used by attackers or malware leveraging new Sysmon OriginalFileName datapoint. references: - https://mgreen27.github.io/posts/2019/05/12/BinaryRename.html - https://mgreen27.github.io/posts/2019/05/29/BinaryRename2.html - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/0f229c0e42bfe7ca736a14023836d65baa941ed2/atomics/T1036.003/T1036.003.md#atomic-test-1---masquerading-as-windows-lsass-process - https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/inno-setup-malware-redline-stealer-campaign.html author: Matthew Green @mgreen27, Ecco, James Pemberton @4A616D6573, oscd.community, Andreas Hunkeler (@Karneades) date: 2019-06-15 modified: 2026-06-05 tags: - attack.stealth - attack.t1036.003 logsource: category: process_creation product: windows detection: selection: OriginalFileName: - Cmd.Exe - CONHOST.EXE - 7z.exe - 7za.exe - 7zr.exe - WinRAR.exe - wevtutil.exe - net.exe - net1.exe - netsh.exe - InstallUtil.exe filter: Image|endswith: - \cmd.exe - \conhost.exe - \7z.exe - \7za.exe - \7zr.exe - \WinRAR.exe - \wevtutil.exe - \net.exe - \net1.exe - \netsh.exe - \InstallUtil.exe condition: selection and not filter falsepositives: - Custom applications use renamed binaries adding slight change to binary name. Typically this is easy to spot and add to whitelist level: medium regression_tests_path: regression_data/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_renamed_binary/info.yml
Near-miss passage: Sigma rule: Detects a renamed "dctask64.exe" execution, a signed binary by ZOHO Corporation part of ManageEngine Endpoint Central. T. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: Renamed ZOHO Dctask64 Execution id: 340a090b-c4e9-412e-bb36-b4b16fe96f9b status: test description: 'Detects a renamed "dctask64.exe" execution, a signed binary by ZOHO Corporation part of ManageEngine Endpoint Central. This binary can be abused for DLL injection, arbitrary command and process execution. ' references: - https://twitter.com/gN3mes1s/status/1222088214581825540 - https://twitter.com/gN3mes1s/status/1222095963789111296 - https://twitter.com/gN3mes1s/status/1222095371175911424 author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) date: 2020-01-28 modified: 2025-01-22 tags: - attack.privilege-escalation - attack.stealth - attack.t1036 - attack.t1055.001 - attack.t1202 - attack.t1218 logsource: category: process_creation product: windows detection: selection: Hashes|contains: - IMPHASH=6834B1B94E49701D77CCB3C0895E1AFD - IMPHASH=1BB6F93B129F398C7C4A76BB97450BBA - IMPHASH=FAA2AC19875FADE461C8D89DCF2710A3 - IMPHASH=F1039CED4B91572AB7847D26032E6BBF filter_main_legit_name: Image|endswith: \dctask64.exe condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_* falsepositives: - Unknown level: high