Query: Sigma YAML for windows / appxdeployment-server
Matching passage: Sigma rule: Detects an appx package that was added to the pipeline of the "to be processed" packages that is located in uncommon loc. Logsource: windows / appxdeployment-server. Rule: title: AppX Located in Uncommon Directory Added to Deployment Pipeline id: c977cb50-3dff-4a9f-b873-9290f56132f1 status: test description: 'Detects an appx package that was added to the pipeline of the "to be processed" packages that is located in uncommon locations. ' references: - Internal Research - https://www.sentinelone.com/labs/inside-malicious-windows-apps-for-malware-deployment/ - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/appxpkg/troubleshooting - https://news.sophos.com/en-us/2021/11/11/bazarloader-call-me-back-attack-abuses-windows-10-apps-mechanism/ author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) date: 2023-01-11 modified: 2025-12-03 tags: - attack.stealth logsource: product: windows service: appxdeployment-server detection: selection: EventID: 854 filter_main_generic: Path|contains: - :/Program%20Files - :/Windows/System32/ - :\Program Files (x86)\ - :\Program Files\ - :\Windows\ImmersiveControlPanel\ - :\Windows\PrintDialog\ - :\Windows\SystemApps\ - AppData/Local/Temp/WinGet/Microsoft.Winget.Source - x-windowsupdate:// filter_main_specific: Path|contains: - https://installer.teams.static.microsoft/ - https://res.cdn.office.net - https://statics.teams.cdn.live.net/ - https://statics.teams.cdn.office.net/ - microsoft.com filter_optional_onedrive: Path|contains: AppData\Local\Microsoft\OneDrive\ filter_optional_winget: Path|contains: - AppData/Local/Temp/WinGet/Microsoft.Winget.Source - AppData\Local\Temp\WinGet\Microsoft.Winget.Source filter_optional_x_windowsupdate: Path|contains: x-windowsupdate:// condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_* and not 1 of filter_optional_* falsepositives: - Unknown level: medium
Near-miss passage: Sigma rule: This rule detects execution of a PowerShell code through the sqlps.exe utility, which is included in the standard set of. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: Detection of PowerShell Execution via Sqlps.exe id: 0152550d-3a26-4efd-9f0e-54a0b28ae2f3 status: test description: 'This rule detects execution of a PowerShell code through the sqlps.exe utility, which is included in the standard set of utilities supplied with the MSSQL Server. Script blocks are not logged in this case, so this utility helps to bypass protection mechanisms based on the analysis of these logs. ' references: - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/sql/tools/sqlps-utility?view=sql-server-ver15 - https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/OtherMSBinaries/Sqlps/ - https://twitter.com/bryon_/status/975835709587075072 author: Agro (@agro_sev) oscd.community date: 2020-10-10 modified: 2022-12-09 tags: - attack.execution - attack.stealth - attack.t1059.001 - attack.t1127 logsource: category: process_creation product: windows detection: selection_parent: ParentImage|endswith: \sqlps.exe selection_image: - Image|endswith: \sqlps.exe - OriginalFileName: sqlps.exe filter_image: ParentImage|endswith: \sqlagent.exe condition: selection_parent or (selection_image and not filter_image) falsepositives: - Direct PS command execution through SQLPS.exe is uncommon, childprocess sqlps.exe spawned by sqlagent.exe is a legitimate action. level: medium