Query: Sigma YAML for windows / process_creation
Matching passage: Sigma rule: Detects the execution of an AnyDesk binary with a version prior to 8.0.8. Prior to version 8.0.8, the Anydesk applicatio. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: Remote Access Tool - AnyDesk Execution With Known Revoked Signing Certificate id: 41f407b5-3096-44ea-a74f-96d04fbc41be status: test description: 'Detects the execution of an AnyDesk binary with a version prior to 8.0.8. Prior to version 8.0.8, the Anydesk application used a signing certificate that got compromised by threat actors. Use this rule to detect instances of older versions of Anydesk using the compromised certificate This is recommended in order to avoid attackers leveraging the certificate and signing their binaries to bypass detections. ' references: - https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/anydesk-says-hackers-breached-its-production-servers-reset-passwords/ - https://anydesk.com/en/changelog/windows author: Sai Prashanth Pulisetti, Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) date: 2024-02-08 tags: - attack.execution - attack.initial-access logsource: product: windows category: process_creation detection: selection_img: - Image|endswith: \AnyDesk.exe - Description: AnyDesk - Product: AnyDesk - Company: AnyDesk Software GmbH selection_version: FileVersion|startswith: - 7.0. - 7.1. - 8.0.1 - 8.0.2 - 8.0.3 - 8.0.4 - 8.0.5 - 8.0.6 - 8.0.7 filter_main_uninstall: CommandLine|contains: - ' --remove' - ' --uninstall' condition: all of selection_* and not 1 of filter_main_* falsepositives: - Unlikely level: medium
Near-miss passage: Sigma rule: Detects the use of a renamed Adfind.exe. AdFind continues to be seen across majority of breaches. It is used to domain t. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: Renamed AdFind Execution id: df55196f-f105-44d3-a675-e9dfb6cc2f2b status: test description: Detects the use of a renamed Adfind.exe. AdFind continues to be seen across majority of breaches. It is used to domain trust discovery to plan out subsequent steps in the attack chain. references: - https://www.joeware.net/freetools/tools/adfind/ - https://thedfirreport.com/2020/05/08/adfind-recon/ - https://thedfirreport.com/2021/01/11/trickbot-still-alive-and-well/ - https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2021/01/20/deep-dive-into-the-solorigate-second-stage-activation-from-sunburst-to-teardrop-and-raindrop/ - https://social.technet.microsoft.com/wiki/contents/articles/7535.adfind-command-examples.aspx - https://github.com/center-for-threat-informed-defense/adversary_emulation_library/blob/bf62ece1c679b07b5fb49c4bae947fe24c81811f/fin6/Emulation_Plan/Phase1.md author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems) date: 2022-08-21 modified: 2025-02-26 tags: - attack.discovery - attack.t1018 - attack.t1087.002 - attack.t1482 - attack.t1069.002 logsource: category: process_creation product: windows detection: selection_1: CommandLine|contains: - domainlist - trustdmp - dcmodes - adinfo - ' dclist ' - computer_pwdnotreqd - objectcategory= - -subnets -f - name="Domain Admins" - '-sc u:' - domainncs - dompol - ' oudmp ' - subnetdmp - gpodmp - fspdmp - users_noexpire - computers_active - computers_pwdnotreqd selection_2: Hashes|contains: - IMPHASH=BCA5675746D13A1F246E2DA3C2217492 - IMPHASH=53E117A96057EAF19C41380D0E87F1C2 - IMPHASH=d144de8117df2beceaba2201ad304764 - IMPHASH=12ce1c0f3f5837ecc18a3782408fa975 - IMPHASH=4fbf3f084fbbb2470b80b2013134df35 - IMPHASH=49b639b4acbecc49d72a01f357aa4930 - IMPHASH=680dad9e300346e05a85023965867201 - IMPHASH=21aa085d54992511b9f115355e468782 selection_3: OriginalFileName: AdFind.exe filter: Image|endswith: \AdFind.exe condition: 1 of selection* and not filter falsepositives: - Unknown level: high regression_tests_path: regression_data/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_renamed_adfind/info.yml