Query: Sigma YAML for windows / image_load
Matching passage: Sigma rule: Detects abusing Azure Browser SSO by requesting OAuth 2.0 refresh tokens for an Azure-AD-authenticated Windows user (i.e. Logsource: windows / image_load. Rule: title: Potential Azure Browser SSO Abuse id: 50f852e6-af22-4c78-9ede-42ef36aa3453 status: test description: 'Detects abusing Azure Browser SSO by requesting OAuth 2.0 refresh tokens for an Azure-AD-authenticated Windows user (i.e. the machine is joined to Azure AD and a user logs in with their Azure AD account) wanting to perform SSO authentication in the browser. An attacker can use this to authenticate to Azure AD in a browser as that user. ' references: - https://posts.specterops.io/requesting-azure-ad-request-tokens-on-azure-ad-joined-machines-for-browser-sso-2b0409caad30 author: Den Iuzvyk date: 2020-07-15 modified: 2023-04-18 tags: - attack.persistence - attack.privilege-escalation - attack.execution - attack.stealth - attack.t1574.001 logsource: category: image_load product: windows detection: selection: ImageLoaded: C:\Windows\System32\MicrosoftAccountTokenProvider.dll filter_main_bgtaskhost: Image|startswith: - C:\Windows\System32\ - C:\Windows\SysWOW64\ Image|endswith: \BackgroundTaskHost.exe filter_optional_devenv: Image|startswith: - C:\Program Files\Microsoft Visual Studio\ - C:\Program Files (x86)\Microsoft Visual Studio\ Image|endswith: \IDE\devenv.exe filter_optional_ie: Image: - C:\Program Files (x86)\Internet Explorer\iexplore.exe - C:\Program Files\Internet Explorer\iexplore.exe filter_optional_edge_1: - Image|startswith: C:\Program Files (x86)\Microsoft\EdgeWebView\Application\ - Image|endswith: \WindowsApps\MicrosoftEdge.exe - Image: - C:\Program Files (x86)\Microsoft\Edge\Application\msedge.exe - C:\Program Files\Microsoft\Edge\Application\msedge.exe filter_optional_edge_2: Image|startswith: - C:\Program Files (x86)\Microsoft\EdgeCore\ - C:\Program Files\Microsoft\EdgeCore\ Image|endswith: - \msedge.exe - \msedgewebview2.exe filter_optional_onedrive: Image|endswith: \AppData\Local\Microsoft\OneDrive\OneDrive.exe filter_optional_null: Image: null condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_* and not 1 of filter_optional_* falsepositives: - False positives are expected since this rules is only looking for the DLL load event. This rule is better used in correlation with related activity level: low
Near-miss passage: Sigma rule: Adversaries may establish persistence and/or elevate privileges by executing malicious content triggered by application. Logsource: windows / file_event. Rule: title: New Custom Shim Database Created id: ee63c85c-6d51-4d12-ad09-04e25877a947 status: test description: 'Adversaries may establish persistence and/or elevate privileges by executing malicious content triggered by application shims. The Microsoft Windows Application Compatibility Infrastructure/Framework (Application Shim) was created to allow for backward compatibility of software as the operating system codebase changes over time. ' references: - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1546.011/T1546.011.md#atomic-test-2---new-shim-database-files-created-in-the-default-shim-database-directory - https://www.mandiant.com/resources/blog/fin7-shim-databases-persistence - https://liberty-shell.com/sec/2020/02/25/shim-persistence/ - https://andreafortuna.org/2018/11/12/process-injection-and-persistence-using-application-shimming/ author: frack113, Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) date: 2021-12-29 modified: 2023-12-06 tags: - attack.privilege-escalation - attack.persistence - attack.t1547.009 logsource: product: windows category: file_event detection: selection: TargetFilename|contains: - :\Windows\apppatch\Custom\ - :\Windows\apppatch\CustomSDB\ condition: selection falsepositives: - Legitimate custom SHIM installations will also trigger this rule level: medium regression_tests_path: regression_data/rules/windows/file/file_event/file_event_win_creation_new_shim_database/info.yml