Query: Sigma YAML for windows / process_creation
Matching passage: Sigma rule: Detects suspicious patterns in program names or folders that are often found in malicious samples or hacktools. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: Suspicious Program Names id: efdd8dd5-cee8-4e59-9390-7d4d5e4dd6f6 status: test description: Detects suspicious patterns in program names or folders that are often found in malicious samples or hacktools references: - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1560.001/T1560.001.md author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems) date: 2022-02-11 modified: 2023-03-22 tags: - attack.execution - attack.t1059 logsource: category: process_creation product: windows detection: selection_image: - Image|contains: - \CVE-202 - \CVE202 - Image|endswith: - \poc.exe - \artifact.exe - \artifact64.exe - \artifact_protected.exe - \artifact32.exe - \artifact32big.exe - obfuscated.exe - obfusc.exe - \meterpreter selection_commandline: CommandLine|contains: - inject.ps1 - Invoke-CVE - pupy.ps1 - payload.ps1 - beacon.ps1 - PowerView.ps1 - bypass.ps1 - obfuscated.ps1 - obfusc.ps1 - obfus.ps1 - obfs.ps1 - evil.ps1 - MiniDogz.ps1 - _enc.ps1 - \shell.ps1 - \rshell.ps1 - revshell.ps1 - \av.ps1 - \av_test.ps1 - adrecon.ps1 - mimikatz.ps1 - \PowerUp_ - powerup.ps1 - \Temp\a.ps1 - \Temp\p.ps1 - \Temp\1.ps1 - Hound.ps1 - encode.ps1 - powercat.ps1 condition: 1 of selection* falsepositives: - Legitimate tools that accidentally match on the searched patterns level: high
Near-miss passage: Sigma rule: Detects the creation or patching of potential malicious RoleBinding. This includes RoleBindings and ClusterRoleBinding.. Logsource: gcp / gcp.audit. Rule: title: Google Cloud Kubernetes RoleBinding id: 0322d9f2-289a-47c2-b5e1-b63c90901a3e status: test description: Detects the creation or patching of potential malicious RoleBinding. This includes RoleBindings and ClusterRoleBinding. references: - https://github.com/elastic/detection-rules/pull/1267 - https://kubernetes.io/docs/reference/kubernetes-api/authorization-resources/cluster-role-v1/#ClusterRole - https://cloud.google.com/kubernetes-engine/docs/how-to/role-based-access-control - https://kubernetes.io/docs/reference/access-authn-authz/rbac/ - https://cloud.google.com/kubernetes-engine/docs/how-to/audit-logging author: Austin Songer @austinsonger date: 2021-08-09 modified: 2022-10-09 tags: - attack.credential-access logsource: product: gcp service: gcp.audit detection: selection: gcp.audit.method_name: - io.k8s.authorization.rbac.v*.clusterrolebindings.create - io.k8s.authorization.rbac.v*.rolebindings.create - io.k8s.authorization.rbac.v*.clusterrolebindings.patch - io.k8s.authorization.rbac.v*.rolebindings.patch - io.k8s.authorization.rbac.v*.clusterrolebindings.update - io.k8s.authorization.rbac.v*.rolebindings.update - io.k8s.authorization.rbac.v*.clusterrolebindings.delete - io.k8s.authorization.rbac.v*.rolebindings.delete condition: selection falsepositives: - RoleBindings and ClusterRoleBinding being modified or deleted may be performed by a system administrator. Verify whether the user identity, user agent, and/or hostname should be making changes in your environment. - RoleBindings and ClusterRoleBinding modified or deleted from unfamiliar users should be investigated. If known behavior is causing false positives, it can be exempted from the rule. level: medium