Query: Lateral movement indicators for Cloud Application Integration
Matching passage: T1671 Cloud Application Integration. Tactics: persistence. Description: Adversaries may achieve persistence by leveraging OAuth application integrations in a software-as-a-service environment. Adversaries may create a custom application, add a legitimate application into the environment, or even co-opt an existing integration to achieve malicious ends.(Citation: Push Security SaaS Persistence 2022)(Citation: SaaS Attacks GitHub Evil Twin Integrations) OAuth is an open standard that allows users to authorize applications to access their information on their behalf. In a SaaS environment such as Microsoft 365 or Google Workspace, users may integrate applications to improve their workflow and achieve tasks. Leveraging application integrations may allow adversaries to persist in an environment – for example, by granting consent to an application from a high-privileged adversary-controlled account in order to maintain access to its data, even in the event of losing access to the account.(Citation: Wiz Midnight Blizzard 2024)(Citation: Microsoft Malicious OAuth Applications 2022)(Citation: Huntress Persistence Microsoft 365 Compromise 2024) In some cases, integrations may remain valid even after the original consenting user account is disabled.(Citation: Push Security Slack Persistence 2023) Application integrations may also allow adversaries to bypass multi-factor authentication requirements through the use of [Application Access Token](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550/001)s. Finally, they may enable persistent [Automated Exfiltration](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1020) over time.(Citation: Synes Cyber Corner Malicious Azure Application 2023) Creating or adding a new application may require the adversary to create a dedicated [Cloud Account](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1136/003) for the application and assign it [Additional Cloud Roles](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1098/003) – for example, in Microsoft 365 environments, an application can only access resources via an associated service principal.(Citation: M
Near-miss passage: T1546.017 Udev Rules. Tactics: persistence, privilege escalation. Description: Adversaries may maintain persistence through executing malicious content triggered using udev rules. Udev is the Linux kernel device manager that dynamically manages device nodes, handles access to pseudo-device files in the `/dev` directory, and responds to hardware events, such as when external devices like hard drives or keyboards are plugged in or removed. Udev uses rule files with `match keys` to specify the conditions a hardware event must meet and `action keys` to define the actions that should follow. Root permissions are required to create, modify, or delete rule files located in `/etc/udev/rules.d/`, `/run/udev/rules.d/`, `/usr/lib/udev/rules.d/`, `/usr/local/lib/udev/rules.d/`, and `/lib/udev/rules.d/`. Rule priority is determined by both directory and by the digit prefix in the rule filename.(Citation: Ignacio Udev research 2024)(Citation: Elastic Linux Persistence 2024) Adversaries may abuse the udev subsystem by adding or modifying rules in udev rule files to execute malicious content. For example, an adversary may configure a rule to execute their binary each time the pseudo-device file, such as `/dev/random`, is accessed by an application. Although udev is limited to running short tasks and is restricted by systemd-udevd's sandbox (blocking network and filesystem access), attackers may use scripting commands under the action key `RUN+=` to detach and run the malicious content’s process in the background to bypass these controls.(Citation: Reichert aon sedexp 2024)