Query: Sigma rule for Detects connections to interplanetary file system (IPFS) containing a user's email address which mirrors behaviours obse
Matching passage: Sigma rule: Detects connections to interplanetary file system (IPFS) containing a user's email address which mirrors behaviours obse. Logsource: proxy. Rule: title: Suspicious Network Communication With IPFS id: eb6c2004-1cef-427f-8885-9042974e5eb6 status: test description: Detects connections to interplanetary file system (IPFS) containing a user's email address which mirrors behaviours observed in recent phishing campaigns leveraging IPFS to host credential harvesting webpages. references: - https://blog.talosintelligence.com/ipfs-abuse/ - https://github.com/Cisco-Talos/IOCs/tree/80caca039988252fbb3f27a2e89c2f2917f582e0/2022/11 - https://isc.sans.edu/diary/IPFS%20phishing%20and%20the%20need%20for%20correctly%20set%20HTTP%20security%20headers/29638 author: Gavin Knapp date: 2023-03-16 tags: - attack.collection - attack.credential-access - attack.t1056 logsource: category: proxy detection: selection: cs-uri|re: (?i)(ipfs\.io/|ipfs\.io\s).+\..+@.+\.[a-z]+ condition: selection falsepositives: - Legitimate use of IPFS being used in the organisation. However the cs-uri regex looking for a user email will likely negate this. level: low
Near-miss passage: Sigma rule: Detects suspicious process access to LSASS.exe from processes located in uncommon locations with dbgcore.dll or dbghelp.. Logsource: windows / process_access. Rule: title: Suspicious Process Access to LSASS with Dbgcore/Dbghelp DLLs id: 9f5c1d59-33be-4e60-bcab-85d2f566effd related: - id: 416bc4a2-7217-4519-8dc7-c3271817f1d5 type: similar status: experimental description: 'Detects suspicious process access to LSASS.exe from processes located in uncommon locations with dbgcore.dll or dbghelp.dll in the call trace. These DLLs contain functions like MiniDumpWriteDump that can be abused for credential dumping purposes. While modern tools like Mimikatz have moved to using ntdll.dll, dbgcore.dll and dbghelp.dll are still used by basic credential dumping utilities and legacy tools for LSASS memory access and process suspension techniques. ' references: - https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/you-bet-your-lsass-hunting-lsass-access.html - https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/api/minidumpapiset/nf-minidumpwritedump author: Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems) date: 2025-11-27 tags: - attack.credential-access - attack.defense-impairment - attack.t1003.001 - attack.t1685 logsource: category: process_access product: windows detection: selection_lsass_calltrace: TargetImage|endswith: \lsass.exe CallTrace|contains: - dbgcore.dll - dbghelp.dll selection_susp_location: SourceImage|contains: - :\Perflogs\ - :\Temp\ - :\Users\Public\ - \$Recycle.Bin\ - \AppData\Roaming\ - \Contacts\ - \Desktop\ - \Documents\ - \Downloads\ - \Favorites\ - \Favourites\ - \inetpub\wwwroot\ - \Music\ - \Pictures\ - \Start Menu\Programs\Startup\ - \Users\Default\ - \Videos\ - \Windows\Temp\ condition: all of selection_* falsepositives: - Possibly during software installation or update processes level: high regression_tests_path: regression_data/rules/windows/process_access/proc_access_win_susp_dbgcore_dbghelp_load/info.yml