Query: alert when Detects execution and usage of the DSInternals PowerShell module. Which can be used to perform what might be considered
Matching passage: Sigma rule: Detects execution and usage of the DSInternals PowerShell module. Which can be used to perform what might be considered. Logsource: windows / ps_script. Rule: title: DSInternals Suspicious PowerShell Cmdlets - ScriptBlock id: 846c7a87-8e14-4569-9d49-ecfd4276a01c related: - id: 43d91656-a9b2-4541-b7e2-6a9bd3a13f4e type: similar status: test description: 'Detects execution and usage of the DSInternals PowerShell module. Which can be used to perform what might be considered as suspicious activity such as dumping DPAPI backup keys or manipulating NTDS.DIT files. The DSInternals PowerShell Module exposes several internal features of Active Directory and Azure Active Directory. These include FIDO2 and NGC key auditing, offline ntds.dit file manipulation, password auditing, DC recovery from IFM backups and password hash calculation. ' references: - https://github.com/MichaelGrafnetter/DSInternals/blob/39ee8a69bbdc1cfd12c9afdd7513b4788c4895d4/Src/DSInternals.PowerShell/DSInternals.psd1 author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) date: 2024-06-26 tags: - attack.execution - attack.t1059.001 logsource: product: windows category: ps_script definition: 'Requirements: Script Block Logging must be enabled' detection: selection: ScriptBlockText|contains: - Add-ADDBSidHistory - Add-ADNgcKey - Add-ADReplNgcKey - ConvertFrom-ADManagedPasswordBlob - ConvertFrom-GPPrefPassword - ConvertFrom-ManagedPasswordBlob - ConvertFrom-UnattendXmlPassword - ConvertFrom-UnicodePassword - ConvertTo-AADHash - ConvertTo-GPPrefPassword - ConvertTo-KerberosKey - ConvertTo-LMHash - ConvertTo-MsoPasswordHash - ConvertTo-NTHash - ConvertTo-OrgIdHash - ConvertTo-UnicodePassword - Disable-ADDBAccount - Enable-ADDBAccount - Get-ADDBAccount - Get-ADDBBackupKey - Get-ADDBDomainController - Get-ADDBGroupManagedServiceAccount - Get-ADDBKdsRootKey - Get-ADDBSchemaAttribute - Get-ADDBServiceAccount - Get-ADDefaultPasswordPolicy - Get-ADKeyCredential - Get-ADPasswordPolicy - Get-ADReplAccount - Get-ADReplBackupKey - Get-ADReplicationAccount - Get-ADSIAccount - Get-AzureADUserEx - Get-BootKey - Get-KeyCredential - Get-LsaBackupKey - Get-LsaPolicy - Get-SamPasswordPolicy - Get-SysKey - Get-SystemKey - New-ADDBRestoreFromMediaScript - New-ADKeyCredential - New-ADNgcKey - New-NTHashSet - Remove-ADDBObject - Save-DPAPIBlob - Set-ADAccountPasswordHash - Set-ADDBAccountPassword - Set-ADDBBootKey - Set-ADDBDomainController - Set-ADDBPrimaryGroup - Set-ADDBSysKey - Set-AzureADUserEx - Set-LsaPolicy - Set-SamAccountPasswordHash - Set-WinUserPasswordHash - Test-ADDBPasswordQuality - Test-ADPasswordQuality - Test-ADReplPasswordQuality - Test-PasswordQuality - Unlock-AD
Near-miss passage: Sigma rule: Detects the execution of SharpMove, a .NET utility performing multiple tasks such as "Task Creation", "SCM" query, VBScr. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: HackTool - SharpMove Tool Execution id: 055fb54c-a8f4-4aee-bd44-f74cf30a0d9d status: test description: 'Detects the execution of SharpMove, a .NET utility performing multiple tasks such as "Task Creation", "SCM" query, VBScript execution using WMI via its PE metadata and command line options. ' references: - https://github.com/0xthirteen/SharpMove/ - https://pentestlab.blog/tag/sharpmove/ author: Luca Di Bartolomeo (CrimpSec) date: 2024-01-29 tags: - attack.lateral-movement - attack.t1021.002 logsource: category: process_creation product: windows detection: selection_img: - Image|endswith: \SharpMove.exe - OriginalFileName: SharpMove.exe selection_cli_computer: CommandLine|contains: computername= selection_cli_actions: CommandLine|contains: - action=create - action=dcom - action=executevbs - action=hijackdcom - action=modschtask - action=modsvc - action=query - action=scm - action=startservice - action=taskscheduler condition: selection_img or all of selection_cli_* falsepositives: - Unknown level: high