Query: alert when Detects a process that initiated a network connection over ports 5985 or 5986 from a non-network service account. This c
Matching passage: Sigma rule: Detects a process that initiated a network connection over ports 5985 or 5986 from a non-network service account. This c. Logsource: windows / network_connection. Rule: title: Potential Remote PowerShell Session Initiated id: c539afac-c12a-46ed-b1bd-5a5567c9f045 status: test description: 'Detects a process that initiated a network connection over ports 5985 or 5986 from a non-network service account. This could potentially indicates a remote PowerShell connection. ' references: - https://threathunterplaybook.com/hunts/windows/190511-RemotePwshExecution/notebook.html author: Roberto Rodriguez @Cyb3rWard0g date: 2019-09-12 modified: 2024-02-02 tags: - attack.execution - attack.t1059.001 - attack.lateral-movement - attack.t1021.006 logsource: category: network_connection product: windows detection: selection: DestinationPort: - 5985 - 5986 Initiated: 'true' SourceIsIpv6: 'false' filter_main_service_users: - User|contains: - NETWORK SERVICE - NETZWERKDIENST - SERVICIO DE RED - SERVIZIO DI RETE - User|contains|all: - SERVICE R - SEAU filter_main_localhost: SourceIp: - ::1 - 127.0.0.1 DestinationIp: - ::1 - 127.0.0.1 filter_optional_avast: Image: - C:\Program Files\Avast Software\Avast\AvastSvc.exe - C:\Program Files (x86)\Avast Software\Avast\AvastSvc.exe condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_* and not 1 of filter_optional_* falsepositives: - Legitimate usage of remote PowerShell, e.g. remote administration and monitoring. - Network Service user name of a not-covered localization level: high
Near-miss passage: Sigma rule: Detects execution of mshta.exe with file types that looks like they do not typically represent HTA (HTML Application) co. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: MSHTA Execution with Suspicious File Extensions id: cc7abbd0-762b-41e3-8a26-57ad50d2eea3 status: test description: 'Detects execution of mshta.exe with file types that looks like they do not typically represent HTA (HTML Application) content, such as .png, .jpg, .zip, .pdf, and others, which are often polyglots. MSHTA is a legitimate Windows utility for executing HTML Applications containing VBScript or JScript. Threat actors often abuse this lolbin utility to download and execute malicious scripts disguised as benign files or hosted under misleading extensions to evade detection. ' references: - http://blog.sevagas.com/?Hacking-around-HTA-files - https://0x00sec.org/t/clientside-exploitation-in-2018-how-pentesting-has-changed/7356 - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/dotnet/framework/data/xml/xslt/xslt-stylesheet-scripting-using-msxsl-script - https://medium.com/tsscyber/pentesting-and-hta-bypassing-powershell-constrained-language-mode-53a42856c997 - https://twitter.com/mattifestation/status/1326228491302563846 - https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/c1f27d9795a2eba630db8a043580a0761798f06370fb1317067805f8a845b00c author: Diego Perez (@darkquassar), Markus Neis, Swisscom (Improve Rule), Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems) date: 2019-02-22 modified: 2025-05-12 tags: - attack.stealth - attack.t1140 - attack.t1218.005 - attack.execution - attack.t1059.007 - cve.2020-1599 logsource: category: process_creation product: windows detection: selection_img: - Image|endswith: \mshta.exe - OriginalFileName: mshta.exe selection_cli: CommandLine|contains: - .7z - .avi - .bat - .bmp - .conf - .csv - .dll - .doc - .gif - .gz - .ini - .jpe - .jpg - .json - .lnk - .log - .mkv - .mp3 - .mp4 - .pdf - .png - .ppt - .rar - .rtf - .svg - .tar - .tmp - .txt - .xls - .xml - .yaml - .yml - .zip - vbscript condition: all of selection_* falsepositives: - False positives depend on scripts and administrative tools used in the monitored environment level: high