Query: rule covering Detects the execution of certutil with certain flags that allow the utility to download files from direct IPs.
Matching passage: Sigma rule: Detects the execution of certutil with certain flags that allow the utility to download files from direct IPs.. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: Suspicious File Downloaded From Direct IP Via Certutil.EXE id: 13e6fe51-d478-4c7e-b0f2-6da9b400a829 related: - id: 19b08b1c-861d-4e75-a1ef-ea0c1baf202b type: similar - id: 42a5f1e7-9603-4f6d-97ae-3f37d130d794 type: similar status: test description: Detects the execution of certutil with certain flags that allow the utility to download files from direct IPs. references: - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/certutil - https://forensicitguy.github.io/agenttesla-vba-certutil-download/ - https://news.sophos.com/en-us/2021/04/13/compromised-exchange-server-hosting-cryptojacker-targeting-other-exchange-servers/ - https://twitter.com/egre55/status/1087685529016193025 - https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Certutil/ - https://twitter.com/_JohnHammond/status/1708910264261980634 - https://www.hexacorn.com/blog/2020/08/23/certutil-one-more-gui-lolbin author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) date: 2023-02-15 modified: 2025-12-01 tags: - attack.stealth - attack.t1027 - attack.command-and-control - attack.t1105 logsource: category: process_creation product: windows detection: selection_img: - Image|endswith: \certutil.exe - OriginalFileName: CertUtil.exe selection_flags: CommandLine|contains: - 'urlcache ' - 'verifyctl ' - 'URL ' selection_http: CommandLine|contains: - ://1 - ://2 - ://3 - ://4 - ://5 - ://6 - ://7 - ://8 - ://9 filter_main_seven_zip: CommandLine|contains: ://7- condition: all of selection_* and not 1 of filter_main_* falsepositives: - Unknown level: high regression_tests_path: regression_data/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_certutil_download_direct_ip/info.yml
Near-miss passage: Sigma rule: Detects changes to the "ServiceDLL" value related to a service in the registry. This is often used as a method of persis. Logsource: windows / registry_set. Rule: title: ServiceDll Hijack id: 612e47e9-8a59-43a6-b404-f48683f45bd6 status: test description: 'Detects changes to the "ServiceDLL" value related to a service in the registry. This is often used as a method of persistence. ' references: - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1543.003/T1543.003.md#atomic-test-4---tinyturla-backdoor-service-w64time - https://www.hexacorn.com/blog/2013/09/19/beyond-good-ol-run-key-part-4/ author: frack113 date: 2022-02-04 modified: 2024-04-03 tags: - attack.persistence - attack.privilege-escalation - attack.t1543.003 logsource: category: registry_set product: windows detection: selection: TargetObject|contains|all: - \System\ - ControlSet - \Services\ TargetObject|endswith: \Parameters\ServiceDll filter_main_printextensionmanger: Details: C:\Windows\system32\spool\drivers\x64\3\PrintConfig.dll filter_main_domain_controller: Image: C:\Windows\system32\lsass.exe TargetObject|endswith: \Services\NTDS\Parameters\ServiceDll Details: '%%systemroot%%\system32\ntdsa.dll' filter_main_poqexec: Image: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe filter_optional_safetica: Image|endswith: \regsvr32.exe Details: C:\Windows\System32\STAgent.dll condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_* and not 1 of filter_optional_* falsepositives: - Administrative scripts - Installation of a service level: medium