Query: alert when Office application called wmic to proxye execution through a LOLBIN process. This is often used to break suspicious pare
Matching passage: Sigma rule: Office application called wmic to proxye execution through a LOLBIN process. This is often used to break suspicious pare. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: Suspicious WMIC Execution Via Office Process id: e1693bc8-7168-4eab-8718-cdcaa68a1738 related: - id: 438025f9-5856-4663-83f7-52f878a70a50 type: derived - id: 518643ba-7d9c-4fa5-9f37-baed36059f6a type: obsolete - id: 9d1c72f5-43f0-4da5-9320-648cf2099dd0 type: obsolete - id: c0e1c3d5-4381-4f18-8145-2583f06a1fe5 type: obsolete - id: 04f5363a-6bca-42ff-be70-0d28bf629ead type: obsolete status: test description: Office application called wmic to proxye execution through a LOLBIN process. This is often used to break suspicious parent-child chain (Office app spawns LOLBin). references: - https://thedfirreport.com/2021/03/29/sodinokibi-aka-revil-ransomware/ - https://github.com/vadim-hunter/Detection-Ideas-Rules/blob/02bcbfc2bfb8b4da601bb30de0344ae453aa1afe/Threat%20Intelligence/The%20DFIR%20Report/20210329_Sodinokibi_(aka_REvil)_Ransomware.yaml author: Vadim Khrykov, Cyb3rEng date: 2021-08-23 modified: 2023-02-14 tags: - attack.stealth - attack.t1204.002 - attack.t1047 - attack.t1218.010 - attack.execution logsource: product: windows category: process_creation detection: selection_parent: ParentImage|endswith: - \WINWORD.EXE - \EXCEL.EXE - \POWERPNT.exe - \MSPUB.exe - \VISIO.exe - \MSACCESS.EXE - \EQNEDT32.EXE - \ONENOTE.EXE - \wordpad.exe - \wordview.exe selection_wmic_img: - Image|endswith: \wbem\WMIC.exe - OriginalFileName: wmic.exe selection_wmic_cli: CommandLine|contains|all: - process - create - call CommandLine|contains: - regsvr32 - rundll32 - msiexec - mshta - verclsid - wscript - cscript condition: all of selection_* falsepositives: - Unknown level: high
Near-miss passage: Sigma rule: Identifies when a Kubernetes account access a sensitive objects such as configmaps or secrets.. Logsource: azure / activitylogs. Rule: title: Azure Kubernetes Secret or Config Object Access id: 7ee0b4aa-d8d4-4088-b661-20efdf41a04c status: test description: Identifies when a Kubernetes account access a sensitive objects such as configmaps or secrets. references: - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/role-based-access-control/resource-provider-operations#microsoftkubernetes - https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2021/03/23/secure-containerized-environments-with-updated-threat-matrix-for-kubernetes/ - https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2020/04/02/attack-matrix-kubernetes/ - https://medium.com/mitre-engenuity/att-ck-for-containers-now-available-4c2359654bf1 author: Austin Songer @austinsonger date: 2021-08-07 modified: 2022-08-23 tags: - attack.impact - attack.t1485 - attack.t1496 - attack.t1489 logsource: product: azure service: activitylogs detection: selection: operationName: - MICROSOFT.KUBERNETES/CONNECTEDCLUSTERS/CONFIGMAPS/WRITE - MICROSOFT.KUBERNETES/CONNECTEDCLUSTERS/CONFIGMAPS/DELETE - MICROSOFT.KUBERNETES/CONNECTEDCLUSTERS/SECRETS/WRITE - MICROSOFT.KUBERNETES/CONNECTEDCLUSTERS/SECRETS/DELETE condition: selection falsepositives: - Sensitive objects may be accessed by a system administrator. Verify whether the user identity, user agent, and/or hostname should be making changes in your environment. Sensitive objects accessed from unfamiliar users should be investigated. If known behavior is causing false positives, it can be exempted from the rule. level: medium