Query: alert when Adversaries may acquire credentials from web browsers by reading files specific to the target browser. Web browsers comm
Matching passage: Sigma rule: Adversaries may acquire credentials from web browsers by reading files specific to the target browser. Web browsers comm. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: Potential Browser Data Stealing id: 47147b5b-9e17-4d76-b8d2-7bac24c5ce1b related: - id: fc028194-969d-4122-8abe-0470d5b8f12f type: derived status: test description: 'Adversaries may acquire credentials from web browsers by reading files specific to the target browser. Web browsers commonly save credentials such as website usernames and passwords so that they do not need to be entered manually in the future. Web browsers typically store the credentials in an encrypted format within a credential store. ' references: - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1555.003/T1555.003.md - https://www.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/2024-04/aa24-109a-stopransomware-akira-ransomware_2.pdf author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) date: 2022-12-23 modified: 2025-03-19 tags: - attack.credential-access - attack.t1555.003 logsource: category: process_creation product: windows detection: selection_cmd: - CommandLine|contains: - copy-item - 'copy ' - 'cpi ' - ' cp ' - 'move ' - move-item - ' mi ' - ' mv ' - Image|endswith: - \esentutl.exe - \xcopy.exe - \robocopy.exe - OriginalFileName: - esentutl.exe - XCOPY.EXE - robocopy.exe selection_path: CommandLine|contains: - \Amigo\User Data - \BraveSoftware\Brave-Browser\User Data - \CentBrowser\User Data - \Chromium\User Data - \CocCoc\Browser\User Data - \Comodo\Dragon\User Data - \Elements Browser\User Data - \Epic Privacy Browser\User Data - \Google\Chrome Beta\User Data - \Google\Chrome SxS\User Data - \Google\Chrome\User Data\ - \Kometa\User Data - \Maxthon5\Users - \Microsoft\Edge\User Data - \Mozilla\Firefox\Profiles - \Nichrome\User Data - \Opera Software\Opera GX Stable\ - \Opera Software\Opera Neon\User Data - \Opera Software\Opera Stable\ - \Orbitum\User Data - \QIP Surf\User Data - \Sputnik\User Data - \Torch\User Data - \uCozMedia\Uran\User Data - \Vivaldi\User Data condition: all of selection_* falsepositives: - Unknown level: medium
Near-miss passage: Sigma rule: Detects suspicious reconnaissance command line activity on Windows systems using Net.EXE Check if the user that executed. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: Suspicious Group And Account Reconnaissance Activity Using Net.EXE id: d95de845-b83c-4a9a-8a6a-4fc802ebf6c0 status: test description: 'Detects suspicious reconnaissance command line activity on Windows systems using Net.EXE Check if the user that executed the commands is suspicious (e.g. service accounts, LOCAL_SYSTEM) ' references: - https://redcanary.com/blog/how-one-hospital-thwarted-a-ryuk-ransomware-outbreak/ - https://thedfirreport.com/2020/10/18/ryuk-in-5-hours/ - https://research.nccgroup.com/2022/08/19/back-in-black-unlocking-a-lockbit-3-0-ransomware-attack/ author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), omkar72, @svch0st, Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) date: 2019-01-16 modified: 2023-03-02 tags: - attack.discovery - attack.t1087.001 - attack.t1087.002 logsource: category: process_creation product: windows detection: selection_img: - Image|endswith: - \net.exe - \net1.exe - OriginalFileName: - net.exe - net1.exe selection_group_root: CommandLine|contains: - ' group ' - ' localgroup ' selection_group_flags: CommandLine|contains: - domain admins - ' administrator' - ' administrateur' - enterprise admins - Exchange Trusted Subsystem - Remote Desktop Users - Utilisateurs du Bureau à distance - Usuarios de escritorio remoto - ' /do' filter_group_add: CommandLine|contains: ' /add' selection_accounts_root: CommandLine|contains: ' accounts ' selection_accounts_flags: CommandLine|contains: ' /do' condition: selection_img and ((all of selection_group_* and not filter_group_add) or all of selection_accounts_*) falsepositives: - Inventory tool runs - Administrative activity level: medium