Query: Sigma rule for Detects the execution of System Informer, a task manager tool to view and manipulate processes, kernel options and other
Matching passage: Sigma rule: Detects the execution of System Informer, a task manager tool to view and manipulate processes, kernel options and other. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: PUA - System Informer Execution id: 5722dff1-4bdd-4949-86ab-fbaf707e767a related: - id: 811e0002-b13b-4a15-9d00-a613fce66e42 type: similar status: test description: Detects the execution of System Informer, a task manager tool to view and manipulate processes, kernel options and other low level operations references: - https://github.com/winsiderss/systeminformer author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems) date: 2023-05-08 modified: 2024-11-23 tags: - attack.persistence - attack.privilege-escalation - attack.discovery - attack.stealth - attack.t1082 - attack.t1564 - attack.t1543 logsource: category: process_creation product: windows detection: selection: - Image|endswith: \SystemInformer.exe - OriginalFileName: SystemInformer.exe - Description: System Informer - Product: System Informer - Hashes|contains: - MD5=19426363A37C03C3ED6FEDF57B6696EC - SHA1=8B12C6DA8FAC0D5E8AB999C31E5EA04AF32D53DC - SHA256=8EE9D84DE50803545937A63C686822388A3338497CDDB660D5D69CF68B68F287 - IMPHASH=B68908ADAEB5D662F87F2528AF318F12 condition: selection falsepositives: - System Informer is regularly used legitimately by system administrators or developers. Apply additional filters accordingly level: medium
Near-miss passage: Sigma rule: Detect suspicious Kerberos TGT requests. Once an attacer obtains a computer certificate by abusing Active Directory Cert. Logsource: windows / security. Rule: title: PetitPotam Suspicious Kerberos TGT Request id: 6a53d871-682d-40b6-83e0-b7c1a6c4e3a5 status: test description: 'Detect suspicious Kerberos TGT requests. Once an attacer obtains a computer certificate by abusing Active Directory Certificate Services in combination with PetitPotam, the next step would be to leverage the certificate for malicious purposes. One way of doing this is to request a Kerberos Ticket Granting Ticket using a tool like Rubeus. This request will generate a 4768 event with some unusual fields depending on the environment. This analytic will require tuning, we recommend filtering Account_Name to the Domain Controller computer accounts. ' references: - https://github.com/topotam/PetitPotam - https://isc.sans.edu/forums/diary/Active+Directory+Certificate+Services+ADCS+PKI+domain+admin+vulnerability/27668/ - https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/88d689fe8a055d8284337b9fad5d9152b42043db/detections/endpoint/petitpotam_suspicious_kerberos_tgt_request.yml author: Mauricio Velazco, Michael Haag date: 2021-09-02 modified: 2022-10-05 tags: - attack.credential-access - attack.t1187 logsource: product: windows service: security definition: The advanced audit policy setting "Account Logon > Kerberos Authentication Service" must be configured for Success/Failure detection: selection: EventID: 4768 TargetUserName|endswith: $ CertThumbprint|contains: '*' filter_local: IpAddress: ::1 filter_thumbprint: CertThumbprint: '' condition: selection and not 1 of filter_* falsepositives: - False positives are possible if the environment is using certificates for authentication. We recommend filtering Account_Name to the Domain Controller computer accounts. level: high