Query: write Sigma for This rule detects execution of a PowerShell code through the sqltoolsps.exe utility, which is included in the standard s
Matching passage: Sigma rule: This rule detects execution of a PowerShell code through the sqltoolsps.exe utility, which is included in the standard s. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: SQL Client Tools PowerShell Session Detection id: a746c9b8-a2fb-4ee5-a428-92bee9e99060 status: test description: 'This rule detects execution of a PowerShell code through the sqltoolsps.exe utility, which is included in the standard set of utilities supplied with the Microsoft SQL Server Management studio. Script blocks are not logged in this case, so this utility helps to bypass protection mechanisms based on the analysis of these logs. ' references: - https://github.com/LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS/blob/8283d8d91552213ded165fd36deb6cb9534cb443/yml/OtherMSBinaries/Sqltoolsps.yml - https://twitter.com/pabraeken/status/993298228840992768 author: Agro (@agro_sev) oscd.communitly date: 2020-10-13 modified: 2022-02-25 tags: - attack.execution - attack.stealth - attack.t1059.001 - attack.t1127 logsource: category: process_creation product: windows detection: selection: - Image|endswith: \sqltoolsps.exe - ParentImage|endswith: \sqltoolsps.exe - OriginalFileName: \sqltoolsps.exe filter: ParentImage|endswith: \smss.exe condition: selection and not filter falsepositives: - Direct PS command execution through SQLToolsPS.exe is uncommon, childprocess sqltoolsps.exe spawned by smss.exe is a legitimate action. level: medium
Near-miss passage: Sigma rule: Detects processes that query known 3rd party registry keys that holds credentials via commandline. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: Enumeration for 3rd Party Creds From CLI id: 87a476dc-0079-4583-a985-dee7a20a03de related: - id: e0b0c2ab-3d52-46d9-8cb7-049dc775fbd1 type: derived - id: cc1abf27-78a3-4ac5-a51c-f3070b1d8e40 type: similar status: test description: Detects processes that query known 3rd party registry keys that holds credentials via commandline references: - https://isc.sans.edu/diary/More+Data+Exfiltration/25698 - https://github.com/synacktiv/Radmin3-Password-Cracker/blob/acfc87393e4b7c06353973a14a6c7126a51f36ac/regkey.txt - https://github.com/HyperSine/how-does-MobaXterm-encrypt-password - https://book.hacktricks.xyz/windows-hardening/windows-local-privilege-escalation#inside-the-registry author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) date: 2022-06-20 modified: 2025-05-22 tags: - attack.credential-access - attack.t1552.002 logsource: category: process_creation product: windows detection: selection: CommandLine|contains: - \Software\Aerofox\Foxmail\V3.1 - \Software\Aerofox\FoxmailPreview - \Software\DownloadManager\Passwords - \Software\FTPWare\COREFTP\Sites - \Software\IncrediMail\Identities - \Software\Martin Prikryl\WinSCP 2\Sessions - \Software\Mobatek\MobaXterm\ - \Software\OpenSSH\Agent\Keys - \Software\OpenVPN-GUI\configs - \Software\ORL\WinVNC3\Password - \Software\Qualcomm\Eudora\CommandLine - \Software\RealVNC\WinVNC4 - \Software\RimArts\B2\Settings - \Software\SimonTatham\PuTTY\Sessions - \Software\SimonTatham\PuTTY\SshHostKeys\ - \Software\Sota\FFFTP - \Software\TightVNC\Server - \Software\WOW6432Node\Radmin\v3.0\Server\Parameters\Radmin filter_main_other_rule: Image|endswith: reg.exe CommandLine|contains: - export - save condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_* falsepositives: - Unknown level: medium