Query: write Sigma for Detects when adversaries stop services or processes by disabling their respective scheduled tasks in order to conduct da
Matching passage: Sigma rule: Detects when adversaries stop services or processes by disabling their respective scheduled tasks in order to conduct da. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: Disable Important Scheduled Task id: 9ac94dc8-9042-493c-ba45-3b5e7c86b980 related: - id: 7595ba94-cf3b-4471-aa03-4f6baa9e5fad type: similar - id: 9e3cb244-bdb8-4632-8c90-6079c8f4f16d type: similar status: test description: Detects when adversaries stop services or processes by disabling their respective scheduled tasks in order to conduct data destructive activities references: - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1490/T1490.md#atomic-test-8---windows---disable-the-sr-scheduled-task - https://twitter.com/MichalKoczwara/status/1553634816016498688 - https://thedfirreport.com/2021/10/18/icedid-to-xinglocker-ransomware-in-24-hours/ author: frack113, Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems), X__Junior date: 2021-12-26 modified: 2026-03-11 tags: - attack.impact - attack.t1489 logsource: category: process_creation product: windows detection: selection_img: - Image|endswith: \schtasks.exe - OriginalFileName: schtasks.exe selection_cli_disable: CommandLine|contains|windash: /disable selection_cli_task: CommandLine|contains: - \Windows\BitLocker - \Windows\ExploitGuard - \Windows\ExploitGuard\ExploitGuard MDM policy Refresh - \Windows\SystemRestore\SR - \Windows\UpdateOrchestrator\ - \Windows\Windows Defender\ - \Windows\WindowsBackup\ - \Windows\WindowsUpdate\ condition: all of selection_* falsepositives: - Unknown level: high regression_tests_path: regression_data/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_schtasks_disable/info.yml simulation: - type: atomic-red-team name: Windows - Disable the SR scheduled task technique: T1490 atomic_guid: 1c68c68d-83a4-4981-974e-8993055fa034
Near-miss passage: Sigma rule: Files with well-known filenames (sensitive files with credential data) copying. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: Copying Sensitive Files with Credential Data id: e7be6119-fc37-43f0-ad4f-1f3f99be2f9f status: test description: Files with well-known filenames (sensitive files with credential data) copying references: - https://room362.com/post/2013/2013-06-10-volume-shadow-copy-ntdsdit-domain-hashes-remotely-part-1/ - https://www.slideshare.net/heirhabarov/hunting-for-credentials-dumping-in-windows-environment - https://dfironthemountain.wordpress.com/2018/12/06/locked-file-access-using-esentutl-exe/ - https://github.com/LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS/blob/2cc01b01132b5c304027a658c698ae09dd6a92bf/yml/OSBinaries/Esentutl.yml author: Teymur Kheirkhabarov, Daniil Yugoslavskiy, oscd.community date: 2019-10-22 modified: 2024-06-04 tags: - attack.credential-access - attack.t1003.002 - attack.t1003.003 - car.2013-07-001 - attack.s0404 logsource: category: process_creation product: windows detection: selection_esent_img: - Image|endswith: \esentutl.exe - OriginalFileName: \esentutl.exe selection_esent_cli: CommandLine|contains|windash: - vss - ' /m ' - ' /y ' selection_susp_paths: CommandLine|contains: - \config\RegBack\sam - \config\RegBack\security - \config\RegBack\system - \config\sam - \config\security - '\config\system ' - \repair\sam - \repair\security - \repair\system - \windows\ntds\ntds.dit condition: all of selection_esent_* or selection_susp_paths falsepositives: - Copying sensitive files for legitimate use (eg. backup) or forensic investigation by legitimate incident responder or forensic investigator. level: high