Query: write Sigma for Detects modification of autostart extensibility point (ASEP) in registry. Adversaries may modify these keys to execute m
Matching passage: Sigma rule: Detects modification of autostart extensibility point (ASEP) in registry. Adversaries may modify these keys to execute m. Logsource: windows / registry_set. Rule: title: Office Autorun Keys Modification id: baecf8fb-edbf-429f-9ade-31fc3f22b970 related: - id: 17f878b8-9968-4578-b814-c4217fc5768c type: obsolete status: test description: 'Detects modification of autostart extensibility point (ASEP) in registry. Adversaries may modify these keys to execute malicious code when Office files are opened. There are various legitimate add-ins that also use these keys and this filter list might not be exhaustive. Thus, it is recommended to review and tune filters for your environment to reduce false positives before deploying to production. ' references: - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1547.001/T1547.001.md - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/downloads/autoruns - https://gist.github.com/GlebSukhodolskiy/0fc5fa5f482903064b448890db1eaf9d author: Victor Sergeev, Daniil Yugoslavskiy, Gleb Sukhodolskiy, Timur Zinniatullin, oscd.community, Tim Shelton, frack113 (split) date: 2019-10-25 modified: 2026-01-09 tags: - attack.privilege-escalation - attack.persistence - attack.t1547.001 logsource: category: registry_set product: windows detection: selection_office_root: TargetObject|contains: - \Software\Wow6432Node\Microsoft\Office - \Software\Microsoft\Office selection_office_details: TargetObject|contains: - \Word\Addins - \PowerPoint\Addins - \Outlook\Addins - \Onenote\Addins - \Excel\Addins - \Access\Addins - test\Special\Perf filter_main_empty: Details: (Empty) filter_main_null: Details: null filter_main_known_addins: Image|startswith: - C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\ - C:\Program Files (x86)\Microsoft Office\ - C:\PROGRA~2\MICROS~2\Office - C:\Windows\System32\msiexec.exe - C:\Windows\SysWOW64\msiexec.exe - C:\Windows\System32\regsvr32.exe - 'C:\Windows\SysWOW64\regsvr32.exe ' TargetObject|contains: - \Excel\Addins\AdHocReportingExcelClientLib.AdHocReportingExcelClientAddIn.1\ - \Excel\Addins\ExcelPlugInShell.PowerMapConnect\ - \Excel\Addins\NativeShim\ - \Excel\Addins\NativeShim.InquireConnector.1\ - \Excel\Addins\PowerPivotExcelClientAddIn.NativeEntry.1\ - \Outlook\AddIns\AccessAddin.DC\ - \Outlook\AddIns\ColleagueImport.ColleagueImportAddin\ - \Outlook\AddIns\EvernoteCC.EvernoteContactConnector\ - \Outlook\AddIns\EvernoteOLRD.Connect\ - \Outlook\Addins\\OneNote.OutlookAddin - \Outlook\Addins\DriveFSExtensionLib.Connect\ - \Outlook\Addins\GoogleAppsSync.Connect\ - \Outlook\Addins\Microsoft.VbaAddinForOutlook.1\ - \Outlook\Addins\OcOffice.OcFo
Near-miss passage: Sigma rule: Detects potentially suspicious child processes launched via the ScreenConnect client service.. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: Remote Access Tool - ScreenConnect Potential Suspicious Remote Command Execution id: 7b582f1a-b318-4c6a-bf4e-66fe49bf55a5 related: - id: d1a401ab-8c47-4e86-a7d8-2460b6a53e4a type: derived status: test description: 'Detects potentially suspicious child processes launched via the ScreenConnect client service. ' references: - https://www.mandiant.com/resources/telegram-malware-iranian-espionage - https://docs.connectwise.com/ConnectWise_Control_Documentation/Get_started/Host_client/View_menu/Backstage_mode - https://www.huntress.com/blog/slashandgrab-screen-connect-post-exploitation-in-the-wild-cve-2024-1709-cve-2024-1708 - https://www.trendmicro.com/en_us/research/24/b/threat-actor-groups-including-black-basta-are-exploiting-recent-.html author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems), @Kostastsale date: 2022-02-25 modified: 2024-02-28 tags: - attack.command-and-control - attack.t1219.002 logsource: product: windows category: process_creation detection: selection: ParentCommandLine|contains|all: - :\Windows\TEMP\ScreenConnect\ - run.cmd Image|endswith: - \bitsadmin.exe - \cmd.exe - \curl.exe - \dllhost.exe - \net.exe - \nltest.exe - \powershell.exe - \pwsh.exe - \rundll32.exe - \wevtutil.exe condition: selection falsepositives: - If the script being executed make use of any of the utilities mentioned in the detection then they should filtered out or allowed. level: medium