Query: write Sigma for Detects execution of "odbcconf" with the "-f" flag in order to load a response file with a non-".rsp" extension.
Matching passage: Sigma rule: Detects execution of "odbcconf" with the "-f" flag in order to load a response file with a non-".rsp" extension.. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: Suspicious Response File Execution Via Odbcconf.EXE id: 2d32dd6f-3196-4093-b9eb-1ad8ab088ca5 related: - id: 5f03babb-12db-4eec-8c82-7b4cb5580868 type: derived - id: 65d2be45-8600-4042-b4c0-577a1ff8a60e type: obsolete status: test description: Detects execution of "odbcconf" with the "-f" flag in order to load a response file with a non-".rsp" extension. references: - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/sql/odbc/odbcconf-exe?view=sql-server-ver16 - https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Odbcconf/ - https://www.trendmicro.com/en_us/research/17/h/backdoor-carrying-emails-set-sights-on-russian-speaking-businesses.html author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) date: 2023-05-22 modified: 2024-03-13 tags: - attack.stealth - attack.t1218.008 logsource: category: process_creation product: windows detection: selection_img: - Image|endswith: \odbcconf.exe - OriginalFileName: odbcconf.exe selection_cli: CommandLine|contains|windash: ' -f ' filter_main_rsp_ext: CommandLine|contains: .rsp filter_main_runonce_odbc: ParentImage: C:\Windows\System32\runonce.exe Image: C:\Windows\System32\odbcconf.exe CommandLine|contains: .exe /E /F "C:\WINDOWS\system32\odbcconf.tmp" condition: all of selection_* and not 1 of filter_main_* falsepositives: - Unlikely level: high
Near-miss passage: Sigma rule: Detects enumeration of local system accounts on MacOS systems. This can be used by attackers to identify accounts for la. Logsource: macos / process_creation. Rule: title: Local System Accounts Discovery - MacOs id: ddf36b67-e872-4507-ab2e-46bda21b842c status: test description: 'Detects enumeration of local system accounts on MacOS systems. This can be used by attackers to identify accounts for lateral movement or privilege escalation. ' references: - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1087.001/T1087.001.md - https://ss64.com/osx/dscl.html - https://ss64.com/mac/dscacheutil.html author: Alejandro Ortuno, oscd.community date: 2020-10-08 modified: 2026-07-07 tags: - attack.discovery - attack.t1087.001 logsource: category: process_creation product: macos detection: selection_dscl: Image|endswith: /dscl CommandLine|contains|all: - list - /users selection_dscacheutil: Image|endswith: /dscacheutil CommandLine|contains|all: - -q - user selection_root: CommandLine|contains: '''*:0:''' selection_passwd_sudo: Image|endswith: - /cat - /awk - /grep CommandLine|contains: - /etc/passwd - /etc/sudoers selection_id: Image|endswith: /id selection_lsof: Image|endswith: /lsof CommandLine|contains: -u selection_logged_in_users: Image|endswith: - /who - /w - /users - /last selection_home_dir_listing: Image|endswith: /ls CommandLine|endswith: - /Users - /Users' - /Users" selection_loginwindow_prefs: Image|endswith: - /defaults - /plutil CommandLine|contains: com.apple.loginwindow condition: 1 of selection* falsepositives: - Legitimate administration activities level: low