Query: Sigma rule for Detects the deletion of backups or system state backups via "wbadmin.exe". This technique is used by numerous ransomware
Matching passage: Sigma rule: Detects the deletion of backups or system state backups via "wbadmin.exe". This technique is used by numerous ransomware. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: Windows Backup Deleted Via Wbadmin.EXE id: 89f75308-5b1b-4390-b2d8-d6b2340efaf8 related: - id: 639c9081-f482-47d3-a0bd-ddee3d4ecd76 type: derived status: test description: 'Detects the deletion of backups or system state backups via "wbadmin.exe". This technique is used by numerous ransomware families and actors. This may only be successful on server platforms that have Windows Backup enabled. ' references: - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1490/T1490.md#atomic-test-5---windows---delete-volume-shadow-copies-via-wmi-with-powershell - https://github.com/albertzsigovits/malware-notes/blob/558898932c1579ff589290092a2c8febefc3a4c9/Ransomware/Lockbit.md - https://www.sentinelone.com/labs/ranzy-ransomware-better-encryption-among-new-features-of-thunderx-derivative/ - https://www.trendmicro.com/vinfo/us/security/news/cybercrime-and-digital-threats/ransomware-report-avaddon-and-new-techniques-emerge-industrial-sector-targeted - https://www.trendmicro.com/content/dam/trendmicro/global/en/research/24/b/lockbit-attempts-to-stay-afloat-with-a-new-version/technical-appendix-lockbit-ng-dev-analysis.pdf - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/wbadmin-delete-systemstatebackup author: frack113, Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) date: 2021-12-13 modified: 2024-05-10 tags: - attack.impact - attack.t1490 logsource: category: process_creation product: windows detection: selection_img: - Image|endswith: \wbadmin.exe - OriginalFileName: WBADMIN.EXE selection_cli: CommandLine|contains|all: - 'delete ' - backup filter_main_keep_versions: CommandLine|contains: keepVersions:0 condition: all of selection_* and not 1 of filter_main_* falsepositives: - Legitimate backup activity from administration scripts and software. level: medium
Near-miss passage: Sigma rule: Detects the addition of a SSP to the registry. Upon a reboot or API call, SSP DLLs gain access to encrypted and plaintex. Logsource: windows / registry_event. Rule: title: Security Support Provider (SSP) Added to LSA Configuration id: eeb30123-9fbd-4ee8-aaa0-2e545bbed6dc status: test description: 'Detects the addition of a SSP to the registry. Upon a reboot or API call, SSP DLLs gain access to encrypted and plaintext passwords stored in Windows. ' references: - https://powersploit.readthedocs.io/en/latest/Persistence/Install-SSP/ - https://github.com/EmpireProject/Empire/blob/08cbd274bef78243d7a8ed6443b8364acd1fc48b/data/module_source/persistence/Install-SSP.ps1#L157 author: iwillkeepwatch date: 2019-01-18 modified: 2026-03-30 tags: - attack.privilege-escalation - attack.persistence - attack.t1547.005 logsource: category: registry_event product: windows detection: selection: TargetObject|endswith: - \Control\Lsa\Security Packages - \Control\Lsa\OSConfig\Security Packages filter_main_msiexec: Image: - C:\Windows\system32\msiexec.exe - C:\Windows\syswow64\MsiExec.exe filter_main_image_null: Image: null condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_* falsepositives: - Unknown level: high