Query: detection rule: Identifies when a user attempts to clear console history. An adversary may clear the command history of a compromised ac
Matching passage: Sigma rule: Identifies when a user attempts to clear console history. An adversary may clear the command history of a compromised ac. Logsource: windows / ps_script. Rule: title: Clearing Windows Console History id: bde47d4b-9987-405c-94c7-b080410e8ea7 status: test description: Identifies when a user attempts to clear console history. An adversary may clear the command history of a compromised account to conceal the actions undertaken during an intrusion. references: - https://stefanos.cloud/blog/kb/how-to-clear-the-powershell-command-history/ - https://www.shellhacks.com/clear-history-powershell/ - https://community.sophos.com/sophos-labs/b/blog/posts/powershell-command-history-forensics author: Austin Songer @austinsonger date: 2021-11-25 modified: 2022-12-25 tags: - attack.stealth - attack.t1070 - attack.t1070.003 logsource: product: windows category: ps_script definition: 'Requirements: Script Block Logging must be enabled' detection: selection1: ScriptBlockText|contains: Clear-History selection2a: ScriptBlockText|contains: - Remove-Item - rm selection2b: ScriptBlockText|contains: - ConsoleHost_history.txt - (Get-PSReadlineOption).HistorySavePath condition: selection1 or selection2a and selection2b falsepositives: - Unknown level: high
Near-miss passage: Sigma rule: Detects changes to environment variables related to ETW logging via the CommandLine. This could indicate potential adver. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: ETW Logging Tamper In .NET Processes Via CommandLine id: 41421f44-58f9-455d-838a-c398859841d4 status: test description: 'Detects changes to environment variables related to ETW logging via the CommandLine. This could indicate potential adversaries stopping ETW providers recording loaded .NET assemblies. ' references: - https://twitter.com/_xpn_/status/1268712093928378368 - https://social.msdn.microsoft.com/Forums/vstudio/en-US/0878832e-39d7-4eaf-8e16-a729c4c40975/what-can-i-use-e13c0d23ccbc4e12931bd9cc2eee27e4-for?forum=clr - https://github.com/dotnet/runtime/blob/ee2355c801d892f2894b0f7b14a20e6cc50e0e54/docs/design/coreclr/jit/viewing-jit-dumps.md#setting-configuration-variables - https://github.com/dotnet/runtime/blob/f62e93416a1799aecc6b0947adad55a0d9870732/src/coreclr/src/inc/clrconfigvalues.h#L35-L38 - https://github.com/dotnet/runtime/blob/7abe42dc1123722ed385218268bb9fe04556e3d3/src/coreclr/src/inc/clrconfig.h#L33-L39 - https://github.com/dotnet/runtime/search?p=1&q=COMPlus_&unscoped_q=COMPlus_ - https://bunnyinside.com/?term=f71e8cb9c76a - http://managed670.rssing.com/chan-5590147/all_p1.html - https://github.com/dotnet/runtime/blob/4f9ae42d861fcb4be2fcd5d3d55d5f227d30e723/docs/coding-guidelines/clr-jit-coding-conventions.md#1412-disabling-code - https://i.blackhat.com/EU-21/Wednesday/EU-21-Teodorescu-Veni-No-Vidi-No-Vici-Attacks-On-ETW-Blind-EDRs.pdf author: Roberto Rodriguez (Cyb3rWard0g), OTR (Open Threat Research) date: 2020-05-02 modified: 2022-12-09 tags: - attack.defense-impairment - attack.t1685 logsource: category: process_creation product: windows detection: selection: CommandLine|contains: - COMPlus_ETWEnabled - COMPlus_ETWFlags condition: selection falsepositives: - Unlikely level: high