Query: rule covering Detects execution of the SharpImpersonation tool. Which can be used to manipulate tokens on a Windows computers remotely
Matching passage: Sigma rule: Detects execution of the SharpImpersonation tool. Which can be used to manipulate tokens on a Windows computers remotely. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: HackTool - SharpImpersonation Execution id: f89b08d0-77ad-4728-817b-9b16c5a69c7a related: - id: cf0c254b-22f1-4b2b-8221-e137b3c0af94 type: similar status: test description: Detects execution of the SharpImpersonation tool. Which can be used to manipulate tokens on a Windows computers remotely (PsExec/WmiExec) or interactively references: - https://s3cur3th1ssh1t.github.io/SharpImpersonation-Introduction/ - https://github.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/SharpImpersonation author: Sai Prashanth Pulisetti @pulisettis, Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) date: 2022-12-27 modified: 2023-02-13 tags: - attack.privilege-escalation - attack.stealth - attack.t1134.001 - attack.t1134.003 logsource: product: windows category: process_creation detection: selection_img: - Image|endswith: \SharpImpersonation.exe - OriginalFileName: SharpImpersonation.exe selection_cli: - CommandLine|contains|all: - ' user:' - ' binary:' - CommandLine|contains|all: - ' user:' - ' shellcode:' - CommandLine|contains: - ' technique:CreateProcessAsUserW' - ' technique:ImpersonateLoggedOnuser' condition: 1 of selection_* falsepositives: - Unknown level: high
Near-miss passage: Sigma rule: Detects the creation of new files with the ".evtx" extension in non-common or non-standard location. This could indicate. Logsource: windows / file_event. Rule: title: EVTX Created In Uncommon Location id: 65236ec7-ace0-4f0c-82fd-737b04fd4dcb status: test description: 'Detects the creation of new files with the ".evtx" extension in non-common or non-standard location. This could indicate tampering with default EVTX locations in order to evade security controls or simply exfiltration of event log to search for sensitive information within. Note that backup software and legitimate administrator might perform similar actions during troubleshooting. ' references: - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/eventlog/eventlog-key author: D3F7A5105 date: 2023-01-02 modified: 2024-03-26 tags: - attack.defense-impairment - attack.t1685.001 logsource: category: file_event product: windows definition: 'Requirements: The ".evtx" extension should be monitored via a Sysmon configuration. Example: <TargetFilename condition="end with">.evtx<TargetFilename>' detection: selection: TargetFilename|endswith: .evtx filter_main_path: TargetFilename|startswith: C:\Windows\System32\winevt\Logs\ filter_main_baseimage: TargetFilename|startswith: C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\Windows\Containers\BaseImages\ TargetFilename|endswith: \Windows\System32\winevt\Logs\ condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_* falsepositives: - Administrator or backup activity - An unknown bug seems to trigger the Windows "svchost" process to drop EVTX files in the "C:\Windows\Temp" directory in the form "<log_name">_<uuid>.evtx". See https://superuser.com/questions/1371229/low-disk-space-after-filling-up-c-windows-temp-with-evtx-and-txt-files level: medium regression_tests_path: regression_data/rules/windows/file/file_event/file_event_win_create_evtx_non_common_locations/info.yml