Query: detection rule: Detects potentially suspicious child process of applications launched from inside the WindowsApps directory. This could
Matching passage: Sigma rule: Detects potentially suspicious child process of applications launched from inside the WindowsApps directory. This could. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: Potentially Suspicious Windows App Activity id: f91ed517-a6ba-471d-9910-b3b4a398c0f3 status: test description: Detects potentially suspicious child process of applications launched from inside the WindowsApps directory. This could be a sign of a rogue ".appx" package installation/execution references: - https://news.sophos.com/en-us/2021/11/11/bazarloader-call-me-back-attack-abuses-windows-10-apps-mechanism/ - https://www.sentinelone.com/labs/inside-malicious-windows-apps-for-malware-deployment/ author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) date: 2023-01-12 modified: 2025-10-07 tags: - attack.stealth logsource: product: windows category: process_creation detection: selection_parent: ParentImage|contains: C:\Program Files\WindowsApps\ selection_susp_img: Image|endswith: - \cmd.exe - \cscript.exe - \mshta.exe - \powershell.exe - \powershell_ise.exe - \pwsh.exe - \regsvr32.exe - \rundll32.exe - \wscript.exe selection_susp_cli: CommandLine|contains: - cmd /c - Invoke- - Base64 filter_optional_terminal: ParentImage|contains: :\Program Files\WindowsApps\Microsoft.WindowsTerminal ParentImage|endswith: \WindowsTerminal.exe Image|endswith: - \powershell.exe - \cmd.exe - \pwsh.exe filter_optional_sysinternals: ParentImage|startswith: C:\Program Files\WindowsApps\Microsoft.SysinternalsSuite Image|endswith: \cmd.exe condition: selection_parent and 1 of selection_susp_* and not 1 of filter_optional_* falsepositives: - Legitimate packages that make use of external binaries such as Windows Terminal level: medium
Near-miss passage: Sigma rule: Detects usage of the "sc.exe" utility adding a new service with special permission seen used by threat actors which make. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: Service DACL Abuse To Hide Services Via Sc.EXE id: a537cfc3-4297-4789-92b5-345bfd845ad0 related: - id: 99cf1e02-00fb-4c0d-8375-563f978dfd37 type: similar - id: 98c5aeef-32d5-492f-b174-64a691896d25 type: similar status: test description: Detects usage of the "sc.exe" utility adding a new service with special permission seen used by threat actors which makes the service hidden and unremovable. references: - https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2021/10/threat-hunting-in-large-datasets-by.html - https://www.sans.org/blog/red-team-tactics-hiding-windows-services/ - https://twitter.com/Alh4zr3d/status/1580925761996828672 - https://itconnect.uw.edu/tools-services-support/it-systems-infrastructure/msinf/other-help/understanding-sddl-syntax/ author: Andreas Hunkeler (@Karneades) date: 2021-12-20 modified: 2022-08-08 tags: - attack.persistence - attack.privilege-escalation - attack.execution - attack.stealth - attack.t1574.011 logsource: category: process_creation product: windows detection: selection_img: - Image|endswith: \sc.exe - OriginalFileName: sc.exe selection_cli: CommandLine|contains|all: - sdset - DCLCWPDTSD condition: all of selection_* falsepositives: - Unknown level: high