Query: Sigma YAML for windows / registry_set
Matching passage: Sigma rule: Detects the creation of the "accepteula" key related to the Sysinternals tools being created from executables with the w. Logsource: windows / registry_set. Rule: title: Suspicious Execution Of Renamed Sysinternals Tools - Registry id: f50f3c09-557d-492d-81db-9064a8d4e211 related: - id: 25ffa65d-76d8-4da5-a832-3f2b0136e133 type: derived - id: 8023f872-3f1d-4301-a384-801889917ab4 type: similar status: test description: Detects the creation of the "accepteula" key related to the Sysinternals tools being created from executables with the wrong name (e.g. a renamed Sysinternals tool) references: - Internal Research author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) date: 2022-08-24 modified: 2026-06-29 tags: - attack.resource-development - attack.t1588.002 logsource: product: windows category: registry_set detection: selection: TargetObject|contains: - \Active Directory Explorer - \Handle - \LiveKd - \ProcDump - \Process Explorer - \PsExec - \PsLoggedon - \PsLoglist - \PsPasswd - \PsPing - \PsService - \SDelete TargetObject|endswith: \EulaAccepted filter: Image|endswith: - \ADExplorer.exe - \ADExplorer64.exe - \ADExplorer64a.exe - \handle.exe - \handle64.exe - \handle64a.exe - \livekd.exe - \livekd64.exe - \procdump.exe - \procdump64.exe - \procdump64a.exe - \procexp.exe - \procexp64.exe - \procexp64a.exe - \PsExec.exe - \PsExec64.exe - \PsExec64a.exe - \PsLoggedon.exe - \PsLoggedon64.exe - \psloglist.exe - \psloglist64.exe - \psloglist64a.exe - \pspasswd.exe - \pspasswd64.exe - \pspasswd64a.exe - \PsPing.exe - \PsPing64.exe - \PsPing64a.exe - \PsService.exe - \PsService64.exe - \PsService64a.exe - \sdelete.exe condition: selection and not filter falsepositives: - Unlikely level: high regression_tests_path: regression_data/rules/windows/registry/registry_set/registry_set_pua_sysinternals_renamed_execution_via_eula/info.yml
Near-miss passage: Sigma rule: Detects execution of mshta.exe with file types that looks like they do not typically represent HTA (HTML Application) co. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: MSHTA Execution with Suspicious File Extensions id: cc7abbd0-762b-41e3-8a26-57ad50d2eea3 status: test description: 'Detects execution of mshta.exe with file types that looks like they do not typically represent HTA (HTML Application) content, such as .png, .jpg, .zip, .pdf, and others, which are often polyglots. MSHTA is a legitimate Windows utility for executing HTML Applications containing VBScript or JScript. Threat actors often abuse this lolbin utility to download and execute malicious scripts disguised as benign files or hosted under misleading extensions to evade detection. ' references: - http://blog.sevagas.com/?Hacking-around-HTA-files - https://0x00sec.org/t/clientside-exploitation-in-2018-how-pentesting-has-changed/7356 - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/dotnet/framework/data/xml/xslt/xslt-stylesheet-scripting-using-msxsl-script - https://medium.com/tsscyber/pentesting-and-hta-bypassing-powershell-constrained-language-mode-53a42856c997 - https://twitter.com/mattifestation/status/1326228491302563846 - https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/c1f27d9795a2eba630db8a043580a0761798f06370fb1317067805f8a845b00c author: Diego Perez (@darkquassar), Markus Neis, Swisscom (Improve Rule), Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems) date: 2019-02-22 modified: 2025-05-12 tags: - attack.stealth - attack.t1140 - attack.t1218.005 - attack.execution - attack.t1059.007 - cve.2020-1599 logsource: category: process_creation product: windows detection: selection_img: - Image|endswith: \mshta.exe - OriginalFileName: mshta.exe selection_cli: CommandLine|contains: - .7z - .avi - .bat - .bmp - .conf - .csv - .dll - .doc - .gif - .gz - .ini - .jpe - .jpg - .json - .lnk - .log - .mkv - .mp3 - .mp4 - .pdf - .png - .ppt - .rar - .rtf - .svg - .tar - .tmp - .txt - .xls - .xml - .yaml - .yml - .zip - vbscript condition: all of selection_* falsepositives: - False positives depend on scripts and administrative tools used in the monitored environment level: high