Query: alert when Detects suspicious print spool service (spoolsv.exe) child processes.
Matching passage: Sigma rule: Detects suspicious print spool service (spoolsv.exe) child processes.. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: Suspicious Spool Service Child Process id: dcdbc940-0bff-46b2-95f3-2d73f848e33b status: test description: Detects suspicious print spool service (spoolsv.exe) child processes. references: - https://github.com/microsoft/Microsoft-365-Defender-Hunting-Queries/blob/efa17a600b43c897b4b7463cc8541daa1987eeb4/Exploits/Print%20Spooler%20RCE/Suspicious%20Spoolsv%20Child%20Process.md author: Justin C. (@endisphotic), @dreadphones (detection), Thomas Patzke (Sigma rule) date: 2021-07-11 modified: 2024-12-01 tags: - attack.execution - attack.t1203 - attack.privilege-escalation - attack.t1068 logsource: category: process_creation product: windows detection: spoolsv: ParentImage|endswith: \spoolsv.exe IntegrityLevel: - System - S-1-16-16384 suspicious_unrestricted: Image|endswith: - \gpupdate.exe - \whoami.exe - \nltest.exe - \taskkill.exe - \wmic.exe - \taskmgr.exe - \sc.exe - \findstr.exe - \curl.exe - \wget.exe - \certutil.exe - \bitsadmin.exe - \accesschk.exe - \wevtutil.exe - \bcdedit.exe - \fsutil.exe - \cipher.exe - \schtasks.exe - \write.exe - \wuauclt.exe - \systeminfo.exe - \reg.exe - \query.exe suspicious_net: Image|endswith: - \net.exe - \net1.exe suspicious_net_filter: CommandLine|contains: start suspicious_cmd: Image|endswith: \cmd.exe suspicious_cmd_filter: CommandLine|contains: - .spl - route add - program files suspicious_netsh: Image|endswith: \netsh.exe suspicious_netsh_filter: CommandLine|contains: - add portopening - rule name suspicious_powershell: Image|endswith: - \powershell.exe - \pwsh.exe suspicious_powershell_filter: CommandLine|contains: .spl suspicious_rundll32_img: - Image|endswith: \rundll32.exe - OriginalFileName: RUNDLL32.EXE suspicious_rundll32_cli: CommandLine|endswith: rundll32.exe condition: spoolsv and ( suspicious_unrestricted or (suspicious_net and not suspicious_net_filter) or (suspicious_cmd and not suspicious_cmd_filter) or (suspicious_netsh and not suspicious_netsh_filter) or (suspicious_powershell and not suspicious_powershell_filter) or all of suspicious_rundll32_* ) falsepositives: - Unknown level: high
Near-miss passage: Sigma rule: Detects the execution of netsh with the "trace" flag in order to start a network capture. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: New Network Trace Capture Started Via Netsh.EXE id: d3c3861d-c504-4c77-ba55-224ba82d0118 status: test description: Detects the execution of netsh with the "trace" flag in order to start a network capture references: - https://blogs.msdn.microsoft.com/canberrapfe/2012/03/30/capture-a-network-trace-without-installing-anything-capture-a-network-trace-of-a-reboot/ - https://klausjochem.me/2016/02/03/netsh-the-cyber-attackers-tool-of-choice/ author: Kutepov Anton, oscd.community date: 2019-10-24 modified: 2023-02-13 tags: - attack.discovery - attack.credential-access - attack.t1040 logsource: category: process_creation product: windows detection: selection_img: - Image|endswith: \netsh.exe - OriginalFileName: netsh.exe selection_cli: CommandLine|contains|all: - trace - start condition: all of selection_* falsepositives: - Legitimate administration activity level: medium