Query: detection rule: Detects the usage of the 'SeLoadDriverPrivilege' privilege. This privilege is required to load or unload a device driver
Matching passage: Sigma rule: Detects the usage of the 'SeLoadDriverPrivilege' privilege. This privilege is required to load or unload a device driver. Logsource: windows / security. Rule: title: Potential Privileged System Service Operation - SeLoadDriverPrivilege id: f63508a0-c809-4435-b3be-ed819394d612 status: test description: 'Detects the usage of the ''SeLoadDriverPrivilege'' privilege. This privilege is required to load or unload a device driver. With this privilege, the user can dynamically load and unload device drivers or other code in to kernel mode. This user right does not apply to Plug and Play device drivers. If you exclude privileged users/admins and processes, which are allowed to do so, you are maybe left with bad programs trying to load malicious kernel drivers. This will detect Ghost-In-The-Logs (https://github.com/bats3c/Ghost-In-The-Logs) and the usage of Sysinternals and various other tools. So you have to work with a whitelist to find the bad stuff. ' references: - https://web.archive.org/web/20230331181619/https://blog.dylan.codes/evading-sysmon-and-windows-event-logging/ - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-10/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4673 author: xknow (@xknow_infosec), xorxes (@xor_xes) date: 2019-04-08 modified: 2026-06-29 tags: - attack.defense-impairment - attack.t1685 logsource: product: windows service: security detection: selection_1: EventID: 4673 PrivilegeList: SeLoadDriverPrivilege Service: '-' filter_main_exact: ProcessName: - C:\Windows\explorer.exe - C:\Windows\HelpPane.exe - C:\Windows\ImmersiveControlPanel\SystemSettings.exe - C:\Windows\System32\Dism.exe - C:\Windows\System32\fltMC.exe - C:\Windows\System32\mmc.exe - C:\Windows\System32\rundll32.exe - C:\Windows\System32\RuntimeBroker.exe - C:\Windows\System32\ShellHost.exe - C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe - C:\Windows\System32\SystemSettingsBroker.exe - C:\Windows\System32\wimserv.exe filter_optional_others: ProcessName|endswith: - \AppData\Local\Microsoft\Teams\current\Teams.exe - \Google\Chrome\Application\chrome.exe - \procexp.exe - \procexp64.exe - \procexp64a.exe - \procmon.exe - \procmon64.exe - \procmon64a.exe filter_main_startswith: ProcessName|startswith: C:\Program Files\WindowsApps\Microsoft filter_optional_dropbox: ProcessName|startswith: - C:\Program Files (x86)\Dropbox\ - C:\Program Files\Dropbox\ ProcessName|endswith: \Dropbox.exe condition: selection_1 and not 1 of filter_main_* and not 1 of filter_optional_* falsepositives: - Other legimate tools loading drivers. Including but not limited to, Sysinternals, CPU-Z, AVs etc. A baseline needs to be created according to the used
Near-miss passage: Sigma rule: Detects potential persistence behavior using the windows telemetry registry key. Windows telemetry makes use of the bina. Logsource: windows / registry_set. Rule: title: Potential Registry Persistence Attempt Via Windows Telemetry id: 73a883d0-0348-4be4-a8d8-51031c2564f8 related: - id: 4e8d5fd3-c959-441f-a941-f73d0cdcdca5 type: obsolete status: test description: 'Detects potential persistence behavior using the windows telemetry registry key. Windows telemetry makes use of the binary CompatTelRunner.exe to run a variety of commands and perform the actual telemetry collections. This binary was created to be easily extensible, and to that end, it relies on the registry to instruct on which commands to run. The problem is, it will run any arbitrary command without restriction of location or type. ' references: - https://www.trustedsec.com/blog/abusing-windows-telemetry-for-persistence/ author: Lednyov Alexey, oscd.community, Sreeman date: 2020-10-16 modified: 2023-08-17 tags: - attack.privilege-escalation - attack.execution - attack.persistence - attack.t1053.005 logsource: category: registry_set product: windows definition: 'Requirements: Sysmon config that monitors \SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\AppCompatFlags\TelemetryController subkey of the HKLM hives' detection: selection: TargetObject|contains: \SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\AppCompatFlags\TelemetryController\ TargetObject|endswith: \Command Details|contains: - .bat - .bin - .cmd - .dat - .dll - .exe - .hta - .jar - .js - .msi - .ps - .sh - .vb filter_main_generic: Details|contains: - \system32\CompatTelRunner.exe - \system32\DeviceCensus.exe condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_* falsepositives: - Unknown level: high