Query: detection rule: Detects the use of reg.exe to disable the Event Tracing for Windows (ETW) Autologger session for Windows Defender API an
Matching passage: Sigma rule: Detects the use of reg.exe to disable the Event Tracing for Windows (ETW) Autologger session for Windows Defender API an. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: Disabling Windows Defender WMI Autologger Session via Reg.exe id: a1b2c3d4-e5f6-a7b8-c9d0-e1f2a3b4c5d6 related: - id: f37b4bce-49d0-4087-9f5b-58bffda77316 type: similar status: experimental description: 'Detects the use of reg.exe to disable the Event Tracing for Windows (ETW) Autologger session for Windows Defender API and Audit events. By setting the ''Start'' value to ''0'' for the ''DefenderApiLogger'' or ''DefenderAuditLogger'' session, an attacker can prevent these critical security events from being logged, effectively blinding monitoring tools that rely on this data. This is a powerful defense evasion technique. ' references: - https://research.splunk.com/endpoint/76406a0f-f5e0-4167-8e1f-337fdc0f1b0c/ - https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/etw/configuring-and-starting-an-autologger-session - https://thedfirreport.com/2021/10/18/icedid-to-xinglocker-ransomware-in-24-hours/ - https://blog.malwarebytes.com/malwarebytes-news/2021/02/lazyscripter-from-empire-to-double-rat/ - https://www.binarly.io/blog/design-issues-of-modern-edrs-bypassing-etw-based-solutions author: Matt Anderson (Huntress) date: 2025-07-09 tags: - attack.defense-impairment - attack.t1685 logsource: category: process_creation product: windows detection: selection_img: - Image|endswith: \reg.exe - OriginalFileName: reg.exe selection_reg_path: CommandLine|contains: - \Control\WMI\Autologger\DefenderApiLogger\Start - \Control\WMI\Autologger\DefenderAuditLogger\Start selection_reg_add: CommandLine|contains|all: - add - '0' filter_main_enable: CommandLine|contains: '0x00000001' condition: all of selection_* and not 1 of filter_main_* falsepositives: - Highly unlikely level: high
Near-miss passage: Sigma rule: Detects a change in the AWS Identity Center (FKA AWS SSO) identity provider. A change in identity provider allows an att. Logsource: aws / cloudtrail. Rule: title: AWS Identity Center Identity Provider Change id: d3adb3ef-b7e7-4003-9092-1924c797db35 status: test description: 'Detects a change in the AWS Identity Center (FKA AWS SSO) identity provider. A change in identity provider allows an attacker to establish persistent access or escalate privileges via user impersonation. ' references: - https://docs.aws.amazon.com/singlesignon/latest/userguide/app-enablement.html - https://docs.aws.amazon.com/singlesignon/latest/userguide/sso-info-in-cloudtrail.html - https://docs.aws.amazon.com/service-authorization/latest/reference/list_awsiamidentitycentersuccessortoawssinglesign-on.html author: Michael McIntyre @wtfender date: 2023-09-27 tags: - attack.persistence - attack.credential-access - attack.defense-impairment - attack.t1556 logsource: product: aws service: cloudtrail detection: selection: eventSource: - sso-directory.amazonaws.com - sso.amazonaws.com eventName: - AssociateDirectory - DisableExternalIdPConfigurationForDirectory - DisassociateDirectory - EnableExternalIdPConfigurationForDirectory condition: selection falsepositives: - Authorized changes to the AWS account's identity provider level: high