Query: alert when Detects usage of the "Set-Service" powershell cmdlet to configure a new SecurityDescriptor that allows a service to be h
Matching passage: Sigma rule: Detects usage of the "Set-Service" powershell cmdlet to configure a new SecurityDescriptor that allows a service to be h. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: Abuse of Service Permissions to Hide Services Via Set-Service id: 514e4c3a-c77d-4cde-a00f-046425e2301e related: - id: a537cfc3-4297-4789-92b5-345bfd845ad0 type: derived - id: 953945c5-22fe-4a92-9f8a-a9edc1e522da type: similar status: test description: Detects usage of the "Set-Service" powershell cmdlet to configure a new SecurityDescriptor that allows a service to be hidden from other utilities such as "sc.exe", "Get-Service"...etc. (Works only in powershell 7) references: - https://twitter.com/Alh4zr3d/status/1580925761996828672 - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/microsoft.powershell.management/set-service?view=powershell-7.2 author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) date: 2022-10-17 tags: - attack.persistence - attack.privilege-escalation - attack.execution - attack.stealth - attack.t1574.011 logsource: category: process_creation product: windows detection: selection_img: - Image|endswith: \pwsh.exe - OriginalFileName: pwsh.dll selection_sddl: CommandLine|contains|all: - 'Set-Service ' - DCLCWPDTSD selection_cmdlet: CommandLine|contains: - '-SecurityDescriptorSddl ' - '-sd ' condition: all of selection_* falsepositives: - Rare intended use of hidden services level: high
Near-miss passage: Sigma rule: Detects process access events where WerFaultSecure accesses MsMpEng.exe with dbgcore.dll or dbghelp.dll in the call trac. Logsource: windows / process_access. Rule: title: Suspicious Process Access of MsMpEng by WerFaultSecure - EDR-Freeze id: 387df17d-3b04-448f-8669-9e7fd5e5fd8c related: - id: 8a2f4b1c-3d5e-4f7a-9b2c-1e4f6d8a9c2b type: similar - id: 1f0b4cac-9c81-41f4-95d0-8475ff46b3e2 type: similar status: experimental description: 'Detects process access events where WerFaultSecure accesses MsMpEng.exe with dbgcore.dll or dbghelp.dll in the call trace, indicating potential EDR freeze techniques. This technique leverages WerFaultSecure.exe running as a Protected Process Light (PPL) with WinTCB protection level to call MiniDumpWriteDump and suspend EDR/AV processes, allowing malicious activity to execute undetected during the suspension period. ' references: - https://blog.axelarator.net/hunting-for-edr-freeze/ author: Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems) date: 2025-11-27 tags: - attack.defense-impairment - attack.t1685 logsource: category: process_access product: windows definition: "Requires Sysmon Event ID 10 (ProcessAccess) with CallTrace enabled.\nExample sysmon config snippet with grouping,\ \ as logging individual ProcessAccess events can generate excessive logs:\n<ProcessAccess onmatch=\"include\">\n <Rule\ \ groupRelation=\"and\">\n <TargetImage condition=\"end with\">\\MsMpEng.exe</TargetImage>\n <SourceImage condition=\"\ end with\">\\WerFaultSecure.exe</SourceImage>\n </Rule>\n</ProcessAccess>\n" detection: selection: SourceImage|endswith: \WerFaultSecure.exe TargetImage|endswith: \MsMpEng.exe CallTrace|contains: - \dbgcore.dll - \dbghelp.dll condition: selection falsepositives: - Legitimate Windows Error Reporting operations level: high regression_tests_path: regression_data/rules/windows/process_access/proc_access_win_werfaultsecure_msmpeng_access/info.yml