Query: Suspicious Securityd Memory execution detected on endpoint
Matching passage: T1555.002 Securityd Memory. Tactics: credential access. Description: An adversary with root access may gather credentials by reading `securityd`’s memory. `securityd` is a service/daemon responsible for implementing security protocols such as encryption and authorization.(Citation: Apple Dev SecurityD) A privileged adversary may be able to scan through `securityd`'s memory to find the correct sequence of keys to decrypt the user’s logon keychain. This may provide the adversary with various plaintext passwords, such as those for users, WiFi, mail, browsers, certificates, secure notes, etc.(Citation: OS X Keychain)(Citation: OSX Keydnap malware) In OS X prior to El Capitan, users with root access can read plaintext keychain passwords of logged-in users because Apple’s keychain implementation allows these credentials to be cached so that users are not repeatedly prompted for passwords.(Citation: OS X Keychain)(Citation: External to DA, the OS X Way) Apple’s `securityd` utility takes the user’s logon password, encrypts it with PBKDF2, and stores this master key in memory. Apple also uses a set of keys and algorithms to encrypt the user’s password, but once the master key is found, an adversary need only iterate over the other values to unlock the final password.(Citation: OS X Keychain)
Near-miss passage: T1555.004 Windows Credential Manager. Tactics: credential access. Description: Adversaries may acquire credentials from the Windows Credential Manager. The Credential Manager stores credentials for signing into websites, applications, and/or devices that request authentication through NTLM or Kerberos in Credential Lockers (previously known as Windows Vaults).(Citation: Microsoft Credential Manager store)(Citation: Microsoft Credential Locker) The Windows Credential Manager separates website credentials from application or network credentials in two lockers. As part of [Credentials from Web Browsers](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1555/003), Internet Explorer and Microsoft Edge website credentials are managed by the Credential Manager and are stored in the Web Credentials locker. Application and network credentials are stored in the Windows Credentials locker. Credential Lockers store credentials in encrypted `.vcrd` files, located under `%Systemdrive%\Users\\[Username]\AppData\Local\Microsoft\\[Vault/Credentials]\`. The encryption key can be found in a file named <code>Policy.vpol</code>, typically located in the same folder as the credentials.(Citation: passcape Windows Vault)(Citation: Malwarebytes The Windows Vault) Adversaries may list credentials managed by the Windows Credential Manager through several mechanisms. <code>vaultcmd.exe</code> is a native Windows executable that can be used to enumerate credentials stored in the Credential Locker through a command-line interface. Adversaries may also gather credentials by directly reading files located inside of the Credential Lockers. Windows APIs, such as <code>CredEnumerateA</code>, may also be absued to list credentials managed by the Credential Manager.(Citation: Microsoft CredEnumerate)(Citation: Delpy Mimikatz Crendential Manager) Adversaries may also obtain credentials from credential backups. Credential backups and restorations may be performed by running <code>rundll32.exe keymgr.dll KRShowKeyMgr</code> then selecting the “Back up...” button on the “Stored User Names and Pas