Query: alert when Detects potential Active Directory enumeration via LDAP
Matching passage: Sigma rule: Detects potential Active Directory enumeration via LDAP. Logsource: windows / ldap. Rule: title: Potential Active Directory Reconnaissance/Enumeration Via LDAP id: 31d68132-4038-47c7-8f8e-635a39a7c174 status: test description: Detects potential Active Directory enumeration via LDAP references: - https://techcommunity.microsoft.com/t5/microsoft-defender-for-endpoint/hunting-for-reconnaissance-activities-using-ldap-search-filters/ba-p/824726 - https://github.com/PowerShellMafia/PowerSploit/blob/d943001a7defb5e0d1657085a77a0e78609be58f/Recon/PowerView.ps1 - https://github.com/BloodHoundAD/SharpHound3/blob/7d96b991b1887ff50349ce59c80980bc0d95c86a/SharpHound3/LdapBuilder.cs - https://medium.com/falconforce/falconfriday-detecting-active-directory-data-collection-0xff21-c22d1a57494c - https://github.com/fox-it/BloodHound.py/blob/d65eb614831cd30f26028ccb072f5e77ca287e0b/bloodhound/ad/domain.py#L427 - https://ipurple.team/2024/07/15/sharphound-detection/ author: Adeem Mawani date: 2021-06-22 modified: 2025-07-04 tags: - attack.discovery - attack.t1069.002 - attack.t1087.002 - attack.t1482 logsource: product: windows service: ldap definition: 'Requirements: Microsoft-Windows-LDAP-Client/Debug ETW logging' detection: generic_search: EventID: 30 SearchFilter|contains: - (groupType:1.2.840.113556.1.4.803:=2147483648) - (groupType:1.2.840.113556.1.4.803:=2147483656) - (groupType:1.2.840.113556.1.4.803:=2147483652) - (groupType:1.2.840.113556.1.4.803:=2147483650) - (sAMAccountType=805306369) - (sAMAccountType=805306368) - (sAMAccountType=536870913) - (sAMAccountType=536870912) - (sAMAccountType=268435457) - (sAMAccountType=268435456) - (objectCategory=groupPolicyContainer) - (objectCategory=organizationalUnit) - (objectCategory=nTDSDSA) - (objectCategory=server) - (objectCategory=domain) - (objectCategory=person) - (objectCategory=group) - (objectCategory=user) - (objectClass=trustedDomain) - (objectClass=computer) - (objectClass=server) - (objectClass=group) - (objectClass=user) - (primaryGroupID=521) - (primaryGroupID=516) - (primaryGroupID=515) - (primaryGroupID=512) - Domain Admins - objectGUID=\* - (schemaIDGUID=\*) - admincount=1 distinguished_name_enumeration: EventID: 30 SearchFilter: (objectclass=\*) DistinguishedName|contains: - CN=Domain Admins - CN=Enterprise Admins - CN=Group Policy Creator Owners suspicious_flag: EventID: 30 SearchFilter|contains: - (userAccountControl:1.2.840.113556.1.4.803:=4194304) - (userAccountControl:1.2.840.113556.1.4.803:=2097152) - '!(userAccountControl:1.2.840.113556.1.4.803:=1048574)' - (userAccountControl:1.2.840.113
Near-miss passage: Sigma rule: Detects DNS queries for subdomains related to MEGA sharing website. Logsource: windows / dns-client. Rule: title: DNS Query To MEGA Hosting Website - DNS Client id: 66474410-b883-415f-9f8d-75345a0a66a6 related: - id: 613c03ba-0779-4a53-8a1f-47f914a4ded3 type: similar status: test description: Detects DNS queries for subdomains related to MEGA sharing website references: - https://research.nccgroup.com/2021/05/27/detecting-rclone-an-effective-tool-for-exfiltration/ author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) date: 2023-01-16 tags: - attack.exfiltration - attack.t1567.002 logsource: product: windows service: dns-client definition: 'Requirements: Microsoft-Windows-DNS Client Events/Operational Event Log must be enabled/collected in order to receive the events.' detection: selection: EventID: 3008 QueryName|contains: userstorage.mega.co.nz condition: selection falsepositives: - Legitimate DNS queries and usage of Mega level: medium