alirezaaminzadeh/secembed-pairs huggingface dataset:
Query: CVE similar to CVE-2015-3331
Matching passage: CVE-2015-3331. CWE: CWE-119. CVSS: 9.300000190734863. The __driver_rfc4106_decrypt function in arch/x86/crypto/aesni-intel_glue.c in the Linux kernel before 3.19.3 does not properly determine the memory locations used for encrypted data, which allows context-dependent attackers to cause a denial of service (buffer overflow and system crash) or possibly execute arbitrary code by triggering a crypto API call, as demonstrated by use of a libkcapi test program with an AF_ALG(aead) socket.
Near-miss passage: CVE-2015-8645. CWE: CWE-119. CVSS: 8.800000190734863. Adobe Flash Player before 18.0.0.324 and 19.x and 20.x before 20.0.0.267 on Windows and OS X and before 11.2.202.559 on Linux, Adobe AIR before 20.0.0.233, Adobe AIR SDK before 20.0.0.233, and Adobe AIR SDK & Compiler before 20.0.0.233 allow attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (memory corruption) via unspecified vectors, a different vulnerability than CVE-2015-8459, CVE-2015-8460, and CVE-2015-8636.
Query: detect Adversaries may steal data by exfiltrating it over an un-encrypted network protocol other than that of the existing comm in logs
Matching passage: Sigma rule: Adversaries may steal data by exfiltrating it over an un-encrypted network protocol other than that of the existing comm. Logsource: windows / network_connection. Rule: title: Suspicious Outbound SMTP Connections id: 9976fa64-2804-423c-8a5b-646ade840773 status: test description: 'Adversaries may steal data by exfiltrating it over an un-encrypted network protocol other than that of the existing command and control channel. The data may also be sent to an alternate network location from the main command and control server. ' references: - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1048.003/T1048.003.md#atomic-test-5---exfiltration-over-alternative-protocol---smtp - https://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc2821.txt author: frack113 date: 2022-01-07 modified: 2022-09-21 tags: - attack.exfiltration - attack.t1048.003 logsource: category: network_connection product: windows detection: selection: DestinationPort: - 25 - 587 - 465 - 2525 Initiated: 'true' filter_clients: Image|endswith: - \thunderbird.exe - \outlook.exe filter_mailserver: Image|startswith: C:\Program Files\Microsoft\Exchange Server\ filter_outlook: Image|startswith: C:\Program Files\WindowsApps\microsoft.windowscommunicationsapps_ Image|endswith: \HxTsr.exe condition: selection and not 1 of filter_* falsepositives: - Other SMTP tools level: medium
Near-miss passage: Sigma rule: Identifies when a service account is disabled or deleted in Google Cloud.. Logsource: gcp / gcp.audit. Rule: title: Google Cloud Service Account Disabled or Deleted id: 13f81a90-a69c-4fab-8f07-b5bb55416a9f status: test description: Identifies when a service account is disabled or deleted in Google Cloud. references: - https://cloud.google.com/iam/docs/reference/rest/v1/projects.serviceAccounts author: Austin Songer @austinsonger date: 2021-08-14 modified: 2022-10-09 tags: - attack.impact - attack.t1531 logsource: product: gcp service: gcp.audit detection: selection: gcp.audit.method_name|endswith: - .serviceAccounts.disable - .serviceAccounts.delete condition: selection falsepositives: - Service Account being disabled or deleted may be performed by a system administrator. Verify whether the user identity, user agent, and/or hostname should be making changes in your environment. - Service Account disabled or deleted from unfamiliar users should be investigated. If known behavior is causing false positives, it can be exempted from the rule. level: medium
Query: detect Detects PowerShell scripts that make use of the "Compress-Archive" Cmdlet in order to compress folders and files where t in logs
Matching passage: Sigma rule: Detects PowerShell scripts that make use of the "Compress-Archive" Cmdlet in order to compress folders and files where t. Logsource: windows / ps_module. Rule: title: Zip A Folder With PowerShell For Staging In Temp - PowerShell Module id: daf7eb81-35fd-410d-9d7a-657837e602bb related: - id: 71ff406e-b633-4989-96ec-bc49d825a412 type: similar - id: b7a3c9a3-09ea-4934-8864-6a32cacd98d9 type: similar - id: 85a8e5ba-bd03-4bfb-bbfa-a4409a8f8b98 type: similar status: test description: 'Detects PowerShell scripts that make use of the "Compress-Archive" Cmdlet in order to compress folders and files where the output is stored in a potentially suspicious location that is used often by malware for exfiltration. An adversary might compress data (e.g., sensitive documents) that is collected prior to exfiltration in order to make it portable and minimize the amount of data sent over the network. ' references: - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1074.001/T1074.001.md - https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/cybersecurity-advisories/aa23-347a author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems), frack113 date: 2021-07-20 modified: 2023-12-18 tags: - attack.collection - attack.t1074.001 logsource: product: windows category: ps_module definition: 0ad03ef1-f21b-4a79-8ce8-e6900c54b65b detection: selection: ContextInfo|contains|all: - Compress-Archive -Path*-DestinationPath $env:TEMP - Compress-Archive -Path*-DestinationPath*\AppData\Local\Temp\ - Compress-Archive -Path*-DestinationPath*:\Windows\Temp\ condition: selection falsepositives: - Unknown level: medium
Near-miss passage: Sigma rule: Detects potential OGNL Injection exploitation, which may lead to RCE. OGNL is an expression language that is supported i. Logsource: jvm / application. Rule: title: Potential OGNL Injection Exploitation In JVM Based Application id: 4d0af518-828e-4a04-a751-a7d03f3046ad status: test description: 'Detects potential OGNL Injection exploitation, which may lead to RCE. OGNL is an expression language that is supported in many JVM based systems. OGNL Injection is the reason for some high profile RCE''s such as Apache Struts (CVE-2017-5638) and Confluence (CVE-2022-26134) ' references: - https://www.wix.engineering/post/threat-and-vulnerability-hunting-with-application-server-error-logs author: Moti Harmats date: 2023-02-11 tags: - attack.initial-access - attack.t1190 - cve.2017-5638 - cve.2022-26134 logsource: category: application product: jvm definition: 'Requirements: application error logs must be collected (with LOG_LEVEL=ERROR and above)' detection: keywords: - org.apache.commons.ognl.OgnlException - ExpressionSyntaxException condition: keywords falsepositives: - Application bugs level: high
Query: Sigma rule for Detects change the the "AutodialDLL" key which could be used as a persistence method to load custom DLL via the "ws2_32"
Matching passage: Sigma rule: Detects change the the "AutodialDLL" key which could be used as a persistence method to load custom DLL via the "ws2_32". Logsource: windows / registry_set. Rule: title: Potential Persistence Via AutodialDLL id: e6fe26ee-d063-4f5b-b007-39e90aaf50e3 status: test description: Detects change the the "AutodialDLL" key which could be used as a persistence method to load custom DLL via the "ws2_32" library references: - https://www.hexacorn.com/blog/2015/01/13/beyond-good-ol-run-key-part-24/ - https://persistence-info.github.io/Data/autodialdll.html author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) date: 2022-08-10 modified: 2023-08-17 tags: - attack.persistence logsource: category: registry_set product: windows detection: selection: TargetObject|contains: \Services\WinSock2\Parameters\AutodialDLL condition: selection falsepositives: - Unlikely level: high
Near-miss passage: Sigma rule: Commandline to launch powershell with a base64 payload. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: Suspicious Execution of Powershell with Base64 id: fb843269-508c-4b76-8b8d-88679db22ce7 status: test description: Commandline to launch powershell with a base64 payload references: - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1059.001/T1059.001.md#atomic-test-20---powershell-invoke-known-malicious-cmdlets - https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/unit42-pulling-back-the-curtains-on-encodedcommand-powershell-attacks/ - https://mikefrobbins.com/2017/06/15/simple-obfuscation-with-powershell-using-base64-encoding/ author: frack113 date: 2022-01-02 modified: 2023-01-05 tags: - attack.execution - attack.t1059.001 logsource: category: process_creation product: windows detection: selection: Image|endswith: - \powershell.exe - \pwsh.exe CommandLine|contains: - ' -e ' - ' -en ' - ' -enc ' - ' -enco' - ' -ec ' filter_encoding: CommandLine|contains: ' -Encoding ' filter_azure: ParentImage|contains: - C:\Packages\Plugins\Microsoft.GuestConfiguration.ConfigurationforWindows\ - \gc_worker.exe condition: selection and not 1 of filter_* falsepositives: - Unknown level: medium
Query: actor TTPs: Control Panel
Matching passage: T1218.002 Control Panel. Tactics: stealth. Description: Adversaries may abuse control.exe to proxy execution of malicious payloads. The Windows Control Panel process binary (control.exe) handles execution of Control Panel items, which are utilities that allow users to view and adjust computer settings. Control Panel items are registered executable (.exe) or Control Panel (.cpl) files, the latter are actually renamed dynamic-link library (.dll) files that export a <code>CPlApplet</code> function.(Citation: Microsoft Implementing CPL)(Citation: TrendMicro CPL Malware Jan 2014) For ease of use, Control Panel items typically include graphical menus available to users after being registered and loaded into the Control Panel.(Citation: Microsoft Implementing CPL) Control Panel items can be executed directly from the command line, programmatically via an application programming interface (API) call, or by simply double-clicking the file.(Citation: Microsoft Implementing CPL) (Citation: TrendMicro CPL Malware Jan 2014)(Citation: TrendMicro CPL Malware Dec 2013) Malicious Control Panel items can be delivered via [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566) campaigns(Citation: TrendMicro CPL Malware Jan 2014)(Citation: TrendMicro CPL Malware Dec 2013) or executed as part of multi-stage malware.(Citation: Palo Alto Reaver Nov 2017) Control Panel items, specifically CPL files, may also bypass application and/or file extension allow lists. Adversaries may also rename malicious DLL files (.dll) with Control Panel file extensions (.cpl) and register them to <code>HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Control Panel\Cpls</code>. Even when these registered DLLs do not comply with the CPL file specification and do not export <code>CPlApplet</code> functions, they are loaded and executed through its <code>DllEntryPoint</code> when Control Panel is executed. CPL files not exporting <code>CPlApplet</code> are not directly executable.(Citation: ESET InvisiMole June 2020)
Near-miss passage: T1218.009 Regsvcs/Regasm. Tactics: stealth. Description: Adversaries may abuse Regsvcs and Regasm to proxy execution of code through a trusted Windows utility. Regsvcs and Regasm are Windows command-line utilities that are used to register .NET [Component Object Model](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1559/001) (COM) assemblies. Both are binaries that may be digitally signed by Microsoft. (Citation: MSDN Regsvcs) (Citation: MSDN Regasm) Both utilities may be used to bypass application control through use of attributes within the binary to specify code that should be run before registration or unregistration: <code>[ComRegisterFunction]</code> or <code>[ComUnregisterFunction]</code> respectively. The code with the registration and unregistration attributes will be executed even if the process is run under insufficient privileges and fails to execute. (Citation: LOLBAS Regsvcs)(Citation: LOLBAS Regasm)
Query: SOC alert related to Determine Physical Locations
Matching passage: T1591.001 Determine Physical Locations. Tactics: reconnaissance. Description: Adversaries may gather the victim's physical location(s) that can be used during targeting. Information about physical locations of a target organization may include a variety of details, including where key resources and infrastructure are housed. Physical locations may also indicate what legal jurisdiction and/or authorities the victim operates within. Adversaries may gather this information in various ways, such as direct elicitation via [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598). Physical locations of a target organization may also be exposed to adversaries via online or other accessible data sets (ex: [Search Victim-Owned Websites](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1594) or [Social Media](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593/001)).(Citation: ThreatPost Broadvoice Leak)(Citation: SEC EDGAR Search) Gathering this information may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598) or [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Develop Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1587) or [Obtain Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1588)), and/or initial access (ex: [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566) or [Hardware Additions](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1200)).
Near-miss passage: T1591.003 Identify Business Tempo. Tactics: reconnaissance. Description: Adversaries may gather information about the victim's business tempo that can be used during targeting. Information about an organization’s business tempo may include a variety of details, including operational hours/days of the week. This information may also reveal times/dates of purchases and shipments of the victim’s hardware and software resources. Adversaries may gather this information in various ways, such as direct elicitation via [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598). Information about business tempo may also be exposed to adversaries via online or other accessible data sets (ex: [Social Media](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593/001) or [Search Victim-Owned Websites](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1594)).(Citation: ThreatPost Broadvoice Leak) Gathering this information may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598) or [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Establish Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1585) or [Compromise Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1586)), and/or initial access (ex: [Supply Chain Compromise](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1195) or [Trusted Relationship](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1199))
Query: adversary uses Office Template Macros
Matching passage: T1137.001 Office Template Macros. Tactics: persistence. Description: Adversaries may abuse Microsoft Office templates to obtain persistence on a compromised system. Microsoft Office contains templates that are part of common Office applications and are used to customize styles. The base templates within the application are used each time an application starts. (Citation: Microsoft Change Normal Template) Office Visual Basic for Applications (VBA) macros (Citation: MSDN VBA in Office) can be inserted into the base template and used to execute code when the respective Office application starts in order to obtain persistence. Examples for both Word and Excel have been discovered and published. By default, Word has a Normal.dotm template created that can be modified to include a malicious macro. Excel does not have a template file created by default, but one can be added that will automatically be loaded.(Citation: enigma0x3 normal.dotm)(Citation: Hexacorn Office Template Macros) Shared templates may also be stored and pulled from remote locations.(Citation: GlobalDotName Jun 2019) Word Normal.dotm location:<br> <code>C:\Users\&lt;username&gt;\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Templates\Normal.dotm</code> Excel Personal.xlsb location:<br> <code>C:\Users\&lt;username&gt;\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Excel\XLSTART\PERSONAL.XLSB</code> Adversaries may also change the location of the base template to point to their own by hijacking the application's search order, e.g. Word 2016 will first look for Normal.dotm under <code>C:\Program Files (x86)\Microsoft Office\root\Office16\</code>, or by modifying the GlobalDotName registry key. By modifying the GlobalDotName registry key an adversary can specify an arbitrary location, file name, and file extension to use for the template that will be loaded on application startup. To abuse GlobalDotName, adversaries may first need to register the template as a trusted document or place it in a trusted location.(Citation: GlobalDotName Jun 2019) An adversary may need to enable macros to execute unrestricted depending
Near-miss passage: T1137.003 Outlook Forms. Tactics: persistence. Description: Adversaries may abuse Microsoft Outlook forms to obtain persistence on a compromised system. Outlook forms are used as templates for presentation and functionality in Outlook messages. Custom Outlook forms can be created that will execute code when a specifically crafted email is sent by an adversary utilizing the same custom Outlook form.(Citation: SensePost Outlook Forms) Once malicious forms have been added to the user’s mailbox, they will be loaded when Outlook is started. Malicious forms will execute when an adversary sends a specifically crafted email to the user.(Citation: SensePost Outlook Forms)
Query: explain CWE-296
Matching passage: CWE-296 Improper Following of a Certificate's Chain of Trust. The product does not follow, or incorrectly follows, the chain of trust for a certificate back to a trusted root certificate.
Near-miss passage: CWE-66 Improper Handling of File Names that Identify Virtual Resources. The product does not handle or incorrectly handles a file name that identifies a virtual resource that is not directly specified within the directory that is associated with the file name, causing the product to perform file-based operations on a resource that is not a file.
Query: intelligence brief on T1055.004
Matching passage: T1055.004 Asynchronous Procedure Call. Tactics: stealth, privilege escalation. Description: Adversaries may inject malicious code into processes via the asynchronous procedure call (APC) queue in order to evade process-based defenses as well as possibly elevate privileges. APC injection is a method of executing arbitrary code in the address space of a separate live process. APC injection is commonly performed by attaching malicious code to the APC Queue (Citation: Microsoft APC) of a process's thread. Queued APC functions are executed when the thread enters an alterable state.(Citation: Microsoft APC) A handle to an existing victim process is first created with native Windows API calls such as <code>OpenThread</code>. At this point <code>QueueUserAPC</code> can be used to invoke a function (such as <code>LoadLibrayA</code> pointing to a malicious DLL). A variation of APC injection, dubbed "Early Bird injection", involves creating a suspended process in which malicious code can be written and executed before the process' entry point (and potentially subsequent anti-malware hooks) via an APC. (Citation: CyberBit Early Bird Apr 2018) AtomBombing (Citation: ENSIL AtomBombing Oct 2016) is another variation that utilizes APCs to invoke malicious code previously written to the global atom table.(Citation: Microsoft Atom Table) Running code in the context of another process may allow access to the process's memory, system/network resources, and possibly elevated privileges. Execution via APC injection may also evade detection from security products since the execution is masked under a legitimate process.
Near-miss passage: T1055.003 Thread Execution Hijacking. Tactics: stealth, privilege escalation. Description: Adversaries may inject malicious code into hijacked processes in order to evade process-based defenses as well as possibly elevate privileges. Thread Execution Hijacking is a method of executing arbitrary code in the address space of a separate live process. Thread Execution Hijacking is commonly performed by suspending an existing process then unmapping/hollowing its memory, which can then be replaced with malicious code or the path to a DLL. A handle to an existing victim process is first created with native Windows API calls such as <code>OpenThread</code>. At this point the process can be suspended then written to, realigned to the injected code, and resumed via <code>SuspendThread </code>, <code>VirtualAllocEx</code>, <code>WriteProcessMemory</code>, <code>SetThreadContext</code>, then <code>ResumeThread</code> respectively.(Citation: Elastic Process Injection July 2017) This is very similar to [Process Hollowing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055/012) but targets an existing process rather than creating a process in a suspended state. Running code in the context of another process may allow access to the process's memory, system/network resources, and possibly elevated privileges. Execution via Thread Execution Hijacking may also evade detection from security products since the execution is masked under a legitimate process.
Query: exploit Multiple cross-site scripting (XSS) vulnerabilities in the (1) RadioGroup and (2) CheckBoxMultipleChoice classes in Apache Wicket 1.5.x before 1.5.15, 6.x before 6.22.0, and 7.x be
Matching passage: CVE-2015-7520. CWE: CWE-79. CVSS: 6.099999904632568. Multiple cross-site scripting (XSS) vulnerabilities in the (1) RadioGroup and (2) CheckBoxMultipleChoice classes in Apache Wicket 1.5.x before 1.5.15, 6.x before 6.22.0, and 7.x before 7.2.0 allow remote attackers to inject arbitrary web script or HTML via a crafted "value" attribute in a <input> element.
Near-miss passage: CVE-2015-8477. CWE: CWE-79. CVSS: 6.099999904632568. Cross-site scripting (XSS) vulnerability in Redmine before 2.6.2 allows remote attackers to inject arbitrary web script or HTML via vectors involving flash message rendering.