Query: SOC alert related to Emond
Matching passage: T1546.014 Emond. Tactics: privilege escalation, persistence. Description: Adversaries may gain persistence and elevate privileges by executing malicious content triggered by the Event Monitor Daemon (emond). Emond is a [Launch Daemon](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/004) that accepts events from various services, runs them through a simple rules engine, and takes action. The emond binary at <code>/sbin/emond</code> will load any rules from the <code>/etc/emond.d/rules/</code> directory and take action once an explicitly defined event takes place. The rule files are in the plist format and define the name, event type, and action to take. Some examples of event types include system startup and user authentication. Examples of actions are to run a system command or send an email. The emond service will not launch if there is no file present in the QueueDirectories path <code>/private/var/db/emondClients</code>, specified in the [Launch Daemon](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/004) configuration file at<code>/System/Library/LaunchDaemons/com.apple.emond.plist</code>.(Citation: xorrior emond Jan 2018)(Citation: magnusviri emond Apr 2016)(Citation: sentinelone macos persist Jun 2019) Adversaries may abuse this service by writing a rule to execute commands when a defined event occurs, such as system start up or user authentication.(Citation: xorrior emond Jan 2018)(Citation: magnusviri emond Apr 2016)(Citation: sentinelone macos persist Jun 2019) Adversaries may also be able to escalate privileges from administrator to root as the emond service is executed with root privileges by the [Launch Daemon](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/004) service.
Near-miss passage: T1546.011 Application Shimming. Tactics: privilege escalation, persistence. Description: Adversaries may establish persistence and/or elevate privileges by executing malicious content triggered by application shims. The Microsoft Windows Application Compatibility Infrastructure/Framework (Application Shim) was created to allow for backward compatibility of software as the operating system codebase changes over time. For example, the application shimming feature allows developers to apply fixes to applications (without rewriting code) that were created for Windows XP so that it will work with Windows 10. (Citation: Elastic Process Injection July 2017) Within the framework, shims are created to act as a buffer between the program (or more specifically, the Import Address Table) and the Windows OS. When a program is executed, the shim cache is referenced to determine if the program requires the use of the shim database (.sdb). If so, the shim database uses hooking to redirect the code as necessary in order to communicate with the OS. A list of all shims currently installed by the default Windows installer (sdbinst.exe) is kept in: * <code>%WINDIR%\AppPatch\sysmain.sdb</code> and * <code>hklm\software\microsoft\windows nt\currentversion\appcompatflags\installedsdb</code> Custom databases are stored in: * <code>%WINDIR%\AppPatch\custom & %WINDIR%\AppPatch\AppPatch64\Custom</code> and * <code>hklm\software\microsoft\windows nt\currentversion\appcompatflags\custom</code> To keep shims secure, Windows designed them to run in user mode so they cannot modify the kernel and you must have administrator privileges to install a shim. However, certain shims can be used to [Bypass User Account Control](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/002) (UAC and RedirectEXE), inject DLLs into processes (InjectDLL), disable Data Execution Prevention (DisableNX) and Structure Exception Handling (DisableSEH), and intercept memory addresses (GetProcAddress). Utilizing these shims may allow an adversary to perform several malicious acts such as elevate privileges, install backdo