Query: rule covering Detects usage of the "Set-Service" powershell cmdlet to configure a new SecurityDescriptor that allows a service to be h
Matching passage: Sigma rule: Detects usage of the "Set-Service" powershell cmdlet to configure a new SecurityDescriptor that allows a service to be h. Logsource: windows / ps_script. Rule: title: Abuse of Service Permissions to Hide Services Via Set-Service - PS id: 953945c5-22fe-4a92-9f8a-a9edc1e522da related: - id: 514e4c3a-c77d-4cde-a00f-046425e2301e type: similar status: test description: Detects usage of the "Set-Service" powershell cmdlet to configure a new SecurityDescriptor that allows a service to be hidden from other utilities such as "sc.exe", "Get-Service"...etc. (Works only in powershell 7) references: - https://twitter.com/Alh4zr3d/status/1580925761996828672 - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/microsoft.powershell.management/set-service?view=powershell-7.2 author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) date: 2022-10-17 tags: - attack.persistence - attack.privilege-escalation - attack.execution - attack.stealth - attack.t1574.011 logsource: product: windows category: ps_script definition: 'Requirements: Script Block Logging must be enabled' detection: selection: ScriptBlockText|contains|all: - 'Set-Service ' - DCLCWPDTSD ScriptBlockText|contains: - '-SecurityDescriptorSddl ' - '-sd ' condition: selection falsepositives: - Rare intended use of hidden services - Rare FP could occur due to the non linearity of the ScriptBlockText log level: high
Near-miss passage: Sigma rule: Detects access to Signal Desktop's sensitive data files: db.sqlite and config.json. The db.sqlite file in Signal Desktop. Logsource: windows / security. Rule: title: File Access Of Signal Desktop Sensitive Data id: 5d6c375a-18ae-4952-b4f6-8b803f6c8555 status: experimental description: 'Detects access to Signal Desktop''s sensitive data files: db.sqlite and config.json. The db.sqlite file in Signal Desktop stores all locally saved messages in an encrypted SQLite database, while the config.json contains the decryption key needed to access that data. Since the key is stored in plain text, a threat actor who gains access to both files can decrypt and read sensitive messages without needing the users credentials. Currently the rule only covers the default Signal installation path in AppData\Roaming. Signal Portable installations may use different paths based on user configuration. Additional paths can be added to the selection as needed. ' references: - https://cloud.google.com/blog/topics/threat-intelligence/russia-targeting-signal-messenger/ - https://vmois.dev/query-signal-desktop-messages-sqlite/ author: Andreas Braathen (mnemonic.io) date: 2025-10-19 tags: - attack.credential-access - attack.t1003 logsource: product: windows service: security definition: 'Requirements: System Access Control List (SACL) policy with attributes List folder/read data on Objects' detection: selection: EventID: 4663 ObjectType: File ObjectName|contains: \AppData\Roaming\Signal\ ObjectName|endswith: - \config.json - \db.sqlite filter_main_signal: ProcessName|endswith: - \signal-portable.exe - \signal.exe condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_* falsepositives: - Unlikely, but possible from AV or backup software accessing the files. level: medium