Query: detect Detects changes to "DsrmAdminLogonBehavior" registry value. During a Domain Controller (DC) promotion, administrators cr in logs
Matching passage: Sigma rule: Detects changes to "DsrmAdminLogonBehavior" registry value. During a Domain Controller (DC) promotion, administrators cr. Logsource: windows / registry_set. Rule: title: Directory Service Restore Mode(DSRM) Registry Value Tampering id: b61e87c0-50db-4b2e-8986-6a2be94b33b0 related: - id: 53ad8e36-f573-46bf-97e4-15ba5bf4bb51 type: similar status: test description: 'Detects changes to "DsrmAdminLogonBehavior" registry value. During a Domain Controller (DC) promotion, administrators create a Directory Services Restore Mode (DSRM) local administrator account with a password that rarely changes. The DSRM account is an “Administrator” account that logs in with the DSRM mode when the server is booting up to restore AD backups or recover the server from a failure. Attackers could abuse DSRM account to maintain their persistence and access to the organization''s Active Directory. If the "DsrmAdminLogonBehavior" value is set to "0", the administrator account can only be used if the DC starts in DSRM. If the "DsrmAdminLogonBehavior" value is set to "1", the administrator account can only be used if the local AD DS service is stopped. If the "DsrmAdminLogonBehavior" value is set to "2", the administrator account can always be used. ' references: - https://adsecurity.org/?p=1785 - https://www.sentinelone.com/blog/detecting-dsrm-account-misconfigurations/ - https://book.hacktricks.xyz/windows-hardening/active-directory-methodology/dsrm-credentials author: Nischal Khadgi date: 2024-07-11 tags: - attack.credential-access - attack.persistence - attack.defense-impairment - attack.t1556 logsource: category: registry_set product: windows detection: selection: TargetObject|endswith: \Control\Lsa\DsrmAdminLogonBehavior filter_main_default_value: Details: DWORD (0x00000000) condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_* falsepositives: - Unknown level: high
Near-miss passage: Sigma rule: Detects usage of the `mknod` syscall to create special files (e.g., character or block devices). Attackers or malware mi. Logsource: linux / auditd. Rule: title: Special File Creation via Mknod Syscall id: 710bdbce-495d-491d-9a8f-7d0d88d2b41e status: experimental description: 'Detects usage of the `mknod` syscall to create special files (e.g., character or block devices). Attackers or malware might use `mknod` to create fake devices, interact with kernel interfaces, or establish covert channels in Linux systems. Monitoring the use of `mknod` is important because this syscall is rarely used by legitimate applications, and it can be abused to bypass file system restrictions or create backdoors. ' references: - https://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man2/mknod.2.html - https://hopeness.medium.com/master-the-linux-mknod-command-a-comprehensive-guide-1c150a546aa8 author: Milad Cheraghi date: 2025-05-31 modified: 2025-12-05 tags: - attack.privilege-escalation - attack.persistence - attack.t1543.003 logsource: product: linux service: auditd detection: selection: type: SYSCALL SYSCALL: mknod condition: selection falsepositives: - Device creation by legitimate scripts or init systems (udevadm, MAKEDEV) - Container runtimes or security tools during initialization level: low