Query: detect Detects possible addition of shadow credentials to an active directory object. in logs
Matching passage: Sigma rule: Detects possible addition of shadow credentials to an active directory object.. Logsource: windows / security. Rule: title: Possible Shadow Credentials Added id: f598ea0c-c25a-4f72-a219-50c44411c791 status: test description: Detects possible addition of shadow credentials to an active directory object. references: - https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/8.4/potential-shadow-credentials-added-to-ad-object.html - https://cyberstoph.org/posts/2022/03/detecting-shadow-credentials/ - https://twitter.com/SBousseaden/status/1581300963650187264? author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems), Elastic (idea) date: 2022-10-17 tags: - attack.persistence - attack.credential-access - attack.defense-impairment - attack.t1556 logsource: product: windows service: security definition: The "Audit Directory Service Changes" logging policy must be configured in order to receive events. Audit events are generated only for objects with configured system access control lists (SACLs). Audit events are generated only for objects with configured system access control lists (SACLs) and only when accessed in a manner that matches their SACL settings. This policy covers the following events ids - 5136, 5137, 5138, 5139, 5141. Note that the default policy does not cover User objects. For that a custom AuditRule need to be setup (See https://github.com/OTRF/Set-AuditRule) detection: selection: EventID: 5136 AttributeLDAPDisplayName: msDS-KeyCredentialLink condition: selection falsepositives: - Modifications in the msDS-KeyCredentialLink attribute can be done legitimately by the Azure AD Connect synchronization account or the ADFS service account. These accounts can be added as Exceptions. (From elastic FP section) level: high
Near-miss passage: Sigma rule: Detects the setting of the environement variable "windir" to a non default value. Attackers often abuse this variable in. Logsource: windows / registry_set. Rule: title: Bypass UAC Using SilentCleanup Task id: 724ea201-6514-4f38-9739-e5973c34f49a status: test description: 'Detects the setting of the environement variable "windir" to a non default value. Attackers often abuse this variable in order to trigger a UAC bypass via the "SilentCleanup" task. The SilentCleanup task located in %windir%\system32\cleanmgr.exe is an auto-elevated task that can be abused to elevate any file with administrator privileges without prompting UAC. ' references: - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1548.002/T1548.002.md#atomic-test-9---bypass-uac-using-silentcleanup-task - https://www.reddit.com/r/hacking/comments/ajtrws/bypassing_highest_uac_level_windows_810/ - https://www.fortinet.com/blog/threat-research/enter-the-darkgate-new-cryptocurrency-mining-and-ransomware-campaign author: frack113, Nextron Systems date: 2022-01-06 modified: 2024-01-30 tags: - attack.privilege-escalation - attack.t1548.002 logsource: category: registry_set product: windows detection: selection: TargetObject|endswith: \Environment\windir filter_main_default: Details: '%SystemRoot%' condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_* falsepositives: - Unknown level: high regression_tests_path: regression_data/rules/windows/registry/registry_set/registry_set_bypass_uac_using_silentcleanup_task/info.yml simulation: - type: atomic-red-team name: Bypass UAC using SilentCleanup Task technique: T1548.002 atomic_guid: 28104f8a-4ff1-4582-bcf6-699dce156608