Query: Suspicious Transport Agent execution detected on endpoint
Matching passage: T1505.002 Transport Agent. Tactics: persistence. Description: Adversaries may abuse Microsoft transport agents to establish persistent access to systems. Microsoft Exchange transport agents can operate on email messages passing through the transport pipeline to perform various tasks such as filtering spam, filtering malicious attachments, journaling, or adding a corporate signature to the end of all outgoing emails.(Citation: Microsoft TransportAgent Jun 2016)(Citation: ESET LightNeuron May 2019) Transport agents can be written by application developers and then compiled to .NET assemblies that are subsequently registered with the Exchange server. Transport agents will be invoked during a specified stage of email processing and carry out developer defined tasks. Adversaries may register a malicious transport agent to provide a persistence mechanism in Exchange Server that can be triggered by adversary-specified email events.(Citation: ESET LightNeuron May 2019) Though a malicious transport agent may be invoked for all emails passing through the Exchange transport pipeline, the agent can be configured to only carry out specific tasks in response to adversary defined criteria. For example, the transport agent may only carry out an action like copying in-transit attachments and saving them for later exfiltration if the recipient email address matches an entry on a list provided by the adversary.
Near-miss passage: T1505.006 vSphere Installation Bundles. Tactics: persistence. Description: Adversaries may abuse vSphere Installation Bundles (VIBs) to establish persistent access to ESXi hypervisors. VIBs are collections of files used for software distribution and virtual system management in VMware environments. Since ESXi uses an in-memory filesystem where changes made to most files are stored in RAM rather than in persistent storage, these modifications are lost after a reboot. However, VIBs can be used to create startup tasks, apply custom firewall rules, or deploy binaries that persist across reboots. Typically, administrators use VIBs for updates and system maintenance. VIBs can be broken down into three components:(Citation: VMware VIBs) * VIB payload: a `.vgz` archive containing the directories and files to be created and executed on boot when the VIBs are loaded. * Signature file: verifies the host acceptance level of a VIB, indicating what testing and validation has been done by VMware or its partners before publication of a VIB. By default, ESXi hosts require a minimum acceptance level of PartnerSupported for VIB installation, meaning the VIB is published by a trusted VMware partner. However, privileged users can change the default acceptance level using the `esxcli` command line interface. Additionally, VIBs are able to be installed regardless of acceptance level by using the <code> esxcli software vib install --force</code> command. * XML descriptor file: a configuration file containing associated VIB metadata, such as the name of the VIB and its dependencies. Adversaries may leverage malicious VIB packages to maintain persistent access to ESXi hypervisors, allowing system changes to be executed upon each bootup of ESXi – such as using `esxcli` to enable firewall rules for backdoor traffic, creating listeners on hard coded ports, and executing backdoors.(Citation: Google Cloud Threat Intelligence ESXi VIBs 2022) Adversaries may also masquerade their malicious VIB files as PartnerSupported by modifying the XML descriptor file.(Citation: Googl