Query: Sigma YAML for windows / process_creation
Matching passage: Sigma rule: Detects the execution of a renamed "cloudflared" binary.. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: Renamed Cloudflared.EXE Execution id: e0c69ebd-b54f-4aed-8ae3-e3467843f3f0 status: test description: Detects the execution of a renamed "cloudflared" binary. references: - https://github.com/cloudflare/cloudflared/releases - https://developers.cloudflare.com/cloudflare-one/connections/connect-networks/do-more-with-tunnels/trycloudflare/ - https://github.com/cloudflare/cloudflared - https://www.intrinsec.com/akira_ransomware/ - https://www.guidepointsecurity.com/blog/tunnel-vision-cloudflared-abused-in-the-wild/ tags: - attack.command-and-control - attack.t1090.001 author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) date: 2023-12-20 logsource: category: process_creation product: windows detection: selection_cleanup: CommandLine|contains|all: - ' tunnel ' - 'cleanup ' CommandLine|contains: - '-config ' - '-connector-id ' selection_tunnel: CommandLine|contains|all: - ' tunnel ' - ' run ' CommandLine|contains: - '-config ' - '-credentials-contents ' - '-credentials-file ' - '-token ' selection_accountless: CommandLine|contains|all: - -url - tunnel selection_hashes: Hashes|contains: - SHA256=2fb6c04c4f95fb8d158af94c137f90ac820716deaf88d8ebec956254e046cb29 - SHA256=b3d21940a10fdef5e415ad70331ce257c24fe3bcf7722262302e0421791f87e8 - SHA256=1fbd8362b2d2d2e6a5750ae3db69cd1815e6c1d31da48a98b796450971a8e039 - SHA256=0409c9b12f9d0eda86e461ed9bdabeefb00172b26322079681a0bdf48e68dc28 - SHA256=7cfb411d04bac42ef93d1f0c93c0a481e38c6f4612b97ae89d4702595988edc7 - SHA256=5b3c2d846ab162dc6bc595cce3a49de5731afde5d6060be7066d21b013a28373 - SHA256=ce95df7f69664c3df19b76028e115931919a71517b776da7b42d353e2ff4a670 - SHA256=1293525a19cfe3bc8296b62fbfe19f083632ed644a1c18c10b045a1d3030d81a - SHA256=af2b9161cfcb654b16408cd6b098afe9d1fb61a037d18d7090a119d4c0c8e0f0 - SHA256=39ddceb56a15798826a5fc4892fa2b474c444bb4d7a8bf2fa95e41cab10fa7a1 - SHA256=ccd11f2328023a0e7929e845d5b6e7bc783fb4650d65faef3ae090239d4bbce2 - SHA256=b6e5c5d2567ae8c69cc012ebcae30e6c9b5359d64a58d17ba75ec89f8bce71ac - SHA256=f813484ea441404f18caad96f28138e8aaf0cb256163c09c2ab8a3acab87f69f - SHA256=fc4a0802ab9c7409b892ca00636bec61e2acfc911bccfdeb9978b8ab5a2f828d - SHA256=083150724b49604c8765c1ba19541fa260b133be0acb0647fcd936d81f054499 - SHA256=44303d6572956f28a0f2e4b188934fb9874f2584f5c81fa431a463cfbf28083b - SHA256=5d38c46032a58e28ae5f7d174d8761ec3d64d186677f3ec53af5f51afb9bfd2f - SHA256=e1e70fa42059911bc6685fafef957f9a73fc66f214d0704a9b932683a5204032 - SHA256=c01356092a365b84f84f0e66870bd1a05ba3feb53cafd973fa5fea2534b
Near-miss passage: Sigma rule: Detects changes to the Windows EventLog channel permission values. It focuses on changes to the Security Descriptor Defi. Logsource: windows / registry_set. Rule: title: Windows Event Log Access Tampering Via Registry id: ba226dcf-d390-4642-b9af-b534872f1156 status: experimental description: 'Detects changes to the Windows EventLog channel permission values. It focuses on changes to the Security Descriptor Definition Language (SDDL) string, as modifications to these values can restrict access to specific users or groups, potentially aiding in defense evasion by controlling who can view or modify a event log channel. Upon execution, the user shouldn''t be able to access the event log channel via the event viewer or via utilities such as "Get-EventLog" or "wevtutil". ' references: - https://www.atomicredteam.io/atomic-red-team/atomics/T1562.002#atomic-test-8---modify-event-log-channel-access-permissions-via-registry---powershell - https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uSYvHUVU8xY - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/secauthz/security-descriptor-definition-language author: X__Junior date: 2025-01-16 modified: 2025-08-16 tags: - attack.privilege-escalation - attack.persistence - attack.defense-impairment - attack.t1547.001 - attack.t1112 logsource: category: registry_set product: windows detection: selection_key_1: TargetObject|contains: \SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\EventLog\ TargetObject|endswith: \CustomSD selection_key_2: TargetObject|contains: - \Policies\Microsoft\Windows\EventLog\ - \Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\WINEVT\Channels TargetObject|endswith: \ChannelAccess selection_details: - Details|contains: D:(D; - Details|contains|all: - D:( - )(D; filter_main_trustedinstaller: Image: C:\Windows\servicing\TrustedInstaller.exe filter_main_tiworker: Image|startswith: C:\Windows\WinSxS\ Image|endswith: \TiWorker.exe filter_optional_empty: Image: '' filter_optional_null: Image: null condition: 1 of selection_key_* and selection_details and not 1 of filter_main_* and not 1 of filter_optional_* falsepositives: - Administrative activity, still unlikely level: high