Query: detect This detection uses Windows security events to detect suspicious access attempts to the registry key values and sub-keys in logs
Matching passage: Sigma rule: This detection uses Windows security events to detect suspicious access attempts to the registry key values and sub-keys. Logsource: windows / security. Rule: title: Azure AD Health Service Agents Registry Keys Access id: 1d2ab8ac-1a01-423b-9c39-001510eae8e8 status: test description: 'This detection uses Windows security events to detect suspicious access attempts to the registry key values and sub-keys of Azure AD Health service agents (e.g AD FS). Information from AD Health service agents can be used to potentially abuse some of the features provided by those services in the cloud (e.g. Federation). This detection requires an access control entry (ACE) on the system access control list (SACL) of the following securable object: HKLM:\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\ADHealthAgent. Make sure you set the SACL to propagate to its sub-keys. ' references: - https://o365blog.com/post/hybridhealthagent/ - https://github.com/OTRF/Set-AuditRule/blob/c3dec5443414231714d850565d364ca73475ade5/rules/registry/aad_connect_health_service_agent.yml author: Roberto Rodriguez (Cyb3rWard0g), OTR (Open Threat Research), MSTIC date: 2021-08-26 modified: 2022-10-09 tags: - attack.discovery - attack.t1012 logsource: product: windows service: security detection: selection: EventID: - 4656 - 4663 ObjectType: Key ObjectName: \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\ADHealthAgent filter: ProcessName|contains: - Microsoft.Identity.Health.Adfs.DiagnosticsAgent.exe - Microsoft.Identity.Health.Adfs.InsightsService.exe - Microsoft.Identity.Health.Adfs.MonitoringAgent.Startup.exe - Microsoft.Identity.Health.Adfs.PshSurrogate.exe - Microsoft.Identity.Health.Common.Clients.ResourceMonitor.exe condition: selection and not filter falsepositives: - Unknown level: medium
Near-miss passage: Sigma rule: Detects network connections to Visual Studio Code tunnel domains initiated by a process on a system. Attackers can abuse. Logsource: windows / network_connection. Rule: title: Network Connection Initiated To Visual Studio Code Tunnels Domain id: 4b657234-038e-4ad5-997c-4be42340bce4 related: - id: 9501f8e6-8e3d-48fc-a8a6-1089dd5d7ef4 type: similar - id: b3e6418f-7c7a-4fad-993a-93b65027a9f1 type: similar - id: 1cb0c6ce-3d00-44fc-ab9c-6d6d577bf20b type: similar status: test description: 'Detects network connections to Visual Studio Code tunnel domains initiated by a process on a system. Attackers can abuse that feature to establish a reverse shell or persistence on a machine. ' references: - https://ipfyx.fr/post/visual-studio-code-tunnel/ - https://badoption.eu/blog/2023/01/31/code_c2.html - https://cydefops.com/vscode-data-exfiltration author: Kamran Saifullah date: 2023-11-20 tags: - attack.exfiltration - attack.command-and-control - attack.t1567 - attack.t1572 logsource: category: network_connection product: windows detection: selection: Initiated: 'true' DestinationHostname|endswith: .tunnels.api.visualstudio.com condition: selection falsepositives: - Legitimate use of Visual Studio Code tunnel will also trigger this. level: medium