Query: alert when Detection of child processes spawned with SYSTEM privileges by parents with LOCAL SERVICE or NETWORK SERVICE accounts
Matching passage: Sigma rule: Detection of child processes spawned with SYSTEM privileges by parents with LOCAL SERVICE or NETWORK SERVICE accounts. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: Suspicious Child Process Created as System id: 590a5f4c-6c8c-4f10-8307-89afe9453a9d status: test description: Detection of child processes spawned with SYSTEM privileges by parents with LOCAL SERVICE or NETWORK SERVICE accounts references: - https://speakerdeck.com/heirhabarov/hunting-for-privilege-escalation-in-windows-environment - https://foxglovesecurity.com/2016/09/26/rotten-potato-privilege-escalation-from-service-accounts-to-system/ - https://github.com/antonioCoco/RogueWinRM - https://twitter.com/Cyb3rWard0g/status/1453123054243024897 author: Teymur Kheirkhabarov, Roberto Rodriguez (@Cyb3rWard0g), Open Threat Research (OTR) date: 2019-10-26 modified: 2024-12-01 tags: - attack.privilege-escalation - attack.stealth - attack.t1134.002 logsource: category: process_creation product: windows definition: 'Requirements: ParentUser field needs sysmon >= 13.30' detection: selection: ParentUser|contains: - AUTHORI - AUTORI ParentUser|endswith: - \NETWORK SERVICE - \LOCAL SERVICE User|contains: - AUTHORI - AUTORI User|endswith: - \SYSTEM - \Système - \СИСТЕМА IntegrityLevel: - System - S-1-16-16384 filter_rundll32: Image|endswith: \rundll32.exe CommandLine|contains: DavSetCookie condition: selection and not 1 of filter_* falsepositives: - Unknown level: high
Near-miss passage: Sigma rule: Detects the usage of wmic.exe to enumerate or read Windows registry via the WMI StdRegProv class read methods (EnumKey,. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: Registry Enumeration via WMI Stdregprov id: a0e417e2-2fa1-40da-b6d2-e094cd5e1191 related: - id: c453ab7a-1f5c-4716-a3b4-dea8135fb43a type: similar status: experimental description: 'Detects the usage of wmic.exe to enumerate or read Windows registry via the WMI StdRegProv class read methods (EnumKey, EnumValues, GetStringValue, etc.). While registry reads are common, attackers may use this technique to perform reconnaissance and discover sensitive configuration values, credentials, or installed software. The use of WMI as an alternative to standard tools like reg.exe can indicate an attempt to evade detection focused on traditional registry query commands. ' references: - https://trustedsec.com/blog/command-line-underdog-wmic-in-action - https://trustedsec.com/blog/wmi-for-script-kiddies - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/desktop/regprov/stdregprov author: Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems) date: 2025-07-30 modified: 2026-06-19 tags: - attack.execution - attack.t1047 - attack.discovery - attack.t1012 logsource: category: process_creation product: windows detection: selection_img: - Image|endswith: \wmic.exe - OriginalFileName: wmic.exe selection_cli: CommandLine|contains|all: - stdregprov - call CommandLine|contains: - CheckAccess - EnumKey - EnumValues - GetBinaryValue - GetDWORDValue - GetExpandedStringValue - GetMultiStringValue - GetQWORDValue - GetSecurityDescriptor - GetStringValue condition: all of selection_* falsepositives: - Legitimate administrative activity level: medium