Query: detect Detects processes leveraging the "ms-msdt" handler or the "msdt.exe" binary to execute arbitrary commands as seen in the in logs
Matching passage: Sigma rule: Detects processes leveraging the "ms-msdt" handler or the "msdt.exe" binary to execute arbitrary commands as seen in the. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: Potential Arbitrary Command Execution Using Msdt.EXE id: 258fc8ce-8352-443a-9120-8a11e4857fa5 status: test description: Detects processes leveraging the "ms-msdt" handler or the "msdt.exe" binary to execute arbitrary commands as seen in the follina (CVE-2022-30190) vulnerability references: - https://twitter.com/nao_sec/status/1530196847679401984 - https://app.any.run/tasks/713f05d2-fe78-4b9d-a744-f7c133e3fafb/ - https://twitter.com/_JohnHammond/status/1531672601067675648 author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) date: 2022-05-29 modified: 2024-03-13 tags: - attack.stealth - attack.t1202 logsource: category: process_creation product: windows detection: selection_img: - Image|endswith: \msdt.exe - OriginalFileName: msdt.exe selection_cmd_inline: CommandLine|contains: IT_BrowseForFile= selection_cmd_answerfile_flag: CommandLine|contains: ' PCWDiagnostic' selection_cmd_answerfile_param: CommandLine|contains|windash: ' -af ' condition: selection_img and (selection_cmd_inline or all of selection_cmd_answerfile_*) falsepositives: - Unknown level: high
Near-miss passage: Sigma rule: Detects tampering of RDP Terminal Service/Server sensitive settings. Such as allowing unauthorized users access to a sys. Logsource: windows / registry_set. Rule: title: RDP Sensitive Settings Changed to Zero id: a2863fbc-d5cb-48d5-83fb-d976d4b1743b related: - id: 3f6b7b62-61aa-45db-96bd-9c31b36b653c type: similar - id: 4b8f6d3a-9c5e-4f2a-a7d8-6b9c3e5f2a8d type: similar status: test description: 'Detects tampering of RDP Terminal Service/Server sensitive settings. Such as allowing unauthorized users access to a system via the ''fAllowUnsolicited'' or enabling RDP via ''fDenyTSConnections'', etc. ' references: - https://web.archive.org/web/20200929062532/https://blog.menasec.net/2019/02/threat-hunting-rdp-hijacking-via.html - http://woshub.com/rds-shadow-how-to-connect-to-a-user-session-in-windows-server-2012-r2/ - https://twitter.com/SagieSec/status/1469001618863624194?t=HRf0eA0W1YYzkTSHb-Ky1A&s=03 - https://threathunterplaybook.com/hunts/windows/190407-RegModEnableRDPConnections/notebook.html - https://bazaar.abuse.ch/sample/6f3aa9362d72e806490a8abce245331030d1ab5ac77e400dd475748236a6cc81/ - http://etutorials.org/Microsoft+Products/microsoft+windows+server+2003+terminal+services/Chapter+6+Registry/Registry+Keys+for+Terminal+Services/ - https://admx.help/HKLM/SOFTWARE/Policies/Microsoft/Windows%20NT/Terminal%20Services author: Samir Bousseaden, David ANDRE, Roberto Rodriguez @Cyb3rWard0g, Nasreddine Bencherchali date: 2022-09-29 modified: 2022-11-26 tags: - attack.persistence - attack.defense-impairment - attack.t1112 logsource: category: registry_set product: windows detection: selection: TargetObject|endswith: - \fDenyTSConnections - \fSingleSessionPerUser - \UserAuthentication Details: DWORD (0x00000000) condition: selection falsepositives: - Some of the keys mentioned here could be modified by an administrator while setting group policy (it should be investigated either way) level: medium