Query: Sigma YAML for windows / file_event
Matching passage: Sigma rule: Detects the creation of an "lsass.dmp" file by the taskmgr process. This indicates a manual dumping of the LSASS.exe pro. Logsource: windows / file_event. Rule: title: LSASS Process Memory Dump Creation Via Taskmgr.EXE id: 69ca12af-119d-44ed-b50f-a47af0ebc364 status: test description: Detects the creation of an "lsass.dmp" file by the taskmgr process. This indicates a manual dumping of the LSASS.exe process memory using Windows Task Manager. author: Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel date: 2023-10-19 references: - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/987e3ca988ae3cff4b9f6e388c139c05bf44bbb8/atomics/T1003.001/T1003.001.md#L1 tags: - attack.credential-access - attack.t1003.001 logsource: category: file_event product: windows detection: selection: Image|endswith: - :\Windows\system32\taskmgr.exe - :\Windows\SysWOW64\taskmgr.exe TargetFilename|contains|all: - \AppData\Local\Temp\ - \lsass - .DMP condition: selection falsepositives: - Rare case of troubleshooting by an administrator or support that has to be investigated regardless level: high regression_tests_path: regression_data/rules/windows/file/file_event/file_event_win_taskmgr_lsass_dump/info.yml
Near-miss passage: Sigma rule: Detects abusing Azure Browser SSO by requesting OAuth 2.0 refresh tokens for an Azure-AD-authenticated Windows user (i.e. Logsource: windows / image_load. Rule: title: Potential Azure Browser SSO Abuse id: 50f852e6-af22-4c78-9ede-42ef36aa3453 status: test description: 'Detects abusing Azure Browser SSO by requesting OAuth 2.0 refresh tokens for an Azure-AD-authenticated Windows user (i.e. the machine is joined to Azure AD and a user logs in with their Azure AD account) wanting to perform SSO authentication in the browser. An attacker can use this to authenticate to Azure AD in a browser as that user. ' references: - https://posts.specterops.io/requesting-azure-ad-request-tokens-on-azure-ad-joined-machines-for-browser-sso-2b0409caad30 author: Den Iuzvyk date: 2020-07-15 modified: 2023-04-18 tags: - attack.persistence - attack.privilege-escalation - attack.execution - attack.stealth - attack.t1574.001 logsource: category: image_load product: windows detection: selection: ImageLoaded: C:\Windows\System32\MicrosoftAccountTokenProvider.dll filter_main_bgtaskhost: Image|startswith: - C:\Windows\System32\ - C:\Windows\SysWOW64\ Image|endswith: \BackgroundTaskHost.exe filter_optional_devenv: Image|startswith: - C:\Program Files\Microsoft Visual Studio\ - C:\Program Files (x86)\Microsoft Visual Studio\ Image|endswith: \IDE\devenv.exe filter_optional_ie: Image: - C:\Program Files (x86)\Internet Explorer\iexplore.exe - C:\Program Files\Internet Explorer\iexplore.exe filter_optional_edge_1: - Image|startswith: C:\Program Files (x86)\Microsoft\EdgeWebView\Application\ - Image|endswith: \WindowsApps\MicrosoftEdge.exe - Image: - C:\Program Files (x86)\Microsoft\Edge\Application\msedge.exe - C:\Program Files\Microsoft\Edge\Application\msedge.exe filter_optional_edge_2: Image|startswith: - C:\Program Files (x86)\Microsoft\EdgeCore\ - C:\Program Files\Microsoft\EdgeCore\ Image|endswith: - \msedge.exe - \msedgewebview2.exe filter_optional_onedrive: Image|endswith: \AppData\Local\Microsoft\OneDrive\OneDrive.exe filter_optional_null: Image: null condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_* and not 1 of filter_optional_* falsepositives: - False positives are expected since this rules is only looking for the DLL load event. This rule is better used in correlation with related activity level: low