Query: detection rule: Detects the execution of netsh with the "trace" flag in order to start a network capture
Matching passage: Sigma rule: Detects the execution of netsh with the "trace" flag in order to start a network capture. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: New Network Trace Capture Started Via Netsh.EXE id: d3c3861d-c504-4c77-ba55-224ba82d0118 status: test description: Detects the execution of netsh with the "trace" flag in order to start a network capture references: - https://blogs.msdn.microsoft.com/canberrapfe/2012/03/30/capture-a-network-trace-without-installing-anything-capture-a-network-trace-of-a-reboot/ - https://klausjochem.me/2016/02/03/netsh-the-cyber-attackers-tool-of-choice/ author: Kutepov Anton, oscd.community date: 2019-10-24 modified: 2023-02-13 tags: - attack.discovery - attack.credential-access - attack.t1040 logsource: category: process_creation product: windows detection: selection_img: - Image|endswith: \netsh.exe - OriginalFileName: netsh.exe selection_cli: CommandLine|contains|all: - trace - start condition: all of selection_* falsepositives: - Legitimate administration activity level: medium
Near-miss passage: Sigma rule: Detects calls to base64 encoded WMI class such as "Win32_ShadowCopy", "Win32_ScheduledJob", etc.. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: PowerShell Base64 Encoded WMI Classes id: 1816994b-42e1-4fb1-afd2-134d88184f71 related: - id: 47688f1b-9f51-4656-b013-3cc49a166a36 type: obsolete status: test description: Detects calls to base64 encoded WMI class such as "Win32_ShadowCopy", "Win32_ScheduledJob", etc. references: - https://github.com/Neo23x0/Raccine/blob/20a569fa21625086433dcce8bb2765d0ea08dcb6/yara/mal_revil.yar author: Christian Burkard (Nextron Systems), Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) date: 2023-01-30 tags: - attack.execution - attack.stealth - attack.t1059.001 - attack.t1027 logsource: category: process_creation product: windows detection: selection_img: - Image|endswith: - \powershell.exe - \pwsh.exe - OriginalFileName: - PowerShell.EXE - pwsh.dll selection_cli_shadowcopy: CommandLine|contains: - VwBpAG4AMwAyAF8AUwBoAGEAZABvAHcAYwBvAHAAeQ - cAaQBuADMAMgBfAFMAaABhAGQAbwB3AGMAbwBwAHkA - XAGkAbgAzADIAXwBTAGgAYQBkAG8AdwBjAG8AcAB5A - V2luMzJfU2hhZG93Y29we - dpbjMyX1NoYWRvd2NvcH - XaW4zMl9TaGFkb3djb3B5 selection_cli_scheduledJob: CommandLine|contains: - VwBpAG4AMwAyAF8AUwBjAGgAZQBkAHUAbABlAGQASgBvAGIA - cAaQBuADMAMgBfAFMAYwBoAGUAZAB1AGwAZQBkAEoAbwBiA - XAGkAbgAzADIAXwBTAGMAaABlAGQAdQBsAGUAZABKAG8AYg - V2luMzJfU2NoZWR1bGVkSm9i - dpbjMyX1NjaGVkdWxlZEpvY - XaW4zMl9TY2hlZHVsZWRKb2 selection_cli_process: CommandLine|contains: - VwBpAG4AMwAyAF8AUAByAG8AYwBlAHMAcw - cAaQBuADMAMgBfAFAAcgBvAGMAZQBzAHMA - XAGkAbgAzADIAXwBQAHIAbwBjAGUAcwBzA - V2luMzJfUHJvY2Vzc - dpbjMyX1Byb2Nlc3 - XaW4zMl9Qcm9jZXNz selection_cli_useraccount: CommandLine|contains: - VwBpAG4AMwAyAF8AVQBzAGUAcgBBAGMAYwBvAHUAbgB0A - cAaQBuADMAMgBfAFUAcwBlAHIAQQBjAGMAbwB1AG4AdA - XAGkAbgAzADIAXwBVAHMAZQByAEEAYwBjAG8AdQBuAHQA - V2luMzJfVXNlckFjY291bn - dpbjMyX1VzZXJBY2NvdW50 - XaW4zMl9Vc2VyQWNjb3Vud selection_cli_loggedonuser: CommandLine|contains: - VwBpAG4AMwAyAF8ATABvAGcAZwBlAGQATwBuAFUAcwBlAHIA - cAaQBuADMAMgBfAEwAbwBnAGcAZQBkAE8AbgBVAHMAZQByA - XAGkAbgAzADIAXwBMAG8AZwBnAGUAZABPAG4AVQBzAGUAcg - V2luMzJfTG9nZ2VkT25Vc2Vy - dpbjMyX0xvZ2dlZE9uVXNlc - XaW4zMl9Mb2dnZWRPblVzZX condition: selection_img and 1 of selection_cli_* falsepositives: - Unknown level: high