Query: rule covering Detects usage of Metasploit SMB PsExec (exploit/windows/smb/psexec) and Impacket psexec.py by triggering on specific ser
Matching passage: Sigma rule: Detects usage of Metasploit SMB PsExec (exploit/windows/smb/psexec) and Impacket psexec.py by triggering on specific ser. Logsource: windows / security. Rule: title: Metasploit Or Impacket Service Installation Via SMB PsExec id: 6fb63b40-e02a-403e-9ffd-3bcc1d749442 related: - id: 1a17ce75-ff0d-4f02-9709-2b7bb5618cf0 type: derived status: test description: Detects usage of Metasploit SMB PsExec (exploit/windows/smb/psexec) and Impacket psexec.py by triggering on specific service installation references: - https://bczyz1.github.io/2021/01/30/psexec.html author: Bartlomiej Czyz, Relativity date: 2021-01-21 modified: 2022-10-05 tags: - attack.lateral-movement - attack.t1021.002 - attack.t1570 - attack.execution - attack.t1569.002 logsource: product: windows service: security definition: The 'System Security Extension' audit subcategory need to be enabled to log the EID 4697 detection: selection: EventID: 4697 ServiceFileName|re: ^%systemroot%\\[a-zA-Z]{8}\.exe$ ServiceName|re: (^[a-zA-Z]{4}$)|(^[a-zA-Z]{8}$)|(^[a-zA-Z]{16}$) ServiceStartType: 3 ServiceType: '0x10' filter: ServiceName: PSEXESVC condition: selection and not filter falsepositives: - Possible, different agents with a 8 character binary and a 4, 8 or 16 character service name level: high
Near-miss passage: Sigma rule: Detects potential abuse of WerFaultSecure.exe to dump Protected Process Light (PPL) processes like LSASS or to freeze se. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: PPL Tampering Via WerFaultSecure id: 1f0b4cac-9c81-41f4-95d0-8475ff46b3e2 related: - id: 387df17d-3b04-448f-8669-9e7fd5e5fd8c type: similar - id: 8a2f4b1c-3d5e-4f7a-9b2c-1e4f6d8a9c2b type: similar status: experimental description: 'Detects potential abuse of WerFaultSecure.exe to dump Protected Process Light (PPL) processes like LSASS or to freeze security solutions (EDR/antivirus). This technique is used by tools such as EDR-Freeze and WSASS to bypass PPL protections and access sensitive information or disable security software. Distinct command line patterns help identify the specific tool: - WSASS usage typically shows: "WSASS.exe WerFaultSecure.exe [PID]" in ParentCommandLine - EDR-Freeze usage typically shows: "EDR-Freeze_[version].exe [PID] [timeout]" in ParentCommandLine Legitimate debugging operations using WerFaultSecure are rare in production environments and should be investigated. ' references: - https://www.zerosalarium.com/2025/09/EDR-Freeze-Puts-EDRs-Antivirus-Into-Coma.html - https://github.com/TwoSevenOneT/EDR-Freeze/blob/a7f61030b36fbde89871f393488f7075d2aa89f6/EDR-Freeze.cpp#L53 - https://www.zerosalarium.com/2025/09/Dumping-LSASS-With-WER-On-Modern-Windows-11.html - https://github.com/TwoSevenOneT/WSASS/blob/2c8fd9fa32143e7bc9f066e9511c6f8a57bc64b5/WSASS.cpp#L251 author: Jason (https://github.com/0xbcf) date: 2025-09-23 modified: 2025-11-23 tags: - attack.defense-impairment - attack.t1685 - attack.credential-access - attack.t1003.001 logsource: category: process_creation product: windows detection: selection_image: - Image|endswith: \WerFaultSecure.exe - OriginalFileName: WerFaultSecure.exe selection_args: CommandLine|contains|all: - ' /h ' - ' /pid ' - ' /tid ' - ' /encfile ' - ' /cancel ' - ' /type ' - ' 268310' condition: all of selection_* falsepositives: - Legitimate usage of WerFaultSecure for debugging purposes level: high regression_tests_path: regression_data/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_werfaultsecure_abuse/info.yml