Query: Sigma rule for Detects potential persistence activity via outlook home page. An attacker can set a home page to achieve code execution
Matching passage: Sigma rule: Detects potential persistence activity via outlook home page. An attacker can set a home page to achieve code execution. Logsource: windows / registry_set. Rule: title: Potential Persistence Via Outlook Home Page id: ddd171b5-2cc6-4975-9e78-f0eccd08cc76 related: - id: 487bb375-12ef-41f6-baae-c6a1572b4dd1 type: similar status: test description: 'Detects potential persistence activity via outlook home page. An attacker can set a home page to achieve code execution and persistence by editing the WebView registry keys. ' references: - https://speakerdeck.com/heirhabarov/hunting-for-persistence-via-microsoft-exchange-server-or-outlook?slide=70 - https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/topic/outlook-home-page-feature-is-missing-in-folder-properties-d207edb7-aa02-46c5-b608-5d9dbed9bd04?ui=en-us&rs=en-us&ad=us - https://trustedsec.com/blog/specula-turning-outlook-into-a-c2-with-one-registry-change author: Tobias Michalski (Nextron Systems), David Bertho (@dbertho) & Eirik Sveen (@0xSV1), Storebrand date: 2021-06-09 modified: 2024-08-07 tags: - attack.persistence - attack.defense-impairment - attack.t1112 logsource: product: windows category: registry_set detection: selection: TargetObject|contains|all: - \Software\Microsoft\Office\ - \Outlook\WebView\ TargetObject|endswith: \URL condition: selection falsepositives: - Unknown level: high
Near-miss passage: Sigma rule: Detects the use of Ngrok, a utility used for port forwarding and tunneling, often used by threat actors to make local pr. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: PUA - Ngrok Execution id: ee37eb7c-a4e7-4cd5-8fa4-efa27f1c3f31 status: test description: 'Detects the use of Ngrok, a utility used for port forwarding and tunneling, often used by threat actors to make local protected services publicly available. Involved domains are bin.equinox.io for download and *.ngrok.io for connections. ' references: - https://ngrok.com/docs - https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2021/05/shining-a-light-on-darkside-ransomware-operations.html - https://stackoverflow.com/questions/42442320/ssh-tunnel-to-ngrok-and-initiate-rdp - https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/58d21840d915aaf4040ceb89522396124c82f325282f805d1085527e1e2ccfa1/detection - https://cybleinc.com/2021/02/15/ngrok-platform-abused-by-hackers-to-deliver-a-new-wave-of-phishing-attacks/ - https://twitter.com/xorJosh/status/1598646907802451969 - https://www.softwaretestinghelp.com/how-to-use-ngrok/ author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems) date: 2021-05-14 modified: 2023-02-21 tags: - attack.command-and-control - attack.t1572 logsource: category: process_creation product: windows detection: selection1: CommandLine|contains: - ' tcp 139' - ' tcp 445' - ' tcp 3389' - ' tcp 5985' - ' tcp 5986' selection2: CommandLine|contains|all: - ' start ' - --all - --config - .yml selection3: Image|endswith: ngrok.exe CommandLine|contains: - ' tcp ' - ' http ' - ' authtoken ' selection4: CommandLine|contains: - '.exe authtoken ' - .exe start --all condition: 1 of selection* falsepositives: - Another tool that uses the command line switches of Ngrok - Ngrok http 3978 (https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/bot-service/bot-service-debug-channel-ngrok?view=azure-bot-service-4.0) level: high