alirezaaminzadeh/secembed-pairs huggingface dataset:
Query: detection engineering for Artificial Intelligence
Matching passage: T1588.007 Artificial Intelligence. Tactics: resource development. Description: Adversaries may obtain access to generative artificial intelligence tools, such as large language models (LLMs), to aid various techniques during targeting. These tools may be used to inform, bolster, and enable a variety of malicious tasks, including conducting [Reconnaissance](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0043), creating basic scripts, assisting social engineering, and even developing payloads.(Citation: MSFT-AI) For example, by utilizing a publicly available LLM an adversary is essentially outsourcing or automating certain tasks to the tool. Using AI, the adversary may draft and generate content in a variety of written languages to be used in [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566)/[Phishing for Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1598) campaigns. The same publicly available tool may further enable vulnerability or other offensive research supporting [Develop Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1587). AI tools may also automate technical tasks by generating, refining, or otherwise enhancing (e.g., [Obfuscated Files or Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1027)) malicious scripts and payloads.(Citation: OpenAI-CTI) Finally, AI-generated text, images, audio, and video may be used for fraud, [Impersonation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1684/001), and other malicious activities.(Citation: Google-Vishing24)(Citation: IC3-AI24)(Citation: WSJ-Vishing-AI24)
Near-miss passage: T1588.003 Code Signing Certificates. Tactics: resource development. Description: Adversaries may buy and/or steal code signing certificates that can be used during targeting. Code signing is the process of digitally signing executables and scripts to confirm the software author and guarantee that the code has not been altered or corrupted. Code signing provides a level of authenticity for a program from the developer and a guarantee that the program has not been tampered with.(Citation: Wikipedia Code Signing) Users and/or security tools may trust a signed piece of code more than an unsigned piece of code even if they don't know who issued the certificate or who the author is. Prior to [Code Signing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1553/002), adversaries may purchase or steal code signing certificates for use in operations. The purchase of code signing certificates may be done using a front organization or using information stolen from a previously compromised entity that allows the adversary to validate to a certificate provider as that entity. Adversaries may also steal code signing materials directly from a compromised third-party.
Query: adversary uses Archive Collected Data
Matching passage: T1560 Archive Collected Data. Tactics: collection. Description: An adversary may compress and/or encrypt data that is collected prior to exfiltration. Compressing the data can help to obfuscate the collected data and minimize the amount of data sent over the network.(Citation: DOJ GRU Indictment Jul 2018) Encryption can be used to hide information that is being exfiltrated from detection or make exfiltration less conspicuous upon inspection by a defender. Both compression and encryption are done prior to exfiltration, and can be performed using a utility, 3rd party library, or custom method.
Near-miss passage: T1560.003 Archive via Custom Method. Tactics: collection. Description: An adversary may compress or encrypt data that is collected prior to exfiltration using a custom method. Adversaries may choose to use custom archival methods, such as encryption with XOR or stream ciphers implemented with no external library or utility references. Custom implementations of well-known compression algorithms have also been used.(Citation: ESET Sednit Part 2)
Query: CVE similar to CVE-2015-8420
Matching passage: CVE-2015-8420. CWE: UNKNOWN. CVSS: 10.0. Use-after-free vulnerability in Adobe Flash Player before 18.0.0.268 and 19.x and 20.x before 20.0.0.228 on Windows and OS X and before 11.2.202.554 on Linux, Adobe AIR before 20.0.0.204, Adobe AIR SDK before 20.0.0.204, and Adobe AIR SDK & Compiler before 20.0.0.204 allows attackers to execute arbitrary code via unspecified vectors, a different vulnerability than CVE-2015-8048, CVE-2015-8049, CVE-2015-8050, CVE-2015-8055, CVE-2015-8056, CVE-2015-8057, CVE-2015-8058, CVE-2015-8059, CVE-2015-8061, CVE-2015-8062, CVE-2015-8063, CVE-2015-8064, CVE-2015-8065, CVE-2015-8066, CVE-2015-8067, CVE-2015-8068, CVE-2015-8069, CVE-2015-8070, CVE-2015-8071, CVE-2015-8401, CVE-2015-8402, CVE-2015-8403, CVE-2015-8404, CVE-2015-8405, CVE-2015-8406, CVE-2015-8410, CVE-2015-8411, CVE-2015-8412, CVE-2015-8413, CVE-2015-8414, CVE-2015-8421, CVE-2015-8422, CVE-2015-8423, CVE-2015-8424, CVE-2015-8425, CVE-2015-8426, CVE-2015-8427, CVE-2015-8428, CVE-2015-8429, CVE-2015-8430, CVE-2015-8431, CVE-2015-8432, CVE-2015-8433, CVE-2015-8434, CVE-2015-8435, CVE-2015-8436, CVE-2015-8437, CVE-2015-8441, CVE-2015-8442, CVE-2015-8447, CVE-2015-8448, CVE-2015-8449, CVE-2015-8450, CVE-2015-8452, and CVE-2015-8454.
Near-miss passage: CVE-2015-2863. CWE: UNKNOWN. CVSS: 4.300000190734863. Open redirect vulnerability in Kaseya Virtual System Administrator (VSA) 7.x before 7.0.0.29, 8.x before 8.0.0.18, 9.0 before 9.0.0.14, and 9.1 before 9.1.0.4 allows remote attackers to redirect users to arbitrary web sites and conduct phishing attacks via unspecified vectors.
Query: Sigma YAML for windows / process_creation
Matching passage: Sigma rule: Detects usage of the "cipher" built-in utility in order to overwrite deleted data from disk. Adversaries may destroy dat. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: Deleted Data Overwritten Via Cipher.EXE id: 4b046706-5789-4673-b111-66f25fe99534 status: test description: 'Detects usage of the "cipher" built-in utility in order to overwrite deleted data from disk. Adversaries may destroy data and files on specific systems or in large numbers on a network to interrupt availability to systems, services, and network resources. Data destruction is likely to render stored data irrecoverable by forensic techniques through overwriting files or data on local and remote drives ' references: - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1485/T1485.md#atomic-test-3---overwrite-deleted-data-on-c-drive author: frack113 date: 2021-12-26 modified: 2023-02-21 tags: - attack.impact - attack.t1485 logsource: category: process_creation product: windows detection: selection_img: - OriginalFileName: CIPHER.EXE - Image|endswith: \cipher.exe selection_cli: CommandLine|contains: ' /w:' condition: all of selection_* falsepositives: - Unknown level: medium regression_tests_path: regression_data/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_cipher_overwrite_deleted_data/info.yml simulation: - type: atomic-red-team name: Overwrite deleted data on C drive technique: T1485 atomic_guid: 321fd25e-0007-417f-adec-33232252be19
Near-miss passage: Sigma rule: Detects the creation of a new PowerShell module in the first folder of the module directory structure "\WindowsPowerShel. Logsource: windows / file_event. Rule: title: Potential Suspicious PowerShell Module File Created id: e8a52bbd-bced-459f-bd93-64db45ce7657 status: test description: Detects the creation of a new PowerShell module in the first folder of the module directory structure "\WindowsPowerShell\Modules\malware\malware.psm1". This is somewhat an uncommon practice as legitimate modules often includes a version folder. references: - Internal Research - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/scripting/developer/module/understanding-a-windows-powershell-module?view=powershell-7.3 author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) date: 2023-05-09 tags: - attack.persistence logsource: category: file_event product: windows detection: selection: TargetFilename|endswith: - \\WindowsPowerShell\\Modules\\*\.ps - \\WindowsPowerShell\\Modules\\*\.dll condition: selection falsepositives: - False positive rate will vary depending on the environments. Additional filters might be required to make this logic usable in production. level: medium
Query: rule covering Csi.exe is a signed binary from Microsoft that comes with Visual Studio and provides C# interactive capabilities. It can
Matching passage: Sigma rule: Csi.exe is a signed binary from Microsoft that comes with Visual Studio and provides C# interactive capabilities. It can. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: Suspicious Csi.exe Usage id: 40b95d31-1afc-469e-8d34-9a3a667d058e status: test description: Csi.exe is a signed binary from Microsoft that comes with Visual Studio and provides C# interactive capabilities. It can be used to run C# code from a file passed as a parameter in command line. Early version of this utility provided with Microsoft “Roslyn” Community Technology Preview was named 'rcsi.exe' references: - https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/OtherMSBinaries/Csi/ - https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/OtherMSBinaries/Rcsi/ - https://enigma0x3.net/2016/11/21/bypassing-application-whitelisting-by-using-rcsi-exe/ - https://twitter.com/Z3Jpa29z/status/1317545798981324801 author: Konstantin Grishchenko, oscd.community date: 2020-10-17 modified: 2022-07-11 tags: - attack.lateral-movement - attack.execution - attack.stealth - attack.t1072 - attack.t1218 logsource: category: process_creation product: windows detection: selection_img: - Image|endswith: - \csi.exe - \rcsi.exe - OriginalFileName: - csi.exe - rcsi.exe selection_cli: Company: Microsoft Corporation condition: all of selection* falsepositives: - Legitimate usage by software developers level: medium
Near-miss passage: Sigma rule: Detects all variations of obfuscated powershell IEX invocation code generated by Invoke-Obfuscation framework from the f. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: Invoke-Obfuscation Obfuscated IEX Invocation id: 4bf943c6-5146-4273-98dd-e958fd1e3abf status: test description: Detects all variations of obfuscated powershell IEX invocation code generated by Invoke-Obfuscation framework from the following code block references: - https://github.com/danielbohannon/Invoke-Obfuscation/blob/f20e7f843edd0a3a7716736e9eddfa423395dd26/Out-ObfuscatedStringCommand.ps1#L873-L888 author: Daniel Bohannon (@Mandiant/@FireEye), oscd.community date: 2019-11-08 modified: 2026-03-16 tags: - attack.stealth - attack.t1027 - attack.execution - attack.t1059.001 logsource: category: process_creation product: windows detection: selection: - CommandLine|re: \$PSHome\[\s*\d{1,3}\s*\]\s*\+\s*\$PSHome\[ - CommandLine|re: \$ShellId\[\s*\d{1,3}\s*\]\s*\+\s*\$ShellId\[ - CommandLine|re: \$env:Public\[\s*\d{1,3}\s*\]\s*\+\s*\$env:Public\[ - CommandLine|re: \$env:ComSpec\[(?:\s*\d{1,3}\s*,){2} - CommandLine|re: \*mdr\*\W\s*\)\.Name - CommandLine|re: \$VerbosePreference\.ToString\( - CommandLine|re: \[String\]\s*\$VerbosePreference condition: selection falsepositives: - Unknown level: high
Query: EDR alert: possible Office Template Macros (T1137.001)
Matching passage: T1137.001 Office Template Macros. Tactics: persistence. Description: Adversaries may abuse Microsoft Office templates to obtain persistence on a compromised system. Microsoft Office contains templates that are part of common Office applications and are used to customize styles. The base templates within the application are used each time an application starts. (Citation: Microsoft Change Normal Template) Office Visual Basic for Applications (VBA) macros (Citation: MSDN VBA in Office) can be inserted into the base template and used to execute code when the respective Office application starts in order to obtain persistence. Examples for both Word and Excel have been discovered and published. By default, Word has a Normal.dotm template created that can be modified to include a malicious macro. Excel does not have a template file created by default, but one can be added that will automatically be loaded.(Citation: enigma0x3 normal.dotm)(Citation: Hexacorn Office Template Macros) Shared templates may also be stored and pulled from remote locations.(Citation: GlobalDotName Jun 2019) Word Normal.dotm location:<br> <code>C:\Users\&lt;username&gt;\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Templates\Normal.dotm</code> Excel Personal.xlsb location:<br> <code>C:\Users\&lt;username&gt;\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Excel\XLSTART\PERSONAL.XLSB</code> Adversaries may also change the location of the base template to point to their own by hijacking the application's search order, e.g. Word 2016 will first look for Normal.dotm under <code>C:\Program Files (x86)\Microsoft Office\root\Office16\</code>, or by modifying the GlobalDotName registry key. By modifying the GlobalDotName registry key an adversary can specify an arbitrary location, file name, and file extension to use for the template that will be loaded on application startup. To abuse GlobalDotName, adversaries may first need to register the template as a trusted document or place it in a trusted location.(Citation: GlobalDotName Jun 2019) An adversary may need to enable macros to execute unrestricted depending
Near-miss passage: T1137.005 Outlook Rules. Tactics: persistence. Description: Adversaries may abuse Microsoft Outlook rules to obtain persistence on a compromised system. Outlook rules allow a user to define automated behavior to manage email messages. A benign rule might, for example, automatically move an email to a particular folder in Outlook if it contains specific words from a specific sender. Malicious Outlook rules can be created that can trigger code execution when an adversary sends a specifically crafted email to that user.(Citation: SilentBreak Outlook Rules) Once malicious rules have been added to the user’s mailbox, they will be loaded when Outlook is started. Malicious rules will execute when an adversary sends a specifically crafted email to the user.(Citation: SilentBreak Outlook Rules)
Query: Sigma YAML for windows / ps_script
Matching passage: Sigma rule: Once established within a system or network, an adversary may use automated techniques for collecting internal data. Logsource: windows / ps_script. Rule: title: Recon Information for Export with PowerShell id: a9723fcc-881c-424c-8709-fd61442ab3c3 status: test description: Once established within a system or network, an adversary may use automated techniques for collecting internal data references: - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1119/T1119.md author: frack113 date: 2021-07-30 modified: 2022-12-25 tags: - attack.collection - attack.t1119 logsource: product: windows category: ps_script definition: 'Requirements: Script Block Logging must be enabled' detection: selection_action: ScriptBlockText|contains: - 'Get-Service ' - 'Get-ChildItem ' - 'Get-Process ' selection_redirect: ScriptBlockText|contains: '> $env:TEMP\' condition: all of selection* falsepositives: - Unknown level: medium
Near-miss passage: Sigma rule: Detects when a new identity provider is created for Okta.. Logsource: okta / okta. Rule: title: Okta Identity Provider Created id: 969c7590-8c19-4797-8c1b-23155de6e7ac status: test description: Detects when a new identity provider is created for Okta. references: - https://developer.okta.com/docs/reference/api/system-log/ - https://sec.okta.com/articles/2023/08/cross-tenant-impersonation-prevention-and-detection author: kelnage date: 2023-09-07 modified: 2026-04-27 tags: - attack.privilege-escalation - attack.persistence - attack.t1098.001 logsource: product: okta service: okta detection: selection: eventType: system.idp.lifecycle.create condition: selection falsepositives: - When an admin creates a new, authorised identity provider. level: medium
Query: campaign using XSL Script Processing
Matching passage: T1220 XSL Script Processing. Tactics: stealth. Description: Adversaries may bypass application control and obscure execution of code by embedding scripts inside XSL files. Extensible Stylesheet Language (XSL) files are commonly used to describe the processing and rendering of data within XML files. To support complex operations, the XSL standard includes support for embedded scripting in various languages. (Citation: Microsoft XSLT Script Mar 2017) Adversaries may abuse this functionality to execute arbitrary files while potentially bypassing application control. Similar to [Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1127), the Microsoft common line transformation utility binary (msxsl.exe) (Citation: Microsoft msxsl.exe) can be installed and used to execute malicious JavaScript embedded within local or remote (URL referenced) XSL files. (Citation: Penetration Testing Lab MSXSL July 2017) Since msxsl.exe is not installed by default, an adversary will likely need to package it with dropped files. (Citation: Reaqta MSXSL Spearphishing MAR 2018) Msxsl.exe takes two main arguments, an XML source file and an XSL stylesheet. Since the XSL file is valid XML, the adversary may call the same XSL file twice. When using msxsl.exe adversaries may also give the XML/XSL files an arbitrary file extension.(Citation: XSL Bypass Mar 2019) Command-line examples:(Citation: Penetration Testing Lab MSXSL July 2017)(Citation: XSL Bypass Mar 2019) * <code>msxsl.exe customers[.]xml script[.]xsl</code> * <code>msxsl.exe script[.]xsl script[.]xsl</code> * <code>msxsl.exe script[.]jpeg script[.]jpeg</code> Another variation of this technique, dubbed “Squiblytwo”, involves using [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047) to invoke JScript or VBScript within an XSL file.(Citation: LOLBAS Wmic) This technique can also execute local/remote scripts and, similar to its [Regsvr32](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/010)/ "Squiblydoo" counterpart, leverages a trusted, built-in W
Near-miss passage: T1070.009 Clear Persistence. Tactics: stealth. Description: Adversaries may clear artifacts associated with previously established persistence on a host system to remove evidence of their activity. This may involve various actions, such as removing services, deleting executables, [Modify Registry](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1112), [Plist File Modification](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1647), or other methods of cleanup to prevent defenders from collecting evidence of their persistent presence.(Citation: Cylance Dust Storm) Adversaries may also delete accounts previously created to maintain persistence (i.e. [Create Account](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1136)).(Citation: Talos - Cisco Attack 2022) In some instances, artifacts of persistence may also be removed once an adversary’s persistence is executed in order to prevent errors with the new instance of the malware.(Citation: NCC Group Team9 June 2020)
Query: CVE similar to CVE-2015-7786
Matching passage: CVE-2015-7786. CWE: CWE-79. CVSS: 6.099999904632568. Cross-site scripting (XSS) vulnerability in the NTT DATA Smart Sourcing JavaScript module 2003-11-26 through 2013-07-09 for Web Analytics Service allows remote attackers to inject arbitrary web script or HTML via unspecified vectors.
Near-miss passage: CVE-2015-9438. CWE: CWE-79. CVSS: 5.400000095367432. The display-widgets plugin before 2.04 for WordPress has XSS via the wp-admin/admin-ajax.php?action=dw_show_widget id_base, widget_number, or instance parameter.
Query: detection engineering for RC Scripts
Matching passage: T1037.004 RC Scripts. Tactics: persistence, privilege escalation. Description: Adversaries may establish persistence by modifying RC scripts, which are executed during a Unix-like system’s startup. These files allow system administrators to map and start custom services at startup for different run levels. RC scripts require root privileges to modify. Adversaries may establish persistence by adding a malicious binary path or shell commands to <code>rc.local</code>, <code>rc.common</code>, and other RC scripts specific to the Unix-like distribution.(Citation: IranThreats Kittens Dec 2017)(Citation: Intezer HiddenWasp Map 2019) Upon reboot, the system executes the script's contents as root, resulting in persistence. Adversary abuse of RC scripts is especially effective for lightweight Unix-like distributions using the root user as default, such as ESXi hypervisors, IoT, or embedded systems.(Citation: intezer-kaiji-malware) As ESXi servers store most system files in memory and therefore discard changes on shutdown, leveraging `/etc/rc.local.d/local.sh` is one of the few mechanisms for enabling persistence across reboots.(Citation: Juniper Networks ESXi Backdoor 2022) Several Unix-like systems have moved to Systemd and deprecated the use of RC scripts. This is now a deprecated mechanism in macOS in favor of Launchd.(Citation: Apple Developer Doco Archive Launchd)(Citation: Startup Items) This technique can be used on Mac OS X Panther v10.3 and earlier versions which still execute the RC scripts.(Citation: Methods of Mac Malware Persistence) To maintain backwards compatibility some systems, such as Ubuntu, will execute the RC scripts if they exist with the correct file permissions.(Citation: Ubuntu Manpage systemd rc)
Near-miss passage: T1037 Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts. Tactics: persistence, privilege escalation. Description: Adversaries may use scripts automatically executed at boot or logon initialization to establish persistence.(Citation: Mandiant APT29 Eye Spy Email Nov 22)(Citation: Anomali Rocke March 2019) Initialization scripts can be used to perform administrative functions, which may often execute other programs or send information to an internal logging server. These scripts can vary based on operating system and whether applied locally or remotely. Adversaries may use these scripts to maintain persistence on a single system. Depending on the access configuration of the logon scripts, either local credentials or an administrator account may be necessary. An adversary may also be able to escalate their privileges since some boot or logon initialization scripts run with higher privileges.
Query: common weakness: Path Equivalence: '/multiple//internal/slash'
Matching passage: CWE-51 Path Equivalence: '/multiple//internal/slash'. The product accepts path input in the form of multiple internal slash ('/multiple//internal/slash/') without appropriate validation, which can lead to ambiguous path resolution and allow an attacker to traverse the file system to unintended locations or access arbitrary files.
Near-miss passage: CWE-58 Path Equivalence: Windows 8.3 Filename. The product contains a protection mechanism that restricts access to a long filename on a Windows operating system, but it does not properly restrict access to the equivalent short 8.3 filename.
Query: playbook for alert: Persistence mechanism resembling Databases
Matching passage: Playbook for T1213.006 Databases. 1) Validate alert telemetry against T1213.006. 2) Scope affected hosts and accounts. 3) Contain by isolating endpoint / disabling account if confirmed. 4) Hunt for related tactics: collection. 5) Eradicate persistence and recover. Reference detection notes: Adversaries may leverage databases to mine valuable information. These databases may be hosted on-premises or in the cloud (both in platform-as-a-service and software-as-a-service environments). Examples of databases from which information may be collected include MySQL, PostgreSQL, MongoDB, Amazon Relational Database Service, Azure SQL Database, Google Firebase, and Snowflake. Databases may inclu
Near-miss passage: Playbook for T1213.002 Sharepoint. Different response path focused on collection.