Query: alert when Detects suspicious Kerberos ticket requests via command line using System.IdentityModel.Tokens.KerberosRequestorSecurity
Matching passage: Sigma rule: Detects suspicious Kerberos ticket requests via command line using System.IdentityModel.Tokens.KerberosRequestorSecurity. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: Suspicious Kerberos Ticket Request via CLI id: caa9a802-8bd8-4b9e-a5cd-4d6221670219 related: - id: a861d835-af37-4930-bcd6-5b178bfb54df type: similar status: experimental description: 'Detects suspicious Kerberos ticket requests via command line using System.IdentityModel.Tokens.KerberosRequestorSecurityToken class. Threat actors may use command line interfaces to request Kerberos tickets for service accounts in order to perform offline password cracking attacks commonly known as Kerberoasting or other Kerberos ticket abuse techniques like silver ticket attacks. ' references: - https://www.huntress.com/blog/gootloader-threat-detection-woff2-obfuscation - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1558.003/T1558.003.md#atomic-test-4---request-a-single-ticket-via-powershell - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/dotnet/api/system.identitymodel.tokens.kerberosrequestorsecuritytoken?view=netframework-4.8.1 author: Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems) date: 2025-11-18 tags: - attack.credential-access - attack.t1558.003 logsource: category: process_creation product: windows detection: selection_img: - Image|endswith: - \powershell.exe - \pwsh.exe - OriginalFileName: - powershell.exe - pwsh.dll selection_cli: CommandLine|contains|all: - System.IdentityModel.Tokens.KerberosRequestorSecurityToken - .GetRequest() condition: all of selection_* falsepositives: - Legitimate command line usage by administrators or security tools. level: high
Near-miss passage: Sigma rule: Detects modifications or creations of Windows Defender's default threat action settings based on severity to 'allow' or. Logsource: windows / registry_event. Rule: title: Windows Defender Threat Severity Default Action Modified id: 5a9e1b2c-8f7d-4a1e-9b3c-0f6d7e5a4b1f related: - id: 1e8a9b4d-3c2a-4f9b-8d1e-7c6a5b4f3d2e type: similar status: experimental description: 'Detects modifications or creations of Windows Defender''s default threat action settings based on severity to ''allow'' or take ''no action''. This is a highly suspicious configuration change that effectively disables Defender''s ability to automatically mitigate threats of a certain severity level, allowing malicious software to run unimpeded. An attacker might use this technique to bypass defenses before executing payloads. ' references: - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/defender/set-mppreference - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-hardware/customize/desktop/unattend/security-malware-windows-defender-threatseveritydefaultaction - https://research.splunk.com/endpoint/7215831c-8252-4ae3-8d43-db588e82f952 - https://gist.github.com/Dump-GUY/8daef859f382b895ac6fd0cf094555d2 - https://thedfirreport.com/2021/10/18/icedid-to-xinglocker-ransomware-in-24-hours/ author: Matt Anderson (Huntress) date: 2025-07-11 tags: - attack.defense-impairment - attack.t1685 logsource: category: registry_event product: windows detection: selection: TargetObject|contains: \Microsoft\Windows Defender\Threats\ThreatSeverityDefaultAction\ TargetObject|endswith: - \1 - \2 - \4 - \5 Details: - DWORD (0x00000006) - DWORD (0x00000009) condition: selection falsepositives: - Legitimate administration via scripts or tools (e.g., SCCM, Intune, GPO enforcement). Correlate with administrative activity. - Software installations that legitimately modify Defender settings (less common for these specific keys). level: high