Query: Sigma rule for Detects creation of a container with a hostPath mount. A hostPath volume mounts a directory or a file from the node to t
Matching passage: Sigma rule: Detects creation of a container with a hostPath mount. A hostPath volume mounts a directory or a file from the node to t. Logsource: kubernetes / application / audit. Rule: title: Container With A hostPath Mount Created id: 402b955c-8fe0-4a8c-b635-622b4ac5f902 status: test description: 'Detects creation of a container with a hostPath mount. A hostPath volume mounts a directory or a file from the node to the container. Attackers who have permissions to create a new pod in the cluster may create one with a writable hostPath volume and chroot to escape to the underlying node. ' references: - https://microsoft.github.io/Threat-Matrix-for-Kubernetes/techniques/Writable%20hostPath%20mount/ - https://blog.appsecco.com/kubernetes-namespace-breakout-using-insecure-host-path-volume-part-1-b382f2a6e216 author: Leo Tsaousis (@laripping) date: 2024-03-26 tags: - attack.t1611 - attack.privilege-escalation logsource: category: application product: kubernetes service: audit detection: selection: verb: create objectRef.resource: pods hostPath: '*' condition: selection falsepositives: - The DaemonSet controller creates pods with hostPath volumes within the kube-system namespace. level: low
Near-miss passage: Sigma rule: Detects suspicious local connections via a named pipe to the AD FS configuration database (Windows Internal Database). U. Logsource: windows / pipe_created. Rule: title: ADFS Database Named Pipe Connection By Uncommon Tool id: 1ea13e8c-03ea-409b-877d-ce5c3d2c1cb3 status: test description: 'Detects suspicious local connections via a named pipe to the AD FS configuration database (Windows Internal Database). Used to access information such as the AD FS configuration settings which contains sensitive information used to sign SAML tokens. ' references: - https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/f99542b94afe0ad2f19a82cc08262e7ac8e1428e/Detections/SecurityEvent/ADFSDBNamedPipeConnection.yaml - https://o365blog.com/post/adfs/ - https://github.com/Azure/SimuLand author: Roberto Rodriguez @Cyb3rWard0g date: 2021-10-08 modified: 2023-11-30 tags: - attack.collection - attack.t1005 logsource: product: windows category: pipe_created definition: Note that you have to configure logging for Named Pipe Events in Sysmon config (Event ID 17 and Event ID 18). The basic configuration is in popular sysmon configuration (https://github.com/SwiftOnSecurity/sysmon-config), but it is worth verifying. You can also use other repo, e.g. https://github.com/Neo23x0/sysmon-config, https://github.com/olafhartong/sysmon-modular. How to test detection? You can check powershell script from this site https://svch0st.medium.com/guide-to-named-pipes-and-hunting-for-cobalt-strike-pipes-dc46b2c5f575 detection: selection: PipeName: \MICROSOFT##WID\tsql\query filter_main_generic: Image|endswith: - :\Windows\System32\mmc.exe - :\Windows\system32\svchost.exe - :\Windows\System32\wsmprovhost.exe - :\Windows\SysWOW64\mmc.exe - :\Windows\SysWOW64\wsmprovhost.exe - :\Windows\WID\Binn\sqlwriter.exe - \AzureADConnect.exe - \Microsoft.Identity.Health.Adfs.PshSurrogate.exe - \Microsoft.IdentityServer.ServiceHost.exe - \Microsoft.Tri.Sensor.exe - \sqlservr.exe - \tssdis.exe condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_* falsepositives: - Unknown level: medium