Query: alert when Detects the image load of VSS DLL by uncommon executables
Matching passage: Sigma rule: Detects the image load of VSS DLL by uncommon executables. Logsource: windows / image_load. Rule: title: Suspicious Volume Shadow Copy Vssapi.dll Load id: 37774c23-25a1-4adb-bb6d-8bb9fd59c0f8 related: - id: 333cdbe8-27bb-4246-bf82-b41a0dca4b70 type: similar - id: 48bfd177-7cf2-412b-ad77-baf923489e82 type: similar status: test description: Detects the image load of VSS DLL by uncommon executables references: - https://github.com/ORCx41/DeleteShadowCopies author: frack113 date: 2022-10-31 modified: 2026-05-18 tags: - attack.impact - attack.t1490 logsource: category: image_load product: windows detection: selection: ImageLoaded|endswith: \vssapi.dll filter_main_windows: - Image: - C:\Windows\explorer.exe - C:\Windows\ImmersiveControlPanel\SystemSettings.exe - Image|startswith: - C:\Windows\System32\ - C:\Windows\SysWOW64\ - C:\Windows\Temp\{ - C:\Windows\WinSxS\ - C:\$WinREAgent\Scratch\ filter_main_program_files: Image|startswith: - C:\Program Files\ - C:\Program Files (x86)\ filter_main_null_image: Image: null filter_optional_programdata_packagecache: Image|startswith: C:\ProgramData\Package Cache\ filter_optional_avira: Image|contains|all: - \temp\is- - \avira_system_speedup.tmp condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_* and not 1 of filter_optional_* falsepositives: - Unknown level: high
Near-miss passage: Sigma rule: Detects the creation of a named pipe matching a pattern used by CobaltStrike Malleable C2 profiles. Logsource: windows / pipe_created. Rule: title: CobaltStrike Named Pipe Pattern Regex id: 0e7163d4-9e19-4fa7-9be6-000c61aad77a related: - id: 85adeb13-4fc9-4e68-8a4a-c7cb2c336eb7 type: similar - id: d5601f8c-b26f-4ab0-9035-69e11a8d4ad2 type: similar status: test description: Detects the creation of a named pipe matching a pattern used by CobaltStrike Malleable C2 profiles references: - https://svch0st.medium.com/guide-to-named-pipes-and-hunting-for-cobalt-strike-pipes-dc46b2c5f575 - https://gist.github.com/MHaggis/6c600e524045a6d49c35291a21e10752 author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems) date: 2021-07-30 modified: 2026-06-18 tags: - attack.privilege-escalation - attack.stealth - attack.t1055 logsource: product: windows category: pipe_created definition: Note that you have to configure logging for Named Pipe Events in Sysmon config (Event ID 17 and Event ID 18). The basic configuration is in popular sysmon configuration (https://github.com/SwiftOnSecurity/sysmon-config), but it is worth verifying. You can also use other repo, e.g. https://github.com/Neo23x0/sysmon-config, https://github.com/olafhartong/sysmon-modular You can also use other repo, e.g. https://github.com/Neo23x0/sysmon-config, https://github.com/olafhartong/sysmon-modular. How to test detection? You can always use Cobalt Strike, but also you can check powershell script from this site https://svch0st.medium.com/guide-to-named-pipes-and-hunting-for-cobalt-strike-pipes-dc46b2c5f575 detection: selection: - PipeName|re: \\mojo\.5688\.8052\.(?:183894939787088877|35780273329370473)[0-9a-f]{2} - PipeName|re: \\wkssvc_?[0-9a-f]{2} - PipeName|re: \\ntsvcs[0-9a-f]{2} - PipeName|re: \\DserNamePipe[0-9a-f]{2} - PipeName|re: \\SearchTextHarvester[0-9a-f]{2} - PipeName|re: \\mypipe-(?:f|h)[0-9a-f]{2} - PipeName|re: \\windows\.update\.manager[0-9a-f]{2,3} - PipeName|re: \\ntsvcs_[0-9a-f]{2} - PipeName|re: \\scerpc_?[0-9a-f]{2} - PipeName|re: \\PGMessagePipe[0-9a-f]{2} - PipeName|re: \\MsFteWds[0-9a-f]{2} - PipeName|re: \\f4c3[0-9a-f]{2} - PipeName|re: \\fullduplex_[0-9a-f]{2} - PipeName|re: \\msrpc_[0-9a-f]{4} - PipeName|re: \\win\\msrpc_[0-9a-f]{2} - PipeName|re: \\f53f[0-9a-f]{2}$ - PipeName|re: \\rpc_[0-9a-f]{2} - PipeName|re: \\spoolss_[0-9a-f]{2} - PipeName|re: \\Winsock2\\CatalogChangeListener-[0-9a-f]{3}-0, condition: selection falsepositives: - Unknown level: critical