alirezaaminzadeh/secembed-pairs huggingface dataset:
Query: SIEM correlation: credential access activity consistent with Windows Credential Manager
Matching passage: T1555.004 Windows Credential Manager. Tactics: credential access. Description: Adversaries may acquire credentials from the Windows Credential Manager. The Credential Manager stores credentials for signing into websites, applications, and/or devices that request authentication through NTLM or Kerberos in Credential Lockers (previously known as Windows Vaults).(Citation: Microsoft Credential Manager store)(Citation: Microsoft Credential Locker) The Windows Credential Manager separates website credentials from application or network credentials in two lockers. As part of [Credentials from Web Browsers](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1555/003), Internet Explorer and Microsoft Edge website credentials are managed by the Credential Manager and are stored in the Web Credentials locker. Application and network credentials are stored in the Windows Credentials locker. Credential Lockers store credentials in encrypted `.vcrd` files, located under `%Systemdrive%\Users\\[Username]\AppData\Local\Microsoft\\[Vault/Credentials]\`. The encryption key can be found in a file named <code>Policy.vpol</code>, typically located in the same folder as the credentials.(Citation: passcape Windows Vault)(Citation: Malwarebytes The Windows Vault) Adversaries may list credentials managed by the Windows Credential Manager through several mechanisms. <code>vaultcmd.exe</code> is a native Windows executable that can be used to enumerate credentials stored in the Credential Locker through a command-line interface. Adversaries may also gather credentials by directly reading files located inside of the Credential Lockers. Windows APIs, such as <code>CredEnumerateA</code>, may also be absued to list credentials managed by the Credential Manager.(Citation: Microsoft CredEnumerate)(Citation: Delpy Mimikatz Crendential Manager) Adversaries may also obtain credentials from credential backups. Credential backups and restorations may be performed by running <code>rundll32.exe keymgr.dll KRShowKeyMgr</code> then selecting the “Back up...” button on the “Stored User Names and Pas
Near-miss passage: T1555 Credentials from Password Stores. Tactics: credential access. Description: Adversaries may search for common password storage locations to obtain user credentials.(Citation: F-Secure The Dukes) Passwords are stored in several places on a system, depending on the operating system or application holding the credentials. There are also specific applications and services that store passwords to make them easier for users to manage and maintain, such as password managers and cloud secrets vaults. Once credentials are obtained, they can be used to perform lateral movement and access restricted information.
Query: intelligence brief on T1114
Matching passage: T1114 Email Collection. Tactics: collection. Description: Adversaries may target user email to collect sensitive information. Emails may contain sensitive data, including trade secrets or personal information, that can prove valuable to adversaries. Emails may also contain details of ongoing incident response operations, which may allow adversaries to adjust their techniques in order to maintain persistence or evade defenses.(Citation: TrustedSec OOB Communications)(Citation: CISA AA20-352A 2021) Adversaries can collect or forward email from mail servers or clients.
Near-miss passage: T1114.003 Email Forwarding Rule. Tactics: collection. Description: Adversaries may setup email forwarding rules to collect sensitive information. Adversaries may abuse email forwarding rules to monitor the activities of a victim, steal information, and further gain intelligence on the victim or the victim’s organization to use as part of further exploits or operations.(Citation: US-CERT TA18-068A 2018) Furthermore, email forwarding rules can allow adversaries to maintain persistent access to victim's emails even after compromised credentials are reset by administrators.(Citation: Pfammatter - Hidden Inbox Rules) Most email clients allow users to create inbox rules for various email functions, including forwarding to a different recipient. These rules may be created through a local email application, a web interface, or by command-line interface. Messages can be forwarded to internal or external recipients, and there are no restrictions limiting the extent of this rule. Administrators may also create forwarding rules for user accounts with the same considerations and outcomes.(Citation: Microsoft Tim McMichael Exchange Mail Forwarding 2)(Citation: Mac Forwarding Rules) Any user or administrator within the organization (or adversary with valid credentials) can create rules to automatically forward all received messages to another recipient, forward emails to different locations based on the sender, and more. Adversaries may also hide the rule by making use of the Microsoft Messaging API (MAPI) to modify the rule properties, making it hidden and not visible from Outlook, OWA or most Exchange Administration tools.(Citation: Pfammatter - Hidden Inbox Rules) In some environments, administrators may be able to enable email forwarding rules that operate organization-wide rather than on individual inboxes. For example, Microsoft Exchange supports transport rules that evaluate all mail an organization receives against user-specified conditions, then performs a user-specified action on mail that adheres to those conditions.(Citation: Microsof
Query: describe CVE-2015-1442
Matching passage: CVE-2015-1442. CWE: CWE-89. CVSS: 7.5. SQL injection vulnerability in views/zero_transact_user.php in the administrative backend in ZeroCMS 1.3.3, 1.3.2, and earlier allows remote authenticated users to execute arbitrary SQL commands via the user_id parameter in a Modify Account action. NOTE: The article_id parameter to zero_view_article.php vector is already covered by CVE-2014-4034.
Near-miss passage: CVE-2015-6522. CWE: CWE-89. CVSS: 7.5. SQL injection vulnerability in the WP Symposium plugin before 15.8 for WordPress allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary SQL commands via the size parameter to get_album_item.php.
Query: Multiple failed authentications followed by Break Process Trees
Matching passage: T1036.009 Break Process Trees. Tactics: stealth. Description: An adversary may attempt to evade process tree-based analysis by modifying executed malware's parent process ID (PPID). If endpoint protection software leverages the “parent-child" relationship for detection, breaking this relationship could result in the adversary’s behavior not being associated with previous process tree activity. On Unix-based systems breaking this process tree is common practice for administrators to execute software using scripts and programs.(Citation: 3OHA double-fork 2022) On Linux systems, adversaries may execute a series of [Native API](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1106) calls to alter malware's process tree. For example, adversaries can execute their payload without any arguments, call the `fork()` API call twice, then have the parent process exit. This creates a grandchild process with no parent process that is immediately adopted by the `init` system process (PID 1), which successfully disconnects the execution of the adversary's payload from its previous process tree. Another example is using the “daemon” syscall to detach from the current parent process and run in the background.(Citation: Sandfly BPFDoor 2022)(Citation: Microsoft XorDdos Linux Stealth 2022)
Near-miss passage: T1036.012 Browser Fingerprint. Tactics: stealth. Description: Adversaries may attempt to blend in with legitimate traffic by spoofing browser and system attributes like operating system, system language, platform, user-agent string, resolution, time zone, etc. The HTTP User-Agent request header is a string that lets servers and network peers identify the application, operating system, vendor, and/or version of the requesting user agent.(Citation: Mozilla User Agent) Adversaries may gather this information through [System Information Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1082) or by users navigating to adversary-controlled websites, and then use that information to craft their web traffic to evade defenses.(Citation: Gummy Browsers Targeted Browser Spoofing against State-of-the-Art Fingerprinting Techniques)
Query: intelligence brief on T1595.003
Matching passage: T1595.003 Wordlist Scanning. Tactics: reconnaissance. Description: Adversaries may iteratively probe infrastructure using brute-forcing and crawling techniques. While this technique employs similar methods to [Brute Force](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1110), its goal is the identification of content and infrastructure rather than the discovery of valid credentials. Wordlists used in these scans may contain generic, commonly used names and file extensions or terms specific to a particular software. Adversaries may also create custom, target-specific wordlists using data gathered from other Reconnaissance techniques (ex: [Gather Victim Org Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1591), or [Search Victim-Owned Websites](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1594)). For example, adversaries may use web content discovery tools such as Dirb, DirBuster, and GoBuster and generic or custom wordlists to enumerate a website’s pages and directories.(Citation: ClearSky Lebanese Cedar Jan 2021) This can help them to discover old, vulnerable pages or hidden administrative portals that could become the target of further operations (ex: [Exploit Public-Facing Application](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1190) or [Brute Force](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1110)). As cloud storage solutions typically use globally unique names, adversaries may also use target-specific wordlists and tools such as s3recon and GCPBucketBrute to enumerate public and private buckets on cloud infrastructure.(Citation: S3Recon GitHub)(Citation: GCPBucketBrute) Once storage objects are discovered, adversaries may leverage [Data from Cloud Storage](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1530) to access valuable information that can be exfiltrated or used to escalate privileges and move laterally.
Near-miss passage: T1595.002 Vulnerability Scanning. Tactics: reconnaissance. Description: Adversaries may scan victims for vulnerabilities that can be used during targeting. Vulnerability scans typically check if the configuration of a target host/application (ex: software and version) potentially aligns with the target of a specific exploit the adversary may seek to use. These scans may also include more broad attempts to [Gather Victim Host Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1592) that can be used to identify more commonly known, exploitable vulnerabilities. Vulnerability scans typically harvest running software and version numbers via server banners, listening ports, or other network artifacts.(Citation: OWASP Vuln Scanning) Information from these scans may reveal opportunities for other forms of reconnaissance (ex: [Search Open Websites/Domains](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1593) or [Search Open Technical Databases](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1596)), establishing operational resources (ex: [Develop Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1587) or [Obtain Capabilities](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1588)), and/or initial access (ex: [Exploit Public-Facing Application](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1190)).
Query: write Sigma for A General detection for sdclt being spawned as an elevated process. This could be an indicator of sdclt being used for b
Matching passage: Sigma rule: A General detection for sdclt being spawned as an elevated process. This could be an indicator of sdclt being used for b. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: Potential UAC Bypass Via Sdclt.EXE id: 40f9af16-589d-4984-b78d-8c2aec023197 status: test description: A General detection for sdclt being spawned as an elevated process. This could be an indicator of sdclt being used for bypass UAC techniques. references: - https://github.com/OTRF/detection-hackathon-apt29/issues/6 - https://github.com/OTRF/ThreatHunter-Playbook/blob/2d4257f630f4c9770f78d0c1df059f891ffc3fec/docs/evals/apt29/detections/3.B.2_C36B49B5-DF58-4A34-9FE9-56189B9DEFEA.md author: Roberto Rodriguez (Cyb3rWard0g), OTR (Open Threat Research) date: 2020-05-02 modified: 2024-12-01 tags: - attack.privilege-escalation - attack.t1548.002 logsource: category: process_creation product: windows detection: selection: Image|endswith: sdclt.exe IntegrityLevel: - High - S-1-16-12288 condition: selection falsepositives: - Unknown level: medium
Near-miss passage: Sigma rule: Detects the execution of netsh to configure a port forwarding of port 3389 (RDP) rule. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: RDP Port Forwarding Rule Added Via Netsh.EXE id: 782d6f3e-4c5d-4b8c-92a3-1d05fed72e63 status: test description: Detects the execution of netsh to configure a port forwarding of port 3389 (RDP) rule references: - https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2019/01/bypassing-network-restrictions-through-rdp-tunneling.html author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), oscd.community date: 2019-01-29 modified: 2023-02-13 tags: - attack.lateral-movement - attack.command-and-control - attack.t1090 logsource: category: process_creation product: windows detection: selection_img: - Image|endswith: \netsh.exe - OriginalFileName: netsh.exe selection_cli: CommandLine|contains|all: - ' i' - ' p' - =3389 - ' c' condition: all of selection_* falsepositives: - Legitimate administration activity level: high
Query: patch priority for CVE-2015-9111
Matching passage: CVE-2015-9111. CWE: CWE-476. CVSS: 9.800000190734863. In Android before 2018-04-05 or earlier security patch level on Qualcomm Snapdragon Automobile and Snapdragon Mobile MDM9625, SD 425, SD 430, SD 450, SD 625, SD 650/52, SD 820, and SD 820A, in a QTEE syscall handler, an untrusted pointer dereference can occur.
Near-miss passage: CVE-2015-0003. CWE: CWE-476. CVSS: 6.900000095367432. win32k.sys in the kernel-mode drivers in Microsoft Windows Server 2003 SP2, Windows Vista SP2, Windows Server 2008 SP2 and R2 SP1, Windows 7 SP1, Windows 8, Windows 8.1, Windows Server 2012 Gold and R2, and Windows RT Gold and 8.1 allows local users to gain privileges or cause a denial of service (NULL pointer dereference) via a crafted application, aka "Win32k Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability."
Query: write Sigma for Detects the enabling of the Windows Recall feature via registry manipulation. Windows Recall can be enabled by deleting
Matching passage: Sigma rule: Detects the enabling of the Windows Recall feature via registry manipulation. Windows Recall can be enabled by deleting. Logsource: windows / registry_delete. Rule: title: Windows Recall Feature Enabled - DisableAIDataAnalysis Value Deleted id: 5dfc1465-8f65-4fde-8eb5-6194380c6a62 related: - id: 75180c5f-4ea1-461a-a4f6-6e4700c065d4 type: similar - id: 817f252c-5143-4dae-b418-48c3e9f63728 type: similar status: test description: 'Detects the enabling of the Windows Recall feature via registry manipulation. Windows Recall can be enabled by deleting the existing "DisableAIDataAnalysis" registry value. Adversaries may enable Windows Recall as part of post-exploitation discovery and collection activities. This rule assumes that Recall is already explicitly disabled on the host, and subsequently enabled by the adversary. ' references: - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/client-management/manage-recall - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/client-management/mdm/policy-csp-windowsai#disableaidataanalysis author: Sajid Nawaz Khan date: 2024-06-02 tags: - attack.collection - attack.t1113 logsource: category: registry_delete product: windows detection: selection: EventType: DeleteValue TargetObject|endswith: \Microsoft\Windows\WindowsAI\DisableAIDataAnalysis condition: selection falsepositives: - Legitimate use/activation of Windows Recall level: medium
Near-miss passage: Sigma rule: Detects command lines that contain the 'accepteula' flag which could be a sign of execution of one of the Sysinternals t. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: Potential Execution of Sysinternals Tools id: 7cccd811-7ae9-4ebe-9afd-cb5c406b824b related: - id: 25ffa65d-76d8-4da5-a832-3f2b0136e133 type: derived status: test description: Detects command lines that contain the 'accepteula' flag which could be a sign of execution of one of the Sysinternals tools references: - https://twitter.com/Moti_B/status/1008587936735035392 author: Markus Neis date: 2017-08-28 modified: 2024-03-13 tags: - attack.resource-development - attack.t1588.002 logsource: category: process_creation product: windows detection: selection: CommandLine|contains|windash: ' -accepteula' condition: selection falsepositives: - Legitimate use of SysInternals tools - Programs that use the same command line flag level: low
Query: Encoded PowerShell / command-line abuse matching Cloud Accounts
Matching passage: T1078.004 Cloud Accounts. Tactics: stealth, persistence, privilege escalation, initial access. Description: Valid accounts in cloud environments may allow adversaries to perform actions to achieve Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Cloud accounts are those created and configured by an organization for use by users, remote support, services, or for administration of resources within a cloud service provider or SaaS application. Cloud Accounts can exist solely in the cloud; alternatively, they may be hybrid-joined between on-premises systems and the cloud through syncing or federation with other identity sources such as Windows Active Directory.(Citation: AWS Identity Federation)(Citation: Google Federating GC)(Citation: Microsoft Deploying AD Federation) Service or user accounts may be targeted by adversaries through [Brute Force](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1110), [Phishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566), or various other means to gain access to the environment. Federated or synced accounts may be a pathway for the adversary to affect both on-premises systems and cloud environments - for example, by leveraging shared credentials to log onto [Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021). High privileged cloud accounts, whether federated, synced, or cloud-only, may also allow pivoting to on-premises environments by leveraging SaaS-based [Software Deployment Tools](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1072) to run commands on hybrid-joined devices. An adversary may create long lasting [Additional Cloud Credentials](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1098/001) on a compromised cloud account to maintain persistence in the environment. Such credentials may also be used to bypass security controls such as multi-factor authentication. Cloud accounts may also be able to assume [Temporary Elevated Cloud Access](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/005) or other privileges through various means within the environment. Misconfigurations in role assignments or role assumption policies may allow an adversar
Near-miss passage: T1078.003 Local Accounts. Tactics: stealth, persistence, privilege escalation, initial access. Description: Adversaries may obtain and abuse credentials of a local account as a means of gaining Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Local accounts are those configured by an organization for use by users, remote support, services, or for administration on a single system or service. Local Accounts may also be abused to elevate privileges and harvest credentials through [OS Credential Dumping](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003). Password reuse may allow the abuse of local accounts across a set of machines on a network for the purposes of Privilege Escalation and Lateral Movement.
Query: detect Detects deployments of pods within the kube-system namespace, which could be intended to imitate system pods. System pod in logs
Matching passage: Sigma rule: Detects deployments of pods within the kube-system namespace, which could be intended to imitate system pods. System pod. Logsource: kubernetes / application / audit. Rule: title: Creation Of Pod In System Namespace id: a80d927d-ac6e-443f-a867-e8d6e3897318 status: test description: 'Detects deployments of pods within the kube-system namespace, which could be intended to imitate system pods. System pods, created by controllers such as Deployments or DaemonSets have random suffixes in their names. Attackers can use this fact and name their backdoor pods as if they were created by these controllers to avoid detection. Deployment of such a backdoor container e.g. named kube-proxy-bv61v, could be attempted in the kube-system namespace alongside the other administrative containers. ' references: - https://microsoft.github.io/Threat-Matrix-for-Kubernetes/techniques/Pod%20or%20container%20name%20similarily/ author: Leo Tsaousis (@laripping) date: 2024-03-26 tags: - attack.stealth - attack.t1036.005 logsource: category: application product: kubernetes service: audit detection: selection: verb: create objectRef.resource: pods objectRef.namespace: kube-system condition: selection falsepositives: - System components such as daemon-set-controller and kube-scheduler also create pods in the kube-system namespace level: medium
Near-miss passage: Sigma rule: Detects the creation of a office macro file from a a suspicious process. Logsource: windows / file_event. Rule: title: Office Macro File Creation From Suspicious Process id: b1c50487-1967-4315-a026-6491686d860e status: test description: Detects the creation of a office macro file from a a suspicious process references: - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1566.001/T1566.001.md - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/deployoffice/compat/office-file-format-reference author: frack113, Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) date: 2022-01-23 modified: 2023-02-22 tags: - attack.initial-access - attack.t1566.001 logsource: category: file_event product: windows definition: 'Requirements: The "ParentImage" field is not available by default on EID 11 of Sysmon logs. To be able to use this rule to the full extent you need to enriche the log with additional ParentImage data' detection: selection_cmd: - Image|endswith: - \cscript.exe - \mshta.exe - \regsvr32.exe - \rundll32.exe - \wscript.exe - ParentImage|endswith: - \cscript.exe - \mshta.exe - \regsvr32.exe - \rundll32.exe - \wscript.exe selection_ext: TargetFilename|endswith: - .docm - .dotm - .xlsm - .xltm - .potm - .pptm condition: all of selection_* falsepositives: - Unknown level: high