Query: Sigma rule for Detects uncommon outbound network activity via Kerberos default port indicating possible lateral movement or first stage
Matching passage: Sigma rule: Detects uncommon outbound network activity via Kerberos default port indicating possible lateral movement or first stage. Logsource: windows / security. Rule: title: Uncommon Outbound Kerberos Connection - Security id: eca91c7c-9214-47b9-b4c5-cb1d7e4f2350 related: - id: e54979bd-c5f9-4d6c-967b-a04b19ac4c74 type: similar status: test description: 'Detects uncommon outbound network activity via Kerberos default port indicating possible lateral movement or first stage PrivEsc via delegation. ' references: - https://github.com/GhostPack/Rubeus author: Ilyas Ochkov, oscd.community date: 2019-10-24 modified: 2024-03-15 tags: - attack.lateral-movement - attack.credential-access - attack.t1558.003 logsource: product: windows service: security detection: selection: EventID: 5156 DestPort: 88 filter_main_lsass: Application|startswith: - \device\harddiskvolume - 'C:' Application|endswith: \Windows\System32\lsass.exe filter_optional_chrome: Application|startswith: - \device\harddiskvolume - 'C:' Application|endswith: - \Program Files (x86)\Google\Chrome\Application\chrome.exe - \Program Files\Google\Chrome\Application\chrome.exe filter_optional_firefox: Application|startswith: - \device\harddiskvolume - 'C:' Application|endswith: - \Program Files (x86)\Mozilla Firefox\firefox.exe - \Program Files\Mozilla Firefox\firefox.exe filter_optional_tomcat: Application|endswith: \tomcat\bin\tomcat8.exe condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_* and not 1 of filter_optional_* falsepositives: - Web Browsers and third party application might generate similar activity. An initial baseline is required. level: medium
Near-miss passage: Sigma rule: Detects execution of "Diskshadow.exe" in script mode using the "/s" flag where the script is located in a potentially su. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: Diskshadow Script Mode - Execution From Potential Suspicious Location id: fa1a7e52-3d02-435b-81b8-00da14dd66c1 related: - id: 1dde5376-a648-492e-9e54-4241dd9b0c7f type: similar - id: 9f546b25-5f12-4c8d-8532-5893dcb1e4b8 type: similar - id: 56b1dde8-b274-435f-a73a-fb75eb81262a type: similar - id: 0c2f8629-7129-4a8a-9897-7e0768f13ff2 type: similar status: test description: Detects execution of "Diskshadow.exe" in script mode using the "/s" flag where the script is located in a potentially suspicious location. references: - https://bohops.com/2018/03/26/diskshadow-the-return-of-vss-evasion-persistence-and-active-directory-database-extraction/ - https://www.ired.team/offensive-security/credential-access-and-credential-dumping/ntds.dit-enumeration - https://medium.com/@cyberjyot/lolbin-execution-via-diskshadow-f6ff681a27a4 - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/diskshadow - https://www.lifars.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/01/GriefRansomware_Whitepaper-2.pdf - https://www.zscaler.com/blogs/security-research/technical-analysis-crytox-ransomware - https://research.checkpoint.com/2022/evilplayout-attack-against-irans-state-broadcaster/ author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) date: 2023-09-15 modified: 2024-03-05 tags: - attack.stealth - attack.t1218 logsource: category: process_creation product: windows detection: selection_img: - OriginalFileName: diskshadow.exe - Image|endswith: \diskshadow.exe selection_cli: CommandLine|contains|windash: '-s ' selection_paths: CommandLine|contains: - :\Temp\ - :\Windows\Temp\ - \AppData\Local\ - \AppData\Roaming\ - \ProgramData\ - \Users\Public\ condition: all of selection_* falsepositives: - False positives may occur if you execute the script from one of the paths mentioned in the rule. Apply additional filters that fits your org needs. level: medium