Query: detection rule: Detects execution and usage of the DSInternals PowerShell module. Which can be used to perform what might be considered
Matching passage: Sigma rule: Detects execution and usage of the DSInternals PowerShell module. Which can be used to perform what might be considered. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: DSInternals Suspicious PowerShell Cmdlets id: 43d91656-a9b2-4541-b7e2-6a9bd3a13f4e related: - id: 846c7a87-8e14-4569-9d49-ecfd4276a01c type: similar status: test description: 'Detects execution and usage of the DSInternals PowerShell module. Which can be used to perform what might be considered as suspicious activity such as dumping DPAPI backup keys or manipulating NTDS.DIT files. The DSInternals PowerShell Module exposes several internal features of Active Directory and Azure Active Directory. These include FIDO2 and NGC key auditing, offline ntds.dit file manipulation, password auditing, DC recovery from IFM backups and password hash calculation. ' references: - https://github.com/MichaelGrafnetter/DSInternals/blob/39ee8a69bbdc1cfd12c9afdd7513b4788c4895d4/Src/DSInternals.PowerShell/DSInternals.psd1 author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems), Nounou Mbeiri date: 2024-06-26 tags: - attack.execution - attack.t1059.001 logsource: product: windows category: process_creation detection: selection: CommandLine|contains: - Add-ADDBSidHistory - Add-ADNgcKey - Add-ADReplNgcKey - ConvertFrom-ADManagedPasswordBlob - ConvertFrom-GPPrefPassword - ConvertFrom-ManagedPasswordBlob - ConvertFrom-UnattendXmlPassword - ConvertFrom-UnicodePassword - ConvertTo-AADHash - ConvertTo-GPPrefPassword - ConvertTo-KerberosKey - ConvertTo-LMHash - ConvertTo-MsoPasswordHash - ConvertTo-NTHash - ConvertTo-OrgIdHash - ConvertTo-UnicodePassword - Disable-ADDBAccount - Enable-ADDBAccount - Get-ADDBAccount - Get-ADDBBackupKey - Get-ADDBDomainController - Get-ADDBGroupManagedServiceAccount - Get-ADDBKdsRootKey - Get-ADDBSchemaAttribute - Get-ADDBServiceAccount - Get-ADDefaultPasswordPolicy - Get-ADKeyCredential - Get-ADPasswordPolicy - Get-ADReplAccount - Get-ADReplBackupKey - Get-ADReplicationAccount - Get-ADSIAccount - Get-AzureADUserEx - Get-BootKey - Get-KeyCredential - Get-LsaBackupKey - Get-LsaPolicy - Get-SamPasswordPolicy - Get-SysKey - Get-SystemKey - New-ADDBRestoreFromMediaScript - New-ADKeyCredential - New-ADNgcKey - New-NTHashSet - Remove-ADDBObject - Save-DPAPIBlob - Set-ADAccountPasswordHash - Set-ADDBAccountPassword - Set-ADDBBootKey - Set-ADDBDomainController - Set-ADDBPrimaryGroup - Set-ADDBSysKey - Set-AzureADUserEx - Set-LsaPolicy - Set-SamAccountPasswordHash - Set-WinUserPasswordHash - Test-ADDBPasswordQuality - Test-ADPasswordQuality - Test-ADReplPasswordQuality - Test-PasswordQuality - Unlock-ADDBAccount - Write-ADNgcKey - Write-ADReplNgcKey condition: se
Near-miss passage: Sigma rule: Detects wmiexec/dcomexec/atexec/smbexec from Impacket framework. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: HackTool - Potential Impacket Lateral Movement Activity id: 10c14723-61c7-4c75-92ca-9af245723ad2 related: - id: e31f89f7-36fb-4697-8ab6-48823708353b type: obsolete status: stable description: Detects wmiexec/dcomexec/atexec/smbexec from Impacket framework references: - https://github.com/SecureAuthCorp/impacket/blob/8b1a99f7c715702eafe3f24851817bb64721b156/examples/wmiexec.py - https://github.com/SecureAuthCorp/impacket/blob/8b1a99f7c715702eafe3f24851817bb64721b156/examples/atexec.py - https://github.com/SecureAuthCorp/impacket/blob/8b1a99f7c715702eafe3f24851817bb64721b156/examples/smbexec.py - https://github.com/SecureAuthCorp/impacket/blob/8b1a99f7c715702eafe3f24851817bb64721b156/examples/dcomexec.py - https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/suspicious-cmd-execution-via-wmi.html author: Ecco, oscd.community, Jonhnathan Ribeiro, Tim Rauch date: 2019-09-03 modified: 2023-02-21 tags: - attack.execution - attack.t1047 - attack.lateral-movement - attack.t1021.003 logsource: category: process_creation product: windows detection: selection_other: ParentImage|endswith: - \wmiprvse.exe - \mmc.exe - \explorer.exe - \services.exe CommandLine|contains|all: - cmd.exe - /Q - /c - \\\\127.0.0.1\\ - '&1' selection_atexec: ParentCommandLine|contains: - svchost.exe -k netsvcs - taskeng.exe CommandLine|contains|all: - cmd.exe - /C - Windows\Temp\ - '&1' condition: 1 of selection_* falsepositives: - Unknown level: high