Query: detect Detects an executable initiating a network connection to "ngrok" tunneling domains. Attackers were seen using this "ngro in logs
Matching passage: Sigma rule: Detects an executable initiating a network connection to "ngrok" tunneling domains. Attackers were seen using this "ngro. Logsource: windows / network_connection. Rule: title: Communication To Ngrok Tunneling Service Initiated id: 1d08ac94-400d-4469-a82f-daee9a908849 related: - id: 18249279-932f-45e2-b37a-8925f2597670 type: similar status: test description: 'Detects an executable initiating a network connection to "ngrok" tunneling domains. Attackers were seen using this "ngrok" in order to store their second stage payloads and malware. While communication with such domains can be legitimate, often times is a sign of either data exfiltration by malicious actors or additional download. ' references: - https://twitter.com/hakluke/status/1587733971814977537/photo/1 - https://ngrok.com/docs/secure-tunnels/tunnels/ssh-reverse-tunnel-agent author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems) date: 2022-11-03 modified: 2024-02-02 tags: - attack.exfiltration - attack.command-and-control - attack.t1567 - attack.t1568.002 - attack.t1572 - attack.t1090 - attack.t1102 - attack.s0508 logsource: category: network_connection product: windows detection: selection: DestinationHostname|contains: - tunnel.us.ngrok.com - tunnel.eu.ngrok.com - tunnel.ap.ngrok.com - tunnel.au.ngrok.com - tunnel.sa.ngrok.com - tunnel.jp.ngrok.com - tunnel.in.ngrok.com condition: selection falsepositives: - Legitimate use of the ngrok service. level: high
Near-miss passage: Sigma rule: Detects a Windows Filtering Platform (WFP) blocked connection event involving common Endpoint Detection and Response (ED. Logsource: windows / security. Rule: title: Windows Filtering Platform Blocked Connection From EDR Agent Binary id: bacf58c6-e199-4040-a94f-95dea0f1e45a status: test description: 'Detects a Windows Filtering Platform (WFP) blocked connection event involving common Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents. Adversaries may use WFP filters to prevent Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents from reporting security events. ' references: - https://github.com/netero1010/EDRSilencer - https://github.com/amjcyber/EDRNoiseMaker - https://ghoulsec.medium.com/misc-series-4-forensics-on-edrsilencer-events-428b20b3f983 author: '@gott_cyber' date: 2024-01-08 tags: - attack.defense-impairment - attack.t1685 logsource: product: windows service: security definition: 'Requirements: Audit Filtering Platform Connection needs to be enabled' detection: selection: EventID: 5157 Application|endswith: - \AmSvc.exe - \cb.exe - \CETASvc.exe - \CNTAoSMgr.exe - \CrAmTray.exe - \CrsSvc.exe - \CSFalconContainer.exe - \CSFalconService.exe - \CybereasonAV.exe - \CylanceSvc.exe - \cyserver.exe - \CyveraService.exe - \CyvrFsFlt.exe - \EIConnector.exe - \elastic-agent.exe - \elastic-endpoint.exe - \EndpointBasecamp.exe - \ExecutionPreventionSvc.exe - \filebeat.exe - \fortiedr.exe - \hmpalert.exe - \hurukai.exe - \LogProcessorService.exe - \mcsagent.exe - \mcsclient.exe - \MsMpEng.exe - \MsSense.exe - \Ntrtscan.exe - \PccNTMon.exe - \QualysAgent.exe - \RepMgr.exe - \RepUtils.exe - \RepUx.exe - \RepWAV.exe - \RepWSC.exe - \sedservice.exe - \SenseCncProxy.exe - \SenseIR.exe - \SenseNdr.exe - \SenseSampleUploader.exe - \SentinelAgent.exe - \SentinelAgentWorker.exe - \SentinelBrowserNativeHost.exe - \SentinelHelperService.exe - \SentinelServiceHost.exe - \SentinelStaticEngine.exe - \SentinelStaticEngineScanner.exe - \sfc.exe - \sophos ui.exe - \sophosfilescanner.exe - \sophosfs.exe - \sophoshealth.exe - \sophosips.exe - \sophosLivequeryservice.exe - \sophosnetfilter.exe - \sophosntpservice.exe - \sophososquery.exe - \sspservice.exe - \TaniumClient.exe - \TaniumCX.exe - \TaniumDetectEngine.exe - \TMBMSRV.exe - \TmCCSF.exe - \TmListen.exe - \TmWSCSvc.exe - \Traps.exe - \winlogbeat.exe - \WSCommunicator.exe - \xagt.exe condition: selection falsepositives: - Unlikely level: high