Query: detection rule: Detects the execution of a renamed version of the "Mavinject" process. Which can be abused to perform process injection
Matching passage: Sigma rule: Detects the execution of a renamed version of the "Mavinject" process. Which can be abused to perform process injection. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: Renamed Mavinject.EXE Execution id: e6474a1b-5390-49cd-ab41-8d88655f7394 status: test description: Detects the execution of a renamed version of the "Mavinject" process. Which can be abused to perform process injection using the "/INJECTRUNNING" flag references: - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1218/T1218.md - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1056.004/T1056.004.md - https://posts.specterops.io/mavinject-exe-functionality-deconstructed-c29ab2cf5c0e - https://twitter.com/gN3mes1s/status/941315826107510784 - https://reaqta.com/2017/12/mavinject-microsoft-injector/ - https://twitter.com/Hexacorn/status/776122138063409152 - https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/issues/3742 - https://github.com/keyboardcrunch/SentinelOne-ATTACK-Queries/blob/6a228d23eefe963ca81f2d52f94b815f61ef5ee0/Tactics/DefenseEvasion.md#t1055-process-injection author: frack113, Florian Roth date: 2022-12-05 modified: 2023-02-03 tags: - attack.privilege-escalation - attack.stealth - attack.t1055.001 - attack.t1218.013 logsource: category: process_creation product: windows detection: selection: OriginalFileName: - mavinject32.exe - mavinject64.exe filter: Image|endswith: - \mavinject32.exe - \mavinject64.exe condition: selection and not filter falsepositives: - Unlikely level: high
Near-miss passage: Sigma rule: Detects the creation of files with suspicious file extensions in the temporary directory that Outlook uses when opening. Logsource: windows / file_event. Rule: title: Suspicious File Created in Outlook Temporary Directory id: fabb0e80-030c-4e3e-a104-d09676991ac3 related: - id: f748c45a-f8d3-4e6f-b617-fe176f695b8f type: obsolete status: experimental description: 'Detects the creation of files with suspicious file extensions in the temporary directory that Outlook uses when opening attachments. This can be used to detect spear-phishing campaigns that use suspicious files as attachments, which may contain malicious code. ' references: - https://vipre.com/blog/svg-phishing-attacks-the-new-trick-in-the-cybercriminals-playbook/ - https://thecyberexpress.com/rogue-rdp-files-used-in-ukraine-cyberattacks/ - https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2024/10/29/midnight-blizzard-conducts-large-scale-spear-phishing-campaign-using-rdp-files/ author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems) date: 2025-07-22 tags: - attack.initial-access - attack.t1566.001 logsource: product: windows category: file_event detection: selection_extension: TargetFilename|endswith: - .cpl - .hta - .iso - .rdp - .svg - .vba - .vbe - .vbs selection_location: - TargetFilename|contains: - \AppData\Local\Packages\Microsoft.Outlook_ - \AppData\Local\Microsoft\Olk\Attachments\ - TargetFilename|contains|all: - \AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\ - \Content.Outlook\ condition: all of selection_* falsepositives: - Opening of headers or footers in email signatures that include SVG images or legitimate SVG attachments level: high