Query: detection rule: Detects the creation or patching of potential malicious RoleBinding. This includes RoleBindings and ClusterRoleBinding.
Matching passage: Sigma rule: Detects the creation or patching of potential malicious RoleBinding. This includes RoleBindings and ClusterRoleBinding.. Logsource: gcp / gcp.audit. Rule: title: Google Cloud Kubernetes RoleBinding id: 0322d9f2-289a-47c2-b5e1-b63c90901a3e status: test description: Detects the creation or patching of potential malicious RoleBinding. This includes RoleBindings and ClusterRoleBinding. references: - https://github.com/elastic/detection-rules/pull/1267 - https://kubernetes.io/docs/reference/kubernetes-api/authorization-resources/cluster-role-v1/#ClusterRole - https://cloud.google.com/kubernetes-engine/docs/how-to/role-based-access-control - https://kubernetes.io/docs/reference/access-authn-authz/rbac/ - https://cloud.google.com/kubernetes-engine/docs/how-to/audit-logging author: Austin Songer @austinsonger date: 2021-08-09 modified: 2022-10-09 tags: - attack.credential-access logsource: product: gcp service: gcp.audit detection: selection: gcp.audit.method_name: - io.k8s.authorization.rbac.v*.clusterrolebindings.create - io.k8s.authorization.rbac.v*.rolebindings.create - io.k8s.authorization.rbac.v*.clusterrolebindings.patch - io.k8s.authorization.rbac.v*.rolebindings.patch - io.k8s.authorization.rbac.v*.clusterrolebindings.update - io.k8s.authorization.rbac.v*.rolebindings.update - io.k8s.authorization.rbac.v*.clusterrolebindings.delete - io.k8s.authorization.rbac.v*.rolebindings.delete condition: selection falsepositives: - RoleBindings and ClusterRoleBinding being modified or deleted may be performed by a system administrator. Verify whether the user identity, user agent, and/or hostname should be making changes in your environment. - RoleBindings and ClusterRoleBinding modified or deleted from unfamiliar users should be investigated. If known behavior is causing false positives, it can be exempted from the rule. level: medium
Near-miss passage: Sigma rule: Detects the clearing of one of the Windows Core Eventlogs. e.g. caused by "wevtutil cl" command execution. Logsource: windows / system. Rule: title: Important Windows Eventlog Cleared id: 100ef69e-3327-481c-8e5c-6d80d9507556 related: - id: a62b37e0-45d3-48d9-a517-90c1a1b0186b type: derived status: test description: Detects the clearing of one of the Windows Core Eventlogs. e.g. caused by "wevtutil cl" command execution references: - https://twitter.com/deviouspolack/status/832535435960209408 - https://www.hybrid-analysis.com/sample/027cc450ef5f8c5f653329641ec1fed91f694e0d229928963b30f6b0d7d3a745?environmentId=100 author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Tim Shelton, Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) date: 2022-05-17 modified: 2023-11-15 tags: - attack.defense-impairment - attack.t1685.005 - car.2016-04-002 logsource: product: windows service: system detection: selection: EventID: 104 Provider_Name: Microsoft-Windows-Eventlog Channel: - Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational - Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational - PowerShellCore/Operational - Security - System - Windows PowerShell condition: selection falsepositives: - Rollout of log collection agents (the setup routine often includes a reset of the local Eventlog) - System provisioning (system reset before the golden image creation) level: high