Query: Sigma rule for Detects UAC Bypass Attempt Using Microsoft Connection Manager Profile Installer Autoelevate-capable COM Objects (e.g. UA
Matching passage: Sigma rule: Detects UAC Bypass Attempt Using Microsoft Connection Manager Profile Installer Autoelevate-capable COM Objects (e.g. UA. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: CMSTP UAC Bypass via COM Object Access id: 4b60e6f2-bf39-47b4-b4ea-398e33cfe253 status: stable description: Detects UAC Bypass Attempt Using Microsoft Connection Manager Profile Installer Autoelevate-capable COM Objects (e.g. UACMe ID of 41, 43, 58 or 65) references: - https://web.archive.org/web/20190720093911/http://www.endurant.io/cmstp/detecting-cmstp-enabled-code-execution-and-uac-bypass-with-sysmon/ - https://twitter.com/hFireF0X/status/897640081053364225 - https://medium.com/falconforce/falconfriday-detecting-uac-bypasses-0xff16-86c2a9107abf - https://github.com/hfiref0x/UACME author: Nik Seetharaman, Christian Burkard (Nextron Systems) date: 2019-07-31 modified: 2024-12-01 tags: - attack.execution - attack.privilege-escalation - attack.stealth - attack.t1548.002 - attack.t1218.003 - attack.g0069 - car.2019-04-001 logsource: category: process_creation product: windows detection: selection: ParentImage|endswith: \DllHost.exe ParentCommandLine|contains: - ' /Processid:{3E5FC7F9-9A51-4367-9063-A120244FBEC7}' - ' /Processid:{3E000D72-A845-4CD9-BD83-80C07C3B881F}' - ' /Processid:{BD54C901-076B-434E-B6C7-17C531F4AB41}' - ' /Processid:{D2E7041B-2927-42FB-8E9F-7CE93B6DC937}' - ' /Processid:{E9495B87-D950-4AB5-87A5-FF6D70BF3E90}' IntegrityLevel: - High - System - S-1-16-16384 - S-1-16-12288 condition: selection falsepositives: - Legitimate CMSTP use (unlikely in modern enterprise environments) level: high
Near-miss passage: Sigma rule: Detects command line parameters used by Bloodhound and Sharphound hack tools. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: HackTool - Bloodhound/Sharphound Execution id: f376c8a7-a2d0-4ddc-aa0c-16c17236d962 status: test description: Detects command line parameters used by Bloodhound and Sharphound hack tools references: - https://github.com/BloodHoundAD/BloodHound - https://github.com/BloodHoundAD/SharpHound author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems) date: 2019-12-20 modified: 2023-02-04 tags: - attack.discovery - attack.t1087.001 - attack.t1087.002 - attack.t1482 - attack.t1069.001 - attack.t1069.002 - attack.execution - attack.t1059.001 logsource: category: process_creation product: windows detection: selection_img: - Product|contains: SharpHound - Description|contains: SharpHound - Company|contains: - SpecterOps - evil corp - Image|contains: - \Bloodhound.exe - \SharpHound.exe selection_cli_1: CommandLine|contains: - ' -CollectionMethod All ' - ' --CollectionMethods Session ' - ' --Loop --Loopduration ' - ' --PortScanTimeout ' - '.exe -c All -d ' - Invoke-Bloodhound - Get-BloodHoundData selection_cli_2: CommandLine|contains|all: - ' -JsonFolder ' - ' -ZipFileName ' selection_cli_3: CommandLine|contains|all: - ' DCOnly ' - ' --NoSaveCache ' condition: 1 of selection_* falsepositives: - Other programs that use these command line option and accepts an 'All' parameter level: high