Query: alert when Detects the configuration of a new ISATAP router on a Windows host. While ISATAP is a legitimate Microsoft technology fo
Matching passage: Sigma rule: Detects the configuration of a new ISATAP router on a Windows host. While ISATAP is a legitimate Microsoft technology fo. Logsource: windows / system. Rule: title: ISATAP Router Address Was Set id: d22df9cd-2aee-4089-93c7-9dc4eae77f2c status: experimental description: 'Detects the configuration of a new ISATAP router on a Windows host. While ISATAP is a legitimate Microsoft technology for IPv6 transition, unexpected or unauthorized ISATAP router configurations could indicate a potential IPv6 DNS Takeover attack using tools like mitm6. In such attacks, adversaries advertise themselves as DHCPv6 servers and set malicious ISATAP routers to intercept traffic. This detection should be correlated with network baselines and known legitimate ISATAP deployments in your environment. ' references: - https://www.blackhillsinfosec.com/mitm6-strikes-again-the-dark-side-of-ipv6/ - https://redfoxsec.com/blog/ipv6-dns-takeover/ - https://www.securityhq.com/blog/malicious-isatap-tunneling-unearthed-on-windows-server/ - https://medium.com/@ninnesoturan/detecting-ipv6-dns-takeover-a54a6a88be1f author: hamid date: 2025-10-19 tags: - attack.impact - attack.credential-access - attack.collection - attack.initial-access - attack.privilege-escalation - attack.execution - attack.t1557 - attack.t1565.002 logsource: product: windows service: system detection: selection: EventID: 4100 Provider_Name: Microsoft-Windows-Iphlpsvc filter_main_localhost: IsatapRouter: - 127.0.0.1 - ::1 filter_optional_null: IsatapRouter: null condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_* and not 1 of filter_optional_* falsepositives: - Legitimate ISATAP router configuration in enterprise environments - IPv6 transition projects and network infrastructure changes - Network administrators configuring dual-stack networking - Automatic ISATAP configuration in some Windows deployments level: medium
Near-miss passage: Sigma rule: Detects all variations of obfuscated powershell IEX invocation code generated by Invoke-Obfuscation framework from the c. Logsource: windows / security. Rule: title: Invoke-Obfuscation Obfuscated IEX Invocation - Security id: fd0f5778-d3cb-4c9a-9695-66759d04702a related: - id: 51aa9387-1c53-4153-91cc-d73c59ae1ca9 type: derived status: test description: Detects all variations of obfuscated powershell IEX invocation code generated by Invoke-Obfuscation framework from the code block linked in the references references: - https://github.com/danielbohannon/Invoke-Obfuscation/blob/f20e7f843edd0a3a7716736e9eddfa423395dd26/Out-ObfuscatedStringCommand.ps1#L873-L888 author: Daniel Bohannon (@Mandiant/@FireEye), oscd.community date: 2019-11-08 modified: 2022-11-27 tags: - attack.stealth - attack.t1027 logsource: product: windows service: security definition: The 'System Security Extension' audit subcategory need to be enabled to log the EID 4697 detection: selection_eid: EventID: 4697 selection_servicefilename: - ServiceFileName|re: \$PSHome\[\s*\d{1,3}\s*\]\s*\+\s*\$PSHome\[ - ServiceFileName|re: \$ShellId\[\s*\d{1,3}\s*\]\s*\+\s*\$ShellId\[ - ServiceFileName|re: \$env:Public\[\s*\d{1,3}\s*\]\s*\+\s*\$env:Public\[ - ServiceFileName|re: \$env:ComSpec\[(\s*\d{1,3}\s*,){2} - ServiceFileName|re: \\*mdr\*\W\s*\)\.Name - ServiceFileName|re: \$VerbosePreference\.ToString\( - ServiceFileName|re: \String\]\s*\$VerbosePreference condition: all of selection_* falsepositives: - Unknown level: high