alirezaaminzadeh/secembed-pairs huggingface dataset:
Query: patch priority for CVE-2015-7305
Matching passage: CVE-2015-7305. CWE: CWE-200. CVSS: 5.0. The Scald module 7.x-1.x before 7.x-1.5 for Drupal does not properly restrict access to fields, which allows remote attackers to obtain sensitive atom property information via vectors involving a "debug context."
Near-miss passage: CVE-2015-2374. CWE: CWE-200. CVSS: 3.299999952316284. The Netlogon service in Microsoft Windows Server 2003 SP2 and R2 SP2, Windows Server 2008 SP2 and R2 SP1, and Windows Server 2012 Gold and R2 does not properly implement domain-controller communication, which allows remote attackers to discover credentials by leveraging certain PDC access and spoofing the BDC role in a PDC communication channel, aka "Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability in Netlogon."
Query: Persistence mechanism resembling Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder
Matching passage: T1547.001 Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder. Tactics: persistence, privilege escalation. Description: Adversaries may achieve persistence by adding a program to a startup folder or referencing it with a Registry run key. Adding an entry to the "run keys" in the Registry or startup folder will cause the program referenced to be executed when a user logs in.(Citation: Microsoft Run Key) These programs will be executed under the context of the user and will have the account's associated permissions level. The following run keys are created by default on Windows systems: * <code>HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run</code> * <code>HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunOnce</code> * <code>HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run</code> * <code>HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunOnce</code> Run keys may exist under multiple hives.(Citation: Microsoft Wow6432Node 2018)(Citation: Malwarebytes Wow6432Node 2016) The <code>HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunOnceEx</code> is also available but is not created by default on Windows Vista and newer. Registry run key entries can reference programs directly or list them as a dependency.(Citation: Microsoft Run Key) For example, it is possible to load a DLL at logon using a "Depend" key with RunOnceEx: <code>reg add HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunOnceEx\0001\Depend /v 1 /d "C:\temp\evil[.]dll"</code> (Citation: Oddvar Moe RunOnceEx Mar 2018) Placing a program within a startup folder will also cause that program to execute when a user logs in. There is a startup folder location for individual user accounts as well as a system-wide startup folder that will be checked regardless of which user account logs in. The startup folder path for the current user is <code>C:\Users\\[Username]\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\Startup</code>. The startup folder path for all users is <code>C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\StartUp</code>. The following Registry
Near-miss passage: T1547.002 Authentication Package. Tactics: persistence, privilege escalation. Description: Adversaries may abuse authentication packages to execute DLLs when the system boots. Windows authentication package DLLs are loaded by the Local Security Authority (LSA) process at system start. They provide support for multiple logon processes and multiple security protocols to the operating system.(Citation: MSDN Authentication Packages) Adversaries can use the autostart mechanism provided by LSA authentication packages for persistence by placing a reference to a binary in the Windows Registry location <code>HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa\</code> with the key value of <code>"Authentication Packages"=&lt;target binary&gt;</code>. The binary will then be executed by the system when the authentication packages are loaded.
Query: detect Login Hook
Matching passage: T1037.002 Login Hook. Tactics: persistence, privilege escalation. Description: Adversaries may use a Login Hook to establish persistence executed upon user logon. A login hook is a plist file that points to a specific script to execute with root privileges upon user logon. The plist file is located in the <code>/Library/Preferences/com.apple.loginwindow.plist</code> file and can be modified using the <code>defaults</code> command-line utility. This behavior is the same for logout hooks where a script can be executed upon user logout. All hooks require administrator permissions to modify or create hooks.(Citation: Login Scripts Apple Dev)(Citation: LoginWindowScripts Apple Dev) Adversaries can add or insert a path to a malicious script in the <code>com.apple.loginwindow.plist</code> file, using the <code>LoginHook</code> or <code>LogoutHook</code> key-value pair. The malicious script is executed upon the next user login. If a login hook already exists, adversaries can add additional commands to an existing login hook. There can be only one login and logout hook on a system at a time.(Citation: S1 macOs Persistence)(Citation: Wardle Persistence Chapter) **Note:** Login hooks were deprecated in 10.11 version of macOS in favor of [Launch Daemon](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/004) and [Launch Agent](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/001)
Near-miss passage: T1037.005 Startup Items. Tactics: persistence, privilege escalation. Description: Adversaries may use startup items automatically executed at boot initialization to establish persistence. Startup items execute during the final phase of the boot process and contain shell scripts or other executable files along with configuration information used by the system to determine the execution order for all startup items.(Citation: Startup Items) This is technically a deprecated technology (superseded by [Launch Daemon](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/004)), and thus the appropriate folder, <code>/Library/StartupItems</code> isn’t guaranteed to exist on the system by default, but does appear to exist by default on macOS Sierra. A startup item is a directory whose executable and configuration property list (plist), <code>StartupParameters.plist</code>, reside in the top-level directory. An adversary can create the appropriate folders/files in the StartupItems directory to register their own persistence mechanism.(Citation: Methods of Mac Malware Persistence) Additionally, since StartupItems run during the bootup phase of macOS, they will run as the elevated root user.
Query: rule covering Detects calls to cmdlets inside of PowerShell scripts that are used to export certificates from the local certificate st
Matching passage: Sigma rule: Detects calls to cmdlets inside of PowerShell scripts that are used to export certificates from the local certificate st. Logsource: windows / ps_script. Rule: title: Certificate Exported Via PowerShell - ScriptBlock id: aa7a3fce-bef5-4311-9cc1-5f04bb8c308c related: - id: 9e716b33-63b2-46da-86a4-bd3c3b9b5dfb type: similar status: test description: Detects calls to cmdlets inside of PowerShell scripts that are used to export certificates from the local certificate store. Threat actors were seen abusing this to steal private keys from compromised machines. references: - https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/analysis-reports/ar21-112a - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/pki/export-pfxcertificate?view=windowsserver2022-ps - https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/breaking-the-chain-defending-against-certificate-services-abuse.html author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems) date: 2021-04-23 modified: 2023-05-18 tags: - attack.credential-access - attack.t1552.004 logsource: product: windows category: ps_script definition: 'Requirements: Script Block Logging must be enabled' detection: selection: ScriptBlockText|contains: - Export-PfxCertificate - Export-Certificate filter_optional_module_export: ScriptBlockText|contains: CmdletsToExport = @( condition: selection and not 1 of filter_optional_* falsepositives: - Legitimate certificate exports by administrators. Additional filters might be required. level: medium
Near-miss passage: Sigma rule: Detects changes to the Netsh registry key to add a new DLL value. This change might be an indication of a potential pers. Logsource: windows / registry_set. Rule: title: Potential Persistence Via Netsh Helper DLL - Registry id: c90362e0-2df3-4e61-94fe-b37615814cb1 related: - id: 56321594-9087-49d9-bf10-524fe8479452 type: similar - id: e7b18879-676e-4a0e-ae18-27039185a8e7 type: similar status: test description: 'Detects changes to the Netsh registry key to add a new DLL value. This change might be an indication of a potential persistence attempt by adding a malicious Netsh helper ' references: - https://www.ired.team/offensive-security/persistence/t1128-netsh-helper-dll - https://pentestlab.blog/2019/10/29/persistence-netsh-helper-dll/ author: Anish Bogati date: 2023-11-28 modified: 2025-10-08 tags: - attack.privilege-escalation - attack.persistence - attack.t1546.007 logsource: category: registry_set product: windows detection: selection: TargetObject|contains: \SOFTWARE\Microsoft\NetSh Details|contains: .dll filter_main_poqexec: Image: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe Details: - ipmontr.dll - iasmontr.dll - ippromon.dll condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_* falsepositives: - Legitimate helper added by different programs and the OS level: medium
Query: CVE similar to CVE-2015-8799
Matching passage: CVE-2015-8799. CWE: CWE-22. CVSS: 7.599999904632568. Directory traversal vulnerability in the Management Server in Symantec Embedded Security: Critical System Protection (SES:CSP) 1.0.x before 1.0 MP5, Embedded Security: Critical System Protection for Controllers and Devices (SES:CSP) 6.5.0 before MP1, Critical System Protection (SCSP) before 5.2.9 MP6, Data Center Security: Server Advanced Server (DCS:SA) 6.x before 6.5 MP1 and 6.6 before MP1, and Data Center Security: Server Advanced Server and Agents (DCS:SA) through 6.6 MP1 allows remote authenticated users to write update-package data to arbitrary agent locations via unspecified vectors.
Near-miss passage: CVE-2015-3297. CWE: CWE-22. CVSS: 7.5. Directory traversal vulnerability in node/utils/Minify.js in Etherpad 1.1.1 through 1.5.2 allows remote attackers to read arbitrary files by leveraging replacement of backslashes with slashes in the path parameter of HTTP API requests.
Query: exploit Password reset tokens in Magento CE before 1.9.2.2, and Magento EE before 1.14.2.2 are passed via a GET request and not canceled after use, which allows remote attackers to obtain 
Matching passage: CVE-2015-8707. CWE: CWE-200. CVSS: 9.800000190734863. Password reset tokens in Magento CE before 1.9.2.2, and Magento EE before 1.14.2.2 are passed via a GET request and not canceled after use, which allows remote attackers to obtain user passwords via a crafted external service with access to the referrer field.
Near-miss passage: CVE-2015-9255. CWE: CWE-200. CVSS: 5.300000190734863. Datto ALTO and SIRIS devices allow remote attackers to obtain sensitive information about data, software versions, configuration, and virtual machines via a request to a Web Virtual Directory.
Query: detection rule: Detects suspicious WMI event filter and command line event consumer based on WMI and Security Logs.
Matching passage: Sigma rule: Detects suspicious WMI event filter and command line event consumer based on WMI and Security Logs.. Logsource: windows / security. Rule: title: WMI Persistence - Security id: f033f3f3-fd24-4995-97d8-a3bb17550a88 related: - id: 0b7889b4-5577-4521-a60a-3376ee7f9f7b type: derived status: test description: Detects suspicious WMI event filter and command line event consumer based on WMI and Security Logs. references: - https://twitter.com/mattifestation/status/899646620148539397 - https://www.eideon.com/2018-03-02-THL03-WMIBackdoors/ author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Gleb Sukhodolskiy, Timur Zinniatullin oscd.community date: 2017-08-22 modified: 2022-11-29 tags: - attack.persistence - attack.privilege-escalation - attack.t1546.003 logsource: product: windows service: security detection: selection: EventID: 4662 ObjectType: WMI Namespace ObjectName|contains: subscription condition: selection falsepositives: - Unknown (data set is too small; further testing needed) level: medium
Near-miss passage: Sigma rule: Detects registry modifications related to 'OracleOciLib' and 'OracleOciLibPath' under 'MSDTC' settings. Threat actors ma. Logsource: windows / registry_set. Rule: title: Registry Modification for OCI DLL Redirection id: c0e0bdec-3e3d-47aa-9974-05539c999c89 status: experimental description: 'Detects registry modifications related to ''OracleOciLib'' and ''OracleOciLibPath'' under ''MSDTC'' settings. Threat actors may modify these registry keys to redirect the loading of ''oci.dll'' to a malicious DLL, facilitating phantom DLL hijacking via the MSDTC service. ' references: - https://www.crowdstrike.com/en-us/blog/4-ways-adversaries-hijack-dlls/ author: Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems) date: 2026-01-24 tags: - attack.persistence - attack.privilege-escalation - attack.execution - attack.stealth - attack.defense-impairment - attack.t1112 - attack.t1574.001 logsource: category: registry_set product: windows detection: selection_ocilib: TargetObject|endswith: \SOFTWARE\Microsoft\MSDTC\MTxOCI\OracleOciLib filter_main_ocilib_file: Details|contains: oci.dll selection_ocilibpath: TargetObject|endswith: \SOFTWARE\Microsoft\MSDTC\MTxOCI\OracleOciLibPath filter_main_ocilibpath: Details|contains: '%SystemRoot%\System32\' condition: (selection_ocilib and not filter_main_ocilib_file) or (selection_ocilibpath and not filter_main_ocilibpath) falsepositives: - Unlikely level: high
Query: risk of Location Framework in Apple iOS before 8.4.1 allows local users to bypass intended restrictions on filesystem modification via a symlink.
Matching passage: CVE-2015-3759. CWE: CWE-59. CVSS: 4.599999904632568. Location Framework in Apple iOS before 8.4.1 allows local users to bypass intended restrictions on filesystem modification via a symlink.
Near-miss passage: CVE-2015-1338. CWE: CWE-59. CVSS: 7.199999809265137. kernel_crashdump in Apport before 2.19 allows local users to cause a denial of service (disk consumption) or possibly gain privileges via a (1) symlink or (2) hard link attack on /var/crash/vmcore.log.
Query: common weakness: Unchecked Return Value to NULL Pointer Dereference
Matching passage: CWE-690 Unchecked Return Value to NULL Pointer Dereference. The product does not check for an error after calling a function that can return with a NULL pointer if the function fails, which leads to a resultant NULL pointer dereference.
Near-miss passage: CWE-202 Exposure of Sensitive Information Through Data Queries. When trying to keep information confidential, an attacker can often infer some of the information by using statistics.
Query: vulnerability: The kernel-mode drivers in Microsoft Windows Server 2003 SP2, Windows Vista SP2, Windows Server 2008 SP2 and R2 SP1, Windows 7 SP1, Windows 8, Windows 8.1, Windows Server 2012 Gold
Matching passage: CVE-2015-0094. CWE: CWE-200. CVSS: 2.0999999046325684. The kernel-mode drivers in Microsoft Windows Server 2003 SP2, Windows Vista SP2, Windows Server 2008 SP2 and R2 SP1, Windows 7 SP1, Windows 8, Windows 8.1, Windows Server 2012 Gold and R2, and Windows RT Gold and 8.1 do not properly restrict the availability of address information during a function call, which makes it easier for local users to bypass the ASLR protection mechanism via a crafted application, aka "Microsoft Windows Kernel Memory Disclosure Vulnerability."
Near-miss passage: CVE-2015-6086. CWE: CWE-200. CVSS: 4.300000190734863. Microsoft Internet Explorer 9 through 11 allows remote attackers to obtain sensitive information from process memory via a crafted web site, aka "Internet Explorer Information Disclosure Vulnerability."
Query: adversary uses Active Setup
Matching passage: T1547.014 Active Setup. Tactics: persistence, privilege escalation. Description: Adversaries may achieve persistence by adding a Registry key to the Active Setup of the local machine. Active Setup is a Windows mechanism that is used to execute programs when a user logs in. The value stored in the Registry key will be executed after a user logs into the computer.(Citation: Klein Active Setup 2010) These programs will be executed under the context of the user and will have the account's associated permissions level. Adversaries may abuse Active Setup by creating a key under <code> HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Active Setup\Installed Components\</code> and setting a malicious value for <code>StubPath</code>. This value will serve as the program that will be executed when a user logs into the computer.(Citation: Mandiant Glyer APT 2010)(Citation: Citizenlab Packrat 2015)(Citation: FireEye CFR Watering Hole 2012)(Citation: SECURELIST Bright Star 2015)(Citation: paloalto Tropic Trooper 2016) Adversaries can abuse these components to execute malware, such as remote access tools, to maintain persistence through system reboots. Adversaries may also use [Masquerading](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036) to make the Registry entries look as if they are associated with legitimate programs.
Near-miss passage: T1547.008 LSASS Driver. Tactics: persistence, privilege escalation. Description: Adversaries may modify or add LSASS drivers to obtain persistence on compromised systems. The Windows security subsystem is a set of components that manage and enforce the security policy for a computer or domain. The Local Security Authority (LSA) is the main component responsible for local security policy and user authentication. The LSA includes multiple dynamic link libraries (DLLs) associated with various other security functions, all of which run in the context of the LSA Subsystem Service (LSASS) lsass.exe process.(Citation: Microsoft Security Subsystem) Adversaries may target LSASS drivers to obtain persistence. By either replacing or adding illegitimate drivers (e.g., [Hijack Execution Flow](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574)), an adversary can use LSA operations to continuously execute malicious payloads.
Query: Sigma YAML for m365 / audit
Matching passage: Sigma rule: Detects a successful login to the Microsoft Intune Company Portal which could allow bypassing Conditional Access Policie. Logsource: m365 / audit. Rule: title: Azure Login Bypassing Conditional Access Policies id: 13f2d3f5-6497-44a7-bf5f-dc13ffafe5dc status: experimental description: 'Detects a successful login to the Microsoft Intune Company Portal which could allow bypassing Conditional Access Policies and InTune device trust using a tool like TokenSmith. ' author: Josh Nickels, Marius Rothenbücher references: - https://labs.jumpsec.com/tokensmith-bypassing-intune-compliant-device-conditional-access/ - https://github.com/JumpsecLabs/TokenSmith date: 2025-01-08 tags: - attack.privilege-escalation - attack.persistence - attack.initial-access - attack.stealth - attack.t1078 logsource: service: audit product: m365 detection: selection: Operation: UserLoggedIn ApplicationId: 9ba1a5c7-f17a-4de9-a1f1-6178c8d51223 ResultStatus: Success RequestType: Cmsi:Cmsi filter_main_bjectid: ObjectId: 0000000a-0000-0000-c000-000000000000 condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_* falsepositives: - Unknown level: high
Near-miss passage: Sigma rule: Detects the creation of a new user account. Such accounts may be used for persistence that do not require persistent rem. Logsource: linux / auditd. Rule: title: Creation Of An User Account id: 759d0d51-bc99-4b5e-9add-8f5b2c8e7512 status: test description: Detects the creation of a new user account. Such accounts may be used for persistence that do not require persistent remote access tools to be deployed on the system. references: - https://access.redhat.com/documentation/en-us/red_hat_enterprise_linux/7/html/security_guide/sec-understanding_audit_log_files - https://access.redhat.com/articles/4409591#audit-record-types-2 - https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VmvY5SQm5-Y&ab_channel=M45C07 author: Marie Euler, Pawel Mazur date: 2020-05-18 modified: 2022-12-20 tags: - attack.t1136.001 - attack.persistence logsource: product: linux service: auditd detection: selection_syscall_record_type: type: SYSCALL exe|endswith: /useradd selection_add_user_record_type: type: ADD_USER condition: 1 of selection_* falsepositives: - Admin activity level: medium
Query: rule covering Detects the execution of "Ldifde.exe" with the import flag "-i". The can be abused to include HTTP-based arguments which
Matching passage: Sigma rule: Detects the execution of "Ldifde.exe" with the import flag "-i". The can be abused to include HTTP-based arguments which. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: Import LDAP Data Interchange Format File Via Ldifde.EXE id: 6f535e01-ca1f-40be-ab8d-45b19c0c8b7f status: test description: 'Detects the execution of "Ldifde.exe" with the import flag "-i". The can be abused to include HTTP-based arguments which will allow the arbitrary download of files from a remote server. ' references: - https://twitter.com/0gtweet/status/1564968845726580736 - https://strontic.github.io/xcyclopedia/library/ldifde.exe-979DE101F5059CEC1D2C56967CA2BAC0.html - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-server-2012-r2-and-2012/cc731033(v=ws.11) author: '@gott_cyber' date: 2022-09-02 modified: 2023-03-14 tags: - attack.command-and-control - attack.stealth - attack.t1218 - attack.t1105 logsource: category: process_creation product: windows detection: selection_img: - Image|endswith: \ldifde.exe - OriginalFileName: ldifde.exe selection_cli: CommandLine|contains|all: - -i - -f condition: all of selection_* falsepositives: - Since the content of the files are unknown, false positives are expected level: medium
Near-miss passage: Sigma rule: Detects anyone attempting a backup for the DPAPI Master Key. This events gets generated at the source and not the Domain. Logsource: windows / security. Rule: title: DPAPI Domain Master Key Backup Attempt id: 39a94fd1-8c9a-4ff6-bf22-c058762f8014 status: test description: Detects anyone attempting a backup for the DPAPI Master Key. This events gets generated at the source and not the Domain Controller. references: - https://threathunterplaybook.com/hunts/windows/190620-DomainDPAPIBackupKeyExtraction/notebook.html author: Roberto Rodriguez @Cyb3rWard0g date: 2019-08-10 modified: 2023-03-15 tags: - attack.credential-access - attack.t1003.004 logsource: product: windows service: security detection: selection: EventID: 4692 condition: selection falsepositives: - If a computer is a member of a domain, DPAPI has a backup mechanism to allow unprotection of the data. Which will trigger this event. level: medium
Query: SOC runbook when seeing Lateral movement indicators for Adversary-in-the-Middle
Matching passage: Playbook for T1557 Adversary-in-the-Middle. 1) Validate alert telemetry against T1557. 2) Scope affected hosts and accounts. 3) Contain by isolating endpoint / disabling account if confirmed. 4) Hunt for related tactics: credential access, collection. 5) Eradicate persistence and recover. Reference detection notes: Adversaries may attempt to position themselves between two or more networked devices using an adversary-in-the-middle (AiTM) technique to support follow-on behaviors such as [Network Sniffing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1040), [Transmitted Data Manipulation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1565/002), or replay attacks ([Exploitation for Credential Access](https://attack.mitre.org/te
Near-miss passage: Playbook for T1557.001 Name Resolution Poisoning and SMB Relay. Different response path focused on credential access, collection.