Query: Sigma YAML for windows / process_creation
Matching passage: Sigma rule: Detects the use of the bcdedit command to tamper with the boot configuration data. This technique is often times used by. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: Boot Configuration Tampering Via Bcdedit.EXE id: 1444443e-6757-43e4-9ea4-c8fc705f79a2 status: stable description: Detects the use of the bcdedit command to tamper with the boot configuration data. This technique is often times used by malware or attackers as a destructive way before launching ransomware. references: - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1490/T1490.md - https://eqllib.readthedocs.io/en/latest/analytics/c4732632-9c1d-4980-9fa8-1d98c93f918e.html author: E.M. Anhaus (originally from Atomic Blue Detections, Endgame), oscd.community date: 2019-10-24 modified: 2023-02-15 tags: - attack.impact - attack.t1490 logsource: category: process_creation product: windows detection: selection_img: - Image|endswith: \bcdedit.exe - OriginalFileName: bcdedit.exe selection_set: CommandLine|contains: set selection_cli: - CommandLine|contains|all: - bootstatuspolicy - ignoreallfailures - CommandLine|contains|all: - recoveryenabled - 'no' condition: all of selection_* falsepositives: - Unlikely level: high simulation: - type: atomic-red-team name: Windows - Disable Windows Recovery Console Repair technique: T1490 atomic_guid: cf21060a-80b3-4238-a595-22525de4ab81
Near-miss passage: Sigma rule: Detects potentially suspicious child process of applications launched from inside the WindowsApps directory. This could. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: Potentially Suspicious Windows App Activity id: f91ed517-a6ba-471d-9910-b3b4a398c0f3 status: test description: Detects potentially suspicious child process of applications launched from inside the WindowsApps directory. This could be a sign of a rogue ".appx" package installation/execution references: - https://news.sophos.com/en-us/2021/11/11/bazarloader-call-me-back-attack-abuses-windows-10-apps-mechanism/ - https://www.sentinelone.com/labs/inside-malicious-windows-apps-for-malware-deployment/ author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) date: 2023-01-12 modified: 2025-10-07 tags: - attack.stealth logsource: product: windows category: process_creation detection: selection_parent: ParentImage|contains: C:\Program Files\WindowsApps\ selection_susp_img: Image|endswith: - \cmd.exe - \cscript.exe - \mshta.exe - \powershell.exe - \powershell_ise.exe - \pwsh.exe - \regsvr32.exe - \rundll32.exe - \wscript.exe selection_susp_cli: CommandLine|contains: - cmd /c - Invoke- - Base64 filter_optional_terminal: ParentImage|contains: :\Program Files\WindowsApps\Microsoft.WindowsTerminal ParentImage|endswith: \WindowsTerminal.exe Image|endswith: - \powershell.exe - \cmd.exe - \pwsh.exe filter_optional_sysinternals: ParentImage|startswith: C:\Program Files\WindowsApps\Microsoft.SysinternalsSuite Image|endswith: \cmd.exe condition: selection_parent and 1 of selection_susp_* and not 1 of filter_optional_* falsepositives: - Legitimate packages that make use of external binaries such as Windows Terminal level: medium