Query: alert when Detects known hacktool execution based on image name.
Matching passage: Sigma rule: Detects known hacktool execution based on image name.. Logsource: linux / process_creation. Rule: title: Linux HackTool Execution id: a015e032-146d-4717-8944-7a1884122111 status: test description: Detects known hacktool execution based on image name. references: - https://github.com/Gui774ume/ebpfkit - https://github.com/pathtofile/bad-bpf - https://github.com/carlospolop/PEASS-ng - https://github.com/t3l3machus/hoaxshell - https://github.com/t3l3machus/Villain - https://github.com/HavocFramework/Havoc - https://github.com/1N3/Sn1per - https://github.com/Ne0nd0g/merlin - https://github.com/Pennyw0rth/NetExec/ author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems), Georg Lauenstein (sure[secure]) date: 2023-01-03 modified: 2024-09-19 tags: - attack.execution - attack.resource-development - attack.t1587 logsource: product: linux category: process_creation detection: selection_c2_frameworks: Image|endswith: - /crackmapexec - /havoc - /merlin-agent - /merlinServer-Linux-x64 - /msfconsole - /msfvenom - /ps-empire server - /ps-empire - /sliver-client - /sliver-server - /Villain.py selection_c2_framework_cobaltstrike: Image|contains: - /cobaltstrike - /teamserver selection_scanners: Image|endswith: - /autorecon - /httpx - /legion - /naabu - /netdiscover - /nuclei - /recon-ng selection_scanners_sniper: Image|contains: /sniper selection_web_enum: Image|endswith: - /dirb - /dirbuster - /eyewitness - /feroxbuster - /ffuf - /gobuster - /wfuzz - /whatweb selection_web_vuln: Image|endswith: - /joomscan - /nikto - /wpscan selection_exploit_tools: Image|endswith: - /aircrack-ng - /bloodhound-python - /bpfdos - /ebpfki - /evil-winrm - /hashcat - /hoaxshell.py - /hydra - /john - /ncrack - /nxc-ubuntu-latest - /pidhide - /pspy32 - /pspy32s - /pspy64 - /pspy64s - /setoolkit - /sqlmap - /writeblocker selection_linpeas: Image|contains: /linpeas condition: 1 of selection_* falsepositives: - Unlikely level: high
Near-miss passage: Sigma rule: Detects when a request has been made to transfer a Route 53 domain to another AWS account.. Logsource: aws / cloudtrail. Rule: title: AWS Route 53 Domain Transferred to Another Account id: b056de1a-6e6e-4e40-a67e-97c9808cf41b status: test description: Detects when a request has been made to transfer a Route 53 domain to another AWS account. references: - https://github.com/elastic/detection-rules/blob/c76a39796972ecde44cb1da6df47f1b6562c9770/rules/integrations/aws/persistence_route_53_domain_transferred_to_another_account.toml author: Elastic, Austin Songer @austinsonger date: 2021-07-22 modified: 2022-10-09 tags: - attack.persistence - attack.credential-access - attack.privilege-escalation - attack.t1098 logsource: product: aws service: cloudtrail detection: selection: eventSource: route53.amazonaws.com eventName: TransferDomainToAnotherAwsAccount condition: selection falsepositives: - A domain may be transferred to another AWS account by a system or network administrator. Verify whether the user identity, user agent, and/or hostname should be making changes in your environment. Domain transfers from unfamiliar users or hosts should be investigated. If known behavior is causing false positives, it can be exempted from the rule. level: low