Query: alert when Detects potential registry persistence technique using the Event Viewer "Events.asp" technique
Matching passage: Sigma rule: Detects potential registry persistence technique using the Event Viewer "Events.asp" technique. Logsource: windows / registry_set. Rule: title: Potential Persistence Via Event Viewer Events.asp id: a1e11042-a74a-46e6-b07c-c4ce8ecc239b status: test description: Detects potential registry persistence technique using the Event Viewer "Events.asp" technique references: - https://twitter.com/nas_bench/status/1626648985824788480 - https://admx.help/?Category=Windows_7_2008R2&Policy=Microsoft.Policies.InternetCommunicationManagement::EventViewer_DisableLinks - https://www.hexacorn.com/blog/2019/02/15/beyond-good-ol-run-key-part-103/ - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f296668303c29d3f4c07e42bdd2b28d8dd6625f9/atomics/T1112/T1112.md author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) date: 2023-02-17 modified: 2023-03-05 tags: - attack.persistence - attack.defense-impairment - attack.t1112 logsource: category: registry_set product: windows detection: selection: TargetObject|contains: - \Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Event Viewer\MicrosoftRedirectionProgram - \Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Event Viewer\MicrosoftRedirectionURL filter_default_redirect_program: Image|endswith: C:\WINDOWS\system32\svchost.exe TargetObject|endswith: \Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Event Viewer\MicrosoftRedirectionProgram Details: '%%SystemRoot%%\PCHealth\HelpCtr\Binaries\HelpCtr.exe' filter_default_redirect_program_cli: Image|endswith: C:\WINDOWS\system32\svchost.exe TargetObject|endswith: \Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Event Viewer\MicrosoftRedirectionProgramCommandLineParameters Details: -url hcp://services/centers/support?topic=%%s filter_url: Details: http://go.microsoft.com/fwlink/events.asp filter_cleaner: Details: (Empty) condition: selection and not 1 of filter_* falsepositives: - Unknown level: medium
Near-miss passage: Sigma rule: Detects the presence of reversed PowerShell commands in the CommandLine. This is often used as a method of obfuscation b. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: Potential PowerShell Obfuscation Via Reversed Commands id: b6b49cd1-34d6-4ead-b1bf-176e9edba9a4 status: test description: Detects the presence of reversed PowerShell commands in the CommandLine. This is often used as a method of obfuscation by attackers references: - https://2019.offzone.moscow/ru/report/hunting-for-powershell-abuses/ - https://speakerdeck.com/heirhabarov/hunting-for-powershell-abuse?slide=66 author: Teymur Kheirkhabarov (idea), Vasiliy Burov (rule), oscd.community, Tim Shelton date: 2020-10-11 modified: 2023-05-31 tags: - attack.stealth - attack.t1027 - attack.execution - attack.t1059.001 logsource: category: process_creation product: windows detection: selection_img: - Image|endswith: - \powershell.exe - \pwsh.exe - OriginalFileName: - PowerShell.EXE - pwsh.dll selection_cli: CommandLine|contains: - hctac - kaerb - dnammoc - ekovn - eliFd - rahc - etirw - golon - tninon - eddih - tpircS - ssecorp - llehsrewop - esnopser - daolnwod - tneilCbeW - tneilc - ptth - elifotevas - 46esab - htaPpmeTteG - tcejbO - maerts - hcaerof - retupmoc filter_main_encoded_keyword: CommandLine|contains: - ' -EncodedCommand ' - ' -enc ' condition: all of selection_* and not 1 of filter_main_* falsepositives: - Unlikely level: high