Query: detect Detects GitHub self-hosted runners executing workflows on local infrastructure that could be abused for persistence and in logs
Matching passage: Sigma rule: Detects GitHub self-hosted runners executing workflows on local infrastructure that could be abused for persistence and. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: Github Self-Hosted Runner Execution id: 5bac7a56-da88-4c27-922e-c81e113b20cb status: test description: 'Detects GitHub self-hosted runners executing workflows on local infrastructure that could be abused for persistence and code execution. Shai-Hulud is an npm supply chain worm targeting CI/CD environments. It installs runners on compromised systems to maintain access after credential theft, leveraging their access to secrets and internal networks. ' references: - https://about.gitlab.com/blog/gitlab-discovers-widespread-npm-supply-chain-attack/ - https://securitylabs.datadoghq.com/articles/shai-hulud-2.0-npm-worm/ author: Daniel Koifman (KoifSec) date: 2025-11-29 tags: - attack.command-and-control - attack.t1102.002 - attack.t1071 logsource: category: process_creation product: windows detection: selection_worker_img: - Image|endswith: \Runner.Worker.exe - OriginalFileName: Runner.Worker.dll selection_worker_cli: CommandLine|contains: spawnclient selection_listener_img: - Image|endswith: \Runner.Listener.exe - OriginalFileName: Runner.Listener.dll selection_listener_cli: CommandLine|contains: - run - configure condition: all of selection_worker_* or all of selection_listener_* falsepositives: - Legitimate GitHub self-hosted runner installations on designated CI/CD infrastructure - Authorized runner deployments by DevOps/Platform teams following change management - Scheduled runner updates or reconfigurations on existing build agents - Self-hosted runners that follow expected/known naming patterns - Installation via expected/known configuration management tools (reflected mostly as parent process name) level: medium regression_tests_path: regression_data/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_github_self_hosted_runner/info.yml
Near-miss passage: Sigma rule: Detection well-known mimikatz command line arguments. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: HackTool - Mimikatz Execution id: a642964e-bead-4bed-8910-1bb4d63e3b4d status: test description: Detection well-known mimikatz command line arguments references: - https://www.slideshare.net/heirhabarov/hunting-for-credentials-dumping-in-windows-environment - https://tools.thehacker.recipes/mimikatz/modules author: Teymur Kheirkhabarov, oscd.community, David ANDRE (additional keywords), Tim Shelton date: 2019-10-22 modified: 2023-02-21 tags: - attack.credential-access - attack.t1003.001 - attack.t1003.002 - attack.t1003.004 - attack.t1003.005 - attack.t1003.006 logsource: category: process_creation product: windows detection: selection_tools_name: CommandLine|contains: - DumpCreds - mimikatz selection_function_names: CommandLine|contains: - ::aadcookie - ::detours - ::memssp - ::mflt - ::ncroutemon - ::ngcsign - ::printnightmare - ::skeleton - ::preshutdown - ::mstsc - ::multirdp selection_module_names: CommandLine|contains: - 'rpc::' - 'token::' - 'crypto::' - 'dpapi::' - 'sekurlsa::' - 'kerberos::' - 'lsadump::' - 'privilege::' - 'process::' - 'vault::' condition: 1 of selection_* falsepositives: - Unlikely level: high