Query: rule covering Detects known hacktool execution based on image name.
Matching passage: Sigma rule: Detects known hacktool execution based on image name.. Logsource: linux / process_creation. Rule: title: Linux HackTool Execution id: a015e032-146d-4717-8944-7a1884122111 status: test description: Detects known hacktool execution based on image name. references: - https://github.com/Gui774ume/ebpfkit - https://github.com/pathtofile/bad-bpf - https://github.com/carlospolop/PEASS-ng - https://github.com/t3l3machus/hoaxshell - https://github.com/t3l3machus/Villain - https://github.com/HavocFramework/Havoc - https://github.com/1N3/Sn1per - https://github.com/Ne0nd0g/merlin - https://github.com/Pennyw0rth/NetExec/ author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems), Georg Lauenstein (sure[secure]) date: 2023-01-03 modified: 2024-09-19 tags: - attack.execution - attack.resource-development - attack.t1587 logsource: product: linux category: process_creation detection: selection_c2_frameworks: Image|endswith: - /crackmapexec - /havoc - /merlin-agent - /merlinServer-Linux-x64 - /msfconsole - /msfvenom - /ps-empire server - /ps-empire - /sliver-client - /sliver-server - /Villain.py selection_c2_framework_cobaltstrike: Image|contains: - /cobaltstrike - /teamserver selection_scanners: Image|endswith: - /autorecon - /httpx - /legion - /naabu - /netdiscover - /nuclei - /recon-ng selection_scanners_sniper: Image|contains: /sniper selection_web_enum: Image|endswith: - /dirb - /dirbuster - /eyewitness - /feroxbuster - /ffuf - /gobuster - /wfuzz - /whatweb selection_web_vuln: Image|endswith: - /joomscan - /nikto - /wpscan selection_exploit_tools: Image|endswith: - /aircrack-ng - /bloodhound-python - /bpfdos - /ebpfki - /evil-winrm - /hashcat - /hoaxshell.py - /hydra - /john - /ncrack - /nxc-ubuntu-latest - /pidhide - /pspy32 - /pspy32s - /pspy64 - /pspy64s - /setoolkit - /sqlmap - /writeblocker selection_linpeas: Image|contains: /linpeas condition: 1 of selection_* falsepositives: - Unlikely level: high
Near-miss passage: Sigma rule: Detect changes to the "PendingFileRenameOperations" registry key from uncommon or suspicious images locations to stage c. Logsource: windows / registry_set. Rule: title: Potential PendingFileRenameOperations Tampering id: 4eec988f-7bf0-49f1-8675-1e6a510b3a2a status: test description: 'Detect changes to the "PendingFileRenameOperations" registry key from uncommon or suspicious images locations to stage currently used files for rename or deletion after reboot. ' references: - https://any.run/report/3ecd4763ffc944fdc67a9027e459cd4f448b1a8d1b36147977afaf86bbf2a261/64b0ba45-e7ce-423b-9a1d-5b4ea59521e6 - https://devblogs.microsoft.com/scripting/determine-pending-reboot-statuspowershell-style-part-1/ - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-2000-server/cc960241(v=technet.10)?redirectedfrom=MSDN - https://www.trendmicro.com/en_us/research/21/j/purplefox-adds-new-backdoor-that-uses-websockets.html - https://www.trendmicro.com/en_us/research/19/i/purple-fox-fileless-malware-with-rookit-component-delivered-by-rig-exploit-kit-now-abuses-powershell.html author: frack113 date: 2023-01-27 modified: 2025-10-07 tags: - attack.stealth - attack.t1036.003 logsource: category: registry_set product: windows detection: selection_main: TargetObject|contains: \CurrentControlSet\Control\Session Manager\PendingFileRenameOperations selection_susp_paths: Image|contains: \Users\Public\ selection_susp_images: Image|endswith: - \reg.exe - \regedit.exe condition: selection_main and 1 of selection_susp_* falsepositives: - Installers and updaters may set currently in use files for rename or deletion after a reboot. level: medium