Query: rule covering Detects a script interpreter process (like node.js or bun) spawning a known credential scanning tool (e.g., trufflehog,
Matching passage: Sigma rule: Detects a script interpreter process (like node.js or bun) spawning a known credential scanning tool (e.g., trufflehog,. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: Script Interpreter Spawning Credential Scanner - Windows id: 0f60b28c-64dd-4e2c-9a63-5334d3e3a6e6 related: - id: f0025a69-e1b7-4dda-a53c-db21fa2d4071 type: similar status: experimental description: 'Detects a script interpreter process (like node.js or bun) spawning a known credential scanning tool (e.g., trufflehog, gitleaks). This behavior is indicative of an attempt to find and steal secrets, as seen in the "Shai-Hulud: The Second Coming" campaign. ' references: - https://github.com/asyncapi/cli/blob/2efa4dff59bc3d3cecdf897ccf178f99b115d63d/bun_environment.js - https://www.stepsecurity.io/blog/sha1-hulud-the-second-coming-zapier-ens-domains-and-other-prominent-npm-packages-compromised - https://www.endorlabs.com/learn/shai-hulud-2-malware-campaign-targets-github-and-cloud-credentials-using-bun-runtime - https://semgrep.dev/blog/2025/digging-for-secrets-sha1-hulud-the-second-coming-of-the-npm-worm/ author: Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems) date: 2025-11-25 tags: - attack.credential-access - attack.t1552 - attack.collection - attack.execution - attack.t1005 - attack.t1059.007 logsource: category: process_creation product: windows detection: selection_parent: ParentImage|endswith: - \node.exe - \bun.exe selection_child: - Image|endswith: - trufflehog.exe - gitleaks.exe - CommandLine|contains: - trufflehog - gitleaks condition: all of selection_* falsepositives: - Legitimate pre-commit hooks or CI/CD pipeline jobs that use a script to run a credential scanner as part of a security check. level: high regression_tests_path: regression_data/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_susp_script_interpretor_spawn_credential_scanner/info.yml
Near-miss passage: Sigma rule: Detects the shell open key manipulation (exefile and ms-settings) used for persistence and the pattern of UAC Bypass usi. Logsource: windows / registry_event. Rule: title: Shell Open Registry Keys Manipulation id: 152f3630-77c1-4284-bcc0-4cc68ab2f6e7 related: - id: dd3ee8cc-f751-41c9-ba53-5a32ed47e563 type: similar status: test description: Detects the shell open key manipulation (exefile and ms-settings) used for persistence and the pattern of UAC Bypass using fodhelper.exe, computerdefaults.exe, slui.exe via registry keys (e.g. UACMe 33 or 62) references: - https://github.com/hfiref0x/UACME - https://winscripting.blog/2017/05/12/first-entry-welcome-and-uac-bypass/ - https://github.com/RhinoSecurityLabs/Aggressor-Scripts/tree/master/UACBypass - https://tria.ge/211119-gs7rtshcfr/behavioral2 [Lokibot sample from Nov 2021] author: Christian Burkard (Nextron Systems) date: 2021-08-30 modified: 2022-01-13 tags: - attack.persistence - attack.privilege-escalation - attack.t1548.002 - attack.t1546.001 logsource: category: registry_event product: windows detection: selection1: EventType: SetValue TargetObject|endswith: Classes\ms-settings\shell\open\command\SymbolicLinkValue Details|contains: \Software\Classes\{ selection2: TargetObject|endswith: Classes\ms-settings\shell\open\command\DelegateExecute selection3: EventType: SetValue TargetObject|endswith: - Classes\ms-settings\shell\open\command\(Default) - Classes\exefile\shell\open\command\(Default) filter_sel3: Details: (Empty) condition: selection1 or selection2 or (selection3 and not filter_sel3) falsepositives: - Unknown level: high