Query: detect Detects the execution of UACMe, a tool used for UAC bypasses, via default PE metadata in logs
Matching passage: Sigma rule: Detects the execution of UACMe, a tool used for UAC bypasses, via default PE metadata. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: HackTool - UACMe Akagi Execution id: d38d2fa4-98e6-4a24-aff1-410b0c9ad177 status: test description: Detects the execution of UACMe, a tool used for UAC bypasses, via default PE metadata references: - https://github.com/hfiref0x/UACME author: Christian Burkard (Nextron Systems), Florian Roth (Nextron Systems) date: 2021-08-30 modified: 2024-11-23 tags: - attack.privilege-escalation - attack.t1548.002 logsource: category: process_creation product: windows detection: selection_pe: - Product: UACMe - Company: - REvol Corp - APT 92 - UG North - Hazardous Environments - CD Project Rekt - Description: - UACMe main module - Pentesting utility - OriginalFileName: - Akagi.exe - Akagi64.exe selection_img: Image|endswith: - \Akagi64.exe - \Akagi.exe selection_hashes_sysmon: Hashes|contains: - IMPHASH=767637C23BB42CD5D7397CF58B0BE688 - IMPHASH=14C4E4C72BA075E9069EE67F39188AD8 - IMPHASH=3C782813D4AFCE07BBFC5A9772ACDBDC - IMPHASH=7D010C6BB6A3726F327F7E239166D127 - IMPHASH=89159BA4DD04E4CE5559F132A9964EB3 - IMPHASH=6F33F4A5FC42B8CEC7314947BD13F30F - IMPHASH=5834ED4291BDEB928270428EBBAF7604 - IMPHASH=5A8A8A43F25485E7EE1B201EDCBC7A38 - IMPHASH=DC7D30B90B2D8ABF664FBED2B1B59894 - IMPHASH=41923EA1F824FE63EA5BEB84DB7A3E74 - IMPHASH=3DE09703C8E79ED2CA3F01074719906B condition: 1 of selection_* falsepositives: - Unknown level: high
Near-miss passage: Sigma rule: Detects potentially suspicious loading of the Offline Registry Library (offreg.dll). Offreg.dll enables direct read/writ. Logsource: windows / image_load. Rule: title: Potentially Suspicious Image Load of Offreg.dll id: c9e5f013-4a6f-4d8c-9b0e-f7a4c3d26e95 status: experimental description: 'Detects potentially suspicious loading of the Offline Registry Library (offreg.dll). Offreg.dll enables direct read/write access to offline registry hives without invoking the Windows Registry API, bypassing its associated audit logging and telemetry. Attackers may abuse this to stealthily modify registry hives while evading detection mechanisms that rely on standard registry event logs. ' references: - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/devnotes/about-the-offline-registry-library - https://github.com/MSNightmare/LegacyHive author: Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems) date: 2026-07-23 tags: - attack.defense-impairment - attack.persistence - attack.t1112 logsource: category: image_load product: windows detection: selection: ImageLoaded|endswith: \offreg.dll filter_main_system32: Image|startswith: - C:\Windows\System32\ - C:\Windows\SysWOW64\ - C:\Windows\WinSxS\ filter_main_program_files: Image|startswith: - C:\Program Files\ - C:\Program Files (x86)\ filter_main_appdata_local_programs: Image|startswith: C:\Users\ Image|contains: \AppData\Local\Programs\ filter_main_defender: Image|startswith: C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\Windows Defender\Platform\ Image|endswith: \MsMpEng.exe condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_* falsepositives: - Third-party backup or forensic software that performs offline registry parsing - Windows deployment tools (DISM, ADK) run from non-standard paths level: medium regression_tests_path: regression_data/rules/windows/image_load/image_load_susp_offreg_dll_load/info.yml