Query: rule covering Detects unusual parent or children of the wab.exe (Windows Contacts) and Wabmig.exe (Microsoft Address Book Import Tool)
Matching passage: Sigma rule: Detects unusual parent or children of the wab.exe (Windows Contacts) and Wabmig.exe (Microsoft Address Book Import Tool). Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: Wab/Wabmig Unusual Parent Or Child Processes id: 63d1ccc0-2a43-4f4b-9289-361b308991ff status: test description: Detects unusual parent or children of the wab.exe (Windows Contacts) and Wabmig.exe (Microsoft Address Book Import Tool) processes as seen being used with bumblebee activity references: - https://thedfirreport.com/2022/08/08/bumblebee-roasts-its-way-to-domain-admin/ - https://symantec-enterprise-blogs.security.com/blogs/threat-intelligence/bumblebee-loader-cybercrime - https://thedfirreport.com/2022/09/26/bumblebee-round-two/ author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) date: 2022-08-12 modified: 2022-09-27 tags: - attack.execution - attack.stealth logsource: category: process_creation product: windows detection: selection_parent: ParentImage|endswith: - \WmiPrvSE.exe - \svchost.exe - \dllhost.exe Image|endswith: - \wab.exe - \wabmig.exe selection_child: ParentImage|endswith: - \wab.exe - \wabmig.exe condition: 1 of selection_* falsepositives: - Unknown level: high
Near-miss passage: Sigma rule: Detects the execution of a renamed binary often used by attackers or malware leveraging new Sysmon OriginalFileName data. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: Potential Defense Evasion Via Rename Of Highly Relevant Binaries id: 0ba1da6d-b6ce-4366-828c-18826c9de23e related: - id: 36480ae1-a1cb-4eaa-a0d6-29801d7e9142 type: similar - id: 2569ed8c-1147-498a-9b8c-2ad3656b10ed type: derived - id: a7a7e0e5-1d57-49df-9c58-9fe5bc0346a2 type: obsolete - id: d178a2d7-129a-4ba4-8ee6-d6e1fecd5d20 type: obsolete - id: d4d2574f-ac17-4d9e-b986-aeeae0dc8fe2 type: obsolete status: test description: Detects the execution of a renamed binary often used by attackers or malware leveraging new Sysmon OriginalFileName datapoint. references: - https://mgreen27.github.io/posts/2019/05/12/BinaryRename.html - https://mgreen27.github.io/posts/2019/05/29/BinaryRename2.html - https://www.trendmicro.com/vinfo/hk-en/security/news/cybercrime-and-digital-threats/megacortex-ransomware-spotted-attacking-enterprise-networks - https://twitter.com/christophetd/status/1164506034720952320 - https://threatresearch.ext.hp.com/svcready-a-new-loader-reveals-itself/ - https://www.huntress.com/blog/malicious-browser-extention-crashfix-kongtuke author: Matthew Green - @mgreen27, Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), frack113 date: 2019-06-15 modified: 2026-06-29 tags: - attack.stealth - attack.t1036.003 - car.2013-05-009 logsource: category: process_creation product: windows detection: selection: - Description: Execute processes remotely - Product: Sysinternals PsExec - Description|startswith: - Windows PowerShell - pwsh - OriginalFileName: - certutil.exe - cmstp.exe - cscript.exe - IE4UINIT.EXE - finger.exe - mshta.exe - msiexec.exe - msxsl.exe - powershell_ise.exe - powershell.exe - psexec.c - psexec.exe - psexesvc.exe - pwsh.dll - reg.exe - regsvr32.exe - rundll32.exe - WerMgr - wmic.exe - wscript.exe filter: Image|endswith: - \certutil.exe - \cmstp.exe - \cscript.exe - \ie4uinit.exe - \finger.exe - \mshta.exe - \msiexec.exe - \msxsl.exe - \powershell_ise.exe - \powershell.exe - \psexec.exe - \psexec64.exe - \psexec64a.exe - \PSEXESVC.exe - \pwsh.exe - \reg.exe - \regsvr32.exe - \rundll32.exe - \wermgr.exe - \wmic.exe - \wscript.exe condition: selection and not filter falsepositives: - Custom applications use renamed binaries adding slight change to binary name. Typically this is easy to spot and add to whitelist - PsExec installed via Windows Store doesn't contain original filename field (False negative) level: high regression_tests_path: regression_data/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_renamed_binary_highly_relevant/info.yml