Query: write Sigma for Detects potentially suspicious CommandLine of electron apps (teams, discord, slack, etc.). This could be a sign of abuse
Matching passage: Sigma rule: Detects potentially suspicious CommandLine of electron apps (teams, discord, slack, etc.). This could be a sign of abuse. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: Potentially Suspicious Electron Application CommandLine id: 378a05d8-963c-46c9-bcce-13c7657eac99 related: - id: f26eb764-fd89-464b-85e2-dc4a8e6e77b8 type: similar status: test description: Detects potentially suspicious CommandLine of electron apps (teams, discord, slack, etc.). This could be a sign of abuse to proxy execution through a signed binary. references: - https://positive.security/blog/ms-officecmd-rce - https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Teams/ - https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Msedge/ - https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/msedgewebview2/ - https://medium.com/@MalFuzzer/one-electron-to-rule-them-all-dc2e9b263daf - https://chromium.googlesource.com/chromium/chromium/+/master/content/public/common/content_switches.cc author: frack113, Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) date: 2023-09-05 modified: 2023-11-09 tags: - attack.execution logsource: category: process_creation product: windows detection: selection_img: - Image|endswith: - \chrome.exe - \code.exe - \discord.exe - \GitHubDesktop.exe - \keybase.exe - \msedge_proxy.exe - \msedge.exe - \msedgewebview2.exe - \msteams.exe - \slack.exe - \Teams.exe - OriginalFileName: - chrome.exe - code.exe - discord.exe - GitHubDesktop.exe - keybase.exe - msedge_proxy.exe - msedge.exe - msedgewebview2.exe - msteams.exe - slack.exe - Teams.exe selection_cli: CommandLine|contains: - --browser-subprocess-path - --gpu-launcher - --renderer-cmd-prefix - --utility-cmd-prefix condition: all of selection_* falsepositives: - Legitimate usage for debugging purposes level: medium
Near-miss passage: Sigma rule: Detects ADDInternals Cmdlet execution. A tool for administering Azure AD and Office 365. Which can be abused by threat a. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: AADInternals PowerShell Cmdlets Execution - ProccessCreation id: c86500e9-a645-4680-98d7-f882c70c1ea3 related: - id: 91e69562-2426-42ce-a647-711b8152ced6 type: similar status: test description: Detects ADDInternals Cmdlet execution. A tool for administering Azure AD and Office 365. Which can be abused by threat actors to attack Azure AD or Office 365. references: - https://o365blog.com/aadinternals/ - https://github.com/Gerenios/AADInternals author: Austin Songer (@austinsonger), Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems), Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems) date: 2022-12-23 modified: 2025-02-06 tags: - attack.execution - attack.reconnaissance - attack.discovery - attack.credential-access - attack.impact logsource: product: windows category: process_creation detection: selection_img: - Image|endswith: - \powershell.exe - \powershell_ise.exe - \pwsh.exe - OriginalFileName: - PowerShell.Exe - pwsh.dll selection_cli: CommandLine|contains: - Add-AADInt - ConvertTo-AADInt - Disable-AADInt - Enable-AADInt - Export-AADInt - Find-AADInt - Get-AADInt - Grant-AADInt - Initialize-AADInt - Install-AADInt - Invoke-AADInt - Join-AADInt - New-AADInt - Open-AADInt - Read-AADInt - Register-AADInt - Remove-AADInt - Reset-AADInt - Resolve-AADInt - Restore-AADInt - Save-AADInt - Search-AADInt - Send-AADInt - Set-AADInt - Start-AADInt - Unprotect-AADInt - Update-AADInt condition: all of selection_* falsepositives: - Legitimate use of the library for administrative activity level: high