Query: Sigma rule for Detects a script interpreter process (like node.js or bun) spawning a known credential scanning tool (e.g., trufflehog,
Matching passage: Sigma rule: Detects a script interpreter process (like node.js or bun) spawning a known credential scanning tool (e.g., trufflehog,. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: Script Interpreter Spawning Credential Scanner - Windows id: 0f60b28c-64dd-4e2c-9a63-5334d3e3a6e6 related: - id: f0025a69-e1b7-4dda-a53c-db21fa2d4071 type: similar status: experimental description: 'Detects a script interpreter process (like node.js or bun) spawning a known credential scanning tool (e.g., trufflehog, gitleaks). This behavior is indicative of an attempt to find and steal secrets, as seen in the "Shai-Hulud: The Second Coming" campaign. ' references: - https://github.com/asyncapi/cli/blob/2efa4dff59bc3d3cecdf897ccf178f99b115d63d/bun_environment.js - https://www.stepsecurity.io/blog/sha1-hulud-the-second-coming-zapier-ens-domains-and-other-prominent-npm-packages-compromised - https://www.endorlabs.com/learn/shai-hulud-2-malware-campaign-targets-github-and-cloud-credentials-using-bun-runtime - https://semgrep.dev/blog/2025/digging-for-secrets-sha1-hulud-the-second-coming-of-the-npm-worm/ author: Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems) date: 2025-11-25 tags: - attack.credential-access - attack.t1552 - attack.collection - attack.execution - attack.t1005 - attack.t1059.007 logsource: category: process_creation product: windows detection: selection_parent: ParentImage|endswith: - \node.exe - \bun.exe selection_child: - Image|endswith: - trufflehog.exe - gitleaks.exe - CommandLine|contains: - trufflehog - gitleaks condition: all of selection_* falsepositives: - Legitimate pre-commit hooks or CI/CD pipeline jobs that use a script to run a credential scanner as part of a security check. level: high regression_tests_path: regression_data/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_susp_script_interpretor_spawn_credential_scanner/info.yml
Near-miss passage: Sigma rule: Detects potential persistence activity via startup add-ins that load when Microsoft Office starts (.wll/.xll are simply. Logsource: windows / file_event. Rule: title: Potential Persistence Via Microsoft Office Add-In id: 8e1cb247-6cf6-42fa-b440-3f27d57e9936 status: test description: Detects potential persistence activity via startup add-ins that load when Microsoft Office starts (.wll/.xll are simply .dll fit for Word or Excel). references: - Internal Research - https://labs.withsecure.com/publications/add-in-opportunities-for-office-persistence - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/4ae9580a1a8772db87a1b6cdb0d03e5af231e966/atomics/T1137.006/T1137.006.md author: NVISO date: 2020-05-11 modified: 2023-02-08 tags: - attack.persistence - attack.t1137.006 logsource: category: file_event product: windows detection: selection_wlldropped: TargetFilename|contains: \Microsoft\Word\Startup\ TargetFilename|endswith: .wll selection_xlldropped: TargetFilename|contains: \Microsoft\Excel\Startup\ TargetFilename|endswith: .xll selection_xladropped: TargetFilename|contains: Microsoft\Excel\XLSTART\ TargetFilename|endswith: .xlam selection_generic: TargetFilename|contains: \Microsoft\Addins\ TargetFilename|endswith: - .xlam - .xla - .ppam condition: 1 of selection_* falsepositives: - Legitimate add-ins level: high