Query: Lateral movement indicators for Email Hiding Rules
Matching passage: T1564.008 Email Hiding Rules. Tactics: stealth. Description: Adversaries may use email rules to hide inbound emails in a compromised user's mailbox. Many email clients allow users to create inbox rules for various email functions, including moving emails to other folders, marking emails as read, or deleting emails. Rules may be created or modified within email clients or through external features such as the <code>New-InboxRule</code> or <code>Set-InboxRule</code> [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001) cmdlets on Windows systems.(Citation: Microsoft Inbox Rules)(Citation: MacOS Email Rules)(Citation: Microsoft New-InboxRule)(Citation: Microsoft Set-InboxRule) Adversaries may utilize email rules within a compromised user's mailbox to delete and/or move emails to less noticeable folders. Adversaries may do this to hide security alerts, C2 communication, or responses to [Internal Spearphishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1534) emails sent from the compromised account. Any user or administrator within the organization (or adversary with valid credentials) may be able to create rules to automatically move or delete emails. These rules can be abused to impair/delay detection had the email content been immediately seen by a user or defender. Malicious rules commonly filter out emails based on key words (such as <code>malware</code>, <code>suspicious</code>, <code>phish</code>, and <code>hack</code>) found in message bodies and subject lines. (Citation: Microsoft Cloud App Security) In some environments, administrators may be able to enable email rules that operate organization-wide rather than on individual inboxes. For example, Microsoft Exchange supports transport rules that evaluate all mail an organization receives against user-specified conditions, then performs a user-specified action on mail that adheres to those conditions.(Citation: Microsoft Mail Flow Rules 2023) Adversaries that abuse such features may be able to automatically modify or delete all emails related to specific topics (such as i
Near-miss passage: T1564.014 Extended Attributes. Tactics: stealth. Description: Adversaries may abuse extended attributes (xattrs) on macOS and Linux to hide their malicious data in order to evade detection. Extended attributes are key-value pairs of file and directory metadata used by both macOS and Linux. They are not visible through standard tools like `Finder`, `ls`, or `cat` and require utilities such as `xattr` (macOS) or `getfattr` (Linux) for inspection. Operating systems and applications use xattrs for tagging, integrity checks, and access control. On Linux, xattrs are organized into namespaces such as `user.` (user permissions), `trusted.` (root permissions), `security.`, and `system.`, each with specific permissions. On macOS, xattrs are flat strings without namespace prefixes, commonly prefixed with `com.apple.*` (e.g., `com.apple.quarantine`, `com.apple.metadata:_kMDItemUserTags`) and used by system features like Gatekeeper and Spotlight.(Citation: Establishing persistence using extended attributes on Linux) An adversary may leverage xattrs by embedding a second-stage payload into the extended attribute of a legitimate file. On macOS, a payload can be embedded into a custom attribute using the `xattr` command. A separate loader can retrieve the attribute with `xattr -p`, decode the content, and execute it using a scripting interpreter. On Linux, an adversary may use `setfattr` to write a payload into the `user.` namespace of a legitimate file. A loader script can later extract the payload with `getfattr --only-values`, decode it, and execute it using bash or another interpreter. In both cases, because the primary file content remains unchanged, security tools and integrity checks that do not inspect extended attributes will observe the original file hash, allowing the malicious payload to evade detection.(Citation: Low GroupIB xattrs nov 2024)