Query: detection rule: Detects process access requests from hacktool processes based on their default image name
Matching passage: Sigma rule: Detects process access requests from hacktool processes based on their default image name. Logsource: windows / process_access. Rule: title: HackTool - Generic Process Access id: d0d2f720-d14f-448d-8242-51ff396a334e status: test description: Detects process access requests from hacktool processes based on their default image name references: - https://jsecurity101.medium.com/bypassing-access-mask-auditing-strategies-480fb641c158 - https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/you-bet-your-lsass-hunting-lsass-access.html author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems), Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel date: 2023-11-27 tags: - attack.credential-access - attack.t1003.001 - attack.s0002 logsource: category: process_access product: windows detection: selection: - SourceImage|endswith: - \Akagi.exe - \Akagi64.exe - \atexec_windows.exe - \Certify.exe - \Certipy.exe - \CoercedPotato.exe - \crackmapexec.exe - \CreateMiniDump.exe - \dcomexec_windows.exe - \dpapi_windows.exe - \findDelegation_windows.exe - \GetADUsers_windows.exe - \GetNPUsers_windows.exe - \getPac_windows.exe - \getST_windows.exe - \getTGT_windows.exe - \GetUserSPNs_windows.exe - \gmer.exe - \hashcat.exe - \htran.exe - \ifmap_windows.exe - \impersonate.exe - \Inveigh.exe - \LocalPotato.exe - \mimikatz_windows.exe - \mimikatz.exe - \netview_windows.exe - \nmapAnswerMachine_windows.exe - \opdump_windows.exe - \PasswordDump.exe - \Potato.exe - \PowerTool.exe - \PowerTool64.exe - \psexec_windows.exe - \PurpleSharp.exe - \pypykatz.exe - \QuarksPwDump.exe - \rdp_check_windows.exe - \Rubeus.exe - \SafetyKatz.exe - \sambaPipe_windows.exe - \SelectMyParent.exe - \SharpChisel.exe - \SharPersist.exe - \SharpEvtMute.exe - \SharpImpersonation.exe - \SharpLDAPmonitor.exe - \SharpLdapWhoami.exe - \SharpUp.exe - \SharpView.exe - \smbclient_windows.exe - \smbserver_windows.exe - \sniff_windows.exe - \sniffer_windows.exe - \split_windows.exe - \SpoolSample.exe - \Stracciatella.exe - \SysmonEOP.exe - \temp\rot.exe - \ticketer_windows.exe - \TruffleSnout.exe - \winPEASany_ofs.exe - \winPEASany.exe - \winPEASx64_ofs.exe - \winPEASx64.exe - \winPEASx86_ofs.exe - \winPEASx86.exe - \xordump.exe - SourceImage|contains: - \goldenPac - \just_dce_ - \karmaSMB - \kintercept - \LocalPotato - \ntlmrelayx - \rpcdump - \samrdump - \secretsdump - \smbexec - \smbrelayx - \wmiexec - \wmipersist - HotPotato - Juicy Potato - JuicyPotato - PetitPotam - RottenPotato condition: selection falsepositives: - Unlikely level: high
Near-miss passage: Sigma rule: Detects actions that clear the local ShimCache and remove forensic evidence. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: ShimCache Flush id: b0524451-19af-4efa-a46f-562a977f792e status: stable description: Detects actions that clear the local ShimCache and remove forensic evidence references: - https://medium.com/@blueteamops/shimcache-flush-89daff28d15e author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems) date: 2021-02-01 tags: - attack.persistence - attack.defense-impairment - attack.t1112 logsource: category: process_creation product: windows detection: selection1a: CommandLine|contains|all: - rundll32 - apphelp.dll selection1b: CommandLine|contains: - ShimFlushCache - '#250' selection2a: CommandLine|contains|all: - rundll32 - kernel32.dll selection2b: CommandLine|contains: - BaseFlushAppcompatCache - '#46' condition: ( selection1a and selection1b ) or ( selection2a and selection2b ) falsepositives: - Unknown level: high