Query: alert when Detects network connections via finger.exe, which can be abused by threat actors to retrieve remote commands for executi
Matching passage: Sigma rule: Detects network connections via finger.exe, which can be abused by threat actors to retrieve remote commands for executi. Logsource: windows / network_connection. Rule: title: Network Connection Initiated via Finger.EXE id: 2fdaf50b-9fd5-449f-ba69-f17248119af6 related: - id: c082c2b0-525b-4dbc-9a26-a57dc4692074 type: similar - id: af491bca-e752-4b44-9c86-df5680533dbc type: similar status: experimental description: 'Detects network connections via finger.exe, which can be abused by threat actors to retrieve remote commands for execution on Windows devices. In one ClickFix malware campaign, adversaries leveraged the finger protocol to fetch commands from a remote server. Since the finger utility is not commonly used in modern Windows environments, its presence already raises suspicion. Investigating such network connections can also help identify potential malicious infrastructure used by threat actors ' references: - https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/decades-old-finger-protocol-abused-in-clickfix-malware-attacks/ author: Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems) date: 2025-11-19 tags: - attack.command-and-control - attack.t1071.004 - attack.execution - attack.t1059.003 logsource: category: network_connection product: windows detection: selection: Initiated: 'true' Image|endswith: \finger.exe condition: selection falsepositives: - Unlikely level: high
Near-miss passage: Sigma rule: Files with well-known filenames (sensitive files with credential data) copying. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: Copying Sensitive Files with Credential Data id: e7be6119-fc37-43f0-ad4f-1f3f99be2f9f status: test description: Files with well-known filenames (sensitive files with credential data) copying references: - https://room362.com/post/2013/2013-06-10-volume-shadow-copy-ntdsdit-domain-hashes-remotely-part-1/ - https://www.slideshare.net/heirhabarov/hunting-for-credentials-dumping-in-windows-environment - https://dfironthemountain.wordpress.com/2018/12/06/locked-file-access-using-esentutl-exe/ - https://github.com/LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS/blob/2cc01b01132b5c304027a658c698ae09dd6a92bf/yml/OSBinaries/Esentutl.yml author: Teymur Kheirkhabarov, Daniil Yugoslavskiy, oscd.community date: 2019-10-22 modified: 2024-06-04 tags: - attack.credential-access - attack.t1003.002 - attack.t1003.003 - car.2013-07-001 - attack.s0404 logsource: category: process_creation product: windows detection: selection_esent_img: - Image|endswith: \esentutl.exe - OriginalFileName: \esentutl.exe selection_esent_cli: CommandLine|contains|windash: - vss - ' /m ' - ' /y ' selection_susp_paths: CommandLine|contains: - \config\RegBack\sam - \config\RegBack\security - \config\RegBack\system - \config\sam - \config\security - '\config\system ' - \repair\sam - \repair\security - \repair\system - \windows\ntds\ntds.dit condition: all of selection_esent_* or selection_susp_paths falsepositives: - Copying sensitive files for legitimate use (eg. backup) or forensic investigation by legitimate incident responder or forensic investigator. level: high