Query: write Sigma for Detects suspicious children spawned via the Windows Terminal application which could be a sign of persistence via Window
Matching passage: Sigma rule: Detects suspicious children spawned via the Windows Terminal application which could be a sign of persistence via Window. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: Suspicious WindowsTerminal Child Processes id: 8de89e52-f6e1-4b5b-afd1-41ecfa300d48 status: test description: Detects suspicious children spawned via the Windows Terminal application which could be a sign of persistence via WindowsTerminal (see references section) references: - https://persistence-info.github.io/Data/windowsterminalprofile.html - https://twitter.com/nas_bench/status/1550836225652686848 author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) date: 2022-07-25 modified: 2023-02-14 tags: - attack.execution - attack.persistence logsource: category: process_creation product: windows detection: selection_parent: ParentImage|endswith: - \WindowsTerminal.exe - \wt.exe selection_susp: - Image|endswith: - \rundll32.exe - \regsvr32.exe - \certutil.exe - \cscript.exe - \wscript.exe - \csc.exe - Image|contains: - C:\Users\Public\ - \Downloads\ - \Desktop\ - \AppData\Local\Temp\ - \Windows\TEMP\ - CommandLine|contains: - ' iex ' - ' icm' - Invoke- - 'Import-Module ' - 'ipmo ' - DownloadString( - ' /c ' - ' /k ' - ' /r ' filter_builtin_visual_studio_shell: CommandLine|contains|all: - Import-Module - Microsoft.VisualStudio.DevShell.dll - Enter-VsDevShell filter_open_settings: CommandLine|contains|all: - \AppData\Local\Packages\Microsoft.WindowsTerminal_ - \LocalState\settings.json filter_vsdevcmd: CommandLine|contains|all: - C:\Program Files\Microsoft Visual Studio\ - \Common7\Tools\VsDevCmd.bat condition: all of selection_* and not 1 of filter_* falsepositives: - Other legitimate "Windows Terminal" profiles level: medium
Near-miss passage: Sigma rule: Detects usage of the "sc.exe" utility adding a new service with special permission seen used by threat actors which make. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: Service DACL Abuse To Hide Services Via Sc.EXE id: a537cfc3-4297-4789-92b5-345bfd845ad0 related: - id: 99cf1e02-00fb-4c0d-8375-563f978dfd37 type: similar - id: 98c5aeef-32d5-492f-b174-64a691896d25 type: similar status: test description: Detects usage of the "sc.exe" utility adding a new service with special permission seen used by threat actors which makes the service hidden and unremovable. references: - https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2021/10/threat-hunting-in-large-datasets-by.html - https://www.sans.org/blog/red-team-tactics-hiding-windows-services/ - https://twitter.com/Alh4zr3d/status/1580925761996828672 - https://itconnect.uw.edu/tools-services-support/it-systems-infrastructure/msinf/other-help/understanding-sddl-syntax/ author: Andreas Hunkeler (@Karneades) date: 2021-12-20 modified: 2022-08-08 tags: - attack.persistence - attack.privilege-escalation - attack.execution - attack.stealth - attack.t1574.011 logsource: category: process_creation product: windows detection: selection_img: - Image|endswith: \sc.exe - OriginalFileName: sc.exe selection_cli: CommandLine|contains|all: - sdset - DCLCWPDTSD condition: all of selection_* falsepositives: - Unknown level: high