alirezaaminzadeh/cybersec-retrieval-benchmark huggingface dataset:
Sigma rule: Detects the creation or patching of potential malicious RoleBinding/ClusterRoleBinding.. Logsource: azure / activitylogs. Rule: title: Azure Kubernetes RoleBinding/ClusterRoleBinding Modified and Deleted id: 25cb259b-bbdc-4b87-98b7-90d7c72f8743 status: test description: Detects the creation or patching of potential malicious RoleBinding/ClusterRoleBinding. references: - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/role-based-access-control/resource-provider-operations#microsoftkubernetes - https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2021/03/23/secure-containerized-environments-with-updated-threat-matrix-for-kubernetes/ - https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2020/04/02/attack-matrix-kubernetes/ - https://medium.com/mitre-engenuity/att-ck-for-containers-now-available-4c2359654bf1 author: Austin Songer @austinsonger date: 2021-08-07 modified: 2022-08-23 tags: - attack.impact - attack.credential-access - attack.t1485 - attack.t1496 - attack.t1489 logsource: product: azure service: activitylogs detection: selection: operationName: - MICROSOFT.KUBERNETES/CONNECTEDCLUSTERS/RBAC.AUTHORIZATION.K8S.IO/CLUSTERROLEBINDINGS/WRITE - MICROSOFT.KUBERNETES/CONNECTEDCLUSTERS/RBAC.AUTHORIZATION.K8S.IO/CLUSTERROLEBINDINGS/DELETE - MICROSOFT.KUBERNETES/CONNECTEDCLUSTERS/RBAC.AUTHORIZATION.K8S.IO/ROLEBINDINGS/WRITE - MICROSOFT.KUBERNETES/CONNECTEDCLUSTERS/RBAC.AUTHORIZATION.K8S.IO/ROLEBINDINGS/DELETE condition: selection falsepositives: - RoleBinding/ClusterRoleBinding being modified and deleted may be performed by a system administrator. Verify whether the user identity, user agent, and/or hostname should be making changes in your environment. - RoleBinding/ClusterRoleBinding modification from unfamiliar users should be investigated. If known behavior is causing false positives, it can be exempted from the rule. level: medium
Sigma rule: Detects the creation of a schtask that executes a file from C:\Users\<USER>\AppData\Local. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: Suspicious Schtasks Execution AppData Folder id: c5c00f49-b3f9-45a6-997e-cfdecc6e1967 status: test description: Detects the creation of a schtask that executes a file from C:\Users\<USER>\AppData\Local references: - https://thedfirreport.com/2022/02/21/qbot-and-zerologon-lead-to-full-domain-compromise/ author: pH-T (Nextron Systems), Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) date: 2022-03-15 modified: 2022-07-28 tags: - attack.privilege-escalation - attack.execution - attack.persistence - attack.t1053.005 - attack.t1059.001 logsource: product: windows category: process_creation detection: selection: Image|endswith: \schtasks.exe CommandLine|contains|all: - /Create - /RU - /TR - C:\Users\ - \AppData\Local\ CommandLine|contains: - NT AUT - ' SYSTEM ' filter: ParentImage|contains|all: - \AppData\Local\Temp\ - TeamViewer_.exe Image|endswith: \schtasks.exe CommandLine|contains: /TN TVInstallRestore condition: selection and not filter falsepositives: - Unknown level: high
Sigma rule: Detects the presence of a loaded unsigned kernel module on the system.. Logsource: windows / codeintegrity-operational. Rule: title: CodeIntegrity - Unsigned Kernel Module Loaded id: 951f8d29-f2f6-48a7-859f-0673ff105e6f status: test description: Detects the presence of a loaded unsigned kernel module on the system. references: - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/application-security/application-control/windows-defender-application-control/operations/event-id-explanations - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/application-security/application-control/windows-defender-application-control/operations/event-tag-explanations - Internal Research author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) date: 2023-06-06 tags: - attack.privilege-escalation logsource: product: windows service: codeintegrity-operational detection: selection: EventID: 3001 condition: selection falsepositives: - Unlikely level: high
Sigma rule: Detects changes to the Netsh registry key to add a new DLL value that is located on a suspicious location. This change m. Logsource: windows / registry_set. Rule: title: New Netsh Helper DLL Registered From A Suspicious Location id: e7b18879-676e-4a0e-ae18-27039185a8e7 related: - id: 56321594-9087-49d9-bf10-524fe8479452 type: similar - id: c90362e0-2df3-4e61-94fe-b37615814cb1 type: similar status: test description: 'Detects changes to the Netsh registry key to add a new DLL value that is located on a suspicious location. This change might be an indication of a potential persistence attempt by adding a malicious Netsh helper ' references: - https://www.ired.team/offensive-security/persistence/t1128-netsh-helper-dll - https://pentestlab.blog/2019/10/29/persistence-netsh-helper-dll/ author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) date: 2023-11-28 tags: - attack.privilege-escalation - attack.persistence - attack.t1546.007 logsource: category: registry_set product: windows detection: selection_target: TargetObject|contains: \SOFTWARE\Microsoft\NetSh selection_folders_1: Details|contains: - :\Perflogs\ - :\Users\Public\ - :\Windows\Temp\ - \AppData\Local\Temp\ - \Temporary Internet selection_folders_2: - Details|contains|all: - :\Users\ - \Favorites\ - Details|contains|all: - :\Users\ - \Favourites\ - Details|contains|all: - :\Users\ - \Contacts\ - Details|contains|all: - :\Users\ - \Pictures\ condition: selection_target and 1 of selection_folders_* falsepositives: - Unknown level: high
Sigma rule: Detects events in which a history file gets deleted, e.g. the ~/bash_history to remove traces of malicious activity. Logsource: linux / process_creation. Rule: title: History File Deletion id: 1182f3b3-e716-4efa-99ab-d2685d04360f status: test description: Detects events in which a history file gets deleted, e.g. the ~/bash_history to remove traces of malicious activity references: - https://github.com/sleventyeleven/linuxprivchecker/ - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1552.003/T1552.003.md author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems) date: 2022-06-20 modified: 2022-09-15 tags: - attack.impact - attack.t1565.001 logsource: category: process_creation product: linux detection: selection: Image|endswith: - /rm - /unlink - /shred selection_history: - CommandLine|contains: - /.bash_history - /.zsh_history - CommandLine|endswith: - _history - .history - zhistory condition: all of selection* falsepositives: - Legitimate administration activities level: high
Sigma rule: Detects tampering of the Vulnerable Driver Blocklist registry via command line tools such as PowerShell or REG.EXE. The. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: Vulnerable Driver Blocklist Registry Tampering Via CommandLine id: 22154f0e-5132-4a54-aa78-cc62f6def531 related: - id: d526c60a-e236-4011-b165-831ffa52ab70 type: similar status: experimental description: 'Detects tampering of the Vulnerable Driver Blocklist registry via command line tools such as PowerShell or REG.EXE. The Vulnerable Driver Blocklist is a security feature that helps prevent the loading of known vulnerable drivers. Disabling this feature may indicate an attempt to bypass security controls, often targeted by threat actors to facilitate the installation of malicious or vulnerable drivers, particularly in scenarios involving Endpoint Detection and Response ' references: - https://www.sophos.com/en-us/blog/sharpening-the-knife-gold-blades-strategic-evolution - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/application-security/application-control/app-control-for-business/design/microsoft-recommended-driver-block-rules author: Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems) date: 2026-01-26 tags: - attack.defense-impairment - attack.t1685 logsource: category: process_creation product: windows detection: selection_img: - Image|endswith: - \powershell.exe - \pwsh.exe - \reg.exe - OriginalFileName: - PowerShell.EXE - pwsh.dll - reg.exe selection_cli_1: CommandLine|contains: - 'add ' - 'New-ItemProperty ' - 'Set-ItemProperty ' - 'si ' selection_cli_2: CommandLine|contains|all: - \Control\CI\Config - VulnerableDriverBlocklistEnable condition: all of selection_* falsepositives: - It is very unlikely for legitimate activities to disable the Vulnerable Driver Blocklist via command line tools; thus it is recommended to investigate promptly. level: high regression_tests_path: regression_data/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_vulnerable_driver_blocklist_registry_tampering/info.yml
Sigma rule: Detects weak passwords or often abused passwords (seen used by threat actors) via the CLI. An example would be a threat. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: Weak or Abused Passwords In CLI id: 91edcfb1-2529-4ac2-9ecc-7617f895c7e4 status: test description: 'Detects weak passwords or often abused passwords (seen used by threat actors) via the CLI. An example would be a threat actor creating a new user via the net command and providing the password inline ' references: - https://symantec-enterprise-blogs.security.com/blogs/threat-intelligence/espionage-asia-governments - https://thedfirreport.com/2022/09/26/bumblebee-round-two/ - https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2022/10/25/dev-0832-vice-society-opportunistic-ransomware-campaigns-impacting-us-education-sector/ - https://www.huntress.com/blog/slashandgrab-screen-connect-post-exploitation-in-the-wild-cve-2024-1709-cve-2024-1708 author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) date: 2022-09-14 modified: 2024-02-23 tags: - attack.execution - attack.stealth logsource: category: process_creation product: windows detection: selection: CommandLine|contains: - '123456789' - 123123qwE - Asd123.aaaa - Decryptme - P@ssw0rd! - Pass8080 - password123 - test@202 condition: selection falsepositives: - Legitimate usage of the passwords by users via commandline (should be discouraged) - Other currently unknown false positives level: medium
Sigma rule: Detects msdt.exe executed by a suspicious parent as seen in CVE-2022-30190 / Follina exploitation. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: Suspicious MSDT Parent Process id: 7a74da6b-ea76-47db-92cc-874ad90df734 status: test description: Detects msdt.exe executed by a suspicious parent as seen in CVE-2022-30190 / Follina exploitation references: - https://twitter.com/nao_sec/status/1530196847679401984 - https://app.any.run/tasks/713f05d2-fe78-4b9d-a744-f7c133e3fafb/ author: Nextron Systems date: 2022-06-01 modified: 2023-02-06 tags: - attack.stealth - attack.t1036 - attack.t1218 logsource: category: process_creation product: windows detection: selection_parent: ParentImage|endswith: - \cmd.exe - \cscript.exe - \mshta.exe - \powershell.exe - \pwsh.exe - \regsvr32.exe - \rundll32.exe - \schtasks.exe - \wmic.exe - \wscript.exe - \wsl.exe selection_msdt: - Image|endswith: \msdt.exe - OriginalFileName: msdt.exe condition: all of selection_* falsepositives: - Unknown level: high
Sigma rule: Detects suspicious PowerShell invocation command parameters. Logsource: windows / ps_script. Rule: title: Suspicious PowerShell Invocations - Generic id: ed965133-513f-41d9-a441-e38076a0798f related: - id: 3d304fda-78aa-43ed-975c-d740798a49c1 type: derived - id: bbb80e91-5746-4fbe-8898-122e2cafdbf4 type: similar status: test description: Detects suspicious PowerShell invocation command parameters references: - Internal Research author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems) date: 2017-03-12 modified: 2023-01-03 tags: - attack.execution - attack.t1059.001 logsource: product: windows category: ps_script definition: 'Requirements: Script Block Logging must be enabled' detection: selection_encoded: ScriptBlockText|contains: - ' -enc ' - ' -EncodedCommand ' - ' -ec ' selection_hidden: ScriptBlockText|contains: - ' -w hidden ' - ' -window hidden ' - ' -windowstyle hidden ' - ' -w 1 ' selection_noninteractive: ScriptBlockText|contains: - ' -noni ' - ' -noninteractive ' condition: all of selection* falsepositives: - Very special / sneaky PowerShell scripts level: high
Sigma rule: Detects a threat actor creating a file named `wbemcomn.dll` in the `C:\Windows\System32\wbem\` directory over the networ. Logsource: windows / security. Rule: title: T1047 Wmiprvse Wbemcomn DLL Hijack id: f6c68d5f-e101-4b86-8c84-7d96851fd65c status: test description: Detects a threat actor creating a file named `wbemcomn.dll` in the `C:\Windows\System32\wbem\` directory over the network for a WMI DLL Hijack scenario. references: - https://threathunterplaybook.com/hunts/windows/201009-RemoteWMIWbemcomnDLLHijack/notebook.html author: Roberto Rodriguez @Cyb3rWard0g, Open Threat Research (OTR) date: 2020-10-12 modified: 2022-02-24 tags: - attack.execution - attack.t1047 - attack.lateral-movement - attack.t1021.002 logsource: product: windows service: security detection: selection: EventID: 5145 RelativeTargetName|endswith: \wbem\wbemcomn.dll filter: SubjectUserName|endswith: $ condition: selection and not filter falsepositives: - Unknown level: high
Sigma rule: Adversaries may abuse features of Winlogon to execute DLLs and/or executables when a user logs in. Winlogon.exe is a Win. Logsource: windows / registry_set. Rule: title: Winlogon Notify Key Logon Persistence id: bbf59793-6efb-4fa1-95ca-a7d288e52c88 status: test description: 'Adversaries may abuse features of Winlogon to execute DLLs and/or executables when a user logs in. Winlogon.exe is a Windows component responsible for actions at logon/logoff as well as the secure attention sequence (SAS) triggered by Ctrl-Alt-Delete. ' references: - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1547.004/T1547.004.md#atomic-test-3---winlogon-notify-key-logon-persistence---powershell author: frack113 date: 2021-12-30 modified: 2023-08-17 tags: - attack.privilege-escalation - attack.persistence - attack.t1547.004 logsource: category: registry_set product: windows detection: selection: TargetObject|endswith: \SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon\Notify\logon Details|endswith: .dll condition: selection falsepositives: - Unknown level: high
Sigma rule: Detects the execution of "wmic" with the "process" flag, which might indicate an attempt to perform reconnaissance on ru. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: Potential Process Reconnaissance via Wmic.EXE id: 221b251a-357a-49a9-920a-271802777cc0 status: test description: 'Detects the execution of "wmic" with the "process" flag, which might indicate an attempt to perform reconnaissance on running processes. Adversaries may use wmic to query for running processes and their details as part of their reconnaissance efforts. ' references: - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1047/T1047.md - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/wmic author: frack113 date: 2022-01-01 modified: 2025-12-15 tags: - attack.execution - attack.t1047 - attack.discovery - attack.t1057 logsource: category: process_creation product: windows detection: selection_img: - Image|endswith: \WMIC.exe - OriginalFileName: wmic.exe selection_cli: CommandLine|contains: process filter_main_creation: CommandLine|contains|all: - call - create filter_main_terminate: CommandLine|contains|all: - call - terminate condition: all of selection* and not 1 of filter_main_* falsepositives: - Unknown level: medium simulation: - type: atomic-red-team name: WMI Reconnaissance Processes technique: T1047 atomic_guid: 5750aa16-0e59-4410-8b9a-8a47ca2788e2 regression_tests_path: regression_data/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_wmic_recon_process/info.yml
Sigma rule: Detects backup catalog deletions. Logsource: windows / application. Rule: title: Backup Catalog Deleted id: 9703792d-fd9a-456d-a672-ff92efe4806a status: test description: Detects backup catalog deletions references: - https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc742154(v=ws.11).aspx - https://www.hybrid-analysis.com/sample/ed01ebfbc9eb5bbea545af4d01bf5f1071661840480439c6e5babe8e080e41aa?environmentId=100 author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Tom U. @c_APT_ure (collection) date: 2017-05-12 modified: 2022-12-25 tags: - attack.stealth - attack.t1070.004 logsource: product: windows service: application detection: selection: EventID: 524 Provider_Name: Microsoft-Windows-Backup condition: selection falsepositives: - Unknown level: medium
Sigma rule: Detects the presence of default Cobalt Strike certificate in the HTTPS traffic. Logsource: zeek / x509. Rule: title: Default Cobalt Strike Certificate id: 7100f7e3-92ce-4584-b7b7-01b40d3d4118 status: test description: Detects the presence of default Cobalt Strike certificate in the HTTPS traffic references: - https://sergiusechel.medium.com/improving-the-network-based-detection-of-cobalt-strike-c2-servers-in-the-wild-while-reducing-the-6964205f6468 author: Bhabesh Raj date: 2021-06-23 modified: 2022-10-09 tags: - attack.command-and-control - attack.s0154 logsource: product: zeek service: x509 detection: selection: certificate.serial: 8BB00EE condition: selection falsepositives: - Unknown level: high
Sigma rule: Identifies when the Secrets are Modified or Deleted.. Logsource: gcp / gcp.audit. Rule: title: Google Cloud Kubernetes Secrets Modified or Deleted id: 2f0bae2d-bf20-4465-be86-1311addebaa3 status: test description: Identifies when the Secrets are Modified or Deleted. references: - https://cloud.google.com/kubernetes-engine/docs/how-to/audit-logging author: Austin Songer @austinsonger date: 2021-08-09 modified: 2022-10-09 tags: - attack.credential-access logsource: product: gcp service: gcp.audit detection: selection: gcp.audit.method_name: - io.k8s.core.v*.secrets.create - io.k8s.core.v*.secrets.update - io.k8s.core.v*.secrets.patch - io.k8s.core.v*.secrets.delete condition: selection falsepositives: - Secrets being modified or deleted may be performed by a system administrator. Verify whether the user identity, user agent, and/or hostname should be making changes in your environment. - Secrets modified or deleted from unfamiliar users should be investigated. If known behavior is causing false positives, it can be exempted from the rule. level: medium
Sigma rule: Detects execution of different log query utilities and commands to search and dump the content of specific event logs or. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: Potentially Suspicious EventLog Recon Activity Using Log Query Utilities id: beaa66d6-aa1b-4e3c-80f5-e0145369bfaf related: - id: 9cd55b6c-430a-4fa9-96f4-7cadf5229e9f type: derived status: test description: 'Detects execution of different log query utilities and commands to search and dump the content of specific event logs or look for specific event IDs. This technique is used by threat actors in order to extract sensitive information from events logs such as usernames, IP addresses, hostnames, etc. ' references: - http://blog.talosintelligence.com/2022/09/lazarus-three-rats.html - https://thedfirreport.com/2023/10/30/netsupport-intrusion-results-in-domain-compromise/ - https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/cybersecurity-advisories/aa23-144a - https://www.group-ib.com/blog/apt41-world-tour-2021/ - https://labs.withsecure.com/content/dam/labs/docs/f-secureLABS-tlp-white-lazarus-threat-intel-report2.pdf - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/microsoft.powershell.diagnostics/get-winevent?view=powershell-7.3 - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/microsoft.powershell.management/get-eventlog?view=powershell-5.1 - http://www.solomonson.com/posts/2010-07-09-reading-eventviewer-command-line/ - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/wevtutil - https://ptsecurity.com/research/pt-esc-threat-intelligence/striking-panda-attacks-apt31-today - https://www.cybertriage.com/artifact/terminalservices_remoteconnectionmanager_log/ - https://ponderthebits.com/2018/02/windows-rdp-related-event-logs-identification-tracking-and-investigation/ author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems), X__Junior (Nextron Systems) date: 2022-09-09 modified: 2025-12-02 tags: - attack.credential-access - attack.discovery - attack.t1552 - attack.t1087 logsource: category: process_creation product: windows detection: selection_wmi: CommandLine|contains|all: - Select - Win32_NTLogEvent selection_wevtutil_img: - Image|endswith: \wevtutil.exe - OriginalFileName: wevtutil.exe selection_wevtutil_cli: CommandLine|contains: - ' qe ' - ' query-events ' selection_wmic_img: - Image|endswith: \wmic.exe - OriginalFileName: wmic.exe selection_wmic_cli: CommandLine|contains: ' ntevent' selection_cmdlet: CommandLine|contains: - 'Get-WinEvent ' - 'get-eventlog ' selection_logs_name: CommandLine|contains: - Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell - Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing - Microsoft-Windows-TerminalServices-LocalSessionManager - Microsof
Sigma rule: Detects failed attempts to clear Windows event logs via the WMI NTEventLogFile ClearEventLog method. Event 5858 in the W. Logsource: windows / wmi. Rule: title: Failed Event Log Clear Via WMI NTEventLogFile ClearEventLog id: d4f1a2b3-7c8e-4d5f-b6a9-1e0c2d3f4e5b status: test description: 'Detects failed attempts to clear Windows event logs via the WMI NTEventLogFile ClearEventLog method. Event 5858 in the WMI-Activity operational log is an error event, meaning it is only generated when the WMI operation encounters an error (e.g. access denied, provider failure). It could be an indication of an attacker attempting to clear event logs via WMI, but failing due to insufficient privileges or other issues. Successful clearing operations will NOT produce this event; for those, correlate with Security event 1102 or System event 104. ' references: - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/cimwin32prov/cleareventlog-method-in-class-win32-nteventlogfile author: Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems) date: 2026-07-01 tags: - attack.defense-impairment - attack.t1685.005 logsource: product: windows service: wmi detection: selection: EventID: 5858 Operation|contains|all: - Win32_NTEventlogFile - cleareventlog condition: selection falsepositives: - Unknown level: medium regression_tests_path: regression_data/rules/windows/builtin/wmi/win_wmi_activity_nteventlogfile_cleareventlog/info.yml
Sigma rule: Detects the use of wget to download content to a suspicious directory. Logsource: linux / process_creation. Rule: title: Download File To Potentially Suspicious Directory Via Wget id: cf610c15-ed71-46e1-bdf8-2bd1a99de6c4 status: test description: Detects the use of wget to download content to a suspicious directory references: - https://blogs.jpcert.or.jp/en/2023/05/gobrat.html - https://jstnk9.github.io/jstnk9/research/GobRAT-Malware/ - https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/60bcd645450e4c846238cf0e7226dc40c84c96eba99f6b2cffcd0ab4a391c8b3/detection - https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/3e44c807a25a56f4068b5b8186eee5002eed6f26d665a8b791c472ad154585d1/detection author: Joseliyo Sanchez, @Joseliyo_Jstnk date: 2023-06-02 tags: - attack.command-and-control - attack.t1105 logsource: category: process_creation product: linux detection: selection_img: Image|endswith: /wget selection_output: - CommandLine|re: \s-O\s - CommandLine|contains: --output-document selection_path: CommandLine|contains: /tmp/ condition: all of selection_* falsepositives: - Unknown level: medium
Sigma rule: Detects suspicious Django web application framework exceptions that could indicate exploitation attempts. Logsource: django / application. Rule: title: Django Framework Exceptions id: fd435618-981e-4a7c-81f8-f78ce480d616 status: stable description: Detects suspicious Django web application framework exceptions that could indicate exploitation attempts references: - https://docs.djangoproject.com/en/1.11/ref/exceptions/ - https://docs.djangoproject.com/en/1.11/topics/logging/#django-security author: Thomas Patzke date: 2017-08-05 modified: 2020-09-01 tags: - attack.initial-access - attack.t1190 logsource: category: application product: django detection: keywords: - SuspiciousOperation - DisallowedHost - DisallowedModelAdminLookup - DisallowedModelAdminToField - DisallowedRedirect - InvalidSessionKey - RequestDataTooBig - SuspiciousFileOperation - SuspiciousMultipartForm - SuspiciousSession - TooManyFieldsSent - PermissionDenied condition: keywords falsepositives: - Application bugs level: medium