alirezaaminzadeh/cybersec-retrieval-benchmark huggingface dataset:
Sigma rule: Detects the execution node.exe which is shipped with multiple software such as VMware, Adobe...etc. In order to execute. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: Potential Arbitrary Code Execution Via Node.EXE id: 6640f31c-01ad-49b5-beb5-83498a5cd8bd status: test description: Detects the execution node.exe which is shipped with multiple software such as VMware, Adobe...etc. In order to execute arbitrary code. For example to establish reverse shell as seen in Log4j attacks...etc references: - http://blog.talosintelligence.com/2022/09/lazarus-three-rats.html - https://www.sprocketsecurity.com/resources/crossing-the-log4j-horizon-a-vulnerability-with-no-return - https://www.rapid7.com/blog/post/2022/01/18/active-exploitation-of-vmware-horizon-servers/ - https://nodejs.org/api/cli.html author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) date: 2022-09-09 modified: 2023-02-03 tags: - attack.execution - attack.stealth - attack.t1127 logsource: category: process_creation product: windows detection: selection_main: Image|endswith: \node.exe CommandLine|contains: - ' -e ' - ' --eval ' selection_action_reverse_shell: CommandLine|contains|all: - .exec( - net.socket - .connect - child_process condition: selection_main and 1 of selection_action_* falsepositives: - Unlikely level: high
Sigma rule: Detects when end user consent is blocked due to risk-based consent.. Logsource: azure / auditlogs. Rule: title: End User Consent Blocked id: 7091372f-623c-4293-bc37-20c32b3492be status: test description: Detects when end user consent is blocked due to risk-based consent. references: - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/architecture/security-operations-applications#end-user-stopped-due-to-risk-based-consent author: Bailey Bercik '@baileybercik', Mark Morowczynski '@markmorow' date: 2022-07-10 tags: - attack.credential-access - attack.t1528 logsource: product: azure service: auditlogs detection: selection: failure_status_reason: Microsoft.online.Security.userConsentBlockedForRiskyAppsExceptions condition: selection falsepositives: - Unknown level: medium
Sigma rule: Detects the use of the spoolss named pipe over SMB. This can be used to trigger the authentication via NTLM of any machi. Logsource: windows / security. Rule: title: DCERPC SMB Spoolss Named Pipe id: 214e8f95-100a-4e04-bb31-ef6cba8ce07e status: test description: Detects the use of the spoolss named pipe over SMB. This can be used to trigger the authentication via NTLM of any machine that has the spoolservice enabled. references: - https://posts.specterops.io/hunting-in-active-directory-unconstrained-delegation-forests-trusts-71f2b33688e1 - https://dirkjanm.io/a-different-way-of-abusing-zerologon/ - https://twitter.com/_dirkjan/status/1309214379003588608 author: OTR (Open Threat Research) date: 2018-11-28 modified: 2022-08-11 tags: - attack.lateral-movement - attack.t1021.002 logsource: product: windows service: security detection: selection: EventID: 5145 ShareName: \\\\\*\\IPC$ RelativeTargetName: spoolss condition: selection falsepositives: - Domain Controllers acting as printer servers too? :) level: medium
Sigma rule: Detects known malicious service installs that appear in cases in which a Cobalt Strike beacon elevates privileges or lat. Logsource: windows / registry_set. Rule: title: Potential CobaltStrike Service Installations - Registry id: 61a7697c-cb79-42a8-a2ff-5f0cdfae0130 status: test description: 'Detects known malicious service installs that appear in cases in which a Cobalt Strike beacon elevates privileges or lateral movement. ' references: - https://www.sans.org/webcasts/tech-tuesday-workshop-cobalt-strike-detection-log-analysis-119395 author: Wojciech Lesicki date: 2021-06-29 modified: 2024-03-25 tags: - attack.persistence - attack.execution - attack.privilege-escalation - attack.lateral-movement - attack.t1021.002 - attack.t1543.003 - attack.t1569.002 logsource: category: registry_set product: windows detection: selection_key: - TargetObject|contains: \System\CurrentControlSet\Services - TargetObject|contains|all: - \System\ControlSet - \Services selection_details: - Details|contains|all: - ADMIN$ - .exe - Details|contains|all: - '%COMSPEC%' - start - powershell condition: all of selection_* falsepositives: - Unlikely level: high
Sigma rule: Detects Azure Hybrid Connection Manager services querying the Azure service bus service. Logsource: windows / dns_query. Rule: title: DNS HybridConnectionManager Service Bus id: 7bd3902d-8b8b-4dd4-838a-c6862d40150d status: test description: Detects Azure Hybrid Connection Manager services querying the Azure service bus service references: - https://twitter.com/Cyb3rWard0g/status/1381642789369286662 author: Roberto Rodriguez (Cyb3rWard0g), OTR (Open Threat Research) date: 2021-04-12 modified: 2023-01-16 tags: - attack.persistence - attack.t1554 logsource: product: windows category: dns_query detection: selection: QueryName|contains: servicebus.windows.net Image|contains: HybridConnectionManager condition: selection falsepositives: - Legitimate use of Azure Hybrid Connection Manager and the Azure Service Bus service level: high
Sigma rule: A General detection for the Get-Clipboard commands in PowerShell logs. This could be an adversary capturing clipboard co. Logsource: windows / ps_module. Rule: title: PowerShell Get Clipboard id: 4cbd4f12-2e22-43e3-882f-bff3247ffb78 status: test description: A General detection for the Get-Clipboard commands in PowerShell logs. This could be an adversary capturing clipboard contents. references: - https://github.com/OTRF/detection-hackathon-apt29/issues/16 - https://github.com/OTRF/ThreatHunter-Playbook/blob/2d4257f630f4c9770f78d0c1df059f891ffc3fec/docs/evals/apt29/detections/7.A.2_F4609F7E-C4DB-4327-91D4-59A58C962A02.md author: Roberto Rodriguez (Cyb3rWard0g), OTR (Open Threat Research) date: 2020-05-02 modified: 2023-01-04 tags: - attack.collection - attack.t1115 logsource: product: windows category: ps_module definition: 0ad03ef1-f21b-4a79-8ce8-e6900c54b65b detection: selection: Payload|contains: Get-Clipboard condition: selection falsepositives: - Unknown level: medium
Sigma rule: Detects any assembly DLL being loaded by an Office Product. Logsource: windows / image_load. Rule: title: DotNET Assembly DLL Loaded Via Office Application id: ff0f2b05-09db-4095-b96d-1b75ca24894a status: test description: Detects any assembly DLL being loaded by an Office Product references: - https://medium.com/threatpunter/detecting-adversary-tradecraft-with-image-load-event-logging-and-eql-8de93338c16 author: Antonlovesdnb date: 2020-02-19 modified: 2023-03-29 tags: - attack.execution - attack.t1204.002 logsource: category: image_load product: windows detection: selection: Image|endswith: - \excel.exe - \mspub.exe - \onenote.exe - \onenoteim.exe - \outlook.exe - \powerpnt.exe - \winword.exe ImageLoaded|startswith: C:\Windows\assembly\ condition: selection falsepositives: - Unknown level: medium
Sigma rule: Detects the execution of the LocalPotato POC based on basic PE metadata information and default CLI examples. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: HackTool - LocalPotato Execution id: 6bd75993-9888-4f91-9404-e1e4e4e34b77 status: test description: Detects the execution of the LocalPotato POC based on basic PE metadata information and default CLI examples references: - https://www.localpotato.com/localpotato_html/LocalPotato.html - https://github.com/decoder-it/LocalPotato author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) date: 2023-02-14 modified: 2024-11-23 tags: - attack.privilege-escalation - cve.2023-21746 - attack.stealth logsource: category: process_creation product: windows detection: selection_img: Image|endswith: \LocalPotato.exe selection_cli: CommandLine|contains|all: - .exe -i C:\ - -o Windows\ selection_hash_plain: Hashes|contains: - IMPHASH=E1742EE971D6549E8D4D81115F88F1FC - IMPHASH=DD82066EFBA94D7556EF582F247C8BB5 condition: 1 of selection_* falsepositives: - Unlikely level: high
Sigma rule: Detects the execution of FSharp Interpreters "FsiAnyCpu.exe" and "FSi.exe" Both can be used for AWL bypass and to execut. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: Use of FSharp Interpreters id: b96b2031-7c17-4473-afe7-a30ce714db29 status: test description: 'Detects the execution of FSharp Interpreters "FsiAnyCpu.exe" and "FSi.exe" Both can be used for AWL bypass and to execute F# code via scripts or inline. ' references: - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/application-security/application-control/windows-defender-application-control/design/applications-that-can-bypass-wdac - https://bohops.com/2020/11/02/exploring-the-wdac-microsoft-recommended-block-rules-part-ii-wfc-fsi/ - https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/OtherMSBinaries/FsiAnyCpu/ - https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/OtherMSBinaries/Fsi/ author: Christopher Peacock @SecurePeacock, SCYTHE @scythe_io date: 2022-06-02 modified: 2024-04-23 tags: - attack.execution - attack.t1059 logsource: category: process_creation product: windows detection: selection: - Image|endswith: - \fsi.exe - \fsianycpu.exe - OriginalFileName: - fsi.exe - fsianycpu.exe condition: selection falsepositives: - Legitimate use by a software developer. level: medium
Sigma rule: Detects a remote DLL load event via "rundll32.exe".. Logsource: windows / image_load. Rule: title: Remote DLL Load Via Rundll32.EXE id: f40017b3-cb2e-4335-ab5d-3babf679c1de status: test description: Detects a remote DLL load event via "rundll32.exe". references: - https://github.com/gabe-k/themebleed - Internal Research author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) date: 2023-09-18 tags: - attack.execution - attack.t1204.002 logsource: category: image_load product: windows detection: selection: Image|endswith: \rundll32.exe ImageLoaded|startswith: \\\\ condition: selection falsepositives: - Unknown level: medium
Sigma rule: Detect malicious GPO modifications can be used to implement many other malicious behaviors.. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: Modify Group Policy Settings id: ada4b0c4-758b-46ac-9033-9004613a150d related: - id: b7216a7d-687e-4c8d-82b1-3080b2ad961f type: similar status: test description: Detect malicious GPO modifications can be used to implement many other malicious behaviors. references: - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/40b77d63808dd4f4eafb83949805636735a1fd15/atomics/T1484.001/T1484.001.md author: frack113 date: 2022-08-19 tags: - attack.privilege-escalation - attack.defense-impairment - attack.t1484.001 logsource: category: process_creation product: windows detection: selection_reg: - Image|endswith: \reg.exe - OriginalFileName: reg.exe selection_path: CommandLine|contains: \SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\System selection_key: CommandLine|contains: - GroupPolicyRefreshTimeDC - GroupPolicyRefreshTimeOffsetDC - GroupPolicyRefreshTime - GroupPolicyRefreshTimeOffset - EnableSmartScreen - ShellSmartScreenLevel condition: all of selection_* falsepositives: - Legitimate use level: medium
Sigma rule: Detects potential PowerShell commands or code within registry run keys. Logsource: windows / registry_set. Rule: title: Suspicious PowerShell In Registry Run Keys id: 8d85cf08-bf97-4260-ba49-986a2a65129c status: test description: Detects potential PowerShell commands or code within registry run keys references: - https://github.com/frack113/atomic-red-team/blob/a9051c38de8a5320b31c7039efcbd3b56cf2d65a/atomics/T1547.001/T1547.001.md#atomic-test-9---systembc-malware-as-a-service-registry - https://www.trendmicro.com/en_us/research/22/j/lv-ransomware-exploits-proxyshell-in-attack.html - https://github.com/HackTricks-wiki/hacktricks/blob/e4c7b21b8f36c97c35b7c622732b38a189ce18f7/src/windows-hardening/windows-local-privilege-escalation/privilege-escalation-with-autorun-binaries.md author: frack113, Florian Roth (Nextron Systems) date: 2022-03-17 modified: 2025-07-18 tags: - attack.privilege-escalation - attack.persistence - attack.t1547.001 logsource: category: registry_set product: windows detection: selection: TargetObject|contains: - \Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run - \Software\WOW6432Node\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run - \Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\Explorer\Run Details|contains: - powershell - 'pwsh ' - FromBase64String - .DownloadFile( - .DownloadString( - ' -w hidden ' - ' -w 1 ' - -windowstyle hidden - -window hidden - ' -nop ' - ' -encodedcommand ' - -ExecutionPolicy Bypass - Invoke-Expression - IEX ( - Invoke-Command - ICM - - Invoke-WebRequest - 'IWR ' - Invoke-RestMethod - 'IRM ' - ' -noni ' - ' -noninteractive ' condition: selection falsepositives: - Legitimate admin or third party scripts. Baseline according to your environment level: medium
Sigma rule: Detects the creation or patching of potential malicious RoleBinding. This includes RoleBindings and ClusterRoleBinding.. Logsource: gcp / gcp.audit. Rule: title: Google Cloud Kubernetes RoleBinding id: 0322d9f2-289a-47c2-b5e1-b63c90901a3e status: test description: Detects the creation or patching of potential malicious RoleBinding. This includes RoleBindings and ClusterRoleBinding. references: - https://github.com/elastic/detection-rules/pull/1267 - https://kubernetes.io/docs/reference/kubernetes-api/authorization-resources/cluster-role-v1/#ClusterRole - https://cloud.google.com/kubernetes-engine/docs/how-to/role-based-access-control - https://kubernetes.io/docs/reference/access-authn-authz/rbac/ - https://cloud.google.com/kubernetes-engine/docs/how-to/audit-logging author: Austin Songer @austinsonger date: 2021-08-09 modified: 2022-10-09 tags: - attack.credential-access logsource: product: gcp service: gcp.audit detection: selection: gcp.audit.method_name: - io.k8s.authorization.rbac.v*.clusterrolebindings.create - io.k8s.authorization.rbac.v*.rolebindings.create - io.k8s.authorization.rbac.v*.clusterrolebindings.patch - io.k8s.authorization.rbac.v*.rolebindings.patch - io.k8s.authorization.rbac.v*.clusterrolebindings.update - io.k8s.authorization.rbac.v*.rolebindings.update - io.k8s.authorization.rbac.v*.clusterrolebindings.delete - io.k8s.authorization.rbac.v*.rolebindings.delete condition: selection falsepositives: - RoleBindings and ClusterRoleBinding being modified or deleted may be performed by a system administrator. Verify whether the user identity, user agent, and/or hostname should be making changes in your environment. - RoleBindings and ClusterRoleBinding modified or deleted from unfamiliar users should be investigated. If known behavior is causing false positives, it can be exempted from the rule. level: medium
Sigma rule: Detects the download of suspicious file type from URLs with IP. Logsource: windows / create_stream_hash. Rule: title: Unusual File Download from Direct IP Address id: 025bd229-fd1f-4fdb-97ab-20006e1a5368 status: test description: Detects the download of suspicious file type from URLs with IP references: - https://github.com/trustedsec/SysmonCommunityGuide/blob/adcdfee20999f422b974c8d4149bf4c361237db7/chapters/file-stream-creation-hash.md - https://labs.withsecure.com/publications/detecting-onenote-abuse author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems), Florian Roth (Nextron Systems) date: 2022-09-07 modified: 2023-02-10 tags: - attack.stealth - attack.t1564.004 logsource: product: windows category: create_stream_hash detection: selection: Contents|re: http[s]?://[0-9]{1,3}\.[0-9]{1,3}\.[0-9]{1,3}\.[0-9]{1,3} TargetFilename|contains: - .ps1:Zone - .bat:Zone - .exe:Zone - .vbe:Zone - .vbs:Zone - .dll:Zone - .one:Zone - .cmd:Zone - .hta:Zone - .xll:Zone - .lnk:Zone condition: selection falsepositives: - Unknown level: high
Sigma rule: Identifies potential full network packet capture in gcp. This feature can potentially be abused to read sensitive data f. Logsource: gcp / gcp.audit. Rule: title: Google Full Network Traffic Packet Capture id: 980a7598-1e7f-4962-9372-2d754c930d0e status: test description: Identifies potential full network packet capture in gcp. This feature can potentially be abused to read sensitive data from unencrypted internal traffic. references: - https://cloud.google.com/kubernetes-engine/docs/how-to/audit-logging - https://developers.google.com/resources/api-libraries/documentation/compute/v1/java/latest/com/google/api/services/compute/Compute.PacketMirrorings.html author: Austin Songer @austinsonger date: 2021-08-13 modified: 2022-10-09 tags: - attack.collection - attack.t1074 logsource: product: gcp service: gcp.audit detection: selection: gcp.audit.method_name: - v*.Compute.PacketMirrorings.Get - v*.Compute.PacketMirrorings.Delete - v*.Compute.PacketMirrorings.Insert - v*.Compute.PacketMirrorings.Patch - v*.Compute.PacketMirrorings.List - v*.Compute.PacketMirrorings.aggregatedList condition: selection falsepositives: - Full Network Packet Capture may be done by a system or network administrator. - If known behavior is causing false positives, it can be exempted from the rule. level: medium
Sigma rule: Detects suspicious FileFix execution patterns where users are tricked into running malicious commands through browser fi. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: Suspicious FileFix Execution Pattern id: b5b29e4e-31fa-4fdf-b058-296e7a1aa0c2 related: - id: 4fee3d51-8069-4a4c-a0f7-924fcaff2c70 type: similar - id: 4be03877-d5b6-4520-85c9-a5911c0a656c type: obsolete status: experimental description: 'Detects suspicious FileFix execution patterns where users are tricked into running malicious commands through browser file upload dialog manipulation. This attack typically begins when users visit malicious websites impersonating legitimate services or news platforms, which may display fake CAPTCHA challenges or direct instructions to open file explorer and paste clipboard content. The clipboard content usually contains commands that download and execute malware, such as information stealing tools. ' references: - https://mrd0x.com/filefix-clickfix-alternative/ - https://expel.com/blog/cache-smuggling-when-a-picture-isnt-a-thousand-words/ - https://blog.checkpoint.com/research/filefix-the-new-social-engineering-attack-building-on-clickfix-tested-in-the-wild/ author: 0xFustang, Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems) date: 2025-11-24 tags: - attack.execution - attack.t1204.004 logsource: category: process_creation product: windows detection: selection_exec_parent: ParentImage|endswith: - \brave.exe - \chrome.exe - \firefox.exe - \msedge.exe CommandLine|contains: '#' selection_cli_lolbin: CommandLine|contains: - '%comspec%' - bitsadmin - certutil - cmd - cscript - curl - finger - mshta - powershell - pwsh - regsvr32 - rundll32 - schtasks - wget - wscript selection_cli_captcha: CommandLine|contains: - account - anti-bot - botcheck - captcha - challenge - confirmation - fraud - human - identification - identificator - identity - robot - validation - verification - verify condition: selection_exec_parent and 1 of selection_cli_* falsepositives: - Legitimate use of PowerShell or other utilities launched from browser extensions or automation tools level: high
Sigma rule: Detects the creation of suspcious binary files inside the "\windows\system32\spool\drivers\color\" as seen in the blog r. Logsource: windows / file_event. Rule: title: Drop Binaries Into Spool Drivers Color Folder id: ce7066a6-508a-42d3-995b-2952c65dc2ce status: test description: Detects the creation of suspcious binary files inside the "\windows\system32\spool\drivers\color\" as seen in the blog referenced below references: - https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2022/07/27/untangling-knotweed-european-private-sector-offensive-actor-using-0-day-exploits/ author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) date: 2022-07-28 tags: - attack.stealth logsource: product: windows category: file_event detection: selection: TargetFilename|startswith: C:\Windows\System32\spool\drivers\color\ TargetFilename|endswith: - .dll - .exe - .sys condition: selection falsepositives: - Unknown level: medium
Sigma rule: Detects the creation of screensaver files (.scr) outside of system folders. Attackers may execute an application as an ". Logsource: windows / file_event. Rule: title: SCR File Write Event id: c048f047-7e2a-4888-b302-55f509d4a91d status: test description: Detects the creation of screensaver files (.scr) outside of system folders. Attackers may execute an application as an ".SCR" file using "rundll32.exe desk.cpl,InstallScreenSaver" for example. references: - https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Libraries/Desk/ author: Christopher Peacock @securepeacock, SCYTHE @scythe_io date: 2022-04-27 modified: 2023-08-23 tags: - attack.stealth - attack.t1218.011 logsource: category: file_event product: windows detection: selection: TargetFilename|endswith: .scr filter: TargetFilename|contains: - :\$WINDOWS.~BT\NewOS\ - :\Windows\System32\ - :\Windows\SysWOW64\ - :\Windows\WinSxS\ - :\WUDownloadCache\ condition: selection and not filter falsepositives: - The installation of new screen savers by third party software level: medium
Sigma rule: Detects potentially suspicious inline JavaScript execution using Node.js with specific keywords in the command line.. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: Potentially Suspicious Inline JavaScript Execution via NodeJS Binary id: 8537c866-072e-460d-bfff-aaf39cbd73d3 status: experimental description: Detects potentially suspicious inline JavaScript execution using Node.js with specific keywords in the command line. references: - https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2025/04/15/threat-actors-misuse-node-js-to-deliver-malware-and-other-malicious-payloads/ author: Microsoft (idea), Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems) date: 2025-04-21 tags: - attack.execution - attack.t1059.007 logsource: category: process_creation product: windows detection: selection_img: - Image|endswith: \node.exe - OriginalFileName: node.exe - Product: Node.js selection_cmd: CommandLine|contains|all: - http - execSync - spawn - fs - path - zlib condition: all of selection_* falsepositives: - Legitimate scripts using Node.js with these modules level: medium
Sigma rule: Detects failed AWS console login attempts due to authentication failures. Monitoring these events is crucial for identif. Logsource: aws / cloudtrail. Rule: title: AWS ConsoleLogin Failed Authentication id: 6393e346-1977-46ef-8987-ad414a145fad status: experimental description: 'Detects failed AWS console login attempts due to authentication failures. Monitoring these events is crucial for identifying potential brute-force attacks or unauthorized access attempts to AWS accounts. ' references: - https://naikordian.github.io/blog/posts/brute-force-aws-console/ - https://help.fortinet.com/fsiem/Public_Resource_Access/7_2_1/rules/PH_RULE_AWS_Management_Console_Brute_Force_of_Root_User_Identity.htm - https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1110.001/aws_login_failure/aws_cloudtrail_events.json author: Ivan Saakov, Nasreddine Bencherchali date: 2025-10-19 tags: - attack.credential-access - attack.t1110 logsource: product: aws service: cloudtrail detection: selection: eventName: ConsoleLogin errorMessage: Failed authentication condition: selection falsepositives: - Legitimate failed login attempts by authorized users. Investigate the source of repeated failed login attempts. level: medium
Sigma rule: Detects attempts of decoding a base64 Gzip archive in a PowerShell script. This technique is often used as a method to l. Logsource: windows / ps_script. Rule: title: Suspicious FromBase64String Usage On Gzip Archive - Ps Script id: df69cb1d-b891-4cd9-90c7-d617d90100ce related: - id: d75d6b6b-adb9-48f7-824b-ac2e786efe1f type: similar status: test description: Detects attempts of decoding a base64 Gzip archive in a PowerShell script. This technique is often used as a method to load malicious content into memory afterward. references: - https://speakerdeck.com/heirhabarov/hunting-for-powershell-abuse?slide=43 author: frack113 date: 2022-12-23 tags: - attack.command-and-control - attack.t1132.001 logsource: product: windows category: ps_script definition: 'Requirements: Script Block Logging must be enabled' detection: selection: ScriptBlockText|contains|all: - FromBase64String - MemoryStream - H4sI condition: selection falsepositives: - Legitimate administrative script level: medium