alirezaaminzadeh/cybersec-retrieval-benchmark huggingface dataset:
Sigma rule: Detects suspicious child processes of electron apps (teams, discord, slack, etc.). This could be a potential sign of ".a. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: Suspicious Electron Application Child Processes id: f26eb764-fd89-464b-85e2-dc4a8e6e77b8 related: - id: 378a05d8-963c-46c9-bcce-13c7657eac99 type: similar status: test description: 'Detects suspicious child processes of electron apps (teams, discord, slack, etc.). This could be a potential sign of ".asar" file tampering (See reference section for more information) or binary execution proxy through specific CLI arguments (see related rule) ' references: - https://taggart-tech.com/quasar-electron/ - https://github.com/mttaggart/quasar - https://positive.security/blog/ms-officecmd-rce - https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Msedge/ - https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Teams/ - https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/msedgewebview2/ - https://medium.com/@MalFuzzer/one-electron-to-rule-them-all-dc2e9b263daf author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) date: 2022-10-21 modified: 2024-07-12 tags: - attack.execution logsource: category: process_creation product: windows detection: selection_parent: ParentImage|endswith: - \chrome.exe - \discord.exe - \GitHubDesktop.exe - \keybase.exe - \msedge.exe - \msedgewebview2.exe - \msteams.exe - \slack.exe - \teams.exe selection_child_image: Image|endswith: - \cmd.exe - \cscript.exe - \mshta.exe - \powershell.exe - \pwsh.exe - \regsvr32.exe - \whoami.exe - \wscript.exe selection_child_paths: Image|contains: - :\ProgramData\ - :\Temp\ - \AppData\Local\Temp\ - \Users\Public\ - \Windows\Temp\ filter_optional_discord: ParentImage|endswith: \Discord.exe Image|endswith: \cmd.exe CommandLine|contains: \NVSMI\nvidia-smi.exe condition: selection_parent and 1 of selection_child_* and not 1 of filter_optional_* falsepositives: - Unknown level: medium
Sigma rule: Detects DNS query requests to Devtunnels domains. Attackers can abuse that feature to establish a reverse shell or persi. Logsource: windows / dns_query. Rule: title: DNS Query To Devtunnels Domain id: 1cb0c6ce-3d00-44fc-ab9c-6d6d577bf20b related: - id: 9501f8e6-8e3d-48fc-a8a6-1089dd5d7ef4 type: similar - id: 4b657234-038e-4ad5-997c-4be42340bce4 type: similar - id: b3e6418f-7c7a-4fad-993a-93b65027a9f1 type: similar status: test description: 'Detects DNS query requests to Devtunnels domains. Attackers can abuse that feature to establish a reverse shell or persistence on a machine. ' references: - https://blueteamops.medium.com/detecting-dev-tunnels-16f0994dc3e2 - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/developer/dev-tunnels/security - https://cydefops.com/devtunnels-unleashed author: citron_ninja date: 2023-10-25 modified: 2023-11-20 tags: - attack.command-and-control - attack.t1071.001 - attack.t1572 logsource: category: dns_query product: windows detection: selection: QueryName|endswith: .devtunnels.ms condition: selection falsepositives: - Legitimate use of Devtunnels will also trigger this. level: medium
Sigma rule: Detects instances where an NTP service on an OpenCanary node has had a NTP monlist request.. Logsource: opencanary / application. Rule: title: OpenCanary - NTP Monlist Request id: 7cded4b3-f09e-405a-b96f-24248433ba44 status: test description: Detects instances where an NTP service on an OpenCanary node has had a NTP monlist request. references: - https://opencanary.readthedocs.io/en/latest/starting/configuration.html#services-configuration - https://github.com/thinkst/opencanary/blob/a0896adfcaf0328cfd5829fe10d2878c7445138e/opencanary/logger.py#L52 author: Security Onion Solutions date: 2024-03-08 tags: - attack.impact - attack.t1498 logsource: category: application product: opencanary detection: selection: logtype: 11001 condition: selection falsepositives: - Unlikely level: high
Sigma rule: Detects usage of the "Set-Service" powershell cmdlet to configure a new SecurityDescriptor that allows a service to be h. Logsource: windows / ps_script. Rule: title: Abuse of Service Permissions to Hide Services Via Set-Service - PS id: 953945c5-22fe-4a92-9f8a-a9edc1e522da related: - id: 514e4c3a-c77d-4cde-a00f-046425e2301e type: similar status: test description: Detects usage of the "Set-Service" powershell cmdlet to configure a new SecurityDescriptor that allows a service to be hidden from other utilities such as "sc.exe", "Get-Service"...etc. (Works only in powershell 7) references: - https://twitter.com/Alh4zr3d/status/1580925761996828672 - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/microsoft.powershell.management/set-service?view=powershell-7.2 author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) date: 2022-10-17 tags: - attack.persistence - attack.privilege-escalation - attack.execution - attack.stealth - attack.t1574.011 logsource: product: windows category: ps_script definition: 'Requirements: Script Block Logging must be enabled' detection: selection: ScriptBlockText|contains|all: - 'Set-Service ' - DCLCWPDTSD ScriptBlockText|contains: - '-SecurityDescriptorSddl ' - '-sd ' condition: selection falsepositives: - Rare intended use of hidden services - Rare FP could occur due to the non linearity of the ScriptBlockText log level: high
Sigma rule: Identifies two sign-ins originating from geographically distant locations, where at least one of the locations may also. Logsource: azure / riskdetection. Rule: title: Atypical Travel id: 1a41023f-1e70-4026-921a-4d9341a9038e status: test description: Identifies two sign-ins originating from geographically distant locations, where at least one of the locations may also be atypical for the user, given past behavior. references: - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/id-protection/concept-identity-protection-risks#atypical-travel - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/architecture/security-operations-user-accounts#unusual-sign-ins author: Mark Morowczynski '@markmorow', Gloria Lee, '@gleeiamglo' date: 2023-09-03 tags: - attack.stealth - attack.t1078 - attack.persistence - attack.privilege-escalation - attack.initial-access logsource: product: azure service: riskdetection detection: selection: riskEventType: unlikelyTravel condition: selection falsepositives: - We recommend investigating the sessions flagged by this detection in the context of other sign-ins from the user. level: high
Sigma rule: Running Chrome VPN Extensions via the Registry install 2 vpn extension. Logsource: windows / registry_set. Rule: title: Running Chrome VPN Extensions via the Registry 2 VPN Extension id: b64a026b-8deb-4c1d-92fd-98893209dff1 status: test description: Running Chrome VPN Extensions via the Registry install 2 vpn extension references: - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1133/T1133.md#atomic-test-1---running-chrome-vpn-extensions-via-the-registry-2-vpn-extension author: frack113 date: 2021-12-28 modified: 2023-08-17 tags: - attack.initial-access - attack.persistence - attack.t1133 logsource: category: registry_set product: windows detection: chrome_ext: TargetObject|contains: Software\Wow6432Node\Google\Chrome\Extensions TargetObject|endswith: update_url chrome_vpn: TargetObject|contains: - fdcgdnkidjaadafnichfpabhfomcebme - fcfhplploccackoneaefokcmbjfbkenj - bihmplhobchoageeokmgbdihknkjbknd - gkojfkhlekighikafcpjkiklfbnlmeio - jajilbjjinjmgcibalaakngmkilboobh - gjknjjomckknofjidppipffbpoekiipm - nabbmpekekjknlbkgpodfndbodhijjem - kpiecbcckbofpmkkkdibbllpinceiihk - nlbejmccbhkncgokjcmghpfloaajcffj - omghfjlpggmjjaagoclmmobgdodcjboh - bibjcjfmgapbfoljiojpipaooddpkpai - mpcaainmfjjigeicjnlkdfajbioopjko - jljopmgdobloagejpohpldgkiellmfnc - lochiccbgeohimldjooaakjllnafhaid - nhnfcgpcbfclhfafjlooihdfghaeinfc - ookhnhpkphagefgdiemllfajmkdkcaim - namfblliamklmeodpcelkokjbffgmeoo - nbcojefnccbanplpoffopkoepjmhgdgh - majdfhpaihoncoakbjgbdhglocklcgno - lnfdmdhmfbimhhpaeocncdlhiodoblbd - eppiocemhmnlbhjplcgkofciiegomcon - cocfojppfigjeefejbpfmedgjbpchcng - foiopecknacmiihiocgdjgbjokkpkohc - hhdobjgopfphlmjbmnpglhfcgppchgje - jgbaghohigdbgbolncodkdlpenhcmcge - inligpkjkhbpifecbdjhmdpcfhnlelja - higioemojdadgdbhbbbkfbebbdlfjbip - hipncndjamdcmphkgngojegjblibadbe - iolonopooapdagdemdoaihahlfkncfgg - nhfjkakglbnnpkpldhjmpmmfefifedcj - jpgljfpmoofbmlieejglhonfofmahini - fgddmllnllkalaagkghckoinaemmogpe - ejkaocphofnobjdedneohbbiilggdlbi - keodbianoliadkoelloecbhllnpiocoi - hoapmlpnmpaehilehggglehfdlnoegck - poeojclicodamonabcabmapamjkkmnnk - dfkdflfgjdajbhocmfjolpjbebdkcjog - kcdahmgmaagjhocpipbodaokikjkampi - klnkiajpmpkkkgpgbogmcgfjhdoljacg - lneaocagcijjdpkcabeanfpdbmapcjjg - pgfpignfckbloagkfnamnolkeaecfgfh - jplnlifepflhkbkgonidnobkakhmpnmh - jliodmnojccaloajphkingdnpljdhdok - hnmpcagpplmpfojmgmnngilcnanddlhb - ffbkglfijbcbgblgflchnbphjdllaogb - kcndmbbelllkmioekdagahekgimemejo - jdgilggpfmjpbodmhndmhojklgfdlhob - bihhflimonbpcfagfadcnbbdngpopnjb - ppajinakbfocjfnijggfndbdmjggcmde - oofgbpoabipfcfjapgnbbjjaenockbdp
Sigma rule: Detects the creation of a file with a suspicious extension in the public folder, which could indicate potential maliciou. Logsource: windows / file_event. Rule: title: Suspicious Binaries and Scripts in Public Folder id: b447f7de-1e53-4cbf-bfb4-f1f6d0b04e4e status: experimental description: Detects the creation of a file with a suspicious extension in the public folder, which could indicate potential malicious activity. references: - https://intel.thedfirreport.com/events/view/30032 - https://intel.thedfirreport.com/eventReports/view/70 - https://thedfirreport.com/2025/01/27/cobalt-strike-and-a-pair-of-socks-lead-to-lockbit-ransomware/ author: The DFIR Report date: 2025-01-23 tags: - attack.execution - attack.t1204 logsource: category: file_event product: windows detection: selection: TargetFilename|contains: :\Users\Public\ TargetFilename|endswith: - .bat - .dll - .exe - .hta - .js - .ps1 - .vbe - .vbs condition: selection falsepositives: - Administrators deploying legitimate binaries to public folders. level: high regression_tests_path: regression_data/rules/windows/file/file_event/file_event_win_susp_public_folder_extension/info.yml
Sigma rule: Detects the usage of "reg.exe" in order to dump sensitive registry hives. This includes SAM, SYSTEM and SECURITY hives.. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: Dumping of Sensitive Hives Via Reg.EXE id: fd877b94-9bb5-4191-bb25-d79cbd93c167 related: - id: 038cd51c-3ad8-41c5-ba8f-5d1c92f3cc1e type: obsolete - id: 4d6c9da1-318b-4edf-bcea-b6c93fa98fd0 type: obsolete status: test description: Detects the usage of "reg.exe" in order to dump sensitive registry hives. This includes SAM, SYSTEM and SECURITY hives. references: - https://www.slideshare.net/heirhabarov/hunting-for-credentials-dumping-in-windows-environment - https://eqllib.readthedocs.io/en/latest/analytics/aed95fc6-5e3f-49dc-8b35-06508613f979.html - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1003/T1003.md - https://www.wietzebeukema.nl/blog/windows-command-line-obfuscation - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1003.002/T1003.002.md#atomic-test-1---registry-dump-of-sam-creds-and-secrets author: Teymur Kheirkhabarov, Endgame, JHasenbusch, Daniil Yugoslavskiy, oscd.community, frack113 date: 2019-10-22 modified: 2023-12-13 tags: - attack.credential-access - attack.t1003.002 - attack.t1003.004 - attack.t1003.005 - car.2013-07-001 logsource: category: process_creation product: windows detection: selection_img: - Image|endswith: \reg.exe - OriginalFileName: reg.exe selection_cli_flag: CommandLine|contains: - ' save ' - ' export ' - ' ˢave ' - ' eˣport ' selection_cli_hklm: CommandLine|contains: - hklm - hk˪m - hkey_local_machine - hkey_˪ocal_machine - hkey_loca˪_machine - hkey_˪oca˪_machine selection_cli_hive: CommandLine|contains: - \system - \sam - \security - \ˢystem - \syˢtem - \ˢyˢtem - \ˢam - \ˢecurity condition: all of selection_* falsepositives: - Dumping hives for legitimate purpouse i.e. backup or forensic investigation level: high
Sigma rule: Detects potential Amazon SSM agent hijack attempts as outlined in the Mitiga research report.. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: Potential Amazon SSM Agent Hijacking id: d20ee2f4-822c-4827-9e15-41500b1fff10 status: test description: Detects potential Amazon SSM agent hijack attempts as outlined in the Mitiga research report. references: - https://www.mitiga.io/blog/mitiga-security-advisory-abusing-the-ssm-agent-as-a-remote-access-trojan - https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/amazons-aws-ssm-agent-can-be-used-as-post-exploitation-rat-malware/ - https://www.helpnetsecurity.com/2023/08/02/aws-instances-attackers-access/ author: Muhammad Faisal date: 2023-08-02 tags: - attack.command-and-control - attack.persistence - attack.t1219.002 logsource: category: process_creation product: windows detection: selection: Image|endswith: \amazon-ssm-agent.exe CommandLine|contains|all: - '-register ' - '-code ' - '-id ' - '-region ' condition: selection falsepositives: - Legitimate activity of system administrators level: medium
Sigma rule: Extract data from cab file and hide it in an alternate data stream. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: Suspicious Extrac32 Alternate Data Stream Execution id: 4b13db67-0c45-40f1-aba8-66a1a7198a1e status: test description: Extract data from cab file and hide it in an alternate data stream references: - https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Extrac32/ author: frack113 date: 2021-11-26 modified: 2022-12-30 tags: - attack.stealth - attack.t1564.004 logsource: category: process_creation product: windows detection: selection: CommandLine|contains|all: - extrac32.exe - .cab CommandLine|re: :[^\\] condition: selection falsepositives: - Unknown level: medium
Sigma rule: Detects attackers attempting to disable Windows Defender using Powershell. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: Disable Windows Defender AV Security Monitoring id: a7ee1722-c3c5-aeff-3212-c777e4733217 status: test description: Detects attackers attempting to disable Windows Defender using Powershell references: - https://research.nccgroup.com/2020/06/23/wastedlocker-a-new-ransomware-variant-developed-by-the-evil-corp-group/ - https://rvsec0n.wordpress.com/2020/01/24/malwares-that-bypass-windows-defender/ - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1562.001/T1562.001.md author: ok @securonix invrep-de, oscd.community, frack113 date: 2020-10-12 modified: 2022-11-18 tags: - attack.defense-impairment - attack.t1685 logsource: category: process_creation product: windows detection: selection_pwsh_binary: - Image|endswith: - \powershell.exe - \pwsh.exe - OriginalFileName: - PowerShell.EXE - pwsh.dll selection_pwsh_cli: CommandLine|contains: - -DisableBehaviorMonitoring $true - -DisableRuntimeMonitoring $true selection_sc_binary: - Image|endswith: \sc.exe - OriginalFileName: sc.exe selection_sc_tamper_cmd_stop: CommandLine|contains|all: - stop - WinDefend selection_sc_tamper_cmd_delete: CommandLine|contains|all: - delete - WinDefend selection_sc_tamper_cmd_disabled: CommandLine|contains|all: - config - WinDefend - start=disabled condition: all of selection_pwsh_* or (selection_sc_binary and 1 of selection_sc_tamper_*) falsepositives: - Minimal, for some older versions of dev tools, such as pycharm, developers were known to sometimes disable Windows Defender to improve performance, but this generally is not considered a good security practice. level: high
Sigma rule: Detects usage of the Get-ADComputer cmdlet to collect computer information and output it to a file. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: Computer Discovery And Export Via Get-ADComputer Cmdlet id: 435e10e4-992a-4281-96f3-38b11106adde related: - id: db885529-903f-4c5d-9864-28fe199e6370 type: similar status: test description: Detects usage of the Get-ADComputer cmdlet to collect computer information and output it to a file references: - http://blog.talosintelligence.com/2022/09/lazarus-three-rats.html - https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2022/10/18/defenders-beware-a-case-for-post-ransomware-investigations/ - https://www.cisa.gov/uscert/sites/default/files/publications/aa22-320a_joint_csa_iranian_government-sponsored_apt_actors_compromise_federal%20network_deploy_crypto%20miner_credential_harvester.pdf author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) date: 2022-11-10 modified: 2022-11-17 tags: - attack.discovery - attack.t1033 logsource: category: process_creation product: windows detection: selection_img: - Image|endswith: - \powershell.exe - \pwsh.exe - OriginalFileName: - PowerShell.EXE - pwsh.dll selection_cli: CommandLine|contains|all: - 'Get-ADComputer ' - ' -Filter \*' CommandLine|contains: - ' > ' - ' | Select ' - Out-File - Set-Content - Add-Content condition: all of selection_* falsepositives: - Legitimate admin scripts may use the same technique, it's better to exclude specific computers or users who execute these commands or scripts often level: medium
Sigma rule: Detects events that appear when a user click on a link file with a powershell command in it. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: Hidden Powershell in Link File Pattern id: 30e92f50-bb5a-4884-98b5-d20aa80f3d7a status: test description: Detects events that appear when a user click on a link file with a powershell command in it references: - https://www.x86matthew.com/view_post?id=embed_exe_lnk author: frack113 date: 2022-02-06 tags: - attack.execution - attack.t1059.001 logsource: category: process_creation product: windows detection: selection: ParentImage: C:\Windows\explorer.exe Image: C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe CommandLine|contains|all: - powershell - .lnk condition: selection falsepositives: - Legitimate commands in .lnk files level: medium
Sigma rule: Detects execution of "csc.exe" to compile .NET code. Attackers often leverage this to compile code on the fly and use it. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: Dynamic .NET Compilation Via Csc.EXE id: dcaa3f04-70c3-427a-80b4-b870d73c94c4 status: test description: Detects execution of "csc.exe" to compile .NET code. Attackers often leverage this to compile code on the fly and use it in other stages. references: - https://securityboulevard.com/2019/08/agent-tesla-evading-edr-by-removing-api-hooks/ - https://www.clearskysec.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/MuddyWater-Operations-in-Lebanon-and-Oman.pdf - https://app.any.run/tasks/c6993447-d1d8-414e-b856-675325e5aa09/ - https://twitter.com/gN3mes1s/status/1206874118282448897 - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/b27a3cb25025161d49ac861cb216db68c46a3537/atomics/T1027.004/T1027.004.md#atomic-test-1---compile-after-delivery-using-cscexe author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), X__Junior (Nextron Systems) date: 2019-08-24 modified: 2026-03-23 tags: - attack.stealth - attack.t1027.004 logsource: category: process_creation product: windows detection: selection_img: Image|endswith: \csc.exe selection_susp_location_1: CommandLine|contains: - :\Perflogs\ - :\Users\Public\ - \AppData\Local\Temp\ - \Temporary Internet - \Windows\Temp\ selection_susp_location_2: - CommandLine|contains|all: - :\Users\ - \Favorites\ - CommandLine|contains|all: - :\Users\ - \Favourites\ - CommandLine|contains|all: - :\Users\ - \Contacts\ - CommandLine|contains|all: - :\Users\ - \Pictures\ selection_susp_location_3: CommandLine|re: (?:[Pp]rogram[Dd]ata|%(?:[Ll]ocal)?[Aa]pp[Dd]ata%|\\[Aa]pp[Dd]ata\\(?:[Ll]ocal(?:[Ll]ow)?|[Rr]oaming))\\[^\\]{1,256}$ filter_main_programfiles: ParentImage|startswith: - C:\Program Files (x86)\ - C:\Program Files\ filter_main_sdiagnhost: ParentImage: C:\Windows\System32\sdiagnhost.exe filter_main_w3p: ParentImage: C:\Windows\System32\inetsrv\w3wp.exe filter_optional_chocolatey: ParentImage: - C:\ProgramData\chocolatey\choco.exe - C:\ProgramData\chocolatey\tools\shimgen.exe filter_optional_defender: ParentCommandLine|contains: \ProgramData\Microsoft\Windows Defender Advanced Threat Protection filter_optional_ansible: ParentCommandLine|contains: - JwB7ACIAZgBhAGkAbABlAGQAIgA6AHQAcgB1AGUALAAiAG0AcwBnACIAOgAiAEEAbgBzAGkAYgBsAGUAIAByAGUAcQB1AGkAcgBlAHMAIABQAG8AdwBlAHIAUwBoAGUAbABsACAAdgAzAC4AMAAgAG8AcgAgAG4AZQB3AGUAcgAiAH0AJw - cAewAiAGYAYQBpAGwAZQBkACIAOgB0AHIAdQBlACwAIgBtAHMAZwAiADoAIgBBAG4AcwBpAGIAbABlACAAcgBlAHEAdQBpAHIAZQBzACAAUABvAHcAZQByAFMAaABlAGwAbAAgAHYAMwAuADAAIABvAHIAIABuAGUAdwBlAHIAIgB9ACcA - nAHsAIgBmAGEAaQBsAGUAZAAiADoAdAByAHUAZQAsACIAbQBzAGcA
Sigma rule: Detects a process that initiated a network connection over ports 5985 or 5986 from a non-network service account. This c. Logsource: windows / network_connection. Rule: title: Potential Remote PowerShell Session Initiated id: c539afac-c12a-46ed-b1bd-5a5567c9f045 status: test description: 'Detects a process that initiated a network connection over ports 5985 or 5986 from a non-network service account. This could potentially indicates a remote PowerShell connection. ' references: - https://threathunterplaybook.com/hunts/windows/190511-RemotePwshExecution/notebook.html author: Roberto Rodriguez @Cyb3rWard0g date: 2019-09-12 modified: 2024-02-02 tags: - attack.execution - attack.t1059.001 - attack.lateral-movement - attack.t1021.006 logsource: category: network_connection product: windows detection: selection: DestinationPort: - 5985 - 5986 Initiated: 'true' SourceIsIpv6: 'false' filter_main_service_users: - User|contains: - NETWORK SERVICE - NETZWERKDIENST - SERVICIO DE RED - SERVIZIO DI RETE - User|contains|all: - SERVICE R - SEAU filter_main_localhost: SourceIp: - ::1 - 127.0.0.1 DestinationIp: - ::1 - 127.0.0.1 filter_optional_avast: Image: - C:\Program Files\Avast Software\Avast\AvastSvc.exe - C:\Program Files (x86)\Avast Software\Avast\AvastSvc.exe condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_* and not 1 of filter_optional_* falsepositives: - Legitimate usage of remote PowerShell, e.g. remote administration and monitoring. - Network Service user name of a not-covered localization level: high
Sigma rule: Detects suspicious PowerShell download patterns that are often used in malicious scripts, stagers or downloaders (make s. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: Suspicious PowerShell Download and Execute Pattern id: e6c54d94-498c-4562-a37c-b469d8e9a275 related: - id: 3b6ab547-8ec2-4991-b9d2-2b06702a48d7 type: derived status: test description: Detects suspicious PowerShell download patterns that are often used in malicious scripts, stagers or downloaders (make sure that your backend applies the strings case-insensitive) references: - https://gist.github.com/jivoi/c354eaaf3019352ce32522f916c03d70 - https://www.trendmicro.com/en_us/research/22/j/lv-ransomware-exploits-proxyshell-in-attack.html author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems) date: 2022-02-28 modified: 2022-03-01 tags: - attack.execution - attack.t1059.001 logsource: category: process_creation product: windows detection: selection: CommandLine|contains: - IEX ((New-Object Net.WebClient).DownloadString - IEX (New-Object Net.WebClient).DownloadString - IEX((New-Object Net.WebClient).DownloadString - IEX(New-Object Net.WebClient).DownloadString - ' -command (New-Object System.Net.WebClient).DownloadFile(' - ' -c (New-Object System.Net.WebClient).DownloadFile(' condition: selection falsepositives: - Software installers that pull packages from remote systems and execute them level: high