alirezaaminzadeh/cybersec-retrieval-benchmark huggingface dataset:
Sigma rule: Detects the modification of an existing service in order to execute an arbitrary payload when the service is started or. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: Potential Persistence Attempt Via Existing Service Tampering id: 38879043-7e1e-47a9-8d46-6bec88e201df status: test description: Detects the modification of an existing service in order to execute an arbitrary payload when the service is started or killed as a potential method for persistence. references: - https://pentestlab.blog/2020/01/22/persistence-modify-existing-service/ author: Sreeman date: 2020-09-29 modified: 2023-02-04 tags: - attack.privilege-escalation - attack.persistence - attack.execution - attack.stealth - attack.t1543.003 - attack.t1574.011 logsource: category: process_creation product: windows detection: selection_sc: - CommandLine|contains|all: - 'sc ' - 'config ' - binpath= - CommandLine|contains|all: - 'sc ' - failure - command= selection_reg_img: - CommandLine|contains|all: - 'reg ' - 'add ' - FailureCommand - CommandLine|contains|all: - 'reg ' - 'add ' - ImagePath selection_reg_ext: CommandLine|contains: - .sh - .exe - .dll - .bin$ - .bat - .cmd - .js - .msh$ - .reg$ - .scr - .ps - .vb - .jar - .pl condition: selection_sc or all of selection_reg_* falsepositives: - Unknown level: medium
Sigma rule: Detects the usage and installation of a backdoor that uses an option to register a malicious debugger for built-in tools. Logsource: windows / registry_event. Rule: title: Sticky Key Like Backdoor Usage - Registry id: baca5663-583c-45f9-b5dc-ea96a22ce542 status: test description: Detects the usage and installation of a backdoor that uses an option to register a malicious debugger for built-in tools that are accessible in the login screen references: - https://blogs.technet.microsoft.com/jonathantrull/2016/10/03/detecting-sticky-key-backdoors/ - https://bazaar.abuse.ch/sample/6f3aa9362d72e806490a8abce245331030d1ab5ac77e400dd475748236a6cc81/ author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), @twjackomo, Jonhnathan Ribeiro, oscd.community date: 2018-03-15 modified: 2022-11-26 tags: - attack.privilege-escalation - attack.persistence - attack.t1546.008 - car.2014-11-003 - car.2014-11-008 logsource: category: registry_event product: windows detection: selection_registry: TargetObject|endswith: - \SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Image File Execution Options\sethc.exe\Debugger - \SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Image File Execution Options\utilman.exe\Debugger - \SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Image File Execution Options\osk.exe\Debugger - \SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Image File Execution Options\Magnify.exe\Debugger - \SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Image File Execution Options\Narrator.exe\Debugger - \SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Image File Execution Options\DisplaySwitch.exe\Debugger - \SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Image File Execution Options\atbroker.exe\Debugger - \SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Image File Execution Options\HelpPane.exe\Debugger condition: selection_registry falsepositives: - Unlikely level: critical
Sigma rule: Detects modification of dMSA link attributes (msDS-ManagedAccountPrecededByLink) via PowerShell scripts. This command li. Logsource: windows / ps_script. Rule: title: DMSA Link Attributes Modified id: 9b111d8e-92e0-4153-88bc-daefc1333aba related: - id: 6c9eb492-e477-4df9-b0f4-571fc9db29cd type: similar status: experimental description: 'Detects modification of dMSA link attributes (msDS-ManagedAccountPrecededByLink) via PowerShell scripts. This command line pattern could be an indicator an attempt to exploit the BadSuccessor privilege escalation vulnerability in Windows Server 2025. ' references: - https://www.akamai.com/blog/security-research/abusing-bad-successor-for-privilege-escalation-in-active-directory author: Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems) date: 2025-05-24 tags: - attack.privilege-escalation - attack.persistence - attack.initial-access - attack.stealth - attack.t1078.002 - attack.t1098 logsource: category: ps_script product: windows detection: selection: ScriptBlockText|contains|all: - .Put("msDS-ManagedAccountPrecededByLink - CN= condition: selection falsepositives: - Legitimate administrative tasks modifying these attributes. level: low
Sigma rule: Detects execution of AppX packages with known suspicious or malicious signature. Logsource: windows / appxpackaging-om. Rule: title: Suspicious Digital Signature Of AppX Package id: b5aa7d60-c17e-4538-97de-09029d6cd76b status: test description: Detects execution of AppX packages with known suspicious or malicious signature references: - Internal Research - https://www.sentinelone.com/labs/inside-malicious-windows-apps-for-malware-deployment/ author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) date: 2023-01-16 tags: - attack.execution - attack.stealth logsource: product: windows service: appxpackaging-om detection: selection: EventID: 157 subjectName: CN=Foresee Consulting Inc., O=Foresee Consulting Inc., L=North York, S=Ontario, C=CA, SERIALNUMBER=1004913-1, OID.1.3.6.1.4.1.311.60.2.1.3=CA, OID.2.5.4.15=Private Organization condition: selection falsepositives: - Unknown level: medium
Sigma rule: Detects DLL sideloading of DLLs that are part of Microsoft Office from non standard location. Logsource: windows / image_load. Rule: title: Microsoft Office DLL Sideload id: 829a3bdf-34da-4051-9cf4-8ed221a8ae4f status: test description: Detects DLL sideloading of DLLs that are part of Microsoft Office from non standard location references: - https://hijacklibs.net/ author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems), Wietze Beukema (project and research) date: 2022-08-17 modified: 2023-03-15 tags: - attack.persistence - attack.privilege-escalation - attack.execution - attack.stealth - attack.t1574.001 logsource: category: image_load product: windows detection: selection: ImageLoaded|endswith: \outllib.dll filter: ImageLoaded|startswith: - C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\OFFICE - C:\Program Files (x86)\Microsoft Office\OFFICE - C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Root\OFFICE - C:\Program Files (x86)\Microsoft Office\Root\OFFICE condition: selection and not filter falsepositives: - Unlikely level: high
Sigma rule: Detects a process spawned by the terminal service server process (this could be an indicator for an exploitation of CVE-. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: Terminal Service Process Spawn id: 1012f107-b8f1-4271-af30-5aed2de89b39 status: test description: Detects a process spawned by the terminal service server process (this could be an indicator for an exploitation of CVE-2019-0708) references: - https://securingtomorrow.mcafee.com/other-blogs/mcafee-labs/rdp-stands-for-really-do-patch-understanding-the-wormable-rdp-vulnerability-cve-2019-0708/ author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems) date: 2019-05-22 modified: 2023-01-25 tags: - attack.initial-access - attack.t1190 - attack.lateral-movement - attack.t1210 - car.2013-07-002 logsource: product: windows category: process_creation detection: selection: ParentCommandLine|contains|all: - \svchost.exe - termsvcs filter_img: Image|endswith: - \rdpclip.exe - :\Windows\System32\csrss.exe - :\Windows\System32\wininit.exe - :\Windows\System32\winlogon.exe filter_null: Image: null condition: selection and not 1 of filter_* falsepositives: - Unknown level: high
Sigma rule: Detects suspicious process related to rundll32 based on command line that includes a *.sys file as seen being used by UN. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: Suspicious Rundll32 Activity Invoking Sys File id: 731231b9-0b5d-4219-94dd-abb6959aa7ea status: test description: Detects suspicious process related to rundll32 based on command line that includes a *.sys file as seen being used by UNC2452 references: - https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2021/03/04/goldmax-goldfinder-sibot-analyzing-nobelium-malware/ author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems) date: 2021-03-05 modified: 2022-10-09 tags: - attack.stealth - attack.t1218.011 logsource: category: process_creation product: windows detection: selection1: CommandLine|contains: rundll32.exe selection2: CommandLine|contains: - .sys, - '.sys ' condition: all of selection* falsepositives: - Unknown level: high
Sigma rule: Detects usage of the "TcpClient" class. Which can be abused to establish remote connections and reverse-shells. As seen. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: Potential Powershell ReverseShell Connection id: edc2f8ae-2412-4dfd-b9d5-0c57727e70be status: stable description: Detects usage of the "TcpClient" class. Which can be abused to establish remote connections and reverse-shells. As seen used by the Nishang "Invoke-PowerShellTcpOneLine" reverse shell and other. references: - https://www.volexity.com/blog/2021/03/02/active-exploitation-of-microsoft-exchange-zero-day-vulnerabilities/ - https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2021/03/02/hafnium-targeting-exchange-servers/ - https://github.com/samratashok/nishang/blob/414ee1104526d7057f9adaeee196d91ae447283e/Shells/Invoke-PowerShellTcpOneLine.ps1 author: FPT.EagleEye, wagga, Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) date: 2021-03-03 modified: 2023-04-05 tags: - attack.execution - attack.t1059.001 logsource: category: process_creation product: windows detection: selection_img: - OriginalFileName: - PowerShell.EXE - pwsh.dll - Image|endswith: - \powershell.exe - \pwsh.exe selection_cli: CommandLine|contains|all: - ' Net.Sockets.TCPClient' - .GetStream( - .Write( condition: all of selection_* falsepositives: - In rare administrative cases, this function might be used to check network connectivity level: high
Sigma rule: Detects launch of the PSEXESVC service, which means that this system was the target of a psexec remote execution. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: PsExec Service Execution id: fdfcbd78-48f1-4a4b-90ac-d82241e368c5 related: - id: fa91cc36-24c9-41ce-b3c8-3bbc3f2f67ba type: obsolete status: test description: Detects launch of the PSEXESVC service, which means that this system was the target of a psexec remote execution references: - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/downloads/psexec - https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ro2QuZTIMBM author: Thomas Patzke, Romaissa Adjailia, Florian Roth (Nextron Systems) date: 2017-06-12 modified: 2023-02-28 tags: - attack.execution logsource: category: process_creation product: windows detection: selection: - Image: C:\Windows\PSEXESVC.exe - OriginalFileName: psexesvc.exe condition: selection falsepositives: - Legitimate administrative tasks level: medium
Sigma rule: Detects service principal name (SPN) enumeration used for Kerberoasting. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: Potential SPN Enumeration Via Setspn.EXE id: 1eeed653-dbc8-4187-ad0c-eeebb20e6599 status: test description: Detects service principal name (SPN) enumeration used for Kerberoasting references: - https://web.archive.org/web/20200329173843/https://p16.praetorian.com/blog/how-to-use-kerberoasting-t1208-for-privilege-escalation - https://www.praetorian.com/blog/how-to-use-kerberoasting-t1208-for-privilege-escalation/?edition=2019 author: Markus Neis, keepwatch date: 2018-11-14 modified: 2023-10-23 tags: - attack.credential-access - attack.t1558.003 logsource: category: process_creation product: windows detection: selection_pe: - Image|endswith: \setspn.exe - OriginalFileName: setspn.exe - Description|contains|all: - Query or reset the computer - SPN attribute selection_cli: CommandLine|contains: - ' -q ' - ' /q ' condition: all of selection_* falsepositives: - Administration activity level: medium
Sigma rule: Detects the execution of AdvancedRun utility in the context of the TrustedInstaller, SYSTEM, Local Service or Network Se. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: PUA - AdvancedRun Suspicious Execution id: fa00b701-44c6-4679-994d-5a18afa8a707 related: - id: d2b749ee-4225-417e-b20e-a8d2193cbb84 type: similar status: test description: Detects the execution of AdvancedRun utility in the context of the TrustedInstaller, SYSTEM, Local Service or Network Service accounts references: - https://twitter.com/splinter_code/status/1483815103279603714 - https://medium.com/s2wblog/analysis-of-destructive-malware-whispergate-targeting-ukraine-9d5d158f19f3 - https://www.elastic.co/security-labs/operation-bleeding-bear - https://www.winhelponline.com/blog/run-program-as-system-localsystem-account-windows/ author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems) date: 2022-01-20 modified: 2023-02-21 tags: - attack.privilege-escalation - attack.stealth - attack.t1134.002 logsource: product: windows category: process_creation detection: selection: CommandLine|contains: - /EXEFilename - /CommandLine selection_runas: - CommandLine|contains: - ' /RunAs 8 ' - ' /RunAs 4 ' - ' /RunAs 10 ' - ' /RunAs 11 ' - CommandLine|endswith: - /RunAs 8 - /RunAs 4 - /RunAs 10 - /RunAs 11 condition: all of selection* falsepositives: - Unknown level: high regression_tests_path: regression_data/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_pua_advancedrun_priv_user/info.yml
Sigma rule: Detects common NTLM brute force device names. Logsource: windows / ntlm. Rule: title: NTLM Brute Force id: 9c8acf1a-cbf9-4db6-b63c-74baabe03e59 status: test description: Detects common NTLM brute force device names references: - https://www.varonis.com/blog/investigate-ntlm-brute-force author: Jerry Shockley '@jsh0x' date: 2022-02-02 tags: - attack.credential-access - attack.t1110 logsource: product: windows service: ntlm definition: Requires events from Microsoft-Windows-NTLM/Operational detection: selection: EventID: 8004 devicename: WorkstationName: - Rdesktop - Remmina - Freerdp - Windows7 - Windows8 - Windows2012 - Windows2016 - Windows2019 condition: selection and devicename falsepositives: - Systems with names equal to the spoofed ones used by the brute force tools level: medium
Sigma rule: Detects scripts or commands that disabled the Powershell command history by removing psreadline module. Logsource: windows / ps_script. Rule: title: Disable Powershell Command History id: 602f5669-6927-4688-84db-0d4b7afb2150 status: test description: Detects scripts or commands that disabled the Powershell command history by removing psreadline module references: - https://twitter.com/DissectMalware/status/1062879286749773824 author: Ali Alwashali date: 2022-08-21 tags: - attack.stealth - attack.t1070.003 logsource: product: windows category: ps_script definition: 'Requirements: Script Block Logging must be enabled' detection: selection: ScriptBlockText|contains|all: - Remove-Module - psreadline condition: selection falsepositives: - Legitimate script that disables the command history level: high
Sigma rule: Detects scriptblock text keywords indicative of potential usge of the tool WinPwn. A tool for Windows and Active Directo. Logsource: windows / ps_script. Rule: title: HackTool - WinPwn Execution - ScriptBlock id: 851fd622-b675-4d26-b803-14bc7baa517a related: - id: d557dc06-62e8-4468-a8e8-7984124908ce type: similar status: test description: 'Detects scriptblock text keywords indicative of potential usge of the tool WinPwn. A tool for Windows and Active Directory reconnaissance and exploitation. ' author: Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel date: 2023-12-04 references: - https://github.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn - https://www.publicnow.com/view/EB87DB49C654D9B63995FAD4C9DE3D3CC4F6C3ED?1671634841 - https://reconshell.com/winpwn-tool-for-internal-windows-pentesting-and-ad-security/ - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/4d6c4e8e23d465af7a2388620cfe3f8c76e16cf0/atomics/T1082/T1082.md - https://grep.app/search?q=winpwn&filter[repo][0]=redcanaryco/atomic-red-team tags: - attack.credential-access - attack.discovery - attack.execution - attack.privilege-escalation - attack.t1046 - attack.t1082 - attack.t1106 - attack.t1518 - attack.t1548.002 - attack.t1552.001 - attack.t1555 - attack.t1555.003 logsource: category: ps_script product: windows definition: 'Requirements: Script Block Logging must be enabled' detection: selection: ScriptBlockText|contains: - Offline_Winpwn - 'WinPwn ' - WinPwn.exe - WinPwn.ps1 condition: selection falsepositives: - As the script block is a blob of text. False positive may occur with scripts that contain the keyword as a reference or simply use it for detection. level: high
Sigma rule: Indicates anomalous behavior based on suspicious sign-in activity across multiple tenants from different countries in th. Logsource: azure / riskdetection. Rule: title: Suspicious Browser Activity id: 944f6adb-7a99-4c69-80c1-b712579e93e6 status: test description: Indicates anomalous behavior based on suspicious sign-in activity across multiple tenants from different countries in the same browser references: - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/id-protection/concept-identity-protection-risks#suspicious-browser - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/architecture/security-operations-user-accounts#unusual-sign-ins author: Mark Morowczynski '@markmorow', Gloria Lee, '@gleeiamglo' date: 2023-09-03 tags: - attack.stealth - attack.t1078 - attack.persistence - attack.privilege-escalation - attack.initial-access logsource: product: azure service: riskdetection detection: selection: riskEventType: suspiciousBrowser condition: selection falsepositives: - We recommend investigating the sessions flagged by this detection in the context of other sign-ins from the user. level: high
Sigma rule: Detects code fragments found in small and obfuscated AMSI bypass PowerShell scripts. Logsource: windows / ps_script. Rule: title: AMSI Bypass Pattern Assembly GetType id: e0d6c087-2d1c-47fd-8799-3904103c5a98 status: test description: Detects code fragments found in small and obfuscated AMSI bypass PowerShell scripts references: - https://www.mdsec.co.uk/2018/06/exploring-powershell-amsi-and-logging-evasion/ - https://twitter.com/cyb3rops/status/1588574518057979905?s=20&t=A7hh93ONM7ni1Rj1jO5OaA author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems) date: 2022-11-09 tags: - attack.defense-impairment - attack.t1685 - attack.execution logsource: product: windows category: ps_script definition: 'Requirements: Script Block Logging must be enabled' detection: selection: ScriptBlockText|contains|all: - '[Ref].Assembly.GetType' - SetValue($null,$true) - NonPublic,Static condition: selection falsepositives: - Unknown level: high
Sigma rule: Detects suspicious process related to rasdial.exe. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: Suspicious RASdial Activity id: 6bba49bf-7f8c-47d6-a1bb-6b4dece4640e status: test description: Detects suspicious process related to rasdial.exe references: - https://twitter.com/subTee/status/891298217907830785 author: juju4 date: 2019-01-16 modified: 2021-11-27 tags: - attack.execution - attack.t1059 logsource: category: process_creation product: windows detection: selection: Image|endswith: rasdial.exe condition: selection falsepositives: - False positives depend on scripts and administrative tools used in the monitored environment level: medium
Sigma rule: Detects the load of a signed WinRing0 driver often used by threat actors, crypto miners (XMRIG) or malware for privilege. Logsource: windows / driver_load. Rule: title: Vulnerable WinRing0 Driver Load id: 1a42dfa6-6cb2-4df9-9b48-295be477e835 status: test description: Detects the load of a signed WinRing0 driver often used by threat actors, crypto miners (XMRIG) or malware for privilege escalation references: - https://github.com/xmrig/xmrig/tree/master/bin/WinRing0 - https://www.rapid7.com/blog/post/2021/12/13/driver-based-attacks-past-and-present/ author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems) date: 2022-07-26 modified: 2024-11-23 tags: - attack.persistence - attack.privilege-escalation - attack.t1543.003 logsource: product: windows category: driver_load detection: selection: - Hashes|contains: IMPHASH=D41FA95D4642DC981F10DE36F4DC8CD7 - ImageLoaded|endswith: - \WinRing0x64.sys - \WinRing0.sys - \WinRing0.dll - \WinRing0x64.dll - \winring00x64.sys condition: selection falsepositives: - Unknown level: high
Sigma rule: Detects enumeration of local system groups. Adversaries may attempt to find local system groups and permission settings. Logsource: linux / process_creation. Rule: title: Local Groups Discovery - Linux id: 676381a6-15ca-4d73-a9c8-6a22e970b90d status: test description: Detects enumeration of local system groups. Adversaries may attempt to find local system groups and permission settings references: - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1069.001/T1069.001.md author: Ömer Günal, Alejandro Ortuno, oscd.community date: 2020-10-11 modified: 2025-06-04 tags: - attack.discovery - attack.t1069.001 logsource: category: process_creation product: linux detection: selection_1: Image|endswith: /groups selection_2: Image|endswith: - /cat - /ed - /head - /less - /more - /nano - /tail - /vi - /vim CommandLine|contains: /etc/group condition: 1 of selection_* falsepositives: - Legitimate administration activities level: low
Sigma rule: Detects instances where an SIP service on an OpenCanary node has had a SIP request.. Logsource: opencanary / application. Rule: title: OpenCanary - SIP Request id: e30de276-68ec-435c-ab99-ef3befec6c61 status: test description: Detects instances where an SIP service on an OpenCanary node has had a SIP request. references: - https://opencanary.readthedocs.io/en/latest/starting/configuration.html#services-configuration - https://github.com/thinkst/opencanary/blob/a0896adfcaf0328cfd5829fe10d2878c7445138e/opencanary/logger.py#L52 author: Security Onion Solutions date: 2024-03-08 tags: - attack.collection - attack.t1123 logsource: category: application product: opencanary detection: selection: logtype: 15001 condition: selection falsepositives: - Unlikely level: high
Sigma rule: Detects a remote file copy attempt to a hidden network share. This may indicate lateral movement or data staging activit. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: Privilege Escalation via Named Pipe Impersonation id: 9bd04a79-dabe-4f1f-a5ff-92430265c96b related: - id: f35c5d71-b489-4e22-a115-f003df287317 type: derived status: test description: Detects a remote file copy attempt to a hidden network share. This may indicate lateral movement or data staging activity. references: - https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/privilege-escalation-via-named-pipe-impersonation.html author: Tim Rauch, Elastic (idea) date: 2022-09-27 modified: 2022-12-30 tags: - attack.lateral-movement - attack.t1021 logsource: category: process_creation product: windows detection: selection_name: - Image|endswith: - \cmd.exe - \powershell.exe - OriginalFileName: - Cmd.Exe - PowerShell.EXE selection_args: CommandLine|contains|all: - echo - '>' - \\\\.\\pipe\\ condition: all of selection* falsepositives: - Other programs that cause these patterns (please report) level: high
Sigma rule: Detects function calls from the EditionUpgradeManager COM interface. Which is an interface that is not used by standard. Logsource: windows / process_access. Rule: title: Function Call From Undocumented COM Interface EditionUpgradeManager id: fb3722e4-1a06-46b6-b772-253e2e7db933 status: test description: Detects function calls from the EditionUpgradeManager COM interface. Which is an interface that is not used by standard executables. references: - https://www.snip2code.com/Snippet/4397378/UAC-bypass-using-EditionUpgradeManager-C/ - https://gist.github.com/hfiref0x/de9c83966623236f5ebf8d9ae2407611 author: oscd.community, Dmitry Uchakin date: 2020-10-07 modified: 2023-11-30 tags: - attack.privilege-escalation - attack.t1548.002 logsource: category: process_access product: windows detection: selection: CallTrace|contains: editionupgrademanagerobj.dll condition: selection falsepositives: - Unknown level: medium