alirezaaminzadeh/cybersec-retrieval-benchmark huggingface dataset:
Sigma rule: Detects potentially suspicious explicit credential logon events where the user is trying to logon with explicit credenti. Logsource: windows / security. Rule: title: Potentially Suspicious Explicit Credential Local Logon id: e3c6d245-7b8f-4e2a-c17f-a9d0e5b38f62 status: experimental description: 'Detects potentially suspicious explicit credential logon events where the user is trying to logon with explicit credentials (username and password) that are different from the current user context. It might indicate an attacker attempting to escalate privileges after obtaining credentials for a different user account. ' references: - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4648 - https://github.com/MSNightmare/LegacyHive author: Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems) date: 2026-07-23 tags: - attack.privilege-escalation - attack.stealth - attack.t1134 - attack.t1134.003 logsource: product: windows service: security detection: selection_eid: EventID: 4648 selection_localhost: - TargetServerName: localhost - TargetInfo: localhost - IpAddress: - 127.0.0.1 - ::1 filter_main_computer_accounts: SubjectUserName|endswith: $ filter_main_system_processes: ProcessName|startswith: - C:\Windows\System32\ - C:\Windows\SysWOW64\ - C:\Windows\WinSxS\ filter_main_program_files: ProcessName|startswith: - C:\Program Files\ - C:\Program Files (x86)\ filter_main_same_user: SubjectUserName|fieldref: TargetUserName condition: all of selection_* and not 1 of filter_main_* falsepositives: - RunAs usage from user-installed applications outside Program Files - Administrative scripts using explicit credentials from non-standard paths level: medium regression_tests_path: regression_data/rules/windows/builtin/security/win_security_explicit_credential_local_logon/info.yml
Sigma rule: Detects tampering of RDP Terminal Service/Server sensitive settings. Such as allowing unauthorized users access to a sys. Logsource: windows / registry_set. Rule: title: RDP Sensitive Settings Changed id: 3f6b7b62-61aa-45db-96bd-9c31b36b653c related: - id: 171b67e1-74b4-460e-8d55-b331f3e32d67 type: obsolete - id: 41904ebe-d56c-4904-b9ad-7a77bdf154b3 type: obsolete - id: a2863fbc-d5cb-48d5-83fb-d976d4b1743b type: similar status: test description: 'Detects tampering of RDP Terminal Service/Server sensitive settings. Such as allowing unauthorized users access to a system via the ''fAllowUnsolicited'' or enabling RDP via ''fDenyTSConnections'', etc. Below is a list of registry keys/values that are monitored by this rule: - Shadow: Used to enable Remote Desktop shadowing, which allows an administrator to view or control a user''s session. - DisableRemoteDesktopAntiAlias: Disables anti-aliasing for remote desktop sessions. - DisableSecuritySettings: Disables certain security settings for Remote Desktop connections. - fAllowUnsolicited: Allows unsolicited remote assistance offers. - fAllowUnsolicitedFullControl: Allows unsolicited remote assistance offers with full control. - InitialProgram: Specifies a program to run automatically when a user logs on to a remote computer. - ServiceDll: Used in RDP hijacking techniques to specify a custom DLL to be loaded by the Terminal Services service. - SecurityLayer: Specifies the security layer used for RDP connections. ' references: - http://etutorials.org/Microsoft+Products/microsoft+windows+server+2003+terminal+services/Chapter+6+Registry/Registry+Keys+for+Terminal+Services/ - http://woshub.com/rds-shadow-how-to-connect-to-a-user-session-in-windows-server-2012-r2/ - https://admx.help/HKLM/SOFTWARE/Policies/Microsoft/Windows%20NT/Terminal%20Services - https://bazaar.abuse.ch/sample/6f3aa9362d72e806490a8abce245331030d1ab5ac77e400dd475748236a6cc81/ - https://blog.sekoia.io/darkgate-internals/ - https://blog.talosintelligence.com/understanding-the-phobos-affiliate-structure/ - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/02c7d02fe1f1feb0fc7944550408ea8224273994/atomics/T1112/T1112.md#atomic-test-63---disable-remote-desktop-anti-alias-setting-through-registry - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/02c7d02fe1f1feb0fc7944550408ea8224273994/atomics/T1112/T1112.md#atomic-test-64---disable-remote-desktop-security-settings-through-registry - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/dd526047b8c399c312fee47d1e6fb531164da54d/atomics/T1112/T1112.yaml#L790 - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-hardware/customize/desktop/unattend/microsoft-windows-terminalser
Sigma rule: Detects the execution of a renamed office binary. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: Renamed Office Binary Execution id: 0b0cd537-fc77-4e6e-a973-e53495c1083d status: test description: Detects the execution of a renamed office binary references: - https://infosec.exchange/@sbousseaden/109542254124022664 author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) date: 2022-12-20 modified: 2025-12-09 tags: - attack.stealth - attack.t1036.003 logsource: category: process_creation product: windows detection: selection: - OriginalFileName: - Excel.exe - MSACCESS.EXE - MSPUB.EXE - OneNote.exe - OneNoteM.exe - OUTLOOK.EXE - POWERPNT.EXE - WinWord.exe - Olk.exe - Description: - Microsoft Access - Microsoft Excel - Microsoft OneNote - Microsoft Outlook - Microsoft PowerPoint - Microsoft Publisher - Microsoft Word - Sent to OneNote Tool filter_main_legit_names: Image|endswith: - \EXCEL.exe - \excelcnv.exe - \MSACCESS.exe - \MSPUB.EXE - \ONENOTE.EXE - \ONENOTEM.EXE - \OUTLOOK.EXE - \POWERPNT.EXE - \WINWORD.exe - \OLK.EXE condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_* falsepositives: - Unknown level: high
Sigma rule: Detects the pattern of UAC Bypass using DismHost DLL hijacking (UACMe 63). Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: UAC Bypass Using DismHost id: 853e74f9-9392-4935-ad3b-2e8c040dae86 status: test description: Detects the pattern of UAC Bypass using DismHost DLL hijacking (UACMe 63) references: - https://github.com/hfiref0x/UACME author: Christian Burkard (Nextron Systems) date: 2021-08-30 modified: 2024-12-01 tags: - attack.privilege-escalation - attack.t1548.002 logsource: category: process_creation product: windows detection: selection: ParentImage|contains|all: - C:\Users\ - \AppData\Local\Temp\ - \DismHost.exe IntegrityLevel: - High - System - S-1-16-16384 - S-1-16-12288 condition: selection falsepositives: - Unknown level: high
Sigma rule: Detects tampering with EventLog service "file" key. In order to change the default location of an Evtx file. This techni. Logsource: windows / registry_set. Rule: title: Potential EventLog File Location Tampering id: 0cb8d736-995d-4ce7-a31e-1e8d452a1459 status: test description: Detects tampering with EventLog service "file" key. In order to change the default location of an Evtx file. This technique is used to tamper with log collection and alerting references: - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/eventlog/eventlog-key author: D3F7A5105 date: 2023-01-02 modified: 2023-08-17 tags: - attack.defense-impairment - attack.t1685.001 logsource: category: registry_set product: windows detection: selection: TargetObject|contains: \SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\EventLog\ TargetObject|endswith: \File filter: Details|contains: \System32\Winevt\Logs\ condition: selection and not filter falsepositives: - Unknown level: high
Sigma rule: Detects RunDLL32.exe spawning explorer.exe as child, which is very uncommon, often observes Gamarue spawning the explore. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: RunDLL32 Spawning Explorer id: caa06de8-fdef-4c91-826a-7f9e163eef4b status: test description: Detects RunDLL32.exe spawning explorer.exe as child, which is very uncommon, often observes Gamarue spawning the explorer.exe process in an unusual way references: - https://redcanary.com/blog/intelligence-insights-november-2021/ author: elhoim, CD_ROM_ date: 2022-04-27 modified: 2022-05-25 tags: - attack.stealth - attack.t1218.011 logsource: category: process_creation product: windows detection: selection: ParentImage|endswith: \rundll32.exe Image|endswith: \explorer.exe filter: ParentCommandLine|contains: \shell32.dll,Control_RunDLL condition: selection and not filter falsepositives: - Unknown level: high
Sigma rule: Detects manual execution of the "Microsoft Compatibility Appraiser" task via schtasks. In order to trigger persistence s. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: Potential Persistence Via Microsoft Compatibility Appraiser id: f548a603-c9f2-4c89-b511-b089f7e94549 related: - id: 73a883d0-0348-4be4-a8d8-51031c2564f8 type: derived status: test description: 'Detects manual execution of the "Microsoft Compatibility Appraiser" task via schtasks. In order to trigger persistence stored in the "\AppCompatFlags\TelemetryController" registry key. ' references: - https://www.trustedsec.com/blog/abusing-windows-telemetry-for-persistence/ author: Sreeman date: 2020-09-29 modified: 2023-02-10 tags: - attack.privilege-escalation - attack.execution - attack.persistence - attack.t1053.005 logsource: product: windows category: process_creation detection: selection_img: - Image|endswith: \schtasks.exe - OriginalFileName: schtasks.exe selection_cli: CommandLine|contains|all: - 'run ' - \Application Experience\Microsoft Compatibility Appraiser condition: all of selection_* falsepositives: - Unknown level: medium
Sigma rule: Detects attempts to disable windows recovery environment using Reagentc. ReAgentc.exe is a command-line tool in Windows. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: Windows Recovery Environment Disabled Via Reagentc id: db1c21e4-cd66-4b4e-85ca-590f0780529c status: experimental description: 'Detects attempts to disable windows recovery environment using Reagentc. ReAgentc.exe is a command-line tool in Windows used to manage the Windows Recovery Environment (WinRE). It allows users to enable, disable, and configure WinRE, which is used for troubleshooting and repairing common boot issues. ' references: - https://www.elastic.co/security-labs/maas-appeal-an-infostealer-rises-from-the-ashes - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-hardware/manufacture/desktop/reagentc-command-line-options?view=windows-11 author: Daniel Koifman (KoifSec), Michael Vilshin date: 2025-07-31 tags: - attack.impact - attack.t1490 logsource: category: process_creation product: windows detection: selection_img: - Image|endswith: \reagentc.exe - OriginalFileName: reagentc.exe selection_cli: CommandLine|contains|windash: /disable condition: all of selection_* falsepositives: - Legitimate administrative activity level: medium
Sigma rule: Detects when a PIM elevation is approved or denied. Outside of normal operations should be investigated.. Logsource: azure / auditlogs. Rule: title: PIM Approvals And Deny Elevation id: 039a7469-0296-4450-84c0-f6966b16dc6d status: test description: Detects when a PIM elevation is approved or denied. Outside of normal operations should be investigated. references: - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/architecture/security-operations-privileged-identity-management#azure-ad-roles-assignment author: Mark Morowczynski '@markmorow', Yochana Henderson, '@Yochana-H' date: 2022-08-09 tags: - attack.persistence - attack.initial-access - attack.privilege-escalation - attack.stealth - attack.t1078.004 logsource: product: azure service: auditlogs detection: selection: properties.message: Request Approved/Denied condition: selection falsepositives: - Actual admin using PIM. level: high
Sigma rule: Identifies modification of ld.so.preload for shared object injection. This technique is used by attackers to load arbitr. Logsource: linux / auditd. Rule: title: Modification of ld.so.preload id: 4b3cb710-5e83-4715-8c45-8b2b5b3e5751 status: test description: Identifies modification of ld.so.preload for shared object injection. This technique is used by attackers to load arbitrary code into processes. references: - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1574.006/T1574.006.md - https://eqllib.readthedocs.io/en/latest/analytics/fd9b987a-1101-4ed3-bda6-a70300eaf57e.html author: E.M. Anhaus (originally from Atomic Blue Detections, Tony Lambert), oscd.community date: 2019-10-24 modified: 2021-11-27 tags: - attack.privilege-escalation - attack.persistence - attack.execution - attack.stealth - attack.t1574.006 logsource: product: linux service: auditd detection: selection: type: PATH name: /etc/ld.so.preload condition: selection falsepositives: - Unknown level: high
Sigma rule: Detects PAExec default named pipe. Logsource: windows / pipe_created. Rule: title: PUA - PAExec Default Named Pipe id: f6451de4-df0a-41fa-8d72-b39f54a08db5 status: test description: Detects PAExec default named pipe references: - https://github.com/microsoft/Microsoft-365-Defender-Hunting-Queries/blob/efa17a600b43c897b4b7463cc8541daa1987eeb4/Command%20and%20Control/C2-NamedPipe.md - https://github.com/poweradminllc/PAExec author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) date: 2022-10-26 tags: - attack.execution - attack.t1569.002 logsource: category: pipe_created product: windows definition: Note that you have to configure logging for Named Pipe Events in Sysmon config (Event ID 17 and Event ID 18). The basic configuration is in popular sysmon configuration (https://github.com/SwiftOnSecurity/sysmon-config), but it is worth verifying. You can also use other repo, e.g. https://github.com/Neo23x0/sysmon-config, https://github.com/olafhartong/sysmon-modular. How to test detection? You can check powershell script from this site https://svch0st.medium.com/guide-to-named-pipes-and-hunting-for-cobalt-strike-pipes-dc46b2c5f575 detection: selection: PipeName|startswith: \PAExec condition: selection falsepositives: - Unknown level: medium
Sigma rule: Detects various indicators of Microsoft Connection Manager Profile Installer execution. Logsource: windows / registry_event. Rule: title: CMSTP Execution Registry Event id: b6d235fc-1d38-4b12-adbe-325f06728f37 status: stable description: Detects various indicators of Microsoft Connection Manager Profile Installer execution references: - https://web.archive.org/web/20190720093911/http://www.endurant.io/cmstp/detecting-cmstp-enabled-code-execution-and-uac-bypass-with-sysmon/ author: Nik Seetharaman date: 2018-07-16 modified: 2020-12-23 tags: - attack.execution - attack.stealth - attack.t1218.003 - attack.g0069 - car.2019-04-001 logsource: category: registry_event product: windows detection: selection: TargetObject|contains: \cmmgr32.exe condition: selection falsepositives: - Legitimate CMSTP use (unlikely in modern enterprise environments) level: high
Sigma rule: Detects potential DLL sideloading of "RjvPlatform.dll" by "SystemResetPlatform.exe" located in a non-default location.. Logsource: windows / image_load. Rule: title: Potential RjvPlatform.DLL Sideloading From Non-Default Location id: 0e0bc253-07ed-43f1-816d-e1b220fe8971 status: test description: Detects potential DLL sideloading of "RjvPlatform.dll" by "SystemResetPlatform.exe" located in a non-default location. references: - https://twitter.com/0gtweet/status/1666716511988330499 author: X__Junior (Nextron Systems) date: 2023-06-09 tags: - attack.persistence - attack.privilege-escalation - attack.execution - attack.stealth - attack.t1574.001 logsource: category: image_load product: windows detection: selection: ImageLoaded|endswith: \RjvPlatform.dll Image: \SystemResetPlatform.exe filter_main_legit_path: Image|startswith: C:\Windows\System32\SystemResetPlatform\ condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_* falsepositives: - Unlikely level: high
Sigma rule: Detects execution of "WerFault.exe" with the "-pr" commandline flag that is used to run files stored in the ReflectDebug. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: Potential ReflectDebugger Content Execution Via WerFault.EXE id: fabfb3a7-3ce1-4445-9c7c-3c27f1051cdd related: - id: 0cf2e1c6-8d10-4273-8059-738778f981ad type: derived status: test description: Detects execution of "WerFault.exe" with the "-pr" commandline flag that is used to run files stored in the ReflectDebugger key which could be used to store the path to the malware in order to masquerade the execution flow references: - https://cocomelonc.github.io/malware/2022/11/02/malware-pers-18.html - https://www.hexacorn.com/blog/2018/08/31/beyond-good-ol-run-key-part-85/ author: X__Junior (Nextron Systems) date: 2023-06-30 tags: - attack.execution - attack.stealth - attack.t1036 logsource: product: windows category: process_creation detection: selection_img: - Image|endswith: \WerFault.exe - OriginalFileName: WerFault.exe selection_cli: CommandLine|contains: ' -pr ' condition: all of selection_* falsepositives: - Unknown level: medium
Sigma rule: Detects an attempt to leverage dnscmd.exe to enumerate the DNS zones of a domain. DNS zones used to host the DNS records. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: Potential Discovery Activity Via Dnscmd.EXE id: b6457d63-d2a2-4e29-859d-4e7affc153d1 status: test description: Detects an attempt to leverage dnscmd.exe to enumerate the DNS zones of a domain. DNS zones used to host the DNS records for a particular domain. references: - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/dnscmd - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/dns/dns-zones-records - https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Dnscmd/ author: '@gott_cyber' date: 2022-07-31 modified: 2023-02-04 tags: - attack.discovery - attack.execution logsource: category: process_creation product: windows detection: selection_img: Image|endswith: \dnscmd.exe selection_cli: CommandLine|contains: - /enumrecords - /enumzones - /ZonePrint - /info condition: all of selection_* falsepositives: - Legitimate administration use level: medium
Sigma rule: Detects sign-in with properties that are unfamiliar to the user. The detection considers past sign-in history to look fo. Logsource: azure / riskdetection. Rule: title: Unfamiliar Sign-In Properties id: 128faeef-79dd-44ca-b43c-a9e236a60f49 status: test description: Detects sign-in with properties that are unfamiliar to the user. The detection considers past sign-in history to look for anomalous sign-ins. references: - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/id-protection/concept-identity-protection-risks#unfamiliar-sign-in-properties - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/architecture/security-operations-user-accounts#unusual-sign-ins author: Mark Morowczynski '@markmorow', Gloria Lee, '@gleeiamglo' date: 2023-09-03 tags: - attack.stealth - attack.t1078 - attack.persistence - attack.privilege-escalation - attack.initial-access logsource: product: azure service: riskdetection detection: selection: riskEventType: unfamiliarFeatures condition: selection falsepositives: - User changing to a new device, location, browser, etc. level: high
Sigma rule: Detection of unusual child processes by different system processes. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: Abused Debug Privilege by Arbitrary Parent Processes id: d522eca2-2973-4391-a3e0-ef0374321dae status: test description: Detection of unusual child processes by different system processes references: - https://image.slidesharecdn.com/kheirkhabarovoffzonefinal-181117201458/95/hunting-for-privilege-escalation-in-windows-environment-74-638.jpg author: Semanur Guneysu @semanurtg, oscd.community date: 2020-10-28 modified: 2022-11-11 tags: - attack.privilege-escalation - attack.t1548 logsource: product: windows category: process_creation detection: selection_parent: ParentImage|endswith: - \winlogon.exe - \services.exe - \lsass.exe - \csrss.exe - \smss.exe - \wininit.exe - \spoolsv.exe - \searchindexer.exe User|contains: - AUTHORI - AUTORI selection_img: - Image|endswith: - \powershell.exe - \pwsh.exe - \cmd.exe - OriginalFileName: - PowerShell.EXE - pwsh.dll - Cmd.Exe filter: CommandLine|contains|all: - ' route ' - ' ADD ' condition: all of selection_* and not filter falsepositives: - Unknown level: high
Sigma rule: Detects a suspicious IIS module registration as described in Microsoft threat report on IIS backdoors. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: Suspicious IIS Module Registration id: 043c4b8b-3a54-4780-9682-081cb6b8185c status: test description: Detects a suspicious IIS module registration as described in Microsoft threat report on IIS backdoors references: - https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2022/07/26/malicious-iis-extensions-quietly-open-persistent-backdoors-into-servers/ author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Microsoft (idea) date: 2022-08-04 modified: 2023-01-23 tags: - attack.persistence - attack.t1505.004 logsource: category: process_creation product: windows detection: selection_parent: ParentImage|endswith: \w3wp.exe selection_cli_1: CommandLine|contains: appcmd.exe add module selection_cli_2: CommandLine|contains: ' system.enterpriseservices.internal.publish' Image|endswith: \powershell.exe selection_cli_3: CommandLine|contains|all: - gacutil - ' /I' condition: selection_parent and 1 of selection_cli_* falsepositives: - Administrative activity level: high
Sigma rule: Detects .NET CLR DLLs being loaded by scripting applications such as wscript or cscript. This could be an indication of. Logsource: windows / image_load. Rule: title: DotNet CLR DLL Loaded By Scripting Applications id: 4508a70e-97ef-4300-b62b-ff27992990ea status: test description: Detects .NET CLR DLLs being loaded by scripting applications such as wscript or cscript. This could be an indication of potential suspicious execution. references: - https://github.com/tyranid/DotNetToJScript - https://thewover.github.io/Introducing-Donut/ - https://web.archive.org/web/20230329154538/https://blog.menasec.net/2019/07/interesting-difr-traces-of-net-clr.html - https://web.archive.org/web/20221026202428/https://gist.github.com/code-scrap/d7f152ffcdb3e0b02f7f394f5187f008 author: omkar72, oscd.community date: 2020-10-14 modified: 2023-02-23 tags: - attack.execution - attack.privilege-escalation - attack.stealth - attack.t1055 logsource: category: image_load product: windows detection: selection: Image|endswith: - \cmstp.exe - \cscript.exe - \mshta.exe - \msxsl.exe - \regsvr32.exe - \wmic.exe - \wscript.exe ImageLoaded|endswith: - \clr.dll - \mscoree.dll - \mscorlib.dll condition: selection falsepositives: - Unknown level: high