alirezaaminzadeh/cybersec-retrieval-benchmark huggingface dataset:
Sigma rule: Detects scheduled task creations that have suspicious action command and folder combinations. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: Schtasks From Suspicious Folders id: 8a8379b8-780b-4dbf-b1e9-31c8d112fefb status: test description: Detects scheduled task creations that have suspicious action command and folder combinations references: - https://symantec-enterprise-blogs.security.com/blogs/threat-intelligence/lazarus-dream-job-chemical author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems) date: 2022-04-15 modified: 2022-11-18 tags: - attack.privilege-escalation - attack.persistence - attack.execution - attack.t1053.005 logsource: product: windows category: process_creation detection: selection_img: - Image|endswith: \schtasks.exe - OriginalFileName: schtasks.exe selection_create: CommandLine|contains: ' /create ' selection_command: CommandLine|contains: - powershell - pwsh - 'cmd /c ' - 'cmd /k ' - 'cmd /r ' - 'cmd.exe /c ' - 'cmd.exe /k ' - 'cmd.exe /r ' selection_all_folders: CommandLine|contains: - C:\ProgramData\ - '%ProgramData%' condition: all of selection_* falsepositives: - Unknown level: high
Sigma rule: Detects a suspicious process creation as SYSTEM user (suspicious program or command line parameter). Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: Suspicious SYSTEM User Process Creation id: 2617e7ed-adb7-40ba-b0f3-8f9945fe6c09 status: test description: Detects a suspicious process creation as SYSTEM user (suspicious program or command line parameter) references: - Internal Research - https://tools.thehacker.recipes/mimikatz/modules author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), David ANDRE (additional keywords) date: 2021-12-20 modified: 2025-10-19 tags: - attack.credential-access - attack.privilege-escalation - attack.stealth - attack.t1134 - attack.t1003 - attack.t1027 logsource: category: process_creation product: windows detection: selection: IntegrityLevel: - System - S-1-16-16384 User|contains: - AUTHORI - AUTORI selection_special: - Image|endswith: - \calc.exe - \cscript.exe - \forfiles.exe - \hh.exe - \mshta.exe - \ping.exe - \wscript.exe - CommandLine|re: net\s+user\s+ - CommandLine|contains: - ' -NoP ' - ' -W Hidden ' - ' -decode ' - ' /decode ' - ' /urlcache ' - ' -urlcache ' - ' -e* JAB' - ' -e* SUVYI' - ' -e* SQBFAFgA' - ' -e* aWV4I' - ' -e* IAB' - ' -e* PAA' - ' -e* aQBlAHgA' - vssadmin delete shadows - reg SAVE HKLM - ' -ma ' - Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run - .downloadstring( - .downloadfile( - ' /ticket:' - 'dpapi::' - event::clear - event::drop - id::modify - 'kerberos::' - 'lsadump::' - 'misc::' - 'privilege::' - 'rpc::' - 'sekurlsa::' - 'sid::' - 'token::' - vault::cred - vault::list - ' p::d ' - ;iex( - MiniDump filter_main_ping: CommandLine|contains|all: - ping - 127.0.0.1 - ' -n ' filter_vs: Image|endswith: \PING.EXE ParentCommandLine|contains: \DismFoDInstall.cmd filter_config_mgr: ParentImage|contains: :\Packages\Plugins\Microsoft.GuestConfiguration.ConfigurationforWindows\ filter_java: ParentImage|contains: - :\Program Files (x86)\Java\ - :\Program Files\Java\ ParentImage|endswith: \bin\javaws.exe Image|contains: - :\Program Files (x86)\Java\ - :\Program Files\Java\ Image|endswith: \bin\jp2launcher.exe CommandLine|contains: ' -ma ' condition: all of selection* and not 1 of filter_* falsepositives: - Administrative activity - Scripts and administrative tools used in the monitored environment - Monitoring activity level: high
Sigma rule: Detects the execution of powershell scripts with calls to the "Start-NetEventSession" cmdlet. Which allows an attacker t. Logsource: windows / ps_script. Rule: title: Potential Packet Capture Activity Via Start-NetEventSession - ScriptBlock id: da34e323-1e65-42db-83be-a6725ac2caa3 status: test description: 'Detects the execution of powershell scripts with calls to the "Start-NetEventSession" cmdlet. Which allows an attacker to start event and packet capture for a network event session. Adversaries may attempt to capture network to gather information over the course of an operation. Data captured via this technique may include user credentials, especially those sent over an insecure, unencrypted protocol. ' references: - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/5f866ca4517e837c4ea576e7309d0891e78080a8/atomics/T1040/T1040.md#atomic-test-16---powershell-network-sniffing - https://github.com/0xsyr0/Awesome-Cybersecurity-Handbooks/blob/7b8935fe4c82cb64d61343de1a8b2e38dd968534/handbooks/10_post_exploitation.md - https://github.com/forgottentq/powershell/blob/9e616363d497143dc955c4fdce68e5c18d28a6cb/captureWindows-Endpoint.ps1#L13 author: frack113 date: 2024-05-12 tags: - attack.credential-access - attack.discovery - attack.t1040 logsource: product: windows category: ps_script definition: 'Requirements: Script Block Logging must be enabled' detection: selection: ScriptBlockText|contains: Start-NetEventSession condition: selection falsepositives: - Legitimate network diagnostic scripts. level: medium
Sigma rule: Detects command line parameters used by Hydra password guessing hack tool. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: HackTool - Hydra Password Bruteforce Execution id: aaafa146-074c-11eb-adc1-0242ac120002 status: test description: Detects command line parameters used by Hydra password guessing hack tool references: - https://github.com/vanhauser-thc/thc-hydra author: Vasiliy Burov date: 2020-10-05 modified: 2023-02-04 tags: - attack.credential-access - attack.t1110 - attack.t1110.001 logsource: category: process_creation product: windows detection: selection: CommandLine|contains|all: - '-u ' - '-p ' CommandLine|contains: - ^USER^ - ^PASS^ condition: selection falsepositives: - Software that uses the caret encased keywords PASS and USER in its command line level: high
Sigma rule: Detects usage of "find" binary in a suspicious manner to perform discovery. Logsource: macos / process_creation. Rule: title: Potential Discovery Activity Using Find - MacOS id: 85de3a19-b675-4a51-bfc6-b11a5186c971 related: - id: 8344c0e5-5783-47cc-9cf9-a0f7fd03e6cf type: similar status: test description: Detects usage of "find" binary in a suspicious manner to perform discovery references: - https://github.com/SaiSathvik1/Linux-Privilege-Escalation-Notes author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) date: 2022-12-28 tags: - attack.discovery - attack.t1083 logsource: category: process_creation product: macos detection: selection: Image|endswith: /find CommandLine|contains: - -perm -4000 - -perm -2000 - -perm 0777 - -perm -222 - -perm -o w - -perm -o x - -perm -u=s - -perm -g=s condition: selection falsepositives: - Unknown level: medium
Sigma rule: Triggers on any Sysmon "FileBlockExecutable" event, which indicates a violation of the configured block policy. Logsource: windows / sysmon. Rule: title: Sysmon Blocked Executable id: 23b71bc5-953e-4971-be4c-c896cda73fc2 status: test description: Triggers on any Sysmon "FileBlockExecutable" event, which indicates a violation of the configured block policy references: - https://medium.com/@olafhartong/sysmon-14-0-fileblockexecutable-13d7ba3dff3e author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) date: 2022-08-16 modified: 2023-09-16 tags: - attack.defense-impairment logsource: product: windows service: sysmon detection: selection: EventID: 27 condition: selection falsepositives: - Unlikely level: high
Sigma rule: Detects the usage of utilities such as 'systemctl', 'service'...etc to stop or disable tools and services on Linux syste. Logsource: linux / process_creation. Rule: title: Disable Or Stop Services id: de25eeb8-3655-4643-ac3a-b662d3f26b6b status: test description: 'Detects the usage of utilities such as ''systemctl'', ''service''...etc to stop or disable tools and services on Linux systems. Attackers may stop or disable security tools and services to evade detection, maintain persistence, or disrupt system operations. ' references: - https://www.trendmicro.com/pl_pl/research/20/i/the-evolution-of-malicious-shell-scripts.html author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) date: 2022-09-15 modified: 2025-03-18 tags: - attack.defense-impairment - attack.t1685 - attack.impact - attack.t1489 logsource: category: process_creation product: linux detection: selection: Image|endswith: - /service - /systemctl - /chkconfig CommandLine|contains: - ' stop ' - ' disable ' filter_main_legit_snapd: Image|endswith: /systemctl CommandLine|contains: - --no-reload disable snap-snapd- - ' stop snap-snapd-' filter_main_ssh_preinstall: Image|endswith: /systemctl ParentCommandLine|contains: tmp.ci/preinst upgrade CommandLine|contains|all: - ' stop ' - ssh. filter_main_ubuntu_upgrade: ParentCommandLine|contains: /dpkg/info/ubuntu-pro-client.prerm upgrade Image|endswith: /systemctl filter_optional_aws_agent: Image|endswith: /systemctl CommandLine|endswith: snap.amazon-ssm-agent.amazon-ssm-agent.service condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_* and not 1 of filter_optional_* falsepositives: - Legitimate administration activities - Some false positives are to be expected. Apply additional filters as needed before pushing to production. level: medium
Sigma rule: Detects the execution of the hdiutil utility in order to mount disk images.. Logsource: macos / process_creation. Rule: title: Disk Image Mounting Via Hdiutil - MacOS id: bf241472-f014-4f01-a869-96f99330ca8c status: test description: Detects the execution of the hdiutil utility in order to mount disk images. references: - https://www.loobins.io/binaries/hdiutil/ - https://www.sentinelone.com/blog/from-the-front-linesunsigned-macos-orat-malware-gambles-for-the-win/ - https://ss64.com/mac/hdiutil.html author: Omar Khaled (@beacon_exe) date: 2024-08-10 tags: - attack.initial-access - attack.collection - attack.t1566.001 - attack.t1560.001 logsource: product: macos category: process_creation detection: selection: Image|endswith: /hdiutil CommandLine|contains: - 'attach ' - 'mount ' condition: selection falsepositives: - Legitimate usage of hdiutil by administrators and users. level: medium
Sigma rule: Detects potential registry persistence technique using the Event Viewer "Events.asp" technique. Logsource: windows / registry_set. Rule: title: Potential Persistence Via Event Viewer Events.asp id: a1e11042-a74a-46e6-b07c-c4ce8ecc239b status: test description: Detects potential registry persistence technique using the Event Viewer "Events.asp" technique references: - https://twitter.com/nas_bench/status/1626648985824788480 - https://admx.help/?Category=Windows_7_2008R2&Policy=Microsoft.Policies.InternetCommunicationManagement::EventViewer_DisableLinks - https://www.hexacorn.com/blog/2019/02/15/beyond-good-ol-run-key-part-103/ - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f296668303c29d3f4c07e42bdd2b28d8dd6625f9/atomics/T1112/T1112.md author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) date: 2023-02-17 modified: 2023-03-05 tags: - attack.persistence - attack.defense-impairment - attack.t1112 logsource: category: registry_set product: windows detection: selection: TargetObject|contains: - \Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Event Viewer\MicrosoftRedirectionProgram - \Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Event Viewer\MicrosoftRedirectionURL filter_default_redirect_program: Image|endswith: C:\WINDOWS\system32\svchost.exe TargetObject|endswith: \Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Event Viewer\MicrosoftRedirectionProgram Details: '%%SystemRoot%%\PCHealth\HelpCtr\Binaries\HelpCtr.exe' filter_default_redirect_program_cli: Image|endswith: C:\WINDOWS\system32\svchost.exe TargetObject|endswith: \Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Event Viewer\MicrosoftRedirectionProgramCommandLineParameters Details: -url hcp://services/centers/support?topic=%%s filter_url: Details: http://go.microsoft.com/fwlink/events.asp filter_cleaner: Details: (Empty) condition: selection and not 1 of filter_* falsepositives: - Unknown level: medium
Sigma rule: Detects the pattern of a pipe name as used by the hack tool EfsPotato. Logsource: windows / pipe_created. Rule: title: HackTool - EfsPotato Named Pipe Creation id: 637f689e-b4a5-4a86-be0e-0100a0a33ba2 status: test description: Detects the pattern of a pipe name as used by the hack tool EfsPotato references: - https://twitter.com/SBousseaden/status/1429530155291193354?s=20 - https://github.com/zcgonvh/EfsPotato author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems) date: 2021-08-23 modified: 2023-12-21 tags: - attack.privilege-escalation - attack.stealth - attack.t1055 logsource: product: windows category: pipe_created definition: Note that you have to configure logging for Named Pipe Events in Sysmon config (Event ID 17 and Event ID 18). The basic configuration is in popular sysmon configuration (https://github.com/SwiftOnSecurity/sysmon-config), but it is worth verifying. You can also use other repo, e.g. https://github.com/Neo23x0/sysmon-config, https://github.com/olafhartong/sysmon-modular. How to test detection? You can check powershell script from this site https://svch0st.medium.com/guide-to-named-pipes-and-hunting-for-cobalt-strike-pipes-dc46b2c5f575 detection: selection: PipeName|contains: - \pipe\ - \pipe\srvsvc filter_optional_ctx: PipeName|contains: \CtxShare filter_optional_default: PipeName|startswith: \pipe\ condition: selection and not 1 of filter_optional_* falsepositives: - \pipe\LOCAL\Monitorian level: high
Sigma rule: Detects the execution of a renamed binary often used by attackers or malware leveraging new Sysmon OriginalFileName data. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: Potential Defense Evasion Via Binary Rename id: 36480ae1-a1cb-4eaa-a0d6-29801d7e9142 related: - id: 0ba1da6d-b6ce-4366-828c-18826c9de23e type: similar status: test description: Detects the execution of a renamed binary often used by attackers or malware leveraging new Sysmon OriginalFileName datapoint. references: - https://mgreen27.github.io/posts/2019/05/12/BinaryRename.html - https://mgreen27.github.io/posts/2019/05/29/BinaryRename2.html - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/0f229c0e42bfe7ca736a14023836d65baa941ed2/atomics/T1036.003/T1036.003.md#atomic-test-1---masquerading-as-windows-lsass-process - https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/inno-setup-malware-redline-stealer-campaign.html author: Matthew Green @mgreen27, Ecco, James Pemberton @4A616D6573, oscd.community, Andreas Hunkeler (@Karneades) date: 2019-06-15 modified: 2026-06-05 tags: - attack.stealth - attack.t1036.003 logsource: category: process_creation product: windows detection: selection: OriginalFileName: - Cmd.Exe - CONHOST.EXE - 7z.exe - 7za.exe - 7zr.exe - WinRAR.exe - wevtutil.exe - net.exe - net1.exe - netsh.exe - InstallUtil.exe filter: Image|endswith: - \cmd.exe - \conhost.exe - \7z.exe - \7za.exe - \7zr.exe - \WinRAR.exe - \wevtutil.exe - \net.exe - \net1.exe - \netsh.exe - \InstallUtil.exe condition: selection and not filter falsepositives: - Custom applications use renamed binaries adding slight change to binary name. Typically this is easy to spot and add to whitelist level: medium regression_tests_path: regression_data/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_renamed_binary/info.yml
Sigma rule: Detects command line parameters or strings often used by crypto miners. Logsource: linux / process_creation. Rule: title: Linux Crypto Mining Indicators id: 9069ea3c-b213-4c52-be13-86506a227ab1 status: test description: Detects command line parameters or strings often used by crypto miners references: - https://www.poolwatch.io/coin/monero author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems) date: 2021-10-26 modified: 2022-12-25 tags: - attack.impact - attack.t1496 logsource: product: linux category: process_creation detection: selection: CommandLine|contains: - ' --cpu-priority=' - --donate-level=0 - ' -o pool.' - ' --nicehash' - ' --algo=rx/0 ' - stratum+tcp:// - stratum+udp:// - sh -c /sbin/modprobe msr allow_writes=on - LS1kb25hdGUtbGV2ZWw9 - 0tZG9uYXRlLWxldmVsP - tLWRvbmF0ZS1sZXZlbD - c3RyYXR1bSt0Y3A6Ly - N0cmF0dW0rdGNwOi8v - zdHJhdHVtK3RjcDovL - c3RyYXR1bSt1ZHA6Ly - N0cmF0dW0rdWRwOi8v - zdHJhdHVtK3VkcDovL condition: selection falsepositives: - Legitimate use of crypto miners level: high
Sigma rule: Detect use of the Windows 8.3 short name. Which could be used as a method to avoid command-line detection. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: Use NTFS Short Name in Command Line id: dd6b39d9-d9be-4a3b-8fe0-fe3c6a5c1795 related: - id: 3ef5605c-9eb9-47b0-9a71-b727e6aa5c3b type: similar status: test description: Detect use of the Windows 8.3 short name. Which could be used as a method to avoid command-line detection references: - https://www.acunetix.com/blog/articles/windows-short-8-3-filenames-web-security-problem/ - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-2000-server/cc959352(v=technet.10) - https://twitter.com/jonasLyk/status/1555914501802921984 author: frack113, Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) date: 2022-08-05 modified: 2022-09-21 tags: - attack.stealth - attack.t1564.004 logsource: category: process_creation product: windows detection: selection: CommandLine|contains: - ~1.exe - ~1.bat - ~1.msi - ~1.vbe - ~1.vbs - ~1.dll - ~1.ps1 - ~1.js - ~1.hta - ~2.exe - ~2.bat - ~2.msi - ~2.vbe - ~2.vbs - ~2.dll - ~2.ps1 - ~2.js - ~2.hta filter: - ParentImage|endswith: - \WebEx\WebexHost.exe - \thor\thor64.exe - CommandLine|contains: C:\xampp\vcredist\VCREDI~1.EXE condition: selection and not filter falsepositives: - Applications could use this notation occasionally which might generate some false positives. In that case Investigate the parent and child process. level: medium
Sigma rule: Detects the creation of the LiveKD driver, which is used for live kernel debugging. Logsource: windows / file_event. Rule: title: LiveKD Driver Creation id: 16fe46bb-4f64-46aa-817d-ff7bec4a2352 status: test description: Detects the creation of the LiveKD driver, which is used for live kernel debugging references: - Internal Research author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) date: 2023-05-16 tags: - attack.privilege-escalation - attack.stealth logsource: product: windows category: file_event detection: selection: TargetFilename: C:\Windows\System32\drivers\LiveKdD.SYS Image|endswith: - \livekd.exe - \livek64.exe condition: selection falsepositives: - Legitimate usage of LiveKD for debugging purposes will also trigger this level: medium
Sigma rule: Detects creation of a scheduled task with a GUID like name. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: Suspicious Scheduled Task Name As GUID id: ff2fff64-4cd6-4a2b-ba7d-e28a30bbe66b status: test description: Detects creation of a scheduled task with a GUID like name references: - https://thedfirreport.com/2022/10/31/follina-exploit-leads-to-domain-compromise/ - https://thedfirreport.com/2022/02/21/qbot-and-zerologon-lead-to-full-domain-compromise/ author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) date: 2022-10-31 tags: - attack.privilege-escalation - attack.persistence - attack.execution - attack.t1053.005 logsource: product: windows category: process_creation detection: selection_img: Image|endswith: \schtasks.exe CommandLine|contains: '/Create ' selection_tn: CommandLine|contains: - /TN "{ - /TN '{ - /TN { selection_end: CommandLine|contains: - '}"' - '}''' - '} ' condition: all of selection_* falsepositives: - Legitimate software naming their tasks as GUIDs level: medium
Sigma rule: Detects attackers using tooling with bad opsec defaults. E.g. spawning a sacrificial process to inject a capability into. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: Bad Opsec Defaults Sacrificial Processes With Improper Arguments id: a7c3d773-caef-227e-a7e7-c2f13c622329 related: - id: f5647edc-a7bf-4737-ab50-ef8c60dc3add type: obsolete status: test description: 'Detects attackers using tooling with bad opsec defaults. E.g. spawning a sacrificial process to inject a capability into the process without taking into account how the process is normally run. One trivial example of this is using rundll32.exe without arguments as a sacrificial process (default in CS, now highlighted by c2lint), running WerFault without arguments (Kraken - credit am0nsec), and other examples. ' references: - https://blog.malwarebytes.com/malwarebytes-news/2020/10/kraken-attack-abuses-wer-service/ - https://www.cobaltstrike.com/help-opsec - https://twitter.com/CyberRaiju/status/1251492025678983169 - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/regsvr32 - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/rundll32 - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/dotnet/framework/tools/regasm-exe-assembly-registration-tool - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/dotnet/framework/tools/regsvcs-exe-net-services-installation-tool author: Oleg Kolesnikov @securonix invrep_de, oscd.community, Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Christian Burkard (Nextron Systems) date: 2020-10-23 modified: 2024-08-15 tags: - attack.stealth - attack.t1218.011 logsource: category: process_creation product: windows detection: selection_werfault: Image|endswith: \WerFault.exe CommandLine|endswith: WerFault.exe selection_rundll32: Image|endswith: \rundll32.exe CommandLine|endswith: rundll32.exe selection_regsvcs: Image|endswith: \regsvcs.exe CommandLine|endswith: regsvcs.exe selection_regasm: Image|endswith: \regasm.exe CommandLine|endswith: regasm.exe selection_regsvr32: Image|endswith: \regsvr32.exe CommandLine|endswith: regsvr32.exe filter_optional_edge_update: ParentImage|contains: \AppData\Local\Microsoft\EdgeUpdate\Install\{ Image|endswith: \rundll32.exe CommandLine|endswith: rundll32.exe filter_optional_chromium_installer: ParentImage|contains: - \AppData\Local\BraveSoftware\Brave-Browser\Application\ - \AppData\Local\Google\Chrome\Application\ ParentImage|endswith: \Installer\setup.exe ParentCommandLine|contains: '--uninstall ' Image|endswith: \rundll32.exe CommandLine|endswith: rundll32.exe condition: 1 of selection_* and not 1 of filter_optional_* falsepositives: - Unlikely level: high
Sigma rule: Detects an uncommon child process of "odbcconf.exe" binary which normally shouldn't have any child processes.. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: Uncommon Child Process Spawned By Odbcconf.EXE id: 8e3c7994-131e-4ba5-b6ea-804d49113a26 status: test description: Detects an uncommon child process of "odbcconf.exe" binary which normally shouldn't have any child processes. references: - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/sql/odbc/odbcconf-exe?view=sql-server-ver16 - https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Odbcconf/ - https://medium.com/@cyberjyot/t1218-008-dll-execution-using-odbcconf-exe-803fa9e08dac author: Harjot Singh @cyb3rjy0t date: 2023-05-22 tags: - attack.stealth - attack.t1218.008 logsource: category: process_creation product: windows detection: selection: ParentImage|endswith: \odbcconf.exe condition: selection falsepositives: - In rare occurrences where "odbcconf" crashes. It might spawn a "werfault" process - Other child processes will depend on the DLL being registered by actions like "regsvr". In case where the DLLs have external calls (which should be rare). Other child processes might spawn and additional filters need to be applied. level: medium
Sigma rule: Detect changes to the "LegalNoticeCaption" or "LegalNoticeText" registry values where the message set contains keywords. Logsource: windows / registry_set. Rule: title: Potential Ransomware Activity Using LegalNotice Message id: 8b9606c9-28be-4a38-b146-0e313cc232c1 status: test description: Detect changes to the "LegalNoticeCaption" or "LegalNoticeText" registry values where the message set contains keywords often used in ransomware ransom messages references: - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/5c1e6f1b4fafd01c8d1ece85f510160fc1275fbf/atomics/T1491.001/T1491.001.md author: frack113 date: 2022-12-11 modified: 2023-08-17 tags: - attack.impact - attack.t1491.001 logsource: product: windows category: registry_set detection: selection: TargetObject|contains: - \SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\System\LegalNoticeCaption - \SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\System\LegalNoticeText Details|contains: - encrypted - Unlock-Password - paying condition: selection falsepositives: - Unknown level: high