alirezaaminzadeh/cybersec-retrieval-benchmark huggingface dataset:
Sigma rule: Detects suspicious Powershell code that execute COM Objects. Logsource: windows / ps_script. Rule: title: Suspicious GetTypeFromCLSID ShellExecute id: 8bc063d5-3a3a-4f01-a140-bc15e55e8437 status: test description: Detects suspicious Powershell code that execute COM Objects references: - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1546.015/T1546.015.md#atomic-test-2---powershell-execute-com-object author: frack113 date: 2022-04-02 tags: - attack.privilege-escalation - attack.persistence - attack.t1546.015 logsource: product: windows category: ps_script definition: 'Requirements: Script Block Logging must be enabled' detection: selection: ScriptBlockText|contains|all: - ::GetTypeFromCLSID( - .ShellExecute( condition: selection falsepositives: - Legitimate PowerShell scripts level: medium
Sigma rule: Detects the execution of renamed schtasks.exe binary, which is a legitimate Windows utility used for scheduling tasks. O. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: Renamed Schtasks Execution id: f91e51c9-f344-4b32-969b-0b6f6b8537d4 status: experimental description: 'Detects the execution of renamed schtasks.exe binary, which is a legitimate Windows utility used for scheduling tasks. One of the very common persistence techniques is schedule malicious tasks using schtasks.exe. Since, it is heavily abused, it is also heavily monitored by security products. To evade detection, threat actors may rename the schtasks.exe binary to schedule their malicious tasks. ' references: - https://x.com/JangPr0/status/1932034543026065833 - https://ss64.com/nt/schtasks.html author: Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems) date: 2025-11-27 tags: - attack.execution - attack.persistence - attack.privilege-escalation - attack.stealth - attack.t1036.003 - attack.t1053.005 logsource: category: process_creation product: windows detection: selection_cmd_operation: CommandLine|contains|windash: - ' /create ' - ' /delete ' - ' /query ' - ' /change ' - ' /run ' - ' /end ' selection_cmd_flags: CommandLine|contains|windash: - ' /tn ' - ' /tr ' - ' /sc ' - ' /st ' - ' /ru ' - ' /fo ' selection_pe: OriginalFileName: schtasks.exe filter_main_cmd: CommandLine|contains: schtasks filter_main_img: Image|endswith: \schtasks.exe condition: (all of selection_cmd_* and not filter_main_cmd) or (selection_pe and not filter_main_img) falsepositives: - Unlikely level: high
Sigma rule: Detects suspicious starts of explorer.exe that use the /NOUACCHECK flag that allows to run all sub processes of that new. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: Explorer NOUACCHECK Flag id: 534f2ef7-e8a2-4433-816d-c91bccde289b status: test description: Detects suspicious starts of explorer.exe that use the /NOUACCHECK flag that allows to run all sub processes of that newly started explorer.exe without any UAC checks references: - https://twitter.com/ORCA6665/status/1496478087244095491 author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems) date: 2022-02-23 modified: 2022-04-21 tags: - attack.privilege-escalation - attack.t1548.002 logsource: category: process_creation product: windows detection: selection: Image|endswith: \explorer.exe CommandLine|contains: /NOUACCHECK filter_dc_logon: - ParentCommandLine: C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s Schedule - ParentImage: C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe condition: selection and not 1 of filter_* falsepositives: - Domain Controller User Logon - Unknown how many legitimate software products use that method level: high
Sigma rule: Detects the execution of 'auditctl' with the '-D' command line parameter, which deletes all configured audit rules and w. Logsource: linux / process_creation. Rule: title: Audit Rules Deleted Via Auditctl id: bed26dea-4525-47f4-b24a-76e30e44ffb0 status: experimental description: 'Detects the execution of ''auditctl'' with the ''-D'' command line parameter, which deletes all configured audit rules and watches on Linux systems. This technique is commonly used by attackers to disable audit logging and cover their tracks by removing monitoring capabilities. Removal of audit rules can significantly impair detection of malicious activities on the affected system. ' references: - https://www.atomicredteam.io/atomic-red-team/atomics/T1562.012 - https://linux.die.net/man/8/auditct author: Mohamed LAKRI date: 2025-10-17 tags: - attack.defense-impairment - attack.t1685.004 logsource: product: linux category: process_creation detection: selection: Image|endswith: /auditctl CommandLine|re: -D condition: selection falsepositives: - An administrator troubleshooting. Investigate all attempts. level: high
Sigma rule: Detects installation of a new shim using sdbinst.exe. Adversaries may establish persistence and/or elevate privileges by. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: Potential Shim Database Persistence via Sdbinst.EXE id: 517490a7-115a-48c6-8862-1a481504d5a8 related: - id: 18ee686c-38a3-4f65-9f44-48a077141f42 type: similar status: test description: 'Detects installation of a new shim using sdbinst.exe. Adversaries may establish persistence and/or elevate privileges by executing malicious content triggered by application shims ' references: - https://www.mandiant.com/resources/blog/fin7-shim-databases-persistence author: Markus Neis date: 2019-01-16 modified: 2023-12-06 tags: - attack.persistence - attack.privilege-escalation - attack.t1546.011 logsource: category: process_creation product: windows detection: selection_img: - Image|endswith: \sdbinst.exe - OriginalFileName: sdbinst.exe selection_cli: CommandLine|contains: .sdb filter_optional_iis: ParentImage|endswith: \msiexec.exe CommandLine|contains: - :\Program Files (x86)\IIS Express\iisexpressshim.sdb - :\Program Files\IIS Express\iisexpressshim.sdb condition: all of selection_* and not 1 of filter_optional_* falsepositives: - Unknown level: medium
Sigma rule: Detects Bitbucket global secret scanning rule deletion activity.. Logsource: bitbucket / audit. Rule: title: Bitbucket Global Secret Scanning Rule Deleted id: e16cf0f0-ee88-4901-bd0b-4c8d13d9ee05 status: test description: Detects Bitbucket global secret scanning rule deletion activity. references: - https://confluence.atlassian.com/bitbucketserver/audit-log-events-776640423.html - https://confluence.atlassian.com/bitbucketserver/secret-scanning-1157471613.html author: Muhammad Faisal (@faisalusuf) date: 2024-02-25 tags: - attack.defense-impairment - attack.t1685 logsource: product: bitbucket service: audit definition: 'Requirements: "Basic" log level is required to receive these audit events.' detection: selection: auditType.category: Global administration auditType.action: Global secret scanning rule deleted condition: selection falsepositives: - Legitimate user activity. level: medium
Sigma rule: Detects changing the PowerShell script execution policy to a potentially insecure level using the "-ExecutionPolicy" fla. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: Change PowerShell Policies to an Insecure Level id: 87e3c4e8-a6a8-4ad9-bb4f-46e7ff99a180 related: - id: cf2e938e-9a3e-4fe8-a347-411642b28a9f type: similar - id: 61d0475c-173f-4844-86f7-f3eebae1c66b type: similar - id: fad91067-08c5-4d1a-8d8c-d96a21b37814 type: similar status: test description: Detects changing the PowerShell script execution policy to a potentially insecure level using the "-ExecutionPolicy" flag. references: - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/microsoft.powershell.security/set-executionpolicy?view=powershell-7.4 - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/microsoft.powershell.core/about/about_execution_policies?view=powershell-7.4 - https://adsecurity.org/?p=2604 - https://thedfirreport.com/2021/11/01/from-zero-to-domain-admin/ author: frack113 date: 2021-11-01 modified: 2025-10-07 tags: - attack.execution - attack.t1059.001 logsource: product: windows category: process_creation detection: selection_img: - OriginalFileName: - powershell_ise.exe - PowerShell.EXE - pwsh.dll - Image|endswith: - \powershell_ise.exe - \powershell.exe - \pwsh.exe selection_option: CommandLine|contains: - '-executionpolicy ' - ' -ep ' - ' -exec ' selection_level: CommandLine|contains: - Bypass - Unrestricted filter_main_powershell_core: ParentImage: - C:\Windows\SysWOW64\msiexec.exe - C:\Windows\System32\msiexec.exe CommandLine|contains: - -NoProfile -ExecutionPolicy Bypass -File "C:\Program Files\PowerShell\7\ - -NoProfile -ExecutionPolicy Bypass -File "C:\Program Files (x86)\PowerShell\7\ filter_optional_avast: ParentImage|contains: - C:\Program Files\Avast Software\Avast\ - C:\Program Files (x86)\Avast Software\Avast\ - \instup.exe CommandLine|contains: - -ExecutionPolicy ByPass -File "C:\Program Files\Avast Software\Avast - -ExecutionPolicy ByPass -File "C:\Program Files (x86)\Avast Software\Avast\ condition: all of selection_* and not 1 of filter_main_* and not 1 of filter_optional_* falsepositives: - Administrator scripts level: medium
Sigma rule: Detects modification to the "Default" value of the "MyComputer" key and subkeys to point to a custom binary that will be. Logsource: windows / registry_set. Rule: title: Potential Persistence Via MyComputer Registry Keys id: 8fbe98a8-8f9d-44f8-aa71-8c572e29ef06 status: test description: Detects modification to the "Default" value of the "MyComputer" key and subkeys to point to a custom binary that will be launched whenever the associated action is executed (see reference section for example) references: - https://www.hexacorn.com/blog/2017/01/18/beyond-good-ol-run-key-part-55/ author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) date: 2022-08-09 modified: 2024-01-11 tags: - attack.persistence logsource: category: registry_set product: windows detection: selection: TargetObject|contains: \Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\MyComputer TargetObject|endswith: (Default) condition: selection falsepositives: - Unlikely but if you experience FPs add specific processes and locations you would like to monitor for level: high
Sigma rule: Detects the addition of a new LogonScript to the registry value "UserInitMprLogonScript" for potential persistence. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: Potential Persistence Via Logon Scripts - CommandLine id: 21d856f9-9281-4ded-9377-51a1a6e2a432 related: - id: 0a98a10c-685d-4ab0-bddc-b6bdd1d48458 type: derived status: test description: Detects the addition of a new LogonScript to the registry value "UserInitMprLogonScript" for potential persistence references: - https://cocomelonc.github.io/persistence/2022/12/09/malware-pers-20.html author: Tom Ueltschi (@c_APT_ure) date: 2019-01-12 modified: 2023-06-09 tags: - attack.privilege-escalation - attack.persistence - attack.t1037.001 logsource: category: process_creation product: windows detection: selection: CommandLine|contains: UserInitMprLogonScript condition: selection falsepositives: - Legitimate addition of Logon Scripts via the command line by administrators or third party tools level: high
Sigma rule: Detects usage of a base64 encoded "FromBase64String" cmdlet in a process command line. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: PowerShell Base64 Encoded FromBase64String Cmdlet id: fdb62a13-9a81-4e5c-a38f-ea93a16f6d7c status: test description: Detects usage of a base64 encoded "FromBase64String" cmdlet in a process command line references: - Internal Research author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems) date: 2019-08-24 modified: 2023-04-06 tags: - attack.stealth - attack.t1140 - attack.execution - attack.t1059.001 logsource: category: process_creation product: windows detection: selection: - CommandLine|base64offset|contains: ::FromBase64String - CommandLine|contains: - OgA6AEYAcgBvAG0AQgBhAHMAZQA2ADQAUwB0AHIAaQBuAGcA - oAOgBGAHIAbwBtAEIAYQBzAGUANgA0AFMAdAByAGkAbgBnA - 6ADoARgByAG8AbQBCAGEAcwBlADYANABTAHQAcgBpAG4AZw condition: selection falsepositives: - Unknown level: high
Sigma rule: Detects the change of user type from "Guest" to "Member" for potential elevation of privilege.. Logsource: azure / auditlogs. Rule: title: User State Changed From Guest To Member id: 8dee7a0d-43fd-4b3c-8cd1-605e189d195e status: test description: Detects the change of user type from "Guest" to "Member" for potential elevation of privilege. references: - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-gb/entra/architecture/security-operations-user-accounts#monitoring-external-user-sign-ins author: MikeDuddington, '@dudders1' date: 2022-06-30 tags: - attack.persistence - attack.privilege-escalation - attack.initial-access - attack.stealth - attack.t1078.004 logsource: product: azure service: auditlogs detection: selection: Category: UserManagement OperationName: Update user properties.message: '"displayName":"UserType","oldValue":"[\"Guest\"]","newValue":"[\"Member\"]"' condition: selection falsepositives: - If this was approved by System Administrator. level: medium
Sigma rule: Detects network connections via finger.exe, which can be abused by threat actors to retrieve remote commands for executi. Logsource: windows / network_connection. Rule: title: Network Connection Initiated via Finger.EXE id: 2fdaf50b-9fd5-449f-ba69-f17248119af6 related: - id: c082c2b0-525b-4dbc-9a26-a57dc4692074 type: similar - id: af491bca-e752-4b44-9c86-df5680533dbc type: similar status: experimental description: 'Detects network connections via finger.exe, which can be abused by threat actors to retrieve remote commands for execution on Windows devices. In one ClickFix malware campaign, adversaries leveraged the finger protocol to fetch commands from a remote server. Since the finger utility is not commonly used in modern Windows environments, its presence already raises suspicion. Investigating such network connections can also help identify potential malicious infrastructure used by threat actors ' references: - https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/decades-old-finger-protocol-abused-in-clickfix-malware-attacks/ author: Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems) date: 2025-11-19 tags: - attack.command-and-control - attack.t1071.004 - attack.execution - attack.t1059.003 logsource: category: network_connection product: windows detection: selection: Initiated: 'true' Image|endswith: \finger.exe condition: selection falsepositives: - Unlikely level: high
Sigma rule: Detects the pattern of UAC Bypass using NTFS reparse point and wusa.exe DLL hijacking (UACMe 36). Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: UAC Bypass Using NTFS Reparse Point - Process id: 39ed3c80-e6a1-431b-9df3-911ac53d08a7 status: test description: Detects the pattern of UAC Bypass using NTFS reparse point and wusa.exe DLL hijacking (UACMe 36) references: - https://github.com/hfiref0x/UACME author: Christian Burkard (Nextron Systems) date: 2021-08-30 modified: 2024-12-01 tags: - attack.privilege-escalation - attack.t1548.002 logsource: category: process_creation product: windows detection: selection1: CommandLine|startswith: '"C:\Windows\system32\wusa.exe" /quiet C:\Users\' CommandLine|endswith: \AppData\Local\Temp\update.msu IntegrityLevel: - High - System - S-1-16-16384 - S-1-16-12288 selection2: ParentCommandLine: '"C:\Windows\system32\dism.exe" /online /quiet /norestart /add-package /packagepath:"C:\Windows\system32\pe386" /ignorecheck' IntegrityLevel: - High - System CommandLine|contains|all: - C:\Users\ - \AppData\Local\Temp\ - \dismhost.exe { Image|endswith: \DismHost.exe condition: 1 of selection* falsepositives: - Unknown level: high
Sigma rule: Detects suspicious launch of the PSEXESVC service on this system and a sub process run as LOCAL_SYSTEM (-s), which means. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: PsExec Service Child Process Execution as LOCAL SYSTEM id: 7c0dcd3d-acf8-4f71-9570-f448b0034f94 related: - id: fa91cc36-24c9-41ce-b3c8-3bbc3f2f67ba type: similar status: test description: Detects suspicious launch of the PSEXESVC service on this system and a sub process run as LOCAL_SYSTEM (-s), which means that someone remotely started a command on this system running it with highest privileges and not only the privileges of the login user account (e.g. the administrator account) references: - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/downloads/psexec author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems) date: 2022-07-21 modified: 2023-02-28 tags: - attack.execution logsource: category: process_creation product: windows detection: selection: ParentImage: C:\Windows\PSEXESVC.exe User|contains: - AUTHORI - AUTORI condition: selection falsepositives: - Users that debug Microsoft Intune issues using the commands mentioned in the official documentation; see https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/mem/intune/apps/intune-management-extension level: high
Sigma rule: Detects attempts to masquerade as legitimate files by adding a space to the end of the filename.. Logsource: macos / process_creation. Rule: title: Space After Filename - macOS id: b6e2a2e3-2d30-43b1-a4ea-071e36595690 status: test description: Detects attempts to masquerade as legitimate files by adding a space to the end of the filename. references: - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1036.006/T1036.006.md author: remotephone date: 2021-11-20 modified: 2023-01-04 tags: - attack.stealth - attack.t1036.006 logsource: product: macos category: process_creation detection: selection1: CommandLine|endswith: ' ' selection2: Image|endswith: ' ' condition: 1 of selection* falsepositives: - Mistyped commands or legitimate binaries named to match the pattern level: low
Sigma rule: Detects an executable initiating a network connection to "LocaltoNet" tunneling sub-domains. LocaltoNet is a reverse pro. Logsource: linux / network_connection. Rule: title: Communication To LocaltoNet Tunneling Service Initiated - Linux id: c4568f5d-131f-4e78-83d4-45b2da0ec4f1 status: test description: 'Detects an executable initiating a network connection to "LocaltoNet" tunneling sub-domains. LocaltoNet is a reverse proxy that enables localhost services to be exposed to the Internet. Attackers have been seen to use this service for command-and-control activities to bypass MFA and perimeter controls. ' references: - https://localtonet.com/documents/supported-tunnels - https://cloud.google.com/blog/topics/threat-intelligence/unc3944-targets-saas-applications author: Andreas Braathen (mnemonic.io) date: 2024-06-17 tags: - attack.command-and-control - attack.t1572 - attack.t1090 - attack.t1102 logsource: category: network_connection product: linux detection: selection: DestinationHostname|endswith: - .localto.net - .localtonet.com Initiated: 'true' condition: selection falsepositives: - Legitimate use of the LocaltoNet service. level: high
Sigma rule: Identifies disabling of default Amazon Elastic Block Store (EBS) encryption in the current region. Disabling default enc. Logsource: aws / cloudtrail. Rule: title: AWS EC2 Disable EBS Encryption id: 16124c2d-e40b-4fcc-8f2c-5ab7870a2223 status: stable description: 'Identifies disabling of default Amazon Elastic Block Store (EBS) encryption in the current region. Disabling default encryption does not change the encryption status of your existing volumes. ' references: - https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AWSEC2/latest/APIReference/API_DisableEbsEncryptionByDefault.html author: Sittikorn S date: 2021-06-29 modified: 2021-08-20 tags: - attack.impact - attack.t1486 - attack.t1565 logsource: product: aws service: cloudtrail detection: selection: eventSource: ec2.amazonaws.com eventName: DisableEbsEncryptionByDefault condition: selection falsepositives: - System Administrator Activities - DEV, UAT, SAT environment. You should apply this rule with PROD account only. level: medium
Sigma rule: Find local accounts being created or modified as well as remote authentication configurations. Logsource: cisco / aaa. Rule: title: Cisco Local Accounts id: 6d844f0f-1c18-41af-8f19-33e7654edfc3 status: test description: Find local accounts being created or modified as well as remote authentication configurations author: Austin Clark date: 2019-08-12 modified: 2023-01-04 tags: - attack.privilege-escalation - attack.persistence - attack.t1136.001 - attack.t1098 logsource: product: cisco service: aaa detection: keywords: - username - aaa condition: keywords falsepositives: - When remote authentication is in place, this should not change often level: high
Sigma rule: Detects execution of perl using the "-e"/"-E" flags. This is could be used as a way to launch a reverse shell or execute. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: Perl Inline Command Execution id: f426547a-e0f7-441a-b63e-854ac5bdf54d status: test description: Detects execution of perl using the "-e"/"-E" flags. This is could be used as a way to launch a reverse shell or execute live perl code. references: - https://pentestmonkey.net/cheat-sheet/shells/reverse-shell-cheat-sheet - https://www.revshells.com/ author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) date: 2023-01-02 tags: - attack.execution - attack.t1059 logsource: category: process_creation product: windows detection: selection_img: - Image|endswith: \perl.exe - OriginalFileName: perl.exe selection_cli: CommandLine|contains: ' -e' condition: all of selection_* falsepositives: - Unknown level: medium
Sigma rule: Detects suspicious process command line that starts with a shell that executes something and finally gets piped into ano. Logsource: linux / process_creation. Rule: title: Linux Shell Pipe to Shell id: 880973f3-9708-491c-a77b-2a35a1921158 status: test description: Detects suspicious process command line that starts with a shell that executes something and finally gets piped into another shell references: - Internal Research author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems) date: 2022-03-14 modified: 2022-07-26 tags: - attack.stealth - attack.t1140 logsource: product: linux category: process_creation detection: selection: CommandLine|startswith: - 'sh -c ' - 'bash -c ' selection_exec: - CommandLine|contains: - '| bash ' - '| sh ' - '|bash ' - '|sh ' - CommandLine|endswith: - '| bash' - '| sh' - '|bash' - ' |sh' condition: all of selection* falsepositives: - Legitimate software that uses these patterns level: medium
Sigma rule: Detects an appx package deployment that was blocked by the local computer policy. The following events indicate that an. Logsource: windows / appxdeployment-server. Rule: title: Deployment Of The AppX Package Was Blocked By The Policy id: e021bbb5-407f-41f5-9dc9-1864c45a7a51 status: test description: 'Detects an appx package deployment that was blocked by the local computer policy. The following events indicate that an AppX package deployment was blocked by a policy: - Event ID 441: The package deployment operation is blocked by the "Allow deployment operations in special profiles" policy - Event ID 442: Deployments to non-system volumes are blocked by the "Disable deployment of Windows Store apps to non-system volumes" policy." - Event ID 453: Package blocked by a platform policy. - Event ID 454: Package blocked by a platform policy. ' references: - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/appxpkg/troubleshooting - https://github.com/nasbench/EVTX-ETW-Resources/blob/7a806a148b3d9d381193d4a80356016e6e8b1ee8/ETWEventsList/CSV/Windows11/22H2/W11_22H2_Pro_20220920_22621.382/Providers/Microsoft-Windows-AppXDeployment-Server.csv author: frack113 date: 2023-01-11 tags: - attack.defense-impairment logsource: product: windows service: appxdeployment-server detection: selection: EventID: - 441 - 442 - 453 - 454 condition: selection falsepositives: - Unlikely, since this event notifies about blocked application deployment. Tune your applocker rules to avoid blocking legitimate applications. level: medium