alirezaaminzadeh/cybersec-retrieval-benchmark huggingface dataset:
Sigma rule: Detects PowerShell scripts to set the ACL to a file in the Windows folder. Logsource: windows / ps_script. Rule: title: PowerShell Set-Acl On Windows Folder - PsScript id: 3bf1d859-3a7e-44cb-8809-a99e066d3478 related: - id: cae80281-ef23-44c5-873b-fd48d2666f49 type: derived - id: 0944e002-e3f6-4eb5-bf69-3a3067b53d73 type: derived - id: bdeb2cff-af74-4094-8426-724dc937f20a type: derived status: test description: Detects PowerShell scripts to set the ACL to a file in the Windows folder references: - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/74438b0237d141ee9c99747976447dc884cb1a39/atomics/T1505.005/T1505.005.md - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/microsoft.powershell.security/set-acl?view=powershell-5.1 author: frack113, Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) date: 2023-07-18 tags: - attack.defense-impairment - attack.t1222 logsource: product: windows category: ps_script definition: bade5735-5ab0-4aa7-a642-a11be0e40872 detection: selection_cmdlet: ScriptBlockText|contains|all: - 'Set-Acl ' - '-AclObject ' selection_paths: ScriptBlockText|contains: - -Path "C:\Windows - -Path "C:/Windows - -Path 'C:\Windows - -Path 'C:/Windows - -Path C:\\Windows - -Path C:/Windows - -Path $env:windir - -Path "$env:windir - -Path '$env:windir selection_permissions: ScriptBlockText|contains: - FullControl - Allow condition: all of selection_* falsepositives: - Unknown level: high
Sigma rule: Detects the addition of a new firewall policy on a Fortinet FortiGate Firewall.. Logsource: fortigate / event. Rule: title: FortiGate - New Firewall Policy Added id: f24ab7a8-f09a-4319-82c1-915586aa642b status: experimental description: Detects the addition of a new firewall policy on a Fortinet FortiGate Firewall. references: - https://www.fortiguard.com/psirt/FG-IR-24-535 - https://docs.fortinet.com/document/fortigate/7.6.4/fortios-log-message-reference/398/event - https://docs.fortinet.com/document/fortigate/7.6.4/cli-reference/333889629/config-firewall-policy - https://docs.fortinet.com/document/fortigate/7.6.4/fortios-log-message-reference/44547/44547-logid-event-config-objattr author: Marco Pedrinazzi (@pedrinazziM) (InTheCyber) date: 2025-11-01 modified: 2026-05-04 tags: - attack.defense-impairment - attack.t1686.002 logsource: product: fortigate service: event detection: selection: action: Add cfgpath: firewall.policy condition: selection falsepositives: - A firewall policy can be added for legitimate purposes. level: medium
Sigma rule: Detects when an application is granted delegated or app role permissions for Microsoft Graph, Exchange, Sharepoint, or A. Logsource: azure / auditlogs. Rule: title: App Granted Microsoft Permissions id: c1d147ae-a951-48e5-8b41-dcd0170c7213 status: test description: Detects when an application is granted delegated or app role permissions for Microsoft Graph, Exchange, Sharepoint, or Azure AD references: - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/architecture/security-operations-applications#application-granted-highly-privileged-permissions author: Bailey Bercik '@baileybercik', Mark Morowczynski '@markmorow' date: 2022-07-10 tags: - attack.credential-access - attack.t1528 logsource: product: azure service: auditlogs detection: selection: properties.message: - Add delegated permission grant - Add app role assignment to service principal condition: selection falsepositives: - When the permission is legitimately needed for the app level: high
Sigma rule: Detects various indicators of Microsoft Connection Manager Profile Installer execution. Logsource: windows / process_access. Rule: title: CMSTP Execution Process Access id: 3b4b232a-af90-427c-a22f-30b0c0837b95 status: stable description: Detects various indicators of Microsoft Connection Manager Profile Installer execution references: - https://web.archive.org/web/20190720093911/http://www.endurant.io/cmstp/detecting-cmstp-enabled-code-execution-and-uac-bypass-with-sysmon/ author: Nik Seetharaman date: 2018-07-16 modified: 2021-06-27 tags: - attack.stealth - attack.t1218.003 - attack.execution - attack.t1559.001 - attack.g0069 - attack.g0080 - car.2019-04-001 logsource: product: windows category: process_access detection: selection: CallTrace|contains: cmlua.dll condition: selection falsepositives: - Legitimate CMSTP use (unlikely in modern enterprise environments) level: high
Sigma rule: Detects the presence of the keywords "lsass" and ".dmp" in the commandline, which could indicate a potential attempt to. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: LSASS Dump Keyword In CommandLine id: ffa6861c-4461-4f59-8a41-578c39f3f23e related: - id: a5a2d357-1ab8-4675-a967-ef9990a59391 type: derived status: test description: 'Detects the presence of the keywords "lsass" and ".dmp" in the commandline, which could indicate a potential attempt to dump or create a dump of the lsass process. ' references: - https://github.com/Hackndo/lsassy - https://medium.com/@markmotig/some-ways-to-dump-lsass-exe-c4a75fdc49bf - https://github.com/elastic/detection-rules/blob/c76a39796972ecde44cb1da6df47f1b6562c9770/rules/windows/credential_access_lsass_memdump_file_created.toml - https://www.whiteoaksecurity.com/blog/attacks-defenses-dumping-lsass-no-mimikatz/ - https://github.com/helpsystems/nanodump - https://github.com/CCob/MirrorDump author: E.M. Anhaus, Tony Lambert, oscd.community, Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) date: 2019-10-24 modified: 2023-08-29 tags: - attack.credential-access - attack.t1003.001 logsource: category: process_creation product: windows detection: selection: - CommandLine|contains: - lsass.dmp - lsass.zip - lsass.rar - Andrew.dmp - Coredump.dmp - NotLSASS.zip - lsass_2 - lsassdump - lsassdmp - CommandLine|contains|all: - lsass - .dmp - CommandLine|contains|all: - SQLDmpr - .mdmp - CommandLine|contains|all: - nanodump - .dmp condition: selection falsepositives: - Unlikely level: high
Sigma rule: Detects when a rule has been added to the Windows Firewall exception list. Logsource: windows / firewall-as. Rule: title: Uncommon New Firewall Rule Added In Windows Firewall Exception List id: cde0a575-7d3d-4a49-9817-b8004a7bf105 status: test description: Detects when a rule has been added to the Windows Firewall exception list references: - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-server-2008-r2-and-2008/dd364427(v=ws.10) author: frack113 date: 2022-02-19 modified: 2025-10-08 tags: - attack.defense-impairment - attack.t1686.003 logsource: product: windows service: firewall-as detection: selection: EventID: - 2004 - 2071 - 2097 filter_main_block: Action: 2 filter_main_generic: ApplicationPath|startswith: - C:\Program Files (x86)\ - C:\Program Files\ - C:\Windows\System32\ - C:\Windows\SysWOW64\ - C:\Windows\WinSxS\ filter_main_covered_paths: ApplicationPath|contains: - C:\PerfLogs\ - C:\Temp\ - C:\Tmp\ - C:\Users\Public\ - C:\Windows\Tasks\ - C:\Windows\Temp\ - \AppData\Local\Temp\ filter_main_system_dllhost: ApplicationPath: System ModifyingApplication: C:\Windows\System32\dllhost.exe filter_main_tiworker: ModifyingApplication|startswith: C:\Windows\WinSxS\ ModifyingApplication|endswith: \TiWorker.exe filter_main_null: ApplicationPath: null filter_optional_no_path: ModifyingApplication: - C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe - C:\Windows\System32\dllhost.exe ApplicationPath: '' filter_optional_msmpeng: - ModifyingApplication|startswith: - C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\Windows Defender\Platform\ - C:\Program Files\Windows Defender\ ModifyingApplication|endswith: \MsMpEng.exe - ApplicationPath|startswith: - C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\Windows Defender\Platform\ - C:\Program Files\Windows Defender\ ApplicationPath|endswith: \MsMpEng.exe condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_* and not 1 of filter_optional_* level: medium
Sigma rule: Detects the execution of the Doppelanger hacktool which is used to dump LSASS memory via process cloning while evading c. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: HackTool - Doppelanger LSASS Dumper Execution id: d474c8fe-bb69-4ea0-b7d9-f682b56d52d3 status: experimental description: Detects the execution of the Doppelanger hacktool which is used to dump LSASS memory via process cloning while evading common detection methods references: - https://labs.yarix.com/2025/06/doppelganger-an-advanced-lsass-dumper-with-process-cloning/ - https://github.com/vari-sh/RedTeamGrimoire/tree/668e0357072546065729ad623f8c02f7be21bb08/Doppelganger author: Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems) date: 2025-07-01 tags: - attack.credential-access - attack.t1003.001 logsource: category: process_creation product: windows detection: selection: - Image|endswith: \Doppelganger.exe - Hashes|contains: - IMPHASH=AB94D5217896ADCD765A06B2D52F0AEB - IMPHASH=65F0EA61156EE0C2A35421926F0C7F78 condition: selection falsepositives: - Unknown level: high
Sigma rule: Detects the occurrence of numerous space characters in RunMRU registry paths, which may indicate execution via phishing. Logsource: windows / registry_set. Rule: title: Suspicious Space Characters in RunMRU Registry Path - ClickFix id: 7a1b4c5e-8f3d-4b9a-7c2e-1f4a5b8c6d9e related: - id: 3ae9974a-eb09-4044-8e70-8980a50c12c8 type: similar status: experimental description: 'Detects the occurrence of numerous space characters in RunMRU registry paths, which may indicate execution via phishing lures using clickfix techniques to hide malicious commands in the Windows Run dialog box from naked eyes. ' references: - https://expel.com/blog/cache-smuggling-when-a-picture-isnt-a-thousand-words/ - https://github.com/JohnHammond/recaptcha-phish author: Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems) date: 2025-11-04 tags: - attack.execution - attack.stealth - attack.t1204.004 - attack.t1027.010 logsource: category: registry_set product: windows detection: selection_key: TargetObject|contains: \Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\RunMRU\ Details|contains: '#' selection_space_variation: Details|contains: - - - - - - - - - - - - - ' ' condition: all of selection_* falsepositives: - Unlikely level: high
Sigma rule: Detects potentially suspicious execution of the Regasm/Regsvcs utilities with an uncommon extension.. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: Potentially Suspicious Execution Of Regasm/Regsvcs With Uncommon Extension id: e9f8f8cc-07cc-4e81-b724-f387db9175e4 related: - id: cc368ed0-2411-45dc-a222-510ace303cb2 type: derived status: test description: Detects potentially suspicious execution of the Regasm/Regsvcs utilities with an uncommon extension. references: - https://www.fortiguard.com/threat-signal-report/4718?s=09 - https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Regasm/ - https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Regsvcs/ author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) date: 2023-02-13 tags: - attack.stealth - attack.t1218.009 logsource: category: process_creation product: windows detection: selection_img: - Image|endswith: - \Regsvcs.exe - \Regasm.exe - OriginalFileName: - RegSvcs.exe - RegAsm.exe selection_extension: CommandLine|contains: - .dat - .gif - .jpeg - .jpg - .png - .txt condition: all of selection_* falsepositives: - Unknown level: medium
Sigma rule: Detects when a firewall rule is modified or deleted in Google Cloud Platform (GCP).. Logsource: gcp / gcp.audit. Rule: title: Google Cloud Firewall Modified or Deleted id: fe513c69-734c-4d4a-8548-ac5f609be82b status: test description: Detects when a firewall rule is modified or deleted in Google Cloud Platform (GCP). references: - https://cloud.google.com/kubernetes-engine/docs/how-to/audit-logging - https://developers.google.com/resources/api-libraries/documentation/compute/v1/java/latest/com/google/api/services/compute/Compute.Firewalls.html author: Austin Songer @austinsonger date: 2021-08-13 modified: 2022-10-09 tags: - attack.defense-impairment - attack.t1685 logsource: product: gcp service: gcp.audit detection: selection: gcp.audit.method_name: - v*.Compute.Firewalls.Delete - v*.Compute.Firewalls.Patch - v*.Compute.Firewalls.Update - v*.Compute.Firewalls.Insert condition: selection falsepositives: - Firewall rules being modified or deleted may be performed by a system administrator. Verify that the firewall configuration change was expected. - Exceptions can be added to this rule to filter expected behavior. level: medium
Sigma rule: Detects the creation of files in a specific location by ScreenConnect RMM. ScreenConnect has feature to remotely execute. Logsource: windows / file_event. Rule: title: Remote Access Tool - ScreenConnect Temporary File id: 0afecb6e-6223-4a82-99fb-bf5b981e92a5 related: - id: b1f73849-6329-4069-bc8f-78a604bb8b23 type: similar status: test description: 'Detects the creation of files in a specific location by ScreenConnect RMM. ScreenConnect has feature to remotely execute binaries on a target machine. These binaries will be dropped to ":\Users\<username>\Documents\ConnectWiseControl\Temp\" before execution. ' references: - https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/pull/4467 author: Ali Alwashali date: 2023-10-10 tags: - attack.execution - attack.t1059.003 logsource: category: file_event product: windows detection: selection: Image|endswith: \ScreenConnect.WindowsClient.exe TargetFilename|contains: \Documents\ConnectWiseControl\Temp\ condition: selection falsepositives: - Legitimate use of ScreenConnect level: low
Sigma rule: Detect AD credential dumping using impacket secretdump HKTL. Based on the SIGMA rules/windows/builtin/win_impacket_secre. Logsource: zeek / smb_files. Rule: title: Possible Impacket SecretDump Remote Activity - Zeek id: 92dae1ed-1c9d-4eff-a567-33acbd95b00e status: test description: Detect AD credential dumping using impacket secretdump HKTL. Based on the SIGMA rules/windows/builtin/win_impacket_secretdump.yml references: - https://web.archive.org/web/20230329153811/https://blog.menasec.net/2019/02/threat-huting-10-impacketsecretdump.html author: Samir Bousseaden, @neu5ron date: 2020-03-19 modified: 2021-11-27 tags: - attack.credential-access - attack.t1003.002 - attack.t1003.004 - attack.t1003.003 logsource: product: zeek service: smb_files detection: selection: path|contains|all: - \ - ADMIN$ name|contains: SYSTEM32\ name|endswith: .tmp condition: selection falsepositives: - Unknown level: high
Sigma rule: Detects the use of the WMI command-line (WMIC) utility to identify and display various system information, including OS,. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: Uncommon System Information Discovery Via Wmic.EXE id: 9d5a1274-922a-49d0-87f3-8c653483b909 related: - id: d85ecdd7-b855-4e6e-af59-d9c78b5b861e type: derived status: test description: 'Detects the use of the WMI command-line (WMIC) utility to identify and display various system information, including OS, CPU, GPU, and disk drive names; memory capacity; display resolution; and baseboard, BIOS, and GPU driver products/versions. Some of these commands were used by Aurora Stealer in late 2022/early 2023. ' references: - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/a2ccd19c37d0278b4ffa8583add3cf52060a5418/atomics/T1082/T1082.md#atomic-test-25---system-information-discovery-with-wmic - https://nwgat.ninja/getting-system-information-with-wmic-on-windows/ - https://blog.sekoia.io/aurora-a-rising-stealer-flying-under-the-radar - https://blog.cyble.com/2023/01/18/aurora-a-stealer-using-shapeshifting-tactics/ - https://app.any.run/tasks/a6aa0057-82ec-451f-8f99-55650ca537da/ - https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/d6f6bc10ae0e634ed4301d584f61418cee18e5d58ad9af72f8aa552dc4aaeca3/behavior author: TropChaud date: 2023-01-26 modified: 2023-12-19 tags: - attack.discovery - attack.t1082 logsource: category: process_creation product: windows detection: selection_wmic: - Description: WMI Commandline Utility - OriginalFileName: wmic.exe - Image|endswith: \WMIC.exe selection_commands: CommandLine|contains: - LOGICALDISK get Name,Size,FreeSpace - os get Caption,OSArchitecture,Version condition: all of selection_* falsepositives: - Unknown level: medium simulation: - type: atomic-red-team name: System Information Discovery with WMIC technique: T1082 atomic_guid: 8851b73a-3624-4bf7-8704-aa312411565c regression_tests_path: regression_data/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_wmic_recon_system_info_uncommon/info.yml
Sigma rule: Detects execution of the Notepad++ updater (gup) from a process other than Notepad++ to download files.. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: File Download Using Notepad++ GUP Utility id: 44143844-0631-49ab-97a0-96387d6b2d7c status: test description: Detects execution of the Notepad++ updater (gup) from a process other than Notepad++ to download files. references: - https://twitter.com/nas_bench/status/1535322182863179776 author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) date: 2022-06-10 modified: 2023-03-02 tags: - attack.command-and-control - attack.t1105 logsource: category: process_creation product: windows detection: selection_img: - Image|endswith: \GUP.exe - OriginalFileName: gup.exe selection_cli: CommandLine|contains|all: - ' -unzipTo ' - http filter: ParentImage|endswith: \notepad++.exe condition: all of selection* and not filter falsepositives: - Other parent processes other than notepad++ using GUP that are not currently identified level: high
Sigma rule: Detects modification of autostart extensibility point (ASEP) in registry.. Logsource: windows / registry_set. Rule: title: Session Manager Autorun Keys Modification id: 046218bd-e0d8-4113-a3c3-895a12b2b298 related: - id: 17f878b8-9968-4578-b814-c4217fc5768c type: obsolete status: test description: Detects modification of autostart extensibility point (ASEP) in registry. references: - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1547.001/T1547.001.md - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/downloads/autoruns - https://gist.github.com/GlebSukhodolskiy/0fc5fa5f482903064b448890db1eaf9d author: Victor Sergeev, Daniil Yugoslavskiy, Gleb Sukhodolskiy, Timur Zinniatullin, oscd.community, Tim Shelton, frack113 (split) date: 2019-10-25 modified: 2023-08-17 tags: - attack.privilege-escalation - attack.persistence - attack.t1547.001 - attack.t1546.009 logsource: category: registry_set product: windows detection: session_manager_base: TargetObject|contains: \System\CurrentControlSet\Control\Session Manager session_manager: TargetObject|contains: - \SetupExecute - \S0InitialCommand - \KnownDlls - \Execute - \BootExecute - \AppCertDlls filter: Details: (Empty) condition: session_manager_base and session_manager and not filter falsepositives: - Legitimate software automatically (mostly, during installation) sets up autorun keys for legitimate reason - Legitimate administrator sets up autorun keys for legitimate reason level: medium
Sigma rule: Detects the abuse of the Print.exe utility for credential harvesting which involves using Print.Exe to copy sensitive fi. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: Sensitive File Dump Via Print.EXE id: 2fcda7e2-8c57-4904-86ac-37fc3157e09d status: test description: 'Detects the abuse of the Print.exe utility for credential harvesting which involves using Print.Exe to copy sensitive files such as ntds.dit, SAM, SECURITY, or SYSTEM from the Windows directory in order to extract credentials, locally or remotely. ' references: - https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2026/02/06/active-exploitation-solarwinds-web-help-desk/ - https://www.huntress.com/blog/credential-theft-expanding-your-reach-pt-2 - https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Print/ author: Ayush Anand (Securityinbits) date: 2026-04-28 tags: - attack.credential-access - attack.stealth - attack.t1003.003 - attack.t1003.002 - attack.t1218 logsource: category: process_creation product: windows detection: selection_img: - Image|endswith: \print.exe - OriginalFileName: Print.EXE selection_cli: CommandLine|contains|windash: /D CommandLine|contains: - \config\SAM - \config\SECURITY - \config\SYSTEM - \windows\ntds\ntds.dit condition: all of selection_* falsepositives: - Unlikely level: high regression_tests_path: regression_data/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_print_dump_sensitive_files/info.yml
Sigma rule: One of the Windows Eventlogs has been cleared. e.g. caused by "wevtutil cl" command execution. Logsource: windows / security. Rule: title: Security Eventlog Cleared id: d99b79d2-0a6f-4f46-ad8b-260b6e17f982 related: - id: f2f01843-e7b8-4f95-a35a-d23584476423 type: obsolete - id: a122ac13-daf8-4175-83a2-72c387be339d type: obsolete status: test description: One of the Windows Eventlogs has been cleared. e.g. caused by "wevtutil cl" command execution references: - https://twitter.com/deviouspolack/status/832535435960209408 - https://www.hybrid-analysis.com/sample/027cc450ef5f8c5f653329641ec1fed91f694e0d229928963b30f6b0d7d3a745?environmentId=100 - https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/f99542b94afe0ad2f19a82cc08262e7ac8e1428e/Detections/SecurityEvent/SecurityEventLogCleared.yaml author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems) date: 2017-01-10 modified: 2022-02-24 tags: - attack.defense-impairment - attack.t1685.005 - car.2016-04-002 logsource: product: windows service: security detection: selection_517: EventID: 517 Provider_Name: Security selection_1102: EventID: 1102 Provider_Name: Microsoft-Windows-Eventlog condition: 1 of selection_* falsepositives: - Rollout of log collection agents (the setup routine often includes a reset of the local Eventlog) - System provisioning (system reset before the golden image creation) level: high
Sigma rule: Detects the creation of files with certain extensions on a static web site. This can be indicative of potential uploads. Logsource: windows / file_event. Rule: title: Potential Webshell Creation On Static Website id: 39f1f9f2-9636-45de-98f6-a4046aa8e4b9 status: test description: Detects the creation of files with certain extensions on a static web site. This can be indicative of potential uploads of a web shell. references: - PT ESC rule and personal experience - https://github.com/swisskyrepo/PayloadsAllTheThings/blob/c95a0a1a2855dc0cd7f7327614545fe30482a636/Upload%20Insecure%20Files/README.md author: Beyu Denis, oscd.community, Tim Shelton, Thurein Oo date: 2019-10-22 modified: 2023-10-15 tags: - attack.persistence - attack.t1505.003 logsource: product: windows category: file_event detection: selection_wwwroot_path: TargetFilename|contains: \inetpub\wwwroot\ selection_wwwroot_ext: TargetFilename|contains: - .ashx - .asp - .ph - .soap selection_htdocs_path: TargetFilename|contains: - \www\ - \htdocs\ - \html\ selection_htdocs_ext: TargetFilename|contains: .ph filter_main_temp: TargetFilename|contains: - \AppData\Local\Temp\ - \Windows\Temp\ filter_main_system: Image: System filter_main_legitimate: TargetFilename|contains: \xampp condition: (all of selection_wwwroot_* or all of selection_htdocs_*) and not 1 of filter_main_* falsepositives: - Legitimate administrator or developer creating legitimate executable files in a web application folder level: medium