alirezaaminzadeh/cybersec-retrieval-benchmark huggingface dataset:
Sigma rule: Detects execution of Netcat. Adversaries may use a non-application layer protocol for communication between host and C2. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: PUA - Netcat Suspicious Execution id: e31033fc-33f0-4020-9a16-faf9b31cbf08 status: test description: Detects execution of Netcat. Adversaries may use a non-application layer protocol for communication between host and C2 server or among infected hosts within a network references: - https://nmap.org/ncat/ - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1095/T1095.md - https://www.revshells.com/ author: frack113, Florian Roth (Nextron Systems) date: 2021-07-21 modified: 2023-02-08 tags: - attack.command-and-control - attack.t1095 logsource: category: process_creation product: windows detection: selection_img: Image|endswith: - \nc.exe - \ncat.exe - \netcat.exe selection_cmdline: CommandLine|contains: - ' -lvp ' - ' -lvnp' - ' -l -v -p ' - ' -lv -p ' - ' -l --proxy-type http ' - ' -vnl --exec ' - ' -vnl -e ' - ' --lua-exec ' - ' --sh-exec ' condition: 1 of selection_* falsepositives: - Legitimate ncat use level: high
Sigma rule: Detects global permissions change activity.. Logsource: bitbucket / audit. Rule: title: Bitbucket Global Permission Changed id: aac6c4f4-87c7-4961-96ac-c3fd3a42c310 status: test description: Detects global permissions change activity. references: - https://confluence.atlassian.com/bitbucketserver/audit-log-events-776640423.html - https://confluence.atlassian.com/bitbucketserver/global-permissions-776640369.html author: Muhammad Faisal (@faisalusuf) date: 2024-02-25 tags: - attack.persistence - attack.privilege-escalation - attack.t1098 logsource: product: bitbucket service: audit definition: 'Requirements: "Advance" log level is required to receive these audit events.' detection: selection: auditType.category: Permissions auditType.action: - Global permission remove request - Global permission removed - Global permission granted - Global permission requested condition: selection falsepositives: - Legitimate user activity. level: medium
Sigma rule: Detects execution of Advanced Installer MSIX Package Support Framework (PSF) components, specifically AI_STUBS executabl. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: Windows MSIX Package Support Framework AI_STUBS Execution id: af5732ed-764e-489d-826d-0447c8b36242 status: experimental description: 'Detects execution of Advanced Installer MSIX Package Support Framework (PSF) components, specifically AI_STUBS executables with original filename ''popupwrapper.exe''. This activity may indicate malicious MSIX packages build with Advanced Installer leveraging the Package Support Framework to bypass application control restrictions. ' references: - https://redcanary.com/blog/threat-intelligence/msix-installers/ - https://redcanary.com/threat-detection-report/techniques/installer-packages/ - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/msix/package/package-support-framework - https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/msix-weaponization-threat-detection-splunk.html author: Michael Haag, Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems) date: 2025-11-03 tags: - attack.execution - attack.stealth - attack.defense-impairment - attack.t1218 - attack.t1553.005 - attack.t1204.002 logsource: category: process_creation product: windows detection: selection: Image|endswith: - \AI_STUBS\AiStubX64Elevated.exe - \AI_STUBS\AiStubX86Elevated.exe - \AI_STUBS\AiStubX64.exe - \AI_STUBS\AiStubX86.exe OriginalFileName: popupwrapper.exe condition: selection falsepositives: - Legitimate applications packaged with Advanced Installer using Package Support Framework level: low
Sigma rule: Detects activity as "net user administrator /domain" and "net group domain admins /domain". Logsource: windows / security. Rule: title: Reconnaissance Activity id: 968eef52-9cff-4454-8992-1e74b9cbad6c status: test description: Detects activity as "net user administrator /domain" and "net group domain admins /domain" references: - https://findingbad.blogspot.de/2017/01/hunting-what-does-it-look-like.html author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Jack Croock (method), Jonhnathan Ribeiro (improvements), oscd.community date: 2017-03-07 modified: 2022-08-22 tags: - attack.discovery - attack.t1087.002 - attack.t1069.002 - attack.s0039 logsource: product: windows service: security definition: The volume of Event ID 4661 is high on Domain Controllers and therefore "Audit SAM" and "Audit Kernel Object" advanced audit policy settings are not configured in the recommendations for server systems detection: selection: EventID: 4661 AccessMask: '0x2d' ObjectType: - SAM_USER - SAM_GROUP ObjectName|startswith: S-1-5-21- ObjectName|endswith: - '-500' - '-512' condition: selection falsepositives: - Administrator activity level: high
Sigma rule: Detects suspicious parent process for cmd.exe. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: Unusual Parent Process For Cmd.EXE id: 4b991083-3d0e-44ce-8fc4-b254025d8d4b status: test description: Detects suspicious parent process for cmd.exe references: - https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/unusual-parent-process-for-cmd.exe.html author: Tim Rauch, Elastic (idea) date: 2022-09-21 modified: 2023-12-05 tags: - attack.execution - attack.t1059 logsource: category: process_creation product: windows detection: selection: Image|endswith: \cmd.exe ParentImage|endswith: - \csrss.exe - \ctfmon.exe - \dllhost.exe - \epad.exe - \FlashPlayerUpdateService.exe - \GoogleUpdate.exe - \jucheck.exe - \jusched.exe - \LogonUI.exe - \lsass.exe - \regsvr32.exe - \SearchIndexer.exe - \SearchProtocolHost.exe - \SIHClient.exe - \sihost.exe - \slui.exe - \spoolsv.exe - \sppsvc.exe - \taskhostw.exe - \unsecapp.exe - \WerFault.exe - \wermgr.exe - \wlanext.exe - \WUDFHost.exe condition: selection falsepositives: - Unknown level: medium
Sigma rule: Detects execution of "msdt.exe" using an answer file which is simulating the legitimate way of calling msdt via "pcwrun.. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: MSDT Execution Via Answer File id: 9c8c7000-3065-44a8-a555-79bcba5d9955 status: test description: 'Detects execution of "msdt.exe" using an answer file which is simulating the legitimate way of calling msdt via "pcwrun.exe" (For example from the compatibility tab). ' references: - https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Msdt/ author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) date: 2022-06-13 modified: 2025-10-29 tags: - attack.stealth - attack.t1218 - attack.execution logsource: category: process_creation product: windows detection: selection: Image|endswith: \msdt.exe CommandLine|contains: \WINDOWS\diagnostics\index\PCWDiagnostic.xml CommandLine|contains|windash: ' -af ' filter_main_pcwrun: ParentImage|endswith: \pcwrun.exe condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_* falsepositives: - Possible undocumented parents of "msdt" other than "pcwrun". level: high
Sigma rule: Detects the dump of highly sensitive files such as "NTDS.DIT" and "SECURITY" hive. Attackers can leverage the "wbadmin". Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: Sensitive File Dump Via Wbadmin.EXE id: 8b93a509-1cb8-42e1-97aa-ee24224cdc15 status: test description: 'Detects the dump of highly sensitive files such as "NTDS.DIT" and "SECURITY" hive. Attackers can leverage the "wbadmin" utility in order to dump sensitive files that might contain credential or sensitive information. ' references: - https://github.com/LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS/blob/2cc01b01132b5c304027a658c698ae09dd6a92bf/yml/OSBinaries/Wbadmin.yml - https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Wbadmin/ - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/wbadmin-start-recovery - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/wbadmin-start-backup author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems), frack113 date: 2024-05-10 tags: - attack.credential-access - attack.t1003.003 logsource: category: process_creation product: windows detection: selection_img: - Image|endswith: \wbadmin.exe - OriginalFileName: WBADMIN.EXE selection_backup: CommandLine|contains: - start - backup selection_path: CommandLine|contains: - \config\SAM - \config\SECURITY - \config\SYSTEM - \Windows\NTDS\NTDS.dit condition: all of selection_* falsepositives: - Legitimate backup operation by authorized administrators. Matches must be investigated and allowed on a case by case basis. level: high
Sigma rule: Detects attempted file load events that did not meet the signing level requirements. It often means the file's signature. Logsource: windows / codeintegrity-operational. Rule: title: CodeIntegrity - Unmet Signing Level Requirements By File Under Validation id: f8931561-97f5-4c46-907f-0a4a592e47a7 status: experimental description: 'Detects attempted file load events that did not meet the signing level requirements. It often means the file''s signature is revoked or a signature with the Lifetime Signing EKU has expired. This event is best correlated with EID 3089 to determine the error of the validation. ' references: - https://twitter.com/SBousseaden/status/1483810148602814466 - https://github.com/MicrosoftDocs/windows-itpro-docs/blob/40fe118976734578f83e5e839b9c63ae7a4af82d/windows/security/threat-protection/windows-defender-application-control/event-id-explanations.md#windows-codeintegrity-operational-log - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/application-security/application-control/windows-defender-application-control/operations/event-tag-explanations - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/application-security/application-control/windows-defender-application-control/operations/event-id-explanations author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) date: 2022-01-20 modified: 2025-02-28 tags: - attack.execution logsource: product: windows service: codeintegrity-operational detection: selection: EventID: - 3033 - 3034 filter_optional_dtrace: FileNameBuffer|endswith: \Program Files\DTrace\dtrace.dll ProcessNameBuffer|endswith: \Windows\System32\svchost.exe RequestedPolicy: 12 filter_optional_av_generic: FileNameBuffer|contains: \Windows\System32\DriverStore\FileRepository\ FileNameBuffer|endswith: \igd10iumd64.dll RequestedPolicy: 7 filter_optional_electron_based_app: FileNameBuffer|endswith: \Windows\System32\nvspcap64.dll ProcessNameBuffer|endswith: - \AppData\Local\Keybase\Gui\Keybase.exe - \Microsoft\Teams\stage\Teams.exe RequestedPolicy: 8 filter_optional_bonjour: FileNameBuffer|endswith: \Program Files\Bonjour\mdnsNSP.dll ProcessNameBuffer|endswith: - \Windows\System32\svchost.exe - \Windows\System32\SIHClient.exe RequestedPolicy: - 8 - 12 filter_optional_msoffice_1: FileNameBuffer|contains: \Microsoft Office\root\vfs\ProgramFilesCommonX64\Microsoft Shared\OFFICE FileNameBuffer|endswith: \MSOXMLMF.DLL RequestedPolicy: 7 filter_optional_msoffice_2: ProcessNameBuffer|contains: \Program Files\Microsoft Office\root\vfs\ProgramFilesCommonX64\Microsoft Shared\Office FileNameBuffer|contains: \Windows\System32\ RequestedPolicy: 8 filter_optional_slack: FileNameBuffer|endsw
Sigma rule: Detects instances where a VNC service on an OpenCanary node has had a connection attempt.. Logsource: opencanary / application. Rule: title: OpenCanary - VNC Connection Attempt id: 9db5446c-b44a-4291-8b89-fcab5609c3b3 status: test description: Detects instances where a VNC service on an OpenCanary node has had a connection attempt. references: - https://opencanary.readthedocs.io/en/latest/starting/configuration.html#services-configuration - https://github.com/thinkst/opencanary/blob/a0896adfcaf0328cfd5829fe10d2878c7445138e/opencanary/logger.py#L52 author: Security Onion Solutions date: 2024-03-08 tags: - attack.lateral-movement - attack.t1021 logsource: category: application product: opencanary detection: selection: logtype: 12001 condition: selection falsepositives: - Unlikely level: high
Sigma rule: Detects usage of bitsadmin downloading a file with a suspicious extension. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: File With Suspicious Extension Downloaded Via Bitsadmin id: 5b80a791-ad9b-4b75-bcc1-ad4e1e89c200 status: test description: Detects usage of bitsadmin downloading a file with a suspicious extension references: - https://blog.netspi.com/15-ways-to-download-a-file/#bitsadmin - https://isc.sans.edu/diary/22264 - https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Bitsadmin/ author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) date: 2022-06-28 modified: 2023-05-30 tags: - attack.persistence - attack.execution - attack.stealth - attack.t1197 - attack.s0190 - attack.t1036.003 - attack.command-and-control - attack.t1105 logsource: category: process_creation product: windows detection: selection_img: - Image|endswith: \bitsadmin.exe - OriginalFileName: bitsadmin.exe selection_flags: CommandLine|contains: - ' /transfer ' - ' /create ' - ' /addfile ' selection_extension: CommandLine|contains: - .7z - .asax - .ashx - .asmx - .asp - .aspx - .bat - .cfm - .cgi - .chm - .cmd - .dll - .gif - .jpeg - .jpg - .jsp - .jspx - .log - .png - .ps1 - .psm1 - .rar - .scf - .sct - .txt - .vbe - .vbs - .war - .wsf - .wsh - .xll - .zip condition: all of selection_* falsepositives: - Unknown level: high regression_tests_path: regression_data/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_bitsadmin_download_susp_extensions/info.yml simulation: - type: atomic-red-team name: Windows - BITSAdmin BITS Download technique: T1105 atomic_guid: a1921cd3-9a2d-47d5-a891-f1d0f2a7a31b
Sigma rule: Detects actions taken by Windows Defender malware detection engines. Logsource: windows / windefend. Rule: title: Windows Defender Threat Detected id: 57b649ef-ff42-4fb0-8bf6-62da243a1708 status: stable description: Detects actions taken by Windows Defender malware detection engines references: - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/defender-endpoint/troubleshoot-microsoft-defender-antivirus author: Ján Trenčanský date: 2020-07-28 tags: - attack.execution - attack.t1059 logsource: product: windows service: windefend detection: selection: EventID: - 1006 - 1015 - 1116 - 1117 condition: selection falsepositives: - Unlikely level: high
Sigma rule: Detects the deletion of the Exchange PowerShell cmdlet History logs which may indicate an attempt to destroy forensic ev. Logsource: windows / file_delete. Rule: title: Exchange PowerShell Cmdlet History Deleted id: a55349d8-9588-4c5a-8e3b-1925fe2a4ffe status: test description: Detects the deletion of the Exchange PowerShell cmdlet History logs which may indicate an attempt to destroy forensic evidence references: - https://m365internals.com/2022/10/07/hunting-in-on-premises-exchange-server-logs/ author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) date: 2022-10-26 modified: 2022-12-30 tags: - attack.stealth - attack.t1070 logsource: category: file_delete product: windows detection: selection: TargetFilename|startswith: \Logging\CmdletInfra\LocalPowerShell\Cmdlet\ TargetFilename|contains: _Cmdlet_ condition: selection falsepositives: - Possible FP during log rotation level: high
Sigma rule: Monitor and alert on conditional access changes.. Logsource: azure / auditlogs. Rule: title: New CA Policy by Non-approved Actor id: 0922467f-db53-4348-b7bf-dee8d0d348c6 status: test description: Monitor and alert on conditional access changes. references: - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/architecture/security-operations-infrastructure author: Corissa Koopmans, '@corissalea' date: 2022-07-18 tags: - attack.privilege-escalation - attack.t1548 logsource: product: azure service: auditlogs detection: selection: properties.message: Add conditional access policy condition: selection falsepositives: - Misconfigured role permissions - Verify whether the user identity, user agent, and/or hostname should be making changes in your environment. level: medium
Sigma rule: Detects creation of files with the ".pub" extension in suspicious or uncommon locations. This could be a sign of attacke. Logsource: windows / file_event. Rule: title: Publisher Attachment File Dropped In Suspicious Location id: 3d2a2d59-929c-4b78-8c1a-145dfe9e07b1 status: test description: Detects creation of files with the ".pub" extension in suspicious or uncommon locations. This could be a sign of attackers abusing Publisher documents references: - https://twitter.com/EmericNasi/status/1623224526220804098 author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) date: 2023-02-08 tags: - attack.stealth logsource: category: file_event product: windows detection: selection: TargetFilename|contains: - \AppData\Local\Temp\ - \Users\Public\ - \Windows\Temp\ - C:\Temp\ TargetFilename|endswith: .pub condition: selection falsepositives: - Legitimate usage of ".pub" files from those locations level: medium
Sigma rule: Detects an attempt to terminate a process via "wmic" with the "call terminate" flag. Adversaries may use wmic to termina. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: Application Termination Attempt via Wmic.EXE id: 49d9671b-0a0a-4c09-8280-d215bfd30662 related: - id: 847d5ff3-8a31-4737-a970-aeae8fe21765 type: derived status: test description: 'Detects an attempt to terminate a process via "wmic" with the "call terminate" flag. Adversaries may use wmic to terminate security products or other applications on the compromised host. This event is triggered on on attempt and process creation can be either successful or unsuccessful. ' references: - https://cyble.com/blog/lockfile-ransomware-using-proxyshell-attack-to-deploy-ransomware/ - https://www.bitdefender.com/files/News/CaseStudies/study/377/Bitdefender-Whitepaper-WMI-creat4871-en-EN-GenericUse.pdf author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) date: 2023-09-11 tags: - attack.execution - attack.t1047 logsource: category: process_creation product: windows detection: selection_img: - Image|endswith: \WMIC.exe - OriginalFileName: wmic.exe selection_cli: CommandLine|contains|all: - call - terminate condition: all of selection_* falsepositives: - Unknown level: medium regression_tests_path: regression_data/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_wmic_terminate_application/info.yml
Sigma rule: Adversaries may leverage the COR_PROFILER environment variable to hijack the execution flow of programs that load the .N. Logsource: windows / ps_script. Rule: title: Registry-Free Process Scope COR_PROFILER id: 23590215-4702-4a70-8805-8dc9e58314a2 status: test description: 'Adversaries may leverage the COR_PROFILER environment variable to hijack the execution flow of programs that load the .NET CLR. The COR_PROFILER is a .NET Framework feature which allows developers to specify an unmanaged (or external of .NET) profiling DLL to be loaded into each .NET process that loads the Common Language Runtime (CLR). These profiliers are designed to monitor, troubleshoot, and debug managed code executed by the .NET CLR. (Citation: Microsoft Profiling Mar 2017) (Citation: Microsoft COR_PROFILER Feb 2013) ' references: - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1574.012/T1574.012.md#atomic-test-3---registry-free-process-scope-cor_profiler author: frack113 date: 2021-12-30 tags: - attack.privilege-escalation - attack.persistence - attack.execution - attack.stealth - attack.t1574.012 logsource: product: windows category: ps_script definition: 'Requirements: Script Block Logging must be enabled' detection: selection: ScriptBlockText|contains|all: - $env:COR_ENABLE_PROFILING - $env:COR_PROFILER - $env:COR_PROFILER_PATH condition: selection falsepositives: - Legitimate administrative script level: medium
Sigma rule: Detects the Setting of Windows Defender Exclusions. Logsource: windows / windefend. Rule: title: Windows Defender Exclusions Added id: 1321dc4e-a1fe-481d-a016-52c45f0c8b4f status: stable description: Detects the Setting of Windows Defender Exclusions references: - https://twitter.com/_nullbind/status/1204923340810543109 author: Christian Burkard (Nextron Systems) date: 2021-07-06 modified: 2022-12-06 tags: - attack.defense-impairment - attack.t1685 logsource: product: windows service: windefend detection: selection: EventID: 5007 NewValue|contains: \Microsoft\Windows Defender\Exclusions condition: selection falsepositives: - Administrator actions level: medium
Sigma rule: Detects when a user bypasses the push protection on a secret detected by secret scanning.. Logsource: github / audit. Rule: title: Github Push Protection Bypass Detected id: 02cf536a-cf21-4876-8842-4159c8aee3cc status: test description: Detects when a user bypasses the push protection on a secret detected by secret scanning. references: - https://docs.github.com/en/enterprise-cloud@latest/code-security/secret-scanning/push-protection-for-repositories-and-organizations - https://thehackernews.com/2024/03/github-rolls-out-default-secret.html author: Muhammad Faisal (@faisalusuf) date: 2024-03-07 tags: - attack.defense-impairment - attack.t1685 logsource: product: github service: audit definition: 'Requirements: The audit log streaming feature must be enabled to be able to receive such logs. You can enable following the documentation here: https://docs.github.com/en/enterprise-cloud@latest/admin/monitoring-activity-in-your-enterprise/reviewing-audit-logs-for-your-enterprise/streaming-the-audit-log-for-your-enterprise#setting-up-audit-log-streaming' detection: selection: action|contains: secret_scanning_push_protection.bypass condition: selection falsepositives: - Allowed administrative activities. level: low
Sigma rule: Detects attempts to create and add an account to the admin group via "dscl". Logsource: macos / process_creation. Rule: title: User Added To Admin Group Via Dscl id: b743623c-2776-40e0-87b1-682b975d0ca5 related: - id: 0c1ffcf9-efa9-436e-ab68-23a9496ebf5b type: obsolete status: test description: Detects attempts to create and add an account to the admin group via "dscl" references: - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1078.003/T1078.003.md#atomic-test-2---create-local-account-with-admin-privileges---macos - https://ss64.com/osx/dscl.html author: Sohan G (D4rkCiph3r) date: 2023-03-19 tags: - attack.persistence - attack.initial-access - attack.privilege-escalation - attack.stealth - attack.t1078.003 logsource: category: process_creation product: macos detection: selection: Image|endswith: /dscl CommandLine|contains|all: - ' -append ' - ' /Groups/admin ' - ' GroupMembership ' condition: selection falsepositives: - Legitimate administration activities level: medium