alirezaaminzadeh/cybersec-retrieval-benchmark huggingface dataset:
Sigma rule: Detects removing immutable file attribute.. Logsource: linux / auditd. Rule: title: Remove Immutable File Attribute - Auditd id: a5b977d6-8a81-4475-91b9-49dbfcd941f7 status: test description: Detects removing immutable file attribute. references: - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1222.002/T1222.002.md author: Jakob Weinzettl, oscd.community date: 2019-09-23 modified: 2022-11-26 tags: - attack.defense-impairment - attack.t1222.002 logsource: product: linux service: auditd detection: selection: type: EXECVE a0|contains: chattr a1|contains: -i condition: selection falsepositives: - Administrator interacting with immutable files (e.g. for instance backups). level: medium simulation: - type: atomic-red-team name: Remove immutable file attribute technique: T1222.002 atomic_guid: e7469fe2-ad41-4382-8965-99b94dd3c13f
Sigma rule: Adversaries may abuse PowerShell commands and scripts for execution. PowerShell is a powerful interactive command-line i. Logsource: windows / ps_script. Rule: title: PowerShell Remote Session Creation id: a0edd39f-a0c6-4c17-8141-261f958e8d8f status: test description: 'Adversaries may abuse PowerShell commands and scripts for execution. PowerShell is a powerful interactive command-line interface and scripting environment included in the Windows operating system ' references: - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1059.001/T1059.001.md#atomic-test-10---powershell-invoke-downloadcradle - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/microsoft.powershell.core/new-pssession?view=powershell-7.4 author: frack113 date: 2022-01-06 modified: 2023-01-02 tags: - attack.execution - attack.t1059.001 logsource: product: windows category: ps_script definition: 'Requirements: Script Block Logging must be enabled' detection: selection: ScriptBlockText|contains|all: - New-PSSession - '-ComputerName ' condition: selection falsepositives: - Legitimate administrative script level: medium
Sigma rule: Detects modification addition to the 'TypedPaths' key in the user or admin registry via the commandline. Which might ind. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: Persistence Via TypedPaths - CommandLine id: ec88289a-7e1a-4cc3-8d18-bd1f60e4b9ba status: test description: Detects modification addition to the 'TypedPaths' key in the user or admin registry via the commandline. Which might indicate persistence attempt references: - https://twitter.com/dez_/status/1560101453150257154 - https://forensafe.com/blogs/typedpaths.html author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) date: 2022-08-22 tags: - attack.persistence logsource: category: process_creation product: windows detection: selection: CommandLine|contains: \Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\TypedPaths condition: selection falsepositives: - Unknown level: medium
Sigma rule: Detects potential abuse of the "manage-bde.wsf" script as a LOLBIN to proxy execution. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: Potential Manage-bde.wsf Abuse To Proxy Execution id: c363385c-f75d-4753-a108-c1a8e28bdbda status: test description: Detects potential abuse of the "manage-bde.wsf" script as a LOLBIN to proxy execution references: - https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Scripts/Manage-bde/ - https://gist.github.com/bohops/735edb7494fe1bd1010d67823842b712 - https://twitter.com/bohops/status/980659399495741441 - https://twitter.com/JohnLaTwC/status/1223292479270600706 - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1216/T1216.md author: oscd.community, Natalia Shornikova, Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) date: 2020-10-13 modified: 2023-02-03 tags: - attack.stealth - attack.t1216 logsource: category: process_creation product: windows detection: selection_wscript_img: - Image|endswith: \wscript.exe - OriginalFileName: wscript.exe selection_wscript_cli: CommandLine|contains: manage-bde.wsf selection_parent: ParentImage|endswith: - \cscript.exe - \wscript.exe ParentCommandLine|contains: manage-bde.wsf selection_filter_cmd: Image|endswith: \cmd.exe condition: all of selection_wscript_* or (selection_parent and not selection_filter_cmd) falsepositives: - Unlikely level: high
Sigma rule: Detects remote thread creation by PowerShell processes into "lsass.exe". Logsource: windows / create_remote_thread. Rule: title: Potential Credential Dumping Attempt Via PowerShell Remote Thread id: fb656378-f909-47c1-8747-278bf09f4f4f related: - id: 3f07b9d1-2082-4c56-9277-613a621983cc type: obsolete - id: 0f920ebe-7aea-4c54-b202-9aa0c609cfe5 type: similar status: test description: Detects remote thread creation by PowerShell processes into "lsass.exe" references: - https://speakerdeck.com/heirhabarov/hunting-for-powershell-abuse author: oscd.community, Natalia Shornikova date: 2020-10-06 modified: 2022-12-18 tags: - attack.credential-access - attack.t1003.001 logsource: product: windows category: create_remote_thread detection: selection: SourceImage|endswith: - \powershell.exe - \pwsh.exe TargetImage|endswith: \lsass.exe condition: selection falsepositives: - Unknown level: high
Sigma rule: Detects suspicious use of PCHunter, a tool like Process Hacker to view and manipulate processes, kernel options and othe. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: HackTool - PCHunter Execution id: fca949cc-79ca-446e-8064-01aa7e52ece5 status: test description: Detects suspicious use of PCHunter, a tool like Process Hacker to view and manipulate processes, kernel options and other low level stuff references: - https://web.archive.org/web/20231210115125/http://www.xuetr.com/ - https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/falcon-overwatch-report-finds-increase-in-ecrime/ - https://www.hexacorn.com/blog/2018/04/20/kernel-hacking-tool-you-might-have-never-heard-of-xuetr-pchunter/ author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Nasreddine Bencherchali date: 2022-10-10 modified: 2024-11-23 tags: - attack.execution - attack.discovery - attack.t1082 - attack.t1057 - attack.t1012 - attack.t1083 - attack.t1007 logsource: category: process_creation product: windows detection: selection_image: Image|endswith: - \PCHunter64.exe - \PCHunter32.exe selection_pe: - OriginalFileName: PCHunter.exe - Description: Epoolsoft Windows Information View Tools selection_hashes: Hashes|contains: - SHA1=5F1CBC3D99558307BC1250D084FA968521482025 - MD5=987B65CD9B9F4E9A1AFD8F8B48CF64A7 - SHA256=2B214BDDAAB130C274DE6204AF6DBA5AEEC7433DA99AA950022FA306421A6D32 - IMPHASH=444D210CEA1FF8112F256A4997EED7FF - SHA1=3FB89787CB97D902780DA080545584D97FB1C2EB - MD5=228DD0C2E6287547E26FFBD973A40F14 - SHA256=55F041BF4E78E9BFA6D4EE68BE40E496CE3A1353E1CA4306598589E19802522C - IMPHASH=0479F44DF47CFA2EF1CCC4416A538663 condition: 1 of selection_* falsepositives: - Unlikely level: high
Sigma rule: Detects the use of rcedit to potentially alter executable PE metadata properties, which could conceal efforts to rename. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: PUA - Potential PE Metadata Tamper Using Rcedit id: 0c92f2e6-f08f-4b73-9216-ecb0ca634689 status: test description: Detects the use of rcedit to potentially alter executable PE metadata properties, which could conceal efforts to rename system utilities for defense evasion. references: - https://security.stackexchange.com/questions/210843/is-it-possible-to-change-original-filename-of-an-exe - https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/02e8e8c5d430d8b768980f517b62d7792d690982b9ba0f7e04163cbc1a6e7915 - https://github.com/electron/rcedit author: Micah Babinski date: 2022-12-11 modified: 2023-03-05 tags: - attack.stealth - attack.t1036.003 - attack.t1036 - attack.t1027.005 - attack.t1027 logsource: category: process_creation product: windows detection: selection_img: - Image|endswith: - \rcedit-x64.exe - \rcedit-x86.exe - Description: Edit resources of exe - Product: rcedit selection_flags: CommandLine|contains: --set- selection_attributes: CommandLine|contains: - OriginalFileName - CompanyName - FileDescription - ProductName - ProductVersion - LegalCopyright condition: all of selection_* falsepositives: - Legitimate use of the tool by administrators or users to update metadata of a binary level: medium
Sigma rule: Identifies when a service principal is created in Azure.. Logsource: azure / auditlogs. Rule: title: Azure Service Principal Created id: 0ddcff6d-d262-40b0-804b-80eb592de8e3 status: test description: Identifies when a service principal is created in Azure. references: - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/identity/monitoring-health/reference-audit-activities#core-directory - https://analyticsrules.exchange/analyticrules/79566f41-df67-4e10-a703-c38a6213afd8/ author: Austin Songer @austinsonger date: 2021-09-02 modified: 2026-04-30 tags: - attack.stealth logsource: product: azure service: auditlogs detection: selection: operationName: Add service principal condition: selection falsepositives: - Service principal being created may be performed by a system administrator. - Verify whether the user identity, user agent, and/or hostname should be making changes in your environment. - Service principal created from unfamiliar users should be investigated. If known behavior is causing false positives, it can be exempted from the rule. level: medium
Sigma rule: Detects a suspicious process command line that uses whoami as first parameter (as e.g. used by EfsPotato). Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: WhoAmI as Parameter id: e9142d84-fbe0-401d-ac50-3e519fb00c89 status: test description: Detects a suspicious process command line that uses whoami as first parameter (as e.g. used by EfsPotato) references: - https://twitter.com/blackarrowsec/status/1463805700602224645?s=12 author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems) date: 2021-11-29 modified: 2022-12-25 tags: - attack.discovery - attack.t1033 - car.2016-03-001 logsource: category: process_creation product: windows detection: selection: CommandLine|contains: .exe whoami condition: selection falsepositives: - Unknown level: high
Sigma rule: Detects modification of Windows Registry Classes keys used for persistence. Adversaries modify these autostart extensibi. Logsource: windows / registry_set. Rule: title: Classes Autorun Keys Modification id: 9df5f547-c86a-433e-b533-f2794357e242 related: - id: 17f878b8-9968-4578-b814-c4217fc5768c type: obsolete status: test description: 'Detects modification of Windows Registry Classes keys used for persistence. Adversaries modify these autostart extensibility points (ASEP) to execute malicious code when file types are opened or actions are performed. Various legitimate software also uses these keys. Currently, this rule only filters out known legitimate software paths, thus it is recommended to review and tune filters for your environment to reduce false positives before deploying to production. ' references: - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1547.001/T1547.001.md - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/downloads/autoruns - https://gist.github.com/GlebSukhodolskiy/0fc5fa5f482903064b448890db1eaf9d author: Victor Sergeev, Daniil Yugoslavskiy, Gleb Sukhodolskiy, Timur Zinniatullin, oscd.community, Tim Shelton, frack113 (split) date: 2019-10-25 modified: 2025-10-22 tags: - attack.privilege-escalation - attack.persistence - attack.t1547.001 logsource: category: registry_set product: windows detection: selection_classes_base: TargetObject|contains: \Software\Classes selection_classes_target: TargetObject|contains: - \Folder\ShellEx\ExtShellFolderViews - \Folder\ShellEx\DragDropHandlers - \Folder\Shellex\ColumnHandlers - \Filter - \Exefile\Shell\Open\Command\(Default) - \Directory\Shellex\DragDropHandlers - \Directory\Shellex\CopyHookHandlers - \CLSID\{AC757296-3522-4E11-9862-C17BE5A1767E}\Instance - \CLSID\{ABE3B9A4-257D-4B97-BD1A-294AF496222E}\Instance - \CLSID\{7ED96837-96F0-4812-B211-F13C24117ED3}\Instance - \CLSID\{083863F1-70DE-11d0-BD40-00A0C911CE86}\Instance - \Classes\AllFileSystemObjects\ShellEx\DragDropHandlers - \.exe - \.cmd - \ShellEx\PropertySheetHandlers - \ShellEx\ContextMenuHandlers filter_main_drivers: Image: C:\Windows\System32\drvinst.exe filter_main_empty: Details: (Empty) filter_main_null: Details: null filter_main_svchost: Image: C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe TargetObject|contains: \lnkfile\shellex\ContextMenuHandlers\ filter_optional_msoffice: Details: '{807583E5-5146-11D5-A672-00B0D022E945}' condition: all of selection_* and not 1 of filter_main_* and not 1 of filter_optional_* falsepositives: - Legitimate software automatically (mostly, during installation) sets up autorun keys for legitimate reason - Legitimate admi
Sigma rule: Detects registry modifications that disable Privacy Settings Experience. Logsource: windows / registry_set. Rule: title: Disable Privacy Settings Experience in Registry id: 0372e1f9-0fd2-40f7-be1b-a7b2b848fa7b status: test description: Detects registry modifications that disable Privacy Settings Experience references: - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/9e5b12c4912c07562aec7500447b11fa3e17e254/atomics/T1562.001/T1562.001.md author: frack113 date: 2022-10-02 modified: 2023-08-17 tags: - attack.defense-impairment - attack.t1685 logsource: category: registry_set product: windows detection: selection: TargetObject|endswith: \SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\OOBE\DisablePrivacyExperience Details: DWORD (0x00000000) condition: selection falsepositives: - Legitimate admin script level: medium
Sigma rule: Detects enabling TurnOffCheck which can be used to bypass defense of MSDT Follina vulnerability. Logsource: windows / registry_set. Rule: title: Scripted Diagnostics Turn Off Check Enabled - Registry id: 7d995e63-ec83-4aa3-89d5-8a17b5c87c86 status: test description: Detects enabling TurnOffCheck which can be used to bypass defense of MSDT Follina vulnerability references: - https://twitter.com/wdormann/status/1537075968568877057?s=20&t=0lr18OAnmAGoGpma6grLUw author: Christopher Peacock @securepeacock, SCYTHE @scythe_io date: 2022-06-15 modified: 2023-08-17 tags: - attack.defense-impairment - attack.t1685 logsource: product: windows category: registry_set detection: selection: TargetObject|endswith: \Policies\Microsoft\Windows\ScriptedDiagnostics\TurnOffCheck Details: DWORD (0x00000001) condition: selection falsepositives: - Administrator actions level: medium
Sigma rule: Detects file and folder permission changes.. Logsource: linux / auditd. Rule: title: File or Folder Permissions Change id: 74c01ace-0152-4094-8ae2-6fd776dd43e5 status: test description: Detects file and folder permission changes. references: - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1222.002/T1222.002.md author: Jakob Weinzettl, oscd.community date: 2019-09-23 modified: 2021-11-27 tags: - attack.defense-impairment - attack.t1222.002 logsource: product: linux service: auditd detection: selection: type: EXECVE a0|contains: - chmod - chown condition: selection falsepositives: - User interacting with files permissions (normal/daily behaviour). level: low
Sigma rule: Detects execution and usage of the DSInternals PowerShell module. Which can be used to perform what might be considered. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: DSInternals Suspicious PowerShell Cmdlets id: 43d91656-a9b2-4541-b7e2-6a9bd3a13f4e related: - id: 846c7a87-8e14-4569-9d49-ecfd4276a01c type: similar status: test description: 'Detects execution and usage of the DSInternals PowerShell module. Which can be used to perform what might be considered as suspicious activity such as dumping DPAPI backup keys or manipulating NTDS.DIT files. The DSInternals PowerShell Module exposes several internal features of Active Directory and Azure Active Directory. These include FIDO2 and NGC key auditing, offline ntds.dit file manipulation, password auditing, DC recovery from IFM backups and password hash calculation. ' references: - https://github.com/MichaelGrafnetter/DSInternals/blob/39ee8a69bbdc1cfd12c9afdd7513b4788c4895d4/Src/DSInternals.PowerShell/DSInternals.psd1 author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems), Nounou Mbeiri date: 2024-06-26 tags: - attack.execution - attack.t1059.001 logsource: product: windows category: process_creation detection: selection: CommandLine|contains: - Add-ADDBSidHistory - Add-ADNgcKey - Add-ADReplNgcKey - ConvertFrom-ADManagedPasswordBlob - ConvertFrom-GPPrefPassword - ConvertFrom-ManagedPasswordBlob - ConvertFrom-UnattendXmlPassword - ConvertFrom-UnicodePassword - ConvertTo-AADHash - ConvertTo-GPPrefPassword - ConvertTo-KerberosKey - ConvertTo-LMHash - ConvertTo-MsoPasswordHash - ConvertTo-NTHash - ConvertTo-OrgIdHash - ConvertTo-UnicodePassword - Disable-ADDBAccount - Enable-ADDBAccount - Get-ADDBAccount - Get-ADDBBackupKey - Get-ADDBDomainController - Get-ADDBGroupManagedServiceAccount - Get-ADDBKdsRootKey - Get-ADDBSchemaAttribute - Get-ADDBServiceAccount - Get-ADDefaultPasswordPolicy - Get-ADKeyCredential - Get-ADPasswordPolicy - Get-ADReplAccount - Get-ADReplBackupKey - Get-ADReplicationAccount - Get-ADSIAccount - Get-AzureADUserEx - Get-BootKey - Get-KeyCredential - Get-LsaBackupKey - Get-LsaPolicy - Get-SamPasswordPolicy - Get-SysKey - Get-SystemKey - New-ADDBRestoreFromMediaScript - New-ADKeyCredential - New-ADNgcKey - New-NTHashSet - Remove-ADDBObject - Save-DPAPIBlob - Set-ADAccountPasswordHash - Set-ADDBAccountPassword - Set-ADDBBootKey - Set-ADDBDomainController - Set-ADDBPrimaryGroup - Set-ADDBSysKey - Set-AzureADUserEx - Set-LsaPolicy - Set-SamAccountPasswordHash - Set-WinUserPasswordHash - Test-ADDBPasswordQuality - Test-ADPasswordQuality - Test-ADReplPasswordQuality - Test-PasswordQuality - Unlock-ADDBAccount - Write-ADNgcKey - Write-ADReplNgcKey condition: se
Sigma rule: Detects Obfuscated Powershell via use Clip.exe in Scripts. Logsource: windows / security. Rule: title: Invoke-Obfuscation Via Use Clip - Security id: 1a0a2ff1-611b-4dac-8216-8a7b47c618a6 related: - id: 63e3365d-4824-42d8-8b82-e56810fefa0c type: derived status: test description: Detects Obfuscated Powershell via use Clip.exe in Scripts references: - https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/issues/1009 author: Nikita Nazarov, oscd.community date: 2020-10-09 modified: 2022-11-29 tags: - attack.stealth - attack.t1027 - attack.execution - attack.t1059.001 logsource: product: windows service: security definition: The 'System Security Extension' audit subcategory need to be enabled to log the EID 4697 detection: selection: EventID: 4697 ServiceFileName|contains: (Clipboard|i condition: selection falsepositives: - Unknown level: high
Sigma rule: Detects disabling Windows Defender Exploit Guard Network Protection. Logsource: windows / registry_set. Rule: title: Disable Exploit Guard Network Protection on Windows Defender id: bf9e1387-b040-4393-9851-1598f8ecfae9 status: test description: Detects disabling Windows Defender Exploit Guard Network Protection references: - https://www.tenforums.com/tutorials/105533-enable-disable-windows-defender-exploit-protection-settings.html author: Austin Songer @austinsonger date: 2021-08-04 modified: 2023-08-17 tags: - attack.defense-impairment - attack.t1685 logsource: category: registry_set product: windows detection: selection: TargetObject|contains: SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\Windows Defender Security Center\App and Browser protection\DisallowExploitProtectionOverride Details: DWORD (00000001) condition: selection falsepositives: - Unknown level: medium
Sigma rule: Detects potential sideloading of "mpclient.dll" by Windows Defender processes ("MpCmdRun" and "NisSrv") from their non-d. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: Potential Mpclient.DLL Sideloading Via Defender Binaries id: 7002aa10-b8d4-47ae-b5ba-51ab07e228b9 related: - id: 418dc89a-9808-4b87-b1d7-e5ae0cb6effc type: similar status: test description: Detects potential sideloading of "mpclient.dll" by Windows Defender processes ("MpCmdRun" and "NisSrv") from their non-default directory. references: - https://www.sentinelone.com/blog/living-off-windows-defender-lockbit-ransomware-sideloads-cobalt-strike-through-microsoft-security-tool author: Bhabesh Raj date: 2022-08-01 modified: 2023-08-04 tags: - attack.privilege-escalation - attack.persistence - attack.execution - attack.stealth - attack.t1574.001 logsource: product: windows category: process_creation detection: selection: Image|endswith: - \MpCmdRun.exe - \NisSrv.exe filter_main_known_locations: Image|startswith: - C:\Program Files (x86)\Windows Defender\ - C:\Program Files\Microsoft Security Client\ - C:\Program Files\Windows Defender\ - C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\Windows Defender\Platform\ - C:\Windows\WinSxS\ condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_* falsepositives: - Unlikely level: high
Sigma rule: Detect use of the Windows 8.3 short name. Which could be used as a method to avoid Image detection. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: Use Short Name Path in Image id: a96970af-f126-420d-90e1-d37bf25e50e1 related: - id: 349d891d-fef0-4fe4-bc53-eee623a15969 type: similar status: test description: Detect use of the Windows 8.3 short name. Which could be used as a method to avoid Image detection references: - https://www.acunetix.com/blog/articles/windows-short-8-3-filenames-web-security-problem/ - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-2000-server/cc959352(v=technet.10) - https://twitter.com/frack113/status/1555830623633375232 author: frack113, Nasreddine Bencherchali date: 2022-08-07 modified: 2025-10-20 tags: - attack.stealth - attack.t1564.004 logsource: category: process_creation product: windows detection: selection: Image|contains: - ~1\ - ~2\ filter_main_system_process: ParentImage: - C:\Windows\System32\Dism.exe - C:\Windows\System32\cleanmgr.exe filter_main_installers: - Image|contains|all: - \AppData\ - \Temp\ - Image|endswith: - ~1\unzip.exe - ~1\7zG.exe filter_optional_webex: ParentImage|endswith: \WebEx\WebexHost.exe filter_optional_thor: ParentImage|endswith: \thor\thor64.exe filter_optional_installshield: - Product: InstallShield (R) - Description: InstallShield (R) Setup Engine - Company: InstallShield Software Corporation condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_* and not 1 of filter_optional_* falsepositives: - Applications could use this notation occasionally which might generate some false positives. In that case Investigate the parent and child process. level: medium
Sigma rule: Detects execution of Microsoft bash launcher without any flags to execute the content of a bash script directly. This ca. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: Indirect Command Execution From Script File Via Bash.EXE id: 2d22a514-e024-4428-9dba-41505bd63a5b related: - id: 5edc2273-c26f-406c-83f3-f4d948e740dd type: similar status: test description: 'Detects execution of Microsoft bash launcher without any flags to execute the content of a bash script directly. This can be used to potentially bypass defenses and execute Linux or Windows-based binaries directly via bash. ' references: - https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Bash/ - https://linux.die.net/man/1/bash - Internal Research author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) date: 2023-08-15 tags: - attack.stealth - attack.t1202 logsource: category: process_creation product: windows detection: selection: - Image|endswith: - :\Windows\System32\bash.exe - :\Windows\SysWOW64\bash.exe - OriginalFileName: Bash.exe filter_main_cli_flag: CommandLine|contains: - bash.exe - - bash - filter_main_no_cli: CommandLine: null filter_main_empty: CommandLine: '' filter_main_no_flag: CommandLine: - bash.exe - bash condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_* falsepositives: - Unknown level: medium