alirezaaminzadeh/cybersec-retrieval-benchmark huggingface dataset:
Sigma rule: Detects when an account makes changes to the ingress or egress rules of a security group. This can indicate that an atta. Logsource: aws / cloudtrail. Rule: title: Ingress/Egress Security Group Modification id: 6fb77778-040f-4015-9440-572aa9b6b580 status: test description: 'Detects when an account makes changes to the ingress or egress rules of a security group. This can indicate that an attacker is attempting to open up new attack vectors in the account, that they are trying to exfiltrate data over the network, or that they are trying to allow machines in that VPC/Subnet to contact a C&C server. ' references: - https://www.gorillastack.com/blog/real-time-events/important-aws-cloudtrail-security-events-tracking/ author: jamesc-grafana date: 2024-07-11 tags: - attack.initial-access - attack.t1190 logsource: product: aws service: cloudtrail detection: selection: eventSource: ec2.amazonaws.com eventName: - AuthorizeSecurityGroupEgress - AuthorizeSecurityGroupIngress - RevokeSecurityGroupEgress - RevokeSecurityGroupIngress condition: selection falsepositives: - New VPCs and Subnets being setup requiring a different security profile to those already defined - A single port being opened for a new service that is known to be deploying - Administrators closing unused ports to reduce the attack surface level: medium
Sigma rule: Detects persistence via Visual Studio Tools for Office (VSTO) add-ins in Office applications.. Logsource: windows / registry_set. Rule: title: Potential Persistence Via Visual Studio Tools for Office id: 9d15044a-7cfe-4d23-8085-6ebc11df7685 status: test description: Detects persistence via Visual Studio Tools for Office (VSTO) add-ins in Office applications. references: - https://twitter.com/_vivami/status/1347925307643355138 - https://vanmieghem.io/stealth-outlook-persistence/ author: Bhabesh Raj date: 2021-01-10 modified: 2026-01-09 tags: - attack.t1137.006 - attack.persistence logsource: category: registry_set product: windows detection: selection: TargetObject|contains: - \Software\Microsoft\Office\Outlook\Addins\ - \Software\Microsoft\Office\Word\Addins\ - \Software\Microsoft\Office\Excel\Addins\ - \Software\Microsoft\Office\Powerpoint\Addins\ - \Software\Microsoft\VSTO\Security\Inclusion\ filter_main_system: Image: - C:\Windows\System32\msiexec.exe - C:\Windows\SysWOW64\msiexec.exe - C:\Windows\System32\regsvr32.exe - C:\Windows\SysWOW64\regsvr32.exe filter_main_office_click_to_run: Image|startswith: - C:\Program Files\Common Files (x86)\Microsoft Shared\ClickToRun\ - C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\ClickToRun\ Image|endswith: \OfficeClickToRun.exe filter_main_integrator: Image: - C:\Program Files (x86)\Microsoft Office\root\integration\integrator.exe - C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\root\integration\integrator.exe filter_main_office_apps: Image|startswith: - C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\OFFICE - C:\Program Files (x86)\Microsoft Office\OFFICE - C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Root\OFFICE - C:\Program Files (x86)\Microsoft Office\Root\OFFICE - C:\PROGRA~2\MICROS~2\Office Image|endswith: - \excel.exe - \Integrator.exe - \OneNote.exe - \outlook.exe - \powerpnt.exe - \Teams.exe - \visio.exe - \winword.exe filter_main_vsto: Image|startswith: - C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\VSTO\ - C:\Program Files (x86)\Microsoft Shared\VSTO\ Image|endswith: \VSTOInstaller.exe filter_optional_avg: Image: - C:\Program Files\AVG\Antivirus\RegSvr.exe - C:\Program Files (x86)\AVG\Antivirus\RegSvr.exe TargetObject|contains: \Microsoft\Office\Outlook\Addins\Antivirus.AsOutExt\ filter_optional_avast: Image: - C:\Program Files\Avast Software\Avast\RegSvr.exe - C:\Program Files (x86)\Avast Software\Avast\RegSvr.exe TargetObject|contains: \Microsoft\Office\Outlook\Addins\Avast.AsOutExt\ condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_* and not 1 of filter_optional_* falsepositives: - Legitimate Addin Installation level: medium
Sigma rule: Detects Obfuscated Powershell via COMPRESS OBFUSCATION. Logsource: windows / security. Rule: title: Invoke-Obfuscation COMPRESS OBFUSCATION - Security id: 7a922f1b-2635-4d6c-91ef-af228b198ad3 related: - id: 175997c5-803c-4b08-8bb0-70b099f47595 type: derived status: test description: Detects Obfuscated Powershell via COMPRESS OBFUSCATION references: - https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/issues/1009 author: Timur Zinniatullin, oscd.community date: 2020-10-18 modified: 2022-11-29 tags: - attack.stealth - attack.t1027 - attack.execution - attack.t1059.001 logsource: product: windows service: security definition: The 'System Security Extension' audit subcategory need to be enabled to log the EID 4697 detection: selection: EventID: 4697 ServiceFileName|contains|all: - new-object - text.encoding]::ascii - readtoend ServiceFileName|contains: - system.io.compression.deflatestream - system.io.streamreader condition: selection falsepositives: - Unknown level: medium
Sigma rule: Detects suspicious execution of Sysinternals PsSuspend, where the utility is used to suspend critical processes such as. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: Sysinternals PsSuspend Suspicious Execution id: 4beb6ae0-f85b-41e2-8f18-8668abc8af78 related: - id: 48bbc537-b652-4b4e-bd1d-281172df448f type: similar status: test description: Detects suspicious execution of Sysinternals PsSuspend, where the utility is used to suspend critical processes such as AV or EDR to bypass defenses references: - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/downloads/pssuspend - https://twitter.com/0gtweet/status/1638069413717975046 author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) date: 2023-03-23 modified: 2026-06-29 tags: - attack.defense-impairment - attack.t1685 logsource: category: process_creation product: windows detection: selection_img: - OriginalFileName: pssuspend.exe - Image|endswith: - \pssuspend.exe - \pssuspend64.exe - \pssuspend64a.exe selection_cli: CommandLine|contains: msmpeng.exe condition: all of selection_* falsepositives: - Unlikely level: high
Sigma rule: Use of reg to get MachineGuid information. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: Suspicious Query of MachineGUID id: f5240972-3938-4e56-8e4b-e33893176c1f status: test description: Use of reg to get MachineGuid information references: - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1082/T1082.md#atomic-test-8---windows-machineguid-discovery author: frack113 date: 2022-01-01 tags: - attack.discovery - attack.t1082 logsource: category: process_creation product: windows detection: selection: Image|endswith: \reg.exe CommandLine|contains|all: - SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Cryptography - '/v ' - MachineGuid condition: selection falsepositives: - Unknown level: low
Sigma rule: Indicates sign-in from a malicious IP address based on high failure rates.. Logsource: azure / riskdetection. Rule: title: Malicious IP Address Sign-In Failure Rate id: a3f55ebd-0c01-4ed6-adc0-8fb76d8cd3cd status: test description: Indicates sign-in from a malicious IP address based on high failure rates. references: - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/id-protection/concept-identity-protection-risks#malicious-ip-address - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/architecture/security-operations-user-accounts#unusual-sign-ins author: Mark Morowczynski '@markmorow', Gloria Lee, '@gleeiamglo' date: 2023-09-07 tags: - attack.t1090 - attack.command-and-control logsource: product: azure service: riskdetection detection: selection: riskEventType: maliciousIPAddress condition: selection falsepositives: - We recommend investigating the sessions flagged by this detection in the context of other sign-ins from the user. level: high
Sigma rule: One way Qbot steals sensitive information is by extracting browser data from Internet Explorer and Microsoft Edge by usi. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: Esentutl Steals Browser Information id: 6a69f62d-ce75-4b57-8dce-6351eb55b362 status: test description: One way Qbot steals sensitive information is by extracting browser data from Internet Explorer and Microsoft Edge by using the built-in utility esentutl.exe references: - https://thedfirreport.com/2022/02/07/qbot-likes-to-move-it-move-it/ - https://redcanary.com/threat-detection-report/threats/qbot/ - https://thedfirreport.com/2022/10/31/follina-exploit-leads-to-domain-compromise/ author: frack113 date: 2022-02-13 modified: 2024-03-05 tags: - attack.collection - attack.t1005 logsource: category: process_creation product: windows detection: selection_img: - Image|endswith: \esentutl.exe - OriginalFileName: esentutl.exe selection_flag: CommandLine|contains|windash: -r selection_webcache: CommandLine|contains: \Windows\WebCache condition: all of selection* falsepositives: - Legitimate use level: medium
Sigma rule: Detects suspicious PowerShell scripts accessing SAM hives. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: PowerShell SAM Copy id: 1af57a4b-460a-4738-9034-db68b880c665 status: test description: Detects suspicious PowerShell scripts accessing SAM hives references: - https://twitter.com/splinter_code/status/1420546784250769408 author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems) date: 2021-07-29 modified: 2023-01-06 tags: - attack.credential-access - attack.t1003.002 logsource: category: process_creation product: windows detection: selection_1: CommandLine|contains|all: - \HarddiskVolumeShadowCopy - System32\config\sam selection_2: CommandLine|contains: - Copy-Item - cp $_. - cpi $_. - copy $_. - .File]::Copy( condition: all of selection* falsepositives: - Some rare backup scenarios - PowerShell scripts fixing HiveNightmare / SeriousSAM ACLs level: high
Sigma rule: Detects PowerShell scripts that make use of the "Compress-Archive" Cmdlet in order to compress folders and files where t. Logsource: windows / powershell-classic. Rule: title: Zip A Folder With PowerShell For Staging In Temp - PowerShell id: 71ff406e-b633-4989-96ec-bc49d825a412 related: - id: daf7eb81-35fd-410d-9d7a-657837e602bb type: similar - id: b7a3c9a3-09ea-4934-8864-6a32cacd98d9 type: similar - id: 85a8e5ba-bd03-4bfb-bbfa-a4409a8f8b98 type: similar status: test description: 'Detects PowerShell scripts that make use of the "Compress-Archive" Cmdlet in order to compress folders and files where the output is stored in a potentially suspicious location that is used often by malware for exfiltration. An adversary might compress data (e.g., sensitive documents) that is collected prior to exfiltration in order to make it portable and minimize the amount of data sent over the network. ' references: - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1074.001/T1074.001.md - https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/cybersecurity-advisories/aa23-347a author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems), frack113 date: 2021-07-20 modified: 2023-12-18 tags: - attack.collection - attack.t1074.001 logsource: product: windows service: powershell-classic detection: selection: Data|contains: - Compress-Archive -Path*-DestinationPath $env:TEMP - Compress-Archive -Path*-DestinationPath*\AppData\Local\Temp\ - Compress-Archive -Path*-DestinationPath*:\Windows\Temp\ condition: selection falsepositives: - Unknown level: medium
Sigma rule: Detects certain command line parameters often used during reconnaissance activity via web shells. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: Webshell Detection With Command Line Keywords id: bed2a484-9348-4143-8a8a-b801c979301c status: test description: Detects certain command line parameters often used during reconnaissance activity via web shells references: - https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2013/08/breaking-down-the-china-chopper-web-shell-part-ii.html - https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/bumblebee-webshell-xhunt-campaign/ - https://www.huntress.com/blog/threat-advisory-oh-no-cleo-cleo-software-actively-being-exploited-in-the-wild author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Jonhnathan Ribeiro, Anton Kutepov, oscd.community, Chad Hudson, Matt Anderson date: 2017-01-01 modified: 2026-07-14 tags: - attack.persistence - attack.discovery - attack.t1505.003 - attack.t1018 - attack.t1033 - attack.t1087 logsource: category: process_creation product: windows detection: selection_webserver_image: ParentImage|endswith: - \w3wp.exe - \php-cgi.exe - \nginx.exe - \httpd.exe - \caddy.exe - \ws_tomcatservice.exe selection_webserver_characteristics_tomcat1: ParentImage|endswith: - \java.exe - \javaw.exe ParentImage|contains: - -tomcat- - \tomcat selection_webserver_characteristics_tomcat2: ParentImage|endswith: - \java.exe - \javaw.exe CommandLine|contains: - catalina.jar - CATALINA_HOME selection_susp_net_utility: OriginalFileName: - net.exe - net1.exe CommandLine|contains: - ' user ' - ' use ' - ' group ' selection_susp_ping_utility: OriginalFileName: ping.exe CommandLine|contains: ' -n ' selection_susp_change_dir: CommandLine|contains: - '&cd&echo' - 'cd /d ' selection_susp_wmic_utility: OriginalFileName: wmic.exe CommandLine|contains: ' /node:' selection_susp_powershell_cli: Image|endswith: - \cmd.exe - \powershell.exe - \pwsh.exe CommandLine|contains: - ' -enc ' - ' -EncodedCommand ' - ' -w hidden ' - ' -windowstyle hidden' - .WebClient).Download selection_susp_misc_discovery_binaries: - Image|endswith: - \dsquery.exe - \find.exe - \findstr.exe - \ipconfig.exe - \netstat.exe - \nslookup.exe - \pathping.exe - \quser.exe - \schtasks.exe - \systeminfo.exe - \tasklist.exe - \tracert.exe - \wevtutil.exe - \whoami.exe - OriginalFileName: - dsquery.exe - find.exe - findstr.exe - ipconfig.exe - netstat.exe - nslookup.exe - pathping.exe - quser.exe - schtasks.exe - sysinfo.exe - tasklist.exe - tracert.exe - VSSADMIN.EXE - wevtutil.exe - whoami.exe selection_susp_misc_discovery_commands: CommandLine|contains: - ' Test-NetConnection ' - dir \ condition: 1 of selection_webserver_* and 1 of selectio
Sigma rule: Detects the deletion of S3 buckets in AWS CloudTrail logs. Monitoring the deletion of S3 buckets is critical for securit. Logsource: aws / cloudtrail. Rule: title: AWS Bucket Deleted id: 39c9f26d-6e3b-4dbb-9c7a-4154b0281112 status: experimental description: 'Detects the deletion of S3 buckets in AWS CloudTrail logs. Monitoring the deletion of S3 buckets is critical for security and data integrity, as it may indicate potential data loss or unauthorized access attempts. ' references: - https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AmazonS3/latest/API/API_DeleteBucket.html - https://awscli.amazonaws.com/v2/documentation/api/latest/reference/s3api/delete-bucket.html author: Ivan Saakov, Nasreddine Bencherchali date: 2025-10-19 tags: - attack.stealth logsource: product: aws service: cloudtrail detection: selection_event_name: eventName: DeleteBucket selection_status_success: errorCode: Success selection_status_null: errorCode: null condition: selection_event_name and 1 of selection_status_* falsepositives: - During maintenance operations or testing, authorized administrators may delete S3 buckets as part of routine data management or cleanup activities. level: medium
Sigma rule: Detects the desktopimgdownldr utility being used to download a remote file. An adversary may use desktopimgdownldr to do. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: Remote File Download Via Desktopimgdownldr Utility id: 214641c2-c579-4ecb-8427-0cf19df6842e status: test description: Detects the desktopimgdownldr utility being used to download a remote file. An adversary may use desktopimgdownldr to download arbitrary files as an alternative to certutil. references: - https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/remote-file-download-via-desktopimgdownldr-utility.html author: Tim Rauch, Elastic (idea) date: 2022-09-27 tags: - attack.command-and-control - attack.t1105 logsource: category: process_creation product: windows detection: selection: Image|endswith: \desktopimgdownldr.exe ParentImage|endswith: \desktopimgdownldr.exe CommandLine|contains: /lockscreenurl:http condition: selection falsepositives: - Unknown level: medium
Sigma rule: Detects file writes of WMI script event consumer. Logsource: windows / file_event. Rule: title: WMI Persistence - Script Event Consumer File Write id: 33f41cdd-35ac-4ba8-814b-c6a4244a1ad4 status: test description: Detects file writes of WMI script event consumer references: - https://www.eideon.com/2018-03-02-THL03-WMIBackdoors/ author: Thomas Patzke date: 2018-03-07 modified: 2021-11-27 tags: - attack.privilege-escalation - attack.t1546.003 - attack.persistence logsource: product: windows category: file_event detection: selection: Image: C:\WINDOWS\system32\wbem\scrcons.exe condition: selection falsepositives: - Dell Power Manager (C:\Program Files\Dell\PowerManager\DpmPowerPlanSetup.exe) level: high
Sigma rule: Detects execution of the binary "wpbbin" which is used as part of the UEFI based persistence method described in the ref. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: UEFI Persistence Via Wpbbin - ProcessCreation id: 4abc0ec4-db5a-412f-9632-26659cddf145 status: test description: Detects execution of the binary "wpbbin" which is used as part of the UEFI based persistence method described in the reference section references: - https://grzegorztworek.medium.com/using-uefi-to-inject-executable-files-into-bitlocker-protected-drives-8ff4ca59c94c - https://persistence-info.github.io/Data/wpbbin.html author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) date: 2022-07-18 tags: - attack.persistence - attack.stealth - attack.t1542.001 logsource: product: windows category: process_creation detection: selection: Image: C:\Windows\System32\wpbbin.exe condition: selection falsepositives: - Legitimate usage of the file by hardware manufacturer such as lenovo (Thanks @0gtweet for the tip) level: high
Sigma rule: Detects DNS queries containing patterns associated with Kerberos coercion attacks via DNS object spoofing. The pattern ". Logsource: windows / dns_query. Rule: title: Suspicious DNS Query Indicating Kerberos Coercion via DNS Object SPN Spoofing id: e7a21b5f-d8c4-4ae5-b8d9-93c5d3f28e1c related: - id: b07e58cf-cacc-4135-8473-ccb2eba63dd2 type: similar - id: 5588576c-5898-4fac-bcdd-7475a60e8f43 type: similar status: experimental description: 'Detects DNS queries containing patterns associated with Kerberos coercion attacks via DNS object spoofing. The pattern "1UWhRCAAAAA..BAAAA" is a base64-encoded signature that corresponds to a marshaled CREDENTIAL_TARGET_INFORMATION structure. Attackers can use this technique to coerce authentication from victim systems to attacker-controlled hosts. It is one of the strong indicators of a Kerberos coercion attack, where adversaries manipulate DNS records to spoof Service Principal Names (SPNs) and redirect authentication requests like CVE-2025-33073. ' references: - https://www.synacktiv.com/publications/ntlm-reflection-is-dead-long-live-ntlm-reflection-an-in-depth-analysis-of-cve-2025 - https://googleprojectzero.blogspot.com/2021/10/using-kerberos-for-authentication-relay.html author: Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems) date: 2025-06-20 tags: - attack.collection - attack.credential-access - attack.persistence - attack.privilege-escalation - attack.t1557.001 - attack.t1187 logsource: product: windows category: dns_query detection: selection: QueryName|contains|all: - UWhRCA - BAAAA condition: selection falsepositives: - Unknown level: high
Sigma rule: Detects enumeration of local system accounts on MacOS systems. This can be used by attackers to identify accounts for la. Logsource: macos / process_creation. Rule: title: Local System Accounts Discovery - MacOs id: ddf36b67-e872-4507-ab2e-46bda21b842c status: test description: 'Detects enumeration of local system accounts on MacOS systems. This can be used by attackers to identify accounts for lateral movement or privilege escalation. ' references: - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1087.001/T1087.001.md - https://ss64.com/osx/dscl.html - https://ss64.com/mac/dscacheutil.html author: Alejandro Ortuno, oscd.community date: 2020-10-08 modified: 2026-07-07 tags: - attack.discovery - attack.t1087.001 logsource: category: process_creation product: macos detection: selection_dscl: Image|endswith: /dscl CommandLine|contains|all: - list - /users selection_dscacheutil: Image|endswith: /dscacheutil CommandLine|contains|all: - -q - user selection_root: CommandLine|contains: '''*:0:''' selection_passwd_sudo: Image|endswith: - /cat - /awk - /grep CommandLine|contains: - /etc/passwd - /etc/sudoers selection_id: Image|endswith: /id selection_lsof: Image|endswith: /lsof CommandLine|contains: -u selection_logged_in_users: Image|endswith: - /who - /w - /users - /last selection_home_dir_listing: Image|endswith: /ls CommandLine|endswith: - /Users - /Users' - /Users" selection_loginwindow_prefs: Image|endswith: - /defaults - /plutil CommandLine|contains: com.apple.loginwindow condition: 1 of selection* falsepositives: - Legitimate administration activities level: low
Sigma rule: Identifies when ClusterRoles/Roles are being modified or deleted.. Logsource: azure / activitylogs. Rule: title: Azure Kubernetes Sensitive Role Access id: 818fee0c-e0ec-4e45-824e-83e4817b0887 status: test description: Identifies when ClusterRoles/Roles are being modified or deleted. references: - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/role-based-access-control/resource-provider-operations#microsoftkubernetes - https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2021/03/23/secure-containerized-environments-with-updated-threat-matrix-for-kubernetes/ - https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2020/04/02/attack-matrix-kubernetes/ - https://medium.com/mitre-engenuity/att-ck-for-containers-now-available-4c2359654bf1 author: Austin Songer @austinsonger date: 2021-08-07 modified: 2022-08-23 tags: - attack.impact - attack.t1485 - attack.t1496 - attack.t1489 logsource: product: azure service: activitylogs detection: selection: operationName: - MICROSOFT.KUBERNETES/CONNECTEDCLUSTERS/RBAC.AUTHORIZATION.K8S.IO/ROLES/WRITE - MICROSOFT.KUBERNETES/CONNECTEDCLUSTERS/RBAC.AUTHORIZATION.K8S.IO/ROLES/DELETE - MICROSOFT.KUBERNETES/CONNECTEDCLUSTERS/RBAC.AUTHORIZATION.K8S.IO/ROLES/BIND/ACTION - MICROSOFT.KUBERNETES/CONNECTEDCLUSTERS/RBAC.AUTHORIZATION.K8S.IO/ROLES/ESCALATE/ACTION - MICROSOFT.KUBERNETES/CONNECTEDCLUSTERS/RBAC.AUTHORIZATION.K8S.IO/CLUSTERROLES/WRITE - MICROSOFT.KUBERNETES/CONNECTEDCLUSTERS/RBAC.AUTHORIZATION.K8S.IO/CLUSTERROLES/DELETE - MICROSOFT.KUBERNETES/CONNECTEDCLUSTERS/RBAC.AUTHORIZATION.K8S.IO/CLUSTERROLES/BIND/ACTION - MICROSOFT.KUBERNETES/CONNECTEDCLUSTERS/RBAC.AUTHORIZATION.K8S.IO/CLUSTERROLES/ESCALATE/ACTION condition: selection falsepositives: - ClusterRoles/Roles being modified and deleted may be performed by a system administrator. Verify whether the user identity, user agent, and/or hostname should be making changes in your environment. - ClusterRoles/Roles modification from unfamiliar users should be investigated. If known behavior is causing false positives, it can be exempted from the rule. level: medium
Sigma rule: Detects instances where a MySQL service on an OpenCanary node has had a login attempt.. Logsource: opencanary / application. Rule: title: OpenCanary - MySQL Login Attempt id: e7d79a1b-25ed-4956-bd56-bd344fa8fd06 status: test description: Detects instances where a MySQL service on an OpenCanary node has had a login attempt. references: - https://opencanary.readthedocs.io/en/latest/starting/configuration.html#services-configuration - https://github.com/thinkst/opencanary/blob/a0896adfcaf0328cfd5829fe10d2878c7445138e/opencanary/logger.py#L52 author: Security Onion Solutions date: 2024-03-08 tags: - attack.credential-access - attack.collection - attack.t1003 - attack.t1213 logsource: category: application product: opencanary detection: selection: logtype: 8001 condition: selection falsepositives: - Unlikely level: high