alirezaaminzadeh/cybersec-retrieval-benchmark huggingface dataset:
Sigma rule: Detects the use of reg.exe to disable the Event Tracing for Windows (ETW) Autologger session for Windows Defender API an. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: Disabling Windows Defender WMI Autologger Session via Reg.exe id: a1b2c3d4-e5f6-a7b8-c9d0-e1f2a3b4c5d6 related: - id: f37b4bce-49d0-4087-9f5b-58bffda77316 type: similar status: experimental description: 'Detects the use of reg.exe to disable the Event Tracing for Windows (ETW) Autologger session for Windows Defender API and Audit events. By setting the ''Start'' value to ''0'' for the ''DefenderApiLogger'' or ''DefenderAuditLogger'' session, an attacker can prevent these critical security events from being logged, effectively blinding monitoring tools that rely on this data. This is a powerful defense evasion technique. ' references: - https://research.splunk.com/endpoint/76406a0f-f5e0-4167-8e1f-337fdc0f1b0c/ - https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/etw/configuring-and-starting-an-autologger-session - https://thedfirreport.com/2021/10/18/icedid-to-xinglocker-ransomware-in-24-hours/ - https://blog.malwarebytes.com/malwarebytes-news/2021/02/lazyscripter-from-empire-to-double-rat/ - https://www.binarly.io/blog/design-issues-of-modern-edrs-bypassing-etw-based-solutions author: Matt Anderson (Huntress) date: 2025-07-09 tags: - attack.defense-impairment - attack.t1685 logsource: category: process_creation product: windows detection: selection_img: - Image|endswith: \reg.exe - OriginalFileName: reg.exe selection_reg_path: CommandLine|contains: - \Control\WMI\Autologger\DefenderApiLogger\Start - \Control\WMI\Autologger\DefenderAuditLogger\Start selection_reg_add: CommandLine|contains|all: - add - '0' filter_main_enable: CommandLine|contains: '0x00000001' condition: all of selection_* and not 1 of filter_main_* falsepositives: - Highly unlikely level: high
Sigma rule: Detects code execution via Pester.bat (Pester - Powershell Modulte for testing). Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: Execute Code with Pester.bat id: 59e938ff-0d6d-4dc3-b13f-36cc28734d4e status: test description: Detects code execution via Pester.bat (Pester - Powershell Modulte for testing) references: - https://twitter.com/Oddvarmoe/status/993383596244258816 - https://github.com/api0cradle/LOLBAS/blob/d148d278f5f205ce67cfaf49afdfb68071c7252a/OSScripts/pester.md author: Julia Fomina, oscd.community date: 2020-10-08 modified: 2023-11-09 tags: - attack.execution - attack.stealth - attack.t1059.001 - attack.t1216 logsource: category: process_creation product: windows detection: powershell_module: Image|endswith: - \powershell.exe - \pwsh.exe CommandLine|contains|all: - Pester - Get-Help cmd_execution: Image|endswith: \cmd.exe CommandLine|contains|all: - pester - ; get_help: CommandLine|contains: - help - \? condition: powershell_module or (cmd_execution and get_help) falsepositives: - Legitimate use of Pester for writing tests for Powershell scripts and modules level: medium
Sigma rule: Detects usage of wmic to start or stop a service. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: Service Started/Stopped Via Wmic.EXE id: 0b7163dc-7eee-4960-af17-c0cd517f92da status: test description: Detects usage of wmic to start or stop a service references: - https://sushant747.gitbooks.io/total-oscp-guide/content/privilege_escalation_windows.html author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) date: 2022-06-20 modified: 2023-02-14 tags: - attack.execution - attack.t1047 logsource: category: process_creation product: windows detection: selection_img: - OriginalFileName: wmic.exe - Image|endswith: \WMIC.exe selection_cli: CommandLine|contains|all: - ' service ' - ' call ' CommandLine|contains: - stopservice - startservice condition: all of selection_* falsepositives: - Unknown level: medium regression_tests_path: regression_data/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_wmic_service_manipulation/info.yml
Sigma rule: Detects Obfuscated use of Environment Variables to execute PowerShell. Logsource: windows / system. Rule: title: Invoke-Obfuscation VAR+ Launcher - System id: 8ca7004b-e620-4ecb-870e-86129b5b8e75 status: test description: Detects Obfuscated use of Environment Variables to execute PowerShell references: - https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/issues/1009 author: Jonathan Cheong, oscd.community date: 2020-10-15 modified: 2022-11-29 tags: - attack.stealth - attack.t1027 - attack.execution - attack.t1059.001 logsource: product: windows service: system detection: selection: Provider_Name: Service Control Manager EventID: 7045 ImagePath|contains|all: - cmd - '"set' - -f ImagePath|contains: - /c - /r condition: selection falsepositives: - Unknown level: high
Sigma rule: Detects the execution of the certutil with the "exportPFX" flag which allows the utility to export certificates.. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: Certificate Exported Via Certutil.EXE id: 3ffd6f51-e6c1-47b7-94b4-c1e61d4117c5 status: test description: Detects the execution of the certutil with the "exportPFX" flag which allows the utility to export certificates. references: - https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/a-golden-saml-journey-solarwinds-continued.html author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Jonhnathan Ribeiro, oscd.community, Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) date: 2023-02-15 modified: 2024-03-05 tags: - attack.stealth - attack.t1027 logsource: category: process_creation product: windows detection: selection_img: - Image|endswith: \certutil.exe - OriginalFileName: CertUtil.exe selection_cli: CommandLine|contains|windash: '-exportPFX ' condition: all of selection_* falsepositives: - There legitimate reasons to export certificates. Investigate the activity to determine if it's benign level: medium regression_tests_path: regression_data/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_certutil_export_pfx/info.yml
Sigma rule: Detects changes to the ESXi syslog configuration via "esxcli". Logsource: linux / process_creation. Rule: title: ESXi Syslog Configuration Change Via ESXCLI id: 38eb1dbb-011f-40b1-a126-cf03a0210563 status: test description: Detects changes to the ESXi syslog configuration via "esxcli" references: - https://support.solarwinds.com/SuccessCenter/s/article/Configure-ESXi-Syslog-to-LEM?language=en_US - https://developer.broadcom.com/xapis/esxcli-command-reference/7.0.0/namespace/esxcli_system.html author: Cedric Maurugeon date: 2023-09-04 tags: - attack.execution - attack.defense-impairment - attack.t1685 - attack.t1690 - attack.t1059.012 logsource: category: process_creation product: linux detection: selection: Image|endswith: /esxcli CommandLine|contains|all: - system - syslog - config CommandLine|contains: ' set' condition: selection falsepositives: - Legitimate administrative activities level: medium
Sigma rule: This rule detects execution of a PowerShell code through the sqlps.exe utility, which is included in the standard set of. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: Detection of PowerShell Execution via Sqlps.exe id: 0152550d-3a26-4efd-9f0e-54a0b28ae2f3 status: test description: 'This rule detects execution of a PowerShell code through the sqlps.exe utility, which is included in the standard set of utilities supplied with the MSSQL Server. Script blocks are not logged in this case, so this utility helps to bypass protection mechanisms based on the analysis of these logs. ' references: - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/sql/tools/sqlps-utility?view=sql-server-ver15 - https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/OtherMSBinaries/Sqlps/ - https://twitter.com/bryon_/status/975835709587075072 author: Agro (@agro_sev) oscd.community date: 2020-10-10 modified: 2022-12-09 tags: - attack.execution - attack.stealth - attack.t1059.001 - attack.t1127 logsource: category: process_creation product: windows detection: selection_parent: ParentImage|endswith: \sqlps.exe selection_image: - Image|endswith: \sqlps.exe - OriginalFileName: sqlps.exe filter_image: ParentImage|endswith: \sqlagent.exe condition: selection_parent or (selection_image and not filter_image) falsepositives: - Direct PS command execution through SQLPS.exe is uncommon, childprocess sqlps.exe spawned by sqlagent.exe is a legitimate action. level: medium
Sigma rule: Detects when a Microsoft Cloud App Security reported when a user signs into your sanctioned apps from a risky IP address. Logsource: m365 / threat_management. Rule: title: Logon from a Risky IP Address id: c191e2fa-f9d6-4ccf-82af-4f2aba08359f status: test description: Detects when a Microsoft Cloud App Security reported when a user signs into your sanctioned apps from a risky IP address. references: - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/defender-cloud-apps/anomaly-detection-policy - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/defender-cloud-apps/policy-template-reference author: Austin Songer @austinsonger date: 2021-08-23 modified: 2022-10-09 tags: - attack.privilege-escalation - attack.persistence - attack.initial-access - attack.stealth - attack.t1078 logsource: service: threat_management product: m365 detection: selection: eventSource: SecurityComplianceCenter eventName: Log on from a risky IP address status: success condition: selection falsepositives: - Unknown level: medium
Sigma rule: Detects a suspicious execution of a Microsoft HTML Help (HH.exe). Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: Suspicious HH.EXE Execution id: e8a95b5e-c891-46e2-b33a-93937d3abc31 status: test description: Detects a suspicious execution of a Microsoft HTML Help (HH.exe) references: - https://www.trustwave.com/en-us/resources/blogs/spiderlabs-blog/chm-badness-delivers-a-banking-trojan/ - https://github.com/elastic/protections-artifacts/commit/746086721fd385d9f5c6647cada1788db4aea95f#diff-27939090904026cc396b0b629c8e4314acd6f5dac40a676edbc87f4567b47eb7 - https://www.ptsecurity.com/ww-en/analytics/pt-esc-threat-intelligence/higaisa-or-winnti-apt-41-backdoors-old-and-new/ - https://www.zscaler.com/blogs/security-research/unintentional-leak-glimpse-attack-vectors-apt37 author: Maxim Pavlunin date: 2020-04-01 modified: 2023-04-12 tags: - attack.execution - attack.initial-access - attack.stealth - attack.t1047 - attack.t1059.001 - attack.t1059.003 - attack.t1059.005 - attack.t1059.007 - attack.t1218 - attack.t1218.001 - attack.t1218.010 - attack.t1218.011 - attack.t1566 - attack.t1566.001 logsource: category: process_creation product: windows detection: selection_img: - OriginalFileName: HH.exe - Image|endswith: \hh.exe selection_paths: CommandLine|contains: - .application - \AppData\Local\Temp\ - \Content.Outlook\ - \Downloads\ - \Users\Public\ - \Windows\Temp\ condition: all of selection_* falsepositives: - Unknown level: high
Sigma rule: Detects when a Microsoft Cloud App Security reported when an activity occurs from a location that wasn't recently or nev. Logsource: m365 / threat_management. Rule: title: Activity from Infrequent Country id: 0f2468a2-5055-4212-a368-7321198ee706 status: test description: Detects when a Microsoft Cloud App Security reported when an activity occurs from a location that wasn't recently or never visited by any user in the organization. references: - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/defender-cloud-apps/anomaly-detection-policy - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/defender-cloud-apps/policy-template-reference author: Austin Songer @austinsonger date: 2021-08-23 modified: 2022-10-09 tags: - attack.command-and-control - attack.t1573 logsource: service: threat_management product: m365 detection: selection: eventSource: SecurityComplianceCenter eventName: Activity from infrequent country status: success condition: selection falsepositives: - Unknown level: medium
Sigma rule: Detects the extraction of password protected ZIP archives. See the filename variable for more details on which file has. Logsource: windows / security. Rule: title: Password Protected ZIP File Opened id: 00ba9da1-b510-4f6b-b258-8d338836180f status: test description: Detects the extraction of password protected ZIP archives. See the filename variable for more details on which file has been opened. references: - https://twitter.com/sbousseaden/status/1523383197513379841 author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems) date: 2022-05-09 tags: - attack.stealth - attack.t1027 logsource: product: windows service: security detection: selection: EventID: 5379 TargetName|contains: Microsoft_Windows_Shell_ZipFolder:filename filter: TargetName|contains: \Temporary Internet Files\Content.Outlook condition: selection and not filter falsepositives: - Legitimate used of encrypted ZIP files level: medium
Sigma rule: Detects when an application is modified or deleted.. Logsource: okta / okta. Rule: title: Okta Application Modified or Deleted id: 7899144b-e416-4c28-b0b5-ab8f9e0a541d status: test description: Detects when an application is modified or deleted. references: - https://developer.okta.com/docs/reference/api/system-log/ - https://developer.okta.com/docs/reference/api/event-types/ author: Austin Songer @austinsonger date: 2021-09-12 modified: 2026-04-27 tags: - attack.impact logsource: product: okta service: okta detection: selection: eventType: - application.lifecycle.update - application.lifecycle.delete condition: selection falsepositives: - Unknown level: medium
Sigma rule: Detects the execution of netsh to configure a port forwarding of port 3389 (RDP) rule. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: RDP Port Forwarding Rule Added Via Netsh.EXE id: 782d6f3e-4c5d-4b8c-92a3-1d05fed72e63 status: test description: Detects the execution of netsh to configure a port forwarding of port 3389 (RDP) rule references: - https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2019/01/bypassing-network-restrictions-through-rdp-tunneling.html author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), oscd.community date: 2019-01-29 modified: 2023-02-13 tags: - attack.lateral-movement - attack.command-and-control - attack.t1090 logsource: category: process_creation product: windows detection: selection_img: - Image|endswith: \netsh.exe - OriginalFileName: netsh.exe selection_cli: CommandLine|contains|all: - ' i' - ' p' - =3389 - ' c' condition: all of selection_* falsepositives: - Legitimate administration activity level: high
Sigma rule: An attacker can use the SID history attribute to gain additional privileges.. Logsource: windows / security. Rule: title: Addition of SID History to Active Directory Object id: 2632954e-db1c-49cb-9936-67d1ef1d17d2 status: stable description: An attacker can use the SID history attribute to gain additional privileges. references: - https://adsecurity.org/?p=1772 author: Thomas Patzke, @atc_project (improvements) date: 2017-02-19 tags: - attack.persistence - attack.privilege-escalation - attack.stealth - attack.t1134.005 logsource: product: windows service: security detection: selection1: EventID: - 4765 - 4766 selection2: EventID: 4738 selection3: SidHistory: - '-' - '%%1793' filter_null: SidHistory: null condition: selection1 or (selection2 and not selection3 and not filter_null) falsepositives: - Migration of an account into a new domain level: medium
Sigma rule: Detects command line containing reference to the "::$index_allocation" stream, which can be used as a technique to preve. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: Potential Hidden Directory Creation Via NTFS INDEX_ALLOCATION Stream - CLI id: 0900463c-b33b-49a8-be1d-552a3b553dae related: - id: a8f866e1-bdd4-425e-a27a-37619238d9c7 type: similar status: test description: 'Detects command line containing reference to the "::$index_allocation" stream, which can be used as a technique to prevent access to folders or files from tooling such as "explorer.exe" or "powershell.exe" ' references: - https://twitter.com/pfiatde/status/1681977680688738305 - https://soroush.me/blog/2010/12/a-dotty-salty-directory-a-secret-place-in-ntfs-for-secret-files/ - https://sec-consult.com/blog/detail/pentesters-windows-ntfs-tricks-collection/ - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/5c3b23002d2bbede3c07e7307165fc2a235a427d/atomics/T1564.004/T1564.004.md#atomic-test-5---create-hidden-directory-via-index_allocation - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/openspecs/windows_protocols/ms-fscc/c54dec26-1551-4d3a-a0ea-4fa40f848eb3 author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems), Scoubi (@ScoubiMtl) date: 2023-10-09 tags: - attack.stealth - attack.t1564.004 logsource: product: windows category: process_creation detection: selection: CommandLine|contains: ::$index_allocation condition: selection falsepositives: - Unlikely level: medium
Sigma rule: Detects the addition of new root, CA or AuthRoot certificates to the Windows registry. Logsource: windows / registry_set. Rule: title: New Root or CA or AuthRoot Certificate to Store id: d223b46b-5621-4037-88fe-fda32eead684 status: test description: Detects the addition of new root, CA or AuthRoot certificates to the Windows registry references: - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1553.004/T1553.004.md#atomic-test-6---add-root-certificate-to-currentuser-certificate-store - https://posts.specterops.io/code-signing-certificate-cloning-attacks-and-defenses-6f98657fc6ec author: frack113 date: 2022-04-04 modified: 2023-08-17 tags: - attack.impact - attack.t1490 logsource: category: registry_set product: windows detection: selection: TargetObject|contains: - \SOFTWARE\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Root\Certificates\ - \SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Root\Certificates\ - \SOFTWARE\Microsoft\EnterpriseCertificates\Root\Certificates\ - \SOFTWARE\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\CA\Certificates\ - \SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\CA\Certificates\ - \SOFTWARE\Microsoft\EnterpriseCertificates\CA\Certificates\ - \SOFTWARE\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\AuthRoot\Certificates\ - \SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\AuthRoot\Certificates\ - \SOFTWARE\Microsoft\EnterpriseCertificates\AuthRoot\Certificates\ TargetObject|endswith: \Blob Details: Binary Data condition: selection falsepositives: - Unknown level: medium
Sigma rule: Detects executable names or flags used by Htran or Htran-like tools (e.g. NATBypass). Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: HackTool - Htran/NATBypass Execution id: f5e3b62f-e577-4e59-931e-0a15b2b94e1e status: test description: Detects executable names or flags used by Htran or Htran-like tools (e.g. NATBypass) references: - https://github.com/HiwinCN/HTran - https://github.com/cw1997/NATBypass author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems) date: 2022-12-27 modified: 2023-02-04 tags: - attack.command-and-control - attack.t1090 - attack.s0040 logsource: category: process_creation product: windows detection: selection_img: Image|endswith: - \htran.exe - \lcx.exe selection_cli: CommandLine|contains: - '.exe -tran ' - '.exe -slave ' condition: 1 of selection_* falsepositives: - Unknown level: high
Sigma rule: Detects suspicious child process creations of VMware Tools process which may indicate persistence setup. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: VMToolsd Suspicious Child Process id: 5687f942-867b-4578-ade7-1e341c46e99a status: test description: Detects suspicious child process creations of VMware Tools process which may indicate persistence setup references: - https://bohops.com/2021/10/08/analyzing-and-detecting-a-vmtools-persistence-technique/ - https://user-images.githubusercontent.com/61026070/136518004-b68cce7d-f9b8-4e9a-9b7b-53b1568a9a94.png - https://github.com/vmware/open-vm-tools/blob/master/open-vm-tools/tools.conf author: bohops, Bhabesh Raj date: 2021-10-08 modified: 2023-07-25 tags: - attack.execution - attack.persistence - attack.t1059 logsource: category: process_creation product: windows detection: selection_parent: ParentImage|endswith: \vmtoolsd.exe selection_img: - Image|endswith: - \cmd.exe - \cscript.exe - \mshta.exe - \powershell.exe - \pwsh.exe - \regsvr32.exe - \rundll32.exe - \wscript.exe - OriginalFileName: - Cmd.Exe - cscript.exe - MSHTA.EXE - PowerShell.EXE - pwsh.dll - REGSVR32.EXE - RUNDLL32.EXE - wscript.exe filter_main_vmwaretools_script: Image|endswith: \cmd.exe CommandLine|contains: - \VMware\VMware Tools\poweron-vm-default.bat - \VMware\VMware Tools\poweroff-vm-default.bat - \VMware\VMware Tools\resume-vm-default.bat - \VMware\VMware Tools\suspend-vm-default.bat filter_main_empty: Image|endswith: \cmd.exe CommandLine: '' filter_main_null: Image|endswith: \cmd.exe CommandLine: null condition: all of selection* and not 1 of filter_main_* falsepositives: - Legitimate use by VM administrator level: high
Sigma rule: Detects execution of the SharpImpersonation tool. Which can be used to manipulate tokens on a Windows computers remotely. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: HackTool - SharpImpersonation Execution id: f89b08d0-77ad-4728-817b-9b16c5a69c7a related: - id: cf0c254b-22f1-4b2b-8221-e137b3c0af94 type: similar status: test description: Detects execution of the SharpImpersonation tool. Which can be used to manipulate tokens on a Windows computers remotely (PsExec/WmiExec) or interactively references: - https://s3cur3th1ssh1t.github.io/SharpImpersonation-Introduction/ - https://github.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/SharpImpersonation author: Sai Prashanth Pulisetti @pulisettis, Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) date: 2022-12-27 modified: 2023-02-13 tags: - attack.privilege-escalation - attack.stealth - attack.t1134.001 - attack.t1134.003 logsource: product: windows category: process_creation detection: selection_img: - Image|endswith: \SharpImpersonation.exe - OriginalFileName: SharpImpersonation.exe selection_cli: - CommandLine|contains|all: - ' user:' - ' binary:' - CommandLine|contains|all: - ' user:' - ' shellcode:' - CommandLine|contains: - ' technique:CreateProcessAsUserW' - ' technique:ImpersonateLoggedOnuser' condition: 1 of selection_* falsepositives: - Unknown level: high
Sigma rule: Detects events with patterns found in commands used for reconnaissance on linux systems. Logsource: linux / process_creation. Rule: title: Linux Recon Indicators id: 0cf7a157-8879-41a2-8f55-388dd23746b7 status: test description: Detects events with patterns found in commands used for reconnaissance on linux systems references: - https://github.com/sleventyeleven/linuxprivchecker/blob/0d701080bbf92efd464e97d71a70f97c6f2cd658/linuxprivchecker.py author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems) date: 2022-06-20 tags: - attack.reconnaissance - attack.t1592.004 - attack.credential-access - attack.t1552.001 logsource: category: process_creation product: linux detection: selection: CommandLine|contains: - ' -name .htpasswd' - ' -perm -4000 ' condition: selection falsepositives: - Legitimate administration activities level: high
Sigma rule: Detects image load events with revoked certificates by code integrity.. Logsource: windows / codeintegrity-operational. Rule: title: CodeIntegrity - Revoked Image Loaded id: 881b7725-47cc-4055-8000-425823344c59 status: test description: Detects image load events with revoked certificates by code integrity. references: - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/application-security/application-control/windows-defender-application-control/operations/event-id-explanations - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/application-security/application-control/windows-defender-application-control/operations/event-tag-explanations - Internal Research author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) date: 2023-06-06 tags: - attack.privilege-escalation logsource: product: windows service: codeintegrity-operational detection: selection: EventID: - 3032 - 3035 condition: selection falsepositives: - Unlikely level: high