alirezaaminzadeh/cybersec-retrieval-benchmark huggingface dataset:
Sigma rule: Detects the deletion of tomcat WebServer logs which may indicate an attempt to destroy forensic evidence. Logsource: windows / file_delete. Rule: title: Tomcat WebServer Logs Deleted id: 270185ff-5f50-4d6d-a27f-24c3b8c9fef8 status: test description: Detects the deletion of tomcat WebServer logs which may indicate an attempt to destroy forensic evidence references: - Internal Research - https://linuxhint.com/view-tomcat-logs-windows/ author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) date: 2023-02-16 tags: - attack.stealth - attack.t1070 logsource: category: file_delete product: windows detection: selection: TargetFilename|contains|all: - \Tomcat - \logs\ TargetFilename|contains: - catalina. - _access_log. - localhost. condition: selection falsepositives: - During uninstallation of the tomcat server - During log rotation level: medium
Sigma rule: Detects the usage of the 'SeLoadDriverPrivilege' privilege. This privilege is required to load or unload a device driver. Logsource: windows / security. Rule: title: Potential Privileged System Service Operation - SeLoadDriverPrivilege id: f63508a0-c809-4435-b3be-ed819394d612 status: test description: 'Detects the usage of the ''SeLoadDriverPrivilege'' privilege. This privilege is required to load or unload a device driver. With this privilege, the user can dynamically load and unload device drivers or other code in to kernel mode. This user right does not apply to Plug and Play device drivers. If you exclude privileged users/admins and processes, which are allowed to do so, you are maybe left with bad programs trying to load malicious kernel drivers. This will detect Ghost-In-The-Logs (https://github.com/bats3c/Ghost-In-The-Logs) and the usage of Sysinternals and various other tools. So you have to work with a whitelist to find the bad stuff. ' references: - https://web.archive.org/web/20230331181619/https://blog.dylan.codes/evading-sysmon-and-windows-event-logging/ - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-10/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4673 author: xknow (@xknow_infosec), xorxes (@xor_xes) date: 2019-04-08 modified: 2026-06-29 tags: - attack.defense-impairment - attack.t1685 logsource: product: windows service: security detection: selection_1: EventID: 4673 PrivilegeList: SeLoadDriverPrivilege Service: '-' filter_main_exact: ProcessName: - C:\Windows\explorer.exe - C:\Windows\HelpPane.exe - C:\Windows\ImmersiveControlPanel\SystemSettings.exe - C:\Windows\System32\Dism.exe - C:\Windows\System32\fltMC.exe - C:\Windows\System32\mmc.exe - C:\Windows\System32\rundll32.exe - C:\Windows\System32\RuntimeBroker.exe - C:\Windows\System32\ShellHost.exe - C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe - C:\Windows\System32\SystemSettingsBroker.exe - C:\Windows\System32\wimserv.exe filter_optional_others: ProcessName|endswith: - \AppData\Local\Microsoft\Teams\current\Teams.exe - \Google\Chrome\Application\chrome.exe - \procexp.exe - \procexp64.exe - \procexp64a.exe - \procmon.exe - \procmon64.exe - \procmon64a.exe filter_main_startswith: ProcessName|startswith: C:\Program Files\WindowsApps\Microsoft filter_optional_dropbox: ProcessName|startswith: - C:\Program Files (x86)\Dropbox\ - C:\Program Files\Dropbox\ ProcessName|endswith: \Dropbox.exe condition: selection_1 and not 1 of filter_main_* and not 1 of filter_optional_* falsepositives: - Other legimate tools loading drivers. Including but not limited to, Sysinternals, CPU-Z, AVs etc. A baseline needs to be created according to the used
Sigma rule: Detects execution of the hacktool NetExec. NetExec (formerly CrackMapExec) is a widely used post-exploitation tool desig. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: HackTool - NetExec Execution id: 7638e5fe-600c-4289-a968-f49dd537ec7d status: experimental description: 'Detects execution of the hacktool NetExec. NetExec (formerly CrackMapExec) is a widely used post-exploitation tool designed for Active Directory penetration testing and network enumeration In enterprise environments, the use of NetExec is considered suspicious or potentially malicious because it enables attackers to enumerate hosts, exploit network services, and move laterally across systems. Threat actors and red teams commonly use NetExec to identify vulnerable systems, harvest credentials, and execute commands remotely. ' references: - https://thedfirreport.com/2025/12/17/cats-got-your-files-lynx-ransomware/ - https://github.com/Pennyw0rth/NetExec - https://www.netexec.wiki/ author: Chirag Damani date: 2026-03-29 tags: - attack.discovery - attack.t1018 - attack.lateral-movement - attack.t1021 logsource: category: process_creation product: windows detection: selection: Image|endswith: \nxc.exe CommandLine|contains: - ' ftp ' - ' ldap ' - ' mssql ' - ' nfs ' - ' rdp ' - ' smb ' - ' ssh ' - ' vnc ' - ' winrm ' - ' wmi ' condition: selection falsepositives: - Legitimate use of NetExec by security professionals or system administrators for network assessment and management. level: high regression_tests_path: regression_data/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_hktl_netexec/info.yml
Sigma rule: Detects failed Kerberos TGT issue operation. This can be a sign of manipulations of TGT messages by an attacker.. Logsource: windows / security. Rule: title: Kerberos Manipulation id: f7644214-0eb0-4ace-9455-331ec4c09253 status: test description: Detects failed Kerberos TGT issue operation. This can be a sign of manipulations of TGT messages by an attacker. references: - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-10/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4771 author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems) date: 2017-02-10 modified: 2024-01-16 tags: - attack.credential-access - attack.t1212 logsource: product: windows service: security detection: selection: EventID: - 675 - 4768 - 4769 - 4771 Status: - '0x9' - '0xA' - '0xB' - '0xF' - '0x10' - '0x11' - '0x13' - '0x14' - '0x1A' - '0x1F' - '0x21' - '0x22' - '0x23' - '0x24' - '0x26' - '0x27' - '0x28' - '0x29' - '0x2C' - '0x2D' - '0x2E' - '0x2F' - '0x31' - '0x32' - '0x3E' - '0x3F' - '0x40' - '0x41' - '0x43' - '0x44' condition: selection falsepositives: - Faulty legacy applications level: high
Sigma rule: Detects the use of systemctl mask to disable system power management targets such as suspend, hibernate, or hybrid sleep. Logsource: linux / process_creation. Rule: title: Mask System Power Settings Via Systemctl id: c172b7b5-f3a1-4af2-90b7-822c63df86cb status: experimental description: 'Detects the use of systemctl mask to disable system power management targets such as suspend, hibernate, or hybrid sleep. Adversaries may mask these targets to prevent a system from entering sleep or shutdown states, ensuring their malicious processes remain active and uninterrupted. This behavior can be associated with persistence or defense evasion, as it impairs normal system power operations to maintain long-term access or avoid termination of malicious activity. ' author: Milad Cheraghi, Nasreddine Bencherchali date: 2025-10-17 references: - https://www.man7.org/linux/man-pages/man1/systemctl.1.html - https://linux-audit.com/systemd/faq/what-is-the-difference-between-systemctl-disable-and-systemctl-mask/ tags: - attack.persistence - attack.impact - attack.t1653 logsource: category: process_creation product: linux detection: selection_systemctl: Image|endswith: /systemctl CommandLine|contains: ' mask' selection_power_options: CommandLine|contains: - suspend.target - hibernate.target - hybrid-sleep.target condition: all of selection_* falsepositives: - Unlikely level: high
Sigma rule: Detects Windows error reporting events where the process that crashed is LSASS (Local Security Authority Subsystem Servi. Logsource: windows / application. Rule: title: LSASS Process Crashed - Application id: a18e0862-127b-43ca-be12-1a542c75c7c5 status: experimental description: 'Detects Windows error reporting events where the process that crashed is LSASS (Local Security Authority Subsystem Service). This could be the cause of a provoked crash by techniques such as Lsass-Shtinkering to dump credentials. ' references: - https://github.com/deepinstinct/Lsass-Shtinkering - https://media.defcon.org/DEF%20CON%2030/DEF%20CON%2030%20presentations/Asaf%20Gilboa%20-%20LSASS%20Shtinkering%20Abusing%20Windows%20Error%20Reporting%20to%20Dump%20LSASS.pdf - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/openspecs/windows_protocols/ms-erref/596a1078-e883-4972-9bbc-49e60bebca55 author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) date: 2022-12-07 modified: 2025-12-03 tags: - attack.credential-access - attack.t1003.001 logsource: product: windows service: application detection: selection: Provider_Name: Application Error EventID: 1000 AppName: lsass.exe ExceptionCode: c0000001 condition: selection falsepositives: - Rare legitimate crashing of the lsass process level: high
Sigma rule: Detects SyncAppvPublishingServer process execution which usually utilized by adversaries to bypass PowerShell execution. Logsource: windows / ps_module. Rule: title: SyncAppvPublishingServer Bypass Powershell Restriction - PS Module id: fe5ce7eb-dad8-467c-84a9-31ec23bd644a related: - id: fde7929d-8beb-4a4c-b922-be9974671667 type: derived - id: 9f7aa113-9da6-4a8d-907c-5f1a4b908299 type: derived status: test description: Detects SyncAppvPublishingServer process execution which usually utilized by adversaries to bypass PowerShell execution restrictions. references: - https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Syncappvpublishingserver/ author: Ensar Şamil, @sblmsrsn, OSCD Community date: 2020-10-05 modified: 2022-12-02 tags: - attack.stealth - attack.t1218 logsource: product: windows category: ps_module definition: 0ad03ef1-f21b-4a79-8ce8-e6900c54b65b detection: selection: ContextInfo|contains: SyncAppvPublishingServer.exe condition: selection falsepositives: - App-V clients level: medium
Sigma rule: Detects the use of HandleKatz, a tool that demonstrates the usage of cloned handles to Lsass in order to create an obfus. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: HackTool - HandleKatz LSASS Dumper Execution id: ca621ba5-54ab-4035-9942-d378e6fcde3c status: test description: Detects the use of HandleKatz, a tool that demonstrates the usage of cloned handles to Lsass in order to create an obfuscated memory dump of the same references: - https://github.com/codewhitesec/HandleKatz author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems) date: 2022-08-18 modified: 2024-11-23 tags: - attack.credential-access - attack.t1003.001 logsource: category: process_creation product: windows detection: selection_loader_img: Image|endswith: \loader.exe CommandLine|contains: '--pid:' selection_loader_imphash: Hashes|contains: - IMPHASH=38D9E015591BBFD4929E0D0F47FA0055 - IMPHASH=0E2216679CA6E1094D63322E3412D650 selection_flags: CommandLine|contains|all: - '--pid:' - '--outfile:' CommandLine|contains: - .dmp - lsass - .obf - dump condition: 1 of selection_* falsepositives: - Unknown level: high
Sigma rule: Detects the execution of WebBrowserPassView.exe. A password recovery tool that reveals the passwords stored by the follo. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: PUA - WebBrowserPassView Execution id: d0dae994-26c6-4d2d-83b5-b3c8b79ae513 status: test description: Detects the execution of WebBrowserPassView.exe. A password recovery tool that reveals the passwords stored by the following Web browsers, Internet Explorer (Version 4.0 - 11.0), Mozilla Firefox (All Versions), Google Chrome, Safari, and Opera references: - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/40b77d63808dd4f4eafb83949805636735a1fd15/atomics/T1555.003/T1555.003.md author: frack113 date: 2022-08-20 modified: 2023-02-14 tags: - attack.credential-access - attack.t1555.003 logsource: category: process_creation product: windows detection: selection: - Description: Web Browser Password Viewer - Image|endswith: \WebBrowserPassView.exe condition: selection falsepositives: - Legitimate use level: medium
Sigma rule: Detects usage of system utilities to discover system network connections. Logsource: macos / process_creation. Rule: title: System Network Connections Discovery - MacOs id: 9a7a0393-2144-4626-9bf1-7c2f5a7321db status: test description: Detects usage of system utilities to discover system network connections references: - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1049/T1049.md author: Daniil Yugoslavskiy, oscd.community date: 2020-10-19 modified: 2022-12-28 tags: - attack.discovery - attack.t1049 logsource: category: process_creation product: macos detection: selection: Image|endswith: - /who - /w - /last - /lsof - /netstat condition: selection falsepositives: - Legitimate activities level: informational
Sigma rule: Detects alternate PowerShell hosts potentially bypassing detections looking for powershell.exe. Logsource: windows / pipe_created. Rule: title: Alternate PowerShell Hosts Pipe id: 58cb02d5-78ce-4692-b3e1-dce850aae41a related: - id: ac7102b4-9e1e-4802-9b4f-17c5524c015c type: derived status: test description: Detects alternate PowerShell hosts potentially bypassing detections looking for powershell.exe references: - https://threathunterplaybook.com/hunts/windows/190610-PwshAlternateHosts/notebook.html - https://threathunterplaybook.com/hunts/windows/190410-LocalPwshExecution/notebook.html author: Roberto Rodriguez @Cyb3rWard0g, Tim Shelton date: 2019-09-12 modified: 2025-10-07 tags: - attack.execution - attack.t1059.001 logsource: product: windows category: pipe_created definition: Note that you have to configure logging for Named Pipe Events in Sysmon config (Event ID 17 and Event ID 18). The basic configuration is in popular sysmon configuration (https://github.com/SwiftOnSecurity/sysmon-config), but it is worth verifying. You can also use other repo, e.g. https://github.com/Neo23x0/sysmon-config, https://github.com/olafhartong/sysmon-modular. How to test detection? You can check powershell script from this site https://svch0st.medium.com/guide-to-named-pipes-and-hunting-for-cobalt-strike-pipes-dc46b2c5f575 detection: selection: PipeName|startswith: \PSHost filter_main_generic: - Image|contains: - :\Program Files\PowerShell\7-preview\pwsh.exe - :\Program Files\PowerShell\7\pwsh.exe - :\Windows\system32\dsac.exe - :\Windows\system32\inetsrv\w3wp.exe - :\Windows\System32\sdiagnhost.exe - :\Windows\system32\ServerManager.exe - :\Windows\system32\wbem\wmiprvse.exe - :\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell_ise.exe - :\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe - :\Windows\System32\wsmprovhost.exe - :\Windows\SysWOW64\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell_ise.exe - :\Windows\SysWOW64\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe - Image|contains|all: - C:\Program Files\WindowsApps\Microsoft.PowerShellPreview - \pwsh.exe - Image|contains|all: - \AppData\Local\Microsoft\WindowsApps\Microsoft.PowerShellPreview - \pwsh.exe filter_optional_sqlserver: Image|startswith: - C:\Program Files (x86)\ - C:\Program Files\ Image|contains: \Microsoft SQL Server\ Image|endswith: \Tools\Binn\SQLPS.exe filter_optional_azure_connected_machine_agent: Image|startswith: C:\Program Files\AzureConnectedMachineAgent\GCArcService Image|endswith: \GC\gc_worker.exe filter_optional_citrix: Image|startswith: C:\Program Files\Citrix\ filter_optional_exchange: Image|startswith: C:\Program Files\Microsoft\Exchange Se
Sigma rule: Detects the execution of whoami that has been renamed to a different name to avoid detection. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: Renamed Whoami Execution id: f1086bf7-a0c4-4a37-9102-01e573caf4a0 status: test description: Detects the execution of whoami that has been renamed to a different name to avoid detection references: - https://brica.de/alerts/alert/public/1247926/agent-tesla-keylogger-delivered-inside-a-power-iso-daa-archive/ - https://app.any.run/tasks/7eaba74e-c1ea-400f-9c17-5e30eee89906/ author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems) date: 2021-08-12 modified: 2022-10-09 tags: - attack.discovery - attack.t1033 - car.2016-03-001 logsource: category: process_creation product: windows detection: selection: OriginalFileName: whoami.exe filter: Image|endswith: \whoami.exe condition: selection and not filter falsepositives: - Unknown level: critical
Sigma rule: Detects the execution of the builtin "copy" command that targets a shadow copy (sometimes used to copy registry hives th. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: Copy From VolumeShadowCopy Via Cmd.EXE id: c73124a7-3e89-44a3-bdc1-25fe4df754b1 status: test description: Detects the execution of the builtin "copy" command that targets a shadow copy (sometimes used to copy registry hives that are in use) references: - https://twitter.com/vxunderground/status/1423336151860002816?s=20 - https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/03e9b8c2e86d6db450e5eceec057d7e369ee2389b9daecaf06331a95410aa5f8/detection - https://pentestlab.blog/2018/07/04/dumping-domain-password-hashes/ author: Max Altgelt (Nextron Systems), Tobias Michalski (Nextron Systems) date: 2021-08-09 modified: 2023-03-07 tags: - attack.impact - attack.t1490 logsource: category: process_creation product: windows detection: selection: CommandLine|contains|all: - 'copy ' - \\\\\?\\GLOBALROOT\\Device\\HarddiskVolumeShadowCopy condition: selection falsepositives: - Backup scenarios using the commandline level: high
Sigma rule: Detects WebDav DownloadCradle. Logsource: proxy. Rule: title: Windows WebDAV User Agent id: e09aed7a-09e0-4c9a-90dd-f0d52507347e status: test description: Detects WebDav DownloadCradle references: - https://mgreen27.github.io/posts/2018/04/02/DownloadCradle.html author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems) date: 2018-04-06 modified: 2021-11-27 tags: - attack.command-and-control - attack.t1071.001 logsource: category: proxy detection: selection: c-useragent|startswith: Microsoft-WebDAV-MiniRedir/ cs-method: GET condition: selection falsepositives: - Administrative scripts that download files from the Internet - Administrative scripts that retrieve certain website contents - Legitimate WebDAV administration level: high
Sigma rule: Detects creation of "UserInitMprLogonScript" registry value which can be used as a persistence method by malicious actor. Logsource: windows / registry_set. Rule: title: Potential Persistence Via Logon Scripts - Registry id: 9ace0707-b560-49b8-b6ca-5148b42f39fb status: test description: Detects creation of "UserInitMprLogonScript" registry value which can be used as a persistence method by malicious actors references: - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1037.001/T1037.001.md author: Tom Ueltschi (@c_APT_ure) date: 2019-01-12 modified: 2025-10-26 tags: - attack.privilege-escalation - attack.t1037.001 - attack.persistence - attack.lateral-movement logsource: category: registry_set product: windows detection: selection: TargetObject|contains: UserInitMprLogonScript condition: selection falsepositives: - Investigate the contents of the "UserInitMprLogonScript" value to determine of the added script is legitimate level: medium regression_tests_path: regression_data/rules/windows/registry/registry_set/registry_set_persistence_logon_scripts_userinitmprlogonscript/info.yml simulation: - type: atomic-red-team name: Logon Scripts technique: T1037.001 atomic_guid: d6042746-07d4-4c92-9ad8-e644c114a231
Sigma rule: Detects PowerShell scripts set ACL to of a file or a folder. Logsource: windows / ps_script. Rule: title: PowerShell Script Change Permission Via Set-Acl - PsScript id: cae80281-ef23-44c5-873b-fd48d2666f49 related: - id: 0944e002-e3f6-4eb5-bf69-3a3067b53d73 type: derived - id: bdeb2cff-af74-4094-8426-724dc937f20a type: derived - id: 3bf1d859-3a7e-44cb-8809-a99e066d3478 type: derived status: test description: Detects PowerShell scripts set ACL to of a file or a folder references: - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/74438b0237d141ee9c99747976447dc884cb1a39/atomics/T1505.005/T1505.005.md author: frack113, Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) date: 2023-07-18 tags: - attack.defense-impairment - attack.t1222 logsource: product: windows category: ps_script definition: bade5735-5ab0-4aa7-a642-a11be0e40872 detection: selection: ScriptBlockText|contains|all: - 'Set-Acl ' - '-AclObject ' - '-Path ' condition: selection falsepositives: - Unknown level: low
Sigma rule: Detects attempts to collect image data stored in the clipboard from users with the usage of xclip tool. Xclip has to be. Logsource: linux / auditd. Rule: title: Clipboard Collection of Image Data with Xclip Tool id: f200dc3f-b219-425d-a17e-c38467364816 status: test description: 'Detects attempts to collect image data stored in the clipboard from users with the usage of xclip tool. Xclip has to be installed. Highly recommended using rule on servers, due to high usage of clipboard utilities on user workstations. ' references: - https://linux.die.net/man/1/xclip author: Pawel Mazur date: 2021-10-01 modified: 2022-10-09 tags: - attack.collection - attack.t1115 logsource: product: linux service: auditd detection: selection: type: EXECVE a0: xclip a1: - -selection - -sel a2: - clipboard - clip a3: -t a4|startswith: image/ a5: -o condition: selection falsepositives: - Legitimate usage of xclip tools level: low
Sigma rule: Detects the execution of "ldifde.exe" in order to export organizational Active Directory structure.. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: Active Directory Structure Export Via Ldifde.EXE id: 4f7a6757-ff79-46db-9687-66501a02d9ec status: test description: Detects the execution of "ldifde.exe" in order to export organizational Active Directory structure. references: - https://businessinsights.bitdefender.com/deep-dive-into-a-backdoordiplomacy-attack-a-study-of-an-attackers-toolkit - https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/5743766-Global-Threat-Report-2019.html - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-server-2012-r2-and-2012/cc731033(v=ws.11) author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) date: 2023-03-14 tags: - attack.exfiltration logsource: category: process_creation product: windows detection: selection_ldif: - Image|endswith: \ldifde.exe - OriginalFileName: ldifde.exe selection_cmd: CommandLine|contains: -f filter_import: CommandLine|contains: ' -i' condition: all of selection_* and not 1 of filter_* falsepositives: - Unknown level: medium