alirezaaminzadeh/cybersec-retrieval-benchmark huggingface dataset:
Sigma rule: Dynamic-link libraries (DLLs) that are specified in the AppCertDLLs value in the Registry key can be abused to obtain pe. Logsource: windows / registry_event. Rule: title: New DLL Added to AppCertDlls Registry Key id: 6aa1d992-5925-4e9f-a49b-845e51d1de01 status: test description: 'Dynamic-link libraries (DLLs) that are specified in the AppCertDLLs value in the Registry key can be abused to obtain persistence and privilege escalation by causing a malicious DLL to be loaded and run in the context of separate processes on the computer. ' references: - http://www.hexacorn.com/blog/2013/01/19/beyond-good-ol-run-key-part-3/ - https://eqllib.readthedocs.io/en/latest/analytics/14f90406-10a0-4d36-a672-31cabe149f2f.html author: Ilyas Ochkov, oscd.community date: 2019-10-25 modified: 2021-11-27 tags: - attack.privilege-escalation - attack.persistence - attack.t1546.009 logsource: category: registry_event product: windows detection: selection: - TargetObject: HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Session Manager\AppCertDlls - NewName: HKLM\SYSTEM\CurentControlSet\Control\Session Manager\AppCertDlls condition: selection falsepositives: - Unknown level: medium
Sigma rule: Detects changes to Internet Explorer's (IE / Windows Internet properties) ZoneMap configuration of the "HTTP" and "HTTPS. Logsource: windows / registry_set. Rule: title: IE ZoneMap Setting Downgraded To MyComputer Zone For HTTP Protocols id: 3fd4c8d7-8362-4557-a8e6-83b29cc0d724 related: - id: 10344bb3-7f65-46c2-b915-2d00d47be5b0 type: similar status: test description: 'Detects changes to Internet Explorer''s (IE / Windows Internet properties) ZoneMap configuration of the "HTTP" and "HTTPS" protocols to point to the "My Computer" zone. This allows downloaded files from the Internet to be granted the same level of trust as files stored locally. ' references: - https://twitter.com/M_haggis/status/1699056847154725107 - https://twitter.com/JAMESWT_MHT/status/1699042827261391247 - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/troubleshoot/developer/browsers/security-privacy/ie-security-zones-registry-entries - https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/339ff720c74dc44265b917b6d3e3ba0411d61f3cd3c328e9a2bae81592c8a6e5/content author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems), Michael Haag (idea) date: 2023-09-05 tags: - attack.stealth logsource: product: windows category: registry_set detection: selection: TargetObject|contains: \Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Internet Settings\ZoneMap\ProtocolDefaults TargetObject|endswith: - \http - \https Details|contains: DWORD (0x00000000) condition: selection falsepositives: - Unknown level: high
Sigma rule: Detects a Windows Filtering Platform (WFP) blocked connection event involving common Endpoint Detection and Response (ED. Logsource: windows / security. Rule: title: Windows Filtering Platform Blocked Connection From EDR Agent Binary id: bacf58c6-e199-4040-a94f-95dea0f1e45a status: test description: 'Detects a Windows Filtering Platform (WFP) blocked connection event involving common Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents. Adversaries may use WFP filters to prevent Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents from reporting security events. ' references: - https://github.com/netero1010/EDRSilencer - https://github.com/amjcyber/EDRNoiseMaker - https://ghoulsec.medium.com/misc-series-4-forensics-on-edrsilencer-events-428b20b3f983 author: '@gott_cyber' date: 2024-01-08 tags: - attack.defense-impairment - attack.t1685 logsource: product: windows service: security definition: 'Requirements: Audit Filtering Platform Connection needs to be enabled' detection: selection: EventID: 5157 Application|endswith: - \AmSvc.exe - \cb.exe - \CETASvc.exe - \CNTAoSMgr.exe - \CrAmTray.exe - \CrsSvc.exe - \CSFalconContainer.exe - \CSFalconService.exe - \CybereasonAV.exe - \CylanceSvc.exe - \cyserver.exe - \CyveraService.exe - \CyvrFsFlt.exe - \EIConnector.exe - \elastic-agent.exe - \elastic-endpoint.exe - \EndpointBasecamp.exe - \ExecutionPreventionSvc.exe - \filebeat.exe - \fortiedr.exe - \hmpalert.exe - \hurukai.exe - \LogProcessorService.exe - \mcsagent.exe - \mcsclient.exe - \MsMpEng.exe - \MsSense.exe - \Ntrtscan.exe - \PccNTMon.exe - \QualysAgent.exe - \RepMgr.exe - \RepUtils.exe - \RepUx.exe - \RepWAV.exe - \RepWSC.exe - \sedservice.exe - \SenseCncProxy.exe - \SenseIR.exe - \SenseNdr.exe - \SenseSampleUploader.exe - \SentinelAgent.exe - \SentinelAgentWorker.exe - \SentinelBrowserNativeHost.exe - \SentinelHelperService.exe - \SentinelServiceHost.exe - \SentinelStaticEngine.exe - \SentinelStaticEngineScanner.exe - \sfc.exe - \sophos ui.exe - \sophosfilescanner.exe - \sophosfs.exe - \sophoshealth.exe - \sophosips.exe - \sophosLivequeryservice.exe - \sophosnetfilter.exe - \sophosntpservice.exe - \sophososquery.exe - \sspservice.exe - \TaniumClient.exe - \TaniumCX.exe - \TaniumDetectEngine.exe - \TMBMSRV.exe - \TmCCSF.exe - \TmListen.exe - \TmWSCSvc.exe - \Traps.exe - \winlogbeat.exe - \WSCommunicator.exe - \xagt.exe condition: selection falsepositives: - Unlikely level: high
Sigma rule: Detects the addition of a new network route to a route table in AWS.. Logsource: aws / cloudtrail. Rule: title: New Network Route Added id: c803b2ce-c4a2-4836-beae-b112010390b1 status: test description: 'Detects the addition of a new network route to a route table in AWS. ' references: - https://www.gorillastack.com/blog/real-time-events/important-aws-cloudtrail-security-events-tracking/ author: jamesc-grafana date: 2024-07-11 tags: - attack.defense-impairment - attack.t1686.001 logsource: product: aws service: cloudtrail detection: selection: eventSource: ec2.amazonaws.com eventName: CreateRoute condition: selection falsepositives: - New VPC Creation requiring setup of a new route table - New subnets added requiring routing setup level: medium
Sigma rule: Detects adversary creating screen capture of a full with xwd. Highly recommended using rule on servers, due high usage o. Logsource: linux / auditd. Rule: title: Screen Capture with Xwd id: e2f17c5d-b02a-442b-9052-6eb89c9fec9c status: test description: Detects adversary creating screen capture of a full with xwd. Highly recommended using rule on servers, due high usage of screenshot utilities on user workstations references: - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1113/T1113.md#atomic-test-3---x-windows-capture - https://linux.die.net/man/1/xwd author: Pawel Mazur date: 2021-09-13 modified: 2022-12-18 tags: - attack.collection - attack.t1113 logsource: product: linux service: auditd detection: selection: type: EXECVE a0: xwd xwd_root_window: a1: -root a2: -out a3|endswith: .xwd xwd_no_root_window: a1: -out a2|endswith: .xwd condition: selection and 1 of xwd_* falsepositives: - Legitimate use of screenshot utility level: low
Sigma rule: Detects the process injection of a LittleCorporal generated Maldoc.. Logsource: windows / process_access. Rule: title: HackTool - LittleCorporal Generated Maldoc Injection id: 7bdde3bf-2a42-4c39-aa31-a92b3e17afac status: test description: Detects the process injection of a LittleCorporal generated Maldoc. references: - https://github.com/connormcgarr/LittleCorporal author: Christian Burkard (Nextron Systems) date: 2021-08-09 modified: 2023-11-28 tags: - attack.execution - attack.privilege-escalation - attack.stealth - attack.t1204.002 - attack.t1055.003 logsource: category: process_access product: windows detection: selection: SourceImage|endswith: \winword.exe CallTrace|contains|all: - :\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework64\v2. - UNKNOWN condition: selection falsepositives: - Unknown level: high
Sigma rule: Detects a non-browser process communicating with the Notion API. This could indicate potential use of a covert C2 channe. Logsource: windows / network_connection. Rule: title: Potentially Suspicious Network Connection To Notion API id: 7e9cf7b6-e827-11ed-a05b-15959c120003 status: test description: Detects a non-browser process communicating with the Notion API. This could indicate potential use of a covert C2 channel such as "OffensiveNotion C2" references: - https://github.com/mttaggart/OffensiveNotion - https://medium.com/@huskyhacks.mk/we-put-a-c2-in-your-notetaking-app-offensivenotion-3e933bace332 author: Gavin Knapp date: 2023-05-03 tags: - attack.command-and-control - attack.t1102 logsource: product: windows category: network_connection detection: selection: DestinationHostname|contains: api.notion.com filter_main_notion: Image|endswith: \AppData\Local\Programs\Notion\Notion.exe filter_main_brave: Image|endswith: \brave.exe filter_main_chrome: Image: - C:\Program Files\Google\Chrome\Application\chrome.exe - C:\Program Files (x86)\Google\Chrome\Application\chrome.exe filter_main_firefox: Image: - C:\Program Files\Mozilla Firefox\firefox.exe - C:\Program Files (x86)\Mozilla Firefox\firefox.exe filter_main_ie: Image: - C:\Program Files (x86)\Internet Explorer\iexplore.exe - C:\Program Files\Internet Explorer\iexplore.exe filter_main_maxthon: Image|endswith: \maxthon.exe filter_main_edge_1: - Image|startswith: C:\Program Files (x86)\Microsoft\EdgeWebView\Application\ - Image|endswith: \WindowsApps\MicrosoftEdge.exe - Image: - C:\Program Files (x86)\Microsoft\Edge\Application\msedge.exe - C:\Program Files\Microsoft\Edge\Application\msedge.exe filter_main_edge_2: Image|startswith: - C:\Program Files (x86)\Microsoft\EdgeCore\ - C:\Program Files\Microsoft\EdgeCore\ Image|endswith: - \msedge.exe - \msedgewebview2.exe filter_main_opera: Image|endswith: \opera.exe filter_main_safari: Image|endswith: \safari.exe filter_main_seamonkey: Image|endswith: \seamonkey.exe filter_main_vivaldi: Image|endswith: \vivaldi.exe filter_main_whale: Image|endswith: \whale.exe condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_* falsepositives: - Legitimate applications communicating with the "api.notion.com" endpoint that are not already in the exclusion list. The desktop and browser applications do not appear to be using the API by default unless integrations are configured. level: low
Sigma rule: Detects the execution of REGSVR32.exe with DLL files masquerading as other files. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: Regsvr32 DLL Execution With Suspicious File Extension id: 089fc3d2-71e8-4763-a8a5-c97fbb0a403e related: - id: 8e2b24c9-4add-46a0-b4bb-0057b4e6187d type: obsolete status: test description: Detects the execution of REGSVR32.exe with DLL files masquerading as other files references: - https://thedfirreport.com/2021/11/29/continuing-the-bazar-ransomware-story/ - https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2021/10/threat-hunting-in-large-datasets-by.html - https://guides.lib.umich.edu/c.php?g=282942&p=1885348 - https://harfanglab.io/insidethelab/uac-0057-pressure-ukraine-poland/ author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), frack113 date: 2021-11-29 modified: 2025-08-27 tags: - attack.stealth - attack.t1218.010 logsource: category: process_creation product: windows detection: selection_img: - Image|endswith: \regsvr32.exe - OriginalFileName: REGSVR32.EXE selection_cli: CommandLine|endswith: - .bin - .bmp - .cr2 - .dat - .eps - .gif - .ico - .jpeg - .jpg - .log - .nef - .orf - .png - .raw - .rtf - .sr2 - .temp - .tif - .tiff - .tmp - .txt condition: all of selection_* falsepositives: - Unlikely level: high
Sigma rule: Detects suspicious Speech Runtime Binary Execution by monitoring its child processes. Child processes spawned by SpeechR. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: Suspicious Speech Runtime Binary Child Process id: 78f10490-f2f4-4d19-a75b-4e0683bf3b8d status: experimental description: 'Detects suspicious Speech Runtime Binary Execution by monitoring its child processes. Child processes spawned by SpeechRuntime.exe could indicate an attempt for lateral movement via COM & DCOM hijacking. ' references: - https://github.com/rtecCyberSec/SpeechRuntimeMove author: andrewdanis date: 2025-10-23 logsource: category: process_creation product: windows tags: - attack.lateral-movement - attack.stealth - attack.t1021.003 - attack.t1218 detection: selection: ParentImage|endswith: \SpeechRuntime.exe condition: selection falsepositives: - Unlikely. level: high
Sigma rule: Detects a non-browser process interacting with the Google API which could indicate the use of a covert C2 such as Google. Logsource: windows / network_connection. Rule: title: Suspicious Non-Browser Network Communication With Google API id: 7e9cf7b6-e827-11ed-a05b-0242ac120003 status: experimental description: 'Detects a non-browser process interacting with the Google API which could indicate the use of a covert C2 such as Google Sheet C2 (GC2-sheet) ' references: - https://github.com/looCiprian/GC2-sheet - https://youtu.be/n2dFlSaBBKo - https://services.google.com/fh/files/blogs/gcat_threathorizons_full_apr2023.pdf - https://www.tanium.com/blog/apt41-deploys-google-gc2-for-attacks-cyber-threat-intelligence-roundup/ - https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/hackers-abuse-google-command-and-control-red-team-tool-in-attacks/ author: Gavin Knapp date: 2023-05-01 modified: 2025-02-22 tags: - attack.command-and-control - attack.t1102 logsource: product: windows category: network_connection detection: selection: DestinationHostname|contains: - drive.googleapis.com - oauth2.googleapis.com - sheets.googleapis.com - www.googleapis.com filter_optional_brave: Image|endswith: \brave.exe filter_optional_chrome: Image|endswith: - :\Program Files\Google\Chrome\Application\chrome.exe - :\Program Files (x86)\Google\Chrome\Application\chrome.exe filter_optional_google_drive: Image|contains: :\Program Files\Google\Drive File Stream\ Image|endswith: \GoogleDriveFS.exe filter_optional_firefox: Image|endswith: - :\Program Files\Mozilla Firefox\firefox.exe - :\Program Files (x86)\Mozilla Firefox\firefox.exe filter_optional_ie: Image|endswith: - :\Program Files (x86)\Internet Explorer\iexplore.exe - :\Program Files\Internet Explorer\iexplore.exe filter_optional_maxthon: Image|endswith: \maxthon.exe filter_optional_edge_1: - Image|contains: :\Program Files (x86)\Microsoft\EdgeWebView\Application\ - Image|endswith: - :\Program Files (x86)\Microsoft\Edge\Application\msedge.exe - :\Program Files\Microsoft\Edge\Application\msedge.exe - \WindowsApps\MicrosoftEdge.exe filter_optional_edge_2: Image|contains: - :\Program Files (x86)\Microsoft\EdgeCore\ - :\Program Files\Microsoft\EdgeCore\ Image|endswith: - \msedge.exe - \msedgewebview2.exe filter_optional_opera: Image|endswith: \opera.exe filter_optional_safari: Image|endswith: \safari.exe filter_optional_seamonkey: Image|endswith: \seamonkey.exe filter_optional_vivaldi: Image|endswith: \vivaldi.exe filter_optional_whale: Image|endswith: \whale.exe filter_optional_googleupdate: Image|endswith: \GoogleUpdate.exe filter_optional_outlook_exe: Image|endswith: \outlook.exe filter_main_null: Image: nul
Sigma rule: Detects the deletion of AMSI provider registry key entries in HKLM\Software\Microsoft\AMSI. This technique could be used. Logsource: windows / registry_delete. Rule: title: Removal Of AMSI Provider Registry Keys id: 41d1058a-aea7-4952-9293-29eaaf516465 status: test description: Detects the deletion of AMSI provider registry key entries in HKLM\Software\Microsoft\AMSI. This technique could be used by an attacker in order to disable AMSI inspection. references: - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1562.001/T1562.001.md - https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/2020/Mar/45 author: frack113 date: 2021-06-07 modified: 2025-10-07 tags: - attack.defense-impairment - attack.t1685 logsource: product: windows category: registry_delete detection: selection: TargetObject|endswith: - '{2781761E-28E0-4109-99FE-B9D127C57AFE}' - '{A7C452EF-8E9F-42EB-9F2B-245613CA0DC9}' filter_main_defender: Image|startswith: - C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\Windows Defender\Platform\ - C:\Program Files\Windows Defender\ - C:\Program Files (x86)\Windows Defender\ Image|endswith: \MsMpEng.exe condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_* falsepositives: - Unlikely level: high regression_tests_path: regression_data/rules/windows/registry/registry_delete/registry_delete_removal_amsi_registry_key/info.yml simulation: - type: atomic-red-team name: AMSI Bypass - Remove AMSI Provider Reg Key technique: T1562.001 atomic_guid: 13f09b91-c953-438e-845b-b585e51cac9b
Sigma rule: Detects when a Microsoft Cloud App Security reported when users were active from an IP address that has been identified. Logsource: m365 / threat_management. Rule: title: Activity from Anonymous IP Addresses id: d8b0a4fe-07a8-41be-bd39-b14afa025d95 status: test description: Detects when a Microsoft Cloud App Security reported when users were active from an IP address that has been identified as an anonymous proxy IP address. references: - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/defender-cloud-apps/anomaly-detection-policy - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/defender-cloud-apps/policy-template-reference author: Austin Songer @austinsonger date: 2021-08-23 modified: 2022-10-09 tags: - attack.command-and-control - attack.t1573 logsource: service: threat_management product: m365 detection: selection: eventSource: SecurityComplianceCenter eventName: Activity from anonymous IP addresses status: success condition: selection falsepositives: - User using a VPN or Proxy level: medium
Sigma rule: An adversary might use WMI to check if a certain remote service is running on a remote device. When the test completes,. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: Service Reconnaissance Via Wmic.EXE id: 76f55eaa-d27f-4213-9d45-7b0e4b60bbae related: - id: 68bcd73b-37ef-49cb-95fc-edc809730be6 type: similar status: test description: 'An adversary might use WMI to check if a certain remote service is running on a remote device. When the test completes, a service information will be displayed on the screen if it exists. A common feedback message is that "No instance(s) Available" if the service queried is not running. A common error message is "Node - (provided IP or default) ERROR Description =The RPC server is unavailable" if the provided remote host is unreachable ' references: - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1047/T1047.md - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/wmic - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/cimwin32prov/win32-service author: frack113, Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) date: 2023-02-14 modified: 2026-01-07 tags: - attack.execution - attack.t1047 logsource: category: process_creation product: windows detection: selection_img: - Image|endswith: \WMIC.exe - OriginalFileName: wmic.exe selection_cli: CommandLine|contains: service filter_main_manipulation: CommandLine|contains: - stopservice - startservice filter_main_win32_methods: CommandLine|contains: - Change - Create - Delete - PauseService - ResumeService - SetSecurityDescriptor - StartService - StopService - UserControlService condition: all of selection_* and not 1 of filter_main_* falsepositives: - Unknown level: medium simulation: - type: atomic-red-team name: WMI Reconnaissance List Remote Services technique: T1047 atomic_guid: 0fd48ef7-d890-4e93-a533-f7dedd5191d3 regression_tests_path: regression_data/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_wmic_recon_service/info.yml
Sigma rule: Detects DCShadow via create new SPN. Logsource: windows / security. Rule: title: Possible DC Shadow Attack id: 32e19d25-4aed-4860-a55a-be99cb0bf7ed related: - id: 611eab06-a145-4dfa-a295-3ccc5c20f59a type: derived status: test description: Detects DCShadow via create new SPN references: - https://twitter.com/gentilkiwi/status/1003236624925413376 - https://gist.github.com/gentilkiwi/dcc132457408cf11ad2061340dcb53c2 - https://web.archive.org/web/20180203014709/https://blog.alsid.eu/dcshadow-explained-4510f52fc19d?gi=c426ac876c48 author: Ilyas Ochkov, oscd.community, Chakib Gzenayi (@Chak092), Hosni Mribah date: 2019-10-25 modified: 2022-10-17 tags: - attack.credential-access - attack.defense-impairment - attack.t1207 logsource: product: windows service: security definition: The "Audit Directory Service Changes" logging policy must be configured in order to receive events. Audit events are generated only for objects with configured system access control lists (SACLs). Audit events are generated only for objects with configured system access control lists (SACLs) and only when accessed in a manner that matches their SACL settings. This policy covers the following events ids - 5136, 5137, 5138, 5139, 5141. Note that the default policy does not cover User objects. For that a custom AuditRule need to be setup (See https://github.com/OTRF/Set-AuditRule) detection: selection1: EventID: 4742 ServicePrincipalNames|contains: GC/ selection2: EventID: 5136 AttributeLDAPDisplayName: servicePrincipalName AttributeValue|startswith: GC/ condition: 1 of selection* falsepositives: - Valid on domain controllers; exclude known DCs level: medium
Sigma rule: An adversary may use legitimate desktop support and remote access software, such as Team Viewer, Go2Assist, LogMein, Amm. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: Remote Access Tool - UltraViewer Execution id: 88656cec-6c3b-487c-82c0-f73ebb805503 status: test description: 'An adversary may use legitimate desktop support and remote access software, such as Team Viewer, Go2Assist, LogMein, AmmyyAdmin, etc, to establish an interactive command and control channel to target systems within networks. These services are commonly used as legitimate technical support software, and may be allowed by application control within a target environment. Remote access tools like VNC, Ammyy, and Teamviewer are used frequently when compared with other legitimate software commonly used by adversaries. (Citation: Symantec Living off the Land) ' references: - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1219/T1219.md author: frack113 date: 2022-09-25 modified: 2024-03-14 tags: - attack.command-and-control - attack.t1219.002 logsource: category: process_creation product: windows detection: selection: - Product: UltraViewer - Company: DucFabulous Co,ltd - OriginalFileName: UltraViewer_Desktop.exe condition: selection falsepositives: - Legitimate use level: medium
Sigma rule: Detects the creation of a new service using the "sc.exe" utility.. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: New Service Creation Using Sc.EXE id: 85ff530b-261d-48c6-a441-facaa2e81e48 related: - id: c02e96b7-c63a-4c47-bd83-4a9f74afcfb2 type: similar status: test description: Detects the creation of a new service using the "sc.exe" utility. references: - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1543.003/T1543.003.md author: Timur Zinniatullin, Daniil Yugoslavskiy, oscd.community date: 2023-02-20 modified: 2025-09-01 tags: - attack.persistence - attack.privilege-escalation - attack.t1543.003 logsource: category: process_creation product: windows detection: selection: Image|endswith: \sc.exe CommandLine|contains|all: - create - binPath filter_optional_dropbox: ParentImage|startswith: - C:\Program Files (x86)\Dropbox\Client\ - C:\Program Files\Dropbox\Client\ ParentImage|endswith: \Dropbox.exe condition: selection and not 1 of filter_optional_* falsepositives: - Legitimate administrator or user creates a service for legitimate reasons. - Software installation level: low