alirezaaminzadeh/cybersec-retrieval-benchmark huggingface dataset:
Sigma rule: Detects executable access via webdav6. Can be seen in APT 29 such as from the emulated APT 29 hackathon https://github.c. Logsource: zeek / http. Rule: title: Executable from Webdav id: aac2fd97-bcba-491b-ad66-a6edf89c71bf status: test description: Detects executable access via webdav6. Can be seen in APT 29 such as from the emulated APT 29 hackathon https://github.com/OTRF/detection-hackathon-apt29/ references: - http://carnal0wnage.attackresearch.com/2012/06/webdav-server-to-download-custom.html - https://github.com/OTRF/detection-hackathon-apt29 author: SOC Prime, Adam Swan date: 2020-05-01 modified: 2021-11-27 tags: - attack.command-and-control - attack.t1105 logsource: product: zeek service: http detection: selection_webdav: - c-useragent|contains: WebDAV - c-uri|contains: webdav selection_executable: - resp_mime_types|contains: dosexec - c-uri|endswith: .exe condition: selection_webdav and selection_executable falsepositives: - Unknown level: medium
Sigma rule: Detects SQL error messages that indicate probing for an injection attack. Logsource: sql / application. Rule: title: Suspicious SQL Error Messages id: 8a670c6d-7189-4b1c-8017-a417ca84a086 status: test description: Detects SQL error messages that indicate probing for an injection attack references: - http://www.sqlinjection.net/errors author: Bjoern Kimminich date: 2017-11-27 modified: 2023-02-12 tags: - attack.initial-access - attack.t1190 logsource: category: application product: sql definition: 'Requirements: application error logs must be collected (with LOG_LEVEL ERROR and above)' detection: keywords: - quoted string not properly terminated - You have an error in your SQL syntax - Unclosed quotation mark - 'near "*": syntax error' - SELECTs to the left and right of UNION do not have the same number of result columns condition: keywords falsepositives: - A syntax error in MySQL also occurs in non-dynamic (safe) queries if there is an empty in() clause, that may often be the case. level: high
Sigma rule: Detects possible suspicious glue development endpoint activity.. Logsource: aws / cloudtrail. Rule: title: AWS Glue Development Endpoint Activity id: 4990c2e3-f4b8-45e3-bc3c-30b14ff0ed26 status: test description: Detects possible suspicious glue development endpoint activity. references: - https://rhinosecuritylabs.com/aws/aws-privilege-escalation-methods-mitigation/ - https://docs.aws.amazon.com/glue/latest/webapi/API_CreateDevEndpoint.html author: Austin Songer @austinsonger date: 2021-10-03 modified: 2022-12-18 tags: - attack.privilege-escalation logsource: product: aws service: cloudtrail detection: selection: eventSource: glue.amazonaws.com eventName: - CreateDevEndpoint - DeleteDevEndpoint - UpdateDevEndpoint condition: selection falsepositives: - Glue Development Endpoint Activity may be performed by a system administrator. Verify whether the user identity, user agent, and/or hostname should be making changes in your environment. - If known behavior is causing false positives, it can be exempted from the rule. level: low
Sigma rule: Detects the ld.so preload persistence file. See `man ld.so` for more information.. Logsource: linux. Rule: title: Code Injection by ld.so Preload id: 7e3c4651-c347-40c4-b1d4-d48590fdf684 status: test description: Detects the ld.so preload persistence file. See `man ld.so` for more information. references: - https://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man8/ld.so.8.html author: Christian Burkard (Nextron Systems) date: 2021-05-05 modified: 2022-10-09 tags: - attack.persistence - attack.privilege-escalation - attack.execution - attack.stealth - attack.t1574.006 logsource: product: linux detection: keywords: - /etc/ld.so.preload condition: keywords falsepositives: - Rare temporary workaround for library misconfiguration level: high
Sigma rule: Detects "svchost.exe" spawning "rundll32.exe" with command arguments like "C:\windows\system32\davclnt.dll,DavSetCookie". Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: WebDav Client Execution Via Rundll32.EXE id: 2dbd9d3d-9e27-42a8-b8df-f13825c6c3d5 status: test description: 'Detects "svchost.exe" spawning "rundll32.exe" with command arguments like "C:\windows\system32\davclnt.dll,DavSetCookie". This could be an indicator of exfiltration or use of WebDav to launch code (hosted on a WebDav server). ' references: - https://github.com/OTRF/detection-hackathon-apt29/issues/17 - https://github.com/OTRF/ThreatHunter-Playbook/blob/2d4257f630f4c9770f78d0c1df059f891ffc3fec/docs/evals/apt29/detections/7.B.4_C10730EA-6345-4934-AA0F-B0EFCA0C4BA6.md author: Roberto Rodriguez (Cyb3rWard0g), OTR (Open Threat Research) date: 2020-05-02 modified: 2023-09-18 tags: - attack.exfiltration - attack.t1048.003 logsource: category: process_creation product: windows detection: selection_parent: ParentImage|endswith: \svchost.exe selection_img: - Image|endswith: \rundll32.exe - OriginalFileName: RUNDLL32.EXE selection_cli: CommandLine|contains: C:\windows\system32\davclnt.dll,DavSetCookie condition: all of selection_* falsepositives: - Unknown level: medium
Sigma rule: Detects Obfuscated Powershell via use Clip.exe in Scripts. Logsource: windows / ps_module. Rule: title: Invoke-Obfuscation Via Use Clip - PowerShell Module id: ebdf49d8-b89c-46c9-8fdf-2c308406f6bd related: - id: db92dd33-a3ad-49cf-8c2c-608c3e30ace0 type: derived status: test description: Detects Obfuscated Powershell via use Clip.exe in Scripts references: - https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/issues/1009 author: Nikita Nazarov, oscd.community date: 2020-10-09 modified: 2024-04-05 tags: - attack.stealth - attack.t1027 - attack.execution - attack.t1059.001 logsource: product: windows category: ps_module definition: 0ad03ef1-f21b-4a79-8ce8-e6900c54b65b detection: selection_4103: Payload|re: (?i)echo.*clip.*&&.*(Clipboard|i`?n`?v`?o`?k`?e`?) condition: selection_4103 falsepositives: - Unknown level: high
Sigma rule: Detects the creation of a named pipe with a pattern found in CobaltStrike malleable C2 profiles. Logsource: windows / pipe_created. Rule: title: CobaltStrike Named Pipe Patterns id: 85adeb13-4fc9-4e68-8a4a-c7cb2c336eb7 related: - id: 0e7163d4-9e19-4fa7-9be6-000c61aad77a type: similar - id: d5601f8c-b26f-4ab0-9035-69e11a8d4ad2 type: similar status: test description: Detects the creation of a named pipe with a pattern found in CobaltStrike malleable C2 profiles references: - https://svch0st.medium.com/guide-to-named-pipes-and-hunting-for-cobalt-strike-pipes-dc46b2c5f575 - https://gist.github.com/MHaggis/6c600e524045a6d49c35291a21e10752 author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Christian Burkard (Nextron Systems) date: 2021-07-30 modified: 2024-01-26 tags: - attack.privilege-escalation - attack.stealth - attack.t1055 - stp.1k logsource: product: windows category: pipe_created definition: Note that you have to configure logging for Named Pipe Events in Sysmon config (Event ID 17 and Event ID 18). The basic configuration is in popular sysmon configuration (https://github.com/SwiftOnSecurity/sysmon-config), but it is worth verifying. You can also use other repo, e.g. https://github.com/Neo23x0/sysmon-config, https://github.com/olafhartong/sysmon-modular You can also use other repo, e.g. https://github.com/Neo23x0/sysmon-config, https://github.com/olafhartong/sysmon-modular. How to test detection? You can always use Cobalt Strike, but also you can check powershell script from this site https://svch0st.medium.com/guide-to-named-pipes-and-hunting-for-cobalt-strike-pipes-dc46b2c5f575 detection: selection_malleable_profile_generic: - PipeName|startswith: - \DserNamePipe - \f4c3 - \f53f - \fullduplex_ - \mojo.5688.8052.183894939787088877 - \mojo.5688.8052.35780273329370473 - \MsFteWds - \msrpc_ - \mypipe-f - \mypipe-h - \ntsvcs - \PGMessagePipe - \rpc_ - \scerpc - \SearchTextHarvester - \spoolss - \win_svc - \win\msrpc_ - \windows.update.manager - \wkssvc - PipeName: - \demoagent_11 - \demoagent_22 selection_malleable_profile_catalog_change_listener: PipeName|startswith: \Winsock2\CatalogChangeListener- PipeName|endswith: -0, filter_main_generic: PipeName: - \wkssvc - \spoolss - \scerpc - \ntsvcs - \SearchTextHarvester - \PGMessagePipe - \MsFteWds filter_optional_websense: Image|contains: - :\Program Files\Websense\ - :\Program Files (x86)\Websense\ PipeName|startswith: - \DserNamePipeR - \DserNamePipeW condition: 1 of selection_malleable_profile_* and not 1 of filter_main_* and not 1 of filter_optional_* falsepositives: - Chrome instances using the exact same pipe name "mojo.xxx" - Websense Endpoint usin
Sigma rule: Detects suspicious processes logging on with explicit credentials. Logsource: windows / security. Rule: title: Suspicious Remote Logon with Explicit Credentials id: 941e5c45-cda7-4864-8cea-bbb7458d194a status: test description: Detects suspicious processes logging on with explicit credentials references: - https://drive.google.com/file/d/1lKya3_mLnR3UQuCoiYruO3qgu052_iS_/view author: oscd.community, Teymur Kheirkhabarov @HeirhabarovT, Zach Stanford @svch0st, Tim Shelton date: 2020-10-05 modified: 2022-08-03 tags: - attack.privilege-escalation - attack.persistence - attack.initial-access - attack.stealth - attack.t1078 - attack.lateral-movement logsource: product: windows service: security detection: selection: EventID: 4648 ProcessName|endswith: - \cmd.exe - \powershell.exe - \pwsh.exe - \winrs.exe - \wmic.exe - \net.exe - \net1.exe - \reg.exe filter1: TargetServerName: localhost filter2: SubjectUserName|endswith: $ TargetUserName|endswith: $ condition: selection and not 1 of filter* falsepositives: - Administrators that use the RunAS command or scheduled tasks level: medium
Sigma rule: Detects when changes are made to the SSH certificate configuration of the organization.. Logsource: github / audit. Rule: title: Github SSH Certificate Configuration Changed id: 2f575940-d85e-4ddc-af13-17dad6f1a0ef status: test description: Detects when changes are made to the SSH certificate configuration of the organization. references: - https://docs.github.com/en/enterprise-cloud@latest/organizations/managing-git-access-to-your-organizations-repositories/about-ssh-certificate-authorities - https://docs.github.com/en/enterprise-cloud@latest/admin/monitoring-activity-in-your-enterprise/reviewing-audit-logs-for-your-enterprise/audit-log-events-for-your-enterprise#ssh_certificate_authority author: Romain Gaillard (@romain-gaillard) date: 2024-07-29 tags: - attack.initial-access - attack.persistence - attack.privilege-escalation - attack.stealth - attack.t1078.004 logsource: product: github service: audit definition: 'Requirements: The audit log streaming feature must be enabled to be able to receive such logs. You can enable following the documentation here: https://docs.github.com/en/enterprise-cloud@latest/admin/monitoring-activity-in-your-enterprise/reviewing-audit-logs-for-your-enterprise/streaming-the-audit-log-for-your-enterprise#setting-up-audit-log-streaming' detection: selection: action: - ssh_certificate_authority.create - ssh_certificate_requirement.disable condition: selection falsepositives: - Allowed administrative activities. level: medium
Sigma rule: Detects the use of PowerShell to identify the current logged user.. Logsource: windows / ps_script. Rule: title: Suspicious PowerShell Get Current User id: 4096a49c-7de4-4da0-a230-c66ccd56ea5a status: test description: Detects the use of PowerShell to identify the current logged user. references: - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1033/T1033.md#atomic-test-4---user-discovery-with-env-vars-powershell-script - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1033/T1033.md#atomic-test-5---getcurrent-user-with-powershell-script author: frack113 date: 2022-04-04 tags: - attack.discovery - attack.t1033 logsource: product: windows category: ps_script definition: 'Requirements: Script Block Logging must be enabled' detection: selection: ScriptBlockText|contains: - '[System.Environment]::UserName' - $env:UserName - '[System.Security.Principal.WindowsIdentity]::GetCurrent()' condition: selection falsepositives: - Legitimate PowerShell scripts level: low
Sigma rule: Detects the use of the `syslog` syscall with action code 5 (SYSLOG_ACTION_CLEAR), (4 is SYSLOG_ACTION_READ_CLEAR and 6 i. Logsource: linux / auditd. Rule: title: Clear or Disable Kernel Ring Buffer Logs via Syslog Syscall id: eca5e022-d368-4043-98e5-9736fb01f72f status: experimental description: 'Detects the use of the `syslog` syscall with action code 5 (SYSLOG_ACTION_CLEAR), (4 is SYSLOG_ACTION_READ_CLEAR and 6 is SYSLOG_ACTION_CONSOLE_OFF) which clears the kernel ring buffer (dmesg logs). This can be used by attackers to hide traces after exploitation or privilege escalation. A common technique is running `dmesg -c`, which triggers this syscall internally. ' references: - https://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man2/syslog.2.html - https://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man1/dmesg.1.html author: Milad Cheraghi date: 2025-05-27 modified: 2025-12-05 tags: - attack.defense-impairment - attack.t1685.006 logsource: product: linux service: auditd definition: 'Required auditd configuration: -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S syslog -F a0=4 -k clear_dmesg_logs -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S syslog -F a0=5 -k clear_dmesg_logs -a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S syslog -F a0=6 -k disable_dmesg_logs -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S syslog -F a0=4 -k clear_dmesg_logs -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S syslog -F a0=5 -k clear_dmesg_logs -a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S syslog -F a0=6 -k disable_dmesg_logs ' detection: selection: type: SYSCALL SYSCALL: syslog a0: - 4 - 5 - 6 condition: selection falsepositives: - System administrators or scripts that intentionally clear logs - Debugging scripts level: medium
Sigma rule: Detects when a successful MFA authentication occurs due to the use of a bypass code. A bypass code is a temporary passco. Logsource: cisco / duo. Rule: title: Cisco Duo Successful MFA Authentication Via Bypass Code id: 6f7e1c10-2dc9-4312-adb6-9574ff09a5c8 status: test description: 'Detects when a successful MFA authentication occurs due to the use of a bypass code. A bypass code is a temporary passcode created by an administrator for a specific user to access a Duo-protected application. These are generally used as "backup codes," so that enrolled users who are having problems with their mobile devices (e.g., mobile service is disrupted, the device is lost or stolen, etc.) or who temporarily can''t use their enrolled devices (on a plane without mobile data services) can still access their Duo-protected systems. ' references: - https://duo.com/docs/adminapi#logs - https://help.duo.com/s/article/6327?language=en_US author: Nikita Khalimonenkov date: 2024-04-17 tags: - attack.credential-access - attack.initial-access - attack.stealth logsource: product: cisco service: duo detection: selection: event_type: authentication reason: bypass_user condition: selection falsepositives: - Legitimate user that was assigned on purpose to a bypass group level: medium
Sigma rule: Detects suspicious session with two users present. Logsource: linux / guacamole. Rule: title: Guacamole Two Users Sharing Session Anomaly id: 1edd77db-0669-4fef-9598-165bda82826d status: test description: Detects suspicious session with two users present references: - https://research.checkpoint.com/2020/apache-guacamole-rce/ author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems) date: 2020-07-03 modified: 2021-11-27 tags: - attack.credential-access - attack.t1212 logsource: product: linux service: guacamole detection: selection: - (2 users now present) condition: selection falsepositives: - Unknown level: high
Sigma rule: Detects the use of various web request commands with commandline tools and Windows PowerShell cmdlets (including aliases. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: Usage Of Web Request Commands And Cmdlets id: 9fc51a3c-81b3-4fa7-b35f-7c02cf10fd2d related: - id: 1139d2e2-84b1-4226-b445-354492eba8ba type: similar - id: f67dbfce-93bc-440d-86ad-a95ae8858c90 type: obsolete - id: cd5c8085-4070-4e22-908d-a5b3342deb74 type: obsolete - id: 6e897651-f157-4d8f-aaeb-df8151488385 type: obsolete status: test description: Detects the use of various web request commands with commandline tools and Windows PowerShell cmdlets (including aliases) via CommandLine references: - https://4sysops.com/archives/use-powershell-to-download-a-file-with-http-https-and-ftp/ - https://blog.jourdant.me/post/3-ways-to-download-files-with-powershell - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/bitstransfer/add-bitsfile?view=windowsserver2019-ps author: James Pemberton / @4A616D6573, Endgame, JHasenbusch, oscd.community, Austin Songer @austinsonger date: 2019-10-24 modified: 2025-10-20 tags: - attack.execution - attack.t1059.001 logsource: category: process_creation product: windows detection: selection: CommandLine|contains: - '[System.Net.WebRequest]::create' - 'curl ' - Invoke-RestMethod - Invoke-WebRequest - ' irm ' - 'iwr ' - Resume-BitsTransfer - Start-BitsTransfer - 'wget ' - WinHttp.WinHttpRequest condition: selection falsepositives: - Use of Get-Command and Get-Help modules to reference Invoke-WebRequest and Start-BitsTransfer. level: medium
Sigma rule: Detects the pattern of UAC Bypass using a msconfig GUI hack (UACMe 55). Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: UAC Bypass Using MSConfig Token Modification - Process id: ad92e3f9-7eb6-460e-96b1-582b0ccbb980 status: test description: Detects the pattern of UAC Bypass using a msconfig GUI hack (UACMe 55) references: - https://github.com/hfiref0x/UACME author: Christian Burkard (Nextron Systems) date: 2021-08-30 modified: 2024-12-01 tags: - attack.privilege-escalation - attack.t1548.002 logsource: category: process_creation product: windows detection: selection: IntegrityLevel: - High - System - S-1-16-16384 - S-1-16-12288 ParentImage|endswith: \AppData\Local\Temp\pkgmgr.exe CommandLine: '"C:\Windows\system32\msconfig.exe" -5' condition: selection falsepositives: - Unknown level: high
Sigma rule: Detects the creation of a schtask via PowerSploit or Empire Default Configuration.. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: HackTool - Default PowerSploit/Empire Scheduled Task Creation id: 56c217c3-2de2-479b-990f-5c109ba8458f status: test description: Detects the creation of a schtask via PowerSploit or Empire Default Configuration. references: - https://github.com/0xdeadbeefJERKY/PowerSploit/blob/8690399ef70d2cad10213575ac67e8fa90ddf7c3/Persistence/Persistence.psm1 - https://github.com/EmpireProject/Empire/blob/08cbd274bef78243d7a8ed6443b8364acd1fc48b/lib/modules/powershell/persistence/userland/schtasks.py author: Markus Neis, @Karneades date: 2018-03-06 modified: 2023-03-03 tags: - attack.execution - attack.persistence - attack.privilege-escalation - attack.s0111 - attack.g0022 - attack.g0060 - car.2013-08-001 - attack.t1053.005 - attack.t1059.001 logsource: product: windows category: process_creation detection: selection: ParentImage|endswith: - \powershell.exe - \pwsh.exe Image|endswith: \schtasks.exe CommandLine|contains|all: - /Create - powershell.exe -NonI - /TN Updater /TR CommandLine|contains: - /SC ONLOGON - /SC DAILY /ST - /SC ONIDLE - /SC HOURLY condition: selection falsepositives: - Unlikely level: high
Sigma rule: Detects using WorkFolders.exe to execute an arbitrary control.exe. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: Execution via WorkFolders.exe id: 0bbc6369-43e3-453d-9944-cae58821c173 status: test description: Detects using WorkFolders.exe to execute an arbitrary control.exe references: - https://twitter.com/elliotkillick/status/1449812843772227588 author: Maxime Thiebaut (@0xThiebaut) date: 2021-10-21 modified: 2022-12-25 tags: - attack.stealth - attack.t1218 logsource: category: process_creation product: windows detection: selection: Image|endswith: \control.exe ParentImage|endswith: \WorkFolders.exe filter: Image: C:\Windows\System32\control.exe condition: selection and not filter falsepositives: - Legitimate usage of the uncommon Windows Work Folders feature. level: high
Sigma rule: Detects suspicious ways to run Invoke-Execution using IEX alias. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: Suspicious PowerShell IEX Execution Patterns id: 09576804-7a05-458e-a817-eb718ca91f54 status: test description: Detects suspicious ways to run Invoke-Execution using IEX alias references: - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/microsoft.powershell.utility/invoke-expression?view=powershell-7.2 - https://www.huntress.com/blog/slashandgrab-screen-connect-post-exploitation-in-the-wild-cve-2024-1709-cve-2024-1708 author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) date: 2022-03-24 modified: 2022-11-28 tags: - attack.execution - attack.t1059.001 logsource: product: windows category: process_creation detection: selection_combined_1: Image|endswith: - \powershell.exe - \pwsh.exe CommandLine|contains: - ' | iex;' - ' | iex ' - ' | iex}' - ' | IEX ;' - ' | IEX -Error' - ' | IEX (new' - ');IEX ' selection_combined_2: CommandLine|contains: - ::FromBase64String - '.GetString([System.Convert]::' selection_standalone: CommandLine|contains: - )|iex;$ - );iex($ - );iex $ - ' | IEX | ' - ' | iex\"' condition: all of selection_combined_* or selection_standalone falsepositives: - Legitimate scripts that use IEX level: high
Sigma rule: Number of VM creations or deployment activities occur in Azure via the azureactivity log.. Logsource: azure / activitylogs. Rule: title: Number Of Resource Creation Or Deployment Activities id: d2d901db-7a75-45a1-bc39-0cbf00812192 status: test description: Number of VM creations or deployment activities occur in Azure via the azureactivity log. references: - https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/e534407884b1ec5371efc9f76ead282176c9e8bb/Detections/AzureActivity/Creating_Anomalous_Number_Of_Resources_detection.yaml author: sawwinnnaung date: 2020-05-07 modified: 2023-10-11 tags: - attack.privilege-escalation - attack.persistence - attack.t1098 logsource: product: azure service: activitylogs detection: keywords: - Microsoft.Compute/virtualMachines/write - Microsoft.Resources/deployments/write condition: keywords falsepositives: - Valid change level: medium
Sigma rule: Detects potential malicious modification of run keys by winekey or team9 backdoor. Logsource: windows / registry_event. Rule: title: WINEKEY Registry Modification id: b98968aa-dbc0-4a9c-ac35-108363cbf8d5 status: test description: Detects potential malicious modification of run keys by winekey or team9 backdoor references: - https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2020/10/kegtap-and-singlemalt-with-a-ransomware-chaser.html author: omkar72 date: 2020-10-30 modified: 2021-11-27 tags: - attack.privilege-escalation - attack.persistence - attack.t1547 logsource: category: registry_event product: windows detection: selection: TargetObject|endswith: Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\Backup Mgr condition: selection falsepositives: - Unknown level: high
Sigma rule: Detects remote PowerShell sessions. Logsource: windows / ps_classic_start. Rule: title: Remote PowerShell Session (PS Classic) id: 60167e5c-84b2-4c95-a7ac-86281f27c445 related: - id: 96b9f619-aa91-478f-bacb-c3e50f8df575 type: derived status: test description: Detects remote PowerShell sessions references: - https://threathunterplaybook.com/hunts/windows/190511-RemotePwshExecution/notebook.html author: Roberto Rodriguez @Cyb3rWard0g date: 2019-08-10 modified: 2024-01-03 tags: - attack.execution - attack.t1059.001 - attack.lateral-movement - attack.t1021.006 logsource: product: windows category: ps_classic_start detection: selection: Data|contains|all: - HostName=ServerRemoteHost - wsmprovhost.exe condition: selection falsepositives: - Legitimate use remote PowerShell sessions level: low