alirezaaminzadeh/cybersec-retrieval-benchmark huggingface dataset:
Sigma rule: Detects Obfuscated use of stdin to execute PowerShell. Logsource: windows / security. Rule: title: Invoke-Obfuscation STDIN+ Launcher - Security id: 0c718a5e-4284-4fb9-b4d9-b9a50b3a1974 related: - id: 72862bf2-0eb1-11eb-adc1-0242ac120002 type: derived status: test description: Detects Obfuscated use of stdin to execute PowerShell references: - https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/issues/1009 author: Jonathan Cheong, oscd.community date: 2020-10-15 modified: 2022-11-29 tags: - attack.stealth - attack.t1027 - attack.execution - attack.t1059.001 logsource: product: windows service: security definition: The 'System Security Extension' audit subcategory need to be enabled to log the EID 4697 detection: selection: EventID: 4697 ServiceFileName|contains|all: - cmd - powershell selection2: ServiceFileName|contains: - ${input} - noexit selection3: ServiceFileName|contains: - ' /c ' - ' /r ' condition: all of selection* falsepositives: - Unknown level: high
Sigma rule: Detects command line activity that tries to clear or disable any ETW trace log which could be a sign of logging evasion.. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: ETW Trace Evasion Activity id: a238b5d0-ce2d-4414-a676-7a531b3d13d6 status: test description: 'Detects command line activity that tries to clear or disable any ETW trace log which could be a sign of logging evasion. ' references: - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/wevtutil - https://abuse.io/lockergoga.txt - https://medium.com/palantir/tampering-with-windows-event-tracing-background-offense-and-defense-4be7ac62ac63 author: '@neu5ron, Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Jonhnathan Ribeiro, oscd.community' date: 2019-03-22 modified: 2022-06-28 tags: - attack.stealth - attack.defense-impairment - attack.t1070 - attack.t1685 - car.2016-04-002 logsource: category: process_creation product: windows detection: selection_clear_1: CommandLine|contains|all: - cl - /Trace selection_clear_2: CommandLine|contains|all: - clear-log - /Trace selection_disable_1: CommandLine|contains|all: - sl - /e:false selection_disable_2: CommandLine|contains|all: - set-log - /e:false selection_disable_3: CommandLine|contains|all: - logman - update - trace - --p - -ets selection_pwsh_remove: CommandLine|contains: Remove-EtwTraceProvider selection_pwsh_set: CommandLine|contains|all: - Set-EtwTraceProvider - '0x11' condition: 1 of selection_* falsepositives: - Unknown level: high
Sigma rule: Detects Obfuscated Powershell via COMPRESS OBFUSCATION. Logsource: windows / system. Rule: title: Invoke-Obfuscation COMPRESS OBFUSCATION - System id: 175997c5-803c-4b08-8bb0-70b099f47595 status: test description: Detects Obfuscated Powershell via COMPRESS OBFUSCATION references: - https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/issues/1009 author: Timur Zinniatullin, oscd.community date: 2020-10-18 modified: 2022-11-29 tags: - attack.stealth - attack.t1027 - attack.execution - attack.t1059.001 logsource: product: windows service: system detection: selection: Provider_Name: Service Control Manager EventID: 7045 ImagePath|contains|all: - new-object - text.encoding]::ascii - readtoend ImagePath|contains: - :system.io.compression.deflatestream - system.io.streamreader condition: selection falsepositives: - Unknown level: medium
Sigma rule: Detects changes to registry keys related to "Trusted Location" of Microsoft Office where the path is set to something un. Logsource: windows / registry_set. Rule: title: Uncommon Microsoft Office Trusted Location Added id: f742bde7-9528-42e5-bd82-84f51a8387d2 related: - id: a0bed973-45fa-4625-adb5-6ecdf9be70ac type: derived status: test description: Detects changes to registry keys related to "Trusted Location" of Microsoft Office where the path is set to something uncommon. Attackers might add additional trusted locations to avoid macro security restrictions. references: - Internal Research - https://admx.help/?Category=Office2016&Policy=excel16.Office.Microsoft.Policies.Windows::L_TrustedLoc01 author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) date: 2023-06-21 modified: 2023-09-29 tags: - attack.persistence - attack.defense-impairment - attack.t1112 logsource: category: registry_set product: windows detection: selection: TargetObject|contains: Security\Trusted Locations\Location TargetObject|endswith: \Path filter_exclude_known_paths: Details|contains: - '%APPDATA%\Microsoft\Templates' - '%%APPDATA%%\Microsoft\Templates' - '%APPDATA%\Microsoft\Word\Startup' - '%%APPDATA%%\Microsoft\Word\Startup' - :\Program Files (x86)\Microsoft Office\root\Templates\ - :\Program Files\Microsoft Office (x86)\Templates - :\Program Files\Microsoft Office\root\Templates\ - :\Program Files\Microsoft Office\Templates\ filter_main_office_click_to_run: Image|contains: :\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\ClickToRun\ Image|endswith: \OfficeClickToRun.exe filter_main_office_apps: Image|contains: - :\Program Files\Microsoft Office\ - :\Program Files (x86)\Microsoft Office\ condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_* and not 1 of filter_exclude_* falsepositives: - Other unknown legitimate or custom paths need to be filtered to avoid false positives level: high
Sigma rule: Detects extracting of zip file from image file. Logsource: linux / auditd. Rule: title: Steganography Unzip Hidden Information From Picture File id: edd595d7-7895-4fa7-acb3-85a18a8772ca status: test description: Detects extracting of zip file from image file references: - https://zerotoroot.me/steganography-hiding-a-zip-in-a-jpeg-file/ author: Pawel Mazur date: 2021-09-09 modified: 2022-10-09 tags: - attack.stealth - attack.t1027.003 logsource: product: linux service: auditd detection: commands: type: EXECVE a0: unzip a1: a1|endswith: - .jpg - .png condition: commands and a1 falsepositives: - Unknown level: low
Sigma rule: Csi.exe is a signed binary from Microsoft that comes with Visual Studio and provides C# interactive capabilities. It can. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: Suspicious Csi.exe Usage id: 40b95d31-1afc-469e-8d34-9a3a667d058e status: test description: Csi.exe is a signed binary from Microsoft that comes with Visual Studio and provides C# interactive capabilities. It can be used to run C# code from a file passed as a parameter in command line. Early version of this utility provided with Microsoft “Roslyn” Community Technology Preview was named 'rcsi.exe' references: - https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/OtherMSBinaries/Csi/ - https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/OtherMSBinaries/Rcsi/ - https://enigma0x3.net/2016/11/21/bypassing-application-whitelisting-by-using-rcsi-exe/ - https://twitter.com/Z3Jpa29z/status/1317545798981324801 author: Konstantin Grishchenko, oscd.community date: 2020-10-17 modified: 2022-07-11 tags: - attack.lateral-movement - attack.execution - attack.stealth - attack.t1072 - attack.t1218 logsource: category: process_creation product: windows detection: selection_img: - Image|endswith: - \csi.exe - \rcsi.exe - OriginalFileName: - csi.exe - rcsi.exe selection_cli: Company: Microsoft Corporation condition: all of selection* falsepositives: - Legitimate usage by software developers level: medium
Sigma rule: Detects dump of credentials in VeeamBackup dbo. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: VeeamBackup Database Credentials Dump Via Sqlcmd.EXE id: b57ba453-b384-4ab9-9f40-1038086b4e53 status: test description: Detects dump of credentials in VeeamBackup dbo references: - https://thedfirreport.com/2021/12/13/diavol-ransomware/ - https://forums.veeam.com/veeam-backup-replication-f2/recover-esxi-password-in-veeam-t34630.html author: frack113 date: 2021-12-20 modified: 2023-02-13 tags: - attack.collection - attack.t1005 logsource: category: process_creation product: windows detection: selection_tools: Image|endswith: \sqlcmd.exe selection_query: CommandLine|contains|all: - SELECT - TOP - '[VeeamBackup].[dbo].[Credentials]' condition: all of selection_* falsepositives: - Unknown level: high
Sigma rule: Rule to detect the Hybrid Connection Manager service running on an endpoint.. Logsource: windows / microsoft-servicebus-client. Rule: title: HybridConnectionManager Service Running id: b55d23e5-6821-44ff-8a6e-67218891e49f status: test description: Rule to detect the Hybrid Connection Manager service running on an endpoint. references: - https://twitter.com/Cyb3rWard0g/status/1381642789369286662 author: Roberto Rodriguez (Cyb3rWard0g), OTR (Open Threat Research) date: 2021-04-12 modified: 2024-08-05 tags: - attack.persistence - attack.t1554 logsource: product: windows service: microsoft-servicebus-client detection: selection: EventID: - 40300 - 40301 - 40302 keywords: - HybridConnection - sb:// - servicebus.windows.net - HybridConnectionManage condition: selection and keywords falsepositives: - Legitimate use of Hybrid Connection Manager via Azure function apps. level: high
Sigma rule: Detects potential arbitrary file download using a Microsoft Office application. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: Potential Arbitrary File Download Using Office Application id: 4ae3e30b-b03f-43aa-87e3-b622f4048eed related: - id: 0c79148b-118e-472b-bdb7-9b57b444cc19 type: obsolete status: test description: Detects potential arbitrary file download using a Microsoft Office application references: - https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/OtherMSBinaries/Winword/ - https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/OtherMSBinaries/Powerpnt/ - https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/OtherMSBinaries/Excel/ - https://medium.com/@reegun/unsanitized-file-validation-leads-to-malicious-payload-download-via-office-binaries-202d02db7191 author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems), Beyu Denis, oscd.community date: 2022-05-17 modified: 2023-06-22 tags: - attack.stealth - attack.t1202 logsource: category: process_creation product: windows detection: selection_img: - Image|endswith: - \EXCEL.EXE - \POWERPNT.EXE - \WINWORD.exe - OriginalFileName: - Excel.exe - POWERPNT.EXE - WinWord.exe selection_http: CommandLine|contains: - http:// - https:// condition: all of selection_* falsepositives: - Unknown level: high
Sigma rule: Detects the execution of Winrs.exe where it is used to execute commands locally. Commands executed this way are launched. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: Winrs Local Command Execution id: bcfece3d-56fe-4545-9931-3b8e92927db1 status: experimental description: 'Detects the execution of Winrs.exe where it is used to execute commands locally. Commands executed this way are launched under Winrshost.exe and can represent proxy execution used for defense evasion or lateral movement. ' references: - https://cardinalops.com/blog/living-off-winrm-abusing-complexity-in-remote-management/ - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/winrs author: Liran Ravich, Nasreddine Bencherchali date: 2025-10-22 tags: - attack.lateral-movement - attack.stealth - attack.t1021.006 - attack.t1218 logsource: category: process_creation product: windows detection: selection_img: - Image|endswith: \winrs.exe - OriginalFileName: winrs.exe selection_local_ip: CommandLine|contains|windash: - /r:localhost - /r:127.0.0.1 - /r:[::1] - /remote:localhost - /remote:127.0.0.1 - /remote:[::1] filter_main_remote: CommandLine|contains|windash: - '/r:' - '/remote:' condition: all of selection_* or (selection_img and not 1 of filter_main_*) falsepositives: - Unlikely level: high
Sigma rule: Adversaries may manipulate accounts to maintain access to victim systems. Account manipulation may consist of any action. Logsource: windows / ps_script. Rule: title: Powershell LocalAccount Manipulation id: 4fdc44df-bfe9-4fcc-b041-68f5a2d3031c status: test description: 'Adversaries may manipulate accounts to maintain access to victim systems. Account manipulation may consist of any action that preserves adversary access to a compromised account, such as modifying credentials or permission groups ' references: - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1098/T1098.md#atomic-test-1---admin-account-manipulate - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/microsoft.powershell.localaccounts/?view=powershell-5.1 author: frack113 date: 2021-12-28 tags: - attack.privilege-escalation - attack.persistence - attack.t1098 logsource: product: windows category: ps_script definition: 'Requirements: Script Block Logging must be enabled' detection: selection: ScriptBlockText|contains: - Disable-LocalUser - Enable-LocalUser - Get-LocalUser - Set-LocalUser - New-LocalUser - Rename-LocalUser - Remove-LocalUser condition: selection falsepositives: - Legitimate administrative script level: medium
Sigma rule: Detects usage of the "Write-EventLog" cmdlet with 'RawData' flag. The cmdlet can be levreage to write malicious payloads. Logsource: windows / ps_script. Rule: title: PowerShell Write-EventLog Usage id: 35f41cd7-c98e-469f-8a02-ec4ba0cc7a7e status: test description: Detects usage of the "Write-EventLog" cmdlet with 'RawData' flag. The cmdlet can be levreage to write malicious payloads to the EventLog and then retrieve them later for later use references: - https://www.blackhillsinfosec.com/windows-event-logs-for-red-teams/ author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) date: 2022-08-16 tags: - attack.defense-impairment logsource: product: windows category: ps_script definition: 'Requirements: Script Block Logging must be enabled' detection: selection: ScriptBlockText|contains|all: - Write-EventLog - '-RawData ' condition: selection falsepositives: - Legitimate applications writing events via this cmdlet. Investigate alerts to determine if the action is benign level: medium
Sigma rule: Detects instances where an FTP service on an OpenCanary node has had a login attempt.. Logsource: opencanary / application. Rule: title: OpenCanary - FTP Login Attempt id: 6991bc2b-ae2e-447f-bc55-3a1ba04c14e5 status: test description: Detects instances where an FTP service on an OpenCanary node has had a login attempt. references: - https://opencanary.readthedocs.io/en/latest/starting/configuration.html#services-configuration - https://github.com/thinkst/opencanary/blob/a0896adfcaf0328cfd5829fe10d2878c7445138e/opencanary/logger.py#L52 author: Security Onion Solutions date: 2024-03-08 tags: - attack.initial-access - attack.exfiltration - attack.lateral-movement - attack.t1190 - attack.t1021 logsource: category: application product: opencanary detection: selection: logtype: 2000 condition: selection falsepositives: - Unlikely level: high
Sigma rule: Detects the use of the Group Policy Management Editor (GPME) to modify Default Domain or Default Domain Controllers Grou. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: Windows Default Domain GPO Modification via GPME id: dcff7e85-d01f-4eb5-badd-84e2e6be8294 related: - id: e5ac86dd-2da1-454b-be74-05d26c769d7d type: similar status: experimental description: 'Detects the use of the Group Policy Management Editor (GPME) to modify Default Domain or Default Domain Controllers Group Policy Objects (GPOs). Adversaries may leverage GPME to make stealthy changes in these default GPOs to deploy malicious GPOs configurations across the domain without raising suspicion. ' references: - https://www.trendmicro.com/en_us/research/25/i/unmasking-the-gentlemen-ransomware.html - https://adsecurity.org/?p=3377 - https://sdmsoftware.com/general-stuff/launching-the-new-gp-management-editor-from-the-command-line/ - https://www.pentestpartners.com/security-blog/living-off-the-land-gpo-style/ author: TropChaud date: 2025-11-22 tags: - attack.privilege-escalation - attack.defense-impairment - attack.t1484.001 logsource: product: windows category: process_creation detection: selection_mmc: - Image|endswith: \mmc.exe - OriginalFileName: MMC.exe selection_gpme: CommandLine|contains|all: - gpme.msc - 'gpobject:' selection_default_gpos: CommandLine|contains: - 31B2F340-016D-11D2-945F-00C04FB984F9 - 6AC1786C-016F-11D2-945F-00C04FB984F9 condition: all of selection_* falsepositives: - Legitimate use of GPME to modify GPOs level: medium
Sigma rule: An adversary may use legitimate desktop support and remote access software,to establish an interactive command and contr. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: Use of UltraVNC Remote Access Software id: 145322e4-0fd3-486b-81ca-9addc75736d8 status: test description: An adversary may use legitimate desktop support and remote access software,to establish an interactive command and control channel to target systems within networks references: - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/9e5b12c4912c07562aec7500447b11fa3e17e254/atomics/T1219/T1219.md author: frack113 date: 2022-10-02 tags: - attack.command-and-control - attack.t1219.002 logsource: category: process_creation product: windows detection: selection: - Description: VNCViewer - Product: UltraVNC VNCViewer - Company: UltraVNC - OriginalFileName: VNCViewer.exe condition: selection falsepositives: - Legitimate use level: medium
Sigma rule: Detects events generated by user-mode applications when they call the CveEventWrite API when a known vulnerability is tr. Logsource: windows / application. Rule: title: Audit CVE Event id: 48d91a3a-2363-43ba-a456-ca71ac3da5c2 status: test description: 'Detects events generated by user-mode applications when they call the CveEventWrite API when a known vulnerability is trying to be exploited. MS started using this log in Jan. 2020 with CVE-2020-0601 (a Windows CryptoAPI vulnerability. Unfortunately, that is about the only instance of CVEs being written to this log. ' references: - https://twitter.com/VM_vivisector/status/1217190929330655232 - https://twitter.com/DidierStevens/status/1217533958096924676 - https://twitter.com/FlemmingRiis/status/1217147415482060800 - https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ebmW42YYveI - https://nullsec.us/windows-event-log-audit-cve/ author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Zach Mathis date: 2020-01-15 modified: 2022-10-22 tags: - attack.execution - attack.stealth - attack.t1203 - attack.privilege-escalation - attack.t1068 - attack.t1211 - attack.credential-access - attack.t1212 - attack.lateral-movement - attack.t1210 - attack.impact - attack.t1499.004 logsource: product: windows service: application detection: selection: Provider_Name: - Microsoft-Windows-Audit-CVE - Audit-CVE EventID: 1 condition: selection falsepositives: - Unknown level: critical
Sigma rule: Detects creation/modification of Assistive Technology applications and persistence with usage of 'at'. Logsource: windows / registry_event. Rule: title: Atbroker Registry Change id: 9577edbb-851f-4243-8c91-1d5b50c1a39b status: test description: Detects creation/modification of Assistive Technology applications and persistence with usage of 'at' references: - http://www.hexacorn.com/blog/2016/07/22/beyond-good-ol-run-key-part-42/ - https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Atbroker/ author: Mateusz Wydra, oscd.community date: 2020-10-13 modified: 2023-01-19 tags: - attack.privilege-escalation - attack.stealth - attack.t1218 - attack.persistence - attack.t1547 logsource: category: registry_event product: windows detection: selection: TargetObject|contains: - Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Accessibility\ATs - Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Accessibility\Configuration filter_atbroker: Image: C:\Windows\system32\atbroker.exe TargetObject|contains: \Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Accessibility\Configuration Details: (Empty) filter_uninstallers: Image|startswith: C:\Windows\Installer\MSI TargetObject|contains: Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Accessibility\ATs condition: selection and not 1 of filter_* falsepositives: - Creation of non-default, legitimate at usage level: medium
Sigma rule: Detects usage of "ProtocolHandler" to download files. Downloaded files will be located in the cache folder (for example. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: File Download Using ProtocolHandler.exe id: 104cdb48-a7a8-4ca7-a453-32942c6e5dcb status: test description: 'Detects usage of "ProtocolHandler" to download files. Downloaded files will be located in the cache folder (for example - %LOCALAPPDATA%\Microsoft\Windows\INetCache\IE) ' references: - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1218/T1218.md - https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/OtherMSBinaries/ProtocolHandler/ author: frack113 date: 2021-07-13 modified: 2023-11-09 tags: - attack.stealth - attack.t1218 logsource: category: process_creation product: windows detection: selection_img: - Image|endswith: \protocolhandler.exe - OriginalFileName: ProtocolHandler.exe selection_cli: CommandLine|contains: - ftp:// - http:// - https:// condition: all of selection_* falsepositives: - Unknown level: medium
Sigma rule: Identifies when a Google Cloud Kubernetes CronJob runs in Azure Cloud. Kubernetes Job is a controller that creates one o. Logsource: gcp / gcp.audit. Rule: title: Google Cloud Kubernetes CronJob id: cd3a808c-c7b7-4c50-a2f3-f4cfcd436435 status: test description: 'Identifies when a Google Cloud Kubernetes CronJob runs in Azure Cloud. Kubernetes Job is a controller that creates one or more pods and ensures that a specified number of them successfully terminate. Kubernetes Job can be used to run containers that perform finite tasks for batch jobs. Kubernetes CronJob is used to schedule Jobs. An Adversary may use Kubernetes CronJob for scheduling execution of malicious code that would run as a container in the cluster. ' references: - https://cloud.google.com/kubernetes-engine/docs - https://kubernetes.io/docs/concepts/workloads/controllers/cron-jobs/ - https://kubernetes.io/docs/concepts/workloads/controllers/job/ author: Austin Songer @austinsonger date: 2021-11-22 modified: 2022-12-25 tags: - attack.persistence - attack.privilege-escalation - attack.execution logsource: product: gcp service: gcp.audit detection: selection: gcp.audit.method_name: - io.k8s.api.batch.v*.Job - io.k8s.api.batch.v*.CronJob condition: selection falsepositives: - Google Cloud Kubernetes CronJob/Job may be done by a system administrator. - If known behavior is causing false positives, it can be exempted from the rule. level: medium
Sigma rule: Modifications to a config that will serve an adversary's impacts or persistence. Logsource: cisco / aaa. Rule: title: Cisco Modify Configuration id: 671ffc77-50a7-464f-9e3d-9ea2b493b26b status: test description: Modifications to a config that will serve an adversary's impacts or persistence author: Austin Clark date: 2019-08-12 modified: 2025-04-28 tags: - attack.privilege-escalation - attack.execution - attack.persistence - attack.impact - attack.t1490 - attack.t1505 - attack.t1565.002 - attack.t1053 logsource: product: cisco service: aaa detection: keywords: - ip http server - ip https server - kron policy-list - kron occurrence - policy-list - access-list - ip access-group - archive maximum - ntp server condition: keywords falsepositives: - Legitimate administrators may run these commands level: medium
Sigma rule: Detects the execution of "gpg.exe" from uncommon location. Often used by ransomware and loaders to decrypt/encrypt data.. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: Portable Gpg.EXE Execution id: 77df53a5-1d78-4f32-bc5a-0e7465bd8f41 status: test description: Detects the execution of "gpg.exe" from uncommon location. Often used by ransomware and loaders to decrypt/encrypt data. references: - https://www.trendmicro.com/vinfo/vn/threat-encyclopedia/malware/ransom.bat.zarlock.a - https://securelist.com/locked-out/68960/ - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/c4097dc7ed14d7f7d08c89d148c4307097e8c294/atomics/T1486/T1486.md author: frack113, Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) date: 2023-08-06 modified: 2023-11-10 tags: - attack.impact - attack.t1486 logsource: category: process_creation product: windows detection: selection: - Image|endswith: - \gpg.exe - \gpg2.exe - OriginalFileName: gpg.exe - Description: GnuPG’s OpenPGP tool filter_main_legit_location: Image|contains: - :\Program Files (x86)\GNU\GnuPG\bin\ - :\Program Files (x86)\GnuPG VS-Desktop\ - :\Program Files (x86)\GnuPG\bin\ - :\Program Files (x86)\Gpg4win\bin\ condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_* level: medium