alirezaaminzadeh/cybersec-retrieval-benchmark huggingface dataset:
Sigma rule: Detects usage of "rar" to add files to an archive for potential compression. An adversary may compress data (e.g. sensit. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: Files Added To An Archive Using Rar.EXE id: 6f3e2987-db24-4c78-a860-b4f4095a7095 status: test description: Detects usage of "rar" to add files to an archive for potential compression. An adversary may compress data (e.g. sensitive documents) that is collected prior to exfiltration in order to make it portable and minimize the amount of data sent over the network. references: - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1560.001/T1560.001.md - https://eqllib.readthedocs.io/en/latest/analytics/1ec33c93-3d0b-4a28-8014-dbdaae5c60ae.html author: Timur Zinniatullin, E.M. Anhaus, oscd.community date: 2019-10-21 modified: 2023-02-05 tags: - attack.collection - attack.t1560.001 logsource: category: process_creation product: windows detection: selection: Image|endswith: \rar.exe CommandLine|contains: ' a ' condition: selection falsepositives: - Highly likely if rar is a default archiver in the monitored environment. level: low
Sigma rule: Adversaries may abuse container files such as disk image (.iso, .vhd) file formats to deliver malicious payloads that ma. Logsource: windows / ps_script. Rule: title: Suspicious Mount-DiskImage id: 29e1c216-6408-489d-8a06-ee9d151ef819 status: test description: Adversaries may abuse container files such as disk image (.iso, .vhd) file formats to deliver malicious payloads that may not be tagged with MOTW. references: - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1553.005/T1553.005.md#atomic-test-1---mount-iso-image - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/storage/mount-diskimage?view=windowsserver2022-ps author: frack113 date: 2022-02-01 tags: - attack.defense-impairment - attack.t1553.005 logsource: product: windows category: ps_script definition: 'Requirements: Script Block Logging must be enabled' detection: selection: ScriptBlockText|contains|all: - 'Mount-DiskImage ' - '-ImagePath ' condition: selection falsepositives: - Legitimate PowerShell scripts level: low
Sigma rule: Detects logon events that have characteristics of events generated during an attack with RottenPotato and the like. Logsource: windows / security. Rule: title: RottenPotato Like Attack Pattern id: 16f5d8ca-44bd-47c8-acbe-6fc95a16c12f status: test description: Detects logon events that have characteristics of events generated during an attack with RottenPotato and the like references: - https://twitter.com/SBousseaden/status/1195284233729777665 author: '@SBousseaden, Florian Roth' date: 2019-11-15 modified: 2022-12-22 tags: - attack.collection - attack.privilege-escalation - attack.credential-access - attack.t1557.001 logsource: product: windows service: security detection: selection: EventID: 4624 LogonType: 3 TargetUserName: ANONYMOUS LOGON WorkstationName: '-' IpAddress: - 127.0.0.1 - ::1 condition: selection falsepositives: - Unknown level: high
Sigma rule: Detects installation of a remote msi file from web.. Logsource: windows / application. Rule: title: MSI Installation From Web id: 5594e67a-7f92-4a04-b65d-1a42fd824a60 status: test description: Detects installation of a remote msi file from web. references: - https://twitter.com/_st0pp3r_/status/1583922009842802689 author: Stamatis Chatzimangou date: 2022-10-23 tags: - attack.stealth - attack.t1218 - attack.t1218.007 logsource: product: windows service: application detection: selection: Provider_Name: MsiInstaller EventID: - 1040 - 1042 Data|contains: :// condition: selection falsepositives: - Unknown level: medium
Sigma rule: Detects when AppLocker "Audit only" enforcement mode reports that an Application, DLL, Script, MSI, or Packaged-App woul. Logsource: windows / applocker. Rule: title: AppLocker Application Would Have Been Blocked id: 557e3bd3-7f21-495d-8d50-7c8bdfb8041c status: experimental description: 'Detects when AppLocker "Audit only" enforcement mode reports that an Application, DLL, Script, MSI, or Packaged-App would have been blocked if AppLocker "Enforce rules" enforcement mode was enabled. ' references: - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/application-security/application-control/windows-defender-application-control/applocker/what-is-applocker - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/application-security/application-control/windows-defender-application-control/applocker/using-event-viewer-with-applocker - https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/deploy-test-monitor-mastering-microsoft-applocker-part-2.html - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-server-2012-r2-and-2012/ee844150(v=ws.11) author: heyyanu date: 2026-03-26 tags: - attack.execution - attack.t1204.002 - attack.t1059.001 - attack.t1059.003 - attack.t1059.005 - attack.t1059.006 - attack.t1059.007 logsource: product: windows service: applocker detection: selection: EventID: - 8003 - 8006 - 8021 - 8024 condition: selection falsepositives: - Expected during AppLocker policy testing and audit mode deployments level: medium
Sigma rule: Detects changes to Microsoft Office protected view registry keys with which the attacker disables this feature.. Logsource: windows / registry_set. Rule: title: Microsoft Office Protected View Disabled id: a5c7a43f-6009-4a8c-80c5-32abf1c53ecc related: - id: 7c637634-c95d-4bbf-b26c-a82510874b34 type: obsolete status: test description: Detects changes to Microsoft Office protected view registry keys with which the attacker disables this feature. references: - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1562.001/T1562.001.md - https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/unit42-gorgon-group-slithering-nation-state-cybercrime/ - https://yoroi.company/research/cyber-criminal-espionage-operation-insists-on-italian-manufacturing/ - https://admx.help/HKCU/software/policies/microsoft/office/16.0/excel/security/protectedview author: frack113, Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) date: 2021-06-08 modified: 2023-08-17 tags: - attack.defense-impairment - attack.t1685 logsource: product: windows category: registry_set detection: selection_path: TargetObject|contains|all: - \SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Office\ - \Security\ProtectedView\ selection_values_1: Details: DWORD (0x00000001) TargetObject|endswith: - \DisableAttachementsInPV - \DisableInternetFilesInPV - \DisableIntranetCheck - \DisableUnsafeLocationsInPV selection_values_0: Details: DWORD (0x00000000) TargetObject|endswith: - \enabledatabasefileprotectedview - \enableforeigntextfileprotectedview condition: selection_path and 1 of selection_values_* falsepositives: - Unlikely level: high
Sigma rule: Detects block events for files that are disallowed by code integrity for protected processes. Logsource: windows / codeintegrity-operational. Rule: title: CodeIntegrity - Disallowed File For Protected Processes Has Been Blocked id: 5daf11c3-022b-4969-adb9-365e6c078c7c status: test description: Detects block events for files that are disallowed by code integrity for protected processes references: - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/application-security/application-control/windows-defender-application-control/operations/event-id-explanations - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/application-security/application-control/windows-defender-application-control/operations/event-tag-explanations - Internal Research author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) date: 2023-06-06 tags: - attack.privilege-escalation logsource: product: windows service: codeintegrity-operational detection: selection: EventID: 3104 condition: selection falsepositives: - Unlikely level: high
Sigma rule: Detects the enumeration and query of interesting and in some cases sensitive services on the system via "sc.exe". Attack. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: Interesting Service Enumeration Via Sc.EXE id: e83e8899-c9b2-483b-b355-5decc942b959 status: test description: 'Detects the enumeration and query of interesting and in some cases sensitive services on the system via "sc.exe". Attackers often try to enumerate the services currently running on a system in order to find different attack vectors. ' references: - https://www.n00py.io/2021/05/dumping-plaintext-rdp-credentials-from-svchost-exe/ - https://pentestlab.blog/tag/svchost/ author: Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel date: 2024-02-12 tags: - attack.t1003 - attack.credential-access logsource: product: windows category: process_creation detection: selection_img: - Image|endswith: \sc.exe - OriginalFileName: sc.exe selection_cli: CommandLine|contains: query selection_cmd: CommandLine|contains: termservice condition: all of selection_* falsepositives: - Unknown level: low
Sigma rule: Adversaries may abuse container files such as disk image (.iso, .vhd) file formats to deliver malicious payloads that ma. Logsource: windows / ps_script. Rule: title: Suspicious Invoke-Item From Mount-DiskImage id: 902cedee-0398-4e3a-8183-6f3a89773a96 status: test description: Adversaries may abuse container files such as disk image (.iso, .vhd) file formats to deliver malicious payloads that may not be tagged with MOTW. references: - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1553.005/T1553.005.md#atomic-test-2---mount-an-iso-image-and-run-executable-from-the-iso - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/storage/mount-diskimage?view=windowsserver2022-ps author: frack113 date: 2022-02-01 tags: - attack.defense-impairment - attack.t1553.005 logsource: product: windows category: ps_script definition: 'Requirements: Script Block Logging must be enabled' detection: selection: ScriptBlockText|contains|all: - 'Mount-DiskImage ' - '-ImagePath ' - Get-Volume - .DriveLetter - 'invoke-item ' - ):\ condition: selection falsepositives: - Legitimate PowerShell scripts level: medium
Sigma rule: Detects the use of curl with NTLM authentication and empty credentials (-u :), which can be abused to leak the currently. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: NTLM Hash Leak Via Curl NTLM Authentication id: 916eb839-895e-47f8-99ee-3008bf377a3e status: test description: 'Detects the use of curl with NTLM authentication and empty credentials (-u :), which can be abused to leak the currently logged-in user''s NTLMv2 challenge-response to an attacker-controlled server, enabling offline cracking or relay attacks. When no credentials are provided, the Microsoft-shipped curl passes a NULL identity to Windows SSPI, which automatically falls back to the current user''s logon session credentials stored in LSASS — without requiring a plaintext password. This behavior is exclusive to the curl binary shipped by Microsoft (available since Windows 10 / Windows Server 2019), which is built with SSPI support. ' references: - https://github.com/curl/curl/blob/master/lib/vauth/ntlm_sspi.c#L128-L140 - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/secauthn/acquirecredentialshandle--ntlm - https://curl.se/docs/manpage.html#--ntlm author: Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems) date: 2026-06-04 tags: - attack.credential-access - attack.t1187 logsource: category: process_creation product: windows detection: selection_img: - Image|endswith: \curl.exe - OriginalFileName: curl.exe selection_ntlm_flag: CommandLine|contains: --ntlm selection_empty_creds: CommandLine|re: '(?i)\s(-u|--user)\s*:' condition: all of selection_* falsepositives: - Should be very rare as it's not widely known or used, but could occur in legitimate use cases where curl is used with NTLM authentication and empty credentials, such as in certain scripts or automation tasks. level: high regression_tests_path: regression_data/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_curl_ntlm_hash_leak_attempt/info.yml
Sigma rule: Detects the creation of potentially malicious script and executable files in Windows startup folders, which is a common. Logsource: windows / file_event. Rule: title: Suspicious Startup Folder Persistence id: 28208707-fe31-437f-9a7f-4b1108b94d2e related: - id: 2aa0a6b4-a865-495b-ab51-c28249537b75 type: similar status: test description: 'Detects the creation of potentially malicious script and executable files in Windows startup folders, which is a common persistence technique used by threat actors. These files (.ps1, .vbs, .js, .bat, etc.) are automatically executed when a user logs in, making the Startup folder an attractive target for attackers. This technique is frequently observed in malvertising campaigns and malware distribution where attackers attempt to maintain long-term access to compromised systems. ' references: - https://github.com/last-byte/PersistenceSniper - https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2025/03/06/malvertising-campaign-leads-to-info-stealers-hosted-on-github/ - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/5ede8f21e42ebe37e0a6eff757dba60bcfa85859/atomics/T1547.001/T1547.001.md author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems), Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems) date: 2022-08-10 modified: 2025-10-12 tags: - attack.privilege-escalation - attack.execution - attack.t1204.002 - attack.persistence - attack.t1547.001 logsource: product: windows category: file_event detection: selection: TargetFilename|contains: \Windows\Start Menu\Programs\Startup\ TargetFilename|endswith: - .bat - .cmd - .dll - .hta - .jar - .js - .jse - .msi - .ps1 - .psd1 - .psm1 - .scr - .url - .vba - .vbe - .vbs - .wsf condition: selection falsepositives: - Rare legitimate usage of some of the extensions mentioned in the rule level: high
Sigma rule: Detect failed attempts to sign in to disabled accounts.. Logsource: azure / signinlogs. Rule: title: Login to Disabled Account id: 908655e0-25cf-4ae1-b775-1c8ce9cf43d8 status: test description: Detect failed attempts to sign in to disabled accounts. references: - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/architecture/security-operations-privileged-accounts author: AlertIQ date: 2021-10-10 modified: 2022-12-25 tags: - attack.privilege-escalation - attack.persistence - attack.initial-access - attack.stealth - attack.t1078.004 logsource: product: azure service: signinlogs detection: selection: ResultType: 50057 ResultDescription: User account is disabled. The account has been disabled by an administrator. condition: selection falsepositives: - Unknown level: medium
Sigma rule: Detects Obfuscated Powershell via use MSHTA in Scripts. Logsource: windows / ps_script. Rule: title: Invoke-Obfuscation Via Use MSHTA - PowerShell id: e55a5195-4724-480e-a77e-3ebe64bd3759 status: test description: Detects Obfuscated Powershell via use MSHTA in Scripts references: - https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/issues/1009 author: Nikita Nazarov, oscd.community date: 2020-10-08 modified: 2022-11-29 tags: - attack.stealth - attack.t1027 - attack.execution - attack.t1059.001 logsource: product: windows category: ps_script definition: 'Requirements: Script Block Logging must be enabled' detection: selection_4104: ScriptBlockText|contains|all: - set - '&&' - mshta - vbscript:createobject - .run - (window.close) condition: selection_4104 falsepositives: - Unknown level: high
Sigma rule: Detects execution of php using the "-r" flag. This is could be used as a way to launch a reverse shell or execute live p. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: Php Inline Command Execution id: d81871ef-5738-47ab-9797-7a9c90cd4bfb status: test description: Detects execution of php using the "-r" flag. This is could be used as a way to launch a reverse shell or execute live php code. references: - https://www.php.net/manual/en/features.commandline.php - https://www.revshells.com/ - https://pentestmonkey.net/cheat-sheet/shells/reverse-shell-cheat-sheet author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) date: 2023-01-02 tags: - attack.execution - attack.t1059 logsource: category: process_creation product: windows detection: selection_img: - Image|endswith: \php.exe - OriginalFileName: php.exe selection_cli: CommandLine|contains: ' -r' condition: all of selection_* falsepositives: - Unknown level: medium
Sigma rule: Detects PAExec service installation. Logsource: windows / system. Rule: title: PAExec Service Installation id: de7ce410-b3fb-4e8a-b38c-3b999e2c3420 status: test description: Detects PAExec service installation references: - https://www.poweradmin.com/paexec/ author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) date: 2022-10-26 tags: - attack.execution - attack.t1569.002 logsource: product: windows service: system detection: selection_eid: Provider_Name: Service Control Manager EventID: 7045 selection_image: - ServiceName|startswith: PAExec- - ImagePath|startswith: C:\WINDOWS\PAExec- condition: all of selection_* falsepositives: - Unknown level: medium
Sigma rule: Detects execution of EDR-Freeze, a tool that exploits the MiniDumpWriteDump function and WerFaultSecure.exe to suspend E. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: Hacktool - EDR-Freeze Execution id: c598cc0c-9e70-4852-b9eb-8921af79f598 status: experimental description: 'Detects execution of EDR-Freeze, a tool that exploits the MiniDumpWriteDump function and WerFaultSecure.exe to suspend EDR and Antivirus processes on Windows. EDR-Freeze leverages a race-condition attack to put security processes into a dormant state by suspending WerFaultSecure at the moment it freezes the target process. This technique does not require kernel-level exploits or BYOVD, but instead abuses user-mode functionality to temporarily disable monitoring by EDR or Antimalware solutions. ' references: - https://www.zerosalarium.com/2025/09/EDR-Freeze-Puts-EDRs-Antivirus-Into-Coma.html - https://github.com/TwoSevenOneT/EDR-Freeze author: Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems) date: 2025-09-24 modified: 2025-11-27 tags: - attack.defense-impairment - attack.t1685 logsource: category: process_creation product: windows detection: selection_img: Image|contains: - \EDR-Freeze - \EDRFreeze Image|endswith: .exe selection_imphash: Hashes|contains: - IMPHASH=1195F7935954A2CD09157390C33F8E8C - IMPHASH=129F58DE3D687FB7F012BF6C3D679997 - IMPHASH=2C617A175D0086251642C6619F7CC8BA - IMPHASH=8828F0B906F7844358FB92A899E9520F - IMPHASH=AF76D95157EC554DC1EF178E4E66D447 - IMPHASH=E1B04316B61ACA31DD52ABBEC0A37FD5 - IMPHASH=8B2D5B54AFCFEC60D54F6B31D80ED4A0 - IMPHASH=AB8BB31EDD91D2A05FE7B62A535E9EB7 condition: 1 of selection_* falsepositives: - Unlikely level: high regression_tests_path: regression_data/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_hktl_edr_freeze/info.yml
Sigma rule: Detects attempts to enable the root account via "dsenableroot". Logsource: macos / process_creation. Rule: title: Root Account Enable Via Dsenableroot id: 821bcf4d-46c7-4b87-bc57-9509d3ba7c11 status: test description: Detects attempts to enable the root account via "dsenableroot" references: - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/b27a3cb25025161d49ac861cb216db68c46a3537/atomics/T1078.003/T1078.003.md - https://github.com/elastic/detection-rules/blob/4312d8c9583be524578a14fe6295c3370b9a9307/rules/macos/persistence_enable_root_account.toml - https://ss64.com/osx/dsenableroot.html author: Sohan G (D4rkCiph3r) date: 2023-08-22 tags: - attack.privilege-escalation - attack.stealth - attack.t1078 - attack.t1078.001 - attack.t1078.003 - attack.initial-access - attack.persistence logsource: category: process_creation product: macos detection: selection: Image|endswith: /dsenableroot filter_main_disable: CommandLine|contains: ' -d ' condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_* falsepositives: - Unknown level: medium
Sigma rule: Detects successful installation of Atera Remote Monitoring & Management (RMM) agent as recently found to be used by Cont. Logsource: windows / application. Rule: title: Atera Agent Installation id: 87261fb2-69d0-42fe-b9de-88c6b5f65a43 status: test description: Detects successful installation of Atera Remote Monitoring & Management (RMM) agent as recently found to be used by Conti operators references: - https://www.advintel.io/post/secret-backdoor-behind-conti-ransomware-operation-introducing-atera-agent author: Bhabesh Raj date: 2021-09-01 modified: 2022-12-25 tags: - attack.command-and-control - attack.t1219.002 logsource: service: application product: windows detection: selection: EventID: 1033 Provider_Name: MsiInstaller Message|contains: AteraAgent condition: selection falsepositives: - Legitimate Atera agent installation level: high
Sigma rule: Detects execution of ntdsutil.exe, which can be used for various attacks against the NTDS database (NTDS.DIT). Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: Invocation of Active Directory Diagnostic Tool (ntdsutil.exe) id: 2afafd61-6aae-4df4-baed-139fa1f4c345 status: test description: Detects execution of ntdsutil.exe, which can be used for various attacks against the NTDS database (NTDS.DIT) references: - https://jpcertcc.github.io/ToolAnalysisResultSheet/details/ntdsutil.htm author: Thomas Patzke date: 2019-01-16 modified: 2022-03-11 tags: - attack.credential-access - attack.t1003.003 logsource: category: process_creation product: windows detection: selection: Image|endswith: \ntdsutil.exe condition: selection falsepositives: - NTDS maintenance level: medium
Sigma rule: A self-hosted runner is a system that you deploy and manage to execute jobs from GitHub Actions on GitHub.com. This rule. Logsource: github / audit. Rule: title: Github Self Hosted Runner Changes Detected id: f8ed0e8f-7438-4b79-85eb-f358ef2fbebd status: test description: 'A self-hosted runner is a system that you deploy and manage to execute jobs from GitHub Actions on GitHub.com. This rule detects changes to self-hosted runners configurations in the environment. The self-hosted runner configuration changes once detected, it should be validated from GitHub UI because the log entry may not provide full context. ' author: Muhammad Faisal (@faisalusuf) date: 2023-01-27 references: - https://docs.github.com/en/actions/hosting-your-own-runners/about-self-hosted-runners#about-self-hosted-runners - https://docs.github.com/en/organizations/keeping-your-organization-secure/managing-security-settings-for-your-organization/reviewing-the-audit-log-for-your-organization#search-based-on-operation tags: - attack.impact - attack.discovery - attack.collection - attack.persistence - attack.privilege-escalation - attack.initial-access - attack.stealth - attack.t1526 - attack.t1213.003 - attack.t1078.004 logsource: product: github service: audit definition: 'Requirements: The audit log streaming feature must be enabled to be able to receive such logs. You can enable following the documentation here: https://docs.github.com/en/enterprise-cloud@latest/admin/monitoring-activity-in-your-enterprise/reviewing-audit-logs-for-your-enterprise/streaming-the-audit-log-for-your-enterprise#setting-up-audit-log-streaming' detection: selection: action: - org.remove_self_hosted_runner - org.runner_group_created - org.runner_group_removed - org.runner_group_runner_removed - org.runner_group_runners_added - org.runner_group_runners_updated - org.runner_group_updated - repo.register_self_hosted_runner - repo.remove_self_hosted_runner condition: selection falsepositives: - Allowed self-hosted runners changes in the environment. - A self-hosted runner is automatically removed from GitHub if it has not connected to GitHub Actions for more than 14 days. - An ephemeral self-hosted runner is automatically removed from GitHub if it has not connected to GitHub Actions for more than 1 day. level: low