alirezaaminzadeh/cybersec-retrieval-benchmark huggingface dataset:
Sigma rule: Detects loading of kernel modules with insmod command. Loadable Kernel Modules (LKMs) are pieces of code that can be loa. Logsource: linux / auditd. Rule: title: Loading of Kernel Module via Insmod id: 106d7cbd-80ff-4985-b682-a7043e5acb72 status: test description: 'Detects loading of kernel modules with insmod command. Loadable Kernel Modules (LKMs) are pieces of code that can be loaded and unloaded into the kernel upon demand. Adversaries may use LKMs to obtain persistence within the system or elevate the privileges. ' references: - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1547.006/T1547.006.md - https://linux.die.net/man/8/insmod - https://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man8/kmod.8.html author: Pawel Mazur date: 2021-11-02 modified: 2022-12-25 tags: - attack.persistence - attack.privilege-escalation - attack.t1547.006 logsource: product: linux service: auditd detection: selection: type: SYSCALL comm: insmod exe: /usr/bin/kmod condition: selection falsepositives: - Unknown level: high
Sigma rule: Identifies the suspicious use of GetSessionToken. Tokens could be created and used by attackers to move laterally and es. Logsource: aws / cloudtrail. Rule: title: AWS STS GetSessionToken Misuse id: b45ab1d2-712f-4f01-a751-df3826969807 status: test description: Identifies the suspicious use of GetSessionToken. Tokens could be created and used by attackers to move laterally and escalate privileges. references: - https://github.com/elastic/detection-rules/pull/1213 - https://docs.aws.amazon.com/STS/latest/APIReference/API_GetSessionToken.html author: Austin Songer @austinsonger date: 2021-07-24 modified: 2022-10-09 tags: - attack.lateral-movement - attack.privilege-escalation - attack.t1548 - attack.t1550 - attack.t1550.001 logsource: product: aws service: cloudtrail detection: selection: eventSource: sts.amazonaws.com eventName: GetSessionToken userIdentity.type: IAMUser condition: selection falsepositives: - GetSessionToken may be done by a system or network administrator. Verify whether the user identity, user agent, and/or hostname should be making changes in your environment. GetSessionToken from unfamiliar users or hosts should be investigated. If known behavior is causing false positives, it can be exempted from the rule. level: low
Sigma rule: Detects PowerShell writing startup shortcuts. This procedure was highlighted in Red Canary Intel Insights Oct. 2021, "We. Logsource: windows / file_event. Rule: title: Potential Startup Shortcut Persistence Via PowerShell.EXE id: 92fa78e7-4d39-45f1-91a3-8b23f3f1088d status: test description: 'Detects PowerShell writing startup shortcuts. This procedure was highlighted in Red Canary Intel Insights Oct. 2021, "We frequently observe adversaries using PowerShell to write malicious .lnk files into the startup directory to establish persistence. Accordingly, this detection opportunity is likely to identify persistence mechanisms in multiple threats. In the context of Yellow Cockatoo, this persistence mechanism eventually launches the command-line script that leads to the installation of a malicious DLL" ' references: - https://redcanary.com/blog/intelligence-insights-october-2021/ - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/36d49de4c8b00bf36054294b4a1fcbab3917d7c5/atomics/T1547.001/T1547.001.md#atomic-test-7---add-executable-shortcut-link-to-user-startup-folder author: Christopher Peacock '@securepeacock', SCYTHE date: 2021-10-24 modified: 2023-02-23 tags: - attack.privilege-escalation - attack.persistence - attack.t1547.001 logsource: product: windows category: file_event detection: selection: Image|endswith: - \powershell.exe - \pwsh.exe TargetFilename|contains: \start menu\programs\startup\ TargetFilename|endswith: .lnk condition: selection falsepositives: - Depending on your environment accepted applications may leverage this at times. It is recommended to search for anomalies inidicative of malware. level: high
Sigma rule: Detects execution of the built-in script located in "C:\Windows\System32\gatherNetworkInfo.vbs". Which can be used to ga. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: Potential Reconnaissance Activity Via GatherNetworkInfo.VBS id: 575dce0c-8139-4e30-9295-1ee75969f7fe related: - id: f92a6f1e-a512-4a15-9735-da09e78d7273 type: similar - id: 07aa184a-870d-413d-893a-157f317f6f58 type: similar status: test description: Detects execution of the built-in script located in "C:\Windows\System32\gatherNetworkInfo.vbs". Which can be used to gather information about the target machine references: - https://posts.slayerlabs.com/living-off-the-land/#gathernetworkinfovbs - https://www.mandiant.com/resources/blog/trojanized-windows-installers-ukrainian-government author: blueteamer8699 date: 2022-01-03 modified: 2023-02-08 tags: - attack.discovery - attack.execution - attack.t1615 - attack.t1059.005 logsource: category: process_creation product: windows detection: selection_img: - Image|endswith: - \cscript.exe - \wscript.exe - OriginalFileName: - cscript.exe - wscript.exe selection_cli: CommandLine|contains: gatherNetworkInfo.vbs condition: all of selection_* falsepositives: - Administrative activity level: medium
Sigma rule: Detects suspicious usage of the ShellExec_RunDLL function to launch other commands as seen in the the raspberry-robin at. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: Suspicious Usage Of ShellExec_RunDLL id: d87bd452-6da1-456e-8155-7dc988157b7d related: - id: 36c5146c-d127-4f85-8e21-01bf62355d5a type: obsolete - id: 8823e85d-31d8-473e-b7f4-92da070f0fc6 type: similar status: test description: Detects suspicious usage of the ShellExec_RunDLL function to launch other commands as seen in the the raspberry-robin attack references: - https://redcanary.com/blog/raspberry-robin/ - https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2022/10/27/raspberry-robin-worm-part-of-larger-ecosystem-facilitating-pre-ransomware-activity/ - https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/issues/1009 author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) date: 2022-09-01 modified: 2022-12-30 tags: - attack.stealth logsource: category: process_creation product: windows detection: selection_openasrundll: CommandLine|contains: ShellExec_RunDLL selection_suspcli: CommandLine|contains: - \Desktop\ - \Temp\ - \Users\Public\ - comspec - iex - Invoke- - msiexec - odbcconf - regsvr32 condition: all of selection_* falsepositives: - Unknown level: high
Sigma rule: Detects remote access to the LSASS process via WinRM. This could be a sign of credential dumping from tools like mimikat. Logsource: windows / process_access. Rule: title: Remote LSASS Process Access Through Windows Remote Management id: aa35a627-33fb-4d04-a165-d33b4afca3e8 status: stable description: Detects remote access to the LSASS process via WinRM. This could be a sign of credential dumping from tools like mimikatz. references: - https://pentestlab.blog/2018/05/15/lateral-movement-winrm/ author: Patryk Prauze - ING Tech date: 2019-05-20 modified: 2023-11-29 tags: - attack.credential-access - attack.execution - attack.t1003.001 - attack.t1059.001 - attack.lateral-movement - attack.t1021.006 - attack.s0002 logsource: category: process_access product: windows detection: selection: TargetImage|endswith: \lsass.exe SourceImage|endswith: :\Windows\system32\wsmprovhost.exe filter_main_access: GrantedAccess: '0x80000000' condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_* falsepositives: - Unlikely level: high
Sigma rule: Detects the execution traces of the WizardUpdate malware. WizardUpdate is a macOS trojan that attempts to infiltrate mac. Logsource: macos / process_creation. Rule: title: Potential WizardUpdate Malware Infection id: f68c4a4f-19ef-4817-952c-50dce331f4b0 status: test description: Detects the execution traces of the WizardUpdate malware. WizardUpdate is a macOS trojan that attempts to infiltrate macOS machines to steal data and it is associated with other types of malicious payloads, increasing the chances of multiple infections on a device. references: - https://github.com/elastic/protections-artifacts/commit/746086721fd385d9f5c6647cada1788db4aea95f#diff-c68a1fcbf7a3f80c87225d7fdc031f691e9f3b6a14a36754be00762bfe6eae97 - https://malpedia.caad.fkie.fraunhofer.de/details/osx.xcsset - https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2022/02/02/the-evolution-of-a-mac-trojan-updateagents-progression/ author: Tim Rauch (rule), Elastic (idea) date: 2022-10-17 tags: - attack.command-and-control logsource: category: process_creation product: macos detection: selection_1: Image|endswith: /sh CommandLine|contains|all: - '=$(curl ' - eval selection_2: Image|endswith: /curl CommandLine|contains: _intermediate_agent_ condition: 1 of selection_* falsepositives: - Unknown level: high
Sigma rule: Detects the execution of PingCastle, a tool designed to quickly assess the Active Directory security level via a script. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: PUA - PingCastle Execution From Potentially Suspicious Parent id: b37998de-a70b-4f33-b219-ec36bf433dc0 related: - id: b1cb4ab6-ac31-43f4-adf1-d9d08957419c type: derived status: test description: 'Detects the execution of PingCastle, a tool designed to quickly assess the Active Directory security level via a script located in a potentially suspicious or uncommon location. ' references: - https://github.com/vletoux/pingcastle - https://thedfirreport.com/2023/10/30/netsupport-intrusion-results-in-domain-compromise/ - https://github.com/fengjixuchui/Start-ADEnum/blob/e237a739db98b6104427d833004836507da36a58/Functions/Start-ADEnum.ps1#L450 - https://github.com/lkys37en/Start-ADEnum/blob/5b42c54215fe5f57fc59abc52c20487d15764005/Functions/Start-ADEnum.ps1#L680 - https://github.com/projectHULK/AD_Recon/blob/dde2daba9b3393a9388cbebda87068972cc0bd3b/SecurityAssessment.ps1#L2699 - https://github.com/802-1x/Compliance/blob/2e53df8b6e89686a0b91116b3f42c8f717dca820/Ping%20Castle/Get-PingCastle-HTMLComplianceReport.ps1#L8 - https://github.com/EvotecIT/TheDashboard/blob/481a9ce8f82f2fd55fe65220ee6486bae6df0c9d/Examples/RunReports/PingCastle.ps1 author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems), X__Junior (Nextron Systems) date: 2024-01-11 tags: - attack.reconnaissance - attack.t1595 logsource: category: process_creation product: windows detection: selection_parent_ext: ParentCommandLine|contains: - .bat - .chm - .cmd - .hta - .htm - .html - .js - .lnk - .ps1 - .vbe - .vbs - .wsf selection_parent_path_1: ParentCommandLine|contains: - :\Perflogs\ - :\Temp\ - :\Users\Public\ - :\Windows\Temp\ - \AppData\Local\Temp - \AppData\Roaming\ - \Temporary Internet selection_parent_path_2: - ParentCommandLine|contains|all: - :\Users\ - \Favorites\ - ParentCommandLine|contains|all: - :\Users\ - \Favourites\ - ParentCommandLine|contains|all: - :\Users\ - \Contacts\ selection_cli: - Image|endswith: \PingCastle.exe - OriginalFileName: PingCastle.exe - Product: Ping Castle - CommandLine|contains: - --scanner aclcheck - --scanner antivirus - --scanner computerversion - --scanner foreignusers - --scanner laps_bitlocker - --scanner localadmin - --scanner nullsession - --scanner nullsession-trust - --scanner oxidbindings - --scanner remote - --scanner share - --scanner smb - --scanner smb3querynetwork - --scanner spooler - --scanner startup - --scanner zerologon - CommandLine|contains: --no-enum-limit - CommandLine|contains|all: - --healthcheck - --level Full - CommandLine|contains|all:
Sigma rule: Detects suspicious Windows Error Reporting manager (wermgr.exe) child process. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: Suspicious Child Process Of Wermgr.EXE id: 396f6630-f3ac-44e3-bfc8-1b161bc00c4e related: - id: 5394fcc7-aeb2-43b5-9a09-cac9fc5edcd5 type: similar status: test description: Detects suspicious Windows Error Reporting manager (wermgr.exe) child process references: - https://www.trendmicro.com/en_us/research/22/j/black-basta-infiltrates-networks-via-qakbot-brute-ratel-and-coba.html - https://www.echotrail.io/insights/search/wermgr.exe - https://github.com/binderlabs/DirCreate2System author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems) date: 2022-10-14 modified: 2024-08-29 tags: - attack.privilege-escalation - attack.stealth - attack.t1055 - attack.t1036 logsource: category: process_creation product: windows detection: selection: ParentImage|endswith: \wermgr.exe Image|endswith: - \cmd.exe - \cscript.exe - \ipconfig.exe - \mshta.exe - \net.exe - \net1.exe - \netstat.exe - \nslookup.exe - \powershell_ise.exe - \powershell.exe - \pwsh.exe - \regsvr32.exe - \rundll32.exe - \systeminfo.exe - \whoami.exe - \wscript.exe filter_main_rundll32: Image|endswith: \rundll32.exe CommandLine|contains|all: - C:\Windows\system32\WerConCpl.dll - 'LaunchErcApp ' CommandLine|contains: - -queuereporting - -responsepester condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_* falsepositives: - Unknown level: high
Sigma rule: Detects Stracciatella which executes a Powershell runspace from within C# (aka SharpPick technique) with AMSI, ETW and S. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: HackTool - Stracciatella Execution id: 7a4d9232-92fc-404d-8ce1-4c92e7caf539 status: test description: Detects Stracciatella which executes a Powershell runspace from within C# (aka SharpPick technique) with AMSI, ETW and Script Block Logging disabled based on PE metadata characteristics. references: - https://github.com/mgeeky/Stracciatella author: pH-T (Nextron Systems) date: 2023-04-17 modified: 2024-11-23 tags: - attack.execution - attack.defense-impairment - attack.t1059 - attack.t1685 logsource: category: process_creation product: windows detection: selection: - Image|endswith: \Stracciatella.exe - OriginalFileName: Stracciatella.exe - Description: Stracciatella - Hashes|contains: - SHA256=9d25e61ec1527e2a69d7c2a4e3fe2fe15890710c198a66a9f25d99fdf6c7b956 - SHA256=fd16609bd9830c63b9413671678bb159b89c357d21942ddbb6b93add808d121a condition: selection falsepositives: - Unlikely level: high
Sigma rule: Detects suspicious Windows Defender Application Control (WDAC) policy file creation from abnormal processes that could b. Logsource: windows / file_event. Rule: title: Potentially Suspicious WDAC Policy File Creation id: 1d2de8a6-4803-4fde-b85b-f58f3aa7a705 status: experimental description: 'Detects suspicious Windows Defender Application Control (WDAC) policy file creation from abnormal processes that could be abused by attacker to block EDR/AV components while allowing their own malicious code to run on the system. ' references: - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/application-security/application-control/app-control-for-business/deployment/deploy-appcontrol-policies-using-group-policy - https://beierle.win/2024-12-20-Weaponizing-WDAC-Killing-the-Dreams-of-EDR/ - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/application-security/application-control/app-control-for-business/deployment/appcontrol-deployment-guide - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/application-security/application-control/app-control-for-business/deployment/deploy-appcontrol-policies-with-script - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/application-security/application-control/app-control-for-business/deployment/deploy-appcontrol-policies-with-memcm author: X__Junior date: 2025-02-07 modified: 2026-05-18 tags: - attack.defense-impairment logsource: category: file_event product: windows detection: selection_target: TargetFilename|contains: \Windows\System32\CodeIntegrity\ filter_main_images: Image|endswith: - \Microsoft.ConfigurationManagement.exe - \WDAC Wizard.exe - C:\Program Files\PowerShell\7-preview\pwsh.exe - C:\Program Files\PowerShell\7\pwsh.exe - C:\Windows\System32\dllhost.exe - C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell_ise.exe - C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe - C:\Windows\SysWOW64\dllhost.exe - C:\Windows\SysWOW64\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell_ise.exe - C:\Windows\SysWOW64\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe filter_main_cli: - CommandLine|contains|all: - ConvertFrom-CIPolicy -XmlFilePath - '-BinaryFilePath ' - CommandLine|contains: CiTool --update-policy - CommandLine|contains|all: - Copy-Item -Path - -Destination filter_main_system: Image: System filter_main_wuauclt: Image: C:\Windows\System32\wuauclt.exe filter_main_wuaucltcore: Image: - C:\Windows\UUS\arm64\wuaucltcore.exe - C:\Windows\UUS\Packages\Preview\arm64\wuaucltcore.exe condition: selection_target and not 1 of filter_main_* falsepositives: - Administrators and security vendors could leverage WDAC, apply additional filters as needed. level: medium
Sigma rule: Detects the use of iexpress.exe to create binaries via Self Extraction Directive (SED) files located in potentially susp. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: Self Extracting Package Creation Via Iexpress.EXE From Potentially Suspicious Location id: b2b048b0-7857-4380-b0fb-d3f0ab820b71 status: test description: 'Detects the use of iexpress.exe to create binaries via Self Extraction Directive (SED) files located in potentially suspicious locations. This behavior has been observed in-the-wild by different threat actors. ' references: - https://strontic.github.io/xcyclopedia/library/iexpress.exe-D594B2A33EFAFD0EABF09E3FDC05FCEA.html - https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/IExpress - https://decoded.avast.io/janvojtesek/raspberry-robins-roshtyak-a-little-lesson-in-trickery/ - https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/602f4ae507fa8de57ada079adff25a6c2a899bd25cd092d0af7e62cdb619c93c/behavior author: Joseliyo Sanchez, @Joseliyo_Jstnk, Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) date: 2024-02-05 modified: 2024-06-04 tags: - attack.stealth - attack.t1218 logsource: category: process_creation product: windows detection: selection_img: - Image|endswith: \iexpress.exe - OriginalFileName: IEXPRESS.exe selection_cli: CommandLine|contains|windash: ' /n ' selection_paths: CommandLine|contains: - :\ProgramData\ - :\Temp\ - :\Windows\System32\Tasks\ - :\Windows\Tasks\ - :\Windows\Temp\ - \AppData\Local\Temp\ condition: all of selection_* falsepositives: - Administrators building packages using iexpress.exe level: high
Sigma rule: Detects file creation events with filename patterns used by Impacket.. Logsource: windows / file_event. Rule: title: HackTool - Impacket File Indicators id: 03f4ca17-de95-428d-a75a-4ee78b047256 related: - id: 6e2a900a-ced9-4e4a-a9c2-13e706f9518a type: similar status: experimental description: Detects file creation events with filename patterns used by Impacket. references: - https://thedfirreport.com/2025/05/19/another-confluence-bites-the-dust-falling-to-elpaco-team-ransomware/ - https://github.com/fortra/impacket author: The DFIR Report, IrishDeath date: 2025-05-19 tags: - attack.credential-access - attack.t1003.001 logsource: product: windows category: file_event detection: selection_names_re: TargetFilename|re: \\sessionresume_[a-zA-Z]{8}$ condition: selection_names_re falsepositives: - Unknown level: high
Sigma rule: Detects suspicious child processes of the Veeam service process. This could indicate potential RCE or SQL Injection.. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: Suspicious Child Process Of Veeam Dabatase id: d55b793d-f847-4eea-b59a-5ab09908ac90 related: - id: 869b9ca7-9ea2-4a5a-8325-e80e62f75445 type: similar status: test description: Detects suspicious child processes of the Veeam service process. This could indicate potential RCE or SQL Injection. references: - https://labs.withsecure.com/publications/fin7-target-veeam-servers author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) date: 2023-05-04 tags: - attack.initial-access - attack.persistence - attack.privilege-escalation logsource: category: process_creation product: windows detection: selection_parent: ParentImage|endswith: \sqlservr.exe ParentCommandLine|contains: VEEAMSQL selection_child_1: Image|endswith: - \cmd.exe - \powershell.exe - \pwsh.exe - \wsl.exe - \wt.exe CommandLine|contains: - '-ex ' - bypass - cscript - DownloadString - http:// - https:// - mshta - regsvr32 - rundll32 - wscript - 'copy ' selection_child_2: Image|endswith: - \net.exe - \net1.exe - \netstat.exe - \nltest.exe - \ping.exe - \tasklist.exe - \whoami.exe condition: selection_parent and 1 of selection_child_* level: critical
Sigma rule: Detects service installation with suspicious folder patterns. Logsource: windows / system. Rule: title: Service Installation with Suspicious Folder Pattern id: 1b2ae822-6fe1-43ba-aa7c-d1a3b3d1d5f2 status: test description: Detects service installation with suspicious folder patterns references: - Internal Research author: pH-T (Nextron Systems) date: 2022-03-18 modified: 2022-03-24 tags: - attack.persistence - attack.privilege-escalation - car.2013-09-005 - attack.t1543.003 logsource: product: windows service: system detection: selection_eid: Provider_Name: Service Control Manager EventID: 7045 selection_img_paths: - ImagePath|re: ^[Cc]:\\[Pp]rogram[Dd]ata\\.{1,9}\.exe - ImagePath|re: ^[Cc]:\\.{1,9}\.exe condition: all of selection_* falsepositives: - Unknown level: high
Sigma rule: Detects Windows executables that write files with suspicious extensions. Logsource: windows / file_event. Rule: title: Windows Binaries Write Suspicious Extensions id: b8fd0e93-ff58-4cbd-8f48-1c114e342e62 related: - id: 1277f594-a7d1-4f28-a2d3-73af5cbeab43 type: derived status: test description: Detects Windows executables that write files with suspicious extensions references: - Internal Research author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) date: 2022-08-12 modified: 2025-10-07 tags: - attack.stealth - attack.t1036 logsource: category: file_event product: windows detection: selection_generic: Image|endswith: - \csrss.exe - \lsass.exe - \RuntimeBroker.exe - \sihost.exe - \smss.exe - \wininit.exe - \winlogon.exe TargetFilename|endswith: - .bat - .dll - .exe - .hta - .iso - .ps1 - .txt - .vbe - .vbs selection_special: Image|endswith: - \dllhost.exe - \rundll32.exe - \svchost.exe TargetFilename|endswith: - .bat - .hta - .iso - .ps1 - .vbe - .vbs filter_main_AppLockerPolicyTest: Image: C:\Windows\System32\dllhost.exe TargetFilename|contains|all: - :\Users\ - \AppData\Local\Temp\__PSScriptPolicyTest_ TargetFilename|endswith: .ps1 filter_main_script_gpo_machine: Image: C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe TargetFilename|contains|all: - C:\Windows\System32\GroupPolicy\DataStore\ - \sysvol\ - \Policies\ - \Machine\Scripts\Startup\ TargetFilename|endswith: - .ps1 - .bat filter_main_clipchamp: Image: C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe TargetFilename|contains|all: - C:\Program Files\WindowsApps\Clipchamp - .ps1 filter_main_powershell_preview: Image: - C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe - C:\Windows\SysWOW64\svchost.exe TargetFilename|startswith: - C:\Program Files\WindowsApps\Microsoft.PowerShellPreview - C:\Program Files (x86)\WindowsApps\Microsoft.PowerShellPreview TargetFilename|endswith: .ps1 condition: 1 of selection_* and not 1 of filter_main_* falsepositives: - Unknown level: high
Sigma rule: Detects suspicious DNS queries to api.telegram.org used by Telegram Bots of any kind. Logsource: dns. Rule: title: Telegram Bot API Request id: c64c5175-5189-431b-a55e-6d9882158251 status: test description: Detects suspicious DNS queries to api.telegram.org used by Telegram Bots of any kind references: - https://core.telegram.org/bots/faq - https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2018/03/unit42-telerat-another-android-trojan-leveraging-telegrams-bot-api-to-target-iranian-users/ - https://blog.malwarebytes.com/threat-analysis/2016/11/telecrypt-the-ransomware-abusing-telegram-api-defeated/ - https://www.welivesecurity.com/2016/12/13/rise-telebots-analyzing-disruptive-killdisk-attacks/ author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems) date: 2018-06-05 modified: 2022-10-09 tags: - attack.command-and-control - attack.t1102.002 logsource: category: dns detection: selection: query: api.telegram.org condition: selection falsepositives: - Legitimate use of Telegram bots in the company level: medium