alirezaaminzadeh/cybersec-retrieval-benchmark huggingface dataset:
Sigma rule: Detects a suspicious copy operation that tries to copy a known LOLBIN from system (System32, SysWOW64, WinSxS) directori. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: LOL-Binary Copied From System Directory id: f5d19838-41b5-476c-98d8-ba8af4929ee2 related: - id: fff9d2b7-e11c-4a69-93d3-40ef66189767 type: derived status: test description: 'Detects a suspicious copy operation that tries to copy a known LOLBIN from system (System32, SysWOW64, WinSxS) directories to another on disk in order to bypass detections based on locations. ' references: - https://www.hybrid-analysis.com/sample/8da5b75b6380a41eee3a399c43dfe0d99eeefaa1fd21027a07b1ecaa4cd96fdd?environmentId=120 - https://web.archive.org/web/20180331144337/https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2018/03/sanny-malware-delivery-method-updated-in-recently-observed-attacks.html - https://thedfirreport.com/2023/08/28/html-smuggling-leads-to-domain-wide-ransomware/ - https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/14e722855605ba78dc1d21153f0e1be90e7528149f2cd2d7d6eba8ef27534bdc/behavior author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) date: 2023-08-29 modified: 2025-11-27 tags: - attack.stealth - attack.t1036.003 logsource: category: process_creation product: windows detection: selection_tools_cmd: Image|endswith: \cmd.exe CommandLine|contains: 'copy ' selection_tools_pwsh: Image|endswith: - \powershell.exe - \pwsh.exe CommandLine|contains: - copy-item - ' copy ' - 'cpi ' - ' cp ' selection_tools_other: - Image|endswith: - \robocopy.exe - \xcopy.exe - OriginalFileName: - robocopy.exe - XCOPY.EXE selection_target_path: CommandLine|contains: - \System32 - \SysWOW64 - \WinSxS selection_target_lolbin: CommandLine|contains: - \bitsadmin.exe - \calc.exe - \certutil.exe - \cmdl32.exe - \cscript.exe - \mshta.exe - \rundll32.exe - \wscript.exe - \ie4uinit.exe condition: 1 of selection_tools_* and all of selection_target_* falsepositives: - Unknown level: high
Sigma rule: Detects potential Active Directory enumeration via LDAP. Logsource: windows / ldap. Rule: title: Potential Active Directory Reconnaissance/Enumeration Via LDAP id: 31d68132-4038-47c7-8f8e-635a39a7c174 status: test description: Detects potential Active Directory enumeration via LDAP references: - https://techcommunity.microsoft.com/t5/microsoft-defender-for-endpoint/hunting-for-reconnaissance-activities-using-ldap-search-filters/ba-p/824726 - https://github.com/PowerShellMafia/PowerSploit/blob/d943001a7defb5e0d1657085a77a0e78609be58f/Recon/PowerView.ps1 - https://github.com/BloodHoundAD/SharpHound3/blob/7d96b991b1887ff50349ce59c80980bc0d95c86a/SharpHound3/LdapBuilder.cs - https://medium.com/falconforce/falconfriday-detecting-active-directory-data-collection-0xff21-c22d1a57494c - https://github.com/fox-it/BloodHound.py/blob/d65eb614831cd30f26028ccb072f5e77ca287e0b/bloodhound/ad/domain.py#L427 - https://ipurple.team/2024/07/15/sharphound-detection/ author: Adeem Mawani date: 2021-06-22 modified: 2025-07-04 tags: - attack.discovery - attack.t1069.002 - attack.t1087.002 - attack.t1482 logsource: product: windows service: ldap definition: 'Requirements: Microsoft-Windows-LDAP-Client/Debug ETW logging' detection: generic_search: EventID: 30 SearchFilter|contains: - (groupType:1.2.840.113556.1.4.803:=2147483648) - (groupType:1.2.840.113556.1.4.803:=2147483656) - (groupType:1.2.840.113556.1.4.803:=2147483652) - (groupType:1.2.840.113556.1.4.803:=2147483650) - (sAMAccountType=805306369) - (sAMAccountType=805306368) - (sAMAccountType=536870913) - (sAMAccountType=536870912) - (sAMAccountType=268435457) - (sAMAccountType=268435456) - (objectCategory=groupPolicyContainer) - (objectCategory=organizationalUnit) - (objectCategory=nTDSDSA) - (objectCategory=server) - (objectCategory=domain) - (objectCategory=person) - (objectCategory=group) - (objectCategory=user) - (objectClass=trustedDomain) - (objectClass=computer) - (objectClass=server) - (objectClass=group) - (objectClass=user) - (primaryGroupID=521) - (primaryGroupID=516) - (primaryGroupID=515) - (primaryGroupID=512) - Domain Admins - objectGUID=\* - (schemaIDGUID=\*) - admincount=1 distinguished_name_enumeration: EventID: 30 SearchFilter: (objectclass=\*) DistinguishedName|contains: - CN=Domain Admins - CN=Enterprise Admins - CN=Group Policy Creator Owners suspicious_flag: EventID: 30 SearchFilter|contains: - (userAccountControl:1.2.840.113556.1.4.803:=4194304) - (userAccountControl:1.2.840.113556.1.4.803:=2097152) - '!(userAccountControl:1.2.840.113556.1.4.803:=1048574)' - (userAccountControl:1.2.840.113
Sigma rule: Detects loading of "credui.dll" and related DLLs by an uncommon process. Attackers might leverage this DLL for potential. Logsource: windows / image_load. Rule: title: CredUI.DLL Loaded By Uncommon Process id: 9ae01559-cf7e-4f8e-8e14-4c290a1b4784 status: test description: Detects loading of "credui.dll" and related DLLs by an uncommon process. Attackers might leverage this DLL for potential use of "CredUIPromptForCredentials" or "CredUnPackAuthenticationBufferW". references: - https://securitydatasets.com/notebooks/atomic/windows/credential_access/SDWIN-201020013208.html - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1056.002/T1056.002.md#atomic-test-2---powershell---prompt-user-for-password - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/api/wincred/nf-wincred-creduipromptforcredentialsa - https://github.com/S12cybersecurity/RDPCredentialStealer author: Roberto Rodriguez (Cyb3rWard0g), OTR (Open Threat Research) date: 2020-10-20 modified: 2026-06-29 tags: - attack.credential-access - attack.collection - attack.t1056.002 logsource: category: image_load product: windows detection: selection: - ImageLoaded|endswith: - \credui.dll - \wincredui.dll - OriginalFileName: - credui.dll - wincredui.dll filter_main_generic: Image|startswith: - C:\Program Files (x86)\ - C:\Program Files\ - C:\Windows\System32\ - C:\Windows\SysWOW64\ - C:\Windows\SystemApps\ filter_main_full: Image: - C:\Windows\explorer.exe - C:\Windows\ImmersiveControlPanel\SystemSettings.exe - C:\Windows\regedit.exe filter_optional_opera: Image|endswith: \opera_autoupdate.exe filter_optional_process_explorer: Image|endswith: - \procexp64.exe - \procexp64a.exe - \procexp.exe filter_optional_teams: Image|startswith: C:\Users\ Image|contains: \AppData\Local\Microsoft\Teams\ Image|endswith: \Teams.exe filter_optional_onedrive: Image|startswith: C:\Users\ Image|contains: \AppData\Local\Microsoft\OneDrive\ condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_* and not 1 of filter_optional_* falsepositives: - Other legitimate processes loading those DLLs in your environment. level: medium
Sigma rule: Detects the use of the PhoneDeepLink parameter to potentially sideload a DLL file that does not exist. This non-existent. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: Potential DLL Sideloading Via DeviceEnroller.EXE id: e173ad47-4388-4012-ae62-bd13f71c18a8 related: - id: ee4c5d06-3abc-48cc-8885-77f1c20f4451 type: similar status: test description: 'Detects the use of the PhoneDeepLink parameter to potentially sideload a DLL file that does not exist. This non-existent DLL file is named "ShellChromeAPI.dll". Adversaries can drop their own renamed DLL and execute it via DeviceEnroller.exe using this parameter ' references: - https://mobile.twitter.com/0gtweet/status/1564131230941122561 - https://strontic.github.io/xcyclopedia/library/DeviceEnroller.exe-24BEF0D6B0ECED36BB41831759FDE18D.html author: '@gott_cyber' date: 2022-08-29 modified: 2023-02-04 tags: - attack.privilege-escalation - attack.persistence - attack.execution - attack.stealth - attack.t1574.001 logsource: category: process_creation product: windows detection: selection_img: - Image|endswith: \deviceenroller.exe - OriginalFileName: deviceenroller.exe selection_cli: CommandLine|contains: /PhoneDeepLink condition: all of selection_* falsepositives: - Unknown level: medium
Sigma rule: Threat actors can use an older version of the auditpol binary available inside the NT resource kit to change audit polic. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: Audit Policy Tampering Via NT Resource Kit Auditpol id: c6c56ada-612b-42d1-9a29-adad3c5c2c1e related: - id: 0a13e132-651d-11eb-ae93-0242ac130002 type: similar status: test description: 'Threat actors can use an older version of the auditpol binary available inside the NT resource kit to change audit policy configuration to impair detection capability. This can be carried out by selectively disabling/removing certain audit policies as well as restoring a custom policy owned by the threat actor. ' references: - https://github.com/3CORESec/MAL-CL/tree/master/Descriptors/Windows%202000%20Resource%20Kit%20Tools/AuditPol author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) date: 2021-12-18 modified: 2023-02-21 tags: - attack.defense-impairment - attack.t1685.001 logsource: category: process_creation product: windows detection: selection: CommandLine|contains: - /logon:none - /system:none - /sam:none - /privilege:none - /object:none - /process:none - /policy:none condition: selection falsepositives: - The old auditpol utility isn't available by default on recent versions of Windows as it was replaced by a newer version. The FP rate should be very low except for tools that use a similar flag structure level: high
Sigma rule: Detects changes to "DsrmAdminLogonBehavior" registry value. During a Domain Controller (DC) promotion, administrators cr. Logsource: windows / registry_set. Rule: title: Directory Service Restore Mode(DSRM) Registry Value Tampering id: b61e87c0-50db-4b2e-8986-6a2be94b33b0 related: - id: 53ad8e36-f573-46bf-97e4-15ba5bf4bb51 type: similar status: test description: 'Detects changes to "DsrmAdminLogonBehavior" registry value. During a Domain Controller (DC) promotion, administrators create a Directory Services Restore Mode (DSRM) local administrator account with a password that rarely changes. The DSRM account is an “Administrator” account that logs in with the DSRM mode when the server is booting up to restore AD backups or recover the server from a failure. Attackers could abuse DSRM account to maintain their persistence and access to the organization''s Active Directory. If the "DsrmAdminLogonBehavior" value is set to "0", the administrator account can only be used if the DC starts in DSRM. If the "DsrmAdminLogonBehavior" value is set to "1", the administrator account can only be used if the local AD DS service is stopped. If the "DsrmAdminLogonBehavior" value is set to "2", the administrator account can always be used. ' references: - https://adsecurity.org/?p=1785 - https://www.sentinelone.com/blog/detecting-dsrm-account-misconfigurations/ - https://book.hacktricks.xyz/windows-hardening/active-directory-methodology/dsrm-credentials author: Nischal Khadgi date: 2024-07-11 tags: - attack.credential-access - attack.persistence - attack.defense-impairment - attack.t1556 logsource: category: registry_set product: windows detection: selection: TargetObject|endswith: \Control\Lsa\DsrmAdminLogonBehavior filter_main_default_value: Details: DWORD (0x00000000) condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_* falsepositives: - Unknown level: high
Sigma rule: Detects a network connection initiated by the Add-In deployment cache updating utility "AddInutil.exe". This could indic. Logsource: windows / network_connection. Rule: title: Network Connection Initiated By AddinUtil.EXE id: 5205613d-2a63-4412-a895-3a2458b587b3 status: test description: 'Detects a network connection initiated by the Add-In deployment cache updating utility "AddInutil.exe". This could indicate a potential command and control communication as this tool doesn''t usually initiate network activity. ' references: - https://www.blue-prints.blog/content/blog/posts/lolbin/addinutil-lolbas.html author: Michael McKinley (@McKinleyMike), Tony Latteri (@TheLatteri) date: 2023-09-18 modified: 2024-07-16 tags: - attack.stealth - attack.t1218 logsource: category: network_connection product: windows detection: selection: Initiated: 'true' Image|endswith: \addinutil.exe condition: selection falsepositives: - Unknown level: high
Sigma rule: Detects usage of curl to upload files to known file sharing domains, which may indicate data exfiltration.. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: Curl File Upload To File Sharing Websites id: e328cc73-f92a-42fb-b3fa-7c2cffda981a related: - id: 00bca14a-df4e-4649-9054-3f2aa676bc04 type: derived - id: 7d1aaf3d-4304-425c-b7c3-162055e0b3ab type: similar status: experimental description: Detects usage of curl to upload files to known file sharing domains, which may indicate data exfiltration. author: Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems) references: - https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/advanced-backdoor-squidoor/ date: 2026-03-29 tags: - attack.exfiltration - attack.t1567.002 logsource: category: process_creation product: windows detection: selection_img: - Image|endswith: \curl.exe - OriginalFileName: curl.exe selection_cli_domain: CommandLine|contains: - 0x0.st - bashupload.com - chunk.io - file.io - filebin.net - pastebin - send.firefox.com - temp.sh - transfer.sh - ufile.io - uploadfiles.io - wetransfer.com - x0.at selection_cli_flags: - CommandLine|contains: - ' --form' - ' --upload-file' - ' --data' - ' -X POST' - ' --request POST ' - CommandLine|re: - \s-[FTd]\s - \s-sT\s condition: all of selection_* falsepositives: - Legitimate file uploads to these services by administrators or developers level: high
Sigma rule: Detects suspicious encoded character syntax often used for defense evasion. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: Potential PowerShell Obfuscation Via WCHAR/CHAR id: e312efd0-35a1-407f-8439-b8d434b438a6 status: test description: Detects suspicious encoded character syntax often used for defense evasion references: - https://twitter.com/0gtweet/status/1281103918693482496 author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems) date: 2020-07-09 modified: 2025-03-03 tags: - attack.execution - attack.stealth - attack.t1059.001 - attack.t1027 logsource: category: process_creation product: windows detection: selection: CommandLine|contains: - '[char]0x' - (WCHAR)0x condition: selection falsepositives: - Unknown level: high
Sigma rule: Detects potential web shell execution from the ScreenConnect server process.. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: Remote Access Tool - ScreenConnect Server Web Shell Execution id: b19146a3-25d4-41b4-928b-1e2a92641b1b status: test description: Detects potential web shell execution from the ScreenConnect server process. references: - https://blackpointcyber.com/resources/blog/breaking-through-the-screen/ - https://www.connectwise.com/company/trust/security-bulletins/connectwise-screenconnect-23.9.8 author: Jason Rathbun (Blackpoint Cyber) date: 2024-02-26 tags: - attack.initial-access - attack.t1190 logsource: product: windows category: process_creation detection: selection: ParentImage|endswith: \ScreenConnect.Service.exe Image|endswith: - \cmd.exe - \csc.exe condition: selection falsepositives: - Unlikely level: high
Sigma rule: Detects uncommon or suspicious child processes spawning from a WSL process. This could indicate an attempt to evade pare. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: WSL Child Process Anomaly id: 2267fe65-0681-42ad-9a6d-46553d3f3480 related: - id: dec44ca7-61ad-493c-bfd7-8819c5faa09b type: derived status: test description: Detects uncommon or suspicious child processes spawning from a WSL process. This could indicate an attempt to evade parent/child relationship detections or persistence attempts via cron using WSL references: - https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/OtherMSBinaries/Wsl/ - https://twitter.com/nas_bench/status/1535431474429808642 author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) date: 2023-01-23 modified: 2023-08-15 tags: - attack.execution - attack.stealth - attack.t1218 - attack.t1202 logsource: category: process_creation product: windows detection: selection_parent: ParentImage|endswith: - \wsl.exe - \wslhost.exe selection_children_images: Image|endswith: - \calc.exe - \cmd.exe - \cscript.exe - \mshta.exe - \powershell.exe - \pwsh.exe - \regsvr32.exe - \rundll32.exe - \wscript.exe selection_children_paths: Image|contains: - \AppData\Local\Temp\ - C:\Users\Public\ - C:\Windows\Temp\ - C:\Temp\ - \Downloads\ - \Desktop\ condition: selection_parent and 1 of selection_children_* falsepositives: - Unknown level: medium
Sigma rule: Detects when the MSSQL "xp_cmdshell" stored procedure is used to execute commands. Logsource: windows / application. Rule: title: MSSQL XPCmdshell Suspicious Execution id: 7f103213-a04e-4d59-8261-213dddf22314 status: test description: Detects when the MSSQL "xp_cmdshell" stored procedure is used to execute commands references: - https://www.netspi.com/blog/technical/network-penetration-testing/sql-server-persistence-part-1-startup-stored-procedures/ - https://thedfirreport.com/2022/07/11/select-xmrig-from-sqlserver/ author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) date: 2022-07-12 modified: 2024-06-26 tags: - attack.execution logsource: product: windows service: application definition: 'Requirements: MSSQL audit policy to monitor for "xp_cmdshell" must be enabled in order to receive this event in the application log (Follow this tutorial https://dba.stackexchange.com/questions/103183/is-there-any-way-to-monitor-execution-of-xp-cmdshell-in-sql-server-2012)' detection: selection: Provider_Name|contains: MSSQL EventID: 33205 Data|contains|all: - object_name:xp_cmdshell - statement:EXEC condition: selection falsepositives: - Unknown level: high
Sigma rule: Detects the addition of a new "Allow" firewall rule by the WMI process (WmiPrvSE.EXE). This can occur if an attacker lev. Logsource: windows / firewall-as. Rule: title: New Firewall Rule Added In Windows Firewall Exception List Via WmiPrvSE.EXE id: eca81e8d-09e1-4d04-8614-c91f44fd0519 status: test description: 'Detects the addition of a new "Allow" firewall rule by the WMI process (WmiPrvSE.EXE). This can occur if an attacker leverages PowerShell cmdlets such as "New-NetFirewallRule", or directly uses WMI CIM classes such as "MSFT_NetFirewallRule". ' references: - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1562.004/T1562.004.md#atomic-test-24---set-a-firewall-rule-using-new-netfirewallrule - https://malware.news/t/the-rhysida-ransomware-activity-analysis-and-ties-to-vice-society/72170 - https://cybersecuritynews.com/rhysida-ransomware-attacking-windows/ author: frack113, Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) date: 2024-05-10 tags: - attack.defense-impairment - attack.t1686.003 logsource: product: windows service: firewall-as detection: selection: EventID: - 2004 - 2071 - 2097 Action: 3 ModifyingApplication|endswith: :\Windows\System32\wbem\WmiPrvSE.exe condition: selection falsepositives: - Administrator scripts or activity. level: medium
Sigma rule: Detects the execution of a system command via the ScreenConnect RMM service.. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: Remote Access Tool - ScreenConnect Remote Command Execution id: b1f73849-6329-4069-bc8f-78a604bb8b23 status: test description: Detects the execution of a system command via the ScreenConnect RMM service. references: - https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/pull/4467 author: Ali Alwashali date: 2023-10-10 modified: 2024-02-26 tags: - attack.execution - attack.t1059.003 logsource: category: process_creation product: windows detection: selection_parent: ParentImage|endswith: \ScreenConnect.ClientService.exe selection_img: - Image|endswith: \cmd.exe - OriginalFileName: Cmd.Exe selection_cli: CommandLine|contains: \TEMP\ScreenConnect\ condition: all of selection_* falsepositives: - Legitimate use of ScreenConnect. Disable this rule if ScreenConnect is heavily used. level: low
Sigma rule: Detects known malicious service installs that appear in cases in which a Cobalt Strike beacon elevates privileges or lat. Logsource: windows / security. Rule: title: CobaltStrike Service Installations - Security id: d7a95147-145f-4678-b85d-d1ff4a3bb3f6 related: - id: 5a105d34-05fc-401e-8553-272b45c1522d type: derived status: test description: Detects known malicious service installs that appear in cases in which a Cobalt Strike beacon elevates privileges or lateral movement references: - https://www.sans.org/webcasts/119395 - https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/getting-the-bacon-from-cobalt-strike-beacon/ - https://thedfirreport.com/2021/08/29/cobalt-strike-a-defenders-guide/ author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Wojciech Lesicki date: 2021-05-26 modified: 2022-11-27 tags: - attack.persistence - attack.execution - attack.privilege-escalation - attack.lateral-movement - attack.t1021.002 - attack.t1543.003 - attack.t1569.002 logsource: product: windows service: security definition: The 'System Security Extension' audit subcategory need to be enabled to log the EID 4697 detection: event_id: EventID: 4697 selection1: ServiceFileName|contains|all: - ADMIN$ - .exe selection2: ServiceFileName|contains|all: - '%COMSPEC%' - start - powershell selection3: ServiceFileName|contains: powershell -nop -w hidden -encodedcommand selection4: ServiceFileName|base64offset|contains: 'IEX (New-Object Net.Webclient).DownloadString(''http://127.0.0.1:' condition: event_id and 1 of selection* falsepositives: - Unknown level: high
Sigma rule: Detects overwriting (effectively wiping/deleting) of a file.. Logsource: linux / auditd. Rule: title: Overwriting the File with Dev Zero or Null id: 37222991-11e9-4b6d-8bdf-60fbe48f753e status: stable description: Detects overwriting (effectively wiping/deleting) of a file. references: - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1485/T1485.md author: Jakob Weinzettl, oscd.community date: 2019-10-23 tags: - attack.impact - attack.t1485 logsource: product: linux service: auditd detection: selection: type: EXECVE a0|contains: dd a1|contains: - if=/dev/null - if=/dev/zero condition: selection falsepositives: - Appending null bytes to files. - Legitimate overwrite of files. level: low
Sigma rule: Detects changes to the PowerShell execution policy registry key in order to bypass signing requirements for script execu. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: Potential PowerShell Execution Policy Tampering - ProcCreation id: cf2e938e-9a3e-4fe8-a347-411642b28a9f related: - id: fad91067-08c5-4d1a-8d8c-d96a21b37814 type: similar - id: 87e3c4e8-a6a8-4ad9-bb4f-46e7ff99a180 type: similar - id: 61d0475c-173f-4844-86f7-f3eebae1c66b type: similar status: test description: Detects changes to the PowerShell execution policy registry key in order to bypass signing requirements for script execution from the CommandLine references: - https://learn.microsoft.com/de-de/powershell/module/microsoft.powershell.security/set-executionpolicy?view=powershell-7.3 author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) date: 2023-01-11 tags: - attack.defense-impairment logsource: product: windows category: process_creation detection: selection_path: CommandLine|contains: - \ShellIds\Microsoft.PowerShell\ExecutionPolicy - \Policies\Microsoft\Windows\PowerShell\ExecutionPolicy selection_values: CommandLine|contains: - Bypass - RemoteSigned - Unrestricted condition: all of selection_* falsepositives: - Unknown level: high