alirezaaminzadeh/cybersec-retrieval-benchmark huggingface dataset:
Sigma rule: Detects tools extracting LSA secret DPAPI domain backup key from Domain Controllers. Logsource: windows / security. Rule: title: DPAPI Domain Backup Key Extraction id: 4ac1f50b-3bd0-4968-902d-868b4647937e status: test description: Detects tools extracting LSA secret DPAPI domain backup key from Domain Controllers references: - https://threathunterplaybook.com/hunts/windows/190620-DomainDPAPIBackupKeyExtraction/notebook.html author: Roberto Rodriguez @Cyb3rWard0g date: 2019-06-20 modified: 2022-02-24 tags: - attack.credential-access - attack.t1003.004 logsource: product: windows service: security detection: selection: EventID: 4662 ObjectType: SecretObject AccessMask: '0x2' ObjectName|contains: BCKUPKEY condition: selection falsepositives: - Unknown level: high
Sigma rule: Detects the execution of Rundll32.exe with DLL files masquerading as image files. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: Suspicious Rundll32 Execution With Image Extension id: 4aa6040b-3f28-44e3-a769-9208e5feb5ec related: - id: 089fc3d2-71e8-4763-a8a5-c97fbb0a403e type: similar status: test description: Detects the execution of Rundll32.exe with DLL files masquerading as image files references: - https://www.zscaler.com/blogs/security-research/onenote-growing-threat-malware-distribution author: Hieu Tran date: 2023-03-13 tags: - attack.stealth - attack.t1218.011 logsource: category: process_creation product: windows detection: selection_img: - Image|endswith: \rundll32.exe - OriginalFileName: RUNDLL32.exe selection_cli: CommandLine|contains: - .bmp - .cr2 - .eps - .gif - .ico - .jpeg - .jpg - .nef - .orf - .png - .raw - .sr2 - .tif - .tiff condition: all of selection_* falsepositives: - Unknown level: high
Sigma rule: Detects suspicious processes including shells spawnd from WinRM host process. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: Suspicious Processes Spawned by WinRM id: 5cc2cda8-f261-4d88-a2de-e9e193c86716 status: test description: Detects suspicious processes including shells spawnd from WinRM host process author: Andreas Hunkeler (@Karneades), Markus Neis references: - Internal Research date: 2021-05-20 modified: 2022-07-14 tags: - attack.t1190 - attack.initial-access - attack.persistence - attack.privilege-escalation logsource: category: process_creation product: windows detection: selection: ParentImage|endswith: \wsmprovhost.exe Image|endswith: - \cmd.exe - \sh.exe - \bash.exe - \powershell.exe - \pwsh.exe - \wsl.exe - \schtasks.exe - \certutil.exe - \whoami.exe - \bitsadmin.exe condition: selection falsepositives: - Legitimate WinRM usage level: high
Sigma rule: Detects the pattern of UAC Bypass using consent.exe and comctl32.dll (UACMe 22). Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: UAC Bypass Using Consent and Comctl32 - Process id: 1ca6bd18-0ba0-44ca-851c-92ed89a61085 status: test description: Detects the pattern of UAC Bypass using consent.exe and comctl32.dll (UACMe 22) references: - https://github.com/hfiref0x/UACME author: Christian Burkard (Nextron Systems) date: 2021-08-23 modified: 2024-12-01 tags: - attack.privilege-escalation - attack.t1548.002 logsource: category: process_creation product: windows detection: selection: ParentImage|endswith: \consent.exe Image|endswith: \werfault.exe IntegrityLevel: - High - System - S-1-16-16384 - S-1-16-12288 condition: selection falsepositives: - Unknown level: high
Sigma rule: Detects the execution of Scheduled Tasks where the Program being run is located in a suspicious location or it's an unus. Logsource: windows / taskscheduler. Rule: title: Scheduled Task Executed From A Suspicious Location id: 424273ea-7cf8-43a6-b712-375f925e481f status: test description: Detects the execution of Scheduled Tasks where the Program being run is located in a suspicious location or it's an unusale program to be run from a Scheduled Task references: - Internal Research author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) date: 2022-12-05 modified: 2023-02-07 tags: - attack.privilege-escalation - attack.execution - attack.persistence - attack.t1053.005 logsource: product: windows service: taskscheduler definition: 'Requirements: The "Microsoft-Windows-TaskScheduler/Operational" is disabled by default and needs to be enabled in order for this detection to trigger' detection: selection: EventID: 129 Path|contains: - C:\Windows\Temp\ - \AppData\Local\Temp\ - \Desktop\ - \Downloads\ - \Users\Public\ - C:\Temp\ condition: selection falsepositives: - Unknown level: medium
Sigma rule: Detects the modification of a user group on a Fortinet FortiGate Firewall. The group could be used to grant VPN access t. Logsource: fortigate / event. Rule: title: FortiGate - User Group Modified id: 69ffc84e-8b1a-4024-8351-e018f66b8275 status: experimental description: 'Detects the modification of a user group on a Fortinet FortiGate Firewall. The group could be used to grant VPN access to a network. ' references: - https://www.fortiguard.com/psirt/FG-IR-24-535 - https://docs.fortinet.com/document/fortigate/7.6.4/fortios-log-message-reference/398/event - https://docs.fortinet.com/document/fortigate/7.6.4/cli-reference/328136827/config-user-group - https://docs.fortinet.com/document/fortigate/7.6.4/fortios-log-message-reference/44547/44547-logid-event-config-objattr author: Marco Pedrinazzi (@pedrinazziM) (InTheCyber) date: 2025-11-01 tags: - attack.persistence - attack.privilege-escalation logsource: product: fortigate service: event detection: selection: action: Edit cfgpath: user.group condition: selection falsepositives: - A group can be modified for legitimate purposes. level: medium
Sigma rule: Detects a core dump of a crashing Nginx worker process, which could be a signal of a serious problem or exploitation att. Logsource: nginx. Rule: title: Nginx Core Dump id: 59ec40bb-322e-40ab-808d-84fa690d7e56 status: test description: Detects a core dump of a crashing Nginx worker process, which could be a signal of a serious problem or exploitation attempts. references: - https://docs.nginx.com/nginx/admin-guide/monitoring/debugging/#enabling-core-dumps - https://www.x41-dsec.de/lab/advisories/x41-2021-002-nginx-resolver-copy/ author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems) date: 2021-05-31 modified: 2023-05-08 tags: - attack.impact - attack.t1499.004 logsource: service: nginx detection: keywords: - exited on signal 6 (core dumped) condition: keywords falsepositives: - Serious issues with a configuration or plugin level: high
Sigma rule: Detects powershell script installed as a Service. Logsource: windows / system. Rule: title: PowerShell Scripts Installed as Services id: a2e5019d-a658-4c6a-92bf-7197b54e2cae status: test description: Detects powershell script installed as a Service references: - https://speakerdeck.com/heirhabarov/hunting-for-powershell-abuse author: oscd.community, Natalia Shornikova date: 2020-10-06 modified: 2022-12-25 tags: - attack.execution - attack.t1569.002 logsource: product: windows service: system detection: selection: Provider_Name: Service Control Manager EventID: 7045 ImagePath|contains: - powershell - pwsh condition: selection falsepositives: - Unknown level: high
Sigma rule: Uses PowerShell to install/copy a file into a system directory such as "System32" or "SysWOW64". Logsource: windows / ps_script. Rule: title: Powershell Install a DLL in System Directory id: 63bf8794-9917-45bc-88dd-e1b5abc0ecfd status: test description: Uses PowerShell to install/copy a file into a system directory such as "System32" or "SysWOW64" references: - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1556.002/T1556.002.md#atomic-test-1---install-and-register-password-filter-dll author: frack113, Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) date: 2021-12-27 modified: 2024-01-22 tags: - attack.persistence - attack.credential-access - attack.defense-impairment - attack.t1556.002 logsource: product: windows category: ps_script definition: 'Requirements: Script Block Logging must be enabled' detection: selection: ScriptBlockText|re: (Copy-Item|cpi) .{2,128} -Destination .{1,32}\\Windows\\(System32|SysWOW64) condition: selection falsepositives: - Unknown level: high
Sigma rule: Detects CSExec service installation and execution events. Logsource: windows / system. Rule: title: CSExec Service Installation id: a27e5fa9-c35e-4e3d-b7e0-1ce2af66ad12 status: test description: Detects CSExec service installation and execution events references: - https://github.com/malcomvetter/CSExec author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) date: 2023-08-07 tags: - attack.execution - attack.t1569.002 logsource: product: windows service: system detection: selection_eid: Provider_Name: Service Control Manager EventID: 7045 selection_service: - ServiceName: csexecsvc - ImagePath|endswith: \csexecsvc.exe condition: all of selection_* falsepositives: - Unknown level: medium
Sigma rule: Detects suspicious manipulations of default accounts such as 'administrator' and 'guest'. For example 'enable' or 'disab. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: Suspicious Manipulation Of Default Accounts Via Net.EXE id: 5b768e71-86f2-4879-b448-81061cbae951 status: test description: Detects suspicious manipulations of default accounts such as 'administrator' and 'guest'. For example 'enable' or 'disable' accounts or change the password...etc references: - https://www.trellix.com/en-sg/about/newsroom/stories/threat-labs/lockergoga-ransomware-family-used-in-targeted-attacks.html - https://redacted.com/blog/bianlian-ransomware-gang-gives-it-a-go/ - https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2022/09/07/profiling-dev-0270-phosphorus-ransomware-operations/ author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) date: 2022-09-01 modified: 2023-02-21 tags: - attack.collection - attack.t1560.001 logsource: category: process_creation product: windows detection: selection_img: - Image|endswith: - \net.exe - \net1.exe - OriginalFileName: - net.exe - net1.exe selection_user_option: CommandLine|contains: ' user ' selection_username: CommandLine|contains: - ' Järjestelmänvalvoja ' - ' Rendszergazda ' - ' Администратор ' - ' Administrateur ' - ' Administrador ' - ' Administratör ' - ' Administrator ' - ' guest ' - ' DefaultAccount ' - ' "Järjestelmänvalvoja" ' - ' "Rendszergazda" ' - ' "Администратор" ' - ' "Administrateur" ' - ' "Administrador" ' - ' "Administratör" ' - ' "Administrator" ' - ' "guest" ' - ' "DefaultAccount" ' - ' ''Järjestelmänvalvoja'' ' - ' ''Rendszergazda'' ' - ' ''Администратор'' ' - ' ''Administrateur'' ' - ' ''Administrador'' ' - ' ''Administratör'' ' - ' ''Administrator'' ' - ' ''guest'' ' - ' ''DefaultAccount'' ' filter: CommandLine|contains|all: - guest - /active no condition: all of selection_* and not filter falsepositives: - Some false positives could occur with the admin or guest account. It depends on the scripts being used by the admins in your env. If you experience a lot of FP you could reduce the level to medium level: high
Sigma rule: Detects execution of "certmgr" with the "add" flag in order to install a new certificate on the system. Adversaries may. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: New Root Certificate Installed Via CertMgr.EXE id: ff992eac-6449-4c60-8c1d-91c9722a1d48 related: - id: 42821614-9264-4761-acfc-5772c3286f76 type: derived - id: 46591fae-7a4c-46ea-aec3-dff5e6d785dc type: obsolete status: test description: 'Detects execution of "certmgr" with the "add" flag in order to install a new certificate on the system. Adversaries may install a root certificate on a compromised system to avoid warnings when connecting to adversary controlled web servers. ' references: - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1553.004/T1553.004.md - https://securelist.com/to-crypt-or-to-mine-that-is-the-question/86307/ author: oscd.community, @redcanary, Zach Stanford @svch0st date: 2023-03-05 tags: - attack.defense-impairment - attack.t1553.004 logsource: category: process_creation product: windows detection: selection_img: - Image|endswith: \CertMgr.exe - OriginalFileName: CERTMGT.EXE selection_cli: CommandLine|contains|all: - /add - root condition: all of selection_* falsepositives: - Help Desk or IT may need to manually add a corporate Root CA on occasion. Need to test if GPO push doesn't trigger FP level: medium
Sigma rule: Detects the creation of a user with the "$" character. This can be used by attackers to hide a user or trick detection s. Logsource: windows / security. Rule: title: New or Renamed User Account with '$' Character id: cfeed607-6aa4-4bbd-9627-b637deb723c8 status: test description: 'Detects the creation of a user with the "$" character. This can be used by attackers to hide a user or trick detection systems that lack the parsing mechanisms. ' references: - https://twitter.com/SBousseaden/status/1387743867663958021 author: Ilyas Ochkov, oscd.community date: 2019-10-25 modified: 2024-01-16 tags: - attack.stealth - attack.t1036 logsource: product: windows service: security detection: selection_create: EventID: 4720 SamAccountName|contains: $ selection_rename: EventID: 4781 NewTargetUserName|contains: $ filter_main_homegroup: EventID: 4720 TargetUserName: HomeGroupUser$ condition: 1 of selection_* and not 1 of filter_main_* falsepositives: - Unknown level: medium
Sigma rule: Detects execution of powershell scripts via Runscripthelper.exe. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: Suspicious Runscripthelper.exe id: eca49c87-8a75-4f13-9c73-a5a29e845f03 status: test description: Detects execution of powershell scripts via Runscripthelper.exe references: - https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Runscripthelper/ author: Victor Sergeev, oscd.community date: 2020-10-09 modified: 2022-07-11 tags: - attack.execution - attack.stealth - attack.t1059 - attack.t1202 logsource: category: process_creation product: windows detection: selection: Image|endswith: \Runscripthelper.exe CommandLine|contains: surfacecheck condition: selection falsepositives: - Unknown level: medium
Sigma rule: Adversaries may abuse msiexec.exe to proxy execution of malicious payloads. Msiexec.exe is the command-line utility for. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: Suspicious Msiexec Execute Arbitrary DLL id: 6f4191bb-912b-48a8-9ce7-682769541e6d status: test description: 'Adversaries may abuse msiexec.exe to proxy execution of malicious payloads. Msiexec.exe is the command-line utility for the Windows Installer and is thus commonly associated with executing installation packages (.msi) ' references: - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/msiexec - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1218.007/T1218.007.md - https://twitter.com/_st0pp3r_/status/1583914515996897281 author: frack113 date: 2022-01-16 modified: 2026-01-09 tags: - attack.stealth - attack.t1218.007 logsource: category: process_creation product: windows detection: selection: Image|endswith: \msiexec.exe CommandLine|contains|windash: ' /Y' filter_main_legit_path: CommandLine|contains: - \MsiExec.exe" /Y "C:\Program Files\ - \MsiExec.exe" /Y "C:\Program Files (x86)\ - \MsiExec.exe" /Y "C:\Windows\System32\ - \MsiExec.exe" /Y "C:\Windows\SysWOW64\ condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_* falsepositives: - Legitimate script level: medium
Sigma rule: Detects the addition of a new Federated Domain.. Logsource: m365 / exchange. Rule: title: New Federated Domain Added - Exchange id: 42127bdd-9133-474f-a6f1-97b6c08a4339 related: - id: 58f88172-a73d-442b-94c9-95eaed3cbb36 type: similar status: test description: Detects the addition of a new Federated Domain. references: - https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/blog/pdfs/wp-m-unc2452-2021-000343-01.pdf - https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/alerts/aa21-008a - https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/a-golden-saml-journey-solarwinds-continued.html - https://www.sygnia.co/golden-saml-advisory - https://o365blog.com/post/aadbackdoor/ author: Splunk Threat Research Team (original rule), '@ionsor (rule)' date: 2022-02-08 tags: - attack.persistence - attack.t1136.003 logsource: service: exchange product: m365 detection: selection: eventSource: Exchange eventName: Add-FederatedDomain status: success condition: selection falsepositives: - The creation of a new Federated domain is not necessarily malicious, however these events need to be followed closely, as it may indicate federated credential abuse or backdoor via federated identities at a similar or different cloud provider. level: medium
Sigma rule: Use of the commandline to shutdown or reboot windows. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: Suspicious Execution of Shutdown id: 34ebb878-1b15-4895-b352-ca2eeb99b274 status: test description: Use of the commandline to shutdown or reboot windows references: - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1529/T1529.md - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/shutdown author: frack113 date: 2022-01-01 tags: - attack.impact - attack.t1529 logsource: category: process_creation product: windows detection: selection: Image|endswith: \shutdown.exe CommandLine|contains: - '/r ' - '/s ' condition: selection falsepositives: - Unknown level: medium
Sigma rule: Detects when PIM alerts are set to disabled.. Logsource: azure / auditlogs. Rule: title: PIM Alert Setting Changes To Disabled id: aeaef14c-e5bf-4690-a9c8-835caad458bd status: test description: Detects when PIM alerts are set to disabled. references: - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/architecture/security-operations-privileged-identity-management#azure-ad-roles-assignment author: Mark Morowczynski '@markmorow', Yochana Henderson, '@Yochana-H' date: 2022-08-09 tags: - attack.initial-access - attack.persistence - attack.privilege-escalation - attack.stealth - attack.t1078 logsource: product: azure service: auditlogs detection: selection: properties.message: Disable PIM Alert condition: selection falsepositives: - Administrator disabling PIM alerts as an active choice. level: high
Sigma rule: Detects remote RPC calls to possibly abuse remote encryption service via MS-SRVS. Logsource: rpc_firewall / application. Rule: title: Remote Server Service Abuse id: b6ea3cc7-542f-43ef-bbe4-980fbed444c7 status: test description: Detects remote RPC calls to possibly abuse remote encryption service via MS-SRVS references: - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/openspecs/windows_protocols/ms-srvs/accf23b0-0f57-441c-9185-43041f1b0ee9 - https://github.com/jsecurity101/MSRPC-to-ATTACK/blob/ddd4608fe8684fcf2fcf9b48c5f0b3c28097f8a3/documents/MS-SRVS.md - https://github.com/zeronetworks/rpcfirewall - https://zeronetworks.com/blog/stopping-lateral-movement-via-the-rpc-firewall/ author: Sagie Dulce, Dekel Paz date: 2022-01-01 tags: - attack.lateral-movement logsource: product: rpc_firewall category: application definition: 'Requirements: install and apply the RPC Firewall to all processes with "audit:true action:block uuid:4b324fc8-1670-01d3-1278-5a47bf6ee188' detection: selection: EventLog: RPCFW EventID: 3 InterfaceUuid: 4b324fc8-1670-01d3-1278-5a47bf6ee188 condition: selection falsepositives: - Legitimate remote share creation level: high
Sigma rule: Detects the execution GMER tool based on image and hash fields.. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: HackTool - GMER Rootkit Detector and Remover Execution id: 9082ff1f-88ab-4678-a3cc-5bcff99fc74d status: test description: Detects the execution GMER tool based on image and hash fields. references: - http://www.gmer.net/ author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) date: 2022-10-05 modified: 2024-11-23 tags: - attack.stealth logsource: category: process_creation product: windows detection: selection_img: Image|endswith: \gmer.exe selection_sysmon_hash: Hashes|contains: - MD5=E9DC058440D321AA17D0600B3CA0AB04 - SHA1=539C228B6B332F5AA523E5CE358C16647D8BBE57 - SHA256=E8A3E804A96C716A3E9B69195DB6FFB0D33E2433AF871E4D4E1EAB3097237173 condition: 1 of selection_* falsepositives: - Unlikely level: high
Sigma rule: Detects script interpreters, command-line tools, and similar suspicious child processes of ArcSOC.exe. ArcSOC.exe is the. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: Suspicious ArcSOC.exe Child Process id: 8e95e73e-ba02-4a87-b4d7-0929b8053038 status: experimental description: 'Detects script interpreters, command-line tools, and similar suspicious child processes of ArcSOC.exe. ArcSOC.exe is the process name which hosts ArcGIS Server REST services. If an attacker compromises an ArcGIS Server system and uploads a malicious Server Object Extension (SOE), they can send crafted requests to the corresponding service endpoint and remotely execute code from the ArcSOC.exe process. ' references: - https://reliaquest.com/blog/threat-spotlight-inside-flax-typhoons-arcgis-compromise/ - https://enterprise.arcgis.com/en/server/12.0/administer/windows/inside-an-arcgis-server-site.htm author: Micah Babinski date: 2025-11-25 tags: - attack.execution - attack.t1059 - attack.t1203 logsource: category: process_creation product: windows detection: selection: ParentImage|endswith: \ArcSOC.exe Image|endswith: - \cmd.exe - \cscript.exe - \mshta.exe - \powershell.exe - \pwsh.exe - \regsvr32.exe - \rundll32.exe - \wmic.exe - \wscript.exe filter_main_cmd: Image|endswith: \cmd.exe CommandLine: cmd.exe /c "ver" condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_* falsepositives: - Unknown level: high
Sigma rule: Detect the harvesting of wifi credentials using netsh.exe. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: Harvesting Of Wifi Credentials Via Netsh.EXE id: 42b1a5b8-353f-4f10-b256-39de4467faff status: test description: Detect the harvesting of wifi credentials using netsh.exe references: - https://blog.malwarebytes.com/threat-analysis/2020/04/new-agenttesla-variant-steals-wifi-credentials/ author: Andreas Hunkeler (@Karneades), oscd.community date: 2020-04-20 modified: 2023-02-13 tags: - attack.discovery - attack.credential-access - attack.t1040 logsource: category: process_creation product: windows detection: selection_img: - Image|endswith: \netsh.exe - OriginalFileName: netsh.exe selection_cli: CommandLine|contains|all: - wlan - ' s' - ' p' - ' k' - =clear condition: all of selection_* falsepositives: - Unknown level: medium
Sigma rule: Detect possible persistence using Fax DLL load when service restart. Logsource: windows / registry_set. Rule: title: Change the Fax Dll id: 9e3357ba-09d4-4fbd-a7c5-ad6386314513 status: test description: Detect possible persistence using Fax DLL load when service restart references: - https://twitter.com/dottor_morte/status/1544652325570191361 - https://raw.githubusercontent.com/RiccardoAncarani/talks/master/F-Secure/unorthodox-lateral-movement.pdf author: frack113 date: 2022-07-17 modified: 2022-12-30 tags: - attack.persistence - attack.defense-impairment - attack.t1112 logsource: product: windows category: registry_set detection: selection: TargetObject|contains|all: - \Software\Microsoft\Fax\Device Providers\ - \ImageName filter: Details: '%systemroot%\system32\fxst30.dll' condition: selection and not filter falsepositives: - Unknown level: high