alirezaaminzadeh/cybersec-retrieval-benchmark huggingface dataset:
Sigma rule: Detects potentially suspicious file downloads from file sharing domains using wget.exe. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: Suspicious File Download From File Sharing Domain Via Wget.EXE id: a0d7e4d2-bede-4141-8896-bc6e237e977c related: - id: 8b48ad89-10d8-4382-a546-50588c410f0d type: similar - id: d635249d-86b5-4dad-a8c7-d7272b788586 type: similar - id: 52182dfb-afb7-41db-b4bc-5336cb29b464 type: similar - id: ae02ed70-11aa-4a22-b397-c0d0e8f6ea99 type: similar - id: e0f8ab85-0ac9-423b-a73a-81b3c7b1aa97 type: similar - id: 7b434893-c57d-4f41-908d-6a17bf1ae98f type: similar - id: 8518ed3d-f7c9-4601-a26c-f361a4256a0c type: similar - id: 42a5f1e7-9603-4f6d-97ae-3f37d130d794 type: similar - id: 56454143-524f-49fb-b1c6-3fb8b1ad41fb type: similar - id: b6e04788-29e1-4557-bb14-77f761848ab8 type: similar - id: 297ae038-edc2-4b2e-bb3e-7c5fc94dd5c7 type: similar status: test description: Detects potentially suspicious file downloads from file sharing domains using wget.exe references: - https://labs.withsecure.com/publications/fin7-target-veeam-servers - https://github.com/WithSecureLabs/iocs/blob/344203de742bb7e68bd56618f66d34be95a9f9fc/FIN7VEEAM/iocs.csv - https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2024/01/17/new-ttps-observed-in-mint-sandstorm-campaign-targeting-high-profile-individuals-at-universities-and-research-orgs/ author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) date: 2023-05-05 modified: 2026-03-29 tags: - attack.execution logsource: category: process_creation product: windows detection: selection_img: - Image|endswith: \wget.exe - OriginalFileName: wget.exe selection_websites: CommandLine|contains: - .githubusercontent.com - 0x0.st - anonfiles.com - bashupload.com - cdn.discordapp.com - chunk.io - ddns.net - dl.dropboxusercontent.com - ghostbin.co - github.com - glitch.me - gofile.io - hastebin.com - mediafire.com - mega.nz - onrender.com - pages.dev - paste.ee - pastebin.com - pastebin.pl - pastetext.net - pixeldrain.com - privatlab.com - privatlab.net - send.exploit.in - sendspace.com - storage.googleapis.com - storjshare.io - supabase.co - temp.sh - transfer.sh - trycloudflare.com - ufile.io - w3spaces.com - workers.dev - x0.at selection_http: CommandLine|contains: http selection_flag: - CommandLine|re: \s-O\s - CommandLine|contains: --output-document selection_ext: CommandLine|endswith: - .ps1 - .ps1' - .ps1" - .dat - .dat' - .dat" - .msi - .msi' - .msi" - .bat - .bat' - .bat" - .exe - .exe' - .exe" - .vbs - .vbs' - .vbs" - .vbe - .vbe' - .vbe" - .hta - .hta' - .hta" - .dll - .dll' - .dll" - .psm1 - .psm1' - .psm1" condition: all of selection_* falsepositives: -
Sigma rule: Detects suspicious call to the "ShellExec_RunDLL" exported function of SHELL32.DLL through the ordinal number to launch. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: Suspicious ShellExec_RunDLL Call Via Ordinal id: 8823e85d-31d8-473e-b7f4-92da070f0fc6 related: - id: d87bd452-6da1-456e-8155-7dc988157b7d type: derived status: test description: 'Detects suspicious call to the "ShellExec_RunDLL" exported function of SHELL32.DLL through the ordinal number to launch other commands. Adversary might only use the ordinal number in order to bypass existing detection that alert on usage of ShellExec_RunDLL on CommandLine. ' references: - https://redcanary.com/blog/raspberry-robin/ - https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2022/10/27/raspberry-robin-worm-part-of-larger-ecosystem-facilitating-pre-ransomware-activity/ - https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/issues/1009 - https://strontic.github.io/xcyclopedia/library/shell32.dll-65DA072F25DE83D9F83653E3FEA3644D.html author: Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel date: 2024-12-01 tags: - attack.stealth - attack.t1218.011 logsource: category: process_creation product: windows detection: selection_parent_img: ParentCommandLine|contains: SHELL32.DLL selection_parent_ordinal: ParentCommandLine|contains: - '#568' - '#570' - '#572' - '#576' selection_susp_cli_parent: - ParentCommandLine|contains: - comspec - iex - Invoke- - msiexec - odbcconf - regsvr32 - ParentCommandLine|contains: - \Desktop\ - \ProgramData\ - \Temp\ - \Users\Public\ selection_susp_child_img: Image|endswith: - \bash.exe - \bitsadmin.exe - \cmd.exe - \cscript.exe - \curl.exe - \mshta.exe - \msiexec.exe - \msxsl.exe - \odbcconf.exe - \powershell.exe - \pwsh.exe - \regsvr32.exe - \schtasks.exe - \wmic.exe - \wscript.exe condition: all of selection_parent_* and 1 of selection_susp_* falsepositives: - Unknown level: high
Sigma rule: When C# is compiled dynamically, a .cmdline file will be created as a part of the process. Certain processes are not typ. Logsource: windows / file_event. Rule: title: Dynamic CSharp Compile Artefact id: e4a74e34-ecde-4aab-b2fb-9112dd01aed0 status: test description: 'When C# is compiled dynamically, a .cmdline file will be created as a part of the process. Certain processes are not typically observed compiling C# code, but can do so without touching disk. This can be used to unpack a payload for execution ' references: - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1027.004/T1027.004.md#atomic-test-2---dynamic-c-compile author: frack113 date: 2022-01-09 modified: 2023-02-17 tags: - attack.stealth - attack.t1027.004 logsource: product: windows category: file_event detection: selection: TargetFilename|endswith: .cmdline condition: selection falsepositives: - Unknown level: low
Sigma rule: Detects activity when the settings of the Windows firewall have been changed. Logsource: windows / firewall-as. Rule: title: Windows Firewall Settings Have Been Changed id: 00bb5bd5-1379-4fcf-a965-a5b6f7478064 status: test description: Detects activity when the settings of the Windows firewall have been changed references: - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-server-2008-r2-and-2008/dd364427(v=ws.10) author: frack113, Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) date: 2022-02-19 modified: 2023-04-21 tags: - attack.defense-impairment - attack.t1686.003 logsource: product: windows service: firewall-as detection: selection: EventID: - 2002 - 2083 - 2003 - 2082 - 2008 condition: selection level: low
Sigma rule: Detects changes to the PowerShell execution policy in order to bypass signing requirements for script execution. Logsource: windows / registry_set. Rule: title: Potential PowerShell Execution Policy Tampering id: fad91067-08c5-4d1a-8d8c-d96a21b37814 related: - id: cf2e938e-9a3e-4fe8-a347-411642b28a9f type: similar - id: 87e3c4e8-a6a8-4ad9-bb4f-46e7ff99a180 type: similar - id: 61d0475c-173f-4844-86f7-f3eebae1c66b type: similar status: test description: Detects changes to the PowerShell execution policy in order to bypass signing requirements for script execution references: - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/microsoft.powershell.security/set-executionpolicy?view=powershell-7.3 author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) date: 2023-01-11 modified: 2023-12-14 tags: - attack.defense-impairment logsource: category: registry_set product: windows detection: selection: TargetObject|endswith: - \ShellIds\Microsoft.PowerShell\ExecutionPolicy - \Policies\Microsoft\Windows\PowerShell\ExecutionPolicy Details|contains: - Bypass - Unrestricted filter_main_svchost: Image|contains: - :\Windows\System32\ - :\Windows\SysWOW64\ condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_* falsepositives: - Unknown level: medium
Sigma rule: Detects changes to the EC2 instance startup script. The shell script will be executed as root/SYSTEM every time the spec. Logsource: aws / cloudtrail. Rule: title: AWS EC2 Startup Shell Script Change id: 1ab3c5ed-5baf-417b-bb6b-78ca33f6c3df status: test description: Detects changes to the EC2 instance startup script. The shell script will be executed as root/SYSTEM every time the specific instances are booted up. references: - https://github.com/RhinoSecurityLabs/pacu/blob/866376cd711666c775bbfcde0524c817f2c5b181/pacu/modules/ec2__startup_shell_script/main.py#L9 author: faloker date: 2020-02-12 modified: 2022-06-07 tags: - attack.execution - attack.t1059.001 - attack.t1059.003 - attack.t1059.004 logsource: product: aws service: cloudtrail detection: selection_source: eventSource: ec2.amazonaws.com requestParameters.attribute: userData eventName: ModifyInstanceAttribute condition: selection_source falsepositives: - Valid changes to the startup script level: high
Sigma rule: Detects a child process spawned by 'winrshost.exe', which suggests remote command execution through Windows Remote Shell. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: Potential Lateral Movement via Windows Remote Shell id: 79df3f68-dccb-48e9-9171-b75cbc37c51d status: experimental description: 'Detects a child process spawned by ''winrshost.exe'', which suggests remote command execution through Windows Remote Shell (WinRs) and may indicate potential lateral movement activity. ' references: - https://cardinalops.com/blog/living-off-winrm-abusing-complexity-in-remote-management/ - https://www.ired.team/offensive-security/lateral-movement/winrs-for-lateral-movement author: Liran Ravich date: 2025-10-22 tags: - attack.lateral-movement - attack.t1021.006 logsource: category: process_creation product: windows detection: selection: ParentImage|endswith: \winrshost.exe filter_main_conhost: Image: C:\Windows\System32\conhost.exe condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_* falsepositives: - Legitimate use of WinRM within the organization level: medium
Sigma rule: Bypasses User Account Control using a fileless method. Logsource: windows / registry_set. Rule: title: Bypass UAC Using DelegateExecute id: 46dd5308-4572-4d12-aa43-8938f0184d4f status: test description: Bypasses User Account Control using a fileless method references: - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/api/shobjidl_core/nn-shobjidl_core-iexecutecommand - https://devblogs.microsoft.com/oldnewthing/20100312-01/?p=14623 - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1548.002/T1548.002.md#atomic-test-7---bypass-uac-using-sdclt-delegateexecute author: frack113 date: 2022-01-05 modified: 2023-08-17 tags: - attack.privilege-escalation - attack.t1548.002 logsource: category: registry_set product: windows detection: selection: TargetObject|endswith: \open\command\DelegateExecute Details: (Empty) condition: selection falsepositives: - Unknown level: high regression_tests_path: regression_data/rules/windows/registry/registry_set/registry_set_bypass_uac_using_delegateexecute/info.yml simulation: - type: atomic-red-team name: Bypass UAC using sdclt DelegateExecute technique: T1548.002 atomic_guid: 3be891eb-4608-4173-87e8-78b494c029b7
Sigma rule: Detects when an Okta end-user reports activity by their account as being potentially suspicious.. Logsource: okta / okta. Rule: title: Okta Suspicious Activity Reported by End-user id: 07e97cc6-aed1-43ae-9081-b3470d2367f1 status: test description: Detects when an Okta end-user reports activity by their account as being potentially suspicious. references: - https://developer.okta.com/docs/reference/api/system-log/ - https://github.com/okta/workflows-templates/blob/1164f0eb71ce47c9ddc7d850e9ab87b5a2b42333/workflows/suspicious_activity_reported/readme.md author: kelnage date: 2023-09-07 modified: 2026-04-27 tags: - attack.resource-development - attack.t1586.003 logsource: product: okta service: okta detection: selection: eventType: user.account.report_suspicious_activity_by_enduser condition: selection falsepositives: - If an end-user incorrectly identifies normal activity as suspicious. level: high
Sigma rule: Detects a whoami.exe executed with the /priv command line flag instructing the tool to show all current user privileges.. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: Security Privileges Enumeration Via Whoami.EXE id: 97a80ec7-0e2f-4d05-9ef4-65760e634f6b status: test description: Detects a whoami.exe executed with the /priv command line flag instructing the tool to show all current user privileges. This is often used after a privilege escalation attempt. references: - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/whoami author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems) date: 2021-05-05 modified: 2023-02-28 tags: - attack.privilege-escalation - attack.discovery - attack.t1033 logsource: category: process_creation product: windows detection: selection_img: - Image|endswith: \whoami.exe - OriginalFileName: whoami.exe selection_cli: CommandLine|contains: - ' /priv' - ' -priv' condition: all of selection_* falsepositives: - Unknown level: high
Sigma rule: Detects when a user downloads a file from an IP based URL using CertOC.exe. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: File Download From IP Based URL Via CertOC.EXE id: b86f6dea-0b2f-41f5-bdcc-a057bd19cd6a related: - id: 70ad0861-d1fe-491c-a45f-fa48148a300d type: similar status: test description: Detects when a user downloads a file from an IP based URL using CertOC.exe references: - https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Certoc/ author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) date: 2023-10-18 tags: - attack.command-and-control - attack.execution - attack.t1105 logsource: category: process_creation product: windows detection: selection_img: - Image|endswith: \certoc.exe - OriginalFileName: CertOC.exe selection_ip: CommandLine|re: ://[0-9]{1,3}\.[0-9]{1,3}\.[0-9]{1,3}\.[0-9]{1,3} selection_cli: CommandLine|contains: -GetCACAPS condition: all of selection* falsepositives: - Unknown level: high
Sigma rule: Detects deletion of registry key that adds 'Scan with Defender' option in context menu. Attackers may use this to make i. Logsource: windows / registry_delete. Rule: title: Delete Defender Scan ShellEx Context Menu Registry Key id: 72a0369a-2576-4aaf-bfc9-6bb24a574ac6 related: - id: b9e8c7d6-a5f4-4e3d-8b1a-9f0c8d7e6a5b type: similar status: experimental description: Detects deletion of registry key that adds 'Scan with Defender' option in context menu. Attackers may use this to make it harder for users to scan files that are suspicious. references: - https://research.splunk.com/endpoint/395ed5fe-ad13-4366-9405-a228427bdd91/ - https://winaero.com/how-to-delete-scan-with-windows-defender-from-context-menu-in-windows-10/ - https://thedfirreport.com/2021/10/18/icedid-to-xinglocker-ransomware-in-24-hours/ - https://blog.malwarebytes.com/malwarebytes-news/2021/02/lazyscripter-from-empire-to-double-rat/ author: Matt Anderson (Huntress) date: 2025-07-11 modified: 2025-10-07 tags: - attack.defense-impairment logsource: category: registry_delete product: windows detection: selection: TargetObject|contains: shellex\ContextMenuHandlers\EPP filter_main_defender: Image|startswith: - C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\Windows Defender\Platform\ - C:\Program Files\Windows Defender\ - C:\Program Files (x86)\Windows Defender\ Image|endswith: \MsMpEng.exe condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_* falsepositives: - Unlikely as this weakens defenses and normally would not be done even if using another AV. level: medium
Sigma rule: Detects system restore registry modification via command line, which can be used by adversaries to disable system restor. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: System Restore Registry Modification via CommandLine id: 7c06ab9b-b1d2-4ba9-b06e-09491ded20d9 related: - id: 5de03871-5d46-4539-a82d-3aa992a69a83 type: similar status: experimental description: 'Detects system restore registry modification via command line, which can be used by adversaries to disable system restore on the computer. ' references: - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1490/T1490.md#atomic-test-9---disable-system-restore-through-registry author: Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems) date: 2026-03-11 tags: - attack.impact - attack.t1490 logsource: category: process_creation product: windows detection: selection_img: - Image|endswith: - \powershell.exe - \pwsh.exe - \reg.exe - OriginalFileName: - powershell.exe - pwsh.dll - reg.exe selection_cli_action: CommandLine|contains: - ' add ' - Set-ItemProperty - New-ItemProperty selection_cli_reg_root: CommandLine|contains: - \SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\Windows NT\SystemRestore - \SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\SystemRestore selection_cli_reg_key: CommandLine|contains: - DisableConfig - DisableSR condition: all of selection_* falsepositives: - Unknown level: high regression_tests_path: regression_data/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_reg_system_restore_modification/info.yml simulation: - type: atomic-red-team name: Disable System Restore Through Registry technique: T1490 atomic_guid: 66e647d1-8741-4e43-b7c1-334760c2047f
Sigma rule: The "ScriptRunner.exe" binary can be abused to proxy execution through it and bypass possible whitelisting. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: Use of Scriptrunner.exe id: 64760eef-87f7-4ed3-93fd-655668ea9420 status: test description: The "ScriptRunner.exe" binary can be abused to proxy execution through it and bypass possible whitelisting references: - https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Scriptrunner/ author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) date: 2022-07-01 tags: - attack.execution - attack.stealth - attack.t1218 logsource: category: process_creation product: windows detection: selection_img: - Image|endswith: \ScriptRunner.exe - OriginalFileName: ScriptRunner.exe selection_cli: CommandLine|contains: ' -appvscript ' condition: all of selection* falsepositives: - Legitimate use when App-v is deployed level: medium
Sigma rule: Detects a Python process initiating a network connection. While this often relates to package installation, it can also. Logsource: windows / network_connection. Rule: title: Python Initiated Connection id: bef0bc5a-b9ae-425d-85c6-7b2d705980c6 status: test description: Detects a Python process initiating a network connection. While this often relates to package installation, it can also indicate a potential malicious script communicating with a C&C server. references: - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1046/T1046.md#atomic-test-4---port-scan-using-python - https://pypi.org/project/scapy/ author: frack113 date: 2021-12-10 modified: 2025-03-05 tags: - attack.discovery - attack.t1046 logsource: category: network_connection product: windows definition: 'Requirements: Field enrichment is required for the filters to work. As field such as CommandLine and ParentImage are not available by default on this event type' detection: selection: Initiated: 'true' Image|contains|all: - \python - .exe filter_optional_conda: ParentImage: C:\ProgramData\Anaconda3\Scripts\conda.exe CommandLine|contains|all: - :\ProgramData\Anaconda3\Scripts\conda-script.py - update filter_optional_conda_jupyter_notebook: ParentImage: C:\ProgramData\Anaconda3\python.exe CommandLine|contains: C:\ProgramData\Anaconda3\Scripts\jupyter-notebook-script.py filter_main_local_communication: DestinationIp: 127.0.0.1 SourceIp: 127.0.0.1 filter_main_pip: CommandLine|contains|all: - pip.exe - install condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_* and not 1 of filter_optional_* falsepositives: - Legitimate python scripts using the socket library or similar will trigger this. Apply additional filters and perform an initial baseline before deploying. level: medium
Sigma rule: Detects when a user installs certificates by using CertOC.exe to loads the target DLL file.. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: DLL Loaded via CertOC.EXE id: 242301bc-f92f-4476-8718-78004a6efd9f related: - id: 84232095-ecca-4015-b0d7-7726507ee793 type: similar status: test description: Detects when a user installs certificates by using CertOC.exe to loads the target DLL file. references: - https://twitter.com/sblmsrsn/status/1445758411803480072?s=20 - https://github.com/elastic/protections-artifacts/commit/746086721fd385d9f5c6647cada1788db4aea95f#diff-fe98e74189873d6df72a15df2eaa0315c59ba9cdaca93ecd68afc4ea09194ef2 - https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Certoc/ author: Austin Songer @austinsonger date: 2021-10-23 modified: 2024-03-05 tags: - attack.stealth - attack.t1218 logsource: category: process_creation product: windows detection: selection_img: - Image|endswith: \certoc.exe - OriginalFileName: CertOC.exe selection_cli: CommandLine|contains|windash: ' -LoadDLL ' condition: all of selection_* falsepositives: - Unknown level: medium
Sigma rule: Detects when an attacker modifies values of the Disk Cleanup Handler in the registry to achieve persistence via autorun.. Logsource: windows / registry_set. Rule: title: Persistence Via Disk Cleanup Handler - Autorun id: d4e2745c-f0c6-4bde-a3ab-b553b3f693cc status: test description: 'Detects when an attacker modifies values of the Disk Cleanup Handler in the registry to achieve persistence via autorun. The disk cleanup manager is part of the operating system. It displays the dialog box […] The user has the option of enabling or disabling individual handlers by selecting or clearing their check box in the disk cleanup manager''s UI. Although Windows comes with a number of disk cleanup handlers, they aren''t designed to handle files produced by other applications. Instead, the disk cleanup manager is designed to be flexible and extensible by enabling any developer to implement and register their own disk cleanup handler. Any developer can extend the available disk cleanup services by implementing and registering a disk cleanup handler. ' references: - https://persistence-info.github.io/Data/diskcleanuphandler.html - https://www.hexacorn.com/blog/2018/09/02/beyond-good-ol-run-key-part-86/ author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) date: 2022-07-21 modified: 2023-08-17 tags: - attack.persistence logsource: category: registry_set product: windows detection: root: TargetObject|contains: \SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\VolumeCaches\ selection_autorun: TargetObject|contains: \Autorun Details: DWORD (0x00000001) selection_pre_after: TargetObject|contains: - \CleanupString - \PreCleanupString Details|contains: - cmd - powershell - rundll32 - mshta - cscript - wscript - wsl - \Users\Public\ - \Windows\TEMP\ - \Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\Startup\ condition: root and 1 of selection_* falsepositives: - Unknown level: medium
Sigma rule: This method detects mimikatz keywords in different Eventlogs (some of them only appear in older Mimikatz version that ar. Logsource: windows. Rule: title: Mimikatz Use id: 06d71506-7beb-4f22-8888-e2e5e2ca7fd8 status: test description: This method detects mimikatz keywords in different Eventlogs (some of them only appear in older Mimikatz version that are however still used by different threat groups) references: - https://tools.thehacker.recipes/mimikatz/modules author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), David ANDRE (additional keywords) date: 2017-01-10 modified: 2022-01-05 tags: - attack.s0002 - attack.lateral-movement - attack.credential-access - car.2013-07-001 - car.2019-04-004 - attack.t1003.002 - attack.t1003.004 - attack.t1003.001 - attack.t1003.006 logsource: product: windows detection: keywords: - dpapi::masterkey - eo.oe.kiwi - event::clear - event::drop - gentilkiwi.com - kerberos::golden - kerberos::ptc - kerberos::ptt - kerberos::tgt - Kiwi Legit Printer - 'lsadump::' - mimidrv.sys - \mimilib.dll - misc::printnightmare - misc::shadowcopies - misc::skeleton - privilege::backup - privilege::debug - privilege::driver - 'sekurlsa::' filter: EventID: 15 condition: keywords and not filter falsepositives: - Naughty administrators - AV Signature updates - Files with Mimikatz in their filename level: high