alirezaaminzadeh/cybersec-retrieval-benchmark huggingface dataset:
Sigma rule: Identifies when a suppression rule is created in Azure. Adversary's could attempt this to evade detection.. Logsource: azure / activitylogs. Rule: title: Azure Suppression Rule Created id: 92cc3e5d-eb57-419d-8c16-5c63f325a401 status: test description: Identifies when a suppression rule is created in Azure. Adversary's could attempt this to evade detection. references: - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/role-based-access-control/resource-provider-operations author: Austin Songer date: 2021-08-16 modified: 2022-08-23 tags: - attack.impact logsource: product: azure service: activitylogs detection: selection: operationName: MICROSOFT.SECURITY/ALERTSSUPPRESSIONRULES/WRITE condition: selection falsepositives: - Suppression Rule being created may be performed by a system administrator. - Verify whether the user identity, user agent, and/or hostname should be making changes in your environment. - Suppression Rule created from unfamiliar users should be investigated. If known behavior is causing false positives, it can be exempted from the rule. level: medium
Sigma rule: Detects potential WerFault "ReflectDebugger" registry value abuse for persistence.. Logsource: windows / registry_set. Rule: title: Potential WerFault ReflectDebugger Registry Value Abuse id: 0cf2e1c6-8d10-4273-8059-738778f981ad related: - id: fabfb3a7-3ce1-4445-9c7c-3c27f1051cdd type: derived status: test description: Detects potential WerFault "ReflectDebugger" registry value abuse for persistence. references: - https://cocomelonc.github.io/malware/2022/11/02/malware-pers-18.html - https://www.hexacorn.com/blog/2018/08/31/beyond-good-ol-run-key-part-85/ author: X__Junior date: 2023-05-18 tags: - attack.stealth - attack.t1036.003 logsource: category: registry_set product: windows detection: selection: TargetObject|endswith: \Microsoft\Windows\Windows Error Reporting\Hangs\ReflectDebugger condition: selection falsepositives: - Unknown level: high
Sigma rule: Detects execution of Windows Defender "OfflineScannerShell.exe" from its non standard directory. The "OfflineScannerShel. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: Potential Mpclient.DLL Sideloading Via OfflineScannerShell.EXE Execution id: 02b18447-ea83-4b1b-8805-714a8a34546a status: test description: 'Detects execution of Windows Defender "OfflineScannerShell.exe" from its non standard directory. The "OfflineScannerShell.exe" binary is vulnerable to DLL side loading and will load any DLL named "mpclient.dll" from the current working directory. ' references: - https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/OfflineScannerShell/ author: frack113 date: 2022-03-06 modified: 2023-08-03 tags: - attack.stealth - attack.t1218 logsource: category: process_creation product: windows detection: selection: - Image|endswith: \OfflineScannerShell.exe - OriginalFileName: OfflineScannerShell.exe filter_main_legit_dir: CurrentDirectory: C:\Program Files\Windows Defender\Offline\ filter_main_empty: CurrentDirectory: '' filter_main_null: CurrentDirectory: null condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_* falsepositives: - Unknown level: medium
Sigma rule: Detects when an internet hosted webdav share is mounted using the "net.exe" utility. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: Windows Internet Hosted WebDav Share Mount Via Net.EXE id: 7e6237fe-3ddb-438f-9381-9bf9de5af8d0 status: test description: Detects when an internet hosted webdav share is mounted using the "net.exe" utility references: - https://drive.google.com/file/d/1lKya3_mLnR3UQuCoiYruO3qgu052_iS_/view author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) date: 2023-02-21 modified: 2023-07-25 tags: - attack.lateral-movement - attack.t1021.002 logsource: category: process_creation product: windows detection: selection_img: - Image|endswith: - \net.exe - \net1.exe - OriginalFileName: - net.exe - net1.exe selection_cli: CommandLine|contains|all: - ' use ' - ' http' condition: all of selection_* falsepositives: - Unknown level: high
Sigma rule: Detects when an attacker tries to add a new network provider in order to dump clear text credentials, similar to how the. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: Potential Credential Dumping Attempt Using New NetworkProvider - CLI id: baef1ec6-2ca9-47a3-97cc-4cf2bda10b77 related: - id: 0442defa-b4a2-41c9-ae2c-ea7042fc4701 type: similar status: test description: Detects when an attacker tries to add a new network provider in order to dump clear text credentials, similar to how the NPPSpy tool does it references: - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/troubleshoot/windows-client/setup-upgrade-and-drivers/network-provider-settings-removed-in-place-upgrade - https://github.com/gtworek/PSBits/tree/master/PasswordStealing/NPPSpy author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) date: 2022-08-23 modified: 2023-02-02 tags: - attack.credential-access - attack.t1003 logsource: category: process_creation product: windows detection: selection: CommandLine|contains|all: - \System\CurrentControlSet\Services\ - \NetworkProvider condition: selection falsepositives: - Other legitimate network providers used and not filtred in this rule level: high
Sigma rule: Detects suspicious DNS queries using base64 encoding. Logsource: dns. Rule: title: Suspicious DNS Query with B64 Encoded String id: 4153a907-2451-4e4f-a578-c52bb6881432 status: test description: Detects suspicious DNS queries using base64 encoding references: - https://github.com/krmaxwell/dns-exfiltration author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems) date: 2018-05-10 modified: 2022-10-09 tags: - attack.exfiltration - attack.t1048.003 - attack.command-and-control - attack.t1071.004 logsource: category: dns detection: selection: query|contains: ==. condition: selection falsepositives: - Unknown level: medium
Sigma rule: Detects a Chromium based browser process with the 'load-extension' flag to start a instance with a custom extension. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: Chromium Browser Instance Executed With Custom Extension id: 88d6e60c-759d-4ac1-a447-c0f1466c2d21 related: - id: 27ba3207-dd30-4812-abbf-5d20c57d474e type: similar status: test description: Detects a Chromium based browser process with the 'load-extension' flag to start a instance with a custom extension references: - https://redcanary.com/blog/chromeloader/ - https://emkc.org/s/RJjuLa - https://www.mandiant.com/resources/blog/lnk-between-browsers author: Aedan Russell, frack113, X__Junior (Nextron Systems) date: 2022-06-19 modified: 2023-11-28 tags: - attack.persistence - attack.t1176.001 logsource: category: process_creation product: windows detection: selection: Image|endswith: - \brave.exe - \chrome.exe - \msedge.exe - \opera.exe - \vivaldi.exe CommandLine|contains: --load-extension= condition: selection falsepositives: - Usage of Chrome Extensions in testing tools such as BurpSuite will trigger this alert level: medium regression_tests_path: regression_data/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_browsers_chromium_load_extension/info.yml
Sigma rule: Detects the load of known vulnerable drivers via the file name of the drivers.. Logsource: windows / driver_load. Rule: title: Vulnerable Driver Load By Name id: 72cd00d6-490c-4650-86ff-1d11f491daa1 status: test description: Detects the load of known vulnerable drivers via the file name of the drivers. references: - https://loldrivers.io/ author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) date: 2022-10-03 modified: 2023-12-02 tags: - attack.persistence - attack.privilege-escalation - attack.t1543.003 - attack.t1068 logsource: product: windows category: driver_load detection: selection: ImageLoaded|endswith: - \panmonfltx64.sys - \dbutil.sys - \fairplaykd.sys - \nvaudio.sys - \superbmc.sys - \bsmi.sys - \smarteio64.sys - \bwrsh.sys - \agent64.sys - \asmmap64.sys - \dellbios.sys - \chaos-rootkit.sys - \wcpu.sys - \dh_kernel.sys - \sbiosio64.sys - \bw.sys - \asrdrv102.sys - \nt6.sys - \mhyprot3.sys - \winio64c.sys - \asupio64.sys - \blackbonedrv10.sys - \d.sys - \driver7-x86.sys - \sfdrvx32.sys - \enetechio64.sys - \gdrv.sys - \sysinfodetectorx64.sys - \fh-ethercat_dio.sys - \asromgdrv.sys - \my.sys - \dcprotect.sys - \irec.sys - \gedevdrv.sys - \winio32a.sys - \gvcidrv64.sys - \winio32.sys - \bs_hwmio64.sys - \nstr.sys - \inpoutx64.sys - \hw.sys - \winio64.sys - \hpportiox64.sys - \iobitunlocker.sys - \b1.sys - \aoddriver.sys - \elbycdio.sys - \protects.sys - \kprocesshacker.sys - \speedfan.sys - \radhwmgr.sys - \iscflashx64.sys - \black.sys - \b4.sys - \hwos2ec10x64.sys - \winflash64.sys - \corsairllaccess64.sys - \bs_i2cio.sys - \d3.sys - \windows-xp-64.sys - \aswvmm.sys - \bs_i2c64.sys - \1.sys - \nchgbios2x64.sys - \cpuz141.sys - \segwindrvx64.sys - \tdeio64.sys - \ntiolib.sys - \gtckmdfbs.sys - \iomap64.sys - \avalueio.sys - \semav6msr.sys - \lgdcatcher.sys - \b.sys - \hwdetectng.sys - \nt4.sys - \tgsafe.sys - \mydrivers.sys - \eneio64.sys - \procexp.sys - \viragt64.sys - \fpcie2com.sys - \lenovodiagnosticsdriver.sys - \cp2x72c.sys - \kerneld.amd64 - \bs_def64.sys - \piddrv.sys - \amifldrv64.sys - \cpuz_x64.sys - \proxy32.sys - \wsdkd.sys - \t8.sys - \ucorew64.sys - \atszio.sys - \lmiinfo.sys - \80.sys - \nt3.sys - \ngiodriver.sys - \lv561av.sys - \gpcidrv64.sys - \fd3b7234419fafc9bdd533f48896ed73_b816c5cd.sys - \rtport.sys - \full.sys - \viragt.sys - \fiddrv64.sys - \cupfixerx64.sys - \cpupress.sys - \hwos2ec7x64.sys - \driver7-x86-withoutdbg.sys - \asrdrv10.sys - \nvflsh64.sys - \asrrapidstartdrv.sys - \tmcomm.sys - \wiseunlo.sys - \rwdrv.sys - \asio64.sys - \nvoclock.sys - \panio.sys - \mtcbsv64.sys - \amigendrv64.sys - \capcom.sys - \netflt.sys - \phlashnt.sys - \dbut
Sigma rule: The .SettingContent-ms file type was introduced in Windows 10 and allows a user to create "shortcuts" to various Windows. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: Arbitrary Shell Command Execution Via Settingcontent-Ms id: 24de4f3b-804c-4165-b442-5a06a2302c7e status: test description: The .SettingContent-ms file type was introduced in Windows 10 and allows a user to create "shortcuts" to various Windows 10 setting pages. These files are simply XML and contain paths to various Windows 10 settings binaries. references: - https://posts.specterops.io/the-tale-of-settingcontent-ms-files-f1ea253e4d39 author: Sreeman date: 2020-03-13 modified: 2022-04-14 tags: - attack.t1204 - attack.t1566.001 - attack.execution - attack.initial-access logsource: category: process_creation product: windows detection: selection: CommandLine|contains: .SettingContent-ms filter: CommandLine|contains: immersivecontrolpanel condition: selection and not filter falsepositives: - Unknown level: medium
Sigma rule: Detects the execution of a renamed ProcDump executable. This often done by attackers or malware in order to evade defens. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: Renamed ProcDump Execution id: 4a0b2c7e-7cb2-495d-8b63-5f268e7bfd67 related: - id: 03795938-1387-481b-9f4c-3f6241e604fe type: obsolete status: test description: 'Detects the execution of a renamed ProcDump executable. This often done by attackers or malware in order to evade defensive mechanisms. ' references: - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/downloads/procdump author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) date: 2019-11-18 modified: 2026-06-29 tags: - attack.stealth - attack.t1036.003 logsource: product: windows category: process_creation detection: selection_ofn: OriginalFileName: procdump selection_cli_dump_flag: CommandLine|contains|windash: - ' -ma ' - ' -mp ' selection_cli_eula_flag: CommandLine|contains|windash: ' /accepteula' filter_main_known_names: Image|endswith: - \procdump.exe - \procdump64.exe - \procdump64a.exe condition: (selection_ofn or all of selection_cli_*) and not 1 of filter_main_* falsepositives: - Procdump illegally bundled with legitimate software. - Administrators who rename binaries (should be investigated). level: high
Sigma rule: This detection excludes known namped pipes accessible remotely and notify on newly observed ones, may help to detect lat. Logsource: zeek / smb_files. Rule: title: First Time Seen Remote Named Pipe - Zeek id: 021310d9-30a6-480a-84b7-eaa69aeb92bb related: - id: 52d8b0c6-53d6-439a-9e41-52ad442ad9ad type: derived status: test description: This detection excludes known namped pipes accessible remotely and notify on newly observed ones, may help to detect lateral movement and remote exec using named pipes references: - https://twitter.com/menasec1/status/1104489274387451904 author: Samir Bousseaden, @neu5ron, Tim Shelton date: 2020-04-02 modified: 2022-12-27 tags: - attack.lateral-movement - attack.t1021.002 logsource: product: zeek service: smb_files detection: selection: path: \\\\\*\\IPC$ filter_keywords: - samr - lsarpc - winreg - netlogon - srvsvc - protected_storage - wkssvc - browser - netdfs - svcctl - spoolss - ntsvcs - LSM_API_service - HydraLsPipe - TermSrv_API_service - MsFteWds condition: selection and not 1 of filter_* falsepositives: - Update the excluded named pipe to filter out any newly observed legit named pipe level: high
Sigma rule: Detects the execution of PingCastle, a tool designed to quickly assess the Active Directory security level.. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: PUA - PingCastle Execution id: b1cb4ab6-ac31-43f4-adf1-d9d08957419c related: - id: b37998de-a70b-4f33-b219-ec36bf433dc0 type: derived status: test description: Detects the execution of PingCastle, a tool designed to quickly assess the Active Directory security level. references: - https://github.com/vletoux/pingcastle - https://thedfirreport.com/2023/10/30/netsupport-intrusion-results-in-domain-compromise/ - https://github.com/fengjixuchui/Start-ADEnum/blob/e237a739db98b6104427d833004836507da36a58/Functions/Start-ADEnum.ps1#L450 - https://github.com/lkys37en/Start-ADEnum/blob/5b42c54215fe5f57fc59abc52c20487d15764005/Functions/Start-ADEnum.ps1#L680 - https://github.com/projectHULK/AD_Recon/blob/dde2daba9b3393a9388cbebda87068972cc0bd3b/SecurityAssessment.ps1#L2699 - https://github.com/802-1x/Compliance/blob/2e53df8b6e89686a0b91116b3f42c8f717dca820/Ping%20Castle/Get-PingCastle-HTMLComplianceReport.ps1#L8 - https://github.com/EvotecIT/TheDashboard/blob/481a9ce8f82f2fd55fe65220ee6486bae6df0c9d/Examples/RunReports/PingCastle.ps1 author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems), frack113 date: 2024-01-11 tags: - attack.reconnaissance - attack.t1595 logsource: category: process_creation product: windows detection: selection: - Hashes|contains: - MD5=f741f25ac909ee434e50812d436c73ff - MD5=d40acbfc29ee24388262e3d8be16f622 - MD5=01bb2c16fadb992fa66228cd02d45c60 - MD5=9e1b18e62e42b5444fc55b51e640355b - MD5=b7f8fe33ac471b074ca9e630ba0c7e79 - MD5=324579d717c9b9b8e71d0269d13f811f - MD5=63257a1ddaf83cfa43fe24a3bc06c207 - MD5=049e85963826b059c9bac273bb9c82ab - MD5=ecb98b7b4d4427eb8221381154ff4cb2 - MD5=faf87749ac790ec3a10dd069d10f9d63 - MD5=f296dba5d21ad18e6990b1992aea8f83 - MD5=93ba94355e794b6c6f98204cf39f7a11 - MD5=a258ef593ac63155523a461ecc73bdba - MD5=97000eb5d1653f1140ee3f47186463c4 - MD5=95eb317fbbe14a82bd9fdf31c48b8d93 - MD5=32fe9f0d2630ac40ea29023920f20f49 - MD5=a05930dde939cfd02677fc18bb2b7df5 - MD5=124283924e86933ff9054a549d3a268b - MD5=ceda6909b8573fdeb0351c6920225686 - MD5=60ce120040f2cd311c810ae6f6bbc182 - MD5=2f10cdc5b09100a260703a28eadd0ceb - MD5=011d967028e797a4c16d547f7ba1463f - MD5=2da9152c0970500c697c1c9b4a9e0360 - MD5=b5ba72034b8f44d431f55275bace9f8b - MD5=d6ed9101df0f24e27ff92ddab42dacca - MD5=3ed3cdb6d12aa1ac562ad185cdbf2d1d - MD5=5e083cd0143ae95a6cb79b68c07ca573 - MD5=28caff93748cb84be70486e79f04c2df - MD5=9d4f12c30f9b500f896efd1800e4dd11 - MD5=4586f7dd14271ad65a5fb696b393f4c0 - MD5=86ba9dddbdf49215145b5bcd081d4011 - MD5=9dce0a481343874ef9a36
Sigma rule: Detects attempts to modify the registry using VBScript's CreateObject("Wscript.shell") and RegWrite methods via common L. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: Registry Modification Attempt Via VBScript id: 921aa10f-2e74-4cca-9498-98f9ca4d6fdf related: - id: 2a0a169d-cc66-43ce-9ae2-6e678e54e46a type: similar - id: 7f4c43f9-b1a5-4c7d-b24a-b41bf3a3ebf2 type: similar status: experimental description: 'Detects attempts to modify the registry using VBScript''s CreateObject("Wscript.shell") and RegWrite methods via common LOLBINs. It could be an attempt to modify the registry for persistence without using straightforward methods like regedit.exe, reg.exe, or PowerShell. Threat Actors may use this technique to evade detection by security solutions that monitor for direct registry modifications through traditional tools. ' references: - https://www.linkedin.com/posts/mauricefielenbach_livingofftheland-redteam-persistence-activity-7344801774182051843-TE00/ - https://www.nextron-systems.com/2025/07/29/detecting-the-most-popular-mitre-persistence-method-registry-run-keys-startup-folder/ date: 2025-08-13 author: Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems) tags: - attack.persistence - attack.execution - attack.defense-impairment - attack.t1112 - attack.t1059.005 logsource: category: process_creation product: windows detection: selection: CommandLine|contains|all: - CreateObject - Wscript.shell - .RegWrite condition: selection falsepositives: - Unknown level: medium
Sigma rule: Detects the image load of VSS DLL by uncommon executables. Logsource: windows / image_load. Rule: title: Potentially Suspicious Volume Shadow Copy Vsstrace.dll Load id: 48bfd177-7cf2-412b-ad77-baf923489e82 related: - id: 333cdbe8-27bb-4246-bf82-b41a0dca4b70 type: similar - id: 37774c23-25a1-4adb-bb6d-8bb9fd59c0f8 type: similar status: test description: Detects the image load of VSS DLL by uncommon executables references: - https://github.com/ORCx41/DeleteShadowCopies author: frack113 date: 2023-02-17 modified: 2025-12-03 tags: - attack.impact - attack.t1490 logsource: category: image_load product: windows detection: selection: ImageLoaded|endswith: \vsstrace.dll filter_main_windows: - Image: - C:\Windows\explorer.exe - C:\Windows\ImmersiveControlPanel\SystemSettings.exe - Image|startswith: - C:\Windows\System32\ - C:\Windows\SysWOW64\ - C:\Windows\Temp\{ - C:\Windows\WinSxS\ - C:\ProgramData\Package Cache\{ filter_main_program_files: Image|startswith: - C:\Program Files\ - C:\Program Files (x86)\ filter_optional_recovery: Image|startswith: C:\$WinREAgent\Scratch\ filter_main_null_image: Image: null filter_optional_avira: Image|contains|all: - \temp\is- - \avira_system_speedup.tmp condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_* and not 1 of filter_optional_* falsepositives: - Unknown level: medium
Sigma rule: Detects changes to environment variables related to ETW logging via the CommandLine. This could indicate potential adver. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: ETW Logging Tamper In .NET Processes Via CommandLine id: 41421f44-58f9-455d-838a-c398859841d4 status: test description: 'Detects changes to environment variables related to ETW logging via the CommandLine. This could indicate potential adversaries stopping ETW providers recording loaded .NET assemblies. ' references: - https://twitter.com/_xpn_/status/1268712093928378368 - https://social.msdn.microsoft.com/Forums/vstudio/en-US/0878832e-39d7-4eaf-8e16-a729c4c40975/what-can-i-use-e13c0d23ccbc4e12931bd9cc2eee27e4-for?forum=clr - https://github.com/dotnet/runtime/blob/ee2355c801d892f2894b0f7b14a20e6cc50e0e54/docs/design/coreclr/jit/viewing-jit-dumps.md#setting-configuration-variables - https://github.com/dotnet/runtime/blob/f62e93416a1799aecc6b0947adad55a0d9870732/src/coreclr/src/inc/clrconfigvalues.h#L35-L38 - https://github.com/dotnet/runtime/blob/7abe42dc1123722ed385218268bb9fe04556e3d3/src/coreclr/src/inc/clrconfig.h#L33-L39 - https://github.com/dotnet/runtime/search?p=1&q=COMPlus_&unscoped_q=COMPlus_ - https://bunnyinside.com/?term=f71e8cb9c76a - http://managed670.rssing.com/chan-5590147/all_p1.html - https://github.com/dotnet/runtime/blob/4f9ae42d861fcb4be2fcd5d3d55d5f227d30e723/docs/coding-guidelines/clr-jit-coding-conventions.md#1412-disabling-code - https://i.blackhat.com/EU-21/Wednesday/EU-21-Teodorescu-Veni-No-Vidi-No-Vici-Attacks-On-ETW-Blind-EDRs.pdf author: Roberto Rodriguez (Cyb3rWard0g), OTR (Open Threat Research) date: 2020-05-02 modified: 2022-12-09 tags: - attack.defense-impairment - attack.t1685 logsource: category: process_creation product: windows detection: selection: CommandLine|contains: - COMPlus_ETWEnabled - COMPlus_ETWFlags condition: selection falsepositives: - Unlikely level: high
Sigma rule: Detects Crassus, a Windows privilege escalation discovery tool, based on PE metadata characteristics.. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: PUA - Crassus Execution id: 2c32b543-1058-4808-91c6-5b31b8bed6c5 status: test description: Detects Crassus, a Windows privilege escalation discovery tool, based on PE metadata characteristics. references: - https://github.com/vu-ls/Crassus author: pH-T (Nextron Systems) date: 2023-04-17 tags: - attack.discovery - attack.reconnaissance - attack.t1590.001 logsource: category: process_creation product: windows detection: selection: - Image|endswith: \Crassus.exe - OriginalFileName: Crassus.exe - Description|contains: Crassus condition: selection falsepositives: - Unlikely level: high
Sigma rule: Detects Rclone config files being created. Logsource: windows / file_event. Rule: title: Rclone Config File Creation id: 34986307-b7f4-49be-92f3-e7a4d01ac5db status: test description: Detects Rclone config files being created references: - https://research.nccgroup.com/2021/05/27/detecting-rclone-an-effective-tool-for-exfiltration/ author: Aaron Greetham (@beardofbinary) - NCC Group date: 2021-05-26 modified: 2023-05-09 tags: - attack.exfiltration - attack.t1567.002 logsource: product: windows category: file_event detection: selection: TargetFilename|contains|all: - :\Users\ - \.config\rclone\ condition: selection falsepositives: - Legitimate Rclone usage level: medium
Sigma rule: Detects the installation of a DNS plugin DLL via ServerLevelPluginDll parameter in registry, which can be used to execut. Logsource: windows / registry_set. Rule: title: New DNS ServerLevelPluginDll Installed id: e61e8a88-59a9-451c-874e-70fcc9740d67 related: - id: cbe51394-cd93-4473-b555-edf0144952d9 type: derived - id: f63b56ee-3f79-4b8a-97fb-5c48007e8573 type: derived status: test description: Detects the installation of a DNS plugin DLL via ServerLevelPluginDll parameter in registry, which can be used to execute code in context of the DNS server (restart required) references: - https://medium.com/@esnesenon/feature-not-bug-dnsadmin-to-dc-compromise-in-one-line-a0f779b8dc83 - https://blog.3or.de/hunting-dns-server-level-plugin-dll-injection.html author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems) date: 2017-05-08 modified: 2023-08-17 tags: - attack.privilege-escalation - attack.persistence - attack.execution - attack.stealth - attack.defense-impairment - attack.t1574.001 - attack.t1112 logsource: product: windows category: registry_set detection: selection: TargetObject|endswith: \services\DNS\Parameters\ServerLevelPluginDll condition: selection falsepositives: - Unknown level: high
Sigma rule: Detects the stopping of a Windows service via the PowerShell Cmdlet "Stop-Service". Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: Stop Windows Service Via PowerShell Stop-Service id: c49c5062-0966-4170-9efd-9968c913a6cf related: - id: eb87818d-db5d-49cc-a987-d5da331fbd90 type: obsolete status: test description: Detects the stopping of a Windows service via the PowerShell Cmdlet "Stop-Service" references: - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/microsoft.powershell.management/stop-service?view=powershell-7.4 author: Jakob Weinzettl, oscd.community, Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) date: 2023-03-05 tags: - attack.impact - attack.t1489 logsource: category: process_creation product: windows detection: selection_sc_net_img: - OriginalFileName: - PowerShell.EXE - pwsh.dll - Image|endswith: - \powershell.exe - \pwsh.exe selection_cli: CommandLine|contains: 'Stop-Service ' condition: all of selection_* falsepositives: - There are many legitimate reasons to stop a service. This rule isn't looking for any suspicious behaviour in particular. Filter legitimate activity accordingly level: low