alirezaaminzadeh/cybersec-retrieval-benchmark huggingface dataset:
Sigma rule: Detects usage of a base64 encoded "IEX" cmdlet in a process command line. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: PowerShell Base64 Encoded IEX Cmdlet id: 88f680b8-070e-402c-ae11-d2914f2257f1 status: test description: Detects usage of a base64 encoded "IEX" cmdlet in a process command line references: - Internal Research author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems) date: 2019-08-23 modified: 2023-04-06 tags: - attack.execution - attack.t1059.001 logsource: category: process_creation product: windows detection: selection: - CommandLine|base64offset|contains: - IEX ([ - iex ([ - iex (New - IEX (New - IEX([ - iex([ - iex(New - IEX(New - IEX((' - iex((' - CommandLine|contains: - SQBFAFgAIAAoAFsA - kARQBYACAAKABbA - JAEUAWAAgACgAWw - aQBlAHgAIAAoAFsA - kAZQB4ACAAKABbA - pAGUAeAAgACgAWw - aQBlAHgAIAAoAE4AZQB3A - kAZQB4ACAAKABOAGUAdw - pAGUAeAAgACgATgBlAHcA - SQBFAFgAIAAoAE4AZQB3A - kARQBYACAAKABOAGUAdw - JAEUAWAAgACgATgBlAHcA condition: selection falsepositives: - Unknown level: high
Sigma rule: Detects the use of Kali Linux through Windows Subsystem for Linux. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: WSL Kali-Linux Usage id: 6f1a11aa-4b8a-4b7f-9e13-4d3e4ff0e0d4 status: experimental description: Detects the use of Kali Linux through Windows Subsystem for Linux references: - https://medium.com/@redfanatic7/running-kali-linux-on-windows-51ad95166e6e - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/wsl/install author: Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems) date: 2025-10-10 tags: - attack.stealth - attack.t1202 logsource: category: process_creation product: windows detection: selection_img_appdata: - Image|contains|all: - :\Users\ - \AppData\Local\packages\KaliLinux - Image|contains|all: - :\Users\ - \AppData\Local\Microsoft\WindowsApps\kali.exe selection_img_windowsapps: Image|contains: :\Program Files\WindowsApps\KaliLinux. Image|endswith: \kali.exe selection_kali_wsl_parent: ParentImage|endswith: - \wsl.exe - \wslhost.exe selection_kali_wsl_child: - Image|contains: - \kali.exe - \KaliLinux - CommandLine|contains: - Kali.exe - Kali-linux - kalilinux filter_main_install_uninstall: CommandLine|contains: - ' -i ' - ' --install ' - ' --unregister ' condition: 1 of selection_img_* or all of selection_kali_* and not 1 of filter_main_* falsepositives: - Legitimate installation or usage of Kali Linux WSL by administrators or security teams level: high
Sigma rule: Detects creation of ".vhd"/".vhdx" files by browser processes. Malware can use mountable Virtual Hard Disk ".vhd" files. Logsource: windows / file_event. Rule: title: VHD Image Download Via Browser id: 8468111a-ef07-4654-903b-b863a80bbc95 status: test description: 'Detects creation of ".vhd"/".vhdx" files by browser processes. Malware can use mountable Virtual Hard Disk ".vhd" files to encapsulate payloads and evade security controls. ' references: - https://redcanary.com/blog/intelligence-insights-october-2021/ - https://www.kaspersky.com/blog/lazarus-vhd-ransomware/36559/ - https://securelist.com/lazarus-on-the-hunt-for-big-game/97757/ author: frack113, Christopher Peacock '@securepeacock', SCYTHE '@scythe_io' date: 2021-10-25 modified: 2023-05-05 tags: - attack.resource-development - attack.t1587.001 logsource: category: file_event product: windows detection: selection: Image|endswith: - \brave.exe - \chrome.exe - \firefox.exe - \iexplore.exe - \maxthon.exe - \MicrosoftEdge.exe - \msedge.exe - \msedgewebview2.exe - \opera.exe - \safari.exe - \seamonkey.exe - \vivaldi.exe - \whale.exe TargetFilename|contains: .vhd condition: selection falsepositives: - Legitimate downloads of ".vhd" files would also trigger this level: medium
Sigma rule: Detects XSS attempts injected via GET requests in access logs. Logsource: webserver. Rule: title: Cross Site Scripting Strings id: 65354b83-a2ea-4ea6-8414-3ab38be0d409 status: test description: Detects XSS attempts injected via GET requests in access logs references: - https://github.com/payloadbox/xss-payload-list - https://portswigger.net/web-security/cross-site-scripting/contexts author: Saw Win Naung, Nasreddine Bencherchali date: 2021-08-15 modified: 2022-06-14 tags: - attack.initial-access - attack.t1189 logsource: category: webserver detection: select_method: cs-method: GET keywords: - =<script> - =%3Cscript%3E - =%253Cscript%253E - '<iframe ' - '%3Ciframe ' - '<svg ' - '%3Csvg ' - document.cookie - document.domain - ' onerror=' - ' onresize=' - ' onload="' - onmouseover= - ${alert - javascript:alert - javascript%3Aalert filter: sc-status: 404 condition: select_method and keywords and not filter falsepositives: - JavaScripts,CSS Files and PNG files - User searches in search boxes of the respective website - Internal vulnerability scanners can cause some serious FPs when used, if you experience a lot of FPs due to this think of adding more filters such as "User Agent" strings and more response codes level: high
Sigma rule: Detects the execution of a renamed binary often used by attackers or malware leveraging new Sysmon OriginalFileName data. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: Potential Defense Evasion Via Rename Of Highly Relevant Binaries id: 0ba1da6d-b6ce-4366-828c-18826c9de23e related: - id: 36480ae1-a1cb-4eaa-a0d6-29801d7e9142 type: similar - id: 2569ed8c-1147-498a-9b8c-2ad3656b10ed type: derived - id: a7a7e0e5-1d57-49df-9c58-9fe5bc0346a2 type: obsolete - id: d178a2d7-129a-4ba4-8ee6-d6e1fecd5d20 type: obsolete - id: d4d2574f-ac17-4d9e-b986-aeeae0dc8fe2 type: obsolete status: test description: Detects the execution of a renamed binary often used by attackers or malware leveraging new Sysmon OriginalFileName datapoint. references: - https://mgreen27.github.io/posts/2019/05/12/BinaryRename.html - https://mgreen27.github.io/posts/2019/05/29/BinaryRename2.html - https://www.trendmicro.com/vinfo/hk-en/security/news/cybercrime-and-digital-threats/megacortex-ransomware-spotted-attacking-enterprise-networks - https://twitter.com/christophetd/status/1164506034720952320 - https://threatresearch.ext.hp.com/svcready-a-new-loader-reveals-itself/ - https://www.huntress.com/blog/malicious-browser-extention-crashfix-kongtuke author: Matthew Green - @mgreen27, Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), frack113 date: 2019-06-15 modified: 2026-06-29 tags: - attack.stealth - attack.t1036.003 - car.2013-05-009 logsource: category: process_creation product: windows detection: selection: - Description: Execute processes remotely - Product: Sysinternals PsExec - Description|startswith: - Windows PowerShell - pwsh - OriginalFileName: - certutil.exe - cmstp.exe - cscript.exe - IE4UINIT.EXE - finger.exe - mshta.exe - msiexec.exe - msxsl.exe - powershell_ise.exe - powershell.exe - psexec.c - psexec.exe - psexesvc.exe - pwsh.dll - reg.exe - regsvr32.exe - rundll32.exe - WerMgr - wmic.exe - wscript.exe filter: Image|endswith: - \certutil.exe - \cmstp.exe - \cscript.exe - \ie4uinit.exe - \finger.exe - \mshta.exe - \msiexec.exe - \msxsl.exe - \powershell_ise.exe - \powershell.exe - \psexec.exe - \psexec64.exe - \psexec64a.exe - \PSEXESVC.exe - \pwsh.exe - \reg.exe - \regsvr32.exe - \rundll32.exe - \wermgr.exe - \wmic.exe - \wscript.exe condition: selection and not filter falsepositives: - Custom applications use renamed binaries adding slight change to binary name. Typically this is easy to spot and add to whitelist - PsExec installed via Windows Store doesn't contain original filename field (False negative) level: high regression_tests_path: regression_data/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_renamed_binary_highly_relevant/info.yml
Sigma rule: Identifies when a application security group is modified or deleted.. Logsource: azure / activitylogs. Rule: title: Azure Application Security Group Modified or Deleted id: 835747f1-9329-40b5-9cc3-97d465754ce6 status: test description: Identifies when a application security group is modified or deleted. references: - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/role-based-access-control/resource-provider-operations author: Austin Songer date: 2021-08-16 modified: 2022-08-23 tags: - attack.impact logsource: product: azure service: activitylogs detection: selection: operationName: - MICROSOFT.NETWORK/APPLICATIONSECURITYGROUPS/WRITE - MICROSOFT.NETWORK/APPLICATIONSECURITYGROUPS/DELETE condition: selection falsepositives: - Application security group being modified or deleted may be performed by a system administrator. - Verify whether the user identity, user agent, and/or hostname should be making changes in your environment. - Application security group modified or deleted from unfamiliar users should be investigated. If known behavior is causing false positives, it can be exempted from the rule. level: medium
Sigma rule: Alert on when a user has performed an eDiscovery search or exported a PST file from the search. This PST file usually ha. Logsource: m365 / threat_management. Rule: title: PST Export Alert Using eDiscovery Alert id: 18b88d08-d73e-4f21-bc25-4b9892a4fdd0 related: - id: 6897cd82-6664-11ed-9022-0242ac120002 type: similar status: test description: Alert on when a user has performed an eDiscovery search or exported a PST file from the search. This PST file usually has sensitive information including email body content references: - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/microsoft-365/compliance/alert-policies?view=o365-worldwide author: Sorina Ionescu date: 2022-02-08 modified: 2022-11-17 tags: - attack.collection - attack.t1114 logsource: service: threat_management product: m365 definition: Requires the 'eDiscovery search or exported' alert to be enabled detection: selection: eventSource: SecurityComplianceCenter eventName: eDiscovery search started or exported status: success condition: selection falsepositives: - PST export can be done for legitimate purposes but due to the sensitive nature of its content it must be monitored. level: medium
Sigma rule: Detects the creation of a process via the Windows task manager. This might be an attempt to bypass UAC. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: New Process Created Via Taskmgr.EXE id: 3d7679bd-0c00-440c-97b0-3f204273e6c7 status: test description: Detects the creation of a process via the Windows task manager. This might be an attempt to bypass UAC references: - https://twitter.com/ReneFreingruber/status/1172244989335810049 author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems) date: 2018-03-13 modified: 2024-01-18 tags: - attack.stealth - attack.t1036 logsource: category: process_creation product: windows detection: selection: ParentImage|endswith: \taskmgr.exe filter_main_generic: Image|endswith: - :\Windows\System32\mmc.exe - :\Windows\System32\resmon.exe - :\Windows\System32\Taskmgr.exe condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_* falsepositives: - Administrative activity level: low
Sigma rule: Detecting attempts to extract passwords with grep. Logsource: linux / auditd. Rule: title: Credentials In Files - Linux id: df3fcaea-2715-4214-99c5-0056ea59eb35 status: test description: Detecting attempts to extract passwords with grep references: - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1552.001/T1552.001.md author: Igor Fits, oscd.community date: 2020-10-15 modified: 2023-04-30 tags: - attack.credential-access - attack.t1552.001 logsource: product: linux service: auditd detection: selection: type: EXECVE keywords: '|all': - grep - password condition: selection and keywords falsepositives: - Unknown level: high
Sigma rule: Detects Obfuscated Powershell via use MSHTA in Scripts. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: Invoke-Obfuscation Via Use MSHTA id: ac20ae82-8758-4f38-958e-b44a3140ca88 status: test description: Detects Obfuscated Powershell via use MSHTA in Scripts references: - https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/issues/1009 author: Nikita Nazarov, oscd.community date: 2020-10-08 modified: 2022-03-08 tags: - attack.stealth - attack.t1027 - attack.execution - attack.t1059.001 logsource: category: process_creation product: windows detection: selection: CommandLine|contains|all: - set - '&&' - mshta - vbscript:createobject - .run - (window.close) condition: selection falsepositives: - Unknown level: high
Sigma rule: Detects a suspicious Microsoft desktopimgdownldr file creation that stores a file to a suspicious location or contains a. Logsource: windows / file_event. Rule: title: Suspicious Desktopimgdownldr Target File id: fc4f4817-0c53-4683-a4ee-b17a64bc1039 status: test description: Detects a suspicious Microsoft desktopimgdownldr file creation that stores a file to a suspicious location or contains a file with a suspicious extension references: - https://labs.sentinelone.com/living-off-windows-land-a-new-native-file-downldr/ - https://twitter.com/SBousseaden/status/1278977301745741825 author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems) date: 2020-07-03 modified: 2022-06-02 tags: - attack.command-and-control - attack.t1105 logsource: product: windows category: file_event detection: selection: Image|endswith: \svchost.exe TargetFilename|contains: \Personalization\LockScreenImage\ filter1: TargetFilename|contains: C:\Windows\ filter2: TargetFilename|contains: - .jpg - .jpeg - .png condition: selection and not filter1 and not filter2 falsepositives: - False positives depend on scripts and administrative tools used in the monitored environment level: high
Sigma rule: Detect changes of syslog daemons configuration files. Logsource: linux / auditd. Rule: title: Logging Configuration Changes on Linux Host id: c830f15d-6f6e-430f-8074-6f73d6807841 status: test description: Detect changes of syslog daemons configuration files references: - self experience author: Mikhail Larin, oscd.community date: 2019-10-25 modified: 2021-11-27 tags: - attack.defense-impairment - attack.t1685 logsource: product: linux service: auditd detection: selection: type: PATH name: - /etc/syslog.conf - /etc/rsyslog.conf - /etc/syslog-ng/syslog-ng.conf condition: selection falsepositives: - Legitimate administrative activity level: high
Sigma rule: Detects certain parent child patterns found in cases in which a web shell is used to perform certain credential dumping. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: Webshell Hacking Activity Patterns id: 4ebc877f-4612-45cb-b3a5-8e3834db36c9 status: test description: 'Detects certain parent child patterns found in cases in which a web shell is used to perform certain credential dumping or exfiltration activities on a compromised system ' references: - https://youtu.be/7aemGhaE9ds?t=641 author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems) date: 2022-03-17 modified: 2023-11-09 tags: - attack.persistence - attack.discovery - attack.t1505.003 - attack.t1018 - attack.t1033 - attack.t1087 logsource: category: process_creation product: windows detection: selection_webserver_image: ParentImage|endswith: - \caddy.exe - \httpd.exe - \nginx.exe - \php-cgi.exe - \w3wp.exe - \ws_tomcatservice.exe selection_webserver_characteristics_tomcat1: ParentImage|endswith: - \java.exe - \javaw.exe ParentImage|contains: - -tomcat- - \tomcat selection_webserver_characteristics_tomcat2: ParentImage|endswith: - \java.exe - \javaw.exe CommandLine|contains: - catalina.jar - CATALINA_HOME selection_child_1: CommandLine|contains|all: - rundll32 - comsvcs selection_child_2: CommandLine|contains|all: - ' -hp' - ' a ' - ' -m' selection_child_3: CommandLine|contains|all: - net - ' user ' - ' /add' selection_child_4: CommandLine|contains|all: - net - ' localgroup ' - ' administrators ' - /add selection_child_5: Image|endswith: - \ntdsutil.exe - \ldifde.exe - \adfind.exe - \procdump.exe - \Nanodump.exe - \vssadmin.exe - \fsutil.exe selection_child_6: CommandLine|contains: - ' -decode ' - ' -NoP ' - ' -W Hidden ' - ' /decode ' - ' /ticket:' - ' sekurlsa' - .dmp full - .downloadfile( - .downloadstring( - FromBase64String - process call create - 'reg save ' - whoami /priv condition: 1 of selection_webserver_* and 1 of selection_child_* falsepositives: - Unlikely level: high
Sigma rule: Detects instances where an OpenCanary node has been targeted by a NMAP OS Scan. Logsource: opencanary / application. Rule: title: OpenCanary - NMAP OS Scan id: e8a677fd-248c-4eab-94df-de2f6f645884 status: experimental description: Detects instances where an OpenCanary node has been targeted by a NMAP OS Scan references: - https://opencanary.readthedocs.io/en/latest/starting/configuration.html#services-configuration - https://github.com/thinkst/opencanary/blob/a0896adfcaf0328cfd5829fe10d2878c7445138e/opencanary/logger.py#L52 author: Marco Pedrinazzi (@pedrinazziM) date: 2026-01-06 tags: - attack.discovery - attack.t1046 logsource: category: application product: opencanary detection: selection: logtype: 5002 condition: selection falsepositives: - Unlikely level: high
Sigma rule: Detects execution of arbitrary DLLs or unsigned code via a ".csproj" files via Dotnet.EXE.. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: Arbitrary DLL or Csproj Code Execution Via Dotnet.EXE id: d80d5c81-04ba-45b4-84e4-92eba40e0ad3 status: test description: Detects execution of arbitrary DLLs or unsigned code via a ".csproj" files via Dotnet.EXE. references: - https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/OtherMSBinaries/Dotnet/ - https://twitter.com/_felamos/status/1204705548668555264 - https://bohops.com/2019/08/19/dotnet-core-a-vector-for-awl-bypass-defense-evasion/ author: Beyu Denis, oscd.community date: 2020-10-18 modified: 2025-10-08 tags: - attack.stealth - attack.t1218 logsource: category: process_creation product: windows detection: selection_img: - Image|endswith: \dotnet.exe - OriginalFileName: .NET Host selection_cli: CommandLine|endswith: - .csproj - .csproj" - .dll - .dll" - .csproj' - .dll' filter_optional_notepadplus_plus: ParentImage: - C:\Program Files (x86)\Notepad++\notepad++.exe - C:\Program Files\Notepad++\notepad++.exe CommandLine|contains|all: - C:\ProgramData\CSScriptNpp\ - '-cscs_path:' - \cs-script\cscs.dll condition: all of selection_* and not 1 of filter_optional_* falsepositives: - Legitimate administrator usage level: medium
Sigma rule: Detects loading of known malicious drivers via the file name of the drivers.. Logsource: windows / driver_load. Rule: title: Malicious Driver Load By Name id: 39b64854-5497-4b57-a448-40977b8c9679 status: test description: Detects loading of known malicious drivers via the file name of the drivers. references: - https://loldrivers.io/ author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) date: 2022-10-03 modified: 2023-12-02 tags: - attack.persistence - attack.privilege-escalation - attack.t1543.003 - attack.t1068 logsource: product: windows category: driver_load detection: selection: ImageLoaded|endswith: - \wfshbr64.sys - \ktmutil7odm.sys - \ktes.sys - \a26363e7b02b13f2b8d697abb90cd5c3.sys - \kt2.sys - \4748696211bd56c2d93c21cab91e82a5.sys - \malicious.sys - \a236e7d654cd932b7d11cb604629a2d0.sys - \spwizimgvt.sys - \c94f405c5929cfcccc8ad00b42c95083.sys - \fur.sys - \wantd.sys - \windbg.sys - \4118b86e490aed091b1a219dba45f332.sys - \gmer64.sys - \1fc7aeeff3ab19004d2e53eae8160ab1.sys - \poortry2.sys - \wintapix.sys - \daxin_blank6.sys - \6771b13a53b9c7449d4891e427735ea2.sys - \blacklotus_driver.sys - \air_system10.sys - \dkrtk.sys - \7.sys - \sense5ext.sys - \ktgn.sys - \ndislan.sys - \nlslexicons0024uvn.sys - \be6318413160e589080df02bb3ca6e6a.sys - \4.sys - \wantd_2.sys - \e29f6311ae87542b3d693c1f38e4e3ad.sys - \daxin_blank3.sys - \gftkyj64.sys - \daxin_blank2.sys - \wantd_4.sys - \reddriver.sys - \834761775.sys - \mlgbbiicaihflrnh.sys - \mjj0ge.sys - \daxin_blank.sys - \daxin_blank5.sys - \poortry1.sys - \msqpq.sys - \mimidrv.sys - \e939448b28a4edc81f1f974cebf6e7d2.sys - \prokiller64.sys - \nodedriver.sys - \wantd_3.sys - \lctka.sys - \kapchelper_x64.sys - \daxin_blank4.sys - \a9df5964635ef8bd567ae487c3d214c4.sys - \wantd_6.sys - \ntbios.sys - \wantd_5.sys - \pciecubed.sys - \mimikatz.sys - \nqrmq.sys - \2.sys - \poortry.sys - \ntbios_2.sys - \fgme.sys - \telephonuafy.sys - \typelibde.sys - \daxin_blank1.sys - \ef0e1725aaf0c6c972593f860531a2ea.sys - \5a4fe297c7d42539303137b6d75b150d.sys condition: selection falsepositives: - False positives may occur if one of the vulnerable driver names mentioned above didn't change its name between versions. So always make sure that the driver being loaded is the legitimate one and the non vulnerable version. - If you experience a lot of FP you could comment the driver name or its exact known legitimate location (when possible) level: medium
Sigma rule: This detection uses azureactivity logs (Administrative category) to identify the creation or update of a server instance. Logsource: azure / activitylogs. Rule: title: Azure Active Directory Hybrid Health AD FS New Server id: 288a39fc-4914-4831-9ada-270e9dc12cb4 status: test description: 'This detection uses azureactivity logs (Administrative category) to identify the creation or update of a server instance in an Azure AD Hybrid health AD FS service. A threat actor can create a new AD Health ADFS service and create a fake server instance to spoof AD FS signing logs. There is no need to compromise an on-prem AD FS server. This can be done programmatically via HTTP requests to Azure. ' references: - https://o365blog.com/post/hybridhealthagent/ author: Roberto Rodriguez (Cyb3rWard0g), OTR (Open Threat Research), MSTIC date: 2021-08-26 modified: 2023-10-11 tags: - attack.defense-impairment - attack.t1578 logsource: product: azure service: activitylogs detection: selection: CategoryValue: Administrative ResourceProviderValue: Microsoft.ADHybridHealthService ResourceId|contains: AdFederationService OperationNameValue: Microsoft.ADHybridHealthService/services/servicemembers/action condition: selection falsepositives: - Legitimate AD FS servers added to an AAD Health AD FS service instance level: medium
Sigma rule: Detects suspicious shell commands used in various Equation Group scripts and tools. Logsource: linux. Rule: title: Equation Group Indicators id: 41e5c73d-9983-4b69-bd03-e13b67e9623c status: test description: Detects suspicious shell commands used in various Equation Group scripts and tools references: - https://medium.com/@shadowbrokerss/dont-forget-your-base-867d304a94b1 author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems) date: 2017-04-09 modified: 2021-11-27 tags: - attack.execution - attack.g0020 - attack.t1059.004 logsource: product: linux detection: keywords: - 'chown root*chmod 4777 ' - cp /bin/sh .;chown - chmod 4777 /tmp/.scsi/dev/bin/gsh - chown root:root /tmp/.scsi/dev/bin/ - chown root:root x; - /bin/telnet locip locport < /dev/console | /bin/sh - /tmp/ratload - 'ewok -t ' - 'xspy -display ' - cat > /dev/tcp/127.0.0.1/80 <<END - rm -f /current/tmp/ftshell.latest - 'ghost_* -v ' - ' --wipe > /dev/null' - ping -c 2 *; grep * /proc/net/arp >/tmp/gx - iptables * OUTPUT -p tcp -d 127.0.0.1 --tcp-flags RST RST -j DROP; - '> /var/log/audit/audit.log; rm -f .' - cp /var/log/audit/audit.log .tmp - sh >/dev/tcp/* <&1 2>&1 - ncat -vv -l -p * < - nc -vv -l -p * < - < /dev/console | uudecode && uncompress - sendmail -osendmail;chmod +x sendmail - /usr/bin/wget -O /tmp/a http* && chmod 755 /tmp/cron - chmod 666 /var/run/utmp~ - chmod 700 nscd crond - cp /etc/shadow /tmp/. - </dev/console |uudecode > /dev/null 2>&1 && uncompress - chmod 700 jp&&netstat -an|grep - uudecode > /dev/null 2>&1 && uncompress -f * && chmod 755 - chmod 700 crond - wget http*; chmod +x /tmp/sendmail - chmod 700 fp sendmail pt - chmod 755 /usr/vmsys/bin/pipe - chmod -R 755 /usr/vmsys - chmod 755 $opbin/*tunnel - chmod 700 sendmail - chmod 0700 sendmail - /usr/bin/wget http*sendmail;chmod +x sendmail; - '&& telnet * 2>&1 </dev/console' condition: keywords falsepositives: - Unknown level: high