alirezaaminzadeh/cybersec-retrieval-benchmark huggingface dataset:
Sigma rule: Identifies when an user or application modified the federation settings on the domain.. Logsource: azure / auditlogs. Rule: title: Azure Domain Federation Settings Modified id: 352a54e1-74ba-4929-9d47-8193d67aba1e status: test description: Identifies when an user or application modified the federation settings on the domain. references: - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/active-directory/hybrid/how-to-connect-monitor-federation-changes author: Austin Songer date: 2021-09-06 modified: 2022-06-08 tags: - attack.privilege-escalation - attack.persistence - attack.initial-access - attack.stealth - attack.t1078 logsource: product: azure service: auditlogs detection: selection: ActivityDisplayName: Set federation settings on domain condition: selection falsepositives: - Federation Settings being modified or deleted may be performed by a system administrator. - Verify whether the user identity, user agent, and/or hostname should be making changes in your environment. - Federation Settings modified from unfamiliar users should be investigated. If known behavior is causing false positives, it can be exempted from the rule. level: medium
Sigma rule: Detects the execution of a binary from the Linux shared memory directory /dev/shm. This directory is a tmpfs mount backe. Logsource: linux / process_creation. Rule: title: Process Execution From Shared Memory Directory id: 5cd16c8f-44a6-4654-81e7-a84d6db507d4 status: experimental description: 'Detects the execution of a binary from the Linux shared memory directory /dev/shm. This directory is a tmpfs mount backed entirely by RAM and is abused by attackers for fileless malware staging because files written there never touch physical disk and may evade disk-based detection. ' references: - https://www.sysdig.com/blog/containers-read-only-fileless-malware - https://unfinished.bike/fun-with-the-new-bpfdoor-2023 - https://asiapacificdefencereporter.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/08/Final-CRWD-2023-Threat-Hunting-Report.pdf - https://www.crowdstrike.com/en-us/blog/how-to-hunt-for-decisivearchitect-and-justforfun-implant/ - https://www.linkedin.com/posts/avradeep_malware-apt-infostealer-activity-7373203959697719296-JR-7 - https://www.stormshield.com/news/orbit-analysis-of-a-linux-dedicated-malware/ author: Stan Beukers date: 2026-06-20 tags: - attack.stealth - attack.execution - attack.t1027.011 logsource: category: process_creation product: linux detection: selection: Image|startswith: /dev/shm/ condition: selection falsepositives: - Unlikely in production environments; some container runtimes or IPC frameworks may use /dev/shm for inter-process communication but should not spawn executables. level: high
Sigma rule: Detects execution of "ftp.exe" script with the "-s" or "/s" flag and any child processes ran by "ftp.exe".. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: Potential Arbitrary Command Execution Via FTP.EXE id: 06b401f4-107c-4ff9-947f-9ec1e7649f1e status: test description: Detects execution of "ftp.exe" script with the "-s" or "/s" flag and any child processes ran by "ftp.exe". references: - https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Ftp/ author: Victor Sergeev, oscd.community date: 2020-10-09 modified: 2024-04-23 tags: - attack.execution - attack.stealth - attack.t1059 - attack.t1202 logsource: category: process_creation product: windows detection: selection_parent: ParentImage|endswith: \ftp.exe selection_child_img: - Image|endswith: \ftp.exe - OriginalFileName: ftp.exe selection_child_cli: CommandLine|contains|windash: '-s:' condition: selection_parent or all of selection_child_* falsepositives: - Unknown level: medium
Sigma rule: Detects default CSExec pipe creation. Logsource: windows / pipe_created. Rule: title: PUA - CSExec Default Named Pipe id: f318b911-ea88-43f4-9281-0de23ede628e related: - id: 9e77ed63-2ecf-4c7b-b09d-640834882028 type: obsolete status: test description: Detects default CSExec pipe creation references: - https://drive.google.com/file/d/1lKya3_mLnR3UQuCoiYruO3qgu052_iS_/view - https://github.com/malcomvetter/CSExec author: Nikita Nazarov, oscd.community, Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) date: 2023-08-07 modified: 2023-11-30 tags: - attack.lateral-movement - attack.t1021.002 - attack.execution - attack.t1569.002 logsource: product: windows category: pipe_created definition: Note that you have to configure logging for Named Pipe Events in Sysmon config (Event ID 17 and Event ID 18). The basic configuration is in popular sysmon configuration (https://github.com/SwiftOnSecurity/sysmon-config), but it is worth verifying. You can also use other repo, e.g. https://github.com/Neo23x0/sysmon-config, https://github.com/olafhartong/sysmon-modular. How to test detection? You can check powershell script from this site https://svch0st.medium.com/guide-to-named-pipes-and-hunting-for-cobalt-strike-pipes-dc46b2c5f575 detection: selection: PipeName|contains: \csexecsvc condition: selection falsepositives: - Legitimate Administrator activity level: medium
Sigma rule: Detects usage of winget to install applications via manifest file. Adversaries can abuse winget to download payloads rem. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: Install New Package Via Winget Local Manifest id: 313d6012-51a0-4d93-8dfc-de8553239e25 status: test description: 'Detects usage of winget to install applications via manifest file. Adversaries can abuse winget to download payloads remotely and execute them. The manifest option enables you to install an application by passing in a YAML file directly to the client. Winget can be used to download and install exe, msi or msix files later. ' references: - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/package-manager/winget/install#local-install - https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Winget/ - https://github.com/nasbench/Misc-Research/tree/b9596e8109dcdb16ec353f316678927e507a5b8d/LOLBINs/Winget author: Sreeman, Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), frack113 date: 2020-04-21 modified: 2023-04-17 tags: - attack.execution - attack.t1059 logsource: category: process_creation product: windows detection: selection_img: - Image|endswith: \winget.exe - OriginalFileName: winget.exe selection_install_flag: CommandLine|contains: - install - ' add ' selection_manifest_flag: CommandLine|contains: - '-m ' - --manifest condition: all of selection_* falsepositives: - Some false positives are expected in some environment that may use this functionality to install and test their custom applications level: medium
Sigma rule: Detects changes to service startup type to 'disabled' or 'manual' using the WMIC command-line utility.. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: Service Startup Type Change Via Wmic.EXE id: c0514f28-fdae-42df-b886-06e2b2bc5b37 status: experimental description: 'Detects changes to service startup type to ''disabled'' or ''manual'' using the WMIC command-line utility. ' references: - https://blog.talosintelligence.com/uncovering-qilin-attack-methods-exposed-through-multiple-cases/ author: Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems) date: 2026-04-27 tags: - attack.execution - attack.defense-impairment - attack.t1047 - attack.t1685 logsource: category: process_creation product: windows detection: selection_img: - Image|endswith: \WMIC.exe - OriginalFileName: wmic.exe selection_cli: CommandLine|contains|all: - ' service ' - ChangeStartMode CommandLine|contains: - Manual - Disabled condition: all of selection_* falsepositives: - Legitimate administrative changes to service startup types using WMIC, investigate accordingly. level: medium regression_tests_path: regression_data/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_wmic_service_startup_change/info.yml
Sigma rule: Detects when an access level is changed for a Google workspace application. An access level is part of BeyondCorp Enterp. Logsource: gcp / google_workspace.admin. Rule: title: Google Workspace Application Access Level Modified id: 22f2fb54-5312-435d-852f-7c74f81684ca status: test description: 'Detects when an access level is changed for a Google workspace application. An access level is part of BeyondCorp Enterprise which is Google Workspace''s way of enforcing Zero Trust model. An adversary would be able to remove access levels to gain easier access to Google workspace resources. ' references: - https://developers.google.com/admin-sdk/reports/v1/appendix/activity/admin-application-settings - https://support.google.com/a/answer/9261439 author: Bryan Lim date: 2024-01-12 tags: - attack.persistence - attack.privilege-escalation - attack.t1098.003 logsource: product: gcp service: google_workspace.admin detection: selection: eventService: admin.googleapis.com eventName: CHANGE_APPLICATION_SETTING setting_name|startswith: ContextAwareAccess condition: selection falsepositives: - Legitimate administrative activities changing the access levels for an application level: medium
Sigma rule: Detects potential DLL sideloading of "SolidPDFCreator.dll". Logsource: windows / image_load. Rule: title: Potential SolidPDFCreator.DLL Sideloading id: a2edbce1-95c8-4291-8676-0d45146862b3 status: test description: Detects potential DLL sideloading of "SolidPDFCreator.dll" references: - https://lab52.io/blog/new-mustang-pandas-campaing-against-australia/ author: X__Junior (Nextron Systems) date: 2023-05-07 tags: - attack.persistence - attack.privilege-escalation - attack.execution - attack.stealth - attack.t1574.001 logsource: category: image_load product: windows detection: selection: ImageLoaded|endswith: \SolidPDFCreator.dll filter_main_path: Image|endswith: \SolidPDFCreator.exe ImageLoaded|startswith: - C:\Program Files (x86)\SolidDocuments\SolidPDFCreator\ - C:\Program Files\SolidDocuments\SolidPDFCreator\ condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_* falsepositives: - Unknown level: medium
Sigma rule: Detects the removal of a previously installed IIS module.. Logsource: windows / iis-configuration. Rule: title: Previously Installed IIS Module Was Removed id: 9e1a1fdf-ee58-40ce-8e15-b66ca5a80e1f status: test description: Detects the removal of a previously installed IIS module. references: - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/iis/manage/provisioning-and-managing-iis/configure-logging-in-iis - https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2022/12/12/iis-modules-the-evolution-of-web-shells-and-how-to-detect-them/ - https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2022/07/26/malicious-iis-extensions-quietly-open-persistent-backdoors-into-servers/ - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/iis/get-started/introduction-to-iis/iis-modules-overview author: Nasreddine Bencherchali date: 2024-10-06 tags: - attack.persistence - attack.defense-impairment - attack.t1685.001 - attack.t1505.004 logsource: product: windows service: iis-configuration detection: selection: EventID: 29 Configuration|contains: /system.webServer/modules/remove condition: selection falsepositives: - Legitimate administrator activity level: low
Sigma rule: Detects the execution of the PUA/Recon tool Seatbelt via PE information of command line parameters. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: PUA - Seatbelt Execution id: 38646daa-e78f-4ace-9de0-55547b2d30da status: test description: Detects the execution of the PUA/Recon tool Seatbelt via PE information of command line parameters references: - https://github.com/GhostPack/Seatbelt - https://www.bluetangle.dev/2022/08/fastening-seatbelt-on-threat-hunting.html author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) date: 2022-10-18 modified: 2023-02-04 tags: - attack.discovery - attack.t1526 - attack.t1087 - attack.t1083 logsource: category: process_creation product: windows detection: selection_img: - Image|endswith: \Seatbelt.exe - OriginalFileName: Seatbelt.exe - Description: Seatbelt - CommandLine|contains: - ' DpapiMasterKeys' - ' InterestingProcesses' - ' InterestingFiles' - ' CertificateThumbprints' - ' ChromiumBookmarks' - ' ChromiumHistory' - ' ChromiumPresence' - ' CloudCredentials' - ' CredEnum' - ' CredGuard' - ' FirefoxHistory' - ' ProcessCreationEvents' selection_group_list: CommandLine|contains: - ' -group=misc' - ' -group=remote' - ' -group=chromium' - ' -group=slack' - ' -group=system' - ' -group=user' - ' -group=all' selection_group_output: CommandLine|contains: ' -outputfile=' condition: selection_img or all of selection_group_* falsepositives: - Unlikely level: high
Sigma rule: Detects activity when a security-enabled global group is deleted. Logsource: windows / security. Rule: title: A Security-Enabled Global Group Was Deleted id: b237c54b-0f15-4612-a819-44b735e0de27 related: - id: 9cf01b6c-e723-4841-a868-6d7f8245ca6e type: obsolete status: stable description: Detects activity when a security-enabled global group is deleted references: - https://www.cisecurity.org/controls/cis-controls-list/ - https://www.pcisecuritystandards.org/documents/PCI_DSS_v3-2-1.pdf - https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/CSWP/NIST.CSWP.04162018.pdf - https://www.ultimatewindowssecurity.com/securitylog/encyclopedia/event.aspx?eventID=4730 - https://www.ultimatewindowssecurity.com/securitylog/encyclopedia/event.aspx?eventID=634 author: Alexandr Yampolskyi, SOC Prime date: 2023-04-26 tags: - attack.privilege-escalation - attack.persistence - attack.t1098 logsource: product: windows service: security detection: selection: EventID: - 4730 - 634 condition: selection falsepositives: - Unknown level: low
Sigma rule: Detects the addition of firewall address objects on a Fortinet FortiGate Firewall.. Logsource: fortigate / event. Rule: title: FortiGate - Firewall Address Object Added id: 5c8d7b41-3812-432f-a0bb-4cfb7c31827e status: experimental description: Detects the addition of firewall address objects on a Fortinet FortiGate Firewall. references: - https://www.fortiguard.com/psirt/FG-IR-24-535 - https://docs.fortinet.com/document/fortigate/7.6.4/fortios-log-message-reference/398/event - https://docs.fortinet.com/document/fortigate/7.6.4/cli-reference/306021697/config-firewall-address - https://docs.fortinet.com/document/fortigate/7.6.4/fortios-log-message-reference/44547/44547-logid-event-config-objattr author: Marco Pedrinazzi (@pedrinazziM) (InTheCyber) date: 2025-11-01 modified: 2026-05-04 tags: - attack.defense-impairment - attack.t1686.002 logsource: product: fortigate service: event detection: selection: action: Add cfgpath: firewall.address condition: selection falsepositives: - An address could be added or deleted for legitimate purposes. level: medium
Sigma rule: Detects the creation of a file with the name "code_tunnel.json" which indicate execution and usage of VsCode tunneling u. Logsource: windows / file_event. Rule: title: Renamed VsCode Code Tunnel Execution - File Indicator id: d102b8f5-61dc-4e68-bd83-9a3187c67377 status: test description: 'Detects the creation of a file with the name "code_tunnel.json" which indicate execution and usage of VsCode tunneling utility by an "Image" or "Process" other than VsCode. ' references: - https://ipfyx.fr/post/visual-studio-code-tunnel/ - https://badoption.eu/blog/2023/01/31/code_c2.html author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) date: 2023-10-25 tags: - attack.command-and-control logsource: category: file_event product: windows detection: selection: TargetFilename|endswith: \code_tunnel.json filter_main_legit_name: Image|endswith: - \code-tunnel.exe - \code.exe condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_* falsepositives: - Unknown level: high
Sigma rule: Detects execution of "rundll32" calling "advpack.dll" with potential obfuscated ordinal calls in order to leverage the ". Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: Suspicious Advpack Call Via Rundll32.EXE id: a1473adb-5338-4a20-b4c3-126763e2d3d3 status: test description: Detects execution of "rundll32" calling "advpack.dll" with potential obfuscated ordinal calls in order to leverage the "RegisterOCX" function references: - https://twitter.com/Hexacorn/status/1224848930795552769 - http://www.hexacorn.com/blog/2020/02/05/stay-positive-lolbins-not/ author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) date: 2023-05-17 tags: - attack.stealth logsource: category: process_creation product: windows detection: selection_img: - Image|endswith: \rundll32.exe - OriginalFileName: RUNDLL32.EXE - CommandLine|contains: rundll32 selection_cli_dll: CommandLine|contains: advpack selection_cli_ordinal: - CommandLine|contains|all: - '#+' - '12' - CommandLine|contains: '#-' condition: all of selection_* falsepositives: - Unlikely level: high
Sigma rule: Detects processes loading modules related to PCRE.NET package. Logsource: windows / image_load. Rule: title: PCRE.NET Package Image Load id: 84b0a8f3-680b-4096-a45b-e9a89221727c status: test description: Detects processes loading modules related to PCRE.NET package references: - https://twitter.com/rbmaslen/status/1321859647091970051 - https://twitter.com/tifkin_/status/1321916444557365248 author: Roberto Rodriguez (Cyb3rWard0g), OTR (Open Threat Research) date: 2020-10-29 modified: 2022-10-09 tags: - attack.execution - attack.t1059 logsource: category: image_load product: windows detection: selection: ImageLoaded|contains: \AppData\Local\Temp\ba9ea7344a4a5f591d6e5dc32a13494b\ condition: selection falsepositives: - Unknown level: high
Sigma rule: Detects the installation of MSIX/AppX packages with full trust privileges which run with elevated privileges outside nor. Logsource: windows / appxdeployment-server. Rule: title: Windows AppX Deployment Full Trust Package Installation id: e54279c7-4910-4e2c-902c-c56a25b549f6 status: experimental description: Detects the installation of MSIX/AppX packages with full trust privileges which run with elevated privileges outside normal AppX container restrictions references: - https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/msix-weaponization-threat-detection-splunk.html author: Michael Haag, Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems) date: 2025-11-03 tags: - attack.execution - attack.defense-impairment - attack.t1204.002 - attack.t1553.005 logsource: product: windows service: appxdeployment-server detection: selection: EventID: 400 HasFullTrust: true filter_main_legitpath: PackageSourceUri|startswith: - file:///C:/Program%20Files/ - file:///C:/Program%20Files%20(x86)/ filter_main_microsoft: - PackageSourceUri|startswith: https://go.microsoft.com/fwlink/?linkid - PackageSourceUri|contains: - .cdn.microsoft.com - .cdn.office.net/ filter_main_callerprocess: CallingProcess|startswith: - sysprep.exe - svchost.exe,AppReadiness filter_optional_x_update: PackageSourceUri|startswith: x-windowsupdate:// filter_optional_microsoftclient: PackageFullName|startswith: MicrosoftWindows.Client. condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_* and not 1 of filter_optional_* falsepositives: - Some legitimate applications installation which have been missed from filtering can generate fps, thus baselining and tuning is recommended before deploying to production level: medium
Sigma rule: Detects keywords that could indicate clearing PowerShell history. Logsource: windows / ps_module. Rule: title: Clear PowerShell History - PowerShell Module id: f99276ad-d122-4989-a09a-d00904a5f9d2 related: - id: dfba4ce1-e0ea-495f-986e-97140f31af2d type: derived status: test description: Detects keywords that could indicate clearing PowerShell history references: - https://gist.github.com/hook-s3c/7363a856c3cdbadeb71085147f042c1a author: Ilyas Ochkov, Jonhnathan Ribeiro, Daniil Yugoslavskiy, oscd.community date: 2019-10-25 modified: 2022-12-02 tags: - attack.stealth - attack.t1070.003 logsource: product: windows category: ps_module definition: 0ad03ef1-f21b-4a79-8ce8-e6900c54b65b detection: selection_1a_payload: Payload|contains: - del - Remove-Item - rm selection_1b_payload: Payload|contains: (Get-PSReadlineOption).HistorySavePath selection_payload_2: Payload|contains|all: - Set-PSReadlineOption - –HistorySaveStyle - SaveNothing selection_payload_3: Payload|contains|all: - Set-PSReadlineOption - -HistorySaveStyle - SaveNothing condition: 1 of selection_payload_* or all of selection_1* falsepositives: - Legitimate PowerShell scripts level: medium
Sigma rule: Detects a script interpreter wscript/cscript opening a network connection to a non-local network. Adversaries may use sc. Logsource: windows / network_connection. Rule: title: Outbound Network Connection Initiated By Script Interpreter id: 992a6cae-db6a-43c8-9cec-76d7195c96fc related: - id: 08249dc0-a28d-4555-8ba5-9255a198e08c type: derived status: test description: Detects a script interpreter wscript/cscript opening a network connection to a non-local network. Adversaries may use script to download malicious payloads. references: - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/28d190330fe44de6ff4767fc400cc10fa7cd6540/atomics/T1105/T1105.md author: frack113, Florian Roth (Nextron Systems) date: 2022-08-28 modified: 2024-03-13 tags: - attack.command-and-control - attack.t1105 logsource: category: network_connection product: windows detection: selection: Initiated: 'true' Image|endswith: - \wscript.exe - \cscript.exe filter_main_local_ranges: DestinationIp|cidr: - 127.0.0.0/8 - 10.0.0.0/8 - 172.16.0.0/12 - 192.168.0.0/16 - 169.254.0.0/16 - ::1/128 - fe80::/10 - fc00::/7 filter_main_ms_ranges: DestinationIp|cidr: 20.0.0.0/11 condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_* falsepositives: - Legitimate scripts level: high
Sigma rule: Detects potential installation or installation attempts of known malicious appx packages. Logsource: windows / appxdeployment-server. Rule: title: Potential Malicious AppX Package Installation Attempts id: 09d3b48b-be17-47f5-bf4e-94e7e75d09ce status: test description: Detects potential installation or installation attempts of known malicious appx packages references: - https://www.sentinelone.com/labs/inside-malicious-windows-apps-for-malware-deployment/ - https://news.sophos.com/en-us/2021/11/11/bazarloader-call-me-back-attack-abuses-windows-10-apps-mechanism/ - https://forensicitguy.github.io/analyzing-magnitude-magniber-appx/ author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) date: 2023-01-11 modified: 2023-01-12 tags: - attack.stealth logsource: product: windows service: appxdeployment-server detection: selection: EventID: - 400 - 401 PackageFullName|contains: 3669e262-ec02-4e9d-bcb4-3d008b4afac9 condition: selection falsepositives: - Rare occasions where a malicious package uses the exact same name and version as a legitimate application. level: medium
Sigma rule: Detects a network connection initiated by "Regsvr32.exe". Logsource: windows / network_connection. Rule: title: Network Connection Initiated By Regsvr32.EXE id: c7e91a02-d771-4a6d-a700-42587e0b1095 status: test description: Detects a network connection initiated by "Regsvr32.exe" references: - https://pentestlab.blog/2017/05/11/applocker-bypass-regsvr32/ - https://oddvar.moe/2017/12/13/applocker-case-study-how-insecure-is-it-really-part-1/ author: Dmitriy Lifanov, oscd.community date: 2019-10-25 modified: 2023-09-18 tags: - attack.execution - attack.stealth - attack.t1559.001 - attack.t1218.010 logsource: category: network_connection product: windows detection: selection: Initiated: 'true' Image|endswith: \regsvr32.exe condition: selection falsepositives: - Unknown level: medium
Sigma rule: Detects Obfuscated Powershell via RUNDLL LAUNCHER. Logsource: windows / system. Rule: title: Invoke-Obfuscation RUNDLL LAUNCHER - System id: 11b52f18-aaec-4d60-9143-5dd8cc4706b9 status: test description: Detects Obfuscated Powershell via RUNDLL LAUNCHER references: - https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/issues/1009 author: Timur Zinniatullin, oscd.community date: 2020-10-18 modified: 2022-11-29 tags: - attack.stealth - attack.t1027 - attack.execution - attack.t1059.001 logsource: product: windows service: system detection: selection: Provider_Name: Service Control Manager EventID: 7045 ImagePath|contains|all: - rundll32.exe - shell32.dll - shellexec_rundll - powershell condition: selection falsepositives: - Unknown level: medium