alirezaaminzadeh/cybersec-retrieval-benchmark huggingface dataset:
Sigma rule: Detects the Installation of a Exchange Transport Agent. Logsource: windows / msexchange-management. Rule: title: MSExchange Transport Agent Installation - Builtin id: 4fe151c2-ecf9-4fae-95ae-b88ec9c2fca6 related: - id: 83809e84-4475-4b69-bc3e-4aad8568612f type: derived status: test description: Detects the Installation of a Exchange Transport Agent references: - https://speakerdeck.com/heirhabarov/hunting-for-persistence-via-microsoft-exchange-server-or-outlook?slide=7 author: Tobias Michalski (Nextron Systems) date: 2021-06-08 modified: 2022-11-27 tags: - attack.persistence - attack.t1505.002 logsource: product: windows service: msexchange-management detection: selection: - Install-TransportAgent condition: selection falsepositives: - Legitimate installations of exchange TransportAgents. AssemblyPath is a good indicator for this. level: medium
Sigma rule: Detects a TacticalRMM service installation. Tactical RMM is a remote monitoring & management tool.. Logsource: windows / system. Rule: title: TacticalRMM Service Installation id: 4bb79b62-ef12-4861-981d-2aab43fab642 status: test description: Detects a TacticalRMM service installation. Tactical RMM is a remote monitoring & management tool. references: - https://thedfirreport.com/2022/11/28/emotet-strikes-again-lnk-file-leads-to-domain-wide-ransomware/ author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) date: 2022-11-28 tags: - attack.command-and-control - attack.t1219.002 logsource: product: windows service: system detection: selection_root: Provider_Name: Service Control Manager EventID: 7045 selection_service: - ImagePath|contains: tacticalrmm.exe - ServiceName|contains: TacticalRMM Agent Service condition: all of selection_* falsepositives: - Legitimate use of the tool level: medium
Sigma rule: Detects when the "index" value of a scheduled task is removed or deleted from the registry. Which effectively hides it f. Logsource: windows / registry_delete. Rule: title: Removal Of Index Value to Hide Schedule Task - Registry id: 526cc8bc-1cdc-48ad-8b26-f19bff969cec related: - id: acd74772-5f88-45c7-956b-6a7b36c294d2 type: similar - id: 5b16df71-8615-4f7f-ac9b-6c43c0509e61 type: similar status: test description: Detects when the "index" value of a scheduled task is removed or deleted from the registry. Which effectively hides it from any tooling such as "schtasks /query" references: - https://blog.qualys.com/vulnerabilities-threat-research/2022/06/20/defending-against-scheduled-task-attacks-in-windows-environments author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) date: 2022-08-26 modified: 2025-10-25 tags: - attack.defense-impairment - attack.t1685 logsource: product: windows category: registry_delete detection: selection: TargetObject|contains|all: - \SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Schedule\TaskCache\Tree\ - Index condition: selection falsepositives: - Unknown level: medium regression_tests_path: regression_data/rules/windows/registry/registry_delete/registry_delete_schtasks_hide_task_via_index_value_removal/info.yml
Sigma rule: Detects restricted access to applications by the Software Restriction Policies (SRP) policy. Logsource: windows / application. Rule: title: Restricted Software Access By SRP id: b4c8da4a-1c12-46b0-8a2b-0a8521d03442 status: test description: Detects restricted access to applications by the Software Restriction Policies (SRP) policy references: - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/identity/software-restriction-policies/software-restriction-policies - https://github.com/nasbench/EVTX-ETW-Resources/blob/7a806a148b3d9d381193d4a80356016e6e8b1ee8/ETWEventsList/CSV/Windows11/22H2/W11_22H2_Pro_20220920_22621.382/Providers/Microsoft-Windows-AppXDeployment-Server.csv author: frack113 date: 2023-01-12 tags: - attack.lateral-movement - attack.execution - attack.t1072 logsource: product: windows service: application detection: selection: Provider_Name: Microsoft-Windows-SoftwareRestrictionPolicies EventID: - 865 - 866 - 867 - 868 - 882 condition: selection falsepositives: - Unknown level: high
Sigma rule: Detects process execution related exceptions in JVM based apps, often relates to RCE. Logsource: jvm / application. Rule: title: Process Execution Error In JVM Based Application id: d65f37da-a26a-48f8-8159-3dde96680ad2 status: test description: Detects process execution related exceptions in JVM based apps, often relates to RCE references: - https://www.wix.engineering/post/threat-and-vulnerability-hunting-with-application-server-error-logs author: Moti Harmats date: 2023-02-11 tags: - attack.initial-access - attack.t1190 logsource: category: application product: jvm definition: 'Requirements: application error logs must be collected (with LOG_LEVEL=ERROR and above)' detection: keywords: - Cannot run program - java.lang.ProcessImpl - java.lang.ProcessBuilder condition: keywords falsepositives: - Application bugs level: high
Sigma rule: Detects process execution related errors in NodeJS. If the exceptions are caused due to user input then they may suggest. Logsource: nodejs / application. Rule: title: Potential RCE Exploitation Attempt In NodeJS id: 97661d9d-2beb-4630-b423-68985291a8af status: test description: Detects process execution related errors in NodeJS. If the exceptions are caused due to user input then they may suggest an RCE vulnerability. references: - https://www.wix.engineering/post/threat-and-vulnerability-hunting-with-application-server-error-logs author: Moti Harmats date: 2023-02-11 tags: - attack.initial-access - attack.t1190 logsource: category: application product: nodejs definition: 'Requirements: application error logs must be collected (with LOG_LEVEL=ERROR and above)' detection: keywords: - node:child_process condition: keywords falsepositives: - Puppeteer invocation exceptions often contain child_process related errors, that doesn't necessarily mean that the app is vulnerable. level: high
Sigma rule: Detects inline Windows shell commands redirecting output via the ">" symbol to a suspicious location. This technique is. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: Potentially Suspicious CMD Shell Output Redirect id: 8e0bb260-d4b2-4fff-bb8d-3f82118e6892 related: - id: aa2efee7-34dd-446e-8a37-40790a66efd7 type: derived - id: 4f4eaa9f-5ad4-410c-a4be-bc6132b0175a type: similar status: test description: 'Detects inline Windows shell commands redirecting output via the ">" symbol to a suspicious location. This technique is sometimes used by malicious actors in order to redirect the output of reconnaissance commands such as "hostname" and "dir" to files for future exfiltration. ' references: - https://thedfirreport.com/2022/07/11/select-xmrig-from-sqlserver/ author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) date: 2022-07-12 modified: 2024-03-19 tags: - attack.stealth - attack.t1218 logsource: category: process_creation product: windows detection: selection_img: - Image|endswith: \cmd.exe - OriginalFileName: Cmd.Exe selection_cli_1: CommandLine|contains: - '>?%APPDATA%\' - '>?%TEMP%\' - '>?%TMP%\' - '>?%USERPROFILE%\' - '>?C:\ProgramData\' - '>?C:\Temp\' - '>?C:\Users\Public\' - '>?C:\Windows\Temp\' selection_cli_2: CommandLine|contains: - ' >' - '">' - '''>' CommandLine|contains|all: - C:\Users\ - \AppData\Local\ condition: selection_img and 1 of selection_cli_* falsepositives: - Legitimate admin or third party scripts used for diagnostic collection might generate some false positives level: medium
Sigma rule: Detect suspicious parent processes of well-known Windows processes. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: Windows Processes Suspicious Parent Directory id: 96036718-71cc-4027-a538-d1587e0006a7 status: test description: Detect suspicious parent processes of well-known Windows processes references: - https://web.archive.org/web/20180718061628/https://securitybytes.io/blue-team-fundamentals-part-two-windows-processes-759fe15965e2 - https://www.carbonblack.com/2014/06/10/screenshot-demo-hunt-evil-faster-than-ever-with-carbon-black/ - https://www.13cubed.com/downloads/windows_process_genealogy_v2.pdf author: vburov date: 2019-02-23 modified: 2025-03-06 tags: - attack.stealth - attack.t1036.003 - attack.t1036.005 logsource: category: process_creation product: windows detection: selection: Image|endswith: - \svchost.exe - \taskhost.exe - \lsm.exe - \lsass.exe - \services.exe - \lsaiso.exe - \csrss.exe - \wininit.exe - \winlogon.exe filter_sys: - ParentImage|endswith: - \SavService.exe - \ngen.exe - ParentImage|contains: - \System32\ - \SysWOW64\ filter_msmpeng: ParentImage|contains: - \Windows Defender\ - \Microsoft Security Client\ ParentImage|endswith: \MsMpEng.exe filter_null: - ParentImage: null - ParentImage: - '' - '-' condition: selection and not 1 of filter_* falsepositives: - Some security products seem to spawn these level: low
Sigma rule: Detects modifications to DNS records in Active Directory where the Distinguished Name (DN) contains a base64-encoded blo. Logsource: windows / security. Rule: title: Potential Kerberos Coercion by Spoofing SPNs via DNS Manipulation id: b07e58cf-cacc-4135-8473-ccb2eba63dd2 related: - id: e7a21b5f-d8c4-4ae5-b8d9-93c5d3f28e1c type: similar - id: 5588576c-5898-4fac-bcdd-7475a60e8f43 type: similar - id: 0ed99dda-6a35-11ef-8c99-0242ac120002 type: similar status: experimental description: 'Detects modifications to DNS records in Active Directory where the Distinguished Name (DN) contains a base64-encoded blob matching the pattern "1UWhRCAAAAA...BAAAA". This pattern corresponds to a marshaled CREDENTIAL_TARGET_INFORMATION structure, commonly used in Kerberos coercion attacks. Adversaries may exploit this to coerce victim systems into authenticating to attacker-controlled hosts by spoofing SPNs via DNS. It is one of the strong indicators of a Kerberos coercion attack,. where adversaries manipulate DNS records to spoof Service Principal Names (SPNs) and redirect authentication requests like CVE-2025-33073. Please investigate the user account that made the changes, as it is likely a low-privileged account that has been compromised. ' references: - https://googleprojectzero.blogspot.com/2021/10/using-kerberos-for-authentication-relay.html - https://www.synacktiv.com/publications/ntlm-reflection-is-dead-long-live-ntlm-reflection-an-in-depth-analysis-of-cve-2025 author: Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems) date: 2025-06-20 tags: - attack.collection - attack.credential-access - attack.t1557.003 - attack.persistence - attack.privilege-escalation logsource: product: windows service: security definition: 'By default these events are not logged by default for MicrosoftDNS objects in Active Directory. To enable detection, configure an AuditRule on the DNS object container with the "CreateChild" permission for the "Everyone" principal. This can be accomplished using tools such as Set-AuditRule (see https://github.com/OTRF/Set-AuditRule). ' detection: selection_directory_service_changes: EventID: - 5136 - 5137 ObjectClass: dnsNode ObjectDN|contains|all: - UWhRCA - BAAAA - CN=MicrosoftDNS selection_directory_service_access: EventID: 4662 AdditionalInfo|contains|all: - UWhRCA - BAAAA - CN=MicrosoftDNS condition: 1 of selection_* falsepositives: - Unknown level: high
Sigma rule: focuses on trivial artifacts observed in variants of prevalent offensive ps1 payloads, including Cobalt Strike Beacon, P. Logsource: windows / ps_module. Rule: title: Bad Opsec Powershell Code Artifacts id: 8d31a8ce-46b5-4dd6-bdc3-680931f1db86 related: - id: 73e733cc-1ace-3212-a107-ff2523cc9fc3 type: derived status: test description: 'focuses on trivial artifacts observed in variants of prevalent offensive ps1 payloads, including Cobalt Strike Beacon, PoshC2, Powerview, Letmein, Empire, Powersploit, and other attack payloads that often undergo minimal changes by attackers due to bad opsec. ' references: - https://newtonpaul.com/analysing-fileless-malware-cobalt-strike-beacon/ - https://labs.sentinelone.com/top-tier-russian-organized-cybercrime-group-unveils-fileless-stealthy-powertrick-backdoor-for-high-value-targets/ - https://www.mdeditor.tw/pl/pgRt author: ok @securonix invrep_de, oscd.community date: 2020-10-09 modified: 2022-12-25 tags: - attack.execution - attack.t1059.001 logsource: product: windows category: ps_module definition: 0ad03ef1-f21b-4a79-8ce8-e6900c54b65b detection: selection_4103: Payload|contains: - $DoIt - harmj0y - mattifestation - _RastaMouse - tifkin_ - '0xdeadbeef' condition: selection_4103 falsepositives: - Moderate-to-low; Despite the shorter length/lower entropy for some of these, because of high specificity, fp appears to be fairly limited in many environments. level: critical
Sigma rule: Detects when the file "passwd" or "shadow" is copied from tmp path. Logsource: linux / process_creation. Rule: title: Copy Passwd Or Shadow From TMP Path id: fa4aaed5-4fe0-498d-bbc0-08e3346387ba status: test description: Detects when the file "passwd" or "shadow" is copied from tmp path references: - https://blogs.blackberry.com/ - https://twitter.com/Joseliyo_Jstnk/status/1620131033474822144 author: Joseliyo Sanchez, @Joseliyo_Jstnk date: 2023-01-31 tags: - attack.credential-access - attack.t1552.001 logsource: product: linux category: process_creation detection: selection_img: Image|endswith: /cp selection_path: CommandLine|contains: /tmp/ selection_file: CommandLine|contains: - passwd - shadow condition: all of selection_* falsepositives: - Unknown level: high
Sigma rule: Detects java process spawning suspicious children. Logsource: linux / process_creation. Rule: title: Suspicious Java Children Processes id: d292e0af-9a18-420c-9525-ec0ac3936892 status: test description: Detects java process spawning suspicious children references: - https://www.tecmint.com/different-types-of-linux-shells/ author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) date: 2022-06-03 tags: - attack.execution - attack.t1059 logsource: category: process_creation product: linux detection: selection: ParentImage|endswith: /java CommandLine|contains: - /bin/sh - bash - dash - ksh - zsh - csh - fish - curl - wget - python condition: selection falsepositives: - Unknown level: high
Sigma rule: Detects DNS queries for IP lookup services such as "api.ipify.org" originating from a non browser process.. Logsource: windows / dns_query. Rule: title: Suspicious DNS Query for IP Lookup Service APIs id: ec82e2a5-81ea-4211-a1f8-37a0286df2c2 status: test description: Detects DNS queries for IP lookup services such as "api.ipify.org" originating from a non browser process. references: - https://www.binarydefense.com/analysis-of-hancitor-when-boring-begets-beacon - https://twitter.com/neonprimetime/status/1436376497980428318 - https://www.trendmicro.com/en_us/research/23/e/managed-xdr-investigation-of-ducktail-in-trend-micro-vision-one.html author: Brandon George (blog post), Thomas Patzke date: 2021-07-08 modified: 2024-03-22 tags: - attack.reconnaissance - attack.t1590 logsource: product: windows category: dns_query detection: selection: - QueryName: - www.ip.cn - l2.io - QueryName|contains: - api.2ip.ua - api.bigdatacloud.net - api.ipify.org - bot.whatismyipaddress.com - canireachthe.net - checkip.amazonaws.com - checkip.dyndns.org - curlmyip.com - db-ip.com - edns.ip-api.com - eth0.me - freegeoip.app - geoipy.com - getip.pro - icanhazip.com - ident.me - ifconfig.io - ifconfig.me - ip-api.com - ip.360.cn - ip.anysrc.net - ip.taobao.com - ip.tyk.nu - ipaddressworld.com - ipapi.co - ipconfig.io - ipecho.net - ipinfo.io - ipip.net - ipof.in - ipv4.icanhazip.com - ipv4bot.whatismyipaddress.com - ipv6-test.com - ipwho.is - jsonip.com - myexternalip.com - seeip.org - wgetip.com - whatismyip.akamai.com - whois.pconline.com.cn - wtfismyip.com filter_optional_brave: Image|endswith: \brave.exe filter_optional_chrome: Image: - C:\Program Files\Google\Chrome\Application\chrome.exe - C:\Program Files (x86)\Google\Chrome\Application\chrome.exe filter_optional_firefox: Image: - C:\Program Files\Mozilla Firefox\firefox.exe - C:\Program Files (x86)\Mozilla Firefox\firefox.exe filter_optional_ie: Image: - C:\Program Files (x86)\Internet Explorer\iexplore.exe - C:\Program Files\Internet Explorer\iexplore.exe filter_optional_maxthon: Image|endswith: \maxthon.exe filter_optional_edge_1: - Image|startswith: C:\Program Files (x86)\Microsoft\EdgeWebView\Application\ - Image|endswith: \WindowsApps\MicrosoftEdge.exe - Image: - C:\Program Files (x86)\Microsoft\Edge\Application\msedge.exe - C:\Program Files\Microsoft\Edge\Application\msedge.exe filter_optional_edge_2: Image|startswith: - C:\Program Files (x86)\Microsoft\EdgeCore\ - C:\Program Files\Microsoft\EdgeCore\ Image|endswith: - \msedge.exe - \msedgewebview2.exe filter_optional_opera: Image|endswith: \opera.exe filter_optional_safari: Image|endswith: \safari.exe filter
Sigma rule: Conti recommendation to its affiliates to use esentutl to access NTDS dumped file. Trickbot also uses this utilities to. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: Esentutl Gather Credentials id: 7df1713a-1a5b-4a4b-a071-dc83b144a101 status: test description: Conti recommendation to its affiliates to use esentutl to access NTDS dumped file. Trickbot also uses this utilities to get MSEdge info via its module pwgrab. references: - https://twitter.com/vxunderground/status/1423336151860002816 - https://thedfirreport.com/2021/08/01/bazarcall-to-conti-ransomware-via-trickbot-and-cobalt-strike/ author: sam0x90 date: 2021-08-06 modified: 2022-10-09 tags: - attack.credential-access - attack.t1003 - attack.t1003.003 - attack.s0404 logsource: category: process_creation product: windows detection: selection: CommandLine|contains|all: - esentutl - ' /p' condition: selection falsepositives: - To be determined level: medium
Sigma rule: Detects Obfuscated use of stdin to execute PowerShell. Logsource: windows / ps_module. Rule: title: Invoke-Obfuscation STDIN+ Launcher - PowerShell Module id: 9ac8b09b-45de-4a07-9da1-0de8c09304a3 related: - id: 779c8c12-0eb1-11eb-adc1-0242ac120002 type: derived status: test description: Detects Obfuscated use of stdin to execute PowerShell references: - https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/issues/1009 author: Jonathan Cheong, oscd.community date: 2020-10-15 modified: 2024-04-05 tags: - attack.stealth - attack.t1027 - attack.execution - attack.t1059.001 logsource: product: windows category: ps_module definition: 0ad03ef1-f21b-4a79-8ce8-e6900c54b65b detection: selection_4103: Payload|re: cmd.{0,5}(?:/c|/r).+powershell.+(?:\$\{?input\}?|noexit).+" condition: selection_4103 falsepositives: - Unknown level: high
Sigma rule: Adversaries may carry out malicious operations using a virtual instance to avoid detection. Logsource: windows / ps_script. Rule: title: Suspicious Hyper-V Cmdlets id: 42d36aa1-3240-4db0-8257-e0118dcdd9cd status: test description: Adversaries may carry out malicious operations using a virtual instance to avoid detection references: - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/virtualization/hyper-v-on-windows/quick-start/enable-hyper-v - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1564.006/T1564.006.md#atomic-test-3---create-and-start-hyper-v-virtual-machine author: frack113 date: 2022-04-09 tags: - attack.stealth - attack.t1564.006 logsource: product: windows category: ps_script definition: 'Requirements: Script Block Logging must be enabled' detection: selection: ScriptBlockText|contains: - New-VM - Set-VMFirmware - Start-VM condition: selection falsepositives: - Legitimate PowerShell scripts level: medium
Sigma rule: Detects Obfuscated Powershell via use MSHTA in Scripts. Logsource: windows / ps_module. Rule: title: Invoke-Obfuscation Via Use MSHTA - PowerShell Module id: 07ad2ea8-6a55-4ac6-bf3e-91b8e59676eb related: - id: e55a5195-4724-480e-a77e-3ebe64bd3759 type: derived status: test description: Detects Obfuscated Powershell via use MSHTA in Scripts references: - https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/issues/1009 author: Nikita Nazarov, oscd.community date: 2020-10-08 modified: 2023-01-04 tags: - attack.stealth - attack.t1027 - attack.execution - attack.t1059.001 logsource: product: windows category: ps_module definition: 0ad03ef1-f21b-4a79-8ce8-e6900c54b65b detection: selection: Payload|contains|all: - set - '&&' - mshta - vbscript:createobject - .run - (window.close) condition: selection falsepositives: - Unknown level: high
Sigma rule: Detects the creation of a new local user on a Fortinet FortiGate Firewall. The new local user could be used for VPN conn. Logsource: fortigate / event. Rule: title: FortiGate - New Local User Created id: ddbbe845-1d74-43a8-8231-2156d180234d status: experimental description: 'Detects the creation of a new local user on a Fortinet FortiGate Firewall. The new local user could be used for VPN connections. ' references: - https://www.fortiguard.com/psirt/FG-IR-24-535 - https://docs.fortinet.com/document/fortigate/7.6.4/fortios-log-message-reference/398/event - https://docs.fortinet.com/document/fortigate/7.6.4/cli-reference/109120963/config-user-local - https://docs.fortinet.com/document/fortigate/7.6.4/fortios-log-message-reference/44547/44547-logid-event-config-objattr author: Marco Pedrinazzi (@pedrinazziM) (InTheCyber) date: 2025-11-01 tags: - attack.persistence - attack.t1136.001 logsource: product: fortigate service: event detection: selection: action: Add cfgpath: user.local condition: selection falsepositives: - A local user can be created for legitimate purposes. Investigate the user details to determine if it is authorized. level: medium
Sigma rule: Hides the file extension through modification of the registry. Logsource: windows / registry_set. Rule: title: Registry Modification to Hidden File Extension id: 5df86130-4e95-4a54-90f7-26541b40aec2 status: test description: Hides the file extension through modification of the registry references: - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1112/T1112.md#atomic-test-1---modify-registry-of-current-user-profile---cmd - https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/ransomware-families/ - https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/wdsi/threats/malware-encyclopedia-description?name=TrojanSpy%3aMSIL%2fHakey.A author: frack113 date: 2022-01-22 modified: 2023-08-17 tags: - attack.persistence - attack.t1137 logsource: category: registry_set product: windows detection: selection_HideFileExt: TargetObject|endswith: \SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\Advanced\HideFileExt Details: DWORD (0x00000001) selection_Hidden: TargetObject|endswith: \SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\Advanced\Hidden Details: DWORD (0x00000002) condition: 1 of selection_* falsepositives: - Administrative scripts level: medium
Sigma rule: Detects registry changes to Microsoft Office "AccessVBOM" to a value of "1" which disables trust access for VBA on the v. Logsource: windows / registry_set. Rule: title: Trust Access Disable For VBApplications id: 1a5c46e9-f32f-42f7-b2bc-6e9084db7fbf related: - id: 9b894e57-033f-46cf-b7fa-a52804181973 type: obsolete status: test description: Detects registry changes to Microsoft Office "AccessVBOM" to a value of "1" which disables trust access for VBA on the victim machine and lets attackers execute malicious macros without any Microsoft Office warnings. references: - https://twitter.com/inversecos/status/1494174785621819397 - https://www.mcafee.com/blogs/other-blogs/mcafee-labs/zloader-with-a-new-infection-technique/ - https://securelist.com/scarcruft-surveilling-north-korean-defectors-and-human-rights-activists/105074/ author: Trent Liffick (@tliffick), Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) date: 2020-05-22 modified: 2023-08-17 tags: - attack.persistence - attack.defense-impairment - attack.t1112 logsource: category: registry_set product: windows detection: selection: TargetObject|endswith: \Security\AccessVBOM Details: DWORD (0x00000001) condition: selection falsepositives: - Unlikely level: high