alirezaaminzadeh/cybersec-retrieval-benchmark huggingface dataset:
Sigma rule: Detects suspicious powershell invocations from interpreters or unusual programs. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: Suspicious PowerShell Invocation From Script Engines id: 95eadcb2-92e4-4ed1-9031-92547773a6db status: test description: Detects suspicious powershell invocations from interpreters or unusual programs references: - https://www.securitynewspaper.com/2017/03/20/attackers-leverage-excel-powershell-dns-latest-non-malware-attack/ author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems) date: 2019-01-16 modified: 2023-01-05 tags: - attack.execution - attack.t1059.001 logsource: category: process_creation product: windows detection: selection: ParentImage|endswith: - \wscript.exe - \cscript.exe Image|endswith: - \powershell.exe - \pwsh.exe filter_health_service: CurrentDirectory|contains: \Health Service State\ condition: selection and not 1 of filter_* falsepositives: - Microsoft Operations Manager (MOM) - Other scripts level: medium
Sigma rule: It is extremely abnormal for svchost.exe to spawn without any CLI arguments and is normally observed when a malicious pr. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: Suspect Svchost Activity id: 16c37b52-b141-42a5-a3ea-bbe098444397 status: test description: It is extremely abnormal for svchost.exe to spawn without any CLI arguments and is normally observed when a malicious process spawns the process and injects code into the process memory space. references: - https://web.archive.org/web/20180718061628/https://securitybytes.io/blue-team-fundamentals-part-two-windows-processes-759fe15965e2 author: David Burkett, @signalblur date: 2019-12-28 modified: 2022-06-27 tags: - attack.privilege-escalation - attack.stealth - attack.t1055 logsource: category: process_creation product: windows detection: selection: CommandLine|endswith: svchost.exe Image|endswith: \svchost.exe filter: - ParentImage|endswith: - \rpcnet.exe - \rpcnetp.exe - CommandLine: null condition: selection and not filter falsepositives: - Rpcnet.exe / rpcnetp.exe which is a lojack style software. https://www.blackhat.com/docs/us-14/materials/us-14-Kamlyuk-Kamluk-Computrace-Backdoor-Revisited.pdf level: high
Sigma rule: Detects potential DLL sideloading of a signed dbghelp.dll by the Sysinternals VMMap.. Logsource: windows / image_load. Rule: title: VMMap Signed Dbghelp.DLL Potential Sideloading id: 98ffaed4-aec2-4e04-9b07-31492fe68b3d related: - id: 273a8dd8-3742-4302-bcc7-7df5a80fe425 type: similar status: test description: Detects potential DLL sideloading of a signed dbghelp.dll by the Sysinternals VMMap. references: - https://techcommunity.microsoft.com/t5/sysinternals-blog/zoomit-v7-1-procdump-2-0-for-linux-process-explorer-v17-05/ba-p/3884766 author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) date: 2023-09-05 tags: - attack.persistence - attack.privilege-escalation - attack.execution - attack.stealth - attack.t1574.001 logsource: category: image_load product: windows detection: selection: ImageLoaded|contains: C:\Debuggers\dbghelp.dll Image|endswith: - \vmmap.exe - \vmmap64.exe Signed: 'true' condition: selection falsepositives: - Unknown level: medium
Sigma rule: Detects modifications to the Windows Defender exclusion registry key. This could indicate a potentially suspicious or ev. Logsource: windows / security. Rule: title: Windows Defender Exclusion List Modified id: 46a68649-f218-4f86-aea1-16a759d81820 related: - id: e9c8808f-4cfb-4ba9-97d4-e5f3beaa244d type: derived - id: a33f8808-2812-4373-ae95-8cfb82134978 type: derived status: test description: 'Detects modifications to the Windows Defender exclusion registry key. This could indicate a potentially suspicious or even malicious activity by an attacker trying to add a new exclusion in order to bypass security. ' references: - https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/gootkit-malware-bypasses-windows-defender-by-setting-path-exclusions/ author: '@BarryShooshooga' date: 2019-10-26 modified: 2023-11-11 tags: - attack.defense-impairment - attack.t1685 logsource: product: windows service: security definition: 'Requirements: Audit Policy : Security Settings/Local Policies/Audit Policy, Registry System Access Control (SACL): Auditing/User' detection: selection: EventID: 4657 ObjectName|contains: \Microsoft\Windows Defender\Exclusions\ condition: selection falsepositives: - Intended exclusions by administrators level: medium
Sigma rule: Detects Obfuscated Powershell via VAR++ LAUNCHER. Logsource: windows / system. Rule: title: Invoke-Obfuscation VAR++ LAUNCHER OBFUSCATION - System id: 14bcba49-a428-42d9-b943-e2ce0f0f7ae6 status: test description: Detects Obfuscated Powershell via VAR++ LAUNCHER references: - https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/issues/1009 author: Timur Zinniatullin, oscd.community date: 2020-10-13 modified: 2022-11-29 tags: - attack.stealth - attack.t1027 - attack.execution - attack.t1059.001 logsource: product: windows service: system detection: selection: Provider_Name: Service Control Manager EventID: 7045 ImagePath|contains|all: - '&&set' - cmd - /c - -f ImagePath|contains: - '{0}' - '{1}' - '{2}' - '{3}' - '{4}' - '{5}' condition: selection falsepositives: - Unknown level: high
Sigma rule: Detects email exfiltration via powershell cmdlets. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: Email Exifiltration Via Powershell id: 312d0384-401c-4b8b-abdf-685ffba9a332 status: test description: Detects email exfiltration via powershell cmdlets references: - https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2022/09/07/profiling-dev-0270-phosphorus-ransomware-operations/ - https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/7e6aa438e254d468feec061618a7877aa528ee9f/Hunting%20Queries/Microsoft%20365%20Defender/Ransomware/DEV-0270/Email%20data%20exfiltration%20via%20PowerShell.yaml author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems), Azure-Sentinel (idea) date: 2022-09-09 tags: - attack.exfiltration logsource: category: process_creation product: windows detection: selection: Image|endswith: - \powershell.exe - \pwsh.exe CommandLine|contains|all: - Add-PSSnapin - Get-Recipient - -ExpandProperty - EmailAddresses - SmtpAddress - -hidetableheaders condition: selection falsepositives: - Unknown level: high
Sigma rule: Detects potential execution of MeshAgent which is a tool used for remote access. Historical data shows that threat actor. Logsource: macos / process_creation. Rule: title: Remote Access Tool - Potential MeshAgent Execution - MacOS id: 22c45af6-f590-4d44-bab3-b5b2d2a2b6d9 related: - id: 2fbbe9ff-0afc-470b-bdc0-592198339968 type: similar status: experimental description: 'Detects potential execution of MeshAgent which is a tool used for remote access. Historical data shows that threat actors rename MeshAgent binary to evade detection. Matching command lines with the ''--meshServiceName'' argument can indicate that the MeshAgent is being used for remote access. ' references: - https://www.huntress.com/blog/know-thy-enemy-a-novel-november-case-on-persistent-remote-access - https://thecyberexpress.com/ukraine-hit-by-meshagent-malware-campaign/ - https://wazuh.com/blog/how-to-detect-meshagent-with-wazuh/ - https://www.security.com/threat-intelligence/medusa-ransomware-attacks author: Norbert Jaśniewicz (AlphaSOC) date: 2025-05-19 tags: - attack.command-and-control - attack.t1219.002 logsource: category: process_creation product: macos detection: selection: CommandLine|contains: --meshServiceName condition: selection falsepositives: - Environments that legitimately use MeshAgent level: medium
Sigma rule: Detects tampering of RDP Terminal Service/Server sensitive settings. Such as allowing unauthorized users access to a sys. Logsource: windows / registry_set. Rule: title: RDP Sensitive Settings Changed to Zero id: a2863fbc-d5cb-48d5-83fb-d976d4b1743b related: - id: 3f6b7b62-61aa-45db-96bd-9c31b36b653c type: similar - id: 4b8f6d3a-9c5e-4f2a-a7d8-6b9c3e5f2a8d type: similar status: test description: 'Detects tampering of RDP Terminal Service/Server sensitive settings. Such as allowing unauthorized users access to a system via the ''fAllowUnsolicited'' or enabling RDP via ''fDenyTSConnections'', etc. ' references: - https://web.archive.org/web/20200929062532/https://blog.menasec.net/2019/02/threat-hunting-rdp-hijacking-via.html - http://woshub.com/rds-shadow-how-to-connect-to-a-user-session-in-windows-server-2012-r2/ - https://twitter.com/SagieSec/status/1469001618863624194?t=HRf0eA0W1YYzkTSHb-Ky1A&s=03 - https://threathunterplaybook.com/hunts/windows/190407-RegModEnableRDPConnections/notebook.html - https://bazaar.abuse.ch/sample/6f3aa9362d72e806490a8abce245331030d1ab5ac77e400dd475748236a6cc81/ - http://etutorials.org/Microsoft+Products/microsoft+windows+server+2003+terminal+services/Chapter+6+Registry/Registry+Keys+for+Terminal+Services/ - https://admx.help/HKLM/SOFTWARE/Policies/Microsoft/Windows%20NT/Terminal%20Services author: Samir Bousseaden, David ANDRE, Roberto Rodriguez @Cyb3rWard0g, Nasreddine Bencherchali date: 2022-09-29 modified: 2022-11-26 tags: - attack.persistence - attack.defense-impairment - attack.t1112 logsource: category: registry_set product: windows detection: selection: TargetObject|endswith: - \fDenyTSConnections - \fSingleSessionPerUser - \UserAuthentication Details: DWORD (0x00000000) condition: selection falsepositives: - Some of the keys mentioned here could be modified by an administrator while setting group policy (it should be investigated either way) level: medium
Sigma rule: Detects the execution of SharpSuccessor, a tool used to exploit the BadSuccessor attack for privilege escalation in WinS. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: HKTL - SharpSuccessor Privilege Escalation Tool Execution id: 38a1ac5f-9c74-47d2-a345-dd6f5eb4e7c8 status: experimental description: 'Detects the execution of SharpSuccessor, a tool used to exploit the BadSuccessor attack for privilege escalation in WinServer 2025 Active Directory environments. Successful usage of this tool can let the attackers gain the domain admin privileges by exploiting the BadSuccessor vulnerability. ' references: - https://github.com/logangoins/SharpSuccessor author: Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems) date: 2025-06-06 tags: - attack.privilege-escalation - attack.t1068 logsource: category: process_creation product: windows detection: selection: - Image|endswith: \SharpSuccessor.exe - OriginalFileName: SharpSuccessor.exe - CommandLine|contains: SharpSuccessor - CommandLine|contains|all: - ' add ' - ' /impersonate' - ' /path' - ' /account' - ' /name' condition: selection falsepositives: - Unknown level: high
Sigma rule: Detect the use of "sc.exe" to change the startup type of a service to "disabled" or "demand". Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: Service StartupType Change Via Sc.EXE id: 85c312b7-f44d-4a51-a024-d671c40b49fc status: test description: Detect the use of "sc.exe" to change the startup type of a service to "disabled" or "demand" references: - https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/38283b775552da8981452941ea74191aa0d203edd3f61fb2dee7b0aea3514955 author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) date: 2022-08-01 modified: 2023-03-04 tags: - attack.execution - attack.defense-impairment - attack.t1685 logsource: category: process_creation product: windows detection: selection_img: - Image|endswith: \sc.exe - OriginalFileName: sc.exe selection_cli: CommandLine|contains|all: - ' config ' - start CommandLine|contains: - disabled - demand condition: all of selection_* falsepositives: - False positives may occur with troubleshooting scripts level: medium
Sigma rule: Detects successful authentication from potential clients using legacy authentication via user agent strings. This could. Logsource: azure / signinlogs. Rule: title: Potential MFA Bypass Using Legacy Client Authentication id: 53bb4f7f-48a8-4475-ac30-5a82ddfdf6fc status: test description: Detects successful authentication from potential clients using legacy authentication via user agent strings. This could be a sign of MFA bypass using a password spray attack. references: - https://web.archive.org/web/20230217071802/https://blooteem.com/march-2022 - https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2021/10/26/protect-your-business-from-password-sprays-with-microsoft-dart-recommendations/ author: Harjot Singh, '@cyb3rjy0t' date: 2023-03-20 tags: - attack.privilege-escalation - attack.persistence - attack.initial-access - attack.credential-access - attack.stealth - attack.t1078.004 - attack.t1110 logsource: product: azure service: signinlogs detection: selection: Status: Success userAgent|contains: - BAV2ROPC - CBAinPROD - CBAinTAR condition: selection falsepositives: - Known Legacy Accounts level: high
Sigma rule: Detects the use of the "Get-ADComputer" cmdlet in order to identify systems which are configured for unconstrained deleg. Logsource: windows / ps_script. Rule: title: Potential Unconstrained Delegation Discovery Via Get-ADComputer - ScriptBlock id: cdfa73b6-3c9d-4bb8-97f8-ddbd8921f5c5 status: experimental description: Detects the use of the "Get-ADComputer" cmdlet in order to identify systems which are configured for unconstrained delegation. references: - https://pentestlab.blog/2022/03/21/unconstrained-delegation/ - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/activedirectory/get-adcomputer?view=windowsserver2022-ps author: frack113 date: 2025-03-05 tags: - attack.reconnaissance - attack.discovery - attack.credential-access - attack.t1018 - attack.t1558 - attack.t1589.002 logsource: product: windows category: ps_script definition: 'Requirements: Script Block Logging must be enable' detection: selection: ScriptBlockText|contains: - -Properties*TrustedForDelegation - -Properties*TrustedToAuthForDelegation - -Properties*msDS-AllowedToDelegateTo - -Properties*PrincipalsAllowedToDelegateToAccount - -LDAPFilter*(userAccountControl:1.2.840.113556.1.4.803:=524288) condition: selection falsepositives: - Legitimate use of the library for administrative activity level: medium
Sigma rule: Detects the suspicious execution of a utility to convert Windows 3.x .grp files or for persistence purposes by malicious. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: Suspicious GrpConv Execution id: f14e169e-9978-4c69-acb3-1cff8200bc36 status: test description: Detects the suspicious execution of a utility to convert Windows 3.x .grp files or for persistence purposes by malicious software or actors references: - https://twitter.com/0gtweet/status/1526833181831200770 author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems) date: 2022-05-19 tags: - attack.privilege-escalation - attack.persistence - attack.t1547 logsource: category: process_creation product: windows detection: selection: CommandLine|contains: - grpconv.exe -o - grpconv -o condition: selection falsepositives: - Unknown level: high
Sigma rule: Detects DNS queries for subdomains related to "Put.io" sharing website.. Logsource: windows / dns-client. Rule: title: DNS Query To Put.io - DNS Client id: 8b69fd42-9dad-4674-abef-7fdef43ef92a status: test description: Detects DNS queries for subdomains related to "Put.io" sharing website. references: - https://darkatlas.io/blog/medusa-ransomware-group-opsec-failure author: Omar Khaled (@beacon_exe) date: 2024-08-23 tags: - attack.command-and-control logsource: product: windows service: dns-client definition: 'Requirements: Microsoft-Windows-DNS Client Events/Operational Event Log must be enabled/collected in order to receive the events.' detection: selection: EventID: 3008 QueryName|contains: - api.put.io - upload.put.io condition: selection falsepositives: - Legitimate DNS queries and usage of Put.io level: medium
Sigma rule: Identifies when a service account is modified or deleted.. Logsource: azure / activitylogs. Rule: title: Azure Kubernetes Service Account Modified or Deleted id: 12d027c3-b48c-4d9d-8bb6-a732200034b2 status: test description: Identifies when a service account is modified or deleted. references: - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/role-based-access-control/resource-provider-operations#microsoftkubernetes - https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2021/03/23/secure-containerized-environments-with-updated-threat-matrix-for-kubernetes/ - https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2020/04/02/attack-matrix-kubernetes/ - https://medium.com/mitre-engenuity/att-ck-for-containers-now-available-4c2359654bf1 author: Austin Songer @austinsonger date: 2021-08-07 modified: 2022-08-23 tags: - attack.impact - attack.t1531 - attack.t1485 - attack.t1496 - attack.t1489 logsource: product: azure service: activitylogs detection: selection: operationName: - MICROSOFT.KUBERNETES/CONNECTEDCLUSTERS/SERVICEACCOUNTS/WRITE - MICROSOFT.KUBERNETES/CONNECTEDCLUSTERS/SERVICEACCOUNTS/DELETE - MICROSOFT.KUBERNETES/CONNECTEDCLUSTERS/SERVICEACCOUNTS/IMPERSONATE/ACTION condition: selection falsepositives: - Service account being modified or deleted may be performed by a system administrator. Verify whether the user identity, user agent, and/or hostname should be making changes in your environment. - Service account modified or deleted from unfamiliar users should be investigated. If known behavior is causing false positives, it can be exempted from the rule. level: medium
Sigma rule: Detects DNS resolution of an .onion address related to Tor routing networks. Logsource: windows / dns-client. Rule: title: Query Tor Onion Address - DNS Client id: 8384bd26-bde6-4da9-8e5d-4174a7a47ca2 related: - id: b55ca2a3-7cff-4dda-8bdd-c7bfa63bf544 type: similar - id: a8322756-015c-42e7-afb1-436e85ed3ff5 type: similar status: test description: Detects DNS resolution of an .onion address related to Tor routing networks references: - https://www.logpoint.com/en/blog/detecting-tor-use-with-logpoint/ - https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/f99542b94afe0ad2f19a82cc08262e7ac8e1428e/Detections/ASimDNS/imDNS_TorProxies.yaml author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) date: 2022-02-20 modified: 2025-09-12 tags: - attack.command-and-control - attack.t1090.003 logsource: product: windows service: dns-client definition: 'Requirements: Microsoft-Windows-DNS Client Events/Operational Event Log must be enabled/collected in order to receive the events.' detection: selection: EventID: 3008 QueryName|endswith: - .hiddenservice.net - .onion.ca - .onion.cab - .onion.casa - .onion.city - .onion.direct - .onion.dog - .onion.glass - .onion.gq - .onion.guide - .onion.in.net - .onion.ink - .onion.it - .onion.link - .onion.lt - .onion.lu - .onion.ly - .onion.mn - .onion.network - .onion.nu - .onion.pet - .onion.plus - .onion.pt - .onion.pw - .onion.rip - .onion.sh - .onion.si - .onion.to - .onion.top - .onion.ws - .onion - .s1.tor-gateways.de - .s2.tor-gateways.de - .s3.tor-gateways.de - .s4.tor-gateways.de - .s5.tor-gateways.de - .t2w.pw - .tor2web.ae.org - .tor2web.blutmagie.de - .tor2web.com - .tor2web.fi - .tor2web.io - .tor2web.org - .tor2web.xyz - .torlink.co condition: selection falsepositives: - Unlikely level: high
Sigma rule: Detects the addition of a new Federated Domain.. Logsource: m365 / audit. Rule: title: New Federated Domain Added id: 58f88172-a73d-442b-94c9-95eaed3cbb36 related: - id: 42127bdd-9133-474f-a6f1-97b6c08a4339 type: similar status: test description: Detects the addition of a new Federated Domain. references: - https://research.splunk.com/cloud/e155876a-6048-11eb-ae93-0242ac130002/ - https://o365blog.com/post/aadbackdoor/ author: Splunk Threat Research Team (original rule), Harjot Singh @cyb3rjy0t (sigma rule) date: 2023-09-18 tags: - attack.privilege-escalation - attack.defense-impairment - attack.t1484.002 logsource: service: audit product: m365 detection: selection_domain: Operation|contains: domain selection_operation: Operation|contains: - add - new condition: all of selection_* falsepositives: - The creation of a new Federated domain is not necessarily malicious, however these events need to be followed closely, as it may indicate federated credential abuse or backdoor via federated identities at a similar or different cloud provider. level: medium
Sigma rule: Detects registry value settings that would replace the user's desktop background. This is a common technique used by mal. Logsource: windows / registry_set. Rule: title: Potentially Suspicious Desktop Background Change Via Registry id: 85b88e05-dadc-430b-8a9e-53ff1cd30aae related: - id: 8cbc9475-8d05-4e27-9c32-df960716c701 type: similar status: test description: 'Detects registry value settings that would replace the user''s desktop background. This is a common technique used by malware to change the desktop background to a ransom note or other image. ' references: - https://www.attackiq.com/2023/09/20/emulating-rhysida/ - https://research.checkpoint.com/2023/the-rhysida-ransomware-activity-analysis-and-ties-to-vice-society/ - https://www.trendmicro.com/en_us/research/23/h/an-overview-of-the-new-rhysida-ransomware.html - https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/a864282fea5a536510ae86c77ce46f7827687783628e4f2ceb5bf2c41b8cd3c6/behavior - https://admx.help/?Category=Windows_10_2016&Policy=Microsoft.Policies.WindowsDesktop::Wallpaper - https://admx.help/?Category=Windows_10_2016&Policy=Microsoft.Policies.ControlPanelDisplay::CPL_Personalization_NoDesktopBackgroundUI author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems), Stephen Lincoln @slincoln-aiq (AttackIQ) date: 2023-12-21 modified: 2025-10-17 tags: - attack.persistence - attack.impact - attack.defense-impairment - attack.t1112 - attack.t1491.001 logsource: product: windows category: registry_set detection: selection_keys: TargetObject|contains: - Control Panel\Desktop - CurrentVersion\Policies\ActiveDesktop - CurrentVersion\Policies\System selection_values_1: TargetObject|endswith: NoChangingWallpaper Details: DWORD (0x00000001) selection_values_2: TargetObject|endswith: \Wallpaper selection_values_3: TargetObject|endswith: \WallpaperStyle Details: '2' filter_main_svchost: Image|endswith: \svchost.exe filter_main_empty: TargetObject|endswith: \Control Panel\Desktop\Wallpaper Details: (Empty) filter_main_explorer: Image|endswith: C:\Windows\Explorer.EXE filter_optional_ec2launch: Image: - C:\Program Files\Amazon\EC2Launch\EC2Launch.exe - C:\Program Files (x86)\Amazon\EC2Launch\EC2Launch.exe TargetObject|endswith: \Control Panel\Desktop\Wallpaper condition: selection_keys and 1 of selection_values_* and not 1 of filter_main_* and not 1 of filter_optional_* falsepositives: - Administrative scripts that change the desktop background to a company logo or other image. level: medium
Sigma rule: Detects the execution of Scheduled Tasks where the program being run is located in a suspicious location or where it is. Logsource: windows / taskscheduler. Rule: title: Scheduled Task Executed Uncommon LOLBIN id: f0767f15-0fb3-44b9-851e-e8d9a6d0005d status: test description: Detects the execution of Scheduled Tasks where the program being run is located in a suspicious location or where it is an unusual program to be run from a Scheduled Task references: - Internal Research author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) date: 2022-12-05 modified: 2023-02-07 tags: - attack.privilege-escalation - attack.execution - attack.persistence - attack.t1053.005 logsource: product: windows service: taskscheduler definition: 'Requirements: The "Microsoft-Windows-TaskScheduler/Operational" is disabled by default and needs to be enabled in order for this detection to trigger' detection: selection: EventID: 129 Path|endswith: - \calc.exe - \cscript.exe - \mshta.exe - \mspaint.exe - \notepad.exe - \regsvr32.exe - \wscript.exe condition: selection falsepositives: - False positives may occur with some of the selected binaries if you have tasks using them (which could be very common in your environment). Exclude all the specific trusted tasks before using this rule level: medium