alirezaaminzadeh/cybersec-retrieval-benchmark huggingface dataset:
Sigma rule: Detects the deletion of an AWS SAML provider, potentially indicating malicious intent to disrupt administrative or secur. Logsource: aws / cloudtrail. Rule: title: AWS SAML Provider Deletion Activity id: ccd6a6c8-bb4e-4a91-9d2a-07e632819374 status: experimental description: 'Detects the deletion of an AWS SAML provider, potentially indicating malicious intent to disrupt administrative or security team access. An attacker can remove the SAML provider for the information security team or a team of system administrators, to make it difficult for them to work and investigate at the time of the attack and after it. ' references: - https://docs.aws.amazon.com/IAM/latest/APIReference/API_DeleteSAMLProvider.html author: Ivan Saakov date: 2024-12-19 tags: - attack.stealth - attack.t1078.004 - attack.privilege-escalation - attack.initial-access - attack.persistence - attack.t1531 - attack.impact logsource: product: aws service: cloudtrail detection: selection: eventSource: iam.amazonaws.com eventName: DeleteSAMLProvider status: success condition: selection falsepositives: - Automated processes using tools like Terraform may trigger this alert. - Legitimate administrative actions by authorized system administrators could cause this alert. Verify the user identity, user agent, and hostname to ensure they are expected. - Deletions by unfamiliar users should be investigated. If the behavior is known and expected, it can be exempted from the rule. level: medium
Sigma rule: Detects service installation of different remote access tools software. These software are often abused by threat actors. Logsource: windows / system. Rule: title: Remote Access Tool Services Have Been Installed - System id: 1a31b18a-f00c-4061-9900-f735b96c99fc related: - id: c8b00925-926c-47e3-beea-298fd563728e type: similar status: test description: Detects service installation of different remote access tools software. These software are often abused by threat actors to perform references: - https://redcanary.com/blog/misbehaving-rats/ author: Connor Martin, Nasreddine Bencherchali date: 2022-12-23 modified: 2023-06-22 tags: - attack.privilege-escalation - attack.persistence - attack.execution - attack.t1543.003 - attack.t1569.002 logsource: product: windows service: system detection: selection: Provider_Name: Service Control Manager EventID: - 7045 - 7036 ServiceName|contains: - AmmyyAdmin - Atera - BASupportExpressSrvcUpdater - BASupportExpressStandaloneService - chromoting - GoToAssist - GoToMyPC - jumpcloud - LMIGuardianSvc - LogMeIn - monblanking - Parsec - RManService - RPCPerformanceService - RPCService - SplashtopRemoteService - SSUService - TeamViewer - TightVNC - vncserver - Zoho condition: selection falsepositives: - Unknown level: medium
Sigma rule: Detects loading of essential DLLs used by PowerShell by non-PowerShell process. Detects behavior similar to meterpreter'. Logsource: windows / image_load. Rule: title: PowerShell Core DLL Loaded By Non PowerShell Process id: 092bc4b9-3d1d-43b4-a6b4-8c8acd83522f related: - id: 867613fb-fa60-4497-a017-a82df74a172c type: obsolete - id: fe6e002f-f244-4278-9263-20e4b593827f type: obsolete status: test description: 'Detects loading of essential DLLs used by PowerShell by non-PowerShell process. Detects behavior similar to meterpreter''s "load powershell" extension. ' references: - https://adsecurity.org/?p=2921 - https://github.com/p3nt4/PowerShdll author: Tom Kern, oscd.community, Natalia Shornikova, Tim Shelton, Roberto Rodriguez (Cyb3rWard0g), OTR (Open Threat Research) date: 2019-11-14 modified: 2026-07-28 tags: - attack.t1059.001 - attack.execution logsource: category: image_load product: windows detection: selection: - Description: System.Management.Automation - OriginalFileName: System.Management.Automation.dll - ImageLoaded|endswith: - \System.Management.Automation.dll - \System.Management.Automation.ni.dll filter_main_powershell: Image: - C:\Program Files\PowerShell\7-preview\pwsh.exe - C:\Program Files\PowerShell\7\pwsh.exe - C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell_ise.exe - C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe - C:\Windows\SysWOW64\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell_ise.exe - C:\Windows\SysWOW64\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe filter_main_pwsh_preview: Image|contains: - C:\Program Files\WindowsApps\Microsoft.PowerShellPreview - \AppData\Local\Microsoft\WindowsApps\Microsoft.PowerShellPreview Image|endswith: \pwsh.exe filter_main_generic: Image: - C:\Windows\System32\dsac.exe - C:\WINDOWS\System32\RemoteFXvGPUDisablement.exe - C:\Windows\System32\runscripthelper.exe - C:\WINDOWS\System32\sdiagnhost.exe - C:\Windows\System32\ServerManager.exe - C:\Windows\System32\SyncAppvPublishingServer.exe - C:\Windows\System32\winrshost.exe - C:\Windows\System32\wsmprovhost.exe - C:\Windows\SysWOW64\winrshost.exe - C:\Windows\SysWOW64\wsmprovhost.exe filter_main_dotnet: Image|startswith: - C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\ - C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\FrameworkArm\ - C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\FrameworkArm64\ - C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework64\ Image|endswith: \mscorsvw.exe filter_optional_gethelp: Image|startswith: C:\Program Files\WindowsApps\Microsoft.GetHelp_ Image|endswith: \GetHelp.exe filter_optional_sql_server_mgmt: Image|startswith: - C:\Program Files (x86)\Microsoft SQL Server Management Studio - C:\Program Files\Microsoft SQL Server Management Studio Image|endswith: \IDE\
Sigma rule: Detects a write of an Exchange CSR to an untypical directory or with aspx name suffix which can be used to place a websh. Logsource: windows / msexchange-management. Rule: title: Certificate Request Export to Exchange Webserver id: b7bc7038-638b-4ffd-880c-292c692209ef status: test description: Detects a write of an Exchange CSR to an untypical directory or with aspx name suffix which can be used to place a webshell references: - https://twitter.com/GossiTheDog/status/1429175908905127938 author: Max Altgelt (Nextron Systems) date: 2021-08-23 modified: 2023-01-23 tags: - attack.persistence - attack.t1505.003 logsource: service: msexchange-management product: windows detection: keywords_export_command: '|all': - New-ExchangeCertificate - ' -GenerateRequest' - ' -BinaryEncoded' - ' -RequestFile' keywords_export_params: - \\\\localhost\\C$ - \\\\127.0.0.1\\C$ - C:\\inetpub - .aspx condition: keywords_export_command and keywords_export_params falsepositives: - Unlikely level: critical
Sigma rule: Detects suspicious child processes of "BgInfo.exe" which could be a sign of potential abuse of the binary to proxy execu. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: Suspicious Child Process Of BgInfo.EXE id: 811f459f-9231-45d4-959a-0266c6311987 related: - id: aaf46cdc-934e-4284-b329-34aa701e3771 type: similar status: test description: Detects suspicious child processes of "BgInfo.exe" which could be a sign of potential abuse of the binary to proxy execution via external VBScript references: - https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/OtherMSBinaries/Bginfo/ - https://oddvar.moe/2017/05/18/bypassing-application-whitelisting-with-bginfo/ author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) date: 2023-08-16 tags: - attack.execution - attack.stealth - attack.t1059.005 - attack.t1218 - attack.t1202 logsource: category: process_creation product: windows detection: selection_parent: ParentImage|endswith: - \bginfo.exe - \bginfo64.exe selection_child: - Image|endswith: - \calc.exe - \cmd.exe - \cscript.exe - \mshta.exe - \notepad.exe - \powershell.exe - \pwsh.exe - \wscript.exe - Image|contains: - \AppData\Local\ - \AppData\Roaming\ - :\Users\Public\ - :\Temp\ - :\Windows\Temp\ - :\PerfLogs\ condition: all of selection_* falsepositives: - Unknown level: high
Sigma rule: Detects loading of "Amsi.dll" by a living of the land process. This could be an indication of a "PowerShell without Powe. Logsource: windows / image_load. Rule: title: Amsi.DLL Loaded Via LOLBIN Process id: 6ec86d9e-912e-4726-91a2-209359b999b9 status: test description: Detects loading of "Amsi.dll" by a living of the land process. This could be an indication of a "PowerShell without PowerShell" attack references: - Internal Research - https://www.paloaltonetworks.com/blog/security-operations/stopping-powershell-without-powershell/ author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) date: 2023-06-01 modified: 2025-10-07 tags: - attack.defense-impairment logsource: category: image_load product: windows detection: selection: ImageLoaded|endswith: \amsi.dll Image|endswith: - \ExtExport.exe - \odbcconf.exe - \rundll32.exe condition: selection falsepositives: - Unknown level: medium
Sigma rule: Detects Obfuscated Powershell via VAR++ LAUNCHER. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: Invoke-Obfuscation VAR++ LAUNCHER OBFUSCATION id: e9f55347-2928-4c06-88e5-1a7f8169942e status: test description: Detects Obfuscated Powershell via VAR++ LAUNCHER references: - https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/issues/1009 author: Timur Zinniatullin, oscd.community date: 2020-10-13 modified: 2022-11-16 tags: - attack.stealth - attack.t1027 - attack.execution - attack.t1059.001 logsource: category: process_creation product: windows detection: selection: CommandLine|contains|all: - '&&set' - cmd - /c - -f CommandLine|contains: - '{0}' - '{1}' - '{2}' - '{3}' - '{4}' - '{5}' condition: selection falsepositives: - Unknown level: high
Sigma rule: Detects Obfuscated Powershell via use Rundll32 in Scripts. Logsource: windows / ps_script. Rule: title: Invoke-Obfuscation Via Use Rundll32 - PowerShell id: a5a30a6e-75ca-4233-8b8c-42e0f2037d3b status: test description: Detects Obfuscated Powershell via use Rundll32 in Scripts references: - https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/issues/1009 author: Nikita Nazarov, oscd.community date: 2019-10-08 modified: 2022-11-29 tags: - attack.stealth - attack.t1027 - attack.execution - attack.t1059.001 logsource: product: windows category: ps_script definition: 'Requirements: Script Block Logging must be enabled' detection: selection_4104: ScriptBlockText|contains|all: - '&&' - rundll32 - shell32.dll - shellexec_rundll ScriptBlockText|contains: - value - invoke - comspec - iex condition: selection_4104 falsepositives: - Unknown level: high
Sigma rule: Detects the creation of diagcab file, which could be caused by some legitimate installer or is a sign of exploitation (r. Logsource: windows / file_event. Rule: title: Creation of a Diagcab id: 3d0ed417-3d94-4963-a562-4a92c940656a status: test description: Detects the creation of diagcab file, which could be caused by some legitimate installer or is a sign of exploitation (review the filename and its location) references: - https://threadreaderapp.com/thread/1533879688141086720.html author: frack113 date: 2022-06-08 tags: - attack.resource-development logsource: product: windows category: file_event detection: selection: TargetFilename|endswith: .diagcab condition: selection falsepositives: - Legitimate microsoft diagcab level: medium
Sigma rule: Detects suspicious shell spawn from Java utility keytool process (e.g. adselfservice plus exploitation). Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: Suspicious Shells Spawn by Java Utility Keytool id: 90fb5e62-ca1f-4e22-b42e-cc521874c938 status: test description: Detects suspicious shell spawn from Java utility keytool process (e.g. adselfservice plus exploitation) references: - https://redcanary.com/blog/intelligence-insights-december-2021 - https://www.synacktiv.com/en/publications/how-to-exploit-cve-2021-40539-on-manageengine-adselfservice-plus.html author: Andreas Hunkeler (@Karneades) date: 2021-12-22 modified: 2023-01-21 tags: - attack.initial-access - attack.persistence - attack.privilege-escalation logsource: category: process_creation product: windows detection: selection: ParentImage|endswith: \keytool.exe Image|endswith: - \cmd.exe - \sh.exe - \bash.exe - \powershell.exe - \pwsh.exe - \schtasks.exe - \certutil.exe - \whoami.exe - \bitsadmin.exe - \wscript.exe - \cscript.exe - \scrcons.exe - \regsvr32.exe - \hh.exe - \wmic.exe - \mshta.exe - \rundll32.exe - \forfiles.exe - \scriptrunner.exe - \mftrace.exe - \AppVLP.exe - \systeminfo.exe - \reg.exe - \query.exe condition: selection falsepositives: - Unknown level: high
Sigma rule: Detects Obfuscated Powershell via VAR++ LAUNCHER. Logsource: windows / ps_script. Rule: title: Invoke-Obfuscation VAR++ LAUNCHER OBFUSCATION - PowerShell id: e54f5149-6ba3-49cf-b153-070d24679126 status: test description: Detects Obfuscated Powershell via VAR++ LAUNCHER references: - https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/issues/1009 author: Timur Zinniatullin, oscd.community date: 2020-10-13 modified: 2024-04-05 tags: - attack.stealth - attack.t1027 - attack.execution - attack.t1059.001 logsource: product: windows category: ps_script definition: 'Requirements: Script Block Logging must be enabled' detection: selection_4104: ScriptBlockText|re: (?i)&&set.*(\{\d\}){2,}\\"\s+?-f.*&&.*cmd.*/c condition: selection_4104 falsepositives: - Unknown level: high
Sigma rule: Detects a suspicious LSASS process process clone that could be a sign of credential dumping activity. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: Potential Credential Dumping Via LSASS Process Clone id: c8da0dfd-4ed0-4b68-962d-13c9c884384e status: test description: Detects a suspicious LSASS process process clone that could be a sign of credential dumping activity references: - https://www.matteomalvica.com/blog/2019/12/02/win-defender-atp-cred-bypass/ - https://twitter.com/Hexacorn/status/1420053502554951689 - https://twitter.com/SBousseaden/status/1464566846594691073?s=20 author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Samir Bousseaden date: 2021-11-27 modified: 2023-03-02 tags: - attack.credential-access - attack.t1003 - attack.t1003.001 logsource: category: process_creation product: windows detection: selection: ParentImage|endswith: \Windows\System32\lsass.exe Image|endswith: \Windows\System32\lsass.exe condition: selection falsepositives: - Unknown level: critical
Sigma rule: Detects DNS queries to a TeamViewer domain only resolved by a TeamViewer client by an image that isn't named TeamViewer. Logsource: windows / dns_query. Rule: title: TeamViewer Domain Query By Non-TeamViewer Application id: 778ba9a8-45e4-4b80-8e3e-34a419f0b85e status: test description: Detects DNS queries to a TeamViewer domain only resolved by a TeamViewer client by an image that isn't named TeamViewer (sometimes used by threat actors for obfuscation) references: - https://www.teamviewer.com/en-us/ author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems) date: 2022-01-30 modified: 2023-09-18 tags: - attack.command-and-control - attack.t1219.002 logsource: product: windows category: dns_query detection: selection: QueryName: - taf.teamviewer.com - udp.ping.teamviewer.com filter_main_teamviewer: Image|contains: TeamViewer condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_* falsepositives: - Unknown binary names of TeamViewer - Depending on the environment the rule might require some initial tuning before usage to avoid FP with third party applications level: medium
Sigma rule: Detects instances where an HTTPPROXY service on an OpenCanary node has had an attempt to proxy another page.. Logsource: opencanary / application. Rule: title: OpenCanary - HTTPPROXY Login Attempt id: 5498fc09-adc6-4804-b9d9-5cca1f0b8760 status: test description: 'Detects instances where an HTTPPROXY service on an OpenCanary node has had an attempt to proxy another page. ' references: - https://opencanary.readthedocs.io/en/latest/starting/configuration.html#services-configuration - https://github.com/thinkst/opencanary/blob/a0896adfcaf0328cfd5829fe10d2878c7445138e/opencanary/logger.py#L52 author: Security Onion Solutions date: 2024-03-08 tags: - attack.initial-access - attack.command-and-control - attack.t1090 logsource: category: application product: opencanary detection: selection: logtype: 7001 condition: selection falsepositives: - Unlikely level: high
Sigma rule: Detects the use of TruffleSnout.exe an iterative AD discovery toolkit for offensive operators, situational awareness and. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: HackTool - TruffleSnout Execution id: 69ca006d-b9a9-47f5-80ff-ecd4d25d481a status: test description: Detects the use of TruffleSnout.exe an iterative AD discovery toolkit for offensive operators, situational awareness and targeted low noise enumeration. references: - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/40b77d63808dd4f4eafb83949805636735a1fd15/atomics/T1482/T1482.md - https://github.com/dsnezhkov/TruffleSnout - https://github.com/dsnezhkov/TruffleSnout/blob/7c2f22e246ef704bc96c396f66fa854e9ca742b9/TruffleSnout/Docs/USAGE.md author: frack113 date: 2022-08-20 modified: 2023-02-13 tags: - attack.discovery - attack.t1482 logsource: category: process_creation product: windows detection: selection: - OriginalFileName: TruffleSnout.exe - Image|endswith: \TruffleSnout.exe condition: selection falsepositives: - Unknown level: high
Sigma rule: Rule to detect the configuration of Run Once registry key. Configured payload can be run by runonce.exe /AlternateShellS. Logsource: windows / registry_event. Rule: title: Run Once Task Configuration in Registry id: c74d7efc-8826-45d9-b8bb-f04fac9e4eff status: test description: Rule to detect the configuration of Run Once registry key. Configured payload can be run by runonce.exe /AlternateShellStartup references: - https://twitter.com/pabraeken/status/990717080805789697 - https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Runonce/ author: Avneet Singh @v3t0_, oscd.community date: 2020-11-15 modified: 2024-03-25 tags: - attack.persistence - attack.defense-impairment - attack.t1112 logsource: product: windows category: registry_event detection: selection: TargetObject|contains: \Microsoft\Active Setup\Installed Components TargetObject|endswith: \StubPath filter_optional_chrome: Details|contains|all: - C:\Program Files\Google\Chrome\Application\ - \Installer\chrmstp.exe" --configure-user-settings --verbose-logging --system-level filter_optional_edge: Details|contains: - C:\Program Files (x86)\Microsoft\Edge\Application\ - C:\Program Files\Microsoft\Edge\Application\ Details|endswith: \Installer\setup.exe" --configure-user-settings --verbose-logging --system-level --msedge --channel=stable condition: selection and not 1 of filter_optional_* falsepositives: - Legitimate modification of the registry key by legitimate program level: medium
Sigma rule: Detects the use of the 'Pubprn.vbs' Microsoft signed script to execute commands.. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: Pubprn.vbs Proxy Execution id: 1fb76ab8-fa60-4b01-bddd-71e89bf555da status: test description: Detects the use of the 'Pubprn.vbs' Microsoft signed script to execute commands. references: - https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Scripts/Pubprn/ author: frack113 date: 2022-05-28 tags: - attack.stealth - attack.t1216.001 logsource: category: process_creation product: windows detection: selection: CommandLine|contains|all: - \pubprn.vbs - 'script:' condition: selection falsepositives: - Unknown level: medium
Sigma rule: Detects a failed installation of a Exchange Transport Agent. Logsource: windows / msexchange-management. Rule: title: Failed MSExchange Transport Agent Installation id: c7d16cae-aaf3-42e5-9c1c-fb8553faa6fa status: test description: Detects a failed installation of a Exchange Transport Agent references: - https://speakerdeck.com/heirhabarov/hunting-for-persistence-via-microsoft-exchange-server-or-outlook?slide=8 author: Tobias Michalski (Nextron Systems) date: 2021-06-08 modified: 2022-07-12 tags: - attack.persistence - attack.t1505.002 logsource: service: msexchange-management product: windows detection: selection: EventID: 6 Data|contains: Install-TransportAgent condition: selection falsepositives: - Legitimate installations of exchange TransportAgents. AssemblyPath is a good indicator for this. level: high
Sigma rule: Detects CLR DLL being loaded by an Office Product. Logsource: windows / image_load. Rule: title: CLR DLL Loaded Via Office Applications id: d13c43f0-f66b-4279-8b2c-5912077c1780 status: test description: Detects CLR DLL being loaded by an Office Product references: - https://medium.com/threatpunter/detecting-adversary-tradecraft-with-image-load-event-logging-and-eql-8de93338c16 author: Antonlovesdnb date: 2020-02-19 modified: 2023-03-29 tags: - attack.execution - attack.t1204.002 logsource: category: image_load product: windows detection: selection: Image|endswith: - \excel.exe - \mspub.exe - \outlook.exe - \onenote.exe - \onenoteim.exe - \powerpnt.exe - \winword.exe ImageLoaded|contains: \clr.dll condition: selection falsepositives: - Unknown level: medium
Sigma rule: Detects commandline arguments for executing a child process via dotnet-trace.exe. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: Binary Proxy Execution Via Dotnet-Trace.EXE id: 9257c05b-4a4a-48e5-a670-b7b073cf401b status: test description: Detects commandline arguments for executing a child process via dotnet-trace.exe references: - https://twitter.com/bohops/status/1740022869198037480 author: Jimmy Bayne (@bohops) date: 2024-01-02 tags: - attack.execution - attack.stealth - attack.t1218 logsource: category: process_creation product: windows detection: selection_img: - Image|endswith: \dotnet-trace.exe - OriginalFileName: dotnet-trace.dll selection_cli: CommandLine|contains|all: - '-- ' - collect condition: all of selection_* falsepositives: - Legitimate usage of the utility in order to debug and trace a program. level: medium
Sigma rule: Detects when an the Administrator role is assigned to an user or group.. Logsource: okta / okta. Rule: title: Okta Admin Role Assigned to an User or Group id: 413d4a81-6c98-4479-9863-014785fd579c status: test description: Detects when an the Administrator role is assigned to an user or group. references: - https://developer.okta.com/docs/reference/api/system-log/ - https://developer.okta.com/docs/reference/api/event-types/ author: Austin Songer @austinsonger date: 2021-09-12 modified: 2026-04-27 tags: - attack.privilege-escalation - attack.persistence - attack.t1098.003 logsource: product: okta service: okta detection: selection: eventType: - group.privilege.grant - user.account.privilege.grant condition: selection falsepositives: - Administrator roles could be assigned to users or group by other admin users. level: medium
Sigma rule: Detect changes to the "PendingFileRenameOperations" registry key from uncommon or suspicious images locations to stage c. Logsource: windows / registry_set. Rule: title: Potential PendingFileRenameOperations Tampering id: 4eec988f-7bf0-49f1-8675-1e6a510b3a2a status: test description: 'Detect changes to the "PendingFileRenameOperations" registry key from uncommon or suspicious images locations to stage currently used files for rename or deletion after reboot. ' references: - https://any.run/report/3ecd4763ffc944fdc67a9027e459cd4f448b1a8d1b36147977afaf86bbf2a261/64b0ba45-e7ce-423b-9a1d-5b4ea59521e6 - https://devblogs.microsoft.com/scripting/determine-pending-reboot-statuspowershell-style-part-1/ - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-2000-server/cc960241(v=technet.10)?redirectedfrom=MSDN - https://www.trendmicro.com/en_us/research/21/j/purplefox-adds-new-backdoor-that-uses-websockets.html - https://www.trendmicro.com/en_us/research/19/i/purple-fox-fileless-malware-with-rookit-component-delivered-by-rig-exploit-kit-now-abuses-powershell.html author: frack113 date: 2023-01-27 modified: 2025-10-07 tags: - attack.stealth - attack.t1036.003 logsource: category: registry_set product: windows detection: selection_main: TargetObject|contains: \CurrentControlSet\Control\Session Manager\PendingFileRenameOperations selection_susp_paths: Image|contains: \Users\Public\ selection_susp_images: Image|endswith: - \reg.exe - \regedit.exe condition: selection_main and 1 of selection_susp_* falsepositives: - Installers and updaters may set currently in use files for rename or deletion after a reboot. level: medium