alirezaaminzadeh/cybersec-retrieval-benchmark huggingface dataset:
Sigma rule: Detects a suspicious CertReq execution downloading a file. This behavior is often used by attackers to download addition. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: Suspicious CertReq Command to Download id: 4480827a-9799-4232-b2c4-ccc6c4e9e12b status: experimental description: 'Detects a suspicious CertReq execution downloading a file. This behavior is often used by attackers to download additional payloads or configuration files. Certreq is a built-in Windows utility used to request and retrieve certificates from a certification authority (CA). However, it can be abused by threat actors for malicious purposes. ' references: - https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Certreq/ author: Christian Burkard (Nextron Systems) date: 2021-11-24 modified: 2025-10-29 tags: - attack.command-and-control - attack.t1105 logsource: category: process_creation product: windows detection: selection_img: - Image|endswith: \certreq.exe - OriginalFileName: CertReq.exe selection_cli_flag_post: CommandLine|contains|windash: -Post selection_cli_flag_config: CommandLine|contains|windash: -config selection_cli_http: CommandLine|contains: http condition: all of selection_* falsepositives: - Unlikely level: high
Sigma rule: ZipExec is a Proof-of-Concept (POC) tool to wrap binary-based tools into a password-protected zip file.. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: Suspicious ZipExec Execution id: 90dcf730-1b71-4ae7-9ffc-6fcf62bd0132 status: test description: ZipExec is a Proof-of-Concept (POC) tool to wrap binary-based tools into a password-protected zip file. references: - https://twitter.com/SBousseaden/status/1451237393017839616 - https://github.com/Tylous/ZipExec author: frack113 date: 2021-11-07 modified: 2022-12-25 tags: - attack.execution - attack.stealth - attack.t1218 - attack.t1202 logsource: category: process_creation product: windows detection: run: CommandLine|contains|all: - /generic:Microsoft_Windows_Shell_ZipFolder:filename= - .zip - '/pass:' - '/user:' delete: CommandLine|contains|all: - /delete - Microsoft_Windows_Shell_ZipFolder:filename= - .zip condition: run or delete falsepositives: - Unknown level: medium
Sigma rule: Monitor and alert for sign-ins where the device was non-compliant.. Logsource: azure / signinlogs. Rule: title: Sign-ins from Non-Compliant Devices id: 4f77e1d7-3982-4ee0-8489-abf2d6b75284 status: test description: Monitor and alert for sign-ins where the device was non-compliant. references: - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/architecture/security-operations-devices#non-compliant-device-sign-in author: Michael Epping, '@mepples21' date: 2022-06-28 tags: - attack.privilege-escalation - attack.persistence - attack.initial-access - attack.stealth - attack.t1078.004 logsource: product: azure service: signinlogs detection: selection: DeviceDetail.isCompliant: 'false' condition: selection falsepositives: - Unknown level: high
Sigma rule: Detects execution of EDRSilencer, a tool that abuses the Windows Filtering Platform (WFP) to block the outbound traffic. Logsource: windows / security. Rule: title: HackTool - EDRSilencer Execution - Filter Added id: 98054878-5eab-434c-85d4-72d4e5a3361b status: test description: 'Detects execution of EDRSilencer, a tool that abuses the Windows Filtering Platform (WFP) to block the outbound traffic of running EDR agents based on specific hardcoded filter names. ' references: - https://github.com/netero1010/EDRSilencer author: Thodoris Polyzos (@SmoothDeploy) date: 2024-01-29 modified: 2024-01-30 tags: - attack.defense-impairment - attack.t1685 logsource: product: windows service: security definition: 'Requirements: Audit Filtering Platform Policy Change needs to be enabled' detection: selection: EventID: - 5441 - 5447 FilterName|contains: Custom Outbound Filter condition: selection falsepositives: - Unknown level: high
Sigma rule: Detects the use of "vim" and it's siblings commands to execute a shell or proxy commands. Such behavior may be associate. Logsource: linux / process_creation. Rule: title: Vim GTFOBin Abuse - Linux id: 7ab8f73a-fcff-428b-84aa-6a5ff7877dea status: test description: 'Detects the use of "vim" and it''s siblings commands to execute a shell or proxy commands. Such behavior may be associated with privilege escalation, unauthorized command execution, or to break out from restricted environments. ' references: - https://gtfobins.github.io/gtfobins/vi/ - https://gtfobins.github.io/gtfobins/vim/ - https://gtfobins.github.io/gtfobins/rvim/ - https://gtfobins.github.io/gtfobins/vimdiff/ author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems), Luc Génaux date: 2022-12-28 modified: 2026-06-05 tags: - attack.execution - attack.discovery - attack.t1059 - attack.t1083 logsource: category: process_creation product: linux detection: selection_img: Image|endswith: - /rvim - /vi - /vim - /vimdiff CommandLine|contains: - ' --cmd ' - ' -c' selection_cli: CommandLine|contains: - :!/ - :!$ - :!.. - ':lua ' - ':py ' - :shell - /bin/bash - /bin/dash - /bin/fish - /bin/sh - /bin/csh - /bin/ksh - /bin/zsh - /bin/tmux condition: all of selection_* falsepositives: - Unknown level: high
Sigma rule: Detects when a DNS zone transfer failed.. Logsource: windows / dns-server. Rule: title: Failed DNS Zone Transfer id: 6d444368-6da1-43fe-b2fc-44202430480e status: test description: Detects when a DNS zone transfer failed. references: - https://kb.eventtracker.com/evtpass/evtpages/EventId_6004_Microsoft-Windows-DNS-Server-Service_65410.asp author: Zach Mathis date: 2023-05-24 tags: - attack.reconnaissance - attack.t1590.002 logsource: product: windows service: dns-server detection: selection: EventID: 6004 condition: selection falsepositives: - Unlikely level: medium
Sigma rule: Detects AnyDesk Remote Desktop silent installation. Which can be used by attackers to gain remote access.. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: Remote Access Tool - AnyDesk Silent Installation id: 114e7f1c-f137-48c8-8f54-3088c24ce4b9 status: test description: Detects AnyDesk Remote Desktop silent installation. Which can be used by attackers to gain remote access. references: - https://twitter.com/TheDFIRReport/status/1423361119926816776?s=20 - https://support.anydesk.com/Automatic_Deployment author: Ján Trenčanský date: 2021-08-06 modified: 2023-03-05 tags: - attack.command-and-control - attack.t1219.002 logsource: category: process_creation product: windows detection: selection: CommandLine|contains|all: - --install - --start-with-win - --silent condition: selection falsepositives: - Legitimate deployment of AnyDesk level: high
Sigma rule: Detects the creation or update of a scheduled task to run with "NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM" privileges. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: Schtasks Creation Or Modification With SYSTEM Privileges id: 89ca78fd-b37c-4310-b3d3-81a023f83936 status: test description: Detects the creation or update of a scheduled task to run with "NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM" privileges references: - https://www.elastic.co/security-labs/exploring-the-qbot-attack-pattern - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/schtasks author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) date: 2022-07-28 modified: 2025-02-15 tags: - attack.privilege-escalation - attack.execution - attack.persistence - attack.t1053.005 logsource: product: windows category: process_creation detection: selection_root: Image|endswith: \schtasks.exe CommandLine|contains: - ' /change ' - ' /create ' selection_run: CommandLine|contains: '/ru ' selection_user: CommandLine|contains: - NT AUT - ' SYSTEM ' filter_optional_teamviewer: Image|endswith: \schtasks.exe CommandLine|contains|all: - /TN TVInstallRestore - \TeamViewer_.exe filter_optional_office: CommandLine|contains|all: - Subscription Heartbeat - \HeartbeatConfig.xml - \Microsoft Shared\OFFICE filter_optional_avira: CommandLine|contains: - '/Create /F /RU System /SC WEEKLY /TN AviraSystemSpeedupVerify /TR ' - :\Program Files (x86)\Avira\System Speedup\setup\avira_speedup_setup.exe - /VERIFY /VERYSILENT /NOSTART /NODOTNET /NORESTART" /RL HIGHEST condition: all of selection_* and not 1 of filter_optional_* falsepositives: - Unknown level: high
Sigma rule: Detects command line parameters used by Bloodhound and Sharphound hack tools. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: HackTool - Bloodhound/Sharphound Execution id: f376c8a7-a2d0-4ddc-aa0c-16c17236d962 status: test description: Detects command line parameters used by Bloodhound and Sharphound hack tools references: - https://github.com/BloodHoundAD/BloodHound - https://github.com/BloodHoundAD/SharpHound author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems) date: 2019-12-20 modified: 2023-02-04 tags: - attack.discovery - attack.t1087.001 - attack.t1087.002 - attack.t1482 - attack.t1069.001 - attack.t1069.002 - attack.execution - attack.t1059.001 logsource: category: process_creation product: windows detection: selection_img: - Product|contains: SharpHound - Description|contains: SharpHound - Company|contains: - SpecterOps - evil corp - Image|contains: - \Bloodhound.exe - \SharpHound.exe selection_cli_1: CommandLine|contains: - ' -CollectionMethod All ' - ' --CollectionMethods Session ' - ' --Loop --Loopduration ' - ' --PortScanTimeout ' - '.exe -c All -d ' - Invoke-Bloodhound - Get-BloodHoundData selection_cli_2: CommandLine|contains|all: - ' -JsonFolder ' - ' -ZipFileName ' selection_cli_3: CommandLine|contains|all: - ' DCOnly ' - ' --NoSaveCache ' condition: 1 of selection_* falsepositives: - Other programs that use these command line option and accepts an 'All' parameter level: high
Sigma rule: Detects when a Security Compliance Center reported a user who exceeded sending limits of the service policies and becaus. Logsource: m365 / threat_management. Rule: title: Microsoft 365 - User Restricted from Sending Email id: ff246f56-7f24-402a-baca-b86540e3925c status: test description: Detects when a Security Compliance Center reported a user who exceeded sending limits of the service policies and because of this has been restricted from sending email. references: - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/defender-cloud-apps/anomaly-detection-policy - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/defender-cloud-apps/policy-template-reference author: austinsonger date: 2021-08-19 modified: 2022-10-09 tags: - attack.initial-access - attack.t1199 logsource: service: threat_management product: m365 detection: selection: eventSource: SecurityComplianceCenter eventName: User restricted from sending email status: success condition: selection falsepositives: - Unknown level: medium
Sigma rule: Detect Attempt PrintNightmare (CVE-2021-1675) Remote code execution in Windows Spooler Service. Logsource: windows / smbclient-security. Rule: title: Suspicious Rejected SMB Guest Logon From IP id: 71886b70-d7b4-4dbf-acce-87d2ca135262 status: test description: Detect Attempt PrintNightmare (CVE-2021-1675) Remote code execution in Windows Spooler Service references: - https://twitter.com/KevTheHermit/status/1410203844064301056 - https://web.archive.org/web/20210629055600/https://github.com/hhlxf/PrintNightmare/ - https://web.archive.org/web/20210701042336/https://github.com/afwu/PrintNightmare author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), KevTheHermit, fuzzyf10w date: 2021-06-30 modified: 2023-01-02 tags: - attack.credential-access - attack.t1110.001 logsource: product: windows service: smbclient-security detection: selection: EventID: 31017 UserName: '' ServerName|startswith: \1 condition: selection falsepositives: - Account fallback reasons (after failed login with specific account) level: medium
Sigma rule: Detect use of scrobj.dll as this DLL looks for the ScriptletURL key to get the location of the script to execute. Logsource: windows / registry_set. Rule: title: Potential Persistence Via Scrobj.dll COM Hijacking id: fe20dda1-6f37-4379-bbe0-a98d400cae90 status: test description: Detect use of scrobj.dll as this DLL looks for the ScriptletURL key to get the location of the script to execute references: - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/40b77d63808dd4f4eafb83949805636735a1fd15/atomics/T1546.015/T1546.015.md author: frack113 date: 2022-08-20 modified: 2023-08-17 tags: - attack.privilege-escalation - attack.persistence - attack.t1546.015 logsource: category: registry_set product: windows detection: selection: TargetObject|endswith: InprocServer32\(Default) Details: C:\WINDOWS\system32\scrobj.dll condition: selection falsepositives: - Legitimate use of the dll. level: medium
Sigma rule: Detects a regedit started with TrustedInstaller privileges or by ProcessHacker.exe. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: Regedit as Trusted Installer id: 883835a7-df45-43e4-bf1d-4268768afda4 status: test description: Detects a regedit started with TrustedInstaller privileges or by ProcessHacker.exe references: - https://twitter.com/1kwpeter/status/1397816101455765504 author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems) date: 2021-05-27 modified: 2022-10-09 tags: - attack.privilege-escalation - attack.t1548 logsource: category: process_creation product: windows detection: selection: Image|endswith: \regedit.exe ParentImage|endswith: - \TrustedInstaller.exe - \ProcessHacker.exe condition: selection falsepositives: - Unlikely level: high
Sigma rule: Detects the creation of files with an "LNK" as a second extension. This is sometimes used by malware as a method to abus. Logsource: windows / file_event. Rule: title: Suspicious LNK Double Extension File Created id: 3215aa19-f060-4332-86d5-5602511f3ca8 related: - id: b4926b47-a9d7-434c-b3a0-adc3fa0bd13e type: derived status: test description: 'Detects the creation of files with an "LNK" as a second extension. This is sometimes used by malware as a method to abuse the fact that Windows hides the "LNK" extension by default. ' references: - https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/meet-crowdstrikes-adversary-of-the-month-for-june-mustang-panda/ - https://www.anomali.com/blog/china-based-apt-mustang-panda-targets-minority-groups-public-and-private-sector-organizations - https://www.cybereason.com/blog/research/a-bazar-of-tricks-following-team9s-development-cycles - https://twitter.com/malwrhunterteam/status/1235135745611960321 - https://twitter.com/luc4m/status/1073181154126254080 author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems), frack113 date: 2022-11-07 modified: 2023-10-18 tags: - attack.stealth - attack.t1036.007 logsource: category: file_event product: windows detection: selection: TargetFilename|endswith: .lnk TargetFilename|contains: - .doc. - .docx. - .jpg. - .pdf. - .ppt. - .pptx. - .xls. - .xlsx. filter_main_recent: TargetFilename|contains: \AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Windows\Recent\ filter_optional_office_recent: Image|endswith: - \excel.exe - \powerpnt.exe - \winword.exe TargetFilename|contains: \AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Office\Recent\ filter_optional_office_excel: Image|endswith: \excel.exe TargetFilename|contains: \AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Excel filter_optional_office_powerpoint: Image|endswith: \powerpnt.exe TargetFilename|contains: \AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\PowerPoint filter_optional_office_word: Image|endswith: \winword.exe TargetFilename|contains: \AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Word condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_* and not 1 of filter_optional_* falsepositives: - Some tuning is required for other general purpose directories of third party apps level: medium regression_tests_path: regression_data/rules/windows/file/file_event/file_event_win_susp_lnk_double_extension/info.yml
Sigma rule: Detects potential malicious modification of the property value of IsCredGuardEnabled from HKLM:\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet. Logsource: windows / registry_event. Rule: title: Wdigest CredGuard Registry Modification id: 1a2d6c47-75b0-45bd-b133-2c0be75349fd status: test description: 'Detects potential malicious modification of the property value of IsCredGuardEnabled from HKLM:\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\SecurityProviders\WDigest to disable Cred Guard on a system. This is usually used with UseLogonCredential to manipulate the caching credentials. ' references: - https://teamhydra.blog/2020/08/25/bypassing-credential-guard/ author: Roberto Rodriguez (Cyb3rWard0g), OTR (Open Threat Research) date: 2019-08-25 modified: 2021-11-27 tags: - attack.persistence - attack.defense-impairment - attack.t1112 logsource: category: registry_event product: windows detection: selection: TargetObject|endswith: \IsCredGuardEnabled condition: selection falsepositives: - Unknown level: high
Sigma rule: Detects execution of commands via the run dialog box on Windows by checking values of the "RunMRU" registry key. This te. Logsource: windows / registry_set. Rule: title: Potentially Suspicious Command Executed Via Run Dialog Box - Registry id: a7df0e9e-91a5-459a-a003-4cde67c2ff5d related: - id: f9d091f6-f1c7-4873-a24f-050b4a02b4dd type: derived status: test description: 'Detects execution of commands via the run dialog box on Windows by checking values of the "RunMRU" registry key. This technique was seen being abused by threat actors to deceive users into pasting and executing malicious commands, often disguised as CAPTCHA verification steps. ' references: - https://medium.com/@ahmed.moh.farou2/fake-captcha-campaign-on-arabic-pirated-movie-sites-delivers-lumma-stealer-4f203f7adabf - https://medium.com/@shaherzakaria8/downloading-trojan-lumma-infostealer-through-capatcha-1f25255a0e71 - https://www.forensafe.com/blogs/runmrukey.html - https://redcanary.com/blog/threat-intelligence/intelligence-insights-october-2024/ author: Ahmed Farouk, Nasreddine Bencherchali date: 2024-11-01 tags: - attack.execution - attack.t1059.001 logsource: product: windows category: registry_set detection: selection_key: TargetObject|contains: \Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\RunMRU selection_powershell_command: Details|contains: - powershell - pwsh selection_powershell_susp_keywords: Details|contains: - ' -e ' - ' -ec ' - ' -en ' - ' -enc ' - ' -enco' - ftp - Hidden - http - iex - Invoke- selection_wmic_command: Details|contains: wmic selection_wmic_susp_keywords: Details|contains: - shadowcopy - process call create condition: selection_key and (all of selection_powershell_* or all of selection_wmic_*) falsepositives: - Unknown level: high
Sigma rule: Detects potential DLL sideloading of "edputil.dll". Logsource: windows / image_load. Rule: title: Potential Edputil.DLL Sideloading id: e4903324-1a10-4ed3-981b-f6fe3be3a2c2 status: test description: Detects potential DLL sideloading of "edputil.dll" references: - https://alternativeto.net/news/2023/5/cybercriminals-use-wordpad-vulnerability-to-spread-qbot-malware/ author: X__Junior (Nextron Systems) date: 2023-06-09 tags: - attack.persistence - attack.privilege-escalation - attack.execution - attack.stealth - attack.t1574.001 logsource: category: image_load product: windows detection: selection: ImageLoaded|endswith: \edputil.dll filter_main_generic: ImageLoaded|startswith: - C:\Windows\System32\ - C:\Windows\SysWOW64\ - C\Windows\WinSxS\ condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_* falsepositives: - Unlikely level: high
Sigma rule: Detects the execution of a renamed "cloudflared" binary.. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: Renamed Cloudflared.EXE Execution id: e0c69ebd-b54f-4aed-8ae3-e3467843f3f0 status: test description: Detects the execution of a renamed "cloudflared" binary. references: - https://github.com/cloudflare/cloudflared/releases - https://developers.cloudflare.com/cloudflare-one/connections/connect-networks/do-more-with-tunnels/trycloudflare/ - https://github.com/cloudflare/cloudflared - https://www.intrinsec.com/akira_ransomware/ - https://www.guidepointsecurity.com/blog/tunnel-vision-cloudflared-abused-in-the-wild/ tags: - attack.command-and-control - attack.t1090.001 author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) date: 2023-12-20 logsource: category: process_creation product: windows detection: selection_cleanup: CommandLine|contains|all: - ' tunnel ' - 'cleanup ' CommandLine|contains: - '-config ' - '-connector-id ' selection_tunnel: CommandLine|contains|all: - ' tunnel ' - ' run ' CommandLine|contains: - '-config ' - '-credentials-contents ' - '-credentials-file ' - '-token ' selection_accountless: CommandLine|contains|all: - -url - tunnel selection_hashes: Hashes|contains: - SHA256=2fb6c04c4f95fb8d158af94c137f90ac820716deaf88d8ebec956254e046cb29 - SHA256=b3d21940a10fdef5e415ad70331ce257c24fe3bcf7722262302e0421791f87e8 - SHA256=1fbd8362b2d2d2e6a5750ae3db69cd1815e6c1d31da48a98b796450971a8e039 - SHA256=0409c9b12f9d0eda86e461ed9bdabeefb00172b26322079681a0bdf48e68dc28 - SHA256=7cfb411d04bac42ef93d1f0c93c0a481e38c6f4612b97ae89d4702595988edc7 - SHA256=5b3c2d846ab162dc6bc595cce3a49de5731afde5d6060be7066d21b013a28373 - SHA256=ce95df7f69664c3df19b76028e115931919a71517b776da7b42d353e2ff4a670 - SHA256=1293525a19cfe3bc8296b62fbfe19f083632ed644a1c18c10b045a1d3030d81a - SHA256=af2b9161cfcb654b16408cd6b098afe9d1fb61a037d18d7090a119d4c0c8e0f0 - SHA256=39ddceb56a15798826a5fc4892fa2b474c444bb4d7a8bf2fa95e41cab10fa7a1 - SHA256=ccd11f2328023a0e7929e845d5b6e7bc783fb4650d65faef3ae090239d4bbce2 - SHA256=b6e5c5d2567ae8c69cc012ebcae30e6c9b5359d64a58d17ba75ec89f8bce71ac - SHA256=f813484ea441404f18caad96f28138e8aaf0cb256163c09c2ab8a3acab87f69f - SHA256=fc4a0802ab9c7409b892ca00636bec61e2acfc911bccfdeb9978b8ab5a2f828d - SHA256=083150724b49604c8765c1ba19541fa260b133be0acb0647fcd936d81f054499 - SHA256=44303d6572956f28a0f2e4b188934fb9874f2584f5c81fa431a463cfbf28083b - SHA256=5d38c46032a58e28ae5f7d174d8761ec3d64d186677f3ec53af5f51afb9bfd2f - SHA256=e1e70fa42059911bc6685fafef957f9a73fc66f214d0704a9b932683a5204032 - SHA256=c01356092a365b84f84f0e66870bd1a05ba3feb53cafd973fa5fea2534b
Sigma rule: Detects the execution of an AnyDesk binary with a version prior to 8.0.8. Prior to version 8.0.8, the Anydesk applicatio. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: Remote Access Tool - AnyDesk Execution With Known Revoked Signing Certificate id: 41f407b5-3096-44ea-a74f-96d04fbc41be status: test description: 'Detects the execution of an AnyDesk binary with a version prior to 8.0.8. Prior to version 8.0.8, the Anydesk application used a signing certificate that got compromised by threat actors. Use this rule to detect instances of older versions of Anydesk using the compromised certificate This is recommended in order to avoid attackers leveraging the certificate and signing their binaries to bypass detections. ' references: - https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/anydesk-says-hackers-breached-its-production-servers-reset-passwords/ - https://anydesk.com/en/changelog/windows author: Sai Prashanth Pulisetti, Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) date: 2024-02-08 tags: - attack.execution - attack.initial-access logsource: product: windows category: process_creation detection: selection_img: - Image|endswith: \AnyDesk.exe - Description: AnyDesk - Product: AnyDesk - Company: AnyDesk Software GmbH selection_version: FileVersion|startswith: - 7.0. - 7.1. - 8.0.1 - 8.0.2 - 8.0.3 - 8.0.4 - 8.0.5 - 8.0.6 - 8.0.7 filter_main_uninstall: CommandLine|contains: - ' --remove' - ' --uninstall' condition: all of selection_* and not 1 of filter_main_* falsepositives: - Unlikely level: medium
Sigma rule: An attacker may execute an application as a SCR File using rundll32.exe desk.cpl,InstallScreenSaver. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: Rundll32 InstallScreenSaver Execution id: 15bd98ea-55f4-4d37-b09a-e7caa0fa2221 status: test description: An attacker may execute an application as a SCR File using rundll32.exe desk.cpl,InstallScreenSaver references: - https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Libraries/Desk/ - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/0f229c0e42bfe7ca736a14023836d65baa941ed2/atomics/T1218.011/T1218.011.md#atomic-test-13---rundll32-with-deskcpl author: Christopher Peacock @securepeacock, SCYTHE @scythe_io, TactiKoolSec date: 2022-04-28 modified: 2023-02-09 tags: - attack.stealth - attack.t1218.011 logsource: category: process_creation product: windows detection: selection_img: - Image|endswith: \rundll32.exe - OriginalFileName: RUNDLL32.EXE selection_cli: CommandLine|contains: InstallScreenSaver condition: all of selection_* falsepositives: - Legitimate installation of a new screensaver level: medium