alirezaaminzadeh/cybersec-retrieval-benchmark huggingface dataset:
Sigma rule: Detects uncommon child processes of "BgInfo.exe" which could be a sign of potential abuse of the binary to proxy executi. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: Uncommon Child Process Of BgInfo.EXE id: aaf46cdc-934e-4284-b329-34aa701e3771 related: - id: 811f459f-9231-45d4-959a-0266c6311987 type: similar status: test description: Detects uncommon child processes of "BgInfo.exe" which could be a sign of potential abuse of the binary to proxy execution via external VBScript references: - https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/OtherMSBinaries/Bginfo/ - https://oddvar.moe/2017/05/18/bypassing-application-whitelisting-with-bginfo/ author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems), Beyu Denis, oscd.community date: 2019-10-26 modified: 2023-08-16 tags: - attack.execution - attack.stealth - attack.t1059.005 - attack.t1218 - attack.t1202 logsource: category: process_creation product: windows detection: selection: ParentImage|endswith: - \bginfo.exe - \bginfo64.exe condition: selection falsepositives: - Unknown level: medium
Sigma rule: Detects execution of "certutil" with the "addstore" flag in order to install a new certificate on the system. Adversarie. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: New Root Certificate Installed Via Certutil.EXE id: d2125259-ddea-4c1c-9c22-977eb5b29cf0 related: - id: 42821614-9264-4761-acfc-5772c3286f76 type: derived - id: 46591fae-7a4c-46ea-aec3-dff5e6d785dc type: obsolete status: test description: 'Detects execution of "certutil" with the "addstore" flag in order to install a new certificate on the system. Adversaries may install a root certificate on a compromised system to avoid warnings when connecting to adversary controlled web servers. ' references: - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1553.004/T1553.004.md author: oscd.community, @redcanary, Zach Stanford @svch0st date: 2023-03-05 modified: 2024-03-05 tags: - attack.defense-impairment - attack.t1553.004 logsource: category: process_creation product: windows detection: selection_img: - Image|endswith: \certutil.exe - OriginalFileName: CertUtil.exe selection_cli_add: CommandLine|contains|windash: -addstore selection_cli_store: CommandLine|contains: root condition: all of selection_* falsepositives: - Help Desk or IT may need to manually add a corporate Root CA on occasion. Need to test if GPO push doesn't trigger FP level: medium regression_tests_path: regression_data/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_certutil_certificate_installation/info.yml
Sigma rule: Detects suspicious computer name samtheadmin-{1..100}$ generated by hacktool. Logsource: windows / security. Rule: title: Win Susp Computer Name Containing Samtheadmin id: 39698b3f-da92-4bc6-bfb5-645a98386e45 status: test description: Detects suspicious computer name samtheadmin-{1..100}$ generated by hacktool references: - https://twitter.com/malmoeb/status/1511760068743766026 - https://github.com/helloexp/0day/blob/614227a7b9beb0e91e7e2c6a5e532e6f7a8e883c/00-CVE_EXP/CVE-2021-42287/sam-the-admin/sam_the_admin.py author: elhoim date: 2022-09-09 modified: 2023-01-04 tags: - attack.initial-access - cve.2021-42278 - cve.2021-42287 - attack.persistence - attack.privilege-escalation - attack.stealth - attack.t1078 logsource: service: security product: windows detection: selection1: SamAccountName|startswith: SAMTHEADMIN- SamAccountName|endswith: $ selection2: TargetUserName|startswith: SAMTHEADMIN- TargetUserName|endswith: $ condition: 1 of selection* falsepositives: - Unknown level: critical
Sigma rule: Detects the use of SFTP.exe to execute commands indirectly via ProxyCommand parameter. Threat actors were seen leveragin. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: Indirect Command Execution via SFTP ProxyCommand id: 762bb580-79b4-40f4-8b9e-9349ce1710f4 status: experimental description: 'Detects the use of SFTP.exe to execute commands indirectly via ProxyCommand parameter. Threat actors were seen leveraging this legitimate Windows binary to bypass security controls and execute arbitrary commands while evading detection. ' references: - https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Sftp/ - https://news.sophos.com/en-us/2025/05/09/lumma-stealer-coming-and-going/ author: Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems) date: 2026-04-27 tags: - attack.stealth - attack.t1202 logsource: category: process_creation product: windows detection: selection: Image|endswith: \sftp.exe CommandLine|contains: ProxyCommand= condition: selection falsepositives: - Legitimate use of SFTP with proxy commands for administration or networking tasks level: medium regression_tests_path: regression_data/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_lolbin_sftp_indirect_cmd_execution/info.yml
Sigma rule: Detects the execution of a renamed instance of the Remote Monitoring and Management (RMM) tool, MeshAgent. RMM tools suc. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: Remote Access Tool - Renamed MeshAgent Execution - Windows id: b471f462-eb0d-4832-be35-28d94bdb4780 related: - id: bd3b5eaa-439d-4a42-8f35-a49f5c8a2582 type: similar - id: 2fbbe9ff-0afc-470b-bdc0-592198339968 type: derived status: experimental description: 'Detects the execution of a renamed instance of the Remote Monitoring and Management (RMM) tool, MeshAgent. RMM tools such as MeshAgent are commonly utilized by IT administrators for legitimate remote support and system management. However, malicious actors may exploit these tools by renaming them to bypass detection mechanisms, enabling unauthorized access and control over compromised systems. ' references: - https://www.huntress.com/blog/know-thy-enemy-a-novel-november-case-on-persistent-remote-access - https://thecyberexpress.com/ukraine-hit-by-meshagent-malware-campaign/ - https://wazuh.com/blog/how-to-detect-meshagent-with-wazuh/ - https://www.security.com/threat-intelligence/medusa-ransomware-attacks author: Norbert Jaśniewicz (AlphaSOC) date: 2025-05-19 tags: - attack.command-and-control - attack.stealth - attack.t1219.002 - attack.t1036.003 logsource: category: process_creation product: windows detection: selection_meshagent: - CommandLine|contains: --meshServiceName - OriginalFileName|contains: meshagent filter_main_legitimate: Image|endswith: \meshagent.exe condition: selection_meshagent and not 1 of filter_main_* falsepositives: - Unknown level: high
Sigma rule: Detects when an attacker adds a new AMSI provider via the Windows Registry to bypass AMSI (Antimalware Scan Interface) p. Logsource: windows / registry_set. Rule: title: Potential Persistence Via New AMSI Providers - Registry id: 33efc23c-6ea2-4503-8cfe-bdf82ce8f705 status: test description: 'Detects when an attacker adds a new AMSI provider via the Windows Registry to bypass AMSI (Antimalware Scan Interface) protections. Attackers may add custom AMSI providers to persist on the system and evade detection by security software that relies on AMSI for scanning scripts and other content. This technique is often used in conjunction with fileless malware and script-based attacks to maintain persistence while avoiding detection. ' references: - https://persistence-info.github.io/Data/amsi.html - https://github.com/gtworek/PSBits/blob/8d767892f3b17eefa4d0668f5d2df78e844f01d8/FakeAMSI/FakeAMSI.c author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) date: 2022-07-21 modified: 2025-10-26 tags: - attack.persistence logsource: category: registry_set product: windows detection: selection: TargetObject|contains: - \SOFTWARE\Microsoft\AMSI\Providers\ - \SOFTWARE\WOW6432Node\Microsoft\AMSI\Providers\ filter_optional_avast: Image: - C:\Program Files\Avast Software\Avast\RegSvr.exe - C:\Program Files\Avast Software\Avast\x86\RegSvr.exe TargetObject|contains: \{FB904E4E-D2C7-4C8D-8492-B620BB9896B1} filter_optional_avg: Image: - C:\Program Files\AVG\Antivirus\RegSvr.exe - C:\Program Files\AVG\Antivirus\x86\RegSvr.exe TargetObject|contains: \{FB904E4E-D2C7-4C8D-8492-B620BB9896B1} filter_optional_avira: Image: C:\Program Files\Avira\Endpoint Protection SDK\endpointprotection.exe TargetObject|contains: \{00000001-3DCC-4B48-A82E-E2071FE58E05} condition: selection and not 1 of filter_optional_* falsepositives: - Legitimate security products adding their own AMSI providers. Filter these according to your environment. level: medium regression_tests_path: regression_data/rules/windows/registry/registry_set/registry_set_persistence_amsi_providers/info.yml
Sigma rule: Detects the addition of a VPN SSL Web Portal on a Fortinet FortiGate Firewall. This behavior was observed in pair with m. Logsource: fortigate / event. Rule: title: FortiGate - New VPN SSL Web Portal Added id: 2bfb6216-0c31-4d20-8501-2629b29a3fa2 status: experimental description: 'Detects the addition of a VPN SSL Web Portal on a Fortinet FortiGate Firewall. This behavior was observed in pair with modification of VPN SSL settings. ' references: - https://www.fortiguard.com/psirt/FG-IR-24-535 - https://docs.fortinet.com/document/fortigate/7.6.4/fortios-log-message-reference/398/event - https://docs.fortinet.com/document/fortigate/7.6.4/cli-reference/113121765/config-vpn-ssl-web-portal - https://docs.fortinet.com/document/fortigate/7.6.4/fortios-log-message-reference/44547/44547-logid-event-config-objattr author: Marco Pedrinazzi (@pedrinazziM) (InTheCyber) date: 2025-11-01 tags: - attack.persistence - attack.initial-access - attack.t1133 logsource: product: fortigate service: event detection: selection: action: Add cfgpath: vpn.ssl.web.portal condition: selection falsepositives: - A VPN SSL Web Portal can be added for legitimate purposes. level: medium
Sigma rule: All TCP traffic on particular port from attacker is routed to different port. ex. '/sbin/iptables -t nat -D PREROUTING -. Logsource: linux / auditd. Rule: title: Bpfdoor TCP Ports Redirect id: 70b4156e-50fc-4523-aa50-c9dddf1993fc status: test description: 'All TCP traffic on particular port from attacker is routed to different port. ex. ''/sbin/iptables -t nat -D PREROUTING -p tcp -s 192.168.1.1 --dport 22 -j REDIRECT --to-ports 42392'' The traffic looks like encrypted SSH communications going to TCP port 22, but in reality is being directed to the shell port once it hits the iptables rule for the attacker host only. ' references: - https://www.sandflysecurity.com/blog/bpfdoor-an-evasive-linux-backdoor-technical-analysis/ - https://www.elastic.co/security-labs/a-peek-behind-the-bpfdoor author: Rafal Piasecki date: 2022-08-10 tags: - attack.defense-impairment - attack.t1686 logsource: product: linux service: auditd detection: cmd: type: EXECVE a0|endswith: iptables a1: -t a2: nat keywords: - --to-ports 42 - --to-ports 43 condition: cmd and keywords falsepositives: - Legitimate ports redirect level: medium
Sigma rule: Detects execution of "rundll32.exe" with a parent process of Explorer.exe. This has been observed by variants of Raspber. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: Rundll32 Spawned Via Explorer.EXE id: 1723e720-616d-4ddc-ab02-f7e3685a4713 status: test description: Detects execution of "rundll32.exe" with a parent process of Explorer.exe. This has been observed by variants of Raspberry Robin, as first reported by Red Canary. references: - https://redcanary.com/blog/raspberry-robin/ - https://thedfirreport.com/2022/09/26/bumblebee-round-two/ author: CD_ROM_ date: 2022-05-21 modified: 2023-08-31 tags: - attack.stealth logsource: category: process_creation product: windows detection: selection_parent: ParentImage|endswith: \explorer.exe selection_img: - Image|endswith: \rundll32.exe - OriginalFileName: RUNDLL32.EXE filter_main_generic: - CommandLine|contains: ' C:\Windows\System32\' - CommandLine|endswith: ' -localserver 22d8c27b-47a1-48d1-ad08-7da7abd79617' condition: all of selection_* and not 1 of filter_main_* falsepositives: - Unknown level: medium
Sigma rule: Detects updates to Sysmon's configuration. Attackers might update or replace the Sysmon configuration with a bare bone o. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: Sysmon Configuration Update id: 87911521-7098-470b-a459-9a57fc80bdfd status: test description: Detects updates to Sysmon's configuration. Attackers might update or replace the Sysmon configuration with a bare bone one to avoid monitoring without shutting down the service completely references: - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/downloads/sysmon author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) date: 2023-03-09 modified: 2026-06-29 tags: - attack.defense-impairment - attack.t1685 logsource: category: process_creation product: windows detection: selection_pe: - Image|endswith: - \Sysmon64.exe - \Sysmon64a.exe - \Sysmon.exe - Description: System activity monitor selection_cli: CommandLine|contains|windash: -c condition: all of selection_* falsepositives: - Legitimate administrators might use this command to update Sysmon configuration. level: medium
Sigma rule: Detects execution of Impacket's psexec.py.. Logsource: windows / security. Rule: title: Impacket PsExec Execution id: 32d56ea1-417f-44ff-822b-882873f5f43b status: test description: Detects execution of Impacket's psexec.py. references: - https://web.archive.org/web/20230329171218/https://blog.menasec.net/2019/02/threat-hunting-3-detecting-psexec.html author: Bhabesh Raj date: 2020-12-14 modified: 2022-09-22 tags: - attack.lateral-movement - attack.t1021.002 logsource: product: windows service: security definition: The advanced audit policy setting "Object Access > Audit Detailed File Share" must be configured for Success/Failure detection: selection1: EventID: 5145 ShareName: \\\\\*\\IPC$ RelativeTargetName|contains: - RemCom_stdin - RemCom_stdout - RemCom_stderr condition: selection1 falsepositives: - Unknown level: high
Sigma rule: Detects the addition of a new file or path exclusion to MacOS Time Machine via the "tmutil" utility. An adversary could. Logsource: macos / process_creation. Rule: title: New File Exclusion Added To Time Machine Via Tmutil - MacOS id: 9acf45ed-3a26-4062-bf08-56857613eb52 status: test description: 'Detects the addition of a new file or path exclusion to MacOS Time Machine via the "tmutil" utility. An adversary could exclude a path from Time Machine backups to prevent certain files from being backed up. ' references: - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1490/T1490.md#atomic-test-12---disable-time-machine - https://www.loobins.io/binaries/tmutil/ author: Pratinav Chandra date: 2024-05-29 tags: - attack.impact - attack.t1490 logsource: category: process_creation product: macos detection: selection_img: - Image|endswith: /tmutil - CommandLine|contains: tmutil selection_cmd: CommandLine|contains: addexclusion condition: all of selection_* falsepositives: - Legitimate administrator activity level: medium
Sigma rule: Detects possible payload obfuscation via the commandline. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: Potential Dosfuscation Activity id: a77c1610-fc73-4019-8e29-0f51efc04a51 status: test description: Detects possible payload obfuscation via the commandline references: - https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/blog/pdfs/dosfuscation-report.pdf - https://github.com/danielbohannon/Invoke-DOSfuscation author: frack113, Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) date: 2022-02-15 modified: 2023-03-06 tags: - attack.execution - attack.t1059 logsource: category: process_creation product: windows detection: selection: CommandLine|contains: - ^^ - ^|^ - ',;,' - ;;;; - ;; ;; - (,(, - '%COMSPEC:~' - ' c^m^d' - ^c^m^d - ' c^md' - ' cm^d' - ^cm^d - ' s^et ' - ' s^e^t ' - ' se^t ' condition: selection falsepositives: - Unknown level: medium
Sigma rule: Detects the execution of "RegAsm.exe" without a commandline flag or file, which might indicate potential process injecti. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: RegAsm.EXE Execution Without CommandLine Flags or Files id: 651f87f7-12db-47f9-84c5-f27b081b94b6 status: experimental description: 'Detects the execution of "RegAsm.exe" without a commandline flag or file, which might indicate potential process injection activity. Usually "RegAsm.exe" should point to a dedicated DLL file or call the help with the "/?" flag. ' references: - https://www.mcafee.com/blogs/other-blogs/mcafee-labs/agent-teslas-unique-approach-vbs-and-steganography-for-delivery-and-intrusion/ - https://www.zscaler.fr/blogs/security-research/threat-actors-exploit-cve-2017-11882-deliver-agent-tesla - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/dotnet/framework/tools/regasm-exe-assembly-registration-tool - https://app.any.run/tasks/ea944b89-69d8-49c8-ac1f-5c76ad300db2 - https://www.joesandbox.com/analysis/1467354/0/html author: frack113 date: 2025-06-04 tags: - attack.stealth - attack.t1218.009 logsource: product: windows category: process_creation detection: selection_img: - Image|endswith: \RegAsm.exe - OriginalFileName: RegAsm.exe selection_cli: CommandLine|endswith: - RegAsm - RegAsm.exe - RegAsm.exe" - RegAsm.exe' condition: all of selection_* falsepositives: - Legitimate use of Regasm by developers. level: low
Sigma rule: Detect filter driver unloading activity via fltmc.exe. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: Filter Driver Unloaded Via Fltmc.EXE id: 4931188c-178e-4ee7-a348-39e8a7a56821 related: - id: 4d7cda18-1b12-4e52-b45c-d28653210df8 type: derived status: test description: Detect filter driver unloading activity via fltmc.exe references: - https://www.darkoperator.com/blog/2018/10/5/operating-offensively-against-sysmon - https://www.cybereason.com/blog/threat-analysis-report-lockbit-2.0-all-paths-lead-to-ransom author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) date: 2023-02-13 modified: 2025-10-07 tags: - attack.stealth - attack.defense-impairment - attack.t1070 - attack.t1685 - attack.t1685.001 logsource: product: windows category: process_creation detection: selection_img: - Image|endswith: \fltMC.exe - OriginalFileName: fltMC.exe selection_cli: CommandLine|contains: unload filter_optional_avira: ParentImage|contains: - \AppData\Local\Temp\ - :\Windows\Temp\ ParentImage|endswith: \endpoint-protection-installer-x64.tmp CommandLine|endswith: - unload rtp_filesystem_filter - unload rtp_filter filter_optional_manageengine: ParentImage: C:\Program Files (x86)\ManageEngine\uems_agent\bin\dcfaservice64.exe CommandLine|endswith: unload DFMFilter condition: all of selection_* and not 1 of filter_optional_* falsepositives: - Unknown level: medium
Sigma rule: detects execution of psexec or paexec with renamed service name, this rule helps to filter out the noise if psexec is us. Logsource: windows / security. Rule: title: Suspicious PsExec Execution id: c462f537-a1e3-41a6-b5fc-b2c2cef9bf82 status: test description: detects execution of psexec or paexec with renamed service name, this rule helps to filter out the noise if psexec is used for legit purposes or if attacker uses a different psexec client other than sysinternal one references: - https://web.archive.org/web/20230329171218/https://blog.menasec.net/2019/02/threat-hunting-3-detecting-psexec.html author: Samir Bousseaden date: 2019-04-03 modified: 2022-08-11 tags: - attack.lateral-movement - attack.t1021.002 logsource: product: windows service: security definition: The advanced audit policy setting "Object Access > Audit Detailed File Share" must be configured for Success/Failure detection: selection1: EventID: 5145 ShareName: \\\\\*\\IPC$ RelativeTargetName|endswith: - -stdin - -stdout - -stderr filter: RelativeTargetName|startswith: PSEXESVC condition: selection1 and not filter falsepositives: - Unknown level: high
Sigma rule: Detects when adversaries stop services or processes by disabling their respective scheduled tasks in order to conduct da. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: Disable Important Scheduled Task id: 9ac94dc8-9042-493c-ba45-3b5e7c86b980 related: - id: 7595ba94-cf3b-4471-aa03-4f6baa9e5fad type: similar - id: 9e3cb244-bdb8-4632-8c90-6079c8f4f16d type: similar status: test description: Detects when adversaries stop services or processes by disabling their respective scheduled tasks in order to conduct data destructive activities references: - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1490/T1490.md#atomic-test-8---windows---disable-the-sr-scheduled-task - https://twitter.com/MichalKoczwara/status/1553634816016498688 - https://thedfirreport.com/2021/10/18/icedid-to-xinglocker-ransomware-in-24-hours/ author: frack113, Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems), X__Junior date: 2021-12-26 modified: 2026-03-11 tags: - attack.impact - attack.t1489 logsource: category: process_creation product: windows detection: selection_img: - Image|endswith: \schtasks.exe - OriginalFileName: schtasks.exe selection_cli_disable: CommandLine|contains|windash: /disable selection_cli_task: CommandLine|contains: - \Windows\BitLocker - \Windows\ExploitGuard - \Windows\ExploitGuard\ExploitGuard MDM policy Refresh - \Windows\SystemRestore\SR - \Windows\UpdateOrchestrator\ - \Windows\Windows Defender\ - \Windows\WindowsBackup\ - \Windows\WindowsUpdate\ condition: all of selection_* falsepositives: - Unknown level: high regression_tests_path: regression_data/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_schtasks_disable/info.yml simulation: - type: atomic-red-team name: Windows - Disable the SR scheduled task technique: T1490 atomic_guid: 1c68c68d-83a4-4981-974e-8993055fa034
Sigma rule: Detects potential commandline obfuscation using known escape characters. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: Potential Commandline Obfuscation Using Escape Characters id: f0cdd048-82dc-4f7a-8a7a-b87a52b6d0fd status: test description: Detects potential commandline obfuscation using known escape characters references: - https://twitter.com/vysecurity/status/885545634958385153 - https://twitter.com/Hexacorn/status/885553465417756673 - https://twitter.com/Hexacorn/status/885570278637678592 - https://www.mandiant.com/resources/blog/obfuscation-wild-targeted-attackers-lead-way-evasion-techniques - https://web.archive.org/web/20190213114956/http://www.windowsinspired.com/understanding-the-command-line-string-and-arguments-received-by-a-windows-program/ author: juju4 date: 2018-12-11 modified: 2023-03-03 tags: - attack.stealth - attack.t1140 logsource: category: process_creation product: windows detection: selection: CommandLine|contains: - h^t^t^p - h"t"t"p condition: selection falsepositives: - Unknown level: medium
Sigma rule: A General detection for files being created in the Windows startup directory. This could be an indicator of persistence.. Logsource: windows / file_event. Rule: title: Startup Folder File Write id: 2aa0a6b4-a865-495b-ab51-c28249537b75 related: - id: 28208707-fe31-437f-9a7f-4b1108b94d2e type: similar status: test description: A General detection for files being created in the Windows startup directory. This could be an indicator of persistence. references: - https://github.com/OTRF/detection-hackathon-apt29/issues/12 - https://github.com/OTRF/ThreatHunter-Playbook/blob/2d4257f630f4c9770f78d0c1df059f891ffc3fec/docs/evals/apt29/detections/5.B.1_611FCA99-97D0-4873-9E51-1C1BA2DBB40D.md author: Roberto Rodriguez (Cyb3rWard0g), OTR (Open Threat Research) date: 2020-05-02 modified: 2025-12-03 tags: - attack.privilege-escalation - attack.persistence - attack.t1547.001 logsource: product: windows category: file_event detection: selection: TargetFilename|contains: \Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\StartUp filter_main_update: - Image: - C:\Windows\System32\wuauclt.exe - C:\Windows\uus\ARM64\wuaucltcore.exe - TargetFilename|startswith: - C:\$WINDOWS.~BT\NewOS\ - C:\$WinREAgent\Scratch\Mount\ filter_optional_onenote: Image|endswith: \ONENOTE.EXE TargetFilename|endswith: \Send to OneNote.lnk condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_* and not 1 of filter_optional_* falsepositives: - FP could be caused by legitimate application writing shortcuts for example. This folder should always be inspected to make sure that all the files in there are legitimate level: medium