alirezaaminzadeh/cybersec-retrieval-benchmark huggingface dataset:
Sigma rule: Detects modifications to the "Hidden" and "ShowSuperHidden" explorer registry values in order to disable showing of hidd. Logsource: windows / registry_set. Rule: title: Displaying Hidden Files Feature Disabled id: 5a5152f1-463f-436b-b2f5-8eceb3964b42 status: test description: 'Detects modifications to the "Hidden" and "ShowSuperHidden" explorer registry values in order to disable showing of hidden files and system files. This technique is abused by several malware families to hide their files from normal users. ' references: - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1564.001/T1564.001.md#atomic-test-8---hide-files-through-registry author: frack113 date: 2022-04-02 modified: 2024-03-26 tags: - attack.stealth - attack.t1564.001 logsource: category: registry_set product: windows detection: selection: TargetObject|endswith: - \Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\Advanced\ShowSuperHidden - \Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\Advanced\Hidden Details: DWORD (0x00000000) condition: selection falsepositives: - Unknown level: medium
Sigma rule: Detects exploitation of LNK file command-line length discrepancy, where attackers hide malicious commands beyond the 260. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: Suspicious LNK Command-Line Padding with Whitespace Characters id: dd8756e7-a3a0-4768-b47e-8f545d1a751c status: experimental description: 'Detects exploitation of LNK file command-line length discrepancy, where attackers hide malicious commands beyond the 260-character UI limit while the actual command-line argument field supports 4096 characters using whitespace padding (e.g., 0x20, 0x09-0x0D). Adversaries insert non-printable whitespace characters (e.g., Line Feed \x0A, Carriage Return \x0D) to pad the visible section of the LNK file, pushing malicious commands past the UI-visible boundary. The hidden payload, executed at runtime but invisible in Windows Explorer properties, enables stealthy execution and evasion—commonly used for social engineering attacks. This rule flags suspicious use of such padding observed in real-world attacks. ' references: - https://syedhasan010.medium.com/forensics-analysis-of-an-lnk-file-da68a98b8415 - https://thehackernews.com/2025/03/unpatched-windows-zero-day-flaw.html - https://www.trendmicro.com/en_us/research/25/c/windows-shortcut-zero-day-exploit.html author: Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems) date: 2025-03-19 tags: - attack.initial-access - attack.execution - attack.t1204.002 logsource: category: process_creation product: windows detection: selection_img: - ParentImage|endswith: \explorer.exe - ParentCommandLine|contains: .lnk selection_cmd: - CommandLine|contains: - ' ' - \u0009 - \u000A - \u0011 - \u0012 - \u0013 - \u000B - \u000C - \u000D - CommandLine|re: \n\n\n\n\n\n condition: all of selection_* falsepositives: - Unknown level: high
Sigma rule: This events that are generated when using the hacktool Ruler by Sensepost. Logsource: windows / security. Rule: title: Hacktool Ruler id: 24549159-ac1b-479c-8175-d42aea947cae status: test description: This events that are generated when using the hacktool Ruler by Sensepost references: - https://github.com/sensepost/ruler - https://github.com/sensepost/ruler/issues/47 - https://github.com/staaldraad/go-ntlm/blob/cd032d41aa8ce5751c07cb7945400c0f5c81e2eb/ntlm/ntlmv1.go#L427 - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-10/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4776 - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-10/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4624 author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems) date: 2017-05-31 modified: 2022-10-09 tags: - attack.discovery - attack.execution - attack.collection - attack.lateral-movement - attack.t1087 - attack.t1114 - attack.t1059 - attack.t1550.002 logsource: product: windows service: security detection: selection1: EventID: 4776 Workstation: RULER selection2: EventID: - 4624 - 4625 WorkstationName: RULER condition: (1 of selection*) falsepositives: - Go utilities that use staaldraad awesome NTLM library level: high
Sigma rule: Detects execution of devcon.exe with commands that disable the VMware Virtual Machine Communication Interface (VMCI) dev. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: Devcon Execution Disabling VMware VMCI Device id: 85f520e7-6f5e-43ca-874c-222e5bf9c0de status: experimental description: 'Detects execution of devcon.exe with commands that disable the VMware Virtual Machine Communication Interface (VMCI) device. This can be legitimate during VMware Tools troubleshooting or driver conflicts, but may also indicate malware attempting to hijack communication with the hardware via the VMCI device. This has been used to facilitate VMware ESXi vulnerability exploits to escape VMs and execute code on the ESXi host. ' references: - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-hardware/drivers/devtest/devcon - https://communities.vmware.com/t5/VMware-Workstation-Pro/VMCI-driver-issues/td-p/2866060 - https://github.com/search?q=devcon+disable+VMWVMCIHOSTDEV - https://huntress.com/blog/esxi-vm-escape-exploit author: Matt Anderson, Dray Agha, Anna Pham (Huntress) date: 2026-01-02 tags: - attack.persistence - attack.privilege-escalation - attack.defense-impairment - attack.t1543.003 - attack.t1685 logsource: category: process_creation product: windows detection: selection_img: - Image|endswith: \devcon.exe - OriginalFileName: DevCon.exe selection_action: CommandLine|contains: ' disable ' selection_vmci_pci: CommandLine|contains: - 15AD&DEV_0740 - VMWVMCIHOSTDEV condition: all of selection_* falsepositives: - Legitimate VMware administration, Tools installation/uninstallation, or troubleshooting driver conflicts. - Automated scripts in virtualized environments for device cleanup. level: high regression_tests_path: regression_data/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_devcon_disable_vmci_driver/info.yml
Sigma rule: Detects python spawning a pretty tty. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: Python Spawning Pretty TTY on Windows id: 480e7e51-e797-47e3-8d72-ebfce65b6d8d related: - id: 899133d5-4d7c-4a7f-94ee-27355c879d90 type: derived status: test description: Detects python spawning a pretty tty references: - https://www.volexity.com/blog/2022/06/02/zero-day-exploitation-of-atlassian-confluence/ author: Nextron Systems date: 2022-06-03 tags: - attack.execution - attack.t1059 logsource: category: process_creation product: windows detection: selection_img: Image|endswith: - python.exe - python3.exe - python2.exe selection_cli_1: CommandLine|contains|all: - import pty - .spawn( selection_cli_2: CommandLine|contains: from pty import spawn condition: selection_img and 1 of selection_cli_* falsepositives: - Unknown level: high
Sigma rule: Detects remote RPC calls to modify the registry and possible execute code. Logsource: rpc_firewall / application. Rule: title: Remote Registry Lateral Movement id: 35c55673-84ca-4e99-8d09-e334f3c29539 status: test description: Detects remote RPC calls to modify the registry and possible execute code references: - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/openspecs/windows_protocols/ms-rrp/0fa3191d-bb79-490a-81bd-54c2601b7a78 - https://github.com/jsecurity101/MSRPC-to-ATTACK/blob/ddd4608fe8684fcf2fcf9b48c5f0b3c28097f8a3/documents/MS-RRP.md - https://github.com/zeronetworks/rpcfirewall - https://zeronetworks.com/blog/stopping-lateral-movement-via-the-rpc-firewall/ author: Sagie Dulce, Dekel Paz date: 2022-01-01 tags: - attack.lateral-movement - attack.defense-impairment - attack.t1112 - attack.persistence logsource: product: rpc_firewall category: application definition: 'Requirements: install and apply the RPC Firewall to all processes with "audit:true action:block uuid:338cd001-2244-31f1-aaaa-900038001003"' detection: selection: EventLog: RPCFW EventID: 3 InterfaceUuid: 338cd001-2244-31f1-aaaa-900038001003 OpNum: - 6 - 7 - 8 - 13 - 18 - 19 - 21 - 22 - 23 - 35 condition: selection falsepositives: - Remote administration of registry values level: high
Sigma rule: Detects suspicious execution of 'Msbuild.exe' by a uncommon parent process. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: Suspicious Msbuild Execution By Uncommon Parent Process id: 33be4333-2c6b-44f4-ae28-102cdbde0a31 status: test description: Detects suspicious execution of 'Msbuild.exe' by a uncommon parent process references: - https://app.any.run/tasks/abdf586e-df0c-4d39-89a7-06bf24913401/ - https://www.echotrail.io/insights/search/msbuild.exe author: frack113 date: 2022-11-17 tags: - attack.stealth logsource: category: process_creation product: windows detection: selection: - Image|endswith: \MSBuild.exe - OriginalFileName: MSBuild.exe filter_parent: ParentImage|endswith: - \devenv.exe - \cmd.exe - \msbuild.exe - \python.exe - \explorer.exe - \nuget.exe condition: selection and not filter_parent falsepositives: - Unknown level: medium
Sigma rule: Detects execution of the "esxcli" command with the "network" flag in order to retrieve information about the network con. Logsource: linux / process_creation. Rule: title: ESXi Network Configuration Discovery Via ESXCLI id: 33e814e0-1f00-4e43-9c34-31fb7ae2b174 status: test description: Detects execution of the "esxcli" command with the "network" flag in order to retrieve information about the network configuration. references: - https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/hypervisor-jackpotting-ecrime-actors-increase-targeting-of-esxi-servers/ - https://developer.broadcom.com/xapis/esxcli-command-reference/7.0.0/namespace/esxcli_network.html author: Cedric Maurugeon date: 2023-09-04 tags: - attack.discovery - attack.execution - attack.t1033 - attack.t1007 - attack.t1059.012 logsource: category: process_creation product: linux detection: selection_img: Image|endswith: /esxcli CommandLine|contains: network selection_cli: CommandLine|contains: - ' get' - ' list' condition: all of selection_* falsepositives: - Legitimate administration activities level: medium
Sigma rule: Detects the creation of a "privileged" container, an action which could be indicative of a threat actor mounting a conta. Logsource: kubernetes / application / audit. Rule: title: Privileged Container Deployed id: c5cd1b20-36bb-488d-8c05-486be3d0cb97 status: test description: 'Detects the creation of a "privileged" container, an action which could be indicative of a threat actor mounting a container breakout attacks. A privileged container is a container that can access the host with all of the root capabilities of the host machine. This allows it to view, interact and modify processes, network operations, IPC calls, the file system, mount points, SELinux configurations etc. as the root user on the host. Various versions of "privileged" containers can be specified, e.g. by setting the securityContext.privileged flag in the resource specification, setting non-standard Linux capabilities, or configuring the hostNetwork/hostPID fields ' references: - https://microsoft.github.io/Threat-Matrix-for-Kubernetes/techniques/Privileged%20container/ - https://docs.aws.amazon.com/guardduty/latest/ug/guardduty_finding-types-kubernetes.html#privilegeescalation-kubernetes-privilegedcontainer - https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/kubernetes-pod-created-with-hostnetwork.html - https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/kubernetes-container-created-with-excessive-linux-capabilities.html author: Leo Tsaousis (@laripping) date: 2024-03-26 tags: - attack.t1611 - attack.privilege-escalation logsource: category: application product: kubernetes service: audit detection: selection: verb: create objectRef.resource: pods capabilities: '*' condition: selection falsepositives: - Unknown level: low
Sigma rule: Detects the creation of a new user account. Such accounts may be used for persistence that do not require persistent rem. Logsource: linux / auditd. Rule: title: Creation Of An User Account id: 759d0d51-bc99-4b5e-9add-8f5b2c8e7512 status: test description: Detects the creation of a new user account. Such accounts may be used for persistence that do not require persistent remote access tools to be deployed on the system. references: - https://access.redhat.com/documentation/en-us/red_hat_enterprise_linux/7/html/security_guide/sec-understanding_audit_log_files - https://access.redhat.com/articles/4409591#audit-record-types-2 - https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VmvY5SQm5-Y&ab_channel=M45C07 author: Marie Euler, Pawel Mazur date: 2020-05-18 modified: 2022-12-20 tags: - attack.t1136.001 - attack.persistence logsource: product: linux service: auditd detection: selection_syscall_record_type: type: SYSCALL exe|endswith: /useradd selection_add_user_record_type: type: ADD_USER condition: 1 of selection_* falsepositives: - Admin activity level: medium
Sigma rule: Detects AdFind execution with common flags seen used during attacks. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: PUA - AdFind Suspicious Execution id: 9a132afa-654e-11eb-ae93-0242ac130002 related: - id: 455b9d50-15a1-4b99-853f-8d37655a4c1b type: similar - id: 75df3b17-8bcc-4565-b89b-c9898acef911 type: obsolete status: test description: Detects AdFind execution with common flags seen used during attacks references: - https://www.joeware.net/freetools/tools/adfind/ - https://thedfirreport.com/2020/05/08/adfind-recon/ - https://thedfirreport.com/2021/01/11/trickbot-still-alive-and-well/ - https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2021/01/20/deep-dive-into-the-solorigate-second-stage-activation-from-sunburst-to-teardrop-and-raindrop/ - https://social.technet.microsoft.com/wiki/contents/articles/7535.adfind-command-examples.aspx - https://github.com/center-for-threat-informed-defense/adversary_emulation_library/blob/bf62ece1c679b07b5fb49c4bae947fe24c81811f/fin6/Emulation_Plan/Phase1.md - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/0f229c0e42bfe7ca736a14023836d65baa941ed2/atomics/T1087.002/T1087.002.md#atomic-test-7---adfind---enumerate-active-directory-user-objects author: Janantha Marasinghe (https://github.com/blueteam0ps), FPT.EagleEye Team, omkar72, oscd.community date: 2021-02-02 modified: 2025-10-24 tags: - attack.discovery - attack.t1018 - attack.t1087.002 - attack.t1482 - attack.t1069.002 - stp.1u logsource: category: process_creation product: windows detection: selection: CommandLine|contains: - domainlist - trustdmp - dcmodes - adinfo - -sc dclist - computer_pwdnotreqd - objectcategory= - -subnets -f - name="Domain Admins" - '-sc u:' - domainncs - dompol - ' oudmp ' - subnetdmp - gpodmp - fspdmp - users_noexpire - computers_active - computers_pwdnotreqd condition: selection falsepositives: - Legitimate admin activity level: high regression_tests_path: regression_data/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_pua_adfind_susp_usage/info.yml simulation: - type: atomic-red-team name: Adfind - Enumerate Active Directory Computer Objects technique: T1018 atomic_guid: a889f5be-2d54-4050-bd05-884578748bb4 - type: atomic-red-team name: Adfind - Enumerate Active Directory Domain Controller Objects technique: T1018 atomic_guid: 5838c31e-a0e2-4b9f-b60a-d79d2cb7995e
Sigma rule: Detects suspicious filenames that contain a right-to-left override character and a potentially spoofed file extensions.. Logsource: windows / file_event. Rule: title: Potential File Extension Spoofing Using Right-to-Left Override id: 979baf41-ca44-4540-9d0c-4fcef3b5a3a4 related: - id: ad691d92-15f2-4181-9aa4-723c74f9ddc3 type: derived status: test description: 'Detects suspicious filenames that contain a right-to-left override character and a potentially spoofed file extensions. ' references: - https://redcanary.com/blog/right-to-left-override/ - https://www.malwarebytes.com/blog/news/2014/01/the-rtlo-method - https://tria.ge/241015-l98snsyeje/behavioral2 - https://www.unicode.org/versions/Unicode5.2.0/ch02.pdf author: Jonathan Peters (Nextron Systems), Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems) date: 2024-11-17 modified: 2026-03-20 tags: - attack.execution - attack.stealth - attack.t1036.002 logsource: category: file_event product: windows detection: selection_rtlo_unicode: TargetFilename|contains: - \u202e - '[U+202E]' - ‮ selection_extensions: TargetFilename|contains: - 3pm. - 4pm. - cod. - fdp. - ftr. - gepj. - gnp. - gpj. - ism. - lmth. - nls. - piz. - slx. - tdo. - vsc. - vwm. - xcod. - xslx. - xtpp. condition: all of selection_* falsepositives: - Filenames that contains scriptures such as arabic or hebrew might make use of this character level: high regression_tests_path: regression_data/rules/windows/file/file_event/file_event_win_susp_right_to_left_override_extension_spoofing/info.yml
Sigma rule: Detects the creation of a new bits job by Bitsadmin. Logsource: windows / bits-client. Rule: title: New BITS Job Created Via Bitsadmin id: 1ff315dc-2a3a-4b71-8dde-873818d25d39 status: test description: Detects the creation of a new bits job by Bitsadmin references: - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1197/T1197.md author: frack113 date: 2022-03-01 modified: 2023-03-27 tags: - attack.persistence - attack.execution - attack.stealth - attack.t1197 logsource: product: windows service: bits-client detection: selection: EventID: 3 processPath|endswith: \bitsadmin.exe condition: selection falsepositives: - Many legitimate applications or scripts could leverage "bitsadmin". This event is best correlated with EID 16403 via the JobID field level: low
Sigma rule: Adversaries may abuse Microsoft Office add-ins to obtain persistence on a compromised system. Office add-ins can be used. Logsource: windows / ps_script. Rule: title: Code Executed Via Office Add-in XLL File id: 36fbec91-fa1b-4d5d-8df1-8d8edcb632ad status: test description: 'Adversaries may abuse Microsoft Office add-ins to obtain persistence on a compromised system. Office add-ins can be used to add functionality to Office programs ' references: - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1137.006/T1137.006.md author: frack113 date: 2021-12-28 tags: - attack.persistence - attack.t1137.006 logsource: product: windows category: ps_script definition: 'Requirements: Script Block Logging must be enabled' detection: selection: ScriptBlockText|contains|all: - 'new-object ' - '-ComObject ' - .application - .RegisterXLL condition: selection falsepositives: - Unknown level: high
Sigma rule: Detects usage of the powerShell New-MailboxExportRequest Cmdlet to exports a mailbox to a remote or local share, as used. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: Suspicious PowerShell Mailbox Export to Share id: 889719ef-dd62-43df-86c3-768fb08dc7c0 status: test description: Detects usage of the powerShell New-MailboxExportRequest Cmdlet to exports a mailbox to a remote or local share, as used in ProxyShell exploitations references: - https://youtu.be/5mqid-7zp8k?t=2481 - https://blog.orange.tw/2021/08/proxylogon-a-new-attack-surface-on-ms-exchange-part-1.html - https://peterjson.medium.com/reproducing-the-proxyshell-pwn2own-exploit-49743a4ea9a1 - https://m365internals.com/2022/10/07/hunting-in-on-premises-exchange-server-logs/ author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems) date: 2021-08-07 modified: 2022-10-26 tags: - attack.exfiltration logsource: category: process_creation product: windows detection: selection: CommandLine|contains|all: - New-MailboxExportRequest - ' -Mailbox ' - ' -FilePath \\\\' condition: selection falsepositives: - Unknown level: critical
Sigma rule: Adversaries may abuse PowerShell commands and scripts for execution. PowerShell is a powerful interactive command-line i. Logsource: windows / ps_script. Rule: title: Powershell MsXml COM Object id: 78aa1347-1517-4454-9982-b338d6df8343 status: test description: 'Adversaries may abuse PowerShell commands and scripts for execution. PowerShell is a powerful interactive command-line interface and scripting environment included in the Windows operating system. (Citation: TechNet PowerShell) Adversaries can use PowerShell to perform a number of actions, including discovery of information and execution of code ' references: - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1059.001/T1059.001.md#atomic-test-7---powershell-msxml-com-object---with-prompt - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/desktop/ms766431(v=vs.85) - https://www.trendmicro.com/en_id/research/22/e/uncovering-a-kingminer-botnet-attack-using-trend-micro-managed-x.html author: frack113, MatilJ date: 2022-01-19 modified: 2022-05-19 tags: - attack.execution - attack.t1059.001 logsource: product: windows category: ps_script definition: 'Requirements: Script Block Logging must be enabled' detection: selection: ScriptBlockText|contains|all: - New-Object - -ComObject - MsXml2. - XmlHttp condition: selection falsepositives: - Legitimate administrative script level: medium
Sigma rule: Detects creation of a malicious DLL file in the location where the OneDrive or Team applications Upon execution of the T. Logsource: windows / file_event. Rule: title: Malicious DLL File Dropped in the Teams or OneDrive Folder id: 1908fcc1-1b92-4272-8214-0fbaf2fa5163 status: test description: 'Detects creation of a malicious DLL file in the location where the OneDrive or Team applications Upon execution of the Teams or OneDrive application, the dropped malicious DLL file ("iphlpapi.dll") is sideloaded ' references: - https://blog.cyble.com/2022/07/27/targeted-attacks-being-carried-out-via-dll-sideloading/ author: frack113 date: 2022-08-12 tags: - attack.persistence - attack.privilege-escalation - attack.execution - attack.stealth - attack.t1574.001 logsource: category: file_event product: windows detection: selection: TargetFilename|contains|all: - iphlpapi.dll - \AppData\Local\Microsoft condition: selection falsepositives: - Unknown level: high