alirezaaminzadeh/cybersec-retrieval-benchmark huggingface dataset:
Sigma rule: Detects a potentially suspicious execution of a process located in the '/tmp/' folder. Logsource: linux / process_creation. Rule: title: Potentially Suspicious Execution From Tmp Folder id: 312b42b1-bded-4441-8b58-163a3af58775 status: test description: Detects a potentially suspicious execution of a process located in the '/tmp/' folder references: - https://blogs.jpcert.or.jp/en/2023/05/gobrat.html - https://jstnk9.github.io/jstnk9/research/GobRAT-Malware/ - https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/60bcd645450e4c846238cf0e7226dc40c84c96eba99f6b2cffcd0ab4a391c8b3/detection - https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/3e44c807a25a56f4068b5b8186eee5002eed6f26d665a8b791c472ad154585d1/detection author: Joseliyo Sanchez, @Joseliyo_Jstnk date: 2023-06-02 modified: 2025-08-05 tags: - attack.stealth - attack.t1036 logsource: product: linux category: process_creation detection: selection: Image|startswith: /tmp/ filter_optional_nextcloud: Image|endswith: /usr/bin/nextcloud condition: selection and not 1 of filter_optional_* falsepositives: - Unknown level: medium
Sigma rule: Detects potential evasion or obfuscation attempts using bogus path traversal via the commandline. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: Potential Command Line Path Traversal Evasion Attempt id: 1327381e-6ab0-4f38-b583-4c1b8346a56b status: test description: Detects potential evasion or obfuscation attempts using bogus path traversal via the commandline references: - https://twitter.com/hexacorn/status/1448037865435320323 - https://twitter.com/Gal_B1t/status/1062971006078345217 author: Christian Burkard (Nextron Systems) date: 2021-10-26 modified: 2023-03-29 tags: - attack.stealth - attack.t1036 logsource: category: process_creation product: windows detection: selection_1: Image|contains: \Windows\ CommandLine|contains: - \..\Windows\ - \..\System32\ - \..\..\ selection_2: CommandLine|contains: .exe\..\ filter_optional_google_drive: CommandLine|contains: \Google\Drive\googledrivesync.exe\..\ filter_optional_citrix: CommandLine|contains: \Citrix\Virtual Smart Card\Citrix.Authentication.VirtualSmartcard.Launcher.exe\..\ condition: 1 of selection_* and not 1 of filter_optional_* falsepositives: - Google Drive - Citrix level: medium
Sigma rule: Detects the command line executed when TeamViewer starts a session started by a remote host. Once a connection has been. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: Remote Access Tool - Team Viewer Session Started On Windows Host id: ab70c354-d9ac-4e11-bbb6-ec8e3b153357 related: - id: 1f6b8cd4-3e60-47cc-b282-5aa1cbc9182d type: similar - id: f459ccb4-9805-41ea-b5b2-55e279e2424a type: similar status: test description: 'Detects the command line executed when TeamViewer starts a session started by a remote host. Once a connection has been started, an investigator can verify the connection details by viewing the "incoming_connections.txt" log file in the TeamViewer folder. ' references: - Internal Research author: Josh Nickels, Qi Nan date: 2024-03-11 tags: - attack.persistence - attack.initial-access - attack.t1133 logsource: category: process_creation product: windows detection: selection: Image: TeamViewer_Desktop.exe ParentImage: TeamViewer_Service.exe CommandLine|endswith: TeamViewer_Desktop.exe --IPCport 5939 --Module 1 condition: selection falsepositives: - Legitimate usage of TeamViewer level: low
Sigma rule: Detects PowerShell execution to set the ACL of a file or a folder. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: PowerShell Script Change Permission Via Set-Acl id: bdeb2cff-af74-4094-8426-724dc937f20a related: - id: cae80281-ef23-44c5-873b-fd48d2666f49 type: derived - id: 0944e002-e3f6-4eb5-bf69-3a3067b53d73 type: derived - id: 3bf1d859-3a7e-44cb-8809-a99e066d3478 type: derived status: test description: Detects PowerShell execution to set the ACL of a file or a folder references: - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/microsoft.powershell.security/set-acl?view=powershell-5.1 - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/74438b0237d141ee9c99747976447dc884cb1a39/atomics/T1505.005/T1505.005.md author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) date: 2022-10-18 tags: - attack.stealth logsource: category: process_creation product: windows detection: selection_img: - OriginalFileName: - PowerShell.EXE - pwsh.dll - Image|endswith: - \powershell.exe - \pwsh.exe selection_cmdlet: CommandLine|contains|all: - 'Set-Acl ' - '-AclObject ' - '-Path ' condition: all of selection_* falsepositives: - Unknown level: high
Sigma rule: Detects suspicious file writes to the root directory of web applications, particularly Apache web servers or Tomcat serv. Logsource: windows / file_event. Rule: title: Suspicious File Write to Webapps Root Directory id: 89c42960-f244-4dad-9151-ae9b1a3287a2 status: experimental description: 'Detects suspicious file writes to the root directory of web applications, particularly Apache web servers or Tomcat servers. This may indicate an attempt to deploy malicious files such as web shells or other unauthorized scripts. ' references: - https://labs.watchtowr.com/guess-who-would-be-stupid-enough-to-rob-the-same-vault-twice-pre-auth-rce-chains-in-commvault/ author: Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems) date: 2025-10-20 tags: - attack.persistence - attack.t1505.003 - attack.initial-access - attack.t1190 logsource: product: windows category: file_event detection: selection_susp_img: Image|endswith: - \dotnet.exe - \w3wp.exe - \java.exe selection_servers: TargetFilename|contains: - \apache - \tomcat selection_path: TargetFilename|contains: \webapps\ROOT\ selection_susp_extensions: TargetFilename|endswith: .jsp condition: all of selection_* falsepositives: - Unknown level: medium
Sigma rule: Detects execution of the "mshta" utility with an argument containing the "http" keyword, which could indicate that an at. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: Remotely Hosted HTA File Executed Via Mshta.EXE id: b98d0db6-511d-45de-ad02-e82a98729620 status: test description: Detects execution of the "mshta" utility with an argument containing the "http" keyword, which could indicate that an attacker is executing a remotely hosted malicious hta file references: - https://www.trendmicro.com/en_us/research/22/e/avoslocker-ransomware-variant-abuses-driver-file-to-disable-anti-Virus-scans-log4shell.html author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) date: 2022-08-08 modified: 2023-02-06 tags: - attack.execution - attack.stealth - attack.t1218.005 logsource: category: process_creation product: windows detection: selection_img: - Image|endswith: \mshta.exe - OriginalFileName: MSHTA.EXE selection_cli: CommandLine|contains: - http:// - https:// - ftp:// condition: all of selection_* falsepositives: - Unknown level: high
Sigma rule: Detects a typical pattern of a CobaltStrike BOF which inject into other processes. Logsource: windows / process_access. Rule: title: HackTool - CobaltStrike BOF Injection Pattern id: 09706624-b7f6-455d-9d02-adee024cee1d status: test description: Detects a typical pattern of a CobaltStrike BOF which inject into other processes references: - https://github.com/boku7/injectAmsiBypass - https://github.com/boku7/spawn author: Christian Burkard (Nextron Systems) date: 2021-08-04 modified: 2023-11-28 tags: - attack.execution - attack.defense-impairment - attack.t1106 - attack.t1685 logsource: category: process_access product: windows detection: selection: CallTrace|re: ^C:\\Windows\\SYSTEM32\\ntdll\.dll\+[a-z0-9]{4,6}\|C:\\Windows\\System32\\KERNELBASE\.dll\+[a-z0-9]{4,6}\|UNKNOWN\([A-Z0-9]{16}\)$ GrantedAccess: - '0x1028' - '0x1fffff' condition: selection falsepositives: - Unknown level: high
Sigma rule: Detects the dump of highly sensitive files such as "NTDS.DIT" and "SECURITY" hive. Attackers can leverage the "wbadmin". Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: Sensitive File Recovery From Backup Via Wbadmin.EXE id: 84972c80-251c-4c3a-9079-4f00aad93938 related: - id: 6fe4aa1e-0531-4510-8be2-782154b73b48 type: derived status: test description: 'Detects the dump of highly sensitive files such as "NTDS.DIT" and "SECURITY" hive. Attackers can leverage the "wbadmin" utility in order to dump sensitive files that might contain credential or sensitive information. ' references: - https://github.com/LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS/blob/2cc01b01132b5c304027a658c698ae09dd6a92bf/yml/OSBinaries/Wbadmin.yml - https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Wbadmin/ - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/wbadmin-start-recovery - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/wbadmin-start-backup author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems), frack113 date: 2024-05-10 tags: - attack.credential-access - attack.t1003.003 logsource: category: process_creation product: windows detection: selection_img: - Image|endswith: \wbadmin.exe - OriginalFileName: WBADMIN.EXE selection_backup: CommandLine|contains|all: - ' recovery' - recoveryTarget - itemtype:File CommandLine|contains: - \config\SAM - \config\SECURITY - \config\SYSTEM - \Windows\NTDS\NTDS.dit condition: all of selection_* falsepositives: - Unknown level: high
Sigma rule: Detects the execution of Xwizard tool from a non-default directory. When executed from a non-default directory, this uti. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: Xwizard.EXE Execution From Non-Default Location id: 193d5ccd-6f59-40c6-b5b0-8e32d5ddd3d1 status: test description: 'Detects the execution of Xwizard tool from a non-default directory. When executed from a non-default directory, this utility can be abused in order to side load a custom version of "xwizards.dll". ' references: - https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Xwizard/ - http://www.hexacorn.com/blog/2017/07/31/the-wizard-of-x-oppa-plugx-style/ author: Christian Burkard (Nextron Systems) date: 2021-09-20 modified: 2024-08-15 tags: - attack.privilege-escalation - attack.persistence - attack.execution - attack.stealth - attack.t1574.001 logsource: category: process_creation product: windows detection: selection: - Image|endswith: \xwizard.exe - OriginalFileName: xwizard.exe filter_main_legit_location: Image|startswith: - C:\Windows\System32\ - C:\Windows\SysWOW64\ - C:\Windows\WinSxS\ condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_* falsepositives: - Windows installed on non-C drive level: high
Sigma rule: Detects the pattern of UAC Bypass using consent.exe and comctl32.dll (UACMe 22). Logsource: windows / file_event. Rule: title: UAC Bypass Using Consent and Comctl32 - File id: 62ed5b55-f991-406a-85d9-e8e8fdf18789 status: test description: Detects the pattern of UAC Bypass using consent.exe and comctl32.dll (UACMe 22) references: - https://github.com/hfiref0x/UACME author: Christian Burkard (Nextron Systems) date: 2021-08-23 modified: 2022-10-09 tags: - attack.privilege-escalation - attack.t1548.002 logsource: category: file_event product: windows detection: selection: TargetFilename|startswith: C:\Windows\System32\consent.exe.@ TargetFilename|endswith: \comctl32.dll condition: selection falsepositives: - Unknown level: high
Sigma rule: Detects Silence EmpireDNSAgent as described in the Group-IP report. Logsource: windows / ps_script. Rule: title: Silence.EDA Detection id: 3ceb2083-a27f-449a-be33-14ec1b7cc973 status: test description: Detects Silence EmpireDNSAgent as described in the Group-IP report references: - https://www.group-ib.com/resources/threat-research/silence_2.0.going_global.pdf author: Alina Stepchenkova, Group-IB, oscd.community date: 2019-11-01 modified: 2023-04-03 tags: - attack.execution - attack.t1059.001 - attack.command-and-control - attack.t1071.004 - attack.t1572 - attack.impact - attack.t1529 - attack.g0091 - attack.s0363 logsource: product: windows category: ps_script definition: 'Requirements: Script Block Logging must be enabled' detection: empire: ScriptBlockText|contains|all: - System.Diagnostics.Process - Stop-Computer - Restart-Computer - Exception in execution - $cmdargs - Close-Dnscat2Tunnel dnscat: ScriptBlockText|contains|all: - set type=$LookupType`nserver - $Command | nslookup 2>&1 | Out-String - New-RandomDNSField - '[Convert]::ToString($SYNOptions, 16)' - $Session.Dead = $True - $Session["Driver"] -eq condition: empire and dnscat falsepositives: - Unknown level: critical
Sigma rule: Detects the installation of RTCore service. Which could be an indication of Micro-Star MSI Afterburner vulnerable driver. Logsource: windows / system. Rule: title: RTCore Suspicious Service Installation id: 91c49341-e2ef-40c0-ac45-49ec5c3fe26c status: test description: Detects the installation of RTCore service. Which could be an indication of Micro-Star MSI Afterburner vulnerable driver abuse references: - https://github.com/br-sn/CheekyBlinder/blob/e1764a8a0e7cda8a3716aefa35799f560686e01c/CheekyBlinder/CheekyBlinder.cpp author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) date: 2022-08-30 tags: - attack.persistence logsource: product: windows service: system detection: selection: Provider_Name: Service Control Manager EventID: 7045 ServiceName: RTCore64 condition: selection falsepositives: - Unknown level: high
Sigma rule: Detects LSASS process access for potential credential dumping by a Python-like tool such as LaZagne or Pypykatz.. Logsource: windows / process_access. Rule: title: Credential Dumping Activity By Python Based Tool id: f8be3e82-46a3-4e4e-ada5-8e538ae8b9c9 related: - id: 4b9a8556-99c4-470b-a40c-9c8d02c77ed0 type: obsolete - id: 7186e989-4ed7-4f4e-a656-4674b9e3e48b type: obsolete status: stable description: Detects LSASS process access for potential credential dumping by a Python-like tool such as LaZagne or Pypykatz. references: - https://twitter.com/bh4b3sh/status/1303674603819081728 - https://github.com/skelsec/pypykatz author: Bhabesh Raj, Jonhnathan Ribeiro date: 2023-11-27 modified: 2023-11-29 tags: - attack.credential-access - attack.t1003.001 - attack.s0349 logsource: category: process_access product: windows detection: selection: TargetImage|endswith: \lsass.exe CallTrace|contains|all: - _ctypes.pyd+ - :\Windows\System32\KERNELBASE.dll+ - :\Windows\SYSTEM32\ntdll.dll+ CallTrace|contains: - python27.dll+ - python3*.dll+ GrantedAccess: '0x1FFFFF' condition: selection falsepositives: - Unknown level: high
Sigma rule: Detects the creation of files with suspicious file extensions in the temporary directory that Outlook uses when opening. Logsource: windows / file_event. Rule: title: Suspicious File Created in Outlook Temporary Directory id: fabb0e80-030c-4e3e-a104-d09676991ac3 related: - id: f748c45a-f8d3-4e6f-b617-fe176f695b8f type: obsolete status: experimental description: 'Detects the creation of files with suspicious file extensions in the temporary directory that Outlook uses when opening attachments. This can be used to detect spear-phishing campaigns that use suspicious files as attachments, which may contain malicious code. ' references: - https://vipre.com/blog/svg-phishing-attacks-the-new-trick-in-the-cybercriminals-playbook/ - https://thecyberexpress.com/rogue-rdp-files-used-in-ukraine-cyberattacks/ - https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2024/10/29/midnight-blizzard-conducts-large-scale-spear-phishing-campaign-using-rdp-files/ author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems) date: 2025-07-22 tags: - attack.initial-access - attack.t1566.001 logsource: product: windows category: file_event detection: selection_extension: TargetFilename|endswith: - .cpl - .hta - .iso - .rdp - .svg - .vba - .vbe - .vbs selection_location: - TargetFilename|contains: - \AppData\Local\Packages\Microsoft.Outlook_ - \AppData\Local\Microsoft\Olk\Attachments\ - TargetFilename|contains|all: - \AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\ - \Content.Outlook\ condition: all of selection_* falsepositives: - Opening of headers or footers in email signatures that include SVG images or legitimate SVG attachments level: high
Sigma rule: Detects .NET Framework CLR and .NET Core CLR "cor_enable_profiling" and "cor_profiler" variables being set and configure. Logsource: windows / registry_set. Rule: title: Enabling COR Profiler Environment Variables id: ad89044a-8f49-4673-9a55-cbd88a1b374f status: test description: Detects .NET Framework CLR and .NET Core CLR "cor_enable_profiling" and "cor_profiler" variables being set and configured. references: - https://twitter.com/jamieantisocial/status/1304520651248668673 - https://www.slideshare.net/JamieWilliams130/started-from-the-bottom-exploiting-data-sources-to-uncover-attck-behaviors - https://www.sans.org/cyber-security-summit/archives - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/dotnet/core/runtime-config/debugging-profiling author: Jose Rodriguez (@Cyb3rPandaH), OTR (Open Threat Research), Jimmy Bayne (@bohops) date: 2020-09-10 modified: 2023-11-24 tags: - attack.persistence - attack.privilege-escalation - attack.execution - attack.stealth - attack.t1574.012 logsource: category: registry_set product: windows detection: selection_1: TargetObject|endswith: - \COR_ENABLE_PROFILING - \COR_PROFILER - \CORECLR_ENABLE_PROFILING selection_2: TargetObject|contains: \CORECLR_PROFILER_PATH condition: 1 of selection_* level: medium
Sigma rule: Detects successful deletion or disabling of an AWS GuardDuty detector, possibly by an attacker trying to avoid detection. Logsource: aws / cloudtrail. Rule: title: AWS GuardDuty Detector Deleted Or Updated id: d2656e78-c069-4571-8220-9e0ab5913f19 status: experimental description: 'Detects successful deletion or disabling of an AWS GuardDuty detector, possibly by an attacker trying to avoid detection of its malicious activities. Upon deletion, GuardDuty stops monitoring the environment and all existing findings are lost. Verify with the user identity that this activity is legitimate. ' references: - https://docs.aws.amazon.com/guardduty/latest/APIReference/API_DeleteDetector.html - https://docs.aws.amazon.com/guardduty/latest/APIReference/API_UpdateDetector.html - https://docs.aws.amazon.com/guardduty/latest/ug/guardduty_suspend-disable.html - https://docs.datadoghq.com/security/default_rules/719-39f-9cd/ - https://docs.prismacloud.io/en/enterprise-edition/policy-reference/aws-policies/aws-general-policies/ensure-aws-guardduty-detector-is-enabled - https://docs.stellarcyber.ai/5.2.x/Using/ML/Alert-Rule-Based-Potentially_Malicious_AWS_Activity.html - https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Solutions/Amazon%20Web%20Services/Analytic%20Rules/AWS_GuardDutyDisabled.yaml - https://github.com/elastic/detection-rules/blob/main/rules/integrations/aws/defense_evasion_guardduty_detector_deletion.toml - https://help.fortinet.com/fsiem/Public_Resource_Access/7_4_0/rules/PH_RULE_AWS_GuardDuty_Detector_Deletion.htm - https://research.splunk.com/sources/5d8bd475-c8bc-4447-b27f-efa508728b90/ - https://suktech24.com/2025/07/17/aws-threat-detection-rule-guardduty-detector-disabled-or-suspended/ - https://www.atomicredteam.io/atomic-red-team/atomics/T156001#atomic-test-46---aws---guardduty-suspension-or-deletion author: suktech24 date: 2025-11-27 tags: - attack.defense-impairment - attack.t1685 - attack.t1685.002 logsource: product: aws service: cloudtrail detection: selection_event_source: eventSource: guardduty.amazonaws.com selection_action_delete: eventName: DeleteDetector selection_action_update: eventName: UpdateDetector requestParameters.enable: 'false' selection_status_success: errorCode: Success selection_status_null: errorCode: null condition: selection_event_source and 1 of selection_action_* and 1 of selection_status_* falsepositives: - Legitimate detector deletion by an admin (e.g., during account decommissioning). - Temporary disablement for troubleshooting (verify via change management tickets). - Automated deployment tools (e.g. Terraform) managing GuardDuty state. level: high
Sigma rule: Detects deletion of local audit logs. Logsource: macos / process_creation. Rule: title: Indicator Removal on Host - Clear Mac System Logs id: acf61bd8-d814-4272-81f0-a7a269aa69aa status: test description: Detects deletion of local audit logs references: - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1070.002/T1070.002.md author: remotephone, oscd.community date: 2020-10-11 modified: 2022-09-16 tags: - attack.defense-impairment - attack.t1685.006 logsource: product: macos category: process_creation detection: selection1: Image|endswith: - /rm - /unlink - /shred selection_cli_1: CommandLine|contains: /var/log selection_cli_2: CommandLine|contains|all: - /Users/ - /Library/Logs/ condition: selection1 and 1 of selection_cli* falsepositives: - Legitimate administration activities level: medium
Sigma rule: Detects the execution of the BCP utility in order to export data from the database. Attackers were seen saving their mal. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: Data Export From MSSQL Table Via BCP.EXE id: c615d676-f655-46b9-b913-78729021e5d7 status: test description: 'Detects the execution of the BCP utility in order to export data from the database. Attackers were seen saving their malware to a database column or table and then later extracting it via "bcp.exe" into a file. ' references: - https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/sql/tools/bcp-utility - https://asec.ahnlab.com/en/61000/ - https://asec.ahnlab.com/en/78944/ - https://www.huntress.com/blog/attacking-mssql-servers - https://www.huntress.com/blog/attacking-mssql-servers-pt-ii - https://news.sophos.com/en-us/2024/08/07/sophos-mdr-hunt-tracks-mimic-ransomware-campaign-against-organizations-in-india/ - https://research.nccgroup.com/2018/03/10/apt15-is-alive-and-strong-an-analysis-of-royalcli-and-royaldns/ author: Omar Khaled (@beacon_exe), MahirAli Khan (in/mahiralikhan), Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) date: 2024-08-20 tags: - attack.execution - attack.exfiltration - attack.t1048 logsource: category: process_creation product: windows detection: selection_img: - Image|endswith: \bcp.exe - OriginalFileName: BCP.exe selection_cli: CommandLine|contains: - ' out ' - ' queryout ' condition: all of selection_* falsepositives: - Legitimate data export operations. level: medium
Sigma rule: Detects the addition of office test registry that allows a user to specify an arbitrary DLL that will be executed every. Logsource: windows / registry_event. Rule: title: Office Application Startup - Office Test id: 3d27f6dd-1c74-4687-b4fa-ca849d128d1c status: test description: Detects the addition of office test registry that allows a user to specify an arbitrary DLL that will be executed every time an Office application is started references: - https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/unit42-technical-walkthrough-office-test-persistence-method-used-in-recent-sofacy-attacks/ author: omkar72 date: 2020-10-25 modified: 2023-11-08 tags: - attack.persistence - attack.t1137.002 logsource: category: registry_event product: windows detection: selection: TargetObject|contains: \Software\Microsoft\Office test\Special\Perf condition: selection falsepositives: - Unlikely level: medium
Sigma rule: Detects command line parameter very often used with coin miners. Logsource: linux / auditd. Rule: title: Possible Coin Miner CPU Priority Param id: 071d5e5a-9cef-47ec-bc4e-a42e34d8d0ed status: test description: Detects command line parameter very often used with coin miners references: - https://xmrig.com/docs/miner/command-line-options author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems) date: 2021-10-09 modified: 2022-12-25 tags: - attack.privilege-escalation - attack.t1068 logsource: product: linux service: auditd detection: cmd1: a1|startswith: --cpu-priority cmd2: a2|startswith: --cpu-priority cmd3: a3|startswith: --cpu-priority cmd4: a4|startswith: --cpu-priority cmd5: a5|startswith: --cpu-priority cmd6: a6|startswith: --cpu-priority cmd7: a7|startswith: --cpu-priority condition: 1 of cmd* falsepositives: - Other tools that use a --cpu-priority flag level: critical