alirezaaminzadeh/cybersec-retrieval-benchmark huggingface dataset:
Sigma rule: Detects the usage of the "Squirrel.exe" to download arbitrary files. This binary is part of multiple Electron based soft. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: Arbitrary File Download Via Squirrel.EXE id: 1e75c1cc-c5d4-42aa-ac3d-91b0b68b3b4c related: - id: 45239e6a-b035-4aaf-b339-8ad379fcb67e type: similar - id: fa4b21c9-0057-4493-b289-2556416ae4d7 type: obsolete status: test description: 'Detects the usage of the "Squirrel.exe" to download arbitrary files. This binary is part of multiple Electron based software installations (Slack, Teams, Discord, etc.) ' references: - https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/OtherMSBinaries/Squirrel/ - http://www.hexacorn.com/blog/2019/03/30/sqirrel-packages-manager-as-a-lolbin-a-k-a-many-electron-apps-are-lolbins-by-default/ - http://www.hexacorn.com/blog/2018/08/16/squirrel-as-a-lolbin/ author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems), Karneades / Markus Neis, Jonhnathan Ribeiro, oscd.community date: 2022-06-09 modified: 2023-11-09 tags: - attack.execution - attack.stealth - attack.t1218 logsource: category: process_creation product: windows detection: selection_img: Image|endswith: - \squirrel.exe - \update.exe selection_download_cli: CommandLine|contains: - ' --download ' - ' --update ' - ' --updateRollback=' selection_download_http_keyword: CommandLine|contains: http condition: all of selection_* falsepositives: - Expected FP with some Electron based applications such as (1Clipboard, Beaker Browser, Caret, Discord, GitHub Desktop, etc.) level: medium
Sigma rule: Detects cmstp loading "dll" or "ocx" files from suspicious locations. Logsource: windows / image_load. Rule: title: DLL Loaded From Suspicious Location Via Cmspt.EXE id: 75e508f7-932d-4ebc-af77-269237a84ce1 status: test description: Detects cmstp loading "dll" or "ocx" files from suspicious locations references: - https://github.com/vadim-hunter/Detection-Ideas-Rules/blob/02bcbfc2bfb8b4da601bb30de0344ae453aa1afe/TTPs/Defense%20Evasion/T1218%20-%20Signed%20Binary%20Proxy%20Execution/T1218.003%20-%20CMSTP/Procedures.yaml author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) date: 2022-08-30 modified: 2023-02-17 tags: - attack.stealth - attack.t1218.003 logsource: category: image_load product: windows detection: selection: Image|endswith: \cmstp.exe ImageLoaded|contains: - \PerfLogs\ - \ProgramData\ - \Users\ - \Windows\Temp\ - C:\Temp\ ImageLoaded|endswith: - .dll - .ocx condition: selection falsepositives: - Unikely level: high
Sigma rule: Detects svchost hosting RDP termsvcs communicating with the loopback address and on TCP port 3389. Logsource: windows / network_connection. Rule: title: RDP Over Reverse SSH Tunnel id: 5f699bc5-5446-4a4a-a0b7-5ef2885a3eb4 status: test description: Detects svchost hosting RDP termsvcs communicating with the loopback address and on TCP port 3389 references: - https://twitter.com/cyb3rops/status/1096842275437625346 author: Samir Bousseaden date: 2019-02-16 modified: 2024-03-12 tags: - attack.command-and-control - attack.t1572 - attack.lateral-movement - attack.t1021.001 - car.2013-07-002 logsource: category: network_connection product: windows detection: selection_img: Image|endswith: \svchost.exe Initiated: 'true' SourcePort: 3389 selection_destination: DestinationIp|cidr: - 127.0.0.0/8 - ::1/128 condition: all of selection_* falsepositives: - Unknown level: high
Sigma rule: Detects suspicious powershell command line parameters used in Empire. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: HackTool - Empire PowerShell Launch Parameters id: 79f4ede3-402e-41c8-bc3e-ebbf5f162581 status: test description: Detects suspicious powershell command line parameters used in Empire references: - https://github.com/EmpireProject/Empire/blob/c2ba61ca8d2031dad0cfc1d5770ba723e8b710db/lib/common/helpers.py#L165 - https://github.com/EmpireProject/Empire/blob/e37fb2eef8ff8f5a0a689f1589f424906fe13055/lib/modules/powershell/persistence/powerbreach/deaduser.py#L191 - https://github.com/EmpireProject/Empire/blob/e37fb2eef8ff8f5a0a689f1589f424906fe13055/lib/modules/powershell/persistence/powerbreach/resolver.py#L178 - https://github.com/EmpireProject/Empire/blob/e37fb2eef8ff8f5a0a689f1589f424906fe13055/data/module_source/privesc/Invoke-EventVwrBypass.ps1#L64 author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems) date: 2019-04-20 modified: 2023-02-21 tags: - attack.execution - attack.t1059.001 logsource: category: process_creation product: windows detection: selection: CommandLine|contains: - ' -NoP -sta -NonI -W Hidden -Enc ' - ' -noP -sta -w 1 -enc ' - ' -NoP -NonI -W Hidden -enc ' - ' -noP -sta -w 1 -enc' - ' -enc SQB' - ' -nop -exec bypass -EncodedCommand ' condition: selection falsepositives: - Other tools that incidentally use the same command line parameters level: high
Sigma rule: Alert on when legacy authentication has been used on an account. Logsource: azure / signinlogs. Rule: title: Use of Legacy Authentication Protocols id: 60f6535a-760f-42a9-be3f-c9a0a025906e status: test description: Alert on when legacy authentication has been used on an account references: - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-gb/entra/architecture/security-operations-privileged-accounts author: Yochana Henderson, '@Yochana-H' date: 2022-06-17 tags: - attack.privilege-escalation - attack.persistence - attack.initial-access - attack.credential-access - attack.stealth - attack.t1078.004 - attack.t1110 logsource: product: azure service: signinlogs detection: selection: ActivityDetails: Sign-ins ClientApp: - Other client - IMAP - POP3 - MAPI - SMTP - Exchange ActiveSync - Exchange Web Services Username: UPN condition: selection falsepositives: - User has been put in acception group so they can use legacy authentication level: high
Sigma rule: Detects loaded kernel modules that did not meet the WHQL signing requirements.. Logsource: windows / codeintegrity-operational. Rule: title: CodeIntegrity - Unmet WHQL Requirements For Loaded Kernel Module id: 2f8cd7a0-9d5a-4f62-9f8b-2c951aa0dd1f status: test description: Detects loaded kernel modules that did not meet the WHQL signing requirements. references: - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/application-security/application-control/windows-defender-application-control/operations/event-id-explanations - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/application-security/application-control/windows-defender-application-control/operations/event-tag-explanations - Internal Research author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) date: 2023-06-06 modified: 2023-06-14 tags: - attack.privilege-escalation logsource: product: windows service: codeintegrity-operational detection: selection: EventID: - 3082 - 3083 filter_optional_vmware: FileNameBuffer: - system32\drivers\vsock.sys - System32\drivers\vmci.sys condition: selection and not 1 of filter_optional_* falsepositives: - Unlikely level: high
Sigma rule: Detects a threat actor creating a file named `wbemcomn.dll` in the `C:\Windows\System32\wbem\` directory over the networ. Logsource: windows / image_load. Rule: title: Wmiprvse Wbemcomn DLL Hijack id: 7707a579-e0d8-4886-a853-ce47e4575aaa status: test description: Detects a threat actor creating a file named `wbemcomn.dll` in the `C:\Windows\System32\wbem\` directory over the network and loading it for a WMI DLL Hijack scenario. references: - https://threathunterplaybook.com/hunts/windows/201009-RemoteWMIWbemcomnDLLHijack/notebook.html author: Roberto Rodriguez (Cyb3rWard0g), OTR (Open Threat Research) date: 2020-10-12 modified: 2022-10-09 tags: - attack.execution - attack.t1047 - attack.lateral-movement - attack.t1021.002 logsource: product: windows category: image_load detection: selection: Image|endswith: \wmiprvse.exe ImageLoaded|endswith: \wbem\wbemcomn.dll condition: selection falsepositives: - Unknown level: high
Sigma rule: Detects outlvba (Microsoft VBA for Outlook Addin) DLL being loaded by the outlook process. Logsource: windows / image_load. Rule: title: Microsoft VBA For Outlook Addin Loaded Via Outlook id: 9a0b8719-cd3c-4f0a-90de-765a4cb3f5ed status: test description: Detects outlvba (Microsoft VBA for Outlook Addin) DLL being loaded by the outlook process references: - https://speakerdeck.com/heirhabarov/hunting-for-persistence-via-microsoft-exchange-server-or-outlook?slide=58 author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) date: 2023-02-08 modified: 2024-03-12 tags: - attack.execution - attack.t1204.002 logsource: category: image_load product: windows detection: selection: Image|endswith: \outlook.exe ImageLoaded|endswith: \outlvba.dll condition: selection falsepositives: - Legitimate macro usage. Add the appropriate filter according to your environment level: medium
Sigma rule: This rule detects execution of a PowerShell code through the sqltoolsps.exe utility, which is included in the standard s. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: SQL Client Tools PowerShell Session Detection id: a746c9b8-a2fb-4ee5-a428-92bee9e99060 status: test description: 'This rule detects execution of a PowerShell code through the sqltoolsps.exe utility, which is included in the standard set of utilities supplied with the Microsoft SQL Server Management studio. Script blocks are not logged in this case, so this utility helps to bypass protection mechanisms based on the analysis of these logs. ' references: - https://github.com/LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS/blob/8283d8d91552213ded165fd36deb6cb9534cb443/yml/OtherMSBinaries/Sqltoolsps.yml - https://twitter.com/pabraeken/status/993298228840992768 author: Agro (@agro_sev) oscd.communitly date: 2020-10-13 modified: 2022-02-25 tags: - attack.execution - attack.stealth - attack.t1059.001 - attack.t1127 logsource: category: process_creation product: windows detection: selection: - Image|endswith: \sqltoolsps.exe - ParentImage|endswith: \sqltoolsps.exe - OriginalFileName: \sqltoolsps.exe filter: ParentImage|endswith: \smss.exe condition: selection and not filter falsepositives: - Direct PS command execution through SQLToolsPS.exe is uncommon, childprocess sqltoolsps.exe spawned by smss.exe is a legitimate action. level: medium
Sigma rule: Detects an executable initiating a network connection to "ngrok" domains. Attackers were seen using this "ngrok" in orde. Logsource: windows / network_connection. Rule: title: Process Initiated Network Connection To Ngrok Domain id: 18249279-932f-45e2-b37a-8925f2597670 related: - id: 1d08ac94-400d-4469-a82f-daee9a908849 type: similar status: test description: 'Detects an executable initiating a network connection to "ngrok" domains. Attackers were seen using this "ngrok" in order to store their second stage payloads and malware. While communication with such domains can be legitimate, often times is a sign of either data exfiltration by malicious actors or additional download. ' references: - https://ngrok.com/ - https://ngrok.com/blog-post/new-ngrok-domains - https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/cca0c1182ac114b44dc52dd2058fcd38611c20bb6b5ad84710681d38212f835a/ - https://www.rnbo.gov.ua/files/2023_YEAR/CYBERCENTER/november/APT29%20attacks%20Embassies%20using%20CVE-2023-38831%20-%20report%20en.pdf author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems) date: 2022-07-16 modified: 2025-07-30 tags: - attack.exfiltration - attack.command-and-control - attack.t1567 - attack.t1572 - attack.t1102 logsource: category: network_connection product: windows detection: selection: Initiated: 'true' DestinationHostname|endswith: - .ngrok-free.app - .ngrok-free.dev - .ngrok.app - .ngrok.dev - .ngrok.io condition: selection falsepositives: - Legitimate use of the ngrok service. level: high
Sigma rule: Detects usage of the windows RPC library Encrypting File System Remote Protocol (MS-EFSRPC). Variations of this RPC are. Logsource: zeek / dce_rpc. Rule: title: Potential PetitPotam Attack Via EFS RPC Calls id: 4096842a-8f9f-4d36-92b4-d0b2a62f9b2a status: test description: "Detects usage of the windows RPC library Encrypting File System Remote Protocol (MS-EFSRPC). Variations of this\ \ RPC are used within the attack refereed to as PetitPotam.\nThe usage of this RPC function should be rare if ever used\ \ at all.\nThus usage of this function is uncommon enough that any usage of this RPC function should warrant further investigation\ \ to determine if it is legitimate.\n View surrounding logs (within a few minutes before and after) from the Source IP to.\ \ Logs from from the Source IP would include dce_rpc, smb_mapping, smb_files, rdp, ntlm, kerberos, etc..'\n" references: - https://github.com/topotam/PetitPotam/blob/d83ac8f2dd34654628c17490f99106eb128e7d1e/PetitPotam/PetitPotam.cpp - https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/ADV210003 - https://vx-underground.org/archive/Symantec/windows-vista-network-attack-07-en.pdf - https://threatpost.com/microsoft-petitpotam-poc/168163/ author: '@neu5ron, @Antonlovesdnb, Mike Remen' date: 2021-08-17 modified: 2022-11-28 tags: - attack.collection - attack.credential-access - attack.t1557.001 - attack.t1187 logsource: product: zeek service: dce_rpc detection: selection: operation|startswith: efs condition: selection falsepositives: - Uncommon but legitimate windows administrator or software tasks that make use of the Encrypting File System RPC Calls. Verify if this is common activity (see description). level: medium
Sigma rule: Detects all variations of obfuscated powershell IEX invocation code generated by Invoke-Obfuscation framework from the c. Logsource: windows / system. Rule: title: Invoke-Obfuscation Obfuscated IEX Invocation - System id: 51aa9387-1c53-4153-91cc-d73c59ae1ca9 status: test description: Detects all variations of obfuscated powershell IEX invocation code generated by Invoke-Obfuscation framework from the code block linked in the references references: - https://github.com/danielbohannon/Invoke-Obfuscation/blob/f20e7f843edd0a3a7716736e9eddfa423395dd26/Out-ObfuscatedStringCommand.ps1#L873-L888 author: Daniel Bohannon (@Mandiant/@FireEye), oscd.community date: 2019-11-08 modified: 2022-11-27 tags: - attack.stealth - attack.t1027 logsource: product: windows service: system detection: selection_eid: EventID: 7045 selection_imagepath: - ImagePath|re: \$PSHome\[\s*\d{1,3}\s*\]\s*\+\s*\$PSHome\[ - ImagePath|re: \$ShellId\[\s*\d{1,3}\s*\]\s*\+\s*\$ShellId\[ - ImagePath|re: \$env:Public\[\s*\d{1,3}\s*\]\s*\+\s*\$env:Public\[ - ImagePath|re: \$env:ComSpec\[(\s*\d{1,3}\s*,){2} - ImagePath|re: \\*mdr\*\W\s*\)\.Name - ImagePath|re: \$VerbosePreference\.ToString\( - ImagePath|re: \String\]\s*\$VerbosePreference condition: all of selection_* falsepositives: - Unknown level: high
Sigma rule: Sysmon registry detection of a local hidden user account.. Logsource: windows / registry_event. Rule: title: Creation of a Local Hidden User Account by Registry id: 460479f3-80b7-42da-9c43-2cc1d54dbccd status: test description: Sysmon registry detection of a local hidden user account. references: - https://twitter.com/SBousseaden/status/1387530414185664538 author: Christian Burkard (Nextron Systems) date: 2021-05-03 modified: 2025-10-31 tags: - attack.persistence - attack.t1136.001 logsource: product: windows category: registry_event detection: selection: TargetObject|contains: \SAM\SAM\Domains\Account\Users\Names\ TargetObject|endswith: $\(Default) Image|endswith: \lsass.exe condition: selection falsepositives: - Unknown level: high regression_tests_path: regression_data/rules/windows/registry/registry_event/registry_event_add_local_hidden_user/info.yml simulation: - type: atomic-red-team name: Create Hidden User in Registry technique: T1564.002 atomic_guid: 173126b7-afe4-45eb-8680-fa9f6400431c
Sigma rule: Detects a suspicious local successful logon event where the Logon Package is Kerberos, the remote address is set to loca. Logsource: windows / security. Rule: title: Potential Privilege Escalation via Local Kerberos Relay over LDAP id: 749c9f5e-b353-4b90-a9c1-05243357ca4b status: test description: 'Detects a suspicious local successful logon event where the Logon Package is Kerberos, the remote address is set to localhost, and the target user SID is the built-in local Administrator account. This may indicate an attempt to leverage a Kerberos relay attack variant that can be used to elevate privilege locally from a domain joined limited user to local System privileges. ' references: - https://twitter.com/sbousseaden/status/1518976397364056071?s=12&t=qKO5eKHvWhAP19a50FTZ7g - https://github.com/elastic/detection-rules/blob/5fe7833312031a4787e07893e27e4ea7a7665745/rules/_deprecated/privilege_escalation_krbrelayup_suspicious_logon.toml#L38 author: Elastic, @SBousseaden date: 2022-04-27 modified: 2024-08-13 tags: - attack.privilege-escalation - attack.credential-access - attack.t1548 logsource: product: windows service: security detection: selection: EventID: 4624 LogonType: 3 AuthenticationPackageName: Kerberos IpAddress: 127.0.0.1 TargetUserSid|startswith: S-1-5-21- TargetUserSid|endswith: '-500' filter_main_ip_null: IpPort: '0' condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_* falsepositives: - Unknown level: high
Sigma rule: Detects suspicious and uncommon child processes of WmiPrvSE. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: Suspicious WmiPrvSE Child Process id: 8a582fe2-0882-4b89-a82a-da6b2dc32937 related: - id: 692f0bec-83ba-4d04-af7e-e884a96059b6 type: similar - id: d21374ff-f574-44a7-9998-4a8c8bf33d7d type: similar - id: 18cf6cf0-39b0-4c22-9593-e244bdc9a2d4 type: obsolete status: test description: Detects suspicious and uncommon child processes of WmiPrvSE references: - https://thedfirreport.com/2021/03/29/sodinokibi-aka-revil-ransomware/ - https://github.com/vadim-hunter/Detection-Ideas-Rules/blob/02bcbfc2bfb8b4da601bb30de0344ae453aa1afe/Threat%20Intelligence/The%20DFIR%20Report/20210329_Sodinokibi_(aka_REvil)_Ransomware.yaml - https://blog.osarmor.com/319/onenote-attachment-delivers-asyncrat-malware/ - https://twitter.com/ForensicITGuy/status/1334734244120309760 author: Vadim Khrykov (ThreatIntel), Cyb3rEng, Florian Roth (Nextron Systems) date: 2021-08-23 modified: 2023-11-10 tags: - attack.execution - attack.stealth - attack.t1047 - attack.t1204.002 - attack.t1218.010 logsource: product: windows category: process_creation detection: selection_parent: ParentImage|endswith: \wbem\WmiPrvSE.exe selection_children_1: Image|endswith: - \certutil.exe - \cscript.exe - \mshta.exe - \msiexec.exe - \regsvr32.exe - \rundll32.exe - \verclsid.exe - \wscript.exe selection_children_2: Image|endswith: \cmd.exe CommandLine|contains: - cscript - mshta - powershell - pwsh - regsvr32 - rundll32 - wscript filter_main_werfault: Image|endswith: \WerFault.exe filter_main_wmiprvse: Image|endswith: \WmiPrvSE.exe filter_main_msiexec: Image|endswith: \msiexec.exe CommandLine|contains: '/i ' condition: selection_parent and 1 of selection_children_* and not 1 of filter_main_* falsepositives: - Unknown level: high
Sigma rule: Detects the use of Ditsnap tool, an inspection tool for Active Directory database, ntds.dit.. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: PUA - DIT Snapshot Viewer id: d3b70aad-097e-409c-9df2-450f80dc476b status: test description: Detects the use of Ditsnap tool, an inspection tool for Active Directory database, ntds.dit. references: - https://thedfirreport.com/2020/06/21/snatch-ransomware/ - https://web.archive.org/web/20201124182207/https://github.com/yosqueoy/ditsnap author: Furkan Caliskan (@caliskanfurkan_) date: 2020-07-04 modified: 2023-02-21 tags: - attack.credential-access - attack.t1003.003 logsource: category: process_creation product: windows detection: selection: - Image|endswith: \ditsnap.exe - CommandLine|contains: ditsnap.exe condition: selection falsepositives: - Legitimate admin usage level: high
Sigma rule: Detects failed logon attempts from clients to MSSQL server.. Logsource: windows / application. Rule: title: MSSQL Server Failed Logon id: 218d2855-2bba-4f61-9c85-81d0ea63ac71 related: - id: ebfe73c2-5bc9-4ed9-aaa8-8b54b2b4777d type: similar status: test description: Detects failed logon attempts from clients to MSSQL server. references: - https://cybersecthreat.com/2020/07/08/enable-mssql-authentication-log-to-eventlog/ - https://www.experts-exchange.com/questions/27800944/EventID-18456-Failed-to-open-the-explicitly-specified-database.html author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems), j4son date: 2023-10-11 modified: 2024-06-26 tags: - attack.credential-access - attack.t1110 logsource: product: windows service: application definition: 'Requirements: Must enable MSSQL authentication.' detection: selection: Provider_Name|contains: MSSQL EventID: 18456 condition: selection falsepositives: - This event could stem from users changing an account's password that's used to authenticate via a job or an automated process. Investigate the source of such events and mitigate them level: low
Sigma rule: Detects successful AWS console logins that were performed without Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA). This alert can be u. Logsource: aws / cloudtrail. Rule: title: AWS Successful Console Login Without MFA id: 77caf516-34e5-4df9-b4db-20744fea0a60 status: experimental description: 'Detects successful AWS console logins that were performed without Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA). This alert can be used to identify potential unauthorized access attempts, as logging in without MFA can indicate compromised credentials or misconfigured security settings. ' references: - https://securitylabs.datadoghq.com/cloud-security-atlas/vulnerabilities/iam-user-without-mfa/ - https://docs.aws.amazon.com/awscloudtrail/latest/userguide/cloudtrail-event-reference-aws-console-sign-in-events.html author: Thuya@Hacktilizer, Ivan Saakov date: 2025-10-18 modified: 2025-10-21 tags: - attack.initial-access - attack.persistence - attack.privilege-escalation - attack.stealth - attack.t1078.004 logsource: product: aws service: cloudtrail detection: selection: eventName: ConsoleLogin additionalEventData.MFAUsed: 'NO' responseElements.ConsoleLogin: Success condition: selection falsepositives: - Unlikely level: medium
Sigma rule: Detects unknown program using commandline flags usually used by tools such as PsExec and PAExec to start programs with S. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: Potential Privilege Escalation To LOCAL SYSTEM id: 207b0396-3689-42d9-8399-4222658efc99 related: - id: 8834e2f7-6b4b-4f09-8906-d2276470ee23 type: similar status: test description: Detects unknown program using commandline flags usually used by tools such as PsExec and PAExec to start programs with SYSTEM Privileges references: - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/downloads/psexec - https://www.poweradmin.com/paexec/ - https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2020/10/kegtap-and-singlemalt-with-a-ransomware-chaser.html author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) date: 2021-05-22 modified: 2024-03-05 tags: - attack.resource-development - attack.t1587.001 logsource: category: process_creation product: windows detection: selection: CommandLine|contains|windash: - ' -s cmd' - ' -s -i cmd' - ' -i -s cmd' - ' -s pwsh' - ' -s -i pwsh' - ' -i -s pwsh' - ' -s powershell' - ' -s -i powershell' - ' -i -s powershell' filter_main_exclude_coverage: CommandLine|contains: - paexec - PsExec - accepteula condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_* falsepositives: - Weird admins that rename their tools - Software companies that bundle PsExec/PAExec with their software and rename it, so that it is less embarrassing level: high