alirezaaminzadeh/cybersec-retrieval-benchmark huggingface dataset:
Sigma rule: Detects default RemCom pipe creation. Logsource: windows / pipe_created. Rule: title: PUA - RemCom Default Named Pipe id: d36f87ea-c403-44d2-aa79-1a0ac7c24456 related: - id: 9e77ed63-2ecf-4c7b-b09d-640834882028 type: obsolete status: test description: Detects default RemCom pipe creation references: - https://drive.google.com/file/d/1lKya3_mLnR3UQuCoiYruO3qgu052_iS_/view - https://github.com/kavika13/RemCom author: Nikita Nazarov, oscd.community, Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) date: 2023-08-07 modified: 2023-11-30 tags: - attack.lateral-movement - attack.t1021.002 - attack.execution - attack.t1569.002 logsource: product: windows category: pipe_created definition: Note that you have to configure logging for Named Pipe Events in Sysmon config (Event ID 17 and Event ID 18). The basic configuration is in popular sysmon configuration (https://github.com/SwiftOnSecurity/sysmon-config), but it is worth verifying. You can also use other repo, e.g. https://github.com/Neo23x0/sysmon-config, https://github.com/olafhartong/sysmon-modular. How to test detection? You can check powershell script from this site https://svch0st.medium.com/guide-to-named-pipes-and-hunting-for-cobalt-strike-pipes-dc46b2c5f575 detection: selection: PipeName|contains: \RemCom condition: selection falsepositives: - Legitimate Administrator activity level: medium
Sigma rule: Detects the execution of programs as Launch Agents or Launch Daemons using launchctl on macOS.. Logsource: macos / process_creation. Rule: title: Launch Agent/Daemon Execution Via Launchctl id: ae9d710f-dcd1-4f75-a0a5-93a73b5dda0e status: test description: Detects the execution of programs as Launch Agents or Launch Daemons using launchctl on macOS. references: - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1569.001/T1569.001.md - https://www.sentinelone.com/labs/20-common-tools-techniques-used-by-macos-threat-actors-malware/ - https://www.welivesecurity.com/2020/07/16/mac-cryptocurrency-trading-application-rebranded-bundled-malware/ - https://www.trendmicro.com/en_us/research/18/d/new-macos-backdoor-linked-to-oceanlotus-found.html - https://www.loobins.io/binaries/launchctl/ author: Pratinav Chandra date: 2024-05-13 tags: - attack.privilege-escalation - attack.execution - attack.persistence - attack.t1569.001 - attack.t1543.001 - attack.t1543.004 logsource: category: process_creation product: macos detection: selection: Image|endswith: /launchctl CommandLine|contains: - submit - load - start condition: selection falsepositives: - Legitimate administration activities is expected to trigger false positives. Investigate the command line being passed to determine if the service or launch agent are suspicious. level: medium
Sigma rule: Detects a network connection initiated by a binary to "api.mega.co.nz". Attackers were seen abusing file sharing website. Logsource: windows / network_connection. Rule: title: Network Connection Initiated To Mega.nz id: fdeebdf0-9f3f-4d08-84a6-4c4d13e39fe4 status: test description: 'Detects a network connection initiated by a binary to "api.mega.co.nz". Attackers were seen abusing file sharing websites similar to "mega.nz" in order to upload/download additional payloads. ' references: - https://megatools.megous.com/ - https://www.mandiant.com/resources/russian-targeting-gov-business author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems) date: 2021-12-06 modified: 2024-05-31 tags: - attack.exfiltration - attack.t1567.002 logsource: category: network_connection product: windows detection: selection: Initiated: 'true' DestinationHostname|endswith: - mega.co.nz - mega.nz condition: selection falsepositives: - Legitimate MEGA installers and utilities are expected to communicate with this domain. Exclude hosts that are known to be allowed to use this tool. level: low
Sigma rule: Detects attempts to enumerate file shares, printer shares and sessions using "net.exe" with the "view" flag.. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: Share And Session Enumeration Using Net.EXE id: 62510e69-616b-4078-b371-847da438cc03 status: stable description: Detects attempts to enumerate file shares, printer shares and sessions using "net.exe" with the "view" flag. references: - https://eqllib.readthedocs.io/en/latest/analytics/b8a94d2f-dc75-4630-9d73-1edc6bd26fff.html - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1018/T1018.md author: Endgame, JHasenbusch (ported for oscd.community) date: 2018-10-30 modified: 2023-02-21 tags: - attack.discovery - attack.t1018 logsource: category: process_creation product: windows detection: selection_img: - Image|endswith: - \net.exe - \net1.exe - OriginalFileName: - net.exe - net1.exe selection_cli: CommandLine|contains: view filter: CommandLine|contains: \\\\ condition: all of selection_* and not filter falsepositives: - Legitimate use of net.exe utility by legitimate user level: low
Sigma rule: Detects the use of grep to discover specific files created by the GobRAT malware. Logsource: linux / process_creation. Rule: title: Potential GobRAT File Discovery Via Grep id: e34cfa0c-0a50-4210-9cb3-5632d08eb041 status: test description: Detects the use of grep to discover specific files created by the GobRAT malware references: - https://blogs.jpcert.or.jp/en/2023/05/gobrat.html - https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/60bcd645450e4c846238cf0e7226dc40c84c96eba99f6b2cffcd0ab4a391c8b3/detection - https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/3e44c807a25a56f4068b5b8186eee5002eed6f26d665a8b791c472ad154585d1/detection author: Joseliyo Sanchez, @Joseliyo_Jstnk date: 2023-06-02 tags: - attack.discovery - attack.t1082 logsource: category: process_creation product: linux detection: selection: Image|endswith: /grep CommandLine|contains: - apached - frpc - sshd.sh - zone.arm condition: selection falsepositives: - Unknown level: high
Sigma rule: Detects MMC20.Application Lateral Movement; specifically looks for the spawning of the parent MMC.exe with a command lin. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: MMC20 Lateral Movement id: f1f3bf22-deb2-418d-8cce-e1a45e46a5bd status: test description: Detects MMC20.Application Lateral Movement; specifically looks for the spawning of the parent MMC.exe with a command line of "-Embedding" as a child of svchost.exe references: - https://enigma0x3.net/2017/01/05/lateral-movement-using-the-mmc20-application-com-object/ - https://drive.google.com/file/d/1lKya3_mLnR3UQuCoiYruO3qgu052_iS_/view?usp=sharing author: '@2xxeformyshirt (Security Risk Advisors) - rule; Teymur Kheirkhabarov (idea)' date: 2020-03-04 modified: 2021-11-27 tags: - attack.execution - attack.lateral-movement - attack.t1021.003 logsource: category: process_creation product: windows detection: selection: ParentImage|endswith: \svchost.exe Image|endswith: \mmc.exe CommandLine|contains: -Embedding condition: selection falsepositives: - Unlikely level: high
Sigma rule: Detects suspicious addition to BitLocker related registry keys via the reg.exe utility. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: Suspicious Reg Add BitLocker id: 0e0255bf-2548-47b8-9582-c0955c9283f5 status: test description: Detects suspicious addition to BitLocker related registry keys via the reg.exe utility references: - https://thedfirreport.com/2021/11/15/exchange-exploit-leads-to-domain-wide-ransomware/ author: frack113 date: 2021-11-15 modified: 2022-09-09 tags: - attack.impact - attack.t1486 logsource: category: process_creation product: windows detection: selection: CommandLine|contains|all: - REG - ADD - \SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\FVE - /v - /f CommandLine|contains: - EnableBDEWithNoTPM - UseAdvancedStartup - UseTPM - UseTPMKey - UseTPMKeyPIN - RecoveryKeyMessageSource - UseTPMPIN - RecoveryKeyMessage condition: selection falsepositives: - Unlikely level: high
Sigma rule: Detects when a user enable developer features such as "Developer Mode" or "Application Sideloading". Which allows the us. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: Potential Signing Bypass Via Windows Developer Features id: a383dec4-deec-4e6e-913b-ed9249670848 related: - id: b110ebaf-697f-4da1-afd5-b536fa27a2c1 type: similar status: test description: Detects when a user enable developer features such as "Developer Mode" or "Application Sideloading". Which allows the user to install untrusted packages. references: - Internal Research - https://www.sentinelone.com/labs/inside-malicious-windows-apps-for-malware-deployment/ author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) date: 2023-01-11 tags: - attack.stealth logsource: category: process_creation product: windows detection: selection_img: - Image|endswith: \SystemSettingsAdminFlows.exe - OriginalFileName: SystemSettingsAdminFlows.EXE selection_flag: CommandLine|contains: TurnOnDeveloperFeatures selection_options: CommandLine|contains: - DeveloperUnlock - EnableSideloading condition: all of selection_* falsepositives: - Unknown level: high
Sigma rule: An adversary may compress or encrypt data that is collected prior to exfiltration using 3rd party utilities. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: Compress Data and Lock With Password for Exfiltration With 7-ZIP id: 9fbf5927-5261-4284-a71d-f681029ea574 status: test description: An adversary may compress or encrypt data that is collected prior to exfiltration using 3rd party utilities references: - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1560.001/T1560.001.md author: frack113 date: 2021-07-27 modified: 2026-06-05 tags: - attack.collection - attack.t1560.001 logsource: category: process_creation product: windows detection: selection_img: - Description|contains: 7-Zip - Image|endswith: - \7z.exe - \7zr.exe - \7za.exe - OriginalFileName: - 7z.exe - 7za.exe - 7zr.exe selection_password: CommandLine|contains: ' -p' selection_action: CommandLine|contains: - ' a ' - ' u ' condition: all of selection_* falsepositives: - Legitimate activity is expected since compressing files with a password is common. level: medium
Sigma rule: Detects execution of the Kaspersky init.d stop script on Linux systems either directly or via systemctl. This activity m. Logsource: linux / process_creation. Rule: title: Kaspersky Endpoint Security Stopped Via CommandLine - Linux id: 36388120-b3f1-4ce9-b50b-280d9a7f4c04 status: experimental description: 'Detects execution of the Kaspersky init.d stop script on Linux systems either directly or via systemctl. This activity may indicate a manual interruption of the antivirus service by an administrator, or it could be a sign of potential tampering or evasion attempts by malicious actors. ' references: - https://support.kaspersky.com/KES4Linux/12.0.0/en-US/197929.htm author: Milad Cheraghi date: 2025-10-18 tags: - attack.execution - attack.defense-impairment - attack.t1685 logsource: product: linux category: process_creation detection: selection: Image|endswith: - /systemctl - /bash - /sh CommandLine|contains|all: - stop - kesl condition: selection falsepositives: - System administrator manually stopping Kaspersky services level: high
Sigma rule: Detects the start, reload or restart of a service.. Logsource: linux / auditd. Rule: title: Service Reload or Start - Linux id: 2625cc59-0634-40d0-821e-cb67382a3dd7 status: test description: Detects the start, reload or restart of a service. references: - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1543.002/T1543.002.md author: Jakob Weinzettl, oscd.community, CheraghiMilad date: 2019-09-23 modified: 2025-03-03 tags: - attack.privilege-escalation - attack.persistence - attack.t1543.002 logsource: product: linux service: auditd detection: selection: type: EXECVE a0|contains: - systemctl - service a1|contains: - reload - start condition: selection falsepositives: - Installation of legitimate service. - Legitimate reconfiguration of service. - Command line contains daemon-reload. level: low
Sigma rule: Detects a suspicious call to Invoke-WebRequest cmdlet where the and output is located in a suspicious location. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: Suspicious Invoke-WebRequest Execution id: 5e3cc4d8-3e68-43db-8656-eaaeefdec9cc related: - id: e218595b-bbe7-4ee5-8a96-f32a24ad3468 type: derived status: test description: Detects a suspicious call to Invoke-WebRequest cmdlet where the and output is located in a suspicious location references: - https://www.sentinelone.com/blog/living-off-windows-defender-lockbit-ransomware-sideloads-cobalt-strike-through-microsoft-security-tool/ author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) date: 2022-08-02 modified: 2025-07-18 tags: - attack.command-and-control - attack.t1105 logsource: category: process_creation product: windows detection: selection_img: - Image|endswith: - \powershell_ise.exe - \powershell.exe - \pwsh.exe - OriginalFileName: - powershell_ise.EXE - PowerShell.EXE - pwsh.dll selection_commands: CommandLine|contains: - 'curl ' - Invoke-WebRequest - 'iwr ' - 'wget ' selection_flags: CommandLine|contains: - ' -ur' - ' -o' selection_susp_locations: CommandLine|contains: - \AppData\ - \Desktop\ - \Temp\ - \Users\Public\ - '%AppData%' - '%Public%' - '%Temp%' - '%tmp%' - :\Windows\ condition: all of selection_* falsepositives: - Unknown level: high
Sigma rule: Detects the pattern of UAC Bypass using ICMLuaUtil Elevated COM interface. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: UAC Bypass via ICMLuaUtil id: 49f2f17b-b4c8-4172-a68b-d5bf95d05130 status: test description: Detects the pattern of UAC Bypass using ICMLuaUtil Elevated COM interface references: - https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/uac-bypass-via-icmluautil-elevated-com-interface.html author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Elastic (idea) date: 2022-09-13 modified: 2022-09-27 tags: - attack.privilege-escalation - attack.t1548.002 logsource: category: process_creation product: windows detection: selection: ParentImage|endswith: \dllhost.exe ParentCommandLine|contains: - /Processid:{3E5FC7F9-9A51-4367-9063-A120244FBEC7} - /Processid:{D2E7041B-2927-42FB-8E9F-7CE93B6DC937} filter: - Image|endswith: \WerFault.exe - OriginalFileName: WerFault.exe condition: selection and not filter falsepositives: - Unknown level: high
Sigma rule: Detects when an Elastic Container Service (ECS) Task Definition includes a command to query the credential endpoint. Thi. Logsource: aws / cloudtrail. Rule: title: AWS ECS Task Definition That Queries The Credential Endpoint id: b94bf91e-c2bf-4047-9c43-c6810f43baad status: test description: 'Detects when an Elastic Container Service (ECS) Task Definition includes a command to query the credential endpoint. This can indicate a potential adversary adding a backdoor to establish persistence or escalate privileges. ' references: - https://github.com/RhinoSecurityLabs/pacu/blob/866376cd711666c775bbfcde0524c817f2c5b181/pacu/modules/ecs__backdoor_task_def/main.py - https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AmazonECS/latest/APIReference/API_RegisterTaskDefinition.html - https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AmazonECS/latest/developerguide/task-iam-roles.html author: Darin Smith date: 2022-06-07 modified: 2023-04-24 tags: - attack.persistence - attack.t1525 logsource: product: aws service: cloudtrail detection: selection: eventSource: ecs.amazonaws.com eventName: - DescribeTaskDefinition - RegisterTaskDefinition - RunTask requestParameters.containerDefinitions.command|contains: $AWS_CONTAINER_CREDENTIALS_RELATIVE_URI condition: selection falsepositives: - Task Definition being modified to request credentials from the Task Metadata Service for valid reasons level: medium
Sigma rule: Detects the execution of "DXCap.EXE" with the "-c" flag, which allows a user to launch any arbitrary binary or windows p. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: New Capture Session Launched Via DXCap.EXE id: 60f16a96-db70-42eb-8f76-16763e333590 status: test description: 'Detects the execution of "DXCap.EXE" with the "-c" flag, which allows a user to launch any arbitrary binary or windows package through DXCap itself. This can be abused to potentially bypass application whitelisting. ' references: - https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/OtherMSBinaries/Dxcap/ - https://twitter.com/harr0ey/status/992008180904419328 author: Beyu Denis, oscd.community, Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) date: 2019-10-26 modified: 2022-06-09 tags: - attack.stealth - attack.t1218 logsource: category: process_creation product: windows detection: selection_img: - Image|endswith: \DXCap.exe - OriginalFileName: DXCap.exe selection_cli: CommandLine|contains: ' -c ' condition: all of selection* falsepositives: - Legitimate execution of dxcap.exe by legitimate user level: medium
Sigma rule: Detects a network connection initiated by IMEWDBLD.EXE. This might indicate potential abuse of the utility as a LOLBIN i. Logsource: windows / network_connection. Rule: title: Network Connection Initiated By IMEWDBLD.EXE id: 8d7e392e-9b28-49e1-831d-5949c6281228 related: - id: 863218bd-c7d0-4c52-80cd-0a96c09f54af type: derived status: test description: 'Detects a network connection initiated by IMEWDBLD.EXE. This might indicate potential abuse of the utility as a LOLBIN in order to download arbitrary files or additional payloads. ' references: - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1105/T1105.md#atomic-test-10---windows---powershell-download - https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/IMEWDBLD/ author: frack113 date: 2022-01-22 modified: 2023-11-09 tags: - attack.command-and-control - attack.t1105 logsource: category: network_connection product: windows detection: selection: Initiated: 'true' Image|endswith: \IMEWDBLD.exe condition: selection falsepositives: - Unknown level: high
Sigma rule: Detects browsers starting with the remote debugging flags. Which is a technique often used to perform browser injection. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: Browser Started with Remote Debugging id: b3d34dc5-2efd-4ae3-845f-8ec14921f449 related: - id: 3e8207c5-fcd2-4ea6-9418-15d45b4890e4 type: derived status: test description: Detects browsers starting with the remote debugging flags. Which is a technique often used to perform browser injection attacks references: - https://yoroi.company/wp-content/uploads/2022/05/EternityGroup_report_compressed.pdf - https://www.mdsec.co.uk/2022/10/analysing-lastpass-part-1/ - https://github.com/defaultnamehere/cookie_crimes/ - https://github.com/wunderwuzzi23/firefox-cookiemonster author: pH-T (Nextron Systems), Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) date: 2022-07-27 modified: 2022-12-23 tags: - attack.credential-access - attack.collection - attack.t1185 logsource: category: process_creation product: windows detection: selection_chromium_based: CommandLine|contains: ' --remote-debugging-' selection_firefox: Image|endswith: \firefox.exe CommandLine|contains: ' -start-debugger-server' condition: 1 of selection_* falsepositives: - Unknown level: medium
Sigma rule: Detects attempts to remove Windows Defender configurations using the 'MpPreference' cmdlet. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: Tamper Windows Defender Remove-MpPreference id: 07e3cb2c-0608-410d-be4b-1511cb1a0448 related: - id: ae2bdd58-0681-48ac-be7f-58ab4e593458 type: similar status: test description: Detects attempts to remove Windows Defender configurations using the 'MpPreference' cmdlet references: - https://techcommunity.microsoft.com/t5/core-infrastructure-and-security/windows-10-controlled-folder-access-event-search/ba-p/2326088 author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) date: 2022-08-05 tags: - attack.defense-impairment - attack.t1685 logsource: product: windows category: process_creation detection: selection_remove: CommandLine|contains: Remove-MpPreference selection_tamper: CommandLine|contains: - '-ControlledFolderAccessProtectedFolders ' - '-AttackSurfaceReductionRules_Ids ' - '-AttackSurfaceReductionRules_Actions ' - '-CheckForSignaturesBeforeRunningScan ' condition: all of selection_* falsepositives: - Legitimate PowerShell scripts level: high
Sigma rule: Detects potential abuse of Active Directory Replication Service (ADRS) from a non machine account to request credentials. Logsource: windows / security. Rule: title: Active Directory Replication from Non Machine Account - DcSync Indicator id: 17d619c1-e020-4347-957e-1d1207455c93 related: - id: 611eab06-a145-4dfa-a295-3ccc5c20f59a type: similar status: test description: Detects potential abuse of Active Directory Replication Service (ADRS) from a non machine account to request credentials. references: - https://threathunterplaybook.com/hunts/windows/180815-ADObjectAccessReplication/notebook.html - https://threathunterplaybook.com/library/windows/active_directory_replication.html - https://threathunterplaybook.com/hunts/windows/190101-ADModDirectoryReplication/notebook.html author: Roberto Rodriguez @Cyb3rWard0g date: 2019-07-26 modified: 2026-07-30 tags: - attack.credential-access - attack.t1003.006 logsource: product: windows service: security definition: 'Requirements: A SACL must be configured on the domain NC root object (e.g. DC=domain,DC=com) to generate Event 4662. Add via ADSI Edit: navigate to the domain NC root → Properties → Security → Advanced → Auditing → add an ACE for Everyone, Type: Success, Applies to: This object only, rights: DS-Replication-Get-Changes and DS-Replication-Get-Changes-All. The OS audit subcategory must also be enabled: auditpol /set /subcategory:"Directory Service Access" /success:enable ' detection: selection: EventID: 4662 Properties|contains: - 1131f6ad-9c07-11d1-f79f-00c04fc2dcd2 - 1131f6aa-9c07-11d1-f79f-00c04fc2dcd2 - 9923a32a-3607-11d2-b9be-0000f87a36b2 - 89e95b76-444d-4c62-991a-0facbeda640c filter_main_machine_accounts: SubjectUserName|endswith: $ filter_optional_subject_domain: SubjectDomainName: Window Manager filter_optional_subject_usersid: SubjectUserName|startswith: - NT AUT - MSOL_ condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_* and not 1 of filter_optional_* falsepositives: - Unknown level: medium
Sigma rule: Detects the initial execution of "cmd.exe" which spawns "explorer.exe" with the appropriate command line arguments for o. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: File Explorer Folder Opened Using Explorer Folder Shortcut Via Shell id: c3d76afc-93df-461e-8e67-9b2bad3f2ac4 status: test description: 'Detects the initial execution of "cmd.exe" which spawns "explorer.exe" with the appropriate command line arguments for opening the "My Computer" folder. ' author: '@Kostastsale' references: - https://ss64.com/nt/shell.html date: 2022-12-22 modified: 2024-08-23 tags: - attack.discovery - attack.t1135 logsource: product: windows category: process_creation detection: selection: ParentImage|endswith: - \cmd.exe - \powershell.exe - \pwsh.exe Image|endswith: \explorer.exe CommandLine|contains: shell:mycomputerfolder condition: selection falsepositives: - Unknown level: high regression_tests_path: regression_data/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_explorer_folder_shortcut_via_shell_binary/info.yml
Sigma rule: Detects a service installed by a client which has PID 0 or whose parent has PID 0. Logsource: windows / system. Rule: title: Service Installed By Unusual Client - System id: 71c276aa-49cd-43d2-b920-2dcd3e6962d5 related: - id: c4e92a97-a9ff-4392-9d2d-7a4c642768ca type: similar status: test description: Detects a service installed by a client which has PID 0 or whose parent has PID 0 references: - https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/windows-service-installed-via-an-unusual-client.html author: Tim Rauch (Nextron Systems), Elastic (idea) date: 2022-09-15 modified: 2023-01-04 tags: - attack.persistence - attack.privilege-escalation - attack.t1543 logsource: product: windows service: system detection: selection: Provider_Name: Service Control Manager EventID: 7045 ProcessId: 0 condition: selection falsepositives: - Unknown level: high