alirezaaminzadeh/cybersec-retrieval-benchmark huggingface dataset:
Sigma rule: Detects the modification of the registry to allow a driver or service to persist in Safe Mode.. Logsource: windows / registry_set. Rule: title: Registry Persistence via Service in Safe Mode id: 1547e27c-3974-43e2-a7d7-7f484fb928ec status: test description: Detects the modification of the registry to allow a driver or service to persist in Safe Mode. references: - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1112/T1112.md#atomic-test-33---windows-add-registry-value-to-load-service-in-safe-mode-without-network - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1112/T1112.md#atomic-test-34---windows-add-registry-value-to-load-service-in-safe-mode-with-network author: frack113 date: 2022-04-04 modified: 2025-10-22 tags: - attack.stealth - attack.t1564.001 logsource: category: registry_set product: windows detection: selection: TargetObject|contains: - \Control\SafeBoot\Minimal\ - \Control\SafeBoot\Network\ TargetObject|endswith: \(Default) Details: Service filter_optional_sophos: Image: C:\WINDOWS\system32\msiexec.exe TargetObject|endswith: - \Control\SafeBoot\Minimal\SAVService\(Default) - \Control\SafeBoot\Network\SAVService\(Default) filter_optional_mbamservice: Image|endswith: \MBAMInstallerService.exe TargetObject|endswith: \MBAMService\(Default) Details: Service filter_optional_hexnode: Image: C:\Hexnode\Hexnode Agent\Current\HexnodeAgent.exe TargetObject|endswith: - \Control\SafeBoot\Minimal\Hexnode Updater\(Default) - \Control\SafeBoot\Network\Hexnode Updater\(Default) - \Control\SafeBoot\Minimal\Hexnode Agent\(Default) - \Control\SafeBoot\Network\Hexnode Agent\(Default) Details: Service condition: selection and not 1 of filter_optional_* falsepositives: - Unknown level: high regression_tests_path: regression_data/rules/windows/registry/registry_set/registry_set_add_load_service_in_safe_mode/info.yml simulation: - type: atomic-red-team name: Windows Add Registry Value to Load Service in Safe Mode without Network technique: T1112 atomic_guid: 1dd59fb3-1cb3-4828-805d-cf80b4c3bbb5 - type: atomic-red-team name: Windows Add Registry Value to Load Service in Safe Mode with Network technique: T1112 atomic_guid: c173c948-65e5-499c-afbe-433722ed5bd4
Sigma rule: Detects usage of "xterm" as a potential reverse shell tunnel. Logsource: linux / process_creation. Rule: title: Potential Xterm Reverse Shell id: 4e25af4b-246d-44ea-8563-e42aacab006b status: test description: Detects usage of "xterm" as a potential reverse shell tunnel references: - https://pentestmonkey.net/cheat-sheet/shells/reverse-shell-cheat-sheet - https://www.revshells.com/ author: '@d4ns4n_' date: 2023-04-24 tags: - attack.execution - attack.t1059 logsource: category: process_creation product: linux detection: selection: Image|contains: xterm CommandLine|contains: -display CommandLine|endswith: :1 condition: selection falsepositives: - Unknown level: medium
Sigma rule: Detects potential RDP Session Hijacking activity on Windows systems. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: Potential RDP Session Hijacking Activity id: 224f140f-3553-4cd1-af78-13d81bf9f7cc status: test description: Detects potential RDP Session Hijacking activity on Windows systems references: - https://twitter.com/Moti_B/status/909449115477659651 author: '@juju4' date: 2022-12-27 modified: 2024-12-01 tags: - attack.execution logsource: category: process_creation product: windows detection: selection_img: - Image|endswith: \tscon.exe - OriginalFileName: tscon.exe selection_integrity: IntegrityLevel: - System - S-1-16-16384 condition: all of selection_* falsepositives: - Administrative activity level: medium
Sigma rule: Detects the execution of obfuscated PowerShell commands that attempt to install MSI packages via the Windows Installer C. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: Obfuscated PowerShell MSI Install via WindowsInstaller COM id: 7b6a7418-3afc-11f0-aff4-000d3abf478c status: experimental description: 'Detects the execution of obfuscated PowerShell commands that attempt to install MSI packages via the Windows Installer COM object (`WindowsInstaller.Installer`). The technique involves manipulating strings to hide functionality, such as constructing class names using string insertion (e.g., ''indowsInstaller.Installer''.Insert(0,''W'')) and correcting malformed URLs (e.g., converting ''htps://'' to ''https://'') at runtime. This behavior is commonly associated with malware loaders or droppers that aim to bypass static detection by hiding intent in runtime-generated strings and using legitimate tools for code execution. The use of `InstallProduct` and COM object creation, particularly combined with hidden window execution and suppressed UI, indicates an attempt to install software (likely malicious) without user interaction. ' references: - https://informationsecuritybuzz.com/the-real-danger-behind-a-simple-windows-shortcut/ - https://redcanary.com/blog/threat-intelligence/intelligence-insights-may-2025/ - https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/f9710b0ba4de5fa0e7ec27da462d4d2fc6838eba83a19f23f6617a466bbad457 author: Meroujan Antonyan (vx3r) date: 2025-05-27 tags: - attack.stealth - attack.t1027.010 - attack.t1218.007 - attack.execution - attack.t1059.001 logsource: category: process_creation product: windows detection: selection_img: - Image|endswith: - \powershell_ise.exe - \powershell.exe - \pwsh.exe - OriginalFileName: - PowerShell_ISE.EXE - PowerShell.EXE - pwsh.dll selection_cli: CommandLine|contains|all: - -ComObject - InstallProduct( - .Insert( - UILevel condition: all of selection_* falsepositives: - Unknown level: high
Sigma rule: Detects the load of RstrtMgr DLL (Restart Manager) by an uncommon process. This library has been used during ransomware. Logsource: windows / image_load. Rule: title: Load Of RstrtMgr.DLL By An Uncommon Process id: 3669afd2-9891-4534-a626-e5cf03810a61 related: - id: b48492dc-c5ef-4572-8dff-32bc241c15c8 type: derived status: test description: 'Detects the load of RstrtMgr DLL (Restart Manager) by an uncommon process. This library has been used during ransomware campaigns to kill processes that would prevent file encryption by locking them (e.g. Conti ransomware, Cactus ransomware). It has also recently been seen used by the BiBi wiper for Windows. It could also be used for anti-analysis purposes by shut downing specific processes. ' references: - https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/windows-restart-manager-part-1/ - https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/windows-restart-manager-part-2/ - https://web.archive.org/web/20231221193106/https://www.swascan.com/cactus-ransomware-malware-analysis/ - https://taiwan.postsen.com/business/88601/Hamas-hackers-use-data-destruction-software-BiBi-which-consumes-a-lot-of-processor-resources-to-wipe-Windows-computer-data--iThome.html author: Luc Génaux date: 2023-11-28 modified: 2026-07-28 tags: - attack.impact - attack.defense-impairment - attack.t1486 - attack.t1685 logsource: category: image_load product: windows detection: selection: - ImageLoaded|endswith: \RstrtMgr.dll - OriginalFileName: RstrtMgr.dll filter_main_generic: Image|startswith: - C:\$WINDOWS.~BT\ - C:\$WinREAgent\ - C:\Program Files (x86)\ - C:\Program Files\ - C:\ProgramData\ - C:\Windows\explorer.exe - C:\Windows\SoftwareDistribution\ - C:\Windows\SysNative\ - C:\Windows\System32\ - C:\Windows\SysWOW64\ - C:\Windows\WinSxS\ - C:\WUDownloadCache\ filter_main_user_software_installations: Image|startswith: C:\Users\ Image|contains|all: - \AppData\Local\Temp\is- - .tmp\ Image|endswith: .tmp filter_main_admin_software_installations: Image|startswith: C:\Windows\Temp\ filter_optional_onedrive_1: Image|startswith: C:\Users\ Image|endswith: - \AppData\Local\Microsoft\OneDrive\OneDrive.exe - \AppData\Local\Microsoft\OneDrive\OneDriveStandaloneUpdater.exe filter_optional_onedrive_2: Image|startswith: C:\Users\ Image|contains: \AppData\Local\Microsoft\OneDrive\ Image|endswith: \OneDrive.Sync.Service.exe condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_* and not 1 of filter_optional_* falsepositives: - Other legitimate Windows processes not currently listed - Processes related to software installation level: low
Sigma rule: The DNS Z flag is bit within the DNS protocol header that is, per the IETF design, meant to be used reserved (unused). A. Logsource: zeek / dns. Rule: title: Suspicious DNS Z Flag Bit Set id: ede05abc-2c9e-4624-9944-9ff17fdc0bf5 status: test description: 'The DNS Z flag is bit within the DNS protocol header that is, per the IETF design, meant to be used reserved (unused). Although recently it has been used in DNSSec, the value being set to anything other than 0 should be rare. Otherwise if it is set to non 0 and DNSSec is being used, then excluding the legitimate domains is low effort and high reward. Determine if multiple of these files were accessed in a short period of time to further enhance the possibility of seeing if this was a one off or the possibility of larger sensitive file gathering. This Sigma query is designed to accompany the Corelight Threat Hunting Guide, which can be found here: https://www3.corelight.com/corelights-introductory-guide-to-threat-hunting-with-zeek-bro-logs'' ' references: - https://twitter.com/neu5ron/status/1346245602502443009 - https://tdm.socprime.com/tdm/info/eLbyj4JjI15v#sigma - https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc2929#section-2.1 - https://www.netresec.com/?page=Blog&month=2021-01&post=Finding-Targeted-SUNBURST-Victims-with-pDNS author: '@neu5ron, SOC Prime Team, Corelight' date: 2021-05-04 modified: 2022-11-29 tags: - attack.t1095 - attack.t1571 - attack.command-and-control logsource: product: zeek service: dns detection: z_flag_unset: Z: 0 most_probable_valid_domain: query|contains: . exclude_tlds: query|endswith: - .arpa - .local - .ultradns.net - .twtrdns.net - .azuredns-prd.info - .azure-dns.com - .azuredns-ff.info - .azuredns-ff.org - .azuregov-dns.org exclude_query_types: qtype_name: - ns - mx exclude_responses: answers|endswith: \\x00 exclude_netbios: id.resp_p: - 137 - 138 - 139 condition: not z_flag_unset and most_probable_valid_domain and not (exclude_tlds or exclude_query_types or exclude_responses or exclude_netbios) falsepositives: - Internal or legitimate external domains using DNSSec. Verify if these are legitimate DNSSec domains and then exclude them. - If you work in a Public Sector then it may be good to exclude things like endswith ".edu", ".gov" and or ".mil" level: medium
Sigma rule: Detects Invoke-Mimikatz PowerShell script and alike. Mimikatz is a credential dumper capable of obtaining plaintext Wind. Logsource: windows / ps_script. Rule: title: Potential Invoke-Mimikatz PowerShell Script id: 189e3b02-82b2-4b90-9662-411eb64486d4 status: test description: Detects Invoke-Mimikatz PowerShell script and alike. Mimikatz is a credential dumper capable of obtaining plaintext Windows account logins and passwords. references: - https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/potential-invoke-mimikatz-powershell-script.html#potential-invoke-mimikatz-powershell-script author: Tim Rauch, Elastic (idea) date: 2022-09-28 tags: - attack.credential-access - attack.t1003 logsource: category: ps_script product: windows detection: selection_1: ScriptBlockText|contains|all: - DumpCreds - DumpCerts selection_2: ScriptBlockText|contains: sekurlsa::logonpasswords selection_3: ScriptBlockText|contains|all: - crypto::certificates - CERT_SYSTEM_STORE_LOCAL_MACHINE condition: 1 of selection* falsepositives: - Mimikatz can be useful for testing the security of networks level: high
Sigma rule: Detects when a API token is created. Logsource: okta / okta. Rule: title: Okta API Token Created id: 19951c21-229d-4ccb-8774-b993c3ff3c5c status: test description: Detects when a API token is created references: - https://developer.okta.com/docs/reference/api/system-log/ - https://developer.okta.com/docs/reference/api/event-types/ author: Austin Songer @austinsonger date: 2021-09-12 modified: 2026-04-27 tags: - attack.persistence logsource: product: okta service: okta detection: selection: eventType: system.api_token.create condition: selection falsepositives: - Legitimate creation of an API token by authorized users level: medium
Sigma rule: Detects the execution of certutil with either the "decode" or "decodehex" flags to decode base64 or hex encoded files. T. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: File Decoded From Base64/Hex Via Certutil.EXE id: cc9cbe82-7bc0-4ef5-bc23-bbfb83947be7 status: test description: Detects the execution of certutil with either the "decode" or "decodehex" flags to decode base64 or hex encoded files. This can be abused by attackers to decode an encoded payload before execution references: - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/certutil - https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/new-babyshark-malware-targets-u-s-national-security-think-tanks/ - https://news.sophos.com/en-us/2021/04/13/compromised-exchange-server-hosting-cryptojacker-targeting-other-exchange-servers/ - https://twitter.com/JohnLaTwC/status/835149808817991680 - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/archive/blogs/pki/basic-crl-checking-with-certutil - https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Certutil/ author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Jonhnathan Ribeiro, oscd.community date: 2023-02-15 modified: 2025-06-04 tags: - attack.stealth - attack.t1027 logsource: category: process_creation product: windows detection: selection_img: - Image|endswith: \certutil.exe - OriginalFileName: CertUtil.exe selection_cli: CommandLine|contains|windash: - '-decode ' - '-decodehex ' condition: all of selection_* falsepositives: - Unknown level: high regression_tests_path: regression_data/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_certutil_decode/info.yml
Sigma rule: Detect set DisallowRun to 1 to prevent user running specific computer program. Logsource: windows / registry_set. Rule: title: Add DisallowRun Execution to Registry id: 275641a5-a492-45e2-a817-7c81e9d9d3e9 status: test description: Detect set DisallowRun to 1 to prevent user running specific computer program references: - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/40b77d63808dd4f4eafb83949805636735a1fd15/atomics/T1112/T1112.md author: frack113 date: 2022-08-19 modified: 2023-08-17 tags: - attack.persistence - attack.defense-impairment - attack.t1112 logsource: category: registry_set product: windows detection: selection: TargetObject|endswith: Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\Explorer\DisallowRun Details: DWORD (0x00000001) condition: selection falsepositives: - Unknown level: medium
Sigma rule: Adversaries may look for details about the network configuration and settings of systems they access or through informat. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: HackTool - SharpView Execution id: b2317cfa-4a47-4ead-b3ff-297438c0bc2d related: - id: dcd74b95-3f36-4ed9-9598-0490951643aa type: similar status: test description: Adversaries may look for details about the network configuration and settings of systems they access or through information discovery of remote systems references: - https://github.com/tevora-threat/SharpView/ - https://github.com/PowerShellMafia/PowerSploit/blob/d943001a7defb5e0d1657085a77a0e78609be58f/Recon/PowerView.ps1 - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1049/T1049.md#atomic-test-4---system-discovery-using-sharpview author: frack113 date: 2021-12-10 modified: 2023-02-14 tags: - attack.discovery - attack.t1049 - attack.t1069.002 - attack.t1482 - attack.t1135 - attack.t1033 logsource: category: process_creation product: windows detection: selection: - OriginalFileName: SharpView.exe - Image|endswith: \SharpView.exe - CommandLine|contains: - Add-RemoteConnection - Convert-ADName - ConvertFrom-SID - ConvertFrom-UACValue - Convert-SidToName - Export-PowerViewCSV - Find-DomainObjectPropertyOutlier - Find-DomainProcess - Find-DomainShare - Find-DomainUserEvent - Find-DomainUserLocation - Find-ForeignGroup - Find-ForeignUser - Find-GPOComputerAdmin - Find-GPOLocation - Find-Interesting - Find-LocalAdminAccess - Find-ManagedSecurityGroups - Get-CachedRDPConnection - Get-DFSshare - Get-DomainComputer - Get-DomainController - Get-DomainDFSShare - Get-DomainDNSRecord - Get-DomainFileServer - Get-DomainForeign - Get-DomainGPO - Get-DomainGroup - Get-DomainGUIDMap - Get-DomainManagedSecurityGroup - Get-DomainObject - Get-DomainOU - Get-DomainPolicy - Get-DomainSID - Get-DomainSite - Get-DomainSPNTicket - Get-DomainSubnet - Get-DomainTrust - Get-DomainUserEvent - Get-ForestDomain - Get-ForestGlobalCatalog - Get-ForestTrust - Get-GptTmpl - Get-GroupsXML - Get-LastLoggedOn - Get-LoggedOnLocal - Get-NetComputer - Get-NetDomain - Get-NetFileServer - Get-NetForest - Get-NetGPO - Get-NetGroupMember - Get-NetLocalGroup - Get-NetLoggedon - Get-NetOU - Get-NetProcess - Get-NetRDPSession - Get-NetSession - Get-NetShare - Get-NetSite - Get-NetSubnet - Get-NetUser - Get-PathAcl - Get-PrincipalContext - Get-RegistryMountedDrive - Get-RegLoggedOn - Get-WMIRegCachedRDPConnection - Get-WMIRegLastLoggedOn - Get-WMIRegMountedDrive - Get-WMIRegProxy - Invoke-ACLScanner - Invoke-CheckLocalAdminAccess - Invoke-Kerberoast - Invoke-MapDomainTrust - Invoke
Sigma rule: Detects uncommon processes creating remote threads.. Logsource: windows / create_remote_thread. Rule: title: Remote Thread Creation By Uncommon Source Image id: 66d31e5f-52d6-40a4-9615-002d3789a119 related: - id: 02d1d718-dd13-41af-989d-ea85c7fab93f type: derived status: test description: Detects uncommon processes creating remote threads. references: - Personal research, statistical analysis - https://lolbas-project.github.io author: Perez Diego (@darkquassar), oscd.community date: 2019-10-27 modified: 2025-07-08 tags: - attack.privilege-escalation - attack.stealth - attack.t1055 logsource: product: windows category: create_remote_thread detection: selection: SourceImage|endswith: - \explorer.exe - \iexplore.exe - \msiexec.exe - \powerpnt.exe - \schtasks.exe - \winlogon.exe filter_main_winlogon_1: SourceImage: C:\Windows\System32\winlogon.exe TargetImage: - C:\Windows\System32\services.exe - C:\Windows\System32\wininit.exe - C:\Windows\System32\csrss.exe - C:\Windows\System32\LogonUI.exe - C:\Windows\System32\wlrmdr.exe - C:\Windows\System32\AtBroker.exe - C:\Windows\System32\dwm.exe - C:\Windows\System32\fontdrvhost.exe - C:\Windows\System32\userinit.exe filter_main_winlogon_2: SourceImage: C:\Windows\System32\winlogon.exe TargetParentProcessId: 4 filter_main_schtasks_conhost: SourceImage: - C:\Windows\System32\schtasks.exe - C:\Windows\SysWOW64\schtasks.exe TargetImage: C:\Windows\System32\conhost.exe filter_main_explorer: SourceImage: C:\Windows\explorer.exe TargetImage|startswith: - C:\Program Files (x86)\ - C:\Program Files\ - C:\Windows\System32\ - C:\Windows\SysWOW64\ filter_main_system: TargetImage: System filter_main_msiexec_1: SourceImage|endswith: \msiexec.exe TargetImage|contains: - \AppData\Local\ - C:\Program Files (x86)\ - C:\Program Files\ - C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework64\ filter_main_msiexec_2: SourceImage|endswith: \msiexec.exe TargetImage: - C:\Windows\System32\msiexec.exe - C:\Windows\SysWOW64\msiexec.exe filter_main_iexplore: SourceImage: C:\Program Files\Internet Explorer\iexplore.exe TargetImage: - C:\Program Files (x86)\Internet Explorer\iexplore.exe - C:\Windows\System32\rundll32.exe filter_main_powerpnt: SourceImage|endswith: \POWERPNT.EXE TargetImage|contains: - C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\ - C:\Program Files (x86)\Microsoft Office\ filter_optional_aurora_smartconsole1: SourceImage: C:\Program Files\internet explorer\iexplore.exe SourceCommandLine|contains|all: - https:// - .checkpoint.com/documents/ - SmartConsole_OLH/ - default.htm#cshid= filter_optional_aurora_smartconsole2: SourceImage: C:\Program Files\internet
Sigma rule: Detects signs of potential use of the WSMAN provider from uncommon processes locally and remote execution.. Logsource: windows / image_load. Rule: title: Suspicious WSMAN Provider Image Loads id: ad1f4bb9-8dfb-4765-adb6-2a7cfb6c0f94 status: test description: Detects signs of potential use of the WSMAN provider from uncommon processes locally and remote execution. references: - https://twitter.com/chadtilbury/status/1275851297770610688 - https://bohops.com/2020/05/12/ws-management-com-another-approach-for-winrm-lateral-movement/ - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/winrm/windows-remote-management-architecture - https://github.com/bohops/WSMan-WinRM author: Roberto Rodriguez (Cyb3rWard0g), OTR (Open Threat Research) date: 2020-06-24 modified: 2026-07-28 tags: - attack.execution - attack.t1059.001 - attack.lateral-movement - attack.t1021.003 logsource: category: image_load product: windows detection: request_client: - ImageLoaded|endswith: - \WsmSvc.dll - \WsmAuto.dll - \Microsoft.WSMan.Management.ni.dll - OriginalFileName: - WsmSvc.dll - WSMANAUTOMATION.DLL - Microsoft.WSMan.Management.dll respond_server: Image|endswith: \svchost.exe OriginalFileName: WsmWmiPl.dll filter_general: Image: - C:\Program Files (x86)\PowerShell\6\pwsh.exe - C:\Program Files (x86)\PowerShell\7\pwsh.exe - C:\Program Files\PowerShell\6\pwsh.exe - C:\Program Files\PowerShell\7\pwsh.exe - C:\Windows\System32\sdiagnhost.exe - C:\Windows\System32\services.exe - C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell_ise.exe - C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe filter_svchost: CommandLine|contains: - svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s BITS - svchost.exe -k GraphicsPerfSvcGroup -s GraphicsPerfSvc - svchost.exe -k NetworkService -p -s Wecsvc - svchost.exe -k netsvcs filter_mscorsvw: Image|startswith: - C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework64\v - C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v - C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\FrameworkArm\v - C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\FrameworkArm64\v Image|endswith: \mscorsvw.exe filter_gethelp: Image|startswith: C:\Program Files\WindowsApps\Microsoft.GetHelp_ Image|endswith: \GetHelp.exe filter_svr_2019: Image: - C:\Windows\System32\Configure-SMRemoting.exe - C:\Windows\System32\ServerManager.exe filter_nextron: Image|startswith: C:\Windows\Temp\asgard2-agent\ filter_citrix: Image|startswith: C:\Program Files\Citrix\ filter_upgrade: Image|startswith: C:\$WINDOWS.~BT\Sources\ filter_mmc: Image|endswith: \mmc.exe svchost: Image|endswith: \svchost.exe commandline_null: CommandLine: null condition: ( request_client or respond_server ) and not 1 of filter* and not ( svchost and commandline_null ) f
Sigma rule: Detects when an a role is modified or deleted in Google Workspace.. Logsource: gcp / google_workspace.admin. Rule: title: Google Workspace Role Modified or Deleted id: 6aef64e3-60c6-4782-8db3-8448759c714e status: test description: Detects when an a role is modified or deleted in Google Workspace. references: - https://cloud.google.com/logging/docs/audit/gsuite-audit-logging#3 - https://developers.google.com/admin-sdk/reports/v1/appendix/activity/admin-delegated-admin-settings author: Austin Songer date: 2021-08-24 modified: 2023-10-11 tags: - attack.impact logsource: product: gcp service: google_workspace.admin detection: selection: eventService: admin.googleapis.com eventName: - DELETE_ROLE - RENAME_ROLE - UPDATE_ROLE condition: selection falsepositives: - Unknown level: medium