alirezaaminzadeh/cybersec-retrieval-benchmark huggingface dataset:
Sigma rule: Detects command line parameters or strings often used by crypto miners. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: Potential Crypto Mining Activity id: 66c3b204-9f88-4d0a-a7f7-8a57d521ca55 status: stable description: Detects command line parameters or strings often used by crypto miners references: - https://www.poolwatch.io/coin/monero author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems) date: 2021-10-26 modified: 2023-02-13 tags: - attack.impact - attack.t1496 logsource: category: process_creation product: windows detection: selection: CommandLine|contains: - ' --cpu-priority=' - --donate-level=0 - ' -o pool.' - ' --nicehash' - ' --algo=rx/0 ' - stratum+tcp:// - stratum+udp:// - LS1kb25hdGUtbGV2ZWw9 - 0tZG9uYXRlLWxldmVsP - tLWRvbmF0ZS1sZXZlbD - c3RyYXR1bSt0Y3A6Ly - N0cmF0dW0rdGNwOi8v - zdHJhdHVtK3RjcDovL - c3RyYXR1bSt1ZHA6Ly - N0cmF0dW0rdWRwOi8v - zdHJhdHVtK3VkcDovL filter: CommandLine|contains: - ' pool.c ' - ' pool.o ' - gcc - condition: selection and not filter falsepositives: - Legitimate use of crypto miners - Some build frameworks level: high
Sigma rule: Detect indirect command execution via Program Compatibility Assistant pcwrun.exe. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: Indirect Command Execution By Program Compatibility Wizard id: b97cd4b1-30b8-4a9d-bd72-6293928d52bc status: test description: Detect indirect command execution via Program Compatibility Assistant pcwrun.exe references: - https://twitter.com/pabraeken/status/991335019833708544 - https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Pcwrun/ author: A. Sungurov , oscd.community date: 2020-10-12 modified: 2021-11-27 tags: - attack.stealth - attack.t1218 - attack.execution logsource: category: process_creation product: windows detection: selection: ParentImage|endswith: \pcwrun.exe condition: selection falsepositives: - Need to use extra processing with 'unique_count' / 'filter' to focus on outliers as opposed to commonly seen artifacts - Legit usage of scripts level: low
Sigma rule: Detects persistence registry keys for Recycle Bin. Logsource: windows / registry_event. Rule: title: Registry Persistence Mechanisms in Recycle Bin id: 277efb8f-60be-4f10-b4d3-037802f37167 status: test description: Detects persistence registry keys for Recycle Bin references: - https://github.com/vxunderground/VXUG-Papers/blob/751edb8d50f95bd7baa730adf2c6c3bb1b034276/The%20Persistence%20Series/Persistence%20via%20Recycle%20Bin/Persistence_via_Recycle_Bin.pdf - https://persistence-info.github.io/Data/recyclebin.html - https://www.hexacorn.com/blog/2018/05/28/beyond-good-ol-run-key-part-78-2/ author: frack113 date: 2021-11-18 modified: 2022-12-06 tags: - attack.privilege-escalation - attack.persistence - attack.t1547 logsource: category: registry_event product: windows detection: selection_create: EventType: RenameKey NewName|contains: \CLSID\{645FF040-5081-101B-9F08-00AA002F954E}\shell\open selection_set: EventType: SetValue TargetObject|contains: \CLSID\{645FF040-5081-101B-9F08-00AA002F954E}\shell\open\command\(Default) condition: 1 of selection_* falsepositives: - Unknown level: high
Sigma rule: Detects usage of the "touch" process in service file.. Logsource: linux / process_creation. Rule: title: Touch Suspicious Service File id: 31545105-3444-4584-bebf-c466353230d2 status: test description: Detects usage of the "touch" process in service file. references: - https://blogs.blackberry.com/ - https://twitter.com/Joseliyo_Jstnk/status/1620131033474822144 author: Joseliyo Sanchez, @Joseliyo_Jstnk date: 2023-01-11 tags: - attack.stealth - attack.t1070.006 logsource: product: linux category: process_creation detection: selection: Image|endswith: /touch CommandLine|contains: ' -t ' CommandLine|endswith: .service condition: selection falsepositives: - Admin changing date of files. level: medium
Sigma rule: Detects the usage of the "sftp.exe" binary as a LOLBIN by abusing the "-D" flag. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: Use Of The SFTP.EXE Binary As A LOLBIN id: a85ffc3a-e8fd-4040-93bf-78aff284d801 status: test description: Detects the usage of the "sftp.exe" binary as a LOLBIN by abusing the "-D" flag references: - https://github.com/LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS/pull/264 author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) date: 2022-11-10 tags: - attack.execution - attack.stealth - attack.t1218 logsource: category: process_creation product: windows detection: selection: Image|endswith: \sftp.exe CommandLine|contains: - ' -D ..' - ' -D C:\' condition: selection falsepositives: - Unknown level: medium
Sigma rule: Detects indirect command execution via Program Compatibility Assistant "pcwrun.exe" leveraging the follina (CVE-2022-301. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: Execute Pcwrun.EXE To Leverage Follina id: 6004abd0-afa4-4557-ba90-49d172e0a299 status: test description: Detects indirect command execution via Program Compatibility Assistant "pcwrun.exe" leveraging the follina (CVE-2022-30190) vulnerability references: - https://twitter.com/nas_bench/status/1535663791362519040 author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) date: 2022-06-13 tags: - attack.stealth - attack.t1218 - attack.execution logsource: category: process_creation product: windows detection: selection: Image|endswith: \pcwrun.exe CommandLine|contains: ../ condition: selection falsepositives: - Unlikely level: high
Sigma rule: Detects tampering with the "ChannelAccess" registry key in order to change access to Windows event channel.. Logsource: windows / registry_set. Rule: title: Change Winevt Channel Access Permission Via Registry id: 7d9263bd-dc47-4a58-bc92-5474abab390c status: test description: Detects tampering with the "ChannelAccess" registry key in order to change access to Windows event channel. references: - https://app.any.run/tasks/77b2e328-8f36-46b2-b2e2-8a80398217ab/ - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/api/winevt/ - https://itconnect.uw.edu/tools-services-support/it-systems-infrastructure/msinf/other-help/understanding-sddl-syntax/ author: frack113 date: 2022-09-17 modified: 2024-03-25 tags: - attack.defense-impairment - attack.t1685.001 logsource: category: registry_set product: windows detection: selection: TargetObject|contains: \Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\WINEVT\Channels\ TargetObject|endswith: \ChannelAccess Details|contains: - (A;;0x1;;;LA) - (A;;0x1;;;SY) - (A;;0x5;;;BA) filter_main_trustedinstaller: Image: C:\Windows\servicing\TrustedInstaller.exe filter_main_tiworker: Image|startswith: C:\Windows\WinSxS\ Image|endswith: \TiWorker.exe condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_* falsepositives: - Unknown level: high
Sigma rule: Detects modifications to shell open registry keys that point to suspicious locations typically used by malware for persi. Logsource: windows / registry_set. Rule: title: Suspicious Shell Open Command Registry Modification id: 9e8894c0-0ae0-11ef-9d85-1f2942bec57c status: experimental description: 'Detects modifications to shell open registry keys that point to suspicious locations typically used by malware for persistence. Generally, modifications to the `*\shell\open\command` registry key can indicate an attempt to change the default action for opening files, and various UAC bypass or persistence techniques involve modifying these keys to execute malicious scripts or binaries. ' references: - https://www.trendmicro.com/en_us/research/25/f/water-curse.html author: Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems) date: 2026-01-24 tags: - attack.privilege-escalation - attack.persistence - attack.t1548.002 - attack.t1546.001 logsource: category: registry_set product: windows detection: selection: TargetObject|contains: \shell\open\command\ Details|contains: - \$Recycle.Bin\ - \AppData\Local\Temp\ - \Contacts\ - \Music\ - \PerfLogs\ - \Photos\ - \Pictures\ - \Users\Public\ - \Videos\ - \Windows\Temp\ - '%AppData%' - '%LocalAppData%' - '%Temp%' - '%tmp%' condition: selection falsepositives: - Legitimate software installations or updates that modify the shell open command registry keys to these locations. level: medium
Sigma rule: Detects process creation with suspicious whitespace padding followed by a '#' character, which may indicate ClickFix or. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: Suspicious Explorer Process with Whitespace Padding - ClickFix/FileFix id: 3ae9974a-eb09-4044-8e70-8980a50c12c8 related: - id: 8f2a5c3d-9e4b-4a7c-8d1f-2e5a6b9c3d7e type: similar - id: 7a1b4c5e-8f3d-4b9a-7c2e-1f4a5b8c6d9e type: similar status: experimental description: 'Detects process creation with suspicious whitespace padding followed by a ''#'' character, which may indicate ClickFix or FileFix techniques used to conceal malicious commands from visual inspection. ClickFix and FileFix are social engineering attack techniques where adversaries distribute phishing documents or malicious links that deceive users into opening the Windows Run dialog box or File Explorer search bar. The victims are then instructed to paste commands from their clipboard, which contain extensive whitespace padding using various Unicode space characters to push the actual malicious command far to the right, effectively hiding it from immediate view. ' references: - https://expel.com/blog/cache-smuggling-when-a-picture-isnt-a-thousand-words/ - https://mrd0x.com/filefix-clickfix-alternative/ author: Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems) date: 2025-11-04 modified: 2025-11-26 tags: - attack.execution - attack.stealth - attack.t1204.004 - attack.t1027.010 logsource: category: process_creation product: windows detection: selection_explorer: ParentImage|endswith: \explorer.exe CommandLine|contains: '#' selection_space_variation: CommandLine|contains: - - - - - - - - - - - - - ' ' condition: all of selection_* falsepositives: - Unknown level: high
Sigma rule: Detects enumeration of local system accounts. This information can help adversaries determine which local accounts exist. Logsource: linux / process_creation. Rule: title: Local System Accounts Discovery - Linux id: b45e3d6f-42c6-47d8-a478-df6bd6cf534c status: test description: Detects enumeration of local system accounts. This information can help adversaries determine which local accounts exist on a system to aid in follow-on behavior. references: - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1087.001/T1087.001.md - https://my.f5.com/manage/s/article/K589 - https://man.freebsd.org/cgi/man.cgi?pwd_mkdb author: Alejandro Ortuno, oscd.community, CheraghiMilad date: 2020-10-08 modified: 2024-12-10 tags: - attack.discovery - attack.t1087.001 logsource: category: process_creation product: linux detection: selection_1: Image|endswith: /lastlog selection_2: CommandLine|contains: '''x:0:''' selection_3: Image|endswith: - /cat - /ed - /head - /more - /nano - /tail - /vi - /vim - /less - /emacs - /sqlite3 - /makemap CommandLine|contains: - /etc/passwd - /etc/shadow - /etc/sudoers - /etc/spwd.db - /etc/pwd.db - /etc/master.passwd selection_4: Image|endswith: /id selection_5: Image|endswith: /lsof CommandLine|contains: -u condition: 1 of selection* falsepositives: - Legitimate administration activities level: low
Sigma rule: Detects a renamed Powershell execution, which is a common technique used to circumvent security controls and bypass dete. Logsource: windows / ps_classic_start. Rule: title: Renamed Powershell Under Powershell Channel id: 30a8cb77-8eb3-4cfb-8e79-ad457c5a4592 status: test description: 'Detects a renamed Powershell execution, which is a common technique used to circumvent security controls and bypass detection logic that''s dependent on process names and process paths. ' references: - https://speakerdeck.com/heirhabarov/hunting-for-powershell-abuse author: Harish Segar, frack113 date: 2020-06-29 modified: 2025-01-20 tags: - attack.execution - attack.stealth - attack.t1059.001 - attack.t1036.003 logsource: product: windows category: ps_classic_start detection: selection: Data|contains: HostName=ConsoleHost filter_main_ps: Data|contains: - HostApplication=powershell - HostApplication=C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell - HostApplication=C:\Windows\SysWOW64\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell - HostApplication=C:/Windows/System32/WindowsPowerShell/v1.0/powershell - HostApplication=C:/Windows/SysWOW64/WindowsPowerShell/v1.0/powershell - HostApplication=C:\\\\WINDOWS\\\\system32\\\\WindowsPowerShell\\\\v1.0\\\\powershell.exe - HostApplication=C:\\\\WINDOWS\\\\SysWOW64\\\\WindowsPowerShell\\\\v1.0\\\\powershell.exe filter_main_host_application_null: Data|re: HostId=[a-zA-Z0-9-]{36}\s+EngineVersion= condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_* falsepositives: - Unknown level: low
Sigma rule: Detects UAC bypass method using Windows event viewer. Logsource: windows / registry_set. Rule: title: UAC Bypass via Event Viewer id: 7c81fec3-1c1d-43b0-996a-46753041b1b6 status: test description: Detects UAC bypass method using Windows event viewer references: - https://enigma0x3.net/2016/08/15/fileless-uac-bypass-using-eventvwr-exe-and-registry-hijacking/ - https://www.hybrid-analysis.com/sample/e122bc8bf291f15cab182a5d2d27b8db1e7019e4e96bb5cdbd1dfe7446f3f51f?environmentId=100 author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems) date: 2017-03-19 modified: 2023-09-28 tags: - attack.privilege-escalation - attack.t1548.002 - car.2019-04-001 logsource: product: windows category: registry_set detection: selection: TargetObject|endswith: \mscfile\shell\open\command condition: selection falsepositives: - Unknown level: high
Sigma rule: Detects Schtask creations that point to a suspicious folder or an environment variable often used by malware. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: Schedule Task Creation From Env Variable Or Potentially Suspicious Path Via Schtasks.EXE id: 81325ce1-be01-4250-944f-b4789644556f related: - id: 43f487f0-755f-4c2a-bce7-d6d2eec2fcf8 type: derived status: test description: Detects Schtask creations that point to a suspicious folder or an environment variable often used by malware references: - https://www.welivesecurity.com/2022/01/18/donot-go-do-not-respawn/ - https://www.joesandbox.com/analysis/514608/0/html#324415FF7D8324231381BAD48A052F85DF04 - https://blog.talosintelligence.com/gophish-powerrat-dcrat/ author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems) date: 2022-02-21 modified: 2025-10-07 tags: - attack.privilege-escalation - attack.persistence - attack.execution - attack.t1053.005 logsource: product: windows category: process_creation detection: selection_1_create: Image|endswith: \schtasks.exe CommandLine|contains|windash: ' /create ' selection_1_all_folders: CommandLine|contains: - :\Perflogs - :\Users\All Users\ - :\Users\Default\ - :\Users\Public - :\Windows\Temp - \AppData\Local\ - \AppData\Roaming\ - '%AppData%' - '%Public%' selection_2_parent: ParentCommandLine|endswith: \svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s Schedule selection_2_some_folders: CommandLine|contains: - :\Perflogs - :\Windows\Temp - \Users\Public - '%Public%' filter_optional_other: - ParentCommandLine|contains: unattended.ini - CommandLine|contains: update_task.xml filter_optional_team_viewer: CommandLine|contains: /Create /TN TVInstallRestore /TR filter_optional_avira_install: CommandLine|contains|all: - '/Create /Xml ' - \Temp\.CR. - \Avira_Security_Installation.xml filter_optional_avira_other: CommandLine|contains|all: - /Create /F /TN - '/Xml ' - \Temp\ - Avira_ CommandLine|contains: - .tmp\UpdateFallbackTask.xml - .tmp\WatchdogServiceControlManagerTimeout.xml - .tmp\SystrayAutostart.xml - .tmp\MaintenanceTask.xml filter_optional_klite_codec: CommandLine|contains|all: - \Temp\ - '/Create /TN "klcp_update" /XML ' - \klcp_update_task.xml condition: ( all of selection_1_* or all of selection_2_* ) and not 1 of filter_optional_* falsepositives: - Benign scheduled tasks creations or executions that happen often during software installations - Software that uses the AppData folder and scheduled tasks to update the software in the AppData folders level: medium
Sigma rule: Detects calls to the AtomicTestHarnesses "Invoke-ATHRemoteFXvGPUDisablementCommand" which is designed to abuse the "Remo. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: RemoteFXvGPUDisablement Abuse Via AtomicTestHarnesses id: a6fc3c46-23b8-4996-9ea2-573f4c4d88c5 related: - id: f65e22f9-819e-4f96-9c7b-498364ae7a25 type: similar - id: 38a7625e-b2cb-485d-b83d-aff137d859f4 type: similar - id: cacef8fc-9d3d-41f7-956d-455c6e881bc5 type: similar status: test description: Detects calls to the AtomicTestHarnesses "Invoke-ATHRemoteFXvGPUDisablementCommand" which is designed to abuse the "RemoteFXvGPUDisablement.exe" binary to run custom PowerShell code via module load-order hijacking. references: - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1218/T1218.md - https://github.com/redcanaryco/AtomicTestHarnesses/blob/7e1e4da116801e3d6fcc6bedb207064577e40572/TestHarnesses/T1218_SignedBinaryProxyExecution/InvokeRemoteFXvGPUDisablementCommand.ps1 author: frack113 date: 2021-07-13 modified: 2023-05-09 tags: - attack.stealth - attack.t1218 logsource: product: windows category: process_creation detection: selection: CommandLine|contains: - Invoke-ATHRemoteFXvGPUDisablementCommand - Invoke-ATHRemoteFXvGPUDisableme condition: selection falsepositives: - Unknown level: high
Sigma rule: Detects changes to the "ServiceDLL" value related to a service in the registry. This is often used as a method of persis. Logsource: windows / registry_set. Rule: title: ServiceDll Hijack id: 612e47e9-8a59-43a6-b404-f48683f45bd6 status: test description: 'Detects changes to the "ServiceDLL" value related to a service in the registry. This is often used as a method of persistence. ' references: - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1543.003/T1543.003.md#atomic-test-4---tinyturla-backdoor-service-w64time - https://www.hexacorn.com/blog/2013/09/19/beyond-good-ol-run-key-part-4/ author: frack113 date: 2022-02-04 modified: 2024-04-03 tags: - attack.persistence - attack.privilege-escalation - attack.t1543.003 logsource: category: registry_set product: windows detection: selection: TargetObject|contains|all: - \System\ - ControlSet - \Services\ TargetObject|endswith: \Parameters\ServiceDll filter_main_printextensionmanger: Details: C:\Windows\system32\spool\drivers\x64\3\PrintConfig.dll filter_main_domain_controller: Image: C:\Windows\system32\lsass.exe TargetObject|endswith: \Services\NTDS\Parameters\ServiceDll Details: '%%systemroot%%\system32\ntdsa.dll' filter_main_poqexec: Image: C:\Windows\System32\poqexec.exe filter_optional_safetica: Image|endswith: \regsvr32.exe Details: C:\Windows\System32\STAgent.dll condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_* and not 1 of filter_optional_* falsepositives: - Administrative scripts - Installation of a service level: medium
Sigma rule: Detects PowerShell scripts that contains reference to keystroke capturing functions. Logsource: windows / ps_script. Rule: title: Potential Keylogger Activity id: 965e2db9-eddb-4cf6-a986-7a967df651e4 status: test description: Detects PowerShell scripts that contains reference to keystroke capturing functions references: - https://twitter.com/ScumBots/status/1610626724257046529 - https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/d4486b63512755316625230e0c9c81655093be93876e0d80732e7eeaf7d83476/content - https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/720a7ee9f2178c70501d7e3f4bcc28a4f456e200486dbd401b25af6da3b4da62/content - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/dotnet/api/system.windows.input.keyboard.iskeydown?view=windowsdesktop-7.0 author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) date: 2023-01-04 tags: - attack.collection - attack.credential-access - attack.t1056.001 logsource: product: windows category: ps_script definition: 'Requirements: Script Block Logging must be enabled' detection: selection: ScriptBlockText|contains: '[Windows.Input.Keyboard]::IsKeyDown([System.Windows.Input.Key]::' condition: selection falsepositives: - Unknown level: medium
Sigma rule: This rule detects suspicious files created by Microsoft Sync Center (mobsync). Logsource: windows / file_event. Rule: title: Created Files by Microsoft Sync Center id: 409f8a98-4496-4aaa-818a-c931c0a8b832 status: test description: This rule detects suspicious files created by Microsoft Sync Center (mobsync) references: - https://redcanary.com/blog/intelligence-insights-november-2021/ author: elhoim date: 2022-04-28 modified: 2022-06-02 tags: - attack.privilege-escalation - attack.stealth - attack.t1055 - attack.t1218 - attack.execution logsource: product: windows category: file_event detection: selection_mobsync: Image|endswith: \mobsync.exe filter_created_file: TargetFilename|endswith: - .dll - .exe condition: selection_mobsync and filter_created_file falsepositives: - Unknown level: medium
Sigma rule: Detects SharpLdapWhoami, a whoami alternative that queries the LDAP service on a domain controller. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: HackTool - SharpLdapWhoami Execution id: d9367cbb-c2e0-47ce-bdc0-128cb6da898d status: test description: Detects SharpLdapWhoami, a whoami alternative that queries the LDAP service on a domain controller references: - https://github.com/bugch3ck/SharpLdapWhoami author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems) date: 2022-08-29 modified: 2023-02-04 tags: - attack.discovery - attack.t1033 - car.2016-03-001 logsource: category: process_creation product: windows detection: selection_name: Image|endswith: \SharpLdapWhoami.exe selection_pe: - OriginalFileName|contains: SharpLdapWhoami - Product: SharpLdapWhoami selection_flags1: CommandLine|endswith: - ' /method:ntlm' - ' /method:kerb' - ' /method:nego' - ' /m:nego' - ' /m:ntlm' - ' /m:kerb' condition: 1 of selection* falsepositives: - Programs that use the same command line flags level: high
Sigma rule: Detects execution of renamed Remote Utilities (RURAT) via Product PE header field. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: Renamed Remote Utilities RAT (RURAT) Execution id: 9ef27c24-4903-4192-881a-3adde7ff92a5 status: test description: Detects execution of renamed Remote Utilities (RURAT) via Product PE header field references: - https://redcanary.com/blog/misbehaving-rats/ author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) date: 2022-09-19 modified: 2023-02-03 tags: - attack.collection - attack.command-and-control - attack.discovery - attack.stealth - attack.s0592 logsource: category: process_creation product: windows detection: selection: Product: Remote Utilities filter: Image|endswith: - \rutserv.exe - \rfusclient.exe condition: selection and not filter falsepositives: - Unknown level: medium
Sigma rule: Detects Processes accessing the camera and microphone from suspicious folder. Logsource: windows / registry_event. Rule: title: Suspicious Camera and Microphone Access id: 62120148-6b7a-42be-8b91-271c04e281a3 status: test description: Detects Processes accessing the camera and microphone from suspicious folder references: - https://medium.com/@7a616368/can-you-track-processes-accessing-the-camera-and-microphone-7e6885b37072 author: Den Iuzvyk date: 2020-06-07 modified: 2022-10-09 tags: - attack.collection - attack.t1125 - attack.t1123 logsource: category: registry_event product: windows detection: selection_1: TargetObject|contains|all: - \Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\CapabilityAccessManager\ConsentStore\ - \NonPackaged selection_2: TargetObject|contains: - microphone - webcam selection_3: TargetObject|contains: - :#Windows#Temp# - :#$Recycle.bin# - :#Temp# - :#Users#Public# - :#Users#Default# - :#Users#Desktop# condition: all of selection_* falsepositives: - Unlikely, there could be conferencing software running from a Temp folder accessing the devices level: high