alirezaaminzadeh/cybersec-retrieval-benchmark huggingface dataset:
Sigma rule: Detects AzureHound (A BloodHound data collector for Microsoft Azure) activity via the default User-Agent that is used du. Logsource: azure / signinlogs. Rule: title: Discovery Using AzureHound id: 35b781cc-1a08-4a5a-80af-42fd7c315c6b status: test description: Detects AzureHound (A BloodHound data collector for Microsoft Azure) activity via the default User-Agent that is used during its operation after successful authentication. references: - https://github.com/BloodHoundAD/AzureHound author: Janantha Marasinghe date: 2022-11-27 tags: - attack.discovery - attack.t1087.004 - attack.t1526 logsource: product: azure service: signinlogs detection: selection: userAgent|contains: azurehound ResultType: 0 condition: selection falsepositives: - Unknown level: high
Sigma rule: Detects adding and using Exchange PowerShell snap-ins to export mailbox data. As seen used by HAFNIUM and APT27. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: Exchange PowerShell Snap-Ins Usage id: 25676e10-2121-446e-80a4-71ff8506af47 status: test description: Detects adding and using Exchange PowerShell snap-ins to export mailbox data. As seen used by HAFNIUM and APT27 references: - https://www.volexity.com/blog/2021/03/02/active-exploitation-of-microsoft-exchange-zero-day-vulnerabilities/ - https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2021/03/02/hafnium-targeting-exchange-servers/ - https://www.intrinsec.com/apt27-analysis/ author: FPT.EagleEye, Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) date: 2021-03-03 modified: 2023-03-24 tags: - attack.execution - attack.t1059.001 - attack.collection - attack.t1114 logsource: category: process_creation product: windows detection: selection_img: - Image|endswith: - \powershell.exe - \pwsh.exe - OriginalFileName: - PowerShell.EXE - pwsh.dll selection_cli: CommandLine|contains: Add-PSSnapin selection_module: CommandLine|contains: - Microsoft.Exchange.Powershell.Snapin - Microsoft.Exchange.Management.PowerShell.SnapIn filter_msiexec: ParentImage: C:\Windows\System32\msiexec.exe CommandLine|contains: $exserver=Get-ExchangeServer ([Environment]::MachineName) -ErrorVariable exerr 2> $null condition: all of selection_* and not 1 of filter_* falsepositives: - Unknown level: high
Sigma rule: Detects a suspicious program execution in Outlook temp folder. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: Suspicious Execution From Outlook Temporary Folder id: a018fdc3-46a3-44e5-9afb-2cd4af1d4b39 status: test description: Detects a suspicious program execution in Outlook temp folder author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems) references: - Internal Research date: 2019-10-01 modified: 2022-10-09 tags: - attack.initial-access - attack.t1566.001 logsource: category: process_creation product: windows detection: selection: Image|contains: \Temporary Internet Files\Content.Outlook\ condition: selection falsepositives: - Unknown level: high
Sigma rule: Detects uninstallation or termination of security products using the WMIC utility. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: Potential Tampering With Security Products Via WMIC id: 847d5ff3-8a31-4737-a970-aeae8fe21765 related: - id: b53317a0-8acf-4fd1-8de8-a5401e776b96 type: derived status: test description: Detects uninstallation or termination of security products using the WMIC utility references: - https://twitter.com/cglyer/status/1355171195654709249 - https://thedfirreport.com/2021/10/18/icedid-to-xinglocker-ransomware-in-24-hours/ - https://www.mandiant.com/resources/unc2165-shifts-to-evade-sanctions - https://research.nccgroup.com/2022/08/19/back-in-black-unlocking-a-lockbit-3-0-ransomware-attack/ - https://www.trendmicro.com/en_us/research/23/a/vice-society-ransomware-group-targets-manufacturing-companies.html author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) date: 2021-01-30 modified: 2025-12-15 tags: - attack.defense-impairment - attack.t1685 logsource: category: process_creation product: windows detection: selection_cli_1: CommandLine|contains|all: - wmic - 'product ' - uninstall CommandLine|contains|windash: /nointeractive selection_cli_2: CommandLine|contains|all: - wmic - 'caption like ' CommandLine|contains: - call delete - call terminate selection_cli_3: CommandLine|contains|all: - 'process ' - 'where ' - delete selection_product: CommandLine|contains: - '%carbon%' - '%cylance%' - '%endpoint%' - '%eset%' - '%malware%' - '%Sophos%' - '%symantec%' - Antivirus - 'AVG ' - Carbon Black - CarbonBlack - Cb Defense Sensor 64-bit - Crowdstrike Sensor - 'Cylance ' - Dell Threat Defense - DLP Endpoint - Endpoint Detection - Endpoint Protection - Endpoint Security - Endpoint Sensor - ESET File Security - LogRhythm System Monitor Service - Malwarebytes - McAfee Agent - Microsoft Security Client - Sophos Anti-Virus - Sophos AutoUpdate - Sophos Credential Store - Sophos Management Console - Sophos Management Database - Sophos Management Server - Sophos Remote Management System - Sophos Update Manager - Threat Protection - VirusScan - Webroot SecureAnywhere - Windows Defender condition: 1 of selection_cli_* and selection_product falsepositives: - Legitimate administration level: high regression_tests_path: regression_data/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_wmic_uninstall_security_products/info.yml
Sigma rule: Detects RAR usage that creates an archive from a suspicious folder, either a system folder or one of the folders often u. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: Suspicious Greedy Compression Using Rar.EXE id: afe52666-401e-4a02-b4ff-5d128990b8cb status: test description: Detects RAR usage that creates an archive from a suspicious folder, either a system folder or one of the folders often used by attackers for staging purposes references: - https://decoded.avast.io/martinchlumecky/png-steganography author: X__Junior (Nextron Systems), Florian Roth (Nextron Systems) date: 2022-12-15 modified: 2024-01-02 tags: - attack.execution - attack.t1059 logsource: product: windows category: process_creation detection: selection_opt_1: - Image|endswith: \rar.exe - Description: Command line RAR selection_opt_2: CommandLine|contains: - '.exe a ' - ' a -m' selection_cli_flags: CommandLine|contains|all: - ' -hp' - ' -r ' selection_cli_folders: CommandLine|contains: - ' ?:\\\*.' - ' ?:\\\\\*.' - ' ?:\$Recycle.bin\' - ' ?:\PerfLogs\' - ' ?:\Temp' - ' ?:\Users\Public\' - ' ?:\Windows\' - ' %public%' condition: 1 of selection_opt_* and all of selection_cli_* falsepositives: - Unknown level: high
Sigma rule: Identifies use of Fodhelper.exe to bypass User Account Control. Adversaries use this technique to execute privileged pro. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: Bypass UAC via Fodhelper.exe id: 7f741dcf-fc22-4759-87b4-9ae8376676a2 status: test description: Identifies use of Fodhelper.exe to bypass User Account Control. Adversaries use this technique to execute privileged processes. references: - https://eqllib.readthedocs.io/en/latest/analytics/e491ce22-792f-11e9-8f5c-d46d6d62a49e.html - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1548.002/T1548.002.md author: E.M. Anhaus (originally from Atomic Blue Detections, Tony Lambert), oscd.community date: 2019-10-24 modified: 2021-11-27 tags: - attack.privilege-escalation - attack.t1548.002 logsource: category: process_creation product: windows detection: selection: ParentImage|endswith: \fodhelper.exe condition: selection falsepositives: - Legitimate use of fodhelper.exe utility by legitimate user level: high
Sigma rule: Detects process access requests from hacktool processes based on their default image name. Logsource: windows / process_access. Rule: title: HackTool - Generic Process Access id: d0d2f720-d14f-448d-8242-51ff396a334e status: test description: Detects process access requests from hacktool processes based on their default image name references: - https://jsecurity101.medium.com/bypassing-access-mask-auditing-strategies-480fb641c158 - https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/you-bet-your-lsass-hunting-lsass-access.html author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems), Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel date: 2023-11-27 tags: - attack.credential-access - attack.t1003.001 - attack.s0002 logsource: category: process_access product: windows detection: selection: - SourceImage|endswith: - \Akagi.exe - \Akagi64.exe - \atexec_windows.exe - \Certify.exe - \Certipy.exe - \CoercedPotato.exe - \crackmapexec.exe - \CreateMiniDump.exe - \dcomexec_windows.exe - \dpapi_windows.exe - \findDelegation_windows.exe - \GetADUsers_windows.exe - \GetNPUsers_windows.exe - \getPac_windows.exe - \getST_windows.exe - \getTGT_windows.exe - \GetUserSPNs_windows.exe - \gmer.exe - \hashcat.exe - \htran.exe - \ifmap_windows.exe - \impersonate.exe - \Inveigh.exe - \LocalPotato.exe - \mimikatz_windows.exe - \mimikatz.exe - \netview_windows.exe - \nmapAnswerMachine_windows.exe - \opdump_windows.exe - \PasswordDump.exe - \Potato.exe - \PowerTool.exe - \PowerTool64.exe - \psexec_windows.exe - \PurpleSharp.exe - \pypykatz.exe - \QuarksPwDump.exe - \rdp_check_windows.exe - \Rubeus.exe - \SafetyKatz.exe - \sambaPipe_windows.exe - \SelectMyParent.exe - \SharpChisel.exe - \SharPersist.exe - \SharpEvtMute.exe - \SharpImpersonation.exe - \SharpLDAPmonitor.exe - \SharpLdapWhoami.exe - \SharpUp.exe - \SharpView.exe - \smbclient_windows.exe - \smbserver_windows.exe - \sniff_windows.exe - \sniffer_windows.exe - \split_windows.exe - \SpoolSample.exe - \Stracciatella.exe - \SysmonEOP.exe - \temp\rot.exe - \ticketer_windows.exe - \TruffleSnout.exe - \winPEASany_ofs.exe - \winPEASany.exe - \winPEASx64_ofs.exe - \winPEASx64.exe - \winPEASx86_ofs.exe - \winPEASx86.exe - \xordump.exe - SourceImage|contains: - \goldenPac - \just_dce_ - \karmaSMB - \kintercept - \LocalPotato - \ntlmrelayx - \rpcdump - \samrdump - \secretsdump - \smbexec - \smbrelayx - \wmiexec - \wmipersist - HotPotato - Juicy Potato - JuicyPotato - PetitPotam - RottenPotato condition: selection falsepositives: - Unlikely level: high
Sigma rule: Detects execution of attacker-controlled WsmPty.xsl or WsmTxt.xsl via winrm.vbs and copied cscript.exe (can be renamed). Logsource: windows / file_event. Rule: title: AWL Bypass with Winrm.vbs and Malicious WsmPty.xsl/WsmTxt.xsl - File id: d353dac0-1b41-46c2-820c-d7d2561fc6ed related: - id: 074e0ded-6ced-4ebd-8b4d-53f55908119d type: derived status: test description: Detects execution of attacker-controlled WsmPty.xsl or WsmTxt.xsl via winrm.vbs and copied cscript.exe (can be renamed) references: - https://posts.specterops.io/application-whitelisting-bypass-and-arbitrary-unsigned-code-execution-technique-in-winrm-vbs-c8c24fb40404 author: Julia Fomina, oscd.community date: 2020-10-06 modified: 2022-11-28 tags: - attack.stealth - attack.t1216 logsource: product: windows category: file_event detection: system_files: TargetFilename|endswith: - WsmPty.xsl - WsmTxt.xsl in_system_folder: TargetFilename|startswith: - C:\Windows\System32\ - C:\Windows\SysWOW64\ condition: system_files and not in_system_folder falsepositives: - Unlikely level: medium
Sigma rule: Detects execution of "git" in order to clone a remote repository that contain suspicious keywords which might be suspici. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: Suspicious Git Clone id: aef9d1f1-7396-4e92-a927-4567c7a495c1 status: test description: Detects execution of "git" in order to clone a remote repository that contain suspicious keywords which might be suspicious references: - https://gist.githubusercontent.com/MichaelKoczwara/12faba9c061c12b5814b711166de8c2f/raw/e2068486692897b620c25fde1ea258c8218fe3d3/history.txt author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) date: 2023-01-03 modified: 2023-01-10 tags: - attack.reconnaissance - attack.t1593.003 logsource: category: process_creation product: windows detection: selection_img: - Image|endswith: - \git.exe - \git-remote-https.exe - OriginalFileName: git.exe selection_cli: CommandLine|contains: - ' clone ' - 'git-remote-https ' selection_keyword: CommandLine|contains: - exploit - Vulns - vulnerability - RemoteCodeExecution - Invoke- - CVE- - poc- - ProofOfConcept - proxyshell - log4shell - eternalblue - eternal-blue - MS17- condition: all of selection_* falsepositives: - Unknown level: medium
Sigma rule: Detects the execution of other scripts using the Node executable packaged with Adobe Creative Cloud. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: Node Process Executions id: df1f26d3-bea7-4700-9ea2-ad3e990cf90e status: test description: Detects the execution of other scripts using the Node executable packaged with Adobe Creative Cloud references: - https://twitter.com/mttaggart/status/1511804863293784064 author: Max Altgelt (Nextron Systems) date: 2022-04-06 tags: - attack.execution - attack.stealth - attack.t1127 - attack.t1059.007 logsource: category: process_creation product: windows detection: selection: Image|endswith: \Adobe Creative Cloud Experience\libs\node.exe filter: CommandLine|contains: Adobe Creative Cloud Experience\js condition: selection and not filter falsepositives: - Unknown level: medium
Sigma rule: Detects PowerShell download activity, via the .DownloadFile() or .DownloadString() methods of the Net.WebClient class. T. Logsource: windows / ps_classic_start. Rule: title: PowerShell Download Via Net.WebClient - PowerShell Classic id: 3236fcd0-b7e3-4433-b4f8-86ad61a9af2d related: - id: 65531a81-a694-4e31-ae04-f8ba5bc33759 type: derived status: test description: 'Detects PowerShell download activity, via the .DownloadFile() or .DownloadString() methods of the Net.WebClient class. This technique is often abused by attackers to download additional payloads. ' references: - https://www.trendmicro.com/en_us/research/22/j/lv-ransomware-exploits-proxyshell-in-attack.html author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems) date: 2017-03-05 modified: 2026-04-28 tags: - attack.execution - attack.command-and-control - attack.t1059.001 - attack.t1105 logsource: product: windows category: ps_classic_start detection: selection_webclient: Data|contains: Net.WebClient selection_download: Data|contains: - .DownloadFile( - .DownloadString( condition: all of selection_* falsepositives: - This activity may be used by legitimate software, such as patch management tools or software updaters. Investigate any such activity and apply the necessary filter. level: low
Sigma rule: Shadow Copies deletion using operating systems utilities via PowerShell. Logsource: windows / ps_classic_start. Rule: title: Delete Volume Shadow Copies Via WMI With PowerShell id: 87df9ee1-5416-453a-8a08-e8d4a51e9ce1 status: stable description: Shadow Copies deletion using operating systems utilities via PowerShell references: - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1490/T1490.md - https://www.fortinet.com/blog/threat-research/stomping-shadow-copies-a-second-look-into-deletion-methods author: frack113 date: 2021-06-03 modified: 2023-10-27 tags: - attack.impact - attack.t1490 logsource: product: windows category: ps_classic_start detection: selection: Data|contains|all: - Get-WmiObject - Win32_ShadowCopy Data|contains: - Delete() - Remove-WmiObject condition: selection falsepositives: - Legitimate Administrator deletes Shadow Copies using operating systems utilities for legitimate reason level: high
Sigma rule: Detects when an Policy Rule is Modified or Deleted.. Logsource: okta / okta. Rule: title: Okta Policy Rule Modified or Deleted id: 0c97c1d3-4057-45c9-b148-1de94b631931 status: test description: Detects when an Policy Rule is Modified or Deleted. references: - https://developer.okta.com/docs/reference/api/system-log/ - https://developer.okta.com/docs/reference/api/event-types/ author: Austin Songer @austinsonger date: 2021-09-12 modified: 2026-04-27 tags: - attack.impact logsource: product: okta service: okta detection: selection: eventType: - policy.rule.update - policy.rule.delete condition: selection falsepositives: - Unknown level: medium
Sigma rule: Detects the load of EvtMuteHook.dll, a key component of SharpEvtHook, a tool that tampers with the Windows event logs. Logsource: windows / image_load. Rule: title: HackTool - SharpEvtMute DLL Load id: 49329257-089d-46e6-af37-4afce4290685 related: - id: bedfc8ad-d1c7-4e37-a20e-e2b0dbee759c type: similar status: test description: Detects the load of EvtMuteHook.dll, a key component of SharpEvtHook, a tool that tampers with the Windows event logs references: - https://github.com/bats3c/EvtMute author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems) date: 2022-09-07 modified: 2024-11-23 tags: - attack.defense-impairment - attack.t1685.001 logsource: category: image_load product: windows detection: selection: Hashes|contains: IMPHASH=330768A4F172E10ACB6287B87289D83B condition: selection falsepositives: - Other DLLs with the same Imphash level: high
Sigma rule: Uses the .NET InstallUtil.exe application in order to execute image without log. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: Suspicious Execution of InstallUtil Without Log id: d042284c-a296-4988-9be5-f424fadcc28c status: test description: Uses the .NET InstallUtil.exe application in order to execute image without log references: - https://securelist.com/moonbounce-the-dark-side-of-uefi-firmware/105468/ - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/dotnet/framework/tools/installutil-exe-installer-tool author: frack113 date: 2022-01-23 modified: 2022-02-04 tags: - attack.stealth logsource: category: process_creation product: windows detection: selection: Image|endswith: \InstallUtil.exe Image|contains: Microsoft.NET\Framework CommandLine|contains|all: - '/logfile= ' - /LogToConsole=false condition: selection falsepositives: - Unknown level: medium
Sigma rule: Detects Obfuscated use of stdin to execute PowerShell. Logsource: windows / system. Rule: title: Invoke-Obfuscation STDIN+ Launcher - System id: 72862bf2-0eb1-11eb-adc1-0242ac120002 status: test description: Detects Obfuscated use of stdin to execute PowerShell references: - https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/issues/1009 author: Jonathan Cheong, oscd.community date: 2020-10-15 modified: 2022-11-29 tags: - attack.stealth - attack.t1027 - attack.execution - attack.t1059.001 logsource: product: windows service: system detection: selection_main: Provider_Name: Service Control Manager EventID: 7045 ImagePath|contains|all: - cmd - powershell ImagePath|contains: - /c - /r selection_other: - ImagePath|contains: noexit - ImagePath|contains|all: - input - $ condition: all of selection_* falsepositives: - Unknown level: high
Sigma rule: Ensure that all account usernames and authentication credentials are transmitted across networks using encrypted channel. Logsource: firewall. Rule: title: Cleartext Protocol Usage id: d7fb8f0e-bd5f-45c2-b467-19571c490d7e status: stable description: 'Ensure that all account usernames and authentication credentials are transmitted across networks using encrypted channels. Ensure that an encryption is used for all sensitive information in transit. Ensure that an encrypted channels is used for all administrative account access. ' references: - https://www.cisecurity.org/controls/cis-controls-list/ - https://www.pcisecuritystandards.org/documents/PCI_DSS_v3-2-1.pdf - https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/CSWP/NIST.CSWP.04162018.pdf author: Alexandr Yampolskyi, SOC Prime, Tim Shelton date: 2019-03-26 modified: 2022-10-10 tags: - attack.credential-access logsource: category: firewall detection: selection: dst_port: - 8080 - 21 - 80 - 23 - 50000 - 1521 - 27017 - 3306 - 1433 - 11211 - 15672 - 5900 - 5901 - 5902 - 5903 - 5904 selection_allow1: action: - forward - accept - 2 selection_allow2: blocked: 'false' condition: selection and 1 of selection_allow* falsepositives: - Unknown level: low
Sigma rule: Detects attempts to modify the registry using VBScript's CreateObject("Wscript.shell") and RegWrite methods embedded wit. Logsource: windows / ps_script. Rule: title: Registry Modification Attempt Via VBScript - PowerShell id: 2a0a169d-cc66-43ce-9ae2-6e678e54e46a related: - id: 921aa10f-2e74-4cca-9498-98f9ca4d6fdf type: similar - id: 7f4c43f9-b1a5-4c7d-b24a-b41bf3a3ebf2 type: similar status: experimental description: 'Detects attempts to modify the registry using VBScript''s CreateObject("Wscript.shell") and RegWrite methods embedded within PowerShell scripts or commands. Threat actors commonly embed VBScript code within PowerShell to perform registry modifications, attempting to evade detection that monitors for direct registry access through traditional tools. This technique can be used for persistence, defense evasion, and privilege escalation by modifying registry keys without using regedit.exe, reg.exe, or PowerShell''s native registry cmdlets. ' references: - https://www.linkedin.com/posts/mauricefielenbach_livingofftheland-redteam-persistence-activity-7344801774182051843-TE00/ - https://www.nextron-systems.com/2025/07/29/detecting-the-most-popular-mitre-persistence-method-registry-run-keys-startup-folder/ - https://detect.fyi/hunting-fileless-malware-in-the-windows-registry-1339ccde00ad date: 2025-08-13 author: Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems) tags: - attack.persistence - attack.execution - attack.defense-impairment - attack.t1112 - attack.t1059.005 logsource: category: ps_script product: windows detection: selection: ScriptBlockText|contains|all: - CreateObject - Wscript.shell - .RegWrite condition: selection falsepositives: - Some legitimate admin or install scripts may use these processes for registry modifications. level: medium
Sigma rule: Detects usage of wsudo (Windows Sudo Utility). Which is a tool that let the user execute programs with different permiss. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: PUA - Wsudo Suspicious Execution id: bdeeabc9-ff2a-4a51-be59-bb253aac7891 status: test description: Detects usage of wsudo (Windows Sudo Utility). Which is a tool that let the user execute programs with different permissions (System, Trusted Installer, Administrator...etc) references: - https://github.com/M2Team/Privexec/ author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) date: 2022-12-02 modified: 2023-02-14 tags: - attack.execution - attack.privilege-escalation - attack.t1059 logsource: category: process_creation product: windows detection: selection_metadata: - Image|endswith: \wsudo.exe - OriginalFileName: wsudo.exe - Description: Windows sudo utility - ParentImage|endswith: \wsudo-bridge.exe selection_cli: CommandLine|contains: - -u System - -uSystem - -u TrustedInstaller - -uTrustedInstaller - ' --ti ' condition: 1 of selection_* falsepositives: - Unknown level: high
Sigma rule: Detects Obfuscated use of Environment Variables to execute PowerShell. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: Invoke-Obfuscation VAR+ Launcher id: 27aec9c9-dbb0-4939-8422-1742242471d0 status: test description: Detects Obfuscated use of Environment Variables to execute PowerShell references: - https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/issues/1009 author: Jonathan Cheong, oscd.community date: 2020-10-15 modified: 2024-04-15 tags: - attack.stealth - attack.t1027 - attack.execution - attack.t1059.001 logsource: category: process_creation product: windows detection: selection: CommandLine|re: cmd.{0,5}(?:/c|/r)(?:\s|)\"set\s[a-zA-Z]{3,6}.*(?:\{\d\}){1,}\\\"\s+?\-f(?:.*\)){1,}.*\" condition: selection falsepositives: - Unknown level: high