alirezaaminzadeh/cybersec-retrieval-benchmark huggingface dataset:
Sigma rule: Detects the execution of WMIC to query information on a remote system. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: WMIC Remote Command Execution id: 7773b877-5abb-4a3e-b9c9-fd0369b59b00 related: - id: e42af9df-d90b-4306-b7fb-05c863847ebd type: obsolete - id: 09af397b-c5eb-4811-b2bb-08b3de464ebf type: obsolete status: test description: Detects the execution of WMIC to query information on a remote system references: - https://securelist.com/moonbounce-the-dark-side-of-uefi-firmware/105468/ - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/wmic author: frack113, Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) date: 2023-02-14 modified: 2025-10-22 tags: - attack.execution - attack.t1047 logsource: category: process_creation product: windows detection: selection_img: - Image|endswith: \WMIC.exe - OriginalFileName: wmic.exe selection_cli: CommandLine|contains|windash: '/node:' filter_main_localhost: CommandLine|contains: - localhost - 127.0.0.1 condition: all of selection_* and not 1 of filter_main_* falsepositives: - Unknown level: medium simulation: - type: atomic-red-team name: WMI Execute Remote Process technique: T1047 atomic_guid: 9c8ef159-c666-472f-9874-90c8d60d136b regression_tests_path: regression_data/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_wmic_remote_execution/info.yml
Sigma rule: Detects DNS queries for subdomains related to MEGA sharing website. Logsource: windows / dns_query. Rule: title: DNS Query To MEGA Hosting Website id: 613c03ba-0779-4a53-8a1f-47f914a4ded3 related: - id: 66474410-b883-415f-9f8d-75345a0a66a6 type: similar status: test description: Detects DNS queries for subdomains related to MEGA sharing website references: - https://research.nccgroup.com/2021/05/27/detecting-rclone-an-effective-tool-for-exfiltration/ author: Aaron Greetham (@beardofbinary) - NCC Group date: 2021-05-26 modified: 2023-09-18 tags: - attack.exfiltration - attack.t1567.002 logsource: product: windows category: dns_query detection: selection: QueryName|contains: userstorage.mega.co.nz condition: selection falsepositives: - Legitimate DNS queries and usage of Mega level: medium
Sigma rule: Detects when a user enables DNS-over-HTTPS. This can be used to hide internet activity or be used to hide the process of. Logsource: windows / registry_set. Rule: title: DNS-over-HTTPS Enabled by Registry id: 04b45a8a-d11d-49e4-9acc-4a1b524407a5 status: test description: 'Detects when a user enables DNS-over-HTTPS. This can be used to hide internet activity or be used to hide the process of exfiltrating data. With this enabled organization will lose visibility into data such as query type, response and originating IP that are used to determine bad actors. ' references: - https://www.tenforums.com/tutorials/151318-how-enable-disable-dns-over-https-doh-microsoft-edge.html - https://github.com/elastic/detection-rules/issues/1371 - https://chromeenterprise.google/policies/?policy=DnsOverHttpsMode - https://admx.help/HKLM/Software/Policies/Mozilla/Firefox/DNSOverHTTPS author: Austin Songer date: 2021-07-22 modified: 2023-08-17 tags: - attack.persistence - attack.stealth - attack.defense-impairment - attack.t1140 - attack.t1112 logsource: product: windows category: registry_set detection: selection_edge: TargetObject|endswith: \SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\Edge\BuiltInDnsClientEnabled Details: DWORD (0x00000001) selection_chrome: TargetObject|endswith: \SOFTWARE\Google\Chrome\DnsOverHttpsMode Details: secure selection_firefox: TargetObject|endswith: \SOFTWARE\Policies\Mozilla\Firefox\DNSOverHTTPS\Enabled Details: DWORD (0x00000001) condition: 1 of selection_* falsepositives: - Unlikely level: medium
Sigma rule: Detects the execution of "whoami.exe" by privileged accounts that are often abused by threat actors. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: Whoami.EXE Execution From Privileged Process id: 79ce34ca-af29-4d0e-b832-fc1b377020db related: - id: 80167ada-7a12-41ed-b8e9-aa47195c66a1 type: obsolete status: test description: Detects the execution of "whoami.exe" by privileged accounts that are often abused by threat actors references: - https://speakerdeck.com/heirhabarov/hunting-for-privilege-escalation-in-windows-environment - https://web.archive.org/web/20221019044836/https://nsudo.m2team.org/en-us/ author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Teymur Kheirkhabarov date: 2022-01-28 modified: 2023-12-04 tags: - attack.privilege-escalation - attack.discovery - attack.t1033 logsource: category: process_creation product: windows detection: selection_img: - OriginalFileName: whoami.exe - Image|endswith: \whoami.exe selection_user: User|contains: - AUTHORI - AUTORI - TrustedInstaller condition: all of selection_* falsepositives: - Unknown level: high
Sigma rule: Detects uncommon child processes spawning from "sigverif.exe", which could indicate potential abuse of the latter as a l. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: Uncommon Sigverif.EXE Child Process id: 7d4aaec2-08ed-4430-8b96-28420e030e04 status: test description: 'Detects uncommon child processes spawning from "sigverif.exe", which could indicate potential abuse of the latter as a living of the land binary in order to proxy execution. ' references: - https://www.hexacorn.com/blog/2018/04/27/i-shot-the-sigverif-exe-the-gui-based-lolbin/ - https://twitter.com/0gtweet/status/1457676633809330184 author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) date: 2022-08-19 modified: 2024-08-27 tags: - attack.stealth - attack.t1216 logsource: category: process_creation product: windows detection: selection: ParentImage|endswith: \sigverif.exe filter_main_werfault: Image: - C:\Windows\System32\WerFault.exe - C:\Windows\SysWOW64\WerFault.exe condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_* falsepositives: - Unknown level: medium
Sigma rule: Detects when an attacker tries to change User Account Control (UAC) elevation request destination via the "PromptOnSecur. Logsource: windows / registry_set. Rule: title: UAC Secure Desktop Prompt Disabled id: 0d7ceeef-3539-4392-8953-3dc664912714 related: - id: c5f6a85d-b647-40f7-bbad-c10b66bab038 type: similar - id: 48437c39-9e5f-47fb-af95-3d663c3f2919 type: similar status: test description: 'Detects when an attacker tries to change User Account Control (UAC) elevation request destination via the "PromptOnSecureDesktop" value. The "PromptOnSecureDesktop" setting specifically determines whether UAC prompts are displayed on the secure desktop. The secure desktop is a separate desktop environment that''s isolated from other processes running on the system. It''s designed to prevent malicious software from intercepting or tampering with UAC prompts. When "PromptOnSecureDesktop" is set to 0, UAC prompts are displayed on the user''s current desktop instead of the secure desktop. This reduces the level of security because it potentially exposes the prompts to manipulation by malicious software. ' references: - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/7e11e9b79583545f208a6dc3fa062f2ed443d999/atomics/T1548.002/T1548.002.md author: frack113 date: 2024-05-10 tags: - attack.privilege-escalation - attack.t1548.002 logsource: category: registry_set product: windows detection: selection: TargetObject|contains: \Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\System\PromptOnSecureDesktop Details: DWORD (0x00000000) condition: selection falsepositives: - Unknown level: medium
Sigma rule: Files with well-known filenames (sensitive files with credential data) copying. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: Copying Sensitive Files with Credential Data id: e7be6119-fc37-43f0-ad4f-1f3f99be2f9f status: test description: Files with well-known filenames (sensitive files with credential data) copying references: - https://room362.com/post/2013/2013-06-10-volume-shadow-copy-ntdsdit-domain-hashes-remotely-part-1/ - https://www.slideshare.net/heirhabarov/hunting-for-credentials-dumping-in-windows-environment - https://dfironthemountain.wordpress.com/2018/12/06/locked-file-access-using-esentutl-exe/ - https://github.com/LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS/blob/2cc01b01132b5c304027a658c698ae09dd6a92bf/yml/OSBinaries/Esentutl.yml author: Teymur Kheirkhabarov, Daniil Yugoslavskiy, oscd.community date: 2019-10-22 modified: 2024-06-04 tags: - attack.credential-access - attack.t1003.002 - attack.t1003.003 - car.2013-07-001 - attack.s0404 logsource: category: process_creation product: windows detection: selection_esent_img: - Image|endswith: \esentutl.exe - OriginalFileName: \esentutl.exe selection_esent_cli: CommandLine|contains|windash: - vss - ' /m ' - ' /y ' selection_susp_paths: CommandLine|contains: - \config\RegBack\sam - \config\RegBack\security - \config\RegBack\system - \config\sam - \config\security - '\config\system ' - \repair\sam - \repair\security - \repair\system - \windows\ntds\ntds.dit condition: all of selection_esent_* or selection_susp_paths falsepositives: - Copying sensitive files for legitimate use (eg. backup) or forensic investigation by legitimate incident responder or forensic investigator. level: high
Sigma rule: Detects process access events where WerFaultSecure accesses MsMpEng.exe with dbgcore.dll or dbghelp.dll in the call trac. Logsource: windows / process_access. Rule: title: Suspicious Process Access of MsMpEng by WerFaultSecure - EDR-Freeze id: 387df17d-3b04-448f-8669-9e7fd5e5fd8c related: - id: 8a2f4b1c-3d5e-4f7a-9b2c-1e4f6d8a9c2b type: similar - id: 1f0b4cac-9c81-41f4-95d0-8475ff46b3e2 type: similar status: experimental description: 'Detects process access events where WerFaultSecure accesses MsMpEng.exe with dbgcore.dll or dbghelp.dll in the call trace, indicating potential EDR freeze techniques. This technique leverages WerFaultSecure.exe running as a Protected Process Light (PPL) with WinTCB protection level to call MiniDumpWriteDump and suspend EDR/AV processes, allowing malicious activity to execute undetected during the suspension period. ' references: - https://blog.axelarator.net/hunting-for-edr-freeze/ author: Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems) date: 2025-11-27 tags: - attack.defense-impairment - attack.t1685 logsource: category: process_access product: windows definition: "Requires Sysmon Event ID 10 (ProcessAccess) with CallTrace enabled.\nExample sysmon config snippet with grouping,\ \ as logging individual ProcessAccess events can generate excessive logs:\n<ProcessAccess onmatch=\"include\">\n <Rule\ \ groupRelation=\"and\">\n <TargetImage condition=\"end with\">\\MsMpEng.exe</TargetImage>\n <SourceImage condition=\"\ end with\">\\WerFaultSecure.exe</SourceImage>\n </Rule>\n</ProcessAccess>\n" detection: selection: SourceImage|endswith: \WerFaultSecure.exe TargetImage|endswith: \MsMpEng.exe CallTrace|contains: - \dbgcore.dll - \dbghelp.dll condition: selection falsepositives: - Legitimate Windows Error Reporting operations level: high regression_tests_path: regression_data/rules/windows/process_access/proc_access_win_werfaultsecure_msmpeng_access/info.yml
Sigma rule: Detects command line parameters used by Koadic hack tool. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: HackTool - Koadic Execution id: 5cddf373-ef00-4112-ad72-960ac29bac34 status: test description: Detects command line parameters used by Koadic hack tool references: - https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/unit42-sofacy-groups-parallel-attacks/ - https://github.com/offsecginger/koadic/blob/457f9a3ff394c989cdb4c599ab90eb34fb2c762c/data/stager/js/stdlib.js - https://blog.f-secure.com/hunting-for-koadic-a-com-based-rootkit/ author: wagga, Jonhnathan Ribeiro, oscd.community date: 2020-01-12 modified: 2023-02-11 tags: - attack.execution - attack.t1059.003 - attack.t1059.005 - attack.t1059.007 logsource: category: process_creation product: windows detection: selection_img: - Image|endswith: \cmd.exe - OriginalFileName: Cmd.Exe selection_cli: CommandLine|contains|all: - /q - /c - chcp condition: all of selection_* falsepositives: - Unknown level: high
Sigma rule: Search for usage of reg or Powershell by non-privileged users to modify service configuration in registry. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: Non-privileged Usage of Reg or Powershell id: 8f02c935-effe-45b3-8fc9-ef8696a9e41d status: test description: Search for usage of reg or Powershell by non-privileged users to modify service configuration in registry references: - https://image.slidesharecdn.com/kheirkhabarovoffzonefinal-181117201458/95/hunting-for-privilege-escalation-in-windows-environment-20-638.jpg author: Teymur Kheirkhabarov (idea), Ryan Plas (rule), oscd.community date: 2020-10-05 modified: 2024-12-01 tags: - attack.persistence - attack.defense-impairment - attack.t1112 logsource: category: process_creation product: windows detection: selection_cli: - CommandLine|contains|all: - 'reg ' - add - CommandLine|contains: - powershell - set-itemproperty - ' sp ' - new-itemproperty selection_data: IntegrityLevel: - Medium - S-1-16-8192 CommandLine|contains|all: - ControlSet - Services CommandLine|contains: - ImagePath - FailureCommand - ServiceDLL condition: all of selection_* falsepositives: - Unknown level: high
Sigma rule: Detects suspicious powershell process starts with base64 encoded commands (e.g. Emotet). Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: Suspicious Encoded PowerShell Command Line id: ca2092a1-c273-4878-9b4b-0d60115bf5ea status: test description: Detects suspicious powershell process starts with base64 encoded commands (e.g. Emotet) references: - https://app.any.run/tasks/6217d77d-3189-4db2-a957-8ab239f3e01e author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Markus Neis, Jonhnathan Ribeiro, Daniil Yugoslavskiy, Anton Kutepov, oscd.community date: 2018-09-03 modified: 2023-04-06 tags: - attack.execution - attack.t1059.001 logsource: category: process_creation product: windows detection: selection_img: - Image|endswith: - \powershell.exe - \pwsh.exe - OriginalFileName: - PowerShell.EXE - pwsh.dll selection_cli_enc: CommandLine|contains: ' -e' selection_cli_content: CommandLine|contains: - ' JAB' - ' SUVYI' - ' SQBFAFgA' - ' aQBlAHgA' - ' aWV4I' - ' IAA' - ' IAB' - ' UwB' - ' cwB' selection_standalone: CommandLine|contains: - '.exe -ENCOD ' - ' BA^J e-' filter_optional_remote_signed: CommandLine|contains: ' -ExecutionPolicy remotesigned ' condition: selection_img and (all of selection_cli_* or selection_standalone) and not 1 of filter_optional_* level: high
Sigma rule: Detects execution from an Alternate Data Stream (ADS). Adversaries may use NTFS file attributes to hide their malicious. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: Execute From Alternate Data Streams id: 7f43c430-5001-4f8b-aaa9-c3b88f18fa5c status: test description: Detects execution from an Alternate Data Stream (ADS). Adversaries may use NTFS file attributes to hide their malicious data in order to evade detection references: - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1564.004/T1564.004.md author: frack113 date: 2021-09-01 modified: 2022-10-09 tags: - attack.stealth - attack.t1564.004 logsource: category: process_creation product: windows detection: selection_stream: CommandLine|contains: 'txt:' selection_tools_type: CommandLine|contains|all: - 'type ' - ' > ' selection_tools_makecab: CommandLine|contains|all: - 'makecab ' - .cab selection_tools_reg: CommandLine|contains|all: - 'reg ' - ' export ' selection_tools_regedit: CommandLine|contains|all: - 'regedit ' - ' /E ' selection_tools_esentutl: CommandLine|contains|all: - 'esentutl ' - ' /y ' - ' /d ' - ' /o ' condition: selection_stream and (1 of selection_tools_*) falsepositives: - Unknown level: medium
Sigma rule: Detects registry changes to Office trust records where the path is located in a potentially suspicious location. Logsource: windows / registry_set. Rule: title: Macro Enabled In A Potentially Suspicious Document id: a166f74e-bf44-409d-b9ba-ea4b2dd8b3cd related: - id: 295a59c1-7b79-4b47-a930-df12c15fc9c2 type: derived status: test description: Detects registry changes to Office trust records where the path is located in a potentially suspicious location references: - https://twitter.com/inversecos/status/1494174785621819397 - Internal Research author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) date: 2023-06-21 modified: 2023-08-17 tags: - attack.persistence - attack.defense-impairment - attack.t1112 logsource: category: registry_set product: windows detection: selection_value: TargetObject|contains: \Security\Trusted Documents\TrustRecords selection_paths: TargetObject|contains: - /AppData/Local/Microsoft/Windows/INetCache/ - /AppData/Local/Temp/ - /PerfLogs/ - C:/Users/Public/ - file:///D:/ - file:///E:/ condition: all of selection_* falsepositives: - Unlikely level: high
Sigma rule: Detects the execution of a renamed "gpg.exe". Often used by ransomware and loaders to decrypt/encrypt data.. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: Renamed Gpg.EXE Execution id: ec0722a3-eb5c-4a56-8ab2-bf6f20708592 status: test description: Detects the execution of a renamed "gpg.exe". Often used by ransomware and loaders to decrypt/encrypt data. references: - https://securelist.com/locked-out/68960/ author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems), frack113 date: 2023-08-09 tags: - attack.impact - attack.t1486 logsource: category: process_creation product: windows detection: selection: OriginalFileName: gpg.exe filter_main_img: Image|endswith: - \gpg.exe - \gpg2.exe condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_* level: high
Sigma rule: Detects disabling of the Windows Defender feature of scanning for malware and other potentially unwanted software. Logsource: windows / windefend. Rule: title: Windows Defender Malware And PUA Scanning Disabled id: bc275be9-0bec-4d77-8c8f-281a2df6710f related: - id: fe34868f-6e0e-4882-81f6-c43aa8f15b62 type: obsolete status: stable description: Detects disabling of the Windows Defender feature of scanning for malware and other potentially unwanted software references: - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/defender-endpoint/troubleshoot-microsoft-defender-antivirus?view=o365-worldwide#event-id-5010 - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1562.001/T1562.001.md - https://craigclouditpro.wordpress.com/2020/03/04/hunting-malicious-windows-defender-activity/ author: Ján Trenčanský, frack113 date: 2020-07-28 modified: 2023-11-22 tags: - attack.defense-impairment - attack.t1685 logsource: product: windows service: windefend detection: selection: EventID: 5010 condition: selection falsepositives: - Unknown level: high
Sigma rule: Detect use of ie4uinit.exe to execute commands from a specially prepared ie4uinit.inf file from a directory other than t. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: Ie4uinit Lolbin Use From Invalid Path id: d3bf399f-b0cf-4250-8bb4-dfc192ab81dc status: test description: Detect use of ie4uinit.exe to execute commands from a specially prepared ie4uinit.inf file from a directory other than the usual directories references: - https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Ie4uinit/ - https://bohops.com/2018/03/10/leveraging-inf-sct-fetch-execute-techniques-for-bypass-evasion-persistence-part-2/ author: frack113 date: 2022-05-07 modified: 2022-05-16 tags: - attack.stealth - attack.t1218 logsource: product: windows category: process_creation detection: lolbin: - Image|endswith: \ie4uinit.exe - OriginalFileName: IE4UINIT.EXE filter_correct: CurrentDirectory: - c:\windows\system32\ - c:\windows\sysWOW64\ filter_missing: CurrentDirectory: null condition: lolbin and not 1 of filter_* falsepositives: - ViberPC updater calls this binary with the following commandline "ie4uinit.exe -ClearIconCache" level: medium
Sigma rule: Detects installation or execution of services. Logsource: windows / system. Rule: title: HackTool Service Registration or Execution id: d26ce60c-2151-403c-9a42-49420d87b5e4 status: test description: Detects installation or execution of services references: - Internal Research author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems) date: 2022-03-21 modified: 2023-08-07 tags: - attack.execution - attack.t1569.002 - attack.s0029 logsource: product: windows service: system detection: selection_eid: Provider_Name: Service Control Manager EventID: - 7045 - 7036 selection_service_name: ServiceName|contains: - cachedump - DumpSvc - gsecdump - pwdump - UACBypassedService - WCE SERVICE - WCESERVICE - winexesvc selection_service_image: ImagePath|contains: bypass condition: selection_eid and 1 of selection_service_* falsepositives: - Unknown level: high
Sigma rule: Detects execution of "Diskshadow.exe" in script mode to execute an script with a potentially uncommon extension. Initial. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: Diskshadow Script Mode - Uncommon Script Extension Execution id: 1dde5376-a648-492e-9e54-4241dd9b0c7f related: - id: fa1a7e52-3d02-435b-81b8-00da14dd66c1 type: similar - id: 9f546b25-5f12-4c8d-8532-5893dcb1e4b8 type: similar - id: 56b1dde8-b274-435f-a73a-fb75eb81262a type: similar - id: 0c2f8629-7129-4a8a-9897-7e0768f13ff2 type: similar status: test description: 'Detects execution of "Diskshadow.exe" in script mode to execute an script with a potentially uncommon extension. Initial baselining of the allowed extension list is required. ' references: - https://bohops.com/2018/03/26/diskshadow-the-return-of-vss-evasion-persistence-and-active-directory-database-extraction/ - https://www.ired.team/offensive-security/credential-access-and-credential-dumping/ntds.dit-enumeration - https://medium.com/@cyberjyot/lolbin-execution-via-diskshadow-f6ff681a27a4 - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/diskshadow - https://www.lifars.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/01/GriefRansomware_Whitepaper-2.pdf - https://www.zscaler.com/blogs/security-research/technical-analysis-crytox-ransomware - https://research.checkpoint.com/2022/evilplayout-attack-against-irans-state-broadcaster/ author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) date: 2023-09-15 modified: 2024-03-05 tags: - attack.stealth - attack.t1218 logsource: category: process_creation product: windows detection: selection_img: - OriginalFileName: diskshadow.exe - Image|endswith: \diskshadow.exe selection_flag: CommandLine|contains|windash: '-s ' filter_main_ext: CommandLine|contains: .txt condition: all of selection_* and not 1 of filter_main_* falsepositives: - False postitve might occur with legitimate or uncommon extensions used internally. Initial baseline is required. level: medium