alirezaaminzadeh/cybersec-retrieval-benchmark huggingface dataset:
Sigma rule: Detects suspicious spawning of a process under a different user context than the parent process. Processes such as notep. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: Suspicious Cross-User Process Spawn id: d2b7a134-9c3e-4f8a-b56d-e0c1f8a29b47 status: experimental description: 'Detects suspicious spawning of a process under a different user context than the parent process. Processes such as notepad.exe, calculator etc. are generally spawned under the same user context and also they are often targeted as sacrificial process or decoy process to check successful privilege escalation. ' references: - https://github.com/MSNightmare/LegacyHive - https://git.projectnightcrawler.dev/NightmareEclipse/LegacyHive author: Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems) date: 2026-07-23 tags: - attack.privilege-escalation - attack.stealth - attack.t1055 - attack.t1134 logsource: category: process_creation product: windows detection: selection: Image|endswith: - \notepad.exe - \calc.exe - \mspaint.exe - \wordpad.exe - \write.exe filter_main_same_user: User|fieldref: ParentUser filter_optional_user_null: User: null filter_optional_parent_null: ParentUser: null filter_optional_empty_user: - ParentUser: - '' - '-' - User: - '' - '-' condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_* and not 1 of filter_optional_* falsepositives: - RunAs usage spawning one of the listed binaries under a different account level: medium regression_tests_path: regression_data/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_susp_cross_user_process_spawn/info.yml
Sigma rule: Detects commonly-used chained commands and strings in the most recent 'url' value of the 'TypedPaths' key, which could b. Logsource: windows / registry_set. Rule: title: FileFix - Command Evidence in TypedPaths id: 4fee3d51-8069-4a4c-a0f7-924fcaff2c70 related: - id: 4be03877-d5b6-4520-85c9-a5911c0a656c type: similar status: experimental description: 'Detects commonly-used chained commands and strings in the most recent ''url'' value of the ''TypedPaths'' key, which could be indicative of a user being targeted by the FileFix technique. ' references: - https://x.com/russianpanda9xx/status/1940831134759506029 - https://mrd0x.com/filefix-clickfix-alternative/ - https://www.scpx.com.au/2025/11/16/decades-old-finger-protocol-abused-in-clickfix-malware-attacks/ author: Alfie Champion (delivr.to), Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems) date: 2025-07-05 modified: 2025-11-19 tags: - attack.execution - attack.t1204.004 logsource: category: registry_set product: windows detection: selection_base: TargetObject|endswith: \Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\TypedPaths\url1 Details|contains|all: - '#' - http selection_cmd: - Details|contains: - account - anti-bot - botcheck - captcha - challenge - confirmation - fraud - human - identification - identificator - identity - robot - validation - verification - verify - Details|contains: - '%comspec%' - bitsadmin - certutil - cmd - cscript - curl - finger - mshta - powershell - pwsh - regsvr32 - rundll32 - schtasks - wget - wscript condition: all of selection_* falsepositives: - Unknown level: high
Sigma rule: Detects execution of wmic utility with the "computersystem" flag in order to obtain information about the machine such a. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: Computer System Reconnaissance Via Wmic.EXE id: 9d7ca793-f6bd-471c-8d0f-11e68b2f0d2f status: test description: Detects execution of wmic utility with the "computersystem" flag in order to obtain information about the machine such as the domain, username, model, etc. references: - https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2022/09/07/profiling-dev-0270-phosphorus-ransomware-operations/ author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) date: 2022-09-08 modified: 2023-02-14 tags: - attack.discovery - attack.execution - attack.t1047 logsource: product: windows category: process_creation detection: selection_img: - Image|endswith: \wmic.exe - OriginalFileName: wmic.exe selection_cli: CommandLine|contains: computersystem condition: all of selection_* falsepositives: - Unknown level: medium regression_tests_path: regression_data/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_wmic_recon_computersystem/info.yml
Sigma rule: Detects system information discovery commands. Logsource: linux / auditd. Rule: title: System and Hardware Information Discovery id: 1f358e2e-cb63-43c3-b575-dfb072a6814f related: - id: 42df45e7-e6e9-43b5-8f26-bec5b39cc239 type: derived status: stable description: Detects system information discovery commands references: - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1082/T1082.md#atomic-test-4---linux-vm-check-via-hardware author: Ömer Günal, oscd.community date: 2020-10-08 modified: 2022-11-26 tags: - attack.discovery - attack.t1082 logsource: product: linux service: auditd detection: selection: type: PATH name: - /sys/class/dmi/id/bios_version - /sys/class/dmi/id/product_name - /sys/class/dmi/id/chassis_vendor - /proc/scsi/scsi - /proc/ide/hd0/model - /proc/version - /etc/*version - /etc/*release - /etc/issue condition: selection falsepositives: - Legitimate administration activities level: informational
Sigma rule: Detects VB DLL's loaded by an office application. Which could indicate the presence of VBA Macros.. Logsource: windows / image_load. Rule: title: VBA DLL Loaded Via Office Application id: e6ce8457-68b1-485b-9bdd-3c2b5d679aa9 status: test description: Detects VB DLL's loaded by an office application. Which could indicate the presence of VBA Macros. references: - https://medium.com/threatpunter/detecting-adversary-tradecraft-with-image-load-event-logging-and-eql-8de93338c16 author: Antonlovesdnb date: 2020-02-19 modified: 2023-02-10 tags: - attack.execution - attack.t1204.002 logsource: category: image_load product: windows detection: selection: Image|endswith: - \excel.exe - \mspub.exe - \onenote.exe - \onenoteim.exe - \outlook.exe - \powerpnt.exe - \winword.exe ImageLoaded|endswith: - \VBE7.DLL - \VBEUI.DLL - \VBE7INTL.DLL condition: selection falsepositives: - Legitimate macro usage. Add the appropriate filter according to your environment level: high
Sigma rule: Detects usage of "query.exe" a system binary to exfil information such as "sessions" and "processes" for later use. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: Query Usage To Exfil Data id: 53ef0cef-fa24-4f25-a34a-6c72dfa2e6e2 status: test description: Detects usage of "query.exe" a system binary to exfil information such as "sessions" and "processes" for later use references: - https://twitter.com/MichalKoczwara/status/1553634816016498688 author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) date: 2022-08-01 modified: 2023-01-19 tags: - attack.execution logsource: category: process_creation product: windows detection: selection: Image|endswith: :\Windows\System32\query.exe CommandLine|contains: - session > - process > condition: selection falsepositives: - Unknown level: medium
Sigma rule: Detects when there is a interruption in the authentication process.. Logsource: azure / signinlogs. Rule: title: Azure Unusual Authentication Interruption id: 8366030e-7216-476b-9927-271d79f13cf3 status: test description: Detects when there is a interruption in the authentication process. references: - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/architecture/security-operations-privileged-accounts author: Austin Songer @austinsonger date: 2021-11-26 modified: 2022-12-18 tags: - attack.privilege-escalation - attack.persistence - attack.initial-access - attack.stealth - attack.t1078 logsource: product: azure service: signinlogs detection: selection_50097: ResultType: 50097 ResultDescription: Device authentication is required selection_50155: ResultType: 50155 ResultDescription: DeviceAuthenticationFailed selection_50158: ResultType: 50158 ResultDescription: ExternalSecurityChallenge - External security challenge was not satisfied condition: 1 of selection_* falsepositives: - Unknown level: medium
Sigma rule: Adversaries may use hidden windows to conceal malicious activity from the plain sight of users. In some cases, windows t. Logsource: windows / ps_script. Rule: title: Suspicious PowerShell WindowStyle Option id: 313fbb0a-a341-4682-848d-6d6f8c4fab7c status: test description: 'Adversaries may use hidden windows to conceal malicious activity from the plain sight of users. In some cases, windows that would typically be displayed when an application carries out an operation can be hidden ' references: - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1564.003/T1564.003.md author: frack113, Tim Shelton (fp AWS) date: 2021-10-20 modified: 2023-01-03 tags: - attack.stealth - attack.t1564.003 logsource: product: windows category: ps_script definition: 'Requirements: Script Block Logging must be enabled' detection: selection: ScriptBlockText|contains|all: - powershell - WindowStyle - Hidden filter: ScriptBlockText|contains|all: - :\Program Files\Amazon\WorkSpacesConfig\Scripts\ - $PSScriptRoot\Module\WorkspaceScriptModule\WorkspaceScriptModule condition: selection and not filter falsepositives: - Unknown level: medium
Sigma rule: Detects creation of new ".dll" files inside the plugins directory of a notepad++ installation by a process other than "g. Logsource: windows / file_event. Rule: title: Potential Persistence Via Notepad++ Plugins id: 54127bd4-f541-4ac3-afdb-ea073f63f692 status: test description: Detects creation of new ".dll" files inside the plugins directory of a notepad++ installation by a process other than "gup.exe". Which could indicates possible persistence references: - https://pentestlab.blog/2022/02/14/persistence-notepad-plugins/ author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) date: 2022-06-10 modified: 2025-09-01 tags: - attack.persistence logsource: product: windows category: file_event detection: selection: TargetFilename|contains: \Notepad++\plugins\ TargetFilename|endswith: .dll filter_gup: Image|endswith: \Notepad++\updater\gup.exe filter_install: Image|startswith: C:\Users\ Image|contains: \AppData\Local\Temp\ Image|endswith: - \target.exe - Installer.x64.exe filter_main_installer: Image|contains: \npp. Image|endswith: .exe TargetFilename: - C:\Program Files\Notepad++\plugins\NppExport\NppExport.dll - C:\Program Files\Notepad++\plugins\mimeTools\mimeTools.dll - C:\Program Files\Notepad++\plugins\NppConverter\NppConverter.dll - C:\Program Files\Notepad++\plugins\Config\nppPluginList.dll condition: selection and not 1 of filter_* falsepositives: - Possible FPs during first installation of Notepad++ - Legitimate use of custom plugins by users in order to enhance notepad++ functionalities level: medium
Sigma rule: Detects file creation events with filename patterns used by CrackMapExec.. Logsource: windows / file_event. Rule: title: HackTool - CrackMapExec File Indicators id: 736ffa74-5f6f-44ca-94ef-1c0df4f51d2a related: - id: 9433ff9c-5d3f-4269-99f8-95fc826ea489 type: obsolete status: test description: Detects file creation events with filename patterns used by CrackMapExec. references: - https://github.com/byt3bl33d3r/CrackMapExec/ author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) date: 2024-03-11 modified: 2024-06-27 tags: - attack.credential-access - attack.t1003.001 logsource: product: windows category: file_event detection: selection_path: TargetFilename|startswith: C:\Windows\Temp\ selection_names_str: TargetFilename|endswith: - \temp.ps1 - \msol.ps1 selection_names_re: - TargetFilename|re: \\[0-9a-f]{8}-[0-9a-f]{4}-[0-9a-f]{4}-[0-9a-f]{4}-[0-9a-f]{12}\.txt$ - TargetFilename|re: \\[a-zA-Z]{8}\.tmp$ condition: selection_path and 1 of selection_names_* falsepositives: - Unknown level: high
Sigma rule: Detects deletion of Windows Volume Shadow Copies with PowerShell code and Get-WMIObject. This technique is used by numer. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: Deletion of Volume Shadow Copies via WMI with PowerShell id: 21ff4ca9-f13a-41ad-b828-0077b2af2e40 related: - id: e17121b4-ef2a-4418-8a59-12fb1631fa9e type: derived - id: c1337eb8-921a-4b59-855b-4ba188ddcc42 type: similar status: test description: Detects deletion of Windows Volume Shadow Copies with PowerShell code and Get-WMIObject. This technique is used by numerous ransomware families such as Sodinokibi/REvil references: - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1490/T1490.md#atomic-test-5---windows---delete-volume-shadow-copies-via-wmi-with-powershell - https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/volume-shadow-copy-deletion-via-powershell.html author: Tim Rauch, Elastic (idea) date: 2022-09-20 modified: 2022-12-30 tags: - attack.impact - attack.t1490 logsource: category: process_creation product: windows detection: selection_get: CommandLine|contains: - Get-WmiObject - gwmi - Get-CimInstance - gcim selection_shadowcopy: CommandLine|contains: Win32_ShadowCopy selection_delete: CommandLine|contains: - .Delete() - Remove-WmiObject - rwmi - Remove-CimInstance - rcim condition: all of selection* falsepositives: - Unknown level: high
Sigma rule: Detects suspicious UTF16 and base64 encoded and often obfuscated PowerShell code often used in command lines. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: Suspicious Obfuscated PowerShell Code id: 8d01b53f-456f-48ee-90f6-bc28e67d4e35 status: test description: Detects suspicious UTF16 and base64 encoded and often obfuscated PowerShell code often used in command lines references: - https://app.any.run/tasks/fcadca91-3580-4ede-aff4-4d2bf809bf99/ author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems) date: 2022-07-11 modified: 2023-02-14 tags: - attack.stealth logsource: category: process_creation product: windows detection: selection: CommandLine|contains: - IAAtAGIAeABvAHIAIAAwAHgA - AALQBiAHgAbwByACAAMAB4A - gAC0AYgB4AG8AcgAgADAAeA - AC4ASQBuAHYAbwBrAGUAKAApACAAfAAg - AuAEkAbgB2AG8AawBlACgAKQAgAHwAI - ALgBJAG4AdgBvAGsAZQAoACkAIAB8AC - AHsAMQB9AHsAMAB9ACIAIAAtAGYAI - B7ADEAfQB7ADAAfQAiACAALQBmAC - AewAxAH0AewAwAH0AIgAgAC0AZgAg - AHsAMAB9AHsAMwB9ACIAIAAtAGYAI - B7ADAAfQB7ADMAfQAiACAALQBmAC - AewAwAH0AewAzAH0AIgAgAC0AZgAg - AHsAMgB9AHsAMAB9ACIAIAAtAGYAI - B7ADIAfQB7ADAAfQAiACAALQBmAC - AewAyAH0AewAwAH0AIgAgAC0AZgAg - AHsAMQB9AHsAMAB9ACcAIAAtAGYAI - B7ADEAfQB7ADAAfQAnACAALQBmAC - AewAxAH0AewAwAH0AJwAgAC0AZgAg - AHsAMAB9AHsAMwB9ACcAIAAtAGYAI - B7ADAAfQB7ADMAfQAnACAALQBmAC - AewAwAH0AewAzAH0AJwAgAC0AZgAg - AHsAMgB9AHsAMAB9ACcAIAAtAGYAI - B7ADIAfQB7ADAAfQAnACAALQBmAC - AewAyAH0AewAwAH0AJwAgAC0AZgAg condition: selection falsepositives: - Unknown level: high
Sigma rule: An adversary may deface systems internal to an organization in an attempt to intimidate or mislead users. This may take. Logsource: windows / ps_script. Rule: title: Replace Desktop Wallpaper by Powershell id: c5ac6a1e-9407-45f5-a0ce-ca9a0806a287 status: test description: 'An adversary may deface systems internal to an organization in an attempt to intimidate or mislead users. This may take the form of modifications to internal websites, or directly to user systems with the replacement of the desktop wallpaper ' references: - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1491.001/T1491.001.md author: frack113 date: 2021-12-26 tags: - attack.impact - attack.t1491.001 logsource: product: windows category: ps_script definition: 'Requirements: Script Block Logging must be enabled' detection: selection_1: ScriptBlockText|contains|all: - Get-ItemProperty - 'Registry::' - HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Control Panel\Desktop\ - WallPaper selection_2: ScriptBlockText|contains: SystemParametersInfo(20,0,*,3) condition: 1 of selection_* falsepositives: - Unknown level: low
Sigma rule: Identifies when a new cloudshell is created inside of Azure portal.. Logsource: azure / activitylogs. Rule: title: Azure New CloudShell Created id: 72af37e2-ec32-47dc-992b-bc288a2708cb status: test description: Identifies when a new cloudshell is created inside of Azure portal. references: - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/role-based-access-control/resource-provider-operations author: Austin Songer date: 2021-09-21 modified: 2022-08-23 tags: - attack.execution - attack.t1059 logsource: product: azure service: activitylogs detection: selection: operationName: MICROSOFT.PORTAL/CONSOLES/WRITE condition: selection falsepositives: - A new cloudshell may be created by a system administrator. level: medium
Sigma rule: Detects parameters used by WMImplant. Logsource: windows / ps_script. Rule: title: WMImplant Hack Tool id: 8028c2c3-e25a-46e3-827f-bbb5abf181d7 status: test description: Detects parameters used by WMImplant references: - https://github.com/FortyNorthSecurity/WMImplant author: NVISO date: 2020-03-26 modified: 2022-12-25 tags: - attack.execution - attack.t1047 - attack.t1059.001 logsource: product: windows category: ps_script definition: 'Requirements: Script Block Logging must be enabled' detection: selection: ScriptBlockText|contains: - WMImplant - ' change_user ' - ' gen_cli ' - ' command_exec ' - ' disable_wdigest ' - ' disable_winrm ' - ' enable_wdigest ' - ' enable_winrm ' - ' registry_mod ' - ' remote_posh ' - ' sched_job ' - ' service_mod ' - ' process_kill ' - ' active_users ' - ' basic_info ' - ' power_off ' - ' vacant_system ' - ' logon_events ' condition: selection falsepositives: - Administrative scripts that use the same keywords. level: high
Sigma rule: Detects the creation of a file with an uncommon extension in an Office application startup folder. Logsource: windows / file_event. Rule: title: Uncommon File Created In Office Startup Folder id: a10a2c40-2c4d-49f8-b557-1a946bc55d9d status: test description: Detects the creation of a file with an uncommon extension in an Office application startup folder references: - https://app.any.run/tasks/d6fe6624-6ef8-485d-aa75-3d1bdda2a08c/ - http://addbalance.com/word/startup.htm - https://answers.microsoft.com/en-us/msoffice/forum/all/document-in-word-startup-folder-doesnt-open-when/44ab0932-2917-4150-8cdc-2f2cf39e86f3 - https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_Microsoft_Office_filename_extensions author: frack113, Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) date: 2022-06-05 modified: 2023-12-13 tags: - attack.resource-development - attack.t1587.001 logsource: product: windows category: file_event detection: selection_word_paths: - TargetFilename|contains: \Microsoft\Word\STARTUP - TargetFilename|contains|all: - \Office - \Program Files - \STARTUP filter_exclude_word_ext: TargetFilename|endswith: - .docb - .docm - .docx - .dotm - .mdb - .mdw - .pdf - .wll - .wwl selection_excel_paths: - TargetFilename|contains: \Microsoft\Excel\XLSTART - TargetFilename|contains|all: - \Office - \Program Files - \XLSTART filter_exclude_excel_ext: TargetFilename|endswith: - .xll - .xls - .xlsm - .xlsx - .xlt - .xltm - .xlw filter_main_office_click_to_run: Image|contains: :\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\ClickToRun\ Image|endswith: \OfficeClickToRun.exe filter_main_office_apps: Image|contains: - :\Program Files\Microsoft Office\ - :\Program Files (x86)\Microsoft Office\ Image|endswith: - \winword.exe - \excel.exe condition: ((selection_word_paths and not filter_exclude_word_ext) or (selection_excel_paths and not filter_exclude_excel_ext)) and not 1 of filter_main_* falsepositives: - False positive might stem from rare extensions used by other Office utilities. level: high
Sigma rule: Detects Obfuscated Powershell via Stdin in Scripts. Logsource: windows / ps_module. Rule: title: Invoke-Obfuscation Via Stdin - PowerShell Module id: c72aca44-8d52-45ad-8f81-f96c4d3c755e related: - id: 86b896ba-ffa1-4fea-83e3-ee28a4c915c7 type: derived status: test description: Detects Obfuscated Powershell via Stdin in Scripts references: - https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/issues/1009 author: Nikita Nazarov, oscd.community date: 2020-10-12 modified: 2024-04-05 tags: - attack.stealth - attack.t1027 - attack.execution - attack.t1059.001 logsource: product: windows category: ps_module definition: 0ad03ef1-f21b-4a79-8ce8-e6900c54b65b detection: selection_4103: Payload|re: (?i)(set).*&&\s?set.*(environment|invoke|\$?\{?input).*&&.*" condition: selection_4103 falsepositives: - Unknown level: high
Sigma rule: Detects the use of the spoolss named pipe over SMB. This can be used to trigger the authentication via NTLM of any machi. Logsource: zeek / smb_files. Rule: title: SMB Spoolss Name Piped Usage id: bae2865c-5565-470d-b505-9496c87d0c30 status: test description: Detects the use of the spoolss named pipe over SMB. This can be used to trigger the authentication via NTLM of any machine that has the spoolservice enabled. references: - https://posts.specterops.io/hunting-in-active-directory-unconstrained-delegation-forests-trusts-71f2b33688e1 - https://dirkjanm.io/a-different-way-of-abusing-zerologon/ - https://twitter.com/_dirkjan/status/1309214379003588608 author: OTR (Open Threat Research), @neu5ron date: 2018-11-28 modified: 2022-10-09 tags: - attack.lateral-movement - attack.t1021.002 logsource: product: zeek service: smb_files detection: selection: path|endswith: IPC$ name: spoolss condition: selection falsepositives: - Domain Controllers that are sometimes, commonly although should not be, acting as printer servers too level: medium
Sigma rule: Detects PsExec service installation and execution events. Logsource: windows / system. Rule: title: PsExec Service Installation id: 42c575ea-e41e-41f1-b248-8093c3e82a28 status: test description: Detects PsExec service installation and execution events references: - https://www.jpcert.or.jp/english/pub/sr/ir_research.html - https://jpcertcc.github.io/ToolAnalysisResultSheet author: Thomas Patzke date: 2017-06-12 modified: 2023-08-04 tags: - attack.execution - attack.t1569.002 - attack.s0029 logsource: product: windows service: system detection: selection_eid: Provider_Name: Service Control Manager EventID: 7045 selection_service: - ServiceName: PSEXESVC - ImagePath|endswith: \PSEXESVC.exe condition: all of selection_* falsepositives: - Unknown level: medium
Sigma rule: Detects LSASS process access requests from a source process with the "dump" keyword in its image name.. Logsource: windows / process_access. Rule: title: LSASS Memory Access by Tool With Dump Keyword In Name id: 9bd012ee-0dff-44d7-84a0-aa698cfd87a3 status: test description: Detects LSASS process access requests from a source process with the "dump" keyword in its image name. references: - https://twitter.com/_xpn_/status/1491557187168178176 - https://www.ired.team/offensive-security/credential-access-and-credential-dumping/dump-credentials-from-lsass-process-without-mimikatz author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems) date: 2022-02-10 modified: 2023-11-29 tags: - attack.credential-access - attack.t1003.001 - attack.s0002 logsource: category: process_access product: windows detection: selection: TargetImage|endswith: \lsass.exe SourceImage|contains: dump GrantedAccess|endswith: - '10' - '30' - '50' - '70' - '90' - B0 - D0 - F0 - '18' - '38' - '58' - '78' - '98' - B8 - D8 - F8 - 1A - 3A - 5A - 7A - 9A - BA - DA - FA - '0x14C2' - FF condition: selection falsepositives: - Rare programs that contain the word dump in their name and access lsass level: high