alirezaaminzadeh/cybersec-retrieval-benchmark huggingface dataset:
Sigma rule: Detects the execution of DeviceCredentialDeployment to hide a process from view.. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: DeviceCredentialDeployment Execution id: b8b1b304-a60f-4999-9a6e-c547bde03ffd status: test description: 'Detects the execution of DeviceCredentialDeployment to hide a process from view. ' references: - https://github.com/LOLBAS-Project/LOLBAS/pull/147 author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) date: 2022-08-19 tags: - attack.stealth - attack.t1218 logsource: category: process_creation product: windows detection: selection: Image|endswith: \DeviceCredentialDeployment.exe condition: selection falsepositives: - Unlikely level: medium
Sigma rule: Detects potential RDP connection via Mstsc using a local ".rdp" file located in suspicious locations.. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: Suspicious Mstsc.EXE Execution With Local RDP File id: 6e22722b-dfb1-4508-a911-49ac840b40f8 status: test description: Detects potential RDP connection via Mstsc using a local ".rdp" file located in suspicious locations. references: - https://www.blackhillsinfosec.com/rogue-rdp-revisiting-initial-access-methods/ - https://web.archive.org/web/20230726144748/https://blog.thickmints.dev/mintsights/detecting-rogue-rdp/ author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) date: 2023-04-18 tags: - attack.command-and-control - attack.t1219.002 logsource: category: process_creation product: windows detection: selection_img: - Image|endswith: \mstsc.exe - OriginalFileName: mstsc.exe selection_extension: CommandLine|endswith: - .rdp - .rdp" selection_paths: CommandLine|contains: - :\Users\Public\ - :\Windows\System32\spool\drivers\color - ':\Windows\System32\Tasks_Migrated ' - :\Windows\Tasks\ - :\Windows\Temp\ - :\Windows\Tracing\ - \AppData\Local\Temp\ - \Downloads\ condition: all of selection_* falsepositives: - Likelihood is related to how often the paths are used in the environment level: high
Sigma rule: Backdooring domain object to grant the rights associated with DCSync to a regular user or machine account using Powervie. Logsource: windows / security. Rule: title: Powerview Add-DomainObjectAcl DCSync AD Extend Right id: 2c99737c-585d-4431-b61a-c911d86ff32f status: test description: Backdooring domain object to grant the rights associated with DCSync to a regular user or machine account using Powerview\Add-DomainObjectAcl DCSync Extended Right cmdlet, will allow to re-obtain the pwd hashes of any user/computer references: - https://twitter.com/menasec1/status/1111556090137903104 - https://www.specterops.io/assets/resources/an_ace_up_the_sleeve.pdf author: Samir Bousseaden, Roberto Rodriguez @Cyb3rWard0g, oscd.community, Tim Shelton, Maxence Fossat date: 2019-04-03 modified: 2022-08-16 tags: - attack.privilege-escalation - attack.persistence - attack.t1098 logsource: product: windows service: security definition: 'Requirements: The "Audit Directory Service Changes" logging policy must be configured in order to receive events. Audit events are generated only for objects with configured system access control lists (SACLs). Audit events are generated only for objects with configured system access control lists (SACLs) and only when accessed in a manner that matches their SACL settings. This policy covers the following events ids - 5136, 5137, 5138, 5139, 5141. Note that the default policy does not cover User objects. For that a custom AuditRule need to be setup (See https://github.com/OTRF/Set-AuditRule)' detection: selection: EventID: 5136 AttributeLDAPDisplayName: ntSecurityDescriptor AttributeValue|contains: - 1131f6ad-9c07-11d1-f79f-00c04fc2dcd2 - 1131f6aa-9c07-11d1-f79f-00c04fc2dcd2 - 89e95b76-444d-4c62-991a-0facbeda640c filter_main_dns_object_class: ObjectClass: - dnsNode - dnsZoneScope - dnsZone condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_* falsepositives: - New Domain Controller computer account, check user SIDs within the value attribute of event 5136 and verify if it's a regular user or DC computer account. level: high
Sigma rule: Detects a successful login to the Microsoft Intune Company Portal which could allow bypassing Conditional Access Policie. Logsource: m365 / audit. Rule: title: Azure Login Bypassing Conditional Access Policies id: 13f2d3f5-6497-44a7-bf5f-dc13ffafe5dc status: experimental description: 'Detects a successful login to the Microsoft Intune Company Portal which could allow bypassing Conditional Access Policies and InTune device trust using a tool like TokenSmith. ' author: Josh Nickels, Marius Rothenbücher references: - https://labs.jumpsec.com/tokensmith-bypassing-intune-compliant-device-conditional-access/ - https://github.com/JumpsecLabs/TokenSmith date: 2025-01-08 tags: - attack.privilege-escalation - attack.persistence - attack.initial-access - attack.stealth - attack.t1078 logsource: service: audit product: m365 detection: selection: Operation: UserLoggedIn ApplicationId: 9ba1a5c7-f17a-4de9-a1f1-6178c8d51223 ResultStatus: Success RequestType: Cmsi:Cmsi filter_main_bjectid: ObjectId: 0000000a-0000-0000-c000-000000000000 condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_* falsepositives: - Unknown level: high
Sigma rule: Detects attempts to delete the RunMRU registry key, which stores the history of commands executed via the run dialog. In. Logsource: windows / registry_delete. Rule: title: RunMRU Registry Key Deletion - Registry id: 3a9b8c1e-5b2e-4f7a-9d1c-2a7f3b6e1c55 related: - id: c11aecef-9c37-45a6-9c07-bc0782f963fd type: similar status: experimental description: 'Detects attempts to delete the RunMRU registry key, which stores the history of commands executed via the run dialog. In the clickfix techniques, the phishing lures instruct users to open a run dialog through (Win + R) and execute malicious commands. Adversaries may delete this key to cover their tracks after executing commands. ' references: - https://www.zscaler.com/blogs/security-research/coldriver-updates-arsenal-baitswitch-and-simplefix author: Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems) date: 2025-09-25 tags: - attack.stealth - attack.t1070.003 logsource: category: registry_delete product: windows detection: selection: TargetObject|endswith: \Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\RunMRU condition: selection falsepositives: - Unknown level: high regression_tests_path: regression_data/rules/windows/registry/registry_delete/registry_delete_runmru/info.yml
Sigma rule: Detects addition of users to highly privileged groups via "Net" or "Add-LocalGroupMember".. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: User Added To Highly Privileged Group id: 10fb649c-3600-4d37-b1e6-56ea90bb7e09 related: - id: ffa28e60-bdb1-46e0-9f82-05f7a61cc06e type: similar - id: ad720b90-25ad-43ff-9b5e-5c841facc8e5 type: similar status: test description: Detects addition of users to highly privileged groups via "Net" or "Add-LocalGroupMember". references: - https://www.huntress.com/blog/slashandgrab-screen-connect-post-exploitation-in-the-wild-cve-2024-1709-cve-2024-1708 author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) date: 2024-02-23 tags: - attack.privilege-escalation - attack.persistence - attack.t1098 logsource: category: process_creation product: windows detection: selection_main: - CommandLine|contains|all: - 'localgroup ' - ' /add' - CommandLine|contains|all: - 'Add-LocalGroupMember ' - ' -Group ' selection_group: CommandLine|contains: - Group Policy Creator Owners - Schema Admins condition: all of selection_* falsepositives: - Administrative activity that must be investigated level: high
Sigma rule: Detects file access requests to the the Windows Data Protection API Master keys by an uncommon application. This can be. Logsource: windows / file_access. Rule: title: Access To Windows DPAPI Master Keys By Uncommon Applications id: 46612ae6-86be-4802-bc07-39b59feb1309 status: test description: 'Detects file access requests to the the Windows Data Protection API Master keys by an uncommon application. This can be a sign of credential stealing. Example case would be usage of mimikatz "dpapi::masterkey" function ' references: - http://blog.harmj0y.net/redteaming/operational-guidance-for-offensive-user-dpapi-abuse/ - https://book.hacktricks.xyz/windows-hardening/windows-local-privilege-escalation/dpapi-extracting-passwords author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) date: 2022-10-17 modified: 2026-07-28 tags: - attack.credential-access - attack.t1555.004 logsource: category: file_access product: windows definition: 'Requirements: Microsoft-Windows-Kernel-File ETW provider' detection: selection: FileName|contains: - \Microsoft\Protect\S-1-5-18\ - \Microsoft\Protect\S-1-5-21- filter_main_system_folders: Image|startswith: - C:\Program Files\ - C:\Program Files (x86)\ - C:\Windows\system32\ - C:\Windows\SysWOW64\ filter_main_explorer: Image: C:\Windows\explorer.exe condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_* falsepositives: - Unknown level: medium
Sigma rule: Detects when an Network Zone is Deactivated or Deleted.. Logsource: okta / okta. Rule: title: Okta Network Zone Deactivated or Deleted id: 9f308120-69ed-4506-abde-ac6da81f4310 status: test description: Detects when an Network Zone is Deactivated or Deleted. references: - https://developer.okta.com/docs/reference/api/system-log/ - https://developer.okta.com/docs/reference/api/event-types/ author: Austin Songer @austinsonger date: 2021-09-12 modified: 2026-04-27 tags: - attack.impact logsource: product: okta service: okta detection: selection: eventType: - zone.deactivate - zone.delete condition: selection falsepositives: - Unknown level: medium
Sigma rule: Detects PowerShell scripts leveraging the "Invoke-WebRequest" cmdlet to send data via either "PUT" or "POST" method.. Logsource: windows / ps_script. Rule: title: PowerShell Script With File Upload Capabilities id: d2e3f2f6-7e09-4bf2-bc5d-90186809e7fb status: test description: Detects PowerShell scripts leveraging the "Invoke-WebRequest" cmdlet to send data via either "PUT" or "POST" method. references: - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1020/T1020.md - https://www.w3.org/Protocols/rfc2616/rfc2616-sec9.html - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/microsoft.powershell.utility/invoke-webrequest?view=powershell-7.4 author: frack113 date: 2022-01-07 modified: 2025-07-18 tags: - attack.exfiltration - attack.t1020 logsource: product: windows category: ps_script definition: bade5735-5ab0-4aa7-a642-a11be0e40872 detection: selection_cmdlet: ScriptBlockText|contains: - Invoke-RestMethod - Invoke-WebRequest - 'irm ' - 'iwr ' selection_flag: ScriptBlockText|contains: - -Method "POST" - -Method "PUT" - -Method POST - -Method PUT - -Method 'POST' - -Method 'PUT' condition: all of selection_* falsepositives: - Unknown level: low
Sigma rule: Detects the usage of "mstsc.exe" with the "/v" flag to initiate a connection to a remote server. Adversaries may use val. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: New Remote Desktop Connection Initiated Via Mstsc.EXE id: 954f0af7-62dd-418f-b3df-a84bc2c7a774 status: test description: 'Detects the usage of "mstsc.exe" with the "/v" flag to initiate a connection to a remote server. Adversaries may use valid accounts to log into a computer using the Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP). The adversary may then perform actions as the logged-on user. ' references: - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1021.001/T1021.001.md#t1021001---remote-desktop-protocol - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/mstsc author: frack113 date: 2022-01-07 modified: 2024-06-04 tags: - attack.lateral-movement - attack.t1021.001 logsource: category: process_creation product: windows detection: selection_img: - Image|endswith: \mstsc.exe - OriginalFileName: mstsc.exe selection_cli: CommandLine|contains|windash: ' /v:' filter_optional_wsl: ParentImage: C:\Windows\System32\lxss\wslhost.exe CommandLine|contains: C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\WSL\wslg.rdp condition: all of selection_* and not 1 of filter_optional_* falsepositives: - WSL (Windows Sub System For Linux) level: medium
Sigma rule: Detects program executions in suspicious non-program folders related to malware or hacking activity. Logsource: linux / auditd. Rule: title: Program Executions in Suspicious Folders id: a39d7fa7-3fbd-4dc2-97e1-d87f546b1bbc status: test description: Detects program executions in suspicious non-program folders related to malware or hacking activity references: - Internal Research author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems) date: 2018-01-23 modified: 2021-11-27 tags: - attack.t1587 - attack.t1584 - attack.resource-development logsource: product: linux service: auditd detection: selection: type: SYSCALL exe|startswith: - /tmp/ - /var/www/ - /home/*/public_html/ - /usr/local/apache2/ - /usr/local/httpd/ - /var/apache/ - /srv/www/ - /home/httpd/html/ - /srv/http/ - /usr/share/nginx/html/ - /var/lib/pgsql/data/ - /usr/local/mysql/data/ - /var/lib/mysql/ - /var/vsftpd/ - /etc/bind/ - /var/named/ condition: selection falsepositives: - Admin activity (especially in /tmp folders) - Crazy web applications level: medium
Sigma rule: Detects the installation of a new shim database where the file is located in a non-default location. Logsource: windows / registry_set. Rule: title: Potential Persistence Via Shim Database In Uncommon Location id: 6b6976a3-b0e6-4723-ac24-ae38a737af41 status: test description: Detects the installation of a new shim database where the file is located in a non-default location references: - https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2017/05/fin7-shim-databases-persistence.html - https://andreafortuna.org/2018/11/12/process-injection-and-persistence-using-application-shimming/ - https://www.blackhat.com/docs/asia-14/materials/Erickson/Asia-14-Erickson-Persist-It-Using-And-Abusing-Microsofts-Fix-It-Patches.pdf author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) date: 2023-08-01 modified: 2023-08-17 tags: - attack.privilege-escalation - attack.persistence - attack.t1546.011 logsource: category: registry_set product: windows detection: selection: TargetObject|contains|all: - \SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\AppCompatFlags\InstalledSDB\ - \DatabasePath filter_main_known_locations: Details|contains: :\Windows\AppPatch\Custom condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_* falsepositives: - Unknown level: high
Sigma rule: Detects the usage of particular AttributeLDAPDisplayNames, which are known for data exchange via LDAP by the tool LDAPFr. Logsource: windows / security. Rule: title: Suspicious LDAP-Attributes Used id: d00a9a72-2c09-4459-ad03-5e0a23351e36 status: test description: Detects the usage of particular AttributeLDAPDisplayNames, which are known for data exchange via LDAP by the tool LDAPFragger and are additionally not commonly used in companies. references: - https://medium.com/@ivecodoe/detecting-ldapfragger-a-newly-released-cobalt-strike-beacon-using-ldap-for-c2-communication-c274a7f00961 - https://blog.fox-it.com/2020/03/19/ldapfragger-command-and-control-over-ldap-attributes/ - https://github.com/fox-it/LDAPFragger author: xknow @xknow_infosec date: 2019-03-24 modified: 2022-10-05 tags: - attack.t1001.003 - attack.command-and-control logsource: product: windows service: security definition: The "Audit Directory Service Changes" logging policy must be configured in order to receive events. Audit events are generated only for objects with configured system access control lists (SACLs). Audit events are generated only for objects with configured system access control lists (SACLs) and only when accessed in a manner that matches their SACL settings. This policy covers the following events ids - 5136, 5137, 5138, 5139, 5141. Note that the default policy does not cover User objects. For that a custom AuditRule need to be setup (See https://github.com/OTRF/Set-AuditRule) detection: selection: EventID: 5136 AttributeValue|contains: '*' AttributeLDAPDisplayName: - primaryInternationalISDNNumber - otherFacsimileTelephoneNumber - primaryTelexNumber condition: selection falsepositives: - Companies, who may use these default LDAP-Attributes for personal information level: high
Sigma rule: Detect usage of the "driverquery" utility to perform reconnaissance on installed drivers. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: Potential Recon Activity Using DriverQuery.EXE id: 9fc3072c-dc8f-4bf7-b231-18950000fadd related: - id: a20def93-0709-4eae-9bd2-31206e21e6b2 type: similar status: test description: Detect usage of the "driverquery" utility to perform reconnaissance on installed drivers references: - https://thedfirreport.com/2023/01/09/unwrapping-ursnifs-gifts/ - https://www.vmray.com/cyber-security-blog/analyzing-ursnif-behavior-malware-sandbox/ - https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2020/01/saigon-mysterious-ursnif-fork.html author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) date: 2023-01-19 modified: 2023-09-29 tags: - attack.discovery logsource: category: process_creation product: windows detection: selection_img: - Image|endswith: driverquery.exe - OriginalFileName: drvqry.exe selection_parent: - ParentImage|endswith: - \cscript.exe - \mshta.exe - \regsvr32.exe - \rundll32.exe - \wscript.exe - ParentImage|contains: - \AppData\Local\ - \Users\Public\ - \Windows\Temp\ condition: all of selection_* falsepositives: - Legitimate usage by some scripts might trigger this as well level: high regression_tests_path: regression_data/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_driverquery_recon/info.yml
Sigma rule: Detects potential DLL sideloading of "DbgModel.dll". Logsource: windows / image_load. Rule: title: Potential DLL Sideloading Of DbgModel.DLL id: fef394cd-f44d-4040-9b18-95d92fe278c0 status: test description: Detects potential DLL sideloading of "DbgModel.dll" references: - https://hijacklibs.net/entries/microsoft/built-in/dbgmodel.html author: Gary Lobermier date: 2024-07-11 modified: 2024-07-22 tags: - attack.privilege-escalation - attack.persistence - attack.execution - attack.stealth - attack.t1574.001 logsource: product: windows category: image_load detection: selection: ImageLoaded|endswith: \dbgmodel.dll filter_main_generic: ImageLoaded|startswith: - C:\Windows\System32\ - C:\Windows\SysWOW64\ - C:\Windows\WinSxS\ filter_optional_windbg: ImageLoaded|startswith: C:\Program Files\WindowsApps\Microsoft.WinDbg_ filter_optional_windows_kits: ImageLoaded|startswith: - C:\Program Files (x86)\Windows Kits\ - C:\Program Files\Windows Kits\ condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_* and not 1 of filter_optional_* falsepositives: - Legitimate applications loading their own versions of the DLL mentioned in this rule level: medium
Sigma rule: Detects unusual parent or children of the ImagingDevices.exe (Windows Contacts) process as seen being used with Bumblebe. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: ImagingDevices Unusual Parent/Child Processes id: f11f2808-adb4-46c0-802a-8660db50fa99 status: test description: Detects unusual parent or children of the ImagingDevices.exe (Windows Contacts) process as seen being used with Bumblebee activity references: - https://thedfirreport.com/2022/09/26/bumblebee-round-two/ author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) date: 2022-09-27 modified: 2022-12-29 tags: - attack.execution - attack.stealth logsource: category: process_creation product: windows detection: selection_parent: ParentImage|endswith: - \WmiPrvSE.exe - \svchost.exe - \dllhost.exe Image|endswith: \ImagingDevices.exe selection_child: ParentImage|endswith: \ImagingDevices.exe condition: 1 of selection_* falsepositives: - Unknown level: high
Sigma rule: Detects Executables in the Downloads folder without FileVersion,Description,Product,Company likely created with py2exe. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: Suspicious File Characteristics Due to Missing Fields id: 9637e8a5-7131-4f7f-bdc7-2b05d8670c43 status: test description: Detects Executables in the Downloads folder without FileVersion,Description,Product,Company likely created with py2exe references: - https://securelist.com/muddywater/88059/ - https://www.virustotal.com/#/file/276a765a10f98cda1a38d3a31e7483585ca3722ecad19d784441293acf1b7beb/detection author: Markus Neis, Sander Wiebing date: 2018-11-22 modified: 2022-10-09 tags: - attack.execution - attack.t1059.006 logsource: product: windows category: process_creation detection: selection1: Description: \? FileVersion: \? selection2: Description: \? Product: \? selection3: Description: \? Company: \? folder: Image|contains: \Downloads\ condition: (selection1 or selection2 or selection3) and folder falsepositives: - Unknown level: medium
Sigma rule: Detects registry key established after masqueraded .scr file execution using Rundll32 through desk.cpl. Logsource: windows / registry_set. Rule: title: ScreenSaver Registry Key Set id: 40b6e656-4e11-4c0c-8772-c1cc6dae34ce status: test description: Detects registry key established after masqueraded .scr file execution using Rundll32 through desk.cpl references: - https://twitter.com/VakninHai/status/1517027824984547329 - https://twitter.com/pabraeken/status/998627081360695297 - https://jstnk9.github.io/jstnk9/research/InstallScreenSaver-SCR-files author: Jose Luis Sanchez Martinez (@Joseliyo_Jstnk) date: 2022-05-04 modified: 2023-08-17 tags: - attack.stealth - attack.t1218.011 logsource: product: windows category: registry_set detection: selection: Image|endswith: \rundll32.exe registry: TargetObject|contains: \Control Panel\Desktop\SCRNSAVE.EXE Details|endswith: .scr filter: Details|contains: - C:\Windows\System32\ - C:\Windows\SysWOW64\ condition: selection and registry and not filter falsepositives: - Legitimate use of screen saver level: medium