alirezaaminzadeh/cybersec-retrieval-benchmark huggingface dataset:
Sigma rule: Detects the creation of a named pipe as used by CobaltStrike. Logsource: windows / pipe_created. Rule: title: CobaltStrike Named Pipe id: d5601f8c-b26f-4ab0-9035-69e11a8d4ad2 related: - id: 85adeb13-4fc9-4e68-8a4a-c7cb2c336eb7 type: similar - id: 0e7163d4-9e19-4fa7-9be6-000c61aad77a type: similar status: test description: Detects the creation of a named pipe as used by CobaltStrike references: - https://twitter.com/d4rksystem/status/1357010969264873472 - https://labs.f-secure.com/blog/detecting-cobalt-strike-default-modules-via-named-pipe-analysis/ - https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/issues/253 - https://blog.cobaltstrike.com/2021/02/09/learn-pipe-fitting-for-all-of-your-offense-projects/ - https://redcanary.com/threat-detection-report/threats/cobalt-strike/ author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Wojciech Lesicki date: 2021-05-25 modified: 2022-10-31 tags: - attack.privilege-escalation - attack.stealth - attack.t1055 logsource: product: windows category: pipe_created definition: Note that you have to configure logging for Named Pipe Events in Sysmon config (Event ID 17 and Event ID 18). The basic configuration is in popular sysmon configuration (https://github.com/SwiftOnSecurity/sysmon-config), but it is worth verifying. You can also use other repo, e.g. https://github.com/Neo23x0/sysmon-config, https://github.com/olafhartong/sysmon-modular. How to test detection? You can always use Cobalt Strike, but also you can check powershell script from this site https://svch0st.medium.com/guide-to-named-pipes-and-hunting-for-cobalt-strike-pipes-dc46b2c5f575 detection: selection_MSSE: PipeName|contains|all: - \MSSE- - -server selection_postex: PipeName|startswith: \postex_ selection_status: PipeName|startswith: \status_ selection_msagent: PipeName|startswith: \msagent_ selection_mojo: PipeName|startswith: \mojo_ selection_interprocess: PipeName|startswith: \interprocess_ selection_samr: PipeName|startswith: \samr_ selection_netlogon: PipeName|startswith: \netlogon_ selection_srvsvc: PipeName|startswith: \srvsvc_ selection_lsarpc: PipeName|startswith: \lsarpc_ selection_wkssvc: PipeName|startswith: \wkssvc_ condition: 1 of selection* falsepositives: - Unknown level: critical
Sigma rule: This rule will collect the data needed to start looking into possible kerberoasting activity. Further analysis or comput. Logsource: windows / security. Rule: title: Kerberoasting Activity - Initial Query id: d04ae2b8-ad54-4de0-bd87-4bc1da66aa59 status: test description: 'This rule will collect the data needed to start looking into possible kerberoasting activity. Further analysis or computation within the query is needed focusing on requests from one specific host/IP towards multiple service names within a time period of 5 seconds. You can then set a threshold for the number of requests and time between the requests to turn this into an alert. ' references: - https://www.trustedsec.com/blog/art_of_kerberoast/ - https://adsecurity.org/?p=3513 author: '@kostastsale' date: 2022-01-21 modified: 2025-10-19 tags: - attack.credential-access - attack.t1558.003 logsource: product: windows service: security detection: selection: EventID: 4769 Status: '0x0' TicketEncryptionType: '0x17' filter_main_krbtgt: ServiceName|endswith: - krbtgt - $ filter_main_machine_accounts: TargetUserName|contains: $@ condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_* falsepositives: - Legacy applications. level: medium
Sigma rule: Detects System Information Discovery commands. Logsource: linux / auditd. Rule: title: System Information Discovery - Auditd id: f34047d9-20d3-4e8b-8672-0a35cc50dc71 status: test description: Detects System Information Discovery commands references: - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f296668303c29d3f4c07e42bdd2b28d8dd6625f9/atomics/T1082/T1082.md author: Pawel Mazur date: 2021-09-03 modified: 2023-03-06 tags: - attack.discovery - attack.t1082 logsource: product: linux service: auditd detection: selection_1: type: PATH name: - /etc/lsb-release - /etc/redhat-release - /etc/issue selection_2: type: EXECVE a0: - uname - uptime - lsmod - hostname - env selection_3: type: EXECVE a0: grep a1|contains: - vbox - vm - xen - virtio - hv selection_4: type: EXECVE a0: kmod a1: list condition: 1 of selection_* falsepositives: - Likely level: low
Sigma rule: Detects the presence of reversed PowerShell commands in the CommandLine. This is often used as a method of obfuscation b. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: Potential PowerShell Obfuscation Via Reversed Commands id: b6b49cd1-34d6-4ead-b1bf-176e9edba9a4 status: test description: Detects the presence of reversed PowerShell commands in the CommandLine. This is often used as a method of obfuscation by attackers references: - https://2019.offzone.moscow/ru/report/hunting-for-powershell-abuses/ - https://speakerdeck.com/heirhabarov/hunting-for-powershell-abuse?slide=66 author: Teymur Kheirkhabarov (idea), Vasiliy Burov (rule), oscd.community, Tim Shelton date: 2020-10-11 modified: 2023-05-31 tags: - attack.stealth - attack.t1027 - attack.execution - attack.t1059.001 logsource: category: process_creation product: windows detection: selection_img: - Image|endswith: - \powershell.exe - \pwsh.exe - OriginalFileName: - PowerShell.EXE - pwsh.dll selection_cli: CommandLine|contains: - hctac - kaerb - dnammoc - ekovn - eliFd - rahc - etirw - golon - tninon - eddih - tpircS - ssecorp - llehsrewop - esnopser - daolnwod - tneilCbeW - tneilc - ptth - elifotevas - 46esab - htaPpmeTteG - tcejbO - maerts - hcaerof - retupmoc filter_main_encoded_keyword: CommandLine|contains: - ' -EncodedCommand ' - ' -enc ' condition: all of selection_* and not 1 of filter_main_* falsepositives: - Unlikely level: high
Sigma rule: Detects NetNTLM downgrade attack. Logsource: windows / registry_event. Rule: title: NetNTLM Downgrade Attack - Registry id: d67572a0-e2ec-45d6-b8db-c100d14b8ef2 status: test description: Detects NetNTLM downgrade attack references: - https://web.archive.org/web/20171113231705/https://www.optiv.com/blog/post-exploitation-using-netntlm-downgrade-attacks - https://www.ultimatewindowssecurity.com/wiki/page.aspx?spid=NSrpcservers author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), wagga, Nasreddine Bencherchali (Splunk STRT) date: 2018-03-20 modified: 2024-12-03 tags: - attack.persistence - attack.defense-impairment - attack.t1685 - attack.t1112 logsource: product: windows category: registry_event detection: selection_regkey: TargetObject|contains|all: - SYSTEM\ - ControlSet - \Control\Lsa selection_value_lmcompatibilitylevel: TargetObject|endswith: \lmcompatibilitylevel Details: - DWORD (0x00000000) - DWORD (0x00000001) - DWORD (0x00000002) selection_value_ntlmminclientsec: TargetObject|endswith: \NtlmMinClientSec Details: - DWORD (0x00000000) - DWORD (0x00000010) - DWORD (0x00000020) - DWORD (0x00000030) selection_value_restrictsendingntlmtraffic: TargetObject|endswith: \RestrictSendingNTLMTraffic condition: selection_regkey and 1 of selection_value_* falsepositives: - Services or tools that set the values to more restrictive values level: high
Sigma rule: Detects the pattern of UAC Bypass using IEInstal.exe (UACMe 64). Logsource: windows / file_event. Rule: title: UAC Bypass Using IEInstal - File id: bdd8157d-8e85-4397-bb82-f06cc9c71dbb status: test description: Detects the pattern of UAC Bypass using IEInstal.exe (UACMe 64) references: - https://github.com/hfiref0x/UACME author: Christian Burkard (Nextron Systems) date: 2021-08-30 modified: 2022-10-09 tags: - attack.privilege-escalation - attack.t1548.002 logsource: category: file_event product: windows detection: selection: Image: C:\Program Files\Internet Explorer\IEInstal.exe TargetFilename|startswith: C:\Users\ TargetFilename|contains: \AppData\Local\Temp\ TargetFilename|endswith: consent.exe condition: selection falsepositives: - Unknown level: high
Sigma rule: Detects well-known credential dumping tools execution via specific named pipe creation. Logsource: windows / pipe_created. Rule: title: HackTool - Credential Dumping Tools Named Pipe Created id: 961d0ba2-3eea-4303-a930-2cf78bbfcc5e status: test description: Detects well-known credential dumping tools execution via specific named pipe creation references: - https://www.slideshare.net/heirhabarov/hunting-for-credentials-dumping-in-windows-environment - https://image.slidesharecdn.com/zeronights2017kheirkhabarov-171118103000/75/hunting-for-credentials-dumping-in-windows-environment-57-2048.jpg?cb=1666035799 author: Teymur Kheirkhabarov, oscd.community date: 2019-11-01 modified: 2023-08-07 tags: - attack.credential-access - attack.t1003.001 - attack.t1003.002 - attack.t1003.004 - attack.t1003.005 logsource: product: windows category: pipe_created definition: Note that you have to configure logging for Named Pipe Events in Sysmon config (Event ID 17 and Event ID 18). The basic configuration is in popular sysmon configuration (https://github.com/SwiftOnSecurity/sysmon-config), but it is worth verifying. You can also use other repo, e.g. https://github.com/Neo23x0/sysmon-config, https://github.com/olafhartong/sysmon-modular. How to test detection? You can check powershell script from this site https://svch0st.medium.com/guide-to-named-pipes-and-hunting-for-cobalt-strike-pipes-dc46b2c5f575 detection: selection: PipeName|contains: - \cachedump - \lsadump - \wceservicepipe condition: selection falsepositives: - Legitimate Administrator using tool for password recovery level: critical
Sigma rule: Detects commands that indicate a Raccine removal from an end system. Raccine is a free ransomware protection tool.. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: Raccine Uninstall id: a31eeaed-3fd5-478e-a8ba-e62c6b3f9ecc status: test description: Detects commands that indicate a Raccine removal from an end system. Raccine is a free ransomware protection tool. references: - https://github.com/Neo23x0/Raccine author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems) date: 2021-01-21 modified: 2022-10-09 tags: - attack.defense-impairment - attack.t1685 logsource: category: process_creation product: windows detection: selection1: CommandLine|contains|all: - 'taskkill ' - RaccineSettings.exe selection2: CommandLine|contains|all: - reg.exe - delete - Raccine Tray selection3: CommandLine|contains|all: - schtasks - /DELETE - Raccine Rules Updater condition: 1 of selection* falsepositives: - Legitimate deinstallation by administrative staff level: high
Sigma rule: Detects when an attacker tries to modify an already existing scheduled tasks to run from a suspicious location Attackers. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: Suspicious Modification Of Scheduled Tasks id: 1c0e41cd-21bb-4433-9acc-4a2cd6367b9b related: - id: 614cf376-6651-47c4-9dcc-6b9527f749f4 type: similar status: test description: 'Detects when an attacker tries to modify an already existing scheduled tasks to run from a suspicious location Attackers can create a simple looking task in order to avoid detection on creation as it''s often the most focused on Instead they modify the task after creation to include their malicious payload ' references: - Internal Research - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/schtasks author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) date: 2022-07-28 modified: 2022-11-18 tags: - attack.privilege-escalation - attack.persistence - attack.execution - attack.t1053.005 logsource: product: windows category: process_creation detection: selection_schtasks: Image|endswith: \schtasks.exe CommandLine|contains|all: - ' /Change ' - ' /TN ' selection_susp_locations: CommandLine|contains: - \AppData\Local\Temp - \AppData\Roaming\ - \Users\Public\ - \WINDOWS\Temp\ - \Desktop\ - \Downloads\ - \Temporary Internet - C:\ProgramData\ - C:\Perflogs\ - '%ProgramData%' - '%appdata%' - '%comspec%' - '%localappdata%' selection_susp_images: CommandLine|contains: - regsvr32 - rundll32 - 'cmd /c ' - 'cmd /k ' - 'cmd /r ' - 'cmd.exe /c ' - 'cmd.exe /k ' - 'cmd.exe /r ' - powershell - mshta - wscript - cscript - certutil - bitsadmin - bash.exe - 'bash ' - scrcons - 'wmic ' - wmic.exe - forfiles - scriptrunner - hh.exe - 'hh ' condition: all of selection_* falsepositives: - Unknown level: high
Sigma rule: Detects DLLs loading from a spoofed Windows directory path with an extra space (e.g "C:\Windows \System32") which can by. Logsource: windows / image_load. Rule: title: Trusted Path Bypass via Windows Directory Spoofing id: 0cbe38c0-270c-41d9-ab79-6e5a9a669290 related: - id: 4ac47ed3-44c2-4b1f-9d51-bf46e8914126 type: similar status: experimental description: 'Detects DLLs loading from a spoofed Windows directory path with an extra space (e.g "C:\Windows \System32") which can bypass Windows trusted path verification. This technique tricks Windows into treating the path as trusted, allowing malicious DLLs to load with high integrity privileges bypassing UAC. ' references: - https://x.com/Wietze/status/1933495426952421843 author: Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems) date: 2025-06-17 tags: - attack.persistence - attack.privilege-escalation - attack.execution - attack.stealth - attack.t1574.007 - attack.t1548.002 logsource: category: image_load product: windows detection: selection: ImageLoaded|contains: - :\Windows \System32\ - :\Windows \SysWOW64\ condition: selection falsepositives: - Unlikely level: high
Sigma rule: Detects potential DLL sideloading of "libcurl.dll" by the "gup.exe" process from an uncommon location. Logsource: windows / image_load. Rule: title: Potential DLL Sideloading Of Libcurl.DLL Via GUP.EXE id: e49b5745-1064-4ac1-9a2e-f687bc2dd37e status: test description: Detects potential DLL sideloading of "libcurl.dll" by the "gup.exe" process from an uncommon location references: - https://labs.withsecure.com/publications/fin7-target-veeam-servers author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) date: 2023-05-05 tags: - attack.persistence - attack.privilege-escalation - attack.execution - attack.stealth - attack.t1574.001 logsource: category: image_load product: windows detection: selection: Image|endswith: \gup.exe ImageLoaded|endswith: \libcurl.dll filter_main_notepad_plusplus: Image|endswith: \Notepad++\updater\GUP.exe condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_* falsepositives: - Unknown level: medium
Sigma rule: Detects uncommon or suspicious child processes of "eventvwr.exe" which might indicate a UAC bypass attempt. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: Potentially Suspicious Event Viewer Child Process id: be344333-921d-4c4d-8bb8-e584cf584780 related: - id: 7c81fec3-1c1d-43b0-996a-46753041b1b6 type: derived status: test description: Detects uncommon or suspicious child processes of "eventvwr.exe" which might indicate a UAC bypass attempt references: - https://enigma0x3.net/2016/08/15/fileless-uac-bypass-using-eventvwr-exe-and-registry-hijacking/ - https://www.hybrid-analysis.com/sample/e122bc8bf291f15cab182a5d2d27b8db1e7019e4e96bb5cdbd1dfe7446f3f51f?environmentId=100 author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems) date: 2017-03-19 modified: 2023-09-28 tags: - attack.privilege-escalation - attack.t1548.002 - car.2019-04-001 logsource: category: process_creation product: windows detection: selection: ParentImage|endswith: \eventvwr.exe filter_main_generic: Image|endswith: - :\Windows\System32\mmc.exe - :\Windows\System32\WerFault.exe - :\Windows\SysWOW64\WerFault.exe condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_* falsepositives: - Unknown level: high
Sigma rule: Detects the addition of a new rule to the Windows firewall via netsh. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: New Firewall Rule Added Via Netsh.EXE id: cd5cfd80-aa5f-44c0-9c20-108c4ae12e3c status: test description: Detects the addition of a new rule to the Windows firewall via netsh references: - https://web.archive.org/web/20190508165435/https://www.operationblockbuster.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/Operation-Blockbuster-RAT-and-Staging-Report.pdf author: Markus Neis, Sander Wiebing date: 2019-01-29 modified: 2023-02-10 tags: - attack.defense-impairment - attack.t1686.003 - attack.s0246 logsource: category: process_creation product: windows detection: selection_img: - Image|endswith: \netsh.exe - OriginalFileName: netsh.exe selection_cli: CommandLine|contains|all: - ' firewall ' - ' add ' filter_optional_dropbox: CommandLine|contains: - advfirewall firewall add rule name=Dropbox dir=in action=allow "program=?:\Program Files (x86)\Dropbox\Client\Dropbox.exe" enable=yes profile=Any - advfirewall firewall add rule name=Dropbox dir=in action=allow "program=?:\Program Files\Dropbox\Client\Dropbox.exe" enable=yes profile=Any condition: all of selection_* and not 1 of filter_optional_* falsepositives: - Legitimate administration activity - Software installations level: medium
Sigma rule: Detects possible execution via LNK file accessed on a WebDAV server.. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: Potentially Suspicious WebDAV LNK Execution id: 1412aa78-a24c-4abd-83df-767dfb2c5bbe related: - id: f0507c0f-a3a2-40f5-acc6-7f543c334993 type: similar status: test description: Detects possible execution via LNK file accessed on a WebDAV server. references: - https://www.trellix.com/en-us/about/newsroom/stories/research/beyond-file-search-a-novel-method.html - https://micahbabinski.medium.com/search-ms-webdav-and-chill-99c5b23ac462 author: Micah Babinski date: 2023-08-21 tags: - attack.execution - attack.t1059.001 - attack.t1204 logsource: category: process_creation product: windows detection: selection: ParentImage|endswith: \explorer.exe Image|endswith: - \cmd.exe - \cscript.exe - \mshta.exe - \powershell.exe - \pwsh.exe - \wscript.exe CommandLine|contains: \DavWWWRoot\ condition: selection falsepositives: - Unknown level: medium
Sigma rule: Detects when an attacker calls the "ALTER SERVER AUDIT" or "DROP SERVER AUDIT" transaction in order to delete or disable. Logsource: windows / application. Rule: title: MSSQL Disable Audit Settings id: 350dfb37-3706-4cdc-9e2e-5e24bc3a46df status: test description: Detects when an attacker calls the "ALTER SERVER AUDIT" or "DROP SERVER AUDIT" transaction in order to delete or disable audit logs on the server references: - https://www.netspi.com/blog/technical/network-penetration-testing/sql-server-persistence-part-1-startup-stored-procedures/ - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/sql/t-sql/statements/drop-server-audit-transact-sql?view=sql-server-ver16 - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/sql/t-sql/statements/alter-server-audit-transact-sql?view=sql-server-ver16 author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) date: 2022-07-13 modified: 2024-06-26 tags: - attack.defense-impairment logsource: product: windows service: application definition: 'Requirements: MSSQL audit policy must be enabled in order to receive this event in the application log' detection: selection: Provider_Name|contains: MSSQL EventID: 33205 Data|contains: - statement:ALTER SERVER AUDIT - statement:DROP SERVER AUDIT condition: selection falsepositives: - This event should only fire when an administrator is modifying the audit policy. Which should be a rare occurrence once it's set up level: high
Sigma rule: Detects the presence of a registry key created during Azorult execution. Logsource: windows / registry_event. Rule: title: Registry Entries For Azorult Malware id: f7f9ab88-7557-4a69-b30e-0a8f91b3a0e7 status: test description: Detects the presence of a registry key created during Azorult execution references: - https://www.trendmicro.com/vinfo/us/threat-encyclopedia/malware/trojan.win32.azoruit.a author: Trent Liffick date: 2020-05-08 modified: 2021-11-27 tags: - attack.persistence - attack.execution - attack.defense-impairment - attack.t1112 logsource: product: windows category: registry_event detection: selection: EventID: - 12 - 13 TargetObject|contains: SYSTEM\ TargetObject|endswith: \services\localNETService condition: selection falsepositives: - Unknown level: critical
Sigma rule: Detects PowerShell download and execution cradles.. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: PowerShell Download and Execution Cradles id: 85b0b087-eddf-4a2b-b033-d771fa2b9775 status: test description: Detects PowerShell download and execution cradles. references: - https://github.com/VirtualAlllocEx/Payload-Download-Cradles/blob/88e8eca34464a547c90d9140d70e9866dcbc6a12/Download-Cradles.cmd - https://labs.withsecure.com/publications/fin7-target-veeam-servers author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems) date: 2022-03-24 modified: 2025-07-18 tags: - attack.execution - attack.t1059 logsource: product: windows category: process_creation detection: selection_download: CommandLine|contains: - .DownloadString( - .DownloadFile( - 'Invoke-WebRequest ' - 'iwr ' - 'Invoke-RestMethod ' - 'irm ' selection_iex: CommandLine|contains: - ;iex $ - '| IEX' - '|IEX ' - I`E`X - I`EX - IE`X - 'iex ' - IEX ( - IEX( - Invoke-Expression condition: all of selection_* falsepositives: - Some PowerShell installers were seen using similar combinations. Apply filters accordingly level: high
Sigma rule: Detects execution of rundll32 where the DLL being called is stored in an Alternate Data Stream (ADS).. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: Potential Rundll32 Execution With DLL Stored In ADS id: 9248c7e1-2bf3-4661-a22c-600a8040b446 status: test description: Detects execution of rundll32 where the DLL being called is stored in an Alternate Data Stream (ADS). references: - https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Rundll32 author: Harjot Singh, '@cyb3rjy0t' date: 2023-01-21 modified: 2026-03-16 tags: - attack.stealth - attack.t1564.004 logsource: category: process_creation product: windows detection: selection_img: - Image|endswith: \rundll32.exe - OriginalFileName: RUNDLL32.EXE selection_cli: CommandLine|re: '[Rr][Uu][Nn][Dd][Ll][Ll]32(?:\.[Ee][Xx][Ee])? \S+?\w:\S+?:' condition: all of selection_* falsepositives: - Unknown level: high
Sigma rule: Detects files dropped by Winnti as described in RedMimicry Winnti playbook. Logsource: windows / file_event. Rule: title: Potential Winnti Dropper Activity id: 130c9e58-28ac-4f83-8574-0a4cc913b97e status: test description: Detects files dropped by Winnti as described in RedMimicry Winnti playbook references: - https://redmimicry.com/posts/redmimicry-winnti/#dropper author: Alexander Rausch date: 2020-06-24 modified: 2023-01-05 tags: - attack.stealth - attack.t1027 logsource: product: windows category: file_event detection: selection: TargetFilename|endswith: - \gthread-3.6.dll - \sigcmm-2.4.dll - \Windows\Temp\tmp.bat condition: selection falsepositives: - Unknown level: high
Sigma rule: Identifies when sensitive information is re-identified in google Cloud.. Logsource: gcp / gcp.audit. Rule: title: Google Cloud Re-identifies Sensitive Information id: 234f9f48-904b-4736-a34c-55d23919e4b7 status: test description: Identifies when sensitive information is re-identified in google Cloud. references: - https://cloud.google.com/dlp/docs/reference/rest/v2/projects.content/reidentify author: Austin Songer @austinsonger date: 2021-08-15 modified: 2022-10-09 tags: - attack.impact - attack.t1565 logsource: product: gcp service: gcp.audit detection: selection: gcp.audit.method_name: projects.content.reidentify condition: selection falsepositives: - Unknown level: medium
Sigma rule: Detects a DNS server error in which a specified plugin DLL (in registry) could not be loaded. Logsource: windows / dns-server. Rule: title: DNS Server Error Failed Loading the ServerLevelPluginDLL id: cbe51394-cd93-4473-b555-edf0144952d9 related: - id: e61e8a88-59a9-451c-874e-70fcc9740d67 type: derived - id: f63b56ee-3f79-4b8a-97fb-5c48007e8573 type: derived status: test description: Detects a DNS server error in which a specified plugin DLL (in registry) could not be loaded references: - https://medium.com/@esnesenon/feature-not-bug-dnsadmin-to-dc-compromise-in-one-line-a0f779b8dc83 - https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc735829(v=ws.10).aspx - https://twitter.com/gentilkiwi/status/861641945944391680 author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems) date: 2017-05-08 modified: 2023-02-05 tags: - attack.privilege-escalation - attack.persistence - attack.execution - attack.stealth - attack.t1574.001 logsource: product: windows service: dns-server detection: selection: EventID: - 150 - 770 - 771 condition: selection falsepositives: - Unknown level: high