alirezaaminzadeh/cybersec-retrieval-benchmark huggingface dataset:
Sigma rule: Detects a user certificate that was valid but could not be mapped to a user in a strong way (such as via explicit mappin. Logsource: windows / system. Rule: title: Certificate Use With No Strong Mapping id: 993c2665-e6ef-40e3-a62a-e1a97686af79 status: test description: 'Detects a user certificate that was valid but could not be mapped to a user in a strong way (such as via explicit mapping, key trust mapping, or a SID) This could be a sign of exploitation of the elevation of privilege vulnerabilities (CVE-2022-34691, CVE-2022-26931, CVE-2022-26923) that can occur when the KDC allows certificate spoofing by not requiring a strong mapping. Events where the AccountName and CN of the Subject do not match, or where the CN ends in a dollar sign indicating a machine, may indicate certificate spoofing. ' references: - https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/topic/kb5014754-certificate-based-authentication-changes-on-windows-domain-controllers-ad2c23b0-15d8-4340-a468-4d4f3b188f16 author: '@br4dy5' date: 2023-10-09 modified: 2025-09-22 tags: - attack.privilege-escalation logsource: product: windows service: system detection: selection: Provider_Name: - Kerberos-Key-Distribution-Center - Microsoft-Windows-Kerberos-Key-Distribution-Center EventID: - 39 - 41 condition: selection falsepositives: - If prevalent in the environment, filter on events where the AccountName and CN of the Subject do not reference the same user - If prevalent in the environment, filter on CNs that end in a dollar sign indicating it is a machine name level: medium
Sigma rule: Detects the execution of a renamed "Msdt.exe" binary. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: Renamed Msdt.EXE Execution id: bd1c6866-65fc-44b2-be51-5588fcff82b9 status: test description: Detects the execution of a renamed "Msdt.exe" binary references: - https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Msdt/ author: pH-T (Nextron Systems) date: 2022-06-03 modified: 2023-02-03 tags: - attack.stealth - attack.t1036.003 logsource: category: process_creation product: windows detection: selection: OriginalFileName: msdt.exe filter: Image|endswith: \msdt.exe condition: selection and not filter falsepositives: - Unlikely level: high regression_tests_path: regression_data/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_renamed_msdt/info.yml
Sigma rule: Detects instances where an HTTP service on an OpenCanary node has received a GET request.. Logsource: opencanary / application. Rule: title: OpenCanary - HTTP GET Request id: af6c3078-84cd-4c68-8842-08b76bd81b13 status: test description: Detects instances where an HTTP service on an OpenCanary node has received a GET request. references: - https://opencanary.readthedocs.io/en/latest/starting/configuration.html#services-configuration - https://github.com/thinkst/opencanary/blob/a0896adfcaf0328cfd5829fe10d2878c7445138e/opencanary/logger.py#L52 author: Security Onion Solutions date: 2024-03-08 tags: - attack.initial-access - attack.t1190 logsource: category: application product: opencanary detection: selection: logtype: 3000 condition: selection falsepositives: - Unlikely level: high
Sigma rule: An adversary might use WMI to discover information about the system, such as the volume name, size, free space, and othe. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: System Disk And Volume Reconnaissance Via Wmic.EXE id: c79da740-5030-45ec-a2e0-479e824a562c related: - id: d85ecdd7-b855-4e6e-af59-d9c78b5b861e type: similar status: test description: 'An adversary might use WMI to discover information about the system, such as the volume name, size, free space, and other disk information. This can be done using the ''wmic'' command-line utility and has been observed being used by threat actors such as Volt Typhoon. ' references: - https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/cybersecurity-advisories/aa23-144a - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/wmic author: Stephen Lincoln '@slincoln-aiq' (AttackIQ) date: 2024-02-02 modified: 2025-10-20 tags: - attack.execution - attack.discovery - attack.t1047 - attack.t1082 logsource: category: process_creation product: windows detection: selection_img: - Image|endswith: \WMIC.exe - OriginalFileName: wmic.exe selection_cli: - CommandLine|contains: - ' volumename' - ' logicaldisk' - CommandLine|contains|all: - path - win32_logicaldisk - CommandLine|contains|all: - ' volume' - ' list ' condition: all of selection_* falsepositives: - Unknown level: medium regression_tests_path: regression_data/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_wmic_recon_volume/info.yml
Sigma rule: Detects suspicious child processes spawning from microsoft office suite applications such as word or excel. This could i. Logsource: macos / process_creation. Rule: title: Suspicious Microsoft Office Child Process - MacOS id: 69483748-1525-4a6c-95ca-90dc8d431b68 status: test description: Detects suspicious child processes spawning from microsoft office suite applications such as word or excel. This could indicates malicious macro execution references: - https://redcanary.com/blog/applescript/ - https://objective-see.org/blog/blog_0x4B.html author: Sohan G (D4rkCiph3r) date: 2023-01-31 modified: 2023-02-04 tags: - attack.execution - attack.persistence - attack.t1059.002 - attack.t1137.002 - attack.t1204.002 logsource: product: macos category: process_creation detection: selection: ParentImage|contains: - Microsoft Word - Microsoft Excel - Microsoft PowerPoint - Microsoft OneNote Image|endswith: - /bash - /curl - /dash - /fish - /osacompile - /osascript - /sh - /zsh - /python - /python3 - /wget condition: selection falsepositives: - Unknown level: high
Sigma rule: Detects an attacker trying to enable the outlook security setting "EnableUnsafeClientMailRules" which allows outlook to. Logsource: windows / registry_set. Rule: title: Outlook EnableUnsafeClientMailRules Setting Enabled - Registry id: 6763c6c8-bd01-4687-bc8d-4fa52cf8ba08 related: - id: c3cefdf4-6703-4e1c-bad8-bf422fc5015a type: similar - id: 55f0a3a1-846e-40eb-8273-677371b8d912 type: similar status: test description: Detects an attacker trying to enable the outlook security setting "EnableUnsafeClientMailRules" which allows outlook to run applications or execute macros references: - https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/topic/how-to-control-the-rule-actions-to-start-an-application-or-run-a-macro-in-outlook-2016-and-outlook-2013-e4964b72-173c-959d-5d7b-ead562979048 - https://speakerdeck.com/heirhabarov/hunting-for-persistence-via-microsoft-exchange-server-or-outlook?slide=44 author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) date: 2023-02-08 modified: 2023-08-17 tags: - attack.persistence - attack.defense-impairment - attack.t1112 logsource: category: registry_set product: windows detection: selection: TargetObject|endswith: \Outlook\Security\EnableUnsafeClientMailRules Details: DWORD (0x00000001) condition: selection falsepositives: - Unknown level: high
Sigma rule: User has indicated they haven't instigated the MFA prompt and could indicate an attacker has the password for the accoun. Logsource: azure / signinlogs. Rule: title: Multifactor Authentication Denied id: e40f4962-b02b-4192-9bfe-245f7ece1f99 status: test description: User has indicated they haven't instigated the MFA prompt and could indicate an attacker has the password for the account. references: - https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2022/03/22/dev-0537-criminal-actor-targeting-organizations-for-data-exfiltration-and-destruction/ author: AlertIQ date: 2022-03-24 tags: - attack.privilege-escalation - attack.persistence - attack.initial-access - attack.credential-access - attack.stealth - attack.t1078.004 - attack.t1110 - attack.t1621 logsource: product: azure service: signinlogs detection: selection: AuthenticationRequirement: multiFactorAuthentication Status|contains: MFA Denied condition: selection falsepositives: - Users actually login but miss-click into the Deny button when MFA prompt. level: medium
Sigma rule: Detects BGP failures which may be indicative of brute force attacks to manipulate routing.. Logsource: huawei / bgp. Rule: title: Huawei BGP Authentication Failures id: a557ffe6-ac54-43d2-ae69-158027082350 status: test description: Detects BGP failures which may be indicative of brute force attacks to manipulate routing. references: - https://www.blackhat.com/presentations/bh-usa-03/bh-us-03-convery-franz-v3.pdf author: Tim Brown date: 2023-01-09 modified: 2023-01-23 tags: - attack.initial-access - attack.persistence - attack.privilege-escalation - attack.credential-access - attack.collection - attack.stealth - attack.t1078 - attack.t1110 - attack.t1557 logsource: product: huawei service: bgp definition: 'Requirements: huawei bgp logs need to be enabled and ingested' detection: keywords_bgp_huawei: '|all': - :179 - BGP_AUTH_FAILED condition: keywords_bgp_huawei falsepositives: - Unlikely. Except due to misconfigurations level: low
Sigma rule: Detects usage of the "sc.exe" utility adding a new service with special permission seen used by threat actors which make. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: Service DACL Abuse To Hide Services Via Sc.EXE id: a537cfc3-4297-4789-92b5-345bfd845ad0 related: - id: 99cf1e02-00fb-4c0d-8375-563f978dfd37 type: similar - id: 98c5aeef-32d5-492f-b174-64a691896d25 type: similar status: test description: Detects usage of the "sc.exe" utility adding a new service with special permission seen used by threat actors which makes the service hidden and unremovable. references: - https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2021/10/threat-hunting-in-large-datasets-by.html - https://www.sans.org/blog/red-team-tactics-hiding-windows-services/ - https://twitter.com/Alh4zr3d/status/1580925761996828672 - https://itconnect.uw.edu/tools-services-support/it-systems-infrastructure/msinf/other-help/understanding-sddl-syntax/ author: Andreas Hunkeler (@Karneades) date: 2021-12-20 modified: 2022-08-08 tags: - attack.persistence - attack.privilege-escalation - attack.execution - attack.stealth - attack.t1574.011 logsource: category: process_creation product: windows detection: selection_img: - Image|endswith: \sc.exe - OriginalFileName: sc.exe selection_cli: CommandLine|contains|all: - sdset - DCLCWPDTSD condition: all of selection_* falsepositives: - Unknown level: high
Sigma rule: Detects when the MSSQL "xp_cmdshell" stored procedure setting is changed.. Logsource: windows / application. Rule: title: MSSQL XPCmdshell Option Change id: d08dd86f-681e-4a00-a92c-1db218754417 status: test description: 'Detects when the MSSQL "xp_cmdshell" stored procedure setting is changed. ' references: - https://www.netspi.com/blog/technical/network-penetration-testing/sql-server-persistence-part-1-startup-stored-procedures/ - https://thedfirreport.com/2022/07/11/select-xmrig-from-sqlserver/ author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) date: 2022-07-12 modified: 2024-06-26 tags: - attack.execution logsource: product: windows service: application detection: selection: Provider_Name|contains: MSSQL EventID: 15457 Data|contains: xp_cmdshell condition: selection falsepositives: - Legitimate enable/disable of the setting - Note that since the event contain the change for both values. This means that this will trigger on both enable and disable level: high
Sigma rule: Detects uses of the createdump.exe LOLOBIN utility to dump process memory. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: CreateDump Process Dump id: 515c8be5-e5df-4c5e-8f6d-a4a2f05e4b48 related: - id: 1a1ed54a-2ba4-4221-94d5-01dee560d71e type: similar status: test description: Detects uses of the createdump.exe LOLOBIN utility to dump process memory references: - https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/overwatch-exposes-aquatic-panda-in-possession-of-log-4-shell-exploit-tools/ - https://twitter.com/bopin2020/status/1366400799199272960 author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) date: 2022-01-04 modified: 2022-08-19 tags: - attack.stealth - attack.t1036 - attack.t1003.001 - attack.credential-access logsource: category: process_creation product: windows detection: selection_img: - Image|endswith: \createdump.exe - OriginalFileName: FX_VER_INTERNALNAME_STR selection_cli: CommandLine|contains: - ' -u ' - ' --full ' - ' -f ' - ' --name ' - '.dmp ' condition: all of selection_* falsepositives: - Command lines that use the same flags level: high
Sigma rule: Detects when an account is disabled or blocked for sign in but tried to log in. Logsource: azure / signinlogs. Rule: title: Account Disabled or Blocked for Sign in Attempts id: 4afac85c-224a-4dd7-b1af-8da40e1c60bd status: test description: Detects when an account is disabled or blocked for sign in but tried to log in references: - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-gb/entra/architecture/security-operations-privileged-accounts author: Yochana Henderson, '@Yochana-H' date: 2022-06-17 tags: - attack.privilege-escalation - attack.persistence - attack.initial-access - attack.stealth - attack.t1078.004 logsource: product: azure service: signinlogs detection: selection: ResultType: 50057 ResultDescription: Failure condition: selection falsepositives: - Account disabled or blocked in error - Automation account has been blocked or disabled level: medium
Sigma rule: Detects the creation of an "Active Directory Schema Cache File" (.sch) file by an uncommon tool.. Logsource: windows / file_event. Rule: title: ADSI-Cache File Creation By Uncommon Tool id: 75bf09fa-1dd7-4d18-9af9-dd9e492562eb status: test description: Detects the creation of an "Active Directory Schema Cache File" (.sch) file by an uncommon tool. references: - https://medium.com/@ivecodoe/detecting-ldapfragger-a-newly-released-cobalt-strike-beacon-using-ldap-for-c2-communication-c274a7f00961 - https://blog.fox-it.com/2020/03/19/ldapfragger-command-and-control-over-ldap-attributes/ - https://github.com/fox-it/LDAPFragger author: xknow @xknow_infosec, Tim Shelton date: 2019-03-24 modified: 2023-10-18 tags: - attack.t1001.003 - attack.command-and-control logsource: product: windows category: file_event detection: selection: TargetFilename|contains: \Local\Microsoft\Windows\SchCache\ TargetFilename|endswith: .sch filter_main_generic: - Image|endswith: - :\Program Files\Cylance\Desktop\CylanceSvc.exe - :\Windows\CCM\CcmExec.exe - :\windows\system32\dllhost.exe - :\Windows\system32\dsac.exe - :\Windows\system32\efsui.exe - :\windows\system32\mmc.exe - :\windows\system32\svchost.exe - :\Windows\System32\wbem\WmiPrvSE.exe - :\windows\system32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe - Image|contains: - :\Windows\ccmsetup\autoupgrade\ccmsetup - :\Program Files\SentinelOne\Sentinel Agent filter_main_office: Image|contains|all: - :\Program Files\ - \Microsoft Office Image|endswith: \OUTLOOK.EXE filter_optional_ldapwhoami: Image|endswith: \LANDesk\LDCLient\ldapwhoami.exe filter_optional_citrix: Image|endswith: :\Program Files\Citrix\Receiver StoreFront\Services\DefaultDomainServices\Citrix.DeliveryServices.DomainServices.ServiceHost.exe condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_* and not 1 of filter_optional_* falsepositives: - Other legimate tools, which do ADSI (LDAP) operations, e.g. any remoting activity by MMC, Powershell, Windows etc. level: medium
Sigma rule: Detects when a user is potentially trying to bypass the Windows Defender AV by renaming a tool to dump64.exe and placing. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: Potential Windows Defender AV Bypass Via Dump64.EXE Rename id: 129966c9-de17-4334-a123-8b58172e664d status: test description: 'Detects when a user is potentially trying to bypass the Windows Defender AV by renaming a tool to dump64.exe and placing it in the Visual Studio folder. Currently the rule is covering only usage of procdump but other utilities can be added in order to increase coverage. ' references: - https://twitter.com/mrd0x/status/1460597833917251595 author: Austin Songer @austinsonger, Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) date: 2021-11-26 modified: 2024-06-21 tags: - attack.credential-access - attack.t1003.001 logsource: product: windows category: process_creation detection: selection_dump: Image|startswith: :\Program Files Image|contains: \Microsoft Visual Studio\ Image|endswith: \dump64.exe selection_tools_procdump: - OriginalFileName: procdump - CommandLine|contains: - ' -ma ' - ' -mp ' condition: selection_dump and 1 of selection_tools_* falsepositives: - Unknown level: high
Sigma rule: Detects write access requests to the Windows Defender exclusions registry keys. This could be an indication of an attack. Logsource: windows / security. Rule: title: Windows Defender Exclusion Registry Key - Write Access Requested id: e9c8808f-4cfb-4ba9-97d4-e5f3beaa244d related: - id: 46a68649-f218-4f86-aea1-16a759d81820 type: derived - id: a33f8808-2812-4373-ae95-8cfb82134978 type: derived status: test description: 'Detects write access requests to the Windows Defender exclusions registry keys. This could be an indication of an attacker trying to request a handle or access the object to write new exclusions in order to bypass security. ' references: - https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/gootkit-malware-bypasses-windows-defender-by-setting-path-exclusions/ author: '@BarryShooshooga, Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)' date: 2019-10-26 modified: 2023-11-11 tags: - attack.defense-impairment - attack.t1685 logsource: product: windows service: security definition: 'Requirements: Audit Policy : Security Settings/Local Policies/Audit Policy, Registry System Access Control (SACL): Auditing/User' detection: selection: AccessList|contains: - '%%4417' - '%%4418' EventID: - 4656 - 4663 ObjectName|contains: \Microsoft\Windows Defender\Exclusions\ condition: selection falsepositives: - Unknown level: medium
Sigma rule: Detects when an API access service account is granted domain authority.. Logsource: gcp / google_workspace.admin. Rule: title: Google Workspace Granted Domain API Access id: 04e2a23a-9b29-4a5c-be3a-3542e3f982ba status: test description: Detects when an API access service account is granted domain authority. references: - https://cloud.google.com/logging/docs/audit/gsuite-audit-logging#3 - https://developers.google.com/admin-sdk/reports/v1/appendix/activity/admin-domain-settings#AUTHORIZE_API_CLIENT_ACCESS author: Austin Songer date: 2021-08-23 modified: 2023-10-11 tags: - attack.privilege-escalation - attack.persistence - attack.t1098 logsource: product: gcp service: google_workspace.admin detection: selection: eventService: admin.googleapis.com eventName: AUTHORIZE_API_CLIENT_ACCESS condition: selection falsepositives: - Unknown level: medium
Sigma rule: Detects the execution of "sysctl" with specific arguments that have been used by threat actors and malware. It provides. Logsource: macos / process_creation. Rule: title: System Information Discovery Via Sysctl - MacOS id: 6ff08e55-ea53-4f27-94a1-eff92e6d9d5c status: test description: 'Detects the execution of "sysctl" with specific arguments that have been used by threat actors and malware. It provides system hardware information. This process is primarily used to detect and avoid virtualization and analysis environments. ' references: - https://www.loobins.io/binaries/sysctl/# - https://evasions.checkpoint.com/techniques/macos.html - https://www.welivesecurity.com/2019/04/09/oceanlotus-macos-malware-update/ - https://www.sentinelone.com/labs/20-common-tools-techniques-used-by-macos-threat-actors-malware/ - https://objective-see.org/blog/blog_0x1E.html - https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/1c547a064494a35d6b5e6b459de183ab2720a22725e082bed6f6629211f7abc1/behavior - https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/b4b1fc65f87b3dcfa35e2dbe8e0a34ad9d8a400bec332025c0a2e200671038aa/behavior author: Pratinav Chandra date: 2024-05-27 tags: - attack.stealth - attack.t1497.001 - attack.discovery - attack.t1082 logsource: product: macos category: process_creation detection: selection_img: - Image|endswith: /sysctl - CommandLine|contains: sysctl selection_cmd: CommandLine|contains: - hw. - kern. - machdep. condition: all of selection_* falsepositives: - Legitimate administrative activities level: medium
Sigma rule: Detects when an security threat is detected in Okta.. Logsource: okta / okta. Rule: title: Okta Security Threat Detected id: 5c82f0b9-3c6d-477f-a318-0e14a1df73e0 status: test description: Detects when an security threat is detected in Okta. references: - https://okta.github.io/okta-help/en/prod/Content/Topics/Security/threat-insight/configure-threatinsight-system-log.htm - https://developer.okta.com/docs/reference/api/system-log/ - https://developer.okta.com/docs/reference/api/event-types/ author: Austin Songer @austinsonger date: 2021-09-12 modified: 2026-04-27 tags: - attack.command-and-control logsource: product: okta service: okta detection: selection: eventType: security.threat.detected condition: selection falsepositives: - Unknown level: medium
Sigma rule: Monitor and alert for Sign-ins by unknown devices from non-Trusted locations.. Logsource: azure / signinlogs. Rule: title: Sign-ins by Unknown Devices id: 4d136857-6a1a-432a-82fc-5dd497ee5e7c status: test description: Monitor and alert for Sign-ins by unknown devices from non-Trusted locations. references: - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/architecture/security-operations-devices#non-compliant-device-sign-in author: Michael Epping, '@mepples21' date: 2022-06-28 modified: 2022-10-05 tags: - attack.privilege-escalation - attack.persistence - attack.initial-access - attack.stealth - attack.t1078.004 logsource: product: azure service: signinlogs detection: selection: AuthenticationRequirement: singleFactorAuthentication ResultType: 0 NetworkLocationDetails: '[]' DeviceDetail.deviceId: '' condition: selection falsepositives: - Unknown level: low
Sigma rule: Detects creation of default named pipe used by the DiagTrackEoP POC, a tool that abuses "SeImpersonate" privilege.. Logsource: windows / pipe_created. Rule: title: HackTool - DiagTrackEoP Default Named Pipe id: 1f7025a6-e747-4130-aac4-961eb47015f1 status: test description: Detects creation of default named pipe used by the DiagTrackEoP POC, a tool that abuses "SeImpersonate" privilege. references: - https://github.com/Wh04m1001/DiagTrackEoP/blob/3a2fc99c9700623eb7dc7d4b5f314fd9ce5ef51f/main.cpp#L22 author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) date: 2022-08-03 modified: 2023-08-07 tags: - attack.privilege-escalation logsource: product: windows category: pipe_created definition: Note that you have to configure logging for Named Pipe Events in Sysmon config (Event ID 17 and Event ID 18). The basic configuration is in popular sysmon configuration (https://github.com/SwiftOnSecurity/sysmon-config), but it is worth verifying. You can also use other repo, e.g. https://github.com/Neo23x0/sysmon-config, https://github.com/olafhartong/sysmon-modular. How to test detection? You can check powershell script from this site https://svch0st.medium.com/guide-to-named-pipes-and-hunting-for-cobalt-strike-pipes-dc46b2c5f575 detection: selection: PipeName|contains: thisispipe condition: selection falsepositives: - Unlikely level: critical
Sigma rule: Detects the execution of a renamed "ftp.exe" binary based on the PE metadata fields. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: Renamed FTP.EXE Execution id: 277a4393-446c-449a-b0ed-7fdc7795244c status: test description: Detects the execution of a renamed "ftp.exe" binary based on the PE metadata fields references: - https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Ftp/ author: Victor Sergeev, oscd.community date: 2020-10-09 modified: 2023-02-03 tags: - attack.execution - attack.stealth - attack.t1059 - attack.t1202 logsource: category: process_creation product: windows detection: selection_original: OriginalFileName: ftp.exe filter_img: Image|endswith: \ftp.exe condition: selection_original and not filter_img falsepositives: - Unknown level: medium regression_tests_path: regression_data/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_renamed_ftp/info.yml