alirezaaminzadeh/cybersec-retrieval-benchmark huggingface dataset:
Sigma rule: Detects the pattern of UAC Bypass using Windows Media Player osksupport.dll (UACMe 32). Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: UAC Bypass Using Windows Media Player - Process id: 0058b9e5-bcd7-40d4-9205-95ca5a16d7b2 status: test description: Detects the pattern of UAC Bypass using Windows Media Player osksupport.dll (UACMe 32) references: - https://github.com/hfiref0x/UACME author: Christian Burkard (Nextron Systems) date: 2021-08-23 modified: 2024-12-01 tags: - attack.privilege-escalation - attack.t1548.002 logsource: category: process_creation product: windows detection: selection_img_1: Image: C:\Program Files\Windows Media Player\osk.exe selection_img_2: Image: C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe ParentCommandLine: '"C:\Windows\system32\mmc.exe" "C:\Windows\system32\eventvwr.msc" /s' selection_integrity: IntegrityLevel: - High - System - S-1-16-16384 - S-1-16-12288 condition: 1 of selection_img_* and selection_integrity falsepositives: - Unknown level: high
Sigma rule: Enumerates Active Directory to determine computers that are joined to the domain. Logsource: windows / ps_script. Rule: title: DirectorySearcher Powershell Exploitation id: 1f6399cf-2c80-4924-ace1-6fcff3393480 status: test description: Enumerates Active Directory to determine computers that are joined to the domain references: - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1018/T1018.md#atomic-test-15---enumerate-domain-computers-within-active-directory-using-directorysearcher author: frack113 date: 2022-02-12 tags: - attack.discovery - attack.t1018 logsource: product: windows category: ps_script definition: 'Requirements: Script Block Logging must be enabled' detection: selection: ScriptBlockText|contains|all: - 'New-Object ' - System.DirectoryServices.DirectorySearcher - .PropertiesToLoad.Add - .findall() - Properties.name condition: selection falsepositives: - Unknown level: medium
Sigma rule: Detects usage of cmdkey to look for cached credentials on the system. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: Potential Reconnaissance For Cached Credentials Via Cmdkey.EXE id: 07f8bdc2-c9b3-472a-9817-5a670b872f53 status: test description: Detects usage of cmdkey to look for cached credentials on the system references: - https://www.peew.pw/blog/2017/11/26/exploring-cmdkey-an-edge-case-for-privilege-escalation - https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc754243(v=ws.11).aspx - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/b27a3cb25025161d49ac861cb216db68c46a3537/atomics/T1003.005/T1003.005.md#atomic-test-1---cached-credential-dump-via-cmdkey author: jmallette, Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) date: 2019-01-16 modified: 2024-03-05 tags: - attack.credential-access - attack.t1003.005 logsource: category: process_creation product: windows detection: selection_img: - Image|endswith: \cmdkey.exe - OriginalFileName: cmdkey.exe selection_cli: CommandLine|contains|windash: ' -l' condition: all of selection* falsepositives: - Legitimate administrative tasks level: high regression_tests_path: regression_data/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_cmdkey_recon/info.yml simulation: - type: atomic-red-team name: Cached Credential Dump via Cmdkey technique: T1003.005 atomic_guid: 56506854-89d6-46a3-9804-b7fde90791f9
Sigma rule: Detects suspicious activities as declared by Florian Roth in its 'Best Practice Auditd Configuration'. This includes the. Logsource: linux / auditd. Rule: title: Suspicious C2 Activities id: f7158a64-6204-4d6d-868a-6e6378b467e0 status: test description: 'Detects suspicious activities as declared by Florian Roth in its ''Best Practice Auditd Configuration''. This includes the detection of the following commands; wget, curl, base64, nc, netcat, ncat, ssh, socat, wireshark, rawshark, rdesktop, nmap. These commands match a few techniques from the tactics "Command and Control", including not exhaustively the following; Application Layer Protocol (T1071), Non-Application Layer Protocol (T1095), Data Encoding (T1132) ' references: - https://github.com/Neo23x0/auditd author: Marie Euler date: 2020-05-18 modified: 2021-11-27 tags: - attack.command-and-control logsource: product: linux service: auditd definition: 'Required auditd configuration: -w /usr/bin/wget -p x -k susp_activity -w /usr/bin/curl -p x -k susp_activity -w /usr/bin/base64 -p x -k susp_activity -w /bin/nc -p x -k susp_activity -w /bin/netcat -p x -k susp_activity -w /usr/bin/ncat -p x -k susp_activity -w /usr/bin/ss -p x -k susp_activity -w /usr/bin/netstat -p x -k susp_activity -w /usr/bin/ssh -p x -k susp_activity -w /usr/bin/scp -p x -k susp_activity -w /usr/bin/sftp -p x -k susp_activity -w /usr/bin/ftp -p x -k susp_activity -w /usr/bin/socat -p x -k susp_activity -w /usr/bin/wireshark -p x -k susp_activity -w /usr/bin/tshark -p x -k susp_activity -w /usr/bin/rawshark -p x -k susp_activity -w /usr/bin/rdesktop -p x -k susp_activity -w /usr/local/bin/rdesktop -p x -k susp_activity -w /usr/bin/wlfreerdp -p x -k susp_activity -w /usr/bin/xfreerdp -p x -k susp_activity -w /usr/local/bin/xfreerdp -p x -k susp_activity -w /usr/bin/nmap -p x -k susp_activity (via https://github.com/Neo23x0/auditd/blob/ddf2603dbc985f97538d102f13b4e4446b402bae/audit.rules#L336) ' detection: selection: key: susp_activity condition: selection falsepositives: - Admin or User activity level: medium
Sigma rule: Windows DCE-RPC functions which indicate a persistence techniques on the remote system. All credit for the Zeek mapping. Logsource: zeek / dce_rpc. Rule: title: MITRE BZAR Indicators for Persistence id: 53389db6-ba46-48e3-a94c-e0f2cefe1583 status: test description: Windows DCE-RPC functions which indicate a persistence techniques on the remote system. All credit for the Zeek mapping of the suspicious endpoint/operation field goes to MITRE. references: - https://github.com/mitre-attack/bzar#indicators-for-attck-persistence author: '@neu5ron, SOC Prime' date: 2020-03-19 modified: 2021-11-27 tags: - attack.privilege-escalation - attack.persistence - attack.t1547.004 logsource: product: zeek service: dce_rpc detection: op1: endpoint: spoolss operation: RpcAddMonitor op2: endpoint: spoolss operation: RpcAddPrintProcessor op3: endpoint: IRemoteWinspool operation: RpcAsyncAddMonitor op4: endpoint: IRemoteWinspool operation: RpcAsyncAddPrintProcessor op5: endpoint: ISecLogon operation: SeclCreateProcessWithLogonW op6: endpoint: ISecLogon operation: SeclCreateProcessWithLogonExW condition: 1 of op* falsepositives: - Windows administrator tasks or troubleshooting - Windows management scripts or software level: medium
Sigma rule: Detects execution of "AdPlus.exe", a binary that is part of the Windows SDK that can be used as a LOLBIN in order to dum. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: Potential Adplus.EXE Abuse id: 2f869d59-7f6a-4931-992c-cce556ff2d53 status: test description: Detects execution of "AdPlus.exe", a binary that is part of the Windows SDK that can be used as a LOLBIN in order to dump process memory and execute arbitrary commands. references: - https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/OtherMSBinaries/Adplus/ - https://twitter.com/nas_bench/status/1534916659676422152 - https://twitter.com/nas_bench/status/1534915321856917506 author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) date: 2022-06-09 modified: 2023-06-23 tags: - attack.execution - attack.credential-access - attack.t1003.001 logsource: category: process_creation product: windows detection: selection_img: - Image|endswith: \adplus.exe - OriginalFileName: Adplus.exe selection_cli: CommandLine|contains: - ' -hang ' - ' -pn ' - ' -pmn ' - ' -p ' - ' -po ' - ' -c ' - ' -sc ' condition: all of selection_* falsepositives: - Legitimate usage of Adplus for debugging purposes level: high
Sigma rule: Detects successful logon from public IP address via RDP. This can indicate a publicly-exposed RDP port.. Logsource: windows / security. Rule: title: External Remote RDP Logon from Public IP id: 259a9cdf-c4dd-4fa2-b243-2269e5ab18a2 related: - id: 78d5cab4-557e-454f-9fb9-a222bd0d5edc type: derived status: test description: Detects successful logon from public IP address via RDP. This can indicate a publicly-exposed RDP port. references: - https://www.inversecos.com/2020/04/successful-4624-anonymous-logons-to.html - https://twitter.com/Purp1eW0lf/status/1616144561965002752 author: Micah Babinski (@micahbabinski), Zach Mathis (@yamatosecurity) date: 2023-01-19 modified: 2024-03-11 tags: - attack.privilege-escalation - attack.persistence - attack.initial-access - attack.credential-access - attack.stealth - attack.t1133 - attack.t1078 - attack.t1110 logsource: product: windows service: security detection: selection: EventID: 4624 LogonType: 10 filter_main_local_ranges: IpAddress|cidr: - ::1/128 - 10.0.0.0/8 - 127.0.0.0/8 - 172.16.0.0/12 - 192.168.0.0/16 - 169.254.0.0/16 - fc00::/7 - fe80::/10 filter_main_empty: IpAddress: '-' condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_* falsepositives: - Legitimate or intentional inbound connections from public IP addresses on the RDP port. level: medium
Sigma rule: Detects the use of parent process ID spoofing tools like Didier Stevens tool SelectMyParent. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: HackTool - PPID Spoofing SelectMyParent Tool Execution id: 52ff7941-8211-46f9-84f8-9903efb7077d status: test description: Detects the use of parent process ID spoofing tools like Didier Stevens tool SelectMyParent references: - https://pentestlab.blog/2020/02/24/parent-pid-spoofing/ - https://www.picussecurity.com/resource/blog/how-to-detect-parent-pid-ppid-spoofing-attacks - https://www.ired.team/offensive-security/defense-evasion/parent-process-id-ppid-spoofing - https://www.virustotal.com/gui/search/filename%253A*spoof*%2520filename%253A*ppid*/files author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems) date: 2022-07-23 modified: 2024-11-23 tags: - attack.privilege-escalation - attack.stealth - attack.t1134.004 logsource: category: process_creation product: windows detection: selection: - Image|endswith: \SelectMyParent.exe - CommandLine|contains: - PPID-spoof - ppid_spoof - spoof-ppid - spoof_ppid - ppidspoof - spoofppid - spoofedppid - ' -spawnto ' - OriginalFileName|contains: - PPID-spoof - ppid_spoof - spoof-ppid - spoof_ppid - ppidspoof - spoofppid - spoofedppid - Description: SelectMyParent - Hashes|contains: - IMPHASH=04D974875BD225F00902B4CAD9AF3FBC - IMPHASH=A782AF154C9E743DDF3F3EB2B8F3D16E - IMPHASH=89059503D7FBF470E68F7E63313DA3AD - IMPHASH=CA28337632625C8281AB8A130B3D6BAD condition: selection falsepositives: - Unlikely level: high
Sigma rule: Detects when a modification (create, update or replace) action is taken that affects mutating or validating webhook conf. Logsource: kubernetes / audit. Rule: title: Kubernetes Admission Controller Modification id: eed82177-38f5-4299-8a76-098d50d225ab related: - id: 6ad91e31-53df-4826-bd27-0166171c8040 type: similar status: test description: 'Detects when a modification (create, update or replace) action is taken that affects mutating or validating webhook configurations, as they can be used by an adversary to achieve persistence or exfiltrate access credentials. ' references: - https://kubernetes.io/docs/reference/config-api/apiserver-audit.v1/ - https://security.padok.fr/en/blog/kubernetes-webhook-attackers author: kelnage date: 2024-07-11 tags: - attack.privilege-escalation - attack.initial-access - attack.persistence - attack.stealth - attack.t1078 - attack.credential-access - attack.t1552 - attack.t1552.007 logsource: product: kubernetes service: audit detection: selection: objectRef.apiGroup: admissionregistration.k8s.io objectRef.resource: - mutatingwebhookconfigurations - validatingwebhookconfigurations verb: - create - delete - patch - replace - update condition: selection falsepositives: - Modifying the Kubernetes Admission Controller may need to be done by a system administrator. - Automated processes may need to take these actions and may need to be filtered. level: medium
Sigma rule: Detects the pattern of UAC Bypass using a WoW64 logger DLL hijack (UACMe 30). Logsource: windows / process_access. Rule: title: UAC Bypass Using WOW64 Logger DLL Hijack id: 4f6c43e2-f989-4ea5-bcd8-843b49a0317c status: test description: Detects the pattern of UAC Bypass using a WoW64 logger DLL hijack (UACMe 30) references: - https://github.com/hfiref0x/UACME author: Christian Burkard (Nextron Systems) date: 2021-08-23 modified: 2022-10-09 tags: - attack.privilege-escalation - attack.t1548.002 logsource: category: process_access product: windows detection: selection: SourceImage|contains: :\Windows\SysWOW64\ GrantedAccess: '0x1fffff' CallTrace|startswith: UNKNOWN(0000000000000000)|UNKNOWN(0000000000000000)| condition: selection falsepositives: - Unknown level: high
Sigma rule: Detects uncommon target processes for remote thread creation. Logsource: windows / create_remote_thread. Rule: title: Remote Thread Creation In Uncommon Target Image id: a1a144b7-5c9b-4853-a559-2172be8d4a03 related: - id: f016c716-754a-467f-a39e-63c06f773987 type: obsolete status: test description: Detects uncommon target processes for remote thread creation references: - https://web.archive.org/web/20220319032520/https://blog.redbluepurple.io/offensive-research/bypassing-injection-detection author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems) date: 2022-03-16 modified: 2025-07-04 tags: - attack.privilege-escalation - attack.stealth - attack.t1055.003 logsource: product: windows category: create_remote_thread detection: selection: TargetImage|endswith: - \calc.exe - \calculator.exe - \mspaint.exe - \notepad.exe - \ping.exe - \sethc.exe - \spoolsv.exe - \wordpad.exe - \write.exe filter_main_csrss: SourceImage: C:\Windows\System32\csrss.exe filter_main_notepad: SourceImage: - C:\Windows\System32\explorer.exe - C:\Windows\System32\OpenWith.exe TargetImage: C:\Windows\System32\notepad.exe filter_main_sethc: SourceImage: C:\Windows\System32\AtBroker.exe TargetImage: C:\Windows\System32\Sethc.exe filter_optional_aurora_1: StartFunction: EtwpNotificationThread filter_optional_aurora_2: SourceImage|contains: unknown process filter_optional_vmtoolsd: SourceImage: C:\Program Files\VMware\VMware Tools\vmtoolsd.exe StartFunction: GetCommandLineW TargetImage: - C:\Windows\System32\notepad.exe - C:\Windows\System32\spoolsv.exe filter_optional_xerox_pjems: SourceImage: C:\Program Files\Xerox\XeroxPrintExperience\CommonFiles\XeroxPrintJobEventManagerService.exe StartFunction: LoadLibraryW TargetImage: C:\Windows\System32\spoolsv.exe condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_* and not 1 of filter_optional_* falsepositives: - Unknown level: medium
Sigma rule: Detects TOKEN OBFUSCATION technique from Invoke-Obfuscation. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: Powershell Token Obfuscation - Process Creation id: deb9b646-a508-44ee-b7c9-d8965921c6b6 related: - id: f3a98ce4-6164-4dd4-867c-4d83de7eca51 type: similar status: test description: Detects TOKEN OBFUSCATION technique from Invoke-Obfuscation references: - https://github.com/danielbohannon/Invoke-Obfuscation author: frack113 date: 2022-12-27 modified: 2026-03-16 tags: - attack.stealth - attack.t1027.009 logsource: category: process_creation product: windows detection: selection: - CommandLine|re: \w+`(?:\w+|-|.)`[\w+|\s] - CommandLine|re: '"(?:\{\d\})+"\s*-f' - CommandLine|re: (?i)\$\{`?e`?n`?v`?:`?p`?a`?t`?h`?\} filter_main_envpath: CommandLine|contains: ${env:path} condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_* falsepositives: - Unknown level: high
Sigma rule: Detects the execution of format.com with an uncommon filesystem selection that could indicate a defense evasion activity. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: Uncommon FileSystem Load Attempt By Format.com id: 9fb6b26e-7f9e-4517-a48b-8cac4a1b6c60 status: test description: 'Detects the execution of format.com with an uncommon filesystem selection that could indicate a defense evasion activity in which "format.com" is used to load malicious DLL files or other programs. ' references: - https://twitter.com/0gtweet/status/1477925112561209344 - https://twitter.com/wdormann/status/1478011052130459653?s=20 author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems) date: 2022-01-04 modified: 2024-05-13 tags: - attack.stealth logsource: category: process_creation product: windows detection: selection: Image|endswith: \format.com CommandLine|contains: '/fs:' filter_main_known_fs: CommandLine|contains: - /fs:exFAT - /fs:FAT - /fs:NTFS - /fs:ReFS - /fs:UDF condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_* falsepositives: - Unknown level: high
Sigma rule: Detects the creation of known offensive powershell scripts used for exploitation. Logsource: windows / file_event. Rule: title: Malicious PowerShell Scripts - FileCreation id: f331aa1f-8c53-4fc3-b083-cc159bc971cb related: - id: 41025fd7-0466-4650-a813-574aaacbe7f4 type: similar status: test description: Detects the creation of known offensive powershell scripts used for exploitation references: - https://github.com/PowerShellMafia/PowerSploit - https://github.com/NetSPI/PowerUpSQL - https://github.com/CsEnox/EventViewer-UACBypass - https://web.archive.org/web/20210511204621/https://github.com/AlsidOfficial/WSUSpendu - https://github.com/nettitude/Invoke-PowerThIEf - https://github.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/WinPwn - https://github.com/S3cur3Th1sSh1t/PowerSharpPack/tree/master/PowerSharpBinaries - https://github.com/BC-SECURITY/Invoke-ZeroLogon/blob/111d17c7fec486d9bb23387e2e828b09a26075e4/Invoke-ZeroLogon.ps1 - https://github.com/xorrior/RandomPS-Scripts/blob/848c919bfce4e2d67b626cbcf4404341cfe3d3b6/Get-DXWebcamVideo.ps1 - https://github.com/rvrsh3ll/Misc-Powershell-Scripts/blob/6f23bb41f9675d7e2d32bacccff75e931ae00554/OfficeMemScraper.ps1 - https://github.com/dafthack/DomainPasswordSpray/blob/b13d64a5834694aa73fd2aea9911a83027c465a7/DomainPasswordSpray.ps1 - https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/threat-assessment-black-basta-ransomware/ - https://research.nccgroup.com/2022/06/06/shining-the-light-on-black-basta/ - https://github.com/HarmJ0y/DAMP - https://github.com/samratashok/nishang - https://github.com/DarkCoderSc/PowerRunAsSystem/ - https://github.com/besimorhino/powercat - https://github.com/Kevin-Robertson/Powermad - https://github.com/adrecon/ADRecon - https://github.com/adrecon/AzureADRecon - https://github.com/sadshade/veeam-creds/blob/6010eaf31ba41011b58d6af3950cffbf6f5cea32/Veeam-Get-Creds.ps1 - https://github.com/The-Viper-One/Invoke-PowerDPAPI/ - https://github.com/Arno0x/DNSExfiltrator/ author: Markus Neis, Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems), Mustafa Kaan Demir, Georg Lauenstein date: 2018-04-07 modified: 2025-12-10 tags: - attack.execution - attack.t1059.001 logsource: category: file_event product: windows detection: selection_generic: TargetFilename|endswith: - \Add-ConstrainedDelegationBackdoor.ps1 - \Add-Exfiltration.ps1 - \Add-Persistence.ps1 - \Add-RegBackdoor.ps1 - \Add-RemoteRegBackdoor.ps1 - \Add-ScrnSaveBackdoor.ps1 - \ADRecon.ps1 - \AzureADRecon.ps1 - \BadSuccessor.ps1 - \Check-VM.ps1 - \ConvertTo-ROT13.ps1 - \Copy-VSS.ps1 - \Create-MultipleSessions.ps1 - \DNS_TXT_Pwnage.ps1 - \dnscat2.ps1 - \Do-Exfiltration.ps1 - \DomainPasswordSpray.ps1 - \Download_
Sigma rule: Detects the execution of an Office application that points to a document that is located in a trusted location. Attacker. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: Potentially Suspicious Office Document Executed From Trusted Location id: f99abdf0-6283-4e71-bd2b-b5c048a94743 status: test description: Detects the execution of an Office application that points to a document that is located in a trusted location. Attackers often used this to avoid macro security and execute their malicious code. references: - Internal Research - https://twitter.com/Max_Mal_/status/1633863678909874176 - https://techcommunity.microsoft.com/t5/microsoft-365-blog/new-security-hardening-policies-for-trusted-documents/ba-p/3023465 - https://twitter.com/_JohnHammond/status/1588155401752788994 author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) date: 2023-06-21 modified: 2023-10-18 tags: - attack.stealth - attack.t1202 logsource: category: process_creation product: windows detection: selection_parent: ParentImage|endswith: - \explorer.exe - \dopus.exe selection_img: - Image|endswith: - \EXCEL.EXE - \POWERPNT.EXE - \WINWORD.exe - OriginalFileName: - Excel.exe - POWERPNT.EXE - WinWord.exe selection_trusted_location: CommandLine|contains: - \AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Templates - \AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Word\Startup\ - \Microsoft Office\root\Templates\ - \Microsoft Office\Templates\ filter_main_dotx: CommandLine|endswith: - .dotx - .xltx - .potx condition: all of selection_* and not 1 of filter_main_* falsepositives: - Unknown level: high
Sigma rule: Detects Certipy execution, a tool for Active Directory Certificate Services enumeration and abuse based on PE metadata c. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: HackTool - Certipy Execution id: 6938366d-8954-4ddc-baff-c830b3ba8fcd status: test description: 'Detects Certipy execution, a tool for Active Directory Certificate Services enumeration and abuse based on PE metadata characteristics and common command line arguments. ' references: - https://github.com/ly4k/Certipy - https://research.ifcr.dk/certipy-4-0-esc9-esc10-bloodhound-gui-new-authentication-and-request-methods-and-more-7237d88061f7 author: pH-T (Nextron Systems), Sittikorn Sangrattanapitak date: 2023-04-17 modified: 2024-10-08 tags: - attack.discovery - attack.credential-access - attack.t1649 logsource: category: process_creation product: windows detection: selection_img: - Image|endswith: \Certipy.exe - OriginalFileName: Certipy.exe - Description|contains: Certipy selection_cli_commands: CommandLine|contains: - ' account ' - ' auth ' - ' cert ' - ' find ' - ' forge ' - ' ptt ' - ' relay ' - ' req ' - ' shadow ' - ' template ' selection_cli_flags: CommandLine|contains: - ' -bloodhound' - ' -ca-pfx ' - ' -dc-ip ' - ' -kirbi' - ' -old-bloodhound' - ' -pfx ' - ' -target' - ' -template' - ' -username ' - ' -vulnerable' - auth -pfx - shadow auto - shadow list condition: selection_img or all of selection_cli_* falsepositives: - Unlikely level: high
Sigma rule: Detects direct access to raw pastes in different paste services often used by malware in their second stages to download. Logsource: proxy. Rule: title: Raw Paste Service Access id: 5468045b-4fcc-4d1a-973c-c9c9578edacb status: test description: Detects direct access to raw pastes in different paste services often used by malware in their second stages to download malicious code in encrypted or encoded form references: - https://www.virustotal.com/gui/domain/paste.ee/relations author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems) date: 2019-12-05 modified: 2023-01-19 tags: - attack.command-and-control - attack.t1071.001 - attack.t1102.001 - attack.t1102.003 logsource: category: proxy detection: selection: c-uri|contains: - .paste.ee/r/ - .pastebin.com/raw/ - .hastebin.com/raw/ - .ghostbin.co/paste/*/raw/ - pastetext.net/ - pastebin.pl/ - paste.ee/ condition: selection falsepositives: - User activity (e.g. developer that shared and copied code snippets and used the raw link instead of just copy & paste) level: high