alirezaaminzadeh/cybersec-retrieval-benchmark huggingface dataset:
Sigma rule: Detects suspicious child processes of the SQLServer process. This could indicate potential RCE or SQL Injection.. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: Suspicious Child Process Of SQL Server id: 869b9ca7-9ea2-4a5a-8325-e80e62f75445 related: - id: 344482e4-a477-436c-aa70-7536d18a48c7 type: obsolete status: test description: Detects suspicious child processes of the SQLServer process. This could indicate potential RCE or SQL Injection. references: - Internal Research author: FPT.EagleEye Team, wagga date: 2020-12-11 modified: 2023-05-04 tags: - attack.t1505.003 - attack.t1190 - attack.initial-access - attack.persistence - attack.privilege-escalation logsource: category: process_creation product: windows detection: selection: ParentImage|endswith: \sqlservr.exe Image|endswith: - \bash.exe - \bitsadmin.exe - \cmd.exe - \netstat.exe - \nltest.exe - \ping.exe - \powershell.exe - \pwsh.exe - \regsvr32.exe - \rundll32.exe - \sh.exe - \systeminfo.exe - \tasklist.exe - \wsl.exe filter_optional_datev: ParentImage|startswith: C:\Program Files\Microsoft SQL Server\ ParentImage|endswith: DATEV_DBENGINE\MSSQL\Binn\sqlservr.exe Image: C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe CommandLine|startswith: '"C:\Windows\system32\cmd.exe" ' condition: selection and not 1 of filter_optional_* level: high
Sigma rule: Detects a tscon.exe start as LOCAL SYSTEM. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: Suspicious TSCON Start as SYSTEM id: 9847f263-4a81-424f-970c-875dab15b79b status: test description: Detects a tscon.exe start as LOCAL SYSTEM references: - http://www.korznikov.com/2017/03/0-day-or-feature-privilege-escalation.html - https://medium.com/@networksecurity/rdp-hijacking-how-to-hijack-rds-and-remoteapp-sessions-transparently-to-move-through-an-da2a1e73a5f6 - https://www.ired.team/offensive-security/lateral-movement/t1076-rdp-hijacking-for-lateral-movement author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems) date: 2018-03-17 modified: 2022-05-27 tags: - attack.command-and-control - attack.t1219.002 logsource: category: process_creation product: windows detection: selection: User|contains: - AUTHORI - AUTORI Image|endswith: \tscon.exe condition: selection falsepositives: - Unknown level: high
Sigma rule: Detects the import of SSH key pairs into AWS EC2, which may indicate an attacker attempting to gain unauthorized access. Logsource: aws / cloudtrail. Rule: title: AWS Key Pair Import Activity id: 92f84194-8d9a-4ee0-8699-c30bfac59780 status: experimental description: 'Detects the import of SSH key pairs into AWS EC2, which may indicate an attacker attempting to gain unauthorized access to instances. This activity could lead to initial access, persistence, or privilege escalation, potentially compromising sensitive data and operations. ' references: - https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AWSEC2/latest/APIReference/API_ImportKeyPair.html author: Ivan Saakov date: 2024-12-19 tags: - attack.initial-access - attack.stealth - attack.t1078 - attack.persistence - attack.privilege-escalation logsource: product: aws service: cloudtrail detection: selection: eventSource: ec2.amazonaws.com eventName: ImportKeyPair condition: selection falsepositives: - Legitimate administrative actions by authorized users importing keys for valid purposes. - Automated processes for infrastructure setup may trigger this alert. - Verify the user identity, user agent, and source IP address to ensure they are expected. level: medium
Sigma rule: Detect remote login by Administrator user (depending on internal pattern).. Logsource: windows / security. Rule: title: Admin User Remote Logon id: 0f63e1ef-1eb9-4226-9d54-8927ca08520a status: test description: Detect remote login by Administrator user (depending on internal pattern). references: - https://car.mitre.org/wiki/CAR-2016-04-005 author: juju4 date: 2017-10-29 modified: 2022-10-09 tags: - attack.privilege-escalation - attack.persistence - attack.lateral-movement - attack.initial-access - attack.stealth - attack.t1078.001 - attack.t1078.002 - attack.t1078.003 - car.2016-04-005 logsource: product: windows service: security definition: 'Requirements: Identifiable administrators usernames (pattern or special unique character. ex: "Admin-*"), internal policy mandating use only as secondary account' detection: selection: EventID: 4624 LogonType: 10 AuthenticationPackageName: Negotiate TargetUserName|startswith: Admin condition: selection falsepositives: - Legitimate administrative activity. level: low
Sigma rule: Show when private keys are being exported from the device, or when new certificates are installed. Logsource: cisco / aaa. Rule: title: Cisco Crypto Commands id: 1f978c6a-4415-47fb-aca5-736a44d7ca3d status: test description: Show when private keys are being exported from the device, or when new certificates are installed references: - https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/td/docs/ios-xml/ios/security/a1/sec-a1-cr-book/sec-a1-cr-book_chapter_0111.html author: Austin Clark date: 2019-08-12 modified: 2023-01-04 tags: - attack.credential-access - attack.defense-impairment - attack.t1553.004 - attack.t1552.004 logsource: product: cisco service: aaa detection: keywords: - crypto pki export - crypto pki import - crypto pki trustpoint condition: keywords falsepositives: - Not commonly run by administrators. Also whitelist your known good certificates level: high
Sigma rule: Detects the execution of a specific OneLiner to download and execute powershell modules in memory.. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: Obfuscated PowerShell OneLiner Execution id: 44e24481-6202-4c62-9127-5a0ae8e3fe3d status: test description: Detects the execution of a specific OneLiner to download and execute powershell modules in memory. references: - https://thedfirreport.com/2022/05/09/seo-poisoning-a-gootloader-story/ - https://gist.github.com/mgeeky/3b11169ab77a7de354f4111aa2f0df38 author: '@Kostastsale, TheDFIRReport' date: 2022-05-09 modified: 2025-04-16 tags: - attack.execution - attack.defense-impairment - attack.t1059.001 - attack.t1685 logsource: product: windows category: process_creation detection: selection: Image|endswith: \powershell.exe CommandLine|contains|all: - http://127.0.0.1 - '%{(IRM $_)}' - Invoke condition: selection falsepositives: - Unknown level: high
Sigma rule: Detects when when a mounted share is removed. Adversaries may remove share connections that are no longer useful in orde. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: Unmount Share Via Net.EXE id: cb7c4a03-2871-43c0-9bbb-18bbdb079896 status: test description: Detects when when a mounted share is removed. Adversaries may remove share connections that are no longer useful in order to clean up traces of their operation references: - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1070.005/T1070.005.md author: oscd.community, @redcanary, Zach Stanford @svch0st date: 2020-10-08 modified: 2023-02-21 tags: - attack.stealth - attack.t1070.005 logsource: category: process_creation product: windows detection: selection_img: - Image|endswith: - \net.exe - \net1.exe - OriginalFileName: - net.exe - net1.exe selection_cli: CommandLine|contains|all: - share - /delete condition: all of selection* falsepositives: - Administrators or Power users may remove their shares via cmd line level: low
Sigma rule: Detects file creation events indicating NetExec (nxc.exe) execution on the local machine. NetExec is a PyInstaller-bundl. Logsource: windows / file_event. Rule: title: HackTool - NetExec File Indicators id: efc21479-9e83-41da-8cf1-122e06ba8db3 status: experimental description: 'Detects file creation events indicating NetExec (nxc.exe) execution on the local machine. NetExec is a PyInstaller-bundled binary that extracts its embedded data files to a "_MEI<random>" directory under the Temp folder upon execution. Files dropped under the "\nxc\" sub-directory of that extraction path are unique to NetExec and serve as reliable on-disk indicators of execution. NetExec (formerly CrackMapExec) is a widely used post-exploitation and lateral movement tool used for Active Directory enumeration, credential harvesting, and remote code execution. ' references: - https://github.com/Pennyw0rth/NetExec - https://www.netexec.wiki/ author: Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems) date: 2026-04-08 tags: - attack.execution - attack.lateral-movement - attack.discovery - attack.t1021.002 - attack.t1059.005 logsource: product: windows category: file_event detection: selection: - Image|contains: \nxc-windows-latest\ - TargetFilename|contains|all: - \Temp\_MEI - \nxc\data\ condition: selection falsepositives: - Unknown level: high regression_tests_path: regression_data/rules/windows/file/file_event/file_event_win_hktl_netexec_file_indicators/info.yml
Sigma rule: Detects POST requests to the F5 BIG-IP iControl Rest API "bash" endpoint, which allows the execution of commands on the. Logsource: webserver. Rule: title: F5 BIG-IP iControl Rest API Command Execution - Webserver id: 85254a62-22be-4239-b79c-2ec17e566c37 related: - id: b59c98c6-95e8-4d65-93ee-f594dfb96b17 type: similar status: test description: Detects POST requests to the F5 BIG-IP iControl Rest API "bash" endpoint, which allows the execution of commands on the BIG-IP references: - https://f5-sdk.readthedocs.io/en/latest/apidoc/f5.bigip.tm.util.html#module-f5.bigip.tm.util.bash - https://community.f5.com/t5/technical-forum/icontrolrest-11-5-execute-bash-command/td-p/203029 - https://community.f5.com/t5/technical-forum/running-bash-commands-via-rest-api/td-p/272516 author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems), Thurein Oo date: 2023-11-08 tags: - attack.execution - attack.t1190 - attack.initial-access logsource: category: webserver detection: selection: cs-method: POST cs-uri-query|endswith: /mgmt/tm/util/bash condition: selection falsepositives: - Legitimate usage of the BIG IP REST API to execute command for administration purposes level: medium
Sigma rule: Masquerading occurs when the name or location of an executable, legitimate or malicious, is manipulated or abused for th. Logsource: linux / auditd. Rule: title: Masquerading as Linux Crond Process id: 9d4548fa-bba0-4e88-bd66-5d5bf516cda0 status: test description: 'Masquerading occurs when the name or location of an executable, legitimate or malicious, is manipulated or abused for the sake of evading defenses and observation. Several different variations of this technique have been observed. ' references: - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/8a82e9b66a5b4f4bc5b91089e9f24e0544f20ad7/atomics/T1036.003/T1036.003.md#atomic-test-2---masquerading-as-linux-crond-process author: Timur Zinniatullin, oscd.community date: 2019-10-21 modified: 2023-08-22 tags: - attack.stealth - attack.t1036.003 logsource: product: linux service: auditd detection: selection: type: execve a0: cp a1: /bin/sh a2|endswith: /crond condition: selection level: medium
Sigma rule: Detects when a new admin is created.. Logsource: azure / auditlogs. Rule: title: Privileged Account Creation id: f7b5b004-dece-46e4-a4a5-f6fd0e1c6947 status: test description: Detects when a new admin is created. references: - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/architecture/security-operations-privileged-accounts#changes-to-privileged-accounts author: Mark Morowczynski '@markmorow', Yochana Henderson, '@Yochana-H', Tim Shelton date: 2022-08-11 modified: 2022-08-16 tags: - attack.initial-access - attack.persistence - attack.privilege-escalation - attack.stealth - attack.t1078.004 logsource: product: azure service: auditlogs detection: selection: properties.message|contains|all: - Add user - Add member to role Status: Success condition: selection falsepositives: - A legitimate new admin account being created level: medium
Sigma rule: Adversaries may attempt to find domain-level groups and permission settings. The knowledge of domain-level permission gr. Logsource: windows / ps_module. Rule: title: AD Groups Or Users Enumeration Using PowerShell - PoshModule id: 815bfc17-7fc6-4908-a55e-2f37b98cedb4 status: test description: 'Adversaries may attempt to find domain-level groups and permission settings. The knowledge of domain-level permission groups can help adversaries determine which groups exist and which users belong to a particular group. Adversaries may use this information to determine which users have elevated permissions, such as domain administrators. ' references: - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1069.002/T1069.002.md author: frack113 date: 2021-12-15 modified: 2023-01-20 tags: - attack.discovery - attack.t1069.001 logsource: product: windows category: ps_module definition: 0ad03ef1-f21b-4a79-8ce8-e6900c54b65b detection: selection_ad_principal: - Payload|contains: get-ADPrincipalGroupMembership - ContextInfo|contains: get-ADPrincipalGroupMembership selection_get_aduser: - Payload|contains|all: - get-aduser - '-f ' - '-pr ' - DoesNotRequirePreAuth - ContextInfo|contains|all: - get-aduser - '-f ' - '-pr ' - DoesNotRequirePreAuth condition: 1 of selection_* falsepositives: - Administrator script level: low
Sigma rule: Detects changes to the "StrongAuthenticationRequirement" value, where the state is set to "0" or "Disabled". Threat acto. Logsource: azure / auditlogs. Rule: title: Multi Factor Authentication Disabled For User Account id: b18454c8-0be3-41f7-86bc-9c614611b839 status: test description: 'Detects changes to the "StrongAuthenticationRequirement" value, where the state is set to "0" or "Disabled". Threat actors were seen disabling multi factor authentication for users in order to maintain or achieve access to the account. Also see in SIM Swap attacks. ' references: - https://www.sans.org/blog/defending-against-scattered-spider-and-the-com-with-cybercrime-intelligence/ author: Harjot Singh (@cyb3rjy0t) date: 2024-08-21 tags: - attack.credential-access - attack.persistence logsource: product: azure service: auditlogs definition: 'Requirements: The TargetResources array needs to be mapped accurately in order for this rule to work' detection: selection: LoggedByService: Core Directory Category: UserManagement OperationName: Update user TargetResources.ModifiedProperties.DisplayName: StrongAuthenticationRequirement TargetResources.ModifiedProperties.NewValue|contains: State":0 condition: selection falsepositives: - Legitimate authorized activity. level: medium
Sigma rule: Detects deletion of an Amazon Bedrock guardrail, which may indicate attempts to remove model safety controls and allow u. Logsource: aws / cloudtrail. Rule: title: AWS Bedrock Guardrail Deleted id: 59b70e4d-dd17-44a9-b740-acf07ae3eb6a status: experimental description: 'Detects deletion of an Amazon Bedrock guardrail, which may indicate attempts to remove model safety controls and allow unsafe or unauthorized model responses. ' references: - https://docs.aws.amazon.com/bedrock/latest/APIReference/API_DeleteGuardrail.html author: Marco Pedrinazzi (@pedrinazziM) (InTheCyber) date: 2026-07-10 tags: - attack.defense-impairment - attack.t1685 logsource: product: aws service: cloudtrail detection: selection: eventName: DeleteGuardrail eventSource: bedrock.amazonaws.com condition: selection falsepositives: - Legitimate guardrail deletion by authorized identities. level: medium
Sigma rule: Detects logs clearing attempts on Linux systems via utilities such as 'rm', 'rmdir', 'shred', and 'unlink' targeting log. Logsource: linux / process_creation. Rule: title: Linux Logs Clearing Attempts id: 80915f59-9b56-4616-9de0-fd0dea6c12fe status: stable description: 'Detects logs clearing attempts on Linux systems via utilities such as ''rm'', ''rmdir'', ''shred'', and ''unlink'' targeting log files and directories. Adversaries often try to clear logs to cover their tracks after performing malicious activities. ' references: - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1070.002/T1070.002.md author: Ömer Günal, oscd.community date: 2020-10-07 modified: 2026-03-18 tags: - attack.defense-impairment - attack.t1685.006 logsource: product: linux category: process_creation detection: selection: Image|endswith: - /rm - /rmdir - /shred - /unlink CommandLine|contains: - /var/log - /var/spool/mail filter_main_legit_systat: Image|endswith: /rm CommandLine|startswith: rm -f /var/log/sysstat/ filter_main_dmseg: Image|endswith: /rm CommandLine|startswith: rm -f -- /var/log//dmesg condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_* falsepositives: - Legitimate administration activities level: medium
Sigma rule: Detects the usage of "reg.exe" to add Defender folder exclusions. Qbot has been seen using this technique to add exclusi. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: Suspicious Windows Defender Folder Exclusion Added Via Reg.EXE id: 48917adc-a28e-4f5d-b729-11e75da8941f status: test description: Detects the usage of "reg.exe" to add Defender folder exclusions. Qbot has been seen using this technique to add exclusions for folders within AppData and ProgramData. references: - https://thedfirreport.com/2022/02/07/qbot-likes-to-move-it-move-it/ - https://redcanary.com/threat-detection-report/threats/qbot/ author: frack113 date: 2022-02-13 modified: 2023-02-04 tags: - attack.defense-impairment - attack.t1685 logsource: category: process_creation product: windows detection: selection: Image|endswith: \reg.exe CommandLine|contains: - SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows Defender\Exclusions\Paths - SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Microsoft Antimalware\Exclusions\Paths CommandLine|contains|all: - 'ADD ' - '/t ' - 'REG_DWORD ' - '/v ' - '/d ' - '0' condition: selection falsepositives: - Legitimate use level: medium
Sigma rule: Detects abuse of the cron utility to perform task scheduling for initial or recurring execution of malicious code. Detec. Logsource: macos / process_creation. Rule: title: Scheduled Cron Task/Job - MacOs id: 7c3b43d8-d794-47d2-800a-d277715aa460 status: test description: Detects abuse of the cron utility to perform task scheduling for initial or recurring execution of malicious code. Detection will focus on crontab jobs uploaded from the tmp folder. references: - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1053.003/T1053.003.md author: Alejandro Ortuno, oscd.community date: 2020-10-06 modified: 2022-11-27 tags: - attack.execution - attack.persistence - attack.privilege-escalation - attack.t1053.003 logsource: category: process_creation product: macos detection: selection: Image|endswith: /crontab CommandLine|contains: /tmp/ condition: selection falsepositives: - Legitimate administration activities level: medium
Sigma rule: Get-Variable is a valid PowerShell cmdlet WindowsApps is by default in the path where PowerShell is executed. So when th. Logsource: windows / file_event. Rule: title: Suspicious Get-Variable.exe Creation id: 0c3fac91-5627-46e8-a6a8-a0d7b9b8ae1b status: test description: 'Get-Variable is a valid PowerShell cmdlet WindowsApps is by default in the path where PowerShell is executed. So when the Get-Variable command is issued on PowerShell execution, the system first looks for the Get-Variable executable in the path and executes the malicious binary instead of looking for the PowerShell cmdlet. ' references: - https://blog.malwarebytes.com/threat-intelligence/2022/04/colibri-loader-combines-task-scheduler-and-powershell-in-clever-persistence-technique/ - https://www.joesandbox.com/analysis/465533/0/html author: frack113 date: 2022-04-23 tags: - attack.privilege-escalation - attack.persistence - attack.stealth - attack.t1546 - attack.t1027 logsource: product: windows category: file_event detection: selection: TargetFilename|endswith: Local\Microsoft\WindowsApps\Get-Variable.exe condition: selection falsepositives: - Unknown level: high
Sigma rule: Detects the use of Advanced IP Scanner. Seems to be a popular tool for ransomware groups.. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: PUA - Advanced IP Scanner Execution id: bef37fa2-f205-4a7b-b484-0759bfd5f86f status: test description: Detects the use of Advanced IP Scanner. Seems to be a popular tool for ransomware groups. references: - https://news.sophos.com/en-us/2019/12/09/snatch-ransomware-reboots-pcs-into-safe-mode-to-bypass-protection/ - https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2020/05/tactics-techniques-procedures-associated-with-maze-ransomware-incidents.html - https://labs.f-secure.com/blog/prelude-to-ransomware-systembc - https://assets.documentcloud.org/documents/20444693/fbi-pin-egregor-ransomware-bc-01062021.pdf - https://thedfirreport.com/2021/01/18/all-that-for-a-coinminer - https://github.com/3CORESec/MAL-CL/tree/master/Descriptors/Other/Advanced%20IP%20Scanner author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems), @ROxPinTeddy date: 2020-05-12 modified: 2023-02-07 tags: - attack.discovery - attack.t1046 - attack.t1135 logsource: category: process_creation product: windows detection: selection_img: - Image|contains: \advanced_ip_scanner - OriginalFileName|contains: advanced_ip_scanner - Description|contains: Advanced IP Scanner selection_cli: CommandLine|contains|all: - /portable - /lng condition: 1 of selection_* falsepositives: - Legitimate administrative use level: medium regression_tests_path: regression_data/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_pua_advanced_ip_scanner/info.yml
Sigma rule: Detects the deletion of a process's executable by itself. This is usually not possible without workarounds and may be us. Logsource: windows / file_delete. Rule: title: Process Deletion of Its Own Executable id: f01d1f70-cd41-42ec-9c0b-26dd9c22bf29 status: test description: 'Detects the deletion of a process''s executable by itself. This is usually not possible without workarounds and may be used by malware to hide its traces. ' references: - https://github.com/joaoviictorti/RustRedOps/tree/ce04369a246006d399e8c61d9fe0e6b34f988a49/Self_Deletion author: Max Altgelt (Nextron Systems) date: 2024-09-03 tags: - attack.stealth logsource: product: windows category: file_delete detection: selection: TargetFilename|fieldref: Image condition: selection falsepositives: - Some false positives are to be expected from uninstallers. level: medium
Sigma rule: Detects processes loading the non-existent DLL "ShellChromeAPI". One known example is the "DeviceEnroller" binary in com. Logsource: windows / image_load. Rule: title: DLL Sideloading Of ShellChromeAPI.DLL id: ee4c5d06-3abc-48cc-8885-77f1c20f4451 related: - id: e173ad47-4388-4012-ae62-bd13f71c18a8 type: similar status: test description: 'Detects processes loading the non-existent DLL "ShellChromeAPI". One known example is the "DeviceEnroller" binary in combination with the "PhoneDeepLink" flag tries to load this DLL. Adversaries can drop their own renamed DLL and execute it via DeviceEnroller.exe using this parameter ' references: - https://mobile.twitter.com/0gtweet/status/1564131230941122561 - https://strontic.github.io/xcyclopedia/library/DeviceEnroller.exe-24BEF0D6B0ECED36BB41831759FDE18D.html author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) date: 2022-12-01 tags: - attack.persistence - attack.privilege-escalation - attack.execution - attack.stealth - attack.t1574.001 logsource: category: image_load product: windows detection: selection: ImageLoaded|endswith: \ShellChromeAPI.dll condition: selection falsepositives: - Unknown level: high