alirezaaminzadeh/cybersec-retrieval-benchmark huggingface dataset:
T1078.003 Local Accounts. Tactics: stealth, persistence, privilege escalation, initial access. Description: Adversaries may obtain and abuse credentials of a local account as a means of gaining Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Local accounts are those configured by an organization for use by users, remote support, services, or for administration on a single system or service. Local Accounts may also be abused to elevate privileges and harvest credentials through [OS Credential Dumping](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003). Password reuse may allow the abuse of local accounts across a set of machines on a network for the purposes of Privilege Escalation and Lateral Movement.
T1669 Wi-Fi Networks. Tactics: initial access. Description: Adversaries may gain initial access to target systems by connecting to wireless networks. They may accomplish this by exploiting open Wi-Fi networks used by target devices or by accessing secured Wi-Fi networks — requiring [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078) — belonging to a target organization.(Citation: DOJ GRU Charges 2018)(Citation: Nearest Neighbor Volexity) Establishing a connection to a Wi-Fi access point requires a certain level of proximity to both discover and maintain a stable network connection. Adversaries may establish a wireless connection through various methods, such as by physically positioning themselves near a Wi-Fi network to conduct close access operations. To bypass the need for physical proximity, adversaries may attempt to remotely compromise nearby third-party systems that have both wired and wireless network connections available (i.e., dual-homed systems). These third-party compromised devices can then serve as a bridge to connect to a target’s Wi-Fi network.(Citation: Nearest Neighbor Volexity) Once an initial wireless connection is achieved, adversaries may leverage this access for follow-on activities in the victim network or further targeting of specific devices on the network. Adversaries may perform [Network Sniffing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1040) or [Adversary-in-the-Middle](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1557) activities for [Credential Access](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0006) or [Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0007).
T1211 Exploitation for Stealth. Tactics: stealth. Description: Adversaries may exploit vulnerabilities to evade detection by hiding activity, suppressing logging, or operating within trusted or unmonitored components. Adversaries may exploit a system or application vulnerability to avoid detection while maintaining access within an environment. Exploitation occurs when an adversary leverages a programming flaw to execute code in a manner that minimizes visibility or blends in with legitimate activity. Rather than directly disabling defenses, adversaries may use exploitation to circumvent monitoring and logging mechanisms. This can include abusing vulnerabilities in logging pipelines, security tools, or cloud infrastructure to evade audit trails, suppress alerts, or operate without generating telemetry. Adversaries may identify these opportunities through prior reconnaissance or by performing discovery of security controls after initial access. In some cases, vulnerabilities in SaaS or public cloud environments may be exploited to evade logging, obscure activity, or deploy infrastructure that remains hidden from standard monitoring tools.(Citation: Bypassing CloudTrail in AWS Service Catalog)(Citation: GhostToken GCP flaw)
T1127 Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution. Tactics: stealth, execution. Description: Adversaries may take advantage of trusted developer utilities to proxy execution of malicious payloads. There are many utilities used for software development related tasks that can be used to execute code in various forms to assist in development, debugging, and reverse engineering.(Citation: engima0x3 DNX Bypass)(Citation: engima0x3 RCSI Bypass)(Citation: Exploit Monday WinDbg)(Citation: LOLBAS Tracker) These utilities may often be signed with legitimate certificates that allow them to execute on a system and proxy execution of malicious code through a trusted process that effectively bypasses application control solutions. Smart App Control is a feature of Windows that blocks applications it considers potentially malicious from running by verifying unsigned applications against a known safe list from a Microsoft cloud service before executing them.(Citation: Microsoft Smart App Control) However, adversaries may leverage "reputation hijacking" to abuse an operating system’s trust of safe, signed applications that support the execution of arbitrary code. By leveraging [Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1127) to run their malicious code, adversaries may bypass Smart App Control protections.(Citation: Elastic Security Labs)
T1529 System Shutdown/Reboot. Tactics: impact. Description: Adversaries may shutdown/reboot systems to interrupt access to, or aid in the destruction of, those systems. Operating systems may contain commands to initiate a shutdown/reboot of a machine or network device. In some cases, these commands may also be used to initiate a shutdown/reboot of a remote computer or network device via [Network Device CLI](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/008) (e.g. <code>reload</code>).(Citation: Microsoft Shutdown Oct 2017)(Citation: alert_TA18_106A) They may also include shutdown/reboot of a virtual machine via hypervisor / cloud consoles or command line tools. Shutting down or rebooting systems may disrupt access to computer resources for legitimate users while also impeding incident response/recovery. Adversaries may also use Windows API functions, such as `InitializeSystemShutdownExW` or `ExitWindowsEx`, to force a system to shut down or reboot.(Citation: CrowdStrike Blog)(Citation: Unit42 Agrius 2023) Alternatively, the `NtRaiseHardError`or `ZwRaiseHardError` Windows API functions with the `ResponseOption` parameter set to `OptionShutdownSystem` may deliver a “blue screen of death” (BSOD) to a system.(Citation: SonicWall)(Citation: NtRaiseHardError)(Citation: NotMe-BSOD) In order to leverage these API functions, an adversary may need to acquire `SeShutdownPrivilege` (e.g., via [Access Token Manipulation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1134)).(Citation: Unit42 Agrius 2023) In some cases, the system may not be able to boot again. Adversaries may attempt to shutdown/reboot a system after impacting it in other ways, such as [Disk Structure Wipe](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1561/002) or [Inhibit System Recovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1490), to hasten the intended effects on system availability.(Citation: Talos Nyetya June 2017)(Citation: Talos Olympic Destroyer 2018)
T1218.014 MMC. Tactics: stealth. Description: Adversaries may abuse mmc.exe to proxy execution of malicious .msc files. Microsoft Management Console (MMC) is a binary that may be signed by Microsoft and is used in several ways in either its GUI or in a command prompt.(Citation: win_mmc)(Citation: what_is_mmc) MMC can be used to create, open, and save custom consoles that contain administrative tools created by Microsoft, called snap-ins. These snap-ins may be used to manage Windows systems locally or remotely. MMC can also be used to open Microsoft created .msc files to manage system configuration.(Citation: win_msc_files_overview) For example, <code>mmc C:\Users\foo\admintools.msc /a</code> will open a custom, saved console msc file in author mode.(Citation: win_mmc) Another common example is <code>mmc gpedit.msc</code>, which will open the Group Policy Editor application window. Adversaries may use MMC commands to perform malicious tasks. For example, <code>mmc wbadmin.msc delete catalog -quiet</code> deletes the backup catalog on the system (i.e. [Inhibit System Recovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1490)) without prompts to the user (Note: <code>wbadmin.msc</code> may only be present by default on Windows Server operating systems).(Citation: win_wbadmin_delete_catalog)(Citation: phobos_virustotal) Adversaries may also abuse MMC to execute malicious .msc files. For example, adversaries may first create a malicious registry Class Identifier (CLSID) subkey, which uniquely identifies a [Component Object Model](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1559/001) class object.(Citation: win_clsid_key) Then, adversaries may create custom consoles with the “Link to Web Address” snap-in that is linked to the malicious CLSID subkey.(Citation: mmc_vulns) Once the .msc file is saved, adversaries may invoke the malicious CLSID payload with the following command: <code>mmc.exe -Embedding C:\path\to\test.msc</code>.(Citation: abusing_com_reg)
T1564.010 Process Argument Spoofing. Tactics: stealth. Description: Adversaries may attempt to hide process command-line arguments by overwriting process memory. Process command-line arguments are stored in the process environment block (PEB), a data structure used by Windows to store various information about/used by a process. The PEB includes the process command-line arguments that are referenced when executing the process. When a process is created, defensive tools/sensors that monitor process creations may retrieve the process arguments from the PEB.(Citation: Microsoft PEB 2021)(Citation: Xpn Argue Like Cobalt 2019) Adversaries may manipulate a process PEB to evade defenses. For example, [Process Hollowing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055/012) can be abused to spawn a process in a suspended state with benign arguments. After the process is spawned and the PEB is initialized (and process information is potentially logged by tools/sensors), adversaries may override the PEB to modify the command-line arguments (ex: using the [Native API](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1106) <code>WriteProcessMemory()</code> function) then resume process execution with malicious arguments.(Citation: Cobalt Strike Arguments 2019)(Citation: Xpn Argue Like Cobalt 2019)(Citation: Nviso Spoof Command Line 2020) Adversaries may also execute a process with malicious command-line arguments then patch the memory with benign arguments that may bypass subsequent process memory analysis.(Citation: FireEye FiveHands April 2021) This behavior may also be combined with other tricks (such as [Parent PID Spoofing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1134/004)) to manipulate or further evade process-based detections.
T1574.012 COR_PROFILER. Tactics: stealth, execution. Description: Adversaries may leverage the COR_PROFILER environment variable to hijack the execution flow of programs that load the .NET CLR. The COR_PROFILER is a .NET Framework feature which allows developers to specify an unmanaged (or external of .NET) profiling DLL to be loaded into each .NET process that loads the Common Language Runtime (CLR). These profilers are designed to monitor, troubleshoot, and debug managed code executed by the .NET CLR.(Citation: Microsoft Profiling Mar 2017)(Citation: Microsoft COR_PROFILER Feb 2013) The COR_PROFILER environment variable can be set at various scopes (system, user, or process) resulting in different levels of influence. System and user-wide environment variable scopes are specified in the Registry, where a [Component Object Model](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1559/001) (COM) object can be registered as a profiler DLL. A process scope COR_PROFILER can also be created in-memory without modifying the Registry. Starting with .NET Framework 4, the profiling DLL does not need to be registered as long as the location of the DLL is specified in the COR_PROFILER_PATH environment variable.(Citation: Microsoft COR_PROFILER Feb 2013) Adversaries may abuse COR_PROFILER to establish persistence that executes a malicious DLL in the context of all .NET processes every time the CLR is invoked. The COR_PROFILER can also be used to elevate privileges (ex: [Bypass User Account Control](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/002)) if the victim .NET process executes at a higher permission level, as well as to hook and impair defenses provided by .NET processes.(Citation: RedCanary Mockingbird May 2020)(Citation: Red Canary COR_PROFILER May 2020)(Citation: Almond COR_PROFILER Apr 2019)(Citation: GitHub OmerYa Invisi-Shell)(Citation: subTee .NET Profilers May 2017)
Sigma rule: Detects the use of the lesser known remote execution tool named CsExec a PsExec alternative. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: PUA - CsExec Execution id: d08a2711-ee8b-4323-bdec-b7d85e892b31 status: test description: Detects the use of the lesser known remote execution tool named CsExec a PsExec alternative references: - https://github.com/malcomvetter/CSExec - https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2022/05/09/ransomware-as-a-service-understanding-the-cybercrime-gig-economy-and-how-to-protect-yourself/ author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems) date: 2022-08-22 modified: 2023-02-21 tags: - attack.resource-development - attack.t1587.001 - attack.execution - attack.t1569.002 logsource: category: process_creation product: windows detection: selection: Image|endswith: \csexec.exe selection_pe: Description: csexec condition: 1 of selection* falsepositives: - Unknown level: high
Sigma rule: Detects if the push protection feature is disabled for an organization, enterprise, repositories or custom pattern rules. Logsource: github / audit. Rule: title: Github Push Protection Disabled id: ccd55945-badd-4bae-936b-823a735d37dd status: test description: Detects if the push protection feature is disabled for an organization, enterprise, repositories or custom pattern rules. references: - https://docs.github.com/en/enterprise-cloud@latest/code-security/secret-scanning/push-protection-for-repositories-and-organizations - https://thehackernews.com/2024/03/github-rolls-out-default-secret.html author: Muhammad Faisal (@faisalusuf) date: 2024-03-07 tags: - attack.defense-impairment - attack.t1685 logsource: product: github service: audit definition: 'Requirements: The audit log streaming feature must be enabled to be able to receive such logs. You can enable following the documentation here: https://docs.github.com/en/enterprise-cloud@latest/admin/monitoring-activity-in-your-enterprise/reviewing-audit-logs-for-your-enterprise/streaming-the-audit-log-for-your-enterprise#setting-up-audit-log-streaming' detection: selection: action: - business_secret_scanning_custom_pattern_push_protection.disabled - business_secret_scanning_push_protection.disable - business_secret_scanning_push_protection.disabled_for_new_repos - org.secret_scanning_custom_pattern_push_protection_disabled - org.secret_scanning_push_protection_disable - org.secret_scanning_push_protection_new_repos_disable - repository_secret_scanning_custom_pattern_push_protection.disabled condition: selection falsepositives: - Allowed administrative activities. level: high
Sigma rule: Detects the presence of an LSASS dump file in the "CrashDumps" folder. This could be a sign of LSASS credential dumping.. Logsource: windows / file_event. Rule: title: LSASS Process Dump Artefact In CrashDumps Folder id: 6902955a-01b7-432c-b32a-6f5f81d8f625 status: test description: Detects the presence of an LSASS dump file in the "CrashDumps" folder. This could be a sign of LSASS credential dumping. Techniques such as the LSASS Shtinkering have been seen abusing the Windows Error Reporting to dump said process. references: - https://github.com/deepinstinct/Lsass-Shtinkering - https://media.defcon.org/DEF%20CON%2030/DEF%20CON%2030%20presentations/Asaf%20Gilboa%20-%20LSASS%20Shtinkering%20Abusing%20Windows%20Error%20Reporting%20to%20Dump%20LSASS.pdf author: '@pbssubhash' date: 2022-12-08 tags: - attack.credential-access - attack.t1003.001 logsource: product: windows category: file_event detection: selection: TargetFilename|startswith: C:\Windows\System32\config\systemprofile\AppData\Local\CrashDumps\ TargetFilename|contains: lsass.exe. TargetFilename|endswith: .dmp condition: selection falsepositives: - Rare legitimate dump of the process by the operating system due to a crash of lsass level: high
Sigma rule: Detects a failed logon attempt from a public IP. A login from a public IP can indicate a misconfigured firewall or netwo. Logsource: windows / security. Rule: title: Failed Logon From Public IP id: f88e112a-21aa-44bd-9b01-6ee2a2bbbed1 status: test description: Detects a failed logon attempt from a public IP. A login from a public IP can indicate a misconfigured firewall or network boundary. references: - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-10/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4625 author: NVISO date: 2020-05-06 modified: 2024-03-11 tags: - attack.privilege-escalation - attack.initial-access - attack.persistence - attack.stealth - attack.t1078 - attack.t1190 - attack.t1133 logsource: product: windows service: security detection: selection: EventID: 4625 filter_main_ip_unknown: IpAddress|contains: '-' filter_main_local_ranges: IpAddress|cidr: - ::1/128 - 10.0.0.0/8 - 127.0.0.0/8 - 172.16.0.0/12 - 192.168.0.0/16 - 169.254.0.0/16 - fc00::/7 - fe80::/10 condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_* falsepositives: - Legitimate logon attempts over the internet - IPv4-to-IPv6 mapped IPs level: medium
Sigma rule: Detects a threat actor creating a file named `iertutil.dll` in the `C:\Program Files\Internet Explorer\` directory over. Logsource: windows / security. Rule: title: DCOM InternetExplorer.Application Iertutil DLL Hijack - Security id: c39f0c81-7348-4965-ab27-2fde35a1b641 status: test description: Detects a threat actor creating a file named `iertutil.dll` in the `C:\Program Files\Internet Explorer\` directory over the network for a DCOM InternetExplorer DLL Hijack scenario. references: - https://threathunterplaybook.com/hunts/windows/201009-RemoteDCOMIErtUtilDLLHijack/notebook.html author: Roberto Rodriguez @Cyb3rWard0g, Open Threat Research (OTR) date: 2020-10-12 modified: 2022-11-26 tags: - attack.lateral-movement - attack.t1021.002 - attack.t1021.003 logsource: product: windows service: security detection: selection: EventID: 5145 RelativeTargetName|endswith: \Internet Explorer\iertutil.dll filter: SubjectUserName|endswith: $ condition: selection and not filter falsepositives: - Unknown level: high
Sigma rule: Detects a network connection initiated by the certutil.exe utility. Attackers can abuse the utility in order to download. Logsource: windows / network_connection. Rule: title: Uncommon Network Connection Initiated By Certutil.EXE id: 0dba975d-a193-4ed1-a067-424df57570d1 status: test description: 'Detects a network connection initiated by the certutil.exe utility. Attackers can abuse the utility in order to download malware or additional payloads. ' references: - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/certutil author: frack113, Florian Roth (Nextron Systems) date: 2022-09-02 modified: 2024-05-31 tags: - attack.command-and-control - attack.t1105 logsource: category: network_connection product: windows detection: selection: Image|endswith: \certutil.exe Initiated: 'true' DestinationPort: - 80 - 135 - 443 - 445 condition: selection falsepositives: - Unknown level: high
Sigma rule: Detects execution of "odbcconf" where the path of the DLL being registered is located in a potentially suspicious locati. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: Odbcconf.EXE Suspicious DLL Location id: 6b65c28e-11f3-46cb-902a-68f2cafaf474 status: test description: Detects execution of "odbcconf" where the path of the DLL being registered is located in a potentially suspicious location. references: - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/sql/odbc/odbcconf-exe?view=sql-server-ver16 - https://www.trendmicro.com/en_us/research/17/h/backdoor-carrying-emails-set-sights-on-russian-speaking-businesses.html - https://securityintelligence.com/posts/raspberry-robin-worm-dridex-malware/ author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) date: 2023-05-22 modified: 2023-05-26 tags: - attack.stealth - attack.t1218.008 logsource: category: process_creation product: windows detection: selection_img: - Image|endswith: \odbcconf.exe - OriginalFileName: odbcconf.exe selection_cli: CommandLine|contains: - :\PerfLogs\ - :\ProgramData\ - :\Temp\ - :\Users\Public\ - :\Windows\Registration\CRMLog - :\Windows\System32\com\dmp\ - :\Windows\System32\FxsTmp\ - :\Windows\System32\Microsoft\Crypto\RSA\MachineKeys\ - :\Windows\System32\spool\drivers\color\ - :\Windows\System32\spool\PRINTERS\ - :\Windows\System32\spool\SERVERS\ - :\Windows\System32\Tasks_Migrated\ - :\Windows\System32\Tasks\Microsoft\Windows\SyncCenter\ - :\Windows\SysWOW64\com\dmp\ - :\Windows\SysWOW64\FxsTmp\ - :\Windows\SysWOW64\Tasks\Microsoft\Windows\PLA\System\ - :\Windows\SysWOW64\Tasks\Microsoft\Windows\SyncCenter\ - :\Windows\Tasks\ - :\Windows\Temp\ - :\Windows\Tracing\ - \AppData\Local\Temp\ - \AppData\Roaming\ condition: all of selection_* falsepositives: - Unlikely level: high
Sigma rule: Detects PsExec default pipe creation where the image executed is located in a suspicious location. Which could indicate. Logsource: windows / pipe_created. Rule: title: PsExec Tool Execution From Suspicious Locations - PipeName id: 41504465-5e3a-4a5b-a5b4-2a0baadd4463 related: - id: f3f3a972-f982-40ad-b63c-bca6afdfad7c type: derived status: test description: Detects PsExec default pipe creation where the image executed is located in a suspicious location. Which could indicate that the tool is being used in an attack references: - https://www.jpcert.or.jp/english/pub/sr/ir_research.html - https://jpcertcc.github.io/ToolAnalysisResultSheet author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) date: 2022-08-04 modified: 2023-09-20 tags: - attack.execution - attack.t1569.002 - attack.s0029 logsource: category: pipe_created product: windows definition: Note that you have to configure logging for Named Pipe Events in Sysmon config (Event ID 17 and Event ID 18). The basic configuration is in popular sysmon configuration (https://github.com/SwiftOnSecurity/sysmon-config), but it is worth verifying. You can also use other repo, e.g. https://github.com/Neo23x0/sysmon-config, https://github.com/olafhartong/sysmon-modular. How to test detection? You can check powershell script from this site https://svch0st.medium.com/guide-to-named-pipes-and-hunting-for-cobalt-strike-pipes-dc46b2c5f575 detection: selection: PipeName: \PSEXESVC Image|contains: - :\Users\Public\ - :\Windows\Temp\ - \AppData\Local\Temp\ - \Desktop\ - \Downloads\ condition: selection falsepositives: - Rare legitimate use of psexec from the locations mentioned above. This will require initial tuning based on your environment. level: medium
Sigma rule: Detects a suspicious process spawning from an Outlook process.. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: Suspicious Outlook Child Process id: 208748f7-881d-47ac-a29c-07ea84bf691d related: - id: 438025f9-5856-4663-83f7-52f878a70a50 type: derived - id: e212d415-0e93-435f-9e1a-f29005bb4723 type: derived status: test description: Detects a suspicious process spawning from an Outlook process. references: - https://www.hybrid-analysis.com/sample/465aabe132ccb949e75b8ab9c5bda36d80cf2fd503d52b8bad54e295f28bbc21?environmentId=100 - https://mgreen27.github.io/posts/2018/04/02/DownloadCradle.html author: Michael Haag, Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Markus Neis, Elastic, FPT.EagleEye Team date: 2022-02-28 modified: 2023-02-04 tags: - attack.execution - attack.t1204.002 logsource: category: process_creation product: windows detection: selection: ParentImage|endswith: \OUTLOOK.EXE Image|endswith: - \AppVLP.exe - \bash.exe - \cmd.exe - \cscript.exe - \forfiles.exe - \hh.exe - \mftrace.exe - \msbuild.exe - \msdt.exe - \mshta.exe - \msiexec.exe - \powershell.exe - \pwsh.exe - \regsvr32.exe - \schtasks.exe - \scrcons.exe - \scriptrunner.exe - \sh.exe - \svchost.exe - \wmic.exe - \wscript.exe condition: selection falsepositives: - Unknown level: high