alirezaaminzadeh/cybersec-retrieval-benchmark huggingface dataset:
Sigma rule: Indicates user activity that is unusual for the user or consistent with known attack patterns.. Logsource: azure / riskdetection. Rule: title: Azure AD Threat Intelligence id: a2cb56ff-4f46-437a-a0fa-ffa4d1303cba status: test description: Indicates user activity that is unusual for the user or consistent with known attack patterns. references: - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/id-protection/concept-identity-protection-risks#azure-ad-threat-intelligence-sign-in - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/id-protection/concept-identity-protection-risks#azure-ad-threat-intelligence-user - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/architecture/security-operations-user-accounts#unusual-sign-ins author: Mark Morowczynski '@markmorow', Gloria Lee, '@gleeiamglo' date: 2023-09-07 tags: - attack.stealth - attack.t1078 - attack.persistence - attack.privilege-escalation - attack.initial-access logsource: product: azure service: riskdetection detection: selection: riskEventType: investigationsThreatIntelligence condition: selection falsepositives: - We recommend investigating the sessions flagged by this detection in the context of other sign-ins from the user. level: high
Sigma rule: Detects non-system users failing to get a handle of the SCM database.. Logsource: windows / security. Rule: title: SCM Database Handle Failure id: 13addce7-47b2-4ca0-a98f-1de964d1d669 status: test description: Detects non-system users failing to get a handle of the SCM database. references: - https://threathunterplaybook.com/hunts/windows/190826-RemoteSCMHandle/notebook.html author: Roberto Rodriguez @Cyb3rWard0g date: 2019-08-12 modified: 2022-07-11 tags: - attack.discovery - attack.t1010 logsource: product: windows service: security detection: selection: EventID: 4656 ObjectType: SC_MANAGER OBJECT ObjectName: ServicesActive AccessMask: '0xf003f' filter: SubjectLogonId: '0x3e4' condition: selection and not filter falsepositives: - Unknown level: medium
Sigma rule: Detect modification of services configuration (ImagePath, FailureCommand and ServiceDLL) in registry by processes with M. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: Potential Privilege Escalation via Service Permissions Weakness id: 0f9c21f1-6a73-4b0e-9809-cb562cb8d981 status: test description: Detect modification of services configuration (ImagePath, FailureCommand and ServiceDLL) in registry by processes with Medium integrity level references: - https://speakerdeck.com/heirhabarov/hunting-for-privilege-escalation-in-windows-environment - https://pentestlab.blog/2017/03/31/insecure-registry-permissions/ author: Teymur Kheirkhabarov date: 2019-10-26 modified: 2024-12-01 tags: - attack.persistence - attack.privilege-escalation - attack.execution - attack.stealth - attack.t1574.011 logsource: product: windows category: process_creation detection: selection: IntegrityLevel: - Medium - S-1-16-8192 CommandLine|contains|all: - ControlSet - services CommandLine|contains: - \ImagePath - \FailureCommand - \ServiceDll condition: selection falsepositives: - Unknown level: high
Sigma rule: Detects execution of NoFilter, a tool for abusing the Windows Filtering Platform for privilege escalation via hardcoded. Logsource: windows / security. Rule: title: HackTool - NoFilter Execution id: 7b14c76a-c602-4ae6-9717-eff868153fc0 status: test description: 'Detects execution of NoFilter, a tool for abusing the Windows Filtering Platform for privilege escalation via hardcoded policy name indicators ' references: - https://github.com/deepinstinct/NoFilter/blob/121d215ab130c5e8e3ad45a7e7fcd56f4de97b4d/NoFilter/Consts.cpp - https://github.com/deepinstinct/NoFilter - https://www.deepinstinct.com/blog/nofilter-abusing-windows-filtering-platform-for-privilege-escalation - https://x.com/_st0pp3r_/status/1742203752361128162?s=20 author: Stamatis Chatzimangou (st0pp3r) date: 2024-01-05 tags: - attack.privilege-escalation - attack.stealth - attack.t1134 - attack.t1134.001 logsource: product: windows service: security definition: 'Requirements: Audit Filtering Platform Policy Change needs to be enabled' detection: selection_5447: EventID: 5447 FilterName|contains: RonPolicy selection_5449: EventID: 5449 ProviderContextName|contains: RonPolicy condition: 1 of selection_* falsepositives: - Unknown level: high
Sigma rule: Detects an appx package deployment / installation with the error code "0x80073cff" which indicates that the package didn. Logsource: windows / appxdeployment-server. Rule: title: AppX Package Deployment Failed Due to Signing Requirements id: 898d5fc9-fbc3-43de-93ad-38e97237c344 status: test description: 'Detects an appx package deployment / installation with the error code "0x80073cff" which indicates that the package didn''t meet the signing requirements. ' references: - https://www.sentinelone.com/labs/inside-malicious-windows-apps-for-malware-deployment/ - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/appxpkg/troubleshooting - https://news.sophos.com/en-us/2021/11/11/bazarloader-call-me-back-attack-abuses-windows-10-apps-mechanism/ author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) date: 2023-01-11 modified: 2025-12-03 tags: - attack.stealth logsource: product: windows service: appxdeployment-server detection: selection: EventID: 401 ErrorCode: '0x80073cff' condition: selection falsepositives: - Legitimate AppX packages not signed by MS used part of an enterprise. level: medium
Sigma rule: Detects the invocation of vshadow.exe with the -exec parameter that executes a specified script or command after the sha. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: Proxy Execution via Vshadow id: d7c75059-2901-4578-b209-8837fd31c6a8 status: experimental description: 'Detects the invocation of vshadow.exe with the -exec parameter that executes a specified script or command after the shadow copies are created but before the VShadow tool exits. VShadow is a command-line tool that you can use to create and manage volume shadow copies. While legitimate backup or administrative scripts may use this flag, attackers can leverage this parameter to proxy the execution of malware. ' author: David Faiss date: 2025-05-26 references: - https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/OtherMSBinaries/Vshadow/ - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/vss/vshadow-tool-and-sample tags: - attack.stealth - attack.t1202 logsource: product: windows category: process_creation detection: selection_img: - Image|endswith: \vshadow.exe - OriginalFileName: vshadow.exe selection_cli: CommandLine|contains: -exec condition: all of selection_* falsepositives: - System backup or administrator tools - Legitimate administrative scripts level: medium
Sigma rule: Detects logons using NTLM to hosts that are potentially not part of the domain.. Logsource: windows / ntlm. Rule: title: Potential Remote Desktop Connection to Non-Domain Host id: ce5678bb-b9aa-4fb5-be4b-e57f686256ad status: test description: Detects logons using NTLM to hosts that are potentially not part of the domain. references: - n/a author: James Pemberton date: 2020-05-22 modified: 2021-11-27 tags: - attack.command-and-control - attack.t1219.002 logsource: product: windows service: ntlm definition: Requires events from Microsoft-Windows-NTLM/Operational detection: selection: EventID: 8001 TargetName|startswith: TERMSRV condition: selection falsepositives: - Host connections to valid domains, exclude these. - Host connections not using host FQDN. - Host connections to external legitimate domains. level: medium
Sigma rule: Detects PowerShell core DLL being loaded by an Office Product. Logsource: windows / image_load. Rule: title: PowerShell Core DLL Loaded Via Office Application id: bb2ba6fb-95d4-4a25-89fc-30bb736c021a status: test description: Detects PowerShell core DLL being loaded by an Office Product references: - Internal Research author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) date: 2023-06-01 tags: - attack.stealth logsource: category: image_load product: windows detection: selection: Image|endswith: - \excel.exe - \mspub.exe - \outlook.exe - \onenote.exe - \onenoteim.exe - \powerpnt.exe - \winword.exe ImageLoaded|contains: - \System.Management.Automation.Dll - \System.Management.Automation.ni.Dll condition: selection falsepositives: - Unknown level: medium
Sigma rule: Detects the pattern of UAC Bypass using NTFS reparse point and wusa.exe DLL hijacking (UACMe 36). Logsource: windows / file_event. Rule: title: UAC Bypass Using NTFS Reparse Point - File id: 7fff6773-2baa-46de-a24a-b6eec1aba2d1 status: test description: Detects the pattern of UAC Bypass using NTFS reparse point and wusa.exe DLL hijacking (UACMe 36) references: - https://github.com/hfiref0x/UACME author: Christian Burkard (Nextron Systems) date: 2021-08-30 modified: 2022-10-09 tags: - attack.privilege-escalation - attack.t1548.002 logsource: category: file_event product: windows detection: selection: TargetFilename|startswith: C:\Users\ TargetFilename|endswith: \AppData\Local\Temp\api-ms-win-core-kernel32-legacy-l1.DLL condition: selection falsepositives: - Unknown level: high
Sigma rule: Detects executables located in potentially suspicious directories initiating network connections towards file sharing do. Logsource: windows / network_connection. Rule: title: Network Communication Initiated To File Sharing Domains From Process Located In Suspicious Folder id: e0f8ab85-0ac9-423b-a73a-81b3c7b1aa97 related: - id: 635dbb88-67b3-4b41-9ea5-a3af2dd88153 type: obsolete - id: 8b48ad89-10d8-4382-a546-50588c410f0d type: similar - id: d635249d-86b5-4dad-a8c7-d7272b788586 type: similar - id: 52182dfb-afb7-41db-b4bc-5336cb29b464 type: similar - id: ae02ed70-11aa-4a22-b397-c0d0e8f6ea99 type: similar - id: 7b434893-c57d-4f41-908d-6a17bf1ae98f type: similar - id: 8518ed3d-f7c9-4601-a26c-f361a4256a0c type: similar - id: 42a5f1e7-9603-4f6d-97ae-3f37d130d794 type: similar - id: 56454143-524f-49fb-b1c6-3fb8b1ad41fb type: similar - id: b6e04788-29e1-4557-bb14-77f761848ab8 type: similar - id: a0d7e4d2-bede-4141-8896-bc6e237e977c type: similar - id: 297ae038-edc2-4b2e-bb3e-7c5fc94dd5c7 type: similar status: test description: Detects executables located in potentially suspicious directories initiating network connections towards file sharing domains. references: - https://twitter.com/M_haggis/status/900741347035889665 - https://twitter.com/M_haggis/status/1032799638213066752 - https://symantec-enterprise-blogs.security.com/blogs/threat-intelligence/ransomware-hive-conti-avoslocker - https://www.cisa.gov/uscert/ncas/alerts/aa22-321a - https://github.com/EmpireProject/Empire/blob/e37fb2eef8ff8f5a0a689f1589f424906fe13055/data/module_source/exfil/Invoke-ExfilDataToGitHub.ps1 author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) date: 2018-08-30 modified: 2026-03-29 tags: - attack.command-and-control - attack.t1105 logsource: category: network_connection product: windows detection: selection_paths: Image|contains: - :\$Recycle.bin - :\Perflogs\ - :\Temp\ - :\Users\Default\ - :\Users\Public\ - :\Windows\Fonts\ - :\Windows\IME\ - :\Windows\System32\Tasks\ - :\Windows\Tasks\ - :\Windows\Temp\ - \AppData\Temp\ - \config\systemprofile\ - \Windows\addins\ selection_domains: Initiated: 'true' DestinationHostname|endswith: - .githubusercontent.com - 0x0.st - anonfiles.com - bashupload.com - cdn.discordapp.com - chunk.io - ddns.net - dl.dropboxusercontent.com - ghostbin.co - github.com - glitch.me - gofile.io - hastebin.com - mediafire.com - mega.co.nz - mega.nz - onrender.com - pages.dev - paste.ee - pastebin.com - pastebin.pl - pastetext.net - pixeldrain.com - privatlab.com - privatlab.net - send.exploit.in - sendspace.com - storage.googleapis.com - storjshare.io - supabase.co - temp.sh - transfer.sh - trycloudfl
Sigma rule: Detects volume shadow copy mount via Windows event log. Logsource: windows / system. Rule: title: Volume Shadow Copy Mount id: f512acbf-e662-4903-843e-97ce4652b740 status: test description: Detects volume shadow copy mount via Windows event log references: - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1003.002/T1003.002.md#atomic-test-3---esentutlexe-sam-copy author: Roberto Rodriguez @Cyb3rWard0g, Open Threat Research (OTR) date: 2020-10-20 modified: 2022-12-25 tags: - attack.credential-access - attack.t1003.002 logsource: product: windows service: system detection: selection: Provider_Name: Microsoft-Windows-Ntfs EventID: 98 DeviceName|contains: HarddiskVolumeShadowCopy condition: selection falsepositives: - Legitimate use of volume shadow copy mounts (backups maybe). level: low
Sigma rule: Detects enumeration of local or remote network services.. Logsource: macos / process_creation. Rule: title: MacOS Network Service Scanning id: 84bae5d4-b518-4ae0-b331-6d4afd34d00f status: test description: Detects enumeration of local or remote network services. references: - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1046/T1046.md author: Alejandro Ortuno, oscd.community date: 2020-10-21 modified: 2021-11-27 tags: - attack.discovery - attack.t1046 logsource: category: process_creation product: macos detection: selection_1: Image|endswith: - /nc - /netcat selection_2: Image|endswith: - /nmap - /telnet filter: CommandLine|contains: l condition: (selection_1 and not filter) or selection_2 falsepositives: - Legitimate administration activities level: low
Sigma rule: Detects scenarios where an attacker enables the OpenSSH server and server starts to listening on SSH socket.. Logsource: windows / openssh. Rule: title: OpenSSH Server Listening On Socket id: 3ce8e9a4-bc61-4c9b-8e69-d7e2492a8781 status: test description: Detects scenarios where an attacker enables the OpenSSH server and server starts to listening on SSH socket. references: - https://github.com/mdecrevoisier/EVTX-to-MITRE-Attack/tree/master/TA0008-Lateral%20Movement/T1021.004-Remote%20Service%20SSH - https://winaero.com/enable-openssh-server-windows-10/ - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/administration/openssh/openssh_install_firstuse - https://virtualizationreview.com/articles/2020/05/21/ssh-server-on-windows-10.aspx - https://medium.com/threatpunter/detecting-adversary-tradecraft-with-image-load-event-logging-and-eql-8de93338c16 author: mdecrevoisier date: 2022-10-25 tags: - attack.lateral-movement - attack.t1021.004 logsource: product: windows service: openssh detection: selection: EventID: 4 process: sshd payload|startswith: 'Server listening on ' condition: selection falsepositives: - Legitimate administrator activity level: medium
Sigma rule: Detects the execution of Python web servers via command line interface (CLI). After gaining access to target systems, ad. Logsource: linux / process_creation. Rule: title: Python WebServer Execution - Linux id: 3f0f5957-04f8-4792-ad89-192b0303bde6 status: experimental description: 'Detects the execution of Python web servers via command line interface (CLI). After gaining access to target systems, adversaries may use Python''s built-in HTTP server modules to quickly establish a web server without requiring additional software. This technique is commonly used in post-exploitation scenarios as it provides a simple method for transferring files between the compromised host and attacker-controlled systems. ' references: - https://www.atomicredteam.io/atomic-red-team/atomics/T1048.003#atomic-test-8---python3-httpserver - https://docs.python.org/3/library/http.server.html - https://docs.python.org/2/library/simplehttpserver.html author: Mohamed LAKRI date: 2025-10-17 tags: - attack.exfiltration - attack.t1048.003 logsource: product: linux category: process_creation detection: selection_img: - Image|endswith: - /python - /python2 - /python3 - Image|contains: - /python2. - /python3. selection_module: CommandLine|contains: - http.server - SimpleHTTPServer condition: all of selection_* falsepositives: - Testing or development activity level: medium
Sigma rule: Detect attacker collecting audio via SoundRecorder application.. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: Audio Capture via SoundRecorder id: 83865853-59aa-449e-9600-74b9d89a6d6e status: test description: Detect attacker collecting audio via SoundRecorder application. references: - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1123/T1123.md - https://eqllib.readthedocs.io/en/latest/analytics/f72a98cb-7b3d-4100-99c3-a138b6e9ff6e.html author: E.M. Anhaus (originally from Atomic Blue Detections, Endgame), oscd.community date: 2019-10-24 modified: 2021-11-27 tags: - attack.collection - attack.t1123 logsource: category: process_creation product: windows detection: selection: Image|endswith: \SoundRecorder.exe CommandLine|contains: /FILE condition: selection falsepositives: - Legitimate audio capture by legitimate user. level: medium
Sigma rule: Detects the creation of new files with the ".evtx" extension in non-common or non-standard location. This could indicate. Logsource: windows / file_event. Rule: title: EVTX Created In Uncommon Location id: 65236ec7-ace0-4f0c-82fd-737b04fd4dcb status: test description: 'Detects the creation of new files with the ".evtx" extension in non-common or non-standard location. This could indicate tampering with default EVTX locations in order to evade security controls or simply exfiltration of event log to search for sensitive information within. Note that backup software and legitimate administrator might perform similar actions during troubleshooting. ' references: - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/eventlog/eventlog-key author: D3F7A5105 date: 2023-01-02 modified: 2024-03-26 tags: - attack.defense-impairment - attack.t1685.001 logsource: category: file_event product: windows definition: 'Requirements: The ".evtx" extension should be monitored via a Sysmon configuration. Example: <TargetFilename condition="end with">.evtx<TargetFilename>' detection: selection: TargetFilename|endswith: .evtx filter_main_path: TargetFilename|startswith: C:\Windows\System32\winevt\Logs\ filter_main_baseimage: TargetFilename|startswith: C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\Windows\Containers\BaseImages\ TargetFilename|endswith: \Windows\System32\winevt\Logs\ condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_* falsepositives: - Administrator or backup activity - An unknown bug seems to trigger the Windows "svchost" process to drop EVTX files in the "C:\Windows\Temp" directory in the form "<log_name">_<uuid>.evtx". See https://superuser.com/questions/1371229/low-disk-space-after-filling-up-c-windows-temp-with-evtx-and-txt-files level: medium regression_tests_path: regression_data/rules/windows/file/file_event/file_event_win_create_evtx_non_common_locations/info.yml
Sigma rule: Detects execution of ruby using the "-e" flag. This is could be used as a way to launch a reverse shell or execute live. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: Ruby Inline Command Execution id: 20a5ffa1-3848-4584-b6f8-c7c7fd9f69c8 status: test description: Detects execution of ruby using the "-e" flag. This is could be used as a way to launch a reverse shell or execute live ruby code. references: - https://pentestmonkey.net/cheat-sheet/shells/reverse-shell-cheat-sheet - https://www.revshells.com/ author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) date: 2023-01-02 tags: - attack.execution - attack.t1059 logsource: category: process_creation product: windows detection: selection_img: - Image|endswith: \ruby.exe - OriginalFileName: ruby.exe selection_cli: CommandLine|contains: ' -e' condition: all of selection_* falsepositives: - Unknown level: medium
Sigma rule: Detects the use of WinAPI Functions via the commandline. As seen used by threat actors via the tool winapiexec. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: Potential WinAPI Calls Via CommandLine id: ba3f5c1b-6272-4119-9dbd-0bc8d21c2702 related: - id: 03d83090-8cba-44a0-b02f-0b756a050306 type: derived status: test description: Detects the use of WinAPI Functions via the commandline. As seen used by threat actors via the tool winapiexec references: - https://twitter.com/m417z/status/1566674631788007425 author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) date: 2022-09-06 modified: 2025-03-06 tags: - attack.execution - attack.t1106 logsource: category: process_creation product: windows detection: selection: CommandLine|contains: - AddSecurityPackage - AdjustTokenPrivileges - Advapi32 - CloseHandle - CreateProcessWithToken - CreatePseudoConsole - CreateRemoteThread - CreateThread - CreateUserThread - DangerousGetHandle - DuplicateTokenEx - EnumerateSecurityPackages - FreeHGlobal - FreeLibrary - GetDelegateForFunctionPointer - GetLogonSessionData - GetModuleHandle - GetProcAddress - GetProcessHandle - GetTokenInformation - ImpersonateLoggedOnUser - kernel32 - LoadLibrary - memcpy - MiniDumpWriteDump - ntdll - OpenDesktop - OpenProcess - OpenProcessToken - OpenThreadToken - OpenWindowStation - PtrToString - QueueUserApc - ReadProcessMemory - RevertToSelf - RtlCreateUserThread - secur32 - SetThreadToken - VirtualAlloc - VirtualFree - VirtualProtect - WaitForSingleObject - WriteInt32 - WriteProcessMemory - ZeroFreeGlobalAllocUnicode filter_optional_mpcmdrun: Image|endswith: \MpCmdRun.exe CommandLine|contains: GetLoadLibraryWAddress32 filter_optional_compatTelRunner: ParentImage|endswith: \CompatTelRunner.exe CommandLine|contains: - FreeHGlobal - PtrToString - kernel32 - CloseHandle condition: selection and not 1 of filter_optional_* falsepositives: - Some legitimate action or applications may use these functions. Investigate further to determine the legitimacy of the activity. level: high
Sigma rule: Detects the removal or uninstallation of an application via "Wmic.EXE".. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: Application Removed Via Wmic.EXE id: b53317a0-8acf-4fd1-8de8-a5401e776b96 related: - id: 847d5ff3-8a31-4737-a970-aeae8fe21765 type: derived status: test description: Detects the removal or uninstallation of an application via "Wmic.EXE". references: - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1047/T1047.md#atomic-test-10---application-uninstall-using-wmic author: frack113 date: 2022-01-28 modified: 2024-07-02 tags: - attack.execution - attack.t1047 logsource: category: process_creation product: windows detection: selection_img: - Image|endswith: \WMIC.exe - OriginalFileName: wmic.exe selection_cli: CommandLine|contains|all: - call - uninstall condition: all of selection_* falsepositives: - Unknown level: medium simulation: - type: atomic-red-team name: Application uninstall using WMIC technique: T1047 atomic_guid: c510d25b-1667-467d-8331-a56d3e9bc4ff regression_tests_path: regression_data/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_wmic_uninstall_application/info.yml
Sigma rule: Detects listing of the inodes of the "/" directory to determine if the we are running inside of a container.. Logsource: linux / process_creation. Rule: title: Potential Container Discovery Via Inodes Listing id: 43e26eb5-cd58-48d1-8ce9-a273f5d298d8 status: test description: Detects listing of the inodes of the "/" directory to determine if the we are running inside of a container. references: - https://blog.skyplabs.net/posts/container-detection/ - https://stackoverflow.com/questions/20010199/how-to-determine-if-a-process-runs-inside-lxc-docker tags: - attack.discovery - attack.t1082 author: Seth Hanford date: 2023-08-23 modified: 2025-11-24 logsource: category: process_creation product: linux detection: selection_ls_img: Image|endswith: /ls selection_ls_cli: - CommandLine|endswith: ' /' - CommandLine|contains: ' / ' selection_regex_inode: CommandLine|re: (?:\s-[^-\s]{0,20}i|\s--inode\s) selection_regex_dir: CommandLine|re: (?:\s-[^-\s]{0,20}d|\s--directory\s) condition: all of selection_* falsepositives: - Legitimate system administrator usage of these commands - Some container tools or deployments may use these techniques natively to determine how they proceed with execution, and will need to be filtered level: low