alirezaaminzadeh/cybersec-retrieval-benchmark huggingface dataset:
Sigma rule: Detects REGSVR32.exe to execute DLL hosted on remote shares. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: Suspicious Regsvr32 Execution From Remote Share id: 88a87a10-384b-4ad7-8871-2f9bf9259ce5 status: test description: Detects REGSVR32.exe to execute DLL hosted on remote shares references: - https://thedfirreport.com/2022/10/31/follina-exploit-leads-to-domain-compromise/ author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) date: 2022-10-31 tags: - attack.stealth - attack.t1218.010 logsource: category: process_creation product: windows detection: selection_img: - Image|endswith: \regsvr32.exe - OriginalFileName: \REGSVR32.EXE selection_cli: CommandLine|contains: ' \\\\' condition: all of selection_* falsepositives: - Unknown level: high
Sigma rule: Detects download of certain file types from hosts with dynamic DNS names (selected list). Logsource: proxy. Rule: title: Download from Suspicious Dyndns Hosts id: 195c1119-ef07-4909-bb12-e66f5e07bf3c status: test description: Detects download of certain file types from hosts with dynamic DNS names (selected list) references: - https://www.alienvault.com/blogs/security-essentials/dynamic-dns-security-and-potential-threats author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems) date: 2017-11-08 modified: 2023-05-18 tags: - attack.command-and-control - attack.t1105 - attack.t1568 logsource: category: proxy detection: selection: c-uri-extension: - exe - vbs - bat - rar - ps1 - doc - docm - xls - xlsm - pptm - rtf - hta - dll - ws - wsf - sct - zip cs-host|endswith: - .hopto.org - .no-ip.org - .no-ip.info - .no-ip.biz - .no-ip.com - .noip.com - .ddns.name - .myftp.org - .myftp.biz - .serveblog.net - .servebeer.com - .servemp3.com - .serveftp.com - .servequake.com - .servehalflife.com - .servehttp.com - .servegame.com - .servepics.com - .myvnc.com - .ignorelist.com - .jkub.com - .dlinkddns.com - .jumpingcrab.com - .ddns.info - .mooo.com - .dns-dns.com - .strangled.net - .adultdns.net - .craftx.biz - .ddns01.com - .dns53.biz - .dnsapi.info - .dnsd.info - .dnsdynamic.com - .dnsdynamic.net - .dnsget.org - .fe100.net - .flashserv.net - .ftp21.net - .http01.com - .http80.info - .https443.com - .imap01.com - .kadm5.com - .mysq1.net - .ns360.info - .ntdll.net - .ole32.com - .proxy8080.com - .sql01.com - .ssh01.com - .ssh22.net - .tempors.com - .tftpd.net - .ttl60.com - .ttl60.org - .user32.com - .voip01.com - .wow64.net - .x64.me - .xns01.com - .dyndns.org - .dyndns.info - .dyndns.tv - .dyndns-at-home.com - .dnsomatic.com - .zapto.org - .webhop.net - .25u.com - .slyip.net condition: selection falsepositives: - Software downloads level: medium
Sigma rule: Detects the deletion of one or more VPC Flow Logs in AWS Elastic Compute Cloud (EC2) through the DeleteFlowLogs API call. Logsource: aws / cloudtrail. Rule: title: AWS VPC Flow Logs Deleted id: e386b9b5-af12-450e-afff-761730fb8a98 status: experimental description: 'Detects the deletion of one or more VPC Flow Logs in AWS Elastic Compute Cloud (EC2) through the DeleteFlowLogs API call. Adversaries may delete flow logs to evade detection or remove evidence of network activity, hindering forensic investigations and visibility into malicious operations. ' references: - https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AWSEC2/latest/APIReference/API_DeleteFlowLogs.html - https://awscli.amazonaws.com/v2/documentation/api/latest/reference/ec2/delete-flow-logs.html - https://www.elastic.co/docs/reference/security/prebuilt-rules/rules/integrations/aws/defense_evasion_ec2_flow_log_deletion author: Ivan Saakov date: 2025-10-19 tags: - attack.stealth logsource: product: aws service: cloudtrail detection: selection_event_name: eventName: DeleteFlowLogs selection_status_success: errorCode: Success selection_status_null: errorCode: null condition: selection_event_name and 1 of selection_status_* falsepositives: - During maintenance operations or testing, authorized administrators may delete VPC Flow Logs as part of routine network management or cleanup activities. level: high
Sigma rule: Detects an executable initiating a network connection to "LocaltoNet" tunneling sub-domains. LocaltoNet is a reverse pro. Logsource: windows / network_connection. Rule: title: Communication To LocaltoNet Tunneling Service Initiated id: 3ab65069-d82a-4d44-a759-466661a082d1 status: test description: 'Detects an executable initiating a network connection to "LocaltoNet" tunneling sub-domains. LocaltoNet is a reverse proxy that enables localhost services to be exposed to the Internet. Attackers have been seen to use this service for command-and-control activities to bypass MFA and perimeter controls. ' references: - https://localtonet.com/documents/supported-tunnels - https://cloud.google.com/blog/topics/threat-intelligence/unc3944-targets-saas-applications author: Andreas Braathen (mnemonic.io) date: 2024-06-17 tags: - attack.command-and-control - attack.t1572 - attack.t1090 - attack.t1102 logsource: category: network_connection product: windows detection: selection: DestinationHostname|endswith: - .localto.net - .localtonet.com Initiated: 'true' condition: selection falsepositives: - Legitimate use of the LocaltoNet service. level: high
Sigma rule: Detects attempts to create a DLL file to a known desktop application dependencies folder such as Slack, Teams or OneDriv. Logsource: windows / file_event. Rule: title: Potential Initial Access via DLL Search Order Hijacking id: dbbd9f66-2ed3-4ca2-98a4-6ea985dd1a1c status: test description: Detects attempts to create a DLL file to a known desktop application dependencies folder such as Slack, Teams or OneDrive and by an unusual process. This may indicate an attempt to load a malicious module via DLL search order hijacking. references: - https://github.com/elastic/protections-artifacts/commit/746086721fd385d9f5c6647cada1788db4aea95f#diff-5d46dd4ac6866b4337ec126be8cee0e115467b3e8703794ba6f6df6432c806bc - https://posts.specterops.io/automating-dll-hijack-discovery-81c4295904b0 author: Tim Rauch (rule), Elastic (idea) date: 2022-10-21 tags: - attack.privilege-escalation - attack.persistence - attack.execution - attack.stealth - attack.t1566 - attack.t1566.001 - attack.initial-access - attack.t1574 - attack.t1574.001 logsource: product: windows category: file_event detection: selection: Image|endswith: - \winword.exe - \excel.exe - \powerpnt.exe - \MSACCESS.EXE - \MSPUB.EXE - \fltldr.exe - \cmd.exe - \certutil.exe - \mshta.exe - \cscript.exe - \wscript.exe - \curl.exe - \powershell.exe - \pwsh.exe TargetFilename|endswith: .dll TargetFilename|contains|all: - \Users\ - \AppData\ TargetFilename|contains: - \Microsoft\OneDrive\ - \Microsoft OneDrive\ - \Microsoft\Teams\ - \Local\slack\app- - \Local\Programs\Microsoft VS Code\ filter: Image|endswith: \cmd.exe TargetFilename|contains|all: - \Users\ - \AppData\ - \Microsoft\OneDrive\ - \api-ms-win-core- condition: selection and not filter falsepositives: - Unknown level: medium
Sigma rule: Detects creation of a local user via PowerShell. Logsource: windows / ps_script. Rule: title: PowerShell Create Local User id: 243de76f-4725-4f2e-8225-a8a69b15ad61 status: test description: Detects creation of a local user via PowerShell references: - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1136.001/T1136.001.md author: '@ROxPinTeddy' date: 2020-04-11 modified: 2022-12-25 tags: - attack.execution - attack.t1059.001 - attack.persistence - attack.t1136.001 logsource: product: windows category: ps_script definition: 'Requirements: Script Block Logging must be enabled' detection: selection: ScriptBlockText|contains: New-LocalUser condition: selection falsepositives: - Legitimate user creation level: medium
Sigma rule: Detects a suspicious command line execution that invokes PowerShell with reference to an AppData folder. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: PowerShell Script Run in AppData id: ac175779-025a-4f12-98b0-acdaeb77ea85 status: test description: Detects a suspicious command line execution that invokes PowerShell with reference to an AppData folder references: - https://twitter.com/JohnLaTwC/status/1082851155481288706 - https://app.any.run/tasks/f87f1c4e-47e2-4c46-9cf4-31454c06ce03 author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Jonhnathan Ribeiro, oscd.community date: 2019-01-09 modified: 2022-07-14 tags: - attack.execution - attack.t1059.001 logsource: category: process_creation product: windows detection: selection1: CommandLine|contains: - powershell.exe - \powershell - \pwsh - pwsh.exe selection2: CommandLine|contains|all: - '/c ' - \AppData\ CommandLine|contains: - Local\ - Roaming\ condition: all of selection* falsepositives: - Administrative scripts level: medium
Sigma rule: Detects modifications to the registry key "HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon\SpecialAccounts\Us. Logsource: windows / registry_set. Rule: title: Hiding User Account Via SpecialAccounts Registry Key id: f8aebc67-a56d-4ec9-9fbe-7b0e8b7b4efd related: - id: 8a58209c-7ae6-4027-afb0-307a78e4589a type: obsolete - id: 9ec9fb1b-e059-4489-9642-f270c207923d type: similar status: test description: Detects modifications to the registry key "HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon\SpecialAccounts\Userlist" where the value is set to "0" in order to hide user account from being listed on the logon screen. references: - https://thedfirreport.com/2022/07/11/select-xmrig-from-sqlserver/ - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/40b77d63808dd4f4eafb83949805636735a1fd15/atomics/T1564.002/T1564.002.md#atomic-test-3---create-hidden-user-in-registry author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems), frack113 date: 2022-07-12 modified: 2023-01-26 tags: - attack.stealth - attack.t1564.002 logsource: category: registry_set product: windows detection: selection: TargetObject|contains: \SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon\SpecialAccounts\UserList Details: DWORD (0x00000000) condition: selection falsepositives: - Unknown level: high regression_tests_path: regression_data/rules/windows/registry/registry_set/registry_set_special_accounts/info.yml simulation: - type: atomic-red-team name: Create Hidden User in Registry technique: T1564.002 atomic_guid: 173126b7-afe4-45eb-8680-fa9f6400431c
Sigma rule: Detects calls to PowerShell with Invoke-WebRequest cmdlet using direct IP access. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: Suspicious Invoke-WebRequest Execution With DirectIP id: 1edff897-9146-48d2-9066-52e8d8f80a2f status: test description: Detects calls to PowerShell with Invoke-WebRequest cmdlet using direct IP access references: - https://www.huntress.com/blog/critical-vulnerabilities-in-papercut-print-management-software author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) date: 2023-04-21 tags: - attack.command-and-control - attack.t1105 logsource: category: process_creation product: windows detection: selection_img: - Image|endswith: - \powershell_ise.exe - \powershell.exe - \pwsh.exe - OriginalFileName: - powershell_ise.EXE - PowerShell.EXE - pwsh.dll selection_commands: CommandLine|contains: - 'curl ' - Invoke-RestMethod - Invoke-WebRequest - ' irm ' - 'iwr ' - 'wget ' selection_ip: CommandLine|contains: - ://1 - ://2 - ://3 - ://4 - ://5 - ://6 - ://7 - ://8 - ://9 condition: all of selection_* falsepositives: - Unknown level: medium
Sigma rule: Detects a potentially suspicious parent of "csc.exe", which could be a sign of payload delivery.. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: Csc.EXE Execution Form Potentially Suspicious Parent id: b730a276-6b63-41b8-bcf8-55930c8fc6ee status: test description: Detects a potentially suspicious parent of "csc.exe", which could be a sign of payload delivery. references: - https://www.uptycs.com/blog/warzonerat-can-now-evade-with-process-hollowing - https://reaqta.com/2017/11/short-journey-darkvnc/ - https://www.pwc.com/gx/en/issues/cybersecurity/cyber-threat-intelligence/yellow-liderc-ships-its-scripts-delivers-imaploader-malware.html author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems), X__Junior (Nextron Systems) date: 2019-02-11 modified: 2026-03-23 tags: - attack.execution - attack.stealth - attack.t1059.005 - attack.t1059.007 - attack.t1218.005 - attack.t1027.004 logsource: category: process_creation product: windows detection: selection_img: - Image|endswith: \csc.exe - OriginalFileName: csc.exe selection_parent_generic: ParentImage|endswith: - \cscript.exe - \excel.exe - \mshta.exe - \onenote.exe - \outlook.exe - \powerpnt.exe - \winword.exe - \wscript.exe selection_parent_powershell: ParentImage|endswith: - \powershell.exe - \pwsh.exe ParentCommandLine|contains: - '-Encoded ' - FromBase64String selection_parent_susp_location: - ParentCommandLine|re: (?:[Pp]rogram[Dd]ata|%(?:[Ll]ocal)?[Aa]pp[Dd]ata%|\\[Aa]pp[Dd]ata\\(?:[Ll]ocal(?:[Ll]ow)?|[Rr]oaming))\\[^\\]{1,256}$ - ParentCommandLine|contains: - :\PerfLogs\ - :\Users\Public\ - :\Windows\Temp\ - \Temporary Internet - ParentCommandLine|contains|all: - :\Users\ - \Favorites\ - ParentCommandLine|contains|all: - :\Users\ - \Favourites\ - ParentCommandLine|contains|all: - :\Users\ - \Contacts\ - ParentCommandLine|contains|all: - :\Users\ - \Pictures\ filter_main_programfiles: ParentImage|startswith: - C:\Program Files (x86)\ - C:\Program Files\ filter_main_sdiagnhost: ParentImage: C:\Windows\System32\sdiagnhost.exe filter_main_w3p: ParentImage: C:\Windows\System32\inetsrv\w3wp.exe filter_optional_chocolatey: ParentImage: C:\ProgramData\chocolatey\choco.exe filter_optional_defender: ParentCommandLine|contains: \ProgramData\Microsoft\Windows Defender Advanced Threat Protection filter_optional_ansible: ParentCommandLine|contains: - JwB7ACIAZgBhAGkAbABlAGQAIgA6AHQAcgB1AGUALAAiAG0AcwBnACIAOgAiAEEAbgBzAGkAYgBsAGUAIAByAGUAcQB1AGkAcgBlAHMAIABQAG8AdwBlAHIAUwBoAGUAbABsACAAdgAzAC4AMAAgAG8AcgAgAG4AZQB3AGUAcgAiAH0AJw - cAewAiAGYAYQBpAGwAZQBkACIAOgB0AHIAdQBlACwAIgBtAHMAZwAiADoAIgBBAG4AcwBpAGIAbABlACAAcgBlAHEAdQBpAHIAZQBzAC
Sigma rule: An adversary may use legitimate desktop support and remote access software, such as Team Viewer, Go2Assist, LogMein, Amm. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: Remote Access Tool - AnyDesk Execution id: b52e84a3-029e-4529-b09b-71d19dd27e94 status: test related: - id: 065b00ca-5d5c-4557-ac95-64a6d0b64d86 type: similar description: 'An adversary may use legitimate desktop support and remote access software, such as Team Viewer, Go2Assist, LogMein, AmmyyAdmin, etc, to establish an interactive command and control channel to target systems within networks. These services are commonly used as legitimate technical support software, and may be allowed by application control within a target environment. Remote access tools like VNC, Ammyy, and Teamviewer are used frequently when compared with other legitimate software commonly used by adversaries. (Citation: Symantec Living off the Land) ' references: - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1219/T1219.md#atomic-test-2---anydesk-files-detected-test-on-windows - https://thedfirreport.com/2025/02/24/confluence-exploit-leads-to-lockbit-ransomware/ author: frack113 date: 2022-02-11 modified: 2025-02-24 tags: - attack.command-and-control - attack.t1219.002 logsource: category: process_creation product: windows detection: selection: - Image|endswith: - \AnyDesk.exe - \AnyDeskMSI.exe - Description: AnyDesk - Product: AnyDesk - Company: AnyDesk Software GmbH condition: selection falsepositives: - Legitimate use level: medium
Sigma rule: Detects suspicious script execution from suspicious directories or folders accessible by environment variables that may. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: Script Interpreter Execution From Suspicious Folder id: 1228c958-e64e-4e71-92ad-7d429f4138ba status: test description: 'Detects suspicious script execution from suspicious directories or folders accessible by environment variables that may indicate malware activity. Script interpreters (cscript, wscript, mshta, powershell) executing from folders like Temp, Public, or user profile directories may suggest attempts to evade detection or execute malicious scripts. ' references: - https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/91ba814a86ddedc7a9d546e26f912c541205b47a853d227756ab1334ade92c3f - https://symantec-enterprise-blogs.security.com/blogs/threat-intelligence/shuckworm-russia-ukraine-military - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/shell/csidl author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) date: 2022-02-08 modified: 2026-02-17 tags: - attack.execution - attack.t1059 logsource: category: process_creation product: windows detection: selection_proc_image: Image|endswith: - \cscript.exe - \mshta.exe - \wscript.exe selection_proc_flags: CommandLine|contains: - ' -ep bypass ' - ' -ExecutionPolicy bypass ' - ' -w hidden ' - '/e:javascript ' - '/e:Jscript ' - '/e:vbscript ' selection_proc_original: OriginalFileName: - cscript.exe - mshta.exe - wscript.exe selection_folders_1: CommandLine|contains: - :\Perflogs\ - :\Users\Public\ - \%Public% - \AppData\Local\Temp - \AppData\Roaming\Temp - \Temporary Internet - \Windows\Temp - \Start Menu\Programs\Startup\ - '%TEMP%' - '%TMP%' - '%LocalAppData%\Temp' selection_folders_2: - CommandLine|contains|all: - :\Users\ - \Favorites\ - CommandLine|contains|all: - :\Users\ - \Favourites\ - CommandLine|contains|all: - :\Users\ - \Contacts\ - CommandLine|contains|all: - :\Users\ - \Documents\ - CommandLine|contains|all: - :\Users\ - \Music\ - CommandLine|contains|all: - :\Users\ - \Pictures\ - CommandLine|contains|all: - :\Users\ - \Videos\ filter_optional_chocolatey_installer: ParentImage: - C:\Windows\System32\Msiexec.exe - C:\Windows\SysWOW64\Msiexec.exe Image|endswith: \powershell.exe CommandLine|contains|all: - -NoProfile -ExecutionPolicy Bypass -Command - AppData\Local\Temp\ - Install-Chocolatey.ps1 condition: 1 of selection_proc_* and 1 of selection_folders_* and not 1 of filter_optional_* falsepositives: - Various legitimate software have been observed to use similar techniques for installation or update purposes;thus, it is recommended to review and tune filters for your environme
Sigma rule: The Devtoolslauncher.exe executes other binary. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: Devtoolslauncher.exe Executes Specified Binary id: cc268ac1-42d9-40fd-9ed3-8c4e1a5b87e6 status: test description: The Devtoolslauncher.exe executes other binary references: - https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/OtherMSBinaries/Devtoolslauncher/ - https://twitter.com/_felamos/status/1179811992841797632 author: Beyu Denis, oscd.community (rule), @_felamos (idea) date: 2019-10-12 modified: 2021-11-27 tags: - attack.stealth - attack.t1218 logsource: category: process_creation product: windows detection: selection: Image|endswith: \devtoolslauncher.exe CommandLine|contains: LaunchForDeploy condition: selection falsepositives: - Legitimate use of devtoolslauncher.exe by legitimate user level: high
Sigma rule: Detects suspicious Splwow64.exe process without any command line parameters. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: Suspicious Splwow64 Without Params id: 1f1a8509-2cbb-44f5-8751-8e1571518ce2 status: test description: Detects suspicious Splwow64.exe process without any command line parameters references: - https://twitter.com/sbousseaden/status/1429401053229891590?s=12 author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems) date: 2021-08-23 modified: 2022-12-25 tags: - attack.stealth - attack.t1202 logsource: category: process_creation product: windows detection: selection: Image|endswith: \splwow64.exe CommandLine|endswith: splwow64.exe condition: selection falsepositives: - Unknown level: high
Sigma rule: Detects usage of the "Import-Module" cmdlet to load the "Microsoft.ActiveDirectory.Management.dl" DLL. Which is often us. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: Potential Active Directory Enumeration Using AD Module - ProcCreation id: 70bc5215-526f-4477-963c-a47a5c9ebd12 related: - id: 9e620995-f2d8-4630-8430-4afd89f77604 type: similar - id: 74176142-4684-4d8a-8b0a-713257e7df8e type: similar status: test description: Detects usage of the "Import-Module" cmdlet to load the "Microsoft.ActiveDirectory.Management.dl" DLL. Which is often used by attackers to perform AD enumeration. references: - https://github.com/samratashok/ADModule - https://twitter.com/cyb3rops/status/1617108657166061568?s=20 - https://www.ired.team/offensive-security-experiments/active-directory-kerberos-abuse/active-directory-enumeration-with-ad-module-without-rsat-or-admin-privileges author: frack113 date: 2023-01-22 tags: - attack.reconnaissance - attack.discovery - attack.impact logsource: product: windows category: process_creation detection: selection_img: - Image|endswith: - \powershell.exe - \pwsh.exe - OriginalFileName: - PowerShell.EXE - pwsh.dll selection_cmdlet: CommandLine|contains: - 'Import-Module ' - 'ipmo ' selection_dll: CommandLine|contains: Microsoft.ActiveDirectory.Management.dll condition: all of selection_* falsepositives: - Legitimate use of the library for administrative activity level: medium
Sigma rule: Detects the Setting of Windows Defender Exclusions. Logsource: windows / registry_set. Rule: title: Windows Defender Exclusions Added - Registry id: a982fc9c-6333-4ffb-a51d-addb04e8b529 related: - id: 1321dc4e-a1fe-481d-a016-52c45f0c8b4f type: derived status: test description: Detects the Setting of Windows Defender Exclusions references: - https://twitter.com/_nullbind/status/1204923340810543109 author: Christian Burkard (Nextron Systems) date: 2021-07-06 modified: 2023-08-17 tags: - attack.defense-impairment - attack.t1685 logsource: product: windows category: registry_set detection: selection2: TargetObject|contains: \Microsoft\Windows Defender\Exclusions condition: selection2 falsepositives: - Administrator actions level: medium
Sigma rule: Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of network connections to or from the compromised system they are currently acc. Logsource: windows / ps_module. Rule: title: Use Get-NetTCPConnection - PowerShell Module id: aff815cc-e400-4bf0-a47a-5d8a2407d4e1 status: test description: Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of network connections to or from the compromised system they are currently accessing or from remote systems by querying for information over the network. references: - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1049/T1049.md#atomic-test-2---system-network-connections-discovery-with-powershell author: frack113 date: 2021-12-10 modified: 2022-12-02 tags: - attack.discovery - attack.t1049 logsource: product: windows category: ps_module definition: 0ad03ef1-f21b-4a79-8ce8-e6900c54b65b detection: selection: ContextInfo|contains: Get-NetTCPConnection condition: selection falsepositives: - Unknown level: low