alirezaaminzadeh/cybersec-retrieval-benchmark huggingface dataset:
Sigma rule: Detetcts PowerShell activity in which Get-Addefaultdomainpasswordpolicy is used to get the default password policy for a. Logsource: windows / ps_script. Rule: title: Password Policy Discovery With Get-AdDefaultDomainPasswordPolicy id: bbb9495b-58fc-4016-b9df-9a3a1b67ca82 status: test description: Detetcts PowerShell activity in which Get-Addefaultdomainpasswordpolicy is used to get the default password policy for an Active Directory domain. references: - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1201/T1201.md#atomic-test-9---enumerate-active-directory-password-policy-with-get-addefaultdomainpasswordpolicy - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/activedirectory/get-addefaultdomainpasswordpolicy?view=windowsserver2022-ps author: frack113 date: 2022-03-17 tags: - attack.discovery - attack.t1201 logsource: product: windows category: ps_script definition: 'Requirements: Script Block Logging must be enabled' detection: selection: ScriptBlockText|contains: Get-AdDefaultDomainPasswordPolicy condition: selection falsepositives: - Legitimate PowerShell scripts level: low
Sigma rule: Detects execution of WSASS, a tool used to dump LSASS memory on Windows systems by leveraging WER's (Windows Error Repor. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: HackTool - WSASS Execution id: 589ac73f-8e12-409c-964e-31a2f5775ae2 status: experimental description: 'Detects execution of WSASS, a tool used to dump LSASS memory on Windows systems by leveraging WER''s (Windows Error Reporting) WerFaultSecure.EXE to bypass PPL (Protected Process Light) protections. ' references: - https://github.com/TwoSevenOneT/WSASS - https://www.zerosalarium.com/2025/09/Dumping-LSASS-With-WER-On-Modern-Windows-11.html author: Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems) date: 2025-11-23 modified: 2026-01-09 tags: - attack.credential-access - attack.t1003.001 logsource: category: process_creation product: windows detection: selection_img: Image|endswith: \wsass.exe selection_hash: Hashes|contains: IMPHASH=32F5095C9BBDCACF28FD4060EB4DFC42 selection_cli: CommandLine|re: (?i)\.exe[\"\']?\s+[^\"]{0,64}werfaultsecure\.exe[\"\']?\s+\d{2,10} condition: 1 of selection_* falsepositives: - Unlikely level: high regression_tests_path: regression_data/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_hktl_wsass/info.yml
Sigma rule: Adversaries may disable security tools to avoid possible detection of their tools and activities by uninstalling Crowdst. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: Uninstall Crowdstrike Falcon Sensor id: f0f7be61-9cf5-43be-9836-99d6ef448a18 status: test description: Adversaries may disable security tools to avoid possible detection of their tools and activities by uninstalling Crowdstrike Falcon references: - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/f339e7da7d05f6057fdfcdd3742bfcf365fee2a9/atomics/T1562.001/T1562.001.md author: frack113 date: 2021-07-12 modified: 2023-03-09 tags: - attack.defense-impairment - attack.t1685 logsource: category: process_creation product: windows detection: selection: CommandLine|contains|all: - \WindowsSensor.exe - ' /uninstall' - ' /quiet' condition: selection falsepositives: - Administrator might leverage the same command line for debugging or other purposes. However this action must be always investigated level: high
Sigma rule: Detects blocking of process creations originating from PSExec and WMI commands. Logsource: windows / windefend. Rule: title: PSExec and WMI Process Creations Block id: 97b9ce1e-c5ab-11ea-87d0-0242ac130003 status: test description: Detects blocking of process creations originating from PSExec and WMI commands references: - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/defender-endpoint/attack-surface-reduction-rules-reference?view=o365-worldwide#block-process-creations-originating-from-psexec-and-wmi-commands - https://twitter.com/duff22b/status/1280166329660497920 author: Bhabesh Raj date: 2020-07-14 modified: 2022-12-25 tags: - attack.execution - attack.lateral-movement - attack.t1047 - attack.t1569.002 logsource: product: windows service: windefend definition: 'Requirements:Enabled Block process creations originating from PSExec and WMI commands from Attack Surface Reduction (GUID: d1e49aac-8f56-4280-b9ba-993a6d77406c)' detection: selection: EventID: 1121 ProcessName|endswith: - \wmiprvse.exe - \psexesvc.exe condition: selection falsepositives: - Unknown level: high
Sigma rule: Detects potential DLL sideloading of "AVKkid.dll". Logsource: windows / image_load. Rule: title: Potential AVKkid.DLL Sideloading id: 952ed57c-8f99-453d-aee0-53a49c22f95d status: test description: Detects potential DLL sideloading of "AVKkid.dll" references: - https://research.checkpoint.com/2023/beyond-the-horizon-traveling-the-world-on-camaro-dragons-usb-flash-drives/ author: X__Junior (Nextron Systems) date: 2023-08-03 tags: - attack.persistence - attack.privilege-escalation - attack.execution - attack.stealth - attack.t1574.001 logsource: category: image_load product: windows detection: selection: ImageLoaded|endswith: \AVKkid.dll filter_main_legit_path: Image|contains: - C:\Program Files (x86)\G DATA\ - C:\Program Files\G DATA\ Image|endswith: \AVKKid.exe ImageLoaded|startswith: - C:\Program Files (x86)\G DATA\ - C:\Program Files\G DATA\ condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_* falsepositives: - Unknown level: medium
Sigma rule: Detects ADDInternals Cmdlet execution. A tool for administering Azure AD and Office 365. Which can be abused by threat a. Logsource: windows / ps_script. Rule: title: AADInternals PowerShell Cmdlets Execution - PsScript id: 91e69562-2426-42ce-a647-711b8152ced6 related: - id: c86500e9-a645-4680-98d7-f882c70c1ea3 type: similar status: test description: Detects ADDInternals Cmdlet execution. A tool for administering Azure AD and Office 365. Which can be abused by threat actors to attack Azure AD or Office 365. references: - https://o365blog.com/aadinternals/ - https://github.com/Gerenios/AADInternals author: Austin Songer (@austinsonger), Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems), Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems) date: 2022-12-23 modified: 2025-02-06 tags: - attack.execution - attack.reconnaissance - attack.discovery - attack.credential-access - attack.impact logsource: product: windows category: ps_script definition: Script Block Logging must be enable detection: selection: ScriptBlockText|contains: - Add-AADInt - ConvertTo-AADInt - Disable-AADInt - Enable-AADInt - Export-AADInt - Find-AADInt - Get-AADInt - Grant-AADInt - Initialize-AADInt - Install-AADInt - Invoke-AADInt - Join-AADInt - New-AADInt - Open-AADInt - Read-AADInt - Register-AADInt - Remove-AADInt - Reset-AADInt - Resolve-AADInt - Restore-AADInt - Save-AADInt - Search-AADInt - Send-AADInt - Set-AADInt - Start-AADInt - Unprotect-AADInt - Update-AADInt condition: selection falsepositives: - Legitimate use of the library for administrative activity level: high
Sigma rule: Detects Obfuscated Powershell via Stdin in Scripts. Logsource: windows / security. Rule: title: Invoke-Obfuscation Via Stdin - Security id: 80b708f3-d034-40e4-a6c8-d23b7a7db3d1 related: - id: 487c7524-f892-4054-b263-8a0ace63fc25 type: derived status: test description: Detects Obfuscated Powershell via Stdin in Scripts references: - https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/issues/1009 author: Nikita Nazarov, oscd.community date: 2020-10-12 modified: 2022-11-29 tags: - attack.stealth - attack.t1027 - attack.execution - attack.t1059.001 logsource: product: windows service: security definition: The 'System Security Extension' audit subcategory need to be enabled to log the EID 4697 detection: selection: EventID: 4697 ServiceFileName|contains|all: - set - '&&' ServiceFileName|contains: - environment - invoke - ${input) condition: selection falsepositives: - Unknown level: high
Sigma rule: Detects the execution of a Windows system binary that is usually located in the system folder from an uncommon location.. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: System File Execution Location Anomaly id: e4a6b256-3e47-40fc-89d2-7a477edd6915 related: - id: be58d2e2-06c8-4f58-b666-b99f6dc3b6cd type: derived status: test description: 'Detects the execution of a Windows system binary that is usually located in the system folder from an uncommon location. ' references: - https://twitter.com/GelosSnake/status/934900723426439170 - https://asec.ahnlab.com/en/39828/ - https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/inno-setup-malware-redline-stealer-campaign.html author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Patrick Bareiss, Anton Kutepov, oscd.community, Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) date: 2017-11-27 modified: 2026-07-28 tags: - attack.stealth - attack.t1036 logsource: category: process_creation product: windows detection: selection: Image|endswith: - \atbroker.exe - \audiodg.exe - \bcdedit.exe - \bitsadmin.exe - \certreq.exe - \certutil.exe - \cmstp.exe - \conhost.exe - \consent.exe - \cscript.exe - \csrss.exe - \dashost.exe - \defrag.exe - \dfrgui.exe - \dism.exe - \dllhost.exe - \dllhst3g.exe - \dwm.exe - \eventvwr.exe - \fsquirt.exe - \finger.exe - \logonui.exe - \LsaIso.exe - \lsass.exe - \lsm.exe - \msiexec.exe - \ntoskrnl.exe - \powershell_ise.exe - \powershell.exe - \pwsh.exe - \regsvr32.exe - \rundll32.exe - \runonce.exe - \RuntimeBroker.exe - \schtasks.exe - \services.exe - \sihost.exe - \smartscreen.exe - \smss.exe - \spoolsv.exe - \svchost.exe - \taskhost.exe - \taskhostw.exe - \Taskmgr.exe - \userinit.exe - \werfault.exe - \werfaultsecure.exe - \wininit.exe - \winlogon.exe - \winver.exe - \wlanext.exe - \wmic.exe - \wscript.exe - \wsl.exe - \wsmprovhost.exe filter_main_generic: Image|startswith: - C:\$WINDOWS.~BT\ - C:\$WinREAgent\ - C:\Windows\SoftwareDistribution\ - C:\Windows\System32\ - C:\Windows\SystemTemp\ - C:\Windows\SysWOW64\ - C:\Windows\uus\ - C:\Windows\WinSxS\ filter_optional_system32: Image|contains: \SystemRoot\System32\ filter_main_powershell: Image|contains: - C:\Program Files\PowerShell\7\ - C:\Program Files\PowerShell\7-preview\ - C:\Program Files\WindowsApps\Microsoft.PowerShellPreview - \AppData\Local\Microsoft\WindowsApps\Microsoft.PowerShellPreview Image|endswith: \pwsh.exe filter_main_wsl_programfiles: Image|startswith: - C:\Program Files\WindowsApps\MicrosoftCorporationII.WindowsSubsystemForLinux - C:\Program Files\WSL\ Image|endswith: \wsl.exe filter_main_wsl_appdata: Image|startswith: C:\Users\ Image|contains: \AppData\Local\Microsoft\WindowsApps\ Image|endswith: \wsl.exe c
Sigma rule: Detects a JAVA process running with remote debugging allowing more than just localhost to connect. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: Java Running with Remote Debugging id: 8f88e3f6-2a49-48f5-a5c4-2f7eedf78710 status: test description: Detects a JAVA process running with remote debugging allowing more than just localhost to connect references: - https://dzone.com/articles/remote-debugging-java-applications-with-jdwp author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems) date: 2019-01-16 modified: 2023-02-01 tags: - attack.t1203 - attack.execution logsource: category: process_creation product: windows detection: selection_jdwp_transport: CommandLine|contains: transport=dt_socket,address= selection_old_jvm_version: CommandLine|contains: - jre1. - jdk1. exclusion: CommandLine|contains: - address=127.0.0.1 - address=localhost condition: all of selection_* and not exclusion falsepositives: - Unknown level: medium
Sigma rule: Detects changes to the Windows EventLog channel permission values. It focuses on changes to the Security Descriptor Defi. Logsource: windows / registry_set. Rule: title: Windows Event Log Access Tampering Via Registry id: ba226dcf-d390-4642-b9af-b534872f1156 status: experimental description: 'Detects changes to the Windows EventLog channel permission values. It focuses on changes to the Security Descriptor Definition Language (SDDL) string, as modifications to these values can restrict access to specific users or groups, potentially aiding in defense evasion by controlling who can view or modify a event log channel. Upon execution, the user shouldn''t be able to access the event log channel via the event viewer or via utilities such as "Get-EventLog" or "wevtutil". ' references: - https://www.atomicredteam.io/atomic-red-team/atomics/T1562.002#atomic-test-8---modify-event-log-channel-access-permissions-via-registry---powershell - https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uSYvHUVU8xY - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/secauthz/security-descriptor-definition-language author: X__Junior date: 2025-01-16 modified: 2025-08-16 tags: - attack.privilege-escalation - attack.persistence - attack.defense-impairment - attack.t1547.001 - attack.t1112 logsource: category: registry_set product: windows detection: selection_key_1: TargetObject|contains: \SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\EventLog\ TargetObject|endswith: \CustomSD selection_key_2: TargetObject|contains: - \Policies\Microsoft\Windows\EventLog\ - \Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\WINEVT\Channels TargetObject|endswith: \ChannelAccess selection_details: - Details|contains: D:(D; - Details|contains|all: - D:( - )(D; filter_main_trustedinstaller: Image: C:\Windows\servicing\TrustedInstaller.exe filter_main_tiworker: Image|startswith: C:\Windows\WinSxS\ Image|endswith: \TiWorker.exe filter_optional_empty: Image: '' filter_optional_null: Image: null condition: 1 of selection_key_* and selection_details and not 1 of filter_main_* and not 1 of filter_optional_* falsepositives: - Administrative activity, still unlikely level: high
Sigma rule: Detects creation of local users via the net.exe command with the option "never expire". Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: New User Created Via Net.EXE With Never Expire Option id: b9f0e6f5-09b4-4358-bae4-08408705bd5c related: - id: cd219ff3-fa99-45d4-8380-a7d15116c6dc type: derived status: test description: Detects creation of local users via the net.exe command with the option "never expire" references: - https://thedfirreport.com/2022/07/11/select-xmrig-from-sqlserver/ author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) date: 2022-07-12 modified: 2023-02-21 tags: - attack.persistence - attack.t1136.001 logsource: category: process_creation product: windows detection: selection_img: - Image|endswith: - \net.exe - \net1.exe - OriginalFileName: - net.exe - net1.exe selection_cli: CommandLine|contains|all: - user - add - expires:never condition: all of selection_* falsepositives: - Unlikely level: high
Sigma rule: Detects a suspicious process spawning from an "mshta.exe" process, which could be indicative of a malicious HTA script e. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: Suspicious MSHTA Child Process id: 03cc0c25-389f-4bf8-b48d-11878079f1ca status: test description: Detects a suspicious process spawning from an "mshta.exe" process, which could be indicative of a malicious HTA script execution references: - https://www.trustedsec.com/july-2015/malicious-htas/ author: Michael Haag date: 2019-01-16 modified: 2023-02-06 tags: - attack.stealth - attack.t1218.005 - car.2013-02-003 - car.2013-03-001 - car.2014-04-003 logsource: category: process_creation product: windows detection: selection_parent: ParentImage|endswith: \mshta.exe selection_child: - Image|endswith: - \cmd.exe - \powershell.exe - \pwsh.exe - \wscript.exe - \cscript.exe - \sh.exe - \bash.exe - \reg.exe - \regsvr32.exe - \bitsadmin.exe - OriginalFileName: - Cmd.Exe - PowerShell.EXE - pwsh.dll - wscript.exe - cscript.exe - Bash.exe - reg.exe - REGSVR32.EXE - bitsadmin.exe condition: all of selection* falsepositives: - Printer software / driver installations - HP software level: high
Sigma rule: Compress target file into a cab file stored in the Alternate Data Stream (ADS) of the target file.. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: Suspicious Diantz Alternate Data Stream Execution id: 6b369ced-4b1d-48f1-b427-fdc0de0790bd status: test description: Compress target file into a cab file stored in the Alternate Data Stream (ADS) of the target file. references: - https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Diantz/ author: frack113 date: 2021-11-26 modified: 2022-12-31 tags: - attack.stealth - attack.t1564.004 logsource: category: process_creation product: windows detection: selection: CommandLine|contains|all: - diantz.exe - .cab CommandLine|re: :[^\\] condition: selection falsepositives: - Very Possible level: medium
Sigma rule: Identifies when a service account is disabled or deleted in Google Cloud.. Logsource: gcp / gcp.audit. Rule: title: Google Cloud Service Account Disabled or Deleted id: 13f81a90-a69c-4fab-8f07-b5bb55416a9f status: test description: Identifies when a service account is disabled or deleted in Google Cloud. references: - https://cloud.google.com/iam/docs/reference/rest/v1/projects.serviceAccounts author: Austin Songer @austinsonger date: 2021-08-14 modified: 2022-10-09 tags: - attack.impact - attack.t1531 logsource: product: gcp service: gcp.audit detection: selection: gcp.audit.method_name|endswith: - .serviceAccounts.disable - .serviceAccounts.delete condition: selection falsepositives: - Service Account being disabled or deleted may be performed by a system administrator. Verify whether the user identity, user agent, and/or hostname should be making changes in your environment. - Service Account disabled or deleted from unfamiliar users should be investigated. If known behavior is causing false positives, it can be exempted from the rule. level: medium
Sigma rule: Detects the execution of 'sudo' command with '--chroot' option, which is used to change the root directory for command e. Logsource: linux / process_creation. Rule: title: Linux Sudo Chroot Execution id: f2bed782-994e-4f40-9cd5-518198cb3fba status: experimental description: 'Detects the execution of ''sudo'' command with ''--chroot'' option, which is used to change the root directory for command execution. Attackers may use this technique to evade detection and execute commands in a modified environment. This can be part of a privilege escalation strategy, as it allows the execution of commands with elevated privileges in a controlled environment as seen in CVE-2025-32463. While investigating, look out for unusual or unexpected use of ''sudo --chroot'' in conjunction with other commands or scripts such as execution from temporary directories or unusual user accounts. ' references: - https://github.com/kh4sh3i/CVE-2025-32463/blob/81bb430f84fa2089224733c3ed4bfa434c197ad4/exploit.sh author: Swachchhanda Shrawn Poudel (Nextron Systems) date: 2025-10-02 tags: - attack.privilege-escalation - attack.t1068 logsource: category: process_creation product: linux detection: selection: Image|endswith: /sudo CommandLine|contains: - ' --chroot ' - 'sudo -R ' condition: selection falsepositives: - Legitimate administrative tasks or scripts that use 'sudo --chroot' for containerization, testing, or system management. level: low
Sigma rule: Detects creation of an ad-hoc Cloudflare Quick Tunnel, which can be used to tunnel local services such as HTTP, RDP, SSH. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: Cloudflared Quick Tunnel Execution id: 222129f7-f4dc-4568-b0d2-22440a9639ba related: - id: 7050bba1-1aed-454e-8f73-3f46f09ce56a type: similar - id: 9a019ffc-3580-4c9d-8d87-079f7e8d3fd4 type: similar status: test description: 'Detects creation of an ad-hoc Cloudflare Quick Tunnel, which can be used to tunnel local services such as HTTP, RDP, SSH and SMB. The free TryCloudflare Quick Tunnel will generate a random subdomain on trycloudflare[.]com, following a call to api[.]trycloudflare[.]com. The tool has been observed in use by threat groups including Akira ransomware. ' references: - https://developers.cloudflare.com/cloudflare-one/connections/connect-networks/do-more-with-tunnels/trycloudflare/ - https://github.com/cloudflare/cloudflared - https://www.intrinsec.com/akira_ransomware/ - https://www.guidepointsecurity.com/blog/tunnel-vision-cloudflared-abused-in-the-wild/ author: Sajid Nawaz Khan tags: - attack.command-and-control - attack.t1090.001 date: 2023-12-20 logsource: category: process_creation product: windows detection: selection_img: - Image|endswith: - \cloudflared.exe - \cloudflared-windows-386.exe - \cloudflared-windows-amd64.exe - Hashes|contains: - SHA256=2fb6c04c4f95fb8d158af94c137f90ac820716deaf88d8ebec956254e046cb29 - SHA256=b3d21940a10fdef5e415ad70331ce257c24fe3bcf7722262302e0421791f87e8 - SHA256=1fbd8362b2d2d2e6a5750ae3db69cd1815e6c1d31da48a98b796450971a8e039 - SHA256=0409c9b12f9d0eda86e461ed9bdabeefb00172b26322079681a0bdf48e68dc28 - SHA256=7cfb411d04bac42ef93d1f0c93c0a481e38c6f4612b97ae89d4702595988edc7 - SHA256=5b3c2d846ab162dc6bc595cce3a49de5731afde5d6060be7066d21b013a28373 - SHA256=ce95df7f69664c3df19b76028e115931919a71517b776da7b42d353e2ff4a670 - SHA256=1293525a19cfe3bc8296b62fbfe19f083632ed644a1c18c10b045a1d3030d81a - SHA256=af2b9161cfcb654b16408cd6b098afe9d1fb61a037d18d7090a119d4c0c8e0f0 - SHA256=39ddceb56a15798826a5fc4892fa2b474c444bb4d7a8bf2fa95e41cab10fa7a1 - SHA256=ccd11f2328023a0e7929e845d5b6e7bc783fb4650d65faef3ae090239d4bbce2 - SHA256=b6e5c5d2567ae8c69cc012ebcae30e6c9b5359d64a58d17ba75ec89f8bce71ac - SHA256=f813484ea441404f18caad96f28138e8aaf0cb256163c09c2ab8a3acab87f69f - SHA256=fc4a0802ab9c7409b892ca00636bec61e2acfc911bccfdeb9978b8ab5a2f828d - SHA256=083150724b49604c8765c1ba19541fa260b133be0acb0647fcd936d81f054499 - SHA256=44303d6572956f28a0f2e4b188934fb9874f2584f5c81fa431a463cfbf28083b - SHA256=5d38c46032a58e28ae5f7d174d8761ec3d64d186677f3ec53af5f51afb9bfd2f - SHA256=e1e70fa42059911bc6685fafef957f9a73fc66f214d070
Sigma rule: Detects the command line executed when TeamViewer starts a session started by a remote host. Once a connection has been. Logsource: macos / process_creation. Rule: title: Remote Access Tool - Team Viewer Session Started On MacOS Host id: f459ccb4-9805-41ea-b5b2-55e279e2424a related: - id: ab70c354-d9ac-4e11-bbb6-ec8e3b153357 type: similar - id: 1f6b8cd4-3e60-47cc-b282-5aa1cbc9182d type: similar status: test description: 'Detects the command line executed when TeamViewer starts a session started by a remote host. Once a connection has been started, an investigator can verify the connection details by viewing the "incoming_connections.txt" log file in the TeamViewer folder. ' references: - Internal Research author: Josh Nickels, Qi Nan date: 2024-03-11 tags: - attack.persistence - attack.initial-access - attack.t1133 logsource: category: process_creation product: macos detection: selection: ParentImage|endswith: /TeamViewer_Service Image|endswith: /TeamViewer_Desktop CommandLine|endswith: /TeamViewer_Desktop --IPCport 5939 --Module 1 condition: selection falsepositives: - Legitimate usage of TeamViewer level: low
Sigma rule: Detects Obfuscated use of Environment Variables to execute PowerShell. Logsource: windows / security. Rule: title: Invoke-Obfuscation VAR+ Launcher - Security id: dcf2db1f-f091-425b-a821-c05875b8925a related: - id: 8ca7004b-e620-4ecb-870e-86129b5b8e75 type: derived status: test description: Detects Obfuscated use of Environment Variables to execute PowerShell references: - https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/issues/1009 author: Jonathan Cheong, oscd.community date: 2020-10-15 modified: 2022-11-29 tags: - attack.stealth - attack.t1027 - attack.execution - attack.t1059.001 logsource: product: windows service: security definition: The 'System Security Extension' audit subcategory need to be enabled to log the EID 4697 detection: selection: EventID: 4697 ServiceFileName|contains|all: - cmd - '"set' - -f ServiceFileName|contains: - /c - /r condition: selection falsepositives: - Unknown level: high