alirezaaminzadeh/cybersec-retrieval-benchmark huggingface dataset:
Sigma rule: Detects enabling or disabling of Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) using alternate methods such as WMIC or PowerShell. In Po. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: RDP Enable or Disable via Win32_TerminalServiceSetting WMI Class id: 4b8f6d3a-9c5e-4f2a-a7d8-6b9c3e5f2a8d related: - id: a2863fbc-d5cb-48d5-83fb-d976d4b1743b type: similar status: experimental description: 'Detects enabling or disabling of Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) using alternate methods such as WMIC or PowerShell. In PowerShell one-liner commands, the "SetAllowTSConnections" method of the "Win32_TerminalServiceSetting" class may be used to enable or disable RDP. In WMIC, the "rdtoggle" alias or "Win32_TerminalServiceSetting" class may be used for the same purpose. ' references: - https://www.trendmicro.com/en_gb/research/22/e/uncovering-a-kingminer-botnet-attack-using-trend-micro-managed-x.html - https://github.com/HackTricks-wiki/hacktricks/blob/72f20a3fa26775b932bd819f1824c6377802a768/src/windows-hardening/basic-cmd-for-pentesters.md#firewall - https://github.com/Lifailon/RSA/blob/rsa/Sources/RSA-1.4.1.ps1#L1468 author: Daniel Koifman (KoifSec), Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems) date: 2025-11-15 tags: - attack.lateral-movement - attack.t1021.001 - attack.execution - attack.t1047 logsource: category: process_creation product: windows detection: selection_img: - Image|endswith: - \wmic.exe - \powershell.exe - \pwsh.exe - OriginalFileName: - wmic.exe - PowerShell.EXE - pwsh.dll selection_cli_method: CommandLine|contains: - rdtoggle - Win32_TerminalServiceSetting selection_cli_property: CommandLine|contains: SetAllowTSConnections condition: all of selection_* falsepositives: - Legitimate system administrators enabling RDP for remote support - System configuration scripts during deployment level: medium
Sigma rule: Detects execution of the "esxcli" command with the "vsan" flag in order to retrieve information about virtual storage. S. Logsource: linux / process_creation. Rule: title: ESXi VSAN Information Discovery Via ESXCLI id: d54c2f06-aca9-4e2b-81c9-5317858f4b79 status: test description: Detects execution of the "esxcli" command with the "vsan" flag in order to retrieve information about virtual storage. Seen used by malware such as DarkSide. references: - https://www.trendmicro.com/en_us/research/21/e/darkside-linux-vms-targeted.html - https://www.trendmicro.com/en_us/research/22/a/analysis-and-Impact-of-lockbit-ransomwares-first-linux-and-vmware-esxi-variant.html - https://developer.broadcom.com/xapis/esxcli-command-reference/7.0.0/namespace/esxcli_vsan.html author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems), Cedric Maurugeon date: 2023-09-04 tags: - attack.discovery - attack.execution - attack.t1033 - attack.t1007 - attack.t1059.012 logsource: category: process_creation product: linux detection: selection_img: Image|endswith: /esxcli CommandLine|contains: vsan selection_cli: CommandLine|contains: - ' get' - ' list' condition: all of selection_* falsepositives: - Legitimate administration activities level: medium
Sigma rule: Detects calls to "LoadAssemblyFromPath" or "LoadAssemblyFromNS" that are part of the "CL_LoadAssembly.ps1" script. This. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: Assembly Loading Via CL_LoadAssembly.ps1 id: c57872c7-614f-4d7f-a40d-b78c8df2d30d status: test description: Detects calls to "LoadAssemblyFromPath" or "LoadAssemblyFromNS" that are part of the "CL_LoadAssembly.ps1" script. This can be abused to load different assemblies and bypass App locker controls. references: - https://bohops.com/2018/01/07/executing-commands-and-bypassing-applocker-with-powershell-diagnostic-scripts/ - https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Scripts/CL_LoadAssembly/ author: frack113, Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) date: 2022-05-21 modified: 2023-08-17 tags: - attack.stealth - attack.t1216 logsource: category: process_creation product: windows detection: selection: CommandLine|contains: - 'LoadAssemblyFromPath ' - 'LoadAssemblyFromNS ' condition: selection falsepositives: - Unknown level: medium
Sigma rule: Detects potential DLL sideloading of "wwlib.dll". Logsource: windows / image_load. Rule: title: Potential WWlib.DLL Sideloading id: e2e01011-5910-4267-9c3b-4149ed5479cf status: test description: Detects potential DLL sideloading of "wwlib.dll" references: - https://twitter.com/WhichbufferArda/status/1658829954182774784 - https://news.sophos.com/en-us/2022/11/03/family-tree-dll-sideloading-cases-may-be-related/ - https://securelist.com/apt-luminousmoth/103332/ author: X__Junior (Nextron Systems) date: 2023-05-18 tags: - attack.persistence - attack.privilege-escalation - attack.execution - attack.stealth - attack.t1574.001 logsource: category: image_load product: windows detection: selection: ImageLoaded|endswith: \wwlib.dll filter_main_path: Image|startswith: - C:\Program Files (x86)\Microsoft Office\ - C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\ Image|endswith: \winword.exe ImageLoaded|startswith: - C:\Program Files (x86)\Microsoft Office\ - C:\Program Files\Microsoft Office\ condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_* falsepositives: - Unknown level: medium
Sigma rule: Detects WMIC executing "process call create" with suspicious calls to processes such as "rundll32", "regsrv32", etc.. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: Suspicious Process Created Via Wmic.EXE id: 3c89a1e8-0fba-449e-8f1b-8409d6267ec8 related: - id: 526be59f-a573-4eea-b5f7-f0973207634d type: derived status: test description: Detects WMIC executing "process call create" with suspicious calls to processes such as "rundll32", "regsrv32", etc. references: - https://thedfirreport.com/2020/10/08/ryuks-return/ - https://symantec-enterprise-blogs.security.com/blogs/threat-intelligence/ransomware-hive-conti-avoslocker author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) date: 2020-10-12 modified: 2023-02-14 tags: - attack.execution - attack.t1047 logsource: category: process_creation product: windows detection: selection: CommandLine|contains|all: - 'process ' - 'call ' - 'create ' CommandLine|contains: - rundll32 - bitsadmin - regsvr32 - 'cmd.exe /c ' - 'cmd.exe /k ' - 'cmd.exe /r ' - 'cmd /c ' - 'cmd /k ' - 'cmd /r ' - powershell - pwsh - certutil - cscript - wscript - mshta - \Users\Public\ - \Windows\Temp\ - \AppData\Local\ - '%temp%' - '%tmp%' - '%ProgramData%' - '%appdata%' - '%comspec%' - '%localappdata%' condition: selection falsepositives: - Unknown level: high simulation: - type: atomic red team name: WMI Execute rundll32 technique: T1047 atomic_guid: 00738d2a-4651-4d76-adf2-c43a41dfb243 regression_tests_path: regression_data/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_wmic_susp_process_creation/info.yml
Sigma rule: Detects usage of special strings/null bits in order to potentially bypass AMSI functionalities. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: Potential AMSI Bypass Using NULL Bits id: 92a974db-ab84-457f-9ec0-55db83d7a825 related: - id: fa2559c8-1197-471d-9cdd-05a0273d4522 type: similar status: test description: Detects usage of special strings/null bits in order to potentially bypass AMSI functionalities references: - https://github.com/r00t-3xp10it/hacking-material-books/blob/43cb1e1932c16ff1f58b755bc9ab6b096046853f/obfuscation/simple_obfuscation.md#amsi-bypass-using-null-bits-satoshi author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems) date: 2023-01-04 modified: 2023-05-09 tags: - attack.defense-impairment - attack.t1685 logsource: product: windows category: process_creation detection: selection: CommandLine|contains: - if(0){{{0}}}' -f $(0 -as [char]) + - '#<NULL>' condition: selection falsepositives: - Unknown level: medium
Sigma rule: Detects when a user tampers with S3 data management in Amazon Web Services.. Logsource: aws / cloudtrail. Rule: title: AWS S3 Data Management Tampering id: 78b3756a-7804-4ef7-8555-7b9024a02e2d status: test description: Detects when a user tampers with S3 data management in Amazon Web Services. references: - https://github.com/elastic/detection-rules/pull/1145/files - https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AmazonS3/latest/API/API_Operations.html - https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AmazonS3/latest/API/API_PutBucketLogging.html - https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AmazonS3/latest/API/API_PutBucketWebsite.html - https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AmazonS3/latest/API/API_PutBucketEncryption.html - https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AmazonS3/latest/userguide/setting-repl-config-perm-overview.html - https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AmazonS3/latest/API/API_RestoreObject.html author: Austin Songer @austinsonger date: 2021-07-24 modified: 2022-10-09 tags: - attack.exfiltration - attack.t1537 logsource: product: aws service: cloudtrail detection: selection: eventSource: s3.amazonaws.com eventName: - PutBucketLogging - PutBucketWebsite - PutEncryptionConfiguration - PutLifecycleConfiguration - PutReplicationConfiguration - ReplicateObject - RestoreObject condition: selection falsepositives: - A S3 configuration change may be done by a system or network administrator. Verify whether the user identity, user agent, and/or hostname should be making changes in your environment. S3 configuration change from unfamiliar users or hosts should be investigated. If known behavior is causing false positives, it can be exempted from the rule. level: low
Sigma rule: Detects usage of bitsadmin downloading a file from a suspicious domain. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: Suspicious Download From File-Sharing Website Via Bitsadmin id: 8518ed3d-f7c9-4601-a26c-f361a4256a0c related: - id: 8b48ad89-10d8-4382-a546-50588c410f0d type: similar - id: d635249d-86b5-4dad-a8c7-d7272b788586 type: similar - id: 52182dfb-afb7-41db-b4bc-5336cb29b464 type: similar - id: ae02ed70-11aa-4a22-b397-c0d0e8f6ea99 type: similar - id: e0f8ab85-0ac9-423b-a73a-81b3c7b1aa97 type: similar - id: 7b434893-c57d-4f41-908d-6a17bf1ae98f type: similar - id: 42a5f1e7-9603-4f6d-97ae-3f37d130d794 type: similar - id: 56454143-524f-49fb-b1c6-3fb8b1ad41fb type: similar - id: b6e04788-29e1-4557-bb14-77f761848ab8 type: similar - id: a0d7e4d2-bede-4141-8896-bc6e237e977c type: similar - id: 297ae038-edc2-4b2e-bb3e-7c5fc94dd5c7 type: similar status: test description: Detects usage of bitsadmin downloading a file from a suspicious domain references: - https://blog.netspi.com/15-ways-to-download-a-file/#bitsadmin - https://isc.sans.edu/diary/22264 - https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Bitsadmin/ - https://symantec-enterprise-blogs.security.com/blogs/threat-intelligence/ransomware-hive-conti-avoslocker - https://www.cisa.gov/uscert/ncas/alerts/aa22-321a - https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2024/01/17/new-ttps-observed-in-mint-sandstorm-campaign-targeting-high-profile-individuals-at-universities-and-research-orgs/ author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems) date: 2022-06-28 modified: 2026-03-29 tags: - attack.persistence - attack.execution - attack.stealth - attack.t1197 - attack.s0190 - attack.t1036.003 - attack.command-and-control - attack.t1105 logsource: category: process_creation product: windows detection: selection_img: - Image|endswith: \bitsadmin.exe - OriginalFileName: bitsadmin.exe selection_flags: CommandLine|contains: - ' /transfer ' - ' /create ' - ' /addfile ' selection_domain: CommandLine|contains: - .githubusercontent.com - 0x0.st - anonfiles.com - bashupload.com - cdn.discordapp.com - chunk.io - ddns.net - dl.dropboxusercontent.com - ghostbin.co - github.com - glitch.me - gofile.io - hastebin.com - mediafire.com - mega.nz - onrender.com - pages.dev - paste.ee - pastebin.com - pastebin.pl - pastetext.net - privatlab.com - privatlab.net - send.exploit.in - sendspace.com - storage.googleapis.com - storjshare.io - supabase.co - temp.sh - transfer.sh - trycloudflare.com - ufile.io - w3spaces.com - workers.dev - x0.at condition: all of selection_* falsepositives: - Some legitimate apps use this, but limited. level: high regression_tests_
Sigma rule: Monitors for the hiding possible malicious files in the C:\Windows\Fonts\ location. This folder doesn't require admin pr. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: Writing Of Malicious Files To The Fonts Folder id: ae9b0bd7-8888-4606-b444-0ed7410cb728 status: test description: Monitors for the hiding possible malicious files in the C:\Windows\Fonts\ location. This folder doesn't require admin privillege to be written and executed from. references: - https://thedfirreport.com/2020/04/20/sqlserver-or-the-miner-in-the-basement/ author: Sreeman date: 2020-04-21 modified: 2022-03-08 tags: - attack.stealth - attack.t1211 - attack.t1059 - attack.persistence - attack.execution logsource: product: windows category: process_creation detection: selection_1: CommandLine|contains: - echo - copy - type - file createnew - cacls selection_2: CommandLine|contains: C:\Windows\Fonts\ selection_3: CommandLine|contains: - .sh - .exe - .dll - .bin - .bat - .cmd - .js - .msh - .reg - .scr - .ps - .vb - .jar - .pl - '.inf' - .cpl - .hta - .msi - .vbs condition: all of selection_* falsepositives: - Unknown level: medium
Sigma rule: Detects potentially highly relevant antivirus events in the application log based on known virus signature names and mal. Logsource: windows / application. Rule: title: Relevant Anti-Virus Signature Keywords In Application Log id: 78bc5783-81d9-4d73-ac97-59f6db4f72a8 status: test description: 'Detects potentially highly relevant antivirus events in the application log based on known virus signature names and malware keywords. ' references: - https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/13828b390d5f58b002e808c2c4f02fdd920e236cc8015480fa33b6c1a9300e31 - https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/15b57c1b68cd6ce3c161042e0f3be9f32d78151fe95461eedc59a79fc222c7ed - https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/5092b2672b4cb87a8dd1c2e6047b487b95995ad8ed5e9fc217f46b8bfb1b8c01 - https://www.nextron-systems.com/?s=antivirus author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems), Arnim Rupp date: 2017-02-19 modified: 2024-12-25 tags: - attack.resource-development - attack.t1588 logsource: product: windows service: application detection: keywords: - Adfind - 'ASP/BackDoor ' - ATK/ - Backdoor.ASP - Backdoor.Cobalt - Backdoor.JSP - Backdoor.PHP - Blackworm - Brutel - BruteR - Chopper - Cobalt - COBEACON - Cometer - CRYPTES - Cryptor - Destructor - DumpCreds - Exploit.Script.CVE - FastReverseProxy - Filecoder - 'GrandCrab ' - HackTool - HKTL - HTool- - /HTool - .HTool - IISExchgSpawnCMD - Impacket - 'JSP/BackDoor ' - Keylogger - Koadic - Krypt - Lazagne - Metasploit - Meterpreter - MeteTool - mikatz - Mimikatz - Mpreter - MsfShell - Nighthawk - Packed.Generic.347 - PentestPowerShell - Phobos - 'PHP/BackDoor ' - Potato - PowerSploit - PowerSSH - PshlSpy - PSWTool - PWCrack - PWDump - Ransom - Rozena - Ryzerlo - Sbelt - Seatbelt - 'SecurityTool ' - SharpDump - Shellcode - Sliver - Splinter - Swrort - Tescrypt - TeslaCrypt - TurtleLoader - Valyria - Webshell filter_optional_generic: - anti_ransomware_service.exe - Anti-Ransomware - Crack - cyber-protect-service.exe - encryptor - Keygen filter_optional_information: Level: 4 filter_optional_restartmanager: Provider_Name: Microsoft-Windows-RestartManager condition: keywords and not 1 of filter_optional_* falsepositives: - Some software piracy tools (key generators, cracks) are classified as hack tools level: high
Sigma rule: Detects the execution of netsh with the "trace" flag in order to start a network capture. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: New Network Trace Capture Started Via Netsh.EXE id: d3c3861d-c504-4c77-ba55-224ba82d0118 status: test description: Detects the execution of netsh with the "trace" flag in order to start a network capture references: - https://blogs.msdn.microsoft.com/canberrapfe/2012/03/30/capture-a-network-trace-without-installing-anything-capture-a-network-trace-of-a-reboot/ - https://klausjochem.me/2016/02/03/netsh-the-cyber-attackers-tool-of-choice/ author: Kutepov Anton, oscd.community date: 2019-10-24 modified: 2023-02-13 tags: - attack.discovery - attack.credential-access - attack.t1040 logsource: category: process_creation product: windows detection: selection_img: - Image|endswith: \netsh.exe - OriginalFileName: netsh.exe selection_cli: CommandLine|contains|all: - trace - start condition: all of selection_* falsepositives: - Legitimate administration activity level: medium
Sigma rule: Detects file access to browser credential storage paths by non-browser processes, which may indicate credential access a. Logsource: windows / file_access. Rule: title: Suspicious File Access to Browser Credential Storage id: a1dfd976-4852-41d4-9507-dc6590a3ccd0 status: experimental description: 'Detects file access to browser credential storage paths by non-browser processes, which may indicate credential access attempts. Adversaries may attempt to access browser credential storage to extract sensitive information such as usernames and passwords or cookies. This behavior is often commonly observed in credential stealing malware. ' references: - https://github.com/splunk/security_content/blob/7283ba3723551f46b69dfeb23a63b358afb2cb0e/lookups/browser_app_list.csv?plain=1 - https://fourcore.io/blogs/threat-hunting-browser-credential-stealing author: frack113, X__Junior (Nextron Systems), Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems), Parth-FourCore date: 2025-05-22 tags: - attack.credential-access - attack.t1555.003 - attack.discovery - attack.t1217 logsource: category: file_access product: windows detection: selection_browser_paths: FileName|contains: - \Sputnik\Sputnik - \MapleStudio\ChromePlus - \QIP Surf - \BlackHawk - \7Star\7Star - \CatalinaGroup\Citrio - \Google\Chrome - \Coowon\Coowon - \CocCoc\Browser - \uCozMedia\Uran - \Tencent\QQBrowser - \Orbitum - \Slimjet - \Iridium - \Vivaldi - \Chromium - \GhostBrowser - \CentBrowser - \Xvast - \Chedot - \SuperBird - \360Browser\Browser - \360Chrome\Chrome - \Comodo\Dragon - \BraveSoftware\Brave-Browser - \Torch - \UCBrowser\ - \Blisk - \Epic Privacy Browser - \Nichrome - \Amigo - \Kometa - \Xpom - \Microsoft\Edge - \Liebao7Default\EncryptedStorage - \AVAST Software\Browser - \Kinza - \Mozilla\SeaMonkey\ - \Comodo\IceDragon\ - \8pecxstudios\Cyberfox\ - \FlashPeak\SlimBrowser\ - \Moonchild Productions\Pale Moon\ selection_browser_subpaths: FileName|contains: - \Profiles\ - \User Data selection_cred_files: - FileName|contains: - \Login Data - \Cookies - \EncryptedStorage - \WebCache\ - FileName|endswith: - cert9.db - cookies.sqlite - formhistory.sqlite - key3.db - key4.db - Login Data.sqlite - logins.json - places.sqlite filter_main_img: Image|endswith: - \Sputnik.exe - \ChromePlus.exe - \QIP Surf.exe - \BlackHawk.exe - \7Star.exe - \Sleipnir5.exe - \Citrio.exe - \Chrome SxS.exe - \Chrome.exe - \Coowon.exe - \CocCocBrowser.exe - \Uran.exe - \QQBrowser.exe - \Orbitum.exe - \Slimjet.exe - \Iridium.exe - \Vivaldi.exe - \Chromium.exe - \GhostBrowser.exe - \CentBrowser.exe - \Xvast.exe - \Chedot.exe - \SuperBird.exe - \360Browser.exe - \360Chrome.exe - \dragon.exe - \brave.e
Sigma rule: Detects the creation of a scheduled task using the "-XML" flag with a file without the '.xml' extension. This behavior c. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: Suspicious Scheduled Task Creation via Masqueraded XML File id: dd2a821e-3b07-4d3b-a9ac-929fe4c6ca0c status: test description: Detects the creation of a scheduled task using the "-XML" flag with a file without the '.xml' extension. This behavior could be indicative of potential defense evasion attempt during persistence references: - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/taskschd/daily-trigger-example--xml- - https://github.com/elastic/protections-artifacts/blob/084067123d3328a823b1c3fdde305b694275c794/behavior/rules/persistence_suspicious_scheduled_task_creation_via_masqueraded_xml_file.toml author: Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel, Elastic (idea) date: 2023-04-20 modified: 2024-12-01 tags: - attack.privilege-escalation - attack.execution - attack.persistence - attack.stealth - attack.t1036.005 - attack.t1053.005 logsource: product: windows category: process_creation detection: selection_img: - Image|endswith: \schtasks.exe - OriginalFileName: schtasks.exe selection_cli_create: CommandLine|contains: - /create - -create selection_cli_xml: CommandLine|contains: - /xml - -xml filter_main_extension_xml: CommandLine|contains: .xml filter_main_system_process: IntegrityLevel: - System - S-1-16-16384 filter_main_rundll32: ParentImage|endswith: \rundll32.exe ParentCommandLine|contains|all: - :\WINDOWS\Installer\MSI - .tmp,zzzzInvokeManagedCustomActionOutOfProc filter_optional_third_party: ParentImage|endswith: - :\ProgramData\OEM\UpgradeTool\CareCenter_*\BUnzip\Setup_msi.exe - :\Program Files\Axis Communications\AXIS Camera Station\SetupActions.exe - :\Program Files\Axis Communications\AXIS Device Manager\AdmSetupActions.exe - :\Program Files (x86)\Zemana\AntiMalware\AntiMalware.exe - :\Program Files\Dell\SupportAssist\pcdrcui.exe condition: all of selection_* and not 1 of filter_main_* and not 1 of filter_optional_* falsepositives: - Unknown level: medium
Sigma rule: Detects changes to 'HKCU\Software\Classes\Folder\shell\open\command\DelegateExecute'. Logsource: windows / registry_set. Rule: title: COM Hijack via Sdclt id: 07743f65-7ec9-404a-a519-913db7118a8d status: test description: Detects changes to 'HKCU\Software\Classes\Folder\shell\open\command\DelegateExecute' references: - http://blog.sevagas.com/?Yet-another-sdclt-UAC-bypass - https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/47696 author: Omkar Gudhate date: 2020-09-27 modified: 2023-09-28 tags: - attack.persistence - attack.privilege-escalation - attack.t1546 - attack.t1548 logsource: category: registry_set product: windows detection: selection: TargetObject|contains: \Software\Classes\Folder\shell\open\command\DelegateExecute condition: selection falsepositives: - Unknown level: high
Sigma rule: Remove SD (Security Descriptor) value in \Schedule\TaskCache\Tree registry hive to hide schedule task. This technique is. Logsource: windows / registry_delete. Rule: title: Removal Of SD Value to Hide Schedule Task - Registry id: acd74772-5f88-45c7-956b-6a7b36c294d2 related: - id: 526cc8bc-1cdc-48ad-8b26-f19bff969cec type: similar status: test description: Remove SD (Security Descriptor) value in \Schedule\TaskCache\Tree registry hive to hide schedule task. This technique is used by Tarrask malware references: - https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2022/04/12/tarrask-malware-uses-scheduled-tasks-for-defense-evasion/ author: Sittikorn S date: 2022-04-15 modified: 2025-10-25 tags: - attack.defense-impairment - attack.t1685 logsource: product: windows category: registry_delete detection: selection: TargetObject|contains|all: - \SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Schedule\TaskCache\Tree\ - SD condition: selection falsepositives: - Unknown level: medium regression_tests_path: regression_data/rules/windows/registry/registry_delete/registry_delete_schtasks_hide_task_via_sd_value_removal/info.yml
Sigma rule: Detects potential access attempts to the PowerShell console history directly via history file (ConsoleHost_history.txt).. Logsource: windows / process_creation. Rule: title: Potential PowerShell Console History Access Attempt via History File id: f4ff7323-b5fc-4323-8b52-6b9408e15788 status: experimental description: 'Detects potential access attempts to the PowerShell console history directly via history file (ConsoleHost_history.txt). This can give access to plaintext passwords used in PowerShell commands or used for general reconnaissance. ' references: - https://0xdf.gitlab.io/2018/11/08/powershell-history-file.html author: Luc Génaux date: 2025-04-03 tags: - attack.credential-access - attack.t1552.001 logsource: category: process_creation product: windows detection: selection: CommandLine|contains: - ConsoleHost_history.txt - (Get-PSReadLineOption).HistorySavePath condition: selection falsepositives: - Legitimate access of the console history file is possible level: medium