CVE-2023-52934 (published 2025-03-27)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

mm/MADV_COLLAPSE: catch !none !huge !bad pmd lookups

In commit 34488399fa08 ("mm/madvise: add file and shmem support to
MADV_COLLAPSE") we make the following change to find_pmd_or_thp_or_none():

	-       if (!pmd_present(pmde))
	-               return SCAN_PMD_NULL;
	+       if (pmd_none(pmde))
	+               return SCAN_PMD_NONE;

This was for-use by MADV_COLLAPSE file/shmem codepaths, where
MADV_COLLAPSE might identify a pte-mapped hugepage, only to have
khugepaged race-in, free the pte table, and clear the pmd.  Such codepaths
include:

A) If we find a suitably-aligned compound page of order HPAGE_PMD_ORDER
   already in the pagecache.
B) In retract_page_tables(), if we fail to grab mmap_lock for the target
   mm/address.

In these cases, collapse_pte_mapped_thp() really does expect a none (not
just !present) pmd, and we want to suitably identify that case separate
from the case where no pmd is found, or it's a bad-pmd (of course, many
things could happen once we drop mmap_lock, and the pmd could plausibly
undergo multiple transitions due to intervening fault, split, etc). 
Regardless, the code is prepared install a huge-pmd only when the existing
pmd entry is either a genuine pte-table-mapping-pmd, or the none-pmd.

However, the commit introduces a logical hole; namely, that we've allowed
!none- && !huge- && !bad-pmds to be classified as genuine
pte-table-mapping-pmds.  One such example that could leak through are swap
entries.  The pmd values aren't checked again before use in
pte_offset_map_lock(), which is expecting nothing less than a genuine
pte-table-mapping-pmd.

We want to put back the !pmd_present() check (below the pmd_none() check),
but need to be careful to deal with subtleties in pmd transitions and
treatments by various arch.

The issue is that __split_huge_pmd_locked() temporarily clears the present
bit (or otherwise marks the entry as invalid), but pmd_present() and
pmd_trans_huge() still need to return true while the pmd is in this
transitory state.  For example, x86's pmd_present() also checks the
_PAGE_PSE , riscv's version also checks the _PAGE_LEAF bit, and arm64 also
checks a PMD_PRESENT_INVALID bit.

Covering all 4 cases for x86 (all checks done on the same pmd value):

1) pmd_present() && pmd_trans_huge()
   All we actually know here is that the PSE bit is set. Either:
   a) We aren't racing with __split_huge_page(), and PRESENT or PROTNONE
      is set.
      => huge-pmd
   b) We are currently racing with __split_huge_page().  The danger here
      is that we proceed as-if we have a huge-pmd, but really we are
      looking at a pte-mapping-pmd.  So, what is the risk of this
      danger?

      The only relevant path is:

	madvise_collapse() -> collapse_pte_mapped_thp()

      Where we might just incorrectly report back "success", when really
      the memory isn't pmd-backed.  This is fine, since split could
      happen immediately after (actually) successful madvise_collapse().
      So, it should be safe to just assume huge-pmd here.

2) pmd_present() && !pmd_trans_huge()
   Either:
   a) PSE not set and either PRESENT or PROTNONE is.
      => pte-table-mapping pmd (or PROT_NONE)
   b) devmap.  This routine can be called immediately after
      unlocking/locking mmap_lock -- or called with no locks held (see
      khugepaged_scan_mm_slot()), so previous VMA checks have since been
      invalidated.

3) !pmd_present() && pmd_trans_huge()
  Not possible.

4) !pmd_present() && !pmd_trans_huge()
  Neither PRESENT nor PROTNONE set
  => not present

I've checked all archs that implement pmd_trans_huge() (arm64, riscv,
powerpc, longarch, x86, mips, s390) and this logic roughly translates
(though devmap treatment is unique to x86 and powerpc, and (3) doesn't
necessarily hold in general -- but that doesn't matter since
!pmd_present() always takes failure path).

Also, add a comment above find_pmd_or_thp_or_none()
---truncated---
Severity: MEDIUM (CVSS 3.1 vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H)
Weakness: CWE-362
Affected vendors: linux
Affected products: linux_kernel