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Title: Strong Baseline Defenses Against Clean-Label Poisoning Attacks

Paper content:
Targeted clean-label poisoning is a type of adversarial attack on machine learning systems where the adversary injects a few correctly-labeled, minimally-perturbed samples into the training data thus causing the deployed model to misclassify a particular test sample during inference.
Although defenses have been proposed for general poisoning attacks (those which aim to reduce overall test accuracy), no reliable defense for clean-label attacks has been demonstrated, despite the attacks' effectiveness and their realistic use cases.
In this work, we propose a set of simple, yet highly-effective defenses against these attacks.
We test our proposed approach against two recently published clean-label poisoning attacks, both of which use the CIFAR-10 dataset.
After reproducing their experiments, we demonstrate that our defenses are able to detect over 99% of poisoning examples in both attacks and remove them without any compromise on model performance.
Our simple defenses show that current clean-label poisoning attack strategies can be annulled, and serve as strong but simple-to-implement baseline defense for which to test future clean-label poisoning attacks.
Machine-learning-based systems are increasingly deployed in settings with high societal impact, such as biometric applications (Sun et al., 2014) and hate speech detection on social networks (Rizoiu et al., 2019) , as well as settings with high cost of failure, such as autonomous driving (Chen et al., 2017a) and malware detection (Pascanu et al., 2015) .
In such settings, robustness to not just noise but also adversarial manipulation of system behavior is paramount.
Complicating matters is the increasing reliance of machine-learning-based systems on training data sourced from public and semi-public places such as social networks, collaboratively-edited forums, and multimedia posting services.
Sourcing data from uncontrolled environments begets a simple attack vector: an adversary can strategically inject data that can manipulate or degrade system performance.
Data poisoning attacks on neural networks occur at training time, wherein an adversary places specially-constructed poison instances into the training data with the intention of manipulating the performance of a classifier at test time.
Most work on data poisoning has focused on either
(i) an attacker generating a small fraction of new training inputs to degrade overall model performance, or
(ii) a defender aiming to detect or otherwise mitigate the impact of that attack; for a recent overview, see Koh et al. (2018) .
In this paper, we focus on clean-label data poisoning (Shafahi et al., 2018) , where an attacker injects a few correctly-labeled, minimally-perturbed samples into the training data.
In contrast to traditional data poisoning, these samples are crafted to cause the model to misclassify a particular target test sample during inference.
These attacks are plausible in a wide range of applications, as they do not require the attacker to have control over the labeling process.
The attacker merely inserts apparently benign data into the training process, for example by posting images online which are scraped and (correctly) labeled by human labelers.
Our contribution: In this paper, we initiate the study of defending against clean-label poisoning attacks on neural networks.
We begin with a defense that exploits the fact that though the raw poisoned examples are not easily detected by human labelers, the feature representations of poisons are anomalous among the feature representations for data points with their (common) label.
This intuition lends itself to a defense based on k nearest neighbors (k-NN) in the feature space; furthermore, the parameter k yields a natural lever for trading off between the power of the attack against which it can defend and the impact of running the defense on overall (unpoisoned) model accuracy.
Next, we adapt a recent traditional data poisoning defense (Steinhardt et al., 2017; Koh et al., 2018) to the clean-label case, and show that-while still simple to implement-its performance in both precision and recall of identifying poison instances is worse than our proposed defense.
We include a portfolio of additional baselines as well.
For each defense, we test against state-of-the-art clean-label data poisoning attacks, using a slate of architectures, and show that our initial defense detects nearly all (99%+) of the poison instances without degrading overall performance.
In summary, we have demonstrated that the simple k-NN baseline approach provides an effective defense against clean-label poisoning attacks with minimal degradation in model performance.
The k-NN defense mechanism identifies virtually all poisons from two state-of-the-art clean label data poisoning attacks, while only filtering a small percentage of non-poisons.
The k-NN defense outperforms other simple baselines against the existing attacks; these defenses provide benchmarks that could be used to measure the efficacy of future defense-aware clean label attacks.
In the bottom two rows, filtered and non-filtered nonpoisons are shown-again there are not visually distinctive differences between pictures in the same class that are filtered rather than not filtered.

assistant: text: We present effective defenses to clean-label poisoning attacks.