J-S52004-17

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

: PENNSYLVANIA

v. :

:

CLIFFORD LEE FASSNACHT, :

:

Appellant : No. 259 MDA 2017

Appeal from the PCRA Order December 8, 2016

in the Court of Common Pleas of Lancaster County,

Criminal Division, No(s): CP-36-CR-0000895-2015; 

CP-36-CR-0002763-2007; CP-36-CR-0003473-2008; 

CP-36-CR-0005913-2014

BEFORE: GANTMAN, P.J., LAZARUS and MUSMANNO, JJ.

MEMORANDUM BY MUSMANNO, J.: FILED AUGUST 31, 2017

Clifford Lee Fassnacht (“Fassnacht”) appeals from the Order denying 

his first Petition filed pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”). 

See 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546. We affirm.

In its Opinion, the PCRA court set forth the relevant factual and 

procedural history, which we adopt for the purpose of this appeal. See

PCRA Court Opinion, 12/8/16, at 1-4. 

The PCRA court denied Fassnacht’s Petition on December 8, 2016. 

Fassnacht subsequently filed a timely Notice of Appeal and a court-ordered 

Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) Concise Statement of errors complained of on appeal.

On appeal, Fassnacht raises the following questions for our review:

I. Did the PCRA court err when it did not permit into evidence[,] 

and did not consider[,] the report of Timothy Martin, D.O., Ph.D. 

[(“Dr. Martin”),] when rendering its decision that [] Fassnacht 

entered a knowing and intelligent plea?
J-S52004-17

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II. Did the PCRA court err when it denied [Fassnacht’s PCRA 

Petition] when it found that trial counsel provided effective 

assistance of counsel[,] when trial counsel permitted [] 

Fassnacht to enter a plea the day after suffering a seizure?

III. Did the PCRA court err when it found that [] Fassnacht’s plea 

was knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently entered?

Brief for Appellant at 4 (issues renumbered).

Our standard of review of a PCRA court’s denial of a 

petition for post[-]conviction relief is well-settled: We must 

examine whether the record supports the PCRA court’s 

determination, and whether the PCRA court’s determination is 

free of legal error. The PCRA court’s findings will not be 

disturbed unless there is no support for the findings in the 

certified record.

Commonwealth v. Franklin, 990 A.2d 795, 797 (Pa. Super. 2010) 

(citation omitted).

In his first claim, Fassnacht argues that the PCRA court erred by failing 

to consider Dr. Martin’s report regarding the effect of seizures on an 

individual’s ability to think, concentrate and function. Brief for Appellant at 

14-15.

Fassnacht failed to explain the relevance of the report, or to cite any 

relevant case law concerning this issue. Because Fassnacht failed to 

adequately develop his first claim, it is waived. See Pa.R.A.P. 2119(a) 

(stating that the argument shall include “such discussion and citation of 

authorities as are deemed pertinent.”); see also Commonwealth v. 

Samuel, 102 A.3d 1001, 1005 (Pa. Super. 2014) (concluding that appellant 
J-S52004-17

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waived his claim by failing to adequately develop his argument or provide 

citation to and discussion of relevant authority).1 

In his second claim, Fassnacht asserts that the PCRA court erred in 

concluding that his plea counsel provided effective assistance at a time when 

Fassnacht was not competent to enter a guilty plea. Brief for Appellant at 

12. Fassnacht cites his testimony at the PCRA hearing, during which he 

stated that he did not remember talking to his counsel on the morning of the 

guilty plea hearing, and he did not recognize his signature on the written 

plea colloquy. Id. at 13. Fassnacht argues that his counsel was aware that 

Fassnacht had a seizure the day prior to the guilty plea hearing, and that 

counsel’s failure to stop the proceedings constituted ineffective assistance. 

Id. at 14.

In its Opinion, the PCRA court set forth the relevant law, addressed 

Fassnacht’s claim, and concluded that it lacks merit. See PCRA Court 

Opinion, 12/8/16, at 4-13. Because we conclude that the PCRA court’s 

determinations are supported by the record and free of legal error, we affirm 

on this basis as to Fassnacht’s second claim. See id. We additionally note 

that Fassnacht does not allege that, had his counsel been effective, he would 

 

1 Moreover, as the PCRA court observed, Dr. Martin failed to identify the 

facts from which he based his opinion. Moreover, Dr. Martin’s letter did not 

address Fassnacht’s particular circumstances, and instead, merely described 

common complaints following a seizure. See PCRA Court Opinion, 12/8/16, 

at 12 n.9; see also Pa.R.E. 705 (stating that “[i]f an expert states an 

opinion[,] the expert must state the facts or data on which the opinion is 

based.”).
J-S52004-17

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not have pled guilty. See Commonwealth v. Timchak, 69 A.3d 765, 770 

(Pa. Super. 2013) (stating that with regard to the prejudice prong of an 

ineffective assistance of counsel claim, “where an appellant has entered a 

guilty plea, the appellant must demonstrate it is reasonably probable that, 

but for counsel’s errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have 

gone to trial.”) (citation and quotation marks omitted). Thus, Fassnacht is 

not entitled to relief on his second claim.

In his third claim, Fassnacht contends that the PCRA court erred in 

concluding that his guilty plea was knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently 

entered. Brief for Appellant at 15-16. Fassnacht argues that if his 

“testimony is taken in conjunction with the report of Dr. Martin, it is 

evidence that [] Fassnacht’s plea was not knowing, intelligent, or voluntary.” 

Id. at 16.

Fassnacht failed to include citation to and discussion of relevant legal 

authorities in support of his contention, with the exception of one citation 

instructing this Court to consider the totality of the circumstances. See Brief 

for Appellant at 16. Instead, Fassnacht baldly claims that his guilty plea was 

involuntarily entered, without citing any evidence in the record to support 

his claim. Accordingly, his claim is waived. See Pa.R.A.P. 2119(a); see 

also Samuel, supra. We additionally point to the PCRA court’s analysis of 

Fassnacht’s ineffectiveness claim, wherein the court addressed the 

underlying claim that Fassnacht’s guilty plea was not knowingly, intelligently, 
J-S52004-17

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and voluntarily entered, and affirm on this basis as to Fassnacht’s third 

claim. See PCRA Court Opinion, 12/8/16, at 7-13 (concluding that 

Fassnacht’s guilty plea was knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily entered, 

and that Fassnacht had not satisfied his burden of proving the he was 

suffering from a mental impairment that rendered the plea involuntary). 

Order affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 8/31/2017
118 Pa.C.S.A. § 3502(a)(4), 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 903, and 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3921(a), 

respectively. 

their personal property. 

them, a Jeep Cherokee. Two women specifically identified Petitioner from photo 

lineups, after having been engaged in conversation with him while his accomplice stole 

occasions, witnesses observed the co-conspirators and the vehicle being driven by 

properties and stole welding cable and copper wiring valued at $1,900.00. On all three 

Petitioner and one or two accomplices entered three different Lancaster County 

theft by unlawful taking.1 Between September 23, 2014 and October 13, 2014, 

n :r.-:a n g :x O 

By Information docketed at No. 5913-2014, Petitioner was charged wiiii twi> § 

:-< .r:- uj 

counts of burglary, two counts of criminal conspiracy to burglary, and three o:iunt~of 

I. Background 

hearing in this matter, the amended petition will be denied. 

Conviction Collateral Relief Act (PCRA), 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546. Following a 

Before the Court is Clifford L. Fassnacht's amended petition pursuant to the Post 

BY: ASHWORTH, J., DECEMBER 8, 2016 

OPINION 

CLIFFORD L. FASSNACHT 

Nos. 2763-2007, 3473-2008, 

5913-2014, 0895-2015 

v. 

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA 

IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF LANCASTER COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA 

CRIMINAL 

Circulated 08/10/2017 12:02 PM
2 

4At Docket No. 3473-2008, Petitioner entered a plea of guilty on December 11, 2009, to 

the charges of burglary, theft by unlawful taking and criminal trespass. On the same date, 

Petitioner pleaded guilty at Docket No. 2763-2007 to the charges of theft by unlawful taking, 

receiving stolen property, criminal conspiracy (two counts), owning, operating or conducting a 

· chop shop, possessing altered or illegally obtained property, and selling vehicle obtained from 

chop shop. 

218 Pa.C.S.A. § 3502(a)(4), 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 903, 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3701(a)(1)(iv), 18 

Pa.C.S.A. § 3921 (a), and 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3304(a)(5), respectively. 

3The robbery charge was no/le prossed. (N.T., Guilty Plea/PV/Sentencing at 2.) 

months' incarceration. (Id. at 13.) 

agreements at Nos. 5913-2014 and 0895-2015, for an aggregate sentence of 45 to 90 

3473-2008 and 2763-20074 to a term of one to two years' incarceration, with those 

sentences to run concurrent with one another but consecutive to the negotiated plea 

time, Petitioner was also sentenced on two probation/parole violations at Docket Nos. 

Plea/PV/Sentencing at 11.) At No. 0895-2015, Petitioner pleaded guilty to all charges 

except robbery for a sentence of 33 to 66 months' incarceration.3 (Id. at 10-11.) At that 

to a sentence of three to six years' incarceration. (Notes of Testimony (N.T.), Guilty 

stolen property. 

On June 3, 2015, Petitioner entered a negotiated plea at Docket No. 5913-2014 

identified by the victims as the male who was inside the building and exited carrying the 

Jeep Cherokee into the driver's side of the truck and fled the scene. Petitioner was 

confronted by two employees in their pick-up truck, the co-conspirators rammed their 

On October 14, 2014, Petitioner and two accomplices illegally entered a work shop at 

Elizabeth Farms and stole scrap metal valued at approximately $100.00. Upon being 

criminal conspiracy to burglary, robbery, theft by unlawful taking, and criminal mischief.2 

By Information docketed at No. 0895-2015, Petitioner was charged with burglary, 
3 

5The pleading is deemed filed on the date of mailing, October 1, 2015, rather than the 

date of docketing, October 6, 2015, pursuant to the "prisoner mailbox rule." Commonwealth v. 

Crawford, 17 A.3d 1279, 1281 (Pa. Super. 2011) ("Under the prisoner mailbox rule, we deem a 

prose document filed on the date it is placed in the hands of prison authorities for mailing."). 

6The PCRA mandates that all petitions for post conviction relief be filed within one year 

of the date upon which the judgment becomes final. Commonwealth v. Lawson, 90 A.3d 1, 5 

(Pa. Super. 2014). For purposes of the PCRA, a judgment of sentence becomes final at the 

conclusion of direct review. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(3). See also Commonwealth v. Jones, 54 

A.3d 14, 17 (Pa. Super. 2012). If a defendant does not file a direct appeal, his judgment of 

sentence becomes final for PCRA purposes 30 days after imposition of sentence. 

Commonwealth v. Brown, 767 A.2d 576, 578 n.2 (Pa. Super. 2001 ). Since Fassnacht did not 

file an appeal, his judgment of sentence became final 30 days after June 3, 2015. Fassnacht, 

therefore, had until July 3, 2016, to file his PCRA motion. As such, his motion is timely. 

complete his review of the case, and the request was granted by the Court. 

petition by December 18, 2015. An additional 60 days was requested by counsel to 

represent Fassnacht on his collateral claims and was granted leave to file an amended 

have taken place. Pursuant to Rule 904(A) of the Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal 

Procedure, Dennis C. Dougherty, Esquire, was court-appointed on October 14, 2015, to 

the truth-determining process that no reliable adjudication of guilt or innocence could 

collateral relief which claimed ineffective assistance of counsel which so undermined 

Defender, specifically, Douglas A. Conrad, Esquire. 

On October 1, 2015,5 Petitioner filed a timely6 prose petition for post conviction 

guilty plea and sentencing hearing by the Lancaster County Office of the Public 

judgment of sentence imposed on June 3, 2015. Petitioner was represented at the 

filed neither post sentence motions nor a direct appeal to the Superior Court from the 

Pennsylvania within thirty days. (N.T., Guilty Plea/PV/Sentencing at 14-15.) Petitioner 

file post-sentence motions within ten days and to file an appeal to the Superior Court of 

At the conclusion of the sentencing hearing, I informed Petitioner of his rights to 
In order to prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel made in the 

post conviction context, a defendant must overcome the presumption that counsel is 

effective by establishing by a preponderance of the evidence that: the underlying claim 

has arguable merit; trial counsel had no reasonable basis for proceeding as he did; and 

4 

II. Eligibility for PCRA Relief 

On February 22, 2016, Fassnacht filed an amended petition which solely 

challenged the effective assistance of trial counsel. The Commonwealth filed a timely 

response, acknowledging the need for a hearing. Accordingly, an evidentiary hearing 

was held on Fassnacht's amended petition on May 26, 2016, at which time testimony 

was heard from Attorney Conrad and Petitioner. At the conclusion of the hearing, 

PCRA Counsel requested that the record remain open so that he could have the 

opportunity to submit a report addressing the effect that a seizure would have on an 

individual, which was one of Petitioner's primary claims for PCRA relief. This request 

was granted. On June 16, 2016, PCRA Counsel petitioned the Court for funds to obtain 

the aforementioned expert's report, which was also granted. 

On July 14, 2016, PCRA Counsel filed a motion to submit into evidence the 

report and curriculum vitae of Timothy Martin, D.O., Ph.D. The Commonwealth 

opposed the request to have Dr. Martin's report entered into evidence. On August 24, 

2016, after considering Petitioner's motion, the Commonwealth's response, and oral 

argument of counsel, the motion was denied and the record of the evidentiary hearing 

was ordered closed. Briefs having been filed by the parties on October 11, 2016, and 

November 10, 2016, this matter is ripe for disposition. 
5 

With regard to the voluntariness of a plea, a guilty plea colloquy 

must affirmatively demonstrate the defendant understood what the 

Commonwealth v. Brown, 48 A.3d 1275, 1277 (Pa. Super. 2012) (citations and 

internal quotation marks omitted). 

"[t]he law does not require that [the defendant] be pleased with the outcome of his 

decision to enter a plea of guilty; rather [a]II that is required is that [the defendant's] 

decision to plead guilty be knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently made." 

In assessing the voluntariness of a guilty plea, our Superior Court has noted that 

of attorneys in criminal cases." Id. (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). 

depends on whether counsel's advice was within the range of competence demanded 

defendant enters his plea on the advice of counsel, the voluntariness of the plea 

Super. 2002) (citation omitted). See also 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9543(a)(2)(iii). "Where the 

involuntary or unknowing plea." Commonwealth v. Hickman, 799 A.2d 136, 141 (Pa. 

serve as a basis for relief only if the ineffectiveness caused the defendant to enter an 

"Allegations of ineffectiveness in connection with the entry of a guilty plea will 

his guilty plea. 

Court or the legality of his sentence. Fassnacht does dispute, however, the validity of 

. ' 

A.2d 582, 593 (Pa. Super. 2005). Fassnacht has not challenged the jurisdiction of this 

jurisdiction, invalid guilty plea, and illegal sentence." Commonwealth v. Kennedy, 868 

guilty plea constitutes a waiver of all defenses and defects except claims of lack of 

515 Pa. 153, 158-59, 527 A.2d 973, 975-76 (1987)). Furthermore, "[t]he entry of a 

v. Spotz, 616 Pa. 164, 187, 47 A.3d 63, 76 (2012) (citing Commonwealth v. Pierce, 

the defendant suffered prejudice. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9543(a)(2)(ii); Commonwealth 
6 

reasons that follow, Petitioner's claims of ineffective assistance of counsel must fail. 

having entered an invalid plea, defense counsel then failed to file a petition to withdraw 

the plea, and further failed to perfect an appeal upon request of Petitioner. For the 

to investigate Petitioner's potential defense. Additionally, Fassnacht contends that, 

incapable of making a knowing and voluntary decision; and (2) defense counsel failed 

proceed with the guilty plea the day after he suffered a seizure which rendered him 

support of this argument, he avers that: (1) defense counsel forced Petitioner to 

Fassnacht claims his trial counsel unlawfully induced him to enter into a plea. In 

Ill. Discussion 

contradict statements made when he pied." Brown, 48 A.3d at 1277. 

colloquy, and a defendant may not later offer reasons for withdrawing the plea that 

(1999). Moreover, "[a] defendant is bound by the statements made during the plea 

agreements." Commonwealth v. Allen, 557 Pa. 135, 146-47, 732 A.2d 582, 588-89 

other proceedings, 'off-the-record' communications with counsel, and written plea 

circumstances surrounding the plea, ... including, but not limited to, transcripts from 

voluntarily and intelligently, the PCRA court "is free to consider the totality of the 

In determining whether a defendant entered into a plea of guilty knowingly, 

quotation marks omitted). 

Commonwealth v. Willis, 68 A.3d 997, 1002 (Pa. Super. 2013) (citations and internal 

plea connoted and its consequences. Once the defendant has 

entered a guilty plea, it is presumed that he was aware of what he 

was doing, and the burden of proving involuntariness is upon him. 
7 

Initially, Fassnacht claims his guilty plea was unknowingly and involuntarily 

entered as a result of his alleged incompetence based on the lingering effects of a 

seizure suffered the day before his guilty plea. (Amended PCRA Petition at ffll 9-10.) 

Petitioner further avers that defense counsel was aware of this seizure and should have 

continued the plea to allow Petitioner to recover and "not be under the mental haze 

caused by his seizure." (Id. at 1J 11.) 

A well-settled principle in this Commonwealth is that "a defendant is presumed to 

be competent to stand trial." Commonwealth v. Santiago, 579 Pa. 46, 67, 855 A.2d 

682, 694 (2004). Furthermore, "the burden is on [the defendant] to prove, by a 

preponderance of the evidence, that he was incompetent to stand trial." Id. In order to 

meet this burden, a defendant must establish that he was either unable to understand 

the nature of the proceedings against him or to participate in his own defense. Id. See 

also 50 Pa.C.S.A. § 7402(a) (a defendant is deemed legally incompetent if he or she is 

"substantially unable to understand the nature or object of the proceedings against him 

or to participate and assist in his defense"). 

Our Superior Court has set forth the relevant standard to determine a 

defendant's mental competency to enter a guilty plea as follows: whether "the 

defendant comprehends the crime for which he stands accused, is able to cooperate 

with his counsel in forming a rational defense, and has a rational and factual 

understanding of the proceedings against him." Willis, 68 A.3d at 1002. This rule is 

A. Unknowing and Involuntary Plea 
commonly applied to determine whether a defendant knowingly, voluntarily and 

intelligently entered a plea of guilty. 

I begin my analysis as to the voluntary, knowing and intelligent nature of 

Fassnacht's plea by exarnininqthe totality of the circumstances surrounding the plea. 

The record establishes that a lengthy and thorough guilty plea colloquy was conducted. 

Fassnacht was advised of the charges against him and the elements of those offenses 

as defined by the Crimes Code and the Pennsylvania Standard Jury Instructions 

(Criminal) were explained to him. (N.T., Guilty Plea/PV/Sentencing at 4-5.) Fassnacht 

was also advised that by pleading guilty he was waiving his rights to a jury trial, the 

presumption of innocence, and other relevant attributes of procedural due process. (Id. 

at 3-4.) He acknowledged that he understood that he was innocent until proven guilty, 

he did not have to plead guilty, and that it was his choice to plead guilty. (Id.) 

The maximum sentences and sentencing guidelines for each charge were also 

reviewed with Fassnacht during the colloquy. (N.T., Guilty Plea/PV/Sentencing at 5-6.) 

Fassnacht acknowledged that because of his "repeat felony offender" status he was 

maxed out. (Id. at 7 .) Fassnacht stated that he understood that the maximum 

sentence, if all the charges were sentenced consecutively, would be 56 years in jail and 

a fine of $137,500.00. (Id. at 6.) 

In addition to the colloquy in open court, I reviewed with Fassnacht the 7-page, 

77-question written guilty plea "long form" completed by defense counsel. (N.T., Guilty 

Plea/PV/Sentencing at 7.) In this document, Fassnacht manifested his understanding 

of the offenses against him, the maximum sentences and the procedural due process 

rights waived by a guilty plea. (Id.) He indicated that he reviewed the colloquy form 

8 
9 

7 Attorney Conrad testified that Petitioner instructed him to inform the Court of his alleged 

seizure the night before the guilty plea hearing, and defense counsel complied. (N.T., PCRA 

Hearing at 19-20.) 

Commonwealth, the negotiated guilty plea presented on Fassnacht's behalf was 

Based upon the representations by Fassnacht, his attorney and the 

(Id.) 

his prior criminal behavior, he was "going to be warehoused" for his newest charges. 

Fassnacht specifically acknowledged that "unfortunately" because of his addiction and 

a lot about the program doing good. I should have been in it 20 years ago." (Id. at 10.) 

mention of his seizures: "I've been fighting drug addiction since I was a kid. And I heard 

statement to the Court, Fassnacht referred only to his drug addiction and made no 

... [Fassnacht] has a long history of drug addiction, which probably 

goes along with his criminal record. 

The last time he was in SCI he was diagnosed with a tumor. I'm 

not sure if it is cancerous or not. He suffers from frequent seizures. 

He just had one last night at LCP. 

(N.T., Guilty Plea/PV/Sentencing at 8-9.7) When asked if he would like to make a 

fully revealed at the guilty plea hearing. Attorney Conrad advised the Court: 

Lastly, the record establishes that Fassnacht's mental and physical health was 

defeating a claim of innocence. (Id. at 8.) 

to the facts recited by the prosecutor which formed the basis for the charges; thus, 

Attorney Maria Cusick. (N.T., Guilty Plea/PV/Sentencing at 7-8.) Fassnacht admitted 

I also reviewed the factual basis of the plea, as summarized by Assistant District 

the Court regarding the form. (Id.) 

with his attorney and signed it. (Id.) Fassnacht had no questions of his attorney or of 
10 

8Fassnacht initially testified that Attorney Conrad did not go over the questions on the 

written colloquy with him on June 3, 2015. (N.T., PCRA Hearing at 35.) On cross-examination, 

however, Fassnacht noted that because his attorney "swore under oath that he went through 

the paperwork with [him]," he would "have to assume" that Attorney Conrad did, in fact, review 

the colloquy questions with him. (Id. at 44.) 

credible and in conflict with his testimony at the time of the guilty plea. 

because of his alleged mental impairment. I find Fassnacht's testimony to not be 

competent to proceed or that he did not understand the guilty plea proceedings 

evidence, besides his own self-serving and uncorroborated statements, that he was not 

"dizzy" and did not know what he was doing. (N.T., Guilty Plea/PV/Sentencing at 36, 

42.) He further claims to have no memory of going through the plea paperwork, 

colloquy, or the guilty plea itself.8 (Id. at 39, 40.) Fassnacht, however, advanced no 

Fassnacht testified at the PCRA hearing that at the time of his plea he was 

which took place the night before his guilty plea. 

induced him to plead guilty when he was suffering from the adverse effects of a seizure 

the written colloquy, it was not his intention to plead guilty and that counsel unlawfully 

despite what was said during the oral colloquy and what was specifically spelled out in 

the ineffective assistance of counsel. Specifically, Fassnacht now contends that, 

Fassnacht, however, claims that his guilty plea is nonetheless invalid based on 

plea was knowing, voluntary and intelligent, and was properly accepted. 

Fassnacht's responses therein, and the representations by defense counsel, the guilty 

circumstances attendant to the plea, including the adequacy of the plea colloquy, and 

accepted. (N.T., Guilty Plea/PV/Sentencing at 10.) On review, considering all the 
11 

. . . [l]n my dealings with [Fassnacht], he seemed to under - understand 

what was going on. I could talk to him. He was answering me in - in a 

normal basis. 

It didn't appear - and we went over the colloquy. He was answering 

the questions in a - the appropriate manner. 

disability related to his seizure the night before . 

that, at the time of the plea, Fassnacht did not appear to be suffering from any mental 

his plea is at odds with the observations of his attorney, Douglas Conrad, who testified 

Moreover, Fassnacht's current claim that he was in a "mental haze" at the time of 

omitted). 

Commonwealth v. Pollard, 832 A.2d 517, 523-24 (Pa. Super. 2003) (citations 

A criminal defendant who elects to plead guilty has a duty to answer 

questions truthfully. We [cannot] permit a defendant to postpone 

the final disposition of his case by lying to the court and later alleging 

that his lies were induced by the prompting of counsel. ... 

The longstanding rule of Pennsylvania law is that a defendant may 

not challenge his guilty plea by asserting that he lied while under 

oath, even if he avers that counsel induced the lies .... A person 

who elects to plead guilty is bound by the statements he makes in 

open court while under oath and he may not later assert grounds 

for withdrawing the plea which contradict the statements he made 

at his plea colloquy .... 

the written colloquy. 

which directly contradicts his own statements made during the oral plea colloquy and on 

plea was induced by counsel's alleged pressure is Fassnacht's proffered testimony, 

against him to force him to plead guilty. (N.T., Guilty Plea/PV/Sentencing at 3; Guilty 

Plea Colloquy at 1J1J 49-52.) Thus, the only evidence suggesting that Fassnacht's guilty 

trial and plead guilty, and that no promises, threats or guarantees had been made to or 

At the plea hearing, Fassnacht testified that it was his decision to waive a jury 
12 

9Petitioner attempted to introduce the expert report of Dr. Martin who opined that "it 

does sound as though [Fassnacht] had a grand mal seizure." (Motion to Submit into Evidence, 

Exhibit 1A.) Dr. Martin fails, however, to identify the facts from which he bases that opinion, 

other than what he was told by defense counsel. The Commonwealth, therefore, objected to the 

proffered report and I did not permit its admission into evidence. 

of what he was doing, and he therefore bears the burden of proving otherwise. 

him.9 Pennsylvania law presumes that a defendant who enters a guilty plea was aware 

absent his own testimony and the testimony of defense counsel of what Petitioner told 

Finally, Fassnacht presented no evidence of actually having suffered a seizure, 

credible, they must be rejected: 

claims are at odds with the testimony he provided at his guilty plea and are simply not 

discuss his seizures and any resultant thought disturbances. As Fassnacht's current 

at 10.) He certainly had the opportunity and the cognitive awareness to similarly 

Corrections' rehabilitation program would benefit him. (N.T., Guilty Plea/PV/Sentencing 

discuss his 20-year battle with addiction, and his hope that the Department of 

Furthermore, at the time of the plea, Fassnacht was clear-headed enough to 

him." (Id. at 26; see also 27.) 

counsel responded, "No ... [Fassnacht] seemed much as he had every time I met with 

able to knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently enter into this guilty plea," to which 

the guilty plea or during the guilty plea did [counsel] find that ... [Fassnacht] was not 

whether "at any time during [counsel's) communications with Mr. Fassnacht just prior to 

(N.T., PCRA Hearing at 20.) I asked a follow-up question of defense counsel as to 

I - I felt that he, in light of the many clients that I have had who have 

had mental health issues and/or other issues, that he understood what 

was going on. 
13 

In Commonwealth v. Willis, 68 A.3d 997, 1009 (Pa. Super. 2013), the Superior 

Court found "the mere fact that [the defendant] was taking prescribed psychotropic 

medication at the time of his plea does not, of itself, result in the conclusion he was 

unable to enter a knowing, voluntary and intelligent guilty plea." Similarly, the 

unsubstantiated allegation that Fassnacht suffered a seizure which impaired his 

thinking does not, of itself, result in the conclusion that his plea was invalid. Absent 

proof of some cognitive defect, and in light of the fact that Fassnacht participated in a 

lengthy colloquy and cogently answered each question addressed to him, this claim is 

without merit, and must be rejected. See Jackson, supra (concluding that when a 

defendant appropriately and coherently participates in an oral plea colloquy, his plea 

will be considered to be knowing, voluntary, and intelligent, even if the petitioner is 

under the influence of a substance at the time); Hazen, supra (holding that the 

defendant, who was on medication after an apparent suicide attempt, and later 

asserted counsel was ineffective in permitting him to plead guilty since he felt 

tranquilized during the plea hearing, was not entitled to withdraw his plea where 

defense counsel opined that he was competent and trial court found that he cogently 

participated in a lengthy plea colloquy). 

Commonwealth v. Reid, 117 A.3d 777, 783 (Pa. Super. 2015) (citing Pollard, 832 

A.2d at 523). Thus, under the circumstances of this case, it was Petitioner's burden to 

demonstrate that he was suffering under some sort of mental impairment, and that the 

impairment rendered the plea involuntary. See Commonwealth v. Jackson, 569 A.2d 

964, 966 (Pa. Super. 1990); Commonwealth v. Hazen, 462 A.2d 732, 735 (Pa. Super. 

1983). 
14 

10The guideline sentences for burglary and conspiracy were 2 to 3 years' incarceration, 

and for theft 12 to 18 months' incarceration. Thus, a consecutive sentence on the six counts 

could have been as high as 9 to 16.5 years' incarceration. (N.T., Guilty Plea/PV/Sentencing at 

6.) 

consecutive sentence on the two counts of burglary, the three counts of theft by 

unlawful taking, and the conspiracy count." (N.T., PCRA at 30.) Thus, Fassnacht's 

based upon Fassnacht's designation as a repeat felony offender, he risked a 

trial but that, with his prior record score and the recommended sentencing guidelines 

pleading guilty, Petitioner testified that counsel told him that the alternative was going to 

Regarding defense counsel's failure to discuss with Petitioner options other than 

be rejected. 

claim that defense counsel never met with him to review discovery, and this claim must 

the discovery with him. (Id. at 36.) Thus, Fassnacht's own testimony refutes his first 

that an investigator from the Public Defender's Office also came to the prison to review 

opportunity to review the discovery in his cases. (Id. at 14.) Fassnacht further testified 

32.) This is consistent with Attorney Conrad's testimony that he gave Petitioner an 

discovery" but Petitioner said he could not sit and look at it. (N.T., PCRA Hearing at 

counsel did visit him at the prison with the discovery and "tried to show [Petitioner] the 

With respect to the discovery review, Fassnacht testified at the PCRA hearing that 

never conducted any pre-trial investigation. (Amended PCRA Petition at 111114-15.) 

discovery, (2) never discussed with him the options other than pleading guilty, and (3) 

Next, Petitioner claims defense counsel (1) never met with him to review 

B. Lack of Pretrial Investigation 
15 

11According to the Affidavit of Probable Cause at No. 5913-2014, it was Lavern Redcay 

who identified Dennis Fassnacht from a photo lineup as the front seat passenger in a vehicle 

that drove down his farm lane on October 2, 2014, and asked if they could hunt on his property. 

There was no criminal activity by the two men in the Jeep at that time. However, on October 13, 

2014, Lavern's wife, Betty Jo Redcay, reported to the police that she observed a white male in 

his early SO's with gray/blond hair exit a Jeep and cut wire from the welding equipment. She, 

however, did not make an identification of the perpetrators. Thus, it would appear that Dennis 

Fassnacht was not actually identified as one of the criminal actors in these charged burglaries. 

However, at least four other witnesses identified Clifford Fassnacht as either the person 

they spoke with while another male burglarized their property or the person they observed 

stealing the personal property. Alta Eberly had conversations on two occasions, September 23, 

2014 and September 24, 2014, with a white male whom she positively identified as Clifford 

Fassnacht in a photo lineup. Another juvenile witness, L.Z., picked Clifford Fassnacht out of a 

photo lineup as the white male who exited a Jeep and asked her about hunting on her land 

while another individual stole welding wire from the Zimmerman work shop. Finally, James 

McClearen, Jr., and Jeffrey Strauss identified Clifford Fassnacht as the individual who entered a 

work building at Elizabeth Farms and cut wire from an industrial welder before fleeing in a Jeep 

with two other men. 

defense. (Id. at 31-32, 38.) 

reasons, Fassnacht claims his attorney was ineffective for failing to investigate this 

identified Dennis Fassnacht, Petitioner's younger brother who allegedly has rotten 

teeth, as one of the individuals who entered his property.11 (Id. at 17.) For these 

claims not to have rotten teeth. (Id. at 31.) Moreover, in one photo lineup, a victim 

described by a witness as having rotten teeth. (N.T., PCRA Hearing at 16.) Fassnacht 

bases his claim of innocence on the fact that in discovery one of the suspects was 

Commonwealth v. Rainey, 928 A.2d 215, 224 (Pa. Super. 2007). Here, Fassnacht 

have uncovered something that would have been helpful to Petitioner's case. 

as a result of trial counsel's alleged failure, and must show that an investigation would 

investigate his defense of innocence, Fassnacht must point to a specific harm suffered 

again belied by his own testimony. 

Lastly, as for Fassnacht's claim of ineffectiveness for counsel's failure to properly 

claim of counsel's failure to discuss with him alternative strategies to pleading guilty is 
16 

12Dennis Fassnacht was not one of the three co-conspirators involved in this criminal 

episode, and Petitioner was identified by two of the victims as the male who entered the 

police implicating Clifford Fassnacht in those crimes.12 Irvin further admitted to driving 

hit and run incident at Elizabeth Farms on October 14, 2014, gave a statement to the 

Moreover, Christopher Irvin, one of the three co-conspirators to the burglary and 

the burglaries does not exonerate Clifford Fassnacht. 

outbuilding and stole the personal property. Thus, simply placing Dennis Fassnacht at 

of the property engaged in conversation, the other male surreptitiously entered an 

accomplices. The modus operandi appeared to be that while one male kept a resident 

evidence, however, revealed that for each criminal episode there were at least two male 

able to mount a defense based upon his alleged mistaken identity with his brother. The 

Had there been only one perpetrator of these crimes, Petitioner might have been 

anything that would have been helpful to Petitioner's case. See Rainey, supra. 

discovery, however, suggests that such an investigation would not have uncovered 

as a possible suspect because of his rotten teeth. (N.T., PCRA Hearing at 18.) The 

Relative to the investigation, defense counsel testified that neither he nor anyone 

from the Public Defender's Office went out to investigate Fassnacht's brother, Dennis, 

mistaken identity with his brother, and that he should not be pleading guilty. (Id. at 43.) 

cross examination that he did not tell the Court at his guilty plea hearing about the 

PCRA Hearing that he was "100 percent innocent" of these charges, he admitted on 

guilty. (N.T., Guilty Plea/PV/Sentencing at 8.) Despite Fassnacht's assertion at the 

his admission of the facts supporting the elements of each offense to which he pleaded 

It is important to first note that Fassnacht's claim of innocence is contradicted by 
17 

building and exited with the stolen property. There was no mention of the perpetrator having 

rotten or missing teeth. · 

Commonwealth v. Spencer, 892 A.2d 840, 842 (Pa. Super. 2006) (citing 

ineffective for failing to perfect an appeal upon the defendant's request. 

so. (Amended PCRA Petition at ,m 12-13.) Generally, an attorney can be found to be 

a withdrawal of his guilty plea, and (2) to perfect an appeal after being requested to do 

Lastly, Fassnacht claims trial counsel was ineffective for failing (1) to petition for 

C. Withdrawal of Guilty Plea/Direct Appeal 

the burden of proof for this PCRA claim. 

lack of evidence linking Petitioner to these crimes. Accordingly, Petitioner has not met 

Petitioner at the preliminary hearing. (N.T., PCRA Hearing at 15-16.) There was no 

perpetrators. Moreover, one of those four witnesses repeated her identification of 

criminal episodes positively identified Clifford Fassnacht in photo lineups as one of the 

Chmiel, 612 Pa. at 362, 30 A.3d at 1127-28. Four eyewitness to three separate 

counsel's alleged ineffectiveness in failing to investigate his brother's teeth. See 

reasonable probability that the outcome of his case would have been different but for 

Given the evidence in this case, Petitioner cannot establlsh that there is a 

other burglaries and thefts together. 

brothers to also borrow his vehicle, a Jeep Cherokee, on multiple occasions to commit 

that, because of a debt owed to Clifford and Dennis Fassnacht, he had allowed the 

two brothers stole black cable wire from a barn. In his police statement, Irvin explained 

both Fassnacht brothers to a farm property approximately one week before, where the 
18 

13Petitioner acknowledged at his guilty plea hearing that Attorney Conrad reviewed with 

him his appeal rights as set forth in the written guilty plea colloquy form. (N.T., Guilty Plea/Pvt 

Sentencing at 14.) I also reviewed with Petitioner his two options for post-sentence review, 

which Petitioner stated he understood. (Id. at 14-15.) A post conviction collateral relief petition 

was not discussed. 

appeal of anything within 10 days and/or 30 days," Petitioner told him: "[D]on't file it ... 

[I'll] just PCRA [you) for everything."13 (Id. at 21, 22.) Attorney Conrad took notes of his 

advising his client "that he should send something to [him] if he was requesting an 

withdraw the plea. (Id. at 26.) To the contrary, Attorney Conrad testified that after 

who asserted that Petitioner never directed him to file either an appeal or a motion to 

Hearing at 37.) This testimony was directly contradicted by that of Attorney Conrad, 

appeal, and that Attorney Conrad's response was "it won't do no good." (N.T., PCRA 

guilty plea/sentencing hearing on June 3, 2015, he requested that his counsel file an 

burden of proof. Petitioner testified at the PCRA hearing that immediately after the 

In the instant case, the record reflects that Petitioner has failed to satisfy his 

2009). 

finding of prejudice." Commonwealth v, Fransen, 986 A.2d 154, 158 (Pa. Super. 

motions does not fall within the narrow ambit of ineffectiveness claims requiring no 

that counsel ignored that request. Id. However, "counsel's failure to file post-sentence 

where the petitioner pleads and proves that a timely appeal was in fact requested and 

would have pursued on appeal to be entitled to relief. Such relief is appropriate only 

defendant does not have to demonstrate his innocence or the merits of the issue he 

constitute prejudice per se, and if the remaining PCRA requirements are satisfied, a 

Supreme Court held that an unjustified failure to file a direct appeal upon request will 

Commonwealth v. Lantzy, 558 Pa. 214, 736 A.2d 564 (1999)). In Lantzy, our 
19 

For the reasons set forth above, Fassnacht's amended petition for post 

conviction collateral relief lacks merit as there is nothing in the record indicating that 

defense counsel was ineffective in his representation of Fassnacht through the guilty 

plea and sentencing, or that the guilty plea was not knowing, intelligent and voluntary. 

Therefore, the amended petition must be dismissed following a hearing in this matter. 

Accordingly, I enter the following: 

IV. Conclusion 

meeting with Petitioner in the holding cell immediately following the guilty plea and 

sentencing. (Id. at 21.) As a result of their conversation, and having received no further 

communication from Petitioner regarding post-sentence motions or an appeal, defense 

counsel took no further action on behalf of his client. (Id. at 22.) 

Petitioner's testimony that he requested counsel to file something after he was 

sentenced lacks credibility. The record establishes that Petitioner made an informed 

decision to enter his guilty plea and Petitioner's testimony that he was unhappy with the 

plea and wanted counsel to withdraw it and/or file an appeal directly contradicts 

statements made by Petitioner in both the written plea colloquy and at the guilty plea 

hearing. Petitioner cannot now avoid the consequences of his actions by claiming 

ineffective assistance of counsel. 
Copies to: Andrew T. LeFever, Assistant District Attorney 

Dennis C. Dougherty, Esquire 

appellate rights. 

It is further ORDERED that Petitioner shall have the right to appeal in forma 

on this matter, it is hereby ORDERED that said petition is DENIED. 

Pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 908(E), this Court advises Petitioner that he has the right 

to appeal from this Order and the right to assistance of counsel in the preparation of that 

appeal. Petitioner shall have 30 days from the date of this final Order to appeal to the · 

Superior Court of Pennsylvania. Failure to appeal within 30 days will result in the loss of 

Fassnacht's amended petition for post conviction collateral relief, and following a hearing 

AND NOW, this 8th day of December, 2016, upon consideration of Clifford L. 

.ORDER 

CLIFFORD L. FASSNACHT 

Nos. 2763-2007, 3473-2008, 

5913-2014, 0895-2015 

V. 

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA 

\ 

IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF LANCASTER COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA 

CRIMINAL.