Filed: November 27, 2012

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON

PORTLAND STATE UNIVERSITY CHAPTER OF THE AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF UNIVERSITY PROFESSORS, Petitioner on Review,

v.

PORTLAND STATE UNIVERSITY, Respondent on Review.

(ERB UP3605; C A A138895; SC S059182)

En Banc
On review from the Court of Appeals.*

Argued and submitted November 7, 2011.

Elizabeth A. Joffe, of McKanna Bishop Joffe & Arms, LLP, Portland, argued the cause and filed the brief for petitioner on review.

David B. Thompson, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Salem, argued the cause and filed the brief for respondent on review. With him on the brief were John R. Kroger, Attorney General, and Mary H. Williams, Solicitor General.

Brad Avakian, Commissioner, Oregon Bureau of Labor and Industries, filed a brief as amicus curiae

. DURHAM, J.

The decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed. The order of the Employment Relations Board is affirmed.

*On appeal of a final order of t he Employment Relations Board, dated March 19
, 2008. 

### 240 Or App 108, 246 P3d 1162 (2010).1 DURHAM, J. 1
This case concerns an employment disc rimination dispute between Portland 2
State University (PSU) and Portland State University Chapter of the American 3
Association of University Professors (the Association), the exclusive representative of a 4
bargaining unit of academic professionals employed by PSU. Those entities entered into 5
a collective bargaining agreement that included a dispute resolution process for alleged 6
violations of the agreement. That dispute resolution process included a "Resort to Other 7
Procedures" (ROP) provision that permitted PSU to decline or discontinue a gr ie vance 8
proceeding if an Association member brought a claim regarding the same matter in an 9

agency or court outside of PSU . Here, PSU invoked that provision to halt a grievance 10
proceeding after an Association member file d discrimination complaints with two outside 11
agencies, the Oregon Bureau of Labor and Industries (BOLI) and the Equal Employment 12
Opportunity Commission (EEOC). 13
The Association subsequently filed a complaint with the Oregon 14
Employment Relations Board (ERB ), alleging in part that PSU had engaged in an unfair 15
labor practice by discontinuing the contractual gri e vance proceeding. ERB concluded 16

that PSU's invocation of the ROP clause constituted unlawful discrimination. It therefore 17

declined to enforce the RO P clause and ordered PSU to submit to the grievance process. 18
On PSU's appeal, the Court of Appeals determined that ERB erred by applying the wrong 19
legal standard in ordering PSU to submit to the grievance process, and it therefore 20

reversed and remanded th e case for ERB's reconsideration. PSU Association of 21
University Professors v. PSU , 240 Or App 108, 246 P3d 1162 (2010). The Association 222

sought review of that decision. We allowed review and now reverse the Court of Appeals 1

decision. 2
The facts regarding t his dispute are straightforward. As noted, Article 28 of 3
the collective bargaining agreement between PSU and the Association outlined the 4
dispute resolution process for resolvin g alleged violations, misinterpretations, or 5
improper applications of the agreement. That process allowed the Association, acting on 6
behalf of its members, to pursue a claim through a specified grievance procedure. The 7
grievance procedure permitted the A ssociation to present a member's complaint within a 8
specific timeframe after an alleged act, omission, or condition took place. Once a 9
grievance was submitted, the Association and PSU commenced informal and formal 10
negotiations. If no resolution was reach ed, the agreement entitled the Association to 11
submit the matter to binding arbitration. However, as noted, PSU could halt grievance 12
and arbitration proceedings under the ROP provision contained in Article 28, division B, 13
section 2, which provided: 14

" Resor t to Other Procedures. If, prior to seeking resolution of a 15 dispute by presenting a grievance hereunder, or while the grievance 16 proceeding is in progress, a member seeks resolution of the matter through 17 any agency outside the University, whether administr ative or judicial, the 18 University shall have no obligation to entertain or proceed further with the 19 matter pursuant to this grievance procedure or pursuant to Division C 20 (ARBITRATION) of this Article." 21
(Boldface and capitalization in original.) 22
In 1998, Wilson was employed by PSU as a fixed

- term faculty member 23
under an annual, renewable contract. In the early fall of 2003, Wilson met with her 24
department head on behalf of a colleague to discuss her belief that the colleague had been 253

sexually hara ssed by a third faculty member . In early December 2003, Wilson received 1
written notice from PSU that her contract would not be renewed when it expired at the 2
end of the academic year. 1 By the springtime, Wilson began to feel ostracized in her 3
department position and began to suspect that it was related to her voicing support for her 4
colleague's sexual harassment claim . On July 1, 2004, Wilson met with personnel from 5
PSU's Office of Affirmative Action and Equal Opportunity (AA/EO) to discuss her belief 6

th at members of her department were retaliating against her. She notified AA/EO 7
personnel that she intended to bring a formal complaint. The following day, PSU sent 8

written notice to Wilson that it would not renew her annual contract. Shortly after 9

receiv ing that notice, Wilson filed a formal complaint with the AA/EO office. Her 10
complaint alleged that the ostracism she had suffered and her subsequent termination 11

constituted discrimination, retaliation, and harassment. AA/EO commenced an 12
investigation and completed a report on the matter , which was disclosed to PSU . That 13
report recommended that PSU take no action on Wilson's complaints, and PSU adopted 14

that recommendation. 15
Meanwhile, Wilson sought the Association's representation in filing a 16
grievance o n her behalf under the collective bargaining agreement. An Association 17

1 As a general practice, PSU sent nonrenewal notices to its fixed

- term faculty members around December of each year. That allowed PSU to be flexible when announcing its budget in the spring. PSU then would send an additiona l notice in the summertime either renewing or terminating each employee's fixed

- term contract. Thus, faculty members commonly understood the December notices to be only tentative. Indeed, Wilson had previously received nonrenewal notices, and her contrac t was renewed each summer.4

representative met with Wilson and informed her that the Association needed to 1
investigate the merits of a potential grievance. In conducting its investigation, the 2
Association reques ted information from PSU that included any findings made in the 3
AA/EO investigation. PSU provided much of the requested information within a 4
relatively short period of time, but it delayed releasing the AA/EO report for months. 5
Then, citing confidentiali ty and relevancy concerns, PSU ultimately declined to release 6
the report. The Association responded in February 2005 by filing a grievance alleging 7

that PSU had violated Article 6 of the collective bargaining agreement by failing to 8
provide it with the AA /EO report. 2 Wilson also separately completed an intake 9
questionnaire with the EEOC regarding a potential discrimination complaint protesting 10

her nonrenewal. The Association notified PSU that Wilson had filed an EEOC 11
complaint. 3 12

PSU thereafter refused to process the Association's grievance. It cited the 13
agreement's ROP clause for support, and claimed that Wilson's EEOC complaint 14
triggered its right to discontinue the grievance proceeding. The Association responded 15

2 Article 6 of the collective bargaining agreement required PSU to make available "all factual information reasonably required for the Association to administer" the agreement.

3 Wilson had completed only an intake questionnai re. However, she mistakenly believed that she had filed a formal EEOC complaint. Although a completed questionnaire may constitute a charge if certain requirements are met, see Federal Express Corp. v. Holowecki, 552 US 389, 128 S Ct 1147, 170 L Ed 2d 10 (2008) (finding a "charge" had been filed with EEOC under the Age Discrimination Employment Act)
, when the EEOC followed up on Wilson's questionnaire, it determined that the time limit for filing a complaint had passed. Wilson indicated that she had dela yed contacting the EEOC because she was advised that doing so could have precluded the Association from pursuing the grievance process on her behalf.5

that the ROP clause was illegal and u nenforceable. Wilson subsequently filed a 1
complaint with BOLI alleging that her nonrenewal was discriminatory and retaliatory. 2
The Association also submitted a second grievance to PSU similarly alleging that 3
Wilson's nonrenewal was discriminatory and ret aliatory. In response, PSU asserted that 4
the ROP provision was lawful and enforceable . Relying on the contentions noted above, 5

PSU informed the Association that it would not process either grievance. 6
The Association then filed a claim with ERB, allegin g that PSU's refusal to 7
process the Association's grievances violated ORS 243.672(1)(g), which provides that it 8
is an unfair labor practice for a public employer to "[v]iolate the provisions of any written 9
contract with respect to employment relations incl uding an agreement to arbitrate." 4 PSU 10
responded that it did not violate the collective bargaining agreement because, under the 11
ROP provision, it had no obligation to process the grievances once Wilson had filed 12
EEOC and BOLI complaints. The Association replied that the ROP clause was illegal 13
and unenforceable because application of that provision constituted unlawful 14

discrimination under ORS 659A.030 (1) (f) 5 and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. 6 15

4 The Association also argued that PSU had engaged in unfair labor practices when it refused to renegoti ate an illegal contract term

-- specifically the ROP provision

-- and when it refused to provide the AA/EO documents.

5 ORS 659A.030(1)(f) provides that it is an "unlawful employment practice":

" For any person to discharge, expel or otherwise discriminate against any other person because that other person has opposed any unlawful practice, or because that other person has filed a complaint, testified or assisted in any proceeding under this chapter or has attempted to do so."

6 Title VII
, s ection 704(a)
, of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 provides :6 ERB held a hearing and subsequently issued an or der explaining its 1
findings and conclusions of law. ERB first determined that PSU had no contractual 2
obligation to process the grievances under the "express and unambiguous" text of the 3

ROP clause. ERB, however, further determined that
, although it gener ally would enforce 4
a bargained contract provision, the ROP clause was illegal and unenforceable. ERB was 5
persuaded by federal cases holding that an employer engages in unlawful discrimination 6
against a bargaining member if it denies that member access to a contractual grievance 7
procedure solely because that member made a complaint to the EEOC. See, e.g.
, EEOC 8
v. Board of Governors of State College s , 957 F2d 424 (7th Cir)
, cert den , 506 US 906 9
(1992) (hereinafter Board of Governors ) (so holding). ERB explained: 10
"The ROP provision * * * penalizes an employee who chooses to exercise 11 rights protected under federal and state law by seeking resolution of a 12 discrimination claim with BOLI or the EEOC. For this reason, it 13 constitutes unlawful retaliation unde r both state and federal law. 42 U

. S

. C

. 14 § 2000e

- 3(a); and ORS 659A.030(1)(f)." 15
Thus, ERB concluded that the ROP clause was illegal and unenforceable, and it ordered 16
PSU to process the grievances in accordance with the remaining terms of the parties' 17

colle ctive bargaining agreement. 7 18

_______________________

"It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to discriminate against any of his [or her] employees * * * because [the employee] has opposed any practice made an unlawful employment pr actice by this subchapter, or because [the employee] has made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under this subchapter."
42 USC § 2000e

- 3(a).

7 In regard to the Association's additiona l claims, ERB determined that PSU7 PSU appealed ERB's order, raising two assignments of error. First, PSU 1

asserted that ERB lacked authority to determine whether the ROP clause constituted 2
discrimination under ORS 659A.030(1)(f) and Title VII because the Asso ciation brought 3
its claim under ORS 243.672(1)(g). In PSU's view, ERB was limited under ORS 4
243.672(1)(g) to examining whether PSU had violated the express terms of the collective 5
bargaining agreement. Second, PSU argued that ERB incorrectly concluded th at PSU's 6

invocation of the ROP clause had violated state and federal antidiscrimination laws. The 7
Association responded that ERB was authorized to assess whether the ROP clause was 8
discriminatory and that ERB correctly concluded that it was. 9

The Court o f Appeals addressed each assignment of error in turn. It 10
rejected PSU's first assignment of error, concluding instead that ERB had statutory 11
authority to determine whether the ROP clause was an enforceable contract provision. 12
PSU Association of Universit y Professors , 240 Or App at 113

- 14. The Court of Appeals, 13

however, agreed with PSU's second assignment of error. 14
In addressing the second assignment of error, t he Court of Appeals began 15
by noting that the Association, in presenting its case, cited both ORS 659A.030(1)(f) and 16

Title VII, but asserted that claims under ORS 659A.030(1)(f) are assessed under the same 17

_______________________ was not obligated to renegotiate the ROP clause when the Association first attempted to do so because, by that point, the ROP clause had not been proved to be illegal. It further ordered PSU to disclose the AA/EO report. PSU and the Association do not raise arguments related to those rulings, and ERB's order requiring PSU to disclose the AA/EO report resolves the claim relating to the Association's first grievance. Thus, only PSU's refusal to process the Association's se cond grievance, which alleged that PSU engaged in unlawful retaliation, remains at issue. We refer to only that grievance in the text below.8

leg al standard as Title VII claims. The Court of Appeals concluded that, " as the issue is 1
framed by the Association, this case depends on wheth er federal employment law bars 2
the enforceability of Article 28.B.2. " PSU Association of University Professors , 240 Or 3

App at 115. The Court of Appeals therefore turned its attention to federal law only and, 4
in particular, a standard under Title VII requ iring an employee to establish a prima facie 5
case showing that he or she was subject to an employer's discriminatory employment 6

action. See id. at 115

- 16 (outlining the standard). The court then recognized that ERB 7
did not apply Burlington N. & S.F.R. Co . v. White , 548 US 53, 126 S Ct 2405, 165 L Ed 8
2d 345 (2006), a recent federal case interpreting "materially adverse" employment actions 9

under the prima facie standard. The Court of Appeals therefore reversed and remanded 10

the case for ERB to reconsider th e parties' claims in light of that precedent. 8 However, in 11
so doing, the court further explained that, under Burlington , "[a]n adverse action gives 12
rise to actionable retaliation only if the adverse action is so serious that it would dissuade 13

a reasonable employee from bringing a discrimination action." PSU Association of 14
University Professors , 240 Or App at 116. In applying that principle to the facts 15
presented in this case, the Court of Appeals refined how the standard was to be applied 16
by ERB on reman d: 17

"Within the context of the Burlington standard, we * * * conclude 18 that a reasonable employee would not likely be dissuaded from filing a 19 discrimination complaint because an employer defends against the 20

8 The Court of Appeals further suggested that ERB consider 14 Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett , 556 US 247, 129 S Ct 1456 , 173 L Ed 2d 398 (2009), a federal case concerning a similar, contractually related discrimination claim that ERB was unable to previously consider because the case was decided after ERB rendered its decision.9

complaint by seeking to consolidate the resolution of the matter into one 1 proceeding. Accordingly, in order to establish that PSU's reliance on [the 2 ROP clause] constitutes unlawful retaliation, the Association must show 3 that [the clause] does something more than allow PSU to undertake such a 4 defensive measure." 5

Id. at 117. The Association sought review, which we allowed

. 6

B efore reaching the parties specific arguments on review, which focus 7
primarily upon the legality of the ROP clause, we first briefly address ERB's authority to 8
examine and decline to enforce the ROP provision. ERB is a state agency operating 9

under the aut hority conferred on it by the legislature. Under the Public Employees 10
Collective Bargaining Act, ORS 243.650 to 243.782 , the legislature expressly has granted 11
ERB authority to investigate complaints and hold hearings to determin e whether public 12
employers or unions have engaged in " an y unfair labor practice listed in ORS 243.672(1) 13
and (2)

. " ORS 243.676( 1 ); see also Ahern v. OPEU
, 329 Or 428, 434

- 35, 988 P2d 364 14
(1999) (recognizing that ERB has exclusive jurisdiction to determine whether an unfair 15
labor practice has been committed under ORS 243.672). The legislature further has 16
empowered ERB to impose remedies when it finds that an unfair labor practice has 17

occurred. See ORS 243.676(2)( b) (authorizing cease and desist orders); ORS 18
243.676(2)(c) (authorizing ERB to take "such affirmative action * * * as necessary" to 19
effectuate the purposes of the act). 20
In this case, the Association filed a labor complaint asserting that PSU had 21
engaged in an unfair labor practice by refusing to process Wilson's grievance under the 22
terms of the collective bargaining agreement. As noted, ORS 243.672(1)(g) defines an 23
unfair labor practice as including an employer's violation of " the provisions of any 2410

writ ten contract with respect to employment relations includ ing an agreement to 1

arbitrate." Under that provision , ERB had the authority to review and interpret the 2
challenged contract provision. ERB concluded that the ROP clause unambiguously 3

stated that PSU was not required to process the grievance filed on Wilson's behalf. After 4
ascertaining the contract's meaning, ERB further determined that the ROP clause was 5

invalid and unenforceable because it constituted unlawful discrimination under state and 6

federal law. Although PSU challenged that latter conclusion on appeal as being beyond 7
ERB's authority, we agree with the Court of Appeals that ERB acted within the limits of 8
its delegated authority. 9
In discharging its duties, ERB regularly examines whether bargaining 10
subjects fall within the lawful scope of collective bargaining. See, e.g., Walter v. 11
Scherzinger , 339 Or 408, 121 P3 d 644 (2005) (when union sought a declaratory ruling on 12
whether a contract proposal was a prohibited subject of bargaining, ERB had authority to 13
determine whether the proposal violated the Custodians' Civil Service Law). Moreover, 14
the legislature has reco gnized ERB's a uthor ity to invalidate illegal provisions within a 15
collective bargaining agreement. See ORS 243.702(1) (expressly providing that " [i]n the 16
event any words or sections of a collective bargaining agreement are declared to be 17

invalid * * * by r uling by the Employment Relations Board ," then the invalid words or 18
sections are reopened for negotiations by request (emphasis added) ) ; ORS 243.650(4) 19
(limiting collective bargaining over subjects prohibited by law). We conclude that ERB 20

acted within its authority by declining to enforce the ROP provision when it determined 21
that the provision was contrary to law. 2211 We turn now to the ROP clause itself. ERB's decision not to enforce the 1
ROP clause was predicated on the assertedly discriminatory nature of that clause. ERB 2
specifically concluded that the ROP provision was unenforceable because it violate d 3
Oregon's antidiscrimination provision, ORS 659A.030(1)(f), and the antidiscrimination 4
provision of Title VII
, 42 USC section 2000e

- 3(a)
, each of which pro hibit an employer 5
from discriminating against an employee who has filed a complaint or has made a charge 6
in response to an employer's unlawful employment practice under ORS chapter 659A or 7
Title VII, respectively. Thus, we must determine whether ERB corre ctly concluded, as a 8

matter of law, that the ROP clause was unenforceable because it purported to allow PSU 9
to engage in unlawful discrimination under ORS 659A.030(1)(f) and 42 USC section 10

2000e

- 3(a)

. See ORS 183.482(8)(a) (court reviews whether an agency has erroneously 11
interpreted a provision of law). That is a question of first impression for this court. 12
In analyzing ERB's interpretation of ORS 659A.030(1)(f) and 42 USC 13

section 2000e

- 3(a), the Court of Appeals framed its analysis solely in Title VII terms, 14
specifically because the Association asserted before both ERB and the Court of Appeals 15

that discrimin ation claims under ORS 659A.030(1)(f) are subject to the same legal 16

standards as claims asserted under 42 USC section 2000e

- 3(a). PSU, for its part, agrees 17
that this court should focus on federal law in analyzing the Association's claims, but it 18

bases tha t assertion on different grounds. In PSU's view, this court need not engage in a 19
rigorous analysis of the standards required under Oregon's antidiscrimination provision 20

because the Association has not offered an analysis that deviates from Title VII 21

prece dent. Stated differently, PSU asserts that
, because the Association has advanced the 2212

same analysis for both ORS 659A.030(1)(f) and 42 USC section 2000e

- 3(a), this court 1
can assume without deciding that the standards required under both the state and feder al 2
provisions are the same. 3

PSU's suggested approach is not without support. In State v. Pratt , 316 Or 4
561, 570 n 6, 853 P2d 827 (1993), this court "assume [ d ] , without deciding, that the 5
analysis [was] the same" for analogous state and federal constitut ional provisions when 6
the defendant had advanced only one analysis in interpreting those provisions. See also 7

S tate v. Langley , 314 Or 247, 259, 839 P2d 692 (1992) adh'd to on recons , 318 Or 28 8
(1993) (same); Dept. of Trans. v. Lundberg , 312 Or 568, 572 n 4, 825 P2d 64 1
, cert den
, 9
506 US 975 (1992) ( applying that assumption ). This court, however, has also 10
subsequently explained that, "[i]n construing a statute, this court is responsible for 11
identifying the correct interpretation, whether or not asserted b y the parties." Stull v. 12

Hoke, 326 Or 72, 7 7, 948 P2d 722 (1997); s ee also Dept

. of Human Services v. J. R. F. , 13
351 Or 570, 579, 273 P3d 87 (2012) (addressing court ' s " obligation to interpret the 14
statutes correctly, which includes an obligation to consider relevant context, regardless of 15
whether it was cited by any party " ); Blacknall v. Board of Parole , 348 Or 131, 139, 229 16

P3d 595 (2010) (stating same principle) ; Newport Church of the Nazarene v. Hensley
, 17

335 Or 1, 16, 56 P3d 386 (2002) (in construing a statute, "this court may be aided by the 18

ar guments of counsel" but "is not bound by them"). 19
As we shall explain, Stull states the better principle to apply in this case. 20
Because this court has not yet interpreted ORS 659A.030(1)(f), we have not yet had 21
occasion to analyze what standards apply un der that provision. This case presents that 2213

interpretive question. Accordingly , we must examine the text and context of the statute, 1
and look to relevant legislative history if it aids our analysis. State v. Gaines , 346 Or 2

160, 171

- 73, 206 P3d 1042 (2009) ; see also ORS 174.020(1)(a) ( " In the construction of a 3
statute, a court shall pursue the intention of the legislature if possible. " ). 4
Oregon's antidiscrimination statute

-- former ORS 659.030, renumbered as 5
ORS 659A.030 (2001)

-- was first enacted in 1947, many years before Congress enacted 6
Title VII. At that time, the Oregon Legislature Assembly declared it against public 7
policy for the state or its political subdivisions "to disc riminate against any individual" 8
with respect to the terms of employment on the basis of "race, color, religion, sex, union 9
membership, national origin or ancestry." Or Laws 1947, ch 508, § 2. In 1949, the 1947 10
act was repealed and replaced with the Fair Employment Practices Act, which set forth 11
more detailed provisions that similarly prohibited discriminatory employment practices. 12

Or Law s 1949, ch 221
, § 14. Significantly
, the 1949 provision included an anti retaliation 13
provision that declared that it was an "unlawful employment practice" for an employer, 14
labor organization, or employment agency to "discharge, expel or otherwise discriminate 15
against any person" because that person opposed any unlawful employment practices or 16
"filed a complaint, testifie d, or assisted in any proceeding" under the act. Id. at § 5(4). 17
The Fair Employment Practices Act remained unchanged until 1969 . A fter 18
1969, the legislature amended the Act on several occasions. Despite numerous 19

amendments to other parts of the Act , h owever, the text of the a nti r etaliation p rovision 20
remained largely unchanged and its substantive effect remained intact. As noted, ORS 21
659A.030(1)(f) now provides that it is an "unlawful employment practice": 2214 "For any person to discharge, expel or other wise discriminate against 1 any other person because that other person has opposed any unlawful 2 practice, or because that other person has filed a complaint, testified or 3 assisted in any proceeding under this chapter or has attempted to do so." 4

That statut e consists of two clauses. The first protects a person who has 5
opposed an unlawful practice. The second protects a person who has filed a complaint or 6
otherwise assisted in an action related to an unlawful practice. The latter clause is at 7

issue in this matter. The operative text of that clause, for the purposes of this case, makes 8
it unlawful for an employer to otherwise discriminate against an employee who engaged 9
in a protected activity, which includes, but is not limited to, filing a discrimination 10
complaint with BOLI

. See ORS 659A.820 (regarding the filing of complaints with 11
BOLI). The legislature has not defined "otherwise discriminate against" as applied under 12
ORS chapter 659A, and the legislative record relating to the enactment of subsection 13
(1)(f) is sparse . As pertinent to our inquiry, the dictionary discloses that "discriminate" 14

means " 2 : to make a difference in treatment or favor on a class or categorical basis in 15
disregard of individual merit." Webster's Third New Int'l Dict ionary 648 (unabridged ed 16
2002) (boldface type in original). Applying the meaning to subsection (1)(f) as it relates 17
to the issue presented in this case, the provision prohibit s an employer from subjecting an 18
employee who has filed a discrimination compla int to disparate treatment that disfavors 19
that employee because that employee has engaged in a protected activity. 20
That understanding is consistent with the remaining prohibitions contained 21
in ORS 659A.030(1). While the activity proscribed under each re maining subsection 22
varies, a common theme is nonetheless discernible. In somewhat general terms, ORS 2315

659A.030(1)(a) to (e) prohibit an employer, labor organization, or employment agency 1
from subjecting an employee to disparate, adverse treatment on accoun t of an employee's 2
race, color, religion, sex, sexual orientation, national origin, marital status, age, or 3
expunged juvenile record. Because discrimination is prohibited in those contexts, it is 4
apparent that an employer, employment agency, or union may not subject an employee to 5
treatment different than that accorded to other employees on the basis of a particular, 6

stated classification. S ubsection (1)(f) similarly prohibits an employer from treating a 7
protected class

-- e.g

. , employees who have partici pated in a protected activity

-- 8
differently. 9
Notwithstanding that stated similarity, there is a notable difference in the 10
text of subsections (1)(a) to (e) and subsection (1)(f). Subsections (1)(a) to (e) address 11
more plainly the stated purpose of the Fair Employment Practices Act, namely, to provide 12
for the elimination of discrimination in various conditions of employment on the basis of 13
immutable characteristics. Those subsections achieve that purpose by directly 14
prohibiting an employer from creating an invidious classification and then subjecting an 15
employee to adverse treatment based on that classification in various, specified 16
employment situations. See, e.g.
, ORS 659A.030(1)(a) (prohibiting discriminatory 17
classifications as related to hiring or d ischarge decisions); ORS 659A.030(1)(b) 18
(prohibiting discriminatory classifications as related to the terms, conditions, or privileges 19
of employment). Those protections are aided by the enforcement mechanisms that the 20
legislature has afforded throughout O RS chapter 659A, and subsection (1)(f) in turn is 21
written in broad terms to safeguard access to those mechanisms. Thus, we understand 2216

subsection (1)(f) to assist the protective purposes of ORS chapter 659A by ensuring that 1
any person who is engaged in pro tected conduct, such as opposing discriminatory 2
practices or seeking redress in an agency or court, is not discouraged from doing so by 3
the threat of being subjected to adverse, disparate treatment. 4

That distinction is consistent with how federal courts have analyzed and 5
applied the antidiscrimination provisions of Title VII

. A lthough federal precedent 6
interpreting an analogous federal provision, or interpreting an Oregon provision for that 7
matter, is not binding on this court when it interpret s the law of this state, this court 8
repeatedly has stated that Oregon courts may examine federal pr ecedent for contextual 9
support when they construe state statutes that parallel fe deral law. See Badger v. Paulson 10

Investment Co., Inc. , 311 Or 14, 21, 803 P2d 1178 (1 991) (when a state statute is based 11
upon a similar federal statute, decisions from federal courts may provide guidance but are 12
not binding); McKean

- Coffman v. Employment Div. , 312 Or 543, 550, 824 P2d 410 ` , 314 13

Or 645 (1992) (examining federal legislative history to analyze Oregon statute that was 14

" virtually verbatim " to federal statute); Karsun v. Kelley , 258 Or 155, 161, 482 P2d 533 15
(1971) (legislative history from a federal statute is helpful when Oregon stat ute is 16
substantially similar). A lthough Oreg on enacted a number of civil rights statutes many 17
years before Congress enacted Title VII, this court too has looked to Title VII precedent 18
to analyze claims brought under other, analogous provisions of ORS chapter 659A, 19
particularly where subsequent amend ments made by the Oregon legislature have reflected 20
the provisions embodied in Title VII. See Civil Serv. Bd of Portland v. Bureau of Labor
, 21

298 Or 307, 313

- 15, 692 P2d 569 (1984); Vaughn v. Pacific Northwest Bell Telephone
, 2217

289 Or 73, 86

- 88, 611 P2d 281 (1980); School District No. 1 v. Nilsen , 271 Or 461, 469

- 1
74, 534 P2d 1135 (1975) . In addressing claims asserting a violation of subsection (1)(f), 2
BOLI, ERB, the Court of Appeals, and federal courts commonly have looked to the 3
framework used in analyzing claims brought under Title VII's antiretaliation provision, 4

42 USC section 2000e

- 3(a), specifically because the federal provision is substantially 5

similar to this state's statute and because federal courts, unlike this court, have had 6
frequent occasion to construe and directly apply those provisions. We agree with the 7

Association that federal precedent interpreting the antidiscrimination provisions of Title 8

VII can provide useful additional context to aid our analysis of the meaning of ORS 9
659A.030(1)(f). 9 10
Title VII protects employees against discrimination based on "race, color, 11
religion, sex, or national origin" in various employment contexts, such as in the hiring or 12
discharge or employees, or in respect to the terms, conditions, or privileges of 13
emplo yment. 42 USC § 2000e

- 2(a). As noted, Title VII also contains an antiretaliation 14
provision that is analogous to ORS 659A.030(1)(f), which, to aid the reader, we again set 15

out: 16
"It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to 17 discriminate against any of his [or her] employees * * * because [the 18 employee] has opposed any practice made an unlawful employment 19 practice by this subchapter , or because [the employee] has made a charge, 20 testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an inves tigation, 21 proceeding, or hearing under this subchapter ." 22

9 Although we may turn to federal precedent for assistance in analyzing ORS 659A.030(1)(f), we stress that that approach is distinct from PSU's proposal that this court should assume, without deciding, that the law is the same under each.18

42 USC § 2000e

- 3(a) (emphasis added). 1

F ederal courts have construed Title VII in light of its curative purpose. See, 2

e.g. , Deravin v. Kerik , 335 F3d 195 (2d Cir 2003) (so stating). The primary purpose of 3

the antiretaliation provision of Title VII is to promote unfettered access to the remedial 4

mechanisms of that title

. Robinson v. Shell Oil Co. , 519 US 337, 346, 117 S Ct 843, 136 5

L Ed 2d 808 (2001); Ghirardelli v. McAvey Sales & Service, Inc. , 287 F Supp 2d 379, 6
387 (2003) ("Permitting employers to discriminate against an employee because of an 7
employee's past use of Title VII's remedial mechanisms could significantly deter 8
employees from engaging in such proceedings.")

. To advance that legislative objective, 9
federal courts have broadly construed the antiretaliation provision of Title VII as 10
prohibiting employers from discriminating "with impunity against an entire class of acts 11

under Titl e VII." Robinson , 519 US at 346; Thompson v. North American Stainless, LP
, 12

__ US __, 131 S Ct 863, 867

- 68, 178 L Ed 2d 694 (2011) ("Title VII's antiretaliation 13
provision must be construed to cover a broad range of employer conduct."). The 14

Supreme Court r ecently clarified that the protections afforded under the antiretaliation 15
provision of Title VII apply to all employer actions that are materially adverse , meaning 16

actions that reasonably would deter a victim of discrimination from pursing the remedial 17

mec hanisms available under Title VII. Burlington , 548 US at 67

- 70

. 18
ORS 659A.030(1)(f ) also reflects the intention that underlies the federal 19
provision of promoting unfettered access to remedial statutory mechanisms by 20
prohibiting employers from discriminat ing against employees engaged in a broad range 21
of protected activities

. Like the antiretaliation provision of Title VII , subsection (1)(f) is 2219

composed of protections for a broad array of activities linked to asserting or defending 1
the rights of employees to seek relief from unlawful discrimination

. Cf. Burlington , 548 2

US at 61

- 64; ORS 659A.030(1)(a)

- (e). If employers, or any person for that matter, could 3
impose adverse, disparate treatment against employees engaged in such activities, th e n 4

the curative m easures contained in ORS c hapter 659A would be thwarted. To achieve 5
the remedial purpose of ORS chapter 659A, subsection (1)(f) accordingly i mposes a 6

standard that restricts an employer from engaging in retaliatory activity that reasonably 7
would impede or deter employees from pursuing their rights under that chapter. T he 8
provision further insulates employees from discrimination if they seek to vindicate their 9
rights to be free from unlawful employment practices. However, the harm from which 10
employees are insulated is not a theoretical or trivial harm, but one that qualifies as a 11

substantive difference in treatment. 12
With that understanding in mind, we return to the parties' arguments. The 13
Association and PSU do not directly dispute that ORS 659A.030(1)( f) is intended to 14
promote access to remedial mechanisms. They do, however, fundamentally disagree 15
whether the ROP clause runs afoul of that purpose. In particular, the Association claims 16

that the ROP clause violates state and federal antiretaliation law because the clause is 17
retaliatory on its face. In the Association's view, the ROP clause is adverse because it 18
expressly targets a bargaining member who exercises a protected statutory right and then 19
penalizes that member by denying access to a contractua l right guaranteed to others. In 20
that way, the policy discourages participation in the remedial process provided by statute. 21
The Association points out , for example, that
, as that policy was implemented in this 2220

case, Wilson was deprived of the benefits o f a bargained

- for grievance procedure when 1
PSU invoked the ROP clause to decline to process the grievance filed on Wilson's 2

behalf. 10 3
PSU rejects the Association's position, arguing instead that the ROP clause 4
is permissible on its face because it does not necessarily penalize an employee who elects 5
to pursue his or her statutorily protected rights . PSU argues that the clause merely giv es 6

PSU the option to stop the grievance process once a bargaining member has filed a 7
complaint in an outside forum, but it does not necessitate that action. PSU further adds 8
that the ROP clause is not plainly adverse because it amounts to a reasonable def ensive 9

measure. In other words, according to PSU, the clause requires only that a bargaining 10
member pursue the internal dispute resolution process outlined in the collective 11
bargaining agreement before pursuing outside remedies. PSU proposes that the ROP 12

clause is a defensive sequencing provision that does not deny a bargaining member the 13
right to an internal grievance process that is guaranteed to others, nor does it necessarily 14
prevent a member from filing a complaint in an external forum. Rather, it s imply 15
requires that the bargaining member bring a complaint to BOLI or the EEOC at a later 16
point in time. Thus, PSU asserts that the ROP clause, on its face, does not constitute 17
retaliation under ORS 659A.030(1)(f) or Title VII because it does not dissuad e an 18
employee from bringing discrimination complaints and, as a result, is not adverse. 11 19

10 BOLI's commissioner has appeared as amicus curiae and in s upport of the Association's position.

11 On review, PSU has responded to only the Association's facial challenge,21 Several federal courts have concluded that an employer has engaged in a 1
retaliatory, adverse action if it denies an employee an important right based on his or her 2

i nvolvement in protected conduct. See Wedding v. University of Toledo , 884 F Supp 253 3
(ND Ohio 1995) (holding that policy requiring grievances to be held in abeyance pending 4
resolution of judicial or administrative proceedings was illegal under Title VII a nd Ohio 5
law), aff'd in part, rev'd in part , 89 F3d 316 (6th Cir 1996) (affirming stay of court 6
proceedings to present legality of clause to arbitrator); Johnson v. Palma , 931 F2d 203 7
(2nd Cir 1991) (holding that union's refusal to process grievance after e mployee filed 8
discrimination complaint with state agency constituted unlawful retaliation); Fasold v. 9

Justice , 409 F3d 178 (3rd Cir 2005) (holding that denial of grievance procedure 10
following filing of a discrimination complaint constituted unlawful retali ation under 11
ADEA and Pennsylvania law). 12

In Board of Governors
, 957 F2d 424, the United States Court of Appeals 13

for the Seventh Circuit addressed a dispute almost identical to that presented in this 14
matter. In that case, the EEOC challenged the lawfulnes s of a provision contained in a 15
collective bargaining agreement between the Illinois Board of Governors of State 16
Colleges and Universities and a union representing faculty members. The provision at 17
issue, Article 17.2, was virtually identical to the ROP c lause challenged in this case. It 18

_______________________ specifically because PSU asserts that the Association makes only a facial challenge before this court. The Association has made a facial cha llenge as well as a challenge in the alternative that the ROP provision is discriminatory as implemented against individual employees

. We resolve this dispute as a facial challenge to the ROP provision and, consequently, do not address the Association's a lternative contention.22

provided: 1
"If prior to filing a grievance hereunder, or while a grievance proceeding is 2 in progress, an employee seeks resolution of the matter in any other forum, 3 whether administrative or judicial, the Board or any Univ ersity shall have 4 no obligation to entertain or proceed further with the matter pursuant to this 5 grievance procedure." 6

Id. at 426. The Board of Governors invoked Article 17.2 and declined to process an 7
employee's grievance because the employee had filed a discrimination claim with the 8

EEOC. The Board of Go vernors defended the provision as a way to avoid duplicative 9
litigation. 10

The Seventh Circuit concluded that Article 17.2 constituted a facially 11
discriminatory policy and that application of that policy would violate an antiretaliation 12
provision under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA). 12 In analyzing the 13
discriminatory nature of the clause, th e court explained: 14
"Article 17.2 authorizes the Board to take an adverse employment action 15 (termination of the in

- house grievance proceeding) for the sole reason that 16 the employee has engaged in protected activity (filing an ADEA claim). 17 Under Article 17. 2 an employee must forfeit his contractual right to a 18 grievance proceeding, a condition of his employment, or surrender his legal 19 right to participate in litigation under the ADEA. Conversely, an employee 20 who elects to pursue his grievance with the Board may lose his right to 21 bring his federal age discrimination claim." 22

Id. at 4 30

. 23
In concluding that the implementation of the clause would constitute 24

12 The relevant provision of the ADEA was substantially similar to the antiretaliation prohibition contained in ORS 659A.030(1)(f) and Title VII. In particular, 29 USC section 623(d), declared it unlawful for an employer "to discri minate against any of his employees * * * because such individual * * * has made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or litigation under this chapter ."23

unlawful retaliation, the Seventh Circuit treated Article 17.2 as per se retaliatory. 1
Accordingly, it rej ected as irrelevant the Board of Governors ' "good faith" reason for 2
enforcing Article 17.2

-- i.e. , to avoid duplicative litigation

-- explaining that
, "[w]hen an 3
employee's participation in statutorily protected activity is the determining factor in an 4

em ployer's decision to take adverse employment action, that action is invalid regardless 5
of the employer's intent." Id . at 428. 13 6

13 The Board of Governors decision is helpful here because the court placed the analytical focus on the policy's unequal treatment of the employees, rather than on the presence or absence of proof that the employer intended its policy to effect discrimination. In declining to require proof of a disc riminatory animus, the Seventh Circuit relied in part on a similar approach taken by the United States Supreme Court in invalidating facially discriminatory employment policies, albeit under nonretaliation

specific antidiscrimination provisions. In Automo bile Workers v. Johnson Controls, Inc.
, 499 US 187, 111 S Ct 1196, 113 L Ed 2d 158 (1991), the Supreme Court held that Johnson Controls' policy barring all fertile women from jobs involving actual or potential lead exposure was facially discriminatory unde r 42 USC section 2000e

- 2(a), which prohibited discrimination based on sex

- based classifications. The Court noted that "[t]he bias in Johnson Controls ' policy is obvious. * * * The policy excludes women with childbearing capacity from lead

- exposed jobs an d so creates a facial classification based on gender. " Id. at 197. The Court further explained that the policy was not neutral, specifically because

" it does not apply to the reproductive capacity of the company ' s male employees in the same way as it app lies to that of the females. Moreover, the abse nce of a malevolent motive does not convert a facially discriminatory policy into a neutral policy with a discriminatory effect. Whether an employment practice involves disparate treatment through explicit f acial discrimination does not depend on why the employer discriminates but rather on the explicit terms of the discrimination. "

Id. at 199; see also
, Trans World Airlines , Inc. v. Thurston , 469 US 111, 124

- 25 , 105 S Ct 613, 83 L Ed 2d 523 (1985) (holding that employer ' s policy discriminated against protected individual s on the basis of age and thereby ran afoul of the ADEA even though employer acted reasonably and in good faith ); Los Angeles Dept. of Water & Power v. Manhart , 435 US 702, 714

- 18, 98 S Ct 13 70, 55 L Ed 2d 657 (1978) ( employer ' s policy requiring female employees to make larger contribution to pension fund than male employees was discriminatory on its face).24 The Seventh Circuit furthermore rejected the Board of Governor s' position 1
that it was free to terminate grievance proceedings because it had no obligation to provide 2
its employees a right to grievance procedures. Id. at 430. In so doing, the court relied on 3
Hishon v. King & Spalding , 467 US 69, 75

- 76, 104 S Ct 2229, 81 L Ed 2d 59 (1984), in 4
which the United States Supreme Court had stated: 5
"A benefit that is part and parcel of the employment relationship may not 6 be doled out in a discriminatory fashion, even if the employer would be free 7 under the employment contract simply not to provide the benefit at all. 8 Those benefits that comprise the 'incidents of employment,' or that form 'an 9 aspect of the relationship between the employer and employees,' may not be 10 afforded in a manner contrary to Title VII." 11
(Internal footnotes and citations omitted.) 12
We find that reasoning to be per suasive in light of the purposes of Oregon's 13
antiretaliation provision outlined above. ORS 659A.030(1)(f), like 42 USC section 14

2000e

- 3(a), prohibits an employer from subjecting any person engaged in a protected 15
activity to disparate treatment when such tr eatment would impede access to the remedial 16
mechanisms contained under those respective measures. An employment policy that 17
expressly targets employees who have filed complaints with regulatory agencies, and 18
then denies those employees an important right guaranteed to other employees, frustrates 19
the remedial purpose of ORS chapter 659A and Title VII. In other words, the employer's 20
policy would tend to dissuade employees from pursuing their protected rights because 21
exercising those rights would result in a substantive difference in treatment

. 22
Applying that reasoning to the case at hand, the Association asserts that the 23
ROP clause is a plainly invalid policy because it targets a bargaining member who 2425

engages in a protected activity and penalizes that membe r by denying access to an 1
important contract right. PSU responds that the clause is permissible on its face because 2
it merely gives PSU the option to, but does not require that, PSU halt internal grievance 3
proceedings. PSU, however, mischaracterizes the effect of the ROP clause. Under the 4
collective bargaining agreement, PSU must engage in the internal grievance process if the 5
Association brings a claim alleging that PSU violated the agreement's terms. 14 In that 6
sense, the agreement does not merely give PSU the option to consider a grievance that 7
has been filed. The ROP clause, in contrast, removes any obligation for PSU to proceed 8
under a grievance process that it otherwise would be compelled to follow. 9

PSU, however, further notes that at least one ci rcuit court

-- the United 10
States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit

-- has reached a result that contrasts with 11
the position taken in Board of Governors , 957 F2d 424 . That court has determined that 12
an employer can undertake reasonable defensive measu res that are not necessarily 13
adverse provided that employees still have leeway in accessing their statutory rights. I n 14
Richardson v. Commission on Human Rights , 532 F3d 114 (2d Cir 2008) cert den , ___ 15
US ___, 130 S Ct 56 (2009), , an employee (Richardson) of the Commission on Human 16
Rights and Opportunities (CHRO)

-- Connecticut's analog to BOLI and the EEOC

-- filed 17

a retaliation claim after CHRO invoked an ROP

- like provision, Article 15, s ection 18

14 Article 28, division A, section 1, of the collective bargaining agreement between t he parties provides that the Association may file a written complaint if it believes that PSU has violated, misinterpreted, or improperly applied the terms of the agreement. Article 28, division A, section 2 in turn requires that "the parties shall meet t o attempt to resolve the matter" in accordance with the grievance procedure outlined under the agreement.26

10(a)(2), 15 to halt collectively ba rgained

- for grievance proceedings after Richardson filed 1

a discrimination claim with CHRO. The Second Circuit concluded that, under the United 2
States Supreme Court's reasoning in Alexander v. Gardner

- Denver Co. , 415 US 36, 94 S 3
Ct 1011, 39 L Ed 2d 147 (19 74), CHRO's ROP

- like clause was an "election

- of

- remedies 4
provision" that did not waive bargaining members' substantive rights to pursue a 5
discrimination complaint with CHRO, the EEOC, or in court, provided that the employee 6
properly timed his or her compla ints. Richardson , 532 F 3 d at 122

- 23. The Second 7

Circuit added that CHRO's reliance on the election

- of

- remedies provision was not an 8
adverse employment action in violation of Title VII. Rather, in the court's view, the 9
bargained

- for policy merely avoided "duplicative proceedings in the two fora maintained 10
by the employer for adjudicating claims of discrimination" and did not foreclose "the 11
right to pursue claims with non

- CHRO bodies * * * [or] subsequent filing of claims with 12

the CHRO." Id. at 123

- 24. I n that sense, the court reasoned that the provision was a 13

reasonable defensive mechanism. 14
PSU urges this court to adopt that position

. In PSU's view, a reasonable 15
employee would understand that he or she had to undertake internal and external claims 16

seq uentially and therefore would not be deterred from pursuing a claim with an outside 17

agency or court . PSU adds that an employee does not have the inherent right to maintain 18

15 The collective bargaining agreement provision at issue, Article 15, section 10(a)(2), stipulated that "disputes over claimed unlawful discriminati on shall be subject to the grievance procedure but shall not be arbitrable if a complaint is filed with the [CHRO] arising from the same common nucleus of operative fact." Richardson , 532 F3d at 118.27

internal and external claims simultaneously. 1
We find PSU's position untenable. A s an initial point, we find the Second 2
Circuit's reasoning in Richardson to be inapplicable to the dispute in this case . In 3
deciding Richardson , the Second Circuit emphasized that Article 15, s ection 10(a)(2) 4
allowed CHRO to avoid "duplicative proceedings in the two fora maintained by [CHRO] 5
for adjudicating claims of discrimination ." Id. at 123 (emphasis added). As the italicized 6
language discloses, Richardson presents a narrow situation in which the employer

-- 7
Connecticut's equivalent to BOLI and the EEOC

-- maintained both the internal, 8
collectively bargained

- for grievance procedure and the external agency forum, each of 9
which processed discrimination claims. Here, the forums are distinct, as are the claims 10

asserted within each. 11
More importantly, however, we disagree with PSU's position that the ROP 12
clause is merely a sequencing provision that, within the contractual bargaining rights of 13
the parties involved, reasonably restricts duplicative proceedings. As noted, under the 14
collective bargaining a greement, PSU is obligated to process a grievance submitted on 15
the employee's behalf, which may in turn result in binding arbitration. The ability to 16
proceed to arbitration on a claim asserting that a contract violation has occurred, as the 17
Association po ints out, provides an important avenue of substantive redress. The right to 18

seek redress for a contractual violation is distinct from the right to pursue statutory claims 19
otherwise available to employees under ORS chapter 659A and Title VII, and the 20
emplo yee loses th e right to pursue that redress for a contractual violation under the ROP 21
clause if the employee elects to exercise his or her statutory right to file a claim with 2228

BOLI or the EEOC. In that sense, the ROP clause penalizes an employee who seeks to 1
exercise a statutorily protected right. 2
14 Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett , 556 US 247, 129 S Ct 1456, 173 L Ed 2d 398 3
(2009), supports that view. In that case, the United States Supreme Court stated that, in 4
the context of arbitration clauses in negotiated collective bargaining agreements, "a 5
substantive waiver of federally protected civil rights will not be upheld." Id. at 273. The 6
Court determined that a clause expressly requiring that all contractual and statutory 7
discrimination claims proceed to arbitr ation rather than litigation pursuant to the terms of 8
a collective bargaining agreement was permissible specifically because an employee was 9
able to exercise his or her substantive statutory rights to be free from workplace 10

discrimination. 16 Id. at 265

- 66

. T he provision in question met the remedial function of 11
Title VII and did not penalize employees for filing claims in an outside forum by 12
requiring the employees to waive a right to seek appropriate redress. Instead, union 13
members were permitted to simult aneously file discrimination claims with the EEOC and 14
other applicable agencies, but if the discrimination claims proceeded to litigation, 15
bargaining members were compelled to undergo arbitration proceedings under the terms 16
of the collective bargaining agr eement to resolve the matter. In reaching that result, the 17

16 The clause provided that all specified discrimination claims "shall be subject to the grievance and arbitration procedures * * * as the sole and exclusive remedy for violations" and that "[a]rbitrators shall apply appropriate law in rendering decisions bas ed on claims of discrimination." 14 Penn Plaza , 556 US at 252. This case does not require this court to decide the validity of a contractual arbitration clause declaring that the arbitration procedure is the sole and exclusive remedy for employment discr imination claims based on state or federal statutes.29

Court specifically distinguished such an all

- encompassing arbitration clause from 1
arbitration clauses that covered only contract

- based claims. Id. at 263

- 64. In the latter 2
instance, the Court noted that employees had not, and could not, waive their substantive 3
rights to pursue their statutory claims. Id. at 265

- 66. 4

The loss of a right to pursue a bargained

- for grievance right is significant. 5

As 14 Penn Pl aza notes , the right to pursue statutory remedies is critical to the 6
achievement of the legislature's goal in forbidding discrimination . This court too has 7
previously recognized the significance of an employee's right to pursue a claim under the 8

statutory scheme provided in ORS chapter 659A, and has explained that that right is 9
distinct and supplemental to rights provided under collective bargaining agreements. See 10
Vaughn , 289 Or at 86

- 87 (relating to personal cause of action for injured worker's 11

discrimi nation claim provided in ORS chapter 659A). Here, as the Association points 12
out, the ROP clause expressly penalizes an employee who elects to pursue his or her 13
statutory remedy by requiring that employee to for e go important rights under the 14

collective bar gaining agreement between the parties. The clause permits the employer to 15
treat employees who have pursued their statutory rights differently and less favorably 16
than those who have not. Such disparate treatment meets the very definition of 17

discrimination . The loss of that important contract right under the circumstances is 18
adverse to the interests of the employee. As shown in this case, implementation of the 19
ROP clause denied Wilson the benefits of having the union pursue her contract claim 20

under the te rms of the collective bargaining agreement solely because she elected to 21
exercise her individual right to file a discrimination claim with BOLI. That action 2230

contravened the purposes of ORS 659A.030(1)(f). As a result, PSU's action constituted 1
illegal ret aliation. 2
Notably, in reversing and remanding this case, the Court of Appeals 3

concluded that ER B incorrectly concluded that the ROP clause was retaliatory because it 4
failed to consider whether the Association presented a prima facie case of retaliation 5

u nder the Title VII standard as explained by the United States Supreme Court in 6
Burlington , 548 US 53. PSU Association of University Professors , 240 Or App at 11 5

- 7

18. U nder that standard, when an employee has asserted an individual claim of 8

retaliation un der Title VII, federal courts have required an employee to prove : (1) that 9
the employee engaged in a statutorily protected activity; (2) that the employee was 10
subjected to the employer's adverse action; and (3) that there was a casual connection 11

between t he protected activity and the adverse action. Somoza v. University of Denver
, 12

513 F3d 1206 , 1212 (10th Cir 2008). As noted, in Burlington , the Supreme Court 13
clarified that, to establish the second prong of that test, an employee must show that "a 14

reasona ble employee would have found the challenged action materially adverse ," 15
meaning that the challenged action " well might have dissuaded a reasonable worker from 16
making or supporting a charge of discrimination." 17 548 US at 68 (internal quotation 17

17 BOLI has adopted a rule interpreting ORS 659A.030(1)(f) reflecting those prima facie requirements:

"(2) An employer will be found to have unlawfully retaliated against an employee if:
"(a) The emplo yee has engaged in a protected activity by:
"(A) Explicitly or implicitly opposing an unlawful practice or what31

marks omit ted ; emphasis added ). 1
In finding that that standard had not been met, the Court of Appeals implied 2
that evidence of the implementation of a retaliatory employment policy, such as that 3

considered in Board of Governors , was somehow incongruous with the sta ndard of proof 4
required under the antiretaliation provision of Title VII as discussed in Burlington . We 5
do not read the standard for proving a retaliation claim discussed in Burlington as being 6
incompatible with the standard for challenging the retaliatory employment policy 7

discussed in Board of Governors . Rather, as noted, a policy that targets an employee 8
who has exercised his or her statutory right to file a discrimination complaint, and then 9
denies that employee an important right, directly frustrate s the purpose of the applicable 10
antidiscrimination statutes by dissuading employees from pursuing claims to protect the 11
rights afforded by those provisions. The Association argues as much in its challenge 12

before this court, and we agree with that position. As noted, the loss of the right to 13
pursue a grievance over discrimination claims is important, and a reasonable employee 14

_______________________

the employee reasonably believed to be an unlawful practice, or
"(B) Filing a charge, testifying, or assisting in an investigation, proceeding , or law suit under ORS 659A, or attempting to do so;
"(b) The employer has subjected the employee to any adverse treatment, in or out of the workplace, that is reasonably likely to deter protected activity, regardless of whether it materially affects the terms, conditions, or privileges of employment ; and
"(c) There is a casual connection between the protected activity and the adverse treatment."

OAR 839

- 005

- 0125.32

would seek to protect such a right. Accordingly, the loss of a contract right is likewise 1

material under 4 2 USC section 2000e

- 3(a). 2
We conclude that ERB correctly held that the ROP clause at issue in this 3
case imposes a form of employer retaliation for protected conduct that reasonably would 4
impede or deter an employee from pursuing his or her statutory righ ts. The resulting 5

harm is neither theoretical n or trivial, but qualifies as a substantive difference in 6
treatment. The ROP provision is therefore facially discriminatory under ORS 7
659A.030(1)(f)

. The ROP provision also is facially discriminator y under Ti tle VII

. 8
Accordingly, ERB properly declined to enforce that illegal contract provision. 9
The decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed. The order of the 10
Employment Relations Board is affirmed. 11