IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT NASHVILLE

June 2000 Session

RONALD L. DAVIS v. TENNESSEE BOARD OF PAROLES, ET AL.

Direct Appeal from the Chancery Court for Davidson County

No. 983555-III Ellen Hobbs Lyle, Chancellor

No. M2000-00668-COA-R3-CV - Filed July 19, 2000 

This is another in a series of cases filed by a certain prison inmate, Ronald L. Davis, this time

seeking the issuance of a common law writ of certiorari on the basis that the Tennessee Board of

Probation and Parole improperly refused to grant him early release. The board cited the seriousness

of the offense for which he was convicted as the basis for its decision and moved for dismissal of

the petition or alternatively for summary judgment. The trial court held this suit to be barred by

Tennessee Code Annotated section 41-21-812 which prohibits the filing of subsequent lawsuits by

inmates who have unpaid costs related to previous suits. The trial court dismissed this case under

Tennessee Code Annotated section 41-21-812 and on the basis that the Petition for Writ of Certiorari

failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. We affirm. 

Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Chancery Court Affirmed

WILLIAM B.CAIN, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which BEN H.CANTRELL, P.J.,M.S., and

PATRICIA J. COTTRELL, J., joined.

Ronald L. Davis, Pikeville, Tennessee, Pro Se.

Paul G. Summers, Attorney General and Reporter, Michael E. Moore, Solicitor General, and

Stephanie R. Reevers, Assistant Attorney General, for the appellee, Tennessee Board of Paroles. 
1Rule 10(b) of the Rules of the Court of Appeals of Tennessee reads as follows:

The Court, with the concurrence of all judges participating in the case, may

affirm, reverse or modify the actions of the trial court by memorandum opinion when

a formal opinion would have no precendential value. When a case is decided by

memorandum opinion it shall be designated “MEMORANDUM OPINION,” shall

not be published, and shall not be cited or relied on for any reason in any unrelated

case.

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MEMORANDUM OPINION1

On December 1, 1998, Ronald L. Davis filed his Petition for Common Law Writ of Certiorari

in the Chancery Court for Davidson County, complaining that the Tennessee Board of Paroles had

refused to grant him early release. In granting the Motion to Dismiss and Summary Judgment, the

trial court held:

With respect to the motion to dismiss or for summary judgment, the Court

grants the motion for summary judgment as follows.

The Court concludes from the papers filed by the respondents that the

petitioner’s suit is barred by Tennessee Code Annotated section 41-21-812 which

prohibits the filing of subsequent lawsuits by inmates who have unpaid costs

assessments related to previous suits. In support of the motion for summary

judgment the respondents have filed bills of costs showing that Mr. Davis has

accrued thousands of dollars of unpaid costs in Davidson County Circuit Court alone.

The petitioner has not stated in his lawsuit any request for injunctive relief as the

result of a substantial threat of irreparable injury or serious physical harm. Thus, the

conditions stated in Tennessee Code Annotated section 41-21-812 have been

complied with, and the Court determines that the above-captioned matter shall be

dismissed for failure of Mr. Davis to pay such costs.

The Court additionally grants the motion to dismiss because the only proper

respondent in this case is the Tennessee Board of Paroles. Tennessee Code

Annotated sections 27-9-101 through 114 and Fairhaven Corp. v. Tennessee Health

Facilities Commission, 566 S.W.2d 885 (Tenn. App. 1976) provide that writs of

certiorari challenging parole decisions of the Tennessee Board of Paroles should

name the Board of Paroles and only the Board of Paroles as the respondent as

ultimately any relief awarded can only be afforded by the Tennessee Board of

Paroles. Therefore the Court dismisses the above-captioned action as to any party

except for the Tennessee Board of Paroles.

Finally, the Court grants the motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim
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upon which relief can be granted because the petitioner has failed to allege specific

material facts demonstrating that the Parole Board acted illegally, fraudulently or

arbitrarily. The conclusory allegations made by the petitioner that the hearing was

“mock” are insufficient. With respect to the petitioner’s theory that seriousness of

the offense was not a legitimate reason for denial of parole, the Court notes that

Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-35-503(b) specificallyprovides that the Board

may refuse to release an inmate on parole if doing so would depreciate the

seriousness of the crime for which the defendant stands convicted. In Arnold v.

Board of Paroles, 956 S.W.2d 478, 482-83 (Tenn. 1997), the Tennessee Supreme

Court held that it is legal for the Board of Paroles to consider the seriousness of an

inmate’s offense in its determinations regarding parole.

We agree with the chancellor in all respects. As to Tennessee Code Annotated section 41-21-

812, the record before the Court shows the following unpaid costs of previous litigation assessed

against Ronald L. Davis by the Circuit Court of Davidson County.

1. Ronald Davis v. Coi Abrams, et al No. 97C-368 $ 206.00

2. Ronald L. Davis v. Donal Cambell, et al No. 98C-237 $ 406.00

3. Ronald L. Davis v. Gary Gray, et al No. 97C-1116 $ 265.00

4. Ronald L. Davis v. Qualls, et al No. 98C-343 $ 308.50

5. Ronald L. Davis v. Don Sundquist, et al No. 98C-287 $ 213.50

6. Ronald L. Davis v. Wilson Sporting Goods Co. No. 97C-2595 $ 194.50

7. Ronald L. Davis v. Sohnia W. Hong, et al No. 97C-2434 $ 227.50

8. Ronald L. Davis v. J. Edwin Ralston, et al No. 97C-451 $ 383.50

On March 29, 2000, this Court released its opinion in Davis v. Holland, No. M1999-00460-

COA-R3-CV, 2000 WL 313537 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2000), applying Tennessee Code Annotated section

41-21-812 against this same Ronald L. Davis. Contemporaneous with the case at bar is Davis v.

Campbell, No. M1999-02294-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. filed July 13, 2000), wherein this Court

affirms the chancellor’s memorandum finding that this plaintiff, Ronald L. Davis, had outstanding

unpaid court costs in the amount of $2,664.

On appeal, the appellant challenges the constitutionality of Tennessee Code Annotated

section 41-21-812. This challenge cannot be raised and heard for the first time on appeal. Lawrence

v. Stanford, 655 S.W.2d 927, 929 (Tenn. 1983).

The judgment of the Chancellor is in all respects affirmed and the costs are assessed against
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Ronald L. Davis.

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WILLIAM B. CAIN, JUDGE