[Cite as State v. Beckwith, 2013-Ohio-1739.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS

ELEVENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT 

ASHTABULA COUNTY, OHIO 

STATE OF OHIO, : O P I N I O N 

 Plaintiff-Appellee, :

CASE NO. 2012-A-0051

 - vs - :

BENJAMIN L. BECKWITH, :

 Defendant-Appellant. :

Criminal Appeal from the Ashtabula County Court of Common Pleas, Case No. 12 CR 

222. 

Judgment: Affirmed. 

Thomas L. Sartini, Ashtabula County Prosecutor, and Shelley M. Pratt, Assistant 

Prosecutor, Ashtabula County Courthouse, 25 West Jefferson Street, Jefferson, OH 

44047-1092 (For Plaintiff-Appellee). 

Marie Lane, Ashtabula County Public Defender, Inc., 4817 State Road, #202, 

Ashtabula, OH 44004-6927 (For Defendant-Appellant). 

COLLEEN MARY O’TOOLE, J. 

{¶1} Appellant, Benjamin L. Beckwith, appeals from the October 3, 2012 

judgment of the Ashtabula County Court of Common Pleas, sentencing him for illegal 

manufacture of drugs. 

{¶2} On May 11, 2012, the Ashtabula County Grand Jury indicted appellant in 

Case No. 12 CR 222 on three counts: count one, illegal manufacture of 

methamphetamine, a felony of the second degree, in violation of R.C. 2925.04(A) and 
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(C)(3)(a); count two, illegal assembly or possession of chemicals for the manufacture of 

drugs, a felony of the third degree, in violation of R.C. 2925.041(A); and count three, 

aggravated possession of drugs, a felony of the fifth degree, in violation of R.C. 

2925.11(A). Appellant pleaded not guilty to all charges at his arraignment. 

{¶3} Thereafter, on August 10, 2012, appellant withdrew his former not guilty 

plea and pleaded guilty to one count of illegal manufacture of drugs, a second degree 

felony. The trial court accepted appellant’s guilty plea, dismissed the remaining 

charges, and deferred sentencing. 

{¶4} On October 3, 2012, the court sentenced appellant to a three year 

mandatory term of incarceration, with 146 days of credit for time already served. The 

court ordered appellant to serve his sentence concurrently with a sentence imposed in 

Case No. 12 CR 220 for theft, and consecutively to a sentence imposed in Case No. 12 

CR 254 for illegal manufacture of drugs. The court also notified appellant that his 

sentence is subject to a three year period of post-release control. Appellant filed a 

timely appeal and asserts the following assignment of error for our review: 

{¶5} “The trial court committed error when it ordered consecutive sentences 

without stating the requisite findings on the record.” 

{¶6} In his sole assignment of error, appellant argues that the trial court failed 

to make the findings necessary to sentence him to consecutive sentences under R.C. 

2929.14. 

{¶7} In State v. Kalish, 120 Ohio St.3d 23, 2008-Ohio-4912, the Ohio Supreme 

Court set forth a two step process for examining felony sentences. The first step is to 

“examine the sentencing court’s compliance with all applicable rules and statutes in 
 3

imposing the sentence to determine whether the sentence is clearly and convincingly 

contrary to law.” Id. at ¶ 4. If this first step “is satisfied,” the second step requires the 

trial court’s decision be “reviewed under an abuse-of-discretion standard.” Id. 

{¶8} We note that H.B. 86, which became effective on September 30, 2011, 

revived the language provided in former R.C. 2929.14(E) and moved it to R.C. 

2929.14(C)(4). The revisions to the felony sentencing statutes under H.B. 86 now 

require a trial court to make specific findings when imposing consecutive sentences. As 

appellant was sentenced on October 3, 2012, the new provisions apply. 

{¶9} R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) states: 

{¶10} “(4) If multiple prison terms are imposed on an offender for convictions of 

multiple offenses, the court may require the offender to serve the prison terms 

consecutively if the court finds that the consecutive service is necessary to protect the 

public from future crime or to punish the offender and that consecutive sentences are 

not disproportionate to the seriousness of the offender’s conduct and to the danger the 

offender poses to the public, and if the court also finds any of the following: 

{¶11} “(a) The offender committed one or more of the multiple offenses while the 

offender was awaiting trial or sentencing, was under a sanction imposed pursuant to 

section 2929.16, 2929.17, or 2929.18 of the Revised Code, or was under post-release 

control for a prior offense. 

{¶12} “(b) At least two of the multiple offenses were committed as part of one or 

more courses of conduct, and the harm caused by two or more of the multiple offenses 

so committed was so great or unusual that no single prison term for any of the offenses 
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committed as part of any of the courses of conduct adequately reflects the seriousness 

of the offender’s conduct. 

{¶13} “(c) The offender’s history of criminal conduct demonstrates that 

consecutive sentences are necessary to protect the public from future crime by the 

offender.” 

{¶14} In Section 11, the legislature explained that in amending former R.C. 

2929.14(E)(4), it intended “to simultaneously repeal and revive the amended language 

in those divisions that was invalidated and severed by the Ohio Supreme Court’s 

decision in State v. Foster, 109 Ohio St.3d 1.” The General Assembly further explained 

that the amended language in those divisions “is subject to reenactment under the 

United States Supreme Court’s decision in Oregon v. Ice, (2009) 555 U.S. 160, and the 

Ohio Supreme Court’s decision in State v. Hodge, (2010) [128] Ohio St.3d [1], slip 

opinion no. 2010-Ohio-6320, * * *.” Thus, it is the legislature’s intent that courts interpret 

the language in R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) in the same manner as the courts did prior to 

Foster. 

{¶15} Although H.B. 86 requires the trial court to make findings before imposing 

a consecutive sentence, it does not require the trial court to give its reasons for 

imposing the sentence. State v. Frasca, 11th Dist. No. 2011-T-0108, 2012-Ohio-3746, 

¶57-58. When making findings regarding consecutive sentencing, “‘a verbatim 

recitation of the statutory language is not required by the trial court.’” Id. at ¶ 60, 

quoting State v. Green, 11th Dist. No. 2003-A-0089, 2005-Ohio-3268, ¶ 26, citing State 

v. Grissom, 11th Dist. No. 2001-L-107, 2002-Ohio-5154, ¶ 21. 
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{¶16} At the sentencing hearing, the court stated the following with regard to 

consecutive sentences: 

{¶17} “So although the defendant doesn’t have a serious past record, and the 

Court notes he’s 22 years of age so he’s only had four years as an adult, but to have 

four felony matters pending here at the same time is very unusual, have that many 

major offenses against the same person. 

{¶18} “* * * 

{¶19} “On the recidivism factors the Court finds recidivism is likely based on the 

two felony convictions of recent time frame and the two that are pending before me. So 

the Court finds that recidivism is likely.” 

{¶20} “* * * 

{¶21} “The Court’s again reviewed the Presentence Investigation Report. The 

defendant, obviously, as I think it was stated earlier, there was a warrant out for him. 

Actually at the defendant’s home they found meth labs. The Court was shown some 

photographs in the presence of defense counsel. Impressed the Court. There was 

more than just a two-liter bottle there full of drugs. There was other equipment and, you 

know, it’s been stated here that there were others involved, too; and you know, when 

you’re making meth, I can’t sit here and believe you’re using all that meth yourself. 

You’re disbursing that. You’re getting other people involved in this; and other people 

have families just like you do, and they’re going to wind up in court, and they’re, they’re 

concerned about their loved ones. 
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{¶22} “But you know, Mr. Beckwith, you had a wonderful opportunity when you 

were approved for Drug Court, as stated earlier, and you never showed up for the Drug 

Court. 

{¶23} “You know, this Court only has so many tools, and when we run out of the 

treatment tools, which the State has pretty much run out of because you’re not 

interested in treatment, there’s nothing left for us except to incarcerate you. 

{¶24} “The meth and the heroin I see in the Presentence Report, according to 

the information, over your lifetime you’ve admitted to using methamphetamine, heroin, 

cocaine, marijuana, and a variety of pain pills. You’ve tried it all. 

{¶25} “And you know, my experience with people that have a drug addiction as 

serious as yours is, it’s going to be a lifetime effort for you to maintain control of that. 

You’re going to have urges for drugs for the rest of your life. If I were to let you out of 

jail today, I would bet within a couple of days’ time you’d be right back in and having a 

high. 

{¶26} “* * * 

{¶27} “In your case the Court’s looked at the recidivism factors on the drug 

charge, and you know, without some treatment or incarceration, recidivism isn’t only 

likely, it’s guaranteed in your case. 

{¶28} “Under the seriousness factors, the Court finds that the more serious 

factors would apply. * * * 

{¶29} “* * * 

{¶30} “But, you know, you’re 22 years old now. You’re an adult. You’re a man. 

You got to do more than just run around, make drugs and feel good all the time. You 
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got some responsibilities: #1.) to support yourself; and #2.) to help your family. And 

you’re never gonna do that unless we get you off the drugs, and a short sentence isn’t 

going to get you off the drugs. 

{¶31} “* * * 

{¶32} “But I think in this case obviously community - - well, community control is 

not in the picture because there’s a mandatory sentence. But even if it were, it would 

demean the seriousness of your conduct, wouldn’t adequately protect the public from 

future crime. 

{¶33} “Considering the seriousness factors, which the Court finds to override the 

less serious, the recidivism factors which are likely, and the purposes and principles of 

the sentencing statutes, the Court finds that a prison sentence is not only mandated by 

the law but is required in this case. 

{¶34} “So it is the judgment and sentence of the Court, I’m going to give you the 

minimum sentence mainly because I’m going to make it consecutive to the other 

minimum you’ve got in the other case; so although you’ve got two convictions, you’re 

gonna get a medium-range sentence when it’s all said and done. 

{¶35} “But it is the judgment and sentence of the Court that you serve a threeyear mandatory sentence on this case for conviction of Illegal Manufacturing of Drugs, a 

felony of the second degree. 

{¶36} “I’m gonna order that this sentence be served consecutive to [Case No.] 

12-CR-254; and I’m gonna order it be served concurrently with Case Number 12-CR220. * * *” 
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{¶37} In addition, the trial court stated in its judgment entry that it “considered 

the record, oral statements, any victim impact statement and Pre-sentence Investigation 

Report prepared, as well as the principles and purposes of sentencing under R.C. 

2929.11, has balanced the seriousness and recidivism factors under R.C. 2929.12, and 

has considered the factors under R.C. 2929.13. 

{¶38} Although the trial court may not have used the exact wording of R.C. 

2929.14(C)(4) in reaching its findings regarding consecutive sentencing, “‘a verbatim 

recitation of the statutory language is not required.’” Frasca, supra, at ¶60. The 

statements made by the court at sentencing establish that consecutive sentences are 

necessary to protect the public from future crime or to punish appellant and that 

consecutive sentences are not disproportionate to the seriousness of his conduct and to 

the danger he poses to the public. The court’s statements also reveal that appellant’s 

criminal history, although brief, demonstrates that consecutive sentences are necessary 

to protect the public from future crime by appellant. Thus, the record establishes that 

the trial court considered and made the appropriate factual findings pursuant to R.C. 

2929.14(C)(4). 

{¶39} For the foregoing reasons, appellant’s sole assignment of error is not welltaken. The judgment of the Ashtabula County Court of Common Pleas is affirmed. The 

court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal. 

CYNTHIA WESTCOTT RICE, J., 

THOMAS R. WRIGHT, J., 

concur.