Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-JT-2753 | June 10, 2020 Page 1 of 9

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before any 

court except for the purpose of establishing 

the defense of res judicata, collateral 

estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

Leanna Weissmann

Lawrenceburg, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Monika Prekopa Talbot

Robert J. Henke

Deputy Attorneys General

Indianapolis, Indiana

I N T H E

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

In re the Termination of the 

Parent-Child Relationship of 

E.V. (Minor Child) and

T.N. (Mother),

Appellant-Respondent,

v.

Indiana Department of Child 

Services,

Appellee-Petitioner.

June 10, 2020

Court of Appeals Case No.

19A-JT-2753

Appeal from the Decatur Circuit 

Court

The Honorable Timothy B. Day, 

Judge

Trial Court Cause No.

16C01-1904-JT-153

Mathias, Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-JT-2753 | June 10, 2020 Page 2 of 9

[1] T.N. (“Mother”) appeals the Decatur Circuit Court’s order terminating her 

parental rights to E.V., her minor child. Mother argues that the trial court’s 

order involuntarily terminating her parental rights is not supported by clear and 

convincing evidence.

[2] We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] E.V. was born to Mother and S.V. (“Father”) in February 2013. In January 

2017, police officers were called to Mother’s hotel room due to a domestic 

violence incident. While responding to the incident, law enforcement learned 

that there was an active warrant for Mother’s arrest, and she was taken into 

custody. Father could not be located. The Indiana Department of Child 

Services (“DCS”) removed E.V. from Mother’s care.

[4] DCS filed a Child in Need of Services (“CHINS”) petition shortly after E.V. 

was removed from Mother’s care. E.V. was adjudicated a CHINS on January 

31, 2017.

[5] During the CHINS proceedings, Mother did not have a stable home or stable 

employment. She tested positive for methamphetamine. Mother sporadically 

participated in home-based services and supervised visitation with E.V. Family 

case managers found it difficult to maintain contact with Mother. And Mother 

never allowed case managers into her home. 
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[6] Because Mother missed a significant number of visits with E.V., visitation 

ceased in March 2018. Family case managers attempted to communicate with 

Mother via telephone calls and text message with the goal of assisting Mother 

with her participation in services. The family case manager texted Mother 

“multiple times” in an attempt to reestablish visitation between Mother and 

E.V. Mother did not reply to the text messages. Tr. p. 16. 

[7] DCS filed a petition to terminate Mother’s parental rights in May 2019. Mother 

did not appear at the initial hearing.

[8] Mother also failed to appear at the termination fact-finding hearing held on 

October 24, 2019.1 Mother had actual notice of the hearing. Tr. p. 10. Family 

case manager Rani Judd testified that there is no bond between Mother and 

E.V. Tr. p. 16. Family case manager Kimberly Miller visited with Mother in 

July 2019. She discussed the termination proceedings with Mother. Mother told 

Miller that she did not plan to attend the fact-finding hearing, but she also 

refused to voluntarily terminate her parental rights to E.V. Tr. p. 18. Miller 

offered Mother services and visitation with E.V. Mother declined Miller’s offer. 

E.V.’s guardian ad litem testified that termination of Mother’s parental rights 

was in E.V.’s best interest. Tr. p. 23. She stated that E.V. is excelling in his preadoptive placement. Id.

1

Father did not appear at the fact-finding hearing, his parental rights were also terminated, and he does not 

participate in this appeal.
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[9] On October 24, 2019, the trial court issued an order terminating Mother’s 

parental rights to E.V. The trial court found in pertinent part:

There is a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted 

in the child’s removal or the reasons for the placement outside 

the parent’s home will not be remedied in that: . . . Mother . . . 

[has] failed to engaged with the Child or the Department with 

regard to services, visitation, or parenting in general and [has] 

failed to make any efforts to improve [her] situation[] or avail 

[herself] of any resources provided in order to do so.

There is a reasonable probability that continuation of the parentchild relationship poses a threat to the well-being of the child in 

that: the Child has been placed with his current placement for 

such a lengthy period that he has developed an extremely strong 

familial bond with them, . . . Mother . . . [has] no bond with the 

Child whatsoever, and that disrupting the established bond 

between the Child and his current caregivers would severely 

traumatize the Child and deny him the permanency he needs to 

thrive.

Termination is in the child’s best interests . . . in that: the Child 

has a strong familial bond with his current foster placement, 

regarding them as his mother and father, has no bond with either 

biological parent whatsoever, and the Child would best achieve 

the permanency, stability, and support he needs and is receiving 

from his placement following the termination of his biological 

parents’ parental rights. 

Appellant’s App. p. 27. Mother now appeals.

Standard of Review

[10] Indiana appellate courts have long had a highly deferential standard of review 

in cases involving the termination of parental rights. In re D.B., 942 N.E.2d 867, 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-JT-2753 | June 10, 2020 Page 5 of 9

871 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011). We neither reweigh the evidence nor assess witness 

credibility. Id. We consider only the evidence and reasonable inferences 

favorable to the trial court’s judgment. Id. In deference to the trial court’s 

unique position to assess the evidence, we will set aside a judgment terminating 

a parent-child relationship only if it is clearly erroneous. Id. Clear error is that 

which leaves us with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been 

made. J.M. v. Marion Cty. Off. of Family & Children, 802 N.E.2d 40, 44 (Ind. Ct. 

App. 2004), trans. denied.

[11] Mother does not challenge any of the trial court’s factual findings as being 

clearly erroneous. We therefore accept the trial court’s findings as true and 

determine only whether these unchallenged findings are sufficient to support 

the judgment. In re A.M., 121 N.E.3d 556, 562 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019), trans. 

denied; see also T.B. v. Ind. Dep’t of Child Servs., 971 N.E.2d 104, 110 (Ind. Ct. 

App. 2012) (holding that when the trial court's unchallenged findings support 

termination, there is no error), trans. denied. 

Discussion and Decision

[12] Mother claims that the trial court’s order involuntarily terminating her parental 

rights is not supported by clear and convincing evidence. Indiana Code section 

31-35-2-4(b)(2) provides that a petition to terminate parental rights must allege:

(B) that one (1) of the following is true:

(i) There is a reasonable probability that the conditions that 

resulted in the child’s removal or the reasons for placement 

outside the home of the parents will not be remedied.
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(ii) There is a reasonable probability that the continuation of 

the parent-child relationship poses a threat to the well-being 

of the child.

(iii) The child has, on two (2) separate occasions, been 

adjudicated a child in need of services;

(C) that termination is in the best interests of the child; and

(D) that there is a satisfactory plan for the care and treatment of 

the child.

[13] DCS must prove each element by clear and convincing evidence. Ind. Code § 

31-37-14-2; In re G.Y., 904 N.E.2d 1257, 1260 (Ind. 2009). Because Indiana 

Code subsection 31-35-2-4(b)(2)(B) is written in the disjunctive, the trial court is 

required to find that only one prong of subsection 4(b)(2)(B) has been 

established by clear and convincing evidence. In re A.K., 924 N.E.2d 212, 220 

(Ind. Ct. App. 2010).

[14] Clear and convincing evidence need not establish that the continued custody of 

the parent is wholly inadequate for the child’s very survival. Bester v. Lake Cty. 

Off. of Family & Children, 839 N.E.2d 143, 148 (Ind. 2005). It is instead sufficient 

to show by clear and convincing evidence that the child’s emotional and 

physical development are put at risk by the parent’s custody. Id. If the court 

finds the allegations in a petition are true, the court shall terminate the parentchild relationship. Ind. Code § 31-35-2-8(a).

[15] The purpose of terminating parental rights is not to punish parents but instead 

to protect the child. In re S.P.H., 806 N.E.2d 874, 880 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004). 
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Although parental rights have a constitutional dimension, the law allows for 

their termination when the parties are unable or unwilling to meet their 

responsibilities as parents. Id. Indeed, parental interests must be subordinated to 

the child’s interests in determining the proper disposition of a petition to 

terminate parental rights. In re G.Y., 904 N.E.2d at 1259.

[16] Mother argues that the trial court clearly erred by concluding that there was a 

reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in the child’s removal 

from her care, or the reasons for his continued placement outside her home, 

would not be remedied. When considering whether DCS has proven this factor 

by clear and convincing evidence, the trial court must determine a parent's 

fitness to care for the child at the time of the termination hearing while also 

taking into consideration evidence of changed circumstances. A.D.S. v. Ind. 

Dep’t of Child Servs., 987 N.E.2d 1150, 1156–57 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013), trans. 

denied. 

[17] Mother contends that DCS failed to prove that there was a reasonable 

probability that the reasons for E.V.’s continued placement outside her home 

would not be remedied because DCS failed to present evidence of the services it 

offered to Mother. The family case manager testified that Mother was offered 

home-based services, a substance abuse assessment, drug screens, and visitation 

with E.V. Tr. p. 15. We agree with Mother that the family case manager’s 

testimony regarding services and Mother’s participation was cursory. 
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[18] However, the family case manager was not able to offer detailed testimony 

because of Mother’s lack of participation in services and minimal visitation 

with E.V. Mother did not maintain communication with the DCS service 

providers, did not keep them informed of her address, refused to allow them 

inside her home, and has not had any contact with E.V. since March 2018. And 

prior to March 2018, Mother’s participation in services and visitation was 

sporadic. Tr. pp. 15–16.

[19] After he was removed from Mother’s care, E.V. continued to be placed outside 

of Mother’s home because her participation in services was inconsistent. 

Importantly, Mother refused to participate in any services or visitation after 

March 2018 even though her family case managers offered services and 

visitation to her. Mother abandoned E.V. and continued to show her lack of 

commitment to the child when she failed to appear for the termination factfinding hearing. 

[20] For all of these reasons, we conclude that clear and convincing evidence 

supports the trial court’s finding that there is a reasonable probability that the 

conditions that resulted in the child’s removal from Mother’s care, or the 

reasons for his continued placement outside her home, would not be remedied.2

2 Because Indiana Code subsection 31-35-2-4(b)(2)(B) is written in the disjunctive, we decline to address 

Mother’s additional claim that DCS failed to prove that continuation of the parent-child relationship 

threatens the children’s well-being. In re A.K., 924 N.E.2d at 220. And Mother does not challenge the trial 

court’s finding that termination of her parental rights is in E.V.’s best interests. 
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Conclusion

[21] Clear and convincing evidence supports the trial court’s order involuntarily 

terminating Mother’s parental rights to her child. 

[22] Affirmed.

Riley, J., and Tavitas, J., concur.