Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 71A03-1704-CR-689 | December 29, 2017 Page 1 of 18

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before any 

court except for the purpose of establishing 

the defense of res judicata, collateral 

estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

Charles W. Lahey

South Bend, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Curtis T. Hill, Jr.

Attorney General of Indiana

Michael Gene Worden

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

I N T H E

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Jefferson Mitchell Dean,

Appellant-Defendant,

v.

State of Indiana,

Appellee-Plaintiff.

December 29, 2017

Court of Appeals Case No.

71A03-1704-CR-689

Appeal from the St. Joseph 

Superior Court

The Honorable Jeffrey L. Sanford, 

Judge

Trial Court Cause No.

71D03-1511-F1-15

Pyle, Judge.
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Statement of the Case

[1] Jefferson Mitchell Dean (“Dean”) appeals his conviction, following a jury trial, 

for Level 4 felony child molesting.

1

 Dean contends that the trial court used an 

improper standard of review when the trial court ruled on his motion to 

suppress his police statement, and he makes policy arguments regarding the 

tactics used by police interrogators. 

[2] Because Dean is appealing following a conviction, his challenge to the trial 

court’s ruling on his motion to suppress would more appropriately be framed as 

whether the trial court properly admitted the evidence of his police statements 

at trial. However, Dean waived any admission of evidence argument when he 

stipulated at trial to the admissibility of the exhibit that contained his police 

statement as part of a defense strategy. Thus, we will not review Dean’s 

argument regarding the trial court’s ruling on his motion to suppress. Nor will 

we review Dean’s policy arguments as they do not present a reviewable 

appellate issue and amount to a request for an advisory opinion. 

[3] We affirm.

Issue

Whether Dean waived any appellate challenge relating to the 

admissibility of the exhibit containing his police statement by 

stipulating at trial to the admissibility of the exhibit.

 

1

IND. CODE § 35-42-4-3.
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Facts

[4] In August 2015, eight-year-old A.C. told her babysitter that Dean, her 

stepfather, had inappropriately touched her vaginal area. The babysitter told 

A.C.’s father about the allegations, and he called the police. A.C.’s father also 

took her to the hospital for an examination and to the CASIE Center in South 

Bend for a forensic interview.

[5] Thereafter, on August 20, 2015, Dean went to the police station and was 

interviewed by Detective Lieutenant Brad Haney (“Detective Haney”) of the St. 

Joseph County Special Victims Unit. Dean was aware that he had been 

accused of inappropriately touching A.C. Detective Haney asked Dean about 

his education, and Dean replied that he had finished tenth grade and “read 

backwards.” (State’s Ex. 3). The detective carefully explained the Miranda

rights and waiver form, and Dean signed it. During this interview (“Interview 

#1”), Dean denied that he had touched A.C. in an inappropriate manner and 

suggested that she was lying. At the conclusion of the interview, Dean left the 

police station. 

[6] Three months later, on November 17, 2015, Detective Haney again interviewed 

Dean at the police station (“Interview #2”). Dean came to the interview 

knowing that he was going to take a polygraph examination. Detective 

Sergeant Scott Bryant (“Detective Bryant”) advised Dean of his rights, and 

Dean signed a waiver of rights. Dean also signed a consent to take a polygraph 

examination, which was administered by Detective Bryant. After the 

polygraph examination, Detective Bryant told Dean that he had failed the 
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polygraph examination. Dean later admitted to Detective Bryant that he had 

touched the front of A.C.’s pants over her clothing and said he did so in order 

to describe to her where she should not let little boys touch her. 

[7] After the polygraph examination, Detective Haney questioned Dean. Dean

told the detective that he had caught A.C. with her mother’s vibrator. He said 

because of that incident, he had touched the inside of A.C.’s pants at her 

waistline to instruct her where little boys should not touch her. Later in the 

interview, Dean admitted that he had once touched the inside of A.C.’s vagina 

with the tip of his pinky, and he drew on a diagram to show how far he had 

inserted his pinky. Dean then stated that he felt bad and wanted to “go through 

classes and shit.” (State’s Ex. 5). The detective agreed that Dean probably

needed some help or counseling. Detective Haney told Dean that he should 

write an apology letter to A.C. Dean agreed to do so but said he was not “book 

smart” or good at writing. (State’s Ex. 5). Dean then dictated a letter for A.C. 

to Detective Haney, and he signed the letter. In this letter, Dean stated as 

follows:

I’m sorry for what I did and it wasn’t meaning to happen like 

that. I love you and your sister to death and if we can get over 

this it will never happen again. I’m sorry about touching you on 

your private area (vagina), it will never happen again. I would 

like to start taking classes. Going through this is hurting your 

mom and your little brother. I just [l]ove you and your brother 

and sister dearly and [I]’m very sorry for doing it and it will never 

happen again.
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(State’s Ex. 8). Dean then told Detective Haney that he was already taking 

classes and had more scheduled. Dean asked the detective if he could go home, 

and the detective informed him that he could not because he had “made some 

admissions” and was in custody. (State’s Ex. 5). 

[8] Subsequently, the State charged Dean with Level 1 felony child molesting. In 

May 2016, Dean filed a motion to suppress his statements to Detective Haney 

during Interview #1 and his statements made to Detective Haney and Detective 

Bryan during Interview #2 and the polygraph examination. He contended that 

his statements were not voluntarily made and that he had made “a false 

confession” because the officers had made “explicit promises” that he would 

not be incarcerated but would just receive counseling. (App. Vol. 2 at 182). 

[9] In July 2016, the trial court held a hearing on Dean’s suppression motion. 

Dean argued that the two police interviews should be suppressed because the 

statements were involuntary and induced by the police making “express 

promises[.]” (Tr. Vol. 2 at 10). Dean acknowledged that Interview #1 did not 

contain a confession. He argued that the video of the polygraph examination 

that occurred during Interview #2 should not be shown the jury during the 

upcoming trial. The State agreed and indicated that it was not planning on 

presenting the video of the polygraph examination at trial and that it was going 

to redact any reference to the polygraph from the videotapes. Both parties 

agreed that the videos alone were sufficient for the trial court to decide whether 

Dean’s police statement was voluntary, and neither party presented witnesses. 
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At the end of the hearing, the trial court took the matter under advisement.2 

Thereafter, the trial court issued an order denying Dean’s motion to suppress

and ultimately found that Dean’s “confession [wa]s a product of rational 

intellect and not the result of promises or improper influence.” (App. Vol. 2 at 

169). Dean did not file appeal the denial of his suppression motion.

[10] The trial court held a four-day jury trial on February 21-24, 2017. On the first 

morning of trial, the State informed the trial court that Dean’s counsel intended 

to stipulate to the admission of the unredacted videos of his police statements 

(Interview #1 and Interview #2). Dean’s counsel confirmed that he “intend[ed] 

to ask that the unredacted statement be introduced” and that “obviously by 

stipulating to that, I don’t have an objection.” (Tr. Vol. 2 at 25). 

[11] Later in the pretrial discussions, when the parties were discussing the 

stipulation, Dean’s counsel stated that his “position [wa]s simply that [Dean]

w[ould] stipulate to the State introducing the video of Mr. Dean unredacted in 

complete form” and to include the video of the polygraph examination. (Tr. 

Vol. 2 at 33, 34). Dean’s counsel also explained that he was planning to ask the 

trial court for a limiting instruction to inform the jury that it should not consider 

 

2 During the hearing, the trial court suggested that Dean, not the State, had the burden of showing that his 

confession, which he sought to suppress, was involuntary. The trial court suggested that the burden was no 

longer on the State because Dean had signed a waiver of rights. When Dean disagreed, the trial court 

suggested that Dean had “a great issue for an appeal.” (Tr. Vol. 2 at 9). The State clarified that Dean’s 

waiver of rights form weighed in favor of determining that his statement was voluntary but was not the sole 

factor in determining the voluntariness. Additionally, the State informed the trial court that it agreed with 

Dean that the burden was on the State once Dean had asserted that his statement was involuntary.
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the police officers’ statement that Dean had failed the polygraph as evidence. 

Dean’s counsel explained his defense theory for the admission of the

unredacted police statements as follows:

I think that the entire film needs to be shown because we have an 

allegation that it was not voluntary and that it was a false 

confession and it was induced by a promise. And my client 

[Dean] is going to explain that. I don’t see how that point can be 

made without showing the entire video warts and all. And the 

fact that it contains a polygraph doesn’t bother me as long as the 

jury is instructed that they are not [to] consider it, and they’re not 

being advised whether he passed it or didn’t pass it, and that 

those results would not be reliable and [would] not be admissible 

anyway.

(Tr. Vol. 2 at 34).

[12] During opening statements, Dean’s counsel told the jury that it would be seeing 

the videotapes of Dean’s police interviews, including the polygraph 

examination. His counsel stated that Dean had told the police, during the 

interviews, that he had not touched A.C. and that Dean had only later admitted 

to touching her because the police had told him that he could get counseling. 

Dean’s counsel contended that Dean’s admission was a “false confession 

induced by trickery.” (Tr. Vol. 2 at 53). Additionally, Dean’s counsel told the 

jury that it would hear testimony from A.C. and from Dean and suggested that 

the jury would have to make its final determination based upon their 

testimonies. 
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[13] During the trial, A.C. testified that Dean, who watched her while her mother 

worked nights, had touched her vagina with his hands while her clothes were 

still on her and that he had “move[d] around” his hands while doing so. (Tr. 

Vol.3 at 18). She testified that he had touched her on the outside of her clothes 

and had also put his hands in her pants and underwear and had touched her 

“private part.” (Tr. Vol. 3 at 16). A.C. testified that Dean touched her “[o]n 

the outside” of her vagina and not the inside. (Tr. Vol. 3 at 20). Additionally, 

she testified that Dean told her not to tell anyone what he had done. 

[14] On the second day of the jury trial, before Detective Haney’s testimony, the 

State informed the trial court that the parties had reached an agreement on the 

stipulation for the admissibility of the videos of Dean’s two police interviews. 

Interview #1 was State’s Exhibit 3, and Interview #2 was State’s Exhibit 5. 

When the State moved to admit State’s Exhibit 3 into evidence during 

Detective Haney’s testimony, Dean’s counsel stated, “No objection, your 

Honor.” (Tr. Vol. 3 at 100). The trial court then read to the jury the parties’

stipulation, which provided as follows:

Comes now the State of Indiana . . . and the Defendant by 

counsel . . . and hereby stipulate and agree as follows:

1. That the Defendant, Jefferson Dean, submitted to a polygraph 

examination on November 17, 2015.

2. Detective Sergeant Scott Bryant administered the polygraph 

examination.
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3. Detective Sergeant Scott Bryant advised the Defendant of his 

Miranda rights prior to administering the polygraph 

examination.

4. The Defendant hereby waives his objection to the admission of 

evidence relating to his submission to the polygraph 

examination, the questions contained in the examination, the 

answers he gave to said questions, and the results of the 

examination.

5. The polygraph examination was audio and video-recorded on 

November 17, 2015.

6. The Defendant acknowledges his right to objection to the 

admission of this recording and specifically waives any objections to 

the contents of the recording being admitted, or that a proper 

foundation must be laid for the recording and stipulates to the 

admissibility of the recording.

7. The Defendant reserves the right to argue the voluntariness of 

his waiver of rights to participate in the polygraph examination 

to the jury as raised in his Motion to Suppress. Defendant 

acknowledges that the results of the polygraph will be admitted 

as part of the video recording and does not wish to have it 

redacted. The Defendant will supply an instruction to the Court 

indicating that the jury should not consider the polygrapher’s 

opinion of the test results as substantive evidence and the jury is 

to determine the truthfulness of the statements.

8. The Defendant further acknowledges and makes a record of 

the fact that there is a strategical trial tactic for agreeing to the 

admission and stipulation of the evidence related to the 

polygraph examination and wishes to have it presented to the 

jury in total.

(Tr. Vol. 3 at 100-02) (emphases added). After reading the stipulation, the trial 

court added, “That is the stipulation. So they’ve agreed that all this stuff is 
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admitted. What you do with that evidence is strictly up to you.” (Tr. Vol. 3 at 

102). 

[15] The State then played State’s Exhibit 3, the video of Interview #1, for the jury. 

Dean’s counsel then thoroughly cross-examined Detective Haney about 

Interview #1. Dean’s counsel questioned the detective about his interrogation 

techniques, including the use of deception, that he had used during Interview 

#1. Counsel also asked the detective multiple times whether Dean had been

free to leave the interview room, and the detective replied that he had been.

[16] On the beginning of the third day of trial, Dean—despite having stipulated to 

the admissibility of the recording of his police interviews—filed a “Renewal of 

Objection to Evidence and Motion for Instruction to Jury.” (App. Vol. 2 at 82). 

In his motion, Dean stated that he was “renew[ing] his objection to the 

introduction of videotapes of [his] interrogation by [O]fficers Haney and Bryant 

on the grounds that the statement taken from [Dean] was not voluntary and 

that it was induced by implicit promises of leniency.” (App. Vol. 2 at 82). The 

trial court discussed Dean’s motion with the parties outside the presence of the 

jury. The trial court, noting that Dean’s motion was the same “argument [he 

had] made for suppressing the statement in the first place[,]” denied Dean’s 

motion “based on [its] previous ruling.” (Tr. Vol. 4 at 4). The trial court, 

however, agreed that it would give Dean’s proposed limiting instruction, which 

provided that Dean’s statements in the videotape were admissible evidence and 

that the statements by the detectives were not to be considered as evidence. 

Dean’s counsel acknowledged that the trial court was finding that the police 
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statements were admissible, but he suggested that he was going to make an 

argument to the jury regarding the voluntariness of the police statements so that 

the jury could determine “the level of believability they treat the evidence.” (Tr. 

Vol. 4 at 5). The trial court agreed that Dean could argue about the weight of 

the police statements.

[17] Also that morning, while still outside the presence of the jury, the State, in an 

effort to “make a record[,]” reminded the trial court that the parties had entered 

a stipulation regarding the admissibility of State’s Exhibit 5, which contained 

Interview #2 and the polygraph examination. Dean’s counsel stated that he 

had “[n]o objection.” (Tr. Vol. 4 at 9). The trial court admitted State’s Exhibit 

5, stating that “Exhibit 5 [wa]s in.” (Tr. Vol. 4 at 9). Thereafter, Dean’s 

counsel stated, “Oh, wait. Except, of course, subject to my original objection 

about voluntariness.” (Tr. Vol. 4 at 9). The trial court reminded counsel that it 

had denied that objection and then stated: “There’s a new rule you don’t have 

to continue making objections. Do you know that? I’ve made a definitive 

ruling on that. It’s during trial. You don’t need to make another objection. I 

denied your motion.” (Tr. Vol. 4 at 9).3 

[18] Thereafter, the State called Detective Bryant as a witness. The detective

testified that he had administered a polygraph examination to Dean during his 

 

3 The “new rule” mentioned by the trial court would have been Indiana Evidence Rule 103(b), which 

provides that “[o]nce the court rules definitively on the record at trial a party need not renew an objection . . . 

to preserve a claim of error for appeal.” This rule became effective January 1, 2014.
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second interview with the police. When the State was ready to publish State’s 

Exhibit 5, the video of the polygraph examination from Interview #2, the State 

stated, “pursuant to the stipulation, your Honor, the State would move to 

publish the previously admitted State’s Exhibit No. 5.” (Tr. Vol. 4 at 19). The 

trial court then stated, “Mr. Lahey [Dean’s counsel], no objection I take it?” 

(Tr. Vol. 4 at 19). Dean’s counsel responded, “No objection.” (Tr. Vol. 4 at 

19). Before playing the video for the jury, the trial court gave Dean’s proposed 

limiting instruction, which provided as follows: 

You are about to be shown a videotape of an 

interrogation of Jefferson Dean by Detectives Haney 

and Bryant of the Special Victims Unit. What Jefferson 

Dean says in this videotape is admissible evidence and you 

may consider it like all other evidence you have heard in this 

trial. Statements by the Police Officers, however, were 

not given under oath, were not subject to cross 

examination and are not evidence. You may not 

consider those statements as evidence.

Specifically, you will hear Officer Bryant tell Mr. Dean 

that Officer Bryant determined that the polygraph 

indicated deception by Jefferson Dean in some of his 

answers. The fact that Jefferson Dean submitted to the 

Polygraph Examination is evidence and may be 

considered by you. However, Detective Bryant will not 

be permitted to testify in court about the results of this 

examination or whether they indicated deception or 

not. You may not consider any statements made by 

him in the videotape as evidence in this case. This 

includes any statement by Detective Bryant about his 

interpretation of polygraph results.
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(App. Vol. 2 at 82) (emphasis added). The trial court then played the polygraph 

examination portion of the video from State’s Exhibit 5. 

[19] When Detective Haney testified, the State then moved to publish the portion of 

the video from State’s Exhibit 5 that contained Dean’s interview with Detective 

Haney. Prior to playing the video, the State told the trial court, “Your Honor, 

pursuant to the previous stipulation, we’ll go ahead and just start the video.” 

(Tr. Vol. 4 at 28). The trial court replied, “Okay,” and Dean’s counsel made no 

comment. (Tr. Vol. 4 at 28). Then the State published the portion of the video 

where Dean had admitted to Detective Haney that he had touched A.C.’s 

private area. Thereafter, the State moved to admit State’s Exhibit 8, the 

dictated apology letter in which Dean admitted that he had touched A.C.’s 

vagina, and Dean’s counsel stated, “No objection.” (Tr. Vol. 4 at 29). 

[20] Dean testified on his own behalf and denied that he had molested A.C. He 

acknowledged that he had told Detective Haney that he had touched A.C. but 

claimed that he had done so because he “was scared of the outcome of what 

would happen if [he] didn’t admit to something that [he] didn’t do.” (Tr. Vol. 4 

at 74). Dean also testified that he had admitted touching A.C. only because he 

thought that he would just have to go to counseling. He believed that he would 

go to prison if he did not admit to touching her. 

[21] On cross-examination, Dean acknowledged that he had voluntarily talked to 

the police during Interview #1 and Interview #2. He also testified that he had 

voluntarily taken the polygraph examination. The State also had Dean clarify 
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that the police had never told him that he would get counseling without jail 

time if he admitted to his crime. 

[22] During closing arguments, Dean’s counsel reminded the jury of the limiting 

instruction that explained that Dean’s statements to police, which were 

contained in State’s Exhibit 5, were “admissible evidence[,]” but counsel argued 

that Dean’s confession to the police was a “false confession.” (Tr. Vol. 4 at 

112, 113, 116). Counsel also argued that the jury should not view Dean’s 

admission as a confession because he was “induced by promises” and subjected 

to “very aggressive” interrogation tactics. (Tr. Vol. 4 at 114, 116). Dean’s 

counsel suggested that Dean’s “claim that his confession was false” should 

“raise a reasonable doubt about whether [the jury] should accept his confession 

as true[.]” (Tr. Vol. 4 at 113). Additionally, his counsel asserted that the jury 

should find credibility in Dean’s testimony that he had “confessed only because 

. . . [he] thought that’s what [he] had to do and not because [he] had done it.” 

(Tr. Vol. 4 at 129). 

[23] As part of the final instructions given to the jury, the trial court gave 

instructions for the lesser-included offenses of Level 4 felony child molesting 

and Level 6 battery. The trial court also gave the two jury instructions 

regarding Dean’s argument about the voluntariness of his police statement. 

The jury found Dean guilty of the lesser-included offense of Level 4 felony child 

molesting. The trial court imposed a six (6) year sentence, with two (2) years 

executed and four (4) years suspended to probation. Dean now appeals.
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Decision

[24] On appeal, Dean does not challenge the actual admissibility of State’s Exhibit 

5, which included Dean’s statements to police and the polygraph examination 

from Interview #2. Indeed, he cannot do so because he stipulated to the 

admissibility of the exhibit as part of his defense strategy. Instead, he makes 

arguments that are tangential to the admission of State’s Exhibit 5. Specifically, 

he contends that the trial court used an improper standard of review when it 

ruled on his motion to suppress, and he makes general policy arguments 

regarding the propriety of deceptive tactics used by police interrogators.

[25] Because Dean is appealing following a conviction, we note that Dean’s first 

challenge regarding the trial court’s ruling on his motion to suppress would 

more appropriately be framed as whether the trial court properly admitted the 

evidence at trial. See Fry v. State, 25 N.E.3d 237, 241 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015), trans. 

denied. The admission and exclusion of evidence falls within the sound 

discretion of the trial court, and we review the admission of evidence only for 

an abuse of discretion. Wilson v. State, 765 N.E.2d 1265, 1272 (Ind. 2002). 

[26] However, as noted above, Dean stipulated to the admissibility of State’s Exhibit 

5 for defense strategy reasons. Indeed, Dean acknowledges that “the recording 

of [his] interrogation” was “admitted without objection” at trial and states that 

admission was “a matter of Defense trial tactics” as explained in the 

“stipulation presented to the jury.” (Dean’s Br. 8). In the parties’ stipulation, 

Dean “waive[d] any objection to the contents of the recording being admitted” 

and “stipulate[d] to the admissibility of the recording.” (Tr. Vol. 3 at 101). 
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Dean reserved his right to “argue the voluntariness” of his statements contained 

within the exhibit so that the “jury [could] determine the truthfulness of the 

statements.” (Tr. Vol. 3 at 101, 102). Dean’s counsel argued to the jury that 

they should put no weight into the credibility of Dean’s police statements and

should disregard them because they were not voluntarily made. The jury made 

its credibility determination, and we will not review or reweigh such a jury 

decision. See Drane v. State, 867 N.E.2d 144, 146 (Ind. 2007). Because Dean is 

appealing following a conviction, his argument regarding the trial court’s ruling 

on his motion to suppress is misplaced. Furthermore, he has waived any 

admission of evidence argument when he stipulated at trial to the admissibility 

of the exhibit that contained his police statement as part of a defense strategy. 

[27] Waiver notwithstanding, even if we were to construe Dean’s appellate 

arguments as a challenge to the admissibility of his statements in State’s Exhibit 

5 and he had not stipulated to the admissibility of the exhibit, any potential 

error in the admission of the statements would be harmless error because they 

were merely cumulative of other admitted evidence, including A.C.’s testimony 

and State’s Exhibit 8 (Dean’s apology letter in which he admitted that he had 

touched A.C.’s vagina). See Turner v. State, 953 N.E.2d 1039, 1059 (Ind. 2011) 

(holding that an improper admission of evidence is harmless error where the 

conviction is supported by “substantial independent evidence of guilt satisfying 

the reviewing court there is no substantial likelihood the challenged evidence 

contributed to the conviction”); King v. State, 985 N.E.2d 755, 759 n.4 (Ind. Ct. 
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App. 2013) (explaining that any error in the admission of evidence that is 

merely cumulative of other evidence admitted is harmless), trans. denied.

[28] We also note that Dean’s arguments regarding the propriety of deceptive tactics 

used by police interrogators merely equate to policy arguments and do not raise 

reviewable appellate issues. More specifically, Dean cites to Henry v. State, 738 

N.E.2d 663 (Ind. 2000), a case in which our Indiana Supreme Court stated that 

it did not condone deceptive police interrogation tactics, but it specifically 

refused to hold that such tactics would automatically render a confession 

inadmissible. Henry, 738 N.E.2d at 664. Instead, the Henry Court explained 

that such tactics “weigh[ed] heavily against the voluntariness of [a] defendant’s 

confession” and would be viewed as one of the factors under the “‘totality of 

the circumstances’ test” for determining the voluntariness of a confession. Id. at 

665. Dean also refers to Detective Haney’s cross-examination testimony that 

police officers are allowed to use deceit in a police interrogation and that 

caselaw had permitted such a practice. Dean contends that the detective’s 

testimony was “a crude and prejudicially misleading oversimplification[.]” 

(Dean’s Br. 10). 

[29] Dean does not challenge the admission of the detective’s testimony, nor could 

he, since the testimony was specifically elicited during Dean’s crossexamination of the detective. See Thacker v. State, 578 N.E.2d 784, 786 (Ind. Ct. 

App. 1991) (explaining that it is invited error for an appellant to elicit testimony 

from a witness on cross-examination and then claim error in the admission of 

the testimony on appeal); Kingery v. State, 659 N.E.2d 490, 494 (Ind. 1995) 
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(holding that “[i]nvited errors are not subject to appellate review”), reh’g denied. 

Instead, he “asserts that lies by police interrogators must be subjected to special 

analytical treatment, because they weigh heavily against the voluntariness of a 

confession, as held in the widely-ignored Henry v. State, 738 N.E.2d 663, 665 

(Ind. 2000).” (Dean’s Br. 6). Dean also suggests that the police, in general,

have disregarded the Indiana Supreme Court’s holding in Henry, and he asserts 

that this disregard has caused “a conflict between Judicial and Executive 

branches of government[,]” resulting in “a subject worthy of scholarly 

analysis[.]”). (Dean’s Br. 15). He further contends that Henry “should have a 

practical application to the tactics of police interrogators” and that “[t]he 

disregard of one arm of governance for the edicts of a powerful competing 

appendage” is “a subject begging review” and “is now presented to the Court 

for desperately-needed clarification.” (Dean’s Br. 6, 15). We decline Dean’s 

request to clarify or comment on the policy issues he has raised because we do 

“not render advisory opinions.” Reed v. State, 796 N.E.2d 771, 775 (Ind. Ct. 

App. 2003).

[30] Affirmed.

Riley, J., and Robb, J., concur.