J. A10014/17

2017 PA Super 415

WILLIAM C. ROVERANO AND : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

JACQUELINE ROVERANO, H/W : PENNSYLVANIA

:

v. :

:

JOHN CRANE, INC. AND BRAND :

INSULATIONS, INC. :

:

APPEAL OF: BRAND INSULATIONS, INC. :

: No. 2837 EDA 2016

Appeal from the Order July 27, 2016

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County 

Civil Division at No(s): No. 1123

WILLIAM C. ROVERANO : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

: PENNSYLVANIA

v. :

:

JOHN CRANE, INC., :

:

APPELLANT :

: No. 2847 EDA 2016

Appeal from the Order July 27, 2016 

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County 

Civil Division at No(s): March Term, 2014 No. 1123

 

BEFORE: DUBOW, J., SOLANO, J., and FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.

OPINION PER CURIAM: FILED DECEMBER 28, 2017

Appellants, John Crane, Inc., and Brand Insulations, Inc., appeal from 

the July 27, 2016 Order denying Post-Trial Motions and entering Judgment in 

favor of Appellees William and Jacqueline Roverano. We affirm in part, 

reverse in part, and remand for a new trial to apportion damages among the 

tortfeasors. 
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We briefly summarize the relevant facts, as gleaned from the certified 

record, as follows.

Appellee William Roverano was employed at PECO from 1971 until his 

retirement in 2001. As part of his employment, Mr. Roverano was exposed 

to a variety of asbestos products over a ten-year period from 1971 until 

1981. 

In November of 2013, Mr. Roverano was diagnosed with lung cancer in 

both lungs. Despite extensive treatment, his prognosis is poor.

On March 10, 2014, Mr. Roverano filed a Complaint against thirty 

named defendants, averring that exposure to asbestos products attributable 

to those defendants caused his lung cancer.1 In addition, Mrs. Roverano 

made a claim for loss of consortium.

Prior to trial, the trial court ruled that the Fair Share Act, 42 Pa.C.S. § 

7102, did not apply to asbestos cases. 

At trial, the parties presented evidence that focused primarily on 

Roverano’s exposure to Appellants’ products that contained asbestos and 

whether such exposure caused Roverano’s lung cancer. The thrust of 

Appellants’ defense was that it was Roverano’s history of smoking that 

caused his lung cancer and any exposure to Appellants’ products was 

insignificant and could not have caused his lung cancer. In contrast, 

 

1 More than a dozen of those named defendants had filed for bankruptcy. Of 

the remaining named defendants, all but Appellants Crane and Brand settled 

with the Roveranos prior to the jury’s verdict. 
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Appellees’ experts opined that it was both his smoking and the exposure to 

Appellants’ products that caused his lung cancer. 

After deliberating, the jury found in favor of Mr. and Mrs. Roverano 

and against the Appellants as well as six of the eight other defendants. The 

jury awarded $5,189,265 to Mr. Roverano and $1,250,000 to Mrs. Roverano. 

Appellants filed separate Motions for Post-Trial Relief. On July 27, 

2016, the trial court denied Appellants’ Motions and entered judgment in 

favor of the Roveranos. The trial court apportioned the judgment equally 

among the eight defendants whom the jury determined to be tortfeasors. In 

particular, the trial court entered separate judgments against Appellant 

Crane and Appellant Brand each in the amount of $648,858 plus $29,604 for 

delay damages for the verdict in favor of Mr. Roverano and $156,250 for the 

verdict in favor of Mrs. Roverano.

Appellants timely appealed. The trial court did not order, and 

Appellants did not file, a Statement of Errors Complained of on Appeal

pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b). 

Although Appellants have filed separate briefs, the issues raised are 

largely overlapping. We, therefore, paraphrase and re-number the collective 

issues Appellants raised as follows:2

 

2 Appellant Crane also argues in one paragraph that we should reverse the 

trial court because its errors are cumulative. Since Appellant does not 

develop this argument or cite any law or references to the record to support 

this argument, we find this argument waived. See J.J. DeLuca Co., Inc. v. 
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1. The trial court erred in defining “factual cause” in its 

instructions to the jury and in response to a written question 

from the jury.

2. The trial court erred by denying Appellant Crane’s proposed 

Verdict Form that addressed whether Roverano’s injuries were 

caused by exposure to asbestos, or, as Appellant Crane 

maintains, smoking. 

3. The trial court erred by failing to provide the jury a Verdict 

Form that allowed them to determine whether Appellant Crane’s 

packing was defective in the absence of a warning.

4. The trial court erred by allowing Roveranos’ experts to offer 

“each and every” or “whatever” asbestos exposure causation 

testimony in a case where Roverano did not have mesothelioma, 

asbestosis, or any other medical marker of asbestos exposure.

5. The trial court erred when it refused to mold the verdict to 

account for named-defendants Georgia Pacific Cement and 

Hajoca Corporation.

6. The trial court erred in failing to apply the Fair Share Act and 

erred specifically as follows:

A. The trial court should have required the jury to 

apportion liability among the alleged tortfeasors; and

B. The trial court should have included certain alleged 

tortfeasors on the verdict sheet, notwithstanding the fact 

that those alleged tortfeasors had filed for bankruptcy 

protection, or to mold the verdict to reflect settlement 

payments received from the bankruptcy estates of 

alleged tortfeasors

Appellant Crane’s Brief at p. 5-6; Appellant Brand’s Brief at p. 3.

 

Toll Naval Associates, 56 A.3d 402, 412 (Pa. Super. 2012) (citing 

Pa.R.A.P. 2119).
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Standard of Review

Our standard of review on appeal is a clear abuse of discretion or an 

error of law that controls the case: 

Our standard of review regarding a trial court's denial of a 

motion for a new trial is limited. The power to grant a new trial 

lies inherently with the trial court and we will not reverse its 

decision absent a clear abuse of discretion or an error of law 

which controls the outcome of the case.

Maya v. Johnson and Johnson, 97 A.3d 1203, 1224 (Pa. Super. 2014) 

(citation omitted). When determining whether the trial court committed an 

error of law controlling the outcome of the case, “our standard of review 

is de novo, and our scope of review is plenary.” Fizzano Bros. Concrete 

Prods., Inc. v. XLN, Inc., 42 A.3d 951, 960 (Pa. 2012). 

1. Factual Cause Jury Instructions

Appellants argue that the trial court erred in defining “factual cause” in 

its instructions to the jury and in response to a written question from the 

jury. In particular, Appellants argue that the “law requires a ‘but for’ 

causation standard for the definition of factual [causation], which was an 

error of law that controlled the outcome of the case.” Crane’s Brief at 30. 

This Court reviews a challenge to jury instructions under the following 

well-settled principles of Pennsylvania law.

[O]ur standard of review when considering the adequacy of jury

instructions in a civil case is to determine whether the trial court 
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committed a clear abuse of discretion or error of law controlling 

the outcome of the case. It is only when the charge as a whole is 

inadequate or not clear or has a tendency to mislead or confuse 

rather than clarify a material issue that error in a charge will be 

found to be a sufficient basis for the award of a new trial.

Further, a trial [court] has wide latitude in [its] choice of 

language when charging a jury, provided always that the court 

fully and adequately conveys the applicable law.

Phillips v. Lock, 86 A.3d 906, 916–917 (Pa. Super. 2014) (citation 

omitted).

In asbestos products liability cases, “Pennsylvania law requires that a 

plaintiff prove two elements: “that the product was defective, and that the 

defect was the substantial factor in causing the injury.” Rost v. Ford 

Motor Company, 151 A.3d 1032, 1037 n.2 (Pa. 2016) (citations omitted; 

emphasis added.). When a plaintiff was exposed to more than one product 

that contained asbestos, the jury, when applying the “substantial factor” 

test, should consider the “frequency, regularity and proximity” of the 

plaintiff’s exposure to each asbestos product. Gregg v. V-J Auto Parts 

Co., 943 A2d 216 (Pa. 2007). This assessment requires a “focus on the 

precise nature of plaintiff’s exposure to the defendant’s product, not on 

other asbestos containing product.” Rost, 151 A.3d at 1048 (emphasis in 

original).

When a jury focuses on the defendant’s product, the jury should 

consider the plaintiff’s exposure to each defendant’s product “was on the one 

hand, a substantial factor or a substantial cause or, on the other hand, 
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whether the defendant’s conduct was an insignificant cause or a negligible 

cause.” Id. at 1049 (quoting Ford v. Jeffries, 379 A.2d 111, 114 (Pa. 

1977)).

The Supreme Court concluded that it has never “insisted that a 

plaintiff exclude every other possible cause for his or her injury and in fact, 

we have consistently held that multiple substantial causes may combine and 

cooperate to produce the resulting harm to the plaintiff.” Rost, supra at 

1051. 

Finally, the Rost Court noted with approval the analysis in Tragarz v. 

Keene Corp., 980 F.2d 411 (7th Cir. 1992), adopted by Gregg, supra at

226, that rejected any notion that the test of “frequency, regularity and 

proximity” requires a comparative analysis of different exposures to 

asbestos and instead made clear that the focus must be on the level of 

exposure to the defendant’s product. Rost, supra at 1050 n.13. Using this 

analysis, our Supreme Court rejected a “but for” causation analysis. 

Suppose a plaintiff shows that the amount of exposure that it 

received from defendant’s A’s asbestos product was alone 

sufficient to cause mesothelioma. If such a plaintiff was not 

exposed to any other products, the plaintiff would have sufficient 

evidence to support a finding that but for exposure to the 

defendant A’s product, the plaintiff would not have gotten ill. On 

the other hand, under a [comparative approach], if the plaintiff 

was exposed to numerous other asbestos products, the plaintiff 

might not be able to prove cause in fact in a suit against 

defendant A because the same exposure to defendant A’s 

product might not be substantial in comparison to the exposure 

to the other products. Such a result does not promote the 

purposes of the substantial factor test, which is aimed at 
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alleviating the inequities that result when applying the but for 

test in a multi-defendant case, not at creating such inequities.

Id., quoting Tragarz, 980 F.2d at 425 (emphasis omitted). 

Based on our review of the foregoing precedential authority, we 

conclude that the trial court in the instant case properly rejected Appellant’s 

request for a “but for causation” jury charge. The Pennsylvania Supreme 

Court has clearly rejected such a standard for causation and requires, when 

addressing a situation in which a plaintiff is exposed to more than one 

asbestos containing products, that the jury determine whether the plaintiff’s 

exposure to each defendant’s product was “frequent, regular and proximate” 

to determine whether such exposure was a substantial factor in causing the 

plaintiff’s injury. 

 Appellants further argue that the “trial court’s instruction did not 

provide a sufficient and correct legal basis to guide the jury.” Crane’s Brief at 

33. 

First, while explaining the Verdict Sheet, the court stated:

The first question I said deals with exposure to the particular 

product of the defendant. Now, these are the elements the 

plaintiff has to prove that exposure. Number one, was the 

plaintiff exposed to the product of the defendant, did it contain 

asbestos, was the plaintiff exposed to the asbestos fibers of that 

particular defendant on a regular frequent and proximate basis.

Now, the second question deals with whether these products 

manufactured, distributed, or supplied by the individual 

defendants was a factual cause in bringing about the plaintiff’s 

lung cancer. In other words, did this exposure, if you find it, was 

it a factual cause in bringing about his lung cancer, did the 
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plaintiff suffer from an asbestos-related disease, the lung cancer, 

that is, was it caused by the exposure.

N.T., 4/13/16, at 336-37; RR 687a. 

After the attorneys made their closing arguments, the court explained 

to the jury the need for Mr. Roverano to establish that he was exposed to 

the asbestos fibers that Appellants had manufactured, distributed or supplied 

on a “regular, frequent and proximate basis.” N.T. at 122; RR. 709a. The 

court then instructed the jurors on the definition of factual cause as:

And here the question is, were the asbestos products 

manufactured, distributed or supplied by that particular 

defendant, John Crane, Brand Insulation, you discuss these 

separately, was it a factual cause in bringing about lung cancer.

In short, did the plaintiff suffer from an asbestos-related disease, 

that is, was the lung cancer an asbestos-related disease.

Now, what do I mean by factual cause? Well, you imagine with 

lawyers and with judges there’s been a lot of discussion as to 

what do we mean by factual cause. I used to use the word 

substantial factor. I think they mean the same, but today we’re 

using factual cause.

Factual cause is a legal cause. In order for the plaintiff to recover 

in this case, the exposure to the defendant’s asbestos products 

must have been a factual cause in bringing about his lung 

cancer. This is what the law recognizes as a legal cause.

A factual cause is an actual real factor, although the result may 

be unusual or unexpected, but it is not an imaginary or fanciful 

factor or a factor having no connection or only an insignificant 

connection with Mr. Roverano’s lung cancer.

N.T. at 118-19; RR at 708a.

By instructing the jury that Mr. Roverano must establish that his 

exposure was regular, frequent, and proximate and such exposure was a 
J. A10014/17

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substantial cause of plaintiff’s lung cancer, the trial court “fully and 

adequately convey[ed] the applicable law.” Philips, 86 A.3d at 916-17. 

We, thus, conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion or commit an 

error of law. 

Appellants also argue that the trial court erred in responding to the 

jury’s question regarding the definition of “factual” cause. Crane’s Brief at 

34; Brand’s Brief at 29. In response to the question, the trial court charged 

the jury correctly by instructing the jury that factual cause is “legal cause, 

sometime referred to as substantial factor:”

Factual cause is a legal cause, sometimes referred to as substantial 

factor, but it’s the same—in my opinion they’re the same definition, 

so I’m going to give you the definition of factual cause as a legal 

cause.

In order for the plaintiff to recover in this case, the exposure to 

defendant’s products based on the elements that I gave you must 

have been a substantial—must have been a factual cause in bringing 

about Mr. Roverano, the plaintiff’s lung cancer. This what the law 

recognizes as legal cause.

A factual cause is a real actual-a factual cause is an actual real 

factor, although the result may be unusual or expected, but it is not 

an imaginary or fanciful factor or a factor having no connection or 

only an insignificant connection with the lung cancer.

Keep in mind you could have more than one cause which is a factual 

cause, but that’s for you to decide. If you’ve got a couple of causes 

and you say one is not a factual cause and one is, the it can only be 

the one that you find the factual cause, but you can find that both 

were factual cause. That’s up to you. You’re the factfinders. 

N.T. at 136-37; RR 712a. 
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Appellants contend that the court’s response to the jury’s inquiry 

was improper because it “changed [the jury’s] mind.” Crane’s Brief at 37; 

see also Brand’s Brief at 32-33. The trial court properly instructed the 

jurors on the law. It is for the jurors to apply the law and determine 

liability. We can only focus on the trial court’s instruction to the jury and 

not speculation about the timing of the jury’s verdict. 

2. Causation Question on Verdict Sheet

Appellant Crane argues that a principal theory of Appellants’ defense 

“was that Mr. Roverano’s lung cancer was not caused by his exposure to 

asbestos at all; rather [the cancer,] along with his emphysema and COPD, 

was caused by his extensive smoking history.” Crane’s Brief at 29. 

Appellant contends that by denying a specific question on the Verdict Sheet 

reflecting this theory, the trial court precluded Appellant Crane from 

presenting this theory to the jury. Id. 

This is a challenge to the trial court’s discretion in fashioning questions 

on the Verdict Sheet and we review such challenges for an abuse of 

discretion. “An abuse of discretion is more than just an error of judgment 

and, on appeal, a trial court will not be found to have abused its discretion 

unless the record discloses that the judgment exercised is manifestly 

unreasonable, or the result of partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will.” 

Commonwealth v. Lane, 424 A.2d 1325, 1328 (Pa. 1981) (citation and 

internal quotation marks omitted).
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Appellant Crane argues that the trial court should have specifically 

included a question on the Verdict Sheet about whether smoking caused Mr. 

Roverano's lung cancer.

The questions on the Verdict Sheet were as follows: 

1. “Was the Plaintiff, Mr. Roverano, exposed to asbestos products 

manufactured, distributed or supplied by Defendant, John Crane, 

Inc.

2. Were the asbestos products manufactured, distributed, or supplied 

by John Crane, Inc, a factual cause in bring about the Plaintiff’s 

lung cancer.”

RR 1058a-1059a (emphasis added.). 

In explaining the second question, the trial court instructed the jury, 

inter alia: “In other words, did this exposure if you find it, did the plaintiff 

suffer from an asbestos-related disease, the lung cancer, that is was it 

caused by the exposure.” N.T., 4/13/16, at 37; RR 687a.

The purpose of the Verdict Sheet is to provide a general guidepost to 

the jury of the general issues the jury must decide. It is not to reflect either 

party’s specific theories. 

In this case, the second question about factual cause on the Verdict 

Sheet required the jury to consider whether it was smoking that caused Mr. 

Roverno’s lung cancer. If the jury had found that it was smoking that had 

caused Mr. Roverano's lung cancer, the jury would have answered “no” to 

the second question. 
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Therefore, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion 

by denying Appellant’s request to include a question on the Verdict Sheet 

that reflected its theory of the case. 

3. “Unreasonably Dangerous” Question on Verdict Sheet

Appellant Crane also argues that the trial court erred by failing to 

provide the jury a question on the Verdict Sheet asking the jury whether 

Crane’s asbestos products were “unreasonably dangerous” and thus, 

defective. 

The trial court rejected Crane’s request for such a question because 

“the issue in this case was one of exposure and causation, not an issue of 

the defect of the product.” Trial Ct. Op., dated 7/25/15, at 6. The trial 

court further noted that “neither defendant disputed that their products 

contained asbestos without proper warnings. Their defenses were based on 

the fact that the exposure to their products was minimal at best or, as with 

Crane, encapsulated.” Id. The trial court concluded that “[a] question 

about defect was irrelevant.” Id. at 7.

We agree with the trial court’s conclusions that the trial was primarily 

focused on exposure and causation. Appellant did not dispute that its 

product contained asbestos. As discussed above, the questions on the 

Verdict Sheet are to provide generalized guideposts to the jurors. To add a 

question about defect when the parties did not present evidence on the issue 
J. A10014/17

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or argue about it in their opening or closing statements would have confused 

the jury. 

Moreover, the trial court properly relied upon the analysis in Moore v. 

Ericsson, 7 A.3d 820 (Pa. Super. 2010), in which this Court noted with 

approval the trial court’s determination as a matter of law that wire and 

cable containing asbestos was defective. See id. at 826. 

As the trial judge stated, the issue was not whether a product 

was defective because it contained asbestos; “instead, the trial 

issues, and therefore the factual issues remaining for the jury 

were limited to whether the Defendant's particular product 

contained asbestos, whether the Plaintiff was exposed to it, and 

whether such exposure caused Plaintiff's mesothelioma.” We find 

no error or abuse of discretion.

Id. (citing Trial Court Opinion).

As the trial court in the instant case noted, “neither defendant 

disputed that their products contained asbestos without proper warnings.” 

Trial Ct. Op. at 6. Therefore, the trial court properly rejected Appellant 

Crane’s request that the Verdict Sheet contain a question about whether the 

asbestos was unreasonably dangerous and limited the questions on the 

Verdict Sheet to whether Appellee was exposed to the defendant’s asbestos 

and whether that exposure caused his lung cancer.

4. “Each and Every” Exposure Testimony

Appellant Crane argues that the trial court erred by allowing 

Roveranos’ experts to offer evidence that “each and every” or “whatever” 
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asbestos exposure caused Mr. Roverano’s injury where Mr. Roverano did not 

have mesothelioma, asbestosis, or any other marker of asbestos exposure. 

We disagree with Appellant Crane’s characterization of the expert 

testimony of the Roveranos. A review of the entire testimony of the 

Roverano experts demonstrates that Roveranos' experts did not testify that 

it was a single exposure to the Appellants' products that caused Mr. 

Roverano's lung cancer; rather, that it was multiple exposures that were a 

substantial factor in causing Roverano’s lung cancer. 

For instance, Dr. Frank testified at length that both smoking and 

regular, proximate, and frequent exposure to asbestos in Appellant Crane’s 

products caused Mr. Roverano’s lung cancer. Dr. Frank first testified about 

general causation:

Cigarette smoking causes lung cancer. Asbestos exposure causes 

lung cancer. When you put the two together, is there some 

interaction between the two that increases the possibility of 

getting lung cancer, and the answer is yes. And there are 

numbers on this and it varies depending on which study you look 

at which time...So there is what we call a multiplicative or 

synergistic response. And again other studies vary by what that 

number. Some are higher, some are lower, but it more than 

simply an additive effect when you put the two together.

N.T., 4/7/16, at 36-38; RR. 533a-34a. 

Dr. Frank later provided testimony regarding specific causation by 

testifying that based upon Mr. Roverano’s testimony of his regular, 

proximate, and frequent exposure to Appellant Crane’s asbestos products, 

that, to a degree of medical certainty, 
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whatever exposure Mr. Roverano had to John Crane packing 

products as described in the hypothetical would have been a 

substantial contributing cause or would have been a factual 

cause of his lung cancer and would have added to his total 

exposures, were part of his cumulative exposure and therefore 

are part of what caused his lung cancer.” 

N.T., at 63; RR R540a.3

Dr. Frank did not base his conclusions on the premise that Mr. 

Roverano had a single exposure to asbestos. In fact, Appellant Crane failed 

to point to testimony of any expert who based his opinion on the premise of 

a single exposure.

Appellant Crane argues that the trial court should have precluded the 

Roverano’s experts’ opinions because they failed to provide “any serious 

assessment of the causal attribution by assessing the frequency, regularity 

and proximity of Mr. Roverano’s exposure to JCI’s products.” Appellant 

Crane’s Brief, at 40, citing Rost, supra. By characterizing the experts’

testimony as lacking “any serious assessment,” Crane’s averment challenges 

the weight, not the admissibility, of the evidence. 

It is within the province of the jury to determine the weight to give the 

evidence and this Court will not disturb the fact-finder’s weight 

 

3 Dr. Frank also opined that “the Brand Insulation materials to which Mr. 

Roverano was exposed to were a factual cause and contributed to his 

developing his lung cancer. The basis of that is the same, that it’s part of 

his cumulative exposure, it added to his risk, and when he got the disease, 

you have to say it was one of the factors that contributed to the totality of 

his dose which ended up giving his lung cancer.” N.T., 4/7/16, at 67; RR. 

541a.
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determination. See Commonwealth v. Champney, 832 A.2d 403, 408 (Pa. 

2003) (noting that “the weight of the evidence is exclusively for the finder of 

fact” and “an appellate court cannot substitute its judgment for that of the 

finder of fact.”). Accordingly, we will not disturb the factfinder’s weight 

determination.

Appellant also avers that “the Plaintiff’s experts’ testimony should 

additionally have been barred because this is not a mesothelioma case.” 

Crane’s Brief at 43. Again, Crane’s argument pertains to the weight, not the 

admissibility, of the evidence. 

Appellants presented evidence that asbestos exposure can only cause 

mesothelioma,4 and argued that because Mr. Roverano developed lung 

cancer, it had demonstrated that it was not asbestos that caused his lung 

cancer. However, Dr. Frank testified on this general causation factor and 

concluded that exposure to asbestos can cause lung cancer. Dr. Gelfand 

also testified that, based on the medical literature and his experience, Mr. 

Roverano’s exposure to asbestos was a “substantial contributing factor to his 

lung cancer and to his poor prognosis for survival.” See Crane Brief at 16-

17, citing N.T. at RR 540a, 765a.

Appellant Crane essentially argues that because the jury believed the 

Roveranos' experts and not the Appellants' experts on the question of 

 

4 Mesothelioma is a cancer of the lining of the lungs. Gregg v. V-J Auto 

Parts Co., 943 A.2d 216, 217 (Pa. 2007).
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general causation, the court erred in permitting the experts to testify. We 

decline to disturb jury’s weight determination.

5. Molding the Verdict to Include Non-Liable Defendants

Georgia Pacific Cement and Hajoca Corporation were both included on 

the Verdict Sheet, and the jury was specifically instructed to determine 

whether either named defendant “manufactured, distributed, or supplied” 

products which “were factual causes in bringing about Plaintiff’s lung 

cancer.” Jury Verdict – Questions to be Answered by the Jury, filed 4/15/16, 

at 3. After hearing the evidence presented at trial, the jury found that 

Georgia Pacific Cement and Hajoca Corporation were not liable for the harm 

to Appellees. Id.

In light of the fact that the jury did not find that Georgia Pacific 

Cement and Hajoca Corporation to be tortfeasors,5the trial court did not err 

in refusing to mold the verdict to include them.

6. Fair Share Act

Appellants contend that the trial court erred as a matter of law by 

refusing to apply the Fair Share Act, 42 Pa.C.S. § 7102(a.1)-(a.2), to this 

case because the litigation involves exposure to asbestos. They argue that 

 

5

In light of our holding in the next section that finds that it is a jury who 

must apportion liability among tortfeasors, we note that since the jury did 

not find Georgia Pacific Cement and Hajoca Corporation to be tortfeasors, 

they should not be included in a jury determination apportioning damages 

among tortfeasors. See note 11, infra.
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the Roveranos’ claim falls within the ambit of the Act and that nothing in the 

plain language of the Act supports the trial court’s decision to exempt 

asbestos litigation from the Act’s requirements. We agree.6

Statutory interpretation is a question of law. Therefore, our standard 

of review is de novo, and our scope of review is plenary. Commonwealth 

v. Hall, 80 A.3d 1204, 1211 (Pa. 2013). “In all matters involving statutory 

interpretation, we apply the Statutory Construction Act, 1 Pa.C.S. § 1501 et 

seq., which provides that the object of interpretation and construction of

statutes is to ascertain and effectuate the intention of the General 

Assembly.” Commonwealth v. McCoy, 962 A.2d 1160, 1166 (Pa. 2009) 

(citation omitted). 

Generally, a statute’s plain language provides the best indication of 

legislative intent. In re Trust of Taylor, 164 A.3d 1147, 1155 (Pa. 2017). 

We will look beyond the plain language of the statute only when the words 

are unclear or ambiguous, see id., or the plain meaning would lead to “a 

 

6 Application of the Fair Share Act to strict liability cases involving asbestos 

exposure is a question of first impression in this Court. Appellants argue 

that dicta in Rost 151 A.3d at 1044 n.7, another case dealing with personal 

injuries caused by exposure to asbestos, establishes that the Act applies to 

these cases. The cited footnote in Rost discussed policy issues underlying 

some of the Supreme Court’s decisions regarding liability from asbestos 

exposure, including issues stemming from application of joint and several 

liability, and then added: “Pennsylvania has now eliminated joint and 

several liability in most cases through amendment of the Fair Share Act.” 

This sentence is a far cry from a clear statement about the statute’s 

application to asbestos cases, and, although we address this issue mindful of 

the Supreme Court’s guidance in Rost, we do not find the footnote 

determinative.
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result that is absurd, impossible of execution or unreasonable.” 1 Pa.C.S. § 

1922(1). Therefore, when ascertaining the meaning of a statute, if the 

language is clear, we give the words their plain and ordinary meaning. Hall, 

80 A.3d at 1211.

The Fair Share Act was enacted in 2011 as an amendment to the 

section of the Judicial Code, 42 Pa. C.S. § 7102, that had provided for 

comparative negligence. See Act No. 2011-17, P.L. 778 (June 28, 2011). It 

replaced subsection (b) of that statute with two new subsections:

(a.1) Recovery against joint defendant; contribution. —

(1) Where recovery is allowed against more than one 

person, including actions for strict liability, and where liability is 

attributed to more than one defendant, each defendant shall be 

liable for that proportion of the total dollar amount awarded as 

damages in the ratio of the amount of that defendant’s liability 

to the amount of liability attributed to all defendants and other 

persons to whom liability is apportioned under subsection (a.2). 

(2) Except as set forth in paragraph (3), a defendant’s 

liability shall be several and not joint, and the court shall enter a 

separate and several judgment in favor of the plaintiff and 

against each defendant for the apportioned amount of that 

defendant’s liability. 

(3) A defendant’s liability in any of the following actions 

shall be joint and several, and the court shall enter a joint and 

several judgment in favor of the plaintiff and against the 

defendant for the total dollar amount awarded as damages: 

(i) Intentional misrepresentation.

(ii) An intentional tort.

(iii) Where the defendant has been held liable for 

not less than 60% of the total liability apportioned to all 

parties. 
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(iv) A release or threatened release of a hazardous 

substance under section 702 of the act of October 18, 

1988 (P.L. 756, No. 108), known as the Hazardous 

Sites Cleanup Act. 

(v) A civil action in which a defendant has violated 

section 497 of the act of April 12, 1951 (P.L. 90, No. 

21), known as the Liquor Code. 

(4) Where a defendant has been held jointly and severally 

liable under this subsection and discharges by payment more 

than that defendant’s proportionate share of the total liability, 

that defendant is entitled to recover contribution from 

defendants who have paid less than their proportionate share. 

Further, in any case, any defendant may recover from any other 

person all or a portion of the damages assessed that defendant 

pursuant to the terms of a contractual agreement. 

(a.2) Apportionment of responsibility among certain 

nonparties and effect. — For purposes of apportioning liability 

only, the question of liability of any defendant or other person 

who has entered into a release with the plaintiff with respect to 

the action and who is not a party shall be transmitted to the trier 

of fact upon appropriate requests and proofs by any party. A 

person whose liability may be determined pursuant to this 

section does not include an employer to the extent that the 

employer is granted immunity from liability or suit pursuant to 

the act of June 2, 1915 (P.L. 736, No. 338), known as the 

Workers’ Compensation Act. An attribution of responsibility to 

any person or entity as provided in this subsection shall not be 

admissible or relied upon in any other action or proceeding for 

any purpose. Nothing in this section shall affect the admissibility 

or nonadmissibility of evidence regarding releases, settlements, 

offers to compromise or compromises as set forth in the 

Pennsylvania Rules of Evidence. Nothing in this section shall 

affect the rules of joinder of parties as set forth in the 

Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure.

42 Pa. C.S. § 7102(a.1)-(a.2). The Act applies to claims that accrued after 

June 28, 2011, and the parties agree that the Roveranos’ claims did not 

accrue before that time.
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One of the main purposes of the Fair Share Act was to make joint and 

several liability inapplicable to most tort cases. The statute accomplished 

that objective in subsection (a.1)(2), which states that, apart from a limited 

class of excepted cases, “a defendant’s liability shall be several and not joint, 

and the court shall enter a separate and several judgment in favor of the 

plaintiff and against each defendant for the apportioned amount of that 

defendant’s liability.” The Act’s lengthy other provisions make clear, 

however, that the statute is not limited only to restricting joint and several 

liability. Rather, insofar as is relevant here, the Act also made several 

adjustments to the rules for allocating liability among joint tortfeasors. 

Before enactment of the Fair Share Act, the Comparative Negligence 

Act provided for proportionate recovery against negligent joint tortfeasors 

according to a percentage determination that was made by the fact-finder:

Where recovery is allowed against more than one defendant, 

each defendant shall be liable for that proportion of the total 

dollar amount awarded as damages in the ratio of the amount of 

his causal negligence to the amount of causal negligence 

attributed to all defendants against whom recovery is allowed. 

. . .

42 Pa. C.S. § 7102(b) (deleted 2011); see Embrey v. Borough of West 

Mifflin, 390 A.2d 765, 769 (Pa. Super. 1978) (role of jury in allocating 

liability). Liability among joint tortfeasors who were strictly liable was not 

covered by the statute and, under court decisions, was calculated on a per 
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capita7 basis — that is, if five defendants were found strictly liable, each 

would be allocated 20% of the liability regardless of how much each 

defendant’s conduct contributed to the injury. See Baker v. ACandS, 755 

A.2d 664, 669 (Pa. 2000); Walton v. Avco Corp., 610 A.2d 454, 462 (Pa. 

1992). 

One of the new Fair Share Act provisions enacted to replace Section 

7102(b) was Section 7102(a.1)(1), which employed language similar to that 

in Section 7102(b), but applied it to both negligent and strictly liable joint 

tortfeasors:

Where recovery is allowed against more than one person, 

including actions for strict liability, and where liability is 

attributed to more than one defendant, each defendant shall be 

liable for that proportion of the total dollar amount awarded as 

damages in the ratio of the amount of that defendant’s liability 

to the amount of liability attributed to all defendants and other 

persons to whom liability is apportioned under subsection (a.2).

42 Pa. C.S. § 7102(a.1)(1). A principal question in this case is whether, and 

to what extent, this provision changed the way to allocate liability among 

strictly liable joint tortfeasors.

Prior to trial, several defendants, including Brand and Crane, filed a 

motion in limine seeking a ruling that their liability, if any, would be 

apportioned by the jury according to the extent to which each defendant 

 

7 Consistent with some of the case law, Appellees call this a “pro rata” 

allocation. Appellants use “per capita,” and that term provides a clearer 

description of the result. The different terminology does not imply any 

substantive difference in the way liability was determined.
J. A10014/17

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caused harm to Mr. Roverano. The court heard argument on that motion on 

April 5, 2016, and summarized the motion as follows:

[W]hat you’re saying is that you want an apportionment —

rather than per capita, you want an apportionment instruction to 

the jury and you want the jury to actually apportion the share of 

liability if they reach that issue.

Tr., 4/5/16, at 9. The court then explained why it would deny the motion:

Here is my difficult[y] with this and why I’ve denied it in the past 

and I will here and you all have an exception, is that all of the 

testimony I’ve ever heard in asbestos, no one quantifies it. They 

say that you can’t quantify it. If you can’t quantify it, how can 

the Fair Share Act apply?

Id. at 9-10. After a discussion during which defense counsel proposed 

possible ways of proving an allocation, the trial court reiterated that the 

motion in limine was denied. Id. at 10-16. In its post-trial opinion, the trial 

court stated that it “properly denied [Appellants’] motion to apply the Fair 

Share Act to this case” because the jury was not presented with evidence 

that would permit an apportionment to be made by it. Trial Ct. Op., 

7/27/15, at 9-10.

In holding that the Fair Share Act did not “apply” to this case, the trial 

court erred. This was an action to hold Appellants strictly liable in tort for 

injuries allegedly caused by asbestos-containing products that they made or 

distributed, and the Fair Share Act explicitly applies to tort cases in which 

“recovery is allowed against more than one person, including actions for 

strict liability.” 42 Pa. C.S. § 7102(a.1)(1) (emphasis added). Nothing in 

the statute makes an exception for strict liability cases involving asbestos. 
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Rather, Section 7102(a.1)(3) excepts only four specific kinds of tort actions 

— intentional misrepresentation, other intentional torts, certain 

environmental cases, and dram shop actions — and cases involving asbestos 

are not among them.

The Roveranos contend that Section 7102(a.1)(1)’s reference to strict 

liability actions was intended only to make clear that the Act’s abrogation of 

joint and several liability applies to such cases. They contend that the Act is 

silent on how liability among strictly liable joint tortfeasors is to be 

apportioned, and that this silence means that apportionment may continue 

to be done in the same way as it was done before the statute’s enactment —

on a per capita basis. In support of this argument, they point out that 

Section 7102(a.1)(1) says only that each joint tortfeasor’s liability shall 

equal “that proportion of the total dollar amount awarded as damages” that 

is calculated by determining “the ratio of the amount of that defendant’s 

liability” to the total liability of all defendants. The Act does not specify how 

that ratio is to be determined, and therefore, they contend, the rule of per 

capita apportionment applicable before the Fair Share Act’s enactment 

remains unchanged. We disagree. Rather, by explicitly making strictly 

liable joint tortfeasors subject to the same liability allocation section as that 

applicable to negligent joint tortfeasors, the Legislature made clear that it 

intended for liability to be allocated in the same way for each.
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The fact that the Fair Share Act does not explicitly say how to allocate 

liability among strictly liable joint tortfeasors just means that the statute is 

ambiguous on that issue, not that the statute does not address it. See In 

re Trust of Taylor, 164 A.3d at 1156 (a statute is ambiguous if it does not 

“contain[] any explicit language addressing the issue raised”). The statute is 

silent on the manner of calculating the ratio for all kinds of tort cases, not 

just strict liability cases. Any suggestion that the silence has special 

meaning for strict liability cases therefore is unfounded. There is nothing in 

the statute to suggest that the Legislature intended the ratio under Section 

7102(a.1)(1) to be calculated one way for negligent tortfeasors and a 

different way for those strictly liable. Rather, the similarity between the 

language of former Section 7102(b) and new Section 7102(a.1)(1) suggests 

that the Legislature intended that the allocation method applicable to 

negligence cases was merely being expanded to apply to strict liability cases 

too. The “including actions for strict liability” clause in Section 7102(a.1)(1) 

supports this conclusion; this clause suggests that the allocations of liability 

that had been done by a jury in negligence cases now would “include” strict 

liability cases as well.

The Legislature’s placement of the “including actions for strict liability” 

clause is revealing. If, as Appellees suggest, the Legislature intended only 

to make clear that the abrogation of joint and several liability applied to 

strict liability actions, it would have added that clause to Section 
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7102(a.1)(2), which abrogates joint and several liability. Instead, the 

Legislature added that clause to Section 7102(a.1)(1), which deals with 

allocation of liability among joint tortfeasors. By doing so, the Legislature 

clearly intended to make a change in the allocation rules that applied before 

the Fair Share Act’s enactment, which called for a fact-based allocation in 

negligence cases and a per capita allocation in strict liability cases. If the 

Legislature did not intend to change those rules, there would be no reason to 

add the “including actions for strict liability clause” to Section 7102(a.1)(1). 

A comparison of Section 7102(a.1)(1) to the language of Section 

7102(b) that it replaced shows that the Legislature accomplished its 

objective by changing the allocation components from —

the amount of [the tortfeasor’s] causal negligence to the 

amount of causal negligence attributed to all defendants against 

whom recovery is allowed

to —

the amount of that defendant’s liability to the amount of liability 

attributed to all defendants and other persons to whom liability 

is apportioned. 

The inclusion of strict liability cases obviously accounts for the Legislature’s 

replacement of “causal negligence” with “liability.” Because this was the 

only change relevant to this issue that the Legislature made to its allocation 

formula,8this comparison again supports the view that the Legislature 

 

8 The Legislature also added the phrase, “and other persons to whom liability 

is apportioned,” which we discuss below.
J. A10014/17

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intended allocation of liability under Section 7102(b) to carry over under the 

new statute and to apply to strict liability cases in the same way as it had 

been done previously under the comparative negligence statute.9

The structure and context of the Fair Share Act as a whole thus 

support the view that Section 7102(a.1)(1) reflects the Legislature’s 

intention to have a fact-finder allocate liability among joint tortfeasors in all 

types of cases, including strict liability cases. This conclusion is confirmed 

by the statute’s history. See 1 Pa. C.S. § 1921(c)(7) (“When the words of a 

statute are not explicit, the intention of the General Assembly may be 

 

9 This case does not require us to opine on the factors that should be 

considered in allocating liability among strictly liable tortfeasors under 

Section 7102(a.1)(1). Prior law prohibited a fault-based allocation because 

of a desire in product liability actions at that time to “fortif[y] the theoretical 

dam between the notions of negligence and strict ‘no fault’ liability,” 

Walton, 610 A.2d at 462, but that dam was cracked in Tincher v. Omega 

Flex, Inc., 104 A.3d 328, 376-81, 399-406 (Pa. 2014) (discussing and 

rejecting prior law’s effort to completely divorce negligence and strict liability 

concepts). Even if there were still some reason to avoid a fault-based 

allocation method, it is not apparent on this record why liability among 

strictly liable tortfeasors may not be allocated by a jury without 

consideration of wrongdoing. A court may apportion liability when it is able 

to identify “a reasonable basis for determining the contribution of each cause 

to a single harm.” Restatement (Second) of Torts § 433A(1) (1965); see 

Martin v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp., 528 A.2d 947, 949 (Pa. 

1987). Brand suggests that liability could have been apportioned here 

according to the amount of Mr. Roverano’s potential exposure to each 

defendant’s product. Brand’s Br. at 19-20. Crane makes a similar argument 

that would factor in the potency of the type of asbestos to which Mr. 

Roverano was exposed (chrysotile versus amphibole). Crane’s Br. at 45-46. 

These causation-based arguments clearly suggest bases for apportionment 

apart from fault. Their reasonableness is for the trial court to determine in 

the first instance, and the weight of their supporting evidence is a matter for 

the jury.
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ascertained by considering, among other matters . . . [t]he 

contemporaneous legislative history”). 

The Act was a reenactment of substantially identical legislation 

enacted in 2002 that was later declared invalid because it was part of a bill 

addressing multiple subjects in violation of Article 3, Section 3 of the 

Pennsylvania Constitution. See Fair Share Act of 2002, Act No. 2002-57, 

P.L. 394 (June 19, 2002), held invalid in DeWeese v. Weaver, 880 A.2d 

54, 62 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2005), aff’d without opinion, 906 A.2d 1193 (Pa. 

2006). The 2002 statute was hotly debated in the Legislature, and during 

those debates the bill’s floor manager in the House, Representative Mike 

Turzai, was asked the precise question that now is before this Court:

Mr. GANNON. . . . Mr. Speaker, where you have a Pennsylvania 

manufacturer selling a product in Pennsylvania through a seller, 

a seller sells the product, it has got a manufacturing defect, how 

would that liability be apportioned under this law — proposed 

law; excuse me.

Mr. TURZAI. Yes. If both of those defendants are present, as you 

have suggested, and you have strict liability claims, . . . you 

would not take into account the plaintiff’s actions or the 

plaintiff’s behavior in terms of reducing the ultimate award as 

you do in negligent situations. However, . . . you would 

apportion the damages between strict liability defendant number 

one and strict liability defendant number two. Let us assume 

they are 70-30 and you would go after strict liability one for the 

70 and you would go after strict liability two for the 30 to the 

degree that the jury or the judge found them causally 

responsible.
J. A10014/17

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2002 Pa. Leg. J. (House) 1199 (June 4, 2002).10 Representative Turzai’s 

answer made clear that liability apportionment between two strictly liable 

tortfeasors would not be per capita, but instead would be based on “the 

degree that the jury or the judge found them causally responsible,” in a 

manner similar to allocation among negligent joint tortfeasors. 

At no time during the debates on the 2002 legislation or the 2011 

legislation was there ever any suggestion that Representative Turzai’s view 

of liability allocation under the statute was incorrect or that there would be 

any allocation among strictly liable joint tortfeasors on a per capita basis. 

Rather, throughout the debates, the repeated concern was about tortfeasors 

(both strictly liable tortfeasors and negligent tortfeasors) who would be 

allocated only a small percentage of liability; the bill’s opponents worried 

that if the legislation were enacted, recovery against such defendants would 

not make the plaintiff whole, while proponents worried that unless the bill 

were enacted such defendants would have to pay more than their fair share 

of the verdict. No one suggested that these implications were different for 

strictly liable joint tortfeasors than for others. 

In fact, the general understanding that strictly liable joint tortfeasors 

would have liability allocated in the same way as other tortfeasors led to the 

 

10 Representative Turzai later clarified that if one of the two defendants was 

70% liable, the case would fall within the exception in Section 

7102(a.1)(3)(iii) that permits that defendant to be held jointly and severally 

liable. 2002 Pa. Leg. J. (House) at 1199. That clarification does not change 

the relevance of his answer for purposes of the issue in this case. 
J. A10014/17

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enactment of one of the exceptions in Section 7102(a.1)(3) of the Act. 

During the 2002 debates, there was concern about how the bill would affect 

recoveries in toxic tort actions, in which strict liability claims often are 

brought against multiple defendants. See 2002 Pa. Leg. J. (House) at 1204-

05, 1213-14. As a result of those debates, the bill was amended to include 

Section 7012(a.1)(3)(iv), which preserves joint and several liability for 

certain strict liability environmental claims. See 2002 Pa. Leg. J. (Sen.) 

1908-09 (June 12, 2002); 2002 Pa. Leg. J. (House) 1349-50 (June 17, 

2002). The amendment shows that the Legislature believed allocation on a 

non-per capita basis in strict liability cases would be the rule, and that it had 

to enact an exception if it wanted a different rule. 

Finally, the Legislature has instructed that we are to interpret a statute 

“to give effect to all its provisions.” 1 Pa. C.S. § 1921(a); see 

Commonwealth v. Anderson, 169 A.3d 1092, 1096 (Pa. Super. 2017) (en 

banc). But Appellees’ interpretation would make an important provision of 

the Act, Section 7102(a.1)(3)(iii), inapplicable to strict liability actions. 

Section 7102(a.1)(3)(iii) was a compromise provision. It states that if a 

defendant is held liable for more than 60% of the liability in the case, joint 

and several liability applies to that defendant. This exception assures that 

those defendants who are substantially responsible for a plaintiff’s injury will 

have to account for the full amount of the plaintiff’s harm. But if liability in a 

strict liability case is per capita, it is mathematically impossible for any of 
J. A10014/17

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those defendants to reach the 60% threshold: with just two defendants, a 

defendant’s liability can only be 50%, and the liability percentage will 

decrease as the number of defendants increases. That is not the result the 

Legislature intended. 

We, therefore, conclude that liability in strict liability cases must be 

allocated in the same way as in other tort cases, and not on a per capita 

basis, and that the trial court erred in holding that the jury could not 

apportion liability pursuant to the Fair Share Act. Of course, apportionment 

by the jury will require submission of appropriate evidence from which the 

jurors may make an allocation. Questions regarding the nature of that 

evidence should be resolved by the trial court in the first instance on 

remand. 

We also agree with Appellants that the jury on remand must be 

permitted to consider evidence of any settlements by the Roveranos with 

bankrupt entities in connection with the apportionment of liability. Section 

7102(a.2) of the Fair Share Act states: “For purposes of apportioning liability 

only, the question of liability of any defendant or other person who has 

entered into a release with the plaintiff with respect to the action and who is 

not a party shall be transmitted to the trier of fact upon appropriate requests 

and proofs by any party.” Under Section 7102(a.1)(1), the settling party’s 

liability is included in the “amount of liability attributed to all defendants and 

other persons to whom liability is apportioned under subsection (a.2)” for 
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purposes of allocating liability among the joint tortfeasors. These provisions 

require that settlements with bankrupt entities be included in the calculation 

of allocated liability under the statute.11 

Section 7102(a.2) contains no exception for settling persons who are 

bankrupt. Rather, the section refers to “any defendant or other person who 

has entered into a release with the plaintiff with respect to the action and 

who is not a party.” 42 Pa. C.S. § 7102(a.2) (emphasis added). The 

Roveranos claim, however, that our decisions in Ottavio v. Fibreboard 

Corp., 617 A.2d 1296, 1300 (Pa. Super. 1992) (en banc), and Ball v. 

Johns-Manville Corp., 625 A.2d 650 (Pa. Super. 1993), which prohibited 

consideration of settlements with bankrupt entities prior to enactment of the 

Fair Share Act, continue to bar consideration of such settlements here. 

Because Ottavio and Ball were based on policy considerations that do not 

apply under the Fair Share Act, we conclude that this argument is mistaken. 

In Ottavio, the defendant, one of several manufacturers of products 

containing asbestos, objected to an apportionment of liability among such 

manufacturers on the ground that bankrupt manufacturers were not included 

in the calculation. Ottavio, 617 A.2d at 1300. In holding that the federal 

 

11 Appellants concede that this requirement is subject to the qualification 

that they “submit evidence to establish that the non-parties were joint 

tortfeasors.” See Amato v. Bell & Gossett, 116 A.3d 607, 617 (Pa. Super. 

2015), appeal dismissed sub nom. Vinciguerra v. Bayer CropScience, 

Inc., 150 A.3d 956 (Pa. 2016). In addition, we agree with Appellees that 

Section 7102(a.2) does not apply to bankrupt entities (or their successors in 

interest) with whom they have not settled and received releases.
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Bankruptcy Code prohibited inclusion of bankrupt companies in the 

calculation, we observed that an allocation of fault pursuant to the 

Comparative Negligent Act12 made the other parties to the allocation joint 

tortfeasors against whom, under the then-prevailing rules of joint and 

several liability, another tortfeasor could seek contribution. That result 

would violate the automatic stay provisions of the Bankruptcy Code13 and 

therefore was preempted by federal law. See id. In Ball, we reached the 

same result on the basis of our holding in Ottavio. See Ball, 625 A.2d at 

660.

The Fair Share Act does not permit a similar result here. Not only 

does it do away with joint and several liability in most cases, but it contains 

the following mandate in Section 7102(a.2): “An attribution of responsibility 

to any person or entity as provided in this subsection shall not be admissible 

or relied upon in any other action or proceeding for any purpose.” The Act 

thus prohibits use of an allocation against a bankrupt company as a basis 

for seeking contribution or any other recovery against that company; 

indeed, the Act makes the allocation finding inadmissible in any other case. 

 

12

 The case apparently included a negligence claim.

13 Section 362 of the Bankruptcy Code provides that the filing of a 

bankruptcy petition “operates as a stay, applicable to all entities, of . . . [an] 

action or proceeding against the debtor . . . to recover a claim against the 

debtor that arose before the commencement of the case under this title” and 

“any act to collect, assess, or recover a claim against the debtor that arose 

before the commencement of the case under this title.” 11 U.S.C. 

§ 362(a)(1), (6).
J. A10014/17

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The finding, therefore, cannot expose the bankrupt company to any sort of 

claim forbidden by the Bankruptcy Code. As a result, it does not conflict 

with the Code and is not preempted by it.14

This is the same conclusion as that reached by our colleague Judge 

Strassburger when he confronted this issue as a trial judge under the 2002 

statute. Finding cases like Ball and Ottavio “inapposite,” he observed: 

Under the Act, it is a new ball game[.] The defendant in Ball was 

seeking a judgment against bankrupt entities. Clearly that would 

have violated the automatic stay. The new Act provides:

An attribution of responsibility to any person or entity as 

provided in this subsection shall not be admissible or relied 

upon in any other action or proceeding for any purpose.

Thus, no judgment violative of the automatic stay can 

eventuate.

Slayton v. Gold Pumps, Inc., No. GD 03-010873, 2004 Pa. Dist. & Cnty. 

Dec. LEXIS 335, *5 (C.P. Alleg., Oct. 25, 2004). Courts in other jurisdictions 

have reached similar conclusions when confronted with legislation similar to 

the Fair Share Act. See, e.g., Bondex v. Ott, 774 N.E.2d 82, 87 (Ind. App. 

 

14 In this respect, we note that “there is a presumption against preemption.” 

Dooner v. DiDonato, 971 A.2d 1187, 1194 (Pa. 2009) (emphasis in 

original). A statute that is preempted by federal law is unconstitutional 

because it violates the Supremacy Clause (Art. VI, cl. 2) of the federal 

Constitution. Id. at 1193. But “acts passed by the General Assembly are 

strongly presumed to be constitutional,” and “a statute will not be declared 

unconstitutional unless it clearly, palpably, and plainly violates the 

Constitution.” Pa. State Ass’n of Jury Comm’rs v. Commonwealth, 64 

A.3d 611, 618 (Pa. 2013) (citations and quotation marks omitted). The 

presumption against preemption and corollary presumption against 

unconstitutionality strongly weigh against following Ottavio as a basis for 

declining to apply the Fair Share Act according to its terms.
J. A10014/17

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2002); see also In re Shondel, 950 F.2d 1301, 1306-07 (7th Cir. 1991) 

(discussing effect of bankruptcy discharge under Section 524 of Code).

For these reasons, we hold that the trial court failed to apply the Fair 

Share Act in the manner intended by the Legislature and that we therefore 

need to remand this case for a new trial on the question of apportionment of 

liability.

Judgment vacated. Order denying Post Trial Motions affirmed in all 

respects other than that portion dealing with the Fair Share Act; such 

portion of the Order is reversed. Case remanded for a new trial to apportion 

the jury verdicts among the Appellants, the non-bankrupt settling 

defendants (excluding Georgia Pacific Cement and Hajoca because the jury 

determined that they were not tortfeasors) and bankrupt settling 

defendants. Jurisdiction relinquished.

President Judge Emeritus Ford-Elliott joins this Opinion Per Curiam. 

Judge Solano files a Concurring and Dissenting Opinion.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 12/28/17