FOR PUBLICATION



### UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

M A NJI ND E R S I N GH , Petitioner ,

v

. W I L L IAM P. B AR

R , Attorney General, Respondent. No. 19-70932
Agency No. A215-827-867

K ULW A N T S I N GH , Petitioner ,

v

. W I L L IAM P. B AR

R , Attorney General, Respondent. No. 19-71025
Agency No. A201-431-264

OPINION

On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Imm igration Appeals Argued and Subm itted September 2, 2020

Seattle, W ashington

Filed Decem

ber 9, 2020S I N GH V

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R 2 Before: Jay S. Bybee and Daniel P. Collins, Circuit Judges, and Richard G. Stearns, * District Judge.

Opinion by Judge Bybee

SUMMARY * *

Immigration

The p anel dism issed for lack of jurisdiction, under 8 U .S.C. § 1252, Manjinder Singh and K ulwant Singh’s petitions for review of separate imm igration judge d ecisions concluding that the y l acked jurisdiction to reopen credible fear proceedings under 8 C.F.R. § 1208.30(g)(2)(iv)(A).

The panel observed that judicial review of an exp edited
rem oval order, in c l u ding the m erits of a credible fear d etermin atio n , is expressly p ro h ib ited b y § 1 2 5 2 (a)(2 )(A )(iii). Petitioners stressed that they were not ask i n g this court to review the m erits of the IJs’ credible f ear determ inations, but i n s tead were asking the court to exercise jurisdiction t o review the IJs’ denials of m otions to reopen on the grounds that the IJs m isconstrued their authority to do so under 8 C.F.R. § 1208.30(g)(2)(iv)(A). The panel concluded that it could not d o so, explaining that wh e re Congress explicitly withdraws jurisdiction to review a final order of deportation,

* The Honorable Richard G. Stearns, United States District Judge f o r the District of Massachusetts, sitting by designation.

** This summ ary constitutes no part o f the opinion of the court. It h as been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.S I N GH V

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R 3 authority to review m otions to reconsider or to reopen deportation proceedings is thereby likewise withdrawn.

Wh ile recognizing that § 1252(e) authorizes so m e ju d icial review of expedited rem oval orders and policies and procedures, the panel concluded that it did not provide jurisdiction over petitioners’ specific challenges.

The p anel noted that in Ayala v. Sessions , 855 F.3d 1012 (9th Cir. 2017), and B a rtolome v. Sessions , 904 F.3d 803 (9th Cir. 2018), this court determ ined that it had jurisdiction to consider an IJ’s denial of m otions to reopen or reconsider, but the panel concluded that those cases were d istinguishable, b ec aus e th e y invol v ed r e v ie w o f r e a s o n ab l e fe ar determ inations in the context of a reinstatem ent of a p rior
remo v a l o r der under 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(5), rather than a credible fear determ ination under § 1225(b)(1).

The p anel also concluded that 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D), which re-vests th e court with jurisdiction to hear certain constitutional claim s o r qu estions of law, did not apply, because that p rovision provides jurisdiction to review claim s otherwise barred under § 1252(a)(2) S ubparagr ap h s (B) o r (C), or those barred by provisions other than § 1252, but by its own term s does n o t cover claim s barred by Subparagraph (A), which was the p r o v i s ion that applied in this case. T he panel explained that even a decision that m ight appe ar t o fall within Subparagraphs (B) or (C) is not reviewable under § 1252(a)(2)(D) if it is subject to a separate prohibition of Subparagraph (A).

The panel noted that petit i o n ers’ Suspension Clause challenge was foreclosed by Department of Ho me land Security v. Thuraissigiam , 140 S. Ct. 1959 (2020).S I N GH V

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C OUNSEL

Matthew B o rowski (argued), Borowski W itm er Imm igration Lawyers, Buffalo, New York for Petitioners.

Tracie N. Jones (argued), Trial Attorney; Andrew N

. O’Malley and Tim othy G. Hayes, Senior Litigation Counsel; Cindy S. Ferrier, Assistant Director; Ethan P. Davis, Acting Assistan t Atto rn ey G en eral; O f

f i ce o f Im m igration L itigation, Civil Division, United States De partm ent of Justice, W ashington, D.C.; for Respondent.

OPINION BYBEE, Circuit Judge:

Petitioners Manjinder Singh and K u lw ant S ingh are Sikhs from Punjab, India who entered the Un i t ed States in late 2018. 1 The United States Custom s and Border Patrol (CBP) determ ined that Petitioners were inadm issable as aliens not in possession of v alid entry docum ents, and processed them for expedited rem oval. Manjinder and K ulwant each expressed
a fear of returning to India, and credible fear interviews were conducted b y United States Citizenship and Imm igration Services (USCIS) asylum officers. The asylum officers m ade negative credible fear determ inations in both case s

. After review, imm igrat ion judges (IJs) concurred in the negative

1 Manjinder and Kulwant’s petitions were brought separately, and the record does n o t s uggest any relationship between the two. However, because the petitions r aise identical legal i ssues and have extensive factual sim ilarities, we address t

he petitions together. W e will refer to them either as “Petitioners” or by their first nam es to avoid confusion.S I N GH V

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credible fear determ inations. Petitioners m oved for the IJs to exercise sua sponte authority to reopen their credible fear determ inations. Both IJs denied the m otions on the b asis that IJs lack jurisdiction to reopen credible fear proceedings under 8 C.F.R. § 1208.30(g)(2)(iv)(A). Petitioners seek re v i e w o f the denials of the m otions to reopen.

Because we lack j ur i sd iction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252 to review Manjinder’s and Kulwant’s petitions, we dism iss.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

A. Manjinder Singh Manjinder Singh is a native and cit i z e n of India. In Oct o b e r 2018, Manjinder encountered border patrol agents outside of a U.S. port o f e ntry. C BP determ ined Manjinder
was inadm issible a s an alien not in possession of entry docum ents, p rocessed M anjinder for expedited rem oval pursuant to 8 U.S. C. § 1225(b)(1), 2 conducted an initial

2 The INA sets out stream lined procedures for t he execution o f expedited rem o v a l o r ders, perm itting rem oval of certain aliens “without further hearing or review unless the alien indicates either an intention to apply for asylum

. . . or a fear of persecution.” 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(i). If the alien expresses either, t he alien m

ust be referred to an asylum officer for a credible fear interview. Id. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(ii). If the asylum officer determ ines the alien doe s h ave a credible fear o f persecut i o n , the alien m

ust be detained for consideration of an asylum application. Id. § 1225(b)(1)(B)(ii).

If the asylum officer d eterm ines that the alien does not have a credible fear, t he alien will be ordered rem oved without further review unless the alien r equests review by an IJ. Id. § § 1225(b)(1)(B)(iii)(I), ( III). The I J’s d e c i s i o n i s f

i n a l a n d ma y n o t b e ap p e a l e d

. 8 C

. F

. R

. § 1208.30(g)(2)(iv)(A). Even i f the IJ affirm s the asylum officer’sS I N GH V

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R 6 interview, and com

pleted a record o f hi s s worn statem ent. Because Manjinder expressed a fear of return i n g to India, CBP referred h im to USCIS for a credible fear interview. In the in t e rview, Manjinder told the o fficer that he was a Sikh from Punjab, India; in February 2018, he was working f or the Mann Party; in May and July 2018, h e wa s harm ed by
m em be rs of the Congress Party; and he feared future harm from the Congress Party and the Bhartiya J ant a Party (BJP) if he returned to India. The asylum o ffi c er f ound that Manjinder was not credible and therefo re lacked a credible fear of harm

upon return to India.

I n Novem

ber 2018, CBP presented Manjinder with an expedited rem oval order. At this tim e, Manjinder requested review of the credible fear determ ination by an IJ. The m atter
was referred to Judge Santos-Garcia who held a hearing and affirm ed the asylum officer’s n e g ative credible fear determ ination.

Alm ost four m onths later, in March 2019, Manjinder filed
a m otion to reopen the credible fear proceedings. His m otion asserted that the asylum officer and Ju d g e Santos-Garcia erred in determ ining that h e was not credible and that he received ineffective assistance of co un sel because his counsel did not attend the hearing. Judge Santos-Garci a de n ie d the
m otio n to reopen for a lack of jurisdiction under 8 C.F.R. § 1208.30(g)(2)(iv)(A). Judge Sant o s -Garcia also found, in the alternative, that the m o t i o n to reopen was untim ely and Manjinder had been g iv en the o pportunity to explain his sta t e m ents at the Novem ber h earing. Manjinder n ow petitions for review of Judge Santos-Garcia’s denial o f his

determ ination the USCIS m ay reconsider a negative credible fear finding after providing notice to the imm igration judge. Id.S I N GH V

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m otion to reopen the credible fear determ ination. Manjinder does not request that we review the m erits of the credible fear determ ination.

B. Kulwant Singh

Kulwant Singh is a thirty-four-year-old m ale, a native and citizen of India. K

ulwant encountered border patrol agents at
a port o f e ntry in Decem b er 2018. CBP determ ined that Ku l want w as inadm issable as an alien not in possession o f valid entry docume nt s and processed him f or expedited
rem oval pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1). Durin g h i s interview with CBP, Kulwant expressed a fear of returning to India because he was in danger from the BJP. CBP referred Kulwant fo r a credible fear interview with a USCIS asylum officer.

Kulwant’s credible fear interview took place in January 2019. At his credible fear interview, Kulwant stated that he
was a Sikh f

rom Punjab, India; he had been a m em ber of the Mann P arty since 2013; in Novem ber 2017 and July 2018, he
wa s attacked by the BJP with baseball bats and wooden sticks; and he feared future harm from the BJP if he returned to India. The asylum o ffice r determ ined that Kulwant was not credible, and therefore lacked a credible fear of returning to India. In F ebruary 2019, CBP presented Kulwant with an expedited rem oval order on the basis of the negative credible fear determ ination. K

ulwant requested rev iew o f the negative credible fear determ ination by an IJ. Judge Attia held a credible f ear hearing and concurred in the asylum o fficer’s negative credible fear determ ination and
remanded the case to USCIS for rem o val. In April 2019, Kulwant f iled a m otion to reopen in which he asserted that heS I N GH V

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received ineffective assistance of counsel and the asylum officer err ed by m ischaracterizing the record. Judge Attia denied the m otion to reopen for a lack of jurisdiction, citing 8 C.F.R. § 1208.30(g)(2)(iv)(A). Kulwant n o w petitions for
r e v iew of Judge Attia’s denial of his m otion to reope n

. Kulwant does not request review of the m erits of the negative credible fear determ ination.

II. JURISDICTION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW

The parties agree that our jurisdiction to review adm inistrative imm igration proceedings is governed b y § 242 of the Immi gr ation and N ationality Act (INA), 8 U.S.C. § 1252, as revised by § 306 of the Illegal Imm igration Reform and Imm igrant Responsibility Act o f 1996 (IIRIRA), Pub. L. No. 104-208, Div. C , § 306, 110 Stat. 3009-607 (1996). The parties dispute whether 8 U.S.C. § 1252 grants us jurisdiction over petitioners’ appeals.

We have jurisdiction to consider our own jurisdiction

. See Daas v. Holder , 620 F.3d 1050, 1053 (9th Cir. 2010).

III. ANALYSIS

The p art i es agree that 8 U.S.C. § 1252 governs our jurisdiction o ver the petitions for review. T he Governm ent contends, however, that § 1252(a)(2)(A) dep r i v e s us o f jurisdiction to review Manjin d e r ’ s and Kulwant’s petitions. W e agree.

W e begin with two observations. First , we s tart from a “presum ption favoring judicial review of adm inis tr ative action.” Kucana v. Holder , 558 U.S. 233, 2 5 1 (2010). “When a statute is ‘reasonably susceptible to divergentS I N GH V

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int erpretation, we adopt the reading that accords with traditional understand in g s a n d b asic p rin cip les: th at e x ecutive determ inations generally are subject to judicial review.’” Id. (quoting Gutierrez de Martinez v. L amagno , 5 1 5 U .S. 417, 434 (1995)). It takes “clear and convincing ev i de n c e” to dislodge this “well-settled” presum ption. Kucana , 558 U.S. at 251–52. S econd , we recognize that we have routinely exercised jurisdiction under § 1 25 2 t o review IJ denials o f
m otions to reopen certain rem oval proce edings. S ee , e.g. , Mata v. L ynch , 576 U.S. 143, 147 (201 5) (“[C]ircuit courts have jurisdiction when an alien app e als from the [Board o f Imm igration Appeals’s (BIA’s)] denial of a m otion to reopen a rem o v al proceeding.”); Kucana , 558 U.S. at 249 (holding that § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii), whi c h governs judicial review o f discretionary decisions m ade by the Attorney G eneral or the Secretary of Hom eland Security, “does not proscribe judicial review o f denials of m otions to reop e n ” ) ; Bonilla v. Lynch , 840 F .3d 575, 581 (9th Cir. 2016) (reviewing denial of a m otion to reopen proceedings for adjustm ent of status); Hernandez v. Holder , 7 3 8 F.3d 1099, 1100–01 (9th Cir. 2013) (reviewing Board’s dism issal for lack of jurisdiction o f
a m otion to reopen application for cancellation of rem oval). Although we have determ ined that we have jurisdiction to review an IJ’s denial of m o tions to reopen or r e c o n s i der in other contexts, see B a rtolome v. Sessions , 904 F.3d 803, 815 (9th Cir. 2 018); Ayala v. Sessions , 8 55 F.3d 1012 1017–18 (9th C ir

. 2 017), we have n ot y et d eterm ined the p recise question at issue here: whether § 1252 prohibits our review of an IJ’s denial of a m otio n t o r eopen a credible fear determ ination. See Kucana , 558 U.S. at 2 50 n.17 (“W e do not reach the question whether review of a reopening denial would be precluded if the court would lack jurisdiction over the a l ien’s underlying claim f or relief.”); cf. Cervantes v.S I N GH V

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Barr , 769 F. App’x 456, 456 (9th C ir. 2 0 1 9 ) (holding that petitioners failed “to p rovide us with a s u fficient basis for statutory jur is diction to review BIA’s dism issal for lack o f jurisdiction of an appeal o f a m otion to reopen” e xp e d ited
rem oval proceedings). W e now answer that question, and we conclude that the language of § 1 252 clearly and convincingly dem onstrates that Congress intended to circum scribe judicial review of m otions to reopen credible fear determ inations.

Section 1252(a)(2)(A) governs the availability of judicial review over expedited orders of rem oval and specified related determ inations. That section provides: Notwithstanding any o ther provision of law (st atut ory or nonstatutory)

. . . no court shall have jurisdiction to review— (i) except as provided in subsection (e), any individu al determ ination or to entertain any other cause o r claim arising from o r relating to the im

plem entation o r operation o f
an o rder of rem oval pursuant to [8 U .S.C. § 1225(b)(1)], (ii) except as provided in subsection (e), a decision by the Attorney General to invoke the provisions of [§ 1225(b)(1)], (iii) the application of [§ 122 5 (b)(1)] to individual aliens, including the [credible fear] d e t e r m i n a t i o n m a d e u n d e r s e c t i o n 1225(b)(1)(B) . . . , orS I N GH V

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R 11 (iv) except as provided in subsection ( e ), procedures and policies adopted b y the Attorney General to im

plem ent the provisions of section 1225(b)(1) . . . .

8 U. S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(A)(i)–(iv). Judicial review of an expedited rem oval order, including th e m erits of a credible fear d eterm ina t i o n , is thus expressly prohibited by § 1252(a)(2)(A)(iii). See Pena , 815 F. 3 d at 455 (court o f appeals lacked jurisdiction to review procedural challenge to expedited rem o val proceedings); Garcia de R incon v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec. , 539 F .3d 1133, 1139 (9th Cir. 2008) (court
o f ap peals lacked jurisdiction to h ear collateral attack on underlying expedited rem o val order in reinstatem ent proceedings); see also Castro v. U.S. D ep ’t of H omeland Sec. , 835 F.3d 422, 431–32 (3d Cir. 2016) (collecting cases).

Petitioners do n ot disagree with our reading o f § 1252(a)(2)(A)(iii). Petitioners repeatedly stress that they
are not asking us to review the merits of the IJs’ credible fear determ inations. Instead, Petitio n e rs ask us to exercise jurisdiction to review the IJs’ denials of motions to reopen on the grounds that the IJs m isconstrued their authority to do so under 8 C.F.R. § 1208.30(g)(2)(iv)(A). 3 This we cannot do.

3 That regulation provides:

If the im m igration judge con cu

r s w i t h the determ ination
o f th e a sylum officer t

hat t he alien does not have a credible fear of persecution or torture, the case shall be returned to th e [USCIS] for rem oval of the alien. The im m igration judge’s d ecision is final and m ay not be appealed. The [USCIS], h owever, m ay reconsi d er a negative credible f

ear finding that has been concurred upon by an im

mi gration judge after providing notice o fS I N GH V

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W e h ave h eld that “where Congress explicitly withdraws our jurisdiction to review a final o r d e r of deportation, our authority to review m otions to reconsider or to reopen deportation proceedings is thereby likewise withdrawn.” Sarmadi v. INS, 121 F .3d 1319, 1322 (9th Cir. 1997); see also Alcala v. Holder , 563 F.3d 1009, 1014 (9th Cir. 2009) (“[O]ur jurisdiction over a m otion to reopen is derivative o f our jurisdiction over the underlying order of rem oval.”).

W e can characterize Petitioners’ request as one either “arising from o r relating to the im plem entation or op e ration of” an expedited rem oval order, 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(A)(i),
or seeking review of “procedures and policies adopted by the Attorney General,” id. § 1252(a)(2)(A)(iv). Either way, the review Petiti o n e r s seek is still outside of o ur jurisdiction “except as provided in [§ 1252(e)].” See Thuraissigiam v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec. , 917 F .3d 1097, 1119 (9th Cir. 2019) (“Section 1252( a )(2)(A)(i)

. . . clearly bars claim s relating to procedural error.”), rev’d on o ther grounds , 140 S. Ct. 1959 (2020). Section 1252(e) does n o t perm it us to review the Petitioners’ requests on a petition for review from
an IJ’s denia l. Though § 1252(e) authorizes som e judicial review of expedited rem oval orders and policies and procedures, it lim its review to specif ic challenges and venues. S ectio n 1 2 5 2 (e)(2 ) p ermits h ab eas co rp u s p ro ceedin g s limited to inquiring “whether the petitioner is an a l i e n,” “whether p etitioner was ordered rem oved under” § 1 252(b)(1), an d whether p e t itioner “can prove by a preponderance of the evidenc e that the petitioner is an alien lawfully adm itted for perm anent residence, has b een adm itted as a refugee

. . . , o r

its reconsideration to the imm igration judge. 8 C.F.R. § 1208.30(g)(2)(iv)(A).S I N GH V

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has been granted asylum

. . . .” S e e 8 U.S.C. § 1 2 52(e)(2); Thuraissigiam , 917 F.3d at 1103–04. Petitioners do not bring challenges on any of these bases.

A ltern ativ ely , a ch allenge to the validity of the regulatio n s i mp l e menting § 1225(b)(1) m ay b e r e v i e we d fo r constitutionality, consistency with § 1225, or other violations of federal law. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(e)(3 )

. However, such actions seeki n g review of regulations m ust be filed no later th an sixty days after the challenged regulation is “first im plem ented” and m

ust be filed in the United States District Court for the District o f Colum bia. S ee id. §§ 1252(e)(3)(A), (B). Section 1252(e) does not grant u s either jurisdiction o r venue to review such pe ti t i o n s. See Garcia de R incon , 539 F.3d at 1139 (“[De Rincon’s challenge] does n ot contest her exp ed i t ed rem o val order on any of the enum erated perm issible grounds in § 1252(e)—this court therefore has no jurisdiction to hear it.”).

Petitioners point u s to Aya la v

. Sessions , 855 F.3d 1012 (9th Cir. 2017), and B a rtolome v. Sessions , 904 F.3d 803 (9th Cir. 2018), but those decisions are not to the contrary. Both of these cases involved review of a reasonable fear determ ina t i on in the context of a reinstatement of a p rior
r e mo v a l order under 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(5), rather than a credible f ear d eterm ination under § 1225(b)(1). In Ayala we concluded that “we have jurisdiction over p etitions for review of reasonable fear determ inations m a d e i n connection with the reinstatem ent of expedited rem oval orders.” 855 F.3d at 1018. W e acknowledged our prio r de c ision in Garcia de Rincon , in which we held that we lack jurisdiction to review
a collateral attack on the underlying expedited rem oval order during reinstatem ent proceedings, Garcia de R incon , 539 F.3d at 1138, b ut we distinguished a reasonable fearS I N GH V

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d eterm ination arising from a reinstatem ent proceeding fr o m an attack on an “original underlying expedited rem oval proceeding[].” Ayala , 855 F.3d at 1018. W e concluded that

“ Garcia d

e Rincon [was] inapplicable.” Id. Be c ause we found that “[n]othing in 8 U.S.C. § 1252 preven t s us from exercising jurisdiction to review the accur a c y o f the

. . . reasonable fear determ ination” in connection with th e reinstatem ent order under § 1231(a)(5), see id. , we were free to reach the question whether “[t]he IJ abused his discretion in denying Ayala’s m otion to reopen and reconsider,” id. at 1020. See also Bartolome , 904 F.3d at 815; A lcala , 563 F.3d at 1 0 14; Medina-Morales v. A shcroft , 371 F.3d 520, 528 (9th Cir. 2004).
Petitioners, at oral argum ent, also pointed us to 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D) as authority perm itting th e r e v iew o f legal and cons t i tut ional q

uestions. See also Ayala , 855 F.3d at 1017–18. That subparagraph provides: Nothing in subparagraph (B) or (C), or in any other p rovision of this chapter (other than this section) which lim its or elim in at es judicial review, shall b e construed as precluding review of constitutional claim s or questions o f law raised upon a petition for review fi l e d with an ap p ropriate court of appeals in accordance with this section.

8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D). W e have read Subparagraph (D) to “re-vest[] the circuit courts w ith jurisdiction to h e ar ‘constitutional claim s or questions of law’ that m ight otherwi se b e barred

. . . . ” Garcia de Rincon , 539 F.3d at 1137. The re-vestm ent clause does not apply to Petitioners’ claim s, however. By its own term s, Subparagraph ( D) doesS I N GH V

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not re-vest jurisdiction in our court over legal questi o ns whose review is prohibited b y Subparagrap h ( A ). 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D). S ubparagraphs ( A) , (B), and (C) each est ab li sh separate and alternative prohibitions on review o f certain m atters. Subparagraph (D) then provide s that the prohibitions “in subparagraph (B) or (C), or in any other provision of [the INA] (other than th is s e ction)” shall not preclude review of legal o r constitutional questions on a petition for review. Subparagraph (D) , th e refore, only overrides prohibitions contained in (1) a provision of the INA other than § 1 252, or (2) either § 1252(a)(2)(B) or (C). It plainly does not override the prohibition in Subparagraph (A) because it is not in a “provision o f [the INA] (other than this section),” and it is not “subparagraph (B) or (C).” Thus, even a decision that m ight appear to fall w ithin Subparagraphs (B)
or (C) is not reviewable under § 1252(a)(2)(D) if it is subject to a separa t e prohibition of S ubparagraph (A). T o say otherwise, would not be a credible reading of the statute. See Kucana , 5 58 U.S. at 2 52 (“‘[M]any provi s ions of IIRIRA [we]re aim ed at protecting [from court review exercises of] th e E x ecu tiv e ’ s di s cretion

. ’”) (alteration s in o rig in al) ( q u o tin g Reno v. American A rab An ti-D i s crim in a tio n C

o m m

. , 5 2 5 U .S. 471, 486 (1999)). The re-vesting provision of Subparagraph (D) d oes not refer to the no n
- re v iewability provisions o f Subparagraph (A), and it is that p rovision that deprives us o f jurisdiction to review the IJs’ refusals to consider Petitioners’
m otions to reopen. 4

4 Petitioners briefly raised a S uspension Cl au s e challenge at oral argum ent. But the Suprem e Court foreclosed this argum ent in D epartment of Homeland Security v. Thuraissigiam , 140 S. Ct. 1959 (2020). See id. at 1 969 (The writ of habeas corpus “sim ply p ro v i d e d a m eans o f contesting the lawfulness of restraint and securing release.”). The Court rejected the contention that the writ re quired the ability “to obtain adm i nistrative or judicial review leading to” “authorization for an alienS I N GH V

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IV. CONCLUSION

Read together, §§ 1252(a)(2)(A), (D) an d 1 2 5 2 (e) p ro v ide clear and convincing evidence that Congress i ntended to deprive circuit courts of appeals of jurisdiction to review expedited rem o val orders and related m atters affecting those orders, including underlying n egative c re dible fear determ inations and rulings on the regulations im plem enting the expedited rem oval statute. W e are without jurisdiction to review the p etitions for review of the d e nials of Petitioners’
m otions to reopen and therefore dism iss.

DISMISSED.

[stopped at the border] to r em ain in a country o ther than his own.” Id. at 1971–81.