UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

________________ _________________ EYOEL-DAWIT MATIOS, et al., in sui juris capacity, Plaintiff - Appellant,

v. CITY OF LOVELAND, et al., in care of Stephen C. Adams, City Manager, Defendant - Appellee. No. 22-1047 (D.C. No. 1:21-CV -02194-WJM-NRN) (D. Colo.)

________________ _________________ ORDER AND JUDGMENT *

________________ _________________ Before HARTZ , BALDOCK , and McHUGH , Circuit Judges.

________________ _________________ Eyoel-Dawit Matios brought a pro se 1 Petition to Confirm an Arbitration Award issued in his favor against the City of Loveland (the “City”) 2 by Brett “Eeon”

* After examining the briefs and appella te record, this pa nel has determined unanimously that oral argument would not ma terially assist in the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Ci r. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctr ines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with Federal Rule of Appellate Procedur e 32.1 and Tenth Circuit Rule 32.1.
1 Because Mr. Matios is proceeding pro se , we construe his filings liberally, but we will not act as his advocate. Hall v. Bellmon , 935 F.2d 1106, 1110 (10th Cir. 1991).
2 The Final Arbitration Award appears to have been awarded against the City and two of its employees, but Mr. Matios’s Petition seeks only to confirm the award issued against the City. Thus, we refer only to the arbitration aw ard against the City. FILED United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit 

### July 14, 2022 Christopher M. Wolpert Clerk of Court Appellate Case: 22-1047 Document: 010110710743 Date Filed: 07/14/2022 Page: 12 Jones of Sitcomm Arbitrati on Association (“Sitcomm”). 3 The district court denied the Petition because there was no contract betw een the parties. Mr . Matios appeals. Because there is no federal subject-matter jurisdiction to grant or deny Mr. Matios’s Petition, we vacate and remand for the distri ct court to dismiss the Petition without prejudice.
I. BACKGROUND During a traffic stop, a City law en forcement officer gave Mr. Matios a citation for speeding. Mr. Matios then sent a document entitled “N otice of Verified Claim for Relief and Money Demand” to th e City. ROA at 21. In this document, Mr. Matios alleged the traffic stop and c itation violated numerous state and federal laws and argued the City owed him millions of dollars in damage s as a result. This document also purports to be a “Self-Exe cuting Contract Agreement Fee Schedule,” id. , which Mr. Matios contends obligated the City to respond to hi s claims “point for point” or be deemed to have agreed to th e claims and the terms in the “contract,” id. at 55–56. The document also includes an arbitr ation clause that es tablishes arbitration as the sole remedy for any issue associated with the “agreement.” Id. at 54–58. The City responded by generally denying the claims. Because the City did not respond to the claims “point for poi nt,” however, Mr. Matios sent two

3 The Final Arbitration Award suggests Sitcomm recused itself, and Mr. Jones is an independent arbitrator separate fro m Sitcomm. But it appears Mr. Jones runs Sitcomm or is closely associated with Sitcomm. See Satcomm v. PayPal , No. 5:19- mc-10-MTT, 2020 WL 1609503, at *2 n.1, 3 (M.D. Ga. April 1, 2020) (recognizing Mr. Jones’s connection to Sitcomm). Appellate Case: 22-1047 Document: 010110710743 Date Filed: 07/14/2022 Page: 23 communications warning the City that it had agreed with his clai ms and consented to all the terms contained in the documen t, including the arbitration clause. Id. at 86. Both times the City responded by rejec ting and denying the claims. Mr. Matios then submitted the claims to arbitration with Sitcomm 4 and notified the City of a hearing date. The City maintained it had not agreed to arbitration and stated it would not participate. Nevertheless, the arbitrator , Mr. Jones, issued a “Fin al Arbitration Award” that largely consisted of rambling and disjoint ed legalese. After parsing through the language in the award, it appears Mr. Jone s concluded the parties had agreed to arbitrate because the City had a duty to respond but failed to do so and, without analyzing the claims, awarded Mr. Mati os $300,000,000 ag ainst the City. Mr. Matios then filed a Petition to Confirm the Arbitration Award in the United States District Court for the Dist rict of Colorado. The magistrate judge ordered Mr. Matios to show cause why the Petition should not be dismissed for (1) lack of an enforceable agreement and (2) lack of subject-m atter jurisdiction.

4 Federal courts have encountered se veral petitions to vacate or confirm arbitration awards issued by Sitcomm and/or Mr. Jones, and they have consistently questioned the validity of the underlying c ontracts and the subs equent arbitration awards. See, e.g. , Mark Wayne Nation v. United States , No. 2022-1256, 2022 WL 1655693, at *1 n.* (Fed. Cir. Feb. 23, 2022); Castro v. Bank of N.Y. Mellon , 852 F. App’x 25, 29 n.1 (2d Ci r. 2021) (unpublished); United States v. Hallman , No. 3:05- 376, 2021 WL 3773335, at *1 n.1 (D.S.C. Aug. 25, 2021); Anderson v. United States , No. H-21-1889, 2021 WL 2417157, at *1 (S.D. Tex. June 14, 2021); Nelson v. Jackson , No. 3:20-cv-28 (CAR), 2021 WL 503502 7, at *1 (M.D. Ga. Apr. 28, 2021); Domino v. Barr , No. 20-2583 (ECT/BRT), 2021 WL 1795762, at *1 n.1 (D. Minn. Feb. 8, 2021). Appellate Case: 22-1047 Document: 010110710743 Date Filed: 07/14/2022 Page: 34 Mr. Matios responded that (1 ) the City offici als’ oaths of o ffice and the selfexecuting contract establishe d a valid contract and (2) the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”) provided federal subject-matte r jurisdiction over the Petition. The magistrate judge recommende d the Petition be denied because there was no valid agreement between the partie s. Mr. Matios objected to that recommendation. Despite Mr. Matios’s objection, the di strict court denied the Petit ion and granted the City’s motion to dismiss for the reasons provide d by the magistrate judge. Mr. Matios appeals the district court’s decision.
II. DISCUSSION As an initial matter, the City argu es there is no federal subject-matter jurisdiction over the Petition because the FAA alone does not provide jurisdiction. Before we can turn to the me rits of the Petition, we mu st determine whether federal subject-matter jurisdiction exists. Arbaugh v. Y&H Corp. , 546 U.S. 500, 514 (2006). The FAA “‘does not create any independen t federal-question jurisdiction,’” so “‘there must be diversity of citizenship or some other independent basis for federal jurisdiction’ before a federal court can act under the FAA.” P&P Indus., Inc. v. Sutter Corp. , 179 F.3d 861, 866 ( 10th Cir. 1999) (quoting Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp. , 460 U.S. 1, 25 n.32 (1983)). The process for determining whether there is an independent basis for federal jurisdiction va ries for different types of petitions brought under the FAA. See Badgerow v. Walters , 142 S. Ct. 1310, 1316–18 (2022) (distinguishi ng the jurisdictional inquiry for a petition to compel arbitration and a petition to confirm an ar bitration award). For a petition to confirm Appellate Case: 22-1047 Document: 010110710743 Date Filed: 07/14/2022 Page: 45 an arbitration award under Section 9 of the FAA, like the one at issue here, courts do not “look through the . . . applications ” to determine whether it would have jurisdiction over the underlying dispute. Id. at 1317. Courts look only to the face of the petition to confirm the arbitration award. Id. at 1316–18. Thus, we must determine whether the Petition itself raises a federal question without regard for the underlying claims, 28 U.S.C. § 1331, or whether ther e is diversity jurisdiction, id. § 1332. We begin by considering whether the Pet ition raises a federa l question. In a petition to confirm an arbitrat ion award, the parties are c ontesting “the enforceability of an arbitral award,” which is “no more than a contractua l resolution of the parties’ dispute.” Badgerow , 142 S. Ct. at 1316–17. These cont ractual disputes are issues of state law, not federal law. Id. at 1317. Thus, the Petition does not establish federalquestion jurisdiction. Moreove r, there is no diversity ju risdiction in this matter because Mr. Matios and the City are both citizens of Colorado. See ROA at 9 (noting Mr. Matios is a citizen of Colorado); Moor v. Alameda Cnty. , 411 U.S. 693, 717–18 (1973) (“[A] political subdivision of a State . . . is a citizen of th e State for diversity purposes.”). As such, the dist rict court lacked subject-m atter jurisdiction, and the Petition must be dismissed without prejudice. Brereton v. Bountiful City Corp. , 434 F.3d 1213, 1216 (10th Cir. 2006) (noting that a dismissal fo r lack of jurisdiction must be without prejudice). The City also requests it s attorney’s fees for de fending the appeal because Mr. Matios brought the appeal in bad faith and for oppressive and vexatious reasons Appellate Case: 22-1047 Document: 010110710743 Date Filed: 07/14/2022 Page: 56 after being told numerous times the arbi tration award was not valid. We lack jurisdiction to consider the merits of the Petition, but the method for determining jurisdiction for a petition to confirm an ar bitration award was not settled until after Mr. Matios filed his Notice of Appeal. ROA at 237 (Notice of Appeal dated February 17, 2022); Badgerow , 142 S. Ct. at 1317–18 (holding courts do not look to the underlying dispute to dete rmine jurisdiction over petitions to confirm arbitration awards on March 31, 2022). Therefor e, we deny the City’s request.
III. CONCLUSION For these reasons, we VACATE and REM AND the denial of the Petition and instruct the district court to dismiss it without prejudice. We also DENY the City’s request for attorney’s fees.

Entered for the Court
Carolyn B. McHugh Circuit Judge Appellate Case: 22-1047 Document: 010110710743 Date Filed: 07/14/2022 Page: 6