The HONORABLE CATHERINE D. PERRY, United States District

*

Judge for the Eastern District of Missouri, sitting by

designation.

 The HONORABLE ROBERT E. LARSEN, United States Magistrate

1

Judge for the Western District of Missouri who tried the case with

the consent of the parties pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c).

___________

No. 96-2214

___________

George Mark Williams, *

*

Plaintiff-Appellant, *

* Appeal from the United States

v. * District Court for the

* Western District of Missouri.

James F. Soligo, *

*

Defendant-Appellee. *

___________

 Submitted: December 13, 1996

 Filed: January 15, 1997

___________

Before LOKEN and HANSEN, Circuit Judges, and PERRY, District Judge. *

___________

LOKEN, Circuit Judge.

In December 1989, George Mark Williams bought a truck from the City

of Kansas City at an abandoned vehicles auction. In August 1990, Kansas

City police impounded the truck and later released it to a prior owner who

had reported it stolen. Williams sued the City and police officer James

F. Soligo, who impounded the truck, asserting state law claims against the

City and § 1983 claims against Soligo. After Williams settled with the

City, his procedural due process claim against Soligo was tried to a jury.

The district court granted Soligo judgment as a matter of law at the close 1

of the evidence. Williams appeals. We affirm. 
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Williams bought the 1975 one-ton Ford truck from the City for $2,000

and invested about $500 in repairs. Months later, Richard Fowler

complained to police that he had located his stolen 1975 one-ton Ford truck

on the Kansas City streets. Detective Soligo from the Auto Theft Unit

investigated and found the truck described by Fowler on the street near

Williams's salvage business. Soligo observed that the vehicle

identification number ("VIN") on the driver's door was for a 1973 half-ton

Ford truck, not a 1975 one-ton truck, and that the truck's license plate

was for a 1989 Chevrolet registered to Williams. Soligo talked to

Williams, who said he bought the truck at the City's abandoned vehicle sale

and showed Soligo a bill of sale from the City for a 1975 Ford truck

bearing the illegitimate VIN.

Based upon this conflicting information, Soligo impounded the truck

pending further investigation. It was towed to a City lot, where Soligo

placed a "hold" on it. After the tow, Soligo located another VIN number

for a 1975 one-ton Ford truck stamped on the truck frame. Soligo also

checked the tow lot sales records, which confirmed Williams's bill of sale.

Concluding that the impounded truck was in fact the truck Fowler had

reported stolen, Soligo turned Williams's license plate and the

illegitimate VIN plate over to the police property room, advised the Auto

Release Desk of the VIN number stamped on the truck frame, and released his

"hold" on the vehicle without further instructions. Soligo did not advise

Williams of these actions. Shortly thereafter, Fowler filed a claim with

the Auto Release Desk, producing a Kansas certificate of title for the

truck. The Auto Release Desk processed this claim and released the vehicle

to Fowler. 

The evidence at trial consisted of Williams's brief testimony and the

reading of a four-page Stipulation of Uncontroverted Facts. On this sparse

record, the district court granted judgment for Soligo because Williams

failed to prove either an intentional or
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reckless due process deprivation or an injury proximately caused by

Soligo's actions.

Mere negligence is not an actionable deprivation under the Due

Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Daniels v. Williams, 474

U.S. 327, 331 (1986). In most § 1983 cases raising procedural due process

claims, it is clear that the alleged deprivation was intentional, even if

the alleged failure to provide adequate process was inadvertent. See

Daniels, 474 U.S. at 333-34 (the relevant conduct in Wolff v. McDonnell,

418 U.S. 539 (1974), for example, was the prison officials' "deliberate

decision to deprive the inmate of good-time credit, not their

hypothetically negligent failure to accord him the procedural protections

of the Due Process Clause"). But in this case, the nature of the alleged

deprivation is not at all clear. Beyond the initial decision to impound

the truck, which Williams does not contest, Soligo took no action depriving

Williams of his property. By releasing his investigative "hold" on the

vehicle, Soligo simply turned the matter over to those City officials at

the Auto Release Desk who are authorized to release a towed vehicle to the

proper claimant. Williams argues that if Soligo had told the Auto Release

Desk of Williams's claim, or had told Williams the "hold" had been released

so Williams could submit a claim, the City would have commenced an

interpleader action to resolve the competing claims of Fowler and Williams.

In other words, Williams contends that in completing his investigative

duties Soligo failed to protect Williams's property interest. That is a

negligent deprivation claim barred by Daniels.

We also agree with the district court's alternative ground, that

Williams failed to prove proximate cause. Williams's damage evidence

consisted of testimony regarding the value of the vehicle to Williams.

That evidence is irrelevant absent proof that Williams's claim to the

vehicle was superior to the claim of Fowler. See Brewer v. Chauvin, 938

F.2d 860 (8th Cir. 1991) (en banc). Of course, a plaintiff deprived of

procedural due process
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is entitled to nominal damages. See Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 266

(1978). But a procedural deprivation must be proved. Here, there was no

proof of Auto Release Desk procedures and no proof that, had Williams

submitted a timely claim to that Desk, his claim would have been

sufficiently potent to persuade the City to commence an interpleader action

or some other form of pre-deprivation hearing. Because Soligo was not

responsible for determining the merits of Williams's claim to the property,

Williams could not prove that Soligo's action proximately caused procedural

due process injury without more evidence regarding what process might

otherwise have been due.

The judgment of the district court is affirmed.

A true copy.

Attest:

 CLERK, U. S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT.