[Cite as State v. Howse, 2012-Ohio-6106.]

STATE OF OHIO ) IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 

 )ss: NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 

COUNTY OF LORAIN ) 

STATE OF OHIO 

 Appellee 

 v. 

ALVERNO M. HOWSE, JR. 

 Appellant 

C.A. No. 12CA010251 

APPEAL FROM JUDGMENT 

ENTERED IN THE 

COURT OF COMMON PLEAS 

COUNTY OF LORAIN, OHIO 

CASE No. 09CR078921 

DECISION AND JOURNAL ENTRY

Dated: December 26, 2012 

 

MOORE, Presiding Judge. 

{¶1} Defendant-Appellant, Alverno Howse, Jr., appeals his convictions in the Lorain 

County Court of Common Pleas. This Court affirms. 

I. 

{¶2} On August 19, 2009, Charles “Chuckie” Howard, Jr. was shot and killed in a 

home rented by Shauda Stark. During the police investigation immediately following the 

shooting and in testimony before the grand jury, witnesses at the home placed Appellant in the 

room with Howard at the time of the shooting. By the time the case went to trial, some of the 

witness testimony had changed. Nonetheless, a jury convicted Appellant of reckless homicide in 

violation of R.C. 2903.041, a felony of the third degree, and tampering with evidence, in 

violation of R.C. 2921.13(A)(1), also a third degree felony. He was also convicted of the 

attendant gun specifications attached to each charge. Appellant was sentenced to 13 years in 

prison. He presents five assignments of error on appeal. 
2 

 

{¶3} Testimony at trial was presented as follows. In the hours before the shooting, 

Stark, Chuckie, Jeris Nelson, Clyde Anderson, Tony Spraggins, Melissa White, Christopher 

Howse, and Appellant were all gathered at the house. Stark left to pick up her son from daycare. 

Stark took Christopher Howse, her boyfriend at the time, and Spraggins with her. Chuckie, 

Nelson, Anderson, White, and Appellant remained at the house. The witnesses testified 

inconsistently as to what happened next. 

{¶4} Sometime after the group left to pick up Stark’s son, White and Anderson went 

into the main bedroom to talk. According to White, she left the bedroom when she heard loud 

voices coming from the living room; she then walked into the kitchen. According to Anderson, 

he left the bedroom with White and walked directly into the bathroom. Nelson remained in the 

living room, and, according to some statements, Chuckie and Appellant walked back towards the 

bedroom. White, Anderson, and Nelson then heard a single gunshot, and, according Nelson and 

White, Chuckie came into the kitchen and collapsed on the floor. When the police arrived, 

Chuckie, Nelson, Anderson, and White were at the house. Appellant was not, and no gun was 

ever found. 

II. 

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR II

THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PLAIN ERROR IN DENYING 

APPELLANT HIS RIGHT TO A PUBLIC TRIAL UNDER THE SIXTH 

AMENDMENT OF THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION AND ARTICLE 

I, SECTION 10 OF THE OHIO CONSTITUTION WHEN IT CLOSED THE 

COURTROOM BASED UPON ONLY VAGUE CONCERNS FOR WITNESS 

SAFETY AND GANG ACTIVITY IN THE MIDDLE OF THE TESTIMONY 

OF ONE KEY WITNESS. 

{¶5} In his second assignment of error, Appellant argues that he was denied his 

constitutional right to a public trial when the court closed the courtroom. We disagree. 
3 

 

{¶6} The Sixth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and Article I, Section 10 of the 

Ohio Constitution guarantee the right to a public trial. State v. Lane, 60 Ohio St.2d 112, 119 

(1979). “The right to a public trial is rudimentary in our judicial system, but, as with most rights, 

it is not absolute * * *.” Id. at 121. It is within the authority of a trial court to order the closure 

of the proceedings in limited instances. State v. Evans, 9th Dist. No. 07CA009274, 2008-Ohio4295, ¶ 15. In those limited instances the right to a public trial: 

must yield to other interests, such as those essential to the administration of 

justice. A trial judge has authority to exercise control over the proceedings and 

the discretion to impose control over the proceedings. Nonetheless, the 

abridgement of a defendant’s right to a public trial may occur only when 

necessary, and any closure must be narrowly drawn and applied sparingly. 

State v. Drummond, 111 Ohio St.3d 14, 2006-Ohio-5084, ¶ 51. “This Court reviews a trial 

court’s decision to exclude spectators from the courtroom under an abuse of discretion standard * 

* *.” State v. Powell, 9th Dist. No. 20067, 2001 WL 1162832, *7 (Oct. 3, 2001). An abuse of 

discretion means that the trial court was unreasonable, arbitrary, or unconscionable in its ruling. 

Blakemore v. Blakemore, 5 Ohio St.3d 217, 219 (1983). 

Substantial Reason

{¶7} When a trial court orders a partial closure of proceedings, there must be a 

“substantial reason” to justify the closure. Drummond at ¶ 53. Appellant argues that “there were 

no explicit statements from any witnesses that they were concerned with their safety.” 

Therefore, according to Appellant, there was no substantial reason for the court to close the 

courtroom. 

{¶8} During the State’s direct examination of Melissa White, its fourth witness, an 

altercation occurred outside the courtroom between a prior witness and one of the victim’s 

family members. The courtroom security responded, and the court removed the jury from the 
4 

 

courtroom. The State then requested the court close the courtroom for the remainder of White’s 

testimony and for the upcoming testimony of a confidential informant. The court conducted a 

hearing on the State’s motion. 

{¶9} Detective Steven Zacharias, of the Elyria Police Department, testified that he had 

been informed “by a reliable source that several of the witnesses to this case [were] being 

intimidated by a gentleman known on the streets as Mook Duke.” He went on to explain that he 

believed Mook Duke to be the street name for Gregory Raymore, the individual responsible for 

posting Appellant’s bail. According to Detective Zacharias, Mook Duke was recruiting 

individuals to attend the trial to provide “an intimidation factor.” Detective Zacharias also 

explained that the “word [] on the street [was] that there could be problems here in the courtroom 

and on the street during and after this trial.” 

{¶10} Detective Larry Barbee and Detective Randall Baker, both of the Elyria Police 

Department, testified about a group called the Middle Avenue Zone (“MA Zone”), a local gang 

to which the detectives believed Appellant belonged. Detective Barbee testified that he had 

noticed several individuals in the back of the courtroom that were known to be involved with 

MA Zone. Detective Barbee further testified that, based on the change in their testimony and 

their demeanor, he believed the prior witnesses were intimidated. In fact, two of the State’s 

witnesses had unexpectedly changed their testimony at trial. Their testimony directly conflicted 

with their prior testimony to the grand jury and subjected them to perjury charges. 

{¶11} Deputy Joseph Greiner, assigned to courtroom security, testified that when he 

responded to a commotion outside of the courtroom, he saw one of the witnesses in an 

altercation with the victim’s step-sister. As he approached, Deputy Greiner heard the witness 

say, “We rule these streets.” This witness testified at trial that Appellant was not present at the 
5 

 

time of the shooting. This testimony was inconsistent with his previous statements to the police 

and with his testimony to the grand jury. 

{¶12} Additionally, Detective Barbee testified that White, in her initial interview, told 

him that she was concerned about someone coming to her house to shoot her. The trial judge 

made a special note of how nervous White seemed during her testimony. The judge 

acknowledged that it is not uncommon for a witness to be nervous, but her nervousness was 

more than that. White requested time to pause and collect herself, she had a “very pained look 

on her face,” grabbed her stomach on several occasions leading the court to believe she “was 

nearing nausea,” and she had raspy, heavy breathing during her testimony. 

{¶13} The court has an interest in maintaining courtroom security and protecting the 

safety of witnesses. Drummond at ¶ 54 (observing the “dangerous nature of gang violence and 

the genuine need to protect witnesses testifying against gang members from the deadly threat of 

retaliation”). After reviewing the record, we cannot conclude that the court abused its discretion 

in finding that there was a substantial reason to close the courtroom. 

Partial Closure

{¶14} The closure of a courtroom must be no broader than necessary to protect the 

overriding interest. Drummond at ¶ 52. Accord Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39, 48 (1984). 

“The [United States] Supreme Court has noted a special concern for allowing a defendant’s 

family members to attend a trial.” Drummond at ¶ 56. However, the defendant’s right to a 

public trial must be balanced with the administration of justice. Id. at ¶ 51. Furthermore, “the 

presence of the media acts as a safeguard against violations of the Sixth Amendment.” Evans, 

2008-Ohio-4295, at ¶ 19, citing Drummond at ¶ 55. 
6 

 

{¶15} Here, the court made two closure orders. For the remainder of White’s testimony, 

the confidential informant’s testimony, and, ultimately, for the recalling of a previous witness, 

the court ordered the proceedings closed to everyone except the parties, the Sheriff’s 

representatives, and one representative from each of the local media (provided they agreed not to 

publish any identifying information of the witnesses). 

{¶16} For the remainder of the trial, the court ordered the number of family members 

and associates to be limited. From the transcript, it appears that Appellant and the victim’s 

family were asked whom they wanted to have in the courtroom. The court then limited the 

attendance to those people requested. The record is unclear as to whether the court placed a limit 

on the number of names allowed. 

{¶17} The court only partially closed the proceedings and only prohibited family for a 

limited number of witnesses. The closure was narrowly tailored to maintain courtroom security 

and protect the safety of witnesses. See Drummond at ¶ 54. Moreover, the media was permitted 

to remain in the courtroom, and the testimony of the witnesses was made part of the public 

record. See Evans at ¶ 19. See also Drummond at ¶ 55. 

Reasonable Alternatives

{¶18} The court must also consider reasonable alternatives to closing the courtroom. 

Drummond at ¶ 52. Here, the Sheriff’s Department employees informed the court before trial of 

a concern about tension between Appellant’s family and the family of the victim. The decision 

was made to keep spectators out of the first rows during voir dire and trial, and to control the 

comings and goings of individuals into the courtroom. The court provided a warning that it 

“would not tolerate inappropriate conduct, not only in th[e] courtroom, but also on th[e] floor or 
7 

 

in th[e] building.” After the altercation outside the courtroom, the court concluded that its 

warnings were no longer sufficient to protect the proceedings. 

{¶19} In its decision to close the courtroom, the court explained that it had also 

considered other possible alternatives. The court discussed the possibility of concealing the 

witness’ identity, but found that this would obstruct the jury’s view of the witness. The court 

concluded that the members of the jury must be able to view the witness when he or she is 

testifying so that they can use their observations to decide the witness’ credibility. 

Findings of Fact

{¶20} Lastly, the court must make findings adequate to support the closure. Id. at ¶ 52. 

The court thoroughly detailed its findings that: (1) two witnesses had changed their testimony to 

conflict with their prior testimony to the grand jury, and a third witness was coming close to 

doing the same; (2) the police had received information from a reliable source that a person 

known as Mook Duke was attempting to intimidate witnesses; (3) White initially expressed fear 

of being shot, although she later recanted that statement; (4) White exhibited extreme 

nervousness while testifying, often saying she could not remember details; (5) Appellant was 

believed to be a member of MA Zone, a gang that had been linked to recent gun violence; (6) 

Appellant had been shot recently and refused to cooperate with the police in their investigation. 

{¶21} After reviewing the record, we cannot conclude that the trial court’s decision to 

partially close the courtroom was arbitrary, unreasonable, or unconscionable. The court had 

substantial reasons to be concerned about witness intimidation and the safety of the witnesses. 

Furthermore, because of an altercation between a witness and a member of the victim’s family, 

the court had a reasonable basis for limiting the contact between Appellant’s family and friends 
8 

 

and the victim’s family and friends. The court did not completely close the courtroom, it 

considered reasonable alternatives, and made adequate findings to support the closure. 

Failure to provide jury instruction

{¶22} Appellant argues the court tainted the jury by failing to provide instructions as to 

why the courtroom was partially closed. Appellant did not request such an instruction at trial. 

Because Appellant did not raise this issue at trial, it is forfeited on appeal, and Appellant must 

establish plain error. State v. Long, 9th Dist. No. 25249, 2011-Ohio-1050, ¶ 14. 

Under Crim.R. 52(B), [p]lain errors or defects affecting substantial rights may be 

noticed although they were not brought to the attention of the court. By its very 

terms, the rule places three limitations on a reviewing court’s decision to correct 

an error despite the absence of a timely objection at trial. First, there must be an 

error, i.e., a deviation from a legal rule. Second, the error must be plain. To be 

plain within the meaning of Crim.R. 52(B), an error must be an obvious defect in 

the trial proceedings. Third, the error must have affected substantial rights. We 

have interpreted this aspect of the rule to mean that the trial court’s error must 

have affected the outcome of the trial. 

(Internal citations and quotations omitted.) State v. Barnes, 94 Ohio St.3d 21, 27 (2002). “A 

trial court’s jury instructions must be correct and complete statements of the law.” State v. 

Wilson, 9th Dist. No. 25100, 2011-Ohio-4072, ¶ 24. A trial court does not err by refusing to 

issue an instruction to which a defendant, as a matter of law, is not entitled. State v. Terrion, 9th 

Dist. No. 25368, 2011-Ohio-3800, ¶ 17. 

{¶23} Appellant makes no argument that he was legally entitled to an instruction 

explaining to the jury why certain portions of the proceedings were closed. Nor does Appellant 

argue that the instructions given were incorrect or incomplete statements of the law. Moreover, 

Appellant acknowledges that he did not ask the court for such an instruction. We cannot 

conclude that the court erred in not providing the jury with an explanation as to why the 

proceedings were partially closed. 
9 

 

{¶24} Appellant’s second assignment of error is overruled. 

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR IV

THE VERDICT IN THIS CASE FINDING APPELLANT GUILTY OF 

RECKLESS HOMICIDE IN VIOLATION OF R.C. §2903.041(A) WAS BASED 

UPON INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE. 

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR V

THE VERDICT IN THIS CASE FINDING APPELLANT GUILTY OF 

TAMPERING WITH EVIDENCE IN VIOLATION OF R.C. §2921.12(A)(1) 

WAS BASED UPON INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE. 

{¶25} In his fourth and fifth assignments of error, Appellant argues that there is not 

sufficient evidence to support his convictions. We disagree. 

{¶26} “‘[S]ufficiency’ is a term of art meaning that legal standard which is applied to 

determine whether the case may go to the jury or whether the evidence is legally sufficient to 

support the jury verdict as a matter of law.” State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 386 (1997), 

quoting Black’s Law Dictionary 1433 (6th Ed.1990). “In essence, sufficiency is a test of 

adequacy.” Thompkins at 386. When reviewing a conviction for sufficiency, evidence must be 

viewed in a light most favorable to the prosecution. State v. Jenks, 61 Ohio St.3d 259 (1991), 

paragraph two of the syllabus. The pertinent question is whether “any rational trier of fact could 

have found the essential elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id.

{¶27} “Whether the evidence is legally sufficient to sustain a verdict is a question of 

law.” Thompkins at 386, citing State v. Robinson, 162 Ohio St. 486 (1955). This Court, 

therefore, reviews questions of sufficiency de novo. State v. Salupo, 177 Ohio App.3d 354, 

2008-Ohio-3721, ¶ 4 (9th Dist.).
10 

 

Reckless Homicide

{¶28} A person is guilty of reckless homicide if he or she recklessly causes the death of 

another person. R.C. 2903.041. “A person acts recklessly when, with heedless indifference to 

the consequences, he perversely disregards a known risk that his conduct is likely to cause a 

certain result or is likely to be of a certain nature. A person is reckless with respect to 

circumstances when, with heedless indifference to the consequences, he perversely disregards a 

known risk that such circumstances are likely to exist.” R.C. 2901.22(C). 

{¶29} A confidential informant testified that he had a reputation among the Lorain 

county jail inmates as being legally savvy and that inmates would often come to him for legal 

advice. According to the informant, when Appellant first came to speak with him about his case, 

he had only been charged with tampering with evidence. The informant testified that Appellant 

was “pretty upset” and wanted to know if he could be charged with murder when “he didn’t 

mean to kill [the] guy * * *. He said that what happened, he had a beef with some people that 

both of them knew. He wanted to go pop these people. This kid Chuckie didn’t want nothing to 

do with it.” According to the informant, Appellant explained that he and Chuckie argued, that he 

got upset, cocked the gun, and pointed it at Chuckie. The gun then accidentally went off. When 

the informant asked Appellant why he didn’t just call the police, he said that he panicked. The 

confidential informant further testified that Appellant was “happy” when he was later indicted 

for reckless homicide “because it wasn’t a murder.” 

{¶30} Detective Barbee testified that he knew Appellant because he was a victim in a 

prior shooting that Barbee had investigated. According to Barbee, Appellant had been shot twice 

last year, but no charges were filed because of a lack of cooperation from witnesses. It would 
11 

 

appear, having been previously shot himself, that Appellant was aware of the risks posed by 

firearms. 

{¶31} Viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution, there is 

evidence that Appellant acted with heedless indifference to the consequences, when he cocked a 

loaded handgun and pointed it at Chuckie while the two argued, and that he “perversely 

disregard[ed] a known risk that his conduct” would likely cause the death of Chuckie. See R.C. 

2901.22(C). Appellant’s fourth assignment of error is overruled. 

Tampering with Evidence

{¶32} A person is guilty of tampering with evidence if he or she, “knowing that an 

official proceeding or investigation is in progress, or is about to be or likely to be instituted, * * * 

alter[s], destroy[s], conceal[s], or remove[s] any record, document, or thing, with purpose to 

impair its value or availability as evidence in such proceeding or investigation[.]” R.C. 

2921.12(A)(1). “A person acts knowingly, regardless of his purpose, when he is aware that his 

conduct will probably cause a certain result or will probably be of a certain nature. A person has 

knowledge of circumstances when he is aware that such circumstances probably exist.” R.C. 

2901.22(B). 

{¶33} The confidential informant testified that Appellant had come to him seeking legal 

advice while the two were incarcerated in the Lorain county jail. According to the informant, 

after Appellant explained that he had shot Chuckie by accident, the informant asked him where 

the gun was, and Appellant responded: “it’s gone.”

{¶34} Anderson testified that he was in the bathroom when he heard a gunshot. After 

hearing the gunshot, Anderson said he ran into the kitchen where he saw Chuckie lying, shot on 

the floor. White and Nelson were also there. Anderson testified that while Appellant was in the 
12 

 

house immediately prior to the shooting, he was no longer in the house when the group was 

standing in the kitchen.

{¶35} Chuckie was shot in the chest with a gun. Appellant, Chuckie, Nelson, Anderson, 

and White were in the house at the time of the shooting. Out of that group, none of the others 

testified to having possessed a gun, and Appellant was the only person to leave the scene. No 

gun was found at the house.

{¶36} Viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution, there is 

sufficient evidence for a juror to conclude that Appellant removed the gun from the house with 

the purpose of preventing it from being used in the investigation into Chuckie’s death. 

Appellant’s fifth assignment of error is overruled. 

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR I

APPELLANT’S CONVICTION FOR RECKLESS HOMICIDE IN VIOLATION 

OF R.C. §2903.041(A) WAS AGAINST THE MANIFEST WEIGHT OF THE 

EVIDENCE. 

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR III

APPELLANT’S CONVICTION FOR TAMPERING WITH EVIDENCE IN 

VIOLATION OF R.C. §2921.12(A)(1) WAS AGAINST THE MANIFEST 

WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE. 

{¶37} In his first and third assignments of error, Appellant argues that his convictions 

are against the manifest weight of the evidence. We disagree. 

{¶38} A conviction that is supported by sufficient evidence may still be found to be 

against the manifest weight of the evidence. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d at 387; Eastley v. 

Volkman, 132 Ohio St.3d 328, 2012-Ohio-2179, ¶ 12. “Weight of the evidence concerns ‘the 

inclination of the greater amount of credible evidence, offered in a trial, to support one side of 

the issue rather than the other.’” (Emphasis sic.) Thompkins at 387, quoting Black’s at 1594. 
13 

 

In determining whether a criminal conviction is against the manifest weight of the 

evidence, an appellate court must review the entire record, weigh the evidence 

and all reasonable inferences, consider the credibility of witnesses and determine 

whether, in resolving conflicts in the evidence, the trier of fact clearly lost its way 

and created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the conviction must be 

reversed and a new trial ordered.

State v. Otten, 33 Ohio App.3d 339, 340 (9th Dist.1986). “When a court of appeals reverses a 

judgment of a trial court on the basis that the verdict is against the weight of the evidence, the 

appellate court sits as a ‘thirteenth juror’ and disagrees with the fact[-]finder’s resolution of the 

conflicting testimony.” Thompkins at 387. An appellate court should exercise the power to 

reverse a judgment as against the manifest weight of the evidence only in exceptional cases. 

State v. Prade, 139 Ohio App.3d 676, 696 (9th Dist.2000). 

{¶39} At trial, Jeris Nelson testified that he was in the house when Chuckie was shot, 

but that Appellant was not. Nelson admitted that this testimony was inconsistent with his prior 

statements to police and his testimony to the grand jury. In his first statement to the police, 

Nelson said that he was not inside the house at the time of the shooting, but ran to the house 

when he heard the gunshot. Nelson later changed his statement to say that both he and Appellant 

were in the house. In a third interview with police, Nelson again said that both he and Appellant 

were in the house at the time of the shooting and explained that he lied in his first interview 

because he was “scared and did not want to cooperate[.]” At the grand jury, Nelson testified that 

Appellant, Anderson, and Chuckie were in the back bedroom when the gun was fired. Nelson 

further testified at the grand jury that he was with Chuckie in the kitchen after the shooting when 

Appellant came in, apologized to Chuckie, and told him it was an accident. At trial, Nelson said 

that his previous statements to police, and his testimony to the grand jury, were not true and that 

he was speaking out of fear at the time. 
14 

 

{¶40} Clyde Anderson testified twice at trial. Anderson first testified that Appellant was 

not in the house at the time of the shooting. He admitted that he had made statements to the 

police, and testified to the grand jury, that Appellant was present. At the grand jury, Anderson 

said that Appellant and Chuckie entered the bedroom as he and White were exiting, and upon 

leaving the bedroom he immediately went into the bathroom, which is where he was when he 

heard the gunshot. 

{¶41} A couple of days after he testified at trial, Anderson voluntarily requested that he 

be allowed to testify again to tell the jury what he knew. This time, Anderson’s testimony was 

consistent with his testimony to the grand jury. Anderson said that he had gone into the bedroom 

with White, and as they were leaving the bedroom Appellant and Chuckie were walking in. 

Anderson went straight into the bathroom, and heard the gunshot shortly thereafter. He ran out 

of the bathroom into the kitchen, and saw Chuckie lying, shot on the floor. Anderson testified 

that Appellant was no longer in the house. When Anderson was asked why he testified 

differently a couple of days before, he explained that he was scared because of several phone 

calls he had received prior to the trial.

{¶42} Melissa White’s testimony was also inconsistent. Most of her testimony was that 

she could not remember if Appellant was in the house at the time of the shooting. She said that 

he was there earlier, but wasn’t sure if he was still there at the time Chuckie was killed. White 

agreed that she was sure in her prior statements to the police that Appellant was there, but said 

that now, at the time of trial, she couldn’t remember. 

{¶43} A confidential informant testified that Appellant admitted to him that he shot 

Chuckie by accident. According to the informant, Appellant and Chuckie had gotten into an 
15 

 

argument, Appellant cocked the gun and pointed it at Chuckie, and the gun accidently went off. 

When the informant asked Appellant where the gun was, Appellant responded that “it’s gone.”

{¶44} The confidential informant has an extensive criminal record, and he received a 

plea deal in a pending case for his testimony in this and two other, unrelated cases. In his 

pending case, the informant was charged with two fifth degree felonies and one felony of the 

third degree. The State agreed to drop the firearm specifications and recommend a two-year 

sentence. Further, the informant’s girlfriend, a co-defendant, received probation for her pending 

charges. These facts were provided to the jury for them to consider in evaluating the credibility 

of the witness. 

{¶45} In reaching its verdict, the jury was entitled to believe all, part, or none of the 

testimony of each witness. Prince v. Jordan, 9th Dist. No. 04CA008423, 2004-Ohio-7184, ¶ 35, 

citing State v. Jackson, 86 Ohio App.3d 29, 33 (4th Dist.1993). “[T]he weight to be given the 

evidence and the credibility of the witnesses are primarily for the trier of the facts.” State v. 

DeHass, 10 Ohio St.2d 230 (1967), paragraph one of the syllabus. Notwithstanding the various 

versions of the events presented by several witnesses, we cannot conclude that Appellant’s 

convictions are against the weight of the evidence. After reviewing the record, this is not the 

exceptional case which requires reversal. See Prade, 139 Ohio App.3d at 696. Accordingly, 

Appellant’s first and third assignments of error are overruled.

III. 

{¶46} Appellant’s assignments of error are overruled. The judgment of the Lorain 

County Court of Common Pleas is affirmed. 

Judgment affirmed. 
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 There were reasonable grounds for this appeal. 

 We order that a special mandate issue out of this Court, directing the Court of Common 

Pleas, County of Lorain, State of Ohio, to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy of 

this journal entry shall constitute the mandate, pursuant to App.R. 27. 

 Immediately upon the filing hereof, this document shall constitute the journal entry of 

judgment, and it shall be file stamped by the Clerk of the Court of Appeals at which time the 

period for review shall begin to run. App.R. 22(C). The Clerk of the Court of Appeals is 

instructed to mail a notice of entry of this judgment to the parties and to make a notation of the 

mailing in the docket, pursuant to App.R. 30. 

 Costs taxed to Appellant. 

 

 CARLA MOORE 

 FOR THE COURT 

DICKINSON, J. 

BELFANCE, J. 

CONCUR.

APPEARANCES:

AARON T. BAKER, Attorney at Law, for Appellant. 

DENNIS P. WILL, Prosecuting Attorney, and MARY R. SLANCZKA, Assistant Prosecuting 

Attorney, for Appellee.