alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 18-11505

Summary Calendar

WILLIAM GALLAHER, II, 

 Plaintiff - Appellant

v.

CITY OF MAYPEARL, TEXAS, 

 Defendant - Appellee

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Texas

USDC No. 3:17-CV-1400

Before DAVIS, HAYNES and GRAVES, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

In this § 1983 suit, William Gallaher alleged that former City of 

Maypearl (“City”) police officer Shahid Mohamad violated his rights under the 

Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments by engaging in excessive force and false 

arrest following a pullover of his vehicle on May 27, 2015. The plaintiff sued 

both the City and Officer Mohamad. The City moved to dismiss under Federal 

 

* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not 

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH 

CIR. R. 47.5.4.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

July 8, 2019

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

 Case: 18-11505 Document: 00515024907 Page: 1 Date Filed: 07/08/2019
No. 18-11505

2

Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim, which the district 

court granted. Gallaher later dismissed Officer Mohamad without prejudice

under Rule 41(a)(1). This appeal followed. 

Except in rare circumstances approved by the Supreme Court and as set 

out in Rule 54(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, we only have 

jurisdiction to review final orders of the district court. In Ryan v. Occidental 

Petroleum Corp., we held that when the district court dismisses certain claims

with prejudice and the plaintiff then voluntarily dismisses the remaining 

claims without prejudice, we do not have appellate jurisdiction to review the 

appeal. 577 F.2d 298, 301–02 (5th Cir. 1978). We reasoned that the judgment 

was not final because the plaintiff did not face an adverse ruling on his entire

case in light of plaintiff’s voluntary dismissal of certain claims which formed 

the bases of his complaint. Id.

Ryan controls this case. Because plaintiff voluntarily dismissed his case 

against Officer Mohamad without prejudice, plaintiff did not suffer an adverse 

ruling as to this defendant and was entitled to pursue another action against 

him. Thus, the judgment appealed from is not a final judgment, and we must 

dismiss this appeal for lack of jurisdiction.

APPEAL DISMISSED. 

 Case: 18-11505 Document: 00515024907 Page: 2 Date Filed: 07/08/2019
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Troy J. GREEN, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 06-7761.

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted: March 22, 2007.

Decided: March 28, 2007.

*278Troy J. Green, Appellant Pro Se. Thomas Oliver Mucklow, Assistant United States Attorney, Martinsburg, West Virginia, for Appellee.

Before WIDENER and WILKINSON, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior Circuit Judge.

Dismissed by unpublished PER CURIAM opinion.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

PER CURIAM:

Troy J. Green seeks to appeal the district court’s order accepting the recommendation of the magistrate judge and denying relief on his 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (2000) motion. The order is not appeal-able unless a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of appealability. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1) (2000). A certifícate of appealability will not issue absent “a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2) (2000). A prisoner satisfies this standard by demonstrating that reasonable jurists would find that any assessment of the constitutional claims by the district court is debatable or wrong and that any dispositive procedural ruling by the district court is likewise debatable. *Miller-El v. Cockrell,*537 U.S. 322, 336-38, 123 S.Ct. 1029, 154 L.Ed.2d 931 (2003); *Slack v. McDaniel,*529 U.S. 473, 484, 120 S.Ct. 1595, 146 L.Ed.2d 542 (2000); *Rose v. Lee,*252 F.3d 676, 683-84 (4th Cir.2001). We have independently reviewed the record and conclude that Green has not made the requisite showing. Accordingly, we deny his motion for a certificate of appealability and dismiss the appeal. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

*DISMISSED.*
**Exhibit 32.2**

 

**CERTIFICATIONPURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350**

 

**AS ADOPTED PURSUANTTO SECTION 906 OF**

**THE SARBANES OXLEYACT OF 2002**

 

In connectionwith the Quarterly Report of Euramax International, Inc. (the “Company”) onForm 10-Q for the period ending March 26, 2004 as filed with the Securities andExchange Commission on the date hereof (the “Report”), I, R. Scott Vansant,Chief Financial Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1350,as adopted pursuant to section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

 

(1)           the Report fully complies with the requirements of Section13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

 

(2)                                  theinformation contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects,the financial position and results of operations of the Company.

 
| /s/   R. Scott Vansant            |   |
|----------------------------------------|--------|
| R. Scott  Vansant                      |
| Chief  Financial Officer and Secretary |
| May 7, 2004                            |

 

----
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 21-7523

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

NOAH BILLIE, a/k/a Red,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina, at 

Columbia. Joseph F. Anderson, Jr., Senior District Judge. (3:17-cr-00246-JFA-2)

Submitted: February 17, 2022 Decided: February 23, 2022

Before AGEE and RUSHING, Circuit Judges, and SHEDD, Senior Circuit Judge.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Noah Billie, Appellant Pro Se.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
2

PER CURIAM:

Noah Billie appeals from the district court’s order denying his motion for 

compassionate release pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A), as amended by the First Step 

Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-391, § 603(b)(1), 132 Stat. 5194, 5239. We review a district 

court’s denial of a compassionate release motion for abuse of discretion. United States v. 

Kibble, 992 F.3d 326, 329 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 142 S. Ct. 383 (2021). We have 

reviewed the record in this case and discern no abuse of discretion. Accordingly, we affirm 

the district court’s order. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal 

contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would 

not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED
FOURTH AMENDMENT TO THE

CNG NONEMPLOYEE DIRECTORS' FEE PLAN TRUST AGREEMENT

THIS AMENDMENT is made and entered into as of the 25th day of April, 2000, by and between CONNECTICUT NATURAL GAS CORPORATION, a Connecticut corporation with its principal office in Hartford, Connecticut (hereinafter referred to as "CNG") and
Putnam Fiduciary Trust Company (hereinafter referred to as the "Trustee").

W I T N E S S E T H:

WHEREAS, by Agreement dated September 28, 1995 (the "Agreement") CNG and FLEET BANK, N.A. entered into an Agreement entitled CNG Nonemployee Directors' Fee Plan Trust Agreement; and

WHEREAS, Putnam Fiduciary Trust Company has been appointed successor trustee under the Agreement and is currently serving as the trustee thereunder; and

WHEREAS, the parties reserve the right to amend the Agreement in Article 10, Section 10.1 thereof, subject to the conditions set forth therein; and

WHEREAS, the Company wishes to amend the Agreement in the particulars set forth below;

NOW, THEREFORE, the Company and the Trustee agree to amend the Agreement, as heretofore amended by the First, Second and Third Amendments thereto, as follows effective immediately prior to the effective date of the consummation of the merger of CTG
Resources, Inc. with and into Oak Merger Co. pursuant to the Agreement and Plan of Merger, dated as of June 29, 1999, by and among CTG Resources, Inc., Energy East Corporation and Oak Merger Co.:

1.	Subparagraph (j) of Paragraph 5.2, as amended by the Third Amendment, is hereby amended by the deletion of the first sentence thereof and the substitution of the following sentence in lieu thereof:

"The Trustee may invest in securities (including stock or rights to acquire stock) or obligations issued by Energy East Corporation or successor thereto, including common stock thereof, as directed by CNG."

2.	Except as herein above modified and amended, the Agreement, as amended, shall remain in full force and effect.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties have caused this Fourth Amendment to be duly executed and respective corporate seals to be hereunto affixed as of the date first above written.

ATTEST:				CONNECTICUT NATURAL GAS CORPORATION



By S/ Jean S. McCarthy

Its Vice President Human Resources

ATTEST:				PUTNAM FIDUCIARY TRUST COMPANY



By S/ Tina Campbell

Its Senior Vice President



STATE OF CONNECTICUT	)

)  SS.  August 10, 2000

COUNTY OF HARTFORD		)

Personally appeared Jean S. McCarthy, Vice President of Connecticut Natural Gas Corporation, signer of the foregoing instrument, and acknowledged the same to be his free act and deed as such Vice President, and the free act and
deed of said corporation, before me.



Alfred B. Lawson, Jr.

Commissioner of the Superior Court

Notary Public

My Commission Expires:  5-31-01





COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS	)

)  SS. August 11, 2000

COUNTY OF NORFOLK	)

Personally appeared Tina Campbell, Sr. Vice President of Putnam Fiduciary Trust Company, signer of the foregoing instrument, and acknowledged the same to be his free act and deed as such , and the free act and deed of said corporation, before me.



S/ Carol Peters

Notary Public

My Commission Expires:  2/23/07
Exhibit 31(b)
 SECTION 302 CERTIFICATION
      a)
    
    designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such disclosure
controls and procedures to be designed under our supervision, to ensure that material
information relating to the registrant, including its consolidated subsidiaries, is
made known to us by others within those entities, particularly during the period in
which this annual report is being prepared;b)
    
    designed such internal control over financial reporting, or caused such
internal control over financial reporting to be designed under our supervision, to
provide reasonable assurance regarding the reliability of financial reporting and the
preparation of financial statements for external purposes in accordance with generally
accepted accounting principles;c)
    
    evaluated the effectiveness of the registrants disclosure controls and
procedures and presented in this report our conclusions about the effectiveness of the
disclosure controls and procedures, as of the end of the period covered by this report
based on such evaluation; andd)
    
    disclosed in this report any change in the registrants internal control over
financial reporting that occurred during the registrants most recent fiscal quarter
(the registrants fourth fiscal quarter in the case of the annual report) that has
materially affected, or is reasonably likely to materially affect, the registrants
internal control over financial reporting.
  a)
    
    all significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or operation
of internal control over financial reporting which are reasonably likely to adversely
affect the registrants ability to record, process, summarize and report financial
information; andb)
    
    any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other employees
who have a significant role in the registrants internal control over financial
reporting.
  /s/ Herman F. Dick, Jr.Herman F. Dick, Jr.Vice President, Secretary, Treasurer and Chief
Financial Officer
Exhibit 31.3

CERTIFICATION OF PRINCIPAL EXECUTIVE OFFICER PURSUANT TO

RULE 13A-14(A)/15D-14(A) OF THE SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT

AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 302 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

I, Narbeh Derhacobian, certify that:

1. I have
reviewed this Annual Report on Form 10-K/A of Adesto Technologies Corporation; and

2. Based on my
knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect
to the period covered by this report.

Date: April 28, 2017



By:

/s/ Narbeh DerhacobianNarbeh Derhacobian President and Chief
Executive Officer(Principal Executive Officer)
#### Marissa S. Kay, Appellant, v State of New York, Respondent.

[4 NYS3d 301]

In a claim, inter alia, to recover damages for medical malpractice, the claimant appeals, as limited by her brief, from so much of an order of the Court of Claims (Lopez-Summa, J.), dated July 30, 2012, as granted that branch of the defendant’s motion which was to dismiss the claim for lack of standing.

Ordered that the order is affirmed insofar as appealed from, with costs.

The claimant is a developmentally disabled young adult. Shortly after the claimant’s eighteenth birthday, her parents filed a petition in the Surrogate’s Court, Suffolk County, seeking to be appointed guardians of her person pursuant to SCPA article 17-A. The petition was granted, and by decree dated *675February 3, 2010, the claimant’s parents were appointed guardians of her person. More than one year later, on June 7, 2011, the claimant’s father, Jonathan D. Kay (hereinafter Kay), filed this claim on her behalf, seeking damages, inter alia, for acts of medical malpractice allegedly committed shortly after the claimant’s birth. The defendant moved to dismiss the claim on several grounds, arguing, among other things, that Kay lacked standing to file this action on the claimant’s behalf. The Court of Claims granted that branch of the defendant’s motion which was to dismiss the claim based on Kay’s lack of standing, concluding that the decree appointing him guardian of the claimant’s person did not authorize him to file and prosecute this action on her behalf.

SCPA 1701 provides that the Surrogate’s Court “has power over the property of an infant and is authorized and empowered to appoint a guardian of the person or of the property or of both of an infant.” The term “infant,” as used in SCPA article 17-A guardianship proceedings, includes a developmentally disabled person (SCPA 1761). The SCPA further specifies that an infant may appear in an action by the guardian of his or her property *(see*SCPA 402 [1]), or by a guardian ad litem *(see*SCPA 402 [2]). In addition, CPLR 1201 provides in relevant part that where no guardian ad litem has been appointed, an infant “shall appear by the guardian of his property.”

Contrary to the claimant’s contention, Kay’s appointment as guardian over her person did not authorize him to file this claim and prosecute it on her behalf. As guardian of the claimant’s person, Kay has custody and control over her person “with a concurrent duty to watch over [her] general welfare” *(Baker v Bronx Lebanon Hosp. Ctr.,*53 AD3d 21, 24 [2008]). This is distinct from the role of a guardian of the property of an infant or a developmentally disabled person, who is required to “protect, preserve and manage” the property (SCPA 1723) so as to provide for the ward’s personal, health, and educational needs *(see Baker v Bronx Lebanon Hosp. Ctr.,*53 AD3d at 24).

The claimant’s remaining contentions either are without merit or need not be reached in light of our determination.

Accordingly, the Court of Claims properly granted that branch of the defendant’s motion which was to dismiss the claim for lack of standing.

Eng, P.J., Chambers, Austin and Cohen, JJ., concur.
Exhibit 32.2

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO

18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,

AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO

SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the hhgregg, Inc. (the Company) Annual Report on Form 10-K for the period ended March 31, 2010 as
filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the Report), I, Jeremy J. Aguilar, Chief Financial Officer of the Company, certify pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that, to the best of my knowledge:



| | (1). | The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended; and
| | ---- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



| | (2). | The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.
| | ---- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



By:

/s/    JEREMY J.
AGUILARJeremy J. Aguilar
Chief Financial Officer


Dated: May 27, 2010

This certification
accompanies this Report pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 and shall not, except to the extent required by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, be deemed filed by the Company for purposes of Section 18 of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, as amended.
#### McDow *v.*The State.

Submitted May 21,

Decided July 17, 1901.

Pish, J.

1: Errors alleged to have been committed upon the trial of a special plea of misnomer in a criminal case do not constitute and can not be considered as proper grounds of a motion for a new trial in the main case ; and this is so although the same jurors passed upon the special plea and upon, the case in chief, it appearing that the two investigations were conducted independently of each other, that the jurors were separately sworn in each, and that there was no direct motion to set aside the finding on the special plea. *Kneeland*v. *State,*62 *Ga.*395; *Boisclair*v. *State,*92 *Ga.*453.

2. An instruction in a criminal case correctly explaining to the jury the elements of the offense for which the accused is on trial is not open to criticism on the ground that the State failed to make out its case. On the contrary, the jury should be informed of the crime charged, in order to enable them, by applying the law to the facts established by the evidence, to determine whether or . not the accused is guilty.

3. The charges complained of which are not dealt with in the preceding note em- ■ braced correct and familiar principles of law, were fully warranted by the evidence, and were not in any sense prejudicial to the accused. There wag, ample evidence to sustain the verdict, and no error in denying a new trial. °

*Judgment affirmed.*

*All the Justices concurring.*

*700. Indictment for assault with intent to murder. Before Judge Henry. Floyd superior court. March 26, 1901.

*Henry Walker,*for plaintiff in error.

*Moses Wright, solicitor-general,*contra.
#### Mary Jo A. STAUNER, Petitioner, v. MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD, Respondent.

No. 2007-3141.

United States Court of Appeals, Federal Circuit.

April 4, 2007.

ORDER

The petitioner having failed to file the required Statement Concerning Discrimination, it is

ORDERED that the petition for review be, and the same hereby is, DISMISSED, for failure to prosecute in accordance with the rules.
Dated:          March 28, 2008
By: /s/
Bruce Kaiserman

Title:
Vice President
Credit Suisse First Boston Mortgage Securities Corp.
I, Bruce Kaiserman, certify that:
1.  I have reviewed this report on Form 10-K and all reports on Form 10-D required to be filed in respect of the period covered by this report on Form 10-K of Credit Suisse First Boston Mortgage Securities Corp. Home Equity Mortgage Trust 2007-2 (the "Exchange Act periodic reports");
2.  Based on my knowledge, the Exchange Act periodic reports, taken as a whole, do not contain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this report;
3.  Based on my knowledge, all of the distribution, servicing and other information required to be provided under Form 10-D for the period covered by this report is included in the Exchange Act periodic reports;
4.  Based on my knowledge and the servicer compliance statements required in this report under Item 1123 of Regulation AB, and except as disclosed in the Exchange Act periodic reports, the servicers have fulfilled their obligations under the servicing agreements in all material respects; and
5.  All of the reports on assessment of compliance with servicing criteria for asset-backed securities and their related attestation reports on assessment of compliance with servicing criteria for asset-backed securities required to be included in this report in accordance with Item 1122 of Regulation AB and Exchange Act Rules 13a-18 and 15d-18 have been included as an exhibit to this report, except as otherwise disclosed in this report. Any material instances of noncompliance described in such reports have been disclosed in this report on Form 10-K.
Bruce Kaiserman
Exhibit 31 : Rule 13a-14(d)/15d-14(d) Certifications
(senior officer in charge of securitization of the depositor)
Name:
In giving the certifications above, I have reasonably relied on information provided to me by the following unaffiliated parties:
LaSalle Bank National Association, as CustodianSelect Portfolio Servicing, Inc., as ServicerU.S. Bank National Association, as Trustee
1

The Honorable Richard E. Dorr, United States District Judge for the Western

District of Missouri.

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 05-2896

___________

Joe Aitro, *

*

Appellant, *

*

v. * Appeal from the United States

* District Court for the

Henry S. Clapper; David Munton; * Western District of Missouri.

George Nichols; City of Lockwood, *

Missouri; Lockwood, MO Police * [UNPUBLISHED]

Department; Ryan Robison; Ruth *

Cottingham; Tamara Dewild; Lathrop *

& Gage, L.C., *

*

Appellees. *

___________

Submitted: August 28, 2006

Filed: September 5, 2006

___________

Before RILEY, COLLOTON, and GRUENDER, Circuit Judges.

___________

PER CURIAM.

Joe Aitro (Aitro) appeals from the district court’s1

 dismissal of his complaint

with prejudice. We dismiss the appeal with prejudice for failure to comply with the

rules of appellate procedure. See Fed. R. App. P. 3(a)(2), 28(a); 8th Cir. R. 28A(f);
-2-

Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 834-35 n.46 (1975) (pro se litigants must comply

with relevant rules of procedure); Haugen v. Sutherlin, 804 F.2d 490, 491 (8th Cir.

1986) (where appellant violated Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure and Eighth

Circuit Rules pertaining to form for briefs and record, holding that any further filings

by appellant would result in sanctions and dismissing appeal as frivolous). Aitro’s

request for oral argument and his motion seeking remand to state court are denied.

______________________________