Filed 2 / 25 / 21 In re F.W. CA2/6

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or or dered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SIX

IN RE F.W

.,

A Person Coming Under The Juvenile Court Law

.

_____________________________ L.W.,

Petitioner

,

v.

THE SUPERIOR COURT OF VENTURA COUNTY,

Respondent;

VENTURA COUNTY HUMAN SERVICES AGENCY,

Real Party in Interest. 2d Juv. No. B 30 8849 (Super. Ct. No

. J07 2027 ) ( Ventura County)2 L.W

. ( mother ) petitions for extraordinary writ relief fro m the juvenile court’s order terminating reunification services for her minor child F.W. and setting the matter for a permanen c y planning hearing pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code 1
section 366.26. Mother contends the court’s order is not supported by substantial evidence. We deny the petition.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Mother and A.W . ( father) 2 a re the natural parents of F.W.
A fter mother gave birth to F.W. in February 2 019, the child

tes ted positive for methadone and was admitted to the natal intensive care unit for treatment of withdrawal symptoms

. On February 2 1 , 2019, the Ventura County Human Services Agency (HS A ) filed a dependency petition alleging failure to protect ( § 300 , subd. (b)). In its February 22 , 2019 findings and order detaining F.W., the juvenile court stated among other things that “[t]he child’s [two older] siblings are currently under legal guardianship with [the paternal gr andparents] due to [the] parents’ chronic substance abuse. The child’s parents have failed to address the issues necessitating the legal guardianship of the siblings. T he child, [F.W.], is at risk of similar abuse and neglect in the parents’ care. ” The court also found that father “has
unaddressed me ntal health issues” that “have led him to self

medicate and these actions periodically render him unable to safely care for the child.”
On March 5
, 2019
, F.W. was discharged from the hospital
and placed in a confidential foster home, where he has remained

1 All undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.

2 Father is not a party to t his writ proceeding.3

throughout the dependency proceedings. I n accordance with HSA’s recommendation, mother and father were offered family
reunification services and super vis ed visitati on

. In its six

- month review report , HSA stated that mother was complying with the requirements of h er case plan , which included participation in Family Treatment C ourt (FTC)

, outpatient
substance abuse treatmen t
, attendance at AA meetings, an d random drug testing

. HS A noted that “[w]hile the mother ha s remained abstinent from substance use, behaviorally, she ha s made decision s that placed her recovery at risk for relapse and potentially pla ce the child at risk for harm/danger. Specifically, the mother has struggle d with her relationship with the presumed father

. . . . [HSA] is worried o f [ sic ] the authenticity of the mother’s statements to separate and not plan to reunify with the pre sume d father, should the child return to the mother’s car e

.

. . . Additionally, the concept of honesty is a cornerstone of recovery with substance use and the mother’s lack of transparency has also raised questions in terms of benefit from
services. Should t he mother continue to make dishonest statements, ‘tell others what they want to hear,’ and not follow through on tasks which benefit her and the child, additional

tre atment services may not help the mother be successful with managing her recovery and incre ase the risk of relapse. ”
HSA nevertheless recommended an additional six months of reunification service s for both parents , and the court so
ordered. Pursuant to HSA’s recommendation, mother’s visitation
with F. W. w as liberalized from supervised to monitored, with one hour of weekly visitatio n adde d for Therapeutic Visitation Cent e r (TVC) services.4 In its status report for the 12

- month review hearing, HSA recommended that both parents be offered an additional six

mo nths of services

. HSA stated that “[d]uring the reporting period, the mother found success in terms of the following: completing outpatient tre atment services, completion of individual therapy, increase/liberalization of visitation,
adherence to the reco mmendations made in the psychological evaluation, con sistent and voluntary participation in Parent Advocate Services (PAS), modification and adherenc e to medication management, and engagement with [TVC] services

. . . . The mother also self reports to be working, part time, as a
writer and has discussed the possibility of working full time [ sic ].
The mother has also reta ined support from the maternal grandparents and remains living in their home. . . . The mother, as a whole, seems more confident in her n eeds and appear ance, than in the past. ”
HSA concluded that F.W. could not yet be returned to mother’s custody because “she has not yet demonstrated sufficient benefit from services which were chosen to mitigate the safety concerns that brought the family to the attention of this agency.” HSA also “ noted some worries in terms of the unclear nature of the relationship status between the mother and [ th e ] presumed father. The mother has relayed that she intends to follow through with

. . . divorc[ing] the presumed father but has not provided any details or i nformation on how this process would take shape. ” HSA added that “ the parent’s [ sic ] ongoing

commu nication is not a child welfare issue nor a criminal act. However, when the parents are communic at ing information pertaining to visitation and making efforts to coordinate without approval or consultation, worries are present in terms of5

boundaries. Additionally, the mother must continue with individual therap y . . . and must coordinate with [ HSA] in terms of how she will access this resource.” HSA also noted that “[h]owever, the mother has made efforts in addressing components in her recovery and substance use treatment services which will allow [HSA] to further assess benefit and e xpand (liberalize) visitat ion.”
At the conclusion of th e February 21, 2020 12

- month review hearing, the court granted both parents an additional six

mo nths of reunification services. An interi m review hearing was scheduled for April 16, 2020

, to address liberalization o f mother’s
visitation with F.W.
On March 30 , 2020, in response to state and county order s regarding the COVID

- 1 9 pandemic, the presiding jud ge of the juvenile court issue d an order temporarily susp ending court

ordered in

- pers on visits for d ependent children and other mi nors in out

- of

- home placement s

. 3 The order stated among ot her things
that H S A wa s authorized to continue allow ing in

- person visits i f
no HSA employee h ad to be present, no one participating in the
visit had exhibited symptoms of being exposed to COVID

- 19, and the child’s cur rent caregiver did not object. The order further
stated that “HSA shall make reasonabl e efforts to facilitate virtual visitation via telepho ne, cell p hone, computer, Facet ime, Skype, or other similar technology for non

- physical contact in

- lieu of any suspended court ordered in

- person visits. ” The order

3 We grant HSA’s request for judicial notice of the juvenile court’s order a nd Emergency Rule 6, which was issued by the Judicial Council to provide guidance on vi sitatio n d uring the COVID

- 19 pan demic with children in out

- of

- home place ments

.6

remained in effect until May 26, 2020, after which in

- person visits were resumed.
At the 1 8

- month review hearing, HSA and F.W.’s counsel
both recommended that reunification services be terminated for both parents and that the matter be set for a section 366.26 hearing. Social worker Tiffany Guerr a p repared HSA’s report and testified at the contested hearing. Guerra concluded that mother had not met the objectives of her case plan since the last review hearing because she had missed seven random drugs tests and had twice tested positive for al cohol

— on March 2, 2020

, with
a b lood alcohol level of .02 percent , and again on July 21, 2020

, with a blood alcohol level o f .06 percent

. G uerra initiated the latter test the same day that father was admitted to the hospital for alcohol abuse. When asked to explain why she had missed drug tests, mother falsely claimed the testing sites w ere closed due to the pandemic. In July 2020,
mother ’s counselor informed Guerra that she did not believe mother was being ho nest about her substance abuse. Mother claimed that the first positive tes t in March 2020 was due to her taking NyQuil, and denied the accuracy of the test conducted on July 21. There were also inconsi stencies in mother’s participation in substance abuse services , and sh e had m issed medical appointments and minimized F.W.’s needs.
Because F.W .’s foster parents had objected to in

- person visits after the order suspending such visits was entered, HS A arranged for virtual visits. When F.W.’s foster parents sent mother several emails to arrange for virtua l visits with F.W.

, mother initially did not respond. Virtual visits were first offered
on Marc h 18 , 2020, but due to mother’s failure to respond the first such visit did not take place until April 8

. When Guerra7

s poke to mother on the phone on April 7, mother said she was resistant to participating it virtual visits because it made her feel
sad and she was afraid she would cry and did not want to do so
while on a video chat with the child. Mother added that she had not responded to the foster parents’ emails because she was experiencing negative emotions about the fact that they would

not agree to in

- person visits. On July 21

, 2020, the paternal grandparents, who live in
Thousand Oaks and are the guardians of mother and father’s ten

year

- old son P.W. and two

- year

- old daughter S.W., sent H S A a letter stating their o bservations regarding mother and f ather’s progress and the benefit of the services they were receiving. The paternal grand parents stated their belief that mother and father “ha ve n ot healed significantly from the underlying opio id . . . dependencies . . . a nd its de bilitating impact on their abilities to
function responsi bility for the care of others.” The paternal grandparents also conveyed their concerns regarding “the eve r

- present risk of relapse and susceptibility to use other addictive substances” and mother and father’s “denial of the impact their lifest yle has had” on their children. They
noted that when P.W. came to live with them less than a year
before F.W . was born , he “had never been to school, couldn’t count to 10 or identify the letter s on an eye chart, [and] had 9
cavities and an abscessed tooth.” On his first day of school, “he
told the whole class that he was accustomed to panhandling to help buy fo od for the family wh ile they lived in th eir van parked behind Walmart.” The parental grandparents also stated their opinions that “if [mother] had not been tak en in by her parents last August a nd [father] had not secured government

- assisted
veterans housi ng they wo uld still be homeless or worse.” The8

paternal grandparents went on to state their belief “that the interests of [F .W.] are better served by re maining with the foster caregivers . . . . With them, he has become accustomed to a stable, loving hom e and the additional support [and] care he needs.” In HSA’s report for the 18

- month review hearing, Guerra stated that mother “has shown success in completing and participating in many case plan services . . . . Although [ mother] has demonstrated an overall improvement, [HSA] continues to
have concerns that substance abuse i ssues were not truthfully
addressed as well as the co

- dependency between the parents.
D espite their reports of remaining separate, their frequent

commu nication, the father’s reported alcohol abuse, and [mother’s] positive alcohol testing results further evoke concerns with regard to [ her ] substance abuse and her receptive recovery

. Additionally, [HSA] is concerned that the l ack of insight regarding the developmental impacts the parent [ s’ ] lifestyle has on their oldest child, plac es [F.W.] at risk for unconscious neglect .”
Mother testified at the contested 18

- month review hearing on her own behalf. S he claimed that she had missed drug tests at the beg inning of the stay

- at

- home orders because s he “wanted to take the isolation [order] seriously” and “didn’t want to put [her parents] in harm [’]s way by leaving the house.” Sh e was currently taking Subutex for her methadone addiction but was in
the process of tapering off the drug

. Mother continue d to claim that her positive test for alcohol in March 2020 was due to her ingestion of NyQuil. She admitted for the first time, however, that she drank alcohol prior to the positive test she took in Jul y and that she had “ lied ” to Guerra9

about it. She claimed that she drank a mimosa with her sister at
lunch that day before Guerra informed her that she needed to take a drug t est

. She acknowledged that Guerra had sent her a text in the morning, but claim ed she did not see the text until the
afternoon. 4
Mother denied that she was still in a relationship with
father. Sh e claimed that she had served father with divorce papers and had sent the court a proof of service, but the court’s
records did not reflect that any p roof of service had been filed.
She denied any knowledge that father was continuing to abus e al cohol and other substanc es. She admitted that her parents did
not know she was still having contact with father and did not support her be ing in a relationship with him. When asked w hy
Guerra had seen her wearing her wedding ring, she offered that

s he had “left it on by accident from seeing [her] other children the day before” and h ad put it o n for them “because they said we have to pretend like we ’re married.”
After tak ing the matter under submission , the cou rt found that reasonable services had been provided to m other but she did not fully comply with her case plan, that she had achi eved only “moderate” progress toward allevia ting th e c oncerns that necessitated F.W.’s removal, an d that there was a substantial
risk of detriment to the child if he were returne d to her care. The court stated: “ It seems the COVID

- 19 pandemic and res ulting

4 On rebuttal, Guerra testified that she sent mother a text message at 8:36 a.m. informing her that she needed to submit to

an on

- demand drug test that day and ask i n g her which testing cite she preferred. Fo ur minutes later, mother sent a response statin g “Westlake please. ” Two minutes later, Guerra responded, “Ok I’ll submit now.”10

shelter

- in

- place orders had a negative effect on [mother ’ s]

progress up to that point and therefore on [HSA’s] ability to

c onsider expanding and liberalizing visits

— a goal toward which
it appeared the case was moving when the statewi de emergency was declared. ” The court continued: “ B ut for one issue, there could be support for finding that the pandemic was a substantial factor in interfering with a parent ’s ability to continue to demonstrate case plan progress, and that it interfe red with the ability to properly
assess whether the mother should receive increased and
liberaliz ed visits.

. . . [¶] But that one issue i s very significant
because it concerns the mother ’s honesty about her substance

use. ” The court noted that mother ha d admittedly lied to Guerra
about her alcohol us e on July 21, and that “the truth of what happened and when it happened that day is much different from

w hat the mother stated under oath. ” The court posited that “[g] iven the true facts about when the mother knew she would have to test and when she ultimately did test on July 21 s t , either the mother had already consumed alcohol before knowing she was g oing to have to test that day,
and sh e waited until the last moment to t est, or she consumed
alcoho l after knowing she would have to test. Regardless, she
failed to inform the social worker th e t r uth , she failed to reach out to her supports, and she failed to te ll the truth at trial.” Regarding the March 2 positive alcohol test, the court noted that
mother had claimed she tested positive “because she took NyQuil and at trial she elaborated on this story by explain ing that she started taking NyQuil as a sleep aid after he r hospitalization in February. However, the record of that test show s she submitted her urine sample that day at 3:36 p.m., long before she would11

have needed an aid for normal nighttime s leep. Her explanation for this positive test is not credible.”
The court further noted that “mother’s dishonesty
undermines her credibility on many other important matters. For example, she continues to insist she is not i n a relationship
with the father. Whet her the parents remain in a committed relationship is significant to this case because the father has not been able to maintain his sobriety. The mot her claimed that she did not even know the father has resumed consuming alcohol or
that he was in a treatment program. The mother’s statement is unlikely to be true. ” The court also found that mother’s preferred explanation for missing drug tests in April and May was
incredible and noted that “ [ i ] n addition to misleading the social
worker and the cou rt regarding her alcohol consumption, the mother continues to deny ever having any problem with substance use and abuse, having any fear of relapse, and having any cravings or desire to use

. ” In finding that that returning F.W. to mother would create

a su bstantial risk of detriment to the child, the court reasoned that “[n]either the mother nor the father has demonstrated
subs tantial progress addressing their substance abuse issu es. The mother’s continued relationship with [F.W.’s] father
threatens the mother’s sobriety. . . . The mother’s sobriety remains a significant concern especially since she has consumed alcohol, denied doing so and as late as this trial, continued to be
dishonest about her conduct. There is no good cause to contin ue this hearing. It is unlikely that a continuance would allow the mother enough time to make behavioral changes necessary t o have [F.W.] returned to her care. [F.W.] is entitled to a promp t resolution of his dependency status; he has been in a legally12

u nstable placement his entire life while the parents at tempted to reunify with him.” Accordingly, the court terminated services for both parents and s et the matte r for a section 366.26 hearing. DISCUSSION
Mother c ontends the juvenile court’s order terminating reunification services is not suppor ted by substantial evidence. She claims the evidence is insufficient to support the co urt’s findings that she was provided reasonable services, that she did

not fully comply with her case plan, and tha t retur ning F.W. to
her custody would create a substantial risk of detriment to the
chi ld. We disagree.
Section 361.5, subdivision (a) provides in pertinent part: “For a child who, on the date of initial removal from the physical custody of the child’s paren t .

. . , was under three years of age

, court

- ordered services shall be provided for a period of six months

. . . but no longer than 12 months from the date the child entered
foster care. [¶]

. . . [¶]

. [C]ourt

- ordered services may be
extended .

. . not to exceed 18 months after the date the child was originally removed from physical custody of the child’s parent

. . . . The court shall extend the time period only if it finds that there is a substantial probability that the child will be returned

t o the physical custody of the child’s parent .

. . within the extended time period or that reasonable services have not been provided to the parent. ” Based on a child’ s need for security and stability, the Legislature has set the 18

- month review hearing a s the cutoff date for family reunification services. ( In re Elizabeth R. (1995) 35 Cal.App.4th 1774, 178 8.) “ At this hearing, the court must return children to their parents and thereby achieve the goal of family preservation or terminate services and proceed to devising13

a permanent plan for the children. [Cit ation.] ” ( I bid .) The juvenile cour t may offer more tha n 18 months of reunification
services if it finds that reasonable reunification services have not been offered or provided. ( I n re M.F

. ( 2019 ) 3 2 C al.App. 5 th 1,
21 .) A t the conclusion of the review period, “ t he court shall order the return of the child to the physical custody of his or her parent or legal guardian unless the court finds, by a preponderance of
the evidence, that the return of the child to his or her parent or legal guardian would create a substantial risk of detriment to the safety, protection, or physical or emotional well

- being of the child. The social worker shall have the burden of establishing that
detriment. ” ( § 366.2 2 , subd. ( a )

. )
We review the court’s findings a t the 18

- month reviewing hearing for substantial eviden ce

. ( See Katie V. v. S uperior Court (2005) 130 Cal.App.4th 586, 598.) In reviewing the challenged finding s , we examine the record in the light most favorable to the juvenile court’ s order, to determine whether there is substantial
evidence from which a reasonable trier of fact could have made
the requ isite findings. ( In re Mary B. (2013) 218 Cal.App .4th 1474, 1483.) We construe all reasonable inference s and resolve all conflicts in favor of the court’s findings. ( In re Jasmine C. (1999) 70 Cal .App.4th 71, 75.) Issues of fact and credibility a re the sole province of the juvenile court

. ( Constance K. v. Superior
Court (1998) 61 Cal.App.4th 689, 705.)
Mother contends the evidence is insufficient to establish
that reasonable services were offere d becaus e her in

- person visits with F.W. were temporar ily suspended due to the COVID

- 19 pandemic. She ass erts t hat “ [v]irtual visits with an 18

- month old
is an ex tremely poor substitute for positive interactions and deeper bonding and attachment between a parent and child

. ”14 We are not persuaded

. Whether the reunification services offered were reasonable and suitable is judged according to the circumstances of the particular case. ( Earl L. v. Superior Cour t (2011) 199 Cal.App.4th 1490, 1501.) “The standard is not whether the services provided were the be st that might be provided in an ideal world, but whether the services were reasonable under the circumstances.” ( In re Misako R. (1991)
2 Cal.App.4 th 538, 547.)
W e conclude t hat substantial evidence suppor ts the juvenile court ’s finding , by clear and convincing evidence, tha t HS A offered or provided reasonable reunification services to mothe r

. A lthough we do not dispute that the temporary suspension of in

- person visits in favor of virtual visits was not ideal, it was warranted b y the circumstance s of the COV ID

- 19 pandemic. Mother also downplays the significance of the fact
th at from March 18 until April 7, she ignored the foster parents’ repeated offers to participate in virtual visits with F.W. Because
she initia ll y refused to participate in virtual visits , she cannot be heard to complain that su ch services were unreasonable. Moreover, the order restricting in

- person visits expired on May
26 , and mother’s in

- person visits with F .W. resumed shortly
thereafter. Under the circumstances, the visitation off ered by
HSA was reasonable. ( In re Misako R.

, supra , 2 Cal.App.4th at

p. 547 .)
The evidence als o supports the court’s finding that mother did not fully comply with her case plan. O ver two weeks before the stay

- at

- home orders went into effect, mother tested positive
for alcohol. She also missed numerous drug tests and refused to participate in virtual visitation for almost three weeks.
Mor eover, her failure to full y comply with her case plan supports15

the finding that F.W. would suffer detriment in he were returned
to mother. ( Robert L. v. Superior Court ( 1996 ) 45 Cal.App.4th
619
, 625 .) In any event, a parent’ s substantial co mpliance with a reunification services pl an doe s not preclude a finding that the
child would suffer detri ment if returned to the parent. ( Constance K. v. Superior Court

, supra , 61 Cal.App.4th at p. 704.) “[T]he court must also consider progress the parent has made
toward elimin ating the conditions lead ing to the children’s placement out of home.” ( In re Dustin R. (1997) 54 Cal.App.4th 1131, 1141

- 1142.) Here, s ubstantial evidence support s the court’s finding that mother had not made sufficient progress in eliminating the conditions that necess itated F.W.’s removal , such
that the child would suffer det riment if returned to her . As the court found, mother has a serious credibility p roblem. She first tested positive for alcohol over two weeks before the stay

- at

- home orders went into effect, whic h undermines her claim that those
orders were the cause of h er relapse. Moreover, she continued (and apparently still continues) to lie about her first relapse. Although she finally admitted her second relapse during her testimony at the hearing, she was plainly dishonest about the
circumstance s of that relapse. As the juvenile court aptly put it, “[t]he mother’s sobriety remains a significant concern especially
since she has consumed alcohol, denied doing so and as late as this trial, continued to be dishonest about her conduct. ” Mother also continued to be dishonest about her relationship with father,
wh o does not appear to be committed to maintaining sobriety. In ligh t of this evidence, the court did not err in finding that F.W. could not be safely returned to mother.16 DISPOSITION The petition for an extraordinary writ is denied.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

PERREN, J.

We concur:

GILBERT

, P. J.

YEGAN , J.Tari L. Cody , Judge Superior Court County of Ventura

______________________________

Denise M. Trerotola

, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Petitioner

. Michael G. Walker , County Counsel, Joseph J. Randazzo, Assistant County Counsel , for Real Party in Interest

. No appearance for Respondent.