IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Janet E. Decker, :

Petitioner :

:

v. : No. 293 C.D. 2019

: SUBMITTED: September 20, 2019

Unemployment Compensation :

Board of Review, :

Respondent :

BEFORE: HONORABLE PATRICIA A. McCULLOUGH, Judge

HONORABLE ANNE E. COVEY, Judge

HONORABLE ELLEN CEISLER, Judge

OPINION NOT REPORTED

MEMORANDUM OPINION 

BY JUDGE CEISLER FILED: November 4, 2019

Janet E. Decker (Claimant) petitions for review, pro se, of the January 24, 

2019 Order of the Unemployment Compensation Board of Review (Board) 

affirming the decision of a Referee to deny Claimant unemployment compensation 

(UC) benefits. The Board concluded that Claimant was ineligible for UC benefits 

under Section 402(b) of the Unemployment Compensation Law (Law)1 because she 

voluntarily quit her employment without cause of a necessitous and compelling 

nature. We affirm the Board’s Order.

 

1 Act of December 5, 1936, Second Ex. Sess., P.L. (1937) 2897, as amended, 43 P.S. § 

802(b). Section 402(b) of the Law provides that an employee shall be ineligible for UC benefits 

for any week “[i]n which his [or her] unemployment is due to voluntarily leaving work without 

cause of a necessitous and compelling nature.” 43 P.S. § 802(b).
2

Background

Claimant worked as a part-time commercial cleaner for Class A Cleaning 

L.L.C. (Employer), a commercial and residential cleaning service, from April 22, 

2018 through September 11, 2018. Bd.’s Finding of Fact (F.F.) Nos. 1, 3. 

Claimant’s job duties were to dust, sweep, vacuum, and clean. Id. No. 4. Claimant’s 

primary assignment for Employer was to clean the offices of Employer’s client, 

Masco Cabinetry (Masco). Id. No. 5.

On September 10, 2018, Claimant’s shift was scheduled to begin at 3:00 p.m. 

Id. No. 6. Shortly before beginning her shift, Claimant met with Employer’s 

president, Stanley Nichols, concerning allegations that Claimant had not completed 

all of her job duties the previous evening. Id. No. 7; Notes of Testimony (N.T.), 

12/3/18, at 9. During his meeting with Claimant, Mr. Nichols contacted the 

employee in charge of the Masco account, Kaylie Ingersol, who told Mr. Nichols

that Masco was dissatisfied because crumbs had not been vacuumed from an office 

the previous evening, which attracted ants. Bd.’s F.F. No. 8; N.T., 12/3/18, at 9, 15. 

Claimant was upset about the allegation that she had failed to complete her assigned 

work, but she did not inform Mr. Nichols about her dissatisfaction with the

allegation. Bd.’s F.F. No. 9.

Around 1:00 a.m. on September 11, 2018, after she had completed her shift, 

Claimant left a handwritten resignation letter in Mr. Nichols’ internal mailbox. Id.

No. 10; N.T., 12/3/18, at 10-12 & Claimant’s Ex. 1. Employer had continuing work 

available for Claimant had she not resigned. Bd.’s F.F. No. 11.

Claimant filed a claim for UC benefits with the local UC Service Center. The 

Service Center found that although “Claimant had a necessitous and compelling 

reason for quitting,” she did not inform Employer of her reason and “there was a 
3

reasonable expectation that the Employer could have provided an alternative to 

resolve the situation.” Record (R.) Item No. 5. Thus, the Service Center denied 

Claimant’s claim for UC benefits under Section 402(b) of the Law. 

Claimant timely appealed to the Referee, who held a telephone hearing on 

December 3, 2018. Claimant appeared pro se and testified on her own behalf. 

Employer presented the testimony of its president, Mr. Nichols. Following the 

hearing, the Referee determined:

[C]laimant testified [that] she became upset after [Mr. Nichols] made 

allegations about [C]laimant’s failure to perform her job duties. 

Furthermore, [C]laimant testified [that] she was upset that [Mr. 

Nichols] had embarrassed her when he contacted [Ms. Ingersol] on 

September 10, 2018 about complaints which were made by [Masco]

about [C]laimant not completing her job duties. Also, [C]laimant 

testified [that Mr. Nichols] informed her that if he were to remove 

[C]laimant from [Masco], he was unsure whether he would be able to 

provide hours to [C]laimant.

[Mr. Nichols] testified [that] he did not embarrass [C]laimant and 

wanted to emphasize that [C]laimant is required to perform her job 

duties and that her failure to perform her job duties could jeopardize 

[E]mployer’s contract with [Masco].

After a careful review of the testimony and the documentary evidence 

in the record, the [R]eferee finds [that C]laimant has failed to meet her 

burden. While the [R]eferee understands [C]laimant’s concerns, 

nevertheless, the [R]eferee finds that [Mr. Nichols] provided credible 

testimony that he had good cause to critique [C]laimant’s job 

performance. [C]laimant’s displeasure with [Mr. Nichols] critiquing 

her job performance would not warrant [C]laimant being eligible for 

[UC] benefits.

Ref.’s Order, 12/4/18, at 2-3. The Referee concluded that Claimant failed to 

establish that she had a necessitous and compelling reason to quit and, thus, affirmed 

the denial of UC benefits under Section 402(b) of the Law.
4

Claimant timely appealed to the Board, which adopted and incorporated the 

Referee’s Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and further concluded:

[C]laimant asserts that she notified [Mr. Nichols] about why she 

resigned when she left a note for him on September 11, 2018, the day 

of [her] separation [from employment]. The Board determines that 

because the note was a resignation letter and not an attempt to resolve 

issues with her supervisor, [C]laimant did not attempt to preserve the 

employment relationship as required by Section 402(b) of the Law.

Bd.’s Order, 1/24/19, at 1. Therefore, the Board affirmed the Referee’s decision. 

Claimant now appeals to this Court.2

Analysis

A claimant who voluntarily terminates her employment has the burden to 

establish a necessitous and compelling reason for doing so. Petrill v. Unemployment 

Comp. Bd. of Review, 883 A.2d 714, 716 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2005). The claimant must 

prove that: (1) circumstances existed that produced real and substantial pressure to 

terminate employment; (2) such circumstances would compel a reasonable person 

to act in the same manner; (3) the claimant acted with ordinary common sense; and 

(4) the claimant made a reasonable effort to preserve her employment. Brunswick 

Hotel & Conference Ctr., LLC v. Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Review, 906 A.2d 

657, 660 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2006).

It is well settled that resentment of a supervisor’s reprimand, absent unjust 

accusations, abusive conduct, or profane language, does not constitute a necessitous 

and compelling reason to voluntarily terminate one’s employment. Krieger v. 

Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Review, 415 A.2d 160, 161 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1980). 

 

2 Our scope of review is limited to determining whether the necessary findings of fact are 

supported by substantial evidence, whether an error of law was committed, or whether 

constitutional rights were violated. Section 704 of the Administrative Agency Law, 2 Pa. C.S. § 

704.
5

Furthermore, “an emotional upset over a reprimand imposed by the employer does 

not as a rule constitute ‘cause of a necessitous and compelling nature.’” Yasgur v. 

Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Review, 328 A.2d 908, 910 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1974) 

(citation omitted).

Here, Claimant contends that she was compelled to quit because Employer 

created a hostile, uncomfortable work environment and because she was singled out, 

embarrassed, and humiliated in front of her co-workers.

3

 Claimant also asserts that 

Mr. Nichols unjustifiably threatened her job. We conclude that the record belies 

these claims.

Contrary to Claimant’s contention, the record contains no evidence that Mr. 

Nichols used harassing or abusive language during his meeting with Claimant on 

September 10, 2018. Moreover, the meeting occurred behind closed doors, and Mr. 

Nichols testified that he chose to confront Claimant privately rather than post 

anything on Masco’s communication board. N.T., 12/3/18, at 15.

4

 Mr. Nichols 

described what transpired during the meeting as follows:

 

3

In her Petition for Appeal to the Referee, Claimant stated that she quit as a result of “being 

threatened to [lose] my job over some stupid ants that were in a chair and being embarrassed [and] 

humiliated” by Mr. Nichols. R. Item No. 6.

4 Mr. Nichols testified:

[Ms. Ingersol] brought [Masco’s complaint] to my attention, and just like as always

[sic], I always bring it to the teammate’s attention. We are a team and 

communication is the key. We even have a communication board over at Masco. 

Instead of [Ms. Ingersol] writing it on the board to save embarrassment, I thought 

it would be better to bring [Claimant] in[to] the office and talk to her directly, 

because everybody can see that board at Masco.

N.T., 12/3/18, at 15.
6

I just brought it to [Claimant’s] attention that we had [received] a 

complaint from Masco, [which] brought [the complaint] to [Ms. 

Ingersol’s] attention [on] this day, [stating that] there w[ere] crumbs, 

there was food all over the place that we missed, it was bringing on 

ants, and [Masco] wanted us to do a better job. And that’s basically 

what I relayed to [Claimant].

Id. Mr. Nichols testified that after this discussion, Claimant did not indicate that she 

was upset, so he was “shock[ed]” when he arrived at work the next morning and 

learned that Claimant had resigned. Id. at 15-16.

As stated above, dissatisfaction with a supervisor’s reprimand or criticism is 

not a necessitous or compelling reason to voluntarily quit. See Lauffer v. 

Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Review, 434 A.2d 249, 251 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1981) 

(concluding that even if a supervisor’s accusations regarding the claimant’s work 

performance were untrue, they were not delivered in an offensive or profane manner 

and were not so uncalled for as to leave the claimant with no alternative but to resign, 

as work performance is a legitimate concern of a supervisor). Here, Claimant failed 

to demonstrate that Mr. Nichols reprimanded her in a profane or offensive manner 

or that he made unjust accusations about her work performance. As this Court 

recognized in Lauffer, comments directly related to work performance are legitimate 

concerns of any supervisor and do not amount to a necessitous or compelling cause. 

Id.

We also reject Claimant’s contention that Employer had threatened her job. 

According to Claimant, when Mr. Nichols told her that he did not know where her

hours would come from, she believed he was threatening to fire her. However, Mr. 

Nichols credibly testified:

The only thing I said was, if Masco drops us from its account, we’re 

not going to have any hours. That’s a true fact, that’s not a threat. In 
7

our contract, we have to keep the tidiness and cleanliness of that 

account or [Masco] can void the contract.

N.T., 12/3/18, at 16. In fact, Claimant admitted on the record that Mr. Nichols “did 

not threaten to fire” her during their conversation. Id. at 12.

Finally, a claimant who voluntarily quits “must take common sense action to 

obviate the problem so that . . . she does not have to terminate employment, and this 

is accomplished by informing one’s superiors of the harassing, humiliating[,] or 

abusive conduct.” Porco v. Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Review, 828 A.2d 426, 428 

(Pa. Cmwlth. 2003). Here, Claimant testified that immediately after she completed 

her shift on the morning of September 11, 2018, “I came back, and I was just so 

upset about it, I made the decision that I’m not going to work there any longer.” 

N.T., 12/3/18, at 10. When asked if she spoke with Mr. Nichols about her feelings 

after their conversation, Claimant replied, “I did not verbally talk to him after that 

conversation.” Id. Mr. Nichols also testified that Claimant did not reach out to him 

regarding her dissatisfaction with the reprimand before submitting her resignation 

letter. Id. at 16. 

We conclude that, by quitting shortly after being reprimanded without

informing Employer of any alleged harassment or dissatisfaction with the reprimand, 

Claimant did not make a reasonable effort to preserve her employment. Therefore, 

we agree with the Board that Claimant failed to satisfy her burden of proving that 

she had a necessitous and compelling reason to voluntarily quit her employment

under Section 402(b) of the Law.

5

 

5

In her appellate brief, Claimant makes numerous assertions regarding factual matters that 

were not presented to either the Referee or the Board. Because such allegations are outside the 

record, we may not consider them. See Hollingsworth v. Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Review, 

189 A.3d 1109, 1113 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2018) (“[B]ecause mere allegations are no substitute for record 

evidence, this Court cannot consider the averments of fact in [the] [c]laimant’s brief when 
8

Conclusion

Accordingly, we affirm the Board’s Order.

__________________________________

ELLEN CEISLER, Judge

 

determining whether the Board erred in issuing its findings.”); Pa. Tpk. Comm’n v. Unemployment 

Comp. Bd. of Review, 991 A.2d 971, 974 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2010) (“This Court may not consider any 

evidence that is not part of the certified record on appeal.”).
IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Janet E. Decker, :

Petitioner :

:

v. : No. 293 C.D. 2019

:

Unemployment Compensation :

Board of Review, :

Respondent :

O R D E R

AND NOW, this 4

th day of November, 2019, the Order of the Unemployment 

Compensation Board of Review, dated January 24, 2019, is hereby AFFIRMED.

__________________________________

ELLEN CEISLER, Judge