alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM 3/31/00
CONSOLIDATED FINANCIAL STATEMENTS AND IS QUALIFIED IN ITS ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE
TO SUCH FINANCIAL STATEMENTS.
</LEGEND>
<CIK> 0001026516
<NAME> CAPSTAR BROADCASTING PARTNERS, INC.

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-2000
<PERIOD-START>                             JAN-31-2000
<PERIOD-END>                               MAR-31-2000
<CASH>                                          28,494
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                  482,765
<ALLOWANCES>                                    27,385
<INVENTORY>                                          0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                               546,048
<PP&E>                                         562,372
<DEPRECIATION>                                 103,151
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                              12,421,347
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                          310,476
<BONDS>                                      5,783,388
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                             1
<OTHER-SE>                                   4,605,894
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                12,421,347
<SALES>                                        521,270
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                               521,270
<CGS>                                                0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                  308,088
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                               270,863
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                             123,780
<INCOME-PRETAX>                              (142,425)
<INCOME-TAX>                                   (9,773)
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                          (157,283)
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                  6,094
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                 (160,067)
<EPS-BASIC>                                          0
<EPS-DILUTED>                                        0


</TABLE>
#### Merritt, executor, *v.*Merritt *et al.*

Argued May 2,

Decided May 23, 1901.

Simmons, C. J.

1. A judgment rendered by any court of competent jurisdiction in this State may, after it has become dormant, be revived by scire facias in the same court. Civil Code, §5377 et seq.

2. The questions raised by the demurrers, as to the right of the court to revive and amend a dormant judgment, were, in the cases of *Williams*v. *Merritt,*109 *Ga.*213, 217, between substantially the same parties, decided contrary to the contentions of the plaintiff in error.

3. Grounds of a motion for a new trial not approved by the trial judge will not be considered by this court. An amendment to a motion for a new trial, which has upon it an entry to the effect that it was “allowed” by the judge, with nothing else to indicate an approval of its grounds, is not sufficiently verified to authorize this court to deal with the assignments of error therein, made. *Long*v. *Scanlan,*105 *Ga.*424.

*Judgment affirmed.*

*All the Justices concurring, except Lewis, J., disqualified.*

*570Motion to amend judgment. Before Judge Hart. Greene supe^ perior court. September 5, 1900.

*J. B. Park Jr.,*for plaintiff in error. *S. II. Sibley,*contra.
#### Mrs. Myrtle G. ALLEN, Plaintiff, v. Anthony J. CELEBREZZE, Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare, Defendant.

Civ. A. No. 4687.

United States District Court D. South Carolina, Rock Hill Division.

Nov. 15, 1965.

John Oates Woods, Rock Hill, S. C., for plaintiff.

John C. Williams, U. S. Atty., Green-ville, S. C., and Geddes Hugh Martin, Asst. U. S. Atty., Greenville, S. C., for defendant.

HEMPHILL, Judge.

Appeal from a “final decision” by the Secretary of Health, Education, *448and Welfare denying that plaintiff is entitled to disability benefits under the Social Security Act. Before the Court is the question of whether or not the Secretary’s decision is supported by substantial evidence. If so supported, it must be affirmed. This Court has no authority to try the issues *de novo.*Conversely, if undue reliance has been placed upon one portion of the record in the face of overwhelming evidence to the contrary, then the Secretary must be reversed. Thomas V. Celebrezze, 331 F.2d 541 (4th Cir. 1964).

The Secretary found that plaintiff, who was born in 1909, and who quit school after completing the eighth grade, has certain impairments, but that singly or in combination they were not of sufficient severity to prevent her from engaging in some type of substantial gain-: ful activity.

It clearly appears that the Secretary is in error, and that undue reliance has been placed upon one portion of the record to the point where the true picture of plaintiff’s disability is obscured and hidden.

Plaintiff's major complaints' are that she has a “heart condition,” diabetes, and an ulcer. The record reveals varying degrees of substantiation of these impairments, plus testimony anent dyspnea, hypertension, and some renal difficulty.

The Hearing Examiner, taking the different ailments of which complaint was made, discussed each ailment, seriatim, and came to the conclusion that none was particularly severe, or that the impediments were essentially under control. As Judge Bell pointed out in Underwood v. Ribicoff, 298 F.2d 850, 854 (4th Cir. 1962) the report of the Hearing Examiner “tends to fractionalize the several ailments and to treat each one in isolation as a clinical medical problem rather than treating it within the framework of Claimant's work history, educational background, and age.”

It is clear that plaintiff has established that she has physical ailments, in combination, of such a character as to preclude her from engaging in any substantial gainful activity, and that there is no substantial evidence to support the finding of the Hearing Examiner.

This plaintiff, who has worked as a seamstress and cloth grader in a cotton mill, and as a seamstress and at the receiving counter in a laundry and dry cleaning plant for many years, by any realistic standard, is “disabled.” The evidence of record points only to that conclusion.

The decision of the Secretary is not supported by substantial evidence, and should be reversed. Accordingly, it is ordered that the Secretary’s decision is reversed. The Clerk will enter Judgment accordingly.

And it is so ordered.
**Exhibit 32.2**

**Certification bythe Chief Financial Officer Pursuant to 18 U. S. C. Section 1350, as AdoptedPursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002**

Pursuant to 18 U. S. C. Section 1350, I, Alan G. Levin,hereby certify that, to the best of my knowledge, the Quarterly Report ofPfizer Inc. on Form 10-Q for the quarter ended October 2, 2005 (the "Report")fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or Section 15(d) of theSecurities Exchange Act of 1934, and that the information contained in thatReport fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition andresults of operations of Pfizer Inc. 

/s/ Alan G. Levin            Alan G. LevinSenior Vice President and Chief Financial OfficerNovember 9, 2005

This certification accompanies this Report on Form 10-Qpursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 and shall not, exceptto the extent required by such Act, be deemed filed by the Company for purposesof Section 18 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended (the "ExchangeAct"). Such certification will not be deemed to be incorporated byreference into any filing under the Securities Act of 1933, as amended, or theExchange Act, except to the extent that the Company specifically incorporatesit by reference.
#### Elida De Jesus Palados SANDOVAL; Gustavo Perez Palacios, Petitioners, v. Alberto R. GONZALES, Attorney General, Respondent.

No. 05-72086.

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted Jan. 8, 2007 *.

Filed Jan. 30, 2007.

Maziar Razi, Esq., Sherman Oaks, CA, for Petitioners.

Ronald E. Lefevre, Chief Counsel, Office of the District Counsel Department of Homeland Security, San Francisco, CA, Joseph Kim, Esq., U.S. Department of Justice Environment & Natural Resources Div., Washington, DC, for Respondent.

Before: ALARCÓN, HALL, and PAEZ, Circuit Judges.

*

 The panel unanimously finds this case suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R.App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM **

Elicia de Jesus Palacios Sandoval and her son Gustavo Perez Palacios, natives and citizens of Guatemala, petition for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ order adopting and affirming an immigration judges’ order denying their applications for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252. Reviewing for substantial evidence, *Ochoa v. Gonzales,*406 F.3d 1166, 1169 (9th Cir.2005), we deny the petition for review.

Substantial evidence supports the agency’s determination that petitioners failed to establish that the alleged violent attacks against various members of their family were motivated by a statutorily protected ground. *See id.*at 1171-72 (inference that persecution was on account of political opinion must be one that is clearly drawn from the facts in evidence). Substantial *521evidence also supports the agency’s determination that petitioners, who did not claim that they were personally harmed or threatened, failed to establish an objectively reasonable basis to fear persecution on account of political opinion. *See Nagoulko v. INS,*333 F.3d 1012, 1018 (9th Cir.2003) (noting that petitioner’s subjectively genuine fear was not objectively reasonable).

Because petitioners failed to establish eligibility for asylum, they necessarily failed to meet the higher burden for withholding of removal. *See Farah v. Ashcroft,*348 F.3d 1153, 1156 (9th Cir.2003).

PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
Exhibit 8.1
 CORPORATE
ORGANIZATIONAL CHART
 
  OCEANSHIP OWNERS LIMITED OCEANWEALTH OWNERS LIMITED
OCEANVENTURE OWNERS LIMITED OCEANRESOURCES OWNERS LIMITED OCEANSTRENGTH OWNERS LIMITED
OCEANENERGY OWNERS LIMITED OCEANTRADE OWNERS LIMITED OCEANPRIME OWNERS LIMITED OCEANCLARITY OWNERS
LIMITED KIFISSIA STAR OWNERS INC. OCEANFIGHTER OWNERS INC. OCEANSHIP SHAREHOLDINGS LIMITED OCEANWEALTH
SHAREHOLDINGS LIMITED OCEANVENTURE SHAREHOLDINGS LIMITED OCEANRESOURCES SHAREHOLDINGS LIMITED OCEANSTRENGTH
SHAREHOLDINGS LIMITED OCEANENERGY SHAREHOLDINGS LIMITED OCEANTRADE SHAREHOLDINGS LIMITED OCEANPRIME
SHAREHOLDINGS LIMITED OCEANCLARITY SHAREHOLDING LIMITED KIFISSIA STAR SHAREHOLDERS INC. OCEANFIGHTER
SHAREHOLDERS INC. M/V TRENTON M/V PIERRE M/V AUSTIN M/V JUNEAU M/V LANSING M/V HELENA M/V TOPEKA M/V RICHMOND
M/T PINK SANDS M/V AUGUSTA M/T OLINDA OCEANFREIGHT INC. OCEAN FAITH OWNERS INC. OCEAN FAITH SHAREHOLDERS INC.
M/T TIGANI OCEAN BLUE SPIRIT OWNERS INC. OCEAN BLUE SPIRIT SHAREHOLDERS INC. M/T TAMARA
#### Branch *v.*The State.

Submitted May 21,

Decided July 17, 1901.

Indictment for assault with intent to rape. Before Judge Henry. Floyd superior court. April 1, 1901.

*M. B. Eubanks,*for plaintiff in' error.

*Moses Wright, solicitor-general,*contra.

Lumpkin, P. J.

No complaint being made of any ruling at the trial, and there being evidence warranting a finding that the accused was guilty of the offense with which he was charged, his conviction must stand, since the verdict of the jury has met with the approval of the presiding judge. It is, however, a case in which, apparently, his discretion would have been wisely exercised in granting a new trial. *Judgment affirmed.*

*All the Justices concurring.*
Document Headings

                    Document headings vary by document type but may contain                    the following:                  
                -                       the agency or agencies that issued and signed a document                    
                -                       the number of the CFR title and the number of each part                      the document amends, proposes to amend, or is directly                      related to                    
                -                       the agency docket number / agency internal file number                    
                -                       the RIN which identifies each regulatory action listed in                      the Unified Agenda of Federal Regulatory and Deregulatory                      Actions                    

                    See the                                          Document Drafting Handbook                                        for more details.                  

###### Department of Agriculture

###### Forest Service

# AGENCY:

Forest Service, USDA. 

# ACTION:

Notice of meeting.

# SUMMARY:

An Opal Creek Scenic Recreation Area Advisory Council meeting will convene in Stayton, Oregon on Monday, March 19, 2001. The meeting is scheduled to begin at 6:00 p.m., and will conclude at approximately 8:30 p.m. The meeting will be held in the South Room of the Stayton Community Center located on 400 West Virginia Street in Stayton, Oregon.

The Opal Creek Wilderness and Opal Creek Scenic Recreation Area Act of 1996 (Opal Creek Act) (Pub. L. 104-208) directed the Secretary of Agriculture to establish the Opal Creek Scenic Recreation Area Advisory Council. The Advisory Council is comprised of thirteen members representing state, county and city governments, and representatives of various organizations, which include mining industry, environmental organizations, inholders in Opal Creek Scenic Recreation Area, economic development, Indian tribes, adjacent landowners and recreation interests. The council provides advice to the Secretary of Agriculture on preparation of a comprehensive Opal Creek Management Plan for the SRA, and consults on a periodic and regular basis on the management of the area. The tentative agenda will include refining issue statements and describing the desired future condition of the SRA.

The public comment period is tentatively scheduled to begin at 8:00 p.m. Time allotted for individual presentations will be limited to 3 minutes. Written comments are encouraged, particularly if the material cannot be presented within the time limits of the comment period. Written comments may be submitted prior to the March 19 meeting by sending them to Designated Federal Official Stephanie Phillips at the address given below.

# FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:

For more information regarding this meeting, contact Designated Federal Official Stephanie Phillips; Willamette National Forest, Detroit Ranger District, HC 73 Box 320, Mill City, OR 97360; (503) 854-3366.

Darrel Kenops,

Forest Supervisor.

[FR Doc. 01-5229  Filed 3-2-01; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 3410-11-M
#### Kristina M. Armstrong, Respondent, v Blank Rome LLP et al., Appellants.

[2 NYS3d 346]

Order, Supreme Court, New York County (Anil C. Singh, J.), entered March 10, 2014, which, to the extent appealed from, denied defendants’ motion to dismiss the Judiciary Law § 487 claim and to strike certain allegations in the complaint, unanimously affirmed, with costs.

The complaint states a claim for violation of Judiciary Law § 487 with sufficient particularity *(see Flycell, Inc. v Schlossberg LLC,*2011 WL 5130159, *5, 2011 US Dist LEXIS 126024, *11-14 [SD NY Oct. 28, 2011, No. 11-CV-0915-CM]; *Greene v Greene,*47 NY2d 447, 451 [1979]). Specifically, the complaint alleges that defendants concealed a conflict of interest that stemmed from defendant law firm’s attorney-client relationship with Morgan Stanley while simultaneously representing plaintiff in divorce proceedings against her ex-husband, a senior Morgan Stanley executive, who participated in Morgan Stanley’s decisions to hire outside counsel *(see*Rules of Profes*428sional Conduct [22 NYCRR 1200.0] rule 1.7 [a]). Contrary to defendants’ argument, applying a liberal construction to the allegations in the complaint *(see e.g. Leon v Martinez,*84 *NY2d 83,*87-88 [1994]), plaintiff identifies the nature of the conflict as stemming from defendants’ interest in maintaining and encouraging its lucrative relationship with Morgan Stanley and the impact of that interest on defendants’ judgement in its representation of plaintiff in the divorce proceedings *(see*Rules of Professional Conduct [22 NYCRR 1200.0] rule 1.7 [a]).

Further, the complaint alleges numerous acts of deceit by defendants, committed in the course of their representation of plaintiff in her matrimonial action. Additionally, the complaint sufficiently alleges that the individual defendants knew of but did not disclose defendant law firm’s representation of Morgan Stanley to plaintiff, and it details the calculations of her damages.

The court did not improvidently deny defendants’ motion to strike allegations in the complaint regarding the conflict of interest, and it correctly found that the allegations complained of are relevant to the legal malpractice claim *(see Kaufman & Kaufman v Hoff,*213 AD2d 197, 199 [1st Dept 1995]). Although an order denying a motion to strike scandalous or prejudicial matter from a pleading is not appealable as of right *(see*CPLR 5701 [b] [3]), we nevertheless reach this issue since plaintiff did not raise the issue of appealability *(see Chowaiki & Co. Fine Art Ltd. v Lacher,*115 AD3d 600 [1st Dept 2014]).

Concur — Acosta, J.P., Andrias, Saxe, DeGrasse and Richter, JJ.
EXHIBIT 35.1





SERVICER COMPLIANCE STATEMENT





I, Steven C. McNeal, Vice President and Treasurer of Entergy Texas, Inc. (the “Servicer”), certify that:





(a) A review of the Servicer's activities during the reporting period covered by this Report on Form 10-K and of its performance under that certain Transition Property Servicing Agreement dated as of June 29, 2007 between Entergy Gulf States Reconstruction Funding I, LLC, as the Issuing Entity, and the Servicer (the “Servicing Agreement”) has been made under my supervision.





(b) To the best of my knowledge, based on such review, the Servicer has fulfilled all of its obligations under the Servicing Agreement in all material respects throughout the reporting period.





Date: March 22, 2018





By: /s/ Steven C. McNeal


Name:  Steven C. McNeal


Title:  Vice President and Treasurer
**Exhibit
      13.1**




**Officer
        Certifications Pursuant to Section 906**
 **of
        the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002**
 **(Subsections
        (a) and (b) of Section 1350, Chapter 63 of Title 18, United States
        Code)**
  Pursuant
        to section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (subsections (a) and (b)
        of
        section 1350, chapter 63 of title 18, United States Code), each of the
        undersigned officers of Empresa Distribuidora y Comercializadora Norte S.A.,
        a
        sociedad anónima organized under the laws of Argentina (the “Company”), does
        hereby certify to such officer’s knowledge that:
  The
        annual report on Form 20-F for the fiscal year ended December 31, 2007 (the
        “Form 20-F”) of the Company fully complies with the requirements of section
        13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and information contained
        in the Form 20-F fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial
        condition and results of operations of the Company.
  Date:
                  June 25, 2008/s/
                Alejandro MacfarlaneName:
                  Alejandro Macfarlane
                Title:
                  Chief Executive OfficerDate:
                  June 25, 2008/s/
                Luis Pablo Rogelio PaganoName:
                  Luis Pablo Rogelio Pagano
                Title:
                  Chief Financial Officer
  A
        signed
        original of this written statement required by Section 906 has been provided
        to
        the Company and will be retained by the Company and furnished to the Securities
        and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.
No. 83199 

FILE 

CLERK OF THE SUPREME COURT 

ELIZABETH A. BROW 

BY: 

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA 

PAUL DORSEY, 

Respondent. 

ORDER DISMISSING APPEAL 

Appellant's motion for a voluntary dismissal of this appeal is 

granted. This appeal is dismissed. NRAP 42(b). 

It is so ORDERED. 

cc: Chief Judge, Eighth Judicial District Court 

Eighth Judicial District Court, Department 11 

Lansford W. Levitt, Settlement Judge 

Malcolm P LaVergne & Associates 

Sklar Williams LLP 

Mincin Law, PLLC 

Eighth District Court Clerk 

ORENTHAL JAMES SIMPSON, 

Appellant, 

VS. 

SUPREME COURT 

OF 

NEVADA 

CLERK'S ORDER 

19-0
EX-35.2
ANNUAL STATEMENT AS TO COMPLIANCE

OFFICER'S CERTIFICATION


Re: GE Commercial Mortgage Corporation
    Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates
    Series 2007-C1


In connection with the above-referenced transaction the undersigned officer, on
behalf of Bank of America, National Association, hereby certifies that (i) a
review of the Servicing activities, for the period ending December 31, 2007 and
of its performance under the SubServicing Agreement dated as of May 1, 2007 has
been made under my supervision, and (ii) to the best of my knowledge,
based on such review, Bank of America, National Association has fulfilled all
of its obligations under this agreement in all material respects throughout the
aforementioned period.

Bank of America, National Association


/s/ Janice M. Smith
Janice M. Smith
Managing Director


/s/ H. Michael Lumadue
H. Michael Lumadue
Vice President