Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 49A02-1606-CR-1470 | March 10, 2017 Page 1 of 5

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

Suzy St. John

Marion County Public Defender

Indianapolis, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Curtis T. Hill, Jr.

Attorney General of Indiana

Christina D. Pace

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

I N T H E

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Darren D. Langdon,

Appellant-Defendant,

v.

State of Indiana,

Appellee-Plaintiff.

March 10, 2017

Court of Appeals Case No.

49A02-1606-CR-1470

Appeal from the Marion Superior

Court

The Honorable David J. Certo, 

Judge

Trial Court Cause No.

49G12-1508-CM-30166

Pyle, Judge.

Statement of the Case

[1] During Darren Langdon’s (“Langdon”) initial hearing, the trial court ordered 

him to pay a $50.00 supplemental public defender fee. Following the 

sentencing hearing, the trial court ordered Langdon to pay a second $50.00 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 49A02-1606-CR-1470 | March 10, 2017 Page 2 of 5

supplemental public defender fee. Langdon claims that the trial court lacked 

statutory authority to impose the second fee. We agree and reverse the trial 

court’s imposition of the second fee.

[2] We reverse and remand for the issuance of an amended sentencing order.

Issue

The sole issue for our review is whether the trial court abused its 

discretion when it imposed the second $50.00 supplemental 

public defender fee following the sentencing hearing.

Facts

[3] In August 2015, the State charged Langdon with Class A misdemeanor battery 

resulting in bodily injury1 after he was involved in a physical altercation with 

his supervisor. At Langdon’s initial hearing, the trial court found him to be 

indigent and appointed a public defender to represent him. The trial court also 

imposed a $50.00 public defender fee, which Langdon paid the following day. 

Langdon also posted a $150.00 cash bond.

[4] The trial court convicted Langdon as charged following a May 2016 bench trial 

and sentenced him to time served following a June 2016 sentencing hearing. 

Also at the sentencing hearing, the trial court suspended Langdon’s $185.00 

court costs, found him to be indigent, and appointed a public defender should 

he decide to pursue an appeal. In a Marion County sentencing order form 

 

1

IND. CODE § 35-42-2-1.
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issued three days later, the trial court ordered Langdon to pay a second $50.00 

supplemental public defender fee. The sentencing order form cited INDIANA 

CODE §§ 33-37-4-1, -4 and 33-37-5-19 as authority for the imposition of this 

second fee. Langdon now appeals the imposition of this fee.

Decision

[5] Langdon’s sole argument is that the trial court abused its discretion when it 

imposed the second $50.00 supplemental public defender fee in the written 

sentencing order. Sentencing decisions, including decisions to impose 

restitution, fines, costs, or fees, are generally left to the trial court’s discretion. 

Berry v. State, 950 N.E.2d 798, 799 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011). If the fees imposed by 

the trial court fall within the parameters provided by statute, we will not find an 

abuse of discretion. Id. 

[6] We begin by noting that the three statutes listed on the Marion County 

sentencing order form do not support the imposition of the second 

supplemental public defender fee. Specifically, INDIANA CODE § 33-37-4-1(a) 

concerns the imposition of a $120 criminal costs fee; subsection (b) sets forth a 

list of criminal costs that do not include a supplemental public defender fee; and 

subsection (c) concerns a pretrial diversion program fee. INDIANA CODE § 33-

37-4-4 concerns civil cost fees, and INDIANA CODE § 33-37-5-19 concern a $2.00 

jury collection fee. The trial court identified no other statutory basis for 

imposing the public defender fees on Langdon. 
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[7] There are three statutory provisions that directly address the imposition of 

public defender fees, and the trial court can order reimbursement under any or a 

combination thereof. Jackson v. State, 968 N.E.2d 328, 333 (Ind. Ct. App. 

2012). The first statute, INDIANA CODE § 33-35-7-6(a), provides that the trial 

court may impose a supplemental public defender fee before completing the 

initial hearing. Pursuant to this statute, the trial court must determine whether 

the defendant is indigent. I.C. § 35-33-7-6(a). If the defendant is found to be 

indigent, public defender fees are $100 in felony cases and $50 in misdemeanor 

cases. I.C. § 35-33-7-6(c). As acknowledged by Langdon, this is the statutory 

provision that supported the trial court’s imposition of the first $50.00 public 

defender fee. Because Langdon was charged with a misdemeanor, found to be 

indigent, and previously ordered to pay a $50.00 public defender fee, INDIANA 

CODE § 33-35-7-6 does not support the imposition of the second $50.00 

supplemental public defender’s fee.

[8] The second statute, INDIANA CODE § 33-40-3-6, provides that if the trial court 

finds that the defendant has the ability to pay the costs of representation, the 

trial court shall impose reasonable attorney fees at any stage of a misdemeanor 

or felony prosecution. In such cases, the trial court must consider certain 

enumerated factors to determine the defendant’s ability to pay. Id.; See I.C. § 

33-40-3-7. Because the trial court did not find that Langdon had the ability to 

pay the costs of representation, this statutory provision also fails to support the 

imposition of the second $50.00 supplemental public defender’s fee.
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[9] The third statute, INDIANA CODE § 33-37-2-3, provides that the trial court may 

impose part of the attorney fees upon a convicted person, provided the trial 

court first determines that such person is not indigent. I.C. § 33-37-2-3. In the 

latter case, the trial court may suspend payment of fees until completion of the 

executed portion of the defendant’s sentence, holding a hearing to determine 

indigency thereafter. Berry, 950 N.E.2d at 802. This statute does not support 

the imposition of the second $50.00 supplemental public defender’s fee because 

the trial court determined that Langdon was indigent. 

[10] Langdon is correct that none of these statutory provisions support the 

imposition of the second $50.00 fee. Accordingly, the trial court abused its 

discretion in imposing it. We, therefore, reverse the trial court’s imposition of 

the second supplemental public defender fee and remand for the issuance of an 

amended sentencing order.

2

[11] Reversed and remanded.

Baker, J., and Mathias, J., concur. 

 

2 The State contends that the trial court had statutory authority to impose the second fee pursuant to 

INDIANA CODE 35-33-8-3.2(a)(2) and (b), which provide that if the trial court requires the defendant to 

deposit cash or cash and security bail, the court may require the defendant to execute an agreement that 

allows the court to retain all or part of the of the cash to pay publicly paid costs of representation if the 

defendant is convicted. This statute does not support the imposition of the second supplemental public 

defender fee in this case because the record on appeal does not reveal such a bail agreement. Furthermore, 

there is no evidence that the trial court retained part of Langdon’s cash bail to pay the second fee.