*Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the Court has determined that this opinion should not be published

and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 99-20680

Summary Calendar

CHARLES EDMUND STAGGS,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus

GARY L. JOHNSON, DIRECTOR, TEXAS

DEPARTMENT OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE, 

INSTITUTIONAL DIVISION; KENT RAMSEY;

MICHAEL WILSON; MICHAEL HALL; JERRY

JACKSON; JOHNNY THOMAS; JAMES A.

SIMPSON,

Defendants-Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Texas

USDC No. H-98-CV-1448

July 24, 2000

Before POLITZ, WIENER, and PARKER, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

CharlesEdmund Staggs appeals the dismissal of his civil rights complaint for
128 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).

2Black v. Warren, 134 F.3d 732 (5th Cir. 1998).

3Bradley v. Puckett, 157 F.3d 1022, 1025 (5thCir. 1998) (internal quotation marks and citation

omitted).

4Lynott v. Henderson, 610 F.2d 340 (5th Cir. 1980); Berry v. Brady, 192 F.2d 504 (5th Cir.

1999).

2

failure to state a claim.1 We review such a dismissal under the same de novo

standard as is employed in reviewing dismissals under FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6).2

Underthisstandard we will “assume that all of the plaintiff’sfactual allegations are

true. The district court’s dismissal may be upheld only if it appears that no relief

could be granted under any set of facts that could be proven consistent with the

allegations.”3

In his complaint Staggs allegesthat the defendants improperly prevented him

from having as a visitor Ann Kemp, who was at the time his fiancee and is now his

wife. Staggs maintained that visitation rights were denied under internal policy

which, for security reasons, forbids former employees of the Texas Department of

Criminal Justice from visiting inmates. Although Staggs admitted that Kemp

worked as a nurse at his prison, he asserted that she was not a former TDCJ

employee because she actually had been employed by the University of Texas

Medical Branch.

Convicted prisoners have no absolute constitutional right to visitation.4

Limitations on visitation, however, must meet legitimate penological objectives,

and the court must “look to see whether the prison’s visitation policies actually
5Lynott, 610 F.2d at 342, 343.

6Jackson v. Cain, 864 F.2d 1235

7See FED. R. CIV. P. 61.

8Jackson, 864 F.2d at 1251-52; McDonald v. Steward, 132 F.3d 225 (5th Cir. 1998).

3

further those objectives.”5 Staggs has no quarrel with the defendants’ policy that

former employeesmay not visit inmates; he contests only the defendants’inclusion

of his wife within the category of former employees. As Staggs is challenging only

the defendants’ construction oftheir own regulations, he has not stated a cognizable

constitutional claim.6 

Staggs has not shown that he was harmed by the district court’s allegedly

improper reference to “supplemental information” regarding hisrightsto visit with

hisstepdaughter, Evelyn Kemp.7 He also has not shown that the district court erred

in failing to address his claims (1) that the defendants violated their own rules in

failing to notify him in writing of the reasons for denying his visitation requests,

and (2) defendants Major Thomas and Captain Simpson retaliated against him

based on his request to visit with his wife.8 To state a valid retaliation claim,

plaintiff must show, inter alia, that defendants intended to retaliate against him for

the exercise of a specific constitutional right. This Staggs has failed to do.

The district court did not err in dismissing Staggs’ complaint. Staggs has

failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.

AFFIRMED.