J-A15011-24

J-A15012-24

- 1 -

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

IN RE: ADOPTION OF: A.N.D., A 

MINOR

APPEAL OF: A.K., MOTHER

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 253 MDA 2024

Appeal from the Decree Entered February 6, 2024

In the Court of Common Pleas of Franklin County Orphans' Court at 

No(s): 50-ADOPT-2023

IN RE: ADOPTION OF: D.J.D., A 

MINOR

APPEAL OF: A.K., MOTHER

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 254 MDA 2024

Appeal from the Decree Entered February 6, 2024

In the Court of Common Pleas of Franklin County Orphans' Court at 

No(s): 51-ADOPT-2023

IN RE: ADOPTION OF: A.N.D., A 

MINOR

APPEAL OF: D.D., FATHER

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 339 MDA 2024

Appeal from the Decree Entered February 6, 2024

In the Court of Common Pleas of Franklin County Orphans' Court at 

No(s): 50-ADOPT-2023
J-A15011-24

J-A15012-24

- 2 -

IN RE: ADOPTION OF: D.J.D., A 

MINOR

APPEAL OF: D.D., FATHER

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 340 MDA 2024

Appeal from the Decree Entered February 6, 2024

In the Court of Common Pleas of Franklin County Orphans' Court at 

No(s): 51-ADOPT-2023

BEFORE: DUBOW, J., BECK, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*

MEMORANDUM BY DUBOW, J.: FILED: SEPTEMBER 13, 2024

In this consolidated appeal, D.D. (“Father”) and A.K. (“Mother”) appeal 

from the February 6, 2024 decrees

1 entered in the Franklin County Court of 

Common Pleas that involuntarily terminated their parental rights to ten-yearold A.N.D. and eight-year-old D.J.D. (collectively, “Children”).

2

 Upon review, 

we affirm.

Father and Mother are parents to Children and were never married. In 

January 2019, the Franklin County Children and Youth Services (“the Agency”) 

became involved with this family due to concerns regarding Children’s 

____________________________________________

* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.

1 The decrees are dated February 1, 2024, but the prothonotary did not docket 

the decrees and serve notice until February 6, 2024.

 

2 We sua sponte consolidate the appeals at Nos. 253 MDA 2024, 254 MDA 

2024, 339 MDA 2024, and 340 MDA 2024. Review indicates that these 

appeals involve related parties and issues. See Pa.R.A.P. 513.
J-A15011-24

J-A15012-24

- 3 -

sexualized behavior as well as concerns that Children were being sexually 

abused. At the time, Mother and Father resided separately but shared physical 

custody of Children. Father lived with Children’s paternal grandfather, who 

was a registered sex offender. Mother lived with her paramour, J.W., III

(“Paramour”). Parents refused to agree to a safety plan to keep Children away 

from potential sexual predators. The Agency obtained emergency custody of 

Children, and, on July 8, 2019, the court adjudicated Children dependent and 

placed them in foster care.

From July 2019 through August 2021, Mother participated in courtordered services with a permanency goal of Reunification. Father initially 

participated in visitation with Children, but discontinued visitation voluntarily 

at some point in 2020. In August 2021, Children were reunified with Mother, 

who was still living with Paramour. From March 2022 to March 2023, Father 

was incarcerated for a controlled substance Driving Under the Influence 

conviction as well as a parole violation.

In May 2022, the Agency once again became involved with the family 

when staff at Children’s elementary school noticed that Children were 

accumulating unusual bruising. On May 20, 2022, the Agency obtained 

emergency custody of Children and placed them in foster care. On July 1, 

2022, upon review of a motion by Children’s guardian ad litem (“GAL”) that 

asserted visitation with Mother posed a grave threat to Children, the court 

suspended visitation between Children and Mother. On July 7, 2022, the court 

adjudicated Children dependent for the second time. 
J-A15011-24

J-A15012-24

- 4 -

On December 9, 2022, after a hearing, the trial court entered orders 

finding aggravated circumstances pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S. § 6341(c.1) with 

respect to Mother and Children, changed Children’s permanency goals from 

Reunification to Adoption, and ordered the Agency to cease reasonable efforts 

to reunify Children with Mother.3 Among the evidence considered by the court 

was testimony from Trisha Goshorn, L.P.N., school nurse; Kathryn Crowell, 

M.D., member of the Child Protection Team of the Penn State Hershey 

Children’s Hospital and expert in child abuse injuries; as well as the Children’s 

forensic interviews with the Children’s Advocacy Center, where Children 

disclosed that both Mother and Paramour physically abused them. The court 

found that Mother and Paramour were both perpetrators of physical abuse 

against Children and additionally found that Mother failed to protect Children 

from physical abuse.4 Agency Ex. 11, Aggravated Circumstances Order, at 

¶¶ 27, 46. Notably, the court found that A.N.D.’s injuries included bruising to 

her right and left upper eyelids, her left cheek, the area under her chin, the 

angle of the right side of her jaw, both of her buttocks, her left lower back, 

her right outer upper arm, her right outer thigh, her bilaterial inner thighs, 

and the top of her left foot; abrasions to the right side of her forehead and

____________________________________________

3 Mother appealed the aggravated circumstances order, and this Court 

affirmed; Father appealed the goal change order, and this Court affirmed. 

See Interest of A.D., 303 A.3d 775 (Pa. Super. 2023) (non-precedential 

decision); Interest of A.D., 303 A.3d 779 (Pa. Super. 2023) (nonprecedential decision).

4 Mother and Paramour both have criminal charges pending regarding 

Children’s injuries. 
J-A15011-24

J-A15012-24

- 5 -

left cheek; and a large coalescent bruise to her mons pubis. Id. at ¶ 17. 

Additionally, the court found that D.J.D.’s injuries included bruising to his right 

and left upper eyelids, the area beneath his right eye, his right forearm, his 

left anterior thigh, his left and right knees, his right anterior shin, his right 

anterior thigh, his right outer hip and thigh, his penis, and both of his buttocks; 

abrasions to his right temple, the right side of his forehead, his left and right

knee, his right anterior shin, his outer right lower leg, the outer aspect of his 

right ankle, his right outer hip and thigh, and both of his buttocks; erythema

under the right side of his chin; curvilinear abrasion near his left elbow; and

possible bruising on the right side of his scrotum. Id. at ¶ 16. 

Children are placed in pre-adoptive foster homes. After the second 

adjudication of dependency, Children returned to the foster home (“Foster 

Family 1”) that they were placed in when they were first adjudicated 

dependent, but behavioral issues consistent with traumatic abuse required 

Children to be separated. A.N.D. expressed an interest to live with Foster 

Family 1’s adult son and daughter-in-law (“Foster Family 2”), who agreed to 

be a placement resource for her. Foster Family 1 and Foster Family 2 live 

approximately three miles apart, often eat dinner together, and Children see 

each other almost every day. Children attend the same school and church. 

Foster Family 1 and Foster Family 2 both take Children to all their medical, 

dental, and therapy appointments and provide for all their emotional and 

physical needs. 
J-A15011-24

J-A15012-24

- 6 -

On October 24, 2023, the Agency filed petitions to terminate Mother and 

Father’s parental rights to Children. The trial court appointed Kristin B. 

Hamilton, Esq., to serve as Children’s GAL and legal counsel after finding that

the dual role did not pose a conflict of interest. On November 14, 2023, and 

December 29, 2023, the trial court held a hearing on the Agency’s petitions. 

The Agency presented testimony from Nicole Weller, Agency Deputy Director; 

Danae Nowell, A.N.D.’s foster mother; and Patti Nowell, D.J.D.’s foster 

mother. Father and Mother both testified on their own behalf.

The Agency’s witnesses testified in accordance with the above-stated 

facts. In addition, Ms. Weller testified that she does not believe there is any 

way that Mother could have visitation with Children without causing severe 

emotional harm to Children. N.T. TPR Hr’g, 11/14/23, 38. Ms. Weller 

explained that Children attend the permanency review hearings and get 

interviewed at a separate location to avoid having contact with Mother during 

the review hearings. Id. at 42-44.

Danae Nowell testified that A.N.D. lives with her, her husband, and her

two younger children. Danae explained that A.N.D. is a “great big sister” who 

“loves her siblings” and is “very motherly at heart and loves to help, loves to 

play with them [and] takes great pride in being the oldest in our family right 

now.” Id. at 56. Danae testified that she and her husband take A.N.D. to all

her medical and therapy appointments. She informed the court that A.N.D. is 

doing well in fourth grade, tries really hard, is social, and is excited to go to 

school. Danae described her relationship with A.N.D. and stated, “I’ve known 
J-A15011-24

J-A15012-24

- 7 -

her for a couple of years and now that she’s in our home and being her foster 

mom, I mean, she’s just like our other kids. We love her just like a daughter, 

and it’s been fun to grow that bond and enjoy life with her and be able to 

teach her things and walk alongside her.” Id. at 56. Danae testified that she 

“absolutely” would like to adopt A.N.D. Id. at 62.

Patti Nowell testified that D.J.D. has lived in her home with her husband 

and five of her children for a total of thirty-four months, seventeen months 

after the first adjudication of dependency and seventeen months additional 

months after the most recent adjudication of dependency. Patti explained 

that he has a “great” relationship with the other children in the home, “just 

like brothers and sisters.” Id. at 70. Patti informed the court that D.J.D. 

participates in therapy and medication management and has improved his 

prior “out of control behaviors.” Id. at 72. Patti testified that D.J.D. is doing 

well in first grade and has turned his behaviors around to be one of the best 

kids in his class. Patti explained that Foster Family 1 and Foster Family 2 are

“one family unit” and that they have a shared farm, eat dinner together every 

night, go on vacation together, and look out for each other. Patti testified that 

she is “very excited to have [D.J.D. and] he’s very excited.” Id. at 75. Patti 

testified that she wants to adopt D.J.D. and that “he would be my son just like 

my other children.” Id. 

Father testified that, when Children were first adjudicated dependent, 

he participated in an assessment with ABC House and they recommended that 

he “go get mentally seen about anger and other things” but that he did not 
J-A15011-24

J-A15012-24

- 8 -

follow up with a parental fitness evaluation. Id. at 89. Father testified that 

he participated in supervised visits with Children for about a year. Father 

testified that the last time he saw Children “was in 2020 and I told [] ABC 

House that I was done doing visits because I got tired of lying to my daughter.” 

Id. at 91. Father further explained that Children would ask about his parents, 

their grandparents, and he was told he was not allowed to discuss the 

allegations against Children’s paternal grandfather with Children. Father 

admitted that he did not attempt to contact Children while he was 

incarcerated. He testified that when he was released from jail in March 2023, 

he contacted the Agency three times to arrange visits with Children. Father 

testified that he “found my religion again,” exercises, has new employment,

is sober, and complies with parole requirements. Id. at 95. Father stated 

that he moved back in with Mother a week before the hearing. Father testified, 

“I regret it every day when I walked out and told ABC House I’m not coming 

back.” Id. at 96. Father explained, “I love my kids. I want to reunify with 

them. I messed up. I admit it. I found God. I’m trying to do the best I can 

in my life.” Id. at 111. 

In her testimony, Mother denied physically abusing Children and denied 

being aware that Paramour physically abused Children. Mother testified that 

she currently has a protection from abuse (“PFA”) order against Paramour and 

would be able to protect Children from physical harm if they were reunited 

with her. Mother stated that she and Children had a bond and that “if given 

the opportunity, we would still have that bond.” N.T. TPR Hr’g, 12/29/24, at 
J-A15011-24

J-A15012-24

- 9 -

7. Mother testified that she is willing to participate in mental health treatment 

for her and Children, is not using illegal substances, and can get Children to 

their required psychiatric appointments, medical appointments, and school 

activities. Mother further testified that, during the two visits she was allowed 

to have with Children prior to visits being suspended, they were excited to see 

her and asked when they could come home. Mother denies that Children are 

fearful of her. Mother testified that she “should have seen the signs. Yes, I 

do take blame for that. I should have pushed my kids harder to tell where 

they got the bruises.” Id. at 50. Mother testified that she does not know if

Paramour abused the kids “[b]ut if the kids are saying that he did and the 

evidence is there, I have to believe it.” Id. at 51. Mother stated that Children 

told their maternal grandmother about the physical abuse by Paramour a 

month before the Agency removed the Children from the home, but she still 

did not see the signs because “over discipline was not an issue. . . . I never 

punished my children. I was too lenient on them[.]” Id. at 52. Mother 

admitted that she has not performed parental duties for the past six months 

but explained that the Agency did not allow her to perform parental duties or

offer her services. Mother further admits that she had been informed on 

multiple occasions that she could pursue reunification services on her own. 

Mother believes that it is in Children’s best interest “[t]o go home with their 

parents.” Id. at 18. Mother testified that she intends to raise the kids with 

Father and that “[h]e has always been a good dad.” Id. Mother testified that 

“[w]e are proceeding as a family.” Id. at 45.
J-A15011-24

J-A15012-24

- 10 -

On February 6, 2024, the trial court terminated Mother and Father’s 

parental rights to Children pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. §§ 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (8), 

and (b). Mother and Father timely appealed. Mother, Father, and the trial 

court all complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.

A.

Mother raises a sole issue for our review: “Did the trial court err by 

determining that the parental rights of [Mother] should be terminated?” 

Mother’s Br. at 3.

Father raises multiple issues for our review: 

1. [] Father argues that the record does not support the trial

court's finding that [] Father had “either a settled purpose of 

relinquishing parental claim” to [Children] or that he has 

“refused or failed to perform parental duties.” Trial Court

Opinion page 12. [] Father testified that he attempted to set 

up supervised visits and enroll in other services but was

advised by the ABC House that he could not without a referral

from [the Agency].

2. [] Father argues that the record does not support the trial

court’s finding that his “repeated and continued incapacity,

abuse, neglect, or refusal” caused [Children] “to be without 

essential parental care, control or subsistence necessary for 

their physical or mental wellbeing and the conditions and 

causes of the incapacity, abuse, neglect, or refusal cannot or 

will not be remedied by” [] Father. Trial Court Opinion page 

12. It is uncontroverted that [] Father was not the perpetrator 

of the alleged abuse against [Children]. The record is void of 

any evidence that [] Father cannot or will not be able to provide 

safe and stable housing for [Children] and meet [Children]’s 

physical and emotional needs.

3. [] Father argues that the record does not support the trial 

court’s finding that “the conditions which led to the removal of 

[C]hildren from Mother continue to exist; nothing suggests any 

possible services which would make reunification safe for
J-A15011-24

J-A15012-24

- 11 -

[C]hildren.” Trial Court Opinion page 10. The record is void of 

any evidence that [] Father has never lived independently, 

cannot provide safe housing for [Children], and that the only 

people that [] Father has lived with were unsuitable for the 

[C]hildren. [] Father also intends to argue that he testified that 

he is willing to complete any services necessary to facilitate 

reunification and that this could be achieved in way such that 

it is safe for [Children]. 

4. [] Father argues that the record does not support the trial

court’s finding that ”there is no present bond between the 

Child[ren] and either parent” and that it would be “destabilizing 

for Father to suddenly take-on a role which he has not 

performed.” Trial Court Opinion page 11. [] Father expressly 

denies that there was any evidence that showed that there is 

no bond between him and [Children]. Further, [] Father 

testified that prior to his incarceration and [Children]’s first 

placement into foster care, the parties shared physical custody 

of [C]hildren. Father intends to argue that it is not [in] the 

[Children]’s best interests that his parental rights be 

terminated

Father’s Br. at 5-7.

B.

In cases involving the involuntary termination of parental rights, this 

Court’s review is limited to determining whether the trial court’s conclusion is 

supported by competent evidence. In re Adoption of L.A.K., 265 A.3d 580, 

591 (Pa. 2021). When we review a trial court’s decision to grant or deny a 

petition to involuntarily terminate parental rights, we must accept the findings 

of fact and credibility determinations of the trial court if the record supports 

them. In re T.S.M., 71 A.3d 251, 267 (Pa. 2013). “If the factual findings 

are supported, appellate courts review to determine if the trial court made an 

error of law or abused its discretion.” Id. (citation omitted). “Absent an abuse 

of discretion, an error of law, or insufficient evidentiary support for the trial 
J-A15011-24

J-A15012-24

- 12 -

court’s decision, the decree must stand.” In re R.N.J., 985 A.2d 273, 276 

(Pa. Super. 2009) (citation omitted). We may not reverse merely because 

the record could support a different result. T.S.M., 71 A.3d at 267. We give 

great deference to the trial courts “that often have first-hand observations of 

the parties spanning multiple hearings.” Id. Moreover, “[t]he trial court is 

free to believe all, part, or none of the evidence presented, and is likewise 

free to make all credibility determinations and resolve conflicts in the 

evidence.” In re M.G., 855 A.2d 68, 73-74 (Pa. Super. 2004) (citation 

omitted).

It is axiomatic that “[p]arents enjoy a fundamental right to make 

decisions regarding the care, custody and control of their children. It cannot 

be denied that significant and permanent consequences for both the parent 

and child can follow the termination of parental rights, as there is an 

undeniable importance in a child’s relationship with a biological parent.” 

L.A.K., 265 A.3d at 591 (internal citations omitted). Accordingly, “[i]n 

recognition of the gravity attendant to the termination of parental rights, the 

moving party must establish the statutory grounds by clear and convincing 

evidence; that is, evidence that is so clear, direct, weighty and convincing as 

to enable a trier of fact to come to a clear conviction, without hesitance, of 

the truth of the precise facts in issue.” Id. at 592 (citations and quotation 

marks omitted).
J-A15011-24

J-A15012-24

- 13 -

Section 2511 of the Adoption Act, 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511, governs 

termination of parental rights, and requires a bifurcated analysis. “Initially, 

the focus is on the conduct of the parent.” In re Adoption of A.C., 162 A.3d 

1123, 1128 (Pa. Super. 2017) (citation omitted). As discussed above, “[t]he 

party seeking termination must prove by clear and convincing evidence that 

the parent’s conduct satisfies the statutory grounds for termination delineated 

in Section 2511(a).” Id. (citation omitted). If the court determines that the 

parent’s conduct warrants termination of his or her parental rights, the court 

then engages in “the second part of the analysis pursuant to Section 2511(b): 

determination of the needs and welfare of the child under the standard of best 

interests of the child.” Id. (citation omitted). Notably, we need only agree 

with the court’s decision as to any one subsection of Section 2511(a), as well 

as Section 2511(b), to affirm the termination of parental rights. In re K.Z.S., 

946 A.2d 753, 758 (Pa. Super. 2008). With regards to Mother, we concentrate 

our analysis on Section 2511(a)(2). With regards to Father, we concentrate 

our analysis on Section 2511(a)(1).

C.

As stated above, with regards to Mother, we concentrate our analysis 

on Section 2511(a)(2). Section 2511(a)(2) provides for termination of 

parental rights where the petitioner demonstrates by clear and convincing 

evidence that “[t]he repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, neglect or 

refusal of the parent has caused the child to be without essential parental 
J-A15011-24

J-A15012-24

- 14 -

care, control or subsistence necessary for his physical or mental well-being 

and the conditions and causes of the incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal 

cannot or will not be remedied by the parent.” 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(2); In 

re Adoption of S.P., 47 A.3d 817, 827 (Pa. 2012). The grounds for 

termination of parental rights under Section 2511(a)(2) due to parental 

incapacity are not limited to affirmative misconduct; those grounds may also 

include acts of refusal as well as incapacity to perform parental duties. In re

Adoption of C.D.R., 111 A.3d 1212, 1216 (Pa. Super. 2015), abrogated on 

other grounds by In re K.T., 296 A.3d 1085 (Pa. 2023). “Parents are required 

to make diligent efforts toward the reasonably prompt assumption of full 

parental duties.” In re C.M.K., 203 A.3d 258, 262 (Pa. Super. 2019). 

Notably, a “parent’s vow to cooperate, after a long period of 

uncooperativeness regarding the necessity or availability of services, may 

properly be rejected as untimely or disingenuous.” In re Z.P., 994 A.2d 1108, 

1118 (Pa. Super. 2010). 

Finally, sincere efforts to perform parental duties may still be insufficient 

to remedy an incapacity. Id. at 1117. This is because subsection (a)(2) 

“emphasizes the child’s present and future need for essential parental care, 

control or subsistence necessary for his physical or mental well-being[,]” 

especially “where disruption of the family has already occurred and there is 

no reasonable prospect for reuniting it.” Id. (citation omitted). 

D.
J-A15011-24

J-A15012-24

- 15 -

The crux of Mother’s argument is that she was limited in her ability to 

provide essential parental care to Children because of the trial court’s novisitation orders and because the Agency was not required to provide 

reunification services. Mother’s Br. at 7-9. Mother admits that she failed to 

provide parental care but blames the court and the Agency for refusing her 

the opportunity to do so. Id. Mother emphasizes that “the [c]ourt 

acknowledged that Mother was not the person who physically abused

[Children], but took exception to the fact that Mother was ‘solely responsible 

for the safety of [C]hildren’ at the time they were harmed.” Id. at 10 (citing 

Decree, 2/6/23, at 8). Mother argues that the trial court failed to consider 

that she has obtained a PFA against Paramour, that she has obtained 

appropriate housing and employment, and that she is willing and able to 

participate in any reunification counseling that the Agency provides. Id. at 

10-11. Mother’s arguments merit no relief.

First and foremost, Mother mischaracterizes the trial court’s findings

regarding abuse, which renders her argument disingenuous at best. In its 

February 6, 2023 decree, the trial court emphasized that the Agency 

presented a forensic pediatric evaluation as well as Children’s forensic 

interviews to support the abuse allegations, and unequivocally made a finding 

that Mother was the perpetrator of child abuse against Children:

Here, the Juvenile Court made a finding that Mother is a 

perpetrator of child abuse against the Child and her brother in May 

2022. The abuse was physical, as graphically described in the 

Juvenile Court's findings. The Juvenile Court also made a finding 
J-A15011-24

J-A15012-24

- 16 -

that Mother’s paramour is a perpetrator of child abuse against the 

Child and her brother. There is no reason to discount the findings 

of the Juvenile Court, especially considering they have been

upheld on appeal.

Decree at 7-8. The trial court made an additional finding that Mother was

also responsible for protecting Children from Paramour:

Mother was the sole parent with custody in May of 2022, and 

therefore was solely responsible for the safety of her children. As 

Mother takes no responsibility, either directly for the abuse, or 

indirectly for failing to prevent the abuse, nothing prevents 

recurrence should the children be returned to her.

Id. The trial court’s finding that Mother was likewise responsible for protecting 

her Children from Paramour’s physical abuse does not negate the trial court’s

clear finding that Mother was directly responsible for perpetrating child abuse

against Children. 

In In re A.D., 93 A.3d 888 (Pa. Super. 2014), an analogous case, a 

father was ordered to have no-contact with the child that he abused and, in 

affirming the termination of his parental rights pursuant to Section 

2511(a)(2), this Court concluded, “parental incapacity caused by a no-contact 

order is not only relevant to a court’s conclusion that grounds for termination 

exist under § 2511(a)(2), but where, as here, the order is required to protect 

the children from further [] abuse at the hands of the excluded parent, we 

find that it is dispositive.” Id. at 897. Instantly, we find A.D. to be instructive.

Here, the trial court emphasized the exceptional nature of this case and 

the fact that the court prohibited all contact between Mother and Children and

found Ms. Weller’s testimony credible that there was no way to ensure 
J-A15011-24

J-A15012-24

- 17 -

Children’s safety if they were to have contact with Mother. The court opined, 

“[t]he Deputy Director of [the Agency] testified that this case . . . is the only 

case where, in her experience, the Juvenile Court prohibited all contact 

between a parent and a child. The Deputy Director also testified that there 

was no way to ensure the emotional safety of [C]hildren if allowed contact 

with Mother.” Decree at 7. The court further emphasized that “Mother has 

not undertaken any form [of] treatment, such as anger-management classes, 

which could remediate the potential for repeated abuse.” Id. 

The trial court concluded that Mother’s physical abuse of Children, the 

resulting no-contact order, Mother’s failure to take responsibility for that 

abuse, and Mother’s failure to engage in services to remediate the potential 

for repeated abuse has prevented Mother from providing essential parental 

care to Child. Id. at 7-8. While Mother argues that the no-contact order was 

to blame for her inability to parent Children, the no-contact order was in place 

to ensure Children’s safety. Pursuant to A.D., the no-contact order was not 

only relevant to the trial court’s analysis but is dispositive. Our review of the 

record supports the trial court’s findings, and we decline to reweigh the 

evidence or usurp the trial court’s credibility determinations.

E.

With regards to Father, we concentrate our analysis on Section 

2511(a)(1), which provides that the trial court may terminate parental rights 

if the Petitioner establishes that “[t]he parent by conduct continuing for a 

period of at least six months immediately preceding the filing of the petition 
J-A15011-24

J-A15012-24

- 18 -

either has evidenced a settled purpose of relinquishing parental claim to a 

child or has refused or failed to perform parental duties.” 23 Pa.C.S. 

§ 2511(a)(1). The focus of involuntary termination proceedings is on the 

conduct of the parent and whether that conduct justifies a termination of 

parental rights. In re B.L.L., 787 A.2d 1007, 1013 (Pa. Super. 2001). 

Although the statute focuses on an analysis of the six months immediately 

preceding the filing of the petition, the court must consider the whole history 

of a given case and may consider a parent’s inaction before the six-month 

statutory provision. In re K.Z.S., 946 A.2d 753, 758 (Pa. Super. 2008). 

“Although courts are to avoid the mechanical application of the Adoption Act, 

we may not ignore that the General Assembly has drawn focus to the six 

months immediately preceding the filing of the termination petition [and] the 

most critical period for evaluation is the six months immediately preceding the 

filing of the termination petition.” L.A.K., 265 A.3d at 592. 

Our Supreme Court has repeatedly defined “parental duties” in general 

as the affirmative obligation to provide consistently for the physical and 

emotional needs of a child:

Parental duties are not defined in the Adoption Act, but our courts 

long have interpreted parental duties in relation to the needs of a 

child, such as love, protection, guidance and support. Parental 

duties are carried out through affirmative actions that develop and 

maintain the parent-child relationship. The roster of such positive 

actions undoubtedly includes communication and association. The 

performance of parental duties requires that a parent exert 

himself to take and maintain a place of importance in the child’s 

life. Fortitude is required, as a parent must act with reasonable 

firmness to overcome obstacles that stand in the way of 
J-A15011-24

J-A15012-24

- 19 -

preserving a parent-child relationship and may not wait for a more 

suitable time to perform parental responsibilities. 

Id. (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).

It is well-settled that “a parent’s efforts are always considered in light 

of existing circumstances.” Id. (citations and internal quotation marks

omitted). “To that end, even where the evidence clearly establishes a parent 

has failed to perform affirmative parental duties for a period in excess of six 

months as required by Section 2511(a)(1), the court must examine the 

individual circumstances and any explanation offered by the parent to 

determine if that evidence, in light of the totality of circumstances, clearly 

warrants permitting the involuntary termination of parental rights.” Id. at 

593 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). 

Our Supreme Court has explained:

Consideration of the totality of the circumstances includes 

evaluation of the following: (1) the parent’s explanation for his or 

her conduct; (2) the post-abandonment contact between the 

parent and child, if any, including any efforts made by the parent 

to reestablish contact with the child; and (3) the effect that 

termination of parental rights would have on the child pursuant to 

Section 2511(b). . . . It is within this framework that a court 

determines whether a parent has faced barriers that prevented 

the parent from maintaining the parent-child relationship. What 

constitutes a “barrier” in the context of a Section 2511(a)(1) 

analysis is a finding within the discretion of the trial court, and 

what may constitute a barrier necessarily will vary with the 

circumstances of each case. In some instances, obstructive 

behavior by the child’s custodian presents a barrier to the parent’s 

ability to perform parental duties, which mitigates the parent’s 

failure to maintain the parent-child relationship.

Id. at 593. Notably, “a parent’s efforts to enforce his or her legal custody 

rights unquestionably establishes the affirmative performance of a positive 
J-A15011-24

J-A15012-24

- 20 -

parental duty, and that when such action is taken in the face of a custodial 

parent’s efforts to thwart access to the child, the attempts to enforce custodial 

rights provide evidence that is highly relevant to the question of whether the 

requirements of Section 2511(a)(1) have been met.” Id. at 594.

F.

With respect to Section 2511(a)(1), Father avers that the record is void 

of evidence that Father had a settled purpose of relinquishing parental claim 

to Children or that he refused to perform parental duties. Father’s Br. at 12. 

Father argues that he and Mother shared custody of Children for 

approximately seven months prior to them being placed in foster care for the 

first time and, after they were placed, Father attended supervised visits for 

approximately one year. Id. at 12. Father further argues that, once Children 

were returned to Mother’s care in 2022, Father wanted to have shared custody 

and/or parental involvement with Children, but Mother refused. Id. at 13. 

Finally, Father asserts that once he was released from incarceration in March 

2023, he attempted to set up visitation with Children three times, 

demonstrating his commitment to be a parent to Children. Id. at 14-15. 

Father’s arguments lack merit.

In terminating Father’s parental rights pursuant to Section 2511(a)(1), 

the trial court placed great weight on the fact that Father has not had contact 

with Children since 2020, and that he voluntarily ceased visitation with them. 

The trial court opined:
J-A15011-24

J-A15012-24

- 21 -

Father has not visited or otherwise communicated with [C]hildren

since 2020. Although Father has been incarcerated off and on, 

incarceration was not the reason for the lack of contact. Rather, 

Father testified that he told ABC House that he was “done doing 

visits”. Father testified on cross examination that he had made a 

conscious decision to “disappear” so that Mother could get

[C]hildren out of foster care during their first dependency. After 

[C]hildren were returned to Mother and the dependency was

terminated, there is no evidence that Father interacted with 

[C]hildren in any way. During Father’s incarceration, Father did 

not attempt to communicate with [C]hildren by sending gifts or 

letters, nor request any form of visitation. Father admitted that 

he had the ability to conduct video conferences with [] Child[ren]

while he was incarcerated in the county jail; he offered no 

explanation for his lack of doing so. 

Father’s testimony regarding his disappearing from [C]hildren’s 

lives in 2020 is clear and convincing evidence of a settled purpose 

to relinquish his parental claims. Additionally, Father has not 

performed parental duties, whether by refusal or failure, in almost 

three years.

Decree at 9. 

Our review of the record supports the trial court’s findings, and we 

decline to reweigh the evidence or usurp the trial court’s credibility 

determinations. Father’s own testimony is compelling. By his own admission, 

he voluntarily ceased visitation with Children and did not attempt to 

communicate with Children while he was incarcerated. At the time of the 

hearing, Father had not seen Children in over three years. Moreover, Father’s 

attempt to set up visitation three times once released from incarceration does 

not fulfill his affirmative obligation to provide for the physical and emotional 

needs of Children on a consistent basis. Accordingly, we find no abuse of 

discretion in the trial court’s conclusion that Father had refused to perform 

parental duties. 
J-A15011-24

J-A15012-24

- 22 -

G.

With respect to Section 2511(b), our analysis focuses on the effect that 

terminating the parental bond will have on the child. This Court reviews 

“whether termination of parental rights would best serve the developmental, 

physical, and emotional needs and welfare of the child.” In re Adoption of 

J.M., 991 A.2d 321, 324 (Pa. Super. 2010). It is well settled that 

“[i]ntangibles such as love, comfort, security, and stability are involved in the 

inquiry into needs and welfare of the child.” In re C.M.S., 884 A.2d 1284, 

1287 (Pa. Super. 2005). 

“One major aspect of the needs and welfare analysis concerns the 

nature and status of the emotional bond” that the child has with the parent, 

with close attention paid to the effect on the child of permanently severing 

any such bond.” In re Adoption of N.N.H., 197 A.3d 777, 783 (Pa Super. 

2018) (citation omitted). The fact that a child has a bond with a parent does 

not preclude the termination of parental rights. A.D., 93 A.3d at 897. Rather, 

the trial court must examine the depth of the bond to determine whether the 

bond is so meaningful to the child that its termination would destroy an 

existing, necessary, and beneficial relationship. Id. at 898. Moreover, the 

trial court may consider intangibles, such as the love, comfort, security, and 

stability the child might have with the adoptive resource. In re N.A.M., 33 

A.3d 95, 103 (Pa. Super. 2011). Ultimately, the concern is the needs and 

welfare of the child. Z.P., 994 A.2d at 1121. 
J-A15011-24

J-A15012-24

- 23 -

Mother and Father both aver that the trial court erred when the court 

found that termination of parental rights was in Children’s best interest. 

Mother’s Br. at 12-13; Father’s Br. at 19-20. Both parents argue that the 

record does not support the trial court’s conclusion that there is no bond 

between Children and parents. Mother’s Br. at 12-13; Father’s Br. at 19. We 

disagree.

While both parents testified that they had a bond with Children, the trial 

court did not find this testimony to be credible. Indeed, in this case, the trial 

court concluded that actions speak louder than words. In finding that there 

was no bond between parents and Children, the court placed great weight on 

the fact that Father has been absent from Children’s lives for over three years

and that Children suffered physical abuse and ongoing trauma at the hands of 

Mother. Further, the trial court emphasized Children’s wishes to not have any

contact with Mother or Father and noted that Children do not even want to be 

in the same building as Mother. The court opined: 

There is no present bond between [Children]

[5] and either parent. 

[Children have] not asked to contact either Mother or Father. 

Rather, due to observed distress, during permanency review 

hearings [C]hildren are interviewed in a separate building from 

Mother to prevent accidental contact. Although Father’s visitation 

was never suspended by the [c]ourt, Father has not sought any 

form of visitation in the Juvenile Court. Neither parent has sent 

letters or gifts to [C]hildren, in an effort to maintain a relationship. 

Therefore, considering that: 1) [Children]’s developmental, 

emotional, and physical needs are met by [their] Foster 

____________________________________________

5 The trial court issued identical findings for A.N.D. and D.J.D. Accordingly, 

we have changed references from “Child” to “Children.”
J-A15011-24

J-A15012-24

- 24 -

Famil[ies]; 2) Father has been absent for the most-recent third of 

[Children]’s life and it would be destabilizing for Father to

suddenly take-on a role which he has not performed; 3) Mother 

had a chance to remediate her deficiencies as a parent and it led 

to [Children] suffering traumatic abuse; and 4) there is no 

evidence of a bond between [Children] and either parent, it is in 

the best interest of [Children] that Mother and Father’s parental 

rights be terminated.

Decree at 11. 

The record supports the trial court’s findings and, thus, we discern no 

abuse of discretion. As always, we decline to reweigh the evidence or usurp 

the trial court’s credibility findings. 

H.

In conclusion, our review of the record supports the trial court’s findings. 

We discern no error of law or abuse of discretion with respect to the trial 

court’s conclusion that the Agency presented clear and convincing evidence to 

terminate Mother’s parental rights pursuant to Section 2511(a)(2) and (b) and 

Father’s parental rights pursuant to Section 2511(a)(1) and (b). In light of 

our disposition, we decline to address Mother and Father’s arguments as they 

relate to other subsections of Section 2511.

Decrees affirmed. 
J-A15011-24

J-A15012-24

- 25 -

Judgment Entered.

Benjamin D. Kohler, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 9/13/2024