17-2914 

Singh v. Barr 

BIA 

Poczter, IJ 

A208 192 405 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

SUMMARY ORDER

RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER

FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF 

APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT=S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER 

IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN 

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ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.

At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals 

for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall 

United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of 

New York, on the 1st day of May, two thousand nineteen. 

PRESENT: 

ROBERT D. SACK,

CHRISTOPHER F. DRONEY, 

RICHARD J. SULLIVAN,

Circuit Judges. 

_____________________________________ 

SUKHJINDER SINGH, AKA RAJU THAPA 

 Petitioner, 

v. 17-2914 

 NAC 

WILLIAM P. BARR, UNITED STATES 

ATTORNEY GENERAL, 

 Respondent. 

_____________________________________ 

FOR PETITIONER: Amy Nussbaum Gell, New York, 

 NY. 

FOR RESPONDENT: Chad A. Readler, Acting Assistant 

Attorney General; Keith I. 

McManus, Assistant Director; 

Giovanni B. Di Maggio, Trial 

Attorney, Office of Immigration 

Litigation, United States 

Department of Justice, Washington, 

DC. 
2 

UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a 

Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby 

ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the petition for review 

is DENIED. 

 Petitioner Sukhjinder Singh, a native and citizen of 

India, seeks review of an August 31, 2017, decision of the 

BIA affirming a November 15, 2016, decision of an Immigration 

Judge (“IJ”) denying his application for asylum, withholding 

of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture 

(“CAT”). In re Sukhjinder Singh, No. A208 192 405 (B.I.A. 

Aug. 31, 2017), aff’g No. A208 192 405 (Immig. Ct. N.Y. City 

Nov. 15, 2016). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the 

underlying facts, procedural history, and issues on appeal. 

 Under the circumstances of this case, we have reviewed 

the IJ’s decision without considering the findings of the IJ 

that the BIA did not reach. See Xue Hong Yang v. U.S. Dep’t 

of Justice, 426 F.3d 520, 522 (2d Cir. 2005). The applicable 

standards of review are well established. See 8 U.S.C. 

§ 1252(b)(4)(B); Hong Fei Gao v. Sessions, 891 F.3d 67, 76 

(2d Cir. 2018). 

 “Considering the totality of the circumstances, and all 

relevant factors, a trier of fact may base a credibility 

determination on . . . the consistency between the 
3 

applicant’s . . . written and oral statements . . . , the 

internal consistency of each such statement, the consistency 

of such statements with other evidence of record . . . without 

regard to whether an inconsistency, inaccuracy, or falsehood 

goes to the heart of the applicant’s claim, or any other 

relevant factor.” 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii); Xiu Xia Lin 

v. Mukasey, 534 F.3d 162, 163-64 (2d Cir. 2008). Substantial 

evidence supports the agency’s determination that Singh was 

not credible as to (1) his claim that members of the Akali 

Dal Badal Party attacked him twice in India on account of his 

membership in the Shiromani Akali Dal Amritsar Party (“SADA”) 

and (2) his fear of similar harm in the future. 

 The agency reasonably relied on Singh’s inconsistent 

descriptions of the attack he purportedly suffered in 2014. 

See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii). In his written statement, 

Singh asserted that Badal Party members punched, slapped, and 

kicked him. However, he testified only that he was hit with 

sticks on the legs without mentioning being hit in any other 

manner. 

 The agency also reasonably relied on Singh’s omission 

from his written statement of his later assertion that Badal 

Party members started threatening him when he joined SADA in 

2000 and threatened him several times before attacking him in 
4 

2014. Although applicants need not list every incident or 

describe every detail in their application statements, the 

agency may rely on an omission of facts “that a credible 

petitioner would reasonably have been expected to disclose 

under the relevant circumstances.” Hong Fei Gao, 891 F.3d 

at 78-79. The agency did not err in relying on Singh’s 

failure to mention that he was threatened several times over 

a period of fourteen years in his written statement because 

that statement described at length and in detail his volunteer 

activities and SADA’s social programs, and generally 

described the Badal Party’s intimidation of SADA members 

during that time yet failed to mention that Singh had been 

personally threatened. See id. at 78-79, 82. Singh could 

not compellingly explain his inconsistent statements. See 

Majidi v. Gonzales, 430 F.3d 77, 80 (2d Cir. 2005) (“A 

petitioner must do more than offer a plausible explanation 

for his inconsistent statements to secure relief; he must 

demonstrate that a reasonable fact-finder would be compelled

to credit his testimony.” (internal quotation marks 

omitted)). 

 Having questioned Singh’s credibility, the agency 

reasonably relied further on his failure to rehabilitate his 

testimony with reliable corroborating evidence. “An 
5 

applicant’s failure to corroborate his or her testimony may 

bear on credibility, because the absence of corroboration in 

general makes an applicant unable to rehabilitate testimony 

that has already been called into question.” Biao Yang v. 

Gonzales, 496 F.3d 268, 273 (2d Cir. 2007). The agency 

reasonably declined to afford weight to affidavits and 

letters from Singh’s relatives and acquaintances because the 

authors were interested parties or were unavailable for 

cross-examination. See Y.C. v. Holder, 741 F.3d 324, 334 (2d 

Cir. 2013) (deferring to agency’s decision to afford little 

weight to relative’s letter from China because it was unsworn 

and from an interested witness); In re H-L-H- & Z-Y-Z-, 25 I. 

& N. Dec. 209, 215 (B.I.A. 2010) (finding that letters from 

alien’s friends and family did not provide substantial 

support for alien’s claims because they were from interested 

witnesses not subject to cross-examination), overruled on 

other grounds by Hui Lin Huang v. Holder, 677 F.3d 130, 133-

38 (2d Cir. 2012). Further, as the agency noted, the 

remaining personalized documents did not constitute evidence 

that Singh suffered or feared harm on account of his political 

opinion. 

 Given Singh’s inconsistent statements and insufficient 

corroboration, the agency’s adverse credibility determination 
6 

is supported by substantial evidence. See 8 U.S.C. 

§ 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii). Contrary to Singh’s argument, the 

credibility determination was dispositive of asylum, 

withholding of removal, and CAT relief because all three 

claims were based on the same factual predicate. See Paul 

v. Gonzales, 444 F.3d 148, 156-57 (2d Cir. 2006). 

 For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is 

DENIED. As we have completed our review, any stay of removal 

that the Court previously granted in this petition is VACATED, 

and any pending motion for a stay of removal in this petition 

is DISMISSED as moot. Any pending request for oral argument 

in this petition is DENIED in accordance with Federal Rule of 

Appellate Procedure 34(a)(2), and Second Circuit Local Rule 

34.1(b). 

FOR THE COURT: 

Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe 

Clerk of Court