### IN THE COURT OF APP EALS OF TENNESS EE AT JAC KSON A pr il 19, 200 6 S es sio n
DOU GLA S ED WAR D C ORD ER v. V ALE RIE JEA N C ORD ER

An Appeal f

romthe Circ uit Court for Sh elby County No. 154501-6 G eorgeR. Ellis, S pecial Judge

No. W2005-01711-C OA-R3-C V - F iled Novem ber 30, 2006

This case involves a divorce d pare nt’s obligation to support colleg e-a g e childre n. After the divorce , t h e m o t h e r

w a s t h e p r i m ar y

r e s i d e n t i a l p ar e n tf

o r t h e p ar t i e s ’ t w o c h i l d r e n , w h o ar e n o w a d u l t s

. In 1999, when both childre n wer e still minors, the fathe r’s c hild support obligation was inc rea sed, and he wa s o rd e re d to pr ov ide to the mothe r fi na nc ia l doc ume nts a ndfi na nc ia l in fo rm a tio n n e c e ssa ry to assi s t the children w ith their private hig h school and c olleg e expenses. The mother later filed a petition for contempt, ar g uing that the fathe r fa iled to com p l y

. At a 2001 conte mpt hearing , the mother aske d that the fa t h er b e h eld i n contempt for, among othe r thing s, his failure to provide Mothe r wi t h his 2000 tax returns f or a f inancial a id application for the older c hild’s I vy L eag ue colleg e tuition. The trial court reserve d the i ssue unt il further evidenc e could be prese nted. Soon
a ft e r the he ari ng , in June 20 01 , th e old e r c hil d g ra du a te d fr om hig h s c ho ol andthe fathe r u nil a te ra lly reduc ed his child support pay ments without seeking a modi fica tion of t he trial c ourt’s support orde r. Four y ear s went by

without a court he aring , and both childre n rea ched ma jority . I n 2005, the fa ther filed a pe tition t o resolve a ll outst anding matters and c lose the case

. After a hearing, the trial court de te r mi n e d th a t th e f

a th e r w a s in c o n te mp t o f c o u r t f o r h is f a il u r e to p r o v id e th e mothe r with the fi n an ci al d o cu m en t s n ec es s ar y t o co m p l et e a fi n an ci al ai d ap p l i ca t i o n fo r t h e o l d erch i l d ’s co l l ege education and awa

rded da mag es to Mo t h er

. The trial c ourt furthe r held that the f ather was not p er m i t t ed t o u n i l at er al l y

re d u ce h i s ch i l d s u p p o rt p ay m en t s wh en t h e o l d erch i l d gra d u at ed fr o mh i gh
s c h o o l an d , c o n s e q u e n tl y , a s s e s s e d a c h il d s u p p o r t a

rr e ar a g e a g a in s t h im

. T h e f a th e r ap p e a ls

. We aff irm in part and r ever se in part holding , int e r a lia , that once the parties’ child was e mancipate d, the t rial court was without authority to require the fa ther to provide f inancial doc uments to assist her in obtaining c olleg e fina ncial aid.
Tenn. R. App . P . 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgme nt of th e Circ uit Court is Reve rsed in Par t, Aff irm ed in Par t, Vac ated in Par t, and Rem anded f or F urther P roce edings

H OL L Y M. K I RBY , J ., delivere d the opinion of the Court, in which D AVI D R. F ARMER , J ., joined; A L AN E. H I G H ERS , J., d iss e nts in p art a ndc on c ur s in pa

rt

.-2-

Wil liam Bry an Penn, Memphis, Tenne ssee, f or the a ppellant, Doug las Edwar d Corder.
Clifford M. Cole, Germantown, Tenne ssee, f or the a ppellee, V alerie J ean Corde r.
OP IN ION

Re sp on de nt/Ap pe lla nt Do ug la s Ed wa rd Cor de r ( “ F a the r” ) andPe tit ion e r/Ap pe lle e Va le ri e J ean Corder (“ Mother”) wer e divorc ed by final dec ree on October 19, 1998, and Mother w as desig nate d the primary

residential pa

rent for the parties’ two childre n, Victoria V ance Tronolone Corder ( born Oc tober 20, 1982) and Alexander J ohn Tronolone Corde r (born Dec ember 7, 1984). Th e tr ia l c ou rt

fo un d th a t F a the r w a s v olu nta ri ly un e mpl oy ed or un de re mpl oy e d, de te rm ine d h is
earning capa city , and ordered him to pay $1,200 per month in child support based on that earning capa city . Mother had r equeste d that Father b e re quired to pay for e x traordina

ry educational expenses, beca

use the mi nor children attended private schools. This reque st was denied. T he fina l decr ee or dere d Father to maintain heal t h an d d ental insuranc e on the pa rties’ c hildren and to pa y Mother a lump sum of $10,000 as a share of the marital property

. On Ap ri l 14, 199 9, Mo the r f ile d a pe tit ion fo r s c ir e fa c ia s, a lle g ing that F a the r h a d f a ile d to comply with his obli g ations under the f inal decr ee. O n April 19, 1999, Father tender ed to Mother a che ck in the amount of $7,200. On April 27, 1999, the trial c ourt enter ed an or der f inding F ather to be i n co ntempt for fa iling to pay Mother $1,496.52 as his shar e of the children’ s medical a nd dental expenses, and the $10,000 l u m p -sum pay ment that was a war ded to Mother a s marital proper ty

. F a th e r w a s o r d e r e d to p a y th e s e it e ms a s w e ll a s $ 2 1 , 6 0 0 in f u tu r e c h il d s u p p o r t for eig hteen months. The tria l court found, howe ver, that Fathe r had pur g ed h i m s el f o f contempt for back c hild support by

tendering the $7,200 chec k.

Th e or de r o n M oth e r’ s c on te mpt pe tit ion inc lud e d a pr ov isi on re qu ir ing F a the r t o c omp le te and g ive to Mothe r an y fi nancia l information that would perta in to the children’s e ducational expenses. The orde r provided:
[Father must] fully , acc urate ly , and promptly complete an d re t urn to [Mot her] any
a nda ll d oc ume nts , a

pp lic a tio ns , a ndthi ng s p e rt a ini ng to the e du c a tio n o f the pa rt ie s’
c hil dr e n, wh e the r s a id r e qu e st p e rt a ins to col lege, hi g h s c ho ol, or mid dle sc ho ol, including, but not limited to a ny reque sts f or financ ial information, financ ial aid, or scholarships nec essary

for sa me.
The trial c ourt ag ain de n i ed M o t h er’ s reque st to require F ather to pay toward the children’ s extraordinary

educational expenses.

I n September 1999, Mother filed a petition to modify , asking the trial court to, among othe r things, incr ease the child support award and order Father to contribute to the private school expenses of the parties’ children. I n this petition, Mother asserted that Father had become g ainfully employ ed and wa s able to pay

the incre ased c hild support and the educational e x pense. She contende d FatherM ot h er a s s er t s i n her b ri ef t h at Fa t h er de l i ber at el y fai l ed t o de s i g n at e t h i s pe t i t i on a s pa r t of t h e r ec or d on 1
appe al , an d s h e a t t ac h ed a copy of t h e pet i t i on a s a n a ppen di x t o h er a ppel l at e br i ef

. I n de ci di n g t h i s a ppea l , w e ca n n ot
c o n sid e r th e p e tit io n a ttac h e d to he r b rie f, b e c a u se it w a s n o t p ro p e rly inc lud e d in the a p p e llate re c o rd

. See T e n n

. R. App. P. 24.
-3- did not visit the children and had moved out of the jurisdiction without providing Mother his new
a d d r e s s o r te le p h o n e n u mb e r

. T h e matt e r w a s a s s ig n e d to a d iv o r c e r e f e r e e

. O n A p ril 26, 2000, ba se d o n th e re fe re e ’s fi nd ing s, thetr ia l c ou rt e nte re d an or de r c on c lud ing that F a the r h a d f a ile d to vis it the c hil dr e n, inc re a sin g F a the r’ s mo nth ly c hil d sup po rt ob lig a tio n to $1,5 58 , a ndre qu ir ing him to p a y Mo the r $ 4, 08 8. 11 fo r h is s ha re of the c hil dr e n’ s me dic a l e xpe ns e s.

In t h e f a l l o f 2 0 0 0 , t h e p ar t i e s ’ o l d e r c h i l d , V i c t o r i a , w a s a

s e n i o r i n h i g h s c h o o l

. In N o v e m b e r o f

t h a tye ar , V i c t o r i a

s e c u r e d e ar l y a d m i s s i o n t o D ar t m o u t h C o l l e g e

. C o n s e q u e n t l y, Mo the r r e qu e ste d F a the r’ s tax re c or ds a nd fi na nc ia l in fo rm a tio n f or Vi c toria ’s c oll e g e fi na nc ia l a id application s

. A c c o r d ing to Mother, Father re fused to timely , acc urate ly , or complete ly provide e ither his income tax returns or the re quested forms. Subsequently , the parties filed various motions reg arding Father’s c hild support obligation. Mo the r a pp are ntl y fi le d a Se c on d Pe tit ion fo r Writ o f Sc ir e F a c ia s a ndCitatio n f or Con te mpt

a g a ins t Father, but a c opy

of that petition is not in t he re cord. Neve rtheless, a co n s en t order was late r 1 enter ed by

the trial court which re fer red to the pe tition. The consent orde r disposed of some of the parties’ motions and stated that counsel for Father “ ag ree s to acc ept servic e on the plaintiff’ s Second Petition for Contempt and enter his/defe ndant’s appe ara nce in sa me.”

On April 12, 2001, the trial court he ld a hea ring on Mother’s se cond petition for sc ire fa cias
a ndpe ti ti on for c on te mpt . B othMo the r andF a the r t e sti fi e d, a nda tr a ns c ri pt o f the he ari ng is included in the record. At the conclusion of t he hearing , the trial court held Father in conte mpt and
or de re d h im t o p a y

Mo the r $ 7, 12 5. 25 in c hil d s up po rt arr e ara g e s, $2 ,2 47 in p a st d ue me dic a l bi lls , and attorne y ’s fe es. Afte r the t ri al court’s r uling, c ounsel for Mother reque sted that Father be
r e q u i r e d t o g i v e h e r

a c o p y o f h i s 2 0 0 0 t a x r e t u r n , w h i c h w a s d u e t o b e f i l e d w i t h t h e IR S t h r e e d a ys fr om the he ari ng , s o th a t Mo the r andVi c toria c ou ld c omp le te Vi c toria ’s app lic a tio n f or fi na nc ia l a id
a t D art mou th. Th e tr ia l cou rt sp e c if ic a lly re se rv e d its rul ing on thi s r e qu e st u nti l f urthe r p ro of

c ou ld be adduc ed.

On Ap ri l 30 , 2 00 1, the tr ia l cou rt e nte re d an or de r titl e d “O rd e r on S e c on d Pe tit ion fo r Writ of Scire F acia s and Citation for Contempt” consistent with its oral ruling. T he orde r stated:
[T]he Or de rs [sic ] of

the Cou rt

da te d A pril 2 4 [si c] , 199 9, re qu ir ing [F a the r] t o pr ov ide [Mothe r] w ith fi na nc ia l in fo rm a tio n f or c oll e g e a dmi ssi on or

fi na nc ial a id is ambiguous a nd the Court will require f urther pr oof on this i s s u e to find [Father] in c on te mpt

of Cou rt fo r f a ilu re to p ro vid e hi s 20 01 [sic ] inc ome ta x re turns to [Mot her].”T h e m e m o ra n d u m o f la w o rd ina rily w o u ld n o t h a v e b e e n in c lud e d in the re c o rd

. See T enn. R

. A p p

. P

. 24 (a); 2

s ee W i l l i s v . Tenn. D ep’ t of Cor r ec t i on , 11 3 S.W

. 3 d 70 6 , 70 9 n. 2 (T enn. C t

. A p p

. 2 0 0 3 ). T hi s m em o randum , how ever,
w a s e n te re d a s a trial e x h ib it.
-4- On May 11, 2001, the trial court entere d a conse nt order disposi n g of unre solved motions filed by the p ar t i es

. May

17, 2001, Father filed a

motion for a re hearing or , in the alternative, a motion to alter or amend the trial court’ s Apri l 3 0 , 2001 order and for a stay of execution of that
o rd er

. Fa t h er ’s m o t i o n wa s n o ts et fo r ah ea ri n g.

Four y ear s passed without substantial activity by the trial court . I n 2005, Father filed a Motion to Terminate Matter s and Close Case, ba sed on the fa ct that both ch i ldren ha d rea ched majority . The a

ppellate r ecor d does not contain a copy of F ather ’s motion, but the memorandum of la w in sup po rt of the mot ion is i nc lud e d a s tria l E xhibi t 3. Cou ns e l f or F a the r d e liv e re d d ir e c tly

to 2 the trial judg e a le tter written by Father, a long w ith a compilation of documents, purportedly showing his compliance w ith the trial court’s orders over t he y ear s. Mother later filed a motion to strike the lette r andthe a c c omp a nying do c ume nts of fe re d b y F a the r i n h is ex parte c o mmu n ic a tion and for sanctions ag ainst him for the improper communication.

On Ma rc h 1 0, 20 05 , th e tr ia l c ou rt he arda rg ume nts on F a th er’s mo tion, bu t ul tim a te ly determined that it could not rule on the motion without hearing proof. The appellate rec ord does not inc lud e a tr a ns c ri pt o f that he ari ng . A n o rd e r w a s e nte re d s ta tin g that th e ma tte r w a s c on tin ue d u nti l J une 1, 2005, “for the purpose of disposing of any and all issues befor e this Court.” I n the orde r, the trial court a sked the pa

rties to submit m emora nda “on the issues rele vant t o contempt, damag es and bankruptc y , as re lated to this cause.”

On J une 1, 2005, the trial court conducted a hearing as schedule d. Both Mother and F ather te sti fi e d at th e he ari ng . M othe r s ta te d th a t sh e is a n atto rn e y wh o h a s p ra c tic e d in the c ommun ity for twe nty -four

y ear s. She testified that Father did not comply with the t rial court’s April 1999 order requiring him to provide financial information to her in order to obtain financ ial aid for e ither of the children to attend colleg e. Reg arding Victoria, Mother stated that in or der to obta in f inancial a id, Dartmouth C olleg e re quired that both par en t s supply the colleg e with tax records a nd financ ial information. When Mother applied to Da rtmouth for such a id on beh al f of Victoria, she a sked Father to pr ovide her with his tax re turns and other financ ial information. Mother clai m ed that F a the r “c on tin uo us ly a nd int e nti on a lly re fu se d” to pr ov ide the ne c e ssa ry inf orma tio n o r o the rw ise assist her in obtaining financ ial ai d fo r Vi ctoria. Thoug h Father submitted some documentation, Mother stated, the information was inc omplete and c ontained m i srepr esenta tions. From the documentation submitted, the colleg e g ave Mothe r $11,812 in financ ial aid the first y ear , and Mother pa id $ 31 ,6 21 ou t- of

-p oc ke t f or Vi c toria ’s fi rs t y e ar o f c oll e g e e xpe ns e s.

Mo the r t e sti fi e d th a t, f

or the sc ho ol y e ars be g inn ing in 2 00 2 a nd 20 03 , F a the r didno t c omp ly with a n y r e q u e s t to p r o v id e ta x r e c o r d s o r f in a n c ia l in f

o r mati o n

. Co n s e q u e n tl y , s h e c o u ldnot complete a n application for financ ial aid for Victoria. I n eac h of t hose y ear s, Mother paid $48,780 in colleg e expenses for

Victoria. In Victoria ’s fi nal y ear at Dartmouth in 2004, M other a skedT h e t r i al c ou r t di d n ot a wa r d M ot h er a n y r el i ef a s t o Fa t h er ’ s f ai l u r e t o pr ov i de f i n an ci al i n for mat i on for 3
A l ex an d er’s co l l eg e a p p l i ca t i o ns.
-5- Da rt mou th t o w a ive the re qu ir e me nt th at Fath er fil e fi na nc ia l r e c or ds , b a se d o n th e fa c t th a t hi s rec ords wer e either unreliable or we re not provide d in the y ear s past. The wa iver wa s g rante d, and Mother said that it was the first wa iver the sc hool had g rante d in over two hundre d y ear s. Mother said that Father finally turned in a financ ial information form, but it was disre g arde d by the school beca use by then the wa iver ha d alre ady been g rante d. I n that y ear , Mother’s out-of -pocke t expenses
wer e $12,000, with the re st paid throug h school financ ial aid.

Mother testified that Da

rtmouth require d students to provide a notarized certification from their hea lth insurance c arrier stating that they are cover ed by health ins uranc e. I n the abse nce of such
certification, she said, the colleg e require s that the students purcha se the school’ s health insuranc e po lic y . A lth ou g h M oth e r r e pe a te dly a sk e d F a the r to send th e c e rt if ic a tio n to Da

rt mou th, sh e sa id he wo uld no t do so

. Whe n Mo the r c on ta c te d F a the r’ s in su ranc e c omp a ny dir e c tly in an a tte mpt

to g et the ce rtifi ca t i o n , s h e wa s told that Father had for bidden the insuranc e ag ents from communicating direc tly

with her. Conseque ntly , for the f our y ear s Victoria at tended Da rtmouth, Mother purc hased the mandatory campus he alth insurance at a total cost of $4,108.

M o t h eral s o t es t i fi ed t h at Fa t h erfa i l ed t o p ro v i d e f i n an ci al i n fo rm a t i o n fo r t h e c o l l ege application of the parties’ son, Alexander. Alexander attended the University

of Arkansas for one y ea r i n 2 0 0 3 , a n d t h e r e af t erat t en d ed S o u t h we s tC o m m u n i t y C o l l ege

. M o t h erp ai d h i s co l l ege

3

e xpe ns e s w ith ou t a ny

fi nan c ia l a id. I n to ta l, M oth e r e sti ma te d th a t sh e bo rr ow e d a pp ro xima te ly $90,000 ag ainst a home e quity line of cr edit t o cover

the colleg e expenses for the parties’ two children.

M o t h er t es t i fi ed t h at , af

t er t h e p ar t i es ’ d au gh t erre ac h ed m aj o ri t y an d gra d u at ed fr o mh i gh school in J une 2001, F ather unilatera lly

reduc ed his child support pay ments, even thoug h no court
or de r h a d b e e n e nte re d p e rm itt ing him to do so. Th us , she a sse rt e d, he wa s $ 7, 65 7. 69 in a rr e ars in child support, which included inter est at the statutory rate of 12%, for the time period betwee n the Ap ri l 2 0 0 1 o rd er an d J u n e 2 0 0 3 wh en t h e y o u n ger ch i l d re ac h ed m aj o ri t y an d gra d u at ed fr o mh i gh school. Mother also testified that Father was $1,789.96 in a rre ars for his sha

re of th e m ed ical expenses the childre n incurre d during that time period.

Mother indicate d that, afte r the April 2001 order holding F ather

in contempt for f

ailure to pa y c hil d s up po rt

a ndme dic a l ex pen se s, F a the r f ile d b a nk ru ptc y in b othof

the ir na me s. As a

re su lt, Mother had to r efina nce her house, which cost her $3,227 in f ees. She ma intained that Father ha d
no t pai d the a mou nts re qu ir e d by the tr ia l cou rt in pr e vio us c ou rt or de rs fo r c hil d s up po rt

arr e ara g e s, me dic a l a rr e ara g e s, or

a tto rn e y ’s fe e s. Mo the r reques ted a t ota l ju dg me nt o f $ 19 ,8 11 .5 7 a g a ins t Father ba sed on these unpaid judgments, plus intere st.Fa t h e r a c k n o w l e d g e d t h a t h e h a d f i l e d b a n k r u p t c y

. He s a i d t h a t h e r e c e i v e d a n o r d e r o f di s ch ar g e f r om 4
b ankruptc y on J an u ar y 9, 2002, f r om a n O r eg on ba n k r u pt cy c ou r t

. H i s de bt s r el at ed t o c h i l d s u ppor t w er e n ot d isc h a rg e a b le in b a n k ru p tc y.
-6- When asked whe ther she and Father had an ag ree ment that he would continue to support the chil d re n b ey o n d ag e eig hteen, Mother replied tha t “[t] he law r equire s him to pay child support bey ond ag e eig hteen . . . .”

Father a lso testified at trial. By the time of trial, he ha d lived in Oreg on for six y ear s. During his testimony , Father introduce d into evidence a spre adshee t he pre pare d, listi n g t h e d at es and
amo u n t s o f the c hild support pay ments he made to Mother af ter the A pril 2001 order . He acknow ledg ed that, whe n Victori a b e c ame emanc ipated, he r educe d his child support pay ments from the court-order ed $1,558 per month to $1,025 per month. Father claimed that he did so based on the advice of his attorney

at the time. The parties ultimately ag ree d that, if Father we re not pe rmitted to reduc e his child support pay m en ts, he owed $4,172 plus 12% statutory interest, which Mothe r calc ulated to be $7,657.69. 4

F a th e r s o u g h t to in tr o d u c e in to e v id e n c e a le tt e r f r o m h is f o r me r a tt o r n e y to Mothe r’s attorney , dated J uly 9, 2001, which related to F ather ’s re duction in child support pay ments and the
rea sons theref

or. The trial court found that the le tter constituted inadmissible hear say and disallowed it. F a the r the n s ub mit te d th e le tte r s ole ly a s a n o ff e r o f p ro of

fo r a pp e a l.

Father a cknowledg ed that he w as oblig ated to provide Mother with t ax rec ords and financial inf orma tio n f

or the c hil dr en’s ed uc a tio n. He c la ime d, ho we ve r, that he c omp lie d w ith thi s ob lig a tio n. He ins ist e d th a t he ha d r e pe a te dly se nt h is t a x re c ords a ndfi na nc ia l in fo rm a tio n to Mother for

Victoria’ s first y ear

at Dartmouth, but t hat Mother r efuse d to acc ept that i n fo rm ati on “bec ause it bene fited [si c] the m I believe not to g et my

tax returns.” Ther efor e, F ather said, he fa x ed the ne c e ssa

ry inf orma tio n d ir e c tly

to D art mou th. He c la ime d th a t th e informa tio n h e pr ov ide d to Dartmouth in 2001 was ac curate. Father stated that after Mother re fused to ac cept the inf ormation he sent in 2001, he “lea

rned his le sson” and subsequently beg an sending the nec essary information direc tly to his daug hter.

As to the ne xt two y e ars , 2 00 2 a nd20 03 , F a the r cl a ime d h e se nt h is t a x re turns dir e c tly to Victoria. I n 2003, he said, Vic toria neve r conta cted him to ask him to fill out t he colleg e’s f inancial
a id f orms. F a the r s a id that for Vi c toria ’s se nio r y e ar a

t D art mou th, 20 04 , h e a g a in s e nt V ic toria his tax returns, and Victoria

asked him to fill out the n ec es s ar y financ ial aid forms. He filled out the forms and se nt them to Dartmouth. Father claimed that there was never a y ear in which he did not comply with a re quest for f

inancial doc uments. He a cknowledg ed an e-ma il to him from Dartmouth, indicating that the colleg e had r ece ived financial information from him for the y ear s 2001 and 2004, but rec eived no information from him for 2002 and 2003.

On the issue of the children’ s health ins uranc e, F ather testified that he se nt Mother a letter in 2003 telling her

that the childre n wer e cove red unde r his health insuranc e. He said that he-7-

included with the lett er h i s CI GNA He althcar e I .D. ca rds. He a sserted tha t he also advised Dartmouth that Victoria was c overe d by his health insuranc e. Reg arding Alexander, F ather stated t hat he was not asked to send informa tion for financ ial aid to the Univer sityof Arkansas, and that he was una war e that his son was ev en at t en d i ng the colleg e until after

he wa s alrea dy

enrolled. H e also maintained that he did not rec eive a reque st for financ ial aid documents for the local c ommunitycolleg e his son attended the next y ear

. During the proc eeding s, counsel for Father arg ued that the t rial court’s April 2001 order was err oneous to the extent that it required F ather to provide financ ial documents to assist with the children’ s educational expenses after the childre n had re ache d the ag e of ma jority

. At the conc lusion of the hearing, the trial court iss ued an oral ruling . I t first found that Father was in conte mpt of court bec ause he “fa iled to fully , acc urate ly and promptly

complete a nd return to her a ny and all documents, applications and things pe rtaining to education of the parties’ daug hter for the y ear

2002 and 2003 .

. . .” As a result of Father’s failure to pr ovide the documents, the trial court found, Mothe r wa s “dama g ed by having to pay

exces s i v e fe es t o Dartmouth C olleg e in the amount of $37,560.00 by his inaction or by

his refusa l to send her t h e right informa tion ordere d.” I n addition to th e s e d a ma g e s , th e tria l c o u r t a w ar d e d M o th e r b a c k c h il d s u p p o r t o f

$ 4 , 1 7 2 , p lus interest, and $1,789.96 in ba ck medical expenses, implicitl y concluding that Father wa s not entitled to unilaterally

reduc e his child support obligation. The trial cou rt d en i ed Mother’s r equest for da ma g e s r e la tin g to F a the r’ s a lle g e d fa ilu re to pr ov ide he a lth ins ur a nc e inf orma tio n to Da

rt mou th College for Vic toria. F inally , the t rial court found t hat, because Fathe r was in contempt of c ourt and his a c tio ns c a us e d th e ins ta nt l iti g a tio n, Mo the r s ho uldbe a wa rd e d $ 17 ,3 25 in atto rn e y ’s fe e s a s a sanction.

On J une 27, 2005, the tria l court ente red a n order consistent with its oral ruling. At the
ou tse t, the or de r c lari fi e d th a t th e June 1, 20 05 he ari ng wa s on Mo the r’ s pe tit ion “ fo r a Se c on d Wr it of Sc ir e F a c ia s a ndto C ite the Re sp on de nt D ou g la s Co rd e r f or Civ il a ndCr imi na l Co nte mpt ” a s w e ll as F ather ’s motion to “Terminate A ll Matters and Close Case.” T h e t ri al co u rt also said that the hearing and the re sulting orde r addre ssed the issue specific ally rese rved in its April 30, 2001 order, namely , whether

Father ha d provided Mother with financia l informati on for c olleg e admission or fi na nc ia l a id i n a c c or da nc e wi th the c ou rt ’s pr e vio us or de rs

. Th e tr ia l c ou rt no te d th a t, “ [a]t the c los e of pr o o f o f f e r e d i n t h i s m a t t e r t h e p e t i t i o n w a s a m e n d e d t o c o n f o r m w i t h t h e p r o o f o f

f e r e d i n th is
cause .” Having clarifie d the s ubject matter of t he hearing and the or der, the written orde r, consistent with the oral ruling , awa rded Mother

$37,560 in damag es for Father’s refusa l to send financia l information in 2002 and 2003, $7,657.69 (inc luding inter est) in bac k child support, $1789.96 in back
me dic a l e xpe ns e s, a nd$1 7, 32 5 in a tto rn e y ’s fe e s. F ro m th is o rd e r, F a the r n ow app e a ls.
On appe al, Father challeng es the trial court’s decision in se vera l r espec ts. H e conte nds that the tr ia l c ou rt

e rr e d in de te rm ini ng that he wa s in c on te mpt of its Ap ri l 199 9 orde r f

or faili ng to provide financ ial documents to Mothe r in 2002 and 2003, beca use his obligation to provide support fo r h is c hil dr e n e nd e d w he n th e y re a c he d ma

jority . In ad dit ion , Fathe r a rg ue s th a t ( 1) his du e pr oc e ss-8-

ri gh t s we re v i o l at ed b ec au s e h e d i d n o th av e a d v an ce n o t i ce o f t h e s co p e o f t h e J u n e 1 , 2 0 0 5 h ea ri n g; (2) the trial court improperly hear d issues that should have be en dismissed based on the doc trine of

re s ju dic ata ; (3) the tria l court violated the double jeopar d yclause of the Te nnessee and fe dera l constitutions; (4) the trial court im proper ly excluded as hearsay the J uly 9, 2001 letter fr om Fathe r to his attorney ; (5) the trial court incor rec tly determined child support arr ear ag es; and (6) the trial
c ou rt e rr e d in a wa

rd ing Mo the r atto rn e y ’s fe e s. On appe al, Mother a

rg ues that the trial court’s ruling was c orre ct in all respe cts, except that the court erre d in awar ding he r less dama g es for Father’s c ontempt than the full amount she cla imed, $1 55 ,7 21 . B othpa

rt ie s se e k atto rn e y ’s fe e s e xpe nd e d in thi s a pp e a l.

We re vie w the tr ia l c ou rt ’s fi nd ing s o f f a c t de novo o n t h e re co rd , p re s u m i n g t h o s e f i n d i n gs to be cor rec t u n l es s the preponde ranc e of the evidenc e is otherwise . Tenn. R. App. P. 13(d). Conclusions of law ar e re viewed de novo , with no such presumption of correc tness. Id. ; Hawks v. Westmore lan d , 960 S.W .2d 10, 15 (Tenn. 1997) . The trial c ourt’s cr edibilitydeterminations are g iven g reat weig ht on appeal, and such de terminations are not reve rsed absent clea r and c onvincing
ev i d en ce to the contra

ry

. See Orten v. Orten , 1 8 5 S. W. 3 d 8 2 5 , 8 3 0

- 3 1 ( T e n n

. Ct

. A p p

. 2 0 05) (q u o t i n g We lls v . T

e nn. B d. of

Re ge nts , 9 S.W .3d 779, 783 (Tenn. 1999) ).

We f irst a ddress the propriety of the trial court’s decision to hold Fa ther in conte mpt of the April 1999 order

for f ailing, in 2002 and 2003, to provide Mother w ith financial re cords a nd other information pertaining to Vic toria’s c olleg e educ ation. Father arg ues first that the trial court erre d beca use the langua g e in the April 1999 order indicates that it was int ended to apply only during the children’ s minority . I n the alternative, he a sserts that, to the extent that the order attempts to reach bey ond the c hildren’s minority , the orde r is invalid because “the power of the c ourt to enfor ce a n order of support is statutory

and exists onl y

during minority .” Ha wkins v . Ha wkins , 797 S.W .2d 89 7, 89 8 (T e nn . Ct. App . 199 0)

. F or bo th re a so ns , he arg ue s, the tr ia l c ou rt e rr e d in ho ldi ng him

in contempt for f

ailing to pr ovide financ ial rec ords for V ictoria’s be nefit in 2002 and 2003, af ter she h a d r e a c h e d m a

j o r i t y.

I n r e sp on se , M oth e r p oin ts o ut that th e lang ua g e in the Ap ri l 19 99 or de r d oe s n ot l imi t Father’s oblig ation to the children’s minority , and contends that the order contemplates that Father’s du ty to p ro vid e fi na nc ia l r e c or ds a ndinf orma tio n w ou ld e xten d th ro ug ho ut t he c oll e g e y e ars of

bo th children. She asserts t hat requiring Fathe r t o “per form parental duti es necessary ” to provide for the
c h i l d r e n ’ s e d u c a t i o n a l n e e d s c o n s t i t u t e d a v a l i d a n d r e a s o n ab l e e x e r c i s e o f t h e tr i a l c o u r t ’ s a u t h o r i t y, in acc ordan ce wi t h sound public policy . The trial c ourt proper ly exercised its discre tion, she maintains, in relieving Father of any obligation to pay for ex traordina ry educational expenses for the children, w hile imposing on him a duty to cooper ate with Mot her’ s eff orts to minim ize the educational expenses she undertook to pay . Mother notes that the pr ovision in t he April 1999 order
was a require ment only

that Father produc e docume nts, not a require ment t h at Father provide financ ial “support,” and that his fail u re t o p roduce such docume nts was a leg itimate basis for the contempt prosec ution. Mother conce des that this is an issue of first impression in Tenne ssee.B e c a u se the p a rtie s d id no t en te r in to a n a g re e m e n t t o su p p o rt the c h ild re n p a st the a g e o f t h e ir m ino rity o r to 5
p a y fo r th e ir c o lleg e e x p e n se s, c a se s in w h ic h a p a re n t wa s o rd e re d to c o m p le te fi n a n c ia l a id a p p lica tio n s p u rs u a n t t o
a m a rita l d isso lutio n a g re e m e n t a re ina p p o site. See Bo nho t el v. Bo nho t el , N o. FA910055322S, 2000 W L 1506893 (C o n n . S u p . C t. S e p t. 2 0 , 2 0 0 0 ); A r oes t y v . Co hen , 81 5 N

. E

. 2 d 63 9 (M ass

. C t

. A p p

. 20 0 4 ).

P a re n ts m a y b e o b liga te d to su p p o rt a d u lt c h ild re n w h o a re d isa b le d un d e r c e rta in c irc u m sta n c e s. S ee J o n es, 6
2004 W L 2973752, a t * 5. T h e ch i l dr en i n v ol v ed i n t h i s c as e ar e n ot di s abl ed.
-9- I n th is c a se , th e tr ia l c ou rt or de re d F a the r t o c omp le te a ndpr ov ide Mo the r with “a ny a nda ll do c ume nts , ap pli c a tio ns , an d thin g s perta ini ng to the e du c a tio n of the pa rt ie s’ c hil dr e n, wh e the r s a id
re qu e st pe rt a ins to c oll e g e , hig h sc ho ol, or mid dle sc ho ol, inc lud ing , b ut n ot l imi te d to a ny re qu e sts fo r f inanc ia l in fo rm a tio n, fi na nc ia l aid , or sc ho lars hip s nec e ssa ry fo r sa me .” Th is p ro vis ion is n ot, by its own terms, lim ited to the children’ s minority . I t compels Father to provide doc uments and oth e r “ thi ng s p e rt a ini ng to the e du c a tio n o f the pa rt ie s’ c hil dr e n” wi th a spe c if ic re fe re nc e to the ir colleg e educ ation. Since childre n typically apply for c olleg e and c olleg e fina ncial aid while the y are still in high sc hool, the require ment that documents be provided for the children’ s colleg e educ ation could apply

both prior t o and after their emanc ipation. Father’s compliance with this order in 2001, befor e Victoria g raduated from hig h school, is not an issue in this appeal. Likewise, a lthough ther e was testimony

at trial about whether Father provided such documents for the c olleg e educ ation of the parties’ son, Al ex an d er, the trial court made no finding s on this is sue and it is not raised on appea l. There fore , the onl y issue on appea l relate s to the rec ords re quired by Victoria’ s colleg e for financ ial aid applications in 2002 and 2 0 0 3 , afte r she ha d g raduated from hig h school and wa s enrolled at Dartmouth.

I n this case, of

course , there was no a g ree ment betwee n the parties as to the childre n’s
e du c a tio na l e xpe ns e s b e y on d h ig h s c ho ol. Th e re fo re , a t is su e is the tr ia l c ou rt ’s a uth ority to i mpo se 5 on a divorc ed pa re n t an y o bligation related to the e ducation of a n emanc ipated child who ha s g ra du a te d f

ro m hi g h s c ho ol.

As ba c kg ro un d, in E ng la nda ndin e arl y Am eri can c omm on la w, the du ty of a pa re nt t o support his children, reg ardle ss of t heir ag e, was a moral obligation and not a lega l duty

. Se e In re Cons e rv ato rsh ip o

f J one s ( Jo ne s v . J

one s) , No. M 2004-00173-COA- R3-CV, 2004 WL 2973752,
a t *5 (T e nn . Ct . A pp . D e c . 22, 20 04 ) (c itatio ns omi tte d)

. As the c omm on la w d e ve lop e d, it b e c a me acc epted in most jurisdictions that a pare nt has a duty at common law to support his mi nor childre n, b u tn o o b l i g a t i o n t o s u p p o r t a c h i l d p a s tt h e a g e o f m a j o r i t y. Id. (citations omitted). I n Tenne ssee,

6 thi s c omm on la w ob lig a tio n is c od if ie d at T e nn e sse e Cod e An no ta te d § 34 -1 -1 02 , w hic h p ro vid e s: (a ) P are nts are the joi nt natur a l g ua rd ia ns of the ir min or c hil dr e n, a ndare e qu a lly
a nd joi ntl y c ha

rg e d wi th the ir c are , n urtur e , w e lf are , e du c a tio n a ndsu pp ort a nda lso with the car e, mana g ement and e x penditure of their estate s. . . . * * * (b) Par ents shall continue to be r esponsible for the support of ea ch child for whom the y are re sp on sib le a ft e r the c hil d re a c he s eig hte e n (18 ) y e ars of a g e if the c hil d is i n h i gh s ch o o l

. T h e d u t y

o f s u p p o rt s h al l co n t i n u e u n t i l t h e c h i l d gra d u at es fr o mh i ghSome s t at es ha v e h el d t h at a par en t ha s a l eg al dut y t o pr ov i de, or t o a i d i n pr ov i di n g , a c ol l eg e edu ca t i on for 7
hi s or her ch i l d i f

t he chi l d dem ons t r at es t he abi l i t y an d wi l l i ng nes s t o at t ai n a hi gh er educ at i on an d t he pare nt ha s
su ff ic ie n t m e a n s to p ro v id e fina n c ia l a ssista n c e w itho u t u n d u e h a rd sh ip

. S ee T h ra sh er v . W i lb u rn , 574 So. 2d 8 39 ( A l a. C iv. A p p . 1 9 9 0 ); Str om v . St r om , 1 4 2 N .E .2 d 1 7 2 , 1 7 9 (Ill. A p p . C t. 1 9 5 7 ); but s ee Lar s on v . Lar s on , 694 N

. W

. 2d 13, 17- 18 ( N

. D

. 2005) ( h ol di n g t h at a s t at u t e al l owi n g c ou r t s t o orde r pos t

- maj or i t y s u ppor t wh en “ appr opr i at e” doe s n ot p rovide aut ho ri t y fo r a court t o ord er a parent t o pa y co l l ege exp enses ).
-10- school or the c lass of which the chil d i s a m em b er w hen the c hild attains eig hteen (1 8) y e ars of

a g e g ra du a te s, wh ic he ve r o c c ur s f ir st.
T.C.A. § 34-1-102( a), ( b) (2001) . Thus, under Te nn es s ee law, a pa rent is obligated to provide support for c hildren only

until they turn eig hteen y ear s old or g raduate from hig h school, whiche ver occur s later. See Kesser v. Kesse r , No. W 2003-02392-SC-R11-CV, 2006 WL 2439758, at *4 (Te nn. Au g . 2 4, 20 06 ); Hop kin s v . Ho pk ins , 152 S.W .3d 447, 449 (Tenn. 2004). Other statutory provisions empower trial courts to ma

ke decisions reg arding the pare nts’ obligation to provide fina ncial support for thei r m inor children in a ccor dance with the child support g uidelines. See T.C.A. § 36-5- 101(e) (1)( A) (2005) . A trial court’s power to order ch i l d s u p p o rt and to enf orce support order s throug h its contempt powers e x ists onlyduring the child’s m i n o ri t y , unless the parties ag ree otherwise. Garey v. Gare

y , 4 82 S.W. 2d13 3, 13 5 ( Te nn . 1 97 2) ; Haw kin s , 797 S.W .2d at 898 (c iting Pe nla nd v . P

e nla nd , 521 S.W. 2d 22 2, 22 4 ( Te nn . 1 97 5) ); see also Bryan v. Le ach , 85 S.W .3d 136, 151 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2001).

Th us , in Te nn e sse e , a par e nt h a s n o le g a l ob lig a tio n to pa y fo r the c oll e g e e du c a tio n o f a c hil d
w h o h a s r e a c h e d t h e a g e o f m a j o r i t y, e x c e p t w h e n t h e p ar e n tc o n tr a c t u a l l y a s s u m e s s u c h a d u t y. See 7 Bryan v. Leac h , 85 S.W .3d 136, 151 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2001). There fore , the trial court did not have the a uth ority

un de r the c omm on la w o r the c ur re nt Te nn e sse e statut e s to or de r F a the r t o s up po rt his child afte r she r eac hed majority

. Lichtenwalt er v. Lic htenw alter , No. M2003-03115-COA- R3-CV, 2006 WL 236945 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 30, 2006), appeal granted ( A u g . 2 1, 20 06 ); see Larson v. Larson , 694 N.W.2d 13, 17-18 (N.D. 2005) (“ The mer e hope that ‘divorce d pare nts would continue to support their children in se eking colleg e educ ations . . . is a far cry from concluding a court can impose an oblig ation upon the par ents to do so as a matter of law.” (quotations omitted)).
Perhaps implicitly

rec og nizi ng this reality , Mother ar g ues that the trial c ourt’s orde r does not require Father to g ive “support” in the financ ial sense, but rathe r, t hat t he ame nded dec ree “af firmed a duty of docume n t p ro d uction” that would assist Victoria in obtaining her c olleg e educ ation. There f o r e , s h e c laim s , th e tria l c o u r t’ s a u th o r it y ar is e s f r o m it s ab il it y to is s u e o r d e r s for the
e sta bli sh e d n e e ds of

the c hil dr e n pa st the a g e of min ority . M oth e r c ite s Na sh v . M ulle , 846 S.W .2d 80 3 ( Te nn . 1 99 3) , f

or the pr op os iti on that a pa

re nt m a y be or de re d to pe rf

orm a c ts f or the sp e c if

ic benef it of his children’s e ducation, eve n when suc h acts will be require d to be per formed a fter the
c h i l d r e n r e a c h m a

j o r i t y.

I n Na sh , t h e tr i a l c o u r to r d e r e d t h e f a t h e r t o p a y $ 3 , 0 9 2 p e r

m o n t h i n c h i l d s u p p o r t , wi th $1,780 to be re serve d for a trust fund established fo r the c hild’s colleg e educ ation. Na sh , 846 S.W

. 2 d a t 8 0 4

. T h e f

a th e r ap p e a le d , ar g u in g th a t r e q u irin g h im to e s ta b li s h s u c h a

tr u s t f und-11-

imp e rm iss ibl y

re qu ir e d h im t o s up po rt th e chil d a ft e r s he re a c he d ma jority . T he c ou rt

of app e a ls ag ree d and re verse d the dec ision of the trial court on that ba sis. Id. The Supreme Court reve rsed the court of appea ls, holding that, “[a]lt houg h child support pay ments may not e x tend bey on d t he child’s minority

. . . , the benefi t s from such pay ments can.” Id. I n rea ching that conclusion, the Cou rt no te d th a t “ the us e of

a trus t f un d f or jus t su c h a

pu rp os e is expl ic itl y a

pp ro ve d by the [ch ild support] guidelines.” T h e C o u rt cited the se ction in the g uidelines for c riteria de viation, which p ro vide spec ifically

that, in case s where the obligor ’s monthly income excee ds $6,250, “the establishment of educ ational or other trust f unds for the benef

it of the child(re n)” mig ht be re quired. Id. a t 8 0 7

. T h e r e a s o n in g e mp lo y e d b y th e c o u r t o f

ap p e a ls , th e Co u r t n o te d , “ r e f u s e s to r e c o g n iz e the laudable g oal of post-sec ondary education . . . .” Id. Th e Cou rt a lso no ted th at pa

re nts wi th highe r incomes ty

pically save f or colleg e over

time, but requiring Mother to save in suc h a manne r wou ld d e ple te the c hil d s up po rt a wa rd . T he re fo re , th e Cou rt

de te rm ine d th a t r e qu ir ing F a the r t o e sta bli sh a trus t fun d for his c hil d’ s col le g e e du c a tio n during the c hil d’ s mi no ri ty wa s a pe rm iss ibl e exercise of

the trial court’s discretion.

This case is disti ng uishable fr om the situation in Na sh . The a cts at issue in this appeal we re require d of F ather after Victoria r eac hed majority , wher eas the order in Na sh re qu ir e d th e fathe r t o contribute during the child’s minority for he r post-majority

benef it. The ac ts require d of the pa rent in Na sh wer e ak in to r e q u irin g F a th e r , d u r in g V ic to r ia ’ s s e n io r y e ar in h ig h s c h o o l, to p r o v ide documentation for her colleg e application and request for financ ial aid. The trial c ourt clea rly had authority to impose this require ment. Most importantly , the C ourt in Na sh relied on the provision in the child support g uidelines for the establishment of a c olleg e trust fund a s indicating leg islative approva l. Mother has c ited no statutory authority for requiring Father, after the parties’ c hild was
emanc ipated, to per form ac ts for the c hild’s benef it.

I n th is c a se , w e c a nn ot d ist ing uis h b e tw e e n f inanc ia l “ su pp ort” a ndoth e r t ype s o f “ su pp ort” fo r e ma nc ipate d c hil dr e n, pa rt ic ula rl y in l ig ht of the statut ory

de sc ri pti on of

a pa re nt’ s o bli g a tio n to
c are fo r m ino r c hil dr e n. I n T e nn e sse e Cod e An no ta te d § 34 -1 -1 02 (a ), pa re nts are c ha

rg e d w ith the ir min or c hil dr e n’ s “ c are , n urtur e , we lf are , ed uc a tio n, a ndsu pp ort. .

. . ” Al l of tho se ob lig a tio ns wo uld be e nc omp a sse d w ith in the te rm “ su pp ort” wh e n re fe rring to a pare nt’ s obli g a tio n to “ su pp ort” his
c hil dr e n d uring min ority . Mor e ov e r, a lth ou g h F a the r i n th is c a se wa s n ot o rd e re d to pr ov ide po stma jority fi na nc ia l supp ort, the ta sk s h e wa s o rd e re d to pe rf orm w e re fo r the dir e c t f

inanc ia l be ne fi t of the c hil dr e n. F or the se re a so ns , we fi nd that or de ri ng F a the r to pr od uc e do c ume nts fo r the be ne fi t of t he children’s college education must be deemed a “support” obligation, and the t rial court was without authority

to impose such a re quirement on F ather past the childre n’s m inority

. Any order
re a c hin g be y on d th e a g e of minority c on sti tut e s a n in va lide xer c ise of jurisd ic tio n a ndis unenfor cea

ble throug h the court’s contempt power s. Se e Haw kin s , 797 S.W .2d at 898.

Acc ording ly , we conclude that, once Victoria was emanc ipated, the tria l court wa s without authority to or der Father to support he r by providing financ ial documents to assist her in obtaining a colleg e educ ation. Whatever Father’s moral obligation to his c hild, he had no leg al duty to do so. There fore , we r ever se the trial court’s hol ding that Father was in contempt of its April 1999 order-12-

in 2 00 2 a nd20 03 by

faili ng to p ro vid e Mo the r w ith the fi na nc ia l do c ume nts ne c e ssa ry to o bta in financ ial aid for V ictoria’s c olleg e expenses af ter she ha d rea ched ma

jority

.
Father next ar g ues that the trial court err ed in addre ssing issues at the hearing othe r than (1) those raise d in his Motion to Terminate All Matters and Close Case and (2) the issue re serve d in the Ap ri l 20 01 or de r, i.e ., wh e the r h e sh ou ld b e he ld i n c on te mpt for fai li ng to p ro vid e Mo the r w ith fi na nc ia l do c ume nts in 2 00 1. B e c a us e Mo the r’ s se c on d pe tit ion fo r sc ir e fa c ia s is no t inc lud e d in the re cord on appea l, he contends that we must assume that it was never filed and that he r ece ived
no no tic e of it. He a lso no te s th a t Mo the r f ile d n o w ri tte n mo tio ns fo r c on te mpt pe rt a ini ng to c hil d support, medical e x penses, or attorney ’s fe es. F ather

arg ues that he w as not put on notice that the tr ia l c ou rt wo uldbe a dd re ssi ng su c h matte rs a t th e he ari ng a nd , co ns e qu e ntl y , his due pr oc e ss rig hts
wer e violated.

As s u m i n g arguendo that this would be a due pr ocess violation, from ou r revie w of the r ecor d, it appear s that both pa

rties wer e put on notice ( indeed F ather ’s motion requested) that the J une 2005 hearing would addre ss all matters that had not y et bee n resolved. T his included Father’s c ompliance with his obli g ation to support the children f rom the time of the April 2001 order up until the y oung er child was em ancipated in J une 2003. I n fac t, in the memorandum in support of F ather ’s “Motion to Terminate A ll Matters and Close Case,” he asse rts that h is child support obligation should be te rm inate d b a se d o n th e c hil dr e n’ s e ma nc ipatio n a ndthe fa ct th at “he has f ull y dis c ha rg e d h is obligations and met the requir ements of this ca se.” This c lear ly puts at i ssue t he matter of F ather ’s compliance with the trial court’ s support order s. I n the orde r of c ontinuance issued a fter the Marc h 2005 hearing, the trial court state d that Father’s motion “must be supported by evidenc e and c annot be dis po se d o f b y me mor a nd um o nly ,” ind ic a tin g tha t e vid e nc e re g ard ing F a the r’ s d isc ha rg e of his obligations would be taken at the upcoming hearing. T he continuanc e orde r also aske d the parties to submit briefs on is s u es related to “conte mpt, damag es, bankr uptcy , as re lated to this cause,” fu rthe r i nd ic a tin g that th e June 20 01 he ari ng wo uld e nc omp a ss a wid e rang e of iss ue s. F a the r f

ull y participated in the hea

ring and made no objection base d on lack of noti ce . The trial c ourt’s orde r pro v id e d th a t “ th e p e ti ti o n w a s a me n d e d to c o n f o r m w ith th e p r o o f o f

f e r e d in th is c a u s e.” U nder these c ircumstance s, Father’s a rg ument is without m erit.

Father a lso arg ues that, bec ause the J une 2005 hea ring wa s b as ed on Mother’s Sec ond Petition for Scire F acia s, which wa s also considere d at t he April 2001 hearing, then the issues raise d in the petition were re s ju dic ata . However , Father identifies no issues r esolved in the April 2001 order that wer e revisited in the J une 2005 orde r. Rather , in its J une 2005 orde r, the trial c ourt addre sse d th e is s u e th a t w a s e xp r e s s ly r e s e r v e d a f te r th e A p r il 2 0 0 1 h e ar in g , a s w e ll a s the obligations that accr

ued after the April 2001 orde r was enter ed. Moreove r, bec ause the April 2001 order rese rved an issue, it wa s not a final order , and wo u l d n o t h ave re s ju dic ata eff ect. See Ric har ds on v . T e nn. B d. of

De ntis try , 913 S.W .2d 446, 459-60 (Tenn. 1995). The ref ore, F ather ’s
re s ju dic ata claim is also without merit.

Fath e r a ls o c laim s th a t th e tria l c o u r t e rr e d in h o ld in g in a d mi s s ib le th e Ju ly 9 , 2 0 0 1 letter from his attorney to Mother’s attorney , informing him that Father ’s re duced June 2001 child supportW h e n a d e c isio n is d e sig n a te d “ n o t fo r p u b lica tio n ,” it m u st b e vie w e d a s p e rs u a siv e a u tho rity o n ly. S e e S ta te 8

v. Ri ce , 1 8 4 S .W .3 d 6 4 6 , 6 6 3 n.2 (T e n n . 2 0 0 6 ); L u c a s v . S ta te , 1 4 1 S .W .3 d 1 2 1 , 1 3 7 n.6 (T e n n . C t. A p p . 2 0 0 4 ); s ee
a l so T enn. R

. Sup

. C t

. 4(H )( 1 ) ( 2 0 0 6 ).
-13- pay ment “is not a partial pay ment since Vic toria has g raduated hig h school. The pr oration is allowed by law.” Father arg ues t hat t he letter is not inadmissible hear say beca use it was not being offe red for the tr uth of the matter a sserted, but wa s o ff er ed instead to demonstrate his reliance on advice fr om c ou ns e l in low e ri ng his c hil d s up po rt pa y me nts

.
Dec isions reg arding the admis sibili ty of evidence rest within the s ound discretion of the trial court. Danny L. Davis Contractors, I nc. v. Hobbs , 157 S.W .3d 414, 418-19 (Te nn. Ct. App. 2004) (c i t i n g Otis v. Cam bridge Mut. F ire Ins. Co. , 850 S.W .2d 439, 442 (Tenn. 1992) ). Assuming that the letter at issue is not hear say , as Father arg ues, it ha s no relevance be cause Father’s r eliance on advice of counsel is not a valid defe nse t o his failure to obey an order of the court. Se e Churc hwe ll
v . Ca lle ns , 252 S.W .2d 131, 132 (Tenn. Ct. App

. 1 952), cited in Rice v. Rice , No. E2003-01336-COA- R3-CV, 2004 WL 1698217, at *3 (Te nn. Ct. App. J uly 29, 2004). Thus, eve n if the trial co u rt err ed, such a n err or wa s harmless and doe s not provide a ba sis for re versa l. See Burr e ll v . Bur re ll , No. 03A01-9809- CV-00291, 1999 WL 172670, at * 2 (Tenn. Ct. App. Ma r. 24, 1999).

F a the r a lso arg ue s th a t th e tr ia l c ou rt e rr e d in c a lc ulatin g his c hil d su pp ort arr e ara g e , b e c a us e he was entitled to an automatic reduc tion in his pay ments to $1,025 after Victoria g raduated from high sc hool in J une 2001. He notes that he filed a mot ion to modify child support in March 2001, which was not a djudicated at the April 2001 hearing. This, he arg ues, satisfies t h e a pplication
re qu ir e me nt o f T e nn e sse e Code Anno ta te d § 36 -5 -1 01 (g )( 1) , w hic h auth orize s th e tr ia l c ou rt to modify a dec ree of support “[u]pon t he application of either pa rty

. . . . ” T.C.A. § 36-5-101( g )(1) (2005). Thu s , Father c laims, based on his applica tion for a support r eduction and his daug hter’s
emanc ipation, he was entitled to reduc e his monthlychild support pay ments to $1,025 in J une 2001 wi tho ut f urthe r o rd e rs of

the c ou rt

.
I t is we ll s e ttl e d th a t th e re tr oa c tiv e mod if ic a tio n of ch ild su pp ort ord e rs is b arr e d, a ndthat, g ener ally , the “burd en [ i s ] o n t he oblig or to come into court and see k any curr ent or prospe ctive
re lief to which he may

be entitled, by

means of a

formal c ourt order .” R u tl e d g e v . B a rre tt , 802 S.W .2d 604, 606-07 (Te nn. 1991). Howe ver, there is authority to support the claim that proration of a c hil d s up po rt

ob lig a tio n w ith ou t a cou rt or de r, ba se d o n th e c hil d’ s e ma nc ipatio n, is n ot a retroa ctive modifica tion of the child s u p p o rt award. Clin ar d v . Cl ina rd , No. 01-S-01-9502- CV00021, 1995 WL

563858, at *2 (Te nn. Sept. 25, 1995) (d es i gn ated not for publication) ; 8 Lichtenwalt er v. Lic htenw alter , No. M 2003-03115-COA- R3-CV, 2006 WL 236945, at *7 (Te nn. Ct. App. J an. 30, 2006), appeal granted (Aug . 21, 2006); Shu

pe v. Shupe , N o

. 1 1 8 , 1 9 9 1 WL 16249, at *2 (Te nn. Ct. App. Feb. 12, 1991). These case s indicate that an obligor pare nt may , under appropriate cir cu m s tance s, prorate his or her child support pay ments after a child is emanc ipated without first obtaining a

court orde r, althoug h it is prudent to reque st that the t rial court modify the child support obligation.-14-

Reg ardle ss, proration may not be appropriate where the support orde r in eff ect r equire s the obligor pare nt to pay

a lump sum for all of the c hildren , wi t h o u t identify ing the amount to which
eac h child is entitled, and the ci rc u mstances justify holding the oblig or par ent re sponsible for the orig inal amount of child support (or at least a disproportionate portion of the orig inal amount) for the remaining minor children. F or example, in Be ll v . Be ll , N o

. 0 1 A 0 1

- 9 5 1 1

- CH

- 0 0 4 9 3 , 1 9 9 6 WL 548150 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 25, 1996), t he trial court had order ed the father of three children to pa y $400 per month in child support. The fathe r acc rued an arr ear ag e, and he later petitioned the trial
co u rt t o cre dit his arrea

rag e for a pro r ata portion of the amount due a fter his oldest child re ache d majority . The trial court conclude d that, under the child support g uidelines, the father should have been ma king pay ments of $453 per month for the two re maining minor c hildren. Be ll , 1996 WL 548150, at *1. I n light of this fa ct, the trial c ourt treated the ca se as thoug h the mother had f iled a petition to modi fy

the child support orde r, and it denie d the father’ s p et i t i o n

. The a ppellate c ourt
a ff ir me d, re a so nin g that th e su pp ort or de r d id no t sp e c if y ho w m uc h o f the $4 00 wa s a ttribu ta ble to
eac h child, and the $400 amount was less than t he guideline amount for the r emaining two children. Under these c ircumstance s, the appe llate court found, proration was inappropriate. Id. a t *2 ; se e als o Silverstein v. Rice , No. W1999-01336-COA-R3-CV, 2000 WL 33146933 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 20, 2000) (f inding that the oblig or father wa s not entitled to an automatic proration of hi s child support obligation upon the oldest child’s majority when the total amount of support order ed was less than the amount re quired unde r the g uidelines for the two rema ining c hildren).

I n the instant case , as in Be ll , the operative support order require d Father to pay a lum p sum amount for both childre n – $1,558 per month. I t is unclear on this recor d whether

the child support g uidelines then in eff

ect, based on F ather ’s income at the time, would have r equire d Father to pay $1,558 per m o n t h in child support for the r emaining minor child, or whethe r F ather ’s prorated pa y me nts of

$1 ,0 25 we re pr op e r. Th e se iss ue s we re no t addre sse d by the tr ia l c ou rt be c a us e it h e ld that F a the r w a s n ot p e rm itt e d to un ilate ra lly re du c e his c hil d s up po rt

a ward . T he re fo re , w e mus t
vacate the holding that Father ha d a child support a rre ara g e of $7,657.69 a nd rema nd for the trial court to determine whether the circumstances justi fy holding Father responsible for

the entire $1,558 pe r m on th f

or the y ou ng e r c hil d a ft e r Jun e 20 01 , in lig ht o f the c hil d s up po rt g uid e lin e s.

F ina lly , F a the r a

rg ue s th a t the tr ia l c ou rt

e rr e d in g ranti ng Mo the r $ 17 ,3 25 in atto rn e y ’s fe e s. I n li g ht o f o ur

ho ldi ng abo ve , th is p ortio n o f the trial cou rt ’s ord er m us t be va c a te d a ndthe c a us e rema nded for

rec onsideration of the issue.

B othpa rt ie s a rg uethat th e y

are e nti tle d to a tto rn e y ’s fe e s incur re d o n a pp e a l. Wh e the r t o awa rd attorne y ’s fe es on appe al re sts within t he sound discre tion of this court

. Archer v. Archer , 907 S.W .2d 412, 419 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1995). U nder the circ umstances, we decline to a war d attorney ’s fe es on appe al to either pa rty . All other issues ra ised on appe al ar e pre termitted.-15-

The trial c ourt’s dec ision is reverse d in part, af firmed in part, and vacat ed i n part, a nd the
cause is remande d for f

urther proce eding s consistent with this Opini on. Costs on appeal ar e to be taxed equally

to Appellant Doug las Edwar d Corder a nd his surety and Appe llee Va lerie Jean Corder , for whic h execution may

issue, if nec essary

.

___________________________________ HOLL Y M. KI RBY, JUDGE