### IN THE COURT OF APP EALS OF TENNESS EE AT NAS HVILLE JU L Y 12, 200 6 S es sio n
ROBE RT W. FINK , ET AL 

### . v. FRED M. CREAN, ET AL 

### .
Direc t Appeal from the Chancer y Court for Williamson County

No. 23346 Tim othy E. Easter, Chancellor

No. M2005- 01364-COA-R 3-CV - F iled on Decem ber 21, 2006

I n this a ppeal, we are asked to de termine whether the chanc ery court prope rly awa rded the plaintiffs a judg ment of $90,000. The defenda nts made improvements to their real property , placing a pave d driveway over a previously

exis ting log g ing tr ail. The plaintiffs notice d an incr ease d water runoff from storms onto their own rea l property , which abutted the defe ndants’ prope rty , and they attributed this increase to the improvements made by the defe ndants. The plaintiffs f iled a complaint, and the action wa s ref

err ed to a judicial se ttlement confe renc e. The result was the parties’ entering into an ag ree d ord e r

to h a v e e n g in e e r s c o n f

e r o n a s o lu ti o n , h o w e v e r , a

c o mp r o mi s e w a s n e v e r

r e a c h ed. After a benc h tri al , t he chancery court issued a

memorandum opinion in which it found the defe ndants’ ac tions to be an ac tionable tempora ry n u i s an ce for which they wer e orde red to pa y $1 4, 14 4. 50 in da ma g e s. Th e c ou rt a lso or de re d the de fe nd a nts to h ir e a n e ng ine e r andwo rk e rs to perf orm construc tion under one of two possible options, or to c omply with a third option of pay ment for the c ost of building a r etain i n g wall, within 180 day s from final judg ment to preve nt further damag e to the plaintiffs’ pr operty . The c ourt furthe r o rd er ed t h at i ts memorandum opinion be reduc ed to writing in an or d er an d fi n al j udg ment to be dra fted by the plaintiffs. The pla intiffs draf ted an or der, w hich the trial c ourt and c ounsel for al l p ar t i es si g ned, howe ver this orde r substitut ed part of the court’s lang uag e re g arding the costs of a reta ining wa ll with the specific dollar amount of $90,000. Afte r 180 day s had expired, and the de fenda nts had beg un but not completed construction per

their chose n option, the plaintiffs filed for an execution of judgme nt in the amount of $90,000. The c hance ry court stay ed the execution of judg ment for thirty day s, during which the parties’ experts were to confe r as to the suff ici en cyof the de fenda nts’ actions in addre ssing the nuisance . When this time period expired with no ag ree ment betwee n the experts or the parties, the
c ha nc e ry c ou rt e nte re d a n ord e r fo r jud g me nt in fa vo r of the plaint if

fs fo r $ 90 ,0 00 . T he de fe nd a nts filed a timely

notice of a

ppeal to this Court. W e af firm.

Tenn. R. App . P . 3; Appeal as of Right; Judgme nt of th e Chancer y Court Affi rm ed

A L AN E. H I G H ERS , J. , d e li v e r e d th e o p in io n o f th e c o u r t, inw h ic h W. F RAN K C RAW FORD , P.J ., W.S ., and H OL L Y M. K I RBY , J ., joined.T en n. R

. C t

. A p p

. 1 0 st ates: 1

T h i s Cou r t , w i t h t h e c on c u r r e n c e of a l l j u dg e s pa r t i c i pa t i n g i n t h e c a s e , ma y a f f i r m,
revers e o r mo d i f

y t he act i o ns o f

t he tria l c o u rt b y m em o randum op i ni o n when a for mal opi n i on w ou l d h av e n o pr ec ede n t i al val u e. W h en a c as e i s de ci ded by

m e m o ra n d u m o p inio n it sh a ll b e d e sig n a te d “M E M O R A N D U M O P IN IO N ,” sh a ll not be publ i s hed, and s hal l not be ci t ed or r el i ed on for a ny r eas on i n a ny un r el at ed

cas e.

T he so l uti o n re co m m en d ed b y bo t h M r. M i shu a nd M r. B all ard wa s as fo l l o w s: 2

A

. I ns t al l a s wal e on t he uphi l l s i de of M r

. Crea n’ s dri vew ay wi t h t he di s cha r ge p o int lo c a te d in a d iffe re n t wa te rs h e d . T h e sw a le sh o u ld ti e to the e x isting sw a le at t he ent r anc e g at e. B

. G r ade M r

. Crea n’ s dri vew ay s o wat er i s di r ect ed t o t he s wal e. C

. I nst al l und erdrai ns, t o co nt rol ground water , whi ch co ul d dis charge t o ward s t he F ink s [s ic ] p ro p e rty. As a ddi t i on al i n for mat i on , t h e u n der dr ai n s h ou l d be i n s t al l ed al on g t h e u ph i l l s i de

o f t h e d riv e w a y w ith a p lug a n d c ro ssd ra in in sta lled a t 7 5 -f o o t i n te rv a ls. A lso , i nst al l as ph al t cur b on t he do w nh i l l s i de near t he ent r an ce ga t e t o prev ent wa t er fro m g o in g o n to th e a d ja c e n t p ro p e rty d u rin g h e a v y ra in fa ll

.

-2- Christ ina F e rr e ll, F rank lin , T N, fo r A pp e lla nts

Gre g ory L . Cashion, Samuel J . Welborn, Nashville, TN, for Appellee s

M EM OR AN DU M OP IN ION 1

I. F A C TUA L B ACKG ROUND AND P R OC EDU R A L H I S T ORY

This case beg an with a dispute betwe en the De fenda nts, Fre d M. Crean a nd Debor ah Crea n (the “ Creans” or “A ppellants”), and the Plaintiffs, Robert W. Fink and Glenda Fink(the “F inks” or “A p p el l ees” ). I n 1993, the Crea ns made improveme nts to their property ; specifica lly , they had a pa ve d d ri ve way

bu ilt on top of a n exist ing log g ing tr a il. Th e re a ft e r, the F ink s n oti c e d a n in c re a se in water runoff from the Cre ans’ uppe r prope rt y t o t he F inks’ lower pr operty . The F inks filed a complaint in the Wil liamson CountyChance ry Court on May

25, 1995, alleg ing that the incre ased water runoff was a result of the Creans’ driveway improvements. The complaint sought tempora ry and permanent injunctions, compensatory damag es, “a

rea sonable attorney

fee , disc re t i o n ar y

and other c osts for bring ing this ac tion.”
The pa rties hired the ir own experts to provide advic e on how be st to reme dy the situation. The F inks hired eng ineer

L ouis P. Mi shu, and the Cre ans employ ed the service s of eng ineer J oseph H. B a ll ar d

. B o th e n g in e e r s in s p e c te d th e Cr e a n s ’ p r o p e r ty a n d e v e n a g r e e d a s to a s o lu tion, but 2 neither eng ineer ’s rec ommendation was implemented by the Creans at that time. T he parties ag ree dC l i ng er man, i n h i s 200 0 re po r t , s t at ed t hat the m ost l ogi cal an d l eas t ex pens i ve r emedy ( kn own as 3

“ R ecomm endat i on 1" ) woul d be f o r t he C rea ns “ t o i nst al l a cur b al on g t he no r t her ly s i de of t hei r dr i vewa y t o di r ect

s t or m wat erf

l ow i nt o t he ex i s t i ng f

r enc h dr ai n t r enc h

. . . [p]l ug t he end s o f al l t he 4

- i nch p i p es t hat run und e r the dri vew ay t o f orce an d/ or k eep s t ormwat er r un

- off i n t he exi s t i ng dri vew ay f r enc h dr ai n s y s t em. ” Cl i n g er man w en t on t o s t at e t h at “ O pt i on 1" c ou l d n ot g u ar an t ee t h at s ee pag e pr obl ems w ou l d n ot

o ccur, and t hat i f

t hi s m et ho d were pursued, t he C reans shoul d hi re an engi neer “ t o pe rf o rm a d rai nage st ud y and de si gn a sy st em s o not t o i m p act t he exi st i ng drai nage sy st em

. . . . ” H e ad vi sed t hat t hi s co ul d be acco m p l i shed “by i nst al l i ng
a s mal l det ent i on bas i n on t he C r ean ’ s [ s i c] proper t y t o det ai n a nd cont r ol t he conce nt r at ed s t ormwat er r un

- off

. . . . ” T he r eport f

urt her r ecomm ended t hat , “ [ i ] f we as s ume t hat no wor k i s done on t he C r ean ’ s [ s i c] propert y an d i n or der t o m ake s ur e n o s ur f ac e run

- o f f o r s eepag e t hr ough t he hi l l s i de i s di r ect ed ont o t he Fi nk ’ s [ s i c] dri vew ay [ , ] ” a r et ai ni ng wal l be bui l t t o c ont r ol t he wat er r un off

. Cl i ng er man’ s es t i mat ed cos t of t hi s r et ai ni ng wal l was $ 8 1 , 72 4 , and he a d m i t t ed that it “co ul d b e m o re o r l ess d ep end i ng o n the f i nal lengt h o f

the ret ai ni ng wal l and how t he

r et ai ni ng wal l ha s t o be desi gn ed bas ed on t he s oi l proper t i es cont ai ned i n a ge ot ech ni cal r eport

. ” T hes e l at t er t wo
reco m m end at i o ns were co l l ect i vel y d esi gnat ed “R eco m m end at i o n 2 " b y the t ri al c o urt i n i t s M ay 1 1 , 20 0 4 m em o randum

o p inio n

. -3- to refe r the F inks’ action to a judicial se ttlement confe renc e, which r esulted in an ag ree d order on November

24, 1997. Howeve r, beca use of a failure of the pa

rties’ e ng ineer s to ag ree on a solution, the ag ree d order ultimately had no binding eff ect on the parties or the prese nt liti g ation. I n 2000, the Finks hi red another eng ineer , Gre g g M. Clingerman (“ Clingerman”) who inspecte d the prope rties
a ndpu t f orth h is o wn re c omm e nd a tio ns in a re po rt

. 3

On Marc h 11

– 12, 2004, a trial on the merits was he ld in the Chancery Court of Wil liamson County . On April 15, 2004, Chance llor TimothyL . Easter issued a memorandum opinion in which he found tha t the Finks had suf fer ed dama g es to their prope rty of $14,144.50 as a

result of the Creans’ driveway

construction. The court he ld that the evidenc e did not support a finding that the Finks had sustaine d any

damag es bey ond this amount. The court also held t hat the manne r in which the drivew ay

was const ructe d had cr eate d an ac tionable tempora ry nuisance , which could be
corr ecte d by the ex penditure of labor or money , and that the Finks we re e ntitled to such corre ction
a t th e e xpe ns e of

theCr e a ns

. Th e c ou rt or de re d the Cr e a ns to pa y the F ink s $1 4, 14 4. 50 in d a ma g e s, repr esenting monies spent for materials, repairs, and consultants. The court also order ed the Cre ans to elect one of t hree options for preventing further runoff damag e to the F inks’ property . The options
we re se t ou t a s f

oll ow s:

The Plaintiffs ar e further e nti t led to relief from the c ontinued
conce ntrat ed s t o rm wa t erru n o ff fr o mt h e D ef

en d an t s ’ d ri v ew ay

to the Plaintiffs’ property

. To acc omplish t his relief, the De fe nd an ts s ha ll

e mp loyan ap

prop ria te e ng ine e r to perform a dra inag e study and desig n wh i ch addre sses the impact of the exis ting dr ainag e into the
e xisti n g s t o r md r a i n l o c a t e d n e ar t h e e n tr a n c e o f

t h e D e f e n d a n ts’ drive way on B e e c h’ s T a ve rn Tr a il. Th is s tud y sh a ll a dd re ss w hat, i f any , impact this soluti on would have on a ltering t h e natural water sheds in the ar ea. If thi s d ra ina ge stu dy fin ds tha t th e re wou ld be no negative impact to the e xi s ting wat ershed, would create no f u r th e r p ro b l e m s f

o r th e D e f e n d a n t s a n d th a t i t w o u l d m e e t al lD u r i n g t h i s t i me per i od, on Se pt embe r 24, 2004, Pau l C. N ey , t h en c ou n s el for t h e Cr ea n s , fi l ed a 4

mo t i on t o wi t hdr aw and su bst i t ut e W i l l i am Squi r es as new coun s el , wh i ch t he C han cel l or g r ant ed by order on Sept emb er 2 8 , 2 0 0 4

. -4-

go v e rn me nta l stor

m w ate r ru no

ff re gu latio ns , th e n th e De fe nd an ts
s h a ll u n de r ta k e to im

p le m e n t t

h e r e c o m m e n d

a ti o n o f G regg Clingerman . . . , as his fi rst recomme ndation. The Court ag ree s that thi s is the m os t lo g ic a l a ndpr ob ably the le a st c os tly

so lut ion . T his solution m ay need altering a bit to acc ommodate the construc tion of Def endants’ gate pos t, which have [sic] g one up since completion of the Clin g e rm a n E ng ine e ri ng Re po rt

.
I f the drainag e study

indicate s a possible neg ative impact to the Def endants a s a re sult of a chang e in the natura l water shed or c reates problems for othe r pr o p ertyowner s, the Def endants shall have the options of install ing a s t o rm detention basi n on their property to detain and c ontrol the conc entra ted s t o rm water runoff into the
e xistin g dr a ina g e sy ste m or p ay for the costs of install ing the retaining wall on the Plaintiff s’ southern edge of the ir driveway as set forth as r ecommendation 2 on pag e 3 of the Clingerman re port

. . . .
The c ourt allowed the Creans nine ty d ay s fr o m the date of

final judg ment to select a nd reta in an eng ineer , and allowe d them an additional ninety day s to implement either recommendation one or two of t he C linge rman report, t otaling 180 day s in which to remedy the Finks’ storm water runof f problem. F inally , the court’s memorandum opini on order ed counsel for the F inks to prepar e a f inal judgme nt consistent with the findings in the memor andum opinion.

After an orde r had be en dra fted, whic h counsel for both parties sig ned, the tria l court ente red the jud g me nt o n A ug us t 26 , 20 04

. Th e inj un c tiv e op tio ns se t fo rth in thi s o rd e r w e re sim ila r t o th os e provided in the memorandum opinion, except that instead of the court’s orig inal provision for the third option to “pay for the costs of i nstalling the reta ining wa ll on the Plainti ffs’ southe rn edg e of their drivew ay ,” ther e wa s the following lang uag e: “pay damag es t o the Plaintiffs in the amount of $90,000, which amount is subject to post-judg ment interest fr om the date of entry of this Order

and Final Judgment.” There was no mention of attorney s’ fe es in this o rd er , or in the memora ndum opinion entere d by

the court.

Over 180 day s later, on Marc h 9, 2005, the C rea ns filed a document with the cha ncery court 4 entitled “Status Report Reg arding Satisfaction of J udg ment.” I n this report, the Cre ans stated that pay ment of $14,144.50 had been tendere d to the Finks on Dec ember 6, 2004, and that post-judg ment interest on that amount had been paid on Dec ember 15, 2004. The Cre ans submitted that they had reta ined the ser vices of e ng ineer Gary O’B rien(“ O’B ri en ”), a nd they attache d to the motion O’B rien’s f

inal report on the runoff problem. The Creans ex plained that they had chose n to pursue the option known as “Cli ng erma n Recommenda tion Number 1” afte r discussing it with O’Brien, andT hi s di s put e i s r ef l ect ed i n t he t r ans cr i pt r ecor d by a l et t er f r om Cl i ng er man t o t he Fi nk s ’ coun s el f i l ed 5
wi t h t he co urt on A p ri l 29 , as well as t he Finks ’ res p o nse t o t he C reans’ m o t i o n fo r cl ari f i cat i o n or rel i ef

. I n t he l et t er, Cl i n g er man s t at ed, i n r el ev an t pa r t : “ Af t er i n s pec t i n g t h e wor k a n d r ev i ew i n g my r epor t an d t es t i mon y i t i s my opi n i on t hat t he work comp l et ed do es not meet r ecomm endat i on N umber 1 cont ai ned i n my Ap r i l 200 0 eng i nee r i ng r eport

. ”

T h e n ot i ce of

a ppea l w as f

i l ed by W i l l i am Squ i r es as cou n s el for Appel l an t s

. O n Se pt embe r 12, 2005, 6
C h ristina F e rr e ll fil e d w ith the c h a n c e ry c o u rt a no tice o f ap p e a ra n c e a s n e w c o u n se l f o r th e C re a n s.
-5- that this opti on was “ rea dy to be implemented by M r. R i ch ar d Spann, and aw ait[ed] only an improvement in weather for construction to be complete.” I n their status r eport, the Creans went on to de sc ri be the va

ri ou s st e ps that th e y

ha d u nd e rt ake n b e tw e e n Se pte mbe r 2 00 4 andMa rc h 2 00 5 to comply with the co urt’s final or der, w hich alleg edly included: submitti ng initial inqui ries to a number of eng ineer s, reque sting bid e stimates, inviting eng ineer s to vie w the site, hiring O ’B rien, inquiring to a sphalt paving construction compa nies, having th ei r counsel review O’B rien’s r eport for compliance with the court’s or der, a nd discussing a construction sche dule with Richard Spann based on the O’B rien re port. Ba sed upon these statements, the Crea ns submitt ed to t h e court that they wer e in substantial compli an ce with the court’s orde r, and tha t full compliance w ould occur up on the we a the r’ s impr ov e me nt.

On Marc h 9, 2005, the Finks notified the Cre ans of their intent to ex ecute a $90,000 judgme nt pursuant to the Aug ust 26, 2004 final judgme nt. O n Marc h 10, 2005, the Crea ns filed a motion to quash the ex ecution and le vy . I n t h i s m o t i o n , the Crea ns claimed that on Mar ch 8, the
c on str uc tio n c re w that had be e n hir e d for the a lte ratio n o f the ir drive way pe rf orme d me a su re me nts , that on Marc h 9, stone and other materia ls to be used wer e cut and mea sured, that on Ma rch 10, the
cre w beg an tre nching around the driveway for “ curbing installation” as rec ommended by the
e n g i n e e r i n g r e p o r t , a n d t h a tt h e f o u n d a t i o n f

o r t h i s c u r b i n g h a d b e e n s c h e d u l e d t o b e g i n t h a td a y. The c hance ry

court he ld a hea

ring on this mot ion on March 14, and on April 4 the court order ed a stay of execution of the judg ment for 30 d ay s fr o m t h e hearing. T he court also order ed that Clin g e rm a n b e a llo we d to ins pe c t th e Cr e a ns ’ drive way to se e if the wo rk be ing pe rf

orme d w a s in
acc ord with “Clinge rman Rec ommendation Number 1.” The c ourt furthe r orde red the Creans to pa y the Finks’ attorney ’s fe es associated wit h the s tay of ex ecution is sue, which amounted to $1,397.88.
On April 18, 2005, the Creans filed a motion for clarification of the April 4 order, or in the alternative, relief

from the f

inal order of Aug ust 26, 2004, as we l l as a memorandum in support the r e o f

. M e a n w h il e , a d is p u te ar o s e b e tw e e n th e p ar ti e s a s to w h e th e r th e w o rk imp le me nted per O’B rien’s rec ommendations conformed with the rec ommendations set forth in Clinge rman’s 2000 report. On May

2, the cha ncery

court he ard a

rg ument on the Crea ns’ motion for clarifi ca t i on or 5 relief . On May

11, the Chance llor entere d an orde r deny ing the Creans’ motion for clarification or relief , and aw arde d the Finks a judgme nt of $90,000 plus costs. The court also denied anyprejudgmen t o r p o st-judgme nt interest and attorney s’ fe es throug h the date of the orde r. The Cre ans filed a notice of appe al to this Court on J une 7, 2005. 6T he Fi nk s di s put e t hat t he not i ce of ap peal was t i mel y fi l ed i n t hi s cas e. W e di s agr ee and pr ovi de an 7

e x p la n a tio n in the D isc u ssio n se c tio n b e lo w

. -6- II. I SSU ES P R ESENTED

Th e Cr e a ns fi le d a

tim e ly no tic e of app e a l, a ndpr e se nt the fo llo wi ng iss ue s f or re vie w: 7

1. Whether the c hance ry

court e rre d in awar ding a $90,000 judgme nt to the Finks; and 2. Whether the c hance ry

court e rre d in its choice of the pr oper me asure of dama g es.

For the following rea sons, we af firm.

III. D I S CUS S I ON

Be fore proce eding to the Creans’ arg uments on appea l, we must first addre ss a pre liminary iss ue raise d b y

the F ink s. I n the ir re sp on se brie f on app e a l, the Ap pe lle e s c ha lle ng e the tim e lin e ss of the Cre ans’ appea l to this Court. The Finks alleg e that the Aug ust 26, 2004 order was the f inal judgme nt in this case , rathe r than the May 11, 2005 order

. They arg ue that any issues not raised by the Crea ns for a

ppeal within 30 day s of the Aug ust 26, 2004 order are now time barre d. We find the F ink s’ arg ume nts on thi s is su e to b e un pe rs ua siv e fo r the fo llo wi ng re a so ns

.
Th is a pp e a l w as bro ug ht p ur su a nt t o Ru le 3( a ) o f the Te nn e sse e Rul e s o f A pp e llate Pr oc e du re , w hic h c le arl y

state s:

Ex cept a s otherwise permitted in rule 9 and in Rule 54.02 Tennessee Rules of Civil P roce dure, if multiple parties or multiple claims for relief are involved in an action, any order that adjudicate s few er tha n all the claims of the rights a nd liabiliti es of f ewe r than a ll the parties is n ot en fo rc e able or app e a la ble a nd is sub

je c t to r e vis ion a t a ny

tim e before e n tryo f afi n al j u d gm en tad j u d i ca t i n g al l t h e c l ai m s , ri gh t s , and lia bil iti e s o f a ll the pa

rt ie s.

T EN N

. R. A PP

. P. 3. As int e rp re te d by ou r su pr e me c ou rt , Rul e 54 .0 2 of the Te nn e sse e Rul e s of Civ il Procedur e allows pa

rties to finalize certain other non-f inal judgme nts by

first obtaining certification from the tria l court that the court has “dire cted the entry of a fina l judgment a s to one or more but few er tha n all of the c laims, and . .

. ma[d] e an e x press de termination that thereis no just reason for delay

. Fox v. Fox , 657 S.W .2d 747 (Tenn. 1983) . The c ourt stated that “[i]n t he abse nce of such direc ti o n an d d et er m i nation by the trial judg e, the or der is interloc utory and can be re vised at any time be fore the entry

of judg ment adjudicating all the claims and rights a nd liabiliti es of a ll parties.” Fox , 6 5 7 S

. W

. 2 d at 7 4 9 (c i t i n g Stid ham v. Fic kle He irs , 643 S.W .2d 324, 325 (Tenn. 1982)).

I n the Finks’ origina l complaint, the pray er for judg ment ref lects that the Appe llees soug ht multipl e cla ims for relief : te mporary and perma nent injunctions a g ainst the Crea ns, compensatoryW hi l e t he co urt did award $ 1 , 3 9 7

. 8 8 i n at t o rney s’ fees t o t he Finks i n t he A p ri l 4, 20 0 5 ord er s t ayi ng 8

ex ec u t i on of

j u dg men t , i t c l ea r l y i n di ca t ed t h at t h i s a wa r d was l i mi t ed t o t h os e fee s as s oci at ed wi t h t h e s t ay of e x ec u t i on issu e

.

A t oral argument, t he Finks ’ co unsel , M r. C ashi o n, cl a ime d t hat t he A ugust 26 , 20 0 4 ord er was t he

9

res ul t of a co o p erat i ve end eavo r i nvo l vi ng hi m sel f and M r. P aul N e y, w h o w a s the n c o unsel fo r t he C reans. A s M r. C ashi o n ad m i t t ed t hat t here i s no t hi ng i n t he reco rd t o ref l ect t hi s, t hi s C o urt shal l hencef o rt h co nsi d er t he o rder t o have b e e n d ra fted b y M r. C a sh io n , as c a lled fo r b y the trial c o u rt’s M a y 1 5 , 2 0 0 4 m e m o ra n d u m o p inio n

. -7- damag es, and “ a re asonable attorney fee , discretionary and other c osts for bring ing this ac tion.” The Chance llor did not rule on the issue of attorney s’ fee s in his April 15, 2004 memorandum opinion, and the issue was similarly not addre ssed by

the cor responding Aug ust 26, 2004 “Orde r and F inal J udg ment” dra fted by

counsel for

the Finks.

Even a ssuming that both the memora ndum opinion and the orde r dra fted by counsel for

the Finks disposed of their

claims as t o injunctive relief , compensa tory

damag es, and c osts of the pr oc e e din g s, a s n ote d a

bo ve , th e c ou rt

didno t ul tim a te ly

a dju dic a te the iss ue of

a tto rn e y s’ fe e s u nti l its order of May

11, 2005, in which it aw ar d ed t h e $90,000 judgment to the Appellee s and specific ally

denied additional attorney s’ fe es throug h the date of the orde r. I f either

party wished 8 to make the judg ment final on Aug ust 26, 2004, they could have proce eded under Rule 54.02 of the Tenne ssee Rul es of Civil Procedur e seeking certification by the trial court, but they

did not do so.

Ap plying Rul e 3 o f the Te nn e sse e Rul e s o f A pp e llate Pr oc e du re , a ll o f the c la ims a ndri g hts of the pa rties wer e not dec ided until the order enter ed on May 11, 2005, and as suc h, this order wa s the appe alable f

inal judgme nt. Since the Appell an t s filed their notice of appe al on J une 7, 2005, wi thi n th e app ro pria te thi rt y da y pe ri od , th is n oti c e of

app e a l w a s ti mel y file d a ndthe ma tte r i s proper ly befor e this Court.

A. P ro pr ie ty of the $9 0, 00 0 Aw ar

d

Th e fi rs t arg ume nt by

Ap pe lla nts to b e c on sid e re d is wh e the r the c ha nc e ry c ou rt e rr e d in
awa rding a $90,000 judg ment to the Finks. Appellants arg ue that this amount was not supported by the evidenc e in the re cord. The Creans posit this arg ument by direc ting this Court’s attention to the absenc e of a

$90,000 amount i n t h e chance ry court’s A pril 15, 2004 memorandum opinion. Appellants note that the me morandum opinion “ car efully outlines a ll of the conclusions re g arding lia bil ity a ndda mages as well a s th e fu tur e re me dia l a c tio ns that th e Cr e a ns we re to i mpl e me nt i n order to addre ss the storm runoff issue

. . . .” The Creans s tate that the first occur renc e of a $90,000 da ma g e a wa

rd in the re c or d oc c ur

re d in the Au g us t 26 , 20 04 or de r dra ft e d b y the F ink s’ c ou ns e l. 9 F urthe rm or e , A pp e lla nts po int to the abs e nc e of a ratio na le fo r the c a lc ulatio n o f the se da ma g e s in the Aug ust 26, 2004 or der. The Creans further arg ue that the Aug ust 26, 2004 order “ was intende d to a llo w the m th e op tio n o f p a y ing da ma g e s, rathe r t ha n in sta lli ng a

sto rm de te nti on dr a in b a sin in the eve nt that their eng ineering study did not support implementation of the Clinge rman Recommenda tion.”-8-

Appellee s contend tha

t the $90,000 judgme nt imposed by the court repre sents the pre sent day cost of installing a reta ining wall and is supported by the evidenc e in the re cord. I n s up po rt of thi s
arg ume nt, the F ink s p oin t to the c ha nc e ry c ou rt ’s Ma y 15 , 200 5 mem or a nd um o pin ion , s pe c if ic a lly the se c tio n listi ng the Cr e a ns ’ av a ila ble op tio ns a ndc on ta ini ng the la ng ua g e , “ or pa y fo r the c os ts of installing the r etaining wall on the Plaintiffs’ southern e dg e of the ir driveway as s et fo rt h as
re c omm e nd a tio n 2 on pa g e 3 of the Clin g e rm a n Re po rt

. . . . ” Ap pe lle e s n ote that w ith in this re po rt , written in 2000, Clingerman stated that the c ost of ere cting a reta ining wall pursuant to “Cling erma n Re c omm e nd a tio n 2" wa s $81 ,7 24

. Ap pe lle e s ar g ue : “G ive n tha t this ca lc ulatio n w a s a pp ro xima te ly five y ear s old at the time the Orde r and Final J udg ment was entered, it is clea r t hat t he trial c ourt’s damag e fig ure of

$90,000.00, which wa s agreed to by counsel for

both parties, is, in light of inflation, rea sonable unde r the c ircumstance s.”

Th e e xiste nc e of

a te mpo ra ry nu isa nc e on the Cr e a ns ’ pr op e rt y a ff e c tin g the F ink s’ pr op e rt y is not at issue in thi s appea l. Whil e several issues are in dispute in this highly fac t-driven case, our revie w is limi ted to the trial court’s $ 9 0 , 0 0 0 awa rd. We g ener ally

will review only

those issues prese nted for r eview by

the parties. T EN N

. R. A PP

. P. 13(b) (2005). We f ind that Appellants’ fa ilure to i nc lud e a

tr a ns c ri pt o r state me nt o f e vid e nc e on app e a l di re c ts u s to a ff ir m th e tr ia l c ou rt ’s imp lic it fi nd in g t hat $90, 00 0 r e pr e se nts the c os t of bu ild ing a

re ta ini ng wa ll a ndits su bs e qu e nt a wa rdin Appellee s’ fa vor.

The trial c ourt’s April 15, 2004 memora ndum opini o n set forth e x tensive finding s of fa ct based upon the trial rec ord, and the rec ord bef ore us shows that the trial court re lied upon both the
rec ommendations of J oseph B allard in 1995 a nd the 2000 Clinger man Report as a

basis for imposing t h e t h ree equitable r emedy options available for

implementation by

the Crea ns. Sp e c if

ic a ll y , the court found that the solution set forth by J oseph B allard i n his September 20, 1995 letter to the Cr e a ns ’ atto rn e y

wa s “ a log ic a l a nd e c on omi c a l re so lut ion ” to the sto rm ru no ff pr ob le m, a ndthat th is
so lut ion wa s a lso c on sis te nt w ith “ Re c omm e nd a tio n # 1” fr om Clin g e rm a n’ s eng ine e ri ng re po rt in 2000. The c ourt g ave theCreans the option to im plement this remedy , but if their eng ineer s de te rm ine d th a t i t w o u l d h a v e a n e g a t i v e i m p a c t t o t h e C r e a n s , t h e C r e a n s a l s o h a d t h e o p t ion to implement “Recommendat i o n 2" by either installing a storm detention basin “ or pay [i ng ] for the costs of installing the r etaining wall. . . .”

F rom o ur re vie w o f the te c hn ic a l r e c or d, it a pp e ars that th e $9 0, 00 0 a mou nt i n th e Au g us t 26, 2004 order

was inserted into the court’s e numera ted options should the Creans choose not to act on the other two pr oposed methods of pe rformance

. Counsel for both parties and the c hance llor sign e d th is o r d e r

. T h e tria l c o u r t’ s th o r o u g h f in d in g s o f f

a c t a s to li ab il it y o f th e Cr e a n s and fea sabilityof the e x perts’ r ecommendations are reflec ted i n the appellate record in the April 15, 2004 memorandum opinion, howeve r there is no transcript of e vidence or statement of evidenc e from trial for this Court to review o n appea l. The basis of the $90,000 amount awar ded to the F inks is not completely

appar ent from the technica l rec ord. The only monetary fig ure approac hing the $90,000 amount that is present in the rec ord befor e us is in Cli ng erma n’s eng ineering r eport, whic h estimated that the cost of installing a re taining w all in 2000 would be $81,724. Appellee s cite to this figure as providing a basis for

their including the $90,000 amount in the Aug ust 26, 2004 order.-9-

The a mount of damag es to be awarde d is a fact question which, upon appea l from a non- jury jud g me nt, is re vie we d by thi s Co urt de novo upon the rec ord acc ompanied by a pre sumption of the
corr ectne ss of finding s of fa ct unless the evide nce pr eponder ates other wise. Rine har t v . St ate , No. 01-A-01- 9309-B C-00428, 1994 Tenn. App. L EXI S 204, at *7 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 13, 1994) (citing T EN N

. R. A PP

. P. Ru le 13 (d ); Fos te r v . Bue , 749 S.W .2d 736 (Tenn. 1988) ).

Where no tra nscript of the e vidence is filed, there is a presumption that the proc eeding s were proper and that the evidence supported the judg ment. Fish er v. Fisher , No. W1998-00864-COA-R3-CV, 2000 Tenn. App. LEXI S 173, at *10 (Te nn. Ct. App. March 20, 2000) (c i t i n g Wilson v. Hafley , 18 9 T e nn . 5 98 , 2 26 S.W. 2d30 8, 31 1 ( 19 49 ); Hol ling swo rth v . Sa

fe c o I ns. Cos

. , 782 S.W .2d 477, 479 (Tenn. A pp. 1989)). The appellate court must assume that the r ecor d would support the trial court' s finding s. Id. (c i t i n g She rro d v . W ix , 8 49 S.W. 2d78 0, 78 3 ( Te nn . Ct

. App. 1992)).

We find that the Aug ust 26, 2004 order inserting the $90,000 amount in place of the e arlier

m em o r a n d u m o p i n i o n ’s “o r p ay [ i n g] fo r t h e c o s t s o f i n s t al l i n g t h e r et ai n i n g wa l l ” l an gu age
e ff e c tiv e ly op e rate d a s a

fi nd ing by

the tr ia l c ou rt

that th is d oll ar amou nt r e pr e sen ted s uc h c os ts. Since there is no transcript or state ment of evide nce be fore us that mi gh t allow us to consider wh e the r the e vid e nc e pr e po nd e rate s a g a ins t th is f ind ing , w e mus t th e re fo re pr e su me thi s a mou nt t o be cor rec t and af

firm the judg ment of the trial c ourt.

B. Measure of Dam ages Appellants’ se cond ar g ument on appea l is closely rel at ed t o t he first. As we perc eive the issue, Appellants submit that if a measure of damag es was appropriate in this instance, the chanc ellor
err ed by apply ing the wrong standard by which to measur e the a war d. The Creans ag ain sug g est that the awa rd is punitive, rather

than compensatory , in nature, a nd that the re cord is devoid of any finding s that the awa

rd would allow the F inks to restore their property to its pre-nuisance condition or that the a war d was for the purpose of

b u i l d i n g a re taining w all. Appellants ar g ue that af ter a dispute arose as to the suffic iency of the wor

k that they

had per formed on the ir property , the
c ha nc e llo r i nc or

po rate d th e $9 0, 00 0 ju dg me nt in to its fi na l or de r o f M a y 11 , 2 00 5, e ff

e c tiv e ly
awa rding a “w indfall” to the F inks that was not justified by the proof. Appellants liken this awar d to punitive damag es “dire cted at punishment of the Creans for failing to meet the spe cifications of [C linge rman], who determined only afte r substantial work was done that those specif ications wer e not met.” Converse ly , Appellee s arg ue that the $90,000 a wa rd i s compensatory , and not “a wi nd fa ll, ” a n d t h a t th i s a w ar d i s a p r o p e r m e a s u r e o f d a m a g e s e n a b l i n g t h e F i n k s t o r e s t o r e the ir property to its pre-nuisance condition in light of the Cre ans’ “ utter fa ilure” to imp l ement “Clinge rman Rec ommendation 1.”

“Whether the trial court ha s utili zed the proper measure of dama g es is a

question of law that
we r eview de novo .” Beaty v. Mc Graw , 15 S.W .3d 819, 829 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1998). T he parties have stipulated that a temporary nuisance exis ts. As rec og nized by both pa rties, “[a] t em p o ra ry nuisa n ce i s o n e t hat ca n be cor rec ted with the expenditure of labor and money .” La rg e nt-10-

Cont racting., Inc. v. Dement Constr

. Co. , No. W1999-02736-COA-R3-CV, 2001 Te nn. App. LE XIS 2 6 6 , at * 1 9

– 2 0 (T en n

. C t

. Ap p

. Ap r. 1 7 , 2 0 0 1 ) ( ci t i n g Caldwell v. Kn ox Concrete Prod. Inc. , 39 1 S .W.2d5 ( Te nn . Ct . A pp . 1 96 4) ). Whe re the nu isa nc e is t e mpo ra ry , d a ma g e s to pr op e rt y a ff e c te d b y the nu isa nc e are re c ur

re nt andma y be re c ov e re d fr om time to time un til the nu isa nc e is abate d. Pate v. Marti n, 614 S.W .2d 46, 48 (Tenn. 1981) . The mea sure of such dama g es is the injury to the value of

the use a nd enjoy ment of the prope rty

. See id. This Court has also held:
A p art y that ha s b e e n s ub

je c te d to a nu is anc e ma y be e nti tle d to
sever al types of da mag es. These damage s may include the cost of restoring the plainti

ff' s property to its condition prior to the creation of the nuisance , persona l damag es such a s inconvenienc e and emotional distress, and injury t o t h e u se and e njoy ment of her property . Such damag es ar e not mutually exclusive.
Pryor v. Willoughby , 3 6 S

. W

. 3 d 8 2 9 , 8 3 1 (T en n

. C t

. Ap p

. 2 0 0 0 ) ( em p h as i s ad d ed ) ( ci t i n g Citi ze ns Real Estat e v. Mountain States Dev. Corp. , 633 S.W .2d 763, 767 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1981))

. Appellants do not take issue with the tria l court’s a war d of $14,144.50 to the F inks, in fact the re cord shows that this amount was pa id in full in Decembe r of 2004. In its April 15, 2004 memorandum opinion, the court measure d this damag e amount ac cording to its own findings of the Finks’ out-of

-pocke t costs in dealing with the nuisance , namely materia ls, repair s, and consultant costs. As discussed above , the re cord in its prese nt state does not in d i ca t e wh ether the court ever articulated finding s as to the costs of installing a reta ining wall, but the $90,000 amoun t was nonetheless incor

porate d into its order

on Aug ust 26.
Ag a in, be c a us e Ap pe lla nts fi le d no tr a ns c ri pt of e vid e nc e fo r u s to re vie w, we mus t pr e su me to b e c or re c t th e tr ia l c ou rt ’s fi nd ing a s to the a mou nt of mon e y ne c e ssa ry to ins ta ll a

re ta ini ng wa ll. When no transcript of t he evidence is filed, we will conclusively presume that the proce eding s were proper and that the e v idence supported the judg ment. Fish er v. Fisher , No. W1998-00864-COA-R3-CV, 2000 Tenn. A pp. LEXI S 173, at *10 (Tenn. Ct. App. Marc h 20, 2000) (c i t i n g Wilson v. Hafley , 18 9 Te nn . 5 98 , 2 26 S.W. 2d30 8, 31 1 ( 19 49 ); Hol ling swo rth v . Sa

fe c o I ns. Cos

. , 782 S.W .2d 477, 4 7 9 (T en n

. App. 1989)). T he appe llate court must assume that the rec ord would support the trial court's f indings. Id. (c i t i n g She rro d v . W ix , 84 9 S.W. 2d 78 0, 78 3 (T e nn . Ct

. Ap p. 19 92 ))

. Th e tr ia l c ou rt wa s wi thi n its dis c re tio n in or de ri ng that c or re c tiv e a c tio n b e take n to addre ss the nuisance that was pre sent on the Crea ns’ prope rty

. The options set forth in the memorandum opinion involved ei t h er the installation of a cur b acc ording to Cli ng erma n’s “Rec ommendation 1,” the installation of a storm detention basin per this same r ecommendation, or pay ment for the cost of i nstalling a reta ining wall. These options involved the e x penditure of labor and money , and nothing in the appellate rec ord sug g ests that they wer e improper ly

measure d by

the trial court. See Largent Con tracting. , Inc. , 2001 Tenn. App. L EXI S 266 , at * 1 9–20. We have alre ady determined that the trial court found that $90,000 ac curately repr esente d the cost of installing
a re taining w all, and we must presume this amount to be correc t. We further hold that the trial court
e mpl oy e d a

pr op e r me a su re of da ma g e s, a nd a c c or din g ly , we a ff ir m th e jud g me nt o f the tr ia l c ou rt

.-11- IV. C ONCL US I ON

F or the re a so ns se t forth he re in, we a ff ir m the jud g me nt of the c ha nc e ry c ou rt

. Cos ts of thi s appea l are taxed to Ap pellants, Fr ed M. Crea n and De borah Cre an, and the ir surety , for whic h execution may

issue if nec essary

.

ALAN E. HI GHERS, J UDGE