RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION

Pursuant to Sixth Circuit I.O.P. 32.1(b)

File Name: 22a0120p.06

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

JUDY FULKERSON,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

UNUM LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY OF AMERICA,

Defendant-Appellant.

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No. 21-3367

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio at Cleveland.

No. 1:19-cv-01180—David A. Ruiz, Magistrate Judge.

Argued: December 8, 2021

Decided and Filed: June 3, 2022

Before: SUTTON, Chief Judge; SILER and READLER, Circuit Judges.

_________________

COUNSEL

ARGUED: Brett K. Bacon, FRANTZ WARD LLP, Cleveland, Ohio, for Appellant. Robert P. 

Rutter, RUTTER & RUSSIN, LLC, Cleveland, Ohio, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Brett K. 

Bacon, Olivia Lin Southam, FRANTZ WARD LLP, Cleveland, Ohio, for Appellant. Robert P. 

Rutter, RUTTER & RUSSIN, LLC, Cleveland, Ohio, for Appellee.

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OPINION

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CHAD A. READLER, Circuit Judge. Daniel Tymoc died in a car crash while speeding 

and driving recklessly. Tymoc’s mother, Judy Fulkerson, pursued accidental death 

benefits under Tymoc’s life insurance policy, issued by Unum Life Insurance Company. Unum, 

however, denied those benefits, invoking a policy exclusion for “losses caused by, contributed to 

>
No. 21-3367 Fulkerson v. Unum Life Ins. Co. of Am. Page 2

by, or resulting from . . . commission of a crime.” Fulkerson successfully challenged Unum’s 

interpretation of the crime exclusion in the district court and was awarded the $100,000 

accidental death benefit. Unum now appeals. Because reckless driving falls within the 

unambiguous plain meaning of crime, we reverse that aspect of the district court’s judgment.

I.

Daniel Tymoc died in a single-car accident. At the time of the accident, Tymoc was 

traveling between 80 and 100 miles per hour, well above the 60 mile per hour speed limit. As 

Tymoc attempted to pass multiple cars, the gap between a car in the right lane and a box truck in 

the left lane closed. In an apparent attempt to avoid a collision, Tymoc veered to the right, 

causing his vehicle to drive off the road, roll down an embankment, strike multiple trees, and flip 

over several times before coming to rest at the bottom of a hill. Tymoc died at the scene.

Through his employer, Tymoc was covered by a Unum life insurance policy that 

provided both basic life insurance coverage and an additional accidental death benefit. His 

mother, Judy Fulkerson, sought to recover benefits as the policy’s beneficiary. Unum approved 

a $100,000 payment of group life insurance benefits. But it withheld $100,000 in accidental 

death benefits on the basis that Tymoc’s conduct at the time of the accident—speeding and 

reckless driving, conduct Fulkerson does not dispute—caused his death, thereby triggering the 

policy’s crime exclusion.

Invoking the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001–

1191d, Fulkerson sued Unum to recover, as relevant here, the accidental death benefits. See 

29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B). The parties cross-moved for judgment on the administrative record, 

which the district court entered in Fulkerson’s favor as to the accidental death benefits. Unum 

timely appealed.

II.

Unum prevails if either reckless driving or speeding triggers the policy’s crime exclusion. 

Concluding, as we do, that the former falls within the crime exclusion, we need not consider the 

latter.
No. 21-3367 Fulkerson v. Unum Life Ins. Co. of Am. Page 3

A. Tymoc’s employer provided him a life insurance policy as part of an employee 

benefit plan. For a “participant or beneficiary” who seeks “to recover benefits due to him under 

the terms of his plan,” ERISA provides the policyholder or beneficiary a statutory cause of 

action. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B). That is the provision Fulkerson, as the beneficiary of 

Tymoc’s life insurance policy, invokes here.

With ERISA governing today’s appeal, two threshold principles deserve emphasis. One, 

the parties agree that we should review the crime exclusion’s applicability here de novo. See 

Clemons v. Norton Healthcare Inc. Ret. Plan, 890 F.3d 254, 264 (6th Cir. 2018) (noting the 

different standards of review that may apply in an ERISA case). Two, when interpreting an 

ERISA-covered insurance policy, “we apply federal common law rules of contract 

interpretation.” Perez v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 150 F.3d 550, 556 (6th Cir. 1998) (en banc). To do 

so, we begin with the policy’s text. See id. Unless that text is ambiguous, we presume the policy 

means what it says and therefore give effect to its “plain meaning in an ordinary and popular 

sense.” Farhner v. United Transp. Union Discipline Income Prot. Program, 645 F.3d 338, 343 

(6th Cir. 2011) (quoting Williams v. Int’l Paper Co., 227 F.3d 706, 711 (6th Cir. 2000)). On that 

score, a policy is ambiguous only if it “is susceptible to multiple reasonable interpretations, not 

just because clever lawyers can disagree over the meaning of terms.” Clemons, 890 F.3d at 269.

B. With these legal tools in hand, we begin the job before us: interpreting the crime 

exclusion in Tymoc’s life insurance policy. We start with the policy’s text. It excludes 

accidental death benefits for “any accidental losses caused by, contributed to by, or resulting 

from . . . an attempt to commit or commission of a crime.” And it frames the question 

underlying this appeal: is reckless driving a “crime” within the meaning of the exclusion?

1. As the policy does not expressly answer that question, we first turn to dictionaries to 

determine the term’s plain meaning. See, e.g., Adams v. Anheuser-Busch Cos., 

758 F.3d 743, 748 (6th Cir. 2014); Kovach v. Zurich Am. Ins. Co., 587 F.3d 323, 332–33 (6th 

Cir. 2009). Black’s Law Dictionary defines “crime” as “[a]n act that the law makes punishable; 

the breach of a legal duty treated as the subject-matter of a criminal proceeding.” Crime, Black’s 

Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019). Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary agrees. It defines 

“crime” as “an illegal act for which someone can be punished by the government; especially: 
No. 21-3367 Fulkerson v. Unum Life Ins. Co. of Am. Page 4

a gross violation of law,” “a grave offense especially against morality,” and “criminal activity.” 

Crime, Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary (last visited June 2, 2022). The American 

Heritage Dictionary similarly instructs that a crime is “[a]n act committed in violation of law 

where the consequence of conviction by a court is punishment, especially where the punishment 

is a serious one such as imprisonment,” “[u]nlawful activity,” and “[a] serious offense, especially 

one in violation of morality.” Crime, American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language 

430 (5th ed. 2011). Read together, these lexiconic sources indicate that the plain meaning of 

“crime” is “an illegal act for which someone can be punished by the government.”

The Eighth Circuit’s decision in Boyer v. Schneider Electric Holdings, Inc., 993 F.3d 578

(8th Cir. 2021), supports our view. There, an individual insured by Unum died while “passing 

vehicles in a no-passing zone and driving approximately 80 miles per hour in a 35 mile-per-hour 

zone,” both misdemeanors under Missouri law. Id. at 580. Applying a crime exclusion identical 

to the one at issue here, Unum denied benefits. Id. On abuse of discretion review, the Eighth 

Circuit upheld Unum’s decision, concluding that the act of “high-speed motoring and improper 

passing was akin to reckless driving,” which qualifies as a “crime” as that term was used in 

“[c]ommon dictionaries.” Id. at 581–83.

Our reading of “crime” is also consistent with the tapestry of state laws regulating 

Tymoc’s conduct. All agree that Tymoc was driving recklessly in violation of Ohio law, that is, 

“in willful or wanton disregard of the safety of persons or property.” Ohio Rev. Code 

Ann. § 4511.20 (West 2022). And all agree that this misdemeanor offense resulted in his death. 

To be sure, one state’s idiosyncratic decision to punish certain behavior may not reflect whether 

that behavior is widely understood to be a crime. See Kovach, 587 F.3d at 332 (explaining that 

courts must interpret an ERISA plan pursuant to “the plain meaning of its language as it would 

be construed by an ordinary person” (citation omitted)); cf. Boyer, 993 F.3d at 583 (reasoning 

that an insurer “is not bound to incorporate a particular State’s criminal law in fashioning its own 

definition of crime” because “that approach could lead to benefits varying by jurisdiction”). But 

a broader survey of state law assures us that the ordinary meaning of “crime” unambiguously 

includes reckless driving. Indeed, the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration reports 

that 48 states expressly punish “reckless driving.” Summary of State Speed Laws, NHTSA 
No. 21-3367 Fulkerson v. Unum Life Ins. Co. of Am. Page 5

(12th ed. 2012), https://www.nhtsa.gov/sites/nhtsa.gov/files/documents/summary_state_speed_la

ws_12th_edition_811769.pdf (last visited June 2, 2022) (note the summary chart on pages vi–ix). 

The lone exceptions are Maine and Vermont. That these two states followed “The Road Not 

Taken” by 48 others, however, does not mean Tymoc’s conduct would go unpunished in much 

of northern New England. Robert Frost, The Road Not Taken and Other Poems 1 (Dover 

Publ’ns 2012). After all, even without the reckless driving moniker, both Maine and Vermont 

punish substantially the same dangerous driving behaviors as their sister states. The Pine Tree 

State penalizes “[d]riving to endanger” and exceeding the speed limit by 30 miles per hour or 

more. Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 29-A, §§ 2074(3), 2413 (West 2022). These offenses, labeled 

Class C and E crimes under Maine law, are punishable by imprisonment and a fine. See, e.g., id. 

§ 2074(3) (“A person commits a Class E crime if that person operates a motor vehicle at a speed 

that exceeds the maximum rate of speed by 30 miles per hour or more.”); id. § 2413; id. tit. 17-A, 

§§ 1604(1)(C), (E), 1704(3), (5). To the same end, the Green Mountain State outlaws negligent 

and grossly negligent operation of a vehicle, with both offenses also punishable by imprisonment 

and a fine. Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 23, § 1091 (West 2022).

All things considered, Tymoc’s reckless driving would constitute a crime in every state in 

the Union. To our eye, this is particularly persuasive evidence that the plain, ordinary meaning 

of crime includes reckless driving. The tragic facts of this case, moreover, make it easy to see 

why every state follows this approach. Reckless driving endangers not only the life and property 

of the perpetrator, but also other individuals unlucky enough to be in the vicinity. Case in point, 

Tymoc nearly collided with one (and perhaps two) other cars while attempting the high-risk 

passing maneuver that led to his own death.

2. The contemporary common usage of the term “reckless driving” further supports our 

view that Tymoc’s conduct fits within the ordinary meaning of “crime.” On this front, corpus 

linguistics is a helpful tool in assessing common usage. See United States v. Woodson, 960

F.3d 852, 855 (6th Cir. 2020) (relying on corpus linguistics); Wilson v. Safelite Grp., Inc., 930 

F.3d 429, 439–40 (6th Cir. 2019) (Thapar, J., concurring in part and in the judgment) (same). By 

corpus linguistics, we mean a collection of databases containing print and spoken media that can 

be culled for examples of a word’s ordinary usage. Wilson, 930 F.3d at 440. As dictionaries 
No. 21-3367 Fulkerson v. Unum Life Ins. Co. of Am. Page 6

often “make no claims about the ordinariness of the words they define or the senses they assign 

those words,” a corpus resource can foster a more rigorous analysis of a term’s ordinary 

meaning. State v. Rasabout, 356 P.3d 1258, 1273 (Utah 2015) (Lee, A.C.J., concurring in part 

and concurring in the judgment) (cleaned up). Although more commonly used in the 

constitutional and statutory interpretive settings, these resources seemingly have the same force 

in many contractual settings as well. See Stephen C. Mouritsen, Contract Interpretation with 

Corpus Linguistics, 94 Wash. L. Rev. 1337, 1341 (2019) (“Corpora can provide evidence of the 

way that language is used by the contracting parties—evidence that was not previously available 

via dictionaries or introspection.”). That includes interpreting everyday terms in “a contract 

drafted by a national or multi-national insurance company.” Id. at 1364–65 (noting corpus 

linguistics’ usefulness when interpreting an insurance contract “according to the shared linguistic 

conventions of a nationwide speech community”).

A search of the Corpus of Contemporary American English for the phrase “reckless 

driving” as used between 1990 and 2018 (the year after Tymoc’s accident) yields over 

300 results. See Reckless Driving, Corpus of Contemporary American English, 

https://www.english-corpora.org/coca/ (last visited June 2, 2022). Tellingly, a vast majority

recount instances in which some manner of prosecution occurred, where individuals either were 

“charged,” “convicted,” and/or “sentenced” for reckless driving. Id. A handful of examples 

illustrate the point:

• “Begay was treated at a Portland hospital for non-life-threatening injuries. He 

was given criminal citations for driving under the influence of intoxicants and 

reckless driving.” Allen Brettman, Driver, 18, accused of smashing into side of 

parked police car, The Oregonian, https://www.oregonlive.com

/portland/2016/11/driver_18_accused_of_smashing.html (last visited June 2, 

2022).

• “Mr. Claybourne, you’re being charged with driving under the influence and 

reckless driving.” Nashville: I Fall to Pieces (CMT television broadcast Sept. 25, 

2013).

• “Paul Raef was charged for four misdemeanors, including ‘reckless driving, 

failing to obey a peace officer, and two counts of following another vehicle too 

closely and reckless driving with intent to capture picture for commercial gain,’ 

reports the L.A. Times.” Nadine Cheung, Justin Bieber Car Chase Charges 
No. 21-3367 Fulkerson v. Unum Life Ins. Co. of Am. Page 7

Dismissed by Judge, Popcrush, https://popcrush.com/justin-bieber-car-chasecharges-dismissed/ (last visited June 2, 2022).

• “Lopez was also charged with speeding, reckless driving, and driving on a 

suspended or revoked license.” Megan Jones, Aurora man accused of leading 

police on high-speed chase, Chicago Tribune, 

https://www.chicagotribune.com/suburbs/aurora-beacon-news/ct-abn-aurora-manarrested-dui-st-0129-story.html (last visited June 2, 2022).

• “A Detroit police union official who swerved off roads and through the Holly 

Academy school campus last winter was convicted Monday of reckless driving 

but will avoid prison and the loss of his police license.” Mike Martindale, Detroit 

cop guilty of misdemeanor in school joyride, The Detroit News,

https://www.detroitnews.com/story/news/local/oakland-county/2017/10/02/detroit

-police-union-head-guilty-misdemeanor/106241342/ (last visited June 2, 2022).

• “Cullip pleaded guilty to vehicular homicide, and reckless driving in the death of 

16-year old Chad Britton.” PBS NewsHour (PBS television broadcast Dec. 15, 

2016). 

Some entries go a step further, explicitly referring to “reckless driving” as a crime:

• “In addition to using ‘Leandra’s Law’ to increase potential charges in a New York 

DUI and DWI arrest, another crime that is often alleged in a drunk driving 

incident is the crime of Reckless Driving (VTL 1212).” Jeremy Saland, Reckless 

Driving (NY VTL 1212) & DWI (NY VTL 1192): Is Evidence of Intoxication Per 

Se Proof of Recklessnes[s] in a New York DUI Arrest, New York Criminal 

Lawyer Blog, https://www.newyorkcriminallawyer-blog.com/reckless-drivingand-intoxication/ (last visited June 2, 2022).

• “All right, I admit it! I flattened the damn fence! What are you gonna do, lock 

me up? Court finds the defendant guilty of crimes under code 453-19 reckless 

driving, and 466-2, reckless endangerment.” Doc Hollywood (Warner Bros. 

1991).

• “Unarmed but distraught, Small’s crime to that point had been reckless driving 

and leading police on an erratic low-speed chase that ended when her car, tires 

flattened to the rims, spun out on a suburban street.” Brad Schrade, Did Caroline 

Small Have to Die?, Atlanta Journal-Constitution, https://investigations.

ajc.com/caroline-small-shooting/ (last visited June 2, 2022).

• “The newspaper reported that in many instances, prosecutors dropped the DWI 

case but refiled it as another crime, such as obstruction of a highway or reckless 

driving, because they did not have enough evidence to obtain a DWI conviction.” 

Tony Plohetski & Christian McDonald, Small Rise in DWIs: An AmericanStatesman Review, Austin-American Statesman, Aug. 11, 2013, at A1.
No. 21-3367 Fulkerson v. Unum Life Ins. Co. of Am. Page 8

That reckless driving has been widely understood to be an illegal act for which one can be 

punished by law furthers our assessment that this conduct amounts to a “crime.”

To sum up, Tymoc’s reckless driving triggered the crime exclusion in his Unum life 

insurance policy. As a result, there was no coverage for Tymoc under the policy’s accidental 

death provision.

C. Fulkerson resists our conclusion on three grounds: textual, precedential, and 

prudential.

1. Start with Fulkerson’s arguments about the crime exclusion’s text. First and foremost, 

she contends that “crime” is ambiguous because it reasonably could be understood to mean only 

serious offenses, such as felonies. Contrast that conduct, she says, with reckless driving 

offenses, which, to her mind, are merely “traffic infractions” that an ordinary person may not 

understand to be crimes. Because the meaning of “crime” is therefore ambiguous, 

Fulkerson says, the crime exclusion “should be construed against the drafting party,” Unum. 

Wallace v. Oakwood Healthcare, Inc., 954 F.3d 879, 890 (6th Cir. 2020) (quoting Perez, 150 

F.3d at 557 n.7).

Fulkerson fails to recognize that crimes have long come in many shapes and 

sizes. Cf. Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 156–57 (1925) (tracing the felonymisdemeanor distinction to English common law). While some acts may fairly be considered 

more severe than others, “crime” nonetheless encompasses a wide spectrum of conduct. On one 

end is conduct that amounts to “a gross violation of law” or a “grave offense especially against 

morality.” Crime, Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary (last visited June 2, 2022). On the 

other end is a “misdemeanor,” “a crime” that is “less serious than a felony.” Misdemeanor, 

Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary (last visited June 2, 2022); see also Misdemeanor, 

American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language 1125 (5th ed. 2011) (“A criminal offense 

that is less serious than a felony and generally punishable by a fine, a jail term of up to a year, or 

both.”). At bottom, crime is a binary term—the law either punishes conduct or it does not. And 

although reckless driving may be a less serious crime than, say, premeditated murder, that fact 

does not cast doubt on whether reckless driving is itself a crime.
No. 21-3367 Fulkerson v. Unum Life Ins. Co. of Am. Page 9

Fulkerson offers an additional text-based argument. She insists that reading “crime” in a 

broad manner will render other policy exclusions “superfluous.” Here, she points to separate 

policy exclusions for “active participation in a riot,” “the use of any prescription or nonprescription drug . . . unless used according to the prescription or direction of [a] physician,” and 

“being intoxicated.” But even accepting Fulkerson’s reading of the policy, we do not see how 

occasional overlap in its various exclusions renders the crime exclusion superfluous. It is just as 

easy, if not more so, to imagine scenarios where one of these exclusions would apply while the 

crime exclusion would not. For example, an insured who succumbs to fatal liver damage 

because she accidentally took too many painkillers commits no crime. Nor does an individual 

who suffers a fatal fall while intoxicated. These examples and others help explain why the antisurplusage interpretive tool often remains in the toolbox when we consider an insurance policy 

rich with belt-and-suspenders language. See Santo’s Italian Café, LLC v. Acuity Ins. Co., 

15 F.4th 398, 405 (6th Cir. 2021); see also TMW Enters., Inc. v. Fed. Ins. Co., 619 F.3d 574, 578 

(6th Cir. 2010) (“[S]urplusage alone does not make an insurance policy ambiguous.” (cleaned 

up)).

2. Next, Fulkerson argues that a handful of our earlier cases support her reading of the 

crime exclusion.

One is American Family Life Assurance Co. v. Bilyeu, 921 F.2d 87 (6th Cir. 1990) (per 

curiam). There, we concluded that, under Kentucky law, the phrase “crime” in an insurance 

policy’s crime exclusion was ambiguous and, as a result, did not encompass drunk driving. Id.

at 89–90. Yet our opinion, which adopted the district court’s reasoning without explanation, 

does not address how the term “crime” would be interpreted through the lens of ERISA’s plain 

meaning analysis. Id. at 89. Likewise, to the extent Fulkerson reads American Family to say 

that the plain meaning of “crime” requires a criminally culpable mental state, Tymoc’s conduct 

is sufficient: Ohio’s reckless driving law requires “willful or wanton disregard of the safety of 

persons or property.” Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 4511.20 (West 2022).

Much the same is true for Auto Club Property-Casualty Insurance Co. v. B.T., 596 F. 

App’x 409 (6th Cir. 2015). Auto Club, it bears emphasizing, did not analyze whether the crime 

exclusion at issue there was ambiguous—the Supreme Court of Kentucky had already decided it 
No. 21-3367 Fulkerson v. Unum Life Ins. Co. of Am. Page 10

was. See id. at 413. And the underlying case Auto Club relied upon to find the crime exclusion 

ambiguous, Healthwise of Kentucky, Ltd. v. Anglin, 956 S.W.2d 213 (Ky. 1997), is decidedly 

unpersuasive. Tasked with determining whether an exclusion for “crime” encompasses losses 

suffered while drag racing in a public road, Healthwise began by acknowledging that “the 

average person would view [drag racing] as criminal.” Id. at 216. Yet for reasons largely left 

unsaid, Healthwise ultimately rejected the notion that “crime . . . should be defined as the 

ordinary person would use the word,” a far cry from the plain meaning interpretive 

practice ERISA demands. See Williams, 227 F.3d at 711 (“When interpreting ERISA plan 

provisions, . . . we interpret the provisions according to their plain meaning in an ordinary and 

popular sense.”).

Next up is Shelby County Health Care Corp. v. Majestic Star Casino, LLC Group Health 

Benefit Plan, 581 F.3d 355 (6th Cir. 2009). In Majestic Star, we held that an ERISA-covered 

insurance policy’s “illegal act” exclusion did not apply to the insured’s driving without a license 

and motor vehicle insurance. Id. at 362–63, 375. Yes, as Fulkerson emphasizes, we deemed the 

term “illegal act” as used in the policy exclusion to be ambiguous because “an illegal act could 

be limited to violations that result in a citation or rise to a certain level of wrongdoing or could 

encompass all acts contrary to law.” Id. at 370. In doing so, we compared the policy’s “illegal 

act” exclusion to a separate “criminal act” exclusion. Id. at 369. We concluded that “illegal act” 

can have multiple meanings, and we rejected the insurer’s position that “illegal act” 

unambiguously includes “any action that is contrary to law, even if such action is not 

criminal.” Id. Yet whether the broad term “illegal act” is ambiguous says little if anything about 

whether the narrower terms “criminal act” and “crime” are similarly ambiguous. Majestic Star, 

in other words, is not the North Star that guides today’s interpretive course.

3. Lastly, Fulkerson points us to several prudential concerns she says undermine today’s 

conclusion. One, she worries that reading the term crime to include misdemeanor traffic 

offenses will result in the denial of coverage to anyone who commits “any illegal act subject to 

any type of punishment.” In making this charge, however, Fulkerson overlooks the causation 

aspect of the crime exclusion. Recall that the exclusion applies only when an insured’s 

accidental death or dismemberment was “caused by, contributed to by, or result[ed] from” those 
No. 21-3367 Fulkerson v. Unum Life Ins. Co. of Am. Page 11

infractions. And a non-jailable misdemeanor traffic infraction or other minor offense, even if it 

falls within the plain meaning of crime, often would pose little risk of causing the insured’s 

death.

Two, Fulkerson worries that reading “crime” in broad fashion may lead to purportedly 

unfair results where an insurer invokes the crime exclusion for jaywalking, de minimis speeding, 

so-called blue laws, or other readily enacted yet seldomly enforced offenses. That is a fair point. 

But it is a point for another day. We do not purport to be resolving every possible application of 

the crime exclusion. If, for instance, “an administrator were to extend the meaning of ‘crime’ to 

cover driving 56 miles per hour in a 55-mile-per-hour zone,” “the reasonableness of that 

position” can be resolved in due course. Boyer, 993 F.3d at 583. To that end, our holding is 

narrow: the plain and ordinary meaning of crime includes reckless driving.

* * * * *

We reverse in part the judgment of the district court. Unum is entitled to judgment in its 

favor as to the applicability of the crime exclusion.