FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL

STATE OF FLORIDA

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No. 1D17-2828

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WILLIAM THOMASON,

Appellant,

v.

STATE OF FLORIDA,

Appellee.

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On appeal from the Circuit Court for Okaloosa County.

John T. Brown, Judge.

April 29, 2019

ROBERTS, J.

Following his conviction and life sentence for the murder of 

his infant daughter, the appellant raises two issues on appeal. 

First, he argues the trial court erred in denying his motion to 

suppress statements he made to law enforcement before and after 

his arrest. Second, he argues the trial court erred in denying his 

motion for mistrial. We find no reversible error and affirm.

Facts

Around noon on September 13, 2013, the appellant’s girlfriend 

left their almost two-month-old daughter alone in the appellant’s 

care. According to the girlfriend, the child was in good health when 

she left. When she returned around four p.m., the child was limp
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and unresponsive with signs of seizure activity. The child was 

rushed to the hospital where she was eventually diagnosed with a 

subdural hemorrhage hematoma – a severe brain injury – caused 

by non-accidental trauma. The child was declared brain dead and 

died three days later.

At around seven p.m. on September 13, law enforcement 

arrived at the appellant’s residence to question him. The appellant 

consented to a search of the home and told law enforcement that 

he did not know what happened to the child. The appellant agreed 

to go to the Sheriff’s Criminal Investigations Division Office (the 

CID) for further questioning. He opted to ride with the 

investigators instead of following in his own car. At around ten 

p.m., an investigator and a sergeant conducted a recorded 

interview with the appellant. They began by telling the appellant 

he was not under arrest, he was free to leave at any time, and he 

could end the interview any time he felt uncomfortable. The 

appellant stated he was “absolutely” there of his own free will. The 

investigator reiterated that the appellant could end the interview 

at any time, and the appellant said, “Okay.” The appellant 

hypothesized that the child’s injuries could have been caused by 

his dog. The sergeant debunked this theory and hypothesized how 

the child could have been unintentionally injured by the appellant. 

The appellant said it seemed like he was being accused and, if he 

was, he would rather have a lawyer present. The investigator 

denied the appellant was being accused. The appellant said he 

would rather be with his daughter and had told them all he knew. 

The investigator and sergeant continued to theorize how the child 

could have been injured. The appellant stated he had “been 

through the system” and had the “vibe” as to where the interview 

was going. The investigator reiterated that the appellant was not 

under arrest and that the only reason he was being interviewed 

was because he was alone with the child. The appellant said, 

“Man, I got to get out of here. I can’t do this.” The investigator 

asked if the appellant wanted a drink, to which the appellant 

replied it was eleven p.m., he was done “just for right now,” and he 

could not talk anymore. The interview was concluded. 

Department of Children and Families (DCF) investigators 

then came in to conduct an additional interview with the 
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appellant. Around midnight, the investigator drove the appellant 

home. 

The next day, the appellant was arrested for the murder of his 

daughter. The same investigator conducted another recorded 

interview with the appellant at the jail. The investigator read the 

appellant his Miranda1 rights, which he indicated he understood

and continued talking.

Motion to Suppress

The appellant moved to suppress his statements made on 

September 13 and 14. A hearing on the motion was held, during 

which the investigator testified that on September 13, the 

appellant was free to leave, voluntarily rode with them to the CID, 

and was free to use his cellphone during the entire interview. The 

sergeant testified the CID interview room door was locked because 

it was after-hours. It could be opened from the inside by pushing 

a button. The investigator testified he did not read the appellant 

his Miranda rights because the appellant was free to leave. The 

investigator acknowledged the appellant’s statement about a 

lawyer, but stated the appellant did not ask to terminate the 

interview at that time and kept talking voluntarily. While he did 

accompany the appellant to the restroom, he only did so to show 

him where it was. When the appellant said he was done talking, 

the investigator ended the interview. The investigator testified he 

gave the appellant a ride home, which was recorded. He seized the 

appellant’s cellphone, but kept it in evidence storage and did not 

search it until obtaining a search warrant on September 19. 

The appellant’s motion to suppress was denied in relevant 

part.2 The trial court also granted the appellant’s motion in limine 

 1 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).

2 The trial court’s denial of the portion of the motion seeking 

to suppress evidence collected from the appellant’s cellphone is not 

challenged on appeal. The appellant’s motion also sought to 

suppress statements made during the DCF interview. The trial 

court granted that portion of the motion. 
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to prohibit any reference to the appellant’s potential drug use 

during trial.

Jury Trial

The appellant proceeded to a jury trial wherein the recorded 

September 13 interviews from the appellant’s home and the CID 

and the September 14 jail interview were admitted into evidence 

during the investigator’s testimony.

During the September 14 interview, the appellant was talking 

about the DCF interview and stated, “I was just straight up with 

them. I told them I wasn’t going to take a drug test[.]” Defense 

counsel objected that that statement should have been redacted 

and moved for a mistrial. Defense counsel argued there was no 

way to cure the error particularly because the appellant had 

previously stated he did not “black out” when caring for the child. 

Regardless of whether the State had a theory of drug use or not, 

defense counsel argued the statement made any defense 

unbelievable because the jury could believe the appellant was 

under the influence of drugs and hurt the child. Counsel rejected a 

curative instruction because it would be inadequate and only 

highlight the error. The State responded that the error was not so 

prejudicial so as to vitiate the entire trial because its theory was 

that the appellant planned to harm the child, which it later 

attempted to prove by evidence of internet searches on shaken 

baby syndrome that the appellant had conducted before the child’s 

death. The trial court denied the motion for mistrial and ordered 

the statement redacted in the transcript. 

The jury found the appellant guilty of first-degree felony 

murder, and he was sentenced to life in prison without the 

possibility of parole.

Motion to Suppress

The appellant first challenges the denial of his motion to 

suppress statements made during the September 13 CID interview 

and the September 14 jail interview. We review the trial court’s 

denial of the motion to suppress under a mixed standard with the 

ultimate ruling reviewed de novo, but the factual findings on which 
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the ruling is based are reviewed for competent, substantial 

evidence. Duke v. State, 255 So. 3d 478, 481 (Fla. 1st DCA 2018).

September 13 CID Interview

The appellant argues the trial court erred in not suppressing 

this interview because he was not Mirandized and the interview 

was clearly custodial in nature. Generally, law enforcement 

officers must administer Miranda warnings before conducting a 

“custodial interrogation.” Pierce v. State, 221 So. 3d 1218, 1220-21 

(Fla. 1st DCA 2017). What took place at the CID was an 

interrogation. See State v. McAdams, 193 So. 3d 824, 833 (Fla. 

2016) (defining interrogation as “when a state agent asks 

questions or engages in actions that a reasonable person would 

conclude are intended to lead to an incriminating response”). 

Thus, for the appellant’s pre-Miranda statements to be admissible 

in this context, the appellant must not have been “in custody.” The 

trial court determined the appellant was not in custody at the CID. 

As pointed out in McAdams, “while precedent remains a guide, 

custody determinations are heavily fact dependent.” 193 So. 3d at 

833 (citing Rigterink v. State, 2 So. 3d 221, 246 (Fla. 2009)).

The test for whether a suspect is in custody is whether “based 

on the totality of the circumstances, a reasonable person would feel 

that his freedom of movement has been restricted to a degree 

associated with actual arrest.” Myers v. State, 211 So. 3d 962, 972

(Fla. 2017) (citing Caldwell v. State, 41 So. 3d 188 (Fla. 2010)). In 

applying the test, courts have relied on the four factors articulated 

in Ramirez v. State, 739 So. 2d 568, 574 (Fla. 1999):

(1) the manner in which police summon the suspect for 

questioning; (2) the purpose, place, and manner of the 

interrogation; (3) the extent to which the suspect is 

confronted with evidence of his or her guilt; [and] (4) 

whether the suspect is informed that he or she is free to 

leave the place of questioning.

“This is a conjunctive test, so no factor is solely determinative of 

whether [a defendant] was in custody for Miranda purposes.” 

Myers, 211 So. 3d at 974. Myers elaborated on the proper analysis, 

stating;
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Although the four Ramirez factors frame our analysis, 

“the ultimate inquiry is twofold: (1) the ‘circumstances 

surrounding the interrogation;’ and (2) ‘given those 

circumstances, would a reasonable person have felt he or 

she was not at liberty to terminate the interrogation and 

leave.’” [Ross v. State, 45 So. 3d 403, 415 (Fla. 2010)] 

(quoting Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 663 

(2004)).

Myers, 211 So. 3d at 973. 

1. The Manner in which Law Enforcement

Summoned the Appellant for Questioning

The investigator’s testimony established the appellant agreed 

to go to the CID for further questioning and voluntarily accepted a 

ride with the investigator. Factor one does not support a 

conclusion that the appellant was in custody.

2. The Purpose, Place, and Manner of the Interrogation

The appellant voluntarily walked through the security doors

at the CID. As it was after hours, the CID door was locked. 

However, the sergeant testified the door could be opened by 

pressing a button inside the room. While questioning occurred at 

the CID, that factor alone is not determinative that the appellant 

was in custody. See Wilson v. State, 242 So. 3d 484, 493 (Fla. 2d 

DCA 2018). 

At the outset of the interview, the appellant was repeatedly 

told he was free to leave and could end questioning at any time he 

felt uncomfortable. The appellant acknowledged he was there of 

his own free will. The appellant was also able to use his cellphone 

freely. 

Investigators did emphasize that they needed to speak to the 

appellant, but they characterized it as needing to find out what 

happened to the child, so the doctors could provide the correct 

medical care. While the investigators rejected the appellant’s 

hypothesis that his dog could have harmed the child, they did not 
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outright claim the appellant was the one who harmed the child. 

Cf. Myers, 211 So. 3d at 976 (finding factor two supported a custody 

determination where investigators used language like, “I need to 

know why you felt the necessity to plot and plan to have your 

husband being murdered at your son’s hands,” and told the 

appellant she was lying before she could respond). The

investigators couched their questioning in terms of needing to find 

out what happened to the child so that the child could get 

appropriate medical care. The appellant asked if they wanted him 

to just admit that he “football kicked” the child to get the interview 

over with, to which the investigator said he did not want him to 

say that, he just wanted the truth. 

While the questioning could be interpreted otherwise, the trial 

court reviewed the recorded interviews as part of ruling on the 

motion to suppress. The trial court’s ruling is reviewed with 

deference on appeal. Schoenwetter v. State, 931 So. 2d 857, 866 

(Fla. 2006) (“A trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress comes 

to the appellate court clothed with a presumption of correctness 

and the court must interpret the evidence and reasonable 

inferences and deductions derived therefrom in a manner most 

favorable to sustaining the trial court’s ruling.”) (citation omitted). 

See also Myers, 211 So. 3d at 966 (noting the Fifth District did not 

afford the proper deference to the trial court’s findings). Factor

two does not support a conclusion that the appellant was in 

custody.

3. The Extent to which the Appellant was 

Confronted with Evidence of his Guilt

The investigators kept pressing the appellant to tell the truth 

to help the child. The investigators did confront the appellant with 

pictures of the child and told the appellant she was in serious 

condition. Again, they couched this in terms of needing to know 

what happened so that they could make the child better. At one 

point, the sergeant told the appellant someone had grabbed the 

child by the leg and it was the appellant. The appellant said he 

could have grabbed the child’s leg, and the investigator asked if he 

could have been trying to prevent her from falling. While this line 

of questioning is suggestive of the appellant’s guilt, it was not so 

confrontational as to outright accuse the appellant of harming the 
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child to the extent of causing brain damage. The appellant then 

stated he felt like he was being accused. The investigators denied 

that he was and attempted to rescue the interview. From that 

point forward, the appellant was less forthcoming, but he did 

continue to speak freely to the investigators. Factor three does not 

support the conclusion that the appellant was in custody.

4. Whether the Appellant was Free to Leave

The appellant was repeatedly told he was not under arrest 

and was free to leave. The appellant was never handcuffed. The 

appellant stated he agreed that he wanted to find out what 

happened to the child and that he was “on the team.” Eventually 

he stated could not continue the interview. After that point, the 

interview concluded, and the investigator drove the appellant 

home. Unlike Myers, the appellant was not perfunctorily told he 

was “free to leave” and then aggressively confronted with his guilt. 

211 So. 2d at 980. The investigators questioned the appellant with 

the stated intent of finding out what happened, not to immediately 

pressure the appellant to incriminate himself. Factor four does not 

support the conclusion that the appellant was in custody.

Under the totality of the circumstances, the trial court 

properly concluded the appellant was not in custody at the time of 

his pre-Miranda statements; therefore, those statements were 

admissible, and suppression of his September 13 CID interview 

was properly denied. 

September 14 Jail Interview

The appellant argues that his September 14 jail interview 

should have been suppressed because his invocation of the right to 

an attorney on September 13 cut off the investigators’ right to 

reinitiate questioning. He argues any waiver of his Miranda rights 

at the outset of the September 14 interview was ineffective. 

Toward the end of his September 13 CID interview, the 

appellant stated, “If I’m being accused of something, I’d rather 

have a lawyer present with me . . . if you’re going to ask me 

anything else.” The trial court found, and the appellant concedes, 

that this was an equivocal request for a lawyer. The appellant 
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argues, however, because he had not waived his Miranda rights 

when he made the equivocal request on September 13, questioning 

should have been terminated, and the fact that the appellant 

waived Miranda on September 14 is irrelevant. 

As aforementioned, the investigators were not required to 

Mirandize the appellant on September 13 because he was not in 

custody. See Caldwell, 41 So. 3d at 198-99 (“We emphasize that 

Miranda warnings are not required in any police encounter in 

which the suspect is not placed under arrest or otherwise in 

custody under Ramirez.”). As the appellant was not in custody, the 

investigators could have continued questioning him even if he 

requested a lawyer. Id. at 198 (“In a noncustodial setting, officers 

are not required to discontinue questioning when a suspect 

indicates that he wishes to exercise his right to remain silent, nor 

are they required to provide a lawyer on the suspect’s request.”). 

Nonetheless, the appellant requested to end the interview, and the 

interview was concluded on September 13.

When the investigator questioned the appellant again the 

next day, he was not reinitiating prohibited questioning because 

the appellant had not had his Miranda rights violated the day 

before. The appellant relies on Traylor v. State, to argue his

equivocal request for an attorney when he was not Mirandized cut 

off the right to reinitiate questioning. 596 So. 2d 957, 966 (Fla. 

1992). However, Traylor is not applicable here because the 

appellant was not in custody on September 13; therefore, he did 

not have any Miranda rights to invoke. The appellant’s equivocal 

request for a lawyer on September 13 did not trigger any rights 

because it had no legal significance as he was not in custody.

The appellant was clearly in custody on September 14. He 

was properly Mirandized at the outset of the interrogation, and he 

waived his Miranda rights. Nothing that transpired during the 

September 13 interview had a bearing on this waiver. Suppression 

of his September 14 statements was properly denied.

Motion for Mistrial

The appellant’s second argument on appeal is that the trial 

court erred in denying his motion for mistrial. This Court reviews 
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a trial court’s ruling on a motion for mistrial under the abuse of 

discretion standard. Morris v. State, 219 So. 3d 33, 44 (Fla. 2017) 

(citing Salazar v. State, 991 So. 2d 364, 371 (Fla. 2008)). A motion 

for mistrial should only be granted when the error is so prejudicial 

as to vitiate the entire trial. Morris, 219 So. 3d at 44 (citing 

England v. State, 940 So. 2d 389, 401-02 (Fla. 2006)). 

The statement about the drug test was very brief in the 

context of a long interview. The State’s case was not that the 

appellant killed the child while under the influence of drugs. 

Rather, the State claimed that the appellant, based on his internet 

searches, planned to harm the child. Given that the case was not 

about drug use, it is unlikely that the statement had much effect 

on the jury’s verdict. While the statement could implicate the 

appellant’s character, the trial did not turn on the appellant’s 

character. There was medical evidence of the child’s injuries, the 

undisputed fact that the child was fine before she was left alone in

the appellant’s care, and evidence of the appellant’s internet 

searches related to shaken baby syndrome as well as the 

appellant’s own statements. Given this evidence, it is unlikely that 

the brief statement about refusing to take a drug test was so 

prejudicial as to vitiate the entire trial. We find the trial court did 

not abuse its discretion in denying the motion for mistrial.

Conclusion

For the reasons stated above, the appellant’s judgment and 

sentence are AFFIRMED.

B.L. THOMAS, C.J., and OSTERHAUS, J., concur.

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Not final until disposition of any timely and 

authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or 

9.331.

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Andy Thomas, Public Defender, Tallahassee; Terry P. Roberts, 

Special Assistant Public Defender, Law Office of Terry P. Roberts, 

Tallahassee, for Appellant.

Ashley Moody, Attorney General, and Steven Edward Woods, 

Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.