Filed 1/30/23 P. v. Barrera CA5

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for 

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or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

BRENDA ESTEFANIA BARRERA,

Defendant and Appellant.

F080953

(Super. Ct. No. CRF46999 )

OPINION

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Tuolumne County. James A. 

Boscoe, Judge.

Ortiz Law Group and Jesse Soto Ortiz for Defendant and Appellant.

Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney 

General, Michael P. Farrell, Assistant Attorney General, Louis M. Vasquez, Amanda D. 

Cary and Lewis A. Martinez, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

-ooOooBrenda Estefania Barrera crashed a car into incoming traffic, killing one person 

and significantly injuring three others. A short while later, officers investigating the 

crash believed Barrera was under the influence of drugs. She was arrested and later 

charged with murder and related crimes. A jury convicted her as charged.
2.

On appeal, Barrera raises six claims. One, was the evidence sufficient to prove the 

convictions? Two, did the court properly admit evidence regarding Barrera’s prior drug 

use? Three, did the court properly remove a juror after the trial started? Four, was an 

expert witness’s testimony properly admitted? Five, did the court err in permitting the 

prosecution’s rebuttal evidence over an objection pursuant to Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 

384 U.S. 436 (Miranda)? Six, are any errors cumulatively prejudicial?

We find no prejudicial error. The judgment is affirmed.

BACKGROUND

Charges

The Tuolumne County District Attorney charged Barrera with four crimes: murder 

(Pen. Code,1 § 187; Count I), gross vehicular manslaughter while intoxicated (§ 191.5;

Count II), driving while intoxicated and causing injury (Veh. Code, § 23153, subd. (e);

Count III), and driving with a suspended driver’s license (Veh. Code, § 14601.4, 

subd. (a); Count IV). Count III included enhancements for causing great bodily injury 

(§ 12022.7, subds. (a) & (c)). 

Trial Evidence

On April 21, 2015, a driver called 911 to report an “erratic” driver. Another driver 

told his wife to call 911 for the same reason. He believed the driver was “ ‘going to kill 

somebody ....’ ” 

A third driver activated a camera after witnessing another car “go” off “the road” 

and it “didn’t look right.” On the video, the driver states, “[Y]ou’ve got to be kidding 

me” because it “looked like [the other car] was going to pass on [the] side of the 

road ....” Instead, the car went “from the right-hand side” “into [] oncoming traffic” and 

collided with another vehicle. In the other car, one person died and three others suffered 

serious injuries.

1 All statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise stated. 
3.

A law enforcement officer responded to the “head-on collision,” determined 

Barrera was driving the car, and caused the collision by “fail[ing] stay on the right half of 

the roadway.” The officer believed Barrera was “driving under the influence of alcohol 

or drugs” based on “multiple witness[es] saying that she was driving very erratically, the 

[collision] itself, and [her] objective symptoms ....”2 

A second law enforcement officer performed a “drug recognition evaluation” on 

Barrera. It is a “12-step process” designed to “determine ... whether or not the individual 

has an impairment or shows impairment, ... whether that impairment is [] medical-related 

or [] drug-related[,] [a]nd, ... if drug-related, ... what drug category [] is” involved. 

The drug recognition evaluation revealed the following facts: Barrera’s “speech 

was slow and mumbled,” she was “lethargic,” her coordination was “[s]low,” her eyes 

were “bloodshot,” “[h]er eyelids appeared droopy,” her pulse was “above normal,” her 

eyes exhibited “nystagmus,”3 and her tongue had “a brown coating ... and a couple of 

heat bumps ....” Barrera’s tongue was consistent with “recent ingestion or smoking,” 

especially “smoking something out of glass.” The officer believed Barrera was “under 

the active influence of a central nervous system depressant or ... marijuana.” Barrera’s 

blood was drawn for testing. 

Later, Barrera’s purse was searched, revealing “two black containers that had an 

odor of marijuana emitting from them” and “a glass smoking tip ....” Barrera stated she 

used the glass “to smoke blunts ....” 

2 Yet another driver reported witnessing Barrera veering off the road either “three 

or four times” or “eight to ten times ....” The objective signs included “bloodshot eyes 

and slow and heavy speech.” Barrera also exhibited “nystagmus,” discussed in greater

detail post. Nystagmus indicated “it’s possible that she[ was] under the influence of 

alcohol or some type of depressant ....” 

3 Nystagmus is “involuntary jerking of the eye[s].” Nystagmus is “sort of an 

indicator of alcohol in the body or drugs, like depressants and things like that.” 
4.

An expert witness tested Barrera’s drawn blood and explained it was consistent 

with consuming “alprazolam”4 and marijuana. The test could not establish “how much” 

or “when” the substances were consumed. Alprazolam is “a central nervous system 

depressant.” The expert believed a hypothetical person similar to Barrera, based on “bad 

driving pattern,” objective “signs and symptoms,” and blood test results, was “consistent 

with being ... under the influence and impaired with ... alprazolam and marijuana.” The 

expert acknowledged many of Barrera’s signs and symptoms were consistent with 

fatigue, but added using marijuana or alprazolam while tired would only amplify fatigue. 

Barrera testified she was previously arrested for and charged with driving under 

the influence. She later pled “guilty.” Prior to the collision in this case, she was “tired, 

rushing, trying to pass cars.” She did not consume alprazolam but did smoke “[b]etween 

three and four” “blunts” the night before the collision.5 She was not impaired by either 

alprazolam or marijuana, but had taken alprazolam “in the past ....” 

Verdict and Sentence

The jury found Barrera guilty of murder and driving while intoxicated and causing 

injury (Counts I and III). The great bodily injury enhancements were found true. The 

jury found her not guilty of gross vehicular manslaughter while intoxicated (Count II).6 

Barrera previously admitted to driving with a suspended license.7 She was sentenced to 

serve 28 years to life in prison.

4 Alprazolam is commonly known as Xanax. 

5 The collision occurred around 10:00 a.m. 

6 The jury was instructed to find Barrera not guilty in Count II if it found her 

guilty in Count I. 

7 The record is imperfect on this point. In our prior opinion, we noted, “[p]rior to 

trial, Barrera admitted” to Count IV. (People v. Barrera (Jan. 9, 2019, F074032) 

[nonpub. opn.].)
5.

DISCUSSION

This appeal presents six questions. Did the evidence sufficiently prove Barrera 

committed either crime? Did the court err in admitting evidence Barrera habitually used 

marijuana and previously used alprazolam? Did the court err in dismissing a juror after 

the parties presented opening statements? Did the court err in allowing the expert witness 

to testify about nystagmus testing? Did the court err in permitting certain impeachment 

evidence, namely evidence taken in violation of Barrera’s right against selfincrimination? Are any errors, if not individually prejudicial, cumulatively prejudicial? 

We find no reason to reverse the judgment.

I. The Evidence Sufficiently Proved Each Crime

In challenging the convictions, Barrera claims the evidence insufficiently proved 

“she was under the influence.”8 The People assert “[s]he is incorrect.” We find the 

evidence sufficient to prove Barrera was under the influence.

“Upon a challenge to the sufficiency of evidence for a jury finding, we 

‘ “ ‘ “review the whole record in the light most favorable to the judgment below to 

determine whether it discloses substantial evidence — that is, evidence which is 

reasonable, credible, and of solid value — such that a reasonable trier of fact could find 

the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” ’ ” ’ ” (People v. Rivera (2019) 

7 Cal.5th 306, 323.) “We presume in support of the judgment the existence of every fact 

the trier of fact reasonably could infer from the evidence. [Citation.] If the 

circumstances reasonably justify the trier of fact’s findings, reversal of the judgment is 

not warranted simply because the circumstances might also reasonably be reconciled with 

a contrary finding. [Citation.] A reviewing court neither reweighs evidence nor 

reevaluates a witness’s credibility.” (People v. Lindberg (2008) 45 Cal.4th 1, 27

(Lindberg).)

8 We confine our analysis to this point.
6.

The following facts prove the jury could justifiably find Barrera guilty beyond a 

reasonable doubt. Barrera admitted to smoking marijuana prior to the collision, albeit 

significantly before the collision. Three witnesses trained in evaluating signs and 

symptoms related to driving under the influence believed Barrera was under the 

influence. Barrera’s tongue indicated she recently consumed marijuana. Indeed, she 

possessed empty containers9 and paraphernalia consistent with recently consuming 

marijuana. Her blood tested positive for consuming marijuana and alprazolam.

Three eyewitnesses were concerned with Barrera’s ability to drive a car. Two 

called 911 and the other activated a video camera. One eyewitness believed Barrera was 

“ ‘going to kill somebody’ ” and another audibly gasps, “You’ve got to be kidding me,” 

in reference to Barrera’s inability to safely operate the car. Barrera then inexplicably 

crosses into oncoming traffic and slams into another car. Although she may have been 

tired, the expert explained consuming marijuana or alprazolam while tired only makes it 

worse. In other words, even if Barrera was tired, marijuana and alprazolam still impaired 

her ability to drive a car.

For all these reasons, the jury was entitled to find Barrera guilty of both crimes.10 

We reject the insufficient evidence claim.

II. Prior Drug Use Evidence

Barrera claims the court violated Evidence Code section 1101, subdivision (a), by 

admitting two statements from a third party about Barrera’s drug-use history. 

Specifically, one statement was that Barrera “smoked [marijuana] whenever she can get 

her hands on it.” The other statement was that Barrera “had used [alprazolam] ... in the 

past ....” 

9 As noted, these containers “had an odor of marijuana emitting from them.”

10 Barrera claims much of the evidence “was impeached, inherently improbable, 

conflicting and inherently suspect.” We disagree with these contentions. (Lindberg, 

supra, 45 Cal.4th at p. 27.)
7.

The People argue the marijuana statement was properly admitted and the 

alprazolam statement was not prejudicial.11 We agree.

A. Additional Background

Prior to trial, Barrera moved to exclude a third party’s statements about Barrera’s 

marijuana and alprazolam use.12 The motion was based on Evidence Code section 1101, 

subdivision (a). Barrera’s counsel argued the marijuana evidence was offered to show 

“Barrera smokes marijuana every day and, therefore, this jury should conclude that she 

smoked it on” the collision date. 

As for alprazolam, counsel argued, “it’s pure speculation. We don’t know what 

the source of that information is.” 

The People countered both statements were “relevant.” Relative to alprazolam, 

the People argued the statement was relevant to voluntary versus involuntary ingestion. 

The court ruled, “So with respect to the marijuana use, I think I’m going to allow 

that. I’ll deny your 1101 motion. I’ll find it’s permissible as evidence of habit, but 

pursuant to Evidence [c]ode [section] 1105.” The court reserved ruling on alprazolam. 

The following morning, the court ruled, “[W]e don’t know the source of [the 

alprazolam] information. ... [¶] The jury can draw whatever inference it wants about ... 

the source of the information, but I’m going to allow” the testimony. 

B. Analysis

We agree the marijuana statement was admissible as habit evidence. We disagree 

the alprazolam statement was admissible.

11 The People also claim Barrera forfeited this point by “fail[ing] to properly argue 

it in” her brief. We would ordinarily agree but believe it is important to nonetheless 

address the issue on the merits.

12 The third party is Barrera’s “son’s father.” 
8.

i. Marijuana

Evidence Code section 1105 states “[a]ny otherwise admissible evidence of habit 

or custom is admissible to prove conduct on a specified occasion in conformity with the 

habit or custom.” “ ‘[A] habit involves a consistent, semiautomatic response to a 

repeated situation.’ ” (Briley v. City of West Covina (2021) 66 Cal.App.5th 119, 138.) 

“The determination whether habit evidence is admissible rests in the sound discretion of 

the trial court.” (People v. Johnson (2019) 8 Cal.5th 475, 518.) “We consider 

the correctness of the trial court’s ruling at the time it was made.” (People v. 

Farley (2009) 46 Cal.4th 1053, 1082; People v. Avila (2004) 117 Cal.App.4th 771, 780, 

fn. 4.)

We discern no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s ruling. The statement 

Barrera uses marijuana whenever she can was admissible because it was supported by 

evidence she had recently consumed marijuana prior to the collision. At the time the 

court ruled, it knew the evidence indicated a blood test consistent with marijuana, 

containers and paraphernalia consistent with recent marijuana use, her tongue appeared 

consistent with recent use, and Barrera admitted she “smoked marijuana for the last seven 

years ....”13 Accordingly, the court’s ruling to admit the evidence was not patently 

unreasonable. Barrera’s argument fails.

ii. Alprazolam

The People make no attempt to defend the court’s ruling on the alprazolam 

statement. Indeed, the People acknowledge the court’s stated reasoning was incorrect. 

We agree the court was incorrect but the error was harmless.

“Sometimes the relevance of evidence depends on the existence of a preliminary 

fact.” (People v. Lucas (1995) 12 Cal.4th 415, 466 (Lucas); Evid. Code, § 403.) “The 

13 This statement was uttered in the jail “during the booking process[.]”
9.

decision whether the foundational evidence is sufficiently substantial is a matter within 

the court’s discretion.” (Lucas, supra, 12 Cal.4th at p. 466.)

Here, the missing link is how the witness knew Barrera previously used 

alprazolam. If it was neither a personal observation nor an admission, the evidence is 

inadmissible. But there is no answer in the record. The court acknowledged as much in 

stating, “[W]e don’t know the source of [the] information.” The court should have 

excluded the evidence at this point but instead ruled “[t]he jury can draw whatever 

inference it wants about ... the source of the information ....” This is clear error.

Nonetheless, “ ‘[w]hen evidence is erroneously admitted, we do not reverse a 

conviction unless it is reasonably probable that a result more favorable to the defendant 

would have occurred absent the error.’ ” (People v. Young (2019) 7 Cal.5th 905, 931.) 

This standard is not met.

There was no argument in this case Barrera did not know about alprazolam. In 

fact, she testified she used alprazolam “in the past ....” There is no reason to believe her 

blood tested positive for alprazolam because it was involuntarily ingested.14 For these 

reasons, there is no possibility Barrera would have achieved a more favorable result 

absent other evidence she had previously used alprazolam. The court’s error was not 

prejudicial.

III. The Juror Was Properly Dismissed

Barrera argues “the trial court erred by improperly discharging a juror ....” The 

People oppose. We conclude the court did not err.

14 We have considered the possibility Barrera testified she previously used 

alprazolam in response to the court’s ruling to admit other evidence of that fact. We 

consider that possibility remote. In arguing to exclude this evidence, Barrera’s counsel 

acknowledged, “There is no defense that she didn’t know what [alprazolam] was. It’s in 

her blood. It’s there.” 
10.

A. Additional Background

After the parties delivered opening statements, a juror announced, “I need to speak 

to you.” The court subsequently held a hearing “in chambers outside the presence of the 

jury.” The juror revealed that “close family members ... were in a major car accident 

based on distracted driving.” The juror “hadn’t made this connection” until after hearing 

opening statements. Nonetheless, the juror expressed, “I think maybe I can work through 

[this] based on the law.” 

The juror then explained, “I think I’ll be able to work through [this] and make the 

right choice, but it’s something that would weigh on me.” Barrera’s counsel asked the 

juror, “[Y]ou think that you might find Ms. Barrera guilty just because of her distracted 

driving and what happened to you, even though the [prosecutor] didn’t prove his case?”15 

The juror answered, “Right. And I think that’s where that – I – I’ll have to work through 

that. But I think that is – that’s a distinction I’ll be able to make.” The juror added, “But 

that’s where I feel like there might be a conflict, but I think I could be rational.” 

Finally, the judge asked the juror if “it would be more difficult” “to analyze the 

facts because of this experience ...?” The juror agreed. The judge followed up and 

asked if the juror could “[w]ithout hesitation” render a guilty or not guilty verdict. The 

juror responded, “Yes, I believe so.” 

The court ruled it was going to excuse the juror. The court stated the juror “was 

visibly upset” and exhibited “some pretty heavy concern” by coming forward to speak. 

B. Analysis

“The trial court may discharge a juror at any time if good cause exists to find that 

the juror is unable to perform his or her duty. (§ 1089.) ‘The trial court’s decision 

whether or not to discharge a juror under section 1089 is reviewed for abuse of discretion 

15 The opening statements are not reported in the record. It is reasonable to 

assume Barrera’s counsel suggested the collision was based on distracted driving.
11.

and will be upheld if supported by substantial evidence; to warrant discharge, 

the juror’s bias or other disability must appear in the record as a demonstrable reality.’ ” 

(People v. Lopez (2018) 5 Cal.5th 339, 365.)

“ ‘The demonstrable reality test ... requires a showing that the court as trier of 

fact did rely on evidence that, in light of the entire record, supports its conclusion that 

[good cause for removing the juror is] established. It is important to make clear that a 

reviewing court does not reweigh the evidence .... [T]he reviewing court must be 

confident that the trial court’s conclusion is manifestly supported by evidence on which 

the court actually relied. [¶] In reaching that conclusion, the reviewing panel will 

consider not just the evidence itself, but also the record of reasons the court provides.’ ” 

(People v. Armstrong (2016) 1 Cal.5th 432, 450–451.)

We take no issue with the court’s decision to remove the juror. The juror 

expressed emotional disturbance and hesitation in remaining impartial. The juror’s final 

answer—“Yes, I believe so.”—implies lingering hesitation. The court relied on this 

evidence to excuse the juror. The court’s reliance was not an abuse of discretion. 

(People v. Barton (2020) 56 Cal.App.5th 496, 508 [“Good cause exists to discharge 

a juror when the juror loses his or her ability to render a fair and impartial verdict based 

on the evidence presented at trial.”].) We reject Barrera’s complaint.16

IV. The Expert Witness Properly Testified About Nystagmus

An expert witness17 testified a subject’s position, i.e., standing, sitting, or lying 

down, is immaterial to accurately assessing nystagmus. Barrera believes the testimony 

violated Evidence Code section 801 because “it was outside the subject matter of [the 

expert’s] area of expertise.” 

16 The People address whether the juror intentionally withheld information. But 

Barrera makes no such claim.

17 The expert witness was John Paul Lopez, a senior criminalist with the 

Department of Justice. 
12.

The People claim the expert “was properly qualified to give” the testimony. We 

agree the expert was properly qualified.

A. Additional Background

The prosecutor asked the expert, “[W]hat effect does whether a person is standing, 

seated, or lying [down] have with the actual [nystagmus] test?” Barrera’s counsel 

objected and the court asked the prosecutor to establish “further foundation” for the 

expert’s experience. 

The expert subsequently explained, “[H]orizontal gaze nystagmus is just the 

ability of the eyes to smoothly go from left to right or up and down for vertical.” The 

expert’s experience relative to nystagmus included attending “drug recognition school” at 

the California Highway Patrol and another “course,” “witness[ing] people under the 

influence of various drugs” and “witnessing their” nystagmus “over 50 times,” and 

“classroom training on toxicology, pharmacology ....” 

The expert also read a “National Highway Transportation Safety Administration 

study” “[w]here they studied the robustness of the [nystagmus] test.” The test in the 

study “was modified ... where the person is sitting, standing, or laying [sic] down.” The 

expert then testified there is “no difference” in nystagmus test results based on the 

subject’s physical position. 

B. Analysis

“ ‘ “A person is qualified to testify as an expert if he [or she] has special 

knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education sufficient to qualify him [or her] as 

an expert on the subject to which his [or her] testimony relates.” [Citation.] An expert 

witness’s testimony in the form of an opinion is limited to a subject “that is sufficiently 

beyond common experience that the opinion of an expert would assist the trier of fact 

....” [Citation.]’ [Citation.] The witness’s qualifications may be established by his or 

her own testimony.” (People v. Fuiava (2012) 53 Cal.4th 622, 672; see Evid. Code, 

§§ 720 & 801.)
13.

“Error regarding a witness’s qualifications as an expert will be found only if the 

evidence shows that the witness ‘ “ ‘clearly lacks qualification as an expert.’ ” ’ ” 

(People v. Farnam (2002) 28 Cal.4th 107, 162.) “We ... evaluate the trial court’s 

decision to admit an expert’s evidence for abuse of discretion and ‘will not disturb a trial 

court’s admissibility ruling “ ‘except on a showing the trial court exercised its discretion 

in an arbitrary, capricious, or patently absurd manner that resulted in a manifest 

miscarriage of justice.’ ” ’ ” (People v. Parker (2022) 13 Cal.5th 1, 49 (Parker).)

The court here did not err in permitting the expert to testify about nystagmus 

testing because the expert did not clearly lack qualification. The expert testified to great 

familiarity and training with the nystagmus test including personally witnessing its 

administration on several occasions. Specifically, with respect to the opinion actually 

offered, the expert had read and understood a study on the precise topic at issue.

Notwithstanding Barrera’s objection, “ ‘ “ ‘ “ ‘[w]here a witness has disclosed 

sufficient knowledge of the subject to entitle his [or her] opinion to go to the jury, the 

question of the degree of his [or her] knowledge goes more to the weight of the evidence 

than to its admissibility.’ ” ’ ” ’ ” (Parker, supra, 13 Cal.5th at p. 49.) Accordingly, we 

reject Barrera’s argument the expert was unqualified to render the nystagmus testing 

opinion.18

18 Barrera also complains the expert was not qualified specifically “on the proper 

administration of the nystagmus tests.” Although attorneys often ask judges to deem 

witnesses experts in specific fields, there appears no such requirement in the law. A 

party feeling aggrieved by a witness’s opinion testimony is entitled to object to the 

witness’s qualifications and to move to strike an unfounded opinion. Here, Barrera did 

object to the witness’s qualifications and had the opportunity to challenge those 

qualifications.
14.

V. There Is No Miranda Error

Prior to the officer conducting the drug recognition evaluation, Barrera invoked 

her right to silence. The court excluded from evidence at trial all testimonial evidence 

gleaned from the evaluation.

Barrera “submits that her performance of the [d]rug [r]ecognition [e]valuation is 

indeed testimonial in nature” and should have been excluded in its entirety. The People 

disagree. As explained below, the court did not err in finding nontestimonial evidence 

admissible at trial.19

A. Additional Background

The officer testified he examined Barrera’s eyes and administered the 

“Romberg”20 test after Barrera invoked her right to silence. The court ruled, “Only the 

... Romberg would require some testimonial evaluation; so that would be excluded.” 

B. Analysis

“The Fifth Amendment does not bar the admission of ‘[v]olunteered statements of 

any kind’ [citation], nor those otherwise not resulting from interrogation. [Citation.] 

Nontestimonial responses by a suspect—even though made in the course of custodial 

interrogation—are not subject to the Miranda rule. [Citation.] The United States 

Supreme Court has drawn ‘a distinction between “testimonial” and “real or physical 

evidence” for purposes of the privilege against self-incrimination.’ [Citation.] Thus, a 

suspect may be compelled to provide a blood sample [citation]; participate in a lineup and 

19 The prosecution, in rebuttal during the trial, introduced the Romberg test results 

to impeach Barrera’s trial testimony. She does not appear to challenge this ruling. Were 

we to address it, we would find no error. (People v. Hoyt (2020) 8 Cal.5th 892, 936 

[“ ‘although statements elicited in violation of Miranda are generally not admissible, 

statements that are otherwise voluntarily made may be used to impeach the defendant’s 

trial testimony.’ ”].)

20 As relevant, the Romberg test involves asking a subject to “close their eyes 

and ... guess 30 seconds in [their] head.” 
15.

repeat a phrase provided by police [citation]; provide a handwriting exemplar [citation]; 

and read a transcript to provide a voice exemplar [citation].” (People v. Cooper (2019) 

37 Cal.App.5th 642, 650.) “[P]hysical observations made by police [are] nontestimonial 

and” do not violate the right to silence. (People v. Bejasa (2012) 205 Cal.App.4th 26, 

42.)

Here, the drug-recognition-evaluation officer, after Barrera invoked her right to 

silence, physically observed Barrera’s eyes and testified to his observations in connection 

with his training and experience. This testimony does not violate the right to silence.

VI. No Cumulative Error

There is no cumulative error because there are no errors to accumulate. (See 

People v. Mataele (2022) 13 Cal.5th 372, 422.)

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed.

SNAUFFER, J.

WE CONCUR:

DETJEN, Acting P. J.

PEÑA, J.