This decision of the New Mexico Court of Appeals was not selected for publication in 

the New Mexico Appellate Reports. Refer to Rule 12-405 NMRA for restrictions on the 

citation of unpublished decisions. Electronic decisions may contain computergenerated errors or other deviations from the official version filed by the Court of 

Appeals.

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO

No. A-1-CA-39933

MARICAR CASTRO,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

UNIVERSITY OF NEW MEXICO

MEDICAL GROUP,

Defendant-Appellee.

APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF BERNALILLO COUNTY

Daniel E. Ramczyk, District Court Judge

Gilpin Law Firm, LLC

Donald G. Gilpin

Christopher P. Machin

Albuquerque, NM

for Appellant

Garcia Law Group, LLC

Bryan C. Garcia

Meghan S. Nocholson

Andrew J. Deakyne

Albuquerque, NM

for Appellee

MEMORANDUM OPINION

BOGARDUS, Judge.

{1} Plaintiff Maricar Castro appeals the grant of summary judgment on her 

Whistleblower Protection Act (WPA) claim, NMSA 1978, Sections 10-16C-1 to -6 

(2010). The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Defendant University of 
New Mexico Medical Group after finding, as a matter of law, that Defendant was not 

subject to the WPA because of its status as a private, nonprofit corporation under the 

University Research Park and Economic Development Act (URPEDA), NMSA 1978, §§ 

21-28-1 to -25 (1989, as amended through 2022).1 On appeal, Plaintiff argues that the 

district court erroneously granted summary judgment because (1) a genuine issue of 

material fact exists as to whether Defendant was a public employer subject to the WPA 

and (2) the district court’s earlier denial of Defendant’s motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s WPA 

claim was law of the case.2 Plaintiff has failed to convince us of error and we therefore 

affirm.3

BACKGROUND

{2} Defendant employed Plaintiff as the chief radiation therapist at the UNM Cancer 

Center. Plaintiff claims she witnessed unsafe and unethical practices occurring in her 

department and reported them to a compliance hotline during a state audit, and to the 

executive director of human resources. Thereafter, Defendant discharged Plaintiff from 

her position, indicating that Plaintiff had violated internal policy and that her services 

were no longer needed. Plaintiff then filed a complaint seeking monetary damages 

under the WPA and common law wrongful discharge alleging that her termination 

constituted retaliation for reporting her concerns.

{3} Defendant filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that URPEDA provided university 

research park corporations immunity from both the WPA and wrongful discharge claims. 

The parties did not dispute at this stage, nor later during summary judgment, that 

Defendant is incorporated under URPEDA and is a university research park corporation.

{4} The district court granted Defendant’s motion to dismiss on the wrongful 

discharge claim, but denied the motion as to Plaintiff’s WPA claim. The district court did 

not provide reasoning in its order, but when it announced its decision in court indicated 

that the WPA could potentially apply to research park corporations incorporated under 

 

1Section 21-28-7 was amended during the pendency of this appeal. See § 21-28-7 (1998, amended 

2022). We apply the version in effect at the time of the events giving rise to this lawsuit. All citations to 

Section 21-28-7 in this opinion are to the 1998 version.

2Plaintiff also appeals the grant of a motion to dismiss her wrongful discharge claim. However, Plaintiff

conceded that the URPEDA immunized Defendant from wrongful discharge claims in her response to the 

motion to dismiss and at the hearing on that motion. See § 21-28-7(C) (“A research park corporation, its 

officers, directors and employees shall be granted immunity from liability for any tort as provided in the 

Tort Claims Act (TCA)[, NMSA 1978, §§ 41-4-1 to -30 (1976, as amended through 2020)].”) Considering 

this concession, Plaintiff cannot reasonably claim that she fairly invoked a ruling by the district court on 

this issue. See Premier Tr. of Nev., Inc. v. City of Albuquerque, 2021-NMCA-004, ¶ 30, 482 P.3d 1261

(“To preserve an issue for review on appeal, it must appear that the appellant fairly invoked a ruling of the 

trial court on the same grounds argued in the appellate court.” (alteration, internal quotation marks, and 

citation omitted)); see also Vigil v. Taintor, 2020-NMCA-037, ¶ 8, 472 P.3d 1220 (providing that “[w]e will 

not review arguments that were not preserved in the district court” and that we will not “consider as 

preserved arguments that are waived below” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). Accordingly, 

we decline to review this unpreserved argument. 

3The Court ordered that the parties provide supplemental briefing in this appeal and both parties timely 

complied. The briefs were considered along with those initially filed by the parties in resolving the issues 

presented on appeal.
the URPEDA because the WPA might not fall within the term “laws relating to 

personnel” as used by Section 21-28-7(A). Defendant unsuccessfully sought a writ of 

superintending control to our Supreme Court after the district court denied the motion to 

dismiss the WPA claim. Order, UNM Medical Group v. Butkus, S-1-SC-37662, (N.M. 

June 6, 2019).

{5} Defendant then filed two summary judgment motions directed to Plaintiff’s WPA

claim: one based on its URPEDA status as a private corporation and the other based on 

the legitimate business purpose of termination. In her response to Defendant’s motion 

for summary judgment based on its URPEDA status, Plaintiff admitted that Defendant is 

a private sector, nonprofit corporation incorporated under URPEDA and the Nonprofit 

Corporations Act, NMSA 1978, §§ 53-8-1 to -99 (1975, as amended through 2021). 

However, Plaintiff also argued that Defendant is a “public entity of UNM” and therefore 

subject to the WPA, even though Defendant is a nonprofit corporation.

{6} Without a hearing, the district court granted Defendant’s motion for summary 

judgment based on its URPEDA status and consequently determined Defendant’s other 

such motion to be moot. The district court found that there was no factual dispute that 

Defendant is a private, nonprofit corporation and that the “specific and plain language of 

the URPEDA makes clear that Plaintiff is not permitted to bring personnel claims 

against . . . Defendant which are available only against public entities.” Thus, the district 

court dismissed the WPA claim as a matter of law. Plaintiff appealed. 

DISCUSSION

I. The District Court Did Not Err In Concluding That There is no Genuine 

Issue Of Material Fact as to Whether Defendant was a Public Employer 

Subject To The WPA

{7} Plaintiff argues that the district court erred in determining that the plain language 

of the URPEDA precludes WPA claims and that a genuine dispute of material fact 

prevents the grant of summary judgment on this issue. Defendant responds that the 

district court correctly granted summary judgment because the plain language of the 

URPEDA precludes WPA claims, and there were otherwise no material issues of fact in 

dispute. Plaintiff has not persuaded us of error.

{8} We review de novo the district court’s grant of summary judgment, the language 

of the URPEDA and WPA, and the application of that language to the facts presented in 

this case. See Cox v. N.M. Dep’t of Pub. Safety, 2010-NMCA-096, ¶ 4, 148 N.M. 934,

242 P.3d 501 (observing that “[a]n appeal from the grant of a motion for summary 

judgment presents a question of law and is reviewed de novo” and “[t]he meaning of 

language used in a statute is a question of law that we review de novo” (internal 

quotation marks and citations omitted)). However, “it is the appellant’s burden to 

persuade us that the district court erred” because “there is a presumption of correctness 

in the rulings and decisions of the district court.” See Hall v. City of Carlsbad, 2023-

NMCA-042, ¶ 5, 531 P.3d 642 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). In 

granting summary judgment, the district court determined that “[t]he specific and plain 
language of the URPEDA makes clear that Plaintiff is not permitted to bring [WPA] 

claims against this Defendant which are available only against public entities.” We thus 

began our analysis by engaging in statutory construction to determine whether the WPA 

applies to research park corporations created under the URPEDA, or whether Section 

21-28-7 precludes application of the WPA.

{9} “In interpreting statutes, we seek to give effect to the Legislature’s intent, and in 

determining intent we look to the language used and consider the statute’s history and 

background.” Valenzuela v. Snyder, 2014-NMCA-061, ¶ 16, 326 P.3d 1120 (internal 

quotation marks and citation omitted). “Our courts have repeatedly observed that a 

statute’s plain language is the most reliable indicator of legislative intent.” Stennis v. City 

of Santa Fe, 2010-NMCA-108, ¶ 10, 149 N.M. 92, 244 P.3d 787. “[W]hen a statute 

contains language which is clear and unambiguous, we must give effect to that 

language and refrain from further statutory interpretation.” Truong v. Allstate Ins. Co., 

2010-NMSC-009, ¶ 37, 147 N.M. 583, 227 P.3d 73 (internal quotation marks and 

citation omitted). “We will not depart from the plain wording of a statute, unless it is 

necessary to resolve an ambiguity, correct a mistake or an absurdity that the Legislature 

could not have intended, or to deal with an irreconcilable conflict among statutory 

provisions.” Regents of the Univ. of N.M. v. N.M. Fed’n of Teachers, 1998-NMSC-020, ¶ 

28, 125 N.M. 401, 962 P.2d 1236.

{10} The Legislature enacted the URPEDA in 1989, in part, to allow universities to 

form “research park corporations” under the Nonprofit Corporation Act, and “to promote, 

develop and administer research parks or technological innovations for scientific, 

educational and economic development opportunities.” Section 21-28-4(A). Research 

park corporations are “separate and apart from the state and the university,” id., are 

governed by a board of directors appointed by the university’s regents, § 21-28-4(B), 

and may sue and be sued in their corporate names. Section 21-28-6(B). 

{11} The URPEDA specifically provides the following limitations on suits against 

research park corporations:

A. A research park corporation shall not be deemed an agency, 

public body or other political subdivision of New Mexico, including for 

purposes of applying statutes and laws relating to personnel, procurement 

of goods and services, meetings of the board of directors, gross receipts 

tax, disposition or acquisition of property, capital outlays, per diem and 

mileage and inspection of records.

B. A research park corporation shall be deemed:

(1) an agency or other political subdivision of the state for 

purposes of applying statutes and laws relating to the furnishing of 

goods and services to the university that operates it and the risk 

management fund; and
(2) a public employer for the purposes of the Public 

Employee Bargaining Act (PEBA)[, NMSA 1978, 10-7E-1 to -26 

(2003, as amended through 2020),] if it owns, operates or manages 

a health care facility or employs individuals who work at a health 

care facility.

C. A research park corporation, its officers, directors and 

employees shall be granted immunity from liability for any tort as provided 

in the Tort Claims Act (TCA)[, NMSA 1978, 41-4-1 to -27 (1976, as 

amended through 2020)]. A research park corporation may enter into 

agreements with insurance carriers to insure against a loss in connection 

with its operations even though the loss may be included among losses 

covered by the risk management fund of New Mexico.

Section 21-28-7 (emphasis added).

{12} The WPA, in turn, prohibits a public employer from taking retaliatory action 

against a public employee. See § 10-16C-3. The WPA defines a “public employer” as:

(1) any department, agency, office, institution, board, 

commission, committee, branch or district of state government;

(2) any political subdivision of the state, created under either 

general or special act, that receives or expends public money from 

whatever source derived;

(3) any entity or instrumentality of the state specifically provided 

for by law; and

(4) every office or officer of any entity listed in Paragraphs (1) 

through (3) of this subsection.

Section 10-16C-2(C).

{13} Plaintiff acknowledges that, pursuant to URPEDA, Defendant cannot be 

considered “an agency, public body or other public subdivision of New Mexico” for 

purposes of personnel laws, including the WPA. Plaintiff contends instead that URPEDA 

does not address “entities or instrumentalities” and maintains that Defendant is an 

“entity or instrumentality of the state specifically provided by law,” § 10-16C-2(C)(3), and 

therefore a “public employer” pursuant to the plain language of the WPA. Concluding 

otherwise, Plaintiff continues, would lead to absurd results. Defendant responds that the 

plain language of URPEDA “specifically articulates that [Defendant] is not a public 

employer,” and “[t]he WPA only applies to public employers,” therefore “[t]he WPA does 

not apply to [Defendant].” 
{14} To determine whether the Legislature intended for the URPEDA to preempt WPA 

claims against research park corporations, we first turn to the applicable statutory 

language. See Valenzuela, 2014-NMCA-061, ¶ 16. As quoted above, the WPA’s 

definition of “public employer” explicitly includes the terms “agency” and “political 

subdivision.” Section 10-16C-2(C)(1)-(2). This terminology overlaps with the WPA’s 

public employer definition, id., and the URPEDA language, see § 21-28-7(A), and is the 

first indication that the Legislature did not intend for WPA to apply to research park 

corporations. See N.M. Indus. Energy Consumers v. N.M. Pub. Regul. Comm’n, 2007-

NMSC-053, ¶ 20, 142 N.M. 533, 168 P.3d 105 (“[T]wo statutes covering the same 

subject matter should be harmonized and construed together when possible, in a way 

that facilitates their operation and achievement of their goals.” (citation omitted)). 

Nevertheless, Plaintiff argues that Defendant is an “entity or instrumentality of the state 

specifically provided for by law”—as enumerated under the WPA as subject to its 

requirements—and therefore the WPA applies. See § 10-16C-2(C)(3). 

{15} Although the plain language in the URPEDA does not explicitly preempt research 

park corporations from being deemed an “entity or instrumentality of the state,” under 

Section 10-16C-2(C)(3) of the WPA, we examine whether these terms fall within the 

meaning of “public body,” as used in Section 21-28-7(A) of URPEDA. We requested the 

parties to provide supplemental briefing on this topic. In response, Plaintiff conceded 

that “there is no substantive difference” between the terms in the WPA and URPEDA. 

Given this concession, we treat the terms as coextensive for the purposes of this 

appeal. See, e.g., Pirtle v. Legislative Council Comm. of N.M. Legislature, 2021-NMSC026, ¶ 58, 492 P.3d 586 (“As a general rule, appellate courts rely on adversarial briefing 

to decide legal issues and avoid reaching out to construct legal arguments that the 

parties, intentionally or otherwise, have not presented.”). In light of Plaintiff’s 

concession, and Plaintiff’s failure to develop an argument in her brief in chief or reply 

brief as to why we should treat the term “entity of the State” any different from “an 

instrumentality of the state,” we do not consider the matter further. See Headley v. 

Morgan Mgmt. Corp., 2005-NMCA-045, ¶ 15, 137 N.M. 339, 110 P.3d 1076 (declining 

to consider an undeveloped argument). Consequently, accepting Plaintiff’s argument 

and concluding that Defendant is an “entity or instrumentality of the state,” § 10-16C2(C)(3), subject to the WPA, would necessarily violate URPEDA’s directive to not deem 

a research park corporation a “public body,” § 21-28-7(A).

{16} The conclusion that Defendant is not a public employer and thus not subject to 

the WPA is supported by the exception included in Section 21-28-7(B) of URPEDA. 

There is one exception to the general rule that “research park corporations shall not be 

deemed an agency, public body or other political subdivision.” See § 21-28-7(A)-(B). 

Section 21-28-7(B) requires research park corporations to be deemed “an agency or 

other political subdivision of the state for purposes of applying statutes and laws relating 

to the furnishing of goods and services to the university that operates it and the risk 

management fund.” This limited and specific exception demonstrates that the 

Legislature generally intended to preclude research park corporations from being 

treated as public employers, unless otherwise specifically directed. See Augustin Plains 

Ranch v. D’Antonio, 2023-NMCA-001, ¶ 13, 521 P.3d 1226 (“[T]he Legislature knows 
how to include language in a statute if it so desires.” (internal quotation marks and 

citation omitted)).

{17} Next, we reject Plaintiff’s argument that our holding leads to an absurd result 

because it would “deny employees of an entity under URPEDA from relief under both 

the [WPA] and common law wrongful discharge.” This Court has recognized that 

“[w]hen a peculiarity in the literal language of a statute leads to an absurd result, the 

court may construe the statute according to its purpose to avoid the absurdity.” City of 

Rio Rancho v. Logan, 2008-NMCA-011, ¶ 18, 143 N.M. 281, 175 P.3d 949 (citation 

omitted). However, “we diverge from the plain meaning of a statute to avoid an absurd 

result only when it is clear that the legislature did not intend such a result.” State v. 

Maestas, 2007-NMSC-001, ¶ 22,140 N.M. 836, 149 P.3d 933; see also BOKF, N.A. v. 

Unknown Heirs of Pacheco, 2021-NMCA-010, 484 P.3d 1020 (“We may only add words 

to a statute where it is necessary to make the statute conform to the Legislature’s clear 

intent, or to prevent the statute from being absurd.” (alterations, internal quotation 

marks, and citation omitted)). 

{18} Concluding that the WPA language created an exception to URPEDA’s general 

prohibition against treating a research park corporation as public bodies would read into 

a statute language that is not there, which we cannot do. High Ridge Hinkle Joint 

Venture v. City of Albuquerque, 1998-NMSC-050, ¶ 5, 126 N.M. 413, 970 P.2d 599 

(“The court will not read into a statute or ordinance language which is not there, 

particularly if it makes sense as written.” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). 

The plain meaning of the statutes is clear and unambiguous, and there is no clear 

evidence that the Legislature intended a different result; therefore we must refrain from 

further interpretation. See Sims v. Sims, 1996-NMSC-078, ¶ 17, 122 N.M. 618, 930 

P.2d 153 (“[W]hen a statute contains language which is clear and unambiguous, we 

must give effect to that language and refrain from further statutory interpretation.” 

(internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

{19} Furthermore, as this Court recently observed when addressing a similar 

contention, see Gardner v. N.M. Health Ins. Exch., mem. op. ¶ 14 (N.M. Ct. App. Feb. 

23, 2023) (nonprecedential), the Legislature may exempt from or limit liability of 

government bodies, entities, agencies, etc., and to do so is a policy decision. See § 41-

4-2(A) (stating that it is “the public policy of New Mexico that governmental entities” are 

“only . . . liable within the limitations of the [TCA]”); see also § 21-28-7(C) (stating that 

“[a] research park corporation, its officers, directors and employees shall be granted 

immunity from liability for any tort as provided in the [TCA]”); see also § 10-16C-6 (“A 

civil action pursuant to the [WPA] shall forever be barred unless the action is filed within 

two years from the date on which the retaliatory action occurred.”). “Unless a statute 

violates the Constitution, we will not question the wisdom, policy, or justness of 

legislation enacted by our Legislature.” Aeda v. Aeda, 2013-NMCA-095, ¶ 11, 310 P.3d 

646 (alteration, internal quotation marks, and citation omitted). We will not say that the 

Legislature’s proper exercise of its power was absurd when creating Defendant and 

limiting its liability.
II. The District Court did Not Err In Concluding that the Law of the Case 

Doctrine did not Preclude Granting Summary Judgment

{20} Finally, we address Plaintiff argument that, by denying Defendant’s prior motion 

to dismiss Plaintiff’s WPA claim, the district court decided that the URPEDA did not 

preclude WPA claims as matter of law, and therefore the law of the case doctrine 

preempted the district court from granting Defendant’s subsequent motion for summary 

judgment. We do not agree the law of the case precluded the district court’s entry of 

summary judgment.

{21} The “law of the case doctrine relates to litigation of the same issue recurring 

within the same suit.” Cordova v. Larsen, 2004-NMCA-087, ¶ 10, 136 N.M. 87, 94 P.3d 

830. “Under the law of the case doctrine, a decision on an issue of law made at one 

stage of a case becomes a binding precedent in successive stages of the same 

litigation.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The district court’s denial of 

Defendant’s motion to dismiss the WPA claim was an interlocutory order, not a final 

judgment on the merits of Plaintiff’s action. See, e.g., Sims v. Sims, 1996-NMSC-078, ¶ 

59, 122 N.M. 618, 930 P.2d 153 (“An interlocutory decision is any decision made by the 

court prior to the final judgment.”); Gutierrez v. Gutierrez, 1993-NMCA-103, ¶ 3, 116 

N.M. 86, 860 P.2d 216 (dismissing an appeal from a denial of a motion to dismiss on 

the ground that such an order is not final). “An interlocutory order may be revised at any 

time prior to final judgment,” Sims, 1996-NMSC-078, ¶ 59, and this Court has held that 

the law of the case doctrine does not prevent a district court from doing so, see Laughlin 

v. Convenient Mgmt. Services, Inc., 2013-NMCA-088, ¶ 23, 308 P.3d 992 (observing 

that “although it would be grossly inefficient for district courts to review repeatedly their 

interlocutory rulings, the law-of-the-case doctrine does not prohibit the practice” 

(alteration, internal quotation marks, and citation omitted)); Bell v. N.M. Interstate 

Stream Comm’n, 1996-NMCA-010, ¶¶ 12-17, 121 N.M. 328, 911 P.2d 222 (providing 

that “the law-of-the-case doctrine does not preclude a trial court from overturning an 

earlier interlocutory order”). Thus, even assuming for the purposes of this opinion that, 

as Plaintiff argues, the district court determined at the motion to dismiss stage that the 

URPEDA did not preclude WPA claims as matter of law, we perceive no error in the 

district court’s later decision to grant Defendant’s motion for summary judgment on the 

basis that the URPEDA does preclude WPA claims against Defendant. 

CONCLUSION

{22} For the foregoing reasons, we affirm. 

{23} IT IS SO ORDERED.

KRISTINA BOGARDUS, Judge

WE CONCUR:

JENNIFER L. ATTREP, Chief Judge
J. MILES HANISEE, Judge