FOR PUBLICATION

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE:

SAMUEL J. BEASLEY GREGORY F. ZOELLER

Muncie, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana

CHANDRA K. HEIN

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

IN THE

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

RAHSAAN A. JOHNSON, )

)

Appellant-Defendant, )

)

vs. ) No. 18A02-1304-CR-343

)

STATE OF INDIANA, )

)

Appellee-Plaintiff. )

APPEAL FROM THE DELAWARE CIRCUIT COURT

The Honorable Marianne L. Vorhees, Judge

Cause No. 18C01-1204-FD-88

May 7, 2014

OPINION - FOR PUBLICATION

RILEY, Judge
2

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Appellant-Defendant, Rahsaan A. Johnson (Johnson), appeals his conviction of 

fourteen Counts of possession of animals for fighting contests, Class D felonies, Ind. Code 

§ 35-46-3-8.

We affirm.

ISSUES

Johnson raises two issues on appeal, which we restate as follows:

(1) Whether there is sufficient evidence beyond a reasonable doubt to support 

Johnson’s conviction of possession of animals for fighting contests; and

(2) Whether Johnson’s conviction of fourteen Counts of possession of animals for 

fighting contests violates the double jeopardy clause of the Indiana Constitution.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY1

On March 19, 2012, two crates were shipped from the Dominican Republic and 

arrived at the Indianapolis International Airport a day later. The importer, Johnson, 

traveled from his home in Muncie, Indiana to Indianapolis to pick up his cargo from the 

Customs Office. Inside of each crate was a live dog. A Customs agent noticed that the 

dogs were covered in bite marks and scars and were clearly in very poor health, so as 

Johnson waited for Customs to clear his shipment, the Customs agent contacted Homeland 

Security Investigations and the Animal Plant Health Inspection Service. Both agencies 

 

1 We note that nearly every citation to the Transcript in Johnson’s appellate brief is incorrect. It is an 

inefficient use of this court’s resources to search through more than 1300 pages to locate the referenced 

information.
3

declined to investigate the matter, so the Customs agent requested assistance from the 

Indianapolis Airport Police. Johnson explained that the dogs were family pets, and 

although Customs eventually released the dogs to Johnson, the Assistant Chief of the 

Airport Police contacted the Muncie Police Department to report his observations and 

concerns about Johnson’s dogs.

Approximately one week later, on March 28, 2012, the Muncie Animal Shelter 

(Shelter) received a report from the City Building Commissioner of dogs barking from 

inside an apparently abandoned trailer located at 2407 North Blaine Street. The next day, 

the Shelter’s superintendent, Phillip Peckinpaugh (Peckinpaugh), went to the reported 

address to investigate the complaint. When Peckinpaugh arrived at the mobile home, it 

appeared that nobody was there. Through a dilapidated fence, Peckinpaugh observed six 

dogs chained up in the back yard. In addition to the heavy tow chains restraining the dogs, 

Peckinpaugh noticed that most of the dogs had severe scarring on their faces, one was

tangled up and unable to move, and none had any food or water. Peckinpaugh also heard

the sounds of other dogs coming from inside the garage and the residence. At this point, 

he called the Muncie Police Department. The police officers arrived on scene and, after 

observing the exterior of the property and speaking with Peckinpaugh, obtained a warrant 

to search the mobile home.

Once inside, Peckinpaugh and the police officers were greeted by the 

“overpowering” scent of “feces and urine.” (Transcript p. 468). The trailer, which did not 

have running water, was in shambles. In each room of the narrow mobile home, 

Peckinpaugh and the officers discovered dog cages stacked and crammed into every 
4

available space. Most of the plastic and metal cages housed a dog, but other broken cages 

were also strewn about the filthy house and yard. While there were bowls stashed on top 

of some of the dog cages, none of the animals had any food or water. The cages, some of 

which were too small to accommodate the dog living inside of it, were lined with soiled 

newspapers. Likewise, the garage was filled with caged dogs. After Peckinpaugh and the 

other Shelter employees removed the dogs from the premises, the police officers further

investigated the scene. They seized twenty-two plastic and metal cages; three treadmills 

designed or modified for dog use; multiple harnesses, leads, cloth and leather muzzles, and 

weighted collars; and various containers and buckets of pet care products and supplements, 

including Penicillin, wound ointment, Epsom salt, iron supplements, vitamins, weight 

boosting supplements, and syringes.

From the mail found inside the residence, the police officers ascertained that the 

trailer belonged to Johnson. Johnson, who did not live in the mobile home, had leased the 

property for $200 per month for the sole purpose of quartering his dogs.2 Despite the lease 

agreement’s prohibition of “pets or other animals[,]” a total of twenty-five dogs were 

confiscated from the property, including the two imported from the Dominican Republic

nine days earlier. (State’s Exh. 27, p. 76). All of the dogs were American Staffordshire 

Terriers or a mix of the breed, which are more commonly referred to as pit bulls. The dogs 

ranged in age from approximately five weeks to eight years, included both males and 

females, and were not neutered or spayed.

 

2

 The residence and yard were left in such a deplorable state that, following the removal of the dogs, city

officials condemned the mobile home and ordered that the landlord incur the expense of its demolition. 
5

Within the two weeks following the dogs’ removal, two veterinarians, Dr. Teresa 

Calvert (Dr. Calvert) and Dr. Roger Smith (Dr. Smith), volunteered their time and 

respectively examined eleven and fourteen of the dogs. In addition to their observations 

of scarring, scabbing, lacerations, and penetrating wounds on nineteen of these dogs, Dr. 

Calvert and Dr. Smith noted findings that included: thin/underweight dogs with muscle 

waste and prominent rib, spine, and hip bones; fungal and yeast infections; untreated 

“cherry eyes”; inflammation; torn dew claws; being down on their pasterns as the result of 

malnutrition and lack of exercise; bow-leggedness and other orthopedic conditions and 

deformities; and parasites, worms, and mange. Both veterinarians testified that the wounds 

and scarring were consistent with dog-fighting injuries. While the veterinarians described 

the specific maladies of each dog, the condition of Dog 1—as he was referred to throughout 

the trial—was particularly gruesome. As x-rays demonstrated, a large, open puncture 

wound on the dog’s cheek had become so infected that the entire left side of the dog’s head 

was drastically swollen. Along with the “open puncture/draining wounds[,]” Dr. Smith 

noted that there were numerous other scars in various stages of healing all over the dog’s 

face, trunk, and forelegs. (State’s Exh. 34, p. 86). Dog 1 was euthanized only six days 

after his removal from the trailer.

At the Shelter, an animal behaviorist, a pit bull rescue group, and a team from the 

American Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals (ASPCA) evaluated the dogs’ 

temperaments. In addition to being timid around humans, many of the dogs were 

exceptionally aggressive, especially toward other animals. In fact, one of the pit bulls 

escaped from her kennel and killed another dog. Although the Shelter endeavored to place 
6

all of the confiscated pit bulls into adoptive homes, those that were too aggressive to 

function in “a normal pet society” were euthanized. (Tr. p. 676).

On April 13, 2012, the State filed an Information but subsequently dismissed and 

amended several of the charges. Ultimately, the State charged Johnson with fourteen

Counts of possession of animals for fighting contests, Class D felonies, I.C. § 35-46-3-8;

two Counts of purchasing animals for fighting contests, Class D felonies, I.C. § 35-46-3-

8; one Count of promoting an animal fighting contest, a Class D felony, I.C. § 35-46-3-9.5; 

and nine Counts of cruelty to an animal, Class A misdemeanors, I.C. § 35-46-3-7(a). With 

the exception of the charge for promoting an animal fighting contest, each of the other 

twenty-five Counts correlated with one particular dog.

On April 23, 2012, pursuant to Indiana Code section 35-46-3-6(e), the trial court 

ordered the State Veterinarian to conduct an investigation of the condition of the animals 

seized from Johnson’s lot. The State Veterinarian subsequently appointed Dr. Melissa 

Justice (Dr. Justice), a field veterinarian for the Indiana State Board of Animal Health, to 

evaluate the dogs. On April 30, 2012, when Dr. Justice traveled to Muncie to examine the 

animals, only five dogs remained at the Shelter as the rest had been adopted or euthanized. 

In the dogs she examined, Dr. Justice found extensive scarring and wounds at various 

stages of healing on three of the dogs, which she testified were consistent with dog bites. 

Dr. Justice’s findings also included low body weights and skittish demeanors in some of 

the dogs. Based on Dr. Justice’s review of all of the evidence, she opined that the dogs 

“were in jeopardy prior to being removed” from Johnson’s custody. (Tr. p. 446). By the 
7

end of May 2012, thirteen of the dogs had been adopted, and twelve were euthanized for 

either medical or temperament reasons.

On October 19, 2012, Johnson filed a motion to dismiss all twenty-six of the charges 

against him. He alleged that his constitutional rights had been violated because the dogs 

were either euthanized or adopted without the court’s permission and without first 

providing him an opportunity to have the animals examined by his veterinarian, thus 

inhibiting his ability to form a proper defense. Following a hearing, the trial court denied

Johnson’s motion to dismiss on October 25, 2012.

A six-day jury trial commenced on October 29, 2012. When the State rested its 

case-in-chief, Johnson moved for a directed verdict. In response, the trial court dismissed 

the sole Count of promoting an animal fighting contest on double jeopardy grounds, as well 

as two Counts of animal cruelty due to insufficient evidence. On November 5, 2012, 

following the close of the evidence, the jury returned a verdict of guilty on all fourteen 

Counts of possession of animals for fighting contests and the remaining seven Counts of 

animal cruelty. The jury found Johnson not guilty of the two Counts of purchasing animals 

for a fighting contest. Immediately thereafter, the trial court entered a judgment of 

conviction for fourteen Class D felonies and seven Class A misdemeanors.

On March 1, 2013, the trial court held a sentencing hearing. The trial court 

sentenced Johnson to a term of three years for each of the fourteen Counts of possession 

of animals for fighting contests, to be served concurrently. For the seven Counts of animal 

cruelty, Johnson received concurrent one-year sentences. The trial court ordered that the 

one-year terms be served consecutively to the three-year terms for an aggregate sentence 
8

of four years, all executed in the Indiana Department of Correction. Thereafter, Johnson 

posted a bond and has deferred his incarceration pending appeal.

Johnson now appeals. Additional facts will be provided as necessary.

DISCUSSION AND DECISION

I. Sufficiency of the Evidence

A. Standard of Review

Johnson first claims that there is insufficient evidence to sustain his conviction of 

possession of animals for fighting contests. Our standard of review for sufficiency of the 

evidence cases is well established. Our court will not reweigh evidence or assess the 

credibility of witnesses, and we will consider only the evidence most favorable to the 

verdict, along with any reasonable inferences that may be drawn therefrom. Clemons v. 

State, 987 N.E.2d 92, 95 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013). As long as the evidence and all derivative 

inferences “constitute substantial evidence of probative value to support the judgment[,]” 

we will affirm the conviction. Id. Where a conviction is based, at least in part, on 

circumstantial evidence, the “evidence need not overcome every reasonable hypothesis of 

innocence.” Id. “Reversal is appropriate only when reasonable persons would not be able 

to form inferences as to each material element of the offense.” Id.

B. Possession of Animals for Fighting Contests

Under Indiana law, it is a Class D felony if an individual “knowingly or intentionally 

purchases or possesses an animal for the purpose of using the animal in an animal fighting 

contest.” I.C. § 35-46-3-8. An “animal fighting contest” is defined as “a conflict between 

two (2) or more animals. The term does not include a conflict that is unorganized or 
9

accidental.” I.C. § 35-46-3-4. Johnson was convicted of fourteen Counts of this offense.3 

This statute does not require the State to prove that Johnson hosted an animal fight or that 

he ever used the dogs in an animal fighting contest; rather, Johnson’s intended purpose in 

possessing the pit bulls is the pertinent consideration. See, e.g., I.C. §§ 35-46-3-9 to -10. 

It is well established that “[i]ntent may be proved by circumstantial evidence [and] can be 

inferred from a defendant’s conduct and the natural and usual sequence to which such 

conduct logically and reasonably points.” Lee v. State, 973 N.E.2d 1207, 1210 (Ind. Ct. 

App. 2012) (citation omitted), trans. denied. “The fact finder is entitled to infer intent from 

the surrounding circumstances.” Id.

Johnson concedes that the testimony of the three veterinarians and Terry Mills 

(Mills), the ASPCA’s Director of Blood Sports Investigations, in conjunction with the 

paraphernalia recovered from the trailer, “could reasonably support the inference by the 

jury that the animals had been involved in animal fighting in the past.” (Appellant’s Br. p. 

18). However, according to Johnson,

this is not enough. It must be demonstrated in some way that [] Johnson 

maintained the purpose to fight his animals at some future time, and the 

method of proof must be more than they were used in animal fighting contests 

in the past, so the inference is made that the individual in possession intends 

to use them in that way in the future.

(Appellant’s Br. p. 18).

To date, there is only one appellate decision concerning the sufficiency of the 

evidence used to obtain a conviction pursuant to Indiana Code section 35-46-3-8. In 

 

3

 Johnson does not challenge his conviction of seven Counts of cruelty to an animal.
10

Clemons, 987 N.E.2d at 95, Clemons was convicted of possessing animals to use in animal 

fighting contests. Despite Clemons’ argument that there was no evidence that he had 

actually participated in a cockfight, our court found overwhelming evidence that Clemons 

knowingly or intentionally possessed “battle cocks” for fighting purposes. Id. at 95-96. In 

addition to the 193 roosters and hens recovered from Clemons’ property at a ratio of two 

or three roosters for every hen, which is “indicative of a cockfighting operation,” the 

evidence revealed that a majority of the roosters had been “dubbed” to prevent their wattles 

and combs from excessive bleeding; fifty of the roosters were tethered to cages with their 

food and water placed on top of barrels; many of the roosters had shortened spurs; and 

cockfighting gear such as magazines, training regimens, grooming tools, medicines, and 

dietary supplements were discovered in Clemons’ possession. Id. Although Clemons 

attempted to characterize the evidence as tools and techniques used by legitimate bird 

breeders, the totality of the circumstances established that those roosters were slated to 

fight. Id. at 96.

We find the present situation to be analogous to Clemons. There is no direct 

evidence of Johnson engaging these dogs in an actual, organized dog fight, and it is 

undisputed that there were no “dog fighting pits” on the property. (Tr. p. 734). 

Nevertheless, the record reveals that Johnson accumulated twenty-five pit bulls, fourteen 

of which are the subjects of these charges. Three veterinarians testified that, among other 

ailments, all fourteen of these dogs were covered in scars, scabs, and puncture wounds at 

various stages of healing. Furthermore, all of the veterinarians stated that the bite marks 

and wounds—which were primarily concentrated on the dogs’ faces, ears, front legs, necks, 
11

and chests—were consistent with injuries that would be sustained in a dog fight. Likewise, 

Mills testified that in a dog fight, “the most consistent injuries are in the front of the dog, 

the chest, and the forearms and the muzzle area and ears.” (Tr. p. 760).

As in Clemons, the presence of paraphernalia further supports a finding that Johnson 

was conditioning the pit bulls to fight. Police officers seized dog treadmills, weighted 

harnesses and collars, and various types of weight-boosting and performance-enhancing 

supplements, all of which are commonly used to train dogs for a fight. See I.C. § 35-46-3-

4.3 (defining “animal fighting paraphernalia”). Johnson correctly posits that there is 

nothing illegal about merely possessing dog treadmills and harnesses. If the evidence had 

otherwise consisted of a muscular, healthy, well-nourished and confident pit bull, the 

paraphernalia would likely be insignificant to uphold his conviction, but such is not the 

case. Moreover, Mills, who was involved in eighty-six dog fights during an eighteenmonth undercover operation with the FBI, explained that following a fight, the dog 

handlers do not take their dogs to a veterinarian. Instead, the handlers personally treat the 

dogs’ injuries. To this end, the police officers found five bottles of Penicillin, syringes,4

and several types of wound spray and ointment in Johnson’s trailer. 

 Johnson attempts to distinguish his case from Clemons, citing the fact that Clemons 

had discussed the desirable qualities of cockfighting roosters with the director of the 

humane society, who was posing as an interested buyer, and that Clemons had been 

 

4

Johnson testified that he used the syringes to give the puppies their shots and to administer dietary 

supplements, but the jury also heard the veterinarians’ findings that the puppies were infested with 

parasites and worms.
12

featured in a cockfighting trade journal giving advice on aggressive bird breeding. 

However, Johnson fails to note that Clemons had admitted to participating in cockfighting 

in the past but maintained that he adhered to Indiana law and limited his activities to selling, 

buying, and breeding roosters. Clemons, 987 N.E.2d at 93-94. Contrary to Johnson’s 

argument that the dogs’ fighting history cannot be indicative of their future purpose, the 

Clemons court found the evidence that the roosters had been used to fight in the past, 

combined with the fighting paraphernalia, was sufficient to uphold Clemons’ conviction. 

We find the same rationale applies in Johnson’s case.

We also find little merit in Johnson’s endeavor to shift the blame for the dogs’ 

shocking conditions. With the exception of one dog, which Johnson claimed had received 

facial scars by chewing through the metal siding of the garage, Johnson testified that all of 

the other dogs were in perfect health, having no scars or injuries, at the time they were 

confiscated. Per Johnson, these dogs sustained their scars because the Shelter allowed 

them to fight, and the Shelter failed to provide the animals with proper nourishment. Even 

if we could fathom these accusations, it is not the role of our court to assess witness

credibility or weigh the evidence. See Fuller v. State, 674 N.E.2d 576, 578 (Ind. Ct. App. 

1996). Thus, it was well within the province of the jury to believe the concurring testimony 

of three veterinarians, an ASPCA blood sport expert, multiple police officers, and the 

Shelter’s superintendent.

C. Other Purposes

Johnson contends that the evidence is insufficient to prove his intent because “there 

are non-animal fighting reasons to maintain possession of the animals, as well as the 
13

paraphernalia.” (Appellant’s Br. p. 19). During the trial, Johnson explained that he kept 

twenty-five pit bulls in an otherwise abandoned trailer in order to enter the pit bulls into

conformation and weight-pulling competitions, which are legal activities. Johnson also 

maintained that some of the dogs were strictly used for breeding purposes or for 

companionship. In support of his position, Johnson submitted photographs of some 

ribbons and trophies as “examples of things [he had] won” at dog shows and stated that he 

had been training two of the dogs for a weight-pulling competition that was scheduled to 

occur one month after the dogs were seized. (Tr. p. 985). As such, Johnson explained that 

he had been using the four-pound weighted collars to condition the dogs to pull a half-ton

payload and that he was feeding the dogs a special diet to reduce them to their lowest 

weight while still building muscle. With respect to his breeding claim, Johnson submitted

several photographs depicting a few of the dogs in the act of mating.

We find that Johnson’s arguments amount to a request to reweigh the evidence, 

which we decline to do. See Clemons, 987 N.E.2d at 96. The record contains sufficient 

contradictory evidence of Johnson’s illicit purpose for keeping twenty-five caged pit bulls, 

and “reasonable minds could reach the inferences drawn by the jury.” Fuller, 674 N.E.2d 

at 578. As both Dr. Justice and Mills explained, weight-pulling contests necessitate 

healthy, heavily muscular dogs. Mills also described how dog handlers must ensure their 

dogs do not exceed a specific predetermined fight weight, and although weight-pulling 

contests do not generally include dogs covered in scars, some dog handlers do participate 

“as a cover for their dog fighting.” (Tr. p. 770). Johnson, who was previously cited while 

living in New Jersey for failing to provide dogs with food and water, specified that he 
14

regularly took photographs of the dogs’ activities in order to defend himself against

accusations such as those at hand. Yet, he stated that he did not keep records of the puppy 

litters, dog sale/exchange transactions, or pedigrees; nor did he offer a single photograph 

of his dog(s) participating in a competition.

We do not dispute Johnson’s assertion that “millions of Hoosiers own animals, and 

the vast majority of them would never dream of using them in an animal fighting contest.” 

(Appellant’s Br. p. 19). It is clear from the evidence, however, that Johnson is not included 

among this majority of Hoosiers. Accordingly, we find that there was sufficient evidence 

for the jury to determine that Johnson possessed these fourteen pit bulls for the purpose of 

animal fighting. Fortunately for Johnson, the Indiana Department of Correction will not 

subject him to the inhumane conditions that he forced upon those twenty-five dogs.

II. Double Jeopardy

Johnson also claims that his conviction merits reversal because it violates the double 

jeopardy clause of the Indiana Constitution. Article I, Section 14 of the Indiana 

Constitution provides: “No person shall be put in jeopardy twice for the same offense.” 

Our supreme court has developed the following two-part test for reviewing double jeopardy 

claims:

[T]wo or more offenses are the “same offense” in violation of Article I, 

Section 14 of the Indiana Constitution, if, with respect to either the statutory 

elements of the challenged crimes or the actual evidence used to convict, the 

essential elements of one challenged offense also establish the essential 

elements of another challenged offense.
15

Lee v. State, 892 N.E.2d 1231, 1233 (Ind. 2008) (quoting Richardson v. State, 717 N.E.2d 

32, 49 (Ind. 1999)). In this case, Johnson claims that his conviction cannot be sustained 

under the actual evidence portion of the same offense test.

According to Indiana’s double jeopardy jurisprudence, “the actual evidence 

presented at trial is examined to determine whether each challenged offense was 

established by separate and distinct facts.” Richardson, 717 N.E.2d at 53. The defendant

must establish “a reasonable probability that the evidentiary facts used by the fact-finder 

to establish the essential elements of one offense may also have been used to establish the 

essential elements of a second challenged offense.” Id. A reasonable possibility that the 

fact-finder relied on the same facts for multiple offenses “requires substantially more than 

a logical possibility” and “turns on a practical assessment of whether the jury may have 

latched on to exactly the same facts for both convictions.” James v. State, 953 N.E.2d 

1191, 1194 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011). On review, we consider the charging information, jury 

instructions, and arguments of counsel to determine the facts relied upon by the jury for 

each element of each offense. Id. If “the evidentiary facts establishing the essential 

elements of one offense also establish only one or even several, but not all, of the essential 

elements of a second offense[,]” there is no double jeopardy violation. Spivey v. State, 761 

N.E.2d 831, 833 (Ind. 2002).

The essential elements of the charged offense are that Johnson (1) knowingly or 

intentionally (2) possessed the dogs (3) for the purpose of using each dog in an animal 

fighting contest. I.C. § 35-46-3-8. It is undisputed that Johnson owned the fourteen pit 

bulls forming the bases for these charges. Johnson asserts a double jeopardy violation 
16

because “the jurors may have very well considered the presence and condition of [the 

thirteen other dogs] in finding that [he] did, in fact, intend to involve [one dog] in an animal 

fighting contest.” (Appellant’s Br. p. 24). As a result, Johnson seeks reversal on thirteen 

of the fourteen Counts. We disagree. The record is replete with evidentiary facts to 

independently support each of the fourteen charges of possessing animals for fighting 

purposes. Dr. Calvert, Dr. Smith, and Dr. Justice testified about the specific dog fight-type 

injuries found on every single dog. Photographs of the individual animals also illustrated

the severity of each dog’s battle scars for the jurors to assess.

Johnson further notes that the jury received an instruction about the statutory 

definition of an “animal fighting contest.” (Appellant’s Br. p. 23). Because the jury was 

specifically informed that such a conflict requires a minimum of two animals, Johnson 

argues that the jury could “have considered the fact that there were in that one location the 

multiple animals necessary to hold an animal fighting contest in arriving at the ultimate 

conclusion.” (Appellant’s Br. p. 24). Again, we disagree. During the trial, Mills described,

in great detail, the customs of organized dog fights. As Mills explained, dog handlers do 

not pit two of their own dogs against each other in a fight. Because of the wagers and 

reputations at stake, each dog represents a potential value to its owner which is contingent 

upon the outcome of a fight. A winning dog is credited with respect, whereas it is not 

uncommon for a handler to execute his dog following a loss. Moreover, the logistics of 

the actual fight resemble a boxing match in that each handler remains in his dog’s 

respective corner; he picks the dog up between rounds, sponges the dog’s face, and 

acknowledges to the referee when his dog shows weakness during the fight. Because there
17

is evidence that each of the fourteen dogs was possessed for the purpose of fighting against

the dog of a different handler, we find Johnson’s contention that the jury relied on the same 

facts to be unfounded.

CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, we conclude that there is sufficient evidence to uphold 

Johnson’s conviction of fourteen Class D felonies for possession of animals for fighting 

contests, and his conviction does not violate the double jeopardy clause of the Indiana 

Constitution.

Affirmed.

ROBB, J. and BRADFORD, J. concur