United States Court of Appeals 

For the First Circuit 

No. 15-1318 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Appellee, 

v. 

ALLISON GONZÁLEZ-MARTÍNEZ, 

Defendant, Appellant. 

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO 

[Hon. Aida M. Delgado-Colón, U.S. District Judge] 

Before 

Kayatta and Barron, Circuit Judges, 

and McAuliffe,* District Judge. 

 John H. Cunha, Jr., with whom Cunha & Holcomb, P.C. was on 

brief, for appellant. 

 Julia M. Meconiates, Assistant United States Attorney, with 

whom Rosa Emilia Rodríguez-Vélez, United States Attorney, and 

Nelson Pérez-Sosa, Assistant United States Attorney, Chief, 

Appellate Division, were on brief, for appellee. 

June 9, 2016 

 * Of the District of New Hampshire, sitting by designation. 
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BARRON, Circuit Judge. Allison González-Martínez was 

convicted after a jury trial of twenty-two counts of theft of 

government property and one count of aggravated identity theft. 

She argues that her convictions must be vacated because the 

evidence at trial was insufficient to support them and because the 

District Court abused its discretion in denying her request to 

continue her trial to a later date. We affirm. 

I. 

 We recite the evidence introduced at trial in the light 

most favorable to the prosecution, as is required when a criminal 

defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support 

her conviction. See United States v. Pena, 586 F.3d 105, 111 (1st 

Cir. 2009). 

 In 2011, the Internal Revenue Service received twentytwo tax returns purporting to be filed by twenty-two individuals. 

Each return showed that the filer was due a tax refund. The 

returns were not what they claimed to be. They had not in fact 

been filed by the individuals whose names and security numbers 

appeared in them. Nevertheless, the IRS approved tax refund checks 

for each of the twenty-two tax returns. Each check was to be paid 

from the funds of the United States Treasury. 

 The Treasury checks ranged in value from $6,210.93 to 

$8,732.69. Each check was issued to the individual on the 

corresponding tax return and sent to the address in the continental 
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United States provided in that return. That address was also typed 

on the front of each check. 

 The twenty-two Treasury checks were eventually submitted 

for deposit into the Banco Popular account of "La Casa de los 

Motores and Junker Correa," a business in Puerto Rico that sells 

used automobile parts. The checks were submitted by Junker 

Correa's owner, González, on twenty-two days from November 2011 to 

May 2012. The first twenty-one of the checks were deposited into 

Junker Correa's account; the twenty-second check was held by the 

bank and not deposited.

 Each check was endorsed twice. The first endorsement 

purported to be the signature of the individual in whose name the 

check had been issued. The second was an endorsement to Junker 

Correa. 

 The individuals in whose names the checks were issued 

never received the checks, never endorsed the checks, and never 

spent the checks. Nor had they ever been to Junker Correa. 

 The jury found González guilty on all counts they were 

asked to decide: twenty-two counts of theft of government property, 

all charged in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 641, and one count of 

aggravated identity theft, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1028A. Each 

of the twenty-two counts of theft of government property alleged 

that González had stolen the value of one of the twenty-two 

Treasury checks. The aggravated identity theft count was charged 
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in connection with just one of the twenty-two checks. González 

appeals. 

II. 

 We review González's challenge to the sufficiency of the 

evidence de novo. United States v. Santos-Soto, 799 F.3d 49, 56 

(1st Cir. 2015). "[W]e examine the evidence, both direct and 

circumstantial, in the light most favorable to the prosecution and 

decide whether that evidence, including all plausible inferences 

drawn therefrom, would allow a rational factfinder to conclude 

beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the charged 

count or crime." United States v. Salva-Morales, 660 F.3d 72, 74 

(1st Cir. 2011) (per curiam) (quoting United States v. Cruz-Díaz, 

550 F.3d 169, 172 n.3 (1st Cir. 2008)). And, when we do, we 

conclude that the evidence was sufficient in this case. 

A. 

 We begin with the twenty-two counts of theft of 

government property. Each count corresponds to the submission for 

deposit by González of one of the Treasury checks. 

 González does not dispute that there was sufficient 

evidence from which a reasonable factfinder could conclude that 

the twenty-two checks were fraudulently obtained from the federal 

government through the filing of false returns. González also 

does not dispute that the evidence showed that she submitted the 

twenty-two checks for deposit into Junker Correa's bank account. 
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 But González does contend that the evidence was not 

sufficient because it revealed that she, too, was "a victim of the 

fraudulent scheme," as she simply "deposited checks received by 

[her] business." And so she contends that the jury could not have 

found her guilty beyond a reasonable doubt given that, in light of 

the evidence, it was equally possible that she submitted the checks 

for deposit on a mistaken understanding of their pedigree as that 

she submitted them knowing that they were fraudulent. 

 González is correct that the government needed to prove 

that she acted with the specific intent to steal a thing of value 

from the United States, and the government does not argue 

otherwise. See United States v. Donato-Morales, 382 F.3d 42, 47 

(1st Cir. 2004) (holding that although 18 U.S.C. § 641 "does not 

expressly require specific intent, the Supreme Court has held that 

Congress, in codifying the common law crimes described in § 641, 

intended to incorporate the common law requirement of specific 

intent as an element of the crime" (citing Morissette v. United 

States, 342 U.S. 246, 270-73 (1952))). And the government put 

forth no evidence regarding how González came to possess the 

fraudulent checks. But the government contends that the evidence 

in the record is still sufficient to support a finding that 

González acted with the requisite intent, and we agree. 

 In support of her challenge, González points to the 

evidence that when Banco Popular began investigating the Treasury 
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checks, she produced eleven invoices that showed that customers 

had purchased items from Junker Correa with the checks. González 

further contends that the invoices were credible because they were 

"detailed and distinctive." For example, she points to the fact 

that one invoice stated that the customer had given a $6 tip. And 

she points to the evidence that shows that she went to Banco 

Popular when the bank did not accept one of the checks and that 

she was a willing participant in Banco Popular's investigation of 

the problem with that check -- "unlikely behavior," she contends, 

"for someone who knew the check to be fraudulent." 

 But the question in resolving a challenge to the 

sufficiency of the evidence is not whether the evidence was such 

that a juror could have voted to acquit. The question is whether 

the evidence was such that a reasonable juror could not have found 

guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. And there are critical holes in 

González's story that, along with the other evidence, provide 

sufficient support for what the jury did. 

 González told the bank that she had an invoice for each 

of the twenty-two checks and copies of forms of identification -- 

which she referred to as "IDs" -- for each person who had paid 

with one of those checks. And yet she did not produce a single 

ID. González insists that she failed to produce the IDs because 

her business was "hectic" and her records sloppy, and she argues 

that the evidence shows as much. But a reasonable juror could 
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reject that argument and find that she failed to produce the IDs 

for a different reason, namely that there were no such customers. 

 Moreover, the invoices that González did produce, while 

containing the kind of detail one would expect from real invoices 

(such as the $6 tip), also claimed that some of the customers had 

used Treasury checks to pay for items that cost significantly less 

than the value of the checks. In one case, the difference exceeded 

four thousand dollars. Some of the invoices did claim that 

customers waited several days to receive the substantial change 

owed. If so, the customers were apparently trusting Junker Correa 

to return the large difference and then accepting that difference 

by cash or check. But Junker Correa's bank account statements did 

not show cash withdrawals consistent with such large cash refunds. 

For those reasons, too, a reasonable juror could reject the view 

that the invoices were real records of past transactions rather 

than post-hoc inventions of exchanges that never occurred. 

 To believe that González did not know the checks were 

fraudulent, a juror would have to believe that Junker Correa, 

despite never before having received payment from a customer in 

the form of Treasury check, suddenly, in one seven-month period, 

received an inundation of twenty-two such payments. A juror would 

also have to believe the customers chose this unusual form of 

payment even though it required them to trust González to refund 

them thousands of dollars at some future point in time. And a 
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juror would also have to believe that it just happened to be the 

case that at the same time that customers began paying with those 

checks, González decided to begin transferring large sums of money 

from the Junker Correa account to her personal account -- something 

that she had done on very few occasions in the several years before 

the Treasury checks appeared.1

 To state what the jury would be required to believe is 

to state the reason that a jury reasonably could have believed the 

government's account of what must have transpired rather than 

González's own. Lending additional support to the government's 

account is the fact that although Banco Popular does not permit 

double-endorsed checks to be deposited into personal accounts, 

such checks may be deposited in commercial accounts. As the Junker 

Correa account was a commercial account, the government presented 

the jurors with a reasonable alternative explanation to the one 

González offers as to why she submitted the checks for deposit 

into the Junker Correa account. 

 "Jurors . . . are not expected to resist commonsense 

inferences on the realities of human experience." See United 

 1 On three occasions in December 2011, for example, González 

transferred $1,700, $2,500, and $4,000 to her personal account. 

She made approximately twenty-five transfers in the first half of 

2012, most of which exceeded $1,000. By comparison, over the 

course of the previous three years, González transferred money to 

her personal account on just several occasions, and the transfers 

ranged from $300 to $1,000. 
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States v. Saccoccia, 58 F.3d 754, 782 (1st Cir. 1995). A rational 

juror could have rejected González's story and concluded beyond a 

reasonable doubt that González, in submitting the checks for 

deposit, was knowingly stealing from the government. Accordingly, 

González's challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence on the 

first twenty-two counts fails. 

B. 

 González also challenges her conviction for aggravated 

identity theft. The identity theft statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1028A, 

provides that someone who "knowingly transfers, possesses, or 

uses, without lawful authority, a means of identification of 

another person," "during and in relation to" various specified 

felonies, including theft of government property in violation of 

§ 641, "shall, in addition to the punishment provided for such 

felony, be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of 2 years." 18 

U.S.C. § 1028A(1). 

 González appears to understand the "means of 

identification of another person" at issue in this case to be the 

signature endorsement on one of the twenty-two Treasury checks. 

The government does not argue otherwise, and so we proceed on that 

understanding as well. 

 González does not contest that the signature on that 

check was transferred, possessed, or used "without lawful 

authority" -- that is, that it was forged. Nor does González 
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contest that she "transfer[red], possess[ed], or use[d]" that 

signature when she submitted the endorsed check for deposit into 

the Junker Correa bank account. Rather, she argues that there was 

insufficient evidence that she did so "knowingly" -- that is, with 

the knowledge that the signature was forged. 

 But for the reasons already given, a reasonable juror 

could conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that González did not 

receive the Treasury checks in exchange for actual sales at Junker 

Correa. From this conclusion, a reasonable juror could further 

infer that González knew that the checks had not been signed by 

the people in whose names they were issued.2

III. 

 González next argues that her convictions should be 

vacated because the District Court erred when it denied her two 

requests -- one made three days before trial and the second on the 

morning of trial -- to continue her trial to a later date. 

González's request was made pursuant to a provision of the Speedy 

Trial Act that permits a trial court to grant a continuance where 

"the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the 

 2 González also argues that the forfeiture count should be 

vacated because the evidence was insufficient to support her 

convictions on the other counts. Because we have concluded that 

the evidence was sufficient to support her convictions, that 

argument fails as well. 
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best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial." 

18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(A). 

 We review a trial court's denial of a request for a 

continuance under that provision of the Speedy Trial Act for an 

abuse of discretion. United States v. Williams, 630 F.3d 44, 48 

(1st Cir. 2010). Under that standard, "we will not disturb such 

a decision if reasonable minds could disagree about the proper 

ruling." United States v. Delgado-Marrero, 744 F.3d 167, 195 (1st 

Cir. 2014). 

 We evaluate each case "on its own facts," Williams, 630 

F.3d at 48, based on considerations that "include 'the reasons 

contemporaneously presented in support of the request, the amount 

of time needed for effective preparation, the complexity of the 

case, the extent of inconvenience to others if a continuance is 

granted, and the likelihood of injustice or unfair prejudice 

attributable to the denial of a continuance.'" Id. (quoting United 

States v. Rodríguez-Durán, 507 F.3d 749, 763 (1st Cir. 2007)). 

And we will "overturn[] the denial of a continuance only when the 

movant identifies specific, concrete ways in which the denial 

resulted in 'substantial prejudice' to his or her defense." 

Delgado-Marrero, 744 F.3d at 196. 

 González argues that the District Court abused its 

discretion in denying her requests to continue trial to a later 

date due to the issuance of the superseding indictment in this 
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case only ten days before trial, and due to her retaining a new 

attorney -- Luis Rafael Rivera -- to represent her just three days 

before trial. But we do not agree. 

 We do not see the basis for concluding González suffered 

prejudice by having to appear for trial with an attorney who had 

just signed on to represent her. The District Court instructed 

González that the court would allow Rivera to appear as counsel 

only if Rivera were "ready for trial as scheduled" -- an order 

González does not challenge as itself an abuse of discretion. 

Thus, by appearing for trial, Rivera represented to the District 

Court that he was prepared.3 Moreover, although Rivera tried the 

case as lead counsel, he had by his side González's two other 

attorneys, each of whom had been on the case since its inception. 

See Delgado-Marrero, 744 F.3d at 196 (listing "other available 

assistance" to the movant as a factor to be considered in 

determining whether a district court abused its discretion in 

denying a motion for a continuance). 

 We also do not see a basis for concluding that González 

was prejudiced by having to go to trial soon after the superseding 

indictment was issued. González is right that the new indictment 

set forth eighteen additional counts of theft of government 

 3 González does not argue to us that counsel was ineffective. 

But she does "reserve her right" to raise that argument in a 28 

U.S.C. § 2255 petition. 
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property, each corresponding to a different Treasury check, as 

well as the one count of aggravated identity theft. But González 

agreed to the trial date in this case over a month and a half 

before trial. When she agreed to that date, moreover, she knew 

that a superseding indictment was forthcoming. González also does 

not challenge the District Court's finding below that over a month 

before trial she was in possession of all the discovery materials 

relevant to the new counts in the superseding indictment. 

 We recognize that González argues that, despite having 

those materials, and despite knowing that a superseding indictment 

was forthcoming, she was unprepared to go to trial because she had 

expected only fifteen new counts of theft of government 

property -- as opposed to eighteen new counts -- and because she 

had not expected to be charged with aggravated identity theft. 

One can certainly see the potential need for more time to prepare 

when faced with a wholly new count. But González must "identify 

specific ways in which the court's erroneous denial of a 

continuance prejudiced . . . her defense." United States v. 

Rodriguez-Marrero, 390 F.3d 1, 22 (1st Cir. 2004); see also 

Rodríguez-Durán, 507 F.3d at 763 ("Identifying prejudice from the 

[denial of a request for a continuance] is essential."). She does 

not, however, point to particular materials she would have more 

carefully reviewed, witnesses or evidence she would have 

investigated, or a strategy she would have pursued had she had 
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more time to prepare. Because she has not identified any concrete 

respect in which she was harmed by the denial of her request for 

a continuance, her challenge fails. See Rodríguez-Durán, 507 F.3d 

at 765 (finding no abuse of discretion in denial of a continuance 

where the defendants "pointed to no pivotal evidence or theories 

that realistically could have made a difference had they been 

allotted more time to prepare for trial"). 

IV. 

Having found no reversible error, we affirm.