Opinion issued March 2, 2023

In The

Court of Appeals 

For The 

First District of Texas 

————————————

NO. 01-22-00601-CR

———————————

JASMINE MARIE ARTEAGA, Appellant

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

On Appeal from the 338th District Court

Harris County, Texas

Trial Court Case Nos. 1708893

MEMORANDUM OPINION

After appellant, Jasmine Marie Arteaga, with an agreed punishment 

recommendation from the State, pleaded guilty to the felony offense of possession 

of a controlled substance, namely, methamphetamine, weighing more than four 
2

grams but less than 200 grams,

1

the trial court deferred adjudication of her guilt and 

placed her on community supervision for four years. Appellant timely filed a notice 

of appeal.

We dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction.2

Background

On April 9, 2021, a Harris County Grand Jury issued a true bill of indictment, 

alleging that appellant, on or about January 30, 2021, “unlawfully, intentionally and 

knowingly possess[ed] a controlled substance, namely, [m]ethamphetamine, 

weighing more than 4 grams and less than 200 grams by aggregate weight.”

Appellant, with an agreed punishment recommendation from the State, 

pleaded guilty to the felony offense of possession of a controlled substance, namely, 

methamphetamine, weighing more than four grams but less than 200 grams. In 

connection with her plea agreement, appellant signed a “Waiver of Constitutional 

1 See TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 481.115(d).

2 Appellant’s appointed appellate counsel filed an Anders brief stating that the record 

presents no reversible error and the appeal is without merit and is frivolous. See 

Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967). However, our review of the record 

reflects that we lack jurisdiction over the appeal. See, e.g., Williams v. State, No. 

01-20-00173-CR, 2022 WL 52635, at *1–2 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Jan. 6, 

2022, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (dismissing appeal in 

which appointed appellate counsel filed Anders brief because this Court lacked 

jurisdiction); Terrell v. State, 245 S.W.3d 602, 605–06 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st 

Dist.] 2007, no pet.) (dismissing appeal in which appointed appellate counsel filed 

Anders brief because defendant entered into plea-bargain agreement, defendant had 

no right to appeal under Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 25.2(a)(2), and Court 

was required to dismiss appeal without examining merits of appeal).
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Rights, Agreement to Stipulate, and Judicial Confession,” in which she pleaded 

guilty to the felony offense of possession of a controlled substance and admitted that 

she committed the acts alleged in the indictment. Appellant’s appointed counsel also 

signed the “Waiver of Constitutional Rights, Agreement to Stipulate, and Judicial 

Confession,” affirming that he believed appellant had entered her guilty plea 

knowingly, voluntarily, and after a full discussion of the consequences of the plea. 

Appellant’s appointed counsel also affirmed that he believed appellant was 

competent to stand trial.

The “Waiver of Constitutional Rights, Agreement to Stipulate, and Judicial 

Confession” also included the following waiver of appellant’s right to appeal:

In open court I consent to the oral and written stipulation of evidence 

in this case and to the introduction of affidavits, written statements[] of 

witnesses, and other documentary evidence. I am satisfied that the 

attorney representing me today in court has properly represented me 

and I have fully discussed this case with him. I intend to enter a plea 

of guilty and the prosecutor will recommend that my punishment 

should be set at 4 year[s] [deferred adjudication] . . . and I agree to that 

recommendation. I waive any further time to prepare for trial to which 

I or my attorney may be entitled. Further, I waive any right of appeal 

which I may have should the court accept the foregoing plea bargain 

between myself and the prosecutor.

Appellant also signed written admonishments, informing her that she had been 

indicted for the felony offense of possession of a controlled substance and of the 

punishment ranges for that offense. Appellant further acknowledged that she 

understood that “[i]f the punishment assessed by the court does not exceed the 
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punishment recommended by the prosecutor and agreed to by [appellant] and [her]

attorney, the court must give its permission to [appellant] before [she] may 

prosecute an appeal on any matter in this case except for those matters raised by 

[appellant] by written motion filed prior to trial.” The written admonishments also 

included a “Statements and Waivers of Defendant,” affirming that she was mentally 

competent, she understood the nature of the charges against her, the trial court’s 

admonishments, and the consequences of her pleas, and she freely and voluntarily 

pleaded guilty. 

Moreover, appellant represented that she had consulted with her trial counsel 

about her plea; she “waive[d] and g[a]ve up any time provided [appellant] by law to 

prepare for trial”; she was “totally satisfied with the representation provided by [her] 

counsel and [she had] received effective and competent representation”; she 

“waive[d] and g[a]ve up [her] right to a jury in th[e] case and [her] right to require 

the appearance, confrontation and cross[-]examination of the witnesses”; and she 

“confess[ed] and admit[ted] that [she] committed each and every allegation 

contained” in the indictment. Appellant requested that the trial court accept her

guilty plea.

Finally, appellant signed a document titled, “Advice of Defendant’s Right of 

Appeal,” explaining that because appellant “pled guilty . . . and accepted the 

punishment recommended by the prosecutor, [appellant could not] appeal [her] 
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conviction unless the [trial court gave her] permission.” Further, appellant 

acknowledged that she “waived or gave up [the] right to appeal, [and she could not] 

appeal [her] conviction.”

The trial court found sufficient evidence of appellant’s guilt and that she had 

entered her guilty plea freely, knowingly, and voluntarily. The trial court 

admonished appellant of her legal rights and accepted her plea of guilty to the alleged 

offense. On July 28, 2022, the trial court entered an Order of Deferred Adjudication, 

deferring adjudication of appellant’s guilt and, in accordance with the agreement 

between appellant and the State, placing her on community supervision for four 

years. The trial court’s Order of Deferred Adjudication acknowledges that a plea

agreement had been reached between the State and appellant.

Also on July 28, 2022, the trial court entered its “Certification of [Appellant’s] 

Right of Appeal, which states that this “[i]s a plea bargain case, and the [appellant]

has NO right of appeal.” See TEX. R. APP. P. 25.2(a)(2), (d). The trial court’s 

certification is included in the appellate record and is signed by appellant and her 

counsel. See id. The record supports the trial court’s certification. See Dears v. 

State, 154 S.W.3d 610, 615 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005).

On August 17, 2022, appellant filed a pro se notice of appeal. In her notice 

of appeal, appellant included a handwritten note stating that her “plea was 

involuntary,” and that her “lawyer didn’t explain to [her] the consequences of [her] 
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plea.” She goes on to state that her counsel “told [her] if [she pleaded] no contest 

[her] case would be thrown out.” On August 31, 2022, appellant’s court-appointed 

trial counsel filed a motion to withdraw as appellant’s counsel. The trial court 

granted the motion to withdraw and appointed counsel to represent appellant on

appeal.

Jurisdiction

“Courts always have jurisdiction to determine their own jurisdiction.” Harrell 

v. State, 286 S.W.3d 315, 317 (Tex. 2009) (internal quotations omitted). Criminal 

defendants have a statutory right to appeal their conviction. See TEX. CODE CRIM.

PROC. ANN. art. 44.02; Carson v. State, 559 S.W.3d 489, 492 (Tex. Crim. App. 

2018). However, when a trial court enters a judgment of guilt, it must certify 

whether the defendant has a right of appeal. See TEX. R. APP. P. 25.2(a)(2). Texas 

Rule of Appellate Procedure 25.2(a) states that: 

In a plea bargain case–that is, a case in which a defendant’s plea was 

guilty . . . and the punishment did not exceed the punishment 

recommended by the prosecutor and agreed to by the defendant–a 

defendant may appeal only: (A) those matters that were raised by 

written motion filed and ruled on before trial, (B) after getting the trial 

court’s permission to appeal, or (C) where the specific appeal is 

expressly authorized by statute. 

TEX. R. APP. P. 25.2(a)(2). 

An appeal must be dismissed if a certification showing that a defendant has 

the right of appeal has not been made part of the record. See TEX.R. APP. P. 25.2(d); 
7

Dears, 154 S.W.3d at 613. Here, the record is clear that appellant pleaded guilty to 

the alleged offense and the punishment did not exceed the punishment recommended 

by the State. Accordingly, appellant could only appeal those matters raised by 

written motion filed and ruled on before trial, with the permission of the trial court, 

or where she was authorized to appeal by statute. See TEX. R. APP. P. 25.2(a)(2). 

The record does not reflect that appellant’s appeal meets any of these requirements. 

Thus, appellant may not appeal her conviction for the felony offense possession of 

a controlled substance.

We note that, in her notice of appeal, filed pro se, appellant challenges the 

voluntariness of her guilty plea, stating that her “plea was involuntary,” and that her 

“lawyer didn’t explain to [her] the consequences of [her] plea.” She further stated 

that her trial counsel “told [her] if [she pleaded] no contest [her] case would be 

thrown out.”3 However, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has concluded that 

Rule 25.2 “does not permit the voluntariness of the plea to be raised on appeal.” 

Cooper v. State, 45 S.W.3d 77, 83 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001) (dismissing appeal for 

lack of jurisdiction where appellant entered plea-bargain agreement with State but 

later filed notice of appeal challenging voluntariness of plea); see also Lenox v. State, 

3 We also note that, while appellant’s notice of appeal references that her trial counsel 

advised her that if she pleaded “no contest,” the “case would be thrown out,” the 

record reflects that appellant did not plead “no contest,” and instead entered a plea 

of guilty.
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56 S.W.3d 660, 664–65 n.2 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2001, pet. ref’d) (concluding 

court was “without jurisdiction to consider the voluntariness of [appellant’s] plea”). 

Instead, “meritorious claims of involuntary pleas may be raised by other procedures: 

motion[s] for new trial and [post-conviction] habeas corpus.” Cooper, 45 S.W.3d at 

82 (“These procedures are not only adequate to resolve claims of involuntary pleas, 

but they are superior to appeal in that the claim may be supported by information 

from sources broader than the appellate record.”).

Because appellant has no right of appeal, we must dismiss her appeal. See 

Chavez v. State, 183 S.W.3d 675, 680 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006) (“A court of appeals, 

while having jurisdiction to ascertain whether an appellant who plea-bargained is 

permitted to appeal by [Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure] 25.2(a)(2), must dismiss 

a prohibited appeal without further action, regardless of the basis for the appeal.”); 

see also Fairley v. State, Nos. 01-20-00824-CR, 01-20-00825-CR, 2022 WL 

210457, at *1–3 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Jan. 25, 2022, no pet.) (mem. op., 

not designated for publication).

Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. See TEX. R. APP.

P. 43.2(f). We dismiss any pending motions as moot.

PER CURIAM

Panel consists of Justices Landau, Countiss, and Guerra.

Do not publish. TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).