IN THE

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

FELIPE PETRONE CABANAS, Petitioner,

v.

THE HONORABLE SUSANNA PINEDA, Judge of the SUPERIOR 

COURT OF THE STATE OF ARIZONA, in and for the County of 

MARICOPA, Respondent Judge,

STATE OF ARIZONA, ex rel. WILLIAM MONTGOMERY, Maricopa 

County Attorney, Real Party in Interest.

No. 1 CA-SA 18-0099

No. 1 CA-SA 18-0119

(Consolidated)

Petition for Special Action from the Superior Court in Maricopa County

No. CR1999-006656-A

The Honorable Susanna C. Pineda, Judge

JURISDICTION ACCEPTED; RELIEF GRANTED

COUNSEL

Maricopa County Public Defender’s Office, Phoenix

By Tennie B. Martin, Kevin D. Heade, Nicholaus Podsiadlik

Co-Counsel for Petitioner

Vikki M. Liles, Attorney at Law, Phoenix

By Vikki M. Liles

Co-Counsel for Petitioner

FILED 11-29-2018
2

Maricopa County Attorney’s Office, Phoenix

By Karen Kemper

Counsel for Real Party in Interest

OPINION

Presiding Judge Maria Elena Cruz delivered the opinion of the Court, in 

which Judge Jennifer B. Campbell and Judge James P. Beene joined.

C R U Z, Judge:

¶1 Felipe Petrone Cabanas seeks special action review of the 

superior court’s rulings granting reconstruction of his 2002 sentencing 

proceeding and ordering him to disclose his mental health and medical

records to the State as part of his post-conviction relief proceedings. We 

hold that Cabanas’ defense of transient immaturity does not, by itself, place 

his mental health at issue such that the State is entitled to have access to his 

medical and mental health records over his objection.

¶2 We accept jurisdiction and grant relief, vacating the superior 

court’s disclosure order. We also separately hold that no reconstruction 

hearing is necessary because the court’s determination as to whether 

Cabanas’ offense was the result of transient immaturity or irreparable 

corruption must be made based on evidence admitted at an upcoming

evidentiary hearing, and not based on consideration of the previous 

sentencing judge’s thought processes outside of his written orders. 

Accordingly, we vacate the order setting such hearing.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶3 In 2001, Cabanas pled guilty to first-degree murder for the 

killing of a police officer. Cabanas was 17 years, 8 months old at the time 

of the murder. During sentencing, the court considered Cabanas’ age, level 

of intelligence, maturity, and other mitigating factors in a twenty-nine-page 

special verdict. The court specifically considered Cabanas’ “juvenile 

impulsivity.” Dr. Barillas, the psychologist that evaluated Cabanas prior to 

sentencing, presented mitigating evidence that Cabanas acted with 

“significant impulsivity.” Determining that mitigation compelled against 

imposition of the death penalty, the court imposed a term of natural life in 

prison without the possibility of release.
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Opinion of the Court

3

¶4 In 2013, Cabanas initiated post-conviction relief proceedings

in light of Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012). The superior court denied 

Cabanas’ request on the grounds that his natural-life sentence was not 

mandatory, “but instead was imposed after the sentencing court had 

considered [Cabanas’] age and other mitigating factors.” State v. Cabanas, 

2017 WL 3599595, at *1, ¶ 5 (Ariz. App. Aug. 22, 2017) (mem. decision). This 

court reversed, stating Cabanas was “sentenced when there was no 

requirement that a sentencing court distinguish between crimes that reflect 

‘irreparable corruption’ as opposed to ‘transient immaturity of youth,’” and 

thus, “[a]lthough the sentencing court considered [his] age in deciding on a 

sentence of natural life, that is insufficient to deny relief . . . based on Miller.” 

Id. at *2, ¶ 8. As a result, we held Cabanas was “entitled to an evidentiary 

hearing to allow him the opportunity to establish that his crime reflected

transient immaturity” and remanded for further proceedings consistent 

with our decision. Id. at ¶¶ 8-9.

I. Disclosure of Medical Records

¶5 At an October 2017 status conference, Cabanas stated his 

intention to call himself, Dr. Barillas, and Professor Steinberg as witnesses,

and further stated that Steinberg would testify in general regarding the 

transient immaturity aspect of the juvenile brain. Claiming the 

determination of transient immaturity requires analysis of the individual’s 

current mental state compared to their juvenile evaluation, Cabanas stated 

he would call Dr. Barillas to testify to Cabanas’ present-day maturity level 

to prove his crime reflected transient immaturity. Under this anticipated 

presentation of the defense’s case, Dr. Barillas was set to testify specifically 

about Cabanas, while Steinberg would testify about general characteristics 

associated with juvenile impulsivity.

¶6 In January 2018, the assigned judge recused herself, Cabanas’ 

counsel withdrew, and the Public Defender’s Office was appointed. After 

Cabanas stated he would not call Dr. Barillas to testify but instead would 

perform a nationwide search to identify an appropriate mental health 

expert, the State requested the court order production of Cabanas’ medical 

and mental health records for the State’s expert to review. The court 

granted the State’s request for disclosure of all Arizona Department of 

Corrections and/or Corizon1 reports dated February 20, 2002 through 

March 1, 2018, and all Maricopa County Correctional Health Services

records from March 27, 1999 through March 4, 2002; June 25, 2015 through 

July 7, 2015; and January 16, 2018 through March 1, 2018. Cabanas objected,

 

1 Corizon is a correctional facility healthcare provider.
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Opinion of the Court

4

arguing he had not noticed a mental health defense nor designated an 

expert; the court overruled the objection, but allowed Cabanas to submit 

redacted records to the court for review. The court did not establish any 

parameters for such redactions. Cabanas again challenged the order but

submitted unredacted copies of the records for the court to review in camera. 

The court denied Cabanas’ challenge and ordered all the documents 

produced.

¶7 Cabanas now seeks special action review from the superior 

court’s order compelling disclosure of his medical and mental health 

records.

II. Reconstruction Hearing

¶8 Also discussed at the October 19 conference was the State’s

request for a reconstruction hearing on remand from this court’s mandate 

in Cabanas, 2017 WL 3599595. In support of its request, the State stated that 

because it was unable to access the transcript of the 2002 sentencing, it 

wanted to call the sentencing judge to testify to reconstruct the record. The 

State argued that while the record contained the special verdict, there was 

no record of the original sentencing proceeding, and that if no transcript or 

court reporter notes were located, the court should reconstruct the original 

sentencing to complete the record. The State argued the record needed to 

be reconstructed because if Cabanas were to meet his burden under 

Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure (“Rule”) 32.8(c), the State would then

have the burden of proving that the constitutional error was harmless 

beyond a reasonable doubt.

¶9 After argument on November 16, the court ordered a hearing 

to reconstruct portions of the record not included within the sentencing 

judge’s twenty-nine-page special verdict, which could not otherwise be 

recreated by way of affidavit or declaration. The State filed a motion reurging its request to have the original sentencing judge testify as a witness 

during a reconstruction hearing and the evidentiary hearing.

¶10 At the hearing on the State’s motion, the State indicated it 

intended to call the sentencing judge to reconstruct the record as well as to 

rebut Cabanas’ purported constitutional violation during the evidentiary 

hearing. The State intended to inquire whether the sentencing judge 

considered Cabanas’ youth as a chronological fact or whether the judge 

considered the crime as being the product of youthful conduct. Previouslyassigned counsel did not object and the court granted the State’s request to 

call the former sentencing judge as a witness for the purpose of 
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Opinion of the Court

5

reconstructing the sentencing record, as well as to provide testimony at the 

subsequent evidentiary hearing; however, before allowing the judge to 

testify, the court directed the parties to research whether the State could 

delve into the mental processes of the sentencing judge.

¶11 New defense counsel was appointed in January 2018 and 

moved to vacate the reconstruction hearing. Through April 2018, the State 

continued to argue that “[i]n order to address [transient immaturity], the 

trial court will need to look at what was considered at the original 

sentencing.” The court heard renewed argument on April 16, 2018, denied 

Cabanas’ motion to vacate the reconstruction hearing, and ordered a threeday evidentiary hearing set for the beginning of July 2018 to “absorb, 

evaluate, and determine whether or not there was transient immaturity,” 

and to reconstruct the evidence provided at the time of sentencing. 

Cabanas also seeks special action relief from this ruling.

DISCUSSION

I. Special Action Jurisdiction

¶12 Special action jurisdiction is proper when a party has no 

“equally plain, speedy, and adequate remedy by appeal.” Ariz. R.P. Spec. 

Act. 1(a). We have discretion to accept special action jurisdiction in cases 

“involving a matter of first impression, statewide significance, or pure 

questions of law.” State ex rel. Pennartz v. Olcavage, 200 Ariz. 582, 585, ¶ 8 

(App. 2001).

A. Disclosure of Medical Records

¶13 Cabanas argues compelled disclosure of all mental health and 

medical records, before he has placed his mental state at issue, violates his 

Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination and Arizona’s statutory 

psychologist-patient privilege. Ariz. Rev. Stat. (“A.R.S.”) § 32-2085(A). The 

State claims Cabanas necessarily placed his mental health at issue by 

challenging his sentence on the grounds that his actions reflected “transient 

immaturity” and not “irreparable corruption.” This case thus involves both 

a matter of first impression and a pure question of law. See Ulibarri v. 

Superior Court, 184 Ariz. 382, 384 (App. 1995) (“Existence of a privilege is a 

question of law, and a special action is the appropriate means of relief when 

the trial court orders disclosure of information that a party believes is 

privileged.”).

¶14 Further, Cabanas argues his case is one of more than thirty 

cases pending in the superior court where defendants have requested
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Opinion of the Court

6

hearings to demonstrate their convictions were the result of “transient 

immaturity” and not “irreparable corruption,” and that it is thus an issue 

of statewide importance likely to arise again. Accordingly, we accept 

special action jurisdiction.

B. The Reconstruction Hearing

¶15 Special action jurisdiction is appropriate when the superior 

court has acted contrary to this court’s mandate. See Demand v. Gordon, 106 

Ariz. 475, 477 (1970). Cabanas argues the superior court has ordered 

reconstruction of the record in nonconformance with this court’s mandate

in Cabanas, 2017 WL 3599595, which required an evidentiary hearing. The 

State argues reconstruction is necessary to fully set forth a record for review 

of Cabanas’ sentence. See State v. Schackart, 175 Ariz. 494, 499 (1993).

¶16 Because the superior court granted the State’s request to 

reconstruct the original sentencing for use during the evidentiary hearing 

at issue, this case involves a challenge to the superior court’s compliance 

with a mandate of this court. Similarly, the petition raises multiple purely 

legal issues that are capable of repetition and are of statewide importance; 

therefore, we accept special action jurisdiction.

II. Disclosure of Mental Health and Medical Records

¶17 Cabanas argues his post-conviction petition did not place his 

mental state at issue and thus the court’s order that he disclose his mental 

health and medical records to the State was in error. We agree.

¶18 Arizona’s physician-patient privilege, A.R.S. § 13-4062(4), 

precludes a physician from testifying, absent the patient’s consent, to any 

information acquired in attending the patient and extends from statements 

to medical records. State v. Zeitner, 244 Ariz. 217, 221, ¶ 16 (App. 2018).2 

Section 32-2085(A) applies the same privilege to psychologist-patient 

communications and records; however, such privilege is waived when a 

party places the relevant medical or mental state at issue. See Bain v. 

Superior Court, 148 Ariz. 331, 334 (1986) (stating a defendant waives the 

psychologist-patient privilege when they either (1) offer themselves as a 

 

2 While not applicable to this post-decree proceeding, unless the 

defendant waives the privilege by asserting an insanity defense, Arizona’s 

rules and statutes governing mental health examinations preserve the 

defendant’s privilege against self-incrimination grounded in the Fifth 

Amendment prior to conviction. State v. Hegyi, 242 Ariz. 415, 417, ¶ 12 

(2017).
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Opinion of the Court

7

witness and voluntarily testify with reference to privileged 

communications, or (2) place a particular condition at issue by means of a 

claim or affirmative defense).

¶19 In Miller, the U.S. Supreme Court held the Eighth 

Amendment prohibits imposition of mandatory life-without-parole 

sentences for juveniles without giving due consideration for the transient 

immaturity associated with their youth, because mandatory sentencing 

schemes that do not consider the characteristics of youth pose too great a 

risk that a defendant who acts with transient immaturity will be 

disproportionately punished. 567 U.S. at 479-80. In Montgomery v. 

Louisiana, the U.S. Supreme Court held Miller applied retroactively, and 

further held that even discretionary life-without-parole sentences were 

unconstitutional for defendants whose crimes reflect transient immaturity. 

136 S. Ct. 718, 734 (2016) (“Even if a court considers a child’s age before 

sentencing him . . . to a lifetime in prison, that sentence still violates the 

Eighth Amendment for a child whose crime reflects unfortunate yet 

transient immaturity.”) (internal quotations and citations omitted).

¶20 In light of Miller and Montgomery, our supreme court clarified 

in Valencia that in the Rule 32 context, after they present a colorable claim 

for relief, defendants sentenced as juveniles to natural life are entitled to a 

Rule 32.8(a) evidentiary hearing “to establish, by a preponderance of the 

evidence, that their crimes did not reflect irreparable corruption but instead 

transient immaturity.” State v. Valencia, 241 Ariz. 206, 210, ¶ 18 (2016).

3 If

defendants can meet their burden and establish that their crimes reflected 

transient immaturity, then they will have established that their natural-life 

sentences are unconstitutional, thus entitling them to parole-eligible

resentencing. Id.

¶21 Before imposing a natural-life sentence upon a juvenile, the 

court must consider: (1) evidence of juvenility’s hallmark characteristics—

immaturity, impetuosity, and a failure to appreciate risks and 

consequences; (2) the juvenile’s family and home environment; (3) the 

 

3 At oral argument, Cabanas argued Rule 32.8(a) was inapplicable as 

the hearing is controlled by Rule 32.8(d) as a “further proceeding.” We 

disagree. Cabanas’ successful Rule 32.1(g) petition for post-conviction 

relief, Cabanas, 2017 WL 3599595, entitles him to an evidentiary hearing 

because he has made a colorable claim for relief based on Miller. See 

Valencia, 241 Ariz. at 210, ¶18 (relying on Rule 32.8(a) and State v. Amaral, 

239 Ariz. 217, 220, ¶¶ 11-12 (2016) (discussing when an evidentiary hearing 

is required)).
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Opinion of the Court

8

circumstances of the offense, including the extent the juvenile’s 

participation in the conduct and the way that familial and peer pressures 

may have affected them, and whether substance abuse played a role; 

(4) evidence as to whether the incompetencies of youth prevent the juvenile 

from being charged with a lesser offense; and (5) evidence bearing on the

possibility of rehabilitation. Miller, 567 U.S at 477-78.

¶22 But nothing in the line of cases from Miller through Valencia

supports the proposition that a defendant who challenges his natural-life 

sentence with Miller necessarily places his or her mental state at issue. 

Miller implicates the sentencing court’s consideration of whether the 

juvenile’s crime reflects transient immaturity based on the diminished 

culpable state of juveniles, but not necessarily his mental state as reflected 

in mental health records or medical records.

4 567 U.S. at 470-74. While the 

Miller Court noted its holding resulted from studies and psychological 

developments, the object of consideration is the juvenile’s “moral 

culpability,” id. at 471-72, not mental status.

¶23 The State cites Kansas v. Cheever and State v. Schackart to argue 

that Cabanas has placed his mental state at issue. In Cheever, the U.S. 

Supreme Court upheld the admission of a court-ordered psychiatric 

evaluation on rebuttal, where the defendant presented a voluntaryintoxication defense and called an expert, whose own evaluation relied on 

the court-ordered psychiatric evaluation, to testify on his behalf. 571 U.S. 

87, 91-97 (2013). The defendant’s “psychiatric evidence concerned his 

mental status because he used it to argue that he lacked the requisite mental 

capacity to premeditate,” and thus the Fifth Amendment did not bar the 

State from using the court-ordered psychiatric evaluation to rebut the 

defendant’s voluntary-intoxication defense. Id. at 96-97. Here, no 

affirmative defense was presented—only the claim that at the time of 

sentencing, Cabanas’ crime did not reflect irreparable corruption: an 

evaluation that does not turn on his mental ability to premeditate or other 

“mental status,” id., but on the aspects of the crime and his level of maturity

at that time.

¶24 In State v. Druke, a special action case, the court of appeals

reviewed whether the superior court could grant the State’s request to 

appoint a mental health expert to examine the accused where the defendant 

 

4 The State conceded at oral argument that Cabanas could challenge 

each of the Miller factors without relying on mental health or medical 

records. Though he may choose to rely upon such records, we agree he 

need not.
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Opinion of the Court

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did not raise an insanity defense, but instead intended to present expert 

testimony pertaining to his mental condition to negate the element of intent. 

143 Ariz. 314, 316 (App. 1984). The court of appeals held the State was 

entitled to a fair opportunity to present its evidence and rebut the evidence 

of the defendant, because the defendant had placed his mental state at issue.

Id. at 318. On review, the Arizona Supreme Court then held that ordering 

the defendant to submit to a mental examination did not violate his 

privilege against self-incrimination because he had “opened the door” to an 

examination by the State’s expert. Schackart, 175 Ariz. at 500-01.

¶25 We find the above cases distinguishable, as each turned on 

the right to records or examination after mental state is first placed at issue 

by the defendant. Relying on juvenile characteristics and claiming transient 

immaturity does not ipso facto equate to a mental health defense, nor would 

it negate an element of the crime. The fair-opportunity rationale compelling 

the Cheever, Druke, and Schackart decisions is absent here. The reciprocal 

rights of discovery established by the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure 

were intended to further the concept that a defendant is not entitled to an 

unfair advantage in the presentation of his defense. Druke, 143 Ariz. at 318.

5 

No such advantage would arise here by allowing Cabanas the opportunity 

to establish transient immaturity without the use of expert testimony or 

other clinical reference to his mental health. We hold that until Cabanas

relies on such records or otherwise places his mental status at issue, the

State is not entitled to disclosure of his mental health records or to a mental 

health evaluation. We vacate the court’s order as premature.

III. The Order Compelling Disclosure Is Overbroad

¶26 In light of State v. Valencia, this court held that Cabanas was 

entitled to an evidentiary hearing to allow him the opportunity to establish 

that his crime reflects transient immaturity. Cabanas, 2017 WL 3599595, at 

*2, ¶ 8. The State argues that because the original sentencing transcripts are 

lost, it is entitled to reconstruct the original hearing. The State further

argues reconstruction is necessary to complete the record for reference 

 

5 While Rule 15 applies to the trial stage, not to post-conviction relief 

proceedings, Canion v. Cole, 210 Ariz. 598, 599, ¶ 9 (2005), we nevertheless 

find the reciprocal-right-of-discovery rationale applicable. The Valencia

hearing (1) grants the petitioner the opportunity to have the court 

determine an issue of material fact, Rule 32.8(a); (2) is part of the original 

criminal action, Rule 32.3; (3) applies the Arizona Rules of Evidence, Rule 

32.8(b); and (4) requires the court to make specific findings of fact and state 

its conclusions of law, Rule 32.8(d)(1).
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Opinion of the Court

10

during the evidentiary hearing. Cabanas argues reconstruction is 

inappropriate, redundant to the purpose of the evidentiary hearing, and 

violates this court’s mandate. This court reviews whether the superior 

court has complied with the appellate court’s mandate de novo. In re 

Marriage of Molloy, 181 Ariz. 146, 149 (App. 1994).

A. Whether a Harmless Error Burden Applies

¶27 Intertwined in the State’s argument for reconstruction and 

questioning the sentencing judge during the evidentiary hearing is its belief 

that Rule 32.8 imposes a burden on the State to establish harmless error if 

the defendant meets his burden showing his sentence was unconstitutional. 

See Rule 32.8(c). The State’s belief is mistaken.

¶28 Miller and Montgomery hold that a natural-life sentence 

imposed on a juvenile for a crime reflecting transient immaturity is

categorically unconstitutional. Valencia, 241 Ariz. at 209-10, ¶¶ 16-18. It is 

the imposition of a life sentence upon a youth whose crime reflects transient 

immaturity which violates the Eighth Amendment, not the sentencing 

court’s consideration of age-related factors. Id. at 210, ¶ 17 (citing 

Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 736) (“Montgomery noted that ‘Miller did not 

require trial courts to make a finding of fact regarding a child’s 

incorrigibility,’ but instead held that imposing a sentence of life without 

parole on a ‘child whose crime reflects transient immaturity’ violates the 

Eighth Amendment.”).

¶29 The Valencia hearing thus operates as an eligibility

determination: if Cabanas meets his burden then he will have established 

that his natural-life sentence is unconstitutional, thus entitling him to 

resentencing. Valencia, 241 Ariz. at 210, ¶ 18; Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 734

(stating Miller “rendered life without parole an unconstitutional penalty for 

a class of defendants because of their status—that is, juvenile offenders 

whose crimes reflect the transient immaturity of youth”) (internal 

quotations and citations omitted). Though the State typically carries the 

burden to rebut a constitutional violation by showing it was harmless per 

Rule 32.8(c), it cannot prove that the failure to consider the Miller-type 

factors was harmless here; if Cabanas is successful, then the 

unconstitutional life sentence cannot stand.

¶30 To the extent the State relies on harmless error to support the 

need for reconstruction, that argument fails. The superior court is limited 

by our mandate to decide the material issue presently before it: whether 

Cabanas’ crime reflected transient immaturity or irreparable corruption. It 
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Opinion of the Court

11

is not tasked with deciding whether the previous sentence should stand,

nor may it base its decision on considerations by the previous sentencing 

judge. See Phillips v. Clancy, 152 Ariz. 415, 418-21 (App. 1986) (discussing 

the impropriety of a judge testifying how he would have ruled had a 

circumstance or factor been different); In re Aubuchon, 233 Ariz. 62, 69-70, 

¶ 34 (2013) (discussing the impropriety of probing into the mental processes 

engaged in by a judge).6

B. Need for Reconstruction

¶31 The State argues Rule 31.8(f) allows reconstruction of a 

portion of the record on appeal because the original sentencing transcript is 

unavailable. See, e.g., Schackart, 175 Ariz. at 497-98. However, the current 

Rule 32.8 proceeding is a post-conviction relief petition and subsequent 

evidentiary hearing to determine whether Cabanas’ crime reflected 

transient immaturity, not a direct appeal—thus, Rule 31.8 is inapplicable. 

See Rule 32.3(a) (discussing the nature of a post-conviction relief proceeding 

and its relation to other remedies); see also State v. Gutierrez, 229 Ariz. 573, 

579, ¶ 32 (2012) (“Rule 32.8(a) provide[s] for an evidentiary hearing only to 

determine issues of material fact.”). More to the point, the superior court is 

not tasked with reviewing a previous court decision for error and thus need 

not review the previous transcript. See Schackart, 175 Ariz. at 499, 503 

(vacating death sentence and ordering new sentencing hearing based on a 

finding that the sentencing transcript was inadequate given the broad scope 

of the court’s obligation to independently review defendant’s death 

sentence); State v. Hart, 110 Ariz. 55, 57 (1973) (remanding for a new trial 

where appellant could not make first appeal without transcripts which 

were unavailable by no fault of appellant).

¶32 The State claims “[r]econstruction will allow this Court to 

hear the facts and circumstances of [Cabanas’] crimes.” The State’s recited 

purpose of reconstruction is redundant to the evidentiary hearing. To the 

extent the superior court on remand seeks to “absorb, evaluate, and 

 

6 The State argues that calling the sentencing judge to testify is 

necessary to complete the record; but a judge may be called upon to give 

evidence, if at all, only in “instances in which there is no other reasonably 

available way to prove the facts sought.” In re Peasley, 208 Ariz. 27, 34-35, 

¶ 30 n.14 (2004) (citation omitted). That is not the case here, as the State 

conceded during oral argument that it has all other records of the original 

sentencing, including the exhibits, list of witnesses, and the original 

sentencing judge’s detailed twenty-nine-page special verdict. The only 

missing portion is the transcript.
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Opinion of the Court

12

determine whether . . . there was transient immaturity,” it must do so 

during the evidentiary hearing, within the parameters established in Miller,

Montgomery, Valencia, and this decision. We therefore hold that the superior 

court erred when it ordered a reconstruction hearing.

¶33 The superior court retains discretion to admit relevant 

evidence during the evidentiary hearing tending to prove or disprove that 

Cabanas’ crime reflected transient immaturity, Ariz. R. Evid. 401-403, and 

make necessary factual findings and conclusions of law pursuant to Rule

32.8.

CONCLUSION

¶34 For the foregoing reasons, we accept special action 

jurisdiction and grant relief. The superior court’s order requiring disclosure 

of Cabanas’ medical and mental health records is vacated. The court’s order 

granting reconstruction and permitting the State to call the sentencing 

judge to testify is also vacated, and we remand for compliance with this 

court’s previous mandate and this decision.