IN THE SUPREME COURT OF NORTH CAROLINA

No. 280PA22

Filed 23 August 2024

KODY KINSLEY, in his official capacity as SECRETARY OF THE NORTH 

CAROLINA DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES

v.

ACE SPEEDWAY RACING, LTD., AFTER 5 EVENTS, LLC, 1804-1814 GREEN 

STREET ASSOCIATES LIMITED PARTNERSHIP, JASON TURNER, and 

ROBERT TURNER

On discretionary review pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7A-31 of a unanimous decision

of the Court of Appeals, 284 N.C. App. 665 (2022), affirming an order entered on 12 

January 2021 by Judge John M. Dunlow in Superior Court, Alamance County. Heard 

in the Supreme Court on 7 November 2023.

Joshua H. Stein, Attorney General, by Ryan Y. Park, Solicitor General, James 

W. Doggett, Deputy Solicitor General, Nicholas S. Brod, Deputy Solicitor 

General, James W. Whalen, Solicitor General Fellow, John P. Barkley, Special 

Deputy Attorney General, and Hyrum J. Hemingway, Assistant Attorney 

General, for plaintiff-appellant. 

Kitchen Law, PLLC, by S.C. Kitchen, for defendants-appellees, After 5 Events, 

LLC, Jason Turner, and Robert Turner. 

Ivy A. Johnson and Kristi L. Graunke for ACLU of North Carolina Legal 

Foundation, amicus curiae.

Maynard Nexsen PC, by David S. Pokela and John Mabe, for Association of 

State and Territorial Health Officials, amicus curiae.

Teague Campbell Dennis & Gorham, by James M. Stanley, Jr. and Matthew 

W. Skidmore, for North Carolina Association of Local Health Directors, amicus 

curiae.
KINSLEY v. ACE SPEEDWAY RACING, LTD.

Opinion of the Court

-2-

Institute for Justice, by Joshua Windham; and Stam Law Firm, by Daniel 

Gibson, for Jay Singleton, D.O. and Singleton Vision Center, P.A., amici curiae.

DIETZ, Justice.

In the early days of the COVID-19 pandemic, Governor Roy Cooper declared a 

state of emergency and issued an executive order affecting outdoor venues such as 

stadiums, concert arenas, and racetracks. The executive order permitted these 

venues to stay open but limited attendance to only twenty-five people, regardless of 

the venue’s size. 

Robert Turner, who operated a racetrack in Alamance County known as Ace 

Speedway, spoke out against these restrictions and told the public that his racetrack 

would remain open for all attendees. This led to the series of events at issue in this

lawsuit. 

These events concern matters that are controversial in contemporary politics. 

The legal issues in this appeal, by contrast, are so time-tested that they border on 

mundane. In our legal system, we treat the initial allegations in a lawsuit as true 

when assessing whether the case can move forward at the outset. It is only after the 

parties have had the opportunity to gather evidence—from each other, and from other 

parties with knowledge about the case—that courts examine whether those 

allegations are true.

Here, the claims at issue allege that Governor Cooper took a series of “unusual 
KINSLEY v. ACE SPEEDWAY RACING, LTD.

Opinion of the Court

-3-

steps” to single out and shut down Ace Speedway—first by pressuring the local sheriff 

to arrest Turner and, when the sheriff refused, ordering public health officials to shut 

down Ace Speedway as a health hazard. The claims also allege that Governor Cooper 

took these actions not because there was an actual health hazard at the racetrack,

but to punish Turner for speaking out, and that health officials did not take similar 

actions against other large outdoor venues whose owners did not openly criticize the 

Governor.

We emphasize that these allegations remain unproven. After all, the case has

barely begun. Still, as explained below, these allegations assert colorable claims 

under the North Carolina Constitution for which there is no alternative remedy. As 

a result, at this stage of the case, the trial court properly denied the State’s motion to 

dismiss. We affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals, which in turn affirmed the 

trial court’s ruling.

Facts and Procedural History

The following statement of facts is taken from the counterclaims asserting 

constitutional violations. Under the applicable standard of review, we take these

unproven allegations as true for purposes of our review. Deminski v. State Bd. of 

Educ., 377 N.C. 406, 412 (2021).

In early March 2020, Governor Roy Cooper declared a state of emergency in 

response to the COVID pandemic. On 20 May 2020, the Governor invoked his 

emergency authority to issue Executive Order 141. That order temporarily prohibited 
KINSLEY v. ACE SPEEDWAY RACING, LTD.

Opinion of the Court

-4-

all “mass gatherings.” The order defined a mass gathering as “an event or convening 

that brings together more than ten (10) people indoors or more than twenty-five (25) 

people outdoors at the same time in a single confined indoor or outdoor space, such 

as an auditorium, stadium, arena, or meeting hall.” Exec. Order No. 141, 34 N.C. Reg. 

2360 (May 20, 2020).

The executive order applied to Ace Speedway, a large outdoor racetrack in 

Alamance County. Shortly after the Governor announced the executive order, one of 

Ace Speedway’s owners, Robert Turner, publicly announced that that racetrack

would remain open and “have people in the stands.” 

Turner explained that “unless they can barricade the road, I’m going to do it. 

The racing community wants to race. They’re sick and tired of the politics. People are 

not scared of something that ain’t killing nobody. It may kill .03 percent, but we deal 

with more than that every day, and I’m not buying it no more.” 

As Turner indicated, Ace Speedway hosted its first race of the season on 23 

May 2020, shortly after the executive order took effect. That event exceeded the 25-

person attendance limit at the racetrack.

Ace Speedway had a second race scheduled for the following week. After 

learning that the speedway did not comply with the executive order, the Governor 

reached out to Alamance County Sheriff Terry Johnson. The Governor asked the 

Sheriff to meet with Ace Speedway and convince the speedway to postpone the 

upcoming race. As requested, Sheriff Johnson met with Ace Speedway. Nevertheless, 
KINSLEY v. ACE SPEEDWAY RACING, LTD.

Opinion of the Court

-5-

the speedway hosted its second race as planned. Following that race, Sheriff Johnson 

announced that he would not take any further steps to enforce the executive order, 

citing concerns with the order’s constitutionality.

On 5 June 2020, the Governor sent a letter to the Alamance County 

Commissioners and to Sheriff Johnson explaining that the races at Ace Speedway 

violated the executive order and were criminal acts subject to enforcement by local 

law enforcement officers. The letter warned that if Sheriff Johnson refused to “do his 

duty” and enforce the executive order, the Governor would take further action.

The letter did not stop Ace Speedway from hosting its third race of the season

in early June. Following that third race, the Secretary of the North Carolina

Department of Health and Human Services issued an abatement order that required 

Ace Speedway to close its operations as an “imminent hazard” to public health. The 

abatement order required Ace Speedway to notify the public that the upcoming races 

and events at the facility were canceled and confirm in writing to DHHS that the 

public had been notified of the racetrack’s closure.

Other large venues across the State also permitted more than 25 people to 

attend their events in violation of the emergency order, but DHHS only issued an 

abatement order against Ace Speedway. DHHS did not take similar enforcement 

action against other venues that had not spoken out against Governor Cooper’s 

policies.

Ace Speedway refused to comply with the abatement order. Just days later, 
KINSLEY v. ACE SPEEDWAY RACING, LTD.

Opinion of the Court

-6-

DHHS filed a lawsuit. The complaint named Ace Speedway and its owners and 

operators as defendants.1 It sought a declaratory judgment that Ace Speedway

violated the abatement order and that the State was entitled to an injunction forcing 

it to comply.

After a hearing, the trial court issued a preliminary injunction prohibiting Ace

Speedway from conducting races and other events at its facilities until it complied 

with the terms of the abatement order.

As the lawsuit progressed, Ace Speedway and its operators answered the 

complaint and asserted counterclaims against the State for violation of their 

constitutional right to earn a living and to be free from selective enforcement of the 

law.

Later in the year, as the lawsuit continued, the Governor replaced Executive 

Order 141 with a new executive order that loosened restrictions on mass gatherings. 

DHHS concluded that this extinguished the existing abatement order. DHHS 

therefore voluntarily dismissed its claims against Ace Speedway. The State also 

moved to dismiss the counterclaims on the ground that those claims were barred by 

sovereign immunity. 

The trial court denied the motion to dismiss and the State appealed. The Court

of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s order denying the motion. This Court allowed the 

State’s petition for discretionary review of that decision. 

1 For ease of reading, we will refer to the defendants collectively as “Ace Speedway.”
KINSLEY v. ACE SPEEDWAY RACING, LTD.

Opinion of the Court

-7-

Analysis

I. Standard of Review

We begin our analysis with the appropriate standard of review. The State 

appealed the trial court’s denial of a motion to dismiss based on sovereign immunity.

Ordinarily, a court’s analysis of sovereign immunity focuses not on the merits of the 

plaintiff’s claim, but on whether the State has “consented or waived its immunity” to 

being sued. Est. of Graham v. Lambert, 385 N.C. 644, 651 (2024).

But here, the analysis is different because of the nature of the claims. Ace 

Speedway brought two claims for violations of rights in the North Carolina 

Constitution. These constitutional claims are known as “Corum claims.” See Corum 

v. Univ. of N.C., 330 N.C. 761 (1992). This Court created Corum claims because of the 

time-honored principle that where there is a right, there is a remedy. Washington v. 

Cline, 385 N.C. 824, 825 (2024). “To ensure that every right does indeed have a 

remedy in our court system, Corum offers a common law cause of action when existing 

relief does not sufficiently redress a violation of a particular constitutional right.” 

Askew v. City of Kinston, 902 S.E.2d 722, 728 (2024) (cleaned up). 

Importantly, the State cannot assert sovereign immunity as a defense to a 

valid Corum claim. As we explained in Corum, when there is “a clash between these 

constitutional rights and sovereign immunity, the constitutional rights must prevail.” 

Corum, 330 N.C. at 786. Thus, sovereign immunity “cannot stand as a barrier” to a 

Corum claim. Id. at 785.
KINSLEY v. ACE SPEEDWAY RACING, LTD.

Opinion of the Court

-8-

But it is not enough for a claimant to simply assert that a claim is valid under

Corum. We have acknowledged that, to pierce the State’s sovereign immunity at the 

outset, the complaint must “sufficiently allege” a Corum claim. Deminski, 377 N.C. 

at 407.

In Deminski, we outlined three criteria necessary to sufficiently allege a Corum

claim. First, the complaint must allege that a state actor violated the claimant’s state 

constitutional rights. Id. at 413. Second, “the claim must be colorable,” meaning that 

the claim “must present facts sufficient to support an alleged violation of a right 

protected by the State Constitution.” Id. Third, there must be no other “adequate 

state remedy” for this alleged constitutional violation. Id. If a claimant satisfies these 

three criteria, sovereign immunity “does not bar the claim” and the trial court must 

deny a motion to dismiss based on sovereign immunity. Id. at 407.

Much of our recent Corum jurisprudence has focused extensively on whether 

there was an adequate alternative remedy. See, e.g., Askew, 902 S.E.2d at 733; 

Washington, 385 N.C. at 825. Here, though, the State does not dispute that Ace 

Speedway has no adequate alternative remedy because there is no other forum in 

which it could seek relief for these constitutional violations. We agree. Likewise, the 

State does not dispute that the complaint alleges state actors violated the state 

constitution. Again, we agree.

Thus, the first and third criteria of the test we set out in Deminski are satisfied. 

The State’s arguments (and, as a result, this entire appeal) focuses solely on the 
KINSLEY v. ACE SPEEDWAY RACING, LTD.

Opinion of the Court

-9-

second criteria—whether Ace Speedway asserted a “colorable claim” under the state 

constitution.

As we made clear in Deminski, at the motion to dismiss stage, whether a claim 

is “colorable” focuses entirely on the allegations in the complaint. Deminski, 377 N.C. 

at 412. Those allegations are “treated as true” and the Court examines whether the 

allegations, if proven, constitute a violation of a right protected by the North Carolina 

Constitution. Id. We therefore examine each of Ace Speedway’s constitutional claims 

and assess whether the allegations assert colorable constitutional claims.

II. Fruits of Their Labor Clause

We begin with Ace Speedway’s claim that the State deprived the speedway and 

its owners of their inalienable right to earn a living guaranteed by the provision of

Article I, Section 1 of the North Carolina Constitution known as the “Fruits of Their 

Labor Clause.”

Article I, Section 1 provides as follows: “We hold it to be self-evident that all 

persons are created equal; that they are endowed by their Creator with certain 

inalienable rights; that among these are life, liberty, the enjoyment of the fruits of 

their own labor, and the pursuit of happiness.” N.C. Const. art. I, § 1. 

This language, added in our state’s 1868 constitution, “borrowed certain 

phraseology from the Declaration of Independence.” State v. Ballance, 229 N.C. 764, 

768 (1949). But the framers also added something new, described in Ballance as an 

“interpolation”—the people’s inalienable right to “the enjoyment of the fruits of their 
KINSLEY v. ACE SPEEDWAY RACING, LTD.

Opinion of the Court

-10-

own labor.” Id.

We explained in Ballance that this added constitutional right protects people 

“engaging in any legitimate business, occupation, or trade.” Id. at 770. It bars state 

action burdening these activities unless “the promotion or protection of the public 

health, morals, order, or safety, or the general welfare makes it reasonably 

necessary.” Id.

Thus, to survive constitutional scrutiny under this provision, the challenged 

state action “must be reasonably necessary to promote the accomplishment of a public 

good, or to prevent the infliction of a public harm.” Id. This test involves a “twofold” 

inquiry: “(1) is there a proper governmental purpose for the statute, and (2) are the 

means chosen to effect that purpose reasonable?” Poor Richard’s, Inc. v. Stone, 322 

N.C. 61, 64 (1988).

The first step in this inquiry requires the reviewing court to identify the State’s 

actual purpose for the constraint on private business activity. Initially, the State may 

simply assert that purpose, without the need to “come forward with evidence” proving 

that it is, indeed, the true purpose. Id. at 66. But the plaintiff may rebut that 

assertion with evidence demonstrating that the State’s asserted purpose is not the 

true one, and instead the State is pursuing a different, unstated purpose. Id.

For example, in Roller v. Allen, the State defended licensing requirements for 

ceramic tile installers by asserting that they were necessary to combat consumer 

fraud by unqualified workers. 245 N.C. 516, 521–23 (1957). After reviewing the 
KINSLEY v. ACE SPEEDWAY RACING, LTD.

Opinion of the Court

-11-

evidence, this Court rejected that assertion, holding that the statute’s “main and 

controlling purpose” was “not health, not safety, not morals, not welfare, but a tight 

control of tile contracting in perpetuity by those already in the business.” Id. at 525.

Simply put, courts assess Fruits of Their Labor Clause claims based on the actual

purpose of the state action, and that may not always be the purpose initially put 

forward by the State.

Once the actual purpose of the challenged state action is identified, the 

reviewing court must then assess whether that purpose is a “proper governmental 

purpose.” Poor Richard’s, 322 N.C. at 64. Proper purposes are those that “promote 

the accomplishment of a public good, or to prevent the infliction of a public harm.”

Ballance, 229 N.C. at 770. It is, of course, impossible to enumerate every public good 

or public harm. But our case law offers guidance on how to determine if a purpose is 

broad enough that it addresses public welfare generally, rather than private 

interests. Id. at 770–71. 

In Ballance, for example, this Court rejected the notion that it was a public 

good to reduce “fire risk incident to the practice of photography on account of 

combustible materials employed.” Id. at 771. That purpose was too narrow to serve 

the public welfare generally. It addressed only “the interests of a particular class 

rather than the good of society as a whole.” Id. at 772. 

Put another way, reducing fire risks for all members of the public is a proper 

governmental purpose. And, if a particular business activity poses a heightened risk 
KINSLEY v. ACE SPEEDWAY RACING, LTD.

Opinion of the Court

-12-

of fire hazards, regulating that specific activity may be a reasonable means of 

advancing the broader purpose, even if it only impacts a subset of the public. See id.

But a proper governmental purpose must address the “public interest.” Protecting the 

public from fire hazards is in the public interest. Protecting only photography 

businesses from fire hazards, with no concern for anyone else, is merely a regulation 

of “a private business unaffected in a legal sense with any public interest.” Id. at 770.

If the reviewing court determines that the challenged state action serves a 

proper governmental purpose, the inquiry then reaches the second stage: “are the 

means chosen to effect that purpose reasonable?” Poor Richard’s, 322 N.C. at 64. This 

is a fact-intensive analysis. “The means used must be measured by balancing the 

public good likely to result from their utilization against the burdens resulting to the 

businesses being regulated.” Id. at 66. 

This requires assessing two fact-specific questions—first, how effective is the 

state action at achieving the desired public purpose and, second, how burdensome is 

that state action to the targeted businesses. The analysis then becomes “a question 

of degree”—given all the options available to the state to advance the governmental 

purpose, was it reasonable for the state to choose this approach, with its 

corresponding benefits and burdens? Id.

Having laid out the appropriate test for a Fruits of Their Labor Clause claim, 

we now turn to whether the Court of Appeals erred when it held that Ace Speedway 

sufficiently alleged a colorable claim under that provision. At this point, we circle 
KINSLEY v. ACE SPEEDWAY RACING, LTD.

Opinion of the Court

-13-

back to the standard of review described above. We treat the allegations in the 

complaint as true and examine whether, if those allegations are proven, Ace 

Speedway would prevail under the two-step inquiry for a Fruits of Their Labor Clause 

claim. See Deminski, 377 N.C. at 412.

We begin with the first step of the test. The State contends that there “can be 

little question that the order seeks to achieve ‘a proper governmental purpose’” 

because “protecting North Carolinians from a novel virus—a virus that would 

eventually kill over one million Americans” is a proper governmental purpose. 

But this ignores the central allegation in Ace Speedway’s claim—that the 

purpose of the abatement order was not to protect public health, but to retaliate 

against Ace Speedway for criticizing the Governor. Ace Speedway alleges that it was 

“singled out by the Governor for enforcement” because it spoke out against the 

Governor’s emergency order, and that other businesses violating the emergency order 

were not subjected to similar enforcement action by the State. This allegation, if true, 

would establish that the State did not pursue a proper governmental purpose because 

its purpose was not to protect the public interest, but to punish a private business for 

standing up to the government.

At the motion to dismiss stage, we must accept Ace Speedway’s allegation as 

true. Deminski, 377 N.C. at 412. Accordingly, Ace Speedway sufficiently alleged that 

the State’s actions did not serve a proper governmental purpose.

We next turn to the second step of the test. Even if the State had a proper 
KINSLEY v. ACE SPEEDWAY RACING, LTD.

Opinion of the Court

-14-

governmental purpose, we must assess whether the means chosen to achieve that 

purpose were reasonable. The State argues that the abatement order was reasonably 

necessary to protect the public health because “large mass gatherings at places like 

racetracks presented an elevated risk for spreading COVID-19.” The State further 

argues that the need to use the abatement order to shut down Ace Speedway stemmed 

from “the best scientific and medical knowledge available at the time” to prevent the 

spread of COVID-19.

But again, the State ignores the allegations in this constitutional claim. Ace 

Speedway alleges that other racetracks and similar businesses violated the same 

emergency order, yet none of those speedways faced similar enforcement action. See

Poor Richard’s, 322 N.C. at 66. Even if we accept the State’s asserted purpose for the 

abatement order—protecting the public by stopping the spread of COVID-19—this 

would mean that the State sought to achieve this governmental purpose by issuing 

an abatement order shutting down a single business while choosing to ignore many 

others presenting identical risks to the public. This is a particularly ineffective means 

of achieving the asserted governmental interest, while simultaneously imposing a 

tremendous burden on Ace Speedway. In other words, balancing the benefits and the 

burdens of the State’s approach, the State’s decision to target Ace Speedway but 

ignore other businesses posing identical risks is not reasonable.

Again, these are merely allegations. But, at this stage, we must accept those 

allegations as true. Deminski, 377 N.C. at 412. Doing so, we conclude that, even 
KINSLEY v. ACE SPEEDWAY RACING, LTD.

Opinion of the Court

-15-

assuming the State had a proper governmental purpose, Ace Speedway sufficiently 

alleged that the means chosen by the State to achieve that purpose were 

unreasonable under the circumstances. 

In sum, Ace Speedway has sufficiently alleged that the challenged state action 

fails both steps in the two-step analysis for a Fruit of Their Labor Clause claim. 

Accordingly, Ace Speedway asserted a colorable constitutional claim that pierces the 

State’s sovereign immunity. The Court of Appeals properly affirmed the trial court’s 

denial of the State’s motion to dismiss this claim based on sovereign immunity.

III. Equal Protection Clause

We next turn to Ace Speedway’s claim that the abatement order was a form of 

unconstitutional selective enforcement in violation of the Equal Protection Clause in 

Article I, Section 19 of the North Carolina Constitution.

Ordinarily, the use of “some selectivity” when the government enforces the law

is appropriate and not a violation of equal protection. State v. Lawson, 310 N.C. 632, 

643 (1984). To establish that the State’s selective enforcement violated the Equal 

Protection Clause, the claimant must show that the enforcement “was motivated by 

a discriminatory purpose and had a discriminatory effect.” State v. Garner, 340 N.C. 

573, 588 (1995). The “discriminatory purpose” prong requires a showing that the 

government consciously and deliberately based the enforcement on an “unjustifiable 

standard” or “arbitrary classification” such as race, religion, or the exercise of the 

claimant’s constitutional rights. State v. Ward, 354 N.C. 231, 244 (2001). The 
KINSLEY v. ACE SPEEDWAY RACING, LTD.

Opinion of the Court

-16-

“discriminatory effect” prong requires a showing that the claimant has been singled 

out and treated differently “when compared to persons similarly situated.” Maines v. 

City of Greensboro, 300 N.C. 126, 132 (1980). Satisfying this two-part test is necessary 

to overcome the presumption that public officials act in good faith when choosing how 

to enforce the law. Id.

As we repeatedly explained above, we assess whether Ace Speedway 

sufficiently alleged a colorable selective enforcement claim at this early stage of the 

proceeding by accepting the allegations as true and examining whether those 

allegations, if proven, satisfy the two-part test articulated in our case law. See

Deminski, 377 N.C. at 412.

Ace Speedway satisfies this standard. The central allegations of this selective 

enforcement claim are that Robert Turner exercised his First Amendment rights by 

openly criticizing Governor Cooper’s emergency order. In response to that protected 

First Amendment activity, according to the allegations, Ace Speedway was “singled 

out by the Governor for enforcement.”

Ace Speedway alleges that the Governor “took the unusual step of having a 

letter sent to the Sheriff of Alamance County directing him to take action” against 

the speedway and its operators. When the Sheriff refused, the State targeted the 

speedway with the abatement order. This was done, according to Ace Speedway’s 

allegations, because of Robert Turner’s public statements criticizing the Governor. 

Other, similarly situated racetracks did not face enforcement action even though the 
KINSLEY v. ACE SPEEDWAY RACING, LTD.

Opinion of the Court

-17-

State knew that they, too, were violating the emergency order.

These allegations, if proven, would establish that the State acted with the 

discriminatory purpose of retaliating against Robert Turner’s valid exercise of his 

First Amendment rights, and that the enforcement had the discriminatory effect of 

harming Ace Speedway while other, similarly situated businesses faced no 

consequences for the same violations of the emergency order. See Garner, 340 N.C. at 

588. Thus, Ace Speedway asserted a colorable selective enforcement claim that 

pierces the State’s sovereign immunity. The Court of Appeals properly affirmed the 

trial court’s denial of the State’s motion to dismiss this claim as well.

IV. Least Intrusive Remedy Criteria

At the close of its new brief to this Court, the State also argues that, even if 

Ace Speedway asserted colorable constitutional claims, those claims “fail for an 

independent, alternative reason as well: Money damages are not the least-intrusive 

remedy for the constitutional violations.”

This argument is not appropriate at this stage of the proceeding. In Corum, we 

held that, when adjudicating these constitutional claims, “the judiciary must 

recognize two critical limitations.” Corum, 33 N.C. at 784. “First, it must bow to 

established claims and remedies where these provide an alternative to the 

extraordinary exercise of its inherent constitutional power.” Id. “Second, in exercising 

that power, the judiciary must minimize the encroachment upon other branches of 

government—in appearance and in fact—by seeking the least intrusive remedy 
KINSLEY v. ACE SPEEDWAY RACING, LTD.

Opinion of the Court

-18-

available and necessary to right the wrong.” Id.

These two “critical limitations” arise at separate stages of a Corum action. As 

explained above, the first of these critical limitations—the adequate remedy prong—

is incorporated into the test for alleging a valid Corum claim. Deminski, 377 N.C. at 

407. It is effectively “an element” of the constitutional claim. Askew, 902 S.E.2d at 

733. As a result, the analysis of whether the claimant has an adequate, alternative 

remedy can occur when a Corum claim is first asserted. Id. If there is an alternative 

remedy, the Corum claim is infirm and must be dismissed. 

By contrast, the second critical limitation—that the Corum court must choose 

“the least intrusive remedy available and necessary to right the wrong”—arises after

the claimant proves a constitutional violation. Corum, 330 N.C. at 784. Corum

permits the judiciary to “exercise its inherent constitutional power to fashion a 

common law remedy for a violation of a particular constitutional right.” Id. That 

remedy “will depend upon the facts of the case developed at trial. It will be a matter 

for the trial judge to craft the necessary relief.” Id.

Thus, the second limitation identified in Corum is intended as a restraint on 

the scope of relief available to a successful Corum claimant. Corum ensures that 

claimants can obtain “remedies that are meaningful, even if not necessarily complete 

or the relief they want.” Washington, 385 N.C. at 830. Thus, even in cases where the 

claimant seeks money damages, the trial court, at the conclusion of the case, may 

need “to fashion a common law remedy less intrusive than money damages.” Corum, 
KINSLEY v. ACE SPEEDWAY RACING, LTD.

Opinion of the Court

-19-

330 N.C. at 785. What remedy is both least-intrusive and sufficient to provide 

meaningful relief is a question that can be answered only after fact issues are resolved 

and the claim is proven. 

Accordingly, we reject the State’s argument that Ace Speedway’s claims fail 

because the claims do not seek the least-intrusive remedy. That argument is not ripe 

for review. As we have repeated throughout this opinion, Ace Speedway’s allegations 

remain unproven. The case has barely begun. The only question reviewable at this 

early stage of the case is whether Ace Speedway has sufficiently alleged a valid 

Corum claim, thus piercing the State’s sovereign immunity and permitting it to bring 

the State into court to litigate the matter. 

The trial court correctly concluded that the claims are valid and therefore the 

State’s motion to dismiss must be denied. The Court of Appeals, in turn, properly 

affirmed that ruling.

Conclusion

We affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals.

AFFIRMED.