COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA

Present: Judges Fran k, Humphreys and Chafin Argued at Chesapeake, Virginia

TYREE LAMONT MOORE MEMORANDUM OPINION * BY v. Record No. 0828-13-1 JUDGE TERESA M. CHAFIN MAY 6, 2014 COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF SUFFOLK Carl E. Eason, Jr., Judge Afshin Farashahi for appellant. Susan Mozley Harris, Assistan t Attorney General (Kenneth T. Cuccinelli, II, Attorney Genera l, on brief), for appellee.

In a bench trial, Tyree Lamont Moore ( “appellant”) was convicted of causing bodily injury to his girlfriend by stra ngulation, in violatio n of Code § 18.2-51.6. On appeal, appellant

contends that the evidence was insufficient to support a finding that there was a wounding or bodily injury as required by the st rangulation statute. Appellant ne xt contends that even if the evidence was sufficient to show a bodily injury, th e evidence was still insufficient to prove that the act of strangulation caused the injury. Finall y, appellant argues that he should not have been convicted of violating the terms of his probation 1 because the evidence was insufficient to prove the strangulation charge.

* Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, this opin ion is not designated for publication.

1 In addition to his convicti on for strangulation, appellant al so appeals four judgments convicting him of violating his probation and revoking previously suspended sentences. The trial court imposed an active term of five year s and six months of his previously suspended sentences for two counts of attempted capital murd er of a police officer, unlawfully shooting or throwing a missile at an occupied ve hicle, and larceny of an animal.UNPUBLISHED- 2 - Background “On appeal, ‘we review the ev idence in the light most fa vorable to the Commonwealth, granting to it all reasonable inferences fairly deducible therefrom.’” Archer v. Commonwealth, 26 Va. App. 1, 11, 492 S.E.2d 826, 831 (1997) (quo ting Martin v. Commonwealth, 4 Va. App. 438, 443, 358 S.E.2d 415, 418 (1987)). So viewed, the evidence showed that on July 28, 2012, Keisha Wilson, appellant’s live-in girlfriend, wa s riding in a car with appellant when she “popped” her son after “fussing” w ith him. Wilson testified that appellant was angry because she had “popped” her son, and afte r exiting the car and entering thei r home, they argued about it.

Wilson testified that when she came out of the kitchen holding her baby, appellant “hit [her] in [her] face twice and then he choked [her] and pus hed [her] to the floor.” She described the “choking” incident as appellant having “his ha nds around [her] throat [and was] squeezing [her] neck.” Wilson fought appellant in an effort to get to her feet. Once she was able to stand, Wilson said that she “grabbed her ki ds and ran out of the house.” Wilson reported the incident to the police, and Suffolk Police Officer D.K. Gawryluk was dispatched to the residence. On arrival, Ga wryluk noticed that Wilson was “very upset” and “very scared.” Several minutes passed before Wilson was able to give an account of appellant’s assault. According to Gawryluk, appellant ha d “fled the scene” by the time he arrived. Gawryluk testified that he saw a “small lace ration or scratch” on Wilson’s neck, minor swelling to her forehead, and bl ood on her left shoulder. Due to the swelling of her forehead, Gawryluk arranged for the Suffolk rescue squad to evaluate Wilson. After the rescue squad “cleaned up . . . blood on her left shoulder,” Wils on declined further emergency care. Wilson did testify, however, that “there was swelling around [her] neck” because of appellant’s squeezing.- 3 - Analysis Appellant contends that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his conviction of strangulation. More specificall y, appellant urges that there wa s no wounding in this case because

there was no breach in the skin and that there was insufficient evidence to prove bodily injury. Further, even assuming Wilson sustained such bodily injury or was wounded, appellant argues that the evidence was insufficient to prove th at such bodily injury or wounding was caused by the strangulation. We disagree.

A. “B ODILY I NJURY ” A defendant violates Code § 18.2-51.6, a Cla ss 6 felony, when that defendant “without consent impedes the blood circulation or respiration of another person by knowingly, intentionally, and unlawfully applying pressure to the neck of such pe rson, resulting in the wounding or bodily injury of such person.” In this case, appellant’s suffici ency argument requires us to ascertain the meaning of the term “bodily injury” as contained in Code § 18.2-51.6. 2 “‘Because statutory interpretation presents a pure question of law, it is subject to de novo review’ by an appellate court.” Hutter v. Virginia Emp’t Comm’n, 50 Va. App. 590, 594, 652 S.E.2d 151, 153 (2007) (quoting Boynton v. Kilgore, 271 Va. 220, 227, 623 S.E.2d 922, 925 (2006)). “In sum, pure statutory interpretation is the prerogative of the judiciary.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Under accepted principles of statutory construction, “words and phrases used in a statute shou ld be given their ordinary and usually accepted meaning unless a different intention is fairly manifest.” Woolfolk v. Commonwealth, 18 Va. App. 840, 847, 447 S.E.2d 530, 534 (1994). In addition, proper construction seeks to harmonize the provisions of a statute both inte rnally and in relation to other statutes . . . . Legislative purpose can best be

2 The Commonwealth conceded at trial that insufficient evidence was presented to prove that a wounding resulted from a ppellant putting his hands around Wilson’s neck. The trial court agreed, only making a finding of guilt as to bodily injury by strangulation. As such, we focus our analysis on the “bodily injury” po rtion of the stra ngulation statute.- 4 - “‘ascertained from the act itself when read in light of other statutes relating to the same subject matter.’” Moreno v. Moreno, 24 Va. App. 190, 197, 480 S.E.2d 792, 796 (1997) (citation omitted). The doctrine of pari materia teaches that “‘statutes are not to be considered as isolated fragments of law, but as a whole, or as parts of a great, connected homogenous system, or a simple and complete statutory arrangement. ’” Id. at 198, 480 S.E.2d at 796 (citation omitted). Hulcher v. Commonwealth, 39 Va. App. 601, 605-06, 575 S.E.2d 579, 581 (2003). Code § 18.2-51, often labeled th e malicious wounding statute, 3 and Code § 18.2-51.6 are part of the same statutory scheme, and were adopted to protect the physical well-being of persons. Concluding that the te rm “bodily injury” has one mean ing in the context of Code § 18.2-51, but has another meaning within the context of Code § 18.2-51.6, when the two statutes are part of the same le gislative scheme and the relevant language of the two statutes is identical, would be illogical. A ccordingly, reading these statutes in pari materia , it is clear that the legislature intended the term “bodily inju ry” to hold its “everyday, ordinary meaning” throughout the entire statutory scheme. In English v. Commonwealth, 58 Va. App. 711, 715 S.E.2d 391 (2011), this Court interpreted the term “bodily injury” in the context of Code § 18.2-51, the malicious wounding statute. Nevertheless, the definition set forth in Englis h is instructive here. Like appellant, the defendant in English argued that the evidence was insufficient to prove a bodily injury because the victim experi enced no “breach of the skin.” Id. at 717, 715 S.E.2d at 394. In construing the phrase “bodily inju ry,” this Court gave the term its “‘everyday,

3 Code § 18.2-51 states, [i]f any person maliciously shoot, stab, cut, or wound any person or by any means cause him bodily injury, with the intent to maim, disfigure, disable, or kill, he sh all, except where it is otherwise provided, be guilty of a Class 3 felony. If such act be done unlawfully but not maliciously, w ith the intent aforesaid, the offender shall be guilty of a Class 6 felony.- 5 - ordinary meaning’ . . . which needs no technical , anatomical definition. ” Id. at 718, 715 S.E.2d at 395 (quoting Luck v. Commonwealth, 32 Va. App. 827, 832, 531 S.E.2d 41, 43 (2000) (interpreting bodily injury under Code § 18.2- 51.1)). See also Floyd v. Commonwealth, 31 Va. App. 193, 522 S.E.2d 382 (1999) (interpret ing bodily injury unde r Code § 18.2-52). Bodily injury “‘includes soft tissue injuries, at least those which require medical attention and have some residual effect.’” Englis h, 58 Va. App. at 718, 715 S.E.2d at 395 (quoting Ronald J. Bacigal, Criminal Offenses and De fenses 46 (2010-11 ed.) (citation omitted). Thus,

we did not establish a minimum threshold for de termining whether bodily injury was inflicted on a victim. Instead, we determined only that “bodily injuries” included, but were not limited to , those injuries which required medical attention or had some residual effects. Therefore, we do not read English to mean that a ll bodily injuries must include thos e that require medical attention

or that have some residual effects. “‘Bodily injury comprehends, it would seem, any bodily hurt whatsoever.’” English, 58 Va. App. at 718, 715 S.E.2d at 395 (quoting Bryant v. Commonwealth, 189 Va. 310, 316, 53 S.E.2d 54, 57 (1949) (citation omitted)). A person with a bodily injury experiences any “‘detriment, hurt, loss, [or] impairment’ that could fairly be considered an injury to the human body.” Id. at 718-19, 715 S.E.2d at 395 (quoting Johnson v. Commonwealth, 184 Va. 409, 416, 35 S.E.2d 594, 596 (1945) (broken ribs are a bodily injury)). A victim “need not experience any obse rvable wounds, cuts, or breaking of the skin” to prove a bodily inju ry. Id. at 719, 715 S.E.2d at 395.

B. S UFFICIENCY OF THE E VIDENCE Appellant contends that “[ e]ven assuming that the Commonwealth’s evidence established a wounding or bodily injury . . ., the evidence did not show that such wo unding or bodily injury was caused by strangulation.” Where the sufficiency of the evidence is challenged after conviction, it is our duty to consid er it in the light most favorable- 6 - to the Commonwealth and give it all reasonable inferences fairly deducible therefrom. We should affirm the judgment unless it appears from the evidence that th e judgment is plainly wrong or without evidence to support it. Higginbotham v. Commonwealth, 216 Va. 349, 352, 218 S.E.2d 534, 537 (1975). “This principle requires us to ‘discard the evidence of the accused in conflict with that of the Commonwealth, and regard as true all the credible evidence favorable to the Commonwealth and

all fair inferences to be drawn therefrom. ’” James v. Commonwealth, 53 Va. App. 671, 675, 674 S.E.2d 571, 573 (2009) (quoting Parks v. Commonwealth, 221 Va. 492, 498, 270 S.E.2d 755, 759 (1980) (emphasis and citation omitted)). In this case, appellant hit W ilson twice in the face and pushe d her to the floor. While on top of Wilson, appellant had his hands around her n eck and was squeezing his hands so as to cut off her circulation. Wilson was able to escape, but walked away with swelling around her neck. 4 It is reasonable to infer that when appellant compressed Wilson’s neck he caused a soft tissue injury that resulted in the swel ling. Soft tissue injuries clearly fall under the ordinary meaning of bodily injury, which is broad enough to encompass any bodily hurt, detriment, or loss. Thus, we

hold that the trial court had credible evidence be fore it that supported its finding that appellant strangled Wilson in viola tion of Code § 18.2-51.6.

C. P ROBATION R EVOCATION Appellant also contends on a ppeal that the revocation of four previously suspended sentences for two counts of attempted capital murder, unlawfully throwing a missile at an occupied vehicle, and larceny of an animal should be reversed because “the evidence was

insufficient to show that the ac t of strangulation caused such w ounding or bodily injury.” Since the trial judge specifically rule d that the strangling conviction “was the only basis” for the

4 Swelling, in a medical sense, is the transien t abnormal enlargement of a body part or area not due to cell proliferation. See, e.g., Ta ber’s Cyclopedic Medical Dictionary 2253 (21st ed. 2009).- 7 - revocation, appellant contends it was error to rule he had violated the terms and conditions of his probation. First, a “trial court is empowered to revoke a suspended sentence for misconduct occurring after the initial suspension of sentence and prior to the expiration of the period of suspension.” Canty v. Commonwealth, 57 Va. App. 171, 175-76, 699 S.E.2d 526, 528 (2010) (citing Collins v. Commonwealth, 269 Va. 141, 147, 607 S.E.2d 719, 722 (2005)). “The cause deemed by the court to be sufficient for revoki ng a suspension must be reasonable cause.” Hamilton v. Commonwealth, 217 Va. 325, 327, 228 S. E.2d 555, 556 (1976) (internal citations and quotations omitted). The “revocation of a su spended sentence lies in the discretion of the trial court and that . . . discretion is quite broad.” Peyton v. Co mmonwealth, 268 Va. 503, 508, 604 S.E.2d 17, 19 (2004). On appeal from a revoca tion proceeding, the trial court’s “‘findings of fact and judgment will not be reversed unless there is a clear showing of abuse of discretion.’” Keselica v Commonwealth, 34 Va. App. 31, 35, 537 S.E.2d 611, 613 (2000) (quoting Davis v. Commonwealth, 12 Va. App. 81, 86, 402 S.E.2d 684, 687 (1991)).

Because we have found the evidence suffi cient to support appellant’s underlying strangulation conviction, the appeal of the revoc ation of appellant’s susp ension of sentences is

moot and we will not address it. Patt erson v. Commonwealth, 12 Va. App. 1046, 1049-50, 407 S.E.2d 43, 45 (1991).

Affirmed.