### The HONORABLE CATHERINE D. PERRY, United States Distric t * 

### Judge for the Eastern District of Missouri, sitting b y designation.

The HONORABLE ROBERT E. LARSEN, United States Magistrat e 1 

### Judge for the Western District of Missouri who tried the case with the consent of the parties pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). ___________ No. 96-2214

___________ George Mark Williams, * * Plaintiff-Appellant, * * Appeal from the United States v. * District Court for the * Western District of Missouri. James F. Soligo, * * Defendant-Appellee. *

___________ Submitted: December 13, 1996 Filed: January 15, 1997

___________ Before LOKEN and HANSEN, Circuit Judges, and PERRY, District Judge. *

___________ LOKEN, Circuit Judge.

In Decemb er 1989, George Mark Williams bought a truck from the City of Kansas City at an abandoned vehicles auction. In August 1990, Kansas City police impounded the truck and later releas ed it to a prior owner who had reported it stolen. Williams sued the City and police officer James F. Soligo, who impounded the truck, asserting st ate law claims against the City and § 1983 claims against Soligo. After Williams settled with th e City, his procedural due process claim against S oligo was tried to a jury. The district court granted Soligo judgment as a matter of law at the close 1 of the evidence. Williams appeals. We affirm.

### -2- Williams bought the 1975 one-ton For d truck from the City for $2,000 and i nvested about $500 in repairs. Months later, Richard Fowle r complained to police that he had located his stolen 1975 one-ton Ford truc k
on the Kansas City streets. Detective Soligo from the Auto Theft Uni t investigated and found the truck described by Fowler on the street nea r Will iams's salvage business. Soligo observed that the vehicl e identification number ("VIN") on the driver's do or was for a 1973 half-ton Ford truck, not a 1975 one-ton truck, and that the truck's license plate
was for a 1989 Chevrolet registered to Williams. Soligo talked t o Williams, who said he bought the truck at the City's abandoned vehicle sal e
an d showed Soligo a bill of sale from the City for a 1975 Ford truc k bearing the illegitimate VIN.

Based upo n this conflicting information, Soligo impounded the truck pending further investigation. It was towed to a City lot, where Soligo placed a "hold" on it. After the tow, Soligo located another VIN number for a 19 75 one-ton Ford truck stamped on the truck frame. Soligo als o checked the tow lot sales records, which confirmed Williams's bill of sale

. Conc luding that the impounded truck was in fact the truck Fowler ha d reported stolen, Soligo turned Williams's license plate and th e illegitimate VIN plat e over to the police property room, advised the Auto Release Desk of the VIN number stamped on the truck frame, and released hi s "hold" on the vehicle without further instructio ns. Soligo did not advise Williams of these act ions. Shortly thereafter, Fowler filed a claim with the A uto Release Desk, producing a Kansas certificate of title for th e truck. The Auto Release Desk processed this claim and released the vehicl e to Fowler.
The evidence at trial consisted of Williams's brief testimony a nd the reading of a four-page Stipulation of Uncontroverted Facts. On this spars e record , the district court granted judgment for Soligo because William s failed to prove either an intentional or

### -3-

reckle ss due process deprivation or an injury proximately caused b y Soligo's actions.

Mere negligence is not an actionable deprivation under the Du e Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Daniels v. Williams , 474 U.S. 327, 331 (1986). In most § 1983 cases rais ing procedural due process claims, it is clear t hat the alleged deprivation was intentional, even if the all eged failure to provide adequate process was inadvertent. Se e Daniels , 474 U.S. at 333-34 (the relevant conduct in Wolff v. McDonnell , 418 U.S. 539 (1974), for example, was the prison officials' "deliberat e decisi on to deprive the inmate of good-time credit, not thei r hypothetically neglig ent failure to accord him the procedural protections of the Due Process Cl ause"). But in this case, the nature of the alleged deprivationis not at all clear. Beyond the initial decision to impound the truck, which Williams does not contest, Soligo took no action deprivin g Williams of his property. By releasing his investigative "hold" on th e vehicle, Soligo simply turned the matter over to those City officials at the Auto Release Desk who are authorized to rele ase a towed vehicle to the proper claimant. Williams argues that if Soligo had told the Auto Release Desk of Williams's claim, or had told Williams the "hold" had been release d
so Williams could submit a claim, the City would have commenced a n interpleader action to resolve the competing claims of Fowler and Williams

. In oth er words, Williams contends that in completing his investigativ e duties Soligo failed to protect Williams's property interest. That is a negligent deprivation claim barred by Daniels

.

We also agree with the district court's alternative ground, tha t Willia ms failed to prove proximate cause. Williams's damage evidenc e consisted of testimony regarding the value of the vehicle to Williams

. That ev idence is irrelevant absent proof that Williams's claim to th e vehicle was superior to the claim of Fowler. See Brewer v. Chauvin , 938 F.2d 86 0 (8th Cir. 1991) (en banc). Of course, a plaintiff deprived o f procedural due process

### -4-

is enti tled to nominal damages. See Carey v. Piphus , 435 U.S. 247, 26 6 (1978). But a proced ural deprivation must be proved. Here, there was no proof of A uto Release Desk procedures and no proof that, had William s
su bmitted a timely claim to that Desk, his claim would have bee n sufficiently potent to persuade the City to commence an interpleader actio n
or so me other form of pre-deprivation hearing. Because Soligo was no t responsible for determining the merits of Williams's claim to the property , Williams could not prove that Soligo's action proximately caused procedura l due pr ocess injury without more evidence regarding what process migh t otherwise have been due.
The judgment of the district court is affirmed.

A true copy.

Attest:

CLERK, U. S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT.