J-A07014-24

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

TAYLOR GRANT MYERS 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 629 MDA 2023

Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered April 3, 2023

In the Court of Common Pleas of York County 

Criminal Division at No: CP-67-CR-0006189-2019

BEFORE: STABILE, J., SULLIVAN, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*

MEMORANDUM BY STABILE, J.: FILED JUNE 27, 2024

Appellant, Taylor Grant Myers, appeals from the order of the Court of 

Common Pleas of York County entered on April 3, 2023, which dismissed his 

petition for collateral relief under the Post Conviction Relief Act, 42 Pa.C.S.A. 

§§ 9541-9546. Upon review, we affirm. 

The PCRA court summarized the relevant background as follows.

[Appellant] was charged by way of Criminal Information on 

October 23, 2019, with Aggravated Indecent Assault of a Child 

under 18 Pa.C.S. § 3125(b), Aggravated Indecent Assault under 

18 Pa.C.S. § 3125(a)(7), two counts of Indecent Assault under 18 

Pa.C.S. § 3126(a)(7), and one count of Corruption of Minors under 

18 Pa.C.S. § 6301(a)(1)(ii).

A criminal jury trial commenced from September 21, 2020, to 

September 23, 2020, where [Appellant] was represented by Korey 

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* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
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Leslie, Esquire (“Attorney Leslie”). After the three-day trial, 

[Appellant] was found guilty on all counts.

On December 30, 2020, [the trial court] sentenced [Appellant] to 

an aggregate of ten to twenty years’ incarceration.

On July 19, 2022, [Appellant] filed a counseled [PCRA petition].

[Appellant] then subsequently filed his second, third, and fourth 

Amended PCRA Petitions.

On December 13, 2022, a PCRA Hearing was held.

After holding the evidentiary hearing, [Appellant]’s Amended 

PCRA Petition was denied on April 3, 2023.

On April 24, 2023, [Appellant] filed a Notice of Appeal to the 

Superior Court of Pennsylvania. On April 25, 2023, [the PCRA 

court] directed [Appellant] to file a Statement of Matters 

Complained of on Appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. § 1925(b)

[“Statement”].

On May 17, 2023, [Appellant] filed a [Statement,] alleging the 

following errors on appeal:

I. Whether the [PCRA court] erred by finding that trial 

counsel’s testimony at the PCRA evidentiary hearing was 

credible and that trial counsel was not ineffective for 

deciding not to call character witnesses.

II. Whether the [PCRA court] erred by finding trial counsel’s 

decision not to call character witnesses reasonable 

considering that arrests that have not led to convictions may 

not be used to impeach character witnesses. 

Commonwealth v. Scott, 496 Pa. 188, 436 A.2d 607 (Pa. 

1981).

PCRA Court Opinion, 6/13/23, at 2-3. 

We review the dismissal of a PCRA petition to determine “whether the 

PCRA court’s findings of fact are supported by the record, and whether its 

conclusions of law are free from legal error.” Commonwealth v. Busanet, 
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54 A.3d 35, 45 (Pa. 2012). “Our scope of review is limited to the findings of 

the PCRA court and the evidence of record, viewed in the light most favorable 

to the party who prevailed in the PCRA court proceeding.” Id. Additionally, 

“[t]o be eligible for post-conviction relief, a petitioner must prove by a 

preponderance of the evidence that his conviction or sentence resulted from 

one of several enumerated circumstances, see 42 Pa.C.S. § 9543(a)(2)[.]” 

Commonwealth v. Reid, 235 A.3d 1124, 1143-44 (Pa. 2020).

On appeal, Appellant argues that the PCRA court erred in not finding 

trial counsel ineffective for failing to call character witnesses to testify.

We begin with the presumption that counsel rendered effective 

assistance. Commonwealth v. Basemore, 560 Pa. 258, 277 

n.10, 744 A.2d 717, 728 n.10 (2000). To obtain relief on a claim 

of ineffective assistance of counsel, a petitioner must rebut that 

presumption and demonstrate that counsel’s performance was 

deficient, and that such performance prejudiced him. Strickland 

v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687–91, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 

L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). In our Commonwealth, we have rearticulated 

the Strickland Court’s performance and prejudice inquiry as a 

three-prong test. Specifically, a petitioner must show: (1) the 

underlying claim is of arguable merit; (2) no reasonable basis 

existed for counsel’s action or inaction; and (3) counsel’s error 

caused prejudice such that there is a reasonable probability that 

the result of the proceeding would have been different absent such 

error. Commonwealth v. Pierce, 515 Pa. 153, 158–59, 527 

A.2d 973, 975 (1987).

Commonwealth v. Dennis, 17 A.3d 297, 301 (Pa. 2011). 

To establish whether counsel was ineffective for failing to call a witness, 

a petitioner must demonstrate: 

(1) the witness existed; (2) the witness was available; (3) counsel 

knew of, or should have known of the existence of the witness; 

(4) the witness was willing to testify for the defense; and (5) the 
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absence of the testimony was so prejudicial to petitioner to have 

denied him or her a fair trial. Commonwealth v. Clark, 599 Pa. 

204, 222, 961 A.2d 80, 90 (2008).

Id. at 302.

At the evidentiary hearing, trial counsel testified that there were some 

discussions with Appellant about calling character witnesses but that the only 

potential character witnesses offered by Appellant were his parents. PCRA 

Court Opinion, 6/13/23, at 3 (citing N.T. PCRA Hearing, 12/13/22, at 11-14). 

Counsel opted not to call them because typically parents are not viewed as 

credible witnesses. Id. Appellant, on the other hand, argues that he readily 

provided several names of non-family witnesses to PCRA counsel and that he 

would have provided these names to trial counsel if character witnesses had 

been discussed. Id. (citing N.T. PCRA Hearing, 1213/23, at 41-42). 

Ultimately, the resolution of this issue presents a question of credibility. 

As our Supreme Court has observed:

A PCRA court passes on witness credibility at PCRA hearings, and 

its credibility determinations should be provided great deference 

by reviewing courts. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. (Damon)

Jones, 912 A.2d 268, 293 (Pa. 2006); Commonwealth v. 

Santiago, 855 A.2d 682, 694 (Pa. 2004) (Opinion Announcing the 

Judgment of the Court) (“[W]e are bound by the PCRA court’s 

credibility determinations where there is record support for those 

determinations.”); Commonwealth v. Abu–Jamal, 720 A.2d 

79, 99 (Pa. 1998) (“Just as with any other credibility 

determination, where the record supports the PCRA court's 

credibility determinations, those determinations are binding on 

this [C]ourt.”). Indeed, one of the primary reasons PCRA hearings 

are held in the first place is so that credibility determinations can 

be made; otherwise, issues of material fact could be decided on 

pleadings and affidavits alone.
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Commonwealth v. Johnson, 966 A.2d 523, 539 (Pa. 2009) (citations 

modified).

Viewed in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth as the 

prevailing party, and considering the other principles noted above guiding our 

review, we discern no abuse of the PCRA court’s discretion in crediting 

Attorney Leslie’s testimony over Appellant’s testimony. Both testified, and the 

PCRA court, based on its assessment of the witnesses, credited counsel over 

Appellant. Based on the record before us, we are unable to disturb the trial 

court’s assessment. See Commonwealth v. Sanchez, 262 A.3d 1283, 

1288-89 (Pa. Super. 2021), appeal denied, 278 A.3d 853 (Pa. 2022) (“Where 

issues of credibility and weight of the evidence are concerned, it is not the 

function of the appellate court to substitute its judgment based on a cold 

record for that of the trial court. The weight to be accorded conflicting evidence 

is exclusively for the fact finder, whose findings will not be disturbed on appeal 

if they are supported by the record.” (citations omitted)).

Appellant next argues that trial counsel incorrectly advised Appellant 

that calling character witnesses on the stand would be risky based on the 

belief that Appellant’s then-pending Risking Catastrophe charge would be 

introduced to impeach any potential character witness. Appellant’s Brief at 

16. No relief is due.

As aptly noted by the PCRA court, even if trial counsel was incorrect in 

believing that character witnesses could be asked about their knowledge of 

Appellant’s arrest in connection with the then-pending charge for Risking 
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Catastrophe, Appellant’s “argument still fails because there were no potential 

character witnesses offered to Attorney Leslie aside from [Appellant]’s 

parents.” PCRA Court Opinion, 6/13/23, at 5-6.

Next, Appellant argues that trial counsel was ineffective for not 

investigating whether there were favorable character witnesses. Appellant’s 

Brief at 16. This claim fails for the same reasons noted above. The record 

shows that trial counsel discussed the matter with Appellant, and that 

Appellant only provided the names of his parents as potential character 

witnesses. No other names were discussed or suggested. Additionally, 

Appellant fails to point out where in the record the facts are that should have 

triggered trial counsel’s obligation to look further for character witnesses.

Because Appellant is unable to prove that trial counsel was ineffective 

for not calling character witnesses, we affirm the order appealed here.

Order affirmed. 

Judgment Entered.

Benjamin D. Kohler, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 06/27/2024