alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
FSIS Employee Eye and Face Protection 

Instructions on the Use of Face Shields with Headband (FSIS-89)

ESHG-Safety 

INSTRUCTIONS 

This document provides instructions on use of face shields for eye and face protection as required by 

Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) regulation 29 CFR 1910.132, PPE General Requirements 

and 29 CFR 1910.133, Eye and Face Protection. These instructions apply to the use of face shields with 

headbands (FSIS-89) manufactured by Open Works. They do not apply to other types of face shields 

manufactured by Elvex, ERB Safety, or Open Works that attach to the helmets. 

Face shields should be worn in conjunction with a cloth face covering or disposable face 

mask, and in accordance with the guidelines below. 

Sprays, splashes of fluids, and person-to-person droplet spread present occupational hazards 

for workers. Droplets of fluids can be inhaled, land on broken skin, or deposit on mucus 

membranes in the mouth, nose, or eyes. Once there, the pathogens they carry may infect 

workers and cause illness. 

To be effective, the face shield should fit comfortably and cover the entire length and width of the face. Users 

issued a face shield should ensure that it is properly disinfected, kept clean and stored in a safe location after 

each use. 

Replace the face shield if it becomes damaged, has reduced visibility from scratching, or if contaminants cannot 

be effectively removed by cleaning. 

PROPER USE 

The face shields should be worn under the helmet, not over the helmet. To ensure the proper use of a face 

shield, follow the steps below: 

Step 1: Slip the band around your Step 2: Place the helmet on the 

head and ensure the bottom of head and ensure that the helmet 

the band does not reduce sits directly above the top of the 

visibility. The fit should be snug, face shield. There should be no 

but not to the point of discomfort. gap between the top of the face 

shield and your helmet. 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

CLEANING, DEFOGGING, AND DISINFECTING 

• To clean your face shield of dust, debris, or non-infectious fluids, use warm water and dishwashing detergent. 

Allow to air dry. To remove streaks or spots, use standard glass cleaner (e.g., Windex) and a soft cloth or 

paper towel. 

• You may order FSIS-57 FSIS Anti-Fog Wipes from the MMSC. Alternatively, you may (1) wipe the face shield 

with a solution comprised of 1 oz. white vinegar to 16 oz. warm water, or (2) wash the face shield with liquid 

dishwashing detergent. A thin film of soap left behind helps prevent fogging. 

• It is currently estimated that COVID-19 can live on hard industrial surfaces (e.g., metal, plastic, and glass) for 

up to several days. To disinfect your face shield, use 70% isopropyl alcohol solution and a soft cloth, isopropyl 

alcohol wipes, food grade dilute phosphoric acid (Star-San), or store your visor in a paper bag for a minimum 

of 3 days. DO NOT use hydrogen peroxide since it will gradually fog the visor. 

QUESTIONS 

If you have any questions, please contact your Occupational Safety and Health Specialist.
Order entered August 27 , 2015

In The 

## Court of Appeals **Fifth District of Texas at Dallas**
No. 05
- 13
- 00835
- CV ECLAT PRIVATE EQUITY , INC. ET AL . , Appellant s V. HASSAN PARSA, Appellee On Appeal from the 134th Judicial District Court Dallas County, Texa s Trial Court Cause No. DC
- 12
- 05093 

### O RDER
The Court REINSTATES the appeal. On August 15, 2014, we abated the appeal due to the filing of bankruptcy by appellee. In response to our August 12, 2015 letter inquiring about the status of the bankruptcy proce edings, we received correspondence stating that the bankruptcy court has confirmed appellee’s Plan of Reorganization and the appeal may proceed. At the time the appeal was abated, the record and briefs had been filed. Accordingly, we DIRECT the Clerk to s et the case at issue as of the date of this order. The appeal will be submitted in due course.
/s/ CAROLYN WRIGHT CHIEF JUSTICE
II 

115TH CONGRESS 

2D SESSION S. 2921 

To amend title XIX of the Social Security Act to help ensure coverage 

of inpatient treatment services furnished in institutions for mental disease. 

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES 

MAY 22, 2018 

Mr. HELLER (for himself, Mr. MENENDEZ, Mr. GRASSLEY, Mrs. MCCASKILL, 

Mr. CORNYN, and Mr. CARPER) introduced the following bill; which was 

read twice and referred to the Committee on Finance 

A BILL 

To amend title XIX of the Social Security Act to help ensure 

coverage of inpatient treatment services furnished in institutions for mental disease. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Securing Flexibility 

5 to Treat Substance Use Disorders Act’’. 


pamtmann on DSKBFK8HB2PROD with BILLS
2 

•S 2921 IS

1 SEC. 2. PAYMENTS TO PROVIDE COVERAGE OF INPATIENT 

2 TREATMENT SERVICES FURNISHED IN INSTI3 TUTIONS FOR MENTAL DISEASE. 

4 Section 1903(m) of the Social Security Act (42 

5 U.S.C. 1396b(m)) is amended by adding at the end the 

6 following new paragraph: 

7 ‘‘(7) Payment shall be made under this title to a 

8 State for expenditures included in the development of capi9 tation payments for treatment described in section 

10 438.6(e) of title 42, Code of Federal Regulations (or any 

11 successor regulation) that is provided to an individual de12 scribed in such section in a facility described in such sec13 tion.’’. 

Æ 


pamtmann on DSKBFK8HB2PROD with BILLS
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1998
<PERIOD-START>                             JAN-01-1998
<PERIOD-END>                               MAR-31-1998
<CASH>                                       9,924,603
<SECURITIES>                                32,129,762
<RECEIVABLES>                               20,592,064
<ALLOWANCES>                                 (400,000)
<INVENTORY>                                  5,014,757
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                            72,437,789
<PP&E>                                       9,790,987
<DEPRECIATION>                             (2,226,706)
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                              80,692,978
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                        9,191,841
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                       254,824
<OTHER-SE>                                  70,256,464
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                80,692,978
<SALES>                                     19,107,373
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                            19,107,373
<CGS>                                        6,615,258
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                6,615,258
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                             6,886,303
<LOSS-PROVISION>                               100,000
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                             362,053
<INCOME-PRETAX>                              6,014,810
<INCOME-TAX>                                 2,250,000
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                                  0
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                 3,764,810
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                     0.15
<EPS-DILUTED>                                     0.14
        

</TABLE>
#### Michael Ellis EVANS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Officer Jeremy JONES, Greenville County Police Department, individual and or official capacity, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 13-7901.

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted: April 24, 2014.

Decided: April 28, 2014.

Michael Ellis Evans, Appellant Pro Se. Russell W. Harter, Jr., Chapman, Harter & Harter, PA, Greenville, South Carolina, for Appellee.

Before NIEMEYER, SHEDD, and FLOYD, Circuit Judges.

Dismissed by unpublished PER CURIAM opinion.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

PER CURIAM:

Michael Ellis Evans seeks to appeal the district court’s order adopting the magistrate judge’s recommendation and denying relief on his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012) complaint. We dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction because the notice of appeal was not timely filed.

Parties are accorded thirty days after the entry of the district court’s final judgment or order to note an appeal, Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1)(A), unless the district court extends the appeal period under Fed. R.App. P. 4(a)(5), or reopens the appeal period under Fed. R.App. P. 4(a)(6). “[T]he timely filing of a notice of appeal in a civil case is a jurisdictional requirement.” *Bowles v. Russell,*551 U.S. 205, 214, 127 S. Ct. 2360, 168 L.Ed.2d 96 (2007).

The district court’s order was entered on the docket on September 4, 2012. The notice of appeal was filed, at the earliest, on November 6, 2013.* Because Evans failed to file a timely notice of appeal or to obtain an extension or reopening of the appeal period, we dismiss the appeal. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately *267presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

*DISMISSED.*

*

 Because Evans is incarcerated, the notice of appeal is considered filed as of the date it was properly delivered to prison officials for mailing to the court. Fed. R.App. P. 4(c)(1); *Houston v. Lack,*487 U.S. 266, 276, 108 S.Ct. 2379, 101 L.Ed.2d 245 (1988). Although Evans did not indicate when he delivered his notice to prison officials for mailing, he dated it November 6, 2013. Therefore, we conclude that this is the earliest date Evans could have submitted his notice of appeal to prison officials.
#### Dale Dallas CRAIG, Petitioner-Appellant, v. NEVADA ATTORNEY GENERAL; et al., Respondents-Appellees.

No. 10-15128.

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted Jan. 10, 2011.*

Filed Jan. 24, 2011.

*965Dale Dallas Craig, Carson City, NV, pro se.

Catherine Cortez Masto, Office of the Nevada Attorney General, Carson City, NV, Dennis Cavanagh Wilson, Senior Deputy Attorney General, Office of the Nevada Attorney General, Las Vegas, NV, for Respondents-Appellees.

Before: BEEZER, TALLMAN, and CALLAHAN, Circuit Judges.

*

 The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R.App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM **

Nevada state prisoner Dale Dallas Craig appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment dismissing his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 habeas petition. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 2253, and we affirm.

Craig contends that the district court erred when finding that equitable tolling of the statute of limitations was not justified. Specifically, Craig argues that equitable tolling is warranted on the basis of five errors that occurred in his case before the state courts, including errors related to the entry of an amended judgment of conviction. However, Craig has failed to demonstrate that extraordinary circumstances prevented him from filing his federal petition in a timely manner. *See Pace v. DiGuglielmo,*544 U.S. 408, 418, 125 S.Ct. 1807, 161 L.Ed.2d 669 (2005). Further, he has failed to show that he pursued his rights diligently. *See id.*

Craig’s request to expand the certificate of appealability is denied. *See*9th Cir. R. 22—1(e); *see also Hiivala v. Wood,*195 F.3d 1098, 1104-05 (9th Cir.1999) (per curiam).

AFFIRMED.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<PAGE>
<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM THE MARCH
31, 2000 BALANCE SHEET AND INCOME STATEMENT AND IS QUALIFIED IN ITS ENTIRETY BY
REFERENCE TO SUCH FINANCIAL STATEMENTS.
</LEGEND>

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-2000
<PERIOD-START>                             JAN-01-2000
<PERIOD-END>                               MAR-31-2000
<CASH>                                          12,189
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                               10,328,927
<ALLOWANCES>                                   100,000
<INVENTORY>                                 16,080,632
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                            27,170,163
<PP&E>                                       8,568,700
<DEPRECIATION>                               5,203,342
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                              30,733,989
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                       10,260,938
<BONDS>                                     21,859,630
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                        5,950,907
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                        18,547
<OTHER-SE>                                 (7,404,857)
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                30,733,989
<SALES>                                     12,008,268
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                            12,008,268
<CGS>                                        9,825,597
<TOTAL-COSTS>                               11,379,173
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                     0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                             570,093
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                 59,002
<INCOME-TAX>                                    33,261
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                             25,741
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                    25,741
<EPS-BASIC>                                      (.10)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                    (.10)


</TABLE>
Document Headings

                    Document headings vary by document type but may contain                    the following:                  
                -                       the agency or agencies that issued and signed a document                    
                -                       the number of the CFR title and the number of each part                      the document amends, proposes to amend, or is directly                      related to                    
                -                       the agency docket number / agency internal file number                    
                -                       the RIN which identifies each regulatory action listed in                      the Unified Agenda of Federal Regulatory and Deregulatory                      Actions                    

                    See the                                          Document Drafting Handbook                                        for more details.                  

###### Federal Trade Commission

          - 16 CFR Part 4

# AGENCY:

Federal Trade Commission (FTC).

# ACTION:

Final rule. 

# SUMMARY:

The Commission is amending its rule governing the appearances of former members and employees, Rule 4.1(b), to make it consistent with President Clinton's December 28, 2000 revocation of Executive Order 12834 (“Ethics Commitments by Executive Branch Appointees”).

# EFFECTIVE DATE:

These amendments are effective March 7, 2001.

# FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:

Ira S. Kaye, 202-326-2426, or Shira Pavis Minton, 202-326-2479, Attorneys, Office of the General Counsel, FTC, 600 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW., Washington, DC 20580.

# SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

The Commission is deleting the note following section (b)(1)(iv) of Commission Rule 4.1, 16 CFR 4.1, which currently states that former Commissioners and certain other “senior” employees may be subject to Executive Order 12834. That order formerly required that certain Executive Branch officials appointed on or after January 20, 1993, sign a pledge making particular post-employment ethics commitments. This amendment is necessary in order to reflect that, by Executive Order 13184 of December 28, 2000, President Clinton revoked Executive Order 12834.

This rule amendment relates solely to agency practice and, thus, is not subject to the notice and comment requirements of the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. 553(a)(2), or to the requirements of the Regulatory Flexibility Act, 5 U.S.C. 601(2).

# List of Subjects in 16 CFR part 4

      - Administrative practice and procedure

For the reasons set forth in the preamble, the Federal Trade Commission amends Title 16, chapter I, subchapter A, of the Code of Federal Regulations as follows:

# PART 4—MISCELLANEOUS RULES

1. The authority citation for part 4 continues to read as follows: 

Authority:Sec. 6, 38 Stat. 721; 15 U.S.C. 46.

§ 4.1

2. Section 4.1 is amended by removing the note that follows paragraph (b)(1)(iv). 

By direction of the Commission.

Donald S. Clark,

Secretary.

[FR Doc. 01-5507  Filed 3-6-01; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 6750-01-M
#### SMARTMETRIC INC., a Nevada Corporation, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. MASTERCARD INTERNATIONAL INCORPORATED, a Delaware Corporation, Defendant-Appellee, and Visa Inc., a Delaware Corporation, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 2014-1037.

United States Court of Appeals, Federal Circuit.

Aug. 13, 2014.

Patrick F. Bright, Wagner, Anderson *&*Bright, P.C., of Glendale; CA, argued for plaintiff-appellant.

Joseph Melnik, Jones Day, of Palo Alto, CA, argued for appellees. With him on the brief for Visa Inc. were An P. Doan; and Matthew J. Silveira, of San Francisco, CA. On the brief for MasterCard International Incorporated were Gary A. Clark, Darren M. Franklin, and Andrew Kim, Sheppard, Mullin, Richter & Hampton LLP, of Los Angeles, CA. Of counsel was Dennis J. Smith.

PROST, Chief Judge, NEWMAN and HUGHES, Circuit Judges.

JUDGMENT

PER CURIAM.

THIS CAUSE having been heard and considered, it is

Ordered and Adjudged:

AFFIRMED. *See*Fed. Cir. R. 36.
#### Janice McLean DELOATCH, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. HARFORD COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 10-1748.

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted: Jan. 18, 2011.

Decided: Jan. 25, 2011.

Janice McLean DeLoatch, Appellant Pro Se. Steven Bruce Schwartzman, Lisa Y. Settles, Hodes, Pessin & Katz, PA, Tow-son, Maryland, for Appellee.

Before NIEMEYER, DUNCAN, and AGEE, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished PER CURIAM opinion.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

*687PER CURIAM:

Janice McLean DeLoatch appeals the district court’s order granting Defendant’s motion to dismiss her complaint alleging race discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (2006). We have reviewed the record and find no reversible error. Accordingly, we affirm for the reasons stated by the district court. *DeLoatch v. Harford Cnty. Bd. of Educ.,*No. 1:09-cv-03125-CCB, 2010 WL 1956804 (D.Md. May 14, 2010). We further deny DeLoatch’s motion for transcript at government expense. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

*AFFIRMED.*
#### The State ex rel. Janosek et al., Appellants, *v.*Cuyahoga Support Enforcement Agency, Appellee.

[Cite as *State ex rel. Janosek v. Cuyahoga Support Enforcement Agency,*123 Ohio St.3d 126, 2009-Ohio-4692.]

(No. 2009-0705

Submitted September 2, 2009

Decided September 16, 2009.)

Per Curiam.

{¶ 1} We affirm the judgment of the court of appeals denying a writ of prohibition to prevent appellee, Cuyahoga Support Enforcement Agency, from ordering the payment of spousal support and the withholding of money allegedly not owed by appellants, James Janosek and Welded Ring Products Company. Because no statute or other pertinent law *required*the agency to conduct a hearing resembling a judicial trial when it issued its notice to withhold income for spousal support, the agency did not exercise the judicial or quasi-judicial authority required for appellants to be entitled to the requested extraordinary relief in prohibition. See *State ex rel. Wright v. Cuyahoga Cty. Bd. of Elections,*120 Ohio St.3d 92, 2008-Ohio-5553, 896 N.E.2d 706, ¶ 8. The authorities cited by appellants refer only to discretionary authority to hold hearings. See, e.g., R.C. 5101.37. Insofar as appellants claim that the agency is acting contrary to a trial court order, they have an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law by way of a motion for contempt in the trial court case. See *State ex rel. Weaver v. Ohio Adult Parole Auth.,*116 Ohio St.3d 340, 2007-Ohio-6435, 879 N.E.2d 191, ¶ 6.

Judgment affirmed.

*127Zukerman, Daiker & Lear Co., L.P.A., Larry W. Zukerman, and S. Michael Lear, for appellants.

William D. Mason, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting Attorney, and Frederick W. Whatley, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee.

Moyer, C.J., and Pfeifer, Lundberg Stratton, O’Connor, O’Donnell, Lanzinger, and Cupp, JJ., concur.
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. William Todd CLARK, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 06-30700

Summary Calendar.

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

March 5, 2007.

Sonia Peters Cassidy, U.S. Attorney’s Office Western District of Louisiana, Shreveport, LA, for Plaintiff-Appellee.

Elton B. Richey, Jr., Law Office of Elton B. Richey Jr., Shreveport, LA, for Defendant-Appellant.

Before DeMOSS, STEWART, and PRADO, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: *

William Todd Clark appeals the sentence imposed following his guilty plea conviction for being a felon in possession of a firearm. 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). Clark *346argues that his sentence of 71 months of imprisonment, which was at the top of the applicable advisory sentencing guideline range, is unreasonable under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) because it was greater than necessary to achieve the goals of sentencing.

Clark’s sentence was within a properly calculated advisory guideline range and is presumed reasonable. *See United, States v. Alonzo,*435 F.3d 551, 554 (5th Cir.2006). Little explanation of a sentence is required when a district court expressly imposes a sentence within the advisory guideline range. *United States v. Mares,*402 F.3d 511, 519 (5th Cir.), *cert. denied,*— U.S. -, 126 S.Ct. 43, 163 L.Ed.2d 76 (2005). Clark has failed to demonstrate that his properly calculated Guidelines sentence was unreasonable, and he is therefore not entitled to relief. *See Alonzo,*435 F.3d at 554.

Accordingly, the district court’s judgment is AFFIRMED.

*

 Pursuant to 5th Cir. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be *346published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir. R. 47.5.4.