UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA JACK JORDAN, : : Plaintiff, : Civil Action No.: 16-1868 (RC) : v. : Re Document Nos.: 10, 16, 20, 24, 25, : 29, 31, 33, 36 : U.S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, : : Defendant. :
MEMORANDUM OPINION
G RANTING P LAINTIFF ’ S U NOPPOSED M OTION TO A MEND C OMPLAINT ; D ENYING P LAINTIFF ’ S C ORRECTED M OTION FOR S UMMARY J UDGMENT ; G RANTING IN P ART AND D ENYING IN P ART D EFENDANT ’ S C ROSS -M OTION FOR S UMMARY J UDGMENT ; D ENYING P LAINTIFF ’ S F IRST M OTION FOR S ANCTIONS U NDER R ULE 11; D ENYING P LAINTIFF ’ S M OTION TO C OMPEL D EPOSITIONS OF T ODD S MYTH AND D IANE J OHNSON ; D ENYING P LAINTIFF ’ S M OTION TO S TRIKE THE S MYTH D ECLARATION ; D ENYING P LAINTIFF ’ S M OTION TO C OMPEL P RODUCTION OF E VIDENCE REGARDING S MYTH D ECLARATION ; D ENYING P LAINTIFF ’ S M OTION TO S TRIKE P ROHIBITED E X P ARTE C OMMUNICATION AND V ACATE O CTOBER 26 M INUTE O RDER ;

D ENYING P LAINTIFF ’ S S ECOND M OTION FOR S ANCTIONS U NDER R ULE 11; D ENYING P LAINTIFF ’ S M OTION REGARDING THE APA AS B ASIS FOR D ECISIONS
I. INTRODUCTION Plaintiff Jack Jordan, an atto rney, sued under the Freedom of I nformation Act (“FOIA”) seeking documents related to FOIA requests he previously submit ted to the Office of Administrative Law Judges (“OALJ” ), an agency within the United States Department of Labor (“DOL”). Mr. Jordan requested the first two emails in a continu ous string of five emails (“DynCorp emails”) related to D efense Base Act Case No. 2015-LD A-00030 (“DBA Proceedings”), a case in which M r. Jordan is representing his w ife, Maria Jordan, against DynCorp International, Inc. (“DynCorp”).2 Mr. Jordan sought the disclos ure of any emails, dated July 30 o r July 31, 2013, with the subject line “WPS – next steps & a ctions” that DynCorp’s counse l had forwarded to Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) Larry S. Merck. The DOL denied this request insofar as it related to unredacted copies of the first two emails, claiming that attorney–client privilege applied to portions of the D ynCorp emails, and provided Mr. Jor dan a redacted copy of the DynCorp emails in response to his initial FOIA request. Mr. Jor dan sued to compel disclosure of all previously undisclosed versi ons of the DynCorp emails assoc iated with his initial request on the grounds that the DOL had no legitimate basis for considerin g the DynCorp emails privileged and exempt from disclosure. Havi ng reviewed the record and the DynCorp emails in camera, the Court agrees that one of the ema ils is privileged and thus exem pt from disclosure, but orders the DOL to either disclose the other email or provide further justi fication for its continued withholding.

II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND Over a period of seven months, M r. Jordan filed five FOIA reque sts relating to the DynCorp emails in an effort to obt ain all previously undisclose d versions of the DynCorp emails.
See Compl. at 5 , ¶¶ 10–19, ECF No. 1. Although the first request i s most relevant here—and the final two requests have no relev ance at all—the Court separatel y describes each of Mr. Jordan’s five requests for the sake of completeness. A. FOIA Request No. F2016-806591 On June 9, 2016, Mr. Jordan submitted his first FOIA request, w hich was for several documents related to the DynCorp emails. See Answer, Ex. 4, 14–16, ECF No. 14-1. 1 Mr. Jordan

1 The DOL’s Answer is locate d at ECF No. 14. Exhibits attached t o the DOL’s answer can be located at ECF No. 14-1.3 specifically requested (1) “a copy of any letter of transmittal , facsimile cover sheet or any other evidence . . . identifying the pe rson or party who forwarded to Judge Merck’s office (or to the OALJ) any documentation related t o . . . the claim for disabili ty compensation that was filed . . . by Maria Jordan,” see id. ¶ 1; (2) “a copy of any version (regardless of whether or not any information was redacted) of certain emails that were forwarded to Judge Merck’s office at any time in October through December 2015” dated “July 30 or 31, 20 13[,] that had substantially the following text in the subject lin e: ‘WPS – next steps & actions ,’” see id. ¶ 2; and (3) “a copy of any letter of transmittal, facsimile cover sheet or any other e vidence dated at any time in October through December 2015 identify ing the person or party who forwa rded to Judge Merck’s office (or to the OALJ) any version of the [DynCorp] emails in #2, abo ve,” see id. ¶ 3. The first paragraph in Mr. Jordan’s requestincluded a footnote clarifyin g that the particular request did not “apply to the underlying documentation, e.g. , any motion or opposition thereto that was served by any party to the captioned case.” See id. at 15, n.1. On June 28, 2016, the DOL partially r eleased and partially withheld documents responsive to Request No. 806591. Def .’s Cross-Mot. Summ. J. an d Opp’n Pl.’s Corrected Mot. for Summ. J. (“Def.’s Cross- Mot.”), Ex. 1, Attach. C, ECF No. 2 0-1. 2 In response to Mr. Jordan’s first request, Acting F OIA Coordinator Diane Johnson c ommunicated that a “search of the Administrative File in ALJ No. 2015-LDA-00030 was conducted ” and revealed a “two page letter dated November 20, 2015 from the law firm of Brown Sims addressed to District Chief Judge Lee Romero in Covington, Louis iana” and forwarded to ALJ Merck. Id. at 21. Per footnote 1 of Mr. Jordan’s request , the DOL enclosed the letter but did not include “the motion itself or the attachments to the motion.” Id. at 21, n.2.

2 All attachments to Def.’s Cross-Mot., Ex. 1 can be found at EC F No. 20-1.4 In response to Mr. Jordan’s s econd request, Ms. Johnson explain ed that ALJ Merck “reviewed [the DynCorp emails] in camera and determined that th ey contained privileged attorney–client communications.” Id. at 22. Due to ALJ Merck’s finding that “the unredacted versions of the requested documen ts [were] protected from disco very by attorney–client privilege,” Ms. Johnson determin ed that FOIA Exemption 4, whichprotects “trade secrets and commercial or financial information obtained from a person [tha t is] privileged or confidential,” 5 U.S.C. §552(b)(4), applied and the unredacted emails would no t be disclosed. See id. However, Ms. Johnson enclosed a 2015 letter from the law firm of Littler Mendelson, P.C. pertaining to the filings, along with redacted vers ions of the DynCorp emails tha t had been filed with ALJ Merck.
See Def.’s Cross-Mot., Ex. 1, Attach s. D–E. The DynCorp email chai n—which contains a total of five separate emails—contains two partially redacted emails, which are also the first two emails of the chain. Of those tw o emails, only the sender, reci pients, date, and subject line were released. Def.’s Cross-Mot ., Ex. 1, Attach. E. The chronologica lly first email (“the Powers email”) spans roughly three page s. Def.’s Cross-Mot., Ex. 1, At tach. E. The second email (“the Huber email”) spans roughly half of a page. Def.’s Cross-Mot., Ex. 1, Attach. E. Littler Mendelson’s letter stated that, per an October 2015 Ord er from ALJ Merck, the firm submitted unredacted copies of the DynCorp emails to ALJ M erck for in camera review.
See Def.’s Cross-Mot., Ex. 1, Attach . D at 25. Littler Mendelson m aintained that “the redacted portions of the at-issue email th read are privileged” and expla ined “the basis for asserting attorney–client privilege.” Id. The DynCorp emails “concerned the status of operations issues in connection with the Worldwide P rotective Services (‘WPS’) Progr am contract” and were transmitted to Christopher Bellomy, an in-house lawyer for DynC orp. Id. Littler Mendelson asserted that the DynCorp emails were transmitted to Mr. Bellom y to apprise him and other5 employees 3 “of developments potentiall y impacting the contract.” Id. at 26. These emails, Littler Mendelson contended, “were int ended to be, and should remain, p rivileged among the select group of employees who received the at-issue communication.” Id. at 25. The letter stated that the notation “Subject to Attorne y Client Privilege” appeared wi thin the DynCorp emails and that the DynCorp emails requested l egal advice related to the develo pments discussed therein. See id. at 25–26. The DOL redacted “all te xt from the body of the initi al two [e]mails,” because, according to Defendant, these two emails were privileged in the ir entirety. Compl. ¶¶ 2, 11. Littler Mendelson’s letter also s atisfied Mr. Jordan’s third re quest. 4 See Def.’s Cross-Mot., Ex. 1, Attach. C at 22. B. FOIA Request No. F2016-819736 On July 5, 2016, 5 Mr. Jordan submitted “additional requests” related to the FOIArequest described above. Def.’s Cro ss-Mot., Ex. 1, Attach. F at 34, ECF No. 20-1. The DOL labeled this supplemental request FOIA Re quest No. F2016-819736 (“Request No . 819736”). Def.’s CrossMot., Ex. 2, Attach. HH at 29, ECF No. 20-2. 6 In Request No. 819736, Mr. Jordan sought (1) “a copy of any documentation in the OALJ’s records evidencing or r elating to any action of, or

3 Other employees that received the DynCorp emails include DarinPowers, Robert A. Huber, Brian J. Cox, William Imbri e, Martha Huelsbeck, and Aubr ey Mitchell. See Def.’s CrossMot., Ex. 1, Attach. E.
4 Mr. Jordan does not challenge t he DOL’s submission of the Litt ler Mendelson letter as an insufficient response to his request for “a copy of any lett er of transmittal, facsimile cover sheet or any other evidence date d at any time in October throug h December 2015 identifying the person or party who forwarded to Ju dge Merck’s office (or to th e OALJ) any version of the [DynCorp] emails.” Answer, Ex. 4, 15–16. As such, the Court con siders the parties to be in agreement that the DOL’s respon se satisfied this portion of Mr. Jordan’s original request.
5 Mr. Jordan submitted this request at 11:24 PM CST on July 5, 2 016, and the DOL received this request at about 12:24 AM EST on July 6, 2016. Pl .’s Corrected Mot. Summ. J. at 8, ECF No. 16. For clarity, the Court will use July 5, 2016, as the date of this request.
6 All attachments to Def.’s Cross-Mot., Ex. 2 can be found at EC F No. 20-2.6 basis in fact or law for, pl acing under seal the unredacted ver sions of the [DynCorp] emails” and (2) “a copy of any documentation submitted to the OALJ . . . to oppose the release of any documentation covered by my re quests in [Request No. 806591].” Def.’s Cross-Mot., Ex. 1, Attach F at 35, ¶¶ 1–2. The DOL mistakenly considered th is request duplicative of FOIA Request No. F2016- 808886—which Mr. Jordan submitted a few hours later and is desc ribed below—and thus did not assign this reque st at the time. Def.’s Cross-Mot., Ex. 2, Declaration of Ramona Branch Oliver (“Oliver D ecl.”) at 3–5, ¶¶ 7–9, ECF No. 20-2. As a resu lt, the DOL failed to respond within 20 business days as statutorily required. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (a)(6)(A)(i). On November 21, 2016, in response to an inquiry 7 about Request No. 819736, the Office of Information Services (“OIS”) “initiated a search for the request within the foiarequ est@dol.gov mailbox.” Oliver Decl. ¶ 10; Def.’s Cross-Mot., Ex. 2, A ttach. AA. OIS continued its s earch from “around November 22[, 2016] through December 1, 2016.” Id. ¶ 12; Def.’s Cross-Mot., Ex. 2, Attach. CC. The DOL contended in its Answer, filed November 28, 2016, that Request No. 819736 “could [not] be located after a reasonable searc h of the FOIA request email inb ox, the OALJ records, and the FOIA Appeals records.” Answer ¶ 12, ECF No. 14. OIS finally loc ated Request No. 819736 on December 2, 2016. Oliver Decl. ¶ 15. The DOL assigned the request for processing on December 8, 2016

. See Def.’s CrossMot., Ex. 2, Attach. FF at 25, ECF No. 20-2. In response to Mr. Jordan’s request seeking documentation relating to placi ng the DynCorp emails under seal , OALJ provided orders from

7 The inquiry came from Emily S. Whitten, a Senior Attorney for FOIA and Information Law at the DOL’s Office of the S olicitor. Def.’s Cross-Mot., Ex . 2, Attach. AA.7 ALJ Merck dated February 9, 2016, 8 and January 27, 2016. 9 See Def.’s Cross-Mot., Ex. 2, Attach. HH

. at 29. In response to Mr. Jorda n’s request seeking documents o pposing Request No. 806591, “OALJ received no document in response to [Request No. 806591] opposing a release under FOIA.” See id. However, OALJ provided Mr. Jor dan a copy of the Littler Mendel son letter in case Mr. Jordan’s request “i mplicate[d] a general preexistin g opposition to release of documents within the record before [ALJ] Merck in [the] [DBA Pr oceedings].” Id. at 29–30. C. FOIA Request No. F2016-808886 In June 2016, Mr. Jordan submitted “additional requests and ana lysis” related to Request No. 806591. Def.’s Cross-Mot., E x. 1, Attach. G at 38, ECF No. 20-1. The DOL labeled this supplemental request FOIA Re quest No. F2016-808886 (“Request No . 808886”). See id. , Attach. H at 43. This request sought disclo sure of segregable portions of the DynCorp emails including (1) the notation “Subject to Atto rney Client Privilege” and (2) any language that constituted an express request for legal advice. 10 Compl. ¶ 14, ECF No. 1; Answer, Ex. 6 at 22, ¶¶ 1–2, ECF No. 14-1. Mr. Jordan asserted that by disclosing the “Subject t o Attorney Client Privilege” notation in Littler Mendelson’s letter (1) DynC orp disclosed pu rportedly privileged information,

8 The “Order Denying Claimant’ s Motion to Compel Production of E mails over which Employer Has Asserted Attorney–C lient Privilege and Order Denyi ng Claimant’s Motion for Sanctions.” Def.’s Cross- Mot., Ex. 2, Attach. HH at 29.
9 The “Order Denying Claimant’s Motion Requesting That This Court ‘Publish’ an Alleged Ex Parte Communication a nd Order Warning Counsel of the Potential Consequences of Filing Frivolous Motions and Order Denying Claimant’s Request f or Subpoenas at this Time.” Def.’s Cross-Mot., Ex. 2, Attach. HH at 29.
10 Mr. Jordan only sought language rel ating to a request for lega l advice and clarified that the DOL should exclude “any particular words that would disclos e privileged information.” Answer, Ex. 6 ¶ 2.8 thus waiving any claim to privilege; 11 (2) DynCorp represented t o ALJ Merck and Mr. Jordan that the DynCorp emails containe d the “Subject to Attorney Clie nt Privilege” notation, requiring DynCorp to now prove that such nota tion exists therein; (3) Dyn Corp waived its privilege by resending the purportedly privileg ed emails to Mr. Huber without including Mr. Bellomy in the email; and (4) ALJ Merck’s ruling rested on his finding that Dy nCorp employees expressly sought legal advice in the D ynCorp emails, a fact not found on the record that mandated disclosure under 5 U.S.C. § 556(e) o f the Administrative Proced ure Act (“APA”). Answer, Ex. 6
at 22–24. Chief ALJ Stephen R. Henley denied Mr. Jordan’s request, reiter ating ALJ Merck’s ruling “that the redacted porti ons of the [DynCorp] emails are covered by attorney–client privilege.” Answer, Ex. 7, at 27. C hief ALJ Henley noted that A LJ Merck had not “ruled on any request to modify his finding” of a ttorney–client privilege and that ALJ Merck’s ruling still stood. Id. Thus, Chief ALJ Henley agreed w ith Ms. Johnson that FOIA Exemp tion 4 exempted the requested information from disclosure. Id. at 26. D. FOIA Request No. F2016-813181 On September 1, 2016, Mr. Jordan submitted a fourth FOIA reques t. See Def.’s CrossMot., Ex. 1, Attach. M, ECF No. 20- 1. The DOL’s Adjudicatory Bo ards (“ARB”) labeled this request FOIA Request No. F2016-813181 (“Request No. 813181”). See Def.’s Cross-Mot., Ex. 1, Attach. N. This request sought a ny document that ALJ Merck r eceived in an ex parte communication, any document regard ing ALJ Merck’s decision to p lace documents under seal, any document withheld from disclosure because it was under seal , and any document

11 Mr. Jordan argued the redacti on of that notation in the versio n of the DynCorp emails he received, see Def.’s Cross-Mot., Ex. 1, Attach . E, ECF No. 20-1, indicated i ts designation as privileged information, see Answer, Ex. 6 at 22–23, ECF No. 14-1.9 demonstrating an OALJ determinat ion that attorney–client privil ege applied to Mr. Jordan’s FOIA requests. Def.’s Cro ss-Mot., Ex. 1, Attach. M at 89. On Se ptember 12, 2016, ARB informed Mr. Jordan that ARB “s earched [the] case tracking syst em and other files and found no material that [met] the paramete rs of [the] request.” Def.’s Cr oss-Mot., Ex. 1, Attach. N. On December 1, 2016, the OALJ closed out Request No. 813181 due to Mr. Jordan’s failure “to pay the fees and cos ts associated with processing t his request.” Def.’s Cross-Mot., Ex. 1, Attach. V. Mr. Jordan does notdispute that he failed to pay the requisite fees; thus, Request No. 813181 has no relevance here. E. FOIA Request No. 820511 On December 18, 2016, Mr. Jordan file d his final request on beh alf of his client. Def.’s Cross-Mot., Ex. 1, Attach. W. In t hat request, Mr. Jordan sough t from the OALJ “a copy of a portion of the record in the [DBA Proceedings].” Id. This request is not at issue here.

III. PROCEDURAL HISTORY After exhausting his administra tive remedies a s required under FOIA, Mr. Jordan filed this case in September 2016. See Compl., ECF No. 1; 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(6)(C)(i). In his complaint, Mr. Jordan sought “[i ]njunctive relief ordering the DOL to disclose to [Mr. Jordan] all previously undisclosed versions of the [DynCorp] [e]mails c overed by [Request No. 806591]” and “[j]udgment for reasonable attorneys’ fees , if any, expense s, and costs.” 12 Compl. at 10–11; Pl.’s Unopposed Mot. Leave Amend Compl., ECF No. 19.

12 In his original complaint, Mr. J ordan also sought “injunctive relief ordering the DOL to refrain from withholding any suc h documentation under an assert ion that such documentation is sealed or subject to an ALJ’s determination . . . that the docu ments are privileged.” Compl. ¶ B. Mr. Jordan moves to amend his co mplaint by no longer seeking th is relief. Pl.’s Unopposed Mot.10 Mr. Jordan and the DOL each move for summary judgment. 13 See Pl.’s Corrected Mot. Summ. J., ECF No. 16; Def.’s Mem. P. & A. Supp. Def.’s Cross-Mo t. Summ. J. & Opp’n Pl.’s Corrected Mot. Summ. J. (“Def.’s Mem.”), 14 ECF No. 20. The parties’ only dispute is whether FOIA Exemption 4 applies to unred acted versions of the DynCorp emails. See Pl.’s Corrected Reply Def.’s Opp’n Pl.’s Correct ed Mot. Summ. J.; Pl.’s Opp’n D ef.’s Cross-Mot. Summ. J. (“Pl.’s Reply”) at 3–8, 19, ECF N o. 30; Def.’s Reply Pl.’s Opp’ n Def.’s Cross-Mot. Summ. J. (“Def.’s Reply”) at 6–7, ECF No. 32. On July 24, 2017, the Court ordered Defendant to submit the DynCorp emails for in camera review. See July 24, 2017 Minute Order, Jordan v. U.S. Dep’t of Labor , 16-cv-1868. Defendant submitted the emails in a timely fashio n, and the Court has carefully reviewed them. In addition to his motion for summary judgment, Mr. Jordan has filed the following motions:

 A motion for sanctions under Rule 11, see Mot. Sanctions Under Rule 11 (“Pl.’s First Rule 11 Mot.”), ECF No. 10;

 A motion to compel depositions of Todd Smyth and Diane Johnson, see Mot. Compel Dep. Smyth & Johnson (“Pl. ’s Mot. Compel Dep.”), ECF No. 24;

 A motion to strike in its ent irety the Smyth Declaration, see Mot. Strike Smyth’s Decl. (“Pl.’s Mot. Strike Smyth Decl.”), ECF No. 25;

 A motion to compel the DOL to produ ce evidence rela ted to the S myth Declaration, see Mot. Compel Produc. Evid. Regar ding Smyth Decl. (“Pl.’s Mot. Compel Produc.”), ECF No. 29;

Leave Amend Compl., ECF No. 19. The Court grants this motion an d considers the initial complaint amended.
13 Mr. Jordan filed an initial M otion for Summary Judgment on Nov ember 15, 2016. See Mot. Summ. J., ECF No. 9. That mo tion was superseded by the Corrected Motion for Summary Judgment filed on December 5, 2016. See Pl.’s Corrected Mot. Summ. J., ECF No. 16.
14 Def.’s Mem. is included in D ef.’s Cross-Mot., ECF No. 20. For precision, the Court will refer directly to the Mem. when appropriate.11  A motion to strike the Departme nt of Justice’s (“DOJ”) October 25 motion for an extension of time to respond to the complaint and to vacate the Court’s October 26 order granting that motion, see Pl.’s Mot. Strike Prohibited Ex Parte Communication & Vacate October 26 Min. Order (“Pl.’s Mot. Vacat e”), ECF No. 31;

 A second motion for san ctions under Rule 11, see Pl.’s Second Mot. Sanctions Under Rule 11 (“Pl.’s Sec. Rule 11 Mot.”), ECF No. 33;

 A motion for the Court to addr ess the APA in its decision, see Mot. Regarding APA Basis Decision (“Pl.’s Mot. Regarding APA”), ECF No. 36. In response, the DOL has filed amotion requesting for the Court to stay all motion practice pending resolution of the parties’ summary judgment mo tions. See Def.’s Mot. Stay Pending Summ. J. (“Def.’s Mot. Stay”), ECF No. 26. Most of the Court’s analysis in this opinion regards the partie s’ substantive disputes. However, the Court also addre sses the litany of other motions f iled by Plaintiff.

IV. LEGAL STANDARDS “[D]isclosure, not secrecy, is th e dominant objective of [FOIA] .” Air Force v. Rose , 425 U.S. 352, 361 (1976). Congress enacte d FOIA so that citizens co uld discover “what their government is up to.” U.S. Dep’t of Justice v. Reporte rs Comm. for Freedom of the Press , 489 U.S. 749, 773 (1989) (quoting EPA v. Mink , 410 U.S. 73, 105 (1973) (Douglas, J., dissenting)). After an agency receives a reque st that “reasonably describes” records being sought, 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(3)(A), the agency must “co nduct[ ] a search reasonably c alculated to uncover all relevant documents.” Weisberg v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice , 705 F.2d 1344, 1351 (D.C. Cir. 1983). Then, FOIA requires the agency to disc lose responsive records reveale d by the search, unless one of FOIA’s nine statutory exemptions apply to material in the recor ds. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(b); see also Elliott v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric. , 596 F.3d 842, 845 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (“[A]gencies may withhold only those documents or por tions thereof that fall und er one of nine delineated statutory12 exemptions.”). The nine FOIA “exem ptions are ‘explicitly exclus ive.’” DOJ v. Tax Analysts , 492 U.S. 136, 151 (1989) (quoting FAA Adm’r v. Robertson , 422 U.S. 255, 262 (1975)). And it is the agency’s burden to show that with held material falls within one of these exemptions. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B); see also Elliott , 596 F.3d at 845. “FOIA cases typically and appropr iately are decided on motions for summary judgment.” Defs. of Wildlife v. U.S. Border Patrol , 623 F. Supp. 2d 83, 87 (D.D.C. 2009). When assessing a summary judgment motion in a FOIA case, the district court revi ews the matter de novo

. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B); Life Extension Found., Inc. v. IRS , 915 F. Supp. 2d 174, 179 (D.D.C. 2013). Summary judgment is appropri ate when “the movant shows t hat there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to j udgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A “material” fact i s one capable of affecting th e substantive outcome of the litigation. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. , 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A dispute is “genuine” if there is enough evidence for a reasonable jury to return a v erdict for the non-movant. See Scott
v. Harris , 550 U.S. 372, 380 (2007). In withholding documents pursuant to a FOIA exemption, “the age ncy must provide ‘a detailed justification and not jus t conclusory statements to de monstrate that all reasonably segregable informati on has been released.’” Gatore v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec. , 177 F. Supp. 3d 46, 51 (D.D.C. 2016) (quoting Valfells v. CIA , 717 F. Supp. 2d 110, 120 (D.D.C. 2010)). To satisfy this burden, “an agenc y may rely on detailed affidavits , declarations, a Vaughn index, in camera review, or a combi nation of these tools.” Comptel v. FCC , 910 F. Supp. 2d 100, 111 (D.D.C. 2012). Typically, agencies provide courts with the requ ired information via a “combination” of a Vaughn index and agency declarations. See id. “A Vaughn index correlates each withheld document, or portion thereof, with a particular F OIA exemption and the13 justification for nondisclosure.” Id. (citing Vaughn v. Rosen , 484 F.2d 820, 827 (D.C. Cir. 1973)). The agency “affidavits [must] describe the documents and the ju stifications for nondisclosure with reasonably spe cific detail, demonstrate that the information withheld logically falls within the cla imed exemption, and are not contr overted by either contrary evidence in the record nor by evi dence of agency bad faith.” Military Audit Project v. Casey , 656 F.2d 724, 738 (D.C. Cir. 1981). Moreover , agency affidavits gen erally enjoy “a presumption of good faith.” See SafeCard Servs., Inc. v. SEC , 926 F.2d 1197, 1200 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (citing Ground Saucer Watch, Inc. v. CIA , 692 F.2d 770, 771 (D.C. Cir. 1981)). The agency should “disclose as much information as possible without thwarting the exemption’s purpose.” Hall v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice , 552 F. Supp. 2d 23, 27 (D.D.C. 2008) (quoting King v. U.S. Dep’t of
Justice , 830 F.2d 210, 224 (D.C. Cir. 1987)). “Ultimately, an agency’s justification for invoking a FOIA exemption is sufficient if it appears ‘logical’ or ‘plau sible.’” Wolf v. CIA , 473 F.3d 370, 374–75 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (quoting Gardels v. CIA , 689 F.2d 1100, 1105 (D.C. Cir. 1982)). Generally, a reviewing court shoul d “respect the expertise of a n agency” and not “overstep the proper limits of the judicial role in FOIA review.” Hayden v. Nat’l Sec. Agency/Cent. Sec. Serv. , 608 F.2d 1381, 1388 (D.C. Cir. 1979). 15

15 The Court ordered in camera review of the DynCorp emails. Such review is appropriate when “the district j udge believes that in camera in spection is needed in order to make a responsible de novo determ ination on the claims of exemp tion.” Ray v. Turner , 587 F.2d 1187, 1195 (D.C. Cir. 1978). Of course, in camera review does not excuse the government of its “obligation to provide detaile d public indexes and justificatio ns whenever possible.” Am. Immigration Council v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec. , 950 F. Supp. 2d 221, 235–36 (D.D.C. 2013) (quoting Lykins v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice , 725 F.2d 1455, 1463 (D.C. Cir. 1984)).14 V. ANALYSIS The DOL contends that FOIA Exe mption 4 protects the unredacted versions of the DynCorp emails requested in R equest No. 806591 from disclosure. See Def.’s Mem. at 9, 13–14, ECF No. 20. The DOL specificall y argues that FOIA Exemption 4 p rotects the attorney–client privileged materials at issue he re, that the contract informati on in the DynCorp emails and the fact that they were sent to an i n-house attorney for legal advi ce demonstrates the privileged nature of the DynCorp emails, and that the limited disclosure o f the DynCorp emails to ALJ Merck for in camera reviewdid not waive any privilege. See id. at 12–14. The DOL also asserts that its initial failure t o respond to Mr. Jordan’s July 5, 201 6 FOIA Request has been mooted by its disclosure of responsive documents. See id. at 18–19. Mr. Jordan argues that FOIA Ex emption 4 does not apply to the D ynCorp emails. See Pl.’s Corrected Mot. Summ. J. at 24–45, ECF No. 16. He contends that the DOL cannot establish that the DynCorp emails were se nt to or by someone acting as a lawyer for a privileged purpose.
See id. at 40–43. Mr. Jordan als o argues that the DOL’s actions during the DBA Proceedings waived the privilege under various APA provisions, required ALJ Merck to disclose the DynCorp emails, and require this C ourt to find that the emails are not privileged. See id. at 32– 40. Mr. Jordan also alleges that D ynCorp waived its privilege b y failing to justif y its claim of privilege and by pretending to mak e full evidentiary disclosure s. See id. at 43–45. Finally, Mr. Jordan claims that the DOL’s belated response to his July 5, 20 16 FOIA request was a “smoke screen” and that the DOL has st ill not provided documents respo nsive to this request. See Pl.’s Reply at 8–11. Having reviewed the record and a ssured itself by inspecting the DynCorp emails in camera, the Court grants summar y judgment in favor of the DOL w ith respect to the Powers15 email—the first email in the DynCorp email chain. The DOL prope rly withheld the unredacted version of the Powers email under FOIA Exemption 4 based on its attorney–clie nt privileged nature. The DOL sufficiently s upported its claim of privilege i n its Smyth Declaration, Vaughn Index, and accompanying attachments . Moreover, DynCorp’s judici ally compelled disclosure of the unredacted versions of its emails to ALJ Merck for in camer a review did not waive its claim to privilege, and the various APA provisions that Mr. Jordan ci tes have no relevance to this case. Finally, the DOL has made Mr. Jor dan’s motion regarding the Jul y 5, 2016 FOIA request moot by providing documents responsive to that request. However, upo n in camera consideration of the Huber email, the Court concludes that, while the email may be exempt from withholding, the DOL has not adequately explaine d its basis for withholding. Thu s the Court will grant Defendant’s motion for summary j udgment, except as it pertains to the Huber email. The DOL may either release the DynCorp e mail chain with the Huber email unredacted, or renew its motion for summary judgment with f urther justification for that particular email. The Court denies Mr. Jordan’s litany of miscellaneous motions, as described above. Mr. Jordan has failed to identify a ny sanctionable behavior by Defe ndant or defense counsel. The Court also denies Mr. Jordan’s motions to (1) compel deposition s of Todd Smyth and Diane16 Johnson; 16 (2) strike in its entir ety the Smyth Declaration; 17 (3) compel the production evidence related to the Sm yth Declaration; 18 (4) strike the DOJ’s Octobe r 25 motion requesting an

16 Mr. Jordan seeks to compel de positions of Mr. Smyth and Ms. Jo hnson. See Pl.’s Mot. Compel Dep. at 2, ECF No. 24. Mr. J ordan claims that he “cannotverify or refute without discovery” the Smyth Declarati on and the DOL’s Memo and that he requires “a deposition of . . . Todd Smyth and Diane Johnson to be conducted as soon as practic able.” See id. at 1–2. “FOIA actions are typically r esolved without discovery.” Voinche v. FBI, 412 F. Supp. 2d 60, 71 (D.D.C. 2006) (citation omitted). Indeed, “[d]iscovery i n FOIA is rare and should be denied where an agency’s declar ations are reasonably detailed, submitted in good faith and the court is satisfied that no factual dispute remains.” Schrecker v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice , 217 F. Supp. 2d 29, 35 (D.D.C. 2002). Though “FOIA actions are not exe mpted from the discovery provisions of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the scop e of the discovery permitted . . . lies in the [C]ourt’s discretion,” the Court treats further dis covery in FOIA actions skeptically and prefers to permit limited dis covery only when truly necessa ry. Bureau of Nat’l Affairs, Inc. v. IRS , 24 F. Supp. 2d 90, 92 (D.D.C. 1998). It is well-established i n this district that “a declarant in a FOIA case satisfies the pe rsonal knowledge requirement in Rule 56(e) if in his declaration, he attests to his personal know ledge of the procedures used in handling a FOIA request and his familiarity with the documents in question.” Barnard v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec. , 531 F. Supp. 2d 131, 138 (D.D.C. 2008) (internal citation and alterati ons omitted); see also Schmitz v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice , 27 F. Supp. 3d 115, 120 (D.D.C. 2014) (noting that the rule i n Barnard is “established”) Mr. Smyth’s declaration establis hes that he has personal knowle dge of the procedures used in handling a FOIA request and demonstrates that he is fam iliar with the documents in question, and thus satisfies Rul e 56(e)’s personal knowledge re quirement. See Smyth Decl. ¶¶ 1, 21–31; Barnard , 531 F. Supp. 2d at 138. And although Mr. Jordan implies bad f aith by Mr. Smyth and states that “there is very good reason to believe tha t the facts asserted were not within Smyth’s personal knowledge” and “[s ]ome factual assertions were very clearly false,” he offers no evidence to substantiate his al legations that might warrant further discovery. See Mem. P. & A. Supp. Pl.’s Mot. Compel Dep. (“Pl.’s Mot. Compel Deps. Mem.” ) at 4, ECF No. 24-1. The Court does not view Mr. Jordan’s “mere assertions” as a suffici ent rationale to allow discovery in this FOIA action. See Voinche , 412 F. Supp. 2d at 72. The Court finds the depositions sought here unnecessary and denies Mr. Jordan’s motion.
17 Mr. Jordan moves to strike the Smyth Declaration on the ground s that “[Mr.] Smyth and the DOJ clearly disregarded a ll safeguards to ensure that S myth’s Declaration was reliable or probative” as outlined by FRCP 56(c)(4). Pl.’s Mot. Strike Smyth Decl. at 2, ECF No. 25. “The decision to grant or deny a m otion to strike is vested in the trial judge’s sound discretion.” Canady v. Erbe Elektromedizin GmbH , 307 F. Supp. 2d 2, 7 (D.D.C. 2004) (citation omitted). “[M]otions to strike are not favored,” and the Court maintains “considerable discretion in disposing of mo tions to strike.” Cobell v. Norton , 224 F.R.D. 1, 2 (D.D.C. 2004). Indeed,17 motions to strike are “often . . . c onsidered ‘time wasters.’” Id. (quoting 2A Moore’s Federal Practice, § 12.21 at 2419). Mr. Jordan’s only germane contention alleges that the Smyth Dec laration included facts of which Mr. Smyth had no personal knowledge. See Mem. P. & A. Supp. Pl.’s Mot. Strike Smyth’s Decl. (“Pl.’s Mot. Str ike Smyth Decl. Mem.”) at 5–6, EC F No. 25-1. Mr. Jordan notes that “[a]n affidavit or declaration [ ] must be made on persona l knowledge . . . and show that the affiant or declarant is compete nt to testify on the matters sta ted.” Id. at 5 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(4)); see also Londrigan v. FBI, 670 F.2d 1164, 1174 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (stating that the “requirement of personal knowle dge by the affiant is unequivoca l[] and cannot be circumvented”). The Court dealt with this concern in footnote 1 6 above. Mr. Smyth’s job responsibilities “included advi sing OALJ FOIA personnel on FOIA requests that were assigned to [his] agency component.” Smyth Decl. ¶ 1. Mr. Smyth’s work c ompetencies indicate that he has the personal knowledge require d to submit his declaration, and the extensive record submitted by the DOL presents an exhaustive companion piece to corroborate the facts in the Smyth Declaration and ground Mr. S myth’s knowledge in the attac hed documents. See Def.’s Cross-Mot., Ex. 1, Attachs. A–W. T he Court thus denies Mr. Jord an’s motion to strike Smyth’s Declaration.
18 Mr. Jordan moves for this Court to order the DOL to produce do cuments regarding “(1) any draft or version of Smyth’s D eclaration or (2) any language that was included in Smyth’s Declaration or in any draft or vers ion of Smyth’s Declaration.” Pl.’s Mot. Compel Produc. at 1, ECF No. 29. The Court reiterates that “FOIA actions are typically resolved without discovery.” Voinche , 412 F. Supp. 2d at 71 (citation omitted). “Discovery in FOIA is rare and should be denied where an agency’s declar ations are reasonably detailed, submitted in good faith and the court is satisfied that no factual dispute remains.” Schrecker , 217 F. Supp. 2d at 35. Typically in FOIA cases, discovery of the ki nd Mr. Jordan seeks is “unnecess ary and impermissible” where the Court finds, as it does he re, “no genuine issue of material fact” exists. Bureau of Nat’l Affairs , 24 F. Supp. 2d at 92. Though “FOIA actions are not exempted f rom the discovery provisions of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the scop e of the discovery permitted . . . lies in the [C]ourt’s discretion,” the Court treats further dis covery in FOIA actions skeptically and prefers to permit limited dis covery only when truly necessa ry. Id

. Granting this motion would depend on concrete evidence rebuttin g the “presumption of good faith” accorded to the DOL in submitting the Smyth Declara tion. See Shrecker , 217 F. Supp. 2d at 35; Voinche , 412 F. Supp. 2d at 64. Rather than providing such concrete ev idence, Mr. Jordan’s motion is littered w ith speculative claims. Mr. Jo rdan invokes the “crime–fraud exception,” Pl.’s Mot. Compel Pr oduc. at 7, alleges “perjury,” id. at 9, misrepresents the reason for submitting the Smyth Declaration as seeking to “influence” the Court, id. , and claims that the DOJ and DOL are engaged in a “cove r up” of ALJ Merck’s “crimina l conduct,” id. at 11. These repeated claims never rise above speculation to warrant the kin d of discovery Mr. Jordan desires. The Court denies Mr. Jordan’s motion to compel the production o f evidence regarding the Smyth Declaration.18 extension to respond to the Comp laint and vacate the Court’s Oc tober 26 Minute Order granting that motion; 19 and (5) address the APA in the Court’s decision. 20 None of these final motions warrants extensive analysis by the Court.

19 Mr. Jordan moves to strike th e DOL’s motion for an extension t o file an answer— deeming that motion a prohibited ex parte communication

—vacate the Court’s October 26, 2016, Minute Order, and force the DOL to admit each factual allegatio n in the Complaint. See Pl.’s Mot. Vacate, ECF No. 31; Pl.’s M ot. Vacate, Proposed Order ¶ 4, ECF No. 31-1. The Court reiterates that “[t ]he decision to grant or deny a mo tion to strike is vested in the trial judge’s sound discretion.” Canady , 307 F. Supp. 2d at 7 (citation omitted). “Generally, motions to strike are disf avored by federal courts.” Wiggins , 853 F. Supp. at 457. Indeed, motions to strike are “often . . . c onsidered ‘time wasters.’” Id. (quoting 2A Moore’s Federal Practice, § 12.21 at 2419). This Court disfavors such motions “ because they propose a drastic remedy.” Canady , 307 F. Supp. 2d at 7–8 (cases collected). Given that an ex parte communicat ion is defined as a “communica tion between counsel and the court when opposing counsel is not present,” Communicat ion, Black’s Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014), Mr. Jordan’s argum ent that “he did not have anopportunity to respond to” the DOL’s motion for an extension does not give the motion “the eff ect of an ex parte communication,” North v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice , 17 F. Supp. 3d 1, 4 (D.D.C. 2013). Courts in this district have held that communications “filed on the publi c docket and thus accessible to all . . . cannot, by definition, be considered ex parte communicati ons.” Id. at 4. Mr. Jordan’s lack of access to the motion until after it had already been granted do es not render the underlying motion ex parte. See Pl.’s Mot. Vacate at 7. Because the underlying motion is not a n ex parte communication, the Court denies M r. Jordan’s requested motion t o strike the DOL’s motion for an extension to file an answer a nd vacate the Court’s October 2 6, 2016 Minute Order. Mr. Jordan’s claims concerning e x parte communications aside, the Court did not grant the DOL’s motion because Mr. Jor dan failed to oppose it; the Co urt granted it because it found a sufficient showing of good cause. I n a routine FOIA case like t his one, where expedited consideration is not at issue, there were no arguments that wou ld have persuaded the Court against granting the same extens ion. That is the sole reason th e Court did not await Plaintiff’s opposition—to preserve the Court’s and the parties’ resources.
20 Finally, Mr. Jordan moves for t he Court to address “the releva nce of the APA to the determination of whether the [ DynCorp] [e]mails could have beenprivileged” in its decision. Pl.’s Mot. Regarding APA at 1, ECF No. 36. This motion attempts to re-litigate the DBA Proceedings under the guise of a FOIA action. See generally Pl.’s Mot. Regarding APA. The Court reiterates th at under FOIA, the Court may do no more than“enjoin [an] agency from withholding agency records and [] order the production of any a gency records improperly withheld from the complainan t.” 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B). This l imited grant of jurisdiction precludes the Court from exami ning various OALJ actions in sepa rate proceedings under different APA provisions. Mr. Jor dan’s motion is therefore deni ed. With that said, none of Plaintiff’s arguments convince the Court that the ALJ did not h ave the authority to conduct an in19 A. Exemption 4 Exempts the Inf ormation Requested in the DynCorp Emails from Disclosure Exemption 4 exempts “trade secret s and commercial or financial information obtained from a person and privileged or conf idential” matters from disc losure, creating a three-prong test. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(4). In non-tr ade-secrets cases, the “ag ency must establish that the withheld records are ‘(1) commerc ial or financial, (2) obtained from a person, and (3) privileged or confidential.’” Pub. Citizen v. HHS , 975 F. Supp. 2d 81, 98 (D.D.C. 2013) (citing Pub. Citizen Health Research Grp. v. FDA , 704 F.2d 1280, 1290 (D.C. Cir. 1983)). The Court determines the applicability of each of these prongs de novo

. 21 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B); see also DOJ v. Reporters Comm. For Freedom of the Press , 489 U.S. 749, 755 (1989) (clar ifying that FOIA “directs the district courts to ‘determine the matter de novo ’” (citing 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B))). 1. The Information at Issue is “ Commercial” or “Financial” The DOL maintains that the at-i ssue information is “commercial” or “financial” because it regards a DynCorp business contract. See Def.’s Mem. at 11. Mr. Jor dan does not dispute that the information at issue is ind eed “commercial” and “financial. ” See id. The D.C. Circuit has held that the terms “commercial” and “fina ncial” should be given their ordinary meanings, see Wash. Post Co. v. HHS , 690 F.2d 252, 266 (D.C. Cir. 1982), which encompass situations in which the submitter has a “commercial i nterest” in the records, see, e.g., Baker & Hostetler LLP v. U.S. Dep’t of Commerce , 473 F.3d 312, 319 (D.C. Cir. 2006); Pub.

camera review. It is unclear how Plainti ff believes the ALJ is to sati sfy himself that the records were indeed privileged. Plainti ff’s strained reading of the var ious APA provisions would make for more opaque decision-making—not less.
21 Mr. Jordan repeatedly “attempts to establish an ‘arbitrary andcapricious’ [APA] standard of review of his Complaint.” See Def.’s Reply at 2, ECF No. 32; see also Pl.’s Reply at 2–3, ECF No. 30. This plainly misstates the de novo standard of review that governs FOIA cases. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (a)(4)(B).20 Citizen Health Research Grp. , 704 F.2d at 1290. Under the “commerc ial interest” standard se t forth in Baker , “commercial” or “financial” i nformation includes, for example , a non-profit organization’s reports “describ ing the operations of its member s’ nuclear power plants” and lens manufacturers’ health and safety data that bears upon “marketin g approval for their products.”
Baker , 473 F.3d at 319 (citing Critical Mass Energy Project v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n , 830 F.2d 278, 281 (D.C. Cir. 1987); Pub. Citizen , 704 F.2d at 1290). Baker thus gives “commercial interest” a broad definition, one that includes records that “r eveal basic commerci al operations,” “relate to the income-produci ng aspects of a business,” or bear upon the “commercial fortunes” of the organization. Baker , 473 F.3d at 319 (internal quotations and citations omitted). The DOL describes the DynCorp ema ils as pertaining to the “status of operations issues in connection with a business co ntract . . . administered and m anaged by [DynCorp] employees.”
See Def.’s Mem. at 11, ECF No. 20; see also Smyth Decl. ¶ 31, ECF N o. 20-1 (portraying the redacted information as “developments potentially impacting the Worldwide Protective Services Program contract”); Def.’s Cross-Mot., Ex. 1, Attach. A (“ Vaughn Index”) (characterizing the redacted information as “concern[ ing] the statu s of operations issues in connection with the Worldwide Protective Services (‘WPS’) Program contract”). The status of operations regardi ng a business contract easily c onforms to Baker ’s “commercial interest” standard. Like in Baker , the information in the DynCorp emails bears directly upon the “commercial fo rtunes” of DynCorp as a companybecause this information addresses a business contract of the company. Def.’s Mem. at 11 ; Baker , 473 F.3d at 319 (quoting Critical Mass Energy Project , 830 F.2d at 281). Thus, the Court agrees with the DOL that the information in question is “commercial” or “financial” because it regards DynCorp’s commercial interest in the administration and management of the WPS Program contract.21 2. The Information in Question w as Obtained from a Person A “person,” under FOIA, includes “an individual, partnership, c orporation, association, or public or private organizati on other than an agency.” 5 U.S. C. § 551(2). The OALJ received the at-issue documents “from c ounsel for the company [DynCorp] in the Defense Base Act hearing before the OALJ.” Def.’s Mem. at 11, ECF No. 20. Mr. Jo rdan makes no argument to the contrary. See generally Pl.’s Corrected Mot. Summ. J ., ECF No. 16. Thus, the sole rema ining issue is whether the informati on in the DynCorp emails is privi leged. 3. The Information in the Po wers Email is Privileged The DOL contends that the withhe ld information is privileged un der Exemption 4. See Def.’s Mem. at 12–14, ECF No. 20. Specifically, the DOL claims that it contains attorney–client privileged communications. See Def.’s Mem. at 12. To substantiate its claim, the DOL asserts that the DynCorp emails had “bee n marked ‘Subject to Attorney C lient Privilege’ and transmitted to an in-house attorney for [DynCorp] in order to a pprise him of developments potentially impacting the Worldwi de Protective Services Program contract and to explicitly request the attorney’s input and r eview of the information tran smitted.” Smyth Decl. ¶ 31; see also Vaughn Index (claiming the information a s privileged under Exemption 4 in nearly identical language). In conclusory terms, M r. Jordan responds that there is no “factual basis or legal authority that support[s] the a pplication of any FOIA exemptionto Plaintiff’s FOIA requests.” Pl.’s Corrected Mot. Summ. J . at 28, ECF No. 16. Mr. Jordan con tends that the OALJ’s “denials of Plaintiff’s FOIA requests [ ] were notably devoid of any exp lanation.” Id. Mr. Jordan asserts that the OALJ erroneously “co ntended that FOIA Exemption 4 appl ied because ALJ Merck purportedly ruled that the [DynC orp] [e]mails were privileged” while “fail[ing] to make any rational connection between FOI A Exemption 4 and the OALJ’s pur ported basis for invoking22 such exemption.” Id. Mr. Jordan insists t hat “[n]o OALJ representative made any suc h determination” finding the DynCorp emails privileged, and, cons equently, implores the Court to make no such determination now. Def.’s Reply at 10. “‘Privileged’ information is ge nerally understood to be informa tion that falls within recognized constitutional, statutory, or common law privileges. ” Gen. Elec. Co. v. Air Force , 648 F. Supp. 2d 95, 101 n.4 (D.D.C. 2009) (citing Wash. Post Co. v. HHS , 690 F.2d 252, 267–68, n.50 (D.C. Cir. 1982)). Though “case law examining privilege un der Exemption 4 is sparse,” Def.’s Mem. at 12, courts have repeatedly found that Exemption 4’s “privilege” requirement covers properly-practice d attorney–client privilege, see Gen. Elec. Co. , 648 F. Supp. 2d at 101 n.4; Artesian Indus., Inc. v. HHS , 646 F. Supp. 1004, 1007–08 (D.D.C. 1986); Indian Law Res. Ctr. v. U.S. Dep’t of Interior , 477 F. Supp. 144, 149 (D.D.C. 1979). Though “the mere fact th at an attorney is liste d as a recipient . . . does not make a document protected under [attorney– client] privilege,” Vento v. I.R.S. , 714 F. Supp. 2d 137, 151 (D.D.C. 2010), confidential disclosures between a n attorney and her cl ient regarding factua l and legal matters are certainly protected by attorney–client privilege, see, e.g., Fisher v. United States , 425 U.S. 391, 403 (1976) (“Confidential disclosure s by a client to an attorney ma de in order to obtain legal assistance are privileged.”); Vento , 714 F. Supp. 2d at 151 (noting that “[f]actual information provided by the client to the atto rney is the essence of privil ege”); Mead Data Cent., Inc. v. Air
Force , 566 F.2d 242, 252 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (stat ing that attorney–cli ent privilege protects “confidential communications b etween an attorney and his client relating to a l egal matter for which the client has sou ght professional advice”). The DOL’s justification—as set f orth in the Smyth Declaration and Vaughn Index and confirmed by the Court’s in camera review —is sufficiently detailed f or the Court to conclude23 that FOIA Exemption 4 applies to the Powers email, because it c ontained privileged communications between an attorn ey and his client. The DOL desc ribes the DynCorp emails in a detailed manner—though obviously i n such a way that does not di sclose the information it seeks to protect—and there is nothing in the record to q uestion the p resumption of good faith that the Court affords the DOL in its exp lanation. The DOL explains thatthe DynCorp emails concerned DynCorp’s confidential informa tion regarding a business contrac t and expressly sought DynCorp’s attorney’s inputand review. Smyth Decl. ¶ 31; Vaughn Index. Additionally, the DOL reiterated that the DynCorp emails are “marked ‘Subject to Atto rney Client Privilege.’” Smyth Decl. ¶ 31; Vaughn Index. This description supports the inference that the DynCor p emails concern contractual information that DynCorp wishes to protect and that this contractual information was sent to in-house attorney Christopher Bellomy f or his legal advice. However, the Court’s review of the DynCorp emails in camera has revealed that the DOL’s justifications are much mo re applicable to the Powers ema il than they are to the Huber email. The Powers email itself is labeled “subject to attorney– client privilege;” the Huber email is itself not. The Powers email contains an express request for legal advice; the Huber email does not. Indeed, although the Huber email responds to information i n the Powers email and has Mr. Bellomy “cc-ed,” it does not necessarily meet the standard for attorney–client privilege—at least as the DOL has articulated its justification to this point. 22 The Court requires further briefing focusing specifically on the DOL’s justification to withhold th e Huber email before it is prepared to grant summary judgmentfor either party.

22 “[M]erely copying or ‘cc-ing’ l egal counsel, in and of itself, is not enough to trigger the attorney–client privilege.” Phillips v. C.R. Bard, Inc. , 290 F.R.D. 615, 630 (D. Nev. 2013).24 The Court therefore orders the DOL to provide further justifica tion for withholding with respect to the Huber email (or voluntarily release it). With re spect to the Powers email, the Court’s in camera review confirms that the conten t of the information and the rea son it was communicated satisfy the demands o f attorney–client privilege. B. DynCorp Did Not Waive its Attorney–Client Privilege Mr. Jordan claims that, even if the communicatio ns were privile ged when originally made, DynCorp subsequently wai ved any claim to privilege in thr ee ways. First, he argues that DynCorp waived the privilege by submitting the DynCorp emails t o the OALJ in the DBA Proceedings. 23 See Pl.’s Corrected Mot. Su mm. J. at 32–40, ECF No. 16. Second, Mr . Jordan contends that DynCorp waived its claim of privilege by failing to ever fully justify its invocation of privilege. See Pl.’s Corrected Mot. Summ. J. a t 43. Mr. Jordan claims that Dy nCorp failed to properly “identify recipients of the [DynCorp] [e]mails in [its ] [r]equired [d]isclosures” and “failed to provide information a bout the purpose of the [DynCor p] [e]mails that would support a finding that the [DynCorp] [ e]mails were privileged.” Id. at 43–44. Mr. Jordan asserts that this insufficient provision of information regarding the DynCorp ema ils waives any privilege that may be applicable to them. See id. Finally, Mr. Jordan argues that“[DynCorp]’s failure to show

23 In conclusory terms, Mr. Jordan a sserts that DynCorp waived it s privilege when nonattorney DynCorp managers forwa rded the DynCorp emails among ea ch other, without including Mr. Bellomy in the emails. Pl.’s Corrected Mot. Summ. J. at 41. Such forwarding does not waive privilege. Mr. Bellomy was a n attorney to DynCorp—not any or al l of the individual employees identified by Plaintiff—givi ng advice to DynCorp, and thus DynC orp holds the attorney–client privilege over the documents. See Upjohn Co. v. United States , 449 U.S. 383, 394 (1981). Internal distribution of privileg ed materials among corporate m anagers does not automatically waive attorney–client privilege; the DynCorp managers who circu lated Mr. Bellomy’s advice did not disclose that advice to any “third party.” See In re United Mine Wo rkers of Am. Employee Ben. Plans Litig. , 159 F.R.D. 307, 313 (D.D.C. 1994).25 that privilege applied before ALJMerck ruled on this issue in his February 9[, 2016] decision should be found to constitute a w aiver of the privilege.” Id. at 44. 24 Conversely, the DOL argues thatsubmission of the DynCorp email s to ALJ Merck for in camera review did not waive DynCor p’s claim of attorney–client privilege. See Def.’s Mem. at 20. The DOL asserts that its submission made clear that DynCorp “did not intend to waive . . . privilege by submitting the documents to” ALJ Merck and that th is limited disclosure of the atissue documents did not “destroy [] the attorne y–client privileg e.” Id. at 20–21. Additionally, the DOL argues that ALJ Merck prop erly found the DynCorp emails pri vileged during the DBA Proceedings and that, as a result, no waiver occurred. See id. at 19–20. Mr. Jordan’s arguments come up short. The submission of documents for judiciallycompelled in camera review comport s with the principles underly ing privilege; that submission itself does not waive privilege. Courts in this district recognize that “disclosure of documents inconsistent with the confidential nature of the attorney–client r elationships waives the attorney–client privilege” with respect to “all other communica tions related to the same subjec t matter.” In re United Mine Workers of Am. Employee Benefit Plans Litig. , 159 F.R.D. 307, 310 (D.D.C. 1994) (citing In re Sealed Case , 877 F.2d 976, 980–81 (D.C. Cir. 1989); In re Sealed Case , 676 F.2d 793, 818 (D.C. Cir. 1982); Chubb Integrated Sys. v. Nat’l Bank of Wash. , 103 F.R.D. 52, 63 (D.D.C. 1984)). In

24 Again in conclusory terms, Mr . Jordan also argues that DynCorp waived its privilege by pretending to make full disclosures. See Pl.’s Corrected Mot. Su mm. J. at 45. To support this argument, Mr. Jordan cites a si ngle, non-FOIA-rel ated case that endorses a court’s choice to “imply a waiver of privilege” wh en a party elects to participat e in a voluntary disclosure program and makes false “pretense[s] of unconditional disclosure.” In re Kellogg Brown & Root, Inc. , 796 F.3d 137, 147 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (quoting In re Sealed Case , 676 F.2d at 823). Mr. Jordan’s argument does not apply, because there is simply no evidence of any such pretense.26 certain situations, the disclosure of information to the government can waive privilege. See, e.g.,
Artesian Industries , 646 F. Supp. at 1008 (inadvertently including an interoffice memorandum marked “CONFIDENTIAL” along with other requested documents waiv ed privilege); Underwater Storage, Inc. v. U.S. Rubber Co. , 314 F. Supp. 546, 548–49 (D.D.C. 1970) (turning over a privileged letter pursuant to a consent order for examin ation waived attorney–client privilege, regardless of plainti ff’s intent). However, in those situations waiver is inferred based on the voluntariness of a party’s disclosure of information. Chubb , 103 F.R.D. at 63 (citing In re Subpoenas Duces Tecum , No. 83–2116, slip op. at 5 (D.C. Cir. July 10, 1984); Transamerica Computer Co., Inc. v. IBM Corp. , 573 F.2d 646, 650–51 (9th Cir. 1978)). “Voluntary disclosure means the documents were not judicially compelled.” Chubb , 103 F.R.D. at 63 n.2. As the Supreme Court held in United States v. Zolin , 491 U.S. 554, 568 (1989), the “disclosure of allegedly privileged materials t o the district court for purpos es of determining the merits of a claim of privilege does not have the legal effect of terminatin g the privilege.” The principle established in Zolin logically applies equally t o ALJs. ALJs are judicial actors who, in the matters pendi ng before them, must make determinations on the propriety of privilege claims asserted by the pa rties before them. There is no basis to conclude that they may not avail themselves of in camera review as a useful tool in ma king those determinations. If submission of information to suc h review jettisoned privilege, the review would have no purpose, because any privileged do cument submitted for in camer a review would be immediately eligible for full disclosure unde r FOIA. Nor is the submission of privileged documents for in camera review “inconsistent with the confidential nature of the attorney–client relationship.” In re United Mine Workers , 159 F.R.D. at 310.27 In no way did DynCorp act “inconsis tent with the confidential n ature of the attorney– client relationships.” See id . Mr. Jordan unjustifiably disreg ards the fact that DynCorp sub mitted its emails for in camera review to validate its claim of privilege in accordance with an ALJ order.
See Def.’s Cross-Mot., Ex. 1, Attach. D at 25, ECF No. 20-1 (stati ng that the submission of the DynCorp emails was “in response t o the Administrative Law Judge ’s October 19, 2015 [o]rder” requiring “[DynCorp] to provide an unredacted copy of the privi leged communication . . . for in camera inspection”); Joint Appendix 25 (“Pl.’s App.”), Attach. 2 a t 16, ECF No. 34-2 (explaining that ALJ Merck’s order for DynCorp’s counsel to submit the DynC orp emails for in camera review occurred during an Oct ober 19, 2015 conference call invo lving both Ms. Jordan’s and DynCorp’s representatives); Def.’s Cross-Mot., Ex. 1, Attach. Q at 114–15 (reiterating that ALJ Merck found it “abundantly clear” th at the DynCorp emails “were subject to attorney client privilege”). DynCorp’s submissi on was consistent with attorney– client confidentiality and did not constitute a waiver of privilege. United Mine Workers , 159 F.R.D. at 310. Indeed, ALJ Merck found that the attorney–cli ent privilege applied, bolster ing the Court’s holding that the review process alone did not wai ve the privilege. Pl.’s App., A ttach. 2 at 13. Furthermore, the facts of the cas e undercut Mr. Jordan’s argume nt that DynCorp waived privilege by failing to substantiate its claim upfront. The tex t of the February 9 order confirms that, prior to the February 9 or der: Mr. Jordan was seeking ema ils “over which [DynCorp] asserted attorney–client privilege,” see Pl.’s App., Attach. 2 at 15, ECF No. 34-2; Mr. Jordan had

25 The Court notes the DOL’s Respons e Regarding the Joint Appendi x (“Def.’s Resp. Regarding J.A.”), ECF No. 35, expr essly disavows that the DOL “ agreed upon the contents of such an appendix or consented to its filing” and “maintains tha t the documents included in [Pl.’s App.] are not relevant or materia l to the resolution of the parties’ cross motions for summary judgment.” Def.’s Resp. Regarding J.A. As such, the DOL contest s labeling this appendix a “Joint Appendix.” Id. The Court agrees.28 received “an amended privilege l og to address Claimant’s concer ns about the [c]ompany’s description of the priv ileged communication,” id. at 16; DynCorp’s Opposition Memorandum in the DBA Proceedings and the Littler Mendelson letter submitted to ALJ Merck for in camera review included a detailed descri ption of the DynCorp emails an d the reason for considering them privileged similar to the rationale espoused in the Smyth Declaration and Vaughn Index,
see id. at 16; and DynCorp’s “management- level employees expressly soug ht legal advice from [DynCorp]’s in-house counsel ” in the DynCorp emails, id. at 18. In short, DynCorp consistently substantiated and maintained its claim of privilege throughout the DBA Proceedings. Thus, the Court finds that DynCorp did not w aive its attorney–client priv ilege.
C. Defendant Provided All “Rea sonably Segregable” Portions of the Powers Email In response to Request No. 806591, t he DOL disclosed a partiall y redacted version of the DynCorp emails that provided unredacted emails from Mr. Imbrie, Mr. Powers and Mr. Huber sent the morning of July 31, 2013, as well as email headings fr om the Huber email and the Powers email. 26 See Def.’s Cross-Mot., Ex. 1, Attac h. E, ECF No. 20-1. However, the DOL completely redacted the text of the Huber email and the Powers email. See id. In Request No. 808886—filed in relation to the redac ted emails Mr. Jordan rece ived in response to Request No. 806591—Mr. Jordan sought the disclos ure of the “notation ‘Subje ct to Attorney Client Privilege’ and non-privileged information supporting [the] contention that . . . [DynCorp] management ‘expressly sought legal advice.’” P l.’s Reply at 3, ECF No. 30; see also Def.’s Cross-Mot., Ex. 1, Attach. G. The DOL maintains that the redacted emails already s ubmitted to Mr. Jordan contain everything that could be disclo sed and that segregability would “not [be] applicable to the

26 The Huber email was sent at 8:20 AM on July 31, 2013, and the Powers email was sent at 5:39 PM on July 30, 2013. Def.’s Cross-Mot., Ex. 1, Attach. E.29 redacted portions” of the DynC orp emails. Smyth Decl. ¶ 27. The DOL further maintains that “any attempt at further segrega ting” the DynCorp emails “would provide little or no informational value,” and the priv ileged “material is inextrica bly intertwined” with any unprivileged material. Id. Because the Court denies Defendant’s motion for summary judgme nt with respect to the Huber email, its segregability analysis is confined to the P owers email. FOIA requires disclosure of “a ny reasonably segregable portion” of an otherwise-exempt record. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b). An agenc y need not disclose non-exem pt portions of records that “are inextricably intertwined with exempt portions.” Kurdyukov v. U.S. Coast Guard , 578 F. Supp. 2d 114, 128 (D.D.C. 2008); see also Mead Data , 566 F.2d at 260. “[T]o demonstrate that all reasonably segregable material h as been released, the agency mu st provide a ‘detailed justification’ for its non-segreg ability,” but “the agency is n ot required to provide so much detail that the exempt material woul d be effectively disclosed.” Johnson v. Exec. Office of U.S. Att’ys , 310 F.3d 771, 776 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (quoting Mead Data , 566 F.2d at 261). Simple “conclusory assertions” that all “reasonabl y segregable” information has be en disclosed “fall short of the specificity required for a court to properly determine whether the non-exempt information is, in fact, not reasonably segregable.” Branch v. FBI, 658 F. Supp. 204, 210 (D.D.C. 1987) (citing
Mead Data , 566 F.2d at 260). Additionally, the Court “has the obligationto consider the segregability issue sua sponte , regardless of whether it ha s been raised by the parties,” Johnson , 310 F.3d at 776 (citing Trans-Pacific Policing Agreement v. U.S. Customs Serv. , 177 F.3d 1022, 1028 (D.C. Cir. 1999)), and “it is err or for a district court t o simply approve the withholding of an entire document without ent ering a finding on segregability, or the lack thereof,” Schiller v.
NLRB , 964 F.2d 1205, 1210 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (quoting Powell v. U.S. Bureau of Prisons , 927 F.2d 1239, 1242 n.4 (D.C. Cir. 1991)).30 With that said, the law of segre gability does not require a cou rt to “order an agency to commit significant time and resour ces to the separation of disj ointed words, phrases, or even sentences which taken separatel y or together have minimal or no information content.” Mead
Data , 566 F.2d at 261 n.55; see also Brown v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice , 734 F. Supp. 2d 99, 110–11 (D.D.C. 2010) (quoting Assassination Archives And Research Center v. C.I.A. , 177 F. Supp. 2d 1, 9 (D.D.C. 2001), order amended , (Oct. 25, 2001) and judgment aff’d , 334 F.3d 55 (D.C. Cir. 2003)). In the context of documen ts exempted by the attorney–cl ient privilege, it is sufficient for an agency’s declaration to provide sufficient detail for a cour t “to conclude that those isolated words or phrases that might not be redacted for release would b e meaningless.” Nat’l Sec. Archive Fund, Inc. v. CIA , 402 F. Supp. 2d 211, 221 (D.D.C. 2005). “If the rule were oth erwise, courts would be required to parse emails, letters and general c onversations on a statement-bystatement basis to determine whic h sentences or even clauses we re protected and which were not. This would only increase the costs and lengthen the delays in litigation e ven beyond what they are today.” Kimberly-Clark Worldwide Inc. v. First Quality Baby Prod. LLC , 2015 WL 13022282, at *3 (E.D. Wis. Apr. 9, 2015). As a general matter, the DOL’s Vaughn Index and attendant affidavits provide a sufficiently “detailed justifica tion” for the DOL’s position th at it has released all non-segregable materials contained in the Power s email, or that release of str ay material would be meaningless. The DOL bolsters its assertion that “[s]egregability is not app licable to the redacted portions” with an in-depth explanation for withholding the information inits entirety. See Smyth Decl. at 10–12, ¶¶ 27–31; Vaughn Index. The DOL details the preci se rationale supporting FOIA Exemption 4’s application to the Powers email. See id. The Vaughn Index first explains that the Powers email is “commercial” or “financial” because it “concern [s] the status of operations31 issues in connection with the WP S Program contract,” “the submi tter of the information has a commercial interest in” the Pow ers email, and the Powers email “relate[s] to business or trade within the ordinary meanings of those terms.” Vaughn Index. Finally, the Vaughn Index explains that the Powers email is privileged because it was “transmitted to an in-house attorney for [DynCorp] in order to apprise h im of developments potentially i mpacting the contract,” “explicitly request[ed] the atto rney’s input and review of the information transmitted,” and was “clearly marked ‘Subject to A ttorney Client Privilege.’” Vaughn Index. The specific materials that M r. Jordan seeks—any statement by aDynCorp employee “that constituted an express request for legal advice” and the notation “Subject to Attorney– Client Privilege,” Compl. ¶ 7—w ere justifiably not produced. Th e first category is, by its very nature, not segregable. Any “expre ss requests for legal advice” made by DynCorp employees to DynCorp’s lawyer would themselves be privileged because they were express requests for legal
advice

. See FTC v. Boehringer Ingelheim Pharm., Inc. , 180 F. Supp. 3d 1, 30 (D.D.C. 2016) (suggesting that “express request s for or provision of legal advice” are prototypically privileged); see also P.&B. Marina, Ltd. v. Logrande , 136 F.R.D. 50, 53 (E.D.N.Y. 1991), aff’d sub nom.
P&B Marina Ltd. v. LoGrande , 983 F.2d 1047 (2d Cir. 1992) (noting that attorney–client privilege “protects communicat ions that . . . [are] express req uests for legal advice”). And, assuming without deciding that it was not itself privilege d, the DOL properly withheld the notation “Subject t o Attorney–Client Privilege.” B eyond bolstering Defendant’s claim that it shows the communi cations were privileged, the sen tence “Subject to Attorney Client Privilege” is “an isolated . . . phrase[] . . . [of which] rele ase would be meaningless.” Nat’l Sec. Archive Fund, Inc. v. CIA , 402 F. Supp. 2d 211, 221 (D.D.C. 2005). Mr. Jordan’s request for the emails with this notation unredac ted is transparently not an attempt to ascertain “what [his]32 government is up to,” see Nat’l Archives & Records Admin. v. Favish , 541 U.S. 157, 171 (2004), but is instead a fishing expediti on with which he hopes to catc h the government red-handed. Stated differently, after he wa s presented with sworn evidence that the documents contained the notation, he responded: “prove it. ” But the government’s affian t is entitled to a presumption of good faith. See SafeCard Servs., Inc. , 926 F.2d at 1200. Without any evidence rebutting that presumption, the Court would ha ve no reason to question that th e privilege notation alone— which, by Mr. Jordan’s own logic sheds no light on the substant ive contents of the privileged conversation—is a boilerplate, “isolated” phrase in an otherwis e-privileged document, of which “release would be meaningless.” See Nat’l Sec. Archive Fund, Inc. , 402 F. Supp. 2d at 221. Indeed, the Court’s in camera review confirms this to be the case. Regardless, the Court will not adopt a rule that requires agenci es “to parse [privileged] emai ls, letters and gene ral conversations on a statement-by-statement basis to determine which sentences or even clauses were protected and which were not” when there i s no indication that the clause s have any substantive meaning. See Kimberly-Clark Worldwide Inc. , 2015 WL 13022282, at *3. Taken together, the DOL “supplied a ‘relatively detailed justif ication, specifically identifying the reasons why a part icular exemption is relevant and correlate[ed] those claims with the particular part of [the ] withheld document,” and demon strated that the r elease of certain portions would be meaningless. Hertzberg v. Veneman , 273 F. Supp. 2d 67, 90 (D.D.C. 2003) (quoting Schiller , 964 F.2d at 1210); Nat’l Sec. Archive Fund, Inc. , 402 F. Supp. 2d at 221. This justification is not “conclusory ” or “vague” and represents the DOL’s good faith effort to segregate privileged and non-pr ivileged information. The DOL re viewed the DynCorp email chain, found the Powers email priv ileged, redacted that privile ged information and disclosed all other information—except the Huber email, which will be subject to further litigation—to Mr.33 Jordan. Def.’s Cross-Mot., E x. 1, Attach. E. This precise segre gation, coupled with the DOL’s Vaughn Index, indicated to the Court th at the DOL provided all meaning ful, reasonably segregable information to Mr. J ordan. The Court’s in camera review confirmed the DOL’s justifications with respect to the Powers email. Because the DO L “show[ed] with reasonable specificity why material could no t be segregated,” the DOL has “[met] its burden under FOIA.” Billington v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice , 301 F. Supp. 2d 15, 24 (D.D.C. 2004) (citing Armstrong v. Executive Office of the President , 97 F.3d 575, 579 (D.C. Cir. 1996)).
D. Defendant Satisfactoril y Responded to Request No. 819736 In Request No. 819736, submitted on July 5, 2016, Mr. Jordan so ught (1) documentation evidencing or providing a factual or legal basis for “the unred acted versions of the [DynCorp] emails” being placed under seal and (2) “documentation submitte d to the ALJ” opposing FOIA Request No. 806591. See Def.’s Cross-Mot., Ex. 1, Attach. F at 35, ECF No. 20-1. Mr. J ordan asserts that the DOL “failed to respond at all” to Request No. 819736 and that this failure to respond means that the DOL must disclose the documents at issue

. See Pl.’s Corrected Mot. Summ. J. at 23, ECF No. 16. Furthermore, Mr. Jordan alleges tha t the “DOJ failed to cite any evidence establishing that the DOL actually did respond at all . . . to the July 5 [r]equest in any manner that could constitute a response under FOIA . . . .” Pl. ’s Reply at 8, ECF No. 30. Mr. Jordan asserts that this failu re to respond necessitates the fu ll disclosure of the documents covered by Request No. 819736. Pl.’s Mot. Summ. J. at 23–24. FOIA requires an agency to r espond to a FOIA request within 20 business days. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(6)(A)(i); Pl.’s Correct ed Mot. Summ. J. at 23. In the context of a federal court case, if the agency has, “however belatedl y, released all nonexempt mate rial” the court has “no further judicial function to perform under the FOIA.” Tijerina v. Walters , 821 F.2d 789, 799 (D.C. Cir.34 1987) (quoting Perry v. Block , 684 F.2d 121, 125 (D.C. Cir. 1982)); see also Heily v. DOD , 896 F. Supp. 2d 25, 37 (D.D.C. 2012) (plainti ff’s receipt of FOIA-r equested documents while litigation was still pe nding mooted plainti ff’s FOIA claims). Here, the DOL did not respond to Request No. 819736 until Decem ber 14, 2016, which was after Mr. Jordan filed his mo tion for summary judgment and well outside of the statutory timeframe. 27 See Def.’s Statement Material Fact s Which Def. Contends No Genuine Issue (“Def.’s Statement”) ¶ 29, ECF No. 20; 28 Def.’s Cross-Mot., Ex. 2, Attach. HH at 29–30, ECF No. 20-2. But regardless of the DOL’s lag in responding to Mr. Jordan’s request, it has released the documents requested in Request No. 819736. See Def.’s Cross-Mot., Ex. 2, Attach. HH at 29–30. To be specific, the DOL conducted a search, located 26 p ages of responsive documents, reviewed them, and provided them to Mr. Jordan unredacted. See Def.’s Statement ¶ 29. In response to Mr. Jordan’s reque st seeking a basis for placing th e DynCorp emails under seal, the DOL enclosed ALJ Merck’s February 9, 2016 order 29 and ALJ Merck’s January 27, 2016

27 The DOL contends that FO IA Request Nos. 819736 and 808886 were received “on the same date,” “within two hours of each other outside of regular business hours, were addressed to the same DOL employee, were re lated in subject matter,” “were b rief, and appeared to be the same or substantially similar.” Def.’s Statement ¶ 24, ECF No. 20. As such, the DOL presumed the requests were “duplicative,” id. ¶ 26, and the DOL did not respond t o or assign Request No. 819736 at that time, id. ¶ 26. However, even a cursory rev iew of both requests would ha ve revealed salient differences be tween the information sought in FOIA Request Nos. 819736 and 808886. Compare Def.’s Cross-Mot., E x. 1, Attach. F at 35, ¶¶ 1–2 with Def.’s Cross-Mot., Ex. 1, Attach. G at 39, ¶¶ 1–2. With t hat said, there is no indicat ion that this overs ight was due to bad faith rather than inattentiveness.
28 Def.’s Statement is included i n Def.’s Cross-Mot., ECF No. 20. For precision, the Court will refer directly to the Statement when appropriate.
29 The “Order Denying Claimant’ s Motion to Compel Production of E mails over which Employer Has Asserted Attorney–C lient Privilege and Order Denyi ng Claimant’s Motion for Sanctions.” Def.’s Cross-Mo t., Ex. 2, Attach. HH at 29. This or der had already been issued to Mr. Jordan on February 9, 2016 in, rel ation to the OALJ DBA Pro ceedings. See Def.’s Reply at 10 n.15, ECF No. 32.35 order. 30 Def.’s Cross-Mot., Ex. 2, Atta ch. HH at 29. In response to Mr. Jordan’s request seeking documentation opposing Request No. 806591, the DOL found “no do cument in response to FOIA Number F2016-806591 opposi ng a release under FOIA.” Id. However, the DOL enclosed the Littler Mendelson letter 31 dated October 28, 2015 on the basis th at Mr. Jordan’s request “may implicate a general preexisting opposition to release of docume nts within the record before Judge Merck” in the DBA Proceedings. Id. at 29–30. Though the DOL’s response came five months after the request, the DOL “processed [Request No. 819736] and provided all non-privileged documents that were responsive to the request,” thus “fulfill[i ng] its obliga tion under FOIA despite the delay in processing.” 32 Def.’s Reply at 11, ECF No. 32. Therefore, Mr. Jordan’s claims in relation to Reque st No. 819736 are denied as moot. See, e.g. Tijerina , 821 F.2d at 799. E. Mr. Jordan’s Defense Base Act Arguments are Beyond the Scop e of this Litigation Mr. Jordan argues that there are additional issues before the C ourt related to his DBA Proceedings. See Pl.’s Corrected Mot. Summ. J. at 12–15, 18–19, 25–40, ECF No. 16. Mr. Jordan argues that the OALJ failed to establish that Exemption 4 applied, see Pl.’s Reply at 4, ECF No. 30, that the conclusions and findings s upporting the DO L’s denials of Mr. Jordan’s FOIA requests were “unwarrant ed by the facts” and “arbitrary, c apricious, [and] an abuse of discretion” under the APA, see id. at 4–5, that the OALJ was re quired to “determine the

30 The “Order Denying Claimant’s Motion Requesting That This Court ‘Publish’ an Alleged Ex Parte Communication a nd Order Warning Counsel of the Potential Consequences of Filing Frivolous Motions and Order Denying Claimant’s Request f or Subpoenas at this Time.” Def.’s Cross-Mot., Ex. 2, Attach. HH at 29.
31 The Littler Mendelson letter ha d already been issued to Mr. Jo rdan on June 28, 2016, in response to Request No. 806591. See Def.’s Cross-Mot., Ex. 1, Attachs. C–D.
32 Plaintiff seems to argue that these documents are not responsi ve to his request. Regardless, Plaintiff has not all eged that any other responsive documents exist that were not provided to him.36 [DynCorp] [e]mails were privileged” but failed to do so, see id. at 5, and that “the OALJ’s denial of FOIA Request 808886 was blatantl y arbitrary and capricious a nd an abuse of discretion,” id. at 5. However, all of these issu es are beyond the scope of this FOIA litigation. Mr. Jordan appears to be atte mpting to use this FOIA action to re-litigate i ssues of the DBA Proceedings, but that is outside the scope of the Court’s r eview under FOIA. FOIA only empowers the Court “to enjoin t he agency from withholding agenc y records and to order the production of any agency records im properly withheld from the c omplainant.” 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B). The Court may not us e FOIA to revisit the OALJ’s actions in the DBA Proceedings. Moreover, the Court is not to review the basis for withholding provided by the agency at the administrative level. See Shapiro v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice , 153 F. Supp. 3d 253, 269 n.6 (D.D.C. 2016) (explaining tha t “an agency may invoke a FOIA exemption for the first time before the district court,” desp ite not having invoked the exce ption at the administrative level). Therefore, the Court dismisses Mr. Jordan’s various claims and contentions raised in his motion for summary judgment regarding the events of his DBA Proceeding s or at the administrative level.
F. The Court Denies Mr. Jordan’s Rule 11 Motions Because Neither Motion Identifies Sanctionable Behavior 1. Mr. Jordan’s First Rule 11 Motion Mr. Jordan first moved for sancti ons on the basis that the DOL did not provide a legal or factual basis for its motion f or extension of time to file an answer. 33 Pl.’s First Rule 11 Mot. at 1,

33 The Court notes that Mr. Jor dan’s October 16, 2016 communicati on with DOJ Attorney Jason Cohen suggests that Mr. Jordan satisfied Rule 11 ’s “safe harbor” provision. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(c)(2); Pl.’s F irst Rule 11 Mot., Ex. 1 at 5, ECF No. 10-1. That communication occurred more than 21 days before Mr. Jordan filed this Rule 11 motion. Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(c)(2); Pl.’s First Rule 11 M ot.; Pl.’s First Rule 11 Mot., E x. 1 at 5. The fact that DOL does37 ECF No. 10; Def.’s First Mot. Ext ension Time Answer or Otherwis e Resp. Compl. (“Def.’s Mot. Extension Answer”), ECF No. 5; October 26, 2016 Minute Order. B ecause the Court granted the DOL’s motion, Mr. Jordan asks the Court to “reverse [its] Octob er 26 order and issue an order finding that [the DOL] admitted e ach factual allegation in the Complaint.” Pl.’s First Rule 11
Mot. at 12. Mr. Jordan specifically argues th at the DOL’s counsel failed to identify or address the controlling statute governing the action before the Court. See Pl.’s First Rule 11 Mot. at 5. He also argues that the DOL’s imp licit contention that it had show n good cause for the requested extension was not warranted by e xisting law or by a nonfrivolou s argument. See id. at 6. Third, Mr. Jordan asserts that the DOL ’s counsel failed to comport with D.C. Civil Rule 7(m) by making no effort “to narrow the are as of disagreement” between the parties. See id. at 7. Fourth, Mr. Jordan claims that the DOL’s counsel failed to include in i ts motion required safeguards against frivolousness and ex parte communications. See id. at 9. Fifth, Mr. Jordan claims that the DOL’s counsel ensured that Mr . Jordan would be denied notice of and opportunity to respond to the DOL’s motion. See id. at 10. Finally, Mr. Jordan argues that the DOL deserves to be sanctioned on the basis that its motion was filed for a clearlyimproper purpose. See id. at 11. The Court denies Mr. Jordan’s first motion for Rule 11 sanction s because Mr. Jordan (1) ignores the DOL’s specific stat ement that FOIA governs this cas e; (2) misstates that this Court found no showing of good cause in gran ting the DOL’s motion; (3 ) misunderstands the requirements imposed by D.C. Civil Rule 7(m); (4) asks for safe guards against frivolousness and ex parte communications when the DOL’s motion contained neither ; and (5) unjustifiably

not challenge this assumption s trengthens this inference. See generally Def.’s Opp’n Pl.’s First Rule 11 Mot. Thus, the Court does no t consider whether Mr. Jord an failed to satisfy the “safe harbor” provision in making this motion.38 conjures bad faith based, for ex ample, on the DOL’s mistaken as sumption that Mr. Jordan received notice of its motion via CM/ECF. Under Federal Rule of Civil Pro cedure 11(b), courts may impose sanctions if “a pleading, written motion, or other paper . . . [is] presented for any imp roper purpose[;] . . . the claims, defenses, and other legal conten tions therein are [un]warrantedby existing law[;] . . . the allegations and other factual c ontentions have [no] evidentiary support[; or] the denials of factual contentions are [un]warranted on the evidence[.]” The Court app lies “an objective standard of reasonable inquiry on represente d parties who sign papers or pl eadings.” Bus. Guides, Inc. v.
Chromatic Commc’ns Enters. , 498 U.S. 533, 554 (1991). Rule 11 is designed to ensure that allegations made in filings “are supported by a sufficient fact ual predicate at the time that the claims are asserted.” City of Yonkers v. Otis Elevator Co. , 106 F.R.D. 524, 525 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (emphasis removed). As such, Rul e 11 “states unambiguously that[the attorney] must conduct a ‘reasonable inquiry’ or face sanctions.” Bus. Guides , 498 U.S. at 548. In deciding on a Rule 11 motion, cou rts consider (1) whether ea ch presenting attorney “conducted a reasonable inquiry,” (2) whether each presenting a ttorney “determined that [the] papers filed with the court a re well grounded in fact [and] leg ally tenable,” and (3) whether the papers were “interposed f or any improper purpose.” Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp. , 496 U.S. 384, 393 (1990). This Court has “dis cretion to determine both w hether a Rule 11 violation has occurred and what sanctions shoul d be imposed if there has beena violation.” Cobell v. Norton , 211 F.R.D. 7, 10 (D.D.C. 2002) (internal quotations omitted). U nder Rule 11(c)(1), if a rule has been violated, the court may im pose sanctions on “any attorney, law firm, or party that violated the rule or is responsible for t he violation.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(c)(1). “The sanction should be imposed on the persons—whether attorneys . . . or parties—who h ave violated the rule or may be39 determined to be responsible for the violation.” Fed. R. Civ. P . 11(c)(1) advisory committee’s note to 1937 amendments (subdivisions (b) and (c)); see also Reynolds v. U.S. Capitol Police
Board , 357 F. Supp. 2d 19, 23–24 (D.D.C. 2004). Courts do not impose Rule 11 sanctions lightly; such sanctions are an extreme punishment for filing pl eadings that frustrate judicial proceedings. See Henok v. Chase Home Fin., LLC , 926 F. Supp. 2d 100, 104 (D.D.C. 2013). As such, the purposes of Rule 11 inclu de “protect[ing] the court f rom frivolous and baseless filings that are not well grounded [or are] legally untenable.” Cobell , 211 F.R.D. at 10. Mr. Jordan’s argument that the DOL’s counsel failed to identify or address the controlling statute governing the action before the Court ignor es clear language in the DOL’s motion. See Pl.’s First Rule 11 Mot. at 5; D ef.’s Mot. Extension Answer at 1, ECF No. 5. The DOL acknowledged that this case was brought “under the Freedom of Information Act,” and the motion demonstrated the DOL’s fam iliarity with FOIA’s thirty-da y response requirement by referencing the date of servi ce—September 28, 2016—the deadline to respond thirty days later, and the showing of “good cause.” See id. ¶ 2; Def.’s Mot. Extension A nswer, Proposed Order at 1, ECF No. 5-1; 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)( C). Furthermore, the DOL d id not “[choose] to eliminate the statutory requirement in FOI A to obtain the benefit of the FRCP rule.” Pl.’s First Rule 11 Mot. at 5. The DOL sought, under Rule 6, to obtain a permitted extension beyond FOIA’s thirtyday requirement. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4 )(C). Mr. Jordan’s first ar gument provides no grounds for Rule 11 sanctions. Mr. Jordan’s second argument thatthe DOL’s implicit contentionof good cause had no basis hinges on the assumpti on that the Court found no showing of good cause. See Pl.’s First Rule 11 Mot. at 6. Mr. Jordan alleg es that the DOL failed to “e xplicitly” show good cause and instead “asserted that legal c ontention implicitly” with a “cur sory” and “boilerplate” explanation40 for its request for an extension. Id. (italics omitted). In particular , Mr. Jordan implies that the DOL could not have shown good cause gi ven that Mr. Jordan’s “FO IA request pertain[ed] to a single document consisting of only three pages that the [DOL] h ad identified and located many months ago.” Id. at 7. However, the Court considere d the DOL’s explanation that “[a]dditional time [was] necessary to complete the review and research, provi de undersigned counsel with a litigation report, and draft and r eview an appropriate response to the Complaint.” Def.’s Mot. Extension Answer ¶ 2. Though the DynCorp emails indeed comprise only a few pages, Mr. Jordan’s Complaint pertained to f our separate FOIA requests, tw o requests for reconsideration, and two appeals, and Mr. Jordan “ failed to attach to the Compla int any of the alleged FOIA requests, reconsideration requests, or appeals.” See Def.’s Opp’n Mot. Sanctions Under Rule 11 (“Def.’s Opp’n Pl.’s First Rul e 11 Mot.”) at 4, ECF No. 17. The Court had ample basis to conclude that preparing an adequa te response to the Complaint r equired additional time. See Def.’s Opp’n Pl.’s First Rule 11 Mot. at 4; see generally Compl. Although Defendant’s motion did not consist of the excessive b riefing characteristic of Pla intiff’s filings, the limited information provided was more than sufficient to justify the ro utine relief sought—a 30 day extension at the begi nning of a FOIA case. The Court, once agai n, finds that the DOL showed good cause for an extension under 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(C). Mr. Jordan’s third argument mis understands the requirements imp osed by D.C. Civil Rule 7(m). See Pl.’s First Rule 11 Mot. at 7–9. H e alleges that he “repeatedl y attempted to work with [the DOL]’s counsel to narro w the areas of disagreement” b ut received nothing in return from the DOL’s counsel. Id. at 8. He cites four reasons that he believes this constituted sanctionable conduct. First, he a rgues that the DOL’s counsel “ refrained from explaining why he contended that the Complaint was not served until September 28, 2016” when Mr. Jordan41 asserted that it was served on September 27, 2016. See Pl.’s First Rule 11 Mot. at 8, ECF No. 10; Pl.’s First Rule 11 Mot., Ex. 2 a t 8, ECF No. 10-1. However, th e DOL explained its reason in its opposition to sanctions. See Def.’s Opp’n Pl.’s First R ule 11 Mot. at 3 n.3. Though “the Complaint was received in the U .S. Attorney mailroom on Septemb er 27, 2016, it was not received by the civil-process cl erk at the United States [A]tto rney’s office until September 28,
2016.” Id. ; see also Pl.’s First Rule 11 Mot ., Ex. 3 at 10, ECF No. 10-1. But even putting this explanation aside, given that the motion for extension was time ly filed on October 25, 2016, regardless of whether service was effected on the 27th or 28th, no consultation was necessary on this point. Mr. Jordan similarly claims that the “[DOL]’s counsel did not e ven begin to attempt to provide any indication that good cause could be shown for reque sting any extension, much less a full 30 day extension.” Pl.’s Fi rst Rule 11 Mot. at 9. However, the DOL emailed Mr. Jordan “to request a 30-day extension and e xplained the reason for the request within said email.” Def.’s Opp’n Pl.’s First Rule 11 Mot. at 4, ECF No. 17; see also Pl.’s First Rule 11 Mot., Ex. 4 at 13, ECF No. 10-1 (“At this time we a re gathering the applicable rec ords and researching your claims[] and require additional time to prepare a responsive pl eading.”). The DOL’s motion demonstrated good cause through its rationale that “[a]dditiona l time [was] necessary to complete the review and research, provide undersigned counsel w ith a litigation report, and draft and review an appropriate response to the Complaint.” Def.’s Mo t. Extension Answer ¶ 2. As set forth above, given the routine relief sought, such limited just ification sufficed. That Mr. Jordan found the DOL’s rationale for requesting additional time unpers uasive, see Pl.’s First Rule 11 Mot., Ex. 4 at 12, ECF No. 10-1, does not render it sanctionabl e.42 Mr. Jordan also claims that the DOL’s failure to respond to his statement that Chief ALJ Henley, ALJ Merck, Ms. Johnson, could simply “admit or deny all allegations in the Complaint pertaining to them” within thi rty minutes to two hours is sanct ionable. Pl.’s First Rule 11 Mot. at 9. Local Civil Rule 7(m) merely r equires parties to attempt a g ood-faith effort to “narrow the areas of disagreement” concerning a nondispositive motion. Mr. Jordan’s argument for sanctions does not concern narrowing the area of disagreement for the DOL ’s motion for an extension, so sanctions are unwarranted. Mr. Jor dan finally alleges that the DOL did not respond to his request that the DOL “establish that Judge Merck’s statement was accurate.” Pl.’s First Rule 11 Mot. at 9; Pl.’s First Rule 11 Mot., E x. 1 at 5. Similarly, that conten tion has nothing to do with narrowing the areas of disagreeme nt regarding the DOL’s motion for an extension. Thus, sanctions based on Rule 7(m) for this contention would also be improper. Mr. Jordan’s fourth argument re garding the DOL’s counsel’s fail ure to safeguard against frivolousness and ex parte communi cations conjures frivolousnes s and ex parte communications where none exist. See Pl.’s First Rule 11 Mot. at 9–10. As to frivolousness, Mr. Jor dan maintains that “[the DOL]’s counsel faile d to state with any particularit y any basis for requesting any extension, much less a full 30 day extension.” Id. at 10. The Court has deal t with this contention
ad nauseam —it is wrong. As for the ex part e allegation, the DOL’s motion simply cannot be properly considered ex parte. See supra note 19. Mr. Jordan’s claim re garding frivolousness and ex parte communications is insuffi cient—perhaps itself to the p oint of frivolousness—and thus sanctions against the DOL are not justified. Mr. Jordan’s fifth argument—thatthe DOL’s counsel acted in suc h a way that meant Mr. Jordan would be denied notice of and opportunity to respond to the DOL’s motion to extend time—unjustifiably assumes sanc tionable bad faith on behalf of the DOL. See Pl.’s First Rule 1143 Mot. at 10. Mr. Jordan claims tha t the DOL’s counsel failed to ascertain whether Mr. Jordan received any notice of f iling from the Court. See id. at 11. The docket reflects that this Court granted Mr. Jordan CM/ECF access on October 19, 2016, five days before the motion for an extension of time was filed. See Order Granting Pl.’s Mot. CM/ ECF User Name and Password at 2, ECF No. 4. As such, the DOL r easonably assumed that Mr. Jord an “was receiving ECF notification of all f ilings by the time the motion for extensio n of time was filed on October 25, 2016.” Def.’s Opp’n Pl.’s First R ule 11 Mot. at 6. The DOL reli ed on Local Rule 5.4(d) which states that “[e]lectronically f iling a document operates to eff ect service of the document on pro

se parties who have obtained CM/ECF passwords,” and that “[t]he r equirement of a certificate of service or other proof of servi ce is satisfied by the automatic notice of filing sent by the CM/ECF software to pro se parties who have obtained CM/ECF passwords.” See LCvR 5.4(d)(1)–(2); Def.’s Opp’n Pl.’s First Rule 11 Mot. at 6. And even assuming that Mr. Jordan was denied his opportunity to respond to the motion because he did not yet formally have ECF access, this denial did not arise from any s anctionable behavior by the DOL. Moreover, Mr. Jordan had knowledge from at least Octobe r 14, 2016, that the DOL intended to file this motion, see Pl.’s First Rule 11 Mot., Ex. 4 at 12, ECF No. 10-1, and the DOL unde rstandably figured that Mr. Jordan received notice via CM/ECF, see Def.’s Opp’n Pl.’s First R ule 11 Mot. at 6. The DOL’s oversight had no effect on the Court’s October 26, 2016 Minute Order. But even putting all this aside, the “minor errors [Mr. J ordan] allege[s] do not warrant an ‘extreme punishment’” like the one he proposes. Landrith v. Roberts , 999 F. Supp. 2d 8, 23 (D.D.C. 2013) (citing Naegele v.
Albers , 355 F. Supp. 2d 129, 144 (D.D.C. 2005)). 34

34 Notably, Mr. Jordan does not exp lain how his erroneous labelin g of the “Joint Appendix,” see ECF No. 34; ECF No. 35, is a mere oversight but Defendant’s counsel’s oversight is sanctionable.44 Finally, Mr. Jordan conjures up an improper purpose on behalf o f the DOL in filing its motion for an extension. See Pl.’s First Rule 11 Mot. at 11–12. Mr. Jordan accuses the DOL of filing its motion to “cause unnecessary delay.” See id. (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b)(1)). However, Mr. Jordan provides no eviden ce beyond the date the DOL filed i ts motion to indicate such an improper purpose. See Pl.’s First Rule 11 Mot. at 11–12. Thirty-day extensions at th e beginning of FOIA cases are common. Without evidence, Plaintiff’s claim r emains mere speculation, and sanctions are inappropriate ba sed solely on speculative, unsupp orted attributions of bad faith. For the foregoing reasons, the Court denies Mr. Jordan’s First Moti on for Rule 11 Sanctions. 2. Mr. Jordan’s Second Rule 11 Motion Mr. Jordan’s second motion for R ule 11 sanctions relates to “th e factual or legal contentions” contained in the DOL ’s (1) First Motion for Extens ion of Time to File Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment , and Proposed Briefing Schedule (“Def.’s Mot. Extension Opp’n Pl.’s Mot. Summ. J.”), ECF No. 11; (2) Opposition to Plai ntiff’s Motion for Sanctions Under Rule 11, Def.’s Opp’n Pl.’s First Rule 11 Mot., ECF No. 1 7; (3) Answer, ECF No. 14; and (4) Memorandum Supporting the Defendant’s Opposition to Plainti ff’s Motion for Summary Judgment, Def.’s Mem., ECF N o. 20. Pl.’s Second Rule 11 Mot. at1., ECF No. 33. 35 As sanctions, Mr. Jordan requests t hat (1) each DOJ attorney that signed or reviewed the filings 36 provide a declaration describi ng the role he or she played with respect to the contentions in the

35 The Court notes that Mr. Jor dan’s February 2, 2017 communicati on with Mr. Cohen suggests that Mr. Jordan satisfi ed Rule 11’s “safe harbor” prov ision. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(c)(2); Pl.’s Second Rule 11 Mot., Ex. 1 a t 1, ECF No. 33-1. That commu nication occurred at least 21 days before Mr. Jordan filed this Rule 11 motion. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(c)(2); Pl.’s Second Rule 11 Mot.; Pl.’s Second Rule 11 M ot., Ex. 1 at 1. Thus, the Court does not consider whether Mr. Jordan failed to satisfy the “ safe harbor” provision in making this motion.
36 This includes Jason T. Cohen (A ssistant United States Attorney ), Channing D. Phillips (United States Attorney) and Dan iel Van Horn (Chief, Civil Divi sion). See Pl.’s Second Rule 11 Mot., Proposed Order at 2, ECF No. 33-2.45 filings and the actual filing of the at-issue documents and (2) the Court impose disciplinary action upon whichever attorney b ears responsibility for filing the contentions and documents at issue in this motion. See Pl.’s Second Rule 11 Mot. at 15 ; Pl.’s Second Rule 11 Mot., Pr oposed Order at 2–3, ECF No. 33-2. Mr. Jordan first contends that no DOJ attorney established that a reasonable inquiry had been conducted before filing the DOL’s Answer. Pl.’s Second Rul e 11 Mot. at 7; Answer. He also claims that no DOJ attorney e stablished that a reasonable inquiry had been conducted regarding the alleged ex parte nature of the DOL’s October 25 m otion for an extension of time.
See Pl.’s Second Rule 11 Mot. at 9; D ef.’s Mot. Extension Answer. F inally, Mr. Jordan asserts that each at-issue filing had the clearly improper purpose of “ causing unnecessary delay.” See Pl.’s Second Rule 11 Mot. at 14. The Court denies Mr. Jordan’s second Rule 11 motion because (1) the DOL conducted a reasonable inquiry regarding the Answer’s evidentiary support; (2) it was unreasonable to expect an inquiry into the ex parte natu re of the DOL’s motion when th ere was nothing ex parte about it; and (3) Mr. Jordan again, without any justification, surmises b ad faith by his adversary. The legal standard governing this mo tion is the same standard that governs Mr. Jordan’s first Rule 11 motion. Mr. Jordan’s contention that no DOJ attorney established that areasonable inquiry had been conducted regarding the evi dentiary support of the DOL’s A nswer misinterprets what a “reasonable inquiry” requires. See Pl.’s Second Rule 11 Mot. at 7; A nswer. The drafters of Rule 11 provide insight into what cons titutes a “reasonable inquiry. ” The Advisory Committee Note

states: [W]hat constitutes a reasonable inquiry may depend on such fact ors as how much time for investigation was available to the signer; whether he had to re ly on a client for information46 as to the facts underlying the pleading, motion, or other paper ; whether the pleading, motion, or other paper was based on a plausible view of the law ; or whether he depended on forwarding counsel or another member of the bar.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 advisory committee note, 97 F.R.D. 198, 199 (1983). The Supreme Court built upon this guidance, cementing the st andard for “a reasonable in quiry into the facts and the law before filing” as “one of reasonableness under the circumstance s.” Bus. Guides , 498 U.S. at 551. Mr. Jordan believes that the DOL ’s assertion that it “lack[ed] knowledge or information sufficient to admit or deny the all egations” in s everal paragra phs of the complaint demonstrates the lack of a reasonable inqui ry. Pl.’s Second Rule 11 Mot. at 7; Answer ¶¶ 8–9, 21–34. These portions of Mr. Jordan’s complaint “pertained to the knowledge, beliefs or actions of ALJ Merck or Chief ALJ Henley,” and, as suc h, Mr. Jordan argues that it i s impossible that no one at the DOL—including ALJ Merck and Chief ALJ Henley at the OALJ—posses sed sufficient knowledge or information. See Pl.’s Second Rule 11 Mot. at 7. Sanctions like the ones sought-aft er by Mr. Jordan require “cle ar and convincing evidence . . . of the predicate misconduct” and “of bad faith.” 3E Mobile, LLC v. Global Cellular, Inc. , 222 F. Supp. 3d 50, 53–54 (D.D.C. 2016) (citing Shepherd v. ABC, Inc. , 62 F.3d 1469, 1478 (D.C. Cir. 1995)); Parsi v. Daioleslam , 778 F.3d 116, 131 (D.C. Cir. 2015)). There is no evidence, let alone clear and convincing evidence, that the DOL did not engage in a reasonable inquiry. And, the DOL a ddressed the issues raised inMr. Jordan’s Complaint in its Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment and related filings. 37

37 Because FOIA cases are routinely decided based on cross-motion s for summary judgment, an answer often plays aninsignificant role in the li tigation. Plaintiff fails to show that the alleged incomplete informa tion provided was material to anyclaim or defense at issue in this litigation.47 Mr. Jordan’s claim regarding a r easonable inquiry into the ex p arte nature of the DOL’s motion also comes up short. As al ready discussed, the DOL’s mot ion cannot be properly considered ex parte because “[Mr . Jordan] was consulted about i ts filing beforehand[] and it was publicly filed on the docket.” Def. ’s Opp’n Pl.’s First Rule 11 Mot. at 5; see also North , 17 F. Supp. 3d at 4 (noting that communi cations “filed on the public docket and thus accessible to all cannot, by definition, be considered ex parte communications.”) . This argument by Mr. Jordan, too, fails. Finally, Mr. Jordan asserts that each at-issue filing had the c learly improper purpose of “causing unnecessary delay.” Pl.’s Second Rule 11 Mot. at 14. I n this assertion, Mr. Jordan erroneously contends that the DOL’s motion for an extension to file constituted an ex parte communication, fails to provide any evidence of the DOJ causing unnecessary delay, and attributes a competing opinion on ho w to the apply the law and facts of this case to a desire to cause unnecessary delay. See Pl.’s Second Rule 11 Mot. at 14–15. Even more accusatorily, Mr. Jordan asserts that the DOL ev inced its desire to cause unneces sary delay by filing its answer on November 28, 2016, filing its cross-mo tion for summary judgmenton December 23, 2016, and proposing a “very protracted brie fing schedule” to the Court. P l.’s Second Rule 11 Mot. at 15. The DOL filed its answer and its cross-motion for summary judgm ent within the timeframe ordered by the Court, and the C ourt adopted the DOL’s proposed briefing schedule. See generally Def.’s Mot. Extension Answe r; October 26, 2016 Minute Order; A nswer; Def.’s Mot. Extension Opp’n Pl.’s Mot. Summ. J.; November 23, 2016 Minute O rder; Def.’s Cross-Mot. There is simply no basis for the contention that the DOL made any filings to cause unnecessary delay. If any party can be accused of unnecessarily delaying th is action, it is Mr. Jordan, who has unnecessarily filed a multitude of repetitive, unsupported, and , ultimately, meritless pleadings.48 * * * The Court appreciates zealous a dvocacy. But Mr. Jordan’s argume nts for sanctions under Rule 11—most of which call dire ctly into question the integrityof opposing counsel—are baseless, if not frivolous themse lves. The Court notes that Mr. Jordan is a lawyer and an active member of the New York bar. See New York State Unified Court System, Attorney Detail: Jack
R.T. Jordan , https://iapps.courts.state.ny.us /attorney/AttorneyDetails?att orneyId=5519085. The Court reminds Mr. Jordan t hat “Rule 11 is not a toy.” Draper & Kramer, Inc. v. Baskin-Robbins,
Inc. , 690 F. Supp. 728, 732 (N.D. Ill. 1988). S anctioning the condu ct of a litigant is a solemn endeavor. “[A]n accusation of such wrongdoing is equally seriou s.” Id. The Court admonishes Mr. Jordan to “think twice” befo re moving for sanctions in the future. See id. Mr. Jordan’s cavalier approach to sanctions m otions could result in him bein g sanctioned himself. See id. (imposing sanctions, sua sponte , on a party for baselessly invoking Rule 11 in its unsuccessfu l merits motion).

VI. CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, the Court denies Mr. Jordan’s Correc ted Motion for Summary Judgment and grants the DOL’s Cross-Motion for Summary Judgmentexcept as it relates to the Huber email described above. Add itionally, the C ourt grants Pla intiff’s Unopposed Motion to Amend the Complaint, denies Mr . Jordan’s First Motion for Sanct ions Under Rule 11, Motion to Compel Depositions of Smyth and Johnson, Motion to Strike Smyth ’s Declaration, Motion to Compel Production of Evidence Re garding Smyth Declaration, Moti on to Strike Prohibited Ex Parte communication and Vacate Oc tober 26 Minute Order, Second Motion for Sanctions Under49 Rule 11, and Motion Regarding the APA as Basis for Decisions. A n order consistent with this Memorandum Opinion is separate ly and contemporaneously issued.
Dated: August 4, 2017 RUDOLPH CONTRERAS United States District Judge