This opinion will be unpublished and

may not be cited except as provided by

Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2012).

STATE OF MINNESOTA

IN COURT OF APPEALS

A14-0037

State of Minnesota, 

Respondent, 

vs. 

Kevin Lee Savoie, Sr., 

Appellant.

Filed November 24, 2014

Affirmed

Bjorkman, Judge

Rice County District Court

File No. 66-CR-12-2407

Lori Swanson, Attorney General, Michael Everson, Assistant Attorney General, St. Paul, 

Minnesota; and 

Paul Beaumaster, Rice County Attorney, Faribault, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Rochelle R. Winn, Assistant 

Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant) 

Considered and decided by Halbrooks, Presiding Judge; Connolly, Judge; and 

Bjorkman, Judge. 

U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N

BJORKMAN, Judge

Appellant challenges his conviction of making terroristic threats, arguing that the 

prosecutor committed misconduct by eliciting inadmissible testimony. In a pro se 
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supplemental brief, appellant also challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting 

his conviction. We affirm.

FACTS

Appellant Kevin Savoie and M.P. dated for 27 years and have two adult children. 

On August 26, 2012, Savoie, M.P., and M.P.’s current boyfriend, R.O., were doing yard 

work at the home of Savoie and M.P.’s son. M.P. was raking and Savoie was using a tree 

saw to help R.O. remove a tree from the fence. As they worked, M.P. asked Savoie about 

a missing camera, and Savoie became angry. He yelled, “I’m not a thief,” and started 

walking toward her with the tree saw in his hand. R.O. told Savoie to “back off,” and 

Savoie said, “Shut the f—k up, O[.], or I’ll stick this in your throat,” indicating the tree 

saw. Savoie continued to approach M.P., and she said, “Kevin, back off, back off.” 

Savoie slapped her on the left side of the face. M.P. went back to raking, and Savoie 

followed her and continued yelling. As she approached the end of the driveway, M.P. 

stopped raking, and as she stood there, Savoie waved the saw toward her, telling her to 

“shut [her] mouth or he was gonna bust [her] in [her] mouth,” then, “I’ll kill you, bi—h, 

and I’ll bury you.” 

The neighbors across the street, D.R.P. and M.L.P., observed the altercation and 

called 911. D.R.P. continued to observe and describe events to the operator, including 

that Savoie was waving the saw around and that Savoie was “getting into her face pretty 

hardcore.” The police arrived shortly after Savoie told M.P. he would kill and bury her. 

When Officer Bryan Johnson arrived at the scene, Savoie approached him, carrying the 

saw and yelling. Officer Johnson ordered Savoie to drop the saw, and he complied. 
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Additional officers arrived shortly thereafter, took a statement from M.P., and arrested 

Savoie.

Savoie was charged with second-degree assault and making terroristic threats. At 

his jury trial, Savoie testified that he argued with and insulted M.P. and that she 

threatened him with the rake, but that he did not threaten her. At Savoie’s request, the 

district court instructed the jury on self-defense. The jury found Savoie guilty of making 

terroristic threats but acquitted him of the assault charge. The district court sentenced 

Savoie to 30 months’ imprisonment. Savoie appeals.

D E C I S I O N

I. The prosecutor did not commit misconduct by eliciting inadmissible

testimony.

When, as here, an appellant claims prosecutorial misconduct based on unobjectedto conduct, we review under a modified plain-error standard. See State v. Ramey, 721

N.W.2d 294, 299-300, 302 (Minn. 2006); see also Minn. R. Crim. P. 31.02. Under this 

standard, an appellant must demonstrate that the prosecutor’s conduct was erroneous and 

the error was plain. Ramey, 721 N.W.2d at 302. The burden then shifts to the state to 

prove that the error did not affect the appellant’s substantial rights. Id.

Savoie argues that the prosecutor committed misconduct by eliciting testimony 

from Officer Johnson and M.P. that suggests Savoie has a criminal record. It is 

misconduct for a prosecutor to ask questions calculated to elicit “clearly inadmissible 

evidence.” State v. Fields, 730 N.W.2d 777, 782 (Minn. 2007). The prosecutor also has 

a duty to prepare the state’s witnesses “to avoid inadmissible or prejudicial statements.” 
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State v. McNeil, 658 N.W.2d 228, 232 (Minn. App. 2003). Testimony suggesting that a 

defendant has a criminal record or frequent contacts with police generally is inadmissible. 

See State v. Strommen, 648 N.W.2d 681, 687-88 (Minn. 2002); State v. Richmond, 298 

Minn. 561, 562-63, 214 N.W.2d 694, 695 (1974). But references to prior crimes or 

police contacts are proper if they elucidate the history of the relationship between the 

defendant and alleged victim or bear on an element of the offense. See Minn. Stat. 

§ 634.20 (2012) (permitting evidence of defendant’s prior domestic abuse or other 

“domestic conduct”); State v. Halverson, 381 N.W.2d 40, 43 (Minn. App. 1986) (noting 

that references to defendant’s incarceration were relevant to caller’s identity in terroristicthreats case because calls stopped during his incarceration), review denied (Minn. Mar. 

21, 1986); cf. State v. Valentine, 787 N.W.2d 630, 641 (Minn. App. 2010) (explaining 

that testimony that officer knows defendant from prior contacts “is error if the 

defendant’s identity is not an issue in the case”), review denied (Minn. Nov. 16, 2010). 

Even improper references to a defendant’s criminal history or police contacts require 

reversal only when it is likely that the testimony substantially affected the jury’s decision. 

McNeil, 658 N.W.2d at 232; see also Valentine, 787 N.W.2d at 641 (holding that 

improper prior-police-contacts testimony was not prejudicial because it was “incidental” 

and the evidence of guilt was overwhelming).

Officer Johnson’s testimony

Savoie first argues that the prosecutor improperly elicited testimony from Officer 

Johnson that he knew Savoie in his capacity as a police officer. We consider the 

challenged testimony in context.
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When asked about his arrival at the scene, Officer Johnson stated that he pulled up 

to the house and “they were standing in the yard.” The prosecutor asked the officer to 

explain:

PROSECUTOR: And when you say they, who was they? 

Who was there?

OFFICER: I saw two people standing there who I recognized

as Kevin Savoie and [M.P.].

PROSECUTOR: And do you see the person you’re referring 

to as Kevin Savoie in the courtroom today?

OFFICER: Yes, I do.

PROSECUTOR: Can you point him out, please, and tell us 

what he’s wearing?

[Officer Johnson identifies Savoie.]

PROSECUTOR: And you knew both Mr. Savoie and [M.P.] 

on sight?

OFFICER: Yes. I’ve had contact with them in my capacity as 

a police officer in the past.

We discern no impropriety in this line of questioning. The prosecutor initially 

sought to clarify vague testimony and then established that Officer Johnson could reliably 

identify Savoie—both proper purposes. Officer Johnson’s statement that he knew Savoie 

in his capacity as a police officer was part of his identification and focused as much on 

M.P. as on Savoie. 

Moreover, it is highly unlikely that the challenged testimony influenced the jury to 

find Savoie guilty of making terroristic threats. The testimony was brief, while the 

evidence against Savoie was strong. M.P.’s testimony was substantially consistent with 
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her initial statement to police, the 911 call, and both neighbors’ testimony. The jury did 

not simply find Savoie guilty based on an inferred propensity toward criminal behavior, 

as evidenced by its not-guilty verdict on the assault charge. 

On this record, we conclude that Savoie’s plain-error challenge to the prosecutor’s 

examination of Officer Johnson fails.

M.P.’s testimony

Savoie also argues that the prosecutor improperly elicited testimony from M.P. 

that Savoie has a history of violent conduct toward her because he did not “place his 

character at issue.” We again consider the challenged testimony in context.

M.P. testified that Savoie threatened to kill and bury her, and the prosecutor asked

whether there was anything about “the way [he] said these things” or about their 

relationship that would have led her to believe “that he was joking or not serious.” M.P. 

responded, “No, because we had a 27-year, volatile relationship . . . . He made threats, he 

usually went through with them.” The prosecutor also asked M.P. how Savoie’s 

statements made her feel. She responded that she was scared of Savoie and afraid that he 

would “beat the hell out of me or he’d stab me with the saw that he had. Kevin’s a very 

violent person.”

This evidence had multiple proper purposes. First, the evidence is relevant to 

whether Savoie intended to cause M.P. fear, an element of both charged offenses. See

Minn. Stat. §§ 609.02, subd. 10 (defining assault), .713, subd. 1 (defining terroristicthreats) (2012); State v. Schweppe, 306 Minn. 395, 401, 237 N.W.2d 609, 614 (1975) 

(stating that the effect of a terroristic threat on the victim is not an essential element of 
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the crime but is circumstantial evidence relevant to the element of the defendant’s intent). 

Second, M.P.’s testimony about Savoie’s past violence toward her is admissible 

relationship evidence under Minn. Stat. § 634.20. Such evidence is generally admissible 

to illuminate the relationship between the accused and the alleged victim and provide a 

context with which the jury can “better judge the credibility of the principals in the 

relationship.” See State v. McCoy, 682 N.W.2d 153, 161 (Minn. 2004); see also State v. 

Harmann, 805 N.W.2d 883, 890 (Minn. App. 2011) (stating that relationship evidence 

includes evidence of a “strained relationship” that puts the incident between the accused 

and the victim in context), review denied (Minn. Jan. 17, 2012). Savoie argued to the 

jury that M.P. was not credible because she overstated his conduct toward her and 

minimized her conduct toward him. M.P.’s testimony about Savoie’s past threats and 

violent conduct toward her provided a context for the jury to evaluate that defense.

But even if M.P.’s testimony exceeded the permissible limits of such evidence, it

did not impair Savoie’s substantial rights. As we discussed above, the evidence against 

Savoie was strong and the jury’s verdicts reflect reasoned examination of the evidence; it 

is unlikely that M.P.’s testimony unfairly influenced the jury’s verdict. Because the 

record indicates neither error nor prejudice, we conclude Savoie’s plain-error challenge to 

the prosecutor’s examination of M.P. fails.

II. Sufficient evidence supports Savoie’s conviction.

When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence supporting a jury verdict, we are

“limited to ascertaining whether, given the facts in the record and the legitimate 

inferences that can be drawn from those facts, a jury could reasonably conclude that the 
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defendant was guilty of the offense charged.” Bernhardt v. State, 684 N.W.2d 465, 476 

(Minn. 2004) (quotation omitted). We “will not disturb the verdict if the jury, acting with 

due regard for the presumption of innocence and for the necessity of overcoming it by 

proof beyond a reasonable doubt, could reasonably conclude that [the] defendant was 

proven guilty of the offense charged.” Id. at 476–77.

Savoie argues that insufficient evidence supports his conviction because the 

testimony of M.P., D.R.P., and M.L.P. was inconsistent with other evidence and therefore 

not credible. We disagree. The jury heard all three witnesses’ testimony, including the 

inconsistencies Savoie claims, and accepted their version of events. We will not secondguess the jury’s credibility determinations. Because Savoie does not dispute that their 

testimony, if believed, amply establishes the elements of making terroristic threats, his 

sufficiency-of-the-evidence challenge fails.

Affirmed.