1 Such claims are in certain instances permissible against the employer qua vessel, even when

the employer has paid workers' compensation under the LHWCA. See Smith v. M/V Captain

Fred, 546 F.2d 119, 122-23 (5th Cir.1977). We do not, however, decide the difficult questions

posed by this case, such as whether the escape pod was a § 905(b) "vessel" or whether there was United States Court of Appeals,

Fifth Circuit.

No. 92-3776.

ODECO OIL AND GAS COMPANY, DRILLING DIVISION and Odeco Drilling Services, Inc.,

Plaintiffs-Appellants,

v.

David J. BONNETTE, et al., Defendants-Appellees.

Oct. 14, 1993.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana.

Before JOHNSON, JOLLY, and JONES, Circuit Judges.

EDITH H. JONES, Circuit Judge:

Odeco Oil & Gas Company and Odeco Drilling Services, Inc. (Odeco) appeal the dismissal

of their declaratory judgment action and the lifting of the stay in a limitation of liabilit y proceeding.

Upon review, we find that the district court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing the declaratory

judgment, but it must reconsider one facet of the lifting of the stay.

I.

On June 2, 1991, Odeco was conductin g safety drills on a fixed platform in the Gulf of

Mexico off the coast of Louisiana. Five members of the platform's crew, David J. Bonnette, Juan M.

Porras, Henry Brumfield, Ottis L. Robbins, and Joel Thompson (the Crew), boarded an escape

capsule suspended 90 feet above the Gulf. Someone in the capsule pulled the wrong lever, releasing

the capsule from the cable that supported it, and the capsule and its passengers plunged 90 feet into

the ocean, severely injuri ng all of them. Odeco immediately began paying workers' compensation

under the Longshore and Harbor Worker's Compensation Act (LHWCA).

Fearing the possibility of mult iple v essel negligence claims under section 905(b) of the

LHWCA, 1 Odeco filed a declaratory judgment action on January 3, 1992 requesting that the court"vessel negligence".

2 Both the declaratory judgment action and the limitation proceeding were based on admiralty

jurisdiction. The district court did not examine the basis of its subject matter jurisdiction, but this

court must do so when it appears at all questionable. See Giannakos v. M/V Bravo Trader, 762

F.2d 1295, 1297 (5th Cir.1985) ("United States District Courts and Courts of Appeals have the

responsibility to consider the question of subject matter jurisdiction sua sponte if it is not raised by

the parties and to dismiss any action if such jurisdiction is lacking."). Despite troubling language

in Sisson v. Ruby, 497 U.S. 358, 364-65, 110 S.Ct. 2892, 2897, 111 L.Ed.2d 292 (1990)

(requiring courts to "focus on the general character of the activity" when determining whether a

substantial relationship exists between the activity giving rise to the incident and traditional

maritime activity), and Executive Jet Aviation, Inc. v. City of Cleveland, 409 U.S. 249, 255-56,

93 S.Ct. 493, 498, 34 L.Ed.2d 454 (1972) (offering hypothetical situations factually similar to this

case that might not satisfy the "significant relationship" test), we think the nature of the

man-overboard drill at issue in this case is sufficiently salty to sustain admiralty jurisdiction, at

least for purposes of the preliminary matters decided by the district court.

3 Because of the automatic stay in the limitation proceedings, Odeco was not a named

defendant.

4 This suit was removed to federal district court, where a motion to remand is pending. determine:

(1) that the escape capsule is not a vessel under section 905(b) of the LHWCA;

(2) that the injuries were not caused by vessel negligence; and

(3) that any action for damages is barred by section 905(a) of the LHWCA.

Alternatively, Odeco sought to limit its liabilit y to $30,000, the alleged value of the capsule, pursuant

to the Limitation of Liability Act, 46 U.S.C.App. § 183 et seq. 2

On January 6, 1992, the dis t rict court issued an order staying any further litigation against

Odeco arising out of the accident until the determination of the limitation of liabilit y proceeding. The

order further required the injured employees to file all of their claims against Odeco in the limitation

proceeding.

Four of the injured men, Brumfield, Bonnette, Thompson, and Robbins, then filed a personal

injury suit in Cameron County, Texas on April 29, 1992 naming Shell Offsho re, Inc., Shell Oil

Company, Whittaker Corporati on, and Juan M. Porras as defendants. 3 Porras, in turn, filed

cross-claims against the other defendants. 4 Porras and the four plaintiffs in the Texas court filed a

motion in the federal district court seeking to dismiss Odeco's declaratory judgment action and to lift

the stay preventing litigation against Odeco. The district court granted that motion, dismissing the5 We agree with Odeco that the legal viability of the crew's § 905(b) claim raises serious and

novel issues of maritime law at the threshold to recovery by appellees. While the state court is

undoubtedly competent to determine these issues, some of them may not finally be resolved under

the parties' stipulation until the federal court considers Odeco's limitation case. declaratory judgment action and lifting the limitation stay to allow the Crew to litigate their claims

against Odeco in the forum of their choice before returning to the district court for the limitation of

liability proceeding within its exclusive jurisdiction.

II.

The Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201 et seq. (1988), provides that a court "may

declare the rights and other legal relations of any interested party seeking such declaration." Id. at

§ 2201. It is well established in this circuit that a court need not provide declaratory judgment relief

o n request, as this is a matter left to the district court's sound discretion. S ee, e.g ., Row an

Companies, Inc. v. Griffin, 876 F.2d 26, 28 (5th Cir.1989) (citing cases); M ission Ins. Co. v. Puritan

Fashions Corp., 706 F.2d 599, 601 (5th Cir.1983) (same). Although a court may not dismiss an

action for declaratory relief "on the basis of whim," Hollis v. Itaw amba County Loans, 657 F.2d 746,

750 (5th Cir.1981), or without providing a written or oral explanation, see Rowan, 876 F.2d at 29-30,

the court may consider a variety of factors in determining whether to decide a declaratory judgment

suit. See Torch, Inc. v. LeBlanc, 947 F.2d 193, 195 (5th Cir.1991); Rowan, 876 F.2d at 29.

In this case the district court found that the Texas court provided an adequate forum init ially

to decide the vessel status of the capsule. 5 The court further found that Odeco's declaratory judgment

action was filed for the purpose of fo rum sho pping in anticipation of other suits to be filed by the

Crew. Finally, the court found that the Texas forum would not cause undue inconvenience to Odeco,

which it does business in Texas, notwithstanding the probability that the Texas court might not apply

the same doctrine of foru m non conveniens as a federal court. Under the circumstances, these

findings are not clearly erroneous, and, alt ho ugh this court might have exercised its discretion

differently, the district court did not abuse its discretion. S ee Magnolia Marine Transport v. LaPlace

Tow ing Corp., 964 F.2d 1571, 1580-82 (5th Cir.1992).

III.6 The "savings to suitors" clause is found in 28 U.S.C. § 1333 (1988) and provides in relevant

part:

The district courts shall have original jurisdiction, exclusive of the courts of

the states, of:

(1) Any civil case of admiralty or maritime jurisdiction, saving to suitors in

all cases all other remedies to which they are otherwise entitled. Nearly four decades ago, the Supreme Court recognized two situations in which a limitation

o f liabilit y proceeding may be stayed to accommodate a claimant's right to pursue common law

remedies under the "saving to suitors" clause. 6 S ee Lake Tankers Corp. v. Henn, 354 U.S. 147, 151-

53, 77 S.Ct. 1269, 1271-73, 1 L.Ed.2d 1246 (1957). Bradley stated, claims may proceed outside the

limitation action (1) if they total less than the value of the vessel, or (2) if the claimants stipulate that

the federal court has exclusive jurisdiction over the limitation of liabilit y proceeding and that they will

not seek to enforce a greater damage award until the limitation action has been heard by the federal

court. S ee Magnolia Marine Transport, 964 F.2d at 1575-76; I n re Two "R" Drilling Co., 943 F.2d

576, 577-78 (5th Cir.1991); In re Dammers & Vanderheide & Scheepvaart Maats Christina B.V.,

836 F.2d 750, 755-60 (2d Cir.1988). Accommodating the goals of both the Limitation of Liability

Act and the "saving to suitors" clause of 28 U.S.C. § 1333 has caused some tensions. S ee Magnolia

Marine Transport, 964 F.2d at 1575 (citing In re Dammers & Vanderheide, 836 F.2d at 754).

Odeco co nt ends that this is a multiple claimant-inadequate fund case that requires the

limitation proceeding to take precedence over the state court suit. This contention is only partly true.

If we assume t hat each of the crew claimants' damage claims must be aggregated and totted up

against the limitation fund, notwithstanding their agreements that, if necessary, they will not enforce

judgments against appellants for more than the limitation fund, then the f und is by definition

inadequate. If the purpose of the Limitation Act were to acco mplish judicial efficiency as well as

limitation of liabilit y, this case would clearly call for concursus proceeding. But the Supreme Court

explained in Lake Tankers, 354 U.S. at 152-53, 77 S.Ct. at 1272-73 that liabilit y may and should be

limit ed consistent with preserving the claimants' right to pro c eed in the fora of their choice. So

where, as here, all of the claimants are so anxious to take advantage of the perceived magnanimity7 If the claimants' stipulation here covers all possible claimants and assures Odeco would never

have to pay more than the limitation fund if the admiralty court so determines, this case is

instantly distinguishable from Pershing Auto Rentals v. Gaffney, 279 F.2d 546 (5th Cir.1960). In

that case, written shortly after Lake Tankers, only two out of four claimants offered to execute

protective stipulations. See id. at 548-49. The sum of the multiple claims still far exceeded the

limitation fund. See id. of South Texas juries that they are willing to stipulate essentially that they will submit to two

trials—the state court trial followed by a substantially redundant federal limitation proceeding—this

court is hard put to deny them. We must accede to this choice i f it is accompanied by stipulations

fully pro tecting Odeco's right to limit liability and agreeing to abide by an admiralty court

determination of the right to limit

. Couched in these terms, Odeco does not co nfro nt a multiple

claim-inadequate fund lawsuit. 7

Two other sources of claimants have been mentioned. The wives of the Crew joined in the

Texas lawsuit but have not appeared or attempted to file claims in the limitation proceeding. Odeco

concedes that case law authorizes those whose claims are derivative of the injured workers to proceed

in state court upon proper stipulation without risking a mult iple claim-inadequate fund situation. S ee

Magnolia Marine, 964 F.2d at 1574, 1579-80; I n re Two "R" Drilling, 943 F.2d at 577-78. The

Crew judicially admitted that their stipulation should have included t h eir spouses' rights, and we

amend the stipulation for that purpose.

Of more concern is the allusion to potential claims for contribution or indemnity against

Odeco by other defendants sued by the Crew in Texas court. Those companies have not yet appeared

in the limitation proceeding; consequently, they are not parties to the stipulation. Because their

claims, if preserved and matured, could cause a mult iple claimant-inadequate fund situation to arise,

we must vacate the district court's stay of the limitation case so that it can consider the implications

of codefendant cross-claims.

Apart from the possible codefendant claims, the stipulations agreed to by the parties contain

standard terms and adequately protect Odeco's interests. For additional clarification, we note that

the Crew, through their lawyers, agreed that the stipulations apply whether their case is litigated in

Texas state or federal court. The stipulations also preserve Odeco's right to litigate a ll issuespertaining to limitation in the limitation court free of any claims of res judicata.

CONCLUSION

The district court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing Odeco's declaratory judgment

action. However, we vacate and remand the stay of the limitation proceeding for the district court

to consider the ramifications of contribution or indemnity claims that might be asserted against Odeco

by virtue of the pending Texas case.

AFFIRMED in part, VACATED and REMANDED in part.