J-S51031-14

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

S.A.G., IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

Appellee

v.

R.L.B., JR.,

Appellant No. 655 MDA 2014

Appeal from the Order entered on December 6, 2013, 

in the Court of Common Pleas of Lancaster County, 

Domestic Relations, at No(s): 2013-00282

BEFORE: BOWES, OTT and MUSMANNO, JJ.

MEMORANDUM BY MUSMANNO, J.: FILED NOVEMBER 18, 2014

R.L.B., Jr. (“Appellant”), appeals, pro se, from the Order requiring him 

to provide support to M.C. (“Child”), born in June 2004, who resides in the 

Commonwealth of Virginia with S.A.G. (“Mother”). We reverse and remand 

for further proceedings.

On January 23, 2013, Mother filed a Support Petition, seeking support 

for Child from Appellant and requesting a determination of paternity of Child. 

In response to Mother’s Support Petition, the trial court ordered Appellant to 

undergo genetic testing. Appellant filed Preliminary Objections to the 

Support Petition, asserting the doctrine of paternity by estoppel with regard 

to another male individual, R.C. The trial court then stayed the genetic 

testing Order, pending a paternity hearing.
J-S51031-14

-2 -

Following a paternity hearing conducted on April 16, 2013, the trial 

court again ordered Appellant to undergo genetic testing. The trial court 

also ordered certified copies of all court orders from Virginia regarding Child 

(whether in custody or support actions, including any paternity action 

involving R.C.). The trial court scheduled another paternity hearing for 

August 7, 2013.

Genetic test results dated May 21, 2013 indicated a 99.99% or more 

probability that Appellant is the biological parent of Child. Accordingly, on 

May 23, 2013, the trial court issued a Rule against Appellant, pursuant to 

Pa.R.C.P. 1910.15(d)(3), directing him to show cause why an order should 

not be entered finding him to be Child’s father, and referring the action to 

conference and hearing, as in other actions for support.1 

On August 7, 2013, the trial court conducted a second paternity 

hearing, at which both Mother and Appellant testified.2 The trial court also 

questioned Child, in camera, in the presence of Mother’s counsel, with 

Appellant’s agreement. Appellant also agreed to the admission of certified 

 

1 The trial court initially directed that the Rule was returnable within 20 

days. However, the trial court entered an amended Order directing the Rule 

to be returnable at the paternity hearing scheduled for August 7, 2013, at 

which Appellant’s written response to the Rule would be addressed.

2 Appellant was represented by counsel, David Wedge, Esquire (“Attorney 

Wedge”), at the first paternity hearing, but appeared pro se at the second 

hearing. No entry of appearance for Attorney Wedge appears on the docket 

or in the certified record, nor is there any order granting the withdrawal of 

Attorney Wedge as counsel. 
J-S51031-14

-3 -

copies of two court Orders from Virginia (“the Virginia court Orders”) 

regarding Child.3 N.T., 8/7/13, at 5-6. Additionally, Appellant 

acknowledged that genetic testing established that he was the biological 

father of Child. Id. at 4. 

On September 4, 2013, the trial court entered an Order (“Paternity 

Order”)4finding that, based on the testimony presented and the results of 

genetic testing, Appellant was both the biological and legal father of Child, 

noting that genetic testing established, to a high degree of scientific 

probability, that Appellant is the biological parent of Child. Trial Court Order, 

9/4/13, at 1. On September 5, 2013, the trial court ordered Appellant to 

appear before a conference officer for support proceedings on October 7, 

2013.

Appellant, pro se, filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the trial court’s

 

3 The Virginia court Orders included an October 19, 2011 Consent Order 

(“the Virginia Consent Order”) declaring R.C. the “psychological” father of 

Child and awarding joint physical custody of Child to Mother and R.C.; and 

an October 19, 2011 Order finding that R.C. is not Child’s biological father. 

See N.T., 8/7/13, at 20-25; Plaintiff’s Exhibits 1 and 2. 

4 The Paternity Order is dated September 3, 2013, but was not entered until 

September 4, 2013.
J-S51031-14

-4 -

Paternity Order.5 The trial court determined that it “was not bound to act 

upon Appellant’s [M]otion [for Reconsideration of the trial court’s Paternity 

Order], and did not do so.” Trial Court Opinion, 6/6/14, at 1 ¶¶ 2-3. 

On October 7, 2013, support proceedings were conducted before a 

conference officer, who issued a Recommended Order for support of Child to 

the trial court. On October 8, 2013, the trial court adopted the conference 

officer’s Recommended Order, and entered an interim support Order 

directing Appellant to provide support for Child.6

On October 15, 2013, Appellant, pro se, filed a Demand for Hearing 

regarding the Recommended Order, asserting that the amount of support 

was excessive. On December 5, 2013, the trial court held a hearing 

regarding the Recommended Order, at which Appellant raised R.C.’s custody 

 

5 The Motion for Reconsideration is not indicated on the trial court’s docket, 

nor is it included in the certified record. However, the trial court discussed 

the Motion for Reconsideration in its Opinion, and indicated that it was filed 

on October 2, 2013. See Trial Court Opinion, 6/6/14, at 1 ¶¶ 2-3. An 

attachment to Appellant’s Brief, entitled “Motion for Reconsideration,” is 

date-stamped September 24, 2013. The trial court has provided no 

explanation as to its failure to include the Motion for Reconsideration either 

on its docket or in the certified record. Accordingly, we have no means of 

determining when it was actually filed. We remind the trial court that the 

prothonotary must inspect documents presented for filing to ensure that 

they are in proper form, but the prothonotary has no power to reject 

documents, and must enter all documents for filing on the trial court’s 

docket. See Amicone v. Rok, 839 A.2d 1109, 1115 (Pa. Super. 2003). 

6 The trial court found Appellant’s net monthly income to be $1,639.57, and 

Mother’s net monthly income to be $0. The trial court set the amount of 

Appellant’s monthly support payment at $434.00 ($395.00 of which was 

current support and $39.00 of which was arrears), and directed that 

arrearages, in the amount of $3,806.38, were due, in full, immediately.
J-S51031-14

-5 -

rights, and argued that the doctrine of paternity by estoppel precluded 

Mother from seeking support from Appellant. N.T., 12/5/13, at 5-6. On 

December 9, 2013, the trial court entered an Order (“Support Order”)7

adopting as final the conference officer’s Recommended Order.

On January 31, 2014, Appellant, through counsel,8filed a Demand for 

Hearing on his pro se Motion for Reconsideration of the Paternity Order.9 In 

his Demand for Hearing, Appellant asserted that (1) the trial court erred in 

finding him to be Child’s father, in light of the Virginia Consent Order 

declaring R.C. the psychological father of Child and awarding joint physical 

custody of Child to Mother and R.C.; and (2) R.C. held himself out to be 

Child’s father since her birth. See Demand for Hearing, 1/31/14, at 1. 

On February 10, 2014, the trial court dismissed, with prejudice, 

Appellant’s Demand for Hearing on his Motion for Reconsideration of the 

Paternity Order. The trial court reasoned that Appellant was foreclosed from 

 

7 The Support Order is dated December 6, 2013, but was not filed until 

December 9, 2013. 

8 Appellant’s Demand for Hearing on his pro se Motion for Reconsideration of 

the Paternity Order was filed by Thomas Cusack, Esquire (“Attorney 

Cusack”). No entry of appearance for Attorney Cusack appears on the 

docket or in the certified record. 

9 This Demand for Hearing was not entered on the trial court’s docket, but is 

referenced in and attached to the trial court’s February 10, 2014 Order. See

Trial Court Order, 2/10/14, at 1, and Exhibit thereto. The trial court’s Order 

also references Mother’s Reply to Appellant’s Demand for Hearing. See id. 

at 1. However, Mother’s Reply was not entered on the trial court’s docket, 

and is not attached to the February 10, 2014 Order or otherwise in the 

certified record. See id.; see also Amicone, supra.
J-S51031-14

-6 -

challenging the Paternity Order due to his failure to file a timely appeal from 

the Support Order. See Trial Court Order, 2/10/14, at 3.

On April 2, 2014, Appellant, pro se, filed an appeal.10 On appeal, 

Appellant raises the following issues for our review:

Is Appellant entitled to a new trial when, applying [] 

Pennsylvania [] [l]aw, the trial court abused its discretion and/or 

misapplied the law by:

a. Omitting or failing to include evidence in the 

determining order, namely the [Virginia Consent 

O]rder [] naming [R.C.] the father of [Child][?]

b. Refusing to acknowledge that this voluntary 

Acknowledgement of Paternity may only be cancelled 

by either party within 60 days after the form is signed 

or the date of a court proceeding related to the child, 

whichever is sooner. After the 60 days, the 

acknowledgement of paternity may be challenged in 

court ONLY on the basis of fraud, duress or material 

mistake of fact[?] 

Appellant’s Brief at 7.

Initially, we must determine whether this Court lacks jurisdiction over 

this appeal due to timeliness considerations. Both the trial court and Mother 

contend that Appellant’s appeal is untimely and, hence, this Court lacks 

 

10 Appellant improperly filed his appeal with our Supreme Court, which 

transferred the appeal, and Appellant’s accompanying Concise Statement of 

Errors Complained of on Appeal, to this Court in an Order entered April 15, 

2014. The Supreme Court noted that Appellant appeared to be appealing 

the Support Order. See Order, 4/15/14, at 1.
J-S51031-14

-7 -

jurisdiction over this appeal.11 See Trial Court Opinion, 6/6/14, at 2-3 ¶¶ 7, 

8, 11, 12; see also Mother’s Brief at 1, 3, and 8.

Mother claims that Appellant improperly challenged the trial court’s 

failure to rule on his Motion for Reconsideration of the Paternity Order, as it 

had already been denied by operation of law. See Mother’s Brief at 8-9 

n.11. Mother asserts that Appellant should have appealed the Support 

Order. Id. Finally, Mother contends that Appellant’s appeal, forwarded to 

this Court from the Supreme Court, was improperly filed pro se, although 

Appellant’s counsel had not filed a praecipe for withdrawal. Id. at 9. 

Initially, pursuant to Rule 1910.15(f) of the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil 

Procedure, an order establishing paternity is not an appealable order, and 

the issue of paternity may be included in an appeal from the final order of 

child support. See Pa.R.C.P. 1910.15(f). Therefore, Appellant’s failure to 

timely challenge the Paternity Order is not fatal to his appeal if he timely 

appealed from the Support Order. 

Pursuant to Pa.R.C.P. 236(a)(2), the prothonotary must immediately 

give written notice to the parties of any order entered by the trial court. 

See Pa.R.C.P. 236(a)(2). Additionally, the prothonotary must note in the 

docket the giving of such notice. See Pa.R.C.P. 236(b). Finally, the date of 

entry of an order is “the day on which the clerk makes the notation in the 

 

11 Mother filed a Motion to Dismiss the appeal. On June 3, 2014, this Court 

denied Mother’s Motion to Dismiss, without prejudice to Mother’s right to reraise the timeliness issue in her appellate brief. 
J-S51031-14

-8 -

docket that notice of entry of the order has been given as required by 

Pa.R.C.P. 236(b).” Pa.R.A.P. 108(b) (emphasis added).

Our Supreme Court has held that “an order is not appealable 

until it is entered on the docket with the required notation that 

appropriate notice has been given.” Frazier v. City of 

Philadelphia, 557 Pa. 618, 621, 735 A.2d 113, 115 (1999) 

(emphasis added). Where there is no indication on the docket 

that Rule 236(b) notice has been given, then the appeal period 

has not started to run. Id. at 621-22, 735 A.2d at 115. Our 

Supreme Court has expressly held that this is a bright-line rule, 

to be interpreted strictly. That the appealing party did indeed 

receive notice does not alter the rule that the 30-day appeal 

period is not triggered until the clerk makes a notation on the 

docket that notice of entry of the order has been given. Id. 

In re L.M., 923 A.2d 505, 508 (Pa. Super. 2007). 

Our review of the record reveals that the prothonotary failed to 

indicate on the trial court docket that it provided notice of the Support Order 

to the parties, in compliance with Pa.R.C.P. 236(b).12 Thus, the appeal 

period was not triggered. See Frazier, 735 A.2d at 115. Accordingly,

Appellant’s appeal from the Support Order is not untimely, and we will 

proceed to review the merits of the appeal.

Our standard of review of support determinations involving a question 

of paternity is that of an abuse of discretion. See Vargo v. Schwartz, 940 

A.2d 459, 462 (Pa. Super. 2007).

An abuse of discretion exists if the trial court misapplied the law, 

or if there is insufficient evidence to sustain the order. 

Moreover, resolution of factual issues is for the trial court, and a 

 

12 We note, with disapproval, that the trial court’s docket fails to reflect that 

Rule 236(b) notice was issued for any of the Orders entered in this case.
J-S51031-14

-9 -

reviewing court will not disturb the trial court’s findings if they 

are supported by competent evidence. It is not enough that we, 

if sitting as a trial court, may have made a different finding.

Doran v. Doran, 820 A.2d 1279, 1282 (Pa. Super. 2003) (quotations 

omitted). When evaluating a support order, this Court may only reverse the 

trial court’s determination where the order cannot be sustained on any valid 

ground. R.K.J. v. S.P.K., 77 A.3d 33, 37 (Pa. Super. 2013) (involving a 

claim of paternity by estoppel).

Appellant contends that the trial court failed to consider all of the 

evidence in the case, and misapplied the law through the omission of 

evidence. Appellant’s Brief at 13-14. Specifically, Appellant contends that 

the trial court failed to consider the Consent Order naming R.C. as Child’s 

father. Id. at 13. Appellant points out that R.C. signed Child’s birth 

certificate and that Child bears R.C.’s surname. Id. at 15. Thus, Appellant 

argues, R.C. is Child’s father by means of the doctrine of paternity by 

estoppel. Id. at 11-12. 

Estoppel in paternity actions is merely the legal 

determination that because of a person’s conduct (e.g., holding 

out the child as his own, or supporting the child) that person, 

regardless of his true biological status, will not be permitted to 

deny parentage, nor will the child’s mother who has participated 

in this conduct be permitted to sue a third party for support, 

claiming that the third party is the true father.... [T]he doctrine 

of estoppel in paternity actions is aimed at “achieving fairness as 

between the parents by holding them, both mother and father, 

to their prior conduct regarding the paternity of the child.”
J-S51031-14

-10 -

Brinkley v. King, 701 A.2d 176, 180 n.5 (Pa. 1997) (emphasis and citation 

omitted). The doctrine of paternity by estoppel seeks to protect the 

interests of the child. T.E.B. v. C.A.B., 74 A.3d 170, 173 (Pa. Super. 2013). 

Estoppel is based on the public policy that children should 

be secure in knowing who their parents are. If a certain person 

has acted as the parent and bonded with the child, the child 

should not be required to suffer the potentially damaging trauma 

that may come from being told that the father he had known all 

his life is not in fact his father.

Id. at 173 (citation omitted).

The doctrine has most usually been applied either to (1) preclude a 

man who had held a child out as his own from avoiding further support of 

the child after his relationship with the mother had ended; or (2) preclude a 

woman who had held one man out as her child’s father from seeking support 

from another man later on. Id. at 174 (citation omitted).

Paternity by estoppel will apply only where it can be shown, on a 

developed record, that it is in the best interests of the involved child. 

K.E.M. v. P.C.S., 38 A.3d 798, 810 (Pa. 2012). In R.K.J., the court, relying 

on K.E.M., specifically recognized the following factors as relevant to the 

child’s best interests in a support case involving an allegation of paternity by 

estoppel: 

(1) a party cannot renounce an assumed duty of parentage 

when the innocent child would be victimized; (2) the law can 

prohibit a putative father from employing sanctions of the law to 

avoid the obligations that his assumed relationship with the child 

would impose; (3) the closeness of the child’s relationship to the 
J-S51031-14

-11 -

putative father; (4) the harm that would befall the child if the 

putative father’s parental status were to be disestablished; and 

(5) the need for continuity, financial support, and potential 

psychological security arising out of an established parent-child 

relationship. 

R.K.J., 77 A.3d at 38. 

Here, in the Paternity Order, the trial court indicated, without 

discussion, that it considered the testimony presented and the results of 

genetic testing before determining that Appellant is both the biological and 

legal father of Child. See Trial Court Order, 9/4/13, at ¶ 1. The trial court 

failed to include any discussion reflecting either its consideration of 

Appellant’s claim of paternity by estoppel, or the five factors identified in 

R.K.J. as relevant to a determination of paternity when there is a question 

of paternity by estoppel.13 Notably, no testimony was received by R.C., 

whom Appellant seeks to establish, through estoppel, is Child’s father.14 

 

13 In its February 10, 2014 Order, the trial court observed that its prior 

determination that Appellant is the biological and legal father of Child was 

based on “extensive testimony and other evidence presented in the course 

of the hearing” and “the results of genetic testing that established to a high 

degree of scientific probability that Appellant is the biological parent of 

Child.” See Trial Court Order, 2/10/14, at 2. The trial court also noted that 

it had reviewed the Virginia court Orders. Id. Finally, the trial court 

indicated, without discussion, that “the record contains evidence which bears 

upon the biological, social and emotional relationships between Child and the 

various father figures in [C]hild’s life, and it includes evidence sufficient to 

support the making of findings in respect to [C]hild’s best interest.” Id. 

While this Order references a broader basis for the trial court’s determination 

than was indicated in the Paternity Order, the trial court nevertheless failed 

to discuss either the claim of paternity by estoppel or the five factors 

identified in R.K.J.

14 As noted by the Court in K.E.M., “absent undue hardship or impossibility, 

we do not believe a court should dismiss a support claim against a purported 
J-S51031-14

-12 -

Thus, we remand the matter to the trial court to consider the five factors 

identified in R.K.J.15

Order reversed. Case remanded for further proceedings consistent 

with this Memorandum. Jurisdiction relinquished.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 11/18/2014

 

biological father based on an estoppel theory vesting legal parenthood in 

another man without the latter being brought before the court at least as a 

witness.” K.E.M., 38 A.3d at 809. 

15 We recognize that the trial court may need to take additional evidence 

and/or conduct further hearings in order to properly consider the five factors 

identified in R.K.J. Moreover, the trial court has the authority to appoint a 

guardian ad litem to advocate Child’s best interests in concrete terms. See 

K.E.M., 38 A.3d at 809.