### IN THE COURT OF APP EALS OF TENNESS EE AT NAS HVILLE A ugus t 18 , 200 5 S es sio n GI LBE RT WATE RS, ET AL 

### . v. WE SLEY COK ER, M.D. Appeal f romthe Circ uit Court for Davidson County No. 01C-1443 Ham ilton Gayden, Jud ge

No. M2004- 01540-COA-R 3-CV - F iled Jun e 29, 2006

Plaintiff in medical m al p ra ct i ce ac t i o n ap p ea l s j u ryv er d i ct al l egi n g t h at t h e “ d y n am i t e c h ar ge” wh i ch supplemented the origina l instruction after the jury was a ppare ntly deadlo ck ed violated Kersey v

. Sta te and its prog eny
. We ag ree and, because we find the i nstruction aff ecte d the re sult, we reve rse. Tenn. R. App . P . 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgme nt of th e Circ uit Court Reve rsed and Rem anded
P ATR I C I A J. C O T T RE LL , J ., delivere d the opinion of the court, in which W I L L I AM C. K O CH , J R ., P.J ., M.S., and W I L L I AM B. C A IN , J ., joined.
Robert L

. Trentha m, T ay lor B. May es, Nashville, Tenne ssee, for the appellant, Wesley Coker, M.D.
L arry D. Ashworth, Richa

rd H. B atson I I , Nashville, Tenne ss ee , for the a ppellees, G ilbert Waters a ndwi fe , H ixie Wat e rs
. OP IN ION
Pla int if fs , G ilb e rt andHi xie Wate rs , f ile d s uit a g a ins t nu me ro us de fe nd a nts se e kin g to rec over for i njuries Mr. Waters sustained during sur g ery . I nitially , plaintiffs named the hospital, the anesthe siologist, the nurse anesthesiolog ist and the ane sthesiology prac tice g roup involved in the surg ery as def endant s
. T he surg eon, Dr . Coker, wa s named late r. During the cour se of the proce eding s, all defe ndants except Dr. Coker wer e dismissed.
The c ase pr ocee ded to t ri al ag ainst Dr. Coker, an orthopedic sur g eon, for medical malprac tice. I n May

of 2000, ac cording to plaintiffs, Dr. Coker perf ormed surg ery on Mr. Waters t o r e p a i r a ru p t u r e d d i s k i n h i s b a c k , a l u m b ar l a m i n e c t o m y. It w a s a n t i c i p a t e d t h a ta f t e r t h e s u r g e r y, Mr. Waters, a heal t h y 6 7 y ea r-old, would be a ble to return to wor

k. I nstead, Mr. Water s suffer ed brain damag e. Plaintiffs maintain that Mr. W ater s’ i njuries wer e ca used by medication g iven Mr. Wa te r s b y D r
. Co k e r d u r in g s u r g e r y ( mo rp h in e a n d f e n tan y l) in a d d it io n to th o s e a d mi n is te r e d by-2-

the a ne sth e sio log ist . D r. Cok e r, on the oth e r h a nd , d e nie d fault a ndbe lie ve d th a t Mr . Wa te rs ’ inj urie s r e su lte d f

ro m a se ri e s o f s tr ok e s. After a two we ek jury

trial, a ve rdict wa s returne d for Dr . Coker. Dr . Coker appe aled the trial court’s r efusa l to awa rd h im discretionary costs. Subsequently , the plaintiffs appe aled, r aising sever al g rounds for r ever sal including the trial court’s denial of their motion to amend the complaint to include informed c on s en t, errone ous jury instructions, and err or in g iving a portion of the jury instructions outside the presenc e of c ounsel and the pa rties. The g round raised by plaintiffs that we find dispositi ve, howe ver, pe rtains to the supplemental char g e which was g iven by the judg e af ter the jury beg an deliber ations and af ter it informed the judge it was dea dlocked.
I. T HE S U PP LEM ENTA L I NS T RUCT I ON H E R E IN
The re cord r efle cts that a da y and a ha lf afte r the jury had re tired to deliberate, the jury fo re ma n wr ote a

no te to the tr ia l ju dg e a dv isi ng the c ou rt that th e jury

wa s d e a dlo c ke d. Th e no te g iven stated: “The jury

in the case of Gilbert Waters and Dr. Coker has rea ched an impasse with a vo te of e le ve n t o on e.” Th e tr ia l c ou rt a c c e pte d th e no te a nd , w ith the jury ou t of the c ou rt ro om, a dv ise d th e pa

rt ie s a ndthe ir

c ou ns e l of

the div isi on , th e n r e a d th e no te in o pe n c ou rt

. After a discussion with counsel, both parties ag ree d for the court to give a “dy namite cha

rg e.” When the jury

was brought back int o the courtroom, the j udg e did not g ive t he jury the instructions abo ut d e lib e ratio ns a ndthe du ty of the jury that had be e n c on ta ine d in the orig ina l in str uc tio ns
. I ns te a d, the c ou rt

g a ve the jury

the fo llo wi ng ins truc tio ns : Okay

. L adies and g entlemen of the jury , the fore person ha s informed me that y ou are prese ntly hung up at eleven t o one. Now, w hat I ’m g oing to do, since lunch has be en or de re d at a quart e r to 1 2:0 0, is I ’m g oin g to a sk

y ou to c on tin ue to d e lib e rate a t le a st throug h lunch. I f all 12 of y ou are in the jury room eating lunch, y ou may talk about t h e c as e w h i l e y o u r e at i n g. Remember this, that don’t g ive up y our convic ti o n s mere ly for the pur

pose of rea ching a verdict. Howeve r, also reme mber that this was an expensive proc eeding on both sides; very

expensive, as y ou can imagine , bring ing doc tors from diffe rent parts of the country

and having discovery

depositions, the lawy er’ s time. And, unfortunate ly , in Tennesse e, we don’t have a majority verdic t or eig ht to three ve rdict as they do in some states, or nine to two.
So n on e of us kn ow wh o - how y ou ’r e vo tin g . B ut I wa nt the pe rs on to s e arc h th e ir conscie nce. I f they

fee l like that they can equally come to a posi tion with the other twelve, to do that. Other eleve n. But, ag ain, don’t g ive up y our convic tions, but do re m em b e r t h at t h e c as e w i l l h av e t o b e t ri ed al l o v er aga i n , an d t h at ’s s o m et h i n g I hope y ou will consider.T hi s was t he same cha rge app roved i n Si m m ons
. K er s ey , 525 S. W

. 2d a t 140 n

. 2. 1
-3- So I ’ll excuse y ou to go e at lunch and c ome bac k. And as I said, nobody knows how that e le ve n- on e is, a ndthat’ s g oo d. We’ ll l e a ve it j us t li ke that. Okay . You may

be excused.
After the j ury left t he courtroom, the j udg e asked the attorne y s if there wer e any objections to “my dy namite lunch cha

rg e.” The rec ord shows no objec tions were ma de. L ater that day , the jury rende red its unanimous verdic t for Dr . Coker.
II. T HE L A W O F “D Y N A M I TE ” C HA R GES
The term “dy namite char g e” g ener ally ref ers to a char g e g iven the jury aft er d el i b er ations have be g un and whe n it appear s the jury is deadlocke d. The c olloquialism arises f rom the intended eff ect to b re ak the dea dlock so that the jury rea ches a

unanimous decision. An examination of case law on the subjec t reve als that in Tennesse e both the mea nin g an d l eg al par ameter s of the “dy namite cha

rg e” ha ve evolve d.
I n Sim mo ns v . S tat e , 281 S.W .2d 487 (Tenn. 1955), the Tennessee Supreme Court approve d a supplementa l c harg e that allowed jurors to be instructed to g ive heed to the opinions of their fe llow jurors. The c harg e appr oved in Simmons was Tennessee ’s ver sion of the dy namite cha rg e appr oved by the United States Supreme Court in Allen v. United States , 164 U. S

. 4 9 2 , 5 0 1 (1 896). The supplem e n ta l c h ar g e u s e d w ith a d e a d lo c k e d ju r y is s o me ti me s r e f e rr e d to a s th e “ A llen” or “dy namite cha

rg e.”
I n Ke rse y v . S tat e , 525 S.W .2d 139 (Tenn. 1975), the Tennessee Supre me Court reje cted the char g e that had be en appr oved in Simmons and provide d clea r gu i d elines re g arding supplemental char g es to dea dlocked jurie s. I n Kersey , the jury in a criminal trial reporte d t o t h e co u rt that they wer e unable to rea ch a unanimous verdict. Id . at 140. Upon i nquiry by the judg e, the jury fore man reported that the jury

was de adlocke d eleve n t o one. Id . There afte r, the judg e g ave the jury what was then c alled a “ dy namite” or “Allen” char g e which, in e ffe ct, advised dissenting jurors that they should give heed to the ma jority position. Id . It wa s ho pe d that the “ dyna mit e ” c ha rg e “ wo uldbla st 1 the jury into a unanimous verdict.” Id

. I n Kersey , the Supreme Court rule d that the cha rg e pre viouslyapprove d in Simmons violated the rig ht to trial by

jury

. Id . at 14 4. Th e c ou rt the n p ro c e e de d to pr ov ide g uid a nc e on se ve ra l a sp e c ts of cha rg ing the jury

afte r deliber ations had beg un in an eff ort to r esolve a dea dlocked jury . First, the trial courts we re a dmonished in Kersey not to inquire about how a jury may be divided. Until the jury shall have rea ched a verdic t, no one - - not e ven the tria l judge - - ha s any rig ht, rea son or power

to question the specific s of its deliberative e fforts.-4-

Id . at 141. The Court went on to instruct trial courts to admonish juries not to disclose their division since the “ only

permissive i n q u i ry ” i s as to prog ress a nd whether it believes further de liberations might be he lpful. Id

. The Court then discussed the history of the “ dy namite” or

“Allen” char g e. The Court noted that this iss ue “ha s tantalized the criminal def ense ba r, torture d t h e trial benc h, and tormente d the appellate courts throug hout the nation.” Id . at 14 2. Th e Cou rt fo un d a s f

oll ow s: The rig ht of trial by

jury may not be impaired or

encumbe red w ith conditions wh ic h, in the ir

pr a c tic a l op e ratio n, ma y e mba rr a ss or vi ol ate the fr e e a ndfu ll enjoy ment of the rig ht.
I n our view the Allen char g e and the Allen-Simmons c ha rg e op erate t o embar rass, impair a nd violate the constitutional rig ht of t ri al b y j u ry . Any undue intrusion by

the trial judg e into this ex clusive province of the jury , is an err or of the first mag nitude. We rec og nize that the trial judge has a le g itimate conce rn in the administration of justice and that he labors under a duty to le nd g uidance to the jury throug h instructions as to the g overning principles of the law. Howe ver, wh en the e ff ort to se c ur e a

ve rdict reach es th e po int that a sin g le jur or

ma y be c oe rc e d in to surre ndering views consc ientiouslyentertained, the jury ’s provinc e i s invaded a nd the re quirement of unanimity is dilut ed. We view these char g es as be ing ta ntamount to a judicially

mandated ma

jority verdic t which is impermissible under Ten nessee law.
Moreove r, there is an inhere nt inconsistency in these cha

rg es in that the dis se nte rs are ur g e d to re c on sid e r the ir ve rd ic t and sim ult a ne ou sly are re min de d to make their

decisions base d upon their own convictions which they are cautioned not to sacrif ice. The y ask the dissenter s to consider shifting their opinions, because the majority is of a differe nt persua sion. We find no merit to any sug g estion that might ne c e ssa ri ly make s r ig ht. We t ake no te of the c la ssi c lin e s:
NOR I S THE PEOPL E’S J UDGME NT AL WAYS TRUE. THE MOST MAY ERR AS GROSSL Y AS T H E F E W.
We conclude that the interests of justice de m an d t h e rejection of the

“ dyna mit e ” c ha

rg e . U nd e r the statut ory

a ndinh e re nt s up e rv iso r

y p o w e r o f this Cou rt , we dir e c t th a t tria l c ou rt s in Te nn e sse e , w he n fa c e d w ith de a dlo c ke d ju ri e s, c omp ly with the AB A Standards Rela ting to Tria l by J ury , Sec. 5.4 . . . .
Th e ins truc tio n c on te mpl a te d in Se c
. 5. 4( a ) ma y be g ive n a s a pa rt of the ma in c ha rg e a ndsh ou ld b e g ive n in the fo llo wi ng fo rm :-5- The ve rdict must rep re sent the consider ed judg ment of ea ch juror. I n order

to return a

verdic t, it is nece ssary

that eac h juror ag ree the re to. Yo ur

ve rd ic t mu st b e un a nim ou s.
I t is y ou r d uty , a s ju ro rs , to con su lt with o ne a no the r andto de lib e rate wi th a vi ew t o r e a c hin g a n a g re e me nt, if y ou c a n d o s o wit h o u t violence to individual judg ment. Eac h of y ou must decide the ca se for

y ourself, but do so only

afte r an impartial consideration of t h e evidenc e with y our fe llow jurors. I n the cour se of y our deliberations, do not hesitate to reexamine y o u r own views a nd chang e y our opinion if con v i n ce d i t is errone ous. But do not surre nder y our honest convic tio n as to the weig ht or eff ect of evidenc e solely

beca use of the opinion of y our fellow jurors, or for the me re pu rp os e of

re turnin g a

ve rd ic t.
I f g iven as a part of the main char g e, it may be repe ated should a d ea d lock develop.
Judic ia l e c on omy a ndun if ormit y de ma ndthe se re su lts . Stri c t a dh e re nc e is expected and va

riations will not be permissible.
We h oldthat th e c ha

rg e g ive n in thi s c a se wa s p re jud ic ia l.
Id . at 144-45 (internal citations o m i t t ed). To summarize, the Supreme Court in Kersey, using the strong est possible lang uag e, g ave the following g uidance when pr oviding suppleme ntal instructions to j ur or s: 1) Jurors should be advised not to disclose how the jury may be divided; 2) The only

permissive inquiry

by the court i s about prog ress a nd whether further de lib e ratio ns ma y

be he lpf ul; 3) I f g iving supplemental instructions, the standard char g e provide d in Kersey mus t be g iven; and 4) The Kersey su pp le me nta l c ha rg e ma y on ly

be g ive n if

it w a s in c lud e d in the ma in char g e.
I n particula

r, the Kersey c ou rt

dis app roveda ny

la ng ua g e that mi g ht c oe rc e a jur or int o s u rr e n d e r i n g t o t h e m a

j o r i t y, a g a i n s t h i s o r h e r

c o n s c i e n t i o u s l y- h e l d v i e w s , f o r t h e s ak e o f

u n a n i m i t y.-6-

Whil e the c ourt in Kersey sa id i t “ re je c te d” the dyna mit e c ha rg e , th e te rm

nevert heles s continues to be used informally to de scribe a supplemental char g e g iven when a jury is deadlocke d. Given subsequent history , it a ppear s more acc urate to say the dy namite char g e g iven by the t rial court in Kersey wa s re

je c te d a nd g uid a nc e wa s g ive n a s to the pa rame te rs of a n a c c e pta

ble dyna mit e char g e for the future , also known as the “ Kersey char g e.” While the term “dy namite charg e” is not favor ed, it rema ins in common usage

. I n 1978, t h e Tenne ssee Supre me Court applied the principles of Kersey to a c ivi l c a se in Va nd e rb ilt Un iv . v . S te e ly , 566 S.W .2d 853 (Tenn. 1978) . Mr. Steely sued Va nderbilt for injuries he sust ained when he f

ell down a f

light of stair s at the university

. Id

. at 853. The issues at tria l were “hotly contested,” and the jury

reported it was unable to r eac h a verdic t a fter it ha d deliberated for some time. Id . T he jud g e g a ve a su pp le me nta l c ha

rg e whi ch variedfr om the c ha rg e pr ov ide d in Kersey . The c harg e in Ste e lyreminded the jury of the ti me and expense consumed at the trial and instructed that ea ch juror should c onsider the opinion of fe llow jurors and be influence d to the extent the juror c onsiders prope r. Id . at 855-56. The Supreme Court in Ste e ly found this char g e violated the g uidelines laid down in Kersey

. First, the suppleme ntal char g e wa s not the one manda ted in Kersey and made ref ere nce to a dditional considerations that should not play a role

. Id . at 854. Second, the supple mental cha rg e g iven had not been include d in the main char g e. Id

. Qu o t i n g Kersey , the Court found this to be “an e rror of the first mag nitude” and r einforc ed that “strict adher ence to the dictate of Kersey is ex pecte d, and variations are not permitted.” Id

. For a cha rg e to be r ever sible err or, howe ver, the err oneous cha rg e must be found to have aff ecte d the re sults of the trial. Id . The Court in Ste e ly p h r a s e d t h e r e q u i r e m e n tt h u s l y:
An e rr or in the c ha

rg e of the ju dge to the jury

is n ot g ro un ds fo r r e ve rs a l un le ss i t aff irmatively

appea rs that th e error ha s aff

ecte d the re sults of the trial. T.C.A. § 27-117. Upon a

considere d revie w of the e ntire re cord of the ca u s e, we are of the op ini on that th e su pp le me nta l cha rg e wa s a mate ri a l fa c tor in pe rs ua din g the jury to return a verdict, and that the variation betwee n that char g e and the Kersey char g e wa s a material fac tor in its having that e ffe ct. I n particula r, the c harg e g iven informed the jury that, should they fail t o ag ree , a new trial would be ne cessa ry , and empha siz ed the waste of time, money , and ef fort that this would entail. I t contains lang uag e that coul d b e in te rp r e te d a s imp lyin g th a t th e ju r o r s h a d a “ d u ty ” to a g r e e
. F in a ll y , the entire c harg e wa s improperly emphasized by being g iven for the first time only afte r the jury had been de adlocke d for se vera l hours. We believe that thesedepartures from the Kersey standard, when taken collectively , worke d to the material prejudice of the pe titioner.
Id . at 854.-7-

This court wa s prese nted wit h a challeng e to a suppleme ntal instruction in Ba ss v . B ar k sd ale , 671 S.W .2d 476 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1984). I n Ba ss , the plaintiff broug ht a medical malpr actice action claiming that due to neg lige nt administration of ethambutol, an anti-tuberculosis drug , she lost her sight. Id . at 478. At the close of the proof and bef ore lunc h, the jury

was c harg ed.
L ater in the afternoon, the judg e ca lled the jury back. Id

. a t 48 3. Th e jud g e a sk e d a bo ut the ir prog ress a nd was informed by the fore man that one juror was pre venting a unanimous ver dict. Id

. The judge then g ave the jury a portion of the Kersey c ha rg e he ha d g ive n in the ma in c ha rg e bu t a lso went bey ond Kersey wh e n h e re min de d th e jury that if the ve rd ic t w a s n ot u na nim ou s th e n th e c a se must be retried and ref

err ed to a r etrial a s a wa ste of the taxpay ers’ money
. Id . at 484. The opinion did not note that any

objections wer e made to the supplemental cha rg e. The c ourt in Ba ss found that t he judge f ailed to admonish the jury not to divulge its division, and fa iled to give the supplemental c harg e laid out in Kersey

. Id . at 485-86.
Whil e the Trial J udg e commit ted “e rror of the fir st mag nitude,” Kersey , 525 S.W .2d at 144, t his alone is not sufficient to re verse . I t must affirmatively appea r that the err or in the jury

char g e has a ffe cted the results of t he trial. Tenn. R. App. P. 36(b); Va nd e rb ilt Un iv e rsi ty v . S te e ly , 566 S.W .2d at 854.
W e a re o f t h e o p i n i o n af

t era r ev i ew o f t h e r ec o rd t h at t h e f ai l u re o f t h e T ri al J u d ge to g ive the entire Kersey char g e in the main cha rg e and the n to emphasize that partial Kersey char g e by

g iving it as a

supplemental cha

rg e to what w as p er ceive d to be a “dea dlocked” jury

was a materia l fac tor, particula

rly when take n with the fac t that the Trial Judge informed the jury “all of the time w e’ve spent on the trial up until now has gone down the drain . . . we’d ha ve to try the ca se all over

ag ain. . . . sometimes it s ee m s like we’ re just wasting the taxpay ers’ money to come bac k in and spend another two wee ks on a ca se that we ’ve trie d,” that re sulted i n p re j u dice to the de fe nd a nts

. Nothing should be done or sa id to a juror which can in any manner be take n by

that juror to indicate that he or she should abandon a n honestly held conviction in orde r to rea ch a ve rdict so that time and money will be saved.
Id . at 486. The Supreme Court’s position i n Kersey and Ste e ly was reaf firmed in J

oh ns on v . H

ar din , 92 6 S. W.2 d 2 36 (T e nn . 199 6) , whe re in the Cou rt re ve rs e d a jur y ve rd ic t bas e d o n f a ilu re to c omp ly with Kersey

. Johnson , 926 S.W .2d at 242-43. In Johnson , the C ourt reiter ated that a mistrial from a hung jury

can be a saf

eg uard to liberty

. Id . at 242.-8-

I n many are as [a hung jury ] is the sole means by which one or a few may stand out ag ainst an over whelming contempora ry public sentiment. Nothing should interf ere with its ex erc ise.
Johnson , 9 2 6 S

. W

. 2 d at 2 4 3 (q u o t i n g Kersey , 525 S.W .2d at 143). The Court in Johnson cited Ba ss fa vo ra bly fo r the princ ipl e that r e fe re nc e to r e so ur c e s e xpe nd e d f or a tr ia l c a nn ot b e us e d to encour ag e unanimity

in a ver dict. Id

. III. A N A L Y SIS
Ba sed upon the pre cede nt set out a bove, we must c onclude that the supple mental instructions wer e er ror. The y clea rly differ ed fr om the instructions specified in Kersey and fa iled to follow the format spe cified in Kersey and Ste e ly

. I n a dd iti on , th e tr ia l c ou rt tw ic e ma de re fe re nc e to the tim e and expense incur

red f or the trial, a lthough our

courts have clea

rly found “appe al to the se irre levant considerations is error.” Johnson , 9 26 S.W. 2da t 24 2; Ste e ly , 566 S

. W .2d at 855. An additional damag ing a spect of the instruction w as the trial court’s ref ere nce to the require ment of a una nimous verdic t which could be pe rce ived as critica l of that require ment: “Unf ortunately , in T ennesse e, we do not have a majority verdic t.” A reasonable juror could have concluded that the trial judg e wa s intimating that a lone holdout juror should not pre vent a ve rdict.
Further, the c ourt direc tly

addre ssed the holdout juror, althoug h it did not identify him or her, a ndsp e c if

ic a lly ur g e d th a t he or

sh e a tte mpt

to c ome to the sa me posi ti on a s th e oth e rs a ndto reme mber that re trial was the c onsequenc e if he or she did not. This lang uag e could ha ve coe rce d the single juror into surr endering c onscientiously -held view s, thereby invading the province of the jury and diluting the r equire ment of unanimity

. State v. Torres , 8 2 S. W. 3 d 2 3 6 , 2 5 7 -58 (Te nn. 2 0 0 2 )

. H ark e n ing ba ck to K ersey , any

instruction that is “tantamount to a judicially mandated majority verdic t” i s not allowed under Tenne ssee law

. Kersey , 52 5 S. W.2 d at 14 5. Th e Sup re me Court ha s repe atedly

advised that “ strict adher ence to Kersey is ex pecte d and fa ilure to do so is an e rr or of the fi rs t ma g nitud e .” We v ie w the char ge g ive n h e re in a s ta ntamou nt t o a jud ic ia lly ma nd a te d ma

jority ve rd ic t.
Since we ha ve found that the s upplemental ins tructions g iven her ein violated the g uidelines set by the Supreme Court in Kersey and Ste e ly , w e mu st als o c on sid e r w he the r i t a ff ir ma tiv e ly appea rs that the er

ror in the jury

char g e has aff

ecte d the re sults of the trial. Tenn. R. App. P. 36(b); Ste e ly , 566 S.W. 2da t 85 4; Ba ss , 671 S.W .2d at 486. The que stion is whether the c harg e violating Kersey was a

materia l fac tor in persua ding the jury to r eturn a verdic t. Ste e ly , 566 S.W .2d at 855; State v. Bishop , No. 02C0 1 -9 5 0 8 -C C-00243, 1997 WL 122246 at *8 (Te nn. Crim. App. Mar. 19, 19 97 ). Th a t de te rm ina

tio n is fa c t- sp e c if

ic a ndmus t be ma de in v ie w o f the c on te xt an d “u nd e r a ll the circ umstances.” Torres , 8 2 S

. W

. 3 d at 2 5 8 ( q u o t i n g Lowenfield v. Phelps , 484 U.S. 231, 237 (1988))

.In B ass , th e tri al co urt pro vi d ed t he o p p o rt uni t y fo r quest i o ns o r ob ject i o ns af t er t he erroneo us charge, and 2

n o n e w e re m a d e
. B a ss , 67 1 S.W

. 2 d at 48 4

. A p p arent l y , t he ap p el l at e co urt i n B a ss di d not vi ew fai l ur e t o ob j ect as prev ent i ng r eve r s al becau s e of t he er r oneous ch ar ge. -9- Con sid e ri ng the po sit io n an d in fl ue nc e of a pr e sid ing tr ia l ju dg e , th e re is r e a so n to believe that his strong reque st to the jury was c alculate d to and did produce a ver dict fr om a jury wh ic h w a s d e a dlo c ke d. I t w a s th e re fo re pr e jud ic ia l a ndno t ha

rm le ss.
Bervoe ts v. Hardy Ralls Pontiac-Olds, Inc

. , No. 86-169-II , 1986 WL 13502 at *12 (Te nn. Ct. App. Dec . 3, 1986).
Ba sed upon the re cord be fore us, we be lieve the e rrone ous instruction was a mate rial fa ctor le a din g to a

ve rd ic t. T he jury

ha d d e lib e rate d f

or on e a ndon e -h a lf

da y s; o ne jur or

dis a g re e d w ith the others; shortly

afte r the trial court g ave the supplemental instruction, a una nimous verdict was rea ched. B ased on the lang uag e of a nd circ umstances surr ounding the char g e, it a ppear s to us that the c ha rg e a ff e c te d th e re su lt.
We n ote that th e c ou rt a sk e d for ob je c tio ns to this c ha

rg e a ndno ne we re ma de

. Th e re qu e st 2 for objec tions, however, w as made af t er t he cha

rg e wa s g iven and a fter the jury had re sumed deliberations. I n this specific fa ctual cir cumstance we do not fi n d a wa i v er. First, any objection would have be en pointless since it would be nearly impossibl e to “unring the bell” a fter the court ha d provided its thoughts on the una nimous verdict re quirement. Sec ond, th e j u ry had alr eady beg un de lib e ratio ns bas ed on the e rr on e ou s c ha rg e be fo re the c ou rt

a sk e d if the re we re ob

je c tio ns
. Ad dit ion a lly , whe re fu nd a me nta l con c e pts un de rl y ing tr ia l by jury are a t st ake , a ny wa ive r s ho uld appea r spec ifically

and def initivelyin the rec ord. Judg me nt o f the tr ia l c ou rt is re ve rs e d, a nd the c a se is re ma nd e d for a ne w t ri a l. C os ts o f this app e a l are a sse sse d again st th e ap pe lla nt, Wes le y Cok e r, M. D. , f

or wh ic h e xec uti on ma y

iss ue if n e c e s s ar y.

____________________________________ PATRI CI A J . COTTRELL , J UDGE