1 (Slip Opini o n) OCTOBER T ERM , 20 06 Sy llabu s N O TE : Wh er e it i s feas ibl e , a s y llab u s (h ead n ot e) wil lbe rel e as ed , as is bein g d o n e incon n ecti onwithth is cas e , a tth e ti meth e op in i o n is is s u ed

. Th e s y ll abu s con s titu tes n o p a r t of th e op in i o nof th eC o u r t bu t h a s be en pre p are dbyt h e Re po rte ro f De ci sio n s fo r t h e co nveni e nce of t h e reade r . Se e United Statesv. Detro it Timbe r& Lumb er Co., 200U. S

. 3 21, 337

. 

# SUPREME CO URT O FTHE UNI TED STATES
Sy llabu s 

### LOP E Z v . GO N Z AL ES , AT TO R N EY G E NE RAL CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT No. 05–5 47. Ar g u ed Oc tober3, 2006—D e c i ded D e c e mb er5, 2006 Th e Immig r at ionan d Natio n alityAc t (I NA) lis ts a s an“ag g r av ated

felony” “illicittrafficking in a co ntrolled subst a nce . . . including a dr u gtr affic k i n gcr ime (as defin e d insection924(c ) of title 1 8),” 8 U. S. C. §1101 (a)(43)(B), bu tdoes n o t defi n e“illic it tr aff i c k in g . ” Title 18 U. S. C. §924(c )(2) defin e s “dr u gtr affic k in gcr ime” to in c l u d e “an y felony punishable under the Controlle d Su bst a n c e s Ac t” (CSA). Peti

tion erLopez, a leg a l per m an en t r e sid e nt alien, ple a ded guilty to S o ut h Da kot acha rges of a i ding a n d ab e tt ing a n ot her pers on’s pos sess ionof c o cain e, w h i chstate lawtr eate d as th e equ iv a len tof pos

sessing the drug, a state felo n y. Th e Immi g r ationan d N atu r a liza t io n S e rvice (INS ) b e ga n remova l proceedings on t h e ground , inter alia , th at Lopez’s s tate c o n v ic tionw a s for an ag g r av ated felon y . Th e Im

mig r ationJu dg e u l timatelyr u l ed th at despite th e CSA’s tr eatmen t o f Lopez’s c r i me as a misdem ean o r , se e 21 U. S. C. §844(a), it w a s an ag g r av ated felon yu n d erth e INA ow in gto its bein ga f e lon yu n d er state law. T h e judge orde red Lopez removed in light of 8 U. S. C. §122 9b(a)( 3 ), w h i c hpr ov ides th a tth e Atto r n e yG e n e r a l’s disc r e tionto c a n c e l th e r e mov a l of a per s onoth e r w i se depor table doe s n o t r e ac h a c o n v ic t of anag g r av ated felon y . Th e Boar d of Immig r a t ionAppea l s (BIA) a ffirmed, a n d t h e Eigh t hCircuita ffir m ed t h e BIA. Held: Con d u c tmade a felon yu n d erstate la wbu t a mi sde m ean o ru n d er

th e CSA is n o t a “felon ypun i sh able u n d erth e Con t r o ll ed Su bstan c e s Act” for INA purposes. A state offense comes within the quoted phra s e only if itpros crib e s c o nductpunis h ab l e a s afelony under t h e CS A. The Governmenta r gu es t h a tposses s i on’s felonious cha ra ct er as a state crime is enough to turn it into an aggravated felony under th e INA bec a u s e th e CSA pu n i sh es poss ession , al beit as a mis d e mean or , w h ile §924(c )(2) r e qu ir es on ly th at th e offen s e be pu n i sh able,2 LOPEZ v. GONZALES Sy llabu s
n o t th atitbe pu n i sh able as a feder alfelon y , so th atapr i o rc o n v ic tion in st ate court will s ati sfy th e felony eleme n t because the St ate treat s pos s e ss ion t h atwa y. This a r gumentis incoherentwit ha n y common sense conception of “illicit traffickin g,” the term ultimat e ly being de

fin e d. Bec a u s e th e s tatu te s inplay do n o t defin e “ t r a f f ic kin g ,” th e Cou r tlooks to th e ter m ’s ev er y d aymean in g , FDIC v. Meye r , 510 U. S. 471, 47 6, w h i chor din a r ily con n o tes some sor tof c o mmer c i al dealin g . Commerce, however, was no part of Lope z ’ s South Dako ta offense of helping someone else to possess, and certainly it is no element of simple pos s es sion , w i thw h i c hth e State e q u ates th atc r i me. Nori s t h e a n oma l y of t h e Govern ment ’s rea d in g limit ed t o Sout h Da kot a c a ses: w h ile feder al lawty pic a llytr eats tr affic k in goffen s es as felo

nies and nont rafficking offe nses as misde m eanors, several States de

v i ate sig n ific a n tlyfr om th is patter n . Readin g§924(c ) th e G o v e rn ment ’s wa y, t h en, would oft en t urn s i mple pos s e ss ion into t r a fficking, j u s twha tt h e Englis h la ngua ge couns els nott oexpect , a n d t h a tre s u ltma kes t h e Courtvery wa ry of t h e G o vernment ’ s p o s i t i on. Al

though the Government might still be right, there woul d have to be some in dic a t i o nth at Con g r e ss me an t to d e fin e anag g r av ated felon y of illicit traff i cking in anunorthodox an d unexpected way. There are good rea s ons to t h ink itw a s doing no s uch t h ing here. Firs t , a nof

fense that necessarily count s as “i llicit tra fficking” under the INA is a “dr u gtr affic k in gc r i me” u n d er§924(c ) , i.e., a “felon ypu n i sh able u n derth e Con t rolled Su bs tan c e s Ac t,” §924 (c )(2). To det e r m in e w h at felonies might qualify, the Court nat urally looks to the d efinitions of crimes punis h ab l e as felonies under t h e CS A. If Congre s s ha d mea n t t h e Courtt o look t o s t at e law, itwould have found amu ch les s mis

leadin gw a yto make its po in t. Th e G o ver n m en t’s ar gu men tto th e cont ra ry cont r avenes norma lwa ys of s p ea king a n d wr it ing, whic h demon s tr ate t h at “felon ypun i sh able u n d erth e . . . Ac t”mean s “fel

ony punis h ab l e a s s uch und er t h e Act” or “felony a s defined b yt h e Act,” and doe s not refer to state fe lonie s , so long as they would be punis h ab l e a t a ll under t h e CS A. The Go vernment ’ s a r gumentis not su ppor t ed by th e INA’s st at emen t th a tth e ter m “ag g r av ated felon y” “applies to anoffense described in this paragraph whether in viola

tionof Feder a l orState law

. ” 8 U. S. C. §110 1(a)(4 3). Rath erth an w r e nc h i ngth e ex pec tation s r a ised byn o rmal En g lishu s ag e, th is pr o vis i on ha s t w o perfect l y s t ra ight forwa rd j o b s t o do. Firs t , itprovides that a generic description of “an offense .

. . i nthis paragraph,” one nots p ecifica l ly cou ched a s as t at e offens e or afedera lone, co vers ei

ther one, and, second, it conf irms that a state offense whose elements include the elements of a fe lony p u n i sh able u n d erth e CSA is anag g r av ated felony

. Th u s , if Lopez’s state c r i me ac tu a lly fe ll w i th inth e general term “illici ttraffick ing,” the stat e felony conviction would3 Cite as: 54 9 U

. S. ____ (2006) Sy llabu s
c o u n tas an“ a g g r av ated felon y , ” r e g a r d les s of th e ex is te n c eof a fed

eral felony co unterpart; and a stateoffe nse of posse ssing more than five grams of cocaine base is an aggr avated felony because it is a fe l

on yun derth e CSA, 21 U. S. C. §844( a). Noth in ginthe pr ov isionin qu estionsu g g e sts th a tCon g r e ss c h a nged th e meaning of “felony pun

ish able u n d erth e [CSA]” w h e nit took that ph r a se fr om Title 1 8of th e U. S. Code an d in c o r p orated i tin to Ti tle 8’s defin i ti onof “ag g r a v ated felon y . ” Y e t th e G o v e r n m en t admit s th at it h a s n e v e rbegu na pr osec u t ionun der18 U. S. C. §924(c )(1 )(A) w h e r e the u n d er ly ing “dr u gtr affic k in gc r i me” w a s a s tate fe lon ybu t a fe der a l mi sde

meanor. This telling failure in the very context in which the phrase “felony punishable under the [CSA]” appe ar s inth e Co de belie s th e G o v e rn men t ’s c l aim th at it s in ter p r e tatio nis th e mor en atu r a l on e. Fina lly, t h e Government ’ s r e a d ing would render t h e la w of a lien re

mov a l, see 8 U. S. C. §1229 b(a)(3), an d th e lawof sen t en c i n gforille

ga l ent r y int o t h e count r y , s e e Unit ed S t a t es S e nt encing Commis s i on , G u i delin es M a n u a l §2L1.2, depen d en t on var y in g state c r i min a l c l as s i fica t i on s even when Congr e s s has a p pa rent ly pegged t h e immigra

tionsta t u t es to th e c l assifi c ation s Con g ress it self c h o se. Con gr e ss would nothave incorpora t e d it s o wn s t a t u tory s cheme of felonies a n d mis d emea nors if it mea n t court s t oignore itwhenever aS t at e chos e to pu n i sha g iv e nac t mor e heav ily

. Pp. 4– 12. 417 F. 3d 93 4, r e v e r s ed an d reman d ed.

S OUTER , J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in whi ch R OBERTS , C. J., and S TEVENS , S CALIA , K ENNEDY , G IN SB U R G , B REYER , and ALITO , JJ., joined. T HOMAS , J., filed a dissenting opinion._________________

_________________ 1 Cite as: 54 9 U

. S. ____ (2006) Opinion of t h eCourt
NOTICE: This op i n ion is subjec t to f o rmal revi si on bef o r e publicat ion in the p r eli m in ary p rin t of th e U n it edS t at es R e p o rts
. R e ad ers ar e r e qu es ted to n o tif yth e R e p o rt e rof D e c i s i on s , Su p r em e C o u rt of th e U n ited St at es , Wa s h

ington, D. C. 2054 3, of any typ o gra p hical or other f o rmal err o rs , in or der th atc o rr ect i on sm a y b e mad eb e f o r e th ep r e lim in aryp rin t go es t o p r es s . 

# SUPREME CO URT O FTHE UNI TED STATES
No. 05–5 47 

### JO S E A N TO N I O LO PE Z, P E T I T I O N ER v. AL BER TO R. GONZAL ES, AT T O RNEY GE N ERAL ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEAL S FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT [D ec ember5, 200 6] 

### J USTICE 

### S OUTER

### delivered the opinion of the C o urt. The question raised is whether conduct ma de a felony under state law but a misdemean o r under the Controlled Substances Act is a “felony punishable under the Con

trolled Substances Act.” 18 U. S. C. §924(c)(2). We hold i t is not. I A The Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) defines the term “aggravated felony” by a list that mentions “illic it trafficking in a control l ed substance .

. . including a drug trafficking crime (as defined in section 924(c) of title 18). ” §101(a)(43)(B), as added by §7342, 102 Stat. 4469, and as amended by §222(a), 108 Stat. 4320, 8 U. S. C. §1101(a)(43)(B). The general phrase “illicit trafficking” is left undefi n ed, but §924(c)(2) of Title 18i d entifies t h e subcategory by defining “dru g tra fficking cri m e” as “any felony punishable und er the Co ntrolled Substances Act” or under either of two other federal s t atutes having no bear

ing on this case. Following the l i sting, §101(a)43 of the INA pro vid es in its penultimate sentence that “[t]he ter m2 LOPEZ v. GONZALES Opinion of t h eCourt 

### [aggra v ated felony] applies to an of fense described in this paragra p h whether in violation of Federal or State law” o r , in certain circumstanc es, “the law of a foreign country.” 8 U. S. C. §1101(a)(43). An aggra v a t ed felony on a criminal record has worse collateral effects than a felony co nviction simple. Und e r the immigr ation statut es, for example, the Attorney Ge n eral’ s discretion to cancel the removal of a person other

wise deportable does n o t reach a convict of an aggra v ated felony. §1229b(a)(3). Nor is an a ggra v ated felon el igibl e for asylum. §§1158(b)(2)(A)(ii), 1158(b)(2)(B)(i). And under the sentencing law, the Federal Guid elines attach special sign ificance to t h e “aggr ava t ed felony” designation: a conviction of unlawfully entering or remaining in the United Sta t es receives an eight-level increas e for a prior aggra v ated felony conviction, buto n ly four levels for “any other felon y .” United Stat es Sentencing Commissio n , Guidelines Manual§2L1.2 ( N ov. 2005) (hereinaf te r USSG); id. , comment., n. 3 (adopting INA definition of aggra v ated felony). B Although p e titioner Jose Antonio Lopez entered the United States il legally in 1986, in 1990 he bec a me a l e gal permanent resident. In 1997, he was arrested on state charges in South Dakota, pleaded guilty to aiding a n d abetting another person’s possession of cocaine, and was sentenced to five years’ imprisonment. See S. D. Codified Laws §22–42–5 (1988); §22–6–1 (Supp. 19 97); §22–3 –3 (1988). He was released for good conduct afte r 15 months. After his release, the Immigration and Naturalization Service (IN S ) 1 

### began removal proceedings against Lopez,

——————

1 The INS ’ s immigra t i on-enforcementfun c t ions a r e now ha ndled b y t h e Burea uof Immigra t i on a n d Cus t oms Enforcementin t h e Depa rt

mentof Homela nd S e curit y . S ee Clarkv. Martin ez , 543 U. S. 371, 3 74, n . 1 (2005).3 Cite as: 54 9 U

. S. ____ (2006) Opinion of t h eCourt 

### on two grou nds: that his state conviction was a controlled substance violation, s ee 8 U. S. C. §1227(a)(2)(B)(i), an d was also for an aggra v ated felony, see §122 7(a)(2)(A)(iii). Lopez conceded the controlled s ubstance violationbu t contested the aggra v ated felony determination, which would disqualify him from discretionary ca ncellation of removal. See §1229b (a)(3). At first, the Immigration Judge agreed with Lopez that his state offense was not a n aggra v ated felony b e cause th e conduct it pr oscribed was no felony under the Controlled Substances Act (CSA). But after the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) switched its position onthe issue, the same j u dge ruled that Lopez’s drug crime was an aggravated fe lony after all, owing to its being a fel o ny under state law. See Matte r ofYanezGar c ia , 23 I. & N. Dec. 390 (2002) (announcing that BI A decisions would conform to the a pplicable C i rcuit law); United Statesv. Briones-Mata , 116 F. 3d 308 (CA8 1997 ) (per cu riam )(holding state felony possessi on offenses ar e aggra v ated feloni es). T hat left Lopez inel igibl e for cancel

lation of re moval, and the judge ordered him removed. The BIA affirmed, and the Court of Appeals affirmed the BIA, 417 F. 3d 934 (CA8 2005). 2 

### We grantedcertiorari t o resolve a conflict in the Circuits about the proper understanding of conduct treated as a felony by t h e State that convicted a defenda n t of commit

ting it, but as a misdemeanor un der the CSA. 3

### 547 U. S.

——————

2 Alt h ough t h eGover n mentha s deport ed Lopez, we a g r e e wit ht h e pa rt ies t h a tthe ca s e is not moot
. Lopez ca n b e nefitfrom relief in t h is Courtb ypurs uing his a pplica t i on for ca ncella tion of remova l, which t h e Immig r ation Ju dg e r efu sed to c o n s idera f terdeter m in i n gth at Lopez h a d c o mmitte d anag g r av at ed felon y .

3 Compare United State sv. Wilson , 316 F. 3d 50 6 (CA 4 2 003) ( s t ate

law felony is an aggravated felony); United Statesv. Si mon , 168 F. 3 d 127 1 (CA1 1 1 999) (s ame); United Statesv. Hinojosa- Lopez , 13 0 F. 3d 691 (CA 5 19 9 7 ) (same); United S t atesv. Briones- Mata , 116 F. 3d 30 8 (CA8 1 997) (pe rcuriam) (same); United Statesv. Cabr era-Sos a , 81 F. 3d 998 ( CA1 0 1 9 96) (s ame); United S t atesv. Rest repo-A g u ilar , 74 F. 3d4 LOPEZ v. GONZALES Opinion of t h eCourt 

### ___ (2006). We now reverse. II The INA m a kes Lopez guilty of a naggra v at ed felony if he has been convicted of “illicit trafficking i na controlled substance .

. . including,” but not limited to, “adru gtraf

ficking cri me (as defined in section 924(c) of title 18).” 8 U. S. C. §1101(a)(43)(B). Lopez’s s t ate conviction was fo r helping someone els epossess cocaine in South Dak o ta, which state law treated as the equ ivalent of possessing th e drug, S. D. Codified Laws §22–3–3, a state felony, §22–42– 5. Mere possessi on is not, however, a felony under th e federal CSA, see 21 U. S. C. §844(a), although possessi ng more than what one person would have for himself wil l support con viction for the federa l f e lony of pos s essionwith intent to distribute, see §841 (2 000 ed. and Supp. III); United S t a t esv. Kates , 174 F. 3d 580, 582 (CA5 1999) (per curiam) (“I n tent to distribute may be inferred from t h e possessi on of a quantity of drug s too large to be used by the defendant alone”). Despite this federal misdemeanortreatment, the Gov

ernment argues that possessi on’s feloni ous character as a state crime can turn it into an aggra v ated felony under the INA. There, it says, illicit tra fficking incl udes a dru g traffic k ing crime as defined in federal Title 18. Title 18 defines “drug traffic k ing crime” as “any felon ypunishable

—————— 361 (CA1 1996) (same), with Gonzales-Go mez v. Achim , 44 1 F. 3d 53 2 (CA7 200 6) (s t ate-lawfelon y is n o t anag g r av ated felon y); United Stat es v. Palacios-S uarez , 418 F. 3d692 ( CA6 20 0 5 ) (sa m e); Ger b i erv. Holmes , 2 8 0 F. 3 d29 7 (CA3 20 02 ) (s a m e). Two Circuit s have cons t rued t h e a ggrav a t e d felony definit i on onewa y i nt h e s e nt enci ng cont exta n d an oth e rinthe immig r ationc o n t ex t. Compar e United S t atesv. Ibarra

Galindo , 206 F. 3d 1 337 ( CA9 20 00) ( i nsen t en c i n g c a se, st ate-l a w felony is an aggravated felony); Un i t edS t a t e sv. Por nes- Garcia , 1 7 1 F. 3d 142 (CA 2 199 9) (same ) , w i th Caza rez - Gutier rez v. Ashcroft , 382 F. 3d 905 (CA 9 200 4) (inimmig r ationc a se, sta t e-law felon y is n o t an ag g r av ated felon y) ; Ag uir r ev. INS , 79 F. 3 d315 (CA 2 19 96) (sa m e).5 Cite as: 54 9 U

. S. ____ (2006) Opinion of t h eCourt 

### under the Controlled Substances Act (21 U. S. C. 801 et seq.),” §924 (c)(2), and the CSA punishes poss ession, albeit as a misdemeanor, see §405(a), 1 02 Stat. 43 84, as renu m bered and amended by §1002(g), 104 Stat. 4828, 21 U. S. C. §8 44(a). That is enough, says the Government, because §9 24(c)(2) requires only t h at the offense be pun

ishable, n o t that it b e punishab le as a federal felon y . Hence, a p r ior convict i on in state court wil lsatisfy th e felony elem ent because the State treats possession tha t way. There are a few things wrong with this argument, the first being its incoherence wi th any commonsense concep

tion of “illicit traffic k ing,” the term ultimately being de

fined. The everyday underst anding of “t raffi cking” should count for a lot here, forthe stat utes in play do not define the term, and so remit us to regular usage to see what Congress probably meant. FDIC v. Meyer , 5 10 U. S. 47 1, 476 (1994). And ordin a rily “traffi cking” means some sort of commercial dealing. See Black’s Law Dictionary 1534 (8th ed. 2004) (defining to “traffic” as to “trade or deal in (goods, esp. illicit drugs or other contraband)”); see also Urena-R a m i rezv. Ash croft , 341 F. 3d 51, 5 7 (CA1 2003) (similar def i nition); Statev. Ezell , 321 S. C. 421, 425, 46 8 S. E. 2d 679, 681 (App. 1996) (same). Commerce, however, was no part of Lopez’s South Da kota offense of helping someoneel se to poss e ss, and certainly it is no el ementof simple possession, with which t h e State e q uates that crime. Nor is the anomaly of the Government’s readin g limited to S o uth Da kot acases: wh ile federal law t y picall y treats trafficking offe nses as felonies and nontrafficki n g offenses as misdemea nors, several States deviate signifi

cantly from this pattern

. 4

——————

4 Sev e r a l State s pu n i shpossessionas a fel on y . See, e. g. , S. D

. Codi

fied Law s §§2 2–4 2– 5 (200 4), 22–6–1 (2 005 Su pp.); Tex . Health& Safety Code An n . §4 81.11 5 (We s t 200 3); Tex . Pen al Code An n . §§12.3 2–1 2.3 56 LOPEZ v. GONZALES Opinion of t h eCourt 

### Reading §924(c) the Government’s wa y, th en, would often turn s i mple possession into trafficking, j u st wha tth e English language tells us not to expect, and that result makes us very war y of the Gov e rnment’s position. Cf. Leocalv. A s hcroft , 543 U. S. 1, 1 1 (2004) (“[W]e cannot forget that we ultimately are determining the meaning of the term ‘c rime of violence’ ”). Which is not to deny tha t the Government might still be right; Hum p ty Dum p ty used a word to mean “ ‘ j ust what [he chose] it to mean— neither more nor less,’ ” 5

### and legisl atures, too, are free to be unorthodox. Congress can defi ne an aggravated felony of illicit trafficking in an unexpected way. B u t Congres s would needto tellus so, and there are goodreasons to think it was doing no such thing here. 6 

### First, an offense that necessarily counts as “i llicit traf

ficking” un der the INA is a “drug traffic k ing crime” under

—————— (West 20 03); s ee also n

. 10, infra

. Incont ra s t , wit hafew ex cept ions , the CSA punishes drug possession offenses as misde m eanors (that is, byon e y e ar’s impr ison men torless, c f

. 18 U. S. C. §3559( a)), see 21 U. S. C. §844( a) (pr o v i din gfor“a ter mof impr ison men tof n o t mor e than 1 year” f o r possession offenses ex cept for repeat off e nders, persons who pos s e s s more t h a nfive gra m s of coca ine b a s e, and pers ons who possess flunitrazepam), an d traffick ing offenses as fe lonies, see §841 (2000 ed. and Supp. III).

5 L. Ca rroll, Alice in Wonderl a nd a n d Thro ugh t h eLooking Gla s s 1 9 8 (M essn er1982 ).

6 Of cou r s e , wemus t a c knowledge t h a t Congres s did count erint u i

tively define some possession offenses as “illicit tra fficking.” T h ose state po ssessio n crimes that correspond to felony violatio n s of one of the three statutes enumerated in §924(c)(2 ), such as possession of cocaine base an d r e c i div i st posse ss ion , see 2 1 U. S. C. §844( a), c l ear l yfal l within the definitions usedby Congr e ss in8 U. S. C. §110 1(a)(4 3)(B ) an d 18 U. S. C. §924(c )(2), r e g a r d less of w h e th erth ese feder al posse s sionfelon ies orth eirstate c o u n t er par t s c o n s titu te “i llic ittr affic k in gin a c o n t r o lled su bstan c e ” or“dr u gtr affic k i n g” as th ose ter m s ar e u s ed in ordinary speech. But this co erced inclusion of a few possession offenses in the definit i on of “illicit traffick ing” does not call f o r reading the sta t u t e to c o v e roth e r s for wh ic hth er e is no c l earstatu to r y c o mman dt o override o r din a ry mea n ing.7 Cite as: 54 9 U

. S. ____ (2006) Opinion of t h eCourt 

### §924(c), that is, a“felony punis hable under the [CSA],” §924(c)(2). And if we want to kn ow what felonies might qualify, the place to go is to the d e finitions of crimes pun

ishable as feloni es under the Act; where else would one naturally look? Al though the Go vernment would have us look to state law, we suspect thatif Congress had meant us to do th at it would have found a much less misleading way to make its point. Indeed, other parts of §924 ex

pressly refer to guilt under sta t e law, see §§924(g)(3), (k)(2), andthe implication co nfirms that the reference solely to a “felony punishable under th e [CSA]” in §924(c)(2) is to a crime punishabl e as a felony under the federal Act. See Russello v. UnitedStates , 464 U. S. 16, 2 3 (1983) (“[W]here Congress includes particular language i n one sectionof a statute but omits it in an other section o f the same Act, it is gen e rally presumed that Congress acts intentionall yand purposely inthe disparate inclusionor exclusion” (alteration i noriginal; i n ternal quotation marks omitted)). Unless a state offense i s punishabl e as a feder a l felony it does not count. The Government stresses that the text does not read “punishable as a fel o ny,” and that by saying simply “pun

ishable” Congress left the d oor open to counting state feloni es, so long as they would be punishable at all unde r the CSA. B u t we do not normally speak or w r i te the Gov

ernment’ s way. We do not use a phrase like “felony pun

ishable und er the [CSA]” when we mean to signal or allow a break between the noun “felony” an d the contiguous modifier “punishable u n der the [CSA],” let al one a brea k that wouldlet us read the phrase as if it said “felony punishable under the CSA whethe r or not as a felony.” Regular usage points in the otherdirection, and when we read “felony punishab le under t h e . . . Act, ” we instin c tively understand “felony punishable as such under the8 LOPEZ v. GONZALES Opinion of t h eCourt 

### Act” or “fel ony as defined by the Act. ” 7 

### Without some further explanation, using the phrase to cover even a misdemean o r punishab le under th e Act would be so muc h tricke r y, violating “th e cardinal rule that s t atutorylan

guage must be read in context.” G e neral Dynamics Land System s, In c. v. Cline , 540 U. S. 5 81, 596 (20 04) (internal quotation marks and brackets o m itted). That is why our interpretive regime reads wholesections of a statu t e together to fix on the meaning of any one of t h em, and t h e last thing this approach would do is divorce a noun fro m the modifier next to it with out some extraordinary reason. The Government thinks it has a good enoughreason for doing just that, in the INA provision already mentioned, that the te rm “a ggra v ated felony” “ap p lies to an offense described in this para graph whet her in violation of Fed

eral or State law.” 8 U. S. C. §1101(a)(43). But before this provision is given the Government’s expansive treatment, it makes s e nse to ask whether itwould hav e some us e short of w r enching t h e expecta tions raised bynorm al English usage, and in fact it has two perfectl y straightfo r ward jobs to do: it provides that a generic description of “an offense .

. . in thi s paragraph,” one not specifically couched as a state offe nse or afe deral one, covers eithe r one, and it confirms that a state offense whose el emen ts include the elements of a felony pu nishable un der the CSA is an aggravated felony. T hus, if Lopez’s state crime actually fell within the general t e rm “illicit trafficking,”

——————

7 Withr e spec t to th is la st po ssi bili ty , forpu r p oses of §924(c )(2) th e crimes the CSA defines as “felonie s” are those crimes to which i t assigns a punishment exceeding on e year’s impriso n ment. As the Gover n mentwis e ly concede s , s e e Brief for Res p ondent25 , a l t h ough for its own purpo s es the CSA d efines the term “felony” standing alone a s “any Federal or State offen se clas sified b yapplicable F e deral or Sta t e lawa s afelon y , ” 21 U. S. C

. §802( 13), th at defin i tion does n o t appl y here: §924(c)(2) refers to a f e lony “punishable under th e [CSA],” not to conductpunis h ab l e under s o me ot her la w b u tdefined a s afelonyb yt h e CSA.9 Cite as: 54 9 U

. S. ____ (2006) Opinion of t h eCourt 

### the state felony conviction would count as an “aggravated felony,” regardless of the existence of a fe deral felon y counterpart; and a sta t e offense of possess in g more than five grams of cocaine base is an aggrava t ed felony because it is a felon yunder the CSA, 21 U. S. C. §844(a). 8 

### The Govern ment’s reliance on the penultimate sentence of 8 U. S. C. §1101(a)(4 3) is mispla ced for a s e cond reason

. The Govern ment tries to justify its unusual reading of a defined term in the criminal co de on the bas is of a s i ngle sentence in the INA. But nothing in the penultimate sentence of §1101(a)(4 3) suggests that Congress changed the meanin gof “felony punishable under the [CSA]” whe n it took thatphrase from Titl e 18 and incorporated it into Title 8’s de finition of “aggra v atedfelony.” Y e t the Go v ernment admits it has never begun a prosecution under 18 U. S. C. §924(c)(1)(A) where the underlying “drug traffi ck

ing crime” was a state felony but a federal misdemeanor

. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 3 3–36. This is telling: the failure of even a single eager Assistant United States Attorney to act on the Government’s interp retation of “f elony punish

able under the [CS A]” in the verycontext inwhich tha t phrase appears in the United States Code belies the Gov

ernment’s c l aim that its interpreta tion is the more natural one. 9

——————

8 Alth ou ghth e par t ies ag r ee th at Con g r e ss added th e pr ov isionth at both state and federal offen ses qualif y as aggravated felonies to codify the BIA’s deci sion in Matter of Barrett , 20 I. & N. D e c . 171 ( 1 9 90), se e also H. R. Rep

. No. 10 1– 681, pt. 1, p. 1 4 7 ( 199 0) (n otin g th at th e pr ov i

sion reflects congre ssional approval of Barret t), ou r e n q u iry req u ir es looking b e yon dCongres s ’ s evidenta ccept a nce of Barre tt
. In Barrett , th e BIA h e ld on lyth at th e ph r a se “ ‘drugt r a fficking cr ime’ ” includes state “crimes analogous to offenses under the Controlled Substances Ac t,” Barrett , supra , at 177, 178, w i th ou t spec ify i n g wh eth e ra state c r i me mu st be “an alog ou s” t o a CS A felon y , as opposed to a C S A m i s demeanor, to c o unt.

9 Cont ra ry t o t h e Gover n ment ’s res p ons e a tora l a r gument , s uch a pros ecut ion s h ould b e poss ib le under t h e Gover n ment ’s proffered10 LOPEZ v. GONZALES Opinion of t h eCourt 

### Finally, the Government’s readingwould render the law of ali e n removal, see 8 U. S. C. §1229b(a)(3), and the l a w of sentencing for illegal entry into the country, see USSG §2L1.2, dep e ndent on v a rying state criminal classifications even when Congress has apparently pegged the immigra

tion statutes to the classifications Congress itself chose. It may not be all that remarkable that federal consequenc es of state cri mes will vary accordin g to sta t e s e verity clas si

fication wh en Congres s describes an aggrava t ed felony i n generic ter m s, without express r e ference to the definition of a crime in a federa l statute (as in the ca se of “il licit trafficking in a controlled substance”). But it would have been passi ng strange for Congress to intend any su ch result when a state criminal clas sification is at odds with a federal provision that the INA expressly provides as a specific example of an “aggravated felon y” (lik e the §924(c)(2) definition of “drug trafficking crime”). We cannot imagine that Congress t ook the trouble to incorpo

rate its own statutory scheme of feloni es and misdemean

ors if it meant courts to igno re it whenever a State chose to punish a given act m o re heavily. Two examples show the untoward consequen c es of the Government’s approach. Consid er simple possessi on of marijuana. Not only is it a mi sdemeanor un der the CSA, see 21 U. S. C. §844(a), but the INA expressly excludes “a single offen s e involving possessio nfor one’ s own use of 30 grams or less” from the controlled substance violations

—————— in ter p r e tationbec a u s e th is su bse tof “dr u gtr affic k in g c r i me[s]” sti l l “maybe pr os ec u t ed ina c o u r tof th e Un ited St ate s , ” 18 U. S. C. §924(c )(1)(A), albei ta tth e misde m ean o rlev e l. Forth e same r e aso n , t h e dis s e nt ’s a r gumentt h a tour rea d ing rende r s s u perfluous t h e r e qu ir emen t in§924(c )(1)(A) th at th e c r i me “m aybe p r osec u t ed in a court of the United States” misse s the mark. Post , at 3 (opinion of T HOMAS , J

. ). Tha tphra s e would b e no less s u perfluous under t h e dis s e nt ’s preferred rea d ing , which would s t ill req u ire t h a tt h e offense be “c apab le of pu n i sh men t u n d erth e Contr o lled Su bs ta n c e s Ac t,” post , at 1, and therefore subj ect to prosecution in federal court.11 Cite as: 54 9 U

. S. ____ (2006) Opinion of t h eCourt 

### that are grounds for deportation, 8 U. S. C. §1227(a) (2)(B)(i). Y e t by the Government’s lights, if a State ma kes it a felony to possess a gram of marijuana the congres

sional judgment is su pplanted, and a state convict is subject to mandatory deportation because the alien i s ineligibl e for cancellation of removal. See §1229b(a)(3). 10 

### There is n ohint inthe stat ute’s text that Congress was courting an y such state

- by-state di sparity. The situation in reverse flouts probability just as much. Possessing more than five grams of cocaine b a se is afel

ony under federal law. See 21 U. S. C. §844(a). If a State drew the misdemean o r-felony li ne at six grams plus, a person convicted in s t ate court of possessing six g r a m s would not be guilty of an aggravated felonyon the Gov

ernment’s r e ading, whi c h makes t h e law of t h e convicti ng jurisdiction dispositive. See Brief for Respondent 48. Again, it is just not plausible t hat Congre ss meant to authorize a State to ov errule its judgment a b out the con

sequences of federal off e nses to which its immigration la w expressly refers. True, the argument is not all one-sided. The Govern

ment points out that some States graduate offenses o f drug possession from misdemeanorto felony d e pending on quantity, whereas Congress generally tre ats possession alone as a misdemean o r whateve rthe amount (but leaves it open to charge the felony of possession with intent to distribute when the amount is large). Thus, an al ien

——————

10 Indeed, several States treat posses siono f less th an3 0 g r ams of mar i ju an a a s a felon y . See Fla. Sta t . §§8 93.13( 6)(a)–(b ) , 775.08 2(3)(d) (200 6) (pu n i sh in gpossess ionof ov er20 g r ams of m a r i ju a n a as a felon y); Nev

. Rev

. Sta t . §§45 3 .336( 1 ) –(2) (2 00 4), §§453.3 36( 4), 1 93.13 0 (2 00 3) (punis h ing pos s e ss ion of more t h a none ounce , or 2 8

. 3 gra m s , of ma r i

ju an a as a felon y) ; N. D. Cent. CodeAn n . §§19– 03.1 –23( 6 ) (Lex is Su pp. 200 5), 1 2 .1– 3 2–0 1(4) (Lex i s 19 97) ( s a m e); O r e . Rev

. St at. §1 61.6 05(3 ) (200 3), Ac t Relatin gto Con t r o lled Su bst a n c e s, §33, 200 5 O r e . Law s p. 200 6 (sa m e).12 LOPEZ v. GONZALES Opinion of t h eCourt 

### convicted b ya Sta t e of possessing l a rge quanti t ies of drugs would escape the aggravated felony designation simply for want of a federal felon ydefined as possessin ga substan

tial amount. This is so , but we do not weigh i tas heavily as the anomalies just mentioned on the other side. After all, Congress knows tha tany resort to state law will impli

cate some disuniformity instate misdemeanor-felony classifications, but that is no reason to think Congress meant to allow the Sta t es to supplant its own classifica

tions when it specifically constru cted its immigration law to turn on them. In sum, we hold that a state offens e constitutes a “felony punishable under the Controlled Substances Act” only if it proscribes conduct pu nishable a s a felony under th at federal law. The jud g ment of t h e Court o f Appeals is reversed, a n d the case is remanded for fu rthe rproceedin gs consistent with this opinion. It is so orde red._________________

_________________ 1 Cite as: 54 9 U

. S. ____ (2006) T HOMAS , J., dissen t in g 

# SUPREME CO URT O FTHE UNI TED STATES
No. 05–5 47 

### JO S E A N TO N I O LO PE Z, P E T I T I O N ER v. AL BER TO R. GONZAL ES, AT T O RNEY GE N ERAL ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEAL S FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT [D ec ember5, 200 6] 

### J USTICE 

### T HOMA S 

### , dissenting. Jose Antonio Lopez pleade d guilty to aiding and abet

ting the possession of cocaine, a felony under SouthDa

kota law. The Court holds that Lopez’s convic tion does not constitute an “aggra v ated fe lony” because federal law would classify Lopez’s possessi on offense as a misde

meanor. I r e spectfully dissent. I The Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) provide s that “[a]n y alien who is convicted of an aggra v ated felony at any tim e after admission is deportable.” 8 U. S. C. §1227(a)(2)( A)(iii)

. Asrelevant to this ca se, th e INA de fin e s an “aggravat ed felony” as “illicit trafficking in a controlled substanc e . . . including a drug trafficking crime (as defined in section 924(c) of title 1 8) .” § 1101(a)(43)(B). An d “the term ‘dru g trafficking crim e ’ means any felony punishable under the Controlled Substances Act

. . . .” 18 U. S. C. §924(c)(2). Lopez’s state felony off e nse qualifi e s as a “dru g traffi ck

ing crime” as defined i n§924(c)(2). A plain reading of this definition i d entifies two elements: First, the offense mu st be a f e lony ; second, th e offens e must be capable of pun ishment under the Controlled Substances Act (CSA). No one disputes that South Dakotapunishes Lopez’s crime as2 LOPEZ v. GONZALES T HOMAS , J., dissen t in g 

### a felony. See S. D. Co dified Laws §22–42–5 (1988). Like

wise, no one disputes that the offense was capable of punishment under the CSA. Se e 21 U. S. C. §844(a). Lopez’s possession of fense therefore satisfi e s both el e ments, and the inquiry should end there. The Court, however, takes the inquiry furth er by rea

soning that only federalfelonies qu alify as dru gtraffickin g crimes. According to the Court, the definition of dru g trafficking crime contains an implied limitation: “any felony punishable [as a felony] under the” CSA. The te xt does not support this interpreta tion. Most o b viously, the language “as a felon y” appears nowhere i n§924(c)(2). Without doubt, Congre ss could have written t h e definition with this limitation, but it did not. Furthermor e , Lopez’s s u ggested a ddition conflicts wit h the clear meaning of §924(c)(2), which extends to b o th state and federal felonies. Specifically, th e definition broadly encompasses “ anyfelony” capable of being pun

ished under the CSA. 18U. S. C. §924(c)(2) (emphas is added). “Read naturally, the word ‘any’ has an expansive meaning

. . . .” UnitedStatesv. Gonzales , 5 20 U. S. 1, 5 (1997) (plurality opinion); see also Smallv. Uni t e dS t at es , 544 U. S. 3 85, 397 (2005) (T HOMAS 

### , J., dissenting) (“Th e broad phra se ‘any court’ unambiguously includes all judi

cial bodies with ju risdiction to imp o se the requisite convic

tion

. . .” (footnote omit ted)). The term “felony” takes its meaning from Title 18, which clas sifies crimes as feloni es when puni shable by death or greater thanone year of imprisonment. §3559(a). “[A]nyfel o ny” therefore includes both federa l and state feloni es: Th e classificat i on depends only on th e authorized term of imprisonment. Accord

ingly, by th e plain terms of §924(c)(2), condu ct prohibited by the CS A may qualify as a “drug traffic k ing crime” if under either federal law or state l a w the con d uct is pun

ishable by more than one year of i m prisonment. This interp retation finds support in other pr ovisions inCite as: 54 9 U

. S. ____ (2006) 3 T HOMAS , J., dissen t in g 

### which Con g ress placed limits on the types of d r ug traffic k

ing crimes eligibl e f o r consid eration. In particular, §924(c)(1)(A) proscribes the use or possessi on of a firearm “during an d in relation to any .

. . drug traf f icking cri me

. . . for whic h the pers on may be p r osecuted in a court of th e United S t ates. . . .” (emphasis added); see also 18 U. S. C. A. §924(c)(5) (Supp. 2006 ) (using identical lan

guage in proscribing the useor pos s essionof “armor pierc

ing ammunition”). The Court has previously interpret e d this language to limit “any .

. . dr ug traffic k i n g crime” t o federal crimes. Gonzales , supra, at 5. T h is langua ge, therefore, acts as aju risdictional limitation, car ving ou t the subset of federal d r ug traffi cking crimes and makin g only those eligible for use in §§92 4 (c)(1)(A) a n d 924(c)(5). No similar federal-crime limitat ion appears in §924(c)(2). Interpreting the term “drug traffi cking crime,” as defined in §924(c)(2), to reach only federal felonies would rende r superfluous the federal-crime limitations in these other provisions. See Duncanv. Walk er , 533 U. S. 167, 17 4 (2001) (plurality opinion) (counseling against interpreta

tions that result in sur p lus language). 1 

### This interp retation also finds support in the INA, whic h lists “ill icit trafficking” and its subset of “drug trafficking cri me[s ]” as aggrav ate dfelonies. 8 U. S. C. §11 01(a)(4 3)(B). The INA c o ns id ers t h es e of fe ns es aggrava t ed f e lo ni e s “wheth er i nvi o l at io nof F e der a l orStat e law

. . . . ” §1101(a)(43) (penultimate sentence). Thus, b yincorpora t

ing §924(c)(2)’s definiti on of “drug trafficking crime,” the

——————

1 Th e major i tymist aken lyc o n t en ds th at m yin ter p r e tationalso r e n ders t h is la ngua ge s u perfluous

. Ante , at 10 n

. 9. A s I h av e sta t ed, t h e plainmean in gof “dr u gtraffic k in gcr ime” in c l u d es tw o c ateg o r i es of felon ies—st at e an d feder al. Forth e limi t in glan g u a g ein§924(c )(1)(A) to h av e mean i n g , it mu st ex c l u d e on e of th ose c ateg o r i es. As a sta t e felony, Lopez’s possession offense do es not fall within the category of federal drug trafficking crimes. Cons e q uently, it is noteligible for use u n d er§924(c ) (1)(A).4 LOPEZ v. GONZALES T HOMAS , J., dissen t in g 

### INA supports and confirms the conclusion that the defini

tion of “dru g t r affickin g c r ime” ap plies to both federal a n d state feloni es. Moreover, the INA isolates the relevant inquiry to the prosecuting jurisdiction. Section 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) of Ti tle 8 makes an alien eli gible for deportation only upon a conviction for an “ag grava ted felony.” The conviction requirement suggests that the jurisdiction issuing t h e conviction determines whethe r the offense is a felony. This result makes sense. When faced with an actu al conviction, it would be unusual to ask, hypothetically, whether th at conviction would have been afelony in a different jurisdiction. Further more, that hypotheti c al inquiry could cause si gnificant inconsistencies. For i n stance, where a State convicts an alien of a misdemean o r drug crime, but federallaw classifies the crim e as a felony, the misdemeanor conviction would constitute an aggra

vated felony. This anomaly does not arise when relying on the prosecuting jurisdi ction’s classification of t h e crime. II The Court’ s approach is unpersuasive. At the outset of its analysis , the Court avers that i tmust look to the ordi

nary meaning of “illici ttraffick ing” because “the statutes in play do not define t h e term.” Ante , at 5. That state

ment is incorrect. Section 1101(a)(43)(B) of Title 8 clearly defines “illi cit trafficki n g in a controlled substance,” a t least in part, as “a drug traffic k ing crime ( as defined i n section 924(c) of title 1 8 ).” (Emphasis added.) Therefore, whatever else “illicit trafficking” might me an, it mus t include anything defin e d as a “drug trafficki n g crime” in §924(c)(2). Rather than grappling with this definition of the relevant term, the Court instead sets up a conflicting strawman d e finition. The majority states that the ordina ry meaning of “il licit traffick ing” involves “some sort of commercial dealing.”5 Cite as: 54 9 U

. S. ____ (2006) T HOMAS , J., dissen t in g 

### Ante , at 5. Because mere possess ion does not constitute commercial dealing, the Cou rt concludes that Lopez’s possessi on offense can n ot qualify as an “illici ttraffickin g” offense—or, by implication, a “drugtrafficking crime.” Yet even the C o urt admit s that the term “d ru g traffi ckin g crime” incl udes federal drug felonies, several of which ar e mere possession off e ns es. See 21 U. S. C. §844(a) (posses

sion of mor e than five grams of cocaine base, possessi on of flunitrazepam, and repeat poss essionoffenses). If the Court reco gnizes, in light of §924(c)(2), some mere posses

sion offenses under the umbre llaof “illicit trafficking,” it cannot reject Lopez’s conviction out of han d. Yet the Court do wn plays these “few ex cep t ions” in t w o footnotes, concluding that “this coerced inclusion of a f e w possessi on offenses” gives no reas on to “override [the] or dinary mean

ing” of “illicit trafficking.” Ante , at 6, nn. 4 an d 6. The inconsi s tency deserves more than the Court’s pass

ing reference. By en compassing repeat possession of

fenses, the term “illicit trafficking” includes far more tha n “a few” offenses outsid e of its ordi nary meaning. It mus t include ever ytype of po ssessio noff e nse under the CSA, so long as the offender has had a pre vious possession offens e. If defining “illicit trafficking” to include the en tire range of unlawful possessi on d oes not provide a “clear statutor y command to override ordinary m e aning,” I do not know what would. 2

——————

2 In it s dis cus s i on of whet h erpos s e s s ion ma y cons t i t u t e“ t r a fficking,” th e Cou r ttake s its ow ntr ip “th r o u ghth e l o okin gg l ass.” See ante, at 6

. “ C ommerce,” a ccording t o th e Court , “ c e r t a i nly .

. . is no elementof simple possession

. . . .” Ante , at 5. Not l o n gag o, th e C o u r tfou n dth e oppos i t e t o be t rue whe n int e rpret i ng t h e s c ope of Congres s ’ powe r under the Commerce Claus e . See Gonzalesv. Raich , 545 U. S. 1, 2 2 (200 5) (plu r a li tyopin ion) (c on c l u d in gth at Con g r e ss mayr e g u late th e mer e posse ssi onof mar i ju a n a as a ffect in g “ c ommerce” )

. In Raich , the Courtfell int o t h e ver yt r a p itpurport s t oident i fy t o day b y“ t urn[i n g] simple po sse ss ionin to [c ommer c e], ju st wh at th e En g lishlan g u a g e tel l s us nott o expect .” Ante , at 6 ; see al so Raic h , supra, at 5 7–5 8 (T HOMAS ,6 LOPEZ v. GONZALES T HOMAS , J., dissen t in g 

### The Court, however, gives on ly fleeting consideration to the text of §924(c)(2) i t self. After referencin g the phrase “felony punishable und er” the CSA, the Court asks “where else wouldone naturally look” other than the CSA to determine whether a felony qualif ies as a dru gtraffickin g crime. Ante , at 7. In response to the Court ’ s rhetorica l question, I suggest tha tone might naturally look to the conviction itself to determine whether it is a f e lony. When presented with an a c t ual convicti on, one would not expe ct to look to a hypothetica lprosecution to determ ine whether an offender has committed a felony. Continuing to avoid the text of §924(c)(2), the Court instead focuses on what the statute does no t say. It co n cludes that Congress could hav e ex pressly referenced state law as in §924(g)(3) a n d (k)(2). Ante , at 7. The response, of course, is that Congress could just as well h a ve defined a “dru g tra fficking cri me” as “an yfelony pu nishable as a felonyunder the CSA.” Rejoining, the Court resorts to an “instinctiv[e] understand[ing]” th at the statutory defin i

tion actually means “felony as defined by th e Act.” Ibid

. Instinct notwithstandi ng, we mu st interpretwhat Con

gress actually wrote, not what it co uld have wr itten. Fu rthermore, the Cou rt’s “ins tin c t” to in terpret §924(c)(2 ) to mean “felony as defi ned by” the CSA creates an unnec

essary ambiguity in the meanin gof “felony.” The CSA defines “fel ony” as “any Federal o rState offense classifi ed by applicable Federal orState la w as a felony.” 21 U. S. C. §802(13). 3

### Under the Court’s int e rpretation, that defini

-

—————— J ., dis s e nt ing). The Court ’s b r oa dening of t h e Commerce Cla u s e s t a n ds inten s ionw i t hits pr esen tn a r r o win ter p r e tationof “tr aff i c k in g , ” w h i ch 8 U. S. C. §1 101( a)(43)( B) ex plic itlyal te r s to in c l u d e atlea s t som e possession offenses.

3 Sev e r a l Cou r t s of Appe al s l ooked to this definition of “f elony” when cons t ruing t h e mea n ing of “ d rug t r a fficking crime.” See, e.g. , United Statesv. Wi lson , 316 F. 3d 506, 5 12 (CA 4 2003). Al th ou ghth e G o v e rn men tw o u l d c l ear l ypr ev ail u n d er21 U. S

. C. §802(13), it h a s c o n c e ded7 Cite as: 54 9 U

. S. ____ (2006) T HOMAS , J., dissen t in g 

### tion seemin gly should apply. The Court concludes other

wise but never resolves the ambigu ity it c r eates: It instead explains that “felony” i s defined by the CSA as somethi n g other than the CSA’s de finition of “f elony.” Ante , at 8, n. 7. That expla nation is, atbest, unsatisfying. After glidi n g past th e statutorytext, the Court ex

presses con c ern over the fact that the Government’s inter

pretation allows federal immigration law to turn on vary

ing state cri minal classifications. Congress apparently did not share t h is concern because some definiti ons of “aggra

vated felony” ex plicitlyturnon the Sta t e’s aut horized ter m of imprisonment, not a uniform federal classification. See 8 U. S. C. §1101(a)(43)(F), (G), (J), (P)–(T). Even the Court finds this variance “not .

. . all that remarkab le.” Ante , at 10. The Court’s real concern therefore has litt l e to do with variations in state law

. Rather, it worries that “a state criminal classification [may be] at odds wi th a feder a l provision.” Ibid. But, o b viously, if a state offe nse does no t qualify un der the definitions in§1101(a)(4 3), then the offense cannot be an “aggravated felony.” As shown i n Part I, thou gh, nothing about Lo pez’s offense conflicts with the plain language of §924(c)(2) as incorporated into §1101(a)(43)(B). He was convicted of a “felony,” and his offense was “punishable under the” CSA. The Court also notes appa rent a n omalies in the Gov

ernment’s approach. It asserts that, under the Govern

ment’s interpretation, a state felony convicti on for simple possessi on of less than 30 grams o f marijuanacould be a n “agg ravatedfelony” ev en though the INA e x pressly ex

cludes such an offense as grounds for deportation under 8 U. S. C. §1227(a)(2)(B)(i). Ante , at 10–11. The Court’s

—————— th at th is defin i tiondoes n o t apply

. Th is c o n c e ssionmak e s g o od sen s e: Th e defin i tionof “dr u gtr affic k in gcr ime” r e sides inTi tl e 18, an d i ti s therefore most natural to construe “fel ony” as used in that title. See, n. 1 , su pr a . A s disc u ssedab ov e, th at defin i tionas w e l lr e qu ir es th at a c r i me be c o n s i d er ed a felon y if th e State de fin e s it as a fel o n y .8 LOPEZ v. GONZALES T HOMAS , J., dissen t in g 

### concern has little basis in reality. Only one State author

izes more than one year of im pris onment for possessi on of over 20 grams. See Fla. Stat. §§893.13(6)(a)–(b), 775.082(3)(a)(3) (2006). A few oth e rs classify possessi on of one ounce (o r 28.3 grams) as a f e l o ny. See, e.g., Nev. Rev. Stat. §§453 .336(1)–(2) (2004), (4), 193.130 (2003). Th e mere possibility that a case could fall into this small g a p and lead to removal p r ovides no ground for the Court to depart from the plain meaning of §924(c)(2). In fact, it is the Court’s interpretation that will have a significant effect on removal proceedings involving state possessi on offenses. Federal law treats possession of lar g e quantities of controlled substances as felon i ou s possess ion with intent to distribute. St ates frequently treat the same conduct as simple poss ession offenses, which would escape classification as aggra v ated felonies under the Court’s interpretati on. Thus, the Court’s interpretati on will resu lt in a large disparity between the treatment of federal and state convictions for possession of large amou nts of drugs. And it is di fficult to see why Cong ress would “authorize a State to ov errule its judgment” a b out possession of large quantities of drugs a n y more than it would about other possessi on offenses. An te , at 11. Finally, the Court admits that its reading will subject an alien defendant co nvicted of a state misdemeanor to deportation if his conduct was punishable as a felony under the CSA. Accor d ingly, even if never convicted of an actual felony, an ali e n defenda n t becomes eligibl e for deportation based on a hypothetical federal prosecution. It is at least anomalous, if not inconsistent, that an actu al misdemean o r may be considered a n“aggravated felony.” III Because a plain reading of the statute would avoid the ambiguities and anomalies creat ed by today’s majority opinion, I respectfully dissent.