alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### Adina Raso, Respondent, v Sachim Jamdar et al., Appellants.

[5 NYS3d 264]

In an action to recover damages for dental malpractice, the defendants appeal, as limited by their brief, from so much of an order of the Supreme Court, Suffolk County (Rebolini, J.), dated August 4, 2014, as granted that branch of the plaintiffs motion pursuant to CPLR 4404 (a) which was to set aside so much of a jury verdict as failed to award any damages for future pain and suffering, and ordered a new trial on the issue of damages for future pain and suffering unless the defendants stipulated to increase the award therefor to $120,000.

Ordered that the order is reversed insofar as appealed from, on the law, with costs, and that branch of the plaintiffs motion pursuant to CPLR 4404 (a) which was to set aside so much of the jury’s verdict as failed to award any damages for future pain and suffering is denied.

In determining a motion pursuant to CPLR 4404 (a) to set aside a verdict as against the weight of the evidence, the court must decide whether the evidence so preponderates in favor of the movant that the verdict could not have been reached upon any fair interpretation of the evidence *(see Lolik v Big v Supermarkets,*86 NY2d 744, 746 [1995]; *Leonard v New York City Tr. Auth.,*90 AD3d 858, 859 [2011]; *Medco Plumbing, Inc. v Sparrow Constr. Corp.,*22 AD3d 647, 649 [2005]). Resolution of the motion does not involve a question of law, but rather requires a discretionary balancing of many factors *(see Flynn v Elrac, Inc.,*98 AD3d 938, 939 [2012]; *Vasquez v County of Nassau,*91 AD3d 855, 857 [2012]). Moreover, “[g]reat deference is accorded to the fact-finding function of the jury, and determinations regarding the credibility of witnesses are for the factfinders, who had the opportunity to see and hear the witness” *777
      *(Hedaya Home Fashions, Inc. v American Motorists Ins.*Co., 12 AD3d 639, 640 [2004]; *see Flynn v Elrac, Inc.,*98 AD3d at 939; *Exarhouleas v Green 317 Madison, LLC,*46 AD3d 854, 855 [2007]). Thus, “[w]here the verdict can be reconciled with a reasonable view of the evidence, the successful party is entitled to the presumption that the jury adopted that view” *(Tapia v Dattco, Inc.,*32 AD3d 842, 845 [2006]).

Contrary to the plaintiffs contention, the jury’s failure to award damages for future pain and suffering was based upon a fair interpretation of the evidence presented at trial, with consideration given to the credibility of the witnesses and the drawing of reasonable inferences therefrom, and there was no basis in the record for the trial court to disturb the jury’s resolution of credibility issues against the plaintiff *(see Abdelkader v Shahine,*66 AD3d 615, 617 [2009]; *Wertzberger v City of New York,*254 AD2d 352 [1998]). Accordingly, the Supreme Court should have denied that branch of the plaintiffs motion pursuant to CPLR 4404 (a) which was to set aside the verdict as to damages for future pain and suffering.

Mastro, J.P., Dickerson, Cohen and LaSalle, JJ., concur.
[Federal Register Volume 66, Number 44 (Tuesday, March 6, 2001)]
[Notices]
[Pages 13521-13522]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 01-5346]


-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY

Federal Energy Regulatory Commission

[Project No. 2897]


S. D. Warren Company; Notice of Authorization for Continued 
Project Operation

February 28, 2001.
    On January 22, 1999, S. D. Warren Company, licensee for the 
Saccarappa Project No. 2897, filed an application for a new or 
subsequent license pursuant to the Federal Power Act (FPA) and the 
Commission's regulations thereunder. Project No. 2897 is located on the 
Presumpscot River in Cumberland County, Maine.
    The license for Project No. 2897 was issued for a period ending 
January 26, 2001. Section 15(a)(1) of the FPA, 16 U.S.C. 808(a)(1), 
requires the Commission, at the expiration of a license term, to issue 
from year to year an annual license to the then licensee under the 
terms and conditions of the

[[Page 13522]]

prior license until a new license is issued, or the project is 
otherwise disposed of as provided section 15 or any other applicable 
section of the FPA. If the project's prior license waived the 
applicability of Section 15 of the FPA, then, based on section 9(b) of 
the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. 558(c), and as set forth at 
18 CFR 16.21(a), if the licensee of such project has filed an 
application for a subsequent license, the licensee may continue to 
operate the project in accordance with the terms and conditions of the 
license after the mirror or minor part license expires, until the 
Commission acts on its application. If the licensee of such a project 
has not filed an application for a subsequent license, then it may be 
required, pursuant to 18 CFR 16.21(b), to continue project operations 
until the Commission issues someone else a license for the project or 
otherwise orders disposition of the project.
    If the project is subject to section 15 of the FPA, notice is 
hereby given that an annual license for Project No. 2897 is issued to 
S. D. Warren Company for a period effective January 27, 2001, through 
January 26, 2002, or until the issuance of a new license for the 
project or other disposition under the FPA, whichever comes first. If 
issuance of a new license (or other disposition) does not take place on 
or before January 27, 2002, notice is hereby given that, pursuant to 18 
CFR 16.18(c), an annual license under section 15(a)(1) of the FPA is 
renewed automatically without further order or notice by the 
Commission, unless the Commission orders otherwise.
    If the project is not subject to section 15 of the FPA, notice is 
hereby given that S. D. Warren Company is authorized to continue 
operation of the Saccarappa Project No. 2897 until such time as the 
Commission acts on its application for subsequent license.

David P. Boergers,
Secretary.
[FR Doc. 01-5346 Filed 3-5-01; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 6717-01-M
EXHIBIT 32.1
             STATEMENT FURNISHED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE
             SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002, 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350

      The undersigned, Santo P. Pasqualucci, is the President and Chief
Executive Officer of Falmouth Bancorp, Inc. (the "Company").

      This statement is being furnished in connection with the filing by
the Company of the Company's Quarterly Report on Form 10-QSB/A for the
quarter ended December 31, 2003 (the "Report").

      By execution of this statement, I certify that:

            A)    the Report fully complies with the requirements of
                  Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of
                  1934 (15 U.S.C. 78m(a) or 78o(d)) and

            B)    the information contained in the Report fairly presents,
                  in all material respects, the financial condition and
                  results of operations of the Company as of the dates and
                  for the periods covered by the Report.

      This statement is authorized to be attached as an exhibit to the
Report so that this statement will accompany the Report at such time as the
Report is filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission, pursuant to
Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 18 U.S.C. Section 1350.  It
is not intended that this statement be deemed to be filed for purposes of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended.

      A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906
has been provided to the Company and will be retained by the Company and
furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon
request.

Date:  April 5, 2004                   /s/ Santo P. Pasqualucci
                                           --------------------------------
                                           Santo P. Pasqualucci
                                           President and Chief Executive
                                           Officer


<PAGE>
**Exhibit 32.2**

 

**Certification**

**Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350**

**As adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002**

 

In connection with the Annual Report of DJO Finance LLC (the “Company”) on Form 10-K for the fiscal year ended December 31, 2010, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on March 3, 2011 (the “Report”), I, Vickie L. Capps, Executive Vice President, Chief Financial Officer , Treasurer , and Manager of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

 

(i) This Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

 

(ii) the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.

 
| Date:   March 3, 2011                                                      |   |
|----------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------|
|                                                                       |   |
| /s/   Vickie L. Capps                                                      |   |
| Vickie   L. Capps                                                          |   |
| Executive   Vice President, Chief Financial Officer, Treasurer and Manager |   |

 

----
#### Julio Cesar ARRIAGA-BRITO; Maria Zoraida Zamora-Guizar, Petitioners, v. Alberto R. GONZALES, Attorney General, Respondent.

No. 05-73871.

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted Feb. 20, 2007.*

Filed Feb. 23, 2007.

Philippe Dwelshauvers, Esq., Fresno, CA, for Petitioners.

*560CAC-Distriet Counsel, Esq., Ronald E. LeFevre, Chief Counsel, Office of the District Counsel Department of Homeland Security, San Francisco, CA, Cindy S. Ferrier, Esq., Scott A. Chutka, Esq., U.S. Dept of Justice Office of Justice Programs Office of General Counsel, Washington, DC, for Respondent.

Before: BEEZER, FERNANDEZ and McKEOWN Circuit Judges.

*

 The panel unanimously finds this case suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R.App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM **

Julio Cesar Arriaga-Brito and Maria Zoraida Zamora-Guizar, natives and citizens of Mexico, petition for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) order dismissing their appeal from an immigration judge’s decision denying their application for cancellation of removal. To the extent we have jurisdiction, it is conferred by 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We review de novo claims of due process violations in immigration proceedings. *See Sanchez-Cruz v. INS,*255 F.3d 775, 779 (9th Cir.2001). We dismiss in part and deny in part the petition for review.

We lack jurisdiction to review the agency’s discretionary determination that the petitioners failed to show exceptional and extremely unusual hardship. *See Martinez-Rosas v. Gonzales,*424 F.3d 926, 929 (9th Cir.2005).

We also lack jurisdiction to review the BIA’s December 28, 2005 order denying the petitioners’ motion to reopen based on ineffective assistance of counsel because the petition for review is not timely as to that order. *See Martinez-Serrano v. INS,*94 F.3d 1256, 1258 (9th Cir.1996).

To the extent the petitioners contend the BIA violated their due process rights when it denied their motion to accept an untimely brief, the contention is unavailing because the record shows the briefing schedule was mailed to the address of record and the BIA did not summarily dismiss the appeal for failure to file a timely brief. *Cf. Singh v. Ashcroft,*362 F.3d 1164, 1168-69 (9th Cir.2004) (finding a due process violation where BIA sent briefing schedule and transcript to wrong address); *Garciar-Cortez v. Ashcroft,*366 F.3d 749, 752-54 (9th Cir.2004) (finding due process violation where BIA summarily dismissed the petitioners’ appeal based on their untimely briefs even though notice of appeal set forth contested issues).

We do not consider the documents submitted with the petitioners’ opening brief because our review is limited to the administrative record on which the order of removal is based. *See*8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(A).

The petitioners’ motion for arbitration and to reset the briefing schedule as to the reply brief is denied.

PETITION FOR REVIEW DISMISSED in part; DENIED in part.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
s



# Fourth Court of Appeals

**San Antonio, Texas**

July 10, 2015

N o. 04

- 15

- 00349

- CV

Steven M. GARY

, Appellant

v.

Mary ROMAN

, Appellee

From the 166th Judicial District Court, Bexar County, Texas

Trial Court No. 2015

- CI

- 01986

Honorable Laura Salinas, Judge Presiding



### ORDER

No timely contest has been filed to appellant Steven M. Gary’s affidavit of indigence.

Accordingly, he may proceed in this appeal without prepayment of costs.

We order the record filed by July 1 7, 2015.

_________________________________ Luz Elena D. Chapa, Justice

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of the said

court on this 10th day of July, 2015

.

___________________________________ Keith E. Hottle

Clerk of Court
#### UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. Paul Tracy ALLENSWORTH, Appellant.

No. 10-2723.

United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.

Submitted: March 2, 2011.

Filed: March 7, 2011.

Patrick C. Harris, Assistant U.S. Attorney, U.S. Attorney’s Office, Little Rock, AR, for Appellee.

Paul Tracy Allensworth, Safford, AZ, pro se.

Angela Lorene Pitts, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Federal Public Defender’s Office, Fayetteville, AR, Chris Tarver, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Federal Public Defender’s Office, Little Rock, AR, for Appellant.

Before WOLLMAN, BOWMAN, and SMITH, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM.

Paul Tracy Allensworth appeals the district court’s1 judgment entered upon a jury verdict finding him guilty of possessing cocaine with intent to distribute, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). The district court sentenced Allensworth to 132 months in prison and 5 years of supervised release. His counsel has moved to withdraw and filed a brief under *Anders v. California,*386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967), arguing that the district court abused its discretion in denying Allensworth’s motion for a mistrial based on improper questions by the prosecutor during cross examination of Allensworth.

We conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion for a mistrial. *See United States v. Swift,*623 F.3d 618, 623 (8th Cir.2010); *United States v. Weaver,*554 F.3d 718, 723-24 (8th Cir.2009); *United States v. Boesen,*541 F.3d 838, 847 (8th Cir.2008). *936Having reviewed the record independently under *Penson v. Ohio,*488 U.S. 75, 80, 109 S.Ct. 346, 102 L.Ed.2d 300 (1988), we find no nonfrivolous issue. Accordingly, we grant counsel’s motion to withdraw, and we affirm the district court’s judgment.

1

. The Honorable William R. Wilson, Jr., United States District Judge for the Eastern District of Arkansas.
#### Paul BASHKIN, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Michael J. HICKMAN, an individual; et al., Defendants-Appellees.

No. 09-55455.

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted Jan. 10, 2011.*

Filed Jan. 25, 2011.

Paul Bashkin, San Diego, CA, pro se.

Michael J. Hickman, San Diego, CA, pro se.

Michael J. Hickman, Musick, Peeler & Garrett, LLP, Susan L. Oliver, Esquire, White, Oliver & Amundson, San Diego, CA, for Defendants-Appellees.

Before: BEEZER, TALLMAN, and CALLAHAN, Circuit Judges.

*

 The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R.App. P. 34(a)(2).

*999MEMORANDUM **

Paul Bashkin appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment dismissing his 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985 action challenging a state court decision declaring him a vexatious litigant. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo. *Noel v. Hall,*341 F.3d 1148, 1154 (9th Cir.2003) (jurisdictional dismissal under the *Rooker-Feldman*doctrine); *Shanks v. Dressel,*540 F.3d 1082, 1086 (9th Cir.2008) (dismissal for failure to state a claim). We affirm.

The district court properly concluded that the *Rooker-Feldman*doctrine barred Bashkin’s action to the extent that he challenged the vexatious litigant order and any other state court orders and judgments, because the action is a “forbidden de facto appeal” of state court judgments, and raises constitutional claims that are “inextricably intertwined” with those prior state court judgments. *Noel,*341 F.3d at 1158. Contrary to Bashkin’s argument, *“Rooker-Feldman*applies where the plaintiff in federal court claims that the state court did not have jurisdiction to render a judgment.” *Doe v. Mann,*415 F.3d 1038, 1043 n. 6 (9th Cir.2005).

The district court properly dismissed the due process claims because the record shows that Bashkin received due process prior to the state court’s entry of the vexatious litigant order. *See Shanks,*540 F.3d at 1090 (elements of procedural due process claim).

Bashkin’s remaining contentions are unpersuasive.

AFFIRMED.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
[Federal Register Volume 66, Number 44 (Tuesday, March 6, 2001)]
[Notices]
[Page 13594]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 01-5471]


=======================================================================
-----------------------------------------------------------------------

NATIONAL CREDIT UNION ADMINISTRATION


Sunshine Act Meetings

Time and Date: 10:00 am, Thursday, March 8, 2001.

Place: Board Room, 7th Floor, Room 7047, 1775 Duke Street, Alexandria, 
VA 22314-3428.

Status: Open.

Matters to be Considered:
    1. Request from a Federal Credit Union to Convert to a Community 
Charter.
    2. Part 702--Prompt Corrective Action Risk Mitigation Credit 
Guidelines.
    3. Notice of Proposed Rulemaking: Part 742 and Amendment to Part 
722, NCUA'S Rules and Regulations, Regulatory Flexibility Program.
    4. Amendments to the Field of Membership and Chartering Manual 
Regarding Requirements for Community Charters.
    5. National Credit Union Share Insurance Fund (NCUSIF) Dividend and 
Insurance Premium.

Recess: 11:15 am

Time and Date: 11:30 am, Thursday, March 8, 2001.

Place: Board Room, 7th Floor, Room 7047, 1775 Duke Street, Alexandria, 
VA 22314-3428.

Status: Closed.

Matter to be Considered:
    1. Three (3) Personnel Matters. Closed pursuant to exemptions (2) 
and (6).

For Further Information Contact: Becky Baker, Secretary of the Board, 
Telephone 703-518-6304.

Becky Baker,
Secretary of the Board.
[FR Doc. 01-5471 Filed 3-1-01; 4:11 pm]
BILLING CODE 7535-01-M
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Raul AVILEZ-MARTINEZ, also known as Raul Aviles, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 06-40873

Conference Calendar.

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

March 7, 2007.

James Lee Turner, Assistant U.S. Attorney, U.S. Attorney’s Office, Southern District of Texas, Houston, TX, for PlaintiffAppellee.

Marjorie A. Meyers, Federal Public Defender, Federal Public Defender’s Office, Southern District of Texas Houston, TX, for Defendant-Appellant.

Before KING, WIENER, and OWEN, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: *

Appealing the Judgment in a Criminal Case, Raul Avilez-Martinez raises arguments that are foreclosed by *Almendarez-Torres v. United States,*523 U.S. 224, 235, 118 S.Ct. 1219, 140 L.Ed.2d 350 (1998), which held that 8 U.S.C. § 1326(b)(2) is a penalty provision and not a separate criminal offense. The Government’s motion for summary affirmance is GRANTED, and the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.

*

 Pursuant to 5th Cir. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir. R. 47.5.4.
NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

 FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

GENGHIS KHAN ALI STEVENSON,

 Plaintiff - Appellant,

 v.

GREGORY BLAKE, Caliptria State

Prison Locksmith,

 Defendant - Appellee.

No. 13-56450

D.C. No. 3:11-cv-00103-LABWVG

MEMORANDUM*

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of California

Larry A. Burns, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted April 13, 2016** 

Before: FARRIS, TALLMAN, and BYBEE, Circuit Judges. 

Genghis Khan Ali Stevenson, a California state prisoner, appeals pro se from

the district court’s judgment following a jury trial in his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action

alleging deliberate indifference to his safety. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.

FILED

APR 19 2016

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

 * This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent

except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.

 ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
§ 1291. We review for an abuse of discretion, Mueller v. Auker, 700 F.3d 1180,

1193 (9th Cir. 2012) (denial of a motion for a new trial); Goodman v. Staples The

Office Superstore, LLC, 644 F.3d 817, 822 (9th Cir. 2011) (discovery sanctions),

and we affirm. 

The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Stevenson’s motion

for a new trial because Stevenson failed to establish that defense counsel

committed misconduct, and therefore did not present any basis for a new trial. See

Mueller, 700 F.3d at 1193-94 (“The district court’s denial of a motion for a new

trial is reversible only if the record contains no evidence in support of the verdict

or if the district court made a mistake of law.” (citation and internal quotation

marks omitted)); Hemmings v. Tidyman’s Inc., 285 F.3d 1174, 1192 (9th Cir.

2002) (“[W]e will not overrule a district court’s ruling about the impact of

counsel’s alleged misconduct unless we have a definite and firm conviction that the

court committed a clear error of judgment.” (citation and internal quotation marks

omitted)).

The district did not abuse its discretion in denying Stevenson’s motion for

sanctions because the record demonstrates that defendant’s failure to produce

documents was not intentional. See Goodman, 644 F.3d at 822.

AFFIRMED.

2 13-56450
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE O F FLORIDA FIFTH DISTRICT

ROBERT MOORE , Petitioner ,
v. Case No. 5D 2 2

- 22 9 LT Case No. 2007

- CF

- 127 STATE OF FLORIDA , Respondent

. ________________________________/ Opinion filed May 20, 2022 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, A Case of Original Jurisdiction. Robert Moore, Crawfordville , pro se. No Appearance for Respondent. PER CURIAM. Due to Petitioner’s apparent abuse of the legal process by his abusive, repetitive, malicious, or frivolous pro se filings attacking his judgment and
sentenc e in Citrus County Circuit Court Case Number 2007

- CF

- 127 , this court issued an o r der directing P etitioner to show cause why he should not be prohibited from future pro se filings. See State v. Spencer , 751 So. 2d 47, 48 (Fla. 1999). Having carefully considered the response and finding it fails2 to show cause why sanctions should not be imposed, we conclude that Petitioner is abusing the judicial process and should be barred from further pro se filings. In order to conserve judicial resources, Petitioner is prohibited from filing with this court any furth er pro se filings concerning Citrus County Circuit Court Case No. 20 0 7

- CF

- 127. The Clerk of this court is directed not to accept any further pro se filings concerning the referenced case

. The Clerk will summarily reject any future filings regarding the re ferenced case unless filed by a member in good standing of The Florida Bar. See Isley v. State , 652 So. 2d 409, 411 (Fla. 5th DCA 1995) (“Enough is enough.”). The Clerk is further directed to forward a certified copy of this opinion to the appropriate
inst itution for consideration of disciplinary proceedings. See § 944.279(1), Fla. Stat. (2019) ; Simpkins v. State , 909 So. 2d 427, 428 (Fla. 5th DCA 2005). Future Pro Se Filings PROHIBITED. EDWARDS, EISNAUGLE and NARDELLA , JJ, concur

.