separate properties, with appellant receiving a $1.7 million equalization 

payment for the difference in value between the two homes. 

The FMA provided that the parties had agreed that rather 

than valuing and dividing their wealth at the time of the divorce, they 

would proceed to liquidate various community business holdings in an 

orderly fashion and divide the net proceeds. As part of that liquidation 

process, each party could be required to make separate property capital 

contributions ("capital calls") for ongoing business expenses as approved 

by a court-appointed financial expert. Under the FMA, appellant and 

respondent were "obligated to use their respective sole and separate 

property to answer capital calls as may be required." Additionally, under 

the district court's judgment of partial property distribution, each party 

was required to maintain $1 million in liquid assets or a line of credit to 

satisfy any future capital calls. If a dispute arose as to the capital calls, 

the parties were to bring the issue before the district court for resolution. 

Finally, the district court retained continuing jurisdiction over 

the liquidation of the parties' community property. In this regard, the 

decree specifically states that the district court "shall have continuing 

jurisdiction over the Orderly Liquidation, as it relates to the parties' 

community property, and all permutations of that Orderly Liquidation." 

During the liquidation process, appellant failed to pay the 

second capital call as requested, and respondent sought relief from the 

district court. The district court entered an order directing appellant to 

pay the second capital call in the amount of $291,676.58. When appellant 

again failed to pay the capital call, respondent filed a motion to hold 

appellant in contempt under NRS 22.010 and requested sanctions in the 

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form of attorney fees and expert fees associated with the collection of that 

capital call. 

After a show cause hearing, the district court entered an order 

on February 5, 2010, finding appellant in contempt for failing to pay the 

capital call. That order also awarded respondent attorney fees incurred in 

collecting the capital call and directed respondent's attorney to provide an 

affidavit regarding his fees. The affidavit was thereafter filed with the 

court, and appellant filed an objection. On March 24, 2010, the district 

court entered an order awarding respondent $25,000 in attorney fees. On 

April 26, 2010, appellant filed her first appeal designating both the 

contempt order and the attorney fees order, which is currently pending in 

Docket No. 56062. 

Respondent then filed in the district court a motion to 

sequester funds for future capital calls, in which he requested that the 

court order the sale of appellant's Traditions home for the purpose of 

meeting future capital calls and assisting with his negotiations with 

various lenders aimed at reducing the loans for which the marital estate 

was still obligated. Appellant opposed the motion. On July 8, 2010, the 

district court entered an order directing the sale of both the Traditions 

home and the Hideaway home. That order also approved another capital 

call to be paid by appellant in the amount of $99,911.99. Appellant's 

timely appeal from that order is pending in Docket No. 56687. 

About eight months after the district court ordered appellant 

to sell her Traditions home, respondent filed a motion to hold appellant in 

contempt for continuing violation of court orders and for attorney fees. In 

the motion, respondent alleged, among other things, that appellant 

interfered with the marketing of her home, failed to meet certain capital 

3 
calls, and failed to execute documents as required by court order. 

Appellant opposed the motion. After a hearing, the district court entered 

an order on June 29, 2011, denying respondent's request to find appellant 

in contempt, but directing appellant to pay respondent $75,000 in attorney 

fees as a sanction based on appellant's continued delay tactics, which 

necessitated respondent's motion practice. Appellant's timely appeal from 

that order is pending in Docket No. 58888. 

DISCUSSION 

When our review of the documents pending before this court 

revealed a potential jurisdictional defect, we directed appellant to show 

cause why these appeals should not be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction 

because the orders did not appear to be substantively appealable. 

Appellant has filed her response as directed.' For the reasons set forth 

below, we conclude that we lack jurisdiction over these appeals. 

This court has jurisdiction to consider an appeal only when the 

appeal is authorized by statute or court rule. Taylor Constr. Co. v. Hilton 

Hotels Corp., 100 Nev. 207, 678 P.2d 1152 (1984). NRAP 3A(b) allows 

appeals to be taken from a final judgment and from a special order entered 

after a final judgment. See NRAP 3A(b)(1) and (8). In response to our 

show cause order, appellant contends that the orders are final and 

appealable under NRAP 3A(b)(1) because they finally resolve issues 

relating to contempt. Alternatively, appellant contends that the orders 

are appealable as special orders entered after a final judgment because 

"On May 9, 2013, respondent filed a motion for leave to reply to 

appellant's response, but only if this court requires additional information. 

In light of our disposition of this matter, we deny the motion. 

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they affect her rights arising from the divorce decree by requiring her to 

sell property awarded to her under the decree and by directing her to pay 

substantial attorney fees to respondent. 

Appellant's contentions are unpersuasive. The district court 

has not entered a final judgment in the proceeding below. Therefore, the 

challenged orders are not appealable as either a final judgment or as 

special orders entered after a final judgment. In a divorce proceeding such 

as this, the final judgment is one that finally resolves all issues pertaining 

to the dissolution of the parties' marriage, including the division of 

property. See Lee v. GNLV Corp., 116 Nev. 424, 426, 996 P.2d 416, 417 

(2000) (recognizing that a final judgment is one that disposes of all issues 

presented and leaves nothing for the court's future consideration, except 

for certain post-judgment issues). In determining whether a judgment is 

final, this court will typically look beyond the label and instead take a 

functional view of finality. Valley Bank of Nevada v. Ginsburg, 110 Nev. 

440, 444, 874 P.2d 729, 733 (1994). The requirement of finality furthers 

judicial economy by avoiding piecemeal appellate review. Id. 

Here, although the district court entered a divorce decree in 

2009, the decree and any prior orders incorporated therein did not finally 

resolve the division of the parties' community property, and that issue 

remains pending. The decree divided some community property assets, 

but pursuant to the parties' agreement, the remaining community estate 

was to be liquidated and the proceeds thereafter divided, with the court 

retaining jurisdiction over that liquidation process. The district court is 

still actively involved in the liquidation and division of the parties' 

community property assets, as evidenced by the various orders challenged 

in these appeals. Therefore, because no final judgment has been entered 

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in the divorce proceeding, the orders challenged in these appeals are 

interlocutory and not independently appealable, and we lack jurisdiction 

to consider them. See NRAP 3A(b) (listing orders and judgments from 

which an appeal may be taken); Pengilly v. Rancho Santa Fe Homeowners 

Ass'n., 116 Nev. 646, 649, 5 P.3d 569, 571 (2000) (recognizing that a 

contempt order is not independently appealable). 

Accordingly, we dismiss these appeals. We note that because 

these orders are interlocutory, they may be challenged on appeal from the 

final judgment that resolves the remaining property distribution issues. 

Consol. Generator-Nevada, Inc. v. Cummins Engine Co., 114 Nev. 1304, 

1312, 971 P.2d 1251, 1256 (1998) (stating that interlocutory orders may be 

challenged on appeal from the final judgment) 

It is so ORDERED. 

Gibbons 

locag 

DougTas 

Saitta 

cc: Ninth Judicial District Court Dept. 1 

Carolyn Worrell, Settlement Judge 

Black & LoBello 

Sherry B. Bowers 

Silverman, Decaria & Kattelman, Chtd. 

Jolley Urga Wirth Woodbury & Standish 

Douglas County Clerk 

J. 

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