U.S. SELF-ASSESSMENT 

AGAINST THE CORE PRINCIPLES 

FOR 

EFFECTIVE DEPOSIT 

INSURANCE SYSTEMS

2020
FOREWORD AND ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation is pleased to present the results of its self-assessment against 

the Core Principles for Effective Deposit Insurance Systems issued by the International Association 

of Deposit Insurers. The Core Principles are established international standards used to evaluate the 

effectiveness of deposit insurance programs around the world.

This is the first time that the FDIC has undertaken such a self-assessment. While the FDIC’s long history 

of contributing to financial stability speaks to its proven effectiveness, a self-assessment against the 

Core Principles is nonetheless useful for promoting continuous improvement, as it provides a systematic 

evaluation of virtually all features of the deposit insurance system. The results of the self-assessment were 

highly satisfactory. The FDIC system was found to be fully or substantially compliant with all of the Core 

Principles.

This is not surprising. FDIC insurance has provided effective protection for depositors since its inception 

in 1933 because the policymakers who established the system provided it with the broad range of powers 

necessary for success. The FDIC program has qualified as a risk minimizing system from the beginning, 

with full inspection powers to assess risks to the insurance fund, authority to set the level of premiums 

necessary to maintain an adequate fund, and full authority for the timely and effective resolution of 

insured-bank failures.

Of course, some important enhancements have been made over time in order to maintain maximum 

effectiveness. These include the authority to charge differential premiums based on risk, the establishment 

of rules to ensure prompt corrective action in the event of a member institution’s deteriorating financial 

condition, the adoption of depositor preference in the priority of claims in a failed-bank receivership, and 

the development of rules to ensure that the least-cost resolution method is selected whenever feasible.

Each of these improvements built upon the broad set of original authorities issued to the FDIC, which 

provided the necessary foundation for a sound deposit insurance system. The framers of the deposit 

insurance system understood the importance of providing the deposit insurer with powers to assess and 

manage its risk exposure and to honor promptly depositors’ claims following bank failures.

The provision for an ex-ante fund coupled with the establishment of a separate failure-resolution regime 

for insured depository institutions were key among the broad powers originally granted to the FDIC. 

Reliable and timely payment of claims, especially to insured depositors, in the resolution process is 

essential for maintaining public confidence in the deposit insurance guarantee and for fostering stability in 

the financial system. As early as 1934, the FDIC stated in its annual report: “... deposit insurance has altered 

the administration of bank receiverships, particularly by the substitution of the [FDIC] as a single claimant 

in place of a large number of depositors.”

The exceptional results of today’s self-assessment against the Core Principles are a credit to the original 

design of the system that included the robust authority needed for the FDIC to establish a fully effective 

deposit insurance program. Major contributors to this assessment included: Anthony Sinopole, Rose 

Kushmeider, Galo Cevallos, Martin Becker, Jonathan Beers, Clayton Boyce, Rita Entsminger, Edward 

Garnett, James Hudson, B. Amon James, Kimberly Stock, Angus Tarpley, James Watts, and Rachel Youssef.

Diane Ellis

Director, Division of Insurance and Research

1
CONTENTS

Foreword and Acknowledgments 1

Abbreviations 3

Preamble 4

Core Principles and Compliance Assessment 8

PRINCIPLE 1 Public Policy Objectives 8

PRINCIPLE 2 Mandate and Powers 11

PRINCIPLE 3 Governance 15

PRINCIPLE 4 Relationships with Other Safety-Net Participants 19

PRINCIPLE 5 Cross-Border Issues 22

PRINCIPLE 6 Deposit Insurer’s Role in Contingency Planning and Crisis Management 23

PRINCIPLE 7 Membership 26

PRINCIPLE 8 Coverage 28

PRINCIPLE 9 Sources and Uses of Funds 31

PRINCIPLE 10 Public Awareness 36

PRINCIPLE 11 Legal Protection 41

PRINCIPLE 12 Dealing with Parties at Fault in a Bank Failure 43

PRINCIPLE 13 Early Detection and Timely Intervention 46

PRINCIPLE 14 Failure Resolution 51

PRINCIPLE 15 Reimbursing Depositors 57

PRINCIPLE 16 Recoveries 61

2
ABBREVIATIONS

AI assuming institution

AML/CFT anti-money laundering/combating the financing of terrorism

CFPB Consumer Financial Protection Bureau

C.F.R. Code of Federal Regulations

CP Core Principle

DIF Deposit Insurance Fund

DINB deposit insurance national bank

EC Essential Criterion

EDIE Electronic Deposit Insurance Estimator

EGRPRA Economic Growth and Regulatory Paperwork Reduction Act

FDI Act Federal Deposit Insurance Act

FDIC Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation

FFIEC Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council

FSOC Financial Stability Oversight Council

FTCA Federal Tort Claims Act

GAO Government Accountability Office

GSIB global systemically important bank

GSIFI global systemically important financial institution

IAP institution-affiliated parties

IDI insured depository institution

OCC Office of the Comptroller of the Currency

OCOM Office of Communications (FDIC)

OIG Office of Inspector General

P&A purchase and assumption

PCA Prompt Corrective Action

U.S.C. United States Code

3
PREAMBLE

1. BACKGROUND INFORMATION ON THE ASSESSMENT

The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) conducted this self-assessment of compliance with the 

International Association of Deposit Insurers Core Principles for Effective Deposit Insurance Systems (Core 

Principles or CPs). An interdisciplinary team with representation from across the FDIC’s divisions performed 

the assessment.

2. METHODOLOGY USED FOR THE ASSESSMENT

The evaluation of compliance with the Core Principles adhered to the methodology in the International 

Association of Deposit Insurers “Handbook for the Assessment of Compliance With the Core Principles for 

Effective Deposit Insurance Systems.” The assessment was based on a review of laws, regulations, policies, 

and practices governing the U.S. deposit insurance system.

This assessment includes a review of the preconditions for effective deposit insurance systems, including 

an overview of the organizational structure and the division of responsibilities among the U.S. agencies 

with authority over regulation and supervision of the U.S. banking sector, and a detailed assessment of 

compliance with each of the Core Principles.1

3. INSTITUTIONAL AND MACROECONOMIC SETTING AND MARKET STRUCTURE OVERVIEW

Macroeconomic Stability

The most-recent U.S. economic expansion that began in June 2009—the longest on record since the 

1850s—ended in February as the economy entered recession, according to the National Bureau of 

Economic Research business cycle dating committee.2 Economic activity suddenly stalled due to the 

outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic and the associated stay-at-home orders and business closures. The 

consensus among business cycle forecasters is for the U.S. economy to contract this year, with a severe 

decline in second quarter, followed by gradual growth in the second half of the year.3 Standard economic 

indicators, including personal consumption expenditures, consumer and business sentiment, and 

business investment have fallen precipitously due to the pandemic-caused recession.4 The labor market 

experienced an unprecedented increase in unemployment in March and April, pushing the unemployment 

rate well above the height of the last recession as businesses closed and workers were furloughed. The 

labor market began to improve in May as businesses began to reopen, but the outlook is uncertain.5 U.S. 

financial markets experienced heightened stress in March with equity market indices bottoming out in 

March, losing almost 40 percent from their February peak. Both the Dow Jones Industrial Average and the 

S&P 500 recovered most of their losses in later months, but weak economic conditions and risks to the 

outlook may weigh on earnings.6

Both fiscal and monetary policies were implemented to support the economy. The Federal Reserve 

lowered interest rates back to 0-25 basis points, increased asset purchases, and began several new lending 

1 For the purposes of this self-assessment, the meaning of the term bank is limited to a bank (or a savings association) that is insured by the FDIC and 

does not include credit unions or uninsured deposit-taking institutions or entities.

2 U.S. Business Cycle Expansions and Contractions Data, National Bureau of Economic Research business cycle dating committee, https://www.nber.

org/cycles/cyclesmain.html.

3 Blue Chip Economic Indicators, https://developers.refinitiv.com/content/blue-chip-economic-indicators%C2%AE.

4 U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis, data on personal consumption expenditures, and business investment, https://www.bea.gov/data. Institute for 

Supply Management business sentiment: https://www.instituteforsupplymanagement.org/ISMReport/. University of Michigan Consumer Sentiment: 

https://data.sca.isr.umich.edu/.

5 Labor market indicators are from U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, https://www.bls.gov/bls/newsrels.htm.

6 Equity indices include the S&P 500 Index and the Dow Jones Industrial Average.

4
programs. Congress enacted several rounds of fiscal spending measures to support businesses and 

consumers. While these measures helped support the economy, economic conditions remained weak. The 

economic outlook remained highly uncertain and dependent on the path and severity of the pandemic.

The weak economic outlook challenges the banking sector. Historical data suggest there will be an 

increase in loan losses and some deterioration in banking conditions, including generally weaker financial 

performance, due to the current recession. The FDIC and other federal banking agencies continue to 

monitor financial system risks and stand ready to intervene.

The FDIC Chairman is a member of the Financial Stability Oversight Council (FSOC). One responsibility 

of the FSOC is to monitor potential systemic risks and vulnerabilities in the U.S. economy and financial 

system. An issue identified by the FSOC in recent annual reports is the increase in leveraged lending 

and an increasing proportion of leveraged loans without strong protective covenants. As the pandemic 

developed, this area remained a key area to watch as highly leveraged corporations were strained by weak 

economic conditions.

Banking Industry Performance

Overall, the banking industry has reported strong financial results over the past five years although the 

economic downturn in early 2020 contributed to a decline in industry earnings.7 Quarterly net income grew 

from $39.8 billion in first quarter 2015 to $54.9 billion in fourth quarter 2019, reflecting strong growth in 

net interest income and noninterest income. Quarterly net income fell to $18.5 billion in first quarter 2020 

because of an increase in provisions for loan and lease losses, which reflect current economic conditions 

as well as the adoption of the new current expected credit losses (CECL) accounting methodology. The 

average return on assets ratio for the banking industry improved from 1.02 percent in first quarter 2015 to 

1.19 percent in fourth quarter 2019 and dropped to 0.38 percent in first quarter 2020.

FDIC-insured institutions continue to extend credit to borrowers to support economic activity. Since 2014, 

the average annual growth rate for loan and lease balances was almost 5.18 percent. Most of this growth 

was driven by business loans, commercial real estate loans, and consumer loans, which include credit card 

loans.

Asset quality indicators have improved since 2014. Nonperforming loans as a percentage of total loans 

have declined since 2014 and were less than 1 percent as of first quarter 2020. Net charge-offs as a 

percentage of total loans have remained relatively stable since 2014 and are well below crisis levels.

Community banks reported strong results through 2019. However, community banks have also been 

adversely affected by the economic downturn in early 2020.8 In first quarter 2020, community banks’ net 

income totaled $4.8 billion, a decline of 21 percent from first quarter of 2019. Similar to the industry as a 

whole, community banks’ decline in net income was driven by increases in provisions for loan and lease 

losses. Loan growth at community banks remains strong. For the twelve months ending March 2020, 

loan and lease balances grew by 5.8 percent at community banks, led by commercial real estate loans, 

residential mortgages, and business loans.

Until recently, the banking industry benefited from the rise in short-term interest rates, but is now 

challenged by several declines in short-term rates between July 2019 and March 2020. The average net 

interest margin for all FDIC-insured institutions rose from just more than 3.12 percent at year-end 2014 

to 3.28 percent at year-end 2019, but dropped to 3.13 percent in first quarter of 2020 as yields on earning 

assets dropped more rapidly than costs of deposits and other borrowings. Larger financial institutions’ net 

interest margin declined more than community banks because larger institutions hold a greater share of 

assets that reprice quickly.

7 FDIC data from Reports of Condition and Income (Call Reports), https://cdr.ffiec.gov/public/.

8 Community banks refers to banks that meet the criteria that were developed for the FDIC Community Banking Study, published in December 2012.

5
The banking industry today is better capitalized and holds more liquid assets than it did pre-crisis. 

However, an extended period of low interest rates and an increasingly competitive lending environment 

has led some institutions to “reach for yield” by increasing the maturities of loan and investment portfolios 

and sometimes by relaxing loan standards. These factors have led to heightened exposure to interest-rate, 

liquidity, and credit risk. With the recent declines in short-term interest rates and economic uncertainty 

warranting higher provisions for loan and lease losses, new challenges may emerge for institutions in 

lending and funding. Banks must maintain underwriting discipline and credit standards and prudently 

manage the risks they face to sustain lending through the downside of this economic cycle.9

Sound Governance of Authorities Comprising the Financial Safety-Net

The United States operates under a “dual banking system.” A bank charter may be issued by the federal 

government or by a state. Federal bank charters for “national banks” and “federal savings associations” are 

issued by the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC). A banking authority in each state may also 

issue a charter under its own laws and regulations. Entities with a state charter are generally called “state 

banks” or “state savings associations” and are supervised by the state regulatory authority in coordination 

with the applicable primary federal regulator.

All banks, whether chartered under state or federal law, are subject to regulation, supervision, and 

examination by a primary federal regulator. Three agencies (hereafter called the “federal banking 

agencies”) provide primary federal supervision over banks:

y the OCC supervises national banks and federal savings associations;

y the Federal Reserve System (Federal Reserve) supervises state banks that choose to be 

members of the Federal Reserve (state member banks); and

y the FDIC supervises state banks that choose not to become members of the Federal Reserve 

(state nonmember banks) and state savings associations.

The FDIC provides deposit insurance for these institutions regardless of the type of bank charter.

Holding companies that own banks are supervised by the Federal Reserve, regardless of the nature of the 

bank charters of their subsidiaries. Foreign banking organizations may operate in the United States with 

the prior approval of the Federal Reserve. Under the International Banking Act of 1978 and the Foreign 

Bank Supervision Enhancement Act of 1991, the Federal Reserve has broad supervisory oversight of a 

foreign banking organization’s U.S. banking operations. Depending on the charter or license granted to 

a foreign banking organization, the Federal Reserve generally relies on either the OCC or state banking 

authorities to examine and supervise these institutions. The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) 

examines institutions with more than $10 billion in assets for consumer protection compliance issues. 

Credit unions in the United States are supervised and separately insured by the National Credit Union 

Administration.

In addition to its role as the deposit insurer for all banks and the supervisor of state nonmember banks, the 

FDIC may accept appointment and act as conservator or receiver for any insured depository institution (IDI) 

under the Federal Deposit Insurance Act (FDI Act) and, in cases in which the financial stability of the United 

States may be at risk, the resolution authority for financial companies under Title II of the Dodd-Frank Wall 

Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (the Dodd-Frank Act). It is important to note that Title II of the 

Dodd-Frank Act expressly excludes IDIs from resolution under Title II; the FDI Act remains the resolution 

regime for IDIs in all cases. The responses in this self-assessment focus on the FDIC’s roles as they relate to 

IDIs and deposit insurance. However, when reference to the Dodd-Frank Act is relevant to a particular Core 

Principle or Essential Criterion, such reference is included for the purpose of completeness.

9 FDIC, Opening Statement, First Quarter 2019 Quarterly Banking Profile, https://www.fdic.gov/news/speeches/spmay2919.pdf.

6
Legal Framework

The United States has a well-developed legal framework. The rule of law is firmly established and legal 

authorities proceed from the U.S. Constitution, which establishes separation of powers between the 

executive, legislative, and judicial branches of government. Federal legislation is enacted by the U.S. 

Congress and implemented by the executive branch of government; the powers of each are constrained 

by the Constitution and their actions are subject to review by and the binding decisions of the federal 

judiciary. There is a defined legal basis for regulation and supervision of banks operating in the United 

States. Agency rulemaking is subject to procedural requirements intended to foster public and stakeholder 

participation in the formulation of standards. The U.S. federal banking agencies issue and regularly update 

regulations and guidelines implementing their statutory authority and supplement these with policy 

statements, formal and informal interpretations, and supervisory guidance and manuals.

The statutes and regulations provide for chartering banks and, among other things, address permissible 

bank and nonbank affiliations, acquisitions, and activities. The statutes and regulations establish a 

framework of minimum prudential standards that banks must meet. For example, standards address 

capital adequacy, internal controls and audits, accounting, liquidity, and anti-money laundering 

and combating the financing of terrorism (AML/CFT) efforts. Bank holding companies and financial 

holding companies (collectively referred to herein as holding companies) also are subject to prudential 

requirements under statutes and regulations consistent with the principle that holding companies should 

serve as a source of financial and managerial strength for insured bank subsidiaries.10

10 Under the Bank Holding Company Act, a bank holding company may elect to be a financial holding company. In addition to banking, a financial 

holding company offers nonbank financial products.

7
Core Principles and Compliance Assessment

PRINCIPLE 1 PUBLIC POLICY OBJECTIVES

The principal public policy objectives for deposit insurance systems are to protect depositors and contribute to 

financial stability. These objectives should be formally specified and publicly disclosed. The design of the deposit 

insurance system should reflect the system’s public policy objectives.

The public policy objectives of the deposit insurance system are clearly and formally 

specified and made public, for example through legislation or documents supporting 

legislation.

The FDIC was created by Congress to protect depositors and maintain stability and public confidence 

in the nation’s financial system.11 The FDIC promotes financial stability through its statutory functions 

as deposit insurer, supervisor, and as receiver or conservator of failed IDIs under the FDI Act and failed 

financial companies under Title II of the Dodd-Frank Act.12

The design of the deposit insurance system is consistent with the system’s public policy 

objectives.

The design of the deposit insurance system is consistent with the system’s policy objectives. Congress 

granted the FDIC statutory authority consistent with its mission, as discussed in greater detail in CP2. Among other things, the FDIC is authorized to approve applications for deposit insurance, collect 

assessments and maintain a fund, hire staff, prescribe regulations, examine banks, compel banks to 

comply with their legal obligations under the deposit insurance system, and manage receiverships and 

conservatorships of failed banks. The FDIC also has the authority to examine for insurance purposes any 

bank, either directly or in cooperation with state or other federal supervisory authorities.13

There is a review of the extent to which a deposit insurance system meets its public 

policy objectives. This involves both an internal review conducted on a regular basis 

by the governing body and an external review conducted periodically by an external 

body (e.g. the body to which the deposit insurer is accountable or an independent entity 

with no conflicts of interest, such as an auditor general). Any review must take into 

consideration the views of key stakeholders.

The U.S. deposit insurance system is subject to regular internal and external reviews to ensure that it is 

satisfying public policy objectives.

Internal Reviews—The FDIC Board of Directors publicly reports annually on the FDIC’s performance 

on policy objectives for each of its major program areas, including deposit insurance, supervision, and 

receivership management. The FDIC’s performance is evaluated against measurable targets—for example, 

whether insured depositors of a failed bank were able to access their funds within one business day. The 

11 FDI Act §§ 1(a), 5(a), 11(a); 12 U.S.C. §§ 1811(a), 1815(a), 1821(a). See generally FDI Act.

12 U.S.C. § 1811 and following. Legislative history also confirms these policy objectives: “Added coverage may help in achieving more fully both of the 

major objectives of deposit insurance—protection of the individual depositor and promotion of stability in the economy as a whole through protection of 

the money supply and maintenance of public confidence in banks.” Amendments to Federal Deposit Insurance Act: Hearings Before the S. Subcommittee 

on Federal Reserve Matters, 81 Cong. 108 (1950) (statement of Thomas McCabe, Chairman, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve).

13 The Board produces and publishes these annual reports as required by several federal statutes, including the Government Performance and Results 

Act of 1993 and the FDI Act § 17(a), 12 U.S.C. § 1827(a).

Essential

Criterion 1

Essential 

Criterion 2

Essential

Criterion 3

8
Board of Directors uses a variety of similar performance objectives to evaluate the FDIC’s performance of 

each of its major functions.14

External Reviews—The FDIC Office of Inspector General (OIG) is an independent unit established by the 

Inspector General Act of 1978 as amended.15 The FDIC OIG conducts audits, evaluations, investigations, 

and other reviews of FDIC programs and operations. The FDIC OIG’s mission is to promote the economy, 

efficiency, and effectiveness of FDIC programs and operations, and to prevent, deter, and detect waste, 

fraud, abuse, and misconduct in FDIC programs and operations. The FDIC OIG aims to prompt and 

encourage improvements and efficiencies, to help preserve the integrity of the agency and the banking 

system, and to protect depositors and financial consumers.

Under Section 5 of the Inspector General Act of 1978, the FDIC OIG reports to the U.S. Congress 

semiannually on the FDIC’s performance, including problems or deficiencies in FDIC programs and 

operations, and provides recommendations for corrective action.16

The FDI Act also requires that if the FDIC is appointed receiver of a bank that failed, and the failure caused 

a material loss to the Deposit Insurance Fund (DIF), the Inspector General of the institution’s supervising 

federal banking agency must review the failure and prepare a material loss review report.17

The FDIC is also subject to external reviews conducted by the Government Accountability Office (GAO), 

an independent, nonpartisan agency. The GAO supports the U.S. Congress in efforts to improve the 

performance and ensure the accountability of the federal government. The GAO publishes reports that are 

intended to help Congress make effective oversight, policy, and funding decisions.18

The reviews described above and the periodic testimony required of FDIC officials at Congressional 

hearings support Congressional oversight of the deposit insurance system and the FDIC. Every year the 

FDIC must submit a full report of its operations, activities, budget, receipts, and expenditures for the 

preceding 12 months. This information is contained in the FDIC Annual Report and is submitted to the 

President of the United States and the U.S. Congress.

If additional public policy objectives are incorporated, they do not conflict with the two 

principal objectives of protecting depositors and contributing to the stability of the 

financial system.

As discussed in EC-1, the FDIC’s mission is to protect depositors and maintain stability and public 

confidence in the nation’s financial system. Aside from the FDIC’s responsibilities under the FDI Act, as 

noted above the FDIC may in certain circumstances be appointed receiver of a systemically important 

financial company under Title II of the Dodd-Frank Act.

In its role as receiver under Title II, the FDIC’s mandate is to resolve failing financial companies that pose a 

significant risk to the financial stability of the United States in a manner that 

y mitigates such risk and minimizes moral hazard, and to do so in a manner that best fulfills this 

purpose so that:

y creditors and shareholders will bear the losses of the financial company;

y management responsible for the condition of the financial company will not be retained; and 

14 See for example 2018 FDIC Annual Report, Section II, Performance Results Summary.

15 5 U.S.C. App. § 1 and following.

16 Pub. L. No. 95-452, 92 Stat. 1101 (1978), 5 U.S.C. App. Section 5 (a) of the Inspector General Act of 1978 provides that the scope of the FDIC OIG’s review 

is not limited to the items enumerated in the statute. The FDIC OIG’s reports to Congress are available online at: https://www.fdicoig.gov/semiannualreports.

17 FDI Act § 38(k), 12 U.S.C. § 1831o(k).

18 GAO reports are available online at https://www.gao.gov/.

Essential

Criterion 4

9
y the FDIC and other appropriate agencies will take all steps necessary and appropriate 

to assure that all parties, including management, directors, and third parties, that have 

responsibility for the condition of the financial company bear losses consistent with their 

responsibility, including actions for damages, restitution, and recoupment of compensation 

and other gains not compatible with such responsibility.

This mandate is consistent with the policy objectives described in the response to EC-1 above.

10
PRINCIPLE 2 MANDATE AND POWERS

The mandate and powers of the deposit insurer should support the public policy objectives and be clearly defined 

and formally specified in legislation.

The mandate and powers of the deposit insurer are formally and clearly specified in 

legislation, and are consistent with stated public policy objectives.

The FDIC’s enabling statute, the FDI Act, clearly articulates the FDIC’s mandate as a risk minimizer and 

provides the FDIC with the powers necessary to fulfill this mandate and the policy objectives discussed 

under CP-1 (please see the response to EC-3 below and the responses in CP-14 for detailed discussion of 

the FDIC’s powers).

The mandate clarifies the roles and responsibilities of the deposit insurer and is aligned 

with the mandates of other safety-net participants.

The objective of the federal banking agencies is to promote safe-and-sound banking practices in the 

United States and to maintain stability and public confidence in the banking system.

The FDIC’s roles and responsibilities are congruent with the mandates of other U.S. safety-net participants, 

including the Federal Reserve and the OCC. The FDIC’s mandate to maintain stability and confidence in the 

U.S. financial system aligns with the Federal Reserve’s mandate to provide the nation with a safer, more 

flexible, and more stable monetary and financial system and with the OCC’s mission to ensure a safe-andsound federal banking system.

Each bank, whether chartered under state or federal law, is subject to regulation, supervision, and 

examination by a primary federal banking regulator who shares responsibility for determining the safety 

and soundness of the U.S. banking system. Depositor protection and resolution are within the scope of the 

FDIC’s responsibilities.

As discussed in more detail in the responses under CP-4, the federal banking agencies maintain a formal 

and comprehensive framework for coordination, including through the Federal Financial Institutions 

Examination Council (FFIEC).19 The FFIEC is a formal interagency body empowered to prescribe uniform 

principles, standards, and report forms for the federal examination of financial institutions by the Federal 

Reserve, the FDIC, the OCC, and certain other federal financial regulatory agencies. 

In 2006, a State Liaison Committee, composed of five representatives of state agencies that supervise 

financial institutions, was added to the Council as a voting member. The FFIEC makes recommendations to 

promote uniformity in the supervision of financial institutions.

As discussed in CP-6, the FDIC Chairman is a voting member of the FSOC, established in 2010 by the DoddFrank Act, which is responsible for identifying risks to the financial stability of the United States, promoting 

market discipline, and responding to emerging risks to the stability of the U.S. financial system.

The powers of the deposit insurer support its mandate and enable the deposit insurer to 

fulfill its roles and responsibilities.

The FDIC has appropriate powers to support its mandate to maintain stability and public confidence in the 

nation’s financial system and to fulfill its roles and responsibilities as deposit insurer, bank examiner and 

supervisor, and receiver or conservator of failed IDIs.

19 Financial Institutions Regulatory and Interest Rate Control Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-630, 92 Stat. 3641, 3694 (codified

at 12 U.S.C. 3301 and following).

Essential

Criterion 1

Essential

Criterion 2

Essential

Criterion 3

11
Deposit Insurer Powers

The FDI Act provides the FDIC powers and authorities to carry out its role as deposit insurer, including 

powers to:

y review and approve or deny applications for deposit insurance from banks engaged in the 

business of receiving deposits, other than trust funds, or any insured branch of a foreign bank 

which is not a federal branch;20

y terminate a bank’s deposit insurance based upon any unsafe or unsound practice or condition 

or any violation specified in the required notice;21 and

y make determinations of amounts of insured deposits that are due any depositor.22

The FDI Act contains a broad array of deposit insurance powers discussed more fully in EC-4.

Bank Supervisory Powers

As discussed in EC-1, the FDIC has the authority to:

y examine state nonmember banks;

y examine any bank for insurance purposes through the FDIC’s secondary examination 

authority;23 and

y take direct enforcement action or recommend that another federal banking agency take 

enforcement action against a bank in appropriate circumstances and may take such action 

directly against the bank if the other agency does not take action.24

Receivership and Resolution Powers

As discussed in greater detail in CP-14, the FDIC is statutorily required to accept appointment to act as 

the receiver for a failed federally chartered IDI.25In all other cases, the FDIC may accept appointment as 

conservator or receiver for any IDI.26 The FDIC is provided a number of powers as receiver or conservator, 

including succeeding to all rights, titles, powers, and privileges of the institution; conducting the business 

of the institution; merging the institution with another IDI; or transferring assets or liabilities of the 

institution to another IDI or to a bridge depository institution.27

Corporate Powers

The general corporate powers of the FDIC enable the FDIC to fulfill its roles and responsibilities, including 

those of deposit insurer. These include the powers to:

y make contracts;

y sue and be sued, and complain and defend, by and through its own attorneys, in any state or 

federal court of law or equity;

y hire officers and employees;

y conduct business;

y exercise all powers specifically granted by the provisions of the FDI Act, and incidental powers 

necessary to carry out the granted powers;

20 FDI Act § 5, 12 U.S.C. § 1815.

21 FDI Act § 8, 12 U.S.C. § 1818.

22 FDI Act § 11(a), 12 U.S.C. § 1821(a).

23 FDI Act § 10(b)(3), 12 U.S.C. § 1820(b)(3).

24 FDI Act § 8, 12 U.S.C. § 1818 and FDI Act § 8(t), 12 U.S.C. § 1818(t).

25 FDI Act § 11(c)(2)(A)(ii), 12 U.S.C. § 1821(c)(2)(A)(ii).

26 FDI Act § 11(c)(1), 12 U.S.C. § 1821(c)(1).

27 FDI Act § 11(d), 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d).

12
y make examinations of and require information and reports from insured banks;

y act as receiver; and

y prescribe such rules and regulations as it may deem necessary to carry out the provisions of 

the FDI Act or of any other law which it has the responsibility of administering or enforcing.28

The powers of the deposit insurer include, but are not limited to:

a) assessing and collecting premiums, levies, or other charges

b) transferring deposits to another bank

c) reimbursing insured depositors

d) obtaining directly from banks timely, accurate, and comprehensive information 

necessary to fulfill its mandate

e) receiving and sharing timely, accurate, and comprehensive information within the 

safety-net, and with applicable safety-net participants in other jurisdictions

f) compelling banks to comply with their legally enforceable obligations to the deposit 

insurer (e.g. provide access to depositor information), or requesting that another 

safety- net participant do so on behalf of the deposit insurer

g) setting operating budgets, policies, systems, and practices

h) entering into contracts.

The FDIC’s authority includes the powers listed in EC-4 above:

a) Any institution that becomes insured by the FDIC must pay the FDIC any fee that the FDIC 

may by regulation prescribe to maintain the reserve ratio of the DIF.29 The FDIC is statutorily 

required to establish by regulation a risk-based assessment system for banks, and each 

institution must pay assessments imposed under such system.30See the responses to CP-9 

(Sources and Uses of Funds) for further discussion of the deposit insurance assessment 

system.

b) The FDIC may, as resolution authority of a bank, transfer any asset or liability of the institution 

in default (including assets and liabilities associated with any trust business) without any 

approval, assignment, or consent; however, a transfer to a bank other than a new institution 

established pursuant to 12 U.S.C. § 1821(m) or a bridge bank requires the approval of the 

appropriate federal banking agency.31

c) In case of liquidation, closing, or winding up of the affairs of any bank, payment of the insured 

deposits in the institution shall be made by the FDIC as soon as possible either by cash 

or by making available to each depositor a transferred deposit in a new bank in the same 

community or in another bank in an amount equal to the insured deposit of such depositor.32

d) As a general matter, the FDIC has access to information in connection with its responsibility 

to conduct examinations of banks and its authority to take enforcement actions against 

banks, bank holding companies, and affiliates under statutorily prescribed conditions.33 Each 

insured state nonmember bank and each foreign bank having an insured branch which is not a 

28 FDI Act § 9(a), 12 U.S.C. § 1819(a).

29 FDI Act § 5(d), 12 U.S.C. § 1815(d).

30 FDI Act § 7(b)-(c), 12 U.S.C. § 1817(b)-(c) and 12 C.F.R. § 327.9.

31 FDI Act § 11(d)(2)(G), 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(2)(G), 12 C.F.R. § 360.1(b); FDI Act § 11(d)(2)(G)(ii), 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(2)(G)(ii).

32 See FDI Act, §§ 8 and following, 10(b) 12 U.S.C. §§ 1818 and following, and 1820(b).

33 FDI Act § 7(a), 12 U.S.C. § 1817(a); 12 C.F.R. § 304.3.

Essential

Criterion 4

13
federal branch shall make to the FDIC reports of condition and include their deposit liabilities 

as directed in those reports. The FDIC may occasionally require additional reports.34 As 

discussed in the response to (e) below, the FDIC has access to reports of examination made by, 

and reports of condition made to, the OCC, the Federal Housing Finance Agency, any Federal 

Home Loan Bank, and any Federal Reserve Bank.35

e) The FDIC shall have access to reports of examination made by, and reports of condition made 

to, the OCC, the Federal Housing Finance Agency, any Federal Home Loan Bank, or any Federal 

Reserve Bank. The FDIC may accept any report made by or to any commission, board, or 

authority having supervision of a depository institution (including state banking entities), and 

may furnish to the OCC; the Federal Housing Finance Agency; and any Federal Home Loan 

Bank, Federal Reserve Bank, commission, board, or authority reports of examination made on 

behalf of, and reports of condition made to, the FDIC.36

f) Any bank which fails to make or publish any report required within the period of time specified 

by its primary federal banking supervisor or submits or publishes any false or misleading 

report or information shall be subject to a penalty for each day during which such failure 

continues or such false or misleading information is not corrected.37

g) As discussed in EC-3, the FDIC has the power to conduct business, prescribe rules and 

regulations, and the ability to exercise incidental powers necessary to carry out its statutory 

powers.38

h) As discussed in EC-3, the FDIC’s power to make contracts is one of the statutory powers 

enumerated in the FDI Act.39

34 FDI Act § 7(a), 12 U.S.C. § 1817(a); 12 C.F.R. § 304.3.

35 FDI Act § 7(a)(2)(A), 12 U.S.C. § 1817(a)(2)(A).

36 FDI Act § 7(a), 12 U.S.C. § 1817(a); 12 C.F.R. § 304.3.

37 12 U.S.C. §§ 161, 164 (for national banks); Federal Reserve Act § 9, 12 U.S.C. § 324 (for state member banks); FDI Act § 7, 12 U.S.C. § 1817 (for insured 

state nonmember commercial and savings banks).

38 FDI Act § 9(a), 12 U.S.C. § 1819(a).

39 FDI Act § 9(a), 12 U.S.C. § 1819(a).

14
PRINCIPLE 3 GOVERNANCE

The deposit insurer should be operationally independent, well-governed, transparent, accountable, and 

insulated from external interference.

The deposit insurer is operationally independent. It is able to use its powers without 

interference from external parties to fulfill its mandate. There is no government, 

central bank, supervisory, or industry interference that compromises the operational 

independence of the deposit insurer.

The FDIC is empowered to act without interference from external parties to fulfill its mandate.

The management of the FDIC is vested in a Board of Directors consisting of five members. One is the 

Comptroller of the Currency. One is the Director of the CFPB. Three are independent directors appointed 

by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate for terms of six years. Not more than three 

Board members may be of the same political party. One of the appointed members is designated by the 

President, with the advice and consent of the Senate, as Chairman of the Board.40

In addition, the FDIC receives no Congressional appropriations. It is funded by premiums that banks pay for 

deposit insurance coverage and from earnings on investments in U.S. Treasury securities.

The governing body of the deposit insurer is held accountable to a higher authority.

The FDIC is managed by a five-member Board of Directors and is primarily accountable to the U.S. 

Congress.41 FDIC management regularly testifies at oversight and other hearings before Congressional 

committees. The GAO, an independent, nonpartisan agency that works for Congress, conducts periodic 

audits of the FDIC. The FDIC OIG conducts regular internal audits of the agency.42

The deposit insurer has the capacity and capability (e.g. human resources, operating 

budget, and salary scales sufficient to attract and retain qualified staff) to support its 

operational independence and the fulfillment of its mandate.

The FDIC is not subject to the congressional budget process or congressional appropriations. The FDIC 

Board ensures that the FDIC has the capacity and capability to support its operational independence and 

fulfill its mandate. The operations of the FDIC acting in its corporate capacity (including that of deposit 

insurer) are generally funded by the DIF, which is funded through regular assessments on banks. The 

operations of the FDIC as receiver of failed banks are funded by the assets of the failed institution and, if 

necessary, the DIF.43

The deposit insurer is well-governed and subject to sound governance practices, 

including appropriate accountability, internal controls, transparency and disclosure 

regimes. The institutional structure of the deposit insurer minimizes the potential for 

real or perceived conflicts of interest.

The FDIC complies with the Government Performance and Results Act of 1993, which requires federal 

agencies, in consultation with the U.S. Congress and outside stakeholders, to prepare a strategic plan 

covering a multiyear period and to submit an annual performance plan and performance report.44 The 

performance plan and report are incorporated in the FDIC annual report, which is required to be made 

40 FDI Act § 2, 12 U.S.C. § 1812.

41 FDI Act § 2, 12 U.S.C. § 1812.

42 The OIG’s mission is to prevent, deter, and detect waste, fraud, abuse, and misconduct in FDIC programs and operations and to promote economy, 

efficiency, and effectiveness at the agency. See Inspector General Act of 1978, 5 U.S.C. App.

43 FDI Act § 13(d), 12 U.S.C. § 1823(d).

44 5 U.S.C. § 306; 31 U.S.C. § 1115.

Essential

Criterion 1

Essential

Criterion 2

Essential

Criterion 3

Essential

Criterion 4

15
public. The FDIC also reports annually on regulatory and supervisory actions taken during the year. 

These requirements provide transparent measures of agency performance against statutory and stated 

performance targets. Moreover, federal agencies, including the FDIC, are subject to the Freedom of 

Information Act, which gives the public the right to access certain federal government records.45 Finally, as 

discussed in the response to EC-2, the GAO, an independent, nonpartisan agency that works for Congress, 

may conduct periodic audits of the FDIC and the FDIC OIG conducts regular internal audits of the agency.

The FDIC requires that its agency heads and all staff maintain high professional standards and exhibit 

high integrity. Federal laws and regulations, including the Standards of Ethical Conduct for Employees of 

the Executive Branch and the Supplemental Standards of Ethical Conduct for Employees of the Federal 

Deposit Insurance Corporation, help to ensure these standards are met.46 For example, FDIC employees 

are prohibited from acquiring, owning, or controlling stock in any FDIC-insured institution or holding 

company owning an FDIC-insured institution. Senior examination staffs of the FDIC generally are subject to 

a one-year post-employment cooling-off period for entities they supervised.47 Violators are subject to civil 

monetary penalties, can be removed from office, and can be prohibited from participating in the affairs of 

the supervised entity for up to five years.

Examiners also are prohibited from accepting loans or gratuities from banks they examine.48 These 

standards are reinforced by a number of criminal statutes, including those prohibiting corruption, bribery, 

theft, and fraud by agency employees. Members of the FDIC Board of Directors are prohibited from holding 

any office, position, or employment in any bank or holding company that owns a bank during their time in 

office and for two years after they leave office, subject to certain exceptions.49

The deposit insurer operates in a transparent and responsible manner. It discloses and 

publishes appropriate information for stakeholders on a regular basis.

The FDIC has instituted the “Trust Through Transparency” initiative to foster a deeper culture of openness 

with stakeholders. The initiative unites each business area across the FDIC behind the goals of being 

accessible, understandable, and responsive. A key feature of the initiative is the publication of performance 

metrics, such as turnaround times for examinations and bank charter applications, call center usage and 

response times, and data on the status of supervisory and assessment appeals.

The FDIC continues to provide information and resources to promote better understanding of the way it 

does business, including, as discussed in the response to EC-4, preparation of a multiyear strategic plan, an 

annual performance plan, and a performance report, which are incorporated into the FDIC annual reports 

and made public. The FDIC also reports annually on regulatory and supervisory actions taken during 

the year. Together, these reports provide responsible and transparent measures of agency performance 

against statutory and stated performance targets.

The FDIC holds Board meetings that are open to the public and the FDIC has placed much information 

about FDIC operations on its website. The FDIC also communicates regularly with its stakeholders and 

the public through a variety of means, including conferences, bankers’ meetings, press releases, policy 

statements, guidance, and frequently asked questions. Another venue for communication is the notice 

and comment rulemaking process, whereby notice is published in the Federal Register seeking comment 

on a proposed rulemaking before it becomes final. Finally, federal agencies, including the FDIC, are subject 

to the Freedom of Information Act, which gives the public the right to access certain federal government 

records.

45 Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552.

46 5 C.F.R. §§ 2635, 3201.

47 See for example FDI Act § 10(k), 12 U.S.C. § 1820(k).

48 18 U.S.C. § 213.

49 FDI Act, § 2, 12 U.S.C. § 1812.

Essential

Criterion 5

16
The governing statutes or other relevant laws and policies governing the deposit insurer 

specify that:

a) the governing body and management are “fit and proper” persons;

b) members of the governing body and the head(s) of the deposit insurer (with the 

exception of ex officio appointees) is/are subject to fixed terms and the fixed terms 

are staggered;

c) there is a transparent process for the appointment and removal of the members of 

the governing body and head(s) of the deposit insurer. Members of the governing 

body and head(s) of the deposit insurer can be removed from office during their term 

only for reasons specified or defined in law, internal statutes, or rules of professional 

conduct, and not without cause; and

d) members of the governing body and employees are subject to high ethical standards 

and comprehensive codes of conduct to minimize the potential for real or perceived 

conflicts of interest.

The FDIC is managed by a five-member Board of Directors, all of whom are appointed by the President 

and confirmed by the Senate. No more than three members may be from the same political party. One 

Board member is the Comptroller of the Currency and one is the Director of the CFPB. The three remaining 

Directors are appointed from among individuals who are citizens of the United States and serve for a 

fixed term of six years, although one of the appointed members is designated by the President to serve as 

Chairman for a five-year term. One appointed Director must have state bank supervisory experience. There 

is no expectation that the appointed FDIC Directors, including the Chairman, will resign at the conclusion 

of the term of the President who appointed them.50

As discussed in the response to EC-4, the FDIC requires that its agency heads and all staff maintain high 

professional standards and exhibit high integrity. FDIC employees are subject to both the Standards 

of Ethical Conduct for Employees of the Executive Branch and the Supplemental Standards of Ethical 

Conduct for Employees of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation. Members of the FDIC Board of 

Directors are subject to restrictions during and after service.51 While serving, no Board member can 

be employed by or hold stock in an insured institution or in a holding company that owns an insured 

institution.52

The deposit insurer is regularly assessed on the extent to which it meets its mandate, 

and the deposit insurer is subject to regular internal and external audits.

As discussed in the response to EC-2, the FDIC is primarily accountable to the U.S. Congress. The FDIC is 

also subject to periodic audit by the GAO, an independent, nonpartisan agency that works for Congress. 

The FDIC OIG conducts regular internal audits of the agency.

The composition of the governing body minimizes the potential for real or perceived 

conflicts of interest. In order to maintain operational independence, representatives of 

the other financial safety-net organizations that participate in the governing body do 

not serve as Chair or constitute a majority.

As discussed in the response to EC-6, the FDIC is managed by a five- member Board of Directors appointed 

by the President and confirmed by the Senate. No more than three members shall be of the same political 

party. One Board member is the Comptroller of the Currency and one is the Director of the CFPB, neither 

50 FDI Act § 2, 12 U.S.C. § 1812.

51 FDI Act § 2, 12 U.S.C. § 1812; 5 C.F.R. §§ 2635, 3201.

52 FDI Act § 2(e), 12 U.S.C. § 1812(e).

Essential

Criterion 6

Essential

Criterion 7

Essential

Criterion 8

17
of whom may serve as Chairman. One of the three remaining appointed Directors is designated by the 

President as Chairman for a five-year term.

No Board member can be employed by or hold stock in an insured institution or holding company that 

owns an insured institution during their service.53

The governing body holds regular meetings to oversee and manage the affairs of the 

deposit insurer (e.g. on a quarterly basis and more frequently as deemed necessary).

The FDIC Board of Directors meets regularly in both open and closed sessions. These meetings typically 

take place monthly, or as necessary to manage the FDIC’s affairs.

53 FDI Act § 2(e), 12 U.S.C. § 1812(e).

Essential

Criterion 9

18
PRINCIPLE 4 RELATIONSHIPS WITH OTHER SAFETY-NET PARTICIPANTS

In order to protect depositors and contribute to financial stability, there should be a formal and comprehensive 

framework in place for the close coordination of activities and information sharing, on an ongoing basis, between 

the deposit insurer and other financial safety-net participants.

Ongoing information sharing and the coordination of actions is explicit and formalized 

through legislation, regulation, memoranda of understanding, legal agreements or a 

combination thereof.

U.S. banking regulators have established a formal and comprehensive framework that ensures effective 

information sharing and close and routine coordination. Information sharing and inter-agency coordination 

is routine, explicit, formalized through a long history of practices governed by interagency agreements, 

and supported by statutory powers.

The federal banking agencies are statutorily authorized, at their discretion, to disclose any report of 

examination or other confidential supervisory information concerning any depository institution or other 

entity examined by such agency under authority of any federal law, to any other federal or state agency 

or authority with supervisory or regulatory authority over the depository institution or other entity, and 

any other person that the Federal banking agency determines to be appropriate.54 The five supervisory 

agencies that comprise the FFIEC (the OCC, the FDIC, the Federal Reserve, the CFPB, and the NCUA)—in 

addition to the Securities and Exchange Commission, the Federal Trade Commission, and the Commodity 

Futures Trading Commission—are authorized to exchange financial records, examination reports and 

other information with respect to a financial institution, holding company or any subsidiary of a depository 

institution or holding company.55 In addition to interagency cooperation agreements with other federal 

and foreign bank authorities, the FDIC maintains agreements with each of the state banking regulatory 

agencies.56 These agreements govern information sharing and alternate examination programs for statechartered institutions that are not members of the Federal Reserve.

Rules regarding confidentiality of information apply to all safety net participants and 

the exchange of information among them. Confidentiality of information is protected by 

law or through agreements so as not to prevent information sharing within the safety 

net.

There are no impediments to information sharing between the FDIC and relevant safety-net participants 

and the confidentiality of privileged information is well-guarded.

The U.S. federal banking agencies have broad statutory powers that allow them to share information 

with other domestic and foreign banking authorities.57 The importance and necessity of maintaining the 

confidentiality of the information are highlighted in several statutory and regulatory provisions, as is the 

requirement that the information be used for lawful supervisory purposes.58

54 FDI Act, 12 U.S.C. § 1817(a)(2)(C).

55 See 12 U.S.C. § 3303(a). 12 U.S.C. § 3412(e).

56 The agreements with state banking regulatory agencies are maintained by the Internal Review and Control Section of the Division of Risk 

Management and Supervision of the FDIC.

57 See for example FDI Act § 7(a)(2)(A), (C), 12 U.S.C. § 1817(a)(2)(A), (C) (sharing with FDIC, a state or federal agency with supervisory or regulatory 

authority over the bank or other entity, or any appropriate person). See also International Banking Act of 1978 § 15(a), 12 U.S.C. § 3109(a).

58 FDI Act § 11(t), 12 U.S.C. 1821(t).

Essential

Criterion 1

Essential

Criterion 2

19
Federal banking agencies and the CFPB, in any capacity, are allowed to share information without waiving 

privilege. Each of the U.S. federal banking agencies has promulgated rules and policies implementing the 

civil and criminal statutes relating to the treatment of confidential supervisory and bank information.59

The confidentiality of sensitive bank information is protected by law and in practice. Unless authorized by 

law, it is a crime for an employee of the U.S. government to divulge, disclose, or make known in any manner 

trade secrets or other confidential business information collected in the course of employment or official 

duties.60

The federal banking agencies are subject to a general statutory prohibition on disclosing certain types of 

confidential financial information unless such sharing is specifically authorized by law.61 In addition, each 

agency’s regulations, which have the force of law, require confidential treatment of a broad range of nonpublic information.

Safety-net participants exchange information on an ongoing basis, and in particular 

when material supervisory actions are being taken in respect of member banks.

Domestically, the U.S. federal banking agencies collaborate and share information with each other, 

including in matters involving routine prudential supervision and in the event material supervisory actions 

have been considered.62

Information sharing between safety-net participants occurs throughout the life cycle of a bank. 

Coordination typically begins at the formation of a banking group, authorization of a new activity, or 

changes in a banking group’s structure where the primary federal (or state) banking authority considers 

applications to obtain a bank or savings association charter or license. Information sharing continues 

throughout normal supervisory activities, where examination findings are shared between the agencies, as 

appropriate, and agencies refer suspected criminal violations to law enforcement authorities. Additionally, 

interagency collaboration and coordination occurs in crisis situations, including when material supervisory 

actions are taken.

Monthly interagency meetings are held among the FDIC and the other federal banking agencies to discuss 

problem banks. Quarterly, the Financial Risk Committee, an interagency group composed of the FDIC and 

other federal banking agencies, meets to exchange information on banks at risk of failing.

Information exchange is reciprocal. The Federal Reserve, for example, as prudential supervisor for holding 

companies, provides information to other bank regulatory agencies and functional regulators regarding 

the financial condition, risk-management policies, and operations of regulated holding companies 

that may have a material impact on an individual regulated subsidiary. Other bank regulatory agencies 

make information about bank subsidiaries of holding companies available to the Federal Reserve and to 

each other. The U.S. federal banking agencies exchange information with functional regulators, such as 

the Securities and Exchange Commission and the Commodity Futures Trading Commission, related to 

securities companies that are part of a banking group or a financial conglomerate that includes a bank.

In addition, as discussed in CP-6, the FDIC Chairman is a voting member of the FSOC, established in 2010 

by the Dodd-Frank Act, which is responsible for identifying risks to the financial stability of the United 

States, promoting market discipline, and responding to emerging risks to the stability of the U.S. financial 

system. To achieve this mission, the FSOC is involved in facilitating coordination and information sharing 

among financial regulators.

59 12 C.F.R. Part 4 (OCC); 12 C.F.R § 211.27 and 12 C.F.R. Part 261 (Federal Reserve Board); 12 C.F.R. § 309.6 and 12 C.F.R. § 347.207 (FDIC); and 12 C.F.R. 

Part 1070 (CFPB).

60 18 U.S.C. § 1905.

61 18 U.S.C. § 1905.

62 International information sharing and coordination are discussed under CP-5.

Essential

Criterion 3

20
The FSOC also advises Congress and makes recommendations in such areas that will enhance the integrity, 

efficiency, competitiveness, and stability of the U.S. financial markets; facilitate information sharing and 

coordination among the member agencies and other federal and state agencies; and identify gaps in 

regulation that could pose risks to the financial stability of the United States. The FSOC must annually 

report to and testify before Congress on, among other things, significant financial market and regulatory 

developments and potential threats to U.S. financial stability.

In situations where there are multiple deposit insurers operating in the same national 

jurisdiction, appropriate information sharing and coordination arrangements among 

those deposit insurers are in place.

The FDIC is the sole federal insurer of bank deposits in the United States.63 In the state of Massachusetts, 

two private insurance funds provide coverage for deposits in excess of the FDIC deposit insurance limit.64

These programs do not affect the FDIC’s deposit insurance regulations or coverage. FDIC has agreements 

with the private insurers that facilitate the determination of the amount of excess deposits and the 

payment of insurance by the private insurers.

63 A separate authority—the National Credit Union Administration—charters, regulates, insures, and resolves federally insured credit unions. It is also 

an independent federal agency.

64 For more information about the two insurance funds in Massachusetts, see http://www.coopcentralbank.com/ and https://www.difxs.com/dif/

home.aspx.

Essential

Criterion 4

21
PRINCIPLE 5 CROSS-BORDER ISSUES

Where there is a material presence of foreign banks in a jurisdiction, formal information sharing and coordination 

arrangements should be in place among deposit insurers in relevant jurisdictions.

Where there is a material presence of foreign banks (i.e. foreign bank subsidiaries or 

branches), formal information sharing and coordination arrangements are in place 

among relevant deposit insurers and relevant safety net participants, subject to 

confidentiality provisions.

The U.S. federal banking agencies have broad authority to share information with foreign banking 

authorities and formal information sharing and coordination arrangements in place to facilitate sharing 

and coordination.65

The FDIC is a party to a number of Memoranda of Understanding, Statements of Cooperation, and other 

agreements establishing frameworks for cooperation and the exchange of information with foreign 

authorities. These agreements contain a number of provisions governing confidentiality. These provisions 

generally cover information sharing to the extent reasonable, subject to relevant statutes or regulations; 

grounds for denial; restricting use to lawful supervisory purposes; holding information confidential; 

requesting prior consent before sharing with third parties; disclosures required by statute or legal process; 

and consenting to onward sharing with stated authorities pursuant to lawful supervisory responsibilities.

In addition, the FDIC and other relevant federal banking agencies participate as host authorities in crisis 

management groups (CMGs) for certain foreign banking organizations.

In circumstances where a deposit insurer is responsible for coverage of deposits 

in a foreign jurisdiction, or where more than one deposit insurer is responsible for 

coverage in a jurisdiction, bilateral or multilateral agreements exist to determine which 

deposit insurer(s) is/are responsible for the reimbursement process, setting levies and 

premiums, and public awareness.

As discussed in the response to CP-14, EC-7, the FDIC is generally not responsible for insuring deposits in 

foreign jurisdictions. 

65 International Banking Act of 1978, § 15(a), 12 U.S.C. § 3109(a).

Essential

Criterion 1

Essential

Criterion 2

22
PRINCIPLE 6 DEPOSIT INSURER’S ROLE IN CONTINGENCY PLANNING AND CRISIS MANAGEMENT

The deposit insurer should have in place effective contingency planning and crisis management policies and 

procedures, to ensure that it is able to effectively respond to the risk of, and actual, bank failures and other 

events. The development of system-wide crisis preparedness strategies and management policies should be the 

joint responsibility of all safety-net participants. The deposit insurer should be a member of any institutional 

framework for ongoing communication and coordination involving financial safety-net participants related to 

system-wide crisis preparedness and management.

The deposit insurer has its own effective contingency planning and crisis management 

policies and procedures in place, to ensure that it is able to effectively respond to the 

risk of, and actual, bank failures and other events.

The FDIC has contingency planning and crisis management policies and procedures in place that allow it 

to respond effectively to the risk of bank failure, actual bank failures, and other events. The FDIC’s ability to 

deal with bank failures is demonstrated through its 85 years of experience in the resolution of thousands of 

banks, including during periods when elevated numbers of bank failures constituted a system-wide crisis. 

For example, from 2008 to 2013, 489 banks failed and were successfully resolved by the FDIC.

In connection with this contingency planning and crisis preparedness, the FDIC requires certain banks to 

submit plans that should enable the FDIC to:

y resolve the institution in a manner that ensures that depositors receive access to their insured 

deposits within one business day of the institution’s failure (two business days if the failure 

occurs on a day other than Friday);

y maximize the net present value return from the sale or disposition of its assets; and

y minimize the amount of any loss realized by the creditors in the resolution.66

In addition, the Large-Bank Deposit Insurance Determination Modernization Rule—which applies to banks 

with at least $2 billion in deposits and at least either (1) 250,000 deposit accounts or (2) $20 billion in total 

assets, regardless of the number of deposit accounts—requires these banks to have in place practices 

and procedures to provide the FDIC at the end of any business day with depositor and customer data 

for all deposit accounts held in domestic and foreign offices and interest-bearing investment accounts 

connected with sweep and automated credit arrangements.67

For severely distressed institutions for which failure appears imminent, the FDIC develops institutionspecific strategies for potential resolution of the failed bank under the FDI Act. In advance of the failure, 

FDIC personnel establish an on-site presence in the failing institution and begin gathering information 

and analyzing the institution’s financial and operational structure in preparation for the potential closing. 

Through this review, FDIC staff determines the optimal type of resolution transaction and, in most cases, 

begins the process of confidentially marketing the institution to potential acquirers. The entire resolution 

process, including the closing event, generally takes 90 days or less, not including post-closing activities. 

These processes are more fully explained in the Resolutions Handbook.

68 Refer to CP-14 for additional 

information about FDIC processes for resolving failed banks.

The FDIC also could be called upon to resolve other types of institutions under Title II of the Dodd-Frank 

Act if their failure could threaten U.S. financial stability. In the years since enactment of the Dodd-Frank Act, 

66 12 C.F.R. § 360.10.

67 12 C.F.R. § 360.9.

68 See for example FDIC, Resolutions Handbook, Chapter 3.

Essential

Criterion 1

23
the FDIC has made significant progress in developing the operational capabilities to carry out a resolution 

if needed and has undertaken institution-specific strategic planning.

The deposit insurer develops and regularly tests its own contingency planning and crisis 

management plans.

The FDIC regularly tests its contingency planning in a variety of ways to ensure that procedures and 

systems are effective. The most effective method of testing is actually resolving failed banks under the FDI 

Act. Other methods include exercises to evaluate the effectiveness of existing procedures and systems. 

The FDIC’s extensive experience with resolution of failed banks has provided the opportunity for testing of 

its resolution processes. As noted in CP-6, EC-1, the FDIC resolved 489 banks between 2008 and 2013. The 

resolution of these failed banks, many of which occurred simultaneously, tested many of the components 

of the FDIC’s contingency and crisis management plans. Aside from actual resolutions, the FDIC employs 

scenario planning and tabletop exercises to test resolution processes. For institutions whose resolution 

would be conducted under the FDI Act, the FDIC conducts liquidity crisis simulations involving closure of 

banks with assets of $5 billion to $50 billion, and holds planning sessions for setting up and running bridge 

banks. The FDIC also regularly tests covered banks’ implementation of the requirements of the Large-Bank 

Deposit Insurance Determination Modernization Rule, discussed in the response to CP-6, EC-1 above.

The deposit insurer is a member of any institutional framework for ongoing 

communication and coordination involving safety-net participants related to systemwide crisis preparedness and management.

The FDIC is a member of the FFIEC, an interagency body empowered to prescribe uniform principles, 

standards, and report forms for the federal examination of financial institutions.69 Additionally, the FDIC 

Chairman is a voting member of the FSOC, established in 2010 by the Dodd-Frank Act, which is responsible 

for identifying risks to the financial stability of the United States, promoting market discipline, and 

responding to emerging risks to the stability of the U.S. financial system. To achieve this mission, the FSOC 

is involved in facilitating coordination and information sharing among financial regulators.70

The FSOC also advises Congress and makes recommendations in such areas that will enhance the integrity, 

efficiency, competitiveness, and stability of the U.S. financial markets; facilitate information sharing and 

coordination among the member agencies and other federal and state agencies; and identify gaps in 

regulation that could pose risks to the financial stability of the United States. The FSOC must annually 

report to and testify before Congress on, among other things, significant financial market and regulatory 

developments and potential threats to U.S. financial stability.71

The deposit insurer participates in regular contingency planning and simulation 

exercises related to system-wide crisis preparedness and management involving all 

safety-net participants.

The FDIC participates in regular contingency planning and simulation exercises related to system-wide 

crisis preparedness and management. The FDIC, as deposit insurer and receiver and conservator for IDIs, 

participates in monthly interagency meetings with banking supervisors to discuss troubled banks. In 

addition, the FDIC meets frequently with both state and federal chartering authorities to discuss resolution 

processes and to ensure appropriate contacts are maintained.

Given the size of the U.S. banking sector, it is possible that a system-wide crisis may also involve the 

exercise of the FDIC’s authority as resolution authority for financial companies under Title II of the Dodd69 For information about the FFIEC’s structure, purpose, and ongoing activities see https://www.ffiec.gov/about.htm.

70 More information about the FSOC is available at https://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/fsoc/Pages/home.aspx.

71 See Dodd-Frank Act § 112(a)(2), 12 U.S.C. § 5322(a)(2).

Essential

Criterion 2

Essential

Criterion 3

Essential

Criterion 4

24
Frank Act. In this regard, the FDIC collaborates with other relevant authorities to discuss processes and 

ensure mechanisms for coordination during times of crisis are in place.

The deposit insurer participates in the development of pre- and post-crisis management 

communication plans involving all safety-net participants, to ensure comprehensive and 

consistent public awareness and communications.

Given the FDIC’s long history of resolving failed banks, the FDIC Office of Communications (OCOM) has 

developed standardized practices for providing information to the public upon placement of an institution 

into resolution under the FDI Act. For every bank failure, including during crisis situations, the FDIC 

executes a comprehensive public communications strategy.72 This includes issuing press releases, use of 

social media, providing detailed information and frequently asked questions on the FDIC website (http://

www.fdic.gov/), and establishing a customer service hotline.

In crisis situations, FDIC has used other tools, including press conferences, public service announcements, 

advertising, and video news releases.

In crisis periods, the FDIC engages with other safety-net participants to develop press releases and 

participates in briefings to inform the public about actions to address the crisis. More detailed information 

regarding communication strategies is in the response to CP-10.

72 The FSOC would also coordinate communication strategies among the federal banking agencies during a widespread financial crisis. There have 

been no systemic crises since the creation of the FSOC in 2010.

Essential

Criterion 5

25
PRINCIPLE 7 MEMBERSHIP

Membership in a deposit insurance system should be compulsory for all banks.

Membership in a deposit insurance system is compulsory for all banks, including stateowned banks (with or without explicit guarantees), and all banks are subject to sound 

prudential regulation and supervision.

State and federal agencies that charter banks condition approval of a new bank on receiving deposit 

insurance coverage. Often, chartering authorities and the FDIC will conduct joint reviews of related 

chartering and deposit insurance applications.

If, upon entry to a newly established deposit insurance system, a bank does not comply 

with all the supervisory or membership requirements and is allowed entry into the 

system, it is required to have a credible plan to address any deficiencies within a 

prescribed time frame (e.g. one year).

This EC is not applicable because there is no newly established deposit insurance system.

The conditions, process, and time frame for attaining membership are explicitly stated 

and transparent.

The conditions for attaining membership in the deposit insurance system are explicitly stated in federal 

law.73 The FDIC website provides several resources that detail the conditions, process, and timeframe for 

attaining membership, including a handbook that organizers of new banks can consult on the deposit 

insurance application process.74

If the deposit insurer is not responsible for granting membership in the deposit 

insurance system, the law or administrative procedures describe a clear and reasonable 

time frame within which the deposit insurer is consulted or informed in advance, and is 

given sufficient information about an application for a new license.

The FDIC grants membership in the deposit insurance system.75

When membership is canceled upon the revocation or surrender of a bank’s license, 

immediate notice is given to depositors to inform them that existing deposits will 

continue to be insured up to a specified deadline.

When a bank’s charter is revoked or surrendered and deposit insurance is terminated either voluntarily 

or involuntarily, the FDI Act and FDIC regulations provide for notice to depositors and the public. The FDI 

Act establishes statutory requirements for the voluntary termination of insurance by a bank without its 

deposit liabilities being assumed by another institution.76 FDIC regulations provide for prior written notice 

73 FDI Act § 6, 12 U.S.C. § 1816. Factors to be considered by the FDIC in authorizing deposit insurance coverage are:

1) the financial history and condition of the depository institution

2) the adequacy of the depository institution’s capital structure

3) the future earnings prospects of the depository institution

4) the general character and fitness of the management of the depository institution

5) the risk presented by such depository institution to the DIF

6) the convenience and needs of the community to be served by such depository institution

7) whether the depository institution’s corporate powers are consistent with the purposes of the FDI Act.

74 See https://www.fdic.gov/regulations/applications/depositinsurance/ and the Deposit Insurance Applications Procedures Manual, https://www.fdic.

gov/regulations/applications/depositinsurance/procmanual.pdf.

75 FDI Act § 5, 12 U.S.C. § 1815.

76 FDI Act § 8(a)(1), 12 U.S.C. § 1818(a)(1) (voluntary termination of insurance); FDI Act § 8(p), 12 U.S.C. § 1818(p) (institution that is not in the business of 

receiving deposits).

Essential

Criterion 1

Essential

Criterion 2

Essential

Criterion 3

Essential

Criterion 4

Essential

Criterion 5

26
to depositors, subject to prior approval of the FDIC.77 These regulations also incorporate a form of notice to 

depositors, which includes an explicit reference to the effective date of termination of FDIC insurance.78

Upon closure of the financial institution, it is the policy of the FDIC to publish and to mail proper notices to 

creditors and depositors advising how they may receive payment of their insured deposit accounts and the 

process of claiming their remaining balances under federal law and regulations.79

When membership is terminated by the deposit insurer, arrangements are in place 

to coordinate the immediate withdrawal of the bank’s deposit-taking license by the 

relevant authority. Upon termination, immediate notice is given to depositors to inform 

them that existing deposits will continue to be covered up to a specified deadline.

Arrangements are in place to coordinate the termination of deposit insurance, the withdrawal of a bank’s 

charter, and the notice to depositors. In some instances, the FDIC can terminate deposit insurance before 

the chartering agency revokes a bank’s charter.80 These actions are rare. The FDIC also is required to 

provide timely notice to the institution of its intention to terminate insurance.81 The FDIC may publish 

notice of termination and the depository institution must give prompt notice to each of its depositors 

and publish notice in a newspaper of general circulation.82 After involuntary termination of insured status, 

deposits of each depositor on the date of termination continue to be insured for a period of six months to 

two years, depending on the type of deposit.83

77 12 C.F.R. § 307.3(a)-(b).

78 12 C.F.R. § 307.3(c); 12 C.F.R. § 307, App. B.

79 See CP-10, EC-2 for more information on depositor notification in the event of a bank failure.

80 FDI Act § 8(a), (w), 12 U.S.C. § 1818(a)(2), (w).

81 FDI Act § 8(a)(2)(B), 12 U.S.C. §§ 1818(a)(2)(B).

82 FDI Act § 8(a)(6), 12 U.S.C. §§ 1818(a)(6); 12 C.F.R. § 308.123. See discussion of notice to depositors under EC-5.

83 FDI Act § 8(a)(7), 12 U.S.C. §§ 1818(a)(7).

Essential

Criterion 6

27
PRINCIPLE 8 COVERAGE

Policymakers should define clearly the level and scope of deposit coverage. Coverage should be limited, credible, 

and cover the large majority of depositors but leave a substantial amount of deposits exposed to market 

discipline. Deposit insurance coverage should be consistent with the deposit insurance system’s public policy 

objectives and related design features.

Insured deposits are clearly and publicly defined in law or regulation and reflect the 

public policy objectives. This definition includes the level and scope of coverage. If 

certain types of deposits and depositors are ineligible for deposit protection, they are 

clearly specified, easily determined and do not affect the speed of reimbursement.

Insured deposits are clearly and publicly defined in laws and regulations and reflect the public policy 

objectives. Deposits that are ineligible for deposit protection are clearly specified and easily determined. 

The standard deposit insurance coverage limit is $250,000 per depositor, per institution, for each account 

ownership category.84

Statute or regulation defines ownership categories, including single accounts, joint accounts, certain 

retirement accounts, revocable trust accounts, irrevocable trust accounts, business accounts, employee 

benefit plan accounts, mortgage servicing accounts, accounts held by a depository institution as trustee 

of an irrevocable trust, annuity contract accounts, public bond accounts, custodian accounts for Native 

Americans, government accounts, and accounts deposited by a bank pursuant to the Bank Deposit 

Financial Assistance Program of the Department of Energy.85

The level and scope of coverage are limited and are designed to be credible, so as to 

minimize the risk of runs on banks and do not undermine market discipline. The level 

and scope of coverage are set so that the large majority of depositors across banks 

are fully protected while leaving a substantial proportion of the value of deposits 

unprotected. In the event that a substantial proportion of the value of deposits is 

protected, moral hazard is mitigated by strong regulation and supervision, as well as by 

the other design features of the deposit insurance system.

Statute and regulation limit the level and scope of coverage to provide appropriate levels of protection 

without creating moral hazard or undermining market discipline. The level and scope of coverage are set to 

protect fully the large majority of depositors, while leaving a substantial proportion of the value of deposits 

unprotected. As of December 31, 2018, the value of total deposits in domestic offices was $12.61 trillion and 

the value of total FDIC-insured deposits was $7.53 trillion, or 59.7 percent of total domestic deposits.86

The deposit insurer applies the level and scope of coverage equally to all its member 

banks.

The FDIC applies the level and scope of coverage (as discussed in the responses to EC-1 and EC-2 above) 

equally to all member banks.

The deposit insurer does not incorporate co-insurance.

The FDIC does not incorporate co-insurance.

84 FDI Act § 11(a), 12 U.S.C. § 1821(a); 12 C.F.R. § 330.

85 FDI Act §§ 7(i)(3), 11(a), 12 U.S.C. §§ 1817(i)(3), 1821(a); 12 C.F.R. § 330 and FDIC, “Financial Institution Employee’s Guide to Deposit Insurance,” 25, 

https://www.fdic.gov/deposit/diguidebankers/documents/financial-institution-employees-guide-to-deposit-insurance.pdf.

86 FDIC, Quarterly Banking Profile, Fourth Quarter 2018, https://www.fdic.gov/bank/analytical/qbp/2018dec/qbp.pdf.

Essential

Criterion 1

Essential

Criterion 2

Essential

Criterion 3

Essential

Criterion 4

28
The level and scope of coverage are reviewed periodically (e.g. at least every five years) 

to ensure that it meets the public policy objectives of the deposit insurance system.

The FDIC reviews the level and scope of coverage every five years to ensure that they meet the public 

policy objectives of the deposit insurance system and to ensure parity between insured banks and insured 

credit unions. The Board of Directors of the FDIC and the Board of Directors of the National Credit Union 

Administration jointly consider the factors set forth under the law. If they determine that an inflation 

adjustment is appropriate, they jointly prescribe the amount by which the standard maximum deposit 

insurance amount should be increased.87

In the event of, or prior to, a merger or amalgamation of separate banks that are 

members of the same deposit insurance system, depositors of the merged or 

amalgamated banks enjoy separate coverage (up to the maximum coverage limit) for 

each of the banks for a limited but publicly stated period, as defined in law or regulation. 

Merging banks must be held responsible for notifying the affected depositors, including 

informing them of the date on which the separate coverage will expire.

The separate insurance of deposits that are assumed in a merger continues for six months from the date 

the merger takes effect or, in the case of a time deposit, the earliest maturity date after the six-month 

period.88 In the case of time deposits which mature within six months of the date that the deposits are 

assumed, and which are renewed at the same dollar amount, and for the same term as the original 

deposit, the separate insurance applies to the renewed deposits until the first maturity date after the 

six-month period. Time deposits that mature within six months of the deposit assumption and that are 

renewed on any other basis, or those that are not renewed and thereby become demand deposits, are 

separately insured only until the end of the six-month period.

The FDIC provides online and printed brochures that explain deposit insurance coverage. The FDIC 

provides the brochures for free to any member bank or depositor. Banks also distribute FDIC brochures to 

the public. One brochure explains the separate deposit insurance coverage that applies after two banks 

merge, and states that depositors need to restructure their accounts to maintain full insurance coverage.89

See CP-10, EC-1, for discussion of the FDIC’s public awareness efforts.

The residency status or nationality of depositors has no effect on coverage.

U.S. laws and regulations do not limit the availability of deposit insurance to citizens and residents of the 

United States.90 All deposits in banks located within the United States and its territories are covered by 

deposit insurance up to the specified limits.

In situations where there are multiple deposit insurers operating in the same national 

jurisdiction, any differences in coverage across banks operating within that jurisdiction 

do not adversely affect overall deposit insurance system effectiveness and financial 

stability.

The FDIC is the only federal insurer of bank deposits operating in the United States. See CP-4, EC-4, in for a 

discussion of the two private deposit insurers in Massachusetts, which provide excess coverage.

87 FDI Act § 11(a)(1)(F)(i), 12 U.S.C. § 1821(a)(1)(F)(i); Federal Credit Union Act § 207(k), 12 U.S.C. § 1787(k).

88 FDI Act § 1, 12 U.S.C. § 1811; 12 C.F.R. § 330.4.

89 FDIC, “Your Insured Deposits,” 24, https://www.fdic.gov/deposit/deposits/brochures/your-insured-deposits-english.pdf.

90 FDI Act § 1, 12 U.S.C. 1811; 12 C.F.R. § 330.3.

Essential

Criterion 5

Essential

Criterion 6

Essential

Criterion 7

Essential

Criterion 8

29
Foreign currency deposits are insured if they are widely used in a jurisdiction.

Deposits denominated in a foreign currency are insured.91 Deposit insurance for such deposits shall 

be determined and paid in the amount of U.S. dollars equal in value to the amount of the deposit 

denominated in the foreign currency as of close of business on the date of default of the bank. The 

exchange rates to be used for such conversions are the “noon buying rates for cable transfers” quoted for 

major currencies by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York on the date of default of the bank, unless the 

deposit agreement specifies that some other widely recognized exchange rates are to be used. In that case 

the rates specified will be used for conversions.92

In cases where there is a blanket guarantee in place, there is a credible plan to transition 

from the blanket guarantee to a limited coverage deposit insurance system. This 

includes:

a) an assessment of the economic environment as it affects the financial system, which 

is conducted before a jurisdiction begins the transition from a blanket guarantee to 

limited coverage.

b) the pace of the transition to limited coverage is consistent with the state of the 

financial industry, prudential regulation and supervision, the legal and judicial 

framework, and accounting and disclosure regimes.

c) policymakers have effective communication strategies to mitigate adverse public 

reaction to the transition.

d) where there is a high level of capital mobility, and/or a regional integration policy, 

the decision to lower coverage limits and/or scope considers the effects of different 

jurisdictions’ protection levels and related policies.

No blanket guarantee is in place.

91 12 C.F.R. § 330.3(c).

92 12 C.F.R. § 330.3(c).

Essential

Criterion 9

Essential

Criterion 10

30
PRINCIPLE 9 SOURCES AND USES OF FUNDS

The deposit insurer should have readily available funds and all funding mechanisms necessary to ensure prompt 

reimbursement of depositors’ claims, including assured liquidity funding arrangements. Responsibility for 

paying the cost of deposit insurance should be borne by banks.

Funding for the deposit insurance system is provided on an ex ante basis. Funding 

arrangements are clearly defined and established in law or regulation.

By law, the FDIC is required to maintain the DIF, which shall be used to carry out its insurance purposes.93

As of March 31, 2020, the DIF balance was $113.2 billion.

The DIF is funded primarily by assessment income, supplemented by investment returns on securities held 

by the DIF. Banks pay assessments based on the particular bank’s risk to the DIF, including the probability 

that the institution will cause a loss to the DIF, and the likely amount of any loss.

When setting assessments, the FDI Act requires the FDIC to consider:

y the DIF’s estimated operating expenses;

y the DIF’s estimated case resolution expenses and income

y the projected effects of the payment of assessments on the capital and earnings of banks;

y risk factors and other factors taken into account under

y Section 7(b)(1) of the FDI Act when establishing the risk-based assessment system, including 

the requirement under that paragraph to maintain a risk-based system; and

y any other factors the FDIC Board of Directors may determine to be appropriate.94

FDIC regulations set forth the rules for the implementation of the risk-based assessment system.95

Funding the deposit insurance system is the responsibility of the member banks.

The FDI Act requires that each bank pay assessments imposed under a risk-based assessment system 

established by the FDIC.96 All amounts assessed against banks by the FDIC must be deposited in the DIF.97

Initial “start-up” or “seed” funding (e.g. from government or international donor 

organizations) is permitted to help establish a deposit insurer. Any start-up funding 

provided by a government should be fully repaid before the deposit insurer reduces any 

or all bank premiums.

The Banking Act of 1933 established the FDIC with initial capital from the U.S. Treasury and the 12 Federal 

Reserve Banks.98 All of the initial capital was repaid by 1948.99

Emergency funding arrangements for the deposit insurance system, including prearranged and assured sources of liquidity funding, are explicitly set out (or permitted) in 

law or regulation. Sources may include a funding agreement with the government, the 

central bank or market borrowing. If market borrowing is used it is not the sole source 

93 FDI Act § 7(b)(3)(B), 12 U.S.C. § 1817(b)(3)(B) and FDI Act § 11(a)(4)(A), 12 U.S.C. § 1821(a)(4)(A).

94 FDI Act § 7(b)(2)(B), 12 U.S.C. § 1817(b)(2)(B).

95 12 C.F.R. Part 327.

96 FDI Act § 7(c)(2), 12 U.S.C. § 1817(c)(2).

97 FDI Act § 11(a)(4), 12 U.S.C. § 1821(a)(4).

98 Banking Act of 1933, Pub. L. 73-66, 48 Stat. 162, 168 (1933); FDIC, “A Brief History of Deposit Insurance in the United States,” 28 (1998).

99 “A Brief History,” 59.

Essential

Criterion 1

Essential

Criterion 2

Essential

Criterion 3

Essential

Criterion 4

31
of funding. The arrangement for emergency liquidity funding is set up in advance, to 

ensure effective and timely access when required.

The FDIC may borrow from the U.S. Treasury, banks, and Federal Home Loan Banks. The FDIC also has the 

authority to impose special assessments on banks.

The FDIC has the authority to borrow from the U.S. Treasury under two separate statutory provisions. 

First, with the Secretary of the Treasury’s approval, the FDIC may borrow up to $100 billion on an interestbearing basis from the U.S. Treasury.100 This borrowing authority requires an agreement to be in effect 

between the Secretary of the Treasury and the FDIC which (a) provides a schedule for the repayment of the 

outstanding amount of any borrowing and (b) demonstrates that income to the FDIC from assessments 

will be sufficient to amortize the outstanding balance within the period established in the repayment 

schedule and pay the interest accruing on such balance.101 The Secretary of the Treasury and the FDIC 

are required to consult with the Financial Services Committee of the House of Representatives and the 

Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs of the Senate on the terms of any repayment schedule 

agreement.102 Second, the FDIC may borrow up to $100 billion from the U.S. Treasury’s Federal Financing 

Bank.103

The FDIC may also borrow from banks or, with concurrence of the Federal Housing Finance Agency, from 

a Federal Home Loan Bank.104 Borrowing from banks or Federal Home Loan Banks, while available under 

statute, has not occurred. The FDIC’s “maximum obligation limitation” limits the amount of obligations the 

DIF can incur to the total of the sum of its cash, 90 percent of the fair market value of other assets, and the 

amount authorized to be borrowed from the Treasury.105

In addition to these borrowing authorities, the FDIC has the authority under Section 7(b)(5) of the FDI Act 

to impose special assessments on banks if necessary to repay amounts borrowed from the Treasury as 

discussed above, to repay amounts borrowed from banks, or for any other purpose that the FDIC deems 

necessary.106

After establishing an ex ante deposit insurance fund:

a) the target fund size is determined on the basis of clear, consistent and transparent 

criteria, which are subject to periodic review; and

b) a reasonable time frame is set to achieve the target fund size.

Section 7 of the FDI Act requires the FDIC Board to annually establish and publish a designated reserve 

ratio.107 The current designated reserve ratio is 2.0 percent.108 In setting the designated reserve ratio each 

year, the FDIC Board is required to:

y take into account the risk of losses to the DIF that year and future years, including historic 

experience and potential and estimated losses from banks;

100 FDI Act § 14(a), 12 U.S.C. § 1824(a).

101 FDI Act § 14(c), 12 U.S.C. § 1824(c).

102 FDI Act § 14(c)(2)(A), 12 U.S.C. § 1824(c)(2)(A).

103 FDI Act § 14(b), 12 U.S.C. § 1824(b). Under section 14(b) of the FDI Act, the FDIC is authorized to sell the Corporation’s obligations, on behalf of the DIF, 

to the Federal Financing Bank. On December 15, 2006, the FDIC entered into a Note Purchase Agreement with the Federal Financing Bank that provides a 

contingency borrowing line of $40 billion. The parties amended this agreement on September 16, 2008, to increase the borrowing line to $100 billion. The 

agreement is extended on an annual basis and currently runs through September 30, 2020.

104 FDI Act § 14(e), 12 U.S.C. § 1824(e).

105 FDI Act § 15(c)(5), 12 U.S.C. § 1825(c)(5).

106 FDI Act § 7(b)(5), 12 U.S.C. § 1817(b)(5).

107 FDI Act § 7(b)(3)(A), 12 U.S.C. § 1817(b)(3)(A).

108 12 C.F.R. § 327.4(g).

Essential

Criterion 5

32
y take into account economic conditions generally affecting banks to allow the designated 

reserve ratio to increase during more favorable economic conditions and to decrease during 

less favorable economic conditions, notwithstanding the increased risks of loss that may exist 

during less favorable conditions, as determined to be appropriate by the FDIC Board;

y seek to prevent sharp swings in the assessment rates for banks; and

y take into account other factors the FDIC Board may determine to be appropriate, consistent 

with these requirements.109

The FDIC Board’s consideration of these criteria is described each year as part of the publication 

establishing the targeted or designated reserve ratio.110 As of March 31, 2020, the DIF’s actual reserve ratio 

was 1.39 percent. Section 7 of the FDI Act establishes requirements for a restoration plan when the reserve 

ratio of the DIF falls below 1.35 percent. The restoration plan is required to be completed within eight years 

of implementation, or longer if necessary if there are extraordinary circumstances.111

The deposit insurer has responsibility for the sound investment and management of 

its funds. The deposit insurer has a defined investment policy for its funds that aims at 

ensuring:

a) the preservation of fund capital and maintenance of liquidity; and

b) that adequate risk management policies and procedures, internal controls, and 

disclosure and reporting systems are in place.

The FDIC’s Corporate Investment Policy defines how the FDIC invests funds in the DIF. The policy outlines 

the legal basis for the Corporate Investment Program, investment objectives and guidelines, and reporting 

requirements.112 The policy is consistent with Section 13(a) of the FDI Act, which requires that the DIF funds 

be invested in obligations of the United States or in obligations guaranteed as to principal and interest by 

the United States.113 The Secretary of the Treasury must approve all such investments in excess of $100,000 

and has granted the FDIC approval to invest the DIF funds only in U.S. Treasury obligations that are 

purchased or sold exclusively through the Treasury’s Bureau of the Fiscal Service’s Government Account 

Series program.114

The deposit insurer may hold funds in the central bank. The deposit insurer establishes 

and complies with rules to limit significant investments in banks.

Under Section 13(b) of the FDI Act, the depository accounts of the FDIC must be kept with the U.S. 

Treasury or, with the approval of the Secretary of the Treasury, with a Federal Reserve Bank or a depository 

institution designated as a depository or fiscal agent of the United States. The Secretary of the Treasury 

has the authority to waive this requirement. The FDIC may also temporarily hold up to $50,000 in 

depository accounts at any one bank, and may establish or maintain depository accounts at a bank to 

facilitate the paying of insured deposits, or making loans to, or purchasing of assets of, a bank.115

109 FDI Act § 7(b)(3)(C), 12 U.S.C. § 1817(b)(3)(C).

110 For example, see Notice of Designated Reserve Ratio for 2019, 84 Fed. Reg. 716, January 31, 2019.

111 FDI Act § 7(b)(3)(E), 12 U.S.C. § 187(b)(3)(E).

112 FDIC, FDIC Annual Report (2018), p 100, https://www.fdic.gov/about/strategic/report/2018annualreport/2018ar-final.pdf.

113 FDI Act § 13(a)(1), 12 U.S.C. § 1823(a)(1).

114 FDI Act § 13(a)(2), 12 U.S.C. § 1823(a)(2).

115 FDI Act § 13(b), 12 U.S.C. § 1823(b).

Essential

Criterion 6

Essential

Criterion 7

33
Where the deposit insurer is not the resolution authority, it has the option within its 

legal framework to authorize the use of its funds for resolution of member institutions 

other than liquidation. In such situations the following conditions are met:

a) the deposit insurer is informed and involved in the resolution decision-making 

process;

b) the use of the deposit insurer’s funds is transparent and documented, and is clearly 

and formally specified;

c) where a bank is resolved through a resolution process other than liquidation, the 

resolution results in a viable, solvent and restructured bank, which limits the 

exposure of the deposit insurer to contribute additional funding in respect of the 

same obligation;

d) contributions are restricted to the costs the deposit insurer would otherwise have 

incurred in a payout of insured depositors in a liquidation net of expected recoveries;

e) contributions are not used for the recapitalization of resolved institutions unless 

shareholders’ interests are reduced to zero and uninsured, unsecured creditors are 

subject to parri passu losses in accordance with the legal claim priority;

f) the use of the deposit insurer’s funds is subject to an independent audit and the 

results reported back to the deposit insurer; and

g) all resolution actions and decisions using the deposit insurer’s funds are subject to ex 

post review.

FDIC is the resolution authority for all IDIs.

Should deposit insurer income/revenue (e.g. premiums received, recoveries from failed 

banks and interest accrued on investment funds) be taxed by the government, it is at 

a rate which is neither punitive nor disproportionate to other corporate taxation, nor 

unduly hinders the accumulation of the deposit insurance fund. Any remittances to the 

government by the deposit insurer are limited to repayment of government-provided 

start-up funding and government-provided liquidity funding.

The FDIC is not subject to corporate taxation.

If the deposit insurer uses differential premium systems:

a) the system for calculating premiums is transparent to all participating banks;

b) the scoring/premium categories are significantly differentiated; and

c) the ratings and rankings resulting from the system pertaining to individual banks are 

kept confidential.

The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of 1991 mandated that the FDIC adopt a riskbased assessment system. As codified in Section 7 of the FDI Act, the FDIC must base a bank’s assessment 

on:

i) the probability that the DIF will incur a loss with respect to the institution, taking into 

consideration the risks attributable to:

I) different categories and concentrations of assets, and

II) different categories and concentrations of liabilities, both insured and uninsured, 

contingent and noncontingent;

Essential

Criterion 8

Essential

Criterion 9

Essential

Criterion 10

34
ii) any other factors the FDIC determines are relevant to assessing such probability the likely 

amount of any such loss; and the DIF’s revenue needs.116

The FDIC’s risk-based assessment system is transparent to the public and all participating banks. 

Modifications to the risk-based assessment system are made only after public notice and opportunity for 

comment.

To calculate a bank’s quarterly deposit insurance assessment, the institution’s assessment rate is 

multiplied by its assessment base. The calculation of assessments and assessment rate schedules are 

transparent and published in regulation. Current initial assessment rates range from 3 basis points to 30 

basis points.

Participating banks can estimate their risk-based assessment using online calculators that describe how 

assessments are determined.117 Under Section 7 of the FDI Act, the FDIC Board may establish separate riskbased assessment systems for large and small institutions.118

The FDIC has separate pricing methods to differentiate risk among:

y small institutions—generally those with less than $10 billion in total assets;

y large institutions—generally those with $10 billion or more in total assets; and

y highly complex institutions—generally those with $50 billion or more in total assets for four 

consecutive quarters and which are controlled by a U.S. holding company with $500 billion or 

more in assets for four consecutive quarters.

Small banks are assigned an individual assessment rate based on a pricing method using several 

financial measures and supervisory ratings. Large and highly complex banks are assigned an individual 

assessment rate based on a scorecard, a pricing method that also incorporates financial measures and 

supervisory ratings. Statistical analyses performed when each system was adopted show how the pricing 

methodologies improve accuracy in differentiating risk among small and large banks. 

The FDIC’s assessment regulations include restrictions on disclosure of an institution’s assessment risk 

classification.119 The assessment systems for large and highly complex institutions and small institutions 

each use confidential supervisory evaluations as an input.

116 FDI Act § 7(b)(1)(C), 12 U.S.C. § 1817(b)(1)(C).

117 FDIC, Current Assessment Calculators, https://www.fdic.gov/deposit/insurance/calculator.html.

118 FDI Act § 7(b), 12 U.S.C. § 1817(b).

119 12 C.F.R. § 327.4(d).

35
PRINCIPLE 10 PUBLIC AWARENESS

In order to protect depositors and contribute to financial stability, it is essential that the public be informed on 

an ongoing basis about the benefits and limitations of the deposit insurance system.

The deposit insurer is responsible for promoting public awareness of the deposit 

insurance system, using a variety of communication tools on an ongoing basis as part of 

a comprehensive communication program.

Since 1934, the FDIC has promoted public awareness of the deposit insurance system using several 

communication tools to help maintain public confidence and stability in the U.S. financial system. The 

FDIC’s comprehensive communication program includes information about open and operating banks and 

information for depositors in the event of a bank failure.

The FDIC publishes deposit insurance brochures to explain insurance coverage and limits. Examples 

include Your Insured Deposits, Deposit Insurance at a Glance, and When a Bank Fails— Facts for Depositors, 

Creditors, and Borrowers.

120 The FDIC provides brochures online or on paper. The paper copy brochures 

are provided free of charge to any depositor or bank, which often distribute FDIC brochures to the public. 

Since 1993, the FDIC has published FDIC Consumer News, a free quarterly newsletter that promotes deposit 

insurance and increases financial awareness.121 Today the web-based publication has more than 19,000 

subscribers. The FDIC has maintained a website since 1995, and in 2018, the website received about 15 

million visitors and 25 million page views.

The FDIC maintains a toll-free telephone number (1-877-ASK-FDIC) so consumers, depositors, and bankers 

can ask questions about deposit insurance coverage. In 2018, the toll-free consumer hotline received 

96,703 telephone calls, and 38,681 were identified as deposit insurance-related inquiries. The FDIC Call 

Center handled 20,102 inquiries and deposit insurance subject matter experts handled 18,579 complex 

telephone calls identifying a total of 50,548 deposit insurance issues. The FDIC also answers written 

requests about deposit insurance coverage from bankers and the public. In 2018, the FDIC received 1,339 

written inquiries from consumers and bankers that identified a total of 2,248 deposit insurance issues.

The FDIC also promotes public awareness of the deposit insurance system by hosting a voluntary webinar 

for bankers, typically four to six times annually. The webinar content is tailored to the bankers who attend 

and includes a question and answer session. More than 300,000 bankers have attended these seminars 

since 2008.

In 2001, the FDIC created a free financial literacy tool called Money Smart to teach consumers about key 

financial concepts, skills, and safe, affordable banking services. The tool fosters greater financial stability 

for people and communities.122 Between 2001 and 2008, more than 3 million people took the curriculum, 

and in 2018, Money Smart products were ordered or downloaded more than 125,000 times.

In 2008, the FDIC celebrated its 75th anniversary and embarked on a public awareness campaign that 

included public service announcements and paid-placement advertising in print media and on radio. The 

agency partnered with a well-known personal finance advisor to be the face of the campaign.

In the event of a bank’s failure, the FDIC has additional communication tools to promote public awareness 

of the deposit insurance system. FDIC policies and procedures address notifying depositors of record 

120 See “Your Insured Deposits,” https://www.fdic.gov/deposit/deposits/brochures/your-insured-deposits-english.pdf; “Deposit Insurance at a Glance,” 

https://www.fdic.gov/deposit/deposits/brochures/deposit-insurance-at-a-glance-english.pdf; and “When a Bank Fails—Facts for Depositors, Creditors, 

and Borrowers,” https://www.fdic.gov/consumers/banking/facts/.

121 https://www.fdic.gov/consumers/consumer/news/index.html.

122 FDIC, Money Smart, https://www.fdic.gov/consumers/consumer/moneysmart/.

Essential

Criterion 1

36
about the failure and the FDIC maintains a “Failed Bank List” on the FDIC website.123 The list includes 

detailed information about each bank failure.

In the event of a bank failure, the deposit insurer must notify depositors, as appropriate 

and as described in law, via media such as press releases, print advertising, websites and 

other media outlets, of the following details:

a) where, how and when insured depositors will be provided with access to their funds;

b) the information that an insured depositor must provide in order to obtain payment;

c) if advance or interim payments are being made; and

d) whether any depositors will lose funds, and procedures whereby uninsured 

depositors can make claims to the liquidator for their uninsured portion.

The FDI Act requires the FDIC to mail notices to the depositors and creditors of a failed financial 

institution.124 The purpose of the notice to the depositors is to advise how they may receive payments for 

their insured deposit accounts, and the process of claiming their accounts.

The notice details vary with the type of closing transaction.125 In all cases, depositors are notified about the 

insured status of their accounts, whether any portion of their funds are not insured, how to access funds, 

and the procedure for claiming uninsured deposits.

Advance dividends may be approved by the FDIC Board of Directors as part of the resolution case.126

Advance dividends are declared and paid to uninsured depositors with allowed claims and Receivership 

Certificates. Payment is made shortly after the closing of the bank and provides an immediate return of a 

portion of the uninsured deposit.127

The FDIC also publishes notices in newspapers of general circulation in the city or town where the financial 

institution and branches are located. Notices in languages other than English are provided as needed. As 

noted in EC-1, the FDIC maintains the Failed Bank List on the FDIC website with detailed information about 

each bank failure. Finally, the FDIC issues a press release for each bank failure to help notify the public.128

The FDIC Office of Communications sends bank failure press releases to media representatives in the cities 

and towns where the bank had branches. The press release is also published on the FDIC website and an 

email notification is sent to almost 90,000 subscribers, many of whom are members of the media. The FDIC 

also posts information about every failed bank on social media.

The public awareness program or activities convey information about the following:

a) the scope (i.e. which types of financial instruments and depositors are covered by 

deposit insurance, and which are not);

b) a list of which banks are members and how they can be identified;

c) deposit insurance coverage level limits; and

d) other information, such as the mandate of the deposit insurer.

123 FDIC, Failed Bank List, https://www.fdic.gov/bank/individual/failed/banklist.html.

124 FDI Act § 11(d)(3)(B)-(C), 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(3)(B)-(C). See also FDIC, Resolutions Handbook, 27, https://www.fdic.gov/bank/historical/reshandbook/

resolutions-handbook.pdf.

125 Closing transactions include payout, insured deposit purchase and assumption, all deposit purchase and assumption, and insured deposit transfer. 

See FDIC, Resolutions Handbook, 16-22, https://www.fdic.gov/bank/historical/reshandbook/resolutions-handbook.pdf.

126 An advance dividend is a payment made to an uninsured depositor after a bank or thrift failure. The amount of the advance dividend represents the 

FDIC’s conservative estimate of the ultimate value of the receivership. Cash dividends equivalent to the Board-approved advance dividend percentage 

(of total outstanding deposit claims) are paid to uninsured depositors, thereby giving them an immediate return of a portion of their uninsured deposit. 

Sometimes when it is projected that all depositor claims will be paid in full an advance dividend will be provided to unsecured creditors.

127 See FDIC, Resolutions Handbook, 27-28, https://www.fdic.gov/bank/historical/reshandbook/resolutions-handbook.pdf.

128 See for example FDIC, Press Release, “Royal Savings Bank, Chicago, Illinois, Acquires the Insured Deposits of Washington Federal Bank for Savings, 

Chicago, Illinois,” December 15, 2017, https://www.fdic.gov/news/news/press/2017/pr17096.html.

Essential

Criterion 2

Essential

Criterion 3

37
As discussed in more detail in the response to EC-1 above, the FDIC’s public awareness program and 

activities are focused primarily on defining the scope of deposit insurance coverage and insurance 

limits and explaining the FDIC’s dual role as deposit insurer and resolution authority. The FDIC’s deposit 

insurance brochures and on-line materials clearly distinguish deposit products from nondeposit 

investment products, which are not insured.129

In 1994, the FDIC issued guidance stating that sales of any nondeposit products should be performed away 

from the FDIC logo, with clear disclosures that the nondeposit product is not FDIC-insured and may involve 

loss of principal. The guidance also states that banks should have a customer sign a statement when a 

customer opens an investment account, acknowledging that the customer has received and understands 

the disclosures. The guidance also states that investment sales personnel should be properly qualified and 

trained in the difference between insured and uninsured accounts.130

The FDIC’s public awareness program also helps consumers correctly identify FDIC-member banks. 

Depositors can use BankFind, a database on the FDIC website, to verify whether an entity is an FDIC 

member bank.131 BankFind can be searched by entity name, FDIC Certificate number, branch address, 

or URL. Furthermore, each bank is required to post the FDIC logo in each branch and next to each teller 

station where deposits are accepted.132 Customers do not have to apply or sign up for deposit insurance; 

it is provided automatically at no cost to the customer upon opening an account at an FDIC-insured 

institution.

Deposit insurance coverage limits are also discussed in FDIC’s brochures and throughout the website. This 

material is supplemented by the FDIC’s Electronic Deposit Insurance

Estimator (EDIE), which allows depositors to enter non-personal information and calculate their insurance 

coverage.133 EDIE generates a printable report showing whether a depositor is fully insured or partially 

uninsured.

The objectives of the public awareness program (e.g. target awareness levels) are clearly 

defined and consistent with the public policy objectives and mandate of the deposit 

insurance system.

The longstanding mission and public policy objective of the FDIC are to maintain public confidence and 

stability in the U.S. financial system. For open and operating banks, the FDIC supports this objective by 

promoting public awareness and understanding of FDIC deposit insurance coverage and seeking to ensure 

depositors and bankers have ready access to information about deposit insurance rules and requirements. 

The FDIC fosters public confidence in the banking system by helping depositors make informed decisions 

about their deposit insurance coverage, which will minimize the risk to depositors of uninsured funds 

should their bank fail.

The objectives of the public awareness program are the same as the FDIC’s overall policy objectives: 

protecting depositors and maintaining public confidence and stability in the U.S. financial system. The 

objectives of the public awareness program include clearly defined operational goals, such as responding 

to 95 percent of written requests for deposit insurance information within 14 calendar days.

129 At each FDIC-member IDI, FDIC insurance applies to all deposit products: checking accounts, savings accounts, negotiable order of withdrawal 

accounts, money market deposit accounts, certificates of deposit and other time deposits, and official items such as cashier’s checks. The FDIC clearly 

states that deposit insurance coverage does not apply to nondeposit products such as stocks, bonds, mutual funds, annuities, safe deposit box contents, 

or U.S. Treasury bills, bonds, or notes.

130 FDIC, Press Release: Regulators Issue Uniform Guidance on Mutual Fund Sales (1994), https://www.fdic.gov/news/news/press/1994/pr9412.html.

131 FDIC, BankFind, https://banks.data.fdic.gov/bankfind-suite/bankfind.

132 12 C.F.R. § 328.2(a).

133 FDIC, Electronic Deposit Insurance Estimator (EDIE), https:/edie.fdic.gov/.

Essential

Criterion 4

38
The deposit insurer sets a long-term strategy to meet its public awareness objectives, 

and makes budget allocations to build and maintain a target level of public awareness 

about deposit insurance.

The FDIC’s 2018–2022 Strategic Plan includes a long-term strategy to meet its public awareness objectives. 

Strategic Goal 1.5 is that the public and banks have accurate and easily understood information about 

FDIC deposit insurance coverage. As noted in the plan, a significant rise in bank failures can undermine 

confidence and increase demand for information about deposit insurance coverage.

For example, in 2008, the FDIC received 18,953 written deposit insurance inquiries from consumers and 

bankers, 360 percent more than in 2007. After the sharp increase in the number of inquiries in 2008, the 

FDIC allocated a portion of its budget to hire temporary staff to, among other things, explain deposit 

insurance coverage to the public and, more broadly, to instill confidence. Public demand for information 

waned in 2009, with total inquiries falling from 100,932 in 2008 to 46,041 in 2009, which allowed the FDIC to 

reduce temporary staffing levels.134

The deposit insurer works closely with banks and other safety- net participants to 

ensure the consistency and accuracy of the information provided to depositors and to 

maximize awareness on an ongoing basis. Law or regulation requires banks to provide 

information about deposit insurance in a format/language prescribed by the deposit 

insurer.

The FDIC ensures that consistent and accurate information about deposit insurance coverage is provided 

to depositors. The primary mechanism is the dissemination of deposit insurance brochures, either directly 

to the public or through banks. Banks, in coordination with the FDIC, may reprint FDIC deposit information 

for their marketing material provided they do not alter the substantive content. The FDIC also provides a 

tool called “Brandable EDIE” which allows member banks to incorporate the FDIC’s insurance estimator on 

the bank’s website.

To help ensure accuracy and consistency, the FDIC also publishes “The Financial Institution Employee’s 

Guide to Deposit Insurance,” which is an in-depth explanation of deposit insurance coverage for bankers 

and financial professionals. As a matter of practice, banks often refer depositors directly to the FDIC’s 

website or publications for information on deposit insurance coverage.

The FDI Act and the FDIC’s regulations describe the official sign of the FDIC and prescribe its use by 

banks.135 The official sign clearly states the deposit insurance limit and states that FDIC deposit insurance 

is backed by the full faith and credit of the United States government. Part 328 also prescribes the official 

advertising statement banks must include in their advertisements.

Essential Criterion 7 The deposit insurer monitors, on an ongoing basis, its public 

awareness activities and arranges, on a periodic basis, independent evaluations of the 

effectiveness of its public awareness program or activities.

Since 1934, the FDIC has refined its public awareness activities to ensure the public can easily identify 

which entities are FDIC members, distinguish deposit from nondeposit financial products, and determine 

the extent of their deposit insurance coverage. The FDIC monitors its public awareness activities on an 

ongoing basis.

134 FDIC, “FDIC Annual Report” at 41 (2009), https://www.fdic.gov/about/strategic/report/2009annualreport/AR09final.pdf.

135 FDI Act § 18(a)(1), 12 U.S.C. § 1828(a)(1) and 12 C.F.R. Part 328.

Essential

Criterion 5

Essential

Criterion 6

Essential

Criterion 7

39
FDIC continuously monitors how quickly it responds to requests for deposit insurance information and 

reports results in its annual report to Congress.136 When the FDIC sends a written explanation about 

deposit insurance coverage, the depositor or banker who receives the response also receives a survey. 

Through survey data, the FDIC can review direct feedback from depositors and bankers and modify its 

approach to public awareness.

The FDIC offers its most comprehensive deposit insurance brochure, “Your Insured Deposits,” free to 

bankers and depositors in several languages, including English, Spanish, Simplified Chinese, Traditional 

Chinese, Korean, Tagalog, and Vietnamese. The English and Spanish versions are also available in large 

print formats. The FDIC tracks demand for each language and format. Online distribution is tracked 

by website visits and similar metrics, and the FDIC tracks the number of page visits to EDIE, an online 

insurance estimator used by depositors and bankers to calculate insurance coverage.

FDIC deposit insurance specialists who provide the public with written explanations of deposit insurance 

coverage are trained in plain writing for effective communication. For quality control, each draft response 

is reviewed by senior staff and modified if necessary. An internal review function compares responses with 

the statutory requirements in the Plain Writing Act of 2010. More broadly, the FDIC tracks the number of 

deposit insurance inquiries and adjusts staffing levels accordingly.

To date, the FDIC has not identified a significant deficiency in its public awareness activities that would 

justify a budgetary expenditure for an independent evaluation.

In addition to internal monitoring, the FDIC is subject to oversight by independent, outside entities such as 

the GAO. See the responses under CP-3 for more discussion regarding external oversight.

Depositors in jurisdictions affected by cross-border banking arrangements conducted 

through foreign bank branches or subsidiaries are provided with clear information 

on the existence and identification of the deposit insurer legally responsible for 

reimbursement, and the limits and scope of coverage.

The FDIC’s “Your Insured Deposits” brochure, readily available to all consumers, states: “The FDIC protects 

depositors of insured banks located in the United States against the loss of their deposits if an insured 

bank fails.” This statement reflects the FDIC’s regulation on deposits payable outside the United States.137

136 In 2018 the FDIC Call Center received 96,703 telephone calls and 38,681 were deposit insurance-related inquiries. The FDIC Call Center handled 

approximately 20,102 inquiries. Deposit insurance subject matter experts handled 18,579 complex telephone calls identifying 50,548 deposit insurance 

issues. The FDIC received 1,339 written inquiries from consumers and bankers identifying 2,248 deposit insurance issues. Of these, 100 percent received 

responses within two weeks, as required by corporate policy.

137 12 C.F.R. § 330.3(e).

Essential

Criterion 8

40
PRINCIPLE 11 LEGAL PROTECTION

The deposit insurer and individuals working both currently and formerly for the deposit insurer in the discharge 

of its mandate must be protected from liability arising from actions, claims, lawsuits or other proceedings for 

their decisions, actions or omissions taken in good faith in the normal course of their duties. Legal protection 

should be defined in legislation.

Legal protection is specified in legislation and provided to the deposit insurer, its current 

and former directors, officers, and employees and any individual currently or previously 

retained or engaged by the deposit insurer, for decisions made and actions or omissions 

taken in good faith in the normal course of their duties.

FDIC current and former employees, officers, and board members (employees) have legal protections 

and these protections are specified in law. The FDIC and its employees, but not its contractors, are 

generally protected from any liability resulting from claims or lawsuits for acts and omissions made while 

discharging their duties in good faith.

Under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), no claims can be brought against the FDIC or its employees for 

money damages for injury or loss of property or personal injury or death caused by any allegedly negligent 

or wrongful act or omission committed by an employee within the scope of the employee’s authority or 

office.138 In FTCA cases, the United States, not the FDIC or the employee, is the proper defendant. Federal 

statutory and regulatory provisions authorize the United States to defend the FDIC and federal employees 

sued in tort for acts within the scope of their employment.139

Under the FDI Act, employees are immune from liability under the Securities Act of 1933 for claims arising 

out of any act or omission within the scope of the person’s employment involving the disposition of assets 

by the FDIC.140

Legal protection precludes damages or other awards against such individuals and covers 

costs, including funding defense costs as incurred (and not just reimbursement after a 

successful defense)

FDIC employees are generally shielded from liability for legal actions brought against them, provided 

the claim arises from conduct within the scope of their official duties. Tort claims against the FDIC or its 

employees must be filed under the FTCA against the United States.141 If a money damage claim under the 

FTCA is ultimately proven, the FDIC pays the judgment or claim.

In addition to protection an employee might be entitled to under federal statutes or by contract, under 

the FDIC’s indemnity policy, the FDIC will indemnify present or past employees against any liability and 

expenses that may be incurred because of any claim for wrongful acts resulting from performing their 

official duties.

The operating policies and procedures of the deposit insurer require individuals with 

legal protection to disclose real or perceived conflicts of interest and to adhere to 

relevant codes of conduct, to ensure that they remain accountable.

The FDIC requires employees to maintain high professional standards and exhibit high integrity. Federal 

laws and regulations and individual conflict-of-interest rules and codes of conduct help ensure these 

standards are met. Examples include:

138 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1).

139 28 U.S.C. § 2679(c); 28 C.F.R. § 50.15.

140 FDI Act § 2(f)(1), 12 U.S.C. § 1812(f)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 77a and following.

141 28 U.S.C. § 2679(a); Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 476 (1994).

Essential

Criterion 1

Essential

Criterion 2

Essential

Criterion 3

41
y Current FDIC employees are generally prohibited from owning stock in any FDIC regulated 

entity.142

y Current FDIC employees are prohibited from purchasing the assets of failed institutions owned 

or controlled by the FDIC in any capacity.143

y Members of the FDIC Board of Directors are generally prohibited from holding any office, 

position, or employment in any bank or bank holding company during their time in office and 

for two years after they leave office, subject to certain exceptions.144

y Senior examination staff generally are subject to a one-year post-employment cooling-off 

period for entities they supervise.145 Violators are subject to civil monetary penalties, can be 

removed from office, and can be prohibited from participating in the affairs of the bank, the 

bank holding company, or any other company for up to five years.

y Examiners are prohibited from accepting loans or gratuities from banks they examine.146

Legal protections do not prevent depositors or other individual claimants or banks from 

making legitimate challenges to the acts or omissions of the deposit insurer in public or 

administrative review (e.g. civil action) procedures.

Depositors, individual claimants, and banks are able to legitimately challenge the acts or omissions of the 

deposit insurer in public or administrative review (civil action) procedures. Depositors’ primary interactions 

with the deposit insurer occur when a bank fails and the FDIC makes determinations regarding claims for 

insurance coverage. A final FDIC determination on a claim for insurance coverage is a final agency action 

reviewable under the Administrative Procedure Act.147 A depositor may challenge an insurance coverage 

determination by filing a complaint in federal court.

A claimant’s interactions with the deposit insurer similarly occur most commonly when a bank fails and the 

FDIC, as receiver for the failed institution, responds to the claim. Such claims can arise in many contexts. 

For example, the claimant might assert damages for the institution’s breach of a contract or an act or 

omission giving rise to a tort claim. Or the claim might concern the receiver’s repudiation of a contract or 

lease, retention of property, or other action. In such situations, a claimant may file a claim with the receiver. 

If the receiver disallows the claim, in whole or in part, the claimant may sue in federal court to seek a de 

novo determination of the claim.148

Financial institutions may challenge the FDIC’s acts or omissions, provided that the act is not fully 

committed to agency discretion. Final actions affecting a bank will generally be reviewable under the 

Administrative Procedure Act.149 For example, a bank may sue in federal court to challenge as arbitrary and 

capricious the FDIC’s decision to issue a cease-and-desist order or to adopt a rule that adversely affects 

the institution.

For some actions, judicial review is authorized by statute. For example, if the FDIC terminates an 

institution’s insured status, the institution may seek judicial review by filing a petition for review in federal 

court.150

142 5 C.F.R. §3201.103.

143 5 C.F.R. § 3201.104.

144 FDI Act § 2(e), 12 U.S.C. § 1812(e).

145 See for example FDI Act § 10(k), 12 U.S.C. § 1820(k).

146 18 U.S.C. § 213.

147 FDI Act § 11(f)(4), 12 U.S.C. § 1821(f)(4); 5 U.S.C. § 701 and following; 12 C.F.R. § 330.

148 FDI Act § 11(d)(6), 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(6).

149 5 U.S.C. § 701 and following.

150 FDI Act § 8(h), 12 U.S.C. § 1818(h).

Essential

Criterion 4

42
PRINCIPLE 12 DEALING WITH PARTIES AT FAULT IN A BANK FAILURE

The deposit insurer, or other relevant authority, should be provided with the power to seek legal redress against 

those parties at fault in a bank failure.

The conduct of parties responsible for, or contributing to, the failure of a bank (e.g. 

officers, directors, managers, owners), as well as the conduct of related parties 

and professional service providers (e.g. auditors, accountants, lawyers and asset 

appraisers), is subject to investigation. The investigation of the conduct of such parties 

may be carried out by one or more of the following: the deposit insurer, supervisor or 

regulatory authority, criminal or investigative authorities, or any other professional or 

disciplinary body, as applicable.

The U.S. resolution framework for failed banks includes tools and resources to ensure that parties who 

may have caused losses to banks are investigated for civil claims. Where appropriate, the FDIC may 

make referrals to the federal or state banking or financial agency responsible for the failed institution for 

consideration of administrative enforcement action.

The FDIC conducts a professional liability program to “recover funds for FDIC receiverships and to hold 

accountable directors, officers, and professionals who caused losses to insured depository institutions 

... that are later placed in FDIC receivership.”151 The FDIC in its receivership capacity investigates potential 

professional liability claims arising from every failure of an IDI. The FDIC pursues claims that are both 

meritorious and expected to be cost effective.152 The investigators may send their results to FDIC in 

its corporate capacity or to the federal or state banking or financial agency responsible for the failed 

institution for consideration of administrative enforcement action. See EC-2 under “FDIC in Its Corporate 

Capacity” and “Federal Reserve and OCC” for a discussion of administrative enforcement actions and 

under “FDIC OIG” for a discussion of criminal investigations.

The relevant authority takes the appropriate steps to pursue those parties that are 

identified as culpable for the failure of the bank. The culpable parties are subject to 

sanction and/or redress. Sanction or redress may include personal or professional 

disciplinary measures (including fines or penalties), criminal prosecution, and civil 

proceedings for damages.

FDIC in Its Capacity as Receiver for Failed IDIs

The FDI Act provides that a director or officer of a failed IDI can be held “personally liable for monetary 

damages in any civil action by, on behalf of, or at the request or direction of the” FDIC, including when 

the FDIC is acting as conservator or receiver of the failed institution.153 From 1986 through 2018, the FDIC 

and the Resolution Trust Corporation, a former agency responsible for asset management during the 

savings and loan crisis, recovered approximately $9.8 billion from professional liability claims at a cost of 

approximately $2.4 billion for the investigations and litigation.

FDIC in Its Corporate Capacity

The FDIC in its corporate capacity is the deposit insurer for all IDIs and the federal banking agency 

responsible for supervising state-chartered IDIs that are not members of the Federal Reserve and FDICinsured branches of foreign banks. The FDIC’s supervisory authority extends to the “institution-affiliated 

parties” of these entities, a term defined to include a director, officer, employee, or controlling shareholder 

151 Professional Liability Program, https://www.fdic.gov/bank/individual/failed/pls/.

152 Ibid.

153 FDI Act § 11(k), 12 U.S.C. § 1821(k).

Essential

Criterion 1

Essential

Criterion 2

43
of, or agent for, an institution, and an independent contractor (such as an attorney, appraiser, or 

accountant).154 The FDIC pursues enforcement actions for violations of laws, rules, or regulations, unsafe or 

unsound banking practices, breaches of fiduciary duty, and violations of final orders, conditions imposed 

in writing, or written agreements. The FDIC as supervisor has a number of remedies when wrongdoing is 

committed by parties affiliated with the failed IDI. These remedies include consent orders, assessments 

of civil money penalties, restitution orders, cease-and-desist orders, and barring of institution-affiliated 

parties from the banking industry. For example, the FDI Act authorizes the FDIC (or another federal banking 

regulator, if the FDIC is not the primary regulator) to issue cease-and-desist orders requiring institutionaffiliated parties to make restitution of losses incurred by a bank through their actions.155

Federal Reserve and OCC

The Federal Reserve and the OCC have similar supervisory authority under the FDI Act.156 The Federal 

Reserve is the appropriate federal banking agency responsible for supervising state-chartered banks that 

are members of the Federal Reserve and bank holding companies. The Federal Reserve’s authority to issue 

enforcement actions extends to those entities and to institution-affiliated parties.157

The OCC is the appropriate federal banking agency responsible for supervising national banks, federal 

branches and agencies of foreign institutions, and federally chartered savings associations and their 

subsidiaries. The OCC’s authority to issue enforcement actions extends to those entities and to institutionaffiliated parties.158

FDIC OIG

The FDIC OIG is responsible, among other things, for investigating criminal conduct in relation to a 

failed IDI, including criminal acts of an institution’s former officers, directors, and agents. The FDIC OIG’s 

investigators routinely work with the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Internal Revenue Service, the 

Department of Homeland Security, and state law enforcement.

Investigations are pursued under federal and state law. When an investigation leads to evidence of criminal 

wrongdoing, the FDIC OIG typically works with U.S. Attorneys in the Department of Justice to pursue a 

criminal case.

The deposit insurer, or other relevant authority, has policies and procedures in place to 

ensure that insiders, related parties, and professional service providers acting for the 

failed bank are appropriately investigated for wrongdoing and for possible culpability in 

a bank failure.

The FDIC has policies and procedures in place to ensure that insiders, related parties, and professional 

service providers that acted for the failed IDI are appropriately investigated for wrongdoing.

FDIC in Its Capacity as Receiver for Failed IDIs

As discussed above, the FDIC in its receivership capacity investigates potential professional liability claims 

based on losses caused to failed IDIs. Claims are pursued if they are both meritorious and expected to be 

cost effective. Written policies and procedures govern the investigation and pursuit of professional liability 

claims. The process followed by the Professional Liability Program is summarized in the OIGs’ Report.159

154 Offices of Inspectors General of the FDIC, Federal Reserve, CFPB, and the Department of the Treasury, “Enforcement Actions and Professional 

Liability Claims Against Institution-Affiliated Parties and Individuals Associated With Failed Institutions” at 9 (2014) [hereinafter Offices of Inspectors 

General], https://www.treasury.gov/about/organizational- structure/ig/Audit%20Reports%20and%20Testimonies/OIGCA14012.pdf.

155 FDI Act § 8(b)(6), 12 U.S.C. § 1818(b)(6).

156 FDI Act § 8, 12 U.S.C. § 1818.

157 Offices of Inspectors General, 6–7.

158 Offices of Inspectors General, 7.

159 Offices of Inspectors General, Appendix 2: Regulators’ Processes for Pursuing EAs and PLCs, FDIC: Professional Liability Claims Process, 50.

Essential

Criterion 3

44
FDIC in Its Corporate Capacity

The FDIC in its corporate capacity is the deposit insurer for all banks and is the appropriate federal 

banking agency responsible for state-chartered banks that are not members of the Federal Reserve 

and for FDIC-insured branches of foreign banks. The FDIC’s supervisory authority extends to institutionaffiliated parties of the foregoing entities, including a director, officer, employee, controlling shareholder, 

agent, or independent contractor (such as an attorney, appraiser, or accountant). The FDIC has secondary 

enforcement authority over banks that are supervised and regulated by the Federal Reserve and the OCC 

and over persons affiliated with those institutions.

The FDIC has a formal process for pursuing enforcement actions, beginning with identification of issues 

that may warrant enforcement action. Potential grounds for enforcement actions are identified with 

information volunteered by institution employees and customers, from contact with other supervisory 

agencies or law enforcement officials, and in routine oversight activities such as conducting examinations 

and reviewing suspicious activity reports. The process followed for FDIC enforcement actions related to 

institution-affiliated parties is summarized in the OIGs’ Report.160

The Federal Reserve and the OCC

Formal processes of the Federal Reserve and the OCC for pursuing enforcement actions related to 

institution-affiliated parties are summarized in the report by the Offices of Inspectors General.

160 Offices of Inspectors General, Appendix 2: Regulators’ Processes for Pursuing EAs and PLCs, FDIC: Enforcement Actions Process Pertaining to IAPs, 47.

45
PRINCIPLE 13 EARLY DETECTION AND TIMELY INTERVENTION

The deposit insurer should be part of a framework within the financial safety net that provides for the early 

detection of, and timely intervention in, troubled banks. The framework should provide for intervention before 

the bank becomes nonviable. Such actions should protect depositors and contribute to financial stability.

The deposit insurer is part of an effective framework within the financial safety net 

that provides for the early detection of, and timely intervention in, banks in financial 

difficulty before the bank becomes nonviable.

The FDIC is effectively integrated into the early detection and intervention functions of the financial safetynet framework. The safety-net’s early warning systems and intervention mechanisms for troubled banks 

are timely and effective.

Integration of the FDIC Into an Effective Safety-Net Framework

The FDIC is part of a framework within the financial safety-net that provides for the early detection 

of, and timely intervention in, troubled banks. Through review of examination reports, use of off-site 

monitoring tools, and participation in examinations conducted by other federal regulators (either through 

agreements with these regulators or, in limited circumstances, under the exercise of the FDIC’s authority 

to conduct special (backup) examination activities), the FDIC regularly monitors the potential risks at all 

insured institutions, including those for which it is not the primary federal supervisor.161 The division of 

responsibility for prudential supervision of U.S. banks is discussed further in CP-2, EC-2.

Coordination among the financial safety-net participants, including the FDIC, OCC, and Federal Reserve, 

is facilitated primarily by the FFIEC, of which each is a member.162 The FDIC Chairman is also a member of 

the FSOC, which identifies and responds to risks to the financial stability of the United States and promotes 

market discipline.163 For additional information regarding coordination and information sharing in bank 

supervision, refer to CP-4.

Early Detection of Troubled Banks

Federal banking agencies detect troubled banks early on with offsite surveillance, onsite examinations, 

and a forward-looking and risk- focused supervisory strategy.164 This approach enables the agencies 

to develop a thorough understanding of the operations of individual banks. The agencies evaluate and 

ensure bank safety, soundness, and compliance with laws and regulations, and monitor the stability of 

banks and the financial system.

Statutes require onsite examinations every 12 to 18 months, depending on the bank’s condition, 

supervisory history, and asset size.165 Full-scope examinations address these components, which are 

scored in a system known as CAMELS:

Capital adequacy;

Asset quality;

Management strength, including quality of oversight by the board of directors and the bank’s 

audit function, internal control structure, and compliance;

161 12 U.S.C. § 1820(b)(3); 12 C.F.R. 327.4(f) and 12 U.S.C. § 1818(t).

162 For information about the FFIEC’s structure, purpose, and activities, see https://www.ffiec.gov/about.htm.

163 For information about the FSOC’s structure, purpose, and activities, see https://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/fsoc/about/Pages/default.aspx.

164 See for example Federal Reserve Supervision and Regulation (SR) Letter 97-24, “Risk-Focused Framework for Supervision of Large Complex 

Institutions,” and Federal Reserve SR Letter 97-25, “Risk-Focused Framework for the Supervision of Community Banks,” which describe examination 

procedures developed by the Federal Reserve and the FDIC. See also OCC, “Large Bank Supervision” and “Community Bank Supervision;” Federal 

Reserve, “Commercial Bank Examination Manual,” Section 1000.1; and FDIC, “Risk Management Manual of Examination Policies,” Section 1.1.

165 FDI Act § 10(d), 12 U.S.C. § 1820(d).

Essential

Criterion 1

46
Earnings quality and sustainability;

Liquidity sources to support cash needs; and

Sensitivity of earnings and capital position to market risk.

For the largest, most complex institutions, federal banking agencies maintain a full-time, on-site 

examination staff to monitor the banking organization’s condition and activities. The FDIC maintains a 

permanent on-site presence at the largest, most complex institutions as secondary supervisor. Each of the 

federal banking agencies uses well-defined off-site surveillance procedures for measuring and monitoring 

the risk profiles of individual banks and bank holding companies.

Timely Intervention in Troubled Banks

If a federal banking agency notes supervisory concerns, the agency will undertake appropriate and timely 

follow-up to verify that the bank has implemented required corrective actions. Typically, weaknesses 

and deficiencies are communicated to the management and directors of a bank during the examination 

process and in a written report. Management and directors are expected to address all problems and take 

measurable actions to ensure that the problems are corrected and will not recur. If a review identifies a 

material supervisory determination, the agency may address it with a variety of supervisory approaches, 

including informal and nonbinding commitments by bank management, and formal enforcement actions. 

Formal enforcement actions may be pursued with or without the cooperation of the bank or the IAP.166

Additionally, the Prompt Corrective Action (PCA) framework serves to promote early identification of 

problems and prompt intervention. See PCA discussion in EC-3 for detailed explanation.

If an institution or IAP fails to comply with a final formal enforcement action, the agency can terminate 

deposit insurance coverage or remove the IAP. When the FDIC terminates deposit insurance, the chartering 

authority will generally revoke the institution’s charter and place the bank into a resolution managed by 

the FDIC.167

Safety-net participants have the operational independence and power to perform their 

respective roles in the framework for early detection and timely intervention.

The legal authority, operational independence, and roles of safety-net participants are established in 

laws. Reliable systems ensure the collection of timely, accurate, and relevant information to evaluate 

individual banks and the banking sector, and the criteria used to identify problem banks are transparent. 

Discretionary and mandatory intervention powers are available for timely and effective intervention 

in troubled banks (see more information under EC-1 above and EC-3 below). In certain circumstances, 

institutions have limited legal means to oppose supervisory actions, but use of these has not caused 

undue interference in addressing troubled banks.

Operational Independence of the Federal Banking Agencies

Federal statutes provide for the operational independence of each federal banking agency. Operational 

independence of safety-net participants is ensured through statutory provisions for appointing and 

removing agency heads, the self-funding nature of the FDIC and the Federal Reserve, and the legal 

protections for staff acting within the scope of their employment. These laws minimize the opportunity 

for government or industry interference that could compromise an agency’s independence or impede an 

agency’s ability to obtain and deploy the resources to carry out its mandate. See CP-3 for more information 

regarding governance and CP-11 for more information regarding legal protection.

166 Additional information about formal actions and the process for imposing them is in the agencies’ handbooks and examination manuals. See OCC, 

“Large Bank Supervision,” and “Community Bank Supervision;” Federal Reserve System, “Commercial Bank Examination Manual” (Section 5040); and 

FDIC, “Risk Management Manual of Examination Policies” (Section 15).

167 See FDI Act § 11(c)(2), 12 U.S.C. § 1821(c)(2). Cessation of deposit insurance coverage is an enumerated ground for appointing a conservator or 

receiver under the FDI Act. See FDI Act § 11(c)(5)(J), 12 U.S.C. § 1821(c)(5)(J).

Essential

Criterion 2

47
Authority of Federal Banking Agencies to Exercise Supervisory Powers

Each federal banking agency operates under statutory authority and has clearly defined objectives and 

responsibilities.168 As discussed under CP-2, statutes and regulations provide the FDIC and other federal 

banking agencies with clear and broad authority to address compliance with laws and ensure the safety 

and soundness of institutions under their jurisdiction. The criteria used as the basis for intervention in 

troubled banks are established in statutes and regulations. These authorities provide supervisors with 

proactive and remedial measures to address matters of concern and the discretion to determine when 

to use them. As described under CP-13, EC-1, the agencies may take prompt remedial action and impose 

penalties through legally binding formal enforcement actions to address unsafe or unsound practices, 

violations of laws or regulations, or breaches of any written agreement signed between the agency and the 

bank.

Appropriate actions undertaken by the federal banking agencies have not been unduly delayed or 

overturned by courts. The statutes and regulations governing the ability of federal banking agencies to 

intervene in a timely manner also contain due process protections for banks and IAPs. Those provisions 

for notice of a proposed enforcement action, the opportunity for an agency hearing, and subsequent 

judicial review are nonetheless structured to allow for prompt agency resolution of problems (and 

immediate agency intervention when necessary).169 Likewise, in the event of a recalcitrant bank or IAP, a 

federal banking agency may apply to court for the judicial enforcement of any effective and outstanding 

enforcement notice or order.

There are also legal avenues available to oppose the appointment of the FDIC as receiver or conservator 

when a bank fails. These legal options have been used infrequently and have not caused undue 

interference in the FDIC’s ability to carry out its receivership authorities. Refer to CP-14 for more 

information.

Systems for Collecting Timely, Accurate, and Relevant Banking Information

The federal banking agencies maintain robust systems to ensure collection of timely, accurate, and 

relevant information to assess individual banks and the overall banking sector. These data are critical for 

early detection and timely intervention. Each quarter, every bank must submit comprehensive financial 

data known as Consolidated Reports of Condition and Income (Call Reports). The data include financial, 

operational, prudential, and structural information and must adhere to uniform instructions that ensure 

consistency and reliability. During bank examinations, examiners review Call Report data to verify integrity 

and accuracy.

The data are available to the public, and the federal banking agencies use the data for offsite monitoring 

of individual banks and the banking sector. Federal banking agencies have the authority to request and 

receive at any time any information from banks and bank holding companies if the agency believes it is 

material to the financial situation or the assessment of the risks of the bank or bank holding company.170

The framework includes a set of clearly defined qualitative and/or quantitative criteria 

that are used to trigger timely intervention or corrective action. The criteria:

a) are clearly defined in law, regulation, or agreements;

b) include safety and soundness indicators such as the institution’s capital, asset 

quality, management, earnings, liquidity, and sensitivity to market risk; and

168 See for example National Bank Act, 12 U.S.C. § 1 and following (OCC); Federal Reserve Act, 12 U.S.C. § 221 and following (Federal Reserve); 12 U.S.C. § 

5491 and following (CFPB); FDI Act, 12 U.S.C. § 1811 and following (FDIC).

169 See for example FDI Act § 8(b)(1) (notice of violation and agency hearing), (c)(1)-(2) (temporary cease and desist orders and judicial review of those 

orders), (h) (agency hearings and orders), 12 U.S.C. § 1818(b)(1), (c)(1)-(2), (h).

170 For example, for national banks, see Revised Statutes § 5211, 12 U.S.C. § 161(a), (c).

Essential

Criterion 3

48
c) are reviewed periodically, and the procedure for this review is formalized.

The framework for corrective action includes qualitative and quantitative criteria defined in laws and 

regulations and used to trigger timely intervention or corrective action. The criteria are based on safety 

and soundness indicators. The effectiveness of the supervisory approach to troubled banks is formally and 

regularly reviewed, including how effectively the regulations were implemented. The appropriateness of 

the criteria is reviewed and updated as needed.171

Timely Intervention Resulting From Qualitative Determinations

As noted in EC-1, the federal banking agencies have the authority to take formal enforcement actions under 

many circumstances. Qualitative criteria are used to support formal enforcement actions when unsafe or 

unsound conditions exist. The term “unsafe or unsound practices or conditions” is not defined in statute or 

regulation because a single definition would not capture the broad spectrum of practices or conditions in 

the term. The FDIC’s “Risk Management Manual of Examination Policies” states that “generally, an unsafe or 

unsound practice encompasses any action, or lack of action, by an institution or an IAP which is contrary 

to generally accepted standards of prudent operation, the possible consequences of which, if continued, 

would result in abnormal risk of loss or damage to an institution, its shareholders, or the” DIF. Precedent 

may also be considered to determine whether unsafe or unsound conditions or practices exist, and the 

FDIC’s “Risk Management Manual of Examination Policies” lists practices and conditions determined in 

past proceedings of the FDIC Board to be unsafe or unsound. “Unsafe or unsound practices or conditions” 

may also be determined when an inadequately capitalized institution breaches quantitative thresholds in 

statutes, which are discussed below.

The federal banking agencies have established minimum operational and managerial standards (including 

internal controls and audit, loan documentation, credit underwriting, interest rate exposure, and asset 

growth); compensation standards; and standards relating to asset quality, earnings, stock valuation, and 

information security.172 If a federal banking agency determines that an institution fails to meet any of 

these established standards, the agency may require the institution, through formal enforcement actions, 

to submit to the agency an acceptable plan, known as a safety and soundness plan, to comply with the 

standard.

Timely Intervention Resulting From Quantitative Determinations

Every bank operating in the United States must maintain minimum levels of capital or be subject to 

restrictions, enforcement actions, or revocation of its banking charter and deposit insurance. While 

qualitative assessments of the adequacy of capital levels are made throughout the supervisory process, 

the federal banking agencies have also established minimum capital thresholds that can trigger 

mandatory or discretionary supervisory interventions.

U.S. capital rules generally follow the framework adopted by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision. 

In 2013, the federal banking agencies issued regulations for banks that align with the Basel III capital 

standards for all U.S. banks. For FDIC-supervised institutions, the capital rules are contained in Part 324 of 

the FDIC Rules and Regulations. Part 324 defines capital elements, establishes risk-weighting guidelines for 

determining capital requirements under standardized and advanced approaches, and prescribes PCA for 

institutions not adequately capitalized.

Any bank which has less than its minimum leverage capital requirement may be deemed engaged in 

an unsafe-and-unsound practice unless the institution has signed and complies with an agreement or 

has submitted and complies with an approved plan to increase its leverage capital ratio and take other 

171 Each of the federal banking agencies makes its examination guidance public through its handbooks and examination policy manuals. See OCC, 

“Large Bank Supervision” and “Community Bank Supervision;” Federal Reserve, “Commercial Bank Examination Manual;” and FDIC, “Risk Management 

Manual of Examination Policies.”

172 12 C.F.R. § 364 (FDIC); 12 C.F.R. § 30 (OCC); 12 C.F.R. § 208 (FRB).

49
necessary actions. Any bank with a Tier 1 capital to total assets ratio less than 2 percent may be deemed 

to be in unsafe-and-unsound condition. Institutions that fail to maintain minimum leverage capital 

requirements may be subject to a capital directive and other formal enforcement actions.

In addition, the federal banking agencies established the PCA framework to impose capital-preservation 

measures if thresholds are breached. Under the PCA framework, each bank’s capital ratios are 

used to place banks into one of five capital categories, ranging from “well-capitalized” to “critically 

undercapitalized.” Supervisory actions are permitted or prescribed, based on the bank’s PCA category. 

The PCA framework generally requires that a bank that is critically undercapitalized be recapitalized, sold, 

merged, liquidated, or placed into receivership or conservatorship within 90 days.173 The PCA framework 

ensures early intervention at banks that have problems, and the timely closure of failing institutions.

The Basel III capital standards incorporated into federal banking agency regulations include a capital 

conservation buffer rule designed to strengthen an institution’s financial resilience during economic 

cycles. Under the rule, banks must maintain a buffer of at least 2.5 percent above each ratio corresponding 

to the “adequately capitalized” level in the PCA framework or the agency may restrict distributions and 

discretionary payments. Banks that exceed asset- or activity-based thresholds are also required to 

maintain an additional leverage buffer to avoid restrictions on capital distributions and discretionary 

bonus payments to executive officers.

Periodic Review of Criteria That Trigger Intervention and Corrective Action

Federal banking agency laws and procedures require formal reviews of the effectiveness of the criteria that 

trigger corrective action. The FDI Act requires a formal review whenever a bank failure results in a material 

loss to the DIF.174 The review and a Material Loss Review report are completed by the Inspector General of 

the federal banking agency that is the bank’s primary regulator.175 The report’s objective is to show why the 

material loss occurred and to recommend ways to prevent similar losses. The report includes an analysis 

of whether PCA actions were appropriately and effectively carried out. Federal banking agencies have 

also implemented other formal procedures that are not mandated by statute. The FDIC conducts internal 

audits of each of its regional offices every three years, including a review of a sample of downgraded 

institutions to assess the effectiveness of efforts to initiate corrective actions promptly.

The appropriateness of the criteria that trigger timely intervention or corrective action is subject to review 

and revision as needed. In 2013, the FDIC made extensive changes to capital measurement methodologies 

and preservation tools to align with Basel III capital standards. In addition, the Economic Growth and 

Regulatory Paperwork Reduction Act (EGRPRA) mandates that federal banking agencies and the FFIEC 

review agency regulations and policies every ten years.176 In this review, criteria may be revised. The most 

recent review, in 2017, included several proposals to revise definitions used to calculate risk-weighted 

capital ratios. The federal banking agencies’ compliance with the Basel III capital standards and EGRPRA 

initiatives show commitment to review and revise criteria when appropriate.

173 FDI Act § 38(h)(3), 12 U.S.C. § 1831o(h)(3).

174 FDI Act § 38(k), 12 U.S.C. § 1831o(k). “Material loss” is defined as a loss to the DIF that exceeds either $50 million or $75 million, depending on criteria 

in the statute.

175 Material Loss Reviews by the FDIC are publicly available at https://www.fdicoig.gov/reports-bank-failures.

176 12 U.S.C. § 3311; see for example FFIEC, Joint Report to Congress: Economic Growth and Regulatory Paperwork Reduction Act (2017), https://www.

ffiec.gov/pdf/2017_FFIEC_EGRPRA_Joint-Report_to_Congress.pdf; FFIEC, Economic Growth and Regulatory Paperwork Reduction Act, https://egrpra.

ffiec.gov/about/the-law.html.

50
PRINCIPLE 14 FAILURE RESOLUTION

An effective failure resolution regime should enable the deposit insurer to provide for protection of depositors 

and contribute to financial stability. The legal framework should include a special resolution regime.

The deposit insurer has the operational independence and sufficient resources to 

exercise its resolution powers consistent with its mandate.

The FDIC has a high degree of operational independence and access to sufficient resources to execute its 

resolution powers, as it is a self-funded independent agency with a strong internal governance system. 

The FDIC operates under the FDI Act to maintain financial stability and public confidence in the nation’s 

financial system. Under the FDI Act, the FDIC is the resolution authority for all IDIs in the United States, 

including systemically important banks. Please see the responses under CP-3 regarding governance for a 

more detailed discussion of the FDIC’s operational independence and the responses under CP-9 regarding 

sources of funds for a more detailed discussion of the FDIC’s resources.

The resolution regime ensures that all banks are resolvable through a broad range of 

powers and options.

The FDIC’s resolution regime is flexible enough to resolve small, medium, and large banks. It is authorized 

to exercise a variety of resolution authorities that with its special powers ensure that the FDIC can 

promptly and effectively execute resolutions.

Once the FDIC has been appointed receiver of a failed IDI, it succeeds to all rights, titles, powers, and 

authorities of that institution, its shareholders, and its management.177 The FDIC as receiver has broad 

authority to manage the assets and operations of the failed bank in resolution to, among other things, 

restructure or wind down the failed institution, repudiate contracts, enforce contracts, transfer contracts, 

enter into contracts, and purchase and sell assets.178 The FDIC also is responsible for paying insured 

depositors, administering a claims process, and marshalling the assets of the institution to pay those 

creditors under the statutorily prescribed hierarchy.179

Resolution Strategies

The FDI Act provides the FDIC as receiver with the tools to resolve small, medium, and large banks. Absent 

a systemic risk determination under the FDI Act, the FDIC as receiver must resolve a failed IDI, regardless 

of its size, in a manner that is least costly to the DIF.180 In most cases—particularly where the FDIC has 

sufficient advance warning, as when the capital condition of an institution deteriorates over a period of 

time—the FDIC will seek to market the assets and liabilities of the failed IDI to an assuming institution (AI) 

through one or more purchase and assumption (P&A) transactions.181 P&A is the method the FDIC has 

used most often to resolve a failing institution and it is the least disruptive to local communities. In a P&A 

transaction a healthy institution agrees to purchase some or all of the assets of the failing institution and 

assumes some or all of its liabilities, including all insured deposits.

The resolution transaction can vary based on factors such as the time available to arrange the transaction, 

the location and size of the financial institution, the nature of its deposits, and the assets available for 

177 FDI Act § 11(d), 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d).

178 FDI Act, 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(2)(B), (E) and (G); (e) and (n).

179 FDI Act § 11(d)(11), 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(11).

180 FDI Act § 13(c)(4), 12 U.S.C. § 1823(c)(4).

181 FDIC, FDIC Resolution Handbook, https://www.fdic.gov/bank/historical/reshandbook/resolutions-handbook.pdf.

Essential

Criterion 1

Essential

Criterion 2

51
sale.182 If there are no bids for a P&A transaction, or if the bids received would not yield the least-costly 

resolution, the FDIC can execute a deposit payout and must pay depositors of the failed institution their 

insured deposits.183

Special Powers

The FDI Act grants the FDIC special powers that allow the receiver to resolve failed IDIs without prior 

judicial approval. For example, the FDIC as receiver may disaffirm or repudiate any contract or lease to 

which the failed institution is a party if the receiver determines that performance of the contract or lease 

would be burdensome, and that repudiation would promote the orderly administration of the institution’s 

affairs.184 The FDIC as receiver may, under certain circumstances, enforce contracts and prevent other 

parties from terminating agreements if preserving the contract is in the best interest of the receivership.185

The FDIC also has special powers in litigation. When the FDIC as receiver is substituted as a party for 

litigation related to the failed institution, the FDIC may request that the court stay the litigation for up to 90 

days, and the court cannot decline to issue the stay.186 The FDIC also has the right to remove that litigation 

from state court to federal court.187

The FDIC has the power to organize one or more bridge institutions, and has the power to enter into legally 

enforceable agreements by which the FDIC can transfer, and the bridge institution can receive, assets 

and liabilities of the failed firm as selected by the FDIC.188 The FDIC as receiver has the power to merge the 

failed institution with another institution and the power to transfer or sell any asset or liability of the failed 

institution to a third party (including an asset management vehicle or bridge institution) without providing 

prior notification or obtaining any approval, assignment, or consent with respect to such transfer.189

Where there are multiple safety-net participants responsible for resolution, the legal 

framework provides for a clear allocation of objectives, mandates, and powers of those 

182 P&A transactions include:

Basic P&A—assets that pass to acquirers generally are limited to cash, cash equivalents, and marketable securities. The liabilities assumed by the 

acquirers will include the portion of the deposit liabilities covered by FDIC insurance and may also include all deposits, if that is the least-costly option.

Whole Bank P&A—this variation emerged as the result of an effort to persuade acquirers to purchase the maximum amount of a failed institution’s assets. 

This type of transaction minimizes FDIC’s one-time cash outlay by having the acquirer purchase all assets, eliminates the FDIC’s further financial 

obligation to the acquirer, and reduces the assets held by the FDIC for liquidation.

P&A With Shared Loss—the FDIC, as receiver, agrees to share losses on certain types of assets with the acquirer. Shared loss assets are typically distressed 

assets that might not appeal to potential acquirers without protection from losses. The shared loss option also reduces the FDIC’s immediate cash 

needs, is operationally simpler, and moves assets quickly to the private sector.

Bridge Bank P&A—used when a P&A transaction cannot be concluded before the failure. A new, temporary national bank is organized by the FDIC and 

chartered by the OCC, and the FDIC manages certain assets and operations of the failed insured depository institution. This new institution exists until 

the FDIC markets the institution to a third party. A bridge bank can be operated for two years, with three one-year extensions. Before establishing a 

bridge bank, a cost analysis must show that the failing institution has franchise value and that this alternative is least-costly for the DIF (subject to a 

systemic risk exception from this least-cost requirement).

183 The three most common versions of a deposit payout are:

Straight Deposit Payout—used when the liquidation, closing, or winding down of affairs is determined to be the least-costly resolution. The FDIC pays 

insured depositors, retains all assets and other liabilities, and the receivership bears the responsibility and cost of liquidating all of the assets.

Insured Deposit Transfer—the insured and secured deposits of a failed institution are transferred to an agent institution in the community. The agent 

institution pays customers of the failed institution, or the customer may request a new account in the agent institution.

Deposit Insurance National Bank (DINB)—a bank of limited life and powers that is organized by the FDIC and chartered by the OCC. The FDIC may create 

a DINB to ensure that depositors, particularly those in underserved areas, have continued access to their insured funds, and time to open accounts 

at other insured institutions, when no other bank has agreed to assume the insured deposits. The FDI Act enables the FDIC to operate a DINB for up 

to two years. However, the majority of recent DINBs operated for only 30 days. All assets and nondeposit liabilities of the failed institution remain in 

receivership.

184 FDI Act § 11(e)(1), 12 U.S.C. § 1821(e)(1).

185 FDI Act § 11(e)(13), 12 U.S.C. § 1821(e)(13).

186 FDI Act § 11(d)(12)(A)-(B), 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(12)(A)-(B).

187 FDI Act § 11(d)(13), 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(13).

188 FDI Act, 12 U.S.C. § 1821(n)(1)(A) and FDI Act, 12 U.S.C. § 1821(n)(3)(A).

189 FDI Act, 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(2)(G) and (n)(1)(A) and (B).

Essential

Criterion 3

52
participants, with no material gaps, overlaps or inconsistencies. Clear arrangements for 

coordination are in place.

The FDIC is the sole resolution authority for all banks in the United States, including systemically important 

banks. The legal framework in the United States provides for a clear allocation of objectives, mandates, 

and powers of all safety-net participants. The U.S. federal banking agencies have in place several formal 

and informal mechanisms for cooperation and information sharing in connection with resolution.

State banking authorities are responsible for the resolution of state-licensed uninsured branches of foreign 

banks. The OCC is responsible for the resolution of federally licensed uninsured branches of foreign banks. 

The FDIC would coordinate with federal and state banking regulators, as the case may be, in circumstances 

in which the FDIC is appointed receiver with respect to a subsidiary of a foreign bank. A comprehensive 

discussion relevant to safety- net participants is provided under CP-4, EC-1.

Resolution and depositor protection procedures are not limited to depositor 

reimbursement. The resolution authorities have effective resolution tools designed to 

help preserve critical bank functions and to resolve banks. These include, but are not 

limited to, powers to replace and remove senior management, terminate contracts, 

transfer and sell assets and liabilities, write down or convert debt to equity and 

establish a temporary bridge institution.

The FDIC has successfully demonstrated the use of various resolution tools to help preserve critical 

bank functions and to resolve failed IDIs in an orderly manner. The FDIC has the ability and legal powers 

supported by policies, procedures, and standards to resolve failing institutions.

FDIC Has Many Tools and Legal Powers to Resolve Failed IDIs

The FDIC as receiver has been granted through statute many powers that can be used to resolve failed IDIs 

that extend beyond depositor payouts. Under the FDI Act, the FDIC as receiver succeeds to all rights, titles, 

powers, and privileges of the failed IDI and of any stockholder, member, officer, or director, and therefore 

can perform all functions of the bank, including the removal and replacement of senior management and 

directors.190 The FDIC also has the authority to repudiate contracts, transfer and sell assets and liabilities, 

manage the claims process, and establish a temporary bridge institution.191

The FDIC has successfully used its bridge bank power to help preserve critical bank functions and to 

resolve failed banks in an orderly manner. Using a bridge bank provides an effective resolution tool when 

there is franchise value in the failing institution. This tool enables the FDIC to establish a new temporary 

national bank (chartered by the OCC) to bridge the gap in time between the failure of the institution and 

the time it takes the FDIC to evaluate and market the institution to a third party. The FDIC as receiver can 

preserve critical bank functions because it succeeds to all rights, titles, powers, and privileges of the failed 

institution and therefore can perform all functions of the failed IDI. See CP-14, EC-2 for more discussion of 

resolution tools and strategies and the FDIC’s special powers.

FDIC Use of Its Powers Is Supported by Policies, Procedures, and Guidance

The FDIC’s exercise of its statutorily granted resolution and receivership powers is supported by a variety of 

sources.192 The FDIC also publishes statements of policy that address receivership and resolution issues.193

In addition, the Resolutions Handbook addresses resolution and receivership processes and practices.194

190 FDI Act § 11(d)(2), 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(2).

191 FDI Act § 11(e), 12 U.S.C. § 1821(e); FDI Act § 11(d)(2)(G), 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(2)(G); FDI Act § 11(d)(3)-(10), 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(3)-(10); FDI Act § 11(n)(1)(A), 

12 U.S.C. § 1821(n)(1)(A).

192 See for example 12 C.F.R. Part 360.

193 FDIC statements of policy are available at https://www.fdic.gov/regulations/laws/rules/5000-100.html.

194 FDIC, Resolutions Handbook, https://www.fdic.gov/bank/historical/reshandbook/resolutions-handbook.pdf.

Essential

Criterion 4

53
FDIC Assesses Whether Resolution Tools Are Used Appropriately

The FDI Act requires the Inspector General of the appropriate federal banking agency to conduct a review 

and prepare a report when the DIF incurs a material loss related to a bank for which the FDIC is appointed 

receiver.195 These reviews consider whether the FDIC properly implemented the PCA provisions of the FDI 

Act and how the resolution of the failed institution was handled. The reviews inform the FDIC’s approach to 

future resolutions.

The FDIC is also subject to external review by the GAO, including an annual audit of the FDIC and the DIF.196

The GAO also conducts reviews of the FDIC’s resolution activities.

One or more of the available resolution methods allows the flexibility for resolution at a 

lesser cost than otherwise expected in liquidation net of expected recoveries.

Generally, the FDIC is required to pursue the resolution option that is least costly to the DIF.197 The FDIC 

has many methods it can use to resolve failed institutions. While the FDIC has used deposit payouts in 

many forms, the FDIC most commonly pursues a P&A transaction strategy to resolve a failed institution. 

There are different P&A transactions that the agency can pursue, ranging from transfer of some assets 

of the failed IDI to the AI all the way to a whole bank P&A. (See the response to EC-2 for a more detailed 

discussion of P&A transactions.) There is an exception to the least-costly resolution requirement when a 

statutory determination is made by the FDIC, the Federal Reserve, and the Secretary of the Treasury that 

compliance with the least-cost test would have serious adverse effects on economic conditions or financial 

stability in the United States.198 For a full discussion of FDIC resolution tools and powers, see responses 

to EC-2 and EC-4. For a discussion of how the FDIC determines which resolution strategy to use, see the 

response to EC-9.

Resolution procedures follow a defined creditor hierarchy in which insured deposits are 

protected from sharing losses and shareholders take first losses.

The FDI Act provides a statutory hierarchy of claims that protects insured deposits and subjects 

shareholders to the first losses when a bank fails. Under the FDI Act, amounts realized from the liquidation 

or other resolution of any bank by the receiver shall be distributed to pay claims (other than secured 

claims) in this order:

i) administrative expenses of the receiver

ii) any deposit liability of the institution

iii) any other general or senior liability of the institution [which is not described in clause (iv) or (v)]

iv) any obligation subordinated to depositors or general creditors [which is not described in 

clause (v)]

v) any obligation to shareholders or members arising because of their status as shareholders 

or members [including any depository institution holding company or any shareholder or 

creditor of such company].199

195 FDI Act § 38(k)(1), 12 U.S.C. § 1831o(k)(1).

196 FDI Act § 17(d)(1), 12 U.S.C. § 1827(d)(1).

197 FDI Act § 13(c)(4), 12 U.S.C. § 1823(c)(4).

198 FDI Act § 13(c)(4)(G), 12 U.S.C. § 1823(c)(4)(G).

199 FDI Act § 11(d)(11)(A), 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(11)(A).

Essential

Criterion 5

Essential

Criterion 6

54
The resolution regime does not discriminate against depositors on the basis of their 

nationality or residence.

The U.S. resolution regime does not discriminate against depositors on the basis of their nationality or 

residence.200

The resolution regime is insulated against legal action that aims at the reversal of 

decisions related to resolving non-viable banks. No court can reverse such decisions. The 

legal remedy for successful challenges is limited to monetary compensation.

The FDI Act sets forth the limited scope of judicial review of FDIC’s operations as receiver of failed IDIs. The 

FDI Act provides that courts may not restrain or affect the exercise of powers or functions of the receiver or 

issue any attachment or execution upon assets in the possession of the FDIC as receiver.201

There are legal means available to challenge the appointment of a receiver for a bank under both federal 

law (for a bank closed by a federal agency) and state law (for a state-chartered bank closed by its state 

regulator). Challenge procedures under state law vary from state to state, and are usually brought in 

state court against the state regulator. When the appointment is under federal law, a bank placed into a 

receivership or conservatorship may, within 30 days, apply in federal court for the FDIC to be removed as 

receiver or conservator.202 Regardless of the state or federal forum or the applicable law, the regulators 

have typically been able to present overwhelming factual evidence about a bank’s troubled condition and 

the need to close it, making any challenge unsuccessful.

The resolution process generally would not be interrupted by the challenge being considered by the court. 

In most cases, the resolution process would involve the rapid transfer of deposits to another institution 

or direct payments to depositors and sale of a substantial amount of the institution’s assets. Once these 

actions have been taken, there is generally no feasible means of reversing them to restore the institution 

intact to its owners. As a result, even if the court found against the appointment of the FDIC as receiver or 

conservator, the relief available to aggrieved parties will generally not include reversal of actions taken in 

receivership; rather it would be limited to monetary damages. Most failing banks are resolved without legal 

opposition.

The resolution regime keeps the period between depositors losing access to their funds 

and implementation of the selected resolution option (e.g. depositor reimbursement) as 

short as possible.

The FDI Act requires the FDIC to make payments of insured deposits as soon as possible upon the failure of 

a bank. The FDIC may make payments of insured deposits either by cash or by providing to each depositor 

a transferred deposit in another bank in the same community.203 Other than “as soon as possible,” 

Congress has not imposed any time limit for paying deposit insurance. In practice, the FDIC has provided 

customers access to insured deposits within one business day of the institution’s failure or within two 

business days if the failure occurs on a day other than Friday. This is facilitated by pre-resolution planning 

and standard policies and procedures that the FDIC follows in making deposit insurance payments.

The majority of bank failures result in a P&A transaction in which the failed IDI’s deposits are transferred 

to another bank after the FDIC is appointed receiver. This approach results in a relatively seamless process 

that minimizes disruption for depositors, as proven during the recent financial crisis. From 2008 to 2013, 

the FDIC resolved 489 banks. Of these resolutions, 463 were P&A transactions; only 26 involved deposit 

payouts or the creation of a deposit insurance national bank (DINB). Of the P&A transactions, 80 were 

200 12 C.F.R. § 330.3; FDI Act § 1, 12 U.S.C. § 1811.

201 FDI Act § 11(d)(13)(C)-(D), (j), 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(13)(C)-(D), (j).

202 FDI Act § 11(c)(7), 12 U.S.C. § 1821(c)(7).

203 FDI Act § 11(f)(1), 12 U.S.C. § 1821(f)(1).

Essential

Criterion 7

Essential

Criterion 8

Essential

Criterion 9

55
whole bank P&A transactions in which both insured and uninsured deposits were transferred to the AI 

and no deposit insurance determination was necessary. Another 304 P&A transactions involved loss share 

agreements, which are similar to whole bank P&A transactions, except that the FDIC as receiver shares 

losses on certain types of assets.204

204 “Crisis and Response,” 200.

56
PRINCIPLE 15 REIMBURSING DEPOSITORS

The deposit insurance system should reimburse depositors’ insured funds promptly, in order to contribute to 

financial stability. There should be a clear and unequivocal trigger for insured depositor reimbursement.

The deposit insurer is able to reimburse most insured depositors within seven working 

days. If the deposit insurer cannot currently meet this target, the deposit insurer has a 

credible plan in place to do so.

The FDI Act requires the FDIC to make payments of insured deposits as soon as possible upon the failure 

of an insured institution either by cash or by providing to each depositor a transferred deposit in a new 

bank equal to the insured deposit.205 While every bank failure is unique, there are standard policies and 

procedures that the FDIC follows in making deposit insurance payments as soon as possible. In practice, 

the FDIC is able to provide customers access to insured deposits on the business day following an 

institution’s failure.

In certain cases, depositors may be required to provide supplemental documentation about their 

deposits, such as for accounts linked to a formal written trust agreement, funds placed by a fiduciary on 

behalf of an owner such as a deposit broker, or deposits placed by an administrator of an employee benefit 

plan. The deposit insurance determination may take longer in such cases. The timing for completing the 

deposit insurance determination is based solely on the depositor providing the required documentation 

needed by the FDIC to determine insurance coverage.

To be credible, the reimbursement plan:

a) has a clear time frame for implementation (e.g. within two years);

b) is supported by relevant laws, regulations, systems, and processes (e.g. intervention 

and resolution manuals); and

c) has clear and measurable deliverables.

The FDI Act requires the FDIC to make payments of insured deposits as soon as possible after the failure of 

an insured institution. In practice the FDIC does so.

In situations where reimbursement is triggered and there may be extended delays in 

reimbursements, the deposit insurer may make advance, interim, or emergency partial 

payments.

The legal framework in the United States allows the FDIC to reimburse insured deposits without extended 

delays. The FDIC has broad powers to manage the capacity and practical ability to pay claims for insured 

deposits as soon as possible by drawing upon the failed institution’s assets, and, if necessary, the DIF. 

Advance dividends for uninsured deposits may also be approved by the FDIC Board of Directors.

In order to provide depositors with prompt access to their funds, the deposit insurer:

a) has access to depositors’ records at all times, which includes the authority to require 

banks to maintain depositor information in a format prescribed by the deposit insurer 

in order to expedite insured depositor reimbursement;

b) has the authority to undertake advance or preparatory examinations (e.g. on-site and 

independently or in conjunction with the supervisory authority) on the reliability of 

205 FDI Act § 11(f)(1), 12 U.S.C. § 1821(f)(1).

Essential

Criterion 1

Essential

Criterion 2

Essential

Criterion 3

Essential

Criterion 4

57
depositor records, and has tested member institution’s IT systems and data to ensure 

the capability to produce such records; and

c) has a range of reimbursement options.

The FDIC:

a) Can directly access the bank’s deposit records and it has the authority to require banks 

to maintain depositor information in a format prescribed by the FDIC to expedite insured 

depositor reimbursement.206 FDIC regulations include recordkeeping requirements that vary 

depending on the size of the institution.207 The FDIC’s examination authority allows for the 

review of deposit records to ensure they are maintained in a manner that would facilitate 

depositor reimbursement.208

b) Maintains the Claims Administration System, which has the ability to interface with an 

institution’s information technology system to quickly calculate deposit insurance coverage. 

The largest banks are required to implement and maintain the information technology 

capability to process their own deposit account records and calculate the deposit insurance 

coverage available for each depositor if a failure occurs.209 The FDIC has implemented 

regulations and provided guidance regarding the file formats for depositor records.210 The 

FDIC has special examination authority for any bank.211 Accordingly, the FDIC has the authority 

to undertake advance or preparatory examinations on the reliability of depositor records, 

and it has the authority to test an institution’s IT systems and data to ensure the capability 

to produce records and deposit insurance determinations where those banks are required to 

maintain those capabilities.212 As part of standard bank examinations, FDIC examiners conduct 

IT examinations to determine the validity and reliability of the records produced by an 

institution’s system.213 During pre-failure preparations, FDIC examination and resolution staff 

gather information about the institution’s deposits, IT systems, and other aspects relevant to 

resolution planning.214 The FDIC uses the Claims Administration System prior to an institution’s 

failure to estimate the amount of insured and uninsured deposits held by an institution.215

c) Pays claims for insured deposits as soon as possible either in cash or by providing to each 

depositor a transferred deposit in another bank.216 In most cases, the FDIC satisfies its 

obligation to pay insured deposits by transferring them to an AI through a P&A transaction. 

As noted in EC-2, the payout can also be made in cash or facilitated through several means, 

including the establishment of a DINB or by using a paying agent.217

206 12 C.F.R. Part 370.1, 12 C.F.R. § 370.3.

207 See for example 12 C.F.R. § 360.9 (requirements for banks that have at least $2 billion in deposits and at least either 250,000 deposit accounts or $20 

billion in total assets); 12 C.F.R. Part 370 (requirements for banks that have 2 million or more deposit accounts).

208 FDI Act § 10(b), 12 U.S.C. § 1820(b).

209 12 C.F.R. § 370.3.

210 See for example 12 C.F.R. Part 360, Appendices A–H (detailing file format requirements for insured institutions subject to 

12 C.F.R. § 360.9); 12 C.F.R. Part 370, Appendices A and B; and FDIC, 12 CFR Part 370 Recordkeeping Information Technology Functional Guide, https://

www.fdic.gov/regulations/resources/recordkeeping/index.html.

211 FDI Act § 10(b)(3), 12 U.S.C. § 1820(b)(3).

212 12 C.F.R. § 360.9(h); 12 C.F.R. § 370.10(b).

213 FDIC, Risk Management Manual of Examination Policies, https://www.fdic.gov/regulations/safety/manual/.

214 Resolutions Handbook, 9-11.

215 FDIC, Freedom of Information Act Service Center—Major Information Systems, https://www.fdic.gov/foia/.

216 FDI Act § 11(f)(1), 12 U.S.C. § 1821(f)(1).

217 FDI Act § 11(m), 12 U.S.C. § 1821(m); and Resolutions Handbook, 19-20.

58
The deposit insurer has the capacity and capability to promptly carry out the 

reimbursement process, including:

a) adequate resources and trained personnel (in-house or contractors) dedicated to 

the reimbursement function and supported with reimbursement documentation or 

manuals;

b) information systems to process depositor information in a systematic and accurate 

manner;

c) pre- and post-closing activities specified in closing documentation or manuals; and

d) scenario planning and simulations, including simulations on bank closings with 

supervisory and resolution authorities.

The FDIC:

a) has adequate in-house personnel and access to contractor personnel to carry out its 

reimbursement functions effectively. The FDI Act requires the FDIC to have a division of asset 

disposition to handle liquidation of banks, which the FDIC has satisfied through its Division 

of Resolutions and Receiverships. This division is responsible for resolving failed IDIs and 

managing the resulting receiverships. The FDIC has established claims determination and 

payments processes supported by reimbursement documentation and manuals.218

b) has information systems to process depositor information in a systematic and accurate 

manner through the Claims Administration System, a centralized, automated repository for 

depositor information used when an IDI fails. It interfaces with an institution’s information 

technology system to quickly calculate deposit insurance coverage. FDIC regulations also 

require large banks to implement and maintain the capabilities to perform deposit insurance 

determinations using their own IT systems.219

c) has developed policies, procedures, standards, and manuals for pre- and post-closing 

activities, including a claims manual, the Resolutions Handbook, and others.220

d) is the sole resolution authority for all IDIs in the United States. The FDIC works with other 

supervisory authorities to plan for future resolutions, including regular meetings with federal 

banking supervisory authorities to discuss troubled institutions.

A review (e.g. post mortem) following a bank failure is performed to determine and 

analyze elements of the reimbursement process (including the resolution procedures 

where applicable) which were successful or unsuccessful.

The FDIC regularly conducts informal reviews of actions taken during the course of the resolution of a 

failed IDI. In addition, the FDI Act requires the Inspector General of the appropriate federal banking agency 

to conduct a review and prepare a report when the DIF incurs a material loss related to a bank for which 

the FDIC is appointed receiver.221 These reviews consider how the resolution of the failed institution was 

handled and they inform the FDIC’s approach to future bank failures. The FDIC also conducts regional 

audits on a three-year cycle to review the effectiveness of resolutions.

218 Resolutions Handbook.

219 12 C.F.R. § 370 (recordkeeping and IT capability requirements for banks that have 2 million or more deposit accounts).

220 Resolutions Handbook.

221 FDI Act § 38(k)(1), 12 U.S.C. § 1831o(k)(1). The FDI Act defines a material loss as any estimated loss to the DIF in excess of $50 million if the loss occurs 

on or after January 1, 2014.

Essential

Criterion 5

Essential

Criterion 6

59
An independent party conducts a periodic audit of the reimbursement process to 

confirm that appropriate internal controls are in place.

The FDIC is accountable through a transparent framework for the review of its discharge of its statutory 

responsibilities, including its management of the reimbursement process. The FDIC is required to maintain 

full accounting of receiverships undertaken under the FDI Act and make an annual accounting available to 

the Secretary of the Treasury and the Comptroller General of the United States, among others.222

The FDIC is also subject to external review by the GAO, including an annual audit of the FDIC and the DIF.223

Finally, the FDI Act requires the Inspector General of the appropriate federal banking agency to conduct 

a review and prepare a report when the DIF incurs a material loss related to a bank for which the FDIC is 

appointed receiver.224

If set-off of insured deposits against past-due claims (e.g. debt service and arrears) 

or matured loans is applied, such application is timely and does not delay prompt 

reimbursement of insured depositors’ claims or undermine financial stability.

The FDIC may withhold payment of a portion of an insured deposit to a depositor to provide for the 

payment of a liability of the depositor which is due and owing to the failed institution or its receiver.225 The 

FDIC has established procedures for the timely application of any offset transactions to ensure prompt 

reimbursement of insured depositors’ claims.226

Working arrangements and/or agreements are in place with relevant clearing and 

settlement system agencies and liquidators, to ensure that transit items are dealt with 

in an appropriate, consistent and timely manner.

The FDIC receivership management process has addressed the treatment of items in transit when a bank 

fails. While the ultimate treatment of these items will depend on the strategy used to resolve the failed 

institution, the FDIC’s goal is to cause the least amount of disruption possible under the circumstances. 

For example, in a resolution handled through a P&A transaction, the institution accepting the transferred 

deposits will also likely clear items in transit. With an insured deposit transfer, the agent bank handling the 

deposit payout will clear items in transit. If a DINB is established following the failure, then items in transit 

will clear when they are presented to the DINB while it remains active.

In cases where the deposit insurer does not have the authority to act as a liquidator, 

the liquidator is obliged by law or regulation to cooperate with the deposit insurer to 

facilitate the reimbursement process.

The FDIC has sole responsibility for liquidating failed IDIs.227

222 FDI Act § 11(d)(15), 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(15).

223 FDI Act § 17(d)(1), 12 U.S.C. § 1827(d)(1).

224 FDI Act § 38(k)(1), 12 U.S.C. § 1831o(k)(1). The FDI Act defines a material loss as any estimated loss to the DIF in excess of $50 million on or after 

January 1, 2014.

225 FDI Act § 12(d), 12 U.S.C. §1822(d).

226 The FDIC’s primary goal as the receiver is to protect the depositors. The FDIC has established procedures to allow depositors to offset the uninsured 

portion of a deposit against loan amounts owed to a failed bank. In the case of a depositor with large deposit balances and loans at the bank, the deposit 

amounts greater than the insurance limit could be used to pay off any loans owed by the depositor to a failed bank.

227 FDI Act § 11(c)(13)(B), 12 U.S.C. § 1821(c)(13)(B).

Essential

Criterion 7

Essential

Criterion 8

Essential

Criterion 9

Essential

Criterion 10

60
PRINCIPLE 16 RECOVERIES

The deposit insurer should have, by law, the right to recover its claims in accordance with the statutory creditor 

hierarchy.

The deposit insurer’s role in the recovery process is clearly defined in law. The deposit 

insurer is clearly recognized as a creditor of the failed bank by subrogation.

Under the FDI Act, the FDIC, upon the payment of claims for insured deposits, becomes subrogated to all 

rights of the depositor against the bank to the extent of the payment or assumption.228

The deposit insurer has at least the same creditor rights or status as a depositor in the 

treatment in law of the estate of the failed bank.

Once the FDIC pays claims for insured deposits, the FDIC is then subrogated to all rights of such insured 

depositors against the estate of the failed institution.229 The FDIC’s subrogated claim is classified as a 

deposit liability and has the same rights and status as an uninsured depositor.

The deposit insurer, in its capacity as creditor, has the right of access to information from 

the liquidator, so that it can monitor the liquidation process.

The FDIC, acting as receiver, has primary responsibility for liquidating failed IDIs.230 The FDIC as receiver 

has access to information regarding the failed institution, including information necessary to administer 

the claims process. The FDI Act does not restrict the FDIC in its receivership capacity from sharing relevant 

information with the FDIC in its deposit insurer (creditor) capacity.

The management and disposition of the assets of a failed bank in its asset management 

and recovery approaches is guided by commercial and economic considerations.

The FDI Act grants the FDIC broad powers to conduct the liquidation, management, and disposition of 

assets of a failed IDI.231 Upon appointment as receiver, the FDIC succeeds to all rights, titles, powers, and 

privileges of the institution. The FDIC may take over the institution’s assets and operate the entity with 

all of the powers of the members or shareholders, directors, and officers, and conduct all business of the 

entity.232

In carrying out its responsibilities in the management and disposition of assets of a failed IDI, the FDIC as 

receiver may utilize services of outside parties, including real estate and loan portfolio asset management, 

property management, auction marketing, legal, and brokerage services. If the FDIC as receiver utilizes the 

services of outside parties, it does so only when it determines that the utilization of the services is the most 

practicable, efficient, and cost-effective option.233

In exercising any right, power, privilege, or authority in connection with any sale or disposition of assets of 

a failed IDI, the FDIC as receiver is required to act in a manner which:

y maximizes the net present value return from the sale or disposition of assets;

y minimizes any loss realized in resolving cases;

y ensures adequate competition and fair and consistent treatment of offerors;

228 FDI Act §§ 11(f)-(g), 13(c)-(d), 12 U.S.C. §§ 1821(f)-(g), 1823(c)-(d).

229 FDI Act §§ 11(f)-(g), 13(c)-(d), 12 U.S.C. §§ 1821(f)-(g), 1823(c)-(d).

230 FDI Act § 11(d)(2), 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(2).

231 FDI Act § 11(d)(2), 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(2).

232 FDI Act § 11(d)(2), 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(2).

233 FDI Act § 11(d)(2)(K), 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(2)(K).

Essential

Criterion 1

Essential

Criterion 2

Essential

Criterion 3

Essential

Criterion 4

61
y prohibits discrimination based on race, sex, or ethnic group in the solicitation and 

consideration of offers; and

y maximizes the preservation of the availability and affordability of residential real property for 

low- and moderate-income individuals.234

In addition, the FDI Act requires the FDIC as receiver to consider the adverse economic impact its 

resolution and liquidation actions would have on local communities.235 After the FDIC is appointed receiver 

for a failed IDI, and before taking any action in the resolution of an institution, the FDIC evaluates the likely 

impact that the means of resolution and any action which the FDIC may take in resolution may have on 

the viability of other banks in the same community. The FDIC considers the evaluation in determining the 

means, terms, and conditions for resolving the institution.236

Those working on behalf of the deposit insurer, other financial safety-net participants, 

and third-party professional service providers providing resolution services are not 

allowed to purchase assets from the liquidator.

FDIC employees, their spouses, and their minor children may not directly or indirectly purchase or acquire 

property held or managed by the FDIC as receiver or liquidator of the assets of a failed IDI.237 A contractor 

or its affiliated business entity that has performed services within the previous three years related to the 

assets that the prospective purchaser might buy is also not eligible to purchase those assets.238

An FDIC employee must disqualify himself or herself in writing from participating in the disposition of 

assets held by the FDIC as receiver or liquidator of an institution upon learning that the employee has a 

“covered relationship” with a prospective buyer.239

234 FDI Act § 11(d)(13)(E), 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(13)(E).

235 FDI Act § 11(h), 12 U.S.C. § 1821(h).

236 FDI Act § 11(h), 12 U.S.C. § 1821(h).

237 5 C.F.R. § 3201.104.

238 The FDIC has established guidelines and certification procedures to identify prospective purchasers who are not eligible to purchase assets of the 

failed financial institutions from the FDIC under the laws, regulations, and policies governing such sales. Prospective buyers must complete a Purchaser 

Eligibility Certification in order to purchase a failed bank’s assets from the FDIC (https://www.fdic.gov/buying/owned/documents/pec-7300-06-ore.pdf).

239 5 C.F.R. § 3201.104(b); 5 C.F.R. § 2635.502(b)(1) (explanation of “covered relationships”).

Essential

Criterion 5

62
63
64