UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v. No. 97-4159

RANDALL G. CRAWFORD,

Defendant-Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of West Virginia, at Charleston.

Charles H. Haden II, Chief District Judge.

(CR-96-151)

Submitted: September 25, 1997

Decided: October 15, 1997

Before LUTTIG, MICHAEL, and MOTZ, Circuit Judges.

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Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

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COUNSEL

Hunt L. Charach, Federal Public Defender, Edward H. Weis, First

Assistant Federal Public Defender, Charleston, West Virginia, for

Appellant. Rebecca Betts, United States Attorney, Michael L. Keller,

Assistant United States Attorney, Charleston, West Virginia, for

Appellee.

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Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See

Local Rule 36(c).

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OPINION

PER CURIAM:

Randall G. Crawford pled guilty to attempting to interfere with

internal revenue laws in violation of 26 U.S.C.§ 7212(a) (1994), and

received a sentence of 18 months imprisonment. He appeals his sentence, alleging that the district court clearly should have awarded him

an adjustment for acceptance of responsibility under U.S. Sentencing

Guidelines Manual, § 3E1.1 (1995). We affirm.

Crawford failed to report as income $110,630 which he stole and

embezzled from his employer during 1994 and 1995. Following his

guilty plea, he was charged with driving on a suspended license. His

license had previously been suspended after he was convicted of driving under the influence of alcohol. Crawford failed to report the new

charge to the probation officer supervising him in Kentucky (where

he was living) or to the probation officer in West Virginia who interviewed him and prepared the presentence report. Although Crawford

cooperated with authorities after his guilty plea and the government

did not oppose an adjustment for acceptance of responsibility, the district court decided that Crawford's conduct, and his failure to report

it to the probation officer, showed a continued disregard for the law.

The court refused to make the adjustment.

We review the court's decision under the clearly erroneous standard.* The district court may find that a defendant has not accepted

responsibility despite a guilty plea and truthful admission of his conduct if he engages in conduct inconsistent with acceptance of responsibility. See USSG § 3E1.1, comment. (n.3). Crawford contends that

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*Crawford asserts that our review should be de novo because the facts

are undisputed. However, the district court's evaluation of a defendant's

acceptance of responsibility is a factual determination. See United States

v. Myers, 66 F.3d 1364, 1372 (4th Cir. 1995).

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new criminal conduct which is unrelated to the offense of conviction

should not be considered in determining acceptance of responsibility.

While the Sixth Circuit has so held, see United States v. Morrison,

983 F.2d 730, 733-35 (6th Cir. 1993), the weight of authority from

other circuits is to the contrary. See United States v. Ceccarani, 98

F.3d 126, 129-30 (3d Cir. 1996) (post-offense conduct can shed significant light on sincerity of defendant's claimed remorse), cert.

denied, ___ U.S. ___, 65 U.S.L.W. 3586 (U.S. Feb. 24, 1997) (No.

96-7616); United States v. Byrd, 76 F.3d 194, 197 (8th Cir. 1996);

United States v. McDonald, 22 F.3d 139, 142-44 (7th Cir. 1994);

United States v. Pace, 17 F.3d 341, 343 (11th Cir. 1994); United

States v. O'Neil, 936 F.2d 599, 601-02 (1st Cir. 1991); United States

v. Watkins, 911 F.2d 983, 985 (5th Cir. 1990). Following these

authorities, we find that the district court did not clearly err in finding

that Crawford had not accepted responsibility for his criminal conduct.

We therefore affirm the sentence. We dispense with oral argument

because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the

materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional

process.

AFFIRMED

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