UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 13-4560

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

 Plaintiff – Appellee,

v.

TRAVIS DOUG BURLEY,

 Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern 

District of Virginia, at Richmond. John A. Gibney, Jr., 

District Judge. (3:12-cr-00186-JAG-1)

Submitted: March 28, 2014 Decided: April 21, 2014

Before SHEDD, DIAZ, and FLOYD, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Amy Leigh Austin, LAW OFFICE OF AMY L. AUSTIN, PLLC, Richmond, 

Virginia, for Appellant. Dana J. Boente, Acting United States 

Attorney, Brian R. Hood, Assistant United States Attorney, 

Richmond, Virginia, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:

Travis Doug Burley appeals his conviction following a 

jury trial for using, carrying, brandishing, and discharging a 

firearm during and in relation to a drug trafficking offense, in 

violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A) (2012). On appeal, Burley 

argues that the evidence elicited at trial was insufficient to 

support his conviction. Because we conclude Burley fails to 

meet his burden of establishing that the evidence was 

insufficient, we affirm.

We review de novo a challenge to the sufficiency of 

the evidence supporting a jury verdict. United States v. Hager, 

721 F.3d 167, 179 (4th Cir. 2013), petition for cert. filed, __ 

U.S.L.W. __ (U.S. Dec. 16, 2013) (No. 13-7913). We will affirm 

if, viewing the evidence and drawing all reasonable inferences 

in the light most favorable to the Government, the verdict is 

supported by substantial evidence. United States v. 

Penniegraft, 641 F.3d 566, 572 (4th Cir. 2011). Substantial 

evidence is defined as such “evidence that a reasonable finder 

of fact could accept as adequate and sufficient to support a 

conclusion of a defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” 

United States v. Green, 599 F.3d 360, 367 (4th Cir. 2010) 

(internal quotation marks omitted). We are obliged to affirm if 

“any rational trier of fact could have found the essential 

elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” United 
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States v. Jaensch, 665 F.3d 83, 93 (4th Cir. 2011) (internal 

quotation marks omitted). A defendant seeking to challenge the 

sufficiency of the evidence “carries a heavy burden,” as 

reversal is reserved for cases “where the prosecution’s failure 

is clear.” United States v. Bishop, 740 F.3d 927, 935 (4th Cir. 

2014) (internal quotation marks omitted). 

To convict Burley of violating § 924(c), the 

Government was required to prove that Burley “used or carried a 

firearm during and in relation to a drug trafficking crime or 

possessed a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime.” 

United States v. Stephens, 482 F.3d 669, 673 (4th Cir. 2007); 

see 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A). In his opening brief, Burley 

essentially raises two distinct challenges to the sufficiency of 

the evidence. Burley primarily argues that the jury could not 

have found the elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt 

because three of the Government’s primary witnesses were not 

credible, and his own theory of the case was more persuasive. 

This argument is entirely unavailing, as it is well-settled that 

“[d]eterminations of credibility are within the sole province of 

the jury and are not susceptible to judicial review.” United 

States v. Palacios, 677 F.3d 234, 248 (4th Cir.) (internal 

quotation marks and alterations omitted), cert. denied, 133 S. 

Ct. 124 (2012).
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Burley also briefly asserts that the evidence failed 

to demonstrate that he knowingly engaged in a drug trafficking 

offense or knowingly possessed the firearm during or in relation 

to the drug trafficking offense. In his opening brief, Burley 

bases this claim solely on the absence of direct evidence that 

he was the intended purchaser in an arranged sale of marijuana, 

during which, the Government alleged, the gun discharged after 

Burley attempted to rob the seller of his marijuana. This 

argument, too, is unavailing. One witness’ testimony regarding 

his interaction with Burley on the day of the shooting provided 

circumstantial evidence from which the jury could infer that 

Burley was the intended drug purchaser. Another witness 

testified that Burley told him the shooting had occurred when 

Burley met with a drug dealer to purchase marijuana and instead

decided to steal it. Viewing the evidence, as we must, in the 

light most favorable to the Government, see Penniegraft, 641 

F.3d at 572, this testimony provided ample evidence from which 

the jury could deduce that Burley was the individual for whom 

the drug transaction had been arranged. 

The arguments raised by Burley in his opening brief 

fall far short of satisfying the heavy burden required for a 

successful challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence. While 

Burley raises additional arguments in his reply brief, these 

arguments are not properly before us, and we decline to consider 
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them. See United States v. Brooks, 524 F.3d 549, 556 & n.11 

(4th Cir. 2008) (deeming claim raised for first time in reply 

brief abandoned); Yousefi v. INS, 260 F.3d 318, 326 (4th Cir. 

2001) (concluding that petitioner abandoned argument on appeal 

raised for first time in reply brief by failing to raise it in 

opening brief).

Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment. 

We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal 

contentions are adequately presented in the materials before 

this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED