COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Judges Bray, Annunziata and Overton 

EDWARD JOSEPH CRONIN 

 MEMORANDUM OPINION*

v. Record No. 0444-98-3 PER CURIAM 

 OCTOBER 27, 1998 

STACEY A. CRONIN 

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF MONTGOMERY COUNTY 

Ray W. Grubbs, Judge 

 (John B. Mann; Levit & Mann, on briefs), for 

appellant. 

 (Marcus H. Long, Jr.; Long, Long & Kellerman, 

on brief), for appellee. 

 Edward Joseph Cronin (husband) seeks to set aside the final 

decree entered March 11, 1997, granting Stacey A. Cronin (wife) a 

divorce and awarding her spousal support and attorney's fees. 

Husband contends that the divorce decree is void because it was 

not entered pursuant to the notice requirements of Rule 1:13 of 

the Rules of the Supreme Court of Virginia. Upon reviewing the 

record and briefs of the parties, we conclude that this appeal is 

without merit. Accordingly, we summarily affirm the decision of 

the trial court. See Rule 5A:27. 

Procedural Background

 Wife commenced this action by filing a bill of complaint on 

July 19, 1995. John Dixon, an attorney, appeared with husband at 

his deposition on November 14, 1995, and filed an answer on 

 

 *Pursuant to Code § 17-116.010 this opinion is not 

designated for publication. 
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behalf of husband on November 27, 1995. Subsequently, both 

wife's counsel, Marcus Long, and the court served husband by 

directing all notices to Dixon at the address listed in the court 

files. Neither Dixon nor husband responded to these notices. On 

September 16, 1996, Long noticed a hearing on October 3, 1996 on 

the issue of spousal support. On November 27, 1996, a new 

attorney, Raphael Hartley, sent a request for production of 

documents to Long, with a copy to the court. Hartley sent 

interrogatories to wife on December 16, 1996, a copy of which was 

also filed with the court. Husband did not move to substitute 

counsel. 

 On February 5, 1997, the trial court issued an opinion 

letter indicating that it found the evidence sufficient to grant 

wife a divorce on the ground of husband's desertion and to award 

wife spousal support and attorney's fees. The opinion letter was 

mailed to Long and Dixon. Pursuant to the court's instructions 

in its opinion letter, on February 17, 1997, Long sent a draft of 

the final decree to the court, with a copy to Dixon. Long noted 

that he had received little or no communication from Dixon. The 

court entered the final decree on March 11, 1997, and mailed a 

copy to Dixon. On March 12, 1997, Hartley filed a motion seeking 

to compel the production of documents, to which Long responded on 

March 17, 1997, indicating that he had not received any previous 

correspondence and that the final decree was entered on March 11, 

1997. On April 14, 1997, more than twenty-one days after entry 
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of the final decree, Hartley filed a motion seeking review, 

accompanied by a copy of an order for substitution of counsel 

which Hartley indicated he had sent to Long earlier. 

 Subsequently, husband obtained new counsel, John Mann, who 

filed a Motion to Vacate the Final Decree. Mann argued that the 

final decree did not comply with Rule 1:13. The trial judge 

denied husband's motion to vacate. 

Rule 1:13

 Rule 1:13 of the Rules of the Supreme Court of Virginia 

provides: 

 Drafts of orders and decrees shall be 

endorsed by counsel of record, or reasonable 

notice of the time and place of presenting 

such drafts together with copies thereof 

shall be served by delivering or mailing to 

all counsel of record who have not endorsed 

them. Compliance with this rule and with 

Rule 1:12 may be modified or dispensed with 

by the court in its discretion. 

"[T]he mere fact that an order may have been entered without 

endorsement of counsel of record does not automatically render it 

void. The last sentence of Rule 1:13 authorizes the trial court 

in its discretion to modify or dispense with the requirement of 

endorsement of counsel." Davis v. Mullins, 251 Va. 141, 147, 466 

S.E.2d 90, 93 (1996). Although husband's counsel of record did 

not endorse the draft decree, Long attempted to obtain counsel's 

endorsement. Long sent the final decree to Dixon on February 17, 

1997, pursuant to the trial court's instructions in its February 

5, 1997 opinion letter. The trial court did not enter the decree 
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until March 11, 1997, twenty-one days later. Both the court and 

Long continually served notice upon Dixon at the address given in 

the court files. The onus fell on husband and Dixon to ensure 

that the court was notified of any changes in counsel's address 

and to file a timely motion seeking to substitute counsel. 

 Moreover, Rule 1:13 grants the trial court discretion to 

modify or dispense with compliance with its provisions. Here, as 

set out in the trial court's January 30, 1998 opinion letter 

denying husband's motion to vacate the decree, the court "further 

dispensed with Mr. Dixon's signature as the Court's 

correspondence to him was returned by the U. S. Postal Service, 

as set forth above." Therefore, credible evidence demonstrates 

that the trial court dispensed with compliance with Rule 1:13. 

Under the circumstances of this case, we find no abuse of 

discretion in the trial court's decision. 

 Finally, even when Hartley became aware that a final decree 

had been entered on March 11, 1997, he took no action to set 

aside the final decree until April 14, 1997. For the reasons set 

out above, the final decree was not void. Under Rule 1:1, the 

divorce decree became final twenty-one days after entry, and the 

trial court lacked jurisdiction thereafter to set aside or vacate 

the decree. See Davis, 251 Va. at 148-49, 466 S.E.2d at 94. 

 Accordingly, the decision of the circuit court is summarily 

affirmed. 

 Affirmed.