alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### Robert A. BERMAN, Petitioner, v. DEPARTMENT OF the INTERIOR, Respondent.

No. 2010-3052.

United States Court of Appeals, Federal Circuit.

Feb. 2, 2011.

*361Robert A. Berman, Vienna, VA, pro se.

Joshua E. Kurland, Department of Justice, Washington, DC, for Respondent.

Before LINN, Circuit Judge.

ON MOTION

ORDER

Robert A. Berman moves to summarily reverse the judgment of the Merit Systems Protection Board in *Berman v. Dep’t of Interior,*No. DC0752090294-I-1, and for this court to instruct the Board to order the Department of Interior to compensate Berman for all losses and restore him to his prior position at the Department. The Department opposes. Berman replies.

Berman was employed as an economist at the Department. In November 1998, Berman accepted a monetary award from the Project on Government Oversight (POGO) for his work related to a qui tarn action involving payments for the extraction of oil on federal lands. Subsequently, the United States filed a civil suit in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia asserting that POGO and Berman violated 18 U.S.C. § 209 which prohibits private parties from making, and Government employees from receiving, payments that compensate employees for government service. In February of 2008, a jury found that POGO and Berman violated § 209. POGO and Berman appealed, seeking review by the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit.

Meanwhile, the Department sought to remove Berman for misconduct based on his acceptance of the award. The administrative judge sustained the Department’s removal, relying in part on the jury verdict. The Board denied Berman’s petition for review and Berman sought review of the Board’s decision by this court.

This court stayed the briefing schedule in this case pending the District of Columbia Circuit’s disposition in *United States v. Project on Gov’t Oversight,*616 F.3d 544 (D.C.Cir.2010). In its decision, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit vacated and remanded in part for a new trial, concluding that intent was a required element of a § 209 violation and that the district court’s jury instruction failed to properly instruct the jury on the intent element.

Berman argues that *United States v. Project on Gov’t Oversight*controls the disposition of this case. The United States argues that *United States v. Project on Gov’t Oversight*does not control disposition of this case.

This court deems it the better course for the parties to raise these arguments in their briefs.

Accordingly,

It Is Ordered That:

(1) Berman’s motion for summary reversal is denied without prejudice to the parties raising their arguments in the briefs. The stay of the briefing schedule is lifted. Berman’s opening brief is due within 80 days of the date of filing of this order.

(2) Any other pending motions are denied as moot.
EX-35.4
(logo) CAPMARK

Annual Statement as to Compliance
For the Year Ended December 31, 2007

J.P. MORGAN CHASE COMMERCIAL MORTGAGE SECURITIES CORP.
Series 2007-CIBC18

Pursuant to Section 11.09 of the Pooling and Servicing Agreement governing the
referenced transaction, I hereby attest that:

i. A review of the activities of Capmark Finance Inc. as Master Servicer during
the period, and of its performance under this Pooling and Servicing Agreement,
has been made under my supervision.

ii. To the best of my knowledge, based on such review, Capmark Finance Inc. as
Master Servicer, has fulfilled in all material respects its obligations under
this Pooling and Servicing Agreement throughout the period.

Capmark Finance Inc.

/s/ Mark E. McCool
By: Mark E. McCool
Title: Managing Director
Date: February 20, 2008

Real Estate Finance, Investments, Services
Capmark Finance Inc.
116 Welsh Road
Horsham, Pa 19044
Exhibit 32.2



CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO

18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,

AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO

SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES  OXLEY ACT OF 2002



In connection with the Quarterly Report of NovaStar Financial, Inc. (the Company) on Form 10-Q for the period ended March 31, 2005, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the
Report), I, Gregory S. Metz, Chief Financial Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes  Oxley Act of 2002, that:



| | (1) | The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and
| | --- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



| | (2) | The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.
| | --- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



|                       
|-----------------------
|                       
|/s/ Gregory S. Metz    
|Gregory S. Metz        
|Chief Financial Officer
|                       
|May 5, 2005            



This certification is made solely for
purpose of 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, subject to the knowledge standard contained therein, and not for any other purpose.
CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350, AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002 In connection with the Annual Report of B2 Health, Inc., (the "Company") on Form 10-K/A-2 for the period ended September 30, 2008, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), I, John Quam, Principal Executive Officer and Principal Financial Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that: (1)The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and(2)The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and result of operations of the Company.   __/s/ John Quam_________ John Quam, Principal Executive Officer, Principal Financial Officer  January 5, 2010
Exhibit
32.1





CERTIFICATION
PURSUANT TO


18 U.S.C.
SECTION 1350,


AS
ADOPTED PURSUANT TO


SECTION
906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002




In
connection with the Quarterly Report of American Tax Credit Properties L.P. (the
“Registrant”) on Form 10-Q for the period ended December 30, 2009 as filed with
the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the “Report”), I,
David Salzman, Chief Executive Officer of Richman Tax Credit Properties Inc.,
general partner of Richman Tax Credit Properties L.P., general partner of the
Registrant, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to
Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:





(1)
            The
      Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of
      the Securities Exchange Act of 1934;
and




(2)
            The
      information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material
      respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the
      Registrant.




/s/David SalzmanDavid
      SalzmanChief
      Executive Officer of Richman TaxCredit
      Properties Inc., general partner ofRichman
      Tax Credit Properties L.P., generalpartner
      of the RegistrantFebruary
      10, 2010
GreenPower Motor Company Inc.: Exhibit 10.26 - Filed by newsfilecorp.com

CERTIFICATIONS 
I, Fraser Atkinson, certify that: 
1.I have reviewed this annual report on Form 20-F of GreenPower Motor Company Inc.; 
2.Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this report; 
3.Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial information included in this report, fairly present in all material respects the financial condition, results of operations and cash flows of the company as of, and for, the periods presented in this report; 
4.The company's other certifying officer(s) and I have disclosed, based on our most recent evaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to the company's auditors and the audit committee of the company's board of directors (or persons performing the equivalent functions): 
(a)All significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or operation of internal control over financial reporting which are reasonably likely to adversely affect the company's ability to record, process, summarize and report financial information; and 
(b)Any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other employees who have a significant role in the company's internal control over financial reporting. 
Date: 20 July 2020
    /s/ Fraser Atkinson   
Fraser Atkinson
Chief Executive Officer
I

103D CONGRESS

1ST SESSION H. R. 2814

To permit the taking effect of certain proposed rules of civil procedure,

with modifications.

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

JULY 30, 1993

Mr. HUGHES (for himself and Mr. MOORHEAD) introduced the following bill;

which was referred to the Committee on the Judiciary

A BILL

To permit the taking effect of certain proposed rules of

civil procedure, with modifications.

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Civil Rules Amend5 ments Act of 1993’’.

6 SEC. 2. MODIFICATION OF PROPOSED AMENDMENTS.

7 The proposed amendments to the Federal Rules of

8 Civil Procedure which are embraced by an order entered

9 by the Supreme Court of the United States on April 22,
2

•HR 2814 IH

1 1993, shall take effect on December 1, 1993, as otherwise

2 provided by law, but with the following amendments:

3 (1) RULE 26.—

4 (A) IN GENERAL.—Proposed rule 26(a) is

5 amended so that paragraph (1) reads as

6 follows:

7 ‘‘(1) INSURANCE AGREEMENTS.—A party may

8 obtain discovery of the existence and contents of any

9 insurance agreement under which any person carry10 ing on an insurance business may be liable to satisfy

11 part or all of a judgment which may be entered in

12 the action or to indemnify or reimburse for pay13 ments made to satisfy the judgment. Information

14 concerning the insurance agreement is not by reason

15 of disclosure admissible in evidence at trial. For pur16 poses of this paragraph, an application for insurance

17 shall not be treated as part of an insurance

18 agreement.’’.

19 (2) CONFORMING AMENDMENTS.—(A) Proposed

20 rule 26(a)(2) is amended by striking ‘‘In addition to

21 the disclosures required by paragraph (1), a’’ and

22 inserting ‘‘A’’.

23 (B) Proposed rule 26(a)(3) is amended by

24 striking ‘‘the preceding paragraphs’’ and inserting

25 ‘‘paragraph (2)’’.
3

•HR 2814 IH

1 (C) Proposed rule 26(a)(4) is amended by strik2 ing ‘‘(1) through’’ and inserting ‘‘(2) and’’.

3 (D) Proposed rule 26(f) is amended by striking

4 ‘‘to make or arrange for the disclosures required by

5 subdivision (a)(1),’’.

6 (E) Proposed rule 26(g)(1) is amended by

7 striking ‘‘subdivision (a)(1) or’’.

8 (3) RULE 30.—

9 (A) IN GENERAL.—Proposed rule 30(b)(2) is

10 amended by striking ‘‘Unless the court orders other11 wise, it may be recorded by sound, sound-and-visual,

12 or stenographic means, and the’’ and inserting ‘‘Un13 less the court upon motion orders, or the parties

14 agree in writing to use, sound or sound-and-visual

15 means, the deposition shall be recorded by steno16 graphic means. The’’.

17 (B) CONFORMING AMENDMENT.—Proposed rule

18 30(b) is amended by striking paragraph (3).

19 (4) FORM 35.—Proposed form 35 is amended—

20 (A) by striking paragraph (2); and

21 (B) by redesignating paragraphs (3) and (4) as

22 paragraphs (2) and (3).

Æ
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#### Roman ASHNUROV, Petitioner, v. U.S. ATTORNEY GENERAL, Respondent. Vira Kostina, Petitioner, v. U.S. Attorney General, Respondent.

Nos. 06-12114, 06-12115

Non-Argument Calendar.

United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit.

April 4, 2007.

Lawrence G. Spivak, Law Office of Lawrence Spivak, New York, NY, for Petitioner.

Ana T. Zablah, David V. Bernal, US-DOJ, Office of Immigration Litigation, Russell J.E. Verby, Washington, DC, for Respondent.

Before BLACK, MARCUS and PRYOR, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

Vira Kostina, as lead petitioner for herself and her husband, Roman Ashnurov, petitions for review of the decisions of the Board of Immigration Appeals that denied her second motion to reconsider and her motion to reopen her petition for asylum under the Immigration and Nationality Act. Kostina argues that the denial of her motion to reopen by the BIA was arbitrary and capricious because she demonstrated meaningful change in the country conditions of Ukraine that support a well-founded fear of future persecution. Because Kostina makes no argument with regard to her appeal of the denial of her motion to reconsider, that issue is waived. *See Sepulveda v. U.S. Att’y Gen.,*401 F.3d 1226, 1228 n. 2 (11th Cir.2005).

‘We review the BIA’s denial of a motion to reopen for abuse of discretion. Our review is limited to determining whether there has been an exercise of administrative discretion and whether the matter of exercise has been arbitrary or capricious.” *Ali v. U.S. Att’y Gen.,*443 F.3d 804, 808 (11th Cir.2006) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). The BIA may grant a motion to reopen if the movant presents new evidence that is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the removal hearing. *See*8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1). A petitioner is ordinarily permitted to file one motion to reopen within 90 days of the *913date of the final order of removal, *see*8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i), but the time and numerical limitations do not apply to the filing of a motion to reopen based on changed country conditions if supported by evidence that is “material and was not available and would not have been discovered or presented at the previous proceeding,” 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii); *see also*8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(h).

Kostina argues that the country conditions in Ukraine have changed and that there is increased persecution of ethnic minorities in Ukraine, but her evidence failed to prove materially changed country conditions. Although more detailed, Kostina’s evidence was substantially the same as the evidence presented to the Immigration Judge during the asylum hearing. The discrimination alleged in the evidence, while harassing, also did not rise to the level of persecution. *See Gonzalez v. Reno,*212 F.3d 1338, 1355 (11th Cir.2000). The BIA did not abuse its discretion when it denied the motion to reopen.

PETITION DENIED.
Exhibit 32.2

 

CERTIFICATION OF CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER 

I certify, pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

1. the Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q of LabOne, Inc. for the period ending September 30, 2004 (the "Report") fully complies with the requirements of Section 13 (a) or 15 (d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

2. the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of LabOne, Inc.

 

LabOne, Inc.

Date:  November 9, 2004
By  /s/ *John W. McCarty*
*Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that

this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except

under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

 

No. 97-40052

Summary Calendar

 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

LAMAR CAMPBELL,

Defendant-Appellant.

 

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Texas

USDC No. 6:96-CR-22-11

 

July 15, 1997

Before HIGGINBOTHAM, WIENER, and BENAVIDES, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Lamar Campbell pled guilty to one count of possessing cocaine

base with intent to distribute, a violation of 21 U.S.C.

§ 841(a)(1). He has appealed the factual basis for the application

of the sentencing guidelines by the district court, which sentenced

Campbell to 78 months in prison and three years of supervised

release.
2

We find no clear error in the district court’s factual

conclusion that the 5.9 grams of crack cocaine and the handgun

found in the attic of the house in which Campbell was arrested were

connected to Campbell’s offense. The circumstances of Campbell’s

arrest made it reasonable for the district court, relying on the

presentence investigation report, to conclude that Campbell could

have reasonably foreseen that his co-conspirators would store crack

cocaine on the premises. See U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3(a)(1)(B) (1995). He

admitted handling the gun earlier in the day; the court could infer

that it was not “clearly improbable that the weapon was connected

with the offense.” U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1 note 3 (1995).

Nor do we find clear error in the district court’s conclusion

that Campbell used marijuana during his pretrial release. Based on

the four positive urine tests and the testimony of Officer Lora

Savoie at a hearing on the government’s motion for detention, the

district court could reasonably conclude that Campbell’s secondhand smoke explanation was not credible. We give “great deference”

to the district court’s determination that a defendant’s conduct is

inconsistent with acceptance of responsibility. U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1

note 5 (1995).

AFFIRMED.
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2009-1848.

#### Campbell v. Bowersock.

Allen App. No. 1-09-39, 2009-Ohio-1833.
2009-2275.

#### State ex rel. Thomas v. Hendon.

In Mandamus. On motion to dismiss. Motion to dismiss granted. Cause dismissed.

*1471Moyer, C.J., and Pfeifer, Lundberg Stratton, O’Connor, Lanzinger, and Cupp, JJ., concur.

O’Donnell, J., dissents and would grant an alternative writ.