NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

_____________

No. 15-2642

_____________

ESTATE OF PHILLIP CARL MARTIN, JR.; LINDA MARTIN, Administratrix of

the Estate; LINDA MARTIN, In her own right; DWAYNE MARTIN; 

PHILLIP COREY CLAX; BRYHEM ISAAC CLAX,

 Appellants

 

v.

UNITED STATES MARSHALS SERVICE AGENTS; CHRISTOPHER LEONE; 

EDWARD FALLON; BARRETT JOHNSON; TIMOTHY O'BRIEN; 

JOHN HUNSINGER; KEVIN CUNANE; WILLIAM WILEY; JEROME SCOTT; 

CAMDEN COUNTY BOARD OF CHOSEN FREEHOLDERS; JOHN ELLIS; 

JOHN GREER; GARY MCBRIDE; PATRICK DALEY; UNKNOWN JOHN DOE 

EMPLOYEES 19-100, In their official and individual capacities; WARREN W. FAULK; 

CAMDEN COUNTY PROSECUTOR; CITY OF CAMDEN POLICE DEPARTMENT; 

KEITH JAMES; WAYNE MATTHEWS; LT. JAMES PHILLIPS; Capt. H. LEONE; Lt. 

ORLANDO CUEVAS; Lt. JOSEPH SAPONARE; and other unknown John Doe Officers 

19-100, In their official and individual capacities; GERALD FEIGIN, M.D.; 

GLOUCESTER CAMDEN SALEM MEDICAL EXAMINER OFFICE,

In their official and individual capacities

_______________

On Appeal from the United States District Court

for theDistrict of New Jersey

(D.C. Civil No. 3-10-cv-00066)

District Judge: Hon. Peter G. Sheridan

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Argued April 6, 2016

BEFORE: FISHER, COWEN and RENDELL, Circuit Judges
2

(Filed: May 10, 2016)

Olugbenga O. Abiona, Esq. (Argued)

1433 South 4th Street

1st Floor

Philadelphia, PA 19147

William F. Joseph, Esq.

18 North Lansdowne Avenue

2nd Floor

Lansdowne, PA 19050

Counsel for Appellants Estate of Phillip

Carl Martin, Jr., Linda M. Martin,

Dwayne Martin, Phillip Corey Clax

and Bryhem Isaac Clax

David V. Bober, Esq. (Argued)

Office of United States Attorney

402 East State Street

Trenton, NJ 08608

Counsel for Appellees United States Marshals,

Christopher Leone, Edward Fallon, Barrett Johnson,

Timothy O’Brien, John Hunsinger, Kevin Cunane,

William Wiley and Jerome Scott

Howard I. Goldberg, Esq. (Argued)

Office of Camden County Counsel

520 Market Street

14th Floor, Courthouse

Camden, NJ 08101

Counsel for Appellees Camden County Board of

Chosen Freeholders, Patrick Daley

and Gerald Feigin

Barbara E. Riefberg, Esq. (Argued)

Ashley H. Buono, Esq.

Shimberg & Friel

20 Brace Road
3

Suite 350

Cherry Hill, NJ 08034

Elyse G. Crawford, Esq.

Parker McCay

9000 Midlantic Drive

Suite 300

Mount Laurel, NJ 08054

Counsel for Appellees John Ellis

and Gary McBride

Timothy J. Galanaugh, Esq. (Argued)

Office of City Attorney

City of Camden

Suite 419

520 Market Street

P.O. Box 95120

Camden, NJ 08101

Counsel for Appellees City of Camden Police

Department, Orlando Cuevas, William Wiley,

Wayne Matthews, H. Leone, Joseph Saponare,

Keith James and James Phillips

______________

OPINION*

_____________

COWEN, Circuit Judge.

Plaintiffs Estate of Phillip Carl Martin, Jr., Linda Martin, Dwayne Martin, Philip 

Corey Clax, and Bryhem Isaac Clax appeal from a series of orders entered by the United 

 

* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and, pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7, does not 

constitute binding precedent.
4

States District Court for the District of New Jersey granting summary judgment in favor 

of Defendants. We will affirm.

I.

This case arises out of the death of Phillip Carl Martin, Jr. (“Martin”). Martin died 

shortly after the entry of several deputized United States marshals into the home of his 

mother (Linda Martin) from a gunshot wound to the head. Linda Martin (acting in her 

own right and as the administrator of his estate), Dwayne Martin (his brother), and 

Martin’s two sons (Phillip Corey Clax and Bryhem Isaac Clax) (collectively, “Plaintiffs”) 

filed suit against a number of Defendants, alleging various claims under the United States 

Constitution and New Jersey law. For purposes of this appeal, Defendants can be sorted

into the following four categories: (1) the “Marshals,” i.e., state or local law enforcement 

officers deputized as members of the New York/New Jersey Regional Fugitive Task 

Force (Christopher Leone, Edward Fallon, Barrett Johnson, Timothy O’Brien, Jerome 

Scott, John Hunsinger, and Kevin Cunane); (2) two investigators working for the Camden 

County Prosecutor’s Office (John Ellis and Gary McBride (“Investigators”)); (3) the 

Camden County Board of Chosen Freeholders, Gerald Feigin, M.D., and Patrick Daley 

(“Camden County Defendants”); and (4) Wayne Matthews, Joseph Saponare, Keith 

James, H. Leone, Orlando Cuevas, James Phillips, and the Camden Police Department 

(“Camden City Defendants”). Plaintiffs urged that the Defendants used excessive force, 

one of the Marshals shot Martin, and there was a conspiracy to cover this up. 
5

The Marshals, Investigators, Camden County Defendants, and Camden City

Defendants moved for summary judgment. The District Court heard oral argument on 

their motions. For the reasons it set forth in a comprehensive and well-reasoned opinion, 

the District Court granted the respective summary judgment motions except as to the 

Plaintiffs’ claims “regarding the unlawful detention of Linda and Dwayne Martin by the 

individual Camden City Defendants and by Defendant Gary McBride of the Camden 

County Prosecutor’s Office.” (A119-A120.) Because the parties were focused on the 

excessive force and conspiracy claims and there was some confusion as to “what actions 

of Defendants’, Plaintiffs’ various causes of action were directed at,” the remaining 

Defendants were given thirty days to file motions for summary judgment “on the narrow 

issues that remain before proceeding to trial.” (A120.) The District Court subsequently 

granted the respective summary judgment motions filed by James, McBride, Matthews, 

and the Camden City Police Department and Phillips.1

II.

Plaintiffs have asserted a number of claims, including allegations that the 

Marshals’ entry violated the Fourth Amendment, an excessive force cause of action under 

the Fourth Amendment, conspiracy allegations under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, various state law 

claims, a Fourth Amendment cause of action for unlawful arrest, detention, and 

interrogation, and claims of municipal liability pursuant to Monell v. New York City 

 

1 The Fourth Amendment unlawful seizure claim against William Wiley (a 

Camden City police officer) went to trial, and the jury returned a verdict in Wiley’s favor.
6

Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978).2 We conclude that the District 

Court appropriately granted summary judgment in Defendants’ favor.

“Plaintiffs Linda Martin and Dwayne Martin assert claims of violation of their 4th

Amendment rights against Defendants Kevin Cunane, Christopher Leone, Barry Johnson, 

John Hunsinger, and Tim O’Brien, who busted into Plaintiff’s home at about 6:30 a.m. on 

January 8, 2008, without a search warrant, without any exigency circumstances and 

without invitation from or free consent of the Plaintiffs.” (Appellants’ Brief at 8 (citing 

A1703-A1705).) Nevertheless, an arrest warrant was issued by a Virginia state court for 

Martin because he had failed to appear on charges of eluding police, being an habitual 

offender, and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. There were also outstanding 

Virginia arrest warrants for probation violations and assault and battery, and Martin was a 

suspect in a string of home invasions in Roanoke City, Virginia. In order to enter a home 

pursuant to an arrest warrant, law enforcement officers must possess “probable cause to 

believe [the] arrestee resides at and is then present within the residence.” United States v. 

Vasquez-Algarin, No. 15-1941, slip op. at 26 (3d Cir. May 2, 2016). At the time they 

approached the residence (103 S. 35th Street, Camden, New Jersey), the Marshals had: 

(1) an outstanding arrest warrant issued by a New Jersey municipal court judge for Martin 

(admittedly dated July 11, 1995)—listing “103 S. 35th St” as his address (A674); (2) 

 

2 The District Court had subject matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 

1367. We have appellate jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We exercise plenary 

review over a district court’s decision to grant summary judgment. See, e.g., Twp. of 

Piscataway v. Duke Energy, 488 F.3d 203, 208 (3d Cir. 2007). “The court shall grant 

summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material 
7

information received from a deputy marshal in Virginia indicating that Martin had 

contacted a cooperating witness “on their cell phone from a blocked number” and that, 

based on a review of the phone records, Martin had called from a cell phone “subscribed 

to by” Dwayne Martin, who resides at 103 S. 35th Street (A667); and (3) they already 

visited and searched another location (the residence of Martin’s girlfriend)—thereby

ruling this address out as a possibility. According to Linda Martin’s deposition 

testimony, the Marshals asked “who was in the house with you,” and she said, “My son 

Dwayne and Phillip.” (A1698 (emphasis omitted).) Plaintiffs point to the statement she 

made on the day of the shooting in which she claimed that the Marshals entered before 

they knew Martin was there and that, when she was asked who was there after answering 

the door, she simply said “me and my two sons.’” (A682.) Even if she had only 

mentioned “my two sons,” the Marshals had probable cause to believe that Martin lived in 

the residence and was present at that time in light of the municipal court arrest warrant, 

the information received regarding the phone call, and the unsuccessful search of the 

girlfriend’s residence. 

Regarding the wrongful death and conspiracy allegations, as the Marshals point 

out, there was no real evidence indicating that anyone shot Martin other than Martin 

himself. The District Court aptly explained that “there has been no evidence produced 

that anyone currently living saw this shot being fired.” (A58.) In particular, Dwayne 

Martin testified at his deposition that he could see the Marshals on the stairs (i.e., their 

 

fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).
8

backs from head to toes), the Marshals were never completely out of his sight, and they 

always remained on the stairs. He heard a single gunshot. Asked if he saw who fired the 

gun, Dwayne Martin answered in the negative. The following exchange then occurred:

Q Earlier you said that the Marshals Service were never out of 

sight. 

Did you see any U.S. Marshals Agent fire their gun?

A. No.

(A1767.) Even if Dwayne Martin was asked “questions posed with regard to an exhibit 

showing the interior steps of the house” (Appellants’ Reply Brief at 5 (citing A1766)), we 

do not see how such a line of questioning could have confused him, especially with 

respect to a direct (and critical) question as to whether he saw the Marshals fire the shot. 

According to Plaintiffs, “Dwayne’s statement to investigators explicitly confirms his 

belief that officers who climbed the stairs ‘shot at’ Phillip, and did so he suggests when 

they ‘went in into his’ room.” (Id. at 4-5 (quoting A691).) Nevertheless, McBride asked 

him the following question: “They didn’t shoot did they?” (A693.) Dwayne Martin’s 

answered in one word—“No.” (Id.)

Plaintiffs turn, inter alia, to several expert reports as well as to various 

inconsistencies in the Defendants’ accounts of what happened. However, we cannot find 

that any of these purported inconstancies were material, especially in light of Dwayne 

Martin’s own eyewitness account. In addition, “Plaintiff’s three expert reports do nothing 

to change the Court’s conclusion that Plaintiffs have offered no plausible theory to 

support their version of the facts and to controvert the well-supported narrative offered by 
9

Defendants.” (A81.) For instance, the Plaintiffs’ pathologist (Dr. Emily Wofford Ward) 

criticized Dr. Feigin, claiming that “‘his photographic documentation of the findings is 

inadequate for any reasonable interpretation that Phillip Martin’s sudden death was a 

suicide.’” (Appellants’ Brief at 15.) As the District Court noted, Dr. Feigin based his 

findings on the autopsy he had conducted while, “Dr. Ward, on the other hand, does base 

her opinion on the photograph, and even though she believes the quality is so poor that 

‘any interpretation’ would be ‘conjecture,’ she opines that Phillip’s death ‘was not the 

result of a self-inflicted contact wound.’”3 (A82-A83 (quoting A1509).) 

According to Plaintiffs, there was sufficient evidence for a jury to conclude that 

the Defendants engaged in a conspiracy to cover up the fact that Martin was shot by one 

of the Marshals. They indicate that this conspiracy theory should go forward “[i]f the jury 

concludes that Phillip Martin did not died from self-inflicted gunshot wound, but from the 

gun shot by one of the U.S. Marshals.” (Appellants’ Brief at 31 (emphasis omitted).) 

However, we have already determined that there was no real evidence indicating that a 

Marshal shot Martin. In any event, a § 1983 conspiracy claim still requires “a ‘“meeting 

of the minds.”’” Startzell v. City of Phila., 533 F.3d 183, 205 (3d Cir. 2008) (quoting 

 

3 We also question whether Martin’s shooting could really be compared to a 

typical “throw down” incident. After all, Defendants claim that Martin shot himself—and 

not that the Marshals shot him because he purportedly had a gun.

Plaintiffs also assert, inter alia, that the Marshals should have given Martin a 

chance to surrender before heading upstairs with their guns drawn. As the District Court 

explained, “officers approaching a fugitive felon with a long string of convictions, 

outstanding weapons charges, and multiple arrest warrants must be afforded wide latitude 

in determining how best to effectuate the arrest.” (A89.)
10

Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 158 (1970)). A plaintiff must rely on more 

than his or her own suspicion and speculation to satisfy this requirement. See, e.g., 

Young v. Kann, 926 F.2d 1396, 1405 n.16 (3d Cir. 1991). We find that there was no 

evidence that the numerous Defendants implicated in this appeal actually reached an 

agreement amongst themselves to engage in a cover-up. 

The District Court appropriately disposed of Plaintiffs’ state law allegations. 

Pursuant to the New Jersey Tort Claims Act (“NJTCA”), an individual may not sue a 

public entity or public employee unless he or she submits a notice of claim. See N.J. Stat. 

Ann. § 59:8-3. The notice must include the following:

a. The name and post office address of the claimant;

b. The post-office address to which the person presenting the claim desires 

notices to be sent;

c. The date, place and other circumstances of the occurrence or transaction 

which gave rise to the claim asserted;

d. A general description of the injury, damage or loss incurred so far as it 

may be known at the time of presentation of the claim;

e. The name or names of the public entity, employee or employees causing 

the injury, damage or loss, if known; and

f. The amount claimed as of the date of presentation of the claim, including 

the estimated amount of any prospective injury, damage, or loss, insofar as 

it may be known at the time of the presentation of the claim, together with 

the basis of computation of the amount claimed.

N.J. Stat. Ann. § 59:8-4. Plaintiffs argue that Linda Martin’s March 23, 2008 letter met

this notice of claim requirement. However, “[t]he letter does not even provide notice that 

the Martins intended to seek money damages; rather, it merely complains about the 
11

conduct of various law enforcement officers and asks for information about what 

occurred.” (A119.) In turn, the body of the letter did not mention the autopsy performed 

by Dr. Feigen or the other Camden County Defendants (and, with respect to the 

Investigators, it merely stated that Linda Martin was asked again and again whether she 

knew the officers were United States marshals). We accordingly find that this letter 

failed to satisfy the NJTCA.4 

 With respect to Plaintiffs’ argument that, “Defendants Camden City Police 

Department, Phillips, McBride and Matthews subjected Linda and Dwayne Martin to 

unlawful arrest, detention and interrogation,” the District Court was also correct. 

(Appellants’ Brief at 53 (emphasis omitted).) “The essential purpose of the proscriptions 

in the Fourth Amendment is to impose a standard of ‘reasonableness’ upon the exercise of 

discretion by government officials.” (Id. at 56 (citing Marshall v. Barlow’s Inc., Inc., 436 

U.S. 307, 312 (1978)).) Linda Martin was understandably upset because she had been 

taken to a police station (in nightclothes and without shoes) after a shooting in her home

and learning that her son had died. Nevertheless, law enforcement personnel had to 

 

4 According to their appellate brief, “Plaintiffs have also asserted common law 

claims of wrongful death and survival actions against these U.S. Marshals” (Appellants’ 

Brief at 7), and Dr. Feigin violated the New Jersey’s State Medical Examiner Act (as well 

as its accompanying regulations), the New Jersey Constitution, and the New Jersey Civil 

Rights Act. Plaintiffs nevertheless fail to mention the District Court’s determination that 

common law claims “cannot be brought against federal officers; rather, they must be 

brought pursuant to the Federal Tort Claims Act (‘FTCA’) and satisfy its exhaustion 

requirements,” which was not done here. (A96-A97 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2679(b)).) 

Similarly, it appears undisputed that Plaintiffs’ claims under the New Jersey Constitution 

and the New Jersey Civil Rights Act trigger the same legal elements and principles as her 

(unsuccessful) federal causes of action. 
12

secure the scene and begin an investigation into what had happened. See, e.g., Muehler v. 

Mena, 544 U.S. 93, 102 (2005) (“In summary, the officers’ detention of Mena in 

handcuffs during the execution of the search warrant was reasonable and did not violate 

the Fourth Amendment. Additionally, the officers’ questioning of Mena did not 

constitute an independent Fourth Amendment violation.”). McBride did not play any role 

in the Martins’ detention at the scene or their transportation to the police station. 

Matthews’s involvement (i.e., he participated in the interviews) mirrored those of 

McBride. During his interview, Dwayne Martin never asked to leave, claimed to be held 

against his will, or refused to answer questions. While she stated that she wanted to go 

home, Linda Martin likewise answered the questions put to her. Her interview also lasted 

less than ten minutes. With respect to Phillips (the purported “Watch Commander” on the 

scene), there was a lack of evidence from which a reasonable finder of fact could infer 

that he personally directed—or had knowledge of, and acquiesced in—the detention of 

Linda and Dwayne Martin. See, e.g., Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195, 1207 (3d Cir. 

1988). Thus, their conduct was reasonable and consistent with their authority, and the 

District Court properly granted summary judgment. 

“When a suit against a municipality is based on § 1983, the municipality can only 

be liable when the alleged constitutional transgression implements or executes a policy, 

regulation or decision officially adopted by the governing body or informally adopted by 

custom.” Beck v. City of Pittsburgh, 89 F.3d 966, 971 (3d Cir. 1996) (citing Monell). 

Custom may be established by evidence of knowledge and acquiescence on the part of 
13

municipal policymakers. See, e.g., id. However, the plaintiff must also show that the 

policy or custom caused his or her injury. See, e.g., id. at 971-72; Bielevicz v. Dubinon, 

915 F.2d 845, 850-51 (3d Cir. 1990). Plaintiffs provide no factual or legal support for 

their contention that, as the “Watch Commander,” Phillips “was like the Chief of Police 

that day, and his actions and conduct on January 8, 2008 were therefore the act of the 

official government policy.” (Appellants’ Brief at 62.) Plaintiffs further cite to their 

March 23, 2008 letter, but this letter was sent months after Martin was shot and his 

mother and brother were taken to the police station. In the end, Plaintiffs failed to present 

evidence establishing “‘a municipal custom coupled with causation, i.e., that 

policymakers were aware of similar unlawful conduct in the past, but failed to take 

precautions against future violations, and that this failure, at least in part, led to their 

injury.’” (A114 (quoting Bielevicz, 915 F.2d at 851).)

III.

For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the orders of the District Court.