1 For a more complete discussion of MSB history, see Franklin Ornstein, Savings Banking: An Industry in Change (1985),

1626; Alan Teck, Mutual Savings Banks and Savings and Loan Associations: Aspects of Growth (1968), 455; and Weldon Welfling, Mutual Savings Banks: The Evolution of a Financial Intermediary (1968), 869. 

Chapter 6

The Mutual Savings The Mutual Savings

Bank Crisis Bank Crisis

Introduction

The first major crisis the FDIC had to confront in the 1980s was the threatened insolvency of a large number of mutual savings banks (MSBs). Historically, state laws had restricted these thrift institutions to investing in long-term, fixed-rate assets; and traditionally,

the majority of MSB liabilities were in passbook savings accounts paying a low rate of interest. Until the 1970s, this manner of operating had enabled mutual savings banks to prosper throughout most of their history. However, in the 1970s the combined forces of rising

interest rates, increased competition for deposits, and legal restrictions on diversifying the

asset side of the balance sheet quickly overwhelmed many thrift institutions. During the

first three years of the 1980s the mutual savings bank industry sustained operating losses of

nearly $3.3 billion, an amount equivalent to more than 28 percent of the industrys general

reserves at year-end 1980. Losses at some individual MSBs were even higher, and these institutions experienced a rapid depletion of capital. This chapter describes the relatively

unique development and history of mutual savings banks in the United States and the causes

of the crisis that peaked in the early 1980s; it also discusses the regulatory and congressional responses to the problem.

Background

Mutual savings banks in the United States date to 1816, when the Philadelphia Saving

Fund Society began operations on a voluntary basis and the Provident Institution for Savings in Boston was granted the first savings bank charter.1 Originally MSBs were organized

to help the working and lower classes by providing a safe place where the small saver, then

shunned by commercial banks, could deposit money and earn interest. Unlike savings and

loan associations (S&Ls), whose purpose was to facilitate the home ownership of members
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212 History of the EightiesLessons for the Future

2 As savings banks expanded, management was delegated to professionals appointed by the trustees. 

3 The other ten states in which MSBs were chartered were Alaska, Delaware, Florida, Indiana, Maryland, Minnesota, Ohio,

Oregon, Vermont, and Wisconsin. MSBs were also chartered in Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands (National Association of Mutual Savings Banks, 1980 National Fact Book of Mutual Savings Banking [1980], 17). 4 Ornstein, Savings Banking, 21. Notable exceptions were Delaware and Maryland, which left the investment of funds to

managements discretion. Ornstein notes, however, that savings banks in these states were subject to exhaustive examinations by the respective banking departments (18). Traditionally, investment powers were relatively broad in the New England states and very restricted in New York and Pennsylvania. 5 John Lintner, Mutual Savings Banks in the Savings and Mortgage Markets (1948), 49; and FDIC, Annual Report (1934),

11213.

by pooling their savings and allocating housing loans, the early mutual savings banks were

largely the result of a philanthropic impulse: wealthy, public-spirited individuals contributed start-up capital and served as trustees of the bank, overseeing operations without

the benefit of remuneration.2 Initially the investment of MSB funds was restricted to federal

and state government bonds. Although depositors in a mutual savings bank technically own

the institutions assets and share in its profits, they are neither stockholders nor members,

and have no voting rights or influence over how their money is invested.

Soon after the early success of the Philadelphia and Boston banks, MSBs were chartered in a number of states, primarily in the Mid-Atlantic region and the industrial Northeast, where there were large numbers of wage earners seeking a safe haven for their savings.

In contrast, demographic and economic conditions in the South and the expanding West favored the development of commercial banks and stock savings associations. Although

eventually MSBs were chartered in 19 states, historically more than 95 percent of total deposits in mutual savings banks were accounted for by only 9 statesConnecticut, Maine,

Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, and

Washington.3

The earliest MSB charters contained no restrictions on investment powers. In practice,

however, the trustee system of savings bank operations fostered conservative management,

and this was reflected in most state laws governing mutual savings banks.4 These statutes

specified the types of investments permitted; set ceilings on the percentage of assets or deposits permitted in each type; and laid out detailed criteria for evaluating eligibility. Originally confined to investing in government securities, MSBs were soon permitted to invest

in high-grade municipal, railroad, utility, and industrial bonds; blue-chip common and preferred stocks; first mortgage loans on real estate; and other collateralized lending. The expanded investment powers went hand in hand with the rapid growth in both the number of

mutual savings banks and their deposits. Between 1820 and 1910, the number of MSBs in

the United States grew from 10 to 637, while total deposits grew from $1 million to more

than $3 billion.5
Chapter 6 The Mutual Savings Bank Crisis

History of the EightiesLessons for the Future 213

6 For example, see Ornstein, Savings Banking, 154; and Teck, Mutual Savings Banks, 118. 7 FDIC, Annual Report (1934), 11113. For a more detailed discussion, see Arthur Castro et al., Public Policy toward Mutual

Savings Banks in New York State: Proposals for Change (1974), 8691. 8 Ornstein, Savings Banking, 54; and Welfling, Mutual Savings Banks, 84. As a result of both the paucity of bank runs and the

savings inflows, mutual savings banks were generally reluctant to join the FDIC in its infancy and, when the permanent deposit insurance fund began operations in August 1935, only 56 MSBsless than 12 percent of the total numberwere

members. Several states organized their own deposit insurance funds, but over the years these were largely abandoned as

state laws came to require federal deposit insurance. By 1975, approximately 70 percent of the mutual savings bank industry was FDIC-insured; the remaining 30 percent consisted of Massachusetts savings banks insured by the Mutual Savings

Central Fund, Inc. In 1985, as a result of the private insurance crises in Ohio and Maryland, all the Massachusetts savings

banks insured by the Mutual Savings Central Fund applied for federal deposit insurance. By late 1986, all those applications

had been granted (see Ada Focer, Savings Banks Get FDIC Protection, American Banker [October 27, 1986], 1). 9 U.S. League of Savings Associations, S&L Fact Book 1976, 81.

The considerable success of mutual savings banks during the first century of their history has been attributed to lack of competition for small deposits and to the rapid industrial

and economic growth of the areas they served. In addition, mutual savings banks traditionally enjoyed a reputation of providing a high level of safety for depositors.6 (An FDIC study

conducted in 1934 suggested that this reputation might have been exaggerated; nevertheless, during the 1930s MSBs were far less prone to bank runs than either commercial banks

or savings and loan associations.7 Indeed, nearly every year during the 1930s MSBs experienced a net savings inflow.)8 Although interest in chartering new MSBs diminished after

1910, existing institutions continued to prosper during and long after the Depression. In

1975 the average MSB had more than $250 million in assets, compared with approximately

$66 million for commercial banks and $69 million for savings and loan associations (see

table 6.1).

The increased demand for housing after World War II meant that a greater proportion

of MSB assets were invested in mortgage loans, with the remainder invested primarily in

permissible securities. Mortgage loans as a proportion of total assets peaked at more than

75 percent during the mid-1960s, but in the late 1970s mortgage investments (including

mortgage-backed securities) still accounted for approximately two-thirds of mutual savings

bank assets (see table 6.2). In comparison, in 1975 savings and loan associations, whose

primary purpose was to provide funds for housing, held more than 82 percent of their assets

in mortgage loans, while commercial banks held only 14 percent.9

Until the mid-1960s, savings banks, like other financial institutions, operated in a relatively stable economic environment. By investing in fixed-rate mortgages and high-quality, long-term bonds, MSBs were able to provide an acceptable return on deposits (which

were primarily passbook accounts) and build a comfortable capital base. Average reserve

ratios at year-end 1975 ranged from 6 percent of assets in New Jersey and Pennsylvania to
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214 History of the EightiesLessons for the Future

Table 6.1

Number, Total Assets, and Average Assets of Selected Types of

Financial Institutions, Selected Years, 19001975

($Millions)

Mutual Savings Banks Commercial Banks Savings and Loan Associations

Total Average Total Average Total Average

Year Number Assets Assets Number Assets Assets Number Assets Assets 

1900 626 $ 2,328 $ 3.7 12,427 $ 9,059 $ 0.7 5,356 $ 571 $ 0.1

1910 637 3,598 5.6 24,514 19,324 0.8 5,869 932 0.2

1920 618 5,586 9.0 30,291 47,509 1.6 8,633 2,520 0.3

1930 592 10,496 17.7 23,679 64,125 2.7 11,777 8,829 0.7

1940 540 11,919 22.1 14,534 67,804 4.7 7,521 5,733 0.8

1945 532 17,013 32.0 14,011 160,312 11.4 6,149 8,747 1.4

1950 529 22,446 42.4 14,121 168,932 12.0 5,992 16,846 2.8

1955 528 31,346 59.4 13,716 210,734 15.4 6,071 37,533 6.2

1960 515 40,571 78.8 13,472 257,552 19.1 6,276 71,314 11.4

1965 506 58,232 115.1 13,804 377,264 27.3 6,185 129,459 20.9

1970 494 78,995 159.9 13,686 576,242 42.1 5,669 176,076 31.1

1975 476 121,056 254.3 14,633 964,900 65.9 4,931 338,233 68.6

10 Table 6.3 also illustrates the effect of different state laws governing permissible investments, particularly the other loans

category, which reflects not only differences in consumer lending powers but also the leeway provisions incorporated in

many state savings bank statutes. It should be noted that states whose MSBs had the lowest levels of total loans, such as

New York, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania, also had the highest concentrations of corporate (and other) bondsand (as discussed below) produced several of the earliest failures. 11 Disintermediation is the withdrawal of funds from interest-bearing accounts at banks or thrifts when rates on competing investments, such as Treasury bills or money market mutual funds, offer the investor a higher return.

8.9 percent in New Hampshire, while the ratio for all mutual savings banks nationwide was

7 percent (see table 6.3).10

Economic and Legislative Developments in the 1970s

Inflationary pressures in the middle to late 1960s caused interest rates generally to rise

throughout the 1970s until, in 1979, they reached unprecedented highs. But already in 1966,

196970, and 197374, thrift institutions had experienced financial disintermediation and

earnings pressures.11 In 1966 the regulatory agencies tried to help thrift institutions by extending deposit interest-rate ceilings to them, to reduce their cost of liabilities and protect

them from deposit rate wars; nevertheless, the ceilings on deposits (although somewhat
Chapter 6 The Mutual Savings Bank Crisis

History of the EightiesLessons for the Future 215

Table 6.2

Composition of Assets of Mutual Savings Banks,

Selected Years, 19001980

($Millions)

Mortgage Investments Securities

GNMA Mortgage- U.S. State and Corporate Other Cash and Total

Year Mortgage Backed Govt Local and Other Loans Other Assets Assets

1900 $ 858 $ 0 $ 105 $ 567 $ 462 $ 169 $ 167 $ 2,328

1910 1,500 0 13 765 906 194 220 3,598

1920 2,291 0 783 650 1,213 336 313 5,586

1930 5,635 0 499 920 2,278 312 520 10,164

1940 4,836 0 3,193 612 1,429 82 1,764 11,916

1945 4,202 0 10,650 84 1,116 62 849 16,962

1950 8,039 0 19,877 96 2,260 127 1,047 22,446

1955 17,279 0 8,463 646 3,364 211 1,382 31,346

1960 26,702 0 6,243 672 5,076 416 1,463 40,571

1965 44,433 0 5,485 320 5,170 862 1,962 58,232

1970 57,775 85 3,151 197 12,791 2,255 2,741 78,995

1975 77,221 3,367 4,740 1,545 24,626 4,023 5,535 121,056

1980 99,865 13,849 8,949 2,390 25,433 11,733 9,344 171,564

(Percentage Distribution)

1900 36.9 0.0 4.5 24.4 19.8 7.3 7.2 100

1910 41.7 0.0 0.4 21.3 25.2 5.4 6.1 100

1920 41.0 0.0 14.0 11.6 21.7 6.0 5.6 100

1930 55.4 0.0 4.9 9.1 22.4 3.1 5.2 100

1940 40.6 0.0 26.8 5.1 12.0 0.7 14.8 100

1945 24.8 0.0 62.8 0.5 6.9 0.4 4.7 100

1950 35.8 0.0 48.5 0.4 10.1 0.6 4.6 100

1955 55.1 0.0 27.0 2.1 10.7 0.7 4.4 100

1960 65.8 0.0 15.4 1.7 12.5 1.0 3.7 100

1965 76.3 0.0 9.4 0.6 8.9 1.5 3.3 100

1970 73.1 0.1 4.0 0.2 16.2 2.9 3.5 100

1975 63.8 2.8 3.9 1.3 20.3 3.3 4.6 100

1980 58.2 8.1 5.2 1.4 14.8 6.8 5.5 100

Source: Ornstein, Savings Banking, 260.
216 History of the EightiesLessons for the Future

Table 6.3

Percentage Distribution of Assets and Liabilities of Mutual Savings Banks, 

by State, Year-end 1975

All

Other

Item Total NY MA CT PA NJ WA NH ME RI MD States

ASSETS

Cash and due from banks 1.9 2.0 1.2 2.0 1.7 2.6 3.2 2.2 2.0 1.3 2.1 3.1

U. S. government 

obligations 3.9 3.6 4.9 3.2 3.0 5.0 2.8 4.8 5.8 3.7 8.9 5.5

Federal agency obligations 2.3 1.6 4.1 1.8 2.7 3.6 2.8 3.3 2.9 4.9 2.1 2.1

State and local obligations 1.3 1.6 0.7 1.0 1.6 0.9 0.4 0.5 0.9 0.1 0.5 1.2

Mortgage-backed securities 2.8 3.2 1.3 0.8 4.0 6.4 3.0 1.1 1.2 2.4 1.7 0.9

Corporate and other bonds 14.5 15.4 12.3 7.4 27.6 15.3 8.6 5.2 8.5 4.9 7.9 13.6

Corporate stock 3.6 3.1 4.7 6.5 2.4 1.8 2.5 6.0 5.5 4.3 1.7 3.0

Total loans 67.1 66.8 68.8 74.2 54.8 62.2 72.7 74.6 70.9 74.6 71.4 67.9

Mortgage loans 63.8 64.3 64.3 68.4 52.8 59.8 68.2 67.0 65.2 68.8 60.0 64.8

Other loans 3.3 2.5 4.5 5.8 2.0 2.4 4.5 7.6 5.7 5.8 11.4 3.1

Bank premises owned 0.9 0.8 0.9 1.0 0.6 1.1 1.3 1.3 1.4 1.7 0.7 1.2

Other real estate 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.8 0.1 0.1 1.4 0.3 0.1 0.2 * 0.3

Other assets 1.4 1.6 0.9 1.3 1.6 1.1 1.1 0.8 0.7 2.1 3.1 1.2

TOTALASSETS 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0

LIABILITIES

Total deposits 90.8 90.0 90.3 89.7 92.1 91.7 91.9 89.0 90.8 89.1 88.8 90.5

Ordinary savings 57.5 58.2 57.1 58.2 55.7 55.2 56.4 59.0 65.0 47.9 70.7 48.3

Time deposits 32.7 32.3 33.1 31.3 35.8 34.1 35.2 29.7 25.5 41.1 15.0 41.1

Other deposits 0.5 0.4 0.1 0.2 0.6 2.3 0.3 0.2 0.3 0.2 2.6 1.1

Borrowings 0.5 0.4 0.1 0.8 0.2 0.7 1.1 0.4 0.2 1.2 - 1.8

Other liabilities 1.8 2.0 1.7 1.6 1.7 1.6 0.9 1.7 1.0 2.1 3.3 1.3

TOTAL LIABILITIES 93.0 93.3 92.1 92.0 94.0 94.0 93.9 91.1 92.0 92.4 92.1 93.6

Capital notes and

debentures 0.2 0.1 * 0.4 0.6 0.3 0.2 0.2 * - - 0.4

Other general reserves 6.8 6.6 7.9 7.6 5.5 5.7 5.9 8.7 8.0 7.6 7.9 6.0

TOTAL GENERAL

RESERVE ACCOUNTS 7.0 6.7 7.9 8.0 6.0 6.0 6.1 8.9 8.0 7.6 7.9 6.4

TOTAL LIABILITIES

AND GENERAL

RESERVE ACCOUNTS 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0

Source: National Association of Mutual Savings Banks, 1976 National Fact Book of Mutual Savings Banking.

*Less than .05 percent.
Chapter 6 The Mutual Savings Bank Crisis

History of the EightiesLessons for the Future 217

12 Commercial banks had been subjected to interest-rate ceilings on deposits since the Banking Act of 1933. The extension of

Regulation Q to thrift institutions was accompanied by a differential allowing a higher ceiling for thrifts than for commercial banks, in order to encourage depositors to keep their savings at thrifts (which were not allowed to offer checking accounts). The differential, originally 75 to 100 basis points, was reduced to 50 basis points in 1970 and to 25 basis points in

1973. 13 See Donald D. Hester, Special Interests: The FINE Situation, and James L. Pierce, The FINE Study, both in Journal of

Money, Credit and Banking 9 (November 1977): 65261 and 60518; and Kenneth A. McLean, Legislative Background

of the Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980, in Federal Home Loan Bank of San Francisco, Savings and Loan Asset Management under Deregulation: Proceedings of the Sixth Annual Conference in San Francisco, California, December 89, 1980, 1730. 

higher for thrifts than for commercial banks) caused outflows from financial institutions

into higher-yielding investments such as capital market instruments, government securities,

andlatermoney market mutual funds.12

From a public policy perspective, disintermediation had several undesirable consequences. Most important, it both restricted the availability of credit to consumers and increased its cost, particularly for home mortgages; the same consequences affected small

and medium-sized businesses that did not have access to the commercial paper market. In

addition, because normal cash outlays increased to meet deposit withdrawals while cash inflows decreased as new funds were diverted to alternative investments, disintermediation

slowed the growth of financial institutions and caused them liquidity concerns. To have the

cash available to meet withdrawal demands, banks and thrifts were often forced either to

borrow money at above-market interest rates or to sell assets, often at a loss from book

value. The former had a negative effect on earnings, the latter on book value capital. 

As early as 1971 these problems were widely recognized at the federal level. In that

year the Presidents Commission on Financial Structure and Regulation, better known as

the Hunt Commission, issued its report recommending additional powers for commercial

banks and thrifts; it also recommended a variety of other reforms on the liability side of the

balance sheet, including a lifting of interest-rate ceilings. These recommendations subsequently received widespread support and, in both 1973 and 1975, were introduced as proposed legislation. The Senate passed the 1975 bill, but the House Committee on Banking,

Currency and Housing instead commissioned its own study, Financial Institutions in the

Nations Economy (FINE), which resulted in a set of discussion principles and the drafting

of the Financial Reform Act of 1976but again no legislation was passed. 

The failure to enact financial reform during the 1970s can be attributed to conflicting

public policy concerns, a lack of consensus among financial institutions, and the successful

efforts of special-interest groups to block legislation they perceived as harmful.13 One example of conflict was the attitudes of different groups toward interest-rate deregulation and

expanded powers for thrifts: housing groups and many members of Congress feared that

both would adversely affect the cost and availability of mortgage credit; thrifts, too, feared
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218 History of the EightiesLessons for the Future

14 Andrew S. Carron, The Plight of the Thrift Institutions (1982), 8. 15 McLean, Legislative Background, 18. 16 For a detailed summary of FIRIRCAs provisions, see Encyclopedia of Banking and Finance, ed. Charles J. Woelfel, 10th

ed. (1994), 45255. 17 Saul B. Klaman, The Changing World of the Savings Bank Industry, American Banker (October 23, 1978), 41.

the loss of the differential, and they were reluctant to compete directly with banks; and commercial banks supported expanded powers for thrifts only if the differential on deposit rate

ceilings was immediately removed.14 In addition, the regulatory agencies were concerned

over the FINE Studys proposal to consolidate regulatory authority. Without a unified constituency, Congress was unable to find a formula for financial reform and abandoned such

efforts at the end of 1977.15

In the following year Congress turned its attention to other matters of regulatory concern: insider transactions and several highly publicized bank failures in the mid-1970s led

to passage of the Financial Institutions Regulatory and Interest Rate Control Act of 1978

(FIRIRCA). In addition to placing restrictions on insider lending, this legislation significantly strengthened regulatory enforcement powers by authorizing the agencies to issue

cease-and-desist orders against individual bank officials, impose civil money penalties, remove directors of financial institutions, and disapprove changes in control. FIRIRCA also

extended for two years the banking and thrift regulatory agencies ability under Regulation

Q to set interest-rate ceilings on deposits and, by allowing existing mutual savings banks to

convert from state to federal charters, extended the dual banking system to all types of depository institutions.16

In response to the problems caused by disintermediation, regulatory efforts during the

late 1970s and early 1980s were aimed at providing the means for commercial banks and

thrift institutions to compete more effectively with money market mutual funds. Thus, regulators authorized a greater variety of time deposit instruments with ceilings that varied

with market rates. The most important of these instruments was the six-month money market certificate of deposit (MMCD), which was introduced on June 1, 1978. These certificates required a minimum deposit of $10,000, and thrift institutions were permitted to pay

a maximum rate of interest equivalent to the Treasury auction discount rate on six-month

Treasury bills plus 25 basis points. The introduction of the six-month MMCD was a dramatic change for the savings bank industry. In his remarks to the Savings Banks Association

of Massachusetts in October 1978, Saul Klaman, then-president of the National Association

of Mutual Savings Banks, noted that June 1, 1978, will be recorded as the day when the philosophy of fixed deposit interest rate ceilings was shattered and the industry was permitted

to slug it out toe to toe with high-flying money market instruments.17 Although this new instrument helped slow deposit outflows at mutual savings banks, it also served to raise the institutions average cost of funds, since a large proportion of these certificates represented
Chapter 6 The Mutual Savings Bank Crisis

History of the EightiesLessons for the Future 219

18 U.S. House Committee on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs, The Report of the Interagency Task Force on Thrift Institutions, 96th Cong., 2d sess., 1980, 6. 19 The Federal Home Loan Bank System was established in 1932 to provide a central credit system for mortgage lending institutions. The System makes advances to member institutions at interest rates lower than those in the commercial market

and thus provides members with an important source of liquidity during periods of disintermediation. 20 In April 1979 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia had ruled that federal regulators exceeded their authority when they approved automatic transfer (ATS) accounts for commercial banks, share draft accounts for credit

unions, and remote service units for savings and loans. All of these accounts were the functional equivalent of interest-bearing checking accounts. At that time, NOW accounts were permitted only in the six New England states. The ruling gave

Congress one year to validate the regulations; otherwise, financial institutions would be required to terminate the services

and disrupt millions of account holders (McLean, Legislative Background, 19).

transfers from low-cost passbook accounts. Less than two years after the certificates were

introduced, more than 30 percent of MSB deposits were in money market certificates.18 By

curbing deposit outflows, bank regulators had been able to forestall thrift failures due to liquidity pressures, a problem that was particularly acute at mutual savings banks because

most were not members of the Federal Home Loan Bank (FHLB) System and therefore did

not have access to that source of liquidity.

19

In March 1980, as interest rates rose to record levels, Congress returned to efforts at

bank reform and enacted the Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control

Act of 1980 (DIDMCA). Among the legislations major provisions were the six-year phaseout of Regulation Q interest ceilings, nationwide authority for all institutions to offer negotiable order of withdrawal (NOW) accounts,20 and an increase in the federal deposit

insurance limit from $40,000 to $100,000. DIDMCA also preempted state usury laws for

mortgage loans and provided expanded lending powers for federally chartered S&Ls. Finally, the act authorized federal savings banks to invest up to 5 percent of their assets in

commercial loans and to accept demand deposits from businesses to which credit had been

extended. 

Although DIDMCA enacted many of the financial reforms that had been debated for

more than a decade, in many respects these changes came too late for MSBs. At the time of

enactment, all of them were still operating under state charters, and many states restricted

their ability to diversify their asset structure or to invest in higher-yielding assets. Some

actions were taken at the state level to liberalize asset powers of thrifts and to alleviate the

burden of restrictive usury ceilings, but these measures, like those at the federal level, came

too late.

More important, however, the federal tax code continued to provide a strong disincentive for S&Ls and MSBs to diversify their assets. Although the Revenue Act of 1951 had

changed the tax-exempt status of thrifts, these institutions could still deduct up to 100 percent of taxable income through the establishment of a bad-debt reserve, whether or not

losses actually occurred. Under the provisions of the Tax Reform Act of 1969, the maxi-
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220 History of the EightiesLessons for the Future

21 U.S. Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, Deposit Interest Rate Ceilings and Housing Credit: The

Report of the Presidents Inter-Agency Task Force on Regulation Q, 96th Cong., 1st sess., 1979, 3745. 22 NAMSB, 1980 National Fact Book, 7.

mum deduction for additions to bad debts was allowed only if a mutual savings bank had

72 percent (or an S&L 82 percent) of its total assets in certain qualifying assets (generally

mortgages and government securities), and the deduction was lost entirely if less than 60

percent of the institutions assets met the investment standard. Moreover, once an institution failed the qualifying asset test, it was required to recapture some of the previous deduction and incur what might be a substantial tax liability. Therefore, even in states that did

expand consumer lending powers during the 1970s, there was no dramatic shift of MSB

funds into consumer and other nonmortgage loans.21 It should be noted, however, that this

situation must also be attributed to the fact that prudently building up a portfolio of such

loans would have been a difficult and lengthy process.

The FDICs Response

Although no one could predict the future course of interest rates, it was fairly apparent throughout the 1970s that MSBs (the only thrifts insured by the FDIC) were at risk in a

rising rate environment. The FDICs monitoring of industry trends and surveillance of individual institutions increased during 197778, when short-term interest rates rose from approximately 4.5 percent to more than 9 percent (see figure 6.1). The FDIC began a monthly

survey of large mutual savings banks and also received periodic reports from the National

Association of Mutual Savings Banks (NAMSB). The agency used the surveys to judge the

rates of both internal disintermediation (from traditional savings accounts to MMCDs) and

external disintermediation and to project the effect of increased interest expense on future

earnings. Although in mid-1978 the outlook for savings banks appeared favorable barring a

significant increase in interest rates, FDIC staff nevertheless began exploring options available to the agency in the event a large savings bank were to fail.

Because of an accelerating inflation rate in 1978 and a shift in monetary policy in October 1979, interest rates rose almost continuously until the spring of 1980. Mutual savings

banks, particularly those located in New York City and Boston, sustained 13 consecutive

months of external disintermediation from March 1979 to April 1980, when a record $10.7

billion in deposits left MSBs.22 In addition to closely monitoring deposit flows and earnings, FDIC staff participated in an interagency task force on thrifts and evaluated a variety

of measures proposed by the industry that were designed to permit MSBs to earn market

rates of interest on assets. These proposals included expanded powers, mortgage warehousing programs, and reinstatement of the differential on six-month MMCDs which

DIDMCA had removed. 
Chapter 6 The Mutual Savings Bank Crisis

History of the EightiesLessons for the Future 221

Figure 6.1

Monthly Treasury Bill Rate (3-Month), 1977–1983

Source: Haver Analytics.

1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983

4

8

12

16

Percent

23 NAMSB, 1981 National Fact Book of Mutual Savings Banking (1981) and National Fact Book of Savings Banking (1982).

An internal FDIC interdivisional task group, known as the Mutual Savings Bank Project Team, was formed in 1980 to develop plans to handle the possible failures of a large

number of savings banks. Among other things, the group developed estimates of the potential magnitude of the problem under various economic scenarios, developed and evaluated

options for handling the situation, and developed a strategic plan for each contingency. The

recommendations prepared by this group shaped the structure of the ensuing assisted savings bank transactions (discussed below).

Mutual Savings Bank Failures, 19811982

Savings bank earnings, which had exceeded $1 billion in 1979, deteriorated very

rapidly as the cost of funds began to exceed the yield on asset portfolios. The industry sustained losses of $123 million in 1980, the first year since World War II that it reported a negative income. In 1981, operating losses escalated to nearly $1.7 billion.23 By early 1982,

aggregate annual losses at FDIC-insured savings banks were running at approximately 1.25
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222 History of the EightiesLessons for the Future

24 FDIC, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation: The First Fifty Years (1984), 99; and NAMSB, 1982 National Fact Book. 25 Washington Financial Report (October 22, 1979), A-22. 26 Banking institutions in New York were taxed at the higher of two alternative tax methods, one based on net income and the

other based on a percentage of deposits. Despite aggregate negative earnings, therefore, MSBs operating in New York City

were burdened by a significant tax liability to both the city and state governments, a liability that exacerbated the problem

of declining surplus accounts. 27 Gary M. Hector, Keefe Warns on State of Savings Bank Industry; Urges Federal Assistance Now, American Banker (December 9, 1980), 1.

percent of assets. The problem was more severe in New York City, where some of the

weaker institutions were experiencing losses of 3.5 percent of assets, a devastating trend

considering that at year-end 1981 total reserves for all MSBs in New York State had been

only 4.8 percent.24

The plight of New Yorks mutual savings banks was discussed in a public forum as

early as 1979, when Anita Miller of the Federal Home Loan Bank Board, in an address before an annual conference on the savings and loan industry, termed their condition particularly worrisome.25 New Yorks MSBs were constrained by limited lending powers, a

restrictive usury ceiling, and unfavorable tax treatment at both the state and city levels.26

Additionally, deposit growth and asset turnover were lower than average in New York City

because of a high degree of competition from large money-center banks and money market

funds and a heavy concentration of long-term bonds in the portfolios of many mutual savings banks. The MSBs could not sell these bonds without incurring a severe loss. Given the

market value of the securities portfolios of the ten largest MSBs in New York City, Harry V.

Keefe, Jr., chairman of Keefe, Bruyette & Woods, Inc., declared in December 1980 that the

nations mutual savings banks, as an industry, are in fact bankrupt and Congress should act

immediately to rescue them from eventual collapse. Keefe further warned that the problems of Chrysler and Lockheed were peanuts compared to those of the mutual savings

banks and that if they were to fail, the liability facing the Federal Deposit Insurance Corp.

would exceed the $10 billion now in the fund.27

The FDICs dilemma, from the standpoint of potential exposure of the deposit insurance fund, was very different from any the agency had faced earlier in its history. Unlike the

situation with most commercial bank failures, asset quality was not a problem. However, as

Keefe noted, a large number of MSBs were facing book insolvency, with the market

value of their assets actually 25 to 30 percent below outstanding liabilities. If the FDIC had

been forced to absorb this market depreciation, the deposit insurance fund would have incurred enormous losses. Resolutions that used either a purchase-and-assumption transaction or a deposit payoff probably would have entailed such absorption. Payoffs would also

have entailed large cash outlays up front, since almost all MSB liabilities consisted of fully
Chapter 6 The Mutual Savings Bank Crisis

History of the EightiesLessons for the Future 223

28 It should be noted that no FDIC-insured mutual savings bank had failed since 1938. 29 Karen Slater, Mutuals Ask for Capital Aid; FDIC Resisting Action, American Banker (August. 14, 1981), 1. 30 Although DIDMCA authorized thrifts to borrow from the discount window, Greenwich was one of the earliest institutions

to borrow under the Federal Reserves new program to provide extended credit to banks and thrifts that were under sustained liquidity pressures. 31 Laura Gross and Gordon Matthews, FDIC Assures on Greenwich; Tells Depositors Funds Are Safe; Seeks Buyers, American Banker (October 30, 1981), 1.

insured deposits. The FDICs principal concern was therefore to keep the cost of handling

failing savings banks at a reasonable level without undermining the publics confidence in

the industry or in the agency.

28 The FDIC also sought to ensure that any financial institution

resulting from a merger with a failing savings bank would be financially sound, would have

the ability to compete effectively in its market, and would continue to serve the credit needs

of its community free of excessive government control.

Pressure on the industry and on the FDIC mounted during 1981, as the growing volume of losses (particularly at the ten largest New York City mutuals) was disclosed. In midAugust it was reported that at least four mutuals with total assets of almost $9 billion were

said to have approached the FDIC with applications or proposals for aid to boost their flagging net worth.29 Losses were most severe at the 148-year-old Greenwich Savings Bank,

which was forced to turn to the Federal Reserves discount window to borrow more than

$100 million after a group of foreign banks refused to roll over approximately $75 million

in collateralized Eurodollar notes.30 On October 28 it was reported that state and federal

bank regulators had met behind closed doors with representatives from a number of major

banks to discuss Greenwichs fate. The next day this story was picked up by The New York

Times and major wire services, while a New York radio station mistakenly announced that

Greenwich had failed. These reports prompted heavier-than-usual activity at the bank and

led the FDIC to issue a press release reassuring Greenwichs depositors that their money

was safe. This statement, possibly unprecedented in the agencys history, acknowledged

that the FDIC was seeking a buyer for Greenwich Savings Bank and that it would arrange

an orderly transaction which will insure that no depositorswhether insured or uninsuredwill experience any loss of any principal or interest.31

On November 4, 1981, the FDIC announced the assisted merger of the Greenwich

Savings Bank into Metropolitan Savings Bank, New Yorka transaction effected under

Section 13(e) of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act, which authorizes the agency to reduce

or avert a threatened loss to the insurance fund by providing assistance to facilitate a merger

between a failing insured bank and another insured bank. Although the FDIC had always

had this authority and had used it frequently in the early years, it had used it only once in
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224 History of the EightiesLessons for the Future

32 U.S. House Committee on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs, Report, 17374. In all assisted mergers of failing mutual

savings banks, the FDIC insisted that senior management and most trustees would not be able to serve with the surviving

institution. In cases where the failing MSB had subordinated debt outstanding, the note holders were required, as a condition of the transaction, to take a substantial hit, in the form of either a lower interest rate or an extended maturity. 33 Tax-loss carry-forwards allow previously incurred taxable losses to be applied to future taxable income, thereby reducing

tax liability in profitable years. 34 In 1980, the FDIC provided open-bank assistance to prevent the failure of the nearly $8 billion First Pennsylvania Bank,

N.A. The largest bank failure before that had been Franklin National Bank of New York, with assets of $3.6 billion, in

1974. 35 Both the FSLIC and the FDIC had previously provided assistance along these general lines in a limited number of cases

(FDIC, First Fifty Years, 100). 

the decade before 1981, largely because the agency was reluctant to provide financial assistance that would benefit the stockholders and management of a failing institution.32

Assisted mergers had frequently been used by the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation (FSLIC) in handling S&L failures, and the FDIC had concluded that, under appropriate circumstances, assisted open-bank mergers could be a desirable way to

handle failing MSBs. Two important considerations were that Section 13(e) assistance required neither new legislation nor a finding by the FDICs Board of Directors that the institution was essential to its community. Other advantages to this approach over a closed-bank

transaction were that it preserved tax-loss carry-forwards,33 gave the acquiring institution

greater flexibility to continue leases and other contractual arrangements, and received

greater cooperation from state supervisors. In addition, it was thought that depositors in

other mutual savings banks would react more favorably if the failing institutions were not

officially closed. The Greenwich/Metropolitan transaction was notable for several reasons.

With more than $2.5 billion in assets, Greenwich at that time was the third-largest bank failure in the FDICs history.

34 More important, the initial estimated cost of the transaction

$465 millionwas more than the reported cost of handling all previous failures of insured

banks. Finally, as the first assisted merger, this transaction served as a prototype for subsequent assisted mergers in its basic structure and procedures. 

The primary strategy developed by the Mutual Savings Bank Project Team was to

structure assistance around what was called an Income Maintenance Agreement (IMA).35

Under an IMA, the FDIC agreed to make periodic payments to the acquiring institution on

the basis of the difference between the yield on the declining balance of acquired earning

assets and the average cost of funds to savings banks, plus a spread to cover administrative

and overhead expenses associated with these assets. This structure allowed the agency to

fund long-term assets at short-term rates, resulting in a significant cost saving relative to the

cost if the bank were to be liquidated. Additionally, it provided protection against the possibility that a windfall gain would accrue to the acquirer if market rates fell. Conversely, an

IMA exposed the FDIC to increased costs in a rising interest-rate environment. From the

acquirers perspective, acquired assets were completely insulated from interest-rate risk,
Chapter 6 The Mutual Savings Bank Crisis

History of the EightiesLessons for the Future 225

36 Other forms of assistance generally included cash, notes, and the assumption of Federal Reserve or Federal Home Loan

Bank debt. 37 William M. Isaac, Depository InstitutionsThe Challenge of Todays Problems and Tomorrows Opportunities (address

to the 52d annual convention of the Independent Bankers Association of America, Sheraton-Waikiki Hotel, March 16,

1982), 2. 38 FDIC, Annual Report (1982) , 4.

whereas the benefits of the reinvestment spread on the cash flow from existing assets provided an increasing source of income. Income maintenance agreements were used in 10 of

the 17 assisted mergers of failing savings banks between 1981 and 1985 (see table 6.4).36

With respect to the cost of funds used to compute IMA payments, the FDIC was reluctant to use a measure that was under the control of the resultant institution. Thus in the

case of a surviving savings bank, the index normally used was based on a group of peer

institutions; in the two instances when the resulting institution was a commercial bank, a

market-based index was used. As part of the assistance agreement, a schedule of remaining

asset balances and average yields was agreed upon for the term of the IMA, and payments

were based on this fixed schedule. This arrangement made it unnecessary for the bank to

maintain separate records and for the FDIC to perform periodic audits, and allowed the acquiring institution to hold or sell a particular asset on the basis of considerations other than

assistance payments.

In the 12 months from November 1981 through October 1982, the FDIC consummated 11 assisted mergers of mutual savings banks with total assets of nearly $15 billion,

more than the total assets of all failed commercial banks since the FDICs inception. The

cost of these failures was approximately $1.8 billion, or approximately 12 percent of assets.

Most of the acquiring institutions were other MSBs, although for the first time in FDIC history commercial banks were the winning biddersfor Farmers and Mechanics Savings

Bank (F&M), Minneapolis, Minnesota, and for Fidelity Mutual Savings Bank, Spokane,

Washington. The merger of F&M, with assets in excess of $980 million, into the $350-

million-asset Marquette National Bank created the fourth-largest commercial bank in the

state of Minnesota. In this case the bidding process was facilitated by the passage of emergency legislation in Minnesota permitting an out-of-state bank holding company to acquire

F&M as a commercial bank. This legislation was thought to have saved the FDIC $50 million.37 The merger of Fidelity Mutual into First Interstate Bank of Washington, N.A., Seattle, Washington, also involved an interstate bidding process that saved the FDIC an

estimated $20 million.38

The drastic drop in interest rates that occurred in the second half of 1982 significantly

reduced the earnings pressure on the industry and brought most savings banks to or above

the break-even level. However, even in the late-1982 interest-rate environment several

large banks were still losing money. The GarnSt Germain Depository Institutions Act of
226 History of the EightiesLessons for the Future

Table 6.4

Failed and Assisted Savings Banks, 19811985

Failed Bank/Acquirer and Assets

Date Location ($Millions) Outcome

11-04-81 Greenwich SB/Metropolitan SB $2,475 Renamed Crossland, FSB, in 1984.

New York City Converted to stock in 1985.

Failed in 1992 (pass-through receivership).

12-04-81 Central SB/Harlem SB 910 Renamed Apple Bank for Savings in 1983.

New York City Converted to stock in 1985.

12-18-81 Union Dime SB / Buffalo SB 1,453 Renamed Goldome Bank for Savings in 1983.

New York City Converted to FSB in 1984; to stock in 1987.

Converted back to state charter in 1988.

Failed in 1991 (purchased by KeyCorp 

and First Empire State Corporation).

01-15-82 Western NY SB/Buffalo SB 1,028 See Goldome (12-18-81).

Buffalo, NY

02-20-82 Farmers & Mechanics 1,010 Renamed Marquette Bank of Minneapolis, 

SB/Marquette NB NA, in 1985.

Minneapolis, MN Acquired by First Bank, NA, in 1993.

03-11-82 U.S. SB/Hudson City SB 688 Hudson City SB is a state-chartered MSB.

Newark, NJ

03-11-82 Fidelity Mutual SB/First 696 First Interstate Bank of Washington, NA

Interstate NB

Spokane, WA

03-26-82 The New York Bank 3,504 See Goldome (12-18-81).

for Savings/Buffalo SB

New York City

04-02-82 Western Savings Fund Society/ 2,126 PSFS converted to stock in 1983.

Philadelphia Saving Fund Society Renamed Meritor SB in 1985.

Philadelphia, PA Failed in 1992 (purchased by Mellon Bank Corp.).

09-24-82 United Mutual SB/American SB 833 Converted to FSB in 1983.

New York City Converted to stock in 1985.

Converted back to state charter in 1989.

Failed in 1992 (acquired by eight different banks).

10-15-82 Mechanics SB/Syracuse SB 55 Syracuse SB failed in 1987

Elmira, NY (acquired by Fleet Bank).

02-09-83 Dry Dock SB/Dollar SB 2,452 Renamed DollarDry Dock Savings Bank.

New York City Renamed DollarDry Dock Bank in 1988.

Failed in 1992 (acquired by Emigrant SB and

Apple Bank for Savings [one branch]).

08-05-83 Oregon Mutual SB/Moore 266 Renamed Oregon First Bank.

Financial Corp. Renamed West One Bank in 1989.

Portland, OR 

10-01-83 Auburn SB/Syracuse SB 133 Syracuse SB failed in 1987 

Auburn, NY (acquired by Fleet Bank).

09-28-84 Orange SB/Hudson City SB 513 Hudson City SB is a state-chartered MSB.

Livingston, NJ

10-01-85 Bowery SB/Ravitch Investor Group* 5,277 Sold in 1988 to H. F. Ahmanson & Co.

New York City Renamed Home Savings of America, FSB, in 1992.

12-31-85 Home SB/Hamburg SB 414 Retained the Home SB name.

Brooklyn, NY Acquired by H. F. Ahmanson & Co. in 1990.

Total17 assisted mergers $23,835

* The FDIC provided financial assistance to recapitalize the Bowery SB and merge it into a newly chartered stock savings

bank that was then acquired by the Ravitch Investor Group.
Chapter 6 The Mutual Savings Bank Crisis

History of the EightiesLessons for the Future 227

39 FDIC Press Release PR-99-82 (December 7, 1982). 40 However, some institutions did benefit from the exemption from state and local franchise taxes that was granted in Title II

of GarnSt Germain.

1982 enabled the FDIC both to adopt a wait-and-see approach and to be more flexible in

dealing with these institutions. For mutual savings banks, one of the most important provisions of this legislation was contained in Title II, which authorized the FDIC to establish a

Net Worth Certificate Program.

Net Worth Certificate and Voluntary Merger Programs

On December 7, 1982, FDIC Chairman William M. Isaac announced details of the Net

Worth Certificate (NWC) Program, in conjunction with a voluntary merger plan designed

to induce savings banks to create their own proposals for assisted mergers. The NWC Program was intended to allow savings banks with capable management and good-quality assets a chance to recover if interest rates should drop from the high levels they were at when

GarnSt Germain was passed in October 1982. Recognizing that a few firms may have to

be merged almost irrespective of what happens to rates and that mergers may be the only

practical longer-range solution for others, the agencys voluntary merger plan provided

tangible financial assistance to encourage mergers involving savings banks when one of the

participants was eligible for aid under the NWC Program.39

To qualify for assistance under the NWC Program, an institution was required to have

(1) net worth equal to or less than 3 percent of assets, (2) losses incurred during the two previous quarters but not as a result of transactions involving mismanagement, and (3) investments in residential mortgages or in securities backed by such mortgages aggregating to at

least 20 percent of loans. Institutions were required to apply by letter with a comprehensive

business plan that included a strategic plan, lending and investment policies, plans for managing liquidity positions and rate-sensitivity gaps, plans to reduce expenses, and a two-year

budget. Additional restrictions were placed on bank operations, particularly employment

contracts with senior management; and participating banks were not permitted to change

charter, convert to stock form, merge, or otherwise change the nature of their business or

ownership without the prior approval of the FDIC. Conversely, however, MSBs that applied

for assistance were required to sign a restrictive covenant obligating them to convert to

stock form at the request of the FDIC.

Essentially, the FDIC increased or maintained the capital of participating institutions

(for regulatory purposes) by purchasing NWCs in an amount equal to a percentage of operating losses over the preceding six-month period, in exchange for promissory notes under

exactly the same terms as the NWC. The certificates counted as surplus for regulatory purposes but had no effect on the net cash flows or income of the institution.40 Therefore, the
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228 History of the EightiesLessons for the Future

41 The NWC Program, as authorized by the GarnSt Germain Depository Institutions Act of 1982, was due to expire after

three years. However, Congress granted two extensions, and the program expired on October 13, 1986. 42 FDIC, Report of Activities under Title II of the GarnSt Germain Depository Institutions Act of 1982 (19831987). 43 A seventh failure (Syracuse Savings Bank) in May 1987 was attributable to a bankrupt real estate investment tax shelter. In

this case the FDICs assistance was limited to indemnifying the acquirer, Norstar Bancorp, against certain contingent liabilities. 

NWC Program was basically a form of capital forbearance. The certificates remained outstanding until the institution became profitable. At that time, repayment was at a rate of onethird of net operating income and was accomplished through the retirement of an equal

amount of promissory notes. Additionally, the FDIC could notify any institution that still

held certificates seven years after issuance that it would have to repay all or a portion within

six months.

A total of 29 savings banks with assets of approximately $40 billion participated in the

original NWC Program (see table 6.5).41 Nearly $720 million in net worth certificates were

issued between 1982 and 1986, and the total amount outstanding at any one time peaked at

$710.4 million at year-end 1985.42 The decline in interest rates during the middle and late

1980s allowed the majority of participating banks to return to profitability. All but three institutions had retired their certificates by year-end 1988, and the last certificate was retired

in 1992.

After introduction of the Net Worth Certificate Program, interest-rate mismatch led to

six mutual savings bank failures, including three in 1983, one in 1984, and two in 1985.43

Five of these were resolved under the FDICs voluntary merger plan. The sixth, Oregon

Mutual Savings Bank of Portland, Oregon, was acquired by Moore Financial Group, Inc.,

of Boise, Idaho. This acquisition was made possible by newly enacted state legislation that

allowed Oregon Mutual to convert to a stock-form, state-chartered commercial bank and be

acquired by a bank holding company in a contiguous state. The assistance agreement between the FDIC and Moore Financial provided that Oregon Mutuals net worth certificates

be prepaid.

Net worth certificates were also prepaid in the assisted merger of Orange Savings

Bank with Hudson City Savings Bank, both in New Jersey. In the four other voluntary

mergers, outstanding net worth certificates were retained, and the surviving institution remained in the NWC Program. One of these transactions was a financial assistance package

to recapitalize the Bowery Savings Bank and merge it into a newly chartered stock savings

bank in order to facilitate its acquisition by a private investor group. The Bowery and DollarDry Dock eventually retired their certificates, whereas Syracuse Savings Bank and

Home Savings Bank failed with net worth certificates still outstanding. These were retired

as part of FDIC-assisted mergers with other institutions.
Chapter 6 The Mutual Savings Bank Crisis

History of the EightiesLessons for the Future 229

Table 6.5

FDIC Net Worth Certificate Program

($Thousands)

Certificates

Assets at Entry (Maximum 

Bank Name City/State into Program Amount Held) Date Retired

Auburn SB* Auburn, NY $ 125,646 $ 1,640 Retained by 

Syracuse SB in 1983

Assisted merger 

Beneficial Mutual Philadelphia, PA 1,628,630 18,862 1991

Bowery SB* New York, NY 4,999,357 220,100 1992

Cayuga County SB Auburn, NY 189,957 788 1986

Colonial Mutual SB Philadelphia, PA 70,732 776 1984Acquired

Dime SB of NY, FSB New York, NY 6,393,743 72,120 1986

Dime SB of Williamsburgh New York, NY 573,858 3,559 1987

DollarDry Dock SB New York, NY 4,972,787 41,321 1986

Dry Dock SB* New York, NY See Dollar-Dry Dock SB

East River SB, FSB New York, NY 1,777,519 26,430 1987

Eastern SB New York, NY 785,962 13,712 1986Merger

Elizabeth SB Elizabeth, NJ 31,695 351 1983Merger

Emigrant SB New York, NY 2,968,586 90,037 1991

Greater NY SB New York, NY 1,816,836 23,054 1987

Home SB* White Plains, NY 427,402 5,628 1986Assisted merger

Inter-County SB New Paltz, NY 123,366 1,588 1986

Lincoln SB, FSB New York, NY 2,090,289 65,865 1987

National SB of the City of Albany Albany, NY 391,205 1,123 1985

Niagara County SB Niagara Falls, NY 291,887 464 1986Merger

Orange SB* Livingston, NJ 531,087 3,509 1984Assisted merger

Oregon Mutual SB* Portland, OR 260,000 1,489 1983Assisted merger

Rochester Community SB Rochester, NY 1,371,335 4,993 1986

Roosevelt SB New York, NY 858,852 5,757 1986

Sag Harbor SB Sag Harbor, NY 203,612 1,412 1987

Savings Fund Society of Germantown Bala Cynwyd, PA 1,373,089 17,706 1987

Seamens SB, FSB New York, NY 1,825,504 31,320 1986

Skaneateles SB Skaneateles, NY 136,092 524 1986

Syracuse SB* Syracuse, NY 1,180,471 See Auburn SB§ 1987Assisted merger

Williamsburgh SB New York, NY 2,215,133 63,945 1987Merger

Total29 institutions $39,614,632 $718,073 

* Failed or was assisted while in NWCP.

 Failed after NWCP participation.

 Certificates issued to Dry Dock SB were retained when that institution was acquired by Dollar SB. Subsequently,

DollarDry Dock acquired additional certificates.

§ Certificates issued to Auburn SB were retained when that institution was acquired by Syracuse SB. Syracuse SB failed in 1987.
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230 History of the EightiesLessons for the Future

44 After so many mutual savings banks converted to the stock form of ownership, the industry is now collectively referred to

as the savings bank industry.

The Net Worth Certificate Program succeeded in providing 22 potentially failing savings banks with the opportunity to return to profitable operations. Although 7 of the participating institutions did require additional FDIC assistance, the cost of these transactions

was less than $420 million, or approximately 4.1 percent of the $10.2 billion in total assets

held by these 7 institutions at the time of their failures. This figure is substantially below the

average loss rate of 12 percent for the savings banks that were resolved before the NWC

Program, and it is certainly far less than what it would have cost the FDIC to close all 29

savings banks had there been no Net Worth Certificate Program. It should be noted that two

institutions failed after having paid off their net worth certificates: the Seamens Savings

Bank (1990) and DollarDry Dock (1992). These failures occurred more than four years after the banks had paid off their net worth certificates, and therefore were probably a result

of actions the institutions took after leaving the NWC Program.

The success of the FDICs Net Worth Certificate Program depended on interest-rate

levels, which were beyond the agencys control. However, the programs success was also

due to several of its key aspects. Stringent application requirements helped ensure that only

banks with capable management, good-quality assets, and the ability to be profitable in a

favorable interest-rate environment received assistance. Equally important, banks in the

program were closely monitored and supervised, and were not permitted to attempt to grow

out of their problems. In sum, the Net Worth Certificate Program minimized the FDICs potential exposure to loss while providing capital forbearance to savings banks.44

Conclusion

In the early 1980s, many mutual savings banks failed because both macroeconomic

forces and changes in the financial services marketplace were inhospitable to the industrys

traditional mode of operating. By law and regulation, MSB assets were permitted to be invested primarily in fixed-rate mortgages and long-term bonds, but as short-term interest

rates rose to historically high levels between 1979 and 1982, the market value of these assets plunged. At the same time, MSB liabilities were composed almost exclusively of shortterm deposits paying rates of interest subject to deposit interest-rate ceilingsand as

market rates rose, even small savers began to think like investors. MSB deposits were withdrawn and placed in higher-yielding investments. Regulators fought this disintermediation

by permitting the introduction of a variety of time deposits paying market rates of interest.

These certificates of deposit helped MSBs retain funds, but they also raised the industrys

cost of funds. Yields on assets rose much more slowly, and net interest margins shrank and
Chapter 6 The Mutual Savings Bank Crisis

History of the EightiesLessons for the Future 231

45 This chapter covers only the FDICs experience during the 1980s. Savings and loan associations also encountered problems of asset/liability mismatch early in the decade, but those institutions were regulated by the Federal Home Loan Bank

Board and insured by the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation. For a discussion of that crisis, see Chapter 4.

became negative. Operating losses were so great that capital levels built up over a century

or more of profitable operations quickly eroded.

MSB failures were predictable and, arguably, preventable. The problems facing the

thrift industry were recognized early and were debated throughout the 1970s.45 However,

Congresss attempts to enact sweeping financial reform were stalemated by the competing

interests of various industry groups, the overlapping layers of state and federal regulators,

and the additional public policy concern of ensuring a continued supply of funds for home

mortgage lending. Thus, despite years of studies and proposals, no consensus could be

reached on how best to proceed with financial deregulation. As a result, changes were enacted on a piecemeal basis and only when a crisis was clearly evident.

From the FDICs perspective, the problems of the mutual savings bank industry in

1980 were the most serious challenge the agency had faced since its inception in 1933. Potential losses to the deposit insurance fund were enormous. What made MSB failures particularly costly were the sizes of the institutions, the large percentage of fully insured

deposits, and the low market value of otherwise good-quality assets. This potential cost

prompted the FDIC to develop strategies to deal with MSB failures that were different from

the traditional methods used to resolve commercial bank failures. 

The predictability of the failures benefited the agency by giving it some planning

time. Moreover, the threat of deposit runs was greatly reduced because a large proportion of

deposits held by the MSB industry were fully insured. Finally, unlike the bank crisis of the

1930s, this crisis was not compounded by a sense of public panic.

The principal strategy the FDIC used was to provide open-bank merger assistance

with healthier institutions. This procedure was acceptable to the agency because, given the

absence of stockholders in mutual savings banks, only depositors would have to be protected in the transactions. Moreover, the problems facing MSBs at this time were not the result of mismanagement or fraud but were caused by forces outside the banks control.

Another consideration was the desire to avoid cash outlays. This was a major concern not

only to the FDIC but also to the U.S. Treasury Department because FDIC expenditures, although not charged to the Treasury, are reflected in the unified budget. Therefore, wherever

possible the FDIC attempted to substitute notes and periodic income maintenance payments

(which were dependent on future interest rates) for direct up-front cash assistance. The

1982 GarnSt Germain Act granted the agency additional time and flexibility and authorized the ensuing Net Worth Certificate Program.
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232 History of the EightiesLessons for the Future

46 The figure was approximate because several cases were still listed as active on the FDICs books.

Using all these procedures, the agency largely succeeded in managing the mutual savings bank crisis of the early 1980s. Between late 1981 and year-end 1985, the agency conducted 17 assisted mergers or acquisitions of mutual savings banks with total assets of

nearly $24 billion. These MSBs accounted for more than 15 percent of the total assets of

FDIC-insured mutual savings banks as of year-end 1980. At year-end 1995, the cost of

these failures was estimated at $2.2 billion.46 This figure is nearly equivalent to the estimated cost of these transactions when they were consummated, notwithstanding the variable nature of some of the components. Although the FDIC benefited from the effect of

declining interest rates on eventual income-maintenance payments, in several transactions

the agency incurred a greater-than-expected loss from the liquidation of assets it purchased.

Nevertheless, the strategies that were used in these assisted mergers minimized both losses

and cash outlays.

It should be noted that although a number of mutual savings banks were able to survive the crisis by the capital forbearance provided in the NWC Program and/or by virtue of

being extremely well managed, a number of others failed between 1985 and 1994 (a list of

these failures appears in the appendix to this chapter). For the most part, these institutions

failed for reasons other than asset/liability mismatch and therefore are not discussed in this

chapter. The question arises, however, whether the FDIC could have prevented these failures, many of which occurred as a result of the expanded powers granted by deregulation.

Notably, several of these post-1985 failures were from assisted mergers that had taken

place in the early 1980s. American Savings Bank, CrossLand FSB (formerly Metropolitan

Savings Bank), DollarDry Dock Bank, Goldome Bank (formerly Buffalo Savings Bank),

and Meritor Savings Bank (formerly Philadelphia Saving Fund Society) all failed in 1991

or 1992. These failures, occurring a decade after the institutions had participated in FDICassisted mergers, were attributable to activities in which the banks became involved after

the introduction of expanded powers. Most of the institutions had long since stopped receiving any type of FDIC assistance and were operating profitably before they encountered

the problems that led to failure. Estimates are not available as to what it might have cost the

FDIC to resolve these institutions separately, nor can it be determined what might have happened to the institutions if they had not participated in FDIC-assisted mergers. Nevertheless, it should be recognized that not all of the assisted merger combinations were a total

success. In addition, a number of savings banks in the New England region, which had

largely been spared in the early 1980s, failed during the early 1990s. These banks, many of
Chapter 6 The Mutual Savings Bank Crisis

History of the EightiesLessons for the Future 233

47 Jennifer L. Eccles and John P. OKeefe, Understanding the Experience of Converted New England Savings Banks, FDIC

Banking Review 8, no. 1 (1995): 117.

which had converted to the stock form of ownership, failed after investing in the boom-tobust New England real estate cycle (see Chapter 10).47

In conclusion, the mutual savings bank industry underwent a profound change between 1980 and 1994. The number of banks declined because of mergers, failures, and conversions to commercial banks. Approximately 30 percent (including many of the largest

savings banks) converted to stock form. Many savings banks benefited from a favorable environment and returned to profitability. (Future success depends on the ability of these

banks to adapt as the financial services industry continues to evolve.) As for the FDIC, in

its handling of the MSB crisis in the early 1980s it gained experience that would prove valuable, for as the decade unfolded, this crisis turned out to be only the first of many the agency

had to confront in rapid succession.
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234 History of the EightiesLessons for the Future

Appendix

Table 6-A.1

BIF-Insured Savings Banks That Failed, 19861994 ($Thousands)

Failure Resolution

Institution Name City, State Date Total Assets Cost

American Savings Bank White Plains, NY 06/12/92 $ 3,202,492 $ 469,713

Amoskeag Bank Manchester, NH 10/10/91 937,259 190,355

Attleboro Pawtucket SB Attleboro, MA 08/21/92 632,450 32,210

Banco de Ahorro FSB Mayaguez, PR 05/30/86 33,961 6,985

Bank Five for Savings Arlington, MA 09/20/91 386,572 99,306

Bank for Savings Malden, MA 03/20/92 397,979 28,620

Bank Mart Bridgeport, CT 12/13/91 578,220 97,785

Bank of Hartford Inc. Hartford, CT 06/10/94 321,457 23,326

Beacon Co-op Bank Boston, MA 06/21/91 31,806 4,210

Brooklyn Savings Bank Danielson, CT 10/19/90 130,931 29,791

Burritt InterFinancial Bcorp. New Britain, CT 12/04/92 523,850 76,931

Central Bank Meriden, CT 10/18/91 654,715 246,047

Central Savings Bank Lowell, MA 02/14/92 369,110 32,594

Colony Savings Bank Wallingford, CT 02/27/92 35,664 6,107

Connecticut Savings Bank New Haven, CT 11/14/91 1,044,990 206,959

Coolidge Corner Coop Bank Brookline, MA 03/14/91 83,699 16,502

Crossland Savings FSB Brooklyn, NY 01/24/92 7,431,636 547,864

Dartmouth Bank Manchester, NH 10/10/91 877,159 224,749

Dollar Dry Dock Bank White Plains, NY 02/21/92 4,028,368 356,622

Eastland Savings Bank Woonsocket, RI 12/11/92 515,301 16,735

Eliot Savings Bank Boston, MA 06/29/90 479,461 220,492

First American Bank for Savings Boston, MA 10/19/90 526,176 137,203

First Constitution Bank New Haven, CT 10/02/92 1,571,240 126,526

First Mutual Bank for Savings Boston, MA 06/28/91 1,129,946 181,037

First Service Bank for Savings Leominster, MA 03/31/89 880,658 292,365

Goldome Buffalo, NY 05/31/91 9,890,866 847,933

Granite Co-op Bank Quincy, MA 12/12/91 103,814 14,768

Heritage Bank For Savings Holyoke, MA 12/04/92 1,288,435 21,566

The Howard Savings Bank Newark, NJ 10/02/92 3,461,421 87,087

Iona Savings Bank Tilton, NH 10/11/91 31,180 5,334

Landmark Bank for Savings Whitman, MA 06/12/92 62,124 13,082

Lowell Institution for Savings Lowell, MA 08/30/91 386,363 126,303

Ludlow Savings Bank Ludlow, MA 10/21/94 222,671 16,681

Maine Savings Bank Portland, ME 02/01/91 1,182,519 5,614

Mechanics & Farmers SB, FSB Bridgeport, CT 08/09/91 1,083,920 323,197

MerchantsBank of Boston Boston, MA 05/18/90 392,219 96,581

Meritor Savings Bank Philadelphia, PA 12/11/92 4,126,701 0

Milford Savings Bank Milford, MA 07/06/90 328,062 137,790

Monroe Savings Bank FSB Rochester, NY 01/26/90 520,587 25,508

New England ALLBANK for Savings Gardner, MA 12/12/90 173,269 70,404

New England Savings Bank New London, CT 05/21/93 914,884 115,216

New Hampshire Savings Bank Concord, NH 10/10/91 1,171,673 234,637

Numerica Savings Bank FSB Manchester, NH 10/10/91 509,074 112,154

The Permanent Savings Bank Niagara Falls, NY 07/13/90 329,994 0

Plymouth Five Cents SB Plymouth, MA 09/18/92 220,972 7,078

Riverhead Savings Bank Riverhead, NY 06/12/92 388,806 0

Seacoast Savings Bank Dover, NH 08/28/92 84,808 7,537

Seamens Bank for Savings FSB New York, NY 04/18/90 3,391,988 188,916

Southstate Bank for Savings Brockton, MA 04/24/92 285,923 16,692

Suffield Bank Suffield, CT 09/06/91 294,777 86,222

Syracuse Savings Bank Syracuse, NY 05/13/87 1,183,321 0

Union Savings Bank Patchogue, NY 08/28/92 491,100 118,874

The U. S. Savings Bank of America Seabrook, NH 07/27/90 12,416 1,511

Vanguard Savings Bank Holyoke, MA 03/27/92 427,949 126,739

Winchendon Savings Bank Winchendon, MA 08/14/92 65,213 7,745

Woburn Five Cents SB Woburn, MA 06/07/91 247,219 44,154

Workingmens Co-op Bank Boston, MA 05/29/92 223,665 14,583

Yankee Bank Finance & Savings, FSB Boston, MA 10/16/87 525,481 65,689