alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
[Federal Register Volume 66, Number 39 (Tuesday, February 27, 2001)]
[Notices]
[Page 12570]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 01-4841]


-----------------------------------------------------------------------

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION


Sunshine Act Meeting

AGENCY HOLDING THE MEETING: Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

DATES: Weeks of February 26, March 5, 12, 19, 26, April 2, 2001.

PLACE: Commissioners' Conference Room, 11555 Rockville Pike, Rockville, 
Maryland.

STATUS: Public and Closed.

MATTERS TO BE CONSIDERED:  

Week of February 26, 2001

Monday, February 26, 2001
    10:15 a.m.  Discussion of Intragovernmental Issues (Closed-Ex. 9) 
(Tentative)
    2:00 p.m.  Meeting with the National Association of Regulatory 
Utility Commissioners (NARUC) (Public Meeting) (Contact: Spiros 
Droggitis, 301-415-2367)

    This meeting will be webcast live at the Web address--www.nrc.gov/
live.html
Tuesday, February 27, 2001
10:25 a.m.  Affirmation Session (Public Meeting) (If needed)
10:30 a.m.  Briefing on Threat Environment Assessment (Closed-Ex. 1)

Week of March 5, 2001--Tentative

    There are no meetings scheduled for the Week of March 5, 2001.

Week of March 12, 2001--Tentative

Monday, March 12, 2001
1:25 p.m.  Affirmation Session (Public Meeting) (If needed)
1:30 p.m.  Discussion of Management Issues (Closed-Ex. 2)

Week of March 19, 2001--Tentative

Thursday, March 22, 2001
10:25 a.m.  Affirmation Session (Public Meeting) (If needed)
10:30 a.m.  Meeting with Advisory Committee on Nuclear Waste (ACNW) 
(Public Meeting) (Contact: John Larkins, 301-415-7360)

    This meeting will be webcast live at the Web address--www.nrc.gov/
live.html.

Week of March 26, 2001--Tentative

    There are no meetings scheduled for the Week of March 26, 2001.

Week of April 2, 2001--Tentative

    There are no meetings scheduled for the Week of April 2, 2001.

    * The schedule for Commission meetings is subject to change on 
short notice. To verify the status of meetings call (recording)--
(301) 415-1292. Contact person for more information: David Louis 
Gamberoni (301) 415-1651.

    The NRC Commission Meeting Schedule can be found on the Internet 
at: http://www.nrc.gov/SECY/smj/schedule.htm.
    This notice is distributed by mail to several hundred subscribers; 
if you no longer wish to receive it, or would like to be added to the 
distribution, please contact the Office of the Secretary, Washington, 
DC 20555 (301-415-1969). In addition, distribution of this meeting 
notice over the Internet system is available. If you are interested in 
receiving this Commission meeting schedule electronically, please send 
an electronic message to <a href="/cdn-cgi/l/email-protection#c3a7a8b483adb1a0eda4acb5"><span class="__cf_email__" data-cfemail="14707f63547a66773a737b62">[email protected]</span></a>.

    Dated: February 22, 2001.
David Louis Gamberoni,
Technical Coordinator, Office of the Secretary.
[FR Doc. 01-4841 Filed 2-23-01; 12:48 pm]
BILLING CODE 7590-01-M


</pre><script data-cfasync="false" src="/cdn-cgi/scripts/5c5dd728/cloudflare-static/email-decode.min.js"></script></body>
</html>
#### Willis Boyd ANNIS, III, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. State of VERMONT PROSECUTORS, Federal Prosecutors State of Vermont, Defendants-Appellees.

No. 13-3247-cv.

United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.

May 28, 2014.

Willis Boyd Annis, III, Burlington, VT, pro se.

No Appearance.

Present: ROBERT D. SACK, REENA RAGGI, and DENNY CHIN, Circuit Judges.

SUMMARY ORDER

UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the judgment entered on June 27, 2013, is AFFIRMED.

Plaintiff Willis Boyd Annis, III, proceeding *pro se,*appeals from the *sua sponte*dismissal of his amended complaint and denial of further leave to amend. We assume familiarity with the facts and underlying proceedings, which we reference only as necessary to explain our decision to affirm.

We review *de novo*a district court’s *sua sponte*dismissal of a complaint. *See Giano v. Goord,*250 F.3d 146, 149-50 (2d Cir.2001). Upon such review, we conclude, substantially for the reasons stated by the district court, that Annis’s complaint about defendants’ failure to prosecute persons tracking his thoughts through a mind-reading device “lacks an arguable basis either in law or fact.” *Neitzke v. Williams,*490 U.S. 319, 325, 109 S.Ct. 1827, 104 L.Ed.2d 338 (1989). It was therefore properly dismissed *sua sponte*under *Neitzke v. Williams.*Even when read with the “special solicitude” due *pro se*pleadings, *Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons,*470 F.3d 471, 474-75 (2d Cir.2006) (internal quotation marks omitted), Annis’s allegations cannot support a plausible claim for relief in light of established precedent, *see Denton v. Hernandez,*504 U.S. 25, 33, 112 S.Ct. 1728, 118 L.Ed.2d 340 (1992) (approving dismissal of complaint based on “irrational or wholly incredible” allegations); *accord Livingston v. Adirondack Beverage Co.,*141 F.3d 434, 437 (2d Cir.1998) (explaining that dismissal is proper where complaint’s factual allegations are the “product of delusion or fanta*10sy” (internal quotation marks omitted)). In addition, “a private citizen lacks a judicially cognizable interest in the prosecution or nonprosecution of another.” *Linda R. S. v. Richard D.,*410 U.S. 614, 619, 93 S. Ct. 1146, 35 L.Ed.2d 536 (1973). Moreover, because there is no reason to think that a valid claim might be stated, the district court’s denial of further leave to amend was appropriate. *See Cuoco v. Moritsugu,*222 F.3d 99, 112 (2d Cir.2000).

We have considered Annis’s remaining arguments and find them to be without merit. Accordingly, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.
2009-2060.

#### In re Application of Ormet Primary Aluminum Corp.

Public Utilities Commission, No. 09-119-EL-AEC. This cause is pending before the court as an appeal from the Public Utilities Commission of Ohio. Upon consideration of the joint motion of the Office of the Ohio Consumer’s Counsel and The Ohio Energy Group to strike portions of appellant’s merit brief,

It is ordered by the court that the motion is denied, without prejudice to the issues being raised again in the Ohio Consumer Counsel’s and The Ohio Energy Group’s merit briefs.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

EASTERN DISTRICT

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA,

Respondent

v.

ANTOINE DAVIS,

Petitioner :

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

: No. 260 EAL 2017

Petition for Allowance of Appeal from

the Order of the Superior Court

ORDER

PER CURIAM

AND NOW , this 4th day of October, 2017

, the Petition for Allowance of Appeal is

DENIED

.
#### Tricia CAMPBELL, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. HOME DEPOT USA, INC., Defendant-Appellee.

No. 06-2797-cv.

United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.

Feb. 21, 2007.

Trida Campbell, Bronx, NY, pro se, for Plaintiff-Appellant.

Debra S. Morway (Melissa C. Rodriguez, on the brief), Morgan, Lewis & Bockius LLP, New York, NY. for Defendant-Appellee.

PRESENT: Hon. DENNIS JACOBS, Chief Judge, Hon. GUIDO CALABRESI, Circuit Judge, Hon. RICHARD M. BERMAN, District Judge.*

*

 The Honorable Richard M. Berman, United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, sitting by designation.

*SUMMARY ORDER*

Plaintiff-appellant Trida Campbell appeals from a final judgment entered on March 31, 2006 in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York (Karas, *J.).*The district court granted summary judgment on all claims to the defendant-appellee, Home Depot, USA, Inc. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural history, and the issues presented for review.

While the amount of time between a plaintiffs protected action and a defendant’s alleged retaliation sufficient to support a finding of causation may vary with the circumstances, that is not ultimately significant in this case, and we affirm for substantially the reasons set forth in the district court’s March 30, 2006 Opinion and Order. *See Campbell v. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc.,*No. 03 Civ. 1421, 2006 WL 839001 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 30, 2006).

*22The judgment of the district court is hereby AFFIRMED.
#### Steven BYRD, Petitioner-Appellant, v. COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA, Respondent-Appellee.

No. 06-7707.

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted: Feb. 23, 2007.

Decided: March 13, 2007.

Steven Byrd, Appellant Pro Se. John H. McLees, Jr., Office of the Attorney General of Virginia, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellee.

Before TRAXLER and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior Circuit Judge.

Dismissed by unpublished PER CURIAM opinion.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

PER CURIAM:

Steven Byrd seeks to appeal the district court’s order denying relief on his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (2000) petition. The order is not appealable unless a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of appealability. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1) (2000). A certificate of appealability will not issue absent “a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2) (2000). A prisoner satisfies this standard by demonstrating that reasonable jurists would find that any assessment of the constitutional claims by the district court is debatable or wrong and that any dispositive procedural ruling by the district court is likewise debatable. *Miller-El v. Cockrell,*537 U.S. 322, 336-38, 123 S.Ct. 1029, 154 L.Ed.2d 931 (2003); *Slack v. McDaniel,*529 U.S. 473, 484, 120 S.Ct. 1595, 146 L.Ed.2d 542 (2000); *Rose v. Lee,*252 F.3d 676, 683-84 (4th Cir.2001). We have independently reviewed the record and conclude that Byrd has not made the requisite showing. Accordingly, we deny a certificate of appealability and dismiss the appeal. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

*DISMISSED.*
#### Carlos A. MENA, Petitioner, v. Alberto R. GONZALES, Attorney General, Respondent.

No. 05-73669.

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted Feb. 20, 2007.*

Filed Feb. 27, 2007.

Charles E. Nichol, Esq., Law Office of Charles E. Nichol, San Francisco, CA, for Petitioner.

Ronald E. Lefevre, Chief Counsel, Office of the District Counsel Department of Homeland Security, San Francisco, CA, Gwynn Kinsey, Jr., Washington, DC, for Respondent.

*664Before: BEEZER, FERNANDEZ, and McKEOWN, Circuit Judges.

*

 The panel unanimously finds this case suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R.App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM **

Carlos A. Mena, a native and citizen of Peru, petitions for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) order denying his motion to reopen removal proceedings and reconsider its prior order affirming, without opinion, an immigration judge’s (“IJ”) decision denying his application for cancellation of removal. We review for abuse of discretion the denial of motions to reopen and reconsider. *See Lara-Torres v. Ashcroft,*383 F.3d 968, 972 (9th Cir.2004), *amended by*404 F.3d 1105 (9th Cir.2005). We deny in part and dismiss in part the petition for review.

The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Mena’s motion as untimely because it was filed almost two years after the BIA issued its final order of removal. *See*8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i)(requiring that motions to reopen be filed within 90 days of the final administrative order of removal); 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(6)(B) (requiring that motions to reconsider be filed within 30 days of the final administrative order of removal).

The BIA did not abuse its discretion or deny Mena due process by not applying equitable tolling, because Mena did not explain how he was prevented from complying with the filing deadline. *See Iturribarria v. INS,*321 F.3d 889, 897 (9th Cir.2003) (equitable tolling applies where an alien is “prevented from [timely] filing because of deception, fraud, or error”); *Socop-Gonzalez v. INS,*272 F.3d 1176, 1193 (9th Cir.2001) (en banc) (equitable tolling applies where an alien demonstrates that he was ignorant of the filing deadline due to circumstances beyond his control).

To the extent Mena contends the BIA should have reopened or reconsidered his case *sua sponte,*we lack jurisdiction because the BIA’s decision whether to invoke its *sua sponte*authority is committed to its unfettered discretion. *See Ekimian v. INS,*303 F.3d 1153, 1159 (9th Cir.2002) (internal citations omitted).

PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED in part; DISMISSED in part.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
<PAGE>   1
                      YURIE SYSTEMS, INC. AND SUBSIDIARIES

             COMPUTATION OF DILUTED EARNINGS PER COMMON AND COMMON
              EQUIVALENT SHARES FOR THE THREE MONTH PERIODS ENDED
                            MARCH 31, 1998 AND 1997

                                  (UNAUDITED)





<TABLE>
<CAPTION>
                                                                         1998                1997
                                                                     --------------     ---------------
            <S>                                                       <C>                <C>
            Net Income                                                $  3,764,810        $    676,900
                                                                     ==============     ===============

            Average shares outstanding during the period                25,385,137          23,400,496

            Dilutive effect of stock options after application
                 of treasury stock method                                2,144,304           1,676,749
                                                                     --------------     ---------------

            Average number of shares and equivalent shares
                 outstanding during the period                          27,529,441          25,077,245
                                                                     ==============     ===============

            Diluted earnings per common and common
                 equivalent share                                     $       0.14       $        0.03
                                                                     ==============     ===============
</TABLE>





                                       12
[Cite as State v. Harris, 130 Ohio St.3d 362, 2011-Ohio-5783.] 

THE STATE OF OHIO, APPELLEE, v. HARRIS, APPELLANT. 

[Cite as State v. Harris, 130 Ohio St.3d 362, 2011-Ohio-5783.] 

Discretionary appeal accepted and cause remanded to the court of appeals for 

application of State v. Williams. 

(No. 2011-1238—Submitted October 18, 2011—Decided November 15, 2011.) 

APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Hamilton County, No. C-100243. 

__________________ 

{¶ 1} The discretionary appeal is accepted. 

{¶ 2} The cause is remanded to the court of appeals for application of 

State v. Williams, 129 Ohio St.3d 344, 2011-Ohio-3374, 952 N.E.2d 1108. 

O’CONNOR, C.J., and PFEIFER, LUNDBERG STRATTON, LANZINGER, CUPP, 

and MCGEE BROWN, JJ., concur. 

O’DONNELL, J., dissents. 

__________________ 

Joseph T. Deters, Hamilton County Prosecuting Attorney, and Paula 

Adams, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee. 

Joshua L. Goode, for appellant. 

______________________
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

MIDDLE DISTRICT

**COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA,**

**Respondent**

**v.**

**WESLEY MORGAN POLLARD, SR.,**

**Petitioner :** 

**:**

**:**

**:**

**:**

**:**

**:**

**:**

**:**

**:**

**: No. 155 MAL 2016** 

**Petition for Allowance of Appeal from the Order of the Superior Court** 

ORDER

PER CURIAM

AND NOW **, this 30th day of August, 2016, the Petition for Al lowance of Appeal is** 

DENIED

**.**

**Justice Mundy did not participate in the decision of this matter**
Exhibit 10.31

   

  FIRST AMENDMENT TO

  PROFIT SHARE AGREEMENT

  

  

  This First Amendment (“First Amendment”) is entered into as of November 1, 2017 (“First Amendment Effective Date”) to amend the Profit Share Agreement (“Agreement”) dated June 30, 2017, (the “Agreement”) between DGS Ltd.
    (the “Company”) and Jeffrey Cox (“Cox”).

  

  

  1.          Definitions. All capitalized terms not defined herein shall have their meaning as defined in
    the Agreement.

  

  

  2.          Amendments. The parties hereby agree to replace “13.93%” in Section 3 of the Agreement with
    “16.18%”.

  

  

  3.          Miscellaneous. This First Amendment, together with the Agreement, constitutes the entire agreement between the parties regarding the subject matter hereof and supersedes all
    prior agreements or representations regarding the same. Except as set forth in this First Amendment, all terms of the Agreement shall remain in full force and effect.

   

  IN WITNESS HEREOF, the parties agree to this First Amendment as of the First Amendment Effective Date:

   

  	
          DGS Ltd.

        	 	
          Jeffrey Cox

        
		 	
           

        
	/s/ Mohammed Khaishgi	 	/s/ Jeffrey Cox
	
          Mohammed Khaishgi

        	 	 
	
          Director
#### Dornatus TANZIL, Petitioner, v. Eric H. HOLDER, Jr., Attorney General, Respondent.

No. 12-73753.

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted April 7, 2014*

Filed April 11, 2014.

David M. Haghighi, Law Offices of David M. Haghighi, APC, Los Angeles, CA, for Petitioner.

Chief Counsel Ice, Office of the Chief Counsel Department of Homeland Security, San Francisco, CA, John M. Mcadams, Jr., OIL, U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, DC, for Respondent.

Before: TASHIMA, GRABER, and IKUTA, Circuit Judges.

*

 The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R.App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM **

Dornatus Tanzil, a native and citizen of Indonesia, petitions for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) order dismissing his appeal from an immigration judge’s decision denying his application for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We review for substantial evidence the agency’s factual findings. *Wakkary v. Holder,*558 F.3d 1049, 1056 (9th Cir.2009). We deny the petition for review.

Substantial evidence supports the agency’s determination that the incidents Tan-zil experienced in Indonesia, even considered cumulatively, did not rise to the level of past persecution. *See Halim v. Holder,*590 F.3d 971, 976 (9th Cir.2009); *Wakka-ry,*558 F.3d at 1059-60 (record did not compel finding of past persecution where petitioner was robbed and beaten as a youth, and accosted by a mob). Substantial evidence also supports the agency’s determination that, even under a disfavored group analysis, Tanzil failed to show sufficient individualized risk of harm to establish a well-founded fear of future persecution in Indonesia. *See Halim,*590 F.3d at 979. We reject Tanzil’s contentions that the BIA failed to consider all the evidence, applied the incorrect legal standard, or otherwise improperly analyzed his claim. Accordingly, Tanzil’s asylum claim fails.

Because Tanzil failed to establish eligibility for asylum, he necessarily failed to establish eligibility for withholding of removal. *See Zehatye v. Gonzales,*453 F.3d 1182, 1189-90 (9th Cir.2006).

Finally, substantial evidence also supports the agency’s denial of Tanzil’s CAT claim because he failed to demonstrate it is more likely than not he would be tortured *498by or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official in Indonesia. *See Silaya v. Mukasey,*524 F.3d 1066, 1073 (9th Cir.2008). We reject Tanzil’s contention that the BIA failed to fully or properly consider the evidence, and his contention that the BIA misapplied the legal standard for CAT.

PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
<PAGE>

                                                                    Exhibit 21.1

                             LIST OF SUBSIDIARIES


West Marine Products, Inc., a California corporation

West Marine Puerto Rico, Inc., a California corporation

West Marine FSC, Inc., a Barbados corporation

West Marine Finance Company, Inc., a California corporation

W Marine Management Company, Inc., a California corporation

West Marine LBC, Inc., a California corporation

West Marine IHC I, Inc., a California corporation

E&B Marine, Inc., a Delaware corporation

E&B Marine LBC, Inc., a California corporation

E&B Marine IHC I, Inc., a California corporation

E&B Marine Supply, Inc. (NJ), a New Jersey corporation

E&B Marine Supply, Inc. (MD), a Maryland corporation

Goldbergs' Marine Distributors, Inc., a Delaware Corporation

James Bliss & Co., Inc., Massachusetts corporation

Sea Ranger Marine, Inc., a Delaware corporation

Krista Corporation, a Delaware corporation

Central Marine Supply, Inc., a New Jersey corporation
<PAGE>   1
                                                                    EXHIBIT 23.1

                       CONSENT OF INDEPENDENT ACCOUNTANTS

We hereby consent to the incorporation by reference in the Registration
Statements on Form S-3 (No. 333-4298), (No. 333-28129), (No. 333-82455) and
(No. 333-88211) and in the Registration Statements on Form S-8 (No. 333-9873)
and (No. 333-82357) of KFx Inc. of our report dated April 14, 2000 relating to
the consolidated financial statements, which appears in this Form 10-K.

PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP


Denver, Colorado
April 27, 2000
```

[Congressional Bills 103th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 2783 Introduced in House (IH)]

103d CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                H. R. 2783

  To direct the Secretary of Transportation to conduct a study of the 
             Brooklyn waterfront, New York City, New York.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                             July 28, 1993

  Mr. Nadler introduced the following bill; which was referred to the 
              Committee on Public Works and Transportation

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
  To direct the Secretary of Transportation to conduct a study of the 
             Brooklyn waterfront, New York City, New York.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. STUDY OF BROOKLYN WATERFRONT, NEW YORK.

    (a) In General.--The Secretary of Transportation, in consultation 
with the Secretary of the Army, shall conduct a study of current land 
uses, land availability, and waterborne and land-side transportation in 
the area from Pier 7 through the 65th Street railyards, from the 
pierhead line up to the Gowanus Expressway, and along the Staten Island 
coast in the vicinity of the Stapleton Home Port, New York City, New 
York, in order to ascertain the feasibility of establishing a major 
container feeder port in such area, the cost of constructing such a 
port, and the commercial viability of such a port.
    (b) Assumptions.--The Secretary of Transportation shall conduct the 
study under this section utilizing each of the following assumptions:
            (1) That a rail freight tunnel which has been proposed by 
        the City of New York will be constructed between Staten Island, 
        New York, or Greenville, New Jersey, and Brooklyn, New York.
            (2) That such a tunnel will not be constructed.

SEC. 2. REPORT.

    Not later than 1 year after the date of the enactment of this Act, 
the Secretary of Transportation shall transmit to Congress a report on 
the results of the study conducted under this Act.

                                 <all>
```