alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
EXHIBIT
32.2




Certification


Pursuant
to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002


(Subsections
(a) and (b) of Section 1350, Chapter 63 of Title 18, United States
Code)




In
connection with the Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q of Pressure BioSciences, Inc.,
a Massachusetts corporation (the “Company”) for the period ended March 31, 2009
as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the
“Report”), I, Richard T. Schumacher, President and Chief Executive Officer of
the Company, do hereby certify, pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act of 2002 (subsections (a) and (b) of Section 1350, Chapter 63 of Title 18,
United States Code) that:





(1)
  The Report of the Company fully complies with the requirements of Section
13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and





(2)
  The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material
respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the
Company.




Dated:
      May 15, 2009
              By:
              /s/   Richard T.
      SchumacherRichard
      T. Schumacher
                President
      & Chief Executive Officer
                (Principal
      Financial and Accounting
Officer)




A signed
original of this written statement required by Section 906 has been provided to
Pressure BioSciences, Inc. and will be retained by Pressure BioSciences, Inc.
and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon
request.
2009-1431.

#### State v. Timofeev.

Summit App. No. 24222, 2009-Ohio-3007.
EXHIBIT 32.2



Certification of CFO Pursuant to

18 U.S.C. Section 1350,

As Adopted Pursuant to

Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002



In connection with the Quarterly Report of Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Inc. (the Company) on Form 10-Q for the period ended March 31, 2004 as filed
with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the Report), I, Daniel J. Taylor, Chief Financial Officer of the Company, hereby certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, to the best of my knowledge that:



| | (1) |  | The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and
| | --- |  | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



| | (2) |  | The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.
| | --- |  | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



Date: April 30, 2004

/s/    DANIEL J. TAYLORDaniel J. Taylor Chief Financial Officer




A signed
original of this written statement required by Section 906 has been provided to the Company and will be retained by the Company and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.
FDIC Quarterly FOIA Report

2nd Quarter 2020 (January 1 – March 31, 2020)

1. Number of requests received during quarter: 113

2. Number of requests processed during quarter: 109

3. Number of requests backlogged at end of quarter: 3

4. Status of the FDIC’s ten overall oldest pending FOIA requests from the previous fiscal 

year (i.e., number closed during quarter): Nine (9) requests were closed during the 1st

quarter of FY2020
In the United States Court of Federal Claims 

OFFICE OF SPECIAL MASTERS

No. 20-0340V

UNPUBLISHED

RACHEL RUTKOWSKI,

 Petitioner,

v.

SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND 

HUMAN SERVICES,

 Respondent.

Chief Special Master Corcoran 

Filed: August 31, 2021

Special Processing Unit (SPU); 

Ruling on Entitlement; Concession;

Table Injury; Influenza (Flu) Vaccine;

Shoulder Injury Related to Vaccine 

Administration (SIRVA)

Paul R. Brazil, Muller Brazil, LLP, Dresher, PA, for Petitioner.

Ida Nassar, U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, DC, for Respondent.

RULING ON ENTITLEMENT1

On March 25, 2020, Rachel Rutkowski filed a petition for compensation under the 

National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program, 42 U.S.C. §300aa-10, et seq.2 (the 

“Vaccine Act”). Petitioner alleges that she suffered a “left shoulder injury resulting from 

the adverse effects of an influenza vaccination” she received on October 1, 2018. Petition 

at ¶ 1. The case was assigned to the Special Processing Unit of the Office of Special 

Masters.

On August 31, 2021, Respondent filed his Rule 4(c) report in which he concedes

that Petitioner is entitled to compensation in this case. Respondent’s Rule 4(c) Report at 

1. Specifically, Respondent agrees that Petitioner had no relevant history of pain, 

inflammation, or dysfunction in her left shoulder; Petitioner’s pain and reduced range of 

1 Because this unpublished Ruling contains a reasoned explanation for the action in this case, I am required 

to post it on the United States Court of Federal Claims' website in accordance with the E-Government Act 

of 2002. 44 U.S.C. § 3501 note (2012) (Federal Management and Promotion of Electronic Government 

Services). This means the Ruling will be available to anyone with access to the internet. In accordance 

with Vaccine Rule 18(b), Petitioner has 14 days to identify and move to redact medical or other information, 

the disclosure of which would constitute an unwarranted invasion of privacy. If, upon review, I agree that 

the identified material fits within this definition, I will redact such material from public access. 

2 National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-660, 100 Stat. 3755. Hereinafter, for ease 

of citation, all section references to the Vaccine Act will be to the pertinent subparagraph of 42 U.S.C. § 

300aa (2012).
2

motion occurred within 48 hours of receipt of an intramuscular vaccination; Petitioner’s 

symptoms were limited to the shoulder in which the vaccine was administered; and no 

other condition or abnormality was identified to explain Petitioner’s symptoms. Id. at 5-6. 

In view of Respondent’s position and the evidence of record, I find that 

Petitioner is entitled to compensation.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

s/Brian H. Corcoran

Brian H. Corcoran

Chief Special Master
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE>                5


<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>               DEC-31-2000
<PERIOD-START>                  JAN-01-2000
<PERIOD-END>                    MAR-31-2000
<CASH>                          33,452
<SECURITIES>                    0
<RECEIVABLES>                   339,492
<ALLOWANCES>                    0
<INVENTORY>                     720,192
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                1,093,136
<PP&E>                          192,038
<DEPRECIATION>                  0
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                  1,884,591
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>           1,506,643
<BONDS>                         0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>           0
<PREFERRED>                     0
<COMMON>                        73
<OTHER-SE>                      (403,358)
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>    1,884,591
<SALES>                         683,121
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                683,121
<CGS>                           456,915
<TOTAL-COSTS>                   347,221
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>              15,123
<INCOME-PRETAX>                 (136,138)
<INCOME-TAX>                    0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>             (136,138)
<DISCONTINUED>                  0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                 0
<CHANGES>                       0
<NET-INCOME>                    (136,138)
<EPS-BASIC>                   (.02)
<EPS-DILUTED>                   (.02)



</TABLE>
UN PUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 16
- 4569

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA , Plaintiff

- Appellee ,

v. CLIFFORD EDWARD SHIRLEY, JR., a/k/a Skip , Defendant

- Appellant

.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina , at Florence

. Bruce H. Hendricks , District Judge. ( 4:15

- cr - 00095

- BHH

- 7 )

Submitted : May 2 , 2017 Decided: May 26, 2017

Before GREGORY, Chief Judge, and KING and WYNN , Circuit Judges.
Affirmed in part ; dismissed in part by un published per curiam opinion

. Timothy Anderson, ANDERSON & ASSOCIATES, Virginia Beach, Virginia, for Appellant. Alfred William Walker Bethea, Jr., Assistant United States Attorney, Florence, S outh Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.2 PER CURIAM: Clifford Edward Shirley , Jr., pleaded g uilty, pursuant to a Fed. R. Crim . P. 11(c)(1)(C) plea agreement, to conspiracy with intent to distribute 2 80 grams or more of cocaine base and 5 kilograms or more of cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(A), 846 (2012). The parties agreed to a 120

- month term of imprisonment, and the district court sentenced Shirley accordingly. Appellate co unsel has filed a brief pursuant
to Anders v. California , 386 U.S. 738 (1967), questioning whether the record contained sufficient evidence to substantiate the drug weights alleged in the indictment . Shirley has filed a pro se supplemental brief raising t he same challenge.

“ A defendant who pleads guilty .

. . admits all of the factual allegations made in the indictment, and waives all non

- jurisdictional defects, including the right to contest the factual merits of the charges.” United States v. Gosselin W orld Wide Moving, N.V. , 411 F.3d 502, 515 (4th Cir. 2005) (citation and inte rnal quotation marks omitted).
A ccordingly, by pleading guilty, Shirley waived his right to challenge the sufficie ncy of the drug weight evidence. S ee United States v. Willis , 992 F.2d 489, 491 (4th Cir. 1993). In accordance with Anders , we have reviewed the entire record in this case and have found no meritorious issues for appeal. We therefore affirm Shirley’s conviction, and dismiss the appeal from Shirley’s sentence for lac k of jurisdiction. See 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a), (c) (1) (2012); United States v. Williams , 811 F.3d 621, 623 , 625 (4th Cir. 2016). This court requires that counsel inform Shirley , in writing, of the right to petition the Supreme Court of the United States for further review. If Shirley requests that a petition be filed, but counsel believes that such a petition would be frivolous, then3 counsel may move in this court for leave to withdraw from representation. Counsel’s motion must state that a copy thereof wa s served on Shirley

. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process. AFFIRMED IN PART; DISMISSED IN PART
# FY18_Q1

# Percent Positives - User Notes
2010-0330.

#### State ex rel. Gaylor, Inc. v. Goodenow.

In Mandamus and Prohibition. This cause originated in this court on the filing of a complaint for a writ of prohibition and mandamus. Upon consideration of relator’s motion for emergency stay and expedited alternative writ,

It is ordered that the prohibition claim is dismissed and relator’s motion for an emergency stay and expedited alternative writ is denied insofar as it is based on the prohibition claim.

It is further ordered that an alternative writ is granted on relator’s mandamus claim, and respondents are sua sponte stayed from enforcing or proceeding on their decisions disqualifying relator’s bid and awarding the contract to an alternate contractor pending the court’s resolution of relator’s mandamus claim. Relator may file an amended complaint to name the board of county commissioners as an additional respondent.

The respondents shall file an answer to the complaint within seven days of this entry; the parties shall file any evidence they intend to present within 20 days of this entry; relator shall file a brief within ten days of the filing of the evidence; respondents shall file a brief within 20 days after the filing of relator’s brief; and relator may file a reply brief within seven days after the filing of respondents’ brief.

Pfeifer, J., dissents and would dismiss the cause.
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Leobardo CHAVEZ-BARRIENTOS, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 06-35246.

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted Feb. 20, 2007 *.

Filed Feb. 23, 2007.

Kent S. Robinson, AUSA, U.S. Attorney’s Office, Portland, OR, for PlaintiffAppellee.

Leobardo Chavez-Barrientos, Taft, CA, pro se.

*630Before: BEEZER, FERNANDEZ and McKEOWN, Circuit Judges.

*

 This panel unanimously finds this case suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R.App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM **

Leobardo Chavez-Barrientos appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment denying his 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion to set aside his conviction for illegal reentry following deportation, in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2253, and we affirm.

Chavez-Barrientos contends that he received ineffective assistance of counsel because counsel failed to assert derivative citizenship as a defense. However, a review of the record reveals that counsel researched this issue and properly determined that Chavez-Barrientos was not entitled to derivative citizenship. *See Barthelemy v. Ashcroft,*329 F.3d 1062, 1065 (9th Cir.2003). Accordingly, counsel’s performance was not deficient. *See Strickland v. Washington,*466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984).

The motion for stay of deportation pending appeal is denied as moot.

AFFIRMED.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
#### WILLIAMS COMMUNICATIONS GROUP, INC., Debtors, Alex Meruelo, Plaintiff-Appellant, Leucadia National Corporation, Wiltel Communications Group, LLC, Defendants-Appellees.

No. 06-4505-bk.

United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.

March 10, 2009.

Behram V. Parekh, Yourman, Alexander *&*Parekh LLP, Manhattan Beach, CA (Michael S. Etkin, Ira M. Levee, Lowen-stein Sandler PC, Roseland, N.J., Jeremy J. Brandon, Susman Godfrey LLP, Dallas Tex., Joshua H. Vinik, Milberg Weiss LLP, New York, N.Y., on the brief), for Appellant.

Joseph S. Allerhand, Weil Gotshal & Manges LLP (Michael L. Cook, Sophie S. Kim, Schulte Roth *&*Zabel, LLP, on the brief), New York, N.Y., for Appellees.

PRESENT: Hon. GUIDO CALABRESI and Hon. RICHARD C. WESLEY, Circuit Judges.1

1

. The Honorable Charles L. Brieant was originally assigned to the panel, sitting by designation from of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York. Judge Brieant has, unfortunately, died. As permitted by Local Rule § 0.14, the panel consists of two judges.

SUMMARY ORDER

The Supreme Court has long held that “federal courts are without power to decide questions that cannot affect the rights of litigants in the case before them.” *North Carolina v. Rice,*404 U.S. 244, 246, 92 S.Ct. 402, 30 L.Ed.2d 413 (1971). As a preliminary matter, we must therefore determine whether there is a live case or *313controversy before us. If the case is moot, then federal courts lack subject matter jurisdiction and must dismiss. *Fox v. Bd. of Trustees of the State Univ. of N.Y.,*42 F.3d 135, 140 (2d Cir.1994).

The interest that the parties before us had in the instant case depended on their obtaining a judgment in an ongoing securities litigation. The parties, however, have lost in that litigation, and the judgment against them has now been affirmed on appeal. *See In re Williams Secs.*Litig.—*WCG Subclass,*558 F.3d 1130 (10th Cir.2009). As a result, they no longer have an interest in the question before us, and the case is now moot.

Accordingly, the appeal is DISMISSED as moot.
EX-10.3





 Exhibit 10.3 

From:     Navios Maritime Holdings Inc. 

7 Avenue de Grande Bretagne, Office 11B2 

Monte Carlo, MC 98000 Monaco 

To:         Grimaud Ventures S.A 

Trust Company Complex 
 Ajeltake
Road , Ajeltake Island 
 Majuro, Marshall Islands, MH96960 

June 25, 2020 
 Dear Sirs, 

Loan agreement dated 25 April 2019, as amended, supplemented or assigned from time to time (the “Loan Agreement”), in respect of a loan of
USD 70,000,000 made between (1) Navios Maritime Holdings Inc. as Borrower and (2) Grimaud Ventures S.A. as Lender 
 We refer to the Loan
Agreement. Words and expressions defined in the Loan Agreement will have the same meaning when used in this letter. 
 Pursuant to clause 3 of the Loan
Agreement, the Borrower and Lender have agreed that the first interest due and payable on June 26, 2020, and July 1, 2020, shall instead be paid as follows: 
  

	 	•	 	 USD6,381,448.63 (United States Dollars Six Million, Three Hundred Eighty One Thousand, Four Hundred Forty Eight,
and Sixty Three cents) on July 10, 2020. 


 With effect as of the date hereof, the Loan Agreement shall be amended by adding the
following: 
 “3.5. The Borrower may elect to pay a maximum of seventy per cent of the interest payable in common shares of the Borrower with the
number of shares to be paid equal to the quotient of (1) the amount representing the interest payable in common shares divided by (2) an amount equal to 80% of the ten-day weighted average share
price (as reported by Bloomberg) for the ten full trading days before the payment date of any Interest Period.” 
 This letter and any non-contractual obligations arising out of or in connection with it shall be governed by and construed in accordance with English law. 

Yours faithfully, 
  

	
	 /s/ Georgios Akhniotis

	 Georgios Akhniotis
 for and on behalf
of

	NAVIOS MARITIME HOLDINGS INC.
	
	Confirmed and agreed, this 25 day of June 2020
	
	 /s/ Ioannis Karyotis

	Ioannis Karyotis
	For and on behalf of
	GRIMAUD VENTURES S.A.
#### Anibal AVILLAN, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Patrick R. DONAHUE, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 13-1220.

United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.

June 9, 2014.

Aníbal Avillan, pro se, Bronx, NY., for Plaintiff-Appellant.

*74Benjamin H. Torrance and Jeffrey Kenneth Powell, Assistant United States Attorneys, New York, NY, for Defendants Appellee.

Present: DENNIS JACOBS, JOSÉ A. CABRANES, DEBRA ANN LIVINGSTON, Circuit Judges.

*SUMMARY ORDER*

UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the judgment is AFFIRMED.

Appellant Aníbal Avillan, proceeding *pro se,*appeals from the district court’s order and judgment dismissing his employment discrimination action as time-barred. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural history of the case, and the issues on appeal.

We review *de novo*a district court decision dismissing a complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). *See Jaghory v. New York State Dep’t of Educ.,*131 F.3d 326, 329 (2d Cir.1997). To survive a motion to dismiss, the complaint must plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” *Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly,*550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007); *see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal,*556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009). Although all allegations contained in the complaint are assumed to be true, this tenet is “inapplicable to legal conclusions.” *Iqbal,*556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937. A claim -will have “facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” *Id.*While *pro se*complaints must contain sufficient factual allegations to meet the plausibility standard, *see Harris v. Mills,*572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir.2009), we look for such allegations by affording the litigant “special solicitude” and “interpreting the complaint to raise the strongest claims that it suggests,” *Hill v. Curcione,*657 F.3d 116, 122 (2d Cir.2011) (quotation marks and alterations omitted).

Upon such review, we conclude that Avillan’s appeal is without merit substantially for the reasons articulated by the district court in its well-reasoned order. *Avillan v. Donahue,*No. 12-cv-3370 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 15, 2013). We have considered all of Avillan’s additional arguments and find them to be without merit.

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court is hereby AFFIRMED.
UNITED STATES SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE


                         COMMISSION
                   WASHINGTON, D.C. 20549
                          FORM 10-Q/A
                        AMENDMENT NO. 1



QUARTERLY REPORT PURSUANT TO SECTION 13 OR 15(D) OF THE
SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934
For the quarterly period ended June 30, 2000



               Commission File Number 1-12473
                    ENRON CAPITAL TRUST I
   (Exact name of registrant as specified in its charter)


           Delaware                          76-0518948
(State or other jurisdiction of     (I.R.S. Employer Identification
incorporation or organization)                Number)


        Enron Building
      1400 Smith Street
        Houston, Texas                         77002
(Address of principal executive              (Zip Code)
           offices)


                       (713) 853-6161
    (Registrant's telephone number, including area code)



     Indicate by check mark whether the registrant (1) has
filed all reports required to be filed by Section 13 or
15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 during the
preceding 12 months (or for such shorter period that the
registrant was required to file such reports), and (2) has
been subject to such filing requirements for the past 90
days.
Yes [X]    No [ ]


     As of June 30, 2000, the Registrant had an aggregate of
8,000,000 8.30% Trust Preferred Securities and 247,440 8.30%
Trust Common Securities outstanding.

<PAGE>
                         SIGNATURES


   Pursuant to the requirements of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934, the Registrant has duly caused this report to
be signed on its behalf by the undersigned thereunto duly
authorized.


                               ENRON CAPITAL TRUST I
                               (Registrant)


Date:  August 4, 2000     By:  BEN GLISAN, JR.
                               Name:  Ben Glisan, Jr.
                               Title: Regular Trustee