2006 D e c i sion s O p inion s of the U nit e d S t a t e s C our t of Appe al s for the Thir d C ir c uit
7-26-2006 

# E vol a v . C a rb one P r e c e de n t i al or N on-P r e c e de n t i al : N on-P r e c e de n t i al D ock e t N o . 05-2508

F o l lo w thi s a nd a dd it ion al w ork s a t : h tt p://d i g it alc ommon s .l a w . v i l l a no v a . e du/thir dc ir c uit_2006

Thi s de c i sion i s br ou gh t t o y ou for f r e e a nd ope n a c c e s s b y the O p inion s of the U nit e d S t a t e s C our t of Appe al s for the Thir d C ir c uit a t V i l l a no v a U niv e r sit y S choo l of L a

w Di g it al R e posit or y

. I t h as be e n a c c e pt e d for inclusion in 2006 D e c i sion s b y a n a uthor i z e d a dmini s tr a t or of V i l l a no v a U niv e r sit y S choo l of L a

w Di g it al R e posit or y

. F or mor e infor m a t ion, p le as e c on t a ct Be n j a min . C a rl s on@l a

w . v i l l a no v a . e du
. R e c omme nde d C it a t ion

" E v o l a v . C a r bone " (2006). 2006 D e cisio n s . P a pe r 693. h tt p://d i g it alc ommon s .l a

w . v i l l a no v a . e du/thir dc ir c uit_2006/693T he H onor abl e Eugene E. Si l er , J r . , Seni or C i r cui t J udge, U ni t ed St at es C our t of * A ppeal s for t he Si xt h C i r cui t , s i t t i ng by des i gnat i on. NOT P RE CE DE NT I AL UN I TED STATES CO UR T OF A PP EALS F O R T H E T H IR D C IR C U IT

N o. 05- 2508

V I T O E V O L A , A ppel l ant / Pet i t i oner

v. ATTO RN EY G ENER AL O F THE UN I TED STATES

O n A p p e a l f

ro m th e U n ited S tate s D istric t C o u rt for t he D i s t r i ct of N ew J er s ey D
. N J
. N o. 05- cv- 01481

T r e a t e d a s a P e t i t i o n f

o r Re v i e w fro m the B o ard o f Im m igrati o n A p p ea ls ( A 3 1 0 6 1 0 8 7 )

Pur s uant t o t he R eal I D A ct and on A pp eal from t he D enial of the W ri t of E rr or C oram N ob i s

D
. N J N o. 05- cv- 01487 D i s t r i ct J udge: T he H onor abl e J oel A
. Pi s ano
Subm i t t ed pur s uant t o T hi r d C i r cui t L
. A
. R
. 34. 1( a)

J une 28, 2006 B efore: B A R R Y , V A N A N T W E R P E N , and S ILE R , C i rcui t Judg es. * ( Fi l ed J ul y 26, 2006)
OP I NI ON

### - 1-

S IL E R , C ir c u it J u d g e . Petitioner Vito Evola prese nts two issues to this court. First, he appea ls the district court’s de ni al of his pe tit ion

fo r a wr it o f e rr or

c or am no bis , a

rguin g that th e ine ff

e c tiv e a ssi sta

nc e of his pr ior c ouns e l c on sti tut e d a

fu nd ame nta l e rr or

wa rr anti ngc or am no bis re lie f. Se c on d, he pr e se nts a pe tit ion fo r re vie w ch a lle ng ing the B oa rd of I mmi g ratio n App e a ls’ (“ B I A” ) d e te rm inatio n th a t hi s conviction under

21 U.S.C. § 843(b) rende red him inelig ible for canc ellation of remova l. We affirm the dec ision of the district court and de ny the petition for re view. BACK GR OUND Evola is a 39-year - o ld Italian national and c itiz en who wa s g rante d lawful pe rmane nt resident status in t h e Un i t ed S t at es in 1980. In 1997, as par t of a plea

ag ree ment droppingother c harg es ag ainst him, Evola pled g uilty to a violation of 21 U.S.C. § 843(b), cha

rg ing use of a c ommunication device to fac ilitate a conspiracy to distribute and to possess with intent to di stribute a contr olled
su bs tanc e . In 1 99 8, he wa s se nte nc e d to fi ve y e ars pr ob a tio n a nd did no t a pp e a l. In 2001, the I

NS initi ated r emoval proc eeding s ag ainst Evola base d on his 1998 c onviction. The I NS char g ed that Evola w as re movable bec ause he was c onvicted of a n “ag g ravated fe lony ,” and b ec au s e h e v i o l at eda f

ed er al l aw re l at i n g t o a co n tro l l ed s u b s t an ce . In2 0 0 4 , an I m m i gra t i o nJ u d ge (“I J ”) or dere d Evola’s re moval to I taly . The B I A af firmed the r emov al o rd er and Evola’ s ineligibility

for c ance llation of removal or other relief, finding that a viol ation of 21 U.S.C. § 843(b) constituted an “a g g ravated fe lony .” Evola f iled a petition for writ of habeas corpus, contestingthat decision in the district court, whic h held t h at a violation of § 843(b) did in fac t constitute an ag g ravated fe lony . Evola appe aled that decision to this court. How ever , in the interveningperiod, Con g re ss e na c te d th e REA L I D Ac t, wh ic h me ans “ that th os e ha be a s p e tit ion s p e nd ingbe fo re thi s

### - 2-

Court on the eff

ective date of the REAL I D Act are proper ly conver ted into pe titions for r eview a nd reta ined by

this Court.” Bonhometre v . Gonzales , 414 F.3d 442, 446 ( 3d Cir. 2005). In 2002, Evola filed a

habea s corpus pe tition pursuant to 28 U.S.C . § 2255 seekingto vacate, set aside, or

corr ect his convic tion as a re sult of ine ffe ctive assistance of counsel. He alleg ed that his attorney , J oseph Santaguida, advised him that he could enter a g uilty plea without suffe ringany conseque nces w ith respec t to his i mmigration status. I n 2003, the district co u rt denied Evola ’s petition because it was barr ed by the relevant one-y ear statute of l imitations
. In 2005, Evola filed
a pe tit ion fo r a wr it o f e rr or

c or am no bis in t

he dis tr ic t c ourt se e kin g to v a c a te his c on vic tio n w ith the same ine ff

e c tiv e a ssi sta

nc e argume nt. Th e dis tr ic t c ourt de nie d th e pe tit ion , ru li ngthat E vo la had fa iled to show fundamenta l err or si nce he could not demonstrate the prejudice nece ssary for a n ine ff e c tiv e a ssi sta

nc e c la im. DI SCU SSIO N A. Wr itof Er r orCo r am No bis “The writ of er

ror c oram no bis is a

va ila ble to f e de ra l c ourt s in c ri min a l matte rs un de r t he Al l Writs Act, 28 U.S.C . § 1651(a) .” United St a t es v. Stoneman , 870 F.2d 102, 105 ( 3d Cir. 1989) (c i t i n g United States v. Morgan , 3 46 U. S. 5 02 (1 95 4) ). Th e wr it “ wa s tr a dit ion a lly ava ila ble on ly to bring befor e the c ourt fac tual err ors ‘material t o the validi ty and reg ularity of t he leg al proc eeding itself,’ such as the de fenda nt’s beingunder a g e or ha

ving die d befor e the ve rdict.” Carlis le v. United States , 5 1 7 U. S
. 4 1 6 , 4 2 9 (1 9 9 6 ) ( qu o t i n g U n ite d S ta te s v. May er , 235 U.S. 55, 67-68 (1914))
. To da y , “ [i]t is us ed to attac k a lle g e dly inv a lid c on vic tio ns wh ic h h ave c on tin uin g c on se qu e nc e s, wh e n th e pe tit ion e r ha s ser ve d his se nte nc e and is no lon g e r ‘i n cu sto dy ’ fo r p ur po se s o f 2 8 U .S. C. § 2255.” Stoneman , 870 F.2d at 105-06. “We have conclude d that to qualify for r elief unde r coram
no bis af t era sente nce ha s been se rved, the petitioner must show exceptional circumstanc es and

### - 3-

continu i n g co l l at eral disadvantag es.” Obado v. New Je rsey , 328 F.3d 716, 718 ( 3d Cir. 2003) (citation omitted). The writ of error coram nobis has been repe atedly ref err ed to as a

n “extraordinar

y
reme dy ,” “ a r em ed y

i n fr equ en t l y

u s ed , ” a n d

“are m ed y

re s erv edfo r e x ce p t i o n al ci rc u mstances.” See, e.g., Morgan , 3 46 U. S. at 51 1; Un ite d S tates v . B ap tis te , 223 F.3d 188, 189 ( 3d Cir. 2000). In expli catingthe contours of cora m nobis, we have stated: Coram no bis is a

n e xtra or din ary re me dy , and a c ourt ’s jur isd ic tio n to g ra nt r e lie f i s of limit ed scope. [ Un ite d S tates v . Ca rio la , 323 F.2d 180, 184 (3d Cir. 1963)]. “The interest in finality

of judg ments dictates that the standa rd for a succe ssful collatera l attack on a

conviction be more stringe nt than the s t an d ard applicable on a direc t appea l.” [ United States v. ] Gr os s , 614 F.2d [365,] 368 [(3d Cir. 1980)]. I t is even m o re s tri n gen tth an th ato na p et i t i o n er s ee k i n g habeas corpus relief under § 2255. See [ Uni t ed

States v. ] Osser , 8 64 F .2 d [10 56 ,] 10 60 -6 1 [( 3d Cir . 1 98 8) ]; United States v. Keogh , 3 9 1 F
. 2 d 1 3 8 , 1 4 8 ( 2 d Ci r . 1 968) (unlike habeas , wher e par t of s entenc e re mained unser

ved, no opportunity

or ince ntive in c oram no bis s e tti ng to retry defe ndant using newly

discovere d evidenc e whe re se ntence alre ady serve d). Stoneman , 870 F.2d at 106. Thus , to summa

ri ze, c ourt s have se t out thr e e re qu ir e me nts fo r a wr it of e rr or c or am no bis : (1) the petitioner must no longer be “in c ustody ,” see O bado , 328 F .3 d at 718 ; ( 2) the pe tit ion e r m us t be attac king a

conviction wit h “continuingpenalties” or “c ollatera l conseque nces” to the petitioner, Osser , 864 F.2d at 1059; a nd (3) the e rror

the petitioner see ks to corre ct is a “f undamental e rror ” for which “the re w as no re medy available at the time of trial and wher e ‘sound rea sons’ exis t f or fa iling to seek re lief ea

rlier,” see Stone man , 870 F.2d at 106 (citation omitted). Evola make s two arguments of fundame ntal err or: (1) the misadvice of pr ior counsel a bout the immigration consequenc es of his guilty plea c onstitut ed inef

fec tive assi stance of counse l that fu nd ame nta lly

fl awe d h is g uil ty ple a ; and (2 ) it wa s f un dame nta l e rr or

fo r t he dis tr ic t no t to a dv ise him of the immigration consequenc es of his guilty plea during the Rule 11 plea c olloquy . His second assig nment of error can easily be dis missed. We have previously held that “Rule 11 doe s not require a sente ncingcourt to explain ‘ collater al’ conseque nces of a guilty plea to a de fenda

nt” and ther efor e

### - 4-

there is “no err or in the sentenc ing c ourt’s fa ilure to inform [a defe ndant] in t he Rule 11 colloquy
o f h is p o s s ib le d e p o rtati o n.” Un i t ed S t ates v. Rome ro-Vilca , 850 F.2d 177, 179 ( 3d Cir. 1988) (citations omitted). Turn ing to Ev ola ’s fi rs t a ssi g nme nt o f e rr or , w e have pr e vio us ly he ld t hat “ pe rs on s n ot h e ld in custody can attack a c onviction for funda mental def

ects, such a s ineffe ct iv e a s s ista nce of counsel,” throug h cora

m nobis. United States v. Rad-O-Lite of Phila., Inc. , 612 F.2d 740, 744 ( 3d Cir. 1979). Neve rtheless, it is an open question whether counsel’s error reg arding the collater al conse quence s of a pr ocee ding is funda

mental to that conviction. See United States v. Nino , 878 F.2d 101, 105 ( 3d Cir. 1989) (decl i n i n g to decide “ whether counsel’s f

ailure to a dvise a c lient about the depor tation conseque nces of

a guilty plea c an constitute deficient represe ntation absent spec ial circ umstances” ). As sumin g , w ith out de c idi ng , that a sh ow ing of ine ff e c tiv e a ssi sta

nc e in thi s c on te xt wo uld

c on sti tut e fundame ntal err or, Evola pr esents insuffic ient evidenc e to satisfy the standar d for inef

fect i ve assistance laid out in Strickland v. W ashington , 466 U.S. 668 (1984). In order for a defe ndant to g ain re lief base d on a constit utional claim that his counsel wa s in effect ive , th e de fe nd ant m us t satis fy

the tw o- pr on g e d te st a

nn ounc e d in Strickland [ ]. The defenda nt must show (1) that counsel’s r epre sentation fell below an ob je c tiv e sta

nd ard of re a so na ble ne ss a nd (2 ) t hat th e re is a

re a so na ble pr ob a bil ity that, b ut f or c ouns e l’ s e rr or , th e re su lt o f t he pr oc e e din g wo uld have be e n d if fe re nt. Both Strickland prong s must be met in order to merit relief . . . . Wit h reg ard to the second pr ong , a re asonable probability is one that is sufficient to under mine confide nce in the outc ome. Carpenter v. Vaughn , 296 F.3d 138, 149 ( 3d Cir. 2002) (interna l quotations and citations omitt ed). To satisfy the pre judice re quirement in the g uilty plea context, “the defe ndant must show that there is a re a so na

ble pr ob a bil ity that, but fo r co un se l’ s er ro rs , h e wo uld

no t ha ve ple a de d guil ty

and wo uld h av e in s is te d o n g o in g to tr ia l. ” Hi llv. L ockh art , 4 74 U. S. 5 2, 59 (1 98 5) . E vo la argue s th a t th is means, to satisfy

the pre judice prongof Strickland , he must only show that “but for

the misadvice [of counsel] he would not have pled guilty and [would have instead] g one to trial.” Howeve r, in a

### - 5-

simil ar c ase, w e have interpre ted the prejudice require ment to me an that a def endant must “show that the re is a re a so na ble pr ob a bil ity tha t but f or his c ouns e l’ s e rr or s the re su lt of thepr oc e e ding wo uld have be en different .” Nino , 878 F.2d at 105 (emphasis adde d). In that case , g iven t hat the re cord was “ reple te with evidenc e of pe titioner’s g uil t, ” the c ourt “c onclude[d] t hat eve n had petitioner be en advised of the deportation consequenc es of his guilty plea, he would have pled g uilty any way or, had he not done so, be en found guilty afte r trial.” Id. In this case, e ven we re w e to assume that Evola would have refuse d to plead guilty had he been a dvised of t he deportation conseque nces of his guilty plea, ther e is overwhelming e vidence of his g uil t in

the reco rd. First , n ow he re in t he re c or d o f t

he se pr oc e e din g s d oe s E vo la c la im h is innocenc e. To the c ontrary , duringhis plea hearing , he ex pressly admitted his g uilt. Furthermor e, ath i s s en t en ci n g h ea ri n g, E v o l a’ s co un s el co n ce d edth e f o l l o wi n g: The only thing [ Evola] did was . . . Mr. Gallina was try ing to g et his drug s into the Camden ar ea. T hey k n ew that Mr. B asker ville has some conne ctions with the Camden ar ea and the Mr. Ba skerville had a dr ug background. The only

way that Mr. Ba skerville wor

ked with Mr. Evola was strictly in the pizz a plac e, had nothingto do with any drugactivity

whatsoeve r. At one point Mr. Gallina wa s looking for Mr. B aske rville and the phone conver sations betwee n Mr. Gallina a nd Mr. Evola wer e can y ou g et in touc h with Mr. Ba skerville bec ause w e wan t to talk to him , not beca use Mr. Evola ha d any participation. The only

rea son why

he is g uilty

is b ec au s e he did know why they we re tr yingto g e t to g e the r a

nd it w ou ld b e lik e tw o pe op le wh o a re g oin g to c omm it a ba nk ro bb e ry and the thi rd pe rs on sa id, loo k, Ido n’ t w ant a

ny pa rt ic ipatio n in

thi s, but he re ’s a

ma sk y ou c an u se in c a se y ou

wa nt t o d o it
. I t w ou ld p ut h im i n th e c on sp ir a c y , b ut n ot i n th e e ff e c t th a t he wa s g oin g to s ha re in an y p r o c e e d s o r

p art i c i p a t e i nan y typ e o f a c t i v i ty i nth e r o b b e r

y. Her e, the only thing he does know what Mr. Gallina’s about, and he doe s know what they wan t Mr. B asker

ville to do. Bec ause Mr . Ba skerville wor ks for him in a leg itimate enterpr ise, he’s try ing to g et in touch with him because they ’re looking f or Mr. B asker

ville and they

wanted to know how the five g rams would be transfe rre d, whether or not those people liked it or didn’t like it. They ’re saying ha ve you seen Ba skerville, ca

n y ou g et him in here?21 U
. S
. C
. § 8 43 (b) st at es: 1 I t s hal l be unl aw ful fo r a n y per s on know i ngl y or i nt ent i onal l y t o us e any comm uni cat i on fac i l i t y i n comm i t t i ng or i n causi ng or fac i l i t at i ng t he c o m m iss io n o f

a n y a c t o r a c ts co n stitu tin g a f e lo n y u n d e r an y p ro v isio n o f th is s ubchapt er or su b ch ap ter I I of t hi s chapt er . E ach s epar at e us e of a comm uni cat i on fac i l i t y s hal l be a s epar at e offens e under t hi s s ubs ect i on. For pur pos es of t hi s s ubs ect i on, t he t er m "c om m uni cat i on fac i l i t y " means any and al l publ i c and pr i vat e i ns t r um ent al i t i es us ed or us eful i n t he t r ans m i s s i on of w ri ti n g , s ig n s, sig n a ls, p ictu re s, o r so u n d s o f a ll k in d s a n d in c lu d e s m a il, t el ephone, w i r e, r adi o, and al l ot her m eans of comm uni cat i on
.



### - 6- As Evola pled g uilty to a violation of 21 U.S.C. § 843(b), this factual sc enar io detailed by counsel 1 sh ow s that Ev ola us e d a c omm un ic a tio n d e vic e to f

a c ili tate a c on sp ir a c y

to d istri bute and

to p os se ss with intent to dis tribute a c ontrolled substance
. In addition, the g overnme nt possessed an impre ssive amount of evidence pointi ng to Evola’s g uilt. First, all eleven of

Evola’s c o-def

endants ha d alre ady

pled g uilty

and we re a

vailable to testify
a g a ins t hi m. Sec on d, the g ov e rnme nt “ po sse sse d c on se ns ua l r e c or din g s o f E vo la ’s pa rt ic ipatio n in the drugconspirac y .” B ased upon the streng th of this evidence and Evola’ s lack of a n innocenc e
c la im, Ev ola

is una ble to sho w the pr e

jud ic e ne c e ssa

ry to m ake out an in e ff

e c tiv e a ssi sta

nc e c la im. See Nino , 878 F.2d at 105. B. Pe tition f

or Re view In his petition for review , Evola ar g ues that there is no traffic ki n g el em en t in 21 U.S.C . § 843(b) a nd, t h er efore, his conviction under that statute does not constitute an a g g ravated fe lony
un d e r 8 U
. S
. C
. § 1 1 0 1 ( a ) ( 4 3 ) ( B )
. A l th o u g h E v o l a c o n c e d e s th a t h e i s r e m o v a b l e sin c e his conviction under

§ 843(b) is a felony punishable under the Controlled Substances Ac t, he contends t h at the BIA err ed when it f ound him inelig ible for canc ellation of remova l unde r 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)( 1) due to its finding that his c onviction c onstitut ed an ag g ravated fe lony . “Reviewof theB I A’ s le g a l c on c lus ion s is de novo , with a ppropriate defe renc e to the ag ency ’s interpre tation of the underlying statute in a ccor dance with a dminist rative law princ iples.” Mahmood v . Gonzales , 427 F.3d 248, 250 ( 3d Cir. 2005) (citations omitted). Despite Evola’ s arguments to the contrar y , a conv i ct i o n u nder § 843( b) constitutes an ag g ravated felony within the m eaning of 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a) (3). Def initions for Chapte r 12 of the I mmigration and Nationality Act (“ I NA”) , which includes the canc ellation of r e mo val statute at issue i nth i s c a s e , ar e l a i d o u t i n 8 U
. S
. C
. § 1 1 0 1
. S e c t i o n1 1 0 1 ( a ) ( 4 3 ) ( B ) d e f i n e s an“ a g g r av a t e d

f e l o n y” to incl u d e “i l l i cit traff

icking in a controlled substanc e (a s defined in se ction 802 of Title 18), i n c l u d i n g a dr

u g tr a f f i c k i n g c r i m e ( a s d e f

i n e d i n s e c t i o n 9 2 4 ( c ) o f T i t l e 1 8 )
. ” Sect i on 924( c) ( 2) defi nes a “dr ug t r aff

i cki ng cr i m e” t o i ncl ude “a ny fel ony puni s hab le u n d er t he C ont r ol l ed S u b s ta n c e s A c t ( 2 1 U .S .C
. § § 8 0 1 , e t s e q .).” E v o la w a s c o n v ic te d o f v io la tin g 2 1 U .S .C . § 843( b) – a par t of t he C ont r ol l ed S ubs t ance s A ct
. A ccor di ngl y , a convi ct i on for a vi ol at i on
o f 2 1 U .S .C . § 8 4 3 (b ) q u a lif ie s a s a n a g g ra v a te d f

e lo n y w ith in th e m e a n in g o f 8 U
. S
. C . § 1 2 2 9 b (a ) a n d E v o la is th e re f o re in e lig ib le f

o r c a n c e lla tio n o f

re m o v a l. S e e K h a n v . A sh c ro ft , 352 F. 3 d 5 2 1 , 5 2 2 ( 2 d Ci r . 2 0 0 3 ) ( n o t i n g t h a t a v i o l a t i o n o f 2 1 U. S. C. § 8 4 3 ( b ) i s “an

a g g ra v a ted f

e lo n y w ith in th e m e a n in g o f th e IN A ” ); se e a lso K a

y ro u z v . A sh c ro

ft , 115 Fed. A ppx. 783, 785 ( 6t h C i r . 2004) ( unpubl i s hed opi n ion ) (“ a vi ol at i on of 21 U
. S. C
. § 843( b) q u ali fies a s an ag g rav ated fe lon y u n d er the IN A ”). T h e d e c isio n o f

th e d istric t co u rt is A F F IR M E D a n d th e p e tit io n f o r re v iew is DE NI E D.