UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 18-6725

AZIZ MATEEN-EL,

 Plaintiff - Appellant,

v.

W. ROBERT BELL, Superior Court Judge; P. LYTLE, Magistrate; R. ANDREW 

MURRAY, District Attorney; KAREN D. MCCALLUM, Assistant District 

Attorney; KEVIN P. TULLY, Public Defender; JESSICA B. DELUCIA, Assistant 

Public Defender; PETER NICHOLSON, Assistant Public Defender; IRWIN 

CARMICHAEL, Mecklenburg County Sheriff; MORTON, Mecklenburg County 

Sheriff Office; ALBERTSON, Charlotte Mecklenburg Police; TASHAUN S. 

LANE, McDonald’s at 3058 Eastway Dr, Charlotte, NC,

 Defendants - Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of North Carolina, 

at Charlotte. Frank D. Whitney, Chief District Judge. (3:18-cv-00224-FDW)

Submitted: December 7, 2018 Decided: January 8, 2019

Before GREGORY, Chief Judge, KEENAN, Circuit Judge, and SHEDD, Senior Circuit 

Judge.

Affirmed as modified by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Aziz Mateen-El, Appellant Pro Se.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
2

PER CURIAM:

Aziz Mateen-El filed a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012) complaint against state court 

judges, district attorneys, public defenders, law enforcement officers, and a private 

citizen, seeking damages and injunctive relief. The district court abstained from 

exercising jurisdiction over Mateen-El’s complaint pursuant to Younger v. Harris, 

401 U.S. 37 (1971), and dismissed the action.

1

 With regard to Mateen-El’s claims for 

injunctive relief, we have reviewed the record and conclude that the district court 

committed no reversible error in abstaining from reviewing those claims. Thus, we grant 

leave to proceed in forma pauperis and affirm that portion of the order for the reasons 

stated by the district court. Mateen-El v. Bell, No. 3:18-cv-00224-FDW (W.D.N.C. 

May 18, 2018). However, we modify the dismissal of the claims for injunctive relief to 

be with prejudice. See Nivens v. Gilchrist, 444 F.3d 237, 247 (4th Cir. 2006).

Turning to Mateen-El’s damages claims, we conclude that Younger abstention 

does not govern those claims, as such relief is not available in state criminal proceedings. 

See id. at 248. Nevertheless, we may affirm the district court’s order “on any grounds 

apparent from the record.” United States v. Riley, 856 F.3d 326, 328 (4th Cir.) (internal 

quotation marks omitted), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 273 (2017). Under 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(e)(2)(B) (2012), a federal district court must dismiss an in forma pauperis case if 

 1 Although the district court dismissed the complaint in part without prejudice, we 

have jurisdiction over the appeal because it is clear that further amendment to the 

complaint would not cure the complaint’s defects. See Goode v. Cent. Va. Legal Aid 

Soc’y, Inc., 807 F.3d 619, 628 (4th Cir. 2015). 
3

the action is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted, 

or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.2

 

State judges, magistrates, and prosecutors are entitled to absolute immunity from 

§ 1983 damages claims, see Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 355-56 (1978); Imbler v. 

Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 424-29 (1976), and Mateen-El failed to allege that any of these 

defendants acted outside the scope of their judicial or prosecutorial duties, see Mireles v. 

Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 11-12 (1991); Safar v. Tingle, 859 F.3d 241, 248 (4th Cir. 2017). 

Next, Mateen-El’s claims against the public defenders and the private citizen were not 

cognizable under § 1983 because those defendants did not act under color of state law. 

See Polk Cty. v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 325 (1981). Finally, with regard to Mateen-El’s

damages claims against the law enforcement officers, we conclude—contrary to 

Mateen-El’s allegations—that the warrant “provide[d] the magistrate with a substantial 

basis for determining the existence of probable cause,” Illinois v. Gates, 472 U.S. 213, 

239 (1983); United States v. Miller, 925 F.2d 695, 698 (4th Cir. 1991), and that the 

warrant satisfied the Fourth Amendment’s particularity requirement. Accordingly, we 

affirm the district court’s dismissal of Mateen-El’s damages claims on these alternative 

“grounds apparent from the record.” Riley, 856 F.3d at 328 (internal quotation marks 

omitted); see 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). 

 2 To the extent Mateen-El argues on appeal that his complaint should have been 

adjudicated under 28 U.S.C. § 1733(b) (2012), his reliance on that provision is misplaced.
4

We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are 

adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the 

decisional process.

AFFIRMED AS MODIFIED