alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
I

103D CONGRESS

1ST SESSION H. R. 2818

To increase the fee for the enforcement of the Tea Importation Act.

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

JULY 30, 1993

Mr. SYNAR (for himself and Mr. DURBIN) introduced the following bill; which

was referred to the Committee on Ways and Means

A BILL

To increase the fee for the enforcement of the Tea

Importation Act.

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

3 SECTION 1. FEE INCREASE.

4 (a) AMENDMENTS TO ACT.—The Tea Importation

5 Act is amended by—

6 (1) striking out sections 11 and 12, and

7 (2) inserting the 4th undesignated paragraph

8 under the center heading ‘‘FOOD AND DRUG ADMIN9 ISTRATION’’ of title II of the Labor-Federal Security

10 Appropriation Act, 1942 (21 U.S.C. 46a) as a new

11 section 11 of such Act.
2

•HR 2818 IH

1 (b) AMENDMENT TO SECTION.—The section 11

2 added to the Tea Importation Act by subsection (a) is

3 amended to read as follows:

4 ‘‘SEC. 11. No tea or merchandise described as tea

5 shall be examined for importation into the United States

6 or released by the Collector of Customs under the Tea Im7 portation Act unless the importer or consignee of such tea

8 or merchandise has paid, before such examination, a fee

9 of 10 cents for each hundred weight or fraction thereof

10 of such tea or merchandise. Such fee shall be deposited

11 into the Treasury of the United States as miscellaneous

12 receipts.’’.

Æ
#### Kimberley H. THOMAS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. FEDERAL NATIONAL MORTGAGE ASSOCIATION, a D.C. domestic nonprofit corporation; et al., Defendants—Appellees.

No. 09-17312.

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

*123Submitted Jan. 12, 2011.*

Filed Jan. 14, 2011.

Michael Lehners, Michael Lehners, Esq., Reno, NY, for Plaintiff-Appellant.

Dana Jonathon Nitz, Esquire, Olson, Cannon, Gormley & Desruisseaux, Donna M. Osborn, Esquire, Wright Finlay & Zak, LLP, Las Vegas, NV, Robin Prema Wright, Esquire, Wright, Finlay *&*Zak, LLP, Newport Beach, CA, for Defendants-Appellees.

Before: KOZINSKI, Chief Judge, NOONAN and SILVERMAN, Circuit Judges.

*

 The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R.App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM **

Kimberley Thomas appeals the district court’s dismissal of her complaint, which alleged wrongful foreclosure, improper notice of default, and violation of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act.

Thomas waived any arguments about the dismissal of her wrongful foreclosure and FDCPA claims by failing to raise them in her opening brief. *See Nisqually Indian Tribe v. Gregoire,*623 F.3d 923, 928 n. 6 (9th Cir.2010). We affirm the dismissal of these claims.

We affirm the dismissal of Thomas’s first improper notice of default claim, which alleged that the notice deprived Thomas of an opportunity to cure her default. The notice informed Thomas that she could bring her account into good standing by paying the past-due amounts no later than five days before the foreclosure sale. At the time of Thomas’s foreclosure, Nevada law required no more than this. *See*Nev.Rev.Stat. § 107.080(3) (2008). Thomas’s deed of trust contained an acceleration clause, and the notice of default was therefore allowed to contained a notice of acceleration. *See id.*Because the text of the notice of default contradicts Thomas’s claim that the notice failed to inform her of her right to cure, the district court correctly dismissed this claim, and we affirm.

We affirm the dismissal of Thomas’s second improper notice of default claim. Thomas never alleged that the trustee wasn’t acting within his authority on the day of the foreclosure sale, *cf. Gomez v. Countrywide Bank, FSB.,*No. 2:09-cv-01489, 2009 WL 3617650, at *7 (D.Nev. Oct.26, 2009), or that she was denied a reasonable opportunity to cure her default because the notice listed the wrong beneficiary and trustee, *see Title Ins. & Trust Co. v. Chi. Title Ins. Co.,*97 Nev. 523, 634 P.2d 1216, 1218 (1981). Absent such allegations, we must conclude that the sale substantially complied with Nevada law. *See*Nev.Rev.Stat. § 107.080(5)(a); *Hankins v. Adm’r of Veterans Affairs,*92 Nev. 578, 555 P.2d 483, 484 (1976).

AFFIRMED.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
Overview

The U.S. Department of Agriculture’s Farm Service 

Agency (FSA) makes operating loans of up to $5,000 

to eligible individual youths ages 10 to 20 to finance 

income-producing, agriculture-related projects. The 

project must be of modest size, educational, and 

initiated, developed, and carried out by youths 

participating in 4-H clubs, FFA, tribal youth 

organizations, or similar agricultural-affiliated groups. 

The project must be an organized and supervised 

program of work. It must be planned and operated with 

the assistance of the organization advisor, produce 

sufficient income to repay the loan, and provide the 

youth with practical business and educational 

experience in agriculture-related skills.

Who May Borrow 

To qualify for a loan, the applicant must: 

• Comply with FSA’s general eligibility requirements;

 and 

• Conduct a modest income-producing project in a

 supervised program of work.

FACT SHEET Youth Loans August 2019

Farm Service Agency

USDA is an equal opportunity provider, employer, and lender.

How Loan Funds May Be Used

These loans can finance many kinds of 

income-producing agricultural projects. The loan funds 

may be used to: 

• Buy livestock, seed, equipment, and supplies; 

• Buy, rent, or repair needed tools and equipment; and 

• Pay operating expenses for the project. 

How It Works

To apply, the applicant must submit completed plans 

and budgets signed by the project advisor and parent 

or guardian along with the FSA application for loan 

assistance. 

These loans: 

• Have a maximum loan amount of $5,000 (total

 principal balance owed at any one time cannot

 exceed this amount); 

• Have an interest rate that is determined based on the

 cost of money to the federal government (after the

 loan is made, the interest rate for that loan will not

 change); 

• Will be secured, in addition to promissory notes, by

 liens on the products produced for sale and on chattel

 property, including livestock, equipment, and fixtures

 purchased with loan funds; and 

• Have a repayment schedule that varies depending on

 the type of project for which the loan is made. For

 example, if it involves raising livestock or crops, the

 loan is paid when the animals or produce are

 normally sold. 

More Information

For more information, visit fsa.usda.gov/farmloans

or farmers.gov. Find your local USDA Service 

Center at farmers.gov/service-locator.
#### Steven L. WHITTENBURG, Petitioner, v. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY, Respondent.

No. 2007-3136.

United States Court of Appeals, Federal Circuit.

April 4, 2007.

Steven L. Whittenburg, pro se.

ORDER

Order Vacated, See 2007 WL 1492298.

The petitioner having failed to file the required Statement Concerning Discrimination, it is

ORDERED that the petition for review be, and the same hereby is, DISMISSED, for failure to prosecute in accordance with the rules.
EXHIBIT 32.1





CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 USC, SECTION 1350,


AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906


OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002








In connection with the Annual Report of United Mines, Inc. (the “Company”) on Form 10-K for the year ended December 31, 2010, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on or about the date hereof (the “Report”), I, Glenn E. Martin, President of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1350, as adopted pursuant to Sec. 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:





(1)           The Report fully complies with the requirements of Sections 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and





(2)           Information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.








Dated:   April 7, 2011
/s/ Glenn E. MartinBy:  Glenn E. MartinIts:  President








A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906 has been provided to United Mines, Inc. and will be retained by United Mines, Inc. and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.
#### Brenda D. LEWIS, M.A.S., J.D.; William L. Flowers, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. MICROSOFT CORPORATION, a Delaware Corporation, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 06-1354.

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted: March 9, 2007.

Decided: March 29, 2007.

Brenda D. Lewis, William L. Flowers, Appellants Pro Se. Richard L. Farley, Christopher Allen Hicks, Katten, Muchin *&*Rosenman, LLP, Charlotte, North Carolina; Timothy L. Boiler, William O. Ferron, Jr., Seed Intellectual Property Law Group, PLLC, Seattle, Washington, for Appellee.

Before MICHAEL, MOTZ, and SHEDD, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished PER CURIAM opinion.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

PER CURIAM:

Brenda D. Lewis, M.A.S., J.D., and William L. Flowers, Jr., appeal the district court’s order granting Microsoft Corporation’s motions for summary judgment and to dismiss, and denying relief in their civil action in which they alleged various claims concerning trademark infringement. We have reviewed the record and find no reversible error. Accordingly, we affirm for the reasons stated by the district court. *Lewis v. Microsoft Corp.,*410 F.Supp.2d 432 (E.D.N.C.2006). We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

*AFFIRMED.*
#### The State of Ohio, Appellant, *v.*Cole, Appellee.

[Cite as *State v. Cole,*124 Ohio St.3d 98, 2009-Ohio-6411.]

(Nos. 2009-0030 and 2009-0315

Submitted November 18, 2009

Decided December 10, 2009.)

{¶ 1} The certified question in case No. 2009-0315 is answered by our opinion in *State v. Cargile,*123 Ohio St.3d 343, 2009-Ohio-4939, 916 N.E.2d 775.

{¶ 2} There is no indication in the court of appeals’ opinion below whether the defendant was warned that bringing contraband into the detention facility would result in additional charges or whether the defendant affirmatively denied possessing any such material. However, whether a warning by an officer and a denial of possession of contraband by the defendant are required prior to a conviction for illegal conveyance was not a consideration before this court in *State v. Cargile.*Accordingly, in order to give the parties the opportunity to consider *99these factors, case No. 2009-0030 is remanded to the court of appeals for consideration of *State v. Cargile*and consideration of whether the absence of both an officer’s warning and the defendant’s denial of possession of contraband, if applicable, would alter the result below.

William D. Mason, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting Attorney, and Thorin Freeman, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellant.

Timothy Young, Ohio Public Defender, and Andrew J. King, Assistant Public Defender, for appellee.

Moyer, C.J., and Pfeifer, Lundberg Stratton, O’Connor, Lanzinger, and Cupp, JJ., concur.

O’Donnell, J., dissents and would affirm the judgment of the court of appeals.
#### USA, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Horace Edward LOCKHART, a.k.a. Clint, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 10-12947

Non-Argument Calendar.

United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit.

Jan. 20, 2011.

Kathleen M. Salyer, Anne R. Schultz, Wifredo A. Ferrer, U.S. Attorney, Jeanne Mullenhoff, Esq., Assistant U.S. Attorney, U.S. Attorney’s Office, Miami, FL, Roger Powell, U.S. Attorney’s Office, Fort Lauderdale, FL, for Plaintiff-Appellee.

Horace Edward Lockhart, Talladega, AL, pro se.

Before HULL, WILSON and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

Horace Edward Lockhart appeals the district court’s denial of his motion for relief from judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b). Lockhart contends the district court erred in determining that it lacked jurisdiction, and he recounts the three issues raised in his motion: that the indictment was defective, that the indictment was impermissibly amended, and that the jury was improperly instructed on the issue of lesser included offenses.

We review jurisdictional questions *de novo. Williams v. Chatman,*510 F.3d 1290, 1293 (11th Cir.2007) (per curiam). Where, in a purported Rule 60(b) motion, a defendant challenges the validity of his conviction by seeking to add a new ground for relief or attacking the previous resolution of a claim on the merits, the motion is properly construed as a successive habeas petition. *Id.*at 1293-94 (quoting *Gonzalez v. Crosby,*545 U.S. 524, 532, 125 S.Ct. 2641, 2648, 162 L.Ed.2d 480 (2005)). Absent an order from this Court authorizing consideration of a successive habeas petition, the district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction as to that petition. *Id.*at 1295; *see also Farris v. United States,*333 F.3d *3081211, 1216 (11th Cir.2003) (per curiam) (the district court lacks jurisdiction to consider a second or successive § 2255 petition without our prior authorization, even if the petition is labeled a Rule 60(b) motion).

Because Lockhart’s Rule 60(b) motion asserts three bases for relief from the state court’s judgment of conviction, and because it does not allege any error in his earlier § 2255 proceedings, the motion is properly construed as a successive habeas petition. *See Williams,*510 F.3d at 1293-94. Lockhart did not obtain authorization from this Court that would give the district court jurisdiction to consider a successive habeas petition; therefore, the district court properly denied Lockhart’s Rule 60(b) motion for lack of jurisdiction.

AFFIRMED.
EX-35.2
(logo) EMC
Mortgage Corporation


ITEM 1123 ANNUAL STATEMENT OF COMPLIANCE

EMC MORTGAGE CORPORATION


The undersigned officers of EMC Mortgage Corporation ("EMC") as servicer
pursuant to the HOMEBANC Mortgage Trust 2007-1 (the "Agreement") hereby certify
that:

1. A review of EMC's activities during the period from and including
   November 1, 2007 through and including December 31, 2007 (the "Reporting
   Period") and EMC's performance under the Agreement has been made under my
   supervision.

2. To the best of my knowledge, based on such review, EMC has fulfilled all of
   its obligations under the Agreement in all material respects throughout the
   Reporting Period.


IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned has duly executed this Certificate this
12th day of March 2008


By: /s/ David B. Little
David B. Little
Executive Vice President
Default Administration


/s/ William Glasgow Jr.
William Glasgow Jr.
Executive Vice President
Enterprise Operations Services


/s/ Jenna Kemp
Jenna Kemp
Executive Vice President
Investor Administration


(logo) MBA
Member
Mortgage Bankers
Association of America

2780 Lake Vista Drive, Lewisville, Texas 75067
Mailing Address: P.O. Box 1292190, Lewisville, Texas 75029-2190
Appeal Dismissed and Memorandum Opinion filed August 4, 2016

.

In The 

## Fourteenth Court of Appeals

NO. 14

- 15

- 00431

- CR

TATRON JAFAR WILLIA MS , Appellant

V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS , Appellee

On Appeal from the 262nd District Court

Harris County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. 1431281

M E M O R A N D U M O P I N I O N A jury found appellant guilty of assault of a family member, second
offender . After the verdict, appellant and the State entered into an agreement as to sentencing. In accordance with the terms of the agreement, the trial court sentenced appellant to six years’ imprisonment in the Institutional Division of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice. We dismiss the appeal. The trial court entered certifications of the defendant’s right to appeal in which the court certified that appellant waived his right of appeal. See Tex. R.2

App. P. 25.2(a)(2). The trial court’s certification is i ncluded in the records on appeal. See Tex. R. App. P. 25.2(d). The records support the trial court’s
certifications. See Dears v. State , 154 S.W.3d 610, 615 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005). Appellant’s waiver reflects that he entered into an agreement with the Stat e after a jury found him guilty. Appellant waived his right of appeal knowing with certainty the punishment that would be assessed. See Blanco v. State , 18 S.W.3d 218, 219 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000) (holding waiver of right to appeal is valid if appellant
know s with certainty the punishment that will be assessed).
Appellant filed a motion for new trial in which he alleges his plea was not voluntarily made. The voluntariness of a plea cannot be raised on direct appeal from a plea

- bargained felony conviction. Co oper v. State , 45 S.W.3d 77 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001). A motion for new trial may not be used to circumvent Cooper

. Whitfield v. State , 111 S.W.3d 786 (Tex. App.

— Eastland 2003, pet. ref’d).
Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal.

PER CURIAM

Panel consists of Justices Boyce, Christopher, and Jamison

. Do Not Publish

— Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b)
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Jerome Lemario CUNNINGHAM, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 06-4235.

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted: March 14, 2007.

Decided: March 26, 2007.

J. Clark Fischer, Randolph *&*Fischer, Winston-Salem, North Carolina, for Appellant. Anna Mills Wagoner, United States Attorney, Clifton T. Barrett, Assistant United States Attorney, Greensboro, North Carolina, for Appellee.

Before WILKINSON, WILLIAMS, and KING, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished PER CURIAM opinion.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

PER CURIAM:

Jerome Lemario Cunningham pled guilty, pursuant to a plea agreement, to one count of attempting to take and obtain currency by threatening with a firearm an employee of a convenience store, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1951*&*2 (2000); one count of carjacking, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2119*&*2 (2000); and one count of carrying and use of a firearm during a crime of violence, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(l)(A)(iii) (2000), and was sentenced to concurrent terms of seventy months’ imprisonment, followed by a 120 month consecutive sentence. Cunningham now appeals his sentence.

On appeal, Cunningham asserts that the district court engaged in impermissible double counting by adding a two point enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2B3.1(b)(5) to Cunningham’s base offense level because the offense involved carjacking. Whether impermissible double counting occurred is a legal issue that is reviewed de novo. *United States v. Rohwedder,*243 F.3d 423, 426-27 (8th Cir.2001). Double counting is permissible under the sentencing guidelines except where it is expressly prohibited. *United States v. Reevey,*364 F.3d 151, 158 (4th Cir.2004)

In determining the offense level, the district court committed no double counting error by adding two levels pursuant to *U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual*§ 2B3.1 (b)(5) (2004). *See United States v. Naves,*252 F.3d 1166 (11th Cir.2001). Cunningham has not otherwise shown that his sentence is unreasonable.

We therefore affirm the judgment of the district court. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal conten*259tions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

*AFFIRMED.*
I

103D CONGRESS

1ST SESSION H. R. 2828

To amend the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 to terminate political

action committees in Federal office elections.

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

AUGUST 2, 1993

Mr. INGLIS of South Carolina introduced the following bill; which was referred

to the Committee on House Administration

A BILL

To amend the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 to

terminate political action committees in Federal office

elections.

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

3 TITLE I—TERMINATION OF POLITICAL ACTION

4 COMMITTEES (PAC’S) ACTIVITIES IN FED5 ERAL ELECTIONS

6 (a) AMENDMENT.—The Federal Election Campaign

7 Act of 1971, title III, is amended by placing at the end

8 the section below:
2

HR 2828 IH

1 ‘‘TERMINATION OF POLITICAL ACTION COMMITTEES

2 (PAC’S)

3 ‘‘SEC. 324. (a) No person other than a political com4 mittee or an individual may solicit, make, or receive con5 tributions, or make expenditures for the purpose of influ6 encing a Federal election.’’.

Æ
Exhibit 32.1

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO

18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,

AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO

SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES  OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the Quarterly Report of Novastar Financial, Inc. (the Company) on Form 10-Q for the period ending March 31, 2006, as filed with
the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the Report), I, Scott F. Hartman, Chairman of the Board and Chief Executive Officer of the Company certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to
Section 906 of the Sarbanes  Oxley Act of 2002, that:



| | (1) | The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and
| | --- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



| | (2) | The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.
| | --- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



|                  |  |  |  |                                                                                
|----------------- |  |  |  | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------
|                  |  | 
|Date: May 5, 2006 |  |  |  | /s/ Scott F. Hartman                                                           
|                  |  |  |  | Scott F. Hartman Chairman of the Board of Directors and Chief Executive Officer

This certification is made solely for purpose of 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, subject to the knowledge standard
contained therein, and not for any other purpose.