United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 97-3749

___________

Wendell R. Ayers, *

*

Appellee, *

*

v. * Appeal from the United States

* District Court for the

Willis Sargent, Warden, Jefferson * Eastern District of Arkansas.

County Correctional Facility, Arkansas *

Department of Correction; Tracy *

Spadoni, Sergeant, Jefferson County * [UNPUBLISHED]

Correctional Facility, Arkansas *

Department of Correction, *

*

Appellants. *

___________

 Submitted: May 7, 1998

 Filed: July 9, 1998

___________

Before FAGG, BEAM, and HANSEN, Circuit Judges.

___________

PER CURIAM.

Willis Sargent and Tracy Spadoni, defendants in this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action

brought by Arkansas inmate Wendell R. Ayers, appeal the district court&s interlocutory

order denying their motion for summary judgment. We reverse, in part, and remand for

further proceedings.
-2-

Ayers brought this action against Sargent, the warden of the Jefferson County Jail

and Correctional Facility, and correctional officer Spadoni. In Ayers&s complaint--which

we construe as asserting claims against defendants in their individual capacities--he

alleged he had been severely beaten by a group of inmates, and both defendants failed

to protect him. 

Proceeding by consent of the parties, the magistrate judge conducted an

evidentiary hearing, then appointed counsel and scheduled a jury trial. Thereafter,

defendants moved for summary judgment, arguing, as relevant, they were entitled to

qualified immunity, and Ayers opposed the motion. The magistrate, referring to his

findings following the evidentiary hearing, construed defendants& motion as a request for

summary judgment solely as to defendant Sargent. Noting Ayers had asserted that

Sargent had been aware of inadequate barracks staffing and threats involving Ayers, the

magistrate judge concluded a fact issue remained as to whether Sargent had been

deliberately indifferent to Ayers&s safety and denied the motion. 

Initially, we hold that the magistrate committed error in construing defendants&

motion for summary judgment based on qualified immunity as a request for judgment by

Sargent alone. See Parton v. Ashcroft, 16 F.3d 226, 227-28 (8th Cir. 1994) (remanding

for ruling on issue of qualified immunity where magistrate judge, who had conducted

pretrial proceedings, set case for trial, and determined that trial would be judicially

efficient way to dispose of claim, refused to rule on summary judgment motion).

Accordingly, we express no opinion on the merits of Ayers&s claim against Spadoni, and

remand for a ruling on Spadoni&s summary judgment motion.

As to Sargent, we have jurisdiction to consider de novo whether the district court

erred in denying summary judgment. See Williams v. Delo, 49 F.3d 442, 445 (8th Cir.

1995). “Qualified immunity shields government actors from liability in civil lawsuits

when #their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights

of which a reasonable person would have known.&” Prater v. Dahm, 89 F.3d 538, 540-
-3-

41 (8th Cir. 1996) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)). In the

context of protecting prisoners from violence at the hands of other prisoners, the question

of qualified immunity requires a determination as to whether a reasonable official could

have believed his actions violated the law, given the information available to him at the

time of the attack. See Prater, 89 F.3d at 541.

Ayers argued below that Spadoni&s first-hand knowledge of threats made against

Ayers could be imputed to Sargent, and also that Sargent had first-hand knowledge

through his experiences with another prison facility of the dangers posed by inadequate

staffing. Ayers stated there had been only two guards on duty to watch four barracks on

the day of his assault, and he attached a copy of a grievance form, which post-dated the

assault, wherein he complained about inadequate security in his barracks. Because

Ayers provided no evidence from which an inference could be made that Sargent

actually knew of the threats against Ayers prior to the assault, or that Sargent somehow

failed to train or supervise Spadoni, we conclude Ayers did not establish a basis for

imposing liability against Sargent. See Otey v. Marshall, 121 F.3d 1150, 1155 (8th Cir.

1997) (liability under § 1983 cannot attach to supervisor merely because subordinate

violated someone&s constitutional rights; rather, supervisor can be liable only if he

directly participated in constitutional violation, or if his failure to train or supervise

offending actor directly caused deprivation). In addition, Ayers presented no evidence

of a pervasive or unreasonable risk of harm based on inadequate staffing, see Williams

v. Willits, 853 F.2d 586, 588 (8th Cir. 1988), nor did he present evidence that the

conditions at the Jefferson County Jail and Correctional Facility were similar to the

conditions at the facility with which Sargent was familiar. The district court therefore

should have granted Sargent&s motion for summary judgment based on qualified

immunity. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the district court and remand for

further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
-4-

A true copy.

Attest:

CLERK, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT.