alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### Henry J. PRIEN, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Johanna SMITH, et al., Defendants-Appellees.

No. 10-35079.

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

*983Submitted Jan. 10, 2010.*

Filed Jan. 24, 2011.

Henry J. Prien, Boise, ID, pro se.

William Michael Loomis, Esquire, Office of the Idaho Attorney General, John J. Burke, Hall Farley Oberrecht & Blanton, Boise, ID, for Defendants-Appellees.

Before: BEEZER, TALLMAN, and CALLAHAN, Circuit Judges.

*

 The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R.App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM **

Henry J. Prien, a former Idaho state prisoner, appeals pro se from the district court’s summary judgment in his 42 U.S.C. *984§ 1983 action alleging deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs in violation of the Eighth Amendment. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo, *Toguchi v. Chung,*391 F.3d 1051, 1056 (9th Cir.2004), and we affirm.

The district court properly granted summary judgment because Prien failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to whether prison medical staff were deliberately indifferent by failing to provide him with a special diet to accommodate his onion allergy and in treating his hand injury. *See id.*at 1057; *see also id.*at 1059-60 (a difference in opinion about the preferred course of medical treatment does not constitute an Eighth Amendment violation). Accordingly, because prison medical staff were not deliberately indifferent, defendant Warden Smith cannot be held liable as a supervisor. *See Taylor v. List,*880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir.1989). Moreover, defendant Johnston cannot be held liable because she was not the proximate cause of the alleged violations. *See id.*(“Liability under section 1983 arises only upon a showing of personal participation by the defendant.”).

Prien’s remaining contentions are unpersuasive.

AFFIRMED.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Ifanise PETIT-FRERE, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 13-15789

Non-Argument Calendar.

United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit.

June 5, 2014.

Emily M. Smachetti, Wifredo A. Ferrer, Maurice A. Johnson, Kathleen Mary Sal-*719yer, U.S. Attorney’s Office, Miami, FL, for Plaintiff-Appellee.

Abigail Emily Becker, Michael Caruso, Federal Public Defender, Federal Public Defender’s Office, Miami, FL, for Defendant-Appellant.

Before WILSON, PRYOR and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

Ifanise Petit-Frere appeals her sentence of 41 months of imprisonment following her guilty plea to reentry of a deported alien, 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a), (b)(2). Petit-Frere argues that her sentence at the low end of the advisory guideline range is substantively unreasonable. We affirm.

We review the reasonableness of a sentence under a deferential standard for abuse of discretion. *Gall v. United States, 552*U.S. 38, 41, 128 S.Ct. 586, 591, 169 L.Ed.2d 445 (2007).

Petit-Frere’s sentence is reasonable. Although Petit-Frere argues that the district court failed to give adequate consideration to her history and characteristics and the nature and circumstances of her offense, the district court stated that it was imposing a sentence at the lowest end of the advisory guideline range because of her personal hardships. Petit-Frere also argues that the district court placed undue weight upon the advisory guideline range and her criminal history, but the record establishes that the district court considered both these and other required factors in its sentencing determination. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). And the weight given to any sentencing factor is committed to the sound discretion of the district court. The district court committed no abuse of its discretion.

AFFIRMED.
Exhibit 10.33

FIRSTAMENDMENT TO LEASE

        **THISFIRST AMENDMENT TO LEASE** (this “**First Amendment**”) is datedas of December 12, 2001, between CABOT INDUSTRIAL PROPERTIES, L.P., a Delawarelimited partnership (“**Landlord**”) and BBI-SOURCE SCIENTIFIC,INC., a Massachusetts corporation (“**Tenant**”). 

        A.   TR Brell Cal Corp, Landlord’s predecessor-in-interest, and SourceScientific, Inc., Tenant’s predecessor-in-interest, entered into thatcertain Standard Industrial/Commercial Single-Tenant Lease-Net dated January 30,1995 (the “**Original Lease**”) and that certain addendum attachedthereto (the “**Addendum**”) with respect to certain premiseslocated at 7390 Lincoln Way, Garden Grove, California. The term“**Lease**” as used herein shall mean the Original Lease as amendedby the Addendum. Unless otherwise defined in this First Amendment,initially-capitalized terms used herein shall have the meanings set forth in theLease. 

        B.   Landlord and Tenant desire to amend the Lease on the terms and conditions set forth herein.

        NOWTHEREFORE, in consideration of the foregoing Recitals, the mutual covenants andagreements contained herein, and for other good and valuable consideration, thereceipt and sufficiency of which are hereby acknowledged, Landlord and Tenantagree, and amend the Lease as follows: 

        1.   Premises.   As of February 1, 2002, the parties desire to decrease the sizeof the space subject to the Lease from 41,184 square feet to 27,165 square feet.Accordingly, as of February 1, 2002, the definition of Premises in Section 1.2of the Lease shall be deleted in its entirety and replaced with the following: 

                1.2   **Premises**:   Approximately 27,165 square feet of space commonly known as aportion of 7390 Lincoln Way, Garden Grove, California, as more particularlydescribed in Exhibit A attached hereto and incorporated herein by thisreference. The term “Property” shall mean that certain real propertyof which the Premises are a part more particularly described in ExhibitA-1 attached hereto and incorporated herein by this reference. 
        2.   Term.   The Term of the Lease is hereby  extended for a period of three (3) years.  Accordingly,  the Term shall expireon January 31, 2005.  Section 1.3 of the Lease is hereby deleted in its entirety and replaced with the following:

                1.3   **Term:   Ten (10) years ("Original  Term")  commencing on February 1, 1995  ("Commencement  Date") and         ending on January 31, 2005 ("Expiration Date").
        3.   Base Rent.   Base Rent for the period from February 1, 2002 through January 31, 2005 shall be as set forth below:**
#### Antonio COLBERT, Appellant v. GREYHOUND, Appellee.

No. 10-7117.

United States Court of Appeals, District of Columbia Circuit.

Jan. 25, 2011.

Antonio Colbert, Washington, DC, pro se.

BEFORE: SENTELLE, Chief Judge, and GARLAND and BROWN, Circuit Judges.

*JUDGMENT*

PER CURIAM.

This appeal was considered on the record from the United States District Court for the District of Columbia and on the brief filed by the appellant. *See*Fed. *352R.App. P. 34(a)(2); D.C.Cir. Rule 34(j). It is

ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that the district court’s order issued August 25, 2010, be affirmed. The district court properly dismissed the complaint for lack of jurisdiction. The district courts of the United States are “courts of limited jurisdiction ... possessing] only that power authorized by Constitution and statute.” *Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of America,*511 U.S. 375, 377, 114 S.Ct. 1673, 128 L.Ed.2d 391 (1994). The district courts have jurisdiction over civil actions presenting a “federal question” under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 1331. The district courts also have jurisdiction in “diversity” cases, when the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000 and the lawsuit is between citizens of different U.S. states or between U.S. citizens and foreign citizens or foreign states. 28 U.S.C. § 1332. In this case, the appellant failed to establish the district court had either federal question jurisdiction or diversity jurisdiction.

Pursuant to D.C. Circuit Rule 36, this disposition will not be published. The Clerk is directed to withhold issuance of the mandate herein until seven days after resolution of any timely petition for rehearing or petition for rehearing en banc. *See*Fed. R.App. P. 41(b); D.C.Cir. Rule 41.
EX-34.11
(logo) VirchowKrause
&company


Report of Independent Registered Public Accounting Firm

We have examined WestLake Settlement Services, LLC's compliance with the
servicing criteria set forth in Item 1122(d) of Regulation AB applicable to
WestLake (the "Applicable Servicing Criteria") as of and for the year ended
December 31, 2007:

1122(d)(4)(xi) Payments made on behalf of an obligor (such as tax or insurance
payments) are made on or before the related penalty or expiration dates, as
indicated on the appropriate bills or notices for such payments, provided that
such support has been received by the servicer at least 30 calendar days prior
to these dates, or such other number of days specified in the transaction
agreements.;

1122(d)(4)(xii) Any late payment penalties in connection with any payment to be
made on behalf of an obligor are paid from the servicer's funds and not charged
to the obligor, unless the late payment was due to the obligor's error or
omission;

Management is responsible for the Company's compliance with these servicing
criteria. Our responsibility is to express an opinion on management's assertion
about the Company's compliance with the servicing criteria based on our
examination.

Our examination was conducted in accordance with standards of the Public
Company Accounting Oversight Board (United States) and, accordingly, included
examining, on a test basis, evidence about the Company's compliance with the
applicable servicing criteria and performing such other procedures as we
considered necessary in the circumstances. We believe that our examination
provides a reasonable basis for our opinion. Our examination does not provide a
legal determination on the Company's compliance with the servicing criteria.

In our opinion, Westlake Settlement Services, LLC complied with, in all material
respects, the aforementioned servicing criteria as of and for the year ended
December 31, 2007.


/s/ Virchow Krause & Company, LLP
Virchow Krause & Company, LLP
March 3, 2008


7900 Xerxes Avenue South * Suite 2400 * Minneapolis, MN 55431-1115 *
Tel 952.835.1344 * Fax 952.835.5845 * www.virchowkrause.com
Virchow Krause & Company, LLP
Certified Public Accountants & Consultants * An Independent Member of Baker
Tilly International
| 1.   | I am the chief financial officer of Los Angeles Syndicate of Technology, Inc. |
|----------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

| 2.   | Attached to this certification is Form 10-K for the fiscal year ended December 31, 2010, a periodic report (the “periodic report”) filed by the issuer with the Securities Exchange Commission pursuant to Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 (the “Exchange Act”), which contains financial statements. |
|----------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

| 3.   | I hereby certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that: |
|----------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

| ·   | The periodic report containing the financial statements fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Exchange Act, and |
|--------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

| ·   | The information in the periodic report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the issuer for the periods presented. |
|--------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

| April 15, 2011 | /s/ James Jago                                   |
|----------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
|           | James Jago                                                                                                                                                                                                            |
|           | Chief Financial Officer                                                                                                                                                                                               |
##### 



Exhibit 32(b)
 CORE MOLDING TECHNOLOGIES, INC.
 CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002
  (1)
    
    The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and(2)
    
    The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the
financial condition and results of operations of the Company.
 /s/ Herman F. Dick, Jr.Herman F. Dick, Jr.Vice President, Secretary, Treasurer and
Chief Financial OfficerMay 14, 2007 26
#### The State of Ohio, Appellee, *v.*Carter, Appellant.

[Cite as *State v. Carter,*123 Ohio St.3d 162, 2009-Ohio-4905.]

(No. 2008-1894

Submitted August 11, 2009

Decided September 22, 2009.)

William D. Mason, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting Attorney, and Pamela Bolton, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee.

Robert L. Tobik, Cuyahoga County Public Defender, and Erika Cunliffe, Assistant Public Defender, for appellant.

{¶ 1} The judgment of the court of appeals is reversed on the authority of *State v. Harris,*122 Ohio St.3d 373, 2009-Ohio-3323, 911 N.E.2d 882, and the cause is remanded to the court of appeals for further consideration of the animus analysis consistent with *State v. Harris.*

Moyer, C.J., and Pfeifer, Lundberg Stratton, O’Connor, O’Donnell, Lanzinger, and Cupp, JJ., concur.
<TABLE> <S> <C>


<ARTICLE>                     5

<CIK>                         0001026488
<NAME>                        MICRO-HYDRO POWER, INC.                       
<MULTIPLIER>                                   1
<CURRENCY>                                     U.S. DOLLARS
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                              DEC-31-1998
<PERIOD-START>                                 JAN-01-1998
<PERIOD-END>                                   MAR-31-1998
<EXCHANGE-RATE>                                1
<CASH>                                         0
<SECURITIES>                                   0
<RECEIVABLES>                                  0
<ALLOWANCES>                                   0
<INVENTORY>                                    0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                               0
<PP&E>                                         0
<DEPRECIATION>                                 0
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 0
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                          14,721
<BONDS>                                        0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                          0
<PREFERRED>                                    0
<COMMON>                                       3
<OTHER-SE>                                    (14,724)
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                   0
<SALES>                                        0
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                               0
<CGS>                                          0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                  0
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                               0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                               0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                             0
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                (2,029)
<INCOME-TAX>                                   100
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                            (2,129)
<DISCONTINUED>                                 0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                0
<CHANGES>                                      0
<NET-INCOME>                                   0
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                 (.01)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                 (.01)
        


</TABLE>
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1998
<PERIOD-START>                             JAN-01-1998
<PERIOD-END>                               MAR-31-1998
<CASH>                                           1,967
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                   28,547
<ALLOWANCES>                                    10,636
<INVENTORY>                                        471
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                28,374
<PP&E>                                          69,068
<DEPRECIATION>                                  26,311
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                  76,177
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                           27,220
<BONDS>                                         25,687
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                           19,512
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                            64
<OTHER-SE>                                     (2,466)
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                    76,177
<SALES>                                              0
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                30,344
<CGS>                                                0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                   28,726
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                     0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                 868
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                (1,123)
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                            (1,123)
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                   (1,123)
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                   (0.17)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                   (0.17)
        

</TABLE>
<PAGE>



                                                                    Exhibit 99.2



                      Statement of Chief Financial Officer

         Pursuant to Section 1350 of Title 18 of the United States Code





Pursuant to Section 1350 of Title 18 of the United States Code, the undersigned,
Bruce Johnson, the Sr. Vice President and Chief Financial Officer of
eResearchTechnology, Inc. (the "Company"), hereby certifies that:

     The Company's Form 10-Q Quarterly Report for the period ended March 31,
     2003 (the "Report") fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a)
     of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

     The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material
     respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.







Dated: May 9, 2003                                  Bruce Johnson
                                                    ----------------------------
                                                    Bruce Johnson,
                                                    Sr. Vice President and Chief
                                                    Financial Officer
_______________________________________ __ Michigan Supreme Court 

# Order

Lansing, Michigan

March 19, 2008 Clifford W. Taylor,
Chief Justice

133686 Michael F. Cavanagh

Elizabeth A. Weaver Marilyn Kelly RAQUEL RODRIGUEZ, Maura D. Corrigan Robert P. Young, Jr. Plaintiff-Appellee, Stephen J. Markman, and Justices
PACIFIC EMPLOYERS INSURANCE, Intervening Plaintiff-Appellee,

v SC: 133686 COA: 263930 Wayne CC: 02-231906-CZ A.S.E. INDUSTRIES, INC., Defendant, Cross-Plaintiff-Appellant, and

AMERICAN AXLE & MANUFACTURING HOLDINGS, INC., and AMERICAN AXLE & MANUFACTURING, INC., Defendants, Cross-Defendants, and

DESIGN SYSTEMS, INC., INNOVATIVE ENGINEERING, INC., and PMI MANAGEMENT GROUP, INC., Defendants.

________________ _______________ __________/

On order of the Court, leave to appeal having been granted and the briefs and oral arguments of the parties having been considered by the Court, we VA CATE our order of October 12, 2007. The applica tion for leave to appeal the March 22, 2007 judgment of the Court of Appeals is DENIED, because we are no longer persuaded that the questions presented should be revi ewed by this Court.

C AVANAGH , J., not participating due to a fa milial relationship with counsel of

record.

t0312 I, Corbin R. Davis, Clerk of the Mi chigan Supreme Cour t, certify that the foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court.

March 19, 2008

Clerk
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Wesley Frances BATES, Defendant-Appellant. United States of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Sandra Corrinne Bates, Defendant-Appellant.

Nos. 06-50062, 06-50073.

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Argued and Submitted Feb. 6, 2007.

Filed Feb. 22, 2007.

U.S. Attorneys Office, USSD — Office of the U.S. Attorney, Peter Ko, Esq., United States Department of Justice, Southern District of California, San Diego, CA, for Plaintiff-Appellee.

Holly S. Hanover, Martha McNab Hall, Esq., Dilorio & Hall, San Diego, CA, for Defendant-Appellant.

*539Before: KOZINSKI and TROTT, Circuit Judges, and BEISTLINE,* District Judge.

*

 The Honorable Ralph R. Beistline, United States District Judge for the District of Alaska, sitting by designation.

MEMORANDUM **

1. The district court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231 because 21 U.S.C. §§ 841, 846 are “federal laws of nationwide applicability that make actions criminal wherever committed.” *United States v. Begay,*42 F.3d 486, 498 (9th Cir.1994).

2. The district court reasonably disbelieved defendants’ explanations about why they pled guilty, *United States v. Snider,*976 F.2d 1249, 1251 (9th Cir.1992) (“Questions of credibility are for the district court.”), and therefore did not abuse its discretion in denying their motions to withdraw.

3. The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the application for expert funds. *United States v. Labansat,*94 F.3d 527, 530 (9th Cir.1996).

AFFIRMGED.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.