N OTE : This disposition is nonprecedential. 

# United States **Court of Appeals**  **for the Federal Circuit**

______________________ PATRICK ZUILI, Appellant

v. GOOGLE LLC, Appellee

______________________ 2017

- 2161, 2017

- 2258, 2017

- 2267

______________________ Appeals from the United States Patent and Trad emark Office, Patent Trial and Appeal Board in No s
. CBM2016

- 00008, CBM2016

- 00021, CBM2016

- 00022.

______________________ Decided: February 9 , 2018

______________________ P ATRICK Z UILI , Boca Raton, FL, pro se.
A NDREW J OHN P INCUS , Mayer Brown LLP, Washin gton, DC, for appellee. Also represented by P AUL W HITFIELD H UGHES , S AQIB S IDDIQUI , J ONATHAN W EINBERG ; R OBERT G. P LUTA , Chicago, IL.

______________________ Before P ROST , Chief Judge , R EYNA and W ALLACH , Circuit Judges.ZUILI v. GOOGLE LLC 2

W ALLACH , Circuit Judge. Appell ee Google LLC (“Google”) filed petition s with the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office’s (“USPTO”) P atent Trial and Appeal Board (“PTAB”), seeking covered business method (“CBM”) patent review of claims 1 –3 , 6, 10, 14

– 15, 18

– 19, and 21 of U.S. Patent No. 7,953,667 (“the ’667 patent”), claims 1

– 3, 5

– 6, 10

– 11, 14

– 15, and 17 of U.S. Patent No. 8,326,763 (“the ’763 patent”) , and claims 1, 5, 9, a nd 11 of U.S. Patent No. 8,671,057 (“the ’057 patent”) (collectively, “the Asserted Claims”) ( colle ctively, “the Patents

- in

- Suit” )

. The Patents

- in

- Suit teach a method and system that relate to identifying invalid or illegitimate “impressions” and “clicks” for online “pay

- per click” and “pay

- per - impression” advertisers. 1 ’057 patent, Abstract; see ’667 patent, Abstract; ’763 patent, Abstract

. The PTAB issued three final written decision s in which it found , inter alia, (1) the Patents

- in

- Suit eligible for CBM review pursuant to the Leahy

- Smith America Invents Act ( “ AIA ”) , Pub L. No. 112

- 29, § 18 , 125 Stat. 284, 329

– 31 (2011); and (2) the Asserted Claims directed to patent

- ineligible subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2012). 2 See Google Inc. v. Zuili ( Google I ), No. CBM2016

- 00021, 2017 WL 2080392, at *20 (P.T.A.B. May 5, 2017) (’667 patent); Google Inc. v. Zuili ( Google II ), No. CBM

2016

- 00022, 2017 WL 2116956, at *19 (P.T.A.B. May 5, 2017) (’763 patent); 3 Google Inc . v. Zuili ( Google III ) , No.

1 Pay

- per - click is “ when advertisers pay upon users actually clicking , ” and pay

- per - impression is “ when adve rtisers pay based on number of views .” ’ 057 p atent, A bstract. 2 Congress did not amend § 101 when it passed the AIA

. See generally Pub. L. No. 112

- 29, 125 Stat. 284. 3 Because of the similarities between the specific ations of the ’763 and ’667 patent s and the nearly identical nature of the PTAB’s reasoning in Google I and Google II ,ZUILI v. GOOGLE LLC 3

CBM2016

- 00008 (P.T.A.B. Apr. 24, 2017) (’057 patent) (Appellee’s App. 1000

– 37). Appellant Patrick Zuili a ppeals. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(4)(A) (2012). We affirm. D ISCUSSION Mr. Zuili has three pr imary contentions on appeal , arguing (1) the Patents

- in

- Suit are not eligible for CBM review, see Appellant’s Br. 51

– 63, (2) the PTAB erred in finding the Asserted Claims patent

- ineligible under § 101, see id. at 63

– 72 , and (3) the overall integrity of the PTAB proceedings may be compromised , see, e.g. , id. at 18

– 36, 93

– 96. W e address each argument in turn. I. Eligibility for CBM Review

“ CBM review is limited to patents ‘ that claim a met hod or corresponding apparatus for performing data pr ocessing or other operations used in the practice, administration, or management of a financial product or service, except that the term does not include patents for technological inventions. ’ ” Blue Calypso, LLC v. Groupon, Inc. , 815 F.3d 1331, 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (quoting Pub. L. No. 112

- 29 , § 18(d)(1) , 125 Stat. at 331 ). In evaluating whether a patent falls within the technological invention exception, the PTAB considers “whether the claimed subject matter as a whole recites a technological feature tha t is novel and unobvious over the prior art; and solves a technical problem using a technical solution.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.301(b) ( 2017 )

. We have reviewed the PTAB’s inte rpretation of t h e language of AIA § 18(d)(1) in Google I

–

III and determine that it accords with our case law. See Google II , 2017 WL 2116956, at *4

– 5, *7

– 8; Appellee’s App. 1006

– 11, 1013

– 14. Accordingly, “[w]e review the

for ease of reference we cite on ly to the ’763 patent and Google II when referring to either patent or their related proceedings, unless otherwise noted

.ZUILI v. GOOGLE LLC 4

[PTAB]’s reasoning” in its application of the CBM statute “under the arbitrary and capricious standard and its factual determinations under the substantial evidence standard.” Blue Calypso , 8 15 F.3d at 133 9

. The PTAB determined that claim 1 of each of the P atents

- in

- Suit meets the financial product or service r equirement because the claim ed method detect s fra udulent clicks for the financial activity of pay

- per - click adverti sing

. See Google II , 2017 WL 2116956, at *5 (citing ’763 patent col. 1 ll. 35

– 47) (“We find

. . . that a pay

- per - click system provides advertising of goods and services, for payment of mone y[, and thus] is itself a financial product and provides a financial service.”); Appellee’s App. 10 12

– 13 (citing ’057 patent col. 1 ll. 28

– 31, 48

– 61, col. 3 ll. 2

– 5) (“[W]e find

. . . each valid click is a transaction for which the merchant is charged a fee and each invalid click is a fraudulent transaction that should be deducted from the merchant’s invoice.”)

. 4 The PTAB also found the statute’s technological invent ion exception does not save any of the Patents

- in

- Suit from CBM review because (1) the ’057 patent is directed to the “business problem” relating to “undesirable level [s] of expenditure on the part of the merchant [caused] by [user] over

- clicking” rather t han using a “technical solution” to solve a “technical problem,”

4 To arrive at this conclusion, the PTAB found the preambles of claim 1 of each of the Patents

- in

- Suit to be limiting

. See Google II , 2017 WL 2116956, at *6; Appe llee’s App. 1011

– 12. Although Mr. Zuili argues that none of the claims’ preambles are limiting, see Appellant’s Br. 53

– 54, 59, we have independently reviewed the specific ation (including the claims) of the Patents

- in

- Suit and find that the relevant preamble s are limiting, see Catalina Mktg. Int’l, Inc. v. Coolsavings.com, Inc. , 289 F.3d 801, 808 (Fed. Cir. 2002) ( setting forth the standards to dete rmine if a preamble is lim iting ).ZUILI v. GOOGLE LLC 5

Appellee’s App. 1015

– 16 (internal quotation marks omi tted) (quoting ’057 patent col. 1 ll. 4 9– 50) , and (2) the ’667 and ’763 patents “do[] not recite a technological feature that is novel and unobvious over the prior art ,” Google II , 2017 WL 2116956, at *10; see id. at *8

– 9 (citing, inter alia, ’763 patent col. 1 ll. 34

– 37, col. 2 ll. 13

– 19; Appellee’s App

. 1694

– 97 (testimony of Google’s expert , Stephen Gray) ). We do not detect error in the P TAB’s findings or reasoning and , therefore , conclude that the Patents

- in

Suit are CBM patents eligible for review. II. Patent Eligibility Under 35 U.S.C. § 101 Under § 101, a patent claim is ineligible if “ (1) it is ‘d irected to ’ a patent

- ineligible concept, ” such as an “abstract idea,” and “ (2), if so, the particular elements of the claim, considered ‘ both indi vidually and “as an ordered combin ation, ” ’ do not add enough to ‘ “ transform the nature of the claim ” into a patent

- eligib le application. ’” Elec. Power Grp., LLC v. Alstom S.A. , 830 F.3d 1350, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (quoting Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int’l , 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2355 (2014) ). We review § 101 determin ations de novo. See Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Syma ntec Corp. , 838 F.3d 1307, 1312 (Fed. Cir. 2016). We hold that t he Asserted Claims are directed to the abstract idea of collecting, transmitting, analyzing , and storing data to detect fraudulent and/or invalid clicks based on t he t ime between two requests by the same device or client. See, e.g. , ’057 patent col. 5 ll. 17

– 37 (claim 1) ; ’667 patent col. 2 l. 61

– col. 3 l. 15 (claim 1), col. 3 ll. 46

– 61 (claim 10), col. 4 ll. 12

– 30 (claim 14), col. 4 ll. 42

– 60 (claim 18); ’763 patent col. 2 l. 59

– col. 3 l. 8 (claim 1), col. 3 ll. 37

– 50 (claim 10), col. 4 ll. 17

– 30 (claim 14)

. 5 We previously have determined that similar claims

5 We cite only to the independent claims of the P atents

- in

- Suit because “[Mr. Zuili] has not separatelyZUILI v. GOOGLE LLC 6

are directed to patent

- ineligible subject matter. See, e.g. , Elec. Power , 830 F.3d at 1353 ( finding claims that , inter alia, “ collect []” and “analyz[e]” information directed to abstract ideas ); In re TLI Commc’ns LLC Patent Litig. , 823 F.3d 607, 609 (Fed. Cir. 2016) ( finding claims that , inter alia, “ transmit []” digital images directed to the “abstract idea of

. . . storing digital image s”). Moreover, although we have stated that claims “purporting to i mprove the functioning of the computer

. . . might not succumb to the abstract idea exception,” Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corp. , 822 F.3d 1327, 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2016) , the Asserted Claims re cite the use of generic computer co mponents performing conventional activities to carry out the claimed invention , s ee , e.g. , ’057 patent col. 5 ll. 18

– 19 (“web page” and “computing device”), 22 (use of conve ntional “code” without explaining further ), 26 (“commun ication network”) ; ’667 patent col. 2 l. 63 (“search engine”), col. 3 ll. 3– 4 (“plurality of links associated with a plurality of websites”) ; ’763 patent col. 3 ll. 40

– 43 (discussing “client side” and “server side” devices) ; Appellee’s App. 1695

– 97 ( providing a statement by Mr. Gray that “the claimed components are generic computer comp onents” and that certain claims “recite generic computing features” (emphases added) ) ; cf. In re TLI Commc’ns , 823 F.3d at 612 ( finding claims “directed to the use of conve ntional or generic technology in a nascent but well

- known environment” do not survive Alice step one ). The Asserted Claims do not recite an inventive co ncept. When c laims , such as the Asserted Claims , are “directed to an abstract idea” and “ merely requir[e] gene ric computer implementation ,” they “ do[] not move into

argued the patent eligibility of the dependent claims and thus has waived any argument that those claims should be analyzed separately.” Affini ty Labs of Tex., LLC v. DIRECTV, LLC , 838 F.3d 1253, 1264 n.4 (Fed. Cir. 2016).ZUILI v. GOOGLE LLC 7

[§] 101 eligibility territory.” buySAFE, Inc. v. Google, Inc. , 765 F.3d 1350, 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (internal quot ation marks and citation omit ted) ; see BASCOM Glob. Internet Servs., Inc. v. AT&T Mobility LLC , 827 F.3d 1341, 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (recognizing that claims directed to an abstract idea that add “the requirement to perform it on the Internet” do not state an inventive concept)

. We have considered Mr. Zuili’s remaining § 101 arguments and conclude that the Asserted Claims are not patent eligible. I II

. Integrity of the PTAB Proceedings Mr. Zuili asserts various theories that the integrity of the PTAB proceedings have been tainted. See, e.g. , Appe llant’s Br. 18

– 36, 93

– 96. We have independently reviewed Mr. Zuili’s claims in light of the record but find his claims insufficiently supported. For instance, Mr. Zuili avers that the USPTO’s Director sought to improperly influence the PTAB proceedings by stacking the judges on the CBM panel to Mr. Zuili’s detriment , see, e.g. , id. at 10

– 12; however, the USPTO’s Director has delegated the autho rity to assign PTAB panels, see Manual of Patent Exami ning Procedure § 1002.02(f)(3) (9th ed. Rev. 8, Jan. 2018) ; see also 35 U.S.C. § 6(c ) , and Mr. Zuili has not presented evidence to cont radict the PTAB panel’s statement that it acted “independently,” Google II , 2017 WL 2116956, at *17 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Similarly, Mr. Zuili claims the PTAB erred in relying on certain testimony submitted to support Google because the declarants were not reliable due to “ inherent co nflict[s] of interest[],” Appellant’s Br. 20, but Mr. Zuili candidly admitted to the PTAB that he “can’t prove” his allegations, Appellee’s App. 1545; see id. at 1542. Accor dingly, we reject Mr. Zuili’s unsupported accusations. C ONCLUSION We have considered Mr. Zuili ’s remaining arguments and find them unpersua sive. Accordingly, the FinalZUILI v. GOOGLE LLC 8

Written Decision s of the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office’s Patent Trial and Appeal Board are AFFIRMED C OSTS Each party shall bear its own costs.