FILED

December 5, 1997

Cecil W. Crowson

Appellate Court Clerk

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

MIDDLE SECTION AT NASHVILLE

JONI SMART HOLT, )

)

Plaintiff/Appellee, )

) Sumner Chancery

) No. 93D-485

VS. )

) Appeal No.

) 01A01-9609-CH-00423

JACK SANDERS HOLT, )

)

Defendant/Appellant. )

APPEAL FROM THE CHANCERY COURT FOR SUMNER COUNTY

AT GALLATIN, TENNESSEE

THE HONORABLE TOM E. GRAY, CHANCELLOR

For the Plaintiff/Appellee: For the Defendant/Appellant:

Rose Palermo Mary Arline Evans

Nashville, Tennessee Nashville, Tennessee

AFFIRMED IN PART; MODIFIED IN PART;

AND REMANDED

WILLIAM C. KOCH, JR., JUDGE
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O P I N I O N

This appeal involves the dissolution of a nineteen-year marriage. The wife

filed suit for divorce in the Chancery Court for Sumner County but then suspended

the proceedings while the parties attempted to reconcile. The efforts proved fruitless,

and, following a bench trial, the trial court granted the wife a divorce on the grounds

of adultery. The trial court also awarded the wife custody of the parties’ two

children, divided the marital estate, and awarded the wife spousal support as well as

additional funds for her legal expenses. The husband takes issue on this appeal with

the financial aspects of the divorce decree, including the division of the marital

property, the long-term spousal support award, and the additional award to defray the

wife’s legal expenses at trial. While the trial court properly divided the marital

property and awarded the wife funds for her legal expenses at trial, we modify the

spousal support award to provide for rehabilitative alimony and for reduced longterm spousal support.

I.

Jack Sanders Holt and Joni Smart Holt were married in Nashville in June 1976.

Ms. Holt was twenty-two years old at the time; while Mr. Holt was twenty-one. Their

first child was born in January 1981. In August 1989 their second child was born

with serious health problems. The boy underwent two heart surgeries before his

second birthday and has also had several less severe surgeries on his ears. 

Mr. Holt was employed as the sales manager for Sanders Manufacturing

Company throughout most of the marriage. Ms. Holt also worked during most of the

marriage but primarily during the early years. She was working as a secretaryreceptionist in a Nashville law office at the time of the marriage and later worked in

the child support division of the circuit court clerk’s office. She stopped working

full-time after her first child was born but continued to work on a part-time basis at

a local department store as a fragrance and cosmetic model. She also worked for a

short time at a day-care facility and for another retailer during the holiday season.

Ms. Holt stopped working completely after the birth of the parties’ second child.

The parties continually disagreed over whether Ms. Holt should return to work.

Their relationship became increasingly strained as the years passed. They tried
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marital counseling in late 1988, but Mr. Holt eventually refused to continue the

counseling. During this time, Ms. Holt began to suspect that Mr. Holt was having an

extramarital affair with a co-worker. The parties separated from February through

April 1993. While their relationship seemed to improve after Mr. Holt returned

home, Ms. Holt filed for divorce in October 1993. Following another unsuccessful

reconciliation attempt, Ms. Holt moved to set aside the order of reconciliation and

later filed an amended divorce complaint.

During the trial in January 1996, Mr. Holt conceded that he had committed

adultery. In an April 8, 1996 order, the trial court granted Ms. Holt a divorce based

on Mr. Holt’s adultery. The trial court gave Ms. Holt custody of the parties’ children

and ordered Mr. Holt to pay $1,494 per month in child support. The trial court

awarded Ms. Holt fifty-four percent of the marital estate, including the marital home,

and awarded Mr. Holt the remaining property, including his stock in Sanders

Manufacturing Company and the parties’ interest in the Danwood Apartments. Mr.

Holt was ordered to pay Ms. Holt alimony in the amount of $1,200 per month until

her death or remarriage and an additional $5,612.75 to defray her legal expenses.

II.

THE DIVISION OF THE MARITAL ESTATE

We turn first to the manner in which the trial court divided the marital estate.

Mr. Holt insists that the division of the marital property is inequitable because Ms.

Holt received a larger portion of the estate and because the trial court overvalued the

Danwood Apartments which were awarded to him. We conclude that the manner in

which the trial court divided the marital property is equitable. 

A.

The Valuation of the Interest in the Danwood Apartments

The parties owned a ten percent interest in the Danwood Apartments, a twelveunit apartment building located on Nashville’s Music Row. At trial, they introduced

evidence consisting of a 1986 financial statement valuing the entire apartment

building at $300,000, another 1988 financial statement valuing the building at

$350,000, subject to a $185,000 mortgage, and a 1995 statement valuing their ten
1The value of the parties’ ten percent interest was $28,500, while their share of the mortgage

debt was $18,500. The value of their interest less their share of the mortgage debt is $10,000.

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percent interest at $10,000.1

 The trial court, adopting the values in the 1988 financial

statement, found that the value of the parties’ interest in the apartment was $16,500.

Mr. Holt insists that the trial court should have adopted the 1995 valuation.

Valuing marital property is not an exact science. It is a question of fact that

depends upon the proof offered by the parties. The parties have the burden of

presenting competent valuation evidence, and they are bound by the evidence they

present. See Wallace v. Wallace, 733 S.W.2d 102, 107 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1987). In the

face of conflicting valuation evidence, trial courts may place a value on the property

that is within the range of the values presented by the evidence. See Brock v. Brock,

941 S.W.2d 896, 902 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1996). Like other fact questions, a trial court’s

decision concerning the valuation of marital property is entitled to great weight on

appeal and will not be second-guessed unless the evidence preponderates otherwise.

See Brock v. Brock, 941 S.W.2d at 902; Smith v. Smith, 912 S.W.2d 155, 157(Tenn.

Ct. App. 1995).

The trial court’s valuation of the parties’ interest in the apartment building is

within the range of the competent proof. We find no basis for second-guessing the

trial court’s decision to base its valuation of this property on the parties’ 1988

financial statement. In the face of contradictory evidence, the trial court’s valuation

is consistent with the nature of the property and its location.

B.

The Division of the Marital Estate

Mr. Holt also asserts that the overall result of the division of the marital estate

is inequitable because Ms. Holt received a disproportionately larger share of their

property. He argues that the size of the marital property award indicates that the trial

court must have considered the relative fault of the parties, and that the size of Ms.

Holt’s share of the marital property will be a disincentive for her to attempt to

rehabilitate herself. We have determined that the manner in which the trial court

allocated the marital property was essentially equitable.
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Trial courts have broad discretion in dividing marital property and allocating

marital debt. See Fisher v. Fisher, 648 S.W.2d 244, 246 (Tenn. 1983); Wade v.

Wade, 897 S.W.2d 702, 715 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1994); Koch v. Koch, 874 S.W.2d 571,

579 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1993). We customarily accord the trial court’s decisions great

weight on appeal, see Wilson v. Moore, 929 S.W.2d 367, 372 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1996),

and we will decline to alter them unless they are inconsistent with the factors in Tenn.

Code Ann. §36-4-121(c) (1996) or are unsupported by the evidence. See Brown v.

Brown, 913 S.W.2d 163, 168 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1994); Mahaffey v. Mahaffey, 775

S.W.2d 618, 622 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1989).

Trial courts must distribute marital property equitably. See Tenn. Code Ann.

§ 36-4-121(a)(1). However, the distribution need not be mathematically equal to be

equitable. See Cohen v. Cohen, 937 S.W.2d 823, 832 (Tenn. 1996); Ellis v. Ellis, 748

S.W.2d 424, 427 (Tenn. 1988); Herrera v. Herrera, 944 S.W.2d 379, 389 (Tenn. Ct.

App. 1996). In addition, each party need not receive a share of each piece of marital

property in order for the division to be equitable. See Brown v. Brown, 913 S.W.2d

at 168.

As is usual in cases of this sort, the parties placed different values on their

marital property. The most significant differences involve the value of their interest

in the Danwood Apartments, the value of the marital home, and the value of the

furnishings in the marital home. Mr. Holt valued the entire marital estate at

approximately $407,126; while Ms. Holt valued it at $367,576. The trial court

determined the value of part, but not all, of the property. Ms. Holt received the

marital home and furnishings, a mower, two individual retirement accounts, and the

contents of her checking account. Depending on which party’s values are used, Ms.

Holt’s share of the marital estate was worth between $199,287 (or 54.2% of the

marital estate according to her valuation) and $240,087 (or 58.9% of the marital

estate according to Mr. Holt’s valuation). 

We have evaluated the overall effect of the trial court’s division of the marital

estate in light of the factors in Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-4-121(c) and have determined

that the division is equitable. The parties were married for nineteen years. During

this time, Ms. Holt focused much of her attention on her family and thus her ability

to earn income and acquire capital assets will not be as great as Mr. Holt’s. Ms.
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Holt’s employment prospects are also more limited than Mr. Holt’s who has remained

in the full-time work force throughout the marriage. Accordingly, we have no basis

to differ with the trial court’s division of the marital estate.

III.

THE AWARD FOR SPOUSAL SUPPORT

Mr. Holt also takes issue with the trial court’s decision to award Ms. Holt

$1,200 per month as spousal support until her death or remarriage. He asserts that

Tennessee’s divorce statutes contain a preference for rehabilitative support and that

Ms. Holt should receive rehabilitative support rather than long-term support. We

agree Ms. Holt’s spousal support should be structured to provide her an incentive to

become more self-sufficient.

A.

Trial courts have broad discretion in setting the amount and duration of spousal

support. See Garfinkel v. Garfinkel, 945 S.W.2d 744, 748 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1996);

Jones v. Jones, 784 S.W.2d 349, 352 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1989). These decisions should

be guided by the particular facts of each case and by a careful balancing of the factors

contained in Tenn. Code Ann. §36-5-101(d)(1) (Supp. 1997). See Hawkins v.

Hawkins, 883 S.W.2d 622, 625 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1994); Loyd v. Loyd, 860 S.W.2d

409, 412 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1993). This court customarily declines to second-guess a

trial court’s decision concerning spousal support unless the decision is not supported

by the evidence or is contrary to public policy embodied in the applicable statutes.

See Brown v. Brown, 913 S.W.2d at 169; Ingram v. Ingram, 721 S.W.2d 262, 264

(Tenn. Ct. App. 1986).

Even though fault is a relevant consideration when setting spousal support,

these decisions are not intended to be punitive. See Brown v. Brown, 913 S.W.2d at

169; McClung v. McClung, 29 Tenn. App. 580, 584, 198 S.W.2d 820, 822 (1946).

Rather, they are intended to assist the economically disadvantaged spouse to become

self-sufficient and, when economic rehabilitation is not feasible, to mitigate the harsh

economic realities of divorce. See Brown v. Brown, 913 S.W.2d at 169-70. The

principal factors influencing spousal support decisions include the need of the
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recipient spouse and the ability of the obligor spouse to pay. See Crain v. Crain, 925

S.W.2d 232, 234 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1996); Hawkins v. Hawkins, 883 S.W.2d at 625. 

Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5-101(d)(1) reflects a preference for temporary,

rehabilitative support, as opposed to long-term support. See Wilson v. Moore, 929

S.W.2d 367, 375 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1996). This preference does not completely

displace other forms of spousal support. See Aaron v. Aaron, 909 S.W.2d 408, 410

(Tenn. 1995); Isbell v. Isbell, 816 S.W.2d 735, 739 (Tenn. 1991). Trial courts

continue to have the prerogative to determine which type of spousal support best fits

the facts of each particular case and may, when appropriate, award a spouse several

different types of support.

B.

Ms. Holt is currently forty-three years old and is in relatively good health. She

has a high school diploma and has completed one year of college. She worked

steadily before and during the early years of the marriage and demonstrated that she

could find employment when she chose to work. She elected not to work in order to

care for the parties’ children while they were younger, but these children are now

seventeen and nine years old. Her younger son’s medical problems have abated

significantly, and the boy is now actively involved in sports and other extracurricular

activities. 

Based on our examination of the record, we have determined that Ms. Holt is

a candidate for rehabilitative support in order to enable her to become more selfsufficient. We have also determined that she should receive some “closing in

money,” Aaron v. Aaron, 909 S.W.2d at 411, over a longer term. Accordingly, we

modify the trial court’s spousal support award to provide that Mr. Holt should

continue to pay Ms. Holt $1,200 per month until December 31, 1999. Thereafter, the

amount of Mr. Holt’s spousal support shall be reduced to $800 per month unless Ms.

Holt presents proof satisfactory to the trial court that she has made serious, good faith

efforts to rehabilitate herself and that her ability to earn income and to accumulate

capital assets has not appreciably improved. 

IV.
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THE AWARD FOR LEGAL EXPENSES

We turn finally to the question of Ms. Holt’s legal expenses. For his part, Mr.

Holt asserts that the trial court should not have required him to pay Ms. Holt an

additional $5,612.75. For her part, Ms. Holt insists that this court should require Mr.

Holt to pay the legal expenses she incurred on this appeal. We have determined that

the trial court properly awarded Ms. Holt the legal expenses she incurred at trial but

that Ms. Holt should be responsible for her own legal expenses for this appeal.

Awards for legal expenses in a divorce proceeding are considered to be awards

for additional support. See Smith v. Smith, 912 S.W.2d 155, 161 (Tenn. Ct. App.

1995); Kincaid v. Kincaid, 912 S.W.2d 140, 144 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1995). They are

warranted when an economically disadvantaged spouse lacks the funds to pay his or

her legal expenses. See Herrera v. Herrera, 944 S.W.2d at 390; Brown v. Brown, 913

S.W.2d at 170. These awards, like other decisions in divorce proceedings, are

discretionary with the trial court, and so the appellate courts will decline to interfere

with the trial court’s decision unless the trial court has abused its discretion. See

Garfinkel v. Garfinkel, 945 S.W.2d at 748; Smith v. Smith, 912 S.W.2d at 161.

Ms. Holt will be returning to employment at the age of forty-three after having

been away from the full-time job market for approximately twenty years. The marital

property she received is not liquid, and she will be required to use these assets to

support her as the years go by. Accordingly, we concur with the trial court’s decision

to require Mr. Holt to pay her an additional $5,612.75 to help defray the legal

expenses she incurred at trial. We have determined, however, that Mr. Holt should

not be required to pay any more of Ms. Holt’s legal expenses and accordingly deny

her request for an additional award for her legal expenses on appeal.

V.

We affirm the judgment as modified herein and remand the case to the trial

court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. We tax the costs of this

appeal in equal proportions to Jack Sanders Holt and his surety and to Joni Smart

Holt for which execution, if necessary, may issue.
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____________________________

WILLIAM C. KOCH, JR., JUDGE

CONCUR:

_________________________________

HENRY F. TODD, PRESIDING JUDGE

MIDDLE SECTION

_________________________________

SAMUEL L. LEWIS, JUDGE