NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

___________

No. 14-1361

___________

QIANG MA,

 Petitioner

v.

ATTORNEY GENERAL UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

 Respondent

_______________________

On Petition for Review of a Decision of the

Board of Immigration Appeals

BIA No. A098-604-530

(U.S. Immigration Judge: Honorable Charles Honeyman)

______________

Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)

March 2, 2015

Before: AMBRO, SCIRICA, and ROTH, Circuit Judges.

(Filed October 27, 2015)

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OPINION*

________________

SCIRICA, Circuit Judge

 

* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 

constitute binding precedent.
2

Petitioner Qiang Ma petitions for review of a final order of removal issued by the 

Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA). For the reasons detailed below, we will deny the 

petition for review. 

Ma, a citizen of China, was admitted to the United States in 2000 as a temporary 

visitor for business. In 2005, through counsel, Ma filed an I-140 application to adjust his 

status, claiming that he had “exceptional ability” as a folk artist. The United States 

Citizenship and Immigration Services denied the application. In 2007, the Department of 

Homeland Security charged Ma with removability under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(1)(B) as an 

alien who had remained in the United States for a longer time than permitted in violation 

of the law. Ma filed an application for withholding of removal, claiming that he had been 

persecuted in China due to his opposition to governmental corruption.

An Immigration Judge (IJ) held a hearing in which Ma testified in support of his 

claim. Ma first disavowed any knowledge of the original I-140 application that had been 

filed on his behalf, although he admitted to signing the document. He testified that he was 

not an artist, but instead owned a gold mine in China, which he opened in 1992. The mine 

prospered for the first two or three years; however, local officials then began to demand 

that Ma pay bribes to them. Ma said that he could afford to pay these bribes, but because 

he is against corruption, he refused to do so. In response, these individuals, who 

controlled the supply of materials that Ma mined for gold, drastically reduced the 

quantity that he received. Ma complained about this conduct to officials in the city 

government and then the provincial government, to no avail. He then made plans to seek 
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help in Beijing, but just as he began his journey, the local police arrested him. He was 

held for over a month, warned that he should not file complaints, and beaten several 

times, suffering a permanent injury to his finger. At around this same time, because of 

Ma’s conduct, local officials forced his wife to retire from her job. After Ma was 

released, he remained in China for a year or two, living off his savings and trying to sell 

his factory. He was unable to do so, and then left for the United States. 

The IJ denied relief to Ma on several grounds. First, the IJ concluded that Ma did 

not testify credibly about his I-140 application. Further, the IJ noted certain other 

inconsistencies in his testimony, but nevertheless concluded that Ma was generally 

credible as to his withholding claim. But the IJ ruled that Ma had failed to present 

evidence to corroborate his allegations that he had problems with the local government, 

he filed complaints, and his wife was forced to retire. The IJ also found that the harm Ma 

suffered in China did not rise to the level of persecution, that he was not persecuted “on 

account of” his political beliefs, and that he would not suffer persecution in the future if 

he returned to China. Ma appealed to the BIA, which dismissed his appeal. The BIA 

concluded that Ma had failed to corroborate his claims or show a nexus between the 

alleged persecution and his political beliefs. Given its resolution of these issues, the BIA 

determined that it need not address the IJ’s other reasons for denying relief. Ma then filed 

a timely petition for review to this Court. 

The government argues that we lack jurisdiction to consider this petition because 

Ma did not challenge the IJ’s corroboration ruling in his appeal to the BIA, and therefore 
4

he has not “exhausted administrative remedies available as of right.” 8 U.S.C. § 

1252(d)(1). Even where the petitioner does not raise an issue before the BIA, however, 

we have jurisdiction to review such an issue if the BIA considers the unraised issue sua 

sponte. See Lin v. Att’y Gen., 543 F.3d 114, 126 (3d Cir. 2008). Here, the BIA considered 

whether the IJ reasonably required Ma to provide corroborating evidence, noting, inter 

alia, that “[t]he Immigration Judge properly relied on the respondent’s failure to provide 

a statement from his wife or any other person with knowledge of the events, or available 

corroboration of his wife’s forced retirement.” Accordingly, we have jurisdiction under 8 

U.S.C. § 1252 to review the BIA’s final order of removal. 

Our review is of the BIA’s decision, although we also review the IJ’s decision to 

the extent that the BIA adopted or deferred to the IJ’s analysis. See Zhang v. Gonzales, 

405 F.3d 150, 155 (3d Cir. 2005). In cases like this one, where the IJ determines that the 

alien should produce evidence to corroborate his testimony, “such evidence must be 

provided unless the applicant does not have the evidence and cannot reasonably obtain 

the evidence.” 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(ii). We may not reverse the agency’s 

determination on the availability of corroborating evidence unless we find “that a 

reasonable trier of fact is compelled to conclude that such corroborating evidence is 

unavailable.” 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4).

We discern no error in the agency’s conclusion that Ma failed adequately to 

corroborate his factual allegations. As an initial matter, he argues at length that, because 

the agency found that he provided credible testimony, it erred in demanding 
5

corroboration. He is incorrect; it is well established that the agency may require 

corroborating evidence even from credible aliens. See, e.g., Chen v. Gonzales, 434 F.3d 

212, 221 (3d Cir. 2005). 

Ma also suggests that the agency failed to conduct the three-part inquiry 

established in Abdulai v. Ashcroft, 239 F.3d 542 (3d Cir. 2001). Under Abdulai, the 

agency must: (1) identify the facts for which it is reasonable to expect corroboration; (2) 

inquire whether the alien has provided information corroborating those facts; and, if he 

has not, (3) analyze whether the applicant has adequately explained his failure to do so. 

Id. at 554. Again, Ma’s argument lacks merit. 

First, the IJ continually advised Ma, beginning more than three years before ruling 

on his application, that he would be required to corroborate his allegations concerning the 

corruption he encountered, his response, and his wife’s forced retirement. The agency 

recognized that Ma could not be expected to present documents from his alleged 

persecutors; however, he did not present even a letter or affidavit from his wife or any 

other person who could vouch for his experiences.1 See Sandie v. Att’y Gen., 562 F.3d 

 

1 While Ma submitted four one-page documents concerning his business and an 

affidavit from a nurse in the United States concerning his finger injury, these documents 

do not purport to corroborate any of Ma’s specific allegations concerning the corruption 

he faced or his response. Three of the business-related documents merely report that he 

was the legal representative of a “gold ore sorting” business. The fourth, meanwhile, is a 

shipping authorization receipt for a five tons of metal ore. As the agency noted, however, 

this document does not even provide the name of the company that received the ore, and 

is not sufficient to sustain Ma’s burden. See, e.g., Sandie v. Att’y Gen., 562 F.3d 246, 254

(3d Cir. 2009). Likewise, the nurse, in her affidavit, naturally did not provide any 

information about what had occurred in China.
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246, 252 (3d Cir. 2009) (“It is reasonable to expect corroboration for testimony that is 

central to an applicant’s claim and easily subject to verification.”). 

Second, the agency accurately observed that Ma provided no evidence to 

corroborate any of these allegations. Finally, the agency concluded that he had failed to 

adequately explain his failure to present corroborating evidence. Indeed, he made little 

effort to do so. While his attorney stated, at a March 2008 hearing, that “we should be 

able to get letters and affidavits from China,” when Ma was asked at his June 2012 

hearing about his failure to obtain evidence from his wife, he said only “[i]f needed there 

should be document[s].” Therefore, we conclude that the agency properly performed the 

Abdulai analysis.2 See, e.g., Chen v. Gonzales, 434 F.3d 212, 219-20 (3d Cir. 2005). 

Accordingly, we will deny the petition for review.

 

2

In light of this conclusion, we need not reach the BIA’s alternate conclusion that 

Ma was not persecuted “on account of” his political opinion. See generally Yuan v. Att’y 

Gen., 642 F.3d 420, 427 (3d Cir. 2011).