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STATE OF MICHIGAN 

COURT OF APPEALS 

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, 

 Plaintiff-Appellee, 

UNPUBLISHED 

January 26, 2016 

v No. 323709 

Wayne Circuit Court 

RANDY MARSH, LC No. 14-001831-FC 

 Defendant-Appellant. 

Before: RIORDAN, P.J., and JANSEN and FORT HOOD, JJ. 

PER CURIAM. 

 Defendant appeals as of right his bench trial convictions of malicious destruction of 

personal property totaling $1,000 or more but less than $20,000, MCL 750.377a(1)(b)(i), 

aggravated domestic violence, MCL 750.81a(2), and aggravated assault, MCL 750.81a(1). 

Defendant was sentenced to one to five years’ imprisonment for his malicious destruction of 

personal property conviction, one year of probation for his aggravated domestic violence 

conviction, and one year of probation for his aggravated assault conviction, with all sentences to 

be served concurrently. We affirm. 

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND 

 This case arises from two violent incidents that occurred on the same day on the eastside 

of Detroit between defendant and Kryjia Bryson, the mother of his child. Kryjia went to the 

home of defendant’s mother, Sheryl Marsh, in the early afternoon to speak with defendant about 

their child. While Kryjia was there, a physical altercation ensued, during which defendant 

grabbed Kryjia and pushed her to the ground. Kryjia sustained bruising to her face and eye, 

which worsened throughout the day. 

 Later, at approximately 8:00 p.m., Kryjia, along with a friend and her sisters Trinity Mix 

and Falise Bryson, drove to the area of Sheryl Marsh’s home. According to Kryjia, as she was 

driving down the street in front of Marsh’s home, a large rock or brick struck the back window 

of the vehicle, startling her and causing her to drive into a snowbank. At this point, Kryjia 

alleged that Sheryl Marsh came running at her, shooting a handgun, and that defendant and 

another individual were hitting her car with stones and bricks. Defendant then pulled Mix out of 

the vehicle by her hair and kicked her in the face, which caused the side of her face to bleed. 

Ultimately, the vehicle sustained approximately $4,000 in damage, as several windows were 
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cracked or shattered, the windshield was cracked, and the headlights and taillights were 

damaged. 

 Following a bench trial, defendant was convicted of malicious destruction of personal 

property, aggravated assault, and aggravated domestic violence. Defendant moved for a new 

trial, arguing that his convictions were against the great weight of the evidence. The trial court 

denied defendant’s motion. 

II. SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE 

 Defendant first argues that the prosecution presented insufficient evidence at trial to 

support a malicious destruction of personal property conviction, as Kryjia’s testimony was the 

only evidence presented regarding the amount of monetary damage. We disagree. 

A. STANDARD OF REVIEW 

 We review de novo a defendant’s challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence underlying 

his conviction. People v Meissner, 294 Mich App 438, 452; 812 NW2d 37 (2011). “We view 

the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution to determine whether a rational trier of 

fact could have found the essential elements of the crime to have been proved beyond a 

reasonable doubt.” Id. Additionally, we are “required to draw all reasonable inferences and 

make credibility choices in support of the . . . verdict.” People v Nowack, 462 Mich 392, 400; 

614 NW2d 78 (2000). 

B. ANALYSIS 

 In relevant part, MCL 750.377a provides: 

 (1) A person who willfully and maliciously destroys or injures the 

personal property of another is guilty of a crime as follows: 

* * * 

 (b) If any of the following apply, the person is guilty of a felony 

punishable by imprisonment for not more than 5 years or a fine of not more than 

$10,000.00 or 3 times the amount of the destruction or injury, whichever is 

greater, or both imprisonment and a fine: 

 (i) The amount of the destruction or injury is $1,000.00 or more but less 

than $20,000.00. 

The statute does not set forth a procedure for calculating the amount of the destruction or injury. 

However, this Court has held that “in a case of malicious destruction of property, the prosecutor 

may establish the amount of damage resulting from an injury by showing either (a) the difference 

in the market value of the property immediately before and after the injury, or (b) the reasonable 

cost of repairing or restoring the property.” People v Hamblin, 224 Mich App 87, 96; 568 NW2d 

339 (1997) (quotation marks and alteration omitted). Although the cost that the “complainant 

actually paid out of pocket to repair” the damage “is not in and of itself controlling” when other 
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evidence is provided, the amount actually paid by the complainant “can properly be considered 

as evidence of value.” Id. at 101. 

 Sufficient evidence was presented at trial to prove that the vehicle sustained $4,000 in 

damage. Kryjia testified at trial that it cost “[a]round $4,000” to repair the vehicle, and that she 

actually had the car repaired. Kryjia described the damages as follows: several windows were 

cracked or shattered, there was a bullet hole in the backseat of the car, the windshield was 

cracked, and the headlights and taillights were damaged. No other evidence was presented to 

refute Kryjia’s claim that the amount of destruction or injury to the vehicle was approximately 

$4,000.1

 The trial court heard Kryjia’s testimony and found it to be credible. It was the role of 

the trier of fact to assess the credibility of the complainant’s testimony, and we will not interfere 

with the superior opportunity and ability of the trial judge to determine witnesses’ credibility. 

People v Wolfe, 440 Mich 508, 514-515; 489 NW2d 748, amended 441 Mich 1201 (1992); 

People v Eisen, 296 Mich App 326, 331; 820 NW2d 229 (2012). 

Thus, especially given our duty to view the evidence in the light most favorable to the 

prosecution, Meissner, 294 Mich App 452, a rational fact-finder could find that the prosecution 

proved beyond a reasonable doubt that “[t]he amount of the destruction or injury [was] $1,000.00 

or more but less than $20,000.00,” MCL 750.377a(1)(b)(i), based on Kryjia’s unrefuted 

testimony. 

III. GREAT WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE 

 Next, defendant argues that the trial court abused its discretion in denying defendant’s 

motion for a new trial because his convictions were against the great weight of the evidence.2

 

We disagree. 

A. STANDARD OF REVIEW AND APPLICABLE LAW 

 

1

 We reject defendant’s argument that the specific facts of Hamblin require us to conclude that 

Kryjia’s testimony was insufficient to prove the reasonable cost of repairing the vehicle. 

Likewise, contrary to defendant’s claim on appeal, Hamblin does not require that the prosecution 

present more evidence than a complainant’s testimony in order to prove the reasonable cost of 

repair. 

2

 To the extent that defendant briefly argues, in presenting the relief requested, that his 

aggravated assault and aggravated domestic violence convictions were supported by insufficient 

evidence, we deem this argument abandoned because he did not raise it in his statement of the 

questions presented. See MCR 7.212(C)(5); People v McMiller, 202 Mich App 82, 83 n 1; 507 

NW2d 812 (1993). Further, because defendant does not assert a separate basis for an 

insufficiency of the evidence claim concerning those convictions, such an argument would fail 

for the same reasons as those discussed infra with regard to his argument that those convictions 

were against the great weight of the evidence. See People v Brown, 239 Mich App 735, 745-

746, 746 n 6; 610 NW2d 234 (2000). 
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 We review “a trial court’s grant or denial of a new trial on the ground that the verdict was 

against the great weight of the evidence” for an abuse of discretion. People v Unger, 278 Mich 

App 210, 232; 749 NW2d 272 (2008). “A trial court abuses its discretion when it selects an 

outcome that does not fall within the range of reasonable and principled outcomes.” People v 

Young, 276 Mich App 446, 448; 740 NW2d 347 (2007). 

 “A trial court may grant a motion for a new trial based on the great weight of the 

evidence only if the evidence preponderates so heavily against the verdict that it would be a 

miscarriage of justice to allow the verdict to stand.” Unger, 278 Mich App at 232, citing People 

v Lemmon, 456 Mich 625, 627; 576 NW2d 129 (1998); see also People v McCray, 245 Mich 

App 631, 637; 630 NW2d 633 (2001). “Conflicting testimony and questions of witness 

credibility are generally insufficient grounds for granting a new trial,” as “[a]bsent exceptional 

circumstances, issues of witness credibility are for the trier of fact.” Unger, 278 Mich App at 

232. Additionally, in general, “a verdict may be vacated only when the evidence does not 

reasonably support it and it was more likely the result of causes outside the record, such as 

passion, prejudice, sympathy, or some other extraneous influence.” People v Lacalamita, 286 

Mich App 467, 469; 780 NW2d 311 (2009). 

B. MALICIOUS DESTRUCTION OF PERSONAL PROPERTY 

 First, defendant argues that the trial court abused its discretion when it denied his motion 

for a new trial because his malicious destruction of personal property conviction was against the 

great weight of the evidence for the same reasons as those raised with regard to his insufficiency 

of the evidence claim. We similarly reject this argument for the same reasons as those discussed 

supra. See People v Brown, 239 Mich App 735, 745-746, 746 n 6; 610 NW2d 234 (2000) 

(noting that whether a defendant’s convictions were supported by sufficient evidence and 

whether they were against the great weight of the evidence are separate questions, but if the 

arguments are parallel or based on the same reasons, then both arguments succeed or fail 

together). Further, because Kryjia’s testimony regarding the amount of damage was not 

contradicted by any other evidence at trial, we cannot conclude that “the evidence preponderates 

so heavily against the verdict that it would be a miscarriage of justice to allow the verdict to 

stand.” Unger, 278 Mich App at 232. 

Thus, we reject defendant’s claim. 

C. AGGRAVATED ASSAULT 

 Next, defendant argues the trial court abused its discretion in denying defendant’s motion 

for a new trial because the evidence of Mix’s injures was “beyond dubious.” He asserts that the 

victims’ testimony was inadequate—without additional photographs, evidence of medical 

treatment, police eyewitness testimony, or other evidence—to establish an injury that rises to the 

level required to establish aggravated assault. He also emphasizes that neither of the police 

officers who observed Mix following the incident testified that she sustained an injury. 

MCL 750.81a(1) provides: 

 (1) Except as otherwise provided in this section, a person who assaults an 

individual without a weapon and inflicts serious or aggravated injury upon that 
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individual without intending to commit murder or to inflict great bodily harm less 

than murder is guilty of a misdemeanor punishable by imprisonment for not more 

than 1 year or a fine of not more than $1,000.00, or both. 

This Court has defined “serious or aggravated injury” as “a physical injury that requires 

immediate medical treatment or that causes disfigurement, impairment of health, or impairment 

of a part of the body.” People v Norris, 236 Mich App 411, 415 n 3; 600 NW2d 658 (1999) 

(quotation marks and citation omitted). In the context of a claim regarding the sufficiency of the 

evidence underlying an aggravated assault conviction, this Court previously stated: 

 Several persons testified at trial concerning complainant’s injuries. Their 

testimony revealed that he had been rendered unconscious by the blow to the 

head, and that his head hit concrete as he fell. He suffered cuts on his face, an eye 

injury, and a bruised neck. We hold this evidence was sufficient to justify a 

reasonable person in concluding that defendant inflicted a serious or aggravated 

injury on complainant. See People v Chadwick, 301 Mich 654, 656-657; 4 NW2d 

45 (1942). While complainant did not seek medical attention until the evening 

following the attack, the need to seek immediate medical attention is only one 

factor used in determining whether the element is established. 

 The defendant also argues that expert testimony is required on the 

question of whether a serious or aggravated injury has been inflicted. We know 

of no such requirement, and decline to imply one. Expert testimony is important 

if it can aid the trier of fact in resolving complex issues beyond the experience of 

a person not trained in a specific field. See MRE 702. We believe, however, that 

a jury is normally capable of applying the statutory language involved in the 

instant case without the need of expert testimony. [People v Brown, 97 Mich App 

606, 611-612; 296 NW2d 121 (1980).] 

 At trial, Mix testified that defendant pulled her out of the vehicle with her hair, in a way 

that caused her face to drag on the ground in the snow, and then kicked her on the side of her 

face. Similarly, Falise testified that “[defendant] started to kick at my sister’s head and I’m 

trying to pull her back into the car and somehow Kryjia pulled her on the other side of me and I 

can remember seeing . . . my sister was bleeding from the side of her face.” Therefore, the 

evidence at trial indicated that defendant’s act of dragging Mix out of the car and kicking her in 

the face caused her face to bleed. 

As the trial court concluded, given the testimony of these eyewitnesses, the evidence does 

not “preponderate[] so heavily against the verdict that it would be a miscarriage of justice to 

allow the verdict to stand.” Unger, 278 Mich App at 232. Neither the fact that the police 

officers responding to the scene did not specifically testify regarding whether Mix sustained 

injuries, nor the fact that there is no additional testimony or documentary evidence regarding 

Mix’s injuries, requires us to conclude that the verdict was against the great weight of the 

evidence. 

Therefore, the trial court’s denial of defendant’s motion for a new trial was not outside 

the range of reasonable and principled outcomes. See Young, 276 Mich App at 448. 
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D. AGGRAVATED DOMESTIC VIOLENCE 

 Lastly, defendant argues that his aggravated domestic violence conviction was against the 

great weight of the evidence because (1) defendant did not intend to assault Kryjia and (2) 

Kryjia’s injuries were not “serious or aggravated.” MCL 750.81a(2) provides: 

 (2) Except as provided in subsection (3), an individual who assaults his or 

her spouse or former spouse, an individual with whom he or she has or has had a 

dating relationship, an individual with whom he or she has had a child in 

common, or a resident or former resident of the same household without a weapon 

and inflicts serious or aggravated injury upon that individual without intending to 

commit murder or to inflict great bodily harm less than murder is guilty of a 

misdemeanor punishable by imprisonment for not more than 1 year or a fine of 

not more than $1,000.00, or both. 

As aggravated domestic violence is a type of aggravated assault, only distinguished by the victim 

of the assault, we conclude that the definition of “serious or aggravated injury” for purposes of 

aggravated domestic violence under MCL 750.81a(1) is the same definition for purposes of 

aggravated assault under MCL 750.81a(2). See Norris, 236 Mich App at 415 n 3. 

 Here, the trial court heard testimony that defendant grabbed Kryjia in order “to fight 

[her]” and then pushed her to the ground. Although Kryjia could not testify as to how she 

sustained her bruises, she testified that she was hit in the face after she and defendant fell to the 

ground. As a result of defendant’s actions, Kryjia suffered bruising to her face and eye, which 

worsened throughout the day.3

 She went to the hospital after the incident, despite not wishing to 

do so, and testified that her injuries did not require medical attention. 

 In light of this testimony, we reject defendant’s claim that “the evidence preponderates so 

heavily against the verdict that it would be a miscarriage of justice to allow the verdict to stand.” 

Unger, 278 Mich App at 232. “[A]n assault is either an attempt to commit a battery or an 

unlawful act that places another in reasonable apprehension of receiving an immediate battery, 

and [a] battery is the consummation of an assault.” People v Milton, 257 Mich App 467, 473; 

668 NW2d 387 (2003) (quotation marks and citation omitted; second alteration in original). 

Assault and battery are both specific intent crimes that require “either an intent to injure or an 

intent to put the victim in reasonable fear or apprehension of an immediate battery.” People v 

Datema, 448 Mich 585, 602; 533 NW2d 272 (1995) (quotation marks and citation omitted). 

Thus, with regard to defendant’s argument that his conduct did not constitute an assault, Kryjia’s 

testimony—which indicated that defendant grabbed her in order “to fight [her]” and pushed her 

 

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 The trial court specifically noted in its order denying defendant’s motion for a new trial that it 

determined that defendant’s conviction was not against the great weight of the evidence in 

“considering the testimony that Kryjia Bryson suffered a bruised face and eye and the 

photographs showing her injuries.” The trial court admitted photographs at trial showing the 

appearance of Kryjia’s eye following the incident, but this evidence was not included in the 

lower court file received on appeal. 
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to the ground—provided evidence that defendant either intended to injure her or intended to put 

her in reasonable fear or apprehension of an immediate battery. Defendant’s testimony at trial 

that he merely stopped Kryjia from fighting with his girlfriend, at which time he and Kryjia fell 

into a pile of snow, does not render the verdict against the great weight of the evidence. See 

Unger, 278 Mich App at 232 (stating that issues of witness credibility are for the trier of fact 

except under exceptional circumstances). 

Additionally, we cannot conclude, solely based on Kryjia’s testimony that her injuries did 

not require immediate medical attention, that the evidence did not reasonably support 

defendant’s conviction, Lacalamita, 286 Mich App at 469, or that this testimony caused the 

evidence to preponderate heavily against the verdict, Unger, 278 Mich App at 232. As stated 

supra, “the need to seek immediate medical attention is only one factor used in determining 

whether the element is established.” Brown, 97 Mich App at 611. 

In sum, given the testimony in the record regarding the nature of Kryjia’s injuries, the 

trial court’s conclusion, that defendant’s aggravated domestic violence conviction was not 

against the great weight of the evidence, is within the range of reasonable and principled 

outcomes. Young, 276 Mich App at 448. 

IV. CONCLUSION 

Defendant has failed to establish that his malicious destruction of personal property 

conviction was supported by insufficient evidence. Additionally, he has failed to demonstrate 

that the trial court abused its discretion when it denied his motion for a new trial. 

 Affirmed. 

/s/ Michael J. Riordan 

/s/ Kathleen Jansen 

/s/ Karen M. Fort Hood