In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

No. 00-2770

In the Matter of: Sheldon Bond,

Debtor.

Appeal of: Vicki A. Dempsey

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Central District of Illinois.

No. 99-3146 Richard Mills, Judge.

Argued March 2, 2001--Decided June 20, 2001

 Before Cudahy, Easterbrook, and Rovner,

Circuit Judges.

 Cudahy, Circuit Judge. Vicki Dempsey

represented debtors in four bankruptcy

cases before Central District of Illinois

courts. In each case, Dempsey requested

attorney’s fees in excess of $1,000, the

Central District’s presumptive attorney’s

fee limit for Chapter 13 bankruptcy

cases. However, the bankruptcy court

found that Dempsey failed to justify fees

in excess of the $1,000 limit in any of

her cases, and thus limited her fee

awards to $1,000 in each case. Dempsey

appealed to the district court. Following

a convoluted series of procedural moves

(involving a remand to the bankruptcy

court for clarification and the filing by

Dempsey of two "motions to reopen appeal"

in the district court), the district

court "affirmed" the bankruptcy court’s

fee award by denying Dempsey’s second

motion to reopen appeal.

I. BACKGROUND

 Two years ago, Dempsey first appeared

before this court to challenge the

Central District’s procedure for awarding

fees to Chapter 13 bankruptcy attorneys.

In In the Matter of Kindhart, 160 F.3d

1176 (7th Cir. 1998) [hereinafter

Kindhart I], Dempsey applied to the

bankruptcy court for--but was denied--

fees in excess of what at the time was an

$800 presumptive fee limit throughout the

Central District./1 The district court

affirmed the $800 fee award, and Dempsey

appealed to this court. Finding the $800
limit an abuse of discretion, this court

reversed and directed the district and

bankruptcy judges of the Central District

to reexamine the manner in which they

awarded fees to Chapter 13 bankruptcy

attorneys. In response to our order, the

district and bankruptcy judges agreed to

raise the Chapter 13 presumptive fee

limit to $1,000; to maintain a uniform

presumptive attorney’s fee limit for

Chapter 13 bankruptcy cases throughout

the district; and to review the

presumptive limit every 24 months. See

Order of the District Court for the

Central District of Illinois at 2 (Dec.

22, 1998). On remand, Dempsey’s fees were

adjusted to reflect the new base fee, but

she still felt short-changed and once

again appealed to this court. We held

that the new $1,000 fee limit was "fair

and reasonable," and thus did not modify

Dempsey’s new fee award. See In the

Matter of Kindhart, 167 F.3d 1158, 1159

(7th Cir. 1999) [hereinafter Kindhart

II].

 Armed now with four new cases, Dempsey

attempts to challenge once again the

Central District’s presumptive fee limit.

In each of these cases, Dempsey filed

motions in the bankruptcy court seeking

fees that exceeded the new $1,000 limit

by amounts ranging from $166 to $309. In

these motions, Dempsey presented detailed

records of the amount of time she had

spent on each case (totaling

approximately 10 to 12 hours per case),

and reported that she had billed this

time at the rate of $110 per hour. 

 Following a hearing on these motions

(which was attended by Dempsey’s partner,

but not by Dempsey herself), the

bankruptcy court ruled that Dempsey had

failed to justify in any of her four

cases a fee in excess of the $1,000

presumptive fee limit. Noting that

Dempsey bore the burden of establishing

the reasonableness of her fees, the

bankruptcy court maintained that it could

not conclude that the $110 hourly rate

was reasonable because "there are

experienced Chapter 13 bankruptcy

attorneys practicing in the Quincy area

whose hourly rate is in the $90 to $100

per hour range." See, e.g., In re

Hatfield, No. 95-72240, slip op. at 6

(Bankr. C.D. Ill. May 7, 1999). Further,

because Dempsey’s cases were some of the

"more simple and straightforward that the
Court and Dempsey have seen," the court

believed that Dempsey "would be

overcompensated by an award of attorney

fees above the $1,000 threshold." Id.

Accordingly, the bankruptcy court limited

Dempsey’s fee to $1,000 in each case. 

 Dempsey appealed to the district court.

That court consolidated the four cases

and decided the newly consolidated case

on the briefs submitted by Dempsey and

the trustee. On December 8, 1999, the

district court entered the following

judgment in each case:

IT IS ORDERED AND ADJUDGED pursuant to

Order entered by The Honorable Richard

Mills, the judgment of the bankruptcy

court for the Central District of

Illinois is VACATED, and this case is

REMANDED to the bankruptcy court for an

elaboration and a more detailed

explanation as to why that court denied

Appellant’s motion for approval of

additional fees. Case Closed.

Dempsey v. United States Bankruptcy Court

(In re Hatfield), No. 99-3144 (Bankr.

C.D. Ill. Dec. 8, 1999); Dempsey v.

United States Bankruptcy Court (In re

Huber), No. 99-3145 (Bankr. C.D. Ill.

Dec. 8, 1999); Dempsey v. United States

Bankruptcy Court (In re Bond), No. 99-

3146 (Bankr. C.D. Ill. Dec. 8, 1999);

Dempsey v. United States Bankruptcy Court

(In re Epperson), No. 99-3147 (Bankr.

C.D. Ill. Dec. 8, 1999). 

 More than four months after the district

court’s remand, the bankruptcy court

still had not entered a new judgment.

Frustrated by the delay, Dempsey filed a

"motion to reopen appeal"/2 in the

district court on April 20, 2000, asking

that the district court allow her

requested fees in their entirety,

establish local bankruptcy attorney’s fee

rules for all judges in the Central

District and provide any other

appropriate relief. Before the district

court could address the merits of

Dempsey’s motion to reopen appeal, the

bankruptcy court ruled. 

 Not surprisingly, the bankruptcy court

once again limited Dempsey’s fees to

$1,000 per case. In addition to restating

its prior reasons for denying Dempsey’s

excess fee requests, the bankruptcy

court’s new opinion set forth numerous
general conclusions, but few specific

factual findings. Among the more specific

new findings were the following. First,

the court complained that Dempsey had

only produced an "unverified itemization

setting forth her time expended and

services rendered." In re Bond, et. al,

Nos. 97-74395, 98-70007, 95-72240, 98-

73553, slip op. at 2 (Bankr. C.D. Ill.

Apr. 27, 2000). Second, the bankruptcy

court found that Dempsey failed to

adequately delegate non-legal work to

non-attorney members of her staff. As a

result, the bankruptcy court believed

that at least some of the hours expended

by Dempsey should have been billed at a

staff rate, rather than at her higher

attorney’s rate. Third, the bankruptcy

court alleged that "Dempsey ha[d] never

filed an application to be hired by the

estate as required by Section 330 of the

Bankruptcy Code . . . . Of more concern,

she ha[d] never sought authority of the

Court to represent the estate postconfirmation." Id. at 12. From the

record, it appears that Dempsey was given

no opportunity to respond to these

concerns (although some of them were

raised for the first time in the

bankruptcy court’s second opinion) before

the bankruptcy court once again denied

her fees. 

 Because the bankruptcy court finally

ruled before the district court could

address Dempsey’s motion to reopen

appeal, the district court denied

Dempsey’s motion to reopen appeal as

moot. However, the district court

directed Dempsey in an order dated May 2

to file another motion (but providing no

time limit for doing so) if "she

continues in her position that these

cases should be reopened." In re Bond,

No. 99-3146, slip op. at 2 (C.D. Ill. May

2, 2000). In accordance with this

directive, Dempsey filed a second motion

to reopen appeal in the district court on

May 11, 2000, more than 10 days after the

bankruptcy court entered its final order.

This motion, which sought to have the

district court review the bankruptcy

court’s decision to deny her fees, is

best viewed as a short appellate brief,

or perhaps, if generously construed, a

notice of appeal. Finding the case "ripe

for adjudication," In re Bond, 249 B.R.

891, 894 (C.D. Ill. June 29, 2000), the

district court denied Dempsey’s second

motion to reopen appeal on the merits,
effectively affirming the bankruptcy

court’s final order. Dempsey now appeals

to this court.

II. DISCUSSION

 On appeal, Dempsey argues that the

district court erred by refusing to award

the requested fees. Before we are able to

address the merits of Dempsey’s argument,

we must first address the intervenor

trustee’s contention that we may not

exercise jurisdiction over this cause--a

problem that arises out of the convoluted

procedure that Dempsey used (partially at

the district court’s direction) to appeal

the bankruptcy court’s decision on

remand. We therefore begin with the

"always stimulating and hopefully

fruitful consideration of technical

jurisdictional points." Fruehauf Corp. v.

Jartran, Inc. (In re Jartran, Inc.), 886

F.2d 859, 866 (7th Cir. 1989). 

A. Jurisdiction

 Under 28 U.S.C. sec. 158, a party may

appeal the final judgment of a bankruptcy

court to an appropriate district court.

However, in order to perfect the appeal

(and provide the district court with

jurisdiction), the party must file a

notice of appeal with the clerk of the

bankruptcy court within 10 days of the

bankruptcy court’s decision. See Fed. R.

Bankr. P. 8002(a). Rule 8002(a) describes

conditions precedent that are "mandatory

and jurisdictional." See Stelpflug v.

Federal Land Bank of St. Paul, 790 F.2d

47, 49 (7th Cir. 1986); see also In re

Schultz Mfg. Fabricating Co., 956 F.2d

686, 689 (7th Cir. 1992) (district court

deprived of jurisdiction when appellant

fails to file timely notice of appeal).

 In this case, Dempsey and the district

court appear to have agreed to waive the

formalities of the Federal Rules of

Bankruptcy Procedure. When Dempsey

appealed the bankruptcy court’s decision

following the district court’s remand,

she did not do so by filing a notice of

appeal in the bankruptcy court within 10

days of the court’s decision. Instead,

she filed a motion to reopen appeal in

the district court, more than 10 days

after the bankruptcy court’s decision. In

response to this novel procedure, the

intervenor trustee argues that the

district court did not have jurisdiction
over Dempsey’s appeal because her motion:

(1) was not filed with the clerk of the

bankruptcy court, (2) was not a notice of

appeal, and (3) even if it was a notice

of appeal, was not filed within the 10-

day window provided by Rule 8002(a) (nor

did Dempsey seek an extension of the

filing time under Rule 8002(c)). Because

any one of these alleged defects can

deprive the district court of

jurisdiction, we devote the bulk of our

discussion to the issue of timeliness, as

did the parties in their briefs.

 Dempsey attempts to refute the trustee’s

argument by noting that when the district

court denied her first motion to reopen

appeal, it explicitly told her to file

another motion if "she continues in her

position that these cases should be

reopened." In light of this ruling,

Dempsey argues that the district court

properly exercised jurisdiction over her

appeal because it specifically assured

her in its ruling on her first motion

that she could file a new motion if she

was dissatisfied with the bankruptcy

court’s decision on remand. Even if the

district court could not derive

jurisdiction from its assurances to

Dempsey, she believes that another, inde

pendent, basis for jurisdiction lies in

the fact that the district court

implicitly retained jurisdiction over the

case when it remanded the case to the

bankruptcy court for further elaboration.

We address, and reject, these arguments

in turn.

 1. The "Unique Circumstances" Doctrine

 Dempsey’s first argument reduces to a

claim that the happenings below call for

application of "a narrow exception to the

general rule prohibiting an untimely

appeal . . . known as the ’unique

circumstances’ doctrine." Varhol v.

National R.R. Passenger Corp., 909 F.2d

1557, 1561 (7th Cir. 1990) (en banc). The

unique circumstances doctrine was first

recognized in Harris Truck Lines, Inc. v.

Cherry Meat Packers, Inc., 371 U.S. 215

(1962), which held that a court of

appeals should defer to a district

court’s finding of excusable neglect

under then-Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 73(a) when a party relies on

the district court’s erroneous extension

of time to file a notice of appeal. Two
years later, the doctrine was extended by

Thompson v. INS, 375 U.S. 384 (1964), in

which the Supreme Court held that "unique

circumstances were present because the

district court had [erroneously] ruled

that the motion for a new trial was filed

in ’ample time’ and the party, relying on

that determination, believed that the

time for taking an appeal would not

continue to run pending final disposition

of the motion." 4A Charles Alan Wright &

Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and

Procedure sec. 1168 at 501 (2d ed. 1987).

 Subsequent Supreme Court decisions have

narrowed the unique circumstances

doctrine to the point where its continued

vitality is in question. See, e.g.,

Varhol, 909 F.2d at 1562. Nonetheless,

the doctrine survives, although we only

apply it as follows: "when a party

performs ’an act which, if properly done,

postponed the deadline for filing an

appeal,’ and the party relied on the

district court’s conclusion that the act

had been properly done, the appeal is

timely if filed within the mistaken new

deadline." Varhol, 909 F.2d at 1562

(quoting Thompson, 375 U.S. at 387). In

addition, the doctrine applies only when

a party has received "specific assurance

by a judicial officer" that the necessary

act has been properly done. Osterneck v.

Ernst & Whinney, 489 U.S. 169, 179

(1989).

 Here, the "unique circumstance" relied

upon by Dempsey is the district court’s

order denying her first motion to reopen

appeal. As noted, the order contains one

sentence which states that the district

court is denying Dempsey’s first motion

to reopen appeal, but that she can file

another motion if "she continues in her

position that these cases should be

reopened." In light of Green v. Bisby,

869 F.2d 1070, 1072 (7th Cir. 1989),

which held that a minute order does not

constitute an affirmative representation,

it is difficult to interpret the one

sentence in the district court’s order

here as the kind of "specific assurance

from a judicial officer" that Osterneck

contemplated as allowing for an exception

to otherwise strict notice of appeal

rules. This is especially true because

Dempsey--unlike the parties in other

"unique circumstance" cases--did not even

request an extension of time from the

court./3 Thus, the district court did
not enter its order with the intent of

assuring Dempsey of the proper timing for

filing an appeal.

 More importantly, even if one sentence

of a judge’s order could generally

constitute an assurance that a motion to

reopen appeal would adequately substitute

for a proper notice of appeal, the order

at issue here does not contain any

"specific assurance" regarding the

timeliness of Dempsey’s action. Instead,

the order merely states that Dempsey’s

"[first] motion [to reopen appeal] is

moot and that if she continues in her

position that these cases should be reopened, she must file a new motion." It

is thus difficult to conclude that the

district court intended to grant Dempsey

an extension of time and that Dempsey

relied on this extension, as required by

Varhol. Instead, the fact that the

district court’s order suggested no time

limit might have caused Dempsey to look

at the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy

Procedure, where she might have

discovered the proper procedure for

filing a valid notice of appeal.

Accordingly, the district court’s order

does not constitute the type of specific

assurance that triggers the "unique

circumstances" doctrine.

 2. Retained Jurisdiction

 Dempsey also argues that the district

court retained jurisdiction over this

cause when it first remanded to the

bankruptcy court for an elaboration of

the bankruptcy court’s reasoning. This

would be an easy argument to make had the

district court explicitly stated that it

was retaining jurisdiction during the

proceedings on remand, the method used by

most courts in this circuit when they

wish to exert a continuing supervisory

role over a dismissed case. See, e.g.,

Kindhart I, 160 F.3d at 1179. Here,

however, the court took the road less

traveled, acting as if it had retained

jurisdiction even though nothing in the

court’s actions at the time it remanded

Dempsey’s case really indicated an intent

to do so. We must thus determine whether

the district court somehow implicitly

retained jurisdiction over Dempsey’s

case.

 Of most help to our determination is
McCall-Bey v. Franzen, 777 F.2d 1178 (7th

Cir. 1985). In McCall-Bey, a prison

inmate’s case was dismissed with

prejudice after the inmate entered into a

settlement agreement with defendant

prison officials. Subsequently, the

inmate complained to the district court

that the settlement agreement was not

being adhered to, and the district court

ruled on the merits. On appeal, we held

that the district court only had

jurisdiction to entertain the inmate’s

complaint if the district court had

exercised a "deliberate retention of

jurisdiction." Id. at 1190. 

 Unfortunately, the district court in

McCall-Bey did not explicitly retain

jurisdiction when it dismissed the

inmate’s suit. Nonetheless, we found that

the district court had retained

jurisdiction, employing reasoning that is

worth quoting at some length:

[W]e know that settlements between

prisoners and prison officials often

contemplate a continuing supervisory role

for the federal court[,] and we know that

when the plaintiff wrote his letter to

the judge, the judge forthwith

characterized it as a petition to enforce

the agreement and proceeded to do so. The

judge would not have been likely to grant

such a petition in a case over which he

had no jurisdiction because he had

dismissed the case outright months

earlier. His response is therefore some

evidence that he had indeed intended to

make his dismissal, though outright in

form, conditional in substance . . . . 

Id. at 1189. Thus, two factors primarily

motivated our finding in McCall-Bey: (1)

the continued role for the court that was

contemplated after dismissal and (2) the

court’s acting as if it had retained

jurisdiction./4 Because these factors

con-stitute the bare minimum requirements

for a finding of retained jurisdiction,

see id., both factors must be present for

a district court to implicitly retain

jurisdiction.

 Here, the McCall-Bey conditions are not

completely satisfied. Unlike settlement

agreements, remands for clarification do

not necessarily contemplate further

proceedings at the appellate level. For

example, we have stated that when a

district court finds that the Social
Security Administration has failed to

articulate a basis for its decision and

remands to the agency to rectify this

deficiency, the hope is that the remand

order is sufficiently definitive to

"enable the dispute to be finally

resolved on remand" without recourse to

another appeal. Richmond v. Chater, 94

F.3d 263, 268 (7th Cir. 1996); see also

Forney v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 266, 270 (1998)

(agreeing with court of appeals’

determination that "it would be ’error

for the district court to attempt to

retain jurisdiction’ after remanding the

case" for further proceedings pursuant to

sentence four of 42 U.S.C. sec. 405(g)).

The district court clearly entertained a

similar hope here. At the time it

remanded Dempsey’s cases to the

bankruptcy court, the district court

vacated the bankruptcy court’s original

judgment, leaving open the possibility

(however remote) that the bankruptcy

court would rule in Dempsey’s favor on

remand. Further, the district court

declined to entertain Dempsey’s first

motion to reopen appeal even though the

bankruptcy court had ruled against

Dempsey on remand, asking her to file a

second motion to reopen appeal only if

she continued to disagree with the result

below. Thus, while the district court’s

ruling on the merits in response to

Dempsey’s second motion to reopen appeal

does at least partially indicate a belief

that it had retained jurisdiction, the

balance of the district court’s actions

do not rise to the kind of "deliberate

retention of jurisdiction" that must be

shown when a court fails to explicitly

retain jurisdiction at the time it

remands a case.

B. Further Matters

 Because the district court erroneously

asserted jurisdiction over this cause,

the merits of Dempsey’s appeal are not

before us. Nonetheless, the happenings

below raise several important concerns.

Some of these concerns are so fundamental

that we conclude by briefly touching on a

few of them.

 First, even if we had reached the merits

of Dempsey’s appeal, we would likely have

upheld the lower courts’ decision to deny

her request for excess fees. Attorney fee

awards are reviewed for an abuse of

discretion, see Munson v. Milwaukee Bd.
of Sch. Dirs., 969 F.2d 266, 269-70 (7th

Cir. 1992), and it would have been

difficult to conclude that the lower

courts abused their discretion by

limiting Dempsey’s fees in these cases,

especially in light of the valid concerns

raised by the bankruptcy and district

courts about the propriety of Dempsey’s

requests. For example, Dempsey billed all

of the work she did in connection with

each case--including work that should

have been done by her non-legal staff--at

her hourly rate. As noted by both the

bankruptcy judge and the district court

judge, attorneys may not bill non-legal

tasks (such as typing) at the rate

commanded by an attorney, and it was

inappropriate for Dempsey to do so. See,

e.g., In re Wildman, 72 B.R. 700, 727

(Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1987). Accordingly,

regardless of whatever problems existed

with the Central District’s handling of

Dempsey’s fee request, Dempsey’s request

had its own share of problems that would

have prevented us from finding an abuse

of discretion in the Central District’s

decision to deny her some of her

requested fees. 

 However, in spite of Dempsey’s failure

to obtain the fees she requested, we note

that she has set forth several reasonable

arguments regarding the manner in which

her fee requests were handled. For

example, the bankruptcy court never

provided her with an opportunity to

address its concerns with her billing

methods prior to ruling on her request,

choosing instead to surprise her with

these concerns in its final opinion (by

which time Dempsey could no longer rebut

the bankruptcy court). In its final

opinion, the bankruptcy court makes much

of the fact that Dempsey sent her partner

in her stead at the hearing on attorney’s

fees, but Dempsey’s partner was just as

capable of hearing the bankruptcy court’s

concerns as was Dempsey. The bankruptcy

court did not raise any concerns with

Dempsey’s partner, and Dempsey’s partner

thus rested on the motions, a perfectly

understandable decision given that no

one-- not the bankruptcy court, not the

trustee, not any of the debtors--had

objected to Dempsey’s fee request.

Because of this treatment, Dempsey has

requested that we require the Central

District to adopt the rule of NAACP v.

City of Evergreen, Ala., 812 F.2d 1332

(11th Cir. 1987). In NAACP, the Eleventh
Circuit held that a court "should give

the [fee] applicant an adequate

opportunity to respond to the court’s

concerns regarding the fee application

and to correct perceived inadequacies in

that application before making its

decision. This is particularly necessary

in the situation when the fee application

is unopposed." 812 F.2d at 1338. We agree

that this seems to be a useful approach

and suggest that the judges of the

Central District bear it in mind when

deciding future fee applications. 

 Also puzzling is the bankruptcy court’s

characterization of Dempsey’s signed fee

application as unverified. The following

reasoning is apposite:

The Bankruptcy Rules neither require nor

provide for the verification of fee

applications. Compare Bankruptcy Rule

2016 with Bankruptcy Rule 9011(b). See

also former Bankruptcy Rules 219(a) and

911(b). Nonetheless, the practice has

developed in this and other jurisdictions

of submitting verified applications for

allowance of compensation and

reimbursement of expenses. A

verification, as used in connection with

fee applications in bankruptcy cases, is

nothing more than a confirmation of the

truth and correctness of the time records

submitted to the Court. Its object is to

assure the good faith and authenticity of

those records. A verification is not a

substitute for testimony in support of a

contested fee application, nor does it

limit the Court’s inquiry as to the

services rendered or reasonableness of

the fee sought. In this Court’s view, the

signature of the attorney or other

professional who submits a fee

application constitutes a certificate by

him of the correctness of his time

records of services actually rendered.

See Bankruptcy Rule 9011(a). A

verification is not required in order to

impress upon an attorney’s conscience the

necessity of truthfulness in the matters

set forth in the fee application.

In re Jensen-Farley Pictures, Inc., 47

B.R. 557, 581-82 (Bankr. D. Utah 1985).

Accordingly, Dempsey’s signature on her

fee application ought to suffice for the

purpose of establishing the truthfulness

of her billing records. Of course, the

bankruptcy court may question Dempsey (or

her partner) regarding her records, but
the fact that her submitted records were

unverified ought not, on its own, be

fatal to Dempsey’s fee application. 

 We are perhaps most concerned that the

Central District seems not to be adhering

to its own bankruptcy fee order, which we

approved in Kindhart II. As noted, that

order required the Central District to

establish a presumptive fee limit that

would be uniform throughout the district

and reviewed every two years. The Central

District does not appear to be adhering

to either of these conditions. Dempsey

represents that, at the time she filed

her initial brief in this matter, the

courts in Danville and Peoria had already

raised their presumptive fee limits to

$1,500. With the Springfield court’s

limit apparently still at $1,000, the

Central District is not applying a

uniform presumptive fee limit in each of

its bankruptcy courts. In addition,

Dempsey represented at oral argument

that, while she was not entirely certain,

she believed the judges of the Central

District had not met in December or

thereabouts to review the $1,000

presumptive fee limit, as mandated by the

order’s promise to review the fee limit

every two years. We noted in Kindhart II

that "[i]t can be expected that the

judges will consider any future

bankruptcy fee issues which may arise

from time to time, including those

mentioned by appellant in her response,

and, if appropriate, will make any needed

adjustments." 167 F.3d at 160. We

continue to hold to this expectation and

trust that the Central District will act

quickly to comply with its own order. 

 We conclude by requesting that Dempsey

and the judges attempt to reach a truce,

for it is apparent from both parties’

documents that neither appropriately

respects the other. As we hope we have

shown, both parties have raised valid

points during the course of this

litigation. There was thus no need for

Dempsey to threaten the district court

with "another trip to Chicago" if it did

not reverse the bankruptcy court. See

Memorandum in Support of Motion to Reopen

Appeal and Response to Bankruptcy Court’s

Order of April 27, 2000 at 2 (May 11,

2000). We are sure that the judges of the

Central District do not enjoy--nor do

they deserve--these sorts of threats, no

matter how aggrieved Dempsey feels by
their rulings. Nonetheless, Dempsey’s

frustration is understandable given the

Central District’s apparent inability to

follow its agreed-upon method of

determining fees. We trust that these

passions may ebb once Dempsey begins

billing her services at appropriate rates

and the judges before whom she appears

adhere to their own order.

III. Conclusion

 Because the district court lacked

jurisdiction to entertain Dempsey’s

appeal, we vacate the district court’s

decision to deny her second motion to

reopen appeal, dated May 11, 2000, and

remand with instructions to dismiss the

motion for lack of jurisdiction.

Vacated and Remanded,

with Instructions.

FOOTNOTES

/1 The Central District holds court in six places:

Champaign/ Urbana, Danville, Peoria, Quincy, Rock

Island and Springfield. However, the District

maintains bankruptcy courts only inDanville,

Peoria and Springfield.

/2 Dempsey’s use of motions to reopen appeal is odd,

and her motions are difficult to characterize,

due in no small part to the fact that none of her

motions cites a statute or procedural rule that

grants a party the right to request the reopening

of an appeal. Our best guess is that Dempsey was

relying upon 11 U.S.C. sec. 350(b), which allows

a case to be reopened "in the court in which such

case was closed to administer assets, to accord

relief to the debtor, or for other cause." See

also Fed. R. Bankr. P. 5010. However, a review of

sec. 350(b), and the case law interpreting it,

shows that it is an inappropriate vehicle for the

purposes for which Dempsey was apparently employing it. Accordingly, we treat Dempsey’s motions

to reopen appeal as what they really were. Thus,

her first motion to reopen appeal, which requested that the district court enforce the terms of

its remand, is roughly equivalent to a writ of

mandamus issued by an appellate court.

/3 Even if Dempsey had requested an extension of

time from the district court, she would have been

in error; Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure

8002(c) only allows the bankruptcy court to grant

extensions of time for the filing of notices of

appeal.

/4 We note that McCall-Bey may be providing too

lenient a standard. Kokkonen v. Guardian Life
Ins. Co., 511 U.S. 375, 380-81 (1994), appears to

require more than McCall-Bey did from a district

court wishing to retain jurisdiction--in particular, implying that the court’s retention must be

express (either a statement in the judgment, or

the incorporation into the judgment of terms

drafted by the parties). However, because the

facts of this case do not satisfy even the more

lenient McCall-Bey standard, we need not decide

whether or how Kokkonen modifies McCall-Bey.