[Cite as State v. Cooper, 2011-Ohio-5017.]

 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MONTGOMERY COUNTY, OHIO 

STATE OF OHIO : 

Plaintiff-Appellee : C.A. CASE NO. 24321 

vs. : T.C. CASE NO. 09CR4069/1 

JAYTRON COOPER : (Criminal Appeal from 

 Common Pleas Court) 

Defendant-Appellant : 

 . . . . . . . . . 

 O P I N I O N

 Rendered on the 30th day of September, 2011. 

 . . . . . . . . . 

Mathias H. Heck, Jr., Pros. Attorney; Timothy J. Cole, Asst. Pros. 

Attorney, Atty. Reg. No. 0084117, P.O. Box 972, Dayton, OH 45422 

Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellee 

Andrea G. Ostrowski, Atty. Reg. No. 0075318, 25 East Central Avenue, 

Suite 4, Springboro, OH 45066 

Attorney for Defendant-Appellant 

 . . . . . . . . . 

GRADY, P.J.: 

{¶ 1} Defendant, Jaytron Cooper, appeals from his conviction 

and sentence for possession of crack cocaine and trafficking in 

marijuana. 

{¶ 2} On December 2, 2009, at 6:53 p.m., an unidentified male 
2

called 911 and reported that he had heard six gunshots and saw 

three African-American males run into the apartment at 5150 

Northcutt Place in Harrison Township. Montgomery County sheriff’s 

deputies were dispatched to the scene. Deputy Hutson went to the 

back door while another deputy watched the front door. Deputy 

Hutson could hear a television or radio playing inside the apartment 

and, after Hutson knocked on the door several times, without any 

response, the volume was turned up. 

{¶ 3} At 7:11 p.m., a person identifying himself as Shawn 

Parker called 911. Parker reported that his son had sent him a 

text message saying that he was being robbed and held against his 

will in the apartment at 5150 Northcutt Place. The police 

dispatcher advised deputies on the scene that the caller’s son 

said he could see the responding officers outside, and that he 

was being held inside a closet upstairs. 

{¶ 4} While standing by the back door, Deputy Hutson saw a 

male briefly stick his head out of second story bathroom window 

and then quickly close that window. Deputy Hutson knocked louder 

on the back door to overcome the sound of the radio or television. 

 Moments later, Defendant opened the door. When Defendant saw 

the officers, he immediately slammed the door shut. Believing 

that emergency circumstances existed justifying a warrantless 

entry into the residence, officers entered the apartment. 
3

{¶ 5} Inside the residence police found six men in the living 

room, another man coming down the stairs, and another man upstairs. 

 Officers immediately began searching for the victim of the 

reported robbery/abduction, but no victim was found. While in 

the kitchen area, police noticed a very strong odor of marijuana 

and observed, in plain view, a plastic cup half full of marijuana 

lying in an open trash can. A second search for the victim was 

conducted by police because none of the people present admitted 

to being the victim of a robbery/abduction. During that second 

search police looked inside closets and under the bed. In a first 

floor closet, police discovered a bulletproof vest. In an upstairs 

bedroom, when police lifted the mattress to look under the bed, 

they discovered several firearms. Police recognized many of the 

individuals in the apartment as persons who had previously been 

trespassed off the property, and they were arrested. 

{¶ 6} After police removed all of the individuals from that 

apartment, they obtained a search warrant for the premises. During 

execution of that search warrant, in the upstairs bedroom police 

recovered from under the mattress the multiple firearms they had 

previously seen while searching for the victim. Also in that 

bedroom, police discovered an electric utility bill for the 

residence in Defendant’s name, and a cigar box inside a tub full 

of men’s clothing. Inside that cigar box police found a small 
4

plastic baggie containing crack cocaine, and a large plastic baggie 

filled with twelve smaller baggies that each contained a small 

amount of marijuana. The small baggies of marijuana were packaged 

for sale. A search of the remainder of that apartment produced 

baggies with pills in them, digital scales, and other drugs and 

guns. After the search, Defendant told Detective Reed that he 

lived at that apartment and had been home sleeping since 9:00 a.m. 

{¶ 7} Defendant was indicted on one count of possession of 

crack cocaine, less than one gram, in violation of R.C. 2925.11(A), 

and one count of trafficking in marijuana in violation of R.C. 

2925.03(A)(2). Three one-year firearm specifications, R.C. 

2941.141, were attached to each count. Defendant filed a motion 

to suppress the evidence, which the trial court overruled following 

a hearing. At trial, Defendant’s theory was that the drugs and 

guns found in his apartment were not his and must have been put 

there by someone else who was present. 

{¶ 8} Defendant was found guilty of both charges and two of 

the three firearm specifications attached to each count. The trial 

court sentenced Defendant to concurrent one year prison terms for 

possession of crack cocaine and trafficking in marijuana, and 

merged all of the firearm specifications and imposed one additional 

and consecutive one year term on those, for a total sentence of 

two years. 
5

{¶ 9} Defendant timely appealed to this court from his 

conviction and sentence. 

FIRST ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR

{¶ 10} “THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT OVERRULED APPELLANT’S 

MOTION TO SUPPRESS.” 

{¶ 11} Defendant argues that the trial court erred in denying 

his motion to suppress the evidence because his Fourth Amendment 

rights were violated when police unlawfully entered his home 

without a warrant and conducted a warrantless search of the 

premises. If the initial entry by police into Defendant’s home 

was unlawful, that tainted the warrant which authorized the 

subsequent search which produced the cocaine and marijuana that 

form the basis for the charges in this case, and that evidence 

must be suppressed. The trial court concluded that police entry 

into Defendant’s home was lawful because it fell within a 

well-recognized exception to the warrant requirement, the exigent 

circumstances or emergency exception, and overruled the motion 

to suppress on that basis. 

{¶ 12} In State v. Overholser (July 25, 1997), Clark App. No. 

96CA0073, this court stated: 

{¶ 13} “The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution 

protects people from ‘unreasonable’ searches and seizures. 

Warrantless searches and seizures are per se unreasonable under 
6

the Fourth Amendment, subject to only a few well recognized 

exceptions. Katz v. United States (1967), 389 U.S. 347, 88 S.Ct. 

507, 19 L.Ed.2d 576. One such recognized exception is the exigent 

circumstances or ‘emergency’ exception. Pursuant to that rule, 

a police officer, even absent a warrant or probable cause, may 

lawfully enter a structure, including a private home, when the 

totality of the facts and circumstances known to the officer gives 

rise to a reasonable belief that immediate entry is necessary to 

either protect that property or assist people inside who may be 

in danger or in need of immediate aid. Ringel, Searches, Seizures, 

Arrests and Confessions, Section 10.5(a); Katz, Ohio Arrest, Search 

and Seizure, Section 10.01-10.03. 

{¶ 14} “A myriad of factual circumstances may give rise to an 

emergency situation and the corresponding need for an immediate 

warrantless entry. See Wayne v. United States (D.C.Cir., 1963), 

318 F.2d 205, 212; Ringel, Searches, Seizures, Arrests and 

Confessions, Section 10.5(a), fn 41 and 42. When police reasonably 

believe that a burglary is in progress or has occurred at a 

particular structure, an immediate warrantless entry undertaken 

to investigate and protect that property and assist any victims 

inside who may be in danger or in need of immediate aid has been 

upheld by the courts as a reasonable search. See Lafave, Search 

and Seizure, Section 6.6(a) and (b). 
7

{¶ 15} “The concept of emergency circumstances justifying an 

immediate warrantless entry by police has long been recognized 

in Ohio. State v. Hyde (1971), 26 Ohio App.2d 32, 268 N.E.2d 820; 

State v. Roach (1982), 8 Ohio App.3d 42, 455 N.E.2d 1328; State 

v. Morris (November 29, 1989), Montgomery App. No. 10992, 

unreported. However, the warrantless entry and search must be 

limited in duration and scope to the purpose justifying that 

intrusion, including only that which is necessary to alleviate 

the emergency and the dangers associated therewith. Mincey v. 

Arizona (1978), 437 U.S. 385, 98 S.Ct. 2408, 57 L.Ed.2d 290. During 

a warrantless emergency entry police may seize contraband which 

is in plain view. Michigan v. Tyler (1978), 436 U.S. 499, 98 S.Ct. 

1942, 56 L.Ed.2d 486; Thompson v. Louisiana (1984), 469 U.S. 17, 

105 S.Ct. 409, 83 L.Ed.2d 246.” 

{¶ 16} Defendant challenges the initial warrantless entry into 

his home by police. Thus, the question becomes whether at the 

time police entered Defendant’s home they had a reasonable belief, 

based upon the totality of the facts and circumstances, that there 

might be a person inside that residence who was in danger or in 

need of immediate aid. Overholser. Based upon the particular 

facts of this case, we answer that question in the affirmative 

and conclude, as did the trial court, that police entry into 

Defendant’s home was reasonable and constitutionally permissible. 
8

{¶ 17} Police were dispatched to Defendant’s home as a result 

of a 911 call wherein an anonymous caller reported that he heard 

six gunshots and saw three African-American males run into the 

apartment at 5150 Northcutt Place. Police repeatedly knocked on 

the door for some 20-25 minutes but no one answered the door. 

Police were aware there were people inside that apartment because 

in response to the police knocking, a radio or television inside 

the apartment was turned up louder. 

{¶ 18} Shortly after officers arrived on the scene, a second 

911 call came in. This second call was made by a person who 

identified himself as Shawn Parker. Calls from identified citizen 

informants are recognized as possessing greater reliability than 

tips received from anonymous callers or known criminal informants, 

and therefore a strong showing as to other indicia of reliability 

may be unnecessary. City of Maumee v. Weisner, 87 Ohio St.3d 295, 

1999-Ohio-68. Parker reported that his son had sent him a text 

message saying he was being held against his will upstairs in the 

apartment at 5150 Northcutt Place, and the occupants had attempted 

to rob him. The police dispatcher advised deputies at the scene 

that according to Parker, his son could see the responding officers 

outside, and that his son was being held in a closet upstairs. 

{¶ 19} While standing by the back door, Deputy Hutson looked 

up and observed a man stick his head out of a second story bathroom 
9

window and then quickly close that window. Deputy Hutson began 

knocking on the door more loudly. In response, Defendant finally 

opened the door. When Defendant observed the officers, he 

immediately slammed the door shut. 

{¶ 20} Under these facts and circumstances, it was reasonable 

for police to believe that the reported robbery victim who was 

being held hostage, as well as the perpetrators of the robbery, 

were still inside the home, and that the victim might be in danger 

or in need of immediate aid. Overholser. Accordingly, police 

were privileged to enter the home without a warrant for the sole 

purpose of looking for the victim and rendering any assistance 

the victim might need. Furthermore, the brief 20-25 minute delay 

here between the 911 calls and police entry into Defendant’s home 

does not negate the exigency that existed. State v. Berry, 167 

Ohio App.3d 206, 2006-Ohio-3035. 

{¶ 21} Defendant argues that even if police were justified in 

initially entering Defendant’s home to search for the reported 

robbery victim that was being held hostage, the second search of 

the home police conducted exceeded the duration and scope of the 

purpose justifying the initial intrusion, to alleviate the 

emergency and the dangers associated therewith. Overholser. 

{¶ 22} The evidence demonstrates that upon entering Defendant’s 

home, police immediately conducted an initial search for the 
10

victim. During that initial search, police rounded up all of the 

people that they found inside the home. When asked by police, 

none of the people present came forward and admitted to being the 

robbery/abduction victim. Based upon information contained in 

the second 911 call, Sergeant Adkins believed, and reasonably so, 

 that there could still be another person inside the home, a robbery 

victim who was being held hostage in a less visible location such 

as a closet or under a bed, who might be injured or in need of 

immediate aid. Berry. Accordingly, Sergeant Adkins ordered a 

second search of the home for the victim. This time police looked 

inside closets, and under the bed, but properly limited the scope 

of their search to places where a person or body can hide or be 

hidden. It was during this second search that police discovered 

several firearms when they lifted a mattress to look under the 

bed, and marijuana in plain view in the kitchen. 

{¶ 23} As we noted in Overholser, 

{¶ 24} “Every Fourth amendment question turns on the issue of 

reasonableness, and every determination of reasonableness is sui 

generis. When in an investigation of crime a search and seizure 

is impelled by reasons of genuine physical danger to any person, 

it presents concerns and needs that are not easily served by a 

slow, deliberative process. Actions are to be judged on a common 

sense standard, . . .” 
11

{¶ 25} Here, applying a common sense review to all of the facts 

and circumstances known to police on the scene, we conclude that 

their entry into Defendant’s home was reasonable and lawful. The 

contraband police observed in plain view during their warrantless 

emergency entry could be seized. Overholser. Their observations 

could likewise be the basis for a warrant permitting seizure of 

the contraband, which is what occurred. Defendant’s Fourth 

Amendment rights were not violated, and the trial court properly 

overruled his motion to suppress the evidence. 

{¶ 26} Defendant’s first assignment of error is overruled. 

SECOND ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR

{¶ 27} “THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT 

ADMITTED HIGHLY PREJUDICIAL EVIDENCE THAT WAS NOT PROBATIVE.” 

{¶ 28} Defendant argues that the trial court abused its 

discretion by admitting into evidence, over his objection, various 

items found in Defendant’s apartment during execution of the search 

warrant, including baggies and bottles of pills, a bulletproof 

vest, a video surveillance camera, and loose ammunition. 

Defendant claims that these items were never connected to him and 

are not relevant to the specific charges against him. Defendant 

argues that whatever minimal probative value these items may have 

had was far outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, and thus 

this evidence should therefore have been excluded. Evid.R. 
12

403(A). Defendant further argues that the prosecutor used these 

items found in Defendant’s apartment as a basis to suggest that 

Defendant engages in a lot of criminal activity, including drug 

dealing, and that he was acting in conformity with that bad 

character on this particular occasion, in violation of Evid.R. 

404(B). 

{¶ 29} With respect to the admission or exclusion of evidence, 

the trial court has broad discretion and its decision in such 

matters will not be disturbed by a reviewing court absent an abuse 

of discretion that has caused material prejudice. State v. Noling, 

98 Ohio St.3d 44, 781 N.E.2d 88, 2002-Ohio-7044. 

{¶ 30} “‘Abuse of discretion’ has been defined as an attitude 

that is unreasonable, arbitrary or unconscionable. Huffman v. Hair 

Surgeon, Inc. (1985), 19 Ohio St.3d 83, 87, 19 OBR 123, 126, 482 

N.E.2d 1248, 1252. It is to be expected that most instances of 

abuse of discretion will result in decisions that are simply 

unreasonable, rather than decisions that are unconscionable or 

arbitrary. 

{¶ 31} “A decision is unreasonable if there is no sound 

reasoning process that would support that decision. It is not 

enough that the reviewing court, were it deciding the issue de 

novo, would not have found that reasoning process to be persuasive, 

perhaps in view of countervailing reasoning processes that would 
13

support a contrary result.” AAAA Enterprises, Inc. v. River Place 

Community Redevelopment (1990), 50 Ohio St.3d 157, 161. 

{¶ 32} Evid.R. 401 defines relevant evidence: 

{¶ 33} “‘Relevant evidence’ means evidence having any tendency 

to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the 

determination of the action more probable or less probable than 

it would be without the evidence.” Evidence which is not relevant 

is not admissible. Evid.R. 402. Furthermore, Evid.R. 403(A) 

provides: 

{¶ 34} “Exclusion mandatory. Although relevant, evidence is 

not admissible if its probative value is substantially outweighed 

by the danger of unfair prejudice, of confusion of the issues, 

or of misleading the jury.” 

{¶ 35} Evid.R. 404(B) states: 

{¶ 36} “Other crimes, wrongs or acts. Evidence of other 

crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character 

of a person in order to show action in conformity therewith. It 

may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of 

motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, 

identity, or absence of mistake or accident.” 

{¶ 37} In State v. Williams, Montgomery App. No. 20271, 

2005-Ohio-1597, the defendant was charged with possession of both 

heroin and cocaine. At trial, the State admitted over the 
14

defendant’s objection various other items found in defendant’s 

apartment during a drug raid, including numerous drugs, scales, 

and two loaded firearms, as well as cash found on defendant’s 

person. Defendant argued that the trial court erred in admitting 

these items because they were never connected to him and do not 

form any part of the charges against him, and that whatever minimal 

probative value the items may possess is far outweighed by the 

danger of unfair prejudice. In concluding that the trial court 

properly admitted these items because they were relevant and 

admissible to prove that Defendant knew the purse he possessed 

and attempted to conceal contained controlled substances, we 

stated: 

{¶ 38} “{¶ 60} Where, as in this case, the collateral matters 

in Evid.R. 404(B) such as knowledge and plan are at issue in the 

case, evidence probative of them is admissible per Evid.R. 404(B) 

to prove the offense charged, notwithstanding that the same 

evidence might also prove another, uncharged offense. Of course, 

the trial court must exclude the evidence if its probative value 

is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, 

confusion of the issues or misleading the jury. Evid.R. 403(A). 

{¶ 39} “{¶ 61} The State was obligated to prove that Defendant 

knew or was probably aware that the purse he had in his possession 

and threw out of the window during this drug raid contained 
15

controlled substances. It is common knowledge that in locations 

where drug activity is prevalent, drugs, scales, weapons and large 

sums of money are often present. The Ohio Supreme Court has 

recognized that a connection exists between drugs and guns to such 

an extent that if drugs are present, it is reasonable to assume 

that weapons may also be present and the suspect(s) may be armed. 

State v. Evans, 67 Ohio St.3d 405, 618 N.E.2d 162, 1993-Ohio-186.” 

{¶ 40} The same is true in this case. Defendant was charged 

with violations of R.C. 2925.11(A) and 2925.03(A)(2), which 

required the State to prove that Defendant knowingly possessed 

crack cocaine, and knowingly prepared marijuana for distribution, 

when he knew the marijuana was intended for sale. The various 

pills, guns, ammunition, bulletproof vest and video surveillance 

camera found inside Defendant’s apartment during this drug raid 

were relevant and admissible to prove Defendant’s knowledge, plan, 

purpose/intent with respect to possessing controlled substances 

and reselling them. Williams. Furthermore, the probative value 

of this evidence is not substantially outweighed by the dangers 

of unfair prejudice. Id. No abuse of discretion is demonstrated 

with respect to the trial court’s admission of this evidence. 

{¶ 41} Defendant’s second assignment of error is overruled. 

THIRD ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR

{¶ 42} “THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT LIMITED 
16

CROSS-EXAMINATION.” 

{¶ 43} Defendant argues that the trial court abused its 

discretion in not allowing defense counsel to cross-examine the 

police officers concerning their knowledge of the criminal 

histories and reputation of the various individuals who were 

present inside Defendant’s apartment when police entered. 

Defendant wanted to introduce that evidence to support his theory 

that it was one or more of the other people who were present, and 

not Defendant, who hid the drugs and guns inside Defendant’s 

apartment. 

{¶ 44} The trial court allowed Defendant to elicit the names 

of the other people present, and allowed Deputy Zollers to testify 

that he recognized some of the individuals in Defendant’s apartment 

and knew them from the community, and he classified them as “bad 

guys.” The court also permitted Defendant to advance his argument 

that some of the other people present may have placed the guns 

and drugs in Defendant’s apartment. The court, however, excluded 

any testimony by the officers concerning their knowledge of the 

various individual’s criminal histories or reputation because that 

information was “irrelevant and immaterial” to the issues in the 

case. 

{¶ 45} In State v. Foust, Montgomery App. No. 20470, 

2005-Ohio-440, at ¶13-14, we stated: 
17

{¶ 46} “The constitutional right of cross-examination includes 

the right to impeach a witness's credibility. State v. Green, 66 

Ohio St.3d 141, 1993-Ohio-26; State v. Brewer (August 24, 1994), 

Montgomery App. No. 13866; Evid.R. 611(B). Unlike Federal Crim.R. 

611, which generally limits cross-examination to matters raised 

during direct, Ohio Crim.R. 611(B) permits cross-examination on 

all relevant issues and matters relating to credibility. 

Weissenberger, Ohio Evidence 2005 Courtroom Manual, at p. 245-246. 

Possible bias, prejudice, pecuniary interest in the litigation 

or motive to misrepresent facts, are matters that may affect 

credibility. Evid.R. 616(A); State v. Ferguson (1983), 5 Ohio St.3d 

160, 450 N.E.2d 265. The denial of full and effective 

cross-examination of any witness who identifies Defendant and the 

perpetrator of the offense, is the denial of the fundamental 

constitutional right of confrontation essential to a fair trial. 

State v. Hannah (1978), 54 Ohio St.2d 84, 374 N.E.2d 1359; Brewer, 

supra. 

{¶ 47} “On the other hand, trial courts have wide latitude in 

imposing reasonable limits on the scope of cross-examination based 

upon concerns about harassment, prejudice, confusion of the issues, 

the witness's safety, or repetitive, marginally relevant 

interrogation. Delaware v. Van Arsdall (1986), 475 U.S. 673, 106 

S.Ct. 1431, 89 L.Ed.2d 674. It is within the trial court's broad 
18

discretion to determine whether testimony is relevant, and to 

balance its potential probative value against the danger of unfair 

prejudice. In re Fugate (2000), Darke App. No. 1512. We will not 

interfere with the trial court's decision in those matters absent 

an abuse of discretion. Id. An abuse of discretion means more than 

a mere error of law or an error in judgment. It implies an arbitrary, 

unreasonable, unconscionable attitude on the part of the trial 

court. Id.” 

{¶ 48} We agree with the trial court that the issues about which 

Defendant wished to cross-examine the police officers, their 

knowledge concerning the criminal histories and reputation of the 

other people present inside Defendant’s apartment, had little if 

any relevance to whether Defendant knowingly possessed cocaine 

and knowingly prepared for distribution marijuana, knowing it was 

intended for sale. Such collateral matters would have injected 

into this case confusion of the issues by placing these other 

individuals who were present on trial, when they were not defendants 

or even witnesses in this case. The information being sought by 

Defendant was not for the purpose of impeaching the credibility 

of the police officers or anyone else who testified. 

{¶ 49} Whatever marginal probative value these extraneous areas 

of inquiry might have had in supporting Defendant’s theory that 

other people present in his apartment were responsible for putting 
19

the drugs and guns there, was far outweighed by the danger of unfair 

prejudice that could result from inquiry into those areas. Evid.R. 

403(A). Under those circumstances, the limits the trial court 

placed on the scope of cross-examination of the police officers 

was entirely reasonable and not an abuse of discretion. 

{¶ 50} Defendant’s third assignment of error is overruled. 

FOURTH ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR

{¶ 51} “THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT OVERRULED APPELLANT’S 

MOTION FOR ACQUITTAL BECAUSE THERE WAS INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO 

SUPPORT THE CHARGES AGAINST APPELLANT.” 

{¶ 52} Defendant argues that the trial court erred in overruling 

his Crim.R. 29 motion for acquittal based upon insufficient 

evidence because the State failed to prove that he knowingly 

possessed the cocaine and marijuana police found in the bedroom 

of his apartment. 

{¶ 53} When considering a Crim.R. 29 motion for acquittal, the 

trial court must construe the evidence in a light most favorable 

to the State and determine whether reasonable minds could reach 

different conclusions on whether the evidence proves each element 

of the offense charged beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. 

Bridgeman (1978), 55 Ohio St.2d 261. The motion will be granted 

only when reasonable minds could only conclude that the evidence 

fails to prove all of the elements of the offense. State v. Miles
20

(1996), 114 Ohio App.3d 738. 

{¶ 54} A Crim.R. 29 motion challenges the legal sufficiency 

of the evidence. A sufficiency of the evidence argument challenges 

whether the State has presented adequate evidence on each element 

of the offense to allow the case to go to the jury or sustain the 

verdict as a matter of law. State v. Thompkins, (1997), 78 Ohio 

St.3d 380. The proper test to apply to such an inquiry is the 

one set forth in paragraph two of the syllabus of State v. Jenks

(1991), 61 Ohio St.3d 259: 

{¶ 55} “An appellate court's function when reviewing the 

sufficiency of the evidence to support a criminal conviction is 

to examine the evidence admitted at trial to determine whether 

such evidence, if believed, would convince the average mind of 

the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The relevant 

inquiry is whether, after viewing the evidence in a light most 

favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could 

have found the essential elements of the crime proven beyond a 

reasonable doubt.” 

{¶ 56} Defendant was charged in count one with violating R.C. 

2925.11(A), which required the State to prove that Defendant 

knowingly possessed crack cocaine, and in count two with violating 

R.C. 2925.03(A)(2), which required the State to prove that 

Defendant knowingly prepared for distribution marijuana, knowing 
21

or having reasonable cause to believe the marijuana was intended 

for sale or resale. 

{¶ 57} “Knowingly” is defined in R.C. 2901.22(B): 

{¶ 58} “A person acts knowingly, regardless of his purpose, 

when he is aware that his conduct will probably cause a certain 

result or will probably be of a certain nature. A person has 

knowledge of circumstances when he is aware that such circumstances 

probably exist.” 

{¶ 59} “Possession” is defined in R.C. 2925.01(K): 

{¶ 60} “‘Possess’ or ‘possession’ means having control over 

a thing or substance, but may not be inferred solely from mere 

access to the thing or substance through ownership or occupation 

of the premises upon which the thing or substance is found.” 

{¶ 61} Possession of a drug may be either actual physical 

possession or constructive possession. State v. Butler (1989), 

42 Ohio St.3d 174. A person has constructive possession of an 

item when he is conscious of the presence of the object and able 

to exercise dominion and control over that item, even if it is 

not within his immediate physical possession. State v. Hankerson

(1982), 70 Ohio St.2d 87; State v. Wolery (1976), 46 Ohio St.2d 

316. 

{¶ 62} Readily usable drugs found in very close proximity to 
22

a defendant may constitute circumstantial evidence sufficient to 

support a conclusion that he constructively possessed those drugs. 

State v. Miller, Montgomery App. No. 19174, 2002-Ohio-4197. In 

determining whether a defendant knowingly possessed a controlled 

substance, it is necessary to examine the totality of the facts 

and circumstances surrounding its discovery. State v. Teamer, 

82 Ohio St.3d 490, 492, 1998-Ohio-193; State v. Pounds, Montgomery 

App. No. 21257, 2006-Ohio-3040. 

{¶ 63} Defendant points out that his fingerprints were not found 

on the baggies of cocaine or marijuana, and that there were eight 

other people present inside his apartment when police arrived. 

According to Defendant, the only evidence of his possession was 

the mere fact that he was the lessor and lived at that apartment 

where the drugs were found, and he was present at the time the 

drugs were discovered by police. Defendant claims that is 

insufficient to prove knowing possession. R.C. 2925.01(K). 

{¶ 64} The evidence presented by the State, which includes 

Defendant’s statements to Detective Reed and the electric utility 

bill found on the desk in the bedroom of the apartment, demonstrates 

that Defendant was the resident of this apartment and was present 

when police entered and discovered the contraband in question. 

A blue tub full of men’s clothing was found at the end of the bed. 

 Inside that tub police found a cigar box which contained a small 
23

baggie of crack cocaine, and a large baggie filled with twelve 

smaller baggies, each of which contained a similar sized small 

amount of marijuana. Deputy Moore and Detective Reed both 

testified that the marijuana was packaged for sale. Inside that 

same bedroom where the cocaine and marijuana were found, police 

discovered several loaded firearms between the mattress and box 

springs. In the kitchen area, police discovered baggies with pills 

in them, digital scales, and marijuana in plain view. 

{¶ 65} From the combination of direct and circumstantial 

evidence in this case, viewed in a light most favorable to the 

State, a rational trier of facts could find beyond a reasonable 

doubt that Defendant constructively possessed the crack cocaine 

and marijuana police found in the bedroom of his apartment. 

Defendant’s convictions are supported by legally sufficient 

evidence and the trial court properly overruled his Crim.R. 29 

motion for acquittal. 

{¶ 66} Defendant’s fourth assignment of error is overruled. 

FIFTH ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR

{¶ 67} “APPELLANT’S CONVICTIONS ARE AGAINST THE MANIFEST WEIGHT 

OF THE EVIDENCE.” 

{¶ 68} A weight of the evidence argument challenges the 

believability of the evidence and asks which of the competing 

inferences suggested by the evidence is more believable or 
24

persuasive. State v. Hufnagle (Sept. 6, 1996), Montgomery App. 

No. 15563, unreported. The proper test to apply to that inquiry 

is the one set forth in State v. Martin (1983), 20 Ohio App.3d 

172, 175: 

{¶ 69} “[t]he court, reviewing the entire record, weighs the 

evidence and all reasonable inferences, considers the credibility 

of witnesses and determines whether in resolving conflicts in the 

evidence, the jury lost its way and created such a manifest 

miscarriage of justice that the conviction must be reversed and 

a new trial ordered.” Accord: State v. Thompkins, supra. 

{¶ 70} The credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be 

given to their testimony are matters for the trier of facts to 

resolve. State v. DeHass (1967), 10 Ohio St.2d 230. In State 

v. Lawson (Aug. 22, 1997), Montgomery App.No. 16288, we observed: 

{¶ 71} “[b]ecause the factfinder . . . has the opportunity to 

see and hear the witnesses, the cautious exercise of the 

discretionary power of a court of appeals to find that a judgment 

is against the manifest weight of the evidence requires that 

substantial deference be extended to the factfinder’s 

determinations of credibility. The decision whether, and to what 

extent, to credit the testimony of particular witnesses is within 

the peculiar competence of the factfinder, who has seen and heard 

the witness.” 
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{¶ 72} This court will not substitute its judgment for that 

of the trier of facts on the issue of witness credibility unless 

it is patently apparent that the trier of facts lost its way in 

arriving at its verdict. State v. Bradley (Oct. 24, 1997), 

Champaign App. No. 97-CA-03. 

{¶ 73} Defendant argues that his conviction on the firearm 

specifications is against the manifest weight of the evidence 

because the State failed to prove that Defendant had possession, 

custody or control over those firearms. Defendant points out that 

no one saw him in actual possession of any firearm, and there was 

no evidence that Defendant’s fingerprints were found on any of 

the firearms. According to Defendant, merely being the tenant 

of the apartment where the firearms were found is not sufficient 

to prove that Defendant possessed or had control over those 

firearms. 

{¶ 74} For essentially the same reasons we discussed in 

overruling the previous assignment of error, the combination of 

direct and circumstantial evidence presented by the State, when 

viewed in its totality, was sufficient to prove that Defendant 

constructively possessed the firearms found in the bedroom of his 

apartment. Defendant admitted to police that he lived at the 

apartment and had been home sleeping from 9:00 a.m. until police 

arrived. The guns were found in the bed in Defendant’s bedroom, 
26

between the mattress and box springs. Defendant’s close personal 

proximity and ready access to these loaded, operable firearms 

establishes his constructive possession/control over them. The 

jury did not lose its way in choosing to believe the State’s version 

of events rather than Defendant’s, which it had a right to do. 

DeHass. 

{¶ 75} Reviewing the record as a whole, we cannot say that the 

evidence weighs heavily against a conviction, that the jury lost 

its way in choosing to believe the State’s witnesses, or that a 

manifest miscarriage of justice occurred. Defendant’s conviction 

on the firearm specifications is not against the manifest weight 

of the evidence. 

{¶ 76} Defendant’s fifth assignment of error is overruled. 

The judgment of the trial court will be affirmed. 

DONOVAN, J. And WAITE, J., concur. 

(Hon. Cheryl L. Waite, Seventh District Court of Appeals, sitting 

by assignment of the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Ohio.) 

Copies mailed to: 

Timothy J. Cole, Esq. 

Andrea G. Ostrowski, Esq. 

Hon. John D. Schmitt (Visiting Judge) 

Hon. Mary Wiseman 
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