Note: Decisions of a three-justice panel are not t o be considered as precedent before any tribunal.

ENTRY ORDER

SUPREME COURT DOCKET NO. 2010-386

JANUARY TERM, 2011

In re T.H., Juvenile } APPEALED FROM: } } } Superior Court, Addison Unit } Family Division } } DOCKET NO. 24-5-09 Anjv

Trial Judge: Cortland Corsones

In the above-entitled cause, the Clerk will enter:

Mother appeals the termination of her parental righ ts with respect to her child, T.H. We

affirm.

The trial court’s fifty-three-page decision details the involvement over the years of the Vermont Department for Children and Families (DCF) with mother—who has longstanding and

serious mental health issues—and her six children. The five other children have all been subject to children in need of care or supervision (CHINS) proceedings. In December 2006, mother’s two oldest children (born in September 2000 and Mar ch 2003) were taken into DCF custody due to concerns regarding mother’s emotional stability. The ensuing CHINS case was resolved by transferring custody of those children to their bio logical father subject to certain conditions, including counseling for both parents and the child ren. Mother and the father now share custody through a domestic relations case. The third child was a “failure to thrive” baby who suffered from numerous suspicious and untreated injuries, in cluding rib fractures, bruising around the face and neck, and a skull fracture. Mother gave d iffering and unsatisfactory explanations for the injuries. The fourth child was taken into DCF custody as a newborn because of the severity of the unexplained injuries to the third child. Ev entually, the parents voluntarily relinquished their rights to those children. In April 2008, a C HINS proceeding commenced for the newborn fifth child based on the parents’ past abuse of the child’s siblings. The child was briefly returned to the parents’ care, but was returned to DCF custo dy in November 2008 after mother gave conflicting explanations for suspicious injuries to the child, including a fractured leg and hemorrhaging under the eye. Although mother had ge nerally thwarted DCF’s efforts to assess her mental health needs over the years, she engaged in counseling in July 2009 shortly before the termination hearing involving her fifth child, only to quit the counseling once the court granted termination of parental rights. This Court later a ffirmed that termination decision. See In re

E.H. , No. 2009-401, 2010 WL 711967, at *3 (Vt. Feb. 25, 2010) (unpub. mem.).

Mother’s sixth child, T.H., the subject of this cas e, was also taken from mother and the father upon the child’s birth in May 2009 due to th e parents’ history of abuse. Following a contested merits hearing in June 2009, the family c ourt adjudicated T.H. CHINS. The disposition case plan called for reunification or t ermination of parental rights. In November 2009, the court suspended visitation between mother and T.H. based on mother’s erratic and2

troubling behavior—and T.H.’s consequent distress—d uring visits. Notwithstanding having received repeated notices from DCF and the court th at mental health treatment was a prerequisite to reinstating visits, mother did not re-engage in mental health counseling until March 2010, and even then continued to deny DCF access to treatment information that would allow the Department to assess her needs and progress. DCF f iled a termination petition in January 2010. Hearings were held over two days in September 2010, and the family court issued its termination order on October 1, 2010.

On appeal, mother argues that the evidence does not support the family court’s conclusion that she will be unable to resume her pa rental duties with respect to T.H. within a reasonable period of time. According to mother, be cause there was no evidence either that she

would never be able to recover from her mental illn ess or that T.H. needed permanency immediately, the court’s conclusion that she would be unable to resume her parental duties within a reasonable period of time cannot stand. W e find no merit to this argument. Notwithstanding mother’s suggestion to the contrary , the court was not required to make findings on what amount of delay would result in harm to T.H . The court acted well within the law and the evidence in this case in deciding not to postpo ne permanency for an infant who had spent her

entire sixteen months of life in foster care while mother continued to have no present ability, and a doubtful future ability, to parent the child. Th e undisputed evidence demonstrated that (1) mother had longstanding, serious, and untreated men tal health issues, which had contributed significantly to the abuse and neglect of her child ren over several years; (2) over that time, mother had resisted entering and remaining in treat ment for those issues and had refused to allow

DCF access to treatment information that could have helped the Department assess and address her mental health needs; (3) apart from one evaluat ion, mother had not seen T.H. since November 2009 because of the risks she posed to the child, with whom she has no parental bond; (4) mother is not able to parent T.H. at this time, and, given her track record, the prospects for her being able to do so in the near future are not good, to say the least; and (5) T.H. has been in foster care awaiting permanency her entire life. I n short, the evidence overwhelmingly supports

the court’s termination order. See In re G.S. , 153 Vt. 651, 652 (1990) (mem.) (noting that as long as family court applied proper standard, its f indings on appeal will not be disturbed unless clearly erroneous, and its conclusions will be uphe ld if supported by those findings).

Affirmed

.

BY THE COURT:

_______________________________________ Paul L. Reiber, Chief Justice

_______________________________________ Denise R. Johnson, Associate Justice

_______________________________________ Marilyn S. Skoglund, Associate Justice