IN THE SUPREME COURT OF 

CALIFORNIA

ANTHONY GANTNER,

Plaintiff and Appellant,

v.

PG&E CORPORATION et al.,

Defendants and Respondents.

S273340

Ninth Circuit 

21-15571

Northern District of California

4:20-cv-02584-HSG

November 20, 2023

Justice Liu authored the opinion of the Court, in which Chief 

Justice Guerrero and Justices Corrigan, Groban, Jenkins, 

Evans, and O’Rourke*concurred. 

* Associate Justice of the Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate 

District, Division One, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant 

to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.
1

GANTNER v. PG&E CORPORATION

S273340

Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 

Pacific Gas and Electric Company (PG&E) conducted a 

series of emergency power shutoffs, called Public Safety Power 

Shutoffs (PSPS), throughout the fall of 2019 to reduce the risk 

that its utility infrastructure would ignite a wildfire during 

extreme weather conditions. Plaintiff Anthony Gantner alleges 

that these power shutoffs were necessitated by PG&E’s 

negligence in maintaining its power grid over multiple decades 

and that Californians harmed by these shutoffs are entitled to 

$2.5 billion in damages.

While Public Utilities Code section 2106 provides a private 

right of action against utilities, section 1759 of the same code

bars actions that would interfere with the California Public 

Utilities Commission (PUC) in the performance of its official 

duties. (All undesignated statutory references are to the Public 

Utilities Code.) We consider here, in response to a request by 

the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit,

whether section 1759 bars a lawsuit that seeks damages 

resulting from PSPS events where the suit alleges that a

utility’s negligence in maintaining its grid necessitated the 

shutoffs but does not allege that the shutoffs were unnecessary 

or violated PUC regulations. We hold that allowing suit here

would interfere with the PUC’s comprehensive regulatory and 

supervisory authority over PSPS. Section 1759 therefore bars

Gantner’s suit. The Ninth Circuit also asked us to decide
GANTNER v. PG&E CORPORATION

Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 

2

whether PG&E Electric Rule No. 14 (Tariff Rule 14) shields 

PG&E from liability, but we do not reach that issue.

I.

Gantner filed a class action complaint against PG&E in 

2019 in the Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of 

California as part of PG&E’s Chapter 11 bankruptcy 

proceedings. Gantner alleges that PG&E negligently

maintained its power grid and electrical equipment for decades 

and that this negligence forced the utility to implement a series 

of PSPS in 2019 to reduce the risk of wildfires. The PSPS events 

in question led to “many days” without power for Gantner and 

other California residents and business owners, who requested

class damages of $2.5 billion to compensate for the “loss of 

habitability of their dwellings, loss of food items in their 

refrigerators, expenses for alternative means of lighting and

power, . . . loss of cell phone connectivity, dangerous dark 

conditions, lack of running water, and loss of productivity and 

business.” Gantner does not allege that the 2019 PSPS were 

unnecessary or that they were implemented in contravention of 

PUC regulations or policies.

PG&E moved to dismiss Gantner’s complaint, arguing 

that the bankruptcy court lacked subject matter jurisdiction 

under section 1759 because Gantner’s suit would interfere with 

the PUC’s supervision and regulation of the PSPS scheme. (See 

San Diego Gas & Electric Co. v. Superior Court (1996) 13 Cal.4th

893, 918 (Covalt).) Alternatively, PG&E argued that its own 

“Tariff Rule 14 provides that the decision to shut off a customer’s

power cannot trigger liability when, in PG&E’s ‘sole opinion’, it 

is necessary for public safety.” The bankruptcy court concluded

that section 1759 bars Gantner’s action and dismissed the 
GANTNER v. PG&E CORPORATION

Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 

3

complaint without leave to amend and without addressing 

PG&E’s Tariff Rule 14 argument. On appeal, the United States 

District Court for the Northern District of California affirmed 

the dismissal based on section 1759 preemption. Gantner 

appealed to the Ninth Circuit, which issued an order requesting 

that this court answer two questions concerning California law.

We granted the Ninth Circuit’s request to consider two 

questions: “(1) Does California Public Utilities Code [section]

1759 preempt a plaintiff’s claim of negligence brought against a 

utility if the alleged negligent acts were not approved by the 

California Public Utilities Commission, but those acts 

foreseeably resulted in the utility having to take subsequent 

action (here, a Public Safety Power Shutoff), pursuant to CPUC 

guidelines, and that subsequent action caused the plaintiff’s 

alleged injury? (2) Does PG&E’s Electric Rule Number 14 shield 

PG&E from liability for an interruption in its services that 

PG&E determines is necessary for the safety of the public at 

large, even if the need for that interruption arises from PG&E’s 

own negligence?”

II.

“ ‘The [Public Utilities] [C]ommission is a state agency of

constitutional origin with far-reaching duties, functions and

powers. (Cal. Const., art. XII, §§ 1–6.) The Constitution confers

broad authority on the commission to regulate utilities,

including the power to fix rates, establish rules, hold various

types of hearings, award reparation, and establish its own

procedures. (Id., §§ 2, 4, 6.)’ ” (Covalt, supra, 13 Cal.4th at

pp. 914–915.) “The Constitution also confers plenary power on 

the Legislature to ‘establish the manner and scope of review of 
GANTNER v. PG&E CORPORATION

Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 

4

commission action in a court of record’ (Cal. Const., art. XII, 

§ 5).” (Id. at p. 915.)

A.

We start by examining the background of PSPS, along 

with the PUC’s supervision and regulation of those procedures. 

“Over the last decade, California has experienced increased, 

intense, and record-breaking wildfires . . . . These fires have 

resulted in devastating loss of life and damage to property and 

infrastructure.” (Decision Adopting De-Energization (Public

Safety Power Shut-Off) Guidelines (Phase 1 Guidelines) (May 30, 

2019) Cal.P.U.C. Dec. No. 19-05-042 [2019 Cal.P.U.C. Lexis 

270, *2].) While the underlying causes of wildfires are complex 

and varied, failure of electric utility infrastructure can ignite 

fires. (Id. at pp. *2–*3.) The risks of infrastructure failure and 

wildfire ignition increase in conjunction with certain conditions 

such as low humidity, high winds, and dry vegetation. (Id. at 

pp. *3–*4.) Conversely, proper maintenance of utility 

infrastructure can reduce these risks and increase safety. (Id. 

at p. *105.)

Electric utilities are required to operate their grids in 

ways that “promote the safety [and] health” of the public. (§ 451; 

see also § 399.2, subd. (a)(1) [requiring electrical utilities to 

operate their grids safely].) The PUC has determined that these 

statutory provisions provide authority for utilities “to shut off 

power in emergency situations when necessary to protect public 

safety.” (Decision Denying Without Prejudice San Diego Gas & 

Electric Company’s Application to Shut Off Power During 

Periods of High Fire Danger (Sept. 10, 2009) Cal.P.U.C. Dec. 

No. 09-09-030 [2009 Cal.P.U.C. Lexis 437, *98].) Nevertheless,

when San Diego Gas & Electric (SDG&E) sought approval of a 
GANTNER v. PG&E CORPORATION

Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 

5

proposed PSPS program in 2009, the PUC denied its request and 

encouraged SDG&E to continue considering options to reduce 

the risk of catastrophic wildfires, reminding the utility that any 

proposals must employ a cost-benefit analysis that weighs the 

benefits of reduced wildfire risk against the costs to customers 

and communities. (Id. at p. *1.)

In 2012, the PUC provided PSPS guidelines applicable 

only to SDG&E, explaining what actions a utility must take 

before and after shutting off power, the factors the PUC would 

consider in assessing the reasonableness of an emergency power 

shutoff, and how shutoffs would be reviewed and evaluated by 

regulators. (Decision Granting Petition to Modify Decision 09-

09-030 and Adopting Fire Safety Requirements for San Diego 

Gas & Electric Company (Apr. 19, 2012) Cal.P.U.C. Dec. No. 12-

04-024 [2012 Cal.P.U.C. Lexis 165, *48–*52].) In 2018, following 

what was then “the most destructive wildfire season on record,” 

the PUC extended de-energization policies and procedures to all 

investor-owned electric utilities, including PG&E. (Resolution

Extending De-Energization Reasonableness, Notification,

Mitigation and Reporting Requirements in Decision 12-04-024 to

All Electric Investor Owned Utilities (July 12, 2018) Cal.P.U.C.

Res. No. ESRB-8 [2018 Cal.P.U.C. Lexis 330, *4].)

In 2019, the PUC promulgated a set of formal PSPS 

guidelines, acknowledging that “[w]ith the growing threat of 

wildfire, utilities will proactively cut power to lines that may fail 

in certain weather conditions in order to reduce the likelihood 

that their infrastructure could cause or contribute to a wildfire.” 

(Cal.P.U.C. Dec. No. 19-05-042, supra, 2019 Cal.P.U.C. Lexis 

270 at p. *3.) These binding guidelines, along with those 

adopted in Resolution ESRB-8, “remain in effect unless and 

until they are superseded by another Commission decision or 
GANTNER v. PG&E CORPORATION

Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 

6

resolution.” (Cal.P.U.C. Dec. No. 19-05-042, supra, 2019 

Cal.P.U.C. Lexis 270 at p. *202.)

The PUC’s guidelines require utilities to undertake a 

public notice and community engagement process, to notify 

customers affected by de-energization as soon as practicable, to 

create plans for mitigating harm from de-energization, and to 

promptly submit a report to the PUC following each deenergization event. (Cal.P.U.C. Res. No. ESRB-8, supra, 2018 

Cal.P.U.C. Lexis 330 at pp. *10–*16.) The PUC also may

conduct post hoc reasonableness reviews of de-energization 

events “to ensure that the power shut off is executed only as a 

last resort and for good reason.” (Id. at p. *8; see ibid. [listing 

factors identified by PUC as pertinent to its reasonableness 

review, including the utility’s de-energization alternatives,

reasonable belief in “an imminent and significant” fire risk, and 

“efforts to mitigate the adverse impacts” of a power shutoff].) 

Before implementing a shutoff, utilities must conduct a costbenefit analysis to “determine[] that the benefit of deenergization outweigh[s] potential public safety risks.” 

(Cal.P.U.C. Dec. No. 19-05-042, supra, 2019 Cal.P.U.C. Lexis 

270 at p. *237.)

Meanwhile, the Legislature in 2016 passed Senate Bill 

No. 1028, which added section 8386 requiring electric utilities 

to submit annual wildfire mitigation plans to the PUC for 

review. (Stats. 2016, ch. 598, § 1; see § 8386, subd. (b).) In 2018, 

the Legislature expanded section 8386 to specify that wildfire 

mitigation plans shall include “[p]rotocols for . . . deenergizing 

portions of the electrical distribution system that consider the 

associated impacts on public safety.” (Stats. 2018, ch. 626, § 38; 

see § 8386, subd. (c)(6).) Effective July 1, 2021, the Legislature 

transferred the responsibility to “oversee and enforce electrical 
GANTNER v. PG&E CORPORATION

Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 

7

corporations’ compliance with wildfire safety” to the Office of 

Energy Infrastructure Safety (OEIS). (Stats. 2019, ch. 81, § 7; 

see § 326, subds. (a)(1), (b).) At the same time, the Legislature 

clarified that “[n]othing in this chapter [describing the power of 

OEIS] affects the commission’s authority or jurisdiction over an 

electrical corporation, electrical cooperative, or local publicly 

owned electric utility.” (§ 8385, subd. (b).) The PUC thus 

continues to have responsibility for ratifying PSPS plans 

approved by the Wildfire Safety Division of OEIS (§ 8386.3, 

subd. (a)), evaluating utilities’ pre-season and post-season 

reports on PSPS (Decision Adopting Phase 3 Revised and 

Additional Guidelines and Rules for Public Safety Power 

Shutoffs (Proactive De-Energizations) of Electric Facilities to 

Mitigate Wildfire Risk Caused by Utility Infrastructure (June 

24, 2021) Cal.P.U.C. Dec. No. 21-06-034 [2021 Cal.P.U.C. Lexis

305, *167–*173]), and conducting investigations and levying

penalties against utilities for noncompliance with PSPS rules 

and regulations (see, e.g., [Proposed] Administrative 

Enforcement Order in the matter of Pacific Gas & Electric 

Company’s Execution of 2020 Public Safety Power Shutoff 

Events (June 15, 2022) available at <https://www.cpuc.ca.gov/-

/media/cpuc-website/divisions/safety-and-enforcementdivision/acos-and-aeos/pge-administrative-enforcement-order---

2020.pdf> [as of Nov. 14, 2023] (brackets in original) [proposing 

to fine PG&E $12 million and implement corrective action for 

regulatory violations during 2020 PSPS events]; all Internet 

citations in this opinion are archived by year, docket number, 

and case name at http://www.courts.ca.gov/38324.htm).

In February 2019, PG&E submitted its annual wildfire 

mitigation plan to the PUC. This plan contained PG&E’s 

proposed PSPS program, including: “(1) PSPS decision factors; 
GANTNER v. PG&E CORPORATION

Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 

8

(2) strategies to enhance PSPS efficiency while reducing 

associated impacts; (3) PSPS notification strategy; and (4) reenergization strategy.” The PUC approved PG&E’s plan as 

compliant with the requirements of section 8386, subdivision (c),

while also noting that “several aspects of the company’s planned 

mitigation . . . require improvement or other follow-up activity.”

After the fall 2019 PSPS events that form the basis of this 

action, PG&E submitted reports on the power shutoffs to the 

PUC. The PUC found that during the PSPS events, PG&E 

violated the Public Utilities Code and PUC guidelines due to 

“the unavailability and non-functionality of [PG&E’s] website,” 

“the inaccuracy of its online outage maps” showing affected 

areas, the “constructive[] inaccessib[ility]” of its secure data 

transfer portals, and its “failure to provide advanced notification

to approximately 50,000 customers,” including “approximately 

1,100 Medical Baseline customers.” (Decision on Alleged 

Violations of Pacific Gas and Electric Company with Respect to 

its Implementation of the Fall 2019 Public Safety Power Shutoff 

Events (Sept. 23, 2021) Cal.P.U.C. Dec. No. 21-09-026 [2021 

Cal.P.U.C. Lexis 480, *110].) For these violations, the PUC 

fined PG&E over $106 million. (Id. at p. *112.) In a separate 

investigation into the same PSPS events, the PUC concluded 

that among other violations of the Public Utilities Code, PG&E 

“failed to identify the possible safety risks resulting from an 

electric power shutoff” and “failed to evaluate these safety risks 

as part of the analysis of weighing the benefits and risks.” 

(Decision Addressing the Late 2019 Public Safety Power Shutoffs 

by Pacific Gas and Electric Company, Southern California 

Edison Company, and San Diego Gas & Electric Company to 

Mitigate the Risk of Wildfire Caused by Utility Infrastructure
GANTNER v. PG&E CORPORATION

Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 

9

(June 3, 2021) Cal.P.U.C. Dec. No. 21-06-014 [2021 Cal.P.U.C.

Lexis 278, *312–*313].) 

B.

This case concerns the bounds of section 1759 preemption.

By statute, public utilities remain liable for “any act, matter, or

thing prohibited or declared unlawful,” as well as for omissions

of “any act, matter, or thing required to be done.” (§ 2106.) This

private right of action is limited by section 1759, which divests

all courts except this court and the Court of Appeal of

jurisdiction “to review, reverse, correct, or annul any order or 

decision of the commission or to . . . enjoin, restrain, or interfere 

with the commission in the performance of its official duties.” 

(§ 1759, subd. (a).)

“[I]n order to resolve the potential conflict between 

sections 1759 and 2106, the latter section must be construed as 

limited to those situations in which an award of damages would 

not hinder or frustrate the commission’s declared supervisory 

and regulatory policies.” (Waters v. Pacific Telephone Co. (1974)

12 Cal.3d 1, 4 (Waters).) Preemption under section 1759 is not

limited to actions that “would directly contravene a specific 

order or decision of the commission.” (Covalt, supra, 13 Cal.4th 

at p. 918.) An action is also barred if it “would simply have the 

effect of undermining a general supervisory or regulatory policy 

of the commission, i.e., when it would ‘hinder’ or ‘frustrate’ or 

‘interfere with’ or ‘obstruct’ that policy.” (Ibid., fn. omitted.) 

Section 1759 bars an action when three requirements are met: 

(1) the PUC had the authority to adopt certain regulations or 

policies; (2) the PUC actually exercised that authority; and (3) 

the action would interfere with the PUC’s exercise of that 
GANTNER v. PG&E CORPORATION

Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 

10

authority. (Hartwell Corp. v. Superior Court (2002) 27 Cal.4th

256, 266 (Hartwell).) 

Where “the relief sought would . . . interfere[] with a broad 

and continuing supervisory or regulatory program of the 

commission,” section 1759 bars the action. (Covalt, supra, 13 

Cal.4th at p. 919.) In Waters, a customer sought damages from 

her telephone company for its alleged failure to provide 

adequate phone service. (Waters, supra, 12 Cal.3d at p. 4.) We 

explained that because the PUC “ha[d] adopted a policy of 

limiting the liability of telephone utilities . . . for acts of ordinary 

negligence to a specified credit allowance,” allowing a suit for 

damages “would be contrary to the policy adopted by the 

commission and would interfere with the commission’s 

regulation of telephone utilities.” (Ibid.) Section 1759 therefore 

barred the customer’s action. (Ibid.) 

Similarly, in Covalt, homeowners sued an electric utility,

arguing that by increasing the number of power lines near the 

plaintiffs’ home, the utility had “ ‘dramatically increased the 

dangerous levels of electromagnetic radiation flowing onto 

plaintiffs’ property.’ ” (Covalt, supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 911.) Over 

the previous decade, the PUC had undertaken a lengthy and 

thorough review of the available scientific evidence, had 

determined that the evidence did not establish that electric and 

magnetic fields (EMF) were dangerous, and had issued a sevenpoint EMF policy. (Id. at pp. 926–934.) We held that because 

the suit sought a court determination that EMF “are in fact 

dangerous,” a determination that “would plainly undermine and 

interfere with [PUC] policy” (id. at p. 947), section 1759 barred 

the action (id. at p. 903).
GANTNER v. PG&E CORPORATION

Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 

11

And in Hartwell, plaintiffs sued water utilities for 

providing allegedly contaminated drinking water, regardless of 

whether the contaminants exceeded the levels allowed by the 

PUC. (Hartwell, supra, 27 Cal.4th at pp. 275–276.) Section 

1759 barred the subset of claims based “on the theory that the 

public utilities provided unhealthy water, even if that water 

actually met [Department of Health Services] and PUC 

standards.” (Hartwell, at p. 276.) At the same time, “damage 

claims based on the theory that the water failed to meet federal 

and state drinking water standards [were] not preempted by

section 1759.” (Ibid.) “A jury award based on a finding that a 

public water utility violated [state] standards would not 

interfere with the PUC regulatory policy requiring water utility 

compliance with those standards.” (Ibid.)

III.

With this background in mind, we turn to the present case. 

The parties agree that the PUC has the authority to regulate 

PSPS and that it has exercised that authority. Gantner does not 

challenge the PUC’s general PSPS regulations or policies, nor 

does he challenge the procedures undertaken by the PUC to 

create those policies. He does not allege that PG&E’s 2019 

shutoff events were unnecessary or that they were conducted in 

violation of PUC regulations or requirements, and we have no 

occasion to consider how section 1759 might apply to a suit 

predicated on PUC findings that a utility violated PUC 

guidelines by or while implementing a PSPS event. Further, 

Gantner does not seek damages or injunctive relief based on 

harms resulting directly from PG&E’s negligent grid 

maintenance. Rather, he alleges that PG&E’s negligent 

maintenance caused the need for the 2019 PSPS events, which 

in turn led directly to the alleged damages. The question is 
GANTNER v. PG&E CORPORATION

Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 

12

whether Gantner’s action would interfere with the PUC’s 

exercise of its authority to regulate PSPS.

A.

Gantner alleges that the fall 2019 PSPS events “were a 

direct and legal result of the negligence” of PG&E in 

maintaining its grid and that “PG&E breached its duty of care 

to millions of its customers by shutting off their power . . . .” 

(Italics added.) Gantner’s suit, while alleging negligence by 

PG&E in grid maintenance only, claims that all of the alleged 

harm — and all damages sought — flow directly from PG&E’s 

fall 2019 PSPS events. To award damages on this theory, a 

court would have to find that PG&E breached its duty by 

negligently maintaining its grid and that this negligence 

foreseeably caused the PSPS events and resulting harms. But 

the PUC has already instituted procedures for evaluating PSPS 

before and after a power shutoff, along with its own criteria for 

examining the propriety of each PSPS decision. Although the 

PUC has conducted extensive investigation into the fall 2019 

PSPS events, Gantner’s suit does not adopt any of the PUC’s 

findings or conclusions. Rather, by claiming damages for PSPS 

events without regard to whether those events were necessary 

or properly executed under PUC guidelines, Gantner’s suit 

impermissibly interferes with the PUC’s supervisory policies 

regarding both PSPS implementation and post hoc 

reasonableness review.

First, Gantner’s suit would interfere with the PUC’s 

“broad and continuing supervisory . . . program” over the 

implementation of PSPS events. (Covalt, supra, 13 Cal.4th at 

p. 919.) For over a decade, the PUC has emphasized that a 

utility’s decision to shut off power must stem from its 
GANTNER v. PG&E CORPORATION

Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 

13

overarching duty to protect public safety. (Cal.P.U.C. Dec. 

No. 09-09-030, supra, 2009 Cal.P.U.C. Lexis 437 at p. *98.) PUC 

guidelines provide that before deciding to implement a PSPS 

event, “a utility must first engage in a critical analysis.” 

(Cal.P.U.C. Dec. No. 21-06-014, supra, 2021 Cal.P.U.C. Lexis 

278 at p. *54.) The utility must “identify and consider the safety 

risks to the public from shutting off electric power,” and “then 

the utility must weigh the risks of a PSPS event against the 

benefits of initiating a PSPS event.” (Ibid.) The PUC has 

“explained, in detail, the potential for ‘significant’ adverse 

impacts on the general public as a result of power shutoffs due 

to wildfire concerns.” (Id. at p. *13; see id. at pp. *13–*14

[describing 15 categories of harm that may result from power 

shutoffs].) Nevertheless, the PUC has authorized the regulated 

use of PSPS events as a “last resort,” endorsing the practice 

where the public safety benefits of a reduced risk of wildfire 

ignition outweigh the harms of lost power. (Cal.P.U.C. Res. 

No. ESRB-8, supra, 2018 Cal.P.U.C. Lexis 330 at p. *8.)

By seeking billions of dollars in alleged damages resulting 

directly from power shutoffs, Gantner’s suit would “ ‘hinder’ or 

‘frustrate’ ” the PUC’s carefully designed implementation 

calculus. (Covalt, supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 918.) In Hartwell, 

section 1759 barred suit against regulated water providers 

where water contaminant levels remained below maximum 

limits allowed by the PUC. (Hartwell, supra, 27 Cal.4th at 

p. 276.) Where the PUC has decided that a certain level of 

contamination is acceptable, an action seeking damages for 

contamination below that threshold “ ‘would plainly undermine 

the commission’s policy.’ ” (Ibid.) Nothing in Hartwell suggests 

that a plaintiff can avoid section 1759 preemption simply by 

alleging that a permissible level of contamination occurred as a 
GANTNER v. PG&E CORPORATION

Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 

14

result of a water provider’s impermissible negligence. This is 

for good reason: section 1759 preemption turns on the 

constitutional and statutory authority of the PUC rather than 

simply the underlying behavior of the utility. (See Waters, 

supra, 12 Cal.3d at p. 10 [“general principles which might 

govern disputes between private parties are not necessarily 

applicable to disputes with regulated utilities”].)

It is true that in Hartwell the PUC concluded that water 

complying with permissible contamination levels was “ ‘ “in no 

way harmful or dangerous to health” ’ ” (Hartwell, supra, 27 

Cal.4th at p. 263), whereas here the PUC acknowledged the 

harms caused by PSPS. But the PUC approved a system of 

PSPS decision-making based on the conclusion that in certain 

conditions, the harms of PSPS are outweighed by the benefits of 

wildfire prevention. Gantner seeks damages resulting from 

PSPS events without alleging negligence in the decision to shut 

off power or in PSPS implementation. Hartwell held that a 

utility could not be liable for contamination levels that fell 

within PUC-approved levels; here, PG&E cannot be liable for 

implementing PSPS events that, as far as the complaint alleges,

fully complied with PUC guidelines. To hold otherwise would 

be to invite interference with a “ ‘broad and continuing 

supervisory or regulatory program’ of the PUC.” (Id. at p. 276.) 

A suit alleging that a utility implemented PSPS events in 

violation of PUC guidelines might present different 

considerations under Hartwell. But we decline to speculate on 

section 1759’s application to such a case.

Gantner contends that PUC guidelines do not permit a 

utility to consider its risk of liability to customers affected by 

PSPS events as part of the balancing necessary to justify PSPS 

implementation. Thus, he argues, a damage award for the 
GANTNER v. PG&E CORPORATION

Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 

15

harms caused by PSPS events would fall outside of, and 

therefore would not frustrate, the PUC’s regulatory framework. 

Assuming without deciding that Gantner is correct that PUC 

guidelines bar utilities from considering the liability risk from a 

power shutoff, this argument is not persuasive.

First, Gantner’s argument fails to account for the fact that 

any prohibition on a utility’s consideration of liability derives 

from PUC guidelines and supervision. If utilities cannot 

consider liability as a factor in implementing PSPS events, it is

because the PUC has determined that as a matter of policy 

utilities ought not consider liability in these decisions. The PUC 

has emphasized that utilities should instead consider only the 

public safety implications through a careful cost-benefit 

analysis. (Cal.P.U.C. Dec. No. 21-06-014, supra, 2021 

Cal.P.U.C. Lexis 278 at p. *54.) By seeking damages resulting 

directly from PSPS events, Gantner’s suit heightens the risk 

that potential tort liability will factor into a utility’s shutoff 

decision-making. This puts Gantner’s suit at cross-purposes

with the PUC’s carefully designed scheme. (Gantner v. PG&E

Corporation (N.D.Cal. 2021) 629 B.R. 60, 67; see also Southern

California Gas Leak Cases (2019) 7 Cal.5th 391, 401 [“exposure

to liability often provides an important incentive for parties to

internalize the social costs of their actions”].)

Furthermore, the PUC’s supervision over PSPS extends 

far beyond regulating the implementation of power shutoffs. 

Recognizing “the growing threat of wildfire” (Cal.P.U.C. Dec. 

No. 19-05-042, supra, 2019 Cal.P.U.C. Lexis 270 at p. *3), the 

PUC determined that “proactively de-energizing power lines can 

save lives” (id. at p. *4). The PUC’s carefully calibrated PSPS 

guidelines “build[] on new weather tracking and modeling 

technology” and add to “tougher regulations for removing 
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Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 

16

vegetation” (ibid.) while acknowledging that power shutoffs can 

cause real harm to affected individuals and businesses (id. at 

pp. *4–*5). By seeking liability for PSPS events regardless of 

whether the shutoff decision or implementation was negligent, 

Gantner’s suit interferes with the PUC’s broad supervisory 

power over how utilities can and should respond to the present 

threat of catastrophic wildfires. Gantner’s suit also risks 

interfering with the PUC’s careful ratemaking decisions, either 

by increasing utility costs directly through extensive litigation 

or by incentivizing the acceleration of grid maintenance and 

improvement beyond the levels accounted for by the PUC. (See 

Hartwell, supra, 27 Cal.4th at p. 276 [section 1759 bars action 

that could interfere with PUC ratemaking]; Waters, supra, 12 

Cal.3d at p. 10 [same].)

Second, Gantner’s suit would interfere with the PUC’s 

post hoc review of PSPS events. The PUC has implemented its 

own process for evaluating the reasonableness of PSPS events 

and maintains the authority to issue penalties and orders to 

utilities based on noncompliance with existing PSPS guidelines. 

(See, e.g., Cal.P.U.C. Dec. No. 21-09-026, supra, 2021 Cal.P.U.C. 

Lexis 480 at p. *1 [finding that PG&E violated PUC guidelines 

in implementing fall 2019 PSPS events and assessing a 

penalty]; see also Cal.P.U.C. Dec. No. 21-06-014, supra, 2021 

Cal.P.U.C. Lexis 278 at pp. *335–*351 [identifying numerous 

violations by PG&E related to the fall 2019 PSPS events].) The 

PUC’s reasonableness review focuses on the environmental and 

grid conditions at the moment a utility decides to implement a 

PSPS event, as well as the utility’s actions subsequent to that 

decision. (See Cal.P.U.C. Res. No. ESRB-8, supra, 2018 

Cal.P.U.C. Lexis 330 at p. *9 [a utility “must reasonably believe 

that there is an imminent and significant risk that strong winds 
GANTNER v. PG&E CORPORATION

Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 

17

will topple its power lines onto tinder dry vegetation or will 

cause major vegetation-related impacts on its facilities during 

periods of extreme fire hazard” in order to implement a PSPS 

event], underscoring omitted.)

Gantner’s suit would require a court to hold a parallel 

review process, adding the judgment of a jury to that of the PUC 

in assessing the causes and propriety of PG&E’s PSPS 

implementation. Gantner’s inquiry focuses on PG&E’s grid 

maintenance going back decades, even though PUC guidelines 

do not indicate that prior grid management or mismanagement

is an appropriate factor for a utility to consider in implementing 

a PSPS event. Rather, the PUC’s extensive guidance is focused 

on the conditions as they exist at the moment of 

implementation, based on a holistic assessment of weather 

conditions, ground conditions, and, inevitably, a utility’s 

understanding of the strength and reliability of its grid

infrastructure. (Cal.P.U.C. Dec. No. 12-04-024, supra, 2012 

Cal.P.U.C. Lexis 165 at p. *40 [the utility “will be in the best 

position to determine when power should be shut off to protect 

public safety” because only the utility “has the detailed 

knowledge of its facilities that is needed to make this decision in 

real time based on contemporaneous local weather conditions”].) 

The PUC has made clear that a utility may decide to de-energize 

only when, in the moment, it believes the wildfire prevention 

benefits of such action outweigh the costs to residents and 

communities of de-energization. Assessment of a utility’s 

compliance with these standards in deciding to implement a 

PSPS event “is a factual issue that is within the exclusive 

jurisdiction of the [PUC] to decide.” (Sarale v. Pacific Gas &

Electric Co. (2010) 189 Cal.App.4th 225, 243 (Sarale).)
GANTNER v. PG&E CORPORATION

Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 

18

Indeed, following the fall 2019 PSPS events at issue here, 

the PUC thoroughly reviewed PG&E’s actions. The PUC found 

that PG&E violated its guidelines in numerous ways and 

assessed fines totaling $106 million, the majority of which 

resulted from inadequate notification to customers. (Cal.P.U.C.

Dec. No. 21-09-026, supra, 2021 Cal.P.U.C. Lexis 480 at 

pp. *112–*114.) In a separate investigation, the PUC further 

determined that PG&E “failed to identify the possible safety 

risks resulting from an electric power shutoff” and “failed to 

evaluate these safety risks as part of the analysis of weighing 

the benefits and risks.” (Cal.P.U.C. Dec. No. 21-06-014, supra,

2021 Cal.P.U.C. Lexis 278 at pp. *312–*313.) Although finding 

that “a monetary remedy [was] appropriate” for these violations 

(id. at p. *67), the PUC was “reluctant to impose monetary 

penalties,” instead applying a ratemaking remedy (id. at p. *69). 

In choosing this remedy, the PUC intended to “strik[e] a balance 

between the need in 2019 for utilities to initiate PSPS events . . . 

against the equally compelling need to conduct PSPS events in 

a safe manner.” (Ibid.)

Gantner’s suit does not adopt any of the findings of fact or 

conclusions of law from either of these post-PSPS reviews. 

Rather, the complaint makes clear that Gantner seeks a parallel 

review process that if successful would require findings in 

tension with PUC guidelines. For example, while the complaint 

alleges underlying negligence in part because the wind gusts at 

the time of one PSPS event “[n]ever came close to the [PUC’s] 92 

miles per hour threshold,” the PUC says it has “declined to use 

wind speed as a determinative factor for when a utility can or 

may not implement a PSPS event.” Similarly, while the 

complaint alleges that PG&E failed to properly manage 

vegetation that “posed a foreseeable hazard to power lines,” the 
GANTNER v. PG&E CORPORATION

Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 

19

PUC considered and approved PG&E’s proposed vegetation 

management as part of the utility’s 2019 Wildfire Mitigation 

Plan (see Decision on Pacific Gas and Electric Company’s 2019

Wildfire Mitigation Plan Pursuant to Senate Bill 901 (May 30, 

2019) Cal.P.U.C. Dec. No. 19-05-037 [2019 Cal.P.U.C. Lexis 272,

*1, *29–*42]).

The current action thus seeks damages for the effects of 

PSPS events without any allegation that those events were 

executed in violation of PUC guidelines. Gantner’s argument 

instead turns entirely on whether PG&E breached its duty of 

care and whether any breach caused the alleged damages. 

Because all alleged damages stem from the PSPS events 

themselves, the adjudication of breach, causation, and damages

will inevitably involve an assessment of why the PSPS events 

were implemented and whether they could or should have been 

avoided. But the questions of PSPS implementation and 

execution — along with the policy choice to use PSPS to mitigate 

wildfire risk and protect public safety — are reserved to the 

PUC, which has exercised its authority to delineate the factors 

relevant to these inquiries. Section 1759 bars Gantner from

seeking a parallel review of PG&E’s PSPS decision-making and 

implementation through his suit. (See Covalt, supra, 13 Cal.4th 

at p. 939 [section 1759 bars an action seeking findings 

“inconsistent with the [PUC]’s conclusion”].)

B.

Gantner argues that if this suit is barred, utilities like 

PG&E will “get a free pass for their own negligence.” But 

“section 1759 does not leave plaintiffs without a remedy” for 

utility negligence. (Sarale, supra, 189 Cal.App.4th at p. 244.) It 

simply means that the “remedy lies before the commission 
GANTNER v. PG&E CORPORATION

Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 

20

rather than in . . . court.” (Ibid.) As the PUC notes in its amicus 

curiae brief, “The Legislature has . . . provided a statutory 

scheme that includes formal complaint procedures before the 

Commission.” Customers concerned that PG&E may

improperly implement PSPS could also “seek injunctive relief 

from the Commission” and could intervene in PSPS rulemaking. 

Moreover, the PUC notes that a utility’s annual wildfire 

mitigation plan must “address all the actions a utility commits 

to take in the coming year to reduce wildfire risk — including 

system hardening, undergrounding lines, inspections, and 

vegetation management.” (See § 8386, subd. (c)(3), (c)(8)–(10),

(c)(12), (c)(14)–(15) [listing requirements of wildfire mitigation 

plans].) These plans are approved by OEIS and ratified by the 

PUC, and members of the public may comment on the proposed 

plans prior to approval. (§ 8386, subd. (d).) Similarly, the PUC’s 

post hoc reasonableness review includes an assessment of why 

the utility implemented a PSPS event (Cal.P.U.C. Res. 

No. ESRB-8, supra, 2018 Cal.P.U.C. Lexis 330 at p. *8), and 

where a utility fails to provide a sound basis for PSPS 

implementation, the PUC can assess penalties and apply other 

remedial measures (Cal.P.U.C. Dec. No. 21-06-014, supra, 2021 

Cal.P.U.C. Lexis 278 at pp. *67–*69 [assessing ratemaking 

remedy in lieu of penalties for PG&E’s failure to consider the 

public risks of shutoffs before implementing its 2019 PSPS

events]).

Gantner next argues that because the PUC cannot award 

damages to customers, this suit does not interfere with its 

authority over PSPS. Gantner is correct that the PUC does not 

and cannot award tort damages to customers affected by the 

negligence of utilities. (Cal.P.U.C. Dec. No. 21-06-014, supra,

2021 Cal.P.U.C. Lexis 278 at p. *68 [PUC “does not have 
GANTNER v. PG&E CORPORATION

Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 

21

jurisdiction to award damages to utility customers”].) Gantner 

is also correct that our proposed holding might limit the ability 

of some customers harmed by PSPS events to seek 

compensation. But the possibility that some customers might 

not receive compensation for harms resulting from PSPS events 

is a result of the Legislature’s decision to adopt section 1759, 

which limits actions that interfere with PUC supervision despite 

the PUC’s inability to offer compensatory relief for utility 

negligence. Gantner’s argument that no claim seeking damages 

based on past negligence could ever be barred by section 1759 is 

unsupported by our precedent. (See, e.g., Waters, supra, 12 

Cal.3d at p. 10 [§ 1759 barred claim seeking damages for 

telephone utility’s past negligence]; Covalt, supra, 13 Cal.4th at 

p. 950 [damages based on negligence of electric utility “would 

plainly undermine” the PUC’s policies]; Hartwell, supra, 27 

Cal.4th at p. 276 [§ 1759 barred claim for damages based on 

utilities’ past provision of allegedly unhealthy drinking water].) 

To the extent that customers are left without recourse to seek 

compensation for the alleged negligence of utilities or the loss of 

power during PSPS events, such concerns are properly directed 

to the Legislature.

Because his suit is based on allegations of negligent grid 

management prohibited by PUC regulations, Gantner contends

that this action supports rather than hinders PUC authority. 

But even if the current action might support the PUC’s 

supervisory role over grid maintenance, the authority it 

interferes with relates to the PUC’s supervision of PSPS. 

Gantner is correct that imposing liability can alter a defendant’s 

behavior, and if this suit were allowed to proceed, Gantner may 

be right that it would “incentivize[] PG&E to provide safe and 

reliable electricity to its customers.” But Gantner did not file
GANTNER v. PG&E CORPORATION

Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 

22

suit based on harm resulting directly from underlying 

negligence in grid maintenance, and he did not seek an 

administrative remedy through the PUC to compel PG&E’s 

compliance with maintenance regulations. Rather, Gantner 

filed suit for alleged harms that resulted directly and exclusively 

from PSPS events. As noted, because the action heightens the 

risk that a utility’s PSPS decision-making may be influenced by

considerations outside the scope of the cost-benefit analysis set 

forth by the PUC, it works at cross-purposes with the PUC’s

regulation, supervision, and guidelines, and thus section 1759 

bars this suit.

As noted, today’s decision does not foreclose the possibility 

of a narrowly tailored suit based on allegations that a utility 

acted negligently and in violation of PUC guidelines in its 

decision to implement PSPS events or the implementation of 

those events. We also decline to address whether a negligent 

grid maintenance suit could proceed on a narrow claim for 

damages or injunctive relief that is properly tailored to avoid 

conflict with any Commission regulations over PSPS and 

wildfire safety. Because Gantner’s complaint does not raise 

such claims, we need not decide whether they would be barred 

by section 1759.

Gantner also argues that regardless of the PUC’s 

regulation of PSPS at the time of the fall 2019 PSPS events, 

subsequent legislation transferring PSPS supervisory authority

to OEIS means the PUC no longer possesses any authority with 

which his suit could interfere. It is true that OEIS now has “all 

functions” of the PUC’s former Wildfire Safety Division. (§ 326, 

subd. (b).) But PG&E notes that the statutory transfer of 

authority to OEIS occurred “well after the filing of this lawsuit 

and the 2019 PSPS events.” The parties thus appear to disagree 
GANTNER v. PG&E CORPORATION

Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 

23

on whether section 1759 preemption can occur where a 

supervisory program was “broad and continuing” or whether it 

requires a program that is “broad and continuing.”

We need not resolve this disagreement because in any 

event, the PUC retains a supervisory and regulatory role over 

PSPS such that section 1759 bars the current action. The 

statute transferring authority to OEIS noted that “[n]othing in 

this chapter affects the commission’s authority or jurisdiction 

over an electrical corporation, electrical cooperative, or local 

publicly owned electric utility.” (§ 8385, subd. (b).) And the 

PUC has continued to exercise control over various aspects of 

PSPS regulation and supervision. The PUC ratifies wildfire 

safety plans approved by OEIS (§ 8386.3, subd. (a)), conducts 

investigations and levies penalties following PSPS events (see, 

e.g., Cal.P.U.C. Dec. No. 21-09-026, supra, 2021 Cal.P.U.C. 

Lexis 480 at pp. *115–*116), and continues to enforce its 

existing PSPS guidelines and resolutions (id. at pp. *109–*110). 

The statute vesting supervisory powers over PSPS in OEIS

repeatedly refers to the ongoing legal obligation of utilities to 

comply with PUC orders, rules, and requirements. (See, e.g., 

§ 8386, subd. (c)(11) [utilities’ de-energization protocols “shall 

comply with any order of the commission regarding 

deenergization events”]; see also id., subd. (c)(7) [mandating 

compliance with “orders of the commission regarding 

notifications of deenergization events”]; id., subd. (c)(12), (c)(15), 

(c)(16), (c)(18), (c)(19)(B), (c)(21), (c)(22)(C) [all referencing PUC 

rules, regulations, or decisions in establishing utilities’ ongoing 

obligations].) Moreover, section 1759 preemption can occur 

where the PUC shares supervisory or regulatory authority with 

another agency. (See Hartwell, supra, 27 Cal.4th at p. 274 [PUC 

“continue[d] to exercise its jurisdiction to regulate drinking 
GANTNER v. PG&E CORPORATION

Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 

24

water quality” despite relying on contamination standards set 

by the Department of Health Services].) 

Finally, we note that the PUC has submitted an amicus 

brief asserting that allowing Gantner’s suit would “interfere 

with the Commission’s broad, general, and ongoing 

administration of PSPS policies.” We have previously given 

weight to the PUC’s views regarding section 1759 preemption. 

(See People ex rel. Orloff v. Pacific Bell (2003) 31 Cal.4th 1132,

1153 [“Indeed, the PUC itself, in an amicus curiae brief filed in 

this court in support of the People, agrees that nothing in the 

present action undermines or hinders any ongoing policy, 

program, or other aspect of its authority.”].) At the same time, 

“ ‘the PUC’s interpretation is not controlling but . . . is one of

“among several tools available to the court.” ’ ” (Wilson v.

Southern California Edison Co. (2015) 234 Cal.App.4th 123,

147, fn. 23; see also id. at pp. 147–151 [declining to adopt the

PUC’s view that § 1759 barred the action].) We have no need 

here to consider as a general matter how much weight is 

properly accorded to the PUC’s view. We simply note that the 

PUC’s position, which is supported by the facts and our section 

1759 precedent, further bolsters our holding.

CONCLUSION

We hold that section 1759 bars Gantner’s action against 

PG&E because the suit would interfere with the PUC’s broad 

and continuing supervision and regulation of PSPS

implementation and review. We express no view on whether 

Tariff Rule 14 would also prohibit Gantner’s suit.
GANTNER v. PG&E CORPORATION

Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 

25

LIU, J.

We Concur:

GUERRERO, C. J.

CORRIGAN, J.

GROBAN, J.

JENKINS, J.

EVANS, J.

O’ROURKE, J.*

* Associate Justice of the Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate 

District, Division One, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant 

to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who 

argued in Supreme Court.

Name of Opinion Gantner v. PG&E Corporation

__________________________________________________________ 

Procedural Posture (see XX below)

Original Appeal

Original Proceeding XX on request by 9th Circuit (Cal. Rules of 

Court, rule 8.548)

Review Granted (published)

Review Granted (unpublished) 

Rehearing Granted

__________________________________________________________ 

Opinion No. S273340

Date Filed: November 20, 2023

__________________________________________________________ 

Court: 

County: 

Judge: 

__________________________________________________________ 

Counsel:

Phillips, Erlewine, Given & Carlin, Nicholas A. Carlin, Brian S. 

Conlon, Kyle P. O'Malley; Hausfeld, Bonny E. Sweeney, Seth R. 

Gassman and Tae H. Kim for Plaintiff and Appellant.

Glancy Prongay & Murray and Jonathan M. Rotter for Former 

President of the Public Utilities Commission Loretta Lynch, Former 

Administrative Law Judge Steven Weissman and Professor Seth Davis 

as Amici Curiae on behalf of Plaintiff and Appellant.

Cravath, Swaine & Moore, Omid H. Nasab; Horvitz & Levy, Robert H. 

Wright and Jeremy B. Rosen for Defendants and Respondents.

Munger, Tolles & Olson, J. Kain Day and Henry Weissmann for 

Southern California Edison and San Diego Gas & Electric as Amici 

Curiae on behalf of Defendants and Respondents.
Vinson & Elkins, Mortimer H. Hartwell, Jeremy C. Marwell, Matthew 

X. Etchemendy and Nathan T. Campbell for Edison Electric Institute 

as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Defendants and Respondents.

Christine Jun Hammond, Candace J. Morey and Mary McKenzie for 

the California Public Utilities Commission as Amicus Curiae.
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for

publication with opinion):

Nicholas A. Carlin

Phillips, Erlewine, Given & Carlin LLP

39 Mesa Street, Suite 201 

San Francisco, CA 94129

(415) 398-0900

Omid H. Nasab

Cravath, Swaine & Moore LLP

Worldwide Plaza

825 8th Avenue

New York, NY 10019

(212) 474-1972

Candace J. Morey

California Public Utilities Commission

505 Van Ness Avenue

San Francisco, CA 94102

(415) 703-3211