2020 IL App (1st) 171890-U

No. 1-17-1890 

Order filed December 23, 2020 

Third Division 

NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and may not be cited as 

precedent by any party except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1). 

______________________________________________________________________________ 

IN THE

APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

FIRST DISTRICT

______________________________________________________________________________ 

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS,

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

 v. 

JASON RAYFORD, 

 Defendant-Appellant. 

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Appeal from the

Circuit Court of 

Cook County. 

No. 15 CR 1394 

Honorable 

Joseph Michael Claps, 

Judge, presiding. 

JUSTICE McBRIDE delivered the judgment of the court.

Justices Ellis and Burke concurred in the judgment. 

ORDER

¶ 1 Held: We affirm defendant’s conviction for reckless homicide where the evidence 

presented was sufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant acted 

recklessly. 

¶ 2 Following a bench trial, defendant Jason Rayford was convicted of reckless homicide 

(720 ILCS 5/9-3 (West 2014)) and of leaving the scene of a motor vehicle accident involving 

death (625 ILCS 5/11-401 (West 2014)), and he was sentenced to consecutive terms of 28 and 22 
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months’ imprisonment, respectively.

1 On appeal, defendant contends that the evidence was 

insufficient to sustain his conviction for reckless homicide because the State failed to prove 

beyond a reasonable doubt that he acted recklessly i.e. that he was consciously aware that his 

actions were likely to cause death or great bodily harm. Defendant does not challenge his 

conviction for leaving the scene of a motor vehicle accident involving death. For the following 

reasons, we affirm.

¶ 3 Sheena Sykes testified that on December 20, 2014, after having attended a Christmas 

party, she, Dajuan Thomas (her fiancé), Javaire Thomas (Dajuan’s cousin), defendant, Kenya 

Thomas (defendant’s wife), and Flenenice (Kenya’s friend) went to a lounge.2 She identified 

defendant in court, and stated he drank alcohol at the Christmas party but not at the lounge. The

group stayed at the lounge for 30 minutes to an hour; then Kenya drove them all to a gas station.

At the gas station, Dajuan left the car, and the rest of the group drove to a restaurant to eat. On 

the way there, defendant began to argue with Javaire and Sykes, and told Sykes to “shut the f*** 

up, b***.” Javaire exited the car and went to ride with his aunt. At this time, Kenya was driving

the car, defendant was in the front passenger seat, Sykes was sitting behind defendant, and 

Flenenice was sitting behind Kenya. Defendant again began to argue with Sykes. Kenya told

defendant to leave Sykes alone, to not be disrespectful and to be quiet. Defendant and Kenya 

then began to argue and defendant “smacked” Kenya on the face. Sykes did not see if defendant 

hit Kenya with an open or closed hand. Kenya placed her right arm up, and defendant grabbed 

1 Although the mittimus does not reflect consecutive sentences, the record shows that in imposing 

sentence, the trial court noted that the terms were to be served consecutively. People v. Carlisle, 2015 IL 

App (1st) 131144, ¶ 87 (“When the oral pronouncement of the court and the written order are in conflict, 

oral pronouncement controls.”).

2 Because there are multiple witnesses with the same last name, we refer to these witnesses by 

their first names; Flenenice’s last name is not provided in the record.
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the wheel with one hand. Sykes explained that defendant “pulled the wheel in a downward 

motion,” and “it looked like he was trying to control the wheel” but “it lost control and that’s 

when the accident happened.” Sykes demonstrated for the court how defendant, using his left 

hand, pulled the steering wheel in a downward motion. After he did so, the car hit a person, later 

identified as Eddie Fuentes, who was entering a parked car. Sykes stayed on the scene until an

ambulance arrived. She did not see defendant on the scene. She did not recall testimony before 

the grand jury where she testified defendant “got out [of the] car and walked off.” 

¶ 4 On cross-examination, Sykes testified that at the time there was no traffic on Western 

Avenue. She did not know if there were people at Maxwell’s hot dog stand (“Maxwell’s”), 

which was “around 50th and Western.” The group was traveling southbound on Western prior to 

the accident.

¶ 5 Javaire testified that he was a passenger in the car and witnessed an argument between 

defendant and Sykes. He also saw Kenya crying. However, he exited the car before the accident 

occurred. 

¶ 6 Leticia Montarrez, mother of Fuentes, testified and identified a photo of Fuentes. The 

photo was entered into evidence. 

¶ 7 Sazsha Alvarez testified that about 3:00 a.m., on the date in question, she was driving 

southbound near the 5300 block of South Western Avenue. Alvarez was driving behind a car that 

“mysteriously just went to the right to where the parked cars were by the restaurant.” She 

described the car as “going fine one minute and just random just turned hard, just really, really 

hard to the right” where it struck multiple vehicles. Alvarez parked her car in front of the scene 

of the accident, exited her car and saw a person on the ground bleeding. She identified a photo of 
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Fuentes as the man on the ground. Alvarez saw defendant on the sidewalk. She remained on 

scene until paramedics came and took Fuentes away at which point she did not see defendant 

present. 

¶ 8 On cross-examination, Alvarez testified the speed limit in the area was 30 miles per hour. 

Prior to the accident, she glanced at Maxwell’s and it looked like there was a crowd of people 

there. She did not hear tires squealing before the accident. She explained that she saw the car 

move laterally within the lane as it went southbound, however that was “way before” she glanced 

at Maxwell’s. Prior to the accident, the car was traveling in a straight line. 

¶ 9 The State presented several stipulations. The parties stipulated that, if called: Detective

Scott Reiff would testify he administered a buccal swab to defendant; Evidence Technician 

Kenneth Leflore would testify he took buccal swabs from the car; Detective Dale Potter would 

testify that he administered a buccal swab to Kenya; Forensic Scientist Greg DiDomenic would 

testify that he conducted DNA analysis on the buccal swab collected from defendant and swabs 

from the car and found that DNA on the exterior of the car matched Fuentes and there were at 

least two DNA profiles on the swabs collected from the steering wheel and one matched the 

DNA profile from Kenya; Medical Examiner Kristin Escobar Alvarenga would testify that she 

conducted a postmortem examination of Fuentes and discovered that the cause of death was

multiple injuries due to a vehicle striking him, and the manner of death was an accident; and 

Chicago Police Investigator Niezabitowskie would testify that he examined the crash data 

recorder from the car involved in the accident and that from 2.5 seconds to 1 second before the 

car crash the car was travelling at a speed of 45 miles per an hour. 
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¶ 10 After defendant’s motion for directed verdict was denied, he presented one stipulation. 

The parties stipulated that, if called, Lee Daley would testify that during an interview with Sykes 

she told him Kenya tried to block defendant’s “swing as she drove and the car began to veer to 

the left. [Defendant] then grabbed the steering wheel and then pulled to the right.” 

¶ 11 The court found defendant guilty of reckless homicide and leaving the scene of an 

accident involving death. In doing so, the court noted that it considered the testimony presented 

and believed “the real issue here is *** whether [defendant’s] acts constituted driving or

operating a vehicle as required.” The court pointed out that it was clear that “the State has proven 

the onus of these offenses beyond a reasonable doubt.” Defendant filed a motion for new trial, 

which the court denied. The court sentenced defendant to 28 months’ imprisonment for reckless 

homicide and 22 months’ imprisonment for leaving the scene of an accident involving death, 

with the terms to be served consecutively. 

¶ 12 On appeal, defendant contends that the evidence was insufficient to convict him of 

reckless homicide. Specifically, he argues that the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable 

doubt that he was consciously aware that his actions were likely to cause death or great bodily 

harm. 

¶ 13 When a defendant challenges his conviction based upon the sufficiency of the evidence 

presented against him, this court asks whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most 

favorable to the State, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the 

crime beyond a reasonable doubt. People v. Brown, 2013 IL 114196, ¶ 48 (citing Jackson v. 

Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 318-19 (1979)). Under this standard, we draw “all reasonable inferences 

from the record in favor of the prosecution.” People v. Davison, 233 Ill.2d 30, 43 (2009). It is the 
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responsibility of the trier of fact to determine the witness’ credibility, the weight given to their 

testimony, to resolve conflicts in the evidence, and to draw all reasonable inferences from the 

evidence. People v. Ortiz, 196 Ill. 2d 236, 259 (2001). We will not substitute our judgment for 

that of the trier of fact on issues involving the weight of the evidence or the credibility of the 

witnesses. People v. Brown, 22013 IL 114196, ¶ 48. A reviewing court “ ‘will not reverse a 

conviction unless the evidence is so improbable, unsatisfactory, or inconclusive that it creates a 

reasonable doubt of defendant’s guilt.’ ” People v. Lloyd, 2013 IL 113510, ¶ 42 (quoting People 

v. Collins, 214 Ill. 2d 206, 217 (2005)). 

¶ 14 In this case, defendant challenges his reckless homicide conviction. A person commits 

reckless homicide if, while driving a motor vehicle, he unintentionally kills an individual and the 

acts which caused the death are performed recklessly and as to create a likelihood of death or 

great bodily harm to some person. 720 ILCS 5/9-3 (West 2014); People v. Edmundson, 247 Ill.

App. 3d 738, 741 (1993). 

¶ 15 Defendant contends that the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he acted 

recklessly i.e. that he was consciously aware his actions were likely to cause death or great 

bodily harm. In doing so, defendant does not dispute that he intentionally grabbed the steering 

wheel and moved it which caused the crash. Rather, he essentially maintains that when Kenya 

“lifted her hand to defend herself, the car veered left, so [defendant] tried to control the wheel 

and pulled it back to the right” which resulted in the accident. He argues that his actions do not 

demonstrate a conscious disregard of a deadly risk. 

¶ 16 “Reckless conduct occurs when an individual consciously disregards a substantial and 

unjustifiable risk that his acts are likely to cause death or great bodily harm to some individual 
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and where such disregard constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of care which a 

reasonable person would exercise in that situation.” Edmundson, 247 Ill. App. 3d at 741; accord 

720 ILCS 5/4-6 (West 2014). The State does have the burden of proving every element of a 

criminal offense beyond a reasonable doubt. U.S. Const., amend. XIV; Ill. Const., art. I, § 2; In 

Re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970); People v. Brown, 2013 IL 114196, ¶ 48. Ultimately, 

“[t]he determination of whether a killing has resulted from an accident or reckless conduct, 

however, is a question for the trier of fact.” People v. Hoover, 250 Ill. App. 3d 338, 351 (1993). 

¶ 17 After reviewing the evidence, in the light most favorable to the State we find that a 

rational trier of fact could conclude that defendant acted recklessly. Sykes testified about 

defendant’s argument with Kenya, the driver of the car. Sykes explained that during the 

argument defendant “smacked” Kenya, who raised her right hand, and then defendant “grabbed 

the wheel” with his left hand, and “it looked like he was trying to control the wheel.” Sykes 

demonstrated for the court how defendant pulled the steering wheel in a downward motion which 

resulted in the crash. Alvarez, who was driving behind Kenya, testified she saw the car turn 

“really, really hard to the right.” She explained that the car “mysteriously just went to the right to 

where the parked cars were by the restaurant.” She described the car as “going fine one minute 

and just random just turned hard, just really, really hard to the right” where it struck multiple 

vehicles. Defendant was not at the scene of the crash afterwards when ambulances arrived. This 

evidence and the reasonable inferences therefrom were sufficient to permit the trier of fact to 

conclude that defendant acted recklessly. People v. Zator, 209 Ill. App. 3d 322, 328 (1991) (The 

mental state of recklessness will “be inferred from all the facts and circumstances in the 
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record.”); People v. Simmons, 407 Ill. 417, 424 (1950) (Among the circumstances that can be 

included are defendant’s flight from the scene of the accident.). 

¶ 18 In reaching this conclusion, we are not persuaded by defendant’s argument that he 

grabbed the wheel to prevent an accident. In support of this argument, he relies on the stipulation 

that Sykes told a police investigator that the car began to veer to the left as Kenya attempted to 

block defendant, who then grabbed the steering wheel and pulled it to the right. However, 

Alvarez, who was driving behind Kenya, testified that the car “mysteriously just went to the right 

to where the parked cars were by the restaurant.” She described the car as “going fine one minute 

and just random just turned hard, just really, really hard to the right” where it struck multiple 

vehicles. Although Alvarez saw the car moving laterally left and right in the lane, she stated that 

“was before, way before” Maxwell’s where the crash occurred. In addition, Sykes explained that 

defendant “pulled the wheel in a downward motion,” and “it looked like he was trying to control 

the wheel” but “it lost control and that’s when the accident happened.” As mentioned, it is the 

responsibility of the trier of fact to determine the witness’ credibility, the weight given to their 

testimony, to resolve conflicts in the evidence, and to draw all reasonable inferences from the 

evidence. Ortiz, 196 Ill. 2d 236, 259 (2001). This court will not substitute its judgment for that of 

the trier of fact on issues involving the weight of the evidence or the credibility of the witnesses.

Brown, 22013 IL 114196, ¶ 48. Given the evidence presented, we cannot say that it was so 

improbable, unsatisfactory, or inconclusive as to create a reasonable doubt of defendant’s guilt. 

Lloyd, 2013 IL 113510, ¶ 42. 

¶ 19 We are likewise unpersuaded by defendant’s reliance on People v. Anderson, 310 Ill. 389

(1923). In Anderson, the defendant, the driver of a vehicle, did not hear a policeman’s whistle 
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and struck a pedestrian at a crosswalk. Id. at 394-95. The defendant stopped his car as soon as he 

could and remained on the scene. Id. at 393, 396. He was charged and found guilty of assault 

with a deadly weapon (an automobile) with intent to inflict upon the person of another a bodily 

injury, where no considerable provocation appears, or where the circumstances of the assault 

show an abandoned or malignant heart. Id. at 390. On appeal, the defendant argued that the 

evidence presented did not show beyond a reasonable doubt that his conduct was so willful and 

wanton as to constitute the crime charged. Id. The Illinois Supreme Court agreed, noting that the 

defendant’s conduct was not so willfully and wantonly reckless as to justify the verdict of guilt. 

Id. at 395-96. The court pointed out that the defendant’s act of driving the car and failing to 

notice a policeman’s whistle was negligent, but a lawful act negligently performed is not 

criminal. Id. Here, unlike in Anderson, defendant was not engaged in a lawful act that he 

performed negligently. Id. Rather, he was the passenger in a vehicle, struck the driver and took 

the affirmative action of pulling down on the steering wheel of the travelling car. Id. Defendant’s 

actions were reckless regardless of whether there were pedestrians present, as striking the driver 

in the face and then forcefully pulling on the steering wheel of a moving car traveling at the 

speed of 45 miles per hour, amount to conduct that is a gross deviation from the standard of care 

of a reasonable person would exercise. 

¶ 20 For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the circuit court of Cook County is affirmed.

¶ 21 Affirmed.