### IN THE COURT OF APP EALS OF TENNESS EE AT JAC KSON JU L Y 23, 200 9 S es sio n

SCOTT PEATROSS , Admini st ra to r o f the E st at e o f BLANCHARD GREE NWOO D, decea se d v . SHEL BY COUNTY, TENNES SEE, ET AL


### .

Direc t Appeal from the Circ uit Court forShelb y County No. CT-002713-07 R obert L. Childers, Judge

No. W2008-02385-C OA-R3-C V - Filed September 10, 2009

This appea l results from the trial c ourt’s g rant of summar y judgme nt i n fa v o r o f d efendants. The issue befor e the trial court was the scope of a rele ase ag ree ment signe d by the dec edent’ s children and one of

the def endants (“ the Med” ). The r emai n ing de fenda nts argued that this ag ree ment provided for

th e r e le a s e o f

c la im s a g a in s t a ll p o te n ti a l d e f e n d an ts

. Pl a inti f

f r e s p o n d e d

th a t the p ar t i es t o t h e a gr e e m en th adn o i n t en t i o no f r el ea s i n g ad d i t i o n al p ar t i es

. E x am i n i n g t h e l an gu age of the re lease and the circumstance s surroundingits ex ecution, we ag ree with the trial court’ s finding that plaintiff’s cla ims a g ainst defe ndants wer e re lease d. We also agree with the trial court’ s finding that the agr eeme nt rele ased any civil rig hts claims that plaintiff m ight assert aga inst the M ed. The judgme nt of the trial cour t is therefor e af

firmed.

Tenn. R. App . P. 3. Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Cir cuit Court Af firme d

J. S TE VE N S TA FF O RD , J., delivere d the opinion of the court, in which A LA N E. H I G H ERS , P.J., W.S., and D AVI D R. F ARMER , J., joined.

Je ff re y S. Ros e nb lum

a nd Ma rc E. Re ism a n, Me mph is, Te nn e sse e fo r the Ap pe lla nt, Sc ott Pe a tr os s.

Debr a L. Fessende n, Memphis, Tennesse e for the Appellee , Shelby County Tennessee.

Ga il O . M a the s, Me mph is, Te nn e sse e fo r the Ap pe lle e , Ci ty o f M e mph is.

James F. Kyle, Jessica M. Hac kett, and Katherine L. Frazie r, Memphis
, Tenne ssee, for t he Appe llee, Shelby County Healthcar e Corporation d/b/a Regional Medical Center at Memphis ("the Med").

Christopher V. Ve scovo, Edd L. Peyton, Memphis, Tenne ssee, f or the Appe llee, Amos Raymond, M.D.The com pl ai nt nam ed s ever al ot her defe nd ant s , but t hi s appeal i s l i m i t ed t o t ho s e def endan t s w ho w er e gr ant ed 1

su m m a ry ju d g m e n t i n th e trial c o u rt.

-2- OP IN ION

Bac kgr ound

The e vents leadingto the prese nt action occ urre d on May 22 and 23, 2006. The entire f actua l backg round is not rele vant on appea l, but in summary , Bla nchar d Gre enwood sustained injurie s and subsequently

died as a result of those injuries on Ma y 23, 2006 at the Med.

On J une 2, 2006, a r epre sentative fr om the Med met with Mr. Gre enwood’ s two children: Japo nic a Gr e e nw oo d a

nd Ce dr ic Gr e e nw oo d. At

that me e tin g , th e Gr e e nw oo ds , a lo ng wi th t he ir ste p- br oth e r, Dw ay

nn e Mc Cur dy , d isc us se d a se ttl e me nt of c la ims wi th the Me d. As a re su lt o f t his meeting the par

ties signe d an AGREEMEN T OF FUL LREL EASE, I NDEMNI TY AND SET TL EM EN T O F AL LCL AI MS ( “ the Re le a se ” ), wh ic h p ro vid e d in re le va nt p art , a s f

oll ow s:

Th e un de rs ig ne d Re le a so rs

.. .d o h e re by fu lly re le a se and

dis c ha rg e the Re le a se d Pa

rt y [t he Med] and ea ch and e very repr esentat i ve, ag ent, serva nt, employ ee, of

fice r or d i r e c t o r o f t h e R e l e a s e d

P art y and any oth er persons, firm s, insu rers, or other entities wh o, together with the R elea sed Party may be liable in any

way resulting fr om t he inc ide nt o r e ve nt m a de the su bj ect matte r o f t

he a bo ve re fe re nc e d f

a c ts

and /or tr ans a c tio ns fr om a

ny and a ll p a st, pr e se nt o r f

utu re c la ims , d e mand s, obligations, a

nd liens, including, but not limited to, all medical, Te nnCare, Me dicar e

and /or Me dic a id l ie ns , a c tio ns , c a us e s o f a c tio ns , n e g lig e nc e c la ims
, wr on g fu l de a th claims, loss of consortium claims, c i v i l ri g h t s c l a i ms , discrimination claims...which the Releasor s now have individually or as the he irs at law of

Bla nchar d Gre enwood, or which ma

y here afte r ac crue or otherw ise be a cquire d, on acc ount of, or may in any way arise out of

, or any future a ction of the Relea sors’ re p re s entatives, which may h a v e r e s u l t e d

o r m ay r e s u l tf

r o ma l l e g e d

a c t s o r o m i s s i o n s o f

t h e R e l e a s e d

P art y.
(empha sis added). The ag ree ment identifies the Med a s the Release d Party

. On May 22, 2007, Scott Peatross (“Pl a in tif f”) , in his repre sentative c apac ity as Administrator

o f t h e E s t at e o f B l an ch ar d Gr ee n wo o d
, fi l eda c o mp l ai n taga i n s t s e v er al d ef en d an t s , i n cl u d i n g: Shelby County , Tenne ssee; C i t y of Memphis, Tenne ssee; Shelby County Hea lthcare Corporation d/b/a The Reg ional Medica l Center at Memphis (“the Med” ); and Amos Ray mond, M.D. The

1 complaint alleg ed that Mr. Gr eenw ood’s injuries and death wer e the result of neg lige nce on the par t of de fe nd ants . T he c omp la int a lso a sse rt e d a

c ivi l rig hts c la im pur su ant to 42 U .S. C. § 19 83 a g a ins t Shelby County , the City

of Memphis, and the Me d.

Af te r a br ie f dis c ov e ry

pe ri od , d e fe nd ants fi le d mo tio ns fo r s umm ary jud g me nt. De fe nd ants

asser ted that the Relea se sig ned by Mr. Greenwood’ s heirs release d any claims that plaintiff mig ht-3-

have a g ainst defe ndants. Plaintiff responde d to the motions fo r s u m mary judgme nt and filed the aff idavits of J aponica Gre enwood and Cedric Gree nwood. The a ffidavits both asser ted that “[w]hen signingthe settlement ag ree ment, we had absolutely no intention of rele asing anyone other than the Med, its employ ees, office rs, and direc tors.” They further asser ted t hat t hey “had no idea whatsoever that we h ad a ri gh t to pursue a c laim ag ainst the Med or a ny other pe rson or e ntity

pursuant to 42 U. S.C. § 1 98 3. ” Con se qu e ntl y , p la int if f a rgue d th a t the Re le a se sh ou ld not be re a d to pr e c lud e its

c la ims a g a ins t de fe nd ants

. On September

23, 2008, the trial cour

t en t ere d an orde r g rantingdefe ndants’ motions for

summa ry jud g me nt. Th e tr ans c ri pt fr om the he ari ng of the mot ion s wa s att a c he d to the or de r. I n it s
o r a l r u li n g , th e tr ia l c o u rt c o n s id e r e d th e d e c is ion in E va n s v. Til lett Bros. C

onstr. C o., Inc. , 545 S.W .2d 8 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1976) a nd applied its rule to the Release signe d by the par ties. The trial

c ourt c on c lud e d th a t th e pla in l angua g e of the Re le a se c le arl y pr ov ide d fo r the re le a se of a ll c la ims ag ainst any potential defe ndants and was not limit ed to claims ag ainst the M ed. Plaintiff appe als the trial court’ s ruling.

Issues Pr esente d

I

. Did the trial court err by g ranting summary judgme nt in favor of un n am ed an d u n i dentified tortfea sors due to a G ener al R elea se between Dece dent’s children and the Me d wher e the undisputed

e vid e nc e wa s th a t th e re wa s n o inte nt t o r e le a se tho se tor tf e a so rs ?

I I . Did the trial cour

t err by g rantingsummary

judgme nt on all claim s fo r re l i ef ag ainst the Med despite alleg ations and proof of mutual mistake of the pa rties or fr aud on the pa

rt of the Me d?

Law a nd A nal ys is

A trial cour

ts decision to gr ant a motion for summary judgme nt pr esents a question of law. Te nn . R. Civ . P. 56 .0 4. Our r e vie w i s de novo with no presumption of corr ectne ss affor ded to the trial court’ s ruling. Bai

n v . W e lls , 9 36 S.W. 2d

61 8, 62 2 ( Te nn . 1 99 7) . In e va luatin g the tr ia l c ourt s decision to gra nt summary judgme nt, we view the evidenc e in the lig ht most favorable to the nonmoving pa

rty and draw all rea sonable infere nces in the nonmoving pa rty ' s favor

. By rd

v . Ha ll
, 84 7 S. W.2 d 2 08 , 2 10 -1 1 ( Te nn . 1 99 3) ; Mooney v. Sneed
, 3 0 S. W. 3 d 3 0 4
, 3 0 5

- 0 6 ( T e n n

. 2 0 0 0).

A re lease is a contract and the rules of construction applied to contra cts are used in construing

a re lease

. Richlan d Coun try Cl u b , I n c. v. C R C Equ ities, Inc. , 8 32 S.W. 2d 55 4, 55 7 ( Te nn . Ct

. App. 1991). Gene rally speaking
, the scope and extent of r elea se depe nds on the intent of the par ties

a s e xpre sse d in the ins tr

ume nt. A g e ne ra l re le a se c ov e rs a ll cla ims be tw e e n the pa rt ie s w hic h a

re in exis tence and within their conte mplation; a relea se conf ined to particula

r matters or

cause s operates to relea se only

such cla ims as fairly

come wi t h i n t h e terms of the r elea se. Cro ss v . Ea rls , 517 S.W .2d 751, 752 (Tenn. 1974) . I n Evans v. Tillett Br os. Cons tr. Co., In c. , 5 45 S.W. 2d 8 ( Te nn . Ct

. App. 1976), the Court e x plained how the sc ope of a rele ase should be de termined:-4-

Th e sc op e o f

a r e l e a s e i s d e t e r

m i n e d b y t h e i n t e n t i o no f

t h e p art i e s a s e xp r e s s e d

in the terms of the particula r instru ment, considere d in the light of a ll the fac ts and circ umstances. The intention of the parties is to be g ather ed from the entire instrument and i n such i nquiry that construction will be adopte d which g ives eff ect t o ea ch an d

ev ery p a r t o f t h e i n s t ru m en twh er e t h at i s p o s s i b l e. I ni n t er p re t i n g a
re le a se to de te rm ine wh e the r a pa rt ic ula r c la im h a s b e e n d isc ha

rg e d, the pr ima

ry ru le of c on str uc tio n is tha

t th e int e nti on of the pa

rt ie s sh a ll g ov e rn

and thi s in te nti on

is t o be d eter mined with a consider ation of what was within the contemplation of the parties whe n the re lease was ex ecute d, which in turn is to be re solved in the light of all of the surr ounding f

acts a nd circ umstances unde r which the parties a cted.

Id. a t 11 ; se eals o , Richlan d , 83 2 S. W.2 d at 55 7; Jackson v. Miller
, 776 S.W .2d 115, 118 (Tenn. Ct. Ap p. 19 89 ). Sub se qu e nt d e c isi on s hav e fu rt he r expl a ine d th a t “ [a] r e le a se or din ari ly c ov e rs a ll such matters a s may fairly be said to ha ve been within the contemplation of the parties whe n it was g iven....Consequently

a dema nd of which a party was ignor ant when the re lease was g iven is not as a rule ...embra ced the rein....” Jackson , 776 S.W .2d at 118 ( quoting 76 C.J .S. Re le as e § 52 (1952))

.

I n Ev ans , plaintiff sig ned an ag ree ment rele asing one tortfeasor from liability “and a ll other persons, fir

ms or corporation l iable or who might be c laimed to be liable.” Ev ans , 545 S.W .2d at 10. The de fenda

nts filed a motion for summary judgme nt assertingthat the settlement ag ree ment rele ased the m from liability as well. I n response , plaintiff filed a n aff idavit indicating that he had be e n tol d that the a g re e me nt wo uld on ly re le a se the de fe nd ant dr ive r and that he re lie d u po n t his

re p re sentation when sig ning the ag ree ment. Id

. O nr e v i e w , t h e C o u rtf o u n d “ t h a tt h e a f

f i d a vit s submitt ed in support of the motion cre ated a materia l issue of fac t with r eg ard to the intention of the parties in re leasingan unname d tortfea sor....” Id . at 12. Conseque n t l y , t h e C ourt conc luded that summary judgme nt was inappropr iate. Id

. The Court, in Louis Dreyfus Corp. v. Aust in C o. , 868 S.W .2d 649 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1993),

a p p li e d th e “ inte n t” a

p p r o a c h s e t f

o rth in Ev an s. The Court first examined the languag e of the rele ase a nd then con s i d er ed t h e agree ment’s terms in light of the surroundingfac ts and circ umstances. Af

ter c onsidering both the terms of t h e agr eeme nt and the extrinsic evidence explaining those terms, t h e C o urt found that summary judgme nt was appr opriate be cause “a jur y could only

conclude that the par

ties intended to rele ase the claims now asserted by [pl aintiff].” Id

. at 656.

I n Ric hla nd , d e fe nd ants mov e d f or summa ry jud g me nt on the ba sis of a re le a se inc lud e d in an ag ree ment with plaintiff. Ric hla nd , 8 32 S.W. 2d a t 55 7. Pla int if

f p re se nte d tw o a ff

ida vit s to show the intention of t h e p ar t i es when they signe d the re lease ag ree ment. I n g rantingsummary judgme nt, the trial court found that the agr eeme nt was unambiguous and theref ore did not consider pla int if f’ s a ff ida vit s. On a pp e a l, t he Co urt reci ted the ru le s o n th e c on str uc tio n o f a

re le a se ag ree ment and found that the trial court erre d: “[t] hus, it appear s that the circ umstances surr ounding the execution of the doc uments in t h i s case , the situation of the par ties, the business to which the ag ree ments relate d...and the subjec t matter of the a g ree ments in ge nera l should have bee n considere d-5-

in const ru ing the eff

ect of the re lease .” Id . at 557. Considering this new information, the Court found that summary

judgme nt was inappropr iate beca u s e “a t ri er of fac t could drawdiffer ent infere nces a

bout the parties’ intent.” Id . at 557.

Ap p l yi n g t h es e r

u l es i nt h e p re s en tca s e, i tap p ea rs t h at we m u s t fi rs t co n s i d er t h e l an gu age of the Relea se itself. Second, w e must examine the fac ts and circ u m s t an ces sur rounding the execution of the Relea se. In d o i n g s o, we will consider the Gre enwoods’ a ffidavits off ere d by plaintiff in order

to determine the parties’ intent. I f a trie r of f act c ould draw diff

ere nt infere nces about their intent, summary judgme nt is inappropriate. Se eEv ans , 545 S.W .2d at 12.

A. De fend ant s She lbyCo unt y, Ci tyof M e m phis , a nd D r . R ay m ond

Wit h respe ct to these de fenda nts, Pl aintiff conte nds that a fac tual dispute exis ts on the intent of the pa rties to the Relea se and that summary judgme nt w as there fore inappropriate. We disag ree

.

Ex amining the lang uag e of the Release itself, we find that the parties ag ree d that the re leasing party would rele ase “the Release d Party and any other pe rsons, firms, insurer s, or other e ntities who, toge ther with the Relea sed Party may be liable in any

way resulting fr o m the incident.” Plaintiff po in ts to o th e r

p r o v is io n s o f

th e Re le a s e th a t d e f

in e th e Re le a s e d

Pa rty mo r e g e n e r a ll y

a s “ T he Me d. ” Th e Te nn e sse e Sup re me Court , ho we ve r, ha s e xpla ine d th a t “ [a]s a ru le , w he re the re are , in a contr act, both g ener al and s p ec i al p ro v isions relating to the same thing , the spec ial provisions control.” Cocke Cou nty Bd. of H ighw ay C om m ’rs v. Ne wport Util

ities Bd.
, 690 S.W .2d 231, 237 (Tenn. 1985) ( quoting

17 Am. J ur. 2d Con tra c ts § 270 (1964)) . Her e, the ge nera l definitions of the Release are subordinate to the specific provision r elea sing “any other persons” from liability

. The lang uag e of the Release there fore supports defe n d a nts ’ c o nte nti o n

th a t p la intiff’s claims ag ainst them have be en re lease d.

Ne xt, w e mus t ana ly

ze the fa c ts an d cir c ums tanc e s sur ro un din g the e xec uti on

of the Re le a se to d e te rm ine wh e the r t

he pa rt ie s in te nded to re le a se po te nti a l c la ims a g a ins t th e se de fe nd ants

. Plaintiff r elies on the Ev ans decision t o support its arg ument that this iss ue should be de cided by the trier of fac t. I n Ev ans , the re leasingparty testified t hat he ha d been told that the r elea se ag ree ment would o nly

apply to one, spec ific def

endant. Ev ans , 545 S.W .2d at 10. He f urther stated that he relied on this re prese ntati o n when signing the ag ree ment. I n the pre sent ca se, there was no such repr es en t at i o n b y the Med. In their af fidavits, the Gre enwoods simply asser t that they

wer e not

awa re that the Release applied to par ties other than the Me d.

This Court has previously held that “in matter s of unambiguous written instruments absent proof of fra ud, misrepre sentation, undue influenc e and situations of like c hara cter , the unspoken subjective intent of a

party is not relevant.” Malone & Hyde Food Servs. v . Parson , 642 S.W .2d 1 5 7
, 1 5 9 (T enn. Ct. App. 1982). He re, the Gre enwoods have off ere d only their subjective impression on their intent when signi n g t h e R el ease. They have not, howe ver, pointed to a ny ind e pe nd e nt f

a c ts o r c ir c ums ta

nc e s f ro m w hic h a

jur y c ou ld c on c lud e tha

t th e y did no t in te nd

to rele ase pa

rties in ad d i t ion to the Med. Consequently , the Ev ans decision is distinguishable.-6-

E x am i n i n g t h e f

ac t s an d ci rc u m s t an ce s s u rr o u n d i n g t h e e x ec u t i o no f t h e R el ea s e, we fi n d t h at n either party inquired or made repr esentations about the scope of the Relea se. The unspoken subjective i n t en to f t h e Gr ee n wo o d s i s t h er ef o re i rr el ev an t an d d o es n o t af fe ct o u r r ea d i n g o f t h e p l ai nl an gu age of the Relea se.

Ha vin g e xam i n e d

t h e R e l e a s e i t s e l f

an d t h e f a c t s an d c i r c u m s t an c e s s u r

r o u n d i n g i ts execution, we find that the pa rties intended to re lease all parties, who in a ddition to the Med, may have be en liable f

or Mr. Gr eenw ood’s injuries. Consequently , we f ind that the trial cour

t did not err in gr anting summary

judgme nt in favor of Shelby County
, the City of Memphis, a nd Dr. Ray

mond.

B. Th e Me d

Withre sp e c t to the Me d, pla int if f c on te nd s th a t th e pa

rt ie s to the Re le a se did

no t in te nd

to rele ase a ny civil r ights claims ag ainst the Med. Ag ain, we look to the languag e of the Release and the fa c ts a nd c ir c ums tanc e s sur

ro un din g its e xec uti on

in o rd e r t o d e te rm ine the int e nt o f t he pa rt ie s.

Th e langua g e of the Re le a se its e lf c le arl y pr ov ide s th at th e Me d is re le a se d f ro m any “ c ivi l rig hts claims.” In their af fidavits, howeve r, the Gr eenw oods assert that the repre sentative fr om the Med t old them th a t t

h e r e w a s a

“ c a p ” o nth e amo u n t t

h a t t h e M e d c o u ld p ay in d a ma g e s

. T he Gr e e nw oo ds a sse rt

tha t th e y we re no t awa

re that th is “cap” wo uld

no t a pp ly to c ivi l r ig hts c la ims broug ht pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Under these c ircumstance s, plaintiff asser ts that there is an issue of m ater ia l f

a c t a s to th e p arti e s ’ in te n t f o r a ju r y to d e c id e

. A g a in
, p la inti f f r e li e s o nthe statement in Ev ans that “whe ther a re lease has bee n executed under mutual mist ake of

a mater ial fac t is a question for the jur

y .” Ev ans , 545 S.W .2d at 11.

Release s are g o v er n ed by contra ct law, a

nd courts g ener ally

“will not relieve parties f rom
co n trac tual obligations simply beca use they later prove to be burdensome or unwise.” Hun t v. Twi sd ale
, No

. M 2 0 0 6 -01870-COA-R3-CV, 2007 WL 2827051, at * 7 (Te nn. Ct. App. Sept. 28, 20 07 ). Ho we ve r, “ c ourt s have the po we r to a lte r the te rm s o f a wr itt e n c on tr a c t w he re , at th e tim e it w a s e xec ute d, bo th p art ie s w e re op e ratin g un de r a mut ua l mis take of fa c t or law re g ard ing a ba sic assumption underlying the barg ain.” Sikora v. V anderploeg , 212 S.W .3d 277, 286 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2006). C ourts may also “modify the provisions of a wr itten contrac t where only one of the parties

wa s o p er at i n g u n d er

a m i s t ak e o f f

ac t o r l a w i f t h e m i s t ak e w as i n fl u en ce d b y t h e o t h er p ar t y 's fra ud.” Id . The g oal of re formation is to “make the contra ct ‘c onform to the re al intent i o n of the parties.’ ” Id

. at 2 8 7 (q u o t i n g Lebo v . Gree n , 426 S.W .2d 489, 494 (Tenn. 1968) ). Be cause the law favor s the validity

of written a g ree ments, the party seekingto r efor

m the ag ree ment must prove the mistake by

clea r and c onvincing evidenc e. Id . at 287.

T o b e e n ti tl e d to r e li e f o n g r o u n d s o f mi s ta k e , th e mi s ta

k e mu s t h a ve bee n mutual or fra udulent and it must be material to the t ransa ction. The party seeking relief must also show injury and that the mistake w as not due to the c omplainant' s neg lige nce. Hunt , 2007 WL 2827051, at *7. Finally , if the claim for relief is ba sed on mutual mistake
, "the intent of both parties must be cle ar andmu st be t he s ame ." Id. , at *8.-7-

Reviewingthe Relea se and the Gre enwoods’ a ffidavits, w e fi n d that the plaintiff has not established mi stake. Unlike the par ties in Ev ans , the Med and the Gre enwoods did not discuss the specific meaningof the provision in question. The Med’ s repr esentative only in fo rm ed the Gre enwoods that the re was a statutory limit on the damag es that it could pay . Fur thermore , the Med’s repr esentative did not discuss civil rights c laims with the Gree nwoods. In Ev ans , the re lease d party made spe cific assertions to the pl aintiff on the meaningand scope of their a g ree ment. Her e, the on ly state me nts a

bo ut c ivi l r ig hts c la ims are incl ud e d in the Re le a se its e lf

, a nd the Re le a se provides that those claims are rele ased. F urthermor e, the Ev ans decision involved a br oad, g ener al provision of the pa rt i es ’ agreement, not a spe cific pr ovision ex plicitly rele asing a ce rtain ty

pe of claim. Consequently , we f ind that the par

ties’ intent on this question is clea r and that the trial court did not err in g rantingsummary judgme nt in favor of

the Med.

For the foreg oing rea sons, the ruli ng of t he trial court is affirme d. Costs of this appea l are assessed to Appe llant, Scott P eatr oss, Administ rator of the Estate of

Bla nchar d Gre enwood.

___________________________________

J. S T E V E N S T A F F O R D
, J.