NOT RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION

File Name: 16a0516n.06

No. 16-1027

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

ALIXPARTNERS, LLP,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

CHARLES BREWINGTON,

Defendant-Appellant.

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ON APPEAL FROM THE 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT 

COURT FOR THE EASTERN 

DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN

BEFORE: MOORE, ROGERS, and SENTELLE,* Circuit Judges.

SENTELLE, Senior Circuit Judge. AlixPartners, LLP (“Alix”) hired Charles Brewington 

(“Brewington”), a resident of Texas, as a Talent Acquisitions Director in Alix’s Dallas office. 

After he was terminated by Alix, Brewington filed a demand for arbitration on behalf of himself 

and a purported class of current, former, and potential Alix employees. Alix filed an action in 

the Eastern District of Michigan, seeking a declaratory judgment that Brewington was precluded 

from pursuing claims in arbitration on behalf of any purported class. Brewington moved to 

dismiss Alix’s complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 

12(b)(2). The district court, finding that Brewington’s contacts with the State of Michigan were 

sufficient to establish personal jurisdiction, denied the motion. Alix filed a motion for summary 

judgment, arguing that the arbitration clause in Brewington’s employment agreement did not 

 

* The Honorable David B. Sentelle, Senior Circuit Judge for United States Court of Appeals for the District 

of Columbia Circuit, sitting by designation.
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authorize him to pursue classwide arbitration. The district court granted Alix’s motion for 

summary judgment and enjoined Brewington from pursuing claims in arbitration on behalf of 

any absent individual or purported class. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm.

I. BACKGROUND

Alix is a global consulting and business advisory firm with offices around the world, 

including one in Southfield, Michigan. Alix’s Michigan office processes and administers payroll 

and benefits for employees in the United States and is directly involved in the hiring of new 

personnel in the United States. In early 2013, Alix hired Brewington, a Texas resident, to serve 

as a Talent Acquisitions Director and a member of Alix’s Corporate Services team in its Dallas, 

Texas office. The employment agreement contains two provisions relevant to this case. First, 

the agreement provides that it “will be construed and interpreted in accordance with the laws of 

the State of Michigan.” Second, it contains the following arbitration clause:

Except for any action by the Company seeking any injunctive 

relief or other equitable relief against you, any dispute arising out 

of or in connection with any aspect of this Agreement and/or any 

termination of employment thereunder . . ., shall be exclusively 

subject to binding arbitration under the National Rules for the 

Resolution of Employment Disputes of the American Arbitration 

Association (“AAA”), provided all substantive rights and remedies 

including any applicable damages provided under any pertinent 

statute(s) related to such claims . . . shall be available in the AAA 

forum. Any decision of the arbitrator shall be final and binding as 

to both parties, and enforceable by any court of competent 

jurisdiction. . . .

In March 2014, Brewington was terminated. He responded by filing a demand for 

arbitration with the AAA, asserting claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 

U.S.C. §§ 2000e et seq. Brewington filed the demand not only on behalf of himself, but also on 

behalf of a purported nationwide class of current, former, and potential Alix employees. Alix 
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responded by filing an action in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of 

Michigan under the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201–2202, seeking a declaration 

that Brewington was precluded from pursuing claims in arbitration on behalf of any purported 

class or absent individuals. 

Brewington moved to dismiss Alix’s action, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 

12(b)(2), for lack of personal jurisdiction. Alix responded by submitting declarations and record 

evidence concerning Brewington’s contacts with Michigan. The record shows that, although 

Brewington lives in Texas, Alix’s Michigan-based personnel were involved in his hiring. As 

part of the candidate evaluation process, for example, Brewington communicated with Dr. Leslie 

Evola, an on-staff psychologist in the Michigan office, and completed a personality and skills 

assessment that was reviewed by Dr. Evola. After Alix extended an offer to Brewington, Alix’s 

Director of Human Resources signed the proposed agreement in Michigan and sent it to 

Brewington in Texas to be signed and returned. Brewington sent the completed agreement, 

which included the Michigan choice-of-law provision, back to Alix’s Michigan office. In late 

April 2013, Brewington travelled to Alix’s Michigan office to attend a mandatory orientation 

program before beginning his full-time work in Texas. 

While working in Dallas, Brewington maintained a substantial connection with Alix’s 

Michigan office. As a member of the Talent Acquisition Team, Brewington was responsible for 

recruiting candidates for Alix’s Financial Advisory Services (“FAS”) group, which required him 

to communicate directly with Alix’s Michigan-based personnel. He worked directly with 

Patricia Diefenbacher, Alix’s Director of Talent Management for FAS, who was based in the 

Michigan office. According to Diefenbacher, she had numerous email and telephone 

communications with Brewington concerning candidates and available positions in the FAS 
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group. On at least one occasion, Brewington worked with Ray Kantor, an Internal Audit 

Director based in the Michigan office, to recruit and network with Michigan candidates for 

Alix’s “Detroit Internal Audit Manager” position.

Based on these facts, the district court denied Brewington’s motion to dismiss. 

AlixPartners, LLP v. Brewington, 133 F. Supp. 3d 947 (E.D. Mich. 2015). Relying on “factually 

similar cases,” the district court found that Brewington “established connections with Michigan 

and availed himself of the forum.” Id. at 957–58. The district court emphasized: 

(1) Brewington’s “semi-regular” email and telephone contact with his supervisors in Michigan; 

(2) the agreement’s Michigan choice-of-law provision; (3) Brewington’s visit to Michigan for an 

orientation session; and (4) Brewington’s work in recruiting Michigan candidates to fill positions 

in the Michigan office.1 Id. at 958. The district court also determined that the cause of action 

had a “‘substantial connection’” with Brewington’s in-state activities, id. at 959 (quoting S. 

Mach. Co. v. Mohasco Indus., Inc., 401 F.2d 374, 384 (6th Cir. 1968)), and concluded that the 

forum was “a reasonable one” for Brewington, “given that the contract was formed, and partly 

carried out, in Michigan,” id. at 960.

While the motion to dismiss was pending, Alix filed its motion for summary judgment. 

Relying on our decision in Reed Elsevier, Inc. ex rel. LexisNexis Division v. Crockett, 734 F.3d 

594 (6th Cir. 2013), Alix argued that Brewington’s arbitration agreement did not authorize him 

to pursue arbitration on behalf of a class. In Reed Elsevier, we held that “the question whether 

an arbitration agreement permits classwide arbitration is a gateway matter, which is reserved ‘for 

 

1 The district court also found that the fact that Brewington “sent and received e-mails contained on servers 

located entirely in Michigan” supported the conclusion that Brewington had sufficient minimum contacts with the 

forum. AlixPartners, 133 F. Supp. 3d at 958. Brewington may not be haled into court in Michigan based on Alix’s 

unilateral activity. Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 475 (1985). Therefore, Alix’s decision to store 

its emails on servers located in Michigan, without more, does not support the exercise of personal jurisdiction over 

Brewington. 
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judicial determination unless the parties clearly and unmistakably provide otherwise.’” Id. at 

599 (quoting Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 537 U.S. 79, 83 (2002)). The district court 

granted Alix’s motion. AlixPartners, LLP v. Brewington, No. 14-CV-14942, 2015 WL 8538089 

(E.D. Mich. Dec. 10, 2015). The district court found that the arbitration clause did not “clearly 

and unmistakably” provide that class arbitrability was a question left for the arbitrator, id. at *4–

5, and after finding no “material distinction” between Reed Elsevier and the instant case, the 

district court granted Alix’s motion and enjoined Brewington from “pursuing claims in 

arbitration on behalf of any absent individual or purported class arising out of the events giving 

rise to this suit . . . .” Id. at *5–6. This appeal followed. 

We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 

II. DISCUSSION

We review de novo both the district court’s denial of Brewington’s motion to dismiss for 

lack of personal jurisdiction, Air Prods. & Controls, Inc. v. Safetech Int’l, Inc., 503 F.3d 544, 

549 (6th Cir. 2007), and the district court’s grant of Alix’s motion for summary judgment, Reed 

Elsevier, 734 F.3d at 596–97 (citing Grden v. Leikin Ingber & Winters PC, 643 F.3d 169, 171 

(6th Cir. 2011)). 

A.

The plaintiff bears the burden of establishing the existence of personal jurisdiction. 

Serras v. First Tenn. Bank Nat’l Ass’n, 875 F.2d 1212, 1214 (6th Cir. 1989) (citations omitted). 

When the district court resolves a Rule 12(b)(2) motion solely on written submissions, the 

plaintiff’s burden is “relatively slight,” and “the plaintiff must make only a prima facie showing 

that personal jurisdiction exists in order to defeat dismissal[.]” Air Prods., 503 F.3d at 549 

(citations and quotation marks omitted). The plaintiff meets this burden by setting forth 
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“specific facts showing that the court has jurisdiction.” Serras, 875 F.2d at 1214 (citation and 

quotation marks omitted). “[T]he pleadings and affidavits submitted must be viewed in a light 

most favorable to the plaintiff, and the district court should not weigh ‘the controverting 

assertions of the party seeking dismissal.’” Air Prods., 503 F.3d at 549 (quoting Theunissen v. 

Matthews, 935 F.2d 1454, 1459 (6th Cir. 1991)).

When a federal court’s subject-matter jurisdiction is based on a federal question, the 

court’s exercise of personal jurisdiction must be both authorized by the forum State’s long-arm 

statute and in accordance with the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Bird v. 

Parsons, 289 F.3d 865, 871 (6th Cir. 2002) (quoting Mich. Coalition of Radioactive Material 

Users, Inc. v. Griepentrog, 954 F.2d 1174, 1176 (6th Cir. 1992)). Michigan’s long-arm statute 

allows a court to exercise “general” personal jurisdiction, Mich. Comp. Laws § 600.701, as well 

as “limited” personal jurisdiction, id. § 600.705. Here, Alix alleges that limited jurisdiction 

exists pursuant to § 600.705(1), which allows a court to exercise jurisdiction over a nonresident 

for claims “arising out of an act” which constitutes “[t]he transaction of any business within the 

state.” Section 600.715(1) is satisfied by “‘the slightest act of business in Michigan,’” Neogen 

Corp. v. Neo Gen Screening, Inc., 282 F.3d 883, 888 (6th Cir. 2002) (quoting Lanier v. Am. Bd. 

of Endodontics, 843 F.2d 901, 906 (6th Cir. 1988)), and Brewington does not appear to contest 

that his conduct falls within the statute. Moreover, Michigan’s long-arm statute “extends to the 

limits imposed by federal constitutional due process requirements and thus, the two questions 

become one.” Mich. Coalition, 954 F.2d at 1176 (citing Chandler v. Barclays Bank PLC, 898 

F.2d 1148, 1150–51 (6th Cir. 1990)). We must therefore determine whether the exercise of 

personal jurisdiction over Brewington comports with constitutional due process. 
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“The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment constrains a State’s authority to 

bind a nonresident defendant to a judgment of its courts.” Walden v. Fiore, 134 S. Ct. 1115, 

1121 (2014) (citing World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 291 (1980)). For 

a nonresident defendant to be subject to personal jurisdiction, he must have “certain minimum 

contacts [with the forum State] such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend traditional 

notions of fair play and substantial justice.” Id. (citations, quotation marks, and ellipsis omitted). 

As noted, Alix asserts that limited, or specific, jurisdiction is present. Therefore, focusing on 

“the relationship among the defendant, the forum, and the litigation,” id. (citations and quotation 

marks omitted); see also Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 472–73 (1985), we 

employ a three-part test to determine whether the exercise of personal jurisdiction over 

Brewington comports with constitutional due process:

First, the defendant must purposefully avail himself of the 

privilege of acting in the forum state or causing a consequence in 

the forum state. Second, the cause of action must arise from the 

defendant’s activities there. Finally, the acts of the defendant or 

consequences caused by the defendant must have a substantial 

enough connection with the forum state to make the exercise of 

jurisdiction over the defendant reasonable.

Air Prods., 503 F.3d at 550 (emphasis added) (quoting Mohasco, 401 F.2d at 381).

1.

Brewington argues that the purposeful availment test is not met. “Purposeful availment” 

is “the constitutional touchstone of personal jurisdiction,” and it exists “where the defendant’s 

contacts with the forum state proximately result from actions by the defendant himself that create 

a substantial connection with the forum State . . . and where the defendant’s conduct and 

connection with the forum are such that he should reasonably anticipate being haled into court 

there.” Neogen, 282 F.3d at 889 (citations and quotation marks omitted). “This purposeful 
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availment requirement ensures that a defendant will not be haled into a jurisdiction solely as a 

result of random, fortuitous, or attenuated contacts, . . . or of the unilateral activity of another 

party or a third person[.]” Burger King, 471 U.S. at 475 (citations and quotation marks omitted). 

Thus, a nonresident who deliberately engages in “significant activities within a State” or creates 

“continuing obligations between himself and residents of the forum” satisfies this requirement. 

Id. at 475–76 (citations and quotation marks omitted). 

Alix alleges that Brewington purposefully availed himself of Michigan by: (1) pursuing 

employment through email and telephone communications with personnel in Alix’s Michigan 

office; (2) signing an employment agreement with a Michigan choice-of-law provision and 

returning it to Alix’s Michigan office; (3) attending a mandatory orientation session in Michigan; 

(4) communicating with his Michigan-based supervisors over the course of his employment; and 

(5) recruiting Michigan candidates for a position in Alix’s Michigan office. Viewing the 

evidence in the light most favorable to Alix, we conclude that Alix has made the required prima 

facie showing. See Air Prods., 503 F.3d at 549; Neogen, 282 F.3d at 887. 

Despite the fact that Alix is not headquartered in Michigan, a number of the company’s 

business and personnel departments, including Human Resources, Benefits, and Payroll, are 

housed in its Michigan office. Accordingly, Brewington secured employment with Alix through 

the company’s Michigan office and attended the mandatory orientation session in Michigan. 

Furthermore, Brewington’s duties required him to report to and conduct business with his 

Michigan-based colleagues throughout his employment with Alix. In addition to his connection 

with Alix’s Michigan-based personnel, the record shows that Brewington’s official duties 

included recruiting Michigan candidates to fill job openings in Michigan. Because Brewington 

accepted a job in which his duties were purposefully aimed at, and tied to, Michigan and its 
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residents, Michigan was, at least in part, the focus of Brewington’s employment and the parties’ 

relationship. Compare Lanier, 843 F.2d at 911 (holding that personal jurisdiction existed where 

“the real object” of nonresident’s contacts was to have “ongoing, far-reaching consequences” in 

the forum State), with Kerry Steel, Inc. v. Paragon Indus., Inc., 106 F.3d 147, 151 (6th Cir. 1997) 

(holding that plaintiff failed to make prima facie showing where it “alleged no facts connecting 

either the subject matter of the contract or its performance to the State of Michigan”). The fact 

that Brewington voluntarily executed an employment agreement with a Michigan choice-of-law 

provision reinforces the conclusion that he “deliberate[ly] affiliate[ed]” himself with the forum. 

Burger King, 471 U.S. at 480–82; see also LAK, Inc. v. Deer Creek Enters., 885 F.2d 1293, 1295 

(6th Cir. 1989). 

The facts of this case establish that Brewington knowingly “created a connection” with 

Alix’s Michigan office that was “intended to be ongoing in nature,” as opposed to “a ‘one-shot 

affair.’” See CompuServe, Inc. v. Patterson, 89 F.3d 1257, 1263–65 (6th Cir. 1996) (quoting 

Mohasco, 401 F.2d at 385). Accordingly, his contacts with Michigan are not “random, 

fortuitous, or attenuated, but are the result of deliberate conduct that amounts to purposeful 

availment.” Air Prods., 503 F.3d at 551 (quotation marks omitted); see also Burger King, 471 

U.S. at 480–81 (concluding that nonresident’s “continuous course of direct communications” 

with plaintiff in Florida confirmed that nonresident “knew that he was affiliating himself with an 

enterprise based primarily in Florida”); Kelly Servs. v. Eidnes, 530 F. Supp. 2d 940, 947 (E.D. 

Mich. 2008) (finding that nonresident’s “semi-regular contact with Michigan-based supervisors 

during the course of her employment” supported finding of purposeful availment). 

Brewington’s reliance on Aysling, L.L.C. v. Mejia, No. 13-13027, 2014 WL 545816 (E.D. 

Mich. Feb. 11, 2014), and Calphalon Corp. v. Rowlette, 228 F.3d 718 (6th Cir. 2000), is 
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misplaced. For the reasons identified by the district court, we find that there are “several 

distinctions that limit the applicability of [Aysling] here.” See AlixPartners, 133 F. Supp. 3d at 

958 n.7. In Calphalon, unlike the instant case, the quality of the parties’ relationship revealed 

that the nonresident defendant’s contacts with the forum State were “purely ‘fortuitous’ and 

‘attenuated.’” 228 F.3d at 722. Notably, the parties’ relationship “centered” on the defendant’s 

work outside the forum State and the defendant’s communications and physical visits to the 

forum “occurred solely because [the plaintiff] chose to be headquartered in [the forum], not 

because [the defendant] sought to further its business and create ‘continuous and substantial’ 

consequences there.” Id. at 723. Based on the fact that the defendant “did not make a deliberate 

affiliation with th[e] state nor could [it] reasonably foresee possible litigation there,” the 

agreement’s Ohio choice-of-law provision was not decisive. Id. In contrast, Brewington’s 

contacts with Michigan are not purely fortuitous and attenuated. He made a deliberate 

connection with the forum State and its residents that was centered in part on his work in 

Michigan. Moreover, the Michigan choice-of-law provision in Brewington’s employment 

agreement, when combined with his relationship with Alix’s Michigan office, “reinforce[s] his 

deliberate affiliation with the forum State . . . .” Burger King, 471 U.S. at 482. 

Brewington’s primary argument is that, in light of the fact that Alix is not a Michigan 

resident, the Court must determine whether Alix’s connection with Michigan is sufficient for 

Brewington to have anticipated being haled into court there. Brewington’s argument misses the 

mark. The minimum contacts analysis focuses on “the defendant’s contacts with the forum State 

itself, not the defendant’s contacts with persons who reside there.” Walden, 134 S. Ct. at 1122 

(citations omitted). Thus, the “plaintiff’s residence in the forum State is not a separate 

requirement, and lack of residence will not defeat jurisdiction established on the basis of 
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defendant’s contacts.” Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 780 (1984); see also 

Walden, 134 S. Ct. at 1124–25 (noting that the plaintiff’s contacts with the defendant and the 

forum cannot “drive the jurisdictional analysis”). We agree with the district court that

“[r]egardless of [Alix’s] status as a forum resident, [Brewington’s] actions established 

connections with Michigan,” AlixPartners, 133 F. Supp. 3d at 959, and therefore, Alix’s 

purported “lack of ‘contacts’” with Michigan “will not defeat . . . jurisdiction,” Calder v. Jones, 

465 U.S. 783, 788 (1984) (citing Keeton, 465 U.S. at 779–81).

2.

We next consider whether Alix’s action arises from Brewington’s contacts with 

Michigan. “We have articulated the standard for this prong in a number of different ways, such 

as whether the causes of action were made possible by or lie in the wake of the defendant’s 

contacts, or whether the causes of action are related to or connected with the defendant’s contacts 

with the forum state[.]” Air Prods., 503 F.3d at 553 (citations and internal quotation marks 

omitted). It is clear, however, that this is a “‘lenient standard’” and “the cause of action need not 

‘formally’ arise from defendant’s contacts.” Id. (quoting Bird, 289 F.3d at 875). At a minimum, 

this factor is satisfied if “‘the cause of action, of whatever type, ha[s] a substantial connection 

with the defendant’s in-state activities.’” Bird, 289 F.3d at 875 (quoting Third Nat’l Bank v. 

Wedge Grp., Inc., 882 F.2d 1087, 1091 (6th Cir. 1989)).

Alix brought a declaratory judgment action seeking to determine the parties’ rights under 

Brewington’s employment agreement, which, as explained above, was centered in part on 

Brewington’s activities in Michigan. Prior to and during his employment, Brewington frequently 

communicated with Alix’s Michigan-based personnel concerning the negotiation, execution, and 

performance of the agreement. Pursuant to that agreement, which contains a Michigan 
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choice-of-law provision, Brewington agreed to resolve “any dispute” through arbitration, and the 

scope of that arbitration clause is at issue in the instant action. “Especially given that this prong 

is a ‘lenient standard,’ that the cause of action need not ‘formally’ arise from [Brewington’s]

contacts, and that [Alix] need only make a prima facie showing of jurisdiction under the 

procedural posture of this case, this prong is satisfied in this case.” Air Prods., 503 F.3d at 554.

3. 

The final requirement is “whether exercising personal jurisdiction over [Brewington] 

would be reasonable, i.e., whether it would comport with traditional notions of fair play and 

substantial justice.” CompuServe, 89 F.3d at 1267–68 (citations and internal quotation marks 

omitted). Where, as here, “the first two criteria are met . . . only the unusual case will not meet 

this third criterion.” Theunissen, 935 F.2d at 1461) (citations and quotation marks omitted). In 

analyzing this requirement, we consider a number of factors, including: “(1) the burden on the 

defendant; (2) the interest of the forum state; (3) the plaintiff’s interest in obtaining relief; and 

(4) other states’ interest in securing the most efficient resolution of the policy.” Air Prods., 503 

F.3d at 554–55 (citation omitted).

Brewington argues that it would be unreasonable to subject him to personal jurisdiction 

in Michigan because “the current dispute has only a tenuous connection with the State of 

Michigan.” As explained above, however, Brewington deliberately affiliated himself with 

Michigan and its residents, and the fact that Brewington lives in Texas does not overcome the 

inference of reasonableness. See, e.g., Youn v. Track, Inc., 324 F.3d 409, 420 (6th Cir. 2003) 

(“We have also upheld specific jurisdiction in cases where doing so forced the defendant to 

travel.”). “Because there is an inference of reasonableness when the first two Southern Machine

prongs are satisfied, and because there are no considerations put forward by [Brewington] to 
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overcome or contradict that inference, the exercise of jurisdiction is reasonable under the 

circumstances of this case.” Air Prods., 503 F.3d at 555; see also AlixPartners, 133 F. Supp. 3d 

at 960 (“While this Court may not be the most convenient forum for Defendant, it is a reasonable 

one given that the contract was formed, and partly carried out, in Michigan.”). 

Finding that Brewington is subject to personal jurisdiction in Michigan, we next review 

the district court’s grant of Alix’s motion for summary judgment. 

B.

Brewington concedes that our review of Alix’s motion for summary judgment is 

controlled by Reed Elsevier, Inc. ex rel. LexisNexis Division v. Crockett, in which we held that 

“the question whether an arbitration agreement permits classwide arbitration is a gateway matter, 

which is reserved for judicial determination unless the parties clearly and unmistakably provide 

otherwise.” 734 F.3d at 599 (citation and quotation marks omitted); see also Huffman v. Hilltop 

Cos., LLC, 747 F.3d 391, 398 (6th Cir. 2014). 

Brewington argues that the broadly-worded arbitration clause in his employment 

agreement “clearly and unmistakably” establishes that the parties agreed to submit the question 

of whether the agreement permits classwide arbitration to the arbitrator. But the arbitration 

clause is “silent as to whether an arbitrator or a court should determine the question of classwide 

arbitrability, meaning the determination lies with this court.” Huffman, 747 F.3d at 398 (citing 

Reed Elsevier, 734 F.3d at 599). Given this silence, the clause’s broad language covering “any 

dispute” is insufficient evidence that the parties intended for the arbitrator to decide this 

question, Reed Elsevier, 734 F.3d at 599, as is the incorporation of the AAA’s rules, see 

Huffman, 747 F.3d at 393–94, 398; Reed Elsevier, 734 F.3d at 599-600. We must therefore 

decide whether the parties agreed to arbitrate. Reed Elsevier, 734 F.3d at 599 (citation omitted).
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An agreement must expressly include the possibility of classwide arbitration for us to 

conclude that the parties agreed to it. Id. at 600; see also Huffman, 747 F.3d at 398–99. This 

arbitration clause is silent on the availability of classwide arbitration, and we may not presume 

from “mere silence” that the parties consented to it. See Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l 

Corp., 559 U.S. 662, 687 (2010). Further, the clause limits its scope to claims “arising out of or 

in connection with any aspect of this Agreement,” as opposed to other employees’ and/or 

potential employees’ agreements, and states that the arbitrator’s decision “shall be final and 

binding as to both parties.” The mere incorporation of the AAA’s rules is not sufficient 

evidence that the parties agreed to classwide arbitration. See Huffman, 747 F.3d at 393–94, 398–

99; Reed Elsevier, 734 F.3d at 599–600. We therefore conclude that the parties’ arbitration 

clause does not authorize classwide arbitration, and hold that Brewington must proceed on an 

individual basis.

III. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the orders of the district court are affirmed. 

So ordered.