[Cite as State v. Farrow, 2023-Ohio-682.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

LAWRENCE COUNTY

State of Ohio, : Case No. 22CA12

Plaintiff-Appellant, : DECISION AND

JUDGMENT ENTRY

v. :

Quazaa S. Farrow, : RELEASED 3/01/2023

Defendant-Appellee. :

______________________________________________________________________

APPEARANCES:

Brigham M. Anderson, Lawrence County Prosecutor, Ironton, Ohio, for appellant.

Steven H. Eckstein, Washington Court House, Ohio, for appellee.

______________________________________________________________________

Hess, J.

{¶1} The state of Ohio appeals from a judgment of the Lawrence County Court 

of Common Pleas granting Defendant-Appellee Quazaa S. Farrow’s motion to suppress 

evidence obtained through a warrantless search of a vehicle in which Farrow was a 

passenger. The state contends that the trial court erred in determining that the trooper’s 

stop consisted of two separate searches and not one continuous search. The trooper 

initially stopped the vehicle for an expired tags violation but detected a strong odor of raw 

marijuana when he approached the driver. The trooper called for a backup officer to assist 

him, placed the driver and passenger, Farrow, in handcuffs in the back of his patrol car 

after informing them both of their Miranda rights, and he and the backup officer searched 

the passenger compartment of the vehicle. Neither officer found any marijuana or other 

illegal drugs. The backup officer left to respond to another call. The trooper returned the 
Lawrence App. No. 22CA12 2

driver and Farrow to the vehicle but detained them while he called for another backup 

officer and reviewed the audio and video recording made of them while they were in the 

back of the patrol car. After reviewing the recordings and further questioning the driver, 

the trooper and backup officer performed a second search of the vehicle, including a 

search of the engine compartment. They discovered marijuana in the passenger

compartment and methamphetamine and heroin hidden near the headlight in the engine 

compartment. 

{¶2} The trial court determined that after the first search of the vehicle’s 

passenger compartment resulted in no discovery of contraband, the trooper’s reasonable 

suspicion of criminal activity was dispelled, and he was required under the Fourth 

Amendment to release the driver and Farrow. The trial court determined that the trooper 

would need a new reasonable suspicion of criminal activity before he could detain them 

for purposes of reviewing the video and audio recordings. In other words, the trial court 

determined that the trooper had no reasonable suspicion of criminal activity after his first 

search of the passenger compartment of the vehicle turned up empty and his review of 

the audio and video recordings was a “fishing expedition” for evidence of a crime.

{¶3} We find that the trooper was engaged in one continuous search. The fact 

that the trooper detected a strong odor of raw marijuana allowed him to conduct an 

expansive search of the vehicle, beyond the passenger compartment and into the trunk 

and engine compartments. The trooper’s continued detention of the driver and Farrow 

while he reviewed the audio and video recording, and asked follow-up questions of the 

driver, aided him in his efforts to target his search to locate what he continued to 
Lawrence App. No. 22CA12 3

reasonably suspect was contraband hidden somewhere in the vehicle. Therefore, we

sustain the state’s assignment of error and reverse the trial court’s judgment.

I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 

{¶4} The Lawrence County grand jury indicted Quazaa S. Farrow on one count 

of aggravated trafficking in drugs in violation of R.C. 2925.03(A)(2)(C)(1)(d), a first-degree 

felony, one count of aggravated possession of drugs in violation of R.C. 

2925.11(A)(C)(1)(c), a second-degree felony, and one count of possession of heroin in 

violation of R.C. 2925.11(A)(C)(6)(d), a second-degree felony. Farrow filed a motion to 

suppress the evidence obtained from the warrantless search of the vehicle on the ground 

that it was an unconstitutionally prolonged detention because the “raw odor of marijuana 

alone does not constitute probable cause for the search of a vehicle.” The state did not 

file a written response to Farrow’s motion but asserted its arguments at the suppression 

hearing.

1

{¶5} At the suppression hearing, Trooper Malone of the Ohio State Highway 

Patrol testified that he was travelling westbound on U.S. 52 when a vehicle passed him 

with expired tags. Trooper Malone stopped the vehicle and as he approached it and spoke 

to the driver, he “detected a strong order of raw marijuana.” He testified that he has 

considerable experience and training in the detection of raw and burnt marijuana by smell. 

He ordered the driver to exit the vehicle, informed her that he detected a strong odor of 

raw marijuana, and asked her if she used marijuana. The driver stated that she had 

smoked marijuana the previous day, but Trooper Malone did not detect any signs of 

1 The state preserved all of the arguments it presented on appeal when it presented them during closing 

arguments at the suppression hearing. E.g., State v. Werder, 6th Dist. Fulton No. F-19-008, 2020-Ohio2865, ¶ 37-39 (a state waives arguments it neither raises in a written response to a motion to suppress 

nor presents at the suppression hearing). 
Lawrence App. No. 22CA12 4

impairment and did not perform a sobriety test. During that same interaction, Trooper 

Malone asked the driver if there was anything illegal in the vehicle, which she denied but 

also stated, “I don’t want to get caught in the crossfire.” Trooper Malone testified that he 

informed the driver of her Miranda rights, handcuffed her, patted her down, and placed 

her in the back of his patrol car. Trooper Malone requested a backup officer to the scene 

and ordered Farrow out of the car, spoke briefly to him, informed him of his Miranda rights, 

handcuffed him, patted him down, and placed him in the back of the patrol car with the 

driver. Trooper Malone testified that Farrow had the odor of raw marijuana on his person 

and a large amount of cash in his pocket. 

{¶6} A Lawrence County Sheriff’s Deputy arrived to assist, and he and Trooper 

Malone searched the passenger compartment of the vehicle based on Trooper Malone’s 

detection of the strong odor of marijuana but did not find any marijuana or other illegal 

drugs. The deputy left to respond to another call. Trooper Malone removed the handcuffs 

from the driver and Farrow, returned them to the vehicle, called for an additional backup 

officer, and reviewed the audio and video recording of the conversation between Farrow 

and the driver while they were detained in the patrol car. 

{¶7} The recording further confirmed Trooper Malone’s suspicion that there were 

drugs hidden somewhere in the vehicle. Trooper Malone testified that law enforcement 

typically review the audio and video recording from the patrol car once probable cause 

has been established. He testified, “I felt that there was, you know, potential to have drug 

activity going on * * * we watch this video to see if, you know, if they’ve just said anything 

to each other * * * anything that would lead me to believe that there’s definitely drugs in 

the car * * * because I hadn’t found anything yet and it was an overwhelming odor of weed 
Lawrence App. No. 22CA12 5

in the car.” Trooper Malone testified that the driver stated, “I’m going to jail” and Farrow 

stated that “he would loose [sic] his money in his pocket if they claimed it.” Trooper Malone 

placed Farrow back in the patrol car, returned to the vehicle, and asked the driver why 

she made the statement about going to jail. The driver said she thought Farrow might 

have drugs and that when Farrow was at her house, she came out of her house and the 

hood was up on her car. Trooper Malone and the second backup officer placed the driver 

back in the patrol car and searched the passenger compartment again “because at this 

time, I hadn’t found anything and there’s still a strong odor of marijuana.” They found a 

bag of marijuana under the front passenger seat. They searched under the hood in the 

engine compartment of the vehicle and found approximately 90 grams of 

methamphetamine and approximately 17 grams of heroin in a small opening near the 

passenger-side headlight.

{¶8} Trooper Malone testified that after a brief conversation with Farrow, he

released the driver without issuing a warning or citation for her expired tags2 and 

transported Farrow to the Lawrence County Jail.

{¶9} Following the hearing, the trial court issued a thorough, reasoned, and wellresearched opinion. The trial court found that Trooper Malone had probable cause to stop 

the vehicle for expired tags and thus the initial traffic stop was constitutional. The trial 

court also found that when Trooper Malone detected a strong odor of raw marijuana 

emanating from the vehicle, he had probable cause to expand the scope of the initial stop 

2 The fact that the officer did not issue a citation for expired tags is not important. The Supreme Court of 

Ohio has stated that “the constitutionality of a prolonged traffic stop does not depend on the issuance of a 

citation.” State v. Batchili, 113 Ohio St.3d 403, 2007-Ohio-2204, 865 N.E.2d 1282, ¶ 20-21. “The failure to 

issue a traffic citation when there is an indication of a potentially far more significant crime is easily excused 

when more pressing issues are being addressed.” Id.
Lawrence App. No. 22CA12 6

and search the driver, Farrow, and the vehicle. However, after the officers found no 

evidence of marijuana in the passenger compartment, the trial court found:

It is at this point where Constitutional concerns begin to surface. The time 

permitted to complete the purpose of this stop (expired tags), and the 

subsequent probable cause search of the vehicle (stemming from the 

detection of the strong odor of raw marijuana) had concluded. But instead 

of issuing a citation or warning (verbal or written) to the driver for her expired 

tags, Trooper Malone took the handcuffs off the defendant and driver, and 

returned them to their vehicles.

Trooper Malone then watched the recording from the in-cruiser camera and 

testified that the conversations between the defendant and the driver while 

detained supported his suspicion that there were drugs in the vehicle. But 

at this point in time, Trooper Malone needed a reasonable articulable 

suspicion of criminal activity to extend the stop before he took the time to 

play the video. Instead, Trooper Malone testified that what he observed on 

the video provided the basis for his suspicion of criminal activity following 

the completion of the initial search of the vehicle.

* * *

After Trooper Malone searched the vehicle and failed to find any evidence 

of illegal activity, he was required by the Constitution to conclude the stop 

and not extend it longer than what was reasonably necessary to effectuate 

its purpose. When he removed the defendant and driver from his patrol car, 

took off their handcuffs and placed them back in the vehicle, but did not 

allow them to leave the scene, he extended the stop beyond the time 

reasonably required to complete his search, and the stop became an 

unlawful violation of the defendant’s rights under the Fourth Amendment to 

the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 14 of the Ohio 

Constitution. Holding otherwise would be a complete deterioration of the 

Rights afforded under our State and Federal Constitutions and would give 

law enforcement the ability to conduct the fishing expeditions reference by 

the Forth [sic] District in State v. Jones[, 2022-Ohio-561, 185 N.E.3d 131 

(4th Dist.)].

* * *

Accordingly, the Court finds that the defendant’s detention was prolonged 

beyond what was reasonably needed to conduct the traffic stop and the first 

search of the vehicle based upon the detection of the strong odor of raw 

marijuana. Therefore, his continued detention of the defendant after the 

initial search of the vehicle constituted an illegal seizure. For the foregoing 

reasons, the defendant[’s] Motion to Suppress is hereby GRANTED.
Lawrence App. No. 22CA12 7

{¶10} The state appealed. 

II. ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR

{¶11} The state presents the following assignment of error:

I. The Trial Court Erred when it granted Defendant-Appellee’s Motion 

to Suppress by determining that the Trooper’s stop consisted of two 

separate searches and not one continuous search.

III. LEGAL ANALYSIS

A. Standard of Review

{¶12} The Supreme Court of Ohio recently reiterated the standard of review of a 

motion to suppress:

Appellate review of a ruling on a motion to suppress presents a mixed 

question of law and fact. An appellate court must accept the trial court's 

findings of fact if they are supported by competent, credible evidence. But 

the appellate court must decide the legal questions de novo. (Citations 

omitted.)

State v. Turner, 163 Ohio St.3d 421, 2020-Ohio-6773, 170 N.E.3d 842, ¶ 14.

B. Motion to Suppress

{¶13} “The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and the Ohio 

Constitution, Article I, Section 14, prohibit unreasonable searches and seizures.” State 

v. Emerson, 134 Ohio St.3d 191, 2012-Ohio-5047, 981 N.E.2d 787, ¶ 15. A traffic stop 

initiated by a law enforcement officer constitutes a seizure within the meaning of the 

Fourth Amendment. Thus, a traffic stop must comply with the Fourth Amendment's 

general reasonableness requirement. An officer's decision to stop a vehicle is reasonable 

when the officer has probable cause or reasonable suspicion to believe that the driver 

has committed, or is committing a crime, including a minor traffic violation. Whren v. 
Lawrence App. No. 22CA12 8

United States, 517 U.S. 806, 809–810, 116 S.Ct. 1769, 135 L.Ed.2d 89 (1996); State v. 

Jones, 2022-Ohio-561, 185 N.E.3d 131, ¶ 15-17 (4th Dist.).

{¶14} An investigative stop may last no longer than necessary to accomplish the 

initial goal of the stop:

[T]he tolerable duration of police inquiries in the traffic-stop context is 

determined by the seizure's “mission”—to address the traffic violation that 

warranted the stop and attend to related safety concerns. Because 

addressing the infraction is the purpose of the stop, it may “last no longer 

than is necessary to effectuate th[at] purpose.” Authority for the seizure thus 

ends when tasks tied to the traffic infraction are—or reasonably should have 

been—completed.

Rodriguez v. United States, 575 U.S. 348, 354, 191 L.Ed.2d 492, 135 S.Ct. 1609 (2015). 

The United States Supreme Court has explained that tasks tied to traffic infractions 

include: (1) determining whether to issue a traffic ticket, (2) checking the driver’s license, 

(3) determining the existence of outstanding warrants, (4) inspecting the vehicle’s 

registration, and (5) examining proof of insurance. “These checks serve the same 

objective as enforcement of the traffic code: ensuring that vehicles on the road are 

operated safely and responsibly.” Id. at 355; State v. Aguirre, 4th Dist. Gallia No. 03CA5, 

2003-Ohio-4909, ¶ 36 (during a traffic violation stop, motorist may be detained for a period 

of time sufficient to issue a citation “and to perform routine procedures such as a computer 

check on the motorist’s driver’s license, registration, and vehicle plates”). 

{¶15} After the reasonable time for the original traffic stop has elapsed, the officer 

must have “ ‘a reasonable articulable suspicion of illegal activity to continue the detention.’ 

” State v. Jones at ¶ 22, quoting State v. Ramos, 155 Ohio App.3d 396, 2003-Ohio-6535, 

801 N.E.2d 523, ¶ 13 (2d Dist.). 
Lawrence App. No. 22CA12 9

When a police officer's objective justification to continue detention of a 

person stopped for a traffic violation for the purpose of searching the 

person's vehicle is not related to the purpose of the original stop, and when 

that continued detention is not based on any articulable facts giving rise to 

a suspicion of some illegal activity justifying an extension of the detention, 

the continued detention to conduct a search constitutes an illegal seizure.

State v. Robinette, 80 Ohio St.3d 234, 685 N.E.2d 762 (1997), paragraph one of syllabus;

State v. Venham, 96 Ohio App.3d 649, 656, 645 N.E.2d 831, 835 (4th Dist.1994) (“If, after 

talking to a driver, a reasonable police officer would be satisfied that there had been no 

unlawful activity, the driver must be permitted to continue on his way.”) However, if “the 

officer ascertained reasonably articulable facts giving rise to a suspicion of criminal 

activity, the officer may then further detain and implement a more in-depth investigation 

of the individual.” Robinette at 241. Any further detention may last as long as the 

reasonable suspicion of criminal activity continues: 

If circumstances attending an otherwise proper stop should give rise to a 

reasonable suspicion of some other illegal activity, different from the 

suspected illegal activity that triggered the stop, then the vehicle and the 

driver may be detained for as long as that new articulable and reasonable 

suspicion continues. Under these conditions, the continued detention is 

lawful, even if the officer is satisfied that the suspicion which initially justified 

the stop has dissipated. However, the lawfulness of the initial stop will not 

support a ‘fishing expedition’ for evidence of another crime. (Citations 

omitted.) (Emphasis added.)

State v. Venham, 96 Ohio App.3d 649, 655, 645 N.E.2d 831, 834 (4th Dist.1994)

{¶16} The continued investigatory detention does not violate the Fourth 

Amendment as long as it is objectively justified by the circumstances. Robinette at 241. 

The length of time for the continued detention is governed by the totality of the 

circumstances:

“The officer may detain the vehicle for a period of time reasonably 

necessary to confirm or dispel [the officer’s] suspicions of criminal activity.” 
Lawrence App. No. 22CA12 10

“Once the officer is satisfied that no criminal activity has occurred, then the 

vehicle's occupants must be released.”

“In determining whether a detention is reasonable, the court must look at 

the totality of the circumstances.” The totality of the circumstances approach 

“allows officers to draw on their own experience and specialized training to 

make inferences from and deductions about the cumulative information 

available to them that ‘might well elude an untrained person.’ ” (Citations 

omitted.)

State v. Williams, 12th Dist. Clinton No. CA2009-08-014, 2010-Ohio-1523, ¶ 18.

{¶17} In situations where the continued detention is based on the officer’s 

detection of the odor of marijuana, the scope of the search depends upon whether the 

officer detects the smell of raw or burnt marijuana. If the officer only detects the smell of 

burnt marijuana, the search must be confined to the passenger compartment of the 

vehicle and cannot extend to the trunk or engine compartment:

A trunk and a passenger compartment of an automobile are subject to 

different standards of probable cause to conduct searches. In State v. 

Murrell (2002), 94 Ohio St.3d 489, 764 N.E.2d 986, syllabus, this court held 

that “[w]hen a police officer has made a lawful custodial arrest of the 

occupant of an automobile, the officer may, as a contemporaneous incident 

of that arrest, search the passenger compartment of that automobile.” 

(Emphasis added.) The court was conspicuous in limiting the search to the 

passenger compartment.

The odor of burnt marijuana in the passenger compartment of 

a vehicle does not, standing alone, establish probable cause for a 

warrantless search of the trunk of the vehicle. United States v. 

Nielsen (C.A.10, 1993), 9 F.3d 1487. No other factors justifying 

a search beyond the passenger compartment were present in this case. 

The officer detected only a light odor of marijuana, and the troopers found 

no other contraband within the passenger compartment. The troopers thus 

lacked probable cause to search the trunk of Farris's vehicle. Therefore, 

the automobile exception does not apply in this case.

State v. Farris, 109 Ohio St.3d 519, 2006-Ohio-3255, 849 N.E.2d 985, ¶ 51-52. “This 

proposition is established by the common sense observation that an odor of burning 
Lawrence App. No. 22CA12 11

marijuana would not create an inference that burning marijuana was located in a trunk.” 

State v. Gonzales, 6th Dist. Wood No. WD-07-060, 2009-Ohio-168, ¶ 21.

{¶18} When an officer detects a strong odor of raw marijuana emanating from the 

vehicle, the officer is justified in extending the search beyond the vehicle’s passenger 

compartment to other areas of the vehicle. 

If, during a valid stop, an officer qualified to recognize the smell of raw 

marijuana detects an overwhelming odor of raw marijuana, the officer is 

justified in believing that the vehicle contains a large amount of raw 

marijuana. If no large amount of raw marijuana is seen in the passenger 

compartment, the officer is justified in believing that a large amount of raw 

marijuana may be found in a container or compartment—including the trunk.

Gonzales at ¶ 23. “[W]hen a police officer has probable cause to believe a vehicle 

contains evidence of a crime, the officer may conduct a warrantless search of every part 

of the vehicle and its contents, including all movable containers and packages, that could 

logically conceal the objects of the search.” State v. Maddox, 2021-Ohio-586, 168 N.E.3d 

613, ¶ 20 (10th Dist.), citing United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 102 S.Ct. 2157, 72 

L.Ed.2d 572 (1982).

{¶19} Here Trooper Malone testified that he detected a strong odor of raw 

marijuana emanating from the vehicle and, when asked about her use of marijuana, the 

driver admitted she had smoked marijuana the day before. Based on this, Trooper 

Malone had probable cause to suspect contraband was hidden in the vehicle. Adding to 

the totality of the circumstances, the driver made an unusual comment about not wanting 

to be “caught in the crossfire” when asked about the presence of illegal drugs in the 

vehicle. Although Trooper Malone was unable to locate contraband in the initial search 

of the passenger compartment, he testified that he continued to suspect the contraband 

was hidden somewhere in the vehicle. When Trooper Malone was asked on cross-
Lawrence App. No. 22CA12 12

examination why he did not let the driver and Farrow go after he found nothing after his 

first search of the passenger compartment,3 he testified, “Because I still believed that 

there was something I wasn’t finding. * * * I had probable cause to search * * * and I felt 

there was drugs there. It would be a borderline dereliction of duty if I just cut someone 

loose before I conducted, what I felt like, a thorough investigation.” He was entitled to 

review the audio and video recording of the driver and Farrow for any assistance it might 

provide in locating hidden contraband, and conduct a warrantless search of the entire 

vehicle, including any containers, the trunk, and the engine compartment. His reasonable 

suspicions were not dispelled merely because he did not locate contraband in the search 

of the passenger compartment. Therefore, he did not need a new articulable and 

reasonable suspicion to review the audio and video recording and conduct a second, 

more thorough search of the vehicle.

{¶20} In State v. Harper, 4th Dist. Scioto No. 21CA3965, 2022-Ohio-4357, a 

trooper stopped a Dodge van after it crossed over the white fog line twice. The vehicle’s 

plates did not match the Dodge van, but instead matched a Toyota. Additionally, the 

passenger lacked identification and both the driver and passenger gave the trooper 

suspicious information about their plans. One claimed they were travelling to West 

Virginia to do “masonry work” and the other called it “missionary work.” The trooper called 

for a backup officer and, while waiting for information from dispatch to confirm the 

passenger’s identity, the trooper walked his canine around the vehicle. The dog alerted 

3 The record identifies the vehicle as a “Sports Utility Vehicle,” but it is unclear whether the initial search of 

the passenger compartment included the trunk area. Because the trooper detected the odor of raw 

marijuana, the distinction between the trunk and passenger compartment is not relevant to our analysis. 

State v. Gonzales, 6th Dist. Wood No. WD-07-060, 2009-Ohio-168, ¶ 24.
Lawrence App. No. 22CA12 13

on the driver’s side back door area and both driver and passenger were informed of their 

Miranda rights and placed in the back of the patrol car. Id. at ¶ 2-3.

{¶21} For the next three hours, the trooper and the backup officer searched the 

van, starting and stopping their searches after reviewing the audio and video recordings 

of the driver and passenger in the patrol car: 

The troopers initially searched the interior of the van while Harper and Allen 

waited in the back seat of the cruiser. While in the cruiser, the men were 

being video and audio recorded as they watched the search take place. 

When the troopers failed to locate drugs hidden in the interior of the van 

during the initial part of the search, they removed the men from the cruiser, 

had them get back into their van, and the troopers then reviewed the video 

and audio footage from inside the cruiser. The troopers repeated this 

pattern twice: placing the men in the cruiser, searching the van, removing 

the men from the cruiser, reviewing video footage, and then resuming the 

search. Based upon statements and body movements of the men, they then 

resumed their search of the van to areas that seemed to be of interest to 

the men based upon their conversation in the back of the cruiser. Finally, 

the troopers located a black package that contained eleven different 

baggies with a total of approximately 1000 pills that were later determined 

to be oxycodone. The package was hidden behind an interior panel located 

on the rear passenger side of the van near the wheel well.

Id. at ¶ 4.

{¶22} The defendant in Harper raised the same defense as Farrow does here. He 

argued that the initial search of the van was based upon the probable cause that arose 

from the canine alert, “but that once the initial search of the van was concluded without 

finding any contraband, ‘there was no constitutional basis to further detain him or search 

the vehicle again and that subsequent searches of the vehicle were the result of an 

illegally prolonged detention.’” Id. at ¶ 20.

{¶23} We found that the canine alert, like the trooper’s detection of the odor of raw 

marijuana here, gave probable cause to search the vehicle for contraband. “This probable 

cause extended to the entire vehicle and there was no time limit in conducting the search.”
Lawrence App. No. 22CA12 14

(Emphasis added.) Id. at ¶ 38.4 See also State v. Williams, 4th Dist. Highland No. 12CA7, 

2013-Ohio-594, ¶ 26-27 (officers were permitted to stop a vehicle search, move the 

vehicle to an impound lot, and continue their search under safer conditions without 

obtaining a warrant because the same probable cause that existed at the time of the initial 

search still existed at the impound lot). 

{¶24} In State v. Maddox, 2021-Ohio-586, 168 N.E.3d 613, ¶ 20 (10th Dist.) the 

defendant raised a similar argument that suspicions had been dispelled and a new 

articulable reasonable suspicion was required before he could be further detained and 

the vehicle searched. In Maddox, the police officer stopped a vehicle after the driver, 

Maddox, failed to use his turn signal. Upon approaching the vehicle, the officer detected

the odor of raw marijuana emanating from the vehicle. After the officer told Maddox he 

smelled raw marijuana, Maddox admitted he had marijuana in his pocket and voluntarily 

surrendered a small amount of it. The officer searched the vehicle and discovered

cocaine, heroin, and a firearm. Maddox filed a motion to suppress on the ground that the 

officer’s reasonable suspicion that the vehicle contained contraband was dispelled when 

Maddox produced the small quantity of marijuana. Maddox argued that after he turned 

over the marijuana, the officer needed a new articulable and reasonable suspicion to 

conduct the search of the vehicle. 

{¶25} The appellate court held that the odor of raw marijuana gave the officer 

probable cause to search “every part of the vehicle and its contents, including all movable 

containers and packages, that could logically conceal the objects of the search.” Id. at ¶ 

4 Our decision in State v. Harper was issued on November 28, 2022. Thus, the trial court did not have the 

benefit of this decision when it rendered its decision in August 2022. Likewise, the parties did not have the 

benefit of it when they prepared their appellate briefs.
Lawrence App. No. 22CA12 15

20. It rejected Maddox’s argument that his voluntary surrender of the marijuana dispelled 

the officer’s suspicion and removed any probable cause to continue a search of the 

vehicle.

We find no merit in appellant's argument at the suppression hearing that 

once appellant voluntarily surrendered the marijuana, the officers were 

required to stop their investigation and simply charge appellant with 

misdemeanor drug possession. To the contrary, when appellant voluntarily 

surrendered the marijuana, officers had probable cause to believe 

appellant's vehicle contained other evidence of a crime. The subsequent 

warrantless search of the vehicle was conducted pursuant to the automobile 

exception. Under the rule of law advocated by appellant, a vehicle operator 

might avoid a search of the vehicle for illegal drugs during a lawful traffic 

stop by voluntarily surrendering a small amount of an illegal substance to 

law enforcement. Ohio law does not support such an absurd result.

Maddox at ¶ 23.

{¶26} Similarly, we find that Trooper Malone’s suspicion that contraband was 

hidden in the vehicle was not dispelled simply because he was unable to locate any in his 

initial search of the passenger compartment. To conclude otherwise would mean that an 

officer who detects the odor of raw marijuana but does not find it in the passenger 

compartment would not be allowed to search the trunk, engine, or containers stored in 

the trunk or hidden in the engine compartment. Ohio law does not support this result and 

instead supports a thorough search of the entire vehicle. Maddox, supra; State v. 

Donaldson, 6th Dist. Wood No. WD-18-034, 2019-Ohio-232, ¶ 25; State v. Lynn, 12th 

Dist. Butler Nos. CA2017-08-129, CA2017-08-132, 2018-Ohio-3335, ¶ 20; State v. 

Gartrell, 2014-Ohio-5203, 24 N.E.3d 680, ¶ 72 (3d Dist.).

{¶27} We find the trooper’s initial stop for expired tags was constitutional and he 

did not violate the Fourth Amendment by expanding the scope of the stop based on the 

strong odor of raw marijuana emanating from the vehicle. The scope and duration of the 
Lawrence App. No. 22CA12 16

stop was tailored to its underlying justification – an articulable and reasonable suspicion 

that the vehicle contained contraband. The trooper’s reasonable suspicions were not 

dispelled after he failed to locate contraband during his initial search of the passenger 

compartment because the odor of raw marijuana entitles law enforcement to search the 

entire vehicle. The trooper did not unconstitutionally extend the duration of the stop to

review the audio and video recording of the driver and Farrow while they were in the back 

of the patrol car. His review of the recording and subsequent questions to the driver 

allowed the trooper to focus his search for the suspected contraband on the engine 

compartment where he found heroin and methamphetamines hidden near the headlight.

IV. CONCLUSION

{¶28} We sustain the state’s sole assignment of error and reverse the trial court’s 

judgment.

JUDGMENT REVERSED.
Lawrence App. No. 22CA12 17

JUDGMENT ENTRY

It is ordered that the JUDGMENT IS REVERSED and that appellee shall pay the 

costs.

The Court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.

It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this Court directing the 

LAWRENCE COUNTY COURT OF COMMON PLEAS to carry this judgment into 

execution.

A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of 

the Rules of Appellate Procedure. 

Smith, P.J. & Wilkin, J.: Concur in Judgment and Opinion.

For the Court

BY: ________________________

 Michael D. Hess, Judge

NOTICE TO COUNSEL

Pursuant to Local Rule No. 14, this document constitutes a final judgment 

entry and the time period for further appeal commences from the date of filing with 

the clerk.