UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 17-1980

KAPTORIA L. SANDERS,

Plaintiff - Appellant,

v.

TIKRAS TECHNOLOGY SOLUTIONS CORPORATION,

Defendant - Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, at 

Alexandria. Claude M. Hilton, Senior District Judge. (1:16-cv-00985-CMH-MSN)

Submitted: March 1, 2018 Decided: March 28, 2018

Before FLOYD and THACKER, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior Circuit Judge.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Ari M. Wilkenfeld, Katherine R. Atkinson, Lauren E. Naylor, WILKENFELD, 

HERENDEEN & ATKINSON, Washington, D.C., for Appellant. Richard D. Kelley, R. 

Douglas Taylor, Jr., Samuel J. Banks, BEAN, KINNEY & KORMAN, P.C., Arlington, 

Virginia, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:

Kaptoria L. Sanders appeals the district court’s order granting summary judgment 

in favor of Tikras Technology Solutions (“Tikras”) in Sanders’ suit that alleged race and 

gender discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 

§§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (2012) (“Title VII”), retaliation in violation of Title VII, and race 

discrimination in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (2012). We affirm. 

“We review the district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo, applying the 

same standard as the district court.” Walker v. Mod-U-Kraf Homes, LLC, 775 F.3d 202, 

207 (4th Cir. 2014). We must construe the evidence in the light most favorable to Sanders, 

the nonmovant, and draw all reasonable inferences in her favor. Id. “The court shall grant 

summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material 

fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).

Title VII prohibits “discriminat[ion] against any individual with respect to [her] 

compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such 

individual’s race . . . [or] sex,” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2012), while 42 U.S.C. § 1981 

“prohibits racial discrimination in the making and enforcement of contracts.” Aleman v. 

Chugach Support Servs., Inc., 485 F.3d 206, 208 (4th Cir. 2007). Title VII also prohibits 

unlawful retaliation, preventing employers from “discriminat[ing] against any of [their] 

employees . . . because [the employees] ha[ve] opposed any practice made an unlawful 

employment practice by [Title VII], or because [the employees] ha[ve] . . . participated in 

any manner in an investigation” under Title VII. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–3(a) (2012). 
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A plaintiff can establish a discrimination or retaliation claim under Title VII or 

§ 1981 in one of two ways. First, the plaintiff can establish the claim through direct or 

circumstantial evidence, Holland v. Wash. Homes, Inc., 487 F.3d 208, 213 (4th Cir. 2007), 

or, alternatively, can establish the claim under the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting 

framework. The McDonnell Douglas framework was initially developed for Title VII 

discrimination cases, McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973), but since 

the McDonnell Douglas decision, the framework has been held to apply in discrimination 

cases arising under § 1981, Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 186 (1989); 

Murrell v. Ocean Mecca Motel, Inc., 262 F.3d 253, 257 (4th Cir. 2001), and in retaliation 

cases under Title VII and § 1981, Beall v. Abbott Labs., 130 F.3d 614, 619 (4th Cir. 1997) 

(Title VII); Hawkins v. PepsiCo, Inc., 203 F.3d 274, 281 n.1 (4th Cir. 2000) (§ 1981). In 

this case, Sanders proceeded under the more plaintiff-friendly McDonnell Douglas

framework. 

There are three steps in the McDonnell Douglas framework: (1) the plaintiff must 

establish a prima facie case of discrimination or retaliation; (2) if the plaintiff presents a 

prima facie case, then the burden shifts to the defendant to show a legitimate nondiscriminatory or non-retaliatory reason for the adverse employment action; and (3) if the 

defendant shows such a reason, then the burden shifts to the plaintiff to prove that the 

reason is pretextual. See McDonnell Douglas Corp., 411 U.S. at 802-04; Guessous v. 

Fairview Prop. Invs., LLC, 828 F.3d 208, 216 (4th Cir. 2016). Here, Sanders failed to 

demonstrate a prima facie case on all of her claims.
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With regard to Sanders’ Title VII and § 1981 discrimination claims, the elements of 

a prima facie case are the same. See Love–Lane v. Martin, 355 F.3d 766, 786 (4th Cir. 

2004) (evaluating § 1981 racial discrimination claim and a Title VII racial discrimination 

claim under the same prima facie case framework). The plaintiff must demonstrate: (1) 

membership in a protected class; (2) satisfactory job performance; (3) adverse employment 

action; and (4) different treatment from similarly situated employees outside the protected 

class. Coleman v. Maryland Court of Appeals, 626 F.3d 187, 190 (4th Cir. 2010). 

Establishing a prima facie case of discrimination is “not onerous.” Evans v. Techs. 

Applications & Serv. Co., 80 F.3d 954, 960 (4th Cir. 1996) (quoting Tex. Dep’t of Cmty. 

Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981)). 

We conclude that Sanders failed to establish the fourth element of a prima facie 

case. Although Sanders was replaced in her position by a Hispanic male, that individual 

had more than twice the experience that Sanders had, and the two therefore were not 

similarly situated. Moreover, although the record may demonstrate that Sanders’ 

supervisor harbored some animosity toward her, there is no evidence that indicates any 

such animus was a result of Sanders’ race or gender, and, thus, his actions do not support 

a Title VII claim. Cf. Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n v. Xerxes Corp., 639 F.3d 658, 

677 (4th Cir. 2011) (noting that absent evidence that conflicts between employee and 

supervisor were discriminatory in nature, such disputes do not support hostile work 

environment claim). In short, Sanders’ Title VII and § 1981 discrimination claims fail for 

the simple reason that she has not demonstrated that similarly situated employees outside 
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her protected classes were treated differently and/or received more favorable treatment than 

her.

As to Sanders’ Title VII claim of retaliation, to establish a prima facie case, she

must demonstrate “(i) that she engaged in protected activity, (ii) that her employer took 

adverse action against her, and (iii) that a causal relationship existed between the protected 

activity and the adverse employment activity.” Guessous, 828 F.3d at 217 (alterations and 

internal quotation marks omitted). “In the context of element one of a retaliation claim, an 

employee is protected when she opposes not only employment actions actually unlawful 

under Title VII but also employment actions she reasonably believes to be unlawful.” 

Boyer-Liberto v. Fontainebleau Corp., 786 F.3d 264, 282 (4th Cir. 2015) (en banc) 

(alterations and internal quotation marks omitted). “[Thus], when an employee 

communicates to her employer a belief that the employer has engaged in a form of 

employment discrimination, that communication virtually always constitutes the 

employee’s opposition to the activity.” DeMasters v. Carilion Clinic, 796 F.3d 409, 417 

(4th Cir. 2015) (alterations and internal quotation marks omitted). However, opposition 

activity is only protected if an employee’s subjective belief is “objectively reasonable in 

light of the facts.” Peters v. Jenny, 327 F.3d 307, 321 (4th Cir. 2017) (regarding Title VII 

retaliation claim).

Sanders fails to establish a prima facie case of retaliation. Sanders’ complaint to 

Shlikas that she was being discriminated against because she was an African-American 

woman would constitute oppositional conduct if her subjective perception of 

discrimination was objectively reasonable. See DeMasters, 796 F.3d at 417 (noting that 
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oppositional conduct includes “voicing one’s opinions in order to bring attention to an 

employer’s discriminatory activities.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). But there is no 

evidence that connects any untoward behavior or comments with any form of racial or 

gender discrimination, and therefore Sanders’ subjective belief that her supervisor was 

acting with discriminatory intent was not objectively reasonable. See Burlington N. & 

Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 68 (2006) (citing with approval treatise noting that 

“personality conflicts at work that generate antipathy and snubbing by supervisors and coworkers are not actionable” (internal quotation marks omitted)). Brinkley v. Harbour 

Recreation Club, 180 F.3d 598, 609 (4th Cir. 1999) (holding that “personal opinion” that 

corporate board held discriminatory animus insufficient absent “specific factual examples 

supporting [that] opinion”), overruled on other grounds by Desert Palace v. Costa, 539 

U.S. 90 (2003). 

Because Sanders failed to establish a prima facie case of discrimination or 

retaliation,1 we affirm the district court’s judgment. We dispense with oral argument 

because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this 

court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED

 1 Sanders also argues that the district court erred by failing to view the facts in the 

light most favorable to her. We discern no reversible error because the facts, when viewed 

in the light most favorable to Sanders, are insufficient to establish a prima facie case of 

discrimination or retaliation.