J-S23014-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

OMAR POWELL 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 2955 EDA 2022

Appeal from the Order Entered November 14, 2022

In the Court of Common Pleas of Lehigh County 

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-39-CR-0002378-2006

BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J., KUNSELMAN, J., and KING, J.

MEMORANDUM BY PANELLA, P.J.: FILED SEPTEMBER 18, 2023

Omar Powell appeals pro se from the order entered in the Lehigh County 

Court of Common Pleas on November 14, 2022, dismissing his “Motion to 

Rescind Judgment of Sentence” pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act 

(“PCRA”), 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546.1 For the reasons discussed below, we 

find the PCRA court properly denied Powell relief and affirm. 

In 2007, after a ten day trial, a jury convicted Powell of first degree 

murder. The trial court sentenced Powell to life imprisonment. We affirmed 

the judgment of sentence on direct appeal. On November 13, 2008, the 

Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied Powell’s petition for allowance of appeal. 

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1 As discussed in further detail below, while Powell did not specifically title his 

pro se filing as a PCRA petition, the court correctly treated this post-conviction 

filing as a petition under the PCRA. 
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Since then, Powell has filed numerous petitions, including multiple 

unsuccessful PCRA petitions. 

On May 11, 2021, Powell filed his sixth PCRA petition, followed by a 

supplemental petition a month later. The PCRA court denied the petition and 

Powell filed an appeal. 

On November 4, 2022, while that appeal was still pending, Powell filed 

the instant “Motion to Rescind Judgment of Sentence Entered April 17, 2007”. 

The PCRA court treated his petition as a PCRA petition subject to the PCRA’s 

timeliness provisions. See Commonwealth v. Johnson, 803 A.2d 1291, 

1293 (Pa. Super. 2002) (“[T]he PCRA provides the sole means for obtaining 

collateral review, and ... any petition filed after the judgment of sentence 

becomes final will be treated as a PCRA petition”); see also Commonwealth 

v. West, 938 A.2d 1034, 1043 (Pa. 2007) (stating the PCRA incorporates the 

remedy of habeas corpus if it offers the petitioner a remedy pursuant to that 

Act). On that basis, the PCRA court determined that Powell’s petition could not 

be considered due to the fact that Powell still had an appeal pending with this 

Court from the denial of his sixth PCRA petition. Further, the PCRA court found 

the petition was untimely. As such, the court denied the petition. This timely 

appeal followed. 

Powell argues the PCRA court erred by treating his motion as a PCRA 

petition. Specifically, Powell contends his claim involves a challenge to the 

legality of his sentence, and that the PCRA court had authority to consider his 
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claim under its inherent jurisdiction to correct patent errors in sentences. We 

disagree.

Whether a PCRA court has jurisdiction to correct allegedly illegal 

sentencing orders absent statutory jurisdiction under the PCRA is 

a question of law. Accordingly, our scope of review is plenary and 

our standard of review is de novo.

The PCRA provides for an action by which persons convicted of 

crimes they did not commit and persons serving illegal sentences 

may obtain collateral relief. When an action is cognizable under 

the PCRA, the PCRA is the sole means of obtaining collateral relief 

and encompasses all other common law and statutory remedies 

for the same purpose[.]

Commonwealth v. Jackson, 30 A.3d 516, 518 (Pa. Super. 2011) (citations 

and internal quotation marks omitted). 

Powell cites to Commonwealth v. Holmes, 933 A.2d 57 (Pa. 2007), 

for the proposition that the PCRA court has inherent authority, at any time, to 

correct its patent and obvious mistakes evidenced by nonconformance with 

the record, common sense, and black-letter law. Powell has misinterpreted 

the holding in Holmes. 

In Holmes, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court created a narrow 

exception to 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 5505 (“a court upon notice to the parties may 

modify or rescind any order within 30 days after its entry ... if no appeal from 

such order has been taken or allowed”), and recognized a trial court's 

“inherent power to correct patent errors despite the absence of traditional 

jurisdiction.” Holmes, 933 A.2d. at 65.
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However, we have since clarified that while “Holmes [ ] recognized the 

limited authority of a trial court to correct patent errors in sentences absent 

statutory jurisdiction under section 5505; it did not establish an alternate 

remedy for collateral relief that sidesteps the jurisdictional requirements of 

the PCRA.” Jackson, 30 A.3d at 521. Under the PCRA, “[w]hen the one-year 

filing deadline of section 9545 has expired, and no statutory exception has 

been pled or proven, a PCRA court cannot invoke inherent jurisdiction to 

correct orders, judgments and decrees, even if the error is patent and 

obvious.” Id. at 524. Accordingly, although illegal sentencing issues cannot 

be waived, they must still be presented in a timely PCRA petition. See 

Commonwealth v. Taylor, 65 A.3d 462 (Pa. Super. 2013). 

The timeliness of a post-conviction petition is jurisdictional. See

Commonwealth v. Hernandez, 79 A.3d 649, 651 (Pa. Super. 2013). 

Because the PCRA’s time limitations implicate the court’s jurisdiction and may 

not be altered or disregarded in order to address the merits of a petition, the 

court here was required to start by examining the timeliness of Powell’s 

petition. See Commonwealth v. Davis, 86 A.3d 883 (Pa. Super. 2014). 

A PCRA petition, including a second or subsequent one, must be 

filed within one year of the date the petitioner’s judgment of 

sentence becomes final, unless he pleads and proves one of the 

three exceptions outlined in 42 Pa.C.S.[A.] § 9545(b)(1). A 

judgment becomes final at the conclusion of direct review by this 

Court or the United States Supreme Court, or at the expiration of 

the time for seeking such review. The PCRA’s timeliness 

requirements are jurisdictional; therefore, a court may not 

address the merits of the issues raised if the petition was not 

timely filed. The timeliness requirements apply to all PCRA 
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petitions, regardless of the nature of the individual claims raised 

therein. The PCRA squarely places upon the petitioner the burden 

of proving an untimely petition fits within one of the three 

exceptions.

Commonwealth v. Jones, 54 A.3d 14, 16-17 (Pa. 2012) (internal citations 

and footnote omitted). 

Powell’s judgment of sentence became final in February 2009, ninety 

days after his petition for allowance of appeal was denied by the Pennsylvania 

Supreme Court, when time for filing a petition for writ of certiorari to the 

United States Supreme Court expired. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(3); 

U.S.Sup.Ct.R. 13. The instant petition – filed more than a decade later – is 

patently untimely. Therefore, the PCRA court lacked jurisdiction to review 

Powell’s petition unless he was able to successfully plead and prove one of the 

statutory exceptions to the PCRA’s time-bar. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 

9545(b)(1)(i)-(iii). 

The PCRA provides three exceptions to its time bar: 

(i) the failure to raise the claim previously was the result of 

interference by government officials with the presentation of the 

claim in violation of the Constitution or laws of this Commonwealth 

or the Constitution or laws of the United States;

(ii) the facts upon which the claim is predicated were unknown to 

the petitioner and could not have been ascertained by the exercise 

of due diligence; or 

(iii) the right asserted is a constitutional right that was recognized 

by the Supreme Court of the United States or the Supreme Court 

of Pennsylvania after the time period provided in this section and 

has been held by that court to apply retroactively. 
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42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1)(i)-(iii). Exceptions to the time-bar must be pled in 

the petition, and may not be raised for the first time on appeal. See 

Commonwealth v. Burton, 936 A.2d 521, 525 (Pa. Super. 2007); see also

Pa.R.A.P. 302(a) (providing that issues not raised before the lower court are 

waived and cannot be raised for the first time on appeal). Further, 

Although this Court is willing to construe liberally materials filed 

by a pro se litigant, pro se status generally confers no special 

benefit upon an appellant. Accordingly, a pro se litigant must 

comply with the procedural rules set forth in the Pennsylvania 

Rules of the Court. This Court may quash or dismiss an appeal if 

an appellant fails to conform with the requirements set forth in 

the Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate Procedure. 

Commonwealth v. Lyons, 833 A.2d 245, 251–52 (Pa. Super. 2003) 

(citations omitted). 

Even liberally construed, Powell has failed to plead and prove that any 

of his claims constitute a valid exception to the PCRA time-bar. In fact, Powell 

failed to make any attempt to plead an exception in his filing. See Motion to 

Rescind Judgment of Sentence, filed 11/14/22. Even on appeal, he makes no 

attempt to argue that a time-bar exception applies. Instead, Powell asserts 

his petition should not have been treated as a PCRA petition. The PCRA court 

properly classified Powell’s petition as a PCRA petition. See Johnson, 803 

A.2d at 1293; see also West, 938 A.2d at 1043. Therefore, the PCRA court 

correctly concluded it lacked jurisdiction to consider Powell’s PCRA petition. 

Accordingly, we affirm the PCRA court’s order denying Powell’s petition.

Order affirmed. Jurisdiction relinquished.
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Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 9/18/2023