07-2213-pr

J ohnson v. Rowley U N IT E D S T A T E S C O U R T O F A P P E A LS
F OR THE S EC OND C IR C U IT

______________ August Term, 2008 (Submitt ed: May

20, 2009 Dec ided: J une 11, 2009)

Docke t No. 07-2213-pr

______________ N EIL J OHNS ON ,

Plaintif f-Appellant , —v.— M. R OWL EY , i nh i s o f

f i c i a l an d i n d i v i d u a l c a p a c i ty, Defendant-

Appellee
.

______________ B e f o r e : M I NER , K ATZ MANN , and R

AGGI , Circuit Judges
.

______________ Appea l from a judgment of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New Y ork (B riea

nt, J. ) ente red on Ma

rch 7, 2007, a dopting the Ma g istrate Judge’ s Report and Re c omm e nd atio n in so fa

r a s it re c omm e nd e d d ism iss ingthe fi rs t, s e c on d, and fo ur th c la ims pleade d in the complaint, and dismissing the third cla im pleaded in the c omplaint without prejudice . Affir

med.

______________

Neil J ohnson, pro s e , Otisvill e, N.Y., Plaintif f-Appellant
.UNI COR “is the trade na me for F eder al Prison Industries, Inc., a g overnme nt 1 corpor ation that provides wor k and tra ining oppor

tunities for fede ral inmates.” United States v. Thompson , 227 F.3d 43, 45 n.4 ( 2d Cir. 2000) (citing28 C.F.R. § 345.11(a) ). 2 Matthew L . Schwar

tz, Assi stant United States Attorney (Elizabeth Wols tein, Assistant United States Attorney , on the brief ), for L ev L . Dassin, ActingUnited States Attorney for the Souther

n District of Ne w York, N ew Yor k, N.Y., for Defendant-Appe llee
.

______________ P ER C UR I AM : This case calls upon us to deter mine principally

whether an inmate in a f

eder al
corr ectional institution has a constitutionally protec ted prope rty

interest in his prison job assig nment. Plaintiff-appe llant Neil J ohnson appea ls from a judg ment of the United States District Court for the Southern D istrict of NewYork (B riea nt, J. ) ente red on Ma

rch 7, 2007, adoptingthe Report and Re commendation (“ R & R”) of Mag istrate Judge Ma rk D. F ox insofar as it rec ommended dismissing the fir st, second, and f ourth claims pleade d in the complaint. The district court dismissed the third claim pleade d in the complaint without prejudice. J ohnson was an inmate in the Fe dera l Correc tional Institut ion in Otisvi lle, New Y ork, and he wa s employ ed as a

cler k by Fe dera l Prison I ndustries, Inc. (“ UNI COR”), under the 1
su pe rv isi on of de fe nd a nt- a pp e lle e Mic ha e l Ro wl e y , at th e tim e that th e inc ide nt g ivi ngri se to t his
a c tio n o c c ur

re d. Ac c or din gto h is c omp la int , o ne of John so n’ s p ri mary

ta sk s a s a

c le rk wa s to ty pe; bec ause his “skills wer e ver y rusty” whe n he first star

ted in the UNI COR program, Johnson would prac tice ty

ping da ily . On J anuar

y 9, 2004, J ohnson worked ove rtime in the UNI COR of fi c e . A ft e r h e c omp le te d h is a ssi g ne d ta sk , Johns on pr a c tic e d h is s kil ls b y

ty pin ga le tte r t o h is wi fe us ingva

ri ou s f onts a nd pit c he s. He the n p ri nte d th e le tte r o ut a nd ma ile d it to h is w if

e to3

show her how

his skill s had deve loped. Prison officials que stioned J ohnson about wher e and why he had ty ped the letter . When J ohnson repor ted for w ork on January

12, 2004, Rowley terminated his employ

ment, appar ently

beca use Johns on had eng ag ed in the unauthor ized persona l use of UNI COR equipment by ty ping the letter to his wife. John so n f ile d th e c omp la int

in t his a c tio n o n Apr il 1 2, 20 05 , r a isi ngfo ur c la ims : (1 ) R ow le y

vio late d Johns on ’s du e pr oc e ss rights wh e n h e te rm inate d h is e mpl oy me nt b e c a

us e Rowley acte d in violation of Bure au of Prisons (“ BO P”) policy ; (2) Rowley violated J ohnson’s due proc ess rights when he te rminated his employ ment beca

use Rowley

and Johnson had an implied ag ree ment and bec ause Johnson’s use of the e quipment fell within an exception to the unauthorized-use r

ule; (3) Rowley

violated J ohnson’s First Ame ndment rig hts beca use Johns on’s termination was ba sed on Rowley ’s per sonal animus towards membe rs of the I slamic faith; and (4) Rowley

violated the Relig ious Fre edom Restoration Ac t of 1993 (“RF RA”) whe n he terminated Johnson’s employ ment. J ohnson sought c ompensatory damag es, dec laratory

and injunctive relief

, and punitive damag es. Rowley moved to dismiss the complaint pursuant to F ed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) and 12( c). In his R & R, Mag istrate Judge F ox dismiss ed Johnson’s first due proce ss claim afte r Johns on withdrew it. Reg ardingthe sec ond due proc ess claim, Judge F ox assumed arguendo that John so n h a d a

pr op e rt y int e re st i n h is U

NI CO R e mpl oy

me nt b ut n on e the le ss d ism iss e d th e c la im be c a us e the pa rt ie s d id n ot h ave an im

pli e d a g re e me nt. F ur

the r, he dis mis se d th e RF RAc la im beca use Johns on failed to e x haust his administrative reme dies. J udg e F ox , howeve r, denie d Rowley ’s motion with respect to Johnson’s First Amendment claim. The district court adopte d the R & R as its own dec ision insofar as it rec ommended dismissing Johns on’s due pr ocess a nd4

RFRA claims. In addition, the district court dismissed J ohnson’s First Ame ndment claim on the g round that Johns on had fa iled to exhaust hi s administrative reme dies. On appe al, J ohnson
c ha lle ng e s th e dis tr ic t c ourt ’s dis mis sa l of (1 ) h is d ue pr oc e ss c la im that Ro wl e y te rm inate d h is
e mpl oy me nt i n v iol atio n o f a

n im pli e d a g re e me nt a

nd (2 ) h is F ir st Ame ndme nt c la im. A. DueP r oc e ss C lai m We reviewa district cour t’s dismiss al pursuant to F ed. R. Civ. P. 12(c) de novo , employing “ the same . . . standa rd applica ble to dismiss als pursuant to F ed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).” Morris v. Schrode r Capital Mgmt. Int’l , 445 F.3d 525, 529 ( 2d Cir. 2006) (interna l quotation
mark s o mitte d) . T hu s, we wi ll a c c e pt a ll f a c tua l a lle g atio ns in t

he c omp la int

a s tr ue and dr aw a ll
rea sonable infe renc es in J ohnson’s favor
. See A TSI Commc’ns, I nc. v. Shaar Fund, Ltd. , 493 F .3 d 8 7, 98 (2 d Ci r. 20 07 ). To surv ive a Rul e 12 (c ) m oti on , Johns on ’s “ c omp la int mus t c onta in sufficie nt fac tual matter, a cce pted as true , to ‘state a c laim to relief that is plausible on its fac e.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal , 1 2 9 S
. C t . 1 9 3 7 , 1 9 4 9 (2 0 0 9 ) ( qu o t i n g Be ll A tl. Cor p. v . Two mb ly , 5 50 U. S. 544, 570 (2007))
. John so n c onte nd s th at hi s d ue pr oc e ss rights we re vio late d whe n Ro wl e y te rm inate d h is UNI COR employ

ment. In order

to succe ed on this claim, J ohnson first must establish that he had a c onstitut ionally

protec ted prope rty

interest in his UNI COR job assignment. Se eW e ins te in v. Albright , 261 F.3d 127, 134 ( 2d Cir. 2001). Such proper ty interests “a

re not c reated by

the Constitution. Rather, they are cre ated a

nd their dimensions are define d by exis ting r

ules or
un d er s t an d i n gs th ats t emfr o mani n d ep en d en ts o urc e s u chas s t at e l aw
— ru l es o r u n d er s t an d i n gs that secur e ce rtain bene fits and that support claims of e ntitlement to thos e bene fits.” Bd. of Re ge nts v . R oth , 4 08 U. S. 5 64 , 5 77 (1 97 2) ; se eals o Ci neSK8 , I nc . v . To wn o

f H e nr ie tta , 507Fur thermore , we a g ree with the district court that Johns on’s ar gument that he had a 2 pr ote c te d p ro pe rt

y int e re st b e c a

us e he and

Row le y ha d a n im pli e d c ontr a c t th at John so n c ou ld use UNI COR equipment for per sonal use is unava iling, as none of the fa cts alleg ed by J ohnson establish the exist ence of any such agree ment. 5 F.3d 778, 784 ( 2d Cir. 2007). Fur ther, “ [t ]o have a prope rty interest in a be nefit, a pe rson . . . must have more tha

n a unilater al expectation of it. He must, instead, have a le g itimate claim of entitlement to it.” Ro th , 4 08 U. S. at 57 7. “ Em plo y e e s at w ill have no pr ote c ta ble pr op e rt

y interest in their c ontinued employ ment.” Abramson v. Pataki , 278 F.3d 93, 99 ( 2d Cir. 2002). Although this Court has held that a prisoner in a

New Y ork State cor

rec tional fac ility

“has no protec ted liberty

interest in a pa

rticular job a ssignment,” Fraz ie r v . Co ug hli n , 81 F.3d 313, 31 8 ( 2d Cir . 1 99 6) (p e r c ur iam) , w e have ne ve r a dd re sse d whe the r a

fe de ra l priso ne r h a s a protec ted prope rty

interest in his or her

UNI COR job assignment. Those c ircuits that have considere d the issue have held that there is no property interest in a f

eder al prisoner ’s UNI COR job assignme nt. See, e .g. , Bulger v. U.S. B ureau of Prisons , 65 F.3d 48, 50 & n.4 (5th Cir. 1995) (c i t i n g Jame

s v. Quinlan , 866 F.2d 627, 629–30 ( 3d Cir. 1989), and Garza v. Miller , 688 F.2d 480, 485–86 (7th Cir. 1982)). F urthermor e, district cour ts within t his Circuit have re ache d the
same c onclusion. See, e .g. , On wua zo mb ev . D od

rill , No. 07 Civ. 873, 2008 W L1758641, at *4 & n.3, 2008 U .S. Dist. L EXI S 31216, at *11–12 & n.3 ( S.D.N.Y. Apr. 16, 2008) . We are pe rs ua de d b y

the re a so nin gpr ov ide d b y tho se c ourt s. Thus , w e joi n o ur sis te r c ir c uit s a

nd ho ld that a fe de ra l priso ne r h a s n o p ro te c te d p ro pe rt y int e re st i n a

UN I CO R jo b a ssi g nme nt. 2 Ac c or din g ly , th e dis tr ic t c ourt pr op e rl y dis mis se d Johns on ’s du e pr oc e ss c la im. B. F ir stAm e ndm e ntCl aim The district cour

t dismi ssed J ohnson’s claim that he w as terminate d beca use of Rowley ’s6

pe rs on a l anim

us tow ard s Mu sli ms o n th e g ro un d th at John so n h a d f a ile d to e xha

us t hi s administrative re medies re g ardingthat claim. We revie w de novo a district cour t’s rulingon whether a plaintiff ha s exhausted administrative reme dies under the Prison L itigation Refor m Act of 1995 (“ PL RA”). See O rtiz v. McBride , 380 F.3d 649, 653 ( 2d Cir. 2004). Her e, we conclude that th e dis tr ic t c ourt

pr op e rl y dis mis se d Johns on ’s F ir st Ame ndme nt c la im f or fa ilure to e xha

us t. The PL RA provides that “[n]o action shall be brought with respec t to prison conditions under [42 U.S.C. § 1983] , or any other F eder al law, by

a prisoner

confine d in any

jail, prison, or other c orre ctional fa cility until such administrative remedie s as ar e ava ilable ar e exhausted.” 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) . The PL RA’s “e x haustion require ment applies to all inmate suits about prison life.” Po rte r v . Nu ssle , 5 34 U. S. 5 16 , 5 32 (2 00 2) ; se eals o Es pin al v . G oo rd, 558 F.3d 119, 124 (2d Cir. 2009). “T here is no question that ex haustion is mandatory under the PL RA and that unexhausted claims cannot be brought in court.” Jones v . Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 211 (2007). In o rd e r t o e xha

us t a c la im, “ pr iso ne rs mus t ‘ c omp le te the a dmi nis tr ativ e re vie w p ro c e ss in acc ordanc e with the applica ble proc edura l rules.’” Id. at2 1 8 (qu o t i n g W oodford v. Ngo , 548 U.S. 81, 88 (2006)). Those proce dural rule s are “def ined not by

the PL RA, but by

the prison g rieva nce pr ocess itself. ” Id. In th is c a se , b e c a us e John so n w a s a

fe de ra l inmate , h e ha d to comply with the BO P’s proce dural rule s, which cr eate d a four -step administrative grieva nce sy stem for prisone r complaints. The f irst step require d inmates to “pre sent an issue of c oncer n informally” to the prison staff so that they

could attempt to resolve it. See28 C.F.R. § 542.13(a)
. I f the issue re mained unre solved, the inmate c ould submit“a f ormal written Administrative Remedy Request” to the institution st aff member de signated to rec eive suc h reque sts. See id. § 542.14. The inmate c ould appea l any adver se dec ision made at that stag e to the Reg ional7

Direc tor, and then to the B OP’s Gene ral Counsel. See id. § 542.15(a)
. Her e, it is undisputed that J ohnson did not raise his First Amendme nt claim until he filed his a pp e a l w iththe Re g ion a l D ir e c tor , at th e thi rd ste p o f t he g ri e va nc e pr oc e ss. He argue s, howeve r, that this does not bar his cla im because (1) Rowley waived e x haustion as a de fense , and (2) there was g ood cause for his fa ilure to exhaust – he had not discover ed Rowley ’s persona l animus towards Muslims prior to when he f iled his appea l with the Reg ional Direc tor. Ne ith e r o f t

he se argume nts ha s me ri t. As an initial matter, fa ilure to exhaust is an affirmative defe nse in a law suit gove rned by the PL RA. See J

ones , 549 U.S. at 216. Rowley raised this def

ense in his answe r to J ohnson’s complaint and has c ontinued to assert it throughout this l itigation. Thus, he ha s not waived the non-exhaustion defense
. See, e .g. , Handberry v . Thompson , 446 F.3d 335, 342 ( 2d Cir. 2006) (d isc us sin gc ir c ums ta

nc e s le a din gto w a ive r o f t he no n- e xha

us tio n d e fe ns e ); Johnson v. Testman , 380 F.3d 691, 695–96 ( 2d Cir. 2004) (same ). F urthermor e, the B OP regulations preclude d John so n f ro m ame nd inghis g ri e va

nc e duri ngthe a dmi nis tr ativ e re vie w p ro c e ss t o r a ise his alleg edly newly discovere d relig ious-animus claim. See 28 C.F .R. § 5 42 .1 5(b) (2 ) ( “ An inm ate may not raise in an A

ppeal issues not ra ised in the lower le vel filing s.”). The district court the re fo re pr op e rl y

dis mis se d Johns on ’s F ir st Ame ndme nt c la im. We have c onsidered a ll of J ohnson’s arguments on appea l and find them to be without
me ri t. A c c or din g ly , f

or the fo re g oin gre a so ns , th e jud g me nt o f t he dis tr ic t c ourt

is AF F IRM ED
.