IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 20-1009

Filed October 7, 2020

IN THE INTEREST OF D.H.,

Minor Child,

K.S., Mother,

Appellant.

________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Linn County, Cynthia S. Finley, 

District Associate Judge.

A mother appeals the termination of her parental rights. AFFIRMED.

Michael M. Lindeman of Lindeman Law, Cedar Rapids, for appellant 

mother.

Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Mary A. Triick, Assistant Attorney 

General, for appellee State.

Kristin L. Denniger, Mt. Vernon, attorney and guardian ad litem for minor 

child.

Considered by Bower, C.J., and Doyle and May, JJ.
2

MAY, Judge.

A mother appeals the termination of her parental rights to her child, D.H.1 

Clear and convincing evidence establishes grounds for termination and shows 

termination is in D.H.’s best interest.2 We affirm.

We review termination proceedings de novo. In re Z.P., ___ N.W.2d ___, 

___, 2020 WL 5268435, at *3 (Iowa 2020). “We will uphold an order terminating 

parental rights where there is clear and convincing evidence of the statutory 

grounds for termination. Evidence is clear and convincing when there is no serious 

or substantial doubt as to the correctness of the conclusions of law drawn from the 

evidence.” In re T.S., 868 N.W.2d 425, 431 (Iowa Ct. App. 2015) (internal citation 

omitted). 

We generally use a three-step analysis to review the termination of parents’

rights. In re A.S., 906 N.W.2d 467, 472 (Iowa 2018). We must determine: 

(1) whether grounds for termination have been established, (2) whether 

termination is in the child’s best interest, and (3) whether we should exercise any 

of the permissive exceptions to termination. Id. at 472–73. “However, if a parent 

does not challenge a step in our analysis, we need not address it.” In re J.P., 

No. 19-1633, 2020 WL 110425, at *1 (Iowa Ct. App. Jan. 9, 2020). 

 

1 D.H.’s father is deceased.

2 To the extent the mother attempts to challenge whether the State made 

reasonable efforts toward reunification or request additional time to work toward 

reunification, we find her arguments are not sufficiently developed for our review. 

See In re K.M., No. 19-1637, 2020 WL 110408, at *3 n.6 (Iowa Ct. App. Jan. 9, 

2020); In re O.B., No. 18-1971, 2019 WL 1294456, at *2 (Iowa Ct. App. Mar. 20, 

2019).
3

The mother claims the State failed to satisfy the statutory grounds 

authorizing termination. The juvenile court found grounds authorizing termination 

under Iowa Code section 232.116(1)(h) (2020). Paragraph (h) authorizes 

termination when:

(1) The child is three years of age or younger.

(2) The child has been adjudicated a child in need of 

assistance pursuant to section 232.96.

(3) The child has been removed from the physical custody of 

the child’s parents for at least six months of the last twelve months, 

or for the last six consecutive months and any trial period at home 

has been less than thirty days.

(4) There is clear and convincing evidence that the child 

cannot be returned to the custody of the child’s parents as provided 

in section 232.102 at the present time.

The mother only challenges the fourth element, whether D.H. could be 

returned to her care. The fourth element is satisfied when the State establishes 

the child cannot be safely returned to the parent at the time of the termination 

hearing. In re T.W., No. 20-0145, 2020 WL 1881115, at *2–3 (Iowa Ct. App. Apr. 

15, 2020). We find D.H. could not be returned to the mother’s care.

The mother has a history of substance abuse, including methamphetamine 

and heroin use. Hair-stat tests for both the mother and D.H. came back positive 

for methamphetamine at the beginning of this case. And the mother tested positive 

for methamphetamine as recently as June 21, 2020, less than one month before 

the termination hearing. 

We reiterate once again, “Methamphetamine is a scourge.” J.P., 2020 WL 

110425, at *2; In re K.L., No. 17-0346, 2017 WL 2465817, at *1 (Iowa Ct. App. 

June 7, 2017). “A parent’s methamphetamine use, in itself, creates a dangerous 

environment for children.” J.P., 2020 WL 110425, at *2. We commend the mother 
4

for entering residential treatment shortly before the termination hearing. But we 

cannot turn a blind eye to her history of relapse. We fear continued 

methamphetamine use is likely in the future.

3

 Cf. In re J.B., No. 18-0696, 2018 WL 

4361058, at *3 (Iowa Ct. App. Sept. 12, 2018) (finding a child could not be returned

to a parent when the parent had only been sober for three months). The mother’s 

drug use prevented reunification. See In re L.B., No. 18-1017, 2018 WL 3650370, 

at *1 (Iowa Ct. App. Aug. 1, 2018) (collecting cases affirming termination of a 

parent’s parental rights when the parent has a history of substance abuse).

In addition to our concerns about the mother’s substance abuse, we find 

she does not have the tools necessary to care for D.H. At the time of the hearing, 

she was unemployed and was not looking for employment.4 Her resulting financial 

instability prevents her from meeting D.H.’s basic needs. See id. (collecting cases 

finding children cannot be returned to a parent who lacks stable employment). And 

during a visit with D.H., the mother gave into D.H.’s cries for soda and gave D.H. 

Mountain Dew even though she “knew [she] shouldn’t give it to her.” While 

providing D.H. a treat is fairly benign in itself, this instance raises questions of 

whether the mother would make decisions with D.H.’s best interest in mind as 

opposed to only considering what would appease D.H. And parents must be able 

to effectively parent their children. Cf. Z.P., ___ N.W.2d at ___, 2020 WL 5268435,

at *4 (considering the father’s age-inappropriate interaction with his child as 

 

3 An Iowa Department of Human Services social worker testified she shares our 

concern that “based on past history there is a good chance [the mother] will 

relapse.” 

4 When asked if she was employed, the mother responded, “No. I can start 

searching for a job tomorrow.” 
5

weighing against reunification). That includes making decisions that serve the 

child’s best interest despite being unpopular with the child. We question whether 

the mother has developed this skill.

Moreover, the mother seemed to concede D.H. could not return to her care, 

testifying, “If I get another chance to have more time, I promise I won’t let anybody 

down.” Given the mother’s instability and substance abuse, we agree with her 

apparent concession and find a statutory ground authorizing termination satisfied. 

Our next step centers on D.H.’s best interest. See Iowa Code § 232.116(2).

We “give primary consideration to the child’s safety, to the best placement for 

furthering the long-term nurturing and growth of the child, and to the physical, 

mental, and emotional condition and needs of the child.” In re P.L., 778 N.W.2d 

33, 40 (Iowa 2010) (quoting Iowa Code § 232.116(2)). “It is well-settled law that 

we cannot deprive a child of permanency after the State has proved a ground for 

termination under section 232.116(1) by hoping someday a parent will learn to be 

a parent and be able to provide a stable home for the child.” Id. at 41.

Like the juvenile court, we conclude termination is in D.H.’s best interest. 

As discussed, the mother has unresolved substance-abuse issues. She currently 

resides at an inpatient treatment facility and does not have concrete plans for a 

permanent home following her anticipated discharge.

5

 And she does not have 

employment. Considering the mother’s history of instability, we are not confident 

she will be able to adequately meet D.H.’s needs in the future. See In re C.W., 

 

5 We acknowledge the mother shared plans to move into a halfway house upon 

completion of the inpatient treatment program. But she had not secured housing 

beyond those plans. 
6

554 N.W.2d 279, 283 (Iowa Ct. App. 1996). So the second step in our analysis is 

complete.

Finally, we consider whether to apply a section 232.116(3) exception to 

termination. Section 232.116(3) exceptions are permissive, not mandatory. In re 

A.R., 932 N.W.2d 588, 591 (Iowa Ct. App. 2019). And the burden of establishing 

a section 232.116(3) exception rests with the parent. See A.S., 906 N.W.2d at 

476.

The mother’s petition on appeal mentions her “clear bond” with D.H. and 

that she “loves her very much.” We assume she is attempting to invoke section 

232.116(3)(c), which authorizes the court to forgo termination if “[t]here is clear and 

convincing evidence that the termination would be detrimental to the child at the 

time due to the closeness of the parent-child relationship.” But she does not 

specifically cite to section 232.116(3)(c) nor does she develop an argument 

beyond her brief reference to her bond with and love for D.H. So we conclude the 

mother has not met her burden of establishing an exception that would permit us 

to forgo termination. 

We agree with the juvenile court and affirm.

AFFIRMED.