In The

Court of Appeals

Sixth Appellate District of Texas at Texarkana

No. 06-18-00015-CR

THOMAS GLEN BAYES, Appellant

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

On Appeal from the 354th District Court

Hunt County, Texas

Trial Court No. 31417

Before Morriss, C.J., Moseley and Burgess, JJ.

Memorandum Opinion by Chief Justice Morriss
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MEMORANDUM OPINION

While serving a period of deferred adjudication community supervision on the offense of 

obstruction or retaliation1for having threatened to harm Greenville, Texas, Police Officer Jackie 

Wayne Maloy, Thomas Glenn Bayes was accused of violating terms of that community 

supervision in five different ways. Bayes’ guilt was adjudicated on the underlying charge, and he 

was sentenced to ten years’ confinement.

On appeal, Bayes challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the trial court’s 

findings that he failed to submit to a required urinalysis on or about December 6, 2017, committed 

the offense of terroristic threat toward community-supervision personnel on or about December 5, 

2017, failed to write an ordered letter of apology to the victim of his retaliation, used alcohol on 

or about December 5, 2017, and failed to perform community service restitution as ordered, for 

the months of September, October, and November 2017. Because the evidence is sufficient to 

support at least one—in fact, all—of the five findings, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

We review an order revoking community supervision under an abuse-of-discretion 

standard. Rickels v. State, 202 S.W.3d 759, 763 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006); Pierce v. State, 113 

S.W.3d 431, 436 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2003, pet. ref’d). The State’s burden of proof to revoke 

community supervision is by a preponderance of the evidence. Rickels, 202 S.W.3d at 763; Pierce, 

113 S.W.3d at 436. The revocation order is “supported by a preponderance of the evidence” if the 

“greater weight of the credible evidence . . . would create a reasonable belief that the defendant 

has violated a condition of his [or her] probation.” Rickels, 202 S.W.3d at 763–64 (quoting 

 

1See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 36.06(a), (c) (West 2016).
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Scamardo v. State, 517 S.W.2d 293, 298 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974)). Assessing the witnesses’

credibility and the weight to be given their testimony is the role of the trial court. In re T.R.S., 115 

S.W.3d 318, 321 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2003, no pet.) (citing Jones v. State, 787 S.W.2d 96, 97 

(Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1990, pet. ref’d)).

We examine the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court’s judgment. Id. 

(citing Jackson v. State, 645 S.W.2d 303, 305 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983)). We will uphold the 

revocation if the State has proven at least one of the alleged violations. Id. (citing Stevens v. State, 

900 S.W.2d 348, 351 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 1995, pet. ref’d)). Here, we conclude that the State 

proved each of the five violations.

Cynthia Ware, with the Hunt County Community Supervision and Corrections 

Department, testified in the adjudication proceeding. Ware testified that the letter of apology 

Bayes was ordered to write to Officer Maloy never materialized,2though Bayes had been told to 

do so and was reminded twice. She also testified that Bayes completed none of the community 

service hours that he was ordered to have performed. To her knowledge and the records she had, 

Bayes never reported as required. Ware also testified that, on December 5, 2017, she received 

reports that Bayes had been drinking and was making threats to “dust the [Hunt County community 

supervision] office.” The Hunt County community supervision office contacted Bayes 

December 5 and directed him to report for a urinalysis, but he failed to report December 5 or 6, as 

requested. A report to Bayes’ community supervision officer from the Police Department of 

 

2Ware actually testified that Bayes was to give the letter he was to have written to the community supervision 

department for delivery to Maloy, but that it was never delivered. 
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Onalaska, Texas, the community in Polk County in which Bayes lived, in connection with the 

report that Bayes had been drinking, indicated that, on December 5 or 6, 2017, Bayes was 

“extremely intoxicated.” His threat to “dust” the Hunt County community supervision office was 

actually reported as Bayes’ statement “that he was going to report and dust [his community 

supervision officer] and the entire office” in Hunt County. 

Jenny Tillery testified that she received numerous telephone calls from Bayes over a threeor four-day period around December 5, 2017, during which he seemed to her to be inebriated and 

made threats to Tillery and her husband, Spencer Williams, to hurt or kill them. Mr. Williams also 

testified to Bayes’ threats and intoxication. 

The trier of fact, in this case the trial court, “is the sole judge of the credibility of the 

witnesses and of the strength of the evidence.” Fuentes v. State, 991 S.W.2d 267, 271 (Tex. Crim. 

App. 1999). The fact-finder may choose to believe or disbelieve any portion of the witnesses’ 

testimony. Sharp v. State, 707 S.W.2d 611, 614 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986). 

Based on the foregoing, we find that sufficient evidence existed to support, by a 

preponderance of the evidence, the trial court’s findings on each of the five grounds alleged by the 

State for Bayes’ adjudication of guilt.

Because the evidence supported the trial court’s finding that the violations occurred, the 

court had sufficient grounds on which to adjudicate Bayes’ guilt and revoke his community 

supervision. See Sanchez v. State, 603 S.W.2d 869, 871 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1980). The 

trial court did not abuse its discretion when it adjudicated Bayes’ guilt, revoked his deferred 

adjudication community supervision, and sentenced him to ten years’ confinement.
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We affirm the trial court’s judgment. 

Josh R. Morriss, III

Chief Justice

Date Submitted: July 2, 2018

Date Decided: July 3, 2018

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