Pursuant to Ind.Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before 

any court except for the purpose of 

establishing the defense of res judicata, 

collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE:

MICHAEL E. MORKEN RANDALL W. GRAFF

Indianapolis, Indiana Kopka, Pinkus, Dolin & Eads, P.C.

Indianapolis, Indiana

IN THE

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

JOSEPH DOWELL, )

)

Appellant-Defendant, )

)

ANGIE L. GROVE AND CODY ROWE, )

)

Defendants, )

)

vs. ) No. 50A03-1211-CT-487

)

AMERICAN MODERN HOME INSURANCE )

COMPANY, )

)

Appellee-Plaintiff. )

APPEAL FROM THE MARSHALL CIRCUIT COURT

The Honorable Curtis Palmer, Judge

Cause No. 50C01-1203-CT-12

July 30, 2013

MEMORANDUM DECISION - NOT FOR PUBLICATION

MAY, Judge
2

Joseph Dowell1appeals summary judgment for American Modern Home Insurance 

Company (AMHIC). We affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On September 7, 2009, Dowell, Jeffrey Blythe, and Cody Rowe were drinking alcohol 

at Angie Grove’s home. Rowe was not old enough to legally drink alcohol. Dowell and 

Blythe left in a car driven by Rowe. Rowe’s car struck a utility pole, killing Blythe and 

injuring Dowell. 

In December 2009, Blythe’s mother brought a wrongful death action against Grove, 

because Grove provided Rowe with alcohol and did not prevent him from leaving her 

property. On August 11, 2011, Grove’s homeowners insurance provider, AMHIC, settled 

with Blythe’s mother on behalf of Grove for $50,000.00, which was the policy limit for 

personal liability. 

Less than a month after that settlement, Dowell filed a personal injury action against 

Grove and Rowe. AMHIC filed a declaratory judgment action, seeking to terminate its duty 

to defend Grove in Dowell’s action because the limit of Grove’s policy was reached when 

AMHIC settled with Blythe’s mother. AMHIC moved for summary judgment, Grove and 

Rowe moved for summary judgment, and Grove filed a motion to dismiss AMHIC’s 

declaratory judgment action. The trial court granted AMHIC’s motion for summary 

judgment, denied Dowell’s motion for summary judgment, and denied Grove’s motion to 

dismiss. It found:

 

1 Angie L. Grove and Cody Rowe do not participate in this appeal.
3

There is no factual dispute that AMHIC has paid out their [sic] policy limits 

with regard to this occurrence. Therefore, AMHIC no longer has a contractual 

duty to defend or indemnify Grove and AMHIC’s Motion for Summary 

Judgment on those issues should be and hereby is GRANTED. 

(App. at 11) (emphasis in original).

DISCUSSION AND DECISION

Summary judgment is appropriate when the designated evidence shows there are no 

genuine issues as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter 

of law. Grinnell Mut. Reinsurance Co. v. Ault, 918 N.E.2d 619, 624 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009). 

When reviewing a summary judgment, we stand in the shoes of the trial court. Id. Once the 

moving party demonstrates, prima facie, that there are no genuine issues of material fact as to 

any determinative issue, the burden is on the non-moving party to come forward with 

contrary evidence. Id. The non-moving party may not rest on the pleadings but must instead 

set forth specific facts, using supporting materials contemplated under Trial Rule 56 that

show there is a genuine issue for trial. Id.

The party appealing a summary judgment bears the burden of persuading this court 

that the trial court erred, but we still carefully scrutinize the entry of summary judgment to 

ensure that the non-prevailing party was not denied its day in court. Id. We do not weigh the 

evidence but rather consider the facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. We 

may sustain the judgment upon any theory supported by the designated evidence. Id. The 

trial court here entered specific findings of fact and conclusions thereon. Although such 

findings and conclusions facilitate appellate review by offering insight into the trial court’s 
4

reasons for granting summary judgment, they do not alter our standard of review and are not 

binding. Id. at 625. Dowell argues the trial court erred when it granted summary judgment 

in favor of AMHIC because AMHIC had a duty to defend Grove in Dowell’s lawsuit. We 

disagree.

Insurance contracts are governed by the same rules of construction as other contracts, 

and the proper interpretation of an insurance policy is generally a question of law appropriate 

for summary judgment. Wellpoint, Inc. v. Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co., 952 N.E.2d 254, 258 

(Ind. Ct. App. 2011), reh’g denied, trans. denied. If the policy language is clear and 

unambiguous, it should be given its plain and ordinary meaning. Id. An ambiguity does not 

exist simply because a controversy exists between the parties, each favoring an interpretation 

contrary to the other. Id. Rather, an insurance policy is ambiguous if reasonable people may 

honestly differ as to the meaning of the policy language. Id. When insurance policies are 

interpreted, exceptions, limitations, and exclusions to coverage must be plainly expressed. 

Id. at 258-59.

The homeowners insurance policy between AMHIC and Grove provides:

If a claim is made or a suit is brought against any insured person for damages 

because of bodily injury or property damage, caused by an occurrence, to 

which this coverage applies, we will: . . .

2. provide a defense at our expense by counsel of our choice. We may 

investigate and settle any claim or suit that we decide is appropriate. Our 

obligation to defend any claim or suit ends when the amount we pay for 

damages resulting from the occurrence in settlement of a claim(s) or in 

satisfaction of a judgment(s) equals our liability limit. We have no duty to 

defend any suit or settle any claims for bodily injury or property damages not 

covered under this policy.
5

(App. at 32) (emphasis added). Blythe’s mother filed a wrongful death action that AMHIC 

settled for the policy limit. By the time Dowell sued Grove and Rowe, the policy limit was

exhausted and AMHIC had no obligation to defend Grove against the claim.2 Accordingly, 

we affirm the decision of the trial court.

Affirmed.

BAKER, J., and MATHIAS, J., concur.

 

2 Dowell argues AMHIC could be released from its duty to defend Grove only by filing an interpleader. While 

this method of distribution of policy proceeds is favored in Indiana, see Mahan v. Am. Standard Ins. Co., 862 

N.E.2d 669, 677 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007), trans. denied, the filing of an interpleader is not required, and we 

decline to insert such a requirement into the contract.