T he H o no rable R o b ert D

. Sac k, Senior C i rcui t Jud ge f o r t he U

. S. Co urt *
o f A p p eal s f

o r t he Se co nd C i rcui t , s i t t i ng by desi gnat i o n. F OR P UB LIC AT ION


### U N I TED STA TES C O U R T O F A PPEA LS F O R T H E N IN T H C IR C U IT

U NI TED S T A T ES O F A M ERI CA ,

Plaintif f-Appellee ,

v.
J A RV I S M AR TI N J UAN ,

Defendant-

Appellant

. No. 11-10539

D.C. No. 2:11-cr- 00554- J AT-1
OPI NI ON

Appea l from the United States District Court for the D istrict of Arizona J ames A. Te ilborg , District J udg e, Presiding

Argued and Submitted No ve mbe r 6 , 2 01 2— San F ra nc isc o, Ca lif

or nia Filed January

7, 2013
Be fore : Robert D. Sack, Ronald M. Gould, *
and Mil an D . Sm ith , Jr. , Ci rc uit Judg e s. Opinion by

J udg e Milan D. Smith, J r.U NI TED S T A T ES V

. J UAN 2

T hi s s ummary cons t i t ut es no part o f the o pi ni on of

t he cour t

. I t ha s ** b een p repa red b y co urt s t af f f o r t he co nveni ence o f

t he read er. SUMMAR

Y **

Crim inal L aw
Th e pa ne l a ff ir me d a c onvic tio n an d sente nc e fo r a ssa ult in a ca se in which the defenda nt claimed that his rig ht to due proce ss was violated whe re the prosec ution threatene d one of its own witnesses, the def

endant’ s wife, with possi ble per jury
c ha rges, a lle g e dly

c a us inghe r t o c ha

ng e he r p re vio us ly
e x c u l p at o r

y tr i a l t e s t i m o n y t o b e i n c u l p at o r y. The pa n el wrote that the g overnme nt’s substantial interfe renc e with t he testi mony of i ts own wit ness, even if the wrong ful interfe renc e does not drive the wit ness off the stand,
c an in c e rt a in c ir c umst ances vio late the de fe nd ant’ s r ig ht t o due proc ess. Without expressing judgme nt a s to whether the prosec utor’s conduc t here was war rante d, the pane l held that the def endant’ s claim would fail in a ny event be cause he ca

n point to no evidence that proves that the alleg edly threatening stat em ents – which the de fenda nt conce des we re dire cted solely to the district judge – wer e ever communicated to the wi tne ss. The pa nel re jected the defe ndant’s conte nt i o n that the district court commi tted proce dural e rror at sentenc ing when it e xpla ine d th e 18 U. S.C. § 3 55 3( a ) r e a so ns su pp or tin g its chosen se ntence immediately afte r imposing se ntence

.U NI TED S T A T ES V

. J UAN 3
CO UN SEL
Daniel Ka

plan, Assistant Fe dera l Publi c De fende r (a rgued), Pho e nix, Ari zon a , f

or De fe nd ant- Ap pe lla

nt.
J oan G. Ruff

ennac h, Assi s t ant United States Attorney (ar g ued), Phoenix, Arizona, for Plaintiff-Appe llee.

OP IN ION
M. SMI TH, Circuit J udg e: Appellant Jarvis Martin J uan appe als his conviction and sentenc ing f

or fe lony and m isdemeanor

assault. J uan challeng es his c onviction on due-pr ocess g rounds, claiming his constitutional rig hts wer e viol ated whe re the prosec ution “thre atene d” one of its own witnesses with possible pe rj ury char g es, alleg edly

causingthe witness to chang e her p r e v i o u s l y e x c u l p at o r

y tr i a l t e s t i m o n y t o b e i n c u l p a t o r y. Be cause J uan ca

nnot meet his evidentiary burden, his dueproce ss challeng e must be re jected.
Simi larly , J uan’s c laim of sentenc ing e rro r fa ils. J uan’s argument that the district court co mmitt ed proc edura l error wher e it explained the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) fa ctors supporting its chosen sentenc e immediately aft er imposi ng sentenc e relies on a misunderstanding of our opinion in United States v. W aknine , 543 F.3d 546 ( 9th Cir. 2008).
F ACTUAL AND P ROCEDURAL BACK GR OUND
On Marc h 15, 2010, J uan and his w ife, C.J ., cele brate d C.J .’s birthday

on the Gila River Indian Reser vation. TheU NI TED S T A T ES V

. J UAN 4

c e l e b r at i o ns t art e d

e ar l y , an d

b y th e a f t e r n o o nJ u anan d

C

. J. had ea ch consume d sever al forty -ounce bottles of malt liquor, alongwith some whiskey and coc aine. As dusk fell, J u an and C.J . beg an ar g uing a fter Juan
a c c us e d h e r o f i nf

ide lity . C. J. int e rr

up te d th e arg

ume nt t o drive a friend to a

near by motel, but the row co n t i n u ed over t ex tm es s age
. W h en C

. J

. re t u rn e d h o m e, J u an wa s wa i t i n g. Be fore she could g et out of the ca r, Juan punched C.J . in the head a nd p u l led her

out of her SUV. Juan then g ot into the vehicle a nd sped off

around the corne r.
J uan re turned in the vehicle a lmost i mmediately , and he and C.J . conti nued their a rgument in the middle of the roa d. At some point, J uan kicked and punched C .J ., who fell to the pave me nt. Juan

the n g ot b a c k into t

he SUV, put th e c ar i n reve rse, a nd ran ove r C.J ., drag g ing he r under t h e vehic le. J uan exited the vehicle onc e ag ain, pu n ched C.J . two more times, and then drove off.
C.J . was take n to the hospital, where sh e was treate d for h e r in ju r ie s
. Sh e w a s r e le a s e d f

r o m t h e h o s p it a l e ar ly

th e n e xt morning , but not before she wa s interviewe d by Detective Romo L ewis of t h e Gila River Police De partment. Dur ing that tape- rec orded inter

view, C.J . claimed that Juan had beate n her a

nd run her

over w ith the SUV. J u an wa s later indicted for assault with a dang erous we apon in violation of 18 U. S.C. §§ 11 53 and

11 3( a )( 3) and

a ssa ult re su lti ngin serious bodi l y i n

j ury in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1153 and 113(a) (6).
At tr ia l, C .J. r e fu se d to c oo pe rate wi th t he g ov e rnme nt, and he r atte nd anc e ha d to be co mpe lle d b y the dis tr ic t c ourt

. On direc t examination, C .J . test i fi ed that she sustained he rU NI TED S T A T ES V

. J UAN 5
i n j ur i e s w h e ns h e a c c i d e n t a l l y f e l l be hin d

Ju an ’ s S U V

. C

. J. also testified that Juan never hit her

. Se ns ingits c a se sli pp ing awa y , the g ov e rnme nt s ou g ht t o int r o d u c e C. J. ’ s e ar li e r s tate me n ts to D e te c ti v e L e w is

. The district court prope rly

denied this reque st. Frustrated by the status of the ca se, and c onvinced that C.J. was lying on the stand, the g overnme nt reque sted that both C.J . and the jury be
e xc u s e d s o th atth e p a

rt i e s c o u l d

d e t e r m i n e “ n e xt s t e p s
. ” C

. J. and the jury wer e excused, and duringthe long colloquy that followed, the g overnme nt repe atedly claimed that C.J. was lying, or otherwise indicated that her trial t es t i m o ny

was “n onsense.” After

near ly forty -five minutes of le g al discussion, the g overnme nt finally sug g ested to the district
c ourt that it wa s “ be g inn ing t o wonde r i f [C. J.] ne e ds a lawy er a ppointed beca

use I believe she ’s co m m itted perjury and af t er l o oking at jail calls betwee n her a nd her husba

nd I
ac tu al l y b el i ev e sh e’ s co m m i t t edp er j ury
. ” T h e d i s tri ctj u d ge ag ree d, and appointed counsel for C.J

. At no point did J uan’s
atto rn e y ob je c t.
The nex t da

y , a ft e r C .J. h a d th e op po rt un ity to c on su lt with her lawy er, the g overnme n t re ca l led C.J . to the stand. The gove rnment aske d C.J . if she “w anted to cor rec t some of [her] t estim o n y ” or “ add to it.” C.J . said she did, and then testified th at J u an hit her w ith both his hands and the SUV. Juan wa s late r c onvic te d o n a ll c ounts

. The district cour

t held a sente ncing h earing on October 18, 2011. Af

t er c onsideringthe views of both pa rties, the jud g e se nte nc ed J ua

n to 37 months imp ri so nme nt. I mmediately

afte r imposing se n t ence the district court explained its reasons for se lectingt h e chosen se ntence , andU NI TED S T A T ES V

. J UAN 6
al s o e xp la in e d h o w it w o u ld f urth e r th e o b

je c ti v e s of 18 U. S.C. § 3 55 3( a ). Juan did no t ob je c t.
JU RI SDI CT ION AN D ST AN DA RD OF RE VI EW We have jur i sdiction to review Juan’s conviction under 28 U. S.C. § 1 29 1. B e c a us e th is is a dir e c t a

pp e a l f ro m a judgme nt of conviction in t h e fe dera l sy stem, the Fe dera l Rules of C riminal Procedur e apply

. Johnson v. U nited States , 520 U.S. 4 6 1 , 4 6 6 (1997). Rule 51(b) codifies the f amiliar pr oc e du ra l pr inci pl e th a t a de fe nd a nt m us t c on te mpo ra

ne ou sly ob

jec t to an a lle g e d e rr or

in o rd e r t o p r e s e r v e th e is s ue. P u ck

ett v. United States , 556 U.S. 129, 13 4 ( 20 09 ). Whe re , a s h e re , the de fe nd ant d oe s n ot o bje c t to an er ror in the trial court, a

ny revie w is for plain e rror . Fe d. R. C ri m. P . 5 2( b) ; se e als o Johnson , 520 U.S. at 466.
W e h ave jur isdiction to review Juan’s sentence under 18 U. S.C. § 37 42

. Whe re a de fe nd ant do e s no t ob je c t to his sentenc ing in the district c ourt, we r eview for plain e rror
. United States v. W

aknine , 543 F.3d 546, 551 (9th Cir. 2008).
DI SCU SSIO N
I. Witness Intimidation
J uan conte nds his Fifth Amendment rig ht to a fair tr ial
wa s v iol ate d whe re the g ov e rnmen t alle g e dly thr e a te ne d h is wife w ith pe rjury

char g es, there by

coer cingher into g iving i n c r i m i n at i n gt e s t i m o n y.
The F ifth Amendment Due Process C l ause “ g uara ntees that a criminal def

endant will be tre ated with the f undamental fa i rn ess essential to the ve ry conce pt of justice.” U n itedU NI TED S T A T ES V

. J UAN 7

A num b er of

t h e c a ses f

o l l o wi ng W

ebb v. Te xas , i ncl ud i ng Uni t ed 1 St at es v. V

avag es , have hel d t ha t Webb p ro te c ts a d e fen d a n t’s S ixth A m e n d m e n t righ t t o c o m p u lso ry p ro c e ss. See , e

. g. , V avag es , 151 F. 3d at 1 1 8 8 ; Uni t ed St at es v. Jaeger , 5 3 8 F .3 d 1 2 2 7 (9 t h C i r. 2 0 0 8 ). T he se h o ld ing s a re fully co n siste n t with J u a n ’s ar g u m e n t t h a t W ebb a lso p ro te c ts
a def en dan t ’ s broa der due

- pr oce s s ri g h t s
. T h e Su pr eme Cour t h as ma de clea r t ha t m uc h o f

it s re aso ning reg ard i ng the C o m p ulso ry P ro ce ss C l au se o f th e S i xt h A m end m ent i s b o rr o wed f rom cases i nvo l vi ng t he D ue P ro c e ss C la u se o f t h e F ift h A m e n d m e n t. Uni t ed St at es v

. Val enz uel aBer nal , 4 58 U

. S. 8 58 , 8 72 (198 2). O t her co ur t s have al s o re cogni zed t hat “[t] h e F ift h (o r F o u rte e n th if a sta te is i n v o lv e d ) a n d S ixth A m e n d m e n ts
c o n c o m itan tly p ro v id e a c rim ina l d e fen d a n t t h e rig h t t o p re se n t a d e fen se .” Uni t ed St at es v

. Se r r ano , 40 6 F.3d 12 0 8 , 12 1 5 (10 t h C i r. 20 0 5 ). T heref o re , w e d o not und ul y co ncern oursel ves wi t h drawing f i ne d i st i nct i o ns b et ween ca ses i nt erpret i ng t he Sixt h A m end m ent C o m p ul sory P ro ce ss C l au se and t ho se int erp reti ng t he F i f t h A m en d m en t D ue P ro ce ss C l aus e. States v. Valenzue la-Bernal , 458 U.S. 858, 872 (1982) (interna l quotations and citation omitt ed). A t its core, the rig ht to due proce ss is the r ight to fa irly “pre sent a de fense .” W ebb v. Texas , 409 U.S. 95, 98 (1972) (pe r cur iam) (quoting W ashington v. Texas , 3 88 U. S. 1 4, 19 (1 96 7) ); se e als o United Sta t es v. Scheffer , 523 U.S. 303, 325–27 (1998) (Stevens, J. di ssenting)

. Although a d ef

endant’ s rig ht to present a de fense is not absolute, t h e Supreme Court has rec og nized that the g overnme nt may

not su bstantially

interfe re w ith the testimony of def ense w itnesses. W

ebb , 40 9 U. S . at 98 ; see also United States v. Vavage s , 151 F.3d 1185, 1188 ( 9th Cir. 19 98 ); Un ite d S

tates v . Li ttle , 753 F.2d 1420, 1438 ( 9th Cir. 1984). “Unnece ssarily

strong admon i tions ag ainst perjury aimed at discourag ing de fense witnesses fr om testifying ha ve be e n h e ld t o d e pr ive a c ri min a l defen da

nt o f h is [constit ut i onal rig hts] .” Vavage s , 151 F.3d at 1188. “The 1U NI TED S T A T ES V

. J UAN 8

se min a l c a se is W

ebb v. Tex as ,” in which the Supreme Court
re v er s eda d e f

e n d an t ’s co n v i ct i o naf

t er th e t ri al j u d ge “g ratuitously

single d out” the d ef

en s e’s sole w itness for a “leng thy admonition on the dang ers of perjury ,” including assuringthe witness that if he lied on the stand, “he would be prosec uted and pr obably convicted for pe rjury .” Id. at 1 1 8 8

– 8 9 (qu o t i n g W

ebb , 4 09 U. S. at 97–98) . T he wi tne ss then re fused to testify

. W ebb , 409 U.S. at 95. Although the trial judge was the ta rg et of the de fenda

nt’s alleg ations of er

ror in W ebb , “ a nu mb e r o f p o s t- W ebb case s re ve a l th at th e tr ia l ju dg e is n ot t he on ly pe rs on wh os e admonitions ag ainst perjury can deprive a criminal def endant of his [constit utional] rig ht[ s].” Vavage s , 151 F.3d at 1189.

“ [T]he c on du c t of

pr os e c uto rs , li ke the c on du c t of jud g e s, is
un qu e s t i o n a

b l y g o v e r n e d b y W ebb .” Id.
W h at i s n o t un qu e s t i o n a

b l y g o v e r n e d b y W ebb is whether the g overnme nt’s substantial interfe renc e with t he testimony of i ts o wn w itn ess c an e ve r v iol ate a de fe nd ant’ s d ue -p ro c e ss ri gh t s
. T o o ur kn o wl ed ge, n o co urt ap p l yi n g W ebb has eve r e x t e n d e d i t s p r i n c i p l e s t o p r o s e c u t i o nw i tn e s s e s
. S i m i l ar l y, n o co urtap p l yi n g W

ebb ha s e ve r e xt e nd e d it to s itu a tio ns , lik e thi s on e , wh e re the a lle g e dly thr e a te ne d wit ne ss continued to testify

afte r the a lleg ed thre at. Instead, the pr oto ty pic a l W ebb challeng e involves conduct so threate ning
a s to “ e f f e c ti v e ly dr iv e [th e ] w it

n e s s o f f th e s ta n d .” Un i ted States v. Jae

ger , 538 F.3d 122 7 , 1 2 3 1 (9th Cir. 2008) (qu o t i n g W

ebb , 409 U.S. at 98). Despite this dear

th of prec edent, J uan persua sively argues that W ebb an d it s p r o g e n y

s h o u ld a p p ly to a ll w it n e s s e s
. We have often stressed the “imperative that prosec utors and other officia ls maintain a posture of stric t neutrality when a dvisingU NI TED S T A T ES V

. J UAN 9
witnesses of their du t i es and r ights.” Vavage s , 151 F.3d at 1 1 9 3 (qu o t i n g United States v. Rich , 580 F .2 d 929 , 934 (9 th Cir. 1978)). Violatingthis du t y b y bully ing a prosec ution wi tness awa

y from testimony

that could under

mine the g ov e rnme nt’ s c a se is n o le ss distor tiv e of the jud ic ia l f

a c tfinding proce ss than i mproperly meddling with the testimony of a de f e n s e w i tn e s s
. R e g ar d l e s s o f w h o s e w i tn e s s is interfe red w ith, the constitutional harm to t he def endant is the same—the i n ab i l ity

to mount a fair a

nd complete de fense

. We see no rea son to doubt that the g overnme nt’s substantial interfe renc e wit h the testimony of its own witnesses ca n violate the Due Process Clause.
I t also seems cle ar that the substantial and wrong ful interferenc e with a pr osecution or de fense witness that does
no t “d rive the w itness off the stand,” but instead leads the witness t o materia lly

chang e his or her

prior trial testimony can, in c erta in circumstanc es, violate due proce ss. I ndeed, such violations ha

ve the potential to w ork eve n g reater ha rm th an th o s e th at s i mp l y r e s u l t i n a b l an k e t r e f u s a l t o t e s t i f

y. Where a witness is coerc ed int o rec anting testimony that was favor able to the de fenda

nt, the h arm to the de fense involves not merely

the preve ntion of

pr os pe c tiv e te sti mony

that might have bolster ed its case , but the retraction of testimony that did bolster its case. See V alenzuela-Be rnal , 458 U.S. at 872 (d ue pr oc e ss i s o ff

e nd e d w he re th e defe nd ant i s w ro ng fu lly denied testimony that “would have been favor able and materia l.”).
Nev er t heless, althoug h we a g ree with J uan that the principles of W

ebb should e x tend to his case , we cannot conclude that he is entitled to relief

. In order to preva il, J uan must “demonstrate misconduc t by a pre pondera

nce of the
ev i d ence .” Vavage

s , 1 5 1 F. 3 d

at1 1 8 8 (c i t i n g U

n ite d S tatesU NI TED S T A T ES V

. J UAN 10

v . Lo rd , 711 F.2d 887, 891 n.3 (9 t h C i r. 1983)) . “The substantial inter fer ence inquiry is e x tremely fac t s p ecif ic,” and Juan mu s t p r o v e th at un d e r th e to ta li ty o f the cir cu mstances, “ the substance of what the prosec utor communicates to the w itness is a threat over a nd above what the re cord indicates is nece ssary [.] ” Id. at 1190 (i n terna l quotations and citations omitted). We note that in many circ umstances, war

ning a witness about the possibi l i t y and conseque nces of

perjury charges i s war

rante d. See, e .g. , W ill iam s v . W

oo dfo rd , 384 F.3d 567, 603 ( 9th Cir. 20 04) (“me rely war ning a witness of t he conse quence s of per jury does n o t unduly

pressure the witness’s choic e to testify or violate the def

endant’ s rig ht to due proce ss.”). We nee d express no judgme nt as to whether the prosecut or’s c onduct i nth i s ca s e w as , o r w as n o t , wa rr an t ed

. Fo r ev en as s u m i n g, arguendo, that the pr osecutor’s s tatements her e we re ina pp ro pr iate ly

thr e ate nin g , Juan’ s c la im wo uld sti ll f a il beca use Juan can point to no evidence th at p ro ves that the alleg edly threatening statements—which J uan conce des we re direc te d s o le ly to the district judge —wer e eve r communicated to C.J. W ithout proof that C.J . ever hear d the prosec utor’s re marks, or pr oof th at C.J .’s appointed lawy er re lay e d th os e re mark s to C.J., Juan sim ply c ann ot e sta

bli sh the ne c e ssa

ry c a us a l li nk betw e e n th e pr os e c uto r’ s “ thr e a ts” and C.J .’s cha

ng ed testim o n y
. Be cause , J uan has not
a de qu ate ly

sh ow n c a

us atio n, he c ann ot m e e t hi s b ur de n to demonstrate misconduc t by a pre pondera

nce of the evidenc e. Acc ording ly , we a ffirm Juan’s conviction.
II. Sentencing Pr ocedures
J uan also a

ppeals his sentenc e, ar g uing that the di s t ri ct court c ommitt ed proc edura l error when it ex plained the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) re aso n s supporting its chose n sentenc eU NI TED S T A T ES V

. J UAN 11 immediately afte r i mposing sentence. Juan claims that such a proc edure i s p roscribed by our opinion in United States v. W aknine , which fo u nd plain proce dural e rror wher e the “district cour

t ga ve no re asons in ref

ere nce to the § 3553( a) fa c tor s be fore imposing sentence.” 543 F.3d at 554 (9th Cir. 2008) (e mphasis added)

. Juan ’s re lia

nc e on on e se nte nc e fro m our o pin ion in W aknineis mispl ace d. In the ver y same pa ragraph that J uan cites for the proposition that t he § 3553(a ) fa ctors must be addre ssed “bef

ore” imposing sentenc e, we explained that the district court er

red be cause it ga

ve “no contemporane ous ann o un c e me n t o f th e c a lc u late d G u id e li n e s r an g e or satisfac tion of the requirement that the s entenc e be rec onciled f o r r e a s o n a

b le n e s s in li g h t o f th e § 3 5 5 3 ( a ) f a c to r s
. ” Id. (empha sis added). The plai n l an g uag e of W aknine sim

ply does not requir e the strict se quencin g o f events urg ed by J uan. Nor would such a string ent re quirement a dvance any of the “important g oals” of § 3553, na mely “(1) informingthe defe ndant of the r easons f or his sentenc e, (2) permitting meaning ful appe llate re view, (3) enabling the public to learn why the def endant r ece ived a pa

rticular se n t ence, and ( 4) g uiding pr obation office rs and pr ison officials in deve loping a program to mee t the defe n d an t’s needs.” United States v. Vi lla fue rte , 502 F.3d 204, 210 (2d C ir. 2007) (c iting S. Rep. No . 9 8- 22 5, at 79 –8 0 ( 19 83 )) ; see also Gall v. United States , 552 U.S. 38, 50 (2007) (“ After se ttl ingon

the a pp ro pr iate sentenc e, [ t h e cour

t] must adequate ly

explain the chosen
se nte nc e to allo w fo r m e anin g fu l a pp e llate re vie w a

nd to promote the pe rc e ption of fair se ntencing .”) ( citation omitted)U NI TED S T A T ES V

. J UAN 12 (em p h a s is a d d e d )

. Wh e r e , a s h e r e , th e d is tr ic t c o urt adequately and contempora neously explains it s sentenc ing
ra tio na le , w e wi ll n ot f

ind pr oc e dura l e rr or. T o h old otherwise w ould needlessly elevate form ove r substance

. AF F IRMED.