* District Judge of the Southern District of Texas, sitting by designation.

1 Pub.L. No. 98-547, § 201, 98 Stat. 2754 (1984). United States Court of Appeals,

Fifth Circuit.

No. 92-8293.

UNITED STATES of America, Petitioner-Appellee,

v.

1988 CHEVROLET SILVERADO, VIN: 1GCDC14H5JZ157972, et al., Respondent(s),

v.

Rodrigo RAMIREZ, Claimant-Appellant.

March 22, 1994.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas.

Before KING and WIENER, Circuit Judges, and ROSENTHAL * , District Judge.

WIENER, Circuit Judge:

Today we address the question—res nova in this circuit—who bears the burden of proof once

the government establishes probable cause to seize property in a civil forfeiture proceeding under 18

U.S.C. § 512, which codifies § 201 of the Motor Vehicle Theft Law Enforcement Act of 1984 (the

"Act"). 1 We conclude that such burden belongs to the claimant.

T he district court here determined that once the government established probable cause

warranting a seizure and forfeiture under § 512, Claimant-Appellant Rodrigo Ramirez had the burden

of proving his "in n ocent owner" defense. After the government was successful in establishing

probable cause , Ramirez failed to offer any evidence in support of his defense. Accordingly, the

district court entered judgment ordering forfeiture to the government. As we agree that t he plain

language of § 512 mandates shift ing the burden of proof to the claimant if t he government first

establishes probable cause, we affirm.

I

FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS2 The facts are drawn from the district court's findings of fact, which in turn are derived from

testimony by the government witness at trial. Ramirez chose not to attempt to rebut this

testimony. On appeal, Ramirez merely attempts to dispute the inferences to be drawn from these

findings.

3 As to the other three vehicles, Oliva C. Molinar filed a claim for the 1982 Chevrolet Silverado

with VIN: 1GCDC14H9CS173149 while Fabian Espudo filed a claim for the 1988 Chevrolet

Short Stepside with VIN: 1GCDC14K7J160299. Both Molinar and Espudo have been dismissed

from this appeal for failure to prosecute. No one filed a claim for the third vehicle, the 1989

Chevrolet Silverado with VIN: 1GCDC14K7KZ233009. The facts of this case are essentially undisputed. 2 In December 1990, officers of the Texas

Department of Public Safety ("DPS") receive d information from a confidential informant that Ramirez

was trafficking in stolen m otor vehicles and m

otor vehicle parts. Officers of the United States Border

Patrol Service and the DPS were shown the location of a "salvage switch and chop shop" in Ojinaga,

Mexico. At that location the officers observed several vehicles that had been purchased by Ramirez,

as well as stolen parts containing vehicle identification numbers ("V INs") that had been tam pered

w it h—alt ered, obliterated, or removed. The investigation revealed that, under the direction of

Ramirez, "new" vehicles were assembled in Ojinaga by inst alling such stolen parts in wrecked vehicles

that Ramirez had purchased previously.

In May, 1991 officers of the Motor Vehicle Theft Service ("MVTS") of the DPS executed

a search warrant on P residio Truck Sales, which is owned by Ramirez, and on his residence. The

officers seized eight vehicles, of which five are implicated in the instant appeal. 3 These vehicles had

been altered as follows:

1. 1988 Chevrolet Silverado VIN: 1GCDC14H5JZ157972 Contained an engine and

transmission that had been reported stolen.

2. 1988 Chevrolet 1500 Pickup VIN: 1GCDC14H4JZ169353 The Federal Safety

Certification Sticker ("Nader Sticker") had been removed. In addition, the VIN on the chassis

had been ground off and restamped using a factory die stamp.

3. 1989 Ford F-350 Pickup VIN: 1FTHF36GXKNB23382 The VIN on the frame had been

ground off and restamped with another number. In addition, the door sticker was removed.

Finally, this vehicle had been reported stolen in Mexico.

4. 1983 Chevrolet Silverado VIN: 1GCEC14H3DS106424 The VIN on the dashboard was

counterfeit. Evidence also indicated that the Nader Sticker and the glove bo x sticker had

been removed and tampered with.

5. 1988 GMC Cheyenne Pickup VIN: 1GTDC14Z9JZ557025 The Nader sticker had been4 Ramirez failed to file a supersedeas bond, which has led to the release of the seized vehicles to

the government. Such failure to file the bond for the appeal of this civil forfeiture proceeding

does not, however, divest this court of jurisdiction to hear this appeal. See Republic Nat'l Bank v.

United States, --- U.S. ----, ----, 113 S.Ct. 554, 557-60, 121 L.Ed.2d 474, 482-84 (1992)

(holding that failure to file a supersedeas bond does not divest an appellate court of jurisdiction,

as control over the res is only required at the initiation of civil forfeiture proceedings), overruling

United States v. $79,000 in United States Currency, 801 F.2d 738, 739 (5th Cir.1986).

5 98 Stat. 2754.

6 H.R.Rep. No. 98-1087, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4628, 4629-

31.

7 Id. removed and replaced. In addition, the engine and transmission VINs (which indicated that

they came from a stolen pickup) differed from the one on the chassis.

In June 1981, the Federal Bureau of Investigation acquired the eight vehicles for forfeiture

pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 512, and published the no t ice o f seizure as required by law. Ramirez

responded by filing claims on these vehicles.

At the bench trial, the government produced Archie Bla ckwell, an investigator with the

MVTS, as a witness. Blackwell testified to the foregoing information, including the descriptions of

the alterations he discovered while inspecting the seized vehicles.

The district court concluded that the government had established probable cause to seize the

vehicles. In response, Ramirez offered only his verified complaint, which co nt ained proofs of

ownership of the seized vehicles. Ramirez presented no evidence, however, regarding any defenses.

Consequently, the district entered judgment ordering forfeiture of the seized vehicles to the

government, and Ramirez timely appealed. 4

II

ANALYSIS

The Act was passed for the express purpose of impeding motor vehicle thefts and reducing

opportunities for exporting or importing stolen m otor vehicles. 5 In particular, Congress here targeted

"chop shops" 6 —illicit operations in which vehicles are dismantled to acquire t heir component

parts—in an effort to stem the export of stolen vehicles from the United States to geographic problem

spots, such as the border area of Mexico. 78 Pub.L. No. 98-547, §§ 101 & 201, 98 Stat. 2754. Section 101 authorizes the Secretary of

Transportation to promulgate rules regarding the addition of identifying numbers to major

component parts of motor vehicles.

9 18 U.S.C. § 512. Section 512 also contains various other defenses, such as a "collision or

fire" defense for changes to identification numbers caused by such collisions or fires.

10 United States v. One 1978 Mack Glider Kit Tractor, 653 F.Supp. 964, 965 (D.Conn.1987);

United States v. White 1981 Race Corvette, 704 F.Supp. 872, 876, 879 (N.D.Ill.1989).

11 18 U.S.C. § 512(b) (emphasis added).

12 See 21 U.S.C. § 881(d). Congress hoped to accomplish these goals by authorizing the identification of principal parts

of m otor vehicles, and by imposing criminal penalties and civil forfeit ures on persons found i n

violation of the Act. 8 The principal enforcement provisions are included in § 201 of the Act: The

criminal provision was codified at 18 U.S.C. § 511, the civil forfeiture provision at 18 U.S.C. § 512.

A. Burdens of Proof in a Forfeiture Proceeding Under § 512

Section 512 provides in pertinent part that:

If an identification number for a m otor vehicle or m

otor vehicle part is removed, obliterated,

tampered with, or altered, such vehicle or part shall be subject to seizure and forfeiture to the

United States unless—

(1)

... the owner of such m otor vehicle does not know that the identification number

has been removed, obliterated, tampered with, or altered; 9

The district court adopted the approach used for o ther forfeiture statutes and by the only other

courts—both district courts 10 —to consider this issue: Once the government est ablishes probable

cause to seize a vehicle for forfeiture under § 512, the burden shifts to the claimant to prove a defense

to that forfeiture. We agree with the district court.

When we turn to the statutory text we see that § 512 further provides that "[a]ll provisions

of law relating to

... the seizure and condemnation of

... vehicles

... for violation of the customs laws,

and proc e dures for summary and judicial forfeiture applicable to such violations

... shall apply to

seizures and forfeitures under this section, to the extent that such provisions are not inconsistent with

this section." 11 Virtually identical language is contained in the civil drug forfeiture statute 1 2 and in the13 See 49 U.S.C. §§ 781-84.

14 The forfeiture statutes applicable to the transportation of contraband were passed in 1939.

See 53 Stat. 1292.

15 It is not surprising that Congress referred to customs laws to provide the procedures and

standards applicable to civil forfeitures. Customs laws providing for such forfeitures, and, in

particular customs laws providing for the procedures applicable to such forfeitures, have existed

since at least 1799. See Act. of Mar. 2, 1799, §§ 84, 88-91, 1 Stat. 694-96.

16 Tariff Act of 1930, 46 Stat. 757.

17 These provisions are codified at §§ 1581-1654 of Title 19. 19 U.S.C. §§ 1581-1654.

18 19 U.S.C. § 1615 (emphasis added).

19 496 F.2d 210 (5th Cir.1974). statutes applicable to the forfeiture of vessels and vehicles used to transport contraband. 13

The inclusion of such essentially identical language in statutes passed from the late-1930's 14

to the mid-1980's confirms that Congress indeed had something specific in mind when it referred to

"customs laws." 15 A reading of Title 19—"Customs Duties"—reveals that in 1930 Congress passed

the Tariff Act, 16 which contains detailed provisions relating to the seizure and forfeiture of property

. 17

In particular, Title 19, section 1615 (codifying section § 615 of the Tariff Act) addresses precisely

t he co re issue of the instant case. Section 1615, "Burden of Proof in Forfeiture Proceedings,"

provides in pertinent part that:

In all suits or actions

... brought for the forfeiture o f any vessel, vehicle, ... under the

pro visions of any law relating to the collection of duties on imports or tonnage, where the

pro perty is claimed by any person, t he burden of proof shall lie upon such claimant;

... Provided, That probable cause shall be first shown for the institution of such suit or action,

to be judged by the court ... 18

From the foregoing statutory analysis, we conclude that t he plain language of § 512

incorporates the burden of proof provision of § 1615 of the "customs laws"; specifically, that after

the government establishes probable cause to seize and claim forfeiture of a vehicle under § 512, the

burden shifts to the claimant to prove entitlement to a valid defense to that forfeiture.

Our co nclusion that § 512 incorporates the standards contained in § 1615 is reinforced by

jurisprudence that addresses statutes with language virtually identical to § 512. In United States v.

One 1971 Chevrolet Corvette Auto, 19 we concluded that the burdens of proof contained in § 161520 Id. at 212 (citing 19 U.S.C. § 1615).

21 689 F.2d 10, 12 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1099, 104 S.Ct. 1591, 80 L.Ed.2d 123

(1984).

22 Ramirez makes no claim that the seizure and forfeiture here fail to comport with due process.

Cf., United States v. James Daniel Good Real Property, --- U.S. ----, ---- - ----, 114 S.Ct. 492,

500-03, 126 L.Ed.2d 490 (1993) (holding that Due Process Clause applies to seizures for civil

forfeitures and indicating that the general prohibition against governmental action absent

predeprivation notice and hearing applies to such seizures).

23 18 U.S.C. § 512(a) (emphasis added).

24 18 U.S.C. § 512(a)(1). are applicable to the statutes for forfeiture of vehicles used to transport contraband. 20 And in U nited

States v. $2500 in United States Currency, 21 the Second C ircuit observed that the burden-shifting

approach applicable to the civil drug forfeiture statute is likewise derived from § 1615.

B. Probable Cause for a Forfeiture Under § 512

Ramirez does not directly attack the burden-shifting approach in § 512 and § 1615. Instead,

he mounts an indirect challenge by arguing that the government had to establish probable cause that

he know ingly removed, tampered with, or otherwise altered a vehicle identification number, or that

he knew the vehicle was stolen. 22 We find this argument to be meritless.

As noted, § 512 provides that if an identification number for a m otor vehicle or m

otor vehicle

part is removed or altered, then "such vehicle or part shall be subject to seizure and forfeiture to the

United States ...." 23 This operative provision of § 512—unlike the criminal co unt erpart of §

511—contains no reference to a "knowing" removal or alteration. Instead, section 512 contains an

"innocent owner" defense: The vehicle shall not be subject to forfeiture if the "owner of the motor

vehicle does not know that the identification number has been removed, obliterated, tampered with,

or altered." 24

The attempt by Ramirez to incorporat e a scienter requirement into the probable cause

standard of § 512 is nothing more than an effort to subvert the burden-shifting approach discussed

above: By placing the burden on the government to show a knowing violation, Ramirez would be

switching the burden of proof reg arding knowledge from the claimant—who, to establish his25 E.g., Mack Glider, 653 F.Supp. at 965 (placing burden on claimant to show that he did not

have knowledge under § 512); United States v. Lot 9, Block 2 of Donnybrook Place, 919 F.2d

994, 999 (5th Cir.1990) (claimant can avoid forfeiture under the civil drug forfeiture statute, 18

U.S.C. § 881(d)(7), if she proves that the illegal acts were committed without her knowledge or

consent).

26 E.g., United States v. One 1978 Chevrolet Impala, etc., 614 F.2d 983, 984 (5th Cir.1980)

(stating same for forfeiture under 21 U.S.C. § 881); United States v. One 1975 Ford Pickup

Truck, etc., 558 F.2d 755, 756 (5th Cir.1977) (stating same for forfeiture under 49 U.S.C. §§

781-84); One 1971 Chevrolet Corvette Auto, 496 F.2d at 212 (same); see also Lot 9, Block 2 of

Donnybrook Place, 919 F.2d at 997-98 (stating that government establishes probable cause

warranting forfeiture of a house under 21 U.S.C. § 881 when it proves "reasonable grounds for

believing that the house was used for illegal purposes."). "innocent owner" defense, must show that he did not know of any alteration or remova l —to the

government, which would then have to show subjectively that the claimant had actual knowledge of

the alteration or removal. Such a requirement would not only be difficult to meet, but would also be

inconsistent with the jurisprudence regarding civil forfeitures 25 and with the plain language of § 512

and § 1615.

C. Application

Application of the requisite burdens of proof to the instant case is straightforward. We have

consistent ly defined probable cause for civil forfeitures as "a reasonable ground for belief of guilt,

supported by less than prima facie proof but more than mere suspicion." 26 The district court found

that each of the seized vehicles bore altered identification numbers. In addition, each had alterations

that were inherently suspicious: The 1988 Chevrolet 1500 Pickup and the 1989 Ford F-350 Pickup

had VINs that had been ground off and restamped; the 1988 Chevrolet Silverado and the 1988 GMC

Cheyenne Pickup contained engines and transmissions with VINs indicating that these engines and

transmissions had been stolen; and the 1983 Chevrolet Silverado had a VIN plate on the dash that

was counterfeit. Finally, the government adduced testimony at trial that these vehicles were part of

the inventory of a "salvage and chop shop" operati on purportedly run by Ramirez. From the totality

of these facts, we conclude that the district court did not err in finding t hat the government

established probable cause warranting seizure and forfeiture under § 512.

In response to the government's pro bable cause evidence, Ramirez offered only a verified

complaint that included proofs of ownership for the seized vehicles. He made no attempt whatsoeverto prove any defense, such as an "innocent owner" defense. Thus, the district court committed no

error in concluding that the government was entitled to a judgment o rdering forfeiture, which the

court entered accordingly.

III

CONCLUSION

The purpose of the Act is to eliminate, inter alia, precisely the type operati on involved in the

instant case: The theft and export of American motor vehicles and motor vehicle parts to Mexico to

be reassembled there at "chop and salvage shops." The civil forfeiture provision of the Act is a

potentially potent weapon for use in the battle to eliminate such operations.

As we determine that the district court correctly placed the burden on Ramirez to establish

an "innocent owner" defense, we conclude that the judgment of the district court should be and is,

AFFIRMED.