In the Court of Appeals for the 

Sixth District of Texas at Texarkana 

Anthony David Teague, § 

 Appellant § 

 § 

v. § No. 06-14-00053-CR

 § 

The State of Texas, § 

 Appellee § 

 On Appeal from Cause Number 366-82919-2013 in the 219th District Court 

Judicial District Court of Collin County, Texas, the Honorable Scott J. Becker, 

Judge Presiding. 

§ § § 

State’s Brief

§ § § 

Greg Willis 

Criminal District Attorney 

Collin County, Texas 

John R. Rolater, Jr.

Assistant Criminal District Attorney 

Chief of the Appellate Division 

SBT#00791565 

 2100 Bloomdale Rd., Ste. 200 

 McKinney, Texas 75071 

(972) 548-4323 

FAX (214) 491-4860 

jrolater@co.collin.tx.us 

Holly Griffin 

Jonathan Richardson 

Assistant Criminal District Attorneys 

ACCEPTED

06-14-00053-CR

SIXTH COURT OF APPEALS

TEXARKANA, TEXAS

2/22/2015 5:21:52 PM

DEBBIE AUTREY

CLERK

 FILED IN 6th COURT OF APPEALS TEXARKANA, TEXAS 2/23/2015 10:05:00 AM DEBBIE AUTREY Clerk
i

Table of Contents

Index of Authorities................................................................................................. iii

Statement of the Case.................................................................................................1

Statement Regarding Oral Argument ........................................................................1

Statement of Facts......................................................................................................2

Summary of the State’s Arguments.........................................................................11

State’s Reply to Appellant’s First Issue...................................................................12

The trial court was not required to conduct an informal inquiry into Appellant’s 

competence to stand trial because there was not a suggestion that Appellant was 

incompetent to stand trial and no facts before the trial court required it to suggest 

Appellant’s incompetence sua sponte. .................................................................12

Standard of Review...............................................................................................12

Applicable Law.....................................................................................................12

Argument ..............................................................................................................13

State’s Reply to Appellant’s Second Issue ..............................................................16

The State’s evidence is sufficient because Appellant repeatedly engaged in 

conduct directed at RK that he knew would place her in fear of bodily injury or 

death, she did fear she would suffer bodily injury or death, and her fear was 

objectively reasonable. .........................................................................................16

Standard of Review...............................................................................................16

Applicable Law.....................................................................................................17

Appellant’s Sufficiency Argument is Contrary to the Statutory Text and 

Unsupported by Applicable Authority..................................................................17

Ample Evidence Supports Appellant’s Conviction for Stalking, Including 

Threats, Disclosures, Following the Victim, and Evidence of Her Fear.............18

Prayer .......................................................................................................................21
ii

Certificate of Service ...............................................................................................21

Certificate of Compliance ........................................................................................22
iii

Index of Authorities

Cases

Brooks v. State, 

323 S.W.3d 893 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010).............................................................16

Fluellen v. State, 

443 S.W.3d 365 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2014, no pet.) ........................ 12, 14, 15

Jackson v. Virginia, 

443 U.S. 307 (1979) .............................................................................................16

Montgomery v. State, 

810 S.W.2d 372 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991)(op. on reh’g).......................................12

Ploeger v. State, 

189 S.W.3d 799 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2006, no pet.) .... 17, 18, 19, 20

Pomier v. State, 

326 S.W.3d 3731 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2010, no pet.)...................18

Turner v. State, 

422 S.W.3d 676 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013)................................................ 14, 15, 16

Statutes

Act of May 19, 2011, 

82nd Leg. , R.S., Ch. 591, § 1, 

2011 Tex. Sess. Law. Serv. 1433 .........................................................................17

Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 46B.003(a)....................................................................13

Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 46B.004(a)....................................................................13

Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 46B.004(b)....................................................................13

Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 46B.004(c)....................................................................13

Tex. Penal Code § 22.01 ..........................................................................................18

Tex. Penal Code § 42.072................................................................................. 17, 18
1

To the Honorable Court of Appeals:

Statement of the Case

Appellant was convicted of stalking after a jury trial. He pleaded true to a 

single enhancement paragraph, and the jury found the enhancement paragraph to 

be true. The jury assessed punishment at 20 years’ confinement in the Texas 

Department of Criminal Justice and a fine of $10,000. CR 1730.

Statement Regarding Oral Argument

Appellant has not requested oral argument and the State likewise does not 

request oral argument. The State does not believe oral argument will assist the 

Court in deciding the case.
2

Statement of Facts

In late Summer of 2012, RK was about to begin a graduate program in video 

game design at the Guildhall, a program of Southern Methodist University located 

in Plano, Collin County, Texas. 3 RR 99-100, 108, 127, 238-40. The school started 

a Facebook page that allowed the students to meet one another before classes 

began. 3 RR 99. RK met her roommate, AH, this way, as well as Appellant. 3 RR 

99-100. RK met Appellant at a group dinner for students at BJ’s Brewhouse. 3 RR 

100, 241-42.

RK found Appellant to be unusual, but he was someone that she could talk 

to. 3 RR 101. They communicated frequently on Facebook. 3 RR 101. Appellant 

helped her get furniture at IKEA and move into her apartment, and he helped her 

buy items for her apartment at Home Depot. 3 RR 101-102, 242-43. They also 

spent time together at group functions with fellow students, and spent time together 

after one of these functions. 3 RR 101-102. 

The two spoke frequently on the phone and by text message. 3 RR 244-45. 

Appellant told RK he wanted a romantic relationship, but she told him frequently 

and bluntly that she did not want that type of relationship. 3 RR 102. RK had 

recently been through a bad breakup. 3 RR 102. Appellant tried giving her gifts, 

but that made RK uncomfortable and she refused the gifts except for a lighter and 
3

some cat toys. 3 RR 102-103. Appellant was “adamant” and “pushy” that she 

should accept the gifts. 3 RR 103-104.

The Guildhall program consisted of forty to forty-five students who were in 

class all day, every day. 3 RR 108. Appellant sat behind her in class, but he would 

follow her outside whenever she took a break to smoke. 3 RR 108. Appellant was 

jealous of their male classmates and made comments about them. 3 RR 107.

After classes began, the relationship between RK and Appellant briefly 

became intimate. 3 RR 104, 244, 246. Appellant pressured her to become more 

intimate with him, and she did. 3 RR 104. He badgered her “we should kiss,” “we 

should have sex,” and “this is what you want.” 3 RR 104. RK “was in a bad place 

emotionally” and immediately regretted allowing the relationship to become 

sexual. 3 RR 104, 246. RK and Appellant had sexual encounters three times in 

about a week. 3 RR 105. RK told Appellant it was a mistake and she wasn’t 

comfortable with that type of relationship, but he kept trying to convince her 

otherwise. 3 RR 104-105. Eventually, he agreed to take a step back, but they got 

drunk with a group of students after a test and had sex for the third, and last, time. 

3 RR 106. 

On August 28, 2012, after meeting with her counselor, RK felt empowered 

and told Appellant that the intimate relationship would stop. 3 RR 109. Appellant 

became angry and irrational, bouncing between despondence and saying cruel and 
4

vulgar things. 3 RR 110. Appellant sent RK 69 text messages, called her three 

times, and posted many messages on Facebook. 3 RR 110; SX7; SX 5; SX 6. On 

Facebook Appellant called RK a “selfish cunt” and told her to “fuck off... 

seriously just die.” SX 6 at 6. By text message he told her “someday you’ll regret 

your choices” and “[i]f you try to give me that lighter back you’ll regret it.” SX 5 

at 3, 13. But, more ominously, Appellant kept insisting that he need to see RK even 

though she refused to see him. He would ask if he could come over, then when told 

no, would still say he was coming over. SX 5 at 6, 8, 15. Appellant also threatened 

to tell RK’s ex-boyfriend they had slept together and to give him RK’s address. SX 

5 at 13, 17; SX6 at 33. Ultimately, Appellant called the police and sent them to 

RK’s home at 4 a.m., telling them he was afraid she would hurt herself. 3 RR 132; 

SX 5 at 18. On the phone he screamed at her, called her a slut, and said things 

about her and her family that “were very manipulative.” 3 RR 132.

Appellant’s behavior made RK fearful. 3 RR 168-70. He tried to get her to 

leave her apartment in the middle of the night. 3 RR 168; SX6 at 52. He told her on 

Facebook that he knew she responded to fear and that he used that as a tactic. 3 RR 

170; SX 6 at 56. He told her that he masturbated while talking to her on the phone. 

SX 6 at 30, 32. And he accused her of having sexual feelings for another 

classmate. SX 6 at 32. When RK told him she didn’t deserve to be spoken to like 

that, Appellant told her “you deserve much worse... now fuck off before you get 
5

it.” SX 6 at 32. Appellant vaguely threated to post photos of RK on Facebook, 

although she did not believe him to possess any compromising photos of her. 3 RR 

170, 266-67.

Several days later, RK agreed to meet Appellant at a Starbucks because he 

promised to leave her alone if she did. 3 RR 171-72. Appellant tried to “twist 

things” during the meeting and attack her psychologically. 3 RR 173. He also tried 

to kiss her and touch her even though she told him not to. 3 RR 174. After she left 

the meeting at Starbucks, she went home, then to visit a classmate, CF. 3 RR 184. 

While she was at CF’s apartment, Appellant sent her a video of a love song. 3 RR 

185-87. RK believed this meant Appellant knew where she was at the time because 

he was jealous of CF, knew where CF lived, and her car was parked in front of 

CF’s apartment. 3 RR 185-87.

On September 8, 2012, RK was forced to call the police when Appellant was 

messaging “adamantly” that he was coming over to her apartment. 3 RR 187-88. 

She called them again the next day when Appellant, who seemed irrational, 

insisted that he was coming to her apartment even though she told him there was 

nothing he could not say over the phone. 3 RR 188-89. By September 12, RK and 

her roommate began staying at other places to avoid Appellant. 3 RR 190-91. SMU 

issued a “no contact” letter to Appellant and published it to the other students, and 
6

he received a criminal trespass warning for SMU’s campuses including the 

Guildhall. 3 RR 188-89; 4 RR 29, 63.

But even after Appellant was kicked out of the Guildhall and ordered not to 

contact RK he continued to do so. 3 RR 188-89. RK had friends stay at her 

apartment when her roommate was away. 3 RR 192. Appellant also contacted 

other persons about RK. 3 RR 192. On October 22, 2012, Appellant came into a 

different Starbucks where RK was studying even though it was away from the area 

where he lived. 3 RR 194-95. Six days later, Appellant left a pack of cigarettes on 

her car while she was watching movies with a group at CF’s apartment. 3 RR 198. 

RK was terrified because Appellant was following her again. 3 RR 199-200. Her 

friends followed her home that night, and she called police again when she 

received a call from a blocked number at 4:00 a.m. the next morning. 3 RR 199-

200. Appellant called again while the police were there and she could hear his 

voice on the phone speaking to the police. 3 RR 199-200.

Others witnessed Appellant’s stalking behavior toward RK. One of the 

Guildhall students, SK, noticed that Appellant was jealous of other people and was 

ready to propose to RK within a month even though they did not sit together in 

class and Appellant complained that RK did not know what she wanted. 4 RR 27. 

SK advised Appellant that RK was young and had just ended a long term 

relationship. 4 RR 27-28. SK also thought Appellant should not date someone “his 
7

daughter’s age” in a closed program of forty people. 4 RR 27-28. Appellant was 

spiteful and asked SK what other girl in the program he could use to make RK 

jealous. 4 RR 28. Although SK thought RK did not reciprocate Appellant’s 

feelings, Appellant said that she did and that the two had “hooked up.” 4 RR 28-

29. 

Appellant came to SK’s apartment unannounced the same day that the 

Guildhall informed the other students of the no contact order. 4 RR 29-30. He told 

SK and another student that they “were going to hear some things about [RK],” 

that she was “very confused,” and that they should “not be mad at her.” 4 RR 30-

31. Appellant was nervous and agitated during the conversation, but it was not 

unusual behavior for him. 4 RR 32. SK had to ask him several times before he 

would leave the apartment. 4 RR 32-33.

CF had talked with Appellant after classes had started, and both had 

discovered they liked RK. 4 RR 36-37. Appellant told CF “she’s all yours” and 

that he had a relationship with a girl in Dallas he was going to pursue, but he also 

seemed visibly upset at the time. 4 RR 37. Appellant later told CF, in a casual 

statement in front of other students, that he and RK had had sex and that “it wasn’t 

that great.” 4 RR 37-38. Appellant contacted CF even after the Guildhall issued the 

no contact order. 4 RR 37-38. Appellant told CF that “he had to warn him about 

[RK],” that “[RK] intentionally draws people in to get the close and then pushes 
8

them away.” 4 RR 38. Appellant told CF that “[RK] wants to be punished” and that 

“he wants to fix her... that something was wrong with her.” 4 RR 38. Appellant 

came to CF’s apartment and talked about RK for three to four hours, but the things 

he said did not make a lot of sense. 4 RR 38-39. After Appellant left, RK came to 

CF’s apartment and was “barely holding herself together.” 4 RR 39-40. She told 

him Appellant had been stalking her and following her everywhere she went. 4 RR 

40-41.

RK’s roommate, AH, also a Guildhall student, did not learn of the failed 

relationship until several days after RK broke up with Appellant. 4 RR 47. RK 

woke her about 1 a.m. crying, and AH thought something had happened to RK’s 

mother. 4 RR 47. RK told her about Appellant’s actions, and AH listened as RK 

yelled at Appellant and told him he was “scaring her” and to “leave her alone. 4 

RR 48-49. A few days later, Appellant insisted he was coming over, and RK and 

AH turned out the lights and hid in their apartment while he knocked on the door. 4 

RR 50. AH called the police herself on another occasion when Appellant insisted 

he was coming over and RK was home alone. 4 RR 51. AH saw Appellant in their 

apartment parking lot at least twice during this time. 4 RR 53. AH cancelled 

appointments so that RK would not be alone, drove RK to school, and would buy 

cigarettes for RK so that she did not have to go to the gas station alone. 4 RR 56-

57.
9

HT, another Guildhall student who lived in the same apartment complex, 

also saw Appellant in the apartments and thought it was strange. 4 RR 59. HT also 

saw Appellant several days later at another student’s birthday party to which RK 

was invited but Appellant was not. 4 RR 60-61.

Plano Police Officer Ray Arnold was dispatched to RK’s apartment on 

September 9, 2012, regarding Appellant’s behavior. 4 RR 73-75. She was upset 

and scared and asked Arnold to contact Appellant and tell him leave her alone. 4 

RR 75. Arnold called Appellant and told him RK did not want him to contact her 

any more, including on social media. 4 RR 75-77. Appellant told Arnold he had 

seen the officer drive into RK’s apartment complex, and left because he was 

scared. 4 RR 76. Appellant told Arnold he understood the request and acted as if he 

would comply. 4 RR 77. Appellant was calm on the phone. 4 RR 77.

Plano Police Officer Robert Mills was dispatched to RK’s apartment on 

October 28, 2012, along with Officer Brian Franz. 4 RR 82-84, 154. Mills 

patrolled the complex looking for suspicious activity while Franz contacted RK. 4 

RR 84-85, 154-55. Appellant called RK while Franz was talking to her, and he 

answered the call “Hello Mr. Teague.” 4 RR 156-57. Frantz told Appellant any 

further communications would be considered harassment. 4 RR 156. Appellant 

asked “who is this really?”, and Franz identified himself by name and badge 

number. 4 RR 156. Appellant asked if Franz “was having sex with his girlfriend?” 
10

4 RR 156-57. Franz said he was a Plano Police Officer and invited Appellant back 

to the apartment to speak with him. 4 RR 157. Mills also spoke to Appellant when 

he called back after Franz hung up on him. 4 RR 86-87.

Appellant also contacted RK’s mother, who lived in Dallas. 4 RR 94-96. 

Appellant first contacted her by LinkedIn, but she later received phone messages 

and text messages from him. 4 RR 96-100; SX 15. She reported the inappropriate 

messages to the Dallas Police Department, who instructed Appellant to “cease and 

desist.” 4 RR 101-103.

Appellant met with Plano Detective Phelan while the matter was under 

investigation. 4 RR 108-109. Phelan told Appellant on September 13, 2012, that 

RK wanted no more contact from him and that she was afraid of him. 4 RR 110. 

Appellant told Phelan that he was angry and unhappy with how RK had handled 

the matter. 4 RR 110. Appellant told Phelan he understood and promised to stop 

contacting RK. 4 RR 110-11. Phelan also spoke with Appellant on September 18, 

2012, again telling Appellant that RK wanted no more communications from him 

and that she considered the relationship to be over. 4 RR 11. On October 29, 2102, 

Phelan again met with Appellant about another incident between him and RK. 4 

RR 111-12. Appellant admitted to Phelan that he had continued to contact RK. 4 

RR 112-13. In Phelan’s opinion, Appellant’s behavior was escalating. 4 RR 8.
11

Summary of the State’s Arguments

The trial court was not required to conduct an informal inquiry into 

Appellant’s competence to stand trial because there was not a suggestion that 

Appellant was incompetent to stand trial and no facts before the trial court required 

it to suggest Appellant’s incompetence sua sponte.

The evidence is legally sufficient to prove that Appellant committed the 

offense of stalking because it shows that he repeatedly engaged in conduct that he 

knew would place her in fear of bodily injury or death, she did fear she would 

suffer bodily injury or death, and her fear was objectively reasonable.
12

State’s Reply to Appellant’s First Issue

In his first issue, Appellant claims the trial court erred in failing to conduct 

an informal inquiry into whether there was evidence he was incompetent to stand 

trial. The trial court was not required to conduct an informal inquiry into 

Appellant’s competence to stand trial because there was not a suggestion that 

Appellant was incompetent to stand trial and no facts before the trial court required 

it to suggest Appellant’s incompetence sua sponte.

Standard of Review

This Court reviews a trial court’s failure to conduct an informal competency 

review for abuse of discretion. Fluellen v. State, 443 S.W.3d 365, 369 (Tex. 

App.—Texarkana 2014, no pet.). To show a clear abuse of discretion requires 

more than a showing that this Court disagrees with the trial court’s determination 

of the issue. Rather, a clear abuse of discretion is shown only where the trial 

court’s determination falls outside “the zone of reasonable disagreement” with 

regard to the determination. Montgomery v. State, 810 S.W.2d 372, 386, 391 (Tex. 

Crim. App. 1991) (op. on reh’g).

Applicable Law

To be competent to stand trial, a person must possess both a sufficient 

present ability to consult with the person’s lawyer with a reasonable degree of 

rational understanding and a rational as well as factual understanding of the 
13

proceedings against the person. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 46B.003(a)(1)-(2). 

Either party or the trial court may suggest a defendant is incompetent to stand trial. 

See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 46B.004(a). If evidence suggesting the defendant 

may be incompetent comes to the attention of the trial court, it must suggest the 

defendant is incompetent. Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 46B.004(b). On a suggestion 

of incompetence, the trial court must conduct an informal inquiry to determine 

whether there is some evidence from any source that would support a finding that 

the defendant may be incompetent to stand trial. Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 

46B.004(c).

Argument

Appellant argues the trial court erred in failing to conduct an informal 

competency review. Appellant’s brief at 9-10, 11-13. But Appellant’s argument 

focuses on historical facts related to his offense and incarceration rather than facts 

related to his mental status at or near the time of trial. Appellant references letters 

sent to the trial court in July and August of 2013. CR 121, 124, 127, 133. The trial 

testimony referenced by Appellant relates to events that transpired in the early fall 

of 2012. Appellant’s brief at 12-13. But Appellant’s trial took place in February of 

2014. CR 1730. Appellant’s two trial lawyers never suggested to the trial court that 

Appellant was unable to consult with them or did not understand what was 

occurring in court. Appellant only testified during the punishment phase, and then 
14

only for the purpose of indicating to the trial court that he understood his Fifth 

Amendment rights, he did not testify at guilt because of his prior convictions, and 

he did not choose to testify in the punishment phase. 7 RR 202-205. Appellant 

points to nothing in this colloquy indicating Appellant could not consult with 

counsel or did not understand the proceedings in court. 

Here, while the record contains some evidence that Appellant could not 

conform his conduct to what society expected of him, there is no evidence that 

Appellant could not consult with counsel and did not understand the nature of the 

proceedings. The facts of this case are similar to those reviewed by the Court in 

Fluellen. 443 S.W.3d at 367-70. In that case, Fluellen, while rejecting plea offers 

pretrial, essentially accepted the same offers by an open plea of guilty later in the 

trial. Id. at 369. Furthermore, there was some evidence of discord between Fluellen 

and his attorney. Id. Nevertheless, this Court noted that the record contained 

nothing indicating that Fluellen was not “fully engaged in the legal process” and 

competent to stand trial. Id. at 369-70. Thus, the trial court was not required to 

engage in an informal competency determination. Id.

The facts of the instant case are unlike those in Turner v. State, 422 S.W.3d 

676 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013), where a sharply divided Court of Criminal Appeals 

found that the trial court should have conducted formal competency review even 

though prior examinations by mental health professionals had found Turner 
15

competent to stand trial. In Turner, trial defense counsel several times requested 

that the trial court revisit the issue of Turner’s competence because he refused to 

communicate with them, accused them of being in league with the prosecutors, 

maintained a strange story about the local mayor threatening him, and tried to fire 

his lawyers before final arguments. Id. at 679-87. The trial court even had Turner 

examined another time for competency, but Turner refused to cooperate. Id. at 683. 

The Court noted that the fact a defendant is mentally ill does not mean he is 

incompetent, nor does a refusal to cooperate with counsel. Id. at 691. But, when a 

defendant’s mental illness operated to prevent him from rationally understanding 

the proceedings against him or engaging rationally with counsel in pursuit of his 

best interests, then he is incompetent. Id. Evidence that raises this possibility is 

what triggers an informal inquiry. Id. Ultimately, the Court in Turner remanded the 

case to the trial court for determination whether a retrospective competency 

determination could be made. Id. at 696-97.

This case is like Fluellen. The trial court received no information from trial 

counsel, Appellant, or other witnesses indicating that Appellant suffered from 

mental illness that prevented him from rationally understanding the proceedings 

against him or rationally assisting his counsel. Rather, the record contains only 

evidence showing that prior examinations had shown that Appellant was not 

incompetent. CR 1693-97. Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion 
16

by failing to sua sponte suggest Appellant was incompetent and conduct an 

informal review under Article 46B.004(b).1 Appellant’s first issue should be 

overruled.

State’s Reply to Appellant’s Second Issue

In his second issue, Appellant claims the evidence is insufficient to sustain 

the jury’s verdict. The State’s evidence is sufficient because Appellant repeatedly 

engaged in conduct directed at RK that he knew would place her in fear of bodily 

injury or death, she did fear she would suffer bodily injury or death, and her fear 

was objectively reasonable.

Standard of Review

In determining whether the evidence is sufficient, a reviewing court views 

all the evidence in the light most favorable to the State and determines whether any 

rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the offense beyond 

a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 318 (1979); Brooks v. State, 

323 S.W.3d 893, 895 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010). This standard ensures that it remains 

the jury’s responsibility to fairly resolve conflicts in the testimony, weigh the 

evidence, and to draw reasonable inferences from basic to ultimate facts. Jackson, 

443 U.S. at 319.

 

1

In the event the Court determines the trial court abused its discretion, the proper remedy is 

remand to the trial court to determine under Article 46B.0004(c) if there is some evidence of 

incompetency. If there is such, then the trial court should conduct a formal competency hearing 

pursuant to Article 46B. See Turner, 422 S.W.3d at 696-97 & n.42.
17

Applicable Law

A person commits the offense of stalking, as charged in this case, if a 

person, on more than one occasion and pursuant to the same scheme or course of 

conduct that is directed specifically at another person, knowingly engages in 

conduct that the person knows or reasonably believes the other person will regard 

as threatening bodily injury or death for the other person, causes the other person 

to be placed in fear of bodily injury or death, and would cause a reasonable person 

to fear bodily injury or death for himself. Act of May 19, 2011, 82nd Leg., R.S., 

Ch. 591, § 1, 2011 Tex. Sess. Law. Serv. 1433, current version codified at Tex. 

Penal Code § 42.072; Ploeger v. State, 189 S.W.3d 799, 807-808 (Tex. App.—

Houston [1st Dist.] 2006, no pet.); CR. 20-22.

Appellant’s Sufficiency Argument is Contrary to the Statutory Text and 

Unsupported by Applicable Authority

Here, Appellant concedes that Appellant’s conduct was directed specifically 

at RK pursuant to the same scheme or course of conduct. Appellant’s brief at 17. 

Appellant claims that the evidence is otherwise insufficient because there was “no 

history of violence, no protective orders,2no assaults, no weapons, nor [was] there 

a threat of bodily injury.” Appellant’s brief at 17. But Appellant’s claim that 

violence, weapons and specific threats of harm are required is not consistent with 

the terms of Section 42.072 or cases applying the statute. Rather, the portion of the 

 

2 A protective order was issued in the case after Appellant was arrested. SX 8; 3 RR 203-204.
18

stalking statute applicable to Appellant penalizes those who “engage in conduct” 

that the actor “knows or reasonably believes” another person will find threatens 

bodily injury or death. In other offenses, the Legislature explicitly requires threats 

of bodily injury or injury in fact, while in the stalking statute they included no such 

requirement. Compare, e.g., Tex. Penal Code § 22.01(a)(1)-(2) (offense of assault 

includes causing bodily injury or threatening imminent bodily injury) with Tex. 

Penal Code § 42.072(a)(1)-(3). Moreover, Appellant cites no authority supporting 

his claim that the absence of such evidence renders the evidence insufficient to 

sustain a conviction. Appellant’s brief at 16-17. Appellant’s sole authority, Pomier 

v. State, 326 S.W.3d 373, 379-81 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2010, no pet.), 

finds a different set of facts to be sufficient to sustain a conviction, but it does not 

stand for the proposition that violence or a weapon is required to sustain a 

conviction for stalking.

Ample Evidence Supports Appellant’s Conviction for Stalking, Including Threats, 

Disclosures, Following the Victim, and Evidence of Her Fear

In Ploeger, the court of appeals found the evidence sufficient to sustain a 

conviction for stalking on evidence similar to that in the instant case. Ploeger 

became fixated on a younger member of his church. He repeatedly sent her 

flowers, gifts, and notes even after he was asked to leave her alone and leave the 

church. Ploeger would stare at the victim and follow her. Ploeger’s behavior made 

the victim nervous, “extremely jumpy,” and fearful enough that she stopped 
19

attending church. Ploeger’s behavior continued even after he was told that it was 

scaring his victim and he should leave her alone. The victim testified that she 

feared Ploeger would hurt or kill her, but there was not testimony the he ever 

directly threatened her. The court of appeals held this evidence legally sufficient to 

sustain Ploeger’s conviction for stalking. 189 S.W.3d at 808-811.

In comparison to Ploeger, the instant case contains evidence of more serious 

threats and conduct. Appellant exposed the intimate nature of his relationship with 

RK to other students and to her ex-boyfriend. 4 RR 37-38; SX 5 at 13, 17. He 

specifically threatened her if she discarded a gift and if she chose to break things 

off with him. SX5 at 3, 13. He repeatedly tried to meet with her despite her 

insistence she did not want to meet with him. SX 5 at 6, 8, 15; SX 6 at 52-53; 3 RR 

168. Indeed, he admitted lying to her about his car breaking down in an attempt to 

lure her to meet him, an episode she described as “wake up dead in a ditch” 

material. SX 6 at 52-53; 3 RR 185. When she did meet with him, he attempted to 

touch her multiple times against her wishes and without her consent. 3 RR 171-74. 

And, he lurked near her apartment multiple times, followed her to CF’s apartment 

on multiple occasions, and lurked near gathering of students she attended. 3 RR 

186-87, 198-99; 4 RR 49, 53, 59-60. And, against her wishes, he contacted her 

again and again by multiple means to make threatening, crass, and scary 

comments. SX 5; SX 6; 3 RR 199-200. Appellant recognized that RK responded to 
20

fear and attempted to use that to manipulate her. 3 RR 170; SX 6 at 56. And the 

record demonstrates she was fearful: she left her apartment, made arrangements 

never to be alone, and had her roommate drive her around and run public errands 

for her. 3 RR 190-92; 4 RR 56-57. Moreover, nothing in the record shows that 

RK’s reaction to Appellant’s behavior was objectively unreasonable. Rather, any 

young, single woman would be fearful of an older, larger man with an explosive 

personality who would not let go or go away. Appellant continued to act this way 

even though he knew his attentions were unwanted and they were causing RK fear. 

The evidence in the instant case amply supports the jury’s verdict. See Ploeger, 

189 S.W.3d at 808-11. Appellant’s second issue should be overruled.
21

Prayer

The State prays that Appellant’s conviction and sentence be affirmed. 

Respectfully submitted,

Greg Willis

Criminal District Attorney

Collin County, Texas

/s/ John R. Rolater, Jr.

John R. Rolater, Jr

Assistant Criminal District Attorney

Chief of the Appellate Division

SBT#00791565

2100 Bloomdale Rd., Ste. 200

McKinney, TX 75071

(972) 548-4323

(214) 491-4860 fax

jrolater@co.collin.tx.us

Certificate of Service

A copy of the State’s brief has been sent by electronic service to counsel for 

Appellant, Shawn S. Ismail, at shawnismail@gmail.com, on this, the 22nd day of

February, 2015.

/s/ John R. Rolater, Jr.

John R. Rolater, Jr.
22

Certificate of Compliance

This brief complies with the word limitations in Texas Rule of Appellate 

Procedure 9.4(i)(2). In reliance on the word count of the computer program used to 

prepare this brief, the undersigned attorney certifies that this brief contains 4,671

words, exclusive of the sections of the brief exempted by Rule 9.4(i)(1).

/s/ John R. Rolater, Jr.

John R. Rolater, Jr.