## In the Court of Appeals Second Appellate Di strict of Tex as at Fo rt Worth

___________________________ No. 02

- 21

- 00353

- CV

___________________________

On Appeal from the 325th District Court Tarrant County, Texas Trial Court No. 325

- 640054

- 18
Before Sudderth, C.J. ; Womack and Wallach, JJ. Memorandu m Opinion by Chief Ju stice Sudderth 

### M IGUEL 

### M ARTINEZ 

### , Appellant

V


### . L ILIA 

### M ARTINEZ 

### , Appellee2 MEMORANDUM OPINION Appel lant Mig uel Martinez (Husband) appeals from a divorce decree dissolving his marriage to appellee Lilia Martinez ( Wife). In two issues , Husband argues that the
trial court abused its discretio n b y awarding Wi fe sp o usal maintenance and by dividing
the marital e stat e in an inequitable m anner. We will affirm.
I. B ackground
Husban d an d W ife were married in 19 87 and separate d in August 2017

. I n May 201 8, Husband sued for divorce and Wi fe co un tersu ed. As H us ba nd and Wife
have no m inor children , the divorce proceedings focused on the division o f property
and Wife ’s reques t for spousal m aintenance

. Husband is a warehouse worker , and Wife is a retai l sal esperson. A t the time
of di vorce, Husb and ear ned $ 20 per hour, and Wife earned $15 per hour

. Each
sp ouse li ved in a separate home , and neither had a mortgage. Other significant asse ts included real property in Mexico, Husband ’ s and Wife ’ s retirement accounts , several
bank accounts , moto r vehicles , and other miscellan eo us per sonal property
. At tr ial, the most significant property div ision dispute con cerned the re al property in Mex ico. Wife asserted that she had purchased the property from her grandfather before she married Husband and pre sented evid ence, including her au nt ’ s testi mony, to support t his claim. 1 However, Husband claimed that the pro pe rty had

1 In addition to testimony from Wife and her au n t , Wife pres en ted a sur ve y that
was dated prior to the parties ’ marria ge and indicated that it had been done for Wi fe,3 been purch ased after marriage an d was therefor e part of the community estate

. The parties also disagreed regarding the property ’ s value: Wife est imated th e value to be approximately $13,0 00, wh ile Husband contended that it was w orth $120,000. 2
In support of her requ est for sp ousal mai ntenance, Wife presented evidence

con c erning her income an d expenses a s well as her ph ysical di sability. Wife tes tified
that as of the ti me of trial , she co uld not pay all of her bills without sp ousal support 3
and that her expenses would incr ease after the divorce was finalized bec ause Husband

was curre ntly paying for her h omeowner ’ s , car , and health insurance

. In a ddition, Wife and her physician ’ s assistant Melissa Encinas testified t hat Wife suffers from fibromyal gia and multiple sc lero sis , that thes e conditions could affect W ife ’ s ability t o work, and th at th e symptoms caused by these conditions would li kely worse n over time.

who was identified by her m aid en name , and a property tax statement reflecting that the proper ty had be en acquired several m onths befor e the marriage.

2 The trial court ’ s findings of fact and conclusions o f law reflect that “ there was no ap praisal

. ” How eve r, t he trial court admi tted into evidence Wife ’ s appraisal from the Mexican governme n t reflec t ing th e va lue to be 260 , 5 72 Mexican p esos, which equ ates to approxima tely $13,400

.
3 Husband had been ordered to pay temporary sp ous al su pport of $450 per mont h during the pendency o f the divorce pro ceedings.4 After a three

- day trial, 4 the trial court entered a final di vorce decree in August
2021

. The dec ree , among ot he r things, awarded Wi fe 100 per cent of the Mex ico
property and required Husband to pay Wife s p ousal maintenance of $450 per month
for 60 mont hs. 5
Husban d timely requested findings of fact and conclusio ns of l aw and file d a
moti on for new trial. In October 2021, the trial court issued its findings of f act and
conclusions of l aw and heard Husband ’ s motion for new trial , which the cou rt denied

o n Novem ber 1, 2021

. This appeal ensued

. II. Discussio n A. Sp ousa l Maintenance In his first issue, Husband argues that the trial cour t abused its discretion by awarding Wife sp ousal maintenance. Specifically, Husband argues t hat the evidence is
insufficient to show (1) that Wife h as a disability t hat prevent s her from pr oviding f or her minim um reas onable needs and (2) that Wife lacks sufficient property upon di vorce to provide for her minimum reasonabl e needs

.

4 Th e trial was condu cted on October 1, 2 02 0 , No vember 5, 2020, and January 2 8 , 202 1.

5 T he decre e prov ides that the p a y ments will continue “ until the earliest of one of the following events occurs ” : (1) April 1, 202 6 ; (2) Hu sband ’ s or Wife ’ s death ; (3) Wife ’ s rem arriage ; or ( 4) “ further orde rs o f the [ c] ourt affecting the spousa l maintenance obligation, including a finding of cohabitation by Wife

. ” See generally Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 8.056

.5 A spouse in a divorce proceed ing is eligible to see k spou sal maintenance if that
spou se lacks sufficient property to meet minimum reasonable needs and c annot support herself due to an incapacitating physical or mental disability. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 8.051(2)(A); In re Green , 22 1 S.W.3d 645, 647 (Tex . 2007) (per curiam) (orig. proceeding) ; In re Marriage of Elabd , 5 89 S.W.3d 280, 283 (Tex. App.

— Waco 2019, no pet.). The term “minimu m reasonable needs” is not defined in the Family Code, nor are there cases defining the term. Slic ker v. Slicker , 464 S. W.3d 850, 860 (Tex. App.

— Dallas 2015, n o pet.). Rather, the minimu m reasonable needs for a particular individual is a fact

- specific dete rmination that should be made by the trial

court on a case

- by

- case basis. Id. Section 8.054(a)(1 ) of the Texas Family Code generally limits a trial court ’ s

a

ward of spousal maintenance based on the length of the marriage. See Tex. Fam. Code. Ann. § 8.054(a )(1); Green , 221 S.W.3d at 647; Elabd , 589 S.W.3d at 283. But
under S ection 8.054(b), if the s pouse seeking maintena nce is unable to support herself throug h appropriate employment bec ause of an incapacitating physical or mental disability, the trial court may order spousal maintenance for an indefinite period of time as long as the disability conti nues. Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 8.054(b); Green , 221
S.W.3d at 6 47; Elabd , 589 S.W.3d at 283

. Additionally, Section 8.056 provides that the obligation to pay future m aintenance terminates on the death of either party ; the remarriage of the oblige e ; or if, af ter a hearing, the tri al court determines that the obligee “c ohabits with another person with whom the obligee has a dating or6 romantic relationship in a permanent place of abode on a continuing basis.” Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 8.056; Green , 221 S.W.3d at 64 7; Elabd , 589 S.W.3d a t 283.
We review a trial court ’ s award of spousal maintenance for a n abuse of
discretion. Smith v. Smith , No. 02

- 20

- 00370

- CV, 2022 WL 1682427, at * 2 (Tex. App.

— Fort Worth May 26, 2022, no pet.) (mem. op.) ; Elabd , 589 S.W.3d at 2 83

– 8 4

. A trial court abuses i ts discretion if it acts without refere nce to any guiding rules or principles

— in other w ords, if it acts arbitrarily or unreasonably. Boyd v. Boyd , 131 S.W.3d 605, 610 (Tex. App.

— Fort Worth 2004, no pet.). Under the abuse of
disc ret i on standard, legal an d factual sufficiency of the evidence a re not independent grounds f or asserting error, but they are relevant factors in assessing whether the trial
court abused its discretion. Elabd , 589 S.W.3d at 283 ; Dunn v. Dunn , 177 S.W.3d 39 3, 396 (Tex. App.

— Houston [1st Dist.] 2005, pet. denied). A tri al court does not abuse
its discretion if there is some evidence of a substantive and probative character t o support its decision or if reasonable minds could differ as to the result. Smith v . S mith , 115 S.W.3d 303, 30 5 (Tex. App.

— Corpus Christi

– Edinburg 2003, no pet.) (first citing Lopez v. Lopez , 55 S.W.3d 194, 198 (Tex. App.

— Corpus Christi

– Edin burg 2001, no pet.); and then citing In re Bertram , 981 S.W.2d 820, 826

– 27 (Tex. App.

— Texarkana
19 98, no pet.) )

. 1. Evidence o f Disability In support of its award of spousal mainten ance, t he tr ial court made the following findings :7 [Wife] is unable to earn sufficient income to provide for her minimum
r easonable nee ds because of an ongoing incapacitati ng phy sical disability or me ntal disability. [Wife] ’ s ability to provide for her m i nimum reas onable needs is substantially diminished because of a physical disability, nam ely mu ltiple
sc ler osis, f i bromyalgia leaving her in chronic pain, fatigued, with vis ua l d istu rbance and

. . . d epression. [Wife] ’ s disability would get progressively worse and a ffect her ability to work. T hough he does not explicitly reference t he above findings in his brief , Hus band argues that the re is insufficient evidence to support th e award of sp ou sal ma intenance
because Wife failed to show that she suffered from an incapaci tating disability that prevented her from continui ng to work as she always has. We disa gree. T her e is n o authority directly addressing the quantum of evidence th at is required to prove disability in an action for sp ousal maintenance. Kelly v. Kelly , 634 S.W.3d 335, 3 67 (Tex. App.

— Houston [ 1st Dist.] 2021, no pet.) ( fir st citing Roberts v.
Roberts , 531 S.W.3d 224, 2 28

– 29 (Tex. App.

— San Antonio 2017, pet. denied) ; th e n ci ting Smith , 115 S.W.3d at 30 9 ; and then citing Pickens v. Pickens , 62 S.W.3d 212, 21 5 (Tex. App.

— Dallas 2001, pet. denied) )

. “ As the factfinder, the tri al court may

reasona bly infer an individual ’ s incapacity from circumstantial evidence or the

com pe t ent testimony of a lay witness. ” Id. ( fi rst citing Roberts , 531 S.W.3d at 228; then citing Smith , 115 S.W.3d at 309; and then citing Pickens , 62 S.W.3d at 2 15 )

. However,
the evi dence must b e p robative to establish (1) that a disability exists and (2) th a t this disability prevents the party seeking support payments from providing for his or her
minimum r easonable needs

. Ro berts , 531 S.W.3d at 2 30 ( first citi ng Pickens , 62 S.W.3d8 at 216 ; then citing Galindo v. Galindo , 04

- 13

- 00325

- CV, 2014 WL 1390474, a t * 2 (Tex. App.

— San Antonio Apr. 9, 2014, no pet.) (mem. op.) ; and t hen citing Smith , 115
S.W.3d at 309 )

. “ The party seeking main tenance must present probative evidence

‘ th at rises above a mere assertion that unsubstantiated symptoms collectively amount

t o a n incapacitating disability. ’ ” Kelly , 634 S.W.3d at 3 67 ( quoting Roberts , 531 S.W.3d
at 230 )

. T he trial cour t he ard testimony from Wife, Wif e ’ s physician ’ s assistant Encinas,
and Husband that supported the court ’ s finding s concerning Wife ’ s di sability

. Wife
and E ncinas both testified that Wife suffer s from fibromyalgia and multiple sclerosis
and detailed Wife ’ s sympto ms , which include chronic headaches and ot her pain,
fat igue, difficulty concentrating, di zziness, depression, and visual disturbances

. At trial, Husband a ck nowledged that Wi fe had suffered from these sympt oms p rior to
the ir s eparat ion.
Fur ther , there is evidence in the record to support the trial court ’ s finding that
W ife ’ s medical condition s affec t her ability to work

— and th us to prov id e for her
needs

. Wife testified that her medica l condit ions make it difficult to per form her job
and that wh ile she always tries to finish her sh ifts, sh e sometimes needs to leav e early

. Because Wife is pa id hourly , her income is negatively impacted i f sh e is unable to
finish out a shift

. Moreover, Encinas e xplained that beca use multiple sclerosi s is often progressive , it is lik ely that Wife ’ s symptoms will get worse over time and will
in creasin gly impact her ability to work.9 We conclude that Wife pre sen ted sub stanti ve and probat ive e vi dence to support the t r ial court ’ s find ings that Wife has a disability that prevents her from

e arning sufficient income to provide for her minimum reasonable needs. 6 See Smith , 115 S.W.3d at 30 5

. Wife ’ s evidence is pro bat ive and suf ficient to establish that she has a disability , that this di sability affects her ability to wor k, and that it will likely impact her work even more in the futur e . See id. at 309 ; Pickens , 62 S.W.3d at 216. Accordingly , w e hold that the tria l c ourt did not abuse its discretion by concluding
that Wife “is unable t o earn sufficient income to provide for [her] reason able needs because of an incapacitating p hysical disability.” See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 8.051(2)(A).

6 Hu sband cit es Chafino v. Cha fino , 228 S.W.3d 467 (Tex. App.

— El Paso 2007, no pet.) , a nd Roberts , 531 S.W. 3d at 2 30 , to support hi s contention that th e trial court erred in determining that Wife has a disability that prevents her from pr oviding for her minimum rea so nable needs

. However, both of these cases are distinguishable

. In Cha fino , the sp ouse sou ght s upport unde r then

- Family Co de Section 8.051(2)(C) and therefore

— unlike Wife who sough t support under Section 8.051 (2)(A)

— had to overcome a statutory pres umption t hat maintenance was not warrante d. 228 S.W.3d at 475 (citing Tex. Fa m . Co de Ann. § 8.053 (a)). Furth er , because the spouse in Chafino did not seek support under Sect ion 8.051( 2)(A), her evidence of disab ilit y w as relevant only to show th at “ she ‘ clearly ’ lacks earning ability in the labor market

. . . to provide support for [he r] reasonable needs

. ” Id. Th u s, the court in Chafino was not ta sked with determining whether the sp ouse see king support had a “ disability ” as th at term is
us ed in Sec t ion 8.051 (2)(A)

. M oreover, unlike the spouse in Rob erts , Wife did not merely testify “ to a variety of ambi guo us and vagu e symptoms and ailments ” but rath er pr ovided evidence of “ a diagnosis, symptoms, [and] treatment of

. 

### . . recognized condition [s ] ”

— multip le sclero sis and fibromyalgia

— which is the very type of evidence that the Rober ts cou rt re cognized had be en held su ffic ient to s upport a finding of disability

. 531 S.W.3d at 230

.10 2. Minimum Reasonable Needs
Hus ban d also chal lenges the trial court ’ s findings that W ife “ lack s suff icient income to provide for her mi nimal needs ” and “ will lack sufficient property on
dissolution o f the mar riage to provide for her minimum rea s onable needs. ” According to Husband, t he evi dence is ins ufficient to show the am o unt of Wife ’ s minimum rea sonable needs , much l ess t hat Wi f e coul d not meet these needs with her
incom e and the property awa rded to her in the divo rce decree. Again, w e disag ree. Wife t estif ied regarding her inco me and expenses
. S he ex p ressed that she was
unable to pay all of her bills without Hu sband ’s monthly $ 450 sp ousal su pport payments
. 7 Her rel iance on the support payment s was corroborated by h er income
and expense statement , which reflect ed mon thly income o f $2 ,107.73 and mont h ly
expen ses of $2,831.18. 8 Further, Wife tes tified that her mont hly expenses would

7 As previously noted, Husband had been ordered to pay temp orary sp o us al
su pport of $450 per mont h during the pendency o f the divorce proceedings.

8 Husb an d challe nges the accurac y of Wi fe ’s in come and expense statem ent and
a sserts that it includes “double

- di pped ” expenses for doctor ’ s vi sits , pre scription medication, and vi tam ins. However, th is issue was raised at trial , and the trial court

— in view o f it s findings of fac t

— f ound W i f

e ’ s inc ome and expense statement to be credib le

. Because “[t] he trial court, as the finder of fact in a bench trial, is in the best position to determine the candor, demeanor, and credibility of the witnesses , ” we defer to its cred ibilit y deter min at ions and resolutions of con flicting evi dence

. I n re Marriage of Hunter , No. 10

- 21

- 00281

- CV , 2 022 WL 7210493 , at *2 (Tex. App.

— Waco Oct . 12, 2022 , no pet
. ) ( mem . op.) ; see also In re A. L.E. , 279 S.W.3d 424, 427 (Tex. App.

— Houston [ 14th Dist.] 2 00 9, no pet.) (“We r ema in mindful that the tria l judge is best able to observe and assess the witnesses’ demeanor and c redibilit y, a nd to sense the ‘for ces, powers, and influe nces’ that may not be apparent from merely reading the11 increase by several hundred dollars after the divorce w as finalized because she would
have to cover th e costs of her hom eowner ’ s , car , and health insu ra nce that Husband had been ordered to p ay during the pendency of the divorce pro ceedin gs . 9 Thus,
there is probative evidence to support th e trial court ’ s finding that Wi fe lacks
sufficient incom e to provide for her minim um reasonable needs. See Smith , 115
S. W.3d at 30 5

. Pointing t o the fact that Wife was a warded a paid

- for home, a working motor vehicle, approximately $ 15 ,00 0 in cash accounts , 10 $6 8,000 in retir ement assets, 11 and

reco rd on app eal.” (quotin g Niska r v. Ni skar , 136 S.W.3d 749, 753 (Tex. A pp.

— Dallas 2004, no pet.)))

.

9 In addition to her testimony, Wif e offere d into evidence an insurance quote from Allstate. According to the q uote, Wife ’ s mon thl y premi ums w ould be
a pproximately $89 for car ins urance an d $69 for h omeowner ’ s insurance. T he insurance quote also reflected estimate d monthly p remium s of $ 43

– $64 for a 10

- year term life insurance policy with $250,000 in cover age .
10 Hu s band a p proximates the value of th e ca sh accounts at $20,000; however , as Wi fe poin ts out in her br ief, Hus band ’ s estimate is based on err o neous va luat ions of several of the accounts and his fa ilure to recognize that one of the accou nts awarded to Wi fe is actually held for the benefit of Wife ’ s mother. Using the account v a lues re f lected in th e trial court ’ s findings of fact and c onclusion s of law

— which , for the most part, are based on the parties ’ stipulat ions

— and ex cluding th e value of the account held for th e benefit of Wi f e ’ s mot h er, the value of the cash accounts awarde d to Wi fe t ota ls app roximately $15,097.

11 Husband e st imates the va lue of these ret irement assets at $92,74 4

. However, as Wife points out in her brief , this value incorrectly assumes that Wife was awar ded 50 percent of the entire $15 3 ,013 value of Husband ’ s 401(k)

. Husb a nd ’ s c o unsel represented to the trial court that approximately $50, 000 of these retir em ent funds were earned prior to marriage and therefore constituted Husband ’s separate property
. T he final divorce decree to ok this into account a nd includ ed lang ua ge aw arding Wife12 the Mexi co property valued at $6 6 , 5 00 , 12 Hus band contends that Wife does not lac k

s ufficient property to provide for her minimum reasonable needs and that the trial court erred by finding otherwi se. How eve r, “ [w] hen considering the assets awarded in a divorce, the law does not require the spouse to spend down long

- term assets, liquid ate all available assets, or incur new debt simply to

. . . meet short

- term needs. ” Schafman v. Schafman , No. 01

- 20

- 00231

- CV , 202 2 WL 962466, at *6 (Tex. App.

— Houston [1st Dist.] Mar. 31 , 2022 , no pet. ) (mem. op.) (first citing Benoit v. Benoit , No.
01

- 15

- 00 023

- CV, 2015 WL 9311401, at *11 (Tex. App.

— Houston [ 1st Dist.] Dec. 22, 2015, no pet.) (mem. op.); then citi ng Everitt v. Everi tt

, No. 01

- 11

- 00031

- CV, 2012 WL 3776343, at *8 (Tex. App.

— Houston [1st Dist.] Au g. 31, 2012, no pet.) (mem. op.) ; and then cit ing Dunaway v. Dunaway , No. 14

- 06

- 01042

- CV, 2007 WL 334 2020, at *3 (Tex. App.

— Houston [14th Dist.] Nov. 13, 2007, no pet.) (mem. o p.) )

. Courts have upheld maintenance award s “in situations where the spouse rec eiving the maintenance obtained substantial pr ope rty in the divorce proceeding when those capital ass ets provided insufficient support.” In re Marriage of McFarland , 176 S.W.3 d 650, 658 (Tex. App.

— Texarkana 2005, no pet.). Thus, the mere fact that Wi fe r eceived significant

“ 50 percent
. . . of the b alance accrued from October 10, 1987 [,] t hrough March 5, 2021. ” A ssuming Husban d ’ s accounting is correct, we calculate the value of the retirem en t assets awa rded to Wife to be approximate ly $67,74 4.

12 A s noted above, the p arties had wi del y differing views regarding the Me xico property ’ s value

. T he trial court valued the property at $66,500 , which is the average of Wif e ’ s $13,000 estimate and Husband ’ s $120 ,000 est imate

.13 property in th e divorce is no t suffi cient to show that the trial court abused its
discretion by awarding Wife sp ousal ma intenance. Wife is not require d to incur the
pena lties and tax consequences associated with withdr awing funds from her
retirement accounts in order to meet her p res ent needs. See id. at 659 (noting, in upholding tri al court ’ s award of maintenance, that primary asset awarded to wife was
retire men t account “which is subject to significant taxes for early withdrawal” and “[t]o generate any immediately accessible inc ome from this fund would impose the significant early w ithdrawal tax consequences”); Amos v. Amos , 79 S.W.3d 747, 749

– 51 (Tex. App.

— C orpus Christi

– Edinburg 2002, no pet.) (reciting trial court ’ s f inding that

as sets available to wife were not sufficient to mee t her needs due to “the heavy penalties, interest an d taxes associated with the withdrawal and use of funds” and holding that tria l court did not abuse its discretion by awarding maintenance to wife)

. Moreo ver, though Husband posits that the Mexico pro per ty could be rented out to help provide for Wife ’ s ne eds, it is not currently rented , and in fact, Wife testi fied th at b ecause of a n agreeme nt with her cou sin to care for the property , it cannot be rented.
No r is Wife required to sell the property , wh ich ha s been in her family for
generat ions , to meet her pr esent needs. See , e.g. , Schafman , 2022 WL 962466, at *6

. Further, th e “ working motor vehicle ” awarded to Wife is a 2008 Ford Fus i on, which , according to Wife ’ s testimony, nee d s repa irs and may soon n e ed to b e replaced

. 13

13 Wife t estified th at h er car “ has n ’ t had AC for a few months , ” “ needs tires , ” is

“ making a noise , ” an d is “ not in good condition anymore. ” She also testified that she14 T hus, Wife presented sub stanti ve and probat ive e vi dence to support the t rial

court ’ s find ings that Wife “ lack s suff icient income to provide for he r mi nimal needs ”
and “ will lack sufficient property on dissolution o f the mar riage to pro vid e for her
minimum rea s onable needs. ” See Smith , 115 S.W.3d at 30 5

. Accordingly, we canno t conclude that the trial court abused its discretion by maki ng these findings. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 8.05 1

. W e overrule Husband ’ s first issue.
B. D ivis ion of the Marita l Estate
I n his secon d issue , Husb and asser ts that the trial court abused its discretion in dividing the marital estate b ecaus e the p roperty division is not “ just and right

. ” See
Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 7.001. How e ver, Husband has not satisf ied his burde n on this issue.
1. Legal Principles Considering both parties ’ rights, a trial court is charged with dividing th e community estate in a “just and right” manner. Id. ; Watson v. Watson , 286 S.W.3d 519, 522 (Tex. Ap p.

— Fort Worth 2009, no pet. ); Todd v. Todd , 173 S.W.3d 126, 128

– 29 (Tex. App.

— Fort Worth 2005, pet. denied); Loaiza v. Loaiza , 130 S.W.3d 894, 899 (Tex. Ap p.

— Fort Worth 2004, no pet. )

. The law requires an equitable

— not an equal

— division of the community e state. Halleman v. Hallema n , 379 S.W.3d 443, 452

had tried unsuccessfully to replace it durin g the p endency of the di vorce procee ding s.15 (Tex. App.

— Fort Worth 2012, no pet.). That said, some reasonable basis must support a disproportionate d ivision. Smith v. Smith , 143 S.W.3d 206, 214 (Tex. App.

— Waco 2004, no pet.). In making its div ision , the trial court may consi der many factors, including • each spouse ’ s earning capacity and financial condition; • the spouses’ respective abilities, educa tion, and business opportunities; • the size of their separate estates and any future needs for suppo rt; • their physical health an d age; • the award of child custody; • the length of the marriage and any fault in its breakup;
• attorney ’ s fees;
• a spouse ’ s dissipation of the estate; and
• any tax consequences. Smith , 2022 WL 1682427, at * 3 ( first citing Coleman v. Coleman , No. 09

- 06

- 171 CV,
2007 WL 1793756, at *2 (Tex. App.

— Beaumont June 21, 2007, pet. deni ed) (mem. op.) ; and then citing Hamilton v. Hamilt on , No. 02

- 19

- 00211

- CV, 2020 WL 6498528, at *5 (Tex. App.

— Fort Worth Nov. 5, 2020, no pet.) (mem. op. ) )

. No single factor

contr ols

. Felix

- Forbes v. Forbes , No. 02

- 15

- 00121

- CV, 2016 WL 3021829, at *2 (Tex. App.

— Fort Worth May 26, 2016, no pet.) (mem. op.)

.16 2. Standard of Re v iew

“ A trial court has broad d iscretion in dividing the marital estate, and we presume the trial cour t e xercised its d iscretion proper ly. ” Lo aiza , 130 S.W.3d at 899 (c iting Mu rff v. Murf f

, 615 S.W.2d 696, 698

– 99 (Tex. 1 981) )

. T o successfully chall enge

a trial court ’ s division of property , a party must demonstrate f rom evidence i n the
record that the div isi on was so unjust that the trial court abused its discretion. I d

. ; Zeptner v . Zeptner , 111 S.W .3d 727, 734 (Tex. App.

— Fort Wort h 2003, no pet.) (op. on
reh ’ g); Pletcher v. Goetz , 9 S.W.3d 442, 446 (Tex. App.

— Fort Wo rth 1999, pet

. denied) (op. on reh ’ g). W hen determining whether a trial court abused it s discretion, we must
decide whether the tr ial court acted without refe rence to any guiding rules or principles; in other words, whether it acted arbitrarily or unreasonably. Loaiz a , 130 S.W.3d at 899

. Th e m ere fact that we might have decided the issue differently
does not establish that the trial court abused its discretio n. Gerge s v. Gerges , 601 S.W.3d 46, 54 (Tex. App.

— El Paso 2020, no pet.); Loaiza , 130 S.W.3d at 900.
When de termining whether the tri al cou rt abused its discretion, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to its ruling. Cypress Creek EMS v. Dol cefino , 5 48 S.W.3d 673, 687 (Tex. App.

— Houston [1st Dist.] 2018, pet. denied). We must indulge every reasonab le presumption that the t ria l cou rt exercised its discretion properly. Faram v. Gervitz

- Faram , 895 S.W.2d 839, 844 (Tex. App.

— Fort Worth 1995,

no writ).17 3. A nalysis Husband argues that the trial cour t ’ s property division was not “ just and right ”
because , by Husband ’ s ca l culations , Wif e received 60 percent of the commu nity

estate
. Because most of the community estate was divided evenly, 14 Hus band ’ s pr imary complaint is that the tria l co urt awarded 100 percent of the Mexico property

t o Wife without pr oviding any off set to Husband for his community interest t herein

. However, Husb and has not met his burden to show that the trial co ur t ’ s div is ion was so unjust that it abused its discretion. See Lo aiza , 130 S.W.3d at 899

. As n oted above, a mong the factors that courts may consider in di vid ing a community estate are each spouse ’ s earning capacity and financial condition ; the spouses’ resp ective ab ilities, education, and business opportunities ; and the size of the
sp o uses ’ separate estates an d any future needs for support
. Smith , 2022 WL 168 2427,
at * 3

. T he trial court , likely with these factors in mind , mad e the following findings i n support of its division of the marital estate :

14 The divor ce decree provided th at the fol lowing pro per t y was divided equally betwe en the spouses: Wife ’ s re tirement account , the community portion of Husband ’ s retirement accou nt , and the funds in all bank accounts in Husband ’ s or Wife ’ s na me that were not held on behalf of a family member

. Each sp ouse was a warded the house in which he or she lived as well as 100 perc ent of any bank accounts in his or her n ame held on behalf of a blood relative. Husband was awarded the follow ing vehicles: 1986 C hevrolet Silv erado, 2001 Ford F

- 150, 2017 To y ota Ca mry, an d 2018 Chevy tr uck

. Wife was awarded her 2008 Ford Fus ion and a utility trailer. In additio n , w ith certain minor exce p tions, e ach sp ouse was awarded the other miscellaneous personal pro perty

— i ncluding clothing , jewel ry, and furniture

— within his or her po ssessi on or subject to his or her sole control.18 [ Wife ] has a need for f uture support [.] [Husband ] has a sepa rate estate. [Wife ] does not have a separate est ate. There is a disparity of earning power between the two sp ouses. [Husband] was e arning $20.00 /hour at his job a t Americold Logistics. [Wife] was earning $15.00/hour at her job a t Ross Stores. T here is a difference between the sp ouses ’ business opportu nitie s , e ducat ion, capacities, abilities , and future employ ability. [Wife ] ha [s] limited educat ion and limi ted ability to work due to her disability. [Husb and ] is traine d to be a forklif t operator and has mo re opportunit ies
ava ilable to him. [Wife ] was d iagnose d with multiple sclerosis and fibromyalgia [,] impa iring her a b ility to work [,] and sh e will have fu tu re medical expenses. Each of these findings is supported by the record. As set for th a bove, 15 there is ample rec ord evidence concerning Wife ’ s medi c al di ag nos es and need for financial
support
. Regardi ng Husband ’ s separate estate, Hu sband ’ s c ounsel represented to the
trial court that approximately $ 50,000 o f the value of his retiremen t accou nt constituted Husband ’ s s eparate property. Further, Wife te stified that Husband had
in herited a share of his pare nts ’ ra nch , and th e trial court ’ s find ings of fact reco gnize
this pr operty interest as part of Husband ’ s sep arate estat e . T he parties ’ testimony and

ex hibits also support the trial court ’ s findings reg arding the sp ouses ’ relative earning capacities , train ing , and future employability

. 16

15 See supra Sect ion II.A .1.

– 2

.
16 Husband testified th at he earned $20 per hour as a warehouse worker and had tr aining to dri ve a forklift

. Husband ’ s income was verified by his p aystu bs, which19 Moreover, beyond the factors addr essed by the trial court ’ s findings discus sed above, the nature of the Mexico propert y supports the trial court ’ s property divis ion.
See Mur f f

, 615 S.W.2d at 6 99 ( listing the nature o f th e propert y among th e factors courts may consider in making a “ just and right ” division of a marital es tate). Wife

t est ified that the p roperty had been in her fam ily for generations and that she had
pur chased it f rom her grandfather prior to marriage. Wh ile the tr ial court may have
determined that Wife ’ s evide nce was insuf ficie nt to rebut the presum ption that the Mexico propert y was part of the community estate, 17 it was undoubtedly a close call

. 18
Wife clearly had stronge r ties to the Me xico prop erty and p resented evidence tha t she

we re admi tted in to evi d ence. W ife ’ s testimony and pays tu bs likewise sup port the trial court ’ s fi nding that s he earns $1 5 per hour as a retail worker. In addition , Wife testi fied that in the past year Husband had earned approximately $50,000 compared to Wif e ’ s $32 ,000 in earni ng s , and this disparity was further evidenced by the sp o uses ’ t ax returns
. Indeed, Husband acknowledged that he had alw ays earned more than Wife

.
17 See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 3.003 (a); see also In re Marria ge of Stegall , 519 S.W.3d 668, 67 4 (Te x. App.

— Amari llo 2017, no pet.) ( “ [W] e begin with a pres umption that all property on hand at the time of dissolution of the marriage is community property. ” )

.
18 In addition to her own testimony, Wif e presented her a u nt ’ s corroborating tes timony as we ll as s urvey a nd tax documents to show that she had purchased the M exico property prior to marriage. See supra n ote 1. How eve r, Wife also acknowledged that because her purchase agreement with her gr andfather was ora l, she di d n ot have any paperwork to pr ove the date o f the agreement and further acknowledge d that her gra ndfather did n ot give her the deed un til after she was married.20 purch ased it prior to marriage

. T hese factors add additional support to the trial

court ’ s decision to award the full value of the property to Wife.
G iven the trial court ’ s findin gs and the e vidence in the record, w e hold t hat the
trial court had a rea sonabl e basis for its property div ision. See Smith , 143 S.W.3d at
214 . Accordingly , we cannot conclude that the division was so unjust as to constitute

an abuse of the t rial court ’ s broad discre t i on. See Lo a iza , 130 S.W.3d at 899

. W e overrule Husband ’ s second issue.
III. Conclus ion Having overruled both of Husband ’ s is sues, we affirm the t rial co urt ’ s judgment

.

/s/ Bonnie Sudderth
Bonnie S udderth Chief Jus tice
Delivered : December 29, 202 2