* Effective March 31, 1995, the functions of the Secr etary of Health and

Human Services in social security cases were transf erred to the Commissioner of Social Security. P.L. No. 103-296. In the text we continue to refer to the Secretary because she was the appropriate party at the time of the underlying decision.

** This order and judgment is not binding precedent, e xcept under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and col lateral estoppel. The court generally disfavors the citation of orders and judg ments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under the terms and condi tions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.

*** Honorable Myron H. Bright, Senior Circuit Judge, Un ited States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, sitting by designat ion.

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Filed 9/3/96 FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

EARL L. ROSE, SR.,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v. SHIRLEY S. CHATER, Commissioner of Social Security, *

Defendant-Appellee. No. 95-7137 (D.C. No. CV-94-565) (E.D. Okla.)

ORDER AND JUDGMENT **

Before PORFILIO, BRIGHT, *** and KELLY, Circuit Judges.-2-

After examining the briefs and appellate record, th is panel has determined unanimously to grant the parties’ request for a dec ision on the briefs without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f) and 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. Th e case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. Claimant Earl L. Rose, Sr. appeals from an order of the district court affirming the final decision of the Secretary of He alth and Human Services denying his applications for social security disabi lity and supplemental security income benefits. Claimant contends he has been dis abled since 1989 due to back and heart problems. After the Appeals Council granted claimant’s request for review of the administrative law judge’s (ALJ) firs t decision denying benefits, the ALJ again denied benefits at step five of the five- step sequential process for determining disability. See Williams v. Bowen , 844 F.2d 748, 750-52 (10th Cir. 1988)(discussing five-step process). The ALJ determined that, while claimant could not return to his past medium work, he retain ed the residual functional capacity to perform light work and could perform a significant number of jobs in the national economy. The ALJ therefore concluded that claimant was not disabled. The Appeals Council affirmed this seconddecision by the ALJ, making it the final decision of the Secretary. We have jurisdiction under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) and 2 8 U.S.C. § 1291. We review the Secretary's decision to determine whethe r it is supported by substantial-3-

evidence and whether the correct legal standards we re applied. Washington v. Shalala , 37 F.3d 1437, 1439 (10th Cir. 1994). Substantial evidence is adequate relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might acce pt to support a conclusion. Richardson v. Perales , 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971). Claimant raises a numb er of issues on appeal, but we only need to address one-- whether the ALJ erred in rejecting the opinions of claimant’s treating physi cians regarding claimant’s heart problems. In September 1991, claimant’s physician, Dr. Carter , diagnosed him as having angina pectoris. From September 1991 throug h April 1993, claimant was hospitalized four times because of his angina. On a number of other occasions during this period, claimant complained to Dr. Cart er of chest pains. In October 1991, Dr. Carter concluded that the results of card iac catheterization tests performed by cardiologist Dr. Nolewajka showed “[e] ctasia of multiple coronary arteries which would lead one to believe that the p atient’s current chest pain is truly myocardial in nature and it is secondary to p oor blood flow.” Appellant’s App. Vol. II at 435. Because claimant’s condition was not amenable to angioplasty, Dr. Nolewajka recommended aggressive m edical therapy. Id. at 442, 445. Although he described some test results such as EKGs as “unremarkable,” Dr. Carter wrote to the Oklahoma Disability Determi nation Unit on April 15, 1992, that-4-

Mr. Rose obviously has evidence of small vessel dis ease involving the heart with a subsequent production of angina wi th exertion. I feel like the most important point is to be noted that the vascular ectasia is present, that the patient will have angi na type symptomology [sic] whenever he exerts himself due t o the small vessel disease. I feel at this time that the patie nt’s small vessel disease is the primary source of his angina and due to the fact it is vascular ectasia, these areas are not amenable to e ither angioplasty or bypass procedures. Both of these particular areas will require medical management. They do place him at some riskfor infarction and therefore, I recommend he not be placed in a si tuation where the possibility of left ventricular strain or increasedmyocardial oxygen consumption is required, thereby possibly producingeither angina or a pre-infarction syndrome. Id. at 478. In November 1992, Dr. Carter wrote to the Social Security Administration, stating that

I have recently evaluated Mr. Rose this date. His current situation is that of increasing chest pain despite the use of both calcium channel blockade, H2 antagonist and nitrate therapy. The patient at this time is being increased on his nitrate therapy. I really feel at this time the patient’s condition is that of being unstable with his angina and his current micr ovasculopathy, and I would recommend that he not be placed back inthe employment situation until we can control his chestpain and offer definitive long term control of his angina, blood p ressure and reflux symptomatology. Id. at 501. It is well-established that “the Secretary must giv e substantial weight to the testimony of a claimant’s treating physician, unles s good cause is shown to the contrary.” Frey v. Bowen , 816 F.2d 508, 513 (10th Cir. 1987). A treating physician’s opinion may be rejected if the Secretary gives specific, legitimate-5-

reasons for doing so, such as the fact that the opi nion is brief, conclusory and unsupported by medical evidence. Id. The ALJ rejected Dr. Carter’s opinion regarding cla imant’s heart problems and concluded they would not affect his ability to do light work: [A]lthough the claimant has coronary artery disease and angina, the severity of his cardiac condition does not require bypass surgery or angioplasty at this time. Laboratory tests, includ ing EKGs and cardiac enzymes, have been essentially normal. Med ical reports do not demonstrate any persistent problem with uncontr ollable angina. Thus, the objective medical evidence shows that the claimant’s cardiac problems would not prevent the claimant fro m performing light work activity.

. . . . The Administrative Law Judge can find no evidence that the claimant’s chest pain, blood pressure or reflux symptomatology cannot be controlled with prescribed medication. T here is no evidence of any persistent problems with shortness of breath, nausea, vomiting, and diaphoresis. Thus, the substantial m edical evidence fails to support Dr. Carter’s opinion that the clai mant is disabled. Accordingly, such opinion is rejected. Id. at 16. We conclude that the ALJ misinterpreted the medical evidence and that his reasons for rejecting Dr. Carter’s opinion are not legitimate. Both Dr. Carter and Dr. Nolewajka stated that claimant’s heart conditio n was not amenable to bypass surgery or angioplasty, not that it was not severe enough to warrant such treatments. Dr. Carter stated that claimant’s ches t pain was increasing despite the use of calcium channel blockade, H2 antagonist and nitrate therapy. Thus, in-6-

contrast to the ALJ’s finding, there is evidence th at claimant’s chest pain cannot be controlled with prescribed medication. While ce rtain laboratory test results may have been “essentially normal” as the ALJ noted , nothing in the record indicates whether these results necessarily undermi ne Dr. Carter’s opinion. The only other medical opinion in the record regarding claimant’s heart problems (other than Dr. Nolewajka’s, which was consistent w ith Dr. Carter’s) is from a consultant for the Secretary, and that opinion is n either inconsistent with Dr. Carter’s nor did it consider all of the test result s and diagnoses regarding the situation. See Appellant’s App. Vol. II at 468-69, 478. We conclude that Dr. Carter’s opinion is neither br ief, conclusory, nor unsupported by the medical evidence, and that in re jecting it, the ALJ essentially substituted his opinion for Dr. Carter’s. That is not “good cause” for rejecting a treating physician’s opinion. We therefore conclud e that the ALJ’s determination that claimant is not disabled is not supported by s ubstantial evidence. Claimant filed his applications for benefits in Jul y 1991. His disability insurance apparently expired on June 30, 1994. Bec ause this is a step-five case, the Secretary would have the burden of proving on r emand that claimant was not disabled prior to July 1994 despite the opinion of his treating physician. Considering the amount of time this case has been p ending, the fact that the ALJ has already conducted two hearings and issued two i ncorrect decisions, the weight-7-

accorded to treating physicians’ opinions over cons ulting opinions, see Frey , 816 F.2d at 513, and the general difficulty in making r etrospective diagnoses, see Potter v. Secretary of Health & Human Servs. , 905 F.2d 1346, 1348-49 (10th Cir. 1990), we do not believe that further administrativ e proceedings to determine disability would be appropriate. See Ragland v. Shalala , 992 F.2d 1056, 1060 (10th Cir. 1993). We therefore REVERSE the distric t court’s judgment and REMAND the case to the district court with instruct ions that the case be remanded to the Commissioner for an award of benefi ts.

Entered for the Court

Paul J. Kelly, Jr. Circuit Judge