NO T R EC OM M EN DE D F OR F UL L- TEX T P UB LIC AT ION F ile Nam e: 10a0252n.06 No. 09-4244 UN ITED STA TES C OU RT OF AP P EA LS F OR THE SI XT H C IR CU IT
UNI TED STATES OF AMERI CA, Plaintiff-Appellee , v. TYRONE A. B RI SSETT, De fe nd ant- Ap pe lla

nt. ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) On Appeal from the United States District Court for the Nor thern Di str ic t of

Oh io

B e fo re : GU Y, B OG GS, and SUT TO N, Cir c uit

Judg e s. BO GGS, Circuit J udg e. Ty rone A. Br issett, a J amaica n citizen, was sentenc ed to 13
mon ths of imp ri so nme nt f

or ill e g a l r e e ntr

y a ft e r d e po rt a tio n, in v iol a tio n o f 8 U. S.C. § 1 32 6. I n th is
a p p e a l, h e c h a ll e n g e s o n ly th e s u b s ta n ti v e r e a s o n a

b le n e s s o f

h is with in

- G u id e li n e s s e n te n c e . We
a ff ir m. I. F ACTUAL BACK GR OUND On M a y 4 , 2 008, Wil loughby

Hills poli ce pulled B rissett over f or drivingslowly

and we aving in and out of his la

ne. Dur ing the stop, he provided a fra udulently obtained drive r’s lice nse, lea ding to his arre st. A subsequent sea rch of his c ar turned up plastic bag s containing about two pounds of marijuana . His arr est also re sulted in the discovery that he had be en depor

t ed to J amaica

on two prior occ asions. L ocal of

ficials notified Immigration an d Cu s to ms E n f

o r ceme nt, and an immigr ation detainer was issued. Appr ox imately one y ear later, while he wa s servinga state se ntence for dr ugNo. 09-4244

United States v. Ty

rone A . Br isset

Th e PSR r e c omm e nd e d a ba se of fe ns e le ve l of

8, purs ua nt t o U SSG §2 L 1. 2( a ). Th e PSR 1 also sug g ested a

2-leve l reduc tion for ac cepta nce of responsibility , pursuant to USSG §3E1.1(a)
. - 2 - traff icking , a fede ral g rand jury returne d an indictment c harg ing him with a sing le count of illeg al
r e e n t r y, t o w h i c h h e e v e n tu a l l y p l e a d e d g u i l t y. Acc ording to Brissett’s pr ese n tence repor t (“PSR”), he ha d a number of prior f

elony convictions. I n 1987, he wa s convicted of falsely claiming United States citizenship, afte r which he was deported to J amaica

for the f irst time. Then, in 1993, he wa s convicted of illega l ree ntry

and
se nt b a c k a g a in. Un de r U SSG §4 A1 .2 (e ), the se c on vic tio ns we re too sta le to c ount t ow ard his
c r i m i n a l h i s t o r

y s c o r e . H o w e v e r , t h e y w e r e n o tt o o o l d t o i mp a c th i s o f

f e n s e l e v e l
. A c c o r d i n g l y, the PSRrec ommended an e nhance ment under U SSG §2L 1.2(b)( 1)(D) , wh ich mandate s a 4-leve l incre ase “ [i ]f the defe ndant pre viously was de ported . . . a fter . . . a ny other fe lo n y [
. ] ” Al l told, B ri sse tt’ s t ot al r e c omm e nd e d o ff e ns e le ve l w a s 1 0. Gi ve n th e PSR’ s d e te rm inatio n th a t B ri sse tt 1

s h o u l d b e p l ac edi nC ri m i n al Hi s t o ry C at ego ry

I I I

— a d et erm i n at i o nb as edo nt h e s t at e d ru gtraff icking conviction and a

state convic tion for petit larc eny —the re sultant advisory

Guidelines
ra ng e wa s 1 0 to 16 months of imp ri so nme nt. At se nte nc ing , th e dis tr ic t c ourt a do pte d th e PSR’ s G uid e li ne s c a lc ulatio ns , a ft e r whic h it permitted the pa

rties to offe r any additional comments relative to the sentenc e. B rissett’s attorney spoke first and a dvance d a number of mitigation arguments. He f ocused pr incipally

on the violence that alleg edly

plag ued Brissett’s l ife in J amaica , noting that B rissett had enr ag ed a g angby finding
a ca ch e of weapons a

nd tossing the a

rms into the sea. Ac cordingto Brissett’s attorney , Br issett’s fa mil y ho me wa s b ur

ne d to the g ro un d in re tr ibutio n, pr omp tin g B ri sse tt to fl e e to t he Un ite d St a te s.No. 09-4244

United States v. Ty

rone A . Br isset

- 3 - Of c ourse, B rissett was then de ported to J amaica , wher e the acts of violence supposedly resumed. Specifica lly , Br issett’s attorney claimed that Br issett was the ta rg et of a shooting that re sulted in the death of Br issett’s friend. On the streng th of these a lleg ed episode s, as well as o t h ers, B rissett’s attorney submitt ed “to the [c] ourt that there has been signific ant mitigation for Mr . Br issett’s return to t he Un ite d St a te s. An d th a t mi tig a tio n w a s n ot o nly fo r h is o wn

sa fe ty but f or the sa fe ty of oth e rs , espec ially those who may

be close to him.” I n a dd iti on

to d isc us sin g B ri sse tt’ s mo tiv a tio ns fo r i lle g a lly e nte ri ngthe Uni ted Sta te s, B ri sse tt’ s atto rn e y

a lso sp ok e a

bo ut B ri sse tt’ s c hil dr e n, ob se rv ing : Now, since [Brissett] has been her e, he doe s have c hildren, Americ an-bor n children, the most rece ntly

[si c] is a 20-month-old child in the Cleveland ar ea, w ith whom he was maintaininga re lationship before his arr est in his state case. Unfortunately , that y oung child has bee n taken into the custody of the state a

uthorities after

having suffe red a skull frac ture within the custody of the c hild’s mother. Once the par

ties had conc luded their re marks, the district cour t indicated that it was requir ed to “impose a sente nce suf ficient but not g reater than ne cessa ry to comply

with the purposes of
se nte nc ingse t f

or th i n Se c tio n 3 55 3( a )( 2) .” Th e dis tr ic t c ourt the n d isc us se d a

numbe r o f f

a c tor s, and imposed a 13- month, middl e-of -the-r ang e sente nce, of

fer ing the following explanation: Now he re i s t h e situation -- a nd Ithink, Mr. Bryan, you do well on beha lf of your client by making some points about his li fe and the sadne ss and trag edy in his li fe, the ac ts of violence that seem to start i n J amaica and then f ollow him to t he United States. And Ithink in his case we’ d probably be m o re sy

mpathetic if whe n he r e tu r n e d t o t h e U n t i e d

S t a t e s , h e , f

i r s t o f a l l , h a d p e r

m i s s i o n t o r e tu r

n , b u ts e c o n d l y, if he did n’ t c omm it c ri me s, pa

rt ic ula rl y dr ugc ri me s. Now he tr ie d

to e xp la in

h is dr u g c o n v ic ti o nin

th e L a k e Co u n ty

Co mm o nPlea s Court. Nonetheless, h e wa s convicted f or traf fickingin marijuana, a

nd he wa s sentenc ed and he ’s -- his sente nce isn’t due to expi re until next m onth.No. 09-4244

United States v. Ty

rone A . Br isset

- 4 - So he’s bee n deporte d now twice. H e has r eturne d to this country
. And I understand that he ha s c hil dr e n h e re , a nd it’ s a ve ry , v e ry sad c ir c ums tanc e re latin g to pa rt ic ula rl y the 20 -m on th- old

c hil d, but th e fa c t re ma ins that th e de fe nd ant i s in thi s country illega lly . The fact re mains he has be en depor ted twice. It’s somewhat of a tough situation bec ause of the violence that he does f ace in J amaica
. Imean, ther e is [si c] no two way s about it. Bu t i t d o esn’t really , in the [c] ourt’s mi n d , mi ti g a te th e w r o n g f u ln e s s o f th e c o n d

u c t in c o mi n g - - in r e tu

r n ing to the United S t at es i n spite of the fa ct that he’ s now bee n deporte d twice, a nd he knows full well that he is not allowed to re turn. Th a t sa id, the [c]o ur

t be lie ve s a

[G]ui de lin e se nte nc e is a n a pp ro pr iate se nte nc e in this c ase. There is something that could be said for g oing above t h e [ G] u idelines be c a us e thi s is no w the thi rd

tim e the de fe nd a

nt h a s a pp e are d i n [ c] ou rt. T he re is something, be cause of his trag ic past, that some might c onsider, although the [c]ourt do e sn ’t fi nd c omp e lli ng , th a t y ou

ou g ht t o g o b e low

the [G]ui de lin e s. Concluding, the district court opined that, “in this instance , the [G] uideline does in fa ct mete out the appropr iate punishment.” B ri sse tt n owa

pp e a ls. II. AN AL YSI S A. Standard of

Review “We re view a district court’s sente ncingdecision for rea sonablene ss under a

‘def ere ntial abuse- of-discr etion standard.’ ” United States v. Pe trus , 588 F.3d 347, 351 (6th Cir. 2009) (quoting United States v. Bolds , 511 F.3d 568, 578 ( 6th Cir. 2007)). Reasona b l en es s review

has two components: one procedura l, the ot her substantive. See Un ite d S tates v . B ro wn , 501 F.3d 722, 724 (6 t h C i r. 2 0 0 7 ) ( ci t i n g Un ite d S tates v . S mi th , 474 F.3d 888, 894 ( 6th Cir. 2007)). Th e pr oc e dura l c omp on e nt i s e va luate d f ir st. I n d oin g so , w e mus t
ensur e th a t th e d is tr ic t c o u rt c o mm itte d n o s ign if ic an t p r o c e d

u r a l e r r o r , s u ch as failing to ca l culate (or improper ly calc ulating) the Guidelines ra ng e, tre ating theNo. 09-4244

United States v. Ty

rone A . Br isset

- 5 - Gu i d el i n es as m an d at o ry , fa i l i n g t o c o n s i d e rt h e § 3 5 5 3 (a ) f ac t o rs , s el ec t i n g a sentenc e based on clea

rly err oneous facts, or failing to adequately explain the chosen sentenc e-inc luding a

n explanation for any

deviation from the Guidelines rang e. Gall v. United States , 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007). I f i t pa sse s p ro c e dura l muste r, we mus t the n de te rm ine wh e the r the se nte nc e is s ub sta nti ve ly
r e a s o n a b le
. I nd o in g s o , w e ar e r e qu ir e d to “ ta k e into a c c o u n t th e to ta li ty o f th e c ir c u ms ta

n c e s [. ]” Ibid. “The touchstone for our revie w is whether the leng th of the sentenc e is r easona ble in light of the § 355 3 (a ) f

ac t o rs .” Un ite d S

tates v . Ta te , 5 16 F .3 d 4 59 , 4 69 (6 th C ir . 2 00 7) ; see also United States v. Kirchhof

, 50 5 F .3 d 40 9, 41 7 (6 th Cir
. 20 07 ) (“ We re ve rs e se nte nc e s wh e n it is u nr e a so na ble to conclude that the circ umstances, in lig ht of the § 3553(a ) fa ctors, justify the sentenc e issued.”)
. “A se ntence may

be conside red substantively unrea sonable whe n the district court sele cts a sente nce
arb itr ari ly , b a se s th e se nte nc e on imp e rm iss ibl e fa c tor s, fa ils to c on sid e r r e le va nt s e nte nc ingfa c tor s, or g ives an unre asonable amount of we ight to any pertinent fa ctor.” United States v. Conatser , 514 F. 3 d 5 08, 520 (6th Cir. 2008) (c itation omit ted). On the other ha nd, “[t] he fa ct that [we] mi g ht
rea sonably

have c oncluded that a

differ ent sentenc e was appropr iate is insuff icient to justify

reve rsal of the district cour

t.” Ga ll , 552 U.S. at 51. I n case s involving within-Guidelines sentenc es, this c ourt applies a rebuttable presumption
o f r ea sonablene ss. S

ee Conatser , 514 F.3d at 520 (“A pr operly calc ulated within-g uidelines sentenc e will be aff

orded a rebuttable presumption of rea sonablene ss on appea l.”). This “pr esumption is not binding.” Rita v. United States , 551 U.S. 338, 347 (2007). I t simpl y “re flec ts the fac t that, by the time [ we ] co n s i der[] a within-Guidelines sentence on revie w, bo th the sentenc ing judg e and the SentencingCommi ssion . . . h ave rea ched the same conclusion as to the pr oper se ntence in theNo. 09-4244

United States v. Ty

rone A . Br isset

Al tho ug h B ri sse tt f

a ile d to make thi s a

rgume nt b e low , w e ne e d n ot d e c ide wheth er it i s 2 forf eited; the fate of his claim is the same r eg ardle ss of the applica ble standar d of re view. F or its pa rt , the Sup re me Court a g re e s wi th the latte r c a te g or izatio n, inc lud ing“ fa il[ure ] to 3 consider the § 3553(a) fac tors” in a list of “sig nificant proc edura l error [s] .” Ga ll , 552 U.S. at 51. - 6 - particula r ca se.” Ibid. “That double deter mination significa

ntly incre ases the likelihood that the sentenc e is a re asonable one.” Ibid. B. Su bst ant ive Re as ona ble ne ss 1. Fa ilu re to C

on sid e r R e le v an t F

ac tor s Early in his brief’s a

naly sis section, Br issett claims “that the di strict court failed to consider rele vant fac tors that rende r the e nhance ment [under §2L 1.2(b)( 1)(D) ] subs tantively unrea sonable as ap pli e d to his c as e .” Ap pe lla nt’ s B r. at 14 . As a

n in iti a l matte r, we no te tha t it is p ro ba bly 2 inacc urate to cha ra ct er i z e this claim as per taining to the substantive r easona bleness of B rissett’s sentenc e. Thoug h we ha ve re peate dly

stated that a se ntence is substantively unrea sonable if the district court fa ils to consider rele vant fa ctors, see, e .g., Conatser , 5 14 F .3 d at 52 0, that no tio n is d er i v ed fr om our dec ision in United States v. W ebb , 403 F.3d 373 ( 6th Cir. 2005), which did not d i s t i n gu i s h b et we en s u

b s t an t i v e a n d

p ro ce d u ra l re as o n ab l en es s . Fo l l o wi n g W ebb , w e h a v e a lso ref err ed to the fa ilure to consider rele vant § 3553(a) fa ctors as a proce dural e rror . See, e .g., 3 Conatser , 514 F.3d at 519. Rece ntly , we have begun to rec tify this appare nt overlap, movingtoward the notion that “the substantive re asonable ness inquiry turns primarily on whether ‘the leng th of the sentenc e is rea sonable in lig ht of the § 3553(a ) fa ctors.’” United Sta t es v. Basulto-Pulido , 3 09 F. Ap p ’x 9 4 5 , 9 4 8 (6 t h C i r. 2 0 0 9 ) ( qu o t i n g Tat e , 516 F.3d at 469).No. 09-4244

United States v. Ty

rone A . Br isset

- 7 - But that issue is ultimately beside the point. Given the broade r contex t of hi s argument, we
are not convinced that Brissett ac tually means to a

rgue that the district court shirke d its obli g ation to consider r eleva

nt § 3553(a) f

actor s. I f he did, his brief wo u l d b e i n t erna lly

inconsistent, for he
c on c e de s th a t hi s se nte nc e is p ro c e dura lly re a so na ble , a dmi tti ngthat “ the dis tr ic t cour t pro pe rl y calc ulated the Guide lines rang e and addressed factors pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3553( a) , in addition to list ening and re sponding to his mitigation ar g uments.” Appellant’s Br . at 14 (e mphasis added)
. Wit h this potential contra diction in mind, we f ind it more plausible that Br issett is si mply parr oting lang uag e fr om the ty

pical st andar d of review in an attempt to undersc ore his main posi tion, which is that the enhanc ement under §2L 1.2(b)( 1)(D) makes the le ng th of his sentence unrea sonable. Ho we ve r, e ve n if

we take B ri sse tt’ s c la im at f a c e va lue , w e fi nd

no e rr or , as t

he re c or d p la inl y indicates that the district c ourt fulfilled its duty to c onsider the § 3553(a) fac tors. DuringBr issett’s
se nte nc inghe ari ng , th e dis tr ic t c ourt ann ounc e d th a t it

wa s “ re qu ir e d to c on sid e r t he a pp lic a ble fa ct o rs enumerated in Sec tion 3553(a)” and spec ifically confirme d that it had done so. While the district court did not expl icitly mention ever

y one of the § 3553(a) fac tors, “we have ne ver r equire d the ritual inca

ntation of the fa ctors to af firm a se ntence .” Un ite d S tates v . S mi th , 505 F.3d 463, 467 (6 th C ir . 2 00 7) (c itatio n a nd int e rn a l qu otatio n mark s omi tte d)
. “ I ns te a d, dis tr ic t c ourt s n e e d o nly articulate their re asoning in a manner sufficie nt to allow for mea ningf ul rea sonablene ss reviewby appellate courts.” United States v. Pe arson , 2 1 2 F. Ap p ’x 5 0 4 , 5 0 7 (6 t hC i r. 2 0 0 7 ) ( ci t i n g United States v. Jac kson , 408 F.3d 301, 305 ( 6th Cir. 2005)). We a re satisfied that, in the pre sent ca se, the district court dischar g ed this obligation.No. 09-4244

United States v. Ty

rone A . Br isset

B ri sse tt d oe s n ot a

pp e ar t o h ave ra ise d the sta le ne ss of his fe lon ie s b e low . A s w e state d in 4 United States v. Vonne r , “[w]hi le we do not require de fenda nts to challeng e the ‘ rea sonablene ss’ of their sentenc es in front of the district court, we su re l y should apply plain-er ror r eview to a

ny argume nts fo r l e nie nc y that the de fe nd ant do e s no t pr e se nt t o th e tr ia l c ourt .” 51 6 F .3 d 3 82 , 3 91 (6 th Cir. 2008) (en banc)
. Howeve r, as befor e, the a pplicability

of plain-e rror

revie w is immaterial, as we r eac h the same r esult under a n abuse- of-discr etion standard.

- 8 - Be fore concludingwith this argument, we acknow ledg e one more possibili ty , namely , that B ri sse tt i s atta c kin g the dis tr ic t c ourt ’s fa ilure to c on sid e r r e le va nt fac ts . Even so, there is no error
. As noted above , Br issett admits t hat the district cour t considere d and addr essed his mitigating arguments. SeeAppellant’s B r. at 14. Thoug h there might be othe r fa cts that weig h i n favor of a lesser se ntence , “it [i s] not incumbent on the District Judge to r aise ever y conce ivably

rele vant issue on his own initi ative.” Ga ll , 5 52 U. S. at 54 ; se e als o U nite d S tates v . W all s , 54 6 F .3 d 7 28 , 7 37 (6 th Cir . 2 00 8) (h old ingtha

t the dis tr ic t c ourt ’s fa ilure to c on sid e r a de fe nd ant’ s “ a g e [an d] the a g e of his offe nses” wa s not an abuse of discretion bec ause the defe ndant neve r broug ht them up). 2. Re as on ab le ne

ss i n Li gh t of the§ 3 55 3(

a) Fa c tor s Br issett’s main argument is that his within-Guidelines se ntence is unduly long in lig ht of the § 3553(a) fac tors. I n making this arg ument, he conte nds that the enha nceme nt imposed under § 2 L 1
. 2 ( b ) ( 1 ) ( D ) “ o v e r s tate s th e n a tu r e an d c i r c u m s t a n c e s o f t h e o f f e n s e a n d [ h is ] c r im in a l h is to r

y [. ]” Ap pe lla nt’ s Br . at 15. Es se nti a lly , he c la ims that, b e c a us e the e nh anc e me nt w a s “ ba se d o n lo ng -p a st prior fe lonies committed [whil e he] was fleeing for his life,” the district court was r equire d to temper the enha nceme nt’s impact t hroug h a downward variance
. Appellant’s Br. at 26. Ultimately , we a re 4

un pe rs ua de d, and

we ho ld t

hat B ri sse tt h as fai le d to ov e rc ome the pr e sumpt ion of re a so na ble ne ss that acc ompanies his within-Guidelines sentenc e.No. 09-4244

United States v. Ty

rone A . Br isset

Th is r e a so nin g ha s me t wi th le g iti mate c ri tic ism
. F ir st, a s Judg e O’ Sc ann la in n ote d in his 5 di s s e n t f r o m t h e d e n i a l o f a r e h e ar i n g e n b an c , “ t h e G u i d e l i n e s d o n o t a s s u m e t h a ta de c a de s- old prior conv i ct i o n is deservingof the same sever e additional punishment as a r ece nt one.” United States v. Ame

zcua-Vasque

z , 586 F.3d 1176, 1179 (9th Cir. 2009). I ndeed, the Guidelines ac count for the sta leness of a

defe ndant’s prior f

elony conviction by

omitti ng it from the “c alculation of the defe ndant’s cr iminal hist ory score .” Ibid. Second, in fa ultin g a dis trict court f

or fa iling to var

y downwar d on acc ount of an e nhancingco n v i cti on’s ag e, an a ppellate c ourt risks “usurp[ing] the policy making role of the district court as we ll as the SentencingCommi ssion.” Id. at 1080. - 9 - For purposes of the following analy sis, we wil l assume that the Ninth and Te nth Circuits are
corr ect in holding that the stalene ss of an e nhancingconviction ca n theore tically

ren d er a withi nGuidelines sentence substantively unrea sonable. See U

nited States v. Ame

zcua-Vasque

z , 567 F.3d 10 50 , 1 05 4– 58 (9 th C ir . 2 00 9) ; United States v. Chave z-Suarez , --- F.3d -

--- , 2010 WL 761077, at *1 (10th Cir. 2010). Acc ording to the Ninth Circuit, “[t ]he fac t that Section 2L 1.2(b) a ddresse s the
se ri ou sn e ss o f t

he of fe ns e —a s o pp os e d to the ri sk of re c idi vis m—e xpla ins the a bs e nc e of tim e limit ations on qualifying pr edi c a tec o nv ic ti o n s . I t does not, howeve r, justify incre asing a def

endant’ s sentenc e b

yth e s a m e m ag

n itude i rr espec tive of the a g e of the prior convic tion at the time of
r e e ntry .” Amezc ua-Vasquez , 5 67 F .3 d at 10 55 ; but see United States v . Adelek e , 968 F.2d 1159, 5 1161 (11th Cir. 1992) (“ [T] he enha nceme nt under § 2L 1.2 is designe d to deter a liens who have been convicted of

a fe lony from re -ente ring the United States.”)
. Fu rt h erm o re , we a ssume, arguendo , that “a downwar d varia nce ma y sometimes be war

rante d based on th e r e la

ti v e ly b e n ig nn a tu

r e o f a p arti c u la r o f f e n s e in c o mp ar is o nto o th e r

o f f e n s es trig g eringthe same e nhance ment.” Chavez-Suare z , 2010 WL 761077, at *2 (1 0 t h C ir. 2010). Section 2L 1.2(b) “ look[ s] onl y to the conviction i t s el f rather than the c onduct under ly ing the conviction.” United States v. Trujill o-Terrazas , 405 F.3d 814, 820 (10th Cir. 2005). Ther efor e, theNo. 09-4244

United States v. Ty

rone A . Br isset

Of course , the enhanc ement could also have been imposed on the basis of his conviction for 6 falsely claiming United States citizenship, but t hat cr ime is a close c ousin of the pre sent offe nse. - 10 - sy mpathe tic c ir c ums tanc e s su rr ound inga

de fe nd ant’ s und e rl yingc on vic tio n mi g ht c on cei vably require mitigation of a

n enhancement unde r §2L 1.2(b)—a s opposed to permitting it, which the y
cer tainly do. Ho we ve r, de sp ite the a g e of Bris se tt’ s c on vic tio ns and the a lle g e d mo tiv a tio ns be hin d h is numerous illeg al entrie s, the duration of his sente nce is re asonable . Whil e it is true that B rissett’s prior fe lony

convictions are somewhat old, they repr esent i n s t al lments in an ong oing pattern of behavior . I ndeed, the sentenc e at issue is f or illega l r eentr

y , prec isely

the same c rime that under lies the enhanc ement. Br issett’s pr evious brushes with the law simply have not dissuade d h i m from 6 illega lly returningto the Unit ed S tates; he admitt ed knowing that he is not allowed to return, and y et h e h as d o n e s o at l ea s t t wi ce . M o re o v er , af t er h i s m o s tre ce n tre en t ry , h e c o m m i t t eda f el o n y dru gtraff icking offe nse. As a c onsequenc e, B rissett’s ca se pre sents a situation in which a sig nificant ter m of inc arc e ratio n is ne c e ssa

ry “ to p ro mot e re sp e c t f

or the law” and

“ to a ff or d a de qu a te de te rr e nc e to
c ri min a l c on du c t[.]” 18 U. S.C. § 3 55 3( a )( 2) (A )– (B ). I n th e wo rd s o f t he dis tr ic t court , “ [t]he re is something that could be said for g oing above the [G] uidelines beca use this is the third tim e t he defe ndant has a

ppear ed in [c]ourt.” That the district court did not vary upwar d sug g ests to us that it adequate ly

acc ounted for B rissett’s sy mpathetic cir cumstance s, such as they may be. III . C ON CL USI ON B ri sse tt’ s se nte nc e is s ub sta nti ve ly re a so na ble . T hu s, we a ff

ir m.