RECORD IMPOUNDED

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-3614-15T4

NEW JERSEY DIVISION OF CHILD 

PROTECTION AND PERMANENCY,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

L.C.,

Defendant-Appellant.

__________________________________

IN THE MATTER OF THE GUARDIANSHIP

OF T.L.M., a minor.

__________________________________

Submitted March 30, 2017 - Decided 

Before Judges Lihotz and Hoffman.

On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey, 

Chancery Division, Family Part, Camden County, 

Docket No. FG-04-116-16.

Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney 

for appellant (Diana S. Yu, Designated 

Counsel, on the brief).

Christopher S. Porrino, Attorney General, 

attorney for respondent (Melissa DuttonSchaffer, Assistant Attorney General, of 

counsel; Laura A. Dwyer, Deputy Attorney 

General, on the brief).

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." 

Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the 

parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R.1:36-3.

April 7, 2017
2 A-3614-15T4

Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, Law 

Guardian, attorney for minor (David Valentin, 

Assistant Deputy Public Defender, on the 

brief).

PER CURIAM

We examine challenges to an April 14, 2016 Family Part 

judgment terminating the parental rights of defendant L.C. and 

awarding plaintiff, the Division of Child Protection and 

Permanency (the Division), guardianship to effectuate the adoption 

of three-year-old T.L.M. The judgment also terminated the parental 

rights of the child's father J.M., noting he executed an identified 

surrender to allow the child's adoption by relatives in California, 

on March 1, 2016, from which he has not filed an appeal. Defendant 

seeks reversal, arguing the Division failed to present clear and 

convincing evidence to sustain the judgment terminating her 

parental rights. More specifically, defendant admits her drug 

abuse caused T.L.M.'s removal, but maintains she made significant 

strides to overcome that harm, which the judge ignored; the 

Division declined to extend in-patient drug treatment program 

services in the Mommy and Me program, which defendant requested; 

and termination of parental rights would cause the child to suffer 

more harm than good. 

The scope of this court's review of a trial court's decision 

to terminate parental rights is limited. In re Guardianship of 
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J.N.H., 172 N.J. 440, 472 (2002). We are obliged to accord 

deference to the trial judge's factual findings and credibility 

determinations respecting the judge's feel of the case based upon 

the opportunity to see and hear the witnesses. Cesare v. Cesare, 

154 N.J. 394, 411-12 (1998); N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. 

v. F.M., 375 N.J. Super. 235, 259 (App. Div. 2005). Reversal is 

required only in those circumstances when the stated findings are 

"so wide of the mark that a mistake must have been made." N.J. 

Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. M.M., 189 N.J. 261, 279 (2007) 

(quoting Snyder Realty, Inc. v. BMW of N. Am., Inc., 233 N.J. 

Super. 65, 69 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 117 N.J. 165 (1989)).

We have considered each of L.C.'s arguments in the context 

of the record and the applicable law. We affirm substantially for 

the reasons expressed in the thorough and extensive oral opinion 

issued by Judge Francine I. Axelrad at the close of evidence on 

April 14, 2016. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(A). We repeat our prior 

determination: 

"[C]oncern has arisen for the best 

interests of children whose parents have 

forsaken their parental duties." N.J. Div. 

of Youth & Family Servs. v. P.P., 180 N.J.

494, 505 (2004) (citations omitted). The 

emphasis of the federal Adoption and Safe 

Families Act of 1997 (ASFA), Pub. L. No. 105-

89, 111 Stat. 2115 (codified as amendments in 

sections of 42 U.S.C.A.) "has shifted from 

protracted efforts for reunification with a 

birth parent to an expeditious, permanent 
4 A-3614-15T4

placement to promote the child's well-being." 

N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. C.S., 

367 N.J. Super. 76, 111 (App. Div.), certif. 

denied, 180 N.J. 456 (2004); see N.J.S.A.

30:4C-15.

In our view, parents dabbling with 

addictive substances must accept the mandate 

to eliminate all substance abuse. Such 

unabated behavior initiates the foster care 

placement of their children and causes 

continuing harm by depriving their children 

of necessary stability and permanency. See

P.P., supra, 180 N.J. at 510; [In re 

Guardianship of] K.H.O., 161 N.J. [337,] 354

[(1999)]. 

[N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. T.S., 

417 N.J. Super. 228, 245 (App. Div. 2010).]

Here, ample credible evidence demonstrated reunification

could not be achieved because defendant failed to remain substance 

free, and the extensive delay caused significant harm to the child, 

who did not have a safe, permanent home, satisfying N.J.S.A. 30:4C15.1(a)(1), (2). Judge Axelrad detailed the drug abuse treatment 

services extended to defendant by the Division, which began in 

2009, long before this child's birth, satisfying N.J.S.A. 30:4C15.1(a)(3). Despite a myriad of treatment programs, her chronic, 

illicit drug use persisted. In February 2016, defendant was 

actively abusing drugs, when she requested to be placed in the 

adult residential "Mommy and Me" treatment program accompanied by 

T.L.M. The program, which was extended to parents moving toward 

reunification with their children, had a waiting list. Defendant 
5 A-3614-15T4

repeatedly refused to engage in a higher treatment level of care 

provided by an adult inpatient facility other than Mommy and Me. 

Accordingly, the Division determined T.L.M., who had been in 

placement for nineteen months, needed permanency. Therefore, the 

Division redirected its efforts toward securing the child's 

adoption, after concluding defendant's conduct demonstrated she 

was not committed to rehabilitation to effect reunification. 

Finally, the judge credited unrefuted expert testimony that T.L.M. 

had an insecure attachment with defendant, such that severing the 

relationship will not cause severe and enduring harm. N.J.S.A.

30:4C-15.1(a)(4).

"A child is not chattel in which a parent has an untempered 

property right" and should not "be held prisoner of the rights of 

others, even those of his or her parents." C.S., supra, 367 N.J. 

Super. at 110-11. The record substantially supports the findings 

by Judge Axelrad that the evidence clearly and convincingly 

established termination of parental rights was in T.L.M.'s best 

interests. N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a).

Affirmed.