FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

DAO LU LIN, 

Petitioner, No. 04-70422

v. Agency No.  A79-760-825 ALBERTO R. GONZALES, Attorney

General, OPINION

Respondent. 

On Petition for Review of an Order of the

Board of Immigration Appeals

Argued and Submitted

November 18, 2005—Honolulu, Hawaii

Filed January 12, 2006

Before: Michael Daly Hawkins, M. Margaret McKeown, and

Richard R. Clifton, Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge McKeown

387
COUNSEL

Benjamin V. Chen, Benjamin V. Chen, AAL, LLLC, Honolulu, Hawaii, for appellant Dao Lu Lin. 

William C. Minick and Barry J. Pettinato, Office of Immigration Litigation, U.S. Department of Justice, Washington,

D.C., for appellee Alberto R. Gonzales, Attorney General. 

OPINION

McKEOWN, Circuit Judge: 

The question we consider in this asylum case is the nature

of evidence required to support an Immigration Judge’s (“IJ”)

adverse credibility finding based on documentary evidence.

We reiterate the longstanding principle that such an adverse

credibility finding must be supported by substantial evidence.

The IJ’s speculation as to what an official document should

look like, conjecture about the significance of the missing

details in the document, and musings as to format of the document cannot be regarded as “reasonable, substantial, and probative evidence” required by the Supreme Court in INS v.

Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 481 (1992). 

Here, the IJ denied Dao Lu Lin’s (“Lin”) asylum application not because she thought Lin lacked credibility or that Lin

told an implausible story. Rather, the IJ denied the application

because she was suspicious about the official documents submitted by Lin. We readily acknowledge that an IJ need not

accept all documents as authentic nor credit documentary submissions without careful scrutiny. But the rejection must be

premised on more than a guess or surmise. A review of this

record reveals that the IJ’s suspicions derive from nothing

more than her personal and subjective view as to what the

documents should look like. Without any objective support in

390 LIN v. GONZALES
the record, these suspicions do not amount to substantial evidence. We grant the petition and remand to the Board of

Immigration Appeals (“Board”) for review of the IJ’s discretionary denial of asylum. 

BACKGROUND

Lin is a native citizen of the People’s Republic of China.

While living in a rural area of a small island called Dongqiang

Town in Pingtan County, China, Lin met his wife, Yu Lan

Chen (“Chen”). Their relationship developed quickly and

Chen unexpectedly became pregnant with their first child,

which prompted the couple to consider getting married.

Because Chen had not reached the legal age for marriage, Lin

contacted a family friend at the marital registration office of

Dongqiang Town to falsify Chen’s age. As a result, the couple

married and received a “Marriage Certificate.” 

After they were married, Lin and Chen had three children.

Within a month after the birth of their first child, a girl, the

family planning unit of Dongqiang Town assessed the couple

a fine for having failed to obtain permission to conceive, otherwise known as an “unplanned birth.” The town officials

then detained Lin for seven days until his family was able to

pay the fine. 

Shortly thereafter, family planning officials required Chen

to have an intrauterine device (IUD) and periodic gynecological examinations in accordance with local family planning

regulations. Lin and Chen were unhappy with this turn of

events as they wanted to have another child. To remedy the

situation, the couple hired a private physician to remove the

IUD, after which they remained in hiding with family members until their second child was born. This child was also a

girl. Due to the stringent birthing laws and the couple’s desire

to have a boy, they gave the child to the midwife so that she

could find adoptive parents. Lin later learned that the child

was adopted by a rich couple in Beijing and that the child was

LIN v. GONZALES 391
receiving an education. During this period, Chen missed her

mandated gynecological examinations. In response, family

planning officials confiscated the couple’s furniture and

detained Lin’s mother for eighteen days. 

While hiding out, Lin and Chen decided to have a third

child with the hope that it would be a boy. This time they

were successful. The couple returned to their home village,

where they lived with Chen’s family. Upon discovering their

return and the “unplanned” baby boy, the family planning

officials arrested Chen, forced her to have a sterilization procedure, and detained Lin for seven days. The family planning

unit issued a “Family Planning Operation Certification” documenting Chen’s sterilization and a “Notice of Fine,” giving

Lin’s family seven days to pay a very substantial fine. 

Without the ability to pay such a large fine, the couple fled

the village with their two children, after which the family

planning officials destroyed their home and furnishings. The

family moved from place to place, trying to make a living.

While working on a Taiwanese fishing vessel, Lin made his

way to the United States. Lin was eventually arrested and

turned over to United States immigration officials. 

Lin applied for asylum, claiming that his wife was forcibly

sterilized as a consequence of multiple violations of China’s

birthing laws. The IJ found that Lin’s “testimony was consistent with his written application. The fact that he was consistent with his written application helps [Lin] establish that

what he is saying is truthful.” The IJ even gave Lin “the benefit of the doubt” as to his oral testimony. 

However, the IJ found suspicious and discounted the probative value of three documents: (1) the Marriage Certificate

issued by Pingtan County Dongqiang People’s Government;

(2) the Family Planning Operation Certification issued by the

Pingtan County Family Planning Bureau documenting that

Chen underwent a female sterilization operation; and (3) the

392 LIN v. GONZALES
Notice of Fine from the Pingtan County Dongqiang Town

People’s Government for the unplanned birth of their son. 

After reviewing and weighing this documentary evidence,

particularly the Family Planning Operation Certification, the

IJ denied Lin’s asylum application, stating, “The Court is not

convinced by this evidence that [Lin] has established that his

wife was forcibly sterilized. The evidence taken as a totality

does not appear credible.” The IJ also denied, in the alternative, Lin’s application as a matter of discretion because he had

given his second child up for adoption at a time that the State

Department reported that “conditions were not good for children in Chinese orphanages [and that] kidnapping and buying

and selling of children persist[ed] in rural areas despite government efforts to prevent this.” The IJ went on to state that

“there does not seem to be any reason why [Lin and his wife]

could not have kept that child and continued to live [with relatives], as they did, until their greatly desired son was born.”

On appeal, the Board affirmed the IJ’s denial of relief stating that “the inconsistencies and omissions in questionable

documents submitted by [Lin] are specific, cogent reasons for

the [IJ]’s final credibility finding.” The Board did not address

the IJ’s discretionary denial of relief.

ANALYSIS

In denying Lin’s asylum application, the IJ observed that

“[t]he crux of this case centers upon what happened to his

wife as he described it. In short, he states that his wife was

forcibly sterilized when local officials learned of the existence

of the [unplanned births of his children].” The IJ correctly

pinpointed the issue—if Lin can prove that his wife was forcibly sterilized, he is automatically eligible for asylum and

withholding of removal. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42); Qu v.

Gonzales, 399 F.3d 1195, 1198-99, 1203 (9th Cir. 2005)

(holding that “one who has suffered involuntary sterilization,

either directly or because of the sterilization of a spouse, is

LIN v. GONZALES 393
entitled, without more, to withholding of removal”); He v.

Ashcroft, 328 F.3d 593, 604 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding that a

husband is “automatically eligible for asylum” based on his

wife’s involuntary sterilization). 

I. ADVERSE CREDIBILITY DETERMINATION

To prove his claim, Lin submitted his application with supporting documentation and testified at the hearing. Nothing

about his story was incredible or unbelievable. The IJ noted

that the consistency between his application and testimony

“helps . . . establish that what he is saying is truthful.” The IJ

did not, therefore, challenge Lin’s application on the basis of

some disbelief in Lin or his account of events. She focused on

the documentary evidence and concluded that she was not

convinced “that his wife was forcibly sterilized. The evidence

taken as a totality does not appear credible.” 

[1] Although an IJ may deny an asylum application based

on a finding that the documentary evidence is not credible,

there are baseline requirements to sustain such a denial. For

example, the adverse credibility finding must be supported by

substantial evidence, which is satisfied if the IJ offers “a legitimate[,] articulable basis” for the finding and “a specific,

cogent reason for any stated disbelief.” Wang v. INS, 352 F.3d

1250, 1253 (9th Cir. 2003); Shah v. INS, 220 F.3d 1062, 1067

(9th Cir. 2000). More specifically, an adverse credibility finding cannot rest on mere speculation or conjecture, such as the

IJ’s bare subjective opinion about the authenticity or probity

of documents. See Wang, 352 F.3d at 1254; Shah, 220 F.3d

at 1071. Rather, the record must include some “evidence

undermining their reliability,” such that a reviewing court can

objectively verify whether the IJ has a legitimate basis to distrust the documents. Wang, 352 F.3d at 1254. Here, the IJ discounted the probative value of the Family Planing Operation

Certification, the Marriage Certificate, and the Notice of Fine

on the basis of speculation and conjecture and without support

in the record. We address each document. 

394 LIN v. GONZALES
A. FAMILY PLANNING OPERATION CERTIFICATION

The main target of the IJ’s suspicions was the Family Planning Operation Certification, which documented Chen’s

forced sterilization. The IJ found this document “suspect

because the resident identification number is blank. There is

also no evidence that [Lin’s] wife is employed and, therefore,

it is difficult to see why she would have such a certification

issued.” The IJ went on to explain: 

But the Court’s primary concern is that this is supposed to be an official document and yet her identification and even her birth date is not listed since the

document simply states that she is 25 years old. . . .

In conclusion, although there is some probative

value for the family planning operation certification,

the Court must find this probative value to be low

since there has been no forensic analysis and the

document itself is incomplete. The Department of

State has in the past cautioned that at times documents from South China are not genuine. 

[2] The difficulty with this analysis is that it rests on speculation as to what the document should look like and whether

the absence of a few details renders a document suspect.

Without some evidence in the record, other than the IJ’s bare

personal view, we have no way of knowing whether the IJ’s

suspicions are simply conjecture or legitimate concerns bearing on the reliability of the document. Here, as in Wang,

“[t]he record does not furnish any evidence that . . . authentic

Chinese sterilization records ordinarily supply the dates and

other details omitted in [the petitioner’s] document. While we

understand the IJ’s suspicion, her basis for questioning these

documents ‘amounts to nothing more than a subjective view

of what these documents would look like.’ ” Wang, 352 F.3d

at 1255 (quoting Shah, 220 F.3d at 1071) (internal editing

marks omitted). Such a “non-evidence-based assumption canLIN v. GONZALES 395
not support an adverse credibility determination.” Ge v. Ashcroft, 367 F.3d 1121, 1126 (9th Cir. 2004). 

We are not unsympathetic to the IJ’s desire to discern the

authenticity of this certification because it serves as a central

piece of evidence. We also acknowledge the State Department’s caution that at times documents from South China are

not genuine. Nonetheless, these concerns do not obviate the

need for actual evidence rather than personal speculation by

the IJ. 

We are also mindful that an IJ may develop an expertise by

repetitive examination of particular documents or may

develop familiarity with the document practices of certain foreign regions. We do not endeavor here to articulate the

parameters of such expertise or the acceptable reach of judicial notice. It is sufficient to note that any such expertise

should, at a minimum, be articulated on the record so that the

reviewing court can be confident that the IJ’s determinations

are based on objective criteria particularized to the document.

The IJ was suspicious in part because the document “is supposed to be an official document” yet had missing details. To

be sure, informality or incompleteness in an official document

could indicate that it is a forgery. On the other hand, what if

the document format is not atypical for the issuing agency, a

local family planning bureau located on a small rural island

in China?1 It strains credulity, for example, to conclude that

a document is untrustworthy simply because it lists a person’s

1The Marriage Certificate and Notice of Fine were similarly discounted

by the IJ for having missing details, such as the resident identification

numbers. These documents were issued under the authority of the same

local Pingtan County government. While speculation may lead one to conclude that the missing details are indicative of fraud, another inference is

that these documents are genuine because they are consistent with one

another, all missing similar details, and all issued by agencies under the

same local county government. Nothing in the record, however, allows the

IJ or a reviewing court to discern which inference is correct. 

396 LIN v. GONZALES
current age rather than their birth date. The reviewing court

should not be in a position of speculating about the IJ’s speculations. 

The Eighth Circuit’s decision in Bropleh v. Gonzales, 428

F.3d 772, 777 (8th Cir. 2005), illustrates how judicial experience combined with obvious warning signs of forgery, when

articulated on the record, may satisfy the substantial evidence

requirement. In Bropleh, the court upheld an IJ’s determination that a passport had been purposefully altered to conceal

the denial of a United States visa. The court noted that the

record contained adequate support for this determination,

including obvious burn marks on the passport in the area of

the alteration and the IJ’s expertise from reviewing hundreds

of passports: 

The IJ observed that the burn-marks on Bropleh’s

passport were “spectacularly inconsistent,” thereby

indicating that Bropleh had tampered with it. . . . The

judge stated he had reviewed “hundreds” of passports, and was familiar with the precise place a

stamp concerning a visa application would be

placed. Given Bropleh’s testimony that he had not

applied for a visa to the United States, a forensic

expert was not required to find it suspicious that the

passport had been selectively burned in the area

where evidence of an application would be found.

Accordingly, the record indicates the judge made

reasonable inferences from the evidence presented in

concluding that the passport had been purposefully

altered and that this reflected adversely upon Bropleh’s credibility. 

Id.

[3] In contrast to the situation in Bropleh, the IJ in Lin’s

case did not indicate that the missing details were unusual or

indicative of forgery based upon her review of numerous

LIN v. GONZALES 397
Family Planning Operation Certifications or other documents

from the Pingtan Family Planning Bureau. Nor did the IJ

point to some other obvious discrepancy or indicia that would

allow one to discredit the document based on logic or common sense. Although the burden of proof rests with the petitioner, the government did not put on a single witness or offer

any evidence regarding the reliability of these documents or

the document practices of the local issuing entities. In other

words, “[t]here is no evidence in the record to indicate that the

[document is] anything but what [it purports to be].” Shah,

220 F.3d at 1071. 

[4] Our insistence on evidentiary support for a finding of

lack of credibility with respect to an official document is in

line with the views of our sister courts. For example, in Chen

v. U.S. Department of Justice, 426 F.3d 104, 115 (2nd Cir.

2005), the Second Circuit held that the record was insufficient

to support an IJ’s adverse credibility findings concerning birth

control certificates submitted by an asylum applicant. The IJ

“found with regard to [the petitioner’s] claim for relief under

family planning that [his] presentation was not credible due to

the documents that he had provided. In particular the IJ noted

that the numbers on the birth control certificates that [the petitioner] submitted were out of sequence.” Id. at 110 (internal

quotation marks omitted). On appeal, the court held that this

adverse credibility finding “was grounded solely on speculation and conjecture” and that the government did not create a

record sufficient to support the IJ’s adverse credibility finding. Id. at 115. 

[5] The IJ’s other bases for discounting the probative value

of the certificate are similarly without support. One of the referenced deficiencies was that “there has been no forensic

analysis.” Our precedent on this point is clear: “[m]ere failure

to authenticate documents, at least in the absence of evidence

undermining their reliability, does not constitute a sufficient

foundation for an adverse credibility finding.” Wang, 352

F.3d at 1254. It is difficult to imagine what the IJ meant by

398 LIN v. GONZALES
her passing reference to the lack of forensic evidence. Surely

an asylum applicant does not have an affirmative duty to have

a document examiner authenticate every piece of documentary evidence. Indeed, the IJ did not conclude that the document was a forgery, and a forensic examiner could hardly

address the IJ’s real concern—lack of certain details. It is true

that such an examination could be helpful in some situations

to establish an applicant’s claim (especially if there is objective evidence undermining the reliability of the document),

but the failure to offer expert authentication of an official document cannot itself be the basis for reasonable suspicion. Id.

[6] The IJ also discredited the Family Planning Operation

Certification because there was “no evidence that [Lin’s] wife

is employed and, therefore, it is difficult to see why she would

have such a certification issued.” This assertion is based on

nothing more than the IJ’s conjecture about the practices of

the Pingtan Family Planning Bureau. See Shah, 220 F.3d at

1071. 

[7] Finally, the IJ’s reference to the generalized State

Department report’s warning of forgeries from South China is

informative but not a sufficient basis to discredit the Family

Planning Operation Certification, particularly since the State

Department report was not tied to the circumstances of Lin’s

case. See id. at 1069; Wang, 352 F.3d at 1254. Although a

State Department report on widespread forgery within a particular region may be part of the IJ’s analysis, speculation that

a document is unreliable merely because other documents

from the same region have been forged in the past can hardly

be regarded as substantial evidence. 

B. MARRIAGE CERTIFICATE AND NOTICE OF FINE

[8] The IJ’s suspicions regarding the Marriage Certificate

and Notice of Fine suffer from many of the same deficiencies

as the Family Planning Operation Certification. As to the

Marriage Certificate, the IJ stated that it was “not a very reliLIN v. GONZALES 399
able piece of evidence” because “the couple’s identity numbers are not listed.”

2

 Regarding the Notice of Fine, the IJ

stated that it “does not give an address for the couple nor their

registration numbers. In addition this notice is not on a preprinted form as is often seen such as the one on the family

planning operation certification.” 

[9] Nothing in the record, other than the IJ’s unsupported

subjective view, suggests that the missing details or format of

the documents are unusual or indicative of a trumped-up document. The corollary to the IJ’s position is that if every item

was filled in, then the document would appear authentic. This

approach is, in fact, counterintuitive. Someone wanting to

forge a document would likely want to make sure to dot every

“i” and cross every “t”—or at least the equivalent in Chinese

—to make the document appear as complete as possible. On

the other hand, bureaucracy does not always yield perfect

results, and it is equally likely that a document missing a few

details is authentic and represents the reality of a clerk processing large numbers of documents. The point is that we do

not know the answer to this quandary and speculation cannot

be used to fill in the blanks. 

[10] The condemnation of the Notice of Fine not being on

a pre-printed form is a perfect illustration of conjecture with2The IJ also mentioned that the birth date listed for Lin’s wife was

inconsistent with another document. Lin explained that the Marriage Certificate contained an inaccurate date because his wife was below the legal

age of marriage and thus the certificate needed to reflect an earlier date of

birth. The IJ did not explain how this inconsistency could bear negatively

on the crux of the asylum claim, i.e., the forced sterilization. Such a minor

inconsistency, especially when adequately explained by the applicant, cannot form the basis of an adverse credibility determination. Shah, 220 F.3d

at 1068 (“[W]e will not uphold an adverse credibility finding unless the

IJ or BIA specifically explains the significance of the discrepancy or

points to the petitioner’s obvious evasiveness when asked about it. If discrepancies ‘cannot be viewed as attempts by the applicant to enhance his

claims of persecution, [they] have no bearing on credibility.’ ”) (second

alteration in original) (citation omitted). 

400 LIN v. GONZALES
out evidence. Because the Family Planning Operation Certification is on a pre-printed form, the IJ hypothesized that such

a pre-printed form is expected for the Notice of Fine. Maybe,

maybe not. That conclusion relies solely on the IJ’s imagination of what a “fine” document would look like and, most

likely, on an American-based view of government forms.

Absent any evidence, how can one reasonably conclude that

the fine would be on a standard form? The fine was issued by

a rural authority and we have no way of divining from the

record whether this type of document is typically preprinted

in China generally, let alone in this rural venue. Nor did the

IJ explain how her suspicions regarding these missing details

reflected on the credibility of Lin’s claim that his wife was

forcibly sterilized. See Shah, 220 F.3d at 1068 (“[T]he IJ gave

no specific indication as to why the discrepancy is significant.

In fact, neither the IJ nor the BIA explained why Mrs. Shah

would [include the discrepancy]. We cannot affirm the credibility determination on this basis.”) 

[11] Aggregating the suspicions as a “totality,” to use the

IJ’s term, does not salvage the adverse credibility finding.

Stacking one suspicion or conjecture on top of another simply

extends but does not strengthen the flimsy house of cards. If

one suspicion cannot meet the substantial evidence standard,

two are no better. The record lacks “a legitimate articulable

basis,” such that we can verify the IJ’s “specific, cogent reason for any stated disbelief.” Wang, 352 F.3d at 1253. 

II. DISCRETIONARY DENIAL OF ASYLUM

Lin also challenges the IJ’s discretionary denial of asylum.

Because this issue was not addressed by the Board, remand is

appropriate. INS v. Ventura, 537 U.S. 12 (2002).3

3We recognize, as did the IJ, that “asylum is rarely denied as a matter

of discretion. . . .” We also note that the grounds for her discretionary

denial appear to suffer from the same sort of unsupported and unparticularized speculation discussed with regards to her adverse credibility finding. We remand to the Board, however, to consider the discretionary

denial of asylum.

LIN v. GONZALES 401
PETITION GRANTED; REMANDED to the Board to

review the IJ’s discretionary denial of asylum. 

402 LIN v. GONZALES