#### Vincent DePASQUALE, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Daniel DePASQUALE, Pension Design Services, Inc., Defendants-Appellees.

No. 13-3274.

United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.

June 3, 2014.

*56Vincent DePasquale, Rahway, NJ, pro se.

Mark D. Lefkowitz, Schwartz & Silver-stein, LLP, New City, NY, for Appellee Daniel DePasquale; Scott A. Schechter, Sergio Alves, Kaufinan, Borgeest & Ryan LLP, Valhalla, NY, for Appellee Pension Design Services, Inc.

Present: JON 0. NEWMAN, JOHN M. WALKER, JR., and JOSÉ A. CABRANES, Circuit Judges.

*SUMMARY ORDER*

UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the judgment and order are AFFIRMED.

Plaintiff-Appellant Vincent DePasquale, proceeding *pro se,*filed suit on May 21, 2012 against his uncle, Daniel DePasquale, a trustee of Debro Manufacturing Corporation’s pension plan, and against Pension Design Services, Inc. (“PDS”), alleging numerous violations of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (“ERISA”), 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461.1 In a judgment entered March 1, 2013, the District Court granted defendants’ motion to dismiss the complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), holding that the claim was time-barred. In a Memorandum and Order entered August 5, 2013, the District Court denied plaintiffs motion for reconsideration and motion to amend the complaint. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural history of the case, and the issues on appeal.

We review *de novo*a district court’s grant of a motion to dismiss, including “legal conclusions” concerning the court’s “interpretation and application of a statute of limitations.” *See City of Pontiac Gen. Emps.’ Ret. Sys. v. MBIA, Inc.,*637 F.3d 169, 173 (2d Cir.2011). To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the complaint must include “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” *Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,*550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007); *see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal,*556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009). Although all allegations contained in the complaint are assumed to be true, this tenet is “inapplicable to legal conclusions.” *Iqbal,*556 U.S. at 678,129 S.Ct. 1937. We review denial of motions for reconsideration and for leave to amend for abuse of discretion. *See Johnson v. Univ. of Rochester Med. Ctr.,*642 F.3d 121, 125 (2d Cir.2011) (denial of Rule 60(b) motion for reconsideration); *ATSI Commc’ns, Inc. v. Shaar Fund, Ltd.,*493 F.3d 87, 108 (2d Cir.2007) (denial of leave to amend).

Upon a review of the record, we agree with the District Court’s conclusions, for substantially the reasons stated in its thorough and well-reasoned orders. Accordingly, the judgment and order of the district court are AFFIRMED.

We DENY Daniel DePasquale’s request for sanctions on the merits, and also as improperly raised in his appellate brief rather than in a separately filed motion as required by Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 38. *See Great Am. Ins. Co. v. M/V Handy Laker,*348 F.3d 352, 354 (2d Cir.2003) (denying request for Rule 38 sanctions raised in appellee’s brief where no separately filed motion had been submitted). We generally impose such sanctions only in cases of blatant frivolity, bad *57faith, or repetitive frivolous filings. *See, e.g., 60 E. 80th St. Equities, Inc. v. Sapir (In re 60 E. 80th St. Equities, Inc.),*218 F.3d 109, 119-20 (2d Cir.2000); *Moore v. Time, Inc.,*180 F.3d 463, 463-64 (2d Cir.1999). While Vincent DePasquale’s appeal is without merit, it does not warrant sanctions under this standard.

1

. Vincent DePasquale was represented by counsel in the District Court, and counsel filed his appellate brief. He terminated counsel before filing his reply brief and presently proceeds *pro se.*