Opinion issued December 5, 2019

In The

Court of Appeals 

For The 

First District of Texas 

————————————

NO. 01-18-00672-CR

———————————

JOSEPH HASKINS, Appellant

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

On Appeal from the 149th District Court

Brazoria County, Texas

Trial Court Case No. 80889-CR

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Appellant, Joseph Haskins, pleaded guilty to the second-degree felony offense 

of burglary of a habitation.1 The trial court deferred adjudication of appellant’s guilt 

 

1 See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 30.02(a)(1).
2

and placed him on community supervision for four years. The State subsequently 

filed two motions to adjudicate guilt, arguing that appellant had violated multiple 

conditions of his community supervision. At a hearing, the trial court found that 

appellant had violated the community supervision conditions. The trial court 

revoked appellant’s community supervision, found appellant guilty of the charged 

offense of burglary, and assessed his punishment at twelve years’ confinement. In 

his sole issue, appellant contends that the trial court abused its discretion by revoking 

his community supervision. The State requests that we modify the judgment of the 

trial court to reflect that the trial court found all of the allegations in the amended 

motion to adjudicate guilt to be true.

We modify the judgment of the trial court and affirm as modified.

Background

In February 2017, a Brazoria County grand jury indicted appellant for the 

offense of burglary of a habitation, alleging that appellant had entered a habitation 

without the effective consent of the owner and with the intent to commit theft. In 

April 2017, appellant pleaded guilty to this offense. The trial court entered an order 

of deferred adjudication and placed appellant on community supervision for four 

years. The trial court imposed multiple conditions on appellant during the period of 

community supervision, including:

• Commit no offense against the laws of Texas or any other state;
3

• Avoid “injurious or vicious conduct” and “totally abstain” from the 

consumption of alcohol or the illegal use of controlled substances;

• Pay a monthly supervision fee, as well as a Crime Stoppers fee, a $500 

fine, and $318 in court costs;

• Submit to random drug and alcohol testing;

• Complete 120 hours of community service;

• Appear for a review hearing before the trial court on October 13, 2017.

Appellant acknowledged receiving a copy of these conditions.

On October 23, 2017, the State filed a motion to adjudicate guilt. In this 

motion, the State alleged that appellant violated the conditions of his community 

supervision relating to (1) avoiding injurious or vicious conduct and abstaining from 

the use of alcohol and controlled substances; (2) paying the required fees and costs; 

(3) completing community service; and (4) appearing at the October 13 review 

hearing. Specifically, the State alleged that appellant used hydrocodone on 

September 2, 2017, marijuana and alcohol on September 9, 2017, and 

methamphetamine and amphetamine on September 27, 2017. The State requested 

that the trial court adjudicate appellant’s guilt of the underlying burglary offense.

The State filed an amended motion to adjudicate guilt on April 3, 2018, raising 

twelve allegations that appellant had violated the conditions of his community 

supervision. In addition to the allegations that appellant had used drugs and alcohol 

in September 2017 and failed to appear at the October 2017 hearing, the State added

allegations that appellant committed an offense against the laws of Texas on March 
4

12, 2018, when he recklessly engaged in conducted that placed Nathan Venters in 

imminent danger of serious bodily injury by “dispersing gasoline in Nathan Venters’ 

residence and attempting to ignite the gasoline.” The State also alleged that appellant 

had failed to pay the required supervision fee for September 2017 through February 

2018, the required Crime Stoppers fee, the $500 fine, and court costs. The State 

further alleged that appellant failed to complete the required community service for 

September 2017 through February 2018.

The trial court held a revocation hearing on July 9, 2018. At the beginning of 

the hearing, the trial court read each of the twelve allegations presented in the State’s 

amended motion to adjudicate guilt and asked for appellant’s plea to each allegation. 

Appellant pleaded not true to allegation one, concerning placing Nathan Venters in 

danger of serious bodily injury by dispersing gasoline in his residence and 

attempting to ignite it; allegation three, that he used alcohol on September 9, 2017; 

and allegation five, that he used amphetamines on September 27, 2017. Appellant 

pleaded true to the other nine allegations raised in the State’s motion to adjudicate. 

The trial court asked appellant whether his pleas of true were made freely and 

voluntarily, whether anyone forced or threatened him to make those pleas, and 

whether he was pleading true because the allegations were true. Appellant responded 

that his pleas of true were made freely and voluntarily, that no one had threatened 

him, and that the allegations to which he pleaded true were true.
5

Houston Police Department Office T. Le testified that she was on patrol on 

March 12, 2018, when she received a dispatch relating to someone pouring gasoline 

inside of an apartment in southeast Houston. When she arrived, Le learned that the 

apartment was rented to Bettie Venters, who lived there with her sons, Nathan 

Venters and appellant. Le could smell a strong smell of gasoline when she entered 

the living room of the apartment. Appellant was not at the apartment at the time that 

Le arrived, but another officer arrested him later that evening in the backyard, and 

he was subsequently charged by a Harris County grand jury with deadly conduct.2

Appellant had marijuana in his possession at the time of his arrest. Nathan Venters 

told Le that appellant had been smoking a cigarette around where he had poured the 

gasoline. Appellant threw his cigarette on the ground, and Nathan extinguished it.

Brazoria County Probation Officer A. Woods was assigned to monitor 

appellant during his community supervision. She met with appellant once on 

September 27, 2017.3 Woods requested that appellant complete a drug and alcohol 

urinalysis test on this date, which he did. Appellant tested positive for marijuana and 

 

2 Officer Le testified that the deadly conduct case against appellant in Harris County 

was still pending at the time of the revocation hearing in Brazoria County.

3 Woods testified that although appellant was placed on community supervision in 

April 2017, she did not meet appellant until September 2017 because appellant had 

a pending charge in Harris County and was sentenced to state jail time. Appellant 

was released from confinement on this charge on September 8, 2017, and Woods 

met with him shortly thereafter.
6

admitted to Woods that he had used marijuana on September 9, 2017. Appellant did 

not test positive for alcohol, but he admitted to Woods that he had consumed alcohol 

on September 9. Appellant’s drug test results also revealed that appellant had 

consumed methamphetamine and amphetamines. When speaking to Woods, 

appellant denied taking methamphetamine and amphetamines, but he admitted 

taking some of his father’s hydrocodone pills.4 Appellant did not have an explanation 

for why he had tested positive for methamphetamine. The trial court admitted copies 

of appellant’s drug test results.

Woods testified that appellant never paid any of his required monthly 

supervision fees, nor did he pay the required Crime Stoppers fee, the $500 fine 

imposed in the order of deferred adjudication, or his court costs. Woods stated that 

the community supervision conditions required appellant to complete 120 hours of 

community service, but although Woods explained this requirement and appellant 

indicated his understanding, he did not complete any community service hours. 

Woods also testified that she twice told appellant—including during a phone 

conversation on October 11—that the community supervision conditions required 

him to appear at a review hearing before the trial court on October 13, 2017, but 

appellant did not attend. Appellant called Woods on October 13 and stated that he 

 

4 Appellant did not test positive for hydrocodone or opiates. Woods asked appellant 

if it was possible that the pills he took were not actually hydrocodone, and appellant 

“explained that those were his father’s pills.”
7

had not been able to attend the hearing because he had been in the emergency room 

for chest pains, but appellant never provided any medical records or documentation 

to Woods. Woods sought a capias for appellant’s arrest due to his failure to attend 

the October 2017 hearing. Woods had no further contact with appellant after October 

2017, and appellant was placed on “absconder” status in December 2017.

Appellant also testified at the revocation hearing. At the time he was placed 

on community supervision he was living with his mother in Houston. Appellant 

testified that he was released from confinement on a separate charge in September 

2017, and he would smoke marijuana every day as a way to deal with the pressure 

of being out of confinement and on community supervision. With respect to the 

positive drug test results for methamphetamine and amphetamines, appellant stated, 

“I wasn’t aware that it was methamphetamine. It was a tab that I took.” He stated 

that he believed he was taking an antidepressant. Appellant testified, “[W]hen I 

failed the [urinalysis] sample, that’s when I figured everything was just downhill

from there; and I was just waiting for them to come and get me.”

With respect to the incident in March 2018 at his apartment with the gasoline, 

appellant stated that he had been hearing voices. He also stated that he had taken “a 

tab” the day before, which he thought was an antidepressant, and he felt frustrated 

and extremely confused regarding what was going on with himself and the people 

around him. He obtained the gasoline that he used from a local corner store. 
8

Appellant denied that he had any drug addictions, but he requested that if the trial 

court believed he needed to participate in a drug treatment program, that he be 

allowed to complete such a program while not being confined.

Appellant admitted that he had not completed any of his required community 

service hours, that he had not paid any of the required fines or costs, and that he had

not attended the October 2017 review hearing. He admitted that he was not in the 

hospital on the date of the review hearing and that he had lied to Woods when he 

told her that that was where he had been. He stated that, because he had failed the 

urinalysis test, he believed he would have been arrested had he shown up to the 

hearing.

At the close of the hearing, the trial court found all twelve allegations raised 

in the State’s amended motion to adjudicate guilt to be true. Approximately two 

weeks later, the trial court held a sentencing hearing at which it revoked appellant’s 

community supervision, found him guilty of the underlying offense of burglary of a 

habitation, and assessed his punishment at twelve years’ confinement.5 This appeal 

followed.

 

5 The trial court’s judgment adjudicating guilt stated, “While on community 

supervision, Defendant violated the terms and conditions of community supervision 

as set out in the State’s 1st Amended Motion to Adjudicate Guilt as follows: 2, 4, 6, 

7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12.” The judgment did not state that appellant violated allegations 

one, three, and five raised in the State’s amended motion, even though the trial court 

orally found these allegations to be true.
9

Revocation of Community Supervision

In his sole issue, appellant contends that the trial court abused its discretion 

by finding that he had violated the conditions of his community supervision and by 

revoking his community supervision.

A. Standard of Review and Governing Law

If, in the opinion of the trial court, the best interest of society and the defendant 

will be served, the court may, after receiving a plea of guilty, hearing the evidence, 

and finding that it substantiates the defendant’s guilt, defer further proceedings 

without entering an adjudication of guilt and place the defendant on deferred 

adjudication community supervision. TEX.CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 42A.101(a). 

The trial court shall inform the defendant of the possible consequences of violating 

a condition of deferred adjudication community supervision. Id. art. 42A.101(b); see 

id. art. 42A.751(b) (“At any time during the period of community supervision, the 

judge may issue a warrant for a violation of any condition of community supervision 

and cause the defendant to be arrested.”). If a defendant violates a condition of 

deferred adjudication community supervision, the defendant “is entitled to a hearing 

limited to a determination by the court of whether the court will proceed with an 

adjudication of guilt on the original charge.” Id. art. 42A.108(b). After the trial court 

adjudicates the defendant’s guilt, all proceedings, including a defendant’s appeal, 

“continue as if the adjudication of guilt had not been deferred.” Id. art. 42A.110(a).
10

For a trial court to revoke a defendant’s community supervision, the State 

must prove the violation of a condition of community supervision by a 

preponderance of the evidence. Hacker v. State, 389 S.W.3d 860, 864–65 (Tex. 

Crim. App. 2013); Rickels v. State, 202 S.W.3d 759, 763 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006); 

Bell v. State, 554 S.W.3d 742, 746 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2018, pet. ref’d). 

In this context, “a preponderance of the evidence” means “that greater weight of the 

credible evidence which would create a reasonable belief that the defendant has 

violated a condition of his probation.” Hacker, 389 S.W.3d at 865 (quoting Rickels, 

202 S.W.3d at 763–64); Bell, 554 S.W.3d at 746.

Our review of a trial court’s order revoking community supervision and 

adjudicating a defendant’s guilt is limited to determining whether the trial court 

abused its discretion in determining that the defendant violated the conditions of his 

community supervision. Bell, 554 S.W.3d at 746 (citing Rickels, 202 S.W.3d at 763); 

Duncan v. State, 321 S.W.3d 53, 56–57 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2010, pet. 

ref’d); see Hacker, 389 S.W.3d at 865 (“For probation-revocation cases, we have 

described the appellate standard of review as whether the trial court abused its 

discretion.”). To support the trial court’s order revoking community supervision and 

adjudicating guilt, the State need only establish one sufficient ground for revocation. 

Duncan, 321 S.W.3d at 57. “A plea of true, standing alone, is sufficient to support 

the revocation of community supervision and adjudicate guilt.” Tapia v. State, 462 
11

S.W.3d 29, 31 n.2 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015). We view the evidence in the light most 

favorable to the trial court’s order. Bell, 554 S.W.3d at 746; Duncan, 321 S.W.3d at 

57. As the factfinder at a revocation proceeding, the trial court determines the 

credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be given to their testimony. Bell, 554 

S.W.3d at 746; Duncan, 321 S.W.3d at 57.

B. Analysis

In this case, appellant pleaded guilty to the underlying criminal offense—a 

charge of burglary of a habitation. The trial court deferred adjudication of appellant’s 

guilt and placed him on community supervision for four years. The trial court 

imposed numerous conditions on appellant during this period of community 

supervision, including requirements that he commit no violations against the laws of 

Texas, that he avoid using alcohol and controlled substances, that he pay certain 

required fines and costs, that he complete 120 hours of community service, and that 

he attend a review hearing on October 13, 2017. The State filed original and 

amended motions to revoke appellant’s community supervision and to adjudicate his 

guilt of the underlying burglary offense, alleging that he had committed twelve 

violations of the conditions of community supervision.

At the revocation hearing, appellant pleaded not true to three of the allegations 

raised by the State in its motion to adjudicate: (1) that he had committed the offense 

of deadly conduct by pouring gasoline in his mother’s apartment and attempting to 
12

ignite the gasoline; (2) that he had used alcohol on September 9, 2017; and (3) that 

he had used amphetamines on September 27, 2017. Appellant pleaded true to the 

other nine allegations raised in the State’s motions. Appellant’s pleas of true to nine 

of the allegations in the State’s motion, standing alone, are sufficient to support the 

trial court’s order revoking his community supervision and adjudicating his guilt of 

the underlying burglary offense.6 See Tapia, 462 S.W.3d at 31 n.2; see also Duncan, 

321 S.W.3d at 57 (stating that, to support trial court’s revocation and adjudication 

order, State need only establish one sufficient ground for revocation).

Appellant argues that the trial court abused its discretion and he was denied 

due process because “the mere placing of a defendant on a deferred adjudication that 

all parties know is a failure from day one violates due process.” As support for this 

 

6 We note that, in addition to appellant’s pleas of true to nine of the allegations raised 

in the State’s amended motion, appellant testified at the revocation hearing and 

admitted that he had used marijuana and controlled substances, that he had poured 

the gasoline inside his mother’s house, that he had completed none of his required 

community service hours, that he had not paid any of his required fees or costs, and 

that he had failed to attend the October 2017 review hearing. Appellant’s testimony 

is also supported by testimony from Officer Le concerning the March 2018 incident 

at his mother’s apartment and from Officer Woods concerning appellant’s positive 

drug test results, failure to complete his community service hours, failure to pay his 

required fees and costs, and failure to attend the review hearing. We conclude that 

the State presented sufficient evidence that appellant violated the conditions of his 

community supervision. See Hacker v. State, 389 S.W.3d 860, 864–65 (Tex. Crim. 

App. 2013) (holding that State must prove that defendant violated condition of 

community supervision by preponderance of evidence, meaning “that greater 

weight of the credible evidence which would create a reasonable belief that the 

defendant has violated a condition of his probation”); Bell v. State, 554 S.W.3d 742, 

746 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2018, pet. ref’d).
13

argument, appellant points out that, at the time he was placed on deferred 

adjudication for the underlying burglary offense in Brazoria County in April 2017, 

he was serving a sentence for an unknown offense in Harris County. He was confined 

for approximately five months on that offense before being released from 

confinement in September 2017. Appellant argues that he was “five or more months 

behind” on his community supervision for the Brazoria County burglary offense at 

the time he was released from confinement for the Harris County offense, and the 

trial court abused its discretion by revoking his deferred adjudication because, at the 

time he was placed on deferred adjudication for the Brazoria County offense, he was 

“immediately in violation of same and subject to revocation” due to his incarceration 

for the Harris County offense.

The State, however, did not seek to adjudicate appellant’s guilt on the Brazoria 

County burglary offense due to any conduct or failures to comply that occurred while 

appellant was incarcerated in Harris County from April 2017 through early 

September 2017. Instead, all of the grounds raised in the State’s motion addressed 

conduct or omissions that occurred after appellant was released from confinement. 

The State alleged that appellant consumed alcohol and controlled substances after 

he was released from confinement in September 2017. It specifically alleged that 

appellant failed to complete his required community service and failed to pay his 

required fees and costs beginning in September 2017 through February 2018. It 
14

alleged that he failed to attend a review hearing in October 2017, after he had been 

released from confinement. And it alleged that he committed a new offense against 

the laws of Texas in March 2018, six months after he had been released from 

confinement. Appellant’s argument that the trial court’s revocation and adjudication 

order violated his due process rights because he was placed on deferred adjudication 

knowing that he would immediately be in violation of the conditions of community 

supervision is therefore unavailing.

We hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding that appellant 

had violated the conditions of his community supervision, revoking his community 

supervision, and adjudicating his guilt of the underlying burglary offense. See 

Hacker, 389 S.W.3d at 865; Bell, 554 S.W.3d at 746.

We overrule appellant’s sole issue.

C. Modification of Trial Court’s Judgment

The State requests that we modify a portion of the trial court’s judgment 

adjudicating appellant’s guilt for the burglary offense because the judgment 

erroneously states that appellant violated the conditions of community supervision 

as set out in allegations “2, 4, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, [and] 12” of the State’s amended 

motion to adjudicate, but the trial court stated both at the close of the revocation 

hearing and at the sentencing hearing approximately two weeks later that it found 
15

that all twelve allegations raised in the State’s amended motion—including 

allegations one, three, and five—were true.

Appellate courts have the authority to reform a judgment and affirm the 

judgment as modified in cases where there is non-reversible error. Walker v. State, 

557 S.W.3d 678, 690 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2018, pet. ref’d); see TEX. R. APP. P.

43.2 (providing that appellate court may “modify the trial court’s judgment and 

affirm it as modified”). We may modify a judgment when the evidence necessary to 

correct that judgment appears in the record. See Bigley v. State, 865 S.W.2d 26, 27–

28 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993) (declining to limit courts of appeals’ authority to reform 

judgments to situations involving clerical mistakes); Edwards v. State, 497 S.W.3d 

147, 164 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2016, pet. ref’d) (stating that appellate 

courts have “the power to correct and reform the judgment of the court below ‘to 

make the record speak the truth when it has the necessary data and information to do 

so’”) (quoting Nolan v. State, 39 S.W.3d 697, 698 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 

2001, no pet.)).

At the close of the revocation hearing, the trial court stated on the record that 

it found all twelve allegations raised in the State’s amended motion to adjudicate 

guilt to be true. At a sentencing hearing approximately two weeks later, the trial 

court stated that it found allegations one through four and allegations six through 

twelve to be true, and allegation five to be not true. The prosecutor sought 
16

clarification, pointing out that at the revocation hearing, the trial court had found all 

twelve allegations to be true. The trial court reviewed its notes and agreed with the 

prosecutor, stating, “I didn’t read my notes correctly. I did find that all allegations 

were true. . . . So I will find all allegations to be true.” The written judgment 

adjudicating appellant’s guilt, however, included a finding stating, “While on 

community supervision, Defendant violated the terms and conditions of community 

supervision as set out in the State’s 1st Amended Motion to Adjudicate Guilt as 

follows: 2, 4, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12.”

The written judgment omits the trial court’s oral findings on the record that 

the first, third, and fifth allegations raised in the State’s amended motion to 

adjudicate guilt were also true. The State argues that we should reform the judgment 

of the trial court to include the court’s oral findings that allegations one, three, and 

five were true. The record reflects that, in addition to the allegations specified in the 

judgment, the trial court also found the first, third, and fifth allegations to be true, 

and evidence presented at the revocation hearing supports these findings. We 

therefore grant the State’s request and modify the judgment of the trial court to 

reflect that the trial court found all allegations raised in the State’s amended motion 

to adjudicate to be true.
17

Conclusion

We modify the judgment of the trial court to state: “While on community 

supervision, Defendant violated the terms and conditions of community supervision 

as set out in the State’s 1st Amended Motion to Adjudicate Guilt as follows: 1, 2, 3, 

4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12.” We affirm the judgment as modified.

Evelyn V. Keyes

Justice

Panel consists of Chief Justice Radack and Justices Keyes and Hightower.

Do not publish. TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).