UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 10-4180

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff – Appellee,

v.

ALEXANDER JESUS SANTIAGO,

Defendant – Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern 

District of Virginia, at Richmond. Robert E. Payne, Senior 

District Judge. (3:09-cr-00299-REP-1)

Submitted: November 24, 2010 Decided: December 29, 2010

Before SHEDD, DUNCAN, and KEENAN, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Michael S. Nachmanoff, Federal Public Defender, Carolyn V. 

Grady, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Caroline S. Platt, 

Research and Writing Attorney, Richmond, Virginia, for 

Appellant. Angela Mastandrea-Miller, Assistant United States 

Attorney, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellee. 

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
2

PER CURIAM:

Alexander Jesus Santiago was indicted on one count of 

possession with intent to distribute one hundred grams or more 

of heroin, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841 (2006). Santiago 

pleaded not guilty and proceeded to trial. Santiago was found 

guilty, and the district court sentenced him to eighty-four 

months’ imprisonment, at the bottom of Santiago’s U.S. 

Sentencing Guidelines Manual (“USSG”) (2009) range.

Santiago appealed, and his counsel filed a brief 

pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), 

concluding that there are no meritorious grounds for appeal, but 

asking us to review, first, whether the district court erred 

when it applied a two-level firearm enhancement, and second, 

whether the district court failed to sufficiently explain the 

sentence imposed. Santiago submitted a pro se supplemental 

brief arguing that he was deprived of the opportunity to 

confront and cross-examine the forensic chemist who identified 

the substances recovered as heroin, and that he received 

ineffective assistance of counsel. We affirm.

Counsel first argues that the district court committed 

plain error when it applied a two-level weapon enhancement 

pursuant to USSG § 2D1.1(b)(1) because there was not a 

sufficient connection between the weapon and the heroin. 

Counsel notes that Santiago did not have a firearm on his person 
3

or in his vehicle when he was arrested, but that the firearm was 

recovered from Santiago’s residence, where no drugs were found.

The Guidelines allow for a two-level increase in 

offense level in a drug offense where “a dangerous weapon 

(including a firearm) was possessed.” USSG § 2D1.1(b)(1). 

Application note three to § 2D1.1 instructs that “[t]he 

adjustment should be applied if the weapon was present, unless 

it is clearly improbable that the weapon was connected with the 

offense.” USSG § 2D1.1 cmt. n.3. This court reviews the 

factual findings underpinning application of a sentence 

enhancement for clear error; “if the issue turns primarily on 

the legal interpretation of the guidelines, . . . review is de 

novo.” United States v. Carter, 601 F.3d 252, 254 

(4th Cir. 2010). In order to support the USSG § 2D1.1(b)(1) 

firearm enhancement, “the Government must prove by a 

preponderance of the evidence that the weapon was possessed in 

connection with drug activity that was part of the same course 

of conduct or common scheme as the offense of conviction.” 

United States v. Manigan

Here, although Santiago was not carrying the firearm 

when he was arrested and no drugs were recovered from Santiago’s 

residence, baggies, digital scales, and a substance frequently 

cut with drugs were recovered from the same room as the firearm. 

, 592 F.3d 621, 628-29 (4th Cir. 2010) 

(internal quotation marks omitted).
4

The Government was not required to prove “precisely concurrent 

acts,” and was entitled to rely on circumstantial evidence, 

including the type of firearm involved, to carry its burden. 

Id. at 629 (internal quotation marks omitted). Under these 

circumstances, the district court did not err when it found the 

firearm sufficiently connected to the drug offense.

Next, counsel argues that Santiago’s sentence is 

procedurally unreasonable because the district court failed to 

provide an individualized assessment of the facts and arguments 

relevant to sentencing. We review the reasonableness of a 

sentence under an abuse of discretion standard. Gall v. United 

States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007). This review requires 

consideration of both the procedural and substantive 

reasonableness of a sentence. Id.; United States v. Lynn, 592 

F.3d 572, 575 (4th Cir. 2010). Here, only the procedural 

reasonableness of Santiago’s sentence has been questioned.

A district court commits procedural error when it 

“fail[s] to adequately explain the chosen sentence.” Lynn, 

592 F.3d at 575 (quoting Gall, 552 U.S. at 51). While district 

judges must provide a particularized assessment as to why the 

sentence imposed is proper in each case, they need not 

“robotically tick through [18 U.S.C.] § 3553(a)’s [(2006)] every 

subsection.” United States v. Johnson, 445 F.3d 339, 345 

(4th Cir. 2006). Moreover, “when a judge decides simply to 
5

apply the Guidelines to a particular case, doing so will not 

necessarily require lengthy explanation.” Rita v. United 

States, 551 U.S. 338, 356 (2007); see Lynn, 592 F.3d at 576.

The district court supplied an adequate explanation 

for the within-Guidelines sentence imposed in this case. The 

district court stated that, given Santiago’s criminal history 

and the nature of his conduct, a sentence at the high end of the 

Guidelines would be warranted to “give him enough prison time to 

show respect for the law and learn respect for the law, to 

protect the public, to deter him from further conduct, as well 

as to send a message to the community that this kind of conduct 

won’t be tolerated.” Nonetheless, the district court determined

that even the minimum, eighty-seven-month sentence under the 

Guidelines would fulfill the objectives of 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). 

Although the district court’s explanation was not elaborate or 

lengthy, it “provide[d] a rationale tailored to the particular 

case at hand” and was adequate to permit “‘meaningful appellate 

review.’” United States v. Carter, 564 F.3d 325, 330 

(4th Cir. 2009) (quoting Gall, 552 U.S. at 50).

In his pro se supplemental brief, Santiago argues that 

the introduction of the laboratory report identifying the heroin

violated the confrontation clause of the Sixth Amendment. 

However, because the report was admitted pursuant to a 

stipulation, Santiago has waived this argument.
6

Santiago also claims that his counsel was 

constitutionally ineffective by stipulating that the substance 

recovered was heroin, by failing to object to a compromised 

juror, and by failing to file a motion to suppress. Claims of 

ineffective assistance of counsel are generally not cognizable 

on direct appeal, unless counsel’s “ineffectiveness conclusively 

appears from the record.” United States v. Baldovinos, 434 F.3d 

233, 239 (4th Cir. 2006). In order to allow for the adequate 

development of the record, Santiago must bring his claim in a 

28 U.S.C.A. § 2255 (West Supp. 2010) motion. See United 

States v. Baptiste, 596 F.3d 214, 216-17 n.1 (4th Cir. 2010).

In accordance with Anders, we have thoroughly reviewed 

the entire record in this case and have found no meritorious 

issues for appeal. We therefore affirm Santiago’s conviction 

and sentence. We deny Santiago’s motion to substitute counsel. 

This court requires that counsel inform Santiago, in writing, of 

the right to petition the Supreme Court of the United States for 

further review. If Santiago requests that a petition be filed, 

but counsel believes that such a petition would be frivolous, 

then counsel may move in this court for leave to withdraw from 

representation. Counsel’s motion must state that a copy thereof 

was served on Santiago.

We dispense with oral argument because the facts and 

legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials 
7

before the court and argument would not aid the decisional 

process.

AFFIRMED