# 3Jn tbe Wniteb**~tates** 

# QCourt ofjfeberal QCiaitns No. 16-206 T (Filed: February 3, 2017)
NOTFORPUBLICATION 

# FILED FEB - 32017
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.S

. COURT OF FEDERAL CLAIMS GINA BRASHERLANGLEY, ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) Plaintiff,

v. THE UNITED STATES, Defendant. Income TaxRefund; Lack ofSubject Matter Jurisdiction; RCFC l2(b )(1); Failure to State A Claim; RCFC 12(b)(6); Untimely Filing; RCFC 12(g); I.R.C. §§ 651 l(a), 6532(a), 7422(a).

### ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~) GinaB. Langley, NeptuneBeach, Fla., prose. BrianJ. Sullivan, Attorney ofRecord, Tax Division, United States Department ofJustice, with whomwere CarolineD. Ciraolo, ActingAssistant Attorney General, and David I. Pincus, Chief, Court ofFederal Claims Section, and G. Robson Stewart, Assistant Chief, CourtofFederal Claims Section, for defendant. OPINION CAMPBELL-SMITH, ChiefJudge This is primarily anincome tax refund claim. Plaintiff, GinaLangley, brings her claim withoutcounsel. Defendantis the Internal Revenue Service (defendant orIRS). Plaintiffseeks an income tax refund for five tax years, 2004, 2009, 201 1, 2012, and 2013

. 1 For 2004, Ms. Langleyfiled ajointincome taxreturn withherthen-husband, BarneyLangley. Foreachofthe remaining years, all ofwhichwere afterthe finalization ofher divorce from Mr. Langley, Ms. Langley filed an individual income taxreturn. Ms. Langley alsobrings a property-related claim inwhich she seeks to havethe name ofherex-husband removed from the title to the former marital home, which is now

Allreferences to a taxyear are to the cotTesponding calendaryear, January 1to December 31.



### 7014 1200 DODO 9093 6514herhome. In addition, Ms. Langley asks this courtto declare that Suzanne Green, Mr. Langley's divorce attorney, has no interest in her home. Duringthe course ofthe Langleys' divorce proceeding in Florida, Ms. Green secured an attorney's charging lien onthe marital home in response to Mr. Langley's non-payment oflegal fees. Defendant moved for the dismissal ofplaintiffs income tax refund claims for four years-2004, 2011, 2012, and 2013-as well as herproperty claims, for lack of jurisdictionunder Rule 12(b)(l) ofthe Rules ofthe United States Court ofFederal Claims (RCFC). With regard to Ms. Langley's tax refund claims for these four years, for varying reasons, defendant argues that each claim is untimely. As to Ms. Langley's property claims against her ex-husband andMs. Green, defendant argues the court lacks subject matterjurisdiction over such claims. Forplaintiffs income tax refund claim for 2009, defendant concedesjurisdiction, but argues that Ms. Langley has failed to state a claim for whichreliefmay be granted, and requests dismissal under RCFC 12(b)(6). As explained below, defendant's RCFC 12(b)(l) amended motion is GRANTED. Defendant's RCFC 12(b)(6) amended motion withregard to Ms. Langley's income tax refund claim for 2009 is DENIED. Ms. Langley's income tax refund claim for 2009 is dismissed sua sponte for lack of jurisdictionunderRCFC 12(h)(3). UnderRCFC 12(b)(l) and 12(h)(3), the complaint is DISMISSED for lack of jurisdiction without prejudice. 

### I. Background'
A. Ms. Langley's Cases in Florida State Court Throughout her claims, plaintiffmakes reference to events stemming from her divorce proceedings initiated in 2004, as well as other litigation inthe Florida state courts. A limited review ofrelevant events will assist in understanding plaintiffs complaint before this court. In September 2004, plaintiffand herthen-husband, Barney Joseph Langley, began divorce proceedings inDuval County, Florida, for whichproceedings Mr. Langley was represented byAttorney Suzanne W. Green. App. 40-42, 3 ECFNo. 1-2 (Sept. 22, 2004 Attorney engagement letterbetween Mr. Langley and Ms. Green). Ms. Langley asserts thather divorce from Mr. Langleybecame final onJune 21, 2006. Comp!.'\[ 27, ECF No. 1.

2 The facts recitedhere are taken from the complaint and supplemental complaint and attachments thereto. The court makes no finding offact in this opinion.

3 The record citations are to the page numbers automatically affixed to the top of every page bythe court's CM/ECF system. 2Mr. Langley apparently did notpayhis legal fees, and with his consent, Ms. Green sought an attorney's charging lien onproperty owned, at least inpart, byMr. Langley. App. 29 

### if 6 (Consent Motion for Charging Lien andMotionto Determine Amount ofand to Enforce ChargingLien, Inre: The Man"iage ofGinaB. Langley, Wife, and BarneyJoseph Langley, Husband, No. 16-2004-DR-009042 (Fla. Circuit Ct. Duval Cty. Mar. 17, 2006)). On May 9, 2006, a Florida circuitjudgegrantedMs. Green her charging lien, App. 32-33, and Ms. Green recorded her lien onMay 15, 2006, App. 26- 27. Accordingto the "Attorney's Judgment and Amended Charging LienAgainst BarneyLangley," Ms. Green's attorney's charging lien was issued on the property located at 700 Oak Street, Neptune Beach, Florida. App. 26-27. ("By Court Order dated the 9th ofMay, 2006 andrecorded

... [in] Duval County, Florida, an attorney's Charging Lien was granted against any and all real orpersonal property ofBarney Langley, including but not limited to real property located at 700 Oak Street, Neptune beach, Florida 32266

...."). According to contact information Ms. Langleyprovidedto this court, 700 Oak Street is her current home. See Comp!. 10. Plaintiffasserts thatMs. Green obtained her attorney's charging lien "without [her] knowledge or consent." Comp!. 

### if 2. Indeed, review ofthe Consent Motionprepared and filed by Ms. Green reveals no mention ofMs. Langley. See App. 29-30. As a separate matter, plaintiffheld an interest inproperty onwhichthe mortgagor, Oceanside Bank, foreclosed. See Oceanside Bank v. Langley, No. 16-2009-CA-00-1429- XXXX-MA (Fla. Circuit Ct. Duval Cty. Jan. 7, 2010). 4 

### InJanuary 2010, a Certificate of Sale was entered, in whichthe Clerk ofCourt certifies that notice of public sale of the property described in the final judgment

... the property was offered for public sale

.... The highest and best bid received for the property inthe amount of 100.00 was submitted by Oceanside Bankto whom the propertywas sold. App. 106. The finaljudgmentis not inthe record, andthe location ofthe property sold at auction is unclear. However, as Ms. Langley cutTently lives inthe property located at 700 Oak Street, the court finds it likelythat Oceanside Bankforeclosed on another

4 Oceanside Banknamed five defendants inthis action, GinaLangley, Barney Langley, TargetNational Bank, DiscoverBank, and Suzanne Green P.A. See App. 106 (case caption). The complaint is not inthe record, but Ms. Green's answer is included. See App. 109-110.

3property. In a list ofmarital assets the Langleys owned at the time oftheir August 2004 separation, they showed two other properties, respectively located at 314 Third Street and 605 10th Avenue, Northwithboth addresses presumably located in Neptune Beach, Florida. Suppl. App. 130, ECF No. 8. The exact location ofthe foreclosed upon property, however, is immaterialto this court's decision.
B. Ms. Langley's Cases inthe United States Tax Court Priorto filing her income tax refund claims in this court, plaintifffiled two separate actions in the United States Tax Court, one for tax year 2004, and one for tax years 2006, 2008, 2009, and 2010. As explained infraPart LE, neither case precludes the filing ofMs. Langley's complaint inthis court.
1. Income Tax Year 2004

- Section 6015(±) Claim
InNovember2012, Ms. Langley filed a petition inthe United States Tax Court seeking reliefunder 26 U.S.C. (Internal Revenue Code, hereafter I.R.C.) 

### § 6015(±) (2012) for income tax years 2004 through 2010. See Langley v. Comm'r, No. 27396-12 (T.C. Nov. 12, 2014) (Order ofDismissal), affdper curiam, 612 F. App'x 585 (11th Cir. 2015), cert denied, 136 S. Ct. 840 (2016). Section 6015(±) addresses relieffromjointand several liability on ajointlyfiled return, otherwise known as innocent spouse relief. Because Ms. Langley filed ajoint income tax return for tax year 2004 only, that is the sole year for which she could have qualified for reliefunder section 6015(±). See Langley, No. 27396-12, at 1, 3. The Tax Court dismissed Ms. Langley's petition for lack of jurisdiction, as it was nottimely filed. Id. at 3.
2. Income Tax Years 2006, 2008, 2009, and 2010-Section 6330(d) Claim
In June 2013, the IRS sent plaintiffa "Notice ofDetermination Concerning Collection Action(s) Under Section 6320 and/or 6330" for four tax years, 2006, 2008, 2009, and 2010. See Suppl. App. 112-116. Section 6330(d)(1) provides that a "person may ...petitionthe Tax Court for review ofsuch determination." The IRS informed plaintiffthat ifshe wanted to "disputethis determination in court, [she] mustfile a petition withthe United States Tax Court within 30 days from the date ofthis letter," Suppl. App. at 67, whichMs. Langley did onJuly 24, 2013, id. at 104-111 (Petition).
InJanuary 2015, the Tax Court issued its decision. See Langley v. Comm'r, 109 T.C.M. (CCH) 1050, No. 17267-13L, 2015 WL 392980 (Jan. 13, 2015). According to the Tax Court, the IRS issued a supplemental Notice ofDetermination in November 2014, in which the IRS statedthat there were no outstanding balances due for tax years 2008 and 201O; thus the court dismissedthose claims as moot. See Langley, 2015 WL

4392980, at *5. Butthe Tax Court sustained the proposed levy to collect unpaid balances for the remaining tax years, 2006 (for $121.48 due) and 2009 (for $3,374.96 due). See id.
C. Ms. Langley's Case Filings InThis Court
1. Original Complaint
Plaintifffiled her complaint on Febtuary 10, 2016, to which she attached 156 pages ofsupporting documents.5 See Comp!., ECF Nos. 1 ("original complaint"), 1-2 ("appendix"). Plaintiffrequested three forms ofrelief, including one tax refund claim and two property claims. Ms. Langley's requests are included below.
Tax Refund Claim Petitioner most respectfully request[s] this Court order the IRS [to] refund the federal taxes due to Petitioner that totals $51,0683.84 (A pages 15 through 23) plus interest as claimed in Petitioner's Petition served to the government on 11-9-15 USSC in Petitioner's statement ofthe case 15-6929 (A pages 4 through 14) that the government waived it[]s right to oppose on 11-23-15. (A page two). Comp!. 9 (secondrequest for relief). The internal citations are to documents attached to the complaint, andthe reference to the U.S. Supreme Court Case No. 15-6929 is a reference to Ms. Langley's innocent spouse reliefclaim for tax year 2004 before the Tax Court, for which she ultimately sought certiorari to the United States Supreme Court. See Langley v. Comm'r, No. 27396-12 (T.C. Nov. 12, 2014)( Order ofDismissal), affdper curiam, 612 F. App'x 585 (11th Cir. 2015), cert denied, 136 S. Ct. 840 (2016). Property Claims Order Barney Langley, Petitioner's x spouse, be removed from the title to Petitioner's home [in which] he gave his interest to Suzanne Green in

5 The courthas reviewedMs. Langley's filings with care. The court notes that some ofthe pages filed byMs. Langley are partial documents, and many pages include significanthand written annotations ormarked out passages, which renders some documents difficult to understand. The filings include numerous documents from Ms. Langley's previous legal actions in Florida, hertwo United States Tax Court actions, including her appeals to the United States Circuit Court ofAppeals for the Eleventh Circuit and the United States Supreme Court, and various correspondence betweenMs. Langley and the Internal Revenue Service for multiple tax years. The court further notes that there are duplicate documents in the filings. 

### 5September 2004 and abandoned in 2009 so that Petitioner can either sell or repair herhomestead. Comp!. 9 (first request for relief). This court order that Suzanne W Green has no interest in [her] homestead, Order thejudgmentrecorded by State ofFlorida on 3-15-15 void, and order Suzanne Worrall Green pay Petitioner the 

### Yi of escrow funds totaling $39,581.96 plus interest since June 8, 2005 and any damages this Court would deem appropriate for the taking ofPetitioner['s] private property by an elected official of the state of Florida

. . . . Petitioner claimed $1,200,000.00 in damages from the government for loss of use in the uncompensatedtaking ofpetitioner's property. Comp!. 9-10 (third request for relief).
2. Amended Complaint Deemed a Supplemental Complaint OnMay 10, 2016, the Clerk's Office received a filing from Ms. Langleytitled "Plaintiffs Prayer for Refund ofFederal 1040 Tax that [Defendant] Waived It[]s Right to Respond onNovember 23, 2015 inUSSC Case 15-6929 as Claimed in this Claim on February 8, 2016 #2 and Plaintiffs Objection to the Conflicting Erroneous Notice(s) to the Plaintifffrom the Defendant." See ECF No. 8 at 1. Ms. Langley's filing totaled 162 pages, including 14 pages for the motion, and 148 pages ofattached documents. An initial review ofplaintiffs May 10, 2016 filing resulted inthe filing ofMs. Langley's submission, by leave ofthe court, as an amended complaint. See ECFNo. 8 (docket text). Upon further review ofplaintiffs filing, the court has now determined that some of the attached documents are duplicative, already having beenfiled withMs. Langley's February 2016 complaint; whereas some ofthe documents are newly filed.
Forthe above stated reasons, the court finds thatMs. Langley's February 2016 complaint was sufficientto assert her claim for reliefand plaintiffs May 10, 2016 is more appropriately categorized as a supplemental filing to her original complaint. Accordingly, the court shall DEEMplaintiffs amended complaint (ECF No. 8) as a supplemental complaint (pages 1-14) and supplemental appendix (pages 15-162) to be included inthis matter. 6

6 The Clerk's Office is directed to deemplaintiffs amended complaint, ECF No. 8, as a supplemental complaint, filed by leave ofthe court, as ofthe date it was submitted in this matter. 

### 6D. Defendant's Motions to Dismiss On May 10, 2016, defendant filed a RCFC 12(b)(l)motion to dismiss Ms. Langley's original complaint, filed inFebruary 2016. Def.'s MTD, ECF No. 9. Plaintiff filed a response onMay 23, 2016. ECF No. 13. Defendant electronically filed its motionto dismiss within minutes ofthe Clerk's Office filing plaintiffs amended complaint by leave ofthe court. ECF No. 8. Withthe court's leave, defendant filed an amended motionto dismiss on June 10, 2016, in which it responded to new information filed byplaintiffinher amended complaint, herein deemed her supplemental complaint. Def.'s Am. MTD, ECF No. 15. Plaintifffiled herresponse, ECF No. 16, and defendant filed a reply, ECF No. 17. Plaintiffattempted to file a surreply, without seeking leave ofcourtto do so, whichthe court did not accept for filing. See Order, Aug. 1, 2016, ECF No. 18.
E. This Court's August 1, 2016 Dismissal Order and Defendant's Motion for Clarification OnAugust 1, 2016, the court issued a decision granting defendant's amended motionto dismiss plaintiffs complaint. Judgment entered that same day. ECFNo. 21. See Opinion and Order, Aug. 1, 2016, ECF No. 20 ("Dismissal Order"), withdrawn and vacated, Order, Aug. 12, 2016, ECFNo. 23. The court found that it lacked subjectmatter jurisdiction over plaintiffsproperty claims against either her ex-husband, Mr. Langley, or his divorce attorney, Ms. Green. Dismissal Order 5-6. The court also found that it lackedjurisdiction over Ms. Langley's income tax refund claims under I.R.C. § 6512(a). Id. at 6-8. Section 6512(a) states that [i]f the Secretary has mailed to the taxpayer a notice of deficiency under section 6212(a) (relating to deficiencies of income

... taxes) and if the taxpayer files a petition with the Tax Court within the time prescribed in section 6213(a)

..., no credit or refund ofincome tax for the same taxable year ... to which such petition relates, inrespect ofwhich the Secretary has determined the deficiency shall be allowed or made and no suit by the taxpayerfor the recovery ofanypartofthetax shallbe instituted in any court except-- I.R.C. 

### § 6512(a). The court further found that Ms. Langley's complaint did not fall withinthe limited exceptions to the prohibition on filing a claim in any court, including this court, for a claim heardbythe Tax Court for the same taxable year. Dismissal Order 8 (citing I.R.C. § 6512(a)(l)). Accordingly, the court granted defendant's amended motionto dismiss the complaint. Id. 7On August 12, 2016, by leave ofcourt, defendant filed a motion for clarification. Def.'s Mot. Clarification, ECF No. 22. Defendant maintained that while dismissal of plaintiffs complaint was proper, section 6512(a) did notprovide a proper basis for dismissal. Id. at 1. Specifically, defendant explained that section 6512(a) does not apply unless the IRS first mailedplaintiffa "notice ofdeficiency," and defendant insists that the IRS never mailed Ms. Langley a notice ofdeficiency. Id. at 1, 3. Defendant acknowledged that one ofMs. Langley's Tax Court actions was in response to a "collection due proceeding" (CDP) instituted bythe IRS against Ms. Langley. Id. at 3 (citing Tax Court case no. 17267-13L for tax years 2006, 2008, 2009, and 2010). But, defendant asserted, there is no statutory barto preventplaintifffrom filing a complaint inthis court afterthe Tax Court has adjudicated a CDP for the same tax years. Id. at 2. Accordingly, argued defendant, section 6512(a) provides no barto plaintiffs complaint inthis court. The court granted defendant's motion for clarification, withdrew its August 1, 2016 decision, and directed the Clerk ofCourt to vacatejudgment. Order, Aug. 12, 2016, ECFNo. 23. By leave ofcourt, Ms. Langley filed a response which consisted ofa 13-page brief, a 2-page Table ofContents, and 173 pages ofattached documents. ECF No. 24. Ms. Langleytook the positionthat the IRS did issue a notice ofdeficiency to her. Id. at 2 (citing to her "Exhibit 5, page two, andthree."). Review ofthe entirety ofplaintiffs markedExhibit 5 shows that neither ofthe documents on whichplaintiffrelies originated from the IRS, and neither is a Notice ofDeficiency. See id. at 48-57. By leave ofcourt, defendantfiled a reply. ECF No. 27. Defendant states that while the documents provided byplaintiffinclude a "notice ofdetermination," they do not include a "notice ofdeficiency," as is required for the applicability ofsection 6512(a). Id. at 2. Defendant is correct, Ms. Langley's documents do include anIRS Notice of Determination for tax years 2006, 2008, 2009, and 2010. See ECF No. 24, at 79. Having reviewed the information inthe parties' briefing on defendant's motion for clarification, the court now turns to defendant's amended motionto dismiss the complaint, ECF No. 15.
II. Legal Standards
Pursuant to the TuckerAct, this court has limitedjurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. 1491(a)(l) (2012).

8The United States Court ofFederal Claims shall havejurisdiction to render judgment upon any claim against the United States founded either upon the Constitution, or any Act of Congress or any regulation of an executive department, or upon any express or implied contract with the United States, or for liquidated or unliquidated damages in cases not sounding in tort. 28 U.S.C. 149l(a)(l).
The TuckerAct serves as a waiver ofsovereign immunity andprovides a jurisdictional grant, but it does not create a substantive cause ofaction. See Jan's Helicopter Serv., Inc. v. Fed. Aviation Admin., 525 F.3d 1299, 1306 (Fed. Cir. 2008). "[B]ecause the TuckerAct itselfdoes not create a substantive cause ofaction, 'in orderto come within thejurisdictional reach andthe waiver ofthe TuckerAct, a plaintiffmust identify a separate source ofsubstantive lawthat creates the right to money damages."' Id. (quoting Fisher v. United States, 402 F.3d 1167, 1172 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en bane in relevantpart)).
A. RCFC 12(b)(l) Ifsubject matterjurisdictionis challenged, plaintiffmust establishthe court's jurisdictionby a preponderance ofthe evidence. Revnolds v. Army & AirForce Exch. Serv., 846 F.2d 746, 748 (Fed. Cir. 1988). When ajurisdictional challenge is raised in a motionto dismiss, "the allegations stated inthe complaint are taken as true and jurisdictionis decided onthe face ofthe pleadings." Foldenv. United States, 379F.3d 1344, 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (quoting Shearin v. United States, 992 F.2d 1195, 1195-96 (Fed. Cir. 1993)). However, the comt may look beyondthe pleadings and "inquire into jurisdictional facts" to determine whetherjurisdiction exists. Rocovichv. United States, 933 F.2d 991, 993 (Fed. Cir. 1991). Ifthe court determines that it lacks subject matter jurisdiction, it must dismiss the complaint. RCFC 12(h)(3).
B. RCFC 12(b)(6)
To survive a motionto dismiss for failure to state a claimunder RCFC 12(b)(6) the complaint must include "enoughfacts to state a claimto reliefthat is plausible on its face." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). "A claim has facial plausibility whenthe plaintiffpleads factual content that allows the courtto draw the reasonable inference thatthe defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Ashcroft v. Igbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). In evaluating a motion to dismiss, the court must accept the factual allegations as true, but the court is not required to accept the plaintiffs legal conclusions. Id.

9C. Pro Se Litigants A pro se complaint is to be liberally construed, and plaintiffs' filings must be held to 'less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers[.]'" Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972)); Durr v. Nicholson, 400 F.3d 1375, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (stating a "background interpretive principle

... is thatprosepleadings are to be liberally construed"). "Pro se petitioners are not expected to frame issues with the precision ofa common law pleading." Roche v. United States Postal Serv., 828 F.2d 1555, 1558 (Fed. Cir. 1987). While leniency will be extended withrespect to the formalities offiling, pro se plaintiffs are not entitledto the relaxation of jurisdictional requirements. See Kelley v. Sec'y, U.S. Dep't ofLabor, 812 F.2d 1378, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 1987) ("[W]here the question is the calculation ofthe time limitations placed on the consent ofthe United States to suit, a court maynot similarly take a liberal view ofthatjurisdictional requirement and set a different rule for pro se litigants only.").
III. Discussion
A. Plaintiffs Income Tax Refunds
Ms. Langleybrings income tax refund claims totaling $51,0683.84 plus interest for five income tax years-specifically 2004, 2009, 2011, 2012, and 2013. Comp!. 9; Suppl. Comp!. I. Prior to considering defendant's amended motion to dismiss, the court first reviews defendant's various RCFC 12 motions for compliance with RCFC 12(g).
I. RCFC 12(g)- Multiple Rule 12 Motions to Dismiss As explained in the court'srules,"[e]xcept as provided inRCFC 12(h)(2) or (3), a partythat makes a motion under [RCFC 12] must not make another motion under [RCFC 12] raising a defense or objectionthat was available to the party but omitted from its earlier motion." RCFC 12(g)(2). Defendant filed a Motion to Dismiss on May 10, 2016, ECF No. 9, an Amended Motionto Dismiss on June 10, 2016, ECF No. 15, and a Motion for Clarification on August 12, 2016, ECF No. 22. Although defendant styled its August 2016 motion only as one for "clarification," defendant for the first time moved for RCFC 12(b)(6) dismissals for Ms. Langley's tax refund claims for 2011, 2012, and 2013. See Def.'s Mot. Clarification 4. That defendant made these arguments for the first time inits motion for clarification renders this motion a second amended RCFC 12 motion to dismiss the complaint, and the courttreats it as such. Defendant's RCFC 12 arguments are summarized inthe table below.

10Defendant's RCFC 12 Arguments (Change from immediately preceding motion noted withbolditalicized font) Tax Motion to Dismiss, Amended MTD, Motion for Year ECFNo. 9 ECFNo.15 Clarification, ECFNo.22 2004 None 12(b)(l) without 12(b)(1) withprejudice preiudice 2009 12(b)(l) without 12(b)(6) withprejudice 12(b)(6) with prejudice prejudice 2011 12(b)(l)without 12(b)(1) without 12(b)(6) withprejudice prejudice prejudice 2012 12(b)(l) without 12(b)(l) without 12(b)(6) withprejudice prejudice prejudice 2013 12(b)(l) without 12(b)(1) without 12(b)(6) withprejudice prejudice prejudice
The question is whether defendant's arguments offered for the first time in either its amended motionto dismiss or its motion for clarification comply with RCFC 12(g)(2).7
As to plaintiffs income tax year 2004 claim, defendant did not address it in its original motion to dismiss. Review ofplaintiffs complaint shows that she requested a taxrefund of$51,068.84, and cited to appendixpages 15 through 23 in support ofthis claim. See Comp!. 9 (second request for relief). Review ofthe cited appendix shows signed, completed Fonns 843 (Claim for Refund and Request for Abatement) for four tax years, 2009, 2011, 2012, and 2013, butno Form 843 for taxyear 2004. See App. 20-23. Nonetheless, plaintiffasserts inher supplemental complaintthat hertax refund claims covered five tax years, inparticular, 2004, 2009, 2011, 2012, and 2013 and reasserts that hertax refund claims total $51,068.84. See Suppl. Comp!. 1. Plaintiffdescribed eachtax refund claim, specifying the tax year and dollar amount for each claim, andprovided an explanation for her claim with a citationto the attached documents. See id. at 7-8. Unlike her original complaint, plaintiffs supplemental complaint clarified that Ms. Langley sought a refund for tax year 2004 and set forth the basis for that claim. Forthese reasons, the court finds that defendant's RCFC 12(b)(l) withoutprejudice argument for income tax year 2004 inits amended motionto dismiss was not available at the time it filed its original motionto dismiss, and thus, is permissible under RCFC 12(g)(2). As to plaintiffstax year 2009 claim, defendant takes the position inits amended motionto dismiss thatthe court hasjurisdiction overplaintiffs claim, but that plaintiff

7 There is no RCFC 12(g) issue withregardto defendant's amended motionto dismiss Ms. Langley's property claims, as it made no change inits Rule 12 arguments for those claims. 11failed to state a claim for which reliefmay be granted. Def.'s Am. MTD 11-13. Defendant bases its change in argument on anIRS document plaintifffiled withher supplemental complaint showing that the "IRS formally disallowed the claim for refund [fortax year 2009] onApril 14, 2016." Id. at 3 (citing ECF No. 8, at 57-58). The IRS document on which defendant relies was not included withplaintiffs original complaint. Because the document on which defendantrelies was not available at the time defendant filed its original motion to dismiss, the court finds that defendant's RCFC 12(b)(6) with prejudice argument in its amended motion to dismiss for income tax year 2009 is permissible under RCFC 12(g)(2). The court turns next to defendant's motion for clarification. For tax year 2004, defendant now seeks a RCFC 12(b)(1) dismissal withprejudice, rather than without prejudice. See Def.'s Mot. Clarification 4. Defendant offers no explanation for this change, and points to no information previously not available when it filed its amended motionto dismiss. Accordingly, the court finds that this argument is precluded byRCFC 12(g)(2). As to income tax years 2011, 2012, and 2013, defendant's motion for clarification for the first time asks this courtto dismiss Ms. Langley's tax refund claims under RCFC 12(b)(6) withprejudice,just as itrequested for tax year 2009 inits amended motionto dismiss. Defendant explains that, [p]laintiffs claims for these years [2009, 2011, 2012, and 2013] are based on [26 U.S.C.] § 165, a purported casualty loss stemming from a lien placed on herproperty. But a lien is not a casualty loss

.... Thus, even ifthis court has jurisdiction over plaintiffs tax refund suit for years 2009, 2011, 2012, and 2013, plaintiffs complaint fails to state a claim for these years upon which reliefcanbe granted, and this court must dismiss plaintiffs complaint as tothose tax years under Rule 12(b)(6).

As with its argument for tax year 2004, defendant offered no explanation for this change, and cited to no infonnation previously not available when it filed its amended motion to dismiss. In addition, review ofthe court's docket shows thatplaintifffiled no documents with this court between the filing onJuly 14, 2016 ofdefendant's reply in support ofits amended motion to dismiss, and the filing ofdefendant's motion for clarification on August 12, 2016. Review ofplaintiffs complaint and supplemental complaint shows that she referred to an alleged casualty loss inbothpleadings. See Comp!. 

### if 41 (making reference to "the refund due to me for the $408,000.00 casualty loss Petitioner suffered onthe conversion ofPetitioner's assets by the state ofFlorida during divorce proceedings

... 12.");Suppl. Comp!. 2 ("Plaintifffiled simultaneously

... 1040Xfor each ofthe tax years 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011and2012 for the Plaintiffs 2010 $408,000 loss

...."); Suppl. Comp!. 11 ("The Defendant's erroneous lien onmyhomestead, requested to preserve the amounts in escrow, is still recorded without Plaintiffs consent in the Defendant's judgment for 'making disbursements' that resulted in Plaintiffs 2010 $408,000.00 casualty loss." 8 (internal citations omitted)). Thus, in making newRCFC 12 arguments in its motion for clarification, defendantraises defenses or objections that were available to it when it filed its amended motionto dismiss.
To make a RCFC 12(b)(6) argument for tax years 2011, 2012, and 2013, defendant must have done so in either its original motion to dismiss or its amended motion to dismiss. Defendant did not do so. Thus, defendant cannotmake a RCFC 12(b)(6) objection in its motion for clarification, "thatwas available

... but omitted from its earlier motion." RCFC 12(g)(2).
Pursuantto RCFC 12(g)(2), the court will consider all ofdefendant's RCFC 12 arguments set forth in its amended motion to dismiss, but none ofthe RCFC 12 arguments set forth in its motion for clarification.
2. Income Tax Year 2004 According to her supplemental complaint, Ms. Langley's tax refund claim for 2004 is the same innocent spouse reliefclaim she asserted previously in the Tax Court. See Suppl. Comp!. 7 (citing "USSC case 15-6929," a reference to the appellate history for Tax Court case no. 27396-12); see also supraPart I.B.1. Defendant argues thatMs. Langley's 2004 tax refund claim is untimely because she did not file a "timely administrative claim for refund with the IRS in accordance with [26 U.S.C.] § 651 l(a)." Def.'s Am. MTD. 9-10. Thus, defendant contends, "hertax refund suit as to 2004 is defective under [26 U.S.C.] § 7422(a)." Id. at 10. Under I.RC. § 7422(a), a plaintiffmaynot bring a tax refund claim in any court, including this court, "until a claim for refund

... has been duly filed with the Secretary, according to the provisions oflaw in that regard." I.R.C. § 7422(a). Further, under I.RC. § 6511 (a), any claim for refund ofan overpayment oftax "shall be filed by the taxpayer within 3 years from the time the return was filed or 2 years from the time the tax was paid, whichever ofsuchperiods expires the later." I.R.C. § 6511(a).

8 Ms. Langley mischaracterizes the lien onher home. There is nothing inthe record to suggest that the IRS everheld a tax lien onherhome. Rather, the only lien on her home reflected inthe record is an attorney's charging lienheld byMs. Green. See supra Part I.A. 13Defendant states that Ms. Langley "filedher administrative claim for refund for tax year 2004 in 2011, six years after herreturn was filed and five years after the tax was paid." Def.'s Am. MTD 9-10 (citing ECF No. 8, at p. 23 ("B9")). The document on which defendant relies is the 2004 Account Transcriptprepared bythe IRS, in which it lists all activity in the taxpayer's account for tax year 2004. As reflected in the Account Transcript, the Langleys filed theirjointtax return on May 30, 2005, and remitted their final taxpayment on February 24, 2006. See Suppl. App. 23. Under I.R.C. § 651 l(a), Ms. Langley's administrative claim was due the later of three years after the return was filed, whichwould have beenMay 30, 2008, ortwo years after the tax was paid, which would have beenFebruary 25, 2008. The later date, May 30, 2008, was the due date for filing Ms. Langley's administrative claim with the IRS to obtain a refund for tax year 2004. But accordingto the 2004 Account Transcript, and as defendant has pointed out, Ms. Langley did not file her claim for Innocent Spouse Relief until April 18, 2011, almost three years past the due date. 9 See Suppl. App. 23. Defendant is correct thatbecausejurisdiction in this court is limited, plaintiffmust show that priorto filing in this court, she filed a timely administrative claim withthe Internal Revenue Service, as provided inI.R.C. §§ 651 l(a) and 7422(a). The failure to do so deprives this court ofitsjurisdiction over such taxrefund claim.
As this court has stated, [i]t is well-settledthat satisfaction ofthesefiling requirements[§ 7422(a) and § 651 l(a) are] a jurisdictional prerequisite to suit in the Court of Federal Claims. Sun Chem. Corp. v. United States, 698 F.2d 1203, 1206 (Fed. Cir. 1983) ("It is a well-established rule that a timely, sufficient claim for refund is ajurisdictionalprerequisite to a refund suit.") (citations omitted)

.... Martinez v. United States, No. 13-107T, 2013 WL 3940958, at *3 (Fed. Cl. July 25, 2013). Thisjurisdictional rule for a claim brought under I.R.C. § 6015(f), like Ms.

9 Documents in the record suggestthat Ms. Langley first filed an Innocent Spouse Reliefclaim on June 5, 2009, not April 18, 2011. See ECF No. 24, at 168-170 (Completed Form 8857 Request for Innocent Spouse Relief, dated May 18, 2009); ECF No. 24, at 119 (Oct. 22, 2012 IRS letterreferencing a Form 8857 filed onJune 5, 2009). The IRS denied this claim on June 16, 2009, becausethere were no outstanding payments due for tax year 2004. See ECF No. 24, at 171. It is unclear why this earlier June 2009 Form 8857 is not reflected inMs. Langley's 2004 Account Transcript. Regardless, even ifthe court were to creditMs. Langley withhaving first filed on June 5, 2009 her administrative claim for a refund for tax year 2004, that claim would still be untimely because it was filed more than one year after the May 30, 2008 due date.
14Langley's, does not allow for exceptions. See Barker v. United States, No. 05-1143T, 2006 WL 2472656, at *2 (Fed. Cl. July 19, 2006) (finding that the restrictions of26 U.S.C. § 6511 "applyto all refund claims, including claims based on the innocent spouse provisions" (citing Yuen v. United States, 825 F.2d244, 245 (9th Cir. 1987); Choate v. United States, 218 F.R.D. 677, 678-79 (S.D. Cal. 2003)).
Because Ms. Langley filed her 2004 administrative claim with the IRS sometime after the May 30, 2008 due date, it was untimely. Under I.R.C. §§ 651 l(a) and 7422(a), the court lacksjurisdictionto hear her tax refund claim for 2004. For this reason, defendant's RCFC 12(b)(l) amended motionto dismiss Ms. Langley's tax refund claim for 2004 is GRANTED.
3. Income Tax Year 2009 Although defendant concedesjurisdictionfor Ms. Langley's 2009 tax refund claim, Def.'s Am. MTD 11, the court has an independent obligationto satisfy itselfthat it hasjurisdictionto hear the claim. See RCFC 12(h)(3) ("Ifthe court determines at any time that it lacks subject-matterjurisdiction, the court must dismiss the action."); PIN/NIP, Inc. v. Platte Chem. Co., 304 F.3d 1235, 1241 (Fed. Cir. 2002) ("[A] court must satisfy itselfthat it hasjurisdiction to hear and decide a case before proceeding to the merits."); ViewEng'g, Inc. v. Robotic Vision Sys., Inc., 115 F.3d 962, 963 (Fed. Cir. 1997) ("[C]ourts must always lookto theirjurisdiction, whetherthe parties raise the issue or not."). Accordingly, priorto considering defendant's RCFC 12(b)(6) amended motion to dismiss, the court considers whether ithasjurisdiction overplaintiffs claim.

a. Whetherthe Court has Jurisdiction over Plaintiffs Claim
Ms. Langley completed and signed a Claim for Refund and Request for Abatement (Form 843) for taxyear 2009 on October 29, 2015. 10 See Suppl. App. 24. Defendant claims that it "appears" thatthe IRS disallowed Ms. Langley's claim on April 14, 2016. Def.'s Am. MTD 10 n.8. As defendant explained, [b]asedon informationplaintiffprovided onMay 10, 2016, it appears thaton April 14, 2016, the IRS did disallow her claim for refund for 2009 filed on October 29, 2015. Thus, her claim for refund for 2009 appears to be timely

10 According to the IRS, it received this claim on November 30, 2015. See Suppl. App. 57. ThatMs. Langley may have mailed herForm 843 after the date on which she signed the Form, and that even less time may have elapsed between the filing ofthe Form 843 with the IRS and the filing ofher Complaint withthis court, does not bear onthe court's determination of jurisdiction. 15Id. Defendant's reference to information provided on May 10, 2016 is a reference to plaintiffs supplemental complaint and supplemental appendix, ECF No. 8. Defendant is conectthat Ms. Langley included an April 14, 2016 IRS letter in whichthe IRS disallowed her income tax year 2009 claim, due to its untimely filing. See Suppl. App. 57. To be clear, the IRS disallowed Ms. Langley's 2009 taxrefund claim on April 14, 2016, two months after Ms. Langley filed her complaint in this court on February 10, 2016. Although the court generally determinesjurisdiction at the time the original complaint is filed, the Federal Circuit has recognized limited exceptions to this general rule, and determinedjurisdictionbased on a supplemental pleading. See Cent. Pines Land Co., L.L.C. v. United States, 697 F.3d 1360, 1365-66 (Fed. Cir. 2012). As the Federal Circuit explained, [g]enerally, "'jurisdiction ofthe court depends uponthe state ofthings at the time ofthe action brought.'" Grupo Datafluxv. Atlas Global Grp., 541 U.S. 567, 570 (2004) (quoting Mollan v. TotTance, 9 Wheat. 537, 539, 6 L.Ed. 154 (1824)). [However,] we have heldthat certain circumstances may exist in which a supplemental complaint can cure a defect in subject matter jurisdiction

... [But], if a statute contains an express prohibition against filing suit, then a supplemental complaintcannot cure the lack of jurisdiction existing at the onset. Black, 93 F.3d at 790 (citing McNeil v. United States, 508 U.S. 106, 110-11 (1993), and Hallstrom v. Tillamook Cnty., 493 U.S. 20, 25-26 (1989)). Itwould defeat the purpose ofthe prohibition to permit a plaintiffto file his complaint during the prohibited period and then, after the prohibited period expired, rely on a supplemental complaint to cure the jurisdictional defect. Id.

Section 6532(a)(l) ofthe Internal Revenue Code states that [n]o suit orproceedingunder section 7422(a) for therecovery ofany internal revenue tax

... shall be begun before the expiration of 6 months from the date of filing the claim required under such section unless the Secretary renders a decision thereon withinthat time

.... 26 U.S.C. § 6532(a)(l) (2012). Under Central Pines Land Company,jurisdiction in this case is determined atthe time plaintifffiled her original complaint, not at the time she filed her supplemental complaint. Ms. Langley filed her Form 843 for tax year 2009 no earlier than October 29, 2015, six months from which was April 29, 2016. Because Ms. Langley filed her complaint on February 10, 2016, she did so priorto the expiration of the six month periodrequired by section 6532(a)(l). Ms. Langley's complaint was thus 16untimely, and for thatreason, the court lacksjurisdiction over hertax refund claim for 2009. Under RCFC 12(h)(3), the court DISMISSES Ms. Langley's income tax refund claim for 2009 for lack of jurisdiction.
Inthe alternative and for the sake ofcompleteness, the court considers defendant's RCFC 12(b)(6) argument. b. Defendant's RCFC 12(b)(6) AmendedMotion to Dismiss In defendant's view, Ms. Langley's refund claim for tax year 2009 stems from an amended tax return Ms. Langleytimely filed for tax year 2010. See Def.'sAm. MTD 4. As defendant stated, [p]laintiffs claim for 2009 stems from a carry back ofa purported casualty loss that occurred in 2010. Plaintiff bases this casualty loss on either the foreclosure ofone ...property in 2010 or a lienplaced on [another] property in2010. (Campi.

...U.S. Court ofFed. CL Campi. Cover Sheet, stating "IRS Refund due and interest due from State ofFl. Official and int. damages for loss ofuse.") Plaintifffurther states that"[d]efendant's erroneous lien on my homestead

... resulted in [p]laintiffs 2010 $408,000 casualty loss." (Am. Campi., ECF No. 8, at p. [11].) Id. The foreclosure and the lien to which defendant refers are the subjects ofearlier legal actions in the state ofFlorida. See supra Part I.A. It is unclear from the record how Ms. Langley atTived at the asserted loss of $408,000, or whether Ms. Langley attributes this loss to either the lien orthe foreclosure separately, orto both events. Regardless, aprecise understanding of Ms. Langley's assetied casualty loss is not necessary to the court's decision. Defendant ai·gues that a "foreclosure or a lien is not

... a casualty loss." Def.'s Am. MTD 12 (citing First Atlas Funding Corp. Through Kersting, 23 Cl. Ct. at 139-40; Vance v. Comm'r oflnternal Revenue, 36 T.C. 54 7 (1961) (finding that a finance company's repossession offurniture where timely payments were not made was not a casualty loss to taxpayer)). Defendant futiher argues that as defined in I.R.C. § I65(a)- the relevant provision for evaluating the casualty losses that Ms. Langleyhas asse1iedsuch losses would not qualify as a tax deductible casualty loss. Section 165(a) allows deductions for "any loss sustained during the taxable year and not compensated for by insurance or othe1wise." 26 U.S.C. § 165(a); see also Cottage Sav. Ass'nv. Comm'roflnternal Revenue, 499U.S. 554, 567 (1991). Section 165(c)(3) states that "[i]nthe case ofan individual, the deduction under subsection (a) shall be limited to

... losses ofprope1iy not connected with a trade orbusiness or a transaction entered into for profit,
17if such losses arise from fire, storm, shipwreck, or other casualty, or from theft." 26 U.S.C. § 165(c)(3); see also Maher v. Comm'r of Internal Revenue, 680 F.2d 91, 91 (11th Cir. 1982). Id. at 11. Itis not clear to the court, however, that Ms. Langley's amended return for tax year 2010 claimed a deduction only for an impermissible casualty loss, as defendant urges. Among the documents Ms. Langley filed with her supplemental complaint was an August 1, 2014 letter that the IRS sent to Ms. Langley after it had reviewed her Form 1040Xfor tax year 2010. See Suppl. App. 58. In its letter, the IRS stated: Thank you for your amendedreturn received 4/15/2014.
We have adjustedyour2010 accountperyour amendedreturn, howeverthere was a change made to yourtax decrease. Ourrecords showyourtax decrease as $1,483.00 and not the amount of$497.86 as you indicated on line 21 of your amended return

.... You will be receiving a letter regarding your carryback claims under separate cover.

Because the IRS adjusted Ms. Langley's taxes based on her 2010 amended tax return,the court cannot conclude, as defendant has, that Ms. Langley sought a taxrefund exclusively for an impermissible casualty loss. Accordingly, the court cannot conclude that a carry back ofthis claim to tax year 2009 is based solely on an impermissible casualty loss. For this reason, defendant's RCFC 12(b)(6) amended motionto dismiss Ms. Langley's taxrefund claim for 2009 for failure to state a claim is DENIED. 4. Income Tax Years 2011, 2012 and 2013 Defendant argues thatthe court lacksjurisdiction overMs. Langley's tax refund claims for 2011, 2012, and 2013, because she filed her complaint in this court prematurely. Specifically, the government contends plaintifffiled suitpriorto either of the statutory conditions precedentto filing an income tax refund suit-namelythe expiration ofsix months from the date offiling an administrative request orthe rendering ofan IRS decision priorto the time offiling suit. See Def.'s Am. MTD 10 (citing l.R.C. §§ 6532(a), 7422(a)). Withregard to the six monthtime period, Ms. Langley signedForms 843 on either October 29, 2015 (for income tax years 2011 and 2013) orNovember 7, 2015 (for
18income tax year 2012). See Suppl. App. 25-27. Assuming that the date on each Form 843 coffesponds to the filing date, the earliest Ms. Langley could have filed a timely complaint in this court for all three tax years wouldhave been six months afterNovember 7, 2015, or May 7, 2016. As Ms. Langley filed her complaint in this court onFebruary 6, 2016, her complaint was untimely. Withregard to a rendered IRS decision, defendant has argued-andthe court agrees-that "[t]here is no indication that the IRS disallowed the claims for refund for 2011, 2012, and 2013 that would allow plaintiffto file her complaint priorto the expiration ofthe six month period." Def.'s Am. MID 10. Accordingly, the court lacksjurisdiction overMs. Langley's taxrefund claims for 2011, 2012, and 2013. See l.R.C. §§ 6532(a), 7422(a)). Defendant's RCFC 12(b)(l) amended motion to dismiss Ms. Langley's income tax refund claims for 2011, 2012, and 2013 for lack of jurisdictionis GRANTED. As explained supra PartIII.A.I, the court will not consider defendant's alternative RCFC 12(b)(6) arguments for these tax years. The court notes that even ifdefendant's RCFC 12(b)(6) arguments were properly before this court, they would not have been persuasive.
Inreviewing the Forms 843 that Ms. Langley filed, it appears thatthe tax refund claimed for 2012 may have beenbased on the 2010 amended tax return, as defendant argues. In the explanation section onthe relevantForm 843, Ms. Langleyrefeffed to her "casualty loss claimed in 2010." See Suppl. App. 26. But as explained in the court's discussion ofplaintiffs 2009 tax refund, supra Part III.A.3.b, the court cannot conclude thatthe tax refund claim based on Ms. Langley's amended taxreturn for 2010 was based on an impermissible casualty loss only.
In addition, the Forms 843 for tax years 2011 and 2013 make no mention ofthe 2010 casualty loss, and insteadrefer to an overpayment in 2013, resulting in a tax refund for that year. See Suppl. App. 25, 27. A June 24, 2014 IRS notice confirmedthatMs. Langley made an overpayment for tax year 2013, which 

### itdid not refund to Ms. Langley, but instead applied tothree earlier tax years-2008, 2010, and 2011-forwhich it claimedMs. Langley owedpayment. See id. at 28. Examination ofboththe Forms 843 for tax years 2011 and 2013, and the IRS notice for tax year 2013, suggests that the refunds Ms. Langley claimed for tax years 2011 and 2013 were unrelatedto her2010 amended return or her alleged casualty loss. Because this assertion was the sole basis for defendant's RCFC 12(b)(6) argument, that argumentwouldhave been unavailing. See Def.'sMot. Clarification 4.

19B. Plaintiffs Property Claims Remaining are Ms. Langley's two property claims. See Comp!. 9-10 (first and third requests for relief); see also supraPartLC. Because Ms. Langley is proceeding without counsel, the court is obliged to construe her complaint liberally. See Haines, 404 U.S. at 520-21; Durr, 400 F.3d at 1380. As the Federal Circuit has instructed, "[p]ro se petitioners are not expected to frame issues with the precision ofa common law pleading." Roche, 828 F.2d at 1558.
Ms. Langley's claims to remove her ex-husband and Ms. Greenfrom the title to her home could be interpreted as quiet-title claims. 11 Defendant argues thatthis court lacksjurisdiction over both property claims because this court'sjurisdictionis limited to claims against the United States. Thus, this court cannot hear a quiet-title claim. Def.'s Am. MTD 6-7 (citing 28 U.S.C. 149l(a)(l); Price v. United States, 123 Fed. Cl. 560, 563 (2015); Dwenv. United States, 62 Fed. Cl. 76, 80 (2004)). Defendant is correct. This court has limitedjurisdiction; it may hear only claims brought against the United States. 28 U.S.C. 149l(a)(l). Ms. Langley's property claims are brought against two private individuals, her ex-husband, Barney Langley, and his divorce attorney, Suzanne Green. Ms. Langley has articulated no property claim against the United States. As an earlier court found, [p]lainly stated, the court is without jurisdiction to entertain a standalone claimto quiet title. Dwen v. United States, 62 Fed. Cl. 76, 80 (2004) (citing Sioux Tribe of Indians v. United States, 3 Cl. Ct. 536, 538 (1983) ("This court has the authority to issue moneyjudgments only; it does not have the authority to decide questions oftitle to land."); Baskett v. United States, 2 Cl. Ct. 356, 363 (1983) ("This court has nojurisdictionto quiet title to land and thus, ifplaintiffs seek to quiet title to the properties in question they are in the wrong court."). The case law is replete with instances where it has been recognized that a cause of action seeking possession ofproperty falls outside ofthe court'sjurisdiction. Oak Forest, Inc. v. United States, 23 Cl. Ct. 90, 94-96 (1991); Gila Gin Co. v. United States, 231 Ct. Cl. 1001, 1003, 1982 WL 25831 (1982); Yaistv. United States, 228 Ct. Cl. 281, 285-87, 656 F.2d 616 (1981); Bourgeoisv. United States, 212 Ct. Cl. 32, 36 n.1, 545 F.2d 727 (1976). Dwen, 62 Fed. Cl. at 80. To the extentMs. Langley asks this court to quiet title to her home, it is withoutjurisdictionto hear such claim or to provide the reliefshe seeks.

11 "Aproceeding to establish a plaintiffs title to landbycompelling the adverse claimantto establish a claim orbe forever estopped from asserting it." Action to quiet title, Black'sLawDictionary (10th ed. 2014). 20Alternatively, Ms. Langley's claims could be construed as a request that this court review the action taken by the Florida state court, when it granted Ms. Green an attorney's charging lien on Ms. Langley's home. This court also lacksjurisdiction over this claim. See, e.g., Jones v. United States, 440 F. App'x 916, 918 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (stating thatthe Court ofFederal Claims does nothavejurisdictionto review state court decisions). Withregard to Ms. Langley's characterization ofthe attorney's charging lien securedbyMs. Green as a "taking

... by an elected official ofthe state ofFlorida," Ms. Langley has mischaracterized the facts. Comp!. 10. The record shows that Ms. Green obtainedthe lien on Ms. Langley's home inher capacity as a private attorney representing Mr. Langley in divorce proceedings. That Ms. Greenmay have been elected to office in November 2014 does not disturb the charging lien she secured on Ms. Langley's home in May 2006. By definition, a charging lien inthe State ofFlorida may onlybe secured by a private attorney, notbythe state or a state official. As explained by a Floridadistrict court, [c]harging liens are a creature ofFlorida common law. Zaklama v. Mount Sinai Med. Ctr., 906 F. 2d 650, 652 (11th Cir. 1990). Such a lien is an equitablerighttohave costs and fees due to an attorneyfor services rendered in a suit secured by thejudgment or recovery in that suit. Sinclair, Louis, Siegel, Heath, Nussbaum & Zavertnik, P.A. v. Baucom, 428 So. 2d 1383, 1384 (Fla. 1983). Gonzalez v. Am. Sec. Ins., Co., No. 15-cv-1515, 2016 WL 6901368, at *1 (M.D. Fla. Nov. 1, 2016). While the comtis obliged to accept as true Ms. Langley's fact allegations, it is underno such obligation with regard to her asserted legal conclusions, including her conclusionthat the lien on her home qualifies as a taking. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 ("[T]he tenetthat a court must accept as true all ofthe allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions."). A dispute with a private individual over an attorney's charging lien granted bythe Florida state court is simply not a taking by the state. Finally, Ms. Langley seeks payment ofescrow funds, over which apparentlyMs. Green has had some involvement or control since June 2005. See Comp!. 9-10 (third request for relief); supra Part LC. Because Ms. Langley's divorce was initiated in 2004, and finalized in 2006, the June 2005 eventto which she refers occurred during her divorce proceedings in a Florida state court. As stated before, this court lacksjurisdiction to review any decision by a state court. See, e.g., Jones, 440 F. App'x at 918.
Forthese reasons, the comtfinds it lacks subject matterjurisdiction overMs. Langley's claims against her ex-husband, Barney Langley, or against his divorce
21attorney, Suzanne Green. Defendant's RCFC 12(b)(l) amended motion to dismiss Ms. Langley's property claims is GRANTED. IV. Conclusion As explained herein, the court hereby GRANTS-IN-PART and DENIES-INPART defendant's amended motion to dismiss, filed June 10, 2016, ECF No. 15. Defendant's RCFC 12(b)(l) amended motionto dismiss Ms. Langley's income tax refund claims for 2004, 2011, 2012, and 2013 and herproperty claims are GRANTED. Defendant's RCFC 12(b)(6) motionto dismiss Ms. Langley's tax refund claim for 2009 is DENIED. Ms. Langley's tax refund claim for 2009 is DISMISSED for lack of jurisdiction sua sponte under RCFC 12(h)(3). Accordingly, pursuantto RCFC 12(b)(l) and 12(h)(3), plaintiff's complaint is DISMISSED for lack of jurisdictionwithout prejudice. The Clerk ofCourt shall enter judgment for defendant. 12 No costs.
ITIS SO ORDERED.

12 Pursuantto SectionI.C.2 ofthis opinion, the Clerk's Office is directed to DEEM plaintiff's amended complaint, ECF No. 8, as a supplemental complaint, filed by leave of the court, as ofthe date it was entered in this matter, May, 5, 2016. 22