IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA 

ZANE MICHAEL FLOYD, 

Appellant, 

vs. 

THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 

COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA, 

IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CLARK; 

AND THE HONORABLE MICHAEL 

VILLANI, DISTRICT JUDGE, 

Respondents, 

and 

THE STATE OF NEVADA, 

Real Party in Interest. 

No. 83167 

FILED 

FEB 2 4 2022 

ELIZABETh A. BROWN 

CLERK 91 SL1PREME COURT 

BY 5 . 

DEPUlY CLERK 

ORDER DENYING PETITION 

This original petition for a writ of mandamus or prohibition 

challenges the authority and jurisdiction of Department 17 in the Eighth 

Judicial District Court to issue an order or warrant of execution for 

petitioner Zane Floyd and to consider Floyd's postconviction habeas 

petition. 

"A writ of mandamus is available to compel the performance of 

an act which the law requires as a duty resulting from an office, trust or 

station, or to control a manifest abuse or an arbitrary or capricious exercise 

of discretion." Cote H. v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 124 Nev. 36, 39, 175 

P.3d 906, 907-08 (2008) (internal quotation marks, footnote, and alterations 

omitted); see also NRS 34.160. The petition presents a pure legal issue. And 

although Floyd has an adequate remedy to challenge Department 17's 

authority to resolve a postconviction habeas petition challenging his 

conviction or sentence—he can appeal from any adverse decision on that 

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petition, see NRS 34.575(1)—it does not appear that he has another 

adequate remedy to challenge Department 17's authority to issue an order 

or warrant of execution. We therefore elect to exercise our discretion to 

consider the merits of Floyd's petition for a writ of mandamus. See Walker 

v. Second Judicial Dist. Court, 136 Nev., Adv. Op. 80, 476 P.3d 1194 (2020). 

Floyd argues that Department 5 in the Eighth Judicial District 

Court is the only court permitted to hear any postconviction matters and to 

issue an order and warrant of execution because it is the court where the 

conviction and death sentence were obtained and where previous 

postconviction habeas petitions were considered. In support of his position, 

Floyd points to language from three provisions in NRS chapter 176 

addressing new orders to execute a judgment of death that has not yet been 

executed as well as language in NRS 34.730. 

'Floyd alternatively argues for a writ of prohibition, but his 

arguments do not implicate the district court's jurisdiction. See United 

States v. Cotton, 535 U.S. 625, 630 (2002) ("[T]he term jurisdiction 

means . . . the courts' statutory or constitutional power to adjudicate the 

case." (internal quotation marks omitted)). The district courts have 

jurisdiction over felonies and gross misdemeanors and over postconviction 

habeas petitions filed by persons held in custody or convicted in their 

respective districts. See Nev. Const., art. 6, § 6 (providing that district 

courts have jurisdiction over, among other things, cases excluded from the 

original jurisdiction of the justice courts and the power to issue writs of 

habeas corpus); NRS 34.738 (delineating where certain postconviction 

habeas petitions must be filed); Kimball v. State, 100 Nev. 190, 1981, 678 

P.2d 675, 676 (1984). And the judges within a district "have concurrent and 

coextensive jurisdiction within the district." NRS 3.020. Thus, Department 

17 has as much jurisdiction over the execution of Floyd's death sentence and 

his postconviction habeas petition(s) as any other department in the 

district. We therefore deny Floyd's petition for a writ of prohibition. 

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(0) 1)47A 414. 
We disagree with Floyd's narrow interpretation of "the court" 

as used in NRS 176.495 and NRS 176.505(1) and (2)—that it refers 

specifically and narrowly to the department in which the conviction or 

sentence was obtained. The statutes plain language lends itself to a 

broader interpretation, encompassing an entire judicial district, not a 

specific department within the judicial district. See Gathrite v. Eighth 

Ju,dicial Dist. Court, 135 Nev. 405, 408, 451 P.3d 891, 894 (2019) 

(recognizing that this court will consider questions of statutory 

interpretation de novo, beginning with the text of the statutes). This 

broader interpretation is consistent with how the term is used in other 

statutes. See, e.g., NRS 1.235(5)(a) (referencing the transfer of a "case to 

another department of the court, if there is more than one department of 

the court in the districe); NRS 32.120 (defining "court" as a district court in 

Nevada for purposes of the Uniform Commercial Real Estate Receivership 

Act); NRS 132.116 (regarding wills and estates, "'District court' or 'court' 

means a district court of this State sitting in probate"); NRS 166A.060 

("Court' means a district court of this State" for the Nevada Uniform 

Custodial Trust Act); NRS 176.211(8)(a) (defining "court" as a district court 

of Nevada for the purpose of deferring judgment); NRS 176A.030 ("Court' 

means a district court of the State of Nevade for purposes of probation and 

suspension of sentence); see also 1967 Nev. Stat., Ch. 523, § 246, at 1434 (a 

statute added at the same time, and as part of the same bill, as NRS 176.495 

that defined "court" as "a district court of the State of Nevade but not 

specifically applying that definition to NRS 176.495).2We are unpersuaded 

2Additional1y, court rules demonstrate a similar understanding of the 

word "court." See, e.g., N.R.Cr.P. 2(1) (describing cases being "randomly 

assigned to a department of the court"); EDCR 1.12(c) ("Court' means the 

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by Floyd's reliance on Rainsberger v. State, 85 Nev. 22, 449 P.2d 254 (1969), 

as the since-repealed statutory provision at issue in that case used 

materially different language than the statutes cited by Floyd in this case. 

See Loughrin v. United States, 573 U.S. 351, 358 (2014) C[W]hen [the 

Legislature] includes particular language in one section of a statute but 

omits it in another—let alone in the very next provision—this Court 

presumes that [the Legislature] intended a difference in meaning." (internal 

quotation marks and alteration omitted)). Accordingly, the plain meaning 

of "the court" in NRS 176.495 and NRS 176.505(1) and (2) is the district 

court where the conviction or death sentence was obtained and is not limited 

to a specific department within that court. Floyd's case is being heard in 

the court in which his conviction and sentence were obtained, the Eighth 

Judicial District Court, thus satisfying NRS 176.495 and NRS 176.505. 

Floyd's related argument involving NRS 34.730(3)(b) is 

similarly without merit. The statute plainly contemplates that there may 

be circumstances when a postconviction habeas petition will not be 

"assigned to the original judge or court." NRS 34.730(3)(b) (stating a 

postconviction habeas petition challenging the validity of a conviction or 

sentence must be, "Whenever possible, assigned to the original judge or 

coure (emphasis added)). And in the Eighth Judicial District Court, the 

chief judge can "assign or reassign all cases pending in the district." EDCR 

1.60(a). Moreover, EDCR 1.30(b)(15) allows the chief judge to "[r]eassign 

cases from a department to another department as convenience or necessity 

requires." See also N.R.Cr.P. 2(1)(B) (requiring a case to remain in the same 

department until final disposition unless the chief judge assigns the case as 

district court."); WDCR 20 (Prospective jurors who have been assigned for 

service in a department of the court . . ."). 

4 
part of "a plan of court-wide case management"). Given the plain language 

of NRS 34.730(3)(b), Floyd has not shown that his postconviction habeas 

petition(s) must be heard in Department 5. 

Because we conclude that Floyd has not shown that the district 

court is required as a matter of law to transfer his criminal case and 

postconviction case(s) to Department 5 of the Eighth Judicial District Court, 

we 

ORDER the petition DENIED. 

• 1 • 

Cum. 

elf....et Er .4 , J. 

Hardesty 

 J. 

Stiglich 

Cadish Silver 

Herndon 

cc: Hon. Michael Villani, District Judge 

Federal Public Defender/Las Vegas 

Attorney General/Carson City 

Clark County District Attorney 

Eighth District Court Clerk 

5 

Par aguirre 

Pickering