Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 19A-CR-2779 | April 8, 2020 Page 1 of 14

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

Paula M. Sauer

Danville, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Curtis T. Hill, Jr.

Attorney General of Indiana

Tiffany A. McCoy

Deputy Attorney General 

Indianapolis, Indiana

IN THE

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Alexander Regino Quintanilla,

Appellant-Defendant,

v.

State of Indiana,

Appellee-Plaintiff.

April 8, 2020

Court of Appeals Case No.

19A-CR-2779

Appeal from the Hendricks 

Superior Court

The Honorable Mark A. Smith, 

Judge

Trial Court Cause No.

32D04-1807-F2-14

Najam, Judge.

Statement of the Case

[1] Alexander Regino Quintanilla appeals his conviction for dealing in 

methamphetamine, as a Level 2 felony, and his ensuing sentence. Quintanilla

raises two issues for our review, which we restate as the following three issues:
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1. Whether Indiana’s statutory requirement to use a turn 

signal prior to turning does not apply where it might not be 

clear to other motorists where specifically the driver will 

turn.

2. Whether the trial court abused its discretion when it relied 

on the substantial amount of methamphetamine—ten 

pounds—found in Quintanilla’s vehicle when sentencing 

him for an already enhanced Level 2 felony offense.

3. Whether Quintanilla’s twenty-year sentence, with ten 

years suspended, is inappropriate in light of the nature of 

the offense and Quintanilla’s character.

[2] We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] On July 15, 2018, officers with the Hendricks County Sheriff’s Department

received a tip that Quintanilla would be traveling through Hendricks County 

with narcotics in his vehicle. Officers in multiple vehicles followed Quintanilla 

westbound on U.S. 36 in Avon. As Quintanilla passed a Target department 

store, he failed to use his left turn signal continuously as he made a “rapid lane 

change” into a turn lane and then turned left onto Gable Drive. Tr. Vol. 2 at 

37. Multiple officers saw the traffic infraction, and Hendricks County Sheriff’s 

Deputy Dennis Sanchez initiated a traffic stop.

[4] During the stop, a K-9 unit indicated the presence of contraband inside 

Quintanilla’s vehicle. Officers then searched the vehicle and seized 
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approximately ten pounds of methamphetamine, distributed over ten onepound bags. Officers arrested Quintanilla.

[5] The State charged Quintanilla with dealing in methamphetamine as a Level 2 

felony because “the amount of the drug involved” was “at least ten (10) grams,” 

or about two-hundredths of one pound. Ind. Code § 35-48-4-1.1(e)(1) (2019). 

Quintanilla moved to suppress the ten pounds of methamphetamine seized 

from the traffic stop on the ground that, had he used a left turn signal, it would 

have been ambiguous to other motorists if he were turning left onto Gable 

Drive or instead into the parking lot of a nearby business. The trial court 

denied the motion. Quintanilla renewed his objection to the admissibility of the 

evidence at his ensuing bench trial, which the trial court overruled. The court 

then found Quintanilla guilty of dealing in methamphetamine, as a Level 2 

felony.

[6] Thereafter, the court sentenced Quintanilla as follows:

[T]here is some prior criminal history but not significant enough

where I would consider it an aggravating circumstance. Both 

offenses appear to be minor. I do think it is an aggravating 

circumstance that he was arrested while this case was pending for 

a new criminal offense. I also find that the amount of the drug was 

a—obviously ten pounds is way over[,] above[,] and beyond what the 

State had to prove in order to meet its burden. . . . [I]n addition to 

that I have considered the fact that the Defendant . . . did score 

low . . . on the risk assessment. Having considered those things

the Court . . . hereby imposes a sentence of twenty years in the 

Department of Correction[]. Ten of those years will be executed, 

ten . . . will be suspended to probation.
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Id. at 155-56 (emphasis added). This appeal ensued.

Discussion and Decision

Issue One: Admission of the Methamphetamine

[7] On appeal, Quintanilla first asserts that officers violated his state and federal 

constitutional rights when they stopped his vehicle. As we have explained:

[The defendant’s] arguments that police violated his Fourth 

Amendment and Article 1, Section 11 rights raise questions of 

law we review de novo. As the United States Supreme Court has 

explained with respect to the Fourth Amendment, “as a general 

matter determinations of reasonable suspicion and probable 

cause should be reviewed de novo on appeal,” while “findings of 

historical fact” underlying those legal determinations are 

reviewed “only for clear error.” Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 

690, 699 (1996). The Indiana Supreme Court applies the same 

standard under Article 1, Section 11. E.g., McIlquham v. State, 10 

N.E.3d 506, 511 (Ind. 2014). In other words, we review whether 

reasonable suspicion or probable cause exists “under a standard 

‘similar to other sufficiency issues’—whether, without reweighing 

the evidence, there is ‘substantial evidence of probative value that 

supports the trial court’s decision.’” Id. (quoting State v. 

Richardson, 927 N.E.2d 379, 385 (Ind. 2010)).

Redfield v. State, 78 N.E.3d 1104, 1106 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017) (some citations and 

quotation marks omitted), trans. denied.

[8] An officer’s observation of a traffic infraction is a well-established basis for a 

traffic stop under both the Fourth Amendment to the United States 

Constitution and Article 1, Section 11 of the Indiana Constitution. E.g., Doctor 

v. State, 57 N.E.3d 846, 853, 856 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016). And Indiana Code 
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Section 9-21-8-25 provides, in relevant part, that “[a] signal of intention to turn 

right or left shall be given continuously during not less than the last two 

hundred (200) feet traveled by a vehicle before turning or changing lanes.”1

 

There is no dispute that Quintanilla did not signal a left turn continuously for at 

least 200 feet prior to turning.

[9] Nonetheless, Quintanilla asserts that the statute does not apply here. In 

particular, Quintanilla asserts that using the left turn signal as required would 

not have clearly indicated to other motorists where specifically Quintanilla 

intended to turn—namely, whether Quintanilla intended to turn onto Gable 

Drive or into the parking lot of a nearby business. 

[10] In support of that argument, Quintanilla relies on this Court’s opinion in State v. 

Rhodes, 950 N.E.2d 1261 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011). In Rhodes, the trial court 

granted the defendant’s motion to suppress, finding that the facts did not 

support the officer’s initiation of a traffic stop for the defendant’s purported 

failure to signal a turn. On the State’s appeal from a negative judgment, we 

recited the defendant’s arguments in support of the trial court’s judgment and 

held as follows:

[The defendant] notes that the trial court questioned why he 

would have turned . . . unless [the officer] had already initiated a 

traffic stop. He also notes that the State did not show that it was 

1

 For speed zones of at least fifty miles per hour, the signal shall be given continuously for at least 300 feet. 

I.C. § 9-21-8-25. But there is no dispute that U.S. 36 at the location in question was a forty-five mile-per-hour 

speed zone.
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possible for him to comply with the statute. The record is clear 

that [the location where the defendant turned off the street] is 

across the street from [where he had originally turned onto the 

street]. [The officer] estimated that [the defendant] turned his 

signal on about 150 feet before turning, but the record does not 

reflect whether there was at least 200 feet between the place 

where he turned onto [the street] and the place where he turned 

[off of the street]. We agree that the State failed to show that 

compliance with the statute was possible under the 

circumstances. In addition, if the trial court credited [the 

defendant’s] testimony, once the officer turned on his emergency 

lights [on the street before the defendant turned], [the defendant]

was required to pull over immediately. See Ind. Code § 9-21-8-35 

(providing that drivers must “immediately” yield to an 

emergency vehicle when its siren or emergency lights are 

activated). Thus, we cannot say that the trial court erred by 

concluding that [the defendant] was not properly stopped for a 

traffic violation.

Id. at 1265.

[11] Quintanilla reads Rhodes to stand for the proposition that, where the continuous 

use of a turn signal would not unambiguously tell other motorists where the 

driver is turning, compliance with the turn-signal statute is not possible. But 

Rhodes does not stand for that proposition. Rhodes stands for the proposition 

that the trial court is the finder of fact, that the State’s burden on appeal from a 

negative judgment is formidable, and that complying with the turn-signal 

statute might not be possible when a driver is on a street for less than 200 feet 

before turning off that same street. None of those circumstances are present 

here.
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[12] Moreover, Quintanilla’s argument that the turn-signal statute applies only when 

using the turn signal will unambiguously inform other motorists where 

specifically the driver intends to turn would create an exception that swallows 

the rule. In any municipality of even slight population density, driveways, 

parking lots, cross-streets, and alleyways are often within 200 feet of each other. 

To hold that the turn-signal statute does not apply under such circumstances 

would amount to an exemption from the turn-signal statute at many locations 

where it is required and beneficial. Our legislature did not intend such an 

absurd result. The statute requires a continuous signal to inform other 

motorists of a driver’s intent to turn—most motorists will figure out where the

driver is turning based on where the driver actually slows down before the turn, 

not from the use of the signal alone.

[13] Accordingly, the statute applied to Quintanilla’s left turn, regardless of whether 

his use of the signal would have clearly communicated that he intended to turn 

onto Gable Drive or into the nearby business parking lot. Again, there is no 

dispute that Quintanilla failed to use the turn signal continuously. Accordingly, 

Officer Sanchez did not violate Quintanilla’s state or federal constitutional 

rights when the officer stopped Quintanilla for an observed traffic infraction, 

and we affirm the trial court’s admission of the ten pounds of seized 

methamphetamine.

Issue Two: Sentencing Discretion

[14] Quintanilla next asserts that the trial court abused its discretion when it 

sentenced him. Sentencing decisions lie within the sound discretion of the trial 
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court. Cardwell v. State, 895 N.E.2d 1219, 1222 (Ind. 2008). An abuse of 

discretion occurs if the decision is “clearly against the logic and effect of the 

facts and circumstances before the court, or the reasonable, probable, and actual 

deductions to be drawn therefrom.” Gross v. State, 22 N.E.3d 863, 869 (Ind. Ct.

App. 2014) (citation omitted), trans. denied.

[15] A trial court abuses its discretion in sentencing if it does any of the following:

(1) fails “to enter a sentencing statement at all;” (2) enters “a 

sentencing statement that explains reasons for imposing a 

sentence—including a finding of aggravating and mitigating 

factors if any—but the record does not support the reasons;” (3) 

enters a sentencing statement that “omits reasons that are clearly 

supported by the record and advanced for consideration;” or (4) 

considers reasons that “are improper as a matter of law.”

Id. (quoting Anglemyer v. State, 868 N.E.2d 482, 490-491 (Ind.), clarified on reh’g

on other grounds, 875 N.E.2d 218 (Ind. 2007)).

[16] The sentencing range for a Level 2 felony is ten to thirty years, with an advisory 

sentence of seventeen and one-half years. I.C. § 35-50-2-4.5. In sentencing 

Quintanilla to a term of twenty years, with ten years suspended, the trial court 

found the substantial amount of methamphetamine seized from Quintanilla’s 

vehicle to be an aggravating circumstance along with Quintanilla’s alleged 

commission of a new criminal offense during the pendency of these 
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proceedings.2

 The trial court did not give aggravating weight to Quintanilla’s 

criminal history, and the court gave some mitigating weight to Quintanilla’s 

low risk to reoffend.

[17] Quintanilla asserts that the trial court abused its discretion when it sentenced 

him because, in finding the ten pounds of methamphetamine to be an 

aggravating circumstance, the court used an element of the Level 2 felony 

offense as an aggravator. Again, the offense for which Quintanilla was charged 

and convicted required the State to show that “the amount of the drug 

involved” was “at least ten (10) grams.” I.C. § 35-48-4-1.1(e)(1). The State’s 

evidence that Quintanilla possessed ten pounds of methamphetamine cleared 

that burden more than 450 times over.

[18] In support of his argument on this issue, Quintanilla relies on Smith v. State, a 

2003 opinion in which a panel of this Court held that the trial court abused its 

discretion when it used the defendant’s possession of eighty-five grams of 

cocaine as a sentencing aggravator because the degree of the offense had 

already been elevated based on the defendant’s possession of three or more 

grams. 780 N.E.2d 1214, 1219 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003), trans. denied. That holding 

in Smith has been followed in only one other published opinion from our 

2

 Quintanilla states that he is challenging the trial court’s use of his arrest as an aggravator, but Quintanilla’s 

precise argument here is not that the trial court erred in finding this aggravator but only that “it is more 

logical to address it as part of an inquiry of his character” under Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B). Appellant’s Br. 

at 28. Accordingly, we conclude that Quintanilla does not challenge on appeal the trial court’s finding that 

his arrest during the instant proceedings is an aggravating circumstance.
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Court.

3 See Donnegan v. State, 809 N.E.2d 966, 978 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004), trans. 

denied. And our similar holding in Donnegan has not been relied upon in any 

subsequent and factually comparable published Indiana appellate opinions.

[19] We conclude that Smith and Donnegan have been superseded on this issue. 

These opinions predate the General Assembly’s substantial overhaul of our 

criminal sentencing statutes in 2005. See Anglemyer, 868 N.E.2d at 487-88. The 

very notion of an “enhanced” sentence has been diluted by the 2005 sentencing 

revisions, under which our trial courts have broad discretion to impose a 

sentence anywhere within the applicable statutory range. Under this statutory 

regime, our appellate courts have routinely deferred to our trial courts’ 

assessments of particularized facts in crafting appropriate sentences. E.g., 

Sorenson v. State, 133 N.E.3d 717, 729 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019) (“Our trial courts 

are broadly authorized to tailor sentences to the facts and circumstances before 

them.”), trans. denied.

[20] Further, and significantly, our current sentencing statute expressly states that, 

“[i]n determining what sentence to impose for a crime, the court may consider” 

as an aggravating circumstance that the “harm . . . suffered by the victim of an 

offense was: (A) significant; and (B) greater than the elements necessary to prove the 

3 In a 2004 Indiana Supreme Court opinion, the defendant relied on this holding from Smith, but rather than 

challenge the merits of that argument the State conceded it and proceeded to argue harmless error. Our 

Supreme Court explicitly skipped an analysis on the merits of the defendant’s argument because of the State’s 

position and instead assessed the defendant’s sentence under Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B). Merlington v. State, 

814 N.E.2d 269, 272-73 (Ind. 2004). 
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commission of the offense.” I.C. § 35-38-1-7.1(a)(1) (emphasis added); cf. I.C. § 35-

38-1-7.1 (2003) (containing no similar language). We think that language 

applies here, where the extraordinary quantity of the drugs seized indicates the 

degree of harm the dealing and dissemination of those drugs would inflict upon 

the community. Finally, we note that the enumerated sentencing factors “do 

not limit the matters that the court may consider in determining the sentence.” 

I.C. § 35-38-1-7.1(c).

[21] While the Indiana Supreme Court has not expressly disapproved of the 

holdings in Smith or Donnegan, other holdings from the Court confirm that we 

should defer to the trial court’s consideration of the particular amount of drugs 

seized here. For example, in Hamilton v. State, our Supreme Court, relying on 

prior case law, reiterated that a trial court does not abuse its discretion in 

finding a victim’s “particularly tender years” to be an aggravating circumstance

even though the degree of the felony offense for child molesting had already 

been elevated based on the victim being less than twelve years of age. 955

N.E.3d 723, 727 (Ind. 2011).

[22] In sum, our trial courts have broad discretion in sentencing defendants based on 

the actual and specific facts of the offenses, and our trial courts may consider 

the degree to which the amount of drugs actually in the defendant’s possession 

is greater than the statutory threshold required to prove the charged offense. 

That is what the trial court here did. The court did not abuse its discretion in 

sentencing Quintanilla.
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Issue Three: Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B)

[23] Last, Quintanilla asserts that his twenty-year sentence, with ten years 

suspended, for dealing ten pounds of methamphetamine is inappropriate in 

light of the nature of the offense and his character. As our Supreme Court has 

made clear:

The Indiana Constitution authorizes appellate review and 

revision of a trial court’s sentencing decision. Ind. Const. art. 7, 

§§ 4, 6; Serino v. State, 798 N.E.2d 852, 856 (Ind. 2003). This 

authority is implemented through Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B), 

which permits an appellate court to revise a sentence if, after due 

consideration of the trial court’s decision, the sentence is found to 

be inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and the 

character of the offender. Serino, 798 N.E.2d at 856. The 

principal role of such review is to attempt to leaven the outliers. 

Cardwell v. State, 895 N.E.2d 1219, 1225 (Ind. 2008). The burden 

is on the defendant to persuade the reviewing court that the 

sentence is inappropriate. Bowman v. State, 51 N.E.3d 1174, 1181 

(Ind. 2016).

Robinson v. State, 91 N.E.3d 574, 577 (Ind. 2018) (per curiam).

[24] Further:

Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B) is a “rare” avenue for appellate relief 

that is reserved “for exceptional cases.” Livingston v. State, 113 

N.E.3d 611, 612-13 (Ind. 2018) (per curiam). Even with Rule 

7(B), “[s]entencing is principally a discretionary function in 

which the trial court’s judgment should receive considerable 

deference.” Stephenson v. State, 29 N.E.3d 111, 122 (Ind. 2015) 

(quoting Cardwell, 895 N.E.2d at 1222). “Such deference should 

prevail unless overcome by compelling evidence portraying in a 

positive light the nature of the offense (such as accompanied by 
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restraint, regard, and lack of brutality) and the defendant’s 

character (such as substantial virtuous traits or persistent 

examples of good character).” Id. Absent such a “sufficiently 

compelling” evidentiary basis, we will not “override the decision 

of . . . the trial court.” Id.

Sorenson, 133 N.E.2d at 728 (alteration and omission original to Sorenson).

[25] According to Quintanilla, there was nothing about his dealing in 

methamphetamine offense that is not already accounted for by the 17.5-year 

advisory sentence for the Level 2 felony. He further asserts that his sentence is 

inappropriate in light of his character because he has lived a mostly law-abiding 

life; the fact that he was arrested while the instant case was pending, without 

more, is not significant; while he did not plead guilty, he did waive his right to a 

jury trial, for which he should receive some mitigating credit; he had a low 

recidivism score; and, he continues, “[i]t does not appear that the trial court 

considered any less restrictive, alternative placement programs . . . .” 

Appellant’s Br. at 37.

[26] We cannot agree. The officers’ testimony at trial demonstrated that Quintanilla 

was in possession of ten pounds of methamphetamine, which, like the trial 

court, we consider an extraordinary quantity, which is many times the amount 

needed to prove the charged offense. Further, he was alleged to have 

committed a new offense while on bond for the instant proceedings. While not 

a conviction, we agree with the trial court that this fact speaks poorly to 

Quintanilla’s character, as does his prior criminal history, even though it is 

minor. And the trial court suspended half of Quintanilla’s sentence to 
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probation. We see no sufficiently compelling evidence in this record to justify 

appellate relief under Rule 7(B) here. We affirm Quintanilla’s sentence.

Conclusion

[27] In sum, officers did not violate Quintanilla’s constitutional rights when they 

stopped him for a traffic infraction. Indiana’s turn-signal statute required 

Quintanilla to signal his turn continuously for at least 200 feet, which he does 

not dispute he did not do. We therefore affirm Quintanilla’s conviction. We 

also conclude that the trial court did not exceed its authority when it considered 

the extraordinary quantity of drugs in Quintanilla’s possession when he was 

arrested, and Quintanilla’s sentence is not inappropriate. We therefore also 

affirm his sentence.

[28] Affirmed.

Kirsch, J., and Brown, J., concur.