SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-5222-16T3

STATE OF NEW JERSEY,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

NICHOLAS W. CEREGHINI,

Defendant-Appellant.

__________________________

Submitted October 17, 2018 – Decided

Before Judges Nugent and Reisner.

On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey, Law 

Division, Ocean County, Indictment Nos. 11-12-2165, 

13-01-0240, 13-02-0336 and 14-05-1363.

Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney for 

appellant (Kevin G. Byrnes, Designated Counsel, on 

the brief). 

Bradley D. Billhimer, Ocean County Prosecutor, 

attorney for respondent (Samuel J. Marzarella, Chief 

Appellate Attorney, of counsel; Roberta Di Biase, 

Supervising Assistant Prosecutor, on the brief). 

PER CURIAM

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the 

internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.

October 31, 2018
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Defendant Nicholas Cereghini appeals from a June 28, 2017 order denying 

his petition for post-conviction relief (PCR). We affirm substantially for the 

reasons stated by Judge James M. Blaney in a written opinion accompanying the 

order. We add the following comments. 

As the result of a comprehensive plea bargain resolving three indictments, 

on October 29, 2013, defendant pled guilty to first-degree robbery, third-degree 

possession of a controlled dangerous substance with intent to distribute, and 

fourth-degree criminal trespass. Pursuant to an additional plea bargain, on June 

23, 2014, he pled guilty to third-degree burglary and other offenses that he 

committed after his October 29 guilty plea but before his scheduled sentencing 

date. On September 19, 2014, the court sentenced defendant, as though he were 

a second-degree offender, to nine years in prison subject to the No Early Release 

Act, N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2, for the first-degree robbery charge. The court also 

imposed a consecutive term of three years for the burglary, and imposed 

concurrent terms for all of the remaining charges. We affirmed the sentence on 

direct appeal, but remanded to give defendant additional jail credits to which the 

State agreed he was entitled. State v. Cereghini, No. A-1795-14 (App. Div. July 

29, 2015). 
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Defendant then filed a PCR petition, claiming that his trial counsel should 

have pursued a Miranda1 motion, instead of withdrawing the motion. Judge 

Blaney issued a cogent written opinion explaining his reasons for denying the 

PCR petition. Significantly, the judge concluded that the State had strong 

evidence against defendant even without his statement, and defendant's trial 

counsel obtained a very favorable plea offer for him, which would not have been 

available if he had insisted on pursuing the Miranda motion. In other words, it 

would not have been rational for defendant to refuse the plea bargain and instead 

insist on going ahead with the Miranda motion and the trial. See State v. 

Maldon, 422 N.J. Super. 475, 486 (App. Div. 2011). 

On this appeal, defendant presents the following points of argument:

POINT I: THE DEFENDANT WAS DENIED THE 

RIGHT TO EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF 

COUNSEL AS GUARANTEED BY THE SIXTH 

AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES 

CONSTITUTION AND ART. I, PAR. 10 OF THE 

NEW JERSEY CONSTITUTION.

POINT II: THE DEFENDANT IS ENTITLED TO AN 

EVIDENTIARY HEARING. 

 

1 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
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Based on our review of the record, we conclude those arguments are 

without sufficient merit to warrant discussion, beyond the following brief 

comments. R. 2:11-3(e)(2). 

Defendant contends that the Miranda motion would have been granted, 

because the police questioned him first, and then administered the Miranda

warnings. However, defendant does not address whether it would have been 

rational to pursue the motion instead of taking the plea bargain he was offered. 

Additionally, defendant did not submit a certification or other legally competent 

evidence explaining what allegedly ineffective advice his trial counsel gave him, 

or attesting that defendant did not want to withdraw the motion. Further, the 

plea transcripts disclose that defendant was well aware of his right to continue 

the Miranda hearing, and he chose to abandon that course of action. At the 

October 29, 2013 plea hearing, the judge stated that there was a pending Miranda

hearing but the motion would probably be withdrawn. At the June 23, 2014 plea 

hearing, the judge reminded defendant that even if he confessed to the offenses, 

he had a right to have hearings prior to trial. When asked, "Are you giving up 

your right to those hearings?" defendant responded, "Yes." 

To prevail on his PCR petition, defendant needed to demonstrate that, due 

to his attorney's ineffective representation, he pled guilty when he otherwise 
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would have insisted on going to trial. State v. DiFrisco, 137 N.J. 434, 457 

(1994). Defendant also needed to establish that it would have been rational to 

reject the plea offer and go to trial. Maldon, 422 N.J. Super. at 486. In his PCR 

petition, defendant did not present evidence that his attorney was ineffective, 

that it would have been rational to proceed with the Miranda hearing, or that 

defendant did not want to waive the hearing and accept the plea deal. 

Consequently, he did not present a prima facie case of ineffective assistance of 

counsel, and Judge Blaney correctly decided the petition without an evidentiary 

hearing. See State v. Preciose, 129 N.J. 451, 462-63 (1992). 

Affirmed.