T he r ecor d bef ore t hi s Co ur t does not cont ai n a copy o f t he ori gi nal judgment for t he D ef endan t ’ s ag gr ava t ed 1 k i dn appi n g c on v i ct i on . I t doe s , h owe v er , c on t ai n a c opy of t h e cor r ec t ed j u dg men t

. T h e “ Rel ea s e El i g i bi l i t y ” s ec t i on o f t he co rr ect ed judgm ent i nd i cat es bo t h t he “St and ard 30 % ” and “V i o l ent 1 0 0 % ” d esi gnat i o ns. T he reco rd al so co nt ai ns (c o n tinu e d ...) 

### IN THE COURT OF CRIMI NAL AP PEALS OF TENNES SEE

AT KNOXVI LLE A ssi gne d on Brie fs S ep te m be r 28, 200 4 DEN NIS E UGE NE EVA NS v. S TAT E OF TEN NES SEE

Ap pe a l f ro m th e Crimi na l Co urt f or Kn ox Cou nty No

. 7 9 3 7 4 R ayL

. J en k i n s , J u d ge

No. E2004-01059- CCA-R3-PC - Filed Dec ember 13, 2004

The De f e n d a n t, D e n n is E u g e n e E v a n s , p le dg u il ty to r o b b e ry

a n da g g r a v a te dk id n ap p in g . T he De fe nd a nt w a s se nte nc e d a s a Ra ng e I stand ardof

fe nd e r to c on c ur

re nt te rm s of thr e e a nde ig ht y e ars , respe ctively . The orig inal judgme nts indicated that the Def endant would be elig ible for pa role a fter having serve d thirty

perc ent of his sentenc e. The trial c ourt subsequently corr ecte d the judg ment for the Def endant’ s ag g ravated kidnapping conviction to ref lect that the sentenc e was to be se rved at one hundred pe rce nt. The De fendant subsequently filed a pe tition for post-conviction relief to set aside th e c o rr e c te dju d g me n t. T h e trial c o u rt s u mm ar il y d e n ie dr e lie f, and this ap p e a l f o ll o w e d

. We aff irm the judg ment of the trial c ourt. Tenn. R. App . P . 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgme nt of th e Cr im inal Cou rt A ff irm ed
D AVI D H. W EL L ES , J ., delivere d the opinion of the court, in which J OS EP H M. T I P TON and J OHN E VE R E TT W I L L I AMS , J J ., joined. Dennis Eug ene E vans, Whitevill e, Te nnessee , Pro Se. Paul G. Summers, Attorney Gene ral and Reporter ; B rent C. Cher ry , Assistant A ttorney

Gene ral; and Randall E. Nichols, District Attorney Gene ral, for

the appe llee, State of Te nnessee . OP IN ION
The Def endant pled g uilty on September 27, 2000, to one count of robbery and one c ount of ag g ravated kidnapping . The De fendant was sentenc ed as a Rang e I standard offende r to conc urre nt terms of thre e y ear s and eight y ear s, respe ctively

. The judg ment forms re flec ting the D efe ndant’s convictions indicated his rele ase eligibility to be thi rty perc ent, which the Defe ndant claims to be 1(

. . . con t i n u ed) 1

a c op y of

a l et t er f r om an off

i ci al wi t h t he D epar t ment of C orr ect i on t o t he t r i al j udge s t at i ng t hat t he s ent enc e i mp ose d o n S e p t. 2 7 , 20 0 0 , i s i l l egal be cause i t i nd i cat es a r el ease el i gi b i l i t y da t e o f June 2 0 0 3 fo r an of

fense r eq ui ri ng one hu ndr ed perc ent ser vi ce. I n l i gh t o f t hes e d ocument s and t he f act t hat t he D ef endan t i s procee di ng pro s e, we acc ept as a c c u ra te the D e fen d a n t’s co n te n tio n tha t t h e o rig ina l ju d g m e n t en te re d o n h is a g g ra v a te d kid n a p p ing c o n v ic tio n se t f o rth a re le a se e ligib ili ty o f t h irty p e rc e n t. -2- in acc ord with his plea ag ree ment. Thirty perc ent re lease elig ibilit y is the corr ect designation for a “standa rd” of fende r sentenc ed to a Rang e I sentenc e. See T enn. Code Ann. § 40- 35-501(c ).
On J anuary

3, 2001, an off

icial with the Depa

rt m en t o f C o rrection wrote the trial judg e a l et t er , ad vising he r that the sente nce imposed on the Def endant f or the a g g ravated kidnapping conviction was illeg al bec ause se ntence s for that offe nse m ust be served at one hundre d perc ent. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 40- 35-501(i)( 1), (i)( 2)(D) . Acc ording ly , on J anuary 1 0, 2001, a cor rec ted judgme nt was filed a s to the Defe ndant’s ag g ravated ki d n ap p i n g conviction, re flec ting that the se nte nc e wa s to be se rv e d at on e hu ndre d p e rc e nt. On Marc h 31 , 2 0 0 4 , t h e Defendant filed a plea ding styled “Petition to Correct an I lleg al Se nte nc e a nd

/or Pe tit ionfo r P os t Co nv ic tio n Re lie f. ” Th e po st- c on vic tion co urt su mma ri ly dismiss ed this pleading on April 8, 2004, on the basis that it was barr ed by the one- y ear

statute of limit ations applicable to petitions for post-conviction relief

. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-30-102( a). On April 12, 2004, t he De fendant filed another pleading , sty led “Ame nded Petition to C orre ct an I lleg al Sentenceand or Amended Petition for Post Conviction Re lief.” Thepost-conviction court summarily

dismiss ed this second plea ding as time-barr ed on April 19, 2004. This appea l followed.
I n his pro se plea dings, the Def endant a sserts that the trial c ourt lacke d jurisdiction to enter the cor rec ted judg ment. Acc ording ly , he arg ues t hat t he correc ted j udg ment should be set aside and the orig inal judgme nt r einstated. The Def endant also claims in this appeal that the post-conviction court e rre d in summarily

dismiss ing his pe titions . We disag reeon both counts.
The sente nce initially

imposed on the Def

endant f or the a g g ravated kidnapping conviction was illeg al bec ause it direc tly contra vened a

statute in exi stence at t h e t i m e i t was imposed. See Taylor v. State, 995 S.W .2d 78, 85 (Tenn. 1999) . Acc ording to the corr ecte d judgme nt form, the Def endant c ommitt ed an a g g ravated kidnapping on April 28, 1999. Our leg islature dete rmined that persons c ommitt ing the offe nse of a g g ravated ki dnapping on or after J uly 1, 1995, “shall serve one hundred perc ent (100%) of the sentenc e imposed by the court

. . . .” Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35- 501(i)(1) , (i)(2) (D). T hus, the trial court’s orig inal judgme nt t h at t h e Defendant be elig ible for rele ase a fter se rving thirty perc ent of his ag g rava

ted kidnapping sentenc e wa s contrary to our se nte nc ing statut e s a ndthe re fo reill e g a l.
The De fendant contends that the trial c ourt lost jurisdiction t o corr ect th e illegal sentence thirty day s afte r j udg ment was entered. The Defendant is corr ect that, normally , the judg ment of a tria l c ou rt be c ome s f

inal th irty day s a ft e r e ntry , a

bs e nt a tim e ly no tice o f app eal or

a n a pp ro priate post-trial motion. Tenn. R. App. P. 4(a), (c ); See State v. Gr een, 106 S.W.3d 646, 648 ( Tenn. 2003).-3-

Oncethe judg ment is final, the tri al court loses jurisdiction t o alter or amend. SeeGre en, 106 S.W. 3da t 64 8- 49 . H ow e ve r, ou r s up re me c ou rt ha s h e ld t

hat, “ a tria l ju dg e may

c or re c t a n il le g a l, as opposed t o a mere ly

err oneous, sentenc e at any time, even if it has be come f inal.” State v. B ur kh art , 56 6 S.W. 2d 87 1, 87 3 (T e nn . 19 78 ). Ac c or din g ly , the tria l c ou rt in this matte r “ ha d b oth the power , and the duty , to c orre ct the judgme nt of [S eptember 27, 2000,] as soon as its i lleg ality was br ou g ht t o [it s] atte nti on .” I d. Th e De fe nd a nt’ s c la im that th e tr ial cou rt la c ke d th e auth ority to corr ect his judg ment is without m erit.
The Defendant also alleg es t hat, as corr ecte d, the judg ment enter ed ag ainst him contravene s his plea ag ree ment. Our Rules of Criminal Proce dure provide t hat a motion to withdraw a g uiltyplea must be made prior

to sentencebeing imposed or, “to cor rec t manifest inj ustice,” after the impositi on of sentenc e but bef

ore the judgme nt becomes f inal. See Tenn. R. Crim. P . 32(f) . Clearly , the Def endant is time-bar

red f rom such a motion in this case.
I n essenc e, the Def

endant’ s claim is that he would not have e ntere d his plea had heknown that hewo uldha ve to se rv e on e hu ndre d p e rc e nt o f h is a g g ravate d kidn apin g se nte nc e . T hat is , h is plea - - as r efle cted by the corr ecte d judgme nt - - was not voluntary . A post-conviction petition is t he proper avenuefor attacking an involuntary g uilty plea. See, e.g ., Reiko Nolen v. State, No. W2001- 03003-CCA-R3-CD, 2002 WL 31443174, at *4 (Te nn. Crim. App., J ac k s o n , Oct. 31, 2002). Howeve r, abse nt an appe al, a pe titioner has only one y ear from the date on which his or her judg ment become s final in which to file for post-conviction re lief. See Tenn. C ode Ann. 40- 30-102(a ). As se t f orth a bo ve , th e jud g me nt o f a

tria l c ou rt

be c ome s f

inal thi rty day s a ft e r i ts e ntry , a bs e nt a tim e ly notice of a

ppeal or post-trial m o t i o n. Tenn. R. App. P. 4 (a) , (c) ; See Gre en, 106 S.W.3d at 648. Her e, howe v er , t h e re l evant “ trig g er” date wa s the date on w hich the trial c ourt filed its corr ecte d jud g m e n t : Jan u ary

1 0 , 2 0 0 1

. S e e M a n n y

T

. A n d e r s o n v . S t a t e , N o . M 2 0 0 2

- 0 0 6 4 1

- CCA -R 3- PC, 2003 WL 2002092, at *4 (Te nn. Crim. App., Nashville, April 3 0 , 2003) (holding that, when an amende d judgme nt was filed thre e y ear s after t h e o ri g inal entry of judg ment, the post-conviction limit ations period beg an to run on the date the ame nded judg ment was filed) . Thus, the one- y ear post-conviction limitations period be g an to run i n J anuary 2001 and expired in J anuary 2002. The De fe nd a nt d id n ot f

ilehis pe tit ionun til Ma

rc h 2 00 4. Th e trial cou rt wa s th e re fo rec or

re c t in dismiss ing theDef

endant’ s petitions as tim e-ba rre d.
The Defendant arg ues t hat t he post -convic tion statute of l imitations does not apply when the c laim is to c o rr e c t a n il le g a l s e n te n c e , r e lyin g o n th is Co u rt’ s u n p u b li s h e d o p in io n s inJ ames Gordon Coons, II I v. State, No. 01C01-9801-CR-00014, 1999 WL 275009, at *3 (Te nn. Crim. App., N a s h v il le , M a y

6 , 1 9 9 9 ) , a n dK e v inL a v e ll A b s to n v . St a te , N o . 0 2 C0 1

- 9 8 0 7

- CR

- 0 0 2 1 2 , 1 9 9 8 WL 906475, at *1 (Te nn. Crim. App., J ackson, D ec. 30, 1998). As corr ecte d, howeve r, the De fendant’s se nte nc e is n ot i lle g a l. T he De fe nd a nt’ s a rg ume nt that th e po st- c on vic tio n s tatut e of lim itatio ns is no t app lic ableis m isp la c e d andwi tho ut m e ri t.Eve n w er e t h e D ef en dan t t o r ec as t h i s pl ea di n g a s on e for a w r i t of h abea s c or pu s , h i s e f

for t s w ou l d be for 2 naught

. A wri t of hab eas corp us m ay b e grant ed where i t i s ap p arent f rom t he f ace o f

t he judgm ent or t he reco rd o f t he p roce ed i ngs up o n whi ch t he judgm ent i s rende red t hat a s ent ence i s i l l egal

. St ep henson v. C arl t o n, 28 S

. W

. 3 d 91 0 (T enn. 2 0 0 0 ). A s exp l ai ned ab o ve, t he co rr ect ed judgm ent i n t hi s c ase - - t he judgm ent unde r whi ch t he D efend ant i s b ei ng conf i ned -

- does not r ef

l ect an i l l ega l s ent enc e. Accordi ng l y , t he D ef endan t i s not ent i t l ed t o habeas cor pus r el i ef

. See M ic h a e l D . O ’G u in v . M ye rs , N o . M 2 0 0 3 -0 2 8 4 6 -C C A -R 3 -H C , 2 0 0 4 W L 2 2 9 0 4 8 7 (T e n n . C rim . A p p ., N a sh v ill e , O c t. 12, 2004) ( pet i t i on er be i n g h el d p urs uant t o a j u dg men t t h at c or r ec t ed t h e i n i t i al j u dg men t ’ s i l l eg al s en t en ce w as n ot en t i t l ed t o ha bea s cor pu s re l i ef bec au s e t h e a men ded j u dg men t or der ed t h e cor r ec t s en t en ce a n d t h e cor r ec t c on v i ct i on a n d w a s the re fo re no t vo id a s ill e g a l). -4- By his pleading , the Def

endant is a

ttempting to nullify

a leg al sentenc e and r einstate an illegal one. The re is no proc edureavailablefor attaining the D efe ndant’s objec tive. At best, the De fendant 2 would be entitl ed to have his plea set aside, allowing him to either re-ple ad to a legal sentence , or be tried. In order

to set aside his plea, however , the Def endant must proce ed via a collater al attac k on his conviction, and the post-c onviction avenuefor this attac k is no long er available be causeof the passag e of time.
I n sum, the orig inal judgme nt e ntere d ag ainst the Def endant with r espec t to his agg ravated kidnapping conviction set forth an illeg al sentenc e. The trial court had the authority to corre ct the judgme nt in order to set forth a leg al sentenc e. Any abridg ment of the Def endant’ s rig hts caused by thetria l c ou rt ’s a c tio n inc or re c tin g thejud g me nt w a s a pr op e r m a tte r f

or a pet it io n for

po stcon vi cti on re lie f. Th e tim e fo r f ili ng su c h a

pe tit ione xpir e d inJanu ary 20 02 . T he De fe nd a nt, ha vin g faile d to fi le his pe tit ionwi thi n th e lim itatio ns pe ri od , is no w time -b arr e d f ro m pu rs uin g his claim. The post-c onviction court did not err in summarily

dismiss ing theDef

endant’ s petitions, and we ther efor e af

firm the judg ments of the post-convic tion court.

___________________________________ DAVID H. WELLES, J UDGE