Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 15A01-1412-CR-545 | December 31, 2015 Page 1 of 30

 

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

Leanna Weissmann

Lawrenceburg, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEES

Gregory F. Zoeller

Attorney General of Indiana

Ian McLean

Deputy Attorney General of Indiana

Indianapolis, Indiana

I N T H E

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Kyle W. Dilts,

Appellant-Defendant,

v.

State of Indiana,

Appellee-Plaintiff.

December 31, 2015

Court of Appeals Case No.

15A01-1412-CR-545

Appeal from the Dearborn Superior 

Court

Trial Court Cause No. 

15D01-1310-FA-22

The Honorable Jonathan N. Cleary, 

Judge

Pyle, Judge.

Statement of the Case

[1] This case is a reminder that failure to make a contemporaneous objection at the 

time evidence is introduced at trial will result in waiver of the issue on appeal. 

Indeed, an appellate claim will not be preserved upon an objection discussed or 

not made immediately prior to or following the admission of evidence. 
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[2] Kyle Dilts (“Dilts”) was charged with and convicted of the following two 

counts of Class A felony child molesting:1 Count I for engaging in sexual 

intercourse with his daughter and Count II for engaging in deviate sexual 

conduct with that same daughter. During sentencing, the trial court vacated 

Dilts’s conviction for Class A felony child molesting in Count II, apparently 

basing its decision on either double jeopardy grounds or the continuing crime 

doctrine, and imposed a thirty-six (36) year sentence for Dilts’s Class A felony 

child molesting under Count I. 

[3] On appeal, Dilts challenges two of the trial court’s evidentiary rulings made 

during his jury trial. Specifically, he contends the trial court abused its 

discretion by admitting: (1) testimony regarding Dilts’s suicidal ideation 

following his daughter’s accusations against him; and (2) his daughter’s

videotaped interview with a child abuse forensic interviewer. The State crossappeals and argues that the trial court erred by vacating Dilts’s Class A felony 

child molesting conviction in Count II because the conviction neither violated 

the prohibition against double jeopardy nor the continuing crime doctrine.

[4] Concluding that Dilts waived review of his evidentiary challenges by failing to 

make a contemporaneous object at the time the challenged evidence was 

introduced at trial, we affirm Dilts’s conviction for Class A felony child 

 

1

IND. CODE § 35-42-4-3(a)(1). We note that, effective July 1, 2014, a new version of this child molesting 

statute was enacted and that Class A felony child molesting is now a Level 1 felony. Because Dilts 

committed his crimes before the effective date, we will refer to the statute in effect at that time.
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molesting as contained in Count I. In regard to the State’s cross-appeal issue, 

we agree that that trial court erred by vacating Dilts’s Class A felony child 

molesting conviction from Count II. Therefore, we reverse the trial court’s 

order vacating this conviction and remand with instructions for the trial court to 

enter judgment of conviction for this conviction under Count II and to hold a

new sentencing hearing to sentence Dilts for this Count II conviction.

[5] We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand.

Issues

1. Appeal Issue – Whether the trial court abused its discretion by

admitting testimony regarding Dilts’s suicidal ideation and by 

admitting the victim’s videotaped interview with a child abuse 

forensic interviewer.

2. Cross-Appeal Issue – Whether the trial court erred by vacating 

Dilts’s Class A felony child molesting conviction in Count II based 

on double jeopardy grounds or the continuing crime doctrine.

Facts

[6] In 2011, Dilts was separated from his wife, Samantha Dilts (“Samantha”), with 

whom he had a daughter, K.D., born in March 2001. At that time, K.D. and 

Samantha lived in Kentucky with K.D.’s siblings and half-siblings, and Dilts 

lived in Aurora, Indiana with his girlfriend, Christie Rutledge (“Rutledge”), and 

her children. 

[7] During the time when Dilts lived in his house in Indiana, he inappropriately 

touched K.D. on multiple occasions when she visited him. The first time, 

which was sometime in 2011, K.D. was in the bathroom when Dilts went into 
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the bathroom and “started fingering [her]” or touching her in her “vaginal area” 

with his fingers “moving in a circular motion.” (Tr. 503, 504). Dilts, who was 

wearing no pants and had been masturbating, then picked up K.D., put her on 

his lap with her facing out, and “proceeded in fingering [her] again.” (Tr. 505). 

Dilts then “[p]artial[ly] inserted his penis into K.D.’s vagina. (Tr. 506). 

[8] Subsequently, a few weeks later, Dilts again touched K.D. in the bathroom at 

his house in Indiana. Dilts “stuck his hands down [K.D.’s] pants[,]” “took all 

of [her] clothes off[,]” picked her up, placed her on his lap as he sat on the 

toilet, and “inserted his penis” into K.D. (Tr. 509, 510). At this time, K.D. saw 

and felt that Dilts had a “bump” on his penis. (Tr. 510).

[9] On a third occasion at Dilts’s house, he went into K.D.’s bedroom, where she 

was getting dressed, “pull[ed] [her] pants down about halfway” and then 

“fingered” and “licked” her “vaginal area.” (Tr. 511). After each molestation, 

Dilts warned K.D. not to tell anyone about what he had done. 

[10] In August 2013, K.D. confided in her friend, T.A., that Dilts had molested her. 

K.D. was “shaky” and “crying.” (Tr. 388). K.D. told T.A. not to tell anyone. 

Around that same time, T.A.’s mother, Melanie Bowman (“Bowman”), noticed 

a change in K.D.’s demeanor from being a “bubbly kid” to “act[ing] strange” 

and not wanting to go around Bowman’s husband. (Tr. 400). T.A. eventually 

told her mother, who then informed K.D.’s mother, Samantha, about what 

Dilts had done. Thereafter, K.D.’s allegations were reported to the Indiana 
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Department of Child Services (“DCS”) and the Dearborn County Sheriff’s 

Department. 

[11] On August 29, 2013, K.D. spoke to Stephanie Back (“Back”), a forensic 

interviewer with the Child Advocacy Center (“CAC”). Detective John Vance 

(“Detective Vance”) of the Dearborn County Sheriff’s Department’s Special 

Crimes Unit and Teresa Patrick (“Patrick”), a family case manager with DCS,

were present for the CAC interview and listened from a separate room. During 

the interview, then twelve-year-old K.D. disclosed to Back that Dilts started to 

sexually abuse her when she was nine years old. K.D. stated that, when she 

was at Dilts’s house in Indiana, he had touched her vagina with his fingers, 

mouth, and penis. Additionally, K.D. alleged that Dilts had molested her when 

they lived in Kentucky and had also molested K.D.’s sister. After K.D.’s 

interview at the CAC, she went to Cincinnati Children’s Hospital for a physical 

examination. Dr. Berkeley Bennett (“Dr. Bennett”), who examined K.D., 

discovered that K.D.’s hymen had a “transection” or a “significant tear” that 

was consistent with sexual abuse. (Tr. 718).

[12] The following day, on August 30, 2013, Detective Garland Bridges (“Detective 

Bridges”) went to Dilts’s house and took a recorded statement from him. 

During that interview, Dilts confirmed that he had a bump on his penis. 

[13] Sometime after K.D.’s allegations against Dilts, DCS filed a petition alleging 

that K.D. was a child in need of services (“CHINS”). Dilts was subpoenaed to 

appear at a CHINS hearing scheduled for September 11, 2013, but he did not 
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appear. At that time, Dilts voluntarily admitted himself to a community mental 

health facility after he had apparently expressed some suicidal ideation.

[14] Shortly thereafter, on October 2, 2013, the State charged Dilts with Count I, 

Class A felony child molesting (based on sexual intercourse); and Count II, 

Class A felony child molesting (based on deviate sexual conduct). These acts 

were alleged to have occurred between January 2011 and August 2013.2

[15] Prior to trial, the State requested a pretrial hearing to determine the 

admissibility of child hearsay pursuant to INDIANA CODE § 35-37-4-6, the 

Protected Person Statute (“PPS”). Specifically, the State asked the trial court to 

determine the admissibility of K.D.’s statements contained in her videotaped 

forensic interview at the CAC. On September 4, 2014, the trial court held a 

pretrial hearing to determine the admissibility of child hearsay pursuant to the 

PPS. During this hearing, K.D. testified about four instances when Dilts had 

molested her at his house in Indiana. At the end of the hearing, the State 

argued that the CAC video should be admissible at trial under the PPS because 

it had met its burden under INDIANA CODE § 35-37-4-6(e)(1) by showing that 

the videotape provided sufficient indications of reliability and its burden under 

section (e)(2) because K.D. would be testifying at trial. Dilts objected to the 

CAC video being admitted at trial, arguing only that the CAC video was 

“unreliable” because K.D.’s testimony during the hearing did not “match up” 

 

2 These dates were contained in the amended information, which was filed on September 4, 2014. 
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with her statements made in the CAC interview. (Tr. 98). Dilts’s counsel 

stated that “unavailability or availability [we]re not issues.” (Tr. 97). 

[16] Following the hearing, the trial court issued an order, in which it found, in part,

that K.D.’s statements during the CAC interview were “generally consistent” 

with her testimony at the child hearsay hearing and that she had also “provided 

additional details of other incidents” involving Dilts. (App. 83). The trial court 

determined that “the August 29, 2013 videotaped [CAC] statement of K.D. 

[would be] admissible at the jury trial, so long as the other requirements of 

Indiana Code [§] 35-37-4-6 [we]re met, including K.D. testifying at trial, as 

required by the Indiana [C]ode absent psychiatrist, physician, or psychologist 

testimony concerning unavailability.” (App. 83-84). 

[17] The trial court held a four-day jury trial on September 15-18, 2014. During voir 

dire, Dilts’s two attorneys stated that they both had brothers who had 

committed suicide. One of the attorneys asked the jury venire “if evidence were 

presented that a suspect, a defendant, was depressed and contemplating suicide, 

that would not be evidence of guilt in your mind, would it?” (Tr. 268). Shortly 

thereafter, Dilts’s other attorney stated that the jury would hear that Dilts, 

“after learning about these accusations . . . attempted suicide.” (Tr. 285-86). 

His counsel then asked, “If you heard that someone attempted suicide, how 

would that make you feel?” (Tr. 286). 

[18] Dilts’s defense at trial was that he was innocent and that K.D. was making up 

the allegations against him. During opening arguments, Dilts’s counsel stated 
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that K.D. had a videotaped interview at the CAC where “she made these 

allegations that led to these charges.” (Tr. 362). His counsel then stated:

And I agree with [the prosecutor], I want you guys to hear it. I 

want to characterize the statements that she made, because, 

again, it’s not good enough that I believe that [Dilts is] innocent. 

You guys get to make that decision. And after you -- after you 

listen to what [K.D.] has to say, just on the face of her statement, 

just from the statement itself and the twists and turns that it 

makes and the outlandish accusations that are contained in her 

statement and in the statement that she’ll give live and in court, 

just from the statement itself you’ll see that she is not telling the 

truth.

(Tr. 362-63). 

[19] On the morning of the second day of the jury trial, before the trial continued,

Dilts’s counsel deposed K.D. During that day of trial, Detective Vance and 

Patrick, the DCS family case manager, both testified that Dilts had failed to 

appear at the CHINS hearing on September 11, 2013. Prior to Detective 

Vance’s testimony on this subject, Dilts objected and argued that any testimony 

regarding a CHINS proceeding was prejudicial and should be excluded under 

Evidence Rule 404(b). The State responded that it was not going to present any 

testimony regarding the findings of the CHINS proceeding and that, instead, 

the testimony would be limited to the fact that Dilts failed to appear at the 

CHINS hearing as subpoenaed. The State added that an upcoming witness 

would testify that Dilts had not appeared for the CHINS hearing because “he 

had attempted to commit suicide or was thinking of committing suicide.” (Tr. 

432). The State argued that Dilts’s failure to appear for the CHINS hearing was 
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“relevant evidence of guilt[.]” (Tr. 432-33). The State asserted that this 

testimony was “evidence of his guilt, just like flight [i]s evidence of someone’s 

guilt . . . suicide is flight, and not appearing at a CHINS proceeding is flight.” 

(Tr. 433). The State acknowledged that “there [we]re other explanations as to 

why someone would commit suicide, but that [went] to the weight, not the 

admissibility” of the evidence. (Tr. 433). Dilts’s counsel responded that any 

evidence of attempted suicide was not evidence of guilt and that it was 

“improper to use a bad act [or] another act by this defendant that is not related 

to the acts for which he’s charged to then somehow prove that he did this other 

thing.” (Tr. 437). After the State told the trial court that Detective Vance 

would not testify about the suicide issue, the trial court overruled Dilts’s 

objection and allowed the State to present testimony from Detective Vance and 

Patrick that Dilts had failed to appear for the CHINS hearing. 

[20] That same day, K.D. testified regarding the three incidents of molestation as set 

forth above. During cross-examination, Dilts’s counsel tried to impeach her 

with: (1) the statements that she had made during the CAC interview; (2) her 

testimony from the child hearsay hearing; and (3) her deposition testimony 

taken the morning of trial. Specifically, Dilts’s counsel attempted to use 

portions of these prior statements to question K.D. about whether she was 

facing toward or away from Dilts when he molested her and whether or not 

Dilts was wearing a condom at that time. When Dilts’s counsel tried to 

impeach K.D. with one of her specific statements from the CAC interview, the 

State objected and argued that, under Evidence Rule 106, K.D.’s entire 
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statement should be introduced into evidence. At that point, the parties agreed

that the CAC interview would be later introduced and played for the jury but 

with a redaction of the portions of the interview that contained allegations that 

Dilts had molested K.D. in Kentucky and had molested K.D.’s sibling. 

Thereafter, the parties finished their examinations of K.D., and the State 

presented other witnesses, including Dilts’s estranged wife, Samantha, who 

corroborated K.D.’s testimony that Dilts had a bump on his penis.

[21] At the end of this second day of trial, the State informed the trial court about its 

intention to introduce and play the CAC interview the following day, and it 

again indicated that the video would need to be redacted. The trial court 

released the jury for the day and conducted a hearing regarding the videotaped 

CAC interview. The State told the trial court that it was working with Dilts’s 

attorneys to redact portions of the CAC interview that referenced the unrelated 

molestation allegations against Dilts. After the prosecutor stated that both 

parties wanted the CAC interview admitted, Dilts’s counsel agreed and stated 

that the parties would “figure . . . out” the redaction issue. (Tr. 613). 

[22] The following day, before resuming the trial, the trial court and the parties 

again discussed the CAC redaction issue. The parties had agreed that the 

Kentucky and sibling molestation allegations should be redacted from the 103-

page CAC interview transcript and video but disagreed on the inclusion of four 

pages (pages 91-95) from K.D.’s statement. Dilts argued that some of the 

statements contained on these pages could lead the jury to believe that there 

were other allegations of abuse. The trial court acknowledged that some of the 
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details of K.D.’s CAC interview on the disputed pages were inconsistent with

her trial testimony. The trial court, however, found that the disputed pages did 

not mention the allegations in Kentucky or involve K.D.’s sibling and ruled that 

these pages would be admitted with the remainder of the CAC interview as 

redacted by the parties. 

[23] Thereafter, still outside of the jury’s presence, the State made an offer of proof 

regarding its intention of presenting testimony regarding Dilts’s suicidal 

ideation. The State argued that it should be allowed to present evidence that 

Dilts did not show up to the CHINS hearing because he had suicidal thoughts 

and was hospitalized. Asserting that this was an issue of first impression in 

Indiana, the State presented supporting case law from other jurisdictions3 and 

argued that the trial court should engage in a Rule 403 balancing test to 

determine whether the evidence was admissible. The State argued that the 

evidence was probative because evidence of a suicide attempt was equivalent to 

evidence of flight, both of which were evidence of the consciousness of guilt. 

The State contended that the evidence was not prejudicial because Dilts could 

argue against the weight of the evidence by arguing that there were other 

reasons why a person would attempt suicide. The State pointed out that Dilts’s 

two attorneys had already done so during voir dire when they discussed reasons 

other than guilt associated with suicide. Dilts, on the other hand, argued that 

 

3 The State submitted State v. Orozco, 708 S.E.2d 227 (S.C. Ct. App. 2011), reh’g denied, cert. granted, and 

Aldridge v. State, 494 S.E.2d 368 (Ga. Ct. App. 1997). The State also submitted an Indiana case in support of 

the proposition that flight could be considered by a jury as evidence of guilt. 
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the State’s proposed evidence would be prejudicial because Dilts had not 

attempted to commit suicide and because his hospitalization had occurred 

before he was charged with the crimes at issue. Dilts also argued that evidence 

of suicide should be excluded because it was a prior bad act that was 

impermissible to prove the offenses. The trial court ruled that it would allow 

the State to present “evidence of the attempted suicide.” (Tr. 660-61). When 

ruling on the admissibility of the evidence, the trial court reasoned that Indiana 

allows evidence of conduct showing consciousness of guilt and that Dilts’s

attorneys were aware of the evidence because they raised it during voir dire.4 

The trial court also stated that it had relied upon the South Carolina case 

submitted by the State and the State’s offer of proof that Dilts’s was aware of 

allegations against him at the time. 

[24] When the trial court resumed the jury trial, the State called Dilts’s sister-in-law, 

Danielle Dilts (“Danielle”), to the stand. Danielle testified that, in September 

2013, she was in the courthouse parking lot, when she saw Dilts’s girlfriend, 

Rutledge, talking to Dilts on the phone. Danielle testified that she talked on the 

phone to Dilts—who was “upset[,]” crying, and “devastated”—while Rutledge 

tried to phone someone “to get help to get to where [Dilts] was located.” (Tr. 

665). Danielle testified that she “was in fear that [Dilts] was in a bad way,” and 

she feared that he would attempt suicide “because of everything leading up to 

 

4 The trial court stated that it was not basing its ruling upon a finding that Dilts had opened the door to such 

evidence. 
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that.” (Tr. 667). Danielle also testified that Dilts was then taken by police 

escort and voluntarily admitted to a community mental health center. Dilts did 

not object to this relevant portion of Danielle’s testimony.5 

[25] Subsequently, the State called Detective Vance as a witness so that it could

introduce and publish the CAC interview, State’s Exhibit 6, to the jury. Before 

the detective took the stand, Dilts’s counsel stated that Dilts “ha[d] to make an 

objection to the video being played at all” based on Tyler v. State, 903 N.E.2d 

463 (Ind. 2009), which he asserted held that allowing live testimony and a 

recorded statement was impermissible because the admission of both would 

result in vouching and bolstering. (Tr. 673). The State questioned the timing of 

Dilts’s bolstering argument and argued that Tyler did not apply because the 

CAC videotaped interview contained inconsistencies from K.D.’s trial 

testimony. The State also asserted that the CAC video should be admitted 

because Dilts had opened the door to its admission by bringing out statements 

from the video during K.D.’s cross-examination. The trial court stated that it 

“st[ood] by the order out of the child hearsay hearing” and ruled that the CAC 

video was admissible evidence. (Tr. 675).

[26] The State then called Detective Vance to the stand and moved to admit the 

video. Dilts did not object, and the trial court admitted the CAC interview into 

evidence and began to play the video for the jury. At some point during the 

 

5 Dilts raised hearsay objections to other portions of Danielle’s testimony.
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publication of this exhibit, Dilts’s counsel approached the bench to make a 

motion. The trial court stopped the video and released the jury for a recess. 

Dilts’s counsel stated that he had planned to object to something he thought he 

heard during the playing of the video, but he informed the trial court that he 

was withdrawing the objection. The trial court expressed it displeasure with 

Dilts’s interruption, stating that “[a] motion such as that made during a 

publication of an exhibit that’s already been admitted obviously is a material 

interruption in the trial.” (Tr. 679-80). 

[27] Then, upon the State’s request, the trial court delayed playing the remainder of 

the CAC video so that the State could present testimony from Dr. Bennett, who 

had a scheduling issue. Later, after the State’s last witness, the parties 

discussed—outside the presence of the jury—the continuation of playing the 

CAC video. The prosecutor informed the trial court that the parties had 

“agreed on a restarting point” for the video and that the remaining duration 

was approximately seventy minutes. (Tr. 774). When the prosecutor requested 

that the video not be interrupted, Dilts’s attorney “apologize[d]” and stated that 

he “want[ed] to be safe with this thing[.]” (Tr. 775). 

[28] Upon reconvening the jury following a lunch break, the State completed 

publication of the CAC interview to the jury and then rested. (Tr. 778). Dilts’s 

attorney then stated that he had “grave concerns about the video” and began 

discussing “references” made in the video. (Tr. 778, 779). The trial court 

removed the jury from the courtroom and then stated:
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The Court notes for the record that the State has rested. We’re 

outside the presence of the jury. 

[Dilts’s counsel] began to make an objection to the Child 

Advocacy Center video. The Court does want to make clear for 

the record that what’s been admitted as State’s Exhibit 5 is the 

transcript of the Child Advocacy Center interview. Beginning 

early this morning in chambers and then throughout the 

morning, there was a lengthy hearing regarding this issue. The 

parties -- What’s highlighted in State’s Exhibit 5, the parties 

agreed that it would be redacted. The Court has carefully 

listened to the video and it was redacted and was not shown to 

the jury. 

There was an objection by defense counsel for page 91 through 

95, and the Court held a hearing on that, overruled the objection, 

and allowed pages 91 through 95 to be published to the jury. 

So the Court feels that this issue has already been ruled upon, 

but, [Dilts’s counsel], if you wish to make a further objection for 

the record, you may.

(Tr. 780-81). Dilts’s counsel started to list instances in the video to which he 

objected, but he then acknowledged that he was making “the same objection” 

as he had previously made. (Tr. 782). The trial court then stated:

Okay. The Court notes the defense has the same continuing 

objection, which the parties agreed to everything except for 91 

through 95 pages. The Court has already ruled upon that, it’s 

been published to the jury, so the Court finds at this point a 

continuing objection is noted but untimely.

(Tr. 782-83). The State then added that it “want[ed] to point out for the record 

that . . . the State did not bring up the content of the CAC interview until the 

defense brought it up during [Dilts’s] cross-examination” and that it was “the 
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State’s position [that] he opened the door to the entire CAC interview by raising 

it on cross-examination.” (Tr. 783). 

[29] Thereafter, Dilts moved for judgment on the evidence, which the trial court 

denied. Dilts then requested that the trial court dismiss Count II, arguing that:

The evidence that’s been presented is that these allegations are --

the factual allegations behind the two charging informations are 

identical and, therefore, having two counts of child molest – the 

second count is redundant, Your Honor. There’s no evidence 

that one count is alleged to have occurred at a different time than 

the other. They are identical in nature, they are identical in time, 

and, therefore, we would ask that Count No. 2 be dismissed.

(Tr. 786-87). The State responded that the two charges involved the two 

separate acts of sexual intercourse and deviant sexual conduct, and the trial 

court denied Dilts’s motion to dismiss Count II. Dilts then rested. 

[30] During the State’s rebuttal closing argument, the prosecutor discussed Dilts’s 

failure to appear at the CHINS hearing, stating that he did not appear for the 

hearing because “he was admitted to [a facility] apparently on some discussion 

of killing himself.” (Tr. 876). The State subsequently argued that “[t]hat’s 

evidence of guilt” and then stated that “[n]ot everyone that kills himself is guilty 

of something[.]” (Tr. 876). At that point, Dilts’s counsel objected, without 

specifying a ground for the objection, and the trial court overruled the 

objection. Following closing arguments, the jury found Dilts guilty as charged. 

[31] At sentencing, Dilts made no further argument regarding the dismissal of his

guilty verdict under Count II. However, when sentencing Dilts, the trial court 
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discussed his two child molestation convictions. The trial court stated, in 

relevant part:

Now, the Court has considered the nature of the criminal offense. 

The weeklong jury trial, the testimony that the jury heard was 

that [K.D.], there was insertion of the defendant’s penis, that he 

licked her vaginal area, that there was finger insertion over a 

period of time when she was nine to 11 years old. That went 

from January 2011 to August of 2013.

* * * * *

So those were the facts that the jury made the determination that 

[Dilts] was guilty of Count 1, which was the sexual intercourse, 

and Count 2, the deviant sexual conduct, which was the --

basically the licking of the vaginal area.

* * * * *

. . . Again, it’s [K.D.’s] father. The charged time period, she was 

between nine and eleven years old. The testimony was that this 

happened on numerous occasions where there was the oral, 

digital, and penis penetration.

* * * * *

The Court wants to make perfectly clear, obviously there was a 

weeklong jury trial where a jury determined that Mr. Dilts did 

molest his daughter [K.D.] . . .

(Tr. 980-985). After discussing the two separate acts that constituted Dilts’s 

convictions, the trial court vacated Dilts’s child molesting conviction under 

Count II, stating:

The Court vacates the conviction for Count 2. That was the oral 

child molestation. The jury found guilty of both. Under the 

double jeopardy analysis, since it was charged during the same 

period of time, the incidents occurred rather simultaneously, the 

Court vacates the conviction for Count 2, does impose sentence 
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on Count 1, child molesting, being sexual intercourse by an 

individual 21 years or older with a person under the years of 12 

years. 

(Tr. 986-87). The trial court then imposed a thirty-six (36) year sentence for 

Dilts’s Class A felony child molesting under Count I and determined that he 

was a “credit-restricted felon under Indiana law.” (Tr. 987). Dilts now appeals 

his conviction under Count I, and the State cross-appeals the trial court’s ruling 

that vacated Dilts’s conviction under Count II.

Decision

1. Appeal Issue – Admission of Evidence

[32] Dilts argues that the trial court abused its discretion by admitting the following 

evidence at trial: (1) testimony regarding Dilts’s suicidal ideation; and (2)

K.D.’s videotaped CAC interview. 

[33] Before we address Dilts’s arguments, we note that the admission and exclusion 

of evidence falls within the sound discretion of the trial court, and we review 

the admission of evidence only for an abuse of discretion. Wilson v. State, 765 

N.E.2d 1265, 1272 (Ind. 2002). An abuse of discretion occurs when the trial 

court’s decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and 

circumstances before it. Conley v. State, 972 N.E.2d 864, 871 (Ind. 2012), reh’g 

denied. 

A. Suicidal Ideation
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[34] Dilts first argues that the trial court abused its discretion by admitting testimony 

regarding his suicidal ideation. Dilts sets forth multiple arguments in regard to 

this issue. First, he acknowledges that other jurisdictions allow evidence of a 

suicide attempt to show consciousness of guilt, but he contends that the 

testimony should not have been admitted because he had only suicidal ideation, 

not a suicide attempt. Dilts also contends that the admission of the testimony 

should be reviewed under Evidence Rule 404(b). He asserts that “his suicidal 

thoughts [were] evidence of a wrongful or bad act because the State framed his 

mental state as [his] avenue to escape imprisonment for the commission of his 

crime.” (Dilts’s Br. 11). Next, he argues that the testimony should have been 

excluded under Evidence Rule 402 because his suicidal ideation was not 

relevant to the molestation accusations.

6

 Finally, Dilts argues that the 

testimony was prejudicial and that this prejudice outweighed its probative 

value.7

[35] The State argues that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by admitting the 

testimony regarding Dilts’s suicidal ideation because it was relevant to prove 

consciousness of guilt. The State points out that Dilts was aware of the child 

molesting allegations against him, which had led to a CHINS proceeding, and 

 

6

In support of this argument, Dilts cites to Cardine v. State, 475 N.E.2d 696 (Ind. 1985) and Kien v. State, 782 

N.E.2d 398 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003), reh’g denied, trans. denied. Dilts admits that “neither Kien nor Cardine are 

dispositive of [his] case” but argues that these cases show that Indiana appellate courts are “reluctan[t] to 

inject a defendant’s suicidal thoughts into evidence in a criminal trial.” (Dilts’s Br. 13) (emphasis of case 

names added). 

7

For this final argument, he does not cite to Evidence Rule 403 even though such an argument falls under 

that rule. 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 15A01-1412-CR-545 | December 31, 2015 Page 20 of 30

that he had failed to appear for the CHINS hearing because he was suicidal and 

admitted to a facility. The State argues that “the circumstances and timing of 

the event shows a sufficient connection between Dilts’ actions and the 

wrongdoing alleged regarding KD to support the trial court’s decision to allow 

the jury to consider whether the evidence proved a consciousness of guilt.” 

(State’s Br. 15). Additionally, the State asserts that Dilts failed to show that the 

evidence should have been excluded under Rule 403 because Dilts did not show 

that he was unfairly prejudiced by it, especially where his counsel had brought 

up the matter during voir dire. The State further contends that, even if this 

evidence of suicide were not admissible, Dilts’s counsel’s discussion of it during 

voir dire opened the door to such testimony. Finally, the State asserts that the 

admission of the testimony would be, at the very least, considered to be

harmless error because there was substantial evidence of Dilts’s guilt. 

[36] The testimony that Dilts challenges on appeal was presented by Dilts’s sister-inlaw, Danielle, whom the State called as a witness. Danielle testified that, on 

the day of the September 2013 CHINS hearing, she had spoken to Dilts, who 

was “upset[,]” crying, and “devastated[.]” (Tr. 665). Danielle further testified 

she feared that Dilts was going to attempt suicide and that he was admitted to a 

mental health facility that day. 

[37] While the parties have presented specific arguments regarding whether or not 

there was any error in the admission of this testimony, they both fail to mention

that Dilts did not make a contemporaneous objection when the testimony was 

offered and admitted at trial. Nevertheless, the record reveals that—before the 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 15A01-1412-CR-545 | December 31, 2015 Page 21 of 30

State called Danielle to the witness stand and outside the presence of the jury—

the parties argued about whether such testimony should be admitted, and the 

trial court ruled that it would allow the testimony. Dilts, however, did not 

object to this specific testimony at the time it was actually presented during 

trial, let alone offer an objection that mirrors his arguments raised on appeal. 

Thus, he has waived review of this issue on appeal. See Brown v. State, 929 

N.E.2d 204, 207 (Ind. 2010) (holding that a defendant’s failure to lodge a 

contemporaneous objection at the time evidence is introduced at trial results in 

waiver of the error on appeal), reh’g denied. See also Stephenson v. State, 29 

N.E.3d 111, 118 (Ind. 2015) (explaining that the failure to timely object to the 

admission of evidence will “procedurally foreclose” the error on appeal); 

Jackson v. State, 735 N.E.2d 1146, 1152 (Ind. 2000) (“The failure to make a 

contemporaneous objection to the admission of evidence at trial results in 

waiver of the error on appeal.”); Tinnin v. State, 416 N.E.2d 116, 118 (Ind. 

1981) (explaining that a defendant “must make his objection to a question 

before the answer is given in order to preserve the issue for appeal”).

[38] Despite the lack of objection, “[a] claim that has been waived by a defendant’s 

failure to raise a contemporaneous objection can be reviewed on appeal if the 

reviewing court determines that a fundamental error occurred.” Brown, 929 

N.E.2d at 207. “The fundamental error exception is ‘extremely narrow, and 

applies only when the error constitutes a blatant violation of basic principles, 

the harm or potential for harm is substantial, and the resulting error denies the 

defendant fundamental due process.’” Id. (quoting Mathews v. State, 849 N.E.2d 
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578, 587 (Ind. 2006)). “The error claimed must either ‘make a fair trial 

impossible’ or constitute ‘clearly blatant violations of basic and elementary 

principles of due process.’” Id. (quoting Clark v. State, 915 N.E.2d 126, 131 

(Ind. 2009), reh’g denied). Dilts, however, does not offer a fundamental error 

argument, and we will not provide one for him.8 See Ind. App. R. 46(A)(8)(a). 

Therefore, Dilts has waived appellate review of this issue, and we will save for 

another day the issue regarding whether a defendant’s suicidal ideation is 

admissible as evidence of consciousness of guilt.9

B. Videotaped Interview

[39] Next, we address Dilts’s argument that the trial court abused its discretion by 

admitting State’s Exhibit 6, the redacted version of K.D.’s videotaped CAC 

interview. Dilts argues that the trial court should not have allowed the State to 

 

8 We note that, given the record before us—including the evidence presented supporting his convictions (e.g., 

K.D.’s testimony and the medical evidence showing a significant tear to K.D.’s hymen) and Dilts’s attorneys’

voir dire references to evidence of his suicidal ideation and alternative reasons for such ideation—we fail to 

see how the admission of Danielle’s testimony regarding Dilts’s suicidal ideation made a fair trial impossible 

or resulted in fundamental error.

9 We, however, recognize that our Indiana Supreme Court—in Stephenson v. State, 29 N.E.3d 111 (Ind. 

2015)—recently discussed the admissibility of a defendant’s suicide attempt. There, the defendant—two days 

after the police had questioned him about the crime of murder—attempted suicide and wrote a note in which 

he disavowed any involvement in the crime. Stephenson, 29 N.E.3d at 115. Evidence of the defendant’s 

suicide attempt and suicide note were admitted into evidence at trial, and the defendant objected to the 

evidence. Id. at 119. On appeal, the State argued that the suicide attempt evidence was relevant to the 

defendant’s motive and consciousness of guilt. Id. at 119-20. The Stephenson Court explained that prior 

Indiana case law had “not announce[d] a general proscription” against suicide attempt evidence. Id. at 119. 

The Court held that evidence was relevant to the issue of motive but “decline[d] to find that the mere 

existence of an attempted suicide, without more, is relevant evidence of a person’s guilty conscience about 

committing a charged crime, especially a charged crime which the person expressly disavows when the 

suicide is attempted.” Id. at 120. 

 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 15A01-1412-CR-545 | December 31, 2015 Page 23 of 30

play the videotaped statement because K.D. had already testified during the 

trial. He contends that the videotaped statement improperly vouched for 

K.D.’s testimony. Dilts also asserts that admission of the videotaped CAC 

interview was in violation of the PPS, INDIANA CODE § 35-37-4-6, and the rule 

set out in Tyler v. State. 

[40] As with the previous evidentiary challenge, Dilts fails to demonstrate that he 

made a timely objection when this challenged evidence was admitted at trial. 

As revealed in the Facts Section above, the parties extensively discussed this 

CAC videotaped interview, including the relevant redactions cooperatively 

made by the parties and Dilts’s Tyler objection. These discussions, however, 

were prior to the time when the State called its sponsoring witness for this 

exhibit. When Detective Vance was on the stand and the State offered the 

CAC videotaped interview as State’s Exhibit 6, Dilts did not raise a 

contemporaneous objection to the admission of the exhibit. While Dilts’s 

counsel raised an objection during the publication of the exhibit and then 

withdrew it, such action was too late. “The requirement that evidentiary 

objections be made timely is for the purpose of permitting a trial court to take 

appropriate preventative or corrective action during trial.” Stephenson, 29 

N.E.3d at 119. Because Dilts did not object to State’s Exhibit 6 when it was 

admitted, he has waived appellate review of this issue. See Hartman v. State, 615 

N.E.2d 455, 459-60 (Ind. Ct. App. 1993) (explaining that a party must make an 

objection to an exhibit when it is offered and before it is admitted into evidence 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 15A01-1412-CR-545 | December 31, 2015 Page 24 of 30

and that an objection made after the evidence is admitted is untimely and 

unavailable for argument on appeal), reh’g denied.

2. Cross-Appeal Issue – Vacated Child Molesting Conviction

[41] The State cross-appeals the trial court’s determination vacating Dilts’s Class A 

felony child molesting conviction in Count II. 

[42] During the sentencing hearing, neither the State nor Dilts made any reference 

to the dismissal of Dilts’s guilty verdict under Count II. However, the trial 

court, after discussing the two separate acts that constituted Dilts’s convictions, 

vacated Dilts’s child molesting conviction under Count II, stating:

The Court vacates the conviction for Count 2. That was the oral 

child molestation. The jury found guilty of both. Under the 

double jeopardy analysis, since it was charged during the same 

period of time, the incidents occurred rather simultaneously, the 

Court vacates the conviction for Count 2, does impose sentence 

on Count 1, child molesting, being sexual intercourse by an 

individual 21 years or older with a person under the years of 12 

years. 

(Tr. 986-87). 

[43] The State contends that the trial court vacated this conviction based on either 

double jeopardy principles or the continuing crime doctrine, and the State 

asserts that such action was improper under either theory. We agree. 

[44] First, as we review the State’s double jeopardy argument, we note that the 

Indiana Double Jeopardy Clause provides, in relevant part, that “No person 

shall be put in jeopardy twice for the same offense.” IND. CONST. art. I, § 14. 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 15A01-1412-CR-545 | December 31, 2015 Page 25 of 30

“Indiana’s Double Jeopardy Clause was intended to prevent the State from 

being able to proceed against a person twice for the same criminal 

transgression.” Richardson v. State, 717 N.E.2d 32, 49 (Ind. 1999). 

Consequently, two or more offenses are the “same offense” and violate the state 

double jeopardy clause if, “with respect to either the statutory elements of the 

challenged crimes or the actual evidence used to convict, the essential elements 

of one challenged offense also establish the essential elements of another 

challenged offense.” Id. The Double Jeopardy Clause is violated under the 

actual evidence test if there is “a reasonable possibility that the evidentiary facts 

used by the fact-finder to establish the essential elements of one offense may 

also have been used to establish the essential elements of a second challenged 

offense.” Id. at 53. “[A] ‘reasonable possibility’ that the jury used the same 

facts to reach two convictions requires substantially more than a logical 

possibility.” Lee v. State, 892 N.E.2d 1231, 1236 (Ind. 2008). “Rather, 

‘reasonable possibility’ turns on a practical assessment of whether the jury may 

have latched on to exactly the same facts for both convictions.” Id. See also 

Griffin v. State, 717 N.E.2d 73, 89 (Ind. 1999) (“To establish that two offenses 

are the same offense under the actual evidence test, the possibility must be 

reasonable, not speculative or remote.”), cert. denied.

[45] Here, the parties do not dispute that the statutory elements and actual evidence 

used to convict Dilts of the two counts of child molesting were distinct. Indeed, 

in Count I, the State charged Dilts with Class A felony child molesting based on 

his act of engaging in sexual intercourse with K.D. between January 2011 and
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August 2013. In Count II, the State charged Dilts with Class A felony child 

molesting based on his act of engaging in deviate sexual conduct with K.D.

between the same time period. The State presented evidence that Dilts 

penetrated K.D.’s vagina with his penis, see I.C. § 35-31.5-2-302 (defining 

sexual intercourse), and it presented evidence that Dilts penetrated K.D.’s 

vagina with his fingers on multiple occasions and licked her vaginal area on one 

occasion. See I.C. § 35-31.5-2-94 (defining deviate sexual conduct).10 Because 

Dilts’s two offenses did not have the same statutory elements and because there 

is not a reasonable possibility that the jury used the same evidentiary facts to 

establish the essential elements of the offenses set out in Count I and Count II, 

the entry of judgment of conviction on both convictions would not have 

violated the Indiana Double Jeopardy Clause. Accordingly, we conclude that

the trial court erred by vacating Dilts’s conviction in Count II based on double 

jeopardy principles. 

[46] Turning to the State’s argument regarding the continuing crime doctrine, we 

note that—during the time period that this appeal was being briefed—our 

Indiana Supreme Court clarified the application of this doctrine in Hines v. State, 

30 N.E.3d 1216 (Ind. 2015). Specifically, our supreme court explained:

The continuous crime doctrine is a rule of statutory construction 

and common law limited to situations where a defendant has 

been charged multiple times with the same offense. “The 

 

10 Effective July 1, 2014, after commission of Dilts’s crimes, this statute was repealed by P.L. 158-2013, sec. 

366. 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 15A01-1412-CR-545 | December 31, 2015 Page 27 of 30

continuous crime doctrine does not seek to reconcile the double 

jeopardy implications of two distinct chargeable crimes; rather, it 

defines those instances where a defendant’s conduct amounts 

only to a single chargeable crime.” Boyd v. State, 766 N.E.2d 396, 

400 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002), trans. not sought, see Pierce v. State, 761 

N.E.2d 826, 830 (Ind. 2002) (recognizing “a series of rules of 

statutory construction and common law that are often described 

as double jeopardy, but are not governed by the constitutional 

test set forth in Richardson ”). The Legislature, not this Court, 

defines when a criminal offense is “continuous,” e.g. not 

terminated by a single act or fact but subsisting for a definite 

period and covering successive, similar occurrences. We have 

applied the continuous crime doctrine in the context of felony 

murder and robbery, confinement, and kidnapping; situations 

where the crime charged, as defined by statute, was 

“continuous.” 

[47] Hines, 30 N.E.3d at 1219-20 (footnotes omitted). The Hines Court held that the 

continuous crime doctrine “applies only where a defendant has been charged 

multiple times with the same ‘continuous’ offense.” Id. at 1220. The Hines

Court held that the continuous crime doctrine did not apply to the facts of that 

case because the defendant, who was convicted of criminal confinement and 

battery, was not convicted of multiple charges of criminal confinement, nor 

multiple charges of battery. Id. at 1220-1221. The Court also reasoned that 

battery was not a crime for which all of the elements necessary to impose 

criminal liability were also elements found in criminal confinement or vice 

versa. Id. at 1221. Thus, the Hines Court concluded that criminal confinement 

and battery were “two distinct chargeable crimes” to which the continuous 

crime doctrine did not apply. Id.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 15A01-1412-CR-545 | December 31, 2015 Page 28 of 30

[48] Here, Dilts was charged with two counts of Class A felony child molesting; 

however, one count was for sexual intercourse and the other was for deviate 

sexual conduct. Furthermore, the evidence presented showed that Dilts 

engaged in these distinct acts on different days. 

[49] Here, Dilts—recognizing the Hines Court’s clarification of the continuous crime 

doctrine—does not specifically repudiate the State’s argument that the trial 

court erred by vacating Dilts’s child molesting conviction under Count II 

pursuant to the continuous crime doctrine. Instead, Dilts argues that: (1) we 

should review the issue under an abuse of discretion standard; and (2) under 

that standard, we should hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by 

vacating Dilts’s Count II conviction under the doctrine because, at the time the 

trial court vacated the conviction, there was a split of authority in our Court 

regarding the doctrine. Specifically, he contends that “[g]iven that there were 

two ways of looking at Indiana’s double jeopardy analysis for continuing crimes 

when Dilts was sentenced, it cannot be said that the court abused its discretion 

in choosing to rely on the analysis set forth in Buchanan [v. State, 913 N.E.2d 

712 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009), trans. denied].” (Dilts’s Reply Br. 8). We disagree.

[50] In Hines, our supreme court disagreed with Buchanan “[t]o the extent Buchanan

st[oo]d for the proposition that the continuous crime doctrine may be judicially 

extended to two distinct criminal offenses[.]” Hines, 30 N.E.3d at 1220. 

Moreover, “‘[w]here the issue presented on appeal is a pure question of law, we 

review the matter de novo.’” Id. at 1219 (quoting State v. Moss–Dwyer, 686 

N.E.2d 109, 110 (Ind. 1997)). Whether convictions violate double jeopardy is a 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 15A01-1412-CR-545 | December 31, 2015 Page 29 of 30

pure question of law, which we review de novo. Rexroat v. State, 966 N.E.2d 165, 

168 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012), trans. denied. Thus, reviewing the specific facts of this 

case under that standard, we conclude that Dilts’s two child molesting 

convictions—one for sexual intercourse and one for deviate sexual conduct that 

occurred on different days—were “two distinct chargeable crimes” to which the 

continuous crime doctrine did not apply.

11

 See, e.g., Williams v. State, 755 

N.E.2d 1183, 1186 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001) (holding that the defendant perpetrated 

two separate offenses of resisting law enforcement and that the trial court 

properly entered convictions for both counts where the defendant fled from 

officers after being commanded to stop and also forcibly resisted those officers 

when they caught up with him and inflicted bodily injury upon them). 

Accordingly, the trial court erred by concluding that the continuous crime 

doctrine precluded the imposition of judgment of conviction on Dilts’s Count II 

Class A felony child molesting conviction. 

[51] Based on our determination that the trial court erred by vacating Dilts’s 

conviction under Count II, we remand with instructions for the trial court to 

enter judgment of conviction for this conviction under Count II and to hold a 

new sentencing hearing to sentence Dilts for this Count II conviction. 

[52] Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.

 

11 Indeed, our conclusion would be so whether under the de novo standard or the standard suggested by 

Dilts. 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 15A01-1412-CR-545 | December 31, 2015 Page 30 of 30

Crone, J., and Brown, J., concur.