### FILED U.S. COURT OF APPEALS ELEVENTH CIRCUIT November 25, 2003 THOMAS K. KAHN CLERK [PUBLISH] IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH

CIRCUIT

________________________ No. 02-11072

________________________ D. C. Docket N

o. 01-00637-CV-J-

20

DANIEL CLARK MEDBERRY, Petitioner-Appel lant,

versus JAMES CROSBY, CHARLIE CRI ST, Florida At torney Gener

al, Respondents-Appell ees.

________________________ No. 02-15808

________________________ D. C. Docket N

o. 01-00689-CV-J-

21 DANIEL C. MEDBERRY, Petitioner-Appel lant,

versus2

JAMES CR OSBY, Sec retary, Department o f Corrections, CHARLIE CRI ST, Florida Attorney Gen

eral, Respondents-Appell ees.

________________________ Appeals from the United States District Court for the Middle Dist

rict of Florida

_________________________ (November 25,

2003)

Before BLACK

, HULL and CO

X, Circuit Judges. BLACK, Circuit Judge: These cons olidated appeals ar ise from Appel lant Danie l Clark Med berry’s habeas corpus petiti

ons challenging two se

parate prison disciplinary actions against him. The district court denied both petitions. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c), this Court granted a certificate of appealability (COA) on very lim ited issues as to each petition. We now vacate the district court’s judgment in appeal number 02-15808 and re mand with instruction s to dismiss the petit ion as moot. We affirm

the district court in

appeal number 02-11072. I. BACKGROUND3

Appellant is an inmate at Un ion Correctional In stitution in Raiford, Florida. He cha lleng es two priso n dis cipli nary pr oceed ings again st hi m. A. June 12 Proceeding, Appeal Numbe

r 02-15808 On June 12, 2000, Appellant was found guilty at a prison disciplinary hearing of disorde rly conduct and was given 30 days’ disciplinary confin ement. After exhausting hi s state court rem edies, Appellant f

iled a petition for a

writ of habeas corpus in the d

istrict court. T

he district court ex

pressed the view tha

t the petition was not pro perly broug ht under § 2254 becau se the leng th of Appel lant’s custody was not in

creased by the

disciplinary pr

oceeding. The cou

rt went on, however, and assum

ed for purposes of its

opinion that the discipl

inary proceedi

ng had extended the ter

m of Appellant ’s confineme nt and denied Appella

nt’s petition on the merits.We granted a CO A on limited issu

es. B. June 7 Proceeding, Appeal Numbe r 02-11072 On June 7, 2000, Appellant was found guil ty at a prison disc

iplinary heari

ng of disobeying a co

rrectional officer’s verbal orde r and was given 30 day

s’ disciplinary con

finement. H

e also lost 39 days of gain time. After exhausting hi s state court rem

edies, Appellant f

iled a petition for a

writ of habeas cor

pus in the district court. The d istrict co urt denied Appellant ’s petitio n on the merit s. We granted a COA on limited iss ues.1 Appellant conten ds the disciplinary

proceeding ma

y increase the length of his impri sonme nt in that i t coul d affe ct his relea se dat e unde r the F lorid a cont rol re lease statu te. In response, Appellees point out that, in 1996, the Florida legislature voided all existing control release dates. Even if control release generally is available, the statute on which Appellant relies (the 1994 version of Fla. Stat. § 947.146) did not authorize control release for prisoners, like App ell ant , wh o ha ve b een c onv ict ed o f se xua l ba tte ry. 4 II. DISCUSSION We review de novo issues of law presented in a cert ificate of appealabil ity. See Ross v. United States , 289 F.3d 677, 680 (11th Cir. 2002). A. June 12 Proceeding With respect to Appellant’s petition challenging the June 12 disciplinary proceeding, we issued a COA on three issues. The fir st issue set out in the COA asked: Are appellant’s claims, challenging a state prison disciplinary proceeding that did not

affect the durati

on of his confinem

ent, cognizable in a fede

ral habeas corpus pe

tition? Before we get to this issue, however , we are face

d with the threshold is sue of whether Appellan

t’s petition was m

oot when filed. Appellant did not file

his petition challengi

ng the disciplinary

proceeding until almost a y

ear after it occ

urred. It is not con

tested that, at the

time Appellan

t filed his petition, he

already had se

rved his 30 days an

d been released fr

om disciplinary confinement. Appellant has not shown that the disciplinary proceeding will af

fect the length of hi s confinement. 12 In Bonner v. City of Pri chard , 661 F.2d 1206, 120

9 (11th Cir. 1981) (

en banc), this Court adopted as bi

nding precede

nt all decisions of t

he former Fifth

Circuit handed dow

n prior to close of business on September 30, 1981.

3 “Striking at the v

ery heart of federal subje

ct matter jurisdic

tion, a mootness issu

e quite clearly can be raised sua sponte if not addressed by the parties.” Sannon v. United States , 631 F.2d 1247, 1250 (5th Cir. 1980) (internal footnote and citation omitted).

4 Due to our holding, we need not consider here the issues set out in the COA. The second and third issues set out in the CO A—whether Appe

llant’s petition fa

lls under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 or 28 U.S.C. § 2254, and whether he is required to have a COA to proceed on appeal—are, however, discussed in the text below as to Appellant’s challenge to the June 7 discipli nary proceeding. Additionally

, we decline Appe

llant’s requests t

o construe his cla

ims as civil rights

claims und er 42 U.S .C. § 19 83 a nd t o al low him to a men d hi s pl eadi ngs a ccor din gly. 5 Under our precede

nt, “it is prope

r for a district co

urt to treat a petit

ion for release from

administrative

segregation as a pet

ition for a writ of

habeas corpus” because “[s]uch release falls into the category of ‘f act or duration of . . . physical imprisonme

nt’ delineated in Preiser v. Rodriguez .” Krist v. Ricket ts , 504 F.2d 887, 887-88 (5th Cir. 1974) (citations omitted). 2 Where, however, a prisoner has completed an im

posed term of a

dministrative se

gregation before he

files his petition, we agree with the Seventh Circuit that the “petition[ is] moot when filed and cannot be revived by collateral consequences.” McCollum v. Miller , 695 F.2d 1044, 1048 (7th Cir. 1 982). Accordingly , we hold Appellan

t’s petition was m

oot when filed. 3 We therefore vacate the distric

t court’s judgm

ent and remand with instructions to dism

iss the petition as m

oot. 4 B. June 7 Proceeding5 When we refer to a petition as being

subject to § 2254, we

mean § 2254 and all

its attendant restri

ctions. 6 With respect to Appellant’s petition challenging the June 7 disciplinary proceeding, we is sued a COA on two i ssues: (1) Should appellant’s habeas corpus petiti

on—challenging the loss of gain time as the result of a state prison disciplinary proceeding that alle

gedly violated his

due process rights,

and contending that he is il

legally serving a longer state sente nce in violation of his constit

utional rights—be const

rued as a petition filed pursuant to 28 U .S.C. § 2241 or one filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254? (2) Regardless of the r uling on the first issue , is appellant, a s tate prisoner, require

d to have a certificate of appealabili ty to proceed on the appea

l from the denia

l of his habeas corpus petition challenging the loss of gain time as the result of a prison disciplinary

proceeding? We now hold that A

ppellant’s petitio

n was subject to bot

h § 2241 and § 2254. 5 We further hold that Appellant is required to have a COA in order to obtain review in this Co urt as to th e merits of hi s challeng es to the di sciplina ry proceedin g. We previously denied Appellant a COA as to the merits of his claims because he failed to make a substan

tial showing of the de

nial of a constitutiona

l right. Because o f our holding here and our

previous denial of a COA, Appellant cannot proceed on appeal as to the m

erits of his claim

s. 1. Section 2241 or Sect ion 22547

Unfortunately

, the relatively

simple issue of w

hether Appellant’ s petition should be evaluated unde r § 2241 or § 2254 has beco me complicated, if only in appearance. The volume of habeas corpus litigation in the federal courts has led us sometime s to use language casu ally when desc

ribing the procedure s and remedies ava

ilable to prisoners se

eking post-conviction r

elief. This lac

k of preci sion has, o ver ti me, crea ted un neces sary co nfus ion. T oday we clear up so me of the confusion and hol

d that, although Appe

llant’s petition is authorized by § 2241 , it als o is gov erned b y § 2254 because Appell ant is “in custody

pursuant to the judgment of a State court.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a).

a. Legislative History of Post-Conviction Relief Statutes For the sake of completeness, we look at the history of federal habeas corpus. We foc

us specifically

on the following discr

ete points in time : (i) the 1789 grant to the federal courts of the limited power to grant writs of habeas corpus; (ii) the 1867 A

mendments t

o the federal habeas statutes; (iii) t he 1874 codification of the s

tatutes; (iv) the 1948

recodification; (

v) the 1966 Amendme

nts; and (vi) the 1996 A

EDPA Enactm

ent. i. 1789 Grant of Author ity8

The First Congres s, in legislation est ablishing the federa

l judiciary,

saw fit to extend to the fed eral courts a limited power t o grant the writ of hab eas corpus. According to sectio

n 14 of the Judiciary

Act of 1789, [A]ll the befor

e-mentioned co

urts of the United S

tates, shall have power to issue writs o f . . . habeas corpus . . . . And . .. either of the justices of the supr

eme court, a

s well as judges of

the district courts, shall have power to grant writs of habeas corpus for the purpose of an inquiry into the caus e of commitment.— Provided , That writs of habeas corpus

shall in no case exte

nd to prisoners in gaol,

unless where they ar

e in custody, unde

r or by colour of

the authority of

the United States, or

are comm

itted for trial bef

ore some court

of the same, or a re neces sary to b e broug ht into court t o testi fy. Act of Sept. 24,

1789, ch. 20, § 14,

1 Stat. 73, 81–82 (codified as ame nded at 28 U.S.C. § 2241). Under the final clause of section 14, the authority of the federal courts to issue writ s of habeas corpus was limited to federal prison ers. See id .; see also Ex parte Dorr

, 44 U.S. (3 H

ow.) 103, 105 (1845) . Despite mi nor amendment

s, the habeas corpu

s statute rema

ined mostly u

nchanged for nearl

y eight decades.9 ii. 1867 Amendm

ents Following the Civil W

ar, Congress am

ended the habeas cor

pus statute to expand its scope to incl

ude state prisoners: [T]he severa

l courts of the Unite

d States, and the se

veral justices a

nd judges of such court

s, within their re spective jurisdic tions, in addition to the authority a

lready confer

red by law, sh

all have power to gr

ant writs of habeas co

rpus in all cases wh

ere any person may be restrained of his or

her liberty in v

iolation of the constit

ution, or of any treaty or law of the United Stat es . . . . Act of Feb. 5, 18 67, ch. 28, § 1, 14 S tat. 385, 385 (codif

ied as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 2241).

Significantly,

the 1867 amendm

ents were the fir

st time Congres s authorized the fede

ral courts to issue th

e Great Writ to any prisoner he ld in violation of the Consti

tution or laws of the

United States, e

ven to a prisoner held in state custody. iii. 1874 Codification In 1874, Congress cod

ified the federal

statutes, locating those governing habeas corpus in §§ 751–66. See Rev. Stat. §§ 751–6 6 (codified as am ended at 28 U.S.C. § 2241 et seq. ). The basic grant of the authority to issue writs of habeas corpus was set out in § 751. See Rev. Stat. § 751 ( “The Suprem

e Court and the circuit and distri ct courts shall hav e power to issue writs o f habeas corpus.”).10

Consistent with the 18 67 Act’s expansion of the writ of habe

as corpus, § 753 provided: The writ of habea

s corpus shall in no cas e extend to a prisoner in jail, unless where he is in custody under or by color of the authority of the United States, or is com

mitted for tri

al before some

court thereof; . . . or is in custody in violation of the Constitution or of a law or treaty of the United States . . . . Rev. Stat. § 753.Later codifica tions of the habeas sta

tutes were substant

ively identical. See, e.g. , 28 U.S.C. §§ 451–463 (1940) (codifie d as amended at

28 U.S.C. § 2241 et seq .).

iv. 1948 Recodification In 1948, Congress re

codified the post-co

nviction relief sta

tutes. The recodification lef

t the basic grant of a

uthority to issue w

rits of habeas corpu

s unchanged. See Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 646, § 2241, 62 S

tat. 964, 964–65 (codified as am

ended at 28 U.S.C . § 2241). The new § 2241 provided as follow s: (a) Writs of ha

beas corpus may

be granted by the

Supreme Cour

t, any justice thereof,

the district courts a

nd any circuit j udge within their respective jurisdict ions. . . .

. . . . (c) The writ of

habeas corpus shall n

ot extend to a prisoner

unless—

. . . .6 The Supreme Court initially announced the exhaustion requirement in Ex Parte Royall , 117 U.S. 241, 6 S. Ct. 734 (1886). The Reviser’s Note to § 2254 clearly stated: “This new section is declaratory of existing law as affirmed by the Supreme Court.” H.R. Rep. No. 90-308, Appendix , at 1908 (ci ting Ex parte Hawk , 321 U.S. 114, 64 S. Ct.

448 (1944)); see also Felker v. Turpin , 518 U.S. 651, 662 n.4, 116 S. Ct. 2333, 2339 n.4 (1996). 11 (3) He is in custody

in violation of the Cons

titution or laws or treaties of the Un ited States . . . . Id. § 2241, 62 Stat. 964–65 . The new § 2241(c ) listed five classe s of persons who could seek the writ of habeas corpus, w ith § 2241(c)(3) incl

uding the 1867 extension of the wri

t to state prisoners.As the Reviser’ s Notes to the 1948 recodification explained, § 2241 me rely “consolidate[d] secti ons 451, 452 and 453 of title 28, U.S. C., 1940 ed., w ith changes in phrase

ology necessary

to effect the consolidation.” H.R. Rep. No. 80–308, App., at 1905 (1947). The 1948 recodificat ion did more, however, than simply restructure § 2241. It also added §§ 2254 and 2255 to the statutory

scheme. In § 2254, Congress codified the judic

ially-construc

ted exhaustion requir

ement: 6 An application for a

writ of habeas cor

pus in behalf of a per

son in custody pursuant

to the judgment

of a State court sh

all not be granted unless it appe

ars that the applica

nt has exhausted the remedies available in the courts of the State, or that there is either an absence of available State correc tive process or the e

xistence of circumstance s rendering such process ineffective to protect the rights of the prisoner. An applicant shall no

t be deemed to ha

ve exhausted the remedies ava

ilable in the courts o f the State, wit hin the meaning of12

this section, if he h

as the right under the

law of the State t

o raise, by any available pr

ocedure, the quest

ion presented. Act of June 25, 1948,

ch. 646, § 2254, 62 S

tat. at 967 (codifi

ed as amended a

t 28 U.S.C. § 2254). In Section 2255, Congress provided a new statutory motion by which federal prisoners could seek post-conviction relief, separate and apart from an application for a writ of habeas corpus. See Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 646, § 2255 ¶ 1, 62 Stat. 967 (c

odified as ame

nded at 28 U.S.C.

§ 2255) (“A pri soner in custody under sent

ence of a court of t

he United States c

laiming the right

to be released . . .may m

ove the court which i

mposed the sente

nce to vacate, se

t aside or correct the sen

tence.”); see also Wofford v. Scott , 177 F.3d 1236, 1239–4 2 (11th Cir. 1999) (discussing legislative histor y of § 2255). Pr

ior to the enactm

ent of § 2255, federal prisoners petitioned for writs of habeas corpus in the district where they were detained, which frequently was different from the district where they had been tried, convicted, and sentenced. This created significant procedural problems for federal court s. See United States v. Hayman , 342 U.S. 205, 212–14, 72 S. Ct. 263, 268–69

(1952); Wofford

, 177 F.3d at 1239. The new motion under § 2255 alleviated m

any of these procedural difficult ies by directing

prisoners to file the motion i

n the court where t

hey were convi

cted and before the

judge who7 Note, however, that the § 2255 motion is not actually a coram nobis procedure. See

Hayman , 342 U.S. at 221 n.36 , 72 S. Ct. at 273 n.36 ( “Congress did no

t adopt the coram n

obis procedure as it existed at common law . . . .”). 13 sentenced them

, though without “

any purpose to im

pinge upon prisoners’ rights of collateral attack upon their convictions.” Hayman , 342 U.S. at 219, 72 S. Ct. at 272. The § 2255 m

otion, however, w

as not a petition for a writ of h abeas corpus. See id . at 220, 72 S. Ct.

at 273; see also H.R. Rep. N o. 80-308, at 1908 (1947) (“This sectio

n restates, clar

ifies and simpli

fies the procedure

in the nature of the ancient writ of er

ror coram nobi s. It provides an ex peditious remed

y for correcting erroneous sentences without resort to habeas corpus.”). 7 Section 2255 also inclu

ded exclusivity la

nguage that renders the writ of habeas corpus (authorized by § 2241) unavailable to most federal prisoners seeking to challen ge their convictio ns or sentences.

An application for a

writ of habeas cor

pus [under §§ 2241] in behalf of a prisoner

who is authorized to a

pply for relief

by motion pursuant to this sectio

n [i.e., § 2255] , shall not be enter tained if it appears that the app

licant has failed to

apply for reli

ef, by mot

ion [under § 2255], to the court which sentenced him, or that such court has denied him re

lief, unless it also

appears that the re

medy by motion [under § 22 55] is inadequate or ineffective to tes

t the legality of his detention. 28 U.S.C. § 2255 ¶ 5. Althou gh the exact purpos e of this language i s unclear, see Wofford , 177 F.3d at 1238–42, it is evident that this clause integrated the new14

§ 2255 remedy

with the traditiona

l writ of habeas corpus. The purpose of the § 2255 motion was t

o replace, in cer

tain situations, the a

pplication for a wr

it of habeas corpus—whic

h in the case of fede

ral prisoners posed s

ignificant adminis trativ e probl ems—with a similar but dif ferent r emedy. If Congress had not simultaneously limited the availability of the writ of habeas corpus to federal prisoners when it au

thorized the new § 22 55 motion, § 2255 w ould have failed to solve the problem

posed by federa

l prisoners petitionin

g for writs of habe

as corpus in districts other than those in which they had been convicted. At the same time, the last clause of th

e § 2255 provision quoted a bove avoided any se

rious question about whether the replacement of the writ of habeas corpus for a federal prisoner with the new § 2255 cau sed an unconstitu tional suspensi on of the writ. See Swain v. Pressley , 430 U.S. 372, 381, 97 S. Ct. 1224, 1229–30 (1977); Hayman , 342 U.S. at 223, 72 S. Ct. a

t 274.

v. 1966 Amendm

ents The statutes govern ing post-convic tion relief were again amende d in 1966. Act of Nov. 2, 19 66, Pub. L. No.89-711, 80 Stat. 1104 (codified as am

ended at 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241–22 55). Although the ba sic grant of habeas power in § 224115

remained the same, see id ., § 2254 was substa ntially altere

d and separated into subsections. The ne

w subsection (a) pr

ovided: The Supreme Court, a Justice thereof, a circuit judge, or a district court shall

entertain an application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a perso

n in custody pursuan

t to the judgmen

t of a State court only on the gr

ound that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws o

r treaties of the U

nited States. Id. § 2(b) (amendi

ng § 2254). The two paragraphs of § 2254 tha t were created

in 1948 were preserved as subsections (b) an d (c). See id . § 2(c). Subsections (d), (e), and (f) w

ere also added, inc

luding a statutory

presumption in fa

vor of state courts’ factual findin gs. See id . § 2(d)–(f). Much of the debate su

rrounding the 1966 revi sions to § 2254 pertained to a proposal to require a

ll habeas petitions to b e heard by thre e-judge district c

ourts, an idea that was ultimately with drawn. See S. Rep. No. 89-1797 (196 6), reprinted in 1966 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3663, 3666; H.R. Rep. No.89-1892, at 3 (1966). Neither the House nor the Se

nate comm

ittee reports inclu

ded substantive com

ment on the revision to § 2254(a); the House report co mmented on that subsection m erely by repeating its lang uage. See H.R. Rep. No . 89-1892, at 8 (1966) . The absence of any substantive comment suppor ts a conclusion that the

new § 2254(a) m

erely reiterated the ba

sic scope of habeas r

elief articulate

d in § 2241. There is

no evidence of any intent for § 2254 to broaden the scope of relief or to provide an16

independent, altern ative remedy to the writ of habeas corpus authorized by § 2241. Indeed, all the provisions of § 2254 curtail a court’s authority to grant habeas corpus relief to sta

te prisoners. vi. 1996 AEDPA Ena ctment Most recently, the statutes governing federal post-conviction relief were amended by the Antiterrorism and Effect ive Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA). Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 St at. 1214 (1996) (cod ified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241 –2255). AEDPA include

d many signif

icant restrictions on the availability of post-convictio n relief in the federal co urts. See H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 104-518, at 111 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C. A.N. 944, 944 (A EDPA “incorporate[d] reforms to cur

b the abuse of the sta

tutory writ of habeas corpus, and t o address the acute problems of unneces sary delay and abuse in capit al cases.”). See generally Larry W. Yackle, A Primer on the Ne w Habeas Corpus Statute, 44 Buff. L. R ev. 381 (1996). Am

ong the significant add

itions were new st

atutes of limita

tion in both §§ 2254 and 2255, bar s on filing second or successive petitions, p rovisions curtailing review

of state court fac

tual determina

tions, and restrict

ions on evidentiary hearings i n federal court. See Pub. L. No. 104 -132, §§ 101, 104-106, 110 Stat. 1214, 121 7–21 (1996) (amending 28 U.S.C. §§ 2244, 2254 & 2255). AEDPA did not,

however, am

end §§ 2241(c), 2254(

a), or 2255 ¶ 1.17 b. The 2241/2254 Issue Resolved After reviewing the relevant history, it is evident that there are two distinct means of securing post-conviction relief in the federal courts: an application for a writ of habeas cor

pus (governed by,

inter alia, §§ 2241 a

nd 2254) and a moti

on to vacate a sentence (governed by § 2255). Because the post-conviction statutes are complicated an

d cumbersom

e, we often found it convenient to refe r generally to cases implica

ting these statutes as

“habeas corpus

cases.” We a

lso referred sim

ply to “§ 2241 petitions, ” “§ 2254 petitions ,” and “§ 2255 pe titions.” The seduc

tive simplicity o f these shorthand references, howe ver, conceals im

portant distinctions between the two pos

t-conviction rem

edies. Take first the narrower of the two remedies: the § 2255 motion to vacate a federal prisoner’s sentence. Section 2255 permits federal prisoners under sentence

to move to vacate

their sentences only

if: (1) “the s entence was im posed in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States;” (2) “the court was without jurisdicti

on to impose such se

ntence;” (3) “

the sentence was i

n excess of the maximu

m authorized by

law;” or (4) the sentence is “oth erwise subject to collateral attack.” 28 U.S.C. § 2255 ¶ 1. Turning to the writ of habeas corpus proper, the first point that bears emphasizing is th

at the writ of habe

as corpus is a single po st-conviction rem edy18

principally governed by two different statutes

. See 28 U.S.C. § 2241( a) (“Writ s of habeas corpus m

ay be granted .. . .”); 28 U. S.C. § 2254(a) ( “[Federal courts] shall entertain an application for a writ of habeas corpus . . . .”). These identical statutory refe

rences to “the

writ of habeas cor

pus” must be rea

d as referring to t

he same remedy. See Sorenson v. Sec’ y of the Treasury , 475 U.S. 851, 860, 106 S. Ct. 1600, 1606 ( 1986). It is hardly surprising, theref

ore, to find previou

s rulings citing both of th

e statutes that apply

to a state prisoner seeking the writ of habeas corpus. E.g. , Grace v. Hopper , 566 F.2d 507, 508 (5 th Cir. 1978) (“ This is a habeas case broug

ht pursuant to 28 U.S .C. §§ 2241, 2254 . . . .”); Glass v. Heyd, 457 F.2d 562, 563 (5th Cir. 1972) (per curiam) (“In this habeas proceeding filed under 28 U.S.C.§§ 2241, 2242, and 2254 .. . .”); see also Francis v. Henderson , 425 U.S. 536, 538, 96 S. Ct. 1708, 1710 (1976) (“There can be no question of a federal district c

ourt’s power to e

ntertain an applica

tion for a writ of h

abeas corpus in a case such as this . 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241, 2254.”)

. The difference

between the statut

es lies in the breadt

h of the situations to which they apply

. Section 2241 provide s that a writ of hab eas corpus may issue to a prisoner in the fol

lowing five situation

s: (1) He is in custody

under or by color

of the authority of the United States or is committed for trial before some court thereof; or19 (2) He is in custody

for an act done or om

itted in pursuance of an Ac

t of Congress, or a

n order, process, judgment or decree of a court or judge of the United States; or (3) He is in custody

in violation of the Constitution or laws o

r treaties of the U

nited States; or (4) He, being a c

itizen of a foreign

state and domiciled therein is in custody for an act done or omitted under any alleged right, title, authority, privilege, protection, or exe

mption claim

ed under the com

mission, order or sanction of

any foreign sta

te, or under color thereof, the vali

dity and effec

t of which depend upon t he law of nations; or (5) It is necessary to bring him into court to testify or for trial. 28 U.S.C. § 2241(

c). Section 2254,

on the other hand, ap

plies to a subset of those to whom § 2241(c )(3) app lies—i t appli es to “a pe rson in custod y pursuant to the judgment of a State cour t ” who is “in cust

ody in violation of t

he Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) (em phasis added). Section 2254(a) is m

ore in the nature of

a limitation on a

uthority than a grant of authority. Compare § 2254(a) (“[Federal courts] shall entertain an application for a w

rit of habeas corpus

in behalf of a perso

n in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is i n custody in violati

on of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” (emphasis added)),20

with § 2241(a) (“W

rits of habeas corpu

s may be gra

nted by [feder

al courts] withi

n their respective j urisdictions.”).Section 2254 presum es that federal co

urts already have the authority

to issue the writ of

habeas corpus to a sta

te prisoner, and it applies restrictio ns on granting th e Great Writ to certain state p risoners—i.e., those who are “

in custody pursuant

to the judgment

of a State court. ” Thus, the text of § 2254 indicates that it is not itself a grant of habeas authority, let alone a discrete and independent source of post-conviction relief. Neither does the history of § 2254 suggest that the section is anything more than a limitatio

n on the preexisting aut

hority under § 2241(

c)(3) to grant the w

rit of habeas corpus to st

ate prisoners. T

he 1948 codification w

hich created § 2254 merely codified judge-made restrictions on issuing the writ of habeas corpus as authorized under § 2241. See supra Part II.B.1. a.iv. Because i t was merely declarative of j udicial limitat ions imposed on habe

as relief under § 22

41, § 2254 could not possibly have created a new post-conviction remedy. Section 2254(a) merely spe

cifies the class of

state prisoners to w

hich the additional re strictions of § 2254 apply. In su

m, § 2254 is not an independent and additio nal post-conviction remedy for state prisoners; th ere is but a single remedy, the writ of habeas corpus. In harmonizing § 2241 and § 2254, and thus in answering the issue presented in the COA, we turn to the canon of statutory construction that the more21

specific takes preced ence over the more general. Edmond v. United States , 520 U.S. 651, 657, 1 17 S. Ct. 1573, 1578 (1997); Tug Allie-B, Inc. v. United States , 273 F.3d 936, 948 (11th Cir. 2001); Bouchard Transp. Co. v. Updegraff , 147 F.3d 1344, 1351 (11th Cir.1998). Applying this canon of statutor

y construction,

the Third Circuit conc

luded that an applica

tion for a writ of h

abeas corpus by a

state prisoner serving h is sentence is subjec t to the requirements of § 2254. Coady v. Vaughn , 251 F.3d 480, 485 (3 d Cir. 2001). The court stated that “

both Sections 2241 and 2254 authorize [petitioner’s] challenge to the legality of his continued state custody,”

but that allowing him

to file his “pet

ition in federal cour

t pursuant to Section 2241 without reliance on Section 2254 would . . . thwart Congressional intent.” Id. at 484-85. We agree. We find further

support for the application of § 2254 in this ca se from the canon of statutory

construction against reading any prov ision, or even any

word, of a statute so as to make it superfluous. See Conn. Nat’l B ank v. Germain , 503 U.S. 249, 253, 1 12 S. Ct. 1146, 1149 (1992) (“[C] ourts should disfavor interpretations of statutes that render language superfluous . . . .”). Our reading of §§ 224 1 and 2254 as governing a single post-conviction remedy, with the § 2254 requir

ements apply

ing to petitions brought by a state prisoner in custody

pursuant to the judgm

ent of a State cour

t, gives meani

ng to22

§ 2254 without rendering § 2241(c)(3) superfluous. Under our reading, there remain som

e state prisoners to

whom § 2254 does not

apply. Secti

on 2254 is limited to state prisoners “in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(

a). State pre-

trial detention, f

or example, m

ight violate the Constitution or the laws or treaties of the United States. Yet a person held in such pre-trial detenti

on would not be “in

custody pursuant t

o the judgment o f a State court.” Such a pr

isoner would file a

n application for a w

rit of habeas corpus governed by § 2241 onl

y. To read §§ 2241 and 2254 other than a s we do would effectively r

ender § 2254 mea

ningless because stat

e prisoners could by

pass its requirements by proceeding under § 2241. If § 2254 were not a

restriction on § 2241’ s authority to gra nt the writ of habeas corpus, and w

ere instead a fre

estanding, alterna

tive post-conviction remedy, then § 2254 would serve no function at all. It would be a complete dead letter, because

no state prisoner w

ould choose to run the ga untlet of § 2254 restrictions when h

e could avoid those lim

itations simply

by writing “ § 2241” on his petition for fede

ral post-conviction r

elief. All of Co

ngress’s time

and effort in enacting § 2254, am

ending it in 1966, and fu

rther amending

it in 1996 with AEDPA would ha

ve been a comple

te waste. Sect

ion 2254 would never be used or applied, and all of the thousands of decisi ons over the past half

-century from

the23

Supreme Court

and other federal

courts interpreting

and applying the pr

ovisions of § 2254 would have been pointless. Section 2254 would be a great irrelevancy because a state pr

isoner could simply opt out of its ope ration by choosing a different label f

or his petition. Appellant’s arg

uments that his a

pplication for habea

s relief is not subj ect to the requireme

nts of § 2254 are unper

suasive. Appellan

t first argues that § 2254 does not reach chall

enges to the executio

n of a sentence. S

pecifically,

he contends that § 2254 “does not apply where the exact custody of which the prisoner complains is a result of administrative proceedings, which are not State court judgments.” As set out above, how ever, to impli

cate § 2254, the prisoner must be “in custody pu

rsuant to the judgm

ent of a State cour

t.” Appellant unde

niably is in custody pursuant to the judgment of the Florid a court. Appellant next argu

es that by holding hi s petition to be governe d by § 2254, the Court would cre

ate the illogical sit

uation where fede

ral prisoners chal

lenge disciplinary proceedings under § 2241, but state prisoners must proceed under § 2254. As we have explained, state pr isoners in custody

pursuant to the judgm

ent of a state court may file a habeas corpus petition, as authorized by § 2241, but they are limited by

§ 2254. When a sta

te prisoner’s pet

ition falls within the

ambit of § 2254, the prisoner i s subject to that sec tion’s restricti

ons. Similarl

y, when a24

federal prisoner’ s claims fall w ithin the ambit of

§ 2255, the prisoner i s subject to that section’s re strictions. The f act that the § 2255 sphe

re of applicability

and

restr ictio ns do not p arall el tho se of § 2254 does n ot make the st atuto ry sche me illogical or our stat

utory interpre

tation incorrect. Appellant further contends that § 2254 is not the best fit for state prisoners challenging prison disc

iplinary procee

dings and sanctions. I

n particular, he points out that state cour t review of prison dis ciplinary proceedings varies by state. He argues that subjec

ting such challenges to

the § 2254 exhaustion re quirement would lead to a lack of uniformity. Appellant further contends that, as to prisoners incarcerated by states not providing state court review, the standard of review provisions set o ut in § 2254(d) and (e) would be rendered meanin gless. With respect to these arguments, we note it is clear from § 2254(c) that Congress was aware at the time of its enactment that the availability of state court review may vary by state. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254( c) (“An appli

cant shall not be deemed to have e

xhausted the rem

edies available in t

he courts of the Sta

te, within the meaning of this sect ion, if he has the right under the law of the State to raise, by any avail

able procedure, t

he question presented.” (emphasis added)). Secti

on 2254 merely

requires that a pet

itioner exhaust any

available state pr

ocedures and25

that, where such procedures are av ailable, the fede

ral courts give a ce

rtain amount of deference to the stat e court determinations. Finally, Appe

llant points out that the

§ 2244(b)(2) provision

governing successive petitions,

by its term

s, would not perm

it a § 2254 petition chal

lenging prison disciplinary

proceedings where

a petitioner has bro

ught an earlier pet

ition challenging his convic

tion or sentence. W

e disagree. The

term “‘ second or successive’ rem

ains a term of

art that must be

given meaning by

reference to both the body of case law developed before the enactment of AEDPA and the policies that prompted AEDPA’s enactment. ” Crouch v. Norris , 251 F.3d 720, 725 (8th Cir. 2001). We agree with the decisions issued by many of our sister circuits that a petition challengin

g such disciplinary

proceedings would not

be second or successive where

the claim could

not have been raised

in an earlier peti

tion and does not otherwise constitute an abu se of the writ. See James v. W alsh , 308 F.3d 162, 167 (2d Cir. 2002); Hill v. Alaska , 297 F.3d 895, 898–99 (9th Cir. 2002); Crouch , 251 F.3d at 725; In re Cain , 137 F.3d 234, 236–37 (5th Cir. 1998). Insofar as we hold Appellant is subje ct to § 2254 and its vario us restrictions, we find ourselves in

agreement w

ith the Second, Thi

rd, Seventh, and E

ight Circuits. Cook v. New York Sta te Div. of Parole, 321 F.3d 274, 278–79 (2d Cir.8 Cf. Felker v. Turpin , 518 U.S. 651, 662, 11 6 S. Ct. 2333, 2339 (1996) (“[A]uthority to grant habeas relief to state prisoners is limited by § 2254, which specifies the conditions under which such relie

f may be g

ranted to ‘a per

son in custody

pursuant to the judg

ment of a State court.’” (citation omitted)). We note that the Ten

th Circuit has take

n a different vie

w. In the cas

e of federal pr

isoners, it distinguishes attacks on convictions or sentences (§ 2255 motions) from attacks on the execution of sente

nces (writs of ha

beas corpus unde

r § 2241). By

analogy t o the distinction it applies to federal prisoners, the Tenth Circuit permits state prisoners to proceed under § 2241 when it would permit a federal prisoner to file a similar petition for a writ of habeas corpus under § 2241. See McIntosh v. U.S. Parole Comm’n , 115 F.3d 809, 811 (10th Cir. 1997) (“Petitions under § 2241 are used to attack the execution of a sentence, in contrast to § 2254 habeas and § 2255 proceedings, which are used to collaterally attac k the validity of a conviction and sentence.” (internal citations omitted)). In our view, the Tenth Circuit’s precedent disreg ards crucial textual differences between § 2254 and § 2255. 26 2003); Crouch , 251 F.3d at 723; Coady , 251 F.3d at 484–85; Walker v. O’Brien , 216 F.3d 626, 633 (7th Cir. 2000). 8 In summary, a state prisoner seeking post-conviction relief from a federal court has but one remedy: an application for a writ of habeas corpus. All such applications for wr

its of habeas corpus a

re governed by § 2

241, which general

ly authorizes federal co urts to grant the writ —to both federal and state prisoners. Most state prisoners ’ applications for writs of habeas co

rpus are subject a

lso to the additional restrict

ions of § 2254. That is , if a state prisone r is “in custody

pursuant to the judgment of a State co urt,” his petition is subject to § 2254 . If, however, a prisoner is in prison pu

rsuant to somethi

ng other than a judgm

ent of a state court

, e.g., a pre-tr

ial bond order, then

his petition is not subj ect to § 2254. 2. COA Requirem

ent27

Finally, we address the issue of w hether Appellant is

required to obtain a certificate of a

ppealability to pr

oceed before this Court on his appeal per taining to the June 7 disciplinar

y proceeding. We hold that he is. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(

c)(1)(A) provid

es: (c)(1) Unless a circuit justice o r judge issues a ce

rtificate of appealability,

an appeal may

not be taken to the cour

t of appeals from— (A) the final orde r in a habeas corpus proceeding in which the detentio

n complained of a

rises out of process issued by a Stat e court . . . . Similarly , our rules provide: “In all appea ls in cases brought pur

suant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 or

§ 2255, counsel shall a

pply to the distric

t court for a ruling o

n a certificate of appealab ility.” 11th Cir. R. 22-1(a). Petitioner contends

that the § 2253(c)(1) (A) COA requir ement does not apply to his petiti

on because the detent

ion of which he is com

plaining arose out of a prison disciplinary proceeding and not “out of process issued by a State court.” We disagree. The § 2253(c)(1)(

A) COA require

ment applies w

here the “dete

ntion complained of arises out of process issued by a State court .” We think Appe

llant espouses far too nar

row a reading of th

is language. As the

District of Colum

bia Circuit has stated, the better, more natural reading is that a COA is required “ when9 We note that the court in Madley did not specify whether the petition had been brought under § 2241 or under § 2254 and that the petition in Greenewas filed under § 2241. Regardle

ss of the section unde

r which those petit

ions were filed, t

he reasoning in

those cases is app

licable here.

10 We note that the Seventh Circuit in Walker , 216 F.3d 626, reached a contrary decision. In that case, t he court not ed that sta tes provid e varying review o f prison di sciplinar y proceedings and stated that “[t]he possibility of limited judicial review does not . . . convert the prisoner’s administrative de

tention into somethin

g that arises from process issued by the state court.” Id. at 637-38. The cour

t stated, moreove

r, that “[t]here is g

ood reason to acc

ord greater f

inality to sta

te court proceedin

gs, where the f

ull range of pro

cedural protec

tions for a defen

dant apply,

than to 28 the prisoner’s de

tention originated in s

tate court process,

even if a later de

cision [by an adminis trative bo ard] is the more immediate caus e of the pri soner’s continuing detention.” Madley v. U.S. Parole Comm’n , 278 F.3d 1306, 1310 (D.C. Cir. 2002). Here, Appella

nt’s incarcera

tion originated in stat

e court process—a judgment sente

ncing him to a ter

m of year s. The term

of imprisonm

ent ordered by the state court has n

ot yet expired.The prison disciplina ry board has no a

uthority to change the judgm

ent. What the boa

rd has the power to d

o is to release him earlier or to delay his earlier release. The prison disciplinary action of which Appellant comp

lains would not have occurred had Appella nt not in the first instan ce been convic ted and senten ced thr ough s tate co urt pro cess. Ac cordin gly, we hold that § 2253 requires Appellant t o obtain a COA to proceed on appeal. See Madley , 278 F.3d at 1310; Greene v. Tenn. Dep’t of Corrs. , 265 F.3d 369, 372 (6th Cir. 2001); 9 Coady , 251 F.3d at 486. 10prison disciplinary proceedings.” Id. at 638. The court further noted that its conclusion

maintained consis

tency betw

een the procedu

res applicable t

o state prisoners

and those applica

ble to federal prisoners because under its precedent a COA was not required by federal prisoners challenging disciplinary proceedings unde r § 2241. Id. The Seventh Circu it’s Walker

decision has, however, been the subject of criticism within that court. See Moffat v. Broyles , 288 F.3d 978, 980 (7th Cir. 2002) (noting that “[n]ot a single judge in any other circuit has adopted the view taken in Walker

that § 2253(c)(1) is inapplicable to collateral attacks on administrative decisions that affect how much of a judicially imposed sentence shall be served,” and stating that

“ Walker reaches a counter-textual conclusion: § 2253(c)(1) asks whether the detention arises out of a state court’s process, while Walker asks whether the challenged decision was made by a state court”). We reje

ct Walker ’s reasoning and conclusion. 29 III. CONCLUSION We vacate the di strict court’s j udgment in appeal number 02-15808 a

nd remand with in

structions to dism

iss Appellant’s pe

tition as moot because, at the time he filed his petition, Appellant already had completed the term of disciplinary confinement imposed on him as a result of the June 12, 2000, prison disciplinary proceeding. We affirm the district court as to appeal number 02-11072. We hold that Appellant’s peti

tion is governed by

§ 2241 and by § 2254 because Appellant is in custody pursuant to

the judgment of

a state court. W

e also hold that Appel

lant is required to obtain a COA in order to proceed on appeal as to the merits of his claims challe

nging the June 7, 2000, prison disciplinary proceeding because

the detention of which he

complains origin

ated in state court p

rocess. We pr

eviously30

denied Appellant a COA as to the m erits of his claim

s. Appellant ther

efore cannot proceed on appeal as t o the merits of his claims. JUDGMENT VACATED AND CASE REMANDED WITH INSTRUCTIONS TO DISMISS AS MOOT IN APPEAL NUMBER 02-15808. JUDGMENT A

FFIRMED IN A

PPEAL NUMB ER 02-11072.