#### In re Charles Ernest HELMICK and Marcese Elline Helmick, Debtors. Márcese Elline Helmick, Plaintiff. v. Gary Gray, Defendant.

Bankruptcy No. 09-50244.

Adversary No. 09-05015.

United States Bankruptcy Court, W.D. Virginia, Harrisonburg Division.

July 9, 2009.

Roland S. Carlton, Jr., Staunton, VA, for Plaintiff.

Gary Gray, Roanoke, VA, pro se.

*740ORDER

ROSS W. KRUMM, Bankruptcy Judge.

At Harrisonburg in said District this *9th*day of July, 2009:

Before the Court is the Plaintiffs Motion to Reconsider, Vacate and Set Aside Order Entered June 22, 2009. The Plaintiff argues that the Court is bound by *Warthen v. Smith (In re Smith),*247 B.R. 191 (W.D.Va.2000), *aff'd,*1 Fed.Appx. 178 (4th Cir.2001) (unpublished table decision), *cert. denied,*532 U.S. 1052, 121 S.Ct. 2194, 149 L.Ed.2d 1025 (2001), to avoid the Defendant’s wholly unsecured judgment lien pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 506(d). This Court disagrees.

The rationale in the Supreme Court’s decision in *Dewsnup v. Timm,*502 U.S. 410, 112 S.Ct. 773, 116 L.Ed.2d 903 (1992), as extended by the Fourth Circuit in *Ryan v. Homecomings Financial Network,*253 F.3d 778, 782 (4th Cir.2001), and *In re Hamlett,*322 F.3d 342, 348 (4th Cir.2003), controls in this case. The Supreme Court in *Dewsnup*denied “strip down” of an undersecured consensual lien, emphasizing that “liens pass through bankruptcy unaffected.” *Dewsnup,*502 U.S. at 417-18, 112 S.Ct. at 778. The Fourth Circuit applied the *Dewsnup*rationale to deny a debtor’s attempt to “strip off’ a wholly unsecured lien in *Ryan.*253 F.3d at 782.1 In *Hamlett,*the Fourth Circuit adopted the Seventh Circuit’s reasoning in *In re Tarnow,*749 F.2d 464 (7th Cir.1984), agreeing that “ § 506(d) only empowers the bankruptcy court to void liens supporting disallowed claims if it judges those liens to be invalid *in substance.” Hamlett, 322*F.3d at 348 (emphasis added). In this case, the Plaintiff advocates that the Defendant’s judgment lien is disallowed under § 506(a) because it is wholly unsecured and is therefore voidable under § 506(d). The Defendant’s lien, however, is properly perfected and valid in substance. Pursuant to the Fourth Circuit’s holdings in *Ryan*and *Hamlett,*the Plaintiff may not “strip off’ the Defendant’s valid unsecured lien under § 506(d).

This Court acknowledges that the Fourth Circuit in *Ryan*denied “strip off’ in the limited context of a wholly unsecured, consensual lien. The *Ryan*decision does not explicitly prohibit “strip off’ of an unsecured judgment lien, however, the Fourth Circuit expressly noted that the Western District’s decision in *Warthen*is at odds with *Dewsnup,*despite the fact that *Dewsnup*“remains the law of the land.” *Ryan,*253 F.3d at 783 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Reading *Ryan*together with *Hamlett,*this Court finds that later Fourth Circuit precedent repudiates the Western District’s holding in *Warthen*that would permit a bankruptcy court to “strip off’ an unsecured judgment lien. This Court is therefore not bound to follow *Warthen.*Accordingly, it is:

ORDERED:

That the Plaintiffs Motion to Reconsider is hereby DENIED.

Copies of this Order are directed to be sent to counsel for the Plaintiff, Roland S. Carlton, Jr., Esq.; and to the Defendant, Gary Gray, 1024 15th Street, Roanoke, VA 24013.

1

. "The term 'strip down’ is used when a [lien] is partially secured and partially unsecured, while the term 'strip off is used when a junior [lien] is totally unsecured.” *Ryan v. Homecomings Financial Network,*253 F.3d 778 (4th Cir.2001) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).