IN THE

TENTH COURT OF APPEALS

No. 10-18-00262-CR

MIKAEL DEANDRE BUSBY,

Appellant

v.

THE STATE OF TEXAS,

Appellee

From the 77th District Court

Limestone County, Texas

Trial Court No. 14163-A

OPINION

In one issue, appellant, Mikael Deandre Busby, challenges his conviction for felony 

assault family violence. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.01(b)(2)(A). Specifically, Busby 

contends that the evidence supporting his conviction in this case is insufficient because 

trial evidence showed that he is “actually innocent” of the underlying misdemeanor 

assault family violence allegation. We affirm.
Busby v. State Page 2

In the instant case, Busby was charged with assault family violence under section 

22.01(a)(1), which was enhanced by his prior conviction for assault family violence under 

section 22.01(b)(2)(A). See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.01(a)(1), (b)(2)(A). Section 

22.01(a)(1) of the Texas Penal Code provides that a person commits the offense of assault 

if he “intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly causes bodily injury to another, including 

the person’s spouse.” Id. § 22.01(a)(1). An offense under subsection (a)(1) may be 

enhanced from a Class A misdemeanor to a third-degree felony if the offense is 

committed against,

a person whose relationship to or association with the defendant is 

described by Section 71.0021(b), 71.003, or 71.005 of the Family Code, if:

(A) it is shown on the trial of the offense that the defendant has 

been previously convicted of an offense under this chapter, 

Chapter 19, or Section 20.03, 20.04, 21.11, or 25.11 against a person 

whose relationship to or association with the defendant is 

described by Section 71.0021(b), 71.003, or 71.005 of the Family 

Code.

Id. § 22.01(b)(2)(A); see Simmons v. State, 590 S.W.3d 702, 708-09 (Tex. App.—Waco 2019, 

pet. filed).

On appeal, Busby focuses on the section 22.01(b)(2)(A) enhancement element 

regarding his prior conviction for misdemeanor assault family violence.1 At trial, the 

State presented a certified copy of Busby’s prior judgment for Class A misdemeanor 

1 The sufficiency of the evidence to prove the other elements of the offense is not challenged on 

appeal.
Busby v. State Page 3

assault family violence, dated September 14, 2016, in cause number 38166. The judgment 

indicated that Busby pleaded guilty to the charged offense. Busby did not object to the 

admission of this evidence. Furthermore, the State offered the testimony of Murray 

Agnew, a fingerprint expert and Chief Deputy of the Limestone County Sheriff’s Office, 

to show that Busby’s fingerprint matches the fingerprint on the 2016 judgment. 

Additionally, the State presented certified copies of the complaint, information, and 

waiver of rights in the 2016 case. This is sufficient evidence to prove the element of a 

prior conviction involving assault family violence to enhance the charged offense in this 

case to a third-degree felony. See Reyes v. State, 314 S.W.3d 74, 81-82 (Tex. App.—San 

Antonio 2010, no pet.); see also Tanner v. State, 335 S.W.3d 784, 786 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 

2011, no pet.) (citing Vaughn v. State, No. 06-06-0040-CR, 2007 Tex. App. LEXIS 3608, at 

**6-7 (Tex. App.—Texarkana May 11, 2007, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for 

publication)).

However, despite the foregoing, Busby directs us to testimony from the 

complainant, A.B., who testified that the 2016 incident involved her hitting Busby when 

he started cussing at her. A.B. further noted that she continued to hit Busby until Busby 

turned around and shoved her to the ground, allegedly causing no bodily injury to A.B.2 

Ostensibly, what Busby attempts to do on appeal is collaterally attack the sufficiency of 

2

It is worth noting that A.B. admitted that Busby, on several occasions, entreated her to sign an 

affidavit of non-prosecution in this case and to lie about the allegations to minimize his culpability.
Busby v. State Page 4

the evidence supporting his 2016 conviction for misdemeanor assault family violence—

an offense to which he pleaded guilty.

Appellant may collaterally attack a prior conviction alleged for enhancement only

if the earlier conviction is void or tainted by a severe constitutional defect. Galloway v. 

State, 578 S.W.2d 142, 143 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1979). However, the Court of 

Criminal Appeals has held that “the sufficiency of the evidence may not be collaterally 

attacked.” Wolfe v. State, 560 S.W.2d 686, 688 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978) (emphasis added); see 

Ex parte Williams, 703 S.W.2d 674, 677 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986).

For a collateral attack based on the void-judgment exception, the record must 

show a complete lack of evidence to support the conviction, not merely insufficient 

evidence. See Nix v. State, 65 S.W.3d 664, 668 n.14 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001); see also Wolfe, 

560 S.W.2d at 688. Appellant’s guilty plea constitutes some evidence to support his 2016 

conviction for misdemeanor assault family violence. See Nix, 65 S.W.3d at 668 n.14; see 

also Ex parte Williams, 703 S.W.2d at 682 (“The entry of a valid plea of guilty has the effect 

of admitting all material facts alleged in the formal criminal charge. A plea of guilty 

waives all nonjurisdictional defenses including contention as to the insufficiency of the 

evidence.” (internal citations omitted)). Therefore, Busby’s complaint does not raise the 

void-judgment exception, and he may not now challenge the sufficiency of the evidence 

as to his 2016 conviction by way of his appeal of his conviction for felony assault family 
Busby v. State Page 5

violence.3 See id.; see also Ex parte Williams, 703 S.W.2d at 677; Galloway, 578 S.W.2d at 143; 

Wolfe, 560 S.W.2d at 688. Moreover, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to 

the jury’s verdict, we conclude that there is sufficient evidence to support Busby’s 

conviction in this case for felony assault family violence. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 

(b)(2)(A); see also Zuniga v. State, 551 S.W.3d 729, 732-33 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018) (stating 

the standard of review for challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence supporting a 

conviction). Accordingly, we overrule Busby’s sole issue on appeal.

We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

 

JOHN E. NEILL

Justice

3

In further support of our conclusion, Texas courts have held that when a defendant enters into a 

plea-bargain agreement, he gains and accepts a bargained-for benefit that estops him from later challenging 

the trial court’s authority. See Ex parte Williams, 65 S.W.3d 656, 660 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001) (Keller, J., 

concurring); Mapes v. State, 187 S.W.3d 655, 662-63 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2006, pet. ref’d) (“In 

answering the question of whether any error capable of rendering a judgment or sentence void can be 

subject to estoppel, Justice Keller asserted that all errors except for subject matter jurisdiction are subject to 

estoppel and concluded that by accepting the plea agreement, appellant gained a bargained-for benefit that 

should now estop him from challenging the trial court’s authority. Although Williams also involved an 

unauthorized grant of probation, because the issue in the present case is whether appellant is estopped 

from complaining about the void 2001 conviction because he enjoyed the benefit of that sentence pursuant 

to a plea bargain, we find Justice Keller’s analysis to be more instructive than the court’s decision in 

Fullbright.” (internal citations & quotations omitted)); see also Rhodes v. State, 240 S.W.3d 882, 892 (Tex. Crim. 

App. 2007) (“A defendant who has enjoyed the benefits of an agreed judgment prescribing a too-lenient 

punishment should not be permitted to collaterally attack that judgment on a later date on the basis of that 

illegal leniency. . . . Had he complained about the illegal leniency at the time of trial or even on direct 

appeal, the State could likely have obtained a legal judgment that would not be available for enhancement 

purposes. But instead, appellant quietly enjoyed the benefits of the illegally lenient judgment, challenging 

it now only because, due to his own subsequent criminal conduct, the judgment can be used to enhance his 

punishment for a new offense. If he agreed to the concurrent sentencing provision, then through his own 

conduct he helped procure and benefit from the illegality and he should not now be allowed to complain.” 

(internal citation omitted)).
Busby v. State Page 6

Before Chief Justice Gray,

Justice Neill, 

and Justice Johnson

(Chief Justice Gray concurring)

Affirmed

Opinion delivered and filed March 3, 2021

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