COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Judges Benton, Bray and Senior Judge Overton 

Argued at Norfolk, Virginia 

REGINALD SLADE 

 MEMORANDUM OPINION* BY 

v. Record No. 0122-98-1 JUDGE NELSON T. OVERTON 

 APRIL 13, 1999 

COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 

 FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF NEWPORT NEWS 

Randolph T. West, Judge 

 Darell Sayer (Ferrell, Backus, Sayer, Nicolo 

& Mobley, P.C., on brief), for appellant. 

 Marla Graff Decker, Assistant Attorney 

General (Mark L. Earley, Attorney General, on 

brief), for appellee. 

 

 *Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, recodifying Code § 17-116.010, 

this opinion is not designated for publication.

 Reginald Slade (appellant) appeals his conviction for 

possession of cocaine in violation of Code § 18.2-250. On 

appeal, appellant argues that the trial court erred by failing 

to grant his motion to suppress the evidence. He also argues 

that the evidence was insufficient to prove that he possessed 

cocaine. Finding no error, we affirm the conviction. 

FACTS

 Because we find that appellant’s motion to suppress the 

evidence was untimely made and was procedurally barred, we 
recite only the facts as related to the sufficiency of the 

evidence. 

 On March 17, 1997, officers of the Newport News Police 

Department executed a search warrant at a residence located on 

28th Street in Newport News. The search warrant authorized a 

search for evidence of selling and/or using narcotics at a 

residence. When the police entered the residence, they saw 

between ten and twenty people inside the residence. The police 

found appellant and a woman lying on a bed in a small bedroom 

located at the top of the stairs. The police also found a 

marble slab, a razor blade containing cocaine residue, and a 

silver knife containing cocaine residue in plain view on a 

dresser located a few feet from the bed on which appellant was 

lying when the police entered the bedroom. The officers 

recovered scales containing cocaine residue from the dresser 

drawer. The door to the bedroom was closed when the officers 

entered. 

 Officer Best testified that one could see the top of the 

dresser while lying on the bed. Appellant told the police that 

he had lived in the room for the past four months. The officers 

also recovered cocaine from a purse belonging to the woman who 

was in the room with appellant. 

 After the Commonwealth had presented its case-in-chief, and 

when the Commonwealth moved to admit into evidence the 

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certificates of analysis, appellant moved to dismiss the charge 

on the ground that the police made an "unlawful," "no-knock" 

entry into the residence in violation of appellant’s Fourth 

Amendment rights. Appellant moved to suppress the evidence 

obtained by the police during their search of the residence. He 

also moved to strike the evidence. The trial court denied both 

motions. 

ANALYSIS

I. Motion to Suppress

 Defense motions or objections seeking 

(i) suppression of evidence on the grounds 

such evidence was obtained in violation of 

the provisions of the Fourth, Fifth or Sixth 

Amendments to the Constitution of the United 

States or Article I, Section 8, 10 or 11 of 

the Constitution of Virginia proscribing 

illegal searches and seizures and protecting 

rights against self-incrimination . . . 

shall be raised by motion or objection, in 

writing, before trial. The motions or 

objections shall be filed and notice given 

to opposing counsel not later than seven 

days before trial. A hearing on all such 

motions or objections shall be held not 

later than three days prior to trial, unless 

such period is waived by the accused, as set 

by the trial judge. The court may, however, 

for good cause shown and in the interest of 

justice, permit the motions or objections to 

be raised at a later time. 

Code § 19.2-266.2. 

 Appellant did not file a written motion to suppress before 

the trial, and he moved to suppress the evidence only after the 

Commonwealth had presented its case-in-chief. Therefore, 

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appellant's motion was untimely. See id. Appellant also failed 

to show good cause for his failure to file a written motion or 

why the "ends of justice" required the trial court to consider 

the motion. Accordingly, the trial court did not err in denying 

the motion. 

II. Sufficiency of the Evidence

 "On appeal, 'we review the evidence in the light most 

favorable to the Commonwealth, granting to it all reasonable 

inferences fairly deducible therefrom.'" Archer v. 

Commonwealth, 26 Va. App. 1, 11, 492 S.E.2d 826, 831 (1997) 

(citation omitted). 

Possession may be actual or constructive. 

Constructive possession may be established 

by "evidence of acts, statements, or conduct 

of the accused or other facts or 

circumstances which tend to show that the 

defendant was aware of both the presence and 

the character of the substance and that it 

was subject to his dominion and control." 

 

Logan v. Commonwealth, 19 Va. App. 437, 444, 452 S.E.2d 364, 

368-69 (1994) (en banc) (citation omitted). "Circumstantial 

evidence of possession is sufficient to support a conviction 

provided it excludes every reasonable hypothesis of innocence." 

Spivey v. Commonwealth, 23 Va. App. 715, 724, 479 S.E.2d 543, 

548 (1997). 

Although mere proximity to drugs is 

insufficient to establish possession, it is 

a circumstance which may be probative in 

determining whether an accused possessed 

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such drugs. Ownership or occupancy of the 

premises is likewise a circumstance 

probative of possession. Thus, in resolving 

this issue, the Court must consider "the 

totality of the circumstances disclosed by 

the evidence." 

Id. at 725, 479 S.E.2d at 548 (citations omitted). 

 From the evidence presented, the fact finder could infer 

beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant was aware of the 

presence and character of the cocaine and that it was subject to 

his dominion and control. See id. at 724, 479 S.E.2d at 548. 

Although there were other people present in the residence at the 

time the officers executed the search warrant, only appellant 

and one woman were in the small bedroom where the police found 

the cocaine residue. In addition, possession need not be 

exclusive and may be shared. See Josephs v. Commonwealth, 10 

Va. App. 87, 99, 390 S.E.2d 491, 497 (1990). 

 Further, appellant admitted to the police that he had been 

living for four months in the room in which the drugs were 

found. Moreover, the police found the cocaine and drug 

paraphernalia in plain view on the top of a dresser located a 

few feet from the bed on which appellant was lying. Therefore, 

"[t]he only reasonable hypothesis arising from such evidence is 

that [appellant] constructively possessed the cocaine . . . 

found . . . in plain view . . . [and was] aware of the nature 

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and character of the drugs." Spivey, 23 Va. App. at 725, 479 

S.E.2d at 548. 

 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the conviction. 

 Affirmed. 

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