UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

_________________________________ 

DEON LAMON JONES, 

 Plaintiff - Appellee, 

v. 

JOSE MANRIQUEZ; GREGORY 

BLACK, 

 Defendants - Appellants. 

No. 19-1144 

(D.C. No. 1:17-CV-01131-CMA-SKC) 

(D. Colo.) 

_________________________________ 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT*

_________________________________ 

Before BRISCOE, MORITZ, and CARSON, Circuit Judges. 

_________________________________ 

Officers Jose Manriquez and Gregory Black appeal the district court’s order 

denying their motion for summary judgment on Deon Jones’s 42 U.S.C. § 1983 

Fourth Amendment claims. For the reasons discussed below, we reverse. 

Background 

 Around 1:30 a.m. on April 26, 2016, Jones sat in his car parked in a spot 

reserved for business in a parking garage attached to a residential building. The 

parking garage was marked with no-trespassing signs and was in a high-crime area 

specifically known for trespass violations. The officers, also parked in the parking 

* This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines 

of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. But it may be cited for its 

persuasive value. See Fed. R. App. P. 32.1; 10th Cir. R. 32.1. 

FILED 

United States Court of Appeals 

Tenth Circuit 

April 23, 2020

Christopher M. Wolpert 

Clerk of Court
2 

garage, noticed Jones, ran his license plate, and learned that his car was not 

registered to the address of the attached residential building. Suspecting Jones of 

trespass, the officers approached him and activated their body cameras. Jones 

informed Manriquez that he was waiting for a friend. He then started his car but 

turned it off after Black told him to. Black asked Jones to get out of the car, but Jones 

did not immediately comply. Eventually, Jones got out of the car and kneeled next to 

the driver’s side door. 

Black and other officers then handcuffed and arrested Jones for violating a 

Denver ordinance requiring compliance with a police officer’s lawful orders. See 

Denver, Colo., Rev. Mun. Code ch. 38, art. II, § 38-31(c). While Jones was 

handcuffed and lying next to his car, Black searched him, including by reaching into 

Jones’s pocket and removing a piece of paper. Shortly thereafter, and while Jones 

remained handcuffed next to his car, Manriquez opened the passenger-side door and 

looked under the seat and around the front area of Jones’s car. Although officers later 

found that Jones was carrying a small amount of a suspected controlled substance, 

the city attorney ultimately declined to prosecute him. 

Jones then brought this § 1983 suit against Black and Manriquez.1

 Relevant to 

this appeal, he claimed they violated his Fourth Amendment rights when they 

(1) detained him without reasonable suspicion, (2) arrested him without probable 

1

 Jones included other defendants, but none are relevant to this appeal. 
3 

cause,2

 (3) searched him, and (4) searched his car. The officers moved for summary 

judgment, arguing that they were entitled to qualified immunity on all four claims. 

The district court denied the motion with respect to each claim. First, it found 

that a jury could determine that the officers violated the Fourth Amendment when 

they detained Jones because the jury could find that the officers did not reasonably 

suspect Jones of any crime. And the district court denied qualified immunity on this 

claim, finding it clearly established that investigative detentions require reasonable 

suspicion. Second, the district court determined that because a reasonable jury could 

find that the officers lacked reasonable suspicion to detain Jones, a jury could also 

find that the stop was consensual and that the officers’ orders were not lawful. 

Accordingly, the district court determined that a jury could find that the officers 

lacked probable cause to believe that Jones committed any crime, including failing to 

obey lawful orders, and thus could determine that the officers violated the Fourth 

Amendment when they arrested Jones. And the district court further concluded that 

this right was clearly established because, under Supreme Court precedent, “officers 

cannot arrest an individual for failing to identify himself when the officers lack 

reasonable suspicion of criminal activity.” App. vol. 2, 359. 

2

 The first claim in Jones’s complaint, entitled “Unlawful Seizure of Person,” 

includes allegations of both an unlawful seizure and an unlawful arrest. App. vol. 1, 

19. Because the standards for determining whether a seizure and an arrest are 

different, we analyze these allegations as two separate claims, as do the parties. See 

United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7 (1989) (noting that seizures require 

reasonable suspicion); Koch v. City of Del City, 660 F.3d 1228, 1239 (10th Cir. 2011)

(noting that arrests require probable cause). 
4 

Third, the district court found that because a reasonable jury could find that 

Jones’s arrest violated the Fourth Amendment, it could also find that the search was 

unlawful as it would not be incident to a lawful arrest. And the district court denied 

qualified immunity on this claim, finding it clearly established that officers may not 

conduct a search pursuant to an unlawful arrest. Finally, the district court determined 

that a reasonable jury could find that Manriquez’s belief that Jones was dangerous 

was unreasonable and thus could find that the search of Jones’s car was unlawful. 

And the district court denied qualified immunity on this claim as well, finding it 

clearly established that without a belief that a detainee is dangerous, an officer cannot 

search his or her car. The officers appeal. 

Analysis 

When reviewing a summary-judgment order denying qualified immunity, we 

have jurisdiction to review “abstract issues of law” but not the “district court’s 

factual conclusions.”3 Fancher v. Barrientos, 723 F.3d 1191, 1198 (10th Cir. 2013) 

3

 The district court stated that it did not make independent factual findings at 

the summary-judgment stage and instead incorporated the findings from the 

magistrate judge’s recommendation on the officers’ motion to dismiss—even though 

the standards for determining facts at these two stages are different. See Bell v. Fur 

Breeders Agric. Co-op., 348 F.3d 1224, 1230 (10th Cir. 2003) (reviewing “the 

difference in the standards applied to” motions to dismiss and motions for summary 

judgment). We note that the better practice is for district courts to explicitly set forth 

the universe of facts they rely on when granting or denying summary judgment on 

qualified-immunity grounds. See Lewis v. Tripp, 604 F.3d 1221, 1226 (10th Cir. 

2010). But in this particular case, despite the district court’s statement that it was not 

making separate factual findings at the summary-judgment stage, the analysis section 

of its summary-judgment order includes factual recitations. And importantly, the 

parties do not dispute the district court’s consideration of any facts relevant to our 

decision here. For example, Jones notes that the district court considered the facts 
5 

(second quoting Fogarty v. Gallegos, 523 F.3d 1147, 1154 (10th Cir. 2008)). In 

doing so, we review “the district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo, 

employing the same legal standard applicable in the district court.” Thomson v. Salt 

Lake Cty., 584 F.3d 1304, 1311 (10th Cir. 2009). Under that standard, “we must grant 

qualified immunity unless [Jones] can show (1) a reasonable jury could find facts 

supporting a violation of a constitutional right, which (2) was clearly established at 

the time of the [officers’] conduct.” Henderson v. Glanz, 813 F.3d 938, 952 (10th 

Cir. 2015). Although the officers’ assertion of qualified immunity alters Jones’s 

burden at summary judgment, we “still view the facts in the light most favorable to 

[Jones] and resolve all factual disputes and reasonable inferences in [his] favor.” Id.

I. Constitutional Violation 

Jones alleges four separate Fourth Amendment violations: an unreasonable 

investigative detention, arrest, search of his person, and search of his car. As the 

analysis of each alleged violation turns on a separate standard, we consider each 

separately. 

First, the investigative detention was unreasonable if the officers did not have 

reasonable suspicion. Sokolow, 490 U.S. at 7. That is, Manriquez and Black must 

have witnessed an “objective manifestation that [Jones was], or [was] about to be, 

engaged in criminal activity.” United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417 (1981). 

that he was “parked in a parking spot reserved for business” and that the area 

surrounding the parking garage is “known for trespass.” Aplee. Br. 27. And in so 

doing, he does not dispute these facts. 
6 

Reasonable suspicion “contains two elements”: (1) “the assessment must be based 

upon all the circumstances” and (2) that assessment “must raise a suspicion that the 

particular individual being stopped is engaged in wrongdoing.” Id. at 418. But this 

level of suspicion is not high—“[a]ll reasonable suspicion requires is ‘some minimal 

level of objective justification.’” U.S. v. Albert, 579 F.3d 1188, 1197 (10th Cir. 2009) 

(quoting Sokolow, 490 U.S. at 7). Manriquez and Black argue they reasonably 

suspected Jones of trespass in violation of both Denver and Colorado law because 

they reasonably suspected that he did not have permission to be in the parking 

garage. See Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-4-503(1); Denver, Colo., Rev. Mun. Code ch. 38, 

art. IV, § 38-115. Thus, to justify the investigative detention of Jones, the totality of 

the circumstances must have supported a suspicion that Jones did not have 

permission to be in the parking garage. 

Here, before the officers detained Jones, they had observed the following: 

Jones sat in a car around 1:30 a.m. parked in a parking spot reserved for business. 

The parking garage was attached to a residential building in an area with high crime 

rates and a history of trespass, and the garage was marked with no-trespassing signs. 

The car was not registered to the address of the residential building attached to the 

parking garage. When the officers approached Jones, he told them he was waiting for 

a friend. Thus, to meet his burden on appeal, Jones must demonstrate that these facts, 

taken as a whole, do not give rise to reasonable suspicion that he was trespassing. See 

Cortez, 449 U.S. at 417 (1981) (noting that when conducting reasonable-suspicion 
7 

analysis, “the totality of the circumstances—the whole picture—must be taken into 

account”). 

In attempting to carry his burden, Jones first argues that the officers’ suspicion 

was not reasonable because it was not particularized to him. Specifically, he contends 

that the officers’ suspicion stemmed entirely from the area’s history of trespass and 

high crime rate as opposed to facts specific to Jones. 

It is true that presence in a high-crime area alone is insufficient to establish 

reasonable suspicion. Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 124 (2000). But it is a 

“relevant contextual consideration[].” Id. And here, the officers had more than just 

knowledge that Jones was in a high-crime area. Jones was in the garage around 1:30 

a.m. See United States v. McHugh, 639 F.3d 1250, 1257 (10th Cir. 2011) (“[T]he fact 

that an incident occurred late at night or early in the morning is relevant to the 

[reasonable-suspicion] analysis.”). Moreover, Jones was parked in a reserved parking 

spot and the officers determined that Jones’s car was not registered to the address 

associated with the parking garage—both facts particularized to Jones. And although 

the area’s history of trespass would be insufficient to establish reasonable suspicion 

on its own, taken as a whole, these facts suggest a particularized and reasonable 

suspicion that Jones lacked permission to be in the parking garage. See Cortez, 449 

U.S. at 417. 

Next, Jones argues that the officers did not have reasonable suspicion because 

his conduct was innocent. But when determining whether “reasonable suspicion 

exists,” an officer “need not rule out the possibility of innocent conduct.” United 
8 

States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 277 (2002); see also Sokolow, 490 U.S. at 9–10 (“[T]he 

relevant inquiry is not whether particular conduct is ‘innocent’ or ‘guilty,’ but the 

degree of suspicion that attaches to particular types of noncriminal acts.” (quoting 

Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 243 n.13 (1983))). Accordingly, the officers were not 

required to rule out the possibility that Jones had permission to be in the garage in 

order to have had reasonable suspicion that he was trespassing. Instead, even if the 

officers determined that Jones’s conduct was “ambiguous and susceptible of an 

innocent explanation,” they were nevertheless permitted to “detain [Jones] to resolve 

the ambiguity.” Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 126. 

Jones further argues that his explanation that he was waiting for a friend 

should have dissipated the officers’ purported reasonable suspicion. Jones does not 

contend that law enforcement must always credit a suspect’s explanation. Instead, he 

argues that in cases where law enforcement appropriately discredited an individual’s 

explanation, there was good reason to doubt that explanation. See, e.g., District of 

Columbia v. Wesby, 138 S. Ct. 577, 587 (2018) (determining that law enforcement 

properly discredited partygoers’ explanation for their lawful presence in house where 

partygoers “gave vague and implausible responses” to police questioning, “claimed 

the event was a bachelor party, but . . . could [not] identify the bachelor,” and 

“scattered at the sight of uniformed officers”). Here, Jones continues, the officers had 

no reason to disbelieve him. The officers, on the other hand, argue that they are 

“simply not required to accept a suspect’s explanation of his conduct at face value.” 

Aplt. Br. 27. 
9 

But the appropriate inquiry is not whether and when law enforcement must 

believe suspects. Instead, the appropriate reasonable-suspicion analysis considers 

Jones’s explanation as one fact among the others that comprise the totality of the 

circumstances. See Arvizu, 534 U.S. at 274 (emphasizing that viewing facts “in 

isolation from each other does not take into account the ‘totality of the 

circumstances’”); cf. Wesby, 138 S. Ct. at 588 (noting that when determining whether 

law enforcement had probable cause, courts should consider “all of the surrounding 

circumstances, including the plausibility of [any] explanation”). And the totality of 

the circumstances here—including Jones’s explanation—suggest that the officers 

reasonably suspected Jones of trespassing. We thus reject Jones’s argument that he 

“credibly explained his presence in a way that vitiated any possible suspicion for 

trespassing.” Aplee. Br. 15. 

Considering the totality of the circumstances—the time of day, the high-crime 

area with a specific history of trespassing, the reserved parking spot, the notrespassing signs, and the address registered to Jones’s car—we determine that the 

officers reasonably suspected that Jones was trespassing, even though Jones may 

have had an innocent or legitimate purpose for being in the garage. As a result, the 

investigative detention did not violate his Fourth Amendment right to be free from 

unreasonable seizures. See Sokolow, 490 U.S. at 7; United States v. VillagranaFlores, 467 F.3d 1269, 1276 (10th Cir. 2006) (finding that law enforcement legally 

detained suspect when they had reasonable suspicion to believe he was trespassing). 
10 

Our determination that the officers had reasonable suspicion leads to our 

conclusions on the constitutionality of Jones’s arrest and the two searches. Regarding 

the arrest, the officers assert that (1) because they had reasonable suspicion to detain 

Jones, Black’s orders to Jones were lawful and (2) by not complying with these 

orders, Jones violated § 38.31(c), the Denver ordinance prohibiting the “fail[ure] to 

obey a lawful order of a police officer if such failure interferes with or hinders such 

police officer in the discharge of his [or her] official duties.” In response, Jones 

argues only that Black’s orders were not lawful because Black lacked reasonable 

suspicion to detain him in the first place. But as just outlined, the officers did have 

reasonable suspicion to detain Jones. And Jones does not assert that Black’s orders 

were unlawful for any other reason. Because the officers therefore had “probable 

cause to believe that [Jones had] committed even a very minor criminal offense in 

[their] presence,” they were permitted to arrest him without violating the Fourth 

Amendment. Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 354 (2001). And further, 

because “a lawful arrest, standing alone, authorizes a search” of the arrestee, the 

officers’ search of Jones after the arrest did not violate Jones’s Fourth Amendment 

right to be free from unreasonable searches. Michigan v. DeFillippo, 443 U.S. 31, 35 

(1979). 

Finally, Jones argues that Manriquez violated his Fourth Amendment rights by 

searching his car because the stop leading to the search was not “justified at its 

inception.” Aplee. Br. 25 (quoting United States v. King, 990 F.2d 1552, 1557 (10th 

Cir. 1993)). But because the officers had reasonable suspicion to detain Jones, the 
11 

stop was “justified at its inception.” Id. (quoting King, 990 F.2d at 1557). 

Accordingly, this argument fails.4

 We thus find that Jones did not meet his burden of 

demonstrating that Manriquez violated his constitutional rights by searching his car. 

See Henderson, 813 F.3d at 952. 

In sum, we determine that the officers had reasonable suspicion that Jones was 

trespassing, such that their investigative detention of Jones did not violate his Fourth 

Amendment rights. See Sokolow, 490 U.S. at 7. We also determine that when Jones 

did not comply with Black’s orders to exit his car, the officers had probable cause 

that Jones violated a Denver ordinance, such that Jones’s arrest did not violate his 

Fourth Amendment rights. See Atwater, 532 U.S. at 354. Further, we determine that 

the officers’ search of Jones was a lawful search incident to arrest under the Fourth 

Amendment. See DeFillippo, 443 U.S. at 35. Finally, we determine that because the 

stop was justified at its inception, Jones did not demonstrate that Manriquez violated 

his Fourth Amendment rights when he searched Jones’s car. See King, 990 F.2d at 

1557.

II. Clearly Established Law 

 Even if we were to assume that Jones established a constitutional violation on 

any of his four claims, we would nevertheless grant qualified immunity because 

4

 Jones does not argue that the search violated the standard set forth by 

Arizona v. Gant, which permits “[p]olice [to] search a vehicle incident to a recent 

occupant’s arrest only if the arrestee is within reaching distance of the passenger 

compartment at the time of the search or it is reasonable to believe the vehicle 

contains evidence of the offense of arrest.” 556 U.S. 332, 351 (2009). We therefore 

do not consider any such argument. 
12 

Jones does not carry his burden of showing that the law was clearly established at the 

time of the incident. See Henderson, 813 F.3d at 952. A right is clearly established if, 

at the time the right was violated, it was “sufficiently clear that every reasonable 

official would have understood that what he is doing violates that right.” Mullenix v. 

Luna, 136 S. Ct. 305, 308 (2015) (per curiam) (quoting Reichle v. Howards, 566 U.S. 

658, 664 (2012)). Stated differently, Jones must show that no reasonable officer 

facing the same circumstances as the officers here could have determined that that it 

was constitutional to detain, arrest, or search Jones or his car. To do so, Jones must 

(1) “identif[y]” a factually similar “Supreme Court or published Tenth Circuit 

decision,” (2) show that “the clearly established weight of authority from other courts 

[has] found the law to be as [he] maintains,” Perry v. Durborow, 892 F.3d 1116, 

1123 (10th Cir. 2018) (quoting Quinn v. Young, 780 F.3d 998, 1005 (10th Cir. 

2015)), or (3) show that “the unlawfulness of the [officers’] conduct is sufficiently 

clear even though existing precedent does not address similar circumstances,” Wesby, 

138 S. Ct. at 590. 

 Regarding the first alleged constitutional violation, Jones first looks to incircuit law and cites to a single Tenth Circuit opinion—United States v. Dell, 487 F. 

App’x 440 (10th Cir. 2012) (unpublished)—to support his argument that the officers 

violated his clearly established rights when they detained him. But Dell is too 

factually distinct to clearly establish law for this case. There, the officer observed 

individuals in a purportedly high-crime area looking into a car’s windows and then 

walking away from the car after noticing the officer approach. Dell, 487 F. App’x at 
13 

444. But the Dell district court gave little weight to the officer’s high-crime 

characterization, and the Dell reviewing court deferred to that factual finding. Id. at 

445. Further, Dell minimized the fact that the defendant walked away from the 

officer. Id. at 445. Thus, that reasonable-suspicion analysis largely turned on the 

officer’s observation of individuals looking into a parked car. See id. at 445–46. 

Accordingly, Dell is too dissimilar to be useful here, and we therefore do not find 

that Tenth Circuit law clearly establishes Jones’s right to be free from an 

unreasonable investigative detention in these circumstances. See Mullenix, 136 S. Ct. 

at 308. 

 Next, Jones cites to four out-of-circuit cases for the broad proposition that 

“momentar[y] observa[tion of] innocuous behavior, that could under certain 

circumstances also be indication of illicit activity,” does not give rise to reasonable 

suspicion. Aplee. Br. 29. But the clearly-established-law analysis “must be 

undertaken in light of the specific context of the case, not as a broad general 

proposition.” Mullenix, 136 S. Ct. at 308 (quoting Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U.S. 194, 

198 (2004) (per curiam)). And this principle is too general to clearly establish Jones’s 

right here. Moreover, the four cases Jones relies on are not factually similar to the 

circumstances faced by the officers here, and “[t]he dispositive question is ‘whether 

the violative nature of particular conduct is clearly established.’” Id. (emphasis 

added) (quoting Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 742 (2011)); see also United 

States v. Lowe, 791 F.3d 424, 434–35 (3d Cir. 2015) (finding no reasonable suspicion 

to detain individual where officers received anonymous tip that someone matching 
14 

individual’s description in high-crime area had gun); United States v. Hill, 752 F.3d 

1029, 1029–31 (5th Cir. 2014) (finding police did not have reasonable suspicion to 

detain driver where driver was parked in high-crime area around 11:00 p.m. and 

police saw his passenger leave and walk quickly toward apartment building); United 

States v. Johnson, 620 F.3d 685, 688–89 (6th Cir. 2010) (finding no reasonable 

suspicion to detain man where officers received anonymous call about “suspicious 

people around a blue Cadillac,” located Cadillac in high-crime area, then saw man 

carrying bag walking past Cadillac toward different car); Patterson v. City of 

Cleveland, No. 97-4226, 1999 WL 68576, at *6 (6th Cir. Jan. 21, 1999) 

(unpublished) (finding officer did not have reasonable suspicion when she saw two 

men possibly exchanging something and then moving apart upon seeing officer). 

Thus, these four cases do not provide clearly established law.

 We further reject Jones’s argument that the officers’ “conduct was so 

obviously unconstitutional that [Jones] need not” cite to a factually similar case. 

Aplee. Br. 32. To be sure, there are constitutional violations that are so “obvious” 

that “the unlawfulness of the officer’s conduct is sufficiently clear even though 

existing precedent does not address similar circumstances.” Wesby, 138 S. Ct. at 590 

(2018) (first quoting Brosseau, 543 U.S. at 199); see also Colbruno v. Kessler, 928 

F.3d 1156, 1164–66 (10th Cir. 2019) (finding officers obviously violated individual’s 

due-process rights by requiring pretrial detainee to walk naked through hospital and 

denying qualified immunity even in absence of factually similar case). But such an 

analysis typically does not apply to an officer’s judgment that “turn[s] on the 
15 

assessment of probabilities in particular factual contexts.” Wesby, 138 S. Ct. at 590 

(alteration in original) (quoting Gates, 462 U.S. at 232) (explaining why plaintiffs 

needed factually similar cases to clearly establish that officers did not have probable 

cause to arrest). And “reasonable suspicion . . . is not ‘readily, or even usefully, 

reduced to a neat set of legal rules.’” Sokolow, 490 U.S. at 7 (quoting Gates, 462 U.S. 

at 232); see also United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. at 418 (noting that reasonable 

suspicion “does not deal with hard certainties, but with probabilities”). Thus, any 

right that the officers may have violated by detaining Jones was not so obvious that 

factually similar cases are unnecessary to clearly establish the right. 

 Finally, Jones does not argue for any clearly established law on his remaining 

three claims. We therefore decline to consider this prong of the qualified-immunity 

test for those three claims. 

Conclusion 

 Jones does not meet his burden of showing that the officers violated his 

constitutional rights. And even if he did, he does not meet his burden of showing that 

any violated right was clearly established at the time of the incident. Thus, we hold 
16 

that the officers are entitled to qualified immunity and reverse the district court’s 

order concluding otherwise. 

Entered for the Court 

Nancy L. Moritz 

Circuit Judge