United States Court of Appeals 

for the Fifth Circuit 

No. 21-50152 

United States of America, 

Plaintiff—Appellee, 

versus

Jesus Cortez, 

Defendant—Appellant. 

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the Western District of Texas 

USDC No. 5:19-CV-1160 

Before Southwick, Graves, and Costa, Circuit Judges. 

Per Curiam:* 

A member of this panel previously denied Jesus Cortez a certificate of 

appealability and denied appointment of counsel. Cortez now moves for 

reconsideration. Both motions are again DENIED. 

*

 Pursuant to 5th Circuit Rule 47.5, the court has determined that this 

opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited 

circumstances set forth in 5th Circuit Rule 47.5.4. 

United States Court of Appeals 

Fifth Circuit 

FILED 

August 31, 2022 

Lyle W. Cayce 

Clerk 

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FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 

 On November 2, 2012, the Drug Enforcement Administration 

(“DEA”) received a confidential tip that a shipment of methamphetamine 

was going to be delivered to a Marriott Hotel in San Antonio, Texas. 

According to the informant, Joseph Ybarra would purchase the narcotics 

from an unknown individual in a vehicle with Arizona license plates, later 

identified as Eleazar Huerta. The DEA set up surveillance in the parking lots 

of two downtown Marriott Hotels. 

 While conducting their surveillance, officers saw a Ford Expedition 

and a Grand Marquis – vehicles that generally matched the informant’s tip – 

drive into the parking lot of one of the Marriott hotels. Each driver went into 

the hotel, then returned to the parking lot. Soon thereafter, both men got 

into the Ford Expedition. Officers then saw a BMW pull into the parking lot, 

driven by defendant Jesus Cortez. Cortez got out, appeared to speak to 

Huerta, then got back into his BMW and seemingly followed the Ford 

Expedition out of the parking lot. 

 At that point, the DEA officers stopped both vehicles. The officers 

removed Cortez and two other people from his BMW and, as one of the 

officers later testified, began to “clear the vehicle for officer safety.” After 

yelling out “clear,” one officer looked to the backseat of the car “to make 

sure nobody was lying on the floorboard” and saw a “firearm on the driver’s 

side set between the seat and the door as you open it.” 

 All the drivers and passengers were detained and informed of their 

Miranda rights. Cortez decided to talk with the police. According to the 

officers, Cortez stated there was methamphetamine and cocaine in the 

vehicle and they were going to his father’s house to drop off the vehicle. 

When asked why the drug dogs did not alert on the vehicle, Cortez said it 

might have been because of the way the drugs were packaged. 

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 As a result of Cortez’s statements, the DEA searched the Ford 

Expedition. They found sixteen bundles of methamphetamine hidden inside, 

weighing over five kilograms in total. Each kilogram had an estimated street 

value of $17,000 to $18,000. 

 Later that same month, a grand jury for the United States District 

Court, Western District of Texas. indicted Cortez for one count of 

conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute methamphetamine in violation 

of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841 and 846, and one count of aiding and abetting possession 

with intent to distribute methamphetamine in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841 

and 18 U.S.C. § 2. Three and a half years later, a grand jury indicted Cortez 

for one count of using or carrying a firearm “during and in relation to” a drug 

trafficking crime or possessing a firearm “in furtherance of” a drug 

trafficking crime, violating 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). 

 After a two-day trial in January 2017, Cortez was convicted on all three 

counts. The district court sentenced Cortez to a term of imprisonment of 

210 months and 5 years of supervised release. This court affirmed Cortez’s 

conviction, holding there was sufficient evidence to support the conviction 

and that the district court’s decision not to follow the Pattern Jury 

Instructions was not per se error or a grave miscarriage of justice. United 

States v. Cortez, No. 17-50504, 2018 WL 3322863 (5th Cir. 2018). 

 Cortez then filed a Section 2255 motion to vacate his sentence, raising 

seven separate ineffective assistance of counsel claims. The Government 

filed a response in opposition to the motion, attaching affidavits from 

Cortez’s trial counsel. The district court dismissed Cortez’s Section 2255 

motion and denied him a certificate of appealability (“COA”) as to any claim. 

Cortez subsequently moved for a COA from this court and filed a motion for 

appointment of counsel. In January 2022, a single member of this panel 

denied the motions. The full panel now reconsiders the denial. 

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DISCUSSION 

 An appeal of a final order in a Section 2255 proceeding is governed by 

28 U.S.C. § 2253(c). A petitioner must obtain a COA from “a circuit justice 

or judge” before appealing the denial of their petition. § 2253(c). Obtaining 

a COA requires that a petitioner make “a substantial showing of the denial of 

a constitutional right.” § 2253(c)(2). Where the district court has denied 

the petitioner’s claims on the merits, the petitioner must establish that 

reasonable jurists would find the denial debatable or wrong. Slack v. 

McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). At the COA stage, we must “limit [our] 

examination to a threshold inquiry into the underlying merits of [the] 

claims.” Buck v. Davis, 137 S. Ct. 759, 773 (2017) (quoting Miller-El v. 

Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 327 (2003)). 

 Cortez’s Section 2255 motion raised eight claims in support of relief. 

We will consider each. 

I. Ineffective assistance of trial counsel 

An ineffective assistance of trial counsel (“IATC”) claim presents a 

court with two issues for resolution. A moving party “must show: (1) ‘that 

counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness,’ 

and (2) that the deficiency was ‘prejudicial to the defense.’” Anaya v. 

Lumpkin, 976 F.3d 545, 550–51 (5th Cir. 2020) (quoting Strickland v. 

Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688, 692 (1984)). In evaluating counsel’s 

performance for objective reasonableness, courts “indulge a strong 

presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable 

assistance.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689. To show prejudice, “there [must 

be] a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s . . . errors, the result of the 

proceeding would have been different.” Id. at 694. 

First, Cortez contends that his trial counsel failed to conduct a 

reasonable investigation by failing to interview six potential witnesses and 

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obtain copies of his bank and phone records. Trial counsel is required to 

“make reasonable investigations or to make a reasonable decision that makes 

particular investigations unnecessary.” Id. at 691. When assessing whether 

pretrial investigation was reasonable, we consider “the ‘number of issues in 

the case, the relative complexity of those issues, the strength of the 

government’s case[,] and the overall strategy of trial counsel.’” Nealy v. 

Cabana, 764 F.2d 1173, 1177 (5th Cir. 1985) (citation omitted). At a 

minimum, counsel must “interview potential witnesses and make an 

independent investigation of the facts and circumstances of the case.” Id.; 

see also American Bar Association Standards for Criminal 

Justice § 4-4.1 (4th ed. 2017).

The district court dismissed this claim, relying on an affidavit 

provided by trial counsel stating that Cortez had not asked counsel to 

interview the potential witnesses or obtain phone or bank records. Though 

perhaps not requested, Cortez’s trial counsel apparently did not interview 

any potential witnesses or conduct an independent investigation. They only 

attempted to interview Cortez’s father and then did not interview anyone 

else. Instead, trial counsel believed, “in [their] professional judgment and 

experience, that [their] defensive theory was best supported by Mr. Cortez’s 

own testimony, and our cross-examination of the Government’s witnesses.” 

Under these facts, reasonable jurists could debate the district court’s 

conclusion that counsel’s efforts were objectively reasonable. See Strickland, 

466 U.S. at 691.

The district court also concluded that Cortez failed to show how 

additional efforts would have altered the outcome of the trial given the weight 

of the evidence against Cortez, including his oral confession. In support of 

his motion, Cortez provided only a single admissible affidavit from his 

brother – one of the named, uncalled witnesses – stating he was available and 

would have testified. See Day v. Quarterman, 566 F.3d 527, 538 (5th Cir. 

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2009) (noting that, for uncalled-witness claims, Strickland requires showing 

that the testimony would have been not only favorable “but also that the 

witness would have testified at trial.” (quoting Alexander v. McCotter, 775 

F.2d 595, 602 (5th Cir. 1985) (citations omitted))). Likewise, though Cortez 

alleges that his bank and phone records could have been used to impeach the 

Government’s witnesses, he has not supported his assertions with any 

evidence that would allow him to prevail on his claim. See Ross v. Estelle, 694 

F.2d 1008, 1011 (5th Cir. 1983). Thus, Cortez has failed to support his claims 

of prejudice with evidence to raise a debatable issue that further 

investigations would have changed the outcome of his trial. 

Second, Cortez contends that his trial counsel was ineffective by 

failing to apprise him of the status of their investigation, which would have 

allowed him to plead guilty. As the district court found, though, defense 

counsel informed Cortez of the government’s case against him and of the 

potential consequences of going to trial. In fact, after the original indictment 

was superseded, the district court held two “Lafler hearings” to ensure that 

Cortez understood the charges against him and risks of rejecting the plea 

offer. See Lafler v. Cooper, 566 U.S. 156 (2012). When the court asked Cortez 

whether he was “satisfied” that he was adequately informed to make an 

independent decision, Cortez always responded that he was. As such, Cortez 

has failed to make a substantial showing that his counsel’s performance was 

objectively unreasonable or that he would have taken the guilty plea but for 

any alleged defective performance. See id. at 174. 

Third, Cortez contends that his trial attorneys were poorly prepared 

for trial because they did not have enough time to review the Government’s 

discovery, research the law applicable to the case, investigate witnesses, and 

consult with Cortez’s doctors or medical experts on his post-traumatic stress 

disorder (“PTSD”) diagnosis. The district court dismissed this claim, 

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concluding that Cortez’s arguments were largely unsubstantiated and that 

his counsel had vigorously represented Cortez at trial.

Cortez raises a debatable issue regarding counsel’s deficient 

performance in failing to consult a medical expert regarding Cortez’s 

apparent diagnosis of PTSD and failure to present evidence of his PTSD at 

trial. The defense knew of Cortez’s claimed PTSD, as counsel relied on it at 

trial extensively. Even so, the defense did not submit documents or expert 

testimony in support of the supposed diagnosis at trial. To substantiate this 

claim, Cortez attached medical notes to his Section 2255 motion showing that 

a doctor listed PTSD as one of Cortez’s ailments on December 1, 2016. 

Importantly, Cortez’s trial counsel did not explain the failure to present this 

evidence or consult with Cortez’s doctors regarding Cortez’s PTSD 

diagnosis, nor did they suggest it was based on any strategic decision.

Nonetheless, Cortez has not made a substantial showing that the 

failure to present this evidence was prejudicial. He has not explained how 

evidence of a PTSD diagnosis would have altered the outcome of the trial 

given the weight of the evidence against him. See Gray v. Lucas, 677 F.2d 

1086, 1093 (5th Cir. 1982). He argues that had his counsel been better 

prepared, they would have “been in a better position to impeach the 

government’s witnesses” and “strengthen[ed] Cortez’s defense.” These 

conclusory allegations cannot satisfy Cortez’s burden of showing prejudice. 

See United States v. Holmes, 406 F.3d 337, 361 (5th Cir. 2005). 

Fourth, Cortez claims that his counsel’s failure to investigate and 

present evidence of his PTSD was ineffective at the sentencing phase. The 

district court concluded that Cortez failed to show that his trial counsel was 

ineffective at sentencing and that but for the failure to investigate his PTSD 

he would have received a lesser sentence, noting that his trial counsel did 

raise the issue of Cortez’s PTSD at sentencing. Indeed, Cortez received a 

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sentence well below the sentencing guidelines. Cortez has failed to explain 

how presenting more evidence of his psychological diagnoses would have 

affected the outcome of sentencing. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. 

Fifth, Cortez claims that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to 

pursue a “substantial assistance” departure at sentencing. The district court 

dismissed this claim because in Cortez’s trial testimony he denied the facts 

he had confessed to investigators regarding his co-defendants and denied 

responsibility for his actions. Also, the prosecutor has discretion whether to 

file a motion for a departure from the Guidelines based on a defendant’s 

substantial assistance. See Wade v. United States, 504 U.S. 181, 185–86 

(1992). District courts have the authority to review the decision not to file 

such a motion and grant relief if they find refusal was based on an 

unconstitutional motive. Id. Cortez does not allege any such motive here. 

Sixth, Cortez contends that his counsel was ineffective by not moving 

to suppress the firearm found in his car. The district court dismissed this 

claim because the gun was found in plain view during a protective sweep of 

Cortez’s vehicle. Defense counsel filed multiple motions to exclude 

evidence, successfully excluding body armor that was found in Cortez’s 

trunk. See Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 375 (1986). Cortez has not 

made a substantial showing that his counsel was deficient on this issue. 

II. Ineffective assistance of appellate counsel 

Claims of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel are also analyzed 

using Strickland’s two-step test. Briseno v. Cockiell, 274 F.3d 204, 207 (5th 

Cir. 2001). To prove prejudice with respect to a claim that appellate counsel 

was ineffective, a petitioner must show a reasonable probability that he would 

have prevailed on appeal but for his counsel’s deficient representation. Id. 

First, Cortez contends his appellate counsel was deficient by failing to 

raise issues of vindictive prosecution and prosecutorial misconduct related to 

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“false statements” that were made outside the presence of the jury. His 

contention is unavailing. As the district court noted, no presumption of 

vindictiveness arises from a prosecutor’s filing a superseding indictment 

after a defendant refuses to accept a guilty plea. See United States v. 

Saltzman, 537 F.3d 353, 360–62 (5th Cir. 2008). Also, Cortez has failed to 

explain how the complained-of “false statements” could have prejudiced 

him or how his appellate counsel would have been able to show plain error. 

Appellate counsel are not required to present patently frivolous – or even all 

non-frivolous issues – on appeal. Ellis v. Lynaugh, 873 F.2d 830, 840 (5th Cir. 

1989). 

Second, Cortez contends his appellate counsel was ineffective when 

they failed to challenge the constitutionality of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(2) after 

the Supreme Court’s decision in Johnson v. United States, 576 U.S. 591 

(2015). Specifically, Cortez complains that his appellate counsel did not 

argue that Section 924(c)(2) is unconstitutionally vague because it fails to 

“provide a fair notice of the prohibited drugs” that constitute “drug 

trafficking.” The district court dismissed this argument because Johnson and 

subsequent cases — Sessions v. Dimaya, 138 S. Ct. 1204 (2018) and United 

States v. Davis, 139 S. Ct. 2319 (2019) — applied to provisions of the United 

States Code with residual clauses. Section 924(c)(2) contains no residual 

clause, making Johnson inapplicable. 

Cortez’s motions for a COA and for appointment of counsel are 

DENIED. 

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