Illinois Official Reports

Appellate Court

People v. Jones, 2020 IL App (3d) 170674

Appellate Court 

Caption

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v.

EMANUEL W. JONES, Defendant-Appellant.

District & No. Third District 

No. 3-17-0674

Filed April 13, 2020

Decision Under 

Review

Appeal from the Circuit Court of Peoria County, No. 16-CF-727; the 

Hon. Kevin Lyons, Judge, presiding.

Judgment Reversed in part, vacated in part, and remanded for further 

proceedings.

Counsel on

Appeal

James E. Chadd, Peter A. Carusona, and James Wozniak, of State 

Appellate Defender’s Office, of Ottawa, for appellant.

Jodi Hoos, State’s Attorney, of Peoria (Patrick Delfino, Thomas D. 

Arado, and Nicholas A. Atwood, of State’s Attorneys Appellate 

Prosecutor’s Office, of counsel), for the People.
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Panel JUSTICE O’BRIEN delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

Presiding Justice Lytton and Justice McDade concurred in the 

judgment and opinion.

OPINION

¶ 1 After being charged with offenses relating to his possession of cocaine, defendant, 

Emanuel W. Jones, filed a motion to quash a search warrant and suppress evidence. That 

motion was ultimately denied, and defendant was found guilty following a stipulated bench 

trial. On appeal, he argues that the Peoria County circuit court’s denial of his motion to quash 

the search warrant and suppress evidence was in error. We reverse the court’s ruling on 

defendant’s motion to quash the search warrant and suppress evidence, vacate defendant’s 

conviction for unlawful possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver, and remand 

the matter for further proceedings.

¶ 2 I. BACKGROUND

¶ 3 The State charged defendant by indictment with unlawful possession of a controlled 

substance with intent to deliver (720 ILCS 570/401(a)(2)(A) (West 2016)) and unlawful 

possession of a controlled substance (id. § 402(a)(2)(A)). Both counts originally alleged that 

defendant possessed more than 15 grams of cocaine. The State would later add two charges 

via indictment, charging lesser versions of those offenses based on the allegation that defendant 

possessed between 1 and 15 grams of cocaine. id. § 401(c)(2) (possession with intent to 

deliver); id. § 402(c) (possession).

¶ 4 Defendant subsequently filed a motion to quash search warrant and suppress evidence 

illegally seized. In the motion, defendant alleged that the search warrant in the case was “bare 

bones” in nature and therefore lacked the probable cause required for its issuance.

¶ 5 The complaint for search warrant was filed on September 24, 2016, by Jared Fuller of the 

Peoria County Sherriff’s Office. The complaint requested a search warrant for the premises 

located at 3003 West Proctor Street in Peoria, as well as for defendant’s person. Fuller, a 

member of the Multi-County Narcotics Enforcement Group, averred that he expected to find 

cocaine, currency, paraphernalia, and other evidence of possession with intent to deliver. He 

continued:

“Complainant states that he does believe that the above listed items to be seized 

will be located on the premises described above, because on at least two occasions the 

complainant has caused the confidential source (C/S) to arrange for the purchase of 

crack cocaine from [defendant]. On each occasion [defendant] was observed leaving 

the above described residence and delivering crack cocaine to the C/S. The following 

facts describe such:

The first occasion, I caused a reliable confidential source to arrange the purchase 

of crack cocaine from [defendant]. Agents met with the C/S at a pre-determined 

location and provided the C/S with $60.00 USC/OAF. Agents followed the C/S to the 

pre-determined buy location, Peoria, IL (observed entire time driving). Agents 

observed [defendant] leave the residence of 3003 W. Proctor St, Peoria, IL. [Defendant] 
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was observed entering the driver seat of his vehicle and drive and meet the C/S. 

[Defendant] drove directly to the C/S (observed the entire time). [Defendant] exited his 

vehicle and met the C/S through the front passenger seat of the C/S vehicle for a brief 

time. [Defendant] then entered his vehicle and drove away. The C/S drove to a predetermined meet location to meet with Agents (observed entire time driving). The C/S 

gave me 0.48 grams of crack cocaine that was purchased with $60.00 USC/OAF. The 

C/S advised [defendant] arrived in his vehicle and exited. The C/S said [defendant] 

handed him/her the 0.48 grams of crack cocaine in exchange for the $60.00 USC/OAF. 

The crack cocaine was field tested with positive results for cocaine. The C/S was 

searched before and after the transaction and no illegal contraband was located.

The second occasion, with the last 72 hours, I again caused the same reliable 

confidential source to arrange for the purchase of crack cocaine from [defendant]. 

Agents met with the C/S at a pre-determined location and provided the C/S with $40.00 

USC/OAF. Agents followed the C/S to the predetermined buy location [in] Peoria, IL 

(observed entire time driving). Agents observed [defendant] leave the residence of 

3003 W. Proctor St, Peoria, IL. [Defendant] was observed to walk North through the 

yards to meet with the C/S at the buy location (observed the entire time). [Defendant] 

was observed entering the front passenger seat of the C/S vehicle. The C/S then drove 

a very short distance and [defendant] exited the C/S vehicle. [Defendant] was then 

observed walking back to the residence of 3003 W. Proctor St, Peoria, IL. The C/S 

drove to a pre-determined meet location to meet with Agents (observed the entire time 

driving). The C/S gave me 0.46 grams of crack cocaine that was purchased with $40.00 

USC/OAF. The C/S advised [defendant] arrived on foot and entered the front passenger 

seat of the C/S vehicle. The C/S said [defendant] had him/her drive a very short 

distance. The C/S said [defendant] handed him/her the 0.46 grams of crack cocaine in 

exchange for the $40.00 USC/OAF. The C/S advised [defendant] then exited the C/S 

vehicle and walked away. The crack cocaine was field tested with positive results for 

cocaine. The C/S was searched before and after the transaction and no illegal 

contraband was located.”

The complaint went on to attest to the basis for the reliability of the confidential source. It also 

detailed Fuller’s experience in narcotics trafficking and investigation. Fuller explained his 

awareness that drug traffickers often maintain, inter alia, “additional amounts of narcotics at 

their residences or other safe places for future sales.”

¶ 6 A hearing was held on the motion on December 15, 2016. The State argued that the 

complaint was sufficient to establish probable cause in part because “defendant was observed 

directly leaving his house and going to the location of the drug sale.” The State also asserted 

that the investigating officers otherwise acted in good faith in relying upon the search warrant.

¶ 7 In issuing its ruling, the court observed that defendant had exited from and returned to his 

home before and after a drug sale. It commented: “There was no information about why the 

Court or officer would think that drugs are in the home other than he has left his home and 

made a transaction on the street.” The court granted defendant’s motion, finding that the 

complaint for search warrant had been “bare bones.”

¶ 8 The State filed a motion to reconsider. In the motion, the State urged that even if the 

complaint for search warrant was insufficient, the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule 

should apply, such that the evidence seized in the case should not be suppressed at trial.
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¶ 9 Following a hearing on the motion, the court reiterated that the complaint had been bare 

bones, as it contained no nexus between defendant’s conduct and the potential for additional 

drugs to be found in the house. The court found, however, that the warrant had nevertheless 

been reasonably relied upon. It therefore found that the good faith exception applied and 

reversed its previous ruling on the motion to quash search warrant and suppress evidence.

¶ 10 Defendant proceeded by way of a stipulated bench trial. The stipulated evidence contained 

multiple references to 3003 West Proctor Street as defendant’s home or residence. The court 

found defendant guilty of unlawful possession with intent to deliver between 1 and 15 grams 

of cocaine and sentenced defendant to an agreed term of five years’ imprisonment.

¶ 11 II. ANALYSIS

¶ 12 On appeal, defendant argues that the court’s ultimate denial of his motion to quash search 

warrant and suppress evidence was erroneous. He maintains that the complaint for a search 

warrant failed to establish the probable cause required for its issuance. He also argues that the 

complaint was so insufficient that the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule may not be 

applied.

¶ 13 A. Probable Cause

¶ 14 The United States and Illinois Constitutions both require “that searches and seizures must 

be reasonable and that probable cause must support search warrants.” People v. Manzo, 2018 

IL 122761, ¶ 28. In determining whether probable cause exists to support a search warrant, a 

court must make a “practical, common-sense decision whether, given all the circumstances set 

forth in the affidavit before [it] ***, there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a 

crime will be found in a particular place.” Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983).

¶ 15 A court of review will not substitute its own judgment for that of the court that previously 

issued a search warrant. People v. McCarty, 223 Ill. 2d 109, 153 (2006). Rather, this court need 

only decide whether the warrant-issuing court had a “substantial basis” for concluding that 

probable cause existed. (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. A court of review will not defer 

to a warrant premised on a complaint that does not provide a substantial basis for probable 

cause. See People v. Sutherland, 223 Ill. 2d 187, 219 (2006).

¶ 16 The facts in the present case are strikingly similar to those set forth in our supreme court’s 

recent decision in Manzo, 2018 IL 122761. We find Manzo to be highly relevant here, nearly 

to the point of being controlling. Accordingly, our analysis must begin with a discussion of the 

court’s opinion in that case.

¶ 17 The complaint for search warrant in Manzo was targeted at Ruben Casillas, a black Ford 

Explorer, and the residence at 701 West Marion Street in Joliet. Id. ¶ 4. The defendant was not 

named in the complaint, but lived at that residence with Leticia Hernandez, Casillas’s cousin. 

Id. In the complaint, the swearing officer explained that he had purchased cocaine from Casillas 

three times in the prior 20 days, including twice “in the vicinity of 701 West Marion Street.” 

Id. ¶ 5.

¶ 18 Casillas arrived at the first of the three transactions in a black Ford Explorer that was 

registered to Hernandez. Id. ¶ 6. While an officer was texting Casillas to arrange the third 

transaction, other officers observed Casillas leaving the residence at 701 West Marion Street 

and proceeding directly to the arranged meeting location. Id. ¶ 8. The complaint included an 
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allegation that law enforcement records showed Casillas to be “an associate of Leticia 

Hernandez who resided at 701 West Marion Street in Joliet.” Id. ¶ 9. The warrant judge issued 

the warrant. Id. ¶ 10. The circuit court denied the defendant’s motion to quash the search 

warrant. Id. ¶¶ 18-19.

¶ 19 Our supreme court found that there was no substantial basis to conclude that probable cause 

existed to believe that contraband would be found in the residence.1 Id. ¶ 61. The court found 

that the facts found in the complaint failed “to establish a sufficient nexus between Casillas’s 

criminal activities and the residence at 701 West Marion Street,” in part because insufficient 

details connecting Casillas to Hernandez—and thus, the residence—had been provided. Id.

¶ 39. The court also rejected the notion that the proximity of the residence to the first two 

transactions supported an inference that the residence was a reasonable place for Casillas to 

store drugs. Id. ¶¶ 42-43. To that point, the court wrote:

“No evidence was presented that defendant lived at 701 West Marion Street, nor was 

there evidence that Casillas was a frequent visitor to 701 West Marion Street. Casillas 

was seen at 701 West Marion Street one time. The affidavit did not specify defendant’s 

legal address, although the complaint stated that Officer Harrison had identified 

Casillas from his Illinois Secretary of State driver’s license. It is possible Casillas also 

lived in the neighborhood and, for that reason, was familiar with the area.” Id. ¶ 43.

¶ 20 Especially relevant to the instant matter, the State in Manzo insisted that the fact that 

Casillas left the residence at 701 West Marion Street and proceeded directly to the third 

transaction served to support the inference that additional drugs were stored at the residence. 

Id. ¶ 47. In rejecting that inference, the court wrote:

“The three drug sales took place over a period of 19 days. With regard to the third drug 

sale, there was no evidence indicating how long Casillas had been at defendant’s home 

before he left the home and walked to the drug sale. While Casillas apparently had the 

drugs on his person when he left 701 West Marion Street to meet Officer Harrison for 

the third drug sale, it does not follow that Casillas obtained those drugs from 

defendant’s home as opposed to any other place. Without more information connecting 

defendant’s home to the drug sale, it is equally possible to infer that Casillas had the 

drugs on his person when he arrived at defendant’s home.” Id. ¶ 48.

¶ 21 Finally, the State in Manzo contended that each of Casillas’s deliveries to the undercover 

officer occurred on the same day as the officer’s request. Id. ¶ 50. It maintained that this “ability 

to produce drugs soon after receiving a request for them suggests he has a ready supply and 

that a drug dealer who has participated in multiple drug sales is far likelier to have access to 

large quantities of drugs and other tools of the trade.” Id. Again, the court rejected that 

argument. Id. ¶ 51. The court wrote:

“The facts and inferences as set forth in Officer Harrison’s sworn complaint were more 

suggestive of an occasional sale than a full-scale drug operation, much less a drug 

operation run out of defendant’s home. There was no allegation in the complaint that 

the amount of drugs sold to Officer Harrison was indicative of a large-scale drug 

operation, nor was there an allegation that Casillas was a known drug dealer. Even 

assuming Casillas had access to a ready supply of drugs, the sworn complaint fails to 

1

A divided panel of this court had affirmed the circuit court’s denial of the motion to quash the 

search warrant. People v. Manzo, 2017 IL App (3d) 150264, ¶ 24.
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create a nexus between defendant’s home and that supply. There certainly was no 

evidence in the sworn complaint supporting an inference that defendant’s home was a 

‘stash house.’ ” Id.

¶ 22 The complaint for a search warrant in the present case provides even less of a substantial 

basis for probable cause than did the facts in Manzo.

¶ 23 Among the biggest issues with the complaint in this case is the complete failure to establish 

the time that the first transaction occurred. While the complaint stated that the second 

transaction had occurred within the 72 hours prior to the filing of the complaint itself, all that 

is known of the first transaction is that it occurred at some unknown point in the past. The 

doctrine of staleness prevents law enforcement from relying upon old or outdated information 

in establishing probable cause. See People v. Beck, 306 Ill. App. 3d 172, 179 (1999) 

(“ ‘Staleness’ refers to the amount of time that has elapsed between the facts alleged in the 

affidavit in support of the search warrant and issuance of the warrant.”). Where simply no 

information is provided regarding when an activity took place, however, neither this court nor 

any other court is able to conduct a staleness analysis. Under these circumstances, it is difficult 

to ascribe any probative value to the first transaction. It could have happened the day before 

the second transaction. It could have happened a decade earlier.2

¶ 24 Also problematic is the lack of connection in the complaint between defendant himself and 

the residence at 3003 West Proctor Street. At no point does the complaint, either explicitly or 

implicitly, state that defendant lived at 3003 West Proctor Street. The complaint never even 

refers to that residence in the possessive, such as “defendant’s residence” or “his residence.” 

While the complaint explains that officers were observing defendant as he left the house, there 

is no explanation for how the officers knew he was there or how he came to be there. There 

was nothing in the complaint to indicate that defendant had anything more than a passing 

familiarity with the residence in question. At most—including the unknown-in-time first 

transaction—the complaint establishes that defendant has been to the residence at 3003 West 

Proctor Street twice in his life. See Manzo, 2018 IL 122761, ¶ 43 (“No evidence was presented 

that defendant lived at 701 West Marion Street, nor was there evidence that Casillas was a 

frequent visitor to 701 West Marion Street.”).

¶ 25 To be sure, a judge issuing a search warrant is entitled to draw reasonable inferences from 

the complaint. People v. Moser, 356 Ill. App. 3d 900, 908 (2005). However, the complaint here 

contained no information from which that inference could be reasonably drawn. See Black’s 

Law Dictionary 897 (10th ed. 2014) (defining inference as “[a] conclusion reached by 

considering other facts and deducing a logical consequence from them”). The conclusion that 

defendant lived at 3003 West Proctor Street would be nothing more than an assumption. We 

recognize that the stipulated trial evidence established that defendant did, in fact, live at the 

address in question. That fact, however, does not impact our analysis. “[P]robable cause exists 

in a particular case when the totality of the facts and circumstances within the affiant’s 

knowledge at the time the warrant is applied for” allow a person of reasonable caution to 

believe contraband will be found on the premises in question. (Emphasis added.) Manzo, 2018 

2

We note that, in any event, defendant’s entry into his vehicle prior to the first transaction tends to 

undermine the nexus between that transaction and the residence, as it raises the equal possibility that 

defendant kept drugs in the vehicle.
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IL 122761, ¶ 29. If Fuller knew that defendant lived at 3003 West Proctor Street, he never 

conveyed that information to the court. 

¶ 26 Next, the complaint in the present case contained no information concerning the passage 

of time between the arrangement of the drug transactions and their actual execution. In other 

words, once the confidential source arranged to purchase drugs from defendant, it is unknown 

whether weeks, days, hours, or mere moments passed before the confidential source actually 

met with defendant. Such a time frame would be highly relevant in potentially connecting 

defendant to the residence at 3003 West Proctor Street; the greater the passage of time between 

arrangement and execution, the greater the potential that defendant retrieved the drugs from 

any of innumerable places prior to leaving the residence to conduct the transaction. On that 

same point, the complaint fails to detail how long officers were positioned in surveillance on 

defendant at 3003 West Proctor Street.

¶ 27 Of course, that fact stands in stark contrast to the facts set forth in Manzo. In that case, the 

complaint stated that the transactions had occurred on the same day as the request for drugs. 

The State argued that that immediacy lended itself to an inference that Casillas had a “ready 

supply.” Id. ¶ 50. Of course, the Manzo court rejected that argument: “Even assuming Casillas 

had access to a ready supply of drugs, the sworn complaint fails to create a nexus between 

defendant’s home and that supply.” Id. ¶ 51. Here there are no facts to imply that defendant 

had any such sort of “ready supply.”

¶ 28 The crux of the State’s argument, both on appeal and below, is that defendant twice left 

3003 West Proctor Street to sell drugs and that must give rise to an inference that he kept his 

drugs there. But the Manzo court rejected such an inference. To reiterate, the Manzo court 

wrote:

“[T]here was no evidence indicating how long Casillas had been at defendant’s home 

before he left the home and walked to the drug sale. While Casillas apparently had the 

drugs on his person when he left 701 West Marion Street to meet Officer Harrison for 

the third drug sale, it does not follow that Casillas obtained those drugs from 

defendant’s home as opposed to any other place. Without more information connecting 

defendant’s home to the drug sale, it is equally possible to infer that Casillas had the 

drugs on his person when he arrived at defendant’s home.” Id. ¶ 48.

That same passage applies with equal force to the present case. The complaint contained no 

evidence indicating how long defendant had been at 3003 West Proctor Street prior to leaving 

to sell drugs. While defendant must have had the drugs on his person when he walked to the 

second transaction, it does not follow that he obtained those drugs from the residence as 

opposed to any other place. To be sure, we do not doubt that a sufficient pattern of leaving the 

same house to attend drug transactions may give rise to probable cause to search that house. 

Here, however, defendant left the residence in question one reliable time to sell drugs. See 

supra ¶ 24. This does not create a nexus between the drugs and that residence.

¶ 29 Finally, we note that the Manzo court’s observation with regard to the amount of drugs sold 

also applies in this case. The Manzo court wrote:

“The facts and inferences as set forth in Officer Harrison’s sworn complaint were more 

suggestive of an occasional sale than a full-scale drug operation, much less a drug 

operation run out of defendant’s home. There was no allegation in the complaint that 

the amount of drugs sold to Officer Harrison was indicative of a large-scale drug 
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operation, nor was there an allegation that Casillas was a known drug dealer.” Manzo, 

2018 IL 122761, ¶ 51.

In making its point, the Manzo court expressly adopted the view of the Sixth Circuit Court of 

Appeals: “[T]he sale of drugs out of a residence ‘exists upon a continuum ranging from an 

individual who effectuates the occasional sale from his or her personal holdings of drugs to 

known acquaintances, to an organized group operating an established and notorious drug 

den.’ ” Id. (quoting United States v. Hython, 443 F.3d 480, 485 (6th Cir. 2006)).

¶ 30 Similarly, all that was established in this case was that defendant sold drugs one time 

recently, and another time in the unknown past. While the complaint did state that the two 

transactions were for 0.48 and 0.46 grams of crack cocaine, it did nothing to contextualize that 

information. Nor did the complaint allege that defendant was a known drug dealer. In short, as 

in Manzo, nothing in the complaint tended to establish that defendant was running a drug 

operation of the magnitude where he would be expected to have some sort of stored supply, as 

opposed to simply dealing out of his “personal holdings.” See Hython, 443 F.3d at 485.

¶ 31 Our supreme court in Manzo found that a substantial basis for probable cause did not exist, 

and our determination can be no different here. However, our finding that there was not a 

substantial basis for probable cause supporting the search at 3003 West Proctor Street does not 

end our review. We must next consider whether the good faith exception to the exclusionary 

rule applies.

¶ 32 B. Good Faith Exception

¶ 33 In United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984), the United States Supreme Court recognized 

a good faith exception to the exclusionary rule. Under this doctrine, evidence illegally seized 

need not be suppressed at trial where officers acted in good faith reliance on a search warrant 

that was subsequently found to have not been supported by probable cause. Id. at 922. The 

Leon Court also found that the good faith exception would be inapplicable where a search 

warrant was issued based on an affidavit or complaint “ ‘so lacking in indicia of probable cause 

as to render official belief in its existence entirely unreasonable.’ ” Id. at 923 (quoting Brown 

v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 610-11 (1975) (Powell, J., concurring in part, joined by Rehnquist, 

J.)).

¶ 34 Illinois has codified the good faith exception in subsections 114-12(b)(1) and (b)(2) of the 

Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (Code) (725 ILCS 5/114-12(b)(1), (b)(2) (West 2016)). 

Section 114-12(b)(1) provides that a court should not suppress otherwise admissible evidence 

if a police officer seized that evidence in good faith. Id. § 114-12(b)(1). Section 114-

12(b)(2)(i), in turn, defines good faith:

“(2) ‘Good faith’ means whenever a peace officer obtains evidence:

(i) pursuant to a search or an arrest warrant obtained from a neutral and detached 

judge, which warrant is free from obvious defects other than non-deliberate errors 

in preparation and contains no material misrepresentation by any agent of the State, 

and the officer reasonably believed the warrant to be valid[.]” Id. § 114-12(b)(2)(i).

¶ 35 Notably, the Manzo court held that the complaint in that case was so lacking as to fall 

outside the scope of the good faith exception. Manzo, 2018 IL 122761, ¶ 69 (“[W]e ***find 

that the affidavit in this case was bare-bones and failed to establish the required minimal nexus 

between defendant’s home and the items sought in the search warrant.”). The court observed 
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that the statements in the complaint were “completely devoid of facts to support Officer 

Harrison’s judgment that probable cause to search defendant’s home existed.” Id.

¶ 36 As we have noted, the present complaint presented even less of a basis for probable cause 

than did the complaint in Manzo. The complaint here presented such a lack of indicia of 

probable cause that official belief in the existence of probable cause for the search was entirely 

unreasonable. Leon, 468 U.S. at 923. We therefore find the good faith exception inapplicable 

here.

¶ 37 In reaching this conclusion, we are compelled to point out that the complaint was, in the 

terms employed by the Code, not free from obvious errors. See 725 ILCS 5/114-12(b)(2)(i) 

(West 2016). In fact, the errors and omissions detailed above were fundamental in nature. The 

complaint failed to state defendant’s relationship to the residence to be searched. It failed to 

detail how much time passed between arrangement of the drug deals and the execution. It failed 

to provide any significant details concerning defendant’s actions before or after the 

transactions, which might tend to connect him to the residence. It failed to even state when one 

of the two transactions took place. These were not minor, technical errors or omissions. They 

were fundamental facts needed to establish a nexus between defendant and the residence. See 

Manzo, 2018 IL 122761, ¶ 69.

¶ 38 Where a search warrant is unsupported by probable cause, and the good faith exception to 

the exclusionary rule does not apply, the fruits of the search based on that warrant must be 

suppressed at trial. We therefore reverse the circuit court’s ruling on defendant’s motion to 

quash search warrant and suppress evidence. As a result, we also vacate defendant’s conviction 

for unlawful possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver and remand the matter 

for further proceedings. See id. ¶ 73.

¶ 39 III. CONCLUSION

¶ 40 The judgment of the circuit court of Peoria County is reversed in part, vacated in part, and 

remanded for further proceedings.

¶ 41 Reversed in part, vacated in part, and remanded for further proceedings.