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Supreme Court

No. 2023-161-Appeal.

(NC 19-464)

Cynthia A. Bell :

v. :

Katy A. McLaughlin et al. :

O R D E R

This case arises out of an arbitration hearing on claims for negligence brought

by the plaintiff, Cynthia A. Bell. The plaintiff now appeals from an order denying 

her motion to vacate an arbitration award in the amount of $15,000 in her favor and 

a separate order granting the motion of the defendants, Katy A. McLaughlin1and 

Daniel R. Pierce, to confirm the award. This Court directed the parties to appear and 

show cause why the issues raised in this appeal should not be summarily decided. 

After carefully reviewing the record, we conclude that cause has not been shown and 

that this case may be decided without further briefing or argument. For the reasons 

set forth herein, we deny and dismiss the plaintiff’s appeal. 

On November 27, 2019, plaintiff filed a complaint in Newport County 

Superior Court naming Katy A. McLaughlin, Daniel R. Pierce, John Griffin, 

Bernadette M. Griffin, John Doe, and Jane Doe as defendants. The plaintiff alleged 

1 The record is inconsistent as to the spelling of Katy A. McLaughlin’s last name. 

We utilize the spelling that appears in the complaint. No disrespect is intended. 
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that, on January 10, 2017, a vehicle operated by McLaughlin and owned by Pierce 

collided with a vehicle operated by Griffin, which in turn collided with plaintiff’s 

vehicle. The plaintiff contended that, as a result of defendants’ negligence, she 

sustained injuries, experienced and continued to experience pain and suffering, 

incurred medical costs, and sustained a loss of wages and/or earning capacity. She 

sought “any other damages recoverable under the full extent of the law.” 

After the named defendants filed answers to plaintiff’s complaint, plaintiff, 

McLaughlin, and Pierce voluntarily entered into binding arbitration, pursuant to G.L. 

1956 § 10-3-2.2 The arbitrator ultimately awarded plaintiff $15,000, plus interest. 

The plaintiff thereafter filed a motion to vacate the arbitration award in Newport 

County Superior Court in the context of the litigation previously filed against all

defendants. She argued that the arbitrator had “exceeded his powers by taking 

[j]udicial [n]otice that Dr. [John] Kripsak ‘did not have an accurate understanding 

of the plaintiff’s prior medical history.’” 

2 General Laws 1956 § 10-3-2 provides in relevant part:

“When clearly written and expressed, * * * an agreement 

in writing between two (2) or more persons to submit to 

arbitration any controversy existing between them at the 

time of the agreement to submit shall be valid, irrevocable, 

and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or 

in equity for the revocation of any contract * * *.”
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In response, defendants McLaughlin and Pierce filed an objection to the 

motion to vacate the arbitration award; they also filed a motion to confirm the 

arbitration award. In their supporting memorandum, these defendants asserted that 

the arbitrator “never took judicial notice” of the fact that “Dr. Kripsak did not have 

an accurate understanding of the [p]laintiff’s prior medical history,” and merely 

“relied on the evidence before him in rendering his award.” The defendants 

McLaughlin and Pierce claimed that the arbitrator “simply did not find Dr. Kripsak’s 

letter” persuasive, “for very good reasons which he clearly enumerate[d] in his 

decision.” 

 A hearing on the motions was held on March 31, 2023, wherein the hearing 

justice ultimately denied plaintiff’s motion to vacate the award and granted 

defendants McLaughlin and Pierces’ motion to confirm the award.3 Orders granting

the motion to confirm the arbitration award and denying the motion to vacate the 

arbitration award were entered on April 6, 2023. The plaintiff filed a notice of appeal 

that same day. No partial final judgment has been entered pursuant to Rule 54(b) of 

the Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure, nor have any of the parties moved for 

entry of such judgment. 

3 McLaughlin and Pierce had also moved for sanctions pursuant to Rule 11 of the 

Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure, which the hearing justice denied despite 

noting that plaintiff’s argument for vacating the arbitration award “had no legs 

whatsoever” and “really was a stretch.”
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After the prebriefing conference was held before a single justice of this Court, 

an order entered, directing that, among other things:

“1. The case is remanded for the sole purpose of the 

Superior Court considering a motion for entry of partial 

final judgment pursuant to Rule 54(b) of the Superior 

Court Rules of Civil Procedure. The record shall remain 

on remand for a period not to exceed sixty (60) days and 

it shall be returned to this Court at the conclusion of such 

period, or upon the Superior Court’s resolution of the 

matter enumerated herein, whichever shall occur sooner.

“2. If the Superior Court denies the motion for entry of 

partial final judgment, the appellant is directed to show 

cause in writing why this appeal should not be dismissed 

within twenty (20) days of the record being returned to this 

Court.

“3. If the Superior Court grants the motion for entry of 

partial final judgment, upon return to this Court, the case 

is assigned to the show cause calendar. The parties are 

directed to appear before this Court on a date to be selected 

in order to show cause why the issues raised by this appeal 

should not be decided without further briefing and 

argument.” (Emphasis omitted.) 

The case was returned to this Court following the remand, but no partial final 

judgment was moved for, considered, or entered. A conditional order of dismissal 

was then entered pursuant to Article I, Rule 18A of the Supreme Court Rules of 

Appellate Procedure, which directed, in relevant part, that: 

“[T]he above-referenced appeal is hereby dismissed for 

failure to file a show cause statement as to why the appeal 

should not be dismissed as provided in this Court’s order 

dated 10/18/2023. 
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“This Order will be vacated and the appeal reinstated if the 

appellant’s supplemental statement is filed on or before 

3/1/2024.” 

The plaintiff filed a supplemental statement on February 28, 2024, asserting that the 

hearing justice had “entered an order of final judgment with regards to Ms. Bell’s 

claim against Ms. McLaughlin and Mr. Pierce on October 26, 2023,” but that it had 

“[i]nadvertently * * * never been scanned into the portal.” An order was 

subsequently entered by this Court stating:

“The [plaintiff] has filed a ‘Supplemental Statement’ with 

this Court indicating that an order entering partial final 

judgment was signed by a Superior Court justice but was 

inadvertently not docketed. For that reason, this matter 

shall be remanded to the Superior Court solely for the 

purpose of the Superior Court entering the consent 

judgment signed by a justice of that court on October 26, 

2023 into the record. The Superior Court may not exceed 

the scope of this remand order.” (Emphasis added.) 

On remand, a “Consent Judgment” dated October 26, 2023, was then entered into 

the record, and the case was returned to this Court. 

Rule 54(b) of the Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure provides, in 

relevant part, that:

“[W]hen multiple parties are involved, the court may 

direct the entry of a final judgment as to one (1) or more 

but fewer than all of the claims or parties only upon an 

express determination that there is no just reason for delay 

and upon an express direction for the entry of judgment. 

In the absence of such determination and direction, any 

order or other form of decision, however designated, 

which adjudicates fewer than all the claims or the rights 
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and liabilities of fewer than all the parties shall not 

terminate the action as to any of the claims or parties, and 

the order or other form of decision is subject to revision at 

any time before the entry of judgment adjudicating all the 

claims and the rights and liabilities of all the parties.” 

(Emphasis added.)

“This Court has clearly stated that ‘the purpose of Rule 54(b) is to avoid piecemeal 

appeals.’” Mateo v. Davidson Media Group Rhode Island Stations, LLC, 310 A.3d 

861, 865 (R.I. 2024) (brackets omitted) (quoting Astro-Med, Inc. v. R. Moroz, Ltd., 

811 A.2d 1154, 1156 (R.I. 2002)). “This policy ‘militates in favor of delaying 

judgment until all claims involving all parties are ripe for disposition and entering 

judgment as to all only when that time arrives.’” Id. (quoting Astro-Med, Inc., 811 

A.2d at 1156). 

In the case at bar, the arbitration and resulting award involved only two of the 

several named defendants, and yet no partial final judgment pursuant to Rule 54(b) 

was ever entered. See Napier v. Epoch Corporation, 971 A.2d 594, 598 (R.I. 2009) 

(“When fewer than all of the claims in a case have been adjudicated, the trial court 

may direct the entry of final judgment as to those claims, but only upon an express 

determination that there is no just reason for delay and upon an express direction for 

the entry of judgment.” (brackets omitted and emphasis added) (quoting Small

Business Loan Fund Corp. v. Loft, 734 A.2d 953, 954 (R.I. 1998))). Furthermore,

plaintiff did not follow this Court’s directive to remand the case “for the sole purpose 

of the Superior Court considering a motion for entry of partial final judgment 
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pursuant to Rule 54(b) of the Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure.” Indeed, the 

“Consent Judgment” does not comport with the standard set forth in Rule 54(b) and 

by this Court. See Mateo, 310 A.3d at 865. The plaintiff did not move for partial 

final judgment nor did the hearing justice consider such a motion. Simply put, the 

hearing justice did not provide the necessary “express determination that there is no

just reason for delay” of the entry of partial final judgment or “an express direction 

for the entry of judgment.” Super. R. Civ. P. 54(b). 

Without a partial final judgment entered pursuant to Rule 54(b), the issues 

raised in the plaintiff’s appeal are not properly before us. 

Accordingly, we deny and dismiss the plaintiff’s appeal. The record shall be 

returned to the Superior Court.

Entered as an Order of this Court this day of June, 2024.

By Order,

____________________________ 

Clerk
SU-CMS-02B (revised November 2022)

STATE OF RHODE ISLAND

SUPREME COURT – CLERK’S OFFICE

Licht Judicial Complex

250 Benefit Street

Providence, RI 02903

ORDER COVER SHEET

Title of Case Cynthia A. Bell v. Katy A. McLaughlin et al.

Case Number No. 2023-161-Appeal.

(NC 19-464)

Date Order Filed June 21, 2024

Justices Suttell, C.J., Goldberg, Robinson, Lynch Prata, and 

Long, JJ.

Source of Appeal Newport County Superior Court 

Judicial Officer from Lower Court Associate Justice Maureen B. Keough

Attorney(s) on Appeal

For Plaintiff:

Ronald J. Resmini, Esq.

For Defendants:

Brian T. Dougan, Esq.