assert an offset when agreeing to reopen part of respondent's claim in 

2003. 

In 2012, after denying further requests to reopen respondent's 

claim, Sierra Nevada Administrators (SNA) notified respondent that it 

was asserting a full offset against respondent's net recovery from the 1998 

settlement and thus was ceasing any benefit payment until respondent 

demonstrated that she had exhausted her net recovery amount. 

Respondent administratively appealed that determination, arguing that 

the 14-year delay in asserting the offset barred SNA's subrogation lien. 

The appeals officer disagreed, finding that laches did not bar the lien 

because the delay was not intentional, the delay did not constitute 

acquiescence to waiving the lien, and respondent was not prejudiced by 

the delay. The district court, however, granted respondent's petition for 

judicial review and reversed the appeals officer's decision, finding that 

laches did bar the lien. Appellant Telecheck Services, Inc., respondent's 

employer at the time of injury and to whose account respondent's benefits 

were charged, appealed the district court's order. Having considered the 

parties' arguments and the appendix, we now reverse. 

An appeals officer's determination regarding the application of 

laches is a fact-based determination to which the court gives deference. 

See Modjeski v. Fed. Bakery of Winona, Inc., 240 N.W.2d 542, 546 (Minn. 

1976) (explaining that laches is primarily a factual, not legal, 

determination); see also Vredenburg v. Sedgwick CMS, 124 Nev. 553, 557, 

188 P.3d 1084, 1087 (2008) (explaining that the appeals officer's fact-based 

decisions will not be disturbed if they are supported by substantial 

evidence). SNA had the statutory right to subrogate against respondent's 

settlement proceeds, and respondent's workers' compensation benefits 

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"must be reduced by the amount of damages recovered" from the thirdparty tortfeasor. NRS 616C.215(2)(a). 

In asserting laches, assuming for the purposes of this appeal 

that it applies, see Thompson v. Workers' Comp. Appeal Bd., 781 A.2d 

1146, 1151-54 (Pa. 2001) (concluding that absent deliberate, bad faith 

conduct by the employer, the right to subrogation is automatic and 

absolute), respondent had the burden to demonstrate that she was 

prejudiced by the delay. Miller v. Burk, 124 Nev. 579, 598, 188 P.3d 1112, 

1125 (2008) (noting that the applicability of laches depends on the facts of 

the case and explaining that the court looks at whether the delay was 

inexcusable, whether the delay constitutes acquiescence to the condition 

being challenged, and whether the inexcusable delay was prejudicial to 

others); Muir v. C.R. Bard, Inc., 519 S.E.2d 583, 599 (S.C. Ct. App. 1999) 

(noting that the person claiming laches bears the burden to show its 

applicability). Here, the record does not contain any evidence that 

respondent was prejudiced by the delay. Respondent's contention that she 

would have kept receipts for her treatment in order to apply them against 

any offset does not demonstrate prejudice because she has not shown that 

she received any treatment related to her claim that was not covered by 

her workers' compensation claim. Indeed, her lumbar reopening request 

was granted and all others were denied as not meeting the statutory 

requirements. Thus, because substantial evidence supported the appeals 

officer's decision, there was no basis for the district court to make new 

factual determinations and reverse the appeals officer's conclusion that 

laches did not apply. See Vredenburg v. Sedgwick CMS, 124 Nev. 553, 557 

& n.4, 188 P.3d 1084, 1087 & n.4 (2008) (defining substantial evidence); 

see also NRS 233B.135(3) (setting forth the standard of review); Nellis 

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Motors v. State, Dep't of Motor Vehicles, 124 Nev. 1263, 1269-70,197 P.3d 

1061, 1066 (2008) (explaining that neither this court nor the district court 

will reweigh the evidence, reassess witness credibility, or substitute our 

judgment for that of the appeals officer on questions of fact). Accordingly, 

the district court erred in granting respondent's petition for judicial 

review, and we 

ORDER the judgment of the district court REVERSED 

Cf9.4 _, J. 

Parraguirre 

cc: Hon. Jessie Elizabeth Walsh, District Judge 

Janet Trost, Settlement Judge 

Lewis Brisbois Bisgaard & Smith, LLP/Las Vegas 

Nevada Attorney for Injured Workers/Las Vegas 

Eighth District Court Clerk 

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