Filed 11/22/23 Conservatorship of M.C. CA2/3

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

Conservatorship of the Person of 

M.C.

B327027

Los Angeles County

LOS ANGELES COUNTY Super. Ct. No. ZE042938

OFFICE OF THE PUBLIC 

GUARDIAN, as Conservator, etc.,

Petitioner and Respondent,

v.

M.C.,

Objector and Appellant.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of 

Los Angeles County. Ronald Owen Kaye, Judge. Affirmed.

Gerald J. Miller, under appointment by the Court 

of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, 

Chief Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, 
2

Assistant Attorney General, Steven D. Matthews and Michael J. 

Wise, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

_________________________

M.C. was charged with murder and declared incompetent 

to stand trial. The Los Angeles County Office of the Public 

Guardian (the Public Guardian) petitioned for appointment

as a Murphy conservator. At trial on the petition, the Public 

Guardian presented evidence that M.C. suffers from delusions, 

some of which involve violence against others. The jury 

found M.C. presents a substantial danger to others by 

reason of a mental disorder, and the court imposed a Murphy 

conservatorship. On appeal, M.C. argues the jury’s verdict 

is not supported by substantial evidence, the court erroneously

admitted his testimony from a prior trial, and the court should 

have declared a mistrial. We reject M.C.’s arguments and affirm. 

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

1. The murder charges

In December 2016, M.C. allegedly killed a man by 

repeatedly stabbing him in the chest with a pair of scissors. 

M.C. was 65 years old at the time. The People charged M.C. 

with murder, but a court found he was incompetent to stand trial. 

M.C. was admitted to Patton State Hospital (Patton), and a court 

issued an order for involuntary medication.

2. The Murphy conservatorship

In August 2018, the Public Guardian filed a petition 

for appointment as a Murphy conservator. A Murphy 

conservatorship is a type of civil commitment for gravely 

disabled individuals who are incompetent to stand trial on 

charges involving death or great bodily harm. (Welf. & Inst. 

Code, § 5361, subd. (a); see Conservatorship of A.A. (2022) 
3

84 Cal.App.5th 66, 68.)

1 After a bench trial, the court found M.C. 

met the criteria for a Murphy conservatorship and appointed 

the Public Guardian as his conservator for a one-year term.

About a month before the end of the conservatorship, 

the Public Guardian filed a petition for re-appointment. At 

M.C.’s request, the case was tried to a jury in December 2021. 

M.C. testified on his own behalf. The jury found M.C. qualified 

for a Murphy conservatorship, and the court reappointed the 

Public Guardian as his conservator.

3. The present trial

The Public Guardian filed another request for 

reappointment, and the case was tried to a jury in 2022. At 

the trial, the parties stipulated that M.C. had a pending charge 

for violating Penal Code section 187, subdivision (a), a court 

found probable cause for the charge, and M.C. was found 

mentally incompetent to stand trial in that case. The only issue 

for the jury to decide was whether M.C. represents a substantial 

danger of physical harm to others by reason of a mental disease, 

defect, or disorder.

a. M.C.’s prior testimony

Over M.C.’s objection, the court allowed the Public 

Guardian to introduce into evidence portions of M.C.’s testimony 

from the December 2021 jury trial. The testimony included 

M.C.’s account of the incident that led to the murder charge. 

M.C. testified he was sleeping under a bridge when the 

victim struck him in the head five times with “steel nunchuks.” 

The victim said he would be back to kill M.C. because he “ ‘hate[s] 

Mexicans.’ ” M.C. grabbed a pair of sewing scissors to protect 

1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare 

and Institutions Code.
4

himself. The victim tried to punch M.C., but M.C. blocked the 

punch and stabbed the victim.

According to M.C., at that point, an “eight-foot tall tornado 

came in like Star Trek in the T.V.” From the “whirlwind,” a man 

named Hector stepped out of colored vapors and accused the 

victim of stealing his money. Hector took out a knife and stabbed 

the victim 12 or 13 times, but it did not kill him. M.C. said 

the victim “was in perfect health,” not injured at all, and now 

runs a liquor store in Atwater Village.

M.C. testified that he had been hospitalized four times 

in the past. He also claimed he had been wrongly convicted of 

assault with a deadly weapon for breaking a man’s hand with 

a tree branch. M.C. seemed to believe the People accused him 

of harming the victim using a photograph of the tree branch, 

rather than the branch itself.

b. M.C.’s treating psychiatrist

The Public Guardian presented testimony from M.C.’s 

treating psychiatrist at Patton, Jasdeep Aulakh. According 

to Aulakh, M.C. had been diagnosed with schizoaffective 

disorder, bipolar type. His symptoms include disorganized 

thought processes, manic episodes, “odd, bizarre, kind of 

grandiose delusions, and persecutory thoughts.” Among other 

delusions, M.C. claimed to be a multi-star general in the military, 

a law professor, and the owner of a baseball team.

Aulakh prescribed M.C. an atypical anti-psychotic 

medication at twice the maximum dosage that would be 

administered in an outpatient setting. Despite the medication, 

M.C. continued to suffer delusions and his mental health had 

not improved.

Aulakh testified that M.C. initially refused to allow staff 

to draw his blood to monitor his health and confirm he was 

taking his medication. After the hospital obtained a court order 
5

allowing staff to do so, M.C. agreed to give one vial of blood 

at a time, which was significantly less than Aulakh needed. 

Nevertheless, Aulakh did not press the issue because he did not 

want a confrontation with M.C., which he feared could place 

hospital staff in danger.

Aulakh reported that M.C. had recently fallen after a chair 

he was sitting in collapsed. For a “brief period of time” after the

fall, M.C. used a walker and wheelchair. Since then, he had been 

walking “really well with a stable gait.” Aulakh described M.C. 

as “quite able-bodied” and considered him a physical threat. 

Nevertheless, Patton staff designated M.C. a “fall risk” and 

placed him in the hospital’s “frail unit.”

According to Aulakh, M.C. had not had any physical 

altercations with other patients or staff at Patton. Aulakh 

explained that, because M.C. is physically imposing, the staff 

tried to avoid confrontations with him. Also, the staff who cared 

for him were trained to minimize the risks of confrontations

with patients.

Aulakh opined it is “[h]ighly unlikely” that M.C. would 

comply with a medicine regiment outside the structured 

environment of Patton. He explained that M.C. claims he 

does not suffer from schizoaffective disorder and believes he 

does not need medication.

c. The Public Guardian’s expert

In addition to M.C.’s treating physician, the Public 

Guardian presented expert testimony from a psychiatrist, Gordon 

Plotkin. Plotkin interviewed M.C. five times and performed 

a psychiatric evaluation of him. Plotkin agreed with M.C.’s 

treating physician that M.C. suffers from schizoaffective disorder, 

bipolar type.

Plotkin testified that M.C.’s symptoms include 

hallucinations, delusions, disorganized thinking, and 
6

disorganized speech. Among other delusions, M.C. claimed 

he is the highest-ranking official in the military, a prosecutor 

in Monte Carlo, and a supreme court justice. He said he has 

authority to have people executed and the governor might ask 

him to murder someone. M.C. believed he would be shielded 

legally because of his military work.

Plotkin explained that schizoaffective disorder is a lifelong 

condition that cannot be cured, but it can be managed with 

anti-psychotic and mood stabilizing medications. The keys to 

managing M.C.’s condition are medication compliance and insight 

into mental illness. M.C. had no insight whatsoever into his 

symptoms and illness, despite having been hospitalized many 

times. M.C. told Plotkin he would stop taking his medication 

if given the choice because he would be better off without it.

Plotkin opined that M.C. presents a substantial danger 

of physical harm to others due to his mental illness. In support, 

he pointed to the fact that M.C. experiences delusions that 

drive him to commit violent acts.

Plotkin acknowledged that M.C. had not had any recent

violent incidents, had been compliant with his medication, and 

was considered a “fall risk.” Plotkin explained those facts did 

not change his opinion concerning M.C.’s dangerousness because 

they were “environment dependent.” Plotkin noted that, since 

2019, M.C. had been living in a high-security facility where 

he was closely supervised by forensically trained staff. He 

also noted that M.C. was considered a fall risk during a time

he was “over-medicated.”

4. Verdict and appeal

After deliberating for less than an hour, the jury found 

M.C. represents a substantial danger of physical harm to others 

by reason of a mental disease, defect, or disorder. It also found 
7

M.C. qualifies for a Murphy conservatorship. M.C. timely 

appealed.

DISCUSSION

1. Relevant law and standard of review

“The Lanterman-Petris-Short Act (Welf. & Inst. Code, 

§ 5000 et seq. . . .) authorizes the creation of renewable one-year 

conservatorships for persons who are gravely disabled as a result 

of a mental disorder.” (People v. Quiroz (2016) 244 Cal.App.4th 

1371, 1375–1376.) As relevant to this case, a person is “gravely 

disabled” if (1) the person has a pending felony case involving 

death or great bodily harm to another; (2) there has been 

a finding of probable cause at a preliminary examination; 

(3) as a result of a mental-health disorder, the person is unable 

to understand the nature and purpose of the proceedings 

against him and to assist counsel in his defense; and (4) the 

person represents a substantial danger of physical harm 

to others by reason of a mental disease, defect, or disorder. 

(§ 5008, subd. (h)(1)(B)(i)–(iv).) A conservatorship imposed 

under this definition of “ ‘gravely disabled’ ” is commonly referred 

to as a “ ‘ “Murphy conservatorship.” ’ ” (Quiroz, at p. 1376.)

A Murphy conservatorship automatically terminates 

after one year. (§ 5361, subd. (a).) If the conservator determines 

the conservatorship is still required beyond that period, the 

conservator may petition the superior court for reappointment 

for an additional one-year period. (Id., subd. (b).) 

A court may impose a Murphy conservatorship over a 

person only if the petitioner proves, beyond a reasonable doubt, 

the person is gravely disabled. (Conservatorship of Murphy 

(1982) 134 Cal.App.3d 15, 17–18 (Murphy).) 

2. Substantial evidence supports the jury’s verdict

M.C. challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting 

the jury’s verdict.
8

We review a jury’s verdict in a Murphy conservatorship 

case for substantial evidence. (Murphy, supra, 134 Cal.App.3d 

at p. 18.) Under this familiar standard, we review the entire 

record in the light most favorable to the verdict to determine 

whether it contains substantial evidence—that is, evidence 

that is reasonable, credible, and of solid value—from which a 

reasonable trier of fact could find all the elements of a Murphy 

conservatorship beyond a reasonable doubt. (See People v. 

Clements (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 276, 298.) In so doing, we 

presume in support of the verdict the existence of every fact 

the trier could reasonably deduce from the evidence. (People v. 

Nieber (2022) 82 Cal.App.5th 458, 476; People v. Owens (2022) 

78 Cal.App.5th 1015, 1022.) Substantial evidence includes 

circumstantial evidence and any reasonable inferences drawn 

from that evidence. (People v. Brooks (2017) 3 Cal.5th 1, 57; 

Nieber, at p. 476.)

We resolve all evidentiary conflicts and questions 

of credibility in favor of the verdict. (People v. Brady (2018) 

22 Cal.App.5th 1008, 1014, quoting People v. Cardenas (2015) 

239 Cal.App.4th 220, 226–227.) We cannot reweigh the evidence 

or reassess witness credibility on our own. (People v. Young 

(2005) 34 Cal.4th 1149, 1181 [resolution of conflicts and 

inconsistencies in the testimony is the exclusive province of 

the trier of fact].)

Here, the parties stipulated to three of the four elements 

required for a Murphy conservatorship: (1) M.C. had a pending 

murder case; (2) there had been a finding of probable cause at 

a preliminary hearing in that case; and (3) M.C. was incompetent 

to stand trial as a result of a mental-health disorder. Therefore, 

the only issue on appeal is whether substantial evidence supports

the jury’s finding on the fourth element: that M.C. represented 

a substantial danger of physical harm to others by reason of a 
9

mental disorder. (§ 5008, subd. (h)(1)(B)(iv).) We conclude 

it does. 

The record contains ample evidence that M.C. has a severe 

mental disorder. M.C.’s treating psychiatrist testified that he 

suffers from schizoaffective disorder, bipolar type, which causes 

him to experience frequent delusions, some of which are violent 

in nature. For example, M.C. claimed he is the highest-ranking 

officer in the military with the authority to have people executed. 

He also claimed the governor might ask him to commit homicide, 

for which he would have legal immunity because of his position 

in the military.

The record also contains evidence that M.C.’s mental 

disorder has led him to commit actual violence. The jury heard 

M.C.’s testimony from the 2021 trial, in which he admitted 

stabbing a man with a pair of scissors. Although portions of 

M.C.’s testimony seemed plausible, he also recounted facts that 

were plainly delusions. For example, he claimed the victim was 

armed with “steel nunchuks,” an “eight-foot tall tornado came 

in like Star Trek,” and a man named Hector appeared in the 

“whirlwind.” M.C. also was adamant that, despite being stabbed 

more than a dozen times, the victim suffered no visible injuries 

and was in “perfect health.” Given these incredible claims, 

the jury reasonably could have found M.C.’s decision to stab 

the victim was connected to his mental disorder.

The jury also reasonably could have concluded there is 

a substantial danger M.C. will commit similar acts of violence 

in the future. The Public Guardian’s expert testified that 

schizoaffective disorder is a lifelong condition that cannot be 

cured. Consistent with that characterization, M.C.’s psychiatrist 

reported his condition had not improved and he continued to

experience delusions, despite being heavily medicated and 

receiving intensive treatment. Moreover, according to the expert, 
10

the keys to managing M.C.’s disorder are medication compliance 

and insight into the disorder. The record indicates M.C. lacked 

both, as he repeatedly denied being mentally ill and claimed 

he would stop taking his medication if given the option. On 

this record, the jury reasonably could have found M.C. poses 

a substantial danger of physical harm to others on account of 

a mental disorder. 

M.C. contends the jury’s finding was unreasonable in 

light of evidence that he is elderly and physically infirm. He 

points out he was 71 years old at the time of trial, the hospital 

staff considered him to be a “fall risk,” he resided in the hospital’s 

“frail unit,” and he had been reliant on a walker and wheelchair.

Contrary to M.C.’s contentions, none of this evidence 

precludes a finding that he was dangerous at the time of trial. 

Although M.C. was 71 years old, he also was relatively elderly—

65 years old—when he reportedly stabbed a man with scissors. 

The record also indicates M.C.’s physical infirmities were 

transitory. The Public Guardian’s expert suggested M.C. 

was considered a fall risk due to the side effects from being 

over-medicated. Given M.C. claimed he wanted to stop taking 

his medication, the jury reasonably could have found those 

side effects would not limit him in the future.

Similarly, M.C.’s reliance on a wheelchair and walker 

seems to have been intermittent, and it does not appear he 

used either during trial. In fact, M.C.’s treating physician 

described him as “quite able-bodied,” such that the physician 

felt threatened by him. The jurors were able to observe 

M.C. throughout the trial, so they could have evaluated the 

reasonableness of the physician’s fear. The jurors were in a 

better position than we are to evaluate M.C.’s physical condition 

at the time of trial, and we decline to second guess them on 

appeal.
11

3. The court did not err by admitting M.C.’s prior

testimony

Before trial, M.C. moved to preclude the prosecutor 

from entering into evidence his testimony from the 2021 trial. 

M.C. argued admission of the testimony violated his right to 

due process because it could be used against him in a future 

criminal proceeding. He also argued the testimony was 

inadmissible hearsay, he was incompetent at the time he gave 

it, the testimony lacked reliability, and he did not understand 

the nature of the oath he was under. Alternatively, he sought 

to exclude the testimony under Evidence Code section 352, 

arguing its prejudicial nature far outweighed its probative value.

The court overruled M.C.’s objections and admitted the 

testimony as party admissions. The court found the testimony 

was “profoundly probative” on key issues in the case: whether 

M.C. suffers from a mental disorder and whether he is 

dangerous. The court noted that whether M.C. understood 

the nature of the oath went to the weight of the evidence, 

not its admissibility.

M.C. argues the trial court erred, raising many of the same 

issues on appeal. First, he contends his prior testimony was 

inadmissible because there is no indication he was competent 

to testify or understood the nature of the oath he was given. 

We are not persuaded. 

At the outset, M.C.’s arguments concern the admissibility 

of the testimony at the 2021 trial, and the proper time to raise 

them was at that trial. Instead, M.C. effectively waived the

issues by voluntarily testifying on his own behalf. At the 2022 

trial, the Public Guardian sought to admit the prior testimony 

as party admissions, which do not require the declarant be 

competent nor under oath. (See Evid. Code, § 1220.) Therefore, 

whether M.C. was competent to testify or understood the nature 
12

of the oath in 2021 is irrelevant to the admissibility of the 

statements in 2022.

Even if M.C.’s competency in 2021 were relevant in 2022, 

he has not shown his prior testimony was inadmissible on 

that basis. M.C. seems to believe the fact he was incompetent 

to stand trial means he was incompetent to testify. However, 

the competency requirements to stand trial and the requirements 

to testify are distinct. A defendant is incompetent to stand trial 

if, “as a result of a mental health disorder or developmental 

disability, the defendant is unable to understand the nature 

of the criminal proceedings or to assist counsel in the conduct of 

a defense in a rational manner.” (Pen. Code, § 1367, subd. (a).) 

In contrast, a witness is incompetent to testify if he or she is 

“(1) Incapable of expressing himself or herself concerning 

the matter so as to be understood . . . ; or (2) Incapable of 

understanding the duty of a witness to tell the truth.” (Evid. 

Code, § 701, subd. (a).) 

Here, despite being incompetent to stand trial, M.C. plainly 

was capable of expressing himself at the 2021 trial. Moreover, 

although his testimony was bizarre and improbable, it appears 

he believed he was testifying truthfully. M.C. points to nothing 

in the record indicating his delusional thinking rendered him 

incapable of understanding his obligation to tell the truth. 

Accordingly, he has not met his burden to show he was 

incompetent to testify. (See People v. Avila (2006) 38 Cal.4th 491, 

589 [the party challenging a witness has the burden to prove 

incompetence].)

M.C. briefly argues his prior testimony should be treated 

like statements made to experts during an examination to 

determine competency, which are not admissible in a subsequent 

trial on guilt or sanity. (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.130(d)(3).) 

We disagree. Our Supreme Court has explained the immunity 
13

rule for statements made during competency examinations is 

necessary because it protects the accused’s privilege against selfincrimination and promotes accuracy in psychiatric evaluations, 

which furthers the public policy of not criminally trying persons 

who are mentally incompetent. (People v. Weaver (2001) 26 

Cal.4th 876, 960.) Those concerns are not present here: M.C. 

voluntarily testified on his own behalf at the 2021 trial, he 

did not give the testimony as part of a psychiatric evaluation, 

and the 2022 trial was a civil proceeding, not a criminal one. 

We decline to extend the immunity rule to these circumstances. 

Next, M.C. argues his prior testimony was “fundamentally 

unreliable” because it expressed delusional thinking. Relatedly, 

he argues the Public Guardian improperly used the testimony 

both to prove the truth of the matters asserted—that he stabbed 

a man—and also that he suffers from delusions. We agree with 

the trial court that these issues go to the weight of the testimony, 

not its admissibility. Moreover, there is nothing improper about 

the Public Guardian using the testimony for multiple purposes. 

(See, e.g., People v. Clark (2016) 63 Cal.4th 522, 593 [rejecting 

a defendant’s argument that a trial court erred by admitting 

evidence for both hearsay and nonhearsay purposes].) The jury 

was capable of analyzing M.C.’s statements to determine which 

were true and which reflected delusional thinking. 

M.C. alternatively argues the court should have excluded 

the testimony under Evidence Code section 352 because its 

probative value was substantially outweighed by the probability 

of undue prejudice. We review a trial court’s decision to admit 

evidence over an Evidence Code section 352 objection for abuse 

of discretion. (People v. Rocha (2013) 221 Cal.App.4th 1385, 

1397.)

Contrary to M.C.’s suggestions, his prior testimony had 

substantial probative value. The Public Guardian’s expert 
14

testified that M.C. suffers from schizoaffective disorder, which 

is a condition that causes delusional thinking. The expert 

explained that, although rare, some people experience delusions 

that lead them to commit acts of violence. M.C.’s prior testimony

—in which he recounted stabbing a man with scissors under 

bizarre and improbable circumstances—indicates he suffers from 

such delusions. Accordingly, it is highly relevant to key issues 

before the jury: whether M.C. suffers from a mental disorder 

that makes him dangerous to others. 

M.C. contends the incident was too remote in time to be 

relevant on the issue of his current dangerousness. We disagree. 

The Public Guardian’s expert testified that schizoaffective 

disorder is a lifelong condition that can be managed, but not 

cured. There is ample evidence that, in the years following 

the stabbing incident, M.C. had not been able to manage the 

disorder effectively. Indeed, despite receiving extensive care and 

medication, he continued to experience delusions, some of which 

involved violence towards others. Under these circumstances, 

evidence that M.C.’s delusional thinking was connected to 

extreme violence in the relatively recent past is highly probative 

of whether he is likely to commit similar acts of violence in 

the present and future.

We also reject M.C.’s suggestion that the evidence was 

unduly prejudicial. Even without M.C.’s testimony, the jury 

would have learned he had been charged with murder and 

suffers from delusional thinking. Although bizarre, M.C.’s 

account of the incident was not particularly graphic. Nor did he 

reveal any information that might have turned the jury against 

him. Weighed against the evidence’s significant probative value 

on key issues, the court did not abuse its discretion by declining 

to exclude the testimony under Evidence Code section 352. 
15

4. The court did not err by denying M.C.’s requests 

for a mistrial

M.C. argues the trial court erred by refusing to declare 

a mistrial in response to improper testimony and argument. He

identifies three instances in which the trial was “infected” by 

references to extraneous and prejudicial matters. We consider 

each in turn.

a. Standard of review

“ ‘A mistrial should be granted if the court is apprised of 

prejudice that it judges incurable by admonition or instruction. 

[Citation.] Whether a particular incident is incurably prejudicial 

is by its nature a speculative matter, and the trial court is 

vested with considerable discretion in ruling on mistrial motions. 

[Citation.]’ [Citation.] A motion for a mistrial should be granted 

when ‘ “ ‘a [defendant’s] chances of receiving a fair trial have been 

irreparably damaged.’ ” ’ ” (People v. Collins (2010) 49 Cal.4th 

175, 198–199.) 

Generally, we review the denial of a mistrial motion for 

an abuse of discretion. (People v. Garcia (2022) 83 Cal.App.5th 

240, 248.) However, we apply a de novo standard where the 

appellant’s constitutional rights are implicated. (Ibid.) 

b. Aulakh’s testimony

At trial, M.C. requested the court instruct the jury not 

to consider the possibility that he could be released into the 

community. In support, M.C. cited People v. Mendez (2018) 

21 Cal.App.5th 654 (Mendez). The court declined to give M.C.’s 

proposed instruction, but it agreed the jury could not consider 

his possible placement.

During direct examination, the Public Guardian asked 

Aulakh—M.C.’s treating psychiatrist—what must happen before 

M.C. can transition to a lower level of care. Aulakh responded 

that M.C. would need to show insight into his disorder, seek 
16

treatment on his own, and work collaboratively with his 

treatment team. The doctor continued: “[M.C.’s] on a very 

structured specialized unit and he’s on a decent dose of 

medication, and I can just imagine if he was in the community 

or . . . .” M.C. objected. The court sustained the objection 

and struck the testimony.

During a break in the trial, M.C. moved for a mistrial, 

citing Mendez, supra, 21 Cal.App.5th 654. M.C. argued that, 

although the court struck Aulakh’s statement, the jury still heard 

the improper testimony. The court denied M.C.’s motion. On 

appeal, M.C. argues the court erred because it was impossible 

to cure the prejudice from Aulakh’s testimony.

M.C.’s reliance on Mendez, supra, 21 Cal.App.5th 654,

is misplaced. In that case, the People sought to commit the 

appellant as a mentally disordered offender (MDO). (Id. at 

p. 656.) Like a Murphy conservatorship, an MDO commitment 

requires a finding that the person represents a substantial 

danger to others. At the People’s request, the trial court in that 

case instructed the jury it must determine whether the appellant 

represented a substantial danger “ ‘if released into the community 

unsupervised.’ ” (Id. at p. 659.) The Court of Appeal held the 

trial court erred and reversed the commitment order. The court 

explained the qualification in the instruction—if released into 

the community unsupervised—was not consistent with the 

statute, improperly asked the jury to consider the consequences 

of its verdict, and was misleading because there were 

alternatives to unsupervised release. (Id. at pp. 660–661, 663.)

We will assume, for the sake of argument, the Mendez 

court’s reasoning also applies to Murphy conservatorships. 

Nevertheless, the case is inapposite. Here, unlike in Mendez, 

the trial court did not give a flawed instruction. Nor did it 

suggest to the jury it should consider M.C.’s future placement 
17

or the consequences of its verdict. To the contrary, when M.C.’s 

psychiatrist started to discuss the possibility that M.C. could be 

released into the community, the court immediately sustained 

M.C.’s objection and struck the testimony. In fact, the court 

sustained the objection before the doctor had finished his 

thought, which plainly communicated to the jury it should 

not consider the issue. The court’s swift and definitive action 

cured any potential prejudice. Accordingly, under any standard 

of review, the court did not err in denying M.C.’s motion for 

a mistrial. 

c. Plotkin’s testimony

On direct examination, the Public Guardian’s expert, 

Gordon Plotkin, testified that M.C. poses a substantial physical 

danger to others due to his mental disorder. The Public 

Guardian asked Plotkin to elaborate on his opinion. Plotkin 

noted there were “two officers next to him in [the] court. So 

the chance of him—.” M.C. objected, and the trial court struck 

the testimony.

The court and the parties discussed the incident during a 

break in the trial. The prosecutor suggested Plotkin was simply 

explaining why he believed M.C. is dangerous, despite the lack 

of recent violent incidents. M.C. moved for a mistrial, arguing 

Plotkin’s comment shifted the burden to show dangerousness.

The court noted the testimony was improper, but it found 

Plotkin’s comment did not warrant a mistrial. The court offered 

to give a curative admonition, which M.C. accepted. The court 

then admonished the jury as follows: “[B]efore we took our break, 

you heard some testimony regarding the fact that there are two 

guards that are here with [M.C.], and then I granted a motion 

to strike, and that was stricken. [¶] But I just wanted to advise 

you that it is standard practice that individuals transported from 

Patton State Hospital to this court are escorted by two guards, 
18

and you should not consider for the purpose of determining 

whether [M.C.] is a danger to others that he is escorted by 

two guards to this courtroom.”

Contrary to M.C.’s contentions, the trial court handled 

the situation appropriately and cured any potential prejudice. 

Regardless of Plotkin’s comment, the jury likely would have 

noticed that M.C. had been escorted by guards throughout the 

trial. Although Plotkin’s comment drew additional attention 

to the situation, the court explained to the jury it was common 

practice and had no bearing on M.C.’s potential dangerousness. 

The court’s admonition sufficiently cured any prejudice. In fact, 

it is likely M.C. benefited from the incident, as the jury was 

no longer left to speculate as to the reason for the heightened 

security. Accordingly, under any standard of review, the court 

did not err in denying M.C.’s motion for a mistrial. 

d. Closing argument

During closing argument, the Public Guardian argued 

M.C. was compliant with his medication only because there was

a threat of an involuntary medication order. M.C. requested 

a sidebar with the court, which was not reported. During 

a subsequent break, M.C. moved for a mistrial, arguing the 

prosecutor’s argument was improper because there was no 

evidence that M.C. was aware of an involuntary medication 

order. The Public Guardian asserted Aulakh had testified 

that he told M.C. about the order. M.C. responded that Aulakh 

was referring to an order for blood draws, not medication.

The court denied the motion, explaining the prosecutor’s 

argument was a reasonable inference from the evidence. The 

court noted that, in its experience, involuntary medication orders 

do not identify specific procedures; instead, they defer to the 

doctor to determine what is necessary.
19

On appeal, M.C. contends the Public Guardian’s argument 

was pure speculation as there is no evidence he was aware of 

an involuntary medication order. We disagree. Aulakh testified 

that he informed M.C. he had obtained a court order to draw his 

blood. Even assuming that order was limited to blood draws, it is

reasonable to conclude it motivated M.C. to take his medication. 

According to Aulakh, one of the reasons to draw M.C.’s blood was 

to ensure he was compliant with his medication. It is reasonable 

to infer M.C. was aware of this fact and knew that, if his doctors 

discovered he was not taking his medication, they also could 

obtain a court order forcing him to do so. Accordingly, the Public 

Guardian’s argument was a fair comment on the evidence, and 

it did not provide grounds for a mistrial under any standard 

of review. 

DISPOSITION

We affirm the order.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

EGERTON, J.

We concur:

LAVIN, Acting P. J. ADAMS, J.