alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Jessie Lamont BAGLEY, a/k/a Tug, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 13-6801.

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted: April 24, 2014.

Decided: April 28, 2014.

Jessie Lamont Bagley, Appellant Pro Se. Jennifer P. May-Parker, Assistant United States Attorney, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee.

Before NIEMEYER, SHEDD, and FLOYD, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished PER CURIAM opinion.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

PER CURIAM:

Jessie Lamont Bagley appeals the district court’s order denying Bagley5s motion for a sentence reduction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) (2102). We have reviewed the record and find no reversible error. Accordingly, we affirm substantially for the reasons stated by the district *257court.*
      *United States v. Bagley,*No. 5:06— cr-00185-BO-l (E.D.N.C. filed May 2, 2013; entered May 3, 2013); *see also*4th Cir. R. 34(b) (limiting appellate review to issues raised in informal brief). We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

*AFFIRMED.*

While Bagley's informal brief challenges his career offender designation under *United States v. Davis,*720 F.3d 215 (4th Cir.2013), this argument was not raised in the district court and is not properly before us. *See Muth v. United States,*1 F.3d 246, 250 (4th Cir.1993) (stating that arguments raised for first time on appeal generally will not be considered).
#### UNITED STATES of America v. Calvin ROYAL.

No. 1:90-CR-119-3.

United States District Court, E.D. Texas, Beaumont Division.

Dec. 28, 1990.

Debra A. Carr, Asst. U.S. Atty., Beaumont, Tex., for plaintiff.

Donald O. Pinkston, New Orleans, La., for defendant.

MEMORANDUM ORDER

COBB, District Judge.

The defendant, Calvin Royal, was ordered detained by Magistrate Hines, pending trial. Royal filed a motion for revocation of detention order. The court has heard the motion, and enters the following findings and conclusions:

This court has authority to review the magistrate’s order pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3145(b). The court reviews the record made before the magistrate, together with any additional evidence presented.

Royal offered only two new pieces of evidence to this court: a letter recommending a relative, Mrs. Iford, for employment; and a letter from the Drug Enforcement *1239Administration, confirming Royal is still litigating a seizure of currency. Royal’s argument at hearing on this motion essentially reiterated his argument before the magistrate.

Royal is charged with two counts of conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to distribute 500 grams or more of a substance containing cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and 846. Royal is further charged with one count of possessing with intent to distribute 500 grams or more of a substance containing cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). These offenses carry a maximum penalty of ten years or more, raising a statutory presumption of danger to the community and risk of flight. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e).

Royal lives in Kenner, Louisiana, and has moved four times in the past two years. He has been unemployed since 1988. He has a prior drug conviction in Louisiana in 1987, and six subsequent arrests. Two of those arrests occurred while he was on probation resulting from his 1987 conviction. Royal’s evidence offered in rebuttal fails to show he could conform his conduct to the law if released. Drug offenses, by their nature, constitute a danger to the community. *United States v. Cox,*635 F.Supp. 1047 (D.Kan.1986).

This court concludes from clear and convincing evidence Royal would pose a danger to the community if released. No condition or combination of conditions could reasonably assure the safety of any other person in the community. The magistrate’s order of detention is AFFIRMED, and the defendant is ORDERED DETAINED pending trial.
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT 

No. 09-7250

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

 Plaintiff - Appellee, 

 v. 

CHARLES PYNE, 

 Defendant - Appellant. 

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of 

Maryland, at Greenbelt. Alexander Williams, Jr., District 

Judge. (8:04-cr-00018-AW-3) 

Submitted: November 19, 2009 Decided: December 2, 2009 

Before MOTZ, GREGORY, and SHEDD, Circuit Judges. 

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion. 

Charles Pyne, Appellant Pro Se. Barbara Suzanne Skalla, 

Assistant United States Attorney, Greenbelt, Maryland, for 

Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. 
2 

PER CURIAM: 

Charles Pyne appeals the district court’s order 

summarily denying his motion for continued recusal and 

disqualification. We have reviewed the record and find no 

reversible error. Accordingly, we affirm the order of the 

district court. See United States v. Pyne, No. 8:04-cr-00018-

AW-3 (D. Md. June 18, 2009). We dispense with oral argument 

because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented 

in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the 

decisional process. 

AFFIRMED
**Exhibit 32.1**

 

**CertificationPursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002(Subsections (a) and (b) of Section 1350, Chapter 63 of Title 18, United StatesCode)**

 

In connection with theQuarterly Report on Form 10-Q of Boston Biomedica, Inc., a Massachusettscorporation (the “Company”) for the period ended March 31, 2004 as filed withthe Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the  “Report”), I, Richard T. Schumacher, Chief Executive  Officer of Boston Biomedica, Inc., a Massachusetts corporation(the “Company”), do hereby certify, pursuant to Section 906 of theSarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (subsections (a) and (b) of Section 1350, Chapter 63of Title 18, United States Code) that:

 

(1)           The  Report  of the Company fully complies with therequirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934;and

 

(2)           The informationcontained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, thefinancial condition and results of operations of the Company.

 
| Dated: May 14, 2004 | */s/  Richard T. Schumacher*   |   |
|---------------------|--------------------------------|--------|
|                | Richard T. Schumacher          |
|                | Chief Executive Officer        |
|                | (Principal Executive  Officer) |

 

 

A signed original of this written statementrequired by Section 906 has been provided to Boston Biomedica, Inc. and will beretained by Boston Biomedica, Inc. and furnished to the Securities and ExchangeCommission or its staff upon request.

 

1

----
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DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA

FOURTH DISTRICT

LENIST KEY,

Appellant,

v.

STATE OF FLORIDA,

Appellee.

No. 4D18-3213

[January 17, 2019]

Appeal of order denying rule 3.850 motion from the Circuit Court for 

the Seventeenth Judicial Circuit, Broward County; Martin S. Fein, Judge; 

L.T. Case No. 11-2654 CF10A.

Lenist Key, Okeechobee, pro se.

No appearance required for appellee.

PER CURIAM.

Affirmed.

DAMOORGIAN, CIKLIN and KLINGENSMITH, JJ., concur. 

* * *

Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.
#### Nancy Melendez CAMILO, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. UNITED STATES, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 2010-5069.

United States Court of Appeals, Federal Circuit.

Nov. 30, 2010.

Michael D.J. Eisenberg, Washington, DC, for Plaintiff-Appellant.

Jessica R. Toplin, Department of Justice, Washington, DC, for Defendant-Ap-pellee.

ON MOTION

ORDER

Nancy Melendez Camilo moves for leave to file her appendix out of time and for reconsideration of the court’s order dismissing her appeal for failure to file an appendix.

Upon consideration thereof,

It Is Ordered That:

Camilo’s motions are granted. The mandate is recalled, the dismissal order is vacated, and the appeal is reinstated. If the appendix has not already been submitted, it is due within 14 days of the date of filing of this order.
#### LIJUN SUN, Petitioner, v. Eric H. HOLDER, Jr., Attorney General, Respondent.

No. 12-72543.

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted April 7, 2014.*

Filed April 11, 2014.

Robert George Ryan, Eugene Chi Ching Wong, I, Esquire, Law Offices of Eugene C. Wong, Inc, San Francisco, CA, for Petitioner.

Chief Counsel Ice, Office of the Chief Counsel Department of Homeland Security, San Francisco, CA, Oil, John M. Mc-Adams, Jr. DOJ-U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, DC, for Respondent.

Before: TASHIMA, GRABER, and IKUTA, Circuit Judges.

*

 The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R.App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM **

Lijun Sun, a native and citizen of China, petitions for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ order dismissing his appeal from an immigration judge’s (“IJ”) decision denying his application for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We review for substantial evidence the agency’s factual findings, applying the standards governing adverse credibility determinations created by the REAL ID Act. *Shrestha v. Holder,*590 F.3d 1034, 1039 (9th Cir.2010). We review de novo claims of due process violations in immigration proceedings. *Zetino v. Holder,*622 F.3d 1007, 1011 (9th Cir.2010). We deny the petition for review.

Substantial evidence supports the agency’s adverse credibility determination based on its findings regarding Sun’s demeanor and responsiveness and based on Sun’s inability to provide details regarding his church attendance in the United States. *See Shrestha,*590 F.3d at 1048 (adverse credibility finding reasonable under totality of circumstances, including based on unresponsive and undetailed testimony); Sing*h-Kaur v. INS,*183 F.3d 1147, 1151 (9th Cir.1999) (giving special deference to IJ’s observation of petition*494er’s demeanor). In light of this conclusion, we reject Sun’s contentions that the agency did not give adequate weight to evidence of country conditions and erred in failing to address his claim of a pattern or practice of persecution. Accordingly, Sun’s asylum and withholding of removal claims fail. *See Farah v. Ashcroft,*348 F.3d 1153, 1156 (9th Cir.2003).

Finally, substantial evidence supports the agency’s denial of CAT relief because Sun failed to establish it is more likely than not he would be tortured if returned to China. *See Singh v. Gonzales,*439 F.3d 1100, 1113 (9th Cir.2006). We reject Sun’s contention that the agency improperly evaluated his CAT claim.

PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 

MATTHEW JONES, 

Respondent Below, 

Appellant, 

v. 

STATE OF DELAWARE, 

Petitioner Below, 

Appellee. 

§ 

§ No. 279, 2017 

§ 

§ 

§ 

§ Court Below: Superior Court 

§ of the State of Delaware 

§ 

§ C.A. No. S17I-00670 

§ 

§ 

 

 Submitted: July 17, 2017

 Decided: August 3, 2017 

Before VAUGHN, SEITZ, and TRAYNOR, Justices. 

O R D E R 

This 3rd day of August 2017, the Court has considered the notice to show cause 

and the appellant’s response. The appellant purports to appeal from a hearing held 

by a Superior Court Commissioner on June 23, 2017. The Superior Court 

Commissioner continued the June 23 hearing until July 28, 2017, over the 

appellant’s objection. Although the appellant attempted to file an amended notice 

of appeal from an interlocutory order under Supreme Court Rule 42, this Court has 

no jurisdiction to hear any appeal directly from a Superior Court Commissioner’s 

order.1

 Accordingly, this appeal must be dismissed. 

 

1 Johnson v. State, 884 A.2d 475, 479 (Del. 2005). 
2

NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that this appeal is DISMISSED. The 

motion to proceed in forma pauperis is moot. 

BY THE COURT: 

/s/ Collins J. Seitz, Jr. 

Justice
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Robert YOUNG, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 13-14618

Non-Argument Calendar.

United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit.

June 5, 2014.

Lennard B. Register, III, Robert G. Davies, U.S. Attorney’s Office, Pensacola, FL, Pamela C. Marsh, Eric K. Mountin, U.S. Attorney’s Office, Tallahassee, FL, for Plaintiff-Appellee.

Chet Kaufman, Randolph Patterson Murrell, Federal Public Defender’s Office, Tallahassee, FL for Defendant-Appellant.

Before TJOFLAT, MARCUS and JORDAN, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

Chet Kaufman, appointed counsel for Robert Young in this direct criminal appeal, has moved to withdraw from further representation of the appellant and filed a brief pursuant to *Anders v. California,*386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967). Our independent review of the entire record reveals that counsel’s assessment of the relative merit of the appeal is correct. Because independent examination of the entire record reveals no arguable issues of merit, counsel’s motion to withdraw is GRANTED, and Young’s convictions and sentences are AFFIRMED.
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPI RES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION AND, IF FILED, DETERMINED IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF FLORIDA SECOND DISTRICT JAMES W. HARKLEROAD, ) ) Appellant, ) ) v. ) Case No. 2D14-5249 ) STATE OF FLORIDA, ) ) Appellee. ) ___________________________________) Opinion filed April 8, 2015. Appeal pursuant to Fla. R. App. P. 9.141(b)(2) from the Circuit Court for Hillsborough County; Caroline J. Tesche, Judge. James W. Harkleroad, pro se.

PER CURIAM.
This proceeding is dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. See Da le v. State, 981 So. 2d 1222, 1223 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008) (dismissing appeal fo r lack of jurisdiction because appellant's untimely motion for rehearing did not delay rendition of the order on appeal). Dismissed.

ALTENBERND, LaROSE, and KHOUZAM, JJ., Concur.
I

103D CONGRESS

1ST SESSION H. R. 2349

To amend the Small Business Act to support the expansion of business

executive education programs for owners and managers of disadvantaged

small business concerns.

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

JUNE 9, 1993

Mr. TORRES (for himself, Mr. BROWN of California, Mr. CONYERS, Mr.

CLYBURN, Mr. DE LUGO, Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA, Mr. FILNER, Mr. FROST,

Mr. JEFFERSON, Mr. KILDEE, Mr. LEWIS of Georgia, Mr. MFUME, Ms.

PELOSI, Mr. SWETT, Mr. WASHINGTON, Mr. WYNN, Mrs. MEEK, Mr.

NADLER, Mr. STOKES, and Mr. ROMERO-BARCELO ́) introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on Small Business

A BILL

To amend the Small Business Act to support the expansion

of business executive education programs for owners and

managers of disadvantaged small business concerns.

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Disadvantaged Small

5 Business Educational Opportunity Act of 1993’’.
2

•HR 2349 IH

1 SEC. 2. FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE FOR EXPANSION OF BUSI2 NESS EDUCATION PROGRAMS.

3 Section 7(j)(2) of the Small Business Act (15 U.S.C.

4 636(j)(2)) is amended—

5 (1) by striking ‘‘(2)’’ and inserting ‘‘(2)(A)’’;

6 (2) by redesignating subparagraphs (A), (B),

7 (C), (D), and (E) as clauses (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), and

8 (v), respectively; and

9 (3) by adding at the end the following new sub10 paragraph:

11 ‘‘(B) Financial assistance under this subsection shall

12 be provided for projects to support the expansion of busi13 ness executive education programs for owners and man14 agers of small business concerns which are eligible to re15 ceive contracts pursuant to section 8(a) of this Act. Such

16 programs shall be presented by institutions of graduate

17 business education which have provided such programs for

18 a minimum of 10 consecutive years.’’.

Æ
[No. 56883-3-I.

Division One.

September 24, 2007.]

#### *In the Matter of the Detention*of James S. Allen, *Appellant.*

Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court for King County, No. 04-2-12240-6, Richard A. Jones, J., entered August 25, 2005. *Affirmed*by unpublished per curiam opinion. Now published at 142 Wn. App. 1.
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T.C. Memo. 1999-320

UNITED STATES TAX COURT

JOHN WALTER WOLF, Petitioner v . COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent

Docket No. 14702-98. Filed September 24, 1999.

John Walter Wolf, pro se. Nancy L. Spitz , for respondent.

MEMORANDUM OPINION GOLDBERG, Special Trial Judge : Respondent determined a deficiency in petitioner's Federal income tax in the amount of $55 for the taxable year 1996. Unless otherwise indicated, section references are to the Internal Revenue Code in effect for the year in issue. The sole issue for determination is whether petitioner is entitled to the earned income credit for the tax year 1996.- 2 -

This case was submitted fully stipulated. The stipulation of facts and the attached exhibits are incorporated herein by this reference. Petitioner resided in Immokalee, Florida, when the petition in this case was filed. During 1996, petitioner was incarcerated at a penal institution. Petitioner listed his occupation as beggar on his 1996 Federal income tax return. In 1996, petitioner received money from family and friends in the amount of $720. The family and friends who provided the money to petitioner had no expectation of repayment. In 1996, petitioner did not earn any income working for the prison. Petitioner reported income from begging in the amount of $720 on his 1996 Federal income tax return and claimed an earned income credit in the amount of $55. Petitioner is not entitled to the earned income credit he claimed on his 1996 tax return. An eligible individual is allowed an earned income credit for the taxable year in an amount equal to the credit percentage of so much of the taxpayer's earned income as does not exceed the earned income amount. See sec. 32(a). Earned income includes wages, salaries, tips, and other employee compensation. See sec. 32(c)(2)(A)(i). The money petitioner received from begging does not meet the definition of earned income provided by section 32. Rather, the money petitioner received from his family and friends was- 3 -

received as a gift. A gift is a transfer that proceeds from a "’detached and disinterested generosity,’ * * * out of affection, respect, admiration, charity or like impulses." Commissioner v. Duberstein , 363 U.S. 278, 285 (1960) (quoting Commissioner v. LoBue , 351 U.S. 243, 246 (1956)). In this case, petitioner's friends and family did not have an expectation of repayment or economic benefit. Instead, petitioner's family and friends transferred money to petitioner with a detached and disinterested generosity and out of charity. With respect to the earned income credit, petitioner had no earned income, and, therefore, is not entitled to the earned income credit. Decision will be entered for respondent
.