### IN THE CO URT OF CR IMINAL APPEALS OF T ENN ESSEE AT NASHVILL E Ass ig ne d o n B rie fs Nov em be r 20 , 20 08

STATE OF TENNES SEE v . DAVID A. FERRELL

Direc t Appeal from the Circ uit Court for Warre n Coun ty Nos. M-10896, M -11032 Larry B. Stanley, Jr., Judge

No. M2007- 01306-CCA -R3-C D - F iled Augu st 7, 2009

The pro se defe ndant, David A. Fe rre ll, was convicted of failure to display a license, violation of the seatbe lt law, and two violations of the vehicle reg istration law. The convictions arose from two indictments separ ated by five months. He was sentenc ed to thirty day s in the county jail for his first violation of the reg istration law and for failure to display a license and to twenty day s for his second violation of the reg istration law. Additionally
, a $20.00 fine was imposed fo r h i s s ea tbelt law violation. His sentenc es wer e order ed to run consec utively

. On appea l, he arg ues that the trial court did not have jurisdiction over his case s. After car eful revie w, we aff irm the judgme nts from the trial court.

Tenn. R. App . P . 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgme nts of

the Circ uit Court Aff

irm ed

J O H N E V E R E T T W I L L I A M S , J ., delivere d the opinion of the court, in which D A V I D H. W E L L E S and N O R M A M C G E E O G L E , J J ., joined.

David A. F err ell, Spencer , Tenne ssee, Pro Se.

Robert E. Cooper, J r., Attorney Gene ral and Reporter ; J

. Ross Dy er, Sen i o r C o u n s el; and L isa Z avog iannis, District Attorney Gene ral, for

the appe llee, State of Te nnessee

.

OP INION

This case arises from two traff ic stops of the defe ndant; one by the McMinnville Police Depa rtment and one by the Tenne ssee Hig hway P at ro l

. On Aug ust 10, 2006, an office r with the McMinnville Police Depa rtment stopped the defe ndant af t er o bserving him opera ting a blue Merc edes with a li cense tag reg istered to a C hevrole t. The officer
, who had prior knowledg e that the defe ndant swappe d license p l at es o n his vehicles, stopped the vehicle when the defe ndant attempted to exit a parking lot and enter the stree t.

The office r informed the defe ndant that his reg istration did not match his vehicle and asked for his driver’ s license and proof of insurance

. T h e d ef endant told him that he did not have top ro v ide any thing to him beca

use he was not a State Trooper and declined to produce a d ri v er ’s lic en s e. T h e o ffice r char g ed him with the offe nses of driving a vehicle that was not proper ly reg istered and failure to display a license. The office r said that he later rese arc hed the defe ndant’s license infor

mation and that it showed he ha d a valid license with no prior neg ative history

.
The second incident g iving rise to this appea l occur red on November 25, 2006, wh en the defe ndant was stopped by a Tenne ssee Hig hway Patro l m an for failing to wea r a seatbe lt and for driving an improper ly

reg istered ve hicle.

The c onvictions were consolidated for this appeal.

Analy sis

On appe al, the def

endant a rg ues that the trial c ourt did not have jurisdiction over his cases and that he is not subject to the e nforc ement of tra ffic la ws by local law e nforc ement author ities.

The defe ndant had a preliminary hear in g in Gene ral Sessions court, probable cause was deter mined in eac h case , and the matters wer e bound over to the g rand jury

. The g rand jury returne d

an indictment in eac h case confe rring jurisdiction of the defe ndant’s case s to the Warren County Cir cu it Court. See T.C.A. §§ 16-10-102 and 40-1-108 (2006). Thus, the Warren County Circuit Court had jurisdiction for the unde rly ing c ases. This issue is without merit.

The defe ndant also contends that he is not subject to the jurisdiction of any court except the Tenne ssee Supreme Court. This claim i s simil ar to one raised i n State v. K el l er , 813 S.W .2d 146 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1991), and Sta t e v. Go o dson
, 77 S.W .3d 240 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2001). This court, in Keller
, rec ited the history of the Tenne ssee Constitution and how the Constit ution vested the judicial power in the supreme court and in such inferior courts as the leg islature shall ordain and establish.

The first Constit ution of Tenne ssee was adopted Fe bruar y 6, 1796[,] and took eff

ect

on J une 1, 1796, the date Tenne ssee was admitted to the Union. T h e second Cons t i t u t i o n was adopted in 1834[,] and took eff ect on Marc h 27, 1835[,] and is g ener ally known as the Constit ution of 1834. Our curr ent Constit ution of 1870 was adopted Febr

uary 23, 1870[,] and became effe ctive May 5, 1870. Compil ers Notes to th e Pr e a mb le a n d D e c lara ti o n o f Ri g h ts o f th e Co n s ti tu ti o n o f th e St a

te o f T e nn e s s e e

.
Article V I , Section 1 of the Te nnessee Constit ution provides:

The judicial power of this State shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such Circuit, Chance ry and other inferior Courts as the L eg islature shall from time to time, ordain and establish; in the J udg es there o f, an d in J ustices of the Peace

. The L eg islature may also vest such jurisdiction in Corporation Courts as may be deeme d

nece ssary . Courts to be holden by J ustices of the Pea ce ma

y also be e stablished.

-2-I n addition to the power to “orda in and establish” courts, the leg islature also has the

constitutional power to chang e the jurisdiction of the courts. Article VI , § 8, Tenne ssee Constit ution. Mo o r e v. L ove , 171 Tenn. 682, 107 S.W .2d 982, 985 (1937). This gra

nt of power

to the leg islature includes the power to determine how many and what kinds of courts are require d for the administration of justice and includes the power to fix the l imits of ea ch cour t’s jurisdiction. The power g rante d to the leg islature by

Article V I , § I , includes the power to “cr eate courts of g ener al, specia l or limit ed j u ri s d i cti on within a particula r county or locality .” State ex rel. W ard v. Murrell
, 169 Tenn. 688, 90 S.W .2d 945, 946 (1936), citing numerous case s.

Pursuant to that g rant of power , the leg islature has expressly confe rred “e x clusive orig inal jurisdiction of all crimes and misdemeanors
, ei ther at common law or by statute” upon the circ uit courts, unless otherwise expressly provided by the leg islature. T.C.A. § 16-10-102. L ike the circ uit courts, the jurisdiction of this Court is derive d from the g rant of power to this C o u rt by the leg islature. This Court’s j u ri s d i cti on extends to the revie w of, among other things, final judgme nts of tr i al courts in criminal case s, both felonies and misdemeanors. T.C.A. § 16-5-108( a)( 1).

State v. Keller , 813 S.W .2d at 147-48.

The defe ndant was convicted of two counts of violation of the state vehicle reg istration law, wh i ch i s forbidden by Tenne ssee Code Annotated section 55-3-102; viol ation of t he seatbelt l aw , forbidden by Tenne ssee Code Annotated section 55-9-603; and failure to display a driver’ s license, forbidden by Tenne ssee Code Annotated section 55-50-351. Thus, it is clea r that the Warren County Circuit Court had jurisdiction to hear and decide the de fenda nt’s case based upon his commission of “cr imes and misdemeanors” and that this C o u rt has the jurisdiction to hear this appea l. “The contention otherw ise is without merit.” Keller , 813 S.W .2d at 148.

The defe ndant also contends that he has a constitutional rig ht to trave l and that the State and the McMinnville Police office rs who stopped him f rom driving impermissibly interfe red with tha t rig ht by requiring that his vehicle be reg istered, that he be licensed, and that he wea r a seatbe lt. This court in State v. Booher
, 978 S

. W

. 2 d 953, 956 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1997), held that the state leg islature may proper ly enac t r easona ble reg ulations r equiring licensing and reg istration of motor vehicles as it further s the interests of public safe ty and welfa re pursuant to its police power

. I t is well settled that “the ability to drive a motor vehicle on a public highw ay is not a fu n d am ental rig ht. I nstead, it is a revoc able privileg e that is g rante d upo n co m p l i ance with statutory licensing proce dures.” Id

. Her e, the defe ndant has not proff ere d any rationale for this Court to depar t from its prior prec edent a

nd is, theref

ore, not e ntitled to any

relief

.

-3-Ba sed on the fore g oing and the rec ord as a whole, we aff irm the j u d g ments from the trial court.

___________________________________ J OHN EV ERETT WI L L I AMS, J UDGE

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