NO T R EC OM M EN DE D F OR F UL L- TEX T P UB LIC AT ION F ile Nam e: 10a0054n.06 No. 08-5234 UN ITED STA TES C OU RT OF AP P EA LS F OR THE SI XT H C IR CU IT
RO B ERT KE SSL ER, Plaintiff-Appellee , v. P A T R IZIA R IC C A R D I, De fe nd ant- Ap pe lla

nt. )

) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ON APPEALFROM THE U NI TED STATES DI STRICT COURT FOR THE MI DDL E DI STRI CT OF TEN NESSEE

B e fo re : N ORRI S, CLAYand SUT TO N, Cir c uit

Judg e s. SUTTON, Circuit J udg e. Dr . Patrizi a Ricca rdi sued Dr . Robert Kessler, al l eging that he reta liated ag ainst her a fter she repor ted him for sexual hara ssment. Kessler , in turn, sued Ricca rdi for de famation, alleg ing that her re ports ag ainst him were f alse a nd damag ed his reputation and
m en t al h ea l t h
. K e s s l e r p re v ai l edi nb o t h s u i t s , an d R i cc ar d i , n o w p ro ce ed i n g pr o s e , claims the district court er

red by : (1) gr anting partial summ ary judgme nt to Kessler on her retaliation claim; (2) resolving three evidentiar y motions i ncorr ectly ; (3) g rantingKessle r’ s p re -ver dict motion for jud g me n ta s a

m a t t e r o f l aw o nt h e r e m a i n d e r

o f h e r r e t a l i a t i o nc l a i m ; an d

( 4 ) d e n yi n g h e r

p os tverdic t motion for judgment a s a matter of law on Kessler ’s defa

mation c laim. We affirm, e x cept wi th r e g ard

to t he pr e -v e rd ic t ju dg me nt a s a matte r o f l aw on the re ta liatio n c la im, wh ic h w e re ve rs e and re mand.No. 08-5234

Kessler v. Ricc ardi

- 2 - I.
Riccar di, a ps y chiatrist, bega n a medica l-rese arc h fellowship in the Radiolog y Depa rtment at Vande rbilt University

in Septe mber 2003. She worke d under the direc t supervision of Kessler , a ra dio log y

and ps y c hiatr y pr of e sso r. Whe n Ric c ard i ac c e pte d a pa rt -t ime fa c ult

y po sit ion in Jul y 20 04 , s he a g re e d to fu

nd a pe rc e nta g e of

he r s a lary

wi th g ra nt m on e y , w hic h s he c ou ld a c c omp lis h either by obtaining h er own g rants or by contributing to the g rants of othe r fa culty members, who would then allocate a por tion of their g rant fundingto her sala ry . DuringRiccar di’s first two y ear s at Vande rbilt, she worke d almost ex clusively with Kessler,
rese arc hing a

n umber of me ntal-hea lth disorders using Posit ron Emission Tomogra phy , a neuroimag ing te chnolog y . Ricca r di claims she came to Vande rbilt specifica lly to work with Kessler , as he w as a r ecog nized scholar in PET imag ing, the field in which she too w anted to spe cialize. As Ric c ard i unde rs too d it, Ke ssl e r pla nn e d to inc lud e he r on a ll o f h is g ra nts and he lp h e r w ithg ra

nts of her own so that she could r eac h her f unding g oal.
The nature of Riccar di and Kessler ’s re lationship differs dra matically dependingon whom y ou ask. Ricca

rdi alleg es that Ke ssler beg an s exually hara ssing he r in Novembe r 2003, which g ra du a lly wo rs e ne d a

nd c ulm inate d in an att e mpt e d ra pe in June 20 05 wh e n th e y we re in T or on to attending a profe ssional c onfer ence . Kessler denies these alleg ations, contendingthat the two beg an
an o n- a g a in- of

f- a g a in a ff

a ir in Janu ary 20 04 that la ste d un til June 20 05 , and that he , n ot R ic c ard i, was the vic tim of the phy sical alter cation in Toronto.No. 08-5234

Kessler v. Ricc ardi

- 3 - The Tor onto incident prompted Ricca rdi to repor

t a ll e g a ti o n s o f K e s s le r ’ s sexual harassment and attempted r ape to Va

nderbilt in J une 2005. University authorities conduc ted an investig ation, ultimately concluding that the evidenc e wa s insufficient to substantiate Ricca rdi’s cla ims. During the investig ation, Kessler told Vander

bilt authorities that he and Ricca rdi had e ng ag ed in a
c on se ns ua l se xua l r e latio ns hip . T he un ive rs ity the re a ft e r s tr ic tly

lim ite d K e ssl e r’ s in te ra c tio n w ith R i c c ar d i , i n s t r

u c t i n g h i m t o a v o i d

b e i n g a l o n e w i t hh e r

an d n o tt o c o m m u n i c a t e w i t h h e r d i r e c t l y. Be cause much of Ricca

rdi’s work r equired the assistance or super vision of Kessler, the parties worke d out a sy stem where by Riccar di and Kes s l er wo u l d communicate by e-ma il and copy

eac h other’s attorney s on all of their messa g es.
I n J une 2006, Ricca

rdi filed a se x ual har assment complaint that named Vande rbilt, Kessler and ra diology

depar tment chair D r. Mar

tin Sandler as defendants. She raised a s tate-la w claim for reta liation ag ainst Kessler individually , along with claims for battery and intentional infliction of emotional distress stemming from the phy sical altercation in Toronto. Kessler counter sued, alleg ing defa mation a s well as a ssault and batter y claims based on the Toronto incident. Ricca rdi settled her claims ag ainst Vande rbilt and Sandler be fore trial.
Riccar di alleg ed—and c ontinues t o claim on appeal—that Kessler unlawfully

reta liated ag ainst her by inadequately supporting her g rant-writing eff orts and by

ref using to include her on a number of his own gra

nt proposals. The dist rict court g rante d partial summ ary judgme nt to Kessler reg arding his conduct on five of the g rants, findingthat Kessler prese nted leg itimate non-reta liatory
rea sons for his ac tions and that Riccar di had n o t s h o wn a g enuine f actua l issue as to whether theNo. 08-5234

Kessler v. Ricc ardi

- 4 - stated re asons wer e pre text ual. As for his conduct on two of the r esea rch pr oj ec t s , h o weve r, the district court found that Ricc ardi e stablished a question of f act suff icient to war

rant a trial.
With the iss ue s wh itt le d do wn to Ric c ard i’ s re ma ini ng tw o a lle g a tio ns of re ta liator y c on du c t, Kessler ’s defamation claim and both of t heir personal-injury claims, the case proceede d to trial. At the clos e o f

th e e v id e n c e an d

b e f o r e th e c a s e w e n t t o th e ju r y , th e d is tr ic t c o u rt g r an te d K essler’ s motion for judgment as a matter of law on Ricc ardi’s r emaining two alleg ations of re taliation, deter mining that Ricca

rdi neither e stablished that she suffe red a ny adver se ac tion nor demonstrated that the explanations Kessler g ave f or his conduct we re pr etextual. The jury found i n Kessler ’s favor ac ross the boar d, awa rding him $15,000 in damag es for battery , $10,000 in compensatory damag es for

assault, $500,0000 i n actua l monetary damag es for defa mation, $1,500,000 in other compensatory damag es for

defa mation and $950,000 in pun itive damag es. App. 1236–39.
Riccar di f iled a post-ver dict motion for judgme nt as a matter of law, c laiming that Ke ssler failed to pre sent evidenc e of a ctual dama g es re sulting fr om the defa matory statements. In the alternative, she re quested a new trial or a remittitur of the compe nsatory and punitive damag es for defa mation. The cour

t gr anted her motion with respe ct to the $500,000 in actua l monetary damag es but de nied it a s to the other compensatory damag es and the punitive da mag es, on the c ondition that Ke ssl e r a c c e pt a

re mittit ur de c re a sin g the c omp e ns a tor y dama g e s awa

rd fr om $ 1, 50 0, 00 0 toNo. 08-5234

Kessler v. Ricc ardi

- 5 - $250,000 and the punitive dama g es aw ard f rom $9 5 0 , 000 to $250,000. Kessler a cce pted the
re mittit ur and the dis tr ic t c ourt

e nte re d a fi na l ju dg me nt.
II.
Ric c ard i f

ir st c la ims that t he d istri c t c ourt e rr e d in g ra nti ngpa rt ia l summa

ry jud g me nt t o Kessler on her r etaliation claim. Te nn es s ee s t ate law prohibits indivi duals from “ reta liat[ ing] or d i s c r i m i n a t [ i n g ] i nan y m an n e r a g a i n s ta p e r s o nb e c a

u s e s u c h p e r s o nh a s o p p o s e d a [ d i s c r i m i n a t o r

y] pr a c tic e .” Te nn. Co de Ann. § 4 -2 1- 30 1. A p la int if f a lle g ing a re ta liatio n c la im und e r t

he statut e must, as wit h a Tit le VI I claim, s how “(1) that she e ng ag ed in ac tivity protec ted by

the THRA; (2) that the exercise of

her pr otect ed civi l rig hts was known to the def endant; (3) that the def

endant there afte r took a materia lly adver se action ag ainst her; and (4) [t hat] ther e was a ca usal conne ction betwee n the protec ted ac tivity and the mate rially

adver se ac tion.” Allen v. Mc Phee , 240 S.W .3d 803, 820–21 (Tenn. 2007) . I f the plaintiff makes the re quired showing , the burde n shifts to the defe ndant “to articulate a leg itimate, non-discriminatory rea son for” the adve rse a ction. Id. at 821. And if the defe ndant satisfies that burde n, the burde n shifts ba ck to the plaintiff, who “must prese nt evidence de mon str a tin g that th e art ic ulate d r e a so n is pr e te xtua l and tha t the de fe nd ant’ s a c tio n w a s a c tua lly motivated by

a desire to retaliate ag ainst the employ ee.” Id.
Kessler does not dispute that Riccardi de monstrated the f irst two elements of he r re taliation
c la im— re po rt inghe r a lle g a tio ns to V and e rb ilt and fi lin g a c omp la int a g a ins t K e ssl e r a

mou nte d to pr ote c te d a c tiv iti e s and

Ke ssl e r k

ne w a bo ut t he m. S e e R.1 33 , 3 5. As for th e fi ve a lle g e dlyNo. 08-5234

Kessler v. Ricc ardi

- 6 - reta liatory

actions on which the district court g ra n t ed summary judgme nt, however , Riccar di’s attempt to show retaliation fa lters af ter that point.

A.
Riccar di a lleg es that Ke ssler re taliated ag ainst her by “providinginadequate assistance with” her “ Sex Diffe renc es Gra

nt proposal.” Riccardi B r. 45. The f acts, a s relayed by

Riccar di, show that
sever al m onths afte r fili ng suit, Riccar di soug ht Kessler ’s assis tance as she pr epar ed to submit the g ra nt p ro po sa l. R ic c ard i g a ve Ke ssl e r a dr a ft of the pr op os a l on

a F ri da y , b e lie vin g that do ingso would g ive Kessler

sufficie nt time over the we ekend to r eview it bef ore the Mo n d ay

submissi on deadline. Still awaiting his response on Sunday , Riccar di asked a university

employ ee to c all Kessler on her be half at about 3: 00 that afte rnoon. Ke ssler re sponded by emailing Riccar di at 4:20, telling her that he “only now had the opportunity to car efully

rea d” her g rant a nd offe ring sever al par ag raphs of comments and sug g estions. App. 726–28. T h e ei gh t y minutes he spent re viewing and commenting on the draft depar ted from his normal pr actice of spendingone to two day s review ing a g rant proposa l.
Riccar di has not shown that Kessler ’s fa ilure to respo n d more quickly —or more substantively

—constituted retaliator y

conduct. Reg ardle ss of how quickly Kessler revie wed Riccar di’s g rant, the undisputed fac ts show that he complied with her reque st to review he r dra ft and provide c omme n t s befor e the Monda y deadline. H e sug g ested wa y s Riccar di might “g ive the revie wer s g reater c onfidenc e t hat [her] study would produce signific ant re sults,” App. 726–27,No. 08-5234

Kessler v. Ricc ardi

- 7 - pointed her to rece nt scholarship in the area and highlig hted s ections that “c ould be explained more clea rly ,” App. 728. Ricc ardi ha s no evidenc e to substantiate her claim that this crit i q u e “was not meaning ful and wa s not provided in g ood faith.” Ricc . Br . 46. And thoug h Kessler ordinarily

might have spe nt more than eighty minutes revie wing g rants, R icca rdi offe rs no evidenc e to show that the explanation he offe red f or his conduct—that he had no t h ad time to revie w the g rant—wa s prete x tual. Riccar di, not Kessler, imposed the time c onstraints, and a jury could not rea sonably

infer that his decision not to spend most of the wee kend re viewing her g rant c onstitut ed re taliatory
c on du c t.
B.
Ric c ard i c la ims that K e ssl e r r e ta liate d a g a ins t he r by pr ov idi ng“ ins uf fi c ie nt a ssi sta

nc e ” wi th the g rant proposal she subm itted to the NI H t o obtain funding to study autism. Ricc. Br . 48. Kessler provided Ricca

rdi with “one pa g e” of

comments af

t er revie wing her dr aft proposa l. Ricc. Br . 49. Th e g ra nt w a s n ot f

un de d, and

the re vie we rs c omm e nte d that the ba c kg ro un d s e c tio n w a s “ dif fi c ult to follow” and “ not cog ent,” App. 721, a nd that the entire proposal needed “car eful editing,” A pp. 719. As Riccar di sees it, the r eviewe rs’ c omments demonstrate that Ke ssler re taliated ag ainst her, be c a us e he —a s an N I H g ra

nt r e vie we r h ims e lf

—s ho ul d “ h a ve wa rn e d [he r] that th e re vie we rs wo uld make suc h comments and sug g ested mea ningf ul way s to avoid such cr iticism.” Ricc. Br . 49.
Riccar di has not demonstrated that Kessler ’s supposedly inadequate assistance constitutes
an ad v er s e employ

ment action suff

icient to sustain a re taliation claim. Kessler ’s “one pag e”No. 08-5234

Kessler v. Ricc ardi

- 8 - email—too short to be helpful by Riccar di’s estimate—sug g ested tha t s he cor rec t various org aniz at ional and substantive proble ms, including some of the same pr oblems mentioned by the revie wer s. See, e .g. , App. 715–16 ( s u gges ting she edit the bac kg round sec tion to make it more

“ tig htl y fo c us e d” ). Ric c ard i of

fe rs no e vid e nc e tha

t K e ssler’s feedba c k amou nte d to an a dv e rs e action: She does not show, for example, that Kessler’ s comments on g rant proposals prior to her
c omp la int we re sig nificant ly

mor e he lpf

ul, no r d oe s sh e su g g e st w hat “ me anin g fu l” c omm e nts should have looked like.
C.
Riccar di fare s no better on he r cla im that Kessler re taliated ag ainst her by ref using to act as the “mentor

/sponsor” of he r application for a YoungI nvestig ator Aw ard sponsore d by NARSAD,
a n o r g an i z a t i o n t h a t f

u n d s p s y c h i a t r i c r e s e ar c h p r o j e c t s . T h e N A R S A D a

p p l i c a t i o n r e qu ir e s a “mento r /s p o n s o r le tt e r ” “ f r o m a no n - s it e me n to r

/s p o n s o r . . . d e s c r ib in g th e me n to r ’ s /s p o n s o r’s commitment to facilitate the spec ific re sear ch proposal.” R.82-2, 2–3. Kessler declined Ricc ardi’s
re qu e st that he a ssume that r ole , s tatin g that, i n li g ht o f t he ir str a ine d r e latio ns hip and

he r r e fu sa l “ to communicate w ith [ him] except b y email,” he “d[id] not see how [he] could eff ectively fulfill the duties require d of a Me ntor/Sponsor for this project.” App. 730. B ased on his own e x perie nce a s a member of the NA RSAD scientific counc il as well as a conver sation with a “senior me mber” of the org anization, he believed that he “would be required to disclose [ their si tuation] to NARSAD” in a Mentor/Spons or’s letter, which could have threate ned her chanc es of r ece iving the g rant. R.82, ¶ 19.No. 08-5234

Kessler v. Ricc ardi

- 9 - Riccar di challeng es the district cour t’s conclusion that these w ere leg itimate, non-reta liatory
rea sons for dec lining her

reque st. She say s that his reason for declining the mentor/sponsor role mu st be pre text ual bec ause the limit s on their communication did not hamper other pr ojects they worke d on toge ther. But evidenc e about other projec ts doe s not help her show pr etext, because the re cord shows that the NARSAD mento r /s p o n s o r r o le is mor e intensive than a n ordinary co-inve stigator role. See R. 82, ¶ 19, see also App. 729. Riccar di rejoins t hat s he did not ask Kessler to be her “mentor,” just her “se n ior collaborator,” whic h purportedly would not have r equire d as much one -to-one
c on ta c t. R ic c . B r. 51 –5 2. No matte r t he tit le , s he do e s n ot dis pu te that K e ssl e r w ou ld h a ve ha d to
su bmi t a le tte r o utl ini nghis pla

ns to s up po rt

he r p ro je c t and dis c los ingthe ir

lim ite d abil ity

to
c omm un ic a te . He r onl y re sp on se is that K e ssl e r o bta ine d mu c h o f h is und e rs tand inga bo ut t he ro le of a me ntor/sponsor from conve rsations with an undisclosed member of NARSAD, which Ricca rdi cl as s i fi es as i n ad m i s s i b l e h ea rs ay i n ap p ro p ri at e f

o r c o n s i d er at i o ni na s u m m ary j u d gm ent ruling . But be c a us e Ke ssl e r t e sti fi e d a

bo ut h is c on ve rs a tio n w itha se nio r m e mbe r o f the NA RSA D c ounc il t o show th e b as i s o f h i s b el ief that he could not help her , not for the truth of the matter a sserted, the
conver sation is not hearsay and the d i s t ri ct co u rt did not err in conside ring it. See Fe d. R. Evid. 801(c)
. D.
Ric c ard i c la ims that K e ssl e r r e ta liate d b y no t na min g he r a s a

c o- inv e sti g a tor

on his V an d e r b il t D is c o v e r

y G r an t p r o p o s a l f

o r a p r o je c t o n“ d o p a mi n e an d

d e p r e s s io n . ” Ri c c . B r . 5 5
. “ [I ]t
wa s a ve ry sma ll g ra

nt, ” Kessl er ex pl ain s, “ wi th a ve ry lim ite d b ud g e t and

on ly the ve ry mos tNo. 08-5234

Kessler v. Ricc ardi

- 10 - essential pe o p l e could be included on it,” R.89-2 at 837, he “ had to have someone fr om the psy chiatry

depar tment wh o w o u ld

r e c r u it th e depre ssed subjects” a

nd “[t] here was not enoug h money in the budg et for a

ny one else .” R.89-2 at 837. In addition, “ the g rant prog ram re quired pa rticipation by tw o V and e rb ilt

de pa rtme nts ,” so “ the
. . . inve sti g a tor on the bu dg e t [othe r t

ha n K e ssl e r] h a d to be fr om a depa

rtment other than r adiolog y ”—the de partment in which K essler a nd Riccar di worked. R.82, ¶ 23. He a dded that, at the time he prepa red the g rant, “ collaboration” with her “ had been exceptionally difficult,” presumably beca use of the restric tions plac ed on their interac tion, R.89-2 at 837, an d ex p l ai n ed that the projec t was small enoug h that he would per form the PET sca ns himself. Id. Other tha

n claiming that this g rant was related t o a larg er NI H gra nt on which she w as
a co- investigator and that she w ould have wor ked for fre e, Ricca

rdi offe rs no evidenc e to show that these non-r etaliatory

rea sons were prete x tual. Ricc. B r. 56–7.
E.
Ric c ard i a

rg ue s th a t K e ssl e r wro ng fu lly wi thd re w his su pp or t of he r “ B or de rl ine Pe rs on a lity Gra nt” proposal “ as a r esult of [her] c omplaint.” Ricc. Br
. 41–42. Acc ording to Riccardi, Ke ssler ag ree d to serve as her

co-inve stigator for the g rant in Mar ch 2005, seve ral months prior to her J une 20 05 c omp la int

to V and e rb ilt

a uth or iti e s. He re vie we d the dr a ft pr op os a l, pr ov ide d Ri c c ard i w ith fe e db a c k a

nd e ve n o ff e re d h e r m on e y

fr om h is o wn

g ra nt f un din g so that Ric c ard i c ou ld o bta in pr e lim ina ry data fo r h e r p ro po sa l. R ic c ard i fi nis he d he r p ro po sa l by June 20 05 , b ut d e c ide d to wa it to submit it until the next funding c y cle r olled around in e arly 2006.No. 08-5234

Kessler v. Ricc ardi

- 11 - As sh e pr e pa

re d t o submi t he r p ro po sa l du ri ngJanu ary

and F e br ua ry of 20 06 , Ri c c ard i, throug h Kessler ’s sec reta

ry , as k e d K e s s le r to c o n f irm that he would ser

ve as c o-principa l investigator by signingpaper

work for the proposal. Kessler ’s attorne y informed Ricc ardi that Ke ssler “[did] not int e nd to d o th is. ” Ap p. 63 5. Ric c ard i subm itt e d th e g ra nt w ith ou t K e ssl e r’ s ( or

any oth e r f a c ult y member’ s) assis tance , and the g rant was not funded. One g rant re viewer commented on he r junior status, noting her

failure to list “either an e stablished psy chiatric co-inve stigator, or a PET c oinvestigator . . . as par

t of her te am.” App. 704.
Ke ssl e r p r o v i d e s a

le g iti mate no n- re ta liator

y re a so n f or his re fu sa l. T he pr oje c t, K e ssl e r s ay s, involved administering medicine that c ould exacerbate the test subjects’ underly ing c onditions, and he wa s c on c e rn e d a

bo ut p a tie nt s a fe ty . In a dd iti on, he claims that Ric c ard i di d n ot p ro vid e him a
co p y o f t h e p ro p o s al i nJ an u ary 2 0 0 6 , s o h e c o u l d

n o t , wi t h o u tru n n i n g u

p aga i n s tet h i cs ru l es , s i gn off without thoroug hly

revie wing and understanding the “e ssential aspec ts” of her projec t. R.82, ¶ 15. These r easons must b e p re t ex u al, R icca rdi insists, because K essler r eviewe d the proposal approximately

ten month s ear lier and a g ree d to serve a s co-investig ator without any mention of safe ty or ethical conce rns. B ut this arg ument does not satisfy her bur den of showingprete x t, as she has not offe red pr oof that the proposa l remaine d in the same for m as it was i n J une 2005, claimed that she provided K essler w ith a copy of the g rant in January

2006 or shown that it would have bee n
e thi c a lly a pp ro pr iate fo r K e ssl e r t o s ig n o ff on the pr op os a l w ith ou t r e -r e vie wi ngit.
Riccar di sugg ests in her r ep l y brief that Kessler’ s safe ty conce rns about the g rant a re prete x tual beca

use Kessler “ag ree d to serve as co-investigator on two of [her] other g rants . . . whichNo. 08-5234

Kessler v. Ricc ardi

- 12 - wer e similar in nature to the [gra nt] in terms of any

potential ‘saf

ety issues. ’” R i cc . R ep l y

3. Be cause she di d not raise this point in the di strict court or in her init ial brief, she has forfeited it. See Moulton v. U.S. Stee l Corp. , 581 F.3d 344, 354 ( 6th Cir. 2009).
III
. Riccar di challeng es t h re e of the district court’s e videntiary ruling s, which we revie w for abuse of discretion. See B iegas v. Quic kway Carriers, Inc. , 573 F.3d 365, 378 ( 6th Cir. 2009).
A.
The district cour

t did not err in per

mitti ng testimony

that Riccar di told Ke ssler about he r prior sexual relationships. Though “ evide n ce o ff er ed to prove ” any

alleg ed victim’s “other

sexual behavior ” or “ sexual predisposition” is gene rally inadmi s s i b l e, the district court may allow such evidenc e if “ its probative value substantially o u t we i ghs the dang er of harm to any

victim and of unfair pr ejudice to a

ny party .” Fe d. R. Evid. 412(a) (1)–( 2), (b)( 2). Kessler ’s defe nse to Riccardi’ s alleg ations was that the two we re in a consensua l sexual relationship. Eliciting testim ony about what Riccar di told Kessler about her past sexual relationships, then, was probative a s to whether the two had the ty

pe of pe rsonal re lationship in which Ri cc ar d i woul d disclose intimate details of her persona l life. We cannot say that the district court e x cee ded its discretion in deter mi n i n g that the probative va lue of evidenc e g oing to the linchpin of Kessler ’s def ense substantially

outweig hed the potential for unf

air pre judice to Ricca

rdi.No. 08-5234

Kessler v. Ricc ardi

- 13 - Riccar di’s alternative argument that the di strict court should have excluded the evidenc e on Rule 404(b) g rounds adds no merit to he r objection. Rule 404(b) prohibits “evidenc e of othe r . . .
a c ts” “ to p ro ve the c ha

ra c te r o f a pe rs on in or de r to sho w ac tio n in con fo rm ity the re wi th. ” F e d. R. Evid. 404(b). I t does not, howeve r, bar evidenc e of prior acts for other purposes—such a s to show that Riccar di shared pe rsonal deta ils of her life w ith Kessler.
B.
Nor did the district cour

t abuse its discretion in de nying Riccar di’s motion to admit evidenc e that K e ssl e r s hif

te d a sse ts a

nd a c c ounts to h is w if

e ’s name and

so ld p ro pe rt

y aro un d th e tim e Ric c ard i ma de he r c omp la int to V and e rb ilt

a uth or iti e s. Ric c ard i su g g e sts that th e e vid e nc e sh ou ld have c ome in t o s ho w that K e ssl e r “ e ng a g e d in a patte rn or sc he me to e va de re sp on sib ili ty fo r h is
a c ti ons” on c e he su sp e c te d Ri c c ard i mi g ht b ri ngc la ims a g a ins t hi m. R ic c . B r. 69 . E ve n if thi s
e vid e nc e c ou ld h a ve sh ow n th a t K e ssl e r w ante d to “evad e re sp on sib ili ty ” by pr ote c tin g his a sse ts fr om a n unf a vo ra ble jud g me nt, it w ou ld h a ve be e n o f little re le va nc e to t he ult imate iss ue s in

thi s
case —whether

Kessler committed battery , i n tentionally inflicted emotional distress or r etaliated ag ainst Riccar di. T he district c ourt there fore did not abuse its discre tion in omi tting evide nce of such attenuate d rele vance . C.
Riccar di’s rema ining e videntiary challeng e—t h at t he district cour t incorre ctly

permitted

“ he ars ay e vid e nc e c on sis tin g of

state me nts [Kessl er] ma de to o the rs . . . th a t he ha d a n in tim a teNo. 08-5234

Kessler v. Ricc ardi

- 14 - re latio ns hip wi th [Ri c c ard i],” Ric c . B r. 63 —is un a va ili ng . Th e dis tr ic t court pe rm itt e d Ke ssl e r t o testify that he told his boss and his wife that he w as havingan affa i r, ci t i n g t he prior c onsistent statement exemption from the hea rsay rule. See Fe d. R. Evid. 801(d)(1). A n out-of-c ourt statement “consistent with” in-c ourt testimony is admissibl e under Rule 801(d)( 1) i f t he out-of- court stateme nt “is offe red to re but an express or implied char g e ag ainst the dec lara nt of re cent fabrica

tion.” Id. Th ro ug ho ut t

he tr ia l, R ic c ard i tr ie d to pr ov e that K e ssler was lyingwh e n h e c la ime d th a t th e ir
re latio ns hip ha d be e n c on se ns ua l. T he re fo re , K e ssl e r o ff e re d te sti mony

that he tol d h is w if

e and his boss of their purpor

ted aff air months be fore Riccar di complained to Vande rbilt authorities for the proper p u r

p o s e o f r e b u tt in g Ri c c ar d i’ s c la im th a t h e li e d a b o u t th e a f

f a ir to p r o te c t h imse lf. No doubt, it is possible that Kessler ma de up the aff air and confe ssed i t to those close to him to take the sting out of

Riccar di’s future se x ual har assment claims, but the theory is sufficiently

speculative that
we c ann ot s ay

the dis tr ic t c ourt

a bu se d it s d isc re tio n in

re je c tin g it.
Riccar di ge ts nowhere wi t h h er c halleng es to other witnesse s’ testimony reg ardingwhat Kessler told them about his r elationship with Ricc ardi. Be cause her attorney s did not objec t at trial to Martin Sandler’s a

nd Craig Oxford’s testimony , she has forf eited thi s argument. And bec ause he r attorney s elicited testimony from Ing rid Kessler

abo u t Ke s s ler’s out-of

-cour t statements, R.264, 756–57, Riccar di cannot now maintain the cour t erre d in allowing that testimony
. Se e Al l A m. Life & Cas. Co. v. Oceanic Trade Alliance Council Int’l, Inc. , 756 F.2d 474, 479–80 (6th Cir. 1985).

I V.No. 08-5234

Kessler v. Ricc ardi

- 15 - Riccar di next challeng es t he dis trict court’s denial of her post-verdic t motion for judgme nt
a s a matt e r of law on Ke ssl e r’ s def a matio n cla im. She c la ims that K e ssl e r d id n ot p re se nt a le g a lly sufficie nt evidentiary basis for a rea sonable jury to find that he suffere d actua l injury as a r esult of her a lleg ations, which she discusse d wi t h o t her c olleagues at Va nderbilt and re ported to the Americ an Association of University Women. (She does not contest the suff iciency of the evidenc e as t o any of the other

elements of a

defa mation claim, nor does she argue the r easona bleness of the punit ive dam a g e s awa

rd .) Ta kin g , a s w e mus t, t

he “ str on g e st l e g iti mate vie w o f t he e vid e nc e in favor of” K essler, w e may

reve rse the district c ourt’s denia l of Riccar di’s motion only if “a
rea sonable mind c ould dr aw but one conclusion”: a conc lusion in R icca rdi’s favor. Ar

ms v . S tate Farm Fire &Cas. Co. , 731 F.2d 1245, 1248 ( 6th Cir. 1984).
To rec over da

mag es on a de famation claim under Tenne ssee law , a par

ty must prove “a ctual injury ” re sulting fr om the alleg edly defa matory statements. Me mp his Publ ’g Co. v . Ni c ho ls , 569 S.W .2d 412, 417–19 (Tenn. 1978)
. “[A]ctual injury is not limit ed to out- of-poc ket loss,” and may “include impair

ment of re putation and standing in the community , persona l humili ation, and mental anguish and suffe ring .” Id. at 416. B ut “ang er, me re a nnoy ance or loss of peac e of mind” ma y not be sufficie nt to demonstrate actua l injury
. Se e Mu rra yv . Li ne be rry , 6 9 S. W.3 d 5 60 , 5 65 (T e nn . Ct
. App. 2001). Viewing the evidence in Ke ssler’s fa vor, a jury could re asonably

have c oncluded that Ke ssler
e xpe ri e nc e d s uf

fi c ie nt a nguis h, humil iati on and

su ff e ri nga s a re su lt o f R ic c ard i’ s a lle g a tio ns to amount to a compensa

ble “a ctual injury .” Kessler t estified that Ricca rdi’s alleg ations of ra

pe we reNo. 08-5234

Kessler v. Ricc ardi

- 16 - “extremely

stressful”; we re “ like a cloud that hang s over y ou and pushes y ou down and zaps y our
e ne rg y ” ; ma d e h i m “ d e p r e s s e d s o m e w h a t , an xi o u s s o m e w h a t ” an d “ u n a b l e t o w o r

k t o g e t[h is] funding g oing” ; cause d him to “wonder . . . how many jobs, positi ons [he was] not being conside red for be cause people think [he’s] a rapist, a cra zy person, a sexual harasser ”; R.242 at 101–102, and trig g ere d ong oing pr oblems sleeping at nig ht, id. at 139.
I n a dd iti on

to K e ssl e r’ s te sti mony , o the r r e c or d e vid e nc e le nt s up po rt to t he re a so na

ble ne ss of t h e j u ry ’s conc lusion that Kessler’s injuries we nt bey ond mere embar rassment, a

nnoy ance or ang er. Ricc ardi’s a lleg ations, for one , prompted a le ng thy internal investig ation into Kessler’s persona l life at Va

nderbilt
. W h en s h e rec ounted her alleg ations to the America n Association of University

Women, the org anization posted them on its website. Ke ssler’s c olleagues ra n acr oss the website a nd aler ted him to it, bol stering the leg itimacy of Ke ssler’s belief t hat t he alleg ations were widely known and that Ricc ardi’s a lleg ations had di minished his reputation. See M yers v . Picke ring Firm, Inc. , 959 S.W .2d 152, 165 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1997) ( finding actua l i n j u ry i n part be cause the evidenc e showe d that plaintiff believe d his r eputation was ta rnished by

the def amatory statements). I n li g ht o f the we b pub lic a tio n an d the int e ns ive inv e sti g a tio n p ro mpt e d b y Ric c ard i’ s c omp la int s, this case is diffe rent fr om Tennesse e ca ses in which the plaintiff suffe red only “mer e annoyance ” or “humiliation” insufficient to prove actua l injury
. See H andley v . May , 5 8 8 S
. W
. 2 d 7 72, 776–77 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1979) (no actua l injury when there was “no evidenc e whatsoeve r of a ny impairment of re putation and/or standing in the community ” and the evidenc e showed that plaintiff was “ under
me nta l st re ss a nd str a in i n d e pe nd e nt o f t

he de fa mator y utt e ra nc e ” ); Do wle n v . M

ath e ws , No. M2001-No. 08-5234

Kessler v. Ricc ardi

- 17 - 03160-COA-R3-CV, 2003 WL1129558, at *5 (Te nn. Ct. A pp. Aug . 25, 2003) (no a ctual injury from d ef en d an t ’s fa l s e s t at em e n t s ab o u ta p o l i ce o ff i ce r b ec au s e h e d i d

n o td em o n s t ra t e h arm “r i s [ i n g]
a bo ve ang e r, me re ann oy anc e or los s o f p e a c e of

min d, ” no r did

he sh owthat th e fa lse state me nts l e d t o t h e o f

f i c e r u n d e r g o i n g an“ i n t e r

n a l i n v e s t i g a t i o n , ” “ d i s c i p l i n ar y a c t i o n , ” o r

an y “ c u t s i np ay, demotions or suspensions”). B eca use the e vidence was leg ally su ff i ci en t to sustain a damag es
awa rd, the district cour

t did not err in deny

ing Ricc ardi’s motion.
V.
L astly , Riccar di claims that the district c ourt’s decision to g rant Ke ssler’s pre -ver dict motion fo r jud g me nt a s a matte r of law on Ric c ard i’ s re ma ini ng tw o a lle g a tio ns of ret ali ation—

tho se surroundingKessler ’s dec isions not t o include Ricca rdi on his “Methamphe tamine Gra nt” and on his “Risperidone Contrac t.” When revie wing a judg ment as a matter of law in a diversity case , “we apply the same standa

rds the for um state would apply ,” Tschira v. W illingham , 135 F.3d 1077, 1087 (6th Cir. 1998), which mea ns “tak[ing] the s trong est leg itimate view of the evidenc e in favor of the non-moving party , construing all evidenc e in that par ty ’s favor . . . [,] disreg arding all counter vailing evidenc e” a

nd reve rsing the judg ment “unless re asonable m i n d s co u l d rea ch only one conc lusion from the e vidence .” Johnson v. Tenne s see Farm ers Mut. Ins. Co. , 205 S.W .3d 365, 370 (Tenn. 2006). As to both the Methamphe t am i n e Gr ant and the Risperidone Contract, he r cha lleng e has merit.
A.No. 08-5234

Kessler v. Ricc ardi

- 18 - K e s s l e r s u b m i t t e d t h e M e t h a mp h e t a m i n e g r an tp r o p o s a l t o t h e N IH i nO c t o b e r 2 0 0 5
. It
name d s e ve ra l ot

he r V and e rb ilt

fa c ult y me mbers as co- inv e sti g a tor s b ut d id n ot i nc lud e Ric c ard i. At summary

judgme nt, Kessler of

fer ed two non-r etaliatory

rea sons for his conduct: (1) that Ricca rdi did not have the r equire d expertise in the g rant’s subjec t matter; and (2) that the g rant’s small budg et
c ou ld n ot acco mmo date Ric c ard i. R ic c ard i c ounte re d th a t th e se re a so ns we re pr e te xtua l, b e c a us e she had a lway s been on his g rants bef ore, e ven if she did n o t h av e t h e nece ssary expertise, and beca use, as the principal investigator, Kessler could have adjusted the budg et to include her or g iven h er t h e op p o rt u n i t y

t o wo rko nt h e gr an twi t h o u tgi v i n g h er a s al ary . Ba s edo nR i cc ar d i ’s re as o n i n g, the district court identified two issues of materia l fac t that prec luded summary judgme nt: (1) whethe r Riccar di, reg ardle ss of her le vel of e x pertise, had b ee n i n cl uded on all of K essler’ s NI H g rant proposals involving PET sc ans up until she complained to V ander bilt author ities in J une 2005; and (2 ) whe the r R ic c ard i r e a so na bly e xpe c te d th a t K e ssl e r w ou ld i nc lud e he r o n a ll o f h is g rants involving PET.
The evidenc e submitt ed at trial did not resolve these questions. Kessler te stified that from the time Riccar di be g an work at Vande rbilt in Septermber 2003 until June 2005, Ricc ardi wor ked
on ever y g rant he submitt ed. He did not refute Ricc ar d i ’s claim t hat her lack of expertise never stopped Kessler

from involving he r on projec ts prior to J une 2005 or g rapple with her point that he
c ite d o ne of

he r p a pe rs in t he g ra nt a pp lic a tio n, su g g e sti ng th a t sh e a t le a st h a d s ome e xpe rt ise to offe r the study . The e vidence prese nted at trial a lso did not settl e whe ther Ricca rdi expected to be included on all of K essler’ s PET-related g rants. Ke ssler, in fac t, l en t s o m e support to theNo. 08-5234

Kessler v. Ricc ardi

- 19 - rea sonablene ss o f h er ex pectation, ag ree ing that he “pr obably ” explained to Riccar di before she
arr ive d at V and e rb ilt

that sh e wo uld

wo rk on his g ra nts , App . 120 2. An d th ou g h K e ssl e r n owpo int s to R ic c ard i’ s te sti mony

that sh e wo rk e d o n a

no the r r e se arc he r’ s g ra

nt d ur ingtha t ti me pe ri od

to disprove the r easona

bleness of Ricc ardi’s be lief, that prove s only that she did not work solely on Kessler ’s g rants, not that she did not expect to be on all of his g rants. B eca use the same questions of fa ct that pre cluded s u m m ar y judgme nt remaine d unresolved at the close of the evidenc e, and beca use “doubt e x ist[ ed] as to the conclusions to be dra wn from [the] e v i d en ce ,” Johnson , 205 S.W .3d at 370, the jury , not the district court, should have determined whether Ricc ardi’s c laim had
me ri t.
Kessler

tries to save this par

t of the judg ment by

claiming that the linge ring questions about prete x t do not matter, bec ause Ricc ardi fa iled to show an “a dverse action” a nd there fore never established a prima facie case of retaliation. The e vidence showed that the g rant wa s never funded, Kessler argues, so fa iling to include Ricc ardi on the g rant wa s not an adve rse a cti on, as it did not hinder her in the end f

rom meetingher f

unding r equire ments. The district cour t appar ently

ag ree d, noting whe n g rantingthe Rule 5 0 m o t i o n that any “dama g e” Ricc ardi incur red w as “e there al and speculative.” App. 1232.
But Kessler

—and the district c ourt—overlooke d a cruc ial fac tual issue. The g rant mig ht not have re c e ive d f

un din g , b ut R ic c ard i te sti fi e d th a t e ve n w or kin g on an unf

un de d g ra nt p ro po sa l w ou ld have a dvance d her car eer . Fr om that, a jury rea sonably

could have found that beingexcluded from
car eer -building, a lbeit unfunded, g rant work “we ll mig ht ha ve dissuaded a re asonable worke r fr omNo. 08-5234

Kessler v. Ricc ardi

- 20 - making or supporting a char g e of di s cr i m ination,” Allen , 2 4 0 S
. W
. 3 d at 8 2 0 (q u o t i n g Burlington N o r th e rn a n d S

a n t a F e R y . Co. v . W

hit e , 548 U.S. 53, 68 (2006), and the ref ore c onstitut ed an
a dv e rs e a c tio n. Ke ssl e r’ s r a tio na le —th a t hi s a c tio ns did no t re all y harm Riccar di be cause she neve r would have r ece ived fundingfrom the g rant a ny way —contains anothe r flaw . I t is aft er -t h e- fact
rea soning that contains its own dose of speculation about whether the a ction was a dverse to Riccardi at t hetim e it occur

red. Se e Bu rli ng ton Nor the rn , 548 U. S
. at 7 2

– 7 3 (“a n indefinite suspension without pay

could well” be an adver se action “eve n if the suspende d employ ee e ventually rec eived backpa y ”).
B.
The district c ourt err ed along simil ar lines in g ranting Kessler ’s Rule 50 motion with respect to the “Risperidone Contra ct.” In Dec ember 2006, Kessler signe d the contra ct, which pr ovided funding to conduct PET sca ns of individuals wi th schizophrenia. Kessler did not seek Riccar di’s—or anyone else’s—a ssistance in pr epar ing the funding application, cla iming that “it wa s fa r s imp le r j us t to wr ite it” him self. R. 89 -2 at 13 . T he dis tr ic t c ourt de nie d s umm ary

jud g me nt,
no tin g that th e pr oje c t wa s sim ila r to oth e r wo rk he and Ric c ard i ha d wo rk e d on tog e the r and that, althoug h Kessler

prepa red the application on his ow n, another colleague, Dr. Robert Shelton, was listed as a co- investigator, which “ [gave ] ri s e t o an infere nce tha t Kessler’ s stated re ason for not including” Riccar di—“that it was just too much trouble”—wa s pretextual. R.133, 34.No. 08-5234

Kessler v. Ricc ardi

- 21 - At trial, Kessler

testified that no one other t h an h i m s el f was listed on the Risperidone Contract, purpor

tedly to provide a leg itimate non-re taliatory rea son for e x cludingRiccar di. When Riccar di’s counsel c onfronted him with the f act that Shelton was listed as a co-inve stigator with a
sa lary on the “ pr op os a l tr ans mitta l f or m,” R.2 42 a t 10 7– 09 , K e ssl e r c la ime d th a t ano the r V and e rb ilt employ ee—not he—put Shelton’s na me on the application. Even though Riccar di’s name wa s not
on th e p r o p o s a l, K e s s le r c o n ti nu e d , s h e w o u ld n o t h a v e b e e n e xc lu d e d f r o m w o r k in g on the Risperidone C o n t ra ct once work be g an on it, but work had be en dela y ed by the company

funding the pr oje c t.
Kessler ’s testimony

that noth i n g would have pr evente d Riccar di from workingon the contra ct once work be g an does not dispel the infe renc es of pr etext identified by the district court at summary judgme nt. Riccardi c laims that Kessler r etaliated a g ainst her by leavingher na

me off the proposal, and a

number of fac ts related to this complaint came out at trial that the jur y should have had the oppor

tunity t o we i gh , namely : (1) that Ricca rdi was include d on all of his PET-related pr oje c ts b e tw e e n Se pte mbe r 2 00 3 a nd June 20 05 ; (2) that he d id n ot a sk he r t o w or

k o n e ith e r o f h is PET projects af

terwa rd; (3) that the Risperidone contra ct was r elated to their other work; and (4) that
someone e lse’s name was plac ed on the pr oposal, sug g esting that he rea dily could have done what he pre viously

alway s had done: include Riccar di’s name.
Kessler opposes this conclusion on two fronts, claiming t hat a jury could not have c oncluded that K e ssl e r’ s c on du c t w a s an “ a dv e rs e a c tio n” and that Ricc ard i of fe re d n oth ingto s up po rt

he r c la im of pr e te xt. L e a vin g Ric c ard i’ s n a me of f t he pro jec t was no t an a dv e rs e a c tio n, Ke ssl e r i ns ist s,No. 08-5234

Kessler v. Ricc ardi

- 22 - beca use work on the project was delay ed. But as with the M ethamphetamine Gra nt, this reality

does
no t un de rm ine Ric c ard i’ s prima facie case . There was evidence afte r all that havingone’s name on projec ts is a car eer

benef it. As to prete x t, Kessler insists that Riccar di cannot re but a purporte d nonreta liatory

rea son for his ac tion—that he did not ex clude Ricc ardi fr om work bec ause no one had started working on the projec t. But any projec t de lay s do nothing to e liminate the harm of be ing le ft off the g r an t. T h e d is tr ic t c o u rt e r r e d w h e nit d id n o t a ll o w th e ju

r y to d e c id e th e s e li n g e r ing questions. (Ke ssler, we should note, appea rs to dispute the premise o f o u r re asoni ng , claiming that

“ Ric c ard i do e s n ot c omp la in t hat he r n a me wa s not inc lud e d on the Ris pe ri do ne Con tr a c t . . . on ly

. . . that she did not do any work on that Contract,” Kessler Br
. 40. We are not sure whe re K essler g ets this idea, as the c ited transcr ipt pag es do not mention the Risperidone Contract and our re view of the trial transcr ipt reve als nothing to that effec t. But eve n if Riccar di at some point sugg ested that sh e wa s o nly

c omp la ini nga

bo ut n ot g e tti ngto w or

k o n a y e t- to- be g in pr oj ect, the re is c e rt a inl y contra ry testimony

indicating that Kessler ’s dec ision not t o include her name on the c ontrac t formed the basis of he r complaint and he r pape rs bef ore both th e d i s t ri ct court and this court confirm a s much, see R.9 5, 38 –3 9, Ric c . B r. a t 61 , Ri c c . Re ply a t 19 (“ [Ke ssl e r’ s] r e ta liator y c on du c t w a s in excluding me f

rom the Risperidone c ontrac t proposal.”) .) Two final points. One, the re ad er may wonder why the par ties—and the district
c ourt —tr e a te d th e va

ri ou s a dv e rs e a c tio ns in thi s c a se a s d ist inc t c la ims a s o pp os e d to on e c la im w ith ag g reg ated ha

rms. We had the same question. The answ er is that this is how the parties pr esente dNo. 08-5234

Kessler v. Ricc ardi

- 23 - the ca se. And be cause the par ties chose to structur e the c ase in this manner and bec ause no pa rty has complained about this aspec t of t he case on a ppeal, we need not de cide whe ther their a ssumptions
a bo ut t he a pp ro pr iate str

uc tur ingof

thi s c a se are c or

re c t. Two, we have asked Robert Rack, the head of the Off ice of Circuit Mediators, to contac t the pa rt ie s to de te rm ine wh e the r t he y may wi shto m e diate the tw o c la ims le ft in thi s c a se . T he mand a te
as a r esult will not i ssue unt i l t h e par ties succe ssfully

mediate the c ase or

deter mine that they

no longe r wish to try

to resolve their

differ ence s throug h court-sponsor ed mediation.

V I.
For these re asons, we a ffirm the judg ment, except with respec t to the district court’s g rant of judg ment as a matter of law on the two re taliation claims tried bef ore a jury , which we reve rse a

nd
rema nd.