In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

No. 14-2402

GREGORY E. RAHN, et al.,

Plaintiffs-Appellants,

v.

BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF NORTHERN

ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY, et al.,

Defendants-Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the 

Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.

No. 1:09-cv-03033— Frederick J. Kapala, Judge.

ARGUED APRIL 13, 2015 — DECIDED SEPTEMBER 23, 2015

Before WOOD, Chief Judge, and ROVNER, Circuit Judge, and

SPRINGMANN, District Judge.*

ROVNER, Circuit Judge. Gregory Rahn (“Rahn”) and

Genemetrix, a company in which Rahn and his wife Regina

Hon. Theresa L. Springmann of the Northern District of Indiana, sitting *

by designation.
2 No. 14-2402

Rahn (hereinafter referred to simply as Regina in order to

avoid confusion with her husband) are principals, filed a

complaint in the district court against the Northern Illinois

University Board of Trustees (“NIU”) and individual Northern

Illinois University officers Promod Vohra, Omar Ghrayeb,

Bradley Bond, and Raymon Alden III, alleging discrimination

and retaliation in violation of Title VII, copyright infringement

and violations of due process. The district court dismissed the

due process claims with prejudice, and that decision is not

challenged in this appeal. The district court granted summary

judgment in favor of the defendants on the racial discrimination, retaliation, and copyright infringement claims, and the

plaintiffs now appeal those decisions. Because the claims are

factually distinct, with no real overlap, we will address the

facts underlying the claims separately. We review the district

court’s summary judgment decision in favor of the defendants

de novo, considering the facts in the light most favorable to the

plaintiffs. Seiser v. City of Chicago, 762 F.3d 647, 653 (7th Cir.

2014).

I.

We begin with the facts underlying the claim of racial

discrimination and retaliation. Rahn, who is white, alleged that

the defendants engaged in reverse discrimination in violation

of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 701 et seq.,

42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e et seq., when they failed to hire him for a

tenure-track assistant professor position at the university based

on his race.

Rahn, who earned aPhDin Industrial Engineering from the

University of Illinois, was hired as a visiting professor at NIU
No. 14-2402 3

for the 2006-2007 school year. His wife Regina was hired as a

tenure-track assistant professor intheDepartment ofIndustrial

and Systems Engineering (“ISYE”) of the College of Engineering andEngineering Technology (“College of Engineering”) for

that same school year. During that year, a tenure-track assistant professor position opened up in that Department, and

Rahn applied for that position. A search committee was

entrusted with evaluating the applicants for the position.

Regina was a member of that committee along with Dr.

Richard Marcellus, Dr. Reinaldo Moraga, Dr. Murali

Krishnamurthi and Michelle Coovert, who was a student

working as a teaching assistant for Rahn. Eighty-two applicants applied for that position, and on March 5, 2007, the

committee met to consider the applicants. At that meeting,they

voted as to the qualifications of the applicants in an effort to

winnow the applicants down to a group that would proceed to

the phone interview stage.

Despite her husband’s status as one of the applicants,

Regina remained on the search committee and participated in

the voting at that meeting. Rahn received three votes at that

meeting—from his wife Regina, his teaching assistant Coovert,

and Moraga—which was sufficient to place him in the top ten

of applicants although he was not the highest vote-getter. A

number of other candidates received three votes as well, one

candidate received five votes, and the person ultimately hired

for the position, Dr. Gary Chen, received four votes at that

meeting. 

Within days of that meeting, on March 9, 2007, Promod

Vohra, the dean of the College of Engineering, convened an

emergency meeting to inform the committee that Regina was
4 No. 14-2402

being removed from it based on the conflict of interest as the

wife of one of the applicants. That decision was consistent with

NIU Board of Trustees policy that provides that “[f]aculty and

administrative employees are selected for employment without

regard to relationship by blood or marriage” and that “no

individual shall initiate or participate in personnel decisions

involving initial employment, retention, promotion ... or other

direct benefit to an individual employee who is a member of

the same immediate family or immediate household [including] an employee’s spouse ... .” Dist. Ct. Doc. 163-16, PageID

1182. Although Rahn contends that the policy applies only to

the Board of Trustees, the language including faculty and

administrative employees belies such an interpretation, and in

any case he fails to provide any support for that contention. 

Coovert testified that at that emergency meeting, Vohra

was upset that Regina had been on the committee voting on

the potential candidates including her husband, and questioned committee member Moraga as to why he voted for

Rahn. Coovert also testified that Vohra stated that he would

not hire a white man into the department if qualified minority

candidates were available. Regina stated that she was listening

outside the door of the meeting, and similarly heard those

statements from Vohra, whereas Ghrayeb, Vohra and Moraga

testified that no such statements were made. For purposes of

summary judgment, however, we must take the testimony in

the light most favorable to Rahn.

In an effort to provide a more transparent process, Krishnamurthi developed an evaluation metric to provide a structure

for comparing the candidates. That metric set forth categories

which corresponded with the requirements set forth in the job
No. 14-2402 5

description, allowing the committee members to numerically

rank each candidate in the individual categories. Once those

scores were tallied, the resulting composite score would

facilitate comparison of candidates. The search committee was

given the opportunity to provide feedback as to the proposed

metric, and once finalized the metric was used in the evaluation of the candidates by the committee. 

Rahn argues that the metric was designed to eliminate him

from consideration, and asserts that Coovert testified to that

effect. Coovert’s testimony, however, does not support that

argument. Coovert initially stated that she believed the metric

was designed to eliminate Rahn, but upon further questioning

she clarified that she thought the metric valued academic

experience such as publishing over industry experience, and

would therefore favor those with that academic background.

She stated that as a student she valued the industry experience

that her professors such as Rahn brought to the classroom.

That testimony does not support the argument that the metric

was a subterfuge for eliminating Rahn on racial grounds. A

university employer may properly preference academic

experience, andRahnhas not even presented any evidence that

such a preference was inconsistent with the initial description

of the position and the preferred qualifications. Moreover,

Coovert did not claim to have any personal knowledge as to

the purpose or procedure of the creation of the metric, and

there was no evidence at all that Krishnamurthi or the other

members of the search committee harbored any discriminatory

intent. Rahn also failed to produce any evidence that Vohra

had any role in the creation of the metric. In fact, the defendants contend that the metric merely tracked the qualifications
6 No. 14-2402

set forth in the position description, and Rahn does not argue

otherwise. 

Rahn did not make the eventual cut of candidates, and did

not proceed to the telephone stage of the process. Regina

therefore was allowed to rejoin the committee and she participated in the interviews and the vote on the final candidates.

The committee then forwarded the proposed final candidates

to Vohra, and he made the ultimate hiring decision to choose

Chen, who was not a white male. 

Rahn subsequently filed a grievance contesting the decision

to hire Chen over him. NIU denied the grievance, and Rahn

pursued an EEOC complaint and then filed this suit alleging

race and gender discrimination, which he ultimately pared

down to simply a claim of race discrimination. He alleges that

under either the direct or indirect method of establishing

discrimination, he should survive summary judgment. 

To prevail under the direct method, a plaintiff must

produce “either direct or circumstantial evidence that would

permit a jury to infer that discrimination motivated an adverse

employment action.” Langenbach v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.,

761 F.3d 792, 802 (7th Cir. 2014). Direct evidence is evidence of

discriminatory intent without resort to inference, such as an

admission of discriminatory intent often referred to as

“smoking gun” evidence. Ripberger v. Corizon, 773 F.3d 871, 877

(7th Cir. 2014); Hutt v. AbbVie Products, LLC, 757 F.3d 687, 691

(7th Cir. 2014). Here, there is no such direct evidence. Rahn

submits that the statement by Vohra regarding hiring a

qualified minority candidate over a white one is dispositive

direct evidence that he was not hired because of his race.
No. 14-2402 7

Vohra, however, did not make the decision to eliminate Rahn

fromconsideration. The search committee, applying the factors

deemedrelevant to the job, eliminated him from consideration.

Vohra chose between the two candidates submitted to him by

the committee, but Rahn was not in that pairing. Accordingly,

the statement by Vohra is not evidence “without resort to

inference” that the hiring decision was based on his race. 

Moreover, even viewed as circumstantial evidence that

discrimination motivated the decision, it is insufficient to

survive summary judgment. “Circumstantial evidence can take

a number of forms, such as suspicious timing, behavior or

comments directed at members of the protected group,

evidence showing that similarly-situated employees outside

the protected group received systematically better treatment,

and evidence that the reason the employer gave for the adverse

action was pretextual.” Langenbach, 761 F.3d at 803. Rahn does

not allege any comments by the decision-makers directed at

white candidates, and although he argues that the committee

was influenced by Vohra’s comment, he fails to cite to any

evidence in the record to support that argument. Nor is there

evidence that the reason given for the hiring decision was

pretextual. Even before the alleged statement by Vohra which

Rahn believes tainted the process, Chen received more votes

than Rahn by the committee; and at that point, the committee

also included his wife Regina. There is, in short, no evidence in

the record at all that contradicts the claim by NIU that Chen

was more qualified for the position than Rahn, and that he was

hired for that non-discriminatory reason. In addition to a

dearth of any evidence that the search committee members

were impacted by Vohra’s views in selecting candidates to be
8 No. 14-2402

sent to him, Rahn has not contested that the candidates were

sorted by applying the criteria of the metric, and as discussed

above he has failed to argue that the metric did not accurately

reflect the legitimate qualifications of the position and was

therefore a pretextual reason for the hiring determination. 

Nor has he argued that the selection of Chen was not based

on that metric, or that it otherwise established that the reason

given was pretextual. In fact, the district court noted that Rahn

failed to address the defendants’ contention that Chen was

hired based on the determination that he was more qualified.

Although Rahn devoted significant time in the district court on

wide-ranging allegationsunrelated to his discrimination claim,

including allegations that Vohra had committed perjury and

questions as to actions taken by the university with respect to

grading issues, Rahn did not even mention the name “Chen”

in his brief and never addressed the defendants’ argument that

Chen was chosen because he was more qualified. In fact,

although Rahn testified that he was “by far the most qualified

candidate,” he acknowledged that he was unaware of the

qualifications of Chen or the other candidates. The defendants

noted in the reply brief that Rahn had therefore waived the

argument, and Rahn then attempted to file a sur-reply without

first seeking the permission of the district court. The district

court ultimately rejected the sur-reply, but the court noted that

even in the sur-reply, Rahn did not address the argument that

Chen was chosen because he was more qualified than Rahn.

The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the

defendants, holding that Rahn had failed to contest the defendants’ claim that it had a non-pretextual reason for hiring Chen

that was unrelated to race. On appeal, Rahn does not address
No. 14-2402 9

that waiver argument, and therefore cannot assert here that the

committee’s determination that Chen was more qualified was

a pretext. That dooms his claim under the indirect method as

well, because even if Rahn was able to establish a prima facie

case of discrimination under that method, he could not survive

summary judgment; the defendants set forth a legitimate

reason for choosing Chen based on the metric evaluation of his

qualifications, and Rahn has waived any argument that the

reason is pretextual. See Matthews v. Waukesha County, 759 F.3d

821, 826-27 (7th Cir. 2014).

In addition to the discrimination claim, Rahn also asserted

that NIU retaliated against him for filing his grievance by

having the NIU police force harass him and by failing to

properly investigate the grievance. The district court held that

the retaliation claim was waived because Rahn failed to

address NIU’s arguments as to that claim aside from two

sentences at the end of Rahn’s response which lacked any legal

support. On appeal, Rahn does not even address the waiver

holding, and therefore has alleged no basis to reverse the

district court on that ground. See Ripberger, 773 F.3d at 879

(perfunctory and undeveloped arguments are waived).

II.

We turn then to the copyright claims. Rahn asserts two

distinct claims of copyright infringement on appeal. The first

involves the use of a course note packet for a course in the

Department of Industrial and Systems Engineering (ISYE) of

the College of Engineering at NIU, the ISYE 100 course entitled

“Essentials of Manufacturing.” While employed as a full-time

tenured professor at NIU, Regina developed the ISYE 100
10 No. 14-2402

course notes, and those notes were utilized by a different

professor, Joe Bittorf, in teaching the course. Although Regina

initially granted him permission to use the ISYE 100 course

notes, in the Spring semester of 2007 she informed Bittorf that

she no longer wanted him to use the course notes. Nevertheless, the ISYE 100 course notes were used in the course through

the Spring semester of 2009. In addition to informing Bittorf

that he could no longer use the course notes, Regina had also

informed defendant Alden, the NIU Provost, by email in

January 2008, that NIU no longer had permission to use the

ISYE 100 course notes. The parties debate whether Regina’s

brief two-sentence statement in a four-page single-spaced

email to Alden was sufficient notice to NIU that it could no

longer use the ISYE 100 course notes, or whether NIU rather

than Regina was the real owner of any interest in the ISYE 100

course notes because they were developed in the scope of

Regina’s employment, but we need not address those issues.

The copyright claim fails for a more fundamental reason,

which is that the evidence establishes only that Regina Rahn

was the author of the ISYE 100 course notes, but Regina is not

a plaintiff in this case. According to appellants’ brief, Regina

was initially a plaintiff, but the district court severed her from

the suit pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 21. The

plaintiffs here allege that the ISYE 100 course notes were

written by Gregory and Regina Rahn as principals of

Genemetrix, and assert that the University violated copyright

law in continuing to distribute the ISYE 100 course notes after

permission to do so was rescinded. The district court rejected

that argument and held that the record indicated that Regina

was the sole author of the ISYE 100 course notes. On appeal,
No. 14-2402 11

Rahn argues only that the district court ventured beyond the

arguments for summary judgment and in doing so failed to

consider the entire record. We reject this argument. The district

court’s determination was responsive to the defendants’

argument on summary judgment that Regina was the sole

author of the ISYE 100 course notes and that they were

prepared as part of her employment. Moreover, that holding

by the district court is consistent with the record.

At the outset, it is important to identify the three documents that are referenced in this claim. The copyrighted work

at the cornerstone of the claim is entitled Trifinity Six Sigma

Series TXu001018550 (“Six Sigma Series.”) There is no dispute

that the document was authored by Gregory and Regina Rahn

who are principals in Genemetrix, and that Genemetrix owns

a valid copyright in that work. A second work entitled

“Essentials for Manufacturing Systems” was purportedly

created after the Six Sigma Series by Gregory and Regina Rahn

for consulting purposes, and is a derivative work. The relationship between the ISYE 100 course notes and the Essentials for

Manufacturing Systems, however, is unnecessarily muddled.

The district court characterized the ISYE 100 course notes as a

derivative of the Essentials for Manufacturing Solutions, which

was itself a derivative of the Six Sigma Series, and held that

because Regina created the ISYE 100 course packet with

authority from Genemetrix, she became the owner to the

copyright to that class note packet, citing Schrock v. Learning

Curve Int’l Inc., 586 F.3d 513, 524 (7th Cir. 2009) (the right to

claim copyright in a derivative work arises by operation of law

but may be altered by agreement). On appeal, Rahn treats the

two derivative works as the same document but does not
12 No. 14-2402

identify them as such. In fact, he identifies no evidence in the

record that would let us conclude that the ISYE 100 course

notes are in fact simply a copy of the Essentials for Manufacturing Systems document, and other evidence in the record

indicates at least some of the ISYE 100 course notes such as

student exercises were not part of the Essentials for Manufacturing Systems work. In addressing the district court’s characterization of the ISYE 100 course notes as a “second derivative,” (a derivative of the Essentials for Manufacturing Systems

which was itself a derivative of the copyrighted work), the

plaintiffs merely state that the existence of a second derivative

is “not substantiated” but is irrelevant because the page of the

notes contained a copyright mark with a Genemetrix logo.

Given the centrality of those documents to the claim and to the

district court’s resolution, it is incomprehensible that at this

stage of the litigation there is any doubt as to the exact composition of the documents. Even on appeal, the plaintiffs to their

detriment fail to clarify the matter, and more importantly fail

to point to any evidence in the record that does so.

First, the plaintiffs have failed to identify evidence in the

record which would demonstrate that they authored the ISYE

100 course notes. In the fact section of the brief, the plaintiffs

initially provide no cite at all for the statement that “[t]he notes

were created by Greg and Gina as principals of GMX

[Genemetrix].” In a later similar statement, they cite to documents that do not in fact contain evidence sufficient to raise a

genuine issue of fact as to that issue. First, they cite to the cover

pages for ISYE 100 coursenotes labeled Essentials for Manufacturing Book 1, Book 2, and Book 3, but no authorship is

indicated. That is followed by three pages that appear identical
No. 14-2402 13

to each other labeled Essentials for Manufacturing Systems,

each of which provides that it is written by Gregory Rahn and

Regina Rahn and contains a Genemetrix copyright. There is no

context provided for those pages, and the exhibit does not

contain the course notes themselves. Moreover, those appear

to be the cover pages for the Essentials for Manufacturing

System derivative work, which, as we discussed, appears to be

distinct from the ISYE 100 course notes. At oral argument,

neither party could even point us to the place in the record

where we could find the ISYE 100 course notes that were the

basis of the claim. In response to our request for supplemental

briefing, the defendants stated that they were unable to find

the course notes in the record, and that only the cover pages

for the three volumes of the course notes were provided in the

record. The exhibit identified by the defendants in fact contains

only the cover pages. The plaintiffs then informed us that the

ISYE 100 course notes can be found in three different exhibits

taken together. Those exhibits contain a document entitled

Essentials for Manufacturing Systems but nowhere does it

identify it as the ISYE 100 course notes. The record does not

appear to contain both the full ISYE 100 course notes and the

Essentials for Manufacturing Systems document which would

allow comparison, and the plaintiffs have not alleged that the

two are identical. The failure of the plaintiffs to clarify the

differences, if any, between those documents is significant

given the district court’s opinion that clearly considered the

documents to be distinct. Even if the citation provided by the

plaintiffs are to the ISYE 100 course notes with the cover pages

missing, that document still does not provide us with the

complete ISYE 100 course notes because the plaintiffs concede
14 No. 14-2402

that some pages of the document are missing from the record.

The failure to clearly identify documents in the record, and to

provide supporting citations for material propositions of fact,

is a recurrent problem in this case. At a minimum, in seeking

copyright protection, the plaintiffs must clearly identify the

work at issue. The plaintiffs have failed to do so here. That

alone could warrant summary judgment,but at a minimumthe

failure to identify the relevant documents in the record

precludes an argument of authorship or copyright that is based

on isolated pages of those incomplete documents. Therefore,

the pages identifying Essentials for Manufacturing Systems as

authored by Greg and Regina Rahn and copyrighted by

Genemetrix are insufficient evidence as to the authors and

copyright owners of the ISYE 100 course notes. 

The only other citation that indicates Rahn as a joint author

with Regina are emails sent by Regina to the bookstore after

the conflict with NIU over the notes had already ensued, in

which she asks how many copies have been sold and refers to

the course notes as notes authored by Rahn and herself. The

plaintiffs cite to no deposition or affidavit testimony from

Regina indicating that Rahn co-authored the course notes, and

therefore has failed to produce admissible evidence to that

effect. The plaintiffs do provide two record citations for the

statement that in 2005 or 2006, “Greg and Gina allowed GMX

[Genemetrix] professional development materials to be used in

the academic curriculum at NIU for the ... ISYE 100 course,”

but upon examination those cites also fail to support that

proposition. The first cite is a statement in the affidavit by

Regina Rahn, stating that documents from Genemetrix were

used in the preparation of the course notes. That statement
No. 14-2402 15

makes no mention as to whether copyrighted material was

used, and also fails to identify Rahn as involved in the authoring or preparation of the notes. The other cite provided for the

factual proposition is even less helpful. That citation is to a

letter from the Interim Department Chair of the Industrial

Engineering Department to Pat Foster of the University

Bookstore, stating that Regina Rahn, as the author of the course

notes, is entitled to receive any royalties from the sale of the

notes. Once again, that fails to demonstrate any connection

between the plaintiffs and the notes, nor does it indicate that

copyrighted materials were used. In his deposition, Donald

Turk, the Manager of the University Bookstore, testified that

royalties were paid for work authored by the professors for

both copyrighted and uncopyrighted materials. Moreover, by

identifying Regina Rahn as the author of the notes, without

reference to Gregory Rahn or Genemetrix, the letter in fact

disputes the proposition that the plaintiffs were authors of the

notes. Although Regina Rahn as author of the course notes

may have an interest in preventing the unauthorized distribution of her course notes, she is not a plaintiff in this case.

Gregory Rahn and Genemetrix have failed to demonstrate any

such interest. 

Nor have they presented evidence that Regina Rahn

authored the course notes in her capacity as principal of

Genemetrix. First, the course notes were prepared for classroom use, and the preparation of such materials was a part of

the duties of professors. Significantly, in providing the course

notes to the bookstore to be copied and sold, Regina Rahn

affirmatively represented that she was the sole author and that

the course notes contained no copyrighted materials. In the
16 No. 14-2402

form submitted with the notes, Regina Rahn signed a declaration which provided “I, Regina Rahn, affirm that the materials

I am submitting to be copied and sold for my class are entirely

my own original work and I have not included any copyrighted material.” Regina acknowledged in her deposition that

the signature and representation was indeed hers. The plaintiffs have failed to point to evidence in the record rebutting

that representation by Regina. If there is evidence in the record

establishing that plaintiffs have a protectible interest in the

ISYE 100 course notes and that the district court erred in

determining otherwise, they have failed to identify it. As we

have oft-stated, “we will not root through the hundreds of

documents and thousands of pages that make up the record

here to make [plaintiff’s] case for him.” Corley v. Rosewood Care

Ctr., Inc. of Peoria, 388 F.3d 990, 1001 (7th Cir. 2004); Friend v.

Valley View Community Unit School Dist. 365U, 789 F.3d 707,

710-11 (7th Cir. 2015); United States v. Dunkel, 927 F.2d 955, 956

(7th Cir. 1991) (Judges are not like pigs, hunting for truffles

buried in the briefs.”). The evidence in the record identified in

the briefs is that Regina Rahn, not the plaintiffs, authored the

ISYE 100 course notes, and she represented to the bookstore

that it contained no copyrighted materials. She is neither a

plaintiff nor a defendant in this case, and the record fails to

otherwise establish a basis for this copyright claim. Accordingly, the district court properly granted summary judgment

on this claim.

One copyright claim remains. Rahn alleges that the defendants copied Rahn’s “Risk Management” power point presentation that he prepared in order to conduct a seminar for

Exelon engineers, whichwasderived from plaintiffs’ Six Sigma
No. 14-2402 17

Series. We take our facts largely from the succinct factual

summary set forth by the district court. In the fall of 2006,

Kathleen Thigpen, the senior training specialist at Exelon,

contactedNIUandinformed Cassandra Simmons,the outreach

coordinator for the College of Engineering, that Exelon was

interested in having an NIU professor provide training for

Exelon employees on risk management. That request arose out

of a relationship that spanned several years prior to the 2006

request, whereby Exelon would provide NIU faculty and

students with industry experience in return for training and

other support from NIU. NIU and Exelon agreed in late 2006

and early 2007 that NIU would furnish the risk management

course by its employee and that Exelon would pay NIU, and

Rahn was chosen to develop and teach that course. Rahn

subsequently developed a power point presentation for that

course using materials previously developed by Regina which

Rahn considers derivative of Genemetrix’s copyrighted

materials. Exelon sought to review the materials before

agreeing to the contract, and Rahn forwarded the presentation

to Thigpen and Yousef Alaeddin, an engineer with Exelon.

They determinedthat the presentation was inadequate for their

needs, finding that the 144 slides lacked any prominent

discussion of risk management. Thigpen also expressed his

dissatisfaction that Rahn included the Genemetrix logo on the

slides given that Exelon had requested that NIU provide one

of its professors to give the presentation. Thigpen therefore

informed Simmons that they did not want Rahn to teach the

risk management course. 

Simmons then asked Rahn’s direct supervisor, Ghrayeb, to

review the presentation and he agreed with Exelon that risk
18 No. 14-2402

management was not a significant part of the presentation. In

addition, the dean of the College of Engineering, Vohra, also

reviewed the presentation. The Exelon course ultimately was

taught by another NIU professor, Dennis Cesarotti.

Rahn asserts that the defendants ’ use of his power point

presentation constituted a copyright violation. It is impossible

to discern the basis for this claim, however, because the

plaintiffs fail to cite to a single case in presenting this argument. The only legal citations in this portion of the argument

relate to the sections concerning the proper weight that the

district court should have given to certain affidavits in considering his copyright claim. As to the legal basis for the copyright

claim itself, the plaintiffsneither identify the relevant copyright

law nor do they identify the aspects of the law that the defendants allegedly violated. Instead, they devote the entirety of

this argument to speculative assertions that Rahn’s forwarding

of the power point presentation was somehow coerced, or that

the power point was distributed to competitors within NIU.

The district court properly rejected those assertions as unsupported in the record, but more fundamentally, the plaintiffs

have waived any claim as to the Exelon power point because

they have failed to cite any legal authority in support of their

argument. See Ball v. City of Indianapolis, 760 F.3d 636, 645 (7th

Cir. 2014) (plaintiff who devoted no more than three sentences

to her argument without citation to legal authority failed to

comply with Fed. R. App. P. 28(a)(8)(A) and has waived the

claim); Yasinskyy v. Holder, 724 F.3d 983, 989 (7th Cir. 2013)

(“[w]e will not entertain baseless and unsupported factual

contentions or undeveloped legal arguments”); United States v.

Lanzotti, 205 F.3d 951, 957 (7th Cir. 2000) (“perfunctory and
No. 14-2402 19

undeveloped arguments, and arguments that are unsupported

by pertinent authority, are waived”); Federal Rule of Appellate

Procedure 28(a)(8)(A).

The decision of the district court is AFFIRMED.