IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE

STATE OF DELAWARE, ) ) ) v. ) ID No. 12 050 25968A ) ) ANZARA M. BROWN, )

Defendant. ) Submitted: July 21 , 2022 Decided: October 2 6 , 2022 ORDER Upon Defendant’s Request for a Certificate of Eligibility to File Under 11 Del. C. § 4214(f) and Del. Super. Ct. Spec. R. 2017

- 1(d), DENIED . This 2 6 th day of October, 2022, upon consideration of Defendant Anzara Brown’s two filings through which he req uests, pro se , a certificate of eligibility to seek review of his sentence under Title 11, Section 4214(f) (D.I. 202 and 203 ), the Attorney General’s response thereto (D.I. 205 ), Mr. Brown’s reply ( D.I. 208), the complete record in this matter, and the applicable authorities governing such requests, it appears to the Court that: (1) Mr. Brown is serving a habitual criminal sentence on each of three separate drug and weapons co unts and non

- habitual sentences fo r other offenses that he was convicted of in his September 2013 trial. 1 More specifically , the

1 A ful ler recounting of the factual and procedural history of Mr. Brown’s crimes and resultant sentence can be found in decisions resolving Mr. Brown ’s prior attacks of his- 2

-

individual components of Mr. Brown’s current cumulative sentence are:

- D rug Dealing

- Delivery or Possession with Intent to Deliver a Tier 4 Quantity of Cocaine (IK12

- 06

- 0541) 2

— a natural life sentence at supervision Level V (to be served under the then

extant provisions of 11 Del. C. § 4214(b));

- Possession of a Deadly Weapon During the Commission of a Felony (P DW DCF) (IK12

- 09

- 0214)

— 25 years at supervision Level V (to be served under the then

- extant provisions of 11 Del. C. § 4214( a ));

- Carrying a Concealed Deadly Weapon (CCDW) ( IK1 2

- 0 9

- 021 3 )

— 2 years at supervision Level V (to be served under the then

- extant provisions of 11 Del. C. § 4214(a));

- Conspiracy Second Degree (I K 12

- 0 9

- 021 6 )

— 2 years at supervision Level V, suspended for 1 year at Level II ;

- Possession of Marijuana (I K 12

- 0 9

- 021 1 )

— 6 months at supervision Level V, suspended for 1 year at Level II

. 3 The effective date of Mr. Brown’s sentence is September 11, 2013 , with credit for three days previously served in lieu of bail

. 4

convictions and sentence

. See e.g. Brown v. State , 117 A.3d 56 8 (Del. 2015) (direct appeal); State v. Brown , 2018 WL 1702888 (Del. Super. Ct. Apr. 6, 2018 ) , aff’d , 2018 WL 6181657 (Del. Nov. 26, 2018) (first postconviction motion)

. 2 See Indictment, State v. An s ara [ sic ] M. Brown , ID No. 1205025968 (Del. Super. Ct. Sept. 4, 2012) (D.I. 3) (charging Mr. Brown with Drug Dealing

- Delivery or Possession with Intent to Deliver a Tier 4 Quantity of Cocaine in violation of then

- extant 16 Del. C. § 4752( 1 )); D EL
. C ODE A NN
. tit. 16, § § 4751C(2)(a) , 4752( 1 ) (2012) (d efining Drug Dealing

- Delivery or Possession with Intent to Deliver a Tier 4 Quantity of Cocaine and classifying it as a class B felony). 3 Corrected Sentencing Order, State v. Ansara [ sic ] M. Brown , ID No. 1205025968 (Del. Super. Ct. Dec. 16 , 201 4 ) (D.I. 79 ). 4 Corr. S entencing Order, at 1.- 3

-

(2) In short, Mr. Brown suggest s that the Court should now grant him a certificate of eligibility because he believes: (1) he meets the requirements for § 4214(f) consideration; and ( 2 ) there were legal errors in his sentencing. 5 (3) When addressing any species of sentencing reduction o r modification request, “the Court first identifies the specific procedural mechanism the inmate attempts to invoke; it must th en determine whether that mechanism is available under the circumstances.” 6 Mr. Brown asks this Court
to grant him a § 4214(f) certificate of eligibility and, in the end, reduce his
sentence to tim e - served and “ Six months transition at work

- release and or [sic] home confinement. ” 7 Within the motion he posits the Court can , via § 4214(f), change his PDWDCF sentence because, in his view, “his original § 4214(a) sentence for PDWDCF was imposed in error.” 8 (4) Mr. Brown’s protestation of some illegality of his § 421 4(a)

- enhanced PDWDCF sentence has no place in this § 4214(f) certificate

- of

eligibility proceeding. As this Court explained recently : [Section 4214(f)] is, at bottom, a truly unique vehicle for those in a very small universe

— i.e. , only those inmates that

5 D.I. 202, 203, and 208.
6 State v. Tollis , 126 A.3d 1117, 1119 (Del. Super. Ct. 2016).
7 D.I. 202 , at 10 ; D.I. 203 , at 10

. 8 D.I. 20 8 at 2 (emphasis in original); id. at 3 (complaining that application of § 4214(a) was “judicial over

- reaching in this case [that] clearly violated established standards in Habitual Offender s entencing and clashes with Delaware courts’ past decisions”); id . at 4 (accusing the State of “neatly sidestep[ping]” his claim of an illegally

- enhanced PDWDCF sentence).- 4

-

received the minimum sentence a judge was constrained to impose under the prior version of the Habitual Criminal Act

— to have their habitual sentences reviewed and the Court decide if a form of wholly discretionary relief is appropriate. 9
Tha t relief being the application of the now

- re vised Habitua l Criminal Act’s sentencing provisions to an inmate who might actually be eligible for release on the date of § 4214(f) application had the newer (reduced) habitual sentencing
structure been an option at his original sentencing. That’s it. A § 4214(f) proceeding provides no occasion to visit (or, here, revisit) 10 claims of legal error in an inmate’s sentence or sentencing proceedings. “ Indeed, just as with any other like sentence redu ction mechanism, an application for § 4214(f) review presupposes a valid conviction and sentence. ” 11 (5) And so, the Court turns to the question of whether Mr. Brown satisf ies the exacting threshold requirements for § 4214(f) eligibility

. “[ T ] o be

9 State v. P. Henry , 2022 WL 4112850, at *3 (Del. Super. Ct. Sept. 9, 2022) (emphasis in original)

. 10 Those claims fall under the Court’s Criminal Rule 35(a), which Mr. Brown has already turned to twice before in vain

. See Brown v. State , 2020 WL 609646, at *2

- 3 (Del. Feb. 7, 2020) (“Brown, by admitting he was an habitual offender under § 4214(a), arguabl y relieved the State of its burden of proof to have him declared an habitual offender under that subsection for any future felony conviction. . . . Likewise, the court was obligated to sentence Brown under § 4214(a) on the felony weapons offenses. In shor t, Brown’s sentence is not illegal.”) ; Brown v. State , 2021 WL 5984261 , at *2 (Del. Dec. 16, 2021) ( denying second motion for correction of sentence)

. 11 P. Henry , 2022 WL 4112850, at *3 (citation omitted)

. See , e.g. , State v. Walsh , 2016 WL 7191539, at *2 (Del. Super. Ct. Dec. 12, 2016) ( “ [A] motion to reduce a sentence under Rule 35(b) presupposes a valid conviction and sentence proceedings. It is not a vehicle to attack the validity of the conviction or related proceedings.” (citations omi tted) ); S tate v. Rivera , 2014 WL 3894274, at *2 (Del. Super. Ct. Aug. 11, 2014) (citing cases).- 5

-

eligible to petition for sentencing relief under § 4214( f ) , an inmate serving a sentence (or sentences) imposed under the pre

- 2016 Habitual Criminal Act must meet both a type

- of

- sentence and the time

- served requirement. ” 12 Mr. Brown may meet the first as to the drug dealing and PDWDCF convictions for which he was sentenced as a habitual criminal, 13 but he does not satisfy the second when his cumulative habitual sentences are considered

. (6) Mr. Brown was sentenced to the minimum requi red for his cocaine dealing conviction

— a term of natural life imprisonment under the then

- extant three

- strikes provision of the Habitual Criminal Act. 14 And it appears he does
meet the § 4214(f) time

- served eligibility requirement for that one conviction

. 15

12 Yelardy v. State , 2022 WL 9632128, at *2 (Del. Oct. 14, 2022) (emphasis added) (citations and quotation marks omitted); State v. Lewis , 2018 WL 4151282, at * 1

- 2 (Del. Super. Ct. Aug. 28, 2018) (describing the requirements that must be met before this Court will issue a certificate of eligibility to seek relief via 11 Del. C. § 4214(f) ), aff’d , 2019 WL 2157519 (Del. May 16, 2019)

. 13 Mr. Brown d oes not meet the type

- of

- sentence requirement for his CCDW sentence because that two

- year habitual criminal term was imposed as a matter of the sentencing judge’s discretion. See J. Henry v. State , 2022 WL 10861279 , at *1 (Del. Oct. 18, 2022) (an inmate does not satis fy the type

- of

- sentence requirement when the sentencing judge exercised his or her discretion under the pre

- 2016 version of 11 Del. C. § 4214(a) to sentence him to a term of years of incarceration that is not a minimum

- mandatory term); s ee also Clark v. State, 2018 WL 1956298, at *3 (Del. Apr. 24, 2018) (“a minimum sentence of not less than the statutory maximum penalty for a violent felo ny” means the inmate must have received the minimum sentence a judge was constrained to impose under the pre

- 2016 version of the Habitual Criminal Act; any other term imposed under that provision as a matter of the judge’s own sentencing discretion is inel igible for modification under § 4214(f) (citation omitted) )

. 14 D EL
. C ODE A NN
. tit. 11, § 4214(b) (2012) ( providing any person sentenced under then

existing § 4214(b) had to receive a natural life sentence for the triggering felony that formed the basis of the State’s habitual criminal petition). 15 Id. § 421 4 (f) (20 22 ) (providing that an inmate has met the time

- served eligibility requirement when the inmate “has served a sentence of incarceration equal to any applicable- 6

-

But “[f]or a person who is serving habitual

- offender sentences for multiple felony convictions in a single case to satisfy the time

- served requirement, each individual count must be eligible f or § 4214(f) relief.” 16 (7) Why? Recall this relief is reserved for one who might

— on the
occasion of the § 4214(f) petition’s grant

— be eligible for release from incarceration. Yet, under either of the Habitual Criminal Act ’s current provision s applicable to Mr. Brown’s PDWDCF c onviction

— § 4214(c) or § 4214( d) 17

— the minimum mandatory term of 25 years of unsuspended imprisonment would be exactly the same. 18 Simply put, he is nowhere close to time

- served eligibility for

mandatory sentence otherwise required by [the new provisions of 11 Del. C. § 4214] or the statutes d escribing said offense or offenses [for which the inmate was sentenced], whichever is greater”); id. § 4214(d) (providing now that one can be declared a habitual criminal on his third felony conviction only if each of his three separate convictions are for Title 11 violent felonies )

. T he possible minimum mandatory sentence for any current analogue to Mr. Brown’s cocaine dealing charge is capped at two years at Level V

. D EL
. C ODE A NN
. tit. 16, § 4701 et seq. (2022). 16 Yelardy , 2022 WL 9632128, at *3 (cleaned up). 17 See D EL
. C ODE A NN
. tit. 11, § 4214(c) (2022) ( providing habitual criminal sentenced for a triggering fourth felony, when that felony is a Title 11 violent felony and at least one of his priors was a Title 11 violent felony, must receive the statutory maximum for that triggering Title 11 violent felony); id. at § 4214(d) ( providing one sentenced under this provision also must receive a minimum sentence of the statutory maximum penalty provided elsewhere in Title 11 for the triggering felony (or felonies) that form the basis of the habitual criminal petition )

. PD WDCF was then and still is a class B violent felony with a statutory maximum of 25 years imprisonment

. D EL
. C ODE A NN
. tit. 11, §§ 1447, 4201(c) and 4205(b)(2) (2012)

. 18 Mr. Brown seems to suggest that n either his 1996 CCDW

- Firearm nor his 2000 CCDW

Firearm and Possession of a Firearm by a Person Prohibited (PFBPP) convictions should be considered violent Title 11 convictions when determining where in the new habitual criminal sentencing regime he would fall. See D.I. 202, at 9; D.I. 203, at 9 (referring to each as “non

violent” convictions). Not so. The definition of “violent felony” as that term is used in § 4214 is controlled by the version of § 4201(c) in effect at the time Mr. Brown committed his 2012 PDWDCF. S ee S tate v. Daniels , 2022 WL 2733509 , at *4

- 5 ( Del. Super. Ct. July 13, 2022). A nd each of those crimes w as listed then as a Title 11 violent felon y . D EL
. C ODE A NN
.- 7

-

release. ( 8 ) A s such, Mr. Brown is not eligible for relief for his drug and weapons convictions under 11 Del. C. § 4214(f) because he does not meet the statute’s
time

- served eligibility req uirement. Accordingly, Mr. Brown ’s request for a certificate of eligibility under Del aware Super ior C our t Spec ial R ule 2017

- 1(c) must be DENIED

. IT IS SO ORDERED.

P aul R. Wallace, Judge

cc: Criminal Prothonotary

– Kent County Mr. Anzara M. Brown, pro se Stephen Welch, Jr., Chief Prosecutor, Kent County

tit. 11, § 4201(c) (2012). So each woul d count as a violent felony when reckoning Mr. Brown ’ s habitual criminal slotting under the current Habitual Criminal Act.