Affirmed as Modified and Majority and Concurring and Dissenting Opinions 

filed December 15, 2022.

In The

Fourteenth Court of Appeals

NO. 14-20-00696-CV

JOSEPH BRYAN DESSENS, Appellant

V.

VICTORIA ARGEROPLOS, Appellee

On Appeal from the 280th District Court

Harris County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. 2020-19658

M A J O R I T Y O P I N I O N

Appellant Joseph Bryan Dessens (“Joseph”) appeals the trial court’s 

rendition of a lifetime protective order for stalking pursuant to former Code of 

Criminal Procedure 7A. In three issues, Joseph argues the evidence is insufficient 

to support (1) the finding that he engaged in behavior constituting stalking; 

(2) certain conditions and restrictions imposed in the protective order; and (3) the 

award of attorney’s fees to appellee Victoria Argeroplos (“Victoria”). For the 

reasons below, we modify the protective order and affirm as modified. 
2

BACKGROUND

Joseph and Victoria were married in 2013 and received a final decree of 

divorce in April 2018. After the divorce, they had no substantive contact for over a

year. 

In June 2019, Joseph sent a text message to Victoria attaching an article with 

a note suggesting that Victoria ended their relationship instead of helping Joseph

deal with his alcoholism. Joseph also accused Victoria of sleeping with her “coke 

dealer.” Victoria responded only with: “I’m not going to dignify that with a 

response.”

There was no contact between the two until March 21, 2020, when Joseph

sent the following email to Victoria and several of her friends and family members:

You started an LLC with your coke dealer. Epic. Was it rape? since 

he got you high on coke before y’all fucked while we were married? I

have no clue how to classify you fucking him after he fed you drugs.

You owe me $100k for tuition. $60k for the car. $30k for the ring.

But instead you’re fucking a Chinese commie coke dealer. How does 

it feel being a traitor?

The next day Joseph texted Victoria about contacting her employer:

Starting to spam your work about you having an llc with your coke 

dealer. You shouldn’t be so reckless while representing a company.

Call me a liar? I will send them the hair I collected. It’s been tested 

and its viable.

On March 23, 2020, Joseph emailed Victoria’s employer with the following

message: “My ex-wife Victoria [] works for you. She started a business with her 

coke dealer. Drug test her.” Victoria’s employer informed her about the email and 

Victoria filed for a protective order shortly thereafter.

In July 2020, the trial court held a hearing on Victoria’s application for a 

protective order. The trial court granted the application and rendered a final 
3

protective order on August 14, 2020. Joseph requested findings of fact and 

conclusions of law, which the trial court signed on October 13, 2020. The findings 

of fact only mention the March 22, 2020 email as evidence supporting the 

protective order.

ANALYSIS

Joseph raises three issues on appeal: (1) the evidence was legally and 

factually insufficient to prove that Joseph engaged in the offense of stalking;

(2) the evidence was legally and factually insufficient to support certain conditions 

ordered by the trial court in the protective order; and (3) the evidence was legally 

and factually insufficient to support the trial court’s award of attorney’s fees to 

Victoria. On appellate review, a trial court’s findings of fact have the same force 

and effect as a jury’s verdict. Anderson v. City of Seven Points, 806 S.W.2d 791, 

794 (Tex. 1991).

I. Statutory Background

The trial court issued the protective order against Joseph in accordance with 

Code of Criminal Procedure chapter 7A.

1 The Code of Criminal Procedure grants 

a trial court authority to issue a protective order “without regard to the relationship 

between the applicant and the alleged offender” if the applicant is a victim of

certain crimes, including stalking. See Act of May 10, 2011, 82nd Leg., R.S., ch. 

135, § 2, 2011 Tex. Gen. Laws 640, 640 (repealed 2019). A trial court “shall issue 

a protective order” if it finds that “there are reasonable grounds to believe that the 

applicant is the victim of . . . stalking.” See Act of May 10, 2011, 82nd Leg., R.S., 

ch. 135, § 4, 2011 Tex. Gen. Laws 640, 641 (repealed 2019). “Stalking” is a 

1 Since the rendition of the final protective order, the Texas legislature enacted 

non-substantive changes to the Code of Criminal Procedure and placed the provisions relating to 

protective orders for stalking in Code of Criminal Procedure article 7B. See Act of May 21,

2019, 86th Leg., ch. 469, § 1.02, 2019 Tex. Gen. Laws, 1065, 1066.
4

criminal offense under the Penal Code. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 42.072.

A person commits the offense of stalking if that person “on more than one 

occasion and pursuant to the same scheme or course of conduct that is directed 

specifically at another person, knowingly engages in conduct” that, as relevant 

here: 

(1) constitutes the offense of harassment;

(2) causes the other person . . . to feel harassed, annoyed, alarmed, 

abused, tormented, embarrassed, or offended; and 

(3) would cause a reasonable person to . . . feel harassed, annoyed, 

alarmed, abused, tormented, embarrassed, or offended.

Id. 

A person commits the offense of harassment “if, with intent to harass, 

annoy, alarm, abuse, torment, or embarrass another, the person:”

(1) initiates communication and in the course of the communication 

makes a comment, request, suggestion, or proposal that is 

obscene;

* * *

(7) sends repeated electronic communications in a manner reasonably 

likely to harass, annoy, alarm, abuse, torment, embarrass, or offend 

another[.]

Id. § 42.07. The term “obscene” is defined in the harassment statute as a 

communication “containing a patently offensive description of or a solicitation to 

commit an ultimate sex act, including sexual intercourse . . . .” Id. § 42.07(b)(3).

The term “electronic communication” is defined in the statute as including, among 

other things, communications sent via electronic mail and text messages. Id. 

§ 42.07(b)(1)(A).

Before the trial court can enter an order, it must hold a hearing to determine 
5

“whether there are reasonable grounds to believe that the applicant is the victim of

. . . stalking.” See Act of May 10, 2011, 82nd Leg., R.S., ch. 135, § 4, 2011 Tex. 

Gen. Laws 640, 641 (repealed 2019).

II. Evidence Joseph Engaged in Stalking or Harassment

In his first issue, Joseph asserts the evidence was legally and factually

insufficient to prove that he engaged in conduct constituting stalking. See Tex. 

Penal Code Ann. § 42.072. 

A. Omitted Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law

Asserting that the trial court’s findings of fact and conclusions of law 

describe only a single instance of harassment or stalking, Joseph argues that the 

final protective order is not supported by legally or factually sufficient evidence as 

it does not establish a “course of conduct” as required by the Penal Code.

Rule of Civil Procedure 299 states the following concerning the import and 

review of findings of fact:

When findings of fact are filed by the trial court they shall form the 

basis of the judgment upon all grounds of recovery and of defense 

embraced therein. The judgment may not be supported upon appeal 

by a presumed finding upon any ground of recovery or defense, no 

element of which has been included in the findings of fact; but when

one or more elements thereof have been found by the trial court, 

omitted unrequested elements, when supported by evidence, will be 

supplied by presumption in support of the judgment. Refusal of the 

court to make a finding requested shall be reviewable on appeal.

Tex. R. Civ. P. 299. The rule plainly states that findings of fact “shall form the

basis of the judgment.” Id. This does not mean that the trial court must make a 

finding as to every element of a cause of action. See id. So long as the trial court 

makes a finding as to at least one element of a cause of action, this court may

presume the trial court made implied findings as to the remaining elements. See id; 
6

see also Clinton v. Gallup, 621 S.W.3d 848, 850 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 

2021, no pet.).

Though Joseph complains on appeal that the trial court failed to make all the 

required findings, he did not make the trial court aware of this omission by 

requesting additional findings. Vickery v. Comm’n for Lawyer Discipline, 5

S.W.3d 241, 255-56 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1999, pet. denied) (“[A] 

request for additional findings is in the nature of an objection[.]”). “In a bench 

trial, the appellant may request additional findings on omitted elements to prevent 

them from being deemed on appeal.” Id. at 254; see also Tex. R. Civ. P. 298 (“any 

party may file with the clerk of the court a request for specified additional or

amended findings or conclusions”). Joseph never requested any additional or 

amended findings of fact. Therefore, we presume the trial court’s omission is 

inadvertent and we are authorized by Rule 299 to presume the trial court impliedly

made any findings, supported by the record, that are necessary to support its 

judgment.2 Vickery, 5 S.W.3d at 258; see also Tex. R. Civ. P. 299. The trial court 

made the following finding:

After almost two years post the divorce of the parties, where there was

nominal interaction. A trivial meeting after the divorce took place to 

discuss the exchange of minor personal property after divorce, 

[Joseph] engaged in the following behavior:

a. After not sleeping for 48-hour period, where Joseph [] testified, he 

was suffering from emotional problems. On March 22, 2020 at 4:48 

2 As discussed at length in Vickery, appellate courts presume the trial court impliedly 

made findings, supported by the record, because public policy supports the validity of judgments. 

Vickery, 5 S.W.3d at 251 (“[T]he presumption of validity extends to judgments derived with or 

without the benefit of a jury. In fact, the presumption of validity is perhaps even stronger in a 

bench trial where an experienced judge exercises the functions of a jury and is charged with the 

responsibility of assessing the credibility of the witnesses, logically evaluating the evidence, 

rationally resolving factual disputes on the basis of such evidence, and correctly applying the law 

to the facts”). Only when it is clear that the omission was intentional, not inadvertent, does the 

presumption not apply. Id. at 252-53.
7

a.m., Joseph [] forwarded the following text message to 7 individual 

persons who are being [Victoria’s] mother, and the others were church 

members; Godsister, childhood friend who attended elementary 

school with [Victoria], the church member, wife and children

interacted with [Victoria] on many[.]

The findings of fact describe only one email sent by Joseph to Victoria and her 

close friends and family. Because at least one element of the offense was found by 

the trial court, we may supply the omitted elements supported by the evidence. See

Tex. R. Civ. P. 299. We turn now to the evidence.

B. Standard of Review

When both legal and factual sufficiency challenges are raised on appeal, we

must first examine the legal sufficiency of the evidence. City of Houston v. Cotton,

171 S.W.3d 541, 546 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2005, pet. denied). In 

conducting a legal sufficiency review, we must consider the evidence in the light 

most favorable to the appealed order and indulge every reasonable inference that 

supports it. City of Keller v. Wilson, 168 S.W.3d 802, 822 (Tex. 2005). The 

evidence is legally sufficient if it would enable reasonable and fair-minded people 

to reach the decision under review. Id. at 827. This court must credit favorable 

evidence if a reasonable trier of fact could, and disregard contrary evidence unless 

a reasonable trier of fact could not. Id. The trier of fact is the sole judge of the 

witnesses’ credibility and the weight to be given their testimony. Id. at 819.

This court may sustain a legal sufficiency challenge only if the record 

reveals one of the following: (1) the complete absence of a vital fact; (2) the court 

is barred by rules of law or of evidence from giving weight to the only evidence 

offered to prove a vital fact; (3) the evidence offered to prove a vital fact is no 

more than a scintilla; or (4) the evidence established conclusively the opposite of 

the vital fact. Id. at 810. When the evidence offered to prove a vital fact is so 
8

weak as to do no more than create a mere surmise or suspicion of its existence, the 

evidence is less than a scintilla and, in legal effect, is no evidence. See Ford Motor 

Co. v. Ridgway, 135 S.W.3d 598, 601 (Tex. 2004).

In reviewing factual sufficiency, we must examine the entire record, 

considering both the evidence in favor of and contrary to the challenged findings.

See Mar. Overseas Corp. v. Ellis, 971 S.W.2d 402, 406-07 (Tex. 1998); Cain v. 

Bain, 709 S.W.2d 175, 176 (Tex. 1986) (per curiam). We may set aside the verdict 

for factual sufficiency only if it is so contrary to the overwhelming weight of the 

evidence as to be clearly wrong and unjust. See Mar. Overseas Corp., 971 S.W.2d 

at 407.

C. Sufficiency of the Evidence

Joseph and Victoria were the only witnesses to testify at the hearing. 

Victoria testified that nearly two years after her divorce from Joseph, she received 

the following email from Joseph:

You started an LLC with your coke dealer. Epic. Was it rape? since 

he got you high on coke before y’all fucked while we were married? I

have no clue how to classify you fucking him after he fed you drugs.

You owe me $100k for tuition. $60k for the car. $30k for the ring.

But instead you’re fucking a Chinese commie coke dealer. How does 

it feel being a traitor?

The email copied several of Victoria’s friends and family members as recipients. 

When asked if this email “alarm[ed]” her, Victoria replied “[v]ery much so.” 

According to Victoria, the following day Joseph sent her a text message 

stating that he was going to contact her employer and tell them that Victoria

“started an LLC with a coke dealer.” He also threatened to submit a viable hair 

sample of hers for testing. Joseph did, in fact, send an email to Victoria’s

employer stating they should drug test her. Victoria testified that this email to her 
9

employer made her “concerned about losing [her] job.” 

These three communications taken together illustrate a course of conduct, on 

more than one occasion, that was directed specifically at Victoria by Joseph that 

caused Victoria to feel harassed, annoyed, and alarmed and would cause a 

reasonable person to feel harassed, annoyed, and alarmed. See Tex. Penal Code

Ann. § 42.072. These emails and text communications also constitute the offense 

of harassment as the evidence at the hearing reflected that Joseph sent repeated

electronic communications in a manner reasonably likely to harass, annoy, alarm, 

abuse, torment, embarrass, or offend Victoria. See id. § 42.07. Viewing the 

evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court’s order, we hold Victoria’s

testimony, along with the electronic communications in evidence, provided more 

than a scintilla of evidence to support the trial court’s findings and imposition of a 

protective order.

We turn next to Joseph’s factual sufficiency challenge. While Joseph

testified during the hearing, he did not offer any testimony controverting Victoria’s

version of the events or the electronic communications. He admitted that he sent 

the communications, though he disputed that his motivation was to harass, annoy,

or alarm Victoria. He testified that he thought contacting her employer might help 

her to get into a rehabilitation program. He stated that when he sent the 

communications he had not slept in several days and was feeling stressed and 

isolated due to the COVID-19 pandemic and illness in his family. 

As the sole judge of the credibility of the witnesses, the trial court was free 

to accept or reject Victoria’s uncontroverted testimony, as well as Joseph’s 

testimony. See City of Keller, 168 S.W.3d at 819; In re Marriage of Moncur, 640 

S.W.3d 309, 317 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2022, no pet.). The evidence 

is not too weak to support the trial court’s findings that Joseph engaged in conduct 
10

constituting harassment and stalking, nor are the findings so against the 

overwhelming weight of the evidence as to be clearly wrong or manifestly unjust.

We conclude the evidence is factually sufficient to support the findings in the 

protective order. 

Joseph also complains the trial court did not identify the specific 

subsection(s) of the harassment statute it found he had violated in either its oral 

rendition or in its findings of fact and conclusions of law. However, Joseph’s

argument is premised on the assumption that the trial court’s findings of fact must 

identify each subsection of the statute violated, and he offers no legal authority for 

this argument. The trial court was required to find whether there were reasonable

grounds to believe that the applicant was the victim of stalking and, if the court 

made such a finding, it was required to issue a protective order. See Act of May 

10, 2011, 82nd Leg., R.S., ch. 135, § 4, 2011 Tex. Gen. Laws 640, 641 (repealed 

2019). The final protective order already included a finding that Joseph engaged in

“conduct directed specifically to [Victoria] that constitutes harassment and stalking 

as defined under Texas Penal Code § 42.07 & 42.072.” Therefore, it contained the 

findings required by statute. The trial court was not required to make a finding on 

every sub-part of the statute violated. See Nicholas v. Envtl. Sys. (Int’l) Ltd., 499 

S.W.3d 888, 894-95 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2016, pet. denied) (“The 

trial court is not required to set out in detail every reason or theory by which it 

arrived at its final conclusions. Nor is the trial court required to accept amended 

findings and conclusions that merely resolve evidentiary issues or are otherwise

unnecessary.”).

We overrule Joseph’s first issue. 

III. Conditions of the Protective Order

In his second issue, Joseph challenges the following conditions of the 
11

protective order: (1) the lifetime duration of the protective order; (2) the lifetime 

prohibition on possession of firearms; (3) the requirement that Joseph attend a 

battering intervention and protection program (“BIPP”); (4) the requirement that 

Joseph submit to a psychological evaluation; and (5) the requirement that Joseph 

submit to an alcohol evaluation. In response, Victoria argues that the trial court 

had discretion to impose all challenged conditions, as well as the attorney’s fees,

and that the trial court’s decision should be affirmed.

A. Standard of Review

We review the conditions included in a protective order for an abuse of 

discretion. In re Doe, 19 S.W.3d 249, 253 (Tex. 2000) (“The abuse of discretion 

standard applies when a trial court has discretion either to grant or deny relief 

based on its factual determinations.”); see Act of May 17, 2013, 83rd Leg., R.S., 

ch. 760, § 2, 2013 Tex. Gen. Laws 1928, 1928-29 (repealed 2019) (“[i]n a 

protective order issued under this subchapter, the court may . . . order the alleged 

offender to take action as specified by the court that the court determines is 

necessary or appropriate to prevent or reduce the likelihood of future harm”)

(emphasis added); see generally Rodriguez v. Doe, 614 S.W.3d 380, 385-86 (Tex. 

App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2020, no pet.) (noting that Family Code section 

85.022(b), which also governs protective orders, gives the trial court discretion to 

prohibit certain conduct).

A trial court abuses its discretion if it acts arbitrarily or unreasonably or 

without reference to guiding rules or principles. Berkel & Co. Contractors, Inc. v. 

Lee, 612 S.W.3d 280, 287 (Tex. 2020). Under an abuse of discretion standard, the 

legal and factual sufficiency of the evidence are relevant factors in determining

whether the trial court abused its discretion, but they are not independent grounds 

of error. See Zeifman v. Michels, 212 S.W.3d 582, 587 (Tex. App.—Austin 2006, 
12

pet. denied); see also Cox v. Walden, No. 13-20-00283-CV, 2022 WL 120014, at 

*5-6 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi Jan. 13, 2022, no pet.) (mem. op.). A trial court 

does not abuse its discretion when some evidence reasonably supports its decision. 

Butnaru v. Ford Motor Co., 84 S.W.3d 198, 211 (Tex. 2002).

B. Duration of the Protective Order

Joseph argues the evidence was factually insufficient to support the lifetime 

duration of the protective order. He acknowledges that while the statute allowed 

the trial court to issue the protective order for his lifetime, it was manifestly unjust 

to do so under the facts of the case.

The Code of Criminal Procedure allows a trial court, when the court has 

found reasonable grounds to believe the applicant is the victim of stalking, to issue 

a protective order “for the duration of the lives of the offender and victim . . . or for 

any shorter period stated in the order.” See Act of May 19, 2011, 82nd Leg., R.S., 

ch. 238, § 2, 2011 Tex. Gen. Laws 280, 281 (repealed 2019). The trial court thus 

had statutory authority to make the protective order issued in this case effective for 

Joseph’s lifetime, or for any shorter period of time in its discretion. See Straughan 

v. Girsch, No. 14-20-00763-CV, 2022 WL 2977049, at *3 (Tex. App.—Houston 

[14th Dist.] July 28, 2022, no pet.) (mem. op.).

Victoria requested the protective order be granted for the duration of

Joseph’s lifetime because she was being harassed and stalked two years after her 

divorce. She explained to the court that she did not believe that a short time period 

would be enough. The trial court agreed and set the duration of the protective

order for Joseph’s lifetime. In contrast to a protective order issued pursuant to the 

Family Code which requires certain findings be made to support a protective order 

exceeding two years in duration, there were no factors or findings required 

constraining the trial court’s discretion. Compare Act of May 19, 2011, 82nd Leg., 
13

R.S., ch. 238, § 2, 2011 Tex. Gen. Laws 280, 281 (repealed 2019) with Tex. Fam. 

Code Ann. § 85.025(a), (a-1). Therefore, we conclude this decision was within the 

trial court’s authority and the trial court had sufficient evidence on which to 

exercise its discretion.

C. Possession of a Firearm

Under the applicable statute, the trial court was permitted to prohibit the 

respondent from “possessing a firearm”. See Act of May 17, 2013, 83rd Leg., 

R.S., ch. 760, § 2, 2013 Tex. Gen. Laws 1928, 1928-29 (repealed 2019). Pursuant 

to that provision, the trial court prohibited Joseph from “possessing a firearm or 

ammunition” for the duration of his life. Challenging that condition on appeal, 

Joseph points out that the evidence at trial did not show a history of physical harm,

bodily injury, or threats of violence between himself and Victoria.3

We agree with Joseph. The record shows that Joseph never physically 

harmed or threatened to physically harm Victoria during their relationship or after 

their divorce. The record also shows that Joseph never physically harmed or 

threatened to harm Victoria’s family. Moreover, the record does not contain any 

evidence showing that Joseph has harmed or threatened to harm any person with a 

firearm. Rather, as the evidence discussed above shows, the actions at issue were 

limited to electronic communications. This evidence alone does not warrant 

prohibiting Joseph from possessing a firearm or ammunition for the duration of his 

life.

3

In his appellate brief, Joseph mentions in passing and without briefing that the lifetime 

prohibition on possessing a firearm infringes on his rights under the Second Amendment to the 

United States Constitution. See U.S. Const. amend. II. However, because Joseph did not raise 

this complaint in the trial court, he did not preserve the issue for appellate review. See Tex. R. 

App. P. 33.1(a); see also In re L.M.I., 119 S.W.3d 707, 710-11 (Tex. 2003) (holding that, to 

preserve a complaint for appellate review, including a constitutional complaint, the party must 

present the complaint to the trial court and obtain a ruling thereon). 
14

Therefore, the trial court abused its discretion when it ordered that Joseph 

was prohibited from possessing a firearm or ammunition. See In re Doe, 19 

S.W.3d at 253. We sustain Joseph’s second issue in part as to this condition of the 

protective order. 

D. Psychological Evaluation and Alcohol Assessment

Joseph also argues in his second issue that the evidence was factually and 

legally insufficient to support the conditions in the protective order requiring him

to participate in (1) a psychological evaluation, and (2) an alcohol assessment. He

acknowledges it was legally permissible for the trial court to order him to submit to 

a psychological evaluation, but argues the evidence presented at trial was so weak 

as to make it manifestly unjust. We disagree. 

The requirement that an alleged offender submit to a psychological 

evaluation or alcohol assessment is not specifically enumerated in article 7A. See

Act of May 17, 2013, 83rd Leg., R.S., ch. 760, § 2, 2013 Tex. Gen. Laws 1928, 

1928-29 (repealed 2019). However, the trial court had the power to require Joseph 

to participate in such evaluations so long as the trial court determined it was

necessary or appropriate to prevent or reduce future harm. See id. The trial court’s 

discretion to enact conditions in the protective order is limited only by the 

requirement that such conditions must be “necessary or appropriate to prevent or 

reduce the likelihood of future harm.” Id. Therefore, the trial court’s 

determination or exercise of discretion should be supported by evidence indicating 

the appropriateness or necessity of the condition. See id. 

The evidence at the hearing revealed that Joseph was struggling with 

isolation during the COVID-19 pandemic, his father’s declining cognitive health,

and his sister’s cancer diagnosis. Victoria testified that Joseph had problems with 

alcohol during their marriage, even though Joseph denied he was drinking at the
15

time he sent the electronic messages. Though Joseph claims there was no evidence 

at the hearing that he had any mental health diagnoses, the lack of an official 

diagnosis does not negate Joseph’s own testimony that when he sent the electronic 

communications to Victoria it was a stressful time and he was “going through a 

lot.” Joseph’s conduct — which the trial court found to constitute stalking — also 

raises the issue of Joseph’s psychological state. Therefore, the trial court received 

sufficient evidence at the hearing to exercise its discretion in requiring Joseph to 

submit to a psychological evaluation, and such a condition was not contrary to the 

overwhelming weight of the evidence or clearly wrong.

Similarly, Joseph argues there was no evidence presented at the hearing that 

he had consumed alcohol since the end of his marriage to Victoria. He also argues 

there was no evidence received at the hearing that alcohol was a contributing factor 

in sending the email communication to Victoria. Therefore, he argues there was no

evidence supporting the trial court’s finding that his participation in an alcohol

assessment was necessary to prevent stalking. However, given the evidence before 

the court reflecting that Joseph had struggled with alcohol or alcoholism in the 

recent past, as well as Victoria’s testimony that his abusive communications

post-divorce escalated from her experience during their marriage, we conclude the 

trial court received sufficient evidence at the hearing to exercise its discretion in 

requiring Joseph to submit to an alcohol assessment as necessary to prevent future 

harm.

We overrule Joseph’s challenge to the conditions in the protective order that

he submit to a psychological evaluation and alcohol assessment.

E. Battering Intervention and Prevention Program (“BIPP”)

Joseph further argues the evidence was legally and factually insufficient to 

support the condition in the protective order requiring him to participate in a BIPP
16

because there was no evidence at trial reflecting a history of physical harm, bodily 

injury, or threats of violence between Joseph and Victoria. Joseph argues the 18-

week program was ordered by the trial court without any basis in the evidence. 

We agree. BIPP is a program created by Texas statute to provide 

“educational services and intervention designed to help the batterers stop their 

abusive behavior.” See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 42.141 §1(7)(B). 

“Batterer” is defined as “a person who commits repeated acts of violence or who 

repeatedly threatens violence against another”. Id. §1(1).

But here, the record is devoid of any evidence showing that Joseph has 

engaged in acts of physical violence or has threatened physical violence against 

another. Without any evidence showing a nexus between the actions at issue and 

BIPP’s aims, we conclude that the imposition of this condition constitutes an abuse 

of direction. See In re Doe, 19 S.W.3d at 253.

We sustain Joseph’s second issue in part and remove the condition of the 

protective order requiring him to participate in a BIPP. 

F. Attorney’s Fees

Finally, Joseph challenges the trial court’s award of attorney’s fees and 

raises two arguments: (1) the Code of Criminal Procedure does not provide for the 

award of attorney’s fees in an application for protective order under article 7A; and 

(2) the evidence was not legally and factually sufficient to support the award.

Victoria argues that Joseph’s challenge to the award of the attorney’s fees 

should be reviewed under the abuse-of-discretion standard instead of under the 

sufficiency-of-the-evidence standard. Relying on Bocquet v. Herring, Victoria 

argues that an award of attorney’s fees is reviewed under the abuse-of-discretion 

standard. 972 S.W.2d 19, 20 (Tex. 1998). However, Bocquet discusses the 
17

limitations on the discretion of a trial court to award attorney’s fees and one of 

those requirements is that attorney’s fees must be reasonable and necessary. Id. at 

21. There also must be sufficient evidence to support the award of attorney’s fees 

as reasonable and necessary. Id. This inquiry also requires a review of both the 

discretion of the court and the evidence supporting the award. Id.

Code of Criminal Procedure Chapter 7A did not contain any provision 

allowing for the recovery of attorney’s fees. However, Chapter 7A provided that 

Family Code Title 4 applies to stalking protective orders unless the provisions of 

the two statutes conflict. See Act of May 20, 2003, 78th Leg., R.S., ch. 836, § 1, 

art. 7A.04, 2003 Tex. Gen. Laws 2622, 2623 (repealed 2019). Family Code 

chapter 81 provides the trial court with discretion to award attorney’s fees against 

the party found to have committed family violence. Tex. Fam. Code Ann. 

§ 81.005. Because he argues the trial court did not make a finding that he had 

committed family violence, Joseph asserts that Chapter 81 does not apply. 

However, Joseph did not object in the trial court to the trial court’s discretion to 

award attorney’s fees and raises only a sufficiency challenge on appeal. Therefore, 

we conclude that Joseph has waived this argument and we need not address it. See

Tex. R. App. P. 33.1.

We turn now to the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the award of 

attorney’s fees, which may be raised for the first time on appeal. See Tex. R. Civ. 

P. 324(a), (b). At the hearing, Victoria’s lawyer, Rick Ramos, testified that while 

he charges an hourly rate for his services, he only charged Victoria a flat fee of 

$2,500. He stated the amount of work he performed exceeded $2,500 in value, but 

he was only seeking a reasonable and necessary amount for filing the protective 

order. Ramos offered no estimate of the number of hours devoted to the case or 

the tasks in which he engaged. He also did not introduce any bills or fee
18

statements into evidence.

An award of attorney’s fees must be supported by evidence that the fees are 

reasonable and necessary. See Rohrmoos Venture v. UTSW DVA Healthcare, LLP,

578 S.W.3d 469, 484 (Tex. 2019) (“When fee-shifting is authorized, whether by

statute or contract, the party seeking a fee award must prove the reasonableness 

and necessity of the requested attorney’s fees.”). Rohrmoos established that the 

lodestar analysis is to be applied in any situation in which an objective calculation 

of reasonable work times a reasonable rate can be employed. Id. at 497-98.

Generally, while contemporaneous billing records are not required, legally 

sufficient evidence to establish a reasonable and necessary fee needs to include a 

description of the particular services performed, the identity of each attorney who 

and approximately when that attorney performed the services, the reasonable 

amount of time required to perform the services, and the reasonable hourly rate for 

each attorney performing the services. See id. at 497-98, 501-02, 502-03. This 

base lodestar figure constitutes a presumptively reasonable and necessary fee for 

prosecuting or defending the prevailing party’s claim through the litigation 

process. Id. at 498-502 (base lodestar accounts for most relevant considerations set 

forth in Arthur Andersen & Co. v. Perry Equip. Corp., 945 S.W.2d 812, 818 (Tex.

1997), and can be enhanced or reduced accordingly).

Without details about the work done, how much time was spent on the tasks, 

and how he justified the flat fee charged in Victoria’s case, we conclude that 

Victoria’s attorney’s testimony “lacks the substance required to uphold a fee 

award” and thus is legally insufficient. See id. at 504-05. Therefore, we sustain 

Joseph’s second issue in part as to the award of attorney’s fees. Because attorney’s

fees for family-violence protective orders are not mandatory, we cannot remand for 

a redetermination of those fees and modify the protective order accordingly. See 
19

In re K.A.M.S., 583 S.W.3d 335, 350 n.10 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2019, 

no pet.) (collecting cases addressing attorney’s fees in suit affecting the parentchild relationship).

We sustain Joseph’s second issue in part as to the award of attorney’s fees.

CONCLUSION

Having sustained Joseph’s second issue in part, we modify the final 

protective order to delete the following condition ordering that Joseph is:

9. Prohibited from possessing a firearm or ammunition, unless 

Respondent is a peace officer, as defined by section 1.07 of the Texas 

Penal Code, actively engaged in employment as a sworn, full-time 

paid employee of a state agency or political subdivision.

We also delete the following paragraph ordering that Joseph attend a BIPP:

IT IS ORDERED that Respondent register to attend a battering 

intervention and prevention program accredited under article 42.141 

of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure with AVDA (Aid to Victims 

of Domestic Violence). Respondent is ORDERED to file proof of 

registration with the Court on or before August 17, 2020 at 5:00 PM.

Finally, we delete the portion of the final protective order “awarding two thousand 

and five hundred dollars ($2,500) as reasonable attorney’s fees for the services of 

Ricardo L. Ramos” and modify the protective order to remove the entire paragraph

addressing the award of attorney’s fees.4 We affirm the final protective order as 

4The paragraph to be struck is as follows:

Attorney’s Fees

The Court finds that Joseph [] should be assessed two thousand and five 

hundred dollars ($2,500) as reasonable attorney’s fees for the services of Ricardo 

L. Ramos. IT IS ORDERED that Ricardo L. Ramos, 2001 Kirby Drive, Suite 

340, Houston, Texas 27019, Harris County, Texas is awarded judgment of two 

thousand and five hundred dollars ($2,500) for legal services rendered. The 

judgment, for which let execution issue, is awarded against Joseph []. The 

amount collected under this judgment shall be paid to Ricardo L. Ramos on or 
20

modified. See Tex. R. App. P. 43.2(b). 

/s/ Meagan Hassan

Justice

Panel consists of Justices Wise, Spain, and Hassan (Spain, J., concurring and 

dissenting).

before the sixtieth day after the date this order is signed by cash, LawPay, credit 

card payment, cashier’s check, or money order.