CLD-339 NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

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No. 16-2945

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IN RE: ROBERT R. DAVIES,

Petitioner

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On a Petition for Writ of Mandamus from the 

United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania 

(Related to W.D. Pa. Civ. No. 2:15-cv-00860; Crim. No. 2:07-cr-00436)

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Submitted Pursuant Rule 21, Fed. R. App. P.

July 7, 2016

Before: FISHER, JORDAN and VANASKIE, Circuit Judges

(Opinion filed: July 19, 2016)

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OPINION*

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PER CURIAM

Petitioner Robert Davies filed this petition for a writ of mandamus pursuant to 28 

U.S.C. § 1651, seeking (1) disqualification of the United States District Judge who 

presided over his case and vacatur of all orders entered since the motion for recusal was 

filed, and (2) reversal of his conviction and dismissal of his indictment based on a 

 

* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 

constitute binding precedent.
2

recently filed (and dismissed) third successive § 2255 motion. For the following reasons, 

we will deny the petition.

A writ of mandamus is an extreme remedy that is invoked only in extraordinary 

situations. See Kerr v. U.S. Dist. Court, 426 U.S. 394, 402 (1976). Within the discretion 

of the issuing court, mandamus traditionally may be “used . . . only ‘to confine an inferior 

court to a lawful exercise of its prescribed jurisdiction or to compel it to exercise its 

authority when it is its duty to do so.’” Id. (citations omitted). A petitioner must show 

“no other adequate means to attain the desired relief, and . . . [a] right to the writ [that] is 

clear and indisputable.’” In re Patenaude, 210 F.3d 135, 141 (3d Cir. 2000) (citing 

Rhone-Poulenc Rorer Inc. v. Home Indem. Co., 32 F.3d 851, 861 (3d Cir. 1994)).1

As an initial matter, to the extent that Davies requests that we order the District 

Court to grant his recently-dismissed third § 2255 motion, or take some other action to 

simply vacate his conviction, he is not entitled to the mandamus relief. Mandamus 

“should not be issued where relief can be obtained through an ordinary appeal.” In re 

Chambers Dev. Co., 148 F.3d 214, 223 (3d Cir. 1998) (quoting Hahnemann Univ. Hosp. 

v. Edgar, 74 F.3d 456, 462 (3d Cir. 1996)). Mandamus is only “available when necessary 

to prevent grave injustice.” Bogosian v. Gulf Oil Corp., 738 F.2d 587, 591 (3d Cir. 

1984). We still perceive no “grave injustice” with the outcome in the District Court 

 

1 Although we have the power to issue extraordinary writs, we nevertheless are chary in 

exercising that power. “Even when the petitioner shows that there is no other adequate 

means to obtain the desired relief, and also has shown a ‘clear and indisputable’ right to 

issuance of the writ, the exercise of our power is largely discretionary.” Alexander v. 
3

regarding Davies’s Fourth Amendment rights, his Sixth Amendment right to counsel, his 

right to a speedy trial, or the definition of his offense in the federal code as applied to the 

facts of his case.2 Regardless, these are all matters for a traditional appeal, not a 

mandamus petition.3

To the extent that Davies argues that recusal is proper under 28 U.S.C. § 455 on 

the basis that the impartiality of the judge presiding over his case might reasonably be 

questioned, we may consider the issue on mandamus. See In re Kensington Int’l Ltd., 

353 F.3d 211, 219-20 (3d Cir. 2003). To determine whether the extraordinary writ 

should issue, we review the decision not to recuse for abuse of discretion. Id. at 301 & 

n.12 (3d Cir. 2004). If a reasonable person, with knowledge of all the facts, would 

reasonably question a judge’s impartiality, that judge must recuse under § 455(a). See id.

at 302. Given the facts of this case, the District Judge did not need to recuse. Davies’s 

primary basis for recusal, his continued dissatisfaction with District Court legal and 

 

Primerica Holdings, 10 F.3d 155, 163 (3d Cir. 1993) (citations omitted).

2

It is worth noting that Davies has already sought the assistance of this Court multiple 

times, to no avail. This Court denied Davies’s applications for Certificates of 

Appealability concerning both first and successive § 2255 motions. 

3 Davies contends that the District Judge did not enter a final order in Civil Action 

number 15-cv-00860 concerning his third successive § 2255 motion. For case 

management purposes, both documents docketed in case number 15-cv-00860 were 

docketed in the criminal case docket instead. Based in part on this Court’s prior finding, 

on October 20, 2015, that “[j]urists of reason would not debate that the District Court 

lacked jurisdiction to consider Davies’ filings that challenged his conviction, as those 

motions were unauthorized second or successive motions to vacate his conviction,” the 

District Court ruled on the third motion and denied it in an order dated May 5, 2016, 

docketed at number 201 in Criminal Action number 07-cr-00436. This is sufficient to 

constitute a final order in Civil Action number 15-cv-00860. 
4

procedural rulings, does not require recusal. Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 555 

(1994). Furthermore, recusal is not required on the basis of “unsupported, irrational, or 

highly tenuous speculation.” In re United States, 666 F.2d 690, 694 (1st Cir. 1981). In 

this case, Davies’s allegations of (1) ex parte communications between the District Judge 

and his retained counsel and (2) the District Judge tampering with court records, as

examples, are just that. 

Finally, Davies complains at length about what can fairly be described as the 

District Judge’s case management decisions, including supposedly improperly granting 

scheduling indulgences to the government and timing certain actions and rulings to the 

purported detriment of Davies.

4

 However, this Court “accord[s] district courts great 

deference with regard to matters of case management,” Drippe v. Tobelinksi, 604 F.3d 

778, 783 (3d Cir. 2010), and “will not interfere with a trial court’s control of its docket 

except upon the clearest showing that the procedures have resulted in actual and 

substantial prejudice to the complaining litigant,” In re Fine Paper Antitrust Litig., 685 

F.2d 810, 817-18 (3d Cir. 1982).5 Davies has not met that bar.

 

4 The government noted below that Davies is a serial filer of long pleadings requiring 

frequent requests for extensions of time to prepare adequate responses.

5 Davies also faults the District Judge for ordering him to redact a pleading to omit the 

names of the underage girls who had been involved in his crime. We do not agree. As 

the District Court concluded in its analysis, Davies pleaded guilty to traveling with intent 

to engage in illicit sexual conduct with the minors, who, because they were under 18 and 

traveling in foreign commerce, were victims of a crime of sexual abuse as defined by 

law, United States v. Schneider, 801 F.3d 186, 196-97 (3d Cir. 2015), with attendant 

privacy rights under 18 U.S.C. § 3509.
5

For these reasons, the District Judge did not err in denying Davies’s motion and 

declining to recuse from hearing his case, and there is thus no need to vacate any orders 

entered by the District Judge on this basis. Moreover, we conclude that there is no other 

grounds here for an extraordinary remedy. Davies’s petition for a writ of mandamus is 

denied.