J-S28025-24 

 

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37 

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA 

 v. 

QUINTIS CLARK 

 Appellant 

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF 

 PENNSYLVANIA 

 No. 303 EDA 2024 

Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered January 4, 2024 

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at 

No(s): CP-51-CR-0009778-2016 

BEFORE: STABILE, J., MURRAY, J., and LANE, J. 

MEMORANDUM BY MURRAY, J.: FILED AUGUST 30, 2024

Quintis Clark (Appellant) appeals, pro se, from the order dismissing his 

second petition filed pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act (PCRA), 42 

Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546. We affirm. 

An exhaustive recitation of the underlying factual history is not 

necessary for disposition of the instant appeal. In short, the Commonwealth 

alleged that on May 30, 2016, Appellant participated in a burglary during 

which Appellant, acting as a principal or an accomplice, killed the 78-year-old 

victim. See N.T., 6/13/18, at 52-56 (the Commonwealth’s factual recitation); 

see also Affidavit of Probable Cause, 6/5/16, at 1. On October 24, 2016, the 

Commonwealth filed a criminal information charging Appellant with, inter alia, 

first-degree murder. 
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On June 13, 2018, Appellant entered a negotiated guilty plea to thirddegree murder, burglary, robbery, and conspiracy to commit robbery.1

 

Immediately following the plea hearing, the trial court sentenced Appellant to 

an aggregate 35 to 70 years in prison. Appellant filed an untimely postsentence motion to modify his sentence, which the trial court denied on 

October 18, 2018. Appellant did not file a direct appeal. 

On May 20, 2019, Appellant, pro se, timely filed his first PCRA petition. 

The PCRA court appointed counsel, who, on July 13, 2020, filed a “no merit” 

letter pursuant to Commonwealth v. Turner, 544 A.2d 927 (Pa. 1988), and 

Commonwealth v. Finley, 550 A.2d 213 (Pa. Super. 1988) (en banc). On 

October 26, 2020, the PCRA court issued notice of intent to dismiss Appellant’s 

PCRA petition pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 907. Appellant filed a pro se response. 

The PCRA court dismissed Appellant’s petition by orders dated December 2 

and 9, 2020.2 

On December 9, 2022, Appellant, pro se, filed the instant PCRA petition, 

his second. Therein, Appellant alleged he was entitled to withdraw his guilty 

plea and proceed to trial because 1) Appellant “was contacted by ‘Right to be 

Free’ informing [him] of the ‘dirty cops’ in Philadelphia [] resulting in [his] 

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1 See 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2502(c), 3502(a)(1), 3701(a)(1)(i), 903(a)(1), 

respectively. 

2

 The record does not disclose why the PCRA court issued two orders 

dismissing Appellant’s first PCRA petition. 
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conviction[,]” and 2) trial counsel did not “fully explain the [sentencing] 

process ... prior to sentencing due to [Appellant’s] (low) education level.” 

PCRA Petition, 12/9/22, at 4. Appellant asserted his untimely filing should be 

excused because (a) law enforcement presented “false evidence resulting in 

his plea”; (b) Appellant “was on psychotrop[]ic med[ications] at the time [he] 

pled guilty[, and he] can’t read or write”; and (c) Appellant’s trial counsel 

failed to “file [a] motion to vacate [his] sentence after [] detectives were found 

to be using illicit actions in the courts.” Id. at 3. 

On December 4, 2023, the PCRA court issued a Rule 907 notice of intent 

to dismiss Appellant’s PCRA petition. Rule 907 Notice, 12/4/23. In its notice, 

the PCRA court opined that Appellant’s second PCRA petition was untimely, 

and “does not invoke an exception to the timeliness provisions of the [PCRA].” 

Id. at 1 (unpaginated). 

On December 26, 2023, Appellant filed a response averring he was not 

“aware that his below level mental capacity[,] along with his being under the 

influence of the drugs[] Zyprexa and Benadryl[,] ... made his guilty plea 

unknowing and involuntary.” Response, 12/26/23, at 1. Appellant claimed 

he only became aware that his guilty plea was invalid after discussing the 

matter with another prison inmate. Id. Appellant further alleged the 

Philadelphia District Attorney’s Office provided him with information 

concerning “dirty officers [in the] Philadelphia Police Department.” Id.; see 

also id., Attachment (correspondence from the Philadelphia District 
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Attorney’s Office, dated February 22, 2023, stating three detectives 

“potentially having been involved in” Appellant’s case, “have or may have 

engaged in misconduct that necessitate[d] disclosure”). 

On January 4, 2024, the PCRA court issued an opinion and order 

dismissing as untimely Appellant’s second PCRA petition. Appellant timely 

appealed. The PCRA court did not order Appellant to file a concise statement 

of issues complained of on appeal. The PCRA court adopted its January 4, 

2024, opinion as its Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) opinion. 

Appellant presents the following issues: 

A. Did the PCRA court err in denying Claim 1 of Appellant’s 

PCRA petition? 

B. Did the PCRA court err in denying Claim 2 of Appellant’s 

PCRA petition? 

C. Did the PCRA court err in denying Claim 3 of Appellant’s 

PCRA petition? 

Appellant’s Brief at 2. 

 Notwithstanding Appellant’s vague Pa.R.A.P. 2116 Statement of 

Questions Involved, upon review of the arguments he presents in his brief, we 

discern Appellant challenges 1) the validity of his guilty plea, and 2) the 

Commonwealth’s failure to provide him with purportedly exculpatory 

evidence. Id. at 6-8. 

“Appellate review of a PCRA court’s dismissal of a PCRA petition is 

limited to the examination of whether the PCRA court’s determination is 

supported by the record and free of legal error.” Commonwealth v. 
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Maxwell, 232 A.3d 739, 744 (Pa. Super. 2020) (en banc) (citation and 

quotation marks omitted). 

Preliminarily, we must address the timeliness of Appellant’s PCRA 

petition. Under the PCRA, any PCRA petition, “including a second or 

subsequent petition, shall be filed within one year of the date the judgment 

becomes final....” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1). A judgment of sentence 

becomes final “at the conclusion of direct review, including discretionary 

review in the Supreme Court of the United States and the Supreme Court of 

Pennsylvania, or at the expiration of time for seeking the review.” Id. § 

9544(b)(3). The PCRA’s timeliness requirements are jurisdictional in nature, 

and a court may not address the merits of an untimely petition. 

Commonwealth v. Rienzi, 827 A.2d 369, 371 (Pa. 2003). 

 Instantly, Appellant’s judgment of sentence became final in July 2018,3

when his time for seeking direct review with this Court expired. See 42 

Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(3). As Appellant filed his second PCRA petition more than 

four years later, his petition is facially untimely. 

 However, Pennsylvania courts may consider an untimely PCRA petition 

if the petitioner satisfies one of three statutory exceptions: 

(i) the failure to raise the claim previously was the result of 

interference by government officials with the presentation of the 

claim in violation of the Constitution or laws of this Commonwealth 

or the Constitution or laws of the United States; 

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3

 Appellant’s untimely post-sentence motion did not toll the 30-day appeal 

period. See Pa.R.Crim.P. 720(A)(3). 
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(ii) the facts upon which the claim is predicated were unknown to 

the petitioner and could not have been ascertained by the exercise 

of due diligence; or 

(iii) the right asserted is a constitutional right that was recognized 

by the Supreme Court of the United States or the Supreme Court 

of Pennsylvania after the time period provided in this section and 

has been held by that court to apply retroactively. 

Id. § 9545(b)(1)(i-iii). A petition invoking an exception must be “filed within 

one year of the date the claim could have been presented.” Id. § 9545(b)(2). 

“[I]t is the petitioner’s burden to plead and prove that one of the exceptions 

applies[.]” Commonwealth v. Jones, 54 A.3d 14, 17 (Pa. 2012) (citation 

omitted). 

 Here, although Appellant does not reference the applicable statutes, he 

appears to invoke the newly-discovered fact and governmental interference 

exceptions to the PCRA’s jurisdictional time-bar. See Appellant’s Brief at 8-

9. Appellant asserts that 1) he was unaware of the contents of the written 

plea agreement until he learned to read in prison, and 2) the Commonwealth 

withheld exculpatory evidence relating to law enforcement misconduct. Id.

The newly-discovered fact exception at 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1)(ii) 

“requires a petitioner to allege and prove that there were facts unknown to 

him and that he exercised due diligence in discovering those facts.” 

Commonwealth v. Brown, 111 A.3d 171, 176 (Pa. Super. 2015). 

Concerning the newly-discovered fact exception, the entirety of 

Appellant’s argument follows: 
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It was not until 7/17/19, following several months of reading and 

comprehend[s]ion tutoring sessions[,] ... that [A]ppellant became 

able to read and understand the language that made up the plea 

agreement. Whereas, the terms and penalty are different from 

what [Appellant] was made to believe, pre-sentence. 

Appellant’s Brief at 8. 

 The PCRA court addressed Appellant’s invocation of the newlydiscovered fact exception in its Pa.R.A.P. 1925 opinion: 

 At the outset, this [c]ourt finds that [Appellant] failed to 

substantiate the alleged fact at issue and his failure to do so is 

fatal to his [newly-discovered fact exception] claim. ... [T]he only 

evidence offered in support of the alleged fact that [Appellant’s] 

guilty plea is invalid due to his purported mental incompetence is 

[Appellant’s] unsupported assertions that he was on psychotropic 

medication and could only read and write at a third[-]grade level 

at the time of the plea. ... Moreover, [Appellant’s] assertions that 

he was medicated and had poor literacy skills at the time of the 

plea, even if true, would not be sufficient to establish the alleged 

fact that [Appellant] was too mentally incompetent to consent to 

a plea agreement. ... 

 Furthermore, even if [Appellant] could substantiate the 

alleged fact at issue, his time bar claim would nonetheless fail 

because he failed to establish this purported fact was previously 

unknown. [Appellant] does not give any indication of when he 

discovered the alleged fact that he was too mentally incompetent 

to consent to his guilty plea. Moreover, [Appellant] fails to offer 

any explanation as to how his own purported mental condition 

during a 201[8] hearing that [Appellant] was present for and 

subject to could have previously been unknown to him when he 

filed the instant [PCRA p]etition more than [four] years later. 

[Appellant’s] failure to even attempt to establish that the alleged 

fact at issue was previously unknown is fatal to his time bar claim. 

PCRA Court Opinion, 1/4/24, at 2-3 (unpaginated). 

 Upon review, we agree with the PCRA court that Appellant has failed to 

plead and prove the existence of a newly discovered fact. Appellant was 
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present at (and participated in) his guilty plea hearing. Even assuming the 

truthfulness of his illiteracy claim, Appellant was aware of his illiteracy at the 

time of his plea hearing. See N.T., 6/13/18, at 18 (Appellant advising the 

trial court that he could write English and read “some” English); see also id.

at 23 (the trial court and guilty plea counsel discussing the “battery of tests 

administered” to Appellant establishing his competency). Therefore, Appellant 

failed to plead and prove the newly-discovered fact exception at subsection 

9545(b)(1)(ii). See Brown, 111 A.3d at 176; see also Commonwealth v. 

Shaw, 217 A.3d 265, 272 (Pa. Super. 2019) (holding mental illness and 

learning disabilities do not qualify as “new facts” for purposes of satisfying the 

subsection 9545(b)(1)(ii) time-bar exception). 

 Next, Appellant purports to invoke the governmental interference 

exception to the PCRA’s jurisdictional time-bar. He argues “the 

Commonwealth withheld relevant factual evidence regarding several 

investigating officers who[] contributed to [Appellant’s] case.” Appellant’s 

Brief at 8. In support of this assertion, Appellant cites to a pamphlet he 

attached to his brief, entitled “Right to Be Free,” listing 81 Philadelphia 

detectives “accused, charged, convicted, and/or ‘disciplined’ for alleged 

actions of misconduct.” See id., Attachment. Appellant claims “the 

Commonwealth was and/or should have been aware of such facts[,] and th[eir 

failure] to disclose such information violated [Appellant’s] penal interest due 

to government [i]nterference.” Id. at 9. 
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To establish the governmental interference exception under Section 

9545(b)(1)(i), “the petitioner must plead and prove the failure to previously 

raise the claim was the result of interference by governmental officials, and 

the information could not have been obtained earlier with the exercise of due 

diligence.” See Commonwealth v. Abu-Jamal, 941 A.2d 1263, 1268 (Pa. 

2008). 

 As Appellant attempts to invoke the governmental interference 

exception for the first time on appeal, his claim is waived. See 

Commonwealth v. Burton, 936 A.2d 521, 525 (Pa. Super. 2007) 

(“[E]xceptions to the [PCRA’s] time bar must be pled in the PCRA petition, and 

may not be raised for the first time on appeal.” (citations omitted)); Pa.R.A.P. 

302(a) (stating a claim cannot be raised for the first time on appeal).4

 Based on the foregoing, the PCRA court’s conclusion that Appellant’s 

second PCRA petition is untimely is supported by the record and free of legal 

error. See Maxwell, 232 A.3d at 744. Accordingly, we affirm. 

 Order affirmed. 

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4

 Even had Appellant preserved his issue, it would fail. Appellant does not 

identify 1) the officers involved in his case who were accused of misconduct; 

2) the nature of the misconduct; 3) when the misconduct occurred; 4) how 

the misconduct impacted his own prosecution; or 5) when the Commonwealth 

became aware of the misconduct. Accordingly, had Appellant preserved his 

claim, we would conclude he failed to satisfy his burden of pleading and 

proving that he was unable to previously raise the issue due to governmental 

interference. See Abu-Jamal, 941 A.2d 1268.
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Date: 8/30/2024