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lln tbe @niteD $.tates @ourt ot Jfelers, Oltig6

No. 14-138C

(Filed: March 18,2014) MAR I B 2014

U.S' COURT OF

FEDERAL CLAIMS

Pro Se; Collateral Attack on

Criminal Conviction; Sua Sponte

Dismissal for Lack of Subject

Matter Jurisdiction - RCFC

12(h)(3); Not in Interest ofJustice

to Transfer under 28 U.S.C. $

1631.

Defendant.

Tramaine Beadles, Pine Knot, KY, pro se.

Sarah M. Valenti, Trial Attorney, Commercial Litigation Branch, Civil Division, United

States Department of Justice, Washington, DC, for defendant.

OPINION AND ORDER OF DISMISSAL

CAMPBELL-SMITH, Chief Judge

Plaintiff Tramaine Beadles brings a claim against the United States seeking

release from his incarceration, the expungement of his criminal record, the retum of his

written confession, and money damages for wrongful imprisonment, loss of wages,

invasion ofprivacy, and emotional distress.

For the reasons more fully explained below, the Court of Federal Claims lacks

jurisdiction over both plaintiff s collateral attack on his criminal conviction and his tort

claim. Accordingly, the court sua sponte disrnisses plaintiff s complaint for lack of

subj ect-matter j urisdiction.

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff is a federal prisoner housed at the U.S. Penitentiary McCreary, located in

Pine Knot, Kentucky. See Compl. 1., ECF No, 1. Plaintiff brings his claim without

counsel.

TRAMAINE BEADLES,

Plaintiff,

THE {.JNITED STATES,
Plaintiff filed a complaint on February 18,20141 , 

in which he claims that various

employees'of the United States violated his "civil right of privacy/invasion ofprivacy"

and engaged in a "grand larceny conspiracy." See id. at 3 (internal quotation marks and

capitalization omitted).

Plaintiff s claim is based on an incident that occurred in December 2010 while he

was housed at CCA Leavenworth.s See id. at 3-4. Plaintiff claims that he made an

"involuntary confession" to two Federal Bureau oflnvestigation (FBI) agents regarding

a crime about which he had knowledge, and that the FBI agents then "illegally seized"

his confession, which plaintiff altemately refers to as his personal property or his

handwritten papers, and turned the confession over to a federal magistrate judge. Id. at

4. The federal magistrate judge used plaintiffs confession to issue an arrest warrant for

plaintiff, the govemment later used plaintiff s confession in securing an indictment

against him, and finally used his confession as evidence against him at his trial. See id.

at 4-5.

' The Office of the Clerk of Court sent plaintiff an application to proceed in forma

p4qpcltt upon receipt of his complaint, the granting of which would relieve plaintiff of

the obligation to pay the court's filing fee. At this time, plaintiff has not yet filed his in

forma pauperis application. Anticipating that plaintiff will complete and return the

application, the court grants the expected application for the limited purpose of

dismissing the complaint on jurisdictional grounds.

2 Plaintiff provides a long list of employees, including multiple Federal Bureau of

Investigation agents, a federal magistrate judge, a federal district courtjudge, three

judges of the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, a federal prosecutor,

multiple legal counsel, the Federal Public Defender's Office, as well as CCA

Leavenworth and the United States Senate Committee on the Judiciary. See Compl. 3,

ECF No. l In addition, plaintiff names several non-federal entities, including the

Kansas Bar Association, the Office of Professional Responsibility, and two private law

firms. See id. While the court does not interpret plaintiff s complaint as being brought

against any ofthese individuals, even if plaintiff had brought suit against any or all of

these individuals, this court would lack jurisdiction over plaintiff s claim against them.

Claims for relief against any party other than the United States, including officers of the

United States government, "must be ignored as beyond the jurisdiction of the court,"

United States v. Sherwood. 312 U.S. 584, 588 (1941); Brown v. United States, 105 F.3d

621, 624 (Fed. Cir. I 997) ("The Tucker Act grants the [United States] Court of Federal

Claims jurisdiction over suits against the United States, not against individual federal

officials.").

t CCA Leavenworth is a maximum security federal detention center in Kansas.

CCA Leavenworth Detention Center, http://cca.com,/facilities/leavenworth-detentioncenter (last visited Feb. 20.2014\.
The grand larceny of which plaintiff complains is the "seizure" of his written

confession. ld,. at4. The violation of his privacy about which plaintiff complains is the

act of the two FBI agents entering CCA Leavenworth and anesting plaintiff and

"seizing" his written confession. ld. at6-7.

Plaintiff titled his complaint a "Memorandum in Support of Tort," and he cited to

the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), 28 U.S.C. $ 1346(b) (2012), as authorizing his

claim against the United States for damages. Id. at 1. Plaintiff contends that the FBI

agents, federal judges, and federal prosecutors involved in the investigation, prosecution

and adjudication of the criminal case against him may be held liable, in their personal

capacities, when individual civil suits, such as this one, are brought. See id. at 7-8.

Plaintiff seeks the following relief:

( I ) the retum of his "illegally seized" personal property;

(2) a full "expunge[ment]" of his "entire criminal record";

(3) three trillion dollars, for inter alia, wrongful imprisonment, loss of wages,

invasion ofprivacy, and emotional distress; and

(4) release from his current imprisonment in a federal penitentiary.

See id. at 9.

LEGAL STANDARD

Complaints filed by pro se plaintiffs are held to "less stringent standards than

formal pleadings drafted by lawyers." Haines v. Kemer. 404 U.S. 519,520 (1972).

Nevertheless, "'the leniency afforded to a plq se litigant with respect to mere formalities

does not relieve [his] burden to meet jurisdictional requirements."' Zulueta v. United

States, No. 2013-5067 , 2014 WL ll420I, at *2 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (quoting Kelley v,

Sec'lz. U.S. Dep't of Labor,82F.2d 1378, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 1987)). In evaluating subjectmatter jurisdiction, "the allegations stated in the complaint are taken as true and

jurisdiction is decided on the face of the pleadings." Folden v. United States ,379 F .3d

1344, 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2004).

The court may question its own subject-matter jurisdiction at any time. Rule of

the United States Court of Federal Claims (RCFC) 12(hX3) ("lf the court determines at

any time that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, the court must dismiss the action.");

Folden, 379 F.3d at 1354 ("Subject-matter jurisdiction may be challenged at any time . .

. by the court sua sponte."). Subj ect-matter jurisdiction, which involves a court's power

to hear a case, may "never be forfeited or waived." Arbaugh v. Y&H Corp., 546 U.S.

500, 5 l4 (2006) (quoting United States v. Cotton, 535 U.S. 625, 630 (2002)).
The Tucker Act provides for this court's jurisdiction over "any claim against the

United States founded either upon the Constitution, or any Act ofCongress or any

regulation ofan executive department, or upon any express or implied contract with the

United States, or for liquidated or unliquidated damages in cases not sounding in tort."

28 U.S.C. $ 1a91(a)(1) (2012) (emphasis added).

"This Court lacks jurisdiction to consider claims which amount to collateral

attacks on criminal convictions." See Perkins v. United States, No. 13-023C,2013 WL

3958350, at *3 (Fed. Cl. July 31,2013) (citing Carter v. United States,228Ct. Cl. 898,

900 (1981)" (rejecting claim, under various constitutional provisions, for money

damages and correction of criminal records, and holding that "Ii]fplaintiff had valid

constitutional defenses to his convictions on criminal charges, he should have asserted

them on appeal in the proper court. This is not such a court and he cannot here be heard

to make a collateral attack on his convictions under the suise of a claim for monev

damages.")).

While this court has jurisdiction to hear a claim for money damages for unjust

conviction, such jurisdiction is dependent on the challenged conviction first having been

reversed, set aside, overtumed after a new trial or hearing, or the prisoner having

received apardon. See 28 U.S.C. $$ 1495,2513(a)(1) (2012); see. e.s., Sharoe v.

United States, 112 Fed. Cl. 468, 477 (2013).

The United States district courts have exclusive jurisdiction over claims brought

under the Federal Tort Claims Act. See 28 U.S.C. $ 1346(b)(l) (2012); see. e.s., Evans

v. United States,249Fed. App'x.201,203 (Fed. Cir.2007).

III. DISCUSSION

The court considers whether it has jurisdiction over plaintiff s claim, and if not,

whether it would be in the interest ofjustice to transfer plaintiff s claim to a federal

district court in which the claim could have been brought.

A. Court of Federal Claims Jurisdiction

Plaintiff points to the Federal Tort Claims Act as authorization for his claim, see

' The United States Court ofAppeals for the Federal Circuit established the

holdings of the Court of Claims issued before the close ofbusiness on September 30,

1982 as precedent for the Federal Circuit. See South Corp. v. United States , 690 F .2d

1368, 1370 (1982). Accordingly, Ca(er is binding precedent in this court.
Compl. I, basing his claim on the acts of various govemment employees, see id. at 3-5.

But, the acts about which he complains are the "seizure" ofhis written confession and

his later arrest, and the injury for which he seeks relief is the criminal conviction that has

resulted in his current incarceration. Plaintiffs grievances are wholly and inextricably

related to his criminal conviction.

Plaintiffs claim is a collateral attack on his criminal conviction, and this court

lacks jurisdiction to hear it. See Carter,228Ct.Cl. at900.

Assuming that plaintiff had brought a valid Federal Tort Claims Act claim, this

court would still lack j urisdiction to hear it. As statutorily provided, the district courts

have exclusive jurisdiction over tort claims for money damages against the United

States. 28 U.S.C. $ 1346(bXl) ("[T]he district courts . . . shall have exclusive

jurisdiction of civil actions on claims against the United States, for money damages, . . .

for injury or loss ofproperty. . . caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omission of

any employee of the Government while acting within the scope of his office or

employment . . . .").

Plaintiff makes no allegation that his conviction has been reversed, set aside,

overturned after a new trial or hearing, or that he has received a pardon. Rather, the

front page of plaintiff s complaint lists his address as the U.S. Penitentiary McCreary,

see Compl. 1, and among his requests for relief is his release from the same, see id. at 9.

Accordingly, even if the court contrued plaintiff s claim for damages ofunjust

conviction as being brought under 28 U.S.C. $$ 1495,2513, the court still would lack

jurisdiction over the claim.

A review of the complaint discloses that plaintiff has made no claim over which

this court has jurisdiction.

B. Transfer Under 28 U.S.C. $ 163l

When this court determines that it lacks jurisdiction, it must transfer the case to a

court where the action could have been brought, if the transfer "is in the interest of

justice." 28 U.S.C. $ 1631 (2012).

Proper venue in a district court is defined by statute, which provides that a civil

action may be brought in "ajudicial district in which a substantial part of the events . . .

giving rise to the claim occurred." 28 U.S.C. g 1391(b)(2) (2012).

The events of which plaintiff complains occurred at CCA Leavenworth in

Kansas. See Compl. 3-4. Plaintiff was convicted and sentenced in the United States

District court for the District of Kansas and appealed his sentence, unsuccessfully, to the

United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit. See id. at 3; Beadles v. United
States, 508 Fed. App'x. 807, 809-10 (lOth Cir. 2013). The district court to which this

matter could be transfened, if in the interest ofjustice, is the U.S. District Court for the

District of Kansas, which sits in the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals.

Under Tenth Circuit precedent, however, it is clear that the Federal Tort Claims

Act is not an appropriate vehicle for challenging the validity ofan outstanding criminal

judgment. See Parris v. United States, 45 F.3d 383, 385 (1Oth Cir. 1995). Mr. Panis

was an incarcerated plaintiff who brought an action under the Federal Tort Claims Act

for alleged attomey malpractice during his district court criminal trial. See id. at 384.

The Tenth Circuit said that while Mr. Panis' claim was "couched in terms of negligence,

he [was] actually seeking further review of the basis for his conviction," through his

allegations ofthe use of false and fabricated evidence to convict him. Id. As the Tenth

Circuit explained.

The FTCA . . . creates liability for certain torts committed by government

officials. As such, we conclude the same common law principles that

informed the Supreme Court's decision in Heck should inform the decision

of whether an action under the FTCA is cognizable when it calls into

question the validity of a prior conviction. We conclude the FTCA . . . is

"not [an] appropriate vehicle[ ] for challenging the validity of outstanding

criminal judgments."

Id. at 385 (quoting Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477,486 (1994)).

The court cannot find that justice would be seryed by transferring plaintiff s

collateral attack on his criminal conviction, brought under the guise of a FTCA claim, to

a district court that does not recognize the FTCA as an appropriate vehicle for

challenging a criminal conviction. For this reason, the undersigned declines to transfer

plaintiffs complaint to a federal district court.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the court finds that it lacks jurisdiction over plaintiff s

claims. Plaintiff s complaint is DISMISSED without prejudice. The clerk of court

will enter judgment for defendant. No costs.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

ATRICIA E:

ChiefJudge