[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advanc e sheets, it may be cited as State ex rel. Cox v. Youngstown Civ. Serv. Comm. , Slip Opinion No. 2021-Ohio-2799.]

NOTICE This slip opinion is subject to f ormal revision before it is pu blished in an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports. Readers are reques ted to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohi o, 65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before the opinion is published.

S LIP O PINION N O
. 2021-O HIO -2799
T HE S TATE OF O HIO EX REL
. C OX ET AL
. v . Y OUNGSTOWN C IVIL S ERVICE C OMMISSION ET AL
. [Until this opinion appears in t he Ohio Official Reports advanc e sheets, it

may be cited as State ex rel. Cox v. Youngstown Civ. Serv. Comm. , Slip Opinion No. 2021-Ohio-2799.] Mandamus—Procedendo—After the entry of a final order of an administrative officer, agency, board, department, tribunal, commission, or other instrumentality, the period of time within which the appeal shall be perfected, unless otherwise pr ovided by law, is 30 days—A public body creates an entry through the act of making or entering a record—Writs
denied. (No. 2020-0821—Submitted May 11, 2021—Decided August 18, 2021.)
I N M ANDAMUS and P ROCEDENDO

.

_________________ Per Curiam. {¶ 1} In this original action, relato r Michael R. Cox, a detective se rgeant with the city of Youngstown poli ce department, seeks a writ of mandamus or,S UPREME C OURT OF O HIO

2 alternatively, a writ of proced endo, ordering respondents, the Youngstown Civil Service Commission, its president, James Messenger, its vice pr esident, John Spivey, and its secretary, Alfre d Fleming (collectively, “Young stown”), to (1) conduct an evidentiary hearing on his appeal of the mayor’s appointment of another detective sergeant to the position of lieutenant, (2) e nter a final, appealable order on the appeal, and (3) serve him with a written copy of t hat order. We note that Cox’s complaint includes the city of Youngstown as an addi tional relator. But because his merit brief focuses exclusively on himself, we will limit our focus accordingly. For the reasons that follow, we deny the writs.
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND {¶ 2} The Youngstown Civil Service Commission “prescribe[s], amend[s] and enforce[s] rules consistent with the provisions of the civi l service laws of the
state of Ohio and in accordance with the Home Rule Charter of t he City of Youngstown.” Youngstown Civil Se rvice Commission Rule (“YCSCR” ) II(1). {¶ 3} In June 2018, Cox, along with several other detective sergeants , sat for an exam administered by the commission. The exam was given to establish a
list of candidates who would be eligible to be promoted to the position of lieutenant. Following the exam, Cox and other examinees submitted written p rotests to the commission, questioning the exam’ s fairness. The commission re sponded to the protests by making an adjustment t o the exam grades, after whic h Cox ranked third on the eligibility list. {¶ 4} On May 14, 2019, the city’s mayor, acting as the appointing aut hority, appointed to the position of lieutenant, Detective Sergeant War d, the examinee who
ranked first on the e ligibility list. {¶ 5} On May 20, 2019, Cox appealed the mayor’s appointment to the commission, renewing his concern th at the exam was administered unfairly. The commission addressed Cox’s appe al at its June 19, 2019 regular meeting. At the meeting, Cox and his counsel pre sented arguments to the commiss ion. TheJanuary Term, 2021

3 commission determined, however, that Cox was not entitled to an evidentiary hearing. The meeting minutes s how that one of the commissioner s described Cox’s appeal as an attempt to “micromanage” the manner in which the c ommission had
administered the exam. The commissioner added that the commiss ion had read everything that Cox had submitted in support of his appeal and noted that any
further relief would have to com e from a court, not the commiss ion. {¶ 6} On July 17, 2019, Youngstown approved the minutes from its June 19, 2019 meeting, and those minutes state that “Michael Cox’s c ase has been concluded.” No party disputes t hat the commission never person ally served Cox with the minutes from the June 19 meeting. {¶ 7} On May 14, 2020, Cox’s counsel filed with the commission a “Mot ion for Entry of Final Appealable O rder and Motion for Reconsiderat ion.” On June 17, 2020, the commission held its re gular monthly meeting, wherein it told Cox that it would not be taking further action on his appeal. {¶ 8} On July 6, 2020, Cox filed with this court a complaint (later a mended) seeking a writ of mandamus or, alternatively, a writ of procede ndo, to (1) compel the commission to convene an evidentiary hearing, (2) issue a f inal, appealable order determining his appeal, a nd (3) serve him with that order . Cox also sought declaratory relief. Because par t of Cox’s mandamus claim inclu ded allegations bearing on a taxpayer action, see R.C. 733.58, 733.59, and 733.61, Cox filed an application asking this court to determine whether he needed to provide additional financial security. Youngstown filed its answer and moved for judgment on the pleadings. Cox thereafter asked this court to strike certain p aragraphs from Youngstown’s answer. {¶ 9} We granted Youngstown’s motion fo r judgment on the pleadings as to Cox’s request for declaratory relief but denied it with resp ect to Cox’s mandamus and procedendo claims and deter mined that Cox lacked standing t o bring a taxpayer action. 160 Ohio St.3d 1513, 2020-Ohio-6834, 159 N.E.3d 1175. We furtherS UPREME C OURT OF O HIO

4 denied Cox’s application for a determination of additional secu rity as moot, denied his motion to strike, and gran ted an alternative writ. Id

. {¶ 10} The parties have submitted evidence and filed briefs in accorda nce with S.Ct.Prac.R. 12.05. And Cox has filed a motion to strike some of Youngstown’s evidence or, alternatively, for leave to file a su pplemental affidavit
to rebut that evidence.
II. ANALYSIS
A. Cox’s mandamus claim {¶ 11} To prevail on his mandamus claim, Cox must establish a clear le gal right to the requested relief, a clear legal duty on the part o f the commission to provide it, and the lack of an a dequate remedy in the ordinary course of the law.
See State ex rel. Waters v. Spaeth , 131 Ohio St.3d 55, 2012-Ohio-69, 960 N.E.2d 452, ¶ 6. {¶ 12} Cox argues that the commission’s rules require it to afford him an evidentiary hearing; issue a final, appealable order that deter mines his appeal; and
serve him with that order. 1 {¶ 13} Section 52 of the city’s charter p rovides that “[a]ll of the pr ovisions
of the Revised Code of the Stat e of Ohio relating to Municipal Civil Service are hereby adopted and made a part of this Charter.” Ohio law, in turn, provides that a “municipal civil service commissi on shall prescribe, amend, and enforce rules” applicable to, among other things , “examinations” and “promotio ns” of civilservice positions. R.C. 124.40(A). {¶ 14} By commission rule, when a vacancy in a position above entry gr ade arises, the vacancy “shall normally be filled by promotion, fol lowing competitive exams, from among persons already employed in lower classes of positions.”

1. Cox argues in passing that R.C. 124.34 provides a supplemen tal basis for relief; however, his failure to develop that argument means that he has waived his r ight to have this court consider it. See Navistar, Inc. v. Testa , 143 Ohio St.3d 460, 2015-Ohio-3283, 39 N.E.3d 509, ¶ 39 (coll ecting cases).January Term, 2021

5 YCSCR V(8). After the commission conducts an exam, it prepares an eligibility list of those achieving a passing sc ore, “arranged in descendin g order of the final score attained,” YCSCR V(15). See also YCSCR VI(1) and (6). For those in the city’s police department, the appointing authority shall appoin t “the person having the highest standing on the eligibility list.” YCSCR VI(6). T he mayor holds the power of appointment. YCSCR I. {¶ 15} “If an employee disagrees with an action of the Appointing Authority, the employee shall have ten (10) days within which t o file a written appeal of that action to the Civ il Service Commission.” YCSCR XII(3). A “filing of a notice of appeal with the Commission is the only act neces sary to initiate an appeal.” Id . “Each party may call witnesses to testify” at the hearing on an employee’s appeal, and all parties “shall be notified in writin g of the Commission’s
decision.” Id

. {¶ 16} Those rules thus establish that after an employee perfects his appeal from the appointing authority’s action, the commission acquires a clear legal duty to hold an evidentiary hearing, make a decision, and notify the employee in writing
of that decision. Id . Because Cox filed a written appeal to the commission within ten days of Ward’s appointment, he has established a clear lega l right to the procedures set forth in YCSCR XII(3) and a clear legal duty on the part of the commission to provide them.
1. Final order {¶ 17} We begin by addressing whether the commission has failed to perform its duty to enter a final order on Cox’s appeal of the mayor’s appointment. {¶ 18} Under Ohio law, “every final order, adjudication, or decision o f any * * * commission * * * of any political subdivision of the stat e may be reviewed by the court of common pleas of the county in which the princip al office of the political subdivision is located as provided in Chapter 2505. o f the Revised Code.” R.C. 2506.01(A). A “final order, adjudication, or decision” is defined as “an order,S UPREME C OURT OF O HIO

6 adjudication, or decision that det ermines rights, duties, privi leges, benefits, or legal relationships of a person.” R .C. 2506.01(C). “After the entry of a final order of an administrative officer, agency, board, department, tribunal, co mmission, or other instrumentality, the period of time within which the appeal sha ll be perfected, unless otherwise provided by l aw, is thirty days.” R.C. 2505.0 7. 2 {¶ 19} Youngstown does not dispute that the subject matter of Cox’s ap peal bore on his “rights, duties, privileges, benefits, or legal rel ationships” within the meaning of R.C. 2506.01(C). And though Cox contests the manner in which the commission determined his appeal, it clearly did so, for the mi nutes from the commission’s June 19, 2019 meeting establish that it rejected h is appeal. Indeed, the final sentence of the approved minutes states: “Michael Cox ’s case has been
concluded.” {¶ 20} Our decision in State ex rel. Hanley v. Roberts , 17 Ohio St.3d 1, 4, 476 N.E.2d 1019 (1985), establishes th at the commission’s appro val of its minutes from the June 19, 2019 meeting c onstituted a final order within the meaning of R.C. 2506.01 and 2505.07. There, we considered what form a civil-se rvice-commission order must take to become final within the meaning of former R. C. 2506.01 and 2505.07. In doing so, we quoted approvingly from the trial cou rt’s observation in
Grimes v. Cleveland , 17 Ohio Misc. 193, 195-196, 243 N.E.2d 777 (C.P.1969), that the “ ‘form of written entry of a decision of an administrative board should be the written minutes of its meeting at which the decision was render ed.’ ” Hanley at 4-
5.

2. Cox suggests in passing that R.C. 119.12 and 124.34(B) also bear on this court’s analysis. But “R.C. Chapter 119 applies only to state agencies.” (Emphasis sic.) Crawford-Cole v. Lucas Cty. Dept. of Job & Family Servs. , 121 Ohio St.3d 560, 2009-Ohio-1355, 906 N.E.2d 409, ¶ 38; accord Lewis v. Parkinson , 1 Ohio App.3d 22, 24, 437 N.E.2d 1215 (10th Dist.1981) (“hold [ing] that there is no right of appeal from an order of a municipal civil servic e commission under R.C. 119.12”). And R.C. 124.34(B) applies to a “removal” or “reduction”—neithe r of which occurred here. See Lewis at 23-24 (holding that R.C. 124.34 creates a right of appeal o nly in cases involving disciplinary removals or reductions).January Term, 2021

7 {¶ 21} Cox argues that the commission’s minutes should set forth forma l criteria akin to that typically found in a judicial order. But the decision he relies on for that proposition, A.M.R. v. Zane Trace Local Bd. of Edn. , 2012-Ohio-2419, 971 N.E.2d 457, ¶ 23 (4th Dist.), declined to adopt such a rule, an d we otherwise find no statutory support for the argument. {¶ 22} In summary, because the commission’ s minutes are its “final ord er” rejecting Cox’s appeal, R.C. 2506.01(A) and (C), we conclude th at Cox’s request for a writ of mandamus ordering the commission to issue a decis ion determining his appeal is moot. See State ex rel. Jerninghan v. Cuyahoga Cty. Court of Common
Pleas , 74 Ohio St.3d 278, 279, 658 N.E.2d 723 (1996) (“A writ of man damus will not lie to compel an act already performed”).
2. Service of the commission’s final order {¶ 23} Next, we consider Cox’s argument that he must be served with th e commission’s decision, claiming that without service, he cannot pursue an appeal in the court of common pleas. T here is no genuine dispute that the commission failed to serve him, for Youngstown concedes that “Cox was not personally served” with a copy of the minutes and Youngstown points to no other ev idence establishing that Cox was otherwise provided written notification of the min utes. Nor does Youngstown point to an adequate legal remedy by which Cox could compel the commission to perform the requi rements of YCSCR XII(3). {¶ 24} Even so, we conclude that Cox is not entitled to a writ of mand amus because it would not benefit him. In State ex rel. Thomas v. Nestor , __ Ohio St.3d __, 2021-Ohio-672, __ N.E.3d __, we a pplied the no-benefit rule to a controversy arising from a civil action in which the clerk of courts had fa iled to serve the trial court’s judgment entry under Ci v.R. 58(B). The relator sought a writ ordering service of the entry, claiming t hat service was necessary for t he purpose of appeal. We disagreed and denied the wr it, reasoning that “[t]he lack of service by the clerkS UPREME C OURT OF O HIO

8 under Civ.R. 58(B) means simply t hat [the relator’s] time for c ommencing an appeal has not begun to run.” Id. at ¶ 8. {¶ 25} Consideration of the no-benefit rule within the context of this case must begin with R.C. 2505.07, which provides that “[a]fter the entry of a final order [of the commission] * * * the period of time within which the a ppeal shall be perfected * * * is thirty days.” Notably, as Youngstown argues , R.C. 2505.07 does not require the decisionmaker to serve its final order on the a ffected party in order for that party to institute an appeal in common pleas court. T he cases cited by Cox do not support that proposition eith er; rather, they say that a court of common pleas may not exercise jurisdiction over an administrative appeal in the absence of a final
order. See Leist v. Mad River Twp. Bd. of Trustees , 2d Dist. Clark No. 2105-CA86, 2016-Ohio-2960, ¶ 6; Galloway v. Firelands Local School Dist. Bd. of Edn. , 9th Dist. Lorain No. 12CA010208, 2013-Ohio-4264, ¶ 6. And Cox does not point to other statutory language with in R.C. Chapters 2505 or 2506 r equiring that he must be served by the commission be fore he is able to perfect h is appeal. {¶ 26} Perfection of the appeal, as R.C. 2505.07 requires, must occur within 30 days after the “entry” of the final order. And a public bod y creates an entry through “the act of making or entering a record.” Merriam Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary 417-418 (11th Ed.2020). Applying that meaning here, we conclu de that the commission made its entry on July 17, 2019, which is the da y it approved its June 19, 2019 minutes. This means that under R.C. 2505.07, Cox had 30 days from July 17, 2019, to perfect his appeal to the common pleas court. See, e.g. , Snell v. Mount Vernon Bd. of Zoning Appeals , 5th Dist. Knox No. 95CA24, 1995 WL 808609, *2 (Dec. 18, 1995) (“the drawing up and signing of the minutes constitutes the ‘entry of the final order’ of the [board] for purposes of R .C. 2505.07”); LaPlant
Ents. v. Toledo , 6th Dist. Lucas No. L-87-369, 1988 WL 69147, *2 (June 30, 198 8) (holding that the time for appealing under R.C. 2505.07 runs fr om the time that the vote and minutes of a planning and zoning committee “were reduc ed to record”).January Term, 2021

9 Because the time for Cox’s appe al expired long ago, he would de rive no benefit from a writ of mandamus ordering the commission to provide him with written notification of its decision under YCSCR XII(3). {¶ 27} Cox responds that the commission’s failure to serve him with it s final order has deprived him of “due process” and a right to “r edress.” Although Cox does not quote any constitutiona l text containing these exa ct words, he perfunctorily references Article 1, Section 16 of the Ohio Cons titution, which provides: “All courts shall be open, and every person, for an i njury done him in his land, goods, person, or reputation, shall have remedy by due co urse of law, and shall have justice administe red without denial or delay.” {¶ 28} The bulk of Cox’s constitutional analysis consists of a couple of footnotes that string cite a num ber of decisions by the courts of appeals and an
extended discussion of A.M.R. , 2012-Ohio-2419, 971 N.E.2d 457, in which the court of appeals held that a le tter from a school superintenden t satisfied the meaning
of “final order” under R.C. 2506.01, not that service of the or der by a public body is constitutionally required. Indeed, Cox does not develop any argument based on

our caselaw that addresses the sc ope of Article I, Section 16 of t he Ohio Constitution. Given the underdeveloped nature of the constitut ional argument, we
decline to address it. See Bronx Park South III Lancaster, L.L.C. v. Fairfield Cty. Bd. of Revision , 153 Ohio St.3d 550, 2018-Ohio-1589, 108 N.E.3d 1079, ¶ 10 (declining to address a constitutional argument when the party had “not formulated a clear argument” in support); In re Application of Columbus S. Power Co. , 129 Ohio St.3d 271, 2011-Ohio-2638, 951 N.E.2d 751, ¶ 19 (“it is no t generally the proper role of this court to de velop a party’s arguments”). 3. Evidentiary hearing {¶ 29} Last, Cox requests that the co mmission be ordered to convene an evidentiary hearing on his appeal. But Cox should have raised any claim that the commission erred in administering his hearing rights by appeali ng theS UPREME C OURT OF O HIO

10 commission’s approval of its minutes. See State ex rel. Henderson v. Maple Hts.
Civ. Serv. Comm. , 63 Ohio St.2d 39, 41, 406 N.E.2d 1105 (1980) (concluding that the relator had an adequate reme dy in the ordinary course of th e law to raise his allegation concerning the de privation of a hearing); State ex rel. Fern v. Cincinnati , 161 Ohio App.3d 804, 2005-Ohio-3168, 832 N.E.2d 106, ¶ 53 (1st Dist.) (“[the commission’s] failure to hold a h earing d[oes] not mean that th e commission’s decision was not subject to appellate review” under R.C. Chapte r 2506). In other words, Cox had an adequate legal remedy to redress this alleged harm. State ex rel.
Kerns v. Simmers , 153 Ohio St.3d 103, 2018-Ohio-256, 101 N.E.3d 430, ¶ 15 (“The extraordinary writ of mandamus will not lie when there exists a n adequate remedy at law”). B. Cox’s procedendo claim {¶ 30} “A writ of procedendo is appropria te when a court has either re fused to render a judgment or has unne cessarily delayed proceeding to judgment.” State
ex rel. Weiss v. Hoover , 84 Ohio St.3d 530, 532, 705 N.E .2d 1227 (1999) . And in such a case, the writ will lie when the relator can “show a cle ar legal right to require the court to proceed, a clear legal duty on the part of the cou rt to proceed, and the lack of an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the law.” State ex rel. Poulton
v. Cottrill , 147 Ohio St.3d 402, 2016-Ohio-5789, 66 N.E.3d 716, ¶ 2. {¶ 31} Here, the commission proceeded to judgment on July 17, 2019, wh en it approved its June 19, 2019 minutes denying Cox’s appeal of t he mayor’s appointment. Accordingly, Cox’s procedendo claim fails because the commission complied with its duty to proceed. C. Cox’s motion and other requests {¶ 32} Cox has filed a motion asking that we strike some or all of exh ibit Nos. 1, 6, 7, 8, 10, 18, and 21 that Youngstown has filed as ev idence, claiming that they are irrelevant; alternatively, Cox seeks leave to file a s upplemental affidavit to rebut Youngstown’s evidence. In g eneral, Cox’s supplemental af fidavit challengesJanuary Term, 2021

11 the manner by which the commission and the third-party author o f the promotional exam developed a solution to address an examinee’s protests. W e conclude that Cox’s motion is moot because the relief it requests does not ch ange the fact that he did not file a timely appeal. {¶ 33} We note also that the cover page o f Cox’s merit brief contains a “request” for oral argument a nd that the body of his brief perf unctorily asserts that the commission must address the motion that he filed on May 14, 2020. But Cox does not expound on the necessity for an oral argument in this case or offer any analysis as to why the commission should be ordered to address that motion. We therefore deny those requests.
III. CONCLUSION {¶ 34} For the foregoing reasons, we deny Cox’s requests for writs of mandamus and procedendo, and we d eny his motion to strike or, a lternatively,
motion for leave to file a s upplemental affidavit.

Writs denied.
O’C ONNOR , C.J., and K ENNEDY , F ISCHER , D E W INE , D ONNELLY , S TEWART , and B RUNNER , JJ., concur.

_________________ Law Offices of S. David Worhatc h and S. David Worhatch, for re lators. Roetzel & Andress, L.P.A., Moni ca L. Frantz, and Diana M. Feit l, for respondents.

_________________