### IN THE UNI TED STAT ES COURT OFAPPEALS FOR THE FIF TH CIRCU IT

No. 08-30477

PRINCESS P. LACAZE, Petitioner-Appellant,
v. WARDEN LOUISIANA CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTE FOR WOMEN, also known as Mariana Leger, Respondent-Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Louisiana

Before SMITH, WIENER, and ELROD, Circuit Judges. JENNIFER WALKER ELROD, Circuit Judge: Princess P. LaCaze (hereinafter “LaCaze”), Louisiana prisoner # 403264,

was c o nvicted in state court of second-degree murder and sentenced to life imprisonment. LaCaze filed a habeas petition in federal district court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, which was denied. This court then granted a certificate of appealability on two issues: first, whether the State withheld Brady material concerning a promise made to LaCaze’s co-defendant, see Brady v. Maryland , 3 7 3 U

. S

. 83 (1963), and second, whether the trial court unconstitutionally denie d U n i te d S ta te s C o u rt o f A p p ea l s

F i ft h C i rc u i t 

### F I L E D June 29 , 20 11 Lyle W . Cayce Clerk

1 Case: 08-30477 Document: 00511524682 Page: 1 Date Filed: 06/29/2011No. 08-30477

her an impartial jury, see Ross v. Oklahoma , 487 U.S. 81 (1988). We REVERSE and REMAND with instructions to grant the writ. I. Meryland Robinson, a l ong-time friend of the victim, was driven by his fourteen-year-old son to the home of Michael LaC a z e (hereinafter “Michael LaCaze”) in Natchitoches Parish, Louisiana under the guise of returning a gun that Rob i n s o n had borrowed. Robinson shot Michael LaCaze through the should e r , killing him. After the shooting, Robinson tossed items from the victim’s desk onto the floor to make it loo k l ike a botched robbery. Princess LaCaze, the victim’s wife, was not home at the time of the shooting. Although LaCaze initially denied any knowledge regarding her husband’s death, she later told the police that he may have arranged his own death due to his failing kidneys. She admitted that she knew beforehand tha t R ob inson planned to kill her husband. Michael LaCaze had previously told her he would

never be dep e n d e n t o n a machine to stay alive, and was scheduled to begin dialysis within days of the murder. Still later, she admitted that she had called Robinson the day of the murder, and he told her that “it would be taken care of that day” and not to return to her home until seven o’clock that even i n g. She also admitted that she had been having an extramarit a l relationship with Robinson at the time of the shooting, but again maintained that Michael LaCaze had sought Robinson’s help in ending his life due to his declining health. Soon after Robinson killed Michael LaCaze, LaCaze began seeing another

man. It was only after LaCaze had Robinson arrested for knocking on the wall of her house a t night that Robinson made a statement implicating LaCaze, contrary to his prior repeated denials of her involvement. B a sed on his

2 Case: 08-30477 Document: 00511524682 Page: 2 Date Filed: 06/29/2011No. 08-30477

statement, both parties were indict e d in J anu ary 1 9 9 8 f or s ec o n d

- de gree murder. Prior to trial, LaCaze filed a motion for discovery of any evidence “which in any way and to any extent” w a s f avorable to her, specifically including “the existenc e and substance of any and all agreements or understandings,

a s s urances or representations, formal or informal, oral or written, confected between the prosecution and a ny and all persons involved in the case in any manner.” The State responded that Robinson had agreed to testify at LaCaze’s trial in exchange for the reduction of his charge from second-degree murder to manslaughter and a sente n c e o f forty years’ imprisonment. The State maintaine d th at it knew of “no direct exculpatory evidence,” but provided as potentially favorable evidence that Robinson initially denied involvement in the crime and gave an alibi to a deputy. The State never disclosed, however, that it had assured Robinson that his son would not be prosecuted if he agreed to make a statement implicating LaCaze. Pursuant to his plea agreement, Robi n s on testified at LaCaze’s trial. Robinson and Michael LaCaze had been friends for over twenty years. Robinson became close to Princess LaCaze through his friendship with her husband, and eventually, they began having an extramarital affair. Robinson tes t i f i e d that LaCaze told him that Michael LaCaze treated her badly. He ex p l a i n ed that, when he began his involvement wi th LaCaze, “nothing else mattered”; he “couldn’t do nothing else but focus on her and she

. . . just meant everything.” Robinson then testified that LaCaze as k e d him if he knew anyone who would kill her husband, and he told her he would ask around. Finally, he agreed to do it himself. Telephone records reflect that she called him from a pay phone the morning of the shooting. Robinson testified that the purpose of that call was

3 Case: 08-30477 Document: 00511524682 Page: 3 Date Filed: 06/29/2011No. 08-30477

to confirm the plan and to coordinate when she should c ome home. Later that day, Robinson went with his son, Rodney Robinson, to the LaCazes’ house. He knocked on the door, greeted Michael LaCaze, and we n t b a c k to his car to retrieve his gun. Upon returning to the hou s e , R ob i nson shot him from the doorway. Robinson admitted that Michael LaCaze had told him he would not go on dialysis and had asked him to end his life about one year before the murder. He also testified that he had witnessed him tell LaCaze that he did not want to have
surgery. In fact, another witness, Glenda Froreich, testified that Michael LaCaze had told her five or six months prior to his death that he definitely did not want medical attention to help him live longer. He mentioned suicide, and he and Froreich discussed Froreich’s own attempted suicide by ov e r d osing on pills. He told her he did not plan to do it that way. Nonetheless, Robinson testified that the real reason he killed Michael LaCaze was because LaCaze had requested that he do so. A few days after the m u r d e r , R obinson cut up the gun and scattered it around town, throwing a piece of it in the river, which he told LaCaze. The man LaCaze began dating shortly after Michael LaCaze’s death testified that LaCaze told him she “wished [the police] would leave her alone,” because the “gun was in the river.” In its opening statement, the State told the jury that Robinson was the most important part of its case. It asked that the jury find him credible, explaining, “there may b e some talk and there was probably some talk about deals and he’s lying because he got a deal, well as far as I’m con c e r ned, folks, forty years and being seventy something years old before you get out of jail is a

4 Case: 08-30477 Document: 00511524682 Page: 4 Date Filed: 06/29/2011No. 08-30477

l i fe sentence. And he’s doing time.” The prosecutor then previewed the m o s t i m p ort ant p art s of Rob in s o n’ s t e s ti m ony, including that LaCaze frequently a s k e d Robinson to kill her husband and that LaCaze knew that Robinson had cut up th e gu n a nd thrown it in the river. In closing argument, the State agai n emphasized Robinson’s credibility, saying he had “never seen anybody pour the truth out from their soul like I saw him and you saw it too.” After the defense emphasized Robinson’s sentencing agreement during its closing argument, the State reiterated on rebuttal that Robinson would not have lied to obtain his forty-year plea agreement, which was basically a life sentence. The prosecutor said, “It’s really the rest of his natural life. And that’s the earliest he’ll get out. He may b e s eventy-six if he lives that long before he gets out. So when [the defense] talks about [us] cutting a deal with him, that ain’t much of a deal. That ain’t much of a deal.” The jury found Princess LaCaze guilty of second-degree murder based on

a finding of “specific intent,” which required a showing that “the circumstances indicate that the offender actively desired the prescribed criminal consequence to follow from her act or failure to act.” She subsequently received a mandatory sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of probation, parole, or suspension of sentence. State v. LaCaze , 759 So. 2d 773, 776 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1999). On direct appeal, the Louisiana Third Circuit Court of Appeal affirmed her conviction, id. at 789, and the Louisiana Supreme Court denied her writ of certiorari, State v. LaCaze , 770 So. 2d 359 (La. 2000). L a C a z e then sought post-conviction relief in state court based on the undis c l o s e d understanding between the prosecutor and Robinson. The trial court denied her request, finding that the assurance Robinson received from the

5 Case: 08-30477 Document: 00511524682 Page: 5 Date Filed: 06/29/2011No. 08-30477

prosecutor was immaterial, but the Louisiana Third Circu i t C o urt of Appeal remanded the case for an evidentiary hearing. T he trial court held two evidentiary hearings. At the first h e a ri n g , Robinson’s attorney, Mike Bonnette, testified that he sought certain assurances prior to Robinson’s giving his statement to the police. Bonnette was “concerned” about Robinson’s statement “because there was a possibility of him implicating his son.” So, before Robinson gave his statement, he received assurances from Danny Hall, an investigator with the district attorney’s office, that his son would not be prosecuted. LaCaze’s trial attorney th e n testified that, although he requested all such information, the State never disclosed that assurance. Had he known about the assurance, he said, he “certainly would have tried to crossexamine him on that and I would have felt that i t w a s r e l e v a nt.” Later, Hall testified th a t , although he remembered meeting with Robinson and Bonnette, he could not remember what was said but did remember that he did not make
any assurance to Robinson. At the second evidentiary hearing, Robinson testified that, before he agreed to give a statement, he asked Danny Hall “over and over again” that his son no t b e p r osecuted. He testified that he probably would not have given a statement without the assurance that his son would not be prosecuted. The Louisiana t ri al court concluded that “the evidentiary hearing testimony proves without d oubt to this Court that while the 14 year old son of Meryland Robinson did in fact drive his father to a n d f r o m the home of the murdered victim,” the son had no part in the planning of and did not participate in the murder, so “[t]here was nothing for the prosecutor to p i n any hope of conviction on even if charges were in fact brought against the youngster.” The

6 Case: 08-30477 Document: 00511524682 Page: 6 Date Filed: 06/29/2011No. 08-30477

trial court further found, however, that “Meryland Robinson did express his

concern as to whether his 14 year old son would be arrest ed. He was assured th a t h i s son would not be arrested.” Nonetheless, the trial court found th a t “there was n o w ri t t en ‘deal’” concerning Robinson’s son. The court also found that Robinson agreed to testify because of his agreement to p l e a d guilty to manslaughter, not because of the assurance he received related to his son. The trial court denied relief because “ [t] h e totality of the evidence [was] so

ov e r whelming in favor of the finding of guilty by the jury that the evidence relating to the 14 year old young man is irrelevant.” LaCaze appealed that decision to the Louisiana Third Circuit Court of Appeal , w hich ruled that the trial court erred in denying her application for post-conviction r e l i e f a n d remanded the case for a new trial. The Louisiana Supreme Court reversed i n a two-paragraph, per curiam opinion, with two j u d g e s noting that they “would grant [the writ] and docket.” State v. LaCaze , 947 So. 2d 716, 717 (La. 2007). The court obs e rv e d th a t “[t]he undisclosed revelation that the state’s main witness, [LaCaze’s] former extramarital lover, sought protection for his young son from criminal charges arising out of the same incident before he made a statement to the police was relevant to the witness’s credibility as a possible motive for his testimony as a state witness at trial.” Id. The Louisiana Supreme Court concluded, however, that LaCaze had not satisfied the third element of the Brady analysis, materiality, for two reasons: first, because Robinson’s agreement to plead guilty to manslaughter for a lesser sentence was revealed to th e j u ry, along with his criminal record, and second, because his testimony was corroborated. Id. The court pointed to the testimony of LaCaze’s new boyfriend, which the court c h a r a c terized as testimony that

7 Case: 08-30477 Document: 00511524682 Page: 7 Date Filed: 06/29/2011No. 08-30477

L a C a z e “told him she would evade charges because the murder weapon w a s

unre c o v e r able,” and to the defendant’s admission that she had discussed her husband’s alleged death wish with Robinson and knew R ob i nson planned “to take care of it.” Id. The court reinstated the defendant’s conviction and sentence. After being denied post-conviction relief by the Louisiana Supreme Court, LaCaze sought habeas relief pursuant t o 2 8 U

. S.C. § 2254 in federal district court, raising twenty-one grounds for relie f. Without holding a hearing, the magistrate judge re c o m m e nded that the district court deny the writ. With regard to the Brady claim, the magistrate judge stated that, “[w]eighed against his crimi n al history alone, the fact that Robinson sought assurances from the State that his son w o u ld not be prosecuted before he gave a statement to the police becomes much more significant.” LaCaze v. Leger , No. 07-CV-0236, 2008 WL 1836374, at *6 (W.D. La. April 03, 2008). The magistrate judge nonetheless determined that th e a s surance was not material because LaCaze “knew, from pretrial discovery, that Robinson had pleaded guilty t o th e r e d uced charge of manslaughter and a forty year sentence,” yet “she did not use that evidence to impeach Robinson at trial.” Id. Had that plea agreement been revealed to the j u ry , i t would have rendered immaterial the non-disclosure of the assurance shielding Robinson’s son from prosecution because that information would have been “essentially cumulative and not material.” Id. In a short, one-pa g e o r d e r, the district court adopted the magistrate judge’s report and recommendation, dismissed the petition with prejudice, and denied a certificate of appealability. This court then granted a certific a t e o f appealability on two issues: (1) whether the State withheld Brady material

8 Case: 08-30477 Document: 00511524682 Page: 8 Date Filed: 06/29/2011No. 08-30477

concerning her co-defendant, and (2) whether the trial court unconstitutionally denied her an impartial jury. II. The Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death P e n alty Act (AEDPA) provides that a federal court may not grant habeas relief after adjudication of a claim in state court unless the adjudication “resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States,” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1),

or “r esulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts i n l i ght of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding,” § 2254(d)(2). Clearly estab li she d federal law comprises “the holdings, as opposed to the dicta, of [the Supreme] C o u rt ’ s decisions as of the time of the relevant state-court decision.” Williams v. Taylor , 529 U.S. 362, 412 (2000). A state court decision is contrary to federal law when it “identifies the correct governing legal rule from [the Supreme Court’s] cases but unreasonably applies it to the facts of the particular st ate prisoner’s case,” id. at 413, or where it “extends a legal principle from [Supreme Court] precedent to a new context where it should not apply or unreasonably refuses to extend that principle to a new context where it should apply,” id. at 407. Thus, under AEDPA’s standard of review, “a federal habeas court may not issue the writ simply because that court concludes in its independen t j u d gment that the relevant state-court decision applied clearly established federal law erro n e ou s ly or inc orre ctly
. Rather, that application must also be unreasonable.” Id. at 411. We review the state court’s “ultimate decision” for unreasonablene s s. Charles v. Thaler , 629 F.3d 494, 501 (5th C ir. 2011). Here, we review the

9 Case: 08-30477 Document: 00511524682 Page: 9 Date Filed: 06/29/2011No. 08-30477

Louisiana Supreme Court’s decision, see id. , giving deference to the Louisiana trial court’s factual fi n di n gs, see Moody v. Quarterman , 476 F.3d 260, 267-68 (5th Cir. 2007). Although we review only the ultim a t e l e g a l determination by the Louisiana Supreme Court and not w h e ther the court provided exhaustive reasoning to support the result, “a thor o u gh and well-reasoned state court opinion may be more likely to be correct and to withstand judicial review

. . . .” Neal v. Puckett , 286 F.3d 230, 246 (5th Cir. 200 2) (per curiam) (en banc). III. To show that the state court’s proceeding resulted in a “decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law,” § 2254(d)(1), LaCaze must show that the prosecution’s fai lure to disclose requested impeachment evidence constituted a violation of due process pursuant to Brady , 373 U.S. at 87, and that the state court’s a p plication of Brady was unreasonable. See Mahler v. Kaylo , 537 F.3d 494, 499 (5th Cir. 2008). LaCaze must show that (1) the prosecution s up p ressed evidence, (2) the evidence

w a s f avorable to the defense, and (3) the evidence was material. Lawrence v
. Lensing, 42 F.3d 255, 257 (5th Cir. 1994). A. The Louisiana trial court found that the prosecut i o n h ad suppressed evidence favorable to LaCaze, satisfying the first and second prongs of the Brady analysis. Specifically, following an evidentiary hearing, the trial court found that Robinson “did in fact voice his concern in the investigative stage of the case about his son being prosecuted” and “was assur e d that his son would not be arrested.” Those facts were accepted on appeal. Although the Louisiana Third Circuit Court of Appeal reversed the t ri al court’s denial of the writ, it agreed with the trial court’s findings, saying that “the State failed to dis close information concerning the p l e a a rr angement made with a critical witness.”

10 Case: 08-30477 Document: 00511524682 Page: 10 Date Filed: 06/29/2011No. 08-30477

State v. LaCaze , KW 05-01170 (La. App. 3 Cir. 2/6/06). The Louisiana Supreme Court, while reinstating the defendant’s conviction, stated that the prosecution failed to disclose that “the state’s main witness, [LaCaze’s] extramarital lover, sought protection for his young son from criminal charges arising out of the same incident before he made a statement to the police,” which was “relevant to th e witness’s credibility as a possible motive for his testimony as a state witness at trial.” LaCaze , 947 So. 2d at 717. We defer to the trial court’s findings, which

were accepted by both appellate courts, as we must under AEDPA. See Moody , 476 F.3d at 267-68. Notwithstanding those findings, the State now contends that the evidence did not need to be disclosed beca u s e R ob i n son and the district attorney never actually reached a “deal.” However, the Supreme Court has never limited a Brady violation to cases where th e facts demonstrate that the state and the witness have reached a bona fide, enforceable deal. In Napue v. I l l i n o i s , 360 U.S. 264, 270 (1959), the Supreme Court explained that the key question is not whether the prosecutor and the witness entered into an effective agreement, but whether the witness “might have believed that [the state] was i n a position to i m p l e ment

. . . any promise of consideration.” Id. ; see Giglio v. United S t a t e s , 405 U.S. 150, 154-55 (1972); Tassin v. Cain , 517 F.3d 770, 778 (5th Cir. 2008) (“A promise is unnecessary.”). In fact, “evidence of any understanding or agreement

as to a future prosecution would be relevant to [the witness’s] credibil i ty.” Giglio , 405 U.S

. a t 1 5 5

. The question is “the extent to which the testimony misled the jury, not whether the promise was indeed a promise

. . . .” Tassin , 517 F.3d at 778 (citing Napue , 360 U.S. at 270). Here, Robinson testified that he “asked

. . . over and over again” that his

son not be prosecuted, that the prosecutor gave him an assurance that he would not be, and tha t R ob i n s o n believed him. Indeed, Robinson testified that he

11 Case: 08-30477 Document: 00511524682 Page: 11 Date Filed: 06/29/2011No. 08-30477

probably would not have given his statement implicating LaCaze if he had not received such an assurance. Robinson’s attorney corroborate d R obinson’s t e s timony, saying that he had “an understanding” with the prosecutor. Th u s , the evidence demonstrates that the assurance impacted Robinson’s decision to implicate LaCaze, re gar dl e s s of wh eth er th ere w a s any possibility Robinson’s son would have been pros ecuted without that assurance. The prosecution had a duty to disclose it. B. We now consider the question of materiality. Whether evidence is material, for purposes of a Brady violation, is a mixed question of law and fact, which we revi e w d e novo. Mahler , 537 F.3d at 500. We review the Louisiana Supreme Court’s holding to determine whether “the adjudication of the claim resulted in a decision that was c o n t rary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law.” 28 U.S.C. § 2 2 5 4(d)(1); see Moody , 476 F.3d at 2 6 7

. The Louisiana Supreme Court concluded that the failure to disclose the assurance was immaterial because Robinson’s agreement to p l e a d gu i lty to manslaughter for a lesser sentence was revealed to the jury, and because his testimony was corroborated by other evidence.

“ [A] s h o wing of materiality does not require demonstration by a preponderance that disclosure of the suppressed evidence would have resulted ultimately in the defendant’s acquittal

. . . .” Kyles v. Whitley , 514 U.S. 419, 434 (1995). Rather, the question is whether “the favorable evidence c oul d re a s o nably be taken to put the whole case in such a different light as to undermine confidence in the verdict.” Id. at 435; see also Tassin , 517 F.3d at 780. Or, put another way, whether the defendant “received a fair trial, understood as a trial resulting in a verdict worthy of confidence” in th e absence of the favorable

e vi d ence. Kyles , 514 U.S at 434. “The materiality of Brady material depend s

12 Case: 08-30477 Document: 00511524682 Page: 12 Date Filed: 06/29/2011No. 08-30477

almost entirely on the value of the e vidence relative to the other evidence mustered by the state.” Rocha v. Thaler , 619 F.3d 387, 396 (5th Ci r
. 2010) (quoting United States v
. S i p e , 3 88 F.3d 471, 478 (5th Cir. 2004) (internal quotation marks omitted)). A Bradyviolation is more likely to occur when the impeaching evidence “would seriously undermine the testimony of a key witness on an essential issue or there is no strong corroboration.” Id. at 397. The State primarily argues that the undisclosed agreement regarding Rob i n s o n’s son was immaterial because Robinson’s sentencing agreement, pursuant to which he pleaded guilty to manslaughter and received a forty-year sentenc e , w a s di sclosed to the jury. Despite its determination that the nondisclosure was relevant as a possible motive to lie, the Louisiana Supreme Court accepted this argument, finding that it was immaterial because the “m a in source” of Robinson’s bias and motivatio n t o lie, his plea agreement, had been disclosed. H o w ev er, this is not the proper legal standard. The materiality inquiry does not turn on which of two competing sources of bias a court, in hindsight, determines the jury would have considered more important. Rather, the inquiry is whether an undisclosed source of bias—even if it is not the only

source or even the “main source”—c o u ld reasonably be taken to put the whole

case in a differ e n t light. Kyles , 514 U.S. at 434-35. The Louisiana Supreme Court neither cited nor applied that standard. Moreover, in Napue , 360 U.S. at 270, the United States Supreme Court made clear that an undisclosed source of bias can be material even if it is not the main source of bias. There, the jury k n e w that “someone whom [the witness] had tentatively identified as being a public defender” had promised “to do what he could” to reduce the witness’s sentence, but was not told that the prosecutor had promised the same thing. Id. at 268, 270. The Court rejected the idea that “the f a ct that the jury was apprised of other grounds for believing that the

13 Case: 08-30477 Document: 00511524682 Page: 13 Date Filed: 06/29/2011No. 08-30477

witness

. . . may have had an interest in testifying a g a i n s t petitioner turned what was otherwise a tainted trial into a fair one.” Id. at 270; see also Tassin , 517 F.3d at 780 (holding that the jury’s knowledge of other aggravating factors justifying the death sentence did not render the failure to disclose exculpatory evidence as to the other factor immaterial). Likewise, here, the argument that

r e l ief should be denied simply because the jury knew one of two complet e l y

u nrelated bases for Robinson to lie cannot be sustained under the S u p r e m e Court’s precedent in Kyles and Napue

. Therefore, ap p l yi n g both AEDPA and Kyles , we must consider whether there was some other reason why the suppressed information was not material. At trial, the parties did not dispute that Robinson killed Michael LaCaze. Nor did they dispute that LaCaze knew in advance th a t R ob inson planned to kill him. Rather, what the two sides contested, and what was integral to LaCaze’s defense, was wheth e r s h e intended for Robinson to kill him. Importantly, Robinson’s testimony provided the only direct evidence of that i n t e n t , as the other member of an alleged two-member conspiracy. 1

Mo reo ver, as in Tas si n , the Sta te here “ca pit alized on this mi sr epr es enta tio n in [it s] 1 clos ing argum ent” by rep eate dly arguing that Robins on had not rec eived a dea l that wo uld give him a reas on to lie—wh ich its elf sho ws the mat eriality of the undi sc los ed dea l. See Tas si n , 517 F.3d at 779. In its ope ning st atem ent, the Sta te tol d the jury Robins on wa s critic al to its
cas e. It ask ed that the jury find him cre dibl e, arguing that Robins on’s agree me nt w a s a de fac to lif e se nten ce and ther efo re not wo rth lying to obta in: “Ther e may be so me talk and ther e wa s pr obably so me talk about dea l s a n d he’s lying beca use he got a dea l, we ll as far as I’m
conc erne d, folk s, fort y years andbeing sevent y som ethi ng years old bef oreyou get out of jail is a lif e se nten ce. An d h e’s doi ng tim e.” In its clos ing argum ent, the Sta te em phas ized Robins on’scredibili ty, saying he had “neve r see n anybody pou r the truth outfromtheirsoul lik e I saw him and you saw it too ,” and then again call ed Robins o n ’ s s e n t e n c i n g agree me nt bas ical ly a lif

e se nten ce on rebu tta l. The State ’ s argum ent that an unreve aled dea l is im mat eria l aft er going to suc h length s t o e m phas ize Robins on’s cre dibi lity and lack of any mo tives f

or lying a t tri al sim ply lack s for ce. 14 Case: 08-30477 Document: 00511524682 Page: 14 Date Filed: 06/29/2011No. 08-30477

In determining that the Brady evidence was not material, the Louisiana Supreme Court then held that there was sufficient other evidence to s u p port LaCaze’s conviction, specifically her statement about the gun’s being in the river and he r a d m itted knowledge of Robinson’s intent to kill her husband, which rendered the failure to disclose immaterial. LaCaze , 947 So. 2d at 717. Again, the court used the wrong standard. See Kyles , 514 U.S. at 435 n .8. “[I]t is not

a sufficiency of evidence test.” Id. at 434. Rather, the state court must consider whether the undisclosed agreement “could reasonably be taken to put the whole

case in such a different light as to undermine confidence in the verdict.” Id. at 2 435. Using that standard, the undisclosed assurance, which the court held was “relevant” and “a possible motive” for his testimony, LaCaze , 947 So. 2d at 717, was material. Robinson’s testimony was the only direct evidence presented by the State to show a critical element: LaCaze’s intent to have her husband killed. LaCaze’s

own statements—particularly those in which she admitted she knew Robinson intended to kill her husband and did nothing to stop it—are damaging, but they do not establish the requisite mens rea to commit the crime. Knowledge does not equal intent. See State v. Wiley , 672 So. 2d 185, 187-88 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1996). In fact, LaCaze’s statements were consistent with her defense at tri a l th a t Michael LaCaze requested that Robinson kill hi m , which s h e a dmitted she knew. Further, the testimony by LaCaze’s new boyfriend did not establish her intent,

Altho ugh its analys is mo re clos ely app roxim ated a s u f f icie ncy of the evide nce 2 st andar d, the Louis iana Sup rem e Court st ated the st andar d as fol low s: “Evid ence is mat eria l [and rever sal wa rra nted] only if it is reas onably pr obable that the res ult of the pr oce edi ng w o uld have been dif

fer ent had the evide nce been dis clos ed to the def ens e. A reas onabl e pr obabil ity is one which is suf fic ient to unde rm ine conf ide nce in the outc om e.” But even that st andar d, whic h requir esthat theevidenc e proba bly unde rm inedthe res ult, is not thesam e as the les se r st andar d in Kyles , wh ich requ ires only that the evide nce coul d hav e unde rm ined the res ult.
15 Case: 08-30477 Document: 00511524682 Page: 15 Date Filed: 06/29/2011No. 08-30477

as the court determined. After-the-fact acknowledgment that she knew where the murderer hid the murder weapon does not establish her specific intent. See id. This case bears a striking resemblance to Tassin , 517 F.3d at 780, in which this court granted habeas relief based on a Brady violation. There, as here, the government’s key witness—the o n ly witness testifying to the defendant’s intent—had received “an understanding” of leniency that the prosecution failed to disclose. Id. at 779-80. The government’s theory of the case w as that Georgina and Robert Tassin had co n spired to commit armed robbery and had killed the victim in the course of the robbery. As the only other member of the two-member conspiracy, Georgina’s testimony was “crucial” to the jury’s finding that Robert had intended to commit armed robbery. If the jury had known of the prosecutor’s assurance that it would seek a favorable sentence for Georgina, it “may have chosen to believe Robert’s story over [Georgina’s].” Id. at 780-81. Indeed, the court found it “most importa nt [] ” that the state capitalized on the non-disclosure when it argued to the jury that the witness had no reason to lie. Id. at 779. Given the absence of evidence supporting the government’s theory of the case and corroborating Georgina’s testimony, the court found that the nondisclosure was material and granted the writ. Likewise , h e r e , Robinson’s testimony was the only direct evidence of LaCaze’s intent, and disclosure of his bias to the jury might have put the whole

case in a different light. In its opening statement, closing argument, and rebuttal, the State argued that Robinson had no reason to lie. In circumstances like these, where “the jury’s estimate of the truthfulness and reliability of [the witness] may well be determinative of guilt or innocence,” the failure to disclose Brady information is material. Napue , 360 U.S. at 2 6 9 ; s e e a ls o Mahler , 537

16 Case: 08-30477 Document: 00511524682 Page: 16 Date Filed: 06/29/2011No. 08-30477

F.3d at 503. As in Tassin , the stat e c o u rt ’ s determination to the contrary was an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law. IV. This case raises a reasonable probability that disclosure of the agreement between the prosecution and Robinson would have produced a different result. Kyles , 514 U.S. at 435. Based on our disposition of LaCaze’s Brady claim, we need not consider the merits of her claim pursuant to Ross v. Oklahoma , 487 U.S. 81 (1988). We reverse and remand with instruction to grant the writ under whatever conditions the district court may set. REVERSED and REMANDED.

17 Case: 08-30477 Document: 00511524682 Page: 17 Date Filed: 06/29/2011