NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

 v.

AARON SANDUSKY,

Defendant-Appellant.

No. 22-50194

D.C. No.

2:12-cr-00548-PA

MEMORANDUM*

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Central District of California

Percy Anderson, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted April 18, 2023**

Pasadena, California

Before: WARDLAW and KOH, Circuit Judges, and ROSENTHAL,*** District

Judge.

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent

except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision 

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

*** The Honorable Lee H. Rosenthal, United States District Judge for the 

Southern District of Texas, sitting by designation.

FILED

APR 21 2023

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
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Aaron Sandusky appeals the district court’s denial of his motion for early 

termination of supervised release. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 

We vacate and remand to allow the district court to reconsider Sandusky’s motion 

under the correct legal standard.

We review a denial of a motion for early termination of supervised release for

abuse of discretion. United States v. Ponce, 22 F.4th 1045, 1046 (9th Cir. 2022) 

(citing United States v. Emmett, 749 F.3d 817, 819 (9th Cir. 2014)). “‘Application 

of the wrong legal standard constitutes an abuse of discretion.’” Id. (quoting

United States v. Ruiz, 257 F.3d 1030, 1033 (9th Cir. 2001) (en banc)). 

Sandusky argues that the district court abused its discretion when it denied his 

motion on the ground that he failed to demonstrate “exceptionally good behavior” 

while on supervised release, contrary to our precedent. We agree. In Ponce, we

clarified that requiring a defendant to demonstrate “exceptional behavior” as a 

condition of early termination of supervised release “is incorrect as a matter of 

law.” Id. at 1047. The proper legal standard is set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(1), 

which “provides that, after considering a subset of the sentencing factors set forth 

in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), a court may terminate a term of supervised release if it is 

satisfied that such action is warranted by the conduct of the defendant released and 

the interest of justice.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 

The district court stated the legal standard as follows:
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Early discharge is appropriate to “account for new or unforeseen 

circumstances” not contemplated at the initial imposition of

supervised release. See [United States v.] Lussier, 104 F.3d [32, 36 

(2d Cir. 1997)]. Changed circumstances that justify early termination 

include a defendant’s exceptionally good behavior that makes the 

previously imposed term of supervised release “either too harsh or 

inappropriately tailored to serve” general punishment goals. Id. 

The district court then found that Sandusky “has failed to present facts and 

circumstances that demonstrate ‘exceptionally good behavior.’”

The district court’s misplaced reliance on Lussier follows our erroneous 

statement in United States v. Smith, 219 F. App’x 666 (9th Cir. 2007), which 

declared, citing Lussier, that “early termination [is] reserved for rare cases of 

‘exceptionally good behavior.’” Id. at 668 (quoting Lussier, 104 F.3d at 36). The 

Ponce court expressly noted the error in Smith, recognizing that Lussier “[did] not 

require new or changed circumstances relating to the defendant in order to modify 

conditions of release, but simply recognize[d] that changed circumstances may in 

some instances justify a modification.” Ponce, 22 F.4th at 1047 (quoting United 

States v. Parisi, 821 F.3d 343, 347 (2d Cir. 2016)).

The government asks us to infer from fragments of the district court’s order

that the district court properly considered the motion for early termination. We 

decline to draw these inferences. The district court previously denied a

codefendant’s motion for early termination of supervised release using the same 

incorrect standard. The denial of the codefendant’s motion in identical terms 
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supports Sandusky’s position that the district court erroneously believed that 

Sandusky’s failure to demonstrate “exceptionally good behavior” was sufficient to 

deny his motion.

In its order, the district court stated that early termination is only 

“‘occasionally’ justified.” This standard is contrary to the Sentencing 

Commission’s policy statement “encourag[ing]” early termination “in appropriate 

cases.” U.S.S.G. § 5D1.2 cmt. 5. Whether a term of supervision is “appropriate” 

for early termination does not turn on how often early termination is granted. The 

district court’s emphasis on the unusual or exceptional nature of early termination

suggests that the court did not evaluate relevant policy statements of the 

Sentencing Commission, as required by 18 U.S.C. §§ 3583(e) and 3553(a)(5), and 

is further evidence that the court applied an incorrect legal standard.

Accordingly, we vacate and remand to allow the district court to reconsider 

the motion for early termination consistent with this decision. 

VACATED and REMANDED.