1 

Present: All the Justices 

EDWARD DONOVAN, ET AL. 

v. Record No. 951196 OPINION BY JUSTICE ELIZABETH B. LACY 

 March 1, 1996 

BOARD OF ZONING APPEALS OF 

ROCKINGHAM COUNTY, ET AL. 

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF ROCKINGHAM COUNTY 

Joshua L. Robinson, Judge Designate 

 In this appeal we consider whether the trial court 

properly upheld a decision by the board of zoning appeals 

affirming the zoning administrator's interpretation and 

application of a zoning ordinance. 

 Rockingham County enacted its first zoning ordinance in 

1969. At that time, property currently owned by appellants, 

Edward, Jean, Brownie, and David Donovan, Jr., (collectively, 

the Donovans) and used by them as an automobile graveyard, was 

zoned A-1, agricultural. Automobile graveyards were not a 

permitted use in an A-1 district; however, the 1969 ordinance 

allowed the continuation of nonconforming uses which were in 

existence on the effective date of the ordinance. The use of 

the Donovans' parcel as an automobile graveyard has continued 

without interruption. 

 In 1994, the zoning administrator of Rockingham County 

notified the Donovans by letter that they were in violation of 

the Rockingham County Code (hereafter, County Code). According 

to the zoning administrator, the 1969 ordinance required the 

Donovans to file for an "automobile graveyard permit with a 
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screening plan" by 1972 and failure to file for the permit 

terminated the right to continue the nonconforming use granted 

by the 1969 ordinance. Because the Donovans had not filed for 

such a permit, Rockingham County did not consider the Donovans' 

present operation to be valid nonconforming use. The zoning 

administrator informed the Donovans that they could validate 

the operation of their automobile graveyard by obtaining a 

special use permit and an automobile graveyard permit with a 

screening plan.1

 

 The Donovans appealed the decision of the zoning 

administrator to the Board of Zoning Appeals (BZA).2 Following 

a hearing, the BZA upheld the zoning administrator's decision 

and refused to consider whether that interpretation of the 

ordinance resulted in a conflict between the ordinance and Code 

§ 15.1-492. The Donovans filed a petition for writ of 

certiorari in the circuit court. The Donovans argued that the 

zoning administrator and the BZA incorrectly applied and 

interpreted the 1969 ordinance, and failed to consider the 

Donovan's contention that such an interpretation conflicted 

 1The current zoning classification for the Donovans' 

property, A-2, permits the operation of an automobile graveyard 

with a special use permit. County Code § 17-27. Chapter 5 of 

the County Code, enacted in 1973 pursuant to Code § 15.1-28, 

regulates automobile graveyards and includes the current 

screening requirements. County Code § 5-2. 

 2

The Donovans also filed a screening plan under County 

Code § 5-2, but the county has deferred action on the plan 

pending the outcome of this litigation. 
 3 

with their vested rights established by the Virginia 

Constitution and Code § 15.1-492. 

 The circuit court found that the 1969 ordinance as 

interpreted by the zoning administrator applied to the 

Donovans' property and dismissed the writ of certiorari. In 

its order, the circuit court stated that the determination of 

whether a zoning ordinance conflicts with a statute is beyond 

the court's jurisdiction in a certiorari proceeding because it 

involves the validity of the ordinance, and that the effect of 

the court's holding was "to affirm the decision of the Board of 

Zoning Appeals of Rockingham County." We awarded the Donovans 

an appeal and, because we conclude that the zoning 

administrator's interpretation of the 1969 zoning ordinance was 

incorrect, we will reverse the order of the circuit court. 

 The principles relevant to the construction of a zoning 

ordinance are well established. The words of the ordinance are 

to be given their plain and natural meaning. McClung v. County 

of Henrico, 200 Va. 870, 875, 108 S.E.2d 513, 516 (1959). The 

purpose and intent of the ordinance should be considered but 

the ordinance should not be extended by interpretation or 

construction beyond its intended purpose. Gough v. Shaner, 197 

Va. 572, 575, 90 S.E.2d 171, 174 (1955). In reviewing a 

decision of the BZA, we give "great weight" to the 

interpretation of the ordinance by those officials charged with 

its administration, and we will reverse the decision only if it 
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is plainly wrong or based on erroneous legal principles. Cook 

v. Board of Zoning Appeals of the City of Falls Church, 244 Va. 

107, 111, 418 S.E.2d 879, 881 (1992); Masterson v. Board of 

Zoning Appeals of the City of Virginia Beach, 233 Va. 37, 44, 

353 S.E.2d 727, 732-33 (1987). 

 The county does not contest the Donovans' assertion that 

their operation of the automobile graveyard was a valid 

nonconforming use following the adoption of the 1969 zoning 

ordinance. The county maintains, however, that the Donovans' 

automobile graveyard lost its status as a valid nonconforming 

use because they failed to screen the operation from public 

view by 1972. Thus, at the time of the county's enforcement 

action, although the cross-references to sections dealing with 

automobile graveyards had been deleted in 1984, the Donovans' 

automobile graveyard no longer was "a lawful use of land" 

entitling them to continue the operation as a nonconforming use 

under the provisions of the current zoning ordinance, County 

Code § 17-161. 

 The county's position is based on its application of the 

following portions of the 1969 ordinance: 

ARTICLE 8--NONCONFORMING USES 

. . . 

 8-1-1. If at the time of enactment of 

this ordinance, any legal 

activity, except those dealt with 

in section 7-2-5, which is being 

pursued, or any lot or structure 

legally utilized in a manner or 

for a purpose which does not 
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conform to the provisions of this 

ordinance, such manner of use or 

purpose may be continued as 

herein provided . . . . 

. . . . 

ARTICLE 7--INDUSTRIAL, GENERAL, 

DISTRICT M-1 

. . . . 

 7-2-5. Automobile graveyards and 

junkyards in existence at the 

time [of] the adoption of this 

ordinance are to be considered as 

nonconforming uses. They may be 

allowed up to three (3) years 

after adoption of this ordinance 

in which to completely screen on 

any side open to view from a 

public road . . . . 

 The county contends that even though Chapter 7 relates to 

M-1 districts, the reference in County Code § 8-1-1 to § 7-2-5 

extends the screening requirements of that section to all 

automobile graveyards existing in 1969. Any other 

interpretation, the county asserts, would allow automobile 

graveyards in districts other than M-1 to remain unscreened, a 

condition inconsistent with the purpose of the ordinance. 

 We agree with the county's assertion that one of the 

purposes of the 1969 zoning ordinance was to require screening 

of all automobile graveyards, and we will assume, without 

deciding, that County Code § 8-1-1 made the screening 

provisions of County Code § 7-2-5 applicable to all automobile 

graveyards existing on the effective date of the ordinance. 

Nevertheless, a provision requiring that a particular 
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nonconforming use be screened from public view is not the same 

as a provision invalidating the nonconforming use itself for 

failure to comply with the screening requirement. 

 The ordinance identifies certain circumstances which 

result in the termination of a valid nonconforming use: if the 

use is discontinued for more than two years after the enactment 

of the ordinance, it is deemed abandoned, County Code § 8-1-3; 

if the use is changed to a more limited use, the prior, more 

expansive use is lost, County Code § 8-1-4; and after two years 

advertising structures must be relocated to districts where 

they are permitted uses, County Code § 8-1-1. The failure to 

screen an automobile graveyard is not identified as a 

circumstance which terminates the status of the use as a valid 

nonconforming use, nor is termination of such status listed as 

the penalty for violation of or failure to conform to the 

screening provisions contained in the 1969 zoning ordinance. 

 The ordinance is silent as to any specific consequences of 

the failure to screen. The absence of a specific consequence 

does not render the requirement meaningless, however. County 

Code § 11-2 states that a violation of the ordinance is a 

misdemeanor which subjects the violator to a fine of up to $250 

for each day the ordinance is violated. Furthermore, under the 

authority of Code §§ 15.1-491 and -499, the county could have 

enforced the screening requirement by seeking an injunction to 

prevent the Donovans from operating the automobile graveyard 
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until they complied with the screening requirement. McNair v. 

Clatterbuck, 212 Va. 532, 533, 186 S.E.2d 45, 46 (1972).3 

Enforcement of the screening requirement by injunction would be 

consistent with the purpose of screening all automobile 

graveyards from public view without terminating a valid 

nonconforming use arising under County Code § 8-1-1. 

 Applying the principles applicable to the construction of 

zoning ordinances, we conclude that the interpretation of the 

1969 zoning ordinance by the zoning administrator as approved 

by the BZA was plainly wrong and based on erroneous principles 

of law. Nothing in the ordinance provides that the failure to 

screen an automobile graveyard terminates a valid nonconforming 

use. Therefore, the failure of the Donovans to screen their 

automobile graveyard within three years of the effective date 

of the 1969 ordinance did not terminate the status of their 

operation as a valid nonconforming use.4

 Accordingly, we will reverse the order of the circuit 

court and enter final judgment in favor of the Donovans. 

 Reversed and

final judgment.

 

 3The zoning ordinance was amended in 1984 to specifically 

give the zoning administrator the authority to insure 

compliance with the chapter by instituting legal action 

including injunctions. County Code § 17-200. 

 4In light of this conclusion, we need not address the 

Donovans' other arguments.