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The Honorable William A. Knox, United States Magistrate Judge for the

Western District of Missouri, sitting by consent of the parties. See 28 U.S.C.

§ 636(c)(1); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 73(a).

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 04-2002

___________

Renea McCann, *

*

Appellant, *

* Appeal from the United States

v. * District Court for the Western

* District of Missouri.

Jo Anne B. Barnhart, Commissioner *

of Social Security Administration, * [UNPUBLISHED]

*

Appellee. *

___________

Submitted: January 13, 2005

Filed: March 28, 2005

___________

Before LOKEN, Chief Judge, and MORRIS SHEPPARD ARNOLD and HANSEN,

Circuit Judges.

___________

PER CURIAM.

Renea McCann appeals from the affirmance by the district court1

 of a final

administrative decision denying Ms. McCann disability insurance benefits under

Title II of the Social Security Act, see 42 U.S.C. §§ 401-434, and supplemental

security income benefits under Title XVI of the Social Security Act, see 42 U.S.C.
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§§ 1381-1383f. Ms. McCann claims that various conditions that cause her pain

amount to a disability within the meaning of the Social Security Act. We affirm.

Ms. McCann maintains that the ALJ erred by not properly evaluating her

credibility. We conclude, however, that the ALJ considered the record as a whole in

deciding that Ms. McCann lacked credibility, and we hold that substantial evidence

supports this determination, cf. Garrett ex rel. Moore v. Barnhart, 366 F.3d 643, 646

(8th Cir. 2004). The ALJ discussed the considerations set out in Polaski v. Heckler,

739 F.2d 1320, 1322 (8th Cir. 1984), which an ALJ must take into account when

evaluating a claimant's subjective complaints. In doing so, the ALJ considered the

lack of medical opinion evidence supporting Ms. McCann's contention that she is

unable to work, see Young v. Apfel, 221 F.3d 1065, 1069 (8th Cir. 2000); the medical

evidence showing that Ms. McCann possesses a normal range of motion and

flexibility and controls her pain with medication; Ms. McCann's testimony about her

household activities, which include cooking, cleaning, and laundering; and

Ms. McCann's unwillingness to undergo behavioral pain management. The ALJ thus

did not discount Ms. McCann's subjective complaints solely because they were not

supported by objective medical evidence; it properly relied instead upon

inconsistencies in the record as a whole. See Lowe v. Apfel, 226 F.3d 969, 972 (8th

Cir. 2000).

Ms. McCann also contends that the ALJ erred by not seeking testimony from

a vocational expert regarding the range of work that Ms. McCann was capable of

performing in light of her non-exertional impairments. We disagree. The same

evidence that supports the ALJ's discounting of Ms. McCann's credibility also

supports the ALJ's finding that Ms. McCann could perform her past relevant work.

Further, the ALJ discussed and compared Ms. McCann's functional limitations and

the tasks that her past relevant work requires. Therefore the ALJ did not err in

finding Ms. McCann capable of performing her past relevant work. As a result, the

Commissioner did not have to show that Ms. McCann could perform other types of
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jobs and thus was not required to introduce expert vocational testimony in order to

prevail. See Lewis v. Barnhart, 353 F.3d 642, 648 (8th Cir. 2003); Conley v. Bowen,

781 F.2d 143, 146 (8th Cir. 1986) (per curiam). 

Affirmed.

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