THE BENEFIT OF MARY C. MILLER 

IRA #MIlEA; RONALD D. SAGER, 

M.D., INC., DEFINED PENSION PLAN; 

SEA HAWK FISHING CORPORATION; 

JAMES G. SILER AND SUSAN 

BUTLER SILER AS CO-TRUSTEES OF 

THE SILER-BUTLER FAMILY 1998 

TRUST; CHARLES E. SIMMONS AND 

JULIA W. SIMMONS AS COTRUSTEES OF THE SIMMONS LIVING 

TRUST DATED JUNE 30, 1988; SWOPE 

MEDICAL GROUP, INC. PROFIT 

SHARING 401K PLAN FOR THE 

BENEFIT OF BRUCE E. SARKIN; 

HERB TATE AS TRUSTEE OF THE 

TATE 1999 TRUST AGREEMENT; 

WARP FACTOR ONE PENSION PLAN; 

DAVID E. BARNETT; SHANNON C. 

LANE; PRO H20 PENSION PLAN; AND 

PHYLLIS HOLLANDER DEFINED 

BENEFIT PENSION PLAN, 

Respondents. 

ORDER AFFIRMING IN PART AND REVERSING IN PART 

This is an appeal from a district court judgment in a real 

property loan guarantee action. Second Judicial District Court, Washoe 

County; Connie J. Steinheimer, Judge. 

Respondents filed a complaint seeking to recover the amount 

due on a promissory note guaranteed by appellant John Serpa.' Both 

parties stipulated to Serpa's obligation on the note, as well as the note's 

value with interest. Prior to a bench trial to determine the fair market 

value of the six properties secured by the note (the Properties), 

'As the parties are familiar with the facts, we do not recount them 

further except as necessary to our disposition. 

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respondents were granted a writ of attachment against a number of other 

properties that Serpa allegedly owned and that respondents claim he 

attempted to conceal through fraudulent transfers. Following a bench 

trial, the district court concluded that the fair market value of the 

Properties on the date of the foreclosure sale was $6 million. 

On appeal, Serpa contends that (1) the district court's fair 

market value determination is not supported by substantial evidence, and 

(2) the district court erred in failing to withdraw the order granting the 

writ of attachment. We affirm the district court's determination of fair 

market value and reverse the district court's refusal to withdraw the writ 

of attachment. 

Substantial evidence supports the district court's fair market valuation 

We uphold a district court's findings of fact if supported by 

substantial evidence and will not set them aside unless clearly erroneous. 

Trident Construction v. West Electric, 105 Nev. 423, 426, 776 P.2d 1239, 

1241 (1989). Substantial evidence is "that which a reasonable mind might 

accept as adequate to support a conclusion." State, Emp. Security v. 

Hilton Hotels, 102 Nev. 606, 608, 729 P.2d 497, 498 (1986) (citation 

omitted) (internal quotation omitted). In a bench trial, a district court 

must "find the facts specially and state separately its conclusions of law." 

NRCP 52(a). 

To begin, Serpa cites Asphalt Products v. All Star Ready Mix, 

111 Nev. 799, 898 P.2d 699 (1995), to support his contention that the 

district court failed to adequately explain its rationale for determining the 

fair market value of the Properties. We disagree. 

In Asphalt, we addressed a district court's damages award 

where the district court did not provide an adequate explanation for how it 

arrived at the reasonable rental value in an unjust enrichment claim. 111 

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Nev. at 802-03, 898 P.2d at 701-02 (1995). We reversed the district court's 

award, reasoning that the district court "provided no rationale for going 

against substantial evidence that the rental value should have been 

higher than the amount he awarded." Id. at 803, 898 P.2d at 702 

(emphasis added). Accordingly, Asphalt's heightened explanation 

requirement only applies where the district court's conclusion goes against 

substantial evidence. Otherwise, this court has interpreted NRCP 52(a) 

as simply requiring the district court to make specific findings that 

indicate the factual basis for the district court's ultimate conclusion. See 

Robison v. Robison, 100 Nev. 668, 673, 691 P.2d 451, 455 (1984). 

Here, the district court's judgment lays out the relevant facts 

necessary to its conclusions of law and explains the legal standards which 

it applied in reaching those conclusions. Specifically, the district court 

stated: 

Upon review of the credible evidence before it, 

including consideration of the appraisals. . . of the 

unimproved land value of the six parcels and upon 

consideration of the testimony by Mr. Hardy, the 

current owner[,] that on January 5, 2011, he 

authorized a bid of $6,000,000, the Court finds 

that the fair market value of the Properties on 

January 5, 2011H was $6,000,000. 

It is apparent from this passage what evidence the district court relied 

upon in reaching its conclusion. Thus, substantial evidence supports the 

district court's conclusion on the fair market value of the Properties. 

Alternatively, Serpa argues that the landowner's bid cannot 

constitute substantial evidence of the land's value. Again, we disagree. 

The court-appointed appraiser assessed the individual parcel value of the 

Properties to be $5,660,000, and Serpa's appraiser valued the land, minus 

improvements, between $5,147,250 and $6,176,700. The findings of fact 

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show that Hardy's testimony alone was not dispositive in reaching the $6 

million figure, but merely one factor considered in reaching that value. 

Thus, because the $6 million figure falls within the range of prices set 

forth by the appraisers, substantial evidence supports the district court's 

fair market valuation. See Halfon v. Title Ins. & Trust Co., 97 Nev. 421, 

423-24, 634 P.2d 660, 661 (1981) (holding that an expert's fair market 

valuation and the later sale price of the property constituted substantial 

evidence of the property's fair market value). 2 

Thus, the district court's conclusion is supported by 

substantial evidence. 

2Serpa makes two alternative arguments that we also reject. First, 

Serpa argues that the district court erred in admitting testimony from 

Hardy on the value of the Properties. We disagree, as Hardy owned the 

beneficial interest in the deed of trust prior to purchasing the land at the 

foreclosure sale. In City of Elko v. Zillich,this court held that a property 

owner is presumed to have special knowledge of the property and may 

testify to its value. 100 Nev. 366, 371, 683 P.2d 5, 8 (1984). Questions 

about the competency of the landowner's testimony go to its weight, not 

admissibility. Id. 

Second, Serpa argues that the district court ignored evidence of the 

highest and best use of the Properties in determining their fair market 

value. The land's highest and best use is "but one factor to be considered 

in ascertaining the property's fair market value." Tahoe Highlander v. 

Westside Fed. Say., 95 Nev. 8, 11, 588 P.2d 1022, 1024 (1979). At trial, 

both appraisers testified that the highest and best use would be 

proceeding with the Chateau project, but there was competing testimony 

regarding whether this use was viable. The original developer had gone 

bankrupt (prompting the foreclosures underlying this action), and the 

individual parcel owners had not agreed to sell the parcels as a whole. 

Consequently, evidence in the record supports the district court's 

conclusion that the unimproved value of the Properties sold as individual 

parcels represented the fair market value. 

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The district court erred in refusing to dissolve the pre-judgment writ of 

attachment 

Serpa argues that the district court erred in refusing to 

dissolve a pre-judgment writ of attachment against a number of properties 

in Carson City, Nevada. 3We agree. 

NRS 31.200(1) allows the defendant to seek the discharge of a 

writ of attachment. The district court shall dissolve the writ if improperly 

or improvidently issued. NRS 31.200(1)(a), (2). We review the district 

court's factual determination of whether a writ of attachment was 

properly granted for abuse of discretion and only uphold the district 

court's findings if supported by substantial evidence. See Charmicor, Inc. 

v. Bradshaw Finance Co., 92 Nev. 310, 313, 550 P.2d 413, 415 (1976) 

(reviewing the underlying factual basis for a district court order denying 

appointment of a receiver under NRS 31.010 for abuse of discretion). 

Upon a motion to dissolve a writ of attachment where the defendant raises 

an issue of fact regarding the underlying legal basis for the writ, we have 

held that the burden shifts to the plaintiff to prove that the writ is 

properly supported. Kuehn v. Paroni, 20 Nev. 203, 207, 19 P. 273, 274 

(1888). 

In the present case, Serpa's motion to dissolve the writ of 

attachment asserted that the Carson City properties which respondents 

3As a threshold matter, respondents argue that the district court's 

minute order refusing to dissolve the writ of attachment does not 

constitute a final, appealable pre-judgment order under NRAP 3A(b)(5). 

Since the district court's minute order does not deal with the "procedural 

posture or merits," it is subject to interlocutory appeal under NRAP 

3A(b)(5). State, Div. Child & Fam. Servs. v. Dist. Ct., 120 Nev. 445, 454, 

92 P.3d 1239, 1245 (2004). 

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J. 

claim he fraudulently transferred were actually owned by his son, who 

shares the same name. Thus, Serpa's motion appears to have raised a 

question of whether he sought to fraudulently transfer the attached 

property. Although respondents' opposition to Serpa's motion attacks the 

evidence Serpa proffered, respondents have not met their burden of 

proving that Serpa owned the properties. Even on appeal, respondents do 

not challenge the factual basis of Serpa's argument. 

Therefore, given respondents' failure to prove that Serpa 

owned the Carson City properties following Serpa's motion to dissolve the 

writ of attachment, the district court's refusal to dissolve the writ is not 

supported by substantial evidence. 4Accordingly, we 

ORDER the judgment of the district court AFFIRMED IN 

PART AND REVERSED IN PART. 

J. 

Hardesty 

J. 

Parraguirre 

4Serpa challenges the original issuance of the writ as well. 

However, given that Serpa did not raise the issue of ownership until after 

the writ was granted, the original writ of attachment was proper. NRS 

31.017(5), 31.020. 

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cc: Hon. Connie J. Steinheimer, District Judge 

David Wasick, Settlement Judge 

Lemons, Grundy & Eisenberg 

Saied Kashani 

Allison, MacKenzie, Pavlakis, Wright & Fagan, Ltd. 

Washoe District Court Clerk 

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