In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit ____________________

Nos. 13-2649, 13-3523

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

GWENDOLYN JACKSON and

LATONJA SPENCER,

Defendants-Appellants.

____________________

Appeals from the United States District Court for the

Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division

Nos. 1:08-cr-00453-4, 1:08-cr-00453-12 — James B. Zagel, Judge.

____________________

ARGUED FEBRUARY 20, 2015 — DECIDED JUNE 3, 2015

____________________

Before RIPPLE, KANNE, and TINDER, Circuit Judges.

RIPPLE, Circuit Judge. Gwendolyn Jackson and Latonja 

Spencer were convicted in the United States District Court 

for the Northern District of Illinois on charges arising out of 

a scheme to defraud mortgage lenders. The district court 

sentenced Ms. Jackson to 112 months’ imprisonment and 

Ms. Spencer to 36 months’ imprisonment. Both defendants 

now appeal their respective convictions and sentences. For 
2 Nos. 13-2649, 13-3523

the reasons set forth in this opinion, we vacate Ms. Jackson’s

sentence and remand for resentencing. In all other respects, 

we affirm the judgments of the district court.

I

BACKGROUND

A.

Ms. Jackson and Ms. Spencer participated in a scheme to 

defraud various Chicago-area mortgage lenders from approximately August 2004 to May 2008. Bobbie Brown Jr. was 

the scheme’s leader. Brown arranged with home builders 

and other sellers of newly constructed residences to receive 

finder’s fees or commissions for locating buyers to purchase 

their properties at inflated prices. Using various businesses 

that he operated, including Chicago Global Investments, Inc. 

(“Chicago Global”), Brown then located nominee buyers 

willing to purchase the properties. To obtain financing for 

the purchases, the nominees were referred to loan officers, 

including Ms. Spencer, who fraudulently qualified the buyers for loans through false statements in loan applications 

and other documents submitted to lenders. Once a purchase 

was finalized, Brown and his coconspirators kept the surplus 

proceeds of the sale—that is, the inflated amount above 

what the seller was seeking.

As president and co-owner of Chicago Global, Ms. Jackson recruited nominee buyers to participate in the scheme. 

She and others also provided, and caused to be provided, 

funds for the real estate deals and falsely represented the 

nominees as the source of those funds. Ms. Jackson’s partici-
Nos. 13-2649, 13-3523 3

pation in the scheme resulted in losses to mortgage lenders 

of approximately $8,515,570. 

For her part, Ms. Spencer participated in the scheme 

through her job as a loan officer at Oxford Financial. As part 

of the scheme, she assisted Brown’s nominee buyers in obtaining funding for twelve different fraudulent real estate 

transactions. Specifically, Ms. Spencer knowingly provided 

false information, including falsely inflated income amounts 

and job histories, to lenders so that the nominees would 

qualify for mortgages. Ms. Spencer’s participation in the 

scheme resulted in losses to mortgage lenders of approximately $3,091,050.

B.

On June 3, 2008, a grand jury returned a twenty-six count

indictment against Ms. Jackson, Ms. Spencer, and nineteen 

other individuals, alleging that the defendants knowingly 

devised and participated in a scheme to defraud financial 

institutions and mortgage lenders. Ms. Jackson was charged 

with two counts of wire fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 

§ 1343, and one count of mail fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 

§ 1341. Ms. Spencer was charged with two counts of bank 

fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1344, and two counts of 

mail fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1341.

Ms. Jackson and Ms. Spencer, along with four of their 

codefendants, were tried together in a two-week jury trial. In 

the end, both defendants were convicted on all counts 

charged in the indictment. The district court sentenced 

Ms. Jackson to 112 months’ imprisonment on each of her 

three counts, to be served concurrently, and ordered her to 
4 Nos. 13-2649, 13-3523

pay $8,515,570 in restitution. As for Ms. Spencer, the court 

sentenced her to 36 months’ imprisonment on each of her 

four counts, also to be served concurrently, and ordered her 

to pay $3,091,050 in restitution.1 Both defendants timely appealed.2

II

DISCUSSION

Ms. Jackson and Ms. Spencer each challenge one aspect 

of the guilt phase of their trial. First, Ms. Jackson contends 

that the district court erred by excluding evidence of 

Brown’s physical violence toward her. Ms. Spencer contends 

that the district court abused its discretion by failing to sever 

her trial from that of her codefendants. Both defendants also 

submit that the district court erred in applying a two-level 

obstruction-of-justice enhancement when calculating their 

respective sentences. We first will review the contentions 

from the guilt phase of the trial. Then we will review the 

sentencing phase. 

A.

We begin with Ms. Jackson’s contention that the district 

court erroneously excluded evidence that Brown, with 

whom she had a personal relationship, abused her. We review the district court’s evidentiary rulings for abuse of dis1 The district court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231.

2 Our jurisdiction is premised on 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a).

 
Nos. 13-2649, 13-3523 5

cretion. United States v. Khan, 771 F.3d 367, 377 (7th Cir. 

2014). 

1.

At trial, Ms. Jackson sought to introduce a police report 

from November 12, 2007, detailing a domestic battery allegation that she had filed against Brown. The point of this evidence, according to Ms. Jackson, was to rebut testimony introduced by the Government that she and Brown were in a 

business relationship. As defense counsel explained, the police report was probative in this regard because “business 

partnerships and battery are opposites.”3

The district court refused to admit the report. In doing 

so, the court rejected Ms. Jackson’s contention that battery 

and business relationships are uncommon, stating that defense counsel “would have to have some expert witness 

come in and testify” to that fact.4 Further, because the incident described in the report occurred approximately four 

months after the last real estate transaction in the case, the 

court determined it was irrelevant to Ms. Jackson’s defense. 

In response, defense counsel inquired whether Ms. Jackson could introduce evidence of Brown’s abuse for a different purpose, namely, to corroborate her defense that she was 

unaware of Brown’s fraudulent activities because she was 

afraid to confront him. The district court responded to this 

request in the affirmative:

3 R.801 at 159.

4 Id.

 
6 Nos. 13-2649, 13-3523

If she wants to say that she didn’t confront him 

because she was afraid of him, she’s perfectly 

entitled to do that. I mean, absolutely. What 

she’s not entitled to do is use a post-event incident as proof that she was right to fear him at 

the time, because it’s a post-event incident.[5]

The next day, prior to Ms. Jackson’s testimony, the following colloquy took place between the district court and 

defense counsel regarding the court’s ruling excluding the 

November 2007 police report:

MR. CAMARENA: ... I just wanted to 

clarify so I don’t violate Your Honor’s order, 

just to be clear, Gwen Jackson can’t testify 

about any physical abuse, is that right?

THE COURT: That’s right.

MR. CAMARENA: Okay. And you 

mentioned earlier, or yesterday, you mentioned an expert and we couldn’t produce that 

without a continuance.

THE COURT: Right.

MR. CAMARENA: Thank you, Your 

Honor.[6]

During her testimony, Ms. Jackson testified that Brown 

controlled her and her company and that she did not know 

the details of his fraudulent scheme because she was afraid 

5 Id. at 162.

6 R.802 at 112.

 
Nos. 13-2649, 13-3523 7

to confront him. In particular, Ms. Jackson testified that 

Brown did not allow her to know the details of Chicago 

Global’s business transactions and that he “would holler and 

scream” if she ever inquired about such information.7 Notably, when asked whether she ever insisted on knowing more 

about the company’s business transactions, Ms. Jackson responded, “For a while, and then—well, Bobbie—Bobbie is 

very intimidating, very intimidating. Bobbie Brown is 5-foot 

9, 260 pounds, and ex-gang member.”8 Finally, on crossexamination, when asked why she continued to do business 

with Brown, Ms. Jackson responded that she “had been dealing with an abusive situation with him.”9

Following the jury’s verdict, Ms. Jackson filed two separate motions for a new trial. In both motions, she asserted 

that the district court had erred by excluding evidence of 

Brown’s physical abuse toward her. The district court denied 

the motions. In doing so, the court concluded that Ms. Jackson’s proffered evidence of abuse was inadmissible because 

it “failed for lack of a proper foundation as to time.”10 Further, the court noted that Ms. Jackson’s defense—i.e., that 

she failed to confront Brown because she was afraid of 

him—“was admitted more than once as was her accusation 

that Brown was abusive.”11

7 Id. at 144.

8 Id. at 145.

9 Id. at 168.

10 R.896 at 2.

11 Id.

 
8 Nos. 13-2649, 13-3523

2.

On appeal, Ms. Jackson contends that the district court 

abused its discretion by precluding her from “presenting 

any evidence that [she] was the victim of physical and mental abuse at the hands of Bobbie Brown.”12 Such evidence, 

she maintains, was necessary to corroborate her defense that 

she was unaware of Brown’s fraudulent activities because 

she feared challenging him. In response, the Government 

submits that the district court made no such ruling, but rather merely precluded Ms. Jackson from introducing a postevent police report in order to show that she and Brown 

were not in a business relationship.

We agree with the Government’s assessment of the district court’s order. The only evidence of Brown’s physical 

abuse ever proffered by Ms. Jackson was the instance described in the November 2007 police report. The district 

court excluded that report as irrelevant to Ms. Jackson’s 

mental state at the time of the offense. Aside from the report, 

the district court did not exclude any other evidence of 

Brown’s physical abuse. Although the court later stated that 

Ms. Jackson could not testify about “any” physical abuse, we 

believe that those remarks, when read in context, refer only 

to the instances of abuse described in the November 2007 

police report. Prior to those remarks, the record contains no 

mention of any other instance of physical abuse. The court’s 

only stated reason for excluding the report was because it 

described a “post-event incident” of abuse.13 Finally, and 

12 Appellants’ Br. 24.

13 R.801 at 162.

 
Nos. 13-2649, 13-3523 9

most importantly, Ms. Jackson testified at trial, without objection, that Brown was abusive, intimidating, and controlling. Under these circumstances, we decline to interpret the 

district court’s order as excluding evidence beyond the November 2007 police report. Because the instance of abuse described in that report post-dated the last fraudulent transaction in the case, we cannot say that the court’s decision to 

exclude it was an abuse of discretion. Cf. United States v. Savage, 505 F.3d 754, 761 (7th Cir. 2007) (concluding that district 

court did not abuse its discretion by excluding evidence of 

post-offense threats offered to support defendant’s coercion 

defense).

B.

Ms. Spencer contends that the district court erred by failing to sever her trial from that of her codefendants. We review a district court’s denial of a defendant’s request for 

severance for an abuse of discretion. United States v. Del Valle, 674 F.3d 696, 704 (7th Cir. 2012). Where, however, a defendant fails to renew a motion for severance at the close of 

evidence, we consider the issue waived. See United States v. 

Plato, 629 F.3d 646, 650 (7th Cir. 2010). 

Severance under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 14 

is required “only if there is a serious risk that a joint trial 

would compromise a specific trial right of one of the defendants, or prevent the jury from making a reliable judgment 

about guilt or innocence.” Zafiro v. United States, 506 U.S. 

534, 539 (1993). “[B]lame-shifting among codefendants, 

without more, does not mandate severance.” Plato, 629 F.3d 
10 Nos. 13-2649, 13-3523

at 650.14 Rather, “[w]hen codefendants blame each other, less 

drastic measures, such as limiting instructions, often will 

suffice to cure any risk of prejudice.” Id. at 651 (internal quotation marks omitted).

Ms. Spencer submits that the district court abused its discretion by failing to sever her trial from that of her codefendant, Edgardo Hernal. More precisely, Ms. Spencer contends that severance was warranted because her trial strategies and defenses were in direct conflict with Hernal’s. The 

Government responds that Ms. Spencer waived this objection by failing to request severance in the district court and 

that, in any event, the district court’s denial of severance was 

not an abuse of discretion.

We agree with the Government. First, there is no indication in the record that Ms. Spencer ever moved for severance 

in the district court. Although her codefendants, Jean and 

Edgardo Hernal, each individually moved to sever their trials from that of Ms. Spencer, there is no indication that 

Ms. Spencer ever joined in those motions. Accordingly, we 

consider this issue waived. See id. at 650. 

14 See also Zafiro v. United States, 506 U.S. 534, 538 (1993) (holding that 

severance is not required simply because codefendants present mutually 

antagonistic defenses); United States v. Hughes, 310 F.3d 557, 564 (7th Cir. 

2002) (“Mere ‘finger-pointing’ at another defendant, such as occurred 

here, is not sufficient to require severance.”); United States v. Mietus, 237 

F.3d 866, 873 (7th Cir. 2001) (“Even a showing that two defendants have 

‘mutually antagonistic defenses,’ that is, that the jury’s acceptance of one 

defense precludes any possibility of acquittal for the other defendant, is 

not sufficient grounds to require a severance unless the defendant also 

shows prejudice to some specific trial right.”).

 
Nos. 13-2649, 13-3523 11

In any event, waiver aside, it is clear that the district 

court did not abuse its discretion by denying severance. On 

appeal, Ms. Spencer only offers one reason for requiring severance: because her defense strategy was “mutually exclusive” with that of Edgardo Hernal.15 Severance, however, is 

not required simply because two codefendants present “mutually antagonistic defenses.” See Zafiro, 506 U.S. at 538. Accordingly, the district court did not abuse its discretion by 

failing to sever Ms. Spencer’s trial from that of her codefendants.

C.

Both defendants contend that the district court erred in 

applying an obstruction-of-justice enhancement when calculating their respective sentences. When reviewing an obstruction-of-justice enhancement, we review the district 

court’s factual findings for clear error and its conclusion that 

those findings support the enhancement de novo. United 

States v. Cheek, 740 F.3d 440, 453 (7th Cir. 2014).

The Sentencing Guidelines permit a two-level enhancement for obstruction of justice

[i]f (1) the defendant willfully obstructed or 

impeded, or attempted to obstruct or impede, 

the administration of justice with respect to the 

investigation, prosecution, or sentencing of the 

instant offense of conviction, and (2) the obstructive conduct related to (A) the defendant’s 

15 Appellants’ Br. 29.

 
12 Nos. 13-2649, 13-3523

offense of conviction and any relevant conduct; 

or (B) a closely related offense[.]

U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1. A finding that the defendant committed 

perjury is sufficient to justify the enhancement. See United 

States v. Riney, 742 F.3d 785, 790 (7th Cir. 2014). “A defendant commits perjury if, while testifying under oath, she gives 

false testimony concerning a material matter with the willful 

intent to provide false testimony, rather than as a result of 

confusion, mistake, or faulty memory.” United States v. Chychula, 757 F.3d 615, 619 (7th Cir. 2014) (alterations omitted) 

(internal quotation marks omitted). “To apply the enhancement based on perjury, the district court should make a finding as to all the factual predicates necessary for a finding of 

perjury: false testimony, materiality, and willful intent.” 

Riney, 742 F.3d at 790 (internal quotation marks omitted).

1.

With these principles in mind, we turn first to 

Ms. Jackson’s contention. The Presentence Investigation Report (“PSR”) for Ms. Jackson recommended a two-level enhancement to her sentencing calculation for obstruction of

justice pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1. In particular, the PSR 

asserted that Ms. Jackson had obstructed justice by knowingly providing false testimony at trial. 

When addressing this issue at sentencing, the district 

court determined, contrary to the PSR, that Ms. Jackson had 

not “deliberately or knowingly lied” while testifying: 

I heard you testify, I think what you said to me 

and testified to was not the truth. I am unwilling to add additional time to the fact that you 
Nos. 13-2649, 13-3523 13

were untruthful, often untruthful, because it is 

possible for me to believe that you started with 

all of this by lying to yourself and perhaps 

coming to believe your lies to yourself. If I 

thought that the false testimony you gave me 

was something that you knew as you testified 

was a lie, the sentence would be more severe. 

People who lie to themselves, particularly in 

this kind of offense you committed, are fairly 

common. The ability to forget what you knew, 

the ability to blame some of your conduct on 

others, the ability to think that the trouble you 

caused people you love and people who are 

close to you is a good ground for me to forget 

the trouble you have caused many people who 

got entwined into this very substantial fraud 

over a very long period of time, but because I 

do not find that you are deliberately and 

knowingly—that you’ve deliberately or knowingly lied at trial or deliberately lied knowingly 

to me now.[16]

Following these remarks, defense counsel pointed out 

that the offense level the court was using to calculate 

Ms. Jackson’s guidelines range still included an enhancement for obstruction of justice. In response, the district court 

stated, “If by raising the obstruction issue in light of what I 

have said about her lying to herself, I do not think lying to 

yourself excuses obstruction of justice.”17 The district court 

16 App. R.48 at 108–09.

17 Id. at 110.

 
14 Nos. 13-2649, 13-3523

then proceeded to calculate Ms. Jackson’s sentence using the 

two-level obstruction enhancement.

Ms. Jackson contends that the district court erroneously 

applied the obstruction enhancement in light of its finding 

that she did not “deliberately or knowingly lie[] at trial.”18

For its part, the Government concedes that the district court 

erred in applying the enhancement and that a remand is 

warranted for resentencing.

We agree with the parties’ conclusion on this issue. The 

district court’s finding that Ms. Jackson did not knowingly 

and deliberately lie during her testimony directly refutes one 

of the key elements required for perjury, namely, willful intent. The Government offers no other basis in the record 

warranting this enhancement. Accordingly, we conclude

that Ms. Jackson’s sentence should be vacated and her case 

remanded for resentencing.

2.

Ms. Spencer’s PSR recommended a two-level obstruction 

enhancement based on the ground that she too had knowingly provided false testimony. In response, Ms. Spencer 

filed an objection to the PSR in which she asserted that just 

because the jury did not believe her testimony does not 

mean that she committed perjury.

At sentencing, the district court determined that 

Ms. Spencer’s conduct warranted the enhancement. In particular, the court agreed with the Government that 

18 Id. at 109.

 
Nos. 13-2649, 13-3523 15

Ms. Spencer had lied when testifying that she did not knowingly provide false information to lenders. Although the 

court recognized that her testimony was “not a brilliant” or

“particularly effective obstruction of justice,” the court nonetheless determined “that she had, at the very minimum, 

shaded the truth” and “knew she was doing it.”19 Thus, the 

court concluded that the enhancement was warranted.

On appeal, Ms. Spencer’s challenge to the district court’s 

obstruction enhancement consists entirely of one sentence: 

“In consolidation, Ms. Spencer believes this argument [referring to Ms. Jackson’s argument] pertains to the imposition of 

the obstruction enhancement for the same reasons and therefore adopts this argument.”20 As we have just discussed, 

Ms. Jackson’s sentencing argument was premised entirely on 

the district court’s finding that she did not deliberately or 

knowingly lie at trial. The district court made no such findings with regard to Ms. Spencer. Rather, it found exactly opposite: that she had “shaded the truth” and “knew she was 

doing it.”21 Thus, Ms. Jackson’s sentencing argument is 

wholly irrelevant to Ms. Spencer’s case. We must conclude 

that the district court did not err in applying the enhancement.22

19 R.1169 at 7.

20 Appellants’ Br. 28.

21 R.1169 at 7.

22 To the extent that Ms. Spencer intended to challenge her sentence on a 

broader rationale, we consider any additional arguments on this issue 

waived. See Perez v. Illinois, 488 F.3d 773, 776–77 (7th Cir. 2007) 

(“[P]erfunctory and undeveloped arguments are deemed waived.”).

 
16 Nos. 13-2649, 13-3523

Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, we vacate Ms. Jackson’s sentence and remand for resentencing. In all other respects, we 

affirm the judgments of the district court.

AFFIRMED IN PART, VACATED AND REMANDED IN 

PART