i i i i i i



### MEM ORA ND UM OP INION No s. 04 -0 8- 00 71 2- CR & 04 -0 8- 00 71 3- CR D o n a l d R ay M c IN TOSH , Appellant
v . STA TE of

Te xas, Appellee Fr om the County

Court at L aw No. 7, Be x ar County , Texas Trial Court Nos. 220294 & 220291 Honora ble Monica E. Gue rre ro, Judge Pre siding Opinion by : Steven C. Hilbig, Just ice Sitt ing: Catherine Stone, Chief Justice

Phy lis J . Speedlin, J ustice Steven C. Hilbig, Just ice Deliver ed and F iled: November 18, 2009 AFF I RMED Donald Ray

McIntosh was found guilty by a jury of vi olating a protective order and re sisting tr ans po rt a tio n, and

fo un d n ot guil ty

of a ssa ult
. Th e tr ia l c ourt se nte nc e d Mc I nto sh to on e y e ar i n ja il and a $500 f

ine on the prote ctive order char g e and to ninety day s in jail and a $100.00 fine on the resisting transportation c h ar g e. McIntosh appea ls, contending the judg ments should be reve rsed beca use the e vidence is leg ally and fa ctually

insufficient to support the jury ’s ver dicts, the trial cour t04
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- 00 71 2- CR & 04
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- 00 71 3- CR

- 2- err ed by allowing the State to a

mend the information char g ing him with re sisting transpor tation, and the trial cour

t erre d in denying his motion to dismiss for lack of a speedy trial. We affir m the trial
c ourt ’s jud g me nts . B ACKG ROUND Be x ar County

Deputy Sheriff Steve n Wheeler testified that on J une 26, 2007, he dr ove to a
re sid e nc e a ft e r so me on e a t the loc a tio n dia le d 91 1, bu t te rm inate d the c a ll. Whe n h e arr ive d, De pu ty Wheeler sa

w a woman and two childre n standing in the front y ard of the re sidence . Deputy

Wheeler testified the woman, later identified a s Caroly n Miller, looked anxious and told him “he” ha d locked th e m o u t o f

th e h o me an d

p u s h e d h e r to th e g r o u n d
. B y

th is ti me , a

s e c o n d d e p u ty , G il M arti n e z,
arr ived at the residenc e and both de puties went to the back yard to look for McIntosh. The deputies found him smoking a c iga rette a nd beg an questioning him about his version of the events. Af ter a sh or t di sc us sion, D e pu ty

Whe e le r d e c ide d to arr e st M c I nto sh fo r “ fa mil y vio le nc e ” and

a ssa ult
. McIntosh was handcuff

ed with his arms behind his back, a nd the deputies wa lked him to the front of the re sidence . Deputy Martinez positioned McI ntosh over the ba ck of the patrol vehic le so he could sea rch him for

wea pons befor e plac ing him in the patr ol car
. Deputy Martinez testified that althoug h McI ntosh was fa cing the ca r, McIntosh used t he vehic le to push ag ainst the deputy and used his leg s to kic k backw ards towards the deputy
. Deputy Wheeler, who had be en che cking McIntosh’s criminal history , testified he sa w the alter cation and w ent t o assist Deputy Martinez. Deputy Wheeler told the j ury

he slappe d McIntosh on the fac e and told him to calm down. When McIntosh continued to strugg le with the deputies, Deputy Wheeler forc ed McIntosh to the g round and plac ed his fore arm
acr oss McI ntosh’s neck to “ secur e” Mc I ntosh on the g round. De puty Wheeler, w ho weig hed about 285 pounds, testified he laid his body on top of McIntosh. There wer e dec orative stones on the04
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- 00 71 2- CR & 04
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- 00 71 3- CR

- 3- g round whe re Mc I ntosh lay , and his fac e wa s cut in the proce ss. McI ntosh was provided me dical trea tment a t t

h e s c e n e , an d

w a s ta k e nto a h o s p it a l l a te r

th a t n ig h t. D e p u ty

Wh e e le r te s ti f ie d that duri ngthe c ours e of

the se e ve nts , M ill e r t old the deputi e s sh e ha d a

pr ote c tiv e or de r a g a ins t McIntosh and she showe d the dep u t i es a copy of the orde r. The or der pr ohibited McI ntosh from g oing w ithin one hundred y ards of Miller’s re sidence
. On e o f Miller’s daug hters, four teen- y ear -old B.M., te stified she ca lled 911 that day and witnessed McI ntosh’s arr est. She testified M cIntosh did not believe he s hould be ar rested a nd was

“ pu lli ngba c k” fr om the de pu ty wi th h is f e e t and arm s. B .M state d th e de pu ty wa s b e hin d M c I nto sh trying to hold him by the cuff s but Mc I ntosh ke pt “ leaning ” back into the office r. She also testified that on e de pu ty

tol d McI nto sh to ca lm dow n an d co un te d “f ro m thr e e to one ” be fo re he “ thr e w h im to the g round” w ith “some forc e.” She e x plained the de puty had “warne d” McIntosh to calm down and the de puty

“put him down to the g round bec ause he didn’t calm down.” Tw o o f t he wi tnes ses the State c a lle d to te sti fy pr e se nte d a

dif fe re nt v e rs ion

of the e ve nts . Miller testified she ne ver told the de puties McI ntosh had assaulted he r, but conc eded she showed the deputies a c opy

of the prote ctive orde r and that the hous e was her residenc e. Mi ller told the jury that
w h e n t h e d e p u t i e s b r o u g h tM c In t o s h t o t h e f r o n to f t h e h o u s e , M c In t o s h w a s w a l k i n g “ p e a c e f u l l y” and inquired politely

as to the rea son for his ar

rest. Ac cordingto Mill er, D eputy Wheeler r esponded by calling McIntosh a “boy” and told him to “s h u t u p . ” W hen McI ntosh ag ain aske d why

he wa s be ingarr e ste d, De pu ty

Whe e le r b e c a me ang ry , pic ke d Mc I nto sh up by his ha ir and the ha nd c uf fs , and thre w him fac e down on the r ocks while say ing, “ I ’ll show y ou what we do with boy s like y ou.” When McI ntosh beg an to scre am, Deputy Wh ee l er p u lled McIntosh’s arms up, for cing his face
a g a ins t th e ro c ks . M ill e r t old the jur y tha t D e pu ty Whe e le r s te pp e d o n M c I nto sh ’s ne c k w ithhis04
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- 4- “stee l-toed” boot a

nd p u l l ed his hair. Miller testified D eputy Wheeler use d his foot to “g rind” McIntosh’s fac e into the roc ks “as if putting out a cig are tte,” and that McI ntosh fainted fr om the pain. Miller’s other daug hter, M.M., who was eleve n y ear s old at t he ti me of trial, a lso told t he jury she saw D eputy

Wheeler use his foot to step on McI ntosh’s head.

L EGA L AN D F A C TUA L S UF F I CI E NCY Stan dard of Revie w We revie w a c halleng e to the leg al suffic iency of the e vidence by

looking at all of the evidenc e in the lig ht most favorable to t h e v er d ict to determine w hether any rational trier

of fa ct could have found the essential ele ments of the off ense be y ond a re asonable doubt. Pr ibl e v . S tat e , 175 S.W .3d 724, 729-30 (Te x . Crim. App.), cert. de nied , 546 U.S. 962 (2005). We re so l v e any inconsistencies in the testimony in f avor of the verdic t. Cur

ry v . S tat e , 3 0 S. W. 3 d

3 9 4 , 4 0 6 ( T e x. Cr im. Ap p. 20 00 ). I n r e vie wi ngthe fa c tua l su ff ic ie nc y of the e vid e nc e , we loo k a t the e vid e nc e in a neutr al light, a

nd ask whether the evidenc e supporting the verdic t is so weak or so ag ainst the g reat weig ht and pre pondera

nce of the evidence as to rende r t he verdict manifestly unjust. Gr ott i v . S tat e , 273 S.W .3d 273, 280 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008). Discussion Resisting Transp ortat ion McIntosh contends the evide nce is leg ally and fa ctually

insufficient to support his conviction fo r r e sis tin g tr ans po rt a tio n. Th e inf or ma tio n f ile d a g a inst Mc I nto sh

a lle g e d in

pa rt that Mc I nto sh “did intentionally

preve nt and obstruct a pe rson, namely : Gi l M ar tinez, hereinaf ter re fer red to a s complainant, whom the de fenda nt knew to be a Peac e Of

fice r, fr om effe cting TRANSPORTATI ON of THE D EFEN DANT by using f orce ag ainst said complainant, to wit: PUSHI NG THE04
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- 00 71 3- CR

1 ... S e c tio n 3 8 .0 3 (a ) p ro v id e s in r e le v a n t p a rt tha t “[a ] p e rs o n c o m m its an o ff e n se if h e inte n tio n a lly p re v e n ts o r o b stru c ts a p e rs o n he kn o w s is a p e a c e o ff ic e r . . . fro m e ff

e c ting a n a rr e st, se a rc h , o r t ra n sp o rta tio n o f the a c to r . . . by us i ng f

orce ag ai ns t t he peace of f i cer . . . . ” T EX . P E N A L C O D E A NN . § 3 8
. 0 3 (a) (V ernon 2 0 0 3 ).

- 5- COMPL AI

NANT.” See T EX . P EN A L C ODE ANN . § 38.03 (a) (Ve rnon 2003). 1 Mc I nto shargue s h is only resistanc e ca

me while he w as on the g round and the resistanc e was simply an attempt to pre vent inj ur y to h is f a c e c a us e d b y the ro c ks . H ow e ve r, thi s argume nt i g no re s the te sti mony of bo th de pu tie s and

B .M . M ill e r t

hat M cI nt osh w a s p us hin g wi th h is b od y and kic kin g his le g s a g a ins t Deputy Martinez befor e De puty Wheeler f

orce d McIntosh to the gr ound. There is sufficient evidenc e for

a re asonable jury

to find bey ond a re asonable doubt all the essential ele ments of resisting transportation. Although Ca

roly n Miller testified McIntosh did not r esist the deputies bef ore be ing thr own to the g round, the jury

was fr ee to c hoose betwe en the diff ere nt versions of fa cts p re sented by the witnesses. We ar e r e qu ir e d to d e f e r to th e ju

r y ’ s a p p ar e n t c r e d ib il it

y d e te r mi n a ti o n s , e v e nin a factual sufficie ncy

revie w. Lan c on v . S

tat e , 2 5 3 S. W. 3 d 6 9 9 , 7 0 5 ( T e x. Cr im
. A p p . 2008). No tw ith sta

nd ingthe c on fl ic tin g te sti mony , th e e vid e nc e su pp or tin g the ve rd ic t is no t so we a k o r s o
a g a ins t th e g re a t we ig ht and pr e po nd e ra nc e of the e vid e nc e a s to re nd e r t he ve rd ic t ma

nif e stl y un jus t. Violation of

P rote ctive Order I n the violat i o n of a pr otective or der c ase, Mc I ntosh was cha rg ed with intentionally

and kn ow ing ly

vio la tin g an O c tob e r 1 0, 20 06 , or de r o f t he 16 6 Di str ic t Co ur

t of B e xar County , T e xas, th issued pursuant to se ction 85.005 of the Texas F amily Code, by “intentionally

and knowing ly

g oing04
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- 00 71 3- CR

2 ... Sect i on 25. 07 ( a) provi des i n par t : ( a) A p er s on comm i t s an of f ens e i f , i n vi ol at i on o f

. . . an order i s s ued und er . . . C hap t er 85 , Fam i l y C o d e, . . . th e p e rs o n k n o w ing ly o r i nt ent i o nal l y : . . . (3) goes t o or near any of t he f ol l owi ng p l ace s as s peci f i cal l y d es cr i bed i n t he order
. . . : (A) t he r es i dence
. . . of a pr ot ect ed i ndi vi dual or a memb er o f t h e fam ily o r h o u se h o ld
. . . . T EX . P E N A L C O D E A NN . § 2 5
. 0 7 (a) (V ernon S up p . 20 0 9 ).

3 ... M ill e r a n d M c In to sh a p p e a le d the p ro te c tive o rd e r to this c o u rt, w h ic h a ff irm e d the o rd e r. M i l l er-M cIn t o sh v . S ta te , N o. 04- 06- 00871- CV , 2009 W L 2608661 ( T ex . App.

— Sa n Ant o ni o S ept . 12, 2007, n o pe t . ) ( mem. op. , n ot d esi gnat ed f

o r pub l i cat i o n).

- 6- to or nea r the RES I DENCE of CAROL YN MARI E MI L L ER.” See T EX . P EN A L C ODE ANN . § 25.07(a) (Ve rnon Supp. 2009). 2 Mc I nto shfi rs t c on te nd s th e pr ote c tiv e or de r i s “ inv a lid ” be c a us e of an a

pp are nt c on fl ic t in its provisions. The protective order, a cer tified copy

of which w as admitted into evidenc e, conta ins an af firmative f

inding of family violence a

nd order s, among other thing s, that McI ntosh is prohibit ed from g oing within 100 y ards of Miller’s residence for a period of two y ear s. The orde r re cites that Miller and

M c I n to s h a g r e e d

to th e o r d e r s th e r e in , an d th a t “ b y th e s ig n a tu

r e s b e lo w , th e p a rties acknow ledg e that thi s ag ree ment expresses t he entire understandingand conc ord of the pa rties, and
c on se nt t hat th e Court , w ith ou t f

ur the r n oti c e , ma

y e nte r b ind ingor de rs in a c c or da nce w it h th is ag ree ment.” The order is sig ned by the pre siding judg e. Howe ver, the signature lines whe re Miller and McI ntosh were to indicate their a pproval of the form of the order eac h bear the notation “re fused to sign.” 3 McI ntosh conclusorily asser ts this renders the order “invalid,” but he fa ils to cite any leg al authority or make any

argument in support of the asser tion. McIntosh doe s not arg ue the judg e who issued the orde r wa s without authority or jurisdiction to enter it or that the orde r wa s otherwise void. McIntosh also asserts the e vidence is insufficient to suppor t the verdic t beca

use Miller and McIntosh “wer e living toge ther, and
. . . Miller actua lly moved back in w ith [ ] McI ntosh where he was living .” M cInt o s h ci tes only to trial counsel’s c losing a rg ument. He doe s not cite to any04
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- 00 71 3- CR

4 ... S ect i o n 2 5
. 0 7 (d) o f the P enal C o d e p rovides t hat “ [r ]eco nci l i at o ry act i o ns o r agr eem ent s m ad e b y pe rs o ns af f ect ed by an order do not af f ect t he val i di t y of t he order or t he dut y of a peace of f i cer t o enf

orce t hi s s ect i on. ” T EX . P E N A L C O D E A NN . § 2 5
. 0 7 (d) (V ernon S up p . 20 0 9 ).

- 7- e vid e nc e in t

he re c or d, no r d oe s h e pr ov ide any le g a l a uth or ity or argume nt a

bo ut h owthe se fa c ts rende r the e vidence insufficient 4

. Be cause McIntosh has not provided arg ument or authority to support his contention that the evidenc e is leg ally

and fac tually insufficient to suppor t the verdic t on the violation of a protec tive order char g e, the issue is inade quately briefe d. See T EX . R. A PP . P. 3 8. 1( h) ; Ru sse au v . S tat e , 171 S.W .3d 871, 881 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005), cert. de nied , 5 48 U. S. 9 26 (2 00 6) . N e ve rt he le ss, be c a

us e the undisputed evidenc e esta blished McI ntosh was found at Miller’s re sidence in violation of a court
or de r i ssu e d un de r Cha

pte r 85 of the F a mil y

Cod e , w e ho ld t

he e vid e nc e is b oth

le g a lly and fa c tua lly sufficie nt to support the verdict, a nd overr ule McIntosh’s first issue. A M EN D M EN T O F I NF ORMATI ON Mc I nto shne xt co mpl a ins he wa s den ie d a fa ir tr ia l bec a us e the tr ia l c ourt

a llo we d th e State to amend the infor

mation char g ing resisting transportation on the day of trial. Ag ain, McIntosh cites no leg al authority

to support his claim. W e will never theless consider

this iss ue in the intere st of justice. Th e or ig ina l in fo rm a ti o n

a l l e g e d M c I nt o s h r e s i s t e d “ arr e st” by

“ str iki ngthe c omp la ina

nt w ith the hand of

the def endant.” On the day

of trial, the State moved to amen d the information by
su bs tit uti ng the wo rd “ tr ans po rt a tio n” fo r “a rr e st, ” and by su

bs tit uti ng “ pu sh ing the c omp la ina nt”
as the manner

and mea ns alleg ation. McIntosh objected to the amendment as be ing untimely . After hear ing Mc I ntosh’s objection, the State reque sted a continuance , to w hich McIntosh obje cted. The trial court ove rruled Mc I ntosh’s objection and pe rmitted the amendme nt, but offer ed a te n-day04
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- 00 71 3- CR

- 8- continuance to allow McIntosh adequate time to prepa re. McIntosh de clined the of fer and expressed his de sir e to p ro c e e d w ithtr ia l. Article 28.10 of

the Texas Code of Criminal Procedur e, which g o v er n s the amendme nt of the c ha rg ingins tr

ume nt, pr ov ide s in

pa rt : (a) After notice to the defenda

nt, a matter of

form or substanc e in an indictment or information may be ame nded at a

ny time before the date the trial on the merit commenc es. On the r equest of the defe ndant, th e co u rt shall allow the de fe nd ant n ot l e ss t

ha n 1 0 d ay s, or

a sh or te r pe ri od if re qu e ste d by the de fe nd ant, to respond to the amended indictment or infor mation.

. . . (c) An indictment or information may not be amende d over the defe ndant’s objection as to form or substance if the amended i ndictment or information charg es the def endant with an a dditional or di ffe rent off ense or if the substantial rig hts of the defe ndant ar e pre

judiced. T EX . C ODE C R IM . P R OC . ANN . art. 28.10 (V ernon 2006) . The S tate conc edes the trial court e rre d by allowing the amendme nt on the day of trial. Be cause the amendment violated a statutory rathe r than constitutional rig ht, w e will r ever se only if the er ror a ffe cted Mc I ntosh’s substantial rights. See T EX . R. A PP . P. 4 4. 2( b) ; Du k

es v. S tat e , 239 S.W .3d 444, 447 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2007, pe t. ref’ d). The untimely amendment of

a cha rg ing instrument a ffe cts a de fenda n t’s substantial rig hts if the ins tr ume nt d id n ot i nf

or m th e de fe nd ant o f t he char ge a g a ins t hi m su ff ic ie ntl y to a llo w h im t o prepa re his def ense, or if prosec ution under the e rrone ous char g ing instrume n t wo u l d subject the defe ndant to the risk of being prosecuted later for the s ame c rime. Tre jos v . S tate , 243 S.W .3d 30, 42 (T e x. Ap p. —H ou sto n [1st Dis t.] 200 7, pe t. r e f’ d) ; Du k es v . S tat e , 239 S.W .3d at 447-48 (c iting Go lli ha r v . S

tat e , 46 S.W .3d 243, 248 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001)).04
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- 00 71 3- CR

- 9- McI n t o s h does not argue, and nothingin the rec ord sug g ests, the amendme nt of the information ha

mp e r e d M c I nto s h ’s ability

to prepa re his def ense. Mc I ntosh’s defe nse appe ars to have been that he did not resist the deputies until after he had be en thrown to the g round and ha d his face pushed ag ainst the rocks. The jury char g e contained a se lf-def ense instruc tion that permitted the jury to a c qu it M c I n to s h if h is u s e o f f o r c e w a s r e a s o n a

b le in r e s p o n s e to D e p u ty M artinez’s use or
a tte mpt e d u se of

un lawf ul f or c e . T he State c a lled as a w itn e ss e ve ry pe rs on the re c or d r e fl e c ts ob se rv e d th e e ve nts e xce pt M c I nto sh . M c I nto shwa s a ble to est abl ish hi s d e fe ns e thr ou g h th e se witnesses. McIntosh has not pointed to any evidenc e he w as unable to procure beca use of the untimely amendment. Nor would the State be able to prose cute Mc I ntosh on the orig inal ch arge in a subsequent action. Section 38.03 of the Texas Penal Code provides that a p er s o n comm its an offe nse if he intentionally

preve nts or obstructs a pe ace office r fr om effe cting “ a n a r r e st, searc h, or transpor

tation” of the a c tor . Th is c ourt ha s no t pr e vio us ly c on sid e re d wh e the r se c tio n 38 .0 3 de fi ne s th re e se pa rate
o f f e n s e s
— r e s i s t i n g ar

r e s t , r e s i s t i n g s e ar c h , an d

r e s i s t i n g t r an s p o rt a t i o n— o r t h r e e d i f f e r e n tw a ys in which the sing le offe nse may be committed. Howe ver, thre e of our sister courts have conc luded section 38.03 def

ines a sing le offe nse that a pe rson may commit by obstructing or pre venting a pea ce office r from perf

orming his duty , whether that duty involves the arr est, sear ch, or transportation of the ac tor. Se e Cle me nt v . S tat e , 2 48 S.W. 3d

79 1, 80 2 ( Te x. Ap p. —F or t Wor th 200 8, no pe t.) ; Ha rti

s
v . S tat e , 18 3 S.W. 3d 79 3, 79 9 (T e x. Ap p. —H ou sto n [14t h D ist .] 20 05 , n o p e t.) ; Fi ns te r v . S tat e , 152 S.W. 3d 21 5, 21 9 ( Te x. Ap p. —D a lla s 2 00 4, no pe t.)
. We a re pe rs ua de d b y

the re a so nin g of

tho se04
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- 00 71 3- CR

5 ... Al t houg h t he t r i al vi ol at ed ar t i cl e 28. 10 ( a) by al l owi ng t he i nfo rm ati o n t o be amended on t he day t r i al co m m enced , t he co urt d i d no t viol at e art i cl e 2 8
. 1 0 (c) b ecause t he am end m ent did no t charge M cInt o sh wi t h a dif f erent o ff e n se . See T EX . C O D E C R IM . P R OC . A NN . art . 28
. 1 0 (c) (V ernon 2 0 0 6 ).

- 10- courts and ag ree that section 38.03 def ines a sing le offe nse. 5 Acc ording ly , the State would not be
a ble to m a int a in a

su bs e qu e nt p ro se c uti on

of Mc I nt os h for re sis tin g his arr e st b y str iki ngDe pu ty M arti n e z. B e c a us e Mc I nto sh ’s a

bil ity to p r e p a r e h i s d e f e n s e w a s n o t

d e t r i m e nta lly

a ff e c te d, and be c a us e do ub le je op ard

y wi ll p re ve nt t

he State fr om p ro se c uti ngMc I nto shon the or ig ina l c ha

rg e , w e ho ld the la te a me ndme nt o f t

he inf or ma tio n d id n ot a ff

e c t Mc I nto sh ’s su

bs tanti a l r ig hts
. S P E E DY T RI AL I n his third issue, McI ntosh arg ues the trial c ourt err ed in de ny ing his motion to dismi ss based on a violation of his rig ht to a speedy trial. On the day the trial beg an, Aug ust 21, 2008, McIntosh’s counsel a sked the trial c ourt to rule on a pro se motion to set aside the information that alleg ed the State violated McIntosh’s rig ht to a speedy trial. See T EX . C ODE C R IM . P R OC . ANN . art. 28.061 (V e rn on 20 06 ) ( statin g if mo ti on to s e t a sid e inf or ma tio n f or fa ilure to p ro vid e sp e e dy tr ia l is sustained, cour

t shall discha

rg e def endant) . During an informa l hear ing a nd without rece iving a

ny evidenc e, the c ourt denied the motion. A s peedy trial is g uara

nteed by both the Unit ed S tates and Te x as Constitut ions. See B arker v. W ingo , 407 U.S
. 5 1 4 (1 972) (holding speedy trial protec ted under

the Six th Amendment); Zam oran o v . S

tat e , 84 S.W .3d 643, 647 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002) (holding Article 1, § 10 of the Te x as Constit ution guara

ntees a speedy and public trial). We r eview the rig ht to a speedy trial g uara

nteed under the Texas Consti tution under the four -prongbalanc ing te st established by the United States Supreme Court in Barker v. W ingo
. Zamorano , 84 S.W .3d at 648. Those f actor s are the leng th of04
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- 00 71 3- CR

- 11- the delay , the re asons for the delay , whether t h e d ef en d an t asser

ted his rig ht to a speedy

trial, and whether the def endant suff

ere d any prejudice as a r esult of the dela y . Id. at 647-48. The State has the bu rd e n t o j u s t i f

y t h e l e n g t h o f t h e d e l ay an d t h e d e f e n d an t h a s t h e b u r d e n t o d e m o n s t ra te his
asser tion of t he rig ht to a speedy trial and that he was pre

judiced. Can tu v . S

tat e , 253 S.W .3d 273, 281 (T ex . C ri m. App. 2008). “[T]he gr eate r the State’s ba d faith or of ficial ne g lige nce a

nd the lon g e r i ts a c tio ns de lay

a tr ia l, the le ss a de fe nd ant mus t sh ow a c tua l pr e jud ic e or pr ov e dil ig e nc e in
asser t i n g h i s ri gh t to a speedy trial.” Id. at 2 8 0 -8 1
. W e r ev i ew t h e t ri al co u rt ’s ru l i n g u s i n g a bifurca ted standar d. We apply an abuse of di scre tion standard to fa ct finding s, and re view de novo the application of the law to the fa cts. Zamorano , 84 S.W. 3d a t 64 8. We i mpl y fi nd ing s o f f

a c t in favor of the trial c ourt’s ruling so long a s they are supported by

the re cord. Id
. Length of the Delay Mc I nto shwa s in c arc e rate d a pp ro xima te ly

fo ur te e n mo nth s awa iti ngtr ia l on the se c ha rg e s. A d e la y o f mo r e th an o n e y e ar is s u f f ic ie n t to tr ig g e r a s p e e dy tr ia l in qu iry
. Sh aw v. S ta te , 117 S.W. 3d 88 3, 88 9 ( Te x. Cr im. Ap p. 20 03 ); Dragoo v . S tat e , 96 S.W .3d 308, 314 (Tex. Crim. App. 20 03 ); se e Ce le

sti ne v . S tat e , No. 14-08-00766- CR, 2009 W L3365893, *3 (Tex. App.—Houston [14t h D ist .] Se pt. 10 , 2 00 9, no pet. ) ( statin g de lay of mor e tha

n o ne y e ar i s “ pr e su mpt ive ly pr e jud ic ia l” ); Oran d v . S

tat e , 254 S.W .3d 560, 566 (Tex. App.—For t Worth 2008, pet. ref’d) (same)
. A delay of four teen months weig hs ag ainst the State.

Reason for the Delay When w e revie w the second fac tor, we assess differ ent weig hts to the differe nt rea sons the State offe rs to justify

the delay
. Shaw , 1 17 S.W. 3d a t 88 9. “ Som e re a so ns are va lid and se rv e to ju s ti f y th e d e la y , w h il e o th e r r e a s o n s ar e n o t v a li d an d d o n o t s e r v e to ju s ti f

y th e delay .” Id

. The04
- 08
- 00 71 2- CR & 04
- 08
- 00 71 3- CR

- 12- pr os e c uti on

of the de fe nd ant on oth e r c ha rg e s may be a va lid re a so n fo r a de lay in b ri ng inghim

to trial. Ea sle

yv . S tat e , 564 S.W .2d 742, 745 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978). Howeve r, the State must offe r argument and proof

to sustain its burden on this fa ctor. See D ragoo , 96 S.W .3d at 314 n.4. Th e State a sse rt e d p art

of the de lay wa s d ue to a fe lony char ge t hat w a s p e nd inga g a ins t McIntosh until Marc h 2008, when it was dismissed. Durin g t he hea ring , the prosec utor told the jud g e it w a s in

the “ [d]e fe nd ant’ s b e st i nte re sts ” to “ wa it” to r e so lv e the mis de me ano r c a se s unti l the fe lony wa s c on c lud e d. I n it s b ri e f, the State argue s th a t be c a us e Mc I nto shdid

no t c ha lle ng e thi s state me nt d

urin g t he hea

ri ng , th is c ourt

sh ou ld attr ibute pa

rt of the de lay to M c I nto sh ’s “ de sir e to dispose of his fel o n y ca s e fi rs t . ” We dec line to do so. The State offe red no pr oof re g ardingthe felony char g e and did not attempt to expl ain how a pe nding c ase that was dismissed justi fied a ny de lay . N or

is the re any

e vid e nc e fr om w hic h o ne c ou ld i nf e r t hat it wa s Mc I nto sh ’s de sir e to d isp os e of the fe lony

case first. I n the absenc e of pr oof, “a court may

presume ne ither a de liberate attempt on the par t of the State to prejudice the def ense nor a valid re ason for

the delay .” Id . at 314. Th e S tat e also argue s p art of the de lay

wa s d ue to a pp e lla nt’ s c ouns e l be inga llo we d to withdraw. The record indicates that approximately six months afte r the c ases we re f iled, an attorne y for a ppellant moved to withdraw , and the motion was gra nted. Howeve r, t he State has not shown whether this caused a

ny delay in setting the c auses f

or trial. F inally , the State points to docket sheet entries indicating that on Ma y 28, 2008, the State announc ed “r eady” for trial in both case s, but the
case s were rese t to J une bec ause de fense counsel wa s in trial in a nother c ourt. We ag ree this part of the de lay

should not be attributed to the State. The doc ket s h ee t s ref lect seve ral other

trial settings, but the State of

fer ed no proof or argument as to the re asons the setting s were passed. B ased on the re cord be fore us, this factor we ighs slig htly ag ainst the State.04
- 08
- 00 71 2- CR & 04
- 08
- 00 71 3- CR

6 ... M cI nt osh al s o f

i l ed a p ro se p e tit io n fo r a w rit o f m a n d a m u s in this c o u rt o n A u g u st 1 1 , 2 0 0 8 , se e k ing to co m p el the t rial co urt t o rule o n va riou s p ro se mo t i ons , i ncl udi ng a mo t i on f or s peedy t r i al , al l ege d t o h ave been f i l ed i n t h e t r i al cou r t on Sept embe r 24, 2007. T h i s cou r t den i ed t h e r equ es t ed r el i ef be ca u s e M cI n t os h w as r epr es en t ed by c o u n se l an d w a s n o t en tit le d to hyb rid re p re se n ta tio n . S ee In re M cIn t o sh , No
. 0 4
- 0 8
- 0 0 6 0 0
- CR , 2 0 0 8 W L 4 0 5 6546 (T ex. A p p . — Sa n A nt o ni o A ug. 29 , 20 0 8 , ori g. pro ceed i ng) ( m em . op . , not d esi gnat ed f o r pub l i cat i o n).

- 13- Def endant’s Ass ertion of his Righ t to Speedy Trial McIntosh has the burde n to de monstrate he a sserted his rig ht to a speedy trial. Can tu , 253 S.W .3d at 281. Although he contends in his brief that he asser ted his rig ht, he re fer s only to the pr o
se motion to s et aside that his attorney urg ed on the f

irst day of trial. A motion seeking dismiss al of a c harg e base d on violation of a spee dy trial rig ht rather

than a motion reque sting a speedy trial “will g ener a ll y w e a k e n a s p e e dy - tr ia l c la im b e c a u s e it s h o w s a d e s ir e to h a v e n o tr ia l in s te a d o f a speedy one.” Can tu , 253 S.W .3d at 283. The recor d in neither case contains a mot ion for a speedy trial. Howe ver, the pr o s e motion to set aside the infor

mation, which McIntosh sig ned J uly 21, 2008 and filed in e ach c ase, r ecites that McIntosh filed a “Motion for Speedy Trial” on September 24, 2007. 6 Assuming the motion was f iled and that it a sked for a speedy trial, as opposed to dismi ssal, the motion was neve r set for hear ing nor
ru le d upo n by th e tr ia l c ourt . B e c a us e Mc I nto shha s n ot m e t hi s b ur de n to sh owhe dil ig e ntl y
asser ted his rig hts, this factor we ighs slig htly ag ainst McI ntosh. Pre jud ic eto t he De fe nda nt McIntosh also has the burde n to demonstrate a ny prejudice flowing from the lac k of a spe edy trial. Id. a t 28 1. Whe n w e ana ly ze t he pr e jud ic e to t

he de fe nd ant, we do so in l ig ht o f t he int e re sts the rig ht to a speedy

trial was de signe d to protect: “( 1) to preve nt oppressive pre trial incar cer ation, (2) to minimize the acc used’s a nx iety and conc ern, a

nd (3) to limit the possibi lity that the ac cused’ s04
- 08
- 00 71 2- CR & 04
- 08
- 00 71 3- CR

- 14- defe nse will be impaired.” Id. at 285. Of these interests, t he latter is the m ost serious “bec ause the inability of a de fenda

nt adequately

to prepa re hi s ca s e skews the f

airne ss of the entire sy stem.” Barker , 407 U.S. at 532. McIntosh did not offer a

ny evidenc e or a

rg ument on this issue at the hear ing, a nd he does not argue in his brief that he was pr ejudiced by the delay
. I n his moti on to set aside, McIntosh asserted wi tne sse s ha d “ be c ome un a va ila ble ,” bu t did no t ide nti fy any wi tne sse s he wo uld be un a ble to c a ll or spec ify what their te stimony

would have be en. Se e Ha rri so n v . S tat e , 2 8 2 S. W. 3 d

7 1 8 , 7 2 2 ( T e x. Ap p. —A mari llo 20 09 , n o p e t.) (h old ingto d e mon str a te prejudic e du e to u nava ila ble wi tne ss,

“ de fe nd ant m

us t pre se nt p ro of

bo th o f t he e ff or ts t o lo c a te the wi tne ss a

nd that th e wi tne ss w ou ld hav e be ne fi tte d th e de fe ns e ” ); Hu nt v . S tat e , 2 3 7 S
. W
. 3 d

4 3 4 , 4 3 8 ( T e x. A p p . —W a c o 2 0 0 7 , pe t. ref ’d) ( holding that to esta

blish prejudice, de fenda

nt must show witness is unavailable , the testimony mig ht b e re le va

nt a nd ma te ri a l to de fe ns e , a

nd he e xer c ise d du e dil ig e nc e to l oc a te wi tne ss) . T his fac tor weig hs heavily

ag ainst McI ntosh. After weig hing the four f

actor s, we c onclude the tr ial court did not err in denying the motion to set aside the infor

mation due to lack of

a spee dy trial. Al t h o u gh t h e fourtee n month delay was sufficie nt to trig g er the speedy trial inquiry , the State was r esponsible for only part of the delay , no bad fa ith on the part of t he S tate is shown by the re cord, a nd McIntosh failed to establish he a sserted h i s r i g h tt o a

s p e e dy t r i a l o r

w a s p r e j u d i c e d b y t h e d e l ay. The judg ments of the trial c ourt are aff irmed.
Steven C. Hilbig, Just ice PUB L I SH