J-S24004-22

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

W.B. HOMES, INC.

v.

USI INSURANCE SERVICES, LLC, 

DONNA GOEPFRICH, HARLEYSVILLE 

WORCESTER INSURANCE COMPANY, 

A SUBSIDIARY OF NATIONWIDE 

MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY, 

HARLEYSVILLE MUTUAL INSURANCE 

COMPANY, A SUBSIDIARY OF 

NATIONWIDE MUTUAL INSURANCE 

COMPANY AND NATIONWIDE 

MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY

v.

CLEMM AND ASSOCIATES, LLC, 

MARK C. CLEMM, ESQUIRE AND 

KATIE M. CLEMM, ESQUIRE 

Appellants

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 2533 EDA 2021

Appeal from the Order Entered June 15, 2021

In the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County Civil Division at 

No(s): 2020-12358

BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J., LAZARUS, J., and PELLEGRINI, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY PANELLA, P.J.: FILED OCTOBER 12, 2022

Clemm and Associates, LLC, Mark C. Clemm, Esquire, and Katie M. 

Clemm, Esquire (collectively, “the Clemm Appellants”), appeal by permission 

____________________________________________

* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
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from the order overruling their preliminary objections to the joinder complaint

filed by USI Insurance Services, LLC (“USI”), and Donna Goepfrich (USI and 

Goepfrich will collectively be referred to as “the USI Defendants”), seeking to 

join the Clemm Appellants as additional defendants in the underlying action.1, 

2 On appeal, the Clemm Appellants ask us to consider whether they were 

properly joined as defendants under theories of sole or joint liability based 

upon their representation of their client, W.B. Homes, the plaintiff in the 

underlying action. After careful review, we reverse and remand. 

Because this is an interlocutory appeal by permission involving only the 

USI Defendants and Clemm Appellants, we will limit our summary of the 

factual and procedural history. The Clemm Appellants are legal counsel for 

W.B. Homes, a residential home builder in Montgomery County, Pennsylvania.

USI has provided W.B. Homes with insurance broker services for over 30 

years. In particular, Goepfrich, as a USI employee, managed W.B. Homes’s

____________________________________________

1 We note that the underlying action also includes claims against Harleysville 

Worcester Insurance Company, a subsidiary of Nationwide Mutual Insurance 

Company; Harleysville Mutual Insurance Company, a subsidiary of Nationwide 

Mutual Insurance Company; and Nationwide Mutual Insurance Company

(collectively, “the Nationwide Defendants”).

2 An order denying preliminary objections is generally interlocutory not 

appealable as of right. See Callan v. Oxford Land Dev., Inc., 858 A.2d 

1229, 1232 (Pa. Super. 2004). Here, however, the Clemm Appellants filed an 

application for amendment of the order pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 702(b). 

After the application was denied by operation of law, the Clemm Appellants

filed a petition for permission to appeal in this Court in accordance with 

Pa.R.A.P. 1311(b). This Court granted the Clemm Appellants permission to 

appeal from the interlocutory order.
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insurance policies for approximately 20 years. The Nationwide Defendants 

have provided insurance coverage for W.B. Homes since 2002.

On July 29, 2020, W.B. Homes filed a complaint alleging causes of action 

in negligence and negligent misrepresentation against the USI Defendants.

Essentially, W.B. Homes asserted that it had failed to request that Nationwide 

provide coverage against claims of defective construction because the USI 

Defendants incorrectly advised it that the Nationwide insurance policy would 

not cover claims for contractor or subcontractor defects. W.B. Homes claimed 

that because of this misinformation, it incurred over $2 million in costs to 

defend against claims that should have been covered under the Nationwide 

policies.

W.B. alleged that in 2019, W.B. Homes again asked Goepfrich whether 

its insurance policy would cover claims for contractor and subcontractor 

defects. Goepfrich informed W.B. Homes that such claims would be, and 

historically had been, covered by the insurance policies. W.B. Homes 

submitted open claims to the Nationwide Defendants at that time. Further, 

W.B. Homes submitted a remediation claim to the Nationwide Defendants, 

seeking repayment for the claims W.B. Homes had defended itself. The 

Nationwide Defendants denied payment based on untimely notification of the

remediation claims.

The USI Defendants filed an answer and new matter. In the new matter, 

the USI Defendants argued W.B. Homes had failed to join an indispensable 
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party, i.e., the attorneys who represented W.B. Homes in its defense against 

the homeowners’ subcontractor claims prior to 2019. The USI Defendants also 

advanced a counterclaim seeking dismissal of the complaint against them, 

along with costs and attorneys’ fees.

On October 27, 2020, the USI Defendants filed a joinder complaint

against the Clemm Appellants alleging contribution and indemnification. The 

USI Defendants claimed the Clemm Appellants had failed to review W.B. 

Homes’s insurance policies or advise W.B. Homes that it should notify the 

Nationwide Defendants of the subcontractor claims. These allegations include 

theories that the Clemm Appellants are solely liable to W.B. Homes, or in the 

alternative, that the Clemm Appellants and the USI Defendants are jointly 

liable.

In response, the Clemm Appellants filed preliminary objections asserting

lack of standing, failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, and 

improper service of the joinder complaint. The trial court subsequently issued 

an order overruling the Clemm Appellants’ preliminary objections and 

directing the Clemm Appellants to file an answer to the joinder complaint. The 

trial court, relying on Somers v. Gross, 574 A.2d 1056 (Pa. Super. 1990), 

concluded joinder of the Clemm Appellants is appropriate because “the 

allegations in the joinder complaint, when read with [W.B. Homes’s] 

complaint, raise a question common to the parties—who, if anyone, is 

responsible for giving W.B. Homes alleged improper insurance coverage 
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advice.” Trial Court Opinion, 2/11/22, at 5. This interlocutory appeal by 

permission followed.

On appeal, the Clemm Appellants argue joinder is inappropriate because 

the USI Defendants, in their joinder complaint, allege claims that are distinct 

from those asserted in W.B. Homes’ original complaint. See Appellants’ Brief 

at 11, 13. Additionally, the Clemm Appellants argue the USI Defendants’ 

indemnity claim does not permit joinder because the USI Defendants, as the 

joining party, cannot be deemed secondarily liable for the attorneys’ alleged 

malpractice. See id. at 13; see also id. (“USI [Defendants] will not be 

vicariously liable or otherwise liable by operation of law for legal malpractice 

by [the Clemm Appellants].”).

The Clemm Appellants highlight the difference between the claims in the 

original complaint and the claims in the joinder complaint: 

The claims by [W.B. Homes] against the USI [Defendants] are for 

negligence and negligent misrepresentation for erroneously 

informing [W.B. Homes] in 2010 that the homeowner claims were 

not covered by insurance and for not submitting the claims to the 

[Nationwide Defendants] for coverage. [The Clemm Appellants 

were] joined for not correcting [the USI Defendants’] erroneous 

advice.

Id. at 16-17; see also id. at 20 (arguing the USI Defendants did not allege 

that the Clemm Appellants were the source of erroneous information 

concerning the insurance policy).

In contrast, the USI Defendants contend the joinder complaint 

addresses the same underlying issue, i.e., “whether the USI Defendants or 
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the Clemm [Appellants] breached a duty to inform W.B. Homes that there 

might be coverage for the construction-defect claims under the commercial 

liability policies and caused the harm alleged in the underlying Complaint.” 

Appellees’ Brief at 11. The USI Defendants emphasize W.B. Homes suffered 

the singular loss of not having their insurance coverage applied to 

subcontractor claims. See id. at 14. The USI Defendants laud the trial court’s 

application of Somers, arguing the continuation of the instant case will 

determine which party or parties are responsible for W.B. Homes’s harm. See 

id. at 14-19.

Alternatively, the USI Defendants claim they and the Clemm Appellants 

are joint tortfeasors. See id. at 19. The USI Defendants assert both parties 

had the same duty to W.B. Homes, and the same evidence would be relevant 

as to each tortfeasor. See id. at 20-21. The USI Defendants also claim “[t]he 

injury in this case is caused by the failure to timely submit the claims to the 

insurer, whether based on the alleged misrepresentation of Goepfrich or the 

failure to advise on the policies by the Clemm [Appellants].” Id. at 21.

According to the USI Defendants, the Clemm Appellants had an independent 

duty to evaluate the relevant insurance policies and advise W.B. Homes 

accordingly. See id. at 22.

We review an order overruling preliminary objections for an error of law. 

See Feingold v. Hendrzak, 15 A.3d 937, 941 (Pa. Super. 2011).

When considering the appropriateness of a ruling on preliminary 

objections, the appellate court must apply the same standard as 
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the trial court. Preliminary objections in the nature of demurrer 

test the legal sufficiency of the complaint. When considering 

preliminary objections, all material facts set forth in the 

challenged pleadings are admitted as true, as well as all inferences 

reasonably deducible therefrom. 

Id. (citation and paragraph break omitted).

Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 2252 governs joinder of additional 

defendants, and provides, in relevant part, as follows:

Rule 2252. Right to Join Additional Defendants

(a) Except has provided by Rule 1706.1 [governing joinder and 

cross-claims in class actions], any party may join as an additional 

defendant any person not a party to the action who may be

(1) solely liable on the underlying cause of action against 

the joining party, or

Note: The term “underlying cause of action” refers to 

the cause of action set forth in the plaintiff’s complaint 

or the defendant’s counterclaim.

(2) liable to or with the joining party on any cause of action 

arising out of the transaction or occurrence or series of 

transactions or occurrences upon which the underlying 

cause of action against the joining party is based.

Note: Subdivision (a)(2) permits a joining party to join 

an additional defendant who may be liable over on the 

underlying cause of action against the joining party or 

jointly and severally liable with the joining party.

Pa.R.C.P. 2252(a)(1), (2).3 Further, “[t]he rule permitting the joinder of 

additional defendants is to be broadly construed to effectuate its purpose of 

____________________________________________

3 We note that Rule 2252(a) has been amended since the decisions we discuss 

below. While the overall content of the Rule remains the same, the current 

(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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avoiding multiple lawsuits by settling in one action all claims arising out of the 

transaction or occurrence which gave rise to the plaintiff’s complaint.” 

Kessock v. Conestoga Title Ins. Co., 194 A.3d 1046, 1052 (Pa. Super. 

2018) (citation and quotation marks omitted).

First, as noted above, a party may join an additional defendant who is 

solely liable on the underlying cause of action. The “‘underlying cause of 

action’ refers to the cause of action set forth in the plaintiff’s complaint or the 

defendant’s counterclaim.” Pa.R.C.P. 2252(a)(1), Note; see also Somers, 

574 A.2d at 1058 (explaining that when assessing the “underlying cause of 

action” for purposes of Rule 2252, courts have traditionally considered “the 

harm of which the plaintiff complains”). If the additional defendant’s alleged 

liability is related to the plaintiff’s underlying cause of action, “joinder is 

permissible because joinder allows the court to evaluate all possible sources 

of the plaintiff’s harm in one action....” 202 Island Car Wash, L.P. v. 

Monridge Const., Inc., 913 A.2d 922, 927 (Pa. Super. 2006). However, 

joinder is not permitted where the allegations in the joinder complaint “relate 

to different harms to be proven with different evidence as to different 

occurrences happening at different times.” Somers, 574 A.2d at 1060-61.

____________________________________________

version of the Rule is divided into additional subsections. We have found no 

authority to support any inference that the changes in the Rule were intended 

to have a substantive effect instead of merely clarifying and reorganizing the 

text.
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In Somers, the plaintiffs filed a professional negligence action against 

their certified public accountant and his accounting firm for providing allegedly 

improper tax advice. See Somers, 574 A.2d at 157. The accountant 

defendants filed a joinder complaint to join the plaintiffs’ attorney, arguing the

plaintiffs had instead relied on their attorney’s tax advice, and the attorney 

was solely liable to plaintiffs. See id.

The panel concluded the necessary identities were met to establish that 

the joinder complaint was based on the same “underlying cause of action":

[T]he plaintiffs’ complaint alleges negligence, and so does the 

joinder complaint; the plaintiffs’ action alleges improper tax 

advice as to plaintiffs’ 1984 taxes, and so does joinder complaint; 

the plaintiffs’ complaint alleges harm in the form of penalties and 

fees incurred because of the improper tax filings made by plaintiff

in reliance on professional tax advice, and so does the joinder 

complaint. The transactions involved and the evidence pertinent 

thereto are the same in time and nature.

Id. at 1059-60. They also observed that “[e]vidence of that course of events 

will necessarily include both evidence of accountants’ involvement and the 

attorney’s involvement in the handling of plaintiffs’ [] taxes and evidence as 

to which of these professionals plaintiffs relied upon in deciding how to 

estimate those taxes.” Id. at 1058-59. The panel therefore concluded joinder 

was required under the circumstances. See id. at 1061.

We conclude the facts here are distinguishable from Somers on all four 

identities. First, we recognize the harms alleged in the original complaint and 

the joinder complaint are arguably the same, as they relate to the lack of 

insurance coverage through the Nationwide Defendants. However, we 
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conclude that the record before us does not establish this identity with any 

certainty.4 Specifically, we observe that the current record cannot establish 

that the Clemm Appellants were retained by W.B. Homes to review W.B. 

Homes’s insurance coverage.

Further, the record cannot establish that the Clemm Appellants were 

retained by W.B. Homes for all the claims at issue. In their joinder complaint, 

the USI defendants allege that the Clemm Appellants “represented W.B. 

Homes in some or all of the claims brought by homeowners” referenced in 

W.B. Homes’s complaint. See Joinder Complaint, 10/27/20, at ¶ 19 (footnote 

omitted).5 At the very least, then, the USI defendants have failed to establish 

____________________________________________

4 We note that one recurring issue with applying Somers to this case is the

distinct procedural posture of Somers. The Somers panel was reviewing an 

order that granted the attorney defendant’s motion for summary judgment. 

See id., at 511-12. The panel noted that “the proper challenge to joinder is 

by way of preliminary objection to the joinder complaint[,]” but that the 

accountant defendants had waived the issue on appeal by not preserving it in 

their Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement. Id., at 512 n.2. While the Somers opinion 

is not explicit on how this fact was established, it treats as fact that the 

attorney defendant was engaged in providing tax advice to the plaintiffs. Here, 

we review a much less developed record, and perhaps most importantly, a 

record devoid of the Clemm Appellants’ answer to the joinder complaint. It 

seems likely that, in practice, Somers represents circumstances that will 

rarely be repeated in the context of a challenge to a joinder complaint.

5

In the omitted footnote, the USI defendants allege that they have requested 

“a list of at-issue claims and the names of those counsel who represented 

W.B. Homes[,]” and noted that W.B. Homes had not responded to that 

request. As we acknowledge in fn.4 above, we appreciate the significance of 

requiring the USI defendants to have knowledge of W.B. Homes’s relationships 

with attorneys at this stage of litigation. However, this appreciation cannot 

overcome our duty to apply the law to the record before us.
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that the Clemm Appellants may have liability for all of the harms alleged by 

W.B. Homes in the underlying complaint. Therefore, the first Somers identity 

does not exist on the record on appeal.

We therefore turn to the second Somers identity: whether the claims 

require the same evidence. In the original complaint, W.B. Homes raised 

negligence and negligent misrepresentation claims, asserting that the USI 

Defendants misadvised W.B. Homes concerning their insurance coverage. See 

Complaint, 7/29/20, at ¶¶ 68-86. To support these claims, W.B. Homes was 

required to allege that the USI defendants had breached “a legally recognized 

duty or obligation [to W.B. Homes] that is causally connected to actual 

damages.” Scampone v. Highland Park Care Center, LLC, 57 A.3d 582,

596 (Pa. 2012). W.B. Homes’s complaint alleges that the USI defendants 

“acted as [W.B. Homes’s] insurance broker and owed a duty to [W.B. Homes]

to discuss, obtain and administer insurance policies for [W.B. Homes] in a 

reasonable and competent fashion.” Complaint, 7/29/20 at ¶¶ 70, 79. In turn, 

the USI Defendants admit that

Goepfrich, as a representative of USI ... has provided insurance 

broker services to W.B. Homes. [Further,] those services include 

the provision of a detailed written annual Proposal which was 

presented to [W.B. Homes’s] management and discussed in detail 

at multiple meetings prior to [W.B. Homes’s] final decisions with 

regard to policies, coverages and limits it elected to purchase.

Id. at ¶ 79. Therefore, it is undisputed that the USI Defendants were acting 

as insurance brokers for W.B. Homes at the relevant times, and any relevant 

duty arose from that relationship. See Gibst v. Ernst, 647 A.2d 882, 890 (Pa. 
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1994) (observing that a negligent misrepresentation claim, like any 

negligence claim, is premised on the existence of duty owed by the defendant 

to the plaintiff).

Generally, the relationship between an insurance broker and a client is 

an arm’s length business relationship. See Wisniski v. Brown & Brown Ins. 

Co. of PA, 906 A.2d 571, 579 (Pa. Super. 2006). Accordingly, W.B. Homes’s 

claims against the USI Defendants, while sounding in negligence, are 

grounded in the contract, explicit or implied, between W.B. Homes and USI.

Finally, the negligence asserted by W.B. Homes is based on its allegation

that the USI Defendants provided the incorrect information about the scope 

of the Nationwide policies at the “2010 Annual Meeting” between the USI 

Defendant and W.B. Homes. See Complaint, 7/29/20, at ¶ 72. W.B. Homes 

claims that this misrepresentation caused it to suffer significant monetary 

losses in the form of payments to homeowners and attorneys for claims “from 

approximately 2010” to 2020. Id. at ¶ 21.

In contrast, the USI Defendants advanced a professional negligence 

claim against the Clemm Appellants.

6 The USI Defendants alleged that the 

Clemm Appellants represented W.B. Homes “in some or all of the claims 

____________________________________________

6 The USI Defendants did not specifically mention professional negligence or 

malpractice. However, the USI Defendants generally alleged the Clemm 

Appellants acted negligently and breached their duty to their client, W.B. 

Homes. The USI Defendants also filed certificates of merit for each of the 

Clemm Appellants. See generally Pa.R.C.P. 1042.3 (requiring a certificate of 

merit be filed in an action alleging professional negligence).
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brought by homeowners” from 2010 to 2020. See Joinder Complaint, 

10/27/20, at ¶ 19. The USI Defendants then assert that W.B. Homes’s harm 

was the result of the Clemm Appellants’ failure to review the Nationwide 

policies and advise W.B. Homes that it may have coverage for the claims. See

id. at ¶¶ 26, 35-37. The USI Defendants also argued W.B. Homes did not 

submit the claims to the Nationwide Defendants because the Clemm 

Appellants failed to advise W.B. Homes about their coverage. See id. at ¶¶ 

21-28, 35-36.

Much like W.B. Homes’s negligence claims against the USI Defendants, 

the joinder complaint sets forth a negligence claim grounded in a contract 

between the Clemm Appellants and W.B. Homes. See Gorski v. Smith, 812 

A.2d 683, 694 (Pa. Super. 2002) (observing that “when an attorney enters 

into a contract to provide legal services, there automatically arises a 

contractual duty on the part of the attorney to render those legal services in 

a manner that comports with the profession at large.”). We note that neither 

W.B. Homes’s contract with the USI Defendants nor its contract with the 

Clemm Appellants is currently in the record. But there is no evidence or 

allegation that the Clemm Appellants were parties to the contract with the USI 
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Defendants. Similarly, there is no evidence or allegation that the USI 

Defendants were parties to the contract with the Clemm Appellants.7

Therefore, the USI Defendants have failed to establish that the joinder 

claim is based on the same contract as the claim in W.B. Homes’s initial 

complaint. As such, they cannot establish that the joinder claim would require 

the same evidence as W.B. Homes’s claim, as the claims are not based on the 

same contract. Each claim would be controlled by different terms applicable 

to the different parties.

Further, a cause of action in legal malpractice is entirely distinct from 

causes of action in ordinary negligence and negligent misrepresentation. See 

Austin J. Richards, Inc. v. McClafferty, 538 A.2d 11, 16 (Pa. Super. 1988)

(in an interference with contract and slander of title action arising from a real 

estate dispute, this Court concluded plaintiff’s attorneys could not be joined 

as additional defendants under a theory of professional negligence because it 

was “an entirely separate cause of action”). A malpractice claim generally 

requires expert testimony to establish the duties owed by the attorney to the 

client, whereas plain negligence and negligent misrepresentation claims do 

not generally require expert testimony.

____________________________________________

7

In fact, we acknowledge the possibility that neither contract is in writing. 

Despite this, we conclude there was at least a contract implied in fact between: 

(a) W.B. Homes and the USI Defendants; and (b) W.B. Homes and the Clemm 

Appellants. See Bricklayers of W. Pennsylvania Combined Funds, Inc. 

v. Scott’s Dev. Co., 90 A.3d 682, 695-96 (Pa. 2014).
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Finally, we emphasize that the breaches of duty alleged in the joinder 

complaint relate to different occurrences at different times than those alleged 

in W.B. Homes’s initial complaint. W.B. Homes alleged that the USI 

Defendants breached their duty at the annual meeting in 2010. In contrast, 

the USI Defendants claim that the Clemm Appellants breached their duties 

over the course of multiple homeowner claims spanning most of the ensuing 

decade. As a result, the USI defendants’ claims necessarily require 

significantly different evidence from the evidence necessary for W.B. Homes’s 

claims.

In turn, these circumstances control our conclusions on the third and 

fourth Somers identities, whether the claims are based on different 

occurrences at different times. As noted above, W.B. Homes’s claims are 

based on statements allegedly made by Goepfrich in 2010. In contrast, the 

USI defendants’ claims are based on alleged attorney malpractice over the 

course of the ensuing decade. These are clearly different occurrences at

different times. 

Accordingly, the considerations set forth in Somers are not met here, 

and the USI Defendants’ legal malpractice claim is not clearly related to the 

causes of action W.B. Homes asserted in the original complaint. See Olson v. 

Grutza, 631 A.2d 191, 197 (Pa. Super. 1993) (stating that “joinder is 

permitted only as long as the additional defendant’s alleged liability is related 

to the claim which the plaintiff asserts against the original defendant.”
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(citation, brackets, and quotation marks omitted)). Therefore, the Clemm 

Appellants cannot be joined on the grounds that, as legal counsel, they are 

solely liable to W.B. Homes.

The USI Defendants also alleged, in the alternative, that the Clemm 

Appellants share joint liability due to their failure to advise W.B. Homes about 

their insurance coverage. See Joinder Complaint, 10/27/20, at ¶¶ 30-33.

Once again, we must consider whether the cause of action asserted in the 

joinder complaint arises out of the same transaction or occurrence as the 

cause of action asserted in the underlying cause of action. See Pa.R.C.P. 

2252(a)(2). And we conclude that the Somers identities apply to this question 

whether it arises under subsection (a)(1) or (a)(2).

As set forth above, the claims in the joinder complaint do not arise out 

of the same transaction or occurrence as those set forth in the initial 

complaint. Once again, we note that the record before is not clear that the 

Clemm Appellants are even potentially liable for all of W.B. Homes’s damages. 

But even if we were to assume that the Clemm Appellants (a) were retained 

to provide insurance coverage review, and (b) represented W.B. Homes in 

connection with all the underlying claims, we would find that the breaches 

leading to liability occurred at distinct occasions over the course of nearly a 

decade.

Based upon these significant differences in causes of action, time, and 

factual context, we conclude that joinder of the Clemm Appellants based on a 
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theory of joint liability under Rule 2252(a)(2) is inappropriate. See Goodman 

v. Kotzen, 647 A.2d 247, 251-52 (Pa. Super. 1994) (concluding that, 

although both the plaintiffs and joining defendants alleged professional 

malpractice claims, joinder was not proper because the claims alleged 

different factual bases). An analysis of each party’s potential negligence would 

necessarily involve different evidence. Cf. Somers, 574 A.2d at 1060 (claims 

in the underlying complaint and joinder complaint arose from the same course 

of events where “[t]he transactions involved and the evidence pertinent 

thereto are the same in time and nature.”). The claims asserted in the joinder 

complaint did not arise from the same transaction or occurrence that gave rise 

to the underlying cause of action, and therefore, the trial court erred by 

permitting joinder of the Clemm Appellants.

Based upon the foregoing, joinder of the Clemm Appellants as additional 

defendants in this matter is inappropriate under Rule 2252. The trial court 

erred by overruling the Clemm Appellants’ preliminary objections to the USI 

Defendants’ joinder complaint. Therefore, we reverse the trial court’s order

overruling the Clemm Appellants’ preliminary objections and remand to the 

trial court for additional proceedings.

Order reversed. Case remanded for further proceedings consistent with 

this Memorandum. Jurisdiction relinquished.
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Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 10/12/2022