Prohibitions and Penalties Under Section 582 of the 1990

Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs

Appropriations Act

S e c tio n 5 8 2 o f th e 1990 Foreign O p e ra tio n s, E x p o rt F in a n c in g , and R elate d P ro g ra m s A p p ro ­

p ria tio n s A c t p ro h ib its only the fo llo w in g : an ex p licit q u id pro q u o a rra n g e m e n t p u rsu a n t to 

w h ic h b o th th e U n ite d States a n d another g o v e rn m e n t o r person th at is to receiv e fin an cial 

a ss is ta n c e fro m th e U nited S ta te s agree th a t re c eip t o f th e assistan ce is ex p re ssly c o n d itio n e d 

u p o n th e re c ip ie n t undertaking a n action th at the U nited S tates w o u ld be sp ecifically p ro h ib ­

ite d b y U n ite d S ta te s law from c a rry in g out.

N e ith e r v io la tio n o f se c tio n 582, n o r con sp iracy to v iolate sectio n 582. is p u n ish ab le as a c rim in a l o ffen se .

April 16, 1990

M e m o r a n d u m O p i n i o n f o r t h e L e g a l A d v i s e r

D e p a r t m e n t o f S t a t e

This memorandum responds to your request for our opinion on (1) the 

scope of the prohibition in section 582 of Public Law No. 101-167, 103 Stat. 

1195, 1251 (1989), the Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related 

Programs Appropriations Act, 1990, and (2) whether violation of or conspiracy to violate section 582 is punishable as a criminal offense. We 

conclude, as did your office,1 that section 582 prohibits only an explicit quid 

pro quo arrangement pursuant to which both the United States and another 

government or person that is to receive financial assistance from the United 

States agree that receipt of the assistance is expressly conditioned upon the 

recipient undertaking an action that the United States would be specifically 

prohibited by United States law from carrying out. As to the second question, we also concur in your conclusion that Congress did not intend to 

punish criminally either violation of or conspiracy to violate section 582.

I.

The first version of the Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 1990 (“the Act”) passed by Congress

1 L etter for W illiam P. Barr, A ssistant Attorney G eneral, O ffice o f Legal C ounsel, from A braham D. 

S ofaer, L egal A dviser, United States D epartm ent o f State (Jan. 19, 1990).

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was H.R. 2939, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989). President Bush vetoed that 

measure on November 19, 1989, see 2 Pub. Papers of George Bush 1545 

(Nov. 19, 1989), in large part because of constitutional concerns with the 

version of section 582 that appeared in that Act. Id. Two days later, on 

November 21, 1989, Congress passed that Act in its current form, specifically to address the Administration’s concerns that had prompted the 

President’s veto. See, e.g., 135 Cong. Rec. S16,332 (daily ed. Nov. 20, 

1989) (statement of Sen. Leahy); id. at H9088 (statement of Rep. Obey).

Section 582(a) of the Act provides as follows:

None of the funds appropriated by this Act may be provided 

to any foreign government (including any instrumentality or 

agency thereof), foreign person, or United States person in 

exchange for that foreign government or person undertaking 

any action which is, if carried out by the United States Government, a United States official or employee, expressly 

prohibited by a provision of United States law.

103 Stat. at 1251. It is clear from this and the remaining provisions of 

section 5822 that the section was intended to be only a narrow appropriation 

limitation, not a criminal prohibition. Congressman Edwards explained the 

purpose of the section in this way:

What we prohibit in this bill is a quid pro quo which would 

allow the money we are appropriating here for the United 

States’ foreign policy purposes to be provided to another government or person in exchange for that government or person 

agreeing to do something which, if it were done by an American citizen or by our Government, would be a violation of 

U.S. law. That is all it does. It prohibits a quid pro quo.

2 Section 582(b) and (c) provides:

(b) For the purposes o f this section the term “funds appropriated by this A ct” includes 

only (1) assistance o f any kind under the Foreign A ssistance Act o f 1961; and (2) credits, 

and guaranties under the Arms Export Control Act.

(c) N othing in this section shall be construed to lim it —

(1) the ability o f the President, the Vice President, or any official or em ployee o f the 

U nited States to m ake statem ents or otherw ise express their views to any party on any 

subject;

(2) the ability o f an official or em ployee o f the United States to express the policies o f 

the President; or

(3) the ability o f an official or em ployee o f the United States to com m unicate w ith any 

foreign country governm ent, group o r individual, either directly or through a third party, 

w ith respect to the prohibitions o f this section including the reasons for such p rohibitions, and the actions, term s, or conditions which m ight lead to the rem oval o f the 

prohibitions o f this section.

103 Stat. at 1251.

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135 Cong. Rec. H9089 (daily ed. Nov. 20, 1989). By its terms, section 

582(a) applies only to funds appropriated by the Act; unlike other similar 

provisions, section 582 does not purport to restrict in any manner funds that 

are appropriated by other acts.3 Section 582 is further limited by the restrictive definition of “funds” in subsection (b) and the additional interpretive 

restrictions imposed by subsection (c). Thus, for example, subsection (c) — 

despite the prohibition in subsection (a) — explicitly permits an employee 

of the United States to express the view to another government that it should 

undertake an action that would be prohibited by United States law, because 

“nothing” in section 582 “shall be construed to limit the ability of . . . [any] 

employee of the United States to . . . express their views to any party on any 

subject.” And the restriction extends only through fiscal year 1990.4

Perhaps the most significant substantive term in the provision is “in exchange for” in subsection (a), and this term was the subject of considerable 

discussion in the legislative history. It is evident that this language was 

intended as a significant limitation on what otherwise might be read as 

prohibited under this section.

Senators Cystine and Rudman engaged in an extended colloquy to clarify 

the meaning of the phrase. Senator Rudman explained:

It is not Congress’ intent in approving this amendment to create a trap for the unwary. Accordingly, there is no intent to 

prohibit the provision of U.S. assistance where, coincidentally, the recipient undertakes an action that the United States 

itself is prohibited to carry out. Therefore, the words “in 

exchange for” in the [section] must be understood to require 

an agreement between the United States and the aid recipient 

under which, as an express condition for receiving the U.S. 

assistance, the recipient undertakes an action which the United 

States itself is prohibited to carry out.

135 Cong. Rec. S 16,363 (daily ed. Nov. 20, 1989).

Notably, earlier the same day, Senator Kasten had introduced a substitute 

version of section 582(a) to clarify that the subsection was only to apply to

3See, e.g., section 403 o f Public L aw No. 101 -45, tit. IV, 103 Stat. 97, 128 (1989) (“N o funds appropriated under this A ct or any other A ct shall be available to the B ureau o f A lcohol, Tobacco and F irearm s fo r the enforcem ent” o f various law s.); section 303 o f Public Law No. 98-396, 98 Stat. 1369, 1422 

(1984) ( “N one o f the funds made available to the U nited States Postal Service under this A ct or any

other Act m ay be used to restructure em ployee com pensation practices as in effect under the m ost 

recen tly effective collective bargaining agreem ent. . . .” ) (em phasis added).

A d d itio n a lly , by its term s, the section is violated only where the specified funds are provided and the 

recipient governm ent o r person actually undertakes the action that w ould be prohibited under the law of 

the U nited S tates. T hus, a request by a U nited States official that the governm ent or person undertake 

that action is, in itself, insufficient to im plicate the prohibition o f the section.

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“an actual quid pro quo,” “pursuant to an agreement under which, as an 

express condition for receipt of such assistance, the recipient is required to 

take the prohibited action.” The proposed amendment provided:

None of the funds appropriated for assistance by this Act 

may be provided to any foreign government (including any 

instrumentality or agency thereof), foreign person, or United 

States persons pursuant to an agreement under which, as an 

express condition for receipt of such assistance, the recipient 

is required to fund or carry out a military or foreign policy 

activity which is expressly prohibited by a provision of United 

States law.

Id. at S I6,361. Following his colloquy with Senator Rudman clarifying that 

section 582(a) as drafted was indeed intended by Congress only to apply to 

such a narrow class of circumstances, Senator Kasten withdrew his amendment. Id. at S I6,361-63.

Congressman Obey, the chairman of the House subcommittee responsible 

for the Act and one of the drafters of section 582, similarly stated that “the 

word ‘exchange’ should be understood to refer to a direct verbal or written 

agreement.” Id. at H9231 (daily ed. Nov. 21, 1989). As noted above, Congressm an Edw ards, the ranking Republican m em ber of the House 

subcommittee and another of the drafters of section 582, declared that section 582 was designed to prohibit only quid pro quo arrangements. Id. at 

H9089 (daily ed. Nov. 20, 1989). President Bush in his signing statement 

accompanying the Act also stated:

I agree with the view expressed on the House and Senate 

floor that this section is intended only to prohibit “quid pro 

quo” transactions — that is, transactions in which U.S. funds 

are provided to a foreign nation on the express condition that 

the foreign nation provide specific assistance to a third country, which assistance U.S. officials are expressly prohibited 

from providing by U.S. law. As reflected both in Congressman Edwards’ statements and in the explanatory colloquy 

between Senators Kasten and Rudman, a “quid pro quo” arrangement requires that both countries understand and agree 

that U.S. aid will not be provided if the foreign government 

does not provide the specific assistance.

It is important to note that Section 582 does not affect the 

ability of the executive branch to urge any course of action 

upon a foreign government or any third party. In addition, the 

section applies only where there is a provision of U.S. law

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that “expressly prohibits” the United States Government, or a 

U.S. official or employee, from undertaking a particular action, and thus would not apply to provisions that merely limit 

funding to undertake such an action.

In these and other key respects, Section 582 is substantially 

narrower than a related provision that prompted my veto of 

H.R. 2939 on November 19, 1989.

2 Pub. Papers of George Bush 1573-74 (Nov. 21, 1989).

It is clear from the foregoing that the term “in exchange for” was purposely chosen to ensure prohibition of only explicit quid pro quo arrangements 

pursuant to which both the United States and the recipient nation(s) intend 

and agree, verbally or in writing, that receipt of United States assistance is 

expressly conditioned upon the recipient undertaking an action that the United 

States would be specifically prohibited by United States law from carrying 

out. We believe that the section should be interpreted and applied consistently with this purpose.

II.

You also requested our opinion on whether either violation of section 582 

or conspiracy to violate that provision could give rise to criminal penalties. 

We believe that it is clear that Congress intended that neither violation of nor 

conspiracy to violate the section would be punished criminally.

Section 582 contains no criminal penalties for its violation, nor does it 

incorporate by reference any penalties existing under criminal (or any other) 

law. If Congress had intended to render United States officials — including 

the President himself — potentially criminally liable under the section, it 

may fairly be assumed that this intention would have been evident from the 

face of the statute. See, e.g., United States v. Campos-Serrano, 404 U.S. 

293, 297 (1971) (a defendant ‘“ is not to be subjected to a penalty unless the 

words of the statute plainly impose it,’” (quoting Keppel v. Tiffin Savings

Bank, 197 U.S. 356, 362 (1905))). In fact, by Senate amendment, the State 

Department Authorization Act of FY 1990 that the President vetoed contained a leveraging provision that had expressly included criminal penalties.5 

Thus, there can be little question that when it passed section 582 without

sSee H .R . 1487, 101st C ong., 1st Sess. § 109 (1989). Section 109 would have am ended the Foreign 

A ssistance A ct o f 1961 to provide in part:

(a) P rohibition. — (1) W henever any provision o f United States law expressly refers to 

this section and expressly prohibits all United States assistance, or all assistance under a

C ontinued

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providing for criminal penalties, the Congress purposely chose not to criminally punish violations of section 582.

This intention is confirmed by the legislative history. Senator Rudman 

stated unequivocally that “[section 582] does not contain criminal penalties.” 135 Cong. Rec. S 16,362 (daily ed. Nov. 20, 1989); id. (section 582 

“contains no criminal sanctions”). He observed: “If a criminal penalty were 

intended, it would have been provided on the face of the provision. In the 

absence of such a provision, it should be understood that Congress intends 

that no criminal penalties will apply to the [section].” Id. Senator Moynihan 

had introduced legislation similar to section 582 that would have explicitly

provided for criminal penalties. Id. Accordingly, we conclude that Congress did not intend to, nor did it impose criminal penalties for violation of 

section 582.6

That Congress chose not to criminalize violations of section 582 does not 

necessarily mean that it did not intend to punish criminally, under 18 U.S.C. 

§ 371,7 a conspiracy to violate the provision. It is clear also, however, that

’ (....continued)

specified U nited States assistance account, from being provided to any specified foreign re ­

gion, country, governm ent, group, or individual for all or specified activities, then no officer 

or em ployee of the Executive branch m ay —

(B) use any U nited States funds o r facilities to assist any transaction w hereby a foreign 

governm ent (including any instrum entality or agency thereof), foreign person, o r U nited 

States person provides any funds or property to any third party ....

if the purpose o f any such act is the furthering or carrying out o f the sam e activities, with 

respect to that region, country, governm ent, group, or individual, for w hich U nited States 

assistance is expressly prohibited ;

(b) Penalty. — Any person who know ingly and w illfully violates the provision o f subsection (a)(1) shall be im prisoned not m ore than S years or fined in accordance w ith title 18. 

U nited States Code, or both.

Senator M oynihan noted in debate on section 582 that section 109, the explicit crim inal leveraging 

provision, “is not before us tonight. It is part of the State D epartm ent authorization bill. Should it not 

becom e law in this session . . . we will return to this m atter in the next one." 135 C ong. Rec. S I 6,362 

(daily ed. Nov. 20, 1989). T his com m ent, com ing im m ediately after Senator R udm an’s statem ent that 

section 582 “does not contain crim inal penalties,” we believe is best understood as Senator M oynihan's 

acquiescence in what by that tim e appeared to be the Senate's conclusion that crim inal penalties w ould 

not attach.

‘ C ongressm an Obey, the principal draftsm an of section 582, never stated that violation o f the provision 

w ould be punishable crim inally. Even after attention had been focused on the specific question o f possible crim inal penalties under the provision, he com m ented only that the provision “is not an attem pt to 

ham string governm ent officials in the course o f their normal duties or to m ake them vulnerable to w ayw ard or runaw ay prosecutors.” 135 Cong. Rec. H 9231 (daily ed. Nov. 2 1 ,1989).

’ Section 371 provides:

If two or more persons conspire either to com m it any offense against the U nited States, o r 

to defraud the United States, or any agency thereof in any m anner or for any purpose, and 

one or m ore persons do any act to effect the object of the conspiracy, each shall be fined not 

more than $10,000 or im prisoned not more than five years, or both.

If, how ever, the offense, the com m ission o f which is the object o f the conspiracy, is a 

m isdem eanor only, the punishm ent for such conspiracy shall not exceed the m axim um punishm ent provided for such m isdem eanor.

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Congress did not intend for the general conspiracy statute to apply to conduct proscribed by section 582. In fact, Congress considered potential 

applicability of 18 U.S.C. § 371, and determined that it would not apply to 

violations of section 582. On November 20, 1989, Senators Kasten and 

Rudman specifically discussed on the floor of the Senate the fact that the 

general conspiracy statute would have no applicability to section 582:

Mr. Kasten. I note that section 582 . . . does not provide a 

criminal penalty for violation of its leveraging prohibition.

Does this indicate congressional intent that there be no criminal penalty for violation of section 582?

Mr. Rudman. Yes Senator, that is my understanding. If a 

criminal penalty were intended, it would have been provided 

on the face of the provision. In the absence of such a provision, it should be understood that Congress intends that no 

criminal penalties will apply to the [section]. In particular, it

should be understood that the criminal conspiracy statute will

not apply to the [section].

Mr. Kasten. I want the record to reflect that my support for 

section 582 is conditioned on the clarifications that [the] Senator has provided. I could not vote for this bill if I believed 

that section 582 could provide a basis for criminal liability 

.... I know that many Senators on my side of the aisle share 

this view.

Mr. Rudman. I fully agree with this interpretation of section 

582, and I know that the votes of many Senators are similarly 

conditioned.

135 Cong. Rec. S16,362-63 (daily ed. Nov. 20, 1989) (emphasis added). 

Immediately afterwards, Senator Dole concurred that section 582 should not 

be interpreted as giving rise to any criminal penalties:

We cannot have lawful, but confident and creative, handling 

of our foreign policy — if every administration official hereafter 

is always looking over his shoulder to see if some aggressive 

special prosecutor — out to get his name in the headlines — 

might be concocting some fanciful charge based on vague language.

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Id. at S 16,363.® Senator Rudman explained the rationale for not imposing 

criminal penalties:

The absence of a criminal penalty reflects the fact that the 

leveraging prohibition is to apply across-the-board to essentially all existing prohibitions on U.S. assistance. Without 

individually examining these prohibitions to determine whether, 

in the context of each prohibition, a criminal penalty for leveraging would be appropriate, it would be unwise for Congress 

to apply such a penalty across-the-board.

Id.

President Bush signed the bill into law on this understanding that neither 

violation of section 582, nor conspiracy to violate the section, would be 

criminally punishable:

Consistent with the expressed intent of the Congress and to 

avoid constitutional problems, I intend to construe this section [section 582] narrowly .... The Senate record also 

makes clear that neither the criminal conspiracy statute, nor 

any other criminal penalty, will apply to any violation of this 

section. My decision to sign this bill is predicated on these 

understandings of Section 582.

2 Pub. Papers of George Bush 1573 (Nov. 21, 1989).9 Thus, there appears to 

have been consensus agreement that the general conspiracy provisions of 18

'C o n siste n t with the view that C ongress did not intend violations of, or conspiracies to violate section 

582 to be crim inally punishable. Senator Leahy described section 582 as “a bipartisan revision [of the 

earlier version o f section 582 vetoed by President Bush] done by C ongressm en Obey and Edw ards to 

m ake it m ore acceptable to the adm inistration.” 135 Cong. Rec. S16.332 (daily ed. N ov. 20, 1989). 

T he A dm inistration had earlier notified Congress that the predecessor version o f section 582 was u n a c ­

ceptable, inter alia, precisely because the threat o f crim inal prosecutions under that version “w ould 

clearly have a negative im pact on the conduct o f foreign relations.” Letter for C ongressm an Jaim ie L. 

W hitten, C hairm an, H ouse Com m ittee on A ppropriations, from C arol T. C raw ford, A ssistant A ttorney 

G eneral, O ffice of Legislative Affairs, at 2 n.2 (Nov. 1, 1989). Senator D ole had also inform ed the 

Senate, prior to passage o f the A ct, that “Senior W hite House officials have told me that they w ould 

advise the President to veto the bill unless this m atter [the scope o f section 582, including the question 

o f crim inal penalties] is satisfactorily clarified." 135 Cong. Rec. S 16,363 (daily ed. Nov. 20, 1989).

’ The P resident’s construction o f section 582 in his signing statem ent is particularly im portant in this 

context. T he President’s interpretation o f the section constitutes his instruction, as head o f the e x ec u ­

tive branch, on im plem entation o f the section — an instruction w ith w hich this D epartm ent, charged 

w ith crim inal law enforcem ent, m ust comply. C ourts properly look to presidential signing statem ents 

to assist in the interpretation o f statutes. See. e.g.. Berry v. Department o f Justice, 733 F.2d 1343, 

1349-50 (9th Cir. 1984).

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U.S.C. § 371 would have no applicability to section 582. Indeed, there is no 

evidence whatever to the contrary.10

In United States v. Hutto, 256 U.S. 524, 528-29 (1921), the Supreme 

Court held that a defendant could be indicted for criminal conspiracy to 

commit an offense against the United States11 even where the predicate offense was not itself criminally punishable. There, the underlying offense 

was punishable by a civil penalty. It may be that conspiring to violate any 

federal law — even a law that itself contains no criminal or civil penalties

— may be criminally punishable under 18 U.S.C. § 371 as a conspiracy to 

commit an offense against the United States.12 We need not determine here, 

however, the full reach of the principle announced in Hutto. The availability 

of section 371 will always be a question of legislative intent. See, e.g.,

United States v. Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp., 344 U.S. 218, 221-22 (1952). 

Thus, where, as here, there is affirmative, uncontradicted evidence that Congress considered the question and intended that criminal penalties under 

section 371 not be available, that section may not be invoked to impose such 

a penalty.13 Accordingly, we conclude that a conspiracy to violate section

10 Compare 42 U .S.C . § 3795b (explicitly providing th at the program s and projects in that chapter “shall 

be subject to th e provisions of section 371 of Title 18").

" In Hutto, the defendants were charged with violation of section 37, C rim inal Code, w hich w as in 

substance identical to 18 U.S.C. § 371. Section 37 provided: “If tw o o r more persons conspire either to 

com m it any offense against the United S tates, or to defraud the U nited States in any m anner or for any 

purpose, and one or m ore o f such parties do any act to effect the object of the conspiracy, each o f the 

p arties to such conspiracy shall be fined . ...” Act o f M ar. 4, 1909, ch. 321, 35 Stat. 1096.

12 We have found no case addressing th e validity o f an indictm ent or conviction under section 371, 

w here the charge was conspiracy to com m it an offense against the United States and the underlying 

offense that the defendants allegedly conspired to com m it did not itself carry either crim inal or civil 

penalties.

H ow ever, even if one could not be charged with o r convicted o f conspiring to com m it an offense 

a gainst the U nited States under these circum stances, it still could be that prosecution w ould be possible 

under section 371. Section 371 also crim inalizes conspiracy to defraud the U nited States T he offense 

o f conspiracy to defraud the United S tates does not seem to depend upon the existence and character o f 

a separate statutory or other prohibition, as does the offense of conspiring to com m it an offense against 

the U nited States. See, e.g., Haas v. Henkel, 216 U.S. 462. 479-80 (1910) (“[A ]ny conspiracy w hich is 

calcu lated to obstruct o r im pair [a governm ental departm ent’s] operations and reports as fair, im partial 

and reasonably accurate w ould be to d efrau d the U nited States ”); Hammerschmidt v. United States, 265 

U .S . 182, 188 (1924) (to defraud the U nited States “ m eans prim arily to cheat the G overnm ent out of 

pro p erty o r m oney, but it also means to interfere with o r obstruct one o f its law ful governm ental functions by deceit, craft or trickery, or at le a st by means that are dishonest") Several cases have sustained 

e ith e r indictm ents o r convictions for conspiracy to defraud the U nited States w here there w as not any 

specific prohibition o f the allegedly fraudulent conduct. Haas v. Henkel, 216 U.S. 462 (1910); United

States v. Klein, 247 F.2d 908 (2d Cir. 1957), cert, denied, 355 U.S. 924 (1958); United States v. Anderson, 579 F.2d 455 (8th C ir.) (dicta), cert, denied, 439 U .S . 980 (1978).

,JT h a t C ongress explicitly considered and decided against the application o f section 371 to conduct 

p ro scrib ed u n d er section 585 distinguishes the circum stances herein discussed from those underlying 

the indictm ent o f O liver N orth and oth ers in United States v. Poindexter, Crim. No. 88-0080 (D .D .C .). ■ 

T h a t indictm ent, w hile charging a conspiracy to violate several crim inal statutes that them selves carry 1 

e x p lic it penalties, also charged conspiracies to violate the so-called Boland A m endm ent, as w ell as 

m ore general prohibitions (e.g., conspiracy to defraud the United States “by im peding, im pairing, defeating and obstructing the lawful governm ental functions of the U nited States, including . . congressional control o f appropriations and ex ercise of o versight"). C ongress did not explicitly con sid er the 

ap p licatio n o f 18 U .S.C . § 371 to a lleged violations o f the B oland A m endm ent. There is sim ilarly 

nothing to indicate that Congress intended to foreclose application o f section 371 to the m ore general 

c o n sp iracy violations w ith which the defendants w ere charged.

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582 would not be punishable under 18 U.S.C. § 371.14

This is not to say that section 582 may be violated with impunity. The 

President has a constitutional duty to “take Care that the Laws be faithfully 

executed.” U.S. Const, art. II, § 3. Moreover, it can be anticipated that 

Congress will seek to monitor executive branch compliance with the section, 

and that an intentional failure to comply may provoke any of a host of 

constitutional or political sanctions, if not remedial legislation. The State 

Department and other affected executive agencies therefore should, by means 

of appropriate directives, urge compliance with the prohibition.

CONCLUSION

We conclude for the reasons set forth above that section 582 prohibits 

only an explicit quid pro quo arrangement pursuant to which both the United 

States and another government or person that is to receive financial assistance from the United States agree that receipt of the assistance is expressly 

conditioned upon the recipient undertaking an action the United States would 

be specifically prohibited by United States law from undertaking. Additionally, we conclude that neither violation of section 582 of Public Law No. 

101-167, nor conspiracy to violate section 582, is punishable as a criminal 

offense.15

J. MICHAEL LUTTIG 

Principal Deputy

Assistant Attorney General

Office o f Legal Counsel

14 T he fact that section 371 is unavailable in this context o f course w ould not prevent prosecution for 

conduct violative o f other crim inal statutes.

15 The C rim inal D ivision o f the D epartm ent o f Justice concurs in these conclusions.

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