J-S55009-14

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37 

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF 

PENNSYLVANIA 

 Appellee 

v.

JAMES E. SATTERTHWAITE, 

 Appellant No. 1943 EDA 2013 

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence May 31, 2013

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0704341-2003 

BEFORE: BOWES, SHOGAN, and OTT, JJ. 

MEMORANDUM BY BOWES, J.: FILED SEPTEMBER 15, 2014 

 James E. Satterthwaite appeals from the judgment of sentence of 

eighteen to thirty-six years incarceration after the court found him guilty of 

third-degree murder and carrying a firearm on a public street. We affirm. 

 Appellant shot and killed Norman Vincent Simon on March 24, 2002, at 

approximately 2:00 a.m. Police arrested Appellant four days later and 

charged him with murder, conspiracy, carrying firearms without a license, 

carrying a firearm on a public street in Philadelphia, and possession of an 

instrument of crime. Appellant proceeded to a jury trial. The jury found 

Appellant guilty of third-degree murder and carrying a firearm on a public 

street in Philadelphia. The court sentenced Appellant to eighteen to thirtysix years incarceration on the third-degree murder charge and a concurrent 

nine months to eighteen months incarceration for the firearms violation. 
J-S55009-14

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Appellant appealed and this Court affirmed. Commonwealth v. 

Satterthwaite, 883 A.2d 694 (Pa.Super. 2005) (unpublished 

memorandum). The Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied allowance of 

appeal on December 28, 2005. Commonwealth v. Satterthwaite, 892 

A.2d 823 (Pa. 2005). 

 Subsequently, Appellant filed a timely PCRA petition alleging that trial 

counsel was ineffective for declining the trial court’s offer to provide a 

specific jury instruction as to bias regarding the Commonwealth’s key 

eyewitness. The PCRA court awarded Appellant a new trial, and the 

Commonwealth appealed. A panel of this Court affirmed the grant of a new 

trial, Commonwealth v. Satterthwaite, 15 A.3d 519 (Pa.Super. 2010) 

(unpublished memorandum), and our Supreme Court denied allowance of 

appeal. Commonwealth v. Satterthwaite 24 A.3d 864 (Pa. 2011). 

Accordingly, Appellant proceeded to a new trial. 

Appellant waived his right to a jury trial. At Appellant’s second trial, 

Willie May Tramel testified that she observed the victim, Appellant, and 

another individual she knew as Roman at an afterhours club. Ms. Tramel 

indicated that the victim appeared angry with Appellant regarding a dispute 

over the victim’s car. The men exited the club and entered a parked car. 

Ms. Tramel witnessed the men in the vehicle with Appellant in the driver’s 

seat, Roman in the front passenger seat, and the victim in the back. As she 

was walking toward another speakeasy to purchase drugs, she heard four or 
J-S55009-14

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five shots. According to Ms. Tramel, she saw the victim fall out of the car. 

The victim was bleeding and unresponsive. Several days after the shooting, 

Ms. Tramel provided police with a statement and identified photographs of 

the victim, Roman, and Appellant. 

 Noel Towles also testified. Mr. Towles was incarcerated and had 

testified at Appellant’s first trial that he saw Appellant shoot the victim. 

However, he maintained at the second trial that police forced him to provide 

that statement by threatening to arrest him. Mr. Towles had also indicated 

that the victim and Appellant were arguing over drugs and the use of the 

victim’s car. Specifically, the victim had allowed Appellant to use his vehicle 

in exchange for drugs and money. The Commonwealth introduced 

Mr. Towles prior testimony that Appellant had shot the victim. 

 Another witness, Lesa Ellis, who also was a drug user at the time of 

the incident, testified that she saw Appellant, the victim, and Roman inside a 

car on the day in question. She continued that, shortly after seeing the 

individuals, she heard gunfire while on the phone with her sister. When she 

went outside, she saw the victim lying on the ground and both Appellant and 

Roman were gone. 

The court found Appellant guilty of third-degree murder and carrying a 

firearm on a public street in Philadelphia. Thereafter, it sentenced Appellant 

to eighteen to thirty-six years incarceration for the murder charge and a 

concurrent term of two and one-half to five years imprisonment on the 
J-S55009-14

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firearm count. Appellant filed a timely motion for reconsideration, which the 

court denied. This timely appeal ensued. The court directed Appellant to file 

and serve a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) concise statement of errors complained of on 

appeal. Appellant complied, and the trial court authored its decision. The 

matter is now ready for our review. Appellant presents two issues for this 

Court’s consideration. 

A. Was the evidence insufficient to support Appellant’s 

conviction for third-degree murder because the 

Commonwealth failed to disprove that the killing was not 

committed in the heat of passion where the evidence showed 

and the Commonwealth argued that Appellant killed the 

victim while Appellant was in a rage? 

B. Did the trial court commit an abuse of discretion by failing to 

consider Appellant’s rehabilitative needs and the fact 

Appellant had completed several self-improvement courses 

while incarcerated, in violation of the sentencing code? 

Appellant’s brief at 3. 

We review the sufficiency of the evidence by considering the entire 

record and all of the evidence admitted at trial. Commonwealth v. 

Watley, 81 A.3d 108, 113 (Pa.Super. 2013) (en banc). We view such 

evidence in a light most favorable to the Commonwealth as the verdict 

winner, drawing all reasonable inferences from the evidence in favor of the 

Commonwealth. Id. When evidence exists to allow the fact-finder to 

determine beyond a reasonable doubt each element of the crimes charged, 

the sufficiency claim will fail. Id. 
J-S55009-14

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The evidence “need not preclude every possibility of innocence and the

fact-finder is free to believe all, part, or none of the evidence presented.” 

Id. In addition, the Commonwealth can prove its case by circumstantial 

evidence. Where “the evidence is so weak and inconclusive that, as a 

matter of law, no probability of fact can be drawn from the combined 

circumstances[,]” a defendant is entitled to relief. This Court is not 

permitted “to re-weigh the evidence and substitute our judgment for that of 

the fact-finder.” Id. 

Appellant argues that the evidence shows that he killed the victim in 

the heat of passion and that he should have been convicted of voluntary 

manslaughter. In his view, the Commonwealth failed to establish malice. 

He avers that sufficient provocation for voluntary manslaughter may exist 

where the cumulative events leading up to the killing cause a sudden and 

intense passion. In support, Appellant relies on Commonwealth v. 

Sullivan, 820 A.2d 795 (Pa.Super. 2003), and Commonwealth v. 

Whitfield, 380 A.2d 362 (Pa. 1977). 

In Sullivan, the defendant was actually convicted of voluntary 

manslaughter and we upheld that conviction. Sullivan thus offers no 

guidance on whether evidence is sufficient for third-degree murder. 

Whitfield, however, did involve a third-degree murder conviction. There, 

the defendant stabbed her mother’s common law husband, killing him. 

Whitfield alleged that, at most, she should have been convicted of voluntary 
J-S55009-14

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manslaughter. Our Supreme Court rejected that argument on the grounds 

that she did not establish legal provocation. Specifically, the Whitfield

Court found that the defendant only had trivial arguments with the victim.1

 

Hence, that case does not compel reversal herein. 

We add that the trial court in its opinion noted that Appellant did not 

argue at trial that he committed the killing in the heat of passion. Rather, 

Appellant argued that even if the Commonwealth’s evidence was believed, 

he acted in imperfect self-defense and that at most he was guilty of 

involuntary manslaughter.2 Accordingly, we find Appellant’s position that he 

should have been found guilty of voluntary manslaughter waived. Moreover, 

for the reasons outlined by the trial court, at pages four through six of its 

opinion, the evidence was sufficient to support Appellant’s third-degree 

murder conviction. 

Appellant’s second issue relates to the discretionary aspects of his 

sentence. To adequately preserve a discretionary sentencing claim, the 

defendant must present the issue in either a post-sentence motion or raise 

the claim during the sentencing proceedings. Commonwealth v. 

Cartrette, 83 A.3d 1030, 1042 (Pa.Super. 2013) (en banc). Further, the 

defendant must “preserve the issue in a court-ordered Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) 

____________________________________________ 

1

 The Commonwealth has failed to file a timely brief in this matter. 

2

 Current counsel did not represent Appellant at trial.
J-S55009-14

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concise statement and a Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f) statement.” Id. Importantly, 

“There is no absolute right to appeal when challenging the discretionary 

aspect of a sentence.” Id. “[A]n appeal is permitted only after this Court 

determines that there is a substantial question that the sentence was not 

appropriate under the sentencing code.” Id. 

Appellant preserved his issue in his post-sentencing motion, 1925(b) 

concise statement, and included a Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f) statement within his 

brief. Therein, he asserts, that the sentencing court failed to consider the 

factors delineated in 42 Pa.C.S. § 9721(b), and did not take into account his 

rehabilitative needs. Appellant maintains that he had prior record score of 

zero, and he successfully completed education and vocational training while 

he was previously incarcerated for this case. According to Appellant, the 

sentencing court did not mention anything about Appellant’s rehabilitative 

needs. Thus, he submits that he has presented a substantial question for 

our review. 

We agree that Appellant’s issue presents a substantial question that 

the sentence was not appropriate under the sentencing guidelines. See 

Commonwealth v. Felmlee, 828 A.2d 1105, 1107 (Pa.Super. 2003). 

However, we find that he is not entitled to relief. Appellant relies on 

Commonwealth v. Caraballo, 848 A.2d 1018 (Pa.Super. 2004), vacated,

933 A.2d 650 (Pa. 2007), in support of the merits of his position. In this 

regard, Appellant argues that it is insufficient for a sentencing court to 
J-S55009-14

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review the presentence report and state that the crime was horrendous. 

Appellant contends that the sentencing court’s pronouncement that it 

considered all of the information presented was insufficient. According to 

Appellant, the sentencing court did not place its reasons for its sentence on 

the record. Appellant continues that he presented numerous mitigating 

factors; specifically that he achieved his GED and received additional 

educational and vocational training while incarcerated. Since, in Appellant’s 

view, the court did not consider these facts, his sentence must be vacated. 

We consider the merits of a discretionary sentencing challenge under 

an abuse of discretion standard. Commonwealth v. Stokes, 38 A.3d 846, 

858 (Pa.Super. 2011). Our review is also dictated by the statutory 

mandates of 42 Pa.C.S. § 9781(c) and (d). Commonwealth v. Macias,

968 A.2d 773, 776 (Pa.Super. 2009). Section 9781(c) provides in relevant 

part: 

(c) Determination on appeal.—The appellate court shall vacate 

the sentence and remand the case to the sentencing court with 

instructions if it finds: 

(1) the sentencing court purported to sentence within the 

sentencing guidelines but applied the guidelines erroneously; 

(2) the sentencing court sentenced within the sentencing 

guidelines but the case involves circumstances where the 

application of the guidelines would be clearly unreasonable; or 

(3) the sentencing court sentenced outside the sentencing 

guidelines and the sentence is unreasonable. 
J-S55009-14

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In all other cases the appellate court shall affirm the sentence 

imposed by the sentencing court. 

42 Pa.C.S. § 9781(c). 

Concomitantly, in considering the record we examine: 

(1) The nature and circumstances of the offense and the history 

and characteristics of the defendant. 

(2) The opportunity of the sentencing court to observe the 

defendant, including any presentence investigation. 

(3) The findings upon which the sentence was based. 

(4) The guidelines promulgated by the commission. 

42 Pa.C.S. § 9781(d); Commonwealth v. Dodge, 77 A.3d 1263, 

1274 (Pa.Super. 2013). Furthermore, we are aware that pursuant to 42 

Pa.C.S. § 9721(b): 

the court shall follow the general principle that the sentence 

imposed should call for confinement that is consistent with the 

protection of the public, the gravity of the offense as it relates to 

the impact on the life of the victim and on the community, and 

the rehabilitative needs of the defendant. The court shall also 

consider any guidelines for sentencing and resentencing adopted 

by the Pennsylvania Commission on Sentencing and taking effect 

under section 2155 (relating to publication of guidelines for 

sentencing, resentencing and parole and recommitment ranges 

following revocation). In every case in which the court imposes a 

sentence for a felony or misdemeanor, modifies a sentence, 

resentences an offender following revocation of probation, 

county intermediate punishment or State intermediate

punishment or resentences following remand, the court shall 

make as a part of the record, and disclose in open court at the 

time of sentencing, a statement of the reason or reasons for the 

sentence imposed. 

 

We begin by pointing out that the Caraballo decision relied on by 

Appellant was vacated by our Supreme Court in light of Commonwealth v. 
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Walls, 926 A.2d 957 (Pa. 2007). Thus, that decision has no precedential 

value. Additionally, in Caraballo the sentencing court imposed a sentence 

well outside the aggravated range for the crimes charged. Here, the 

sentencing court imposed a guideline range sentence.3

 Only where the 

sentence is clearly unreasonable will we vacate. Cf. Walls, supra; 42 

Pa.C.S. § 9771(c)(2). 

We decline to find Appellant’s sentence clearly unreasonable. The 

court had the aid of a presentence investigation and is presumed to have 

considered that report. Dodge, supra. The court noted that it considered 

all of the information presented, including Appellant’s mitigation evidence. 

Further, in its opinion, the sentencing court set forth that it considered 

Appellant’s rehabilitative efforts but “the fact that [Appellant] had numerous 

infractions while incarcerated outweighed any efforts he expended in 

rehabilitating himself.” Trial Court Opinion, 3/7/14, at 8. Accordingly, 

Appellant is not entitled to relief. 

Judgment of sentence affirmed. 

____________________________________________ 

3

 The guideline range for third-degree murder includes the statutory 

maximum of twenty to forty years. Appellant’s sentence was below that 

range. 
J-S55009-14

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Judgment Entered. 

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq. 

Prothonotary 

Date: 9/15/2014 
IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF PHILADELPHIA COUNTY 

FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA 

CRIMINAL TRIAL DIVISION 

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA NO. CP-SI-CR-0704341-2003 

VS. 

JAMES E. SA TTERTHW AITE 

PROCEDURAL HISTORY 

OPINjON 

F~LED 

MAR Ii 7 2014 

Criminal Appaals Unit 

First Judicial Districj· t:;f PA 

Defendant, James E. Satterthwaite, was charged with, inter alia, murder, criminal· 

conspiracy, carrying firearms without a license, carrying as firearm on a public street, and 

possessing an instrument of crime, generally. These charges were lodged against defendant as a 

result of all incident that occurrd on March 24, 2002, during which appellant shot and killed 

Norman Simon during an argument. 

Appellant was first tried in tried in July of 2004, before the Honorable Katherine Streeter 

. Lewis and was convicted of third-degree murder and carrying as firearm on a public street. 

Appellani, who thereafter received.a state sentence of inca.-ceration, filed a direct appeal to the 

Superior Court, which on July 13, 3005, issued a memorandum and order affirming the judgment 

of sentence. Commonwealth v. Satterthwaite, 2758 EDA ·2004. A petition for allowance of 

appeal was denied by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court on December 28, 2005, l~ 415 EAL 

2005. 

1 

~xn-'! BI T A> 
; 

After his petition for allowance of appeal was denied, defendant filed a timely petition 

pursuant to the Post-Conviction Relief Act. 42 l'a.C.S. § 9541 el seq. Said petition wa~ a~signcd 

to the Honorable Benjamin Lerner, Judge of the Court of Common Pleas for disposition. Judge 

Lerner granted the petition on February 6, 2009, and awarded defendant a new trial. The 

Commonwealth unsuccessfully appealed to the Superior .Court, which, on October 7, 2009, 

affirmed Judge Lerner's order. Commonwealth v. Satterthwaite, 679 EDA 2009. A subsequent 

petition filed by the Commonwealth was denied by the Supreme Court on July 27, 2011. (582 

EAL 2010). 

The matter was then assigned to this Court for trial. After defendant waived his right to a 

jury trial, his trial commenced on January 22, 2013. At the conclusion of the trial, this Court 

convicted defendant of third-degree murder and carrying a firearm on a public street Sentencing 

was deferred \ll1til May 31, 2013, on which date this Comt imposed conCUITent sentences of 

eighteen to thirty-six years' and two and one-half to five years' incarceration on the third-degree 

murder and weapons offenses respectively. 

Following the imposition of sentence, defendant filed a motion for reconsideration of 

sentence. On June 25, 2013, this COllrt denied that motion after which defendant filed a notice of 

appeal as well as a requested Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement. 

FACTS 

On March 2,1, 20()2, al approxin"lldy 2:00 a.m., ddC!ndalll, Ih~ viclim, and ·s"I11C(ln~ 

named Roman were together when defendant and the victim began arguing about defendant'S 

use ofMr. Simon's car. Mr. Noel Towles was standing at \he comer of Hoops and Fallon Streets 

in Philadelphia and witnessed the argument. Towles knew defendant and the victim and 

2 
indicated that defendant "rented" the victim's car and used it to sell drugs. As defendant and the 

victim argued, Towles heard defendant tell the victim that be was not going to give the victim 

any morc drugs and that be was not going to use the victim's car anymore. 

The argument between the two men soon became physical and defendant and the victim 

exchanged shoves. Defendant then withdrew a firearm trom his pants pocket and fired five 

shots, two of which struck the victim killing him.' Defendant then fled the scene of the incident 

in a vehicle. 

DISCUSSION 

In his 1925(b) statement, defendant first asserts that the evidence was insufficient to 

sustain his conviction of Third-Degree Murder. Specifically, defendant asserts that the 

Commonwealth failed to disprove that the killing was not committed in the heat of passion 

because even the prosecutor conceded during his closing speech that defendant acted in a fit of 

rage when he shot the victim. (N.T. 1/28/1 3, 23). 

In assessing the sufficiency of evidence, the court must view the evidence in the light 

most favorable to the verdict winner - in this case, the Commonwealth. Commonwealth v. 

Boczkowski, 846 A.2d 75, 80 (Pa. 2004). Both direct and circumstantial evidence, along with all 

reasonable inferences arising therefrom from which the finder of fact could properly have based 

its verdict, must be accepted as true and sufficient to support tbe challenged conviction. 

Commonwealth v. Perez, 931 A.2d 703, 706-7 (pa. Super. 2007); Commonwealth v. Johnson, 

1 At the second trial, Mr. Towles repeatedly disavowed his previous testimony as well as whal 

was conlained in his statement to police. Previously, Towles identified defendant as the man he 

saw arguing with the victim and the person who shot him. While on direct examination, Mr. 

Towles claimed that his earlier statements and testimony were products of police coercion. 

When confronted with his prior statement and testimony by the District Attorney, Mr. Towles 

stated that "if that's what was written, then that's what I told them" (Nrr p. 74 1/22/20\3). 

3 
719 A.2d 788 (Pa. Super. 1998), appeal denied. The finder.offact may believe all, part, or none 

of the evidence regarding the question of whether reasonable doubt existed, and the facts and 

circumstances need not be incompatible with the defendant's innocence. Commonwealth v. 

Derr, 841 A.2d. 558,559 (Pa. Super. 2004). An appellate court may only award a new trial if the 

evidence was so unreliable and contradictory that it would be incapable of supporting a guilty 

verdict. Commonwealth v. Karkaria, 625 A.2d 1167, 1167 (Pa. 1993). 

"Third-degree murder is estab]jsh~d when a killing is committed wilh malice 

aforethought, but without specific intent." 18 Pa.C.S. § 2502(a), (c); Commonwealth v. Solano, 

906 A.2d i 180, 1]90 (Pa. 2006) (citation omitted). Malice is the distinguishing factor between 

murder and manslaughter and consists of a "wickedness of disposition, hardness of heart, cruelty, 

recklessness of consequences, and a mind regardless of so~ial duty, although a particular person , 

may not be intended to.be injured." Commonwealth v. Young, 431 A.2d 230, 232 (Pa. 1981). 

Malice may be found to exist not only in an intentional killing, but also where the perpetrator 

"consciously disregarded an unjustified and extremely high risk that his actions might cause 

death or serious bodily harm." Id. (citation omitted). 

When a person kills another either under the mistaken belief that deadly force was 

necessary to save his iife or under "a sudden and internal passion resulting from serious 

provocation" by the victim, the killing is without malice lind the crime committed is voluntary 

manslaughter. See 18 Pa.C.S. § 25032

; Commonweallh ~. While, 424 A2d 1296, 1297 (Pa. 

2 18 Pa.C.S. § 2503 provides, in pertinent part: 

(a) GENERAL RULE. -- A person who kills an individual without lawful justification 

commits voluntary manslaughter ifat the time of the killing he is acting under a sudden and intense passion rt!sulling 

from serious provocation by: . 

4 
1981) ("Voluntary manslaughter is killing committed with(lut malice, in the heat of passion or 

under unreasonable belief that it was justified."). 

A person is guilty of "heat of passion" voluntary 'manslaughter "if at the time of the 

killing [he or she] reacted under a sudden and intense passion resulting from serious provocation 

by the victim." Commonwealth v. Ragan, 743 A.2d 390, 396 (Pa. 1999). "'Heat of passion' 

includes emotions such as anger, rage, sudden resentment or terror which renders the mind 

incapable of reason." Commonwealth v. Mason, 741 A.2<:1 708, 713 (Pa. 1999). An objective 

standard is applied to determine whether the provocation was sufficient to support the defense of 

"heat of passion" voluntary manslaughter. Commonwealth v. Laich, 777 A.2d 1057, 1066 (Pa. 

2001). "'111<:: ultimate te~t for adequate provocation l'fIllains whethel' a reasonllbJc man, 

confronted with this series of events, became impassion~d to the extent that his mind was 

incapable of cool reflection." Commonwealth v. Thomton,431 A.2d 248, 252 (Pa. 1981). The 

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has indicated that both passion and provocation must be 

established. and that "if there be provocation without passion, or passion without a sufficient 

cause of provocation, or there be time to cool, and reason has resumed its sway, the killing will 

be murder." Commonwealth v. Hutchinson. 25 A.3d 277, 315 (Pa. 2011). (quoting 

Commonwealth v. Bamoskv. 258 A.2d 512, 515 (Pa. 1969)). 

(I) the individual kilted; or 

(:.) ilJlo(ll~r Wll\t,ll III': <ll'rOl'CJltk:lyors to l.;ill, hUlbl.: I1t;gligt:Jl!ly or 

accidentally causes the death of the individual killed. 

(b) UNREASONABLE BEUEF KILLING JUSTIFIABLE. -~ A person who intentiollally 

or knowingly kills an individual commits voluntary manslaughter ifat the time of the killing he believes lilt! 

circumstances to be such that, if they eXIsted, would justify the kIlling under Chapter 5 of this time, but his bcliefis 

unreasonable. 

5 
Instantly, while the prosecution argued that defendant was in a rage when he killed the 

victim, the evidence presented at trial indicated that any such rage emanated from a mere 

argument and a minor tussle between defendant and the victim over the use of the victim's car. 

Rage emanating out of a mere dispute is not sufficient to render a person incapable of cool 

reflection. In Hutchinson, supra, the Supreme Court found 'that evidence showing that the victim 

and Hutchinson were arguing when the murder occun'ed was insufficient to establish adequate 

provocation to reduce murder to' manslaughter even where tllere were other factors present. In 

addition, the fact that defendant may have been angry with the victim on account of the dispute 

over the use of the victim's car and that the two men were arguing and the victim may have 

pushed defendant is not the type of anger society recognizes as sufficient to reduce murder to 

manslaughter. See Commonwealth v. Cartagena, 416 A.2d 560 (Pa. Super. 1979) (holding that 

fact that victim punched defendant insufficient to dispel conclusion that defendant acted with 

malice). Accordingly, it is suggested that reliefbe denied with respect to this claim.3 

Defendant next asserts that this Court committed an abuse of discretion by imposing an 

excessive sentence. In addition, defendant alleges that this Court failed to consider defendant's 

rehabilitative needs as well as his efforts in improving himself while incarcerated. 

Whe:u scatencing an individual convicted of a crime. a Court must consider the protection 

of the public, the gravity of the offense as it relates to the impact on the life of the victim and on 

the community, and the rehabilitative needs of the defendant. 18 Pa.C.S. § 9721 (b). Here, the 

sentence imposed on the defendant's third-degree murder conviction was within the standard 

range of the applicable Sentencing Guidelines, so the Superior Court is required to affirm unless 

, It is noted that defendant did not argue allriallhat lhe killing was co~milted in the heat of passion and other than 

the argument presenled by lhe prosecutor, there was no evidence upon which such a claim could be predicated. 

6 
it finds that the guidelines were clearly applied unreasona,bly. 42 Pa.C.S. § 9781(c);3 see also 

Commonwealth v. Walls, 926 A.2d 957 (Pa. 2007). The standard of review is whether the 

sentencing comt abused its discretion, which requires more than an error in judgment; the record 

must show that "the judgment exercised was manifestly unreasonable, or the result of partiality, 

prejudice, bias or ill-will." Commonwealth v. Smith, 673 A.2d 893, 895 (Pa. 1996). A 

sentencing court may commit an abuse of discretion if it considers improper factors when 

determir>jng the s~ntence. Commonwealth v. McAfee, 849 A.2d 270 (Pa. Super. 2004) (citing 

Commonwealth v. Archer, 722 A.2d 203 (Pa. Super. 1998)). The Pennsylvania Supreme Court 

has subsequently stated, though, that if the sentencing court relies on an improper factor but also , 

offers other, proper reasons for its sentencing decision, it should be affinned. Smith, 673 A.2d at 

896-97. 

R(.:'gardil1g ']('ft'n<i;!Jll's claim thnl the sc'ntl;:"!1c('" WHS excessive, tl~l'" law provick:. 111:11 n 

mere claim alleging that a sentence is excessive does not r~ise a substantial question for review. 

See Commonwealth v. Harvard, 04 A.3d WO, 70 I (l'a.Super.l0 13) (slating, "a bald ass<orlillJl Ihm 

a sentence is excessive does not by itself raise a substantiul questioll jllstilYing tltis CUUrl'~ 

review of the merits of the underlying claim []"). A defendant must establish that the sentence 

imposed is excessive given the facts of the case and the criminai conduct underlying the 

conviction. Commonwealth v. Dodge, 77 AJd 1263, '1271 'Cpa. Super. 2013). 

l Section 9781 (c) states: 

(c) Detennination On Al'l'eal.-- The appellate court shall vacate the sentence and remand the case to the sentencing 

court with instructions if it finds: 

(l) (ile scntt!ncing court purported to sentence within the senrencing guidelines but applied the gllidelines 

erroneously; 

(2) the sentencing court sentenced within the sentencing guidelines but the case involves circumslances where the 

application of the guidelines would be clearly unreasonable; or 

(3) the sentencing court sentenced outside the sentencing guidelines and the sentence is unreasonable. 

In aJ[ other cases the appellate court shall afflrm the sentence imposed by the sentencing court. 

42 Pa.C.S. § 97& I (c). 

7 
Instantly, no relief is due on defendant's excessive sentencing claim. Apart from the fact 

that defendant has failed to state why he believes that the sentence is excessive under the 

circumstances, in deciding upon the sentence ultimatel)' imposed on defendant, this Court 

reviewed the evidence adduced at trial, the statutory maximum and the applicable guidelines 

range of 90 to 240 months, plus or minus twelve months, and the pre-sentence repOtts prepared 

for this matter as well as the underlying criminal conduci,4 Having conducted this review this 

court deter.z:,l;>ed .:11"t a s;,;;]ifi.::ant sentence was warrinted givcn that defendant shot the 

unanned victim after a minor dispute and that while incarcerated, defendant had numerous 

infractions thereby demonstrating that he had difficulty in following the rules. (N.T. 5/31113,11-

12). Accordingly, it is respectfully recommended that defendant's excessive sentencing claim be 

denied. 

Regarding defendant's claim that this Court did not consider his rehabilitative needs, as 

noted in the discussion of the previous issue, this Court considered numerous factors, incitlding 

appellant's actions and behavior while incarcerated. Where the sentencing comt had the benefit 

of a pre-sentence investigation report, the law presumes that the court was aware of and weighed 

relevant infomlation regarding a defendant's chara,cter and any mitigating factors. 

Commonwealth v. Tirado, 870 A. 2d. 362 (Pa. Super. 2005). 

[n addition, in this Court's view, the fact that defendant had numerous infractions while 

incarcerated outweighed any efforts he expended in rehabilitating himself. Having considered 

all relevant factors, this Court complied with the law and, defendant's claim should be deemed 

4 Defendant had a prior record score of zero. 1n calculating the applicable guidelines ranges this Court noted that Ihe 

offense gravity for third-degree murder is fourteen, and that the deadly weapon used enhancement applied. ~ 204 

Pa. Code § 303.15. 

8 
lacking in merit. Commonwealth v. Zurburg, 937 A.2d 1131, 1136 CPa. Super. 2007) (holding 

that claim that sentencing court erred by not considering defendant's rehabilitative needs was 

without merit because court considered all relevant factors in deciding upon a sentence). 

CONCLUSION 

For the foregoing reasons, defendant's assertions of error should be dismissed for lack of 

merit and the judgment of sentence should be affimled. 

By the Court, 

Date:J!dq 

9