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ADVANCE SHEET HEADNOTE

September 12, 2016

2016 CO 59

No. 15SC83, Johnson v. People—Restitution.

This case presents the narrow question of whether the People’s motion to change 

a restitution payee from one victim identified in a restitution order to other victims 

identified therein (whom the first victim was obliged to pay but did not pay) constitutes 

a new restitution request that must comply with the statutory requirements for making 

restitution requests. The county court rejected the petitioner’s argument that the 

People’s request to change the restitution payee was effectively a new restitution 

request and was untimely, and it granted the People’s motion to change the restitution 

payee. The district court affirmed on appeal, and the supreme court then granted 

certiorari. Like the district court, the supreme court now concludes that on the facts 

presented here, the People’s motion to change the restitution payee did not constitute a 

new restitution request. Accordingly, the supreme court affirms.
The Supreme Court of the State of Colorado

2 East 14th Avenue • Denver, Colorado 80203

2016 CO 59

Supreme Court Case No. 15SC83

Certiorari to the District Court

Adams County District Court No. 14CV30380

Petitioner:

Donald Johnson,

v.

Respondent:

The People of the State of Colorado.

Order Affirmed

en banc

September 12, 2016

Attorneys for Petitioner:

Douglas K. Wilson, Public Defender

Ari Krichiver, Deputy Public Defender

Brighton, Colorado

Attorneys for Respondent:

Dave Young, District Attorney, Seventeenth Judicial District

Michael J. Milne, Senior Deputy District Attorney

Brighton, Colorado

JUSTICE GABRIEL delivered the Opinion of the Court.
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¶1 This case presents the narrow question of whether a motion to change a 

restitution payee from one victim identified in a restitution order to other victims 

identified therein (whom the first victim was obliged to pay but did not pay) constitutes 

a new restitution request that must comply with the statutory requirements for making 

restitution requests.

¶2 Petitioner Donald Johnson was convicted of careless driving-no injury, and the 

county court ordered him to pay $23,435.20 in restitution for pecuniary losses suffered 

by, among others, (1) a woman whose vehicle he struck with his vehicle and (2) the

woman’s seven medical providers. Initially, the restitution payments were disbursed to 

the woman, who was obliged to pay her medical providers. After the People learned

that the woman had not paid the providers, however, the People moved to change the 

restitution payee, so that the restitution payments would be disbursed directly to the 

providers. The court granted that motion.

¶3 Johnson then filed a motion for reconsideration. He argued that the People’s 

request to change the restitution payee was effectively a new restitution request and 

was untimely. The county court rejected this argument and denied Johnson’s motion.

¶4 Johnson appealed the foregoing orders to the district court, that court affirmed,

and we granted certiorari.

1

 Like the district court, we now conclude that on the facts 

presented here, the People’s motion to change the restitution payee did not constitute a 

 

1 We granted certiorari to review the following issue:

Whether the state’s motion to change payee constitutes a new restitution

request subject to the requirements of section 18-1.3-603, C.R.S. (2015).
3

new restitution request.

¶5 Accordingly, we affirm.

I. Facts and Procedural History

¶6 While driving carelessly, Johnson struck another vehicle, seriously injuring the

woman who was driving that vehicle. Johnson subsequently pleaded guilty to careless 

driving-no injury, and the People sought a restitution award of $23,435.20. The People’s 

motion summarized their restitution request as follows: 

LOST WAGES

$4,357.12 May 12, 2008 through July 7, 2008

(8 weeks X 544.64/weekly)

RENTAL CAR

$749.99 June 4, 2008 through July 3, 2008

MEDICAL EXPENSES – (Expenses not covered by any insurance due to 

policy limits)

$169.62 CarePoint, P.C.

$1,444.94 Medical Center of Aurora

$44.68 Radiology Imaging Associates, P.C.

$298.60 CACC Lowry

$244.82 University Physicians, Inc.

$144.51 Rural/Metro of Central Colorado

$40,980.92 Denver Health

$48,435.20

PAYMENTS RECEIVED

($25,000.00) Settlement from Defendant’s Insurance Company

$23,435.20 TOTAL RESTITUTION REQUEST.
4

¶7 In addition, the People’s request included the woman’s mailing address and 

invoices from each of her seven medical providers showing their payment mailing 

addresses.

¶8 Johnson objected to the People’s request, and the county court convened a 

restitution hearing. At the conclusion of that hearing, the court granted the requested 

restitution, subject to a $74.99 deduction reflecting the 10% discount that the female 

victim had received from her rental car company. Johnson appealed this order to the 

district court, but that court affirmed.

¶9 Several years later, the People filed a motion to change the restitution payee. The 

People informed the county court that despite receiving $25,000 from Johnson’s 

insurance company and $3,200 in restitution from Johnson, the female victim had not 

made any payments to her medical providers. (As it turned out, the woman had filed 

for bankruptcy protection, and the bankruptcy court had discharged her debts to the

medical providers.) The People thus requested an order that all future restitution 

payments be disbursed directly to the seven medical providers, again supplying the 

addresses for and itemizing the medical expenses due to each provider. This 

information was identical to the addresses and medical expenses provided in the initial 

motion for restitution, although the People reduced the amount that each medical 

provider was to receive to reflect the restitution that had already been paid, albeit to the 

female victim.

¶10 The court granted the People’s request, stating, “The restitution payee 

information has been changed to reflect that all future restitution payments will be 
5

disbursed to the medical providers rather than to [the female victim].”

¶11 Johnson then filed a motion to reconsider, to strike the People’s motion to change 

the payee, and to deny the People’s “new restitution request.” As pertinent here, 

Johnson argued that the People’s request to amend the restitution payee was effectively 

a new and untimely restitution request. He further asserted that his restitution 

obligations should be discharged because the medical providers were not victims, the 

female victim had been made whole, and the time for requesting restitution had long 

passed. The court set Johnson’s reconsideration motion for a hearing.

¶12 At the hearing, the People argued that their motion for change of payee was not 

a new restitution request. In support of this argument, the People observed that the 

original request specifically named all of the victims of the incident, including all of the 

medical providers. The People further stated:

The People aren’t asking for any change in the amount that the defendant 

is liable for. We’re not increasing, we’re not decreasing, and we’re not 

adding any new recipient of the money. It’s all the people that we had 

requested restitution for initially. The only thing the People are doing is 

asking the Court to re-direct the payment. We originally had [the female 

victim] as some—I’ll use the word conduit for the money. It was to go to 

her [and] flow through her to these medical providers. When we found 

out that that was not what was happening and that the medical providers 

were not getting the restitution, we asked the Court to re-direct the 

payment to go directly to these medical providers that the Court had 

already found to be victims of the defendant’s actions. 

So it is not a new request. All of the players have been set since the 

beginning[, and] the amount of money has been set since the beginning. 

The only thing we’re asking the Court to do is re-direct the money to the 

medical providers.

¶13 In a written order, the court agreed with the People, reasoning, in pertinent part:
6

Defense asserts that the prosecution’s request to “re-direct” payment of 

restitution to the medical providers is a “new” restitution request. This 

court disagrees. The prosecution’s request does not increase 

Mr. Johnson’s liability nor does it ask for an additional amount of 

compensation. The request does not increase his punishment for the 

sentence imposed. . . . [R]estitution liability can be re-directed to a person 

or entity that qualifies as a victim . . . . 

¶14 Johnson appealed to the district court, and in a detailed and comprehensive 

order, that court affirmed. As pertinent here, the court reasoned that (1) extinguishing 

Johnson’s restitution obligation would be contrary to statutory provisions requiring him 

to pay restitution in full and allowing restitution to be reduced only under certain 

circumstances; (2) permitting the female victim to remain as payee would result in a 

windfall to her to the detriment of the medical providers; (3) although the restitution 

statute does not specifically authorize a change of payee, it does not bar such a change 

either; and (4) permitting the change in payee furthered the restitution statute’s purpose

without increasing the burden on Johnson.

¶15 We subsequently granted Johnson’s petition for certiorari.

II. Analysis

¶16 Johnson argues that the People’s motion to change the payee constituted a new 

restitution request that was subject to the requirements of section 18-1.3-603, C.R.S. 

(2016), including the deadline for filing such requests. We are not persuaded.

A. Standard of Review and Rules of Statutory Construction

¶17 We review issues of statutory construction de novo. Doubleday v. People, 2016 

CO 3, ¶ 19, 364 P.3d 193, 196. Our primary purpose in statutory construction is to 
7

ascertain and give effect to the intent of the General Assembly. Id. We look first to the 

language of the statute, giving words and phrases their plain and ordinary meanings. 

Id. We read statutory words and phrases in context, and we construe them according to 

the rules of grammar and common usage. Id.

¶18 In addition, we must interpret a statute so as to effectuate the purpose of the 

legislative scheme. Id. at ¶ 20, 364 P.3d at 196. In doing so, we read the scheme as a 

whole, giving consistent, harmonious, and sensible effect to all of its parts. Id. We must 

avoid constructions that would render any words or phrases superfluous or lead to 

illogical or absurd results. Id. If the statute is unambiguous, then we need not conduct 

any further statutory analysis. Id.

B. The Restitution Statute

¶19 Section 18-1.3-603(1) provides:

Every order of conviction of a felony, misdemeanor, petty, or traffic 

misdemeanor offense, except any order of conviction for a state traffic 

misdemeanor offense issued by a municipal or county court in which the 

prosecuting attorney is acting as a special deputy district attorney 

pursuant to an agreement with the district attorney’s office, shall include 

consideration of restitution. Each such order shall include one or more of 

the following:

(a) An order of a specific amount of restitution be paid by the defendant;

(b) An order that the defendant is obligated to pay restitution, but that the 

specific amount of restitution shall be determined within the 

ninety-one days immediately following the order of conviction, unless 

good cause is shown for extending the time period by which the 

restitution amount shall be determined;

(c) An order, in addition to or in place of a specific amount of restitution, 

that the defendant pay restitution covering the actual costs of specific 

future treatment of any victim of the crime; or
8

(d) Contain a specific finding that no victim of the crime suffered a 

pecuniary loss and therefore no order for the payment of restitution is 

being entered.

¶20 “Restitution” is defined, in pertinent part, as “any pecuniary loss suffered by a 

victim.” § 18-1.3-602(3)(a), C.R.S. (2016).

¶21 “Victim,” in turn, is defined as “any person aggrieved by the conduct of an 

offender” and includes, as pertinent here: 

(I) Any person against whom any felony, misdemeanor, petty, or traffic 

misdemeanor offense has been perpetrated or attempted;

(II) Any person harmed by an offender’s criminal conduct in the course 

of a scheme, conspiracy, or pattern of criminal activity;

(III) Any person who has suffered losses because of a contractual 

relationship with, including but not limited to an insurer, . . . for a 

person described in subparagraph (I) or (II) . . . .

§ 18-1.3-602(4)(a).

2

¶22 A sentencing court must base its restitution order on “information presented to 

the court by the prosecuting attorney, who shall compile such information through 

victim impact statements or other means to determine the amount of restitution and the 

identities of the victims.” § 18-1.3-603(2).

¶23 A restitution order is “a final civil judgment in favor of the state and any victim,” 

 

2 The county court concluded that the medical providers at issue in this case were 

victims under subparagraph (III). The district court, however, concluded that they were 

victims under subparagraph (II). This court denied certiorari on the issue of whether 

the medical care providers were “victims” for purposes of the restitution statute. 

Accordingly, we express no opinion concerning which subparagraph applies. Instead,

we simply observe that the medical providers’ status as victims has been fully litigated

and established in this case.
9

and “such judgment shall remain in force until the restitution is paid in full.” 

§ 18-1.3-603(4)(a)(I).

C. The Change of Payee

¶24 Here, pursuant to the above-described statutes, the initial restitution order 

required Johnson to pay specific amounts of restitution to compensate the identified 

victims (including the medical providers) for their pecuniary losses. The motion for 

change of payee did not seek to alter or add any victims, nor did it seek to modify the 

amounts due (other than to adjust for restitution that Johnson had previously paid). 

And the order granting the motion for change of payee did not do so. To the contrary, 

the victims’ identities, the amounts of their pecuniary losses, and the total amount of 

restitution that Johnson was to pay remained exactly the same.

¶25 Although we have not yet had occasion to address whether on such facts a 

request to change a restitution payee amounts to a new restitution request, other courts’ 

decisions shed light on this question.

¶26 For example, in Walker v. State, 919 So. 2d 501, 502 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2005), the 

sentencing court had ordered the defendant, who had been convicted of one count of 

DUI-manslaughter, to pay restitution to the victim’s family for the victim’s medical and 

funeral expenses. Several years later, the defendant appeared in court for a report 

regarding probation. Id. At that conference, the probation officer advised the court that 

an insurance company had paid for the victim’s funeral expenses and that the family 

did not want restitution from the defendant. Id. The prosecution thus sought a 

modification of the defendant’s probation conditions, requesting that the court order 
10

the defendant to pay restitution to the insurance company rather than to the victim’s 

family. Id. The trial court granted that request, and the defendant appealed, 

challenging the modification. Id. The appellate court affirmed, stating, as pertinent 

here, “Changing the payee does not alter [the defendant’s] probation conditions in any 

way; [the defendant’s] obligation hasn’t changed.” Id. The court further observed, 

“The modification of the payee was ministerial, as restitution had been ordered as part 

of the original probation sentence.” Id. at 502–03.

¶27 Similarly, in State v. Edelman, 984 P.2d 421, 423–24 (Wash. Ct. App. 1999), the 

court addressed whether a restitution order could be modified after a victim’s death to 

require the defendant to pay the victim’s estate instead of the victim. The court held 

that it could, noting, “The modification urged by the State does not award 

compensation for any additional loss, but continues to represent the amount that [the 

defendant] embezzled from [the victim].” Id. at 424. The court further observed, “In

this situation, modifying the designated payee under the order does not change the 

nature of the defendant’s obligation.” Id.

¶28 Although it arose in a different context, our decision in People v. Woodward, 

11 P.3d 1090, 1092–93 (Colo. 2000), is consistent with the foregoing courts’ 

determinations. In Woodward, the restitution statute in effect at the time the defendant 

was sentenced allowed restitution only to the direct victim of a crime and not to that 

victim’s insurers. Id. at 1092. After the defendant was sentenced, however, the 

restitution statute was amended to allow courts to award restitution to insurers. Id. 

The trial court then applied the amended statute to require the defendant to make 
11

restitution payments to the victim’s insurers. Id. at 1091. The defendant asserted an ex 

post facto violation, but we ultimately rejected that argument. Id. at 1092. As pertinent 

here, we observed that the retroactive application of the amended statute “did not 

increase [the defendant’s] initial liability at all, but merely redirected his payment 

obligation.” Id. at 1093. We further stated that the retroactive application of the 

amended statute “neither made [the defendant’s] punishment more burdensome nor 

increased the scope of his liability.” Id.

¶29 In our view, the same rationale applies here. Specifically, changing the payee on 

the facts of this case did not substantively alter Johnson’s restitution obligation in any 

way. It did not award compensation for any additional losses, nor did it alter who 

ultimately was to receive the sums awarded. Rather, the award as modified by the 

change of payee continued to reflect the same amounts (reduced only by restitution 

payments already made) due to the same victims, including the medical providers. The 

only change was to order that the payments be made directly to the medical providers, 

rather than to the medical providers through the female victim, and this change was 

effected simply to ensure that the providers, who were always supposed to receive a 

share of the restitution award, actually received what the court had ordered.

¶30 On these facts, we conclude that the change of payee did not constitute a new 

restitution request subject to the requirements of section 18-1.3-603.

¶31 This conclusion is amply supported by the restitution statute’s legislative

scheme. See Doubleday, ¶ 20, 364 P.3d at 196 (noting that we interpret a statute to 

effectuate the purpose of the legislative scheme, reading the scheme as a whole and 
12

giving effect to all of its parts).

¶32 Specifically, the legislative declaration to the restitution statute provides that the 

statute “shall be liberally construed” to accomplish the statute’s purposes, which 

include (1) rehabilitating offenders; (2) deterring future criminality; and (3) lessening

the financial burdens inflicted on crime victims and their families, compensating them 

for their suffering and hardship, and preserving the individual dignity of victims. 

§ 18-1.3-601(1)(c)–(e), (2), C.R.S. (2016). The legislative declaration further provides, “It 

is the intent of the general assembly that restitution be ordered, collected, and disbursed

to the victims of crime and their immediate families.” § 18-1.3-601(2) (emphasis added). 

In addition, the restitution statute makes clear that the judgment of restitution remains 

in force until the restitution is paid in full. See § 18-1.3-603(4)(a)(I). Finally, under the 

statute, a defendant’s restitution obligation can be decreased only (1) “[w]ith the 

consent of the prosecuting attorney and the victim or victims to whom the restitution is 

owed” or (2) “[i]f the defendant has otherwise compensated the victim or victims for 

the pecuniary losses suffered.” § 18-1.3-603(3)(b).

¶33 Here, allowing the change of payee (and declining Johnson’s request to discharge 

his restitution obligations) serves the statutory purposes of rehabilitation and 

deterrence vis-à-vis Johnson, as well as the legislative objectives of lessening the

financial burdens inflicted on the victims of Johnson’s crime and compensating them for 

their suffering and hardship. Moreover, Johnson was not prejudiced in any way by the 

order changing the party to whom payments were to be made, particularly when, as 

here, the parties who were ultimately to receive those payments (and the sums due) 
13

remained the same.

¶34 To conclude otherwise would be contrary to the above-described statutory 

scheme. Specifically, were we to adopt Johnson’s position in this case, he would 

effectively have his remaining restitution obligations discharged—and, therefore, his 

total obligations dramatically reduced—before all of his victims were made whole. 

Such a result would not only be contrary to both the statutory requirement that a 

judgment of restitution must remain in force until the restitution is paid in full, see

§ 18-1.3-603(4)(a), and the statutory limits on when a restitution obligation may be 

reduced, see § 18-1.3-603(3)(b), but also it would provide a substantial windfall to 

Johnson, at his victims’ expense, which the restitution statute does not countenance.

¶35 We are not persuaded otherwise by Johnson’s argument that the sentencing 

court had no authority to change the restitution payee (or by his reliance on State v. 

Moore, No. 03CA18, 2004 WL 1689674 (Ohio Ct. App. July 26, 2004), in support of that

argument). The question of the sentencing court’s authority to change a restitution

payee was not within our grant of certiorari, nor does such a question implicate the 

sentencing court’s jurisdiction (indeed, at oral argument, Johnson conceded that he is 

not challenging the sentencing court’s jurisdiction). Accordingly, the question of

whether the sentencing court had the authority to change the restitution payee is not 

before us, and our analysis is limited to the narrow question presented, namely, 

whether on the facts of this case, the People’s request for a change of payee constituted 

a new restitution request.
14

III. Conclusion

¶36 For these reasons, the order is affirmed, and the case is remanded for further 

proceedings consistent with this opinion.female victim