Harris County Courthouae

Houston, Texas

Dear Mr. Resweber: OpinionNo. WW-1454 Re: Whether the county court underArticle 5547-38,Vernon’s Civil Statutes, can commitan Individual, found to be mentally ill, to a mental hospital for a period not to exceed any specific number of days less than 90 days. You have requestedan opinion regarding the authority of the County Court, to commit a person for a period of any specific number of days less than 90 days, consistentwith the provisions of Article 5547-38,Vernon’s Civil Statutes.

The applicableportion of Article 5547-38,Vernon’s Civil Statutes, states in part:

.the court shall order that the mentally ill

7îí l erson be committedas a patient for observation and or treatment in a mental hospital for a not exceedingninety (90)days.” (Enph-a In construing statutes the courts of this State have held consistentwith Article 10 [I),. Vernon’s Civil Statutes, that the natural and commonlyunderstoodmeaning will be given to words used In a statute unless It Is plain or clear from the statute as a whole that such constructionwould defeat the manifest intention of the Legislature.

The phrase “not exceedingninety (90)days” has an ordinary and commonmeaning denoting a maximum that cannotbe exceededbut which necessarilyauthorizes any lesser period of time. Consistentwith this generally understood meaning, the words “not exceeding”have been characterized &%I# words of limitation, and, standing alone are ordinarily construeda8 such. City of Klngsvllle v. Meredith, 103 F.2d 279 ( C.C.A. 5th, 1939).

In Brockelhurst v. State, 195 Ark. 67, 111 S.W.2d 527 (1937), the appellant questioned the trial courts’ authority to commit him for a period not to exceed 15 dayswhere the statuteMr. Joe Resweber, page 2 (W-1454)

authorized commitment "for such time as the court shall direct, not exceeding one month." At page 528, theArkansas Supreme Court upheld the trial courtls 15 day commitmenton the ground that the w~ords"not exceeding"were words of limitationand merely set a time beyond which the trial court could not go. It Is presumed that every word, sentenceor provisionwas intended-for some useful purpose and has some force and effect. Lyles v. Ohelm, 138 Tex. 133, 142 S.W.2d 959,,aff. 159 S.W.2d 102, (Cl

v. PP., A 1940). Therefore, unless such a constructionwould conflict with other provisionsof the Mental Health Code, it appears that the plain meaning of Article 5547-38,Vernon's Civil Statutes, would authorize commitment for any period from 1 to 90 days.

An examinationof the other provisions of the Mental Health Code reveals two other Sections affecting the length of commitment. Both of these Sections take effect subsequent to the commitment and prior to the date of release set out in the court order. One of these,Article 5547-78 (a)authorizes the head of the hospital to file an application for temporaryhospitalization or Indefinite commitmentwhere It has been determined that furtherhospitalization Is necessary. Conversely,Article 5547-80 (a)authorizes the head of the hospital to discharge a patient at any time no longer requiringhospitalization.

It Is submitted that these sectionsdo not conflict with the County Court's original authority to commit the patient but rather are additionalprovisionsmerely intended to provide a simple and effective manner to more accurately fulfill the needs of the individualpatient. The discretionvested in the head of the hospitalwould remain in full force and effect under the constructionof the Court's authority as given above, and therefore It appears that these provisionspresent no real conflict with such natural meaning construction.

It Is also persuasive that the authority for this statute,Article I and XV, Constitutionof Texas, provides for commitment "fora period of time not to exceed ninety (90)days." Giving effect to the plain provisions,without adding to, detracting from or changing the law, clearly Indicates that any period of time not exceeding 90 dayswas authorizedby the Constitution and declared again by statutoryenactment. SUMMARY The County Court is authorized to commit a person to a mental hospital for temporaryhospitalization for. -

Mr. Joe Resweber, page 3 (WW-14%)

any period of time not exceeding 90 days. Sincerely, WILL WILSON Attorney General of Texas

Assistant PP:mkh APPROVED: OPINION COMMITTEE W. V..Geppert, Chairman Grady Chandler Ben Harrison Scranton Jones REVIEWED FOR THE ATTORNEY GENERAL BY: Leonard Passmore