# ELED

MAR 07 202

ELI7 "TH A. BR CLER1 OF 'U lEME URT
BY— rtIEF DEPUTY CLERK 139 Nev., Advance Opinion 57 

## IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE

STATE OF NEVADA

IN THE MATTER OF THE GUARDIANSHIP OF THE PERSON AND ESTATE OF KATHLEEN JUNE JONES, PiturEcTED PERSON.
KATHLEEN JUNE JONES, APPELLANT, V. ROBYN FRIEDMAN; DONNA SIMMONS; AND ELIZABETH BRICKFIELD, GUARDIAN AD LITEM FOR KATHLEEN JUNE JONES, RESPONDENTS.
No. 84655 December 21, 2023 Appeal from district court order grantingguardian ad litem fees. Eighth Judicial District Court, Family Division, Clark County; Linda Marquis, Judge. Affirmed. Legal Aid Center ofSouthern Nevada, Inc., and Scott Cardenas and Elizabeth Mikesell, Las Vegas, for Appellant.

Dawson & Lordahl, PLLC, and Elizabeth Bricklield, Las Vegas, for Respondent Elizabeth Brickfield.

Michaelson Law and John P. Michaelson, Amnwn E. Francom, and Peter R. Pratt, Henderson, for Respondents Robyn Friedman and Donna Simmons.
Julia S. Gold, Chairperson, Dara Goldsmith, Amicus Curiae Chairperson, Michael if Keane, and Amanda Netuschil, Reno, for Arnicus Curiae State Bar of Nevada, Probate and Trust Law Section.

Before the Supreme Court, HERNDON, LEE, and PARRAGUIRRE, JJ.

OPINION

By the Court, HERNIDON, J.: Roughly 18 months after respondents petitioned forguardianship
over their mother, triggering the contentious litigation that followed,' the district court appointed a guardian ad litem (GAL)toaid
'See Mauer qfGuardianship qfJones, 138 Nev. 51, 507 P.3d 598 (Ct. App. 2022), for background inlbrination on the guardianship proceedings.in re Guardianship ofiones

it in determiningthe protected person's best interests.The GAL,an attorney, soon thereafter filed a notice ofintent toseek the fees and costs to be incurred at her standard hourly rate. After submitting a report, the GAL sought fees at her stated rate. The court awarded herthose fees over the protected person's objection. At issue in this appeal are three arguments against the fee award: (1) the GAL has
no right to fees when the district court order appointing her did not specify the rate, as required by the Nevada Statewide Rules for Guardianship (NSRG);(2)the court improperly appointed an attorney as the GAL under NRS 159.0455 and NSRG Rule 8; and (3)the rate ofcompensation to which the GAL is entitled should be that of
a fiduciary, not an attorney. We conclude that the protected person waived any argument pertaining to the form ofthe district court's order by failing to raise the issue below. Even so, we note that, within days of the GAL's appointment,the protected person was notified thatthe GAL would seek fees at her requested rate of compensation, and the district court's failure to specify the rate in the order thus did not prejudice the protected person. We further conclude that the district court erred in interpreting NRS 159.0455(3) as requiring the court to appoint an attorney where there is no court-approved volunteer program. However, this error was harmless because the district court expressly appointed an experienced attorney as the GAL due tothe cornplexity ofthis matter. Lastly, we conclude that the record containssubstantial evidence supportingthe GAL's fee request.The district court did not abuse its discretion in awarding the GAL the full amount ofher requested fees.

FACTSAND PROCEDURAL HISTORY Upon petition, respondents Robyn Friedman and Donna Simmons became temporary guardians over their mother, appellant Kathleen June Jones (June); their temporary guardianship was followed by their sister Kimberly's appointment as guardian. During Kirnberly's term as guardian, there were over 400 documents filed in the case,25 hearingsheld, and at least 3 investigationsconducted into the circumstances underlyingthe guardianship proceedings. A major issue between the parties concerned Robyn's and Donna's ability toobtain Collinilinication, visits,and vacation time with June. The district court scheduled an evidentiary hearing on the issue and appointed respondent Elizabeth Brickfield, an attorney,as GAL forJune. ln particular, the court directed Brickfield to address the issue in the following manner: Schedule[ ]opportunities for Protected Person toelecttospeak withand/orvisit in person withheradult daughtersand [address] whether the Guardian has an obligation to facilitate, prompt,In re Guardianship ofJones 3

encourage, plan, schedule, and/or create an environment that promotes an opportunity for continued communication between Protected Person and her adult daughters based upon the current level ofcare and needs ofthe Protected Person.
The court later asked Brickfield to assist with another issue—that ofrelocating June to California. It noted that each ofthe issues for which it sought the GAL's help were interrelated and complex. As to compensation, the order stated, "[t]he guardian ad litern rnay request fees from the guardianship estate or a third party" and any request must comply with NRS 159.344. Five days after the order was filed, Brickfield filed a notice of appearance and a notice of intent to seek attorney fees and costs from the guardianship estate pursuant to NRS 159.344(3). Brickfield's notice indicated that her hourly rate was $400 and listed various support staff billing at rates ranging from $75 to $350 per hour. In response, June filed a notice of objection, arguing that the GAL was not entitled to her attorney rate of$400 per hour because the issues did not require legal services or legal expertise. June proposed that the GAL should charge within the national average range, which June represented to be $22 to $48 per hour. Kimberlyjoined June's opposition. Brickfield filed a declaration in response to the notice ofobjection, describing her extensive experience and qualifications and asserting that the rate was comparable to that charged by other attorneys with similar qualifications in Clark County for services as counsel and as a GAL. About 6 weeks later, Brickfield filed her report to the court. The report outlined Brickfield's work on the case: (i) reviewed the pleadings relevant to the issues of visitation and communication and the Physician's Certificate and accompanying report; (ii) rnet with Ms. Jones by telephone

on 2/24/21 and in person on 3/25/21; Ms. Jones was accompanied by LACSN counsel; (iii) inet individually with Ms. Jones' five children by separate telephone or Zoom conferences; the children who are represented by counsel were accompanied by counsel. Each meeting with a child lasted approximately

one hour; the two meetings with Ms. Jones totaled one hour; and (iv) separate telephone conversations with the respective children's counsel.
Brickfield also provided her conclusions and made recommendations in June's best interests. Brickfield thereafter filed a petition seeking approval ofher GAL fees and costs, requesting a total of $5713.50. Brickfield requested $5400 in fees for herself for 13.5 hours of work, $310 in fees for 2 hours ofwork by a paralegal, and $3.50 in costs for filing fees. June4 In re Guardianship ofJones

objected, agreeingthat Brickfield was entitled to compensation but arguing that a GAL should be paid at a lower GAL rate rather than

an attorney rate. She added that 13rickfield misrepresented how she benefited her and that, in fact, she gained no benefit from Brickfield's appointrnent. She added that she should not have to pay for

a GAL to whom she objected. The district court entered a written order awarding Brickfield her requested $5713.50 in fees and costs. June appealed,' and the Probate and Trust Section ofthe Nevada State Bar was permitted to file an amicus curiae brief.
DISCUSSION Anyerrorin ihe districtcourt'sorderappointingthe GAL is waived
June argues the district court lacked authority to award the GAL fees because it did not specify the GAL's rate in its appointment order. NSRG 8(1) requires the district court to "state the hourly rate to be charged by the guardian ad litern" in the appointment order. June contends that Brickfield cannot receive payrnent because her rate was not specified in the appointment order. She adds that the district court also did not amend its appointment order to cornply with NSRG 8(1) after receiving Brickfield's notice of intent to seek fees. Respondents assert that June waived her argument that the order appointing the GAL does not conform with NSRG 8(1) because June failed to raise it below.' Respondents also argue that any error in failing tostate the GAL'sexact rate was not prejudicial. Generally, la) point not urged in the trial court, unless it goes to thejurisdiction ofthat court, is deemed to have been waived and will not be considered on appeal." OldAztecMine, Inc. v. Brown,97 Nev.49, 52,623 P.2d 981, 983 (1981). Thisgeneral rule applies even to issues that are subject to review de novo. Schuck v. Signature

2Respondents assert that we lackjurisdiction over this appeal because the order awarding guardian ad litem fees and costs was entered amidst ongoing guardianship proceedings and thus does not constitute a special order after final judgment appealable under NRA 3A(h)(8) and because it is not appealable under anyother provision ofthat rule. We conclude that the order is independently appealable under NRS 159.375(5) (allowing appeals from orders in guardianship proceedings"authorizingthe payment ()fa debt,claim,devise, guardian's feesorattorney's fees"). Moreover,despite respondents' request,we decline to issue sanctions for June's counsel filing this appeal, as this appeal ostensibly wasfiled to protect her interestsand presents previously unanswered questionsoflaw pertaining to attorney GALs. NSRG 9.

3Respondents further suggest that the issue was waived when June failed to appeal from theorderappointingtheCiAt that orderwas not appealable.Seegrownv. MHCStagecoach, LLC, 129 Nev. 343, 345.301 P.3d 850, 851 (2013)("[Wiemay only considerappealsauthorized by statute orcourt rule."); NRAP 3A(b) (providing appellatejurisdiction over finalju(lgments and other specified orders).In re Guardianship ofJones 5
Flight Support ofNev., Inc., 126 Nev. 434, 436, 245 P.3d 542, 544 (2010). The record below supports that June waived any argument that the district court order did not satisfy the forrnalities under NSRG 8(1).Junedid not raiseany such issueswith thedistrictcourt'sorder in her objection to Brickfield's notice for fees, nor did she raise any such issues in heropposition to Brickfield'spetition for fees. Finally, June did not raise arty issues with the GAL's appointment order at the hearing on the motion for fees. Thus, June waived any aresuments to the form ofthe appointment order. Even ifthe issue had been properly raised. June fails to demonstrate any prejudice warranting reversal. See NRCP 61 (providing that reversal is notwarranted wheretheerror isharmless).Theorder specifically required the GAL to comply with NRS 159.344, indicatingtothe parties the GAL was allowed to seek fees,and further expressly permitted the GAL to "request fees from the guardianshipestateora third party."Shortly after the orderwas entered and
on the same day she filed her notice ofappearance, Brickfield filed her notice ofintent to seek fees. See NSRG 8(1). June noticed her objection, but the court did not alter the noticed cornpensation rate. Thus, while June correctly notes that the district court should have statedthe GAL's permissiblehourly rate in itsorderofappointment, the error was harmless in this instance and did not divest the court ofauthority to later award tees.
The district court erredinconcluding that it must appoint an attorney to serve as a GAL, but the error was harmless InaddressingJune'sobjectionstoBrickfield's motion for fees,the district court concluded that it could appoint a nonattorney asGAL only if a court-approved volunteer advocate program was established under NRS 159.0455. June argues that the court erred in so concluding. Respondents argue that, even if the court could have appointed a nonattorney outside ofa volunteer advocate program,
no other person who had the appropriate training and experience to serve as the GAL was suggested to the court, noting that Brickfield was uniquely qualified to address the issues present in such a complex case. The district court's interpretation and construction of a statute presents a question of law that is reviewed de novo. Zohar v. Zbiegien, 130Nev.733,737,334 P.3d 402,405 (2014). Likewise,the district court's legal conclusionsregardingcourt rules are reviewed de novo. Casey v. Wells Fargo I3ank, N.A., 128 Nev. 713, 715, 290 P.3d 265,267(2012). When interpreting a statute that is clear on its face, the language ofa statute should be given its plain meaning. Zohar, 130 Nev. at 737, 334 P.3d at 405.6 In re Guardianship ofJones

A GAL may be appointed by the court to represent a protected person ifthe court deterrnines that the protected person will benefit from the appointment and the GAL's services will be beneficial in determining the protected person's best interests. NRS 159.0455(1). Under NRS 159.0455(3), lilt

-a court-approved volunteer advocate prograrn for guardians ad litern has been established in a judicial district, a court may appoint a person who is not an attorney to represent a protected person or proposed protected person as a guardian ad litem." On the other hand, NSRG 8, which governs GALs appointed pursuant to NRS 159.0455, specifies in subsection 11 that "[a] guardian ad litein may be a trained volunteer from
a court-approved advocate program, an attorney, or any other person that the court finds has appropriate training and experience." June argues that NRS 159.0455 and NSRG 8(H) contradict each other on the topic ofwho a court may appoint as GAL. But there is
no conflict: NSRG 8(H) creates a complete list ofpeople who could be eligible to serve as a GAL ("a trained volunteer from a courtapproved advocate program, an auorney, or any other person that the court finds has appropriate training and experience"). Meanwhile, the statute clarifies that the court may appoint a nonattorney li]f a court-approved volunteer advocate program for guardians ad litern has been established in ajudicial district." NRS 159.0455(3). But the statute does not create a necessary condition for the appointment of a nonattorney. So the district court erred in interpreting NRS 159.0455(3) as requiring the appointment ofan attorney where there is no court-approved volunteer program. A third option underNSRG 8(H)exists and does not conflict with NRS 159.0455(3). NSRG 8(H) provides three types of individuals that the district court can appoint as a GAL: an attorney, a volunteer frorn a volunteer advocate program, and "any other person that the court finds has appropriate training and experience." While the district court analyzed the first two options, it did not address the third option, which included any person trained and experienced as
a GAL. Thus, it erred to the extent it concluded that it had to appoint
an attorney because no trained volunteer was available. This error, however, was harmless, as the district court alternatively stated that an attorney GAL wasspecifically appointed due to the complex nature ofthe case, the visitation issues' impact on June, and the parties' continuing inability to communicate effectively.See NRCP 61: Cook v. SW1rise Hosp. & Med. Cir., LLC, 124 Nev. 997, 1007, 194 P.3d 1214, 1220 (2008) (explaining that to be reversible error, the moving party rnust demonstrate that a substantial right
was prejudiced and "that, but for the error, a different result might have been reached"). There is no evidence in the record that the district court was aware of any nonattorney with the appropriateIn reGuardianship ofJones 7
training and experience to be considered for the appointment. Nor does the record reflect that any such persons were proposed to the district court forconsideration. So,while NSRG 8(1-1)providesthree options, the facts ofthe instant case indicate that the third option
was not available to the district court. The district court reviewed Brickfield's extensive qualifications, includingherexperience, legal abilities, and knowledge in the guardianship field. Because June cannot demonstrate that the district court could have appointed a nonattorney to deal with the complex legal issues relating to June's guardianship and relocation, we conclude that the district court's
error could not have affected the outcome ofthe GAL proceedings. lts error was thus harmless.

The district court didnot abuse its discretion in awarding the GAO fres June contends that the district court should not have awarded Brickfield fees at her attorney rate because a GAL performs fiduciary services, as opposed to legal services!' June argues that NRS 159.0455 and NSRG 8 make clear that a GAL, as "an officer ofthe court," is a fiduciary and is restricted from "offer[ing] legal advice tothe protected person."NRS 159.0455;NSRG 8(C)(notingthat"[all guardian ad litem is an officer ofthe court"); NSRG 8(N) (distineuishing the role ofan attorney from the role ofthe GAL); see also NRS 159.344 (concerning the payment ofattorney fees and costs in a guardianship). June alleges that the district court's findingthat thecustomary fiduciary rate for a GAL in Clark County is$400 per houror more has noevidentiary basisand that, based on the market rate, a reasonable fee ranges between $22 to $48 per hour. Respondents argue that the district court's fee order is supported by substantial evidence and that Brickfield's fees as a GAL were appropriately paid at an amount commensurate with her attorney rate. Respondents contend that there is no market rate requirement and that the district court satisfied the requirements codified in NRS 159.344. But the statute requires a court to determine the nature of'the services performed in awarding compensation: it distinguishes between "services that require an attorney[r which may be compensated at an attorney rate, and "fiduciary services," which may be compensated at a fiduciary rate. NRS 159.344(5)(g). We now deterrnine that, while GALs in Nevada act in the same manner as a fiduciaryand donot provide"attorney"work,the record nonetheless
4June does not provide any arguments specific to the S3.50 in costs or the paralegal's $310 in lees. Thus, June appears to only dispute the $5400 in lees awarded to Brickfield.8 ln re Guardianship ofJones

contains substantial evidence supporting the district court's award ofBrickfield's requested fees.
GALs orefichiciaries A fiduciary relationship is one "between two persons when one ofthem is under a duty to act for or to give advice for the benefit ofanother upon matters within the scope ofthe relation[ship]." Restatement (Second) ofTorts § 874 cmt. a (Am. Law 'Inst. 2008);
see also Mutter ofFrei Irrevocable Tr. Dated Oct. 29, 1996, 133 Nev. 50, 58, 390 P.3d 646, 653 (2017) (same). Asnoted,thedistrictcourt may appointa GAL tobenefit theprotected person and assist in determining the protected person's best interests.NRS 159.0455(l)(a). A GAL "is an officer ofthe court and is nota party tothe case."NRS 159.0455(4);seealso In re Christina B., 23 Cal. Rptr. 2d 918, 926 (Ct. App. 1993) (clarifying that a GAL is a party's representative whose purpose is to protect the person, creating a role that is "more than an attorney's but less than a party's");Shainwaldv. Shainwald, 395 S.E.2d 441, 444 (S.C. Ct. App. 1990) (collecting cases and explaining that "[a] guardian ad litem is a representative ofthe court"). The GAL's duties are limited to those set forth in the district court's order. NRS 159.0455(2). GALs
are also prohibited from offering legal advice to the protected person. NRS 159.0455(4). We conclude that the relationship between GALs and protected persons isfiduciary in nature.ThescopeofdutiesGALsare ordered to perform is directed by the court for the benefit ofthe protected person. NSRG 8. While amicus contends that GALs are only "officersofthe court"pursuant toNRS 159.0455(4), nothing preventsan officer ofthe court from also being a fiduciary. GALs are required to "zealously advocate for the best interest of the protected person
.. . in a mannerthat will enablethecourttodeterrninetheaction that will be the least restrictive and in the best interest ofthe protected person or proposed protected person."NSRG 8(13). Thisduty fits squarely with the definition ofa fiduciary. Likewise, GALs are to "advocate for the best interest ofthe protected person
. . . based
on admissible evidence available"and "conduct independent investigation and assessment ofthe facts tocarryout thedirectives ofthe appointingorderand maysubmit recommendationstothecourt that
are based on admissible evidence."NSRG 8(G). Here, every aspect ofthe GAL's relationship with June is to act forherbenefitandwith herbest interests in mind underthedirection ofthe district court. Other states have recognized the same where the GAL iscourt-appointed and actingasa branch ofthejudiciary.'

'See. e.g., Garrick v. Weaver, 888 F.2d 687, 693(10th Cir. 1989)(concluding that the GAL is a type offiduciary): Golin v. Allenby, 118 Cal. Rptr. 3d 762,In re Guardianship ofJones 9
This,however,doesnot mean that theGALcannot perform services that require an attorney. Forexample,advocacybefore a court isthe quintessential task of an attorney and a purpose ofthe GAL. See NRS 159.0455(4)(a)& (b)(requiringa GAL to advocate forthe protected person's best in(erests in a manner that enables the court to act in those interests). We now take this opportunity to clarify how the GAUs actions in a guardianship proceeding bear on the type of fees they may seek. ln Hull v. United States, the Tenth Circuit considered whether compensation for a GAL was taxable as costs or as attorney fees. 971 F.2d 1499 (10th Cir. 1992). That court held that the GAL's role determines whether itsexpensesare taxed ascosts or attorney fees. Id. at 1510. It then remanded the case to district court to determine what portions of the guardian ad litem's work should be taxed as costsand what portions should be paid asattorney fees based on the nature ofthe GAL's work; specifically, based on whether the GAL performed tasks "as an officer ofthe court," or whether they performed "legal services as an attorney." Id. On appeal after remand, the court upheld the award ofguardian ad litem fees as costs, finding undisputed evidence that the GAL rendered services solely as
an officer ofthe court while a separately retained attorney rendered attorney services. Hull ex rel. Hull v. UnitedStates, 53 F.3d 1125, 1128-29 (10th Cir. 1995). We now adopt this distinguishing factor because itclarifies that the typeofwork performed by the GAL dictates the propriety ofthe GAL's fees. GALs are not presumptively entitled to "attorney fees" because they do not act as attorneys on behalfofthe protected person. However, ifthey perform the type of services also performed by attorneys and have commensurate experience as an attorney, GALs may be compensated at an attorney rate for their work. This conclusion accords with NSRG 8(J), which requires courts to analyze the work completed by the GAL and their particular expertise and experience. We hold that courts,

787 (Ct. App. 2010) (observing that a GAL's powers are "subject to both the fiduciary duties owed to the incompetent person and

... the requirement that court approval he obtained kir certain acts"); People ex rel. KAI, 726 P.2d 1108, 1119-20 (Colo. 1986) (notingthe propriety olappointinga GALas a fiduciary representative fbr the protected person): Collins ex rel. Collins v. Tabei, 806 P.2d 40,49(N.M. 1991)(recognizingthat GALs "occup[yla position ofthe highest trust suggest[ingl that he or she is a fiduciary"); Byrd v. Woodrifff, 891 S.W.2d 689. 706 (Tex. App. 1994) (holdini4 that "a guardian .1(.1 litein's courtappointed role to act as the representative ofa minor's interest is sullicient to establish a fiduciary relationship"); see cdso 1 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 1991 (2008) (defining GAL as a fiduciary): f Honing v. Ashill, 483 S.E.2d 751, 753-54 (S.C. 1997) (holding that the relationship between a CiAL and the court is not
an employer-employee relationship. creating no agency relationship between the court and the GAL).10 In re GuardianshipofJones

when determining fees for a GAL, should evaluate (1) the experience and qualifications ofthe GAL,(2)the nature and complexityof the work asked ofthe GAL,(3)the work actually performed,(4)the result ofthe GAL's work, and (5) any other factors the court finds to be relevant in a particular case.6 We adopt these factors, which

are similar to the factors guiding inquiries into attorney fees in guardianship proceedirws, because they bear on the propriety of the GAL's rate, the success (or lack thereof) ofthe GAL, and the nature ofthe GAL's work.
The award ofBrickfield'sfees al a rate ofS400 per hour is reasonable When a fee award depends on the interpretation of a statute or court rule,thedistrict court's decision is reviewed de novo. Loganv. Abe, 131 Nev. 260,264,350 R3d 1139, 1141 (2015).An awardofcosts is reviewed for an abuse ofdiscretion. Id. at 267, 350 P.3d at 1144. This court has not determined the standard of review for an award of fees to a GAL as a fiduciary. We now determine that the appropriate standard ofreview is abuse ofdiscretion. See Robbins V. Ginese, 638 N.E.2d 627, 629 (Ohio Ct. App. 1994) (concluding that the district court did not abuse its discretion by awarding the GAL itsattorney rate). An abuse ofdiscretion "occurs ifthe district court'sdecision isarbitrary or capriciousor ifit exceedsthe bounds of law or reason."Jackson v. Stale, 117 Nev. 116, 120, 17 13.3d 998, 1000 (2001). The parties agree that the district court discussed each enumerated factor in NRS 159.344(5) when evaluating Brickfield's fee request. While we now clarify that NRS 159.344(5) is not appropriately applied to GAL fees but rather only toattorney fees, June's only argument is that the fiduciary rate is not equivalent to the attorney rate. However, based on the factors enumerated above, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in awarding Brickfield $400 per hour, as the court noted the importance ofthe GAL's report and its determination regarding the visitation petition.See Brunzell v. Golden GaleNat'l Bank, 85 Nev. 345,350, 455 P.2d 31, 33-34 (1969) (stating that the trier of fact understands the value ofthe services the best). June's analysis fails to consider that Brickfield's experience as an attorney was important to this case, though she was acting as a fiduciary. The district court was not required to rely on June's suggested $22 to $48 per hour range,

"We also clarify that while ti GAL seeking compensation must mect the requirements of' NRS 159.344, as per NSRG 8(.1), the factors listed in NRS 159.344(5) applyonlyto attorney lees. not GAL lees.That is.GALs must meet the written notice and petition requirements laid out in the statute. hut courts evaluating their compensation should consider the factors enumerated above, not the factors enumerated in NRS 159.344(5).In re Guardianship ofJones 11

as she merely surveyed three websites without any indication as to delineating factors like each GAL's experience, qualifications,

or work performed. June also ignores the difficulty of the visitation petition and the legal knowledge required to serve her best interests. Meanwhile, the district court reviewed Brickfield's experience, her qualifications, the services she provided for June, the invoices submitted, and the benefits June received. The district court also repeatedly noted the complexity ofthe visitation petition and the need for someone with extensive guardianship experience. As it noted, Brickfield operated in the sensitive area ofdetermining how June's family members could cornrnunicate with or visit her, a determination that required legal experience and skill. Brickfield also aided in the court's deterrnination to remove Kimberly as June's guardian and its appointment ofJune's next guardian. Thus, the district court did not abuse its discretion byfinding that Brickfield's requested fees were appropriate compensation for her work as a fiduciary in this case. While Brickfield's fees are more appropriately termed as a fiduciary lee rather than an attorney fee, the district court did not abuse its discretion in awarding the full amount requested.
CONCLUSION Although the district court erred by failing to include Brickfield's rate in the order ofappointment. June waived this argument by failing to raise it below. Likewise, the district court's error in concluding an attorney must be appointed where a volunteer is not available from a GAL program, without acknowledging the third option under NSRG 8(I-1), was harmless. Finally, while Brickfield is a fiduciary entitled to fiduciary fees, the district court did not abuse its discretion in awarding her fees in an amount cornmensurate with her attorney rate because the award was supported by the GAL's experience,specialized knowledge, and ability to understand the intricacies ofthis particular case's complex legal issues. Accordingly, we affirm the district court's order awarding the GAL fees.
LEE and PARRAGUIRRE, JJ., concur.

SPO,CARSON CITY, NEVADA, 2023