UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 11-5214

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

ARLINGTON ASHLEY, a/k/a Arlington Efrain Ashley,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern 

District of Virginia, at Newport News. Raymond A. Jackson, 

District Judge. (4:10-cr-00088-RAJ-TEM-1)

Submitted: June 15, 2012 Decided: July 20, 2012

Before SHEDD and AGEE, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior 

Circuit Judge.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Mark Diamond, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellant. Neil H. 

MacBride, United States Attorney, Alexandria, Virginia; Michelle 

Sudano, Second Year Law Student, WILLIAM & MARY SCHOOL OF LAW, 

Williamsburg, Virginia; Eric M. Hurt, Assistant United States 

Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Newport News, 

Virginia, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
- 2 -

PER CURIAM:

Arlington Ashley (Ashley) appeals the district court’s 

judgment following his convictions and sentence on one count of 

possession with the intent to distribute more than 500 grams of 

cocaine, 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(B)(iii); one count of 

importing more than 500 grams of cocaine from Panama, id. § 952;

and one count of escape from custody, 18 U.S.C. § 751(a). We 

affirm.

Ashley first argues the police lacked probable cause to 

arrest him, and therefore, the district court erred in denying 

his motion to suppress incriminating statements that he made to 

the police following his arrest and to suppress cocaine found at 

the home of a woman named Tara Upshaw (Upshaw), where Ashley was 

arrested. We review the factual findings underlying the 

district court’s denial of Ashley’s motion to suppress the 

evidence at issue for clear error and its legal conclusions de 

novo. United States v. Perkins, 363 F.3d 317, 320 (4th Cir.

2004).

Ashley was arrested without a warrant. Of relevance here, 

the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, U.S. 

Const. amend. IV, permits a police officer to arrest a suspect 

without a warrant if such police officer has probable cause to 

believe the suspect has committed a crime, United States v. 

Williams, 10 F.3d 1070, 1073 (4th Cir. 1993). An officer has 
- 3 -

probable cause to believe a suspect has committed a crime if the 

facts and circumstances within the officer’s knowledge are

sufficient to warrant a prudent person, in the circumstances 

shown, to conclude that the suspect has committed an offense.

Michigan v. DeFillippo, 443 U.S. 31, 37 (1979). Whether the 

arresting officer himself had probable cause to arrest the 

defendant is determined by the “totality of the circumstances,” 

Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366, 371 (2003), either known 

personally to the arresting officer, communicated to him by one 

or more of his fellow officers, or a combination of both, United 

States v. Massenburg, 654 F.3d 480, 491-96 (4th Cir. 2011). Our 

review of the record discloses that the arresting officer had 

probable cause to believe that Ashley had committed two crimes, 

namely, possession of cocaine with the intent to distribute and 

the importation of cocaine from Panama, and therefore, his 

arrest without a warrant did not violate the Fourth Amendment.

Second, Ashley contends the district court erred in denying 

his Rule 29 motion for judgment of acquittal. Fed. R. Crim. P. 

29. According to Ashley, he was entitled to judgment of 

acquittal because the government failed to produce sufficient 

evidence for a reasonable jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt 

that he possessed with the intent to distribute and imported the 

cocaine admitted into evidence at his trial. We review the 

district court’s denial of Ashley’s Rule 29 motion de novo. 
- 4 -

United States v. Green, 599 F.3d 360, 367 (4th Cir.), cert.

denied, 131 S. Ct. 271 (2010). “We review the sufficiency of 

the evidence to support a conviction by determining whether 

there is substantial evidence in the record, when viewed in the 

light most favorable to the government, to support the 

conviction.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 

Furthermore, “[i]n evaluating the sufficiency of the evidence, 

we do not review the credibility of the witnesses and assume 

that the jury resolved all contradictions in the testimony in 

favor of the government.” United States v. Foster, 507 F.3d 

233, 245 (4th Cir. 2007). After reviewing the evidence adduced 

at trial with respect to whether Ashley possessed with the 

intent to distribute and imported the cocaine admitted into 

evidence at his trial, we conclude that the district court did 

not err in denying Ashley’s motion for judgment of acquittal.

Third, Ashley contends the district court deprived him of 

his Sixth Amendment right to counsel during his sentencing

proceedings when it granted his motion to dismiss his court 

appointed counsel and to proceed pro se during his sentencing

proceedings. Although the Sixth Amendment guarantees the right 

to assistance of counsel at every critical stage of a criminal 

prosecution, a defendant may waive the right and elect to 

proceed pro se “if the waiver is knowing, intelligent, and 

voluntary.” United States v. Singleton, 107 F.3d 1091, 1095
- 5 -

(4th Cir. 1997). Whether Ashley effectively waived his right to 

counsel during his sentencing proceedings is a question of law, 

which we review de novo, based upon our examination of the 

record as a whole. Id. at 1097 n.3. Our review of the record 

in this case demonstrates that Ashley knowingly, intelligently, 

and voluntarily waived his Sixth Amendment right to counsel

during his sentencing proceedings and elected to proceed pro se. 

Thus, the district court did not err in granting his motion to 

dismiss his court appointed counsel and to proceed pro se during 

his sentencing proceedings.

Finally, Ashley contends the district court procedurally 

erred when it refused to permit him to orally object for the 

first time to facts stated in his presentence report at his 

sentencing hearing. Ashley’s contention is without merit. 

Although the district court informed Ashley of the requirement

that he make timely written objections to his presentence report 

prior to his sentencing hearing, Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(f), Ashley 

failed to do so and failed to show good cause for making the 

untimely oral objections that he did make to the presentence 

report at his sentencing hearing. Therefore, the district court 

did not err when it refused to permit Ashley to orally object,

for the first time at his sentencing hearing, to facts stated in 

the presentence report.
- 6 -

For the reasons stated, we affirm the judgment below in 

toto. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and 

legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials 

before the court and argument would not aid the decisional 

process.

AFFIRMED