IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 18-11369

Summary Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee

v.

ALLEN NASH, also known as A-1,

Defendant - Appellant

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Texas

USDC No. 3:15-CR-478-1

Before BENAVIDES, DENNIS, and OLDHAM, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Allen Nash appeals his convictions of sex trafficking of a child; 

transportation of a minor to engage in commercial sex acts; possession of 

ammunition by a felon; sex trafficking through force, fraud, or coercion; and 

conspiracy to commit sex trafficking. First, he argues that the district court 

 

* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not 

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH 

CIR. R. 47.5.4.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

November 15, 2019

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

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No. 18-11369

2

erroneously denied his motion to sever the charge of being a felon in possession 

of ammunition from the other charges in the indictment. Second, Nash 

contends that the district court improperly denied his constitutional right to 

self-representation after he clearly and unequivocally invoked that right. 

We review the denial of a motion to sever counts for abuse of discretion

and reverse when “there is clear, specific and compelling prejudice that 

resulted in an unfair trial.” United States v. Singh, 261 F.3d 530, 533 (5th Cir. 

2001) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Felon-in-possession 

charges present special prejudice concerns. United States v. Turner, 674 F.3d 

420, 430 (5th Cir. 2012). Even so, given the location and timing of law 

enforcement’s discovery of the ammunition in this case, the district court did 

not abuse its discretion in denying the motion to sever. See id. Nash has not 

shown clear, specific, and compelling prejudice that rendered his trial unfair. 

See Singh, 261 F.3d at 533.

While we review the denial of the constitutional right to selfrepresentation de novo, we review the district court’s underlying factual 

findings for clear error. United States v. Weast, 811 F.3d 743, 748 (5th Cir. 

2016). Contrary to Nash’s arguments, he did not clearly and unequivocally 

invoke his right to self-representation prior to jury selection because he 

abandoned that request after the district court complied with Faretta v. 

California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975), and after it warned him of the perils of 

proceeding pro se. See United States v. Cano, 519 F.3d 512, 516 (5th Cir. 2008). 

Finally, despite Nash’s arguments that he clearly and unequivocally requested 

self-representation on the morning of opening statements, in light of his 

behavior, the district court did not clearly err in denying his request on the 

ground that he was intending to delay and disrupt the proceedings. See Weast, 

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811 F.3d at 746, 748-50; United States v. Long, 597 F.3d 720, 726-29 (5th Cir. 

2010).

Accordingly, the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.

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