The Court has substituted Administrator Kar en Mills as the defe ndant in place of 1 former Administrator Hec tor V. B arr eto and f ormer A ctingAdministrator Dar ryl Hairston pursuant to Rule 25(d) of the Fe dera l Rules of Civil Procedur e. UN I TE D ST AT ES D I STR I CT C OU RT F O R T H E D IS T R IC T O F C O LU M B IA

__________________________________________ ) KEVI N R. KEL L Y, ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) v. ) Ci vi l A cti on No. 05 -90 0 (P L F) ) KA RENG. MI L L S, A dmi nis tr ator , U nit e d St ate s ) Small Business Administration, ) ) De fe nd ant. )

1 __________________________________________)

OPI NI ON, F I NDI NGS OF F ACT AND CONCLUSI ONS OF LAW Th is m atte r c ame be fo re the Court fo r a fo ur -d ay be nc h tr ia l on

pla int if f K e vin Kelly ’s claim that his employ er, the United States Small Business Administration (“SBA ”), dis c ri min ate d a g a ins t hi m on a c c ount o f h is r a c e and

re ta liate d a g a ins t hi m f

or purs uin gpa st claims of discrimination, in violation of Title VI Iof the Civil Ri g hts Act of 1964 (“ Title VI I ”), a s amende d, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e et seq. The Court pre viously dismiss ed without prejudice three
c la ims in p la int if

f’ s f ir st a me nd e d c omp la int , s e e Ke lly v. B arr e to , Civil Action No. 05-900, Orde r at 1 (D .D.C. Sept. 5, 2006); Opinion at 6-9 (D.D.C. Sept. 5, 2006), a nd g rante d d ef en d an t ’s m o t i o nfo r s u m m ary j u d gm en to np l ai n t i ff

’s age d i s cr i m i n at i o ncl ai mun d er th e A ge Discrimination in Employ ment Act. See K elly

v. Hairston

, 605 F. Supp. 2d 175 (D.D .C. 2009). The one issue that rema ined for tr ial conce rns plaintiff’s c laims of rac e discrimination and
r e t a l i at i o ni nv i o l at i o no f

T i t l e V II.The followingwitnesses testified at trial: Kevin Kelly , Ver onica Johnson, Tracy 2 Ebb-Murphy , Eug ene Corne lius, J r., David King, L eo Sanche z, and Napoleon Ave ry . The Court ha s c are fu lly

c on sid e re d a ll the e vid e nc e pr e se nte d b y the pa rt ie s at tr ia l but do e s n ot d isc us s in this Opinion all t he evide nce it ultimately found unper suasive or immater ial to the outcome. The SDB office was pre viously ref err ed to as the O ffice of Minority Employ ment 3 Deve lopment prior to an ag ency reor g anization in 2001.

2 I . F I ND I NG S OF F AC T The fa cts in this case re volve ar ound plaintiff’s employ ment at the SBAfrom September 1998 to May

2004, and primar ily

from 2001 until his termination on J une 1, 2004. Pla int if f’ s r a c e dis c ri min atio n c la im a lle g e s th at hi s su pe rv iso r, L e o Sa

nc he z, tr e ate d h im differ ently

from a similarly

situated Hispanic e mploy ee, Jorg e Rivera . Plaintiff’s reta liation claim alleg es that he w as plac ed on a Per formanc e Improvement Plan (“ PI P”) and later terminated f

or eng ag ing in pr otected a ctivity . Upon ca ref ul consideration and evaluation of the testimony of all the witnesse s and the doc umentary evidenc e admitted at tria l, and making
cre dibilit y

finding s as nec essar

y and appr opriate to re solve any materia l discrepa

ncies in the te sti mony , th e Court

make s th e fo llo wi ngfi nd ing s o f f a c t. 2
A. Gene ral Background Kevin Ke lly , an Af

rica n-Amer ican male , beg an wor king at the SBA in September 1998 as a G S-11 Business Oppor tunity Specialist (“B OS”) in the Of fice of Small Disadvantag ed Business Cer

tification and Elig ibilit y

(“SDB office ”). Mr. Kelly ’s duties as a B OS included 3The SDB prog ram c ertified e ligible businesse s for c ontrac t work with the fe dera l 4 g overnme nt by

evaluating six criteria: (1) whether the applica

nt possessed at lea st 51% owne rs hip int e re st i n th e bu sin e ss; (2 ) whe the r t he a pp lic ant m ana g e d a

nd c on tr oll e d th e bu sin e ss by handlingdaily

business operations; (3) whether the business fell within the size standards e sta bli sh e d b y

the SB A w ithre sp e c t to g ro ss a nnua l r e c e ipt s o r n

umb e r o f e mpl oye e s; (4) whe ther the a

pplicant was soc ially

disadvantag ed; (5) whether the applica

nt was economica lly

disadvantag ed; and ( 6) whe ther the a pplicant was a

U.S. citiz en. 3 scre eningand ana ly

zing applications from small businesses to determine whe ther they wer e
e lig ibl e fo r c e rt if

ic atio n und e r t

he Sma ll D isa dv anta g e d B us ine ss ( “ SDB ” ) p ro g ra m. 4 In makingcer

tification rec ommendations for the SDB prog ram, B OSs followed a twostep proce ss. First, a B OS “scre ened” applications to ensure that they contained a ll information
nece ssary for the r eview pr ocess. Unde r ag ency regulations, the scre eningperiod wa s to be completed within 15 day s. I f a B OS determined that the application wa s missi ngrequire d information, he or

she could e ither re turn the application with a letter explaining the de ficienc ies or mark it as pe nding a

nd contac t the applicant dire ctly to reque st additional information. Be cause missing information inevitably delayed the r eview pr ocess, a BO S ty pically imposed a deadline by

which the a

pplicant was r equire d to submitthe re quired infor mation if this second option was chosen.

Second, a B OS “proc essed” applications by evaluating whe ther the businesse s satisfied the six eligibility criter ia for the SDB program. Af ter re viewingthe application, a BO S submitt ed a written rec ommendation to a supervisor which included a n evaluation of eac h of the six c ri te ri a . A g e nc y

re g ulatio ns re qu ir e d th at th e pr oc e ssi ngpe ri od be c omp le te d w ith in 6 0 d ay s, setting a n overa ll 75-day

deadline f

rom the re ceipt of the application for the B OSs to complete“PX” r efe rs to plaintiff’s exhibits ; “DX” ref ers to def endant’ s. 5 Ms. Eb b- Murp hy

wo rk e d a s a

B OS d ur ingthe same tim e pe ri od that Mr . K e lly 6 was e mploy ed at the SB A, 1998 throug h 2004.

Severa l witnesses, including Mr. Kingand Mr. Sanc hez, testified that an 7 overwhelming numbe r of B OSs in the SDB offic e we re A frica n-Amer ican, both bef

ore a nd afte r the re org anization in 2001. Ind e e d, Mr . K ingte sti fi e d th at w he n h e le ft the SDB of

fi c e in Fe bruar y 2002, 15 of 17 B OSs were Afric an-A merica n. 4 their re view. B eca

use of the of

ten substantial number of a pplications submitt ed to the SDB prog ram, super

visors permitted B OSs to work on applications beyond the 75-da y period. The SBAutiliz ed a c omputerized trackingsy stem to monit or the progress of
a pp lic atio ns . O ne of

the ite ms tra c ke d b y

the sy ste m w a s th e numbe r o f d ay s it too k f or a B OS t o revie w a c ase. Super

visors used this information to determine whe ther a BO S met the 75-day deadline or

exceede d it (and by

how many

day s) and to eva luate an e mploy ee’ s job perfor mance . Mr. Kelly testified that the SDB trac king sy stem was er ror- prone a

nd fre quently

repor ted inacc urate data. F or example, he said the sy stem occa sionally display ed an inc orre ct number of day s that he had w orked on a n application or r eporte d that an applica tion was still pending that he had a lrea dy

completed. Mr. K elly , as we ll as other B OSs, broug ht this error to the attention of their super

visors. See P l a i n t i f

f ’ s E x h i b i t( “ P X ” ) 1
. P l a i n t i f f ’ s w i tn e s s , T r a c y E b b

- M ur p h y, 5 sim ila rl y te sti fi e d to the data

re po rt ingpr ob le ms w iththe tr a c kin gsy ste m. 6 In 2 00 1, the SB A und e rw e nt a re or g anizatio n whic h r e du c e d th e numbe r o f B OSs from appr ox imately

60 to 10 or 12 and e liminated all cleric al staff
. This shifted many 7 administrative re sponsibili ties to BOSs, including staffingthe help desk to re spond to applicant inquiries. Severa l witnesses testified that all B OSs rece ived inquiries from a pplicants. Around 2003, the SBA hire d temporar y employ ees to staf

f the he lp desk.5 B e c a us e of the sta ff re du c tio ns , M r. Ke lly

te sti fi e d th at hi s w or

klo a d, a lon gwi th the workloa ds of all re maining e mploy ees, inc rea sed substantially . Severa l witnesses testified that with fewe r B OSs to scree n and proc ess applications, the reorg anization created a substantial backlogof applications needingto be re viewed. I n a June 17, 2003 email to a field super visor, L eo Sanche z, Mr. Kelly ’s supervisor in the SDB office duringmost of the rele vant time period, descr ibed the bac klog in the f ollowing wa

y : “[S ]i nce the prog ram off ice we nt from nea

rly 60 staff me mbers and 9 ma

nag ers to 11 staff

members a

nd me we f

ight a losing battle eac h and
ever y day . . . I t just doesn’t make sense to rea ssign c ases to re maining sta ff membe rs who themselves ar e all alr eady overloa ded.” See PX 4. In Marc h 2003, Eug ene Corne lius, an Afric an-A merica n male, wa s assig ned to the SDB off ice a s an assoc iate administrator a nd was c harg ed with re ducingthe bac klog. Mr
. Cornelius serve d as Mr. Ke lly ’s third-line super visor. Be g inning in appr ox imately November 2003, he aske d Mr. Kelly to submitwee kly

prog ress re ports to him. B. Mr. Kelly’s Pe rformance Ev aluations i n 1999 and 2000 In November

1999, Mr. Kelly

rec eived a

perf ormanc e eva luation for fisca l y ear (“F Y”) 1999 from his first-line super visor, L eo Sanche z, a Hispanic male. See PX 2 . M r. Ke lly
rec eived a

ratingof “4” on a 5-point sca le. See id. at 1. This ratingcorr esponds to a perf ormanc e which “ Ex cee ds Fully Successf ul,” one step be low “Outstanding .” I d. at 3. Mr. Sanchez noted in his justification of the rating that Mr. K elly had “pr ocesse d approximately 25
c a se s f or the y e ar” and

ha d “ pr ov ide d o uts tand ingc us tom e r s e rv ic e .” I d. Mr . Sa nc he z al so
rec ommended Mr. Ke lly

for a promotion to GS-12 status, effec tive October 26, 1999. See id.Mr. Kelly testified that Mr. Kingrepla ced Mr . Sanchez as his offic ial supervisor 8 from Oc tober through Dec ember 2000. Mr. Kingtestified, howeve r, that his detail in the SDB office did not beg in until December 2000. To the extent that it i s releva nt to plaintiff’s claim, the Court c re dit s th e te sti mony

of Mr . K ingwi th t

he re sp e c t to the date s o f h is d e ta il b e c a us e it presumes that he would have the most acc urate rec ollection of whe n he beg an wor king in the SDB off ice. More over, Mr . Kingtestified that duringhis SDB detail, he ne ver r eplac ed Mr. Sanchez as Mr. K elly ’s supervisor but r ather that they jointly supervised Mr . Kelly . The Court need not r esolve this fac tual discrepa ncy beca use it is imm ater ial to its analy sis. 6 Mr . K e lly a g a in r e c e ive d a

ratin gof “ 4, ” “ Exc e e ds F ull y

Suc c e ssf ul, ” on his pe rf or manc e e va luatio n f

ro m Mr . Sa

nc he z fo r F Y 2 00 0. Se e PX 3 . M r. Sanc he z no te d in his justification that Mr. Kelly had “pr ocesse d approximately 19 case s for the year , howeve r, many have involved c omplex social or e conomic issues.” I d. at 2. Mr. Sanche z also reported that Mr. Ke lly ha d a c te d a s a

“ [t]ea m [l]e a de r” and

that “ his pe e rs re ly

on him fo r a ssi sta

nc e in c a se analy sis and thinking throug h the ce rtification eva luation proce ss.” I d.

C. Mr. King’s SDB Detail, Dec embe r 2000 through February 2002 In Dec ember

2000, David King , then an attorney advisor in the SBAOffic e of Procure ment, was de tailed to the SDB of fice until Februa

ry 2002. Mr. King , an Af

rica n- 8 Americ an male, a dvised the off ice on c omplex elig ibilit y issues. Eventually , Mr. Kingassisted in review ing e mploy ee w ork and c onductingperf ormanc e eva luations. The Court hea

rd conf licting testimony

from Mr. Ke lly

and Mr. Kingconce rning
sever al minor fac ts. First, Mr. Ke lly testified that Mr. Kingasked him to take on a dditional job responsibilities. Mr. Kelly declined to do so be cause he fe are d rese ntment from his co-wor kers and bec ause Mr . Kingcould not offe r additional compe nsation or a pr omotion. Mr. King de nied that he eve r aske d Mr. Kelly to assume additional re sponsibili ty . Second, Mr. Ke lly claimed that he wa s routinely

assig ned more complex cases than other BO Ss and that these ca ses took longe rTo be pre cise, Mr. K elly rec eived a

“3.2” r atingon his FY 2001 pe rfor mance 9 evaluation, which was the a vera g e of f

ive cr itical elements ratings. See PX 5 at 1. His “3.2 ” ratingwas rounde d down to a “3” pursuant to the summary ratingdefinitions that were included i nth e p er fo rm an ce ev al u at i o nd o cu m en t . S ee , e. g. , PX 3 at 3.

In h is gri e va

nc e , M r. Ke lly

a lle g e d th at Mr . K ing ’s fa ilure to c omp ly wi th c e rt a in 10 proce dures e stablished by the union contra ct constituted a violation of the a g ree ment. Specifica lly , he cla imed in an “SB A/AFG E Grieva nce F orm,” dated J anuar

y 1, 2002, that Mr. Kingfailed to g ive him notification of the per formanc e def iciencie s which justified the lower rating . See PX 2 7A . In h is t e sti mony , M r. Ke lly fu rt he r a sse rt e d th at Mr . K ingsigne d h is perf ormanc e eva luation two day s after the re viewingofficia l, J osephine Stallings, sig ned the evaluation; Mr. Kelly

said this violated proce dures outlined in the union contra ct. Mr. King e xpla ine d in

his te sti mony

that hi s p oli c y

wa s to sign th e e va luatio n whil e dis c us sin git d ur inghis me e tin g s w ithe mpl oye e s, wh ic h n e c e ssa ri ly oc c ur re d a ft e r h e pr e se nte d th e ra tin g s to Ms. Stallings and obtaine d her sig nature . 7 to scree n and proc ess. Mr. Kingalso denied this. To the e x tent that these fa ctual discre pancie s
ar e r el ev an tt o i t s an al y s i s , th e C o urtcr ed i t s th e t es t i m o n y o f M r. Ki n g. Mr. Kingserve d as the rating of ficial for Mr. Kelly ’s per formanc e eva luation for FY 2001. See PX 5. Mr. Kingand Mr. Ke lly met on November

9, 2001 to discuss the
e va luatio n. Mr . K e lly

re c e ive d a

ratin gof “ 3” on a 5- po int sc a le wh ic h c or

re sp on ds to a

“ F ull y Successf ul” per formanc e. I d. Although no written justification for this ratingacc ompanied the 9 evaluation, Mr. King te stified that the rating r efle cted his obser vation that Mr. Kelly ’s work w as incre asing ly

tardy and that he f

ailed to re view applications by the re g ulatory

deadlines. Mr
. Kelly ref used to sign the evaluation. After this revie w, Mr. Ke lly beg an to believe that Mr. King
was re taliating a g ainst him for ref using to a cce pt additional responsibility . Soon therea fter, he spoke to an EEO counselor a nd ultimately

decide d to file a union g rieva nce a g ainst Mr. Kingon J anuar y 1, 2002. See PX 27A. 10Mr. Kelly ’s pre cise ra ting wa s a 2.4, which w as the avera g e of f ive cr itical 11 elements. This number w as rounde d down to a 2 pursua nt to the ratingsummary

definitions. S ee , e. g. , PX 3 at 3. 8 D. Mr. Kelly’s Claims of Disparate Treatment Mr. Kelly testified that duringthe cour se of his employ ment at the SBA , Mr. Sanc he z tr e ate d h im d if

fe re ntl y fr om h is c o- wo rk e r, Jorg e Riv e ra , who a lso wo rk e d a s a B OS i n the SDB O ffice . L ike Mr. Sanche z, Mr. Ri vera is a Hispanic, Spanish-spe akingmale. At trial, Mr. Ke lly

offe red e vidence he cla ims shows that Mr. Sanchez favor ed Mr . Ri ve ra . F or

e xamp le , o n O c tob e r 2 0, 20 02 , M r. Ke lly re c e ive d a

pe rf or manc e e va luatio n in which Mr. Sanc hez, who had re sumed responsibility as his ratingofficia l, ga

ve him a rating of

a “2.” See PX 7. This ratingcorr esponds to a “Minimally Successf ul” per formanc e. I d. at 1. 11 Mr . Sa nc he z’s wr itt e n ju sti fi c atio n n ote d: “ [Mr .] K e lly sc re e ne d a

pp ro ximate ly

20 0 c a se s ( wi thi n the ave rag e ra

ng e for all staff me mbers). H oweve r, his aver ag e time to scre en ca ses was 40 da y s. Twenty -five da

y s over the r egulatory

require ments [] . And well over the offic e ave rag e. The office aver ag e wa s about 13 day s which is within the regulatory time frame .” I d. at 2. Mr. Sanchez furthe r noted that Mr. K elly proce ssed 66 ca ses for the y ear , which wa s within the office
ave ra g e , b ut t

hat w he n h is s c re e nin gand pr oc e ssi ngave ra g e s w e re a dd e d to g e the r, Mr . K e lly reta ined the ca ses at his desk for a total of 106 da

y s, well beyond the 75-da y deadline. I d. Mr. Sanchez also obser

ved that he ha d previously remove d Mr. Kelly

from the list of B OSs rece iving
new c ases with the g oal that doingso “may help him ge t up to speed.” I d. By the end of

the ratingperiod, howe ver, Mr . Kelly still had not completed 20 c ases. F inally , Mr. Sanche z in d ic ate d th at M r . K e ll y

“ h a d c o n s is te n tl y

b e e nun ti me ly

[an d ] un r e s p o n s iv e an d

[h a d ]Eu g e ne Cor ne liu s te sti fi e d th at a

B OS’ s w ri tte n w or

k p ro du c t is “ c ri tic a l” ; it

is 12 90% of what review ers c onsider in makingperf ormanc e dete rminations. Mr. Cornelius testified that Mr. Kelly ’s written re ports wer e “substanda rd.” Ba rbar a Seldon-Dotson is an Af rica n-Amer ican f

emale. 13 9 chronic ally

missed deadlines” and that his written wor k “consistently

had sy ntax and g rammatica l error s.” I d. 12

Mr. Kelly attache d a wr itten statement to his evaluation for F Y 2002, in which he expressed disag ree ment with the rating . See PX 7 at 3. He explained: “The rating doe s not ref lect the c omplex ity

of the c ases that I

have c ompleted . . . One c ompelling f act whic h had a profound a ffe ct [sic] and impact on my perf ormanc e rating( s) is the fac t that our offic e has decr ease d in staff number s.” I d.

Mr . K e lly of fe re d into e vid e nc e the pe rf or manc e e va luatio ns of

tw o o the r B OSs for the sa me time period, Mr. River a and B arba ra Seldon-D otson. Mr. Sanche z rated Mr. 13 Rivera’ s perf

ormanc e as “ Ex cee ds Fully Successf ul” and noted that he “pr ocesse d 85 case s for the y ear with an ave rag e of 29 da y s” and “ scre ened 152 c ases r eturning47 perc ent of the c ases that he re viewed in a

n aver ag e of a

rec ord 4 day s.” See PX 8 at 1. In Ms. Seldon-Dotson’s evaluation, Mr. Sanchez rate d her pe rfor mance as “O utstanding” and noted that she “proc essed 80 case s for the year

in an ave rag e for

23 day s” and “ scre ened a pproxi mately

180 case s for the y ear .” See id. at 2.

Mr. Kelly rec eived a

ratingof “2.4 ” (“Minimally Successf ul”) on a mid-y ear perf ormanc e eva luation give n on J une 11, 2003. See PX 11. As set forth in g reater de tail below, this evaluation eve ntually led to his placeme nt on a Perfor mance I mprovement Plan (“ PI P”). As evi den ce of

ret ali ati on , M r. K ell y

off eredth e per forman ce eva lu ati on s o f ot her BO S s fo r FYThe Court notes that all of the se employ ees a re A frica n-Amer ican. 14 For

example, the “Guidelines f or Timeliness of Review ” instruct that an 15 employ ee’ s perf

ormanc e should be rated as a “3” or “F ully Successf ul” when “ 85-89% of

the a ssi g ne d c a se s [are ] co mpl e te d a nd su bmi tte d f or re vie w . . . wi thi n 4 5 d ay s o f a ssi g nme nt d ate and no ca se is completed more than 50 day s after assig nment.” See PX 12 at 5. In a perf ormanc e eva luation for F Y 2003, howeve r, Mr. Sanc hez ga ve an e mploy ee a

“3” r atingeven though she had proc essed only 22% of he r ca ses within 45 day s. I d. Mr. Sanche z si milarly rate d another employ ee’ s perf

ormanc e a “ 3” whe n she complete d only 33% of he r ca ses within 45 day s. I d. Mr. Sanche z ex plained in his testimony that in assigningrating s, he exercise d permissible discre tion in calculatingan off ice avera g e and the n ratingemploy ees ba sed on whe re they fell within that aver ag e ra ng e. Acc ordingto Mr. Kelly , the sig nificanc e of ha ndwritten notes is that they can be 16 easily disreg arde d and destroyed, whe rea s email messag es build a per manent re cord of

inquiries 10 2003, claimingthat sever al other e mploy ees r ece ived “Minimally Successf ul” ratings a

nd wer e not placed on a

PI P. See PX 22. These e valuations also show that Mr. Sanc hez, as the rating 14 officia l, rated the se employ ees at a hig her le vel than the r eleva nt guide lines instructed. Mr. 15 Kelly claims that Mr. Sanche z’s failure to exerc ise his discretion to adjust Mr. Kelly ’s rating in a simil ar w ay

constitutes retaliation. Aside fr om the perf

ormanc e eva luations for F Y 2002 and mid-year 2003, Mr. Kelly relied on se vera l pieces of anec dotal evidenc e to establish his claim that Mr. Sanche z treated him differ ently

from Mr. Rivera . First, he te stified — and no one disputed this, including Mr. Sanche z — that Mr. Sanchez sometimes spoke to Mr. Rivera in Spanish, g ree ting him by
saying , “ B ue no s d ia s, mi h ijo ,” wh ic h tr ans late s to “ Go od mor nin g , my so n. ” He a lso c a lle d h im “amig o.” F urthermor e, it is undisputed that when Mr. Sanche z had conce rns about a c ase or had
rec eived a

n inquiry from an a

pplicant, he would f

ollow-up with the BO S assigne d to the case
. On occ asion, Mr. Sanche z left handwritten notes for Mr. Rivera c oncer

ning his c ases, se e PX 6, while Mr. Ke lly

claims that he re ceive d only email messag es fr om Mr. Sanchez. Be cause Mr. 16and

c omp la int s, wh ic h c an la te r b e us e d to jus tif

y a dv e rs e e mpl oy

me nt a c tio ns . M r. Ke lly

c ou ld not say for c erta in whether

Mr. Rivera a lso rece ived emails fr om Mr. Sanchez, in addition to the handwr itten notes. 11 Sanchez did not specifica lly addre ss whether

he lef t handwritten notes f

or anyone other

than Mr. Rivera, the Court c redits the testimony of Mr. Ke lly
. Alongthese same lines, Mr. Kelly testified that Mr. Sanche z invi ted Mr. Rivera int o h is o ff

ic e on se ve ra l oc c a sio ns but di d n ot e xten d th e same inv itatio n to Mr . K e lly . B e c a us e Mr. Sanche z did not specific ally addre ss this allegation, the Court ag ain ac cepts Mr. K elly ’s testimony . Mr. Kelly

further testified that Mr. Sanche z occasionally “stopped the c lock” on the SDB tra ckingsy stem for Mr. River a so that the pa ssing time wa s not counted ag ainst the 75-day de a dli ne but di d n ot d o th e same fo r h im. Mr . Sa nc he z did no t a dd re ss t he a lle g atio n in

his testimony . Other tha

n his testimony , Mr. Kelly did not present any

evidenc e that this occur

red; he of fe re d n o d oc ume ntatio n, re c or ds or te sti mony

fr om o the r e mpl oye e s to su bs tanti ate his
c la im that Mr . Sa

nc he z se le c tiv e ly

sto pp e d th e c loc k. I t se e ms l ike ly to t he Court that if thi s alleg ation wer e true , other e vidence that it occurr ed would be a vailable. The ref

ore, e ven without a stateme nt from Mr. Sanche z contradictingthe alleg ation, the Court reje cts it beca use of the la ck of suffic ient evidenc e in the re cord.

Finally , Mr. Kelly

testified that he ove rhea

rd Mr. Sanc hez tell a contra ct worke r staffingthe help desk that if there w as a c all from an a pplicant for Mr . Kelly , Mr. Sanche z wanted to know a

bout it. Mr. Kelly

was una war e of Mr . Sanchez askingfor this information about Mr. Rivera . Mr. Sanche z did not addre ss this allegation in his testimony , so the Court
acc epts Mr. Ke lly ’s alleg ation. Be cause Mr. Sanche z ex plained that he ha d substantial conce rns about Mr. Ke lly ’s job perf ormanc e af

ter the r eorg anization in 2001, however, the Court draws a n12

infere nce that Mr. Sanchez aske d for this information about Mr. K elly in order to ove rsee and better e valuate his wor

k. E. Mr. Kelly’s Union Grie vance s As a res ul t o f t he FY 2 00 2 ev alu ati on s, Mr. Kel ly , al on g wit h fi ve o th er S BA employ ees, f

iled a cla ss action union g rieva nce a g ainst Mr. Sanche z on November 13, 2002. See PX 27B. All six employ ees who filed the g rieva nce w orked a s BOSs and w ere Afric anAmeric an. Mr. Ke lly

testified that he se rved a s the class a g ent for this g rieva nce but that the actua l gr ievanc e for

m was sig ned by

another person, Jennifer Weston. I d. The g rieva nce claimed that “ [n] o interim ratingwas provide d as re quired by [t he union contra ct]; nor were critica l elements in place as wa s stated in a mee ting be tween [sever al employ ees a nd Mr. Sanchez] in t he union offic e on May 15, 2002.” I d. Th e g ri e va nc e a lso a lle g e d th at Mr . K ingdid not provide an inter im rating for e ach SDB employ ee that he supervise d befor e leaving the office
. I d. Despite unsubstantiated c laims from Mr. Ke lly that Mr. Sanche z knew of the g rieva nce a nd his role in filing it, it remains unc lear from the testimony

when, if e ver, Mr . Sanchez lear ned that thi s c omp la int

ha d b e e n ma de a g a ins t hi m. The Perf ormanc e Mana g ement Appr aisal Sy stem standards ( “PMAS standards”) fo r t he SDB of

fi c e , whic h w e re us e d to e va luate e mpl oye e job pe rf or manc e , c ha

ng e d in Dec ember

2002. Mr. Sanche z met with M r. Ke lly on Dec ember

12, 2002, to expl ain the new perf ormanc e standa

rds to him. See DX 2. Mr. Ke lly ref used to sign the paper

acknow ledg ing th at n e ws ta

n d ar d s w e r e in

e f f e c t a n d th at h e w o u ld

b e e v a lu ate d

b y th e m d ur in gh is n e xt perf ormanc e re view. I d. On Dec ember 18, 2002, Mr. Kelly , alongwith seven other BO Ss, sent13

Mr. Sanche z a memo objectingto the proposed c hang es bec ause e mploy ee input had not be en solicited and askingfor a

meetingwith him. S ee PX 11 at 10-15. B eca use Mr. Sanc hez did not respond to this memo, the employ ees se nt a similar memo via email to Hec tor Ba rre to, then the
a dmi nis tr ator

of the SB A, and

oth e r m ana g e rs , in c lud ingMr . Sa nc he z, o n Jun e 10 , 2 00 3. Se e PX 10. F. Mr. Kelly’s Pe rformance I mprove ment Plan Mr. Sanche z testi fied that followingthe re org anization in 2001, he observed tr ou bli ngc ha ng e s in Mr . K e lly ’s job pe rf

or manc e . H e te sti fi e d th at a lth ou g h th e wo rk loa d f or a ll B OSs ha d in c re a se d s ub sta nti a lly , M r. Ke lly

str ug g le d mo re tha

n a nyon e e lse to r e sp on d to applicants in a timely

fashion and to sc ree n and proc ess applications withi n the dea dlines. Mr. Sanc he z te sti fi e d th at Mr . K e lly ’s pe rf or manc e ratin gof

a “ 2” fo r F Y 2 00 2 r e fl e c ts the se
conce rns. See PX 7.

Fr om Dece mber 2002 to June 2003, Mr. Sanchez testified that his conce rns about Mr. Kelly had g rown so seve re that he spoke to re prese ntatives from the SB A Off ice of Human Resource s for guidance . At this ti me, he pr ovided examples to Human Resource s of Mr. Ke lly ’s lateness in re viewingcase s and re sponding to c ustomers. See DX 3B . Human Resourc es
a dv ise d M r. Sanc he z to p la c e Mr . K e lly on a Pe rf or manc e I mpr ov e me nt P lan ( “ PI P” ). Da vid Kingand Eug ene Corne lius, who were familiar with Mr. Ke lly ’s work dur ing this time, testified that they share d Mr. Sanche z’s concer ns about Mr. Ke lly ’s poor job per formanc e and suppor ted the de c isi on

to i mpl e me nt t

he PI P.In h e r c los ingargume nt, c ouns e l f or Mr . K e lly

su g g e ste d th at th e fa c t th at he did 17 n o tl e ar na b o u tth e P IP un t i l J un e 2 6 , 2 0 0 3 , d e m o n s tr at e s th atM r . S an c h e z b a c k d at e d th e P IP le tte r a ft e r l e arn ingof

Mr . K e lly ’s c on ta c t w ithan E EO Couns e lor on June 5, 20 03 . B e c a

us e the re is a bs olute ly no e vid e nc e in t

he re c or d to su

pp or t th is a lle g atio n, ho we ve r, the Court re je c ts it. 14

On J une 11, 2003, Mr. Ke lly met with Mr. Sanchez for his mid-y ear perf ormanc e
re vie w. Mr . K e lly

te sti fi e d th at he and

Mr . Sa nc he z pr ima

ri ly dis c us se d M r. Ke lly ’s ob je c tio n to the new PMAS standar ds and his belief that chang ing the m without input from the e mploy ees violated the union contra ct. Mr. Sanche z testi fied that they discussed Mr. Ke lly ’s deter iorating perf ormanc e, the de cision to place Mr . Kelly on the PI P, and the re asons for implementingthe PI P. Mr. Kelly

ref used to sign the perf

ormanc e eva luation discussed at the mee ting, instea d writing in the space for his sig nature : “bec ause of the supervisor’ s ref

usal to addre ss the attache d (D e c . 1 8, 20 02 ) P MA S c on c e rn s, it i s in my be st i nte re st n ot t o s ig n th is PM AS h and e d to me today with the supervisor statingour mee ting today is for your mid-y ear

revie w.” See PX 11 at 1. Mr. Sanche z wrote on the eva luation: “Staff member put on PI P 11 J un 2003.” I d. Mr. Kelly claims that there was no discussion of the PI P at the J une 11 mee ting and that he f

irst learne d of the PI P 15 day s after this meeting, on June 26, 2003, when he discovere d a copy

of the pe rfor

mance evaluation on his desk. He testified that the perf ormanc e 17
e va luatio n o n h is d e sk

dif fe re d f ro m th e on e he re me mbe re d f ro m hi s me e tin g , h ow e ve r, be c a us e it contained Mr. Sanc hez’s notation about the PI P. On J une 26, 2003, Mr. Ke lly filed anothe r
un i o ng r i e v an c e a g a i n s tM r . S an c h e z , c l a i m i n gth ath e “ w a s n e v e r s e r v e d w i tha c o p y o f w h y” the PI P had been imposed. See PX 2 7C.

On J uly 3, 2003, afte r Mr. Sanc hez informed the Of fice of Human Resour ces that Mr. Kelly claimed he had not re ceive d the PI P during the ir meeting , Human Resourc es fax ed Mr.Acc ordingto the PI P letter, one a pplicant wrote an ema il to Mr. Sanchez 18 indicatingthat he had le ft 14 messag es for Mr. Kelly

that had neve r bee n returne d. Another applicant sa id he had c ontacted Mr . Kelly approximately

two dozen times with no response. See PX 13 at 2. 15 Kelly a copy of the PI P, stamped and date d J une 11, 2003. See PX 13. The letter e x plained the
rea sons for Mr. Ke lly ’s PI P placement a nd identified ar eas in whic h Mr. Kelly neede d to improve his job performa

nce in or der to avoid “re assig nment, reduc tion in gra de or r emoval fr om the Fe dera l Service.” I d. at 5.

The letter set forth in deta il the rea sons for the PI P placement. Spec ifically , Mr. Kelly was be ing pla ced on a

PI P because his avera g e scr eeningtime of 72 day s was 63% be low the natio na l ave ra g e of

44 da y s. Se e PX 1 3. Th e le tte r a lso no te d th at Mr . K e lly ha d f a ile d to proce ss 41 case s within the applicable time fr ame a nd summarized complaints from sever al clients that Mr. Ke lly

had not re sponded to repe ated inquiries into the status of their a pplications. I d. 18 Acc ordingto the letter, the te rms of the PI P can be summar ized as follows: (1) the PI P would last for 120 day s and the pe rfor mance require ments had bee n prorated to ref lect the fac t that its duration was less than a f ull y ear ; (2) duringthat time period, there could be no more than two instance s when Mr. K elly ’s work r equire d supervisory intervention for

incomplete or inacc urate information, fa ilure to update a nd maintain acc urate information in the SDB database , or fa ilure to m e e t r e g ulator

y de a dli ne s o r t

ho se imp os e d b y

su pe rv iso rs ; ( 3) wi th r e sp e c t to
scre eningof applications, Mr. Kelly could have no more than two instanc es whe n he did not
c omm un ic ate to a

c lie nt t he status of

a c a se and su pe rv iso ry int e rv e nti on

wa s r e qu ir e d o r f

a ile d to revie w and f

orwa rd applications withi n the re g ulatory time frame without adequate justification;Ms. Clock’s summary indicated that the c lass specific ally alleg ed that they

wer e 19 “tre ated diff

ere ntly than a Hispa

nic employ ee in the of

fice .” See PX 9. 16 (4) with re spect to proc essingapplications, Mr. Ke lly could have no more than two instanc es when a pplications were proce ssed outside the time fra me or super

visory intervention wa s require d to take over

the ana ly sis; and (5) Mr. Ke lly must complete 80 to 84% of a ssigne d case s within 45 calenda

r day s and no ca se could be completed more than 50 day s after assig nment. See PX 1 3. Th e le tte r a lso ind ic ate d th at Mr . Sa nc he z wo uld

me e t w ithMr . K e lly

bi- we e kly duringthe PI P period to discuss his progr ess. I d. at 4. Althoug h the PI P went into effe ct on J une 11, 2003, the first such mee ting did not occ ur until Aug ust 6, 2003.
G. Mr . Ke lly ’s EE O A c tiv ity Prior to his meeting w ith Mr. Sanchez on J une 11, 2003, Mr. Ke lly contac ted EEO Counselor Wanda Clock on J une 5, 2003. He testified that he did so as the spoke sperson for a class of A frica

n-Amer ican B OSs. Mr. Kelly also testified that whe n he later met with Ms. Cl ock h e t o l d h e r th ath e p l an n e d

t o f i l e ani n d i v i d

u a l E E O c o mp l a i n ta g a i n s tM r . S an c h e z f o r h i s P IP place ment, which he be lieved to be in re taliation for his union g rieva nces. A fter a

n initial interview w ith Mr. Kelly

on J une 26, 2003, Ms. Clock wrote a n EEO Counselor’s Repor t summarizing the deta ils of Mr. Kelly ’s individual complaint and of the c lass complaint, which inc lud e d a lle g atio ns of

ra c ia l di sc ri min atio n a

nd re ta liatio n f

or fi lin ga un ion g ri e va nc e . Se e PX 9. Mr . Sa

nc he z an d Jose ph ine Sta lli ng s w e re name d a s th e “ pr inc ipa l r e sp on din gof fi c ia ls” in 19 the c omp la int . M s. Clo c k me t w iththe m on Au g us t 13 , 2 00 3, to d isc us s th e a lle g atio ns . The EEO class complaint wa s officia lly filed on Oc tober 7, 2003. See PX 29. Mr. Kelly ’s individual EEO complaint was of ficially filed on Oc tober 8, 2003. See PX 30. Mr.17

Kelly amende d his complaint on October 16, 2003, to include a re taliation claim alleg ing that Mr. Sanche z sent him a letter of re primand while he was a way from wor k on medical lea

ve. I d. Mr. Sanche z testi fied that whe n he met with Mr. Ke lly on J une 11, 2003, he w as
un awa re of the fa c t th at Mr . K e lly

ha d c on ta c te d a

n E EO Couns e lor

on June 5, 20 03 . H e a lso
sa id t hat w hil e he c ann ot s pe c if ic a lly re c a ll whe n h e le arn e d o f t he EE O c omp la int

fi le d a g a ins t him , it wa s afte r he plac ed Mr. Ke lly on a PI P on J une 11, 2003. The Court acc epts the testimony of Mr. Sanc hez that he did not learn of Mr. Kelly ’s EEO a ctivity until after June 11, 2003, the date that Mr. Sanchez testified that he implemente d the PI P, and in fac t may not have lear ned about it until justbefor e he me t with Ms. C lock on August 13, 2003.
H. Me eting on August 6, 2003, Between M r. Sanchez, M

r. Kelly, and Ms. Johnson Mr . Sa nc he z sc he du le d th e fi rs t PI P me e tin gon Au g us t 6, 20 03 . M r. Ke lly invited his union st ewa

rd, Ve ronica

J ohnson, to attend the mee ting with him. When Ms. J ohnson informed Mr. Sanc hez of her pla nned attenda

nce in a n email, Mr. Sanche z advised her that the union contrac t did not entitl e Mr. Ke lly to a union repr esentative at meeting s conce rning employ ee pe rfor

mance . See PX 14. Be cause Ms. J ohnson disag ree d with this i nterpre tation of the c on tr a c t, s he inf

or me d M r. Sanc he z that sh e sti ll w ou ld atte nd . I d. Whe n M r. Ke lly and Ms. J ohnson arr ived at Mr. Sanc hez’s office on August 6, 2003, Mr. Sanchez shouted at her to leave, shouted at Mr. Ke lly , and dema nded that he sit down. Ac cordingto Ms. J ohnson, Mr. Sanche z

“ we nt b a lli sti c .” Th is b e havio r c a us e d M r. Ke lly

to h ave a phy sic a l r e a c tio n d

ur ingwh ic h h e fe lt stomach and he ad pains a nd his breathingbeca

me difficult, makinghim fear ful he wa s havingaMr. Sanche z testi fied that he only raised his voice at the mee ting. The Court finds 20 the diffe renc e betwe en the two c hara cter izations of his behavior irrele vant bec ause it cr edits Mr. Kelly ’s testimony

about the phy sical and e motional reac tion he had that day
. 18 hear t attack. Mr. K elly

was take n to a hospital immediately afte r this incident and he w as rele ased later that e vening . See PX 26. 20

I. Mr. Kelly’

s Medical Leav e, August 6, 2003 through Novembe r 4, 2003 Mr . K e lly wa s o n me dic a l le ave fr om t he SB A f ro m Augus t 6, 20 03 , unti l November

4, 2003. Duringthis ti me, he wa s under medic al ca re. See PX 26. DuringMr. Kelly ’s leave , Mr. Sanche z sent a letter to his home inquiring a bout the location of 32 c ases that ha d b e e n p re vio us ly

a ssi g ne d to Mr . K e lly . M r. Ke lly te sti fi e d th at he did

no t r e sp on d b e c a

us e he had be en advise d by

a doctor to avoid stressful situations. Mr. Sanchez later se nt a letter of repr imand to Mr. Kelly

for f ailing to r espond. Mr . K e lly re tur ne d to wo rk

at th e SB A o n N ov e mbe r 4 , 2 00 3, and le arn e d th at hi s PI P had been e x tended until Fe bruar y 5, 2004. Duringthis ti me per iod, none of his supervisors informed him that he wa s failingthe PI P. Mr. Sanchez testified that he e valuated Mr . Kelly ’s perf ormanc e at the e nd of the e x tended PI P period and de termined that ther e had be en no imp ro ve me nt. Mr . Sa

nc he z te sti fi e d th at he c on fe rr e d w iththe Of fi c e of Human Re so ur c e s in Fe bruar y 2004 and discussed his proposa l to terminate Mr. Ke lly ’s employ ment. Mr. Kelly also testified that af

ter he returne d from medica l leave, he was preve nted from pa

rticipatingin an elec tive trainingopportunity for B OSs. Mr. Cornelius, who org anized the training , said that althoug h Mr. Kelly never signe d up for the tr ainingin advanc e (as wa s require d) and ha d not reser ved a spa ce in the va

n driving to the training , he off ere d Mr.19

Kelly the option of drivinghis own car and beingreimburse d for g as. Mr. Ke lly did not acce pt this offer a

nd did not attend the training . The Court ac cepts Mr. Corne lius’ testimony and finds th atM r . K e l l y w a s n o tp r e v e n t e d f r o mat t e n d i n gth e tr a i n i n go p p o rtun i ty. J. Mr. Kelly’

s Termination On May 12, 2004, Mr. Sanche z gave Mr. Kelly a letter proposinghis removal f r o mth e f e d e r a l s e r v i c e . S e e P X 2 0
. T h e l e t t e r e x p l a i n e d

th atM r . K e l l y

f a i l e d t o s at i s f y th e P IP require ments. Specifica lly , Mr. Kelly had bee n assig ned eight case s for proc essingduringthe PI P period but had complete d the proc essingof only one ca se. I d. He ha d also failed to sc ree n at le a st t e n c a se s w ith in t

he re qu ir e d 1 5- da

y de a dli ne . I d. Th e le tte r a lso summa ri zed c omp la int s fr om s e ve n c us tom e rs , c on c e rn ingMr . K e lly ’s fa ilure to r e sp on d to the ir inq uir ie s in a tim e ly fashion. I d. Mr. Kelly

appea led this decision to Mr. King , who was the decidingofficia l in the action. Mr. Kinghad re turned to the SDB office in October 2002 for a

second de tail. Mr. King testified that af

ter c are fully

consideringthe appe al, which mostly consisted of proc edura l challeng es to the termination, he suppor ted the dec ision to t erminate Mr. Kelly ’s employ ment. Mr. Kingcomposed a

nother letter

to Mr. Kelly

explaining his decision to uphold the termination, which identified Mr . Kelly ’s poor job per formanc e in terms of sc ree ning a nd proce ssing applications within the regulations as the re ason for his termination. See DX 6. That letter wa s sent to Mr. Kelly

on J une 1, 2004.20 I I . CONCLUSI ONS OF LAW A. Plain tif

f’ s D isc rim ina tio n Claim Title VI Iprovides, in per

tinent part, that “[a]ll personnel ac tions affe cting employ ees or

applicants for

employ ment . . . in executive ag encie s . . . shall be made f ree from any discrimination based on ra ce, c olor, relig ion, sex , or national orig in.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16. I t is unlawful for a

n employ er “ to fail or re fuse to hire or to dischar g e any individual, or oth e rw ise dis c ri min ate a g a ins t any ind ivi du a l w ithre sp e c t to his c omp e ns atio n, te rm s,
c o n d it io n s , o r

p r iv il e g e s o f

e mp lo y me n t, b e c a

u s e o f s u c hin d iv id

u a l’ s r a c e , c o lo r , r e li g io n , s e x, or national orig in.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a )(1) . Title VI Ialso makes it unlawf ul for an e mploy er to retaliate ag ainst an employ ee f or eng ag ing in pr otected a ctivity such as f iling a c harg e of discrimination. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a ); see a lso Holcomb v. Powell, 433 F.3d 889, 901 (D.C. Cir. 2006).

Absent direc t evidence that an employ ment-re lated dec ision was discriminatory or
re ta liator y , th e c la ims mus t be ana ly zed un de r t he burd e n- sh if

tin gfr ame wo rk

of Mc Do nn e ll Do ug la s Co rp . v . G re e n, 41 1 U .S. 79 2 ( 19 73 ). Se e Jone s v . B e rn ank e , 5 57 F .3 d 6 70 , 6 78 (D .C. Cir. 2009); Moncada

v. Peters, 579 F . Supp. 2d 46, 53 (D.D.C. 2008) (c iting B arne tte v. Chertoff, 453 F .3d 513, 515 (D.C. Cir. 2006)). Tr aditionally , within that framew ork, a pla intiff must first establish a pr im a fa c iecase of discrimination or re taliation. See Mo nc a da v. Pe te rs , 579 F. Supp. 2d at 53 (c iting Te neyck v. Omni Shoreham Hotel, 365 F.3d 1139, 1149 ( D.C. Cir. 2004)). “ Doingso cre ates a rebuttable presumption of discrimination [or retaliation] and ‘t ri g g e rs the e mpl oye r’ s b ur de n to pr od uc e a dmi ssi ble e vid e nc e that, i f b e lie ve d, wo uld e sta bli sh th atth e e mp l o ye r ’ s a c t i o nw a s m o t i v at e d b y a l e g i t i m at e , n o n d i s c r i m i n at o r y [ o r n o n r e t a l i at o r

y]21

re a so n. ’” Mo nc a da

v. Pe te rs , 5 79 F . Su

pp . 2 d at 53 (q

uo tin gTe ne y c k v . O mni Sho re ham H ote l, 365 F.3d at 1151).

Re c e ntl y , th e Un ite d St ate s Co ur t of Ap pe a ls f

or the Di str ic t of

Col umb ia

Cir c uit
ma de c le ar t

hat th e qu e sti on

wh e the r t he pla int if

f i n a dis pa ra te tr e atme nt d isc ri min atio n s uit actua lly made out a pr ima fac ie ca se “is almost alwa y s irrele vant” on a

n employ er’ s motion for summary judgme nt or judg ment as a matter of law or, in a c ase like this one, at the trial stag e. See B ra dy v. Of fi c e of the Se rg e ant at A rm s, 52 0 F .3 d 4 90 , 4 92 , 4 94 (D .C. Cir . 2 00 8) (c iti ngSt. Mary ’s Honor Socie ty

v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 514-15 (1993) ; U.S. Pos tal Service Boa rd of Go ve rn or s v . A ike ns , 4 60 U. S. 7 11 , 7 16 (1 98 3) ). On c e the e mpl oye r h a s su bmi tte d a dmi ssi ble evidenc e of a

leg itimate, non-discriminatory rea son, the only

question is whether “ the employ ee produce d sufficie nt evidence for a rea sonable jury

to find that the employ er’ s asserte d nondiscriminatory

rea son was not the ac tual rea son and that the e mploy er intentionally discriminated ag ainst the employ ee on the basis of ra ce, c olor, relig ion, sex , or national orig in[ .]” I d. at 494. Neve rtheless, in dete rmining whether a plaintiff ha s shown that defe ndant’s prof fer ed re ason for its a dv e rs e a c tio n a g a ins t th e e mpl oye e is p re te xtua l, t he str e ng th o f p la int if

f’ s p ri ma fa c ie c a se
rema ins a rele vant consider ation. See Jones v. Ber nanke, 557 F .3d at 679 (“ [T] he cour t review s
e a c h o f t he thr e e re le va

nt c ate g or ie s o f e vid e nc e — p ri ma fa c ie , p re te xt, and

any oth e r — to deter mine whether

they ‘either separ ately

or in combination’ provide sufficie nt evidence for a
rea sonable jury

to infer [discrimination or] retaliation.”) (c iting Waterhouse v. District of Columbi a, 298 F .3d 989, 996 (D.C. Cir. 2002). With t his frame work in mind, the Court will now turn to plaintiff’s cla ims of discrimination.22 1. Asserte d Adver se Ac tions “While Bra dy

direc ts the . . . focus to the e mploy er’ s proffe red non- discriminatory
re a so n, ” at tr ia l th e fa c tf

ind e r “ sti ll f

ir st mus t de te rm ine wh e the r p la int if f h a s su ff e re d a n a dv e rs e employ ment action.” A desalu v. Copps, 606 F. Supp. 2d 97, 103 (D.D .C. 2007) (citingBr ady v. Of fi c e of the Se rg e ant at A rm s, 52 0 F .3 d at 49 4) . “ An ‘a dv e rs e e mpl oy

me nt a c tio n’ [und e r T itl e VI I ] i s ‘a sig nificant c hang e in employ ment status, such as hiring , firing , failingto promote,
re as s i gn m en twi ths i gn i fi ca n t l y d i ff er en tre s p o n s i b i l i t i es , o r ad ec i s i o ncau s i n g s i gn i fi ca n tch an ge in b e ne fi ts. ’” Do ug la s v . D on ov an, 55 9 F .3 d 5 49 , 5 52 (D .C. Cir . 2 00 9) (c iti ngTa ylor v. Sma ll, 350 F.3d 1286, 1293 ( D.C. Cir. 2003)). To show that he suffe red f rom an a dverse employ

ment action, “[a]n employ ee must [have] ‘experience [d] materia lly adver se conse quence s aff ectingthe te rm s, c on dit ion s, or

pr ivi le g e s o f e mpl oy

me nt o r f utu re e mpl oy me nt o pp or

tun iti e s su c h th at a
re a so na ble tr ie r o f f

a c t c ou ld f

ind ob je c tiv e ly tang ibl e ha

rm .’ ” I d. (q

uo tin gF or

kk io v . Po we ll, 306 F.3d 1127, 1131 ( D.C. Cir. 2006)). “[N]ot every thing that make s an employ ee unha ppy is an actionable adver se ac tion.” Russell v. P rincipi, 257 F.3d 815, 818 ( D.C. Cir. 2001).

Pla int if f a rgue s th at th e fo llo wi nge ve nts c on sti tut e a dv e rs e e mpl oy me nt a c tio ns : (1) Mr. Sanc hez spoke Spanish to Mr. Rivera and not to Mr. Ke lly ; (2) Mr. Sanc hez left ha nd wr itt e n n ote s f

or Mr . Ri ve ra

and no t f or Mr . K e lly ; ( 3) Mr . Sa

nc he z inv ite d M r. Riv e ra

int o his office and not Mr. Ke lly ; (4) Mr. Sanc hez ga ve Mr. Ke lly

a lower perf ormanc e rating than he g ave Mr . Rivera f

or F Y 2002, eve n though Mr . Kelly scre ened 48 mor e ca ses than Mr. Rivera did; (5) Mr. Sanche z placed Mr. Ke lly on a PI P on J une 11, 2003; and ( 6) Mr. Ke lly was terminated f

rom his employ

ment at the SBAin May

2004.23 As to plaintiff’s ar g uments that Mr. Sanche z spoke Spanish to M r. Rivera , invited him to his office , and lef

t him handwritten notes, the Court conc ludes that these e vents are not
a dv e rs e e mpl oy

me nt a c tio ns be c a

us e the re wa s n o “ signif

ic ant c ha ng e in e mpl oy

me nt s tatus , such as hiring , firing , failingto promote, rea ssignment with sig nificantly differ ent responsibilities,” nor did they cause a “sig nificant c hang e in bene fits.” Doug las v. Donovan, 559 F.3d at 552. Plainti ff may have pr efe rre d a super

visor with a more a ffe ctionate or inclusive manag ement style, but he has not provide d the Court with an explanation of how any or all of these e vents constituted a “sig nificant c hang e in employ ment status” or ha d “any

eff ect on [the] salary , benef

its, or gr ade” of his employ ment responsibilities or future e mploy ment opportunities. Bla ckmon-Malloy

v. United States Capital Police Bd., 338 F . Supp. 2d 97, 106 (D.D.C. 2004). As the Supreme Court ha s reminded, Title VI I“does not set f orth ‘a g ener al civility

code f or the Americ an wor

kplace .’” B urling ton N. & Santa Fe Ry . Co. v. W hite, 548 U.S. 53, 68 (2006) (quoting Onca le v. Sundowner O ffshore Service s, Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 79 (1998). E ven an employ ee who repor

ts discriminatory

behavior is not im muniz ed “f

rom those petty

slights or minor annoy ance s that often take place at work a nd that all employ ees e x perie nce.” I d. at 68. With out mo re of

a sh ow ingfr om p la int if

f, the Court

c on c lud e s th at th e se e ve nts do no t c on sti tut e
a dv e rs e e mpl oy

me nt a c tio ns fo r p ur

po se s o f h is d isc ri min atio n c la im. Thoug h more ser ious, Mr. Kelly ’s complaint that his FY 2002 pe rfor mance evaluation constitut ed an a dverse employ ment action also fa ils. P oor per formanc e eva luations by themselves, thoug h undesirable , are not adver se employ ment actions unless they

“af fec t [ ] t he [em plo y e e ’s ] g ra de or

sa lary .” B ro wn

v. B ro dy , 1 99 F .3 d 4 46 , 4 57 -5 8 ( D. C. C ir . 1 99 9) ; se e a lso Doug las v. Donovan, 559 F .3d at 552; Taylor v. Small, 350 F.3d at 1293. While a neg ativeI f any thing, the e valuations support the SBA’ s perf ormanc e-ba sed re ason for 21 placingplaintiff on a PI P and ultimately terminatinghis employ

ment beca

use they reve al that Mr. Kelly worke d too slowly
. 24 evaluation sometim es “ma y drastica lly

limit an employ ee’ s chanc es for advanc ement,” in other
case s it may

be of no r eal c onsequenc e. Russell v. Principi, 257 F.3d at 819. Without a showing that th e e va luatio n h a d a

n e ff e c t on the “ te rm s, c on dit ion s o r p ri vil e g e s” of his e mpl oy

me nt, plaintiff’s neg ative per formanc e eva luation does not amount to an adve rse e mploy ment action. Doug las v. Donovan, 559 F .3d at 552. Moreove r, the fa ct that Mr. Rivera rec eived a

highe r ratingthan plaintiff for

FY 2002, e ven thoug h he scr eene d few er c ases than pla intiff did, does not transfor m the evaluation its elf into an a dverse employ ment action. While it is true that plaintiff
scre ened 28 mor e ca ses than Mr. Rivera did, it took M r. Ke lly

40 day s to do so, where as it took Mr. Rivera a

n aver ag e of only

4 day s. See PX 8. Sim ilarly , plaintiff proc essed only 66 case s duringthe re view per iod, where as Mr. Rivera proce ssed 85 ca ses. I d. On the evide nce pr e se nte d, the Court

c on c lud e s th at th e dif

fe re nc e in p e rf

or manc e e va luatio ns be tw e e n M r. Ke lly and Mr. Rivera

does not amount to an adve rse e mploy ment action. 21 Nor doe s placingplaintiff on a PI P constitut e an a dverse employ ment action. The PI P placement itself ha d no eff ect on the te rms or conditions of Mr. Ke lly ’s employ ment and thus was not “materially

adver se” be cause it did not cause a “ signific ant cha ng e in employ

ment status.” D o u g l a s v . D o n o v an , 5 5 9 F
. 3 d at5 5 2 ; s e e a l s o T ayl o r

v . S m a l l , 3 5 0 F
. 3 d

at1 2 9 3 ( P IP
no t an a dv e rs e e mpl oy

me nt a c tio n whe n p la int if f “ did no t pr e se nt a

ny e vid e nc e [that th e PI P]
a ff e c te d h e r gra de or

sa lary” ); Na ’i m v. Clinton , 6 26 F . Su pp . 2 d 6 3, 78 (D .D .C. 20 09 ) ( atte mpt s to p la c e pla int if

f o n PI P are no t mate ri a lly a dv e rs e a c tio ns fo r p ur

po se s o f r e ta liatio n c la im25

beca use “no e vidence that they had any impact on plaintiff’s e mploy ment”). While it is true that Mr. Kelly ’s fa ilure to fulfill the requir ements of the PI P eventually led to his termination, he has
ma de no argume nt t

hat th e PI P pl a c e me nt i tse lf c a us e d h im t o s uf

fe r a ny signif ic ant c ha ng e in h is employ ment status. Doug las v. Donovan, 559 F .3d at 552. Termination fr om employ ment is undisputably

an adve rse e mploy

ment action. The Court there fore turns next t o defe ndant’s asse rted, non-disc riminatory rea sons for t e r m i n at i n gM r . K e l l y.

2. Asserte d Non-Discr iminatory Reasons for

Termination The SBAprese nted cr edible and pe rsuasive e vidence showing that plaintiff was place d on a PI P and ultimately terminated be cause of his unacc eptable job pe rfor mance . To beg in with, defenda

nt presente d evidenc e that Mr. Sanc hez hired Mr. Ke lly and numer ous other Afric an-A merica

n employ ees to wor

k at the SBA . At the beg inning of Mr. Kelly ’s tenure in the SDB of fi c e , M r. Sanc he z g ave him tw o p os iti ve pe rf

or manc e e va luatio ns and

re c omm e nd e d h is pr omo tio n to GS- 12 status . Se e PX 2 ; PX3. Al tho ug h f ar f ro m de te rm inativ e , c ourt s in thi s dis tr ic t ha ve ob se rv e d th at an in fe re nc e of no nd isc ri min atio n is a

pp ro pr iate wh e n th e same person who hir ed or pr omoted the employ ee later propose s that an adve rse a ction be take n ag ainst him. S ee Mianulli v. P otter, 634 F . Supp. 2d 90, 97 (D.D.C. 2009); Valles- Halle v. Center f or Nonprof

it Adv., 481 F. Supp. 2d 118, 151 (D.D.C. 2007); Waterhouse v. District of Columbi a, 124 F . Supp. 2d 1, 12-13 (D.D.C. 2000). Althoug h plaintiff has pre sented e vidence that Mr . Sa

nc he z spo ke to M r. Riv e ra in S pa nis h a nd le ft him ha nd wr itt e n n ote s, thi s e vid e nc e is not sufficient to over come this infer ence or to sustain plaintiff’s cla im of intentional26

discrimination. At issue in this case is not whether Mr. Sanc hez should have treated plaintiff
more a ffe ctionately , but rather whether he violated Title VI Iby

placingplaintiff on a PI P and the n te rm inatin ghis e mpl oy me nt. Mr . Sa

nc he z’s be havio r s imp ly

is n ot e no ug h to dis c re dit defe ndant’s per formanc e-ba sed explanation.

The e vidence supports defe ndant’s asse rtion that after the re org anization in 2001, Mr . K e lly wa s una ble to s atis fy

the de mand s o f h is i nc re a se d w or klo a d a nd pe rf or me d th e same job at a le ve l lo we r t

ha n h is c o- wo rk e rs . A s a

n e xamp le of

ho w h is p e rf

or manc e c omp are d to that of other B OSs, plaintiff’s perf ormanc e eva luation for F Y 2002 shows that he wor ked much slower than his c olleagues: his aver ag e time to scre en ca ses was 40 da y s compare d to the office
aver ag e of 13 da

y s. See PX 7. Moreover , many of the c o-worke rs to whom plaintiff was
c omp are d w e re a lso Af

ri c an- Am e ri c an a

nd ha d p art ic ipate d in

pr ote c te d a c tiv ity

a lon gwi th plaintiff; y et they

wer e not place d on a PI P or terminated. As se vera l witnesses testified, the le ng th o f t ime it t oo k f

or a B OS t o s c re e n a

nd pr oc e ss a c a se wa s a

c ri tic a l c on sid e ratio n in
e va luatin ge mpl oye e job pe rf or manc e be c a

us e of the re g ulatio ns re qu ir ingthe SB A t o c omp le te its wo rk wi thi n 7 5 d ay s. Pla int if

f’ s p ro ble ms i n me e tin gtho se de a dli ne s d ir e c tly c on tr ibute d to the SBA’ s substantial backlogand impaire d its abilit y to assist small bus inesses, as e vidence d by
nume ro us c omp la int s r e c e ive d b y c us tom e rs wh o inte ra c te d w iththe pla int if f. Pla int if

f’ s c la im that the ca ses he wa s assig ned involved more complex is sues than those of his c olleagues and there fore took longe r to proce ss is not supported by the evidenc e. His super

visors offe red
cre dible testimony

that the complexity

of his case load was substantially the same a s — and at tim e s e ve n le ss t

ha n — that of oth e r e mpl oye e s. F ur

the rm or e , unli ke that of

so me of his27

c oll e a g ue s, pla int if

f’ s w ri tte n w or

k p ro du c t w a s r e ple te wi th s y ntax an d g ra

mmatic a l e rr or s, further justify ing the “Minimally Successf ul” rating he rec eived in 2002. See PX 7. The testimony

of Mr. Sanc hez, Mr. Cornelius and Mr. Kingalso supports the SBA’s c laim that these per formanc e def iciencie s continued throug hout the next y ear as we ll. The fa ct that Mr. Cornelius and Mr . Kingare both Africa n-Amer ican, a

nd there fore members of the same pr otected c lass as plaintiff, we ighs f urther a g ainst an infer ence of discrimination. See W ash in gton v. Ch ao, 57 7 F. S up p. 2d27 , 4 2 n .8 (D. D.C . 2 00 8); Ham mo ndv. Ch ao, 38 3 F. Sup p. 2d 47 , 5 8 n .1 (D .D .C. 20 05 ). In 2 00 3, Mr . Sa nc he z expr e sse d h is c on c e rn s to repr esentatives of the Of

fice of Human Resour ces, who ag ree d that Mr. Kelly ’s place ment on a PI P was the appr opriate ne x t step. The evide nce show s that plaintiff’s per formanc e still did not imp ro ve duri ngthe PI P pe ri od . E ve n th ou g h h e wa s a ssi g ne d f e we r c a se s th an h is c o- wo rk e rs , Mr. Kelly still had multiple overdue applications and f ailed to complete his wor k within the de a dli ne s. Mr . Sa

nc he z’s re c omm e nd atio n to te rm inate pla int if f’ s e mpl oy

me nt w a s a g a in supported by

Mr. King , Mr. Cornelius, and the O ffice of Human Resour ces. Be cause defe ndant has off ere d a leg itimate, non-discriminatory rea son for the adver se ac tions taken ag ainst plaintiff — namely , poor and de teriorating job per formanc e — the Court will nex t examine plaintiff’s claim that the prof fer ed re ason is prete x tual and should not be be lie ve d. To su

pp or t hi s c la im o f p re te xt, pl a int if f t e sti fi e d a

bo ut s e ve ra l di sc re te e ve nts
conce rningMr. Rivera, a

Hispanic e mploy ee, that he believe s demonstrate r ace -base d discrimination. As discussed supra a t 10-11, to the extent that Mr. Sanchez treate d Mr. Rivera differ ently

by speakingto him in S panish, writinghim notes and inviting him to his office, ther e i s n o e v i d e n c e t o s u g g e s tth atth i s b e h av i o r h a d an yth i n gt o d o w i thM r . K e l l y’ s r a c e . S i m i l ar l y,28

the fa ct that Mr. Rivera

rec eived a

highe r per formanc e rating in 2002 eve n though he proce ssed few er c ases is unper suasive. As the Court pre viously noted, the eva luation also indicated that Mr. Rivera pr ocesse d case s much more quickly and scr eene d more c ases than pla intiff did. See supra at 8-9. In short, the eve nts identified by plaintiff do not amount to “suffic ient evidenc e” that the def

endant’ s rea son for plac ing him on a PI P or terminatinghim — poor job perfor mance — was pre text ual. See B rady v. Offic e of the Serg eant of Arms, 520 F.3d a

t 494. The re cord
s i mp l y d o e s n o ts u

p p o rta f i n d i n gth atd i s c r i m i n at o r

y an i mu s w a s th e r e a s o nf

o r h i s P IP pla c e me nt o r t e rm inatio n. Ac c or din g ly , p la int if f’ s r a c e dis c ri min atio n c la im f a ils
. B. Plaintiff ’s Retaliation Clai ms Plaintiff also claims that he wa s subject to reta liation in viol ation of Title VI Ifor filing individual and c lass action cha rg es of discr imination with t he EEOC a nd for se rvingas the class re prese ntative in connec tion with the class char g es. To esta blish a pr im a fa c iecase of reta liation, the plaintiff must show (1) “that he eng ag ed in a statutorily protec ted ac tivity ; (2) that he suff ere d a mater ially

adver se ac tion by

his employ er; a

nd (3) that a

causa l link connects the two.” Jones v. Ber

nanke, 557 F .3d at 677; see a lso Hussain v. Nicholson, 435 F.3d 359, 366 (D .C. Cir . 2 00 6) ; H olc omb v. Pow e ll, 43 3 F .3 d at 90 1- 02 . A s d e sc ri be d a bo ve , th e same analy tical fra mework se t forth in Br ady for discr imination claims applies to retaliation claims. Taylor v. Solis, 571 F.3d 1313, 1320 n.12 (D.C. Cir. 2009); J ones v. B erna nke, 557 F .3d at 670. B ra dy re qu ir e s th at th e e mpl oye r p ro vid e a le g iti mate , n on -r e ta liator y re a so n f or its a dv e rs e action. See B rady

v. Offic e of Ser g eant of

Arms, 520 F.3d a

t 494. I f the e mploy er doe s so, the only question is retaliation vel non : whether the employ ee ha s produce d sufficie nt evidence for aDespite their c entra lity to plaintiff’s ca se at trial, de fenda nt corre ctly

argues that 22 plaintiff’s numer ous union gr ievanc es do not constitute protec ted ac tivity beca use they do not all ege di scr im in ati on ou tl awedby Ti tl e VI I . S ee R ame y

v. P ot om ac El ect ri c P owe r C o. , 4 68 F. Sup p. 2d 51 , 5 9- 60 (D .D .C. 20 06 ) ( “ [T]he un ion g ri e va nc e fi le d b y

pla int if f i s n ot c ate g or ic a lly protec ted, but may

be conside red pr otected a ctivity if it alleg es discrimination or anothe r pra ctice ma de un lawf

ul u nd e r T itl e VI I .” ); Wel zel v. B e rn ste in, 43 6 F . Su pp . 2 d 1 10 , 1 22 -2 3 ( D. D. C. 2006) (e mploy ee’ s complaints about her supe rvisor’s unprof essional and a

busive behavior do not c on sti tut e pr ote c te d a c tiv ity wi tho ut a

n a lle g atio n th at e mpl oye r v iol ate d T itl e VI I ). Pla int if f s til l eng ag ed in protec ted ac tivity , howeve r, bec ause in a ddition to t hese union g rieva nces, he contac ted an EEO Counselor in J une 2003 and f iled EEO cha

rg es in Octobe r 2003. See supr a at 16; PX 29; P X 30.
29 fac tfinder to find the e mploy er’ s asserte d nonreta liatory rea son was “not the a ctual re ason and that the employ er intentionally [retaliated] ag ainst the employ ee” for e ng ag ing in pr otected activity . Br ady

v. Offic e of Ser g eant of

Arms, 520 F.3d at 494. “The c ourt ca n resolve that qu e sti on in f avo r o f t he e mpl oye r b a se d e ith e r u po n th e e mpl oye e ’s fa ilure to r e but it s
e xplanatio n o r u

po n th e e mpl oye e ’s fa ilure to p ro ve an e le me nt o f [h is] c a se .” Ta ylor v. Sol is, 571 F.3d at 1320 n.12; see also Smith v. Dist rict of Columbia, 430 F.3d at 455. I n this case, plaintiff’s cla ims of retaliation ar e base d on his PI P placement in June 2003 and his termination from the SB A in May

2004. Mr. Kelly ’s contac t with an EEO Counselor in June 2003, see supra at 16, and the filing of individual and class ra ce disc rimination claims are undisputedly protec ted ac tivity . See PX 29; PX 30. Reg ardingthe question whethe r plaintiff suff ere d a mater ially

adver se ac tion, 22 the “ sc op e of

the anti -r e ta liatio n p ro vis ion e xten ds be y on d th e wo rk pla c e -r e late d o r e mpl oy

me ntrelated re taliatory

acts a nd harm.” Bur lington Nor thern & Santa Fe Railway Co. v. W hite, 548 U.S. 53, 67 (2006).Th is gro up of no n- mate ri a lly

a dv e rs e e ve nts inc lud e s Mr . Sa nc he z’s g re e tin g s in 23 Spanish, handwritten notes, invitations to Mr. Rivera to visit his office, and pla intiff’s complaint that he re ceive d an unfa

vorable perf

ormanc e eva luation in FY 2002. See B aloch v. Ke mpthorne, 550 F.3d at 1199 (the followingalleg ations do not amount to retaliation: employ ee’ s sick leave restric tions, proposed suspensions, letters of c ounseling and re primand, unsatisfac tory perf ormanc e re view, and a lleg ed ver bal alter cations with supervisor) . As discussed supra at 23- 24 , p la int if

f h a s n ot e xpla ine d h owthe se e ve nts c a us e d h im any ha

rm , mu c h le ss h owthe y

wo uld have dissuade d a re asonable employ ee f rom makingor supportinga discrimination cha rg e. 30 “Adve rse a ctions” in the re taliation con t ex t encompa ss a broa der sw e e p o f a c tio ns tha

n th os e in a pu re d isc ri min atio n c la im. Du e to d if f e r ence s in the languag e and pur poses behind Title VI I ’s re taliation and dis c ri min atio n p ro vis ion s, the Sup re me Cou rt c larif ie d in Bur lington [N. & Santa

Fe R y Co. v. W hite], 548 U.S . 53, that the re qu ir e me nts are distin c t: Re ta liatio n c la ims are “ no t li mit e d to d is c r im in ato r

y a c ti o n s th at a f

f e c t t h e te r ms an d c o n d it io n s of employ ment” and ma

y extend to harms that are not workplac e-r elated o r e mp loy ment-re lated so longas “a rea sonable e mploy ee w ould have found the c halleng ed ac tion materially adver se.” I d. at 64, 68. B a loc h v . K e mpt

ho rn e , 5 50 F .3 d 1 19 1, 19 98 n. 4 ( D. C. C ir . 2 00 8) . A n a c tio n is a dv e rs e if it likely would have “ dissuaded a r easona ble worke r fr om making or supporting a

char g e of discrimination.” B urling ton N. & Santa Fe Ry . Co. v. W hite, 548 U.S. at 60 (interna l quotations omitted). Al tho ug h ma ny of the e ve nts a

bo ut whic h p la int if

f c omp la ins are on e s th at a
rea sonable e mploy ee w ould not have f ound to be mater ially

adver se, plac ement on a PI P and the termination of employ

ment are actions that a r easona ble per son might we ll consider “ma terial” or “sig nificant” or would dissuade him fr om eng ag ing in f urther pr otected a ctivity . See Rochon v. Gonzalez, 438 F.3d 1211, 1219 (D.C. Cir. 2006). The Court there fore will consider plac ement 23 on the PI P and plaintiff’s ter mination as adver se ac tions for purposes of plaintiff’s re taliation
c la im.31 1. Plaintiff’s PI P as Retaliation Pla int if f’ s c la im that pl a c inghim on the PI P wa s th e re su lt o f r e ta liatio n f a ils beca use def endant ha s shown a leg itimate, non-reta liatory explanation for its impl ementation — that pl a int if

f’ s jo b p e rf

or manc e ha d d e te ri or ate d o ve r t he c ours e of

se ve ra l y e ars and

that it neede d to improve. Plaintiff loses on this claim because he has not shown that de fenda nt’s perf ormanc e-ba sed re ason wa s pretextual. See B rady v. Offic e of Ser g eant of

Arms, 520 F.3d at 494. The ove rwhe lming testimony reve aled that c oncer

ns about plaintiff’s job pe rf or manc e did

no t ari se ov e rn ig ht. Th e le tte r t o p la int if f, date d Jun e 11 , 2 00 3, se t f or th i n detail the re asons that plaintiff wa s place d on the PI P. See PX 13; DX 3; see a lso supra at 15. His perf ormanc e in three out of five c ritical ele ments by which his work wa s evaluated was r ated “unsucc essful.” See DX 3. Multipl e customer s whose applications had been a ssigne d to plaintiff complained that he was unre sponsive to their inquiries and that their a pplications had languished
un de r p la int if

f’ s r e vie w. I d. Th e le tte r a lso e xpla ine d th at pl a int if f f a ile d to sc re e n a

nd pr oc e ss a signific ant number of

applications in a timely

fashion, despite se vera l occa sions where he
re c e ive d s up e rv iso ry

a ssi sta nc e in m ana g inghis wo rk loa d. I d. Mo re ov e r, se ve ra l su pe rv iso rs , who independe ntly

observe d plaintiff’s wor

k over the course of seve ral year s, expressed serious
conce rns with his perfor

mance as ea

rly as his perf

ormanc e eva luation in FY 2001. See PX 5. L ater evaluations as well as ema il messag es fr om customers fur ther support de fenda

nt’s nonreta liatory

explanation for placingplaintiff on the PI P. Plaintiff has failed to pr esent suff icient evidenc e that this non-re taliatory explanation was prete x tual. Plaintiff’s only argument that the PI P was reta liatory is based on theTo summarize the rele vant chr onology , plaintiff contac ted the EEO c ounselor on 24 J une 5, 2003. The PI P letter was dated J une 11, 2003, and Mr . Sanchez met with plaintiff on J une 11, 2003, for

a mid-y ear

evaluation. Mr. Sanchez was intervie wed by an EEO Counselor

on August 13, 2003. As his sole evidence that the PI P placement wa s retaliator y , plaintiff re lies on his own testimony

that Mr. Sanche z did not mention the PI P to him duringtheir June 11, 2003, meeting . Acc ordingto plaintiff, he first lea rned of the PI P when he f

ound a copy

on his desk on J une 26, 2003. 32 alleg ed tempora l prox imity betwee n his protected a ctivity and the PI P. Specifically , plaintiff claims that Mr. Sanche z decided to implement the PI P after le arningof his EEO ac tivity and then backdated the letter

to indicate that Mr. Sanc hez and Mr. Ke lly discussed the PI P at their meeting
on June 11 , 2 00 3. Th e re c or d s imp ly do e s n ot s up po rt

pla int if f’ s c la im f

or tw o r e a so ns : f

ir st, 24 there is absolutely

no evidenc e in the re cord, dire ct or c ircumstantial, to support the asser tion of backdating; all that exists i s plaintiff’s counse l’s unsupported ar g ument (see supra at 14 n. 17);
and se c on d, a s th e Court

ha s f ound a s a fa c t, M r. Sanc he z le arn e d a bo ut t he EE O c on ta c t at so me po int afte r the meetingon J une 11, 2003, whe re he alleg edly implemented the PI P. See supra at 17. Acc ording ly , plaintiff’s cla im that the PI P was the re sult of retaliation fa ils. S ee Smith v. District of Columbia, 430 F.3d at 455.
2. Plaintiff’s Termination as Reta liation At trial, the def

endant of fer ed undisputed, cr edible evide nce that plaintiff’s poor job perfor

mance was the r eason f

or his termination. As discussed supra at 7, plaintiff’s job perf ormanc e beg an to deter iorate a s ear ly as 2001, see PX 5, and g ot worse ove r the months and y ear s leadingup to his placement on the PI P on J une 11, 2003. See PX 7, PX 11. The termination letter g iven to plaintiff on May 12, 2004, near ly

a y ear later, of fer s additional examples of plaintiff’s unac cepta ble job perf

ormanc e, includingmore c omplaints from33

applicants a

nd more tar dy

applications. See DX 4. In plaintiff’s testimony at trial, he f

ailed eve n to addre ss the alleg ed re asons for his ter mination, inst ead e mphasizi nghis own conclusory observations and assessments of Mr. Sanc hez’s behavior
.

The Court is further

persua ded that no pre text exis ts by the fa ct that supervisors other than Mr . Sanchez — spec ifically , Mr. Kingand Mr. Corne lius, who, like plaintiff, also are Af ri c an- Am e ri c an —

and re pr e se ntativ e s f

ro m th e Of

fi c e of Human Re so ur c e s p art ic ipate d in
and a pp ro ve d o f t

he de c isi on

to t e rm inate Mr . K e lly . E ve n if Mr . Sa nc he z ha d f

e lt i nc lin e d to reta liate ag ainst plaintiff afte r lea rningof the discr imination claims filed ag ainst him, he did not wield unbridled a

nd unilatera l power ove r the SBA ’s employ ment decisions. Sever al supervisors more senior

than Mr. Sanche z had personally observe d Mr. Kelly ’s work a nd approve d the termination dec ision. Morever, in ter minating plaintiff’ s employ ment, the SBA f

ollowed detailed pr ocedur es that had be en set for th by the Off ice of Human Resourc es. See D X 7. Plaintiff directly

appea led his termination to Mr. King , and af ter c are fully

revie wingplaintiff’s
mos tly pr oc e dura l c ha lle ng e s — su c h a s h is c la im that he did no t r e c e ive the te rm inatio n unti l
sever al wee ks after

the meeting— Mr. Kingdeter mined that the termination wa s justified. Indeed, Mr . Sanchez, Mr. Cornelius, and Mr . Kingeac h independe ntly conclude d that plaintiff’s pe rf or manc e ha d b e e n uns atis fa c tor y fo r s ome tim e , a

nd the y e a c h e xpre sse d s pe c if

ic , le g iti mate
rea sons for their c onclusions. The Court conc ludes that defe ndant had a leg itimate, nondiscriminatory

rea son for ter

minating plaintiff’ s employ ment. Plaintiff has not demonstrated to the Court that de fenda nt’s perf ormanc e-ba sed
e xplanatio n w a s p re te xtua l and that hi s te rm inatio n w a s th e re su lt o f r e ta liatio n. Pla int if f’ s34

arguments can be reduc ed to re citations of eve nts which he be lieves show pre text and re taliatory intent but, in the Court’s view, do not.

Plaintiff first sugg ests that the compar ison of his mid-y ear perf ormanc e eva luation in J une 2003 with the annual F Y 2003 eva luations for other B OS employ ees, se e PX 22, shows that Mr. Sanche z used his subj ective judg ment to rate se vera l of his colleagues hig her tha n the ratingg uidelines indicated the y deser ved. None of the other

employ ees who failed to mee t the require ments were place d on a PI P or terminated. Plaintiff complains that Mr. Sanc hez applied ob je c tiv e sta

nd ard s to pla int if

f’ s p e rf or manc e but us e d s ub

je c tiv e sta

nd ard s to a ssi g n r atin g s to other e mploy ees. In his testimony , Mr. Sanche z ex plained that instead of rely ing e x clusively

on the objective guidelines, he c alculate d office aver ag es for the leng th of time it took for the entire BO S staff to scre en and pr ocess a pplications. He then a ssessed an individual B OS’s perf ormanc e relative to the office aver ag e.

The Court is persua ded by this ex planation. To beg in with, plaintiff presente d no evidenc e that the r atingg uidelines wer e mandatory or that it was inappr opriate f or Mr. Sanc hez to use offic e ave rag es in assig ning r ating s. Performa nce e valuations over the course of seve ral y ear s also indicate that of fice aver ag es we re r outinely used to assess individual employ ee perf ormanc e. See , e. g. , PX 7. The bottom line is that plainti ff’ s perf ormanc e fa iled to meet either the perf

ormanc e cr iteria or to f

all within the releva

nt aver ag es for

a satisfa ctory perf ormanc e, supportingdefe ndant’s non-discr iminatory explanation for plaintiff’s ter mination. Pla int if f n e xt ar g ue s th at he wa s p re ve nte d f ro m atte nd inga

tr a ini ngop po rt

un ity in A pr il 2 00 4 a

nd that th is i nc ide nt h e lps to e sta bli shMr . Sa

nc he z’s re ta liator

y te nd e nc ie s. F ir st, there is no evidence that Mr. Sanche z had any thing to do with org anizing the tra ining35

opportunity . In fac t, Mr. Cornelius testified that he org anized the training . Second, Mr. Cor ne liu s te sti fi e d th at pl a int if f n ot o nly fa ile d to re sp on d to the inv itatio n to the tr a ini ngand to
re se rv e a se at in the va n, but th at he a lso de c lin e d M r. Cor ne liu s’ of fe r t hat pl a int if

f d ri ve him se lf and be r eimbursed f

or g as and milea g e. The Court found Mr. Cornelius’ testimony cre dible, see supra at 19, and re

jects the a

rgument that Mr. Kelly

was pre vented f

rom attendingthe trainingas pr oo f o f h is r e ta lia

tio n c la im. Finally , plaintiff ar g ues that the PI P its elf a nd Mr. Sanche z’s behavior duringthe PI P period demonstrate prete x t and re taliatory intent. Plainti ff a

rgues that the burde nsome nature of the ter ms of his PI P sugg ests reta liation. See DX 3. The PI P requireme nts, however , wer e identical to the g ener ally

applicable standards f

or B OSs ex cept that some e lements, such as the number of times “ supervisory intervention” w ould be allowed, w ere pro-r ated to re flec t the fac t that the PI P covere d a 120-da y period rather than a

full y ear . I d. Contrary

to Mr. Kelly ’s te sti mony , th e PI P a c kn ow le dg e d th at ta rd ine ss w ou ld b e tol e rate d und e r c ir c ums tanc e s w ith “ade quate justification.” I d.

The fa ct that Mr. Sanche z im plemented the PI P on J une 11, 2003 and did not schedule a for

mal meetingwith plaintiff until August 6, 2003, despite state ments in the PI P letter that he would mee t with plaintiff “bi-we ekly ,” sug g ests that in this respect at least Mr. Sanche z
may no t ha ve be e n a mod e l su pe rv iso r. Spe c if

ic a lly , M r. Sanc he z pla c e d p la int if f o n a PI P, which imposed string ent per formanc e re quirements and le ft him lit tle room for e rror . After doing this, he w aited nea

rly two months to schedule a mee ting with plaintiff to eva luate his work or off er a n appra isal of whethe r plaintiff wa s adequately fulfilling the te rms of the PI P. W hen plaintiff re turned fr om medical lea ve and c ompleted the 120-da y PI P period, Mr. Sanche z never36

informed plaintiff that he had f ailed the PI P and that he planne d to propose his termination. Mr. Sanc he z al so a dmi tte d to be ing“ e xtre me ly fr us tr ate d” and

ra isi nghis vo ic e at pl a int if f a t th e ir
me e tin gon

Au g us t 6, 20 03 , b e c a

us e pla int if

f b ro ug ht h is unio n r e pr e se ntativ e , M s. John so n, to the meeting . This may

have be en unre asonable or unprof essional conduc t, as was Mr. Sanc hez’s action in sendinga letter

of re primand to plaintiff while he was home on sick le ave. B ut however inappropriate some of this conduc t may have be en, it is not enoug h to satisfy plaintiff’s burde n of de mon str atin gthat th e de fe nd ant’ s p e rf or manc e -b a se d r e a so n f

or his te rm inatio n w a s p re te xtua l.
I I I . CONCLUSI ON The Court denie d defe ndant’s motion for summary judgme nt beca

use there wer e “g enuine issues of material fa ct in dispute with respec t to Mr. Kelly ’s claims of unlaw ful ret ali ati on anddi scr im in ati on on th e bas is of r ace un der T it le V I I .” K ell y v. Hai rst on , 6 05 F. Supp. 2d at 178. But as the f inder of f act at trial, the Court had an oppor tunity to assess the
cre dibilit y

of all the witnesse s and to test plaintiff’s asse rtions throug h the cr ucible of dire ct and
c ro ss- e xami natio n o f t

ho se wi tne sse s. Pla int if

f’ s te sti mony , a

nd that of his wi tne sse s, fa ile d to show that rac e or pla intiff’s par ticipation in protected a ctivity “ac tually play ed a r ole in [t he employ er’ s decision-making ] process and ha d a dete rminative influenc e on the outcome .” Re e ve s v . Sa

nd e rs on Plumbi ngPr od s. , Inc ., 53 0 U .S. at 14 1 ( br a c ke ts i n o ri g ina l) . It “ is n ot t his Court’s job to decide if de fenda nt’s proff ere d rea sons were wise, fa ir, or cor rec t, but rather, whether defe ndant honestly

believed those rea sons and ac ted in g ood faith upon those belief s.” Crockett v. Richar dson, 127 F. Supp. 2d 40, 47 (D.D.C. 2001); se e B arbour v. Br owner , 181 F.3d 1342, 1346 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (quotingDale v. Chica g o Tribune, Co., 797 F .2d 458, 464 (7th Cir.37

1986) (inter

nal quotation marks omitted) (f eder al cour

t not “a super -per sonnel depa rtment that examines an entity ’s business dec isions”). Def endant pr esente d cre dible evidenc e that de mon str ate d th at pl a int if f w a s p la c e d o n a

PI P and te rm inate d f

ro m th e SB A b e c a

us e of his
unacc eptable job pe rfor

mance . Acc ording ly , the Court will enter judg ment for the de fenda nt. A na p p r o p r i at e O r d e r

w i l l i s s u e th i s s am e d ay. SO ORDERED.
/s/_____________________________ PAULL . FRI EDMAN Un i t edS t at es Di s tri ctJ u d ge DATE: January

6, 2010