[Cite as State v. Short, 129 Ohio St.3d 360, 2011-Ohio-3641.] 

THE STATE OF OHIO, APPELLEE, v. SHORT, APPELLANT. 

[Cite as State v. Short, 129 Ohio St.3d 360, 2011-Ohio-3641.] 

Criminal law — Aggravated murder — Death penalty upheld. 

(No. 2006-1366 — Submitted April 5, 2011 — Decided July 28, 2011.) 

APPEAL from the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County, 

No. 2004 CR 02635. 

__________________ 

LANZINGER, J.

{¶ 1} This is an appeal as of right by defendant-appellant, Duane Short. 

A jury found Short guilty of the aggravated murders of Rhonda Short and Donnie 

Sweeney. He was sentenced to death for both offenses. 

Factual Background 

{¶ 2} Evidence introduced at trial showed that Duane and Rhonda Short 

were married and lived on Staton Street in Lemon Township, Middletown, Ohio, 

with their three children, Justin, Tiffany, and Jesse (born in 1990, 1992, and 1995 

respectively). Short worked as a meat cutter for McGee Supermarket. 

{¶ 3} There was testimony at trial that Rhonda Short attended church and 

taught Sunday school at the Faith Baptist Church in Miamisburg. There was also 

testimony that she became acquainted there with Brenda Barian and Donnie 

Sweeney, Barian’s son, both of whom also taught Sunday school at Faith Baptist. 

Barian described her relationship with Rhonda as “very close. [Rhonda] was like 

a daughter to” her. Tiffany testified that Rhonda and her children sometimes went 

out for ice cream with Barian and Sweeney after church. Jesse recalled that he, 

Rhonda, and Tiffany had once gone to a McDonald’s in Miamisburg with 

Sweeney and others after church. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

2 

{¶ 4} The prosecution introduced evidence that during the two months 

preceding the offenses, Short made several statements about intending to kill 

Rhonda if she left him. Rhonda’s friend Amy Spurlock testified that “[a]bout one 

or two months before” Rhonda’s death, Short showed Rhonda a newspaper article 

about a husband who had murdered his wife after she left him. Spurlock’s 

testimony described how Short waved the article around angrily and “tr[ied] to 

push it in her face.” According to Spurlock, Rhonda refused to read the article, so 

Short read it aloud to her and had then said, “[L]ook what happens if you ever 

leave me or cheat on me, then I’ll kill you, the kids and myself.” 

{¶ 5} Short’s supervisor, Robert Thomas, testified that “[a] couple 

months before the shooting,” he and Short had a conversation “about 

relationships, marriage and divorce * * * in general.” According to Thomas, 

Short said: “I don’t think I’d be able to handle it * * *. [I]f my wife would ever 

leave me for another man * * * I would shoot both of ’em and then kill myself.” 

{¶ 6} Tiffany Short testified that in July 2004, she overheard her father 

tell her mother: “If you ever leave, I’ll kill you.” Brandon Fletcher, a member of 

the Faith Baptist congregation, testified about a conversation he had had with 

Short on or about July 8, 2004. Fletcher told Short that he had seen Sweeney 

“kinda hugging” Rhonda in the basement at Faith Baptist Church, that it “wasn’t 

right,” and that Fletcher “didn’t like what [he] saw.” According to Fletcher, he 

also told Short that “Rhonda would leave [church] first and then Donnie would 

follow her.” Fletcher testified that Short “was upset by finding out that his wife 

was possibly involved with another guy.” 

{¶ 7} Witnesses testified that on July 15, 2004, Rhonda Short moved out 

of the house on Staton Street. She took Tiffany and Jesse, the two younger 

children, with her. She did not take Justin; in his trial testimony, Justin explained 

that he had wanted to stay with his father. According to Justin, Rhonda left a note 

for Short that “said basically that she was leaving him.” Justin testified that he 
January Term, 2011 

3 

gave his father the note when his father came home from work that day. Upon 

reading the note, Short became “[u]pset and maybe angry.” Short then got into 

his truck with Justin and searched for Rhonda and continued to search for her 

during the ensuing week. 

{¶ 8} Brenda Barian testified that Rhonda went to Barian’s house on July 

15, and Barian took her to a hotel. At trial, Barian recounted how over the next 

five days, Rhonda stayed at three hotels and also spent time at Barian’s house. 

Barian testified that she had paid for Rhonda’s hotel stays while helping her find a 

place to live. On Saturday, July 17, Barian found a house available for rent at 

5035 Pepper Drive in Huber Heights, Ohio. On the following Monday, July 19, 

Rhonda opened an account with the Dayton Power and Light Company 

(“DP&L”) for service at 5035 Pepper Drive. Barian testified, and DP&L records 

corroborate, that Rhonda opened this account under her maiden name, Rhonda 

Dalton. The next day, Barian testified, she drove Rhonda and the two children to 

the house and helped them move in. 

{¶ 9} Robert Thomas testified that on July 19 or 20, Short told him that 

Rhonda had left him, that he was “really down,” and that he “just wanted to die.” 

According to Thomas, “[t]hat’s all [Short] talked about” that day. Thomas 

described Short as “tearful” and “run down.” Short was unable to work and left 

early. Short’s cousin, Loren Taylor, testified that he encountered Short and Justin 

on the night of July 21 at the Abundant Life Tabernacle in Germantown, Ohio. 

Short said: “Rhonda left me. * * * I think she left me for another man.” 

According to Taylor, during this conversation, Short raised his fist and stated that 

he had “thought about going over there and killing him.” 

The Events of July 22, 2004 

{¶ 10} Robert McGee, who owns the McGee Supermarket, testified that 

Short came to work July 22. According to McGee, Short complained that he 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

4 

would be unable to keep his home if he had to pay child support. Short left work 

that day at 2:30 p.m., McGee testified. 

{¶ 11} Telephone records introduced at trial indicate that Short phoned 

DP&L and spoke with a customer service representative (“CSR”) around 3:30 

p.m. on July 22, 2004. A recording of the call was introduced at trial and shows 

that Short gave Rhonda’s Social Security number to the CSR and asked whether 

there were any accounts under Rhonda’s name. DP&L computer records 

introduced at trial indicate that the CSR had found a newly opened account under 

the name of Rhonda Dalton at 5035 Pepper Drive. During her conversation with 

Short, the CSR mentioned that address. 

{¶ 12} That afternoon, according to Justin, Short went to Huber Heights. 

Justin was with him. They stopped at a real-estate office. The real-estate agent in 

the office testified that Short had asked her for a map of Huber Heights. She did 

not have such a map, but offered to look up an address for him on the Yahoo 

maps website. Short gave her the Pepper Drive address. The agent testified that 

she entered the address, found a map online, printed it, and gave it to Short. She 

described Short’s demeanor as “calm” and “normal.” 

{¶ 13} Brandon Fletcher testified that on July 22, he was visiting a friend 

who lived across the street from Short. Around 6:00 p.m., Justin came over and 

said Short wanted to talk to him. According to Fletcher, “a couple weeks” before 

July 22, Short had discussed the possibility of buying a 12-gauge shotgun from 

him. When Fletcher arrived at Short’s house, Short asked him whether he still 

wanted to sell the gun. 

{¶ 14} Fletcher testified that he knew that Rhonda had left Short. In light 

of Short’s emotional state, Fletcher testified, he felt that he should not provide 

him with a gun. He therefore told Short, falsely, that he had already sold it. 

Fletcher stated that Short put his fist against the wall and said, “I don’t know what 

I’ve done to her to deserve this.” 
January Term, 2011 

5 

{¶ 15} According to telephone records introduced by the state at trial, 

Short phoned Robert McGee at 6:28 p.m. McGee testified that Short asked to 

borrow the store’s truck to move some furniture, and McGee gave permission. 

Justin testified that Short drove his own truck to McGee’s store in Trenton, 

bringing Justin with him. Short left his truck there; he and Justin went home in 

the store’s truck. The evidence in the record indicates that the store’s truck did 

not resemble Short’s. According to trial testimony, Short’s truck was a small 

Jeep, variously described as either gray, blue with “gray primer on it,” or “a faded 

out black color.” Testimony and photographs introduced at trial show that the 

store’s truck was a white Ford F250. 

{¶ 16} The telephone records indicate that at 7:30 p.m., Short phoned 

Dick’s Sporting Goods store at the Dayton Mall. Justin said that Short asked 

about buying a shotgun. Justin testified that after Short hung up, he and Justin 

drove to the store. (Charles Taylor, a Huber Heights detective, testified that this 

was about a 20–mile drive.) According to Justin, Short brought along a towel, a 

pair of gloves, a black raincoat, two hats, and boxes of 20-gauge shotgun 

ammunition. 

{¶ 17} At trial, the prosecution introduced sales records and a securitycamera videotape that documented Short’s purchase of a 20-gauge shotgun at 

Dick’s Sporting Goods on the night of July 22. The receipt indicates that the sale 

took place at 8:46 p.m. According to Justin, Short told him he was buying the 

gun for hunting. 

{¶ 18} Justin testified that they went to a nearby Meijer store to buy a 

hacksaw. (Detective Taylor testified that the store was about two miles from 

Dick’s Sporting Goods.) At trial, the state introduced business records and a 

security-camera video from the Meijer on Springboro Pike, Dayton, which 

documented Short’s purchase of a hacksaw at 9:04 p.m. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

6 

{¶ 19} Justin testified that from Meijer, Short drove to Huber Heights. 

Using the map provided by the real-estate agent, Short located 5035 Pepper Drive 

and “circled around” the area for a time. According to Justin, Short put on a hat 

and told Justin to do the same, so Rhonda would not recognize them if she saw 

them. He then went to a Huber Heights motel and rented a room. 

{¶ 20} Justin testified about Short’s actions at the motel. His father 

carried the shotgun and hacksaw inside, posted the do-not-disturb sign, closed the 

door, and turned up the television so nobody could hear what he was doing. He 

then sawed off the shotgun’s barrel. He tried to saw off the stock as well, but was 

unable to do so. Justin testified that while this was going on, he entreated his 

father to talk to Donnie, or even fight him, rather than shoot anyone. But Short 

merely replied, “[N]o – I have to do this.” 

{¶ 21} Justin testified that with these preparations completed, he and his 

father got into the truck, taking along the sawed-off shotgun, the barrel, and the 

hacksaw. Short drove back to Rhonda’s neighborhood and parked on a side street 

ending directly in front of 5035 Pepper Drive. Short donned a black raincoat and 

got out of the truck. He approached 5035 Pepper Drive and went to the back of 

the house. Then he returned to the truck. He picked up some shotgun shells and 

hid the shotgun under his raincoat. 

{¶ 22} According to Justin, Short said that he would “probably go to 

prison for this.” He told Justin he loved him and warned him to keep his head 

down so he “wouldn’t get shot.” Short then went to the rear of 5035 Pepper 

Drive. Justin testified that he then heard a gunshot. 

{¶ 23} Short’s daughter, Tiffany, testified that on July 22, 2004, she and 

her brother Jesse were watching television, Rhonda was taking a shower, and 

Donnie Sweeney was cooking dinner on the patio behind the house. Tiffany 

heard voices outside. She and Jesse testified that they went to the kitchen to look 
January Term, 2011 

7 

out the rear window, but it was too dark outside to see. According to Tiffany, 

Sweeney said, “[N]o, man, please stop.” Then they heard a loud noise. 

{¶ 24} The children testified that Jesse began to open the back door. 

Short then pushed it open with enough force to shove the children away from it. 

When their father entered the house, both children saw that he was carrying a gun. 

Tiffany testified that she had said, “Dad, stop,” but Short did not acknowledge her 

or Jesse. 

{¶ 25} The children ran out of the house through the back door. Tiffany 

testified that as she fled, she heard another loud noise from inside the house. 

Tiffany testified that as they ran through the back yard, she noticed a person lying 

on the ground. 

{¶ 26} They ran to the nearby home of Donovan and Janet Patrick, who 

let them inside. The Patricks testified that the children, who arrived just before 

10:30 p.m., were screaming, crying, and trembling. Tiffany told them that her 

father “had shot her mother and her mother’s friend.” Janet called 9-1-1. 

{¶ 27} Justin testified that after he heard a loud noise, his father ran back 

to the truck, placed the gun inside, and told Justin that “he [thought] he [had] just 

killed [Justin’s] mom and Donnie.” 

{¶ 28} Short drove to a nearby convenience store, got out, talked to a 

woman, got back into the truck, and drove back to Pepper Drive, where he and 

Justin entered the house from the back. Justin saw Sweeney lying in the back 

yard, not moving. Inside the house, Justin saw his mother “sitting * * * at a chair 

at the [kitchen] table * * * [with] a towel over her * * * stomach.” 

{¶ 29} At 10:27 p.m., Huber Heights police responded to Janet’s 9-1-1 

call. They arrested Short, who offered no resistance, and took him to the police 

station. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

8 

{¶ 30} Paramedics were dispatched to 5035 Pepper Drive at 10:28 p.m. 

One of the paramedics testified that he examined Sweeney, who was lying in the 

back yard, and pronounced him dead. 

{¶ 31} In the kitchen, the paramedics found Rhonda Short lying on her 

back. She was still alive, but she had a bloody hole in her chest, about one and 

one-half inches in diameter, and appeared to be in severe pain. “She said that she 

couldn’t breathe and * * * that it hurt so bad.” 

{¶ 32} The paramedics took Rhonda to the hospital. According to the 

paramedics, Rhonda kept repeating such statements as “[I]t hurts so bad,” “I can’t 

breath[e],” “I think I’m gonna die,” and “[H]e shot me.” Rhonda died at 4:38 

a.m., July 23, 2004. 

{¶ 33} Dr. Lee Lehman, the chief deputy coroner of Montgomery County, 

testified that he performed autopsies on Rhonda Short and Donnie Sweeney on 

July 23, 2004. Lehman concluded that each victim died of a shotgun wound to 

the chest. 

{¶ 34} On July 28, Huber Heights police officers examined the crime 

scene. Evidence technician Matthew Blair testified that although the bathroom 

door was open, the doorknob was in the locked position, and the lock was broken, 

with pieces of the locking mechanism lying on the bathroom floor. Blair further 

testified that a shoeprint was visible on the exterior of the bathroom door, adjacent 

to the knob. 

{¶ 35} Short was indicted on three counts of aggravated murder. One 

count charged him with the aggravated murder of Donnie Sweeney with prior 

calculation and design under R.C. 2903.01(A); one count charged him with the 

aggravated murder of Rhonda Short with prior calculation and design under R.C. 

2903.01(A); and one count charged him with committing the aggravated murder 

of Rhonda Short while committing aggravated burglary under R.C. 2903.01(B). 

Each aggravated-murder count carried two death specifications: multiple murder, 
January Term, 2011 

9 

R.C. 2929.04(A)(5), and felony murder predicated on aggravated burglary, R.C. 

2929.04(A)(7). 

{¶ 36} The indictment also charged Short with one count of breaking and 

entering, R.C. 2911.13(B); one count of aggravated burglary, R.C. 2911.11(A)(2); 

and one count of possession of dangerous ordnance (the sawed-off shotgun), R.C. 

2923.17(A). Each count of the indictment carried a firearm specification under 

R.C. 2941.145. 

{¶ 37} The jury found Short guilty of all counts and specifications. Short 

chose not to present evidence in the penalty phase. After hearing the arguments 

of counsel in the penalty phase, the jury recommended death sentences on all 

three counts of aggravated murder. The trial court, after merging the counts 

dealing with the aggravated murder of Rhonda Short, sentenced Short to death on 

the remaining two counts. 

{¶ 38} In this appeal, Short raises 14 propositions of law. 

I. Waiver of Mitigation 

{¶ 39} In his first proposition of law, Short contends that his waiver of the 

right to present evidence in the penalty phase was not knowing and voluntary and 

hence was invalid. 

A. The Trial Court’s Ashworth Inquiry 

{¶ 40} In January 2005, about 16 months before trial, Short first expressed 

an interest in waiving mitigation. He asked the trial court’s permission to 

withdraw a motion to suppress, change his plea to guilty, and proceed “without 

any mitigation.” At defense counsel’s request, the trial court ordered a 

psychological evaluation pursuant to State v. Ashworth (1999), 85 Ohio St.3d 56, 

706 N.E.2d 1231. The next month, the clinical psychologist’s report concluded, 

“Mr. Duane Short is currently competent * * * to Waive Presentation of 

Mitigating Factors for Sentencing.” 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

10 

{¶ 41} Then, on the day the penalty phase began, the trial court addressed 

defense counsel as follows: “[I]t’s my understanding * * * that the Defendant * * 

* does not intend to present any additional * * * mitigating evidence other than 

that which was presented in the trial phase, is that correct?” Defense counsel 

affirmed that that was correct. 

{¶ 42} The trial court asked counsel whether they had discussed with 

Short “his right to present mitigation evidence” and had explained “what 

mitigation evidence consists of.” Counsel reported that they had done so, and 

also that they had “made a thorough investigation of mitigating evidence * * * 

including inquiries of family members and other persons.” 

{¶ 43} The trial court then addressed Short, stating: “It’s my 

understanding * * * that you * * * did not want then and you do not want now any 

additional assistance in the presentation of mitigating evidence * * *.” Short 

replied: “That’s correct.” Short affirmed that he had consulted with his counsel 

about mitigation and that they had “fully explained” it to him. 

{¶ 44} The court also delved into Short’s specific understanding of 

mitigation. Short explained in his own words what he understood mitigation to 

mean and why it was important: mitigation meant “factors that could result in 

causing the jury to sway the case to give me more of a possibility of * * *a more 

in-depth look into what happened and possibly * * * a lighter sentence.” Short 

told the court that it was important: “[I]t would give the jurors, like I said, for a 

more indef [sic] – perspective than them just considering what the prosecution 

had presented to weigh more accurately their sentencing phase, I guess.” 

{¶ 45} The court explained to Short that the defense had the burden of 

going forward with evidence of mitigating factors, while the state had the burden 

of proving that the aggravating circumstances outweighed the mitigating factors, 

and that a death sentence could be imposed only if the prosecutor met its burden. 

Short said he understood. 
January Term, 2011 

11 

{¶ 46} The court asked Short whether he understood that without 

evidence in mitigation, “it may be difficult * * * for the jury to impose anything 

other than the death sentence.” Short emphatically affirmed that he understood: 

“I certainly do.” Later in the colloquy, he restated in his own words: “[I]t could 

very well cost me my life if I don’t put on any mitigation. I understand that 

fully.” 

{¶ 47} In a written decision, the trial court made the following findings: 

{¶ 48} (1) Short understood the choice between life and death; 

{¶ 49} (2) He had the ability to make a knowing and intelligent decision 

not to present mitigating evidence; 

{¶ 50} (3) He fully understood the ramifications of that decision; 

{¶ 51} (4) He had the ability to reason logically; 

{¶ 52} (5) He understood his right to present mitigating evidence; 

{¶ 53} (6) He understood the meaning of mitigating evidence; 

{¶ 54} (7) He understood the importance of mitigating evidence; 

{¶ 55} (8) He understood the use of mitigating evidence to offset the 

aggravating circumstances; 

{¶ 56} (9) He understood the effect of failing to present mitigation. 

{¶ 57} Short did not present any mitigating evidence to the jury in the 

penalty phase. However, his counsel did argue for a life sentence. Based on 

guilt-phase evidence, counsel argued that Short had committed the murders while 

suffering from severe emotional distress due to the breakup of his marriage, that 

he did not plan the murders in advance, and that his 38 years of life should not be 

judged exclusively on his actions during a seven-hour period. 

B. Short’s Challenge to the Validity of His Waiver 

{¶ 58} Short argues that his waiver of mitigation was not knowing and 

voluntary, because his subsequent actions were inconsistent with waiving 

mitigation, thus demonstrating that he did not really want to waive it, and because 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

12 

defense counsel had failed to investigate mitigation before the waiver. Short also 

argues that the trial court should have inquired more deeply into his competence 

to waive mitigation and his reasons for doing so. The state argues that the trial 

court was not required to conduct any inquiry in the first place, because Short 

actually did present mitigating evidence, albeit not in the penalty phase. 

{¶ 59} This court has held that the right to present mitigating evidence is 

not a fundamental right that must be personally waived by the defendant. State v. 

Keith (1997), 79 Ohio St.3d 514, 530, 684 N.E.2d 47. Moreover, the Supreme 

Court of the United States has stated: “We have never imposed an ‘informed and 

knowing’ requirement upon a defendant’s decision not to introduce evidence. * * 

* [W]e have never required a specific colloquy to ensure that a defendant 

knowingly and intentionally refused to present mitigating evidence.” Schriro v. 

Landrigan (2007), 550 U.S. 465, 479, 127 S.Ct. 1933, 167 L.Ed.2d 836. For this 

reason, the trial court has no constitutional duty to secure from the defendant an 

on-the-record waiver of the right to present mitigating evidence. Keith at 530. 

C. Short’s Challenge to the Ashworth Colloquy 

{¶ 60} In State v. Ashworth, 85 Ohio St.3d 56, 706 N.E.2d 1231, 

paragraph one of the syllabus, we held: “In a capital case, when a defendant 

wishes to waive the presentation of all mitigating evidence, a trial court must 

conduct an inquiry of the defendant on the record to determine whether the waiver 

is knowing and voluntary.” (Emphasis sic.) As part of the inquiry, the trial court 

must determine “whether the defendant understands his or her rights both in the 

plea process and in the sentencing proceedings.” Id. at 62. 

{¶ 61} Ashworth sets forth specific requirements for the colloquy: “The 

trial court must inform the defendant of the right to present mitigating evidence 

and explain what mitigating evidence is. The court must then inquire of the 

defendant, and make a determination on the record, whether the defendant 

understands the importance of mitigating evidence, the use of such evidence to 
January Term, 2011 

13 

offset the aggravating circumstances, and the effect of failing to present that 

evidence. After being assured that the defendant understands these concepts, the 

court must inquire whether the defendant desires to waive the right to present 

mitigating evidence, and, finally, the court must make finding of fact as to the 

defendant’s understanding and waiver of rights.” Id. In addition, “[t]he trial court 

must decide whether the defendant is competent,” but only if counsel so requests 

or if the defendant displays “any indicia of incompetence.” Id. 

{¶ 62} But the requirement of an Ashworth inquiry is triggered only 

“when a defendant wishes to waive the presentation of all mitigating evidence.” 

(Emphasis sic.) Ashworth at paragraph one of the syllabus; see also State v. 

Barton, 108 Ohio St.3d 402, 2006-Ohio-1324, 844 N.E.2d 307, ¶ 51. The state 

contends that the defense did not waive the presentation of all mitigating 

evidence; therefore, the trial court was not required to conduct any inquiry to 

determine whether Short’s waiver of mitigation was knowing and voluntary. 

{¶ 63} The state’s argument has merit. During the guilt phase, the defense 

had introduced mitigating evidence, to which counsel referred during the penalty 

phase. Specifically, the defense had attempted to show that Short was deeply 

emotionally distressed because Rhonda left him. Mike Rosenbalm, a Monroe, 

Ohio police officer and the sole witness in the defense case-in-chief, testified that 

he was dispatched to Short’s house on July 16, and that Short was “very 

emotional [and] crying.” 

{¶ 64} In cross-examining prosecution witnesses, the defense elicited 

further testimony to support its claim of emotional distress. Justin Short testified 

on cross-examination that the police had come to the house one night after 

Rhonda’s departure and had confiscated Short’s gun, and that Short “went to a 

hospital.” Justin further testified that his father had received disturbing phone 

calls, during which someone had played songs that upset him. Short’s boss, 

Robert Thomas, testified on cross-examination that on the Monday or Tuesday 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

14 

before the murders, Short was “tearful,” appeared “run down,” said he “just 

wanted to die,” and was unable to work. 

{¶ 65} During the cross-examination of Brandon Fletcher, the defense 

elicited that Fletcher had told Short about Sweeney and Rhonda “hugging” at 

church in a manner he considered inappropriate and that this news had upset 

Short. In cross-examining Short’s cousin, Loren Taylor, concerning Short’s July 

21 visit to the Abundant Life Tabernacle, the defense stressed that Short was not a 

member of the congregation, but had attended the service and had gone up to the 

altar for prayer, implying that Short was taking unusual actions in an attempt to 

deal with strong emotions. Similarly, the defense elicited testimony from Justin 

that Short had attended services at four churches other than his own from July 15 

to 22, and that the congregation at each one offered special prayers for him. 

{¶ 66} Short’s emotional distress over Rhonda formed the principal theme 

of the defense penalty-phase closing argument. The defense argument juxtaposed 

Justin’s testimony with Officer Rosenbalm’s to imply that Short had been 

suicidal. During closing arguments, the defense reminded the jury: “First day, 

Justin says, how did your dad seem very sad, very sad. Officer Rosenbalm is 

called out, he comes to the house. What did you find, Officer? * * * He was 

crying, he was depressed, I confiscated a gun.” 

{¶ 67} Defense counsel argued that Short had gone to several churches 

during the week before the murders because he “was crying for help the only way 

he knows. He goes to church. * * * [H]e’s going from church to church to church 

trying to get some sort of help, trying to stop this stuff that he’s been carrying 

around for two months. His life is gone, his wife is gone, the kids are gone, he 

has nothing, he goes to church.” 

{¶ 68} Using both the state’s evidence and the testimony elicited by 

defense cross-examination, the defense argued that Short was “not a cold-blooded 
January Term, 2011 

15 

person,” but was “a mess,” was “torn apart,” and had “lost the battle with his 

demons” when he killed Rhonda and Sweeney. 

{¶ 69} This case is analogous to Barton, 108 Ohio St.3d 402, 2006-Ohio1324, 844 N.E.2d 307. In Barton, a capital defendant declined to present 

mitigating evidence in the penalty phase of his trial. Id. at ¶ 43. Although he did 

make an unsworn statement, his statement urged the jury to sentence him to death. 

Id. at ¶ 50. However, during the guilt phase, defense counsel “cross-examined 

several prosecution witnesses * * * and elicited mitigating testimony on [the 

defendant’s] behalf.” Id. at ¶ 49. 

{¶ 70} On appeal, Barton argued that the trial court should not have 

accepted his waiver of mitigation without an Ashworth inquiry. We rejected 

Barton’s claim: “We conclude that the evidence of mitigation presented during 

the guilt phase of trial as contained in the record, together with Barton’s unsworn 

statement during the penalty phase of trial and defense counsel’s closing 

argument, rendered Ashworth inapplicable to this case because Barton did not 

waive the presentation of all mitigating evidence.” Id. at ¶ 52. 

{¶ 71} Here, although Short did not make an unsworn penalty-phase 

statement, his counsel did elicit mitigating evidence in the guilt phase by crossexamining the state’s witnesses. Moreover, counsel used that evidence in the 

penalty phase to argue that Short did not deserve death. 

{¶ 72} Barton states: “Presentation of any mitigating evidence during 

either the guilt phase or the penalty phase of a capital-murder trial relieves the 

trial court of the duty to conduct an Ashworth inquiry.” (Emphasis added.) 108 

Ohio St.3d 402, 2006-Ohio-1324, 844 N.E.2d 307, paragraph two of the syllabus. 

Short did not forgo the presentation of all mitigating evidence. Clearly, he 

presented mitigating evidence during the guilt phase. Hence, no Ashworth inquiry 

was required. 

{¶ 73} Short’s first proposition of law is overruled. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

16 

II. Defense Attempt to Present Mitigation Solely to Trial Judge 

{¶ 74} In his second proposition of law, Short contends that the trial court 

violated his right to present mitigating evidence by denying Short’s request to 

present mitigating evidence to the judge alone, after the penalty phase. 

{¶ 75} Short waived his right to present mitigating evidence in the penalty 

phase of trial. On May 8, 2006, the jury returned a recommendation of death and 

was discharged. Sentencing was scheduled for May 24, 2006. On May 23, the 

defense filed a motion for continuance, in part because defense counsel desired to 

interview “several witnesses * * * that maybe [sic] testifying on Mr. Short’s 

behalf.” 

{¶ 76} In court the following day, the defense requested that the trial court 

hold “a sentencing hearing under [former R.C.] 2929.19(A)(1) [which addresses 

felony sentencing] and all that that includes.” 150 Ohio Laws, Part IV, 5707, 

5741.1

 Specifically, the defense wanted the opportunity to introduce evidence 

before the trial judge. The state opposed the request, arguing that R.C. 2929.19 

did not apply to capital sentencing. 

{¶ 77} The trial judge denied Short’s request on authority of State v. Roe

(1989), 41 Ohio St.3d 18, 26, 535 N.E.2d 1351. In Roe, the appellant argued, 

among other things, that the trial court had erred by refusing “to permit 

presentation of more mitigating evidence subsequent to the jury 

recommendation.” Id. at 26. We rejected Roe’s claim: “R.C. 2929.03(D)(1) 

[imposing sentence for a capital offense] provides that all mitigating evidence 

must be presented to the jury, if the offender was tried by a jury * * *. A 

defendant may not wait for an unfavorable jury recommendation before 

presenting all relevant evidence in mitigation of sentence.” Id. 

 

1. The statute, R.C. 2929.19(A)(1) was amended effective April 29, 2005. All references in this 

opinion to R.C. 2929.19(A)(1) are to the former version of the statute. 
January Term, 2011 

17 

{¶ 78} Short argues that Roe was incorrectly decided on this point and 

asks that we reconsider it. At trial, he based his argument on R.C. 2929.19(A)(1). 

On appeal, he bases his argument on Crim.R. 32(A)(1) (imposition of sentence), 

and he further argues that the Eighth Amendment to the United States 

Constitution, forbidding cruel and unusual punishment, requires that a capital 

defendant be permitted to present mitigating evidence to the trial judge even if 

that evidence was withheld from the jury in the penalty phase. We consider each 

of these arguments in turn. 

A. Applicability of R.C. 2929.19(A)(1) 

{¶ 79} Before it was amended effective April 29, 2005, R.C. 

2929.19(A)(1) provided: “The court shall hold a sentencing hearing before 

imposing a sentence under this chapter upon an offender who was convicted of or 

pleaded guilty to a felony * * *. At the hearing, the offender, the prosecuting 

attorney, the victim or the victim's representative in accordance with [R.C.] 

2930.14 * * *, and, with the approval of the court, any other person may present 

information relevant to the imposition of sentence in the case. The court shall 

inform the offender of the verdict of the jury or finding of the court and ask the 

offender whether the offender has anything to say as to why sentence should not 

be imposed upon the offender.” 150 Ohio Laws, Part IV, at 5741. 

{¶ 80} Aggravated murder is a felony, R.C. 2901.02(C), and a sentence 

for aggravated murder with aggravating circumstances is imposed under “this 

chapter”—that is, R.C. Chapter 2929. R.C. 2929.03(C)(2)(a), (D), and (E) 

(setting forth sentences for aggravated murder with one or more aggravatingcircumstance specification). Hence, Short argued at trial, capital cases fall within 

the literal terms of R.C. 2929.19(A)(1). Moreover, according to Short, neither 

R.C. 2929.19 nor 2929.03 specifically exempts capital cases from the scope of 

R.C. 2929.19(A)(1). Therefore, Short argued at trial, a capital defendant is 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

18 

entitled to a hearing under R.C. 2929.19(A)(1), at which he “may present 

information relevant to the imposition of sentence in the case.” 

{¶ 81} Short’s reading of R.C. 2929.19(A)(1) is unpersuasive. Were we 

to accept it, capital defendants would be entitled to two evidentiary hearings: one 

before the judge and jury (the penalty phase), and a second before the judge alone. 

Short fails to explain why the General Assembly would have intended to create 

such a system. There is no reason to believe that a system of dual evidentiary 

hearings would make capital sentencing more fair, reliable, or consistent. 

{¶ 82} Moreover, had the General Assembly intended R.C. 2929.19 to 

apply in capital cases, we believe it would have said so expressly. The 

comprehensive procedural scheme set forth in R.C. 2929.03 predates the 

enactment of R.C. 2929.19 by 22 years.2

 Short’s reading of R.C. 2929.19 would 

work a major change in that comprehensive scheme. The General Assembly 

would not have intended to make such a change in a statute dealing with 

noncapital sentencing procedures without clearly saying so. We therefore reject 

Short’s contention that R.C. 2929.19(A)(1) applies to capital sentencing. 

B. Applicability of Crim.R. 32(A)(1) 

{¶ 83} Although Short’s argument at trial focused on R.C. 2929.19(A)(1), 

he claims on appeal that Crim.R. 32(A)(1) also entitles a capital defendant to a 

sentencing hearing in front of the judge without a jury. 

{¶ 84} We disagree. Crim.R. 32(A)(1) grants the defendant in a criminal 

case the right to address the court in allocution, either in person or through 

counsel. The rule permits counsel “to speak on behalf of the defendant” and 

entitles the defendant “to make a statement in his or her own behalf or present any 

information in mitigation of punishment.” 

 

2. R.C. 2929.19 was enacted in 1995. Am.Sub.S.B. No. 2, 146 Ohio Laws Part IV, 7136, 7485. 

R.C. 2929.03 became effective in 1973. Am.Sub.H.B. No. 511, 134 Ohio Laws, Part II, 1866, 

1978-1979. 
January Term, 2011 

19 

{¶ 85} However, the right to “present any information in mitigation” does 

not imply a right to an evidentiary hearing. “The purpose of allocution is to 

permit the defendant to speak on his own behalf or present any information in 

mitigation of punishment.” State v. Reynolds (1998), 80 Ohio St.3d 670, 684, 687 

N.E.2d 1358. See also State v. Campbell (2000), 90 Ohio St.3d 320, 325-326, 

738 N.E.2d 1178 (allocution involves defendant’s ability to make a personal 

appeal to sentencing judge). Moreover, “the plain wording of the rule does not 

encompass anyone other than the defendant presenting information in mitigation.” 

State v. Lowe (May 3, 2001), Cuyahoga App. No. 78021, 2001 WL 468536, *2. 

{¶ 86} Thus, neither R.C. 2929.19(A)(1) nor Crim.R. 32(A)(1) entitles a 

capital defendant to withhold mitigating evidence from the jury and then present it 

to the trial judge alone. Accordingly, we decline Short’s invitation to overrule 

Roe. 

C. Eighth Amendment Claim 

{¶ 87} Finally, Short contends that by refusing to permit him to present 

evidence after the penalty phase, the trial court violated his Eighth Amendment 

right to present evidence in mitigation. However, he cites no authority in support 

of this proposition. 

{¶ 88} It is well established that the Eighth Amendment requires that a 

sentencer in a capital case “not be precluded from considering,” as a mitigating 

factor, “any aspect of a defendant's character or record and any of the 

circumstances of the offense that the defendant proffers as a basis for a sentence 

less than death.” Lockett v. Ohio (1978), 438 U.S. 586, 604, 98 S.Ct. 2954, 57 

L.Ed.2d 973. See also Eddings v. Oklahoma (1982), 455 U.S. 104, 112, 102 S.Ct. 

869, 71 L.Ed.2d 1. 

{¶ 89} Unquestionably, then, Short had a right to present mitigating 

evidence to the trial judge. But he had his opportunity to do so in the penalty 

phase of his trial when, as provided by R.C. 2929.03(D)(1), he could have 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

20 

presented his evidence to both the judge and jury. He declined to take that 

opportunity. Nothing in Eighth Amendment jurisprudence entitled him to a 

second opportunity to present before the judge alone mitigation that he had 

chosen to withhold from the jury. 

{¶ 90} Short’s second proposition of law is overruled. 

III. Hearing on the Defense’s Pretrial Access to Witnesses 

{¶ 91} At trial, the defense claimed that the Victim Witness Division of 

the Montgomery County prosecutor’s office unconstitutionally interfered with 

counsel’s ability to interview Short’s children, all state witnesses, before trial.3

 In 

his third proposition of law, Short contends that the trial court erred by failing to 

hold a hearing to inquire into this claim. 

{¶ 92} Short’s three minor children testified as prosecution witnesses in 

the guilt phase. According to Jeffrey D. Livingston, the guardian ad litem of the 

Short children, Rhonda Short’s mother, Macy Lane, had custody of Justin, 

Rhonda’s sister Amy Spivey had custody of Tiffany, and Rhonda’s sister Gina 

Gibbs had custody of Jesse. Before trial, the defense filed a motion for an order 

allowing defense counsel to interview the children in the presence of the guardian 

ad litem. The trial court did not rule immediately on this motion. 

{¶ 93} During pretrial proceedings, defense attorney L. Patrick Mulligan 

told the court that he had been in contact with Livingston, who was working to 

arrange an interview. Mulligan told the court that the children’s guardians were 

refusing to let the interviews go forward. He said his office had forwarded to him 

a message from Livingston to the effect that Gina Gibbs and Amy Spivey had 

 

3. A criminal defendant has a right to seek pretrial interviews with witnesses without interference 

from the prosecution. See generally Annotation, Interference by Prosecution with Defense 

Interrogation of Witnesses (1979), 90 A.L.R.3d 1231, Section 2(a). On the other hand, a witness 

generally has no obligation to submit to a pretrial interview. State v. Zeh (1987), 31 Ohio St.3d 

99, 31 OBR 263, 509 N.E.2d 414, paragraph one of the syllabus. Moreover, “[i]f the witness is a 

minor, the legal custodian has the right to refuse the interview.” State v. Brown (1996), 112 Ohio 

App.3d 583, 596, 679 N.E.2d 361. 
January Term, 2011 

21 

“said no” to the proposed interviews, “so there will be no meeting today. * * * 

Because he [Livingston] is allowing the guardians to make the call, we are not 

being given access to the potential witnesses.” 

{¶ 94} The trial court asked Mulligan whether he had any evidence that 

the state had interfered with defense efforts to interview the children. Mulligan 

admitted that he had no “direct evidence” of state interference. He added: “The 

only thing I know from Mr. Livingston was that Amy supposedly is going to 

contact Victim Witness before making a decision. I don’t know if that’s been 

done or not, and I could not seek what was sent to them by Victim Witness.” 

{¶ 95} The prosecutor stated: “I’m unaware [of] Victim Witness being 

contacted or having any contact with the – the legal [guardians] – or the Guardian 

Ad Litem.” He added that Livingston had “contacted [them] also indicating that 

[at] the request of defense counsel he contacted the legal custodians to see if he 

could help in any way in facilitating * * * an interview or a meeting with * * * the 

children, but it’s also our understanding that he explained to them that it was their 

call, it was their decision whether or not they wanted to meet with defense 

counsel, and apparently they’ve made that call.” 

{¶ 96} During the state’s case-in-chief, Tiffany and Jesse Short testified 

and were cross-examined by the defense. Before Tiffany’s direct testimony, the 

trial court denied the defense motion to interview the children because “there was 

no evidence that the State interfered in any manner with the Defendant’s access to 

the minor children.” 

{¶ 97} After Justin Short testified on direct examination, the defense 

raised the access issue again. The defense asked that the trial court strike Justin’s 

testimony, partly on the ground that the defense had “no access” to him before 

trial.4

 The trial court asked whether the defense had any evidence that the state 

 

4. The defense also alleged discovery violations, but Short is not raising any discovery issue on 

appeal. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

22 

had interfered with defense access to Justin. The defense pointed out, “[W]e have 

not had a hearing on that,” and the trial court stated: “We can still have a 

hearing.” The defense requested “a hearing where we may voir dire Justin Short, 

we may question the * * * Guardian Ad Litem, and the guardian of Justin Short, 

and possibly the people from Victim Witness.” 

{¶ 98} The trial court again asked whether the defense had any “good 

faith evidence or basis to suggest that the State in any manner has interfered with 

the Defendant’s access to the witnesses.” Counsel replied, “At the moment, Your 

Honor, no, we don’t. That’s why we’re asking for a hearing on this stuff. * * * 

[W]e would have to pull people in here from the State and * * * Justin himself to 

show that.” The court asked: “Were you denied access by the State?” Defense 

counsel replied: “Your Honor, how would I know? I don’t know.” However, 

counsel admitted that they had not tried to contact the children’s legal guardians 

directly. 

{¶ 99} Initially, the trial court denied the request for a hearing. However, 

defense counsel then stated: “It’s my understanding that the contact with the 

Victim Witness [sic] and they indicated that they wouldn’t agree. * * * We 

believe that Victim Witness would if asked * * * say that, that’s correct.” The 

trial court stated: “I’ve not heard before that Victim Witness told somebody not to 

testify.” Defense counsel stated: “I don’t know whether that’s a true statement. * 

* * What Mr. Livingston said was there was a conversation. The content of that 

conversation I was not privy to.” The trial court decided to call Livingston to 

testify. 

{¶ 100} Livingston testified that “a couple weeks ago,” Mulligan had 

called him to set up an interview with the children. Livingston agreed that any 

such interview could be held at his office, and a tentative date was scheduled. 

Livingston then phoned the three legal guardians. According to Livingston, Lane 

indicated that she wanted to consult Spivey. Livingston left a message for Gibbs, 
January Term, 2011 

23 

but he did not testify on whether he had ever reached her. He testified that he 

spoke to Spivey, but he did not testify to what she said. The meeting between the 

children and defense counsel did not take place. 

{¶ 101} Livingston testified that he did not know of any conversations or 

contacts between any of the legal guardians and the Victim Witness Division. He 

also testified that the guardians had never stated to him that they had contacted the 

Victim Witness Division. Defense attorney Mulligan asked whether Livingston 

recalled telling Mulligan that the custodians “were going to contact Victim 

Witness,” but Livingston did not recall making such a statement. 

{¶ 102} After Livingston’s testimony, attorney Mulligan made the 

following proffer: “[B]asically Mr. Livingston and I were trying to set up this 

meeting as he described. The meeting did not happen. 

{¶ 103} “It’s my understanding that one — and I don’t know which one 

exactly to be quite frank about it, Your Honor. 

{¶ 104} “One of the legal custodians called Victim Witness and I don’t 

know the content of that conversation. The meeting did not happen. 

{¶ 105} “* * * [W]e assume that * * * the kibosh was put on it at that 

time. That’s an assumption because I don’t know the content of the 

conversation.” 

{¶ 106} The prosecutor asked Mulligan for the source of his assertion 

that one of the legal custodians had called Victim Witness. Mulligan stated that 

this information came from Livingston. The trial court asked defense counsel 

whether they had anything further to present, and counsel said, “No.” 

{¶ 107} The trial court denied the defense request for further hearing, 

finding “no evidence that the State in any manner has interfered with the 

Defendant’s access to the witnesses.” She added, “[A]s I previously indicated, 

the Defendant and his counsel were free to communicate with the custodians 

themselves.” Short now contends that the trial court’s “fail[ure] * * * to hold a 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

24 

hearing with the guardians and the Victim Witness personnel involved” denied 

him due process. This claim lacks merit. 

{¶ 108} To begin with, Short cites no authority for the proposition that a 

defendant is entitled to a hearing on an allegation of prosecutorial interference 

when he is unable to state any facts in support of that allegation. When Short’s 

counsel requested the hearing, they admitted that they had no evidence of 

interference and did not know whether any interference had actually taken place. 

The defense repeatedly admitted that it did not know what, if anything, the 

Victim Witness Division had told the legal guardians. The defense also conceded 

that they had not asked the guardians about any contact they might have had with 

the Victim Witness Division. 

{¶ 109} Nevertheless, the trial court did grant the defense a hearing into 

its allegation of interference. Short complains that the scope of the hearing was 

insufficient in that the custodians of the children and certain unidentified Victim 

Witness personnel did not testify. We disagree. The trial court imposed no limits 

on the hearing’s scope. On the contrary, after Mulligan made his proffer, the 

court specifically asked whether the defense had anything further, and defense 

counsel said, “No.” 

{¶ 110} The defense did not attempt to call either the guardians or any 

personnel from the Victim Witness Division to testify at the hearing. Victim 

Witness personnel, at least, could easily have been called, for the record indicates 

that Victim Witness personnel were present in court just before the hearing began. 

According to the transcript, the trial court asked the “people from Victim Witness 

in the back to step out” before discussing the defense claims of interference. 

Nothing in the record suggests that the trial judge would have refused to hear such 

witnesses had the defense chosen to call them. 

{¶ 111} Nor did Short’s counsel ask the trial court to allow them to 

interview Justin before cross-examining him. Had they requested such an 
January Term, 2011 

25 

opportunity, they might have been able to interview Justin there and then. 

(Alternatively, if Justin or his guardian had refused an interview, Short’s counsel 

could have asked them, on the record, whether the Victim Witness Division had 

influenced that decision.) Counsel’s failure to seek this remedy suggests that the 

defense was not prejudiced by its inability to interview Justin before trial. 

{¶ 112} Short’s third proposition of law is overruled. 

IV. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel 

{¶ 113} In his fourth proposition of law, Short claims that his trial 

counsel rendered ineffective assistance. To establish ineffective assistance, he 

must show (1) deficient performance by counsel, i.e., performance falling below 

an objective standard of reasonable representation, and (2) prejudice, i.e., a 

reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, the proceeding’s result would 

have been different. Strickland v. Washington (1984), 466 U.S. 668, 687-688, 

694, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674; State v. Bradley (1989), 42 Ohio St.3d 136, 

538 N.E.2d 373, paragraph two of the syllabus. Short’s individual allegations of 

ineffective assistance are set forth in parts B through F of his fourth proposition. 

{¶ 114} In part B, he contends that his counsel failed him “by not 

properly pursuing the issue of contact with his children.” As we discussed above, 

Short’s counsel tried to schedule defense interviews with the children through the 

guardian ad litem, Jeffrey Livingston. After the children’s custodians refused to 

allow the requested interviews, defense counsel filed a motion asking the trial 

court to order the interviews. After that motion was denied, defense counsel 

orally moved to strike Justin’s testimony on the ground that the Victim Witness 

Division of the prosecutor’s office had somehow been involved in the decisions of 

the guardians. 

{¶ 115} When the trial court held a hearing on the motion to strike, only 

the guardian ad litem was called as a witness. Short points out that his trial 

counsel made no attempt to call any witness from the Victim Witness Division to 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

26 

support the defense claim of interference. Counsel’s failure to call such witnesses 

appears to be the gravamen of his ineffective-assistance claim (although Short’s 

brief is unclear on this point). 

{¶ 116} However, Short’s claim is speculative. He does not identify any 

particular person or persons from the Victim Witness Division who should have 

been called to testify. Thus, he fails to identify deficient performance on the part 

of his counsel. 

{¶ 117} Short also fails to show prejudice. The record does not show 

what those witnesses would have testified to, even if his counsel had called them. 

Short’s counsel believed that there had been some contact between a Victim 

Witness representative and the guardians before the guardians refused to permit 

defense interviews. But counsel conceded that they did not know what the 

content of any such conversations may have been. 

{¶ 118} Indeed, there is no evidence in the record that any such 

conversations took place. At most, defense attorney Mulligan stated that 

Livingston had told him that one of the guardians had called the Victim Witness 

Division. Even this claim was implicitly contradicted by Livingston, who 

testified that none of the custodians had ever told him that they had contacted the 

Victim Witness Division, that he did not know whether any such contact 

occurred, and that he did not recall having told attorney Mulligan that the 

custodians “were going to contact Victim Witness.” 

{¶ 119} Short’s claim with respect to both performance and prejudice 

rests on mere speculation. “Such speculation is insufficient to establish 

ineffective assistance.” State v. Perez, 124 Ohio St.3d 122, 2009-Ohio-6179, 920 

N.E.2d 104, ¶ 217, citing State v. Were, 118 Ohio St.3d 448, 2008-Ohio-2762, 

890 N.E.2d 263, ¶ 219, and State v. Elmore, 111 Ohio St.3d 515, 2006-Ohio6207, 857 N.E.2d 547, ¶ 121. 
January Term, 2011 

27 

{¶ 120} In part C of his fourth proposition, Short contends that his 

counsel failed to make sufficient efforts to introduce evidence that on the day 

after Rhonda left him, he was suicidally despondent. During the guilt-phase 

cross-examination of Justin Short, the defense elicited testimony that one night 

after Rhonda left Short, police had come to Short’s house, had confiscated his 

shotgun, and had taken him to a hospital. 

{¶ 121} During Short’s guilt-phase case-in-chief, the defense called Mike 

Rosenbalm, a Monroe, Ohio, police officer. Rosenbalm testified that on July 16, 

2004, he had been dispatched to Short’s home and that Short had been crying and 

was highly emotional. Rosenbalm remained at Short’s house for over an hour. 

However, the state objected to anticipated testimony that Short was suicidal, that 

Rosenbalm had taken him to a hospital for psychiatric testing and had confiscated 

his gun, arguing that Rosenbalm could not testify about Short’s mental state. The 

state’s objections to the testimony were sustained. The defense did not call 

Rosenbalm as a witness in the penalty phase. 

{¶ 122} Although Short does not challenge the exclusion of Rosenbalm’s 

testimony from the guilt phase, he contends that his attorneys should have called 

Rosenbalm as a mitigation witness in the penalty phase. According to Short, 

Rosenbalm’s testimony would have had mitigating value, because it showed the 

depth of Short’s emotional distress at Rhonda’s leaving. 

{¶ 123} However, Short’s claims fail to demonstrate prejudice. First, 

evidence that Short was suicidal on July 16 would have had little relevance or 

mitigating value relative to murders that he committed on July 22, nearly a week 

later. Second, there was already considerable evidence in the guilt-phase record 

to show that Short was deeply upset after Rhonda left. 

{¶ 124} Justin testified that his father was “[u]pset and maybe angry” and 

“pretty sad” after reading Rhonda’s note announcing her departure. Officer 

Rosenbalm testified that Short was “very emotional [and] crying” on July 16. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

28 

Justin was permitted to testify that the police had confiscated Short’s gun one 

night and that Short “went to a hospital” that same night. Short’s work 

supervisor, Robert Thomas, testified that on the Monday or Tuesday before the 

murders (i.e., July 19 or 20), Short was “tearful” and appeared “run down.” Short 

told Thomas he “just wanted to die” because Rhonda had left him. He could talk 

of nothing else and was unable to work. 

{¶ 125} Short’s cousin Loren Taylor testified that on the night of July 21, 

at the Abundant Life Tabernacle, Short made a fist and in a tense, aggravated tone 

of voice, spoke of killing. Taylor’s testimony also indicated that Short had not 

been feeding Justin: “[H]e said, is there any food here because we haven’t aten 

[sic] in awhile. My son hasn’t ate in awhile.” 

{¶ 126} Though not a member of Taylor’s church, Short not only 

attended that evening’s service but went up to the altar to pray. In fact, Justin 

testified that Short sought religious consolation during the week by attending 

services at four churches other than his own and that the congregation at each one 

offered special prayers for him. 

{¶ 127} On the night of July 22, while trying to buy a gun from Brandon 

Fletcher, Short struck the wall and said, “I don’t know what I’ve done to her to 

deserve this.” Fletcher testified that Short’s emotional state was such that 

Fletcher had thought it unwise to sell him a gun. 

{¶ 128} Given the extensive evidence of Short’s emotional distress, 

evidence that Short was suicidal on July 16 would have added little to the 

defense’s mitigation case. Thus, it cannot be said that defense counsel’s failure to 

call Rosenbalm created a reasonable probability that the result of the penalty 

phase would have been otherwise. 

{¶ 129} In part D of his fourth proposition, Short contends that his 

counsel failed to investigate mitigation and therefore could not make an informed 

strategic judgment on whether to present mitigating evidence to the jury. Short’s 
January Term, 2011 

29 

contention fails because “the record does not show the extent of counsel’s 

investigation.” Perez, 124 Ohio St.3d 122, 2009-Ohio-6179, 920 N.E.2d 104, ¶ 

224. In fact, defense counsel advised the trial court that they had “made a 

thorough investigation of mitigating evidence * * * including inquiries of family 

members and other persons.” 

{¶ 130} The record does show that counsel declined to engage a courtappointed mitigation specialist to help investigate mitigating factors. However, 

Short fails to demonstrate prejudice resulting from this decision. Nothing in the 

record indicates what a mitigation specialist could have discovered. Thus, Short’s 

ineffective-assistance claim is speculative. 

{¶ 131} In part E of his fourth proposition, Short contends that the trial 

court failed to define the term “mitigating factors” for the prospective jurors 

during the voir dire and that defense counsel should have objected to this 

omission. However, Short cites no authority for the proposition that the trial court 

was obliged to define “mitigating factors” during voir dire. Thus, he fails to show 

that defense counsel erred by not objecting. Short also fails to demonstrate 

prejudice. He offers no explanation of why or how the result of the proceeding 

would have been different had the trial court defined “mitigating factors” during 

voir dire. 

{¶ 132} Finally, in part F of his fourth proposition of law, Short contends 

that trial counsel should have raised constitutional and international-law 

objections to Ohio’s death-penalty statutes. These objections are weak and have 

been consistently rejected. (See “Settled Issues,” below.) Short’s counsel did not 

perform deficiently by declining to raise claims with no chance of success. In 

State v. Davis (1991), 62 Ohio St.3d 326, 349, 581 N.E.2d 1362, we held that trial 

counsel’s failure to file a pretrial motion challenging the constitutionality of 

Ohio’s death-penalty statute did not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel. 

{¶ 133} Short’s fourth proposition is overruled. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

30 

V. Nature and Circumstances of Offense 

{¶ 134} Short filed a motion in limine to prohibit the prosecution from 

asking the jury to consider the nature and circumstances of the offense during the 

mitigation phase of the trial. In his fifth proposition, he contends that the trial 

court erred by overruling this motion. 

{¶ 135} This proposition of law lacks merit. In the first place, Short fails 

to identify any improper prosecutorial references to the nature and circumstances 

of the offense. Even if he were able to do so, his motion in limine, by itself, was 

insufficient to preserve any issue. See State v. Maurer (1984), 15 Ohio St.3d 239, 

259, 15 OBR 379, 473 N.E.2d 768. Short’s fifth proposition is therefore 

overruled. 

VI. Settled Issues 

{¶ 136} In his sixth through 13th propositions, Short attacks the 

constitutionality of Ohio’s death-penalty statutes. His claims are summarily 

overruled. See generally State v. Poindexter (1988), 36 Ohio St.3d 1, 520 N.E.2d 

568, syllabus; State v. Spisak (1988), 36 Ohio St.3d 80, 82, 521 N.E.2d 800. 

{¶ 137} Short’s sixth proposition contends that the death penalty violates 

various aspects of international law. He contends that Ohio imposes the death 

penalty in a racially discriminatory manner and thereby violates the Convention 

on Racial Discrimination. However, Short fails to cite any precedent supporting 

this claim. We have rejected claims that Ohio applies the death penalty in a 

racially discriminatory manner. See State v. Mink, 101 Ohio St.3d 350, 2004-

Ohio-1580, 805 N.E.2d 1064, ¶ 103 (Ohio’s statutory scheme is not racially 

discriminatory), citing State v. Steffen (1987), 31 Ohio St.3d 111, 124-125, 31 

OBR 273, 509 N.E.2d 383; and State v. Zuern (1987), 32 Ohio St.3d 56, 64-66, 

512 N.E.2d 585, discussing McCleskey v. Kemp (1987), 481 U.S. 279, 107 S.Ct. 

1756, 95 L.Ed.2d 262. Hence, we have already rejected the premise of Short’s 

international-law argument. 
January Term, 2011 

31 

{¶ 138} Short’s other international-law claims have all been rejected by 

this court and/or other courts. See State v. Phillips (1995), 74 Ohio St.3d 72, 101, 

103-104, 656 N.E.2d 643; Buell v. Mitchell (C.A.6, 2001), 274 F.3d 337, 370-372 

(death penalty does not violate International Covenant on Civil and Political 

Rights (“ICCPR”) or the “customary international law norm”); People v. Perry

(2006), 38 Cal.4th 302, 322, 42 Cal.Rptr.3d 30, 132 P.3d 235 (death penalty does 

not violate ICCPR); Sorto v. State (Tex.Crim.App.2005), 173 S.W.3d 469, 490 

(death penalty does not violate United Nations Convention against Torture). 

{¶ 139} In his seventh proposition, Short contends that Ohio’s death 

penalty scheme is arbitrary and thus violates the Eighth and Fourteenth 

Amendments. He further claims that it is administered in a racially 

discriminatory manner and thus violates the Fourteenth Amendment. We have 

rejected both arguments. See State v. Jenkins (1984), 15 Ohio St.3d 164, 168-

169, 15 OBR 311, 473 N.E.2d 264; Mink, 101 Ohio St.3d 350, 2004-Ohio-1580, 

805 N.E.2d 1064; Steffen, 31 Ohio St.3d 111, 31 OBR 273, 509 N.E.2d 383; 

Zuern, 32 Ohio St.3d 56, 512 N.E.2d 585. 

{¶ 140} Likewise, we summarily reject the claims pressed in Short’s 

eighth through 13th propositions, which assert that Ohio’s death-penalty statutory 

scheme is unconstitutional for various reasons. Short’s eighth proposition is 

rejected on the authority of Jenkins at 172-173; State v. Stumpf (1987), 32 Ohio 

St.3d 95, 104, 512 N.E.2d 598. His ninth proposition is overruled on the authority 

of State v. Henderson (1988), 39 Ohio St.3d 24, 28-29, 528 N.E.2d 1237, and 

Jenkins at 178-179. His tenth proposition is overruled on the authority of State v. 

Buell (1986), 22 Ohio St.3d 124, 138, 22 OBR 203, 489 N.E.2d 795, citing State 

v. Nabozny (1978), 54 Ohio St.2d 195, 8 O.O.3d 181, 375 N.E.2d 784, paragraph 

one of the syllabus, overruled on other grounds in Nabozny v. Ohio (1978), 439 

U.S. 811, 99 S.Ct. 70, 58 L.Ed.2d 103. His 11th proposition is overruled on the 

authority of Henderson at 28-29, following Lowenfield v. Phelps (1988), 484 U.S. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

32 

231, 108 S.Ct. 546, 98 L.Ed.2d 568. His 12th proposition is overruled on the 

authority of State v. McNeill (1998), 83 Ohio St.3d 438, 453, 700 N.E.2d 596, 

citing Tuilaepa v. California (1994), 512 U.S. 967, 973-980, 114 S.Ct. 2630, 129 

L.Ed.2d 750. His 13th proposition is overruled on the authority of Steffen, 31 

Ohio St.3d 111, 31 OBR 273, 509 N.E.2d 383, paragraph one of the syllabus; see 

also State v. LaMar, 95 Ohio St.3d 181, 2002-Ohio-2128, 767 N.E.2d 166, ¶ 23. 

VII. Independent Sentence Review 

{¶ 141} In his 14th proposition of law, Short contends that the 

aggravating circumstances in his case do not outweigh the mitigating factors 

beyond a reasonable doubt. This claim invokes our duty of independent review 

under R.C. 2929.05. Under that statute, this court must independently review 

Short’s death sentence to determine whether the evidence supports the jury’s 

finding of aggravating circumstances, whether the aggravating circumstances 

outweigh the mitigating factors, and whether the death sentence is proportionate 

to those affirmed in similar cases. R.C. 2929.05(A). 

{¶ 142} With respect to each murder, Short was convicted of two 

aggravating circumstances: multiple murder, R.C. 2929.04(A)(5), and felonymurder, R.C. 2929.04(A)(7). 

{¶ 143} Multiple murder: Short was convicted under the course-ofconduct provision of R.C. 2929.04(A)(5): “[T]he offense at bar was part of a 

course of conduct involving the purposeful killing of or attempt to kill two or 

more persons by the offender.” The evidence supports Short’s convictions of this 

aggravating circumstance. First the evidence establishes that both killings were 

purposeful. Three times during the two months preceding the killings, witnesses 

heard Short say he would shoot or kill Rhonda if she ever left him. On one of 

those occasions, Short said that if Rhonda left him for another man, he would 

“shoot both of ’em.” After Rhonda left him, Short told Loren Taylor that she had 

left him for “another man” and that he had “just thought about going over there 
January Term, 2011 

33 

and killing him.” On the night of the murders, Short drove to the Dayton Mall to 

buy a gun after trying to buy one from his neighbor. When Justin begged him not 

to shoot anyone, Short replied, “[N]o — I have to do this.” After shooting 

Sweeney, Short pursued Rhonda to the bathroom, kicked in the locked door, and 

shot her. Short shot both victims in the chest, a vital area. 

{¶ 144} Second, the evidence establishes that both murders were part of a 

single course of conduct. “In order to find that two offenses constitute a single 

course of conduct under R.C. 2929.04(A)(5), the trier of fact ‘must * * * discern 

some connection, common scheme, or some pattern or psychological thread that 

ties [the offenses] together.’ ” State v. Sapp, 105 Ohio St.3d 104, 2004-Ohio7008 822 N.E.2d 1239, syllabus, quoting State v. Cummings (1992), 332 N.C. 

487, 510, 422 S.E.2d 692. Specific examples of “factual link[s]” that may 

establish a course of conduct include “time, location, murder weapon, or cause of 

death” and “a similar motivation on the killer’s part for his crimes.” Sapp at ¶ 52. 

{¶ 145} In this case, the two victims were killed within minutes of each 

other, at the same address, with the same weapon, and for the same reason. Thus, 

the evidence supports the jury’s finding that they were part of a single course of 

conduct for purposes of R.C. 2929.04(A)(5). 

{¶ 146} Felony murder: Under R.C. 2929.04(A)(7), Short was convicted 

of committing the murders as the principal offender while committing, attempting 

to commit, or fleeing immediately after committing or attempting to commit 

aggravated burglary. 

{¶ 147} The evidence supports this specification. Aggravated burglary 

under R.C. 2911.11(A)(2), as charged in the indictment, consists of trespassing by 

force, stealth, or deception in an occupied structure (defined in R.C. 2929.01(C)), 

with purpose to commit a criminal offense, while possessing a “deadly weapon or 

dangerous ordnance” (defined in R.C. 2923.11(A) and (K)), when another person 

(other than an accomplice) is present therein. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

34 

{¶ 148} When Short entered the back door of 5035 Pepper Drive, he 

trespassed. The circumstances of Rhonda’s occupancy – she had fled the family 

home at a time of marital disharmony without leaving a forwarding address and 

had contracted for utility service under her maiden name – permit the inference 

that Short lacked permission to be there. Short trespassed by force, as shown by 

Tiffany’s testimony that he shoved the door open forcefully: “When he came in 

me and Jesse kinda went back, like when he came in it was hard enough for us to 

go back * * *.” 

{¶ 149} The evidence showed that the house was an “occupied structure” 

as defined in R.C. 2909.01(C). It was undisputed that Rhonda, Tiffany, and Jesse, 

who were not Short’s accomplices, were present when Short forced his way in. 

Finally, Short’s sawed-off shotgun was a “deadly weapon” as R.C. 2923.11(A) 

defines that term: “[A]ny instrument, device, or thing capable of inflicting death, 

and designed or specially adapted for use as a weapon, or possessed, carried, or 

used as a weapon.” 

{¶ 150} Short did not introduce any evidence in the penalty phase, nor 

did he make an unsworn statement to the jury, choosing instead to rely solely on 

guilt-phase evidence. He did make a statement in allocution to the trial court, 

however. In allocution, Short stated that he accepted “full responsibility” for the 

murders and that he blamed no one else. However, he also said, “[O]ther people 

played crucial parts in what led up to my actions * * *.” Specifically, he blamed 

Donnie Sweeney for being “involved” with Rhonda, and Sweeney’s mother, 

Brenda Barian, for “playing Cupid” for Sweeney and Rhonda. 

{¶ 151} Short contended that he committed the offenses while in the grip 

of strong emotions caused by Rhonda’s leaving him. Short explained that on the 

night Officer Rosenbalm came to his house, he had been “pacing back and forth 

with a loaded shotgun contemplating suicide.” He eventually surrendered the gun 

and was taken to Middletown Regional Hospital for observation and evaluation, 
January Term, 2011 

35 

but was released within hours. Although he had been given nerve and sleep 

medication, he found that they did not help. 

{¶ 152} Short also said that one night after Rhonda left, he answered the 

telephone: “[A]ll I heard on the line was sorrowful country music like, your 

baby’s gone and the reason I must go. Someone apparently thinking my pain and 

mental anguish were amusing. This occurred sporadically throughout that 

evening.” 

{¶ 153} Short claimed that he still loved Rhonda and denied that Rhonda 

had been afraid of him. He claimed that during the week he was looking for 

Rhonda, “all [he] wanted to do was to talk to” her. In fact, Short claimed that 

even on the night of the murders, he wanted only to talk to Rhonda. 

{¶ 154} Short gave his own account of what he was thinking on the night 

of the murders. He said that he had a gun only because he feared a confrontation 

with Sweeney. Had Sweeney not been at the house, Short claimed, he would 

have left the gun in the truck. He claimed that he waited across the street “not for 

reconnaissance purposes.” He “was waiting and hoping for Mr. Sweeney * * * to 

leave.” Finally, when he “couldn’t take the mental pressure and emotional torture 

any longer,” he went to the back yard, but only so he could look through a 

window and see what Rhonda and Sweeney were doing. 

{¶ 155} Short claimed that when he encountered Sweeney on the back 

patio, he said, “[H]ey, what are you doing here with my wife?” Short said that 

Sweeney was shot during a struggle for the gun. Short said he then “went into a 

fit of rage and passion, and that’s when [his] wife was shot.” He “kicked in the 

bathroom door.” 

{¶ 156} Short stated that he had reloaded the gun and was about to kill 

himself when he saw the dying Rhonda walk into the kitchen. He put her into a 

chair and told her to “hang on” while he went for help. According to Short, he 

drove to the corner UDF and asked someone to call 9-1-1 for help at 5035 Pepper 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

36 

Drive. Then he returned to the house and waited for the police. Short concluded 

by apologizing to Sweeney’s family, Rhonda’s family, his own family, and his 

children. 

{¶ 157} Short’s principal claim in mitigation was that he suffered 

emotional distress because Rhonda left him. There is some evidence in the record 

to support this contention. However, under the circumstances of this case, this 

factor deserves no weight. Short committed the murders an entire week after 

Rhonda left him. The evidence at trial shows that the murders were thoroughly 

planned and elaborately prepared. Short discovered Rhonda’s new address from 

the power company by deception. He then drove to Huber Heights to locate the 

address. According to the realtor in Huber Heights, Short’s demeanor was calm 

at that time. 

{¶ 158} Short used his employer’s truck and wore a hat so that Rhonda 

would not recognize him. He tried to buy a shotgun from his neighbor; when he 

failed, he bought one at a store, filling out the required forms and showing 

identification. He went to a different store and bought a hacksaw, then checked 

into a hotel for privacy while he sawed off the barrel and tried to saw off the 

stock. Each step in this lengthy process required consideration and gave Short an 

opportunity to bring his emotions under control. Yet when Justin asked him not 

to kill anyone, Short insisted, “I have to do this.” Justin was with Short 

continuously during the hours leading up to the murders, and nothing in his 

testimony indicates that Short displayed any strong emotion during that time. 

{¶ 159} Thus, while the record suggests that Short did feel strong 

emotional distress over Rhonda’s leaving, it fails to indicate that Short was in the 

grip of uncontrollable emotion when he committed the murders. Thus, we find 

that this mitigating factor should receive no weight. See State v. Turner, 105 

Ohio St.3d 331, 2005-Ohio-1938, 826 N.E.2d 266, ¶ 95. 
January Term, 2011 

37 

{¶ 160} In addition to Short’s emotional state, other mitigating factors 

exist. The record shows that Short was employed and supported his family. Short 

also submitted to arrest without resistance and cooperated with the police. 

R.C.2929.04(B)(7). 

{¶ 161} In its sentencing opinion, the trial court noted that it had 

considered psychiatric reports that had been prepared before trial with regard to 

Short’s competence. The reports indicated that Short had sustained a head injury 

in 1997, had developed a dependency on prescription drugs as a result, and had a 

history of drug and alcohol abuse. Although he had some “social adjustment 

issues,” and his mother was “very strict,” Short reported no abuse. 

{¶ 162} There is nothing mitigating in the nature and circumstances of 

the offenses. Moreover, we find little that is mitigating in Short’s allocution. 

While purporting to accept “full responsibility” for the murders, Short’s 

allocution actually blames them on Sweeney and Barian. Short also gives an 

implausible account of the murders, in which Sweeney was killed in a struggle 

over the gun and Rhonda was then killed “in a fit of rage or passion.” This claim 

cannot be reconciled with Tiffany’s testimony. 

{¶ 163} We must weigh two aggravating circumstances—multiple 

murder, R.C. 2929.04(A)(5), and felony murder predicated on aggravated 

burglary, R.C. 2929.04(A)(7)—against the weak mitigation. Short asserts that the 

multiple-murder aggravating circumstance deserves only a “comparatively light” 

weight. He does not explain why this should be so, however. To the contrary, we 

found in a case that involved one murder and one attempted murder, that the 

multiple murder specification carried “great weight in aggravation.” State v. 

Hutton, 100 Ohio St.3d 176, 2003-Ohio-5607, 797 N.E.2d 948, ¶ 91. Here, 

Duane Short killed two persons, Rhonda Short and Donnie Sweeney, in the 

process of committing aggravated burglary. In this case, we find that the 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

38 

aggravating circumstances outweigh the mitigating factors beyond a reasonable 

doubt. 

{¶ 164} Finally, Short’s death sentence is proportionate to sentences 

approved in similar cases. We have affirmed death sentences in other cases 

conjoining the murder of two victims with felony murder. See State v. 

Hughbanks, 99 Ohio St.3d 365, 2003-Ohio-4121, 792 N.E.2d 1081, ¶ 144 

(burglary and double murder); State v. Mink, 101 Ohio St.3d 350, 2004-Ohio1580, 805 N.E.2d 1064, ¶ 112 (robbery and double murder). Indeed, we have 

approved death sentences for double murder or burglary-murder standing alone. 

See Braden, 98 Ohio St.3d 354, 2003-Ohio-1325, 785 N.E.2d 439, ¶ 162 (double 

murder); State v. Awkal (1996), 76 Ohio St.3d 324, 339-340, 667 N.E.2d 960 

(same); State v. Combs (1991), 62 Ohio St.3d 278, 294, 581 N.E.2d 1071 (same); 

State v. O’Neal (2000), 87 Ohio St.3d 402, 421, 721 N.E.2d 73 (defendant 

murdered estranged wife during aggravated burglary).5

{¶ 165} For the foregoing reasons, we affirm Short’s judgments of 

conviction and sentence of death. 

Judgment affirmed. 

 O’CONNOR, C.J., and PFEIFER, LUNDBERG STRATTON, O’DONNELL, CUPP, 

and MCGEE BROWN, JJ., concur. 

__________________ 

Mathias J. Heck Jr., Montgomery County Prosecuting Attorney, and 

Carley J. Ingram, Robert C. Deschler, and Leon J. Daidone, Assistant Prosecuting 

Attorneys, for appellee. 

Gary W. Crim; and Altick & Corwin., L.P.A., and Dennis J. Adkins, for 

appellant. 

______________________ 

 

5. The state’s brief incorrectly cites State v. Turner, 105 Ohio St.3d 331, 2005-Ohio-1938, 826 

N.E.2d 266, as a case involving murder during an aggravated burglary.