FI L ED U.S. COURT OF A P P E A LS E LE V EN T H C IR C U IT Au gus t 8 , 2006 THOMAS K. KAH

N CL ERK [PUBLIS H] IN THE UN ITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FO R T HE EL EV EN TH CIRC UI T

____ ____ ____ N o. 00- 1580 7

____ ____ ____ _ D.C. Dock etNo. 9 6- 00 09 7- 3- CV-DF JOHN WAS HING TO N H IG HT OW ER , Pet it io ne r-Ap pe ll an t, ve rs us W ILLIAM TERRY, Respondent -Appellee.

____ ____ ____ __ Appeal f rom the United State s District Court for the Middle District of Ge orgia

____ ____ ____ _ (A ug us t 8, 200 6) ON REMAND FROM THE UNI TED ST ATES SUPREME COURT Be fo re T JO FL A T , A

N D E RS O N and W IL SO N , Ci rc uit Jud ge s. TJO FL AT , C ircuit Judg e:Hig htower w as convic ted in 1988 of murder ing his wife and two step-da ug hters the 1 y ear b ef o re . He wa s s en t en ce d

t o d ea thfo r e ac hk i l l i n g. Our opinion in Hig htower de scribes H ightowe r’s c riminal acts and the proce dural 2 his tor y of the c a se – in

state and fe de ra l c ourt . In B atso n, the Sup re me Court he ld t hat th e Eq

ua l Pr ote c tio n Cl a

us e of the 14 th 3 Amendment for

bad the State f

rom exercisingpere mptory strikes in a ra cially

discriminatory manner duringjury

selec tion in a criminal prosec ution. The Court established a thre e-pa rt me c ha nis m f or e sta bli sh ingsu c h d isc ri min atio n, wh ic h th e Court ha s summa

ri zed a s f oll ow s: Under our B atson jurisprudenc e, once the opponent of a pere mptory

challeng e has made out a pr ima fac ie ca se of r acia l discrimination (step one), the burden of production shifts to the proponent of the strike to come f orwa rd with a ra cene utral explanation (step two). I f a r ace neutra l expl anation is tender ed, the tria l court must then decide ( step three ) whe ther the oppone nt of the strike ha s proved purposef ul discrimination. Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765, 767, 115 S. C t. 1769, 1770-71, 131 L . Ed. 2d 834 (1995). 2 Pe tit ion er Joh n W as hin gto n H igh tow er is a G eo rg iapr iso n in m at e aw ai tin g ex ec uti on f

or m ur de r. O n Augus t 6, 199 9, the U nit ed S tate s D istri ct

Co urt f or the 1 Middle District of G eorgia denied his appli cation for w rit of habeas corpus under 28 U . S. C. § 22 54, and, on Apr il 12, 200 4, w e af fi rm ed it s de ci sio n. H igh tow er

v. Sc hof ie ld, 365 F . 3d 1 008 (1 1thCi r. 200 5) . H igh tow er the re af te r pe tit ion ed

the 2 Suprem e Court for c ertiorar i review . One of the issues hi s petition raised w as wh et h erth e s t at e t ri al co u rterre di nre je ct i n g h i s cl ai m

th atth e p ro s ec u t o r’s pe re m pto ry c ha lle nge s of

bla ck j ur or s vi olate d th e Batso n r ule . S ee Batso n v. Ke ntucky , 476 U. S. 79, 106 S. C t. 1712, 90 L. Ed. 2d 69 (198 6). T he Court 3 gr an te d H igh tow er ’ s pe tit ion , va cate d our j udgm en t, and r em an de d th e ca se “ fo r further c onsid eration in light of” Miller- El v. Dr etke, 545 U.S . U .S . ___, 125 S.Miller-El’s petition soug ht relief on othe r constitutional claims as well. Miller-El, 125 4 S. Ct . at 2323. None a

re r eleva nt here . The district cour

t refe rre d Miller-El’s petition to a mag istrate judg e. Af ter he aringthe 5 petitioner’s c laims, the mag istrate judg e issued a r eport a nd rec ommendation, rec ommending that the dis tr ic t c ourt

de ny re lie f. Mil le r- El v. John so n, No . Ci v. 3:9 6- CV -1 99 2- H, sli p. op . at 1 3 Ct . 231 7, 162 L . E d. 2d 1 96 ( 2005 ). H igh tow er v. S ch of ie ld, 125 S . Ct . 292 9, 2929 -30, 162 L. Ed. 2d 863 (2005). W e conclude that Miller-E l does not counsel a decision contrary

the one we reac hed in Hightower v. Schofield, and therefore ad he re t o t ha t d eci si on . Why Mi lle r- E l do es not

c ontro l our de ci sio n be co m es c le ar w he n on e co nsi de rs howMi lle r- E l r ea ch ed the S upr em e Co urt and h owH igh tow er v. Sc hof ie ld c am e to u s. I n M ill er -E l, a ft er the T ex as Co urt of

Cr im ina l Appe al s affir m ed the trial court’ s determ ination that the prosecutor’ s perem ptory ch al le nge s of

bla ck j ur or s w er e not

r ac ia lly m oti va te d, Mi lle r- E l pe tit ion ed the United States D istrict Court for the Southern D istrict of T exas for habeas r elief – to review the court of crim inal appeals’ Batson decision. Miller-E l, 125 S. Ct. at 4 2323 . I nst ea d of

r eque sti ng the dis tr ic t c ourt t o r ev ie wthat de ci sio n onthe ba sis of the r ec or d c re at ed

be fo re the T ex as tr ia l j udge , Mi lle r- E l a ske d th e co urt t o au gm en t tha t r ec or d to c onsi de r oth er e vid en ce , inc lud ing j ur or que sti onna ir es and j uror inform ation cards. I d. at 2334 n.15. T he State had no objec tion; the district court therefor e convened an evidentiary hearing to consid er the a dditi onal 5(N.D. Te x . 2000) (mem.) (unpublished). The court a dopted the mag istrate judg e’s

rec ommendations and finding s, with modifications not relevant he re. I d. at 2. 4 ev ide nc e. I d. T he c ourt r ej ec te d M ill er -E l’ s B at son cl ai m , c hoos ing to de fe r to

“ the e xpe ri en ce of

the tr ia l c ourt j udge in ev al ua tin g th e de m ea nor of e ac h j ur or an d th e pr ose cu tor

in de te rm ini ng p ur

pose fu l di sc ri m inatio n. ” Mi lle r- E l v. Jo hn so n, No . Civ . 3: 96 -CV-1 99 2- H, sl ip . op . at 2 (N.D. Tex. 20 00 ) (m em .) (unpub lis he d) . Mi lle r- E l a ppe al ed , and the F if

th C ir cu it af

fi rm ed . Mi lle r- E l v. D re tke , 361 F . 3d 8 49, 862 ( 5thCi r. 200 4) . O f re le vanc e to the c as e be fo re us, the co urt of appe al s r ej ec te d th e pe tit ion er ’ s arg um en ts tha t “ the . . . sim ilari ty be tw ee n no n- bla ck

ve nir e m em

be rs w ho w er e not

str uc k by the pr ose cu tio n and six bla ck s who w er e” and the pr ose cu tor ’ s “ dis parate que sti oni ng w ithr es pe ct to ve nir e m em

be rs ’ vie w s onthe de ath pe na lty and the ir abil ity to im pose the m i n i m u m p u n i s h m en t ” c o n s t i tu t edci rc u m s t an t i al ev i d en ce o f t h e p ro s ec u t o r’s intent to discrim inate against the black m em bers on account of their rac e. Id. at 854- 55. T he S upr em e Co urt di sa gr ee d w iththe F if th C ir cu it’ s a sse ssm en t of the ev ide nc e co nta ine d inthe r ec or d, i. e. , the r ec or d be fo re the T ex as tr ia l j udge and the e vid en ce Mi lle r- E l pr es en te d to the dis tr ic t j udge w iththe S tate ’ s c onse nt; the Co urt c onc lud ed

that “ w he n th e ev ide nc e on the iss ue s [ the pe tit ion er ] r ai se d isIn Miller-El, the Court, addr essingthe proprie ty – under 28 U .S.C. § 2254(d)(2) – of 6 consideringevidenc e not pre sented to the trial judg e whe n rulingon the petitioner’s B atson objection, stated that it was r eac hing no de cision about whethe r the limitation on evidence in § 2254(d)( 2) is waivea

ble. Miller-El, 125 S. Ct. at 2334 n.15. Section 2254(d)(2) instructs fede ral habea s courts to consider only “the e vidence prese nted in the State cour t proce eding ,” i.e., the proce edingin which the B atson objection is raised. 5 vie w ed c um ulativ el y it s di re ct ionis too pow er fu l t o c onc lud e anythi ng b ut [ ra ci al ] di sc riminat io n.” Mil le r-El , 12 5 S . Ct. at23 39 . Inthe c as e at

hand, w e did

not de ci de H igh tow er ’ s B at son cl ai m on the ba sis of an augm en te d r ec or d, a s th e dis tr ic t c ourt, the c ourt of appe al s, and the Su pr em e Co urt di d inMi lle r- E l; rathe r, w e w er e, and are pos t- Mi lle r- E l, li m ite d to the e vid en tiary

r ec or d de ve lop ed

in the state tr ia l c ourt duri ng j ur y se le ct ionand the tr ia l c ourt’ s r

uli ng, H igh tow er ’ s and the S tate ’ s br ie fs to the S upr em e Co urt of

6 G eo rg ia( w ithr es pe ct

to the Batso n c la im), and tha t c ourt’ s op ini on ( ag ai n, w ith res pe ctto th e Bat so n c la im ). T he pr oc ed

ur al his tor

y of thi s c as e is i llu str at ive . A ft er the G eo rg ia Suprem e Court af

firm ed his conv ictions anddeath sentences, H ighto we r p e t i t i o n e dth e s t a t e s up e r i o r c o u rtf o r aw r i to f h ab e a s c o r

p u s . A mo n g h i s c l a i ms w as the Batso n c la im

he ha d pr es en te d to the sup re m e co urt i n a ppe al ing his co nvi ct ion s. T he sup er ior c ourt de cl ine d to e nte rt ai n th e Batso n c la im , c iti ng Gunter v. Hic km an, 256 Ga . 315, 348 S. E. 2d 644 (G a. 1986 ), which held that issues raised in a defendant’ s direct appeal of his conviction cannot be relitigated6

on c oll at er al a tta ck , in a habe as c or pus pr oc ee din g, se e G unt er 256 G a. a t 31 6, 348 S. E. 2 dat6 4 4 . Af

t erth e s up er i o r c o u rtd en i edre l i ef (o nal l o f t h e p et i t i o n ’s cl ai m s) , the G eo rg iaS upr em e Co urt de nie d H igh tow er ’ s a ppl ic at ionf

or pr oba ble ca use to ap pe al , and the S upr em e Co urt de nie d hi s pe tit ionf or aw ri t of c er tio rari , Hightower v. T hom as, 515 U. S. 1162 , 115 S. Ct. 2618 , 132 L. Ed. 2d 860 (1995). Having exhausted his state rem edies, H ighto we r filed the instant habeas pe tit ion . T he pe tit ionc ont ai ne d se ve ra l c la im s, inc lud ing the Batso n c la im now unde r co nsi de ratio n purs uant t o th e Su pr em e Co urt’ s m an da te . I n hi s pe tit ionand supp orting m em oranda, H ighto we r presented his Batson claim as he had presented it earlier in his brief to the Georgia S uprem e Court on direct appeal, but he added an argum ent he had om itted from his brief to the suprem e court. H e contended that if the district court com pared the prosecutor’ s questio ns to th e white juror s with those put to the black j urors, or vice versa, and the respective j urors’ answer s to those que sti ons, it

w oul d be co m e ap pare nt that the pr ose cu tor , in ex er ci sin g hi s pe re m pto ry c ha lle nge s, w as dis cr im inatin g a ga ins t the bla ck j ur or s be ca

use of their rac e. T he district court igno red this additio nal argum ent; it denied H igh tow er ’ s B at son cl ai m w iththe se w or ds: Pe tit ion er ha s e as ily

satis fi ed the f ir st tw o pr ongs of

his pr im a fa ci e bur de n un de r Batso n; the onl y dis put ed iss ue is w he the r the tot al ity of the c ir cum stanc es r ai se d an in fe re nc e that the pr ose cu tor pe re m pto ri lyIn deter mining whe ther the G eorg ia Supreme Court’s r ejec tion of Hig htower’ s Batson 7 c la im s ho uld

be su sta ine d, the dis tr ic t c ourt fo c us e d o n what w a s b e fo re the Ge or g ia Sup re me Court. In other wor ds, to the ext ent that Hig htower’ s petition contained an a rgument that Hig htower did not pre sent to that court, the district cour t ignor ed the a

rgument. The Rules Gover ning Sec tion 2254 Cases in the United States District Courts acc ommodate this policy of limit ing the district court’s e x amination of the state high court’s de cision to what was be fore the high c ourt. I f the district cour t orders the State to respond to a ha beas pe tition, Rule 5(c ) re quires the State to attach to its answe r “pa rts of the tra

nscript that the [St ate] considers r eleva nt.” Where, a s here , a B atson claim is involved, the State must attach the tra nscript of the por

tions of the trial dea ling with jury selec tion (and the B atson objection). The State provided the e ntire tr ans c ri pt o f t

he jur y se le c tio n in

thi s c a se . Ru le 5( d) a lso re qu ir e s th e State to atta c h to its answe r the brie fs the petitioner a nd the State submitted to the state appellate court, a nd that court’s “ opinions and disposit ive orde rs” r elatingto the petitioner’s c laim(s). The State pr ovided the district court with these materials in this case. I n sum, the district court, in examining, and de nying , H ighto we r’ s B atso n c la im, re lie d o n tr ans c ri pt o f t he jur y se le c tio n, the pa

rt ie s’ br ie fs to the Geor g ia Supreme Court, a nd that court’s dispositive opinion. Th e on ly

e vid e nc e Hi g hto we r a

tte mpt e d to pr e se nt t o th e tr ia l c ourt in s up po rt

of his 8 Batson objection came in the form of a newspa per a rticle, whic h purportedly

showed that the prosec utor had a

uthored a memorandum de tailing a scheme to exclude black per sons from juries. The trial c ourt excluded the new spaper article from the r ecor d, on the g round that it had not bee n 7 str uc k c er ta in j ur or s be ca

use of the ir r ac e. T he tr ia l c ourt, havin g th e be st o ppor

tun ity to vie wthe pr ose cu tor ’ s de m eanor and d et er m ine his cr ed ibi lity , f

ound the pr ose cu tor ’ s e xpl an at ion s to be c re dib le . T he tr ia l c ourt a lso f

ound the re to be ar ac e- ne utr al ba sis f or a ll of the pr ose cu tor ’ s pe re m

pto ry c ha lle nge s of

bla ck pr ospe ct ive j ur or s. T he G eo rg iaS upr em e Co urt a ff irm ed the tr ia l c ourt’ s e va luatio n. T his Court cannot say

that the Geor gia Suprem e Court’ s determ ination wa s unr ea sona

ble or c ontrary to Batso n or

any oth er S upr em e Co urt c as e w ith in the m eanin g of

the [ A nti te rr or ism

and E ff ec tiv e D eath P en al ty A ct ] . A cc or din gly , P et iti one r is n ot e nti tle d to r el ie f on this ba sis . 7 W e an al y ze d H igh tow er ’ s B at son cl ai m in the sam e fa shi on, and c onc lud ed , as the dis tr ic t c ourt di d, that “ H igh tow er ne ve r pr ovi de d th e [s tate tr ia l] c ourt w ith any evidence tending to discredit the persuasiveness of the prosecuto r’ s stated re as ons fo r str iki ng b la ck j ur or s. ” H igh tow er

v. S ch of ie ld, 365 F . 3d at 10 35. 8authenticated. We are bound by that ruling , and, as suc h, we do not conside r the a rticle a s part of the re cord be fore the Geor g ia cour ts for the purpose s of our re view under § 2254(d). 8 H igh tow er

c ont en ds tha t M ill er -E l r equir ed the dis tr ic t c ourt, and this c ourt, to e nte rt ai n th e ar gum en t he pr es en te d to the G eo rg iaS upr em e Co urt a s w el l a s th e ad dit ion al arg um en t pr es en te d to the dis tr ic t c ourt – that the c om pari son m entioned abo ve of the prosecutor’ s handlin g of the white and black j urors co m pe ls the inf

er en ce that the pr ose cu tor e xe rc ise d hi s pe re m

pto ry c ha lle nge s on r a c i a l g r o u n d s . I ne f

f e c t , h e w an t s t o r e - b r i e f

h i s ap p e a l t o th e G e o r g i aS up r e me Co urt. W e as sum e that he int en de d to do j ust that whe n he inc lud ed

his Batso n claim in his habeas petiti on to th e state superior court. T he superior court rej ected his attem pt; the sup rem e court had adj udicated the claim , and state procedural law p r e c l u d e dh i m f

r o m r e l i t i g at i n g i to nc o l l a t e r a l a t t a c k . T h e G e o r g i aS up r e me Co urt e ff ec tiv el y a gr ee d whe n it

de nie d H igh tow er ’ s a

ppl ic at ionf

or pr oba ble cau se to ap pe al . T he ne t e ff

ec t of the se r uli ngs is tha t i f H igh tow er w an ts the f

ed er al c ourts to e nte rt ai n an arg um en t he c oul d have m ad e in the G eo rg iaS upr em e Co urt but did not , he m

ust e sta bli sh c au se f

or his c ouns el ’ s f

ai lur e to p re se nt the arg um en t an d r es ult ing pr ej udi ce . S ee F ranc is v . H en de rs on, 425 U . S. 536 , 542 , 96 S . Ct . 1708 , 171 1, 48 L . E d. 2d 1 49 ( 1976 ). H e ha s de m onstrate d ne ith er . A lth oughhisAl tho ugh M ill e r- El inv olv e d o nly the a pp lic atio n o f § 22 54 (d )( 2) , M ill e r- El , 1 25 S. Ct . 9 at 2325, the dissent contends that we should g rant Hightower’ s writ of habe as cor pus on the g round that the Ge org ia cour ts’ reje ction of Hightower’ s Batson claim constituted a dec ision “contr ary to, or involv[ ing] an unre asonable application of, c lear ly established F eder al law” under § 2254( d)(1) . See post, at __. The dissent a rgues that the state c ourts rende red suc h a decision bec ause the trial court, a nd the Geor g ia Supreme Court on a ppeal, f ailed to ca

rry out Batson’s third step in that they failed to find c redible the prosec utor’s ra ce- neutra l expl anations fo r s tr iki ngbla c k ju

ro rs . Se e po st, at __ ; se e a lso Ric e v. Col lin s, __ _ U .S. __ _, __ _, 12 6 S. Ct. 969, 974, 163 L . Ed. 2d 824 (2006) ( “Third, the c ourt must then determine whether the def endant has ca rried his burde n of provingpurposef ul discrimination. This final step involves evaluating the per suasiveness of

the justification proff

ere d by the prosec utor . . . .” (c itations and internal qu otatio n ma

rk s o mitte d) ). In s o d oin g , th e dis se nt f oc us e s o n th e tr ia l c ourt ’s langua g e in overr uling Hightower’ s Batson objection, in which it stated only that, “as to e ach individual strike, the State has pr esente d an ar ticulable nonra ce r elated r eason f or strikingthe prospec tive juror.” Th e dis se nt f

a ils to r e c ognize , h ow e ve r, that a tr ia l c ourt ’s dis po sit ive ru lin gmay c onta in implicit findi ng s, which, thoug h unstated, ar e nec essar y to that ruling. See United States v. $2 42 ,4 84 .0 0, 38 9 F .3 d 1 14 9, 11 54 (1 1th Cir . 2 00 4) (e n b anc ) ( “ [W]e and oth e r f e de ra l a pp e llate courts have “infe rre d from a district c ourt’s explicit factual finding s and conc lusion implied fac tual finding s that are consistent with the its judgment although unstated.”) ; see a lso 9A C h ar l e s A l anW r i g h t& A rthur M i l l e r , F e d e r a l P r a c t i c e an d P r o c e d ur e , § 2 5 7 9 ( 2 d

e d . 1 9 9 5 ) ( “ In so me c a se s if

the c ourt fa ils to m ake a

fi nd ingon

a pa rt ic ula r f a c t it ha s b e e n a ssume d . . . that it impliedly made a findingconsistent with its gene ral finding .”). I n such ca ses, we make “the common sense judg ment that materia l fac tual issues were resolved by the [trial] court in favor of the judg ment when it was r easona ble for that court to [have] do[ ne] so in li g ht of the evide nce.” $2 42 ,4 84 .0 0 at 11 54 -5 5. We h ave inv ok e d ( a lbe it t a c itl y ) t his pr inc ipl e in t

wo B atso n a

pp e a ls, United States v. Cure, 996 F .2d 1136 (11th Cir. 1993), and United States v. D avid, 844 F.2d 767 (11th Cir. 1988), in which we upheld a district cour t’s overr uling of a B atson objection eve n though the district court did not expl icitly find the prose cutor’s r ace -neutra l expl anations to be 9 habe as pe tit ionto the dis tr ic t c ourt a lle ge s th at his law y er s de nie d hi m

e ff ec tiv e as sis tanc e of

c ouns el , it

doe s no t a lle ge that c ouns el w er e ine ff ec tiv e in the Ge orgia Suprem e Court for f ailing to advance his com parisons of black jurors st ru ckby the pro se cu to r to whi te juro rs acce pt edby the pro se cu to r. We h av e c o n s i d er edMi l l er -E l i nth e c o n t ex to f t h e i n s t an tca s e. We c o n c l u d e th a ti td o e s n o tc h an g e o u r d i s p o s i t i o no f

H i g h t o w e r ’s B a t s o nc l a i m. 9cre dible. See Cure, 996 F .2d at 1138-39; David, 844 F.2d at 769.

In th is c a se , th e tr ia l c ourt , a ft e r a ssumin gthat H ighto we r h a d ma de out a pr ima fa c ie case of ra cial discrimination, expressly found that the prose cutor ha d provided a n “ar ticulable, nonrac e re lated re ason” f or ea ch strike, a

nd overr uled Hig htower’ s Batson objection. The trial court’s ove rrulingof Hightower’ s Batson objection would have de fied log ic had the c ourt disbelieved the pr osecutor’ s rac e-ne utral explanations. We may there fore make “ the common sense judg ment” – in light of defe nse counse l’s failure to rebut the prose cutor’s e x planations and the trial cour

t’s ultimate ruling – that the trial court implicitly found the prose cutor’s r ace -neutra l explanations to be credible, the reby completingstep three of the B atson inquiry .

10 Ourop in io n i n Hi gh to wer v . Sch of ie ldis acco rd in gl y

rei ns ta te d. SO ORDERED.11

W IL SO N , Ci rc uit

Jud ge , dis se nti ng: I dissent from

the order r einstating our previous o pinio n because this case, ev enm or e than Miller-E l v. Dretk e , 545 U . S. 231 , 125 S . Ct . 231 7, 162 L . E d. 2d 196 (2 005) , c om

pe ls a f ind ing that Batson v. K

entucky , 476 U . S. 79, 106 S . Ct . 17 12 , 90 L. Ed. 2d69 (19 86 ), was v io la te d. Mil le r- El cam e to the Suprem e Court on r ev ie w“ fo llo w ing the T ex as tr ia l c ourt’ s pr ior de te rm inatio n of

f ac t tha t the State’ s race -neutral explanations [for striking b lack venirem em bers] we re true. ” 545 U . S. a t __

_, 125 S . Ct . a t 23 25. T he tr ia l c ourt i n Mil le r- El spe ci fi ca lly

f ound that the prosecutor’ s justifications for striking black venirem em bers we re

“ co m ple te ly c re dib le [ an d] suf

fi ci en t” to supp ort a

f ind ing of “ no p ur pose fu l dis cr im inatio n. ” 545 U . S. a t __ _, 125 S . Ct . a t 23 23. T he S upr em e Co urt, re vie w ing the c as e unde r the A nti te rr or ism and E ff ec tiv e D eath P en al ty

A ct of 1996 ( the “ A E D PA ”) , state d th at “ Mi lle r- E l m ay

obt ai n r el ie f onl y

by sho w ing the T ex as c onc lus ionto be ‘ anunr ea sona ble de te rm inatio n of

the f ac ts i n li ght

of the evidence presented in the State court proce eding.’ ” Id . a t __ _, 125 S . Ct . a t 23 25 (quot ing 28 U . S. C. § 22 54( d) (2 )) . T o pr ev ai l, Mi lle r- E l w as r equir ed to pr ove “by cl ear a ndco nv in ci ng ev id en ce” t ha t t he factua l d et erm in at io n was un reas on ab le . Id . ; 28 U . S. C. § 22 54.12

Mi lle r- E l ha d to ove rc om e a dif fi cu lt bur de n ( cl ear an d c onvi nc ing evidence); H ighto we r, on the oth er hand, does not . In Hightower ’ s case, the trial co urt m er el y

f ound that the pr ose cu tor ’ s j ust if ic at ion s w er e “ ar

tic ula ble ” an d

“ nonr ac e re late d” and n ev er tou ch ed on the c re dib ili ty

of tho se state m en ts. T he G eo rg iac ourts n ev er

m ad e fa ct

ua l de te rm inatio ns r eg ar din g th e pla usi bil ity of the proffer ed j ustifications because they never applied the final step of B ats on . T hus, the Geor gia courts rendered a decision th at w as “ contrary to, or involved an un reas on ab le ap pl ic at io n o f, cl earl y est ab li sh edFed eral law.” 2 8 U.S.C. § 2254 (d )( 1) . I n li ght

of the G eo rg iac ourts’ e rr or and o f the e vid en ce pr es en te d to the m , I w oul d gr an t H igh tow er ’ s ha be as pe tit ion . I. T he Ge or gia c ou rt s f ail ed t o ap pl y Batson’s third step. Whe n w e ini tia lly

de ci de d th is c as e, I c onc ur re d w iththe r es ult

but expressed reser

vations about the state courts’ application o f B ats on . See H igh tow er v . Sc hof ie ld , 365 F . 3d 1 008, 104 1 (2004) ( “H ighto wer I” ) (W il so n, J ., concurring). As I stated in m y concurrence , it a

ppeared that the state trial c ourt an dth e Ge o r g i aS up r e me C o u rtf a i l e dt o p r o p e r l y a

p p l y B ats on’

s thi rd ste p by co nc lu di ng th ei r an al y si s at th e en d o f th e se co ndst ep . Id . a t 10 42. A B ats on ch al le ng e req ui res a th ree- st ep in qu iry. R ic e v. Co lli ns , __ U .S .

__, __, 126 S . Ct . 969 , 973 , 163 L . E d. 2d 8 24 ( 2006 ). “ Fi rs t, the tr ia l c ourt m ustThe trial c ourt found that Hightower f ailed to establish a pr ima fac ie ca se of 1 discrimination. That deter mination is erroneous. Se eHi gh tow e r I , 365 F.3d at 1043 (Wil son, J ., concur ring ). B oth the majority , here , and the Ge org ia Supreme Court a ssumed for pur poses of analy sis that Hightowe r established a prima fa cie c ase of

discrimination. 13 de te rm ine w he the r the de fe ndant h as m ad e a pr im a fa ci e show ing that the pr ose cutor

e xe rc ise d ape re m

pto ry c ha lle nge on the ba sis of r ac e. S ec ond, if

the showing is m ade, the burden shi fts to the prosecutor to present a race -neutral explanation for striking the juror in question.” Id . ( ci tatio ns o m itt ed ). T he se co nd ste p r equir es e va luatin g th e explana tio n onit s f ac e – “ so l ong as the r ea son is n ot inherently

discrim inatory , it suffic es.” Id . T hir d, the tr ia l c ourt m

ust “ as se ss the plausib ility

of that rea son in light o f all evidence w ith a bearing on it.” Mil le r- El , 545 U . S. a t __

_, 125 S . Ct . 233 1. “ T his f ina l st ep inv olv es e va luatin g ‘ the persuasiveness of the justification’ proffer ed by the prosecutor . . . .” Rice , ___ U . S. a t __

_, 126 S . Ct . a t 97 4 ( quot ing Purkett v. Ele m , 514 U. S. 765, 768, 115 S. Ct . 176 9, 177 1, 131 L . E d. 2d 8 34 ( 1995 ) (p er c ur iam )) . T he G eo rg iac ourts d id n o tap p l y Batson’s thi rd

ste p. The tri al co ur t m ad e ex pl ic itde te rm in at io ns wit h re ga rdto on ly the fir sttwo steps. T he trial court asked the prosecutor, Joseph Briley , a bouteach struck black 1 ve nir em em

be r, start ing w ithRi cky

T hom as . A ft er

Br ile y of fe re d hi s j ust if

ic at ion , the trial court im

m ediately stated, w ithou t asking for the defendant’ s inpu t, “ Mr.14

Br ile y , I f ind that i s an art ic ula

ble r ea son the S tate ha s st at ed f or str iki ng R ic ky T hom as and i s no t r ac e re late d. ” T he tr ia l c ourt the n pr oc ee de d to a sk a bout the ne xt p ote nti al j ur or . A ga in a ft er Br ile y ’ s e xpl an at ion , the tr ia l c ourt, w ith out pausi ng, f

ound that “ the S tate ha s st at ed an art ic ula

ble r ea son fo r str iki ng L uc iou s Boswell and the re ason is no t race relate d.” The tr ial court and Briley repeated this sequ ence f

or eac h of the six struck bl ack venirem em bers. Finally , a fter he ar ing a ll the pr ose cu tor ’ s r ea sons , the c ourt st at ed , “ I fi nd tha t the de fe ndants have f ai le d to e sta

bli sh a pr im a fa ci e ca se of

dis cr im inatio n onthe part of the district attorney . I further find that as to each individ ual strike, the S tate has presented an articulable, nonrace re lated rea son for striking the prospective juror. ” The trial court

never m ade a finding th at these reaso ns were credible and never ad dr es se d “ th e p er

su as iv en es s o

f the ju st if

ic at io n[ s] .” P urk

et t , 514 U . S. a t 76 8, 115 S. Ct . a t 17 71. T he G eo rg iaS upr em e Co urt a lso f ai le d to r ea ch Batson’s fin al st ep . Apply ing a clearly

err oneous standard and assum ing th at H ighto we r had established a prim a fa cie ca se, the G eorgia Suprem e Court af firm ed the trial court’ s determ ination that the prosecutor’ s reasons for striking venirem em bers w er e ra ce -n eutr al . T he langua ge use d inthe G eo rg iaS upr em e Co urt’ s op ini on s u g g es t s th ato n ce a p ro s ec u t o r h as ar t i cu l at edre as o n s fo r h i s ch al l en g es , aco u rt ’sTh e Ge or g ia Sup re me Court ’s e nti re dis c us sio n o f H ighto we r’ s Batson claim is as 2 fo llo ws : The de fenda

nt contends the prose cution was guilty of ra cial discrimination. The prosecutor used only seven of his authorized 10 pere mptory strikes. He use d six of those seve n strikes ag ainst black prospe ctive jurors. The rec ord shows that at least two blac k prospec tive jurors wer e struck by

the def endant a fter ha

ving be en ac cepte d by

the prosec utor. The pr osecutor e xpla ine d h is p e re mpt or

y c ha lle ng e s. F our o f t

he c ha lle ng e d p ro sp e c tiv e jur or s w e re c los e ly related to persons c onvicted of se rious felonies. The other two were c onscientiously opposed to the death penalty , althoug h not to the extent they wer e excused for

cause . The trial c ourt fo un d th at th e pro secu tor h a d a rt ic ulate d le g iti ma

te no n- ra c ia l r e a so ns fo r h is c ha lle ng e s. Ev e n a ssumin gthe de fe nd ant m a de out a pr ima fa c ie c a se , the tr ia l court ’s de te rm inatio n is no t c le arl y

e rr on e ou s. Hi gh tow e r v . S

tate , 259 Ga. 770, 773, 386 S.E.2d 509, 512 (1989) (citations omitted). The Geor g ia Supreme Court used the words “le g itimate” and “ non-ra cial” when par aphra sing the trial court’s f indings re g ardingto the prosec utor’s prof fer ed re asons, but the trial cour t stated that for eac h struck venir emember , “the State [] presented an articulable, nonrace re lated rea son.” Importantly , the Geor g ia Supreme Court mer ely aff irmed the trial c ourt’s finding s, which did not inc lud e fi nd ing s a s to the pla us ibi lity of the pr os e c uto r’ s p ro ff

e re d r e a so ns . 15 finding that those reasons are ra ce-neutra l is sufficient to end the B ats on i n qu i ry. 2 The G eorgia Suprem e Court appear s to have been evaluating n ot whether H igh tow er

ha d m et his bur de n of

e sta bli shi ng p ur

pose fu l di sc ri m inatio n, but m erely whether the prosecutor’ s proffer ed rea sons for the strikes w ere race -n eu tra l. T he m aj or ity

say s th at the tr ia l c ourt implicitly reac he d t he fin al st ep . A nte , __ n.9. I disagree. Im

plicit findin gs m

ust be “ reasonable in light o f the re cord evidence.” U

nited Sta tes v . $24 2, 484. 00 , 389 F . 3d 1 149, 115 4- 55. T he m aj or ity does not evaluate the re cord to determ ine whether its im plicit findin gs are re as ona ble . A s I e xpl ai n be low , the r ec or d f ai ls t o su ppor t a f ind ing that theTh is c a se is d ist inguis ha ble fr om Atwater v. Crosby , 11th Cir. 2006, ___ F.3d ___ (No. 3 03-16259, June 12, 2006). In Atwater , w e he ld t hat g e ne ra lly

a de fe nd ant m

us t pr e se nt s ome evidenc e or a

rgument of compa

rability at the time that the Batson c ha lle ng e is m a de in o rd e r t o rely upon that argument in habea s proce eding s. Id. Howeve r, in Atwater , the trial cour t“went beyond a mer e findingthat the state a rticulated a

rac e neutr al re ason for

the strike.” Id. “The tr ia l ju dg e up he ld t

he pe re mpt or

y str ike a ft e r a g re e ingthat [th e jur or ] exhi bit e d s ome dif fi c ult y with her re sponses to the prosec ution question.” In so doing, “ the third step of the Batson analy sis was touched.” Id. Her e, the judg e mer ely found, for

ever y struck blac k venire member, that Br iley

had g iven an “ articula

ble” a nd “nonra ce r elated” justification for the strike–ne ver venturingbeyond Batson’s second step r equiringa cle arly articulated, ra ce- neutra l justi fication. “ Wisd om t oo of

te n n e ve r c ome s, and

so on e ou g ht n ot t o r e

je c t it me re ly be c a us e it 4 comes late .” Hensleev. Union Planters Nat. Bank &Trust Co. , 3 35 U. S. 5 95 , 6 00 , 6 9 S. Ct. 290, 293, 93 L . Ed. 259 (1949) ( Fr ankfur ter, J., dis senting ). 16 pr os ecu to r’s reas on s wer e cre di bl e. T he c onc lus ionhe re is ine sc ap ab le : B y r ej ec tin g H igh tow er ’ s B ats on c la im m erely because the prosecutor’ s justifications we re “ articulable” and “ nonrace related, ” the G eorgia courts’ adj udication “ resulted in a decision th at w as contrary to, or involved an un reasonable application of,” B ats on . § 2254 (d)(1). 3 II. Th e pr of

fe re d re ason s wer e pr et ex tu al . Having re- considered m

y pre-Mil le r- El

concurrence , I am

now persuaded that had the Georgia courts engaged in all three of Batson’s ste ps, the y in al l likeliho od would have foun d a B ats on violatio n. H ere, the trial court had before 4 it the num

be r of pe re m pto ry str ike s us ed

to re m ove bla ck

ve nir em em

be rs , the voi r dir e an sw er s of

a ll the ve nir em em

be rs , the pr ose cu tor ’ s pr of fe re d r ea sons f

or str iki ng c er

ta in v en ir em em

be rs , the de fe ndant’ s r ep re se ntatio ns a bout theThe de fense attorney made the f

ollowing state ment, amongothers, in support of 5 Hi g hto we r’ s Batson challeng e:

[Of the seven pe remptory strikes, Br iley ] has used six of those strikes to strike blacks. . . . Mr. B riley

has in the past shown a

bent and sc heme to kee p down the low numbe r o f b la c ks on

e ith e r t he g ra nd jur y or re gula r p ane ls. . . . H e ha s p ur

po se ly e xclu de d b la c ks so that Mr . H ighto we r w ill no t g e t a fa ir and imp art ia l he ari ngon

thi s case and this matter. Your Honor , Ihave he re a copy of the Fulton Daily Reporter which wa s on Wednesday , Marc h 30, 1988, wher e we g ot headlines, “ Does County Plan To Discriminate, high court he ars jury panel.” This was re g ardingthe ca se of the State v. Amadeo which has g one up to the Ge org ia Supreme Court. I will make a quote he re f

rom the U.S. Supreme Court Jus tice John P aul Stevens. “The evidenc e disclosed is the intentional prog ram of r igg ing the jury by the prosec utor’s off

ice.” This arose out of

a memo which has be en attributed to Mr. B riley stating that there w as a pur pose and a

plan to h ave a me mbe r [s ic ] num

be r o f b la c ks on

the g ra nd jur y in P utn am Co unty

in o rd e r t o have it just half the jury

criter ia for grand jury . . . . You ar e we ll acquainted w ith that case , Your Honor . We would say that this is t he same circ umstances [sic], t he same sort of sc he me that Mr . B ri le y

wa s d oin gin t

his pa rt ic ula r c a se . H e is p ur

po se ly us inghis strikes to provide for

just the mini mum amount of blacks, absolutely the minimum amount, but what he ha s done is preve nted Mr. Hightower f rom g etting a

fair a nd i mp art i al h eari n g. Impo rt antl y , B ri le y , a lth ou g h d isp uti ngthe me mor and um’ s p ur po se , e sse nti a lly admitted penningthe memora ndum when he r esponded, “ Your Honor , insofar a s the statements from the D aily Report and the statements from Just ice Stevens, . . . I believe J ustice O’Conne r aske d the def ense la wyer . . . ‘ couldn’t it have be en that Mr. B riley was trying to g et the matter

improved and w as tellingthem how fe w they could put on it, in the jury box .’ So, Your Honor , it is a matter of whic h direc tion y ou look at this case . . . .” 17 p ro s ec u t o r’s h i s t o ry o f d i s cr i m i n at i o ni nju ry s el ec t i o n , a n dth e p ro s ec u t o r’s re spon se to the a cc usatio ns. 5 Be ca use the G eo rg iac ourts n ev er a sse sse d B ri le y ’ s c re dib ili ty r eg ar din g hi s use of perem

ptory strikes, w e have no factual f indin g to which to defer, and can lo okto th e rec or d t o d et erm in e whe th er i t s up po rts th e p ro ffer edjus ti fic at io ns . Se e Mil le r- El , 545 U . S. a t __ _, 125 S . Ct . a t 23 23, 232 6- 30 ( w he re the state c ourtsThe majority states that in order

for us to consider

Hig htower’ s arguments comparing 6 str uc k b la c k v e nir e me mbe rs wi th n on -c ha lle ng e d n on -b la c k v e nir e me mbe rs , “ he mus t e sta bli sh cause for his counse l’s failure to present the a rgument [i n state cour

t] and re sulting pre

judice.” Ma jor ity Op ., at __

_. To the e xtent th at th e ma jor ity ho lds that any

pa rt of Hi g hto we r’ s Batson c la im proce durally

defa ulted, Idisag ree . No Geor g ia cour t has eve r found a

ny part of Hi g hto we r’ s Batson claim proc edura lly barr ed, nor did the ma

jority mention this as a g round for denying r elief in the pr ior vac ated opinion. Se e, ge ne ra lly , H igh tow e r v . S

tate , 259 Ga. 770, 386 S.E .2 d 5 09 (1 98 9) ; Hi

gh tow e r I , 365 F.3d 1008 ( 2004). F urthermor e, the c omparative juror analy sis is further evide nce of a Batson vio latio n th at th e tr ia l c ourt could haveconsidere d at Batson’s third step, whether counsel made the ar gument or not. See, e .g., Miller-El , 545 U.S. at ___, 125 S. Ct . at 2325 (whe re c omparative juror ana ly sis was consider ed). 18 an d th e Su

pr em e Co urt l ooke d to the voi r dir e re co rd to de te rm ine w he the r the pr of fe re d r ea sons w er e pr et ex tua l) . “ If a pr ose cu tor ’ s pr of

fe re d r ea son fo r str iki ng a bla ck pane lis t a

ppl ie s j ust

a s w el l t o an othe rw ise -s im ilar nonb la ck [ pane lis t] w ho i s pe rm itt ed

to se rv e, that i s e vid en ce te ndi ng t o pr ove pur pose fu l dis cr im inatio n to be c onsi de re d at Batson’s third step.” Mil le r- El , 545 U. S. at ___, 125 S. Ct. at 2325. T he rec ord is replete w ith exam ples of venirem em

bers 6 w ho w er e str

uc k arg uably

be ca use of the ir r ac e, but thr ee str ike s are e spe ci al ly tr o ub l i n g , s p e c i f

i c a l l y t h e e x e r c i s e o f

p e r e mp t o ry c h a l l e n g e s t o e l i mi n a t e T h e l ma Bu tle r, Ri cky

T hom as , and E m er son D av is. Br ile y c la im s th at

he str uc k T he lm a Bu tle r be ca

use he suc ce ssf

ull y prosecuted her brother-in-lawtwe lve y ears prior. H e also claim s that Butler wa s som ew hat hosti le. From

the rec ord, it appear s that Butler wa s an ideal j uror for a prosecutor seeking th e death penalty . Butler fe lt that peopl e tried for m urder ar e19

treated too leniently . She w as stronglyin favor of the death penalty . She fe lt that m iti ga tin g c ir cum stanc es m ust be pr ove n be fo re she w oul d c onsi de r im posi ng a life sentence. H er answers a lone und erm ine the veracity of Briley ’ s proffer ed jus ti fic at io n, es pe ci al ly sin ce h e n ev er que st io ne d B ut le r ab ou t h er b ro th er-i n- la w. Even m ore striking is th e fa ct that Briley declined to strike a non-black juror, Mi ch ae l H en sle r, w ho, him se lf , ha d be enc onvi ct ed

of and i m pr iso ne d f

or volu ntary m anslaugh ter by

Briley ’ s office. Inanothe r ex am

ple , Ri cky

T hom as ’ s f

athe r ha d be enc onvi ct ed of kil lin g his m oth er . B ec au se of

thi s c onvi ct ionand the f ac t tha t T hom as ha d li ve d w ithhis father a fter his father’ s release , the prosecutor struck him speculating th at T hom as m ay possi bly identify his father’ s case w ith Hightower’ s. Y et, Thom as indicated that he w as in favor

of the de ath pe na lty , and tha t he did not e ve n r em em

be r the ci rc um stanc es sur

ro undi ng h is m oth er ’ s ki lli ng b ec au se he w as too y oung a t the tim e. T he pr ose cu tor

ne ve r que sti one d T hom as about his r el at ion shi p w ithhis fathe r or the pot en tia l i m

pa ct on h is a bil ity to de ci de the c as e fa ir ly . A ga in, the pr et ex t i s m or e ap pare nt whe n vi ew ed in lig ht o f the f

ac t tha t H en sle r w as not str uc k. Em erson Davis w as struck because the prosecutor claim ed that Davis w as som ewha t op pose d to the de ath pe na lty , m or e so than othe r ve nir em em be rs . D av isThese jur ors include Me rrick Ca rter, Rhonda

Batchelor, N ellie Stapp, M. P. Ervin, 7 Miriam Shatterly , and John Hutcheson. 20 ne ve r state d th at

he w as opp ose d to the de ath pe na lty , but r athe r ha d to he ar

the case bef ore im posin g the penalty . The prosec utor m ischaracter ized his voir dire, the re by und er m ini ng a c la im that the pr ose cu tor ’ s r ea son w as r ac e- ne utr al . I n f ac t, D av is’ s vi ew s w er e in l ine w ithse ve ra l no n- bla ck j ur or s w hom

the pr ose cu tor 7 declined to challenge. If

Davis was undesirable as com pared to other ve nir em em

be rs on the que sti on a

bout the de ath pe na lty , the n th e pr ose cu tor w oul d have use d hi s r em ai nin g pe re m pto ry str ike s to e lim inate oth er ve nir em em

be rs w ho gave sim ilar answe rs. How ever, the non-black venirem em bers who gave sim ilar an sw er s w er e not

str uc k. V ie w ing the e vid en ce in its tot al ity , inc lud ing the “ sm oki ng g un” m em or an dum

pe nne d by

Br ile y , it is cl ear that B ri le y ’ s pr of fe re d j ust if

ic at ion s w er e pr et ex tua l.

III. This c ase is factually on all fours w ith Miller-El. T he f ac tua l si m ilari tie s be tw ee n Mil le r- El and this case are extensive. In Mil le r- El , the prosecutors struck ten of the eleven qualified black venirem em bers w i th p e r e mp t o ry c h a l l e n g e s . 5 4 5 U. S . a t_ _ _ , 1 2 5 S . C t . a t2 3 2 5 . He r e , B r i l e y,In Miller-El , one blac k juror wa s allowed to ser ve. 545 U.S. at ___, 125 S. Ct. at 2325. 8 Her e, thre e blac k jurors ser ved at tria l. This differe nce is unimportant, espe cially in light of Br i l ey ’s m em o ran d

um . A p ro s ec ut o r u s i n g any of its pere mptory challeng e to eliminate a venire member be cause of ra ce r uns afoul of the Equal Protection Clause. See B atson , 4 76 U. S. at 98 n. 22 , 1 06 S. Ct . at 17 24 n. 22 ; Cochran v. He rring , 43 F.3d 1404, 1412 ( 11th Cir. 1995). B ri le y str uc k B utl e r, Th oma s, Luc iou s B os we ll, and Matti e Ha

rr is. 9 21 use d si x of

se ve n pe re m

pto ry str ike s to str ike bla ck

ve nir em em

be rs . I n Mil le r- El , 8 the pr ose cutor

str uc k abla ck

ve nir em em

be r be ca use the j ur or

w as “ inc lin ed ” to favor r eh ab ili tatio n, w hil e non- bla ck j ur or s, w ho e xpr es se d stro nge r be lie fs in fav orof r eh ab il it at io n, wer e n otst ru ck . 54 5 U.S. at__ _, 1 25 S. Ct. at23 27 -2 9. He re, Briley

struck Davis, a black venirem em ber, because he w as “ som ew hat oppo se d to the de ath pe na lty ” as c om pare d to oth er

ve nir em em

be rs , but did not strike non-black veni rem em bers, such as Carter , S hatterly , and oth ers m entioned above, who expressed views sim ilar to Davis’s, and in som e instances expressed vie w s m or e equiv oc al than D av is’ s. Furthe r, in Mil le r- El , the prosecutor struck fr om the j ury black v en i re m emb er s b ec au s e t h ey h adre l at i v es wh o we re p ro s ec u t edb y th e D .A. ’s office. 545 U. S. ___, 125 S. Ct at 2328 . The C ourt noted th e prosecutor’ s failure to inq uire into the details of the conv ictions andrelationships as further evidence th atth e rea so n was a pr et ex t. Id . H ere, Briley

struck four black venirem em bers because they

allegedly had relatives w ho were prosecuted by the D. A. ’ s office. 922

Jus t a s in Mil le r- El , Br ile y did not inquir e int o th e de ta ils of the se c onvi ct ion s and re latio nshi ps. B ri le y

a lso de cl ine d to c ha lle nge , H en sle r, anon -b la ck j ur or w ho him se lf had been prosecuted and convi cted of volunt ary m anslaugh ter. In Mil le r- El , the pr ose cutor , w hil e statin g th e ra ce -n eu tr al r ea sons f or the strikes, m ischaracter ized the voir dire testim ony of som e of the black venirem em

bers he struck. 545 U.S . at ___, 125 S. Ct at 2327 . Sim ilarly , B riley m isc hara ct er iz ed

the te sti m ony

of D av is. T his c as e is a

m or e fa ct

ua lly c om pe lli ng B ats on vio latio n th an Mil le r- El be ca use of Br ile y ’ s pe rs ona l hi sto ry of pa st d isc ri m inatio n. T he de fe ndant i n Mil le r- El de m onstrate d li ttl e, if

any , pa st h ist or

y of dis cr im inatio n by

the spe ci fi c prosecutors inv olved in his case, rely ing m ainly on a m anual that instructed prosecutors to m inim ize the num ber of black j urors. T he Suprem e Court stated that this evid ence confirm ed its conclusi on that th e ra ce-neutra l reasons we re pr et ex tua l. 545 U . S. a t __ _, 125 S . Ct

a t 23 39. H er e, Br ile y

him se lf auth or ed a m em orandum

that spelled out the schem e to lim it the num ber of blacks in the j ury pool . T he H igh tow er ’ s c ouns el arg ue d th at Br ile y ha d “ in the pa st s hown abe nt an d sc he m e to k ee p do w n th e [] num be r of bla ck s” se rv ing on j ur

y pane ls, and cl ai m ed that B ri le y

w ro te am em or an dum

de ta ili ng a

plan to li m it the num

be r of b l a c k s o ng r an dj u r i e s . I n s t e a do f d e n yi n g i n v o l v e me n tw i th th e me mo r an du m,23

Br ile y r es pond ed

to the a cc usatio ns arg uin g th at the m em or an dum

c oul d be vie w ed a s an e ff ort t o im pr ove m atte rs . H ad the tr ia l c ourt de lve d in to Batson’s thi rd ste p, thi s e vid en ce a lon gsi de th e o th erev i d en ce wo u l dh av e c as tg ra v e d o ub to nth e t ru th fu l n es s o f B ri l ey’s pr of fe re d r ea sons . IV . C on cl us ion Th e G eo rg i a c o u rt s m ad e n o d et erm i n at i o nas t o wh et h erth e p ro s ec u t o r’s pr of fe re d j ust if

ic at ion s w er e pr et ex tua l. I n f ind ing no B ats on vio latio n, the state co urts r el ie d onthe f

ac t tha t the pr of

fe re d j ust if

ic at ion s w er e “ ar

tic ula ble ” an d

“ nonrace re lated.” This is sufficient for B ats on’ s second step, but no t the third step which “ invo lves evaluating the persuasiveness of the justification.” Rice , ___ U. S. at ___, 126 S. C t. at 974. W e cannot presum e that Briley ’ s proffer ed j ustifications we re truthful because the tria l court never m ade that finding. Af ter re vie w ing the e vid en ce ava ila ble to the tr ia l c ourt, I c onc lud e that B ri le y ’ s r ea sons w er e pr et ex tua l, and tha t B ats on w as vio late d. A cc or din gly , I w oul d gr an t Hig ht owe r’s writof h ab eas co rp us . T he S upr em e Co urt va cate d our pr ior de ci sio n and r em an de d th is c as e “ fo r further c onsid eration in light of [Mil le r- El ] .” H igh tow er v . Sc hof ie ld , __ U . S. __,

__, 125 S . Ct . 292 9, 292 9- 30, 162 L . E d. 2d 8 63 ( 2005 ). R ei nst at ing the pr ior24

pa ne l o pi ni on vi ol at es th e Supr em e Co ur t’s ex pr es s m an da te . Res pe ct fu ll y , I dis se nt.