2011 Decisions

Opinions of the United

States Court of Appeals

for the Third Circuit

1-13-2011

James Talley v. City of Atlantic City

Precedential or Non-Precedential: Non-Precedential

Docket No. 10-3428

Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2011

This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit at Villanova

University School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in 2011 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova

University School of Law Digital Repository. For more information, please contact Benjamin.Carlson@law.villanova.edu.

Recommended Citation

"James Talley v. City of Atlantic City" (2011). 2011 Decisions. Paper 1971.

http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2011/1971
DLD-065 NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

___________

No. 10-3428

___________

JAMERS TALLEY, Firefighter,

Appellant

v.

CITY OF ATLANTIC CITY, NEW JERSEY; MAYOR OF ATLANTIC CITY, NEW 

JERSEY; LARANZO LANGFORD; ATLANTIC CITY FIRE DEPARTMENT, NEW 

JERSEY; BENJAMIN F. BRENNER, The Atlantic City New Jersey's Fire Departments 

Chief Engineer (Retired March 1, 2004); JOHN BEREHEIKO, Newly appointed Chief 

Engineer; STEVEN S. SMOGER, City Solicitor for the City of Atlantic City; EILEEN 

LINDINGER, Assistant Solicitor; TIMOTHY PINSKY, Medical review officer

____________________________________

On Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of New Jersey

(D.C. Civil No. 04-cv-01146)

District Judge: Honorable Jerome B. Simandle

____________________________________

Submitted for Possible Summary Action Pursuant to 

Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6

December 16, 2010

Before: BARRY, FISHER AND STAPLETON, Circuit Judges

(Opinion filed : January 13, 2011 )

_________

OPINION

_________

PER CURIAM

James Talley, proceeding pro se, appeals from the District Court’s order denying 
2

his motion to reopen. For the reasons that follow, we will summarily affirm.

I

This appeal is the latest step in a protracted case. In 2004, Talley filed in the 

District Court an employment discrimination complaint against his former employer, the 

City of Atlantic City, and others.1 In January 2005, the District Court granted the 

defendants’ motion to dismiss. Talley filed an appeal, which we dismissed as untimely. 

See Talley v. City of Atl. City, C.A. No. 05-3780 (order filed November 22, 2005). In 

February 2007, after filing numerous unsuccessful post-judgment motions, Talley filed in 

the District Court a motion to reopen his case pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 

60(b)(3). The defendants opposed the motion and renewed a previously-denied motion 

for sanctions. The District Court denied Talley’s motion to reopen and assessed $250 in 

attorneys’ fees against him. Talley appealed, and we again dismissed his appeal as 

untimely. See Talley v. City of Atl. City, C.A. No. 07-4074 (order filed September 11, 

2008).

Nearly two years later, Talley filed in the District Court this motion to reopen. He 

alleged, much as he did in his 2007 motion to reopen, that the defendants engaged in 

fraudulent behavior and professional misconduct during discovery. The District Court 

denied the motion, relying on the reasoning articulated in its 2007 order denying the first 

motion to reopen. Talley filed a timely notice of appeal.

 

1

 Talley challenged his termination as a firefighter for Atlantic City, which occurred 

after he twice tested positive for cocaine use.
3

II

We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we may summarily affirm 

the District Court’s order if the appeal presents no substantial question. See 3d Cir. 

L.A.R. 27.4; 3d Cir. I.O.P. 10.6. We construe Talley’s motion to reopen as seeking relief 

pursuant to Rule 60(b)(6).2 We review the denial of a motion under Rule 60(b)(6) for 

abuse of discretion. See Budget Blinds, Inc. v. White, 536 F.3d 244, 251 (3d Cir. 2008). 

“This court has consistently held that the Rule 60(b)(6) ground for relief from 

judgment provides for extraordinary relief and may only be invoked upon a showing of 

exceptional circumstances.” In re Fine Paper Antitrust Litig., 840 F.2d 188, 194 (3d Cir. 

1988) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). This requires a showing of “an 

extreme and unexpected hardship.” Budget Blinds, 536 F.3d at 255. Talley has not 

alleged that he has endured any such hardship. Rather, he reiterates his belief that the 

defendants were not forthcoming in responding to his discovery requests. His bare 

allegations, however, do not warrant reopening his case, nor do they appear to have any 

bearing on the District Court’s ultimate conclusion that his federal complaint was timebarred. The fact that he has consulted with an attorney who agrees -- to some extent, at 

least -- that the defendants should have provided Talley with documents that he requested 

 

2

 Rule 60(b) provides six grounds under which a litigant can obtain relief from a final 

judgment. Talley cannot seek relief under subsections 1 through 3, as they are subject 

to a one-year time limitation. Nor is there any basis to conclude that the judgment is 

void, see Rule 60(b)(4), or that “the judgment has been satisfied, released or 

discharged. . . .” Rule 60(b)(5). 
4

does not constitute an exceptional circumstance. We conclude that the District Court 

properly denied Talley’s motion to reopen.

On a final note, we caution Talley that, if he persists in raising legally frivolous 

arguments in the District Court or before this Court, he may face further sanctions for 

such conduct.

As this appeal presents no substantial questions, we will summarily affirm the 

District Court’s order.