I

103D CONGRESS

1ST SESSION H. R. 2521

To direct the President to implement and enforce certain economic sanctions

against the Government of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam until such

time as the United States Government has received from the Government

of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam the fullest possible accounting of

American POW/MIAs from the Vietnam conflict, and for other purposes.

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

JUNE 24, 1993

Mr. GILMAN introduced the following bill; which was referred jointly to the

Committees on Foreign Affairs, Ways and Means, and Banking, Finance

and Urban Affairs

A BILL

To direct the President to implement and enforce certain

economic sanctions against the Government of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam until such time as the United

States Government has received from the Government

of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam the fullest possible

accounting of American POW/MIAs from the Vietnam

conflict, and for other purposes.

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘POW/MIA Full

5 Accounting Act of 1993’’.
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1 SEC. 2. FINDINGS.

2 The Congress finds the following:

3 (1) Many recent news reports state that Presi4 dent Clinton’s top national security advisors have

5 urged ending United States opposition to multilat6 eral lending to the Government of the Socialist Re7 public of Vietnam.

8 (2) In early July 1993, the International Mone9 tary Fund is scheduled to meet to discuss the possi10 bility of repayment of loans made to the Government

11 of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam.

12 (3) Despite the increased level of field activities

13 by personnel of the Joint Task Force-Full Account14 ing of the Department of Defense, particularly field

15 activities conducted in the Socialist Republic of Viet16 nam, the last 2 to 3 years have been the worst since

17 1981 in terms of results which account for American

18 POW/MIAs from the Vietnam conflict, with only 10

19 POW/MIAs having been accounted for in 1992 and

20 only 1 POW/MIA in 1993.

21 (4) There are still more than 200 American

22 POW/MIAs from the Vietnam conflict last known

23 alive in the Socialist Republic of Vietnam and Laos.

24 (5) 700 Americans were shot down or captured

25 over Laos during the Vietnam conflict but only 9 re26 turned to the United States, and United States offi-
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1 cials have testified that more than 80 percent of the

2 members of the Armed Forces missing in Laos were

3 captured or missing in action in areas under North

4 Vietnamese control.

5 (6) The most recent documents and films

6 shown in the Socialist Republic of Vietnam to visit7 ing delegations show little new information on the

8 fate of American POW/MIAs.

9 (7) Although the most recent documents re10 garding American POW/MIAs found in the archives

11 of the former Soviet Union contain possible minor

12 inaccuracies, such documents point to a larger truth

13 that the Government of the former Soviet Union and

14 the Government of North Vietnam collaborated

15 throughout the Vietnam conflict in the exploitation

16 of American POW/MIAs, and the Government of

17 North Vietnam withheld and may continue to with18 hold American POW/MIAs, and the Government of

19 North Vietnam withheld and continues to withhold

20 information about such POW/MIAs and the remains

21 of American POW/MIAs who have died.

22 (8) A June 10, 1971, Central Intelligence

23 Agency intelligence information report describes a

24 debriefing center in Vinh Phu province of North

25 Vietnam where from 1965 through 1967 captured
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1 American pilots were questioned by Soviet and Chi2 nese personnel.

3 (9) No American POW/MIAs who returned dur4 ing Operation Homecoming in 1973 reported having

5 been interrogated by Soviet or Chinese personnel de6 spite a significant volume of evidence that some had

7 been questioned by such personnel.

8 (10) Among documents given to United States

9 Ambassador Toon in Moscow in April 1993 was a

10 top secret report from the Soviet Embassy in Hanoi

11 dated March 14, 1967, that describes systematic in12 volvement of Soviet technical specialists visiting

13 downed American aircraft from the Vietnam conflict

14 and confiscating technical equipment for shipment to

15 the former Soviet Union.

16 (11) Such report also included a description of

17 competition between Soviet technical specialists and

18 Chinese technical teams, including incidents in which

19 Chinese technical teams would destroy American air20 planes before Soviet specialists could conduct their

21 investigations.

22 (12) In early 1993 the cockpit capsule of an

23 American F–111A aircraft downed in North Viet24 nam was found in a Moscow area museum and the
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1 legible serial numbers on the airplane matched those

2 of missing American pilots.

3 (13) A series of previously secret Department

4 of State cables between January and July of 1967

5 describe a proposed prisoner exchange offered by

6 East Germany in which between 2 to 6 severely

7 wounded American pilots (including one amputee)

8 from the Vietnam conflict reportedly being held in

9 an East German hospital would be exchanged for a

10 Soviet husband and wife spy team being held in

11 Great Britain. These pilots were never exchanged

12 and no amputee American prisoners were ever re13 turned from the Vietnam conflict.

14 (14) One facilitator of that unsuccessful ex15 change, Doctor/Professor Wolfgang Vogel, had pre16 viously participated in a number of successful pris17 oner trades between the East Bloc and the West.

18 (15) A military document from North Vietnam

19 found in the archives of the former Soviet Union

20 purportedly quoting from a speech by North Viet21 namese General Tran Van Quang states that some

22 700 American prisoners of war were being held by

23 Hanoi in addition to those returned in Operation

24 Homecoming in 1973. Subsequently, General Quang

25 denied authoring the document and stated that he
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1 was not Deputy Chief of Staff nor involved with

2 American prisoners of war. However, both South Vi3 etnamese and American intelligence documents from

4 that time period list Quang as Deputy Chief of Staff

5 of the North Vietnamese Army.

6 (16) In June 1993 General Quang admitted in

7 Hanoi that during the French/Indo-China War he

8 had French and other European prisoners on his

9 Enemy Proselytizing Department staff and he was

10 also in charge of French prisoners following that

11 war which caused long delays in accounting for

12 French POW/MIAs.

13 (17) General Quang also admitted that as Com14 mander of Military Region Four during the Vietnam

15 conflict he had control over the Ho Chi Minh trail

16 in Laos where hundreds of Americans were listed as

17 captured or missing and held prisoner but never re18 turned to the United States.

19 (18) A November 17, 1975, Central Intelligence

20 Agency document relating to exploitation of Amer21 ican prisoners of war states that French prisoners

22 captured during the 1945–54 period ‘‘are still being

23 held in North Vietnam’’ some 20 years after that

24 war had ended, and that there was some possibility
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1 that American prisoners of war are still being held

2 in the Socialist Republic of Vietnam.

3 (19) An October 1979 Defense Intelligence

4 Agency report states that Le Dinh, a credible former

5 North Vietnamese intelligence officer who had been

6 involved with American prisoners during the Viet7 nam conflict, said that he heard ‘‘at staff meetings

8 that about 700 Americans still remained in Viet9 nam’’, constituting a strategic asset that could be

10 used to force the United States to pay reparations

11 to North Vietnam.

12 (20) Among recently declassified United States

13 documents from the ‘‘Cold Spot’’ intelligence pro14 gram conducted in Laos and North Vietnam during

15 the Vietnam conflict are documents that discuss 112

16 American prisoners of war still in North Vietnam

17 after Operation Homecoming in March 1973.

18 (21) Between the spring of 1971 and the fall of

19 1972 a series of United States intelligence docu20 ments from North Vietnam, Burma, and Taiwan in21 dicate that a large number of American prisoners of

22 war were transferred from North Vietnam to the

23 Yunnan province in China under joint Vietnamese/

24 Chinese control.
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1 (22) A September 1972 Department of the

2 Navy ‘‘Bright Light’’ intelligence report contained a

3 narrative from a high ranking North Vietnamese of4 ficial which stated that the Government of the Peo5 ple’s Republic of China had secretly agreed to keep

6 a number of American POW/MIAs for North Viet7 nam in China and that the Government of the Peo8 ple’s Republic of China would never release these

9 POW/MIAs to the United States without the ap10 proval of North Vietnam.

11 (23) A series of successive United States ad12 ministrations have consistently denied Russian, East

13 Bloc, or Chinese involvement with American POW/

14 MIAs in North Vietnam.

15 (24) More than 100 boxes of National Security

16 Agency documents relating to the Vietnam conflict

17 and its aftermath were not studied by the Senate

18 Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs because of

19 time constraints, and thousands of more documents

20 are now being declassified by order of the President.

21 (25) Such documents may contain important

22 information regarding Russian, East Bloc, and Chi23 nese involvement with American POW/MIAs and the

24 transfer of American prisoners of war to Eastern
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1 Europe, the former Soviet Union, and the People’s

2 Republic of China.

3 (26) The American Legion ‘‘strongly believes

4 the final report (of the Senate Select Committee on

5 POW/MIA Affairs) is flawed and incomplete’’ and

6 ‘‘unfortunately, the Committee has produced a re7 port that may turn out to be improperly used to en8 courage further favorable U.S. Government actions

9 toward Vietnam without receiving any substantial

10 cooperation on the POW/MIA issue in return’’.

11 (27) The preceding paragraphs demonstrate

12 that the Governments of the Socialist Republic of

13 Vietnam, Laos, the People’s Republic of China, and

14 Russia have not given United States investigators all

15 of the information that those Governments possess

16 relating to all American POW/MIAs from the Viet17 nam conflict.

18 SEC. 3. DECLARATION OF POLICY WITH RESPECT TO AMER19 ICAN POW/MIAs FROM THE VIETNAM CON20 FLICT.

21 The Congress declares that the issue of American

22 POW/MIAs from the Vietnam conflict will be resolved only

23 when the fullest possible accounting of all such POW/

24 MIAs, particularily those last known alive, is achieved and

25 all available information relating to such issue, including
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1 documents, eyewitness accounts, film, and other commu2 nications, is obtained and thoroughly studied by impartial

3 United States investigators.

4 SEC. 4. SENSE OF THE CONGRESS WITH RESPECT TO NOR5 MALIZATION OF RELATIONS WITH THE SO6 CIALIST REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM.

7 It is the sense of the Congress that the President

8 should not normalize or otherwise upgrade diplomatic rela9 tions with the Government of the Socialist Republic of

10 Vietnam until such time as the President certifies to the

11 Congress that the United States Government has received

12 from the Government of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam

13 the fullest possible accounting of American POW/MIAs

14 from the Vietnam conflict.

15 SEC. 5. CONTINUATION OF UNITED STATES TRADE EMBAR16 GO AGAINST THE SOCIALIST REPUBLIC OF

17 VIETNAM.

18 The President shall not terminate, alter, or amend

19 the United States trade embargo in effect as of June 1,

20 1993, against the Socialist Republic of Vietnam until such

21 time as the President certifies to the Congress that the

22 United States Government has received from the Govern23 ment of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam the fullest pos24 sible accounting of American POW/MIAs from the Viet25 nam conflict.
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1 SEC. 6. DEFERRAL OF IMF RESOLUTION RELATING TO RE2 PAYMENT OF IMF LOANS BY THE SOCIALIST

3 REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM.

4 The President shall instruct the United States Exec5 utive Director of the International Monetary Fund to use

6 the voice and vote of the United States to defer consider7 ation of any resolution by such Fund that allows the Gov8 ernment of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam to pay off

9 any or all loans that are in arrears to such Fund until

10 such time as the President certifies to the Congress that

11 the United States Government has received from the Gov12 ernment of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam the fullest

13 possible accounting of American POW/MIAs from the

14 Vietnam conflict.

15 SEC. 7. DENIAL OF LOANS, GRANTS, AND CREDITS BY

16 INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS

17 TO THE SOCIALIST REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM.

18 The President shall instruct the United States Exec19 utive Directors of the International Bank for Reconstruc20 tion and Development, the International Monetary Fund,

21 and other appropriate multilateral financial institutions to

22 use the voice and vote of the United States to deny any

23 new loans, grants, or credits to the Government of the So24 cialist Republic of Vietnam until such time as the Presi25 dent certifies to the Congress that the United States Gov26 ernment has received from the Government of the Socialist
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1 Republic of Vietnam the fullest possible accounting of

2 American POW/MIAs from the Vietnam conflict.

3 SEC. 8. DEFINITIONS.

4 For purposes of this Act, the following definitions

5 apply:

6 (1) AMERICAN POW/MIAS.—The term ‘‘Amer7 ican POW/MIAs’’ means—

8 (A) members of the United States Armed

9 Forces who have been identified as prisoners of

10 war or missing in action; and

11 (B) civilian employees of the United States

12 who have been identified as captured or miss13 ing.

14 (2) FULLEST POSSIBLE ACCOUNTING OF AMER15 ICAN POW/MIAS FROM THE VIETNAM CONFLICT.—

16 The term ‘‘fullest possible accounting of American

17 POW/MIAs from the Vietnam conflict’’ means—

18 (A) the return of all American POW/MIAs

19 who are still alive;

20 (B) the identification and return of all re21 mains of American POW/MIAs who have died;

22 or

23 (C) convincing evidence as to why the re24 turn of all American POW/MIAs described in

25 subparagraph (A), the identification and return
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1 of all remains described in subparagraph (B),

2 or both, is not possible.

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