NO. 4-00-0744

	IN THE APPELLATE COURT

	OF ILLINOIS

	FOURTH DISTRICT

ALPHA GAMMA RHO ALUMNI; MARK E. ANDER

SON; WILLIE ANDERSON; APARTMENT MART,

INC.; VICTOR ARMSTRONG; STEPHANIE ANN

BAKER; CHARLES G. BEELER; BLOOMINGTON

FARM MANAGEMENT; BRIDGESTONE/FIRE-

STONE; BROCK OIL; C. EUGENE BURWELL;

JOHN B. BUSCHER; KENNETH BUSH; DANVERS

FARMERS ELEVATOR; JOHN DEFFNER; ROBERT

DENNISON; EUREKA COMPANY; F.F.G. AGRI-

VEST; JAMES L. FANNIN; FIRST OF AMER

ICA; DONALD R. FRANKE; FUNKS GROVE

GRAIN COMPANY; GROWMARK, INC.; DANIEL

HARMS; ROSE HARMS; DARRELL HARTWEG;

HERITAGE ENTERPRISES, INC.; MARK

HICKS; HICKSATOMIC STATIONS, INC.;

HICKSGAS BLOOMINGTON, INC.; HICKSGAS

COLFAX, INC.; KURT HOEFERLE; MARTIN L.

HOGAN;  R. MICHAEL HUNDMAN; LESA

HUNDMAN; JEFFERY HUNT; JOHN KAUFFMAN;

ANNA BLANCHE CUSEY KUNTZ; LAESCH DAIRY

COMPANY; TIM LEMAN; JOHN R. LUEDTKE;

MAGIRL SUPPLY COMPANY; MICHAEL MC-

CLAIN; MCKEY and ROEGGE, INC.; DAVID

H. MILLER; NAPA; O.K. APPLIANCE; DAN

IEL O'BRIEN; RICHARD OWEN; PARKWAY

MITSUBISHI; CURT PIERCY; JOSEPH L.

POIRIEZ; PONTIAC HICKSGAS, INC.; RED

BIRD APARTMENT MANAGEMENT, INC.; DEL-

BERT RENGEL; VIRGINIA RENGEL; GORDON

J. SCHERBER; DAVID SEVERINO; SHIRLEY

OIL and SUPPLY COMPANY; ARLEN P. SIEG;

CLEVELAND SMITH; JACK O. SNYDER;

SPRINGWOOD ASSOCIATES, LP; ALICE

STRUBHAR; J. MICHAEL STRUBHAR; JEAN R.

STUBBLEFIELD; GIAN C. SUD; SUNRAY

PORK, LTD.; DON SUTTON; RALPH T.

TURNER; UNION AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE;

DAVID WEAVER; STEPHEN G. WHITE;

CHARLES WILLIAMS; WALLACE L. YODER;

YOUNG AMERICA REALTY,

		Plaintiffs-Appellants,

		v.

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS ex

rel. JAMES BOYLAN, County Treasurer

and ex Officio County Collector of

Taxes for McLean County, Illinois;	)

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)	Appeal from

Circuit Court of

McLean County

No. 95TX1(30)

BLOOMINGTON/NORMAL AIRPORT AUTHORITY;

BLOOMINGTON/NORMAL WATER RECLAMATION

DISTRICT; THE TOWN OF THE CITY OF

BLOOMINGTON; RANDOLPH TOWNSHIP; RAN-

DOLPH TOWNSHIP FIRE PROTECTION DIS

TRICT; HEYWORTH PUBLIC LIBRARY DIS

TRICT; BLOOMINGTON CEMETERY DISTRICT;

THE TOWN OF RANDOLPH; OLYMPIA COMMU

NITY SCHOOL DISTRICT #16; LEXINGTON

COMMUNITY UNIT SCHOOL DISTRICT #7;

COMMUNITY UNIT SCHOOL DISTRICT #5 OF

McLEAN and WOODFORD COUNTIES; GIBSON

CITY-MELVIN-SIBLEY COMMUNITY UNIT

SCHOOL DISTRICT #5E; HEARTLAND COMMU

NITY COLLEGE DISTRICT #540; THE CITY

OF BLOOMINGTON; MT. HOPE-FUNKS GROVE

LIBRARY DISTRICT; HUDSON COMMUNITY

FIRE PROTECTION DISTRICT; THE TOWN OF

NORMAL; THE NORMAL PUBLIC LIBRARY;

LAWNDALE TOWNSHIP; McLEAN COUNTY;

ALLIN TOWNSHIP; ANCHOR TOWNSHIP;

ARROWSMITH TOWNSHIP; BLOOMINGTON 

TOWNSHIP; BLUE MOUND TOWNSHIP;

CHENEY'S GROVE TOWNSHIP; CHENOA TOWN

SHIP; CROOPSEY TOWNSHIP; DALE TOWN

SHIP; DANVERS TOWNSHIP; DAWSON TOWN

SHIP; DOWNS TOWNSHIP; DRY GROVE TOWN

SHIP; FUNKS GROVE TOWNSHIP; GRIDLEY

TOWNSHIP; HUDSON TOWNSHIP; LAWNDALE

TOWNSHIP; LEXINGTON TOWNSHIP; MONEY

CREEK TOWNSHIP; MARTIN TOWNSHIP; OLD

TOWN TOWNSHIP; TOWANDA TOWNSHIP; WEST

TOWNSHIP; WHITE OAK TOWNSHIP; YATES

TOWNSHIP; ALLIN-DALE MULTI TOWNSHIP;

ARROWSMITH-DAWSON MULTI TOWNSHIP;

BELLFLOWER-CHENEY'S GROVE-WEST MULTI

TOWNSHIP; BLUE MOUND-MARTIN MULTI

TOWNSHIP; DOWNS-OLD TOWN MULTI TOWN

SHIP; FUNKS GROVE-MOUNT HOPE MULTI

TOWNSHIP; LEXINGTON-MONEY CREEK MULTI

TOWNSHIP; ALLIN ROAD and BRIDGE DIS

TRICT; ANCHOR ROAD and BRIDGE DIS

TRICT; ARROWSMITH ROAD and BRIDGE DIS

TRICT; BELLFLOWER ROAD and BRIDGE DIS

TRICT; BLOOMINGTON ROAD and BRIDGE

DISTRICT; BLUE MOUND ROAD and BRIDGE

DISTRICT; CHENEY'S GROVE ROAD and

BRIDGE DISTRICT; CHENOA ROAD and

BRIDGE DISTRICT; CROPSEY ROAD and

BRIDGE DISTRICT; DALE ROAD and BRIDGE

DISTRICT; DANVERS ROAD and BRIDGE DIS-	)

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TRICT; DAWSON ROAD and BRIDGE DIS

TRICT; DOWNS ROAD and BRIDGE DISTRICT;

DRY GROVE ROAD and BRIDGE DISTRICT;

EMPIRE ROAD and BRIDGE DISTRICT; FUNKS

GROVE ROAD and BRIDGE DISTRICT; GRID-

LEY ROAD and BRIDGE DISTRICT; HUDSON

ROAD and BRIDGE DISTRICT; LAWNDALE

ROAD and BRIDGE DISTRICT; LEXINGTON

ROAD and BRIDGE DISTRICT; MARTIN ROAD

and BRIDGE DISTRICT; MONEY CREEK ROAD

and BRIDGE DISTRICT; MOUNT HOPE ROAD

and BRIDGE DISTRICT; OLD TOWN ROAD and

BRIDGE DISTRICT; TOWANDA ROAD and

BRIDGE DISTRICT; WEST ROAD and BRIDGE

DISTRICT; WHITE OAK ROAD and BRIDGE

DISTRICT; YATES ROAD and BRIDGE DIS

TRICT; THE VILLAGE OF ANCHOR; THE VIL

LAGE OF BELLFLOWER; THE VILLAGE OF

CARLOCK; THE CITY OF CHENOA; THE VIL

LAGE OF COLFAX; THE VILLAGE OF DAN-

VERS; THE VILLAGE OF GRIDLEY; THE CITY

OF LEXINGTON; THE VILLAGE OF Mc LEAN;

THE ALLIN FIRE PROTECTION DISTRICT;

THE BLOOMINGTON FIRE PROTECTION DIS

TRICT; THE CARLOCK FIRE PROTECTION

DISTRICT; THE CHENOA FIRE PROTECTION

DISTRICT; THE DALE FIRE PROTECTION

DISTRICT; THE DANVERS FIRE PROTECTION

DISTRICT; THE DOWNS FIRE PROTECTION

DISTRICT; THE EL PASO FIRE PROTECTION

DISTRICT; THE FARMER CITY FIRE PROTEC

TION DISTRICT; THE GRIDLEY FIRE PRO

TECTION DISTRICT; THE LEROY FIRE PRO

TECTION DISTRICT; THE LEXINGTON FIRE

PROTECTION DISTRICT; THE NORTHERN

PIATT FIRE PROTECTION DISTRICT; THE

OCTAVIA FIRE PROTECTION DISTRICT; THE

TOWANDA FIRE PROTECTION DISTRICT; THE

GOLDEN PRAIRIE LIBRARY DISTRICT; THE

GRIDLEY LIBRARY DISTRICT; THE HUDSON

AREA LIBRARY DISTRICT; THE LEXINGTON

LIBRARY DISTRICT; THE TOWANDA LIBRARY

DISTRICT; THE WHITE OAK LIBRARY DIS

TRICT; THE MOUNT HOPE COMMUNITY BUILD

ING; THE ALLIN CEMETERY DISTRICT; THE

ALLIN TOWNSHIP PARK DISTRICT; THE CHE-

NOA PARK DISTRICT; THE LEROY COMMUNITY

PARK DISTRICT; THE LEXINGTON PARK DIS

TRICT; THE OCTAVIA PARK DISTRICT; and

THE DANVERS TOWNSHIP WATER AUTHORITY,

		Defendants-Appellees.	)

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Honorable

Ronald C. Dozier,

Judge Presiding.

_________________________________________________________________

		JuUSTIVEECCE cMCcCMULLOUGH delivered the opinion of the court:

	ORDER

		Plaintiffs paid 1994 real-estate taxes under protest

and filed objections to the levies of several units of local

government in McLean County.  Part of plaintiffs' complaint

alleged that 73 taxing districts accumulated improper surpluses,

invalidating their property-tax levies.

		Defendants filed motions to dismiss, which the trial

court granted at an April 24, 1996, hearing.  The trial court 

ruled that plaintiffs had to follow the formula in Central Illinois Public Service Co. v. Miller, 42 Ill. 2d 542, 248 N.E.2d 89 (1969), and that formula needed to be applied on a fund-by- fund basis.  The trial court granted leave for plaintiffs to

amend their complaint.  After plaintiffs filed amended objec

tions, both plaintiffs and defendants filed motions for summary

judgment on the issue of excess accumulation.  At an October 31,

1996, hearing, the trial court granted summary judgment to

defendants as to funds with an accumulated surplus below the

Miller guidelines and as to other funds when defendants filed affidavits justifying the surplus.

		On July 28, 2000, the trial court approved the parties'

stipulation setting forth the amount of tax to be refunded by

each taxing entity.  The trial court then ordered the county

collector to refund $21,913.86 plus interest.  On August 25,

2000, plaintiffs filed a notice of appeal, stating that plain

tiffs were appealing:

"from portions of the [f]inal [o]rder entered *** July 28, 2000, in the following particu

lars:

	1. The trial court's order on April 24,

1996, granting the dismissal of all of

[plaintiffs'] allegations of unlawful accumu

lation of surplus funds in [f]iremen's

[p]ension [f]unds, [p]olicemen's [p]ension

[f]unds, the Illinois Retirement Fund, Social

Security, and Medicare;

	2. The trial court's order on April 24,

1996, granting the dismissal of [plaintiffs']

allegations of unlawful accumulation of sur

plus funds in the levies of the home-rule

municipalities of the Town of Normal and the

City of Bloomington;

	3. The trial court's order on October

31, 1996, granting summary judgment in favor

of the following taxing districts on the

issue of illegal accumulation of surplus

funds:

	Funks Grove Township	(Town Fund)

	Lexington Township		(Town Fund)

	Money Creek Township	(Town Fund)

	White Oak Township		(General Assistance

							 Fund)

	Lexington Community Fire

	Protection District	   (Operation Fund)

	City of Chenoa			(General Assistance 	 							 Fund)."

On November 2, 2000, plaintiffs' attorney made a motion in this

court to amend the notice of appeal "to include a couple of

additional issues to be appealed."  We allowed the motion, and

plaintiffs filed an amended notice of appeal, substituting the

following for the third issue stated in the original notice of

appeal:

"1. The trial court's order on April 24,

1996, that the issue of surplus funds avail

able to a taxing district was subject to the

strict guidelines of Miller [(citation)].

2. The trial court's order on April 24, 1996,

that a fund-by-fund approach must be used

when computing the amounts of surplus funds

available to a taxing district, as opposed to

a multiple[-]fund approach."

		Taken with the case are defendants' motions to recon

sider and for leave to file a motion to dismiss the motion for

leave to file an amended notice of appeal.  Upon reconsideration,

we conclude that leave to file the amended notice was improvi

dently granted because plaintiffs' November 2, 2000, motion was

untimely.

		Supreme Court Rule 303(b)(4) (155 Ill. 2d R. 303(b)(4))

allows this court to grant plaintiffs' motion to amend notice of appeal only if made within the time specified in Rule 303(d) (155

Ill. 2d R. 303(d) (within 30 days after expiration of the time

for filing the notice of appeal).  Heller Financial, Inc. v. Johns-Byrne Co., 264 Ill. App. 3d 681, 688, 637 N.E.2d 1085, 1090 (1994).  In this case, that time period expired on September 26,

2000.  Accordingly, we shall restrict our consideration to the

issues raised in plaintiffs' August 25 notice of appeal.

		A threshold question involves the sufficiency of the

August 25 notice of appeal.  Plaintiffs ask us to reverse the

trial court's order and remand "[t]he entire case" for an eviden

tiary hearing.  Certain defendants object to the scope of our

review, contending that plaintiffs failed to perfect an appeal of

any issue involving them and that they would be prejudiced if

forced to respond.

		Rule 303(b)(2) (155 Ill. 2d R. 303(b)(2)) requires a

notice of appeal to "specify the judgment or part thereof or

other orders appealed from and the relief sought from the review

ing court."  When an appeal is taken from a part of a specified

judgment, the appellate court acquires no jurisdiction to review

other judgments or parts thereof not so specified or not fairly

inferred from the notice as intended to be presented for review. 

Burtell v. First Charter Service Corp., 76 Ill. 2d 427, 434, 394 N.E.2d 380, 383 (1979).  Appellate jurisdiction may still be

conferred if the notice fairly and accurately advises the suc

cessful party of the nature of the appeal.  In re Marriage of Betts, 159 Ill. App. 3d 327, 330, 511 N.E.2d 732, 734 (1987).  This court liberally construes a notice of appeal absent preju

dice to the litigants.  Dowell v. Bitner, 273 Ill. App. 3d 681, 689, 652 N.E.2d 1372, 1378 (1995).

		We have no jurisdiction to reverse and remand "the

entire case" as plaintiffs request.  Plaintiffs' August 25 notice

of appeal specifies that they were appealing from "[t]he trial

court's order *** granting summary judgment in favor of the

following taxing districts on the issue of illegal accumulation of surplus funds" (emphasis added).  Plaintiffs designated only

six funds.  Plaintiffs' notice does not fairly and accurately

advise defendants that plaintiffs sought relief in this court

against all 73 defendants with alleged improper surpluses, nor

can it be fairly inferred from the notice, even when liberally

construed.  Therefore, we review the trial court's October 31,

1996, order granting summary judgment in favor of the six stated

taxing districts.

		Plaintiffs contend that the trial court erred in

strictly following Miller and granting summary judgment to defendants for funds with available assets not exceeding 2.84

times the prior year's expenses and 3.24 times the three-year

average of annual expenses.  We conduct a de novo review of an award of summary judgment.  People v. Select Specialties, Ltd., 317 Ill. App. 3d 538, 542, 740 N.E.2d 543, 547 (2000).

		A levy that results in an unnecessary accumulation of

public money is illegal.  People ex rel. Toynton v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 285 Ill. App. 3d 357, 361, 674 N.E.2d 809, 812 (1996).  A taxing body retains broad discretion in estimating the

amounts necessary to carry out its lawful objectives.  In re Application of Rosewell, 159 Ill. 2d 393, 401, 639 N.E.2d 559, 562 (1994).  Thus, tax objectors bear a substantial burden of proof in establishing that a taxing body has illegally accumu

lated taxes in a given year.  Rosewell, 159 Ill. 2d at 404, 639 N.E.2d at 564.  The Miller court set only a framework for analyz ing unnecessary accumulations; it did not determine a precise

threshold at 2.84 times the average annual expenditure and 3.24

times the amount expended in the last previous fiscal year.  In re Application of O'Connor, 80 Ill. App. 3d 354, 356, 399 N.E.2d 683, 685 (1980).

		The following chart summarizes the Miller ratios for each of the six funds that plaintiffs appealed:

Fund					Available Assets		Average Expenses	Ratio

Funks Grove Town Fund		$28,919				$15,416		1.88

Lexington Town Fund			$109,952				$58,517		1.88

Money Creek Town Fund		$48,699				$21,011		2.32

White Oak General

Assistance Fund			$75,022				$57,109		1.31

Lexington Community Fire

Protection District

Operation Fund				$141,774				$102,965		1.38

City of Chenoa

General Assistance Fund	$777,775				$325,482		2.39

		The trial court did not err in granting summary judg

ment to defendants as to these six funds because plaintiffs

failed to overcome the presumption that defendants did not abuse their discretion in making the levies.  Each of these funds had a

ratio of available assets to three-year-average expenses well

below the 2.84 ratio that the supreme court found to be an

unnecessary accumulation in Miller.

		Plaintiffs argue that the trial court erred by requir

ing plaintiffs to analyze defendants' accumulated surpluses on a

fund-by-fund basis.  We disagree.  A fund-by-fund analysis is

preferable even if the monies in various funds are to some extent

transferable.  O'Connor, 80 Ill. App. 3d at 357, 399 N.E.2d at 686.  Plaintiffs contend that this approach allows a taxing

district to accumulate the same amount of surplus in each fund. 

We disagree because the district's expenditures would also be

divided among funds.  Actually, the multiple-fund approach

suggested by plaintiffs would allow a district to accumulate a

greater surplus by averaging out one fund's unreasonably large

surplus relative to that fund's expenditures.  Therefore, a fund-

by-fund approach more greatly restricts defendants' ability to

accumulate a surplus, and the trial court did not err in adopting

it.

 		The trial court did not err in dismissing plaintiffs' claims of unlawful accumulation of surplus funds in the Town of

Normal's Police Pension Fund and Firefighters' Pension Fund. 

General rules prohibiting unnecessary accumulation do not apply

when a statute authorizes accumulation.  People ex rel. Brenza v. Morrison Hotel Corp., 4 Ill. 2d 542, 548, 123 N.E.2d 488, 492 (1954).  The uncontradicted facts show that the accumulations are justified to account for unfunded accrued liability as required

state law.  See 40 ILCS 5/3-125 (West 1994) (police pension

fund); 40 ILCS 5/4-118 (West 1994) (firefighters' pension fund).

		The trial court also did not err in dismissing plain

tiffs' claims of unlawful accumulation by the home-rule munici

palities of the Town of Normal and the City of Bloomington.  The

issue of whether a home-rule unit's tax levy is subject to

judicial review for abuse of discretion is one of first impres

sion.

		The courts cannot control a legislature's exercise of

discretion in setting tax rates.  Mathews v. City of Chicago, 342 Ill. 120, 141, 174 N.E. 35, 43 (1930).  A home-rule unit may

exercise any power, including the power to tax, and perform any

function pertaining to its government and affairs.  Ill. Const.

1970, art. VII, §6(a).  Thus, a home-rule unit exercises sover

eign powers (Johnson v. Halloran, 194 Ill. 2d 493, 496, 742 N.E.2d 741, 743 (2000)), and those powers are subject only to

constitutional limitations (Kanellos v. County of Cook, 53 Ill. 2d 161, 166, 290 N.E.2d 240, 243 (1972)).  For example, the

General Assembly may pass a law by three-fifths vote to deny or

limit a home-rule unit's power to tax.  Ill. Const. 1970, art.

VII, §6(g).  No such law applies in this case, and plaintiffs

have not alleged that the tax levies in this case are unconstitu

tional.  Therefore, the trial court correctly declined to review

the alleged unlawful accumulations by the two home-rule munici

palities for abuse of discretion.

		For the reasons stated, we affirm the trial court's

judgment.

		Affirmed.

		McCULLOUGH, J., with MYERSCOUGH and COOK, JJ., concurring.