J-S37033-22

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

JUSTIN ROSE

v.

ELIZABETH ROSE N/K/A ELIZABETH 

BLAUKOVITCH

APPEAL OF: JAMES E. ROSE JR.

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 1562 EDA 2022

Appeal from the Order Entered June 8, 2022

In the Court of Common Pleas of Lehigh County Civil Division at No(s): 

2013-FC-1269

BEFORE: BOWES, J., LAZARUS, J., and OLSON, J.

MEMORANDUM BY OLSON, J.: FILED NOVEMBER 30, 2022

Appellant, James E. Rose, Jr., appeals pro se from the order entered on 

June 8, 2022 that denied his motion for visitation rights on grounds that 

Appellant, paternal grandfather to L.G.R.1 (a female born March, 2011)

(Child), lacked standing to seek physical custody, legal custody, partial 

physical custody, or supervised physical custody of Child. We affirm.

We briefly summarize the facts and procedural history of this case as 

follows. On August 22, 2018, the trial court entered a final custody order 

regarding Child, granting shared legal and physical custody to Justin Rose 

(Father) and Elizabeth Rose n/k/a Elizabeth Blaukovitch (Mother). On 

February 4, 2022, Appellant filed a pro se motion for grandparent visitation 

____________________________________________

1

 We will refer to the minor involved in this case by her initials or as “Child” 

to protect her identity.
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rights. Following a remote video hearing held on June 8, 2022, the trial court 

entered an order denying relief after determining that Appellant lacked 

standing. On June 9, 2022, Appellant filed a timely pro se notice of appeal. 

On June 13, 2022, the trial court ordered Appellant to file a concise statement 

of errors complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b). Appellant 

complied timely on July 5, 2022. On July 22, 2022, the trial court issued an 

opinion pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a). In its opinion, the trial court initially 

determined that Appellant waived all of his issues on appeal because his Rule 

1925(b) statement, which raised 110 allegations of error, was not concise. 

Alternatively, the trial court relied upon the reasons it expressed at the June 

8, 2022 hearing as ground for denying relief.

Initially, we note that Appellant’s pro se brief to this Court is woefully 

undeveloped. This Court has previously determined:

[A]ppellate briefs and reproduced records must materially 

conform to the requirements of the Pennsylvania Rules of 

Appellate Procedure. Pa.R.A.P. 2101.

This Court may quash or dismiss an appeal if the appellant fails to 

conform to the requirements set forth in the Pennsylvania Rules 

of Appellate Procedure. Id.; Commonwealth v. Lyons, 833 A.2d 

245 (Pa. Super. 2003). Although this Court is willing to liberally 

construe materials filed by a pro se litigant, pro se status confers 

no special benefit upon the appellant. Id. at 252. To the contrary, 

any person choosing to represent himself in a legal proceeding 

must, to a reasonable extent, assume that his lack of expertise 

and legal training will be his undoing. Commonwealth v. 

Rivera, 685 A.2d 1011 (Pa. Super. 1996).

The Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate Procedure provide guidelines 

regarding the required content of an appellate brief as follows:

Rule 2111. Brief of the Appellant
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(a) General Rule. The brief of the appellant, except as 

otherwise prescribed by these rules, shall consist of the 

following matters, separately and distinctly entitled and in 

the following order:

(1) Statement of jurisdiction.

(2) Statement of both the scope of review and the standard 

of review.

(3) Order or other determination in question.

(4) Statement of the question involved.

(5) Statement of the case.

(6) Summary of the argument.

(7) Argument for the appellant.

(8) A short conclusion stating the precise relief sought.

(9) The opinions and pleadings specified in Subdivisions (b) 

and (c) of this rule.

(10) In the Superior Court, a copy of the statement of the 

matters complained of on appeal filed with the trial court 

pursuant to Rule 1925(b), or an averment that no order 

requiring a Rule 1925(b) statement was entered.

Pa.R.A.P. 2111(a)(1)-(10) (emphasis added). Additionally, Rules 

2114 through 2119 specify in greater detail the material to be 

included in briefs on appeal. See Pa.R.A.P. 2114-2119.

Commonwealth v. Adams, 882 A.2d 496, 497–498 (Pa. Super. 2005).

Moreover, this Court has stated:

Parties to an appeal are required to submit briefs in conformity, in 

all material respects, with the requirements of the Rules of 

Appellate Procedure, as nearly as the circumstances of the 

particular case will permit. Pa.R.A.P. 2101. Rules 2111 and 2114 

through 2119 detail the specific requirements relevant to the brief 

of an appellant. Of particular importance is the provision of Rule 

2119(a) that a brief must contain a developed argument 

augmented by citation to pertinent authorities. Arguments not 

appropriately developed are waived. It is not the duty of the 
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Superior Court to act as an appellant's counsel, and it is an 

appellant's responsibility to establish both the purported errors 

and any entitlement to relief therefrom.

Commonwealth v. Love, 896 A.2d 1276, 1287 (Pa. Super. 2006) (some 

citations omitted).

Here, Appellant’s appellate brief is a diatribe that enumerates 97 

stream-of-conscience bullet points. Of all of the above-cited appellate rules, 

Appellant only complied with the directives to file a copy of the trial court 

opinion and provide a short conclusion stating the relief sought. Appellant, 

however, failed to include a statement of jurisdiction, statement of scope and 

standard of review, statement of questions involved, statement of the case, 

an argument or summary of the argument, or a copy of his Rule 1925(b) 

concise statement and order in question in his appellate brief. Moreover, 

Appellant’s brief contains no citations to authority and makes no specific 

reference to the certified record. See Pa.R.A.P. 2119(b)-(c). On these bases, 

we could quash or dismiss Appellant’s appeal for failure to comply with our 

Rules of Appellate Procedure. See Pa.R.A.P. 2101.

Moreover, this Court has previously determined that

issues not raised in a Rule 1925(b) statement will be deemed 

waived for review. An appellant's concise statement must 

properly specify the error to be addressed on appeal. In other 

words, the Rule 1925(b) statement must be specific enough for 

the trial court to identify and address the issue an appellant 

wishes to raise on appeal. 

A concise statement which is too vague to allow the court to 

identify the issues raised on appeal is the functional equivalent of 

no concise statement at all. The court's review and legal analysis 

can be fatally impaired when the court has to guess at the issues 
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raised. Thus, if a concise statement is too vague, the court may 

find waiver.

Commonwealth v. Scott, 212 A.3d 1094, 1112 (Pa. Super. 2019) (internal 

citations, quotations and brackets omitted). Here, the trial court determined 

that Appellant’s Rule 1925(b) statement was vague instead of concise and, 

therefore, concluded Appellant waived all of his appellate issues. We could 

dismiss Appellant’s appeal on this basis, as well.

However, after our review of the certified record, Appellant’s pro se brief

and applicable law, we conclude that Appellant is not entitled to relief for the 

reasons that follow. As gleaned from Appellant’s brief, Appellant alleges that 

he has a strained relationship with his son, Father. Essentially, Appellant 

claims that Father falsely accused Appellant of being a criminal, threatened to 

sue Appellant in federal court, and used Child “as a pawn to punish [] 

Appellant.” See Appellant’s Pro Se Brief at ¶¶ 5-7, 12, and 80. Baldly 

referencing the 14th Amendment to the United States Constitution and the 

Equal Protection Clause, Appellant claims he was not afforded the same rights 

of visitation that maternal grandparents were given because he is black, and 

they are white. Id. at ¶¶ 2, 12-15, 22-26, 78, 82, and 89.

“[A]ppellate courts possess a broad scope of review in partial custody 

and visitation cases, [but] they may not, and in fact cannot, substitute their 

own findings of fact with respect to the parties' emotional feelings and 

attitudes towards one another.” Com. ex rel. Zaffarano v. Genaro, 455 

A.2d 1180, 1183 (Pa. 1983). “[G]randparents bear the burden of proving to 
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the court that it would be in their grandchild's best interest for the 

grandparents to have custody of the child away from his or her parent for 

limited periods of time.” Id. Our Supreme Court has determined:

Our scope of review in a custody matter is of the broadest type, 

and we are not bound by deductions or inferences made by a trial 

court.... We must exercise an independent judgment based on the 

evidence and make such an order on the merits of the case as 

right and justice dictate.

Id. (citation omitted).

This Court has previously determined:

Well-settled Pennsylvania law provides that persons other than a 

child's biological or natural parents are third parties for purposes 

of custody disputes. In addition, natural parents have a prima 

facie right to custody. Except via dependency proceedings, third 

parties lack standing to seek custody as against the natural 

parents unless they can demonstrate a prima facie right to 

custody. Even when standing to seek custody is conferred upon 

a third party, the natural parent has a prima facie right to custody, 

which will be forfeited only if clear and convincing reasons appear 

that the child's best interest will be served by an award to the 

third party. Thus, even before the proceedings start, the 

evidentiary scale is tipped, and tipped hard to the biological 

parents' side.

There is a stringent test for standing in third-party suits for... 

custody due to the respect for the traditionally strong right of 

parents to raise their children as they see fit. The courts generally 

find standing in third-party visitation and custody cases only 

where the legislature specifically authorizes the cause of action. 

A third party has been permitted to maintain an action for custody, 

however, where that party stands in loco parentis to the child. 

* * *

The phrase in loco parentis refers to a person who puts oneself in 

the situation of a lawful parent by assuming the obligations 

incident to the parental relationship without going through the 
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formality of a legal adoption.... The third party in this type of 

relationship, however, cannot place himself in loco parentis in 

defiance of the parents' wishes and the parent/child relationship. 

This Court has also specifically stated:

An important factor in determining whether a third party has 

standing is whether the third party lived with the child and 

the natural parent in a family setting, irrespective of its 

traditional or nontraditional composition, and developed a 

relationship with the child as a result of the participation and 

acquiescence of the natural parent.

In other words, a third party may not intervene and assume in 

loco parentis status where the natural parent opposes such 

intervention.

J.F. v. D.B., 897 A.2d 1261, 1273–1274 (Pa. Super. 2006) (internal citations, 

quotations, brackets omitted). 

Pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 5324, the following individuals are eligible to 

exercise standing to file an action for any form of physical or legal custody:

(3) A grandparent of the child who is not in loco parentis to the 

child:

(i) whose relationship with the child began either with the 

consent of a parent of the child or under a court order;

(ii) who assumes or is willing to assume responsibility for 

the child; and

(iii) when one of the following conditions is met:

(A) the child has been determined to be a dependent 

child[;]

(B) the child is substantially at risk due to parental abuse, 

neglect, drug or alcohol abuse or incapacity; or

(C) the child has, for a period of at least 12 consecutive 

months, resided with the grandparent, excluding brief 

temporary absences of the child from the home, and is 

removed from the home by the parents, in which case 
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the action must be filed within six months after the 

removal of the child from the home.

23 Pa.C.S.A. § 5324(3).

Moreover,

[i]n addition to situations set forth in [S]ection 5324 (relating to 

standing for any form of physical custody or legal custody), 

grandparents and great-grandparents may file an action under 

[Section 5325] for partial physical custody or supervised physical 

custody in the following situations:

(1) where the parent of the child is deceased, a parent or 

grandparent of the deceased parent may file an action under this 

section;

(2) where the relationship with the child began either with the 

consent of a parent of the child or under a court order and where 

the parents of the child:

(i) have commenced a proceeding for custody; and

(ii) do not agree as to whether the grandparents or 

great-grandparents should have custody under this section; 

or

(3) when the child has, for a period of at least 12 consecutive 

months, resided with the grandparent or great-grandparent, 

excluding brief temporary absences of the child from the home, 

and is removed from the home by the parents, an action must be 

filed within six months after the removal of the child from the 

home.

23 Pa.C.S.A. § 5325.

Here, the trial court determined that pursuant to Section 5324, 

Appellant failed to establish that Child had been adjudicated dependent, at 

risk of abuse or neglect, and/or that Child ever resided with Appellant. See

N.T., 6/8/22, at 4. Father testified that the last time Appellant saw Child was 

“around Christmas time when she was about 10 months old” and that Child 
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had no meaningful recollection of Appellant. Id. at 7. Additionally, neither

Mother nor Father is deceased, Appellant does not stand in loco parentis, and 

both parents testified at the June 8, 2022 hearing that they did not consent 

to an order of visitation for Appellant. Id. at 5-8. Moreover, when the trial 

court denied Appellant’s request for visitation based upon his lack of standing, 

Appellant replied, “if they say they don’t want me to see their daughter, well, 

it breaks my heart, but I’ll honor their wishes.” Id. at 11. Currently, Appellant 

does not contest the trial court’s finding that he lacks standing pursuant to 

Sections 5324 and 5325, as set forth above. Finally, Appellant’s challenges 

to the credibility of Father and Mother are not supported by the record and 

rest largely on matters wholly irrelevant to Child’s custody. 

We note, in closing, that Appellant raises an equal protection argument 

for the first time on appeal. “Issues not raised in the trial court are waived 

and cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.” Pa.R.A.P. 302(a). 

Regardless, the Equal Protection Clause provides that “[n]o State shall ... deny 

to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” U.S. 

Const. Amend. XIV, § 1. “The essence of the constitutional principle of equal 

protection under the law is that like persons in like circumstances will be 

treated similarly.” Curtis v. Kline, 666 A.2d 265, 267 (Pa. 1995). “Equal 

protection analysis requires that we find state action that denies a person 

‘equal protection of the laws’ because it constrains only the actions of the 

State not of private persons.” Uniontown Newspapers, Inc. v. Roberts, 

839 A.2d 185, 200 (Pa. 2003), citing U.S. Const. Amend. XIV, § 1, cl. 4. 
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Appellant cannot assert equal protection claims against Father or Mother since 

such claims lack the essential component of state action. Moreover, in 

determining that Appellant did not meet the threshold to establish standing 

under Sections 5324 and 5325, as set forth above, the trial court neither 

considered Appellant’s race nor compared Appellant’s claim or status to Child’s 

maternal grandparents.2

Accordingly, based upon our standard of review and our examination of 

the certified record and applicable law, we discern no abuse of discretion or 

error of law by the trial court’s denial of Appellant’s request for visitation of 

Child.

Order affirmed. 

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 11/30/2022

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2

 The trial court held a hearing on Appellant’s motion for visitation, so 

Appellant had notice and an opportunity to be heard and there is no viable

claim that he was denied due process of law. Moreover, from our review of 

the certified record, there have been no filings, orders, or trial court decisions 

regarding visitation by Child’s maternal grandparents. Mother and Father did 

not testify regarding the relationship between Child and her maternal 

grandparents at the hearing on Appellant’s request for visitation. As such, 

there is no record evidence that Appellant was treated differently under the 

law than “persons in like circumstances.” 
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