IN THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA

No. 09–0847 & 09–0848

Filed April 1, 2011

IOWA SUPREME COURT ATTORNEY DISCIPLINARY BOARD,

Complainant,

vs.

DAVID L. POLSLEY,

Respondent.

---------------------------------

IOWA SUPREME COURT ATTORNEY DISCIPLINARY BOARD,

Complainant,

vs.

KATHRYN SUE POLSLEY,

Respondent.

On review of the report of the Grievance Commission of the 

Supreme Court of Iowa.

Grievance commission recommends suspensions of six months. 

LICENSES REVOKED.

Charles L. Harrington and David J. Grace, Des Moines, for 

complainant.

David L. Polsley and Kathryn Sue Polsley, Ottawa, Kansas, pro se.
2

HECHT, Justice.

The Iowa Supreme Court Attorney Disciplinary Board filed a 

complaint alleging the respondents, David L. Polsley and Kathryn S. 

Polsley, violated the Iowa Code of Professional Responsibility for Lawyers

by converting government property to their own use. The Grievance 

Commission of the Supreme Court of Iowa found the board had proved 

the allegations of the complaint and recommended we suspend the 

respondents’ licenses to practice law indefinitely with no possibility of 

reinstatement for six months. We find the board proved the Polsleys’ 

conduct violated several ethical rules requiring revocation of their 

licenses. 

I. Factual Background and Prior Proceedings.

The Polsleys, husband and wife, reside in Ottawa, Kansas. 

Kathryn graduated from the University of Kansas School of Law in 1979, 

and David graduated from the same law school in 1981. After practicing 

law in Kansas for a short time, the couple moved to Iowa, took the Iowa 

bar examination, and were admitted to practice in this state. David

accepted a job offer from a Wisconsin corporation, and they moved there 

in 1987. In 1991, they returned to Kansas and practiced law together 

thereafter. 

In December 1998, Kathryn’s mother, Lois Simpson, fell ill with 

Creutzfeldt-Jakob’s syndrome, a terminal degenerative neurological 

disorder. From February 4, 1999, until July 3, 2000, Mrs. Simpson was 

bedridden in a persistent vegetative state. The Polsleys and their 

children moved into Simpson’s home and served as her primary

caretakers during her illness. 

Mrs. Simpson was the beneficiary of a trust which owned a bank 

account. Farm income from Mrs. Simpson’s mother and Mrs. Simpson’s 
3

own social security survivor’s benefits were customarily deposited into 

the account.1 As her mother’s trustee, Kathryn drew checks on the

trust’s bank account to pay the ordinary and necessary bills of the

household.2 

Mrs. Simpson died in July 2000. Although the Social Security 

Administration (SSA) was notified of Mrs. Simpson’s death, Mrs. 

Simpson’s social security payments continued to be deposited into the 

trust account.3 During the months following her mother’s death, 

Kathryn drew checks on the account totaling $15,150 to David for legal 

services rendered to the trust.4 Kathryn also wrote checks on the 

account to herself in the amount of $1827.19 as reimbursement for 

property taxes, furnace repairs, and other expenses she incurred to keep 

Mrs. Simpson’s real estate habitable and marketable after her death.

After an employee of the depository bank and the attorney for 

Mrs. Simpson’s estate notified the SSA of the mistaken deposits, the 

Polsleys promptly reimbursed the overpayments to the SSA. 

A. Criminal Prosecution. In November 2002, a fifteen-count

indictment was filed against the Polsleys in U.S. District Court for the 

District of Kansas. Count one of the indictment charged the Polsleys 

with felony fraud against the SSA, and the remaining counts charged 

misdemeanor offenses of aiding and abetting the conversion of a social 

 1The Social Security Administration directly deposited Simpson’s benefits into 

the trust’s bank account.

2The record indicates that, at Kathryn’s direction, David occasionally prepared 

checks on the trust account for Kathryn’s signature. 

3The total amount of the SSA checks mistakenly deposited into the account was 

$10,709.74.

4Mrs. Simpson’s estate had a value of approximately $1,000,000 at the time of 

her death.
4

security benefit payment. The Polsleys each pled guilty to one 

misdemeanor count in April 2003.5

B. Professional Discipline. Professional disciplinary proceedings 

were instituted against the Polsleys in Kansas following their criminal 

convictions. After a hearing before a disciplinary panel of the Kansas 

Board for the Discipline of Attorneys, the Polsleys were found to have 

violated Kansas Rule of Professional Conduct (KRPC) 8.4(b) which 

defined “professional misconduct” to include the commission of “a 

criminal act that reflects adversely on the lawyer’s honesty, 

trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer in other respects.” Upon 

consideration of the record made before the disciplinary panel, the 

Supreme Court of Kansas found clear and convincing evidence that the 

Polsleys violated KRPC 8.4(b). The court’s finding was based on the 

Polsleys’ admissions in their plea agreements that they “knowingly and 

willfully converted government property to [their] own use.” Accepting 

the panel’s recommendation, the court suspended Kathryn’s license to 

practice law in Kansas for two years6 and indefinitely suspended David’s 

license.7 

Upon receipt of notice of the criminal convictions in federal court, 

this court entered an order on April 5, 2007, temporarily suspending the 

Polsleys’ licenses to practice law in Iowa. Subsequently, the Iowa 

 5They were subsequently sentenced to three months of home detention, one 

hundred hours of community service, and three years of probation.

6Kathryn’s license to practice law in Kansas was reinstated on December 13, 

2006.

7The Kansas court concluded mitigating circumstances justified a sanction of 

suspension rather than disbarment. In re David L. Polsley, 85 P.3d 693, 696–97 (Kan. 

2004); In re Kathryn S. Polsley, 86 P.3d 531, 534–35 (Kan. 2004). The sanction imposed 

against David in the Kansas proceedings was more severe because he had previously 

been reprimanded on two occasions, including one private admonition and one public 

censure. 
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Supreme Court Attorney Disciplinary Board filed a complaint against the 

Polsleys asserting issue preclusion and alleging their criminal acts

constituted violations of DR 1–102(A)(3) (engaging in illegal conduct 

involving moral turpitude), (4) (engaging in conduct involving dishonesty, 

fraud, deceit or misrepresentation), (5) (engaging in conduct prejudicial 

to the administration of justice), and (6) (engaging in any other conduct 

that adversely reflects on the fitness to practice law). Following a 

hearing, the grievance commission found the Polsleys had been convicted 

“of a misdemeanor involving moral turpitude as well as a dishonest 

intent.” The commission concluded the Polsleys violated DR 1–102(A)(3), 

(4), (5), and (6) “by knowingly and willingly converting government 

property to their own use, in violation of federal law.” As a sanction for 

the criminal conduct, the commission recommended the Polsleys’ 

licenses to practice law in Iowa be suspended for an additional six 

months beyond the pending temporary suspensions.

II. Standard of Review.

Our review of attorney disciplinary proceedings is de novo. Iowa 

Ct. R. 35.10(1) (2008); Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. 

Gottschalk, 729 N.W.2d 812, 815 (Iowa 2007). The commission’s 

findings and recommendations are given respectful consideration, but we 

are not bound by them. Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. 

Isaacson, 750 N.W.2d 104, 106 (Iowa 2008). The board has the burden 

of proving attorney misconduct by a convincing preponderance of the 

evidence. Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Conrad, 723 N.W.2d 

791, 792 (Iowa 2006).

“This burden is less than proof beyond a reasonable doubt, 

but more than the preponderance standard required in the 

usual civil case. Once misconduct is proven, we ‘may 
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impose a lesser or greater sanction than the discipline 

recommended by the grievance commission.’ ”

Id. (quoting Iowa Supreme Ct. Bd. of Prof’l Ethics & Conduct v. Lett, 674 

N.W.2d 139, 142 (Iowa 2004) (citations omitted)). As neither party has 

appealed the commission’s recommendation, our review is pursuant to

Iowa Court Rule 35.10(1). See Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. 

Templeton, 784 N.W.2d 761, 766 (Iowa 2010).

III. Ethical Violations. 

The board invoked issue preclusion in this case under Iowa 

Supreme Court Rule 35.7(3). Under this rule, relitigation of an issue is 

precluded if

a. The issue has been resolved in a civil proceeding 

that resulted in a final judgment, or in a criminal proceeding 

that resulted in a finding of guilt, even if the Iowa Supreme 

Court Attorney Disciplinary Board was not a party to the 

prior proceeding.

b. The burden of proof in the prior proceeding was 

greater than a mere preponderance of the evidence.

c. The party seeking preclusive effect has given written 

notice to the opposing party, not less than ten days prior to 

the hearing, of the party’s intention to invoke issue 

preclusion.

Iowa Ct. R. 35.7(3). In the Kansas disciplinary proceedings, the Supreme 

Court of Kansas found clear and convincing evidence that the Polsleys 

knowingly and willfully converted government property to their own use 

and that their criminal conduct involved dishonesty. In re David L. 

Polsley, 85 P.3d 693, 696–97 (Kan. 2004) (Polsley I); In re Kathryn S. 

Polsley, 86 P.3d 531, 533–35 (Kan. 2004) (Polsley II). This finding has 

preclusive effect under rule 35.7(3). With these principles in mind, we 

next consider whether the board has proved violations of disciplinary 

rules prescribing ethical conduct for Iowa lawyers. 
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A. DR 1–102(A)(3) (Illegal Conduct Involving Moral Turpitude). 

The board first asserts the Polsleys engaged in illegal conduct involving 

moral turpitude. “Moral turpitude” in the context of attorney disciplinary 

proceedings means illegal conduct done with a fraudulent or dishonest 

intent. Comm. on Prof’l Ethics & Conduct v. Cody, 412 N.W.2d 637, 639 

(Iowa 1987). The Polsleys were both convicted of a crime based on their 

admission that they knowingly and willfully converted government 

property to their own use. According preclusive effect to the Kansas 

Supreme Court’s finding that the Polsleys engaged in dishonesty, we 

conclude the board proved by a clear preponderance of the evidence that 

the Polsleys violated DR 1–102(A)(3) when they converted the trust’s 

funds.

B. DR 1–102(A)(4) (Engaging in Conduct Involving Dishonesty,

Fraud, Deceit or Misrepresentation). For the reasons stated in support 

of our finding that the Polsleys committed acts involving moral turpitude, 

we find the board also proved the Polsleys’ acts of conversion were 

characterized by dishonesty. Accordingly, we find the board proved the 

Polsleys violated DR 1–102(A)(4) in this case.

C. DR 1–102(A)(5) (Engaging in Conduct Prejudicial to the 

Administration of Justice). The commission of a crime does not 

necessarily constitute a violation of the ethical rule prohibiting conduct 

prejudicial to the administration of justice. Templeton, 784 N.W.2d at 

768. Our recent decisions have made clear that “the mere act of 

committing a crime does not constitute a violation of this rule because 

the rule does not simply prohibit the doing of an act.” Id. Rather, an act 

is prejudicial to the administration of justice and sanctionable only if it 

violates the well-understood norms and conventions of the practice of 

law. Id. These norms include the fundamental proposition that 
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attorneys must not convert property of others. See Iowa Supreme Ct. 

Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Carroll, 721 N.W.2d 788, 791–92 (Iowa 2006). 

Accordingly, we conclude the board proved by a convincing 

preponderance of the evidence that the Polsleys violated DR 1–102(A)(5).

D. DR 1–102(A)(6) (Engaging in Conduct Adversely Reflecting on 

Fitness to Practice). We now turn to the question of whether the board 

has established the Polsleys violated our disciplinary rule prohibiting 

conduct reflecting adversely on the Polsleys’ fitness to practice law. In 

Templeton, we noted that “the mere commission of a criminal act does 

not necessarily reflect adversely on the fitness of an attorney to practice 

law.” Templeton, 784 N.W.2d at 767. Ordinarily, our determination of 

whether an attorney’s conduct reflects adversely upon his or her fitness 

to practice law turns not on whether the conduct is illegal, but rather 

upon whether there is some rational connection between the specific 

conduct and the actor’s fitness to practice law. Id. 

As we have noted, the Supreme Court of Kansas found by clear 

and convincing evidence that the Polsleys were “convicted of theft of 

government property, a crime that reflects adversely on [their] honesty 

and trustworthiness.” Polsley I, 85 P.3d at 695, 697; see also Polsley II, 

86 P.3d at 533, 535. The Kansas court’s finding was made in civil 

proceedings imposing a burden of proof greater than a preponderance of 

the evidence. Polsley I, 85 P.3d at 697; Polsley II, 86 P.3d at 535. Upon 

our review, we conclude the principles of issue preclusion also control 

our determination of this issue. See Iowa Ct. R. 35.7(3). Accordingly, we 

conclude the Polsleys’ conduct reflected adversely on their fitness to 

practice, and therefore violated DR 1–102(A)(6). 
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IV. Sanction.

“ ‘[I]t is almost axiomatic that the licenses of lawyers who convert 

funds entrusted to them should be revoked.’ ” Iowa Supreme Ct. Bd. of 

Prof’l Ethics & Conduct v. Anderson, 687 N.W.2d 587, 590 (Iowa 2004)

(quoting Iowa Supreme Ct. Bd. of Prof’l Ethics & Conduct v. Irwin, 679 

N.W.2d 641, 644 (Iowa 2004)) (cataloguing cases in which we have 

revoked an attorney’s license for theft of entrusted funds). When a 

sanction less severe than revocation has been imposed against attorneys 

who misappropriated a client’s money or fiduciary funds, we have found 

the attorneys “had a colorable future claim to the funds or did not take 

the funds for [their] own use.” Id. We find no factual basis in the record 

supporting a finding that the Polsleys had a colorable future claim to the 

government funds in the trust’s bank account or that the funds were not 

taken for their own use. Accordingly, we conclude the proper sanction in 

this case is revocation. 

V. Conclusion.

We conclude the board proved by a convincing preponderance of 

the evidence that the Polsleys violated several disciplinary rules requiring 

revocation of their licenses to practice law in Iowa. 

LICENSES REVOKED.

All justices concur except Waterman, Mansfield, and Zager, JJ., 

who take no part.