1

The Honorable Robert W. Pratt, Chief Judge, United States District Court for

the Southern District of Iowa.

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 07-2387

___________

Michael Ron Runyan, *

*

Appellant, *

* Appeal from the United States

v. * District Court for the

* Southern District of Iowa.

Jerry Burt, Warden, *

*

Appellee. *

___________

Submitted: February 13, 2008 

Filed: April 8, 2008

___________

Before RILEY, JOHN R. GIBSON, and BENTON, Circuit Judges.

___________

RILEY, Circuit Judge.

Michael Ron Runyan (Runyan) appeals the district court’s1

 denial of his 28

U.S.C. § 2254 application for a writ of habeas corpus. Runyan contends the district

court incorrectly determined (1) Runyan’s application was untimely, and (2) Runyan

was not entitled to equitable tolling. We affirm.
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I. BACKGROUND

On October 2, 1997, Runyan was convicted of first degree murder in the Story

County (Iowa) District Court. Runyan appealed, and the Iowa Supreme Court

ultimately denied Runyan’s application for further direct review on July 30, 1999. 

Runyan mailed an application for Iowa post-conviction relief (Iowa PCR

application), writing April 14, 2000 on the letter accompanying his application. On

April 27, 2000, the Story County District Court issued an order directing Runyan to

pay 20% of the $80.00 filing fee ($16.00), as required by Iowa Code § 610A.1(1)(a).

The letter specifically informed Runyan he was required to pay the $16.00 “before the

Clerk will file the post conviction relief application.” The order also informed

Runyan his Iowa PCR application “[did] not bear an original signature . . . and the

application is not verified as required by Section 822.3, Code of Iowa.” The order

instructed Runyan, “When and if Mr. Runyan submits the required percentage of the

filing fee he should additionally send an original verified copy of his application to

the Clerk for filing.” Runyan subsequently met these requirements and his Iowa PCR

application was stamped as filed on May 24, 2000. 

The Story County District Court denied the Iowa PCR application on the merits

on September 30, 2003. Runyan appealed through the state appellate courts, and the

post-conviction review process concluded on September 26, 2005. 

On March 23, 2006, Runyan filed a federal application for a writ of habeas

corpus pursuant to § 2254. The district court found Runyan’s application untimely

and denied Runyan’s request for equitable tolling, dismissing Runyan’s application

under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d). 
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II. DISCUSSION

We review the district court’s interpretation of the one-year Antiterrorism and

Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) limitation de novo. See Walker v. Norris, 436

F.3d 1026, 1029 (8th Cir. 2006).

A. “Properly Filed” Under AEDPA

“The AEDPA establishes a one-year statute of limitations for filing federal

habeas corpus petitions which runs from ‘the date on which the judgment became final

by the conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such

review.’” Id. (quoting § 2244(d)(1)(A)). “The statute of limitations is tolled,

however, while ‘a properly filed application for State post-conviction or other

collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is pending.’” Id. at

1029-30 (quoting § 2244(d)(2)). 

The time between the date direct review of a conviction is completed and the

date an application for state post-conviction relief is filed does not toll the AEDPA

one-year statute of limitations. See Painter v. Iowa, 247 F.3d 1255, 1256 (8th Cir.

2001). The Iowa Supreme Court denied Runyan’s application for further direct

review on July 30, 1999. Runyan concedes the ninety-day period in which to seek

certiorari to the United States Supreme Court thus would have expired on October 28,

1999, concluding the period of direct review and beginning the one-year period in

which Runyan could apply for federal habeas relief. Runyan’s Iowa PCR application

was ultimately denied and mandated on September 26, 2005. Thus, the statute of

limitations again was running until Runyan filed his federal habeas application on

March 23, 2006. At issue is the date Runyan’s Iowa PCR application was “properly

filed” as required by § 2244(d)(2).

Runyan argues his Iowa PCR application was properly filed on April 14, 2000,

the date Runyan claims he first mailed the application. Runyan thus contends his

federal habeas application was filed before the expiration of the one-year limitations
2

Runyan also argues the order sent to him by the Story County District Court

“did not indicate . . . [Runyan’s] application would not be filed until [Runyan]

submitted a notarized version, [and] [i]n fact . . . suggest[ed] [Runyan’s] application

had been filed and the payment of the filing fee and verification process was only a

formality.” This characterization of the order is incorrect. The order specifically

informed Runyan he was required to pay the $16.00 “before the Clerk will file the post

conviction relief application.” (emphasis added). The order also instructed Runyan

“When and if Mr. Runyan submits the required percentage of the filing fee he should

additionally send an original verified copy of his application to the Clerk for filing.”

(emphasis added).

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period. The district court found, however, Runyan’s Iowa PCR application was not

“properly filed” until May 24, 2000, rendering Runyan’s federal habeas application

untimely by 21 days.

The district court correctly reasoned Runyan’s Iowa PCR application was not

properly filed as of April 14, 2000, because the original application failed to meet the

State’s filing requirements. The district court analogized Runyan’s case to Walker.

In Walker, the petitioner signed his application for post-conviction relief, but failed

to verify the application properly by having it notarized, as was required by the law

of the State of Arkansas. See Walker, 436 F.3d at 1028. An Arkansas state court

dismissed the application because it was unverified, and the Arkansas Supreme Court

affirmed. Id. at 1029. The federal district court found Walker’s state application was

not “properly filed” and we affirmed. See id. at 1029-32.

 

Runyan’s case is partially distinguishable from Walker, because the Iowa state

court never specifically determined Runyan’s application for post-conviction relief

was untimely.2

 This does not alter the inescapable conclusion Runyan’s Iowa PCR

application was not properly filed under Iowa law. As the United States Supreme

Court has explained:
3

Runyan contends Iowa Code § 610A.1(d) required the Story County District

Court to file his application even absent the fee payment, because that section

provides the court may only dismiss the action if “the inmate or prisoner has

previously failed to pay fees and costs in accordance with this section.” Simply

because the application cannot be dismissed unless the failure to pay fees has been

repeated does not necessarily mean an application without proper payment is

“properly filed.” We need not interpret this nuance of Iowa law, because Runyan also

failed to verify the Iowa PCR application, as required by Iowa Code § 822.3.

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An application is “filed,” as that term is commonly understood, when it

is delivered to, and accepted by, the appropriate court officer for

placement into the official record. And an application is “properly filed”

when its delivery and acceptance are in compliance with the applicable

laws and rules governing filings. These usually prescribe, for example,

the form of the document, the time limits upon its delivery, the court and

office in which it must be lodged, and the requisite filing fee. 

Artuz v. Bennett, 531 U.S. 4, 8 (2000) (internal citations and footnote omitted) (some

emphasis added); see also Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 413 (2005). 

Further, the fact the Iowa courts proceeded to deny Runyan’s application on the

merits does not alter our conclusion. See Carey v. Saffold, 536 U.S. 214, 225-26

(2002) (declaring a state court ruling “on the merits” does not necessarily mean the

underlying petition was timely); see also Lewis v. Norris, 454 F.3d 778, 780 (8th Cir.

2006) (“[T]he Supreme Court has . . . instructed federal courts to determine

independently whether state court proceedings are timely, even if the state courts treat

them as such.” (citing Evans v. Chavis, 546 U.S. 189, 197-98 (2006))). We are

applying a federal law nationwide by interpreting numerous and varying state and

local filing laws and rules in an attempt to construct some uniformity and

predictability. Runyan failed to comply with the applicable Iowa laws and rules

governing his initial Iowa PCR application by failing to pay the applicable filing fee

and by not properly verifying the application.3

 Thus, the district court correctly found
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Runyan’s Iowa PCR application was not properly filed until May 24, 2000, when

Runyan’s errors were corrected.

B. Equitable Tolling 

The district court also correctly determined Runyan was not entitled to

equitable tolling. “To be entitled to equitable tolling, [Runyan] must show (1) that he

has been pursing his rights diligently, and (2) that some extraordinary circumstance

stood in his way and prevented timely filing.” Finch v. Miller, 491 F.3d 424, 427 (8th

Cir. 2007) (citation omitted). “Equitable tolling is proper only when extraordinary

circumstances beyond a prisoner’s control make it impossible to file a petition on

time.” Id. (citation omitted) (emphasis added). “Equitable tolling is an exceedingly

narrow window of relief.” Id. at 427-28 (citation omitted) (emphasis added).

Runyan asserts “[c]ircumstances beyond Mr. Runyan’s control caused the

[Story County District Court] Clerk to erroneously fail to file-stamp [Runyan’s]

application as of the April 14, 2000 date of filing.” This contention lacks merit. As

previously discussed, see supra at n.2, the Story County District Court’s order was not

misleading. Properly verifying the Iowa PCR application and including the requisite

filing fee were entirely within Runyan’s control. 

Finally, Runyan contends if we uphold the district court’s dismissal of

Runyan’s application as untimely, “the courts would never get to hear the arguments

Mr. Runyan planned to make in his habeas petition . . .” and argues “this alone is an

extraordinary circumstance.” If we were to accept Runyan’s equitable argument, it

would invalidate Congress’s judgment that one year represents a fair and appropriate

limitations period and, in effect, nullify the limitation. Runyan’s “pre-filing efforts

dealt with the kinds of obstacles faced by many if not most habeas petitioners, and

therefore Congress is presumed to have considered such equities in enacting a

one-year limitations period.” Jihad v. Hvass, 267 F.3d 803, 806-07 (8th Cir. 2001).

“[A]ny invocation of equity to relieve the strict application of a statute of limitations
4

We note Runyan could have protected himself via the “stay and abeyance”

procedure discussed in Walker. See Walker, 436 F.3d at 1030-31.

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must be guarded and infrequent, lest circumstances of individualized hardship

supplant the rules of clearly drafted statutes.” Id. at 806 (citation omitted).4

III. CONCLUSION

The district court’s dismissal of Runyan’s habeas application as untimely is

affirmed. 

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