Illinois Official Reports

Appellate Court

Universal Metro Asian Services Ass’n v. Mahmood, 2021 IL App (1st) 200584

Appellate Court 

Caption

UNIVERSAL METRO ASIAN SERVICES ASSOCIATION and 

UNIVERSAL INDUSTRIES, INC., Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. IMRAN 

MAHMOOD; ACCURATE CONSULTING ENTERPRISE GROUP, 

LTD.; ACCURATE BUILDERS GROUP, LTD.; MEHNAZ IMRAN; 

and CHICAGO TITLE LAND TRUST COMPANY, as Trustee on 

Behalf of Trust No. 8002365763, Defendants-Appellants.

District & No. First District, Second Division 

No. 1-20-0584

Filed April 27, 2021

Decision Under 

Review

Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook County, No. 2017-L-000662; 

the Hon. Michael F. Otto, Judge, presiding.

Judgment Affirmed.

Counsel on

Appeal

Michael Lee Tinaglia, of Law Offices of Michael Lee Tinaglia, Ltd., 

of Park Ridge, for appellants.

Jeffrey Schulman and Katelyn Hodgman, of Wolin & Rosen, Ltd., of 

Chicago, for appellees.
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Panel JUSTICE COBBS delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

Justices Lavin and Pucinski concurred in the judgment and opinion.

OPINION

¶ 1 Plaintiffs-appellees, Universal Metro Asian Services Association (Universal Metro) and 

Universal Industries, Inc. (collectively, Universal), filed suit in state court against defendantsappellants, Imran Mahmood; Mehnaz Imran; Chicago Title Land Trust Company as trustee on 

behalf of trust No. 8002365763; and Accurate Consulting Enterprise Group, Ltd., and Accurate 

Builders Group, Ltd. (collectively, Accurate companies), alleging conversion and unjust 

enrichment. After Mahmood was criminally charged with tax evasion in federal court, he 

moved to stay the state court civil proceedings and discovery until the resolution of the federal 

criminal case. Specifically, Mahmood argued that, without a stay, he would be denied due 

process in the civil proceedings because he would be forced to assert his fifth amendment right 

against self-incrimination while the criminal charges were still pending. The Accurate 

companies moved to adopt and clarify Mahmood’s motion to stay. Following the circuit court’s 

denial of their motions, defendants filed the instant interlocutory appeal. Defendants contend 

that the circuit court erred in denying their motions and therefore request this court to reverse 

the circuit court’s decision and order a stay in the instant matter until the resolution of the 

federal criminal case. For the following reasons, we affirm. 

¶ 2 I. BACKGROUND

¶ 3 Universal Metro is a not-for-profit organization that, inter alia, administers homecare 

services to “ethnic seniors of India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, the Middle East, Latin America, and 

Europe.” Universal Industries, Inc., is an Illinois corporation which holds homecare services 

contracts that Universal Metro fulfills. The Accurate companies are accounting corporations 

solely owned and controlled by Mahmood, who serves as an auditor and accountant. 

¶ 4 On January 19, 2017, plaintiffs filed the instant action in state court. Relevant to this appeal 

is plaintiffs’ second amended complaint, filed on May 7, 2019, which alleged claims of 

conversion and unjust enrichment.1 The complaint alleged that on or about June 24, 2002, 

plaintiffs and Accurate Consulting Enterprise Group, Ltd., entered into an agreement to 

provide a limited financial compliance audit for the period of July 2001 to February 2002. 

Mahmood was assigned to the audit. Although no further written agreements were executed 

between the parties, Mahmood continued to provide auditing services to Universal and became 

its comptroller and bookkeeper. Plaintiffs alleged that beginning in 2011, a series of checks 

and transfers totaling approximately $9 million were disbursed from Universal to Mahmood 

and the Accurate companies without authorization. 

¶ 5 On March 21, 2019, Mahmood was charged by information with criminal tax evasion in 

federal court, in a case captioned United States v. Imran Mahmood, No. 18-CR-519 (N.D. Ill.). 

1

The complaint alleges “[n]o wrongdoing” against Chicago Land Trust Company and states that it 

was “joined solely for the purposes of entering effective and complete relief.” Similarly, Imran, the 

spouse of Mahmood, was joined to the extent that she “has or claims to have an interest in the beneficial 

interest in [a] Land Trust.”
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The charges alleged that in 2014, Mahmood willfully evaded payment of income tax in the 

amount of $1,215,935 on more than $3 million in income he received from “Company A.”2

The information charged that on or about October 10, 2015, Mahmood “willfully failed and 

caused to be filed a false personal income tax return that failed to report all income he received 

in [2014].” 

¶ 6 On November 6, 2019, Mahmood filed a motion to stay the civil proceedings, pending 

disposition of the federal criminal case. Mahmood argued that the civil proceedings should be 

stayed because without a stay he would be “seriously and unfairly prejudice[d]” and “will be 

denied due process if he is forced to assert his Fifth Amendment right against selfincrimination in these civil proceedings.” Further, Mahmood argued that he would be denied 

his right to effective assistance of counsel. 

¶ 7 While defendants’ motion was pending, plaintiffs propounded interrogatories, a request to 

produce documents, and a request to admit. On November 13, 2019, Mahmood moved to stay 

discovery, arguing that discovery should be stayed until there was a determination by the court 

on the motion to stay proceedings. On November 21, 2019, the circuit court ordered “[a]ll 

discovery as to Mahmood *** tolled pending ruling on [the] motion to stay” and set a briefing 

schedule on the motion to stay.

¶ 8 On December 9, 2019, the Accurate companies joined in Mahmood’s motion to stay 

proceedings via a motion to adopt and clarify. In their motion to adopt and clarify, the Accurate 

companies argued that a “full stay of proceedings as to Mahmood and [the Accurate companies 

should be granted]” because they “must rely on Mahmood, their sole shareholder, director, and 

officer to answer discovery requests” and he “cannot do so without imperiling selfincrimination or adverse inferences.” The Accurate companies contended that the “Fifth 

Amendment privilege” would be implicated where the information sought was testimonial, as 

the “review of the interrogatories and request to produce in the instant case reveals that every 

question or request seeks testimonial responses.”

¶ 9 On March 11, 2020, a hearing was held on the motions. The court found that “[t]his case 

is unlike some cases where the request for a stay is made due to a parallel criminal proceeding.” 

According to the court, the federal action was different from the instant civil proceeding 

because it required proving that Mahmood did not pay taxes and not that he “came into 

possession of *** money unlawfully or illicitly.” The court further considered the five factors 

articulated in Davies v. Pasamba, 2014 IL App (1st) 133551, ¶ 52, in determining whether a 

stay was appropriate, including (1) the plaintiff’s interest in an expeditious resolution of the 

civil case and any prejudice to the plaintiff in not proceeding, (2) the interests and burdens on 

the defendant, including the extent to which defendant’s fifth amendment rights are implicated, 

(3) the convenience to the court in managing its docket and efficiently using judicial resources, 

(4) the interests of persons who are not parties to the civil proceeding, and (5) the interests of 

the public in the pending civil and criminal actions. 

¶ 10 The circuit court found that four of the five factors favored denial of the motion for a stay. 

First, the court noted that plaintiffs clearly have an interest in the expeditious resolution of the 

civil case because they allege being deprived of approximately $9 million. However, the 

second factor weighed in favor of defendants, who established “some tension between 

2

The information defines “Company A” as a “not-for-profit company that, among other services, 

provided homecare services to seniors residing in Illinois.” 
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[Mahmood’s fifth amendment] rights and moving forward with this case.” As to the third 

factor, the court found that it “clearly notates against the stay in this case” because the issue 

could have been raised previously, given that this was a 2017 case and, “although the 

information was not filed until 2019 [in the criminal case], the criminal complaint has been on 

file since 2018.” Fourth, the court noted that a stay in this case may potentially delay a 

consolidated case, Universal Metro Asian Services Ass’n v. Ekhomu, No. 2018-L-011704 (Cir. 

Ct. Cook County), where plaintiff Universal Metro filed suit against its auditor or accountant. 

Finally, the court noted that the fifth factor could go “either way, the public has an interest in 

[the] swift prosecution of criminal matters, but also in justice for individuals who claim to have 

been defrauded.” With respect to the stay of discovery, the court found that there was no “clearcut case and the briefs did not make out one that any specific interrogatory or document request 

seeks or that a response to any of them *** would be clearly testimonial in nature.” 

Nevertheless, the court stated that, “if the [d]efendants do wish to object to any particular 

interrogatory request or request for production on [Fifth] Amendment grounds, I’m not 

precluding them from doing so as the case moves forward.”

¶ 11 After the hearing, the court entered an order denying (1) Mahmood’s motion to stay 

proceedings, (2) Mahmood’s motion to stay discovery, and (3) the Accurate companies’ 

motion to adopt and clarify Mahmood’s motion to stay. The court further ordered defendants 

“to answer the second amended complaint and all written discovery.” On March 30, 2020, 

defendants filed a notice of interlocutory appeal pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 

307(a)(1) (eff. Nov. 1, 2017). 

¶ 12 On or about April 9, 2020, Mahmood responded to plaintiffs’ first set of interrogatories, 

request for production of documents, and request to admit by asserting his right against selfincrimination under the fifth amendment. 

¶ 13 II. ANALYSIS

¶ 14 On appeal, defendants argue that the circuit court erred in denying their motions to stay 

where the factors used to evaluate the propriety of a stay in the civil proceeding overlap with 

the criminal prosecution. Defendants also contend that the court erred in denying their motions 

to stay discovery because “virtually all of the written discovery promulgated by [plaintiffs] 

sought testimonial responses and information.”

¶ 15 A. Mootness 

¶ 16 Plaintiffs argue that this appeal became moot when defendants filed their responses to 

plaintiffs’ discovery requests. Plaintiffs contend that, by submitting their answers and asserting 

their fifth amendment right to plaintiffs’ first set of interrogatories, request for production of 

documents, and request to admit, defendants can no longer seek reversal of the circuit court’s 

denial of their motion to stay discovery and motion to adopt and clarify because there is no 

longer an active controversy. 

¶ 17 Mootness presents a question of justiciability. MI Management, LLC v. Proteus Holdings, 

LLC, 2018 IL App (1st) 160972, ¶ 61. In order to invoke the subject-matter jurisdiction of the 

court, a case must present a justiciable matter. See In re M.W., 232 Ill. 2d 408, 424 (2009) 

(subject-matter jurisdiction exists as a matter of law if the matter before the court is 

“justiciable”). Generally, “a ‘justiciable matter’ ” is “a controversy appropriate for review by 

the court, in that it is definite and concrete, as opposed to hypothetical or moot, touching upon 
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the legal relations of parties having adverse legal interests.” Belleville Toyota, Inc. v. Toyota 

Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc., 199 Ill. 2d 325, 335 (2002). An appeal is moot if “the occurrence of 

events since filing of the appeal makes it impossible for the reviewing court to render effectual 

relief.” Berlin v. Sarah Bush Lincoln Health Center, 179 Ill. 2d 1, 7 (1997). “The existence of 

an actual controversy is an essential requisite to appellate jurisdiction, and courts of review 

will generally not decide abstract, hypothetical, or moot questions.” In re Marriage of 

Nienhouse, 355 Ill. App. 3d 146, 149 (2004). “Mootness, as a doctrine, stems from the concern 

that parties to a resolved dispute lack a sufficient personal stake in the outcome to assure that 

there is an adversarial relationship that sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the 

courts largely depend for illumination of difficult questions.” Fisch v. Loews Cineplex 

Theatres, Inc., 365 Ill. App. 3d 537, 539 (2005). An action will be dismissed as moot when a 

party has secured what was originally sought. Id. at 539-40. Claims of mootness present 

questions of law, which we review de novo. In re Alfred H.H., 233 Ill. 2d 345, 350 (2009). 

¶ 18 Here, defendants seek to have the instant civil proceedings stayed along with discovery, 

pending disposition of the federal criminal action. We note that an active controversy exists 

where there is a question of whether a stay of proceedings should have been granted. 

Defendants have not secured what was originally sought, which is a stay of proceedings 

pending the federal action. Further, we find that defendants’ response to discovery does not 

render their efforts to obtain a stay moot because further discovery may ensue. As defendants 

point out, Mahmood “most certainly will be called upon to give *** deposition in his individual 

capacity and as a representative of [the Accurate companies].” As such, we find that the issue 

before us presents an actual controversy and is, therefore, not moot. 

¶ 19 B. Jurisdiction 

¶ 20 Regardless of whether the parties raise the issue, this court has an independent duty to 

evaluate its own jurisdiction (A.M. Realty Western L.L.C. v. MSMC Realty, L.L.C., 2016 IL 

App (1st) 151087, ¶ 67) and to dismiss an appeal if jurisdiction is lacking (Department of 

Healthcare & Family Services v. Cortez, 2012 IL App (2d) 120502, ¶ 7). As a general rule, an 

appeal may only be taken from a final order. American Country Insurance Co. v. Chicago 

Carriage Cab Corp., 2012 IL App (1st) 110761, ¶ 21. However, Rule 307(a)(1) provides that 

an appeal may be taken from an interlocutory order “granting, modifying, refusing, dissolving, 

or refusing to dissolve or modify an injunction.” Ill. S. Ct. R. 307(a)(1) (eff. Nov. 1, 2017). 

Defendants appeal both the circuit court’s order denying a stay of the civil proceedings and the 

order denying a stay of discovery. It has long been established that the denial of a motion to 

stay a proceeding may be treated as a denial of a request for a preliminary injunction, which 

may form the basis for an interlocutory appeal as of right pursuant to Rule 307(a)(1). Marzouki 

v. Najar-Marzouki, 2014 IL App (1st) 132841, ¶ 8. Thus, we have jurisdiction to review the 

circuit court’s denial of defendants’ motion to stay the civil proceedings.

¶ 21 Contrarily, discovery orders that are purely ministerial or administrative and regulate only 

procedural details of the litigation are not injunctive in nature. Rathje v. Horlbeck Capital 

Management, LLC, 2014 IL App (2d) 140682, ¶ 26. Thus, they do not fall within the ambit of 

injunctive relief. In re A Minor, 127 Ill. 2d 247, 261-62 (1989). Our supreme court has held 

that, to determine what constitutes an appealable injunctive order under Rule 307(a)(1), we 

must look to the substance of the action and not its form. Id. at 260. 
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¶ 22 An injunction has been defined as “ ‘a judicial process, by which a party is required to do 

a particular thing, or to refrain from doing a particular thing.’ ” Id. at 261 (quoting Wangelin 

v. Goe, 50 Ill. 459, 463 (1869)). Actions of the circuit court having the force and effect of 

injunction are appealable even if called something else. Id. at 260. Here, the circuit court’s 

order denying defendants’ motion to stay required defendants “to respond to all written 

discovery.” The court’s order served to do more than regulate the procedural details of the 

litigation. It required defendants to disclose substantive evidence relevant to the issues at trial 

and had an injunctive effect apart from the litigation. Thus, we conclude that, like the circuit 

court’s order denying the motion to stay the civil proceedings, the court’s order denying the 

stay of discovery is reviewable under Rule 307(a)(1). 

¶ 23 C. Stay of Proceedings 

¶ 24 Defendants argue that the circuit court abused its discretion in denying the stay of 

proceedings where to do so would violate their right against self-incrimination.

¶ 25 The fifth amendment provides that “[n]o person *** shall be compelled in any criminal 

case to be a witness against himself.” U.S. Const., amend. V. “The right against selfincrimination is one of the most fundamental rights under the Constitution of the United 

States.” CHB Uptown Properties, LLC v. Financial Place Apartments, LLC, 378 Ill. App. 3d 

105, 108 (2007). When, as here, criminal charges are pending against a party to a civil case, 

courts may defer civil proceedings in such a manner to, inter alia, protect a party from making 

admissions or furnishing other proof of a crime, protect the party from not being able to defend 

a civil suit regarding the same matter, protect the party from abuse of discovery in the criminal 

matter, and protect the party from otherwise prejudicing his criminal case. People ex rel. 

Hartigan v. Kafka & Sons Building & Supply Co., 252 Ill. App. 3d 115, 119 (1993). However, 

“the fact that a party involved in a civil proceeding invokes his fifth amendment privilege 

against self-incrimination ‘does not *** mandate a stay of [the] civil proceeding[ ] pending the 

outcome of similar or parallel criminal proceedings.’ ” Cordeck Sales, Inc. v. Construction 

Systems, Inc., 382 Ill. App. 3d 334, 348-49 (2008) (quoting Jacksonville Savings Bank v. 

Kovack, 326 Ill. App. 3d 1131, 1135 (2002)). The party seeking the stay must justify it by clear 

and convincing circumstances outweighing potential harm to the party against whom the stay 

is operative. Davies, 2014 IL App (1st) 133551, ¶ 36.

¶ 26 The decision to grant such a stay is a matter within the trial court’s discretion. Jacksonville, 

326 Ill. App. 3d at 1136. Under the abuse of discretion standard, the question is not whether 

this court might have decided the issue differently. In re Marriage of Samardzija, 365 Ill. App. 

3d 702, 708 (2006). We will not disturb a trial court’s decision to issue or deny a stay absent 

an abuse of discretion. Cholipski v. Bovis Lend Lease, Inc., 2014 IL App (1st) 132842, ¶ 39. A 

trial court abuses its discretion when its “ruling is arbitrary, fanciful, or unreasonable, or when 

no reasonable person would take the same view.” Bovay v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 2013 IL 

App (1st) 120789, ¶ 26. 

¶ 27 In determining the propriety of a stay, the court considers the following five factors: (1) the 

plaintiff’s interest in an expeditious resolution of the civil case and any prejudice to the plaintiff 

in not proceeding, (2) the interests of and burdens on the defendant, including the extent to 

which defendant’s fifth amendment rights are implicated, (3) the convenience to the court in 

managing its docket and efficiently using judicial resources, (4) the interests of persons who 
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are not parties to the civil proceedings, and (5) the interests of the public in the pending civil 

and criminal actions. Davies, 2014 IL App (1st) 133551, ¶ 52. 

¶ 28 On appeal, defendants challenge only the circuit court’s finding with respect to the second 

factor, i.e., “ ‘the interests of and burdens on the defendant, including the extent to which the 

defendant’s fifth amendment rights are implicated.’ ” Thus, we do not review the circuit court’s 

disposition on the other four factors, which, as we recited earlier, the court determined weighed 

against granting the stay. 

¶ 29 Defendants assert that the circuit court erred in its analysis of the second factor. To their 

point, defendants recite that portion of the circuit court’s ruling in which it stated that it would 

look to the factors as articulated in Davies in rendering its decision, that Davies was instructive 

because it is a “2014 case from the 1st District which controls [and] the United States District’s 

formulation in [Hollinger Int’l., Inc. v. Hollinger Inc., 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14437] and the 

4th District earlier formulation [in Jacksonville, 326 Ill. App. 3d at 1131] do not control.” They 

then proceed to argue that, because the court’s distinction “makes no sense, they appear to 

confirm a very serious error made by the court with respect to the second factor.” 

¶ 30 Prior to addressing the substance of defendants’ argument, we would point out the 

following. It is fundamental in Illinois that the decisions of the appellate court are binding 

precedent on all circuit courts, regardless of locale. People v. Harris, 123 Ill. 2d 113, 128 

(1988). Decisions of the appellate court in one district, though not binding on the appellate 

court in other districts, are binding on circuit courts throughout the state. State Farm Fire & 

Casualty Co. v. Yapejian, 152 Ill. 2d 533, 539 (1992). In the event conflicts arise amongst the 

districts, the circuit court is bound by the decision of the appellate court of the district in which 

it sits. Aleckson v. Village of Round Lake Park, 176 Ill. 2d 82, 92 (1997). Generally, a trial 

court located in one appellate district will adhere to the decisional law in that district. See 

Garcia v. Hynes & Howes Real Estate, Inc., 29 Ill. App. 3d 479, 482 (1975).

¶ 31 Here, the circuit court of Cook County, which is located in the First District, looked to the 

factors as articulated in Davies, a First District Appellate Court case. Davies cites Jacksonville

and reiterates the same factors for stay. The federal case of Hollinger, which has no binding 

authority, also included similar factors. See Illinois State Toll Highway Authority v. Amoco Oil 

Co., 336 Ill. App. 3d 300, 317 (2003) (providing that “[f]ederal cases are not binding authority 

in [Illinois] state courts”) Davies, a more recently decided First District case, remains good 

precedent, is instructive as to the issue of whether a stay should be granted, and is controlling. 

Thus, there was nothing either “curious” or nonsensical about the circuit court’s reliance on 

caselaw from its home district. 

¶ 32 We return to our review of defendants’ substantive claim. Defendants argue that “a very 

serious error [was] made by the [c]ircuit [c]ourt with respect to [the] determination of the 

second factor.” They maintain that a party’s fifth amendment rights are implicated when the 

issues in the criminal action overlap with those in the civil proceedings and, here, the cases 

overlap because “the factual issues and allegations *** share a common nucleus of operative 

facts.” It is their contention that whether a party’s fifth amendment rights are implicated is not 

only a significant factor but the most significant factor. The court’s reliance on a “same proofs 

analysis” skewed its application of the test, resulting in the court giving improper weight to the 

four less significant factors.

¶ 33 Contrary to defendants’ assertions, the circuit court ultimately found that the second factor 

weighed in favor of defendants because they showed “some tension between [Mahmood’s fifth 
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amendment] rights and moving forward with this case.” We acknowledge that there may be 

some inherent risk to defendants’ rights in proceeding with the instant case. However, as the 

circuit court correctly concluded, although this factor may weigh in favor of the defendants 

with respect to Mahmood’s fifth amendment rights, this was only one of the five factors in 

determining the propriety of a stay. Further, as the court in Jacksonville stated, 

“ ‘[a] defendant has no absolute right not to be forced to choose between testifying in 

a civil matter and asserting his [f]ifth [a]mendment privilege. Not only is it permissible 

to conduct a civil proceeding at the same time as a related criminal proceeding, even if 

that necessitates invocation of the [f]ifth [a]mendment privilege, but it is even 

permissible for the trier of fact to draw adverse inferences from the invocation of the 

[f]ifth [a]mendment in a civil proceeding.’ ” Jacksonville, 326 Ill. App. 3d at 1135 

(quoting Keating v. Office of Thrift Supervision, 45 F.3d 322, 326 (9th Cir. 1995)).

¶ 34 Our sister court in the Fourth District stated that whether a party’s fifth amendment rights 

have been implicated is a “significant factor for the trial court to consider in deciding whether 

to stay civil proceedings.” Id. at 1136. The court also stated, however, that it is “ ‘only one 

consideration to be weighed against others.’ ” Id. Further, the court noted that selfincrimination is more likely “[w]hen issues in a criminal matter significantly overlap with those 

in the civil proceedings.” Id. at 1136-37.

¶ 35 Defendants contend that plaintiffs’ second amended complaint and the criminal 

information allege the same facts. At first blush it may appear that the same operative facts 

arise as to both suits. Both the civil and federal case arise from the fact that defendants were 

issued checks by Company A or Universal. However, the operative facts necessary for the 

resolution of these two cases are quite different. For the civil action, the only relevant facts are 

whether the checks were unauthorized or, as the circuit court noted, whether Mahmood “came 

into possession of *** money unlawfully or illicitly.” But, for the federal action, what is 

relevant is the set of facts as to whether Mahmood received additional income for which he 

did not report or pay taxes. Whether Mahmood received this income without authorization is 

irrelevant in the federal case. The only real relation here between these two cases is a nominal 

one: the occurrence of alleged checks triggered the question of whether Mahmood received 

additional income that he did not report as income tax. Therefore, we agree with the circuit 

court that the causes have no bearing on each other. 

¶ 36 Defendants have failed to meet their burden to show that the stay was necessary in this 

case. The court properly considered the relevant factors that guide a decision on a stay of 

proceedings. We find no abuse of discretion.

¶ 37 The Accurate companies argue that a grant of stay should extend to them because they are 

corporations that “must rely on Mahmood, their sole shareholder, director and officer to answer 

discovery requests, they face the same impediment as Mahmood.” 

¶ 38 We note, as do plaintiffs, that there is one critical difference between Mahmood and the 

Accurate companies. Defendant Mahmood is an individual. Defendants the Accurate 

companies are corporations, and corporations are not protected by the fifth amendment. See 

In re Zisook, 88 Ill. 2d 321, 336 (1981); see also Braswell v. United States, 487 U.S. 99, 102 

(1988) (corporations are not protected by the fifth amendment); cf. United States v. All Meat 

& Poultry Products, No. 02 C 5145, 2003 WL 22284318, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 3, 2003) (holding 

that where the defendants included indicted individuals and indicted corporate entities, and 

“the indicted individual defendants appear to be the central figures in both the civil and 
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criminal proceedings, courts have determined that the better course is to enter a stay as to all 

defendants”). The motion for a stay of proceedings was denied as to defendant Mahmood. 

Other than the relationship between defendant Mahmood and the Accurate companies, 

defendants do not and cannot offer anything in either federal or state jurisprudence that would 

place the Accurate companies on equal footing with defendant Mahmood for fifth amendment 

purposes. The court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion to stay the proceedings 

as it relates to the Accurate companies. 

¶ 39 D. Stay of Discovery 

¶ 40 Defendants first argue that in finding that there was no “clearcut case” that “any specific 

interrogatory or document request sought testimonial information,” the circuit court erred in 

denying their motions to stay discovery. Defendants contend that they argued in their motion 

that “virtually all of the written discovery promulgated by [plaintiffs] sought testimonial 

responses and information” and that, by attaching or incorporating the discovery requests to 

their motions, they effectively argued that all information sought was testimonial. Second, in 

reliance on City of Chicago v. Reliable Truck Parts Co., 768 F. Supp. 642, 646-47 (N.D. Ill. 

1991), they state, without more, that the “question as to the propriety of proceeding with 

discovery against a corporate defendant in the face of the exercise of the fifth amendment 

privilege by its corporate officers is whether the information sought is testimonial, rather than 

documentary and corporate in nature.” The inference that we believe defendants seek to have 

this court draw is that the nature of the information that plaintiffs here seek is testimonial and 

could, therefore, potentially incriminate the representative personally. For that reason, they 

seemingly suggest, compliance should not be compelled. 

¶ 41 Defendants can take no refuge in Reliable. Reliable does not stand for the proposition that 

in such instances a stay as to both the individual and corporate defendants should issue. 

Notably, the court in Reliable suggested that a stay should not be granted. Further, the court 

held that, should the individual defendants decline to respond to the discovery, the City of 

Chicago could make full use of the negative inference of their silence at trial. Id at 647. 

¶ 42 Further, some years earlier in Braswell, the petitioner argued that, because the Supreme 

Court had previously recognized that the act of production was potentially testimonial, such 

an act could not be compelled if it would tend to incriminate the representative personally. 

Braswell, 487 U.S. at 113-14. The Court recognized that its precedent showed the Court’s 

appreciation of the testimonial nature of the act of production but nonetheless rejected the 

argument. Id. at 114-15. The Court commented that its precedent “ ‘apparently did not note 

any self-incrimination problem [with the testimonial significance of the act of production].’ ” 

Id. at 115 (quoting Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 430 n.9 (1976) (Brennan, J., 

concurring)).

¶ 43 We are aided in our disposition of this issue by our supreme court’s reasoning in In re 

Zisook, 88 Ill. 2d at 327. In Zisook, attorney Zisook was subpoenaed by the Attorney 

Registration and Disciplinary Commission (ARDC) to produce certain documents in the 

possession of a professional corporation. Id. at 326-27. Asserting the privilege against selfincrimination, Zisook failed to comply. Id. at 327. The ARDC filed a report with the court, and 

the court issued a rule to show cause as to why Zisook should not be held in contempt. Id. The 

court, in issuing the rule noted that Zisook held the documents of the corporation in a 

representative, as opposed to a personal, capacity. Id. at 340 (citing Bellis v. United States, 417 
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U.S. 85 (1974)). The court held “employees of professional corporations do not possess the 

privilege against self-incrimination so far as records of the corporation are concerned.” Id. at 

337. The privilege protects an employee from disclosing his “personal” records that may 

incriminate him, but it does not protect him from providing corporate records in his possession 

that may incriminate him. Id. at 340. Thus, the scope of Zisook’s personal privilege did not 

extend to the documents of the corporation. Id.

¶ 44 In Reamer v. Beall, 506 F.2d 1345 (4th Cir. 1974) (per curiam), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 955 

(1975), the sole employee and stockholder of a professional corporation was found in contempt 

for failing to obey a jury subpoena for the production of certain corporate records. Id. at 1346. 

The court, quoting the Supreme Court’s holding in Bellis, 417 U.S. at 100, stated “ ‘no 

privilege can be claimed by the custodian of corporate records, regardless of how small the 

corporation may be.’ ” Reamer, 506 F.2d at 1346. 

¶ 45 We acknowledge that Mahmood’s response to discovery on behalf of the Accurate 

companies could potentially give rise to self-incrimination concerns. Even so, that potential 

does not relieve him of the obligation to respond either in his individual or representative 

capacity. In re Two Grand Jury Subpoenae Duces Tecum, 769 F.2d 52, 57 (2d Cir. 1985), is 

consistent with our supreme court’s holding in In re Zisook and, thus, is persuasive. There, the 

Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that the fifth amendment protects a person only 

from incriminating himself by his own compelled testimonial communications as opposed to 

being incriminated by the testimonial act of a third person, such as a corporation that produces 

requested information. Id. In rare situations where a corporation’s custodian of records would 

incriminate himself by producing the company’s records, the corporation must appoint some 

other employee or agent to produce the documents. Id. Simply put, no situation could exist that 

would prevent a corporation from producing corporate records, as the corporation itself 

possesses no fifth amendment privilege.

¶ 46 We note that in this case, at the hearing on defendants’ motion to stay, the circuit court 

suggested that the self-incrimination concerns could perhaps be addressed by appointing an 

agent to respond to discovery. Thus, defendants are not without some protective mechanism. 

As a final note, regardless of whether the court recognized defendants’ attached exhibits to its 

motion to stay as substantive argument, the court’s denial of the motion to stay discovery was 

not an abuse of discretion.

¶ 47 Moreover, here, where the stay of proceedings has been denied, it would be incongruous 

to hold that discovery is nonetheless stayed. The purpose of discovery is to enable attorneys to 

better prepare and evaluate their cases. People ex rel. Terry v. Fisher, 12 Ill. 2d 231, 236 

(1957). Discerning the truth and the ultimate disposition of the litigation is best accomplished 

when the parties are well educated regarding their respective claims. Monier v. Chamberlain, 

35 Ill. 2d 351, 361 (1966). It is more than well established in Illinois that pretrial discovery is 

intended to enhance the truth-seeking process. Drehle v. Fleming, 129 Ill. App. 2d 166, 171 

(1970), aff’d, 49 Ill. 2d 293 (1971). The practical effect of a stay of discovery here would be 

to stay the fair and final disposition of the civil proceedings. As we found no abuse of discretion 

in the court’s denial of stay of the proceedings, we cannot so find in its denial of a stay of 

discovery.
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¶ 48 III. CONCLUSION

¶ 49 For the reasons stated, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court.

¶ 50 Affirmed.