UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

 

CRYSTAL G. FARRILL, 

 Plaintiff-Appellant, 

v. 

MICHAEL J. ASTRUE, Commissioner 

of Social Security Administration, 

 Defendant-Appellee. 

No. 11-7075 

(D.C. No. 6:10-CV-00167-KEW) 

(E.D. Okla.)

 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT*

 

Before HARTZ, ANDERSON, and O’BRIEN, Circuit Judges. 

 

 Crystal G. Farrill appeals the denial of her application for supplemental 

security income benefits. Exercising jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 

42 U.S.C. § 405(g), we reverse and remand with instructions to the district court to 

remand this matter to the Commissioner for further proceedings. 

 

*

 After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined 

unanimously to grant the parties’ request for a decision on the briefs without oral 

argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore 

ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding 

precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral 

estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with 

Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1. 

FILED 

United States Court of Appeals 

Tenth Circuit 

June 28, 2012

Elisabeth A. Shumaker 

Clerk of Court
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 An administrative law judge (ALJ) found that Ms. Farrill suffers from 

degenerative disc disease of the lumbar spine, degenerative joint disease of the 

shoulder, and obesity. The ALJ recognized that Ms. Farrill also suffers from 

depression, but he determined that her depression was non-severe because it imposed, 

at most, only mild limitations. At step four of the familiar five-step process, the ALJ 

assessed Ms. Farrill with the residual functional capacity (RFC) to perform light 

work, with some restrictions on stooping, and concluded that she could perform her 

past relevant work as a waitress and a housekeeper. The Appeals Council denied 

review and the district court affirmed. 

 “We review the Commissioner’s decision to determine whether his factual 

findings are supported by substantial evidence in the record viewed as a whole and 

whether he applied the correct legal standards.” Frantz v. Astrue, 509 F.3d 1299, 

1300 (10th Cir. 2007) (brackets and internal quotation marks omitted). We conclude 

that of the various arguments Ms. Farrill presents before this court, the only 

meritorious issues concern the ALJ’s compliance with Winfrey v. Chater, 92 F.3d 

1017 (10th Cir. 1996). 

 In Winfrey, this court set forth a three-part framework for establishing whether 

a claimant can return to her past relevant work. First, the ALJ must evaluate the 

claimant’s physical and mental RFC. Id. at 1023. In doing so, the ALJ must 

“consider the limiting effects of all [the claimant’s] impairment(s), even those that 

are not severe.” 20 C.F.R. § 416.945(e); see also Salazar v. Barnhart, 468 F.3d 615, 
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621 (10th Cir. 2006) (“[A]n ALJ is required to consider all of the claimant’s 

medically determinable impairments, singly and in combination; the statute and 

regulations require nothing less” and a failure to do so “is reversible error”). Second, 

“the ALJ must make findings regarding the physical and mental demands of the 

claimant’s past relevant work.” Winfrey, 92 F.3d at 1024. As Winfrey noted, 

[w]hen the claimant has a mental impairment, care must be taken to 

obtain a precise description of the particular job duties which are likely 

to produce tension and anxiety, e.g., speed, precision, complexity of 

tasks, independent judgments, working with other people, etc., in order 

to determine if the claimant’s mental impairment is compatible with the 

performance of such work. 

Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Finally, the ALJ must compare the claimant’s 

RFC to the demands of the past relevant work to determine whether the claimant can 

still perform such work. See id. at 1023, 1024-25. “At each of these phases, the ALJ 

must make specific findings.” Id. at 1023. 

 At step two of the five-step process, the ALJ found that Ms. Farrill’s 

depression was a medically determinable impairment resulting in mild limitations in 

certain areas of functioning. After noting that the analysis of mental limitations for 

steps two and three differs from the analysis for steps four and five, and that the latter 

steps require “a more detailed assessment,” the ALJ then asserted that “the following 

residual functional capacity assessment reflects the degree of [mental] limitation the 

undersigned has found.” Aplt. App., Vol. 2 at 13. But the RFC did not include any 

mental limitations, and the ALJ never explained why he chose not to include any 

mental limitations in the RFC, despite his previous assessment of mild limitations. 
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 Further, although the ALJ stated he was comparing Ms. Farrill’s RFC with 

both the physical and the mental demands of her waitress and housekeeping jobs, 

“the ALJ made no inquiry into, or any findings specifying, the mental demands of 

plaintiff’s past relevant work, either as plaintiff actually performed the work or as it 

is customarily performed in the national economy.” Winfrey, 92 F.3d at 1024. Our 

review of the record does not reveal any evidence regarding the mental demands of 

Ms. Farrill’s past relevant work. “Having failed to complete phase two 

appropriately, the ALJ was unable to make the necessary findings at phase three 

about plaintiff’s ability to meet the mental demands of [her] past relevant work 

despite [her] mental impairment[].” Id. at 1024-25. 

 For these reasons, we cannot sustain the Commissioner’s decision that 

Ms. Farrill can perform her past relevant work. The judgment of the district court is 

vacated, and the case is remanded with directions to remand to the agency for further 

proceedings consistent with this order and judgment. 

 Entered for the Court 

 Stephen H. Anderson 

 Circuit Judge