Filed 7/18/13 P. v. Salazar CA2/6 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication o r ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SIX

THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent,

v. NORMAN THOMAS SALAZAR, Defendant and Appellant. 2d Crim. No. B246076 (Super. Ct. No . 2012000428) (Ventura County)

Norman Thomas Salazar appeals from a 32-month state prison sentence entered after he pled guilty to felony evading an officer with willful disregard (Veh. Code, § 2800.2., subd. (a)), admitted a prior strike co nviction (Pen. Code, §§ 667, subds. (c)(1) & (e)(1); 1170.12, subds. (a)(1) & (c)(1)), 1 and admitted two prior pr ison term enhancements (§ 667.5, subd. (b)). Appellant contends that the trial court abused its discretion in denying

a Romero motion ( People v. Superior Court (Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497) to strike his prior strike conviction for attempted carjacki ng. (§§ 664/215, subd. (a).) We affirm. Facts and Procedural History On January 5, 2012, a Ventura police officer saw appellant drive erratically at a high rate of speed through a residential neighborhood. The officer activated his lights and siren and tried to stop the vehicle, but appellant failed to yield. Appellant drove through red lights and stop signs, reaching speeds up to 85 to 90 miles per hour on the surface streets and Highway 101. When appella nt reached Camarillo, the officer rammed appellant's vehicle, causing the ve hicle to spin out and stop.

1 All statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise stated.2 Appellant was arrested for felony evadin g an officer with willful disregard. (Veh. Code, § 2800.2, subd. (a).) A records check rev ealed that appellant had an outstanding warrant, was on parole, and was driving with a licen se that had been suspended due to a prior driving unde r the influence related offense. After appellant was arraigned, the tr ial court found appellant not competent to stand trial and suspended criminal procee dings. (§ 1368.) On June 14, 2012, Patton State Hospital reported that appella nt was feigning me ntal illness. Appellant was found competent to stand trial and brought a Romero motion to strike his 2001 conviction for attempted car jacking. Denying the motion, the trial court found: "There's a significant criminal history. . . including a carjacking offense in [appellant's] past a little over ten years ago. [Appellant] has not main tained a law-abiding [life] since the commission of that offense, and the Court views what occurred in this matter as also a public safety threat and for those reasons . . . find[s] him within the scope of the [Three Strikes] law." Appellant entered a change of plea and admitted the prior strike and prior prison term enhancements. The trial court se ntenced him to 16 months prison for felony evading an officer with willful disregard (Veh. Code, § 2800.2, subd. (a)), doubled the sentence based on the prior strike convic tion, and struck the prior prison term

enhancements.

Discussion Section 1385, subdivision (a) vests a tria l court with the discretion to strike a prior serious or violent felony conviction "in furtherance of justice . . . ." ( Romero , supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 530.) In ruling on a Romero motion, the trial court considers the nature and circumstances of the present felony offens e, defendant's prior se rious or violent felony convictions, and defendant's backgrou nd, character and prospects. ( People v. Williams (1998) 17 Cal.4th 148, 161.) Only under extraordinary circumstances will a career criminal fall outside the spirit of the Three Strikes law. ( People v. Carmony (2004) 33 Cal.4th 367, 378.)3 The current felony offense strikes at th e heart of public safety. Appellant had an outstanding warrant, was on parole , and led the police on a 10-mile chase, endangering the lives of motorists, bystanders , and law enforcement. Driving at speeds up to 85 or 90 miles per hour, appe llant ran red lights, failed to yield to police sirens and lights, and swerved into oncoming traffic. The officer had to ram appellant's vehicle in order to stop it. It was a miracle that appella nt did not kill or seriously injure someone. Appellant argues that he was receivi ng mental health services which is a mitigating factor. Patton State Hospital repor ted that appellant was "exaggerating and fabricating a large number of psychiatric a nd cognitive symptoms in an unsophisticated attempt to appear impaired and psychiatrically in distress." Appellant said that he had received outpatient treatment but could not name a clinic, doctor, or wh en he was treated. The hospital reported that appe llant suffered from an antisoc ial personality disorder and substance abuse, and "admits to chronically using methamphetamine and cannabis and has a history of alcohol-related convictions."

The trial court read and considered th e report before reinstating criminal proceedings. The report states that appellant has a long history of substance abuse and has never addressed the problem. It is not a miti gating factor under the Three Strikes law. (See e.g., People v. Williams, supra, 17 Cal.4th at p. 163 [defe ndant's failure to address substance abuse problem]; People v. Gaston (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 310; 322 [same].) We reject the argument that appellant's mental hea lth problems were not considered or justify striking the 2001 conviction fo r attempted carjacking. Appellant's argues that the 2001 attempted carjacking conviction was a simple assault and remote in time. The probation memorandum states that appellant and two men drove up in a stolen vehicle and acco sted a female employee in a restaurant parking lot. David Hartman, the victim's co -worker, asked appellant to leave. Appellant

threw a beer bottle at Hartman and wrestle d him as appellant's companions kicked Hartman in the face and ribs. Appellant then grabbed a female customer by the arms and tried to take her car keys and flee in her car. Appellant tore the woman's sweater and injured her arms as the woman scr eamed, "No get away from me."4 The trial court reasonably concluded that the attempted carjacking was not

an isolated incident or remote in ti me for sentencing pu rposes. (See e.g., People v. Humphrey (1997) 58 Cal.App.4th 809, 813 [20-year old felony conviction not remote given defendant's criminal recidivism].) Th e probation memorandum states that appellant "has a significant criminal reco rd dating back over 20 years. His propensity for violence and disregard for authority is evident, as well as his hi story of drug abuse and noncompliance." Appellant's criminal history dates back to 1995 and includ es two felony and

16 misdemeanor convictions. In 1995 he was convicted of battery on his girlfriend. (§ 242.) Appellant was convicted of a second batte ry four months later after he struck the victim on the head with a handgun and fired a shot as the victim fled. Between 1996 and 2007, defendant wa s convicted five times for using or being under the influence of a controlled subs tance. (Health & Saf. Code, § 11550, subd. (a).) In 1998, appellant was convicted of reckless driving (Veh. Code, § 23103, subd. (a)), assault with a dead ly weapon (§ 245, subd. (a)(1), and vehicular hit and run (Veh. Code, § 20002, subd. (a)) afte r he forced a male driver a nd his family to the side of the road. Appellant backed his up truck almost running ove r the driver, and rammed the

car. Two children were in the car. In 1998, appellant was convicted of co rporal injury on his girlfriend. (§ 273.5, subd. (a).) Appellant fo llowed her into a hospital, stru ck her in the chest, grabbed her hair, and threatened her. Three months late r, appellant threw a heavy set of keys in the girlfriend's face, cutting her face. Appellant fl ed, returned that even ing, and punched the victim in the chest, arms, and, mouth. Wh en a witness tried to intervene, appellant punched him in the face. In 2001, appellant was convicted of attempted carjacking. Like the prior offense, it involved multiple vic tims and acts of violence. It wa s appellant's first strike and resulted in a four year six month state prison sentence. After appellant was paroled, he

continued his life of crime.5 In 2008, appellant caused a domestic disturbance and was observed getting out of a stolen vehicle. The police ordered appellant at gun point to lie on the ground. Appellant tried to charge the officer, kicked an officer, and was ta ken to the ground. Appellant smelled of alcohol, was laughing a nd saying "Fuck you," and tried to kick the officer as he was put in the patrol car. A ppellant was convicted of possession of stolen property and resisting an officer. (§§ 496d, subd. (a); 14 8, subd.. (a)(1).) In 2009, appellant was convicted of batte ry after he punched the victim in the head, threw the victim to the ground, and punched the vic tim repeatedly on the head and upper back. When officers responded to the 911 call, appellant said "Yeah, I kicked his ass" and admitted drinking 10 beers. Appellant's criminal history, marked by violent assaults, disregard for authority and long term substance abuse, puts him squarely within the spirit of the Three Strikes law. (See e.g., People v. Strong (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 328, 338-339.) Based on appellant's age (39), his unrelen ting history of violence and substance/alcohol abuse, his prior commitments to jail and prison, the failed attempts at parole and probation, and the life-threatening nature of the current felony offense, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the Romero motion and sentencing appellant to 32 months state prison. (See e..g, People v. Williams, supra, 17 Cal.4th at pp. 162-164; People v. Humphrey, supra, 58 Cal.App.4th at pp. 812-813.) Appella nt is the kind of revolving-door career criminal for whom the Three Strikes law was devised. ( People v. Gaston, supra, 74 Cal.App.4th at p. 320.) The judgment is affirmed.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

YEGAN, J. We concur:

GILBERT, P.J.

PERREN, J.6 Kevin J. McGee, Judge

Superior Court County of Ventura

________________ ______________

California Appellate Project , under appointment by the Court of Appeal, Jonathan B. Steiner, Executive Director a nd Richard B. Lennon, Staff Attorney, for Defendant and Appellant.

Kamala D. Harris, Attorney Genera l, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Zee Rodriguez, Connie H. Kan, Deputy Attorneys Gene ral, for Plaintiff and Respondent.