Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 09A02-1609-CR-2147 | February 28, 2017 Page 1 of 7

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before any 

court except for the purpose of establishing 

the defense of res judicata, collateral 

estoppel, or the law of the case.

APPELLANT PRO SE

Jerry C. Wilson

Michigan City, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Curtis T. Hill, Jr.

Attorney General of Indiana

Michael Gene Worden

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

I N T H E

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Jerry C. Wilson,

Appellant-Defendant,

v.

State of Indiana,

Appellee-Plaintiff.

February 28, 2017

Court of Appeals Case No.

09A02-1609-CR-2147

Appeal from the 

Cass Circuit Court

The Honorable 

Thomas C. Perrone, Special Judge

Trial Court Cause No.

09C01-9108-CF-85

Kirsch, Judge.

[1] Jerry C. Wilson (“Wilson”) appeals the denial of his motion to correct 

erroneous sentence. He raises several issues, which we consolidate and 
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rephrase as: whether the trial court abused its discretion when it denied his 

motion to correct erroneous sentence.

[2] We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] In 1991, the State charged Wilson with two counts of Class A felony attempted 

murder and one count of Class C felony possession of explosive or inflammable 

substance. After a jury trial in 1992, Wilson was convicted as charged and 

sentenced to fifty years for each attempted murder conviction and eight years 

for the possession of explosive or inflammable substance conviction, all to run 

consecutively, for an aggregate sentence of 108 years. After a direct appeal, a 

panel of this court found that Wilson’s conviction for possession of explosive or 

inflammable substance violated double jeopardy and vacated that conviction, 

but affirmed his convictions and sentences in all other respects. As a result of 

his direct appeal, Wilson’s remaining sentence for his two attempted murder 

convictions was 100 years. Wilson later filed a petition for post-conviction 

relief, which was denied in 2001, and a panel of this court affirmed that denial 

on November 16, 2001. 

[4] On February 27, 2003, Wilson filed his first motion to correct erroneous 

sentence, which was denied, and the denial was affirmed on appeal by this 

court. In that appeal, Wilson challenged whether his sentence violated Blakely 

v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004), and this court found that it did not because 

Wilson’s direct appeal terminated when transfer was denied in 1993. Wilson v. 
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State, No. 09A05-0602-PC-62 (Ind. Ct. App. Oct. 24, 2006). Therefore, because 

Wilson’s case was final before Blakely was decided, Blakely did not have 

retroactive application. Id. Wilson also contended that the trial court had 

found improper aggravating factors in sentencing him and that his sentence was 

manifestly unreasonable; this court held that those issues were not issues 

reviewable under a motion to correct erroneous sentence. Id. Wilson 

additionally argued that his sentence violated the consecutive sentencing 

provisions under Indiana Code section 35-50-1-2, and this court held that 

Wilson’s sentence was within the parameters of the statute in effect at the time 

of his sentencing, and he was not entitled to the benefit of subsequent 

amendments of the statute. Id. 

[5] On July 22, 2016, Wilson filed the motion to correct erroneous sentence at issue 

in the present case, which is the fifth such motion he has filed. The trial court 

denied the motion without a hearing on September 2, 2016. Wilson now 

appeals.

Discussion and Decision

[6] We review a trial court’s decision on a motion to correct erroneous sentence 

only for an abuse of discretion. Davis v. State, 978 N.E.2d 470, 472 (Ind. Ct. 

App. 2012). An abuse of discretion occurs when the trial court’s decision is 

against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before it. Id. A

motion to correct erroneous sentence is available only when the sentence is 

erroneous on its face and may only arise out of information contained on the 
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formal judgment of conviction. Id. A motion to correct erroneous sentence 

may only be used to correct sentencing errors that are clear from the face of the 

judgment imposing the sentence in light of the statutory authority. Woodcox v. 

State, 30 N.E.3d 748, 751 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015). Claims that require 

consideration of the proceedings before, during, or after trial may not be 

presented by way of a motion to correct erroneous sentence. Id. Sentencing 

claims that are not facially apparent may be raised only on direct appeal and, 

where appropriate, by post-conviction proceedings. Davis, 978 N.E.2d at 472.

[7] Initially, we note that Wilson has not provided this court with his formal 

sentencing judgment from 1992 or his motion to correct erroneous sentence that 

was filed with the trial court. An appellant bears the burden of presenting this 

court with a record that is complete with respect to the issues raised on appeal. 

Eiler v. State, 938 N.E.2d 1235, 1237 n.2 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010). Wilson’s claims 

rely on his contention that his sentencing judgment from 1992 was erroneous. 

Without the actual formal sentencing judgment, we cannot determine whether 

the trial court imposed a sentence that was erroneous on its face, and without 

his motion to correct erroneous sentence, we do not know what issues he raised 

to the trial court. “[I]t is defendant’s duty to present this [c]ourt with an 

adequate record on appeal and when defendant fails to do so, the issue is 

deemed waived.” Lee v. State, 694 N.E.2d 719, 722 n.6 (Ind. 1998), cert. denied, 

525 U.S. 1023 (1998).

[8] Waiver notwithstanding, we find that the trial court properly denied Wilson’s 

motion to correct erroneous sentence. In his brief, Wilson raises the following 
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issues: whether (1) 1994 amendments to Indiana Code section 35-50-1-2 should 

apply to his sentence; (2) consecutive sentences were barred by the 1994 

amendment of section 35-50-1-2 because his crimes constituted one criminal 

act; (3) he should receive retroactive benefit of the revised section 35-50-1-2 and 

Indiana cases holding that enhanced and consecutive sentences on multiple 

counts of attempted murder are illegal; (4) Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B) is 

applicable to Wilson’s case because no evidence supported the imposition of 

consecutive sentences; (5) his sentence should be reduced to fifty years due to 

the fact that the State had previously offered to do so, but Wilson rejected the 

offer; (6) his sentence was invalid because the trial court did not have statutory 

authority to impose enhanced and consecutive sentences and the trial court’s 

sentencing was not supported by aggravators contained in Indiana Code section 

35-50-1-7(b); (7) Wilson’s sentence was improper in light of recent cases that 

have held that new substantive rules of criminal procedure and constitutional 

law shall have retroactive effect; and (8) his sentence was unreasonable in light 

of the fact he was denied a defense expert to test the fingerprint evidence at 

trial. 

[9] Many of Wilson’s issues, including issues (2), (4), (5), and (6), require 

consideration of the proceedings before, during, or after trial and other matters 

outside of the face of the sentencing judgment, such as evidentiary facts, a prior 

offer by the State for a sentence reduction, and the charging information. These 

issues, therefore, fall outside the purview of a motion to correct erroneous 

sentence and were not proper to raise in such a motion. See Woodcox, 30 
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N.E.3d at 751 (claims requiring consideration of proceedings before, during, or 

after trial may not be presented by way of motion to correct erroneous 

sentence).

[10] Further, other issues raised by Wilson in his brief are barred by res judicata. 

The doctrine of res judicata bars the litigation of a claim after a final judgment 

has been rendered in a prior action involving the same claim between the same 

parties or their privies. Love v. State, 22 N.E.3d 663, 664 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014), 

trans. denied. The principle behind the doctrine is to prevent repetitive litigation 

of the same dispute. Id. 

[11] Issues (1), (3), (6), and (7) have been previously litigated in a prior action. Both 

issues (1) and (3) are claims that Wilson should have been able to retroactively 

benefit from Indiana Code section 35-50-1-2, which was amended in 1994. The 

contentions contained within these issues have already been determined in 

Wilson’s appeal of the denial of his first motion to correct erroneous sentence 

where this court held that Wilson’s sentence was within the parameters of the 

statute in effect at the time of his sentencing, and he was not entitled to the 

benefit of subsequent amendments of the statute. Wilson v. State, No. 09A05-

0602-PC-62 (Ind. Ct. App. Oct. 24, 2006). 

[12] Issues (6) and (7) both bring up the issue of whether the holding of Blakely

should retroactively apply to Wilson’s case. This issue has also previously been 

determined in Wilson’s appeal of the denial of his first motion to correct 

erroneous sentence. In that appeal, this court found that, because Wilson’s 
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direct appeal terminated when transfer was denied in 1993, Wilson’s case was 

final before Blakely was decided, and Blakely did not have retroactive 

application. Id. Additionally, to the extent that issue (6) argues that Wilson’s 

sentence was excessive and unreasonable, this issue is also res judicata as this 

court held that Wilson’s sentence was not manifestly unreasonable in his direct 

appeal. Wilson v. State, 611 N.E.2d 160, 166-67 (Ind. Ct. App. 1993), trans. 

denied. 

[13] As for issue (8), this contention is not appropriate for a motion to correct 

erroneous sentence. Issue (8) is essentially a claim that the trial court erred in 

not allowing certain evidence to be used during Wilson’s trial. Such a claim is 

not appropriate for a motion to correct erroneous sentence because it does not 

raise any argument based on the face of the sentencing judgment. A motion to 

correct erroneous sentence may only be used to correct sentencing errors that 

are clear from the face of the judgment imposing the sentence in light of the 

statutory authority. Woodcox, 30 N.E.3d at 751. Based on the above reasons, 

we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it denied 

Wilson’s motion to correct erroneous sentence. 

[14] Affirmed.

Robb, J., and Barnes, J., concur