Filed 4/18/23 Sanchez v. CoreCivic of Tennessee CA4/1

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for 

publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication

or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. 

COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

MONICA NICOLE WILLIAMS 

SANCHEZ,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

CORECIVIC OF TENNESSEE, LLC et 

al.,

Defendants and Appellants.

 D080285

 (Super. Ct. No. 37-2021-

 00046382-CU-WT-CTL)

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of San Diego County, 

Kenneth J. Medel, Judge. Affirmed and remanded.

Gleason and Favarote, Paul M. Gleason and Jing Tong, for Defendants

and Appellants.

Bodell Law Group, Daniel D. Bodell; Williams Iagmin and 

Jon R. Williams, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

This appeal revolves around a single paragraph in a complaint that 

contains 127 paragraphs and asserts ten causes of action. Defendants 

CoreCivic of Tennessee and Bessy Glaske appeal from the trial court’s order 

denying their special motion to strike as a strategic lawsuit against public 
2

participation (SLAPP) eight of the ten causes of action asserted by plaintiff 

Monica Nicole Williams Sanchez. In the underlying retaliation and 

discrimination action, Sanchez alleges that defendants harassed, retaliated 

against, and wrongfully terminated her for reporting the company’s unlawful 

and unethical conduct and for seeking medical leave to which she was legally 

entitled. Defendants argue in their anti-SLAPP motion that eight of 

Sanchez’s claims are based on an alleged conversation between Glaske and a 

governmental agency, which Sanchez references in one paragraph in her 

general allegations, and her claims thus arise from protected speech and 

activity. 

On de novo review, we conclude that defendants’ alleged liability is not 

predicated on any protected activity, and the trial court thus properly denied 

their anti-SLAPP motion. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s order. We 

also find that defendants’ anti-SLAPP motion, and their appeal of the denial 

of that motion, are devoid of merit, and on that basis grant Sanchez’s request 

for an award of fees and costs on appeal.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A. The Parties

CoreCivic of Tennessee, LLC (CoreCivic) is a for-profit, publicly traded 

company headquartered in Tennessee that owns and manages private 

prisons and detention centers on contract with federal, state, and local 

governments. Specifically, CoreCivic designs, builds, manages, and operates 

correctional facilities and detention centers for the Federal Bureau of 

Prisons, Immigration and Customs Enforcement, the United States Marshals 

Service, as well as state and county facilities across the United States. 

CoreCivic operates one such correctional facility, located on Boston Avenue in 
3

San Diego, under contract with the California Department of Corrections and 

Rehabilitation (CDCR). 

Sanchez is a San Diego resident who was employed by CoreCivic and 

its predecessors from 1994 until her termination in 2021. She has held a 

variety of roles at CoreCivic, including program manager, senior case 

manager, case manager, job developer, disciplinary hearing officer and clerk. 

She was named facility director at the Boston Avenue facility (the facility) in 

2013. 

Defendant Bessy Glaske is a managing director for CoreCivic and one 

of Sanchez’s direct supervisors during her employment with CoreCivic. 

Glaske controlled all aspects of Sanchez’s employment, including her hiring 

and termination, setting her compensation terms, and setting the terms of 

the employment agreements.

B. Factual Background as Alleged in Complaint

In May 2021, the CDCR made an unannounced visit to the facility and 

expressed concerns to Sanchez about CoreCivic. The CDCR complained 

about CoreCivic’s failure to maintain staffing levels, its lack of programming, 

the amount and quality of food served to inmates, and its failure to test for 

fentanyl. Sanchez had previously made identical complaints to CoreCivic 

and her supervisor Glaske, which she reminded Glaske of on the day of the 

CDCR visit. 

In August 2021, Sanchez had a meeting with Glaske and a senior 

director at CoreCivic to discuss Sanchez’s leadership potential and future 

goals with the company. Glaske told Sanchez she was considered a high 

performer and was slated toward accelerated development, and she 

scheduled a meeting with Sanchez for the following month to discuss future 

promotions. 
4

Later that month, Sanchez advised Glaske that she intended to take 

leave pursuant to the Family Medical Leave Act (FMLA) and California 

Family Rights Act (CFRA) due to grief-related health issues after her mother 

had passed away. She told Gaske that she had been experiencing an 

extremely hard time dealing with her mother’s recent death but had been 

forced to miss numerous grief counseling sessions and parent loss grief 

groups because of work demands. Sanchez also told Glaske that she had 

gotten a dog from the humane society that was intended for emotional 

support, but the dog had not alleviated her grief. Sanchez further informed 

Glaske that she was under the care of a psychiatrist but was unable to take 

her prescribed medication because it made her drowsy and she was on call for 

work every hour of every day. 

In September 2021, Sanchez learned about an incident relating to a 

monthly CoreCivic bill that had been presented to a CDCR employee for 

approval. The CDCR employee signed it but also wrote a note on the bill 

stating something to the effect of “waste of money, fraud, lack of 

programming, only three counselors.” After a CoreCivic accountant received 

the bill and note, she showed it to Sanchez, who expressed concern and stated 

that the note must be reported to CoreCivic and Glaske. Instead, the 

accountant ripped up the note. Sanchez was alarmed and reported the 

incident to Glaske via email and phone. Sanchez was eventually able to 

locate the ripped-up note from the accountant’s trash bin after the accountant 

had originally claimed she had placed it in the shredding bin. Sanchez taped

the note back together and emailed the recovered note to Glaske. 

Later that day, Sanchez again spoke with Glaske to confirm she would 

be taking FMLA/CRFA leave. Glaske was not receptive to this news and 

insisted Sanchez was not eligible to take leave. Sanchez informed Glaske 
5

that she had already confirmed with CoreCivic’s human resources manager 

that she was eligible, but Glaske instructed Sanchez to confirm her eligibility 

with CoreCivic’s human resources generalist. 

Sanchez was unable to reach the human resources generalist but 

confirmed again with the human resources manager that she was eligible for 

FMLA/CRFA leave. Sanchez then emailed excerpts of CoreCivic’s 

FMLA/CRFA policy to Glaske to demonstrate her eligibility and informed 

Glaske that she would be starting her leave on September 20, 2021. That 

evening, Sanchez called Glaske and complained that Glaske’s efforts to 

discourage her from taking leave were upsetting. Shortly after that 

conversation, Glaske responded to Sanchez’s email from earlier in the day 

regarding her leave eligibility and indicated she was happy that Sanchez got

the information that she needed. According to Sanchez, this was an attempt 

to deflect Sanchez’s criticism of Glaske during their phone call. 

The next day, Sanchez met with her psychiatrist to discuss her leave, 

and they determined that Sanchez would take FMLA/CFRA for eight weeks,

with Sanchez’s last workday on September 17, 2021. Following this meeting, 

Sanchez spoke with Glaske to confirm again that Sanchez’s last day of work 

prior to her leave would be that upcoming Friday and to inquire about 

Glaske’s meeting with the CDCR. Glaske told Sanchez that the meeting with 

the CDCR went well for the most part, but the CDCR representatives 

complained about the lack of programming and counselors. At no time did 

Glaske indicate that the CDCR had concerns with Sanchez’s performance as 

facility director. 

On September 16, 2021, the day before Sanchez’s last day of work 

before her FMLA/CFRA leave began, Glaske and CoreCivic advised her that 

although they were happy with her performance, the CDCR wanted a change 
6

of leadership at the facility, and CoreCivic was therefore terminating her

immediately. Glaske and CoreCivic then presented Sanchez with a severance 

agreement providing that in exchange for approximately $50,000 (six months 

of salary) minus withholdings, Sanchez would give up all of her rights to sue 

CoreCivic and its employees, keep the settlement confidential, and agree that 

CoreCivic was not admitting to any fault whatsoever. The severance 

agreement further stated: “Employee also acknowledges that Employee has 

been properly provided any leave of absence that Employee may be or may 

have been entitled to under the Family and Medical Leave Act and has not 

been subjected to any improper treatment, conduct, or actions due to a 

request for or taking such leave. Employee acknowledges that Employee has 

had the opportunity to provide the Company with notice of any and all 

concerns regarding suspected ethical and compliance issues or violations on 

the part of the Company or the Released Parties.” 

C. Complaint

Sanchez timely filed charges of discrimination with the Department of 

Fair Employment and Housing (DFEH) against defendants and received 

right to sue letters. She then filed suit against defendants, asserting ten 

causes of action: (1) retaliation in violation of Labor Code section 1102.5; 

(2) wrongful termination and retaliation in violation of public policy; 

(3) unfair business practices in violation of Business and Professions Code 

section 17200 et seq.; (4) intentional infliction of emotional distress;

(5) employment discrimination in violation of the Fair Employment and 

Housing Act (FEHA) (Gov. Code, § 12940 et seq.); (6) failure to accommodate 

in violation of FEHA (Gov. Code, § 12940 et seq.); (7) retaliation in violation 

of FEHA (Gov. Code, § 12940 et seq.); (8) harassment based on medical

condition and election to take medical leave in violation of FEHA (Gov. Code,
7

§ 12940 et seq.) (9) violation of Civil Code section 3344; and (10) failure to 

provide personnel records in violation of Labor Code section 1198.5. She 

asserted the fourth claim against Glaske, the eighth claim against both 

Glaske and CoreCivic, and the remaining claims against only CoreCivic. 

Sanchez alleged that defendants harassed, discriminated against, and

retaliated against her in response to her medical condition and decision to 

take medical leave, as well as her discovery of and complaints about illegal, 

unethical, and unsafe practices of defendants and others at the facility 

relating to facility staffing and operations. Sanchez also alleged that, despite 

stating they were pleased with her performance, defendants did not offer to 

transfer her to another facility or put her on a performance improvement 

plan. According to Sanchez, this is because defendants wrongfully 

terminated her employment in response to her complaints about defendants’

illegal, unethical, and unsafe practices and her impending medical leave. 

The complaint alleged that Glaske was intimately aware of Sanchez’s

urgent need to take FMLA/CFRA leave but terminated her anyway. Sanchez 

alleged that, during Glaske’s meeting with the CDCR, she disparaged 

Sanchez’s performance to deflect the CDCR’s criticism from her own 

performance and save her own job. According to Sanchez, Glaske’s

statements denigrating her performance were demonstrably false, and 

Glaske knew her comments would ruin Sanchez’s career. She further alleged 

that her termination and Glaske’s statements to the CDCR were motivated 

by Glaske’s personal animus toward Sanchez and were an attempt to silence 

her whistleblowing. 

Sanchez claimed that defendants’ illegal conduct resulted in her 

financial and emotional harm. She sought damages, interest on the losses 
8

incurred in earnings and other employee benefits, punitive damages, civil 

and statutory penalties, and injunctive relief. 

D. Defendants’ Special Motion to Strike

Defendants filed a special motion to strike pursuant to Code of Civil 

Procedure section 425.16,1 known as an anti-SLAPP motion, against the

complaint’s first eight causes of action. Defendants claimed that these causes 

of action arise from protected activity under section 425.16, subdivisions 

(e)(l), (e)(2) and (e)(4), because they seek damages and other relief based on 

communications between defendants and the CDCR that were made in 

connection with an issue under review by the CDCR and in connection with a 

public issue and/or an issue of public interest. They argued that causes of 

action one through eight in Sanchez’s complaint must be dismissed because 

(1) the conduct giving rise to the claims was defendants’ unfavorable report of 

Sanchez’s job performance to the CDCR as part of the CDCR’s review of the

facility, the CDCR’s subsequent request that Sanchez be replaced, and 

CoreCivic’s termination of Sanchez’s employment in furtherance of that 

request, all of which constituted protected speech and/or actions in 

furtherance of that speech under the anti-SLAPP statute; and (2) Sanchez 

cannot establish a probability of prevailing on the merits of her claims. 

Defendants argued that all statements made to and from a 

governmental agency such as the CDCR in connection with an official review 

are protected by the anti-SLAPP statute. They also argued that Sanchez’s

first eight claims were all based on her allegation that Glaske disparaged her 

job performance in statements made to the CDCR as part of their official 

review of the facility. According to defendants, Sanchez’s claims were thus 

necessarily based on protected speech.

1 All further statutory references are to the Code of Civil Procedure.
9

In support of their motion, defendants submitted a short declaration 

from Glaske explaining that CoreCivic operates the facility under a contract 

with the CDCR, stating that the CDCR and CoreCivic’s other governmental 

partners operate in areas of public interest, and setting forth (and attaching 

as an exhibit) CoreCivic’s mission statement. Glaske’s declaration did not 

contain any information about Sanchez, her employment, or her allegations 

against defendants. Specifically, Glaske’s declaration did not include any 

facts addressing the merits of Sanchez’s claims of harassment, 

discrimination, retaliation, or failure to accommodate.

E. Sanchez’s Opposition 

Sanchez argued in opposition that defendants’ motion was frivolous, as 

her claims were clearly not based on statements to or from the CDCR. She 

contended that defendants were attempting to hide their misconduct behind 

a single meeting between Glaske and the CDCR that was briefly referenced 

in the complaint. Defendants’ wrongful actions toward Sanchez, she argued, 

were not “inextricably connected” to any protected speech by defendants 

and/or the CDCR and in fact were wholly unrelated to the CDCR. 

Instead, Sanchez argued, the basis of her complaint is that defendants

terminated her due to her complaints about defendants’ illegal, unethical,

and unsafe practices (including her complaints that CoreCivic deliberately 

did not hire additional counselors to maximize its profits, in violation of its 

contract with the CDCR), her impending medical leave, her ongoing medical 

condition, her refusal to ignore another employee’s violation of CoreCivic’s 

Code of Ethics and document retention policy by destroying evidence. 

Sanchez argued that none of those allegations constituted protected speech or

petitioning activity under the anti-SLAPP statute and the trial court should 

therefore deny defendants’ motion. Even if her claims were based on 
10

protected activity, she argued, the lengthy declaration she submitted in 

support of her opposition to the anti-SLAPP motion constituted sufficient 

evidence to demonstrate minimal merit on each of the challenged claims. 

Sanchez’s declaration contained many of the facts outlined in her 

complaint but also provided additional details supporting her claims, as set 

forth below. 

1. Sanchez’s Duties and Performance History

Sanchez explained that as facility director, her duties were wideranging. Per CoreCivic policy, though, many decisions and policies regarding 

the facility were made by Glaske and other senior management personnel. 

Throughout her career at CoreCivic, Sanchez received outstanding 

evaluations and was repeatedly promoted. She was often praised by 

CoreCivic and Glaske and received regular raises, bonuses, and stock options. 

Her last review prior to her September 2021 termination was in February 

2021. The review was conducted by Glaske, who gave Sanchez the highest 

possible overall competency rating of “exceeds expectations.” 

2. The CDCR’s Visit to the Facility

Sanchez also detailed in her declaration how, during the CDCR’s May 

2021 visit to the facility, CDCR personnel complained about CoreCivic’s 

failure to maintain staffing levels and lack of programming. At the time, the 

facility only had two counselors but a population of over sixty participants. 

Per CoreCivic’s contract with the CDCR, the counselor ratio should have been 

1 to 18, but the facility had been significantly short staffed since the 

beginning of the year. According to Sanchez, CoreCivic deliberately did not 

hire additional counselors so it could maximize its profits, in violation of its 

contract with the CDCR. The CDCR also complained about the amount and 

quality of food served to inmates and CoreCivic’s failure to test for fentanyl. 
11

These complaints were identical to complaints Sanchez had repeatedly lodged 

with defendants. 

That same day, Sanchez discussed the CDCR’s complaints with Glaske, 

reminding her that she had previously complained of these issues, and again 

inquired why CoreCivic continued to accept inmates despite inadequate 

staffing. In response, Glaske repeated her prior response that Sanchez 

should not worry about it. As was the case when Sanchez had previously 

complained to Glaske, Glaske appeared annoyed with Sanchez’s continued 

persistence in complaining about these issues. 

CDCR employee Jessica F. repeatedly assured Sanchez that their 

criticisms were not directed toward her, but rather toward CoreCivic. Jessica 

stated that the CDCR was unhappy with CoreCivic but happy with Sanchez’s 

performance. 

3. Note Incident 

Sanchez’s declaration also provided further details about the incident 

with one of CoreCivic’s accountants, Roberta M., that took place a couple of 

weeks before Sanchez’s termination. After Roberta ripped up the 

handwritten note containing comments from a CDCR employee complaining 

about CoreCivic’s waste of money, fraud, and lack of programming and 

counselors, Sanchez was alarmed and reported the incident to Glaske. 

Sanchez was required to do so pursuant to CoreCivic’s Code of Ethics (Code), 

which states that employees must report possible violations of the Code and 

prohibits retaliation as a result of making a report. Roberta’s destruction of 

the note was a clear violation of CoreCivic’s document retention policy 

outlined in the Code, which Sanchez declared reads as follows: “No CoreCivic 

employee is ever authorized to destroy or alter any company record based on 

a concern that the record could be harmful to CoreCivic in a potential 
12

investigation, audit or litigation. Employees must comply with CoreCivic’s 

records retention policy and procedures, as well as any ‘hold’ notices issued 

under the policy.” The Code states that employees may be terminated for 

violating the Code. 

When Sanchez reported the note and its destruction to Glaske, Glaske 

resisted Sanchez’s requests that the note and Roberta’s destruction of it be 

reported to upper management at CoreCivic. Glaske informed Sanchez that, 

even though it appeared that CoreCivic was being accused of fraud, and that 

a CoreCivic employee had destroyed evidence relative to that accusation, she 

had no intention of reporting the incident to upper management. Sanchez 

told Glaske that her approach was inappropriate and violated CoreCivic 

policy. She further advised Glaske that she intended to retrieve the shredded 

note and insisted that Glaske share it with her direct supervisor. After 

Sanchez eventually found the note in Roberta’s trash and the note was taped 

back together, she immediately emailed the recovered note to Glaske. 

4. Sanchez’s Final Meetings with Glaske and Termination

During Sanchez’s meeting with Glaske two days prior to Sanchez’s 

termination, Glaske stated that the meeting with CDCR personnel went well 

for the most part, but they spoke about the need to increase programming 

and the lack of counselors. At no time did Glaske indicate that the CDCR 

had concerns with Sanchez’s performance. 

As Sanchez explained in her complaint, CoreCivic terminated her two 

business days before her FMLA/CFRA leave was to begin. In her declaration, 

Sanchez added that, during that meeting with Glaske and Human Resources 

Director Steve S., Sanchez specifically requested that she be allowed to file a 

grievance regarding her termination pursuant to CoreCivic policy. That 

policy, outlined in the Code, allows employees who believe they have been 
13

unfairly disciplined to file an employee grievance with CoreCivic. Sanchez 

also requested that she be considered for a transfer to one of the numerous 

other CoreCivic facilities given that she was eligible for a transfer pursuant 

to CoreCivic policy. Glaske and Steve rejected both requests. 

Sanchez stated in her declaration that, as a result of defendants’ 

actions, she has suffered and continues to suffer substantial losses in 

earnings, bonuses, and other employment benefits, as well as anxiety, 

humiliation, mental anguish, embarrassment, worry, sleeplessness, and 

mental and emotional distress. She also attached copies of CoreCivic’s Code 

of Ethics and proposed severance agreement to her declaration. 

F. Defendants’ Reply

Defendants’ reply in support of their anti-SLAPP motion argued that 

Sanchez sought to ignore her claims as pleaded and instead impermissibly 

recast “the heart of her complaint” as a single meeting between Glaske and 

the CDCR. Defendants argued that Sanchez admitted in her complaint that 

each of her first eight causes of action were based at least in part on Glaske’s 

statements to the CDCR as part of its official review of the facility, and the 

CDCR’s statements that they had lost faith in Sanchez’s ability to 

competently perform her job. They further argued that Sanchez’s allegation 

regarding Glaske’s statements to the CDCR supplied an element of each of 

Sanchez’s claims. Finally, they claimed that Sanchez failed to show minimal 

merit and her first eight claims must therefore be stricken.

G. Trial Court Ruling

The trial court held a hearing on defendants’ anti-SLAPP motion and, 

shortly after, adopted its tentative ruling denying the motion. The court 

stated that it did “not find that the gravamen of plaintiff’s action is within 
14

the purview of CCP 425.16” and that plaintiff’s request for attorneys’ fees 

pursuant to the statute could be decided by a separately noticed motion. 

Defendants timely appealed the order.

DISCUSSION

I

A. Governing Law and Standard of Review

California’s anti-SLAPP statute authorizes a special motion to strike 

any claim “against a person arising from any act of that person in 

furtherance of the person’s right of petition or free speech under the United 

States Constitution or the California Constitution in connection with a public 

issue . . . unless the court determines that the plaintiff has established that 

there is a probability that the plaintiff will prevail on the claim.” (§ 425.16, 

subd. (b)(1).) Subdivision (e) of section 425.16 sets forth four categories of 

protected activity: “(1) any written or oral statement or writing made before 

a legislative, executive, or judicial proceeding, or any other official proceeding 

authorized by law, (2) any written or oral statement or writing made in 

connection with an issue under consideration or review by a legislative, 

executive, or judicial body, or any other official proceeding authorized by law, 

(3) any written or oral statement or writing made in a place open to the 

public or a public forum in connection with an issue of public interest, or 

(4) any other conduct in furtherance of the exercise of the constitutional right 

of petition or the constitutional right of free speech in connection with a 

public issue or an issue of public interest.” (§ 425.16, subd. (e)(1)–(4).)

Our review of an order granting or denying an anti-SLAPP motion is de 

novo. (Park v. Board of Trustees of California State University (2017) 

2 Cal.5th 1057, 1067 (Park).) We first determine whether the defendant has 

established that the challenged claim arises from activity protected under 
15

section 425.16, meaning that the activity itself forms the basis of the claim. 

(Ibid.; id. at p. 1062; Balla v. Hall (2021) 59 Cal.App.5th 652, 671 (Balla).) 

At this first step, courts analyze “each act or set of acts supplying a basis for 

relief, of which there may be several in a single pleaded cause of action—to 

determine whether the acts are protected[.]” (Bonni v. St. Joseph Health 

System (2021) 11 Cal.5th 995, 1010 (Bonni).) 

“ ‘If the defendant makes the required showing, the burden shifts to the 

plaintiff to demonstrate the merit of the claim by establishing a probability of 

success.’ ” (Balla, supra, 59 Cal.App. 5th at p. 671, citing Baral v. Schnitt 

(2016) 1 Cal.5th 376, 384 (Baral).) Our review at this second step is similar 

to our review of a ruling on a summary judgment motion. (Baral, at p. 384.) 

We accept the plaintiff’s evidence as true and consider the defendant’s 

evidence only to determine whether it defeats the challenged claim as a 

matter of law. (Id. at p. 385.) Claims with at least minimal merit may 

proceed. (Bonni, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 1009.)

B. Analysis

We address as an initial matter defendants’ argument that the trial 

court incorrectly applied a gravamen test to Sanchez’s complaint as a whole 

rather than analyzing each claim for relief to determine whether the activity 

was protected, in contradiction of the Supreme Court’s instruction in Bonni 

and Baral. As the Supreme Court explained in Bonni, however, not every 

court that labels its approach as a “gravamen” test has erred; some courts 

have properly invoked the term “to determine whether particular acts alleged 

within the cause of action supply the elements of a claim . . . or instead are 

incidental background.” (Bonni, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 1012.) The trial 

court did not specify in its order in which way it invoked the term 

“gravamen,” but we must presume the trial court knew and properly applied 
16

the law. (Cahill v. San Diego Gas & Electric Co. (2011) 194 Cal.App.4th 939, 

956.) Thus, defendants have failed to demonstrate that the trial court used 

the term “gravamen” in a legally impermissible way. And even if the court 

did not properly invoke the term in reaching its decision, if the decision is 

correct on any theory, we must affirm it regardless of the court’s reasoning. 

(See ibid.)

Turning to step one of the anti-SLAPP analysis, defendants contend 

that each of Sanchez’s first eight causes of action are based on protected 

activity because (a) they rely on the allegation that Glaske made disparaging 

statements about Sanchez in a meeting with the CDCR, and (b) all 

statements made in connection with official governmental reviews are 

entitled to anti-SLAPP protection. Specifically, defendants point to 

paragraph 61 of the complaint, which alleges: “Further, during her meeting 

with CDCR, Glaske disparaged Plaintiff’s performance in an attempt to 

deflect CDCR’s criticism from her own shoddy performance and save her own 

job. Glaske’s statements denigrating Plaintiff’s performance were obviously 

and demonstrably false. When Glaske made these charges against Plaintiff, 

she knew they were false and would torpedo Plaintiff’s career. Glaske’s false 

charges were motivated by Glaske’s personal animus toward Plaintiff and 

were designed to silence her whistleblowing.” 

Sanchez responds that defendants are attempting to use a single 

paragraph of her complaint to recast all of her claims as arising from 

protected speech or petitioning activities while ignoring the rest of her 

allegations that are wholly unrelated to communications to or from the 

CDCR. She argues that the allegations in paragraph 61 merely provide 

context and supply evidence of Glaske’s retaliatory animus rather than an 

essential element or basis for liability.
17

Sanchez has the better argument. A claim challenged in an antiSLAPP motion “may be struck only if the speech or petitioning activity itself

is the wrong complained of, and not just evidence of liability or a step leading 

to some different act for which liability is asserted”—an important 

distinction. (Park, supra, 2 Cal.5th at pp. 1060, 1064.) The question is 

whether the protected activity supplies an element of the claim at issue. 

(Id. at p. 1063.) In reviewing the defendants’ anti-SLAPP motion, therefore, 

we must consider the elements of each challenged claim, the actions alleged 

to supply those elements (and thus form the basis for liability), and whether 

those actions are protected. (Ibid.; Bonni, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 1015.) 

“Allegations of protected activity that merely provide context, without 

supporting a claim for recovery, cannot be stricken under the anti-SLAPP 

statute.” (Baral, supra, 1 Cal.5th at p. 394; see also Oakland Bulk and 

Oversized Terminal, LLC v. City of Oakland (2020) 54 Cal.App.5th 738, 759 

[directing trial court to deny anti-SLAPP motion on the merits where the 

incorporated allegations of protected activity merely provided context and 

were not the basis for plaintiffs’ claims for recovery].) 

Properly construed in light of the facts Sanchez has alleged in her 

complaint and declaration, we conclude that each of her claims is based on 

unprotected activity. Any allegations of protected activity in paragraph 61 of 

her complaint merely provide context and therefore cannot be stricken. 

1. Sanchez’s Discrimination and Retaliation Claims 

Defendants argue that Sanchez’s first, second, fifth, sixth, and seventh 

causes of action are based on protected speech because each requires proof of 

an adverse employment action as one of its elements. According to 

defendants, the complaint alleges that Glaske’s statements to the CDCR 

evaluating Sanchez’s job performance constituted an adverse employment 
18

action taken to retaliate against Sanchez, thus supplying an essential 

element of her first, fifth, and seventh causes of action for retaliation in 

violation of Labor Code section 1102.5, employment discrimination in 

violation of FEHA, and retaliation in violation of FEHA, respectively. They 

further argue that Glaske’s speech to the CDCR and CoreCivic’s act in 

terminating Sanchez at the CDCR’s direction was an action in furtherance of 

protected speech that supplied the adverse employment action that is an 

essential element of Sanchez’s second cause of action (wrongful termination 

and retaliation in violation of public policy) and sixth cause of action (failure 

to accommodate in violation of FEHA) as well. 

We are not persuaded. The Supreme Court recently addressed the 

application of section 425.16 to employment discrimination and retaliation 

claims and provided useful guidance applicable here: “The anti-SLAPP 

statute does not apply simply because an employer protests that its personnel 

decisions followed, or were communicated through, speech or petitioning 

activity. . . . [T]o carry its burden at the first step, the defendant in a 

discrimination suit must show that the complained-of adverse action, in and 

of itself, is an act in furtherance of its speech or petitioning rights. Cases 

that fit that description are the exception, not the rule.” (Wilson v. Cable 

News Network, Inc. (2019) 7 Cal.5th 871, 890.) This case is not an exception, 

and the fact that CoreCivic’s decision to terminate Sanchez may have 

followed or been communicated through speech or petitioning activity does 

not compel the conclusion that the termination itself is a protected act. 

It is also plain from Sanchez’s complaint and declaration that her 

claims do not arise from Glaske’s speech. Sanchez’s first, second, fifth, sixth, 

and seventh causes of action are based on specific allegations that CoreCivic

wrongfully terminated her and retaliated against her in response to her 
19

reports of illegal, unethical, and unsafe conduct, and discriminated against 

her, failed to accommodate her, and retaliated against her in response to her 

request for medical leave. None of the specific allegations under these causes 

of action refer to or rely on any statements Glaske may or may not have made 

to the CDCR. 

None of Sanchez’s general allegations reference Glaske’s statements 

about Sanchez to the CDCR, either, with the exception of paragraph 61.

Defendants’ assertion that Sanchez pleads in paragraph 61 that she was 

terminated at the direction of the CDCR, and therefore in furtherance of the 

CDCR’s speech, is factually wrong. Nowhere in her complaint does Sanchez 

allege that the CDCR directed defendants to fire her in response to Glaske’s 

statements. Instead, she alleges that defendants wrongfully terminated her 

in response to her complaints about defendants’ unethical practices and her 

request for medical leave, arguing that defendants’ claim that they were 

terminating her because the CDCR desired a change of leadership at the 

facility was pretext. 

Specifically, she details in her general allegations that (1) Sanchez 

reported to Glaske critical staff shortages and lack of programming at the 

facility, which CoreCivic failed to remedy, (2) the CDCR’s complaints about 

the facility mirrored Sanchez’s prior complaints, (3) Sanchez reported conduct 

by another CoreCivic employee who attempted to destroy a business record 

containing allegations of fraud asserted by a CDCR employee, (4) Glaske 

attempted to thwart Sanchez from taking medical leave, and (5) defendants 

terminated Sanchez just before her medical leave was to begin, after 27 years 

of service to CoreCivic, and refused her grievance and transfer requests

despite claiming they were pleased with Sanchez’s performance.
20

Nor does Sanchez reference any of Glaske’s statements about her from 

that meeting in the declaration she submitted in support of her opposition to 

defendants’ anti-SLAPP motion. Instead, she provides additional evidence 

supporting her claim that defendants terminated Sanchez because of her 

whistleblowing and request for medical leave and not because they were 

directed to do so by the CDCR. For example, Sanchez states that CDCR 

employee Jessica F. repeatedly assured her that the CDCR’s criticisms were 

not directed toward her, but rather toward CoreCivic, and the CDCR was 

happy with Sanchez’s performance. She also describes how Glaske became

annoyed with Sanchez when she persisted in complaining about issues at the 

facility and how defendants rejected Sanchez’s request that she be considered 

for a transfer to one of the numerous other CoreCivic facilities even though

she was eligible and defendants told her they were pleased with her 

performance.2 

Rather than supplying an essential element of Sanchez’s discrimination 

and retaliation claims, the allegations of Glaske’s statements in paragraph 61

merely provide evidence of Glaske’s requisite retaliatory and discriminatory 

animus. As the Supreme Court has explained, courts analyzing lawsuits 

alleging discriminatory actions are appropriately careful “not to treat such 

claims as arising from protected activity simply because the discriminatory 

animus might have been evidenced by one or more communications by a 

defendant.” (Park, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 1065.) 

In Park, the plaintiff filed discrimination and related claims after being

denied tenure. (Park, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 1061.) His employer filed an 

2 Defendants, on the other hand, failed to submit any evidence to the 

trial court in support of their argument that Sanchez’s claims were based on 

protected activity. Glaske’s declaration provided only very basic information 

about CoreCivic. It did not mention Sanchez or her claims.
21

anti-SLAPP motion, claiming its tenure decision and related communications 

were protected activity. (Ibid.) The Supreme Court rejected the employer’s 

argument, holding that the elements of the plaintiff’s discrimination claim 

“depend not on the grievance proceeding, any statements, or any specific 

evaluations of him in the tenure process, but only on the denial of tenure 

itself and whether the motive for that action was impermissible.” (Id. at 

p. 1068.) The Court found that the alleged prejudicial comments of the dean

merely supplied evidence of animus, not elements of the claim. (Ibid.)

Likewise here—the allegations in paragraph 61 of Sanchez’s complaint 

merely supply context and evidence of Glaske’s animus. 

Martin v. Inland Empire Utilities Agency (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 611 

(Martin) is also instructive. The plaintiff in Martin sued his employer, a 

government agency, for discrimination and retaliation, resulting in his 

constructive discharge, as well as defamation. (Id. at pp. 624–625.) The 

employer filed an anti-SLAPP motion, contending that the discrimination 

and retaliation claims were based on negative evaluations of the plaintiff’s 

performance at a board meeting, which constituted protected activity. (Ibid.) 

The Court of Appeal rejected the employer’s argument. (Ibid.; see also id. at 

p. 625 [“Indeed, the board meeting is mentioned only minimally in plaintiff’s 

pleadings. . . .”].) As the Supreme Court in Park noted, any liability for the 

defendants in Martin would “arise from the constructive discharge of the 

plaintiff for illegal reasons, not the defendants’ evaluations of the plaintiff at 

the agency’s board meeting.” (Park, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 1066; see also Area 

51 Productions, Inc. v. City of Alameda (2018) 20 Cal.App.5th 581, 594–595

[affirming order denying anti-SLAPP motion and finding that the

communications that led to and followed the alleged injury-producing conduct

were merely incidental to the asserted claims]; San Ramon Valley Fire 
22

Protection Dist. v. Contra Costa County Employees’ Retirement Assn. (2004) 

125 Cal.App.4th 343, 354 [distinguishing for anti-SLAPP purposes between 

county retirement board’s decision and the board’s deliberations and vote 

that led to the decision, concluding that the latter were not protected].)

Again, the same is true here. Sanchez’s complaint, declaration, and 

argument on appeal make clear that it is defendants’ harassment and 

termination of Sanchez, not Glaske’s statements at the meeting with the 

CDCR, that creates potential liability for defendants. We therefore conclude 

that Sanchez’s first, second, fifth, sixth, and seventh causes of action are not 

based on protected activity.

2. Sanchez’s Harassment and Emotional Distress Claims 

Defendants also argue that Sanchez’s fourth and eighth causes of 

action, for intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED) and harassment

based on her medical condition and election to take medical leave in violation 

of FEHA, are “indisputably entirely based on protected speech to the CDCR, 

namely Glaske’s alleged communication of Respondent’s poor job performance 

in an official CDCR meeting.” They assert that this is the only fact in the 

complaint that could support a harassment claim against Glaske and 

CoreCivic and a claim for IIED against Glaske. 

Contrary to defendants’ assertion, Sanchez alleged many other facts in 

support of her harassment and IIED claims. We again conclude that the 

allegations in paragraph 61 merely provided context.

Section 12940, subdivision (j)(1), of FEHA makes it unlawful for an 

employer to harass an employee because of the employee’s medical condition. 

(Gov. Code, § 12940, subd. (j)(1).) To establish a cause of action for 

harassment under FEHA, the employee must show that the harassing 

conduct was more than annoying or merely offensive—it must be severe or 
23

pervasive. (Cornell v. Berkeley Tennis Club (2017) 18 Cal.App.5th 908, 940.) 

Similarly, a plaintiff asserting an IIED claim must prove that the defendant 

engaged in extreme and outrageous conduct that causes extreme or severe 

emotional distress. (Hughes v. Pair (2009) 46 Cal.4th 1035, 1050.) 

The complaint explicitly states that Sanchez’s claim for harassment 

against defendants is based on their failure to take corrective action to 

address discriminatory behavior and prevent harassment against her 

because of her medical condition and election to take medical leave, in 

violation of FEHA. In support of this claim, Sanchez alleges that she advised 

Glaske she had been having an extremely hard time dealing with her 

mother’s recent passing, had missed numerous individual and group grief 

counseling sessions due to work, and was unable to take her prescribed 

medication—also due to work. According to Sanchez, Glaske knew all about 

Sanchez’s health issues but still was not receptive to her request to take 

statutorily provided leave; instead, Glaske attempted to prevent her from 

taking leave, including by repeatedly insisting that Sanchez was not eligible 

for such leave despite having already confirmed her eligibility with 

CoreCivic’s human resources department. Sanchez argues that these same 

facts also support her IIED claim. 

Again, we find that the allegations in paragraph 61 merely provide 

context for Sanchez’s harassment and IIED claims, as they demonstrate a 

“discriminatory animus” on Glaske’s part.3 (Park, supra, 2 Cal.5th at 

3 Indeed, the allegations of paragraph 61 could not plausibly satisfy the 

element of extreme and outrageous conduct for an IIED claim. (Hughes v. 

Pair (2009) 46 Cal.4th 1035, 1050–1051 [IIED requires conduct so extreme as 

to exceed all bounds of that usually tolerated in a civilized society].) 

Although we do not decide the issue, the only allegations that might support 

such a claim are those involving Glaske’s knowing retaliation against 

Sanchez for taking authorized medical leave to deal with her deep grief over 
24

p. 1065.) Courts have consistently declined to treat claims of discrimination 

and retaliation as arising from protected activity simply because such 

discriminatory animus might have been evidenced by communications by a 

defendant. (Ibid.) And as Sanchez has confirmed, she does not seek relief 

based on anything Glaske did or did not say about her to the CDCR. There is 

no evidence showing otherwise—indeed, Sanchez did not even reference 

Glaske’s comments to the CDCR in her declaration below.

We express no opinion as to whether the above facts sufficiently state a 

claim for harassment or IIED, or whether Sanchez is likely to prevail on 

these claims. The only question before us at this stage is whether any

protected activity identified by defendants in paragraph 61 forms the basis 

for potential liability. We conclude that it does not.

3. Sanchez’s Unfair Business Practices Claim

Finally, defendants argue that Sanchez’s third cause of action, unfair 

business practices in violation of Business and Professions Code section 

17200 et seq., or the unfair competition law (UCL), is based on protected 

speech and petitioning activity because the only statements described in the 

complaint as “false” or “fraudulent” are Glaske’s statements to the CDCR and 

CoreCivic’s severance offer. We again disagree.

First, defendants fail to explain how unknown statements from Glaske 

to the CDCR could form the basis of an unfair business practices claim. 

Second, we do not agree with defendants that Bonni stands for the 

proposition that a severance offer made during a termination meeting can be 

fairly categorized as part of “settlement negotiations” that constitute 

her mother’s death. (See McCoy v. Pacific Maritime Assn. (2013) 216 

Cal.App.4th 283, 295 [holding that retaliation “does not necessarily rise to the 

‘extreme and outrageous’ standard required” for IIED (italics added)].) 
25

protected petitioning activity. (See Bonni, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 1025.) On 

this basis alone, defendants have not met their burden of establishing that 

Sanchez’s UCL claim arises from protected activity.

In any event, a UCL violation does not require false or fraudulent 

conduct. The UCL prohibits all types of unfair competition, including 

unlawful, unfair, and fraudulent business acts. (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 17200 

et seq.) It “covers a wide range of conduct” and “ ‘borrows’ violations from 

other laws by making them independently actionable as unfair competitive 

practices.” (Korea Supply Co. v. Lockheed Martin Corp. (2003) 29 Cal.4th 

1134, 1143.) Courts have also held that “ ‘[a]n employer’s business practices 

concerning its employee are within the scope of [the UCL].’ ” (Davis v. 

Farmers Ins. Exchange (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 1302, 1326, fn. 17.) Sanchez 

alleges in her complaint that defendants violated several other laws, 

including FEHA, Labor Code sections 1102.5 and 1198.5, and Civil Code 

section 3344—none of which are based on protected activity. We therefore 

conclude that defendants have similarly failed to demonstrate that Sanchez’s 

UCL claim is based on protected activity.

Because we determine that Sanchez does not seek relief based on any

protected activity identified in paragraph 61 of the complaint, we need not 

reach the question of whether communications to and from the CDCR are in 

fact protected under section 425.16, subdivision (e), or whether Sanchez’s 

claims have minimal merit. We note, however, that even if we were to strike 

paragraph 61, it would not result in any of Sanchez’s claims being stricken, 

as she has sufficiently alleged and substantiated in her declaration other 

unprotected conduct supporting each cause of action.
26

II

Sanchez asks us to award her attorneys’ fees and costs on appeal, 

arguing that defendants’ anti-SLAPP motion was frivolous and brought solely 

to cause unnecessary delay. Defendants contend that because their antiSLAPP motion should have been granted, it is they who are entitled to an 

award of fees and costs. We agree with Sanchez that defendants’ motion and 

this appeal were frivolous.

Section 425.16, subdivision (c)(1), provides that “[i]f the court finds that 

a special motion to strike is frivolous or is solely intended to cause 

unnecessary delay, the court shall award costs and reasonable attorney’s fees 

to a plaintiff prevailing on the motion. . . .” In this context, frivolous “means 

that any reasonable attorney would agree the motion was totally devoid of 

merit.” (Gerbosi v. Gaims, Weil, West & Epstein, LLP (2011) 193 Cal.App.4th 

435, 450.) Appellate challenges to an anti-SLAPP motion are also subject to 

an award of fees and costs, in an amount to be determined by the trial court 

after the appeal is resolved. (Christian Research Institute v. Alnor (2008) 165 

Cal.App.4th 1315, 1320.) 

Defendants contend that Sanchez “in her own words made protected 

conduct the cornerstone of her complaint.” To the contrary—it is defendants 

who tried to do so, by repeatedly and unreasonably attempting to distort a 

single paragraph from Sanchez’s 127-paragraph complaint and turn it into

the basis of eight of her ten claims. Defendants also consistently

misrepresented the actual content of Sanchez’s complaint, both in the trial 

court and in this court. Further, they failed to submit any evidence in 

support of their argument that Sanchez’s claims arose from protected 

activity, either when they filed their motion or in response to the detailed 

declaration Sanchez submitted in opposition. Without any supporting 
27

evidence, defendants tried to manufacture a SLAPP theory by repeatedly 

asserting that they fired Sanchez at the request of the CDCR and claiming 

that the termination was therefore protected conduct in furtherance of the 

CDCR’s speech—even going so far as to state that Sanchez “does not dispute 

that her termination came at the direction of the CDCR . . . .” But Sanchez 

clearly does dispute this claim. In fact, the only evidence in the record on this 

point is Sanchez’s evidence suggesting that this was merely a pretext for her 

termination. Glaske easily could have stated in her declaration that the 

CDCR requested Sanchez’s termination, but her declaration is conspicuously 

silent on the issue. And defendants submitted no other evidence to support 

their assertion that they fired Sanchez at CDCR’s request. 

“Both the Legislature and the Supreme Court have acknowledged the 

ironic unintended consequence that anti-SLAPP procedures, enacted to curb 

abusive litigation, are also prone to abuse.” (Olsen v. Harbison (2005) 134 

Cal.App.4th 278, 283.) By bringing a frivolous anti-SLAPP motion, then 

appealing its denial, a defendant forces the plaintiff to incur unnecessary fees 

and a long delay during the mandatory stay of proceedings pending appeal. 

(Varian Medical Systems, Inc. v. Delfino (2005) 35 Cal.4th 180, 191 [appeal 

from denial of anti-SLAPP motion automatically stays trial court 

proceedings]; Moriarty v. Laramar Management Corp. (2014) 224 Cal.App.4th 

125, 128 [noting that “appeal by a defendant whose anti-SLAPP motion failed 

below . . . will result in inordinate delay of the plaintiff’s case and cause him 

to incur more unnecessary attorney fees”].) Courts must therefore be vigilant 

to protect against abuse of the statute. Specifically, courts must award fees 

when the defendant brings an objectively frivolous anti-SLAPP motion based 

on tangential or purely incidental allegations of arguably protected activity 

that are not the actual basis for the claims asserted. (See Workman v. 
28

Colichman (2019) 33 Cal.App.5th 1039, 1056–1058 [award of reasonable 

attorneys’ fees and costs for frivolous anti-SLAPP motion is mandatory].) 

We believe no reasonable attorney could have concluded that this antiSLAPP motion was well taken. This is particularly so after the trial court 

had already determined that defendants’ motion was without merit and thus 

awarded Sanchez her fees below. After being put on notice by the trial court 

that their motion was frivolous, defendants proceeded with this appeal at 

their own peril. Accordingly, Sanchez may also recover reasonable fees for 

this appeal. 

DISPOSITION

The order denying the anti-SLAPP motion is affirmed. Sanchez shall 

recover her costs and fees on appeal. The matter is remanded to the trial 

court for a determination of the amount of recoverable costs and fees on 

appeal.

BUCHANAN, J.

WE CONCUR:

HUFFMAN, Acting P. J.

IRION, J.