1 Unless otherwise indicated, all section references are to

(continued...)

T.C. Memo. 2007-24

UNITED STATES TAX COURT

DANIEL O. ABELEIN, Petitioner v.

COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent

Docket No. 24804-04L. Filed February 6, 2007.

Terri A. Merriam, for petitioner.

Gregory M. Hahn and Thomas N. Tomashek, for respondent.

MEMORANDUM FINDINGS OF FACT AND OPINION

HAINES, Judge: Petitioner filed a petition with this Court

in response to a Notice of Determination Concerning Collection

Action(s) Under Section 6330 (notice of determination) for 1982

through 1986.1 Pursuant to section 6330(d), petitioner seeks
- 2 -

1(...continued)

the Internal Revenue Code, as amended, and all Rule references

are to the Tax Court Rules of Practice and Procedure. Amounts

are rounded to the nearest dollar.

2 Petitioner also disputes respondent’s determination that

he is liable for the increased rate of interest on tax-motivated

transactions under sec. 6621(c). As to this dispute, the parties

filed a stipulation to be bound by the Court’s determination in

Ertz v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2007-15, which involves a

similar issue.

3 Respondent reserved relevancy objections to many of the

exhibits attached to the stipulations of fact. Fed. R. Evid. 402

provides the general rule that all relevant evidence is

admissible, while evidence which is not relevant is not

admissible. Fed. R. Evid. 401 defines relevant evidence as

“evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact

that is of consequence to the determination of the action more

probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence.” 

While the relevance of some exhibits is certainly limited, we

find that the exhibits meet the threshold definition of relevant

evidence and are admissible. The Court will give the exhibits

only such consideration as is warranted by their pertinence to

the Court’s analysis of petitioner’s case.

Respondent also objected to many of the exhibits on the

basis of hearsay. Even if we were to receive those exhibits into

evidence, they would have no impact on our findings of fact or on

the outcome of this case.

review of respondent’s determination. The issue for decision is

whether respondent abused his discretion in sustaining the

proposed collection action.2

FINDINGS OF FACT

Some of the facts have been stipulated and are so found. 

The first, second, third, fourth, and fifth stipulations of fact

and the attached exhibits are incorporated herein by this

reference.3
- 3 -

4 The parties stipulated that petitioner became a partner

in DGE 85-1 and SGE 85-1 in 1984. However, petitioner testified,

and the rest of the record indicates, that he became a partner in

1985.

Petitioner was also a partner in other Hoyt-related

partnerships identified as “DGE 1986-A” and “FF #4”. The details

of these partnerships are not in the record. Though unclear, it

appears that all adjustments made to petitioner’s income tax

liability for 1982-86 were attributable to his involvement in DGE

85-1 and SGE 85-1 only.

Petitioner resided in Boring, Oregon, when he filed his

petition. Petitioner has a highschool education, worked as an

electrician for many years, and is now self-employed as a general

contractor building houses in the Greater Portland, Oregon, area. 

At the time of trial, petitioner was 55 years old.

In 1985, petitioner became a partner in Durham Genetic

Engineering, Ltd. 1985-1 (DGE 85-1) and in Shorthorn Genetic

Engineering, Ltd. 1985-1 (SGE 85-1), cattle breeding partnerships

organized and operated by Walter J. Hoyt III (Hoyt).4 

From about 1971 through 1998, Hoyt organized, promoted, and

operated more than 100 cattle breeding partnerships. Hoyt also

organized, promoted, and operated sheep breeding partnerships. 

From 1983 to his subsequent removal by the Tax Court in 2000 

through 2003, Hoyt was the tax matters partner of each Hoyt

partnership. From approximately 1980 through 1997, Hoyt was a

licensed enrolled agent, and as such, he represented many of the

Hoyt partners before the Internal Revenue Service (IRS). In
- 4 -

5 Petitioner asks the Court to take judicial notice of

certain “facts” in other Hoyt-related cases and apply judicial

estoppel to “facts respondent has asserted in previous [Hoytrelated] litigation”. We do neither.

A judicially noticeable fact is one not subject to

reasonable dispute in that it is either (1) generally known

within the territorial jurisdiction of the trial court or (2)

capable of accurate and ready determination by resort to sources

whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned. Fed. R. Evid.

201(b). Petitioner is not asking the Court to take judicial

notice of facts that are not subject to reasonable dispute. 

Instead, petitioner is asking the Court to take judicial notice

of the truth of assertions made by taxpayers and the Commissioner

in other Hoyt-related cases. Such assertions are not the proper

subject of judicial notice.

The doctrine of judicial estoppel prevents a party from

asserting in a legal proceeding a claim that is inconsistent with

a position successfully taken by that party in a previous

proceeding. New Hampshire v. Maine, 532 U.S. 742, 749 (2001). 

Among the requirements for judicial estoppel to be invoked, a

party’s current litigating position must be “clearly

inconsistent” with a prior litigating position. Id. at 750-751. 

Petitioner has failed to identify any clear inconsistencies

between respondent’s current position and his position in any

previous litigation.

1998, Hoyt’s enrolled agent status was revoked. Hoyt was

convicted of various criminal charges in 2000.5

Beginning in 1985 until at least 1986, petitioner claimed

losses and credits on his Federal income tax returns arising from

his involvement in the Hoyt partnerships. Petitioner

also carried back unused investment credits to 1982, 1983, and

1984. As a result of these losses and credits, petitioner

reported overpayments of tax for 1982 through 1986 and received

refunds in the amounts claimed.
- 5 -

6 The FPAAs and other information specific to DGE 85-1’s

and SGE 85-1’s partnership-level proceedings are not in the

record.

Respondent issued notices of final partnership

administrative adjustments (FPAAs) to DGE 85-1 and SGE 85-1 for

their 1985 and 1986 taxable years.6 After completion of the

partnership-level proceedings, respondent determined deficiencies

in petitioner’s income tax for his 1982 through 1986 tax years. 

On January 24, 2002, respondent issued petitioner a Final

Notice--Notice of Intent to Levy and Notice of Your Right to a

Hearing (final notice). The final notice included petitioner’s

outstanding tax liabilities for 1982 through 1986.

On February 12, 2002, petitioner submitted a Form 12153,

Request for a Collection Due Process Hearing. Petitioner argued

that the proposed levy was inappropriate and that an offer-incompromise should be accepted. 

Petitioner’s case was assigned to Settlement Officer Linda

Cochran (Ms. Cochran). Ms. Cochran scheduled a telephone section

6330 hearing for March 23, 2004. During the hearing,

petitioner’s representative, Terri A. Merriam (Ms. Merriam),

requested that petitioner be given more time to submit

information to be considered. Ms. Cochran extended petitioner’s

deadline for submitting information to be considered to April 6,

2004. 
- 6 -

7 The details of petitioner’s 1986-96 tax years are not in

the record.

On April 5, 2004, petitioner submitted to Ms. Cochran a Form

656, Offer in Compromise, a Form 433-A, Collection Information

Statement for Wage Earners and Self-Employed Individuals, one

letter explaining the offer amount, and three letters setting out

in detail petitioner’s position regarding the offer-incompromise. Petitioner’s letters included several exhibits. 

The Form 656 indicated that petitioner was seeking an

effective tax administration offer-in-compromise based on public

policy and equity grounds. Petitioner offered to pay $129,230 to

compromise his outstanding tax liabilities for 1982 through

1996.7

On the Form 433-A, petitioner reported assets worth

approximately $420,000 and outstanding liabilities of

approximately $264,000. Petitioner also reported gross monthly

income of $21,728 and monthly living expenses of $14,382.

In the letter explaining the offer amount, petitioner stated

that he was offering to pay $129,230 “for all Hoyt-related years

to be paid in twenty-four months * * *. The amount accounts for

all the tax liability for 1982 through 1998 * * * and regular

interest through April 15, 1993. This offer assumes that no Tax

Motivated Transaction (TMT) interest is imposed”.
- 7 -

8 Respondent determined that petitioner had monthly

disposable income of $15,739 and multiplied that amount by 79,

the number of months remaining on the collection statute.

In the remaining three letters, petitioner alleged that he

was a victim of Hoyt’s fraud and asserted various arguments

regarding the appropriateness of an offer-in-compromise. 

On May 21, 2004, petitioner submitted another letter to Ms.

Cochran, which included 42 exhibits not provided with the

previous letters. 

On November 23, 2004, respondent issued petitioner a notice

of determination. Respondent determined that petitioner had: 

(1) Total net realizable equity in his assets of $156,053; (2) an

amount collectible from future income of $1,243,381,8 and (3) a

reasonable collection potential of $1,415,173. Respondent

determined that petitioner was not entitled to an effective tax

administration offer-in-compromise based on public policy or

equity ground because the case “fails to meet the criteria for

such consideration”. Respondent determined that petitioner did

not offer an acceptable collection alternative and that all

requirements of law and administrative procedure had been met. 

Respondent concluded that the proposed collection action could

proceed.

In response to the notice of determination, petitioner filed

a petition with this Court on December 29, 2004. 
- 8 -

9 While petitioner disputes his liability for sec. 6621(c)

interest, see supra note 2, he did not raise doubt as to

liability as a grounds for compromise.

OPINION

Section 7122(a) provides that “The Secretary may compromise

any civil * * * case arising under the internal revenue laws”. 

Whether to accept an offer-in-compromise is left to the

Secretary’s discretion. Fargo v. Commissioner, 447 F.3d 706, 712

(9th Cir. 2006), affg. T.C. Memo. 2004-13; sec. 301.7122-1(c)(1),

Proced. & Admin. Regs.

The regulations under section 7122(a) set forth three

grounds for the compromise of a tax liability: (1) Doubt as to

liability; (2) doubt as to collectibility; or (3) promotion of

effective tax administration. Sec. 301.7122-1(b), Proced. &

Admin. Regs. Doubt as to liability and doubt as to

collectibility are not at issue in this case.9

As pertinent here, the Secretary may compromise a tax

liability on the ground of effective tax administration when: 

(1) Exceptional circumstances exist such that collection of the

full liability would undermine public confidence that the tax

laws are being administered in a fair and equitable manner; and

(2) compromise of the liability would not undermine compliance by
- 9 -

10 The regulations also provide that the Secretary may

compromise a liability on the ground of effective tax

administration when collection of the full liability will create

economic hardship. See sec. 301.7122-1(b), Proced. & Admin.

Regs. While petitioner disputes Ms. Cochran’s determination of

his reasonable collection potential, he does not argue that

collection of the full liability would create economic hardship.

taxpayers with the tax laws.10 Sec. 301.7122-1(b)(3), Proced. &

Admin. Regs.

Petitioner proposed an offer-in-compromise based on

effective tax administration, arguing that exceptional

circumstances existed such that collection of the full liability

would undermine public confidence that the tax laws are being

administered in a fair and equitable manner. Respondent

determined that petitioner’s offer-in-compromise did not meet the

criteria for an effective tax administration offer-in-compromise. 

Because the underlying tax liability is not at issue, our

review under section 6330 is for abuse of discretion. See Sego

v. Commissioner, 114 T.C. 604, 610 (2000); Goza v. Commissioner,

114 T.C. 176, 182 (2000). This standard does not ask us to

decide whether in our own opinion petitioner’s offer-incompromise should have been accepted, but whether respondent’s

rejection of the offer-in-compromise was arbitrary, capricious,

or without sound basis in fact or law. Woodral v. Commissioner,

112 T.C. 19, 23 (1999); Keller v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2006-

166; Fowler v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2004-163. 
- 10 -

A. Exceptional Circumstances

Petitioner asserts that “There are so many unique and

equitable facts in this case that this case is an exceptional

circumstance” and respondent abused his discretion by not

accepting those facts as grounds for an offer-in-compromise. In

support of his assertion, petitioner argues: (1) The

longstanding nature of this case justifies acceptance of the

offer-in-compromise; (2) respondent’s reliance on an example in

the Internal Revenue Manual (IRM) was improper; and (3)

respondent failed to consider petitioner’s other “equitable

facts”.

1. Longstanding Case

Petitioner asserts that the legislative history requires

respondent to resolve “longstanding” cases by forgiving penalties

and interest which would otherwise apply. Petitioner argues

that, because this is a longstanding case, respondent abused his

discretion by failing to accept their offer-in-compromise.

Petitioner’s argument is essentially the same considered and

rejected by the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in Fargo

v. Commissioner, supra at 711-712. See also Keller v.

Commissioner, supra; Barnes v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2006-150. 

We reject petitioner’s argument for the same reasons stated by

the Court of Appeals. We add that petitioner’s counsel

participated in the appeal in Fargo as counsel for the amici. On
- 11 -

brief, petitioner suggests that the Court of Appeals knowingly

wrote its opinion in Fargo in such a way as to distinguish that

case from the cases of counsel’s similarly situated clients

(e.g., petitioner), and to otherwise allow those clients’

liabilities for penalties and interest to be forgiven. We do not

read the opinion of the Court of Appeals in Fargo to support that

conclusion. See Keller v. Commissioner, supra; Barnes v.

Commissioner, supra.

Respondent’s rejection of petitioner’s longstanding case

argument was not arbitrary or capricious.

2. The IRM Example

Petitioner argues that respondent erred when he determined

that petitioner was not entitled to relief based on the second

example in IRM section 5.8.11.2.2(3). Petitioner asserts that

many of the facts in this case were not present in the example,

and, therefore, any reliance on the example was misplaced. 

Petitioner’s argument is not persuasive.

IRM section 5.8.11.2.2(3) discusses effective tax

administration offers-in-compromise based on equity and public

policy grounds and states in the second example:

In 1983, the taxpayer invested in a nationally marketed

partnership which promised the taxpayer tax benefits

far exceeding the amount of the investment. 

Immediately upon investing, the taxpayer claimed

investment tax credits that significantly reduced or

eliminated the tax liabilities for the years 1981

through 1983. In 1984, the IRS opened an audit of the

partnership under the provisions of the Tax Equity and
- 12 -

Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982 (TEFRA). After

issuance of the Final Partnership Administrative

Adjustment (FPAA), but prior to any proceedings in Tax

Court, the IRS made a global settlement offer in which

it offered to concede a substantial portion of the

interest and penalties that could be expected to be

assessed if the IRS’s determinations were upheld by the

court. The taxpayer rejected the settlement offer. 

After several years of litigation, the partnership

level proceeding eventually ended in Tax Court

decisions upholding the vast majority of the

deficiencies asserted in the FPAA on the grounds that

the partnership’s activities lacked economic substance. 

The taxpayer has now offered to compromise all the

penalties and interest on terms more favorable than

those contained in the prior settlement offer, arguing

that TEFRA is unfair and that the liabilities accrued

in large part due to the actions of the Tax Matters

Partner (TMP) during the audit and litigation. Neither

the operation of the TEFRA rules nor the TMP’s actions

on behalf of the taxpayer provide grounds to compromise

under the equity provision of paragraph (b)(4)(i)(B) of

this section. Compromise on those grounds would

undermine the purpose of both the penalty and interest

provisions at issue and the consistent settlement

principles of TEFRA. * * *

1 Administration, Internal Revenue Manual (CCH), sec.

5.8.11.2.2(3), at 16,378. We agree with respondent that the

example presents similar circumstances to those in petitioner’s

case, including: Petitioner invested in TEFRA partnerships in

the early 1980s; petitioner’s outstanding tax liability is

related to his investment in the partnerships; FPAAs were issued

to the partnerships; after several years of litigation, Tax Court

decisions upheld the vast majority of the deficiencies asserted

in the FPAAs; and petitioner argues that interest has accumulated
- 13 -

11 Bales v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1989-568, involved

deficiencies determined against various investors in several Hoyt

partnerships. This Court found in favor of the investors on

several issues, stating that “the transaction in issue should be

respected for Federal income tax purposes.” Taxpayers in many

Hoyt-related cases have used Bales as the basis for a reasonable

cause defense to accuracy-related penalties. This argument has

been uniformly rejected by this Court and by the Courts of

Appeals for the Sixth, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits. See, e.g.,

Hansen v. Commissioner, 471 F.3d 1021 (9th Cir. 2006), affg. T.C.

Memo. 2004-269; Mortensen v. Commissioner, 440 F.3d 375, 390-391

(6th Cir. 2006), affg. T.C. Memo. 2004-279; Van Scoten v.

Commissioner, 439 F.3d 1243, 1254-1256 (10th Cir. 2006), affg.

T.C. Memo. 2004-275.

as the result of delays by and other actions of the tax matters

partner. 

Petitioner is also correct in asserting that not all the

facts in his case are present in the example. However, it is

unreasonable to expect that facts in an example be identical to

facts of a particular case before the example can be relied upon. 

The IRM example was only one of many factors respondent

considered. Given the similarities to petitioner’s case,

respondent’s reliance on that example was not arbitrary or

capricious.

3. Petitioner’s Other “Equitable Facts”

Petitioner argues that respondent abused his discretion by

failing to consider the other “equitable facts” of this case. 

Petitioner’s “equitable facts” include reference to: (1)

Petitioner’s reliance on Bales v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1989-

568;11 (2) petitioner’s reliance on Hoyt’s enrolled agent status;
- 14 -

(3) Hoyt’s criminal conviction; (4) Hoyt’s fraud on petitioner;

and (5) other letters and cases. The basic thrust of

petitioner’s argument is that he was defrauded by Hoyt and that,

if he were held responsible for penalties and interest incurred

as a result of their investment in a tax shelter, it would be

inequitable and against public policy. Petitioner’s argument is

not persuasive.

While the regulations do not set forth a specific standard

for evaluating an offer-in-compromise based on claims of public

policy or equity, the regulations contain two examples. See sec.

301.7122-1(c)(3)(iv), Examples (1) and (2), Proced. & Admin.

Regs. The first example describes a taxpayer who is seriously

ill and unable to file income tax returns for several years. The

second example describes a taxpayer who received erroneous advice

from the Commissioner as to the tax effect of the taxpayer’s

actions. Neither example bears any resemblance to this case. 

Unlike the exceptional circumstances exemplified in the

regulations, petitioner’s situation is neither unique nor

exceptional in that his situation mirrors those of numerous other

taxpayers who claimed tax shelter deductions in the 1980s and

1990s. See Keller v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2006-166; Barnes

v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2006-150.

Of course, the examples in the regulations are not meant to

be exhaustive, and petitioner has a more sympathetic case than
- 15 -

the taxpayers in Fargo v. Commissioner, 447 F.3d at 714, for whom

the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit noted that “no

evidence was presented to suggest that Taxpayers were the subject

of fraud or deception”. Such considerations, however, have not

kept this Court from finding investors in the Hoyt tax shelters

to be liable for penalties and interest, nor have they prevented

the Courts of Appeals for the Sixth, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits

from affirming our decisions to that effect. See Hansen v.

Commissioner, 471 F.3d 1021 (9th Cir. 2006), affg. T.C. Memo.

2004-269; Mortensen v. Commissioner, 440 F.3d 375 (6th Cir.

2006), affg. T.C. Memo. 2004-279; Van Scoten v. Commissioner, 439

F.3d 1243 (10th Cir. 2006), affg. T.C. Memo. 2004-275.

Ms. Cochran testified that she considered all of Ms.

Merriam’s and petitioner’s assertions, including the numerous

letters and exhibits. Nevertheless, Ms. Cochran determined that

petitioner did not qualify for an offer-in-compromise.

The mere fact that petitioner’s “equitable facts” did not

persuade respondent to accept their offer-in-compromise does not

mean that those assertions were not considered. The notice of

determination and Ms. Cochran’s testimony demonstrate

respondent’s clear understanding and careful consideration of the

facts and circumstances of petitioner’s case. We find that

respondent’s determination that the “equitable facts” did not

justify acceptance of petitioner’s offer-in-compromise was not
- 16 -

arbitrary or capricious, and thus it was not an abuse of

discretion.

We also find that compromising petitioner’s case on grounds

of public policy or equity would not enhance voluntary compliance

by other taxpayers. A compromise on that basis would place the

Government in the unenviable role of an insurer against poor

business decisions by taxpayers, reducing the incentive for

taxpayers to investigate thoroughly the consequences of

transactions into which they enter. It would be particularly

inappropriate for the Government to play that role here, where

the transaction at issue is participation in a tax shelter. 

Reducing the risks of participating in tax shelters would

encourage more taxpayers to run those risks, thus undermining

rather than enhancing compliance with the tax laws. See Barnes

v. Commissioner, supra.

B. Petitioner’s Other Arguments

1. Compromise of Penalties and Interest in an Effective

Tax Administration Offer-in-Compromise

Petitioner advances a number of arguments focusing on his

assertion that respondent determined that penalties and interest

could not be compromised in an effective tax administration

offer-in-compromise. Petitioner argues that such a determination

is contrary to legislative history and is therefore an abuse of

discretion. These arguments are not persuasive.
- 17 -

The regulations under section 7122 provide that “If the

Secretary determines that there are grounds for compromise under

this section, the Secretary may, at the Secretary’s discretion,

compromise any civil * * * liability arising under the internal

revenue laws”. Sec. 301.7122-1(a)(1), Proced. & Admin. Regs. In

other words, the Secretary may compromise a taxpayer’s tax

liability if he determines that grounds for a compromise exist. 

If the Secretary determines that grounds do not exist, the amount

offered (or the way in which the offer is calculated) need not be

considered.

Petitioner’s arguments regarding the compromise of penalties

and interest do not relate to whether there are grounds for a

compromise. Instead, these arguments go to whether the amount

petitioner offered to compromise his tax liability was

acceptable. As addressed above, respondent’s determination that

the facts and circumstances of petitioner’s case did not warrant

acceptance of their offer-in-compromise was not arbitrary or

capricious and was thus not an abuse of discretion. Because no

grounds for compromise exist, we need not address whether

respondent can or should compromise penalties and interest in an

effective tax administration offer-in-compromise. See Keller v.

Commissioner, supra.
- 18 -

12 While sec. 7491 shifts the burden of proof and/or the

burden of production to the Commissioner in certain

circumstances, this section is not applicable in this case

because respondent’s examination of petitioner’s returns did not

commence after July 22, 1998. See Internal Revenue Service

Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998, Pub. L. 105-206, sec.

3001(c), 112 Stat. 727.

2. Information Sufficient for the Court To Review

Respondent’s Determination

Petitioner argues that respondent failed to provide the

Court with sufficient information “so that this Court can conduct

a thorough, probing, and in-depth review of respondent’s

determinations.” Petitioner’s argument is without merit.

Generally, a taxpayer bears the burden of proving the

Commissioner’s determinations incorrect. Rule 142(a)(1); Welch

v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111, 115 (1933).12 The burden was on

petitioner to show that respondent abused his discretion. The

burden was not on respondent to provide enough information to

show that he did not abuse his discretion. Nevertheless, we find

that we had more than sufficient information to review

respondent’s determination.

3. Deadline for Submission of Information

Petitioner argues that Ms. Cochran abused her discretion by

not allowing his counsel additional time to submit information to

be considered. Petitioner’s argument is not supported by the

record.
- 19 -

Petitioner asserts that he was “initially only given four

weeks” to provide all information. However, he ignores the fact

that Ms. Cochran granted his requested extension and allowed him

until April 6, 2004, to submit information. Additionally,

petitioner has not identified any documents or other information

that he believes Ms. Cochran should have considered but that he

was unable to produce because of the deadline for submission. 

Given the thoroughness and the amount of information submitted,

it is unclear why petitioner needed additional time. We do not

believe that Ms. Cochran abused her discretion by establishing a

deadline for the submission of information.

4. Efficient Collection Versus Intrusiveness

Petitioner argues that respondent failed to balance the need

for efficient collection of taxes with the legitimate concern

that the collection action be no more intrusive than necessary. 

See sec. 6330(c)(3)(C). Petitioner’s argument is not supported

by the record.

Petitioner has an outstanding tax liability. In his section

6330 hearing, petitioner proposed only an offer-in-compromise. 

Because no other collection alternatives were proposed, there

were not less intrusive means for respondent to consider. We

find that respondent balanced the need for efficient collection

of taxes with petitioner’s legitimate concern that collection be

no more intrusive than necessary.
- 20 -

C. Conclusion

Petitioner has not shown that respondent’s determination was

arbitrary or capricious, or without sound basis in fact or law. 

For all of the above reasons, we hold that respondent’s

determination was not an abuse of discretion, and respondent may

proceed with the proposed collection action. 

In reaching our holdings herein, we have considered all

arguments made, and, to the extent not mentioned above, we find

them to be moot, irrelevant, or without merit.

To reflect the foregoing, 

Decision will be

entered for respondent.