In the Missouri Court of Appeals

Western District 

IN THE INTEREST OF: I.D.,

Appellant,

v.

JUVENILE OFFICER,

Respondent.

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WD83393

FILED: September 29, 2020

APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF BUCHANAN COUNTY

THE HONORABLE DANIEL F. KELLOGG, JUDGE

BEFORE DIVISION THREE: GARY D. WITT, PRESIDING JUDGE,

LISA WHITE HARDWICK AND THOMAS N. CHAPMAN, JUDGES

I.D. appeals the juvenile court’s judgment finding him delinquent because 

he committed acts that, if committed by an adult, would have constituted firstdegree arson and second-degree involuntary manslaughter. I.D. contends the

court failed to apply the common law infancy presumption of doli incapax to 

determine that he did not have the capacity to commit crimes. He also argues 

that the evidence was insufficient to find that he committed acts constituting 

arson and involuntary manslaughter. For reasons explained herein, we affirm the 

judgment.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
2

Viewed in the light most favorable to the judgment, the evidence was that 

on February 20, 2019, ten-year old I.D. and four other minors, N.D., C.H., K.C., and 

C.S., gathered around midnight at a house located in Buchanan County, Missouri. 

N.D. is I.D.’s brother. None of the minors lived in the house, and the owner of the 

house was not home at the time. C.S. was sleeping in a bedroom near the front of 

the house while I.D., N.D., C.H., and K.C. were in the living room. Throughout the 

evening, I.D. and N.D. were “being destructive” by tearing up and breaking 

household items and by hitting the walls in the living room. After a while, I.D. and 

the others in the living room went into the bedroom where C.S. was sleeping. 

The group woke up C.S. to ask him where the marijuana was. C.S. told them he 

did not have any marijuana and went back to sleep. The rest of the group 

returned to the living room.

Around 3:00 a.m., I.D. and N.D. found a lighter and either shave gel or 

cologne in C.H.’s bag. I.D. sprayed the shave gel or cologne on a couch in the 

living room, while N.D. waited with the lighter. Realizing that I.D. and N.D. were 

about to burn the couch, K.C., one of the oldest present, requested I.D. and N.D. to 

wake up C.S. but neither of them did so. N.D. lit the couch on fire and the shave 

gel or cologne acted as an accelerant. When the fire started, I.D., N.D., C.H., and 

K.C. ran past the bedroom where C.S. was sleeping and out the front door. I.D. 

and N.D. were the last to leave the house. The group made no attempt to awaken 

or warn C.S. prior to leaving the house. The house ultimately burned down and 

collapsed with C.S. inside, resulting in his death. Emergency responders were not 
3

aware that C.S. was in the house and therefore did not immediately discover his 

body in the debris.

Before authorities learned of C.S.’s death in the fire, I.D. and his neighbor, 

J.R.S.J., attended a party, where there was alcohol and marijuana. During the 

party, I.D. told J.R.S.J. that he had killed C.S. in the fire. I.D. laughed after making 

this unsolicited statement. 

 In April 2019, the St. Joseph Police Department heard rumors that C.S. had 

died in the fire on February 20, 2019, and launched an investigation. C.S.’s body 

was located in the debris, and dental records confirmed his identity. A 

subsequent autopsy revealed that C.S. was alive at the time the fire started and 

died of smoke inhalation and high temperature exposure. The autopsy reported 

the manner of his death as homicide. 

When the police apprehended I.D., he was hiding in a suitcase. I.D. denied 

any involvement in the fire and claimed that he was in another room when the fire 

started. The Juvenile Officer of Buchanan County (“Juvenile Officer”) filed a 

delinquency petition alleging that I.D. committed what would be the crimes of 

first-degree arson, second-degree involuntary manslaughter, and abandonment of 

a corpse if committed by an adult. After an adjudication hearing, the court found 

the facts alleging first-degree arson and second-degree involuntary manslaughter 

to be true beyond a reasonable doubt but did not find the facts alleging 

abandonment of a corpse to be true beyond a reasonable doubt. The court 

committed I.D. to the custody of the Division of Youth Services. I.D. appeals. 
4

STANDARD OF REVIEW

“Juvenile proceedings are reviewed in the same manner as other courttried cases.” D.C.M v. Pemiscot Cty. Juvenile Office, 578 S.W.3d 776, 786 (Mo. 

banc 2019) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). We will, therefore, 

affirm a judgment in a juvenile proceeding “unless there is no substantial 

evidence to support it, it is against the weight of the evidence, or it erroneously 

declares or applies the law.” Ivie v. Smith, 439 S.W.3d 189, 198-99 (Mo. banc 

2014). “The credibility of the witnesses and the weight their testimony should be 

given is a matter to be determined at the hearing by the circuit court, which is free 

to believe none, part, or all of their testimony.” Pemiscot Cty., 578 S.W.3d at 786 

(citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

When, as here, “a juvenile is alleged to have committed an act that would 

be a criminal offense if committed by an adult, the standard of proof, like that in 

criminal trials, is beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. Consequently, we must 

determine “whether there is sufficient evidence from which the fact finder could 

have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” J.N.C.B. 

v. Juvenile Officer, 403 S.W.3d 120, 124 (Mo. App. 2013). “In determining the 

sufficiency of the evidence, we view the evidence and reasonable inferences 

which may be drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the verdict and we 
5

ignore all evidence and inferences to the contrary.” Id. (citation and internal 

quotation marks omitted).

ANALYSIS

In Point I, I.D. contends that the juvenile court erred in failing to apply the 

infancy presumption of doli incapax. Doli incapax is a common law presumption 

that a minor between the ages of seven and fourteen lacks the capacity to commit 

crime. State v. Adams, 76 Mo. 355, 357-58 (1882).

1

 The traditional burden of 

rebuttal is on the prosecuting party, and the rebuttal standard is “beyond all 

doubt.” Id. at 358. If applied to the delinquency proceeding here, doli incapax

would create a presumption that I.D. lacked the capacity to understand right from 

wrong, which the Juvenile Officer would then have had to rebut, in addition to 

proving the elements required for what would be arson and manslaughter 

charges if I.D. were tried as an adult. Id. at 357-58. 

The Juvenile Officer notes, and I.D. does not dispute, that I.D. did not raise 

this issue below. Therefore, the Juvenile Officer asserts that we may review this 

issue for only plain error. We disagree. If applicable, doli incapax creates a prima 

facie presumption that has the effect of requiring that the prosecuting party rebut 

the presumption and prove capacity beyond all doubt, in addition to proving all 

other elements of the charges. Adams, 76 Mo. at 355-58. Thus, if the prosecuting 

party fails to bring evidence sufficient to support a finding of capacity in doli 

 

1 Children under seven are deemed to lack capacity entirely. Adams, 76 Mo. at 357-58.
6

incapax cases, we would treat that failure the same as we would treat the failure 

to support any other element. Our Supreme Court “long has held that sufficiency 

claims are considered on appeal even if not briefed or not properly briefed in the 

appellate courts.” State v. Claycomb, 470 S.W.3d 358, 361 (Mo. banc 2015). 

Review is on the merits, and not for plain error. Id. at 362. 

Our review on the merits need not take us far, however. The presumption 

of doli incapax has not been applied in delinquency proceedings in Missouri, and 

we decline to extend its application now. Traditionally, the doli incapax

presumption has been applied only in criminal proceedings where a child faced 

adult criminal sentencing. See Adams, 76 Mo. at 357-58. The presumption has 

since been narrowly applied in a libel and slander case involving actual malice. 

See Mundin v. Harris, 134 S.W. 1076 (Mo. App. 1911). Although the juvenile court 

can adjudge what would be criminal conduct but for a child's infancy, delinquency 

proceedings are civil in nature, and thus stand “apart from the criminal justice 

system.” J.D.H. v. Juvenile Court of St. Louis Cty, 508 S.W.2d 497, 500 (Mo. banc

1974). Missouri courts have previously discussed this distinction, noting:

[T]he violation of a criminal statute by [an infant] is still a crime, if 

such person has the capacity at common law to commit crime; the 

Juvenile Court Act merely makes such violation also an act of 

delinquency, a jurisdictional ground for the administration, in a 

proper case, of its corrective and reformatory measures. 

State ex rel. Boyd v. Rutledge, 13 S.W.2d 1062, 1065 (Mo. 1929) (emphasis added) 

(finding that the Juvenile Court Act's discretionary transfer of juvenile cases into a 

court of general jurisdiction for criminal proceedings, similar to Section 211.071 
7

today, creates a clear distinction between criminal conduct and delinquency). 

Given that delinquency and criminal convictions are separate and distinct, we face 

the question of whether the doli incapax presumption, as applied in criminal 

cases, applies to delinquency proceedings as well. We conclude that it does not. 

The reason for the distinction between crime and delinquency is simple –

delinquency proceedings protect children from the rigors of adult criminal 

sentences while still allowing for their “care, protection, and discipline” in the 

hope of rehabilitation. Rutledge, 13 S.W.2d at 1065; §§ 211.011, 211.071.1 and 

211.073.1, RSMo Cum. Supp.

2

 Moreover, as a reflection of public policy, Section 

211.011 states that the Juvenile Code endeavors to provide all minors within its 

jurisdiction such “care, guidance and control as will conduce to the child's welfare 

and the best interests of the state.” § 211.011. To apply doli incapax to 

delinquency proceedings would necessarily frustrate that purpose by precluding 

some children from delinquency findings conducive to their care, protection, and 

discipline. This finding is consistent with the majority of other states that have 

reviewed this issue. See, e.g., Com. v. Ogden O., 864 N.E.2d 13 (Mass. 2007); 

W.D.B. v. Com., 246 S.W.3d 448 (Ky. 2007); In re Raymond G., 715 N.E.2d 486 (N.Y. 

1999); Barbra Kaban, Revitalizing the Infancy Defense in the Contemporary 

Juvenile Court, 60 RUTGERS. L. REV 33, 52-56 (2007). 

 

2 All statutory references are to the Revised Statutes of Missouri 2016, as updated by the 2019 

Cumulative Supplement. 
8

I.D.'s sole contention for the applicability of doli incapax to the Juvenile 

Code rests on Missouri's adoption of the English common law in Section 1.010.1. 

He asserts the long-standing rule that common law principles are applicable 

“absent constitutional or statutory provisions to the contrary.” State v. Brown, 

443 S.W.2d 805, 805 (Mo. banc 1969). However, as explained above, the doli 

incapax presumption has traditionally been applied only when children were 

subject to full criminal convictions so that they might be protected from adult 

criminal sentences. Adams, 76 Mo. at 357-5; see also Section 1.010.1. While the 

common law may evolve over time, neither our Supreme Court nor the 

intermediate appellate courts have extended doli incapax to juvenile proceedings. 

See La Plant v. E. I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co., 346 S.W.2d 231, 245-46 (Mo. App.

1961); Barbra Kaban, Revitalizing the Infancy Defense in the Contemporary 

Juvenile Court, 60 RUTGERS. L. REV 33, 52-56 (2007). Furthermore, Section 1.010.1 

does not automatically reform the common law to apply to new areas of law 

merely because the legislature has declined to state otherwise; rather, Section 

1.010.1 applies the common law as it existed in 1607 unless a court affirmatively 

expands it. See Jones v. State Highway Comm’n, 557 S.W.2d 225, 227-28 (Mo. 

banc 1977), superseded on other grounds by Bartley v. Special Sch. Dist. of St. 

Louis Cty., 649 S.W.2d 864 (Mo. banc 1983). Because the English common law of 

1607 was designed to protect children only from adult criminal punishment, we 

decline to find that it further extends to civil delinquency proceedings today. 
9

A.W.G. Kean, The History of the Criminal Liability of Children, 53 L.Q. REV. 364, 

365-68 (1937). 

Moreover, we note that, when the Supreme Court in Rutledge explained the 

jurisdictional effects and constitutionality of releasing the juvenile court’s

jurisdiction of a juvenile case to a court of general criminal jurisdiction, it twice 

emphasized the need for a child to have capacity to receive a criminal 

conviction—but not for a delinquency finding. Rutledge, 13 S.W.2d at 1065-66. 

Here, without the need for capacity findings in delinquency proceedings, there,

too, would be no need for an infancy presumption of capacity in such 

proceedings. In contrast, in criminal proceedings where a child's capacity 

remains an acute issue, the doli incapax presumption has utility. Further, because 

no Missouri court has applied doli incapax to juvenile proceedings and public 

policy supports not applying the presumption here, it is logical to view the 

discussion in Rutledge as additional persuasive evidence that doli incapax applies 

in criminal proceedings and not in juvenile proceedings. Therefore, the juvenile 

court did not err in failing to apply the doli incapax presumption. Point I is denied.

In Points II and III, I.D. challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support 

the juvenile court’s findings of knowing, reckless, and grossly negligent conduct 

under theories of first-degree arson and second-degree involuntary manslaughter,

if I.D. were tried as an adult. Section 569.040.1 provides that “[a] person commits 

the offense of arson in the first degree if he knowingly damages an inhabitable 

structure by starting a fire when another person is present, and thereby recklessly 
10

places such person in danger of death or serious physical injury.” A person acts 

knowingly under Section 562.016.3 when:

(1) With respect to his or her conduct or to attendant circumstances 

when he or she is aware of the nature of his or her conduct or that 

those circumstances exist; or

(2) With respect to a result of his or her conduct when he or she is 

aware that his or her conduct is practically certain to cause that 

result.

Reckless conduct occurs when a person “consciously disregards a substantial and 

unjustifiable risk that circumstances exist or that a result will follow, and such 

disregard constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of care which a 

reasonable person would exercise in the situation.” § 562.016.4. 

Section 565.027.1 provides that “[a] person commits involuntary 

manslaughter in the second degree if he acts with criminal negligence to cause 

the death of any person.” A person is criminally negligent “when he or she fails 

to be aware of a substantial and unjustifiable risk that circumstances exist or a 

result will follow, and such failure constitutes a gross deviation from the standard 

of care which a reasonable person would exercise in the situation.” § 562.016.5. 

“Intent can be proved by direct evidence and reasonable inferences drawn from 

the circumstances surrounding the incident.” State v. Brown, 360 S.W.3d 919, 924 

(Mo. App. 2012) (internal quotation marks omitted). 

I.D. argues that his age prevented him from possessing the requisite mens 

rea for both offenses. Specifically, I.D. asserts that his youth requires the 

application of a reduced standard of care to that of a child of similar age. We 
11

agree. In negligence, the children’s standard of care is that of a child of “the same 

age, capacity, and experience.” Mantia v. Mo. Dept. of Transp., 529 S.W.3d 804, 

810 (Mo. banc. 2017) (internal quotation marks omitted). Similarly, recklessness 

under Section 562.016.4 also requires a gross deviation of a reasonable person’s 

standard of care. Finally, a knowing mens rea relates to the actor’s subjective 

knowledge and understanding. § 562.016.3. Finding knowing conduct in a child 

necessarily requires consideration of the child’s ability to subjectively understand 

his conduct due to factors such as age, capacity, or experience. Therefore, we 

review Points II and III with reference to I.D.’s age and under a standard of care 

fitting his age, capacity, and experience. 

In the light most favorable to the verdict, the evidence was that, prior to 

starting the fire, I.D. and N.D. were behaving in a destructive manner by tearing 

up and breaking things in the house and by hitting the walls in the house. Before 

I.D. and N.D. lit the couch on fire, K.C. told them to wake up C.S., but they did not.

I.D. then applied an accelerant to the couch while N.D. stood ready with a lighter. 

After I.D. had finished applying the accelerant., N.D. ignited the fire. Partaking in 

destructive behavior for several hours beforehand suggests I.D. and N.D. lit the 

fire in continuation of that behavior. This conduct points to I.D.’s knowledge that 

setting a fire was destructive in nature. Furthermore, N.D. waiting to ignite the 

fire until after I.D. applied the accelerant leads to a reasonable conclusion that the 

boys expected the accelerant to produce an enlarged fire in the home. Based on 

these facts, the court could reasonably find that I.D. was aware of the dangerous 
12

nature of his conduct while he was spreading the accelerant on the couch or,

alternately, that he was aware that his conduct of combining accelerant to the 

flame his brother was about to ignite with the lighter was practically certain to 

bring about a fire that would damage the home. 

The court could also find that I.D. recklessly put other persons who were 

present in danger of death or serious injury. I.D. was in the same living area as at 

least three other individuals, N.D., K.C., and C.H., and he had previously entered 

the room where C.S. was sleeping and had interacted with him. Yet, I.D. never 

warned or awoke C.S., even when K.C. instructed him to do so. Even as a minor, 

the court could still find that I.D. knew there was a risk of the fire spreading when 

they started it, as evidenced by the fact that he, along with N.D., K.C., and C.D., 

ran from the house after they started the fire. The destructive behavior 

throughout the night also suggests I.D. was aware of the risk that combining the 

accelerant and flame would lead to a dangerous and destructive result. The 

evidence is sufficient to support a finding, beyond a reasonable doubt, that I.D. 

consciously disregarded the fact that C.S. was still in the house, would be unable 

to exit the house, and would ultimately die in the fire. By disregarding the risk of 

harm to C.S. before setting the fire, I.D.’s actions recklessly placed C.S. in danger 

of death or serious physical injury, and constituted a gross deviation from the 

standard of care which a reasonable person of I.D.’s age, capacity, and experience

would exercise in the situation. Because the other elements are not in dispute, 

there is sufficient evidence to support a finding of first-degree arson. 
13

Finally, our analysis for criminal negligence is duplicative of the preceding 

mens rea analysis for what would be first-degree arson. Because I.D. knew of 

C.S.’s presence and incapacity, and he was aware of the danger of the fire, the 

juvenile court could reasonably conclude that he violated his standard of care by 

failing to awaken C.S. both before and after starting the fire. I.D. ran past the 

room where he knew C.S. slept and escaped the house only seconds after starting 

the fire. He also ignored a direct request from K.C. that he awaken C.S. 

immediately before N.D. ignited the fire. Even a child of I.D.’s age could 

understand the importance of such a request and the danger of non-compliance. 

Both facts indicate a substantial disregard for the danger C.S. faced due to the fire. 

The court reasonably concluded under these facts, beyond a reasonable doubt,

that I.D. acted in gross deviation of what a child of I.D.’s age, capacity, and 

experience would do under similar circumstances. There is sufficient evidence to 

support a finding of criminal negligence and second-degree involuntary 

manslaughter. 

Along with partaking in generally destructive activity, applying accelerant to 

burn the couch, and interacting with others present in the home, I.D. was also 

involved in abnormal activity for his age, such as late-night activity, marijuana,

and alcohol. Additionally, I.D. told J.R.S.J. that he killed C.S. in the fire and 

laughed about it. The juvenile court expressly found these facts credible and 

afforded them weight, and we decline to second guess these determinations. 

These facts demonstrate, beyond a reasonable doubt, that I.D. acted knowingly, 
14

recklessly, and in a criminally negligent manner. Therefore, we deny Points II and 

III. 

CONCLUSION

The judgment is affirmed.

____________________________________

LISA WHITE HARDWICK, JUDGE

ALL CONCUR.