Pursuant to Ind.Appellate Rule 65(D),

this Memorandum Decision shall not be regarded as precedent or cited before any court except for the purpose of establishing the defense of res judicata, collateral estoppel, or th e law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT : ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE : ELIZABETH A. BELLIN GREGORY F. ZOELLER Elkhart, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana MONIKA PREKOPA TALBOT Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana


## IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

RAYMOND CANTU, ) ) Appellant

- Defendant, ) ) vs. ) No. 20A03

- 1301

- CR

- 8 ) STATE OF INDIANA, ) ) Appellee

- Plaintiff. )

APPEAL FROM THE ELKHART SUPERIOR COURT The Honorable George W. Biddlecome, Judge Cause No. 20D03

- 1008

- FA

- 28
April 23 , 2014 MEMORANDUM DECISION
- NOT FOR PUBLICATION MAY, Judge2

Raymond Cantu appeals his convictions of Class A felony child molesting, 1 Class C felony child molesting, 2 and Class A felony attempted child molesting. 3 He alleges hearsay evidence was improperly admitted an d his sentence is inappropriate. We affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY Cantu met A

. C . (“Mother”) in 1997. About six months later, Mother and her two daughters, four

- year - old L.M.R. and two

- year - old R.W.R., moved in with Cantu. He became

a father fig ure to the girls , whose father had died just before R.N.R. was born

. When L.M.R. was in first grade, Cantu began sexually abusing her. On one occasion, when Mother was out of the house, L.M.R. woke to find her underwear around her ankles and Cantu perfo rming oral sex on her. Cantu t old L.M.R. that if she told any one, she would get in trouble. Cantu also molested L.M.R. after school, while Mother was still at work. He would turn on a movie for R.W.R. and send L.M.R. to his room, where he would order he r to put on only a nightgown and lay on top of him while he watched pornography and held her. Sometimes Cantu would have L.M.R. touch him in a sexual manner, and once he attempted to have intercourse with L.M.R, but did not achieve penetration. The moles tations ended when L.M.R. was in second grade, because Mother broke up with Cantu and moved with her daughters to another town. L.M.R. did not tell anyone about the molestations until 2009, when she was sixteen years old. The first person she told was R .W.R., and soon thereafter she told a friend in front

1 Ind. Code § 35

- 42

- 4

- 3(a)(1). 2 Ind. Code § 35

- 42

- 4

- 3(b). 3 Ind. Code § 35

- 42

- 4

- 3(a)(1) (child molesting), and Ind. Code § 35

- 41

- 5

- 1 (attempt).3

of R.W.R. About a year l ater, R.W.R. told Mother , who told her husband

. H e co ntacted the police. The State charged Cantu with Class A felony child molesting, Class A felony attempted child molesting, and Class C felony child molesting. A jury found Cantu guilty of all three charges, and the court imposed an aggregate sentence of forty

- six years. DISCUSSION AND DECISION 1. Admission of Evidence Cantu alleges he was denied a fair trial by the erroneous ad mission of hearsay testimony. We typically review allegations of error in the admission of evidence for an abuse of discretion, Kindred v. State , 973 N.E.2d 1245, 1252 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012), which occurs “when the trial court’s ruling is clearly against th e logic, facts, and circumstances presented.” Id . As we conduct our review, we will not reweigh the evidence, and we must consider conflicting evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court’s ruling. Id

. Cantu did not object at trial to most of the evidence about which he now complains. Thus, he must demonstrate fundamental error. See Taylor v. State , 687 N.E.2d 606, 609 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997) (defendant who does not object at trial waives any claim of error on appeal unless the error is fundame ntal ) , trans. denied

. Fundamental error is a “blatant violation of basic principles, the harm or potential for harm is substantial, and the resulting error denies the defendant fundamental due process.” Kindred , 973 N.E.2d at 1252 (quoting Kimbrough
v. S tate , 911 N.E.2d 621, 634 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009)). The fundamental error exception is extremely narrow. Id

.4

We need not decide whether the challenged statements were hearsay or were improperly admitted, as any such error was harmless. Harmless error, by definition, is “an error that does not affect the substantial rights of a party.” Rosales v. State , 3 N.E.3d 1014, 1019 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014)

. Where an error is harmless, we may not grant relief or reverse on appeal. Id . “ Harmless error is the exact opp osite of fun damental error, which requires

‘ clearly blatant violations of basic and elementary principles of due process. ’ ” Id . (quoting Canaan v. State, 683 N.E.2d 227, 235 n. 6 (Ind. 1997) )

. A dmission of hearsay is not grounds for reversal where it is merely cumulative of other evidence admitted. Mathis v. State , 859 N.E.2d 1275, 1280 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007)

. I mproper admission of evidence is harmless error when the conviction is supported by substantial independent evidence of guilt that satisf ies us th at there i s no substantial likelihood the questioned evidence contributed to the conviction. Id

. Cantu asserts “five (5) separate state’s witnesses [were] called to testify as to [L.M.R.’s] prior out of court statements depicting her story.” (Br. of Ap pellant at 7.) Any error in admitting that testimony was harmless, as L.M.R. herself presented “her story” to the jury. L.M.R. testified at length and in detail about what the sexual abuse was, when and where it happened, and why she did not reveal it fo r years. In light of that substantial independent evidence of Cantu’s guilt , we cannot say there was a substantial likelihood the evidence Cantu now challenges as hearsay contributed to his conviction . Cantu has not demonstrated fundamental error.5

2. Inappropriateness We may revise a sentence if it is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and the character of the offender. Williams v. State , 891 N.E. 2d 621, 633 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008) (citing Ind. Appellate Rule 7(B)). We consider not onl y the aggravators and mitigators found by the trial court, but also any other factors appearing in the record. Roney v. State , 872 N.E.2d 192, 206 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007), trans. denied. The appellant bears the burden of demonstrating his sentence is inappr opriate. Childress v. State , 848 N.E.2d 1073, 1080 (Ind. 2006). When considering the nature of the offense, the advisory sentence is the starting point to determine the appropriateness of a sentence. Anglemyer v State , 868 N.E.2d 482, 494 (Ind. 2007 ), cl arified on reh’g 875 N.E.2d 218 (2007)

. The advisory sentence for a Class A felony is thirty years, with a range of twenty to fifty years. Ind. Code § 35

- 50

- 2

- 4

. Cantu was sentenced to forty years for each Class A felony conviction , but the court ordere d those two sentences served concurrently

. The advisory sentence for a Class C felony is four years, with a range of two to eight years. Ind. Code § 35

- 50

- 2

- 6. The court imposed a six

- year sentence to be served consecutive to the two concurrent forty

- ye ar sentences, for an aggregate sentence of forty

- six years. Cantu’s victim was a six

- year old girl who was the daughter of his fiancé. Her father died when she was two years old, and she considered Cantu a father figure. He told her she would “get in t rouble,” (Tr. at 137), if she told anyone what he had done to her and, even after the abuse ended, he bought expensive presents and spoke to her in ways that she felt6

were attempts to keep her silent about the abuse. When considering the character of th e offender, one relevant fact is the defendant’s criminal history. Rutherford v. State , 866 N.E.2d 867, 874 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007). The significance of a criminal history in assessing a defendant’s character varies based on the gravity, nature, and number of prior offenses in relation to the current offense. Id

. Cantu’s criminal history includes a 1989 Class A misdemeanor conviction of driving while intoxicated endangering a person and a 2008 conviction of misdemeanor intimidation. In light of the fact s before the trial court, w e cannot say a forty

- six

- year sentence is inappropriate for Cantu’s character and offense

. CONCLUSION Cantu has not demonstrated fundamental error in the admission of evidence. Nor ha s he demonstrated his sentence i s i nappropria te based on his character and offense. Accordingly, we affirm. Affirmed. BAKER, J., and MATHIAS, J., concur.