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*********************************************** 
STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. JEFFREY K. WARD

(AC 40534)

Alvord, Sheldon and Moll, Js.*

Syllabus

The defendant, who had been convicted, on pleas of guilty, of the crimes

of manslaughter in the first degree and assault in the first degree in

connection with an incident that occurred at a motel, appealed to this

court from the trial court’s denial of his motion to correct an illegal

sentence. The defendant had a long history of untreated mental health

issues for which he began treatment after his arrest. After the court

canvassed the defendant, the court accepted his pleas of guilty and

sentenced him to a total effective sentence of twenty-five years of incarceration. Thereafter, the defendant filed a motion to correct an illegal

sentence, claiming, inter alia, that he was incompetent at the time of

his sentencing hearing and, therefore, that his sentence was imposed

in an illegal manner. On appeal to this court, the defendant claimed that

the trial court improperly dismissed his motion to correct illegal sentence

for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Held:

1. The defendant could not prevail on his unpreserved claim that his due

process rights, under the federal constitution, were violated when the

trial court failed to refer his motion to correct to the sentencing judge,

whom the defendant claimed was familiar with the defendant and his

mental health issues, and was better situated to consider the issues

raised in the motion to correct; this court previously has determined

that due process does not require the sentencing court to hear and

adjudicate a defendant’s motion to correct an illegal sentence or a

sentence imposed in an illegal manner, there was no appellate authority

in support of the defendant’s claim, and due process, which seeks to

assure a defendant a fair trial, not a perfect one, does not mandate that

a motion to correct an illegal sentence or a sentence imposed in an

illegal matter be heard by the judge whom the defendant preferred or

who had the greatest familiarity with the defendant.

2. The trial court did not err in dismissing the motion to correct an illegal

sentence for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, as the defendant failed

to set forth a colorable claim that his sentence was imposed in an illegal

manner; the defendant’s motion failed to establish any possibility that

he was incompetent at the time of sentencing or that there was sufficient

information before the sentencing court requiring a competency examination and hearing prior to the defendant’s sentencing, although the

parties and the sentencing court were aware that the defendant had a

history of mental health issues, nothing in the transcripts indicated that

he had been incompetent when he was sentenced or that a competency

evaluation and hearing prior to sentencing were required, and a police

report, psychiatric report and records on which the defendant relied in

support of his claim could not be viewed reasonably to support a conclusion that he was incompetent at the time of sentencing, as those records

suggested that the defendant had a history of mental health issues

and was at risk of experiencing symptoms in the future, but failed to

demonstrate that there was any likelihood that he was incompetent

when sentenced.

(One judge dissenting in part and concurring in part)

Argued February 11—officially released October 29, 2019

Procedural History

Substitute information charging the defendant with

the crimes of manslaughter in the first degree and

assault in the first degree, brought to the Superior Court

in the judicial district of Hartford, where the defendant

was presented to the court, Alexander, J., on pleas of

guilty; judgment of guilty; thereafter, the court, Dewey,

J., dismissed the defendant’s motion to correct an illegal
sentence, and the defendant appealed to this court.

Affirmed.

Aimee Lynn Mahon, assigned counsel, with whom

was Temmy Ann Miller, assigned counsel, for the appellant (defendant).

Sarah Hanna, assistant state’s attorney, with whom,

on the brief, were Gail P. Hardy, state’s attorney, and

John F. Fahey, senior assistant state’s attorney, for the

appellee (state).
Opinion

MOLL, J. The defendant, Jeffrey K. Ward, appeals

from the judgment of the trial court dismissing his

motion to correct a sentence imposed in an illegal manner (motion to correct). On appeal, the defendant claims

that the court erred in (1) adjudicating the motion to

correct, rather than referring the motion to the sentencing court, and (2) concluding that it lacked subject

matter jurisdiction over the motion to correct.1 We disagree and, accordingly, affirm the judgment of the trial

court.

The following facts and procedural history are relevant to our resolution of the appeal. On June 25, 2012,

pursuant to a plea agreement, the defendant pleaded

guilty to manslaughter in the first degree in violation

of General Statutes § 53a-55 (a) (1) and assault in the

first degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-59 (a)

(1) in connection with an incident that had occurred

at a motel in Enfield on September 29, 2011. After

canvassing the defendant, the trial court, Alexander,

J., accepted the defendant’s guilty pleas. On July 23,

2012, following a sentencing hearing, Judge Alexander

sentenced the defendant to a period of twenty years of

incarceration on the count of manslaughter in the first

degree and five years of incarceration on the count of

assault in the first degree, to run consecutively to the

sentence on the count of manslaughter in the first

degree, for a total effective sentence of twenty-five

years of incarceration, as agreed to by the parties.2 The

defendant did not appeal from his conviction.

On November 3, 2016, pursuant to Practice Book § 43-

22, the defendant filed the motion to correct, accompanied by a memorandum of law and exhibits. Specifically,

the defendant contended that his sentence was imposed

in an illegal manner on the grounds that (1) he had

been incompetent at the time of sentencing and (2) the

sentencing court had failed to order, sua sponte, that

a competency evaluation and hearing be conducted pursuant to General Statutes § 54-56d before the defendant’s sentencing on the basis of information known

to the sentencing court.

On November 17, 2016, the trial court, Dewey, J.,

held a hearing on the motion to correct. At the outset

of the hearing, the state argued that the court lacked

subject matter jurisdiction over the motion to correct,

contending that the defendant’s claims should be raised

by way of a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. In

addition, the state argued that the record did not demonstrate that the defendant’s sentence was imposed in an

illegal manner. The defendant argued that the court had

subject matter jurisdiction over the motion to correct

because his alleged incompetence at the time of sentencing and the sentencing court’s failure to order, sua

sponte, that a competency evaluation and hearing be
conducted before sentencing were germane to the legality of the manner in which his sentence was imposed.

Following argument, the court reserved its decision

regarding jurisdiction and heard the parties on the merits of the motion to correct. On March 7, 2017, the

court issued a memorandum of decision dismissing the

motion to correct for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

This appeal followed. Additional facts and procedural

history will be set forth as necessary.

I

We first address the defendant’s claim that Judge

Dewey erred in hearing and ruling on the motion to

correct, rather than referring the motion to correct to

Judge Alexander, the sentencing judge. Specifically, the

defendant asserts that due process3

required the motion

to correct to be adjudicated by Judge Alexander, who,

as the sentencing judge, had observed and interacted

with the defendant, was familiar with the defendant

and his mental health issues, and was better situated

to consider the issues raised in the motion to correct.

We are not persuaded.

As a preliminary matter, the defendant concedes that

this claim is unpreserved;4 he argues, however, that his

unpreserved claim is reviewable pursuant to State v.

Golding, 213 Conn. 233, 239–40, 567 A.2d 823 (1989),

as modified by In re Yasiel R., 317 Conn. 773, 781,

120 A.3d 1188 (2015). Under Golding, ‘‘a defendant can

prevail on a claim of constitutional error not preserved

at trial only if all of the following conditions are met:

(1) the record is adequate to review the alleged claim

of error; (2) the claim is of constitutional magnitude

alleging the violation of a fundamental right; (3) the

alleged constitutional violation . . . exists and . . .

deprived the defendant of a fair trial; and (4) if subject

to harmless error analysis, the state has failed to demonstrate harmlessness of the alleged constitutional violation beyond a reasonable doubt. In the absence of

any one of these conditions, the defendant’s claim will

fail.’’ (Emphasis in original; footnote omitted.) State

v. Golding, supra, 239–40. ‘‘The first two steps in the

Golding analysis address the reviewability of the claim,

while the last two steps involve the merits of the claim.’’

(Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Jerrell R.,

187 Conn. App. 537, 543, 202 A.3d 1044, cert. denied,

331 Conn. 918, 204 A.3d 1160 (2019).

At the outset, in response to a question raised by the

state in its appellate brief, we note that the defendant’s

unpreserved claim does not fall within the ambit of

those cases that stand for the proposition that a defendant is not entitled to Golding review of an unpreserved

claim challenging the legality of a sentence that was

not raised by way of a motion to correct an illegal

sentence. See, e.g., State v. Gang Jin, 179 Conn. App.

185, 195–96, 179 A.3d 266 (2018). Here, the unpreserved

claim at issue concerns the actions of Judge Dewey
in not referring the motion to correct to Judge Alexander, as opposed to the legality of the sentence imposed

by Judge Alexander, and, thus, Golding review may

be available. See Mozell v. Commissioner of Correction, 291 Conn. 62, 67 n.2, 967 A.2d 41 (2009) (rejecting respondent’s argument that Golding review inapplicable in all circumstances arising from appeal from

judgment of habeas court and concluding that Golding

review may be available to challenge certain actions of

habeas court); see also State v. White, 182 Conn. App.

656, 673–74, 191 A.3d 172 (concluding that defendant’s

unpreserved claim, that trial court erred by not recusing

itself from hearing merits of motion to correct illegal

sentence, failed under third prong of Golding), cert.

denied, 330 Conn. 924, 194 A.3d 291 (2018).

The defendant’s unpreserved claim, that, as a matter of law, the sentencing court was the only judicial

authority permitted to decide the motion to correct,

meets the first two prongs of Golding and, therefore,

is reviewable. Turning to the first prong of Golding,

we conclude that the record is adequate to review the

defendant’s claim of error. With respect to the second

prong of Golding, the defendant’s due process claim is

of constitutional magnitude. See State v. Battle, 192

Conn. App. 128, 144, A.3d (2019) (claim that

defendant’s right to due process was violated because

sentencing court did not act on motion to correct illegal

sentence was of constitutional magnitude).

Although the defendant’s due process claim is reviewable, we conclude that the claim does not satisfy the

third prong of Golding in light of this court’s recent

decision in State v. Battle, supra, 192 Conn. App. 146–47,

wherein this court concluded that due process does

not require the sentencing court to hear and adjudicate

a defendant’s motion to correct an illegal sentence or

a sentence imposed in an illegal manner.

In Battle, this court observed that the current version

of Practice Book § 43-225

‘‘does not limit the ‘judicial

authority’ empowered to correct an illegal sentence or a

sentence imposed in an illegal manner to the sentencing

court.’’ Id., 145. This court further observed that there

was no appellate authority ‘‘holding that a defendant’s

motion to correct an illegal sentence or a sentence

imposed in an illegal manner must be heard and adjudicated by the particular judge who imposed the sentence.’’ (Emphasis in original.) Id. Ultimately, this court

concluded: ‘‘Due process does not mandate that a

motion to correct an illegal sentence or a sentence

imposed in an illegal manner be heard by the judge

whom the defendant prefers or who has the greatest

familiarity with the defendant. Due process seeks to

assure a defendant a fair trial, not a perfect one.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 146–47.

The defendant’s due process claim is controlled by

Battle. Accordingly, we conclude that the defendant in
the present case did not suffer a due process violation

and, therefore, his claim fails under the third prong

of Golding.

6

II

We now turn to the defendant’s claim that the court

erred in dismissing the motion to correct for lack of

subject matter jurisdiction. Specifically, the defendant

asserts that the court misconstrued his claim in the

motion to correct, which led the court to conclude

erroneously that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction

over the motion to correct. He contends that he raised

a colorable claim contesting the legality of the manner

in which his sentence was imposed, thereby invoking

the court’s subject matter jurisdiction. Although we

agree with the defendant that the court’s analysis in

dismissing the motion to correct was flawed, we nevertheless conclude that the defendant failed to present a

colorable claim that his sentence was imposed in an

illegal manner, and, thus, the court properly dismissed

the motion to correct for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

We begin by setting forth the relevant standard of

review and legal principles that guide our analysis of

the defendant’s claim. ‘‘Because the defendant’s [claim]

pertain[s] to the subject matter jurisdiction of the trial

court, [it] . . . present[s] a question of law subject to

the plenary standard of review. . . .

‘‘The Superior Court is a constitutional court of general jurisdiction. In the absence of statutory or constitutional provisions, the limits of its jurisdiction are delineated by the common law. . . . It is well established

that under the common law a trial court has the discretionary power to modify or vacate a criminal judgment

before the sentence has been executed. . . . This is so

because the court loses jurisdiction over the case when

the defendant is committed to the custody of the commissioner of correction and begins serving the sentence. . . . Because it is well established that the jurisdiction of the trial court terminates once a defendant

has been sentenced, a trial court may no longer take

any action affecting a defendant’s sentence unless it

expressly has been authorized to act. . . .

‘‘[Practice Book] § 43-22 embodies a common-law

exception that permits the trial court to correct an

illegal sentence or other illegal disposition. . . . Thus,

if the defendant cannot demonstrate that his motion to

correct falls within the purview of § 43-22, the court

lacks jurisdiction to entertain it. . . . [I]n order for the

court to have jurisdiction over a motion to correct an

illegal sentence after the sentence has been executed,

the sentencing proceeding [itself] . . . must be the

subject of the attack. . . .

‘‘[A]n illegal sentence is essentially one [that] either

exceeds the relevant statutory maximum limits, violates
a defendant’s right against double jeopardy, is ambiguous, or is internally contradictory. By contrast . . .

[s]entences imposed in an illegal manner have been

defined as being within the relevant statutory limits but

. . . imposed in a way [that] violates [a] defendant’s

right . . . to be addressed personally at sentencing and

to speak in mitigation of punishment . . . or his right

to be sentenced by a judge relying on accurate information or considerations solely in the record, or his right

that the government keep its plea agreement promises

. . . . These definitions are not exhaustive, however,

and the parameters of an invalid sentence will evolve

. . . as additional rights and procedures affecting sentencing are subsequently recognized under state and

federal law.’’ (Citation omitted; emphasis omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Jason B., 176

Conn. App. 236, 242–44, 170 A.3d 139 (2017). Pursuant

to § 54-56d (a), ‘‘[a] defendant shall not be tried, convicted or sentenced while the defendant is not competent. For the purposes of this section, a defendant is

not competent if the defendant is unable to understand

the proceedings against him or her or to assist in his

or her own defense.’’ (Emphasis added.) A defendant

is presumed to be competent, and the burden of proving

that a defendant is not competent is on the party raising

the issue, or on the state if the trial court raises the

issue. See General Statutes § 54-56d (b). In addition,

‘‘[i]f, at any time during a criminal proceeding, it appears

that the defendant is not competent, counsel for the

defendant or for the state, or the court, on its own

motion, may request an examination to determine the

defendant’s competency.’’ General Statutes § 54-56d

(c).

In the motion to correct, the defendant claimed that

his sentence was imposed in an illegal manner because

(1) he had been incompetent at the time of sentencing

and (2) the sentencing court had failed to order, sua

sponte, that a competency hearing be held prior to

sentencing on the basis of information known to the

court. The defendant also asserted that he had been

incompetent when he had entered his guilty pleas on

June 25, 2012, and that he believed that he was entitled

to withdraw his guilty pleas if the motion to correct

were granted and a new sentencing hearing were

ordered; however, he stated expressly in the motion to

correct that ‘‘[t]he issue [raised in the motion to correct]

. . . is [the defendant’s] sentencing, and given [the

defendant’s] incompetence at the time, it was imposed

in an illegal manner.’’ In addition, during the hearing

held on the motion to correct, defense counsel stressed

that the defendant was not challenging the legality of

his sentence but, rather, the legality of the manner in

which it was imposed. The defendant submitted the

following with the motion to correct: four pretrial transcripts and the sentencing transcript; a police report;

a report completed following a psychiatric evaluation
of the defendant (psychiatric report), which was filed

under seal; and certain of the defendant’s psychiatric

records from the Department of Correction (psychiatric

records), which were filed under seal.

In its memorandum of decision dismissing the motion

to correct, the court interpreted the defendant’s chief

claim to be that ‘‘[the defendant] was incompetent at

the time of sentencing and, consequently, the sentence

was imposed in an illegal manner.’’ The court continued:

‘‘The difficulty with the defendant’s position is that the

sentencing procedure in the present case complied with

all constitutional and statutory requirements.’’ Citing

State v. Robles, 169 Conn. App. 127, 133, 150 A.3d 687

(2016), cert. denied, 324 Conn. 906, 152 A.3d 544 (2017),

the court determined that the defendant’s claims did

not fall into any of the categories of claims identified

in Robles over which a trial court has jurisdiction to

modify a sentence after it has commenced. The court

then determined that, in substance, the defendant was

making an improper collateral attack on his conviction

on the basis of his purported incompetence. The court

determined that the defendant had entered his guilty

pleas knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily, and that

a motion to correct was not the proper vehicle by which

to challenge the voluntariness of his pleas.

In addition, the court stated that the defendant ‘‘suggests that the trial court has an obligation, sua sponte,

to suspect the defendant’s competency. Nothing in the

record before the trial court reflected an inappropriate

mental health status. To the contrary, there was a presumption in favor of competence.’’ The court determined that nothing in the pretrial proceedings demonstrated that the defendant was unable to assist in his

defense or to consult with his counsel, and that the

court’s participation in the pretrial proceedings had not

put the court on notice that a more searching inquiry

into the defendant’s competence to enter his guilty pleas

was necessary.

We agree with the defendant that the court’s analysis

in dismissing the motion to correct was flawed. After

the court correctly construed the defendant’s claim to

be that his sentence was imposed in an illegal manner

stemming from his alleged incompetence at the time

of sentencing, the court determined that the defendant’s

claim failed to fall into any of the categories recited in

Robles and, thus, the court lacked jurisdiction to consider it. In Robles, this court stated in relevant part:

‘‘Connecticut courts have considered four categories

of claims pursuant to [Practice Book] § 43-22. The first

category has addressed whether the sentence was

within the permissible range for the crimes charged.

. . . The second category has considered violations of

the prohibition against double jeopardy. . . . The third

category has involved claims pertaining to the computation of the length of the sentence and the question of
consecutive or concurrent prison time. . . . The fourth

category has involved questions as to which sentencing

statute was applicable. . . . [I]f a defendant’s claim

falls within one of these four categories the trial court

has jurisdiction to modify a sentence after it has commenced. . . . If the claim is not within one of these

categories, then the court must dismiss the claim for a

lack of jurisdiction and not consider its merits.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Robles, supra,

169 Conn. App. 133. The foregoing analysis applies,

however, only to a claim that a sentence is illegal, as

opposed to a claim that a sentence was imposed in

an illegal manner.7 See State v. Evans, 329 Conn. 770,

779–80, 189 A.3d 1184 (2018) (discussing trial court’s

jurisdiction to entertain claims challenging legality of

sentence and legality of manner in which sentence

imposed), cert. denied, U.S. , 139 S. Ct. 1304,

203 L. Ed. 2d 425 (2019). Thus, the court erred in relying

on Robles in adjudicating the defendant’s claim that his

sentence was imposed in an illegal manner. In addition,

the court’s determination that it lacked subject matter

jurisdiction over the motion to correct because the

defendant was collaterally attacking his conviction and

the validity of his guilty pleas was erroneous. Although

the defendant argued that he would seek to withdraw

his guilty pleas ifthe court granted the motion to correct

and ordered a new sentencing hearing, the pleadings

and the record make clear that the singular focus of

the motion to correct was the sentencing proceeding

and the legality of the manner in which the defendant’s

sentence was imposed. Thus, the court’s examination

of the circumstances surrounding the defendant’s guilty

pleas and its focus on his competence at the time that

he had entered his guilty pleas were misplaced.

Although the court’s analysis in dismissing the motion

to correct was flawed, we nevertheless conclude that

the court properly dismissed the motion to correct for

lack of subject matter jurisdiction on different grounds.

See HSBC Bank USA, National Assn. v. Lahr, 165 Conn.

App. 144, 151, 138 A.3d 1064 (2016) (affirming judgment

of trial court on different grounds). The defendant

asserts that he raised a colorable claim in the motion

to correct asserting that his sentence was imposed in

an illegal manner and, thus, the court had subject matter

jurisdiction to entertain the motion to correct.8 We disagree and conclude that the motion to correct, on its

face, did not set forth a colorable claim contesting the

legality of the manner in which the defendant’s sentence

was imposed, thereby depriving the court of subject

matter jurisdiction.

‘‘Recently, our Supreme Court explained [in State v.

Delgado, 323 Conn. 801, 810, 151 A.3d 345 (2016)], in

addressing the trial court’s dismissal on jurisdictional

grounds of a motion to correct an illegal sentence that

[t]he subject matter jurisdiction requirement may not

be waived by any party, and also may be raised by a
party, or by the court sua sponte, at any stage of the

proceedings, including on appeal. . . . At issue is

whether the defendant has raised a colorable claim

within the scope of Practice Book § 43-22 that would,

if the merits of the claim were reached and decided in

the defendant’s favor, require correction of a sentence.

. . . In the absence of a colorable claim requiring correction, the trial court has no jurisdiction to modify the

sentence. . . .

‘‘Therefore, as made clear by our Supreme Court in

Delgado, for the trial court to have jurisdiction over

a defendant’s motion to correct a sentence that was

imposed in an illegal manner, the defendant must put

forth a colorable claim that his sentence, in fact, was

imposed in an illegal manner. A colorable claim is [a]

claim that is legitimate and that may reasonably be

asserted, given the facts presented and the current law

(or a reasonable and logical extension or modification

of the current law). . . . For jurisdictional purposes,

to establish a colorable claim, a party must demonstrate

that there is a possibility, rather than a certainty, that a

factual basis necessary to establish jurisdiction exists.’’

(Citations omitted; emphasis omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Jason B., supra, 176 Conn.

App. 244–45.

In State v. Jason B., supra, 176 Conn. App. 241–42,

the defendant filed a ‘‘motion to correct an illegal sentence,’’ asserting that his sentence was imposed in an

illegal manner because, on the basis of statements made

by the sentencing court at his sentencing hearing, the

sentencing court had considered information that was

inaccurate and outside of the record when imposing

his sentence. The trial court dismissed the defendant’s

motion for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, concluding that the defendant had not raised a colorable claim

that his sentence was imposed in an illegal manner. Id.,

242. On appeal, this court affirmed the judgment. Id.,

248. After reviewing the record, this court determined

that the sentencing court’s statements at issue in the

defendant’s motion to correct could not reasonably be

viewed as demonstrating that the court considered

information that was inaccurate or outside of the

record. Id., 245–47. Accordingly, this court concluded

that the defendant’s motion to correct, on its face, failed

to present a colorable claim invoking the subject matter

jurisdiction of the trial court. Id.

Here, in the motion to correct, the defendant asserted

that his sentence was imposed in an illegal manner

because (1) he had been incompetent at the time of

sentencing and (2) the sentencing court had failed to

order, sua sponte, a competency evaluation and hearing

on the basis of information known to the court when

it had sentenced the defendant. The defendant attached

several exhibits to the motion to correct to support his

assertions. Guided by the rationale of Jason B., and for
the reasons discussed as follows, we conclude that the

motion to correct, on its face, did not set forth a colorable claim that the defendant’s sentence was imposed

in an illegal manner.

In support of the motion to correct, the defendant

relied on transcripts of several pretrial proceedings and

the sentencing hearing. During a pretrial proceeding on

April 10, 2012, defense counsel informed Judge Alexander that the defendant had undergone a psychiatric

evaluation during the prior week and that counsel

expected to receive the psychiatric report in the immediate future. Judge Alexander stated that she intended

to review the psychiatric report ‘‘before we can start

discussing any disposition . . . .’’ During a pretrial proceeding on April 26, 2012, defense counsel informed

Judge Alexander that additional information needed to

be provided to the psychiatrist to complete the psychiatric report for the court’s review. During a pretrial proceeding on May 15, 2012, the court stated that it was

going to continue the case as a result of ongoing plea

discussions. There was no mention of the defendant’s

psychiatric evaluation or mental health during the May

15, 2012 hearing. During a pretrial proceeding on June

25, 2012, after canvassing the defendant, the trial court

accepted the defendant’s guilty pleas. There was no

discussion of the defendant’s psychiatric evaluation or

mental health at that time. During the sentencing hearing on July 23, 2012, the prosecutor stated that sentencing the defendant to a total effective sentence of twentyfive years of incarceration was an appropriate disposition as a result of the defendant’s ‘‘psychiatric background’’ and ‘‘mental health history.’’ In addition,

defense counsel represented that the defendant had

been experiencing ‘‘psychotic symptoms which diminished his capacity to conform his behavior to the law’’

at the time of the incident in September, 2011. Defense

counsel also noted that the psychiatrist hired by defense

counsel to evaluate the defendant had diagnosed him

with paranoid type schizophrenia; the defendant had

been suffering from a mental illness throughout most

of his adult life; in October, 2011, following his incarceration, the defendant began receiving mental health

treatment and taking anti-psychotic medication; and the

defendant’s symptoms had improved significantly and,

at the time of the sentencing hearing, he was ‘‘calm,

rational, and . . . [understood] and [appreciated] the

seriousness of this situation.’’ Before sentencing the

defendant, Judge Alexander acknowledged that the

defendant had a ‘‘mental health disease,’’ she accepted

defense counsel’s representations that the Department

of Correction was treating the defendant, and she commented that she hoped the defendant would continue

to take the proper medication as it was ‘‘essential for

[his] clear thinking.’’ In the motion to correct, the defendant asserted that the transcripts demonstrated that

the parties and Judge Alexander were aware that the
defendant had ‘‘serious mental health issues’’ prior to

his sentencing.

Next, the defendant relied on a police report dated

September 30, 2011. The police report indicated that

during an interview conducted by a police detective on

that day, the defendant inserted a pencil approximately

five to six inches into his right nostril and, after the

detective had intervened, the defendant attempted to

stab himself in the neck with the pencil, causing a minor

laceration. In the motion to correct, the defendant

asserted that the police report helped demonstrate that

he had been incompetent at the time that he was sentenced.

The next item on which the defendant relied was the

psychiatric report, which included a cover letter dated

May 8, 2012. The psychiatrist who authored the psychiatric report based his findings on information that he

had gathered from, inter alia, a ninety minute interview

with the defendant conducted on April 5, 2012, three

and one-half months before sentencing. In the motion

to correct, the defendant asserted that the psychiatric

report contained findings establishing that the defendant was socially withdrawn as an adolescent9 and

began experiencing auditory hallucinations in his early

twenties, which led the defendant to attempt to commit

suicide on multiple occasions; the defendant experienced episodes of paranoid ideation and depression;

the defendant displayed significant mood symptoms

and obsessive and compulsive symptoms, which interfered with his ability to think; the defendant had paranoid type schizophrenia; the defendant had been receiving and responding well to anti-psychotic medication,

but he had suffered from psychotic symptoms for many

years without treatment, which could contribute to an

increased likelihood of worse, chronic, and/or more

frequent exacerbations of symptoms; and even with

continued treatment, the defendant was at a significant

risk of continuing to suffer symptoms of his schizophrenia. The defendant contended that the findings set forth

in the psychiatric report helped demonstrate that he

had been incompetent when sentenced.

Last, the defendant relied on the psychiatric records,

which comprised clinical records from the Department

of Correction. In the motion to correct, the defendant

asserted that the psychiatric records revealed that in

October, 2011, the defendant reportedly was having

auditory hallucinations and exhibiting paranoid thought

processes, and that he did not believe that his medications were working; on May 4, 2012, the defendant

reportedly failed to take several doses of medication;

on May 31, 2012, the defendant reportedly was referred

to ‘‘psych for med. re-evaluation’’ and reportedly stated

that he had ‘‘agreed to 20 years for murder’’ but was not

yet sentenced; on July 2, 2012, the defendant reportedly

missed multiple doses of medication, although he was
not exhibiting symptoms of his psychosis; on July 11,

2012, the defendant reportedly missed taking his medication ‘‘intermittently’’ and reportedly was hearing

voices at night; on July 13, 2012, the defendant reportedly stated that he was going to be sentenced to twenty

years of incarceration for manslaughter and that his

medication was working to suppress the voices but not

his depression; and on August 24, 2012, the defendant

reportedly stated that he had been sentenced to thirty

years of incarceration for manslaughter. The defendant

contended that the psychiatric records helped establish

that he had been incompetent at the time of his sentencing.

We conclude that, on its face, the motion to correct

did not raise the possibility that the defendant was

incompetent at the time of his sentencing or that Judge

Alexander had information prior to sentencing that

required her to order that a competency evaluation

and hearing be conducted. The pretrial and sentencing

transcripts indicate that the parties and Judge Alexander were aware that the defendant had a history of

mental health issues, but nothing in the transcripts

raises any indication that the defendant had been

incompetent when he was sentenced or that a competency evaluation and hearing prior to sentencing were

required. Likewise, the police report, the psychiatric

report, and the psychiatric records cannot be viewed

reasonably to support a conclusion that the defendant

was incompetent at the time of sentencing.10 The incident described in the police report, which occurred in

September, 2011, well before the defendant’s sentencing and before the defendant had begun receiving mental health treatment from the Department of Correction,

provides no support for the proposition that the defendant was incompetent at the time of sentencing. The

psychiatric report, dated over two months prior to the

defendant’s sentencing, suggests that the defendant had

a history of mental health issues and was at risk of

experiencing symptoms in the future, but it does not

establish that there was any likelihood that the defendant was incompetent when sentenced. Similarly, the

representations in the psychiatric records that, in the

weeks and months preceding his sentencing, the defendant had failed to maintain a strict medication schedule

and had experienced symptoms associated with his

mental health issues do not imply that the defendant

was incompetent when sentenced. In addition, the statements reportedly made by the defendant before and

after his sentencing suggesting that he misunderstood

the length of his sentence cannot be viewed rationally

as establishing that he was not competent at the time

of his sentencing. Accordingly, the defendant failed to

raise a colorable claim in the motion to correct that his

sentence was imposed in an illegal manner.11

The defendant, citing State v. Evans, supra, 329 Conn.

770, appears to contend that his claim that his sentence
was imposed in an illegal manner is colorable per se

because his claim challenges the actions of the sentencing court and, if successful, would require a new sentencing hearing. We are not persuaded.

In Evans, our Supreme Court concluded that the trial

court had subject matter jurisdiction over a motion to

correct an illegal sentence filed by the defendant, in

which the defendant claimed that his sentence was

illegal because, inter alia, under United States Supreme

Court precedent, the sentence exceeded the relevant

statutory limits. Id., 775. In analyzing whether the court

had subject matter jurisdiction to entertain the defendant’s claim, our Supreme Court stated that ‘‘[t]he jurisdictional and merits inquiries are separate; whether the

defendant ultimately succeeds on the merits of his claim

does not affect the trial court’s jurisdiction to hear it.

. . . It is well established that, in determining whether

a court has subject matter jurisdiction, every presumption favoring jurisdiction should be indulged. . . . We

emphasize, however, that this general principle that

there is a strong presumption in favor of jurisdiction

. . . in criminal cases . . . is considered in light of the

common-law rule that, once a defendant’s sentence has

begun [the] court may no longer take any action affecting a defendant’s sentence unless it expressly has been

authorized to act. . . . Thus, the presumption in favor

of jurisdiction does not itself broaden the nature of

the postsentencing claims over which the court may

exercise jurisdiction in criminal cases, but merely

serves to emphasize that the jurisdictional inquiry is

guided by the plausibility that the defendant’s claim is

a challenge to his sentence, rather than its ultimate

legal correctness. . . . In determining whether it is

plausible that the defendant’s motion challenged the

sentence, rather than the underlying trial or conviction,

we consider the nature of the specific legal claim raised

therein.’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks

omitted.) Id., 784.

Our Supreme Court determined that the defendant

had presented a ‘‘sufficiently plausible’’ interpretation

of the statutes at issue in that case to render his claim

‘‘colorable for the purpose of jurisdiction over his

motion [to correct an illegal sentence]’’ and observed

that the defendant was not requesting that his conviction be disturbed but, rather, was seeking a remand for

resentencing. Id., 786.

Evans supports, rather than conflicts with, our conclusion that the defendant failed to set forth a colorable

claim that his sentence was imposed in an illegal manner. In Evans, our Supreme Court did not conclude that

the defendant had raised a colorable claim contesting

the legality of his sentence merely because the defendant’s claim was directed to the validity of his sentence

and the defendant would be entitled to a new sentencing

hearing if the claim was successful; instead, our
Supreme Court determined that the defendant’s claim

was colorable on the ground that the defendant had

set forth a ‘‘sufficiently plausible’’ interpretation of the

statutory scheme underlying his contention that his sentence exceeded statutory limits. Id., 785–86. In the present case, in contrast, the defendant’s claim is not colorable because the defendant’s motion to correct, on its

face, failed to establish any possibility that he was

incompetent at the time of sentencing or that there was

sufficient information before Judge Alexander requiring

a competency examination and hearing prior to the

defendant’s sentencing.

In sum, we conclude that the court lacked subject

matter jurisdiction to entertain the motion to correct

on the basis that the defendant failed to set forth a

colorable claim in the motion to correct that his sentence was imposed in an illegal manner. Therefore, the

court properly dismissed the motion to correct for lack

of subject matter jurisdiction.

The judgment is affirmed.

In this opinion ALVORD, J., concurred.

* The listing of the judges reflects their seniority status on this court as

of the date of oral argument.

1 For ease of discussion, we address the defendant’s claims in a different

order than they are set forth in his principal appellate brief.

2

In addition to pleading guilty to manslaughter in the first degree and

assault in the first degree, the defendant admitted to two counts of violating

his probation in violation of General Statutes § 53a-32. Judge Alexander

revoked and terminated the defendant’s probations.

3 The defendant does not specify whether his due process claim is raised

pursuant to the federal constitution or the state constitution. Therefore, we

treat the defendant’s claim as limited to the federal constitution. See State

v. Alvarez, 257 Conn. 782, 796 n.10, 778 A.2d 938 (2001).

4 Not only did the defendant never request that Judge Alexander adjudicate

the motion to correct, but the proposed order attached to the motion to

correct specifically contemplated Judge Dewey being the deciding authority.

5 Practice Book § 43-22 provides: ‘‘The judicial authority may at any time

correct an illegal sentence or other illegal disposition, or it may correct a

sentence imposed in an illegal manner or any other disposition made in an

illegal manner.’’

6

In his reply brief, the defendant asserts for the first time that we should

invoke our inherent supervisory authority to review his unpreserved claim

if we conclude that his claim fails under Golding. ‘‘Generally, this court

does not consider claims raised for the first time in a reply brief.’’ Perry v.

State, 94 Conn. App. 733, 740 n.5, 894 A.2d 367, cert. denied, 278 Conn. 915,

899 A.2d 621 (2006). Even if the defendant’s request were proper, we observe

that ‘‘[b]ypass doctrines permitting the review of unpreserved claims such

as [Golding] and plain error, are generally adequate to protect the rights of

the defendant and the integrity of the judicial system . . . . [T]he supervisory authority of this state’s appellate courts is not intended to serve as a

bypass to the bypass, permitting the review of unpreserved claims of case

specific error—constitutional or not—that are not otherwise amenable to

relief under Golding or the plain error doctrine. Rather, the integrity of the

judicial system serves as a unifying principle behind the seemingly disparate

use of our supervisory powers. . . . Thus, a defendant seeking review of

an unpreserved claim under our supervisory authority must demonstrate

that his claim is one that, as a matter of policy, is relevant to the perceived

fairness of the judicial system as a whole, most typically in that it lends

itself to the adoption of a procedural rule that will guide the lower courts

in the administration of justice in all aspects of the criminal process.’’

(Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Leach, 165 Conn. App. 28, 35–36,

138 A.3d 445, cert. denied, 323 Conn. 948, 169 A.3d 792 (2016). We see no

reason to invoke our supervisory powers here.

7 The excerpt in Robles cited by the trial court quotes language that was

first set forth by our Supreme Court in State v. Lawrence, 281 Conn. 147,

156–57, 913 A.2d 428 (2007), in analyzing the parameters of a claim that a

sentence is illegal.
8 On June 24, 2019, after the parties had submitted their respective appellate briefs and following oral argument, we, sua sponte, ordered the parties

to file supplemental briefs addressing the following question: ‘‘Whether the

facts pleaded by the defendant in support of his motion to correct a sentence

imposed in an illegal manner were sufficient to state a colorable claim of

incompetency at sentencing. See State v. Mukhtaar, 189 Conn. App. 144,

150 n.6., 207 A.3d 29 (2019); State v. Jason B., [supra], 176 Conn. App.

[244–45].’’ The parties filed their respective supplemental briefs on July

8, 2019.

9 The defendant was born in 1977.

10 There is nothing in the record to suggest that Judge Alexander had been

provided with the police report, the psychiatric report, or the psychiatric

records prior to sentencing, and, thus, Judge Alexander could not have

relied on those documents to consider ordering that a competency evaluation

and hearing be conducted.

11 We observe that in State v. Mukhtaar, supra, 189 Conn. App. 149–50,

the defendant appealed from a judgment dismissing his motion to correct

an illegal sentence in which he asserted that his sentence was illegal because,

inter alia, the trial court had failed to order a competency hearing on his

behalf before or after his criminal trial. This court concluded that the trial

court lacked jurisdiction to entertain that claim because the defendant was

not attacking the sentencing proceeding itself. Id., 150. In a footnote, this

court additionally stated that ‘‘a claim regarding a defendant’s competency

at the sentencing proceeding; see General Statutes § 54-56d (a); or a claim

that the court failed to inquire, sua sponte, into a defendant’s competency

at the sentencing proceeding when there is sufficient evidence at that proceeding to raise a reasonable doubt as to whether that defendant can understand the proceeding or assist in his or her defense therein; State v. Yeaw,

162 Conn. App. 382, 389–90, 131 A.3d 1172 (2016); would fall within the

jurisdiction of the trial court for the purpose of a motion to correct an illegal

sentence filed pursuant to Practice Book § 43-22.’’ Id., 150 n.6. Our conclusion

that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the motion to correct

in the present case does not conflict with the aforementioned language in

Mukhtaar. If the defendant had raised a colorable claim in the motion to

correct regarding his competency at the time of his sentencing or the sentencing court’s failure to order that a competency evaluation and hearing be

conducted, then the court would have had subject matter jurisdiction over

the motion. Because the defendant failed to raise a colorable claim in the

motion to correct, however, the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to

entertain the motion.