alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 03-2014 

EUGENE GRAY,

Plaintiff - Appellant,

versus

WILLIAM S. COHEN, Honorable, Secretary Department of

Defense; U. S. DEFENSE COMMISSARY AGENCY; RICHARD E. BEALE,

Executive Director, in his individual and official capacity;

CROSBY JOHNSON, Director of Contracts, in his individual and

official capacity; VICKIE ARCHILLETTI, Manager, Contracts

Business Unit, in her individual and official capacity;

LARRY HAHN, Director, Contract Equipment Division, in his

individual and official capacity; HAROLD WHITE, Supervisor,

Contract Equipment Branch, in his individual and official

capacity; ARAM DARAKAJUIAN, Supervisor, Personnel Relations

Specialist, in his individual and official capacity; PHIL

KOREN, General Counsel, in his individual and official

capacity; JOHN SCHERE, II, General Counsel, in his

individual and official capacity; KATHY HAWTHORNE, Contract

Specialist, in her individual and official capacity; UNITED

STATES DEPARTMENT OF LABOR

Defendants - Appellees,

 and

MEDICAL COLLEGE OF VIRGINIA; JOEL SILVERMAN,

Doctor, in his individual and official

capacity,

Defendants.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern

District of Virginia, at Richmond. Robert E. Payne, District

Judge. (CA-99-255-3)
- 2 -

Submitted: January 29, 2004 Decided: February 4, 2004

Before WILKINSON, MICHAEL, and KING, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Eugene Gray, Appellant Pro Se. M. Hannah Lauck, Assistant United

States Attorney, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellees.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

See Local Rule 36(c).
- 3 -

PER CURIAM:

Eugene Gray appeals the district court’s order denying as

untimely his motion to reconsider a prior order dismissing his

civil action. Our review of the record and the district court’s

opinion discloses no reversible error. Accordingly, although we

grant Gray’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal, we deny

Gray’s motion for a stay and affirm on the reasoning of the

district court. See Gray v. Cohen, No. CA-99-255-3 (E.D. Va. June

12, 2003). We dispense with oral argument because the facts and

legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before

the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED
EXHIBIT 32.1



                            CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                             18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the Quarterly Report of Oregon Steel Mills, Inc. (the
"Company") on Form 10-Q for the quarterly period ended June 30, 2003 as filed
with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"),
I, James E. Declusin, President and Chief Executive Officer of the Company,
certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906
of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that to the best of my knowledge:

(1)  The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d)
     of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78m or 78c(d)); and

(2)  The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material
     respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.




/s/ James E. Declusin
-------------------------------------
James E. Declusin
President and Chief Executive Officer

August 14, 2003
NO. 07-08-0375-CR

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SEVENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

AT AMARILLO

PANEL B

DECEMBER 22, 2008

______________________________

KATIE ARSENIA CLUBINE,

Appellant

v.

THE STATE OF TEXAS,

Appellee

_________________________________

FROM THE 251 DISTRICT COURT OF POTTER COUNTY; st

NO. 57,281-C; HON. ANA ESTEVEZ, PRESIDING

__________________________________

ON MOTION TO DISMISS

__________________________________

Before QUINN, C.J., and CAMPBELL and HANCOCK, JJ.

Appellant Katie Arsenia Clubine, by and through her attorney, has filed a motion to

dismiss her appeal because she no longer desires to prosecute it. Without passing on the

merits of the case, we grant the motion to dismiss pursuant to Texas Rule of Appellate

Procedure 42.2(a) and dismiss the appeal. Having dismissed the appeal at appellant’s

request, no motion for rehearing will be entertained, and our mandate will issue forthwith.

Brian Quinn

 Chief Justice

Do not publish.
<PAGE>   1
                                                                    EXHIBIT 23.1


INDEPENDENT AUDITORS' CONSENT


We consent to the incorporation by reference in the Registration Statements
No. 333-89669, 333-89687, 333-80615, 333-72833, 333-35861, and 333-13231 on
Form S-3 and No. 333-34596, 333-92597, and 333-04589 on Form S-8, as amended,
of StarBase Corporation of our report dated June 27, 2000, appearing in the
Annual Report on Form 10-K of StarBase Corporation for the year ended
March 31, 2000.


DELOITTE & TOUCHE LLP


Costa Mesa, California
June 27, 2000
945 A.2d 162

#### Carter Scott SHIELDS, Appellant v. Kimberly M. Caserta SHIELDS, Appellee.

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

Argued April 16, 2008.

Decided April 18, 2008.

Lloyd T. Hoppe, Jr., Esq., Shields, & Hoppe, L.L.P., for Carter Scott Shields.

Walter Andrew Konyk, Esq., Law Offices of Walter and Amanda Konyk, Media, for Kimberly M. Caserta Shields.

BEFORE: CASTILLE, C.J., and SAYLOR, EAKIN, BAER and TODD, JJ.

*469
      *ORDER*

PER CURIAM.

The appeal is dismissed as having been IMPROVIDENTLY GRANTED.

Justice McCAFFERY did not participate in the consideration or decision of this case.
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent *

except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.

The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision **

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

 FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

WEST AMERICAN INSURANCE

COMPANY, an Ohio corporation,

 Plaintiff - Appellant,

 v.

JUSTIN L. HERNANDEZ and DANIELA

A. HERNANDEZ,

 Defendants - Appellees.

No. 11-35278

D.C. No. 6:07-cv-01447-AA

MEMORANDUM*

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Oregon

Ann L. Aiken, Chief District Judge, Presiding

Submitted May 10, 2012** 

Portland, Oregon

Before: KOZINSKI, Chief Judge, TALLMAN and IKUTA, Circuit Judges.

FILED

MAY 14 2012

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
2

The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying West American

Insurance Company’s motions under Rules 60(b), 62, and 67 of the Federal Rules

of Civil Procedure. West American’s motion to resolve a dispute regarding its

entitlement to the $170,000 judgment under the mortgage clause sought relief that

was unavailable under Rule 60(b)(6) because it rested on a claim that was not

litigated as part of the underlying judgment. See Delay v. Gordon, 475 F.3d 1039,

1044–46 (9th Cir. 2007); see also United States v. $119,980, 680 F.2d 106, 107–08

(11th Cir. 1982). West American did not appeal the district court’s prior denials of

its motion to adjudicate that dispute, and Rule 60(b) is not available for

adjudication of claims not adjudicated in the underlying order or judgment. See

Delay, 475 F.3d at 1046–47. Nor was relief available under Rule 60(b)(5): The

judgment had not “been satisfied, released or discharged,” and circumstances had

not changed since the judgment was entered such that “applying it prospectively

[was] no longer equitable.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(5).

West American’s motions under Rules 62 and 67 became moot when the

district court decided its Rule 60(b) motion.

AFFIRMED.
944 A.2d 751

#### Linda PIEHL and William Piehl, H/W v. CITY OF PHILADELPHIA and Commonwealth of Pennsylvania Petition of Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

March 12, 2008.

*ORDER*

PER CURIAM.

AND NOW, this 12th day of March, 2008, the Petition for Allowance of Appeal is hereby GRANTED. The issue, as stated by Petitioner, is:

*461Whether a complaint which names the Commonwealth as a defendant in the caption may be amended to substitute a Commonwealth agency as a party after the statute of limitations has run?
Attachment G 

FEDERAL RETIREMENT THRIFT INVESTMENT BOARD 

Self-Certifying Safety Checklist 

This checklist is designed to assess the overall safety of the designated work area of the 

alternative workplace. Each employee should read and complete the self-certification safety 

checklist. Upon completion, you and your supervisor should review your responses, address any 

issues which require attention before you begin your telework arrangement, and submit the 

completed checklist to the Agency Telework Coordinator. 

Employee: Position: 

Office: Supervisor: 

Location of Alternate Workplace: 

 

Workplace Environment Yes No 

Q1. Are temperatures, noise, ventilation, and lighting levels adequate for 

maintaining your normal level of job performance? 

 

 

Q2. Are all circuit breakers and/or fuses in the electrical panel labeled as to 

intended service? 

 

 

Q3. Do circuit breakers clearly indicate if they are in the open or closed 

position? 

 

 

Q4. Is all electrical equipment free of recognized hazards that would cause 

physical harm (frayed wires, bare conductors, loose wires, flexible 

wires running through walls, exposed wires to the ceiling)? 

 

 

Q5. Does your home’s electrical system permit the grounding of electrical 

equipment with 3-prong plugs? 

 

 

Q6. Do you use a grounded electrical power strip to protect your computer, 

printer and other equipment from electrical surges? 

 

 

Q7. Are aisles, doorways, and corners free of obstructions to permit 

visibility and movement? 

 

 

Q8. Are the telephone lines, electrical cords, and extension wires secured 

under a desk or alongside a baseboard to prevent trip hazards? 

 
 

Q9. Is the office space neat, clean and free of combustibles and 

flammables? 

 

 

Q10. Are floor surfaces clean, dry, level and free of worn or frayed seams to 

prevent slips? 

 

 

Q11. Is there enough light for reading? 

 

Q12. Does your chair provide adequate support to enable you to comfortably 

perform work for extended periods of time? 

 

 

Computer Workstation Yes No 

Q13. Are you satisfied with the placement of your monitor and keyboard? 

 

Q14. Is it easy to read the text on your screen? 

 

Q15. Is the screen free from noticeable glare? 

 

Q16. Is the top of the screen eye-level? 

 

Q17. Do you need a document holder? 

 

Q18. Do you have enough legroom at your desk/workstation? 

 

Q19. Is there adequate space to rest your arms while not keying? 

 

Q20. When keying, are your forearms parallel with the floor? 

Employee Signature: Date: 

Supervisor Signature: Date:
#### CHICAGO, R. I. & P. R. CO. v. EXCISE BOARD OF SEMINOLE COUNTY.

No. 22279.

Feb. 19, 1935.

*574W. R. Bleakmore, W. L. Farmer, John Barry, and Robert E. Lee, for plaintiffs in error.

J. Berry King and Randell S. Cobb, for defendant in error.

BAYLESS, J.

The Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific Railway Company, a corporation, hereinafter called protestant, appeals to this court from a judgment of the Court of Tax Review of the state of Oklahoma, denying the plaintiff’s protest against certain levies for sinking fund purposes made by Seminole county and two of its townships, hereinafter called protestees.

The protest as to the county sinking fund involves the question of the disposition of certain taxes delinquent for the years 1925, 1926, 1927, and 1928, which were collected in the fiscal year of 1929-80, and alleged by the protestant to be on hand, as surplus, at the end of that fiscal year and at the beginning of the fiscal year 1930-31, to be used to reduce the levy for sinking fund purposes for the last-named fiscal year. These collections were made from the excess 10 per cent, added in those years to allow for delinquencies.

The only witness to testify in the trial of this cause was the tax agent of the protestant. His testimony was unsupported by the introduction of the proper and pertinent financial records of the county and was unexplained as to detail. The testimony discloses that this witness concluded that in the fiscal year 1929^30 the ád valorem taxes for the years 1925', 1926, 1927, and 1928 were over collected into the 10 per eent. which had been added in those years for delinquencies, to the extent of $11,034.75, and that that sum had not been paid out by the county, but was in the treasury of the county, and had been applied to a deficit.

It is impossible for us to determine from, the record before us if the needs of the sink ■ ing fiund for the years above mentioned' were fully supplied or when the deficit which' existed in the sinking fund accrued. These-deficiencies in the evidence were as apparent to the Court of Tax Review as to us. We can only conclude that the protest on> this item was denied for lack of proper evidence. We ought not, and will not, try to-arrive at decisions affecting the financial powers and arrangements of the municipal-subdivisions of this state upon meager and insufficient evidence such as that before us. We can determine the correctness or incorrectness of the decisions of the Court of Tax Review only from the records that come-to us from that court.

The protest as to the two townships involves the disposition of the interest which would have been earned by the sinking fund-investments of these townships had the sinking fund assets been so invested as to earn 3 per cent, thereon, as required by law. Protestant does not contend, nor is there any evidence in the record, that such interest was earned in fact. Therefore, it cannot be considered as on hand.

The judgment of the Court of Tax Review is affirmed.

MeNEILL, C. j., OSBORN, Y. C. j., and WELCH and CORN, JJ., concur.
```

[Congressional Bills 103th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 201 Introduced in House (IH)]

103d CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                H. R. 201

  To amend the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 to provide a limited 
           exemption from child labor provisions of such Act.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                            January 5, 1993

  Mr. Hunter introduced the following bill; which was referred to the 
                    Committee on Education and Labor

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
  To amend the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 to provide a limited 
           exemption from child labor provisions of such Act.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. EXEMPTION.

    Section 13 of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 (29 U.S.C. 213) 
is amended by adding at the end the following:
    ``(k)(1) The provisions of section 12 shall not apply to any minor 
who is under the age of 14 and who--
            ``(A) is enrolled in a school accredited by the education 
        agency of the State in which it is located,
            ``(B) has completed the 6th grade, and
            ``(C) is participating in a work study program that fully 
        conforms with criteria specified by the Secretary acting 
        through the Administrator of the Wage and Hour Division.
    ``(2) The employment of minors in a work study program described in 
paragraph (1)(C) shall be limited--
            ``(A) to no more than 4 hours per week and no more than 16 
        weeks in a school year, and
            ``(B) to such periods and conditions of employment as may 
        be prescribed by the Secretary by regulation.''.

                                 <all>
```
| | EXHIBIT 32.1 | 
| | ------------ | 

|
|

| | CERTIFICATION OF CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350 | 
| | --------------------------------------------------------------------------- | 

|In connection with the Quarterly Report of AirRover Wi-Fi Corp. (the "Company") on Form 10-QSB for the period ending September 30, 2004, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), I, David Loflin, President of the Company, certify, pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (subsections (a) and (b) of Section 1350, Chapter 63 of Title 18, United States Code), that:
|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

|(1) | The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and                              
|--- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
|(2) | The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and result of operations of the Company.

|
|

|Dated: November 22, 2004. | /s/ DAVID LOFLIN | 
|------------------------- | ---------------- | 

| | David Loflin President | 
| | ---------------------- |
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM THE
FINANCIAL STATEMENTS OF SOUTHEAST ACQUISITIONS II, L.P. FOR THE THREE MONTHS
ENDED JUNE 30, 1998 AND IS QUALIFIED IN ITS ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE TO SUCH
FINANCIAL STATEMENTS.
</LEGEND>
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   6-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1998
<PERIOD-END>                               JUN-30-1998
<CASH>                                         461,298
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                        0
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0
<INVENTORY>                                          0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                   422
<PP&E>                                       2,227,929
<DEPRECIATION>                                       0
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                               2,689,649
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                           31,643
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                             0
<OTHER-SE>                                   2,658,006
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                 2,689,649
<SALES>                                        249,211      
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                               257,505
<CGS>                                                0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                        0
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                66,417
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                   0
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                191,088
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                            191,088
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                   191,088
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                    19.60
<EPS-DILUTED>                                    19.60
        

</TABLE>
#### In re Matthew J. NASUTI, Petitioner.

No. 2014-139.

United States Court of Appeals, Federal Circuit.

Aug. 5, 2014.

Rehearing En Banc Denied Sept. 23, 2014.*

Before REYNA, BRYSON, and TARANTO, Circuit Judges.

*

 Circuit Judge Bryson participated only in the petition for panel rehearing. Circuit Judge Hughes did not participate.

*888ON PETITION

ORDER

PER CURIAM.

The court treats Matthew J. Nasuti’s submission received on May 30, 2014, as a petition for a writ of mandamus to direct the Merit Systems Protection Board (“Board”) to, *inter alia,*hold a hearing and conduct discovery. The Department of State responds. Nasuti replies.

Nasuti challenged his termination following two weeks of employment as Senior City Management Advisor in the State Department’s Iraq Transition Assistance Office. In his most recent petition for review in this court, we reversed the Board’s determination that it did not possess jurisdiction over Nasuti’s claims that he had been terminated in connection with an alleged protected disclosure concerning body armor. *Nasuti v. Merit Systems Protection Board,*504 Fed.Appx. 894, 898-99 (Fed.Cir.2013). We also remanded for the Board to determine if the Whistleblower Protection Enhancement Act of 2012 (“WPEA”) “applie[d] retroactively and whether, if so, Nasuti ha[d] alleged a protected disclosure under the new statute.” *Id.*at 899.

On remand, the Board determined that the WPEA applied retroactively and that Nasuti had made a nonfrivolous claim that his disclosure was a contributing factor in his removal. As a result, the Board concluded it possessed jurisdiction over the appeal and remanded the action for a merits determination by an administrative judge in the first instance. The Board also directed that the parties be given an opportunity to conduct discovery prior to a hearing on the merits.

The remedy of mandamus is available only in extraordinary situations to correct a clear abuse of discretion or usurpation of judicial power. *In re Calmar, Inc.,*854 F.2d 461, 464 (Fed.Cir.1988). A party seeking a writ bears the burden of proving that it has no other means of securing the relief desired and that the right to issuance of the writ is “clear and indisputable.” *Mallard v. United States District Court,*490 U.S. 296, 309, 109 S.Ct. 1814, 104 L.Ed.2d 318 (1989) (citation omitted).

Nasuti appears to challenge the speed with or at which his proceeding is advancing and seeks discovery related to matters that should be raised before the Board in the first instance. If the Board declines or has already denied Nasuti’s requests, then on further petition for review from a final Board decision or order Nasuti can raise his challenges in this court. Nasuti has not shown undue delay or that review of the issues raised are appropriate at this interlocutory stage. Thus, we deny his petition.

Accordingly,

It Is Ordered That:

The petition is denied.
#### Cora HOUSTON, Appellant v. SECTEK, INC., Appellee.

No. 10-7022.

United States Court of Appeals, District of Columbia Circuit.

Jan. 31, 2011.

Lisa Alexis Jones, Esquire, Lisa Alexis Jones, PLLC, Washington, DC, for Appellant.

Alan S. Block, Andrew Butz, Bonner Kiernan Trebach & Crociata, LLP, Washington, DC, for Appellee.

BEFORE: SENTELLE, Chief Judge, and HENDERSON and GARLAND, Circuit Judges.

*JUDGMENT*

PER CURIAM.

This case was considered on the record from the United States District Court for the District of Columbia and on the briefs and arguments by counsel. It is

ORDERED that the judgment of the district court be affirmed.

Appellant Cora Houston, a black female, brought suit under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e *et seq.,*and 42 U.S.C. § 1981 against her former employer, SecTek, Inc., alleging race-based disparate treatment, hostile work environment and constructive discharge. The district court granted summary judgment to SecTek. For the reasons stated in the district *491court’s memorandum opinion filed January 28, 2010, we affirm.

Pursuant to D.C. Circuit Rule 36, this disposition will not be published. The Clerk is directed to withhold issuance of the mandate herein until seven days after resolution of any timely petition for rehearing or rehearing en banc. *See*Fed. R.App. P. 41(b); D.C.Cir. Rule 41(a)(1).