UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

No. 97-4862

JERRY JEFFERSON SEXTON, a/k/a Jim

Smith, a/k/a George Thompson,

Defendant-Appellant.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

No. 97-4863

COLEEN ALLIEFIER SEXTON, a/k/a

Colleen Sexton, a/k/a Lynn

Carraway,

Defendant-Appellant.

Appeals from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Virginia, at Charlottesville.

Samuel G. Wilson, Chief District Judge.

(CR-97-9)

Argued: March 1, 1999

Decided: May 10, 1999

Before NIEMEYER and KING, Circuit Judges, and

LEE, United States District Judge for the

Eastern District of Virginia, sitting by designation.

_________________________________________________________________

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
COUNSEL

ARGUED: William Thomas Robey, III, Buena Vista, Virginia, for

Appellant Jerry Sexton; Robert F. Rider, Roanoke, Virginia, for

Appellant Coleen Sexton. Jean Barrett Hudson, Assistant United

States Attorney, Charlottesville, Virginia, for Appellee. ON BRIEF:

Robert P. Crouch, Jr., United States Attorney, Charlottesville, Virginia, for Appellee.

_________________________________________________________________

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See

Local Rule 36(c).

_________________________________________________________________

OPINION

PER CURIAM:

Jerry and Coleen Sexton appeal their convictions by a jury in the

Western District of Virginia for various drug and firearm offenses.

They contend on appeal that the district court erred in denying their

motions to suppress certain evidence. Finding no reversible error, we

affirm each of the convictions.

I.

On March 30, 1996, at approximately 11:30 p.m., Virginia State

Police Trooper David Albert received a dispatch to"be on the lookout"1

for a 1993 Winnebago-type vehicle motor home ("the Winnebago" or

"the motor home"), described as white with red and blue stripes, bearing South Carolina plates LMC-542.2 The dispatcher advised Trooper

Albert that the BOLO had been issued by the FBI, and that the occu-

_________________________________________________________________

1 A "be on the lookout" teletype or message is called, among other

things, a "BOLO" broadcast. We will refer to it here as "the BOLO."

2 There were in fact, two BOLOs-- the second BOLO was a brief

update indicating that the suspects had exchanged their Toyota for a

Winnebago-type vehicle.

 2
pants of the motor home, possibly three subjects-- one white married

couple with the last name of Sexton and another man-- were wanted

and were "extremely armed and dangerous . . . with excessive weapons." The Sextons were reported by the BOLO to be using the aliases

of George Allen Thompson and Lynn Carraway. The BOLO also

indicated that they were suspects in homicides in Delaware and possibly in Virginia. The BOLO stated: "Warrants issued by US District

Court in Delaware with warrants on file at the US Marshall's [sic]

office in Wilmington, DE." It did not otherwise specifically identify

the subjects of the warrants.

At approximately 6 a.m. the following morning, March 31, 1996,

Trooper Albert observed a motor home that matched the description

in the BOLO parked in the lot of a Golden Corral restaurant located

in Rockbridge County, Virginia. When back-up forces arrived and

began to barricade the entrance to the Golden Corral parking lot, the

Winnebago attempted to pull out of the parking lot. Trooper Albert

thereupon initiated a felony traffic stop.3

Trooper Albert ordered the individuals occupying the driver and

passenger seats, later identified as defendants Jerry and Coleen Sexton, out of the vehicle. After the Sextons were both handcuffed and

secured outside the Winnebago, Trooper Albert and two other officers

entered to search for the third suspect referred to in the BOLO. No

other person was found inside.

As one of the officers exited the motor home, he asked the Sextons

if there were any weapons inside, and they responded affirmatively.

One of the troopers then located and removed weapons, specifically

a 9mm pistol and a .380 caliber pistol, from locations indicated by the

Sextons.

Upon being asked for identification, Ms. Sexton presented the officers with a false South Carolina driver's license bearing her photo-

_________________________________________________________________

3 According to Trooper Albert, a felony traffic stop is a high-risk stop

that is used when confronting individuals known to be armed and dangerous. The car is stopped at gunpoint; a PA system is used, and officers

do not approach the vehicle until the occupants are removed, handcuffed,

and under control.

 3
graph and the name Lynn Carraway. Mr. Sexton's South Carolina

driver's license, which was also false, bore his photograph and the

name George Thompson. The couple stated that they were Lynn Carraway and George Thompson, and that the police officers had made

a "tremendous mistake." Trooper Albert immediately took the Sextons into custody, after informing them that the names they were

using were known aliases for subjects known as Jerry and Coleen

Sexton, and that there were warrants on file for their arrests.

The Sextons were thereafter taken separately to the Rockbridge

County Regional Jail, about 500 yards from the Golden Corral restaurant, at approximately 6:40 a.m. The Winnebago was also initially

taken to the jail parking lot, where it was secured and locked. Meanwhile, Trooper Albert searched the area surrounding the Golden Corral for the third suspect for about forty-five minutes, to no avail.

Sometime between 8:30 a.m. and 8:45 a.m. at the jail, Officer Jane

Clark searched Ms. Sexton for weapons and contraband pursuant to

the jail's policy. During that search, Officer Clark discovered cocaine

in Ms. Sexton's purse. At approximately 10:30 a.m., an arrest warrant

was obtained for Ms. Sexton, based on possession of the cocaine that

had been found in her purse. Unknown to Officer Clark at the time

of the search, it had been discovered at about 8:00 a.m. that, contrary

to the BOLO, there were no outstanding warrants for Ms. Sexton. Significantly, the district court found that at the time Officer Clark

searched Ms. Sexton, she had no knowledge that there were, in fact,

no outstanding warrants for Ms. Sexton.

Trooper Albert was not aware of the developments relating to Ms.

Sexton until later that morning, because after giving up his initial

search for the third suspect, he returned to the Rockbridge County

jail, and with other police officers, took the motor home -- which had

already been secured and locked up at the jail -- back to the Golden

Corral parking lot. The return of the Winnebago to the Golden Corral

was a further attempt to locate the third suspect, whom they hoped

would eventually return to the motor home. At around 8:00 a.m.,

while Albert and the other officers were waiting at the Golden Corral

inside the Winnebago, they decided to make an inventory of the contents of it. At this point, both Sextons were at the jail under arrest

based on the BOLO and the presentation of false identification to the

 4
officers. Of significance, in the inventory search of the Winnebago,

the officers found -- among other things -- more than 500 grams of

cocaine, a pen gun,4 cell phones, police scanners and pagers.

The Sextons were indicted on multiple drug and firearm charges.

Each moved to suppress all the evidence that had been obtained as a

result of the stop of the motor home and their subsequent arrests.

After a hearing concluding on May 12, 1997, the district court found

that the officers properly stopped the Winnebago and had probable

cause to arrest each of the defendants, and thus denied their motions

to suppress. A three-day jury trial promptly followed. Ms. Sexton was

found guilty of six drug and firearm offenses; Mr. Sexton was found

guilty of the same six offenses, as well as two additional firearm

offenses.5

On October 15, 1997, the district court sentenced Coleen and Jerry

Sexton to terms of imprisonment of 123 months and 200 months,

respectively. The defendants timely filed notices of appeal on October

24, 1997.

The issues raised on appeal relate to the denial of the motions to

suppress, premised on claims that the arrest of Ms. Sexton was

improper, as were the searches of Ms. Sexton and the Winnebago.

_________________________________________________________________

4 As defined by the provisions of 26 U.S.C. § 5845(a)(5) and (e), a pen

gun -- a single shot weapon that looks like a fountain pen -- is a firearm

required by 26 U.S.C. § 5841 to be registered in the National Firearms

Registration and Transfer Record. Possession by the defendants of an

unregistered pen gun violated 26 U.S.C. § 5861(d), and the unregistered

firearm was related to various charges in the indictment.

5 Both Coleen and Jerry Sexton were convicted of possession with

intent to distribute cocaine, 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1); possession with intent

to distribute amphetamine, 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1); possession of a firearm

during a drug trafficking crime, 18 U.S.C. § 924(c); conspiracy to distribute cocaine and marijuana, 21 U.S.C. § 846; conspiracy to use a firearm in a drug trafficking crime, 18 U.S.C. § 924(o); and possession of

a nonregistered firearm, 26 U.S.C. § 5861(d). In addition, Jerry Sexton

was convicted of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, 18 U.S.C.

§ 922(g)(1), and possession of a firearm by a fugitive, 18 U.S.C.

§ 922(g)(2).

 5
II.

The crux of the Sextons' appeal is their allegation that there was

no probable cause to arrest Ms. Sexton at the Golden Corral parking

lot, because there was no warrant on file for her arrest. Had she been

properly released at the Golden Corral, they contend, she would have

been free to leave with the motor home, the title of which was in her

name, and none of the damaging evidence in the Winnebago would

have been discovered.6 In considering the denial of the Sextons'

motions to suppress, we review the district court's legal conclusions

de novo and its factual findings for clear error. See United States v.

Rusher, 966 F.2d 868, 873 (4th Cir. 1992).

A.

During the hearing conducted by the district court on the motions

to suppress, counsel for Mr. and Ms. Sexton both stipulated that the

BOLO provided the officers with the reasonable suspicion needed to

stop the Winnebago, detain the two suspects at the scene, and question them. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21, 30 (1968) (a brief investigative stop is permissible if the police officer has a reasonable

_________________________________________________________________

6 Having conceded below that there was probable cause to arrest him

based on the BOLO and the fact that there were warrants on file for his

arrest, Mr. Sexton hinges his appeal on whether there was probable cause

to arrest Ms. Sexton.

It is unclear to us, however, how Mr. Sexton can assert a violation of

his Fourth Amendment rights based on the alleged illegality of Ms.

Sexton's arrest. The Supreme Court has had a"long history of insistence

that Fourth Amendment rights are personal in nature." Rakas v. Illinois,

439 U.S. 128, 140 (1978). "Fourth Amendment rights are personal rights

which . . . may not be vicariously asserted." Alderman v. United States,

394 U.S. 165, 174 (1969); Rakas, 439 U.S. at 133-34 (quoting same).

Mr. Sexton thus cannot challenge the legality of the arrest of Ms. Sexton;

this claim belongs to her alone. Nor may he seek to exclude evidence discovered pursuant to the inventory search based on the claim that they are

the ill-gotten fruits of the illegal arrest of Ms. Sexton. Again, his Fourth

Amendment rights were not infringed. Rakas, 439 U.S. at 134. However,

we need not decide this issue -- which was neither presented in the district court nor on appeal. Because the arrest of Ms. Sexton was valid,

there is no relief for Mr. Sexton even under his theory.

 6
suspicion based on "specific and articulable facts" that "criminal

activity may be afoot"). Although appellants argue on appeal that the

stop of the Winnebago was improper under Terry , they waived this

issue in the district court and cannot properly raise it on appeal.

United States v. Maxton, 940 F.2d 103, 105 (4th Cir. 1991).

Trooper Albert clearly had reasonable suspicion to perform an

investigatory stop of the motor home based on the BOLO. That the

BOLO broadcast incorrectly suggested Ms. Sexton was the subject of

an outstanding arrest warrant does not vitiate the legality of the stop

of the Winnebago because Mr. Sexton was, in fact, wanted and was

travelling in the motor home. That is, even if the BOLO had specifically indicated that only Mr. Sexton was wanted, this would have provided the reasonable suspicion necessary for a Terry stop of the motor

home.

B.

Counsel for Mr. Sexton conceded at the suppression hearing that

there was probable cause to arrest his client. Indeed, there was probable cause to arrest Mr. Sexton on the basis of the BOLO. Ms. Sexton

contends, however, that there was no probable cause to arrest her,

because the BOLO did not specifically identify whom the warrants

were for, and it turned out that there were, in fact, no warrants on file

for Ms. Sexton. She also argues that Trooper Albert improperly

arrested her on the basis of the BOLO alone, and not for having presented him with false identification.

In accordance with Supreme Court precedent, this circuit has

defined probable cause to arrest as "facts and circumstances within

the officer's knowledge that are sufficient to warrant a prudent person, or one of reasonable caution, in believing, in the circumstances

shown, that the suspect has committed, is committing, or is about to

commit an offense." United States v. Williams , 10 F.3d 1070, 1073-74

(4th Cir. 1994) (quoting Michigan v. DeFillippo , 443 U.S. 31, 37

(1979)).

The test of probable cause is an objective one. We have stated that

"[t]he Supreme Court's definition of probable cause asks not whether

the arresting officer reasonably believed that the arrestee had commit-

 7
ted a crime, but whether the evidence was sufficient to support such

a reasonable belief." United States v. Han , 74 F.3d 537, 541 (4th Cir.

1996) (citation omitted). The subjective state of mind of the arresting

officer is irrelevant. Id.

At the suppression hearing, Trooper Albert testified that he arrested

both the Sextons after they presented him with false identifications --

a Class 2 misdemeanor in Virginia pursuant to Va. Code Ann. § 18.2-

204.2 -- bearing the names of the aliases that were reported in the

BOLO. But under Han, regardless of whether Trooper Albert arrested

Mr. and Ms. Sexton based solely on the BOLO, there was proper

ground for both arrests. The false IDs alone, or in combination with

the BOLO, clearly satisfy the objective probable cause test, and we

need not inquire further into Trooper Albert's state of mind. See 1

Wayne R. LaFave & Jerold H. Israel, Criminal Procedure § 3.3, at

188 (1984) ("if the objective probable cause test is met it is not also

necessary to establish that the particular officer making the arrest or

search subjectively believed probable cause was present"). In other

words, when Ms. Sexton presented the police officers with false identification there was probable cause to arrest her, regardless of the

BOLO. Thus the district court correctly held that there was probable

cause to arrest both Mr. and Ms. Sexton.

Because there was probable cause to arrest Ms. Sexton based solely

on her presentation of false identification, Officer Clark's search of

Ms. Sexton's purse pursuant to the policies of the Rockbridge County

jail was a valid search. Moreover, although some officers may have

learned that there were no outstanding warrants for Ms. Sexton's

arrest shortly before Officer Clark searched Ms. Sexton's purse, the

district court did not clearly err in finding that there was no evidence

that Officer Clark knew of this fact.

C.

Because it was proper for the officers to stop the motor home, and

there was probable cause to arrest both of the Sextons, the officers

could, and did, legitimately conduct a warrantless inventory search of

the motor home pursuant to Virginia State Police policy. If an inventory search is conducted according to standard departmental procedures, the search will be upheld and the evidence admissible. Florida

 8
v. Wells, 495 U.S. 1, 3-4 (1990); see also United States v. Brown, 787

F.2d 929, 932 (4th Cir. 1986) ("If the vehicle is in lawful custody, the

police may inventory the vehicle, if such inventories are routine and

conducted pursuant to standard police procedures, so long as the purpose of the inventory is to secure the car or its contents and not to

gather incriminating evidence against the owner.").

Trooper Albert testified at the suppression hearing in the district

court regarding Virginia State Police policy on inventory searches. He

further testified that the search of the Winnebago was performed

according to this policy. The defendants presented no evidence to

either contradict or impeach this testimony.7

Nonetheless, the Sextons argue that the inventory search was not

conducted according to established procedures. But there is nothing

in the record to support their contention. We therefore conclude that

the district court did not clearly err in finding that the search of the

motor home was performed properly in accordance with established

procedures.8

_________________________________________________________________

7 Albert testified that while he and another officer were waiting in the

motor home for the third suspect to return they decided to inventory the

vehicle, because

since the subjects were under arrest, according to department

policy, I have to inventory any vehicle I take and arrest anybody

from because we're responsible for the contents of it and I

should go ahead and start ISP-158, which is a Virginia State

Police inventory form, and I went ahead and we started inventorying the motor home since it had such a vast amount of belongings inside of it.

8 We also reject the Sextons' final issue on appeal -- that the district

court erroneously shifted the burden of persuasion to the defendants and

improperly restricted their ability to challenge the validity of the FBI

BOLO broadcasts. Nothing in the record suggests that the burden was

shifted to the defendants to prove lack of probable cause. The district

court properly refused to permit defense counsel to belabor the issue of

the validity of the FBI messages when the point they were focusing on

-- the lack of outstanding warrants for Coleen Sexton's arrest -- had

already been conceded by the Government.

 9
III.

In sum, the defendants concede that it was proper for the police

officers to stop the motor home, detain the Sextons, and make reasonable inquiry of them. Mr. Sexton conceded at the suppression hearing

that there was probable cause to arrest him. Without deciding whether

the BOLO alone was sufficient to provide probable cause for the

arrest of Ms. Sexton, we conclude that when she presented false evidence of her identity to Trooper Albert, he had probable cause to

arrest her. Because Ms. Sexton was lawfully arrested, the ensuing

search of her possessions at the jail, which uncovered cocaine, was

valid. And because both of the Sextons were lawfully arrested, the

inventory search of the Winnebago was also valid. Finally, the district

court did not err in finding that the inventory search was conducted

according to Virginia State Police policy.

The convictions of each defendant must therefore be affirmed.

AFFIRMED

 10