FIRST DIVISION

							July 9, 2001

No. 1-00-2188

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS,	)	Appeal from the

								)	Circuit Court of

		Plaintiff-Appellee,			)	Cook County

								)

	v.							)				 								)

PAUL WEST,						)	Honorable

								)	S. Sutker-Dermer,

		Defendant-Appellant.		)	Judge Presiding

	PRESIDING JUSTICE MCNULTY delivered the opinion of the

court:

	This case presents a straightforward question of statutory

interpretation.  When the legislature prescribed a sentence of

natural life in prison for a first degree murder committed by a

person who had previously committed "first degree murder under any

state or federal law" (730 ILCS 5/5-8-1(a)(1)(c)(i) (West 1998)),

did the legislature mean the sentencing provisions to apply only if

the state had named the prior conviction as one for "first degree

murder"?  The parties agree that the legislative history includes

no discussion of the issue.

	In 1978 defendant, Paul West, pled guilty to a charge of

murder.  People v. West, 187 Ill. 2d 418, 437, 719 N.E.2d 664 (1999).  The trial court, in a bench trial, found defendant guilty

of another murder committed in 1986 and sentenced him to death. 

Defendant appealed his conviction and sentence for the second

murder.

	In 1986 the legislature renamed the offense of murder to first

degree murder.  People v. Jeffries, 164 Ill. 2d 104, 111, 646 N.E.2d 587 (1995).  The legislature also amended the sentencing

provision for murder.  Before the amendment, the statute prescribed

the sentence of natural life in prison for any defendant convicted

of murder who had a prior murder conviction under any state or

federal law.  Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 38, par. 1005-8-1(a)(1)(c). 

The amended Unified Code of Corrections provides:

		"[F]or first degree murder, 

							*** 

		(c) the court shall sentence the defendant to

a term of natural life imprisonment when the death

penalty is not imposed if the defendant [] 

		(i) has previously been convicted of first

degree murder under any state or federal law."  730

ILCS 5/5-8-1(a)(1)(c)(i) (West 1998).

	On the appeal from the second murder conviction, our supreme

court affirmed the conviction but remanded to the trial court for

the imposition of a sentence other than death.  At the new

sentencing hearing the trial court held that the statute mandated

a sentence of natural life in prison.  Defendant again appeals from

his sentence.

	Defendant contends that in 1978 he pled guilty to "murder,"

not to "first degree murder," and therefore section 5-8-

1(a)(1)(c)(i) does not apply.  The legislature defined first degree murder in section 9-1(a) of the Criminal Code.  720 ILCS 5/9-1(a)

(West 1998).  That section states:

		"A person who kills an individual without lawful

justification commits first degree murder if, in

performing the acts which cause the death:

		(1) he either intends to kill or do great bodily

harm to that individual or another, or knows that such

acts will cause death to that individual or another;  or

		(2) he knows that such acts create a strong

probability of death or great bodily harm to that

individual or another;  or

		(3) he is attempting or committing a forcible felony

other than second degree murder."  7820 ILCS 5/9-1(a)

(West 1998).

	When defendant pled guilty to murder, the statute defined

"murder" in the following language:

		"A person who kills an individual without lawful

justification commits murder if, in performing the acts

which cause the death:

		(1) He either intends to kill or do great bodily

harm to that individual or another, or knows that such

acts will cause death to that individual or another;  or

		(2) He knows that such acts create a strong

probability of death or great bodily harm to that

individual or another;  or

		(3) He is attempting or committing a forcible felony

other than voluntary manslaughter."  Ill. Rev. Stat.

1977, ch. 38, par. 9-1(a).

	A comparison of the two sections shows that they are

identical, except that the new section uses the term "second degree

murder" instead of "voluntary manslaughter," in accord with the

statutory revision that replaced the crime of voluntary

manslaughter with second degree murder.  See People v. Lewis, 229 Ill. App. 3d 874, 879-80, 594 N.E.2d 414 (1992).  Therefore, when

defendant pled guilty to murder in 1978, he admitted he committed

a crime identical to that named "first degree murder" in the

present statutes.

	Defendant argues that the legislature could have easily said

that any conviction under a law substantially similar to our first

degree murder statute would qualify for the penalty, as the

legislature did in the death penalty statute.  See 720 ILCS 5/9-

1(b)(3)(West 1998).  The legislature did not unambiguously

establish the intention to mandate life imprisonment for persons

convicted of "murder" rather than "first degree murder."

	The defendant in People v. Shoultz, 289 Ill. App. 3d 392, 682 N.E.2d 446 (1997), raised a similar argument.  Section 5-8-

1(a)(1)(c)(ii) of the Unified Code of Corrections also mandates a

sentence of natural life in prison for any defendant found guilty

of "murdering" more than one person.  730 ILCS 5/5-8-1(a)(1)(c)(ii)

(West 1994).  The jury found Shoultz guilty on one count of feticide and also guilty on a count of first degree murder for the

death of the mother of the fetus.  Shoultz argued that the jury had

not found him guilty of "murdering" more than one person, so

section 5-8-1(a)(1)(c)(ii) did not apply.  The trial court rejected

the argument.  The appellate court agreed with the trial court,

finding that the statutory scheme, which imposed the same penalties

for feticide as for first degree murder, unambiguously showed the

intention to treat feticide as a form of murder for the Unified

Code of Corrections.

	Here, as in Shoultz, we find that the legislature has unambiguously expressed an intention to treat murder convictions

under the prior statute as convictions for first degree murder

under the current statute.

	By defining first degree murder to include conduct identical

to that named "murder" under the statute in effect when defendant

pled guilty to murder, the legislature unambiguously indicated an

intention to treat convictions for murder under the prior statute

as convictions for first degree murder.  The trial court correctly

held that the  Unified Code of Corrections mandated a sentence of

natural life in prison for defendant because the jury found him

guilty of a first degree murder, and he had a prior conviction for

a first degree murder.  Accordingly, the judgment of the trial

court is affirmed.

	Affirmed.

	O"'MARAW FROSSARD and COHEN, JJ./, concur.