J-A29020-22

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

CHEYENNE A. HETRICK 

Appellant

v.

NATHAN J. MCCLINTOCK

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 721 WDA 2022

Appeal from the Order Entered May 23, 2022

In the Court of Common Pleas of Clarion County Civil Division at No(s): 

No. 1021 CD 2021

BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., OLSON, J., and KUNSELMAN, J.

MEMORANDUM BY OLSON, J.: FILED: FEBRUARY 3, 2023

Appellant, Cheyenne A. Hetrick (“Mother”), appeals from the order 

dated May 20, 2022, and entered May 23, 2022, in the Clarion County Court 

of Common Pleas, awarding Nathan J. McClintock (“Father”) primary physical 

custody of his daughter, J.A.S. (“Child”), born in October 2016. Upon careful 

review, we affirm. 

The relevant facts and procedural history are as follows. In May 2015, 

Mother married R.H. (“Stepfather”), and they separated that same year. N.T., 

5/10/22, at 143, 152-153, 182. In late 2015 and early 2016, Mother began 

dating Father (collectively, “Parents”). Id. at 13, 143, 182. Parents’ romantic 

relationship lasted four months, during which time Mother conceived Child. 

Id. at 13, 16. 
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In May 2016, Mother moved from Pennsylvania to Florida, where she 

gave birth to Child in October 2016, and Father remained in Pennsylvania. Id.

at 16-18, 144. Mother filed for full custody of Child in Florida, and Father’s 

paternity of Child was established during the pendency of the custody matter. 

Id. at 18-19. The custody case was subsequently dismissed when Mother 

expressed her intent to return to Pennsylvania. Id. at 19. 

In October 2017, Mother and Child traveled to Pennsylvania, and Father 

had one overnight visit with Child. Id. at 20. The following month, Mother 

reconciled with Stepfather. As best we can discern, Mother and Child began 

residing with Stepfather in Marienville, Forest County, Pennsylvania at that 

time. Id. at 20-21, 182-183. Between November 2017 and June 2018, Father 

had one additional weekend visit with Child. Id. at 21. In 2018, Father moved 

into his parents’ (“Paternal Grandparents”) home in Rouseville, Venango 

County, Pennsylvania, where he continued to reside through the time of the 

subject proceeding. Id. at 3-4, 18, 54. 

In June 2018, Parents entered an informal custody arrangement, 

wherein Father could visit Child every weekend. Id. at 21-23. At the time,

Mother attended classes at Clarion University during part of the week. Id. at 

23-25. Upon agreement, Father registered Child for daycare. Id. at 24-25. 

When Mother attended classes, Father picked Child up from daycare twice a 

week, and those weekday custodial times typically lasted a “couple hours.” 

Id. at 23-24. 
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In January 2019, Mother commenced a custody action in the Court of 

Common Pleas of Forest County. Id. at 25. By order dated February 25, 

2019, and entered March 6, 2019, the trial court awarded Parents shared legal 

custody and shared physical custody as determined by mutual agreement of 

the parties. Around Easter weekend of 2019, Parents had a disagreement 

about the time that Father was to return Child to Mother at the conclusion of 

Father’s weekend visit. Id. at 25. Father returned Child to Mother past the 

agreed upon drop-off time. Id. at 26.

In April and May 2019, respectively, Parents filed cross-petitions for 

modification of the custody order.

1

 By consent order entered on July 26, 2019

(“existing custody order”), the trial court awarded Parents shared legal 

custody, Mother primary physical custody, and Father partial physical custody 

three out of four weekends per month and at other times based on mutual 

agreement. Order, 7/26/19, at 2. In addition, the court awarded Parents

physical custody for two nonconsecutive weeks each year and holidays based 

on their agreement. The court further directed Parents to have reasonable 

contact with Child while she is in the physical custody of the other parent, and

such contact may include telephone, email, text, or social media. Id. at 9. 

____________________________________________

1 Mother also filed a petition for civil contempt on April 29, 2019. Mother 

subsequently filed a motion to withdraw the petition, and the trial court 

granted the motion to withdraw.
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In March 2020, Mother filed a petition for emergency custody, seeking 

to retain “emergency primary custody until [the] pandemic is under control.” 

Mother’s Petition for Emergency Custody, 3/25/20. At this time, Mother 

remained married to Stepfather and had bore him a son, who was then 

approximately seven months old. Following a hearing in April 2020, the trial 

court denied Mother’s petition. In June 2020, Mother filed a protection from 

abuse (“PFA”) petition against Father, alleging Father had abused Child. N.T., 

5/10/22, at 29. However, the county children and youth services agency 

investigated the allegations and determined that they were unfounded. Id.

at 29-30. No criminal charges were brought against Father, and the PFA was 

dismissed in October 2020. Id. at 30. During the pendency of the PFA 

petition, Father had supervised visits with Child two days a week, for one hour. 

Id. Once the PFA was dismissed, Father resumed his weekend custodial time. 

Id. at 31-32. 

In August 2020, Mother separated from Stepfather, and she relocated 

with Child to the home of her mother (“Maternal Grandmother”) in Clarion 

County, where they remained until approximately December 2020. Id. at 

137, 161, 185, 212. In 2020, Mother made a Facebook post, stating in part, 

the following:2

And sometimes, maybe I did act crazy.

____________________________________________

2 As best we can discern, soon after her separation from Stepfather, Mother

made the Facebook post about her relationship with Stepfather. N.T., 

5/10/22, at 185-186. 
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I was emotionally and mentally abused for [six] years. 

I moved 1600 miles to do this all over again. 

. . .

I once went [fourteen] days without being spoken to. 

. . .

I had PPD and was having suicidal thoughts, he sent me to my 

moms and broke up with me. 

. . .

He threw things, broke things, sent me into panic attacks 

regularly. 

. . .

He called me an addict for taking my prescribed medications.

He threatened to kill me more times than I can count, in front of 

nearly everyone I know. . . . I was spit on. Then had a wallet 

thrown at my face. I was charged at while 6 months pregnant.

Then I was grabbed up, with my life threatened. In front of his 

mother. And no one helped. The only thing they cared about was 

the coffee cup I smashed afterwards. 

Then, a knife was pulled, and I was bruised and thrown down a 

hallway with my life being threatened. In front of my family.

Then, I was blamed. 

Told I did it to myself. 

By everyone who swore I was their family too. His mother 

included, who claims to be a victim of abuse herself. 

He ran off [three] hours away after stealing every dime of food 

money, credit cards, and my child support. And never saw his 

kids or tried to work something out. 

Father’s Exhibit C; N.T., 5/10/22, at 41-43. According to Mother, Mother had 

“harmed” herself around November 2020. N.T., 5/10/22, at 197. 
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From December 2020 through October 2021, Mother and Child resided 

in a public housing apartment in Rimersburg, Clarion County. Id. at 137-138. 

The driving distance between Mother’s Clarion County home and Father’s 

home in Venango County was approximately one hour. Id. at 170. In 2021, 

upon the parties’ agreement, Father exercised custody four weekends every 

month. Id. at 40. In approximately August 2021, Child was enrolled in 

pre-kindergarten. Id. at 204; Father’s Exhibit F, at 5. Father picked Child up 

from preschool once a week, and those visits lasted a couple hours each. N.T., 

5/10/22, at 40-41. In October 2021, Father stopped picking Child up due to 

a change in his work schedule. Id. at 10, 49-50, 123. 

In October 2021, Mother was evicted from her Rimersburg apartment.3 

Id. at 44. Mother notified Father that she had been evicted and was 

considering a move to Indiana County. Id. at 44, 46-47. Father indicated he 

was not in agreement with Child moving to Indiana County and requested that 

Mother and Child remain in Clarion County. Id. at 47. According to Mother, 

later that month, Mother moved into Stepfather’s home in Mansfield, in Tioga 

County, “to discuss options while waiting on housing.” Id. at 194-195. Child 

____________________________________________

3

 According to Father, Mother was residing in Rimersburg with a boyfriend. 

N.T., 5/10/22, at 31-33. Father introduced into evidence newspaper articles 

showing Mother and her boyfriend were charged with disorderly conduct, and 

Mother’s boyfriend was charged with harassment on a separate occasion. Id.

at 44-45; Father’s Exhibit D. The record does not indicate the status of those 

charges. 
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was also withdrawn from preschool in late October 2021. Id. at 57, 204; 

Father’s Exhibit F, at 5. In November 2021, Mother reconciled with 

Stepfather, and she and Child remained with him in Tioga County. N.T., 

5/10/22, at 138-139, 153.

On October 29, 2021, Father filed a petition for emergency custody in 

the Forest County Court of Common Pleas and a petition to modify the existing 

custody order, requesting shared legal and primary physical custody. Father 

contemporaneously filed a petition to transfer the action to the Clarion County 

Court of Common Pleas, which was granted on November 24, 2021. 

The evidentiary hearing on Father’s petition for emergency custody 

occurred in the Clarion County Court of Common Pleas on January 18, 2022. 

By order dated January 18, 2022, and entered January 25, 2022, the trial 

court ordered an expedited hearing on: (1) whether a relocation has occurred; 

(2) whether relocation should be granted; and (3) whether Father’s petition 

for modification should be granted. 

The court held the subject hearing on May 10, 2022. Both Parents

testified on their own behalf. The parties stipulated to the testimony of Child’s 

paternal grandmother (“Paternal Grandmother”). N.T., 5/10/22, at 135. The 

parties also stipulated that Maternal Grandmother, who resides in Clarion 

County, would have testified, in part, that: Maternal Grandmother sees 

Mother and Child “a few times a month, on a regular basis,” and that Mother 

and Child have visited Maternal Grandmother’s house. Id. at 212-213. 
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Father testified he has been living with Paternal Grandparents in 

Venango County, and he does not plan to move out of their home due to his 

financial circumstances. Id. at 3-4, 54, 60, 107. When asked about the 

proximity between his home and Mother’s residence in Tioga County, Father 

testified, “Three and a half hours. I can’t remember the [mileage], one 

hundred and eighty-some miles, I think.” Id. at 62.

Father testified that Mother never informed him about moving to Tioga 

County, and he found out only after Mother had moved. Id. at 53. Father 

testified that in November 2021, he had a FaceTime call with Child, and he 

saw Mother and Stepfather together on the couch. Id. He testified that at 

that point, he suspected Mother had not been truthful to him about resuming 

her relationship with Stepfather. Id. 

Father testified he is presently self-employed, managing a tree service 

company that provides trimming, tree removal, and landscaping services, and 

he noted he has “variable” work hours. Id. at 9, 50. Father testified that 

during the winter of 2021, he worked at a welding shop in Warren, Ohio. Id.

at 10, 49-50. Father testified he previously worked for six years at the 

maintenance department for the Department of Conservation and Natural 

Resources at Presque Isle State Park in Erie, Pennsylvania. Id. at 11. 

Mother testified that she currently resides in a three-bedroom home in 

Tioga County with Child, Stepfather, and her two-year-old son with 

Stepfather. Id. at 137-140. She testified that Stepfather’s twelve-year-old 
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daughter visits their home a couple times per month. Id. at 138-139. Mother 

testified that Child’s maternal grandparents reside in Clarion County. Id. at 

161. She testified that Child has contact with her maternal grandparents “at 

least weekly” but “sometimes more.” Id. at 162. 

Mother testified that she was prescribed Adderall, Gabapentin, Effexor, 

Premarin, and Buspar to treat her depression, anxiety, attention deficit 

hyperactivity disorder (“ADHD”), and neuropathy. Id. at 155-156. She 

stopped taking her medications in October or November of 2021. Id. at 156. 

Mother testified that Child has a sensory processing disorder and is on 

the autism spectrum. Id. at 173. Mother testified she attends to Child’s needs 

by learning about autism and helping Child calm down when she is 

over-stimulated. Id. Mother testified that Child receives Individualized 

Education Plan (“IEP”) services on Mondays, for about one hour. Id. at 159. 

Mother testified that the recommendation from Child’s IEP is for Child to 

receive therapy. Id. 

By opinion and order dated May 20, 2022, and entered May 23, 2022, 

the court found Mother had relocated and that the relocation was not in Child’s 

best interests. Further, the court granted primary physical custody of Child 

to Father and awarded partial physical custody to Mother. 

On June 20, 2022, Mother timely filed a notice of appeal and a concise 

statement of errors complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 
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1925(a)(2)(i) and (b). The trial court filed a statement pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 

1925(a), wherein it refers this Court to the May 23, 2022 opinion. 

On appeal, Mother raises four issues, which we have reordered for ease 

of disposition:

1. Whether the trial court committed an error of law and/or 

abused its discretion by finding that Mother’s move 

constituted a relocation as defined by 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 5322?

2. Whether the trial court committed an error of law and/or 

abused its discretion in failing to find factors, 23 Pa.C.S.A. 

[§] 5328(a)(1), [(3), (4), (9), (10), (12), and (13)] favored 

Mother, where the evidence clearly showed that said factors 

favored Mother?

3. Whether the trial court committed an error of law and/or 

abused its discretion in failing to give proper weight to all 

things that affect the “best interest” of the child?

4. Whether the trial court committed an error of law and/or 

abused its discretion in finding that Mother’s move would 

not serve the “best interests” pursuant to the 23 Pa.C.S.A. 

§ 5337(h) factors?

Mother’s Brief at 3-4 (suggested answers omitted).

We review Mother’s issues according to the following scope and standard 

of review:

[T]he appellate court is not bound by the deductions or 

inferences made by the trial court from its findings of fact, 

nor must the reviewing court accept a finding that has no 

competent evidence to support it. . . . However, this broad 

scope of review does not vest in the reviewing court the 

duty or the privilege of making its own independent 

determination. . . . Thus, an appellate court is empowered 

to determine whether the trial court’s incontrovertible 

factual findings support its factual conclusions, but it may 

not interfere with those conclusions unless they are 
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unreasonable in view of the trial court’s factual findings; 

and thus, represent a gross abuse of discretion. 

R.M.G., Jr. v. F.M.G., 986 A.2d 1234, 1237 (Pa. Super. 2009) 

(quoting Bovard v. Baker, 775 A.2d 835, 838 (Pa. Super. 

2001)). Moreover,

[O]n issues of credibility and weight of the evidence, we 

defer to the findings of the trial [court which] has had the 

opportunity to observe the proceedings and demeanor of 

the witnesses.

The parties cannot dictate the amount of weight the trial 

court places on evidence. Rather, the paramount concern 

of the trial court is the best interest of the child. Appellate 

interference is unwarranted if the trial court’s consideration 

of the best interest of the child was careful and thorough, 

and we are unable to find any abuse of discretion.

R.M.G., Jr., supra at 1237 (internal citations omitted). The test 

is whether the evidence of record supports the trial court’s 

conclusions. Ketterer v. Seifert, 902 A.2d 533, 539 (Pa. Super. 

2006).

A.V. v. S.T., 87 A.3d 818, 820 (Pa. Super. 2014). 

We have explained, “It is not this Court’s function to determine whether 

the trial court reached the ‘right’ decision; rather, we must consider whether, 

‘based on the evidence presented, giv[ing] due deference to the trial court’s 

weight and credibility determinations,’ the trial court erred or abused its 

discretion. . . .” King v. King, 889 A.2d 630, 632 (Pa. Super. 2005) (quoting 

Hanson v. Hanson, 878 A.2d 127, 129 (Pa. Super. 2005)). This Court has 

recognized that “the knowledge gained by a trial court in observing witnesses 

in a custody proceeding cannot adequately be imparted to an appellate court 
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by a printed record.” Ketterer, 902 A.2d at 540 (quoting Jackson v. Beck, 

858 A.2d 1250, 1254 (Pa. Super. 2004)).

With respect to custody cases, the primary concern is the best interests 

of the child. “The best-interests standard, decided on a case-by-case basis, 

considers all factors that legitimately have an effect upon the child’s physical, 

intellectual, moral, and spiritual wellbeing.” Saintz v. Rinker, 902 A.2d 509, 

512 (Pa. Super. 2006) (quoting Arnold v. Arnold, 847 A.2d 674, 677 (Pa.

Super. 2004)).

Child custody actions are governed by the Child Custody Act (“Act”), 23 

Pa.C.S.A. §§ 5321-5340. Section 5328 of the Act provides the following list 

of factors that a trial court is required to consider in determining the best 

interests of the child when awarding any form of custody: 

§ 5328. Factors to consider when awarding custody.

(a) Factors. – In ordering any form of custody, the court shall 

determine the best interest of the child by considering all relevant 

factors, giving weighted consideration to those factors which 

affect the safety of the child, including the following:

 (1) Which party is more likely to encourage and permit 

frequent and continuing contact between the child and 

another party.

 (2) The present and past abuse committed by a party or 

member of the party’s household, whether there is a 

continued risk of harm to the child or an abused party and 

which party can better provide adequate physical safeguards 

and supervision of the child.

(2.1) The information set forth in section 5329.1(a)(1) and 

(2) (relating to consideration of child abuse and involvement 

with protective services).
J-A29020-22

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 (3) The parental duties performed by each party on behalf 

of the child.

 (4) The need for stability and continuity in the child’s 

education, family life and community life.

 (5) The availability of extended family.

 (6) The child’s sibling relationships.

 (7) The well-reasoned preference of the child, based on the 

child’s maturity and judgment.

 (8) The attempts of a parent to turn the child against the 

other parent, except in cases of domestic violence where 

reasonable safety measures are necessary to protect the 

child from harm.

 (9) Which party is more likely to maintain a loving, stable, 

consistent and nurturing relationship with the child adequate 

for the child's emotional needs.

 (10) Which party is more likely to attend to the daily 

physical, emotional, developmental, educational and special 

needs of the child.

 (11) The proximity of the residences of the parties.

 (12) Each party’s availability to care for the child or ability 

to make appropriate child-care arrangements.

 (13) The level of conflict between the parties and the 

willingness and ability of the parties to cooperate with one 

another. A party’s effort to protect a child from abuse by 

another party is not evidence of unwillingness or inability to 

cooperate with that party.

 (14) The history of drug or alcohol abuse of a party or 

member of a party’s household.

 (15) The mental and physical condition of a party or 

member of a party’s household.
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 (16) Any other relevant factor.

23 Pa.C.S.A. § 5328(a). “In any action regarding the custody of the child 

between the parents of the child, there shall be no presumption that custody 

should be awarded to a particular parent.” 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 5327(a). 

Additionally, when a custody action involves a relocation, “[t]he party 

proposing the relocation has the burden of establishing that the relocation will 

serve the best interest of the child as shown under the factors set forth in 

subsection (h),” which provides as follows:

(h) Relocation factors.--In determining whether to grant a 

proposed relocation, the court shall consider the following factors, 

giving weighted consideration to those factors which affect the 

safety of the child:

(1) The nature, quality, extent of involvement and duration 

of the child’s relationship with the party proposing to relocate 

and with the nonrelocating party, siblings and other significant 

persons in the child’s life.

(2) The age, developmental stage, needs of the child and 

the likely impact the relocation will have on the child’s physical, 

educational and emotional development, taking into 

consideration any special needs of the child.

(3) The feasibility of preserving the relationship between the 

nonrelocating party and the child through suitable custody 

arrangements, considering the logistics and financial 

circumstances of the parties.

(4) The child’s preference, taking into consideration the age 

and maturity of the child.

(5) Whether there is an established pattern of conduct of 

either party to promote or thwart the relationship of the child 

and the other party.
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(6) Whether the relocation will enhance the general quality 

of life for the party seeking the relocation, including, but not 

limited to, financial or emotional benefit or educational 

opportunity.

(7) Whether the relocation will enhance the general quality 

of life for the child, including, but not limited to, financial or 

emotional benefit or educational opportunity.

(8) The reasons and motivation of each party for seeking or 

opposing the relocation.

(9) The present and past abuse committed by a party or 

member of the party’s household and whether there is a 

continued risk of harm to the child or an abused party.

(10) Any other factor affecting the best interest of the child.

23 Pa.C.S.A. § 5337(h). 

In matters involving both a custody determination and relocation 

decision, this Court has explained that the trial court is required to consider 

all of the factors listed in Sections 5328(a) and 5337(h) when entering a 

custody order. A.V., 87 A.3d at 822 (citation omitted); see also A.M.S. v. 

M.R.C., 70 A.3d 830, 836 (Pa. Super. 2013) (stating that, when making a 

decision on relocation that also involves a custody decision, “the trial court 

must consider all ten relocation factors and all sixteen custody factors” 

outlined in the Act). Moreover, “[i]n a custody action, it is within the trial 

court’s discretion based on the record before it to determine the relevant 

weight to give each of the Section 5328(a) factors in a particular case.” T.M. 

v. H.M., 210 A.3d 283, 289 (Pa. Super. 2019) (citing M.J.M. v. M.L.G., 63 

A.3d 331, 339 (Pa. Super. 2013)). 
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Instantly, in its opinion accompanying the subject order, the trial court 

found that Mother relocated, as defined by 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 5322, when she 

moved from Clarion County to Tioga County, which is 180 miles away from 

Father’s home in Venango County. Trial Court Opinion, 5/23/22, at 3-4. The 

court considered the sixteen best interest factors and the ten relocation factors 

and provided the reasons for its decision. Id. at 4-12. With respect to the 

best interest factors, the court found Section 5328(a)(2), (15), and (16) in 

favor of Father, while finding Section 5328(a)(6) in favor of Mother. Id. at 

9-10, 12. The court found Section 5328(a)(2.1), (7), and (8) inapplicable. 

Id. at 9-11. The court found the remaining factors neutral in that Section 

5328(a)(1), (3), (4), (5), (9), (10), (12), and (14) favored both Parents, and 

(11) and (13) did not favor either parent. Id. at 9-12. 

With respect to the relocation factors, the trial court found

Section 5337(h)(2) and (3) favored Father, while Section 5337(h)(6) slightly

favored relocation. Id. at 5-7. The court found Section 5337(h)(1), (5), (7), 

and (8) neutral and Section 5337(h)(4) and (9) inapplicable. Id. at 5-7. 

Under Section 5337(h)(10), the court considered Mother’s failure to provide 

reasonable notice of her proposed relocation. Id. at 8. The court concluded 

that Mother’s relocation would not serve the best interests of Child. Id. at 9.

The court awarded primary physical custody to Father and partial physical 

custody to Mother.
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Turning to the merits of the appeal, in her first issue, Mother claims the 

trial court erred in finding that Mother relocated to Tioga County because 

Mother’s move did not impact Father’s involvement with Child. Mother’s Brief 

at 18-22. Specifically, Mother notes that prior to moving, she and Father lived 

one hour apart and never lived in the same school district or county. Id. at 

22. She further asserts Father had daily phone calls with Child after he filed 

his petition to modify in October 2021, and he continued to see Child during 

his periods of partial custody. Id. at 20-21. We are not persuaded by 

Mother’s argument.

As an initial matter, in cases involving statutory interpretation, this 

Court has held: 

[T]he interpretation and application of a statute is a question of 

law that compels plenary review to determine whether the court 

committed an error of law. As with all questions of law, the 

appellate standard of review is de novo and the appellate scope 

of review is plenary. 

C.B. v. J.B., 65 A.3d 946, 951 (Pa. Super. 2013) (quoting In re Adoption of 

J.A.S., 939 A.2d 403, 405 (Pa. Super. 2007)). 

The Act defines a relocation as, “[a] change in a residence of the child 

which significantly impairs the ability of a nonrelocating party to exercise 

custodial rights.” 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 5322(a). The Act provides that no relocation 

shall occur without the consent of every individual who has custody rights to 

the child to the proposed relocation or court approval of the proposed 

relocation. 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 5337(b). Further, the party proposing the 
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relocation is required to notify every other individual who has custody rights 

to the child. 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 5337(c).

The trial court found:

In the present case, Mother moved to Mansfield, Tioga County, 

Pennsylvania, late last year, approximately 180 miles and a 

three[-]and[-]one[-]half[-]hour drive from Father’s residence in 

Rouseville, Venango County, Pennsylvania. Prior to that time, 

Father was actively involved in the Child’s life. Beginning in June 

2018, he saw her on a regular basis. There was no court [o]rder. 

He saw her every weekend. Mother started to attend college 

classes and Father saw the Child more than on just weekends; he 

saw her two times per week during the weekdays for a couple of 

hours. Father registered the Child for daycare at the Child 

Development Center because of Mother’s work schedule and to 

help her out. Father often picked her up at daycare.

The parties began having difficulty communicating and they 

engaged in various court proceedings which resulted in several 

court Orders for custody. In early 2021, communications and coparenting improved, and Father got additional time. He had 

custody on most weekends, and he picked the Child up at daycare 

and had her for a couple of hours at least once per week. 

Father has participated with the Child in many family activities and 

in outdoor activities, including hiking, snowboarding and rock wall 

climbing, as depicted in the photos in Defendant’s Exhibit I. 

This evidence shows that Father has had regular and continued 

involvement co-parenting in different aspects of the Child’s life 

that go beyond his periods of partial physical custody as 

prescribed by court [o]rders. With a distance between residences 

of about 180 miles and one-way travel time of about three and 

one[-]half hours, the consistency and frequency of Father’s 

involvement would be broken, threatening significant impairment 

of Father’s ability to exercise his custodial rights. Therefore, the 

move by Mother is a “relocation.” 

Trial Court Opinion, 5/23/22, at 3-4 (cleaned up).
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The record supports the trial court’s finding of a relocation. Mother 

testified that her prior residence in Clarion County was one hour from Father’s 

residence. N.T., 5/10/22, at 170. Father testified that Mother’s new residence 

in Tioga County is three and one-half hours or 180 miles from his residence. 

Id. at 62. Father testified that when Mother attended college and Parents 

agreed on an informal custody arrangement in 2018, Father registered Child 

for daycare and picked Child up from daycare twice a week during Mother’s 

class times. Id. at 21-24. Father testified that these weekday visits lasted a 

couple hours. Id.

The existing custody order granted Father overnight weekend custodial 

time for three weekends per month, as well as any additional time that is 

mutually agreed upon by the parties. Order, 7/26/19. Upon agreement of 

the parties, Father had overnight weekend custody four weekends out of the 

month. N.T., 5/10/22, at 40. After Child’s enrollment in preschool in August 

2021, Father testified that he picked Child up from preschool once a week for 

“a couple hours,” taking her out to eat and driving her back to Mother’s home

in Clarion County. Id. at 40-42; Father’s Exhibit F, at 5. On 

cross-examination, Mother agreed that Father has been actively involved with 

Child since June 2018. N.T., 5/10/22, at 209. 

Father acknowledged that he stopped picking Child up from preschool

in October 2021 due to a change in his work schedule at his previous welding 

job. Id. at 10, 49-50, 123. However, Father is now self-employed operating
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a tree service business, which affords a flexible work schedule. Id. at 9, 50. 

Further, the record demonstrates that Mother withdrew Child from preschool

in late October 2021 when she and Child moved to Tioga County. Id. at 57, 

204; Father’s Exhibit F, at 5. 

Mother claims that Father had greater contact with the Child after 

Mother’s move to Tioga County because he participated in daily phone calls or 

video calls with Child, each lasting approximately fifty minutes to one hour. 

Mother’s Brief at 20-21. Mother’s claim is not persuasive. Although Father’s 

ability to have reasonable contact with Child pursuant to the existing custody 

order was not impacted by the relocation, the record supports the court’s

finding that “the consistency and frequency of Father’s involvement would be 

broken, threatening significant impairment of Father’s ability to exercise his 

custodial rights.” Trial Court Opinion, 5/23/22, at 4. Therefore, the trial court 

properly concluded that Mother had relocated.

In support of its decision, the trial court cites C.M.K. v. K.E.M., 45 A.3d 

417 (Pa. Super. 2012). Trial Court Opinion, 5/23/22, at 2-3. To the extent 

that Mother contends that C.M.K. is inapplicable here, Mother’s contention 

fails. In C.M.K., the mother proposed to move to a location approximately 

sixty-eight miles from the father’s residence. 45 A.3d at 420. This Court in 

C.M.K. affirmed the trial court’s finding that mother’s proposed move 

constituted a relocation because it significantly impaired the father’s ability to 

exercise his custodial rights. Id. at 426. The trial court found that the father 
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had regular and continued involvement in co-parenting the child that went 

beyond his periods of partial physical custody. Id. Specifically, the father 

was involved in the child’s school activities, medical appointments, and sports 

events, and had a desire to coach the child. Id.

The record here provides greater support for the trial court’s finding that 

Mother’s move to Tioga County meets the statutory definition of a relocation. 

Compared to the sixty-eight miles in C.M.K., Mother’s move to Tioga County 

resulted in a distance of 180 miles from Father’s residence, equivalent to a 

one-way drive time of three and a half hours. Additionally, Father here was 

actively involved in Child’s life since June 2018, having overnight weekend 

custody and exercising custodial time after Child’s daycare and preschool

activities concluded. 

Mother’s reliance on G.R.S. v. M.L.S., 236 A.3d 1089 (Pa. Super. 2020) 

(unpublished memorandum) to challenge the trial court’s finding is misplaced,

as that case is distinguishable.4 This Court in G.R.S. found that a mother’s 

move to a location thirty minutes away from the father’s home was not a 

relocation because it did not significantly impair the father’s ability to exercise 

custody of the child. 236 A.3d 1089, at *6. Unlike G.R.S., Mother’s new 

residence in Tioga County is three and one-half hours from Father’s residence. 

____________________________________________

4

In accordance with this Court’s Operating Procedure § 65.37, a nonprecedential decision of this Court filed after May 1, 2019, may be cited for its 

persuasive value, pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 126(b). 210 Pa. Code § 65.37(A).
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N.T., 5/10/22, at 62. The distance between the parties’ residences in G.R.S.

is not comparable to the distance in the present case. 

Citing D.K. v. S.P.K, 102 A.3d 467 (Pa. Super. 2014), Mother contends 

that a change in the custody order is not necessary for the parties to maintain 

their respective rights and Mother had not requested any changes in the 

schedule. Mother’s Brief at 27. However, the facts in D.K. are distinguishable 

from the instant case. The D.K. court specifically held that in a custody case 

“where neither [m]other nor [f]ather is relocating and only the children stand 

to move to a significantly distant location, the relocation provisions of the Child 

Custody Act, 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 5337, are not per se triggered and the notice 

requirement of section 5337(c) does not apply.” D.K. 102 A.3d at 468. The 

court further stated, “In a case such as this, where both parents remain in 

their established residences, there are no changed circumstances to assess.” 

Id. at 473. Unlike the parties in D.K., Mother in the instant matter changed 

her geographic location when she relocated 180 miles away from Father’s 

home. Contrary to Mother’s contention, the record supports the trial court’s 

finding that Mother’s move to Tioga County meets the statutory definition of 

a relocation. We discern no error or abuse of discretion by the trial court. 

In her second issue, Mother contends the trial court erred or abused its 

discretion in finding neutral the following factors: Section 5328(a)(1), (3), 

(4), (9), (10), (12), and (13). Mother’s Brief at 37-39. Here, the trial court 

set forth its consideration of Section 5328(a)(1), (3), (4), (9), (10), (12), and 
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(13) and found these factors neutral as to both Parents. The court found both 

Parents are likely to permit frequent and continuing contact with Child under 

Section 5328(a)(1). Trial Court Opinion, 5/23/22, at 9. The court found both 

Parents adequately performed parental duties, and both can meet the need 

for stability and continuity in the Child’s education, family, and community 

life, pursuant to Sections 5328(a)(3) and (4). Regarding Section 5328(a)(9), 

the court determined both parents are equally likely to maintain a loving, 

stable, consistent, and nurturing relationship with Child. The court found both 

Parents can attend to Child’s needs and are available to care for Child and 

make appropriate childcare arrangements, with respect to Section

5328(a)(10) and (12). Id. at 11. With regards to Section 5328(a)(13), the 

court found “[t]here is a level of conflict between the parties which prevents 

effective communication,” but the court did not find this factor in favor of or 

against either parent. Id. at 12. 

Mother emphasizes that she is a stay-at-home mother who would be 

able to attend to Child’s needs. Mother’s Brief at 38-39. This is particularly 

relevant to Sections 5328(a)(10) and (12), which, respectively, pertain to 

which party is more likely to attend to the child’s daily needs and a party’s 

availability to care for the child or to make appropriate childcare 

arrangements. 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 5328(a)(10), (12). Father testified that he 

believed both he and Mother can attend to Child’s physical, developmental, 

and educational needs, though he believed he is more likely to attend to 
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Child’s emotional needs. N.T., 5/10/22, at 95. Father testified that when he 

is working, he would rely on Paternal Grandparents to provide childcare. Id.

at 63. While Mother argues she would be a stay-at-home mother, the record 

reflects, from Mother’s own testimony, that she relies on a baby-sitter when 

needed. Id. at 162, 201. Mother also testified that she believed Father is a 

“good dad” and that both she and Father can provide for Child’s daily physical 

needs. Id. at 147, 202-203. In turn, the trial court was well within its 

discretion when it found these factors neutral. 

Additionally, we find that Mother’s argument that the court did not 

properly consider the remaining Section 5328(a) factors to be without merit. 

Mother fails to put forth any argument with citation to the record showing that 

the court’s conclusions with respect to the remaining best interest factors at 

issue are unreasonable or unsupported by the record. Essentially, Mother is 

asking this Court to reweigh the evidence and credibility determinations made 

by the trial court. This we cannot do. The trial court cited each custody factor, 

determined whether the factor was neutral, inapplicable, or weighed in favor 

of Mother or Father, and provided its reasoning. Trial Court Opinion, 5/23/22, 

at 9-12. The trial court’s findings of fact and determinations regarding 

credibility and weight of the evidence are not to be disturbed absent an abuse 

of discretion. E.R. v. J.N.B., 129 A.3d 521, 527 (Pa. Super. 2015); C.R.F. v. 

S.E.F., 45 A.3d 441, 443 (Pa. Super. 2012); King, 889 A.2d at 632. We 

discern no error or abuse of discretion by the trial court. 
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In her third issue, Mother argues that the Section 5328 best interest 

factors overall favored Mother. Mother’s Brief at 34-36. Specifically, she 

claims that the trial court improperly considered Mother’s failure to provide 

notice of her relocation when it analyzed Section 5328(a)(16), and that no 

other factors favored Father. Id. at 34. Mother claims that the court imposed 

a sanction against Mother rather than conducting a best interest analysis. Id.

at 37. We do not find Mother’s argument persuasive.

Contrary to Mother’s assertion, in addition to Section 5328(a)(16), the 

trial court found that Section 5328(a)(2) and (15) weighed against Mother. 

Under Section 5328(a)(2), the trial court is required to consider “the present 

and past abuse” committed by a party or a party’s household member, 

“whether there is a continued risk of harm to the child or an abused party,” 

and “which party can better provide adequate physical safeguards and 

supervision of the child.” 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 5328(a)(2). 

Here, the trial court noted that “Mother previously stated that Stepfather 

had abused her, but she partially recanted her statements at trial.” Trial Court 

Opinion, 5/23/22, at 9. The court explained it was “concerned about the 

current stability” of Mother and Stepfather’s relationship given its unstable

history. Id. The trial court’s stated concern regarding the stability of Mother’s 

current relationship reveals that it found this best interest factor against 

Mother. 
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The record supports the trial court’s finding with respect to Section 

5328(a)(2). After her separation from Stepfather in 2020, Mother made a 

Facebook post about her relationship with Stepfather. N.T., 5/10/22, at 41; 

Father’s Exhibit C. In the post, Mother stated that Stepfather “threw things, 

broke things” and sent her into “panic attacks regularly.” Father’s Exhibit C. 

She further stated that Stepfather called her “an addict” for taking her 

prescribed medications, threatened to kill her, spat on her, threw a wallet at 

her face, and charged at her while she was six months pregnant. Id. 

At the subject proceeding, Mother testified that what she had written in 

the Facebook post is partly true and that she made statements on social media 

when she was depressed. N.T., 5/10/22, at 156, 186, 189. Mother testified

that she had suicidal thoughts after separating from Stepfather. Id. at 

187-188. Mother agreed that she “did act crazy,” but she did not agree that 

she was emotionally and mentally abused. Id. at 186. Mother testified that 

Stepfather “threw things,” “probably” broke things, and called her an addict 

for taking prescribed medications. Id. at 188-189. Mother testified that she 

and Stepfather were in a “bad fight” when she was pregnant, but she did not 

believe a knife was pulled on her. Id. at 190-191. Mother acknowledged

that this is the third time that she and Stepfather formed a romantic

relationship. Id. at 199. We find that the record supports the trial court’s 

concern about the current stability of Mother and Stepfather’s relationship. 
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We discern no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s consideration of this factor 

against Mother.

In Section 5328(a)(15), the trial court considers the mental and physical 

condition of a party or a party’s household member. 23 Pa.C.S.A. 

§ 5328(a)(15). Here, the trial court stated that, in light of Mother’s social 

media communications, it is concerned about Mother’s mental health. Trial 

Court Opinion, 5/23/22, at 12. The trial court’s concern regarding Mother’s 

mental health demonstrates it found this factor against Mother.

The record supports the court’s assessment of Section 5328(a)(15). 

Father testified that Stepfather contacted him with concerns “during their 

break-up” regarding Mother’s mental health, self-harm, and drug use. N.T., 

5/10/22, at 33. Father testified regarding a series of text messages that 

Mother sent to Stepfather, which included a picture of someone’s arm bleeding 

from cutting. Id. at 36; Father’s Exhibit A. The text message also contained 

the following communication that Mother wrote to Stepfather: 

Actually I lied. I am not doing okay at all honestly. Worse than 

before.

. . . . 

Like[,] bad[,] bad. And I’m only showing you this because idk 

[sic]. Someone should know[,] I guess[,] before it gets too bad. 

Just in case. I’m still fighting every day. But idk [sic]. I don’t 

wanna [sic] be me anymore. I’m so tired. My soul is tired. I’m 

a burden to literally everyone. . . .

And no[,] I don’t want you to be there for me right now. But if 

something happens[,] I just want you to know that I love you. 

And I’m trying. Hard. But idk [sic] if I can do it much longer. So
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if someday I give up, just know that I’m fighting with literally 

every breath I have. 

N.T., 5/10/22, at 37; Father’s Exhibit A. 

On cross-examination, Mother testified that she had suicidal thoughts 

when she separated from Stepfather, and that she had “harmed” herself in 

November 2020. N.T., 5/10/22, at 188, 197. Mother testified that she had 

been prescribed medications for depression, anxiety, and ADHD, but she 

stopped taking those medications in October or November 2021. Id. at 

155-156. Thus, the record evidence supports the trial court’s stated concern 

regarding Mother’s mental health. We find no abuse of discretion by the trial 

court in finding this factor against Mother.

With respect to Section 5328(a)(16), the trial court is to consider any 

other relevant factor. 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 5328(a)(16). Pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. 

§ 5337(j), the court may consider a failure of a party to provide reasonable 

notice of relocation as:

(1) a factor in making a determination regarding the relocation;

(2) a factor in determining whether custody rights should be 

modified; 

(3) a basis for ordering the return of the child to the nonrelocating 

party if the relocation has occurred without reasonable notice;

23 Pa.C.S.A. § 5337(j). 

Here, we discern no abuse of discretion by the trial court in considering 

Mother’s failure to provide notice of relocation under Section 5328(a)(16). 

There is no dispute that Mother did not provide Father with reasonable notice 
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of relocation in violation of 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 5337(c) when she relocated to Tioga 

County, 180 miles from Father’s residence. In this case, the record amply 

supports the trial court’s analysis of the best interest factors of Section 5328, 

and the court appropriately found Section 5328(a)(2), (15), and (16) did not 

favor Mother.

In her fourth issue, Mother argues that the trial court did not adequately 

analyze the relocation factors, specifically Section 5337(h)(1), (2), (3), and 

(7). Mother’s Brief at 29. We address each of these factors in turn.

With respect to Section 5337(h)(1), pertaining to the nature, quality, 

extent of involvement and duration of the child’s relationship with the party 

proposing to relocate and the nonrelocating party, Mother contends that the 

trial court erred when it did not weigh this factor in favor of relocation. Id. at 

31. Specifically, Mother asserts the court discounted the evidence showing 

that she has been Child’s primary caretaker since birth, and Child has a close 

relationship with her younger brother, who also lives in Mother’s home. Id. 

The trial court here found that Section 5337(h)(1) did not favor either 

parent, and the record supports its finding. Trial Court Opinion, 5/23/22, at 

5. The court explained, “The Child has very close relationships with both 

parents, with her sibling, and with the family members and friends of both 

parents.” Id. Contrary to Mother’s claim, the court expressly recognized that 

Child has a very close relationship with her sibling and Mother. Id. The record 

also supports the court’s finding that Child has a very close relationship with 
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Father and his family members. Father testified that he has a very good 

relationship with Child, and that Child is generally well-behaved. N.T., 

5/10/22, at 72-73. Father testified Child gets along with her extended family

and has a good relationship with Paternal Grandparents. Id. 73. Father 

introduced into evidence photographs of Child with Father, her Paternal 

Grandparents, and her cousins. Id. at 74. Father testified that he has been 

involved in Child’s life since June 2018, participates in overnight weekend 

visits with Child, and maintains daily phone contact with the Child. Id. at 79. 

Mother testified that Child’s phone calls with Father last between one hour and 

one hour and thirty minutes. Id. at 151. Mother also testified that she 

believed Father is a “good dad” and that he has been actively involved in 

Child’s life. Id. at 147, 209. The record supports the trial court’s assessment 

that this factor does not favor either parent given Child’s close relationships 

with both Parents, as well as extended family members. 

With respect to Section 5337(h)(2), which considers the child’s age, 

developmental stage, and needs, and the likely impact of relocation on the 

child’s development, Mother claims that the court did not adequately consider 

the impact on Child’s development. Mother’s Brief at 30. We disagree. The 

trial court weighed this factor in favor of Father, noting that while Mother was 

Child’s primary caregiver, Father assisted with childcare responsibilities when 

he was not working. Trial Court Opinion, 5/23/22, at 5. The court found that 

Child will depend on both Parents for her basic daily needs. Id. The court 
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determined that relocation would have a negative impact on Child’s physical, 

educational, and emotional development in that the consistency and 

frequency of Father’s involvement will be broken. Id. 

The record supports the trial court’s finding. Prior to Mother’s move to 

Tioga County, Father participated in overnight weekend visits with Child, and 

spent time with Child one or two times per week when he picked her up from 

daycare and preschool. N.T., 5/10/22, at 24, 39-40. Father testified that he 

has a very good relationship with Child. Id. at 72-73. Significantly, Mother 

testified she believed Father is a “good dad” and that he is “loving and 

nurturing,” though she did not believe him to be stable or consistent. Id. at 

147, 166. While Father participated in daily phone contact with Child since 

Mother’s relocation, there is no evidence that Father would be able to maintain 

the frequency and consistency of in-person custodial time with Child given 

Mother’s relocation 180 miles from his home. Thus, we find no abuse of 

discretion regarding this factor.

With respect to Section 5337(h)(3), which pertains to the feasibility of 

preserving the relationship between the nonrelocating party and the child 

through suitable custody arrangements, Mother argues that the parties would 

be able to maintain custody in their consent order. Mother’s Brief at 30. Here, 

the trial court stated that “[f]or reasons previously stated, this factor weighs 

against relocation.” Trial Court Opinion, 5/23/22, at 6. Earlier in its opinion, 

the trial court stated:
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With a distance between residences of about 180 miles and 

one-way travel time of about three and one half hours, the 

consistency and frequency of Father’s involvement would be 

broken, threatening significant impairment of Father’s ability to 

exercise his custodial rights. 

Id. at 4. We discern no abuse of discretion.

Regarding Section 5337(h)(7), Mother claims the trial court did not 

specify whether this factor is neutral or weighed against relocation. Mother’s 

Brief at 30. Mother asserts that the court did not address the evidence that 

Child moved from a public housing apartment to a three-bedroom home and 

that the improvement of Mother’s financial situation would enhance the Child’s 

quality of life. Id. 

Section 5337(h)(7) requires the trial court to consider whether the 

relocation will enhance the general quality of life for the child, including, but 

not limited to, financial or emotional benefit or educational opportunity. 23 

Pa.C.S.A. § 5337(h)(7). Here, the trial court provided the following 

reasoning:

The Child will not benefit financially because both parents can now 

provide financial support. The Child will benefit emotionally if 

Mother is happier, however, the move will also be detrimental to 

her emotional wellbeing because Father will lose access to share 

in her educational and other activities. There is no convincing 

evidence that the school system in Mansfield is better than that in 

the Rouseville area. 

Trial Court Opinion, 5/23/22, at 7. While the court did not expressly state its 

conclusion, it is evident from the court’s analysis that it determined this factor 

to be neutral. 
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The record supports the trial court’s consideration of Section 

5337(h)(7). Mother testified that she has an extremely close bond with Child, 

and she believes her current home in Tioga County is “substantially better” 

than the public housing in Clarion County. N.T., 5/10/22, at 166-168. Mother 

also testified that she assists Stepfather with a car detailing business from 

their home, and she is working on obtaining a notary license. Id. at 158-159. 

Additionally, Father testified that he and Child have a very good 

relationship. Id. at 73. Father testified that he is self-employed as he 

operates a tree service company and previously worked at a welding shop. 

Id. at 9. Father testified that he has “four jobs lined up” and has “estimates 

scheduled in the coming weeks.” Id. at 129. Mother acknowledged that 

Father was actively involved in Child’s life since June 2018, outside of the 

pendency of the PFA. Id. at 209. Mother testified that Father is loving and 

nurturing, though she does not believe he is stable or consistent. Id. at 166, 

173. The record demonstrates that both Parents have a source of income, 

which supports the trial court’s finding that Child will not benefit financially as 

both Parents can provide financial support. The record further demonstrates 

that both Parents have a close relationship with the Child. Thus, the trial court 

appropriately found this factor neutral. 

Accordingly, we discern no error or abuse of discretion by the trial court 

in finding that Mother’s relocation would not be in Child’s best interest and in 

awarding primary physical custody to Father. 
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Order affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 2/3/2023