Filed 3/8/21 Protecting Our Water etc. v. County of Stanislaus CA5

Opinion on remand from Supreme Court

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for 

publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication 

or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

PROTECTING OUR WATER & 

ENVIRONMENTAL RESOURCES et al.,

Plaintiffs and Appellants,

v.

COUNTY OF STANISLAUS et al.,

Defendants and Respondents.

F073634

(Stanislaus Super. Ct. No. 2006153)

OPINION

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Stanislaus County. Roger M. 

Beauchesne, Judge.

Law Office of Thomas N. Lippe and Thomas N. Lippe for Plaintiffs and 

Appellants.

M.R. Wolfe & Associates and Mark R. Wolfe; Law Office of Babak Naficy and 

Babak Naficy for California Water Impact Network and California Wildlife Foundation

as Amici Curiae on behalf of Plaintiffs and Appellants.

Shute, Mihaly & Weinberger, Matthew D. Zinn, Sarah H. Sigman, Lauren M. 

Tarpey and Peter J. Broderick; Thomas E. Boze and John P. Doering, County Counsel, 

for Defendants and Respondents.

Dennis Bunting, County Counsel (Solano)Peter R. Miljanich, Deputy County 

Counsel, and Jennifer Henning for the California State Association of Counties as 

Amicus Curiae on behalf of Defendants and Respondents.

-ooOoo-
2.

This matter has been remanded to us from the Supreme Court. The case concerns 

respondent Stanislaus County’s (the County) practice of treating the issuance of all 

nonvariance well permits as ministerial acts under the California Environmental Quality 

Act (CEQA or the Act). (Pub. Resources Code, § 21000 et seq.) The Supreme Court 

held this practice is unlawful because one of the applicable standards for well 

construction – Standard 8.A of Bulletin No. 74 – confers discretionary authority on the 

County in at least some instances. 

The Supreme Court declined to reconsider conclusions this court made regarding 

Standards 8.B and 8.C. On remand from the Supreme Court, plaintiffs have asked us to 

hold that other standards (Standards 8.B and 8.C) likewise confer discretionary authority; 

and that other purportedly discretionary provisions in Department of Water Resources 

Bulletin 74 have been incorporated into the Stanislaus County Code. 

We hold that Standards 8.B and 8.C do confer discretionary authority in at least 

some instances but reject plaintiffs’ claim that certain other provisions in Bulletin 74 are 

incorporated into the Stanislaus County Code. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of 

the trial court and remand.

FACTS

I. History of Water Well Standards in California

In 1949, the Legislature enacted section 231 of the Water Code,1 which then 

provided:

“The department, either independently or in cooperation with any person or 

any county, state, federal or other agency, shall investigate and survey 

conditions of damage to quality of underground waters, which conditions 

are or may be caused by improperly constructed, abandoned or defective 

wells through the interconnection of strata or the introduction of surface 

waters into underground waters. The department shall report to the

appropriate regional water pollution control board its recommendations for 

minimum standards of well construction in any particular locality in which 

1 All further statutory references are to the Water Code unless otherwise stated.
3.

it deems regulation necessary to protection of quality of underground water, 

and shall report to the Legislature from time to time, its recommendations 

for proper sealing of abandoned wells.”2 (Stats.1949, ch. 1552, p. 2795.)

In 1967, the Legislature enacted sections 13800 through 13806 of the Water Code. 

(Stats.1967, ch. 323, pp. 1518–1519; see also Stats.1969, ch. 482, pp. 1081–1082.) 

Those statutes empowered the Department of Water Resources (“DWR”), after 

completing the studies and investigations described in section 231, to make a 

determination that a particular area of the state “need[s]” “water well construction, 

maintenance, abandonment, and destruction standards ... to protect the quality of water 

used.” (Stats.1967, ch. 323, p. 1518.) Such a determination would then be reported to 

the area’s regional water quality control board (“regional board”). (Ibid.) If the area’s 

regional board concurred in DWR’s determination, it was to make a report to the affected 

counties and cities and transmit any well standards that had been recommended by DWR. 

(Ibid.) The affected counties and cities would then have 120 days to adopt an ordinance 

establishing “standards of water well construction, maintenance, abandonment, and 

destruction.” (Ibid.) If a county or city failed to so adopt an ordinance, the regional 

board could adopt such standards for the area. (Id. at p. 1519.) Standards adopted in that 

fashion would “have the same force and effect as if adopted as a county or city 

ordinance.” (Ibid.)

2

In 1969, the statute’s reference to “regional water pollution control board[s]” 

was changed to “the appropriate California regional water quality control board.” 

(Stats.1969, ch. 482, pp. 1047–1048.) Otherwise, the statute’s language remains in effect 

today as it was enacted in 1949. (See § 231.)
4.

Bulletin 74-68

In February 1968, DWR published a document titled, Bulletin No. 74, Water Well 

Standards: State of California (Bulletin 74-68.)3 Bulletin 74-68 stated that it was 

prepared as part of DWR’s compliance with section 231.4

Bulletin 74-68 stated DWR’s understanding that sections 13800 through 13806 

“established a procedure for implementing standards developed under Section 231.”

In Bulletin 74-68’s foreword, the Director of DWR stated, “The standards 

presented in this report are issued as guides to good practice for those engaged in the 

construction of water wells or in the regulation of water well construction and the 

destruction of abandoned wells in California.” The Director claimed Bulletin 74-68 

“fulfill[s] the need for a basic set of standards that are satisfactory under most conditions 

and which can be modified or expanded to accommodate local variations in geologic or 

ground water conditions.” The foreword concluded by acknowledging that the standards 

would need to be revised and updated over time “in light of both changes in practice and 

the degree of success achieved in their application.”

Bulletin 74-68 was organized into three chapters, titled “Introduction,” 

“Standards,” and “Destruction of Wells.” Some of the chapters were further divided into 

parts, and some parts were further divided into sections. Relevant here, Chapter 2 

(Standards) has a Part II titled “Well Construction.” Section 8 of Part II is titled, “Well 

Location with Respect to Contaminants and Pollutants.” It is this section, as later 

amended, that takes center stage in the present appeal.

3 This Bulletin did not refer to itself as Bulletin 74-68. However, subsequent 

editions are identified as “Bulletin 74-” followed by the last two digits of the year it was 

published. For consistency, we will refer to the original Bulletin 74, published in 1968, 

as “Bulletin 74-68.”

4 A “preliminary edition” of this bulletin was issued in 1962. The 1962 edition 

was the first recommended statewide standards for water well construction and sealing.
5.

Chapter 9.36 of the Stanislaus County Code

In 1973, Chapter 9.36 of the Stanislaus County Code was enacted. (Protecting 

Our Water & Environmental Resources v. County of Stanislaus (2020) 10 Cal.5th 479, 

490 (Protecting Our Water).) It provides that a permit from the county health officer is 

required to construct, repair, or destroy a water well. (Stanislaus Co. Code, § 9.36.030.) 

Chapter 9.36 establishes several standards for water well construction. It also 

imports certain standards from Bulletin 74 as follows:

“Except as may be otherwise provided by this chapter, standards for the 

construction, repair, reconstruction, or abandonment of wells shall be as set 

forth in Chapter II of the Department of Water Resources Bulletin No. 74, 

“Water Well Standards” (February 1968), or as subsequently revised or 

supplemented, which are incorporated in this chapter and made a part of 

this chapter.”

“Chapter 9.36 also allows for variance permits. The county health officer ‘may 

authorize an exception to any provision of this chapter when, in his/her opinion, the 

application of such provision is unnecessary.’ (Stanislaus County Code, § 9.36.110.) 

When authorizing a variance, the health officer may prescribe ‘such conditions as, in his 

or her judgment, are necessary to protect the waters of the state ....’ (Stanislaus County 

Code, § 9.36.110.)” (Protecting Our Water, supra, 10 Cal.5th at p. 491.)

Bulletin 74-81

DWR updated Bulletin 74 in December 1981. We refer to this updated bulletin as 

Bulletin 74-81. Bulletin 74-81 is a nearly 100-page document which, like its predecessor, 

is “filled with technical specifications for water wells ....” (See California Groundwater 

Assn. v. Semitropic Water Storage Dist. (2009) 178 Cal.App.4th 1460, 1469.) 

Chapter I of Bulletin 74-81, entitled “Introduction,” describes the history of well 

standards in the state. 

Chapter II of Bulletin 74-81, entitled “Standards,” is split into three parts: 

“General” (Part I); “Well Construction” (Part II); and “Destruction of Wells” (Part III). 
6.

The section 8 standards referenced throughout this opinion are located in Part II of 

Chapter II.

At the beginning of Chapter II, before even Part I begins, there is a two-paragraph 

preamble. Relevant here, the first paragraph reads:

“The standards presented in this chapter are intended to apply to the 

construction (including major reconstruction) or destruction of water wells 

throughout the State of California. However, under certain circumstances, 

adequate protection of ground water quality may require more stringent 

standards than those presented here; under other circumstances, it may be 

necessary to substitute other measures which will provide protection equal 

to that provided by these standards. Such situations arise from practicalities 

in applying any standards or, in this case, from anomalies in ground water 

geology or hydrology. Since it is impractical to prepare standards for every 

conceivable situation, provision has been made for deviation from the 

standards as well as for additional ones. However, the Department believes 

that for most conditions encountered in the State, the standards presented in 

this report are satisfactory for the protection of ground water quality.”

After the preamble section, Part I of Chapter II begins.

Section 3 of Part I of Chapter II is entitled. “Exemption Due to Unusual 

Conditions,” and provides:

“If the enforcing agency finds that compliance with any of the 

requirements prescribed herein is impractical for a particular location 

because of unusual conditions or if compliance would result in construction 

of an unsatisfactory well, the enforcing agency may waive compliance and 

prescribe alternative requirements which are “equal to” these standards in 

terms of protection obtained.”

Section 5.A. of Part II of Chapter II, provides:

“In locations where existing geologic or ground water conditions 

require standards more restrictive than those described herein, such special 

additional standards may be prescribed by the enforcing agency.”

County’s CEQA Regulations

“In 1983 County adopted its own CEQA regulations which generally classified 

issuance of all well construction permits as ministerial projects unless the county health 

officer granted a variance. A variance permit was designated as a discretionary project,
7.

triggering environmental review. As enacted, County’s regulations provided that the 

issuance of a nonvariance well construction permit was presumed to be ministerial ‘[i]n 

the absence of any discretionary provision contained in the relevant ordinance.’ The 

parties stipulated that County’s practice has been to treat all nonvariance permit issuances 

as ministerial. This practice ignores the quoted clause, which mirrors language in CEQA 

Guidelines, section 15268, subdivision (b).” (Protecting Our Water, supra, 10 Cal.5th at 

p. 491.) 

Water Code Section 13801

In 1986, the Legislature amended section 13801. (Stats.1986, ch. 1152; see also 

California Groundwater Assn. v. Semitropic Water Storage Dist., supra, 178 Cal.App.4th 

at pp. 1468–1469.) As amended, section 13801, subdivision (c) required that counties 

adopt a water well ordinance “that meets or exceeds the standards contained in Bulletin 

74-81” by January 15, 1990.5 (§ 13801, subd. (c).)

Through this statute, the Legislature has established the standards in Bulletin 74-

81 as the “baseline for local ordinances.” (California Groundwater Assn. v. Semitropic 

Water Storage Dist., supra, 178 Cal.App.4th at p. 1469.) However, “the Legislature did 

not adopt Bulletin No. 74-81 as state law.” (Ibid.) 

The County asserts that Stanislaus County Code section 9.36.150, cited above, 

complies with section 13801, subdivision (c).

Bulletin 74-90

“In 1991, a supplement was issued as bulletin No. 74-90.” (Protecting Our Water, 

supra, at p. 490, fn. 5.) Bulletin 74-90 revised some of the standards contained in 

Bulletin 74-81. All other standards in Bulletin 74-81 remain in effect.

5

If they failed to do so, a model ordinance prepared by the State Board of Water 

Resources would take effect in that jurisdiction on February 15, 1990. (§ 13801, 

subd. (d).)
8.

In its “General Introduction,” Bulletin 74-90 has a section titled “Limitations of 

Standards.” That section provides, in pertinent part:

“Well standards contained in Bulletin 74-81 together with well 

standards in this supplement (Bulletin 74-90) are recommended minimum 

statewide standards for the protection of ground water quality. The 

standards are not necessarily sufficient for local conditions. Local 

enforcing agencies may need to adopt more stringent standards for local 

conditions to ensure ground water quality protection.

“In some cases, it may be necessary for a local enforcing agency to 

substitute alternate measures or standards to provide protection equal to that 

otherwise afforded by DWR standards. Such cases arise from practicalities 

in applying standards, and from variations in geologic and hydrologic 

conditions. Because it is impractical to prepare “site-specific” standards 

covering every conceivable case, provision has been made for deviation 

from the standards.

“Standards in Bulletin 74-81 and this supplement (Bulletin 74-90) do 

not ensure proper construction or function of any type of well. Proper well 

design and construction practices require the use of these standards together 

with accepted industry practices, regulatory requirements, and 

consideration of site conditions.” (Italics added.)

Bulletin 74-90 also revised sections 8 and 9 of Bulletin 74-81.

Section 8

“Section 8.A of the bulletin (Standard 8.A) addresses the distance between 

proposed wells and potential sources of contamination. It requires that all wells “be 

located an adequate horizontal distance” from those sources. The standard lists 

separation distances that are generally considered adequate for specific situations. For 

example, it notes that a well should be located at least 50 feet from any sewer line; 100 

feet from any watertight septic tank or animal enclosure; and 150 feet from any cesspool 

or seepage pit. However, the standard makes clear that the distances are not intended to 

be rigidly applied. It notes that: “[m]any variables are involved in determining the ‘safe’ 

separation distance;” “[n]o set separation distance is adequate and reasonable for all 

conditions;” and “[d]etermination of the safe separation distance for individual wells 
9.

requires detailed evaluation of existing and future site conditions.” It also provides that 

“[c]onsideration should ... be given to adequate separation from sites or areas with 

known or suspected soil or water pollution or contamination.” Significantly, it allows the 

agency to increase or decrease suggested distances, depending on attendant 

circumstances.

“Standard 8.B provides that, ‘[w]here possible, a well shall be located up the 

ground water gradient from potential sources of pollution or contamination.’ Under 

Standard 8.C, ‘[i]f possible, a well should be located outside areas of flooding.’ ” 

(Protecting Our Water, supra, 10 Cal.5th at p. 490.)

Standard 9.A

Standard 9.A requires that the annular surface seal for water wells must extend 

from ground surface to certain specified minimum depths (e.g., 20 feet below ground 

surface for agricultural and individual domestic wells.) Standard 9.A permits the 

enforcing agency to grant exceptions to the listed minimum depths “where the water to be 

produced is at a depth less than 20 feet.” However, in no case may the annular seal 

extend less than 10 feet below land surface or be less than 10 feet long. If a well is to be 

located closer to a pollution or contamination source than otherwise allowed by Standard 

8, then the annular seal must extend to a minimum depth of 50 feet.

Standard 9.A also provides for exceptions from the general requirement for 

annular seals to extend from ground surface: “The top of an annular surface seal may be 

below ground surface in areas where freezing is likely, but in no case more than 4 feet 

below ground surface.” The standard defines “freezing areas” as those were the mean 

length of the freeze-free period described by the National Weather Service is less than 

100 days.” The Bulletin observes that those areas generally include portions of Modoc, 

Lassen, and Siskiyou Counties, as well as portions of the North Lahontan area and the 

area of Lake Arrowhead.
10.

The top of an annular surface seal can also be below ground where traffic or 

“other conditions” require, so long as the “seal and casing extend to a watertight and 

structurally sound subsurface vault, or equivalent feature.” Even in that situation, the top 

of the annular seal may not be more than 4 feet below ground surface.

Chapter 9.37

“In 2014, County’s board of supervisors amended Chapter 9.37 to prohibit the 

unsustainable extraction and export of groundwater. (Stanislaus County Code, 

§ 9.37.040, subd. A.) The amendment requires that future permit applications satisfy 

both Chapter 9.36 and Chapter 9.37, unless exempt from the latter. (Stanislaus County 

Code, § 9.37.045, subd. A.)” (Protecting Our Water, supra, 10 Cal.5th at p. 491, fn. 

omitted.)

II. Present Litigation

A. Trial Court Proceedings

“In January 2014, plaintiffs filed this action alleging “a pattern and practice” of 

approving well construction permits without CEQA review. They assert that all permit 

issuance decisions are discretionary projects because County can “deny [a] permit or 

require changes in the project as a condition of permit approval to address concerns 

relating to environmental impacts.” For example, a permit application could be denied or 

ordered modified if the distance between the proposed well and a potential contamination 

source is deemed inadequate (Standard 8.A) or if the proposed well is situated in a 

flooding area when it could be located elsewhere (Standard 8.C). Plaintiffs urge that, 

because determining compliance with Chapter 9.36’s standards requires the exercise of 

subjective judgment, the projects are discretionary. Plaintiffs seek a declaration that 

County’s practice of approving misclassified permits without environmental review is 

“unlawful,” and seek to enjoin County from issuing any more permits until it changes its 

policy.” (Protecting Our Water, supra, 10 Cal.5th at p. 492, fn. omitted.)
11.

The trial court held Stanislaus County’s practice of treating all nonvariance well 

permit issuances as ministerial does not violate CEQA.

B. This Court’s Original Opinion

In an unpublished decision filed on August 24, 2018, this court reversed the trial 

court’s judgment. In that opinion, we focused on section 8(A) of the Bulletin, which 

provided: “All water wells shall be located an adequate horizontal distance from known 

or potential sources of pollution and contamination.” We held that “[d]etermining 

whether a particular spacing is ‘adequate’ inherently involves subjective judgment” and 

therefore the well permit issuances were discretionary under CEQA. 

Two footnotes in our prior opinion are important here. 

In footnote 8, we discussed Standards 8.B, 8.C, and 9:

“Appellants also point to provisions in section 8(B), 8(C), and 9. 

Section 8(B) provides that, “[w]here possible, a well shall be located up the 

ground water gradient from potential sources of pollution or 

contamination.” (Italics added.) Section 8(C) states that, “[i]f possible, a 

well should be located outside areas of flooding.” (Italics added.)

“ ‘Possible’ is a more objective standard than ‘adequate.’ While 

determining whether something is ‘possible’ may require scientific 

expertise, the ultimate question being asked is objective (i.e., can this be 

done?) rather than subjective (i.e., should it be done this way?).

“Next, in section 9, the Bulletin provides for the minimum depths to 

which a well’s annular seal must extend below ground surface. An annular 

seal is ‘a watertight seal placed between the well casing and the side wall of 

a drilled hole.’ (Stan. Co. Code, § 9.36.020(G).) For example, the annular 

seals of individual domestic wells must extend at least 20 feet below 

ground surface. But the annular seal requirements do not have an 

overarching “adequacy” standard. Instead, the section lists actual 

“minimum” depths that apply for each type of well, without the qualifying 

“guidepost” language found in the contamination source spacing section. 

Limited exceptions to the annular seal depth minimums are allowed in 

cases of shallow water depth, freezing areas, etc. But even those exceptions 

have absolute minimum depths – e.g., 10-foot seal depth when water depth 

is less than 20 feet; 50-foot seal depth for wells near pollution source; 4-

foot seal depth for freezing areas; 4-foot seal depth if subsurface vault or 

equivalent feature is used. These annular seal depth provisions are 
12.

objective and simply do not involve the scope of discretion provided in the 

well/pollution source spacing standard.”

In footnote 9, we stated: “The parties disagree ... as to whether other provisions 

in the Bulletin are incorporated by section 9.36.150. We need not resolve that issue 

because we conclude a provision the parties do agree was incorporated – i.e., the 

contamination source spacing standard – renders the issuance of well permits 

discretionary.”

C. Supreme Court Proceedings

Respondents petitioned for review of our decision in the Supreme Court. 

Appellants filed an answer to the petition for review, in which they asked the Supreme 

Court to consider the following issues for review (see Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.504(c)), 

including:

“1. Does Stanislaus’ County’s local groundwater well permit 

ordinance incorporate the state Bulletins’ general discretionary standards, 

and thereby confer discretionary authority triggering CEQA review?

“2. Do the state Bulletins’ specific discretionary standards 

referenced in footnote 8 of the Opinion confer discretionary authority 

triggering CEQA review?”

In their merits brief filed in the Supreme Court, appellants argued that the 

standards referenced in footnote 8 of our opinion – i.e., Standards 8.B and 8.C –

conferred discretionary authority.

The Supreme Court granted review and issued its decision on August 27, 2020. 

The Supreme Court held that, “The plain language of Standard 8.A authorizes County to 

exercise ‘judgment or deliberation when [it] decides to approve or disapprove’ a permit. 

(CEQA Guidelines, § 15357.)” (Protecting Our Water, supra, 10 Cal.5th at p. 496.) 

Consequently, permit issuances “in which County is required to exercise independent 

judgment under Standard 8.A cannot be classified as ministerial.” (Id. at p. 497.) 

Accordingly, the Supreme Court affirmed our conclusion that the County’s blanket 

ministerial categorization was unlawful.
13.

However, the Supreme Court determined our holding was too broad because 

Standard 8.A only applies when there is a contamination source “near” a proposed well. 

(Protecting Our Water, supra, 10 Cal.5th at p. 500.) Absent a nearby contamination 

source identified during the permit approval process, the issuance of a construction 

permit may be ministerial.6 Therefore, the court held that while plaintiffs were entitled to 

a judicial declaration that the County’s blanket ministerial categorization is unlawful, 

they were not entitled to a declaration that well permit issuances are always discretionary 

because of Standard 8.A. 

After observing Standard 8.A would be implicated in some, but not all, permit 

applications, the Supreme Court said, “[t]he same principle would apply to Standards 8.B 

and 8.C.” (Protecting Our Water, supra, 10 Cal.5th at p. 500.) However, the court 

“declined to determine whether those provisions [i.e., Standards 8.B and 8.C] confer 

discretionary authority in some instances.” (Ibid.) The court concluded that it need not 

address that issue in light of its conclusions regarding the authority granted by Standard 

8.A. 

The court continued, 

“Even if Standards 8.B and 8.C might be understood to grant discretionary 

authority in some cases, we could not conclude that they would always do 

so. Standard 8.B only applies when a proposed well is downhill from a 

contamination source. Standard 8.C is only implicated when a proposed 

well is in a flood area. In other words, like Standard 8.A, Standards 8.B 

and 8.C may or may not be involved in the issuance of a particular permit.” 

(Protecting Our Water, supra, 10 Cal.5th at p. 500, fn. omitted.)

6 The Supreme Court did not reach the issue of what constitutes “near” for 

purposes of this rule. Determining what distance is sufficiently “near” to make Standard 

8.A applicable would likely involve some of the same discretionary considerations used 

to determine whether that same distance is “adequate” to satisfy Standard 8.A. 

Regardless, the Supreme Court’s opinion seems clear that if it is determined as a 

preliminary matter that a well is not “near” its closest contamination source and no other 

discretionary decision is involved – then the County may proceed with a ministerial 

permit issuance. 
14.

At the conclusion of that excerpt, the opinion includes the following footnote:

“Plaintiffs have also asked us to review whether (1) any other 

standards in Bulletin No. 74 are incorporated into Chapter 9.36 and (2) the 

inclusion of those standards makes permit issuance discretionary. The 

Court of Appeal declined to address these questions because it found that 

the discretion conferred by Standard 8.A made permit issuance a 

discretionary project. These questions should be answered by the Court of 

Appeal on remand in the first instance.” (Protecting Our Water, supra, 10 

Cal.5th at p. 501, fn. 11.) 

The Supreme Court noted that “the fact that an individual project is classified as 

discretionary does not mean that full environmental review, including an EIR, will 

always be required. The project may qualify for another CEQA exemption or the agency 

may be able to prepare either a negative declaration or a mitigated negative declaration 

after its initial study. Any of these circumstances would obviate the need for an EIR.” 

(Protecting Our Water, supra, 10 Cal.5th at p. 501.)

The Supreme Court concluded plaintiffs are entitled to a declaratory judgment 

stating the County’s blanket ministerial categorization is unlawful. (Protecting Our 

Water, supra, 10 Cal.5th at pp. 501–502.) However, plaintiffs are not entitled to a 

judicial declaration that all permit issuance under Chapter 9.36 are discretionary; nor are 

they entitled to an injunction requiring County to treat all such permit issuances as 

discretionary. (Id. at p. 501.)

Finally, the opinion concludes by directing that “[t]he matter is remanded to the 

Court of Appeal for it to evaluate the questions it declined to answer and to reassess 

plaintiffs’ entitlement to relief.” (Protecting Our Water, supra, 10 Cal.5th at p. 502.)

DISCUSSION

I. Summary of Issues

Each party filed a brief on remand. (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.200(b).) 

Plaintiffs make two contentions: (1) that Standards 8.B and 8.C confer discretion that 

may require application of CEQA to water well construction permits; and (2) the County 

Code incorporates other portions of the Bulletin, rendering the County’s decisions on 
15.

well permits discretionary. Respondents argue plaintiffs first contention exceeds the 

scope of remand and contravenes the law of the case doctrine. Respondents acknowledge 

plaintiffs second argument comes within the scope of remand, but contend it is meritless.

We reject plaintiffs’ claim that the Stanislaus County Code incorporates certain 

other excerpts of Bulletin 74. However, we conclude Standards 8.B and 8.C confer 

discretion in at least some circumstances. 

A. The Stanislaus County Code does not Incorporate Other Portions of 

Bulletin 74 Identified by Plaintiffs

The parties dispute whether certain provisions found in Bulletin No. 74 are 

incorporated into the county code. That question is controlled by Stanislaus County Code 

section 9.36.150, which establishes the County’s “standards for the construction, repair, 

reconstruction, or abandonment of wells” as those “set forth in Chapter II of the 

Department of Water Resources Bulletin No. 74....” (Stanislaus County Code, 

§ 9.36.150.) In order to resolve the questions presented here, we need to flesh out the 

definition of the phrase, “standards for the construction, repair, reconstruction, or 

abandonment of wells.”

As the term is commonly used, a “standard” is “something set up and established 

by authority as a rule for the measure of quantity, weight, extent, value, or quality.” 

(“Standard.” Merriam-Webster.com Dictionary, Merriam-Webster, 

https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/standard, accessed Dec. 23, 2020.) 

Here, we are dealing with a specific type of standard: standards for the 

construction, repair, reconstruction, or abandonment of wells.” (Stanislaus County

Code, § 9.36.150; see also § 231 [directs DWR to report its recommendations for 

“minimum standards of well construction” (italics added)]; Bulletin 74, Ch. II [“The 

standards presented in this chapter are intended to apply to the construction (including 

major reconstruction) or destruction of water wells....” (Italics added)].)
16.

Undisputed examples of standards include Bulletin 74’s requirements for the 

thickness of materials used in well casing; and approved materials to be used for 

grouting. For example, sealing material must consist of “neat cement grout, sand-cement 

grout, bentonite clay, or concrete.” Another standard provides that steel conductor casing 

for community water supply wells must be six millimeters thick if a single casing is used 

and must be No. 10 U.S. standard gage or thicker if a double casing is used.

We believe a straightforward definition of “standards for the construction, repair, 

reconstruction, or abandonment of wells” can be derived from the general definition of 

the word “standard”; its present usage in the context of well construction; and the 

undisputed examples of actual standards. We conclude the phrase is best defined as: the 

set of prescribed methods and materials to be employed in the construction, repair, 

reconstruction, or abandonment of water wells. 

It is important to note this working definition of standard includes both rigidly 

fixed requirements that establish a single, precise method or measurement that must be 

used; and requirements expressed as a range of acceptable methods or measurements. 

Moreover, standards can also be either quantitative or qualitative.

For example, Bulletin 74-68 establishes a ranged, quantitative standard by 

requiring that the thickness of well seals “shall be at least two (2) inches, and not less 

than three (3) times the size of the largest coarse aggregate used in the sealing material.” 

Additionally, Bulletin 74-81 sets forth a qualitative standard by requiring that “sealing 

material shall be applied, where possible, in one continuous operation from the bottom of 

the interval to be sealed to the top.” Both are “standards” for well construction.

It is also important to note what this definition excludes from its scope. 

Specifically, the concept of a “standard[] for the construction, repair, reconstruction, or 

abandonment of wells” (Stanislaus County Code, § 9.36.150), does not include 

discussions or comments about the general topic of standards. Such discussions do not 

themselves establish an actual rule or requirement prescribing a method or material to be 
17.

employed in well construction, repair, reconstruction or abandonment. That is not to 

deny that these discussions or comments may be quite important. It is only to say that 

they are not standards for the construction, repair, reconstruction or abandonment of 

wells, and therefore are not incorporated by Stanislaus County Code section 9.36.150. 

1. Chapter II Preamble

For example, plaintiffs cite the first paragraph of Chapter II’s preamble and 

identify it as a “standard.” That paragraph reads:

“The standards presented in this chapter are intended to apply to the 

construction (including major reconstruction) or destruction of water wells 

throughout the State of California. However, under certain circumstances, 

adequate protection of ground water quality may require more stringent 

standards than those presented here; under other circumstances, it may be 

necessary to substitute other measures which will provide protection equal 

to that provided by these standards. Such situations arise from practicalities 

in applying any standards or, in this case, from anomalies in ground water 

geology or hydrology. Since it is impractical to prepare standards for every 

conceivable situation, provision has been made for deviation from the 

standards as well as for additional ones. However, the Department believes 

that for most conditions encountered in the State, the standards presented in 

this report are satisfactory for the protection of ground water quality.”

As its text makes clear, this paragraph is not a standard itself. It is not a rule for 

the methods or materials employed in well construction. Instead, the paragraph is a broad 

discussion of the occasional need for different standards than those presented in the 

bulletin. The paragraph is clearly meant to preface the actual standards that follow in the 

operative “Parts” of Chapter II. 

This clear import of the text is also supported by other considerations. The 

preamble paragraph repeatedly references the “standards” as something outside of itself. 

Indeed, the paragraph begins, “The standards presented in this chapter ....” Additionally, 

the preamble paragraph is located at the beginning of the chapter, before even Part I and 

the definitions section begin.
18.

2. General Introduction of Bulletin 74-90

Similarly, plaintiffs also cite to a portion of the General Introduction of Bulletin 

74-90:

“Well standards contained in Bulletin 74-81 together with well 

standards in this supplement (Bulletin 74-90) are recommended minimum 

statewide standards for the protection of ground water quality. The 

standards are not necessarily sufficient for local conditions. Local 

enforcing agencies may need to adopt more stringent standards for local 

conditions to ensure ground water quality protection.

“In some cases, it may be necessary for a local enforcing agency to 

substitute alternate measures or standards to provide protection equal to that 

otherwise afforded by DWR standards. Such cases arise from practicalities 

in applying standards, and from variations in geologic and hydrologic 

conditions. Because it is impractical to prepare “site-specific” standards 

covering every conceivable case, provision has been made for deviation 

from the standards.

“Standards in Bulletin 74-81 and this supplement (Bulletin 74-90) do 

not ensure proper construction or function of any type of well. Proper well 

design and construction practices require the use of these standards together 

with accepted industry practices, regulatory requirements, and 

consideration of site conditions.”

In several respects, this excerpt is similar to the preamble of Chapter II addressed 

above. It does not establish or prescribe any methods or materials for well construction, 

but rather broadly discusses the potential need for different standards in certain situations. 

Again, this clear import of the text is further supported by other considerations. 

The excerpt repeatedly references the “standards” as something outside of itself. 

Moreover, the excerpt appears in the “General Introduction” of Bulletin 74-90, well 

before the substantive section entitled, “Standards.” The location of this excerpt outside 

Chapter II has special force considering that section 9.36.150 only incorporates certain 

standards “set forth in Chapter II.” (Stanislaus County Code, § 9.36.150.) 
19.

3. Section 3, Part II of Bulletin 74

Next, we examine section 3 of Part II, entitled “Exemption Due to Unusual 

Conditions”:

“If the enforcing agency finds that compliance with any of the 

requirements prescribed herein is impractical for a particular location 

because of unusual conditions or if compliance would result in construction 

of an unsatisfactory well, the enforcing agency may waive compliance and 

prescribe alternative requirements which are “equal to” these standards in 

terms of protection obtained.”

We conclude this is not a “standard[] for the construction, repair, reconstruction, 

or abandonment of wells” and is therefore not incorporated into the county code by virtue 

of Stanislaus County Code section 9.36.150. The provision does not establish a rule for 

any specific aspect of well construction. It does not describe how any portion of the well 

construction process must be performed, nor does it prescribe particular materials that 

must be used in construction. Instead, it is a broad acknowledgment by DWR that 

enforcing agencies should have the flexibility to establish alternative standards where 

conditions require.

Moreover, even if this provision had been incorporated into the county code, 

plaintiffs would not be entitled to relief on that basis. The county code already provides 

that the county health officer may authorize exceptions to well standards when 

application of the provision is “unnecessary.” (Stanislaus County Code, § 9.36.110.) In 

such circumstances, the health officer can issue a variance permit and prescribe 

conditions “necessary to protect the waters of the state from pollution.” (Ibid.) 

Importantly, the County already performs CEQA review of applications for variance 

permits. On the record before us, it remains entirely possible that even if section 3 were 

deemed incorporated into the county code, respondents would have viewed it as eliciting 

a discretionary decision (as respondents do with variance permit applications.) Plaintiffs 

have not shown that any applicants have sought an “alternative requirement[]” under 

section 3 or that respondents have a policy of treating such requests as prompting 
20.

ministerial decisions. Accordingly, declaratory relief on this issue would not have been 

“necessary or proper at this time under all the circumstances.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 1061.)

4. Water Code Section 13801

Plaintiffs suggest that Stanislaus County Code section 9.36.150 incorporates the 

above-described provisions “because it must” under section 13801. (Cf. Simpson v. Hite 

(1950) 36 Cal.2d 125, 131.) They argue that section 13801 does not distinguish between 

qualitative and quantitative standards. However, our holding is not based on our 

classification of these provisions as qualitative or quantitative. Rather, we conclude they 

are not “standards” at all. Instead, they are discussions about standards. They do not 

themselves prescribe any methods or materials for well construction. And since section 

13801, subdivision (c) only speaks to “standards,” it does not require incorporation of 

these provisions into local ordinances.

Moreover, even if section 13801 had required incorporation of these provisions, 

and the County failed to comply with that requirement, the argument would not go as far 

as plaintiffs need. The consequence of a county failing to adopt an ordinance in 

compliance with section 13801, subdivision (c) is not enactment of Bulletin 74 in the 

jurisdiction or reformation of the local ordinance to incorporate all provisions in Bulletin 

74. Instead, the consequence would be application of a “model ordinance” prepared by 

the State Board of Water Resources in the jurisdiction. (§ 13801, subd. (d).) Plaintiffs 

have not shown whether the “model ordinance” contains the provisions from Bulletin 74 

discussed above (or analogous provisions).7

7 Because we conclude these provisions are not incorporated into the Stanislaus 

County Code, plaintiffs’ arguments premised on incorporation necessarily fail.
21.

II. Standards 8.B and 8.C Confer Discretion in At Least Some Circumstances

A. This Issue is Cognizable on Remand

Appellants contend Standards 8.B and 8.C confer discretion, while respondents 

insist the issue is “beyond the scope of the issues on remand” and cannot be revisited 

under the law of the case doctrine.

1. Footnote 8 of This Court’s Original Opinion Did Not Establish Law 

of the Case

The law of the case doctrine provides that “ ‘when, in deciding an appeal, an 

appellate court “states in its opinion a principle or rule of law necessary to the decision, 

that principle or rule becomes the law of the case and must be adhered to throughout its 

subsequent progress, both in the lower court and upon subsequent appeal.” ’ [Citation.]” 

(Quackenbush v. Superior Court (2000) 79 Cal.App.4th 867, 874.) By its own terms, the 

doctrine does not apply to dicta. (9 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (5th ed. 2020) Appeal, § 474; 

see also DeMirjian v. Ideal Heating Corp. (1954) 129 Cal.App.2d 758, 764.)

Respondents argue our statements regarding Standards 8.B and 8.C in footnote 8 

of our original opinion established law of the case that cannot be revisited. However, as 

footnote 9 of our opinion made clear, determining the impact of standards other than 8.A 

was not material to our decision because Standard 8.A, standing alone, rendered the 

permit decision discretionary. Consequently, our comments regarding Standards 8.B and 

8.C were dicta in that they were “unnecessary to the decision in the case ....” (Black’s 

Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019), “obiter dictum”.) Because the comments were dicta, 

they did not establish law of the case. (See Quackenbush v. Superior Court, supra, 79 

Cal.App.4th at p. 874; DeMirjian v. Ideal Heating Corp., supra, 129 Cal.App.2d at 

p. 764; 9 Witkin, Cal. Procedure, supra, Appeal, § 474.)

2. We Have Jurisdiction to Reassess Standards 8.B and 8.C 

Respondents also suggest that revisiting Standards 8.B and 8.C. would exceed the 

scope of remand from the Supreme Court. We disagree.
22.

In reviewing a lower court’s decision, the Supreme Court “may affirm, reverse, or 

modify any judgment or order appealed from, and may direct the proper judgment or 

order to be entered, or direct a new trial or further proceedings to be had.” (Code Civ. 

Proc., § 43.) When the Supreme Court remands with instructions, those directives 

“define[] the scope of the jurisdiction of the court to which the matter is returned.” 

(Griset v. Fair Political Practices Com. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 688, 701.) 

Here, the Supreme Court’s opinion included an express directive that we “reassess 

plaintiffs’ entitlement to relief” on remand. (Protecting Our Water, supra, 10 Cal.5th at 

p. 502.) We understand that to mean that we are to re-assess the issues that bear on 

plaintiffs’ entitlement to relief, so long as our reassessment is consistent with the 

Supreme Court’s opinion. That would include whether Standards 8.B and 8.C confer 

discretion under the analytical framework established by the Supreme Court’s opinion.

Respondents argue, and we agree, the Supreme Court did not “disturb” our 

previous conclusions regarding Standards 8.B and 8.C. But that is not precisely the same 

issue as whether we have jurisdiction to revisit those conclusions on remand. While, the 

Supreme Court did not “disturb” our conclusions, neither did they endorse them. To the 

contrary, the Supreme Court (1) expressly declined to decide whether Standard 8.B and 

8.C “confer discretionary authority in some instances” (Protecting Our Water, supra, 10 

Cal.5th at pp. 500–501) and (2) openly acknowledged the possibility they might confer 

discretionary authority in some instances. (Id. at p. 501 [“Even if Standards 8.B and 8.C 

might be understood to grant discretionary authority in some cases ....”].) In sum, the 

Supreme Court’s decision to neither “disturb” nor affirm our conclusions regarding 

Standards 8.B and 8.C does not limit the jurisdiction conferred by the directive to 

reassess plaintiffs’ entitlement to relief. 

B. Standards 8.B and 8.C Confer Discretion in at Least Some Cases

When we initially considered Standards 8.B and 8.C, we evaluated them in the 

abstract. However, the Supreme Court’s decision makes clear that the relevant question 
23.

is not whether a standard implies discretion in the abstract, but whether it would give the 

County discretionary authority in “at least some circumstances” in which it would be 

applied. (Protecting Our Water, supra, 10 Cal.5th at p. 495, italics added; see also id. at 

p. 499 [“in at least some circumstances.”].) If so, the program cannot be categorically 

classified as ministerial. 

Applying that framework, we conclude Standards 8.B and 8.C may confer 

discretion in at least some circumstances. 

Standard 8.B’s primary directive is that wells shall be located up the ground water 

gradient from contamination sources where possible. Later, the standard provides: 

“However, consideration should be given that the gradient near a well can be reversed by 

pumping ... or by other influences.” Thus, the application of Standard 8.B could, in at 

least some cases, involve discretion to determine what should be done if a reversed 

gradient or “other influences” on the gradient are present at a proposed well site.

Similarly, Standard 8.C primarily provides that wells should be located outside of 

flood areas, if possible. This standard further requires that the top of the well casing 

terminate (1) above grade and (2) above known levels of flooding cause by drainage or 

runoff. However, if compliance with this provision is “not practical, the enforcing 

agency shall require alternate means of protection.”

It is readily apparent that application of Standard 8.C will, in at least some cases, 

involve discretionary decisions by the County. First, the determination of whether it is 

“practical” to comply with the well casing relative height requirements could easily 

involve a subjective determination regarding what measures are likely to be effective, and 

how difficult such measures would be to implement. Such decisions would not involve 

straightforward application of objective standards, but rather a range of discretionary 

options. Second, setting the “alternate means of protection” might often involve a 

subjective decision as to which measures would sufficiently protect the well (and the 
24.

broader environment) from problems caused by drainage or runoff moving over the top 

of the well casing.8

Because Standards 8.B and 8.C confer discretion in at least some of the 

circumstances to which they apply, it is unlawful for the County to treat all nonvariance 

permit issuances as ministerial acts.9

CONCLUSION

The law in this area arises from a patchwork of sources spanning decades. It 

involves state statutes being applied to local codes, which in turn incorporate provisions 

from a state bulletin as required by yet other state statutes. As a result, unintended 

consequences abound. For one, it seems readily apparent that certain provisions in 

Bulletin 74 were initially designed to offer flexibility to local jurisdictions, but now have 

the effect of invoking CEQA and its substantial administrative and cost burdens. We 

cannot say the drafters of Bulletin 74 would have anticipated this effect. However, it is 

clear that CEQA applies nonetheless. We are ever reminded that this court’s limited role 

is to state the law as it is. (Code Civ. Proc., § 858.) 

DISPOSITION

The judgment is reversed and the matter remanded. The trial court is directed to 

consider plaintiffs’ prayer for attorney fees in the first instance. The trial court is further 

directed to enter a judgment in favor of plaintiffs that is consistent with this opinion and 

8 Similarly, Standard 9.A.1 confers discretion to enforcing agencies to allow 

shorter seal depths than otherwise required. It is true that this discretion may only be 

invoked when the water to be produced by the well is at a depth less than 20 feet. 

Additionally, the discretion is restricted in that the enforcing agency cannot permit an 

annular seal depth of less than 10 feet. However, the crucial fact remains that Standard 

9.A confers discretion in at least some of the circumstances to which it applies.

9 However, even projects classified as discretionary may not always require an 

EIR. (Protecting Our Water, supra, 10 Cal.5th at p. 501.) “The project may qualify for 

another CEQA exemption or the agency may be able to prepare either a negative 

declaration or a mitigated negative declaration after its initial study. Any of these 

circumstances would obviate the need for an EIR.” (Ibid.)
25.

which declares unlawful the County’s practice of treating all issuances of nonvariance 

well permits as ministerial acts under CEQA. However, the judgment shall not declare 

that all nonvariance well permits are discretionary under CEQA, nor shall the judgment 

include injunctive relief. (Protecting Our Water, supra, 10 Cal.5th at pp. 487, 501.)

Plaintiffs shall recover their costs on appeal.

POOCHIGIAN, Acting P.J.

WE CONCUR:

FRANSON, J.

PEÑA, J.