1

Filed 7/15/20

CERTIFIED FOR PARTIAL PUBLICATION*

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

QUENTIN BOWEN,

Defendant and Appellant.

 A155630

 (Sonoma County

 Super. Ct. No. SCR-701060)

Defendant Quentin Bowen appeals from a judgment after a jury trial 

finding him guilty of one count of attempted murder committed willfully, 

deliberately and with premeditation, with a great bodily injury enhancement 

and a personal knife use enhancement, and one count of assault with a 

deadly weapon, with a great bodily injury enhancement. Defendant 

complains of improper admission of certain evidence, prosecutorial 

misconduct during closing argument, and insufficient evidence of 

premeditation and deliberation, and that his sentence for attempted murder 

is unauthorized. We affirm.

BACKGROUND

On July 19, 2017, the Sonoma County District Attorney filed an 

information charging defendant with attempted murder (Pen. Code, §§ 664, 

* Pursuant to California Rules of Court, rules 8.1105(b) and 8.1110, this 

opinion is certified for publication with the exception of parts II through V of 

the discussion.
2

187, subd. (a); count one)1 and assault with a deadly weapon (§ 245, subd. (a); 

count two). With respect to count one, the information alleged an 

enhancement of personal use of a deadly and dangerous weapon, to wit, a

knife (§ 12022, subd. (b)(1)), and that defendant committed the attempted 

murder willfully, deliberately and with premeditation. With respect to both 

counts, the information alleged a great bodily injury enhancement (§ 12022.7, 

subd. (a)). On March 27, 2018, a jury found defendant guilty as charged and 

the enhancements to be true. The defendant was sentenced to prison on 

count one as follows: seven years to life for attempted murder plus a 

determinate term of three years for the great bodily injury enhancement and 

one year for the use of a deadly and dangerous weapon enhancement. On 

count two the defendant was sentenced to four years plus three years for the 

great bodily injury enhancement. The time imposed for count two was stayed 

under section 654. Defendant’s overall prison sentence was seven years to 

life consecutive to a determinate term of four years.

I. Prosecution’s Case

In July 2016, defendant placed an online advertisement looking for 

boarding for his dog, Dash, offering to pay $100 per week. Dennis N., a 62-

year-old man, initially agreed to care for Dash for two weeks but later agreed 

to keep the dog longer at defendant’s request. Although Dennis N. took care 

of Dash for five months, defendant never paid him.

On November 26, 2016, defendant told Dennis N. he had found a place 

to live and asked Dennis N. to return Dash to him. Dennis N. asked for a few 

more days with Dash, and defendant agreed. On December 3, 2016, 

Dennis N. texted defendant: “There is the little matter of 

compensation/reimbursement for the excellent care that Dash has received. I 

1 All further references are to the Penal Code unless stated otherwise.
3

am not a mathematician but 20 weeks (5 months)@$100 per week = a lot. I’m 

sure you will do what’s right.” Dennis N. thought defendant should “man up 

and take care of his responsibilities.” Defendant responded that Dennis N.

had agreed to “do it pro bono.” After looking up the meaning of “pro bono,” 

Dennis N. texted defendant back: “Do you understand how Karma works.” A 

few days later, defendant came to Dennis N.’s home with three other people 

and took Dash. The defendant still did not pay Dennis N.

Dennis N. texted defendant a few weeks later asking him what Dash 

wanted for Christmas. Defendant responded: “He’d like a friend for him to 

play with at your place.” Dennis N. texted back: “He had a best friend to 

play with at my place until you took him away.” Defendant responded: “Ok 

man, I’ve been patient with you. We’re done. You will never see my Dog 

again. . . . He needs to go out and meet people EVERY single day. He needs 

to RUN. He also needs the person who raised him. You are none of those 

things. Get your own dog, or kill yourself. I don’t care either way.” 

Dennis N. thought it was “unbelievable” that defendant would treat him that 

way after he did him a favor. Dennis N. texted the defendant back and told 

him he still owed him $2,000. Defendant responded by accusing Dennis N. of 

taking “bad care” of Dash by overfeeding him, underexercising him, and not 

grooming him. Defendant further texted that Dennis N. had agreed to “do it 

for free,” “[o]therwise, you lunatic, I would not have let you.” Dennis N.

responded that “taking advantage of a disabled senior citizen and swindling 

them is a crime.” He texted that defendant had “12 hours to apologize . . .

and come up with a plan to make this right.” Defendant stopped responding 

to Dennis N., and Dennis N. dropped the matter.

In March 2017, Dennis N. responded to a new online advertisement 

placed by defendant regarding Dash. Although Dennis N. stated he thought 
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Dash looked sad, he did not ask to take Dash back. Then, one night in 

March, defendant came to Dennis N.’s mobile home and begged him to take 

Dash. Dennis N. agreed.

On March 30, 2017, defendant texted Dennis N. that he planned to visit 

Dash the following day and wanted to put a new tag on him. Defendant went

to Dennis N.’s home around noon the next day and stayed for about three 

hours. During the visit, defendant took off his jacket. Dennis N. observed 

defendant was wearing a black T-shirt underneath. Defendant groomed 

Dash, put the new tag on him, and filled out paperwork for Dash to attend an 

activity center. Dennis N. noticed defendant was wearing a knife clip on his 

front pocket, but he did not see the knife. At first, Dennis N. did not think 

too much about it. Their conversation over the three hours was pleasant, and 

there was no discussion of the money defendant owed Dennis N.

At one point, Dennis N. reached into his mobile home to get wisteria 

clippings he wanted defendant to smell. When Dennis N. saw the wisteria 

was not where he thought, he backed out of the mobile home. Suddenly,

Dennis N. was hit hard on the back of his head. He initially thought 

something had fallen from the roof. As he turned around, defendant stabbed 

him in the neck two or three times. Dennis N. grabbed defendant’s left wrist; 

defendant was holding the knife in his left hand. Defendant then clubbed 

Dennis N. on the side of his jaw with a rock. Defendant dropped the rock and 

switched the knife to his right hand and started stabbing Dennis N. in the 

neck again. When Dennis N. grabbed defendant’s stabbing hand, defendant 

again switched the knife to his opposite hand. Defendant stabbed Dennis N.

twice in the chest and once in the shoulder. Dennis N. asked defendant why 

he was doing this. Defendant did not respond.
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Dennis N. eventually placed defendant into a half nelson while 

gripping the wrist of the hand defendant was using to hold the knife. They 

tumbled inside the doorway of Dennis N.’s mobile home. Dennis N. had a 

glimpse of the knife that the defendant used and described it as a three-inch

pocket knife that was either silver or possibly red and with holes on the 

handle.

Dennis N. continued to hold defendant in the half nelson position for 

several minutes while bleeding from his neck. He told defendant to drop the 

knife, but defendant refused. He said he was bleeding out and needed 

medical attention. Defendant said he would help if Dennis N. would let him 

go. Dennis N. worried defendant would “finish the job” because defendant 

refused to drop the knife. Ultimately, Dennis N. pushed defendant further 

into the mobile home and ran down his driveway toward a nearby preschool,

yelling for help. Dash followed Dennis N. Although Dennis N. was afraid 

defendant would pursue him and slit his throat, he looked back and saw 

defendant walking away with defendant’s bicycle.

Sarah R. and Lisa C. were outside their children’s preschool when they 

saw Dennis N., who asked them to call 911. They saw another man walking 

away with a bicycle through the field toward the trees. Dennis N. held 

pressure on his neck and returned to his mobile home to wait for the police 

and paramedics. Officer Adams responded to the scene, and Dennis N. 

provided the police with the defendant’s cell phone number. Dennis N. was 

taken to the hospital, where he was treated for eight stab wounds. Justin F., 

a Sonoma County animal control officer, was called to the scene to impound 

Dash.

Officer Adams had police dispatch contact defendant’s mobile phone 

service provider to determine the defendant’s possible location. Shortly 
6

before 6:00 p.m., police dispatch provided Officer Adams with a possible 

location of the defendant in the area of the Santa Rosa Creek Trail. Officers 

searched the area, and at 7:18 p.m., they found defendant walking on the 

trail wearing a backpack, a jacket, and no shirt. Defendant was arrested; his 

cell phone, backpack, and several knives were seized. Defendant had blood

on his right ear, and DNA tests confirmed the blood was consistent with both 

defendant’s and Dennis N.’s.

II. Defense Case

Defendant testified that he visited Dennis N. on March 31, 2017, to see 

Dash and put a tag on him, and he gave Dennis N. money for Dash’s food. 

Dennis N. began acting in a menacing manner after a few hours, and 

defendant texted his friend Krysta: “Hey, I am at sketchy guys house behind 

raleys on Fulton. The trailor RIGHT behind the store. [¶] *If I disappear, it 

was this guy. [¶] His name is Dennis.” (Sic.) When Dennis N. began to act 

normally again, defendant agreed to follow him into his mobile home. As 

they walked into the hallway, Dennis N. suddenly turned around and tried to 

stab defendant with a large knife. Defendant fell backward onto a pile of 

items, and Dennis N. again tried to stab him. Defendant grabbed Dennis N.’s 

hand and maneuvered the knife out of his hand. Dennis N. held defendant 

down with one hand and hit him in the head with his other hand. Dennis N.

was bigger than defendant and defendant could not push him away.

Defendant testified he stabbed Dennis N. because he was afraid for his 

life. Dennis N. hit defendant on his head and threatened to shoot him. 

Defendant continued to stab Dennis N. When Dennis N. stopped attacking 

him, defendant dropped the knife and ran outside. He grabbed his bike and 

ran through the field. He rode away on his bike until he got a flat tire. He 
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left his bike and started running. He hid in a ditch because he was afraid 

Dennis N. might come after him.

While he was in the ditch, defendant received a call from Justin F., the 

animal control officer. Although defendant did not remember what he said to

Justin F., he testified he did not ask him for help. Further, he did not call the 

police or a friend because he was not thinking clearly.

When it became dark, defendant began walking along the creek trail.

He testified he was relieved when he saw the police. He admitted to the 

police that he had four knives on him but denied he had used any of them 

during the incident. One knife was a credit card knife, or novelty knife. The 

second knife was a folding knife, which he used to cut food. The third knife 

was a red folding knife, which was used to cut insulation at his job. The 

fourth knife was a multitool knife with pliers and screwdriver features. 

Defendant denied he attacked Dennis N. from behind with a rock or that he 

intended to kill him.

III. Rebuttal Evidence

At 4:50 p.m. on March 31, 2017, Justin F. called defendant to tell him 

he had Dash and asked defendant if he wanted to meet to pick up the dog. 

Defendant calmly responded that he would call him back, and about 5 to 10 

minutes later defendant left Justin F. a voicemail message saying he would 

meet him at a grocery store in Rohnert Park in about 25 minutes, after an 

interview ended. Thirty minutes later, defendant texted Justin F. saying his 

interview had lasted longer than expected and that he did not have a place 

for Dash. Justin F. texted back that he would impound Dash at the Sonoma 

County Animal Services. The defendant responded by text and thanked him. 

Defendant did not ever tell Justin F. that he had been attacked that 

afternoon.
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DISCUSSION

I. Cell Phone Ping Did Not Violate Fourth Amendment

Defendant argues the knives should have been excluded because they 

were the product of a warrantless search in which the police requested that 

defendant’s mobile service provider “ping” his phone and provide location 

data.

Defendant filed a motion to suppress the evidence seized from his 

backpack2 on the grounds that the police failed to obtain a warrant before 

having defendant’s service provider ping his cell phone to locate him. The 

People argued the warrantless cell phone ping was justified by exigent 

circumstances and the officers’ good faith reliance on section 1546.1.3 At the 

motion to suppress hearing, Officer Adams testified he was dispatched at 

3:37 p.m. to a stabbing incident. He initially spoke with two witnesses at a 

preschool behind a shopping center who told him an older man who was 

bleeding from his neck said he had been stabbed. They also told Officer 

2 On appeal, defendant contests the admission of the knives only, and 

not any other items seized by the police.

3 Section 1546.1, subdivision (c)(6) states: “A government entity may 

access electronic device information by means of physical interaction or 

electronic communication with the device only as follows: [¶] . . . [¶] If the 

government entity, in good faith, believes that an emergency involving 

danger of death or serious physical injury to any person requires access to the 

electronic device information.”

Subdivision (h) states: “If a government entity obtains electronic 

information pursuant to an emergency involving danger of death or serious 

physical injury to a person, that requires access to the electronic information 

without delay, the government entity shall, within three court days after 

obtaining the electronic information, file with the appropriate court an 

application for a warrant or order authorizing obtaining the electronic 

information or a motion seeking approval of the emergency disclosures that 

shall set forth the facts giving rise to the emergency . . . .”
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Adams they saw another man walking away through a nearby field. Officer 

Adams then spoke with Officer Cadaret at the scene of the stabbing, 

approximately 200 feet from the preschool, and he learned the victim had 

been repeatedly stabbed in the neck in an unprovoked attack. The victim 

told the officers that the suspect’s dog had a tag with the suspect’s cell phone 

number.

At 4:19 p.m., on the way to the hospital, Officer Adams called police 

dispatch and asked if the dispatcher could obtain a ping from the suspect’s 

cell phone. Officer Adams explained “it was imperative” that police find the 

suspect because “[t]he suspect had just been involved in a very violent crime. 

The victim was brutally stabbed multiple times, seemingly unprovoked, from 

the information we had. This took place literally less than 200 feet away 

from a preschool that was—my witnesses were there to pick up their kids, so 

the preschool was letting out. It’s broad daylight in the middle of the 

afternoon on Friday, and it’s right near a large shopping center. There’s 

multiple neighborhoods in the area. The suspect was last seen walking away

. . . still possibly armed. And based on the totality of the circumstances, I 

didn’t want anybody else to possibly be the victim.” Officer Cadaret also 

testified at the motion to suppress hearing that the police and a police dog 

attempted to locate defendant but were unsuccessful before receiving the cell 

phone ping location information.

At 5:57 p.m., the police learned the suspect’s cell phone had pinged on 

the Santa Rosa Creek Trail east of Willowside Road. Once the police learned 

the location information, additional officers and resources, including a 

helicopter, converged on the trail and the defendant was apprehended on the 

trail at 7 p.m. On April 3, 2017, Officer Cadaret filled out a request for a 

court order for the cell phone ping.
10

The trial court denied defendant’s suppression motion, stating: “There 

was information that this was an unprovoked attack, fairly brutal in the 

nature of the attack. Very near a school, shopping center. And the response 

to the officers hearing about this is to mobilize, even mobilizing a helicopter. 

There’s no doubt in my mind that Officer Adams had a good faith belief that, 

in fact, there was a serious situation that needed immediate remediation, and 

the best way to have done that was a ping. [¶] I believe this was a search 

under California law; but I also believe that based on the evidence of the 

timing, the circumstances, the response, the—all the different people, 

including preschool, that the ping was absolutely in a good faith response and 

necessary.”

“On appeal from a denial of a motion to suppress evidence on Fourth 

Amendment grounds, we review the historical facts as determined by the 

trial court under the familiar substantial evidence standard of review. Once 

the historical facts underlying the motion have been determined, we review 

those facts and apply the de novo standard of review in determining their 

consequences. Although we give deference to the trial court’s factual 

determinations, we independently decide the legal effect of such 

determinations.” (People v. Esayian (2003) 112 Cal.App.4th 1031, 1038.)

Defendant agrees the trial court was correct in finding that the ping of 

defendant’s cell phone was a search but argues no exception to the warrant 

requirement applied. The People argue first that there was no Fourth 

Amendment violation because a single ping of defendant’s cell phone does not 

constitute a search. Both parties cite Carpenter v. United States (2018) 585 

U.S. ___ [138 S.Ct. 2206], which was decided after the verdict but before 

defendant was sentenced. Carpenter held that accessing seven days of 
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historical CSLI4 providing a record of a defendant’s past physical movements 

constituted a Fourth Amendment search. (Carpenter, supra, 138 S.Ct. at p. 

2217 & fn. 3.) However, Carpenter declined to “decide whether there is a 

limited period for which the Government may obtain an individual’s 

historical CSLI free from Fourth Amendment scrutiny, and if so, how long 

that period might be” (id. at p. 2217, fn. 3), nor did the Supreme Court 

“express a view on matters not before [it, including] real-time CSLI” (id. at p. 

2220). The parties do not cite any California cases addressing whether 

obtaining real-time CSLI constitutes a search, and we are unaware of any 

published authority on this issue. Because we conclude that exigent 

circumstances justified the officers’ pinging defendant’s cell phone, we need 

not decide whether a single real-time ping of defendant’s cell phone was a 

search.

“ ‘A long-recognized exception to the warrant requirement exists when 

“exigent circumstances” make necessary the conduct of a warrantless 

search. . . . “ ‘[E]xigent circumstances’ means an emergency situation 

requiring swift action to prevent imminent danger to life or serious damage 

to property, or to forestall imminent escape of a suspect or destruction of 

evidence. There is no ready litmus test for determining whether such 

circumstances exist, and in each case the claim of an extraordinary situation 

must be measured by facts known to the officers.” ’ ” (People v. Panah (2005) 

35 Cal.4th 395, 465.) The reasonableness of the officers’ conduct depends 

upon whether facts available at the moment of the search support a 

reasonable belief that the action taken was appropriate. (Ibid.)

4 CSLI stands for “cell-site location information.” (Carpenter v. United 

States, supra, 138 S.Ct. at p. 2211.)
12

Here, at the time Officer Adams requested a ping of defendant’s cell 

phone, the information available to him was that less than an hour earlier 

Dennis N. had been repeatedly stabbed in the neck in an unprovoked attack,

within 200 yards of a preschool and near a shopping center and multiple 

neighborhoods. Further, the suspect, who was possibly still armed with a 

knife, had fled on foot. The area where the witnesses indicated the defendant 

had headed was a several-hundred-yard field with multiple entrances and 

exits leading to a creek trail, houses and apartment complexes, and a store;

and there are “hundreds of people moving about” the area. The police were 

actively looking for defendant when they received the CSLI. Based upon the 

circumstances known to Officer Adams, he believed it was imperative that 

the suspect be found as soon as possible to prevent another possible 

unprovoked attack. We agree with the trial court’s determination that the 

exigent circumstances exception applies under the facts of this case, and 

defendant’s motion to suppress was properly denied.

Defendant cites People v. Ramey (1976) 16 Cal.3d 263 and argues that 

the circumstances here were not “an emergency situation requiring swift 

action to prevent imminent danger to life[.]” (Ramey, at p. 276.) Ramey

involved a warrantless arrest in the defendant’s home, and the court found 

that under the circumstances of Ramey’s arrest for the nonviolent crime of 

receipt of stolen property, there was no imminent danger to life or property 

and no likelihood of flight or destruction of evidence. (Ramey, at p. 276.) 

Here, the circumstances are readily distinguishable from Ramey, and we find 

they support a finding of exigent circumstances. (See ibid. [“There is no 

ready litmus test for determining whether [exigent] circumstances exist, and 

in each case the claim of an extraordinary situation must be measured by the 

facts known to the officers”].)
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Because we find the exigent circumstances exception applied here, we 

do not reach the People’s alternative argument that the police acted in good 

faith reliance upon section 1546.1, subdivision (h).

II. Admission of the Recovered Knives

Defendant argues the trial court abused its discretion when it denied 

his motion in limine seeking to exclude the knives as irrelevant and 

prejudicial. He argued below, and he argues on appeal, that because the 

knives recovered from defendant were not “alleged to have been used in any 

way in this case,” they have no probative value and are extremely prejudicial. 

We find no abuse of discretion.

A. Motion In Limine Testimony Regarding the Recovered

Knives

The trial court held a hearing on the defendant’s motion5 during which 

Officer Cadaret testified that the knife used in the attack was described as 

having red on it and containing holes and that two of the knives recovered

from the defendant “shared descriptions of the knife that was used at the 

time of the attack.” Officer Cadaret testified that one of the knives found on 

the defendant had a dark brown substance on it that tested negative for 

blood. The prosecutor argued that although there was no conclusive 

determination based on DNA or blood testing that any of the knives found on 

defendant was used in the attack, she was not prepared to stipulate that the 

recovered knives were not used in the incident. She argued that they were 

relevant because two of them matched the victim’s description of the knife 

5 Defendant’s motion in limine also argued for exclusion of certain 

evidence, including the knives, based upon the evidence technician’s chain of 

custody errors, including storing certain evidence in an unsecured location for 

multiple days and a multiple-day delay in between collecting the evidence 

and booking it into evidence. These issues are not raised on appeal.
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used. During the motion in limine hearing, defense counsel cross-examined

Officer Cadaret regarding whether the knives matched the victim’s 

description. He testified that “two of those knives were similar in description 

to what was given [in that] one of them was red and one of them had holes in 

it,” but he acknowledged that no single knife had both characteristics. 

Officer Cadaret further testified that officers searched the area around the 

creek trail because they were uncertain if they had recovered the knife used 

in the attack.

The trial court denied defendant’s motion, stating, “I do believe there is 

some relevancy that would help the jury . . . decide[] guilt or innocence . . . , 

and that [defense counsel] can certainly cross-examine the officer as to their 

non-connection to this case.”

B. Trial Testimony Regarding the Recovered Knives

At trial, Dennis N. testified he saw a “glimpse” of the knife and he 

thought it was a three- or three-and-a-half-inch pocket knife with holes in the 

handle and that it was silver or possibly red. He testified he thought the red 

could have been blood. Dennis N. was not shown the knives recovered from 

the defendant before or during his testimony. Officer Cadaret testified that 

he understood Dennis N. told another officer that the knife used had holes 

and a red handle. Officer Cadaret did not initially show Dennis N. the knives 

recovered from the defendant because he did not think any of them matched 

Dennis N.’s description. After Dennis N. testified that the red could have 

been blood, Officer Cadaret showed Dennis N. photographs of the knives.6 

Officer Cadaret testified that Dennis N. told him one of the knives “was 

6 It appears from the record that Officer Cadaret is referring to 

Dennis N.’s trial testimony on March 20, 2018, the day before Officer Cadaret 

testified.
15

similar in blade length and the fact that it had holes in the knife, but he did 

not believe [it] was the knife [used in the attack].”

C. Knives Were Relevant and Not Unduly Prejudicial

We review rulings on the admissibility of evidence for an abuse of 

discretion and will not reverse unless it is established that the “court 

exercised its discretion in an arbitrary, capricious, or patently absurd manner 

that resulted in a manifest miscarriage of justice.” (People v. Rodriguez 

(1999) 20 Cal.4th 1, 9–10.) Here, two of the knives recovered from the

defendant shortly after the stabbing attack were similar to the victim’s 

description of the weapon. The trial court considered defendant’s argument 

that none of the knives found matched all of the characteristics described by 

the victim, but nonetheless found the knife evidence7 had “some relevancy” 

and that the defendant could cross-examine the officer at trial regarding 

whether a determination had been made that any of the knives found on 

defendant was the weapon used.

Although it was not conclusively established that any of the knives 

recovered from the defendant was the actual weapon, two of them shared 

characteristics with the weapon the victim described. They were relevant as 

it was possible one of them was the weapon used. (People v. Carpenter (1999) 

21 Cal.4th 1016, 1052 [“Although the witnesses did not establish the gun 

necessarily was the murder weapon, it might have been. . . . The evidence 

was thus relevant and admissible as circumstantial evidence that he 

committed the charged offenses”].)

Defendant argues the knives were not relevant because the People did 

not claim any of the knives found was used in the attack. Defendant 

7 Knife evidence refers to the four knives recovered from the defendant 

and used at trial.
16

overstates the People’s position. During the motion in limine hearing, the 

prosecutor stated, “I’m not prepared to stipulate they weren’t the knives, just 

there was no conclusive determination they were. . . . [C]ertainly, the fact 

that he had two knives matching the description of the knife used . . . is 

relevant.” Defendant argues the prosecutor conceded in closing argument 

that there was no evidence any of the knives recovered from defendant was 

used in the attack. In closing argument, the prosecutor argued that defense 

counsel’s questioning of the police officers regarding the process of collecting 

the knives and whether they were tested for DNA was a red herring because 

“nobody got up here and claimed these knives were used in the assault.” This 

statement in the prosecutor’s closing argument commented on the evidence at 

trial and is not a basis to reverse the trial court’s earlier decision to admit the 

knife evidence. (People v. Fruits (2016) 247 Cal.App.4th 188, 208 (Fruits) [“In 

determining whether the trial court abused its discretion, we must focus on 

what the court was made aware of at the time it ruled on the motion, not on 

evidence that came out or circumstances that took place during trial. ‘To do 

otherwise would require us to hold the trial court to an impossible 

standard’ ”].)

Here, the People argued the knives found on defendant at the time of 

his arrest hours after the attack were relevant, in part, because two of the 

knives shared characteristics with the description provided by the victim. At 

trial, Officer Cadaret testified he showed the victim the photographs of the 

knives only after the victim’s testimony that he thought the red he saw could 

have been his blood. At that point, the victim told the officer one of the 

knives was similar but “he did not believe” it was the knife used. The 

prosecutor commented on this testimony in closing argument to discount the 

evidence collection issues raised by defendant. This argument, following 
17

evidence developed during trial testimony, does not make the trial court’s 

evidentiary ruling on the motion in limine erroneous.

Defendant relies upon People v. Barnwell (2007) 41 Cal.4th 1038 and 

People v. Archer (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 1380 (Archer) in support of his

argument that the knives were not relevant because they were not used in 

the assault. Both cases are distinguishable. In Barnwell, the Supreme Court 

found the trial court committed harmless error in admitting evidence that 

approximately a year prior to the charged murder, the defendant possessed a 

firearm that the facts reasonably demonstrated could not have been the 

murder weapon. (Id. at p. 1044.) The murder weapon had been found at the 

scene, and a police officer had witnessed the shooting. (Id. at pp. 1042–1043.)

The Supreme Court stated: “When the prosecution relies on evidence

regarding a specific type of weapon, it is error to admit evidence that other

weapons were found in the defendant's possession, for such evidence tends to

show not that he committed the crime, but only that he is the sort of person

who carries deadly weapons.” (Id. at p. 1056.) Further, the trial court 

admitted the evidence specifically to demonstrate the defendant’s

“ ‘propensity to own or carry that type of weapon.’ ” (Ibid.) The Supreme 

Court concluded that the admission of evidence regarding the defendant’s 

prior gun possession was error “[b]ecause the prosecution did not claim the

weapon found by Officer Flores [a year prior to the murder] was the murder

weapon.” (Ibid.) Here, in contrast, although the prosecutor did not 

conclusively determine whether any of the knives recovered was used in the 

assault, the evidence established similarities between the victim’s description 

of the knife used and two of the knives recovered. Thus, it was possible one 

of the knives, found on the defendant only hours after the attack, might have 

been the weapon used. (People v. Carpenter, supra, 21 Cal.4th at p. 1052 [no 
18

error in admitting evidence that defendant possessed gun that might have 

been murder weapon].) The fact that after the motion in limine hearing 

Officer Cadaret testified at trial that the victim (a year after the assault in 

which he “glimpsed” the knife) told him that one of the knives found on the 

defendant “was similar in blade length and the fact that it had holes . . . but 

he did not believe it was the knife [used in the attack]” goes to the weight of 

the evidence rather than its admissibility.

In Archer, supra, 82 Cal.App.4th 1380, the defendant objected to the 

relevance of nine knives recovered from his yard, bedroom, workshop, and 

storage locker over a year after the victim’s murder. (Archer, at pp. 1384, 

1392.) A codefendant testified that one of the knives resembled the knife 

used in the stabbing of the victim. (Id. at p. 1392.) Another knife tested 

positive for blood. (Ibid.) The court found that “[a]dmission of the knives 

other than the two which had some arguable relevance to the case created a 

risk of” an inference that defendant is the kind of person who surrounds 

himself with deadly weapons and that the trial court had abused its 

discretion in overruling defendant’s objection. (Id. at p. 1393, italics added.) 

Here, the knives were found only hours after the attack and two of them

shared characteristics with the victim’s description of the knife used in the 

attack. Archer acknowledges relevance in such circumstances. (Id. at pp.

1392–1393.)

Nor did the trial court err by finding the evidence was not unduly 

prejudicial under Evidence Code section 352. “Evidence is not inadmissible 

under [Evidence Code] section 352 unless the probative value is 

‘ “substantially” outweighed by the probability of a “substantial danger” of 

undue prejudice.’ ” (Fruits, supra, 247 Cal.App.4th at p. 205.) “ ‘ “ ‘ “The 

‘prejudice’ referred to in Evidence Code section 352 applies to evidence which 
19

uniquely tends to evoke an emotional bias against the defendant as an 

individual and which has very little effect on the issues.” ’ ” ’ ” (Ibid.)

We agree with the trial court that the evidence was relevant, and we do 

not find a substantial danger of undue prejudice. The jury heard testimony 

from Officer Cadaret that the victim said he “did not believe” any of the 

knives were used. In addition, defendant did not dispute that he stabbed the 

victim. Further, the evidence does not “ ‘ “ ‘ “uniquely tend[] to evoke an 

emotional bias against the defendant as an individual.” ’ ” ’ ” (Fruits, supra, 

247 Cal.App.4th at p. 205.) As the defendant testified, each knife he carried 

had a separate use. He used one folding knife for cutting food and one for 

cutting insulation at work, and he used the multitool knife for its utility tools. 

We find the probative value of the knives found on the defendant when he 

was arrested several hours after the attack was not “ ‘ “substantially”

outweighed by [a] probability of a “substantial danger” of undue prejudice.’ ”

(Fruits, at p. 205.)

III. No Prosecutorial Misconduct

Defendant argues the prosecutor committed misconduct during closing 

argument by (1) arguing that it was defendant’s burden to convince jurors his 

self-defense claim was true and (2) misstating the law regarding jury 

deliberations on attempted murder and the lesser included offense of 

attempted voluntary manslaughter under CALCRIM No. 3517. Defendant 

acknowledges he did not object below to the prosecutor’s alleged 

misstatements but argues that his trial counsel was ineffective in failing to 

object. We find the prosecutor did not commit misconduct during closing 

argument and therefore defendant’s trial counsel was not ineffective for 

failing to object to the prosecutor’s statements.
20

A. Self-defense Comments

Defendant asserts that the prosecutor misstated the law during closing 

argument by suggesting that it was defendant’s burden to convince the jury 

of the truth of his self-defense claim. Defendant acknowledges that the jury 

was properly instructed with CALCRIM No. 34708 and CALCRIM No. 604,

9

which state the People have the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt 

that the defendant did not act in lawful self-defense or imperfect self-defense. 

Although the prosecutor never discussed the burden of proof in the context of 

the self-defense claim, defendant argues she stated 10 times that self-defense 

depends on whether the jury believed defendant’s version of the incident.10

“Advocates are given significant leeway in discussing the legal and 

factual merits of a case during argument. [Citation.] However, ‘it is 

improper for the prosecutor to misstate the law generally [citation], and 

particularly to attempt to absolve the prosecution from its . . . obligation to 

overcome reasonable doubt on all elements [citation].’ ” (People v. Centeno

(2014) 60 Cal.4th 659, 666 (Centeno).) “When attacking the prosecutor’s 

8 The jury was instructed: “The People have the burden of proving 

beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant did not act in lawful selfdefense. If the People have not met this burden, you must find the defendant 

not guilty of Counts 1 and 2, the lesser included offenses, and the 

enhancements.” (CALCRIM No. 3470.)

9 The jury was instructed: “The People have the burden of proving 

beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was not acting in imperfect 

self-defense. If the People have not met this burden, you must find the 

defendant not guilty of attempted murder.” (CALCRIM No. 604.)

10 Examples of the prosecutor’s statements include: “So if you buy the 

defendant’s complete self-defense story, then he’s not guilty of anything”; 

“[R]eally with these two witnesses it’s credibility and who do you believe”; 

“You’d have to believe all of that to believe his self-defense claim and it 

doesn’t make sense and it’s not reasonable.”
21

remarks to the jury, the defendant must show that, ‘[i]n the context of the 

whole argument and the instructions’ [citation] there was ‘a reasonable 

likelihood the jury understood or applied the complained-of comments in an 

improper or erroneous manner. [Citations.] In conducting this inquiry, we 

“do not lightly infer” that the jury drew the most damaging rather than the 

least damaging meaning from the prosecutor’s statements.’ ” (Centeno, at p.

667.)

The prosecutor’s argument, which characterized the defense theory of 

self-defense as not credible based on the evidence, was not improper. 

(Centeno, supra, 60 Cal.4th at p. 672 [“It is permissible to argue that the jury 

may reject impossible or unreasonable interpretations of the evidence and to 

so characterize a defense theory”].) The prosecutor did not argue the 

defendant had the burden of proof or that the prosecutor’s burden was less 

than proof beyond a reasonable doubt. The jury was properly instructed by 

the court that the prosecutor had the burden of proving beyond a reasonable 

doubt that the defendant was not acting in self-defense. Defense counsel also 

argued in closing, “It is also [the People’s] job to prove that this was not in 

self-defense by a reasonable doubt. It is their burden of proof beyond a 

reasonable doubt this was not self-defense.” We find that in the context of 

the whole argument and the instructions there was not “a reasonable

likelihood the jury understood or applied the complained-of comments in an 

improper or erroneous manner.” (Centeno, at p. 667.)

B. CALCRIM No. 3517 Comments

Prior to closing arguments, the jury was instructed with CALCRIM No. 

3517.11 The prosecutor argued in closing: “So, for the lesser included offense, 

11 The jury was instructed: “If all of you find that the defendant is not 

guilty of a greater crime, you may find him guilty of a lesser crime, if you are 

convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is guilty of that 
22

lesser crime. A defendant may not be convicted of both a greater and lesser 

crime for the same conduct.

“Count 1 has a lesser included offense of Attempted Voluntary 

Manslaughter.

“Count 2 has a lesser included offense of Simple Assault.

“It is up to you to decide the order in which you consider each crime 

and the relevant evidence, but I can accept a verdict of guilty of a lesser crime 

only if you have found the defendant not guilty of the corresponding greater 

crime.

“For the count in which a greater and lesser crime is charged, you will 

receive verdict forms of guilty and not guilty for the greater crime and also 

verdict forms of guilty and not guilty for the lesser crime. Follow these 

directions before you give me any completed and signed, final verdict form. 

Return any unused verdict forms to me, unsigned.

“1. If all of you agree the People have proved that the defendant is 

guilty of the greater crime charged in Counts 1 and/or 2, complete and sign 

the verdict form for guilty of that crime. Do not complete or sign any other 

verdict form for that count. You must consider each greater crime separately.

“2. If all of you cannot agree whether the People have proved that the 

defendant is guilty of the greater crime, inform me only that you cannot 

reach an agreement and do not complete or sign any verdict form for that 

count.

“3. If all of you agree that the People have not proved that the 

defendant is guilty of the greater crime and you also agree that the People 

have proved he is guilty of the lesser crime or attempted voluntary 

manslaughter, and/or simple assault, complete and sign the verdict form for 

not guilty of the greater crime and the verdict form for guilty of the lesser 

crime.

“4. If all of you agree the People have not proved that defendant is 

guilty of the greater or lesser crime, complete and sign the verdict form for 

not guilty of the greater crime and the verdict form for not guilty of the lesser 

crimes.

“5. If you all agree the People have not proved that the defendant is 

guilty of the greater crime, but you cannot agree on a verdict for the lesser 

crime, complete and sign the verdict form for not guilty of the greater crime 

and inform me only that you cannot reach an agreement about the lesser 

crimes.

“Whenever I tell you the People must prove something, I mean they 

must prove it beyond a reasonable doubt unless I specifically tell you 

otherwise.” (CALCRIM No. 3517.)
23

the instruction, 3517, it’s very long and can be hard to follow, but take a look 

at it because it does explain this to you in great detail. That instruction tells 

you that first you’re looking at whether he’s guilty of attempted murder. And 

if you find him guilty of attempted murder, you’re going to use this verdict 

form. It’s probably the biggest one and it has guilty of attempted murder. 

And then once you fill that in, then you move on to whether the allegation of 

premeditation is true or not and whether the great bodily injury and deadly 

weapon enhancements were true and proven. [¶] If you look at the attempted 

murder charge though and you can’t decide amongst you if he’s guilty of 

attempted murder or not, it means that you’re hung on that count. You don’t 

move on to the lesser at that point. You tell us you’re hung on that count, we 

don’t know what to do, and you don’t look at the lesser, you don’t look at the 

enhancements, you don’t look at the special allegations, you don’t fill out any 

forms on this count. It’s only if you take this form and fill it out saying he’s 

not guilty of attempted murder, then you’d move on to whether he’s guilty or 

not guilty of the lesser offense.”

Defendant argues that the prosecutor’s comments incorrectly informed 

the jury that it could not consider the lesser include offense of attempted 

voluntary manslaughter unless it first reached a not guilty verdict on the 

attempted murder charge. (See People v. Kurtzman (1988) 46 Cal.3d 322, 

324–325 [jury is restricted from returning a verdict on a lesser included 

offense before acquitting on a greater offense, but is not precluded from 

considering lesser offenses during its deliberations].) We disagree.

The jury was properly instructed by the court that “[i]t is up to you to 

decide the order in which you consider each crime and the relevant evidence, 

but I can accept a verdict of guilty of a lesser crime only if you have found the 

defendant not guilty of the corresponding greater crime.” (CALCRIM No. 
24

3517.) In closing argument, the prosecutor did not state the jury was 

prohibited from considering the lesser offense or deliberating on it. In fact, 

she told the jury to “take a look at [CALCRIM No. 3517] because it does 

explain this to you in great detail.” The prosecutor’s further comments 

regarding returning the various verdict forms are in line with the court’s 

instruction that it cannot “accept a verdict of guilty of a lesser crime [unless] 

you have found the defendant not guilty of the corresponding greater crime” 

and do not constitute misconduct.

IV. Sufficient Evidence Supports Finding of Premeditation 

and Deliberation

Defendant argues there was insufficient evidence to support the jury’s 

finding of premeditation and deliberation.12 We disagree.

“ ‘ “[P]remeditated” means “considered beforehand” and “deliberate” 

means “formed or arrived at or determined upon as a result of careful 

thought and weighing of considerations for and against the proposed course 

of action.” ’ [Citation.] ‘An intentional killing is premeditated and deliberate 

if it occurred as the result of preexisting thought and reflection rather than 

unconsidered or rash impulse.’ [Citation.] A reviewing court normally 

considers three kinds of evidence to determine whether a finding of 

premeditation and deliberation is adequately supported—preexisting motive, 

planning activity, and manner of killing—but ‘[t]hese factors need not be 

present in any particular combination to find substantial evidence of 

premeditation and deliberation.’ ” (People v. Jurado (2006) 38 Cal.4th 72, 

118–119.)

12 The jury found true the allegation that the attempted murder was 

committed willfully, deliberately, and with premeditation within the meaning 

of section 189. Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence regarding 

the deliberation and premeditation findings only.
25

“ ‘The proper test for determining a claim of insufficiency of evidence in 

a criminal case is whether, on the entire record, a rational trier of fact could 

find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. [Citations.] On appeal, 

we must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the People and must 

presume in support of the judgment the existence of every fact the trier could 

reasonably deduce from the evidence. [Citation.] [¶] Although we must 

ensure the evidence is reasonable, credible, and of solid value, nonetheless it 

is the exclusive province of the trial judge or jury to determine the credibility 

of a witness and the truth or falsity of the facts on which that determination 

depends. [Citation.] Thus, if the verdict is supported by substantial 

evidence, we must accord due deference to the trier of fact and not substitute 

our evaluation of a witness’s credibility for that of the fact finder.’ ” (People v. 

Ochoa (1993) 6 Cal.4th 1199, 1206.)

We find sufficient evidence supports the jury’s finding of premeditation 

and deliberation. First, there was evidence of past disputes between the 

victim and the defendant regarding payment for Dash’s care and how the 

victim cared for Dash, including an angry text message in which the 

defendant told the victim, “Get your own dog, or kill yourself. I don’t care,” 

and another message in which the defendant called the victim a “lunatic.” 

From this evidence the jury could have reasonably concluded the defendant 

wanted to kill the victim because of their past disputes. Second, there was 

evidence of planning. The defendant brought knives to the victim’s home and 

then waited nearly three hours before attacking the victim. When the victim 

turned his back and was in a vulnerable position, the defendant began his 

attack by hitting the victim in the head with a rock and then stabbed him 

repeatedly. (See People v. Sanchez (1995) 12 Cal.4th 1, 34 [planning activity 

may occur over a short period of time], disapproved on other grounds in
26

People v. Doolin (2009) 45 Cal.4th 390, 421, fn. 22.) In addition, the manner 

of the attempted killing further supports the jury’s finding. Defendant 

stabbed the victim eight times in the neck and chest. Even once the victim 

was able to get control of defendant and told him to drop the knife, the 

defendant refused. Based upon this record, a rational trier of fact could find 

beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant acted with premeditation and 

deliberation.

V. Sentencing

On count one, the defendant was sentenced to prison for seven years to 

life for attempted murder plus a determinate sentence of three years for the 

great bodily injury enhancement and one year for the use of a deadly and 

dangerous weapon enhancement. On count two the defendant was sentenced 

to four years plus three years for the great bodily injury enhancement and 

the time imposed was stayed under section 654. Defendant’s overall prison 

sentence was seven years to life consecutive to a determinate term of four 

years.

Defendant argues the seven years to life sentence is unauthorized and 

must be corrected to life with the possibility of parole because section 664 

states: “[I]f the crime attempted is willful, deliberate, and premeditated 

murder, as defined in Section 189, the person guilty of that attempt shall be 

punished by imprisonment in the state prison for life with the possibility of 

parole.” (§ 664, subd. (a).) Defendant relies on a footnote in People v. Wong

(2018) 27 Cal.App.5th 972 which notes the trial court and the parties referred 

to the sentence by a “common shorthand” including the minimum parole 

eligibility period but that “a more accurate statement of the sentence for 

attempted murder is simply ‘life, plus’ any determinate enhancements.” (Id.

at pp. 977–978, fn. 4.) At issue in Wong was whether the defendant had been 
27

improperly sentenced to three consecutive one-year terms for deadly weapons 

enhancements on a single attempted murder count. (Wong, supra, at p. 978.)

Wong does not address whether a sentence of seven years to life for 

attempted murder is unauthorized and must be corrected, and we do not find 

it persuasive authority for defendant’s position here.

The People argue there is no sentencing error because although section 

664, subdivision (a) provides the punishment for attempted premeditated 

murder is “life with the possibility of parole,” defendant cannot be paroled 

under section 3046 until he has served “at least seven calendar years” in 

prison. (§ 3046, subd. (a)(1).) People v. Jefferson (1999) 21 Cal.4th 86

(Jefferson) addressed a related issue regarding doubling of the minimum 

term for attempted premeditated murder under section 667, subdivision (e)(1)

(the “Three Strikes” law). (Jefferson, at pp. 91–92.) The California Supreme 

Court stated: “Defendants insist that the sentence for attempted 

premeditated murder does not have a minimum term, because section 664, 

the relevant penalty provision, does not mention service of any minimum 

term, stating only that the punishment is ‘imprisonment in the state prison 

for life with the possibility of parole.’ But as we have explained, the 

minimum term for a defendant found guilty of attempted premeditated 

murder is found not in section 664 but in section 3046. The parole eligibility 

period set by section 3046 is a minimum term within the sentence-doubling 

language of section 667(e)(1).” (Jefferson, at p. 96.) Jefferson also noted there 

was nothing improper about the trial court’s including the minimum term 

established by section 3046 in its oral pronouncement of the sentence. “By 

including the minimum term of imprisonment in its sentence, a trial court 

gives guidance to the Board of Prison Terms regarding the appropriate term 

to apply, and it informs the victims attending the sentencing hearing of the 
28

minimum period the defendant will have to serve before becoming eligible for 

parole. Thus, when the trial court here pronounced defendants’ sentences, it 

properly included their minimum terms . . . .” (Id. at p. 102, fn. 3.)

Defendant argues Jefferson is distinguishable because there is no 

“sentence doubling” issue here. We do not find this to be a meaningful 

distinction given Jefferson’s statements that the seven-year parole eligibility 

period is the minimum term for attempted premeditated murder and that the 

trial court “properly included their minimum terms.”13 (Jefferson, supra, 21 

Cal.4th at pp. 96, 102, fn. 3.) We conclude the trial court did not err.

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed.

13 Although we do not find the trial court’s seven-years-to-life sentence 

erroneous given that section 3046 provides seven years is the minimum 

period that must be served before parole eligibility for attempted murder, the 

better practice is to follow the language of section 664, which provides the 

sentence for attempted murder is “life with the possibility of parole.” (§ 664, 

subd. (a).)
29

_________________________

Jackson, J.

WE CONCUR:

_________________________

Siggins, P. J.

_________________________

Fujisaki, J.

A155630/People v. Quentin Bowen
30

A155630/People v. Quentin Bowen

Trial Court: Superior Court of the County of Sonoma

Trial Judge: Peter Ottenweller, J.

Counsel: Stephen Greenberg, under appointment by the Court of 

Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief 

Assistant Attorney General, Jeffrey M. Laurence, 

Senior Assistant Attorney General, Catherine A. 

Rivlin and Ann P. Wathen, Deputy Attorneys General,

for Plaintiff and Respondent.