IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 11-30267

Summary Calendar

MICHAEL R. MURRAY,

Plaintiff – Appellant

v.

STATE OF LOUISIANA-DIVISION OF ADMINISTRATION-OFFICE OF

PLANNING AND BUDGET; RAY STOCKSTILL, 

Defendants – Appellees

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the Middle District of Louisiana

USDC No. 3:08-CV-254

Before KING, JOLLY, and GRAVES, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Plaintiff–Appellant Michael Murray appeals the district court’s grant of

summary judgment in favor of Defendants–Appellees on his Title VII retaliation

claim. We conclude that Murray failed to establish a prima facie case of

retaliation, and therefore AFFIRM.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

F I L E D

August 26, 2011

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

 Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not *

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.

R. 47.5.4.

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No. 11-30267

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Michael R. Murray began working for the State of Louisiana in

its Office of Planning and Budget (“OPB”) in 1979. In 2000, a co-worker named

Ann Bland complained that OPB had discriminated against her on the basis of

her sex in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Bland’s complaint

resulted in an investigation by the Louisiana Division of Administration’s Office

of Human Resources, which interviewed Murray in connection with Bland’s

complaint in July 2000. Murray also testified at a related hearing in July 2001.

In both instances, he spoke in support of Bland’s complaint.

On August 30, 2006, Murray filed a charge of discrimination with the

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”). Murray stated in his

charge that beginning in 2000, after he supported Bland’s complaint, he was

subject to retaliation in the form of consistently poor ratings on his annual

Performance Planning and Reviews (“PPRs”). As a result, Murray alleged that

he had been denied merit-based pay raises, consideration for promotions,

bonuses, and opportunities to obtain other employment.

After receiving his Notice of Right to Sue from the EEOC, Murray filed

this suit against OPB and Ray Stockstill, OPB’s State Budget Director (together,

“Defendants”). In his complaint, Murray alleged numerous claims of

discrimination, retaliation, and other violations of rights. Defendants moved for

summary judgment on all of Murray’s claims. The district court adopted the

report and recommendation of the magistrate judge, and granted the motion

over Murray’s objection. Murray appeals only as to his claim for retaliation

under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–3(a).

DISCUSSION

We review the grant of summary judgment de novo, viewing the evidence

in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Cerda v. 2004-EQR1 L.L.C.,

612 F.3d 781, 786 (5th Cir. 2010). Summary judgment is proper “if the movant

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shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant

is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).

A plaintiff establishes a prima facie case for unlawful retaliation under 42

U.S.C. § 2000e–3(a) by showing: “(i) he engaged in a protected activity, (ii) an

adverse employment action occurred, and (iii) there was a causal link between

the protected activity and the adverse employment action.” Hernandez v. Yellow

Transp., Inc., 641 F.3d 118, 129 (5th Cir. 2011). Summary judgment in favor of

the defendant is appropriate if the plaintiff cannot support all three elements. 

Stewart v. Miss. Transp. Comm’n, 586 F.3d 321, 331 (5th Cir. 2009).

Murray satisfied the first element by participating in the Title VII

investigation in 2000, an activity protected under Title VII. See 42 U.S.C.

§ 2000e–3(a) (defining “protected activity” to include making a charge,testifying,

assisting, or participating in any manner in a Title VII investigation, proceeding,

or hearing). Murray argues, and Defendants do not contest, that he also

satisfied the second element by showing that an adverse employment action

occurred within three hundred days of the filing of his EEOC complaint.1

Murray complains of the following actions that occurred during this statutory

period: denial of a $1500 bonus given to OPB staff for “extraordinary work”

related to Hurricanes Katrina and Rita in August 2006; denial of a promotion to

State Budget Manager in January 2006; and two negative PPRs resulting in

denial of merit pay raises. Assuming arguendo that all of these actions

We consider only those adverse employment actions that occurred on or after 1

November 4, 2005, the date three hundred days before Murray filed his charge of

discrimination on August 30, 2006. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–5(e)(1); Janmeja v. Bd. of

Supervisors of La. State Univ. & Agric. & Mech. Coll., 96 F. App’x 212, 214 (5th Cir. 2004) (in

a “deferral state” like Louisiana, a plaintiff must file his charge within three hundred days of

the complained-of conduct, rather than within the one hundred eighty days that would

otherwise apply). To the extent that Murray argues that we should consider discrete

employment actions as far back as 2000 under the “continuing violation” doctrine applicable

to hostile work environment claims, the Supreme Court has rejected this argument. See Nat’l

R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 114 (2002).

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constitute actionable adverse employment actions, Murray is unable to show 2

that there was a causal link between his protected activity and these actions and

thus fails to establish the third element of a prima facie case of retaliation.

The record establishes that Ann Bland was Murray’s direct supervisor

during the three hundred days prior to the filing of his EEOC charge. In her role

as Murray’s supervisor, Bland gave Murray the poor ratings in his PPRs, and

was thereby directly responsible for the denial of Murray’s merit raises. Murray

directs the court’s attention to multiple affidavits from former co-workers that

counter some of the negative evaluations in his PPRs. Although this evidence

certainly raises doubts as to Bland’s evaluation of Murray’s work performance,

it fails to create a genuine issue of material fact as to retaliatory animus. 

Murray himself admitted in his deposition that Bland’s conduct could not have

been retaliatory given that the “protected activity” underlying Murray’s

retaliation claim was his support for Bland in her Title VII complaint against

OPB.

Murray also alleges that his poor PPRs resulted in his failure to obtain

promotions, bonuses, and opportunities for other employment. To the extent

that Murray argues that these adverse employment actions are attributable to

Ray Stockstill, rather than to the poor PPR ratings he received from Bland, he

does not provide any evidence that Stockstill’s actions were taken in retaliation

for Murray’s protected activity back in 2000. Several of the affidavits contain

An “adverse employment action” is one that “a reasonable employee would have found 2

. . . [to be] materially adverse, which in this context means it well might have dissuaded a

reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge of discrimination.” Burlington N. &

Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 68 (2006) (citation and internal quotation marks

omitted). Although it is clearly established that the denial of a promotion is an actionable

adverse employment action, see, e.g., Alvarado v. Tex. Rangers, 492 F.3d 605, 612 (5th Cir.

2007), it is less clear whether a negative evaluation such as Murray’s PPRs or the denial of a

bonus constitute actionable adverse employment actions. Given the Defendants’ failure to

brief this issue and the unnecessariness of addressing this second element, we decline to

answer those questions here. 

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attestations that Stockstill made negative comments about Murray during

management meetings. While this evidence certainly paints a picture of

Stockstill’s dislike for Murray, it does not shed any light on the reason for this

dislike and therefore does not create a genuine issue of material fact as to

whether Stockstill’s alleged actions were in retaliation forMurray’s participation

in the 2000 investigation. 

CONCLUSION

Murray has failed to provide sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie

case for unlawful retaliation. The district court therefore properly granted

summary judgment in Defendants’ favor. AFFIRMED. 

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