[Cite as State v. Carrion, 2023-Ohio-4386.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO

HAMILTON COUNTY, OHIO

STATE OF OHIO,

 Plaintiff-Appellee,

 vs.

RAYMOND CARRION,

 Defendant-Appellant.

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APPEAL NO. C-230070

TRIAL NO. 23CRB-681A

 

 O P I N I O N.

Criminal Appeal From: Hamilton County Municipal Court

Judgment Appealed From Is: Affirmed

Date of Judgment Entry on Appeal: December 6, 2023

Emily Smart Woerner, City Soliciter, William T. Horsley, Chief Prosecuting Attorney, 

and Danielle Ferris, Assistant City Prosecutor, for Plaintiff-Appellee,

Raymond T. Faller, Hamilton County Public Defender, and Sarah E. Nelson, Assistant 

Public Defender, for Defendant-Appellant.
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KINSLEY, Judge.

{¶1} Following a jury trial in the Hamilton County Municipal Court, 

defendant-appellant Raymond Carrion was convicted of one count of obstruction of 

official business in violation of R.C. 2921.31, a misdemeanor of the second degree. 

{¶2} In his first assignment of error, Carrion argues that the state failed to 

present sufficient evidence to support his conviction. In his second assignment of 

error, Carrion argues that his conviction is against the manifest weight of the evidence. 

For the reasons set forth below, we affirm Carrion’s conviction. 

Factual and Procedural History

{¶3} The incident which forms the basis for this appeal occurred on January 

12, 2023, when Officers Justin Bittinger and Robert Dews arrived at Carrion’s home 

to serve him with a felony arrest warrant for a parole violation from Kentucky.

{¶4} At trial, Bittinger testified that when he arrived at Carrion’s home, he 

knocked on the front door twice. When no one responded, Bittinger opened the 

unlocked door. Carrion then appeared in the opening from the hallway, and Bittinger 

asked him to step out from the hallway. Carrion asked Bittinger, “Who are you,” and 

asked why Bittinger was at his home.

{¶5} Bittinger informed Carrion that police were there to serve an arrest 

warrant for a parole violation. Bittinger then told Carrion to “come here,” but Carrion 

did not comply. Bittinger then further entered Carrion’s home and made physical 

contact with Carrion.

{¶6} As Bittinger approached Carrion, he asked Carrion to put his hands 

behind his back. Carrion complied with respect to one hand, which Bittinger was able 

to hold, but Carrion placed his other hand against the wall. A scuffle then ensued. 
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Bittinger grabbed Carrion’s hand from the wall in an attempt to arrest him. Carrion 

spun around, and his hand from the wall was freed from Bittinger’s grip. Aided by 

Dews, who had subsequently entered the house, Bittinger then took Carrion to the 

ground to handcuff him.

{¶7} Bittinger testified that when he tried to get Carrion on the ground,

Carrion was tucking his hands, not placing them behind his back. Bittinger testified 

that while Carrion was on the ground, he was tensing his muscles, after which Bittinger 

maced him. Bittinger further testified that it took three officers—himself, Dews, and 

another officer who arrived to assist—to detain Carrion. Ultimately, medics were 

called, and Carrion was placed inside the police vehicle without further incident. 

{¶8} Dews testified that when the officers entered Carrion’s home, they did 

not immediately announce themselves as police officers. Dews heard Carrion ask the 

officers to “hold on” because he had just woken up. Dews testified that right after 

Carrion said this, Bittinger “guided” him to the ground. Dews testified that while 

Carrion was on the ground being asked to put his hands behind his back, both he and 

another officer were holding Carrion’s hands. Dews heard Carrion say that he was 

trying to put his hands behind his back, even though one of the officers had his hand 

before Carrion was maced. Dews acknowledged that this was preventing Carrion from 

placing his hands behind his back.

{¶9} The entire encounter, from when Bittinger opened the door until 

officers had Carrion in handcuffs, lasted approximately one minute and 45 seconds. 

The state presented body-worn camera footage at trial that corroborated Bittinger’s 

and Dews’s accounts of Carrion’s arrest. 
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{¶10} Carrion testified on his own behalf at trial. He explained that he was 

on parole in Kentucky and was only allowed to cross state lines for an emergency 

regarding his daughter. On the day of the incident, Carrion was at the house in 

Cincinnati because his daughter was sick. He explained that he woke up to someone 

knocking at his door, and when he rounded the corner, he saw people standing in the 

doorway, but could not make them out due to a flashlight being shined. Carrion 

testified that he was surprised that the officers were there, because he was in 

communication with his parole officer and was usually informed if problems arose. 

He explained that when Bittinger took one of his hands and placed it behind his back, 

Carrion put his other hand on the wall and continued to ask the officers why they were 

there, to which he received no response. Carrion testified that one to two seconds 

later, he was on the floor. Carrion told the officers multiple times that he was going 

down, that he had a broken shoulder, and that he was unable to put his hand behind 

his back because one of the officers had it pinned to the ground. Bittinger then maced 

Carrion and the third officer said he was going to “tase the sh*t out of [Carrion]” but 

did not end up tasing him. Carrion testified that he had a “burning sensation across 

my whole face, my eyes, and my mouth. Couldn’t breathe, soreness on my dislocated 

shoulder[,]” as a result of the incident.

{¶11} Carrion was charged with one count of obstructing official business, a 

misdemeanor of the second degree, and one count of resisting arrest, a misdemeanor 

of the second degree. The jury convicted Carrion of obstruction of official business in 

violation of R.C. 2921.31, but acquitted him of resisting arrest. The trial court 

sentenced Carrion to 90 days incarceration with credit for 25 days and ordered him to 

pay a $250 fine plus court fees. 
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{¶12} Carrion timely appealed. 

Sufficiency of Evidence 

{¶13} Carrion raises two assignments of error on appeal. First, Carrion argues 

that the state failed to present sufficient evidence to support his conviction. Second, 

Carrion argues that his conviction is against the manifest weight of the evidence. 

{¶14} We begin with Carrion’s first assignment of error regarding the 

sufficiency of the evidence. 

{¶15} When reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, we 

examine the evidence admitted at the trial to determine whether such evidence, if 

believed, would convince the average mind of the defendant’s guilt beyond a 

reasonable doubt. The relevant inquiry is whether, after viewing the evidence in a light 

most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the 

essential elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Jenks, 61 

Ohio St.3d 259, 574 N.E.2d 492 (1991), paragraph two of the syllabus.

{¶16} R.C. 2921.31(A) defines the crime of obstruction of official business as 

follows: “[n]o person, without privilege to do so and with purpose to prevent, obstruct, 

or delay the performance by a public official of any authorized act within the public 

official’s official capacity, shall do any act that hampers or impedes a public official in 

the performance of the public official’s lawful duties.” Consistent with this statute, to 

sustain a conviction for obstruction of official business, the state is required to prove

that the defendant: “(1) performed an act; (2) without privilege; (3) with purpose to 

prevent, obstruct, or delay the performance of a public official of any authorized act 

within the public official’s official capacity; and (4) that hampered or impeded the 
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performance of the public official’s duties.” In re S.J., 1st Dist. Hamilton Nos. C220221, C-220222, C-220223 and C-220224, 2023-Ohio-3441, ¶ 21.

{¶17} Carrion does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence presented to 

show that he acted without privilege and with purpose to prevent, obstruct, or delay 

the performance of an official act. Thus, we only address whether there was sufficient 

evidence of an affirmative act and that Carrion’s conduct hampered or impeded the 

performance of the police officers’ official duties. We conclude that there was. 

Affirmative Act

{¶18} Carrion first asserts that he did not engage in an affirmative act. He 

alleges that placing his hand on the wall was not an affirmative act because it was done 

without the purpose of preventing officers from arresting him. He further alleges that 

his other conduct, including spinning away from Bittinger and struggling with officers, 

did not constitute an affirmative act because officers were physically controlling his 

body and because he was not attempting to walk away or otherwise evade arrest.

{¶19} “[A] violation of [the obstruction] statute requires an affirmative act.” 

State v. Grice, 180 Ohio App.3d 700, 2009-Ohio-372, 906 N.E.2d 1203, ¶ 9 (1st Dist.). 

An affirmative act is defined as any conduct, physical or verbal, that hampers or 

impedes the officer in the performance of his or her duties. State v. Wellman, 173 Ohio 

App.3d 494, 2007-Ohio-2953, 879 N.E.2d 215 (1st Dist.). “A person cannot be guilty 

of obstructing official business by doing nothing or failing to act. Further, mere failure 

to obey an officer’s order does not give rise to obstruction.” (Internal citations 

omitted.) In re S.J. at ¶ 24. Further, “the nature of a defendant’s conduct must be such 

that a trier of fact can reasonably infer that the accused intended his conduct to 
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obstruct official business.” In re Payne, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-040705, 2005-Ohio4849, ¶ 15. 

{¶20} Here, the state presented ample evidence that Carrion engaged in an 

affirmative act, going beyond the mere failure to act, within the meaning of the 

obstruction-of-official-business statute. First, the evidence demonstrated that 

Carrion placed his hand on the wall and asked the officers to “hold on” while they were 

attempting to arrest him. Second, Bittinger testified that Carrion tucked his wrists and 

tensed his muscles to avoid the placement of handcuffs. While these acts were brief in 

duration, reviewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the state, we find 

Carrion’s conduct sufficient to establish that an affirmative act occurred. 

Hamper and Impeded

{¶21} Carrion next asserts that he did not hamper and impede the officers in 

their official duties, given that it took less than two minutes for him to be arrested after 

officers entered his home.

{¶22} Although “hamper” and “impede” are not defined in R.C. 2921.31, this 

court has stated that an act violates the statute when it creates a “substantial stoppage” 

of the officers’ progress. (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re R.B., 2021-Ohio3749, 179 N.E.3d 749, ¶ 18-19 (1st Dist.). This “substantial stoppage” requirement is 

not defined by any particular period of time, but rather must merely occur because of 

the defendant’s act. Id.

{¶23} Bittinger testified that he was obstructed and delayed in arresting 

Carrion when Carrion put “his hands on the wall trying to push away.” Dews testified 

that officers were impeded and delayed by Carrion failing to give his hands to the 
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officers when asked. Dews also testified that it took three officers to arrest Carrion 

rather than the usual one.

{¶24} Therefore, however slight the hampering and impeding may have been, 

when reviewing the record in a light most favorable to the state, there is evidence to 

show that Carrion’s actions hampered and impeded the officers in effectuating the 

arrest. 

{¶25} Therefore, we overrule Carrion’s first assignment of error. 

Manifest Weight

{¶26} In his second assignment of error, Carrion challenges his conviction 

under the manifest-weight-of-the-evidence standard.

{¶27} When reviewing a challenge to the manifest weight of the evidence, we 

sit as a “thirteenth juror.” State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 388, 678 N.E.2d 

541 (1997). Unlike our review of a sufficiency challenge, review of a manifest-weight 

challenge requires us to independently “review the entire record, weigh the evidence, 

consider the credibility of the witnesses, and determine whether the trier of fact clearly 

lost its way and created a manifest miscarriage of justice.” State v. Powell, 1st Dist. 

Hamilton No. C-190508, 2020-Ohio-4283, ¶ 16, citing Thompkins at 397. However, 

we will reverse the trial court’s decision to convict and grant a new trial only 

in “ ‘exceptional cases in which the evidence weighs heavily against the conviction.’ ” 

State v. Sipple, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-190462, 2021-Ohio-1319, ¶ 7, quoting State 

v. Martin, 20 Ohio App.3d 172, 175, 485 N.E.2d 717 (1st Dist.1983).
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Purpose

{¶28} Carrion argues that his conviction was against the manifest weight of 

the evidence solely as to one element of obstruction of official business: purpose to 

prevent, obstruct, or delay a public official. 

{¶29} “[T]he nature of a defendant’s conduct must be such that a trier of fact 

can reasonably infer that the accused intended his conduct to obstruct official 

business. To constitute obstruction, a defendant must act with purpose, meaning it is 

his or her specific intention to cause a certain result or engage in a conduct of a certain 

nature.” (Internal citation and quotation marks omitted.) In re S.J., 1st Dist. Hamilton 

Nos. C-220221, C-220222, C-220223 and C-220224, 2023-Ohio-3441, ¶ 26.

{¶30} With regard to purpose, the evidence shows that Carrion placed his 

hand on the wall and asked the officers to “hold on.” Carrion explained he had just 

awakened and wanted more time before being arrested. While an understandable 

human reaction, Carrion’s statement offers a glimpse into his state of mind, which was 

a desire to delay his arrest. Given this evidence, we cannot say that the jury clearly lost 

its way and created a manifest miscarriage of justice in finding that Carrion acted 

purposely in hampering or impeding his arrest.

{¶31} Therefore, we overrule Carrion’s second assignment of error.

Conclusion

{¶32} For the reasons set forth in this opinion, we affirm the judgment of the 

trial court. 

Judgment affirmed. 

ZAYAS, P.J., and BOCK, J., concur.

Please note:
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The court has recorded its own entry on the date of the release of this opinion.