J-S51038-19

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

IN RE: R.W.A., A MINOR

APPEAL OF: S.B.A., MOTHER

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IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

No. 816 MDA 2019

Appeal from the Decree Entered April 17, 2019

in the Court of Common Pleas of Lancaster County 

Orphans' Court at No(s): 2567 of 2017

BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J., GANTMAN, P.J.E., and MUSMANNO, J.

MEMORANDUM BY MUSMANNO, J.: FILED DECEMBER 12, 2019

S.B.A. (“Mother”) appeals from the Decree granting the Petition filed by 

S.F. (“Paternal Grandmother”) and M.F. (collectively, the “Petitioners” or 

“Paternal Grandparents”), and involuntarily terminating Mother’s parental 

rights to her minor, male child, R.W.A. (“Child” or “the Child”), pursuant to 

the Adoption Act, 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(1), (2), and (b).1 We affirm.

The orphans’ court set forth the factual and procedural history of this 

matter as follows:

[The Child] ... was born [i]n July [] 2012. When the Child was first 

born, he resided primarily with his parents. In November or 

December of 2012, []Paternal Grandmother[] filed a Petition for 

custody to ensure her visitation rights [concerning the Child,] and 

was granted a shared physical custody schedule. On September 

12, 2013, Paternal Grandmother’s partial custody was expanded 

to three days a week. As time progressed, the Child spent more 

and more time with [] Paternal Grandparents, eventually 

escalating to three weekends a month with the[m] [].

____________________________________________

1 Child’s biological father, R.H. (“Father”), consented to the termination of his 

parental rights. 
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The Lancaster County Children and Youth Social Service 

Agency (hereinafter “the Agency”) received a referral regarding 

Mother’s and Father’s purported [illicit] drug use in 2016. Paternal 

Grandmother testified that in 2016[,] she was aware that Mother 

and Father were struggling with drug use in their lives and that 

she would frequently get calls requesting that [Paternal 

Grandparents] take the Child immediately. The initial drug test 

for Mother and Father came back invalid [for both parties,] while 

the second urine screen came back positive for opiates [for both]. 

At the time the Agency became involved, the family consisted of 

Mother, Father, the Child and Mother’s two daughters from a 

previous relationship. The family left Pennsylvania during the 

assessment period so Mother and Father could enter a 

detoxification program in Florida. Mother testified that she went 

to a detoxification program in Miami, Florida for approximately 13 

days in the summer of 2016.

The family was accepted by the Agency for services on July 

12, 2016[,] and eventually returned to Pennsylvania. The plan 

developed for the family included goals for Mother and Father to 

“cooperate with Agency services, allow home visits and allow the 

caseworker into the home ...[,] maintain stable housing[,] and 

have income to meet the children’s basic needs.” The plan also 

included a substance abuse goal requiring Mother and Father to 

submit to an evaluation and follow any recommendations. There 

was also a parenting goal and an education goal for the two older 

girls in the home.

The Agency caseworker described Mother as being 

uncooperative with her during the Agency’s involvement. Mother 

had several urine screens that were invalid or unable to be tested; 

specifically, on May 26, 2016, the urine was clear and cold; on 

November 8, the urine was invalid for foul-smelling urine[,] and 

on November 21, Mother and Father both refused a drug screen. 

The Agency caseworker testified that Mother subsequently 

left Pennsylvania after the Agency filed a Petition for emergency 

custody of Mother’s two oldest children. When Mother left 

Pennsylvania with her two daughters, the Child did not go with 

her. Despite the issuance of an emergency Order granting the 

Agency’s request for physical custody, Mother never attended any 

hearings and did not return her two daughters to Pennsylvania. 

The Agency eventually referred the case to the appropriate 

authorities in Florida when it became apparent that Mother was 

not returning to Pennsylvania. 
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In December of 2016, Paternal Grandmother filed a Petition 

for modification of the current custody Order for the Child on an 

emergency basis. Paternal Grandmother’s Petition was granted 

and sole physical and legal custody was awarded by Order dated 

December 9, 2016. The Agency did not file a custody petition for 

the Child[,] as Petitioners had filed for and been awarded custody 

through the Lancaster County family court system. The Child has 

resided with Petitioners since December of 2016. Father did 

complete his goals and his case was closed for services on May 

22, 2017. A custody conference was held on January 25, 2017. 

Mother attended this conference and was represented by counsel. 

Paternal Grandmother and Father also attended the custody 

conference in early 2017. A follow-up custody conference was ...

held on April 25, 2017. Mother was not present for the follow-up 

conference but Mother’s counsel did attend. [Mother’s father] 

testified that he believed Mother was in a drug rehabilitation 

program at the time of the conference. 

On May 10, 2017, after granting Mother a period in which to 

object[,] and after receiving no objection, the court entered an 

Order granting primary physical and legal custody of the Child to 

Paternal Grandmother and partial physical custody to Father. 

Mother was directed to have no contact with the Child pending 

further order of court. [Mother’s father] testified that Mother has 

not seen the Child since December of 2016. 

Orphans’ Court Opinion, 4/17/19, at 3-6 (citations to the record and footnote 

omitted, some capitalization altered).

On November 16, 2017, Paternal Grandparents filed a Petition seeking 

to involuntarily terminate Mother’s parental rights and to adopt Child. Father 

informed the court that he would consent to the termination of his parental 

rights to Child, if Mother’s parental rights were terminated, and he would 

consent to adoption. In January 2018, the court appointed Pamela Breneman, 

Esquire, to act as Child’s guardian ad litem, who subsequently opined that 

termination of Mother’s parental rights was in Child’s best interest. 
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The court conducted hearings on Petitioners’ Petition on June 13, 2018,

and July 30, 2018.2 Petitioners presented the testimony of the family support 

caseworker for the Agency, Father, and that of Petitioners. Mother presented 

the testimony of her father and mother, and that of Mother’s daughter. 

Further, Mother testified on her own behalf.3

In Mother’s brief contesting the termination, she objected that the court 

had failed to appoint legal counsel for Child, pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. 

§ 2313(a) (requiring a court to appoint counsel to a child in a contested 

termination of parental rights proceeding). Accordingly, in November 2018, 

the court appointed Angela Rieck, Esquire (“Attorney Rieck”), as legal counsel 

for Child. The court instructed Attorney Rieck to determine whether the record 

needed to be re-opened to present testimony on behalf of Child. Attorney

Rieck thereafter sent a letter to the court stating that she had reviewed the 

hearing transcripts and met with Child, and that it was unnecessary for the 

court to re-open the record. Although Attorney Rieck questioned whether 

Child, who was then six years old, completely understood the proceedings, 

she represented that Child had clearly expressed that he wanted to remain in 

the care of Petitioners. 

On April 17, 2019, the court entered a Decree involuntarily terminating 

Mother’s parental rights to Child pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(1), (2), 

____________________________________________

2 Mother lives primarily in Florida, and a number of hearings were postponed 

due to issues relating to service of court Notices. 

3 Mother did not attend the hearing on June 13, 2018, as she was in prison. 
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and (b). Mother thereafter timely filed a Notice of Appeal simultaneously with 

a Pa.R.A.P. 1925 Concise Statement of errors complained of on appeal.

Mother now presents the following issues for our review:

1. Did the lower court erroneously terminate [] Mother’s parental 

rights?

2. Whether the lower court failed to properly weigh the evidence 

in assessing whether [] termination was appropriate?

3. Whether the lower court failed to properly weigh the best 

interests of the Child by terminating [] Mother’s parental 

rights?

Mother’s Brief at 5 (capitalization omitted).4

We review these claims, which we will address simultaneously due to 

their relatedness, mindful of our well-settled standard of review:

The standard of review in termination of parental rights cases 

requires appellate courts to accept the findings of fact and 

credibility determinations of the trial court if they are supported 

by the record. If the factual findings are supported, appellate 

courts review to determine if the trial court made an error of law 

or abused its discretion. A decision may be reversed for an abuse 

of discretion only upon demonstration of manifest 

unreasonableness, partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will. The trial 

court’s decision, however, should not be reversed merely because 

the record would support a different result. We have previously 

emphasized our deference to trial courts that often have first-hand 

observations of the parties spanning multiple hearings.

In re T.S.M., 71 A.3d 251, 267 (Pa. 2013) (citations and quotation marks 

omitted). 

____________________________________________

4 While Mother stated her issues somewhat differently in her Rule 1925(b)

Concise Statement, we find them sufficiently preserved for our review. 

Further, in Mother’s brief, her arguments overlap between the various 

sections. 
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Termination of parental rights is governed by Section 2511 of the 

Adoption Act, which requires a bifurcated analysis: 

Initially, the focus is on the conduct of the parent. The party 

seeking termination must prove by clear and convincing evidence 

that the parent’s conduct satisfies the statutory grounds for 

termination delineated in Section 2511(a). Only if the court 

determines that the parent’s conduct warrants termination of his 

or her parental rights does the court engage in the second part of 

the analysis pursuant to Section 2511(b): determination of the 

needs and welfare of the child under the standard of best interests 

of the child. One major aspect of the needs and welfare analysis 

concerns the nature and status of the emotional bond between 

parent and child, with close attention paid to the effect on the child 

of permanently severing any such bond.

In re L.M., 923 A.2d 505, 511 (Pa. Super. 2007) (citations omitted).

In this case, the orphans’ court terminated Mother’s parental rights 

pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(1) and (2), as well as (b). This Court may 

affirm an orphans’ court’s decision regarding the termination of parental rights 

with regard to any one subsection of section 2511(a), as well as a 

consideration of section 2511(b). See In re B.L.W., 843 A.2d 380, 384 (Pa. 

Super. 2004) (en banc). Here, we will focus our analysis on section 

2511(a)(1) and (b), which provides as follows:

§ 2511. Grounds for involuntary termination

(a) General rule.-- The rights of a parent in regard to a child 

may be terminated after a petition filed on any of the following 

grounds:

(1) The parent by conduct continuing for a period of at 

least six months immediately preceding the filing of the 

petition either has evidenced a settled purpose of 

relinquishing parental claim to a child or has refused or 

failed to perform parental duties.

* * *
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(b) Other considerations.-- The court in terminating the rights 

of a parent shall give primary consideration to the developmental, 

physical and emotional needs and welfare of the child. The rights 

of a parent shall not be terminated solely on the basis of 

environmental factors such as inadequate housing, furnishings, 

income, clothing and medical care if found to be beyond the 

control of the parent. With respect to any petition filed pursuant 

to subsection (a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall not consider any 

efforts by the parent to remedy the conditions described therein 

which are first initiated subsequent to the giving of notice of the 

filing of the petition.

23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(1), (b).

Section 2511 

does not require that the parent demonstrate both a settled 

purpose of relinquishing parental claim to a child and refusal or 

failure to perform parental duties. Accordingly, parental rights 

may be terminated pursuant to Section 2511(a)(1) if the parent 

either demonstrates a settled purpose of relinquishing parental 

claim to a child or fails to perform parental duties.

In re Adoption of Charles E.D.M., 708 A.2d 88, 91 (Pa. 1998) (emphasis 

in original) (citation omitted); see also In re Burns, 379 A.2d 535, 540 (Pa. 

1977) (discussing parental duties and stating that “[a] child needs love, 

protection, guidance, and support. These needs, physical and emotional, 

cannot be met by a merely passive interest in the development of the child. 

Thus, this Court has held that the parental obligation is a positive duty which 

requires affirmative performance.”). 

With respect to Section 2511(a)(1), Mother asserts that there is no clear 

and convincing evidence that she had abandoned Child or demonstrated a 

settled purpose of relinquishing her parental claim. Brief for Mother at 25. 

Mother’s argument rests primarily on her own testimony that she returned to 
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Pennsylvania from Florida and made diligent efforts, primarily with Father, to 

see Child. Id. at 25-26. Further, Mother asserts that she attempted to contact 

Child via phone several times, and mailed him a birthday card. Id. at 26, 31. 

Mother also relies on the testimony of her witnesses, including her daughter, 

to establish that Mother attempted to have a relationship with Child. Id. at 

26. 

The orphans’ court, in addressing Section 2511(a)(1), stated in its 

Opinion as follows:

Mother has done nothing to parent the Child since last 

seeing him in December of 2016. Any attempts by Mother’s family 

to contact the Child are also irrelevant as it relates to the 

termination proceeding for Mother. Mother has failed to attend to 

the Child’s physical or emotional needs. Mother is to be 

commended for seeking help with her substance abuse 

problems[,] but time cannot stand still waiting for her to complete 

her various treatment programs and incarcerations. Mother chose 

to flee Pennsylvania with her two daughters and not return after 

the family cruise in December of 2016. She chose to remain in 

Florida[,] with [her] two [daughters] remaining in her custody[,]

at the expense of the Child, whom she left behind. Since Mother 

left, the Child’s daily needs have been provided for by Petitioners. 

They sought counseling services for [Child]. They take him to the 

doctor and ensure he is safe.

Mother was aware of where Petitioners lived, where they 

worked, [and had] their cell phone numbers and the telephone 

number of their residence. Mother had the ability to access the 

legal system to seek visitation with the Child and she already had 

a custody lawyer. Mother failed to use any of the information or 

resources available to her to see [Child]. Furthermore, she stood 

by and allowed Paternal Grandparents to care for [Child] without 

providing any support for him.

Mother, for a period of at least six months prior to the filing 

of the [P]etition to terminate her parental rights, has failed to 

perform her parental duties as they relate to the Child. Petitioners 
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have met their burden to terminate Mother’s parental rights under 

section 2511(a)(1).

Orphans’ Court Opinion, 4/17/19, at 11-12 (footnote omitted). Additionally,

the orphans’ court assessed Mother’s testimony, and opined that it was 

incredible and vague. Id. at 10; see also id. at 11 (finding that the testimony 

presented by Mother’s parents was also vague). Our review discloses that the 

record supports the orphans’ court’s findings and determination, and we may 

not disturb its credibility determinations, nor do we discern any abuse of its 

discretion. See In re M.J.S., 903 A.2d 1, 8 (Pa. Super. 2006) (stating that 

this Court may not reverse the credibility determinations of the orphans’ court 

absent an abuse of discretion). Accordingly, we affirm on this basis in 

concluding that there was clear and convincing evidence to support 

termination of Mother’s parental rights under Section 2511(a)(1). See

Orphans’ Court Opinion, 4/17/19, at 10-12.

Turning to Section 2511(b), the court must consider whether the 

termination of Mother’s parental rights would best serve the developmental, 

physical and emotional needs and welfare of Child. See In re C.M.S., 884 

A.2d 1284, 1286-87 (Pa. Super. 2005). “Intangibles such as love, comfort, 

security, and stability are involved in the inquiry into the needs and welfare 

of the child.” Id. at 1287 (citation omitted). The court must also discern the 

nature and status of the parent-child bond, with utmost attention to the effect 

on the child of permanently severing that bond. Id. When evaluating a 

parental bond, “the court is not required to use expert testimony. Social 
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workers and caseworkers can offer evaluations as well. Additionally, section 

2511(b) does not require a formal bonding evaluation.” In re Z.P., 994 A.2d 

1108, 1121 (Pa. Super. 2010) (internal citations omitted). 

Here, Mother argues that she desires to have the same bond with Child 

that she does with her other children, and that there was a bond between her 

and Child. See Brief for Mother at 23-24. Mother asserts that it was in Child’s 

best interest to wait until Child comprehends the full impact of terminating 

Mother’s parental rights, so that Mother could continue to improve her life and 

have a relationship with Child. Id. at 28, 39-40. Additionally, Mother argues 

that the court should have “appointed a counselor and/or therapist to assess 

the mother-child relationship and what was in the best interests of the 

[C]hild.” Id. at 42-43. 

In addressing Section 2511(b), the orphans’ court credited testimony 

that Child’s life was not stable prior to December 2016, particularly where 

Mother and Father used drugs in front of Child. Orphans’ Court Opinion, 

4/17/19, at 16; see also id. (finding that Child’s life had been “unstable, 

unsafe and transient.”). Further, the court observed that, after custody 

transferred to Paternal Grandmother, Mother did nothing to ensure ongoing 

contact with Child. Id. In Mother’s absence, Petitioners took on the parental 

role in Child’s life. Id. at 16-17. The court credited testimony from M.F., 

Paternal Grandmother’s husband, that Child does not mention Mother. Id. at 

17. Further, the court considered the guardian ad litem’s position that Child 

spoke very little about Mother, and that Child was very comfortable with 
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Petitioners, wherein there was a “genuine caring atmosphere in the home.” 

Id. Additionally, the court noted Father’s testimony that Mother made no 

request to see Child. Id. The court further determined as follows:

The Child deserves stability, permanence and safety. He 

should not be made to wait until it is convenient for Mother or 

Father to parent. Mother asserts that her rights should not be 

terminated as she is not calling for the Child to be removed from 

the home of Petitioners at this time and that an ongoing custody 

order could protect against any of Petitioners’ concerns. But 

childhood is short and the Child deserves a stable home where his 

physical, emotional and safety needs are met. To allow Mother to 

try to inject herself back into the life of the Child now[,] or at some 

unknown time in the future[,] does not provide the Child with any 

stability or feeling of permanence.

Based upon the evidence presented, and having resolved all 

issues of credibility, the [c]ourt finds ... that Petitioners have 

established by clear and convincing evidence that the parental 

rights of Mother should be terminated as requested, and that the 

termination will promote and enhance the developmental, physical 

and emotional needs and welfare of the Child.

Id. at 18. Our review discloses that the record supports the court’s findings, 

and we discern no abuse of its discretion in determining that Child’s best 

interests are served through the termination of Mother’s parental rights.

5

 

Finally, Mother argues that the orphans’ court erred when it appointed 

counsel for Child, Attorney Rieck, after the close of testimony. See Brief for 

____________________________________________

5 To the extent Mother asserts that expert testimony was needed to evaluate 

the bond between her and Child, this is clearly belied by the law. See In re 

Z.P., supra. Further, while Mother may profess to love Child, a parent’s own 

feelings of love and affection for a child, alone, will not preclude termination 

of parental rights. See In re Z.P., 994 A.2d at 1121. By the time of the 

termination hearings, the credited testimony established that Mother had not 

seen Child since December 2016, which constituted a substantial portion of 

his young life.
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Mother at 26-27. Though Mother acknowledges that the court gave Attorney 

Rieck an opportunity to review the record, Mother contends that the late 

appointment of counsel was insufficient, as Child’s interests were not 

protected throughout the proceedings. Id. at 27. Further, according to 

Mother, “[b]oth the guardian ad litem and [Attorney Rieck] stated Child did 

not fully comprehend the effect of the termination of [] Mother’s rights.” Id. 

at 38-39.

The orphans’ court rejected Mother’s claims, reasoning as follows:

[T]he court, out of an abundance of caution, did appoint 

[Attorney Rieck] for the Child and provided that attorney with the 

opportunity to review the record and open the matter for further 

testimony if counsel deemed it appropriate. In accordance with 

the court’s deadline, [Attorney Rieck] informed the court that 

opening the record was unnecessary. Any possible error due to 

the delay in the appointment of counsel for the Child was remedied 

by allowing counsel ample time to review the record and reopen 

the matter if counsel deemed it necessary.

The second issue raised by Mother ... is the failure to 

consider the Child’s lack of understanding of the proceeding, which 

is not persuasive. There is no statutory requirement that a child 

subject to a petition for adoption “fully comprehend” the

termination of the rights of the biological parents. To require that 

a child fully comprehend termination would result in the 

unwarranted delay of adoption for years for all children. Under

Mother’s theory, an infant would wait years while it developed 

language and comprehension skills before an adoption could be 

completed. To make the Child wait in limbo for some unspecified 

amount of time until the Child could fully comprehend the 

implications of terminating Mother’s parental rights only serves 

Mother’s interest and is to the detriment of what is in the best 

interests of the Child. Childhood is short. The Child deserves 

stability and permanence during his childhood[,] and this stability 

has been provided by the Paternal Grandparents.

Orphans’ Court Opinion, 6/11/19, at 2-3 (some capitalization altered).
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We discern no error of law or abuse of discretion in the court’s analysis. 

Moreover, the court complied with our Supreme Court’s dictates in In re 

Adoption of L.B.M., 161 A.3d 172 (Pa. 2017) (plurality), which held that 23 

Pa.C.S.A. § 2313(a) requires that counsel be appointed to represent the legal 

interests of any child involved in contested involuntary termination 

proceedings. Id. at 183; see also id. (noting that legal interests are 

synonymous with the child’s preferred outcome, but the child’s best interests 

are determined by the court). Here, the record reflects there was no conflict 

between Child’s preferred outcome and his best interest, and the appointment 

of the guardian ad litem satisfied the requirements of Section 2313, regardless 

of the late appointment of legal counsel for Child. Further, there is no 

requirement that a child “fully comprehend” the impact of the termination of 

parental rights. Rather, the Supreme Court has determined that when a child 

is pre-verbal, and therefore clearly unable to “fully comprehend” the impact 

of the termination of parental rights, there is no conflict between the child’s 

best and legal interests. See In re T.S., 192 A.3d at 1092-93. Child was 

verbal and expressed his preferred outcome, which was to live with 

Petitioners. Attorney Rieck conveyed Child’s preferred outcome to the court, 

and the court did not err by entering its Decree before Child “fully 

comprehended” the impact that termination of Mother’s parental rights might 

have on him. 

Decree affirmed.
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Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 12/12/2019