Cooke also sued James Spence, a nother Cana dian l awy er involved in the neg otiations, and 1 Ay lesworth L .L .P., a Canadian la w firm. The trial court g rante d specia l a ppear ance s filed by

Spence and Aylesworth, and this appe al conc erns only the court’s overr

uling of Doane ’s spec ial appea ranc e. 

### TEXA S C OU R T OF A PPEAL S, THIR D DIST R ICT , AT AU STIN

NO. 03-0 6 -00 414 -CV

M ar ti n Do ane , A ppe lla nt

v. Thomas F . Cooke , Appellee

F ROM THE DISTRICT CO URT OF TRAVIS COUNTY , 353RD JUDICIAL DISTRICT NO. D-1- GN-05- 0033 41 , HO NORAB LE STEP HEN Y ELENOSK Y , JUDGE PRESIDI NG

M E M O R

A N D U M O P I N I O N

I n this int erloc utory

appea l, appellant Mar

tin Doane c hall en ges t he trial c ourt’s

overr uling of his special appe ara nce. A ppellee T homas Cooke sued Doa ne and two othe r de fe nd ants for f

raud, intentional and neg lige nt misre prese ntation, a nd failure to disc lose materia l 1 information. We aff

irm the trial cour

t’s order denying D oane’ s special a ppear ance .
F ac tu al B ac kgr ound Cooke i s a T ex as re sident who was the ha lf-owne r of Austin Ac quisiti on Deve lopment Corp. (“AA DC”); he w as also its chief e x ecutive of fice r. D o an e is a Canadian att o rn ey who ac ted as a

n ag ent for O ptima Services International, L td. in relation to an esc rowA medallion sig nature g uara ntee is a signature guara

ntee issued by

a fina ncial instituti on 2 that participates in one of thre e “Me dallion signature gua rante e progr ams.” A pa

rticipating financ ial instit ution guara

ntees a customer’ s signature “with the assura nce that their g uara

ntees will be immediately

acc epted f

or proc essing by

transfe r ag ents
. ” S i g nature g uara ntees issued by

nonm ed al l i o ni n s t i tu t i o n s m ay b e r ef u s edb y t ra n s fe r a gen t s . Un i t edS t at es S ec u ri t i es & E x ch an ge Commi ssion, Signature Guarantees: Preve nting the Unauthorized Transf er of Sec urities , ava ila

ble a t http: //w ww .s e c .g ov /ans we rs /si g g ua r. htm

. 2 ag ree ment betwee n Cooke and Optima. The unde rlying tr ansac tion for which the pa rties ar rang ed the escr ow ag ree ment was a stock purcha se ag ree ment under which Optima ag ree d to buy 500 share s

o f A A D C f

r o m Co o k e in e xc h a n g e f o r CN D $ 5 3 0 , 0 0 0 in c a s h a n d a p r o mi s s o r y n o te for CND$1,120,000. The note w as pay able in two CND$560,000 installments to be paid April 1, 2005, and Jul y 1, 2005. To secur e the note, O p t i m a agr ee d to place w ith an escr ow ag ent 1.4 million common share s it owned in Trinity Plumas Capital C orp. alongwith a “medal l i o n signature g uara ntee” for the c ertifica

te. Negot iations too k a

bo ut s ix mon ths , a

nd the de a l w a s f

ina lize d in 2 No ve mbe r 2 00 4. Duri ngne g oti a tio ns , Co ok e wa s in Te xas a nd Op tim a a nd it s agent s w e re in Cana da . Co ok e te sti fi e d:

Iwas not fa

miliar with what a meda llion si g nature g uara ntee . . . was. B ut when we g ot into the neg otiation relative to what was going to be nec essar y for me to tra

nsfer the stock into my

name, Optima sa id t h ro u gh Doane or Doa ne said individually

or Spence or a ll th r e e o f th e m w e r e te ll in g me th a t it w a s g o in g to ju s t dr a g o ut the tr ans a c tio n to o lo ngto b e a ble to t ra ns fe r t he sto c k c e rt ificat e in to my name . So they —so we re sear ched the —what wa s g oing to be nece ssary in the event that Ihad to take possession of the stock to g et it r eg istered in my name throug h the t ra nsfer ag ent . . . . And it wa s pointed out to us that the medallion signatur e g uara ntee wa s critica l to that process in the e vent that I did end up with that cer

tificate.

On or a bout November

15, 2004, the par

ties closed on the de al by telephone. T he transac tion was comprised of four doc uments: a purcha se ag ree ment, a promissory note, an e scrowAttache d to the stock ce rtificate and sent with Spence’ s Dec ember 30 letter is a doc ument 3 signe d by Doane as vice -pre sident and secreta ry of Opti ma t hat recites that “the unde rsig ned her eby sells, assigns a

nd transfe rs” 1.4 million shares of T rinity Plumas stock. 3 ag ree ment, and a mutual relea se. Cooke sig ned the pur chase ag ree ment and the e scrow a g ree ment in his indi vidual capa city , and Doa ne sig ned the pur chase ag re em en t , escr ow ag ree ment, and promissory

note as vice -pre sident and s ec retary of Optima. The pur chase ag ree ment, promissory note, and e scrow a g ree ment all provided that Te x as law would g overn the ag ree ments and that any disputes arising under the ag ree ments would be resolved i n Travis County . The e scrow a g ree ment states that under

the terms of the purcha se ag ree ment, “Optim a wi ll deliver to the Escr ow Ag ent 1.4 milli on share s of [ Trinity Plumas] stock

. . . and a fully executed blank stock power of attorne y and assig nment form toge ther with a medallion g uara nty of signature . . . to be held by EscrowAg ent in acc ordanc e with th e terms hereof .” Cooke testified, “ Iwould never have e ntere d into the ag ree ment without a medallion signature g uara ntee. . . . I t was a c orner stone to the ag ree ment.” On Dec ember

30, 2004, Sp e n c e ’ s a s s is ta n t s e n t t h e e s c r o w ag ent a “ transmittal letter,” which stated that enclosed w ith the letter we re a cer tificate f or 1.4 million shares of Tr inity Plumas stock and a

“blank stock pow er of

attorney with m edallion s ignature g uara ntee by HSBD B ank Canada ” for the share s, copying Cooke on the letter. Howeve r, the escr ow ag ent re ceive d a sig nature g uara ntee, not the promised medallion signature guara ntee. Optima defa

ulted, and Cooke lea

rned 3 that th e e sc ro w a g e nt h a d ne ve r re c e ive d the me da lli on sig natur e g ua ra nte e . Wh e n Co ok e tr ie d to exercise his rights to the stock, Doane ref used to provide a

medallion signature g uara ntee. Cooke testified that bef

ore f iling this suit, he had bee n forc ed to bring two other law suits aga inst the escrow

a g e nt a n d t h e C a n a d i a n t r a n s f e r a g e n t t o g e t t h e s t o c k c e rt i f i c a t e r e l e a s e d a n d t r a n s f

e r r e d int o h is4

name. C ooke aske d Doane for the me dallion signature g uara ntee be fore and af

ter those suits, but Doane ref used. Cooke also testified that Doa ne said he would “fig ht the transfe r ag ent” whe n Cooke soug ht to have the stock tra nsfer red into his name. On September

15, 2005, Cook filed this suit ag ainst th e A y lesworth law f

irm, Spence, and Doa ne, suing both attorney s in th ei r i n d i v i dual ca pacities. Cooke’ s petition alleg ed that the de fe nd ants mis re pr e se nte d to him a nd the e sc ro w ag e nt “that the e sc ro w de po sit c on sis te d of a f ull y executed blank stock power of attorne y

and assig nment form g uara nteed by a meda llion si g nature g uara ntee.” Cooke alleg ed that the de fenda nts committ ed fr aud, intenti o n al and neg lige nt misrepre sentation, and fa ilure to disclose mater ial information, all re lated to their fa ilure to include the medallion sig nature g uara ntee a s promised. Eac h defe ndant filed a specia l appea

ranc e. At the hea ring on the s p e c ia l a

ppear ance s, Cooke testified that he a nd his ag ents relied on Spence’ s statement in his Dece mber 30 tra nsmitt al letter that the medallion signature guara ntee had bee n delivere d to the escr ow ag ent. Asked what relationship Spence and Doane had to the law firm, Cooke answe red, “ Ibelieve the y wer e [partner s or associates up until November or Dec ember

2004]. I am not sure e x actly . Imea n , l i k e I said, it was kind of a moving targ et.” He went on to say

that Doane and Spence “we re wea ring two hats. I t was kind of har d to discern wha t their roles w ere . I n fac t, Mr. Doane started of f as a n independe nt counsel and t h en h e b ec am e an office r and direc tor of the—of Optima I nternational T rust.” Cooke did not know when in late 2004 Doane switched from being employ ed as an attorney with A y lesworth to a n executive a t Op tima. Fr om Cooke’s testimony , it se ems that most of his ne g otiations we re with Spenc e, who pre pare d the documents and state d in his Dece mber 2004 letter that the medallion s i gn at u re gua rante e wa s5

included. Howe ver, Cooke a lso te stified that he spoke to Doa ne duringthe neg otiations and, when asked w hether

“Doa ne re prese nted to you that a medallion g uara ntee signature would be provide d,” Cooke answe red, “ Yes.”

Doane did not present evide nce except for his affidavit in which he state d that he had no contac ts, h ad n o t co mmitt ed any torts or enter ed into contra cts, and did not own prope rty or

c on du c t bu sin e ss i n T e xas. Do a ne a ve rr e d, “ My c omm un ic a tio ns wi th M r. Coo ke we re do ne in m y

cap ac i t y as an at t o rn ey

an d / o r a n age n to f O p t i m a S er v i ce s I n t ern at i o n al , L t d

. No n e of m y d ea l i n gs with Mr. Cooke wer e in my individual capac ity .” After the hea ring , the trial cour

t sustained Spence’ s and Ay l es wo rth’s spec ial appea ranc es, dismissing Cooke’s c lai ms ag ainst those defe ndants. The c ourt overr uled Doane ’s specia l appea

ranc e. Doa

ne did not reque st and the cour t did not make finding s of fa ct or c onclusions of law. I t is fr om t

he or de r o ve rr

uli nghis sp e c ia l a

pp e a ra nc e that D oa

ne a pp e a ls.

Stand ard of Review A Texas court may

exercise pe rsonal jurisdiction over a nonresident if e x erc ise of jur isd ic tio n is a

ut h o r i z e d b y

the Te xas l on g -a

rm statut e and

c omp or ts w ithc on sti tut ion a l du e pr oc e ss g uara ntees. Sc hlo bo hm v . S

c ha pir o , 784 S.W .2d 355, 356 (Tex. 1990). The plainti ff has the burden of plea ding a lleg ations sufficient to satisfy Texas’s long-ar m s t atut e. BMC Software Belgium, N.V. v. Marchand , 83 S.W .3d 789, 793 (Tex. 2002). I f the plaintiff satisfies that initial burden, the burden the n shifts to the defendant to af firmatively

neg ate the a sserted jurisdictional ba ses. See id. The long -ar

m statute allows a cour t to ex erc ise jurisdiction ov er a nonre sident who does business in Texas, and committi ng a tort in Texas constitutes doing business in the state. T ex. C iv.6

Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 17.042 (West 2008)

. The long- arm statute rea ches a s far as the fe dera l Constit ution pe rmits a

nd, there fore , our analy sis is consistent with the fede ral test. Guardian Royal Ex c h. As su ra nc e, Lt

d. v . E ng lis h Ch ina Cla

y s, P. L.C. , 815 S.W .2d 223, 226 (Tex. 1991). Pe rs on a l juri sd ic tio n may a ri se thr ou g h g e ne ra l juri sd ic tio n o r, a s Co ok e a sse rt s, specific jurisdiction, which require s that the defe ndant’s acts in Texas relate to the ca use of a ction. See Sc hlobohm , 78 4 S.W. 2d a t 35 8. Thus , a no nr e sid e nt m a y

be su bje c t to sp e c if

ic jur isd ic tio n in Texas if (1) he purposef

ully does an a ct or c ons u m m at es a transaction in Texas, thus establishing minimum contac ts; (2) the act or transac tion is connected to or g ives rise to the c ause of action; and (3) the exercise of jurisdiction does not off end tra ditional notions of fa ir play and substantial justice. Id. Specific juri s d i ct i o n requires a substantial conne ction betwee n Texas, the lawsuit, and the de fe nd ant, a nd

we fo c us no t on

wh e re the inj ur

y wa s f e lt, bu t on the de fe nd a nt’ s a c tio ns in T e xas. Michiana Easy Livin’ Country, Inc . v. Holten , 168 S.W .3d 777, 789-90 (Te x . 2005).

We r e v ie w d e n o v o a tr ia l c o u rt’ s d e c is io n o n a s p e c ia l a p p e a r a n ce. Marchand , 83 S.W .3d at 794. I n making its jurisdi ctional deter mination, the trial court must resolve nec essar y fac tual questions, and when a trial court doe s not issue findings of f act, we assume the c ourt made all nece ssary

finding s of fac t that a

re suppor ted by the evidenc e. Id. at 794-95. How ever , “[w]hen the appe llate re cord inc ludes the re p o rt er ’s and cle rk’s re cords, these implied findings ar e not conclusive a

nd may be cha lleng ed for

leg al and f

actua l sufficienc y .” Id . at 79 5. Ev ide nc e is l e g a lly sufficie nt if “there is more than a scintilla of evidenc e to support the finding ,” id ., and it i s f a c tua lly insufficient o n l y i f, in light of the e ntire re cord, a finding is so ag ainst the g reat weig ht and preponde ranc e of the evid en ce as to be manife stly err oneous or unjust. Ennis v. Loiseau ,7

16 4 S. W.3 d 6 98 , 7 06 (T e x. Ap p. —A us tin 20 05 , n o p e t.) . T he tr ia l c ourt is t he so le jud g e of

wi tne ss

cre dibilit y

and the weig ht to be given to testimony , and we “will not disturb a trial c ourt’s re solution of conf licting e vidence that turns on the cr edibility or we ight of

the evidenc e.” Id

. Discussion Cooke satisfied hi s initial burden, pleading sufficie nt alleg ations to come within the Texas long- arm statute whe n he alleg ed that Doane committed fraud, misre prese ntation, and fa ilure to d i s cl o s e duringhis neg otiations with a Texas resident. See M archand , 8 3 S. W.3 d at 79 3. Hi s claims are based on his alleg ations that Doane knowing ly and fa lsely

repr esente d to Cooke that he and the other

defe nda nts would provide and ha d provided the r equire d medallion signature g uara ntee in compliance w ith the various ag ree ments. Cooke further alleg ed that Doa

ne knew that Cooke would not have e ntere d into the ag ree ment without a medallion signature g uara ntee a nd repr esente d “that the Bla

nk Stock Powe r of Attorney was guara nteed by a meda llion si g nature g uara ntee whe n it w a s n ot. ” B e c a

us e Coo ke me t hi s b ur de n o f m a kin g jur isd ic tio n a lle g a tio ns a s to a ll thr e e c la ims , the burde n shifted to Doane to neg ate a ll asserted jurisdictional ba ses.

Be cause the trial cour

t did n o t m ak e findings of fa ct, we must assume that it made all finding s nece ssary

to support its decision to overrule Doa ne’s spe cial appe ara

nce. See id. at 795. To hold Doane amena

ble to jurisdiction i n Texas, the trial court must have deter mined that he purp os e fu lly

did a n a c t or c on su mmate d a

tr a ns a c tio n in

Te xas that wa s c on ne c te d to Coo ke ’s c a us e of a c tio n an d th a t th e e xer c ise of jur isd ic tio n o ve r D oa

ne wo uld no t of fe nd tr a dit ion a l no tio ns of

fa ir play and substantial justice. See Sc hlobohm , 784 S.W .2d at 358.8 A nonre sident who ac ts in an officia l capaci t y o n b eh alf of a cor poration may

be subject to specif

ic jurisdiction if he eng ag ed in tortious or fra udulent conduct, dire cted at Texas, for

w h ic h h e ma

y b e h e ld p e r s o n a ll y

liable. En nis , 1 64 S.W. 3d a t 70 7. Th is i s b e c a

us e a “ c or po rate

o f f ic e r is p r im a r il y li a

b le f o r h is o w n torts.” Mor ris v . P owe ll , 150 S.W .3d 212, 221 (T e x. A p p . — Sa

n A n to n io 2 0 0 4 , n o p e t. ) ( s p e c if ic ju r is d ic ti o n p r o p e r

w h e n p la in ti f

f a lle g ed neg lige nce, f

raud, a nd neg lige nt misreprese ntation in corporat e d uties). I f a c orporate offic er ha d

“ d i r e c t , p e r s o n a l p a rt i c i p a t i o n i n t h e w r o n g d o i n g ” a n d w a s c e n t r a l t o t h e w r o n g f u l c o r p o r a t e a c t i v i t y, he may not esca pe liability

. E

nn is , 1 6 4 S

. W

. 3 d

at 7 0 7 (q u o t i n g Mozin go v . Co rre c t M fg. Cor p ., 752 F.2d 168, 174 ( 5th Cir. 1985)). “I t is t h e gen er al ru l e in Texas that corporate ag ents are individually

liable for f

raudule nt or

to r ti o u s acts c ommitt ed while in the se rvice of their c orporation,” Sh a polsky v . Brewton , 56 S.W .3d 120, 133 (Tex. App.—Houston [14t h Dist.] 2001, pet. denied) , and

a cor porate office r nee d not have committed an int entional t ort to be haled into Texas courts. En nis , 164 S.W .3d at 708. I nstead, the pla intiff “must establis h t h at t h e off icer committed fraudule nt or tortious acts for w hich he may be held individually

liable.” Id . I n other words, a c orporate offic er’ s “status as [an] employ ee[] does not s o m eh ow insulate [him] from jurisdiction,” Calder v. Jone s , 46 5 U .S. 78 3, 79 0 ( 19 84 ), a nd wi ll n ot g ra

nt h im “ bla

nk e t pr ote c tio n f

ro m juri sd ic tio n s imp ly beca use [his] alleg ed ac ts were done in a c orporate ca pacity ,” SITQ E.U., Inc. v. Re ata Rests., Inc. , 111 S.W .3d 638, 651 (Tex. App.—For t Worth 2003, pet. denied). We are not asked to dete rmine whe t h er Do an e will ultimately be held liable on Cooke’s cla ims

. Ou r inquiry is whether Cooke “suff iciently established fa cts sug g esting that [Doane] should have anticipate d being haled into a Te x as cour t based on his actions.” Se e En nis ,Fr aud is the fa lse repr esentation of a mater ial fac t, ma de intentionally or re cklessly

by the 4 defe ndant, intended to be and actua lly relied on by the plaintiff to his detriment. Formosa Plastics Corp. USA v. Presidio Engrs. & Contractors, Inc. , 960 S.W .2d 41, 47 (Tex. 1998). “A pr omise of 9 16 4 S. W.3 d at 70 8- 09

. “ He nc e , if the e vid e nc e su g g e sts that the no nr e sid e nt of fi c e r pa rt ic ipate d in tor tio us or fr a ud ule nt a cti vi ti es, whichwe re dir e c te d at T e xas a nd fo r w hic h h e may

be he ld pe rs on a lly

lia ble,” th e re may

be su ff ic ie nt g ro un ds to e xer c ise sp e c if ic jur isd ic tio n o ve r h im. Se e id . at 709. Cooke alleg ed and te stified that Doane , a lo n g w it h o th e r s , p a r ticipated in neg otiations with Cooke, a Texas reside nt, over a bout six mont h s , arrang ing f or Cooke to sell share s in a Texas corporation to Optima, a for eig n corpor ation, in exchang e for cer tain sums. Cooke alleg ed

and te sti fi e d th a t Do a ne him se lf pr omi se d th a t O pti ma ’s pa y me nts wo uld

be se c ur e d b y

a c e rt if ic a te for 1.4 million Trinity

Plumas shares and that Optima would provid e a me dallion signature g uara ntee to ease the stock transf

er in the event of

Optima’s def

ault. Cooke testified that he w ould not have ag ree d to the transac tion but for the promised meda llion si g nature g uara ntee a nd that Doane later ref used re peate d reque s t s fo r t h e guara ntee a nd told Cooke that he would fig ht the transfe r of the stock into Cooke’s n a

me . D o a n e signe d documents that stated that the me dallion signature g uara ntee would be attac hed to the stock c ertificate, and t h o s e d o cuments included c lauses subjec ting the ag ree ment and any

disputes to Tex as law and venue in Tr avis County . The a ctions of which Cooke complains—Doane ’s alleg ed misrepr esentations that the medallion signatur e g uara ntee would be provided to the e scrow ag ent along with the s tock certificate —wer e certainly direc ted at Tex as and

connec ted to Cooke’s ca uses of a ction, all o f wh i ch rely on alleg ed misrepr esentations that the medallion signature guara ntee would be provided. Se e id . at 708-09. F urther, if Cooke’s testimony 4f

u tu r e p e r f o r ma n c e c o n s ti tute s a n a c ti o n a b le mi s r e p r e s e n tati o n if th e p r o mi s e w a s ma d e w it h no intention of performing at t he ti me i t was made .” Id. a t 48

. Ne g lig e nt m isr e pr e se ntatio n o c c ur s if in the course of business in w hich he has a pecunia ry interest, a de fenda

nt give s false infor

mation for a plaintiff’s g uidance , without ex erc ising re asonable care o r competenc e in obtaining or providing the information, on which the plaintiff justifiably relies and suffe rs a re sulting pec uniary loss. Fede ral Land Bank Ass’n v. Sloane , 825 S.W .2d 439, 442 (Tex. 1991)

. Fi n al ly , fra udulent nondisclosure oc curs when t he defenda nt fails to disclose a f

act he knows may

justifiably

induce the plaintiff to act in a busine ss tran saction if he ow ed the plaintiff a duty of re asonable car e. See Ralston Purina Co

. v. Mc Kendrick , 850 S.W .2d 629, 633-36 (Te x . App.—San Antonio 1993, writ denied)

. Do a ne ’s a ff

ida vit state s th a t he is a

Cana dia n atto rn e y ; he ha s n ot e nte re d in to a ny c on tr a c ts 5 or committed any

torts in Tex as; he ha s conducte d no bus i n es s , has no conta cts, and owns no proper ty in Texas; and all of his communications with Cooke were in his role a s attorney or ag ent for Optima, not his individual capa city . His statements about his contac ts with Cooke and that he h ad n o t co m m itted a tort in Texas do not refe r to supporting fac ts or discuss what knowledg e or int e nt h e ha d a

bo ut t he me da lli on

g ua ra nte e wh e n h e ma de the va

ri ou s r e pr e se ntatio ns . T he a ff ida vit provides no fa ctual support for his statements ab o u t h i s co ntacts with Cooke or that he had not committed a tort. I nstead, it mere ly states Doane ’s leg al conclusions about the capa city in which he acte d and that

h is a c ts n o t t o rti o u s in

n a tu r e . T h o s e b a

r e a v e r me n ts a r e c o n c lu s o r

y a n d n ot competent a ffidavit evide nce. See Coastal T ransp. Co. v. Crown C ent. Pe troleum Corp. , 13 6 S.W.3 d 227 , 2 32 (T e x. 20 04 ); Brownlee v. Brownlee , 66 5 S.W. 2d 11 1, 11 2 (T e x. 19 84 ); FNFS, Ltd . v . S e c ur ity St. Ba nk & Tru st , 63 S.W .3d 546, 550 (T ex . Ap p . — Austin 2001, pet. denied); Do me l v . Ci ty

of G e or ge tow n , 6 S.W .3d 349, 355-56 (Te x . App.—Austin 1999, pet. denied)

. 10 is credible, a s the trial court impliedly found by its denial of Doane ’s spec ial appea ranc e, Doa

ne’s

c on du c t wa s tor

tio us a nd fr a

ud ule nt, a nd he c ou ld be he ld pe rs on a lly lia ble fo r t hat c on du c t de sp ite i th a v i n g b e e n d o n e i n h i s o f f i c i a l c a p a c i t y. 5 We rec og nize that the supreme c ourt has pl ace d limit s on the exercise of jurisdiction when a n actor “dire cts” a

tort at Texas and that it has held that the c ommissi on of a “ tort in a telephone call” to Te x as does not “ne cessa rily establish[] ” spec ific jurisdiction. Se e Mi c hia na Ea sy Liv in’ Cou ntr y , 168 S.W .3d at 789-92 (noting that court ha d “expressly reje cted jurisdiction ‘ba sed solely upon the ef

fec ts or conseque nce s o f an allege d conspirac y ’” in Te x as) ( quoting National Indus. Sand Ass’n v. G ibson , 897 S.W .2d 769, 773 (Tex. 1995)). Howe v er, the acts ofA n on re sid e nt s e e kin g to a vo id jur isd ic tio n in Te xas m us t pr e se nt a

“ c omp e lli ngc a se ” to 6 e xp la in w h y li ti g a ti o n in

T e xa s w o u ld

b e u n d u ly b u rdensome. Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz , 47 1 U.S. 46 2, 47 7 ( 19 85 ). Do a ne ’s a ff ida vit state s o nly

that “ [r]e qu ir ingme to d e fe nd a n a c tio n in Texas would be a hug e burde n and cost.” 11 which Co o k e c o mp la in s—Doane ’s alleg ed misrepr esentations related to the inclusion of a medallion sig natur e g ua

ra nte e —w e re re pe a te d, dir e c te d at T e xas, a nd ma de in t he c ours e of

buy ingsh a re s in a Te x as compa

ny owned by

at least one Texas citiz en, a c ontrac t which the par ties ag ree d would be controlled by

Texas law. See id. at 789-90 (important fac tors are extent of defe ndant’s ac tiviti es and relationship of defenda

nt, forum stat e, an d litigation). We have considere d the extent of Doane ’s

a lle g e d mi sd e e ds , th e natur e of tho se a c ts, a nd the c on tr a c tua l re la tio ns hip e sta bli sh e d w ithTe xas,

a s we ll as the ple a din g s, Do a ne ’s sp e c ia l a pp e a ra nc e a rgume nts , a

nd Coo ke ’s te sti mony . We ho ld that the trial cour

t did not err in de termining that Doane purposef ully direc ted suffic ient actions at Texas th ro u gh h i s neg otiations with and repre sentations to Cooke, that there is a nexus between Doane ’s alleg ed ac tions and Cooke’s ca uses of a ction, and that the tria l court’s e x erc ise of jurisdiction over Doa

ne would not offe nd traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice. See 6 Schlobohm , 784 S.W .2d at 358. Conclusion

No matter w hether

Doane is ultimately held l iable for his alleg ed conduct, Cooke’s testimony and evide nce at the specia l-appe ara nce he aringsug g ests that Doane knowing ly or, at the least, neg lige ntly

misled Cooke into believing that Optima would provide and was providing Cooke wi t h a m edallion sig nature g uara ntee, whic h Cooke consider ed to be a n essential par

t of the12

transac tion. W e ther efor e over rule Doa ne’s sole point of e rror

and af firm t he trial c ourt’s orde r denying D oane’ s special a ppear ance .

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David Pury ear , J ustice Be fore Chief J ustice L aw a nd J ustices Pury ear

and He nson Affir med Filed: Nove mber 14, 2008