alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<PAGE>
<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM THE BALANCE
SHEET AS OF SEPTEMBER 30, 2000 AND THE RELATED STATEMENT OF OPERATIONS FOR THE
QUARTER ENDED SEPTEMBER 30, 2000 AND IS QUALIFIED IN ITS ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE
TO SUCH FINANCIAL STATEMENTS.
</LEGEND>
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   9-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-30-2000
<PERIOD-START>                             JAN-02-2000
<PERIOD-END>                               SEP-30-2000
<CASH>                                          31,098
<SECURITIES>                                       799
<RECEIVABLES>                                    8,244
<ALLOWANCES>                                       625
<INVENTORY>                                     14,923
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                56,421
<PP&E>                                          32,483
<DEPRECIATION>                                   7,479
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                  81,962
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                           17,631
<BONDS>                                          7,200
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                           236
<OTHER-SE>                                      56,895
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                    81,962
<SALES>                                         22,483
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                22,483
<CGS>                                           15,742
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                   49,585
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                     0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                               (826)
<INCOME-PRETAX>                               (42,018)
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                           (42,018)
<DISCONTINUED>                                 (4,983)
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                  (47,001)
<EPS-BASIC>                                     (2.30)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                   (2.30)


</TABLE>
##### 



Exhibit 10.46
 TRIAD GUARANTY INC.
OUTSIDE DIRECTOR STOCK OPTION AGREEMENT
  WHEREAS,
 NOW, THEREFORE,
 Grant of Option.
 Termination of Option.
        1




---



##### 



Vesting.
 Date
    

Percentage
of CommonStock
Subject to OptionOn ____________
    
    ___%On ____________
    
    ___%On ____________
    
    100%
      2




---



##### 



Transferability.
 Committee Interpretations Binding.
 No Rights as Stockholder.
   Controlling Documents.
   3




---



##### 



No Guarantee of Directorship.
 Governing Law.
 IN WITNESS WHEREOF,
 OPTIONEE:
    
    COMPANY:TRIAD GUARANTY INC.By:Name:Its:
 4
# In the United States Court of Federal Claims

OFFICE OF SPECIAL MASTERS

No. 16

- 255 V

Filed: August 26, 2016

UNPUBLISHED

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

CHERYL BOURGERIE , *

*
Petitioner, * Ruling on Entitlement; Concession;

v. * Influenza (“ Flu ” ) Vaccination ; Shoulder

* Injury Related to Vaccine Administration

SECRETARY OF HEALTH * (“ SIRVA ” ); Special Processing Unit AND HUMAN SERVICES, * (“SPU”)

* Respondent. *

*

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * Jeffrey S. Pop, Jeffrey S. Pop, Attorney at L aw, Beverly Hills, CA

, for petitioner. Kelly Heidrich , U .S. Department of Justice, Washington, DC, for respondent.

RULING ON ENTITLEMENT 1

Dorsey

, Chief Special Master:

On February 23, 2016

, p etitioner filed a petition for compensation under the National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program, 42 U.S.C. §300aa

- 10, et seq

. , 2 (the “Vaccine Act”)

. Peti tioner alleges that her September 23, 2014 influenza (“ flu ”)

va ccination caused her to suffer Shoulder Injury Related to Vaccine Administration (“ SIRVA ”). Petit ion at 1. The case was assigned to the Special Processing Unit of the Office of Special Masters.

On August 25, 2016

, respondent filed her Rule 4(c) r eport in which she concedes that petitioner is entitled to compensation in this case. Respondent’s Rule 4(c) Report

at 1. Specifically, respondent

has concluded that petitioner’s alleged injury is consistent with shoulder injury related to vaccine administration (“SIRVA”), and that it was caused

1 Because this unpublished ruling contains a reasoned explanation for the action in this case, the undersigned intends to post it on the United States Court of Federal Claims' website, in accordance wi th

the E

- Government Act of 2002

. 44 U.S.C. § 3501 note (2012) (Federal Management and Promotion of Electronic Government Services). In accordance with Vaccine Rule 18(b), petitioner has 14 days to identify and move to redact medical or other information, the disclosure of which would constitute an unwarranted invasion of privacy. If, upon review, the undersigned agrees that the identified material fits within this definition, the undersigned will redact such material from public access.

2 National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99

- 660, 100 Stat. 3755. Hereinafter, for ease of citation, all “§” references to the Vaccine Act will be to the pertinent subparagraph of 42 U.S.C. § 300aa (2012 ).2 in fact by the flu vaccine she received on or about September 23, 2014. [Respondent] did not identify any other causes for petitioner’s SIRVA, and records show that she suffered the sequela of her injury for more than six

months.

Id

. at 2

- 3. Respondent further agrees that b ased on the medical records “ petitioner has met the statutory requirements for entitlement to compensation ” and “ satisfied all legal prerequisites for compensation under the Act. ” Id

. at 3.

In view of respondent’s concession and the evidence before me, the undersigned find s that petitioner is entitle d to compensation

.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

s/Nora Beth Dorsey Nora Beth Dorsey Chief Special Master
[Federal Register Volume 66, Number 33 (Friday, February 16, 2001)]
[Notices]
[Page 10692]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 01-3931]


-----------------------------------------------------------------------

FEDERAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY

[FEMA-1355-DR]


Oklahoma; Amendment No. 2 to Notice of a Major Disaster 
Declaration

AGENCY: Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA).

ACTION: Notice.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SUMMARY: This notice amends the notice of a major disaster declaration 
for the State of Oklahoma (FEMA-1355-DR), dated January 5, 2001, and 
related determinations.

EFFECTIVE DATE: January 10, 2001.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Madge Dale, Response and Recovery 
Directorate, Federal Emergency Management Agency, Washington, DC 20472, 
(202) 646-3772.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: Notice is hereby given that the incident 
period for this disaster is closed effective January 10, 2001.

(The following Catalog of Federal Domestic Assistance Numbers (CFDA) 
are to be used for reporting and drawing funds: 83.537, Community 
Disaster Loans; 83.538, Cora Brown Fund Program; 83.539, Crisis 
Counseling; 83.540, Disaster Legal Services Program; 83.541, 
Disaster Unemployment Assistance (DUA); 83.542, Fire Suppression 
Assistance; 83.543, Individual and Family Grant (IFG) Program; 
83.544, Public Assistance Grants; 83.545, Disaster Housing Program; 
83.548, Hazard Mitigation Grant Program)


Lacy E. Suiter,
Executive Associate Director, Response and Recovery Directorate.
[FR Doc. 01-3931 Filed 2-15-01; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 6718-02-P
Michigan Supreme Court

Lansing, Michigan

Robert P. Young, Jr., Chief Justice

Michael F. Cavanagh

Stephen J. Markman

Mary Beth Kelly

Brian K. Zahra

Bridget M. McCormack

David F. Viviano, Justices

I, Larry S. Royster, Clerk of the Michigan Supreme Court, certify that the

foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court.

 May 21, 2014

d0514

Order 

Clerk

May 21, 2014

148001

ALAN A. MAY, Personal Representative of the

ESTATE OF BURR NEEDHAM, Deceased,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v SC: 148001

COA: 303999

Monroe CC: 05-019213-NH

MERCY MEMORIAL NURSING CENTER,

a/k/a MONROE COMMUNITY HEALTH

SERVICES,

Defendant-Appellee,

and

ARUN GUPTA, M.D., WILLINE BELOW, 

L.P.N., RETA OBLINGER, L.P.N., S. SCOTT,

L.P.N., TINA DALE, L.P.N., and JULIE

CEBINA, L.P.N.,

Defendants.

_________________________________________/

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the October 3, 2013 

judgment of the Court of Appeals is considered, and it is DENIED, because we are not 

persuaded that the questions presented should be reviewed by this Court.
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 04-6384

JOE DAVID BARNARD,

Plaintiff - Appellant,

versus

GREENVILLE FAMILY COURT; AMY C. SUTHERLAND,

Chief Administrative Judge,

Defendants - Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of

South Carolina, at Anderson. Henry M. Herlong, Jr., District

Judge. (CA-03-3427-8-20BI)

Submitted: April 29, 2004 Decided: May 6, 2004

Before LUTTIG, WILLIAMS, and SHEDD, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Joe David Barnard, Appellant Pro Se.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

See Local Rule 36(c).
- 2 -

PER CURIAM:

Joe David Barnard appeals the district court’s order

accepting the recommendation of the magistrate judge and denying

relief on his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000) complaint under 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(e)(2)(B) (2000). We have reviewed the record and find no

reversible error. Accordingly, we affirm on the reasoning of the

district court. See Barnard v. Greenville Family Court, No. CA-03-

3427-8-20BI (D.S.C. Nov. 26, 2003). We deny Barnard’s motion for

appointment of counsel. We dispense with oral argument because the

facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the

materials before the court and argument would not aid the

decisional process.

AFFIRMED
[Federal Register Volume 66, Number 35 (Wednesday, February 21, 2001)]
[Notices]
[Page 11031]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 01-4214]


-----------------------------------------------------------------------

FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION

[Report No. 2464]


Petitions for Reconsideration and Clarification of Action in 
Rulemaking Proceedings

February 9, 2001.
    Petitions for Reconsideration and Clarification have been filed in 
the Commission's rulemaking proceedings listed in this Public Notice 
and published pursuant to 47 CFR Section 1.429(e). The full text of 
these documents are available for viewing and copying in Room CY-A257, 
445 12th Street, SW., Washington, DC or may be purchased from the 
Commission's copy contractor, ITS, Inc. (202) 857-3800. Oppositions to 
these petitions must be filed by March 8, 2001. See Section 1.4(b)(1) 
of the Commission's rules (47 CFR 1.4(b)(1)). Replies to an opposition 
must be filed within 10 days after the time for filing oppositions have 
expired.
    Subject: Implementation of Sections 309(j) and 337 of the 
Communications Act of 1934 as Amended (WT Docket No. 99-87, RM-9332, 
RM-9405, RM-9705); Promotion of Spectrum Efficient Technologies on 
Certain Part 90 Frequencies; Establishment of Public Service Radio Pool 
in the Private Mobile Frequencies Below 800 MHz; and Petition for Rule 
Making of the American Mobile Telecommunications Association.
    Number of Petitions Filed: 14.
    Subject: Revision of the Commission's Rules To Ensure Compatibility 
with Enhanced 911 Emergency Calling Systems (CC Docket No. 94-102).
    Number of Petitions Filed: 1.

    Federal Communications Commission.
Magalie Roman Salas,
Secretary.
[FR Doc. 01-4214 Filed 2-20-01; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 6712-01-M
#### Ann M. LEMBARIS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. UNIVERSITY OF ROCHESTER, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 13-3474-cv.

United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.

May 19, 2014.

*90Ann M. Lembaris, *pro se,*Springwater, NY,* for Plaintiff-Appellant.

Jacqueline Phipps Polito, Littler Men-delson, P.C., Rochester, NY, for Defendant-Appellee.

Present: AMALYA L. KEARSE, CHESTER J. STRAUB, and SUSAN L. CARNEY, Circuit Judges.

*

 Christina A. Agola, Christina A. Agola, PLLC, Brighton, NY, filed a brief on behalf of Appellant before being relieved as counsel.

SUMMARY ORDER

UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the judgment entered on August 29, 2013, is AFFIRMED.

Appellant Ann Lembaris, proceeding *pro se,*appeals from the District Court’s grant of summary judgment for Appellee University of Rochester and dismissal of Lembaris’s employment discrimination action. *See Lembaris v. Univ. of Rochester,*No. 12-cv-6214 (MAT), 2013 WL 4587810 (W.D.N.Y. Aug. 28, 2013). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural history of the case, and the issues on appeal, to which we refer only as necessary to explain our decision to affirm.

We review *de novo*a district court’s grant of summary judgment. *See Abdu-Brisson v. Delta Air Lines, Inc.,*239 F.3d 456, 465 (2d Cir.2001). Summary judgment is appropriate “only when there are no genuine issues of material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” *Id.*On summary judgment, the court must consider “not whether ... the evidence unmistakably favors one side or the other but whether a fair-minded jury could return a verdict for the plaintiff on the evidence presented.” *Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,*477 U.S. 242, 252, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). “[T]he mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the plaintiffs position will be insufficient; there must be evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for the plaintiff.” *Id.*

Upon review, we conclude — substantially for the reasons articulated by the District Court in its well-reasoned opinion — that Lembaris has failed to produce evidence sufficient to support a reasonable finding that the University of Rochester’s proffered non-discriminatory grounds for her termination were pretextual. *See Abdtir-Brisson,*239 F.3d at 470.

We have considered Appellant’s remaining arguments and find them to be without merit. For the reasons set out above, we AFFIRM the judgment of the District Court.
NOT FOR PUBLICATION UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff - Appellee,
v. ALVARO MEJIA, Defendant - Appellant. No. 13-50450 D. C. 2:06-cr-00243-SJO-1 MEMORANDUM *

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Central District of California S. James Otero, District Judge, Presiding Submitted August 25, 2014 ** Pasadena, California Before: O’SCANNLAIN and RAWLINS ON, Circuit Judges, and RAKOFF, Senior District Judge. *** 

# FILED
SEP 04 2014 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
*** The Honorable Jed S. Rakoff, Senior District Judge for the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York, sitting by designation.Defendant-Appellant Alvaro Mejia a ppeals from the District Court’s judgment revoking his supervised release and imposing a 30-month sentence of imprisonment. Because Mejia has withdrawn his challenge to the District Court’s finding that he violated the terms and conditions of his supervised release, the only issue that remains is his sentence. Mejia contends, and the government concedes, that the District Court incorrectly calcu lated his state law offenses as Grade A violations under Section 7B1.1(a) of the advisory United States Sentencing Guidelines (“Guidelines”), when in fact they were Grade B violations. The parties concur that this plain error resulted in a Guidelines range of 24 to 30 months, rather than the correct range of 12 to 18 months. We agree. 1 Accordingly, we VACATE the senten ce and REMAND this matter to the District Court for resentencing.

1 Because we remand for resentencing ba sed on the Guidelines error, we do not address Mejia’s challenge to the reasonableness of his sentence. -2-
Exhibit 31.1

CERTIFICATION



Certification of President



I, Wm. Lee Popham, President, certify that:



1.

I have reviewed this quarterly report on Form 10-Q of Admiral Financial Corp.;



2.

Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this report;



3.

Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial information included in this report, fairly present in all material respects the financial condition, results of operations and cash flows of the small business issuer as of, and for, the periods presented in this report;



4.

The small business issuer's other certifying officer(s) and I are responsible for establishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) and internal control over financial reporting (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(f) and 15d-15(f)) for the small business issuer and have:



(a)

Designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such disclosure controls and procedures to be designed under our supervision, to ensure that material information relating to the small business issuer, including its consolidated subsidiaries, is made known to us by others within those entities, particularly during the period in which this report is being prepared;

(b)

Evaluated the effectiveness of the small business issuer's disclosure controls and procedures and presented in this report our conclusions about the effectiveness of the disclosure controls and procedures, as of the end of the period covered by this report based on such evaluation; and

(c)

Disclosed in this report any change in the small business issuer's internal control over financial reporting that occurred during the small business issuer's most recent fiscal quarter (the small business issuer's fourth fiscal quarter in the case of an annual report) that has materially affected, or is reasonably likely to materially affect, the small business issuer's internal control over financial reporting; and



5.

The small business issuer's other certifying officer(s) and I have disclosed, based on our most recent evaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to the small business issuer's auditors and the audit committee of the small business issuer's board of directors (or persons performing the equivalent functions):



(a)

All significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or operation of internal control over financial reporting which are reasonably likely to adversely affect the small business issuer's ability to record, process, summarize and report financial information; and

(b)

Any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other employees who have a significant role in the small business issuer's internal control over financial reporting.



Dated: February 11, 2010



/s/ Wm. Lee Popham

Wm. Lee Popham, President
UN PUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 17
- 6175

MICHAEL BREYAN , Plaintiff

- Appellant ,

v. CLASSIFICATION EMPLOYEES , Defendant

- Appellee

.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina , at Charleston

. Bruce H. Hendricks , District Judge . ( 2:17

- cv - 00062

- BHH )

Submitted : June 22, 2017 Decided: June 26, 2017

Before GREGORY, Chief Judge, and FLOYD and HARRIS , Circuit Judges.

Dismissed and remanded by un published per curiam opinion

. Michael Breyan, Appellant Pro Se.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.2 PER CURIAM: Michael Breyan seeks to appeal the district court ’ s or der accepting the magistrate judge’s recommendation and dismissing without prejudice his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012) complaint. This court may exercise jurisdiction only over final orders, 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (2012), and certain inte rlocutory and collateral orde rs, 28 U.S.C. § 1292 (2012); Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b), Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp. , 337 U.S. 541, 545

- 47 (1949). Because the deficiencies identified by the district court may be remedied by filing an amended complaint, we conclude that the order Br eyan seeks to appeal is neither a final order nor an appealable interlocutory or collateral order. See Goode v. Cent. Va. Legal Aid Soc’y, Inc. , 807 F.3d 619, 623

- 24 (4th Cir. 2015); Domino Sugar Corp. v. Sugar Workers Local Union 392 , 10 F.3d 1064, 1066

- 67 (4th Cir. 1993). Accordingly, we dismiss this appeal for lack of jurisdiction and remand the case to the district court with instructions to allow Breyan to amend his complaint. Goode , 807 F.3d at 630. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

DISMISSED AND REMANDED
THE THIRTEENTH COURT OF APPEALS

13-18-00463-CR

Ex Parte Christopher Floyd

On Appeal from the

28th District Court of Nueces County, Texas

Trial Cause No. 17FC-2162A

JUDGMENT

THE THIRTEENTH COURT OF APPEALS, having considered this cause on 

appeal, concludes that the judgment of the trial court should be AFFIRMED. The Court 

orders the judgment of the trial court AFFIRMED.

We further order this decision certified below for observance.

October 10, 2019