[Cite as State v. Emmons, 2016-Ohio-5384.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO 

HAMILTON COUNTY, OHIO 

STATE OF OHIO, 

 Plaintiff-Appellant, 

 vs. 

DEBRA EMMONS, 

 Defendant-Appellee. 

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APPEAL NO. C-150636 

TRIAL NO. B-1501487 

 O P I N I O N.

 

 

Criminal Appeal From: Hamilton County Court of Common Pleas 

 

Judgment Appealed From Is: Reversed and Cause Remanded 

 

Date of Judgment Entry on Appeal: August 17, 2016 

Joseph T. Deters, Hamilton County Prosecuting Attorney, and Philip R. Cummings, 

Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for Plaintiff-Appellant, 

Raymond T. Faller, Hamilton County Public Defender, and David Hoffman, 

Assistant Public Defender, for Defendant-Appellee. 
OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS 

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DEWINE, Judge.

{¶1} This is an appeal by the state from a trial court’s decision suppressing 

evidence of illegal drug possession obtained during a traffic stop. The trial court 

found that a seven-minute traffic stop was unreasonably prolonged by the arresting 

trooper’s questioning of the driver and passenger about matters unrelated to the 

reason for the stop. We conclude that the officer’s questions did not convert the stop 

into something other than a lawful seizure because the questions did not measurably 

extend the duration of the stop. Moreover, we hold that even if the traffic stop had 

been prolonged, reasonable suspicion under the totality of the circumstances 

justified the ongoing detention. Therefore, we reverse the trial court’s judgment. 

I. A Seven-Minute Traffic Stop 

{¶2} Debra Emmons was arrested for illegal drug possession following a 

traffic stop of a vehicle in which she was a passenger. The traffic stop—which lasted 

seven minutes from the time of the stop until Ms. Emmons’s arrest—was captured on 

video and introduced into evidence at Emmons’s motion-to-suppress hearing. 

{¶3} State Trooper Kyle Doebrich pulled over a car driven by Hubert 

Barrett for failing to stop at a marked stop line. Immediately after being stopped, 

Mr. Barrett told the trooper he had a driver’s license but did not have it with him. 

Ms. Emmons said that the car was hers and that she had identification. The trooper 

then asked where they were from and where they were headed. He testified that 

Emmons answered some of the questions he had directed to Barrett, and that both 

seemed very nervous. 
OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS 

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{¶4} Next, the trooper asked Emmons for her identification. While she was 

retrieving it, he quizzed Barrett about small wounds on the backs of his hands. Mr. 

Barrett responded that his dog had caused them. The trooper testified that the 

wounds did not look like they had come from a dog. He knew from his training and 

experience that the wounds were track marks—that is, wounds caused by using a 

hypodermic needle to inject drugs such as heroin or cocaine. 

{¶5} The trooper instructed Barrett to get out of the car so he could verify 

his personal information on the cruiser’s computer. Mr. Barrett volunteered that 

there was an open capias for him. The trooper questioned Barrett about the capias, 

and about where he and Emmons had been. He patted Barrett down and placed him 

in the cruiser. After running Barrett’s name and social security number in his 

computer, he learned that Barrett’s driver’s license was valid and that he had 

previous felony drug convictions. In response to questioning, Mr. Barrett stated that 

the prior charges involved cocaine, but denied recent drug use or that his wounds 

were drug related. 

{¶6} As Trooper Doebrich continued to use his computer, he inquired into 

Barrett’s relationship with Emmons, their activities that day, and their address. The 

trooper noted that Barrett stammered in his responses and that some of his answers 

made no sense and conflicted with statements made by Emmons. 

{¶7} Trooper Doebrich had not yet written Barrett a citation when he left 

the cruiser to speak to Emmons, who was still seated in her car. Noticing that she 

was picking at the skin of her thumbs, he asked her why she was so nervous. He also 

quizzed her about what appeared to be dried blood on her shirt sleeve, in the area 

just inside her elbow. He knew from experience that the small amount of blood and 
OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS 

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its location “over a large accessible vein [were] common with using a hypodermic 

needle.” After she agreed to his request to pull up her sleeves, the trooper noticed 

fresh track marks on her arms. Ms. Emmons admitted that she had injected heroin 

about four days earlier. He asked if she had anything illegal on her and she said no. 

He then asked if she minded showing him her purse. She handed it to him, and he 

immediately found a needle and placed Emmons under arrest. A subsequent search 

of Emmons’s car revealed a baggie of cocaine. 

{¶8} Trooper Doebrich estimated that he had made hundreds of traffic 

stops in his three years with the Ohio State Highway Patrol. He testified that a traffic 

stop resulting in the issuance of a traffic citation ordinarily takes about seven to 12 

minutes. 

{¶9} The trial court issued a written decision three weeks after the 

suppression hearing, granting the motion and suppressing the physical evidence 

seized by the trooper. The trial court concluded that the trooper had no reasonable 

articulable suspicion to ask Barnett to get out of the car, to ask questions unrelated to 

the traffic violation, or to ask Emmons for identification. It reasoned that, by asking 

“irrelevant” questions, the trooper had impermissibly prolonged the detention 

beyond what was required for the traffic investigation. Finally, the court evaluated 

the individual circumstances of the stop in isolation and determined that none of 

them led to a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity beyond the traffic violation. 

II. The Motion to Suppress Was Improperly Granted 

{¶10} This appeal followed. In its sole assignment of error, the state asserts 

that the trial court erred when it granted the motion to suppress. 
OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS 

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{¶11} Appellate review of a motion to suppress presents a mixed question of 

law and fact. State v. Burnside, 100 Ohio St.3d 152, 2003-Ohio-5372, 797 N.E.2d 71, 

¶ 8. We must accept the trial court’s factual findings if they are supported by 

competent, credible evidence, but we review de novo the trial court’s application of 

the law to those facts. Id. As a general matter, determinations of reasonable 

suspicion and probable cause are reviewed de novo on appeal. Ornelas v. United 

States, 517 U.S. 690, 699, 116 S.Ct. 1657, 134 L.Ed.2d 911 (1996). 

A. The Traffic Stop Was Not Unreasonably Prolonged 

{¶12} The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution protects 

individuals against unreasonable governmental searches and seizures. A traffic stop 

of a vehicle and the detention of its occupants, however brief, is a “seizure” for 

Fourth Amendment purposes. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653, 99 S.Ct. 1391, 

59 L.Ed.2d 660 (1979); Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 809, 116 S.Ct. 1769, 

135 L.Ed.2d 89 (1996). The temporary seizure of a vehicle’s occupants in a traffic 

stop ordinarily remains reasonable during the officer’s investigation into matters 

related to the justification for the stop. Arizona v. Johnson, 555 U.S. 323, 333, 129 

S.Ct. 781, 172 L.Ed.2d 694 (2009). 

{¶13} An officer’s traffic stop investigation involves more than making a 

determination whether to issue a traffic citation or warning. Rodriguez v. United 

States, ___ U.S. ___, 135 S.Ct. 1609, 1615, 191 L.Ed.2d 492 (2015). An officer 

ordinarily must check the driver’s license, vehicle registration, and proof of 

insurance and determine whether there are outstanding warrants against the driver. 

Id.; Prouse at 659. See State v. Batchili, 113 Ohio St.3d 403, 2007-Ohio-2204, 865 

N.E.2d 1282, ¶ 12. 
OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS 

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{¶14} Contrary to the trial court’s finding, it is well settled that once a vehicle 

has been lawfully detained for a traffic violation, police officers may order the driver 

to get out of the car without violating the Fourth Amendment’s proscriptions against 

unreasonable searches and seizures. Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 111, 98 

S.Ct. 330, 54 L.Ed.2d 331 (1977). An officer may also ask the driver and passengers 

about matters unrelated to the traffic stop itself, so long as those questions do not 

measurably extend the duration of the stop. Rodriguez at 1615; Johnson at 333. 

{¶15} As the United States Supreme Court has repeatedly held, mere police 

questioning does not constitute a seizure. Muehler v. Mena, 544 U.S. 93, 101, 125 

S.Ct. 1465, 161 L.Ed.2d 299 (2005); Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 434, 111 S.Ct. 

2382, 115 L.Ed.2d 389 (1991). “[E]ven when officers have no basis for suspecting a 

particular individual, they may generally ask questions of that individual; ask to 

examine the individual’s identification; and request consent to search his or her 

luggage.” Muehler at 101, citing Bostick at 434-435. As long as a detention is not 

prolonged by the questioning, there is no additional seizure within the meaning of 

the Fourth Amendment. Id. For example, officers do not need reasonable suspicion 

to ask a detained individual for her name, date and place of birth, or immigration 

status. Id. In addition, a police officer may request identifying information from a 

passenger in a vehicle stopped for a traffic violation without particularized suspicion 

that the passenger poses a safety risk or is violating the law. United States v. 

Alexander, 467 Fed.Appx. 355, 362 (6th Cir.2012); United States v. Fernandez, 600 

F.3d 56 (1st Cir.2010); United States v. Soriano-Jarquin, 492 F.3d 495 (4th 

Cir.2007). See State v. Chagaris, 107 Ohio App.3d 551, 669 N.E.2d 92 (9th 

Dist.1995). 
OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS 

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{¶16} A seizure justified solely by a traffic violation may become unlawful 

only if it is prolonged beyond the time that is reasonably required for the issuance of 

a citation for the violation. See Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 407, 125 S.Ct. 834, 

160 L.Ed.2d 842 (2005). In other words, a traffic stop that exceeds the time needed 

to handle the matter for which the stop was made is an unlawful seizure. Rodriguez 

at 1612. In assessing the reasonableness of a traffic stop, courts must examine the 

totality of the circumstances to determine if the police diligently pursued the 

investigation into the purpose for the stop. State v. Reece, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C140635, 2015-Ohio-3638, ¶ 21, citing Rodriguez at 1614. 

{¶17} In this case, the traffic stop was not unreasonably prolonged beyond 

the time required for the initial purpose of the stop. There is no dispute that the stop 

for the stop-sign violation was lawful. Because the occupants of the car were lawfully 

detained for the traffic violation, Trooper Doebrich did not need reasonable 

suspicion of further criminal activity to ask for the driver’s license or to order the 

driver from the car. His request for the passenger’s identification added no 

appreciable additional time to the detention. Confronted with a driver carrying no 

license or identification, who admitted to an open arrest warrant, the trooper 

diligently pursued his traffic investigation. The arrest of the passenger occurred well 

within the seven-to-12-minute window for an ordinary traffic citation. Nothing in 

the record suggests that the detention of Emmons “was of sufficient length to make it 

constitutionally dubious.” See Batchili, 113 Ohio St.3d 403, 2007-Ohio-2204, 865 

N.E.2d 1282, at ¶ 14. Therefore, we hold that the trial court erred by concluding that 

the seven-minute traffic stop had been unlawfully prolonged. 
OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS 

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B. Reasonable Suspicion of Criminal Activity 

{¶18} Moreover, the circumstances in this case would have warranted a 

prolonged detention. A traffic stop may be prolonged upon the discovery of 

additional facts “that give rise to a reasonable, articulable suspicion of criminal 

activity beyond that which prompted the initial stop.” Batchili at ¶ 15. “The 

‘reasonable and articulable’ standard applied to a prolonged traffic stop encompasses 

the totality of the circumstances, and a court may not evaluate in isolation each 

articulated reason for the stop.” Id. at paragraph two of the syllabus, applying 

United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 274, 122 S.Ct. 744, 151 L.Ed.2d 740 (2002). In 

this case, the trial court considered in isolation multiple actions by the trooper and 

concluded that none of them justified Trooper Doebrich’s suspicion of criminal 

activity. The court’s approach failed to take into account the totality of the 

circumstances, which necessarily included the trooper’s “experience and specialized 

training” that would allow him “to make inferences from and deductions about the 

cumulative information available to [him] that ‘might well elude an untrained 

person.’ ” Arvizu at 273, quoting United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 418, 101 S.Ct. 

690, 66 L.Ed.2d 621 (1981). 

{¶19} Trooper Doebrich had plenty of reasons to be suspicious. He was 

confronted with two nervous individuals whose answers conflicted. The driver had 

no license or identification and admitted to an open warrant for his arrest. He 

stammered and lied about the origins of track marks on his hands, even while 

acknowledging prior drug use. Ms. Emmons had what looked to be dried blood on 

her sleeve and fresh track marks on her arm, and admitted to recent heroin use. Fair 
OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS 

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to say, the detention of Emmons was supported by specific facts that gave rise to the 

suspicion of ongoing drug activity. 

III. Conclusion 

{¶20} The trial court erred by finding that the traffic stop was unreasonably 

prolonged beyond what was necessary to address the traffic violation and by finding 

that Trooper Doebrich’s investigation constituted an impermissible extension of the 

seizure. Furthermore, the court erred by failing to examine the reasonableness of the 

trooper’s suspicion under the totality of the circumstances and by finding that the 

trooper did not have reasonable suspicion “of anything beyond a traffic violation.” 

Consequently, we sustain the sole assignment of error. We reverse the judgment of 

the trial court and remand this matter for further proceedings consistent with law 

and this opinion. 

 Judgment reversed and cause remanded. 

FISCHER, P.J., concurs. 

HENDON, J., concurs separately. 

HENDON, J., concurring separately. 

{¶21} While I have trouble accepting the trooper’s stated justification for 

questioning the passenger, I am constrained to concur that there was no 

constitutional deprivation. 

Please note: 

 The court has recorded its own entry on the date of the release of this opinion.