United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit



## FILED

May 23, 2005

Charles R. Fulbruge III

Clerk 

## In the 

# United States Court of Appeals

for the Fifth Circuit

_______________



### m 04-41307

Summary Calendar

_______________



### I N THE 

### M ATTER OF 

### :

S AM 

### D ILLON



### ,

Debtor.



### S AM 

### D ILLON AND 

### P AM 

### D ILLON



### ,

Appellants,

VERSUS



### T EXAS 

### C OMMISSION ON 

### E NVIRONMENTAL 

### Q UALITY AND 

### M ICHAEL 

### G ROSS



### ,

Appellees.

_________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Texas



### m 9:04-CV-92-RHC



### m 9:04-CV-93-RHC



### m 9:04-CV-94-RHC



### m 9:04-CV-95-RHC

______________________________2

Before D AVIS

, S MITH , and D ENNIS

, Circuit Judges.

J ERRY E. S MITH , Circuit Judge: *

Pro se appellants Sam and Pam Dillon appeal the district court’s order that affirmed the

bankruptcy court’s finding that they are ineligible for relief under chapter 13 of the B ankruptcy Code. Finding no error, we affirm.

I.

Sam Dillon and his wife filed for chapter 13

bankruptcy about three years after Dillon had

received a chapter 7 disch arge. The Texas

Commissi on on Environmental Quality

(“TCEQ”) 

### SS

th e Texas state agency charged

with enforcing environmental laws 

### SS filed a

t imely claim against Dillo n in connection with

the chapter 13 filing for governmental fines,

penalties, and other liabilit ies arising fro m alleged unlawful operati on of public water ut ilities. The Dillons objected to TCEQ’s initial

claim, asserting that they should not be fined

for periods before o r during the pendency of

their chapter 7 proceeding. TCEQ amended

its cl aim to assert an unsecured interest in

$337,000 in fines and penalties only for unlawful operati o n allegedly conducted between

the dat es o f the chapter 7 discharge and the

chapter 13 filing.

The bankruptcy court denied the Dill ons’

objection to T CE Q’s amended claim, finding

that the debtor had continued to opera te the

water sys t ems after the chapter 7 discharge.

Because TCEQ’s unsecur ed claim exceeded

$290,925 (the maximum amount of non-cont ingent, liquidated, unsecured debt that a

debtor may have to receive relief under chapter 13, see 11 U.S.C. § 109(e)), the court denied co n firmation of the Dillons’ chapter 13

plan, denied their motions f o r a hardship discharge pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 1328(b) , and

dismissed their chapter 13 case without prejudice. The district court affirmed the bankruptcy court’s rulings.

II.

We revi ew the bankruptcy court’s factual

findings for clear error and its legal c o nclusions de novo

. S ee Lambert v. Miss. State Tax

Comm’n

, 179 F.3d 281, 284 (5th Ci r. 1999).

Findings of

fact are clearly erroneous if we

have a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made. S ee Mabey v. Southw estern Elec. Power Co.

, 150 F.3d 503, 513 (5th

Cir. 1998). “Strict applicat ion of the clearly

erroneous rule is particularly important whe[n]

the district court has affirmed the bankruptcy

court’s findings.” C

oston v. Bank of Malvern,

987 F.2d 1096, 1099 (5th Cir. 1992).

The Dillons ar e pro se , so their briefs are

liberally construed and not held to the standard

of ex a ctitude expected of briefs by attorneys.

See, e.g., Amin v. Universal Life Ins. Co.

, 706

F.2d 638, 640 n.1 (5th Cir. 1983). But, “ p ro

se litigants have no general immunit y from the

rule that issues and arguments not briefed o n

appeal are abandoned.” G eiger v. Jowers

, 2005 U.S. App . LEXIS 4572, at *4 n. 6 (5th

Cir. Mar. 21, 2005).

III.

The Dillons assert that the trustee, TCEQ,

and the Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”) are

l iable for violating a plethora of federal statutes, Texas regulations, and provisions in the

Unite d States and Texas constitutions. As a

threshold matter, we refrain from considering

the claims made against the IRS, because they * Pursuant to 5 TH C IR

. R. 47.5, the court has

determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited

circumstances set forth in 5 TH C IR . R. 47.5.4.3

are wholly irrelevant to the issues presented by

the instant appeal; the IRS is not a party to this

action, and the asserted liability has no

colorable impact on the issues that are present

vis-á-vis the part ies t hat are properly part of

this action. Moreover, because the Dillons

merely string-cite the provisions and fail to include any facts or brief any argument explaining why t hese laws were violated or how

finding liabilit

y under them would affect the

disposition in the district and bankruptcy

courts, the claims are deemed waived for inadequate briefing. 1

IV.

As the district court properly found, the

dispositive issue is whe ther the bankruptcy

court properly allowed TCEQ’s claim, over

the Dillons’ objection, for an amount that exceeded $290,525; under 11 U .S.C. § 109(e),

an individual may not obtain relief under chapter 13 unless, at the time of the petition, the

aggregated non-contingent, liquidated, unsecured debts are lower than that amount.

Liberally construing t he arguments presented

in the Dillons’ brief, they assert only two coherent challenges to the bankruptcy court’s allowance of TCEQ’s claim: (1) t hat the claim

was fraudulent and (2) that it was error to approve the claim for $460,000 when the amended claim was for $337,000. 2 The Dillons point to nothing in the record

that is probative of their assertion that TCEQ’s

claim was forged and fraudulent. Mere

conclus io nal assertions do not demonstrate

that the bankruptcy court was clearly erroneo us in its factual finding that the cl aim was

legitimate. Even assuming arguendo that the

bankruptcy court erred in approving TCEQ’s

claim for $460,000 when it had requested only

$337,000, that would not affect the disposition

of the case, because $337,000 plainly exceeds

the $290,525 jurisdictional threshold limit for

c hapter 13 bankruptcy relief established by §

109(e).

Because the bankruptcy court did not err in

allowing TCEQ’s claim for at least $290,525,

the Dillons are ineligible for relief under chapter 13, because the debt exceeded the jurisdictional limit s established in §109(e). The remaining rulings of the bankruptcy court are

correct as a matter of law, because t hey flow

fr o m the Dillons’ ineligibility for relief under

chapter 13; the court appropriately denied

certificatio n o f their plan, denied a hardship

discharge, 3 and dismissed their case without

prejudice.

AFFIRMED.

1 Se e F ED

. R. A PP

. P. 28(a)(9)(A); see also

United States v. Martinez

, 263 F.3d 436 (5th Cir.

2 001) (noting that failure adequately to brief a n

issue on appeal can constitute waiver of that argument); Geiger

, 2005 U.S. App. LEXIS 4572, at *4

n. 6 (“ [P]ro se litigants have no general immunity

from the rule that issues and arguments not briefed

on appeal are abandoned.”).

2 The Dillons do not argue that the method of

calculating TCEQ’s claim was in error, nor do they

(continued...) 2 (...continued)

assert that the claim was n o t aggregated, noncontingent, liquidated and unsec u red, as required

for disqualifying a p arty from chapter 13 relief

under § 109(e).

3 A hardship discharg e may be granted by the

bankruptcy court only “[a]t any time after the confirmation of the plan.” 11 U.S.C. § 1328(b)

(emphasis added).