ELED 

MAR 07 202 

ELI7 "TH A. BR 

CLER1 OF 'U lEME URT 

BY—

rtIEF DEPUTY CLERK 

139 Nev., Advance Opinion 57 

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 

STATE OF NEVADA 

IN THE MATTER OF THE GUARDIANSHIP OF THE PERSON AND ESTATE 

OF KATHLEEN JUNE JONES, PiturEcTED PERSON. 

KATHLEEN JUNE JONES, APPELLANT, V. ROBYN FRIEDMAN; 

DONNA SIMMONS; AND ELIZABETH BRICKFIELD, 

GUARDIAN AD LITEM FOR KATHLEEN JUNE JONES, 

RESPONDENTS. 

No. 84655 

December 21, 2023 

Appeal from district court order granting guardian ad l item fees. 

Eighth Judicial District Court, Family Division, Clark County; 

Linda Marquis, Judge. 

Affirmed. 

Legal Aid Center of Southern Nevada, Inc., and Scott Cardenas 

and Elizabeth Mikesell, Las Vegas, for Appellant. 

Dawson & Lordahl, PLLC, and Elizabeth Bricklield, Las Vegas, 

for Respondent Elizabeth Brickfield. 

Michaelson Law and John P. Michaelson, Amnwn E. Francom, 

and Peter R. Pratt, Henderson, for Respondents Robyn Friedman 

and Donna Simmons. 

Julia S. Gold, Chairperson, Dara Goldsmith, Amicus Curiae Chairperson, Michael if Keane, and Amanda Netuschil, Reno, 

for Arnicus Curiae State Bar of Nevada, Probate and Trust Law 

Sect ion. 

Before the Supreme Court, HERNDON, LEE, and PARRAGUIRRE, JJ. 

OPINION 

By the Court, H ER NI DON, J.: 

Roughly 18 months after respondents petitioned for guardianship 

over their mother, triggering the contentious litigation that followed,' the district court appointed a guardian ad litem (GAL) to aid 

'See Mauer qf Guardianship qf Jones, 138 Nev. 51, 507 P.3d 598 (Ct. App. 

2022), for background inlbrination on the guardianship proceedings. 
in re Guardianship ofiones 

it in determining the protected person's best interests. The GAL, an 

attorney, soon thereafter filed a notice of intent to seek the fees and 

costs to be incurred at her standard hourly rate. After submitting a 

report, the GAL sought fees at her stated rate. The court awarded 

her those fees over the protected person's objection. At issue in this 

appeal are three arguments against the fee award: (1) the GAL has 

no right to fees when the district court order appointing her did 

not specify the rate, as required by the Nevada Statewide Rules for 

Guardianship (NSRG); (2) the court improperly appointed an attorney as the GAL under N RS 159.0455 and NSRG Rule 8; and (3) the 

rate of compensation to which the GAL is entitled should be that of 

a fiduciary, not an attorney. 

We conclude that the protected person waived any argument pertaining to the form of the district court's order by failing to raise 

the issue below. Even so, we note that, within days of the GAL's 

appointment, the protected person was notified that the GAL would 

seek fees at her requested rate of compensation, and the district 

court's failure to specify the rate in the order thus did not prejudice the protected person. We further conclude that the district 

court erred in interpreting NRS 159.0455(3) as requiring the court 

to appoint an attorney where there is no court-approved volunteer 

program. However, this error was harmless because the district 

court expressly appointed an experienced attorney as the GAL due 

to the cornplexity of this matter. Lastly, we conclude that the record 

contains substantial evidence supporting the GAL's fee request. The 

district court did not abuse its discretion in awarding the GAL the 

full amount of her requested fees. 

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 

Upon petition, respondents Robyn Friedman and Donna Simmons became temporary guardians over their mother, appellant 

Kathleen June Jones (June); their temporary guardianship was followed by their sister Kimberly's appointment as guardian. During 

Kirnberly's term as guardian, there were over 400 documents filed 

in the case, 25 hearings held, and at least 3 investigations conducted 

into the circumstances underlying the guardianship proceedings. 

A major issue between the parties concerned Robyn's and Donna's ability to obtain Collinilin icat ion, visits, and vacation time with 

June. The district court scheduled an evidentiary hearing on the 

issue and appointed respondent Elizabeth Brickfield, an attorney, as 

GAL for June. ln particular, the court directed Brickfield to address 

the issue in the following manner: 

Schedule[ ] opportunities for Protected Person to elect to speak 

with and/or visit in person with her adult daughters and [address] 

whether the Guardian has an obligation to facilitate, prompt, 
I n re Guardianship of Jones 3 

encourage, plan, schedule, and/or create an environment that 

promotes an opportunity for continued communication between 

Protected Person and her adult daughters based upon the current level of care and needs of the Protected Person. 

The court later asked Brickfield to assist with another issue—that 

of relocating June to California. It noted that each of the issues for 

which it sought the GA L's help were interrelated and complex. As 

to compensation, the order stated, "[t]he guardian ad litern rnay 

request fees from the guardianship estate or a third party" and any 

request must comply with NRS 159.344. 

Five days after the order was filed, Brickfield filed a notice of 

appearance and a notice of intent to seek attorney fees and costs 

from the guardianship estate pursuant to N RS 159.344(3). Brickfield's notice indicated that her hourly rate was $400 and listed 

various support staff billing at rates ranging from $75 to $350 per 

hour. In response, June filed a notice of objection, arguing that the 

GAL was not entitled to her attorney rate of $400 per hour because 

the issues did not require legal services or legal expertise. June proposed that the GAL should charge within the national average range, 

which June represented to be $22 to $48 per hour. Kimberly joined 

June's opposition. Brickfield filed a declaration in response to the 

notice of objection, describing her extensive experience and qualifications and asserting that the rate was comparable to that charged 

by other attorneys with similar qualifications in Clark County for 

services as counsel and as a GAL. 

About 6 weeks later, Brickfield filed her report to the court. The 

report outlined Brickfield's work on the case: 

(i) reviewed the pleadings relevant to the issues of visitation and communication and the Physician's Certificate and 

accompanying report; (ii) rnet with Ms. Jones by telephone 

on 2/24/21 and in person on 3/25/21; Ms. Jones was accompanied by LACSN counsel; (iii) inet individually with Ms. Jones' 

five children by separate telephone or Zoom conferences; the 

children who are represented by counsel were accompanied 

by counsel. Each meeting with a child lasted approximately 

one hour; the two meetings with Ms. Jones totaled one hour; 

and (iv) separate telephone conversations with the respective 

children's counsel. 

Brickfield also provided her conclusions and made recommendations in June's best interests. 

Brickfield thereafter filed a petition seeking approval of her GAL 

fees and costs, requesting a total of $5713.50. Brickfield requested 

$5400 in fees for herself for 13.5 hours of work, $310 in fees for 2 

hours of work by a paralegal, and $3.50 in costs for filing fees. June 
4 In re Guardianship of Jones 

objected, agreeing that Brickfield was entitled to compensation but 

arguing that a GAL should be paid at a lower GAL rate rather than 

an attorney rate. She added that 13rickfield misrepresented how she 

benefited her and that, in fact, she gained no benefit from Brickfield's appointrnent. She added that she should not have to pay for 

a GAL to whom she objected. The district court entered a written 

order awarding Brickfield her requested $5713.50 in fees and costs. 

June appealed,' and the Probate and Trust Section of the Nevada 

State Bar was permitted to file an am icus curiae brief. 

DISCUSSION 

Any error in ihe district court's order appointing the GAL is waived 

June argues the district court lacked authority to award the GAL 

fees because it did not specify the GAL's rate in its appointment 

order. NSRG 8(1) requires the district court to "state the hourly rate 

to be charged by the guardian ad litern" in the appointment order. 

June contends that Brickfield cannot receive payrnent because her 

rate was not specified in the appointment order. She adds that the 

district court also did not amend its appointment order to cornply with NSRG 8(1) after receiving Brickfield's notice of intent to 

seek fees. Respondents assert that June waived her argument that 

the order appointing the GAL does not conform with NSRG 8(1) 

because June failed to raise it below.' Respondents also argue that 

any error in failing to state the GAL's exact rate was not prejudicial. 

Generally, la) point not urged in the trial court, unless it goes 

to the jurisdiction of that court, is deemed to have been waived and 

will not be considered on appeal." Old Aztec Mine, Inc. v. Brown, 97 

Nev. 49, 52, 623 P.2d 981, 983 (1981). This general rule applies even 

to issues that are subject to review de novo. Schuck v. Signature 

2Respondents assert that we lack jurisdiction over this appeal because the 

order awarding guardian ad litem fees and costs was entered amidst ongoing guardianship proceedings and thus does not constitute a special order 

after final judgment appealable under N RA 3A(h)(8) and because it is not 

appealable under any other provision of that rule. We conclude that the order is 

independently appealable under N RS 159.375(5) (allowing appeals from orders 

in guardianship proceedings "authorizing the payment ()fa debt, claim, devise, 

guardian's fees or attorney's fees"). Moreover, despite respondents' request, we 

decline to issue sanctions for June's counsel filing this appeal, as this appeal 

ostensibly was filed to protect her interests and presents previously unanswered 

questions of law pertaining to attorney GALs. NSRG 9. 

3Respondents further suggest that the issue was waived when June failed to 

appeal from the order appointing the CiAt that order was not appealable. See grown v. MHC Stagecoach, L LC, 129 Nev. 343, 345. 301 P.3d 850, 851 

(2013) ("[Wie may only consider appeals authorized by statute or court rule."); 

N RA P 3A(b) (providing appellate jurisdiction over final ju(lgments and other 

specified orders). 
In re Guardianship ofJones 5 

Flight Support of Nev., Inc., 126 Nev. 434, 436, 245 P.3d 542, 544 

(2010). 

The record below supports that June waived any argument that 

the district court order did not satisfy the forrnalities under NSRG 

8(1). June did not raise any such issues with the district court's order 

in her objection to Brickfield's notice for fees, nor did she raise any 

such issues in her opposition to Brickfield's petition for fees. Finally, 

June did not raise arty issues with the GA L's appointment order at 

the hearing on the motion for fees. Thus, June waived any aresuments to the form of the appoint ment order. 

Even if the issue had been properly raised. June fails to demonstrate any prejudice warranting reversal. See NRCP 61 (providing 

that reversal is not warranted where the error is harmless). The order 

specifically required the GAL to comply with N RS 159.344, indicating to the parties the GAL was allowed to seek fees, and further 

expressly permitted the GAL to "request fees from the guardianship estate or a third party." Shortly after the order was entered and 

on the same day she filed her notice of appearance, Brickfield filed 

her notice of intent to seek fees. See NSRG 8(1). June noticed her 

objection, but the court did not alter the noticed cornpensation rate. 

Thus, while June correctly notes that the district court should have 

stated the GA L's permissible hourly rate in its order of appointment, 

the error was harmless in this instance and did not divest the court 

of authority to later award tees. 

The district court erred in concluding that it must appoint an attorney to serve as a GA L, but the error was harmless 

In addressing June's objections to Brickfield's motion for fees, the 

district court concluded that it could appoint a nonattorney as GAL 

only if a court-approved volunteer advocate program was established under NRS 159.0455. June argues that the court erred in so 

concluding. Respondents argue that, even if the court could have 

appointed a nonattorney outside of a volunteer advocate program, 

no other person who had the appropriate training and experience 

to serve as the GAL was suggested to the court, noting that Brickfield was uniquely qualified to address the issues present in such a 

complex case. 

The district court's interpretation and construction of a statute presents a question of law that is reviewed de novo. Zohar v. 

Zbiegien, 130 Nev. 733, 737, 334 P.3d 402, 405 (2014). Likewise, the 

district court's legal conclusions regarding court rules are reviewed 

de novo. Casey v. Wells Fargo I3ank, N.A., 128 Nev. 713, 715, 290 

P.3d 265, 267 (2012). When interpreting a statute that is clear on its 

face, the language of a statute should be given its plain meaning. 

Zohar, 130 Nev. at 737, 334 P.3d at 405. 
6 In re Guardianship of Jones 

A GAL may be appointed by the court to represent a protected 

person if the court deterrnines that the protected person will benefit 

from the appointment and the GA L's services will be beneficial in 

determining the protected person's best interests. N RS 159.0455(1). 

Under NRS 159.0455(3), lilt- a court-approved volunteer advocate 

prograrn for guardians ad litern has been established in a judicial 

district, a court may appoint a person who is not an attorney to 

represent a protected person or proposed protected person as a 

guardian ad litem." On the other hand, NSRG 8, which governs 

GALs appointed pursuant to NRS 159.0455, specifies in subsection 11 that "[a] guardian ad litein may be a trained volunteer from 

a court-approved advocate program, an attorney, or any other person that the court finds has appropriate training and experience." 

June argues that NRS 159.0455 and NSRG 8(H) contradict each 

other on the topic of who a court may appoint as GAL. But there is 

no conflict: NSRG 8(H) creates a complete list of people who could 

be eligible to serve as a GAL ("a trained volunteer from a courtapproved advocate program, an auorney, or any other person that 

the court finds has appropriate training and experience"). Meanwhile, the statute clarifies that the court may appoint a nonattorney 

li]f a court-approved volunteer advocate program for guardians ad 

litern has been established in a judicial district." N RS 159.0455(3). 

But the statute does not create a necessary condition for the appointment of a nonattorney. So the district court erred in interpreting 

N RS 159.0455(3) as requiring the appointment of an attorney where 

there is no court-approved volunteer program. 

A third option under NSRG 8(H) exists and does not conflict with 

N RS 159.0455(3). NSRG 8(H) provides three types of individuals 

that the district court can appoint as a GA L: an attorney, a volunteer frorn a volunteer advocate program, and "any other person that 

the court finds has appropriate training and experience." While the 

district court analyzed the first two options, it did not address the 

third option, which included any person trained and experienced as 

a GAL. Thus, it erred to the extent it concluded that it had to appoint 

an attorney because no trained volunteer was available. 

This error, however, was harmless, as the district court alternatively stated that an attorney GAL was specifically appointed due to 

the complex nature of the case, the visitation issues' impact on June, 

and the parties' continuing inability to communicate effectively. See 

NRCP 61: Cook v. SW1rise Hosp. & Med. Cir., LLC, 124 Nev. 997, 

1007, 194 P.3d 1214, 1220 (2008) (explaining that to be reversible 

error, the moving party rnust demonstrate that a substantial right 

was prejudiced and "that, but for the error, a different result might 

have been reached"). There is no evidence in the record that the 

district court was aware of any nonattorney with the appropriate 
In re Guardianship of Jones 7 

training and experience to be considered for the appointment. Nor 

does the record reflect that any such persons were proposed to the 

district court for consideration. So, while NSRG 8(1-1) provides three 

options, the facts of the instant case indicate that the third option 

was not available to the district court. The district court reviewed 

Brickfield's extensive qualifications, including her experience, legal 

abilities, and knowledge in the guardianship field. Because June 

cannot demonstrate that the district court could have appointed a 

nonattorney to deal with the complex legal issues relating to June's 

guardianship and relocation, we conclude that the district court's 

error could not have affected the outcome of the GAL proceedings. 

lts error was thus harmless. 

The district court did not abuse its discretion in awarding the GAO 

fres 

June contends that the district court should not have awarded 

Brickfield fees at her attorney rate because a GAL performs fiduciary services, as opposed to legal services!' June argues that NRS 

159.0455 and NSRG 8 make clear that a GAL, as "an officer of the 

court," is a fiduciary and is restricted from "offer[ing] legal advice 

to the protected person." NRS 159.0455; NSRG 8(C) (noting that "[all 

guardian ad litem is an officer of the court"); NSRG 8(N) (distineuishing the role of an attorney from the role of the GAL); see also 

NRS 159.344 (concerning the payment of attorney fees and costs 

in a guardianship). June alleges that the district court's finding that 

the customary fiduciary rate for a GAL in Clark County is $400 per 

hour or more has no evidentiary basis and that, based on the market 

rate, a reasonable fee ranges between $22 to $48 per hour. 

Respondents argue that the district court's fee order is supported 

by substantial evidence and that Brickfield's fees as a GAL were 

appropriately paid at an amount commensurate with her attorney 

rate. Respondents contend that there is no market rate requirement 

and that the district court satisfied the requirements codified in 

NRS 159.344. 

But the statute requires a court to determine the nature of' the 

services performed in awarding compensation: it distinguishes 

between "services that require an attorney[r which may be compensated at an attorney rate, and "fiduciary services," which may 

be compensated at a fiduciary rate. NRS 159.344(5)(g). We now 

deterrnine that, while GA Ls in Nevada act in the same manner as a 

fiduciary and do not provide "attorney" work, the record nonetheless 

4June does not provide any arguments specific to the S3.50 in costs or the 

paralegal's $310 in lees. Thus, June appears to only dispute the $5400 in lees 

awarded to Brickfield. 
8 ln re Guardianship ofJones 

contains substantial evidence supporting the district court's award 

of Brickfield's requested fees. 

GA Ls ore fichiciaries 

A fiduciary relationship is one "between two persons when one 

of them is under a duty to act for or to give advice for the benefit of another upon matters within the scope of the relation[ship]." 

Restatement (Second) of Torts § 874 cmt. a (Am. Law 'Inst. 2008); 

see also Mutter of Frei Irrevocable Tr. Dated Oct. 29, 1996, 133 

Nev. 50, 58, 390 P.3d 646, 653 (2017) (same). 

As noted, the district court may appoint a GAL to benefit the protected person and assist in determining the protected person's best 

interests. N RS 159.0455(l)(a). A GAL "is an officer of the court and 

is not a party to the case." NRS 159.0455(4); see also In re Christina 

B., 23 Cal. Rptr. 2d 918, 926 (Ct. App. 1993) (clarifying that a GAL 

is a party's representative whose purpose is to protect the person, 

creating a role that is "more than an attorney's but less than a party's"); Shainwald v. Shainwald, 395 S.E.2d 441, 444 (S.C. Ct. App. 

1990) (collecting cases and explaining that "[a] guardian ad litem 

is a representative of the court"). The GA L's duties are limited to 

those set forth in the district court's order. NRS 159.0455(2). GA Ls 

are also prohibited from offering legal advice to the protected person. NRS 159.0455(4). 

We conclude that the relationship between GA Ls and protected 

persons is fiduciary in nature. The scope of duties GA Ls are ordered 

to perform is directed by the court for the benefit of the protected 

person. NSRG 8. While amicus contends that GA Ls are only "officers of the court" pursuant to N RS 159.0455(4), nothing prevents an 

officer of the court from also being a fiduciary. GA Ls are required 

to "zealously advocate for the best interest of the protected person .. . in a manner that will enable the court to deterrnine the action 

that will be the least restrictive and in the best interest of the protected person or proposed protected person." NSRG 8(13). This duty 

fits squarely with the definition of a fiduciary. Likewise, GA Ls are 

to "advocate for the best interest of the protected person . . . based 

on admissible evidence available" and "conduct independent investigation and assessment of the facts to carry out the directives of the 

appointing order and may submit recommendations to the court that 

are based on admissible evidence." NSRG 8(G). 

Here, every aspect of the GA L's relationship with June is to act 

for her benefit and with her best interests in mind under the direction 

of the district court. Other states have recognized the same where 

the GAL is court-appointed and acting as a branch of the judiciary.' 

'See. e.g., Garrick v. Weaver, 888 F.2d 687, 693 (10th Cir. 1989) (concluding 

that the GAL is a type of fiduciary): Golin v. Allenby, 118 Cal. Rptr. 3d 762, 
In re Guardianship of Jones 9 

This, however, does not mean that the GAL cannot perform services 

that require an attorney. For example, advocacy before a court is the 

quintessential task of an attorney and a purpose of the GAL. See 

NRS 159.0455(4)(a) & (b) (requiring a GAL to advocate for the protected person's best in(erests in a manner that enables the court to 

act in those interests). We now take this opportunity to clarify how 

the GA Us actions in a guardianship proceeding bear on the type of 

fees they may seek. 

ln Hull v. United States, the Tenth Circuit considered whether 

compensation for a GAL was taxable as costs or as attorney fees. 

971 F.2d 1499 (10th Cir. 1992). That court held that the GA L's role 

determines whether its expenses are taxed as costs or attorney fees. 

Id. at 1510. It then remanded the case to district court to determine 

what portions of the guardian ad litem's work should be taxed as 

costs and what portions should be paid as attorney fees based on the 

nature of the GA L's work; specifically, based on whether the GAL 

performed tasks "as an officer of the court," or whether they performed "legal services as an attorney." Id. On appeal after remand, 

the court upheld the award of guardian ad litem fees as costs, finding undisputed evidence that the GAL rendered services solely as 

an officer of the court while a separately retained attorney rendered 

attorney services. Hull ex rel. Hull v. United States, 53 F.3d 1125, 

1128-29 (10th Cir. 1995). We now adopt this distinguishing factor 

because it clarifies that the type of work performed by the GAL dictates the propriety of the GA L's fees. GA Ls are not presumptively 

entitled to "attorney fees" because they do not act as attorneys on 

behalf of the protected person. However, if they perform the type 

of services also performed by attorneys and have commensurate 

experience as an attorney, GA Ls may be compensated at an attorney rate for their work. This conclusion accords with NSRG 8(J), 

which requires courts to analyze the work completed by the GAL 

and their particular expertise and experience. We hold that courts, 

787 (Ct. App. 2010) (observing that a GA L's powers are "subject to both the 

fiduciary duties owed to the incompetent person and ... the requirement that 

court approval he obtained kir certain acts"); People ex rel. KAI, 726 P.2d 

1108, 1119-20 (Colo. 1986) (noting the propriety olappointing a GAL as a fiduciary representative fbr the protected person): Collins ex rel. Collins v. Tabei, 

806 P.2d 40, 49 (N.M. 1991) (recognizing that GA Ls "occup[yl a position ofthe 

highest trust suggest[ingl that he or she is a fiduciary"); Byrd v. Woodrifff, 891 

S.W.2d 689. 706 (Tex. App. 1994) (holdini4 that "a guardian .1(.1 litein's courtappointed role to act as the representative of a minor's interest is sullicient to 

establish a fiduciary relationship"); see cdso 1 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 1991 (2008) 

(defining GAL as a fiduciary): f

 Honing v. Ashill, 483 S.E.2d 751, 753-54 

(S.C. 1997) (holding that the relationship between a CiAL and the court is not 

an employer-employee relationship. creating no agency relationship between 

the court and the GAL). 
10 In re Guardianship of Jones 

when determining fees for a GA L, should evaluate (1) the experience and qualifications of the GAL, (2) the nature and complexity of 

the work asked of the GAL, (3) the work actually performed, (4) the 

result of the GA L's work, and (5) any other factors the court finds 

to be relevant in a particular case.6 We adopt these factors, which 

are similar to the factors guiding inquiries into attorney fees in 

guardianship proceedirws, because they bear on the propriety of 

the GAL's rate, the success (or lack thereof) of the GAL, and the 

nature of the GA L's work. 

The award of Brickfield's fees al a rate of S400 per hour is 

reasonable 

When a fee award depends on the interpretation of a statute or 

court rule, the district court's decision is reviewed de novo. Logan v. 

Abe, 131 Nev. 260, 264, 350 R3d 1139, 1141 (2015). An award of costs 

is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Id. at 267, 350 P.3d at 1144. 

This court has not determined the standard of review for an 

award of fees to a GAL as a fiduciary. We now determine that the 

appropriate standard of review is abuse of discretion. See Robbins 

V. Ginese, 638 N.E.2d 627, 629 (Ohio Ct. App. 1994) (concluding 

that the district court did not abuse its discretion by awarding the 

GAL its attorney rate). An abuse of discretion "occurs if the district 

court's decision is arbitrary or capricious or if it exceeds the bounds 

of law or reason." Jackson v. Stale, 117 Nev. 116, 120, 17 13.3d 998, 

1000 (2001). 

The parties agree that the district court discussed each enumerated factor in NRS 159.344(5) when evaluating Brickfield's fee 

request. While we now clarify that N RS 159.344(5) is not appropriately applied to GAL fees but rather only to attorney fees, June's 

only argument is that the fiduciary rate is not equivalent to the 

attorney rate. However, based on the factors enumerated above, we 

conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in awarding Brickfield $400 per hour, as the court noted the importance 

of the GA L's report and its determination regarding the visitation 

petition. See Brunzell v. Golden Gale Nat'l Bank, 85 Nev. 345, 350, 

455 P.2d 31, 33-34 (1969) (stating that the trier of fact understands 

the value of the services the best). June's analysis fails to consider 

that Brickfield's experience as an attorney was important to this 

case, though she was acting as a fiduciary. The district court was 

not required to rely on June's suggested $22 to $48 per hour range, 

"We also clarify that while ti GAL seeking compensation must mect the 

requirements of' NRS 159.344, as per NSRG 8(.1), the factors listed in N RS 

159.344(5) apply only to attorney lees. not GAL lees. That is. GA Ls must meet 

the written notice and petition requirements laid out in the statute. hut courts 

evaluating their compensation should consider the factors enumerated above, 

not the factors enumerated in NRS 159.344(5). 
In re Guardianship of Jones 11 

as she merely surveyed three websites without any indication as 

to delineating factors like each GA L's experience, qualifications, 

or work performed. June also ignores the difficulty of the visitation petition and the legal knowledge required to serve her best 

interests. Meanwhile, the district court reviewed Brickfield's experience, her qualifications, the services she provided for June, the 

invoices submitted, and the benefits June received. The district 

court also repeatedly noted the complexity of the visitation petition 

and the need for someone with extensive guardianship experience. 

As it noted, Brickfield operated in the sensitive area of determining how June's family members could cornrnunicate with or visit 

her, a determination that required legal experience and skill. Brickfield also aided in the court's deterrnination to remove Kimberly as 

June's guardian and its appointment of June's next guardian. 

Thus, the district court did not abuse its discretion by finding that 

Brickfield's requested fees were appropriate compensation for her 

work as a fiduciary in this case. While Brick field's fees are more 

appropriately termed as a fiduciary lee rather than an attorney fee, 

the district court did not abuse its discretion in awarding the full 

amount requested. 

CONCLUSION 

Although the district court erred by failing to include Brickfield's rate in the order of appointment. June waived this argument 

by failing to raise it below. Likewise, the district court's error in 

concluding an attorney must be appointed where a volunteer is not 

available from a GAL program, without acknowledging the third 

option under NSRG 8(I-1), was harmless. Finally, while Brickfield 

is a fiduciary entitled to fiduciary fees, the district court did not 

abuse its discretion in awarding her fees in an amount cornmensurate with her attorney rate because the award was supported by the 

GAL's experience, specialized knowledge, and ability to understand 

the intricacies of this particular case's complex legal issues. Accordingly, we affirm the district court's order awarding the GAL fees. 

LEE and PARRAGUIRRE, JJ., concur. 

SPO, CARSON CITY, NEVADA, 2023