If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to 

revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.

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S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N

C O U R T O F A P P E A L S

PETER DE FILIPPIS,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

UNPUBLISHED

July 6, 2023

v No. 359734

Wayne Circuit Court

REDFORD POLICE DEPARTMENT, LC No. 21-001626-CZ

Defendant-Appellee.

Before: SWARTZLE, P.J., and CAVANAGH and LETICA, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

Plaintiff appeals as of right a December 7, 2021 order denying his motion to recuse the trial 

judge, following the entry of an October 28, 2021 order granting summary disposition to defendant 

and dismissing plaintiff’s complaint with prejudice. We affirm.

Plaintiff is a serial litigant who is proceeding in propria persona. He has filed multiple 

unsuccessful lawsuits and appeals related to the same underlying events, which involve his 

encounters with defendant in 2013 and 2014, including the issuance of an arrest warrant against 

him. The underlying dispute involved an investigation and prosecution of plaintiff in Redford 

Township for telephonic-harassment and a subsequent guilty plea for driving without a license. 

Sanctions have previously been awarded against plaintiff for being a vexatious litigator. See 

DeFilippis v Dep’t of Civil Rights, unpublished per curiam opinion of the Court of Appeals, issued 

September 17, 2020 (Docket No. 350894)1(DeFilippis I). In May 2019, a Wayne Circuit Court 

judge entered an order barring plaintiff from filing any new lawsuits in the Wayne Circuit Court

without seeking and obtaining the approval of the Chief Judge. Plaintiff nonetheless continued to 

file new lawsuits, including the present action, without complying with the May 2019 order. In 

the present case, defendant moved for summary disposition on multiple bases, including plaintiff’s 

lack of compliance with the May 2019 order, and the trial court granted defendant’s motion. 

Plaintiff then moved to recuse the trial judge, who denied the recusal motion as moot because the 

 

1 Plaintiff’s last name is spelled De Filippis, but we will use the spelling consistent with the opinion 

to avoid further confusion.
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order dismissing the case had already been entered and there were no further proceedings or rulings 

that were necessary. This appeal ensued.

On appeal, plaintiff presents arguments challenging the trial court’s summary disposition 

ruling and the denial of his motion to recuse the trial judge. Plaintiff also challenges this Court’s 

case-call assignment procedure.

A trial court’s ruling on a motion for summary disposition is reviewed de novo. El-Khalil 

v Oakwood Healthcare, Inc, 504 Mich 152, 159; 934 NW2d 665 (2019). Defendant moved for 

summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(7), (8), and (10). The trial court did not specify the 

subrule under which summary disposition was granted, but the court’s reasoning reflects that 

summary disposition was granted because of plaintiff’s failure to comply with the May 2019 order 

requiring him to seek and obtain the permission of the chief judge before filing a new lawsuit. 

Defendant’s argument for summary disposition on this basis was premised primarily on 

MCR 2.116(C)(7), which was the appropriate subrule. “When reviewing a motion under 

MCR 2.116(C)(7), a reviewing court must consider all affidavits, pleadings, and other 

documentary evidence submitted by the parties and construe the pleadings and evidence in favor 

of the nonmoving party.” Anzaldua v Neogen Corp, 292 Mich App 626, 629; 808 NW2d 804 

(2011).

“The factual findings underlying a ruling on a motion for [judicial] disqualification are 

reviewed for an abuse of discretion, while application of the facts to the law is reviewed de novo.” 

Butler v Simmons-Butler, 308 Mich App 195, 226; 863 NW2d 677 (2014), citing Cain v Dep’t of 

Corrections, 451 Mich 470, 503; 548 NW2d 210 (1996), and In re Contempt of Henry, 282 Mich 

App 656, 679; 765 NW2d 44 (2009). “An abuse of discretion occurs when the decision is outside 

the range of reasonable and principled outcomes.” Butler, 308 Mich App at 226.

Plaintiff’s argument challenging this Court’s case-call assignment procedure could be 

viewed as concerning a matter of appellate procedure. Procedural issues involving questions of 

law are reviewed de novo. In re BZ, 264 Mich App 286, 291; 690 NW2d 505 (2004). Also, to the 

extent plaintiff is asserting a violation of his right to due process, the issue is reviewed de novo. 

In re Sangster, 340 Mich App 60, 68; 985 NW2d 245 (2022).

This Court has explained “that a person acting in propria persona should be held to the 

same standards as members of the bar.” Totman v Royal Oak Sch Dist, 135 Mich App 121, 126; 

352 NW2d 364 (1984). It is nonetheless recognized that documents submitted by pro se litigants 

are to be construed liberally. Estelle v Gamble, 429 US 97, 106; 97 S Ct 285; 50 L Ed 2d 251 

(1976). As already discussed, plaintiff is a serial litigant who has filed multiple unsuccessful 

lawsuits and appeals related to the same underlying events, that sanctions have been awarded 

against him, and that he has been barred from filing new lawsuits below without the approval of 

the Chief Judge of the Wayne Circuit Court. Liberally construing plaintiff’s brief, his appellate 

presentation is lacking. The brief contains rambling assertions and ad hominem attacks on multiple 

judges of the Wayne Circuit Court and this Court as well as the staff of both courts. He largely 

fails to focus on the relevant decisions that were made by the trial court in this case or on anything 

that would entitle him to relief in this appeal, instead devoting much of his argument to the 

underlying facts regarding his interactions with defendant in 2013 and 2014, as well as events that 

occurred in other lawsuits and other appeals that are not pertinent here. Plaintiff also fails to cite 
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relevant authorities in support of any of his arguments. “A party may not simply announce a 

position and leave it to this Court to make the party’s arguments and search for authority to support 

the party’s position. Failure to adequately brief an issue constitutes abandonment.” Seifeddine v 

Jaber, 327 Mich App 514, 519-520; 934 NW2d 64 (2019) (citation omitted). Even so, we will 

address plaintiff’s arguments as we understand.

Plaintiff seems to challenge the trial court’s grant of summary disposition to defendant. 

Plaintiff’s argument lacks merit. As this Court noted in another of plaintiff’s appeals, a May 2019 

order entered by a judge of the Wayne Circuit Court in one of plaintiff’s earlier cases provided:

It is Further Ordered that plaintiff shall be precluded from filing any more 

motions in this case, or any other lawsuits related to this matter in the Wayne 

County Circuit Court, without first providing a paper copy of the motion, brief, and 

all exhibits, and/or Complaint, to the Chief Judge of this Court and thereafter 

obtaining leave from the Chief Judge of this Court to e-file a motion in this case or 

a Complaint in a new case. [DeFilippis v Redford Police Dep’t, unpublished per 

curiam opinion of the Court of Appeals, issued February 24, 2022 (Docket 

No. 356168)2(DeFilippis II), pp 4-5 (brackets omitted).3]

Plaintiff failed to comply with this order. He did not request and obtain permission from the 

Wayne County Circuit Court Chief Judge before filing this lawsuit. Plaintiff argues that he had 

been in communication with the Chief Judge’s clerk, including with respect to other matters. 

Plaintiff seems to intimate that he made efforts to initiate the prefiling-review process but fails to 

indicate precisely when he did so. Plaintiff does not assert that he sought and obtained leave from 

the Chief Judge before filing this lawsuit. Nor has plaintiff provided any evidence that would 

support such an assertion. It is thus beyond any reasonable dispute that plaintiff failed to comply 

with the May 2019 order. Therefore, the circuit court’s dismissal of plaintiff’s complaint was 

proper. See id. at 5 (concluding that dismissal of another of plaintiff’s cases was proper because 

he failed to comply with the May 2019 order).

Next, plaintiff seems to challenge the denial of his motion to recuse the trial judge. Again,

the circuit court denied plaintiff’s recusal motion on the ground that it was moot. The court 

explained that plaintiff filed his recusal motion after the entry of the October 28, 2021 order 

granting summary disposition to defendant and dismissing plaintiff’s complaint with prejudice,

and the court noted that there was no indication of any supplemental proceedings or further rulings 

that were necessary. During oral argument, plaintiff conceded the recusal motion was moot. And, 

even absent plaintiff’s concession he failed to address the trial court’s mootness rationale for 

denying the recusal motion. “When an appellant fails to address the basis of a trial court’s decision, 

this Court need not even consider granting relief.” Seifeddine, 327 Mich App at 522. And, given 

our conclusion that summary disposition was properly granted to defendant because of plaintiff’s 

failure to comply with the May 2019 order, the issue regarding disqualification of the trial judge

 

2 See footnote 1.

3 A copy of the May 2019 order was attached to defendant’s motion for summary disposition in 

this case.
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is moot. This Court generally does not decide moot issues. B P 7 v Bureau of State Lottery, 231 

Mich App 356, 359; 586 NW2d 117 (1998). “A case is moot when it presents only abstract 

questions of law that do not rest upon existing facts or rights. An issue is deemed moot when an 

event occurs that renders it impossible for a reviewing court to grant relief.” Id. (citation omitted). 

Because we have determined on de novo review that summary disposition for defendant was 

proper, any issue regarding the trial judge’s disqualification is rendered moot. There will be no 

further proceedings before the trial judge in this case, and even if the trial judge should have been 

disqualified, we have reviewed the summary-disposition issue anew, without any deference to the 

trial judge, and we have concluded that summary disposition for defendant was proper. Therefore, 

it is impossible to grant relief to plaintiff on the disqualification issue, thereby rendering the issue

moot.

Moreover, although not necessary to the resolution of the issue, we note that, even if the 

issue was not moot, denial of plaintiff’s motion to recuse the trial judge would have been proper 

on other grounds. A motion for judicial disqualification “must be filed within 14 days of the 

discovery of the grounds for disqualification,” MCR 2.003(D)(1)(a),4or within 14 days of when 

the moving party “should have discovered the alleged bases for disqualification . . . .” In re MKK, 

286 Mich App 546, 566; 781 NW2d 132 (2009). Plaintiff filed his motion for recusal of the trial 

judge on November 8, 2021. He asserted that recusal was required because of the trial judge’s

behavior, both on and off the record, at the October 20, 2021 hearing on defendant’s motion for 

summary disposition. Hence, the alleged bias was or should have been discovered more than 14 

days before the recusal motion was filed. It would thus have been proper for the trial court to deny 

the recusal motion on that basis alone. See id. (“Because respondent’s motion for disqualification 

was filed more than 14 days after he knew or should have discovered the alleged bases for 

disqualification, it was untimely and was, therefore, properly denied.”); DeFilippis II, unpub op at 

6 (providing a similar analysis regarding the untimeliness of another judicial-disqualification 

motion filed by plaintiff in another of his cases).

Further, while it is again unnecessary to the analysis, we note that plaintiff failed to 

establish any disqualifying bias on the part of the trial judge. “[T]he party who challenges a judge 

on the basis of bias or prejudice must overcome a heavy presumption of judicial impartiality.” 

Cain, 451 Mich at 497. “Disqualification on the basis of bias or prejudice cannot be established 

merely by repeated rulings against a litigant, even if the rulings are erroneous.” In re MKK, 286 

Mich App at 566. A trial judge’s remarks that “are critical of or hostile to counsel, the parties, or 

their cases, ordinarily do not establish disqualifying bias.” Id. at 567. “Moreover, partiality is not 

established by expressions of impatience, dissatisfaction, annoyance, and even anger, that are 

within the bounds of what imperfect men and women sometimes display.” People v McIntire, 232 

 

4 A due-process ground for disqualification is also subject to the time limitation of the court rule. 

See In re MKK, 286 Mich App 546, 566; 781 NW2d 132 (2009) (“[W]e disagree with [the] 

respondent’s assertion that his due process ground for disqualification should not be subject to the 

[14-day] time limitation.”).
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Mich App 71, 105; 591 NW2d 231 (1998), rev’d on other grounds 461 Mich 147 (1999), citing 

Cain, 451 Mich at 497 n 30.

Review of the October 20, 2021 hearing transcript reflects that the trial judge was patient 

and courteous with plaintiff. Plaintiff was afforded ample opportunity to present his arguments. 

At times, the trial judge gently interceded to redirect plaintiff to focus on the issues before it given 

plaintiff’s tendency to discuss matters that were not pertinent. There was no indication of 

disqualifying bias or partiality on the trial judge’s part.5 Thus, denial of plaintiff’s motion for 

recusal would have been proper even if it had been timely filed and was not moot.

And even if the trial judge had recused himself and a different judge had been assigned, 

the outcome of the case would not have been different. The fact would still remain that plaintiff 

failed to comply with the May 2019 order requiring him to seek prefiling review from the Chief 

Judge, thereby warranting dismissal of the case. Plaintiff would thus not be entitled to relief in 

any event. See DeFilippis II, unpub op at 7 (making the same point in the same type of context).

Next, plaintiff asserts that there were certain errors in the trial court’s December 7, 2021 

opinion and order. Plaintiff notes that the caption of the December 7, 2021 opinion and order 

incorrectly identified defendant as the “City of Redford,” rather than Redford Police Department. 

But this made no difference to the trial court’s analysis. Also, in summarizing the underlying facts, 

the trial court said it did not appear that plaintiff was ever arrested, and plaintiff says this is 

incorrect. Again, this had nothing to do with the substance or the basis of the trial court’s rulings 

on any relevant issues. MCR 2.613(A) provides:

An error in the admission or the exclusion of evidence, an error in a ruling or order, 

or an error or defect in anything done or omitted by the court or by the parties is 

not ground for granting a new trial, for setting aside a verdict, or for vacating, 

modifying, or otherwise disturbing a judgment or order, unless refusal to take this 

action appears to the court inconsistent with substantial justice.

In applying MCR 2.613(A), this Court has explained that a lower “court’s error is harmless if it is 

not decisive to the case’s outcome.” Ellison v Dep’t of State, 320 Mich App 169, 179; 906 NW2d 

221 (2017); see also In re Williams, 333 Mich App 172, 181; 958 NW2d 629 (2020) (“An error 

 

5

In his brief on appeal, plaintiff asserted that the trial judge made comments indicating bias while 

off the record at the time of the October 20, 2021 hearing, but the lower court record contains no 

support for plaintiff’s assertion. Plaintiff also said in his appellate brief that he had an audio 

recording of a December 3, 2021 telephone conversation that he had with the trial judge, and 

plaintiff said that he was going to play this audio recording, along with a recording of a different 

conversation with a lower court staff person, at oral argument in this Court. When plaintiff 

attempted to play the audio during oral argument, the panel advised that such audio recordings are 

not part of the lower court record and could not be considered. See Sherman v Sea Ray Boats, Inc, 

251 Mich App 41, 56; 649 NW2d 783 (2002) (“This Court’s review is limited to the record 

established by the trial court, and a party may not expand the record on appeal.”).
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does not require reversal if it was not decisive to the outcome of the case.”). Because these alleged 

errors were not decisive to the outcome, plaintiff is not entitled to reversal.

Finally, plaintiff asserts that this Court’s case-call assignment procedure has been 

manipulated so that judges appointed by a particular governor have been assigned to his appeals. 

He suggests that certain individual judges of this Court and its Clerk’s Office have been involved 

in some type of conspiracy against him. Plaintiff further contends that his right to due process has 

been violated by the alleged manipulation of the case-call assignment procedure. Plaintiff, 

however, cites no authority and presents no substantive argument to support such a conclusion. 

His argument is thus abandoned due to his inadequate briefing. Seifeddine, 327 Mich App at 519-

520. In any event, his argument fails because it is premised on his baseless conspiracy theory 

regarding the alleged manipulation of this Court’s case-call assignment procedure.6 “The basic 

requirements of due process in a civil case include notice of the proceeding and a meaningful 

opportunity to be heard.” Al-Maliki v LaGrant, 286 Mich App 483, 485; 781 NW2d 853 (2009). 

Plaintiff identifies no basis to conclude that he has been denied any requirement of due process. 

And, to the extent plaintiff is arguing that individual judges of this Court should be disqualified, 

he filed a motion to disqualify Judge Swartzle, which was denied. De Filippis v Redford Police 

Dep’t, unpublished order of the Court of Appeals, entered May 22, 2023 (Docket No. 359734).

Plaintiff then requested that the motion to disqualify Judge Swartzle be referred to the Chief Judge 

for review and the Chief Judge denied plaintiff’s motion to disqualify Judge Swartzle. De Filippis 

v Redford Police Dep’t, unpublished order of the Court of Appeals, entered May 24, 2023 (Docket 

No. 359734).

Affirmed.

/s/ Brock A. Swartzle

/s/ Mark J. Cavanagh

/s/ Anica Letica

 

6 Contrary to plaintiff’s speculation, this Court’s panel assignment process is governed by 

MCR 7.201(D) and (E) and described as follows:

When sitting in a session of the Court, judges are divided into panels of three. A 

computer program randomly rotates judicial assignments so that each judge sits 

with every other judge an approximately equal number of times over the years. 

Likewise, the city of oral argument is rotated for each judge. [See Internal 

Operating Procedure (IOP) 7.210(D).]