RECORD IMPOUNDED

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-3407-16T2

NEW JERSEY DIVISION OF CHILD

PROTECTION AND PERMANENCY,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

E.T.

Defendant-Appellant,

and

T.C.

Defendant.

______________________________________

IN THE MATTER OF THE GUARDIANSHIP

OF A.J.V.T.-C., J.R.T.-C., and E.M.T.-C., 

Minors.

______________________________________

Submitted September 26, 2018 – Decided

Before Judges Fuentes, Accurso and Moynihan.

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the 

internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.

October 26, 2018
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A-3407-16T2

On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey, 

Chancery Division, Family Part, Ocean County, Docket 

No. FG-15-0056-16.

Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney for 

appellant E.T. (Gilbert G. Miller, Designated Counsel, 

on the brief).

Gurbir S. Grewal, Attorney General, attorney for 

respondent (Melissa H. Raksa, Assistant Attorney 

General, of counsel; Amy M. Young, Deputy Attorney 

General, on the brief).

Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, Law Guardian, 

attorney for minors J.R.T.-C. and E.M.T.-C. (Margo 

E.K. Hirsch, Designated Counsel, on the brief).

Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, Law Guardian, 

attorney for minor A.J.V.T.-C. (Meredith A. Pollock, 

Deputy Public Defender, of counsel; Todd S. Wilson, 

Designated Counsel, on the brief).

PER CURIAM

Defendant, E.T. (Eliza)1is the biological mother of three children –

twelve-year-old A.J.V.T.-C. (Anthony), nine-year-old J.R.T.-C. (Jenny), and 

seven-year-old E.M.T.-C. (Emily). Defendant appeals from an order entered by 

the Family Part in this guardianship case that terminated her parental rights to 

 

1 We use pseudonyms to refer to the parties and their family members to protect 

their privacy and preserve the confidentiality of these proceedings. R. 1:38-

3(e). We use fictitious first names to refer to adults to avoid confusion. No 

disrespect is intended. 
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her children. The children's biological father, T.C. (Ted) did not attend the 

three-day trial conducted by the Family Part. He has not appealed from the final 

judgment of the court. Eliza and her family have an extensive history of 

involvement with the Division of Child Protection and Permanency (Division)

that dates back to Anthony's birth in 2006. The Division has filed four 

guardianship actions and executed two emergency removals of the children, all

related to Eliza's chronic and untreated drug addiction. She has consistently 

failed to comply with services offered by the Division over a period of several 

years.

Judge Madelin F. Einbinder presided over the guardianship trial. The 

Division presented the testimony of four caseworkers who described their 

interactions with defendant, Ted, and the children. Psychologist Dr. David 

Brandwein testified as an expert witness for the Division. He performed a 

psychological evaluation of defendant on April 26, 2016. Dr. Brandwein found 

defendant had very limited insight and extremely poor judgment. She "views 

psychological problems as a sign of weakness" and consequently refuses to 

recognize how her dysfunctional conduct is symptomatic of her mental health 

problems. 
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Dr. Brandwein diagnosed defendant with a "[p]ersonality [d]isorder with 

[a]ntisocial and [n]arcissistic [f]eatures," and an unspecified opioid-related 

disorder. According to Dr. Brandwein, the combined effect of these mental 

health issues and abuse problems has rendered defendant unable to safely care 

for her children. Dr. Brandwein thus declined to recommend any services for 

Eliza. He did "not support [Eliza] as an independent caregiver for the . . .

children"; he found it highly unlikely that she would be able to perform this role 

safely and adequately in the foreseeable future.

On October 24, 2016, Dr. Brandwein performed bonding evaluations with 

the children and their resource parents, whom the children referred to as 

"mommy" and "dad" or "daddy." Dr. Brandwein noted that the children 

appeared emotionally happy and well-cared for physically. He opined that "all 

three children are securely bonded to their resource parents and look to them as 

primary parental figures." Thus, "[s]hould the bond between the children and 

their resource parents be broken, all three children are likely to experience a 

grief reaction that would include sadness, anxiety, and uncertainty about their 

future." In his opinion, separation from the resource parents "is likely to 

provoke rather extreme and enduring emotional reactions that would have the 

potential to destabilize them emotionally and behaviorally for the long-term."
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On November 1, 2016, Dr. Brandwein performed a similar bonding 

evaluation with defendant and the children. Because defendant was incarcerated 

at the time, the evaluation took place in the Ocean County Courthouse. Dr. 

Brandwein characterized her interactions with the children as warm and loving. 

However, the children appeared to be occasionally distant and distracted.2 He 

nevertheless opined that a "continued relationship with [defendant] would be to 

these children's detriment." He found the children "have built healthy, strong, 

and secure relationships with their resource parents" and recommended 

"immediate termination" of Eliza's parental rights so that the children could be 

permanently placed with their resource parents.

On November 14, 2016, psychologist Dr. Maureen Santina performed an 

independent bonding evaluation of defendant and the children on behalf of the 

Law Guardian. Dr. Santina found defendant "severely and repeatedly minimized 

her substance abuse problem and denied its impacts on her children." Dr. 

Santina particularly noted that defendant "showed no distress when discussing 

 

2 Dr. Brandwein did not comment on or acknowledge the inherent awkwardness 

of the setting where these interactions occurred. He also did not consider how 

defendant's incarceration and pending criminal charges may have exacerbated 

any uneasiness she may have felt at the time. We nevertheless did not find any 

basis to question the reliability of his professional assessment of defendant's 

parental fitness.
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[Anthony's] traumatic brain injury."3 Dr. Santina opined that defendant 

"exhibited persistent denial of responsibility for her actions and their effects, 

and displaces blame onto others for their consequences." 

According to Dr. Santina, due to Eliza's "continued lack of recognition of 

her own role in her problems with stability and parenting, and her history of 

reckless behavior, substance addiction4and poor judgment, she cannot be 

 

3

In 2011, defendant was involved in a serious accident when the car she was 

driving collided head-on with a large truck. She was pregnant with Emily at the 

time; Anthony and Jenny were also in the car. Anthony suffered a traumatic 

brain injury, multiple facial fractures, a broken nose, a broken eye socket, and

seriously injured his spinal cord. Defendant and Jenny were not seriously 

injured. The accident occurred in Newark. Defendant resided at the time in 

Manchester Township, located in Ocean County. Members of defendant's 

family alleged she had gone to Newark to buy drugs. They claimed Anthony's 

injuries were caused by a drug dealer who hit the boy with a concrete brick. 

They also alleged defendant deliberately caused the accident to conceal the true 

cause of her son's injuries. Anthony told social workers that "a mean man 

bashed [him] in the face" and that someone hit him in the head with a brick. The 

police confirmed that the area where the accident occurred was known for illicit 

drug trafficking. 

4 Defendant gave birth to Emily approximately one month after the car accident. 

Emily tested positive for opiates, displayed withdrawal symptoms, and was 

treated with morphine. According to the hospital staff, defendant showed signs 

of intoxication after birth; defendant nearly dropped Emily when she fell asleep 

while holding her infant daughter. The Division substantiated a case of abuse 

and neglect against defendant when a post-partum drug test confirmed she used 

illicit narcotics during the pregnancy. We note, however, that the legal 

soundness of the Division's decision to substantiate abuse and neglect against 

defendant under these circumstances is not before us in this appeal. 
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considered a reliable or dependable caregiver for her children currently or in the 

foreseeable future." She ultimately concluded that Eliza "is not currently 

capable of safely and effectively parenting her children, and the prognosis is 

very poor that she will become a safe and effective caregiver in the foreseeable 

future."

Dr. Santina also conducted a bonding evaluation between Eliza and the 

children. She observed the children to be "excessively loud and hyperactive ."

Defendant made little effort to control their behavior. Dr. Santina noted that 

when Anthony announced his resource parents' last name as his own, defendant 

did not make any effort to correct or dissuade him. Dr. Santina opined that 

defendant's "lax and passive parenting would be likely to have a significantly 

negative effect on the children's emotional and behavioral functioning if they 

were placed in her care." She concluded that defendant "is not currently a safe 

and effective caregiver for her children and is not likely to become one in the 

foreseeable future" and that the interests of the children "would best be served 

by termination of [defendant]'s parental rights." In her opinion, the children 

"will not suffer enduring harm by the termination of their mother's parental 

rights." 
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Dr. Santina also confirmed that all three children "exhibit a strong, 

positive parental attachment to their resource mother" and the resource parents 

"will effectively buffer any sense of loss they may feel and would ameliorate 

any possible transient harm" which the children might experience as a result of 

the termination of parental rights. Defendant did not testify or call any 

witnesses. 

In a thirty-one-page memorandum of opinion, Judge Einbinder chronicled 

defendant's dysfunctional involvement in the lives of these three children. Due 

to her chronic and unaddressed substance abuse problem, defendant has caused 

irreparable harm to all of her children. After carefully reviewing the evidence, 

Judge Einbinder correctly applied the statutory prongs in N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a)

and terminated the parental rights of both parents. Defendant appeals, arguing

Judge Einbinder erred by finding the Division established, by clear and 

convincing evidence, all four statutory prongs. The Law Guardian joins the 

Division in opposing defendant's appeal.

It is well-settled that parents have a fundamental constitutional right to 

raise their children. N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. R.G., 217 N.J. 527, 

553 (2014). However, this parental right is tempered by the State's 

commensurate responsibility to "protect children whose vulnerable lives or 
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psychological well-being may have been harmed or may be seriously 

endangered by a neglectful or abusive parent." N.J. Div. of Youth & Family 

Servs. v. F.M., 211 N.J. 420, 447 (2012). The termination of parental rights is 

viewed as a "weapon of last resort." Ibid. As this court has aptly noted, "[a]fter 

the elimination of the death penalty, we can think of no legal consequence of 

greater magnitude than the termination of parental rights." In re Adoption of 

Child by J.E.V., 442 N.J. Super. 472, 481 (App. Div. 2015). Thus, a court may 

terminate parental rights "only in those circumstances in which proof of parental 

unfitness is clear," and with great caution and care. F.M., 211 N.J. at 447.

"The best-interests-of-the-child standard codified at N.J.S.A. 30:4C15.1(a) 'aims to achieve the appropriate balance between parental rights and the 

State's parens patriae responsibility.'" R.G., 217 N.J. at 554 (quoting N.J. Div. 

of Youth & Family Servs. v. M.M., 189 N.J. 261, 280 (2007)). In order to 

terminate defendant's parental rights, the Division must prove, by clear and 

convincing evidence the following statutory criteria: 

(1) The child's safety, health, or development has been 

or will continue to be endangered by the parental 

relationship;

(2) The parent is unwilling or unable to eliminate the 

harm facing the child or is unable or unwilling to 

provide a safe and stable home for the child and the 

delay of permanent placement will add to the harm. 
10 A-3407-16T2

Such harm may include evidence that separating the 

child from his resource family parents would cause 

serious and enduring emotional or psychological harm 

to the child; 

(3) The [D]ivision has made reasonable efforts to 

provide services to help the parent correct the 

circumstances which led to the child's placement 

outside the home and the court has considered 

alternatives to termination of parental rights; and 

(4) Termination of parental rights will not do more 

harm than good. 

[N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a); see also N.J. Div. of Youth & 

Family Servs. v. A.W., 103 N.J. 591, 604-11 (1986) 

(reciting the four controlling factors codified in 

N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a)).] 

These four statutory factors are not "discrete and separate" but instead, 

"they relate to and overlap with one another to provide a comprehensive standard 

that identifies a child's best interests." In re Guardianship of K.H.O., 161 N.J.

337, 348 (1999). The Division must prove each of the four factors by clear and 

convincing evidence. R.G., 217 N.J. at 554. That standard "is not a hollow 

one," N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. I.S., 202 N.J. 145, 168 (2010), as 

such evidence produces "a firm belief or conviction as to the truth of the 

allegations sought to be established, evidence so clear, direct and weighty and 

convincing as to enable the factfinder to come to a clear conviction, without 
11 A-3407-16T2

hesitancy, of the precise facts in issue." Ibid. (quoting In re Seaman, 133 N.J. 

67, 74 (1993)). 

The scope of review on appeals from orders terminating parental rights is 

limited. R.G., 217 N.J. at 552. We are bound to uphold the trial court's findings 

as long as they are supported by "adequate, substantial, and credible evidence." 

Ibid. The Family Part's decision should be reversed or altered on appeal only if 

the trial court's findings were "so wholly unsupportable as to result in a denial 

of justice." N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. P.P., 180 N.J. 494, 511 (2004) 

(quoting In re Guardianship of J.N.H., 172 N.J. 440, 472 (2002)). Likewise, the 

appellate court must give considerable deference to the family court judge's 

expertise and opportunity to have observed the witnesses firsthand and evaluate 

their credibility. R.G., 217 N.J. at 552-53. The Family Part "has the opportunity 

to make first-hand credibility judgments about the witnesses who appear on the 

stand; it has a 'feel of the case' that can never be realized by a review of the cold 

record." N.J. Div. of Youth & Fam. Servs. v. E.P., 196 N.J. 88, 104 (2008) 

(quoting M.M., 189 N.J. at 293). 

Additionally, as the fact finder, while the "trial judge is 'not required to 

accept all or any part of [an] expert opinion,'" In re Civil Commitment of R.F., 

217 N.J. 152, 156, 174 (2014) (quoting In re D.C., 146 N.J. 31, 59 (1996)), he 
12 A-3407-16T2

or she may "place[] decisive weight on [the] expert." Id. at 174. Even where an 

appellant alleges "error in the trial judge's evaluation of the underlying facts and 

the implications to be drawn therefrom," deference must be afforded unless the 

judge "went so wide of the mark that a mistake must have been made." M.M., 

189 N.J. at 279 (quoting C.B. Snyder Realty, Inc. v. BMW of N. Am. Inc., 233 

N.J. Super. 65, 69 (App. Div. 1989)). However, "[a] trial court's interpretation 

of the law and the legal consequences that flow from established facts are not 

entitled to any special deference." R.G., 217 N.J. at 552 (quoting Manalapan 

Realty, LP v. Manalapan Twp. Comm., 140 N.J. 366, 378 (1995)).

Against these standards of review, we discern no legal basis to disturb 

Judge Einbinder's factual findings or her well-reasoned application of the 

statutory prongs in N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a). Defendant remains unable or 

unwilling to address her addiction. The expert witnesses who testified, both in 

the Division's case in chief and on behalf of the children through the Law 

Guardian, stressed the need for permanency and stability in these children's 

lives. Judge Einbinder found the extended family members that defendant 

proffered as placement options were unsuitable for this task. We also discern 

no legal basis to disturb Judge Einbinder's decision to deny the maternal 

grandparents' three motions to intervene in this case. Grandparents do not have 
13 A-3407-16T2

a right to intervene absent a showing of psychological parentage which was not 

alleged here. Watkins v. Nelson, 163 N.J. 235, 254 (2000).

Affirmed.