[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as State 

ex rel. Cox v. Youngstown Civ. Serv. Comm., Slip Opinion No. 2021-Ohio-2799.] 

NOTICE 

This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in an 

advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports. Readers are requested to 

promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 65 

South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other 

formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before 

the opinion is published. 

SLIP OPINION NO. 2021-OHIO-2799

THE STATE OF OHIO EX REL. COX ET AL. v. YOUNGSTOWN CIVIL SERVICE 

COMMISSION ET AL.

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 

may be cited as State ex rel. Cox v. Youngstown Civ. Serv. Comm., Slip 

Opinion No. 2021-Ohio-2799.] 

Mandamus—Procedendo—After the entry of a final order of an administrative 

officer, agency, board, department, tribunal, commission, or other 

instrumentality, the period of time within which the appeal shall be 

perfected, unless otherwise provided by law, is 30 days—A public body 

creates an entry through the act of making or entering a record—Writs 

denied. 

(No. 2020-0821—Submitted May 11, 2021—Decided August 18, 2021.)

IN MANDAMUS and PROCEDENDO. 

_________________ 

Per Curiam.

{¶ 1} In this original action, relator Michael R. Cox, a detective sergeant 

with the city of Youngstown police department, seeks a writ of mandamus or, 
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 2

alternatively, a writ of procedendo, ordering respondents, the Youngstown Civil 

Service Commission, its president, James Messenger, its vice president, John 

Spivey, and its secretary, Alfred Fleming (collectively, “Youngstown”), to 

(1) conduct an evidentiary hearing on his appeal of the mayor’s appointment of 

another detective sergeant to the position of lieutenant, (2) enter a final, appealable 

order on the appeal, and (3) serve him with a written copy of that order. We note 

that Cox’s complaint includes the city of Youngstown as an additional relator. But 

because his merit brief focuses exclusively on himself, we will limit our focus 

accordingly. For the reasons that follow, we deny the writs. 

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND 

{¶ 2} The Youngstown Civil Service Commission “prescribe[s], amend[s]

and enforce[s] rules consistent with the provisions of the civil service laws of the 

state of Ohio and in accordance with the Home Rule Charter of the City of 

Youngstown.” Youngstown Civil Service Commission Rule (“YCSCR”) II(1). 

{¶ 3} In June 2018, Cox, along with several other detective sergeants, sat 

for an exam administered by the commission. The exam was given to establish a 

list of candidates who would be eligible to be promoted to the position of lieutenant. 

Following the exam, Cox and other examinees submitted written protests to the 

commission, questioning the exam’s fairness. The commission responded to the 

protests by making an adjustment to the exam grades, after which Cox ranked third 

on the eligibility list. 

{¶ 4} On May 14, 2019, the city’s mayor, acting as the appointing authority, 

appointed to the position of lieutenant, Detective Sergeant Ward, the examinee who 

ranked first on the eligibility list. 

{¶ 5} On May 20, 2019, Cox appealed the mayor’s appointment to the 

commission, renewing his concern that the exam was administered unfairly. The 

commission addressed Cox’s appeal at its June 19, 2019 regular meeting. At the 

meeting, Cox and his counsel presented arguments to the commission. The 
January Term, 2021 

3

commission determined, however, that Cox was not entitled to an evidentiary 

hearing. The meeting minutes show that one of the commissioners described Cox’s 

appeal as an attempt to “micromanage” the manner in which the commission had 

administered the exam. The commissioner added that the commission had read 

everything that Cox had submitted in support of his appeal and noted that any 

further relief would have to come from a court, not the commission. 

{¶ 6} On July 17, 2019, Youngstown approved the minutes from its June

19, 2019 meeting, and those minutes state that “Michael Cox’s case has been 

concluded.” No party disputes that the commission never personally served Cox 

with the minutes from the June 19 meeting. 

{¶ 7} On May 14, 2020, Cox’s counsel filed with the commission a “Motion 

for Entry of Final Appealable Order and Motion for Reconsideration.” On June 17, 

2020, the commission held its regular monthly meeting, wherein it told Cox that it 

would not be taking further action on his appeal. 

{¶ 8} On July 6, 2020, Cox filed with this court a complaint (later amended) 

seeking a writ of mandamus or, alternatively, a writ of procedendo, to (1) compel 

the commission to convene an evidentiary hearing, (2) issue a final, appealable 

order determining his appeal, and (3) serve him with that order. Cox also sought 

declaratory relief. Because part of Cox’s mandamus claim included allegations 

bearing on a taxpayer action, see R.C. 733.58, 733.59, and 733.61, Cox filed an 

application asking this court to determine whether he needed to provide additional 

financial security. Youngstown filed its answer and moved for judgment on the 

pleadings. Cox thereafter asked this court to strike certain paragraphs from 

Youngstown’s answer. 

{¶ 9} We granted Youngstown’s motion for judgment on the pleadings as

to Cox’s request for declaratory relief but denied it with respect to Cox’s mandamus 

and procedendo claims and determined that Cox lacked standing to bring a taxpayer 

action. 160 Ohio St.3d 1513, 2020-Ohio-6834, 159 N.E.3d 1175. We further 
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denied Cox’s application for a determination of additional security as moot, denied 

his motion to strike, and granted an alternative writ. Id. 

{¶ 10} The parties have submitted evidence and filed briefs in accordance 

with S.Ct.Prac.R. 12.05. And Cox has filed a motion to strike some of 

Youngstown’s evidence or, alternatively, for leave to file a supplemental affidavit 

to rebut that evidence. 

II. ANALYSIS 

A. Cox’s mandamus claim 

{¶ 11} To prevail on his mandamus claim, Cox must establish a clear legal 

right to the requested relief, a clear legal duty on the part of the commission to 

provide it, and the lack of an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the law. 

See State ex rel. Waters v. Spaeth, 131 Ohio St.3d 55, 2012-Ohio-69, 960 N.E.2d 

452, ¶ 6. 

{¶ 12} Cox argues that the commission’s rules require it to afford him an 

evidentiary hearing; issue a final, appealable order that determines his appeal; and 

serve him with that order.1

{¶ 13} Section 52 of the city’s charter provides that “[a]ll of the provisions 

of the Revised Code of the State of Ohio relating to Municipal Civil Service are 

hereby adopted and made a part of this Charter.” Ohio law, in turn, provides that a 

“municipal civil service commission shall prescribe, amend, and enforce rules” 

applicable to, among other things, “examinations” and “promotions” of civilservice positions. R.C. 124.40(A). 

{¶ 14} By commission rule, when a vacancy in a position above entry grade 

arises, the vacancy “shall normally be filled by promotion, following competitive 

exams, from among persons already employed in lower classes of positions.” 

1. Cox argues in passing that R.C. 124.34 provides a supplemental basis for relief; however, his 

failure to develop that argument means that he has waived his right to have this court consider it. 

See Navistar, Inc. v. Testa, 143 Ohio St.3d 460, 2015-Ohio-3283, 39 N.E.3d 509, ¶ 39 (collecting 

cases). 
January Term, 2021 

5

YCSCR V(8). After the commission conducts an exam, it prepares an eligibility 

list of those achieving a passing score, “arranged in descending order of the final 

score attained,” YCSCR V(15). See also YCSCR VI(1) and (6). For those in the 

city’s police department, the appointing authority shall appoint “the person having 

the highest standing on the eligibility list.” YCSCR VI(6). The mayor holds the 

power of appointment. YCSCR I. 

{¶ 15} “If an employee disagrees with an action of the Appointing 

Authority, the employee shall have ten (10) days within which to file a written 

appeal of that action to the Civil Service Commission.” YCSCR XII(3). A “filing 

of a notice of appeal with the Commission is the only act necessary to initiate an 

appeal.” Id. “Each party may call witnesses to testify” at the hearing on an 

employee’s appeal, and all parties “shall be notified in writing of the Commission’s 

decision.” Id. 

{¶ 16} Those rules thus establish that after an employee perfects his appeal 

from the appointing authority’s action, the commission acquires a clear legal duty 

to hold an evidentiary hearing, make a decision, and notify the employee in writing 

of that decision. Id. Because Cox filed a written appeal to the commission within 

ten days of Ward’s appointment, he has established a clear legal right to the 

procedures set forth in YCSCR XII(3) and a clear legal duty on the part of the 

commission to provide them. 

1. Final order 

{¶ 17} We begin by addressing whether the commission has failed to 

perform its duty to enter a final order on Cox’s appeal of the mayor’s appointment. 

{¶ 18} Under Ohio law, “every final order, adjudication, or decision of any 

* * * commission * * * of any political subdivision of the state may be reviewed 

by the court of common pleas of the county in which the principal office of the 

political subdivision is located as provided in Chapter 2505. of the Revised Code.” 

R.C. 2506.01(A). A “final order, adjudication, or decision” is defined as “an order, 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

 6

adjudication, or decision that determines rights, duties, privileges, benefits, or legal 

relationships of a person.” R.C. 2506.01(C). “After the entry of a final order of an 

administrative officer, agency, board, department, tribunal, commission, or other 

instrumentality, the period of time within which the appeal shall be perfected, 

unless otherwise provided by law, is thirty days.” R.C. 2505.07.2

{¶ 19} Youngstown does not dispute that the subject matter of Cox’s appeal 

bore on his “rights, duties, privileges, benefits, or legal relationships” within the 

meaning of R.C. 2506.01(C). And though Cox contests the manner in which the 

commission determined his appeal, it clearly did so, for the minutes from the 

commission’s June 19, 2019 meeting establish that it rejected his appeal. Indeed, 

the final sentence of the approved minutes states: “Michael Cox’s case has been 

concluded.” 

{¶ 20} Our decision in State ex rel. Hanley v. Roberts, 17 Ohio St.3d 1, 4, 

476 N.E.2d 1019 (1985), establishes that the commission’s approval of its minutes 

from the June 19, 2019 meeting constituted a final order within the meaning of R.C. 

2506.01 and 2505.07. There, we considered what form a civil-service-commission 

order must take to become final within the meaning of former R.C. 2506.01 and 

2505.07. In doing so, we quoted approvingly from the trial court’s observation in 

Grimes v. Cleveland, 17 Ohio Misc. 193, 195-196, 243 N.E.2d 777 (C.P.1969), that 

the “ ‘form of written entry of a decision of an administrative board should be the 

written minutes of its meeting at which the decision was rendered.’ ” Hanley at 4-

5. 

2. Cox suggests in passing that R.C. 119.12 and 124.34(B) also bear on this court’s analysis. But 

“R.C. Chapter 119 applies only to state agencies.” (Emphasis sic.) Crawford-Cole v. Lucas Cty. 

Dept. of Job & Family Servs., 121 Ohio St.3d 560, 2009-Ohio-1355, 906 N.E.2d 409, ¶ 38; accord 

Lewis v. Parkinson, 1 Ohio App.3d 22, 24, 437 N.E.2d 1215 (10th Dist.1981) (“hold[ing] that there 

is no right of appeal from an order of a municipal civil service commission under R.C. 119.12”). 

And R.C. 124.34(B) applies to a “removal” or “reduction”—neither of which occurred here. See 

Lewis at 23-24 (holding that R.C. 124.34 creates a right of appeal only in cases involving 

disciplinary removals or reductions). 
January Term, 2021 

7

{¶ 21} Cox argues that the commission’s minutes should set forth formal 

criteria akin to that typically found in a judicial order. But the decision he relies on 

for that proposition, A.M.R. v. Zane Trace Local Bd. of Edn., 2012-Ohio-2419, 971 

N.E.2d 457, ¶ 23 (4th Dist.), declined to adopt such a rule, and we otherwise find 

no statutory support for the argument. 

{¶ 22} In summary, because the commission’s minutes are its “final order” 

rejecting Cox’s appeal, R.C. 2506.01(A) and (C), we conclude that Cox’s request 

for a writ of mandamus ordering the commission to issue a decision determining 

his appeal is moot. See State ex rel. Jerninghan v. Cuyahoga Cty. Court of Common 

Pleas, 74 Ohio St.3d 278, 279, 658 N.E.2d 723 (1996) (“A writ of mandamus will 

not lie to compel an act already performed”). 

2. Service of the commission’s final order 

{¶ 23} Next, we consider Cox’s argument that he must be served with the 

commission’s decision, claiming that without service, he cannot pursue an appeal 

in the court of common pleas. There is no genuine dispute that the commission 

failed to serve him, for Youngstown concedes that “Cox was not personally served” 

with a copy of the minutes and Youngstown points to no other evidence establishing 

that Cox was otherwise provided written notification of the minutes. Nor does 

Youngstown point to an adequate legal remedy by which Cox could compel the 

commission to perform the requirements of YCSCR XII(3). 

{¶ 24} Even so, we conclude that Cox is not entitled to a writ of mandamus 

because it would not benefit him. In State ex rel. Thomas v. Nestor, __ Ohio St.3d 

__, 2021-Ohio-672, __ N.E.3d __, we applied the no-benefit rule to a controversy 

arising from a civil action in which the clerk of courts had failed to serve the trial 

court’s judgment entry under Civ.R. 58(B). The relator sought a writ ordering 

service of the entry, claiming that service was necessary for the purpose of appeal. 

We disagreed and denied the writ, reasoning that “[t]he lack of service by the clerk 
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under Civ.R. 58(B) means simply that [the relator’s] time for commencing an 

appeal has not begun to run.” Id. at ¶ 8. 

{¶ 25} Consideration of the no-benefit rule within the context of this case 

must begin with R.C. 2505.07, which provides that “[a]fter the entry of a final order 

[of the commission] * * * the period of time within which the appeal shall be 

perfected * * * is thirty days.” Notably, as Youngstown argues, R.C. 2505.07 does 

not require the decisionmaker to serve its final order on the affected party in order 

for that party to institute an appeal in common pleas court. The cases cited by Cox 

do not support that proposition either; rather, they say that a court of common pleas 

may not exercise jurisdiction over an administrative appeal in the absence of a final 

order. See Leist v. Mad River Twp. Bd. of Trustees, 2d Dist. Clark No. 2105-CA86, 2016-Ohio-2960, ¶ 6; Galloway v. Firelands Local School Dist. Bd. of Edn., 

9th Dist. Lorain No. 12CA010208, 2013-Ohio-4264, ¶ 6. And Cox does not point 

to other statutory language within R.C. Chapters 2505 or 2506 requiring that he 

must be served by the commission before he is able to perfect his appeal. 

{¶ 26} Perfection of the appeal, as R.C. 2505.07 requires, must occur within 

30 days after the “entry” of the final order. And a public body creates an entry 

through “the act of making or entering a record.” Merriam Webster’s Collegiate 

Dictionary 417-418 (11th Ed.2020). Applying that meaning here, we conclude that 

the commission made its entry on July 17, 2019, which is the day it approved its 

June 19, 2019 minutes. This means that under R.C. 2505.07, Cox had 30 days from 

July 17, 2019, to perfect his appeal to the common pleas court. See, e.g., Snell v. 

Mount Vernon Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 5th Dist. Knox No. 95CA24, 1995 WL 

808609, *2 (Dec. 18, 1995) (“the drawing up and signing of the minutes constitutes 

the ‘entry of the final order’ of the [board] for purposes of R.C. 2505.07”); LaPlant 

Ents. v. Toledo, 6th Dist. Lucas No. L-87-369, 1988 WL 69147, *2 (June 30, 1988) 

(holding that the time for appealing under R.C. 2505.07 runs from the time that the 

vote and minutes of a planning and zoning committee “were reduced to record”). 
January Term, 2021 

9

Because the time for Cox’s appeal expired long ago, he would derive no benefit 

from a writ of mandamus ordering the commission to provide him with written 

notification of its decision under YCSCR XII(3). 

{¶ 27} Cox responds that the commission’s failure to serve him with its 

final order has deprived him of “due process” and a right to “redress.” Although 

Cox does not quote any constitutional text containing these exact words, he 

perfunctorily references Article 1, Section 16 of the Ohio Constitution, which 

provides: “All courts shall be open, and every person, for an injury done him in his 

land, goods, person, or reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law, and 

shall have justice administered without denial or delay.” 

{¶ 28} The bulk of Cox’s constitutional analysis consists of a couple of 

footnotes that string cite a number of decisions by the courts of appeals and an 

extended discussion of A.M.R., 2012-Ohio-2419, 971 N.E.2d 457, in which the 

court of appeals held that a letter from a school superintendent satisfied the meaning 

of “final order” under R.C. 2506.01, not that service of the order by a public body 

is constitutionally required. Indeed, Cox does not develop any argument based on 

our caselaw that addresses the scope of Article I, Section 16 of the Ohio 

Constitution. Given the underdeveloped nature of the constitutional argument, we 

decline to address it. See Bronx Park South III Lancaster, L.L.C. v. Fairfield Cty. 

Bd. of Revision, 153 Ohio St.3d 550, 2018-Ohio-1589, 108 N.E.3d 1079, ¶ 10 

(declining to address a constitutional argument when the party had “not formulated 

a clear argument” in support); In re Application of Columbus S. Power Co., 129 

Ohio St.3d 271, 2011-Ohio-2638, 951 N.E.2d 751, ¶ 19 (“it is not generally the 

proper role of this court to develop a party’s arguments”). 

3. Evidentiary hearing 

{¶ 29} Last, Cox requests that the commission be ordered to convene an

evidentiary hearing on his appeal. But Cox should have raised any claim that the 

commission erred in administering his hearing rights by appealing the 
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 10 

commission’s approval of its minutes. See State ex rel. Henderson v. Maple Hts. 

Civ. Serv. Comm., 63 Ohio St.2d 39, 41, 406 N.E.2d 1105 (1980) (concluding that

the relator had an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the law to raise his 

allegation concerning the deprivation of a hearing); State ex rel. Fern v. Cincinnati, 

161 Ohio App.3d 804, 2005-Ohio-3168, 832 N.E.2d 106, ¶ 53 (1st Dist.) (“[the 

commission’s] failure to hold a hearing d[oes] not mean that the commission’s 

decision was not subject to appellate review” under R.C. Chapter 2506). In other 

words, Cox had an adequate legal remedy to redress this alleged harm. State ex rel. 

Kerns v. Simmers, 153 Ohio St.3d 103, 2018-Ohio-256, 101 N.E.3d 430, ¶ 15 (“The

extraordinary writ of mandamus will not lie when there exists an adequate remedy 

at law”). 

B. Cox’s procedendo claim 

{¶ 30} “A writ of procedendo is appropriate when a court has either refused 

to render a judgment or has unnecessarily delayed proceeding to judgment.” State 

ex rel. Weiss v. Hoover, 84 Ohio St.3d 530, 532, 705 N.E.2d 1227 (1999). And in 

such a case, the writ will lie when the relator can “show a clear legal right to require 

the court to proceed, a clear legal duty on the part of the court to proceed, and the 

lack of an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the law.” State ex rel. Poulton 

v. Cottrill, 147 Ohio St.3d 402, 2016-Ohio-5789, 66 N.E.3d 716, ¶ 2. 

{¶ 31} Here, the commission proceeded to judgment on July 17, 2019, when 

it approved its June 19, 2019 minutes denying Cox’s appeal of the mayor’s 

appointment. Accordingly, Cox’s procedendo claim fails because the commission 

complied with its duty to proceed. 

C. Cox’s motion and other requests 

{¶ 32} Cox has filed a motion asking that we strike some or all of exhibit 

Nos. 1, 6, 7, 8, 10, 18, and 21 that Youngstown has filed as evidence, claiming that 

they are irrelevant; alternatively, Cox seeks leave to file a supplemental affidavit to 

rebut Youngstown’s evidence. In general, Cox’s supplemental affidavit challenges 
January Term, 2021 

11 

the manner by which the commission and the third-party author of the promotional 

exam developed a solution to address an examinee’s protests. We conclude that 

Cox’s motion is moot because the relief it requests does not change the fact that he 

did not file a timely appeal. 

{¶ 33} We note also that the cover page of Cox’s merit brief contains a 

“request” for oral argument and that the body of his brief perfunctorily asserts that 

the commission must address the motion that he filed on May 14, 2020. But Cox 

does not expound on the necessity for an oral argument in this case or offer any 

analysis as to why the commission should be ordered to address that motion. We 

therefore deny those requests. 

III. CONCLUSION 

{¶ 34} For the foregoing reasons, we deny Cox’s requests for writs of 

mandamus and procedendo, and we deny his motion to strike or, alternatively, 

motion for leave to file a supplemental affidavit. 

 Writs denied. 

O’CONNOR, C.J., and KENNEDY, FISCHER, DEWINE, DONNELLY, STEWART, 

and BRUNNER, JJ., concur. 

_________________ 

 Law Offices of S. David Worhatch and S. David Worhatch, for relators. 

 Roetzel & Andress, L.P.A., Monica L. Frantz, and Diana M. Feitl, for 

respondents. 

_________________