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THE SUPREME COURT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

___________________________

Merrimack

No. 2015-0329

THE STATE OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

v.

WILLIAM EDIC

Argued: September 14, 2016

Opinion Issued: January 31, 2017

Joseph A. Foster, attorney general (Peter Hinckley, senior assistant 

attorney general, on the brief and orally), for the State.

Christopher M. Johnson, chief appellate defender, of Concord, on the 

brief and orally, for the defendant.

HICKS, J. The defendant, William Edic, appeals his conviction, following 

a jury trial in Superior Court (McNamara, J.), on one count of second degree 

murder and one count of falsifying physical evidence. See RSA 630:1-b, I(b)

(2016); RSA 641:6, I (2016). On appeal, the defendant challenges various 

evidentiary rulings made at trial. We affirm.

The record supports the following facts. The charges against the 

defendant stem from events occurring on July 26, 2010, at the New Hampshire 

State Prison where the defendant and the victim were then incarcerated. The 
2

second degree murder indictment alleged that the defendant, acting in concert 

with and aided by another inmate, Thomas Milton, “recklessly cause[d] the 

death of [the victim] under circumstances manifesting an extreme indifference 

to the value of human life by striking [the victim] repeatedly in the head and 

face areas.” The falsifying physical evidence indictment alleged that the 

defendant, acting in concert with and aided by Milton and/or others, “believing 

that an official law enforcement investigation into the . . . attack on [the victim] 

was about to be instituted, destroyed, concealed, and/or removed items, to wit, 

blood evidence and cleaning materials, including towels and similar cloths, 

with a purpose to impair their availability in such investigation.” After a trial, 

the jury found the defendant guilty on both counts.

On appeal, the defendant argues that the trial court erred in prohibiting 

him from: (1) introducing three audio recordings of telephone calls made by 

other inmates at the New Hampshire State Prison; (2) questioning another 

inmate about that inmate’s prison disciplinary history; and (3) calling certain 

correctional officers to testify at trial. The defendant asserts that the trial court 

erroneously relied upon New Hampshire Rule of Evidence 608(b) in excluding 

the three audio recordings, and that the exclusion of the recordings violated his 

state and federal constitutional rights to due process, confrontation, and to 

present all proofs favorable. See N.H. CONST. pt. I, art. 15; U.S. CONST. 

amends. V, VI, XIV. As to the other inmate’s prison disciplinary history, the 

defendant challenges the trial court’s rulings that the inmate’s disciplinary 

history was beyond the scope of redirect examination, and that the inmate did 

not open the door to his disciplinary record. With respect to the correctional 

officers’ testimony, the defendant contends that the trial court misapplied Rule 

608(b) in excluding the officers’ testimony, and, alternatively, that the State 

opened the door to it.

As an initial matter, the State asserts that a number of the defendant’s 

arguments are not preserved. Specifically, the State argues that: (1) the 

defendant’s Rule 608(b) argument is not preserved as it relates to the first two 

audio recordings; (2) the defendant’s constitutional arguments relating to the 

recordings are not preserved; and (3) the defendant’s Rule 608(b) argument is 

not preserved as it relates to the correctional officers’ testimony.

“The general rule in this jurisdiction is that a contemporaneous and 

specific objection is required to preserve an issue for appellate review.” State v. 

Blackmer, 149 N.H. 47, 48 (2003) (quotation omitted). “This rule, which is 

based on common sense and judicial economy, recognizes that trial forums 

should have an opportunity to rule on issues and to correct errors before they 

are presented to the appellate court.” Id. (quotation omitted).

Based upon our review of the record, we conclude that the defendant 

failed to preserve the following arguments: (1) his argument that the trial court 

erroneously applied Rule 608(b) to preclude him from introducing the second
3

recording; (2) his constitutional arguments relating to the first and second

recordings; and (3) his due process argument relating to the third recording. 

Because the record demonstrates that the defendant did not raise these 

arguments in the trial court, they are not preserved for our review. We, 

accordingly, decline to consider these arguments in the first instance on 

appeal. See id.; see also State v. Alexander, 143 N.H. 216, 220 (1998)

(determining that defendant’s constitutional argument not preserved for 

appellate review where defendant did not specifically assert constitutional 

challenge before trial court).

We conclude that the defendant’s remaining arguments are preserved,

and consider the following issues in turn: (1) the defendant’s evidentiary 

arguments relating to the third audio recording; (2) the defendant’s argument 

that exclusion of the third recording violated his state and federal 

constitutional rights to confrontation and to present all proofs favorable; and 

(3) collectively, the defendant’s evidentiary arguments relating to the exclusion 

of the first recording, the limitation of cross-examination of an inmate about 

his prison disciplinary history, and the exclusion of the correctional officers’ 

testimony.

I. Exclusion of Third Recording — Evidentiary Argument

The third audio recording is of a conversation between State witness 

William Morel, an inmate at the New Hampshire State Prison whose testimony 

implicated the defendant in the July 26, 2010 incident, and an investigator. 

The defendant sought to admit this recording at trial to demonstrate that Morel 

received a benefit—specifically, a reduction in his inmate classification—in 

exchange for providing testimony against the defendant. The State objected,

and the trial court sustained the State’s objection.

“The trial court has broad discretion to determine the admissibility of 

evidence, and we will not upset its ruling absent an unsustainable exercise of 

discretion.” State v. Stowe, 162 N.H. 464, 470 (2011). “To prevail under this 

standard, the defendant must demonstrate that the trial court’s decision was 

clearly untenable or unreasonable to the prejudice of his case.” Id.

On appeal, the defendant argues that the trial court erred in excluding 

this audio recording under Rule 608(b). Rule 608(b) provides, in relevant part:

Specific instances of the conduct of a witness, for the purpose of 

attacking or supporting the witness’ credibility, other than 

conviction of crime as provided in Rule § 609, may not be proved 

by extrinsic evidence. They may, however, in the discretion of the 

court, if probative of truthfulness or untruthfulness, be inquired 

into on cross examination of the witness . . . concerning the 

witness’ character for truthfulness or untruthfulness . . . .
4

This rule “permits a cross-examiner to inquire into conduct that is probative of 

the witness’s character for truthfulness or untruthfulness.” Stowe, 162 N.H. at 

470. “Generally, however, the examiner must take the answer as the witness 

gives it.” Id. This is because the rule “prohibits the examiner from introducing 

extrinsic evidence, such as calling other witnesses, to rebut the witness’s 

statements.” Id. (quotation omitted).

The defendant contends that Rule 608(b) applies only to a general attack 

on a witness’s character for truthfulness or untruthfulness. He claims that the 

third recording evidences Morel’s motive to provide testimony rather than his 

general character for truthfulness or untruthfulness, and that, therefore, Rule 

608(b) did not bar introduction of the recording at trial. In response, the State 

contends that the trial court’s ruling precluding the defendant from introducing 

the recording was proper.

The State also suggests that, in addition to relying upon Rule 608(b), the 

trial court ruled that the third audio recording was inadmissible hearsay. See

N.H. R. Ev. 801(c) (“‘Hearsay’ is a statement, other than one made by the 

declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the 

truth of the matter asserted.”); N.H. R. Ev. 802 (“Hearsay is not admissible 

except as provided by these rules or by other rules prescribed by the Supreme 

Court pursuant to statutory authority.”). Based upon our review of the record, 

we agree that the trial court made such a ruling. The defendant does not 

challenge this basis for the trial court’s ruling on appeal. Because the trial 

court’s hearsay ruling provided a secondary basis for the exclusion of the third

recording from trial—one which the defendant did not appeal—we uphold the 

court’s decision to exclude the recording without addressing the merits of the 

defendant’s argument under Rule 608(b). Cf. Koor Communication v. City of 

Lebanon, 148 N.H. 618, 624 (2002) (upholding trial court’s grant of summary 

judgment without addressing merits of plaintiff’s argument where trial court 

articulated second basis for ruling and plaintiff did not properly challenge 

secondary basis on appeal).

II. Exclusion of Third Recording — Constitutional Arguments

The defendant next argues that the trial court’s exclusion of the third 

recording violated his state and federal constitutional rights to confrontation, 

and to present all proofs favorable. See N.H. CONST. pt. I, art. 15; U.S. 

CONST. amends. V, VI, XIV. We first address the defendant’s claim under the 

State Constitution and rely upon federal law only to aid our analysis. State v. 

Ball, 124 N.H. 226, 231-33 (1983). Part I, Article 15 of the State Constitution 

provides, in pertinent part: “Every subject shall have a right to produce all 

proofs that may be favorable to himself; to meet the witnesses against him face 

to face, and to be fully heard in his defense, by himself, and counsel.” N.H. 

CONST. pt. I, art. 15.
5

The defendant argues that the trial court’s preclusion of the third 

recording violated his right to present all proofs favorable. Part I, Article 15 of 

the State Constitution and the Compulsory Process Clause of the Sixth 

Amendment to the Federal Constitution guarantee the defendant “the right . . . 

to produce all proofs favorable to his defense.” State v. Newcomb, 140 N.H. 72, 

79 (1995); see Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 56 (1987) (explaining that, 

as part of the specific rights secured by the Sixth Amendment, “criminal 

defendants have the right to the government’s assistance in compelling the 

attendance of favorable witnesses at trial and the right to put before a jury 

evidence that might influence the determination of guilt”). However, neither 

provision “entitle[s] the defendant to introduce evidence in violation of the rules 

of evidence.” State v. Graf, 143 N.H. 294, 296–97 (1999); see Taylor v. Illinois, 

484 U.S. 400, 410 (1988) (“The accused does not have an unfettered right to 

offer testimony that is incompetent, privileged, or otherwise inadmissible under 

standard rules of evidence.”). Here, the trial court excluded the third audio 

recording on hearsay grounds—a ruling not challenged on appeal. Accordingly, 

we reject the defendant’s argument that the trial court’s refusal to allow him to 

introduce the third recording violated his right to produce all proofs favorable. 

See Graf, 143 N.H. at 296–97.

The defendant further argues that the trial court’s preclusion of the third

recording violated his right to confrontation. We have held that, incident to the 

rights guaranteed under Part I, Article 15, is the opportunity to impeach a 

witness’s credibility through cross-examination. State v. Miller, 155 N.H. 246, 

253 (2007). The trial court “may not completely deny a defendant the right to 

cross-examine a witness on a proper matter of inquiry,” but “[o]nce a defendant 

has been permitted a threshold level of inquiry, . . . the constitutional standard 

is satisfied, and the judge’s limiting of cross-examination is measured against 

an unsustainable exercise of discretion standard.” Id. at 253-54 (quotation 

omitted). “Thus, when the record reveals that a threshold level of inquiry was 

allowed, we will uphold the trial court’s decision limiting the scope of further 

cross-examination unless the defendant demonstrates that the court’s ruling 

was clearly untenable or unreasonable to the prejudice of his case.” Id. at 254

(quotation omitted).

Here, the defendant does not argue that his ability to cross-examine 

Morel about the recording was either denied or limited. Rather, he asserts 

that, “by preventing counsel from playing the recording[] in the jury’s presence 

during cross[-examination], the [trial] court deprived counsel of the opportunity 

to persuade the jury of the validity of the line of attack on [Morel’s] credibility.” 

The trial court permitted the defendant to extensively cross-examine Morel on 

issues related to the recorded conversation. Defense counsel cross-examined 

Morel at length about whether Morel requested benefits such as reclassification 

from investigators, and about whether investigators in fact assisted with his 

reclassification or provided him with any other benefits. She also questioned 

Morel about the statements he made on the third recording. Specifically, Morel 
6

agreed with defense counsel that he had told an investigator that he 

“appreciate[ed] the secretive [reclassification]” and asked the investigator to 

“send Santa Claus a thank you message.” (Quotation omitted.) Although 

defense counsel was precluded from eliciting the investigator’s responses to 

Morel’s statements, defense counsel was nevertheless able to explore the 

question of whether Morel received a benefit in exchange for his testimony.

Our review of the record demonstrates that the defendant was able to make a 

sufficient threshold level of inquiry in his attempt to discredit Morel in the eyes 

of the jury. See id. Accordingly, we conclude that exclusion of the third audio 

recording did not violate the defendant’s right to confrontation.

The Federal Constitution offers the defendant no greater protection than 

does the State Constitution under these circumstances. Roy, 167 N.H. at 290. 

Accordingly, we reach the same result under the Federal Constitution as we do 

under the State Constitution.

III. Exclusion of First Audio Recording, Limitation of Cross-examination about 

Prison Disciplinary History, and Exclusion of Correctional Officers’ Testimony

The trial court excluded the first audio recording from trial. This 

recording captured a conversation between Michael Mendoza, another inmate 

at the New Hampshire State Prison whose testimony implicated the defendant 

in the July 26, 2010 incident, and his wife during which the two argued. The 

defendant contends that exclusion of this recording was error because the 

recording was relevant to Mendoza’s motivation to testify against the 

defendant.

The trial court also prohibited the defendant from questioning Mendoza

about Mendoza’s prison disciplinary history during recross-examination. 

According to the defendant, Mendoza’s disciplinary history was relevant to 

impeach Mendoza’s general credibility and, because it evidenced his desire to 

obtain favorable consideration at an upcoming parole hearing, it was also 

relevant to the issue of Mendoza’s motivation to testify against the defendant.

The trial court also excluded the testimony of two correctional officers. 

The defendant sought to introduce the testimony of the two correctional officers

regarding a physical altercation that occurred at the New Hampshire State 

Prison involving State witness Randall Chapman—another inmate at the prison 

whose testimony implicated the defendant in the July 26, 2010 incident. 

Specifically, the defense asserted that the officers would testify that Chapman 

had been involved in a fight, and that video footage of that altercation, which 

was no longer available, suggested that Chapman may have instigated the 

fight, and may have acted in concert with another inmate. The defendant 

argues that exclusion of this testimony was erroneous because it was relevant 

to the issue of Chapman’s motive to testify at the defendant’s trial. The 

defendant maintains that the officers’ testimony evidenced Chapman’s motive 
7

to testify for the prosecution, and that it countered the State’s position that 

Chapman agreed to testify against the defendant only because the prison gang 

with which he and the defendant were associated “turned on him.”

The defendant argues that: (1) the trial court erroneously relied upon 

Rule 608(b) in excluding the first recording; (2) the trial court erroneously 

prohibited him from cross-examining Mendoza about his disciplinary history

because, among other things, Mendoza opened the door to questioning

regarding his disciplinary record; and (3) the trial court erroneously relied upon 

Rule 608(b) in excluding the correctional officers’ testimony and erroneously 

ruled that the State did not open the door to it. The State responds to these 

arguments on their merits, and argues, in the alternative, that any error in 

excluding this evidence was harmless. We need not determine whether the

trial court erred in excluding the first audio recording, limiting crossexamination about Mendoza’s disciplinary history, and excluding the 

correctional officers’ testimony because, even if these rulings were erroneous, 

any error was harmless. See State v. Botelho, 165 N.H. 751, 756 (2013).

The harmless-error doctrine recognizes the principle that the 

central purpose of a criminal trial is to decide the factual question 

of the defendant’s guilt or innocence, and promotes public respect 

for the criminal process by focusing on the underlying fairness of 

the trial rather than on the virtually inevitable presence of 

immaterial error.

State v. Dupont, 149 N.H. 70, 74 (2003) (quotation omitted). “To establish that 

an error was harmless, the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that 

the error did not affect the verdict.” State v. Peters, 162 N.H. 30, 36 (2011). 

“This standard applies to both the erroneous admission and exclusion of 

evidence.” Id. An error may be harmless beyond a reasonable doubt if the 

other evidence of the defendant’s guilt is of an overwhelming nature, quantity, 

or weight, and if the evidence that was improperly admitted or excluded is 

merely cumulative or inconsequential in relation to the strength of the State’s 

evidence of guilt. Id. In making this determination, we consider the other

evidence presented at trial as well as the character of the erroneously admitted 

or excluded evidence itself. Id.

The defendant was convicted of second degree murder and falsifying 

physical evidence. See RSA 630:1-b, I(b); RSA 641:6, I. To convict the 

defendant of the applicable variant of second degree murder, the State had to 

prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he caused the death of another

“recklessly under circumstances manifesting an extreme indifference to the 

value of human life.” RSA 630:1-b, I(b). “A person acts recklessly with respect

to a material element of an offense when he is aware of and consciously 

disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the material element exists 

or will result from his conduct.” RSA 626:2, II(c) (2016). “The risk must be of 
8

such a nature and degree that, considering the circumstances known to him, 

its disregard constitutes a gross deviation from the conduct that a law-abiding 

person would observe in the situation.” Id. Additionally, proof of the 

applicable variant of falsifying physical evidence required the State to show 

that, “believing that an . . . investigation [was] pending or about to be 

instituted, [the defendant] . . . [a]lter[ed], destroy[ed], conceal[ed] or remove[ed]

any thing with a purpose to impair its verity or availability in such proceeding 

or investigation.” RSA 641:6, I.

Here, the other evidence of the defendant’s guilt of these crimes was 

overwhelming. The other evidence included the testimony of Mendoza, Morel, 

and another inmate who witnessed the attack on the victim. All three of these 

witnesses identified the defendant in court, and testified that the defendant 

participated in the attack on the victim by “stomping” on the victim’s head 

multiple times. They variously described the victim’s head as “bouncing” or 

“lifting” off of the concrete floor as the defendant stomped on it. They also 

testified that the defendant helped to move the victim’s unconscious body from 

the area where the attack occurred. A nurse employed by the prison testified 

that she was called to respond to a medical emergency and observed the victim 

“laying on the mezzanine full of blood, not responsive and in very bad shape.” 

She testified that the victim’s “face was swollen,” and that he “was bruised and 

bloody” and “making an abnormal respiration sound.” Moreover, the State 

presented medical testimony linking the attack to the victim’s subsequent 

death.

The other evidence also included the testimony of Mendoza and 

Chapman who witnessed the defendant’s participation in the destruction of 

evidence. Mendoza testified that, after the attack, the defendant used a towel 

to help clean the victim’s “[b]lood” off of the floor. Chapman testified that the 

defendant cleaned up both “blood” and “brain matter.” Chapman also testified 

that he assisted the defendant in cleaning up after the attack, and that the 

defendant flushed the towel the defendant had used down a toilet. A prison

investigator testified that, at the time of the attack, the inmates had access to 

showers, sinks, toilets, and drains, and a correctional officer testified that the 

inmates had access to cleaning supplies.

The other evidence also included testimony that the defendant had a 

motive for attacking the victim. Specifically, Mendoza, Morel, and Chapman 

testified that the defendant was a member of a prison gang. Chapman, a fellow 

gang member, testified that a high-ranking gang member believed that the 

victim had informed on him, and that the defendant and Milton attacked the 

victim because that is what the high-ranking gang member wanted them to do. 

Chapman further testified that he tried to talk the defendant out of attacking 

the victim, and that the defendant told Chapman that “he was going to do what 

[the high-ranking gang member] wanted.” Morel also testified on the issue of 

motive, stating that, before the attack, the high-ranking gang member told him 
9

that the victim “was a rat and . . . was telling on things that he shouldn’t have 

been telling on.” Chapman explained that a “rat” is someone who provides 

incriminating information to the authorities. Further, another inmate testified 

that, just prior to the attack, Milton and the defendant talked about how they 

were “waiting on somebody” and were going to “hit him.” According to the 

inmate, Milton and the defendant talked about the person they were waiting for

“being a snitch,” which he explained is the same thing as a “rat.” Mendoza, 

Morel, and another inmate each testified that, during the attack, the defendant 

and/or Milton called the victim a “rat.” Additionally, the State presented 

testimony from a member of the East Coast Gang Investigators Association 

explaining that members of the defendant’s gang who fail to follow gang rules

could face retribution from the gang.

Finally, the other evidence included the defendant’s confession to other 

inmates and evidence showing that the defendant was conscious of his guilt. 

Mendoza testified that, after the attack, the defendant confessed that he and 

Milton “jumped [the victim] because [the victim] had snitched.” Morel testified 

that the defendant told him that he “really didn’t mean to take it that far” and 

that he had “flushed [the towel he used to clean up the victim’s blood] down the 

toilet.” Moreover, Chapman testified that, after the attack, the defendant told 

him that “he had snapped and things got out of control,” that “he never meant 

for [the victim] to get hurt and killed,” that “he never meant for it to happen,” 

that “he should have listened [to Chapman],” and that “he frigging should never 

have got involved.”

Against this evidence, the first audio recording, the evidence of 

Mendoza’s inmate disciplinary history, and the correctional officers’ testimony

would have been merely cumulative or inconsequential. See Peters, 162 N.H. 

at 36. The evidence the defendant sought to admit was not direct evidence of 

the crimes charged. Rather, as the defendant argues, the first audio recording 

was relevant to Mendoza’s motive to testify, Mendoza’s prison disciplinary 

history was relevant to both his general credibility and motive to testify, and 

the correctional officers’ testimony was relevant to Chapman’s motive to testify.

The record contains ample other evidence that Mendoza was motivated to 

testify by his desire to get out of prison. On cross-examination, Mendoza 

agreed with defense counsel that he argued with his wife “every six months or 

so,” and that they had one such argument—the argument captured by the first 

audio recording—in the days leading up to the attack on the victim. He agreed 

with defense counsel that these arguments were about the difficulties of 

“having a husband in prison,” including the financial, emotional, and social 

difficulties his wife faced. He further agreed with defense counsel that these 

arguments with his wife were “hard,” and that they made him “want to get out 

of prison really bad.” We thus conclude that the first audio recording was 

“merely cumulative . . . in relation to the strength of the State’s evidence of 

guilt.” Id.
10

For similar reasons, we also conclude that Mendoza’s disciplinary history 

was inconsequential in light of other evidence of his motive to testify at trial. In 

addition to Mendoza’s agreement with defense counsel that he “want[ed] to get 

out of prison really bad” because it was hard on his marriage, Mendoza

testified that he had safety issues in prison. He agreed with defense counsel on 

cross-examination that he had an upcoming parole hearing and that he was 

“hoping to get parole.” He testified that, to be paroled, he had to have his 

“programs done,” and agreed with defense counsel that he was worried he 

would not get parole because he could not get into a certain program.

Moreover, although Mendoza’s disciplinary history was relevant to his 

general credibility, there was ample other evidence demonstrating his lack of 

trustworthiness. At trial, defense counsel elicited testimony from Mendoza 

that, in 2008, he was convicted on four counts of witness tampering, one count 

of falsifying physical evidence, and one count of accomplice to reckless 

conduct. She also elicited testimony that, in 2011, Mendoza was charged with

additional crimes, including possession of Oxycodone, possession of cocaine, 

and escape. Further, defense counsel elicited testimony that, in addition to his

2008 and 2011 crimes, Mendoza had been convicted on two counts of 

aggravated battery on a law enforcement officer with a deadly weapon and one 

count of carrying a concealed weapon. This type of evidence bears on

Mendoza’s general credibility in the same fashion as his disciplinary history. 

See State v. Mayo, 167 N.H. 443, 458 (2015) (“Jurors ought to be informed of 

what sort of person is asking them to take his word, and lack of 

trustworthiness may be evinced by a [witness]’s abiding and repeated contempt 

for laws which he is legally and morally bound to obey.” (quotation and 

emphasis omitted)). In light of this other evidence of Mendoza’s lack of 

trustworthiness, the impeachment value of Mendoza’s disciplinary history was 

inconsequential.

The record likewise contains ample evidence of Chapman’s motive to 

testify, rendering the anticipated testimony of the two correctional officers both 

cumulative and inconsequential. As noted above, the defendant argues that 

the officers’ testimony evidenced Chapman’s self-interested motive to offer 

testimony because it: (1) evidenced his desire to curry favor with the 

prosecution; and (2) countered the State’s position that Chapman agreed to 

testify against the defendant only because the gang “turned on him.”

The officers’ testimony was cumulative of Chapman’s testimony on crossexamination. Although Chapman’s testimony may have created the inference

that his altercation was the product of gang retaliation, he agreed with the 

prosecutor that he was charged with a disciplinary violation after the 

altercation, and testified that he pleaded guilty to the disciplinary charge. He 

further agreed with defense counsel that a disciplinary violation of this nature 

could interfere with his parole eligibility, that he was placed in secured housing
11

after the incident, and that he remained uninjured while his purported 

attacker sustained injuries during the altercation.

In addition, the officers’ testimony was inconsequential in light of other 

evidence of Chapman’s motive to testify. At trial, Chapman agreed with 

defense counsel that he “[did not] want to be in jail or prison.” He testified that 

he entered into a cooperation agreement with the State in exchange for “[a] few 

months knocked off [his] minimum sentence” and, consequently, “[e]arly 

release on [his] parole.” See United States v. Spriggs, 996 F.2d 320, 323 (D.C. 

Cir. 1993) (explaining that a cooperation agreement “obviously gives the 

witness an incentive to incriminate the defendant, guilty or not, in the hope of 

leniency for himself”). He also agreed with defense counsel that he was paroled 

despite having a major disciplinary violation on his record, and moved to 

another correctional facility after he entered into the cooperation agreement.

For these reasons, we conclude that the State has met its burden of 

proving that any error in excluding the evidence the defendant sought to admit 

was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.

Finally, any issues raised in the defendant’s notice of appeal, but not 

briefed, are deemed waived. See State v. Cooper, 168 N.H. 161, 171 (2015).

Affirmed.

DALIANIS, C.J., and CONBOY, LYNN, and BASSETT, JJ., concurred.