IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA

FIFTH DISTRICT

NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO

FILE MOTION FOR REHEARING AND

DISPOSITION THEREOF IF FILED

STATE OF FLORIDA, 

Appellant, 

v. Case No. 5D21-1416

LT Case No. 05-2019-CF-051407-A

MELVIN ERNEST REDHEAD, 

Appellee. 

________________________________/

Opinion filed June 10, 2022

Appeal from the Circuit Court

for Brevard County, 

Stephen G. Henderson, Judge. 

Ashley Moody, Attorney General, 

Tallahassee, and Richard Alexander 

Pallas, Jr., Assistant Attorney General, 

Daytona Beach, for Appellant. 

Matthew J. Metz, Public Defender, and 

Nancy Ryan, Assistant Public Defender, 

Daytona Beach, for Appellee. 

PER CURIAM. 

The State of Florida appeals the trial court’s order granting Melvin

Ernest Redhead’s (“Redhead”) motion to suppress evidence collected from 

his home pursuant to a search warrant. It argues that the trial court erred in 
2

ruling that the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule described in 

United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984), did not apply here and asserts 

the evidence obtained should not have been suppressed. As we explain, we 

find the good faith exception applies and, thus, reverse the suppression order

and remand this case for further proceedings.

In October 2019, Agent Jorge Negron, of the Palm Bay Police 

Department, submitted an affidavit requesting a search warrant for 

Redhead’s residence (the “Early Drive residence”). In it, Agent Negron

described Redhead as a convicted felon and listed his extensive criminal 

history that included the sale of cocaine. Agent Negron then stated that the 

Palm Bay Police Department had received two Crime Line tips that Redhead

was selling heroin and cocaine from the Early Drive residence. 

After receiving the tips, the Palm Bay Police Department cultivated an 

informant who was willing to provide information on cocaine trafficking

occurring within the City of Palm Bay. In May of 2019, the confidential 

informant, whose reliability was unproven at the time, provided the Palm Bay 

Police Department with an audio-recorded sworn statement in which he 

averred that between December 2018 and April 2019 he regularly purchased 

large amounts of heroin and cocaine from Redhead at the Early Drive 

residence. The informant also stated that a week earlier he drove with 

Redhead to another residence (the “Las Palmos residence”) to pick up more 
3

cocaine. The informant stated that Redhead went inside the residence for 

five minutes before exiting with a cake-sized brick of cocaine in a plastic bag.

The two then drove back to the Early Drive residence where Redhead sold 

the informant cocaine from the brick. After the interview, the informant drove 

with an officer and identified the Las Palmos residence where Redhead had 

retrieved the brick of cocaine.

With this information, the Palm Bay Police Department, including Agent 

Negron, surveilled the Early Drive and Las Palmos residences between May 

and October 2019. During this period and consistent with the informant’s 

statements, officers witnessed Redhead travel between the two residences, 

often staying at the Las Palmos residence for five minutes at a time before 

exiting, often with an object, and returning to the Early Drive residence. They 

also observed numerous known heroin and cocaine traffickers coming and 

going from both residences, often spending only a few minutes at each 

location. In addition, officers observed what appeared to be a hand-to-hand 

exchange at the front door of the Early Drive residence. 

During the course of their surveillance, officers also conducted another 

audio- and video-recorded interview with the same informant who showed 

them messages from Redhead inviting the informant to travel to Redhead 

whenever he wanted. According to the informant, based upon his history 
4

with Redhead, he knew that the messages were an invitation to purchase 

cocaine. 

Based upon the foregoing, Agent Negron submitted an affidavit for a 

search warrant and alleged that there was probable cause to believe that 

heroin and cocaine were being stored and trafficked from the Early Drive

residence. The magistrate judge agreed and issued a warrant for the Early 

Drive residence. 

During the search, police found substantial quantities of heroin, 

fentanyl, and cocaine, as well as drug trafficking paraphernalia, which led to 

charges for trafficking in illegal drugs, trafficking in fentanyl, trafficking in 

cocaine, and use or possession of drug paraphernalia. Redhead moved to 

suppress the evidence discovered during the search, arguing that Agent 

Negron’s affidavit presented insufficient probable cause to believe that a 

crime was being committed at the Early Drive residence. In response, the 

State argued that the allegations in Agent Negron’s affidavit were sufficient 

to establish probable cause for the search and, even if that were not the 

case, the good faith exception in Leon applied to preclude exclusion of the 

evidence discovered during the search. 

Following a hearing at which the trial court considered only Agent 

Negron’s affidavit, as well as argument from counsel, the court granted the 

motion to suppress. Addressing Redhead’s argument that the allegations in 
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Agent Negron’s affidavit provided insufficient probable cause for issuance of 

the search warrant, the court found the affidavit did not go far enough to 

establish the informant’s reliability, noting that police could have 

corroborated the informant’s claims through trash pulls or controlled buys. 

The court further found that even if the informant was reliable, probable 

cause was still lacking because the information provided by the informant in 

his sworn audio-recorded statement about drugs being present at the Early 

Drive residence was stale, as it was offered several months before police

applied for the search warrant.

The trial court next considered the State’s argument that the good faith 

exception to the exclusionary rule applied such that the evidence seized 

pursuant to the search warrant should not be suppressed. The court

concluded that it did not, writing only that the “affidavit is ‘so lacking in indicia 

of probable cause as to render official belief in its existence entirely 

unreasonable.’” As previously indicated, the State challenges only this 

determination on appeal. 

When reviewing an order granting a motion to suppress, we “defer to 

a trial court’s factual findings but apply a de novo review to the trial court’s 

application of law to those facts.” State v. Hart, 308 So. 3d 232, 235 (Fla. 

5th DCA 2020). However, as the trial court’s decision here was based solely 

on a review of Agent Negron’s affidavit for a search warrant and no evidence 
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was introduced at the hearing on Redhead’s motion to suppress, our review 

of the order suppressing the evidence is de novo. Pagan v. State, 830 So. 

2d 792, 806 (Fla. 2002). 

Redhead’s suppression motion is grounded upon the evidence being 

seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment to the United States 

Constitution. This amendment protects the “right of the people to be secure 

in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable

searches and seizures.”1 Amend. IV, U.S. Const. To safeguard these Fourth 

Amendment rights by deterring police misconduct, evidence that is gathered

in a manner that violates the Fourth Amendment is suppressed under a 

court-created exclusionary rule. United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 

348 (1974); see also State v. Teamer, 151 So. 3d 421, 430 (Fla. 2014). 

However, the application of the exclusionary rule to a given factual 

scenario is not automatic. In Leon, the United States Supreme Court created

the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule, which has been

summarized as follows: 

In general, the good faith exception to the 

exclusionary rule precludes the suppression of 

evidence secured pursuant to an invalid warrant 

when the officer who conducts the search does so in 

1 The Florida Constitution also provides protection from unreasonable 

searches and seizures but mandates that the right “be construed in 

conformity with the 4th Amendment to the United States Constitution, as 

interpreted by the United States Supreme Court.” Art. I, § 12, Fla. Const. 
7

an objectively reasonable reliance upon the validity 

of the warrant. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897

[ ] (1984). In determining whether an officer acted in 

reasonable reliance on the validity of the warrant, 

courts must consider whether, given the totality of the 

circumstances, a well-trained officer armed with the 

information possessed by the officer conducting the 

search would have believed the warrant to be valid.

State v. Sabourin, 39 So. 3d 376, 384 (Fla. 1st DCA 

2010). The good faith exception does not apply 

under the following circumstances: (1) if, in issuing 

the warrant, the magistrate was misled by 

information in an affidavit that the affiant knew was 

false or would have known was false except for his 

reckless disregard of the truth; (2) where the issuing 

magistrate wholly abandoned his judicial role; (3) 

where the warrant is based on an affidavit so lacking 

in indicia of probable cause as to render official belief 

in its existence entirely unreasonable; or (4) where a 

warrant is so facially deficient (i.e., in failing to 

particularize the place to be searched or the items to 

be seized) that the executing officer could not 

reasonably presume it to be valid. Leon, 468 U.S. at 

923 [ ]. 

The rationale behind the good faith exception 

is that the exclusionary rule “is designed to deter 

police misconduct rather than to punish the errors of 

judges and magistrates.” Id. at 916 [ ]. Therefore, 

when the police act in good faith on a warrant they 

have no reason to believe is invalid, the deterrent 

effect of suppressing illegally seized evidence is 

minimal. Id. at 919–20 [ ]; see also State v. Watt, 946 

So. 2d 108, 110 (Fla. 5th DCA 2007) (“In order to 

reject the application of the good faith exception in 

this case, we would need to conclude that an 

objectively reasonable police officer would have a 

better understanding of the law of search and seizure 

and probable cause than did the trial judge who 

issued the warrant.”). 
8

State v. McGill, 125 So. 3d 343, 351–52 (Fla. 5th DCA 2013).

In sum, the good faith exception applies, precluding the suppression of 

evidence obtained by officers, if the officers acted in objectively reasonable 

reliance on the search warrant issued by a detached and neutral magistrate, 

regardless of whether the warrant was later found by the trial court to be 

unsupported by probable cause. Thus, the issue before the trial court was

whether, given the totality of the circumstances, a well-trained officer with the 

same information would have believed the warrant to be valid, see 

Sabourin, 39 So. 3d at 384, with the caveat that if the search warrant at issue 

was based on an affidavit so lacking in indicia of probable cause so as to 

render official belief in its existence entirely unreasonable, then the good faith 

exception to the exclusionary rule does not apply. See Leon, 468 U.S. at

923. 

Here, the trial court appears to have rejected the good faith exception 

for the same reasons it found probable cause for issuance of the warrant 

lacking—the unproven reliability of the confidential informant and the 

staleness of his disclosures. While these issues may raise doubt about the 

presence of probable cause, based upon the totality of the circumstances, 

we find that the good faith exception applies. 

We find that the warrant was not so lacking in the indicia of probable 

cause so as to render belief in its existence entirely unreasonable. See 
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Wingate v. State, 289 So. 3d 566, 568–70 (Fla. 1st DCA 2020) (explaining 

the separate framework for each analysis). First, Agent Negron’s affidavit 

upon which the warrant was issued related that a confidential informant

swore in an audio-recorded statement that he routinely and recently 

purchased drugs from Redhead at the Early Drive residence. Riding with an 

officer, the informant also identified the Las Palmos residence where he 

alleged Redhead had taken the informant to retrieve a brick of cocaine. 

While the informant’s reliability was unproven at the time of this disclosure, 

Agent Negron’s affidavit provided independent verification of the informant’s

claim that Redhead would travel to the Las Palmos residence, quickly 

retrieve something, and return to the Early Drive residence. See State v. 

Smith, 315 So. 3d 1228, 1230 (Fla. 1st DCA 2021) (finding good faith 

exception applied, in part, because the affidavit included facts supporting the 

ex-girlfriend’s claim that defendant was selling drugs from his residence). 

Second, while the informant’s disclosures predated the warrant by 

several months, Agent Negron’s affidavit documented ongoing activity

observed by police at the Early Drive and Las Palmos residences, including, 

but not limited to, visits by known drug traffickers. According to Agent 

Negron’s affidavit, such activity continued to occur less than a week before

the date the warrant issued, demonstrating a likelihood that Redhead 

continued to sell drugs from the Early Drive residence. See State v. Paige, 
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934 So. 2d 595, 601 (Fla. 5th DCA 2006) (“When an affidavit establishes the 

existence of a widespread, firmly entrenched, and ongoing narcotics 

operation, which is observed to be continuing, a staleness argument loses 

much of its force.”); see also State v. Irizarry, 948 So. 2d 39, 43 (Fla. 5th 

DCA 2006) (noting that law enforcement’s viewing of numerous people 

arriving at the residence in question and staying for a very brief time “was at 

least consistent with drug sales being consummated at the residence”). 

Since these allegations at least raise a colorable argument that the informant 

was reliable and his information had not gone stale, it was reasonable for 

law enforcement to rely on the magistrate’s prior determination that probable 

cause existed for issuance of the warrant to search the Early Drive residence 

for evidence of drug trafficking. See Smith, 315 So. 3d at 1230 (finding good 

faith exception applied where “the search warrant affidavit created at least a 

‘colorable argument’ that probable cause existed”).

Our conclusion that the good faith exception is applicable here is 

buttressed by the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Leon, which we find to 

be factually analogous. In Leon, an officer with the Burbank Police 

Department received a tip from a confidential informant of unproven reliability 

claiming that cocaine and methaqualone were being sold out of a residence 

in Burbank. Leon, 468 U.S. at 901. The informant also claimed that the

dealers stored larger quantities of drugs at another residence. Id. This 
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information led the Burbank Police Department to “initiate[] an extensive 

investigation” of the two residences. Id. 

During the investigation, which, based on the Supreme Court’s 

description appears to have largely consisted of surveillance, officers 

observed several individuals known to be involved in the drug trade arrive at 

the residences in question and, shortly after their arrival, leave with small 

packages in tow. Id. at 901–02. One of the individuals observed by the 

officers was associated with Alberto Leon, who had been arrested the prior

year on drug charges. Id. at 901. At the time of his arrest, Leon’s 

“companion” informed police that Leon was heavily involved in the 

importation of drugs. Id. Also, officers learned that prior to their current 

investigation, an informant, whose reliability was not discussed by the 

Supreme Court, told a Glendale police officer that Leon stored a large 

quantity of methaqualone at his residence in Glendale. Id. at 901–02. During 

the investigation, though, officers learned that Leon moved to a residence in 

Burbank. Id. at 902.

Based upon this information, the investigating officer applied for and 

obtained a search warrant for three residences, including Leon’s residence 

in Burbank, which resulted in the discovery of narcotics at each residence.

Id. Leon and others were charged with various drug offenses and moved to 

suppress the evidence discovered pursuant to the search warrant. Id. at 
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902–03. The trial court granted the motion, and a divided panel on the Ninth 

Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed. Id. at 903–05.

The Supreme Court reversed. In concluding that the good faith 

exception applied and that the evidence should not be suppressed or 

excluded, the court explained: 

In the absence of an allegation that the magistrate 

abandoned his detached and neutral role, suppression is 

appropriate only if the officers were dishonest or reckless in 

preparing their affidavit or could not have harbored an objectively 

reasonable belief in the existence of probable cause. Only 

respondent Leon has contended that no reasonably well trained 

police officer could have believed that there existed probable 

cause to search his house; significantly, the other respondents 

advance no comparable argument. Officer Rombach’s 

application for a warrant clearly was supported by much more 

than a “bare bones” affidavit. The affidavit related the results of 

an extensive investigation and, as the opinions of the divided 

panel of the Court of Appeals make clear, provided evidence 

sufficient to create disagreement among thoughtful and 

competent judges as to the existence of probable cause. Under 

these circumstances, the officers’ reliance on the magistrate’s 

determination of probable cause was objectively reasonable, and 

application of the extreme sanction of exclusion is inappropriate.

Id. at 926.

Like the situation in Leon, Agent Negron’s affidavit for a search warrant

of the Early Drive residence was more than a bare-bones affidavit. As 

previously described, Agent Negron’s affidavit relayed the results of a long 

investigation that corroborated much of the informant’s claims, supporting

the notion that the informant was reliable. Agent Negron’s affidavit also 
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detailed events suggesting that Redhead continued to sell narcotics from the 

Early Drive residence days before the warrant was issued. Given the 

similarities between this case and Leon, we find that the trial court erred in 

concluding that the good faith exception did not apply.

2

REVERSED and REMANDED for further proceedings.

LAMBERT, C.J., WALLIS and NARDELLA, JJ., concur.

 

2 Redhead raises several tipsy coachman arguments in support of 

affirmance. We considered those arguments and find none of them to be 

availing.