IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT KNOXVILLE

Assigned on Briefs June 26, 2018

STEPHANIE ANN COLE v. STATE OF TENNESSEE

Appeal from the Criminal Court for Cumberland County

No. 2014-CR-195 David A. Patterson, Judge

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No. E2017-02036-CCA-R3-PC

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The Petitioner, Stephanie Ann Cole, appeals the denial of her petition for post-conviction 

relief. The Petitioner pled guilty to first degree premeditated murder and received a life 

sentence. The Petitioner sought post-conviction relief on multiple claims, and the postconviction court denied relief following a hearing. On appeal, the Petitioner argues that 

trial counsel was ineffective by failing to provide his professional advice regarding the 

Petitioner’s decision to enter a guilty plea. After review, we affirm the judgment of the 

post-conviction court.

Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Criminal Court Affirmed

JOHN EVERETT WILLIAMS, P.J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which CAMILLE R.

MCMULLEN and ROBERT H. MONTGOMERY, JR., JJ., joined.

Richard L. Gaines, Knoxville, Tennessee, for the appellant, Stephanie Ann Cole.

Herbert H. Slatery III, Attorney General and Reporter; Katherine C. Redding, Assistant 

Attorney General; Bryant C. Dunaway, District Attorney General; and Phillip A. Hatch, 

Assistant District Attorney General, for the appellee, State of Tennessee.

OPINION

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Guilty Plea Hearing

The Petitioner was indicted for and pled guilty to the first degree premeditated 

murder of the victim, Louis Tammaro, receiving a life sentence. At the plea hearing, the 

07/12/2018
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State proffered the factual basis for the Petitioner’s guilty plea. The State asserted, 

through the testimony of Agent Dan Friel of the Tennessee Bureau of Investigation, that 

on June 20, 2014, the Petitioner’s neighbor went to the Petitioner’s house after hearing a 

gunshot. The neighbor saw the Petitioner holding a handgun while in the backyard. The 

neighbor asked the Petitioner to give her the gun, and the Petitioner complied and told the 

neighbor “that she had done something horrible.” When the neighbor asked what the 

Petitioner had done, the Petitioner replied she had shot her boyfriend. The neighbor 

called 9-1-1, and Cumberland County deputies responded to the scene. Upon their 

arrival, the Petitioner told the deputies that she had shot her boyfriend. 

The victim’s body was found inside a utility tote, which also contained two 

pillows, a blanket, a black plastic bag, and two latex gloves. One pillow had a hole 

through it and was covered in gunshot residue. The victim died from a gunshot wound to 

the head, a bullet of the same caliber as the handgun taken from the Petitioner was 

recovered from the victim, and the Petitioner’s DNA was found on the handle of the gun. 

The victim’s blood was on the outside of the latex gloves found with the body, and the 

Petitioner’s DNA was on the inside of the gloves. Agent Friel opined that based on his 

investigation, he believed the Petitioner placed a pillow over the victim’s head while he 

was sleeping and shot him in the head with the handgun.

During an extensive plea colloquy, the Petitioner stipulated to the factual basis for 

the plea, testified that she understood the rights she was waiving, and stated that she 

understood she would receive a life sentence. She testified that she did not have any 

questions about entering her plea and agreed that she believed trial counsel had “done all 

that he need[ed] to do.” The Petitioner also made a statement to the post-conviction court 

and the victim’s family:

Your honor, I’m aware of what I’ve done[,] and I am deeply 

saddened over the circumstances. I would like to say how very sorry I am 

to the [the victim’s] family, my family, the community [in] which I lived 

and taught, all the students and families who looked up to me and the 

people who I’ve let down by my actions. 

I am taking full responsibility and pleading guilty with the hope that 

there will be some sense of closure for everyone that I have hurt.

 

The trial court found that the Petitioner entered her plea knowingly and voluntarily 

and accepted the plea. The Petitioner subsequently filed a petition for post-conviction 

relief, raising claims that trial counsel was ineffective.
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Post-Conviction Hearing

At the post-conviction hearing, the Petitioner testified that she had a college 

education and worked for fourteen years as an elementary school teacher. She stated that 

prior to the date of the offense, she had received treatment for depressive disorder and 

anxiety. She had complained about auditory hallucinations to her psychiatrist, and at 

some point, she was diagnosed with obsessive compulsive disorder. She maintained that 

she was abusing alcohol and “on mushrooms” while also taking prescriptions for Xanax 

and Prozac. She did not recall much of what occurred on the date of the offense.

After the Petitioner was arrested, she was evaluated by a counselor at the jail and 

continued to take a prescription for Prozac. She was later transferred to a mental health 

center, where she took prescription medication for depression and anxiety. She agreed 

that trial counsel had her evaluated by a mental health professional, but she explained that 

trial counsel did not discuss the results of the evaluation with her or advise her of possible 

defenses at trial. 

The Petitioner testified that she met with trial counsel on six or seven occasions. 

She stated that trial counsel did not explain the elements of first degree murder to her, but 

she later acknowledged that he explained the State would have been required to prove 

premeditation. She agreed that trial counsel showed her some of the discovery he 

received but explained that she did not want to see all of it. She stated that although trial 

counsel was considering a “psychological defense,” he did not discuss insanity, 

diminished capacity, or intoxication defenses with her. 

A few days before trial, the Petitioner and trial counsel discussed the possibility of 

pleading guilty. Trial counsel explained to the Petitioner that if she pled guilty, she 

would receive a life sentence. She agreed that trial counsel also told her she would 

receive the same sentence if she were found guilty following trial. She stated that trial 

counsel never discussed the death penalty with her. Trial counsel “vaguely mentioned 

aggravators” to the extent that he explained that none would apply to her case.

Trial counsel met with the Petitioner again after they discussed the possibility of 

pleading guilty. The Petitioner testified that she asked trial counsel what would happen if 

she changed her mind about pleading, and he responded that “it would be down to crunch 

time,” which the Petitioner understood to mean “there wasn’t much time at all to come up 

with a good defense.” The Petitioner stated that trial counsel never told her about any 

weaknesses in the case and that she believed there were no possible defenses based on 

what trial counsel had told her. She testified that she “felt a little bit trapped” into 

pleading and agreed that she felt as though she did not have a choice. 
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The Petitioner stated that she asked trial counsel “for his professional opinion” 

regarding the guilty plea, but he responded that the decision was for her to make. She 

stated that by the time of the guilty plea hearing, she “had lost faith in [trial] counsel,” so 

she felt pleading guilty was “what [she] needed to do.” She stated that she did not think 

she could get another lawyer and did not know she could ask for one. She testified that 

now that she knew more about her case and possible defenses, she would have gone to 

trial instead of entering a guilty plea.

On cross-examination, the Petitioner reviewed the transcript from the guilty plea 

hearing and agreed that she told the trial court during the plea colloquy that there was 

nothing else she needed trial counsel to do for her case. She agreed that trial counsel 

filed a motion for discovery and that he reviewed the discovery with her in person but

that she did not want to look at the photographs from the crime scene. She agreed that 

trial counsel discussed filing various pretrial motions and that trial counsel filed a motion 

to suppress her statements to law enforcement, which the trial court denied. 

The Petitioner agreed that she was evaluated by a mental health expert retained by 

trial counsel. She acknowledged that after the evaluation, trial counsel visited her and 

explained that in the expert’s opinion there were not sufficient mental health issues to 

support a mental health defense. She agreed that she was aware of this information when 

she began discussing the possibility of pleading guilty with trial counsel.

The Petitioner acknowledged that she told the trial court that she wanted to enter 

her plea to take responsibility for her actions. She agreed that she did not dispute the 

factual basis for her plea and that she understood the rights she was waiving by entering 

her plea. She further agreed that she was not surprised by the trial court’s informing her 

she would receive a life sentence because trial counsel had already explained the sentence 

to her weeks before she entered her plea. She acknowledged that she told the trial court 

in her plea colloquy that trial counsel had explained to her the elements of first degree 

premeditated murder, any lesser-included offenses, and possible defenses. She agreed 

that she was of clear mind and not under the influence of intoxicants when entering her 

plea. She stated that the decision to enter her plea was completely her own.

On redirect, the Petitioner clarified that although trial counsel told her that insanity 

would not be a viable defense, he did not discuss diminished capacity or intoxication as 

possible defenses. Based on that, she concluded that she did not have a defense.

Trial counsel testified that he met with the Petitioner prior to the preliminary 

hearing to discuss the facts that were available at the time. He discussed possible 

witnesses and defenses with the Petitioner throughout his representation. He met with the 

Petitioner in person “a least a dozen times” and reviewed with her the discovery he 
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received, with the exception of “certain parts of the crime scene video that she asked not 

to see.” He discussed the potential witnesses that the State would likely call as well as 

the witnesses the defense could call. He explained the strengths and weaknesses of the 

State’s case against her.

Trial counsel testified that he determined early in the case that a mental health 

expert needed to be hired to evaluate the Petitioner. After the evaluation, trial counsel 

discussed the results with the Petitioner and explained that a diminished capacity defense 

was not viable. He testified that based on the results from evaluation and his own 

opinion of the case, the Petitioner had neither an insanity nor a diminished capacity 

defense.

Trial counsel stated that he discussed filing pretrial motions with the Petitioner and 

that he in fact filed numerous motions, including the motion to suppress her statements to 

law enforcement officers. The motion to suppress was heard by the trial court and denied. 

He did not perceive any search or seizure issues in the case.

Trial counsel testified that after he explained that diminished capacity would not 

be a viable defense, the Petitioner indicated that she wanted to plead guilty to the 

indictment. Trial counsel explained the ramifications of pleading and her sentencing 

exposure. He estimated this conversation occurred at least one month prior to the date of 

the plea hearing. He asked that the Petitioner allow him to attempt to work out an 

agreement with the State for a lesser-included offense. After unsuccessful attempts, he 

explained to the Petitioner that he could not get an agreement for anything less than first 

degree murder, and the Petitioner was “very adamant” about pleading guilty. 

Trial counsel stated that he discussed the plea with the Petitioner “three to four 

times prior to the actual plea date.” He explained that she would receive the same 

sentence even if she went to trial and was found guilty. He also explained that she would 

lose her right to appeal, including the right to appeal the trial court’s denial of her motion 

to suppress. He testified that the Petitioner was responsive and that he believed she 

understood everything throughout her case. He again explained to the Petitioner the 

elements of the offense, the consequences of pleading, and the procedural aspects of trial.

Trial counsel testified that when the Petitioner decided she wanted to plead guilty 

to the indictment, he explained the plea form with her. He did not recall her having any 

questions about the form. He told her to take the weekend to think over the plea again. 

After the weekend, she still wanted to enter the plea. Trial counsel did not observe 

anything unusual about her demeanor on the day of the plea hearing. He stated that if he 

had felt that the Petitioner was under the influence of anything, he would have asked for a 

continuance and not allowed her to enter the plea.
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On cross-examination, trial counsel testified that he had been an attorney for 

twenty years and had tried three or four murder cases by the time he represented the 

Petitioner. He testified that he discussed with the Petitioner her drug use at the time of 

the offense. He explained that he was familiar with intoxication as a defense but did not 

recall anything in the Petitioner’s case that would have substantiated such a defense. He

agreed that if he could have established at trial that the Petitioner was on prescription 

drugs, in addition to mushrooms, alcohol, and marijuana, then intoxication could have 

potentially been a defense but that it would have been a question for the jury. He agreed 

that he thought the Petitioner was “out of it” when he first met with her after her arrest. 

He believed the Petitioner was on suicide watch at the jail for a period of time. He 

explained that the Petitioner did not appear “out of it” in his later meetings with her.

Trial counsel stated that he encouraged the Petitioner “to sleep on it” before 

making a final decision regarding the plea. He discussed requesting a continuance of the

trial date if she needed more time to make a decision. He stated that when the Petitioner 

asked for his opinion, he explained that it was her decision to make. He explained that 

when clients ask what he would do in their situations, his standard response is that the 

decisions are for the clients to make, not him. He further explained that if he had said 

something about “crunch time,” he would have meant that if the Petitioner was going to 

plead, it was time to do so, or they needed to continue to prepare for trial.

Trial counsel acknowledged that the Petitioner would have received the same 

sentence had she been found guilty by a jury. He stated that the State did not seek the 

death penalty. He said the Petitioner indicated to him that she did not want to put the 

victim’s family through a trial, that she did not believe she could face the victim’s family, 

and that she did not want to go through the trial process.

Following the hearing, the post-conviction court made oral findings that the 

Petitioner failed to present facts establishing ineffective assistance of counsel by clear 

and convincing evidence. The trial court noted the extensive plea colloquy conducted at 

the plea hearing, as well as the Petitioner’s statement of remorse and acceptance of 

responsibility. The court also noted that the Petitioner did not have any defenses and that 

no defenses were established during the post-conviction hearing. The court stated that 

trial counsel “gave [the Petitioner] every bit of information that she needed in order to 

make her decision.” A written order denying relief and reflecting the post-conviction 

court’s oral findings was subsequently filed. The Petitioner timely appeals.

ANALYSIS

On appeal, the Petitioner argues that trial counsel’s failure to provide professional 

advice regarding her guilty plea constituted ineffective assistance of counsel. The State 
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responds that the Petitioner has failed to show that she received ineffective assistance of 

counsel. We agree with the State.

To be granted post-conviction relief, a petitioner must establish that his conviction 

or sentence is void or voidable due to the abridgement of any constitutional right. T.C.A. 

§ 40-30-103. The petitioner has the burden of proving the allegations of fact by clear and 

convincing evidence. Id. § 40-30-110(f); Grindstaff v. State, 297 S.W.3d 208, 216 (Tenn. 

2009). “‘Evidence is clear and convincing when there is no serious or substantial doubt 

about the correctness of the conclusions drawn from the evidence.’” Grindstaff, 297 

S.W.3d at 216 (quoting Hicks v. State, 983 S.W.2d 240, 245 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1998)). 

Factual findings by the post-conviction court are conclusive on appeal unless the 

evidence preponderates against them. Ward v. State, 315 S.W.3d 461, 465 (Tenn. 2010). 

This court may not substitute its inferences for those drawn by the trial judge, and 

“questions concerning the credibility of witnesses, the weight and value to be given their 

testimony, and the factual issues raised by the evidence are to be resolved by the trial 

judge.” Henley v. State, 960 S.W.2d 572, 579 (Tenn. 1997). 

The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and article I, section 9 of 

the Tennessee Constitution guarantee the accused the right to effective assistance of 

counsel. To prevail on a claim for ineffective assistance, a petitioner must prove “that 

counsel’s performance was deficient and that the deficiency prejudiced the defense.” 

Goad v. State, 938 S.W.2d 363, 369 (Tenn. 1996) (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 

U.S. 668, 687 (1984)). “Failure to establish either deficient performance or prejudice 

necessarily precludes relief.” Felts v. State, 354 S.W.3d 266, 276 (Tenn. 2011).

To demonstrate deficiency, a petitioner must show “‘that counsel made errors so 

serious that counsel was not functioning as the “counsel” guaranteed the defendant by the 

Sixth Amendment.’” Id. (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687). A petitioner “‘must show 

that counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness’ guided 

by ‘professional norms’ prevailing at the time of trial.” Id. (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. 

at 688). On review, counsel’s performance is not to be measured by “20-20 hindsight.” 

Id. at 277 (citing Hellard v. State, 629 S.W.2d 4, 9 (Tenn. 1982)). Instead, there is a 

“strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable 

professional assistance.” Id. (citing State v. Burns, 6 S.W.3d 453, 462 (Tenn. 1999)). 

The court must presume that counsel’s acts might be “‘sound trial strategy,’” and 

strategic decisions are “‘virtually unchallengeable’” when made after a thorough 

investigation. Id. (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689). 

To establish prejudice, “a petitioner must establish ‘a reasonable probability that, 

but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the results of the proceeding would have been 

different.’” Id. (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694). “A reasonable probability is a 
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probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Id. In the context of a 

guilty plea, the focus is “‘on whether counsel’s constitutionally ineffective performance 

affected the outcome of the plea process.’” Calvert v. State, 342 S.W.3d 477, 486 (Tenn. 

2011) (quoting Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59 (1985)). A petitioner “‘must show that 

there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, he would not have pleaded 

guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.’” Id. (quoting Hill, 474 U.S. at 59). 

This inquiry should focus on whether any alleged deficiency affected the outcome of the 

plea process. Grindstaff, 297 S.W.3d at 217. A petitioner is not required to prove that 

the result at trial would have been more favorable than the results of the plea agreement. 

Id. 

Claims of ineffective assistance of counsel in post-conviction petitions are 

regarded as mixed questions of law and fact. Id. at 216. Factual findings made by the 

post-conviction court are reviewed de novo with a presumption of correctness, unless the 

evidence preponderates against the court’s factual findings. Id. The post-conviction 

court’s conclusions of law, however, are reviewed under a purely de novo standard with 

no presumption of correctness. Fields v. State, 40 S.W.3d 450, 458 (Tenn. 2001). 

The Petitioner argues that trial counsel was ineffective by not providing advice 

about whether to plead guilty to the indictment, despite the fact that the Petitioner was 

waiving her right to appellate review, forfeiting her chance to be acquitted, and receiving 

the same sentence she would have received had a jury found her guilty.1 She asserts that 

she received no benefit in exchange for pleading guilty. The State responds that trial 

counsel provided the Petitioner with all of the information she needed to make an 

informed decision.

The right to effective assistance of counsel applies in all critical stages of the 

criminal process, including plea negotiations. Nesbit v. State, 452 S.W.3d 779, 787 

(Tenn. 2014). An attorney is required to “explain a matter to the extent reasonably 

necessary to permit the client to make informed decisions regarding the representation.” 

Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 8, RPC 1.4(b). When considering a plea, “counsel must advise the 

accused, among other things, of the choices that are available to him as well as the 

 

1

The Petitioner cites Martha Ann Freeman v. State, No. M2011-01617-CCA-R3-PC, 

2014 WL 1285686 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 31, 2014), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Sept. 25, 2014), 

for the contention that trial counsel’s failure to give professional advice regarding the 

Petitioner’s plea constituted ineffective assistance. However, as the State correctly argues, we 

cannot give this case any precedential value because it has been designated “Not for Citation” by 

our supreme court. See Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 4(E)(1) (“If an application for permission to appeal is 

hereafter denied by [the Tennessee Supreme] Court with a “Not for Citation” designation, the 

opinion of the intermediate appellate court has no precedential value.”). 
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probable outcome of these choices.” Parham v. State, 885 S.W.2d 375, 384 (Tenn. Crim. 

App. 1994) (footnotes omitted); see American Bar Association Standards for Criminal 

Justice 14–3.2 (“To aid the defendant in reaching a decision, defense counsel, after 

appropriate investigation, should advise the defendant of the alternatives available and 

address considerations deemed important by defense counsel or the defendant in reaching 

a decision.”). An attorney, after providing “‘competent and fully informed advice, 

including an analysis of the risks that the client would face in proceeding to trial,’” must 

abide by the accused’s decision to either accept or reject a plea. Nesbit, 452 S.W.3d at 

787 (quoting Burt v. Titlow, 571 U.S. 12, 25 (2013) (Sotomayor, J., concurring)). 

Trial counsel testified that after the Petitioner indicated that she wanted to plead 

guilty, he made several unsuccessful attempts to come to an agreement with the State. 

When the Petitioner still wished to plead guilty, he encouraged her to take additional time 

to think about her decision. He explained the elements of first degree premeditated 

murder, lesser-included offenses, the strengths and weaknesses of the State’s case, and 

possible defenses. He explained that diminished capacity and insanity would not be 

viable defenses after receiving the results from the mental health expert who evaluated 

the Petitioner. Trial counsel informed the Petitioner of the rights she would be giving up 

by entering a guilty plea. The Petitioner does not contest the fact that she was aware she 

was receiving the same sentence as she would have received had she been found guilty 

following a jury trial. The Petitioner indicated her motives for pleading were not about 

the sentence itself, but about avoiding the trial process for the sake of both the Petitioner 

and the victim’s families and about taking responsibility for her actions. This is further 

reflected in the statement she gave at the guilty plea hearing.

Although trial counsel explained that the decision to plead guilty was for the 

Petitioner to make when she asked his professional advice on what she should do, trial 

counsel had provided the Petitioner with all of the information she needed to make an 

informed decision. The Petitioner’s testimony that trial counsel did not explain the 

elements of first degree murder, lesser-included offenses, and possible defenses was 

contradictory to both her testimony in the plea colloquy and trial counsel’s testimony in 

the post-conviction hearing. The trial court, by denying the Petitioner relief, credited the 

testimony of trial counsel, and we will not reweigh such testimony. See Henley, 960 

S.W.2d at 579. The Petitioner was aware of the rights she was waiving and the sentence 

she would receive when pleading guilty. She has failed to present facts establishing by 

clear and convincing evidence that trial counsel was ineffective and is, accordingly, 

denied relief.
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CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the post-conviction court is 

affirmed.

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JOHN EVERETT WILLIAMS, PRESIDING JUDGE