I

103D CONGRESS

1ST SESSION H. R. 2076

To establish a policy of the United States with respect to nuclear

nonproliferation.

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

MAY 11, 1993

Mr. STARK (for himself, Mr. MCCLOSKEY, Mr. PENNY, and Mr.

FALEOMAVAEGA) introduced the following bill; which was referred to the

Committee on Foreign Affairs

A BILL

To establish a policy of the United States with respect to

nuclear nonproliferation.

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Nuclear Non-Prolifera5 tion Policy Act of 1993’’.

6 SEC. 2. FINDINGS.

7 The Congress makes the following findings:

8 (1) The United States has been a leader in

9 seeking to contain the spread of nuclear weapons

10 technology and materials.
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1 (2) With the end of the Cold War and the

2 breakup of the Soviet Union, the proliferation of nu3 clear weapons, especially to countries in unstable re4 gions, is now the leading military threat to the na5 tional security of the United States and its allies.

6 (3) The United Nations Security Council de7 clared on January 31, 1992, that ‘‘proliferation of

8 all weapons of mass destruction constitutes a threat

9 to international peace and security’’ and committed

10 to taking appropriate action to prevent proliferation

11 from occurring. The establishment of the United Na12 tions Special Commission on Iraq was an important

13 precedent to that end.

14 (4) Aside from the 5 declared nuclear weapon

15 states, a number of other nations have or are pursu16 ing nuclear weapons capabilities.

17 (5) Regional nuclear arms races pose perhaps

18 the most likely prospect for the future use of nuclear

19 weapons.

20 (6) The break-up of the Soviet Union has in21 creased the threat of nuclear proliferation.

22 (7) In May 1992, Ukraine, Belarus, and

23 Kazakhstan signed the protocols to START I and

24 committed to acceding to the Nuclear Non-Prolifera-
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1 tion Treaty as non-nuclear weapon states ‘‘in the

2 shortest possible time’’.

3 (8) Iraq had a substantial, clandestine nuclear

4 weapons program which went undetected by the

5 International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspec6 tion process and was greatly assisted by dual-use ex7 ports from western countries, including the United

8 States.

9 (9) North Korea’s statement of intent to with10 draw from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty,

11 and its refusal to allow IAEA inspections of all of

12 its known and suspected nuclear facilities, are un13 precedented actions which could greatly undermine

14 efforts to stop nuclear proliferation.

15 (10) Brazil and Argentina had substantial pro16 grams to build nuclear weapons and South Africa

17 has admitted developing and building 6 nuclear

18 weapons, but in response to reduced regional ten19 sions and other factors, all 3 countries have re20 nounced nuclear weapons and accepted IAEA safe21 guards for all of their nuclear facilities, and South

22 Africa has acceded to the Non-Proliferation Treaty

23 as a non-nuclear weapon state.

24 (11) United States security interests and cur25 rent policy and practices are consistent with the
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1 terms of the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Trea2 ty which, like nuclear weapons free zones in Latin

3 America, South Asia, and the Middle East that the

4 United States supports, can contribute to efforts to

5 avoid regional conflicts and prevent arms races.

6 (12) The IAEA is a valuable tool to counter

7 proliferation, but the effectiveness of its system to

8 safeguard nuclear materials may be adversely af9 fected by institutional and financial constraints.

10 (13) The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty,

11 which codifies world consensus against further nu12 clear proliferation and is scheduled for review and

13 extension in 1995, should be expanded in member14 ship and extended indefinitely, and additional steps

15 should be taken to strengthen the international nu16 clear nonproliferation regime.

17 (14) The Nuclear Nonproliferation Act of 1978

18 declared that the United States is committed to con19 tinued strong support for the Nuclear Non-Prolifera20 tion Treaty and to a strengthened and more effective

21 IAEA, and established that it is United States policy

22 to establish more effective controls over the transfer

23 of nuclear equipment, materials, and technology.

24 (15) The goal of the United States is to end the

25 further spread of nuclear weapons capability, roll
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1 back nuclear proliferation where it has occurred, and

2 prevent the use of nuclear weapons anywhere in the

3 world. To that end the United States should adopt

4 a comprehensive nuclear nonproliferation policy.

5 SEC. 3. COMPREHENSIVE NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION

6 POLICY.

7 In order to end nuclear proliferation and reduce cur8 rent nuclear arsenals and supplies of weapons-usable nu9 clear materials, it shall be the policy of the United States

10 to pursue the following objectives:

11 (1) Encourage Ukraine to join Kazakhstan and

12 Belarus in ratifying the START I treaty and en13 courage Ukraine and Kazakhstan to join Belarus in

14 voting to accede to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation

15 Treaty as non-nuclear weapon states in the shortest

16 possible time.

17 (2) Encourage Belarus, Ukraine, and

18 Kazakhstan to remove all nuclear weapons from

19 their territory, accept IAEA safeguards over all of

20 their nuclear facilities, and implement effective con21 trols on nuclear and nuclear-related dual-use ex22 ports.

23 (3) Reach an agreement with the Russian Fed24 eration—
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1 (A) to deactivate and retire from field de2 ployment on an accelerated schedule all weap3 ons to be withdrawn under the START I treaty

4 and the START II treaty;

5 (B) on data exchanges and inspection ar6 rangements to verify the elimination of all nu7 clear weapons scheduled to be withdrawn under

8 the START I treaty and the START II treaty;

9 and

10 (C) to place all fissile material from such

11 weapons under bilateral or international con12 trols, or both.

13 (4) Prepare for the ratification of the START

14 II treaty by seeking the exchange of information be15 tween the United States and the Russian Federation

16 on nuclear weapons stockpiles and fissile material

17 facilities and inventories as required by the United

18 States Senate as a condition to its approval of the

19 START I Treaty.

20 (5) Conclude a multilateral comprehensive nu21 clear test ban treaty by early 1995, before the con22 ference to renew and extend the Nuclear Non-Pro23 liferation Treaty is held.

24 (6) Ratify the START II treaty in the United

25 States and encourage ratification of that treaty by
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1 the Russian Federation, and reach agreement with

2 the Russian Federation to end the production of new

3 types of nuclear warheads.

4 (7) Conclude a multilateral agreement to reduce

5 the strategic nuclear arsenals of the United States

6 and the Russian Federation to within a range of

7 1,000 to 2,000 each, with lower levels for the United

8 Kingdom, France, and the People’s Republic of

9 China.

10 (8) Conclude additional multilateral agreements

11 to significantly and continuously reduce the nuclear

12 arsenals of all countries through a stage-by-stage

13 process.

14 (9) Reach immediate agreement with the Rus15 sian Federation to halt permanently the production

16 of fissile material for weapons purposes, and achieve

17 worldwide agreements to—

18 (A) end by 1995 the production of fissile

19 material for any purpose;

20 (B) place existing stockpiles of such mate21 rials under bilateral or international controls;

22 and

23 (C) require all countries to place all of

24 their nuclear facilities dedicated to peaceful

25 purposes under IAEA safeguards.
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1 (10) Strengthen IAEA safeguards to more ef2 fectively verify that countries are complying with

3 their nonproliferation commitments and provide the

4 IAEA with the political, technical, and financial sup5 port necessary to implement the necessary safeguard

6 reforms.

7 (11) Strengthen nuclear export controls in the

8 United States and other nuclear supplier nations,

9 impose sanctions on individuals, companies, and

10 countries which contribute to nuclear proliferation,

11 and provide increased public information on nuclear

12 export licenses approved in the United States.

13 (12) Reduce incentives for countries to pursue

14 the acquisition of nuclear weapons by seeking to re15 duce regional tensions and to strengthen regional se16 curity agreements, and encourage the United Na17 tions Security Council to increase its role in enforc18 ing international nuclear nonproliferation agree19 ments.

20 (13) Support the indefinite extension of the Nu21 clear Non-Proliferation Treaty at the 1995 con22 ference to review and extend that treaty and seek to

23 ensure that all countries sign the treaty or partici24 pate in a comparable international regime for mon-
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1 itoring and safeguarding nuclear facilities and mate2 rials.

3 (14) Adopt a United States policy of ‘‘no first

4 use’’ of nuclear weapons, reach agreement with the

5 other nuclear weapon states to adopt such a policy

6 and to assist immediately any country which is a

7 party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty

8 should the use of nuclear weapons be initiated

9 against such country.

10 (15) Conclude a verifiable bilateral agreement

11 with the Russian Federation under which both coun12 tries withdraw from their arsenals and dismantle all

13 tactical nuclear weapons, and seek to extend to all

14 nuclear weapon states this zero option for tactical

15 nuclear weapons.

16 (16) Sign the appropriate protocols to the

17 South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty.

18 SEC. 4. REQUIREMENTS FOR IMPLEMENTATION OF POLICY.

19 (a) REPORT TO CONGRESS.—Not later than 180 days

20 after the date of the enactment of this Act, and not later

21 than February 1 of each year thereafter, the President

22 shall submit to the Congress a report on—

23 (1) the actions the United States has taken and

24 the actions the United States plans to take during
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1 the succeeding 12-month period to implement each

2 of the policy objectives set forth in this Act;

3 (2) actions which have been taken by the Rus4 sian Federation, by the other former Soviet repub5 lics, and by other countries and institutions to

6 achieve those policy objectives; and

7 (3) obstacles that have been encountered in

8 seeking to implement those policy objectives.

9 Each such report shall be submitted in unclassified form,

10 with a classified appendix if necessary.

11 (b) REPORT ON NUCLEAR STOCKPILE INFORMA12 TION.—The President shall submit a report to the Con13 gress on the specific actions that have been taken and

14 those that are planned to comply with Condition 8 con15 cerning the ‘‘Nuclear Stockpile Weapons Arrangement’’ of

16 the Senate resolution of ratification of the START I trea17 ty (Treaty Doc. 102–20 and 102–32).

18 SEC. 5. DEFINITIONS.

19 As used in this Act—

20 (1) the term ‘‘fissile materials’’ means highly

21 enriched uranium and plutonium;

22 (2) the term ‘‘highly enriched uranium’’ means

23 uranium enriched to 20 percent or more in the iso24 tope U–235;
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1 (3) the term ‘‘IAEA’’ means the International

2 Atomic Energy Agency;

3 (4) the term ‘‘IAEA safeguards’’ means the

4 safeguards set forth in an agreement between a

5 country and the IAEA, as authorized by Article

6 III(A)(5) of the Statute of the International Atomic

7 Energy Agency;

8 (5) a policy of ‘‘no first use’’ of nuclear weap9 ons means a commitment not to initiate the use of

10 nuclear weapons;

11 (6) the term ‘‘non-nuclear weapon state’’ means

12 any country that is not a nuclear weapon state;

13 (7) the term ‘‘Nuclear Non-Proliferation Trea14 ty’’ means the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of

15 Nuclear Weapons, signed at Washington, London,

16 and Moscow on July 1, 1968;

17 (8) the term ‘‘nuclear weapon state’’ means any

18 country that is a nuclear-weapon state, as defined by

19 Article IX(3) of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation

20 of Nuclear Weapons, signed at Washington, London,

21 and Moscow on July 1, 1968;

22 (9) the term ‘‘START I treaty’’ means the

23 Treaty on the Reduction of Strategic Offensive

24 Arms, signed by the United States and the Union of

25 Soviet Socialist Republics on July 31, 1991; and
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1 (10) the term ‘‘START II treaty’’ means the

2 Treaty on Further Reductions and Limitations of

3 Strategic Offensive Arms, signed by the United

4 States and the Russian Federation on January 3,

5 1993.

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