Gordon Collins v. State of Maryland, No. 54, September Term, 2018

RIGHT TO FAIR AND IMPARTIAL JURY – VOIR DIRE – COMPOUND 

QUESTIONS – PROPERLY-PHRASED QUESTIONS – “STRONG FEELINGS” 

QUESTION – Court of Appeals reaffirmed its holding in Pearson v. State, 437 Md. 350, 

354, 86 A.3d 1232, 1234 (2014), that, on request, trial court is required to ask properlyphrased—i.e., non-compound—“strong feelings” question. In other words, under Pearson, 

during voir dire, on request, trial court must ask: “Do any of you have strong feelings about 

[crime with which defendant is charged]?” Court reiterated that, during voir dire, on 

request, trial court must ask “strong feelings” question in form set forth above, and it is 

improper for trial court to ask “strong feelings” question in compound form, such as: “Does 

any member of jury panel have such strong feelings about [charges in this case] that it 

would be difficult for you to fairly and impartially weigh facts?” 

In this case, trial court abused its discretion by asking compound “strong feelings” 

questions and refusing to ask properly-phrased “strong feelings” questions during voir dire. 

Court declined State’s invitation to determine that other questions asked by trial court 

during voir dire could substitute for properly-phrased “strong feelings” questions, and 

Court held that trial court did not cure its abuse of discretion by asking selected jury 

properly-phrased “strong feelings” questions after conclusion of voir dire and opening 

statements.
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS

OF MARYLAND

No. 54

September Term, 2018

______________________________________

GORDON COLLINS

v.

STATE OF MARYLAND

______________________________________

Barbera, C.J.

Greene

McDonald

Watts

Hotten

Getty

Harrell, Jr., Glenn T. (Senior 

Judge, Specially Assigned),

JJ.

______________________________________

Opinion by Watts, J.

Harrell, J., concurs.

Barbera, C.J., and McDonald, J., dissent.

______________________________________

Filed: April 2, 2019

Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County

Case No. C-02-CR-17-001278 

Argued: February 1, 2019
“Voir dire” is Law French1

for “to speak the truth[,]” and refers to “[a] preliminary 

examination of a prospective juror by a [trial court] to decide whether [he or she] is 

qualified and suitable to serve on a jury.” Voir Dire, Black’s Law Dictionary (10th ed. 

2014). Voir dire is critical to implementing a defendant’s right to a fair and impartial jury. 

See Pearson v. State, 437 Md. 350, 356, 86 A.3d 1232, 1235 (2014).

“[I]n Maryland, the sole purpose of voir dire is to ensure a fair and impartial jury 

by determining the existence of specific cause for disqualification.” Id. at 356, 86 A.3d at 

1235 (cleaned up). To that end, “[o]n request, a trial court must ask a voir dire question if 

and only if the voir dire question is reasonably likely to reveal specific cause for 

disqualification.” Id. at 357, 86 A.3d at 1236 (cleaned up). “There are two categories of 

specific cause for disqualification: (1) a statute disqualifies a prospective juror; or (2) a 

collateral matter is reasonably liable to have undue influence over a prospective juror.” Id.

at 357, 86 A.3d at 1236 (cleaned up). “The latter category is comprised of biases [that are] 

directly related to the crime, the witnesses, or the defendant.” Id. at 357, 86 A.3d at 1236 

(cleaned up).

One example of a question that is reasonably likely to reveal bias that is directly 

related to the crime is what is commonly called the “strong feelings” question—i.e., “‘Do 

any of you have strong feelings about [the crime with which the defendant is charged]?’” 

Id. at 354, 86 A.3d at 1234 (brackets in original). In Pearson, id. at 363, 86 A.3d at 1239,

 

1According to Black’s Law Dictionary, Law French is “[t]he corrupted form of the 

Norman French language . . . that was used for several centuries as the primary language 

of the English legal system[.]” Law French, Black’s Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014).
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this Court held that, during voir dire, on request, a trial court must ask the “strong feelings” 

question in the form set forth above, and that it is improper for a trial court to ask the 

“strong feelings” question in compound form, such as: “‘Does any member of the jury 

panel have such strong feelings about [the charges in this case] that it would be difficult 

for you to fairly and impartially weigh the facts[?]’” (Cleaned up) (first set of brackets in 

original). We refer to such a question as “a compound ‘strong feelings’ question” because 

it essentially combines two questions: one regarding whether the prospective juror has 

strong feelings about the charges; and, if so, one regarding whether those strong feelings 

would make it difficult for the prospective juror to be fair and impartial. See id. at 362, 86 

A.3d at 1238-39.

This case requires us to decide whether a trial court abused its discretion where, 

during voir dire, the trial court violated this Court’s holding in Pearson by asking 

compound “strong feelings” questions and refusing to ask properly-phrased—i.e., noncompound—“strong feelings” questions. We must also determine whether other questions 

that the trial court asked during voir dire, such as whether any prospective jurors or any of 

their immediate relatives had been a victim of a crime or a member of a law enforcement 

agency, could substitute for properly-phrased “strong feelings” questions; and whether, 

after the jury was seated and heard opening statements, the trial court cured any abuse of 

discretion by asking properly-phrased “strong feelings” questions.

In the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County, the State, Respondent, charged 

Gordon Collins, Petitioner, with first-degree burglary and theft of property with a value of 

less than $1,000. During voir dire, the circuit court asked the “victim” question and the 
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“law enforcement agency” question, to each of which multiple prospective jurors 

responded. The circuit court asked the following compound “strong feelings” questions: 

“Does anyone on this panel have any strong feelings about the offense of burglary to the 

point where you could not render a fair and impartial verdict based on the evidence?”; and 

“Does any member of this panel have strong feelings about the offense of theft to the extent 

that it would make you unable to be fair and impartial and base your decision only on the 

evidence in this case[?]” None of the prospective jurors responded to either of the 

compound “strong feelings” questions. Collins’s counsel requested that the circuit court 

ask properly-phrased “strong feelings” questions, and the circuit court refused. 

The jury was seated and sworn, and heard preliminary jury instructions and opening 

statements. After a recess, the prosecutor advised the circuit court that the compound 

“strong feelings” questions were improper, and proposed that the circuit court ask the jury 

properly-phrased “strong feelings” questions. Over Collins’s counsel’s objection, the 

circuit court did so. None of the jurors responded. 

Before us, Collins contends that the circuit court abused its discretion by asking 

compound “strong feelings” questions and refusing to ask properly-phrased ones during 

voir dire. Collins argues that other questions that the circuit court asked could not

substitute for properly-phrased “strong feelings” questions. Collins asserts that the circuit 

court did not cure its abuse of discretion by later asking the jury properly-phrased “strong 

feelings” questions. The State responds that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion 

because other questions that the circuit court asked during voir dire were designed to elicit 

any potential bias based on the nature of the charges of burglary and/or theft. The State 
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contends that the circuit court cured any error by later asking the jury properly-phrased 

“strong feelings” questions. 

We reaffirm our holding in Pearson, 437 Md. at 354, 86 A.3d at 1234, that, on 

request, a trial court is required to ask a properly-phrased—i.e., non-compound—“strong 

feelings” question. In other words, under Pearson, during voir dire, on request, a trial court 

must ask: “Do any of you have strong feelings about [the crime with which the defendant 

is charged]?” We reiterate that, during voir dire, on request, a trial court must ask the 

“strong feelings” question in the form set forth above, and it is improper for a trial court to 

ask the “strong feelings” question in compound form, such as: “Does any member of the 

jury panel have such strong feelings about [the charges in this case] that it would be difficult 

for you to fairly and impartially weigh the facts?”

We hold that, in this case, the circuit court abused its discretion by asking compound 

“strong feelings” questions and refusing to ask properly-phrased “strong feelings” 

questions during voir dire. We decline the State’s invitation to determine that other 

questions that the circuit court asked during voir dire could substitute for properly-phrased 

“strong feelings” questions, and we conclude that the circuit court did not cure its abuse of 

discretion by later asking the selected jury properly-phrased “strong feelings” questions, 

after the conclusion of voir dire and opening statements.

BACKGROUND

Voir Dire

On November 2, 2017, Collins, his counsel, the prosecutor, and forty-five 

prospective jurors appeared before the circuit court. The courtroom clerk swore the 
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prospective jurors, and the circuit court began to conduct voir dire. The circuit court asked 

whether any prospective jurors knew Collins, his counsel, the prosecutor, the State’s 

witnesses, certain law enforcement officers, or any of their fellow prospective jurors. 

Multiple prospective jurors responded.2 The circuit court informed the prospective jurors 

that the State alleged that, “on or about March 17, 2017, [] Collins committed a first-degree 

burglary and theft of goods . . . by breaking into the home of Juliette Tower at 801 Severn 

Avenue in Annapolis . . . with the intent to steal her property.” The circuit court asked 

whether any of the prospective jurors had “heard anything about the facts of this case[,]” 

whether Tower’s address “mean[t] anything to anyone[,]” and whether another address in 

Annapolis “resonate[d] with anyone[.]” None of the prospective jurors responded. The 

circuit court asked more questions to which no prospective juror responded, stating:

THE COURT: General question, has any member of this panel had 

something happen to you in the past that would prevent you from either 

returning a verdict of guilty or not guilty in a criminal case under any 

circumstances?

Again, we are trying to make sure nobody has any preconceived 

feelings about any of these issues because, ultimately, I will instruct you 

that[,] when you render a verdict, it is going to based only on the evidence 

that you hear in this case and nothing else.

(No audible response.)

THE COURT: Does any member of this panel have any political, religious, 

or philosophical beliefs about our system of criminal justice that would make 

you hesitate to sit as a juror in this case?

(No audible response.) 

 

2For brevity’s sake, we omit the prospective jurors’ responses.
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The circuit court asked whether any of the prospective jurors had “ever testified as 

a witness in a criminal case[.]” Multiple prospective jurors responded. The circuit court 

asked more questions to which no prospective juror responded, stating:

THE COURT: Is there any member of this panel who would allow sympathy, 

pity, anger[,] or any other emotion to influence your verdict in any way in 

this case? The verdict should not be based on those feeling[s], they should 

be based on the evidence.

(No audible response.)

THE COURT: The State is required to prove the Defendant guilty beyond a 

reasonable doubt. Is there any member of this panel who feels that the State 

must prove its case beyond all doubt? And I will give you an instruction later 

on what the actual term reasonable doubt means.

(No audible response.)

THE COURT: But, no response. Is there any member of this panel who 

would allow the possible punishment of the Defendant to influence your 

verdict in this case?

(No audible response.) 

The circuit court asked whether any of the prospective jurors, or any member of 

their “immediate family[, had] ever been accused of a crime, been the victim of a crime, or 

been a witness to a crime[.]” Multiple prospective jurors responded. The circuit court 

judge who presided over the trial asked whether any of the prospective jurors knew him or 

had had any prior dealings with him. One prospective juror responded. The circuit court 

asked whether any prospective jurors, any members of their immediate families, or anyone 

else with whom a prospective juror was “closely acquainted [had] ever been employed by 

any law enforcement agency[.]” Multiple prospective jurors responded. The circuit court 

asked whether any of the prospective jurors had ever been a juror in a criminal case. 
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Multiple prospective jurors responded. The circuit court asked whether any of the 

prospective jurors would “give either more or less weight to the testimony of a police 

officer simply because they are a police officer and treat it differently than any other 

witness[.]” None of the prospective jurors responded. The circuit court asked whether any 

of the prospective jurors was “a member of the Maryland Crime Victim Resource Center, 

Maryland Network Against Domestic Violence, Neighborhood Watch, the Stephanie 

Roper Committee, House of Ruth, Sarah’s [H]ouse, YWCA[,] or a similar victim advocacy 

group[.]” One prospective juror responded. The circuit court asked more questions to 

which no prospective juror responded, stating:

THE COURT: Does any member of this panel hold any beliefs related to 

race, sex, color, religion, national origin, or other personal attributes of the 

accused or other witnesses that might affect your ability to render a fair and 

impartial verdict based only on the evidence and the law[?]

(No audible response.)

THE COURT: Does anyone on this panel have any strong feelings about 

the offense of burglary to the point where you could not render a fair 

and impartial verdict based on the evidence?

(No audible response.)

THE COURT: Does any member of this panel have strong feelings about 

the offense of theft to the extent that it would make you unable to be fair 

and impartial and base your decision only on the evidence in this case[?]

(No audible response.) 

(Emphasis added). Immediately afterward, counsel approached the bench, and the 

following exchange occurred regarding the compound “strong feelings” questions:

THE COURT: Anything else?
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[COLLINS’S COUNSEL]: I would ask for the question[s] to be asked --

THE COURT: I am not asking [them] that way.

[COLLINS’S COUNSEL]: Okay.

THE COURT: Nobody is going to have good feelings about any crimes. So, 

it is totally misleading.

[COLLINS’S COUNSEL]: Okay. Can I just put something on the record?

THE COURT: Sure.

[COLLINS’S COUNSEL]: So, the question that I had asked for was[: “]Does 

any member of this jury panel have strong feelings about the offense of 

burglary?[”]

THE COURT: Right.

[COLLINS’S COUNSEL]: And . . . [“D]oes any member of this panel have 

strong feelings about the offense of theft?[”]

THE COURT: And I simply supplemented it.

[COLLINS’S COUNSEL]: Okay. Could we just note my objection?

THE COURT: Okay[.] 

The circuit court asked the following “catchall” question: “Is there any other reason 

that we have not already explained or discussed why any member of this panel cannot be 

a fair and impartial juror in this case, anything that we have not covered?” None of the 

prospective jurors responded. 

The circuit court excused three prospective jurors whom it had stricken for cause on 
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its own initiative. Collins’s counsel exercised four peremptory strikes,

3

and the prosecutor 

did not exercise any. Twelve jurors and two alternate jurors were seated. 

Start of Trial

The courtroom clerk swore the jurors and alternate jurors, the circuit court gave 

preliminary jury instructions, counsel gave opening statements, and the circuit court 

recessed for lunch at 11:39 a.m. 

At 1:33 p.m., the trial court resumed. Outside the jury’s presence, the prosecutor 

advised that there was an issue as to the compound “strong feelings” questions. The 

prosecutor explained that, “where you basically allow the panel to sort of self-answer and 

make their own determination as to their fairness and impartiality, it is reversible.” The 

prosecutor suggested that, instead of declaring a mistrial, the circuit court could ask the 

jury properly-phrased “strong feelings” questions. The circuit court asked Collins’s 

counsel whether she believed that that would be an appropriate remedy. Collins’s counsel 

responded in the negative. The circuit court asked Collins’s counsel whether she thought 

that there was a remedy at all. Collins’s counsel responded: “I don’t think [that] there is . 

. . [b]ecause the [‘strong feelings’] question[s] ha[ve] not been posed to the entire pool of 

[prospective] jurors.” Collins’s counsel explained that, even if the circuit court asked the 

jury properly-phrased “strong feelings” questions, she still would not know how the other 

 

3Collins was permitted ten peremptory strikes. Maryland Rule 4-313(a)(3) 

provides: “Each defendant who is subject on any single count to a sentence of 

imprisonment for [twenty] years or more . . . is permitted ten peremptory challenges[.]” 

The maximum sentence for first-degree burglary is twenty years. See Md. Code Ann., 

Crim. Law (2002, 2012 Repl. Vol.) § 6-202(c).
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prospective jurors would have responded to such questions. 

The circuit court stated that it would ask the jury properly-phrased “strong feelings” 

questions. Collins’s counsel made a motion for a mistrial, which the circuit court denied. 

Collins’s counsel stated: “[W]e already had opening[ statements], so that also might affect 

how these jurors respond versus how the [other prospective] jurors might have responded 

prior to opening[ statements.]” The circuit court responded: “[T]hat is too speculative[,] 

though. I think [that] the question now is whether the jury [that] we have picked can be 

fair and impartial[.] But I will leave that part [] of it off. I will simply ask the [‘strong 

feelings’] question[s] as you stated[.]” Collins’s counsel stated: “[N]ot only am I moving 

for a mistrial, I object to the[] jurors being asked those two [‘strong feelings’] questions.” 

The jury returned to the courtroom, and the circuit court addressed it as follows:

THE COURT: Members of the jury, before you hear the first witness, I am 

going to re-ask two questions that we covered earlier[,] but I am going to ask 

them [in] a slightly different manner. 

If either of these apply to you, please let me know, and we will take 

your response up here privately.

Does any member of this panel have strong feelings about the 

offense of burglary, is the first question?

(No audible response.)

THE COURT: I see no responses. The next question [is,] does any member 

of this panel have strong feelings about the offense of theft?

(No audible response.)

THE COURT: I see no responses. 

(Emphasis added). The circuit court then allowed the State to call its first witness. 
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Trial Testimony and Verdicts

As a witness for the State, Tower testified that, on March 17, 2017, at approximately 

11:20 p.m., she and her husband were in bed in their home at 801 Severn Avenue in 

Annapolis. Tower, who was awake, heard noises. Tower nudged her husband awake and 

said: “I think there’s somebody downstairs.” Tower’s husband went downstairs. Tower 

called 911, then went downstairs. Items were “scattered all over” the television room. 

Tower’s Michael Kors jacket, her son’s Xbox, a few of his Xbox games, and his 

headphones were missing. 

As a witness for the State, Sergeant Kenneth Brown of the Annapolis Police 

Department testified that, on March 17, 2017, at 11:21 p.m., he was informed of a report 

of a burglary at 801 Severn Avenue. Sergeant Brown drove on Wells Avenue towards 

Adams Street. According to Sergeant Brown, the intersection of Wells Avenue and Adams 

Street is within five minutes’ walking distance from 801 Severn Avenue. To his right, 

Sergeant Brown saw Collins walking in the opposite direction on the sidewalk on Wells 

Avenue with a garbage bag over his shoulder. Sergeant Brown reached the intersection of 

Wells Avenue and Adams Street, made a three-point turn, and started driving back on 

Wells Avenue. Sergeant Brown saw Collins, who was no longer holding the garbage bag, 

walk back onto the sidewalk on the south side of Wells Avenue from 408 Adams Street, 

which is on the corner of Wells Avenue and Adams Street. Then, Collins resumed walking. 

Sergeant Brown exited his vehicle and spoke to Collins. After another officer arrived, 

Sergeant Brown checked the other side of a fence on one end of 408 Adams Street, and 

found a garbage bag that contained a Michael Kors jacket, an Xbox, two Xbox games, 
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headphones, and an empty cell phone case. Throughout his investigation, Sergeant Brown 

did not see anyone else in the area besides Collins and the other officer. 

After Sergeant Brown finished testifying, the State rested, and Collins rested 

without offering any evidence. The jury found Collins guilty of first-degree burglary and 

theft of property with a value of less than $1,000. 

Opinion of the Court of Special Appeals

Collins appealed. On August 30, 2018, the Court of Special Appeals affirmed 

Collins’s convictions. See Collins v. State, 238 Md. App. 545, 561, 192 A.3d 920, 929 

(2018). The Court of Special Appeals held that the circuit court did not err during voir 

dire, and, alternatively, that the circuit court cured any error after the jury was seated. See

id. at 557-58, 192 A.3d at 927-28. Writing for the panel of the Court of Special Appeals,4

Judge Charles E. Moylan, Jr. acknowledged that, “if the two originally posed compound 

questions inquiring about ‘strong feelings’ with respect to burglary and theft respectively 

were before us in a vacuum, [Collins] would be armed with a very viable contention.” 

Collins, 238 Md. App. at 552, 192 A.3d at 925. Judge Moylan went on to state: “Those 

originally posed compound questions, however, did not long remain in a vacuum. They 

are, as we now look back upon the trial, but part of a larger and more significant totality.” 

Id. at 553, 192 A.3d at 925. Judge Moylan observed that the circuit court asked whether 

any prospective jurors had “any preconceived feelings about [certain] issues[,]” whether 

 

4

Judge Melanie Shaw Geter joined the majority opinion; Judge Kathryn Grill Graeff 

joined in the judgment only, and did not write separately. See Collins, 238 Md. App. at 

561, 192 A.3d at 929.
- 13 -

they had “any other emotion to influence [their] verdict in any way in this case[,]” whether 

they had been the victim of a crime, and whether there was “any other reason” why they 

could not be fair and impartial. See id. at 553-54, 192 A.3d at 925-26. Judge Moylan 

addressed the significance of these questions—as well as this Court’s holding in Pearson, 

437 Md. at 363, 86 A.3d at 1239, that compound “strong feelings” questions are 

improper—as follows:

We are not suggesting that any one of these questions individually passed 

muster pursuant to Pearson, but only that, under the circumstances of this 

case, the sheer accumulation of the inquiries in their totality would have 

brought out anything significant that a direct question about “strong feelings” 

could have brought out. 

We cannot conceive of what ground for disqualification might have 

been unearthed by a simple, non-compound “strong feelings” question that 

was not unearthed by the totality of questions that actually were asked in this 

case. Whatever the compound questions about “strong feelings” may have 

failed to uncover directly was fully uncovered by the totality of questions 

that were asked. Everything was explored that reasonably should have been 

explored, even if by alternative interrogative avenues. That, of course, is the 

bottom-line goal of the voir-dire examination and not a preference for the 

simple over the compound question simply as an academic abstraction. We 

do not foreclose the possibility of some diabolical law-school hypothetical, 

but, as a practical matter, everything that should have been brought out was 

brought out. As for the law-school hypothetical, we will not anguish over 

whether Plato might have been disqualified as a juror based upon some 

arcane factor other than his own or familial life experiences. We are not 

administering the voir-dire process as a drill, or as a precise rubric, just for 

the sake of the drill.

Id. at 554-55, 192 A.3d at 926 (underlining in original). Addressing the issue of whether 

the “victim” question could substitute for the “strong feelings” question, Judge Moylan 

stated:

[A] properly framed question about “strong feelings” is at least the equivalent 

of, and therefore an adequate substitute for, a missing question about 

personal or familial involvement with the crime. But is the converse also 
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true? Is a question about personal or familial involvement the equivalent of, 

and an adequate substitute for, a missing or improperly[-]phrased question 

about “strong feelings”?

Equivalency can be a tricky thing. Is the more general question 

broader and the more specific question narrower? Might it be that a broader 

question could substitute for a missing narrower question, but that a narrower 

question would not substitute for a missing broader question? Or are we 

slicing the analysis too thinly, and should simply accept equivalency as a 

general truth?

Pearson, of course, had no occasion to deal with its converse, and, 

therefore, does not answer our question. In our reading of Pearson, however, 

we find nothing to foreclose the acceptance of the converse. As a practical 

matter, a prospective juror with “strong feelings” and a prospective juror with 

some personal or familial experience with a similar crime would both have 

been called to the bench. They would both have been probed, by court and 

counsel, about the source of their “strong feelings” or their involvement with 

the crime. Both lines of inquiry would have led to the same place. It seems 

to us almost inevitable that both inquiries would have revealed the same 

underlying circumstances, whichever way the initial question, which 

triggered the further examination at the bench, had been put. Looking at the 

totality of this voir-dire examination, we conclude that no critical or 

dispositive fact was left undiscovered.

Collins, 238 Md. App. at 557, 192 A.3d at 927 (underlining in original). Judge Moylan 

reasoned that, given that the circuit court asked the seated jurors whether they had strong 

feelings about burglary and/or theft, Collins had “received, perhaps an hour and one-half 

later, precisely what he had sought one hour and one-half earlier, a jury competent to return 

a fair and impartial verdict. Nothing of any critical significance had occurred in that 

intervening hour and one-half.” Id. at 558, 192 A.3d at 928.

Finally, Judge Moylan rejected Collins’s contention that the circuit court’s failure 

to ask properly-phrased “strong feelings” questions during voir dire impaired his purported 

right to intelligently exercise peremptory strikes, stating:

Unfortunately for [Collins], he mounts his argument in the wrong 

[S]tate. Although the law in many jurisdictions might be receptive to 
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[Collins]’s contention, the law of Maryland is not and never has been. The 

voir-dire examination in Maryland does not exist, even partially, for the 

purpose of supplying information to trial counsel that may guide them in the 

strategic use of their peremptory challenges. . . . Thus, the “right” asserted 

by [Collins] does not exist in Maryland.

Id. at 559-60, 192 A.3d at 928-29 (underlining in original).

Petition for a Writ of Certiorari

On September 26, 2018, Collins petitioned for a writ of certiorari, raising the 

following three issues:

1. . . . . Did the Court of Special Appeals err in this case when it held that 

the [circuit] court’s failure to ask the [prospective jurors] properly[-]phrased 

“strong feelings” questions was not reversible error in light of the fact that 

the [circuit] court asked the [prospective jurors] whether [they or] anyone

. . . in their immediate family had been the victim of a crime?

2. Did the Court of Special Appeals err in this case when it held that the 

[circuit] court’s failure to ask the [prospective jurors] properly[-]phrased 

“strong feelings” questions was not reversible error in light of the fact that 

the [circuit] court asked the [] jury properly[-]phrased “strong feelings” 

questions after the jury had been sworn and had heard opening statements?

3. Did the Court of Special Appeals err when it held that the [circuit] 

court’s failure to ask the [prospective jurors] properly[-]phrased “strong 

feelings” questions was not reversible error in light of the fact that the 

[circuit] court asked a number of other generic questions? 

On November 7, 2018, this Court granted the petition. See Collins v. State, 461 Md. 612, 

196 A.3d 904 (2018).

DISCUSSION

The Parties’ Contentions

Collins contends that the circuit court abused its discretion by asking during voir 

dire compound “strong feelings” questions and refusing to ask properly-phrased ones. 
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Collins argues that, under Pearson, 437 Md. at 363, 86 A.3d at 1239, the compound “strong 

feelings” questions were improper because they shifted to the prospective jurors the 

responsibility to determine whether any strong feelings would render them unable to be 

fair and impartial. Collins asserts that the “victim” question could not substitute for 

properly-phrased “strong feelings” questions because some prospective jurors may have 

had strong feelings about burglary and/or theft, even though neither they nor any of their

immediate relatives had been victims of crimes. Collins maintains that the “catchall” 

question—as well as the “something in the past” question and the “sympathy, pity, anger, 

or any other emotion” question—were compound questions, and thus shifted to the 

prospective jurors the burden to determine whether they could be fair and impartial. 

Collins contends that the circuit court did not cure its abuse of discretion by asking 

the jury properly-phrased “strong feelings” questions. Collins argues that, when the circuit 

court asked the selected jury properly-phrased “strong feelings” questions, the jurors—

none of whom had responded earlier to the compound “strong feelings” questions—may 

have been reluctant to respond because they would appear to have changed their answer, 

or because they would have been embarrassed to respond during the trial, as opposed to 

during voir dire. Collins also asserts that the jurors may have already become invested in 

this case, and may have formed ideas about the case as a result of the opening statements. 

Alternatively, despite this Court’s case law establishing that voir dire does not exist to 

facilitate the use of peremptory strikes, Collins maintains that the circuit court’s failure to 

ask properly-phrased “strong feelings” questions during voir dire impaired his purported 

right to intelligently exercise peremptory strikes. 
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The State responds that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion because the 

questions that the circuit court asked during voir dire elicited any potential bias based on 

the nature of the charges of burglary and/or theft, and made clear which prospective jurors 

would have responded to properly-phrased “strong feelings” questions. The State contends

that the prospective jurors who were most likely to have had strong feelings about burglary 

and/or theft, yet believed that they could still be fair and impartial, were the prospective 

jurors who responded to the “victim” question. The State argues that the “victim” question, 

the “sympathy, pity, anger, or any other emotion” question, and the “something in the past” 

question ensured that any of the prospective jurors who had experiences with crime were

brought to the attention of the circuit court and counsel. The State asserts that, by stating 

“we are trying to make sure nobody has any preconceived feelings about any of these 

issues” immediately after asking the “something in the past” question, the circuit court 

helped ensure that any potential bias would be elicited. The State maintains that this Court 

should not interpret Pearson, 437 Md. at 363, 86 A.3d at 1239, to require trial courts to 

follow a precise rubric for voir dire questions. The State contends that, in Pearson, the 

compound “strong feelings” question was improper not necessarily because a trial court 

must ask the “strong feelings” question in non-compound form, but instead because, in 

Pearson, the trial court did not ask any other questions that would have elicited the 

information that a properly-phrased “strong feelings” question would have. The State 

argues that the circuit court cured any error by asking the jury properly-phrased “strong 

feelings” questions later. 
- 18 -

Standard of Review

An appellate court reviews for abuse of discretion a trial court’s “rulings on the 

record of the voir dire process as a whole[.]” Pearson, 437 Md. at 356, 86 A.3d at 1235 

(citation omitted).

Law

In Dingle v. State, 361 Md. 1, 8-9, 5-6, 759 A.2d 819, 823, 821 (2000), this Court 

held that a trial court abused its discretion by asking during voir dire compound questions,

such as: “[H]ave you or any family member or a friend been the victim of a crime, and[,]

if the answer to that part of the question is yes, would that fact interfere with your ability 

to be fair and impartial in this case?” This Court observed that a trial court “must decide 

whether, and when, cause for disqualification exists for any particular [prospective juror]. 

That is not a position occupied, or a decision to be made, by . . . the individual [prospective 

juror]s.” Id. at 14-15, 759 A.2d at 826. This Court determined that, in Dingle, the trial 

court “avoid[ed] examination of each affected [prospective juror] as to the admittedly 

relevant matters[,] and allow[ed] each such person to make his or her own call as to his or 

her qualification to serve.” Id. at 14, 759 A.2d at 826. In other words, this Court concluded 

that the compound questions “usurped the [trial] court’s responsibility” to “determine, in 

the final analysis, the fitness of the individual” prospective jurors. Id. at 8-9, 759 A.2d at 

823. This Court explained that the compound questions also “deprived [the defendant] of 

the ability to challenge . . . for cause” any prospective jurors who did not respond to the 

compound questions because the defendant lacked “information bearing on the relevant 

experiences or associations of” those prospective jurors. Id. at 21, 759 A.2d at 830. This 
- 19 -

Court reiterated that the compound questions interfered with both the trial court’s ability 

to determine whether prospective jurors were biased and the defendant’s ability to move to 

strike prospective jurors for cause, stating:

Because [the trial court] did not require an answer to be given to the question 

as to the existence of the status or experience unless accompanied by a 

statement of partiality, the trial [court] was precluded from discharging [its] 

responsibility, i.e. exercising discretion, and, at the same time, the 

[defendant] was denied the opportunity to discover and challenge 

[prospective juror]s who might be biased.

Id. at 17, 759 A.2d at 828.

Despite having expressly disapproved of compound questions in Dingle, in three 

subsequent cases, this Court held that trial courts abused their discretion by refusing to ask 

compound “strong feelings” questions. In State v. Thomas, 369 Md. 202, 204-05, 798 

A.2d 566, 567-68 (2002), this Court held that a trial court abused its discretion by refusing 

to ask: “Does any member of the jury panel have such strong feelings regarding violations 

of the narcotics laws that it would be difficult for you to fairly and impartially weigh the 

facts at a trial where narcotics violations have been alleged?” (Footnote omitted). In Sweet 

v. State, 371 Md. 1, 9-10, 806 A.2d 265, 270-71 (2002), this Court held that a trial court 

abused its discretion by refusing to ask: “Do the charges stir up strong emotional feelings 

in you that would affect your ability to be fair and impartial in this case?” And, in State v. 

Shim, 418 Md. 37, 40, 42, 12 A.3d 671, 672-73, 674 (2011), this Court held that a trial 

court abused its discretion by refusing to ask: “Does any member of the jury panel have 

such strong feelings concerning the violent death of another human being that you would 

be unable to render a fair and impartial verdict based solely on the evidence presented?”
- 20 -

Notably, “although Thomas, Sweet, and Shim postdate Dingle, in none of the three 

cases did this Court supersede Dingle; in Thomas, Sweet, and Shim, this Court did not 

address any issue regarding the ‘strong feelings’ [] questions’ phrasings.” Pearson, 437 

Md. at 363-64, 86 A.3d at 1240. In Thomas, 369 Md. at 204 n.1, 798 A.2d at 567 n.1, in a 

footnote in the background section of this Court’s opinion, this Court commented, in dicta: 

“When the inquiry is into the state of mind or attitude of the [prospective jurors] with regard 

to a particular crime or category of crimes, it is appropriate to phrase the question as was 

done in this case.” This Court did not explain how a compound “strong feelings” question 

could be permissible under Dingle, or otherwise provide any reasoning for its dicta. See

Thomas, 369 Md. at 204 n.1, 798 A.2d at 567 n.1. In any event, in Thomas, no issue as to 

the phrasing of the “strong feelings” question was before this Court, as the defendant 

specifically requested that the trial court ask the “strong feelings” question in compound 

form, and the trial court refused; thus, the question was whether the trial court abused its 

discretion by refusing to ask the “strong feelings” question, not whether the “strong 

feelings” question was phrased properly. See id. at 204, 798 A.2d at 567.

In Pearson, 437 Md. at 363, 86 A.3d at 1239, this Court overruled Thomas, Sweet, 

and Shim to the extent that they required a trial court, on request, to ask the “strong 

feelings” question in compound form, and held “that, on request, a trial court must ask 

during voir dire: ‘Do any of you have strong feelings about [the crime with which the 

defendant is charged]?’” (Brackets in original). This Court “reaffirm[ed] this Court’s 

essential holding in Shim that, on request, a trial court must ask during voir dire whether 

any prospective juror has ‘strong feelings’ about the crime with which the defendant is 
- 21 -

charged.” Pearson, 437 Md. at 363, 86 A.3d at 1239. This Court “simply recognize[d] 

that, in Shim and its parent cases, the ‘strong feelings’ [] questions’ phrasings were at odds 

with Dingle, 361 Md. at 21, 759 A.2d at 830.” Pearson, 437 Md. at 363, 86 A.3d at 1239 

(citations omitted). This Court explained why compound “strong feelings” questions are

inconsistent with Dingle, stating:

Just like the phrasing of the [compound] questions in Dingle, [361 

Md.] at 5, 759 A.2d at 821, the phrasing of the “strong feelings” [] question

in Shim “shifts from the trial [court] to the [prospective jurors] responsibility 

to decide [prospective] juror bias.” Dingle, 361 Md. at 21, 759 A.2d at 830. 

In other words, as with the [compound] questions’ phrasings in Dingle, id. at 

5, 759 A.2d at 821, the phrasing of the “strong feelings” [] question in Shim

required each prospective juror to evaluate his or her own potential bias. 

Specifically, under Shim, 418 Md. at 54, 12 A.3d at 681, each prospective 

juror decides whether his or her “strong feelings” (if any) about the crime 

with which the defendant is charged “would [make it] difficult for [the 

prospective juror] to fairly and impartially weigh the facts.” That decision 

belongs to the trial court, not the prospective juror.

Pearson, 437 Md. at 362, 86 A.3d at 1239 (some alterations in original).

In Pearson, id. at 354-55, 86 A.3d at 1234, during voir dire, the trial court asked the 

following compound “strong feelings” question: “Does any member of the panel hold such 

strong feelings regarding violations of the narcotics laws that it would be difficult for you 

to fairly and impartially weigh the facts of this trial where narcotics violations have been 

alleged?” The trial court refused to ask whether any of the prospective jurors knew anyone 

who had been the victim of a crime, or who had been a member of a law enforcement 

agency. See id. at 354-55, 86 A.3d at 1234.

Before this Court, the defendant contended that the trial court abused its discretion 

by refusing to ask the “victim” question. See id. at 356, 86 A.3d at 1235. “[F]or three 
- 22 -

reasons, [this Court] conclude[d] that a trial court need not ask during voir dire whether 

any prospective juror has ever been the victim of a crime.” Id. at 359, 86 A.3d at 1237. 

“First, a prospective juror’s experience as the victim of a crime lacks a demonstrably strong 

correlation with a mental state that gives rise to specific cause for disqualification.” Id. at 

359, 86 A.3d at 1237 (cleaned up). “Second, the ‘victim’ [] question may consume an 

enormous amount of time.” Id. at 359, 86 A.3d at 1237 (citation omitted). “Third, this 

Court ha[d] already held that, on request, a trial court must ask during voir dire whether 

any prospective juror has ‘strong feelings about’ the crime with which the defendant is 

charged.” Id. at 360, 86 A.3d at 1238 (quoting Shim, 418 Md. at 54, 12 A.3d at 681). This 

Court explained: “The ‘strong feelings’ [] question makes the ‘victim’ [] question

unnecessary by revealing the specific cause for disqualification at which the ‘victim’ [] 

question is aimed”—“assuming that the ‘strong feelings’ [] question is phrased properly.” 

Pearson, 437 Md. at 360, 361 n.4, 86 A.3d at 1238 & n.4 (footnote omitted). As discussed 

above, this Court concluded that the “strong feelings” question is phrased properly if and 

only if it is in non-compound form. See id. at 363, 86 A.3d at 1239. Accordingly, this 

Court determined that, in Pearson, although the trial court did not abuse its discretion by

refusing to ask the “victim” question, the trial court abused its discretion by asking the 

“strong feelings” question in compound form. See id. at 364, 86 A.3d at 1240.

The defendant also argued that the trial court abused its discretion by refusing to ask 

the “law enforcement agency” question. See id. at 364, 86 A.3d at 1240. This Court held 

that:

where all of the State’s witnesses are members of law enforcement agencies 
- 23 -

and/or where the basis for a conviction is reasonably likely to be the 

testimony of members of law enforcement agencies, on request, a trial court 

must ask during voir dire: “Have any of you ever been a member of a law 

enforcement agency?”

Id. at 369, 86 A.3d at 1243. This Court determined that, because all of the State’s witnesses 

in Pearson were law enforcement officers, the trial court abused its discretion by refusing 

to ask the “law enforcement agency” question. See id. at 369, 86 A.3d at 1243.

Analysis

In this case, we reaffirm our holding in Pearson, 437 Md. at 354, 86 A.3d at 1234, 

that, on request, a trial court is required to ask a properly-phrased—i.e., non-compound—

“strong feelings” question. In other words, under Pearson, during voir dire, on request, a 

trial court must ask: “Do any of you have strong feelings about [the crime with which the 

defendant is charged]?” We reiterate that, during voir dire, on request, a trial court must 

ask the “strong feelings” question in the form set forth above, and it is improper for a trial 

court to ask the “strong feelings” question in compound form, such as: “Does any member 

of the jury panel have such strong feelings about [the charges in this case] that it would be 

difficult for you to fairly and impartially weigh the facts?” 

We hold that, in this case, the circuit court abused its discretion by asking compound 

“strong feelings” questions and refusing to ask properly-phrased “strong feelings” 

questions during voir dire. We decline the State’s invitation to determine that the other 

questions that the circuit court asked during voir dire could substitute for properly-phrased 

“strong feelings” questions, and we hold that the circuit court did not cure its abuse of 

discretion by later asking the selected jury properly-phrased “strong feelings” questions, 
- 24 -

after the conclusion of voir dire and opening statements.

By asking compound “strong feelings” questions and refusing to ask properlyphrased ones during voir dire, the circuit court prevented voir dire from fulfilling its 

purpose of “ensur[ing] a fair and impartial jury by determining the existence of specific 

cause for disqualification.” Pearson, 437 Md. at 356, 86 A.3d at 1235 (cleaned up). 

Compound “strong feelings” questions are improper because they “‘shift[] from the trial 

court to the prospective jurors [the] responsibility to decide prospective juror bias.’” Id. at 

362, 86 A.3d at 1239 (quoting Dingle, 361 Md. at 21, 759 A.2d at 830) (brackets omitted). 

Specifically, where a trial court asks a compound “strong feelings” question, “each 

prospective juror decides whether his or her strong feelings (if any) about the crime with 

which the defendant is charged would make it difficult for the prospective juror to fairly 

and impartially weigh the facts.” Pearson, 437 Md. at 362, 86 A.3d at 1239 (cleaned up). 

Compound “strong feelings” questions make it impossible to know whether any 

prospective juror, in fact, had strong feelings about the crimes with which the defendant 

was charged, yet determined for him- or herself that he or she could be fair and impartial 

despite his or her strong feelings. For example, here, although no prospective juror 

responded to the compound “strong feelings” questions, the record leaves us in the dark 

regarding whether any prospective juror had strong feelings about burglary and/or theft, 

but nonetheless judged him- or herself to be able to be fair and impartial.

Critically, by asking compound “strong feelings” questions, the circuit court failed 

to elicit significant information, in response to which Collins’s counsel could have 

followed up with further questions, and moved to strike prospective jurors for cause. As 
- 25 -

this Court explained in Dingle, 361 Md. at 21, 759 A.2d at 830, compound questions 

“deprive[ the defendant’s counsel] of the ability to challenge [certain prospective juror]s 

for cause” because compound questions fail to elicit “information bearing on the relevant 

experiences or associations of the [prospective juror]s who were not required to respond[.]” 

In short, the circuit court should have asked, but failed to ask, properly-phrased “strong 

feelings” questions during voir dire.

Contrary to the position of the State and the Court of Special Appeals, see Collins, 

238 Md. App. at 557, 192 A.3d at 927, the “victim” question cannot substitute for a 

properly-phrased “strong feelings” question. Nor can the “law enforcement agency” 

question, for that matter. It is possible for a prospective juror to have strong feelings about 

a particular crime even though neither the prospective juror, nor any of his or her relatives 

or friends, has ever been a victim of a crime or a member of a law enforcement agency. 

For example, suppose that, in a murder case, a prospective juror has never been a victim of 

a crime or a member of a law enforcement agency, and neither have any of the prospective 

juror’s relatives or friends. The prospective juror, however, regularly watches television 

shows that sensationalize various murders; as a result, the prospective juror has strong 

feelings about murder. This is simply one of countless examples of prospective jurors who 

would have strong feelings about a crime, yet would not respond to the “victim” question 

or the “law enforcement agency” question. The “victim” question is also ineffective as a

substitute for a properly-phrased “strong feelings” question where, as here, a trial court 

asks whether any prospective jurors or their close relatives have been victims of crime, but 

does not ask whether any prospective jurors’ friends have been victims of crime. It is 
- 26 -

critical that a trial court ask a properly-phrased “strong feelings” question on request during 

voir dire because, generally speaking, other questions are not as effective at eliciting bias 

that is directly related to the crime with which the defendant is charged.

Like the “victim” and “law enforcement agency” questions, the other questions that 

the circuit court asked could not substitute for properly-phrased “strong feelings” 

questions. The circuit court asked whether any prospective jurors “had something happen 

to [them] in the past that would prevent [them] from either returning a verdict of guilty or 

not guilty in a criminal case under any circumstances[.]” Immediately afterward, the circuit 

court added: “[W]e are trying to make sure nobody has any preconceived feelings about 

any of these issues because, ultimately, I will instruct you that[,] when you render a verdict, 

it is going to based only on the evidence that you hear in this case and nothing else.” Later, 

the circuit court asked whether any prospective jurors “would allow sympathy, pity, 

anger[,] or any other emotion to influence [their] verdict in any way in this case[.]” 

Immediately afterward, the circuit court added: “The verdict should not be based on those 

feeling[s], they should be based on the evidence.” Still later, the circuit court asked the 

following “catchall” question: “Is there any other reason that we have not already explained 

or discussed why any member of this panel cannot be a fair and impartial juror in this case, 

anything that we have not covered?” 

We disagree with the reasoning of the State and the Court of Special Appeals, see

Collins, 238 Md. App. at 553-55, 192 A.3d at 925-26, that it is consequential that none of 

the prospective jurors responded to the “something in the past,” “sympathy, pity, anger, or 

any other emotion,” and “catchall” questions. These questions essentially constituted 
- 27 -

compound questions because they “‘shift[ed] from the trial court to the prospective jurors 

responsibility to decide prospective juror bias.’” Pearson, 437 Md. at 362, 86 A.3d at 1239 

(quoting Dingle, 361 Md. at 21, 759 A.2d at 830) (brackets omitted). The “something in 

the past” question required the prospective jurors to decide for themselves whether any 

prior experiences would “prevent” them from reaching a particular verdict “under any 

circumstances[.]” Similarly, the “sympathy, pity, anger, or any other emotion” question 

required the prospective jurors to decide for themselves whether any emotion would 

“influence” the verdicts. Finally, the “catchall” question required the prospective jurors to 

decide for themselves whether any matter that had not already been covered would prevent 

them from being “fair and impartial[.]” 

Due to the way in which the circuit court phrased these three questions, it is 

impossible to know whether any prospective juror refrained from responding because, even 

though he or she was involved with a prior experience, emotion, or other matter that posed 

a threat to his or her ability to be fair and impartial, the prospective juror determined for 

him- or herself that the prior experience, emotion, or other matter would not prevent him 

or her from being fair and impartial. To be clear, a trial court may ask the “something in 

the past,” “sympathy, pity, anger, or any other emotion,” and “catchall” questions. Our 

point with regard to the “something in the past,” “sympathy, pity, anger, or any other 

emotion,” and “catchall” questions is that, contrary to the position of the State and the 

Court of Special Appeals, see Collins, 238 Md. App. at 553-55, 192 A.3d at 925-26, these 

questions did not substitute for properly-phrased “strong feelings” questions.

On a related note, the State is incorrect in arguing that, in Pearson, the compound 
- 28 -

“strong feelings” question was improper not necessarily because a trial court must ask the 

“strong feelings” question in non-compound form, but instead because, in Pearson, the trial 

court did not ask any other questions that would have elicited the information that a 

properly-phrased “strong feelings” question would have. The State misapprehends this 

Court’s holding in Pearson, 437 Md. at 364, 86 A.3d at 1240, which was that the trial “court 

abused its discretion by phrasing the ‘strong feelings’ [] question” in compound form. 

Indeed, the whole point of this Court’s holding was to specifically require a trial court, on 

request, to ask the “strong feelings” question in non-compound form; this Court expressly 

held that, “on request, a trial court must ask during voir dire: ‘Do any of you have strong 

feelings about [the crime with which the defendant is charged]?’” Id. at 364, 86 A.3d at 

1240 (brackets in original). Tellingly, in a line of cases that began more than a decade 

before Pearson, this Court had held that trial courts abused their discretion by refusing to 

ask compound “strong feelings” questions. See Thomas, 369 Md. at 204-05, 798 A.2d at 

567-68; Sweet, 371 Md. at 9-10, 806 A.2d at 270-71; Shim, 418 Md. at 40, 42, 12 A.3d at 

672-73, 674. Thus, by the time that this Court decided Pearson, it was already wellestablished that the “strong feelings” question is mandatory on request. In Pearson, 437 

Md. at 362-63, 86 A.3d at 1239, this Court reaffirmed that principle, and determined that, 

under Dingle, 361 Md. at 21, 759 A.2d at 830, where the “strong feelings” question is 

requested, a trial court must ask it in non-compound form. In sum, although we understand 

the Court of Special Appeals’s reasoning, we disagree with its determination that 

“[w]hatever the compound questions about ‘strong feelings’ may have failed to uncover 

directly was fully uncovered by the totality of questions that were asked.” Collins, 238 
- 29 -

Md. App. at 555, 192 A.3d at 926.

Having concluded that the other questions that the circuit court asked during voir 

dire could not substitute for properly-phrased “strong feelings” questions, we now explain 

why, contrary to the position of the State and the Court of Special Appeals, see Collins, 

238 Md. App. at 558, 192 A.3d at 928, the circuit court did not cure its abuse of discretion 

by later asking the selected jury properly-phrased “strong feelings” questions. To be sure, 

“[a]n appellate court presumes that prospective jurors are honest in deciding whether to 

respond affirmatively to a voir dire question.” Pearson, 437 Md. at 360 n.3, 86 A.3d at 

1238 n.3 (citations omitted). That said, in this case, although none of the selected jurors 

responded to the properly-phrased “strong feelings” questions, multiple circumstances cast 

doubt on our ability to conclude that the jurors’ lack of response would have been the same 

had the circuit court asked properly-phrased “strong feelings” questions during voir dire. 

For one thing, the circuit court had already asked compound “strong feelings” questions 

during voir dire; and, after the jury was seated, the circuit court prefaced the properlyphrased “strong feelings” questions by stating: “I am going to re-ask two questions that we 

covered earlier[,] but I am going to ask them [in] a slightly different manner.” Under these 

circumstances, it is not clear that the jurors would have appreciated the difference between 

the compound “strong feelings” questions and the properly-phrased ones. Despite having 

been asked properly-phrased “strong feelings” questions later, each juror may have been 

left with the impression that, as the compound “strong feelings” questions had indicated

earlier, even if the juror had strong feelings about burglary and/or theft, he or she did not 

need to respond if, in his or her view, such strong feelings would not have rendered him or 
- 30 -

her unable to be fair and impartial. If there were any jurors who had strong feelings about 

burglary and/or theft, yet judged themselves to still be able to be fair and impartial, those 

jurors, after having been exposed to the compound “strong feelings” questions, may have 

opted not to respond to the properly-phrased “strong feelings” questions later.

Additionally, jurors may have failed to respond because they thought that 

responding was unnecessary, as the circuit court had previously asked “strong feelings” 

questions; or, the jurors may have been hesitant to respond because they were concerned 

about appearing to have changed their response to the “strong feelings” questions. Such 

hesitation could have been brought about by the circumstance that, when the circuit court 

asked the jury properly-phrased “strong feelings” questions, the jurors were in a group of 

fourteen people in the jury box. Accordingly, compared to responding to the compound

“strong feelings” questions during voir dire in a large group, responding to the properlyphrased “strong feelings” questions during the trial would have drawn much more attention 

to any responding juror.

By the time that the circuit court asked the jury properly-phrased “strong feelings” 

questions, the jurors had already been sworn, had already heard preliminary jury 

instructions, and had already heard opening statements. In other words, the jurors knew 

that the trial was underway, and that each of them was part of a select group of people who 

had been chosen to be the triers of fact. As a result, it is reasonable to infer that, at this

point, the jurors may have felt invested in this case, and felt obligated to participate in the 

trial to its conclusion. It would have been obvious that the circuit court might excuse any 

juror who responded affirmatively to the properly-phrased “strong feelings” questions. 
- 31 -

Accordingly, the idea of responding to the properly-phrased “strong feelings” questions 

may have prompted concerns for the jurors about being relieved of their positions on the 

jury. Also, a juror may have felt that, if he or she were excused, the time that he or she had 

spent listening to the preliminary jury instructions and the opening statements would have 

been a waste.

None of these concerns would have existed during voir dire. At that time, none of 

the prospective jurors knew whether they would be seated as jurors. Additionally, apart 

from the circuit court’s one-sentence summary of the allegations against Collins, none of 

the prospective jurors knew anything about this case’s facts. As a result, during voir dire, 

the prospective jurors were not invested in this case in any way. There were forty-five 

prospective jurors. Any response to the compound “strong feelings” question while there 

was a group of forty-five prospective jurors in the gallery during voir dire would have 

generated far less attention than a response to the properly-phrased “strong feelings” 

questions while there was a group of fourteen jurors in the jury box during the trial. In 

short, the circumstances that the selected jurors were under when the circuit court asked 

the jury properly-phrased “strong feelings” questions did not exist during voir dire. We 

cannot conclude that the circuit court court’s asking properly-phrased “strong feelings” 

questions of selected jurors cured any abuse of discretion that was caused by asking the 

compound “strong feelings” questions during voir dire.

In conclusion, asking the selected jury properly-phrased “strong feelings” questions

after preliminary jury instructions and opening statements was too little, too late. By the 

time that the trial was underway, it was impossible to recreate the circumstances that had 
- 32 -

existed during voir dire, and the circumstances were such that the selected jurors were less 

likely to disclose the existence of any strong feelings about burglary and/or theft. In other 

words, we do not share the Court of Special Appeals’s certainty that “no juror with ‘strong 

feelings’ served on [the] jury.” Collins, 238 Md. App. at 560 n.2, 192 A.3d at 929 n.2.5

Finally, to be clear, we reject Collins’s contention that asking the jury properlyphrased “strong feelings” questions did not cure the circuit court’s abuse of discretion

because the circuit court’s failure to ask such questions during voir dire impaired his 

purported right to intelligently use peremptory strikes. As the Court of Special Appeals

aptly explained, Collins “mounts his argument in the wrong [S]tate” because, in Maryland, 

voir dire “does not exist, even partially, for the purpose of supplying information to trial 

counsel that may guide them in the strategic use of their peremptory challenges.” Collins, 

238 Md. App. at 559, 192 A.3d at 928. In cases, from as recently as two years ago, see

Collins v. State, 452 Md. 614, 622, 158 A.3d 553, 558 (2017), to Pearson, 437 Md. at 356-

57, 86 A.3d at 1235-36, to as far back as more than a century ago, see Handy v. State, 101 

Md. 39, 43-44, 60 A. 452, 454 (1905), this Court has consistently confirmed that Maryland 

employs limited voir dire—that is, in Maryland, voir dire’s sole purpose is to elicit specific 

 

5Although this Court has applied the doctrine of harmless error to a trial court’s 

decision to ask a particular question during voir dire, see State v. Stringfellow, 425 Md. 

461, 465, 42 A.3d 27, 29 (2012), curiously, in its brief, the State does not contend that the 

circuit court’s abuse of discretion was harmless. At oral argument, the Assistant Attorney 

General explained that the State’s contention “isn’t a ‘harmless error’ argument, but it’s a 

‘correction of the error’ argument[.]” As such, we do not address harmless error.

(Continued...)
- 33 -

cause for disqualification, not to aid counsel in the intelligent use of peremptory strikes.6

For the above reasons, the circuit court abused its discretion by asking compound 

“strong feelings” questions and refusing to ask properly-phrased ones during voir dire, and 

the circuit court did not cure its abuse of discretion by asking the jury properly-phrased 

“strong feelings” questions. We reverse and remand for a new trial. On remand, the circuit 

court must, on request, ask properly-phrased “strong feelings” questions during voir dire.

JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF SPECIAL 

APPEALS REVERSED. CASE REMANDED TO 

THAT COURT WITH INSTRUCTIONS TO 

REVERSE THE JUDGMENTS OF THE CIRCUIT 

COURT FOR ANNE ARUNDEL COUNTY AND 

REMAND TO THAT COURT FOR A NEW 

TRIAL. ANNE ARUNDEL COUNTY TO PAY 

COSTS IN THIS COURT AND IN THE COURT 

OF SPECIAL APPEALS.

 

6We note that, in his reply brief, Collins expressly states that he “is not asking this 

Court to adopt an expanded voir dire process[,]” and that, instead, he asserts that the circuit 

court’s abuse of discretion “impaired” “his [purported] right to intelligently . . . exercise 

his” peremptory strikes. Again, this Court has never recognized such a right. 
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS

OF MARYLAND

No. 54

September Term, 2018

______________________________________

GORDON COLLINS

v.

STATE OF MARYLAND

______________________________________

Barbera, C.J.

Greene

McDonald

Watts

Hotten

Getty

Harrell, Jr., Glenn T. (Senior 

Judge, Specially Assigned),

JJ.

______________________________________

Concurring Opinion by Harrell, J.

______________________________________

Filed: April 2, 2019

Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County

Case No. C-02-CR-17-001278 

Argued: February 1, 2019
As I did in my concurrence in Pearson v. State, 437 Md. 350, 370-71, 86 A.3d 1232, 

1243-44 (2014), I howl anew into an unresponsive void that the present case1should be the 

vehicle by which this Court embraces expansion of the purpose and use of voir dire to aid 

in the intelligent exercise of peremptory challenges. Perhaps by tackling this problem, the 

Court could cure or minimize also some of the peculiarities in the present state of the law 

identified by Judge McDonald in his dissent here (see dissent slip op. at 2-5). 

The Court received on 15 July 2014 the 185th Report of its Standing Committee on 

the Rules of Practice & Procedure, which contained a post-Pearson analysis and 

recommendations regarding “intelligent exercise” of peremptory challenges. The Rules 

Committee recommended that the Court adopt such an approach, thus joining the federal 

courts and the great majority of the state courts. This report, like my concurrences, seems 

to have received publicly from the Court only the chirping of crickets in reply. The Court 

has done nothing (to my admittedly limited knowledge as a Senior Judge who no longer 

occupies an on-going seat at the table) with the recommendations of the Rules Committee. 

If it is waiting for a product from the Maryland State Bar Association’s special committee 

(created in 2011) regarding draft pattern criminal voir dire questions, such patience has 

been expended. The special committee estimated for the Rules Committee in 2014 that it 

could take up to two years to generate its product. Yet, here we are in 2019 with nothing 

to consider. Time moves on and the Court should act.

I join the judgment only in this case because the Court has twisted over the years 

 

1 Even though Collins, in his reply brief at 10, eschews asking the Court to entertain 

this objective in his case. See also the Majority slip op. at 32, n.6.
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the state of the governing relevant law into a pretzel in obeisance to its historical posture 

of limited voir dire, such that the majority opinion’s reasoning and outcome here appear to 

be on solid precedential grounds. I confess my earlier sins in joining in that exercise for 

some time, but I had a “come-to-Jesus” moment in State v. Thomas, 369 Md. 202, 217-19, 

798 A.2d 566, 574-76 (2002) and find myself advocating since for a new way of thinking. 
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS

OF MARYLAND

No. 54

September Term, 2018

______________________________________

GORDON COLLINS

v.

STATE OF MARYLAND

______________________________________

Barbera, C.J.

Greene

McDonald

Watts

Hotten

Getty

Harrell, Jr., Glenn T. (Senior 

Judge, Specially Assigned),

JJ.

______________________________________

Dissenting Opinion by McDonald, J., 

which Barbera, C.J., joins. 

______________________________________

Filed: April 2, 2019

Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County

Case No. C-02-CR-17-001278 

Argued: February 1, 2019
I would affirm the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals in this case and adopt 

that court’s well-reasoned opinion. Collins v. State, 238 Md. App. 545 (2018) (Moylan, 

J.). In that opinion, the intermediate appellate court carefully reviewed the voir dire process 

as a whole and concluded that the process adequately served the purpose of determining 

whether there were specific reasons to disqualify prospective jurors.

The Majority Opinion takes a narrower focus. It holds that, upon request, a trial 

judge must always ask a jury panel “Do any of you have strong feelings about [the crime 

with which the defendant is charged]?” and may not include in that question any proviso 

that relates any such “feelings” to the prospective juror’s ability to serve fairly and 

impartially. Majority slip op. at 4. The Majority Opinion holds that the failure to ask the 

question in its prescribed manner is an abuse of discretion that necessitates reversal of a 

conviction. Id. at 23.

As the Majority Opinion recounts, the trial court in this case asked two “strong 

feelings” questions related to the charged crimes in the following form: “Does anyone on 

this panel have any strong feelings about [the offense charged] to the point where you could 

not render a fair and impartial verdict on the evidence?” Majority slip op. at 7. This was 

essentially the question that this Court unanimously mandated in 2011 that trial courts ask 

during voir dire. State v. Shim, 418 Md. 37, 54 (2011). A few years later, however, a 

majority of this Court held that a trial court abused its discretion when it asked the question 

in that form because it was a compound question that required self-evaluation by the 

prospective juror. Pearson v. State, 437 Md. 350, 356-64 (2014).

There are good reasons to have a general preference against the use of compound 
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questions during voir dire. A compound question is inherently harder to comprehend. That 

may be especially true when the question is posed orally in a setting that, for most 

prospective jurors, is unfamiliar and perhaps intimidating. Moreover, compound questions

that ask the prospective juror not only to provide information, but also to evaluate the 

significance of that information can undermine the purpose of voir dire. For example, in

Dingle v. State, 361 Md. 1 (2000), the Court held that certain voir dire questions relating 

to the prospective juror’s specific relationships and past experiences1should not have been 

asked in compound form. While the questions themselves asked for specific information 

from the prospective juror that was amenable to a “yes” or “no” answer – which would 

allow appropriate follow-up of a “yes” answer – the second part of each question told a 

prospective juror who would otherwise have answered “yes” that no response was 

necessary if they felt they could be fair and impartial. This self-evaluation meant that a 

juror’s unstated “yes” response concerning the juror’s relevant relationships and 

experiences could escape follow-up inquiry.

The particular question at issue in this case – concerning “strong feelings” about a 

type of crime – is a peculiar one. Unlike the questions considered in Dingle, it does not 

ask the juror for specific information about relationships or experiences, but requires the 

juror’s self-evaluation from the outset – What are my feelings about this topic? Are they 

“strong”? 

 

1 The seven questions at issue in Dingle asked whether the prospective juror (or a 

friend or family member) had been a victim of a crime, accused of a crime, a witness in a 

criminal case, a juror in a criminal case, a member of a victims’ rights group, a lawyer or 

law student, or associated with a law enforcement agency. Dingle, 361 Md. at 4 n.4.
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Suppose the crime charged happens to be murder, or rape, or child abuse. Under 

the rule applied by the Majority Opinion, a trial court is bound to ask simply whether any 

members of the jury venire “have strong feelings” about murder, or rape, or child abuse. It 

is quite possible that an entire jury venire would respond affirmatively to such a question. 

In a sense, society collectively has “strong feelings” about such conduct – that’s why such 

conduct has been classified as criminal. A prospective juror who does not have “strong 

feelings” about such crimes may well be suspect. One would think that it would be more 

appropriate to ask follow-up questions of those potential jurors who do not stand or raise 

their hands in response to such a question.

Perhaps such a question is meant to ferret out whether a prospective juror has 

stronger feelings than most people about a particular type of crime; if so, it presumably 

should be phrased in that way. But, again, that would require the individual panel member 

to evaluate his or her own feelings and then compare those feelings to some hypothetical 

benchmark. In any event, asking prospective jurors whether they have “strong feelings”

by definition requires them to do a self-evaluation and not simply to reveal information 

about relationships, present status, or past experiences. 

It is perhaps not surprising that other jurisdictions that mandate open-ended 

questions in voir dire and that discourage compound questions have not reached the same 

conclusion as the Majority Opinion. An example may be found in the model voir dire 

questions promulgated by the New Jersey Supreme Court. New Jersey Supreme Court 

Directive #4-07 (May 16, 2007). That directive expresses a strong preference for openended voir dire questions. Id. at 4-5. However, among the mandatory standard voir dire 
- 4 -

questions is the following:

11. Is there anything about the nature of the charge itself that 

would interfere with your impartiality?

Id., Model Jury Selection Questions – Standard Jury Voir Dire – Criminal, at p. 3. Under 

the Majority Opinion in this case, such a question would be considered a forbidden 

compound question that would result in reversal of a conviction.

Another interesting contrast to the Majority Opinion is the approach of the United 

States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. Like this Court, the United 

States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit has held that a trial court’s use 

of compound questions during voir dire denied a defendant a “full and fair opportunity to 

expose bias or prejudice” in the jury panel and, for that reason, vacated the defendant’s 

conviction. United States v. Littlejohn, 489 F.3d 1335 (D.C. Cir. 2007). But the basis of 

that holding was very different from the one in this case.

During jury selection in Littlejohn, the trial court had asked the panel compound 

voir dire questions concerning (1) any relationship to law enforcement officers; (2) 

acquaintance with other members of the jury panel; (3) employment by a criminal defense 

attorney; (4) whether the prospective juror was a lawyer or law student; (5) previous service 

as a grand juror; (6) previous service as a juror. 489 F.3d at 1341.2 The second part of 

each compound question asked whether, if the prospective juror had such a relationship, 

acquaintance, legal knowledge, or past experience, it would affect his or her ability to be a 

 

2 As is evident these are very similar to the questions that this Court found 

problematic in Dingle. See footnote 1 above.
- 5 -

fair and impartial juror in the case. Id. Note that, as in Dingle, each of those questions 

concerns a prospective juror’s relationships, present status, and past experiences. And, 

again like Dingle, none of the questions concerned “strong feelings” about the crime 

charged.

But, unlike the Majority Opinion in this case, the United States Court of Appeals 

for the District of Columbia Circuit does not condemn all compound questions 

indiscriminately. Indeed, that court has specifically endorsed a “kitchen sink” question at 

the end of the voir dire process in which a trial court invites individual panel members to 

come forward if there is “any reason that you can think of, even though we have not covered 

it in a question, that you believe is a basis for your inability to sit fairly, attentively, and 

impartially if selected as a juror.” United States v. West, 458 F.3d 1, 7 (D.C. Cir. 2006) 

(Garland, J.). Such a question might be criticized as compound and inviting self-evaluation 

by the prospective juror, but the District of Columbia Circuit deemed it “important”

because it requires each juror to consider the oath that the juror has taken and to respond if 

the prospective juror feels that any aspect of the case might affect the juror’s impartiality. 

Id.

Perhaps my research is wanting, but I could not find any other jurisdiction in which 

an appellate court has reversed a conviction because the trial court asked the voir dire 

question on which the Court reverses this conviction. 

In my view, the opinion of the Court of Special Appeals applies the holding of 

Pearson in a sensible way that honors the underlying concern about the biases and 

prejudices that voir dire seeks to expose, as well as the concern about juror self-evaluation.
- 6 -

Chief Judge Barbera has advised that she joins this opinion.