United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

May 23, 2005

Charles R. Fulbruge III

Clerk

In the

United States Court of Appeals

for the Fifth Circuit

_______________

m 04-41307

Summary Calendar

_______________

IN THE MATTER OF:

SAM DILLON,

Debtor.

SAM DILLON AND PAM DILLON,

Appellants,

VERSUS

TEXAS COMMISSION ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY AND MICHAEL GROSS,

Appellees.

_________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Texas

m 9:04-CV-92-RHC

m 9:04-CV-93-RHC

m 9:04-CV-94-RHC

m 9:04-CV-95-RHC

______________________________
2

Before DAVIS, SMITH, and DENNIS, 

Circuit Judges.

JERRY E. SMITH, Circuit Judge:*

Pro se appellants Sam and Pam Dillon appeal the district court’s order that affirmed the

bankruptcy court’s finding that they are ineligible for relief under chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Code. Finding no error, we affirm.

I.

SamDillon and his wife filed for chapter 13

bankruptcy about three years after Dillon had

received a chapter 7 discharge. The Texas

Commission on Environmental Quality

(“TCEQ”)SSthe Texas state agency charged

with enforcing environmental lawsSSfiled a

timely claim against Dillon in connection with

the chapter 13 filing for governmental fines,

penalties, and other liabilities arising from alleged unlawful operation of public water utilities. The Dillons objected to TCEQ’s initial

claim, asserting that they should not be fined

for periods before or during the pendency of

their chapter 7 proceeding. TCEQ amended

its claim to assert an unsecured interest in

$337,000 in fines and penalties only for unlawful operation allegedly conducted between

the dates of the chapter 7 discharge and the

chapter 13 filing. 

The bankruptcy court denied the Dillons’

objection to TCEQ’s amended claim, finding

that the debtor had continued to operate the

water systems after the chapter 7 discharge.

Because TCEQ’s unsecured claim exceeded

$290,925 (the maximum amount of non-contingent, liquidated, unsecured debt that a

debtor may have to receive relief under chapter 13, see 11 U.S.C. § 109(e)), the court denied confirmation of the Dillons’ chapter 13

plan, denied their motions for a hardship discharge pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 1328(b), and

dismissed their chapter 13 case without prejudice. The district court affirmed the bankruptcy court’s rulings.

II.

We review the bankruptcy court’s factual

findings for clear error and its legal conclusions de novo. See Lambert v. Miss. State Tax

Comm’n, 179 F.3d 281, 284 (5th Cir. 1999).

Findings of fact are clearly erroneous if we

have a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made. See Mabey v. Southwestern Elec. Power Co., 150 F.3d 503, 513 (5th

Cir. 1998). “Strict application of the clearly

erroneousrule is particularlyimportant whe[n]

the district court has affirmed the bankruptcy

court’sfindings.” Coston v. Bank of Malvern,

987 F.2d 1096, 1099 (5th Cir. 1992).

The Dillons are pro se, so their briefs are

liberallyconstrued and not held to the standard

of exactitude expected of briefs by attorneys.

See, e.g., Amin v. Universal Life Ins. Co., 706

F.2d 638, 640 n.1 (5th Cir. 1983). But, “pro

se litigants have no general immunity from the

rule that issues and arguments not briefed on

appeal are abandoned.” Geiger v. Jowers,

2005 U.S. App. LEXIS 4572, at *4 n. 6 (5th

Cir. Mar. 21, 2005).

III.

The Dillons assert that the trustee, TCEQ,

and the Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”) are

liable for violating a plethora of federal statutes, Texas regulations, and provisions in the

United States and Texas constitutions. As a

threshold matter, we refrain from considering

the claims made against the IRS, because they

* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has

determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited

circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
3

are wholly irrelevant to the issues presented by

the instant appeal; the IRS is not a party to this

action, and the asserted liability has no

colorable impact on the issues that are present

vis-á-vis the parties that are properly part of

this action. Moreover, because the Dillons

merely string-cite the provisions and fail to include any facts or brief any argument explaining why these laws were violated or how

finding liability under them would affect the

disposition in the district and bankruptcy

courts, the claims are deemed waived for inadequate briefing.1

IV.

As the district court properly found, the

dispositive issue is whether the bankruptcy

court properly allowed TCEQ’s claim, over

the Dillons’ objection, for an amount that exceeded $290,525; under 11 U.S.C. § 109(e),

an individual may not obtain relief under chapter 13 unless, at the time of the petition, the

aggregated non-contingent, liquidated, unsecured debts are lower than that amount.

Liberally construing the arguments presented

in the Dillons’ brief, they assert only two coherent challengesto the bankruptcy court’s allowance of TCEQ’s claim: (1) that the claim

was fraudulent and (2) that it was error to approve the claim for $460,000 when the amended claim was for $337,000.2

 

The Dillons point to nothing in the record

that is probative oftheir assertion that TCEQ’s

claim was forged and fraudulent. Mere

conclusional assertions do not demonstrate

that the bankruptcy court was clearly erroneous in its factual finding that the claim was

legitimate. Even assuming arguendo that the

bankruptcy court erred in approving TCEQ’s

claim for $460,000 when it had requested only

$337,000, that would not affect the disposition

of the case, because $337,000 plainly exceeds

the $290,525 jurisdictional threshold limit for

chapter 13 bankruptcy relief established by §

109(e).

Because the bankruptcy court did not err in

allowing TCEQ’s claim for at least $290,525,

the Dillons are ineligible for relief under chapter 13, because the debt exceeded the jurisdictional limits established in §109(e). The remaining rulings of the bankruptcy court are

correct as a matter of law, because they flow

from the Dillons’ ineligibility for relief under

chapter 13; the court appropriately denied

certification of their plan, denied a hardship

discharge,3and dismissed their case without

prejudice.

AFFIRMED.

1

See FED. R. APP. P. 28(a)(9)(A); see also

United States v. Martinez, 263 F.3d 436 (5th Cir.

2001) (noting that failure adequately to brief an

issue on appeal can constitute waiver of that argument); Geiger, 2005 U.S. App. LEXIS 4572, at *4

n. 6 (“[P]ro se litigants have no general immunity

from the rule that issues and arguments not briefed

on appeal are abandoned.”).

2 The Dillons do not argue that the method of

calculatingTCEQ’s claimwasin error, nor do they

(continued...)

2

(...continued)

assert that the claim was not aggregated, noncontingent, liquidated and unsecured, as required

for disqualifying a party from chapter 13 relief

under § 109(e).

3 A hardship discharge may be granted by the

bankruptcy court only “[a]t any time after the confirmation of the plan.” 11 U.S.C. § 1328(b)

(emphasis added).