# United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit Chicago, Illinois 60604

Submitted July 30 , 201 8 * Decided August 17, 2018

Before

DIANE P. WOOD , C hief Judge

ILANA DIAMOND ROVNER , Circuit Judge

DIANE S. SYKES , Circuit Judge

No. 18

- 1040

MICHAEL E. BARGO, JR

. , Plaintiff

- Appellant ,

v

.
PORTER COUNTY, INDIA NA , et al. , Defendants

- Appellees

. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Indiana, Hammond Division

.

No. 2:16

- cv

- 177

Joseph S. Van Bokkelen , Judge

.
O R D E R

Michael Bargo sued P orter County , its officials , and two Indiana judges alleging

a conspir acy to deprive him of his property without due process. The di strict court dismissed the suit on the ground that Bargo , who had filed for bankruptcy protection after the events giving rise to this law suit, no longer was the real party in interest to any claim in this suit. See F ED

. R. C IV

. P. 17(a)(1). We affirm the judgment , though we modify it to reflect that some claims must be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction , as barred

* We have agreed to decide th is case without oral argument because the briefs and record adequately present the facts and legal arguments, and oral argument would not significantly aid the court

. F ED

. R. A PP

. P. 34(a)(2)(C). NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION To be cited only in accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1No. 18

- 1040 Page 2

by the Rooker

- Feldman doctrine

. See D

. C

. Ct

. App

. v. Feldman , 460 U.S. 462 (1983) ; Rooker v. Fid. Tr

. Co. , 263 U.S. 413 (1923).

Acco rding to Bargo’s complaint, officials in Porter County and two Indiana judges conspired fraudulently to seize and sell his real property

. As he explains, a n auditor and treasurer for the County refused to credit his 2011 and 2012 property tax payments, and a judge who presid ed over a subsequent tax

- sale hearing “ refused to acknowledge ” that Bargo had paid his tax bills

. Bargo responded by su ing the county
tr easurer in small

- claims court , seeking to recoup his property and tax payments. B ut according to Bargo, the presiding judge in that court d ismissed his suit without providing him notice, a hearing, or an opportunity to respond, and the clerk of the small

- c laims court prevented him from filing an appeal when she remov ed his pleadings from the docket

. The defendants further conspired , he asserted, by producing a fraudulent tax bill, intimidat ing him, and refusing to turn over certain court documents . The defe ndants’ seizure and sale of Bargo’s property “ruined his credit so he had to file Chapter 7 bankruptcy.” In this suit, Bargo seeks compensatory damages measured by the value of his lost property.
The county defendants mo ved to dismiss Bargo’s complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) for want of subject

- matter jurisdiction. They argued that Bargo lacked “standing” to bring the claims in this suit because, under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 17(a)(1), he was not the real party in interest to those claims . T hose claims had become part of Bargo’s bankruptcy estate wh en he petitioned for bankruptcy; thus only the bankruptcy trustee had the right to pursue them

. Bargo’s complaint , they added, also was barred under the Rooker

- Feldman doctrine b ecause it sought review of two state

- court judgments entered against him before he filed th is suit

.
T he district court dismiss ed Bargo’s complaint on the ground that he did not have “standing” under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 17(a)(1) , a rule that r equires suit s to “be prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest.” T he court , taking judicial notic e of Bargo’s bankruptcy proceedings, agreed with the county defendants that only the bankruptcy trustee could prosecute the claims in this suit

. Nonetheless, the
court invited Bargo under Rule 17(a)(3) to have the trustee, as the real party in interest, “ratify, join, or be substituted into the action.” Bargo tried to show that t he bankruptcy
trustee “abandon ed ” the bankruptcy estate ’s interest in the claims , s ee 11 U.S.C. § 554(a) , when the trustee sent him an email forswearing any interest in the litigation. But t he court concluded that none of the statutory requiremen ts for abandonment had been met and dismiss ed the suit.No. 18

- 1040 Page 3

On appeal Bargo maintai ns that his case should not have been dismissed , because he is the real party in interest . This prompts us to begin with a correcti on . T o the extent that the district court based its dismissal on Rule 17 ’s real

- party

- in

- interest requirement , that ruling was no t jurisdictional. Rule 17 does not limit the subject

- matter jurisdiction of federal courts

. See Knopick v. Jayco, Inc. , 895 F.3d 525 , 529 (7th Cir. 2018) (citing Rawoof v. Texor Petroleum Co. , 521 F.3d 750, 75 6

– 5 7 (7th Cir. 2008) ); Norris v. Causey , 869 F.3d 360, 366

– 67 (5th Cir. 2017 )

. Although we treat the real

- party

- in

- interest requirement similar ly to the rule that bars litigants from assert ing the legal rights of others, G & S Holdings LLC v. Cont'l Cas. Co. , 697 F.3d 534, 540

– 41 (7th Cir. 2012) , rules of this genre do not deprive courts of subject

- matter jurisdiction ; they are flexible rules for deciding when a case should not go forward. See United States v. Windsor , 570 U.S. 744, 7 57 (2013); Doermer v. Callen , 847 F.3d 522, 526

– 27 n.1 (7th Cir. 2017) ; see also RK Co. v. See , 622 F.3d 846, 851

– 52 (7th Cir. 2010) ( distinguishing Rule 17 and prudential

- standing doctrine).
The defendants, for their part, continue to assert that some of Bargo’s claims are jurisdictionally barred by Rooker

- Feldman because they seek review of state

- court judgments. Indeed, j urisdiction to review state

- court judgments is vested exclusively in the Supreme Court

. 28 U.S.C. § 1257; Skinner v. Switzer , 562 U.S. 521, 53 1

– 3 2 (2011)

. Under the Rooker

- Feldman doctrine , federa l courts other than the Supreme Court must dismiss a party’s claims asserting injuries from a judgment that a state court issued against the party before the federal suit

. Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp. , 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005 ). Bargo attack ed the state

- court judgments ordering the sale of his property and denying him relief from that sale when he ask ed the district court to order the defendants to compensate him for their role in the improper sale of his property

.
As for Bargo’s claims that are not barred by Rooker

- Feldman , they were properly dismissed under Rule 17. Bargo’s complaint includes claims for conspiracy, fraud, and intimidation , all of which attack not the state

- court judgment but the unlawful conduct that led the state court s to rul e against him

. See Iqbal v. Patel , 780 F.3d 728, 729

– 31 (7th Cir. 2015) ; Jones v. Brennan , 465 F.3d 304 , 305 (7th Cir. 2006). These claims were properly dismissed under Rule 17 (a)(1) , however, because the bankruptcy trustee, not Bargo , wa s the real party in interest

. These c laims arose before Bargo filed for bankruptcy , and thus they are part of the bankruptcy estate and may be prosecuted only by the bankruptcy trustee

. See 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1); Biesek v. Soo Line R.R. Co. , 440 F.3d 410, 413 (7th Cir. 2006); In re Polis , 217 F.3d 899, 902 (7th Cir. 2000).No. 18

- 1040 Page 4

Bargo also reiterates that the bankruptcy estate ’s “abandonment” of any interest in this suit is reflected in the email he received from the bankruptcy trustee. But the bankrup tcy statute requires more to establish abandonment: a trustee must provide notice to Bargo’s creditors and the opportunity for a hearing before an abandonment will occur

. See 11 U.S.C. § 554(a); Biesek , 440 F.3d at 411.
Lastly , Bargo says that the district judge should have recused himself because he worked from 1969 to 1972 in the Indiana Attorney General’s Office, which is a party to this appeal. But this contention is frivolous , e ven if we construe it as an argument under 28 U.S.C. § 455 (a) , which requires judges to disqualify themselves from any proceeding in which their impartiality might reasonably be questioned

. “ O ur judicial system would hardly function if judges were potentially obliged to disqualify themselves ” in every
case involving a former employers, without more, let alone employers from 40 years ago. Nich olson v. City of Peoria , 860 F.3d 520 , 525 n.6 (7th Cir. 2017) , cert denied , 138 S. Ct. 981 (2018)

. The district court’s judgment is modified to reflect that Bargo’s claims all eging an injury from the outcomes of the tax sale and small

- claims case are dismissed for lack of jurisdiction

. As modified, the judgment is

AFFIRMED

.