UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 16-1769

ROBERT HOROWITZ; CATHY HOROWITZ,

Plaintiffs - Appellants,

v.

FEDERAL INSURANCE COMPANY, d/b/a Chubb & Son, a division of 

Federal Insurance Company,

Defendant - Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of 

Maryland, at Greenbelt. Deborah K. Chasanow, Senior District 

Judge. (8:15-cv-01959-DKC)

Submitted: February 28, 2017 Decided: March 10, 2017

Before AGEE, KEENAN, and WYNN, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

John S. Lopatto III, Washington, D.C., for Appellant. Eric 

Hemmendinger, SHAWE & ROSENTHAL LLP, Baltimore, Maryland, for 

Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:

Plaintiffs Robert Horowitz and Cathy Horowitz commenced 

this action against Federal Insurance Company (“Federal”), 

alleging that Federal violated the Maryland Consumer Debt 

Collection Act, Md. Code Ann., Com. Law §§ 14-201 to -204

(LexisNexis 2013) (MCDCA), and the Maryland Collection Agency 

Licensing Act, Md. Code Ann., Bus. Reg. §§ 7-101 to -502

(LexisNexis 2015) (MCALA), by funding a state court action for 

unpaid legal fees brought against the Horowitzes by the 

Horowitzes’ former counsel. The district court granted 

Federal’s motion to dismiss the complaint, and we affirm.

We review de novo a district court’s ruling on a Fed. R. 

Civ. P. 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, taking the complaint’s 

factual allegations as true and drawing all reasonable 

inferences in the plaintiffs’ favor. Harbout v. PPE Casino 

Resorts Md., LLC, 820 F.3d 655, 658 (4th Cir. 2016). To survive 

a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient facts 

to state a claim that is plausible on its face. Bell Atl. Corp. 

v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). “The plausibility 

standard is not akin to a probability requirement, but it asks 

for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted 

unlawfully.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) 

(internal quotation marks omitted). 
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To state a cause of action under the MCDCA, the Horowitzes 

were required to assert that Federal was a collector—that is, “a 

person collecting or attempting to collect an alleged debt 

arising out of a consumer transaction.” Md. Code Ann., Com. Law 

§ 14-201(b). To state a claim under the MCALA, the Horowitzes 

had to allege that Federal was a collection agency—that is, “a 

person who engages directly or indirectly in the business of 

collecting for, or soliciting from another, a consumer claim.” 

Md. Code Ann., Bus. Reg. § 7-101(c)(1)(i) (LexisNexis 2015). 

The Horowitzes failed on both fronts. Although the complaint 

insinuated that someone other than Selzer paid for Selzer’s 

legal representation, it fell short of plausibly asserting that 

Federal here acted as a collector or a collection agency as 

defined by the state statutes in Maryland. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 

678.

Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s dismissal of 

the complaint. We dispense with oral argument because the facts 

and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials 

before this court and argument would not aid the decisional 

process.

AFFIRMED