Opinion filed October 24, 2013

In The

Eleventh Court of Appeals __________

No. 11-12-00026-CV

__________

SCOTT MATTISON LAWSON, Appellant

V.

TEXAS COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS ET AL., Appellees

On Appeal from the 250th District Court

Travis County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. D-1-GN-11-002913

M E M O R A N D U M O P I N I O N

The trial court granted a plea to the jurisdiction and dismissed Scott 

Mattison Lawson’s suit for declaratory judgment that he filed against the Texas 

Court of Criminal Appeals; the presiding judge of that court, Sharon Keller; and 

some of the other Texas Court of Criminal Appeals judges: Barbara P. Hervey, 

Mike Keasler, Charles R. Holcomb, and Cathy Cochran. Because we agree with 

the trial court that immunity bars Appellant’s suit, we affirm.
2

I. Issue Presented

Appellant presents the following question on appeal: Did the trial court err 

when it granted Appellees’ plea to the jurisdiction? 

II. Background Facts

 Before Appellant filed this civil lawsuit, he was convicted of felony murder. 

The Amarillo Court of Appeals and the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed 

that conviction. Lawson v. State, 26 S.W.3d 920, 921–22 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 

2000), aff’d, 64 S.W.3d 396, 397 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001).

Appellant alleged in his declaratory judgment action that the Court of 

Criminal Appeals, and the named judges, violated his constitutional rights and 

committed reversible error when they refused to abide by their own court 

precedent and affirmed his murder conviction. Appellees responded with a plea to 

the jurisdiction. Appellees alleged that Appellant’s claims are barred by sovereign

and judicial immunity and that the Declaratory Judgment Act has no application to 

criminal cases. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 37.001–.011 (West 

2008). After it held a hearing by telephone conference, the trial court granted 

Appellees’ plea to the jurisdiction and dismissed the case.

III. Standard of Review

Because subject-matter jurisdiction is a question of law, we review a trial 

court’s decision on a plea to the jurisdiction de novo. Tex. Dep’t of Parks & 

Wildlife v. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d 217, 228 (Tex. 2004). We may review the entire 

record to determine if the facts support jurisdiction in the trial court. Bland Indep. 

Sch. Dist. v. Blue, 34 S.W.3d 547, 554–55 (Tex. 2000). A judgment may be 

reversed only for error that probably caused the rendition of an improper judgment 

or probably prevented an appellant from presenting his appeal. TEX. R.

APP. P. 44.1(a).
3

IV. Analysis

Sovereign immunity deprives a trial court of subject-matter jurisdiction and

may be properly asserted in a plea to the jurisdiction. Tex. Dep’t of Parks & 

Wildlife, 133 S.W.3d at 226–27. Under the doctrine of sovereign immunity, the 

State of Texas and its officials are protected from suit unless immunity has been 

specifically waived by the legislature by clear and unambiguous language. TEX.

GOV’T CODE ANN. § 311.034 (West 2013); Dallas Cnty. Mental Health & Mental 

Retardation v. Bossley, 968 S.W.2d 339, 341 (Tex. 1998). Sovereign immunity 

provides immunity from suit and immunity from liability. Fed. Sign v. Tex. S. 

Univ., 951 S.W.2d 401, 405 (Tex. 1997).

A judge is entitled to judicial immunity from liability for judicial acts 

performed in his official capacity and within the scope of his jurisdiction. Dallas 

Cnty. v. Halsey, 87 S.W.3d 552, 554 (Tex. 2002) (citing Stump v. Sparkman, 435 

U.S. 349, 356–57 (1978)). To determine whether a judge is protected by judicial 

immunity, the inquiry is whether he had jurisdiction over the subject matter of the 

challenged action. Stump, 435 U.S. at 356. “A judge will not be deprived of 

immunity because the action he took was in error, was done maliciously, or was in 

excess of his authority; rather, he will be subject to liability only when he has acted 

in the ‘clear absence of all jurisdiction.’” Id. at 356–57 (quoting Bradley v. Fisher,

80 U.S. 335, 351 (1871)).

Appellees properly asserted both sovereign and judicial immunity in their 

plea to the jurisdiction. Appellees, as officials of the State of Texas, may claim 

sovereign immunity, and Appellant has not shown a valid waiver of that immunity. 

Appellees are also entitled to judicial immunity, as their decision to affirm

Appellant’s murder conviction constituted judicial action that fell within the scope 

of their jurisdiction as judges of the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals. 
4

Appellees’ immunity deprived the trial court of subject-matter jurisdiction 

and properly resulted in the dismissal of Appellant’s suit. See Reata Constr. 

Corp. v. City of Dallas, 197 S.W.3d 371, 374 (Tex. 2006). Because we hold that 

Appellees are protected by sovereign and judicial immunity as a matter of law, we 

need not address Appellees’ additional contention that the Declaratory Judgment 

Act has no application to criminal cases. Appellant’s sole issue on appeal is 

overruled. 

V. This Court’s Ruling

We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

MIKE WILLSON

JUSTICE

October 24, 2013

Panel consists of: Wright, C.J.,

McCall, J., and Willson, J.