J-S09026-20

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

WILLIAM C. COTTRELL 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 2659 EDA 2019

Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered August 13, 2019

In the Court of Common Pleas of Bucks County Criminal Division at 

No(s): CP-09-CR-0006498-2015

BEFORE: SHOGAN, J., LAZARUS, J., and COLINS, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY LAZARUS, J.: FILED MARCH 27, 2020

William C. Cottrell appeals from the order, entered in the Court of 

Common Pleas of Bucks County, denying his petition filed pursuant to the Post 

Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”), 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546. Upon careful 

review, we affirm. 

At approximately 2:00 a.m. on June 16, 2012, an individual accosted 

Fox McClure outside his residence. The man forced McClure to give him $200 

from his wallet and demanded to be let into the McClure residence, where 

McClure’s wife, Willie Mae, was present. Upon entering the home, the 

individual demanded that the McClures open their safe. At first, the McClures 

denied owning a safe but, after the individual struck Mr. McClure in the head 

with a gun and threatened to kill Mrs. McClure, Mrs. McClure opened the safe 

____________________________________________

* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
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and gave the man the $300 in antique silver dollars contained therein. Shortly 

thereafter, the man fled through the front door of the McClure home. The 

McClures later described the individual as a black male wearing a black 

bandana or ski mask, a black hoody and a baseball cap. They estimated him 

to be in his late 20s or early 30s and between 5’10” and 6’1” tall, with a 

medium build. 

Mrs. McClure called 911 and provided information as to the direction in 

which the individual had fled. Nearby K9 Officer Keith Bertram received the 

emergency dispatch, and was advised that an individual in dark clothing was 

seen running across the turnpike near the ramp and access road. Within two 

minutes of receiving the dispatch, Officer Bertram arrived at the location of 

the ramp with his K9 partner, Apollo. Officer Bertram deployed Apollo, who 

alerted near a house with a fence and pool on Beaver Dam Road. Officer 

Bertram did not see anyone at that location and, shortly thereafter, ceased 

tracking. 

That same morning, at approximately 2:30 or 3:00 a.m., Michael Hill

was in his residence at 5725 Beaver Dam Road when he heard a banging noise 

and police sirens outside. He walked out to his backyard to investigate and 

saw a black man approach him from the deck area near the family pool. Hill 

described the man, who was not wearing anything on his face, as six feet tall, 

in his mid- to late-30s, with cornrow-style hair and scruffy facial hair. The 

man offered Hill money not to say anything about their encounter and Hill told 

him to get out of his yard. Later that day, Hill returned to his backyard and 
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discovered a dark hooded sweatshirt and a dark baseball cap under the pool 

deck near the area where the man had been. Hill notified police, who 

recovered the items. A black and white bandana was discovered inside the 

hooded sweatshirt. DNA matching that of Cottrell was subsequently found on 

both the bandana and the baseball cap.

Cottrell was ultimately arrested in July 2015 and charged with numerous 

offenses related to the McClure incident. The Commonwealth subsequently

nolle prossed many of those charges and proceeded to trial on the following

offenses: two counts each of robbery—threaten immediate serious injury and 

robbery—inflict or threaten immediate bodily injury, and one count each of 

burglary, aggravated assault and simple assault. After a jury trial, Cottrell 

was convicted of all of the above charges. On August 22, 2016, the trial court 

sentenced him to an aggregate of seven to 20 years’ incarceration. Cottrell 

appealed, and this Court affirmed his judgment of sentence on July 31, 2017. 

See Commonwealth v. Cottrell, 3210 EDA 2016 (Pa. Super. filed July 31, 

2017) (unpublished memorandum). Our Supreme Court denied allowance of 

appeal on January 17, 2018. See Commonwealth v. Cottrell, 179 A.3d 440 

(Pa. 2018) (Table).

Cottrell filed a timely pro se first PCRA petition on December 17, 2018. 

The PCRA court appointed counsel, who filed an amended petition on April 5, 

2019. The Commonwealth filed an answer and the court held a hearing on 

June 14, 2019. Following briefing by the parties, the court dismissed Cottrell’s 
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petition on August 13, 2019. This timely appeal followed. Both Cottrell and 

the court have complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.

Cottrell raises the following claims for our review: 

1. Did the [PCRA] court err in denying [Cottrell’s] PCRA claim that 

trial counsel was ineffective in failing to present character witness 

testimony at the time of trial[?]

2. Did the [PCRA] court err in denying [Cottrell’s] PCRA claim that 

trial counsel was ineffective in failing to retain a DNA expert 

witness to rebut the testimony of the Commonwealth’s expert and 

to raise a reasonable doubt upon the weight and sufficiency of the 

prosecution’s DNA evidence which allegedly linked [Cottrell] to the 

crime[?]

3. Did the [PCRA] court err in denying [Cottrell’s] PCRA claim that 

he was denied his constitutionally guaranteed right to effective 

representation, and trial counsel was ineffective when counsel 

failed to properly prepare for trial, or meet with [Cottrell] to 

prepare for trial[?]

Brief of Appellant, at v (renumbered for ease of disposition). 

We begin by noting our standard and scope of review of the denial of 

PCRA relief:

On appeal from the denial of PCRA relief, our standard [] of review 

is limited to determining whether the PCRA court’s findings are 

supported by the record and without legal error. Our scope of 

review is limited to the findings of the PCRA court and the evidence 

of record, viewed in the light most favorable to the prevailing party 

at the PCRA court level. The PCRA court’s credibility 

determinations, when supported by the record, are binding on this 

Court. However, this Court applies a de novo standard of review 

to the PCRA court’s legal conclusions.

Commonwealth v. Medina, 92 A.3d 1210, 1214–15 (Pa. Super. 2014) 

(citations, quotation marks and brackets omitted). 
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Cottrell’s claims all allege the ineffectiveness of trial counsel. Counsel 

is presumed effective, and it is a petitioner’s burden to prove otherwise. 

Commonwealth v. Ousley, 21 A.3d 1238, 1244 (Pa. Super. 2011). In order 

to prove that counsel was ineffective, a petitioner must plead and prove each 

of the following: “(1) the underlying legal claim is of arguable merit; (2) 

counsel’s action or inaction lacked any objectively reasonable basis designed 

to effectuate his client’s interest; and (3) prejudice, to the effect that there 

was a reasonable probability of a different outcome if not for counsel’s error.” 

Commonwealth v. Grove, 170 A.3d 1127, 1138 (Pa. Super. 2017) (citation 

omitted). A failure to plead or prove any prong will defeat an ineffectiveness 

claim. Id. 

With regard to the second element, an appellant must show that:

[I]n light of all the alternatives available to counsel, the strategy 

actually employed was so unreasonable that no competent lawyer 

would have chosen it. We inquire whether counsel made an 

informed choice, which at the time the decision was made 

reasonably could have been considered to advance and protect 

[the] defendant’s interests.

Commonwealth v. Buska, 655 A.2d 576, 582-83 (Pa. Super. 1995). “If 

counsel’s chosen course had some reasonable basis, the inquiry ends and 

counsel’s assistance is deemed effective.” Commonwealth v. Williams, 899 

A.2d 1060, 1064 (Pa. 2006).

Finally, 

[a] PCRA petitioner will be granted relief only when he proves, by 

a preponderance of the evidence, that his conviction or sentence 

resulted from the ineffective assistance of counsel which, in the 

circumstances of the particular case, so undermined the truth 
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determining process that no reliable adjudication of guilt or 

innocence could have taken place.

Commonwealth v. Ligon, 206 A.3d 515, 519 (Pa. Super. 2019) (citation 

omitted). 

Cottrell first alleges that trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by 

failing to present character witness testimony at trial. Specifically, Cottrell 

asserts that counsel should have called his friend, Monique Cooper, to testify 

as to Cottrell’s character traits of “kindness, compassion, non-violence, and 

peacefulness.” Brief of Appellant, at 17-18. Cottrell argues that, because he 

“had little defense other than to tell the jury himself he did not commit the 

crime and to present to the jury his good character,” there was “no logical 

explanation” for not presenting character testimony. Id. at 18. He asserts 

that counsel’s explanation for not calling character testimony—that he could 

not present Cottrell’s reputation for being a law abiding person due to past 

convictions for drug-related offenses and fleeing police—was unreasonable 

because Cooper would not have testified regarding his character for being lawabiding. Cottrell is entitled to no relief. 

Generally, evidence of a person’s character may not be admitted to 

show that individual acted in conformity with that characteristic or trait on a 

particular occasion. Pa.R.E. 404(a). However, Pennsylvania Rule of Evidence 

404(a)(1) provides an exception which allows a criminal defendant to offer 

evidence of his or her character traits that are pertinent to the crimes charged 

and allows the Commonwealth to rebut the same. Pa.R.E. 404(a)(1). 
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Evidence of good character offered by a defendant in a criminal 

prosecution must be limited to his general reputation for the 

particular trait or traits of character involved in the commission of 

the crime charged. The cross-examination of such witnesses by 

the Commonwealth must be limited to the same traits. Such 

evidence must relate to a period at or about the time the offense 

was committed, and must be established by testimony of 

witnesses as to the community opinion of the individual in 

question, not through specific acts or mere rumor.

Commonwealth v. Johnson, 27 A.3d 244, 248 (Pa. Super. 2011) (citation 

omitted). If character evidence is offered by a defendant, the Commonwealth 

may offer evidence to rebut it. See Pa.R.E. 404(a). “While character 

witnesses may not be impeached with specific acts of misconduct, a character 

witness may be cross-examined regarding his or her knowledge of particular 

acts of misconduct to test the accuracy of the testimony.” Commonwealth 

v. Treiber, 121 A.3d 435, 464 (Pa. 2015) (citation omitted).

Here, the PCRA court concluded that trial counsel had a reasonable basis 

for not calling character witnesses to testify as to Cottrell’s peacefulness and 

non-violence, as it would have opened the door to rebuttal by the 

Commonwealth with questions concerning Cottrell’s past convictions for drug 

dealing and fleeing and eluding police. We agree with the PCRA court. The 

Commonwealth could have “properly probed the standard by which the 

witness[] evaluated the peacefulness of a drug dealer generally [to] shed light 

upon Appellant’s character trait which he, himself, had put at issue. Such 

cross-examination is permissible under Pa.R.E. 405(a)[.]” Commonwealth 

v. Rashid, 160 A.3d 838, 849 (Pa. Super. 2017). In light of Cottrell’s past 

convictions, counsel’s strategy to “attack the prosecution and not call 
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character evidence” was reasonable under the circumstances and, thus, did 

not amount to ineffectiveness. Grove, supra. 

Next, Cottrell asserts that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to 

retain a DNA expert to rebut the Commonwealth’s DNA evidence. Cottrell is 

entitled to no relief on this claim. 

In order to establish ineffectiveness of counsel for failure to call a 

witness, a petitioner must show that: (1) the witness existed; (2) the witness 

was available to testify for the defense at trial; (3) counsel knew of, or should 

have known of, the existence of the witness; (4) the witness was willing to 

testify for the defense; and (5) the absence of the witness’ testimony was so 

prejudicial as to have denied the petitioner a fair trial. Commonwealth v. 

Puksar, 951 A.2d 267, 277 (Pa. 2008). 

Here, Cottrell failed to identify, much less present testimony from, a 

DNA expert who would have been willing and able to testify on his behalf at 

trial. Consequently, he is unable to demonstrate the manner in which the 

unidentified expert would have been helpful to his defense and that the 

absence of such testimony prejudiced him. See id. Accordingly, this claim 

fails. 

Finally, Cottrell asserts that counsel was ineffective for failing to properly 

prepare for trial or to meet with Cottrell for that purpose. Cottrell claims that, 

at most, he spoke with counsel twice by telephone prior to trial and once in 

person on the day of trial. He asserts that counsel did not review the case or 

discuss discovery with him. Cottrell argues that “without meeting in person, 
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or at least having a substantive telephone conversation regarding the 

evidence and possible defenses, trial counsel could not have learned of 

potential character witnesses, alibi witnesses, defense evidence or have 

prepared [Cottrell] to testify.” Brief of Appellant, at 21. Cottrell believed he 

had a strong defense and, by failing to meet with him, counsel “took away 

any and all chance [Cottrell] had for a different outcome.” Id. at 22. 

At Cottrell’s PCRA hearing, counsel—who had at that time been 

practicing criminal law for 33 years—testified that, in the absence of an alibi 

defense,1 he did not believe that Cottrell would have been able to assist him 

in the preparation of a defense. See N.T. PCRA Hearing, at 91. Rather, 

counsel “believe[d] this case would be based on . . . [c]ross-[e]xamination 

and the lack of identification by the victim or any witnesses, and [an] attempt 

to discount the DNA found on items that w[ere] found some distance away.” 

Id. In furtherance of Cottrell’s defense, counsel testified: 

I reviewed discovery. I honed up on DNA and reviewed the 

transcripts. Probably made various notes to myself before court 

. . . . I prepared the case like I prepare any serious case, by 

spending a lot of time on it, by asking colleagues questions, things 

like that.

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1 Cottrell testified at trial that he had no alibi for the time of the crime. See

N.T. Trial, 5/24/16, at 285 (“Q: So let’s try to get to my question. You have 

no alibi whatsoever? A: No.”). At his PCRA hearing, Cottrell presented 

testimony by his girlfriend, Kyra Williams, in an attempt to demonstrate an 

alibi. Williams testified that she realized at some point that the crime Cottrell 

was accused of had occurred on her birthday and that she and Cottrell had 

usually spent her birthday together. However, she was unable to specifically 

testify either that she and Cottrell were together on the date of the offense or 

what they may have been doing. 
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Id. at 99. Counsel also testified that he visited the scene of the crime in 

preparation for trial: “I was curious about the layout of the area so I did all 

that myself. So I went out there, I looked on the maps, things like that.” Id.

at 97. With respect to DNA evidence, counsel recalled that “there were three

items [but] only one of them had [] Cottrell’s DNA on it as opposed to 

mixtures” and the items with DNA had been recovered “some distance away 

and across the turnpike from where the event happened.” Id. at 98. Counsel 

testified that his strategy was to highlight both of those factors. Finally, 

counsel testified that he would have preferred Cottrell not testify at trial. 

However, once Cottrell indicated his intent to testify, counsel discussed with 

him: the manner in which he should present himself to the jury; how to look 

the jurors in the eye; how to dress; that he should tell the truth; that his 

denial of committing the crime should be strong; and to let his personality 

show through. See id. at 86. Counsel also prepared Cottrell for the questions 

he would ask him on direct examination. See id. at 86-87

In denying relief on this claim, the PCRA court concluded that counsel 

presented reasonable, strategic bases for his decisions regarding Cottrell’s 

defense. We can discern no error on the part of the court. Although counsel 

did not have substantial contact with Cottrell prior to trial, the length and 

frequency of consultations alone cannot support a finding of ineffectiveness. 

See Commonwealth v. Johnson, 51 A.3d 237, 244 (Pa. Super. 2012). 

Rather, we must evaluate the substantive impact of the consultations counsel 

did perform. Id. 
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Here, counsel reasonably explained that, given the facts of the case and 

his intention to focus Cottrell’s defense on discrediting the Commonwealth’s 

evidence, he did not feel that Cottrell could be of much assistance in preparing 

his defense. Moreover, prior to trial, counsel personally investigated the scene 

of the crime and reviewed the discovery as well as the preliminary hearing 

notes.2 At trial, counsel subjected the Commonwealth’s witnesses to vigorous 

cross-examination in an attempt to cast doubt on the identification of Cottrell 

as the perpetrator of the robbery. In cross-examining Fox and Willie Mae 

McClure, counsel elicited their agreement that, although Cottrell stood 

accused of the crime, neither one of them had any idea as to the actual identity 

of the robber. See N.T. Trial, 5/24/16, at 46, 70. Counsel also questioned 

the McClures regarding the robber’s seeming knowledge of the fact that the 

McClures owned a safe. In an attempt to discredit the police investigation, 

counsel successfully elicited testimony from the McClures that the police never 

asked them to identify any individuals who may have been aware of the 

presence of a safe in their home. See id. at 72 (“Q: [D]id they ask you, like, 

who—friends or family, who might know that you have the safe in your 

bedroom closet? A: No. Q: They ever ask you to tell them like a list of 

names? A: No.”). Counsel also sought to cast doubt on the DNA evidence 

by eliciting testimony from the Commonwealth’s forensic DNA analyst that it 

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2 Cottrell was represented by privately-retained counsel at his preliminary 

hearing. 
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was impossible for her to determine how long the DNA samples found on the 

cap and bandana had actually been present. See id. at 160, 162-63. 

Taken as a whole, the record does not demonstrate that counsel either 

failed adequately to prepare for trial, or provided ineffective representation at 

trial. Counsel’s defense strategy was a reasonable one under the 

circumstances and we can discern no error on the part of the PCRA court in 

denying relief on this claim. See Williams, supra (counsel not ineffective 

where chosen course had some reasonable basis).

Order affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 3/27/2020