No. 82-155 

IN THE SUPREP! COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 

1982 

IN RE THE MARRIAGE OF: 

LILLIAN A. GRENFELL, 

Appellant 

vs . 

ALLEN W. GRENFELL, 

Respondent, 

and 

IN RE THE MARRIAGE OF: 

ALLEN W. GRENFELL, 

vs . 

LILLIAN A. GRENFELL. 

Appeai from: District Court of the Third Judicial District, 

In and for the County of Deer Lodge 

Honorable Mark P. Sullivan, Judge presiding. 

Counsel of Record: 

For Appellant: 

Knight, Dahood, McLean & Everett; David M. McLean, 

Anaconda, Montana 

For Respondent: 

R. Lewis Brown, Jr., Butte, Montana 

- 

Submitted on briefs: August 12, 1982 

Decided: October 4, 1982 

Filed: ott a - 1982 

%mg.*h 

Clerk 
Mr. Chief Justice Frank I. Haswell delivered the Opinion of 

the Court. 

Lillian A. Grenfell appeals from an order of the Deer 

Lodge County District Court holding that Allen W. Grenfell 

was not in contempt of court and changing the payment 

schedule on support and maintenance. We affirm. 

In 1976, Lillian and Allen filed suit against each 

other for divorce. The actions were consolidated. At the 

divorce hearing the evidence disclosed a $3,806.92 spending 

spree by Lillian following the parties' separation with the 

indebtedness charged to Allen. Lillian had also forged 

Allen's name to an income tax refund check and spent the 

$1992. Allen had been paying $450 per month in temporary 

child support and maintenance, which he reduced to $300 per 

month following the spree. 

On March 3, 1977, the District Court issued findings 

of fact and conclusions of law and entered a decree dissolving the marriage. The court found Lillian liable to Allen 

for the shopping spree and the tax refund to the extent of 

$5,798.92. The court ordered Lillian to repay Allen by 

transferring to him stock worth $5,798.22 from her half of 

the stock in the family corporation. The court also ordered 

Allen to pay $375 per month as child support and maintenance, stating that such a reduction would enable him to 

liquidate "the debts Mrs. Grenfell showered upon him . . ." 

over the course of four or five years. The decree was modified on July 28, 1977. 

On appeal of that order, this Court held that the 

District Court had improperly penalized appellant twice for 

the debts she had accumulated--first by ordering her to give 

a portion of her corporate stock shares to Allen and again 
by reducing the child support and maintenance to be paid by 

Allen. Grenfell v. Grenfell (1979), 182 Mont. 229, 233, 596 

P.2d 205, 207. 

On remand the District Court held a hearing to adjust 

the property rights between the parties. The stock in the 

family corporation was once again equally divided between 

the parties and support and maintenance payments were raised 

to $450 per month. 

Allen has failed to pay any of the debts from the 

shopping spree, and Lillian has been sued by most of the 

creditors involved. She requested that Allen be held in 

contempt of court. The District Court held that Allen had 

not violated the provisions of tne amended divorce decree 

and was therefore not in contempt of any order of the 

District Court and ordered Allen to make support and maintenance payments on or before the 25th day of each month. 

Two issues are raised on appeal: 

(1) Whether Allen violated the provisions of the 

amended divorce decree and should have been held in contempt 

of court; and 

(2) Whether the District Court erred in modifying the 

schedule for child support and maintenance payments - sua 

sponte? 

For this Court to reverse the District Court, Lillian 

rnust demonstrate that there was a clear abuse of discretion 

by the District Court, that there is a clear preponderance 

of evidence against the District Court's findings, and she 

must overcome the presumption that the judgment of the 

District Court is correct. Jensen v. Jensen (1979), 182 

Mont. 472, 474, 597 P.2d 733, 734. 
The District Court has the power to compel obedience 

to its orders, section 3-1-111(4), MCA, and to punish disobedience of an order in a cause before it as contempt of 

court, section 3-1-501(e), MCA. See also, Board of Commissioners of Flathead County v. Eleventh Judicial District 

Court (1979), 182 Mont. 463, 470, 597 P.2d 728, 732; In Re 

Nelson et al. (1936), 103 Mont. 43, 52, 60 P.2d 365, 369, 

and cases cited therein. The District Court is not, however, bound to find a contempt of court where the facts do 

not support willful disobedience of a court order. Williams 

v. Budke (1980), Mont. , 606 P.2d 515, 518, 37 

St.Rep. 228, 232; State v. District Court of Third Judicial 

District (1938), 107 Mont. 185, 81 P.2d 692. 

Here, the District Court had before it the agreed 

facts as presented by counsel for both parties, the transcript of the modification hearing on remand, and the 

previous orders, findings of fact, and conclusions of law 

entered in this action. The record on appeal supports the 

District Court's determination that Allen was not in violation of the divorce decree as amended. 

The decree of dissolution was entered on March 3, 

1977. On July 28, 1977, the findings of fact, conclusions 

of law and supporting opinion of the District Court were 

modified and supplemented. In the decree and its supporting 

findings, conclusions and opinion, the District Court 

plainly indicated that Lillian owed Allen property to the 

extent of the $5,798.92 total of the shopping spree and the 

tax refund check appropriated by Lillian. The decree 

ordered Lillian to transfer stock worth $5,798.92 to Allen 

to balance the property rights of the parties. The findings 
of fact and the decree's supporting opiniorl indicated that 

Allen was to pay three specific bills that totaled less than 

$200 "as he [was] able" and provided as the rationale for 

the lowering of the child support and maintenance payments 

to $375 per month that this would give Allen the opportunity 

to pay off the bills Lillian had "showered upon him" over 

four to five years. 

The court noted in the findings of fact that Lillian's 

shopping spree had plunged Allen so far into debt that 

creditors were beginning to sue him on the accounts. The decree did not, however, order Allen to assume responsibility 

for the debts. 

On appeal this Court held that the reduction in child 

support and maintenance for the purpose of allowing Allen to 

liquidate the debts constituted a second penalty to Lillian 

since she had already been required to transfer stock to 

Allen in order to balance the property award. Upon remand, 

the District Court divided the stock equally between the 

parties and then proceeded to raise the child support and 

maintenance awards on the basis of changed circumstances. 

'The record on appeal does not support Lillian's contention 

that tne raise in the maintenance and support award was in 

part due to the District Court's consideration of the 

previous reduction in child support and maintenance for the 

purpose of allowing Allen to liquidate the debts. The 

findings and conclusions of the court in support of the 

amended decree make no reference to the previous reduction. 

They base the raise in the award solely upon a change in 

circumstances. Again, the decree did not order Allen to pay 

the debts. 
The record demonstrates an awareness on the part of 

the original trial court of the likelihood that Allen would 

be sued for collection on the accounts and that therefore 

the property award should be adjusted accordingly. It does 

not show that this was considered thereafter on remand when 

the trial court equalized the property award and adjusted 

the support and maintenance award based upon a change in 

circumstances. 

The record supports the order of the District Court 

entered on March 17, 1982, which held that Allen had not 

vlolated the decree of divorce as amended and entered on 

Narch 6, 1980. Lillian has failed to make a showing that 

Allen is in contempt of court in regard to the bills from 

the shopping spree. Nor does the record show that Allen was 

"able" to pay the three minor bills, was requested to do so 

and refused. This argument fails. 

The second issue raised by Lillian is whether the 

District Court erred in modifying the schedule for child 

support and maintenance payments sua sponte. Here, however, 

tile court's action was not sua sponte. Lillian's argument 

is without merit. 

Lillian, in her affidavit in support of order to show 

cause, requested the District Court to order Allen to make 

payments "when due." At the hearing on this matter, counsel 

for Lillian again asked the court to examine existing 

problems with the payment schedule for support payments. 

The original decree and the amendments of July 28, 

1977, called for one payment on the 15th day of the month. 

On remand, the District Court provided that the support 

payments be made "on a bi-monthly schedule as required by 
the original decree of the court on March 3, 1977 to conform 

with his pay periods set by employer." 

Since conflict exists between the payment schedule as 

set forth in the original decree and in the decree as 

amended on remand, it was the duty of the District Court to 

resolve it. The District Court questioned both Allen and 

Lillian as to the existing payment schedule and the problems 

with it. Modification of the schedule to conform to the 

original requirement of one payment per month and to allow 

Allen to process his paycheck before sending his money order 

to the clerk of court's office is well within the District 

Court's discretion. Section 3-1-111(8), MCA. 

Af f irmed. 

Chief Justice