22-527

United States v. Goodman

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

SUMMARY ORDER

RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION 

TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS 

GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’'S

LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH 

THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN 

ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY 

CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT 

REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL. 

At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, 

held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the 

City of New York, on the 18th day of May, two thousand twenty-three.

PRESENT:

DENNIS JACOBS,

RICHARD J. SULLIVAN,

MARIA ARAÚJO KAHN,

Circuit Judges. 

______________________________________

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Appellee,

v. No. 22-527

COLLYER GOODMAN, AKA WEST,

Defendant-Appellant.

∗

______________________________________

∗

The Clerk of Court is respectfully directed to amend the official case caption as set forth above.
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For Defendant Appellant: Peter J. Tomao, Law Office of Peter J. 

Tamao, Garden City, NY.

For Appellee: Anden Chow, Hagan Scotten,

Assistant United States Attorneys, for

Damian Williams, United States 

Attorney for the Southern District of 

New York, New York, NY.

Appeal from orders of the United States District Court for the Southern

District of New York (Cathy Seibel, Judge). 

UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, 

ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the orders of the district court are

AFFIRMED.

Collyer Goodman appeals from the district court’s orders (1) denying a 

motion for a sentence reduction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A) and 

(2) refusing reconsideration of that denial. We assume the parties’ familiarity 

with the underlying facts, procedural history, and issues on appeal.

In 2017, after a jury trial, Goodman was convicted of one count of conspiracy

to distribute and possess with intent to distribute cocaine and crack cocaine, in 

violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(b)(1)(A), (b)(1)(B) and 846. The district court 

imposed the mandatory-minimum sentence of 120 months’ imprisonment, to be 
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followed by five years’ supervised release. In April 2020, Goodman filed his first 

motion for compassionate release pursuant to the First Step Act of 2018. 

Under the First Step Act, a district court may, in its discretion, grant a

motion for compassionate release when the defendant has exhausted 

administrative remedies, demonstrated that extraordinary and compelling 

reasons warrant such relief, and shown that a reduced sentence is consistent with 

the objectives of sentencing set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). See United States v. 

Keitt, 21 F.4th 67, 73 (2d Cir. 2021). Significantly, “if a district court determines 

that one of those conditions is lacking, it need not address the remaining ones.” 

Id.; see also United States v. Jones, 17 F.4th 371, 374 (2d Cir. 2021) (“[A] district court’s 

reasonable evaluation of the [s]ection[-]3553(a) factors is an alternative and 

independent basis for denial of compassionate release.” (internal quotation marks 

omitted)).

Applying that standard, the district court denied Goodman’s first motion 

for failure to exhaust administrative remedies, without prejudice to renewal. 

When Goodman renewed his motion, the district court denied it in May 2020, this 

time “assum[ing] for the sake of argument that” Goodman had demonstrated 

extraordinary and compelling circumstances but finding that the “[section-
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3553(a)] factors weigh[ed] against release.” App’x at 70. The district court noted 

that Goodman “had numerous prior convictions, many involving drugs and/or 

weapons, [that] he returned to criminal activity relatively quickly after those 

convictions,” and that the present offense involved “dealing a significant amount 

of narcotics.” Id. The district court therefore concluded that compassionate 

release “would not amount to just punishment[,] . . . would undermine whatever 

deterrent value the sentence may have[,] and . . . would not sufficiently address 

the need to protect the public from further crimes of [Goodman].” Id.; see also 

18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1), (a)(2)(A)–(C). Thereafter, Goodman filed a third motion for 

compassionate release, which the district court again denied in January 2021, as it 

“continue[d] to find that the [section-]3553(a) factors . . . militate[d] against 

release, . . . essentially for the reasons stated in [the] previous ruling.” App’x at 

72; see also id. at 73 (denying a motion for reconsideration). 

About a year later, Goodman filed his fourth – and for purposes of this 

appeal, final – motion for compassionate release. The government opposed on 

numerous grounds, and in February 2022, the district court agreed, stating that the 

motion was “denied essentially for the reasons set forth by the [g]overnment.” Id. 

at 76. Specifically, the district court stated that “[i]t did not appear that 
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[Goodman] ha[d] properly exhausted, but assuming he ha[d], no extraordinary 

and compelling reasons exist[ed] . . . and the [section-]3553(a) factors continue[d]

to militate against release.” Id. Goodman moved for reconsideration, 

submitting new exhibits most pertinent to exhaustion and the existence of 

extraordinary and compelling reasons warranting his early release, but in March 

2022, the district court chose to “adhere to [its prior] decision.” Id. at 131; see also 

Shrader v. CSX Transp., Inc., 70 F.3d 255, 257 (2d Cir. 1995) (explaining that 

“reconsideration will generally be denied unless the moving party can point to 

controlling decisions or data that the court overlooked – matters, in other words, 

that might reasonably be expected to alter the conclusion reached by the court”).

Goodman now appeals from both the February 2022 order denying his 

fourth motion for compassionate release and the March 2022 order denying his 

motion for reconsideration.1 We review a district court’s denial of a motion for 

compassionate release and denial of a motion for reconsideration for abuse of 

discretion. United States v. Saladino, 7 F.4th 120, 122 (2d Cir. 2021); United States v. 

Moreno, 789 F.3d 72, 78 n.4 (2d Cir. 2015). “[A] district court has abused its 

1 The government has forfeited any objection to the timeliness of Goodman’s appeal as to the 

February 2022 order. See Fed. R. App. P. 4(b)(1)(A); United States v. Frias, 521 F.3d 229, 231–34

(2d Cir. 2008).
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discretion if it [has] based its ruling on an erroneous view of the law or on a clearly 

erroneous assessment of the evidence, or rendered a decision that cannot be 

located within the range of permissible decisions.” United States v. Borden, 564 

F.3d 100, 104 (2d Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). Because the 

district court reasonably determined in its February 2022 order that a sentencing 

reduction was not warranted under the section-3553(a) sentencing factors, it did 

not abuse its discretion in denying Goodman’s fourth motion for compassionate 

release and in refusing to reconsider that denial. 

Goodman’s two arguments to the contrary are unavailing. First, Goodman

contends that the district court provided inadequate explanation for its section3553(a) analysis in its February 2022 order. But we need not view the district 

court’s February 2022 order in a vacuum. Read in context with the government’s 

submissions and the district court’s prior compassionate-release orders, the 

district court’s February 2022 order provided ample justification for the court’s 

denial on the basis of the section-3553(a) factors. See United States v. Rosa, 957 F.3d 

113, 119 (2d Cir. 2020) (“The context and the record may render a district court’s 

explanation adequate even where the judge might have said more.” (internal 

quotation marks omitted)); see also Keitt, 21 F.4th at 72–73. 
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Second, Goodman suggests that the district court failed to place enough 

weight on the health risks posed by COVID-19 and the strides he had made toward 

rehabilitation, while placing undue weight on the public-safety risks associated 

with his narcotics-trafficking offense. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1), (a)(2)(A)–(D); 

Pepper v. United States, 562 U.S. 476, 491 (2011). But, as we have repeatedly made 

clear, “[m]ere disagreement with how the district court balanced the 

[section-]3553(a) factors . . . is not a sufficient ground for finding an abuse of 

discretion.” United States v. Halvon, 26 F.4th 566, 569 (2d Cir. 2022) (internal 

quotation marks omitted); see also United States v. Verkhoglyad, 516 F.3d 122, 131 (2d 

Cir. 2008) (“[T]he weight . . . afforded [to] any [section-]3553(a) factor is a matter 

firmly committed to the discretion of the sentencing judge.” (internal quotation 

marks omitted)). Given Goodman’s prior criminal history and the seriousness of 

the present offense, see 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1), (a)(2)(A)–(C), we cannot say that the 

district court abused its discretion in determining that, even in February 2022, the 

section-3553(a) sentencing factors counseled against early release.
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We have considered Goodman’s remaining arguments and find them to be 

without merit.2 Accordingly, we AFFIRM the orders of the district court.

FOR THE COURT: 

Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk of Court

2 Goodman also asserts that the district court erred in determining that he had (1) not exhausted 

his administrative remedies and (2) not demonstrated extraordinary and compelling 

circumstances warranting relief. As noted above, we need not address these arguments, since 

the section-3553(a) factors provide a sufficient ground upon which we can affirm the district 

court’s denial of Goodman’s fourth motion for compassionate release and motion for 

reconsideration. See Keitt, 21 F.4th at 73 & n.4.