United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit ______________________

SUMECHT NA, INC., DBA SUMEC NORTH 

AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellant

v.

UNITED STATES, SOLARWORLD AMERICAS, INC.,

Defendants-Appellees

______________________

2019-1015

______________________

Appeal from the United States Court of International 

Trade in No. 1:17-cv-00244-JCG, Judge Jennifer ChoeGroves.

______________________

Decided: May 8, 2019

______________________

MARK B. LEHNARDT, Baker & Hostetler LLP, Washington, DC, argued for plaintiff-appellant. 

 JUSTIN REINHART MILLER, International Trade Field 

Office, Commercial Litigation Branch, Civil Division, 

United States Department of Justice, New York, NY, argued for defendant-appellee United States. Also represented by JOSEPH H. HUNT, REGINALD THOMAS BLADES, JR.,

JEANNE DAVIDSON, Washington, DC; DAVID W. CAMPBELL, 

Office of Chief Counsel for Trade Enforcement and Compliance, United States Department of Commerce, 
2 SUMECHT NA, INC. v. UNITED STATES

Washington, DC. 

 TIMOTHY C. BRIGHTBILL, Wiley Rein, LLP, Washington, 

DC, for defendant-appellee SolarWorld Americas, Inc. Also 

represented by STEPHANIE MANAKER BELL, TESSA V.

CAPELOTO, LAURA EL-SABAAWI, CYNTHIA CRISTINA GALVEZ,

USHA NEELAKANTAN, ADAM MILAN TESLIK, MAUREEN E.

THORSON.

 ______________________

Before MOORE, CLEVENGER, and WALLACH, Circuit Judges.

WALLACH, Circuit Judge.

Appellant Sumecht NA, Inc., dba Sumec North America (“Sumec”), a U.S. importer, sued Appellee the United 

States (“Government”) in the U.S. Court of International 

Trade (“CIT”), challenging the U.S. Department of Commerce’s (“Commerce”) liquidation1 instructions. Sumec 

filed a motion for a preliminary injunction to enjoin the 

Government from liquidating certain entries, and the CIT 

issued an opinion and order denying Sumec’s Motion. Sumecht NA, Inc. v. United States, 331 F. Supp. 3d 1408, 1412 

(Ct. Int’l Trade 2018); see J.A. 8–10 (denying reconsideration). 

Sumec appeals. We have jurisdiction over this appeal 

of an interlocutory order pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(c)(1) 

(2012). We affirm.

BACKGROUND

I. Legal Framework

Antidumping duties may be imposed on foreign merchandise sold, or likely to be sold, “in the United States at 

 

1 “Liquidation means the final computation or ascertainment of duties on entries for consumption or drawback 

entries.” 19 C.F.R. § 159.1 (2019).
SUMECHT NA, INC. v. UNITED STATES 3

less than its fair value.” 19 U.S.C. § 1673(1) (2012). At the 

conclusion of an investigation, if Commerce and the U.S.

International Trade Commission have made the requisite 

findings, Commerce “shall publish an antidumping duty 

order” directing U.S. Customs and Border Protection 

(“Customs”) officers to assess duties on imported goods covered by the investigation. Id. § 1673e(a). Commerce typically must “determine the individual weighted average 

dumping margin for each known exporter and producer of 

the subject merchandise.” Id. § 1677f–1(c)(1). “A dumping 

margin reflects the amount by which the normal value (the 

price a producer charges in its home market) exceeds the 

export price (the price of the product in the United States) 

or constructed export price.” SolarWorld Ams., Inc. v. 

United States, 910 F.3d 1216, 1220 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (internal quotation marks and footnote omitted); see 19 U.S.C. 

§ 1677(35)(A).

Relevant here, Commerce considers China to be a nonmarket economy country. See SolarWorld, 910 F.3d at

1220 n.3. A “nonmarket economy country” is “any foreign 

country that [Commerce] determines does not operate on 

market principles of cost or pricing structures, so that sales 

of merchandise in such country do not reflect the fair value 

of the merchandise.” 19 U.S.C. § 1677(18)(A). “In antidumping duty proceedings involving merchandise from a 

non-market economy, . . . Commerce presumes that all respondents are government-controlled and therefore subject 

to a single country-wide rate,” unless respondents “rebut 

this presumption” to demonstrate eligibility for separate 

rates, i.e., “individual dumping margins . . . for each known 

exporter or producer.” Dongtai Peak Honey Indus. Co. v. 

United States, 777 F.3d 1343, 1349–50 (Fed. Cir. 2015) 

(footnote omitted) (citing, inter alia, 19 U.S.C. § 1677f1(c)(1)).
4 SUMECHT NA, INC. v. UNITED STATES

II. Factual Background and Procedural History

This appeal relates to Commerce’s antidumping duty 

order on crystalline silicon photovoltaic cells, whether or 

not assembled into modules (“subject merchandise”), from 

the People’s Republic of China (“China”). See Crystalline 

Silicon Photovoltaic Cells, Whether or Not Assembled into 

Modules, from the People’s Republic of China, 77 Fed. Reg. 

73,018, 73,018 (Dep’t of Commerce Dec. 7, 2012) (am. final 

determination & antidumping duty order). Based on its 

investigation, Commerce published its final determination, 

in which it concluded that Sumec’s Chinese exporter of subject merchandise, Sumec Hardware & Tools Co., Ltd. 

(“Hardware”), was separate from the China-wide entity.

See id. at 73,019. Therefore, Commerce assigned Hardware a separate rate, which was an antidumping duty margin of 24.48%. See id. at 73,021. In contrast, Commerce 

assigned the China-wide entity an antidumping duty margin of 249.96%. See id. In August 2015, the 24.48% margin

assigned to Hardware was amended to 13.18% pursuant to 

the U.S. Trade Representative’s decision to implement a 

related World Trade Organization determination. See Implementation of Determination Under Section 129 of the 

Uruguay Round Agreements Act, 80 Fed. Reg. 48,812, 

48,818 (Dep’t Commerce Aug. 14, 2015); see 19 U.S.C. 

§ 3538 (Section 129 of the Uruguay Round Agreements 

Act).

After Commerce’s Final Determination was challenged 

before the CIT, “Commerce requested and was granted a 

voluntary remand to reevaluate evidence and reconsider 

the separate rate eligibility of[, inter alia, Hardware]” due 

to a “concern for consistency with [Commerce]’s approach 

to similar issues.” Jiangsu Jiasheng Photovoltaic Tech. Co. 

v. United States, 121 F. Supp. 3d 1263, 1267 (Ct. Int’l Trade 

2015). Commerce reconsidered Hardware’s eligibility for a 

separate rate and determined that it no longer qualified; 

instead, Commerce assigned Hardware the China-wide 

rate. See id. The CIT affirmed this determination on 
SUMECHT NA, INC. v. UNITED STATES 5

October 5, 2015. See id. at 1273. As a result, Commerce 

published a notice pursuant to Timken Co. v. United States

(“Timken notice”), see 893 F.2d 337 (Fed. Cir. 1990),2 “notifying the public that the final judgment . . . is not in harmony with [Commerce]’s [f]inal [d]etermination . . . in the 

antidumping duty investigation,” and Commerce suspended liquidation of entries in accordance with the CIT’s 

decision, Crystalline Silicon Photovoltaic Cells, Whether or 

Not Assembled into Modules, from the People’s Republic of 

China, 80 Fed. Reg. 72,950, 72,950 (Dep’t Commerce Nov. 

23, 2015) (notice). Although Commerce published the Timken notice on November 23, 2015, i.e., forty-nine days after 

the CIT issued its opinion in Jiangsu Jiasheng, the Timken 

notice listed an effective date of “October 15, 2015,” which 

is ten days after the issuance of Jiangsu Jiasheng. Id.

In December 2015, Commerce issued amended cash deposit instructions, instructing Customs to collect cash deposits on subject merchandise exported by Hardware at the 

China-wide rate of 238.95%3 for any entries made after 

 

2 In Timken, we explained that, “[i]f the CIT (or this 

court) renders a decision which is not in harmony with 

Commerce’s determination, then Commerce must publish 

notice of the decision within ten days of issuance (i.e., entry 

of judgment), regardless of the time for appeal or of 

whether an appeal is taken.” 893 F.2d at 341. 

3 During the first annual administrative review of 

the antidumping duty order, Commerce assigned a Chinawide rate of 238.95%, which “equals the [previously assigned China]-wide entity rate of 249.96% adjusted for export subsidies and estimated domestic subsidy passthrough.” Crystalline Silicon Photovoltaic Cells, Whether 

or not Assembled into Modules, from the People’s Republic 

of China, 80 Fed. Reg. 40,998, 41,002 n.50 (Dep’t of Commerce July 15, 2015) (final admin. review); see id. at 

41,002.
6 SUMECHT NA, INC. v. UNITED STATES

October 15, 2015. J.A. 74–75. In March 2016, Commerce 

issued liquidation instructions, ordering Customs to liquidate “all entries” for Hardware “at the cash deposit . . . rate 

in effect.” J.A. 82. 

Sumec filed a complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1581(i). See J.A. 52; see also 28 U.S.C. § 1581(i) (setting 

forth the CIT’s “exclusive jurisdiction” over actions that 

arise out of laws “providing for,” inter alia, “tariffs, duties, 

fees, or other taxes on the importation of merchandise for 

reasons other than the raising of revenue,” and “administration and enforcement” of matters related to the CIT’s 

other bases for jurisdiction). Sumec challenged Commerce’s liquidation instructions and its decision to assess 

the China-wide rate on Hardware’s entries of subject merchandise during a thirty-nine-day period covering October 

15, 2015, to November 23, 2015. J.A. 58, 60–61. According 

to Sumec, Commerce should have set the “date for the 

change in liquidation rate as the date of publication of the 

Timken [n]otice,” i.e., November 23, 2015, rather than October 15, 2015. J.A. 56. Sumec alleges that Hardware 

made entries of subject merchandise during this thirtynine-day period, which should have been subject to the separate rate of 13.18% rather than the China-wide rate of 

238.95%. See J.A. 56–57.4 Sumec filed its Motion, seeking 

 

4 Separately, Hardware challenged Commerce’s 

margin calculation in an administrative review of a countervailing duty order covering the same type of merchandise. See Compl. ¶¶ 1, 11–24, Sumec Hardware & Tools 

Co. v. United States, No. 1:18-cv-00186-JAR (Ct. Int’l Trade 

Aug. 31, 2018), ECF No. 6. In that action, the CIT issued 

a statutory injunction enjoining the Government “from issuing instructions to liquidate” subject merchandise exported by Hardware “[t]hat were entered . . . on or after 

January 1, 2015 up to and including December 31, 2015.” 
SUMECHT NA, INC. v. UNITED STATES 7

to enjoin liquidation of these entries. J.A. 103. The CIT 

denied Sumec’s Motion. Sumecht, 331 F. Supp. 3d at 1412. 

DISCUSSION

I. Standard of Review and Legal Standard

We review the CIT’s preliminary injunction determination for an abuse of discretion. Wind Tower Trade Coal. v. 

United States, 741 F.3d 89, 95 (Fed. Cir. 2014). The CIT 

abuses its discretion if it “made a clear error of judgment 

in weighing the relevant factors or exercised its discretion 

based on an error of law or clearly erroneous fact finding. 

To the extent [the CIT]’s decision to grant or deny a preliminary injunction hinges on questions of law, [our] review 

is de novo.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citations

omitted). 

To receive a preliminary injunction, the movant must 

show “(1) likelihood of success on the merits, (2) irreparable harm absent immediate relief, (3) the balance of interests weighing in favor of relief, and (4) that the injunction 

serves the public interest.” Silfab Solar, Inc. v. United 

States, 892 F.3d 1340, 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (citing Winter 

v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008)). Although 

“preliminary injunctions against liquidation have become 

almost automatic” in antidumping and countervailing duty 

cases, they are “an extraordinary remedy never awarded as 

of right.” Wind Tower, 741 F.3d at 95 (internal quotation 

marks and citation omitted). 

II. The CIT Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in Denying 

Sumec’s Motion for a Preliminary Injunction

The CIT held that “Sumec has failed to show irreparable harm.” Sumecht, 331 F. Supp. 3d at 1412. The CIT 

 

Order for Statutory Inj. upon Consent 1–2, Sumec Hardware & Tools Co. v. United States, No. 1:18-cv-00186-JAR 

(Ct. Int’l Trade Aug. 31, 2018), ECF No. 8 (“Statutory Inj.”).
8 SUMECHT NA, INC. v. UNITED STATES

rejected Sumec’s allegations of “financial hardship” due to 

the “amount of duties owed” because “Sumec [did] not specify any concrete, individualized harm” or “proffer further 

evidence in support of its allegations.” Id. The CIT also 

rejected Sumec’s claim that a preliminary injunction 

should issue because the possibility of reliquidation5 was 

“unclear.” Id. Based on this finding of no irreparable 

harm, the CIT determined it did not need to “address the 

remaining three factors” for a preliminary injunction. Id. 

Following Sumec’s motion for reconsideration, the CIT denied this request, explaining that a preliminary injunction 

in this case involving a challenge to antidumping duties 

was not necessary “because Sumec ha[d] already obtained 

its desired relief through the grant of [the S]tatutory 

[I]njunction in a separate proceeding [challenging countervailing duties],” as both cases covered “the same entries at 

issue” and therefore the injunction in the countervailing 

duty case prevented liquidation of the entries here. J.A. 9 

(citation omitted).6

 

5 Reliquidation “is the re-calculation of the duties or 

drawback accruing on an entry” subsequent to liquidation. 

Shinyei Corp. of Am. v. United States, 355 F.3d 1297, 1310 

n.8 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (internal quotation marks omitted).

6 The Government contends Sumec’s request for a 

preliminary injunction to prevent liquidation of its entries 

at the China-wide rate is moot because of the Statutory Injunction preventing liquidation of the same entries in the 

countervailing duty case. See Appellee’s Br. 16–17. We 

disagree. The party asserting mootness bears the burden 

of demonstrating that (1) “there is no reasonable expectation that the alleged violation will recur, and (2) interim 

relief or events have completely and irrevocably eradicated 

the effects of the alleged violation.” County of Los Angeles 

v. Davis, 440 U.S. 625, 631 (1979) (internal quotation 
SUMECHT NA, INC. v. UNITED STATES 9

Sumec contends the CIT abused its discretion by basing its decision on the Statutory Injunction, which was issued in the separate, countervailing duty case. See 

Appellant’s Br. 20. Sumec also argues the CIT’s irreparable harm determination is “directly contrary to this court’s 

holdings in Ugine [& ALZ Belgium v. United States] and 

Am[erican] Signature[, Inc. v. United States],” which contemplate the availability of reliquidation. Id. at 15 (capitalization modified); see id. at 15–20 (first citing 452 F.3d 

1289 (Fed. Cir. 2006); then citing 598 F.3d 816 (Fed. Cir. 

2010)). We disagree.

Sumec has not demonstrated that it will be irreparably 

harmed absent immediate relief in the form of a preliminary injunction. First, Sumec’s subject merchandise is covered by the Statutory Injunction in the corresponding 

countervailing duty case, meaning these same entries cannot be liquidated at this time. The threat of liquidation is 

typically sufficient to demonstrate irreparable harm 

 

marks, ellipsis, and citations omitted); see Friends of the 

Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 

167, 190 (2000) (discussing the burden of proof). The Government fails to meet this burden because the relief offered 

by the Statutory Injunction in the countervailing duty case 

is temporary—it is only effective “during the pendency of 

[that] litigation, including any appeals.” Statutory Inj. at 

1. Such temporary relief does not “completely and irrevocably eradicate[]” the potential for harm in the antidumping duty case. Davis, 440 U.S. at 631; cf. City of Los Angeles 

v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 101 (1983) (holding that, where a 

plaintiff challenged a certain practice, a city’s voluntarily

imposed moratorium on that practice did not moot the action because “the moratorium by its terms is not permanent,” such that “[i]ntervening events have not irrevocably 

eradicated the effects of the alleged violation” (emphasis 

added) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)).
10 SUMECHT NA, INC. v. UNITED STATES

because liquidation may moot further judicial relief in challenges to administrative proceedings. Zenith Radio Corp. 

v. United States, 710 F.2d 806, 810 (Fed. Cir. 1983) 

(“[L]iquidation would . . . eliminate the only remedy available to [the plaintiff] for an incorrect review determination 

by depriving the [CIT] of the ability to assess dumping duties . . . . [W]e conclude that the consequences of liquidation do constitute irreparable injury.”). Here, however, 

Sumec has obtained the Statutory Injunction in the countervailing duty case, thereby preventing liquidation of the 

same entries in the present antidumping duty case. See 

Statutory Inj. at 1–2. The Statutory Injunction enjoins liquidation for entries of subject merchandise made “on or after January 1, 2015 up to and including December 31, 

2015,” id., and this time period completely overlaps with 

the thirty-nine-day period at issue in this case, i.e., from 

October 15, 2015, to November 23, 2015, see J.A. 56–57. 

Sumec’s citation to an example where the CIT, in two separate cases, issued two injunctions that overlapped by covering the same entries is unavailing, see Appellant’s 

Br. 23–24 (citations omitted), because Sumec fails to cite to 

precedent that requires such overlapping injunctions, see 

generally id. We will not constrain the CIT’s discretion by 

imposing this type of acontextual rule. See Wind Tower, 

741 F.3d at 95 (recognizing that the CIT is afforded discretion when deciding requests for preliminary injunctions). 

Under these circumstances, Sumec’s entries are currently 

protected from liquidation due to the Statutory Injunction. 

See Statutory Inj. at 1–2. Even if the Statutory Injunction 

is dissolved, nothing would then prevent Sumec from immediately seeking a temporary restraining order (“TRO”) 

or preliminary injunction in the underlying antidumping 

duty case. See USCIT R. 65(a)–(b) (authorizing the CIT to 

issue TROs and preliminary injunctions).

Second, the CIT did not commit legal error in determining that the availability of reliquidation means that Sumec 

failed to demonstrate irreparable harm. In Shinyei, which
SUMECHT NA, INC. v. UNITED STATES 11

involved an action contesting Commerce’s liquidation instructions pursuant to § 1581(i), we recognized that the 

CIT’s equitable powers allowed it to order reliquidation in 

a § 1581(i) action (“Shinyei relief”). 355 F.3d at 1305, 1312. 

We explained the CIT has “broad remedial powers” under 

28 U.S.C. § 2643(c)(1), which “allows the [CIT] to ‘order any 

other relief that is appropriate in a civil action,’” meaning 

the CIT may order reliquidation even in “[t]he absence of 

an express reliquidation provision.” Id. at 1312 (ellipsis 

omitted). On the other hand, we have found it unclear 

whether Shinyei relief is available in two cases brought under § 1581(i). In Ugine, we reversed the CIT’s denial of a 

motion for a preliminary injunction in a case challenging 

Commerce’s liquidation instructions as applying an improper “country-of-origin designation[] for entries that 

have not [yet] been liquidated” for an earlier administrative review, even though Commerce determined in a later 

administrative review to apply the country-of-origin designation argued for by the challenger. 452 F.3d at 1293; see 

id. at 1290. We explained that, although “Shinyei appears 

to provide [the challenger] with an avenue for seeking a judicial remedy . . . because [the challenger], like [the party 

in Shinyei], challenges only Commerce’s liquidation instructions,” “the possibility that Shinyei will not be interpreted to encompass the sort of claim at issue 

here . . . raises doubt whether [the challenger] will have 

the opportunity to obtain reliquidation once its entries are 

liquidated.” Id. at 1296. We distinguished Shinyei, where 

the “complaint alleged a violation of 19 U.S.C. 

§ 1675(a)(2)(C),”7 on the basis that the challenger in Ugine

did not rely on § 1675(a)(2)(C) and “instead contended that

 

7 Section 1675(a)(2)(C) provides that the determination in a particular administrative review “shall be the basis for the assessment of countervailing or antidumping 

duties on entries of merchandise covered by the determination and for deposits of estimated duties.”
12 SUMECHT NA, INC. v. UNITED STATES

Commerce’s instructions for entries imported prior to the 

[later] administrative review are inconsistent with Commerce’s determination in th[at later] administrative review.” Id. 

Similarly, in American Signature, we reversed the 

CIT’s denial of a motion for a preliminary injunction, in a 

case challenging Commerce’s authority to issue certain corrected liquidation instructions that sought to remedy “a 

computer programming error in Commerce’s antidumping 

margin calculation.” 598 F.3d at 821; see id. at 821–22. 

“[W]e conclude[d] that the possibility of Shinyei relief does 

not defeat [plaintiff]’s claim of irreparable harm,” without 

further explanation for why Shinyei relief may be lacking 

in that case. Id. at 829.8 Ultimately, in both cases, we determined “the availability of Shinyei relief to [the plaintiff] 

is uncertain,” and did not defeat the plaintiff’s showing of 

irreparable harm. Id.; see Ugine, 452 F.3d at 1297 (explaining that “it is not clear at this juncture” that Shinyei relief 

would be available to the challenger). Admittedly, neither 

case is a model of clarity for establishing when Shinyei relief may be unavailable in § 1581(i) actions challenging 

Commerce’s liquidation instructions or when a sufficient 

showing of irreparable harm can be established by the potential of such relief being unavailable. We certainly, however, do not read Ugine and American Signature as 

creating a presumption that, in the preliminary injunction 

 

8 Although not addressed in our American Signature 

decision, the underlying complaint there expressly referenced § 1675(a)(2)(C) to allege that Commerce’s corrected 

liquidation instructions were erroneous as a matter of law, 

thereby distinguishing that case from Ugine. Compare 

Compl. ¶¶ 30–32, Am. Signature, Inc. v. United States, No. 

09-00400 (Ct. Int’l Trade Sept. 18, 2009), ECF No. 6, with 

Ugine, 452 F.3d at 1296 (stating the challenger did not rely 

on § 1675(a)(2)(C)).
SUMECHT NA, INC. v. UNITED STATES 13

context, Shinyei relief is uncertain for purposes of irreparable harm in § 1581(i) actions because such a presumption 

runs counter to Shinyei’s holding that the CIT has “broad 

remedial powers,” including the ability to order reliquidation. 355 F.3d at 1312.

In any case, Ugine and American Signature are inapposite here because the Government in this case has “represented unequivocally that, should Sumec prevail on the 

merits of this case, the [CIT] has the power to grant Sumec 

relief, including the authority to order the Government to 

reliquidate Sumec’s entries” and that “Sumec would be entitled to refunds plus interest on any overpayments.” Appellee’s Br. 25 (citation omitted); see, e.g., Ugine, 452 F.3d 

at 1296 (acknowledging that the Government “was unwilling to take a position” on the availability of Shinyei relief).9 

Based on this representation, the Government would be judicially estopped from taking a contrary position regarding 

the CIT’s authority to order reliquidation in this case. See 

Trs. in Bankr. of N. Am. Rubber Thread Co. v. United 

States, 593 F.3d 1346, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (“Where a 

party assumes a certain position in a legal proceeding, and 

succeeds in maintaining that position, [that party] may not 

thereafter, simply because [its] interests have changed, assume a contrary position . . . .” (internal quotation marks 

and brackets omitted)). Accordingly, we conclude the CIT 

did not abuse its discretion in denying Sumec’s request for 

 

9 The Government straightforwardly maintained 

this position at oral argument. Oral Arg. at 17:39–46, 

http://oralarguments.cafc.uscourts.gov/default.aspx?fl=

2019-1015.mp3 (“If Sumec were to prevail on the merits, 

the Government would not challenge the [CIT] from ordering reliquidation.”), 19:50–57 (“If they win on the merits, . . . we would believe that the rule [of Shinyei] would 

apply, which means the [CIT] would have the authority [to 

reliquidate].”).
14 SUMECHT NA, INC. v. UNITED STATES

a preliminary injunction, based on its holding that Sumec 

failed to demonstrate irreparable harm. See Chrysler Motors Corp. v. Auto Body Panels of Ohio, Inc., 908 F.2d 951, 

953 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (“If [a preliminary] injunction is denied, the absence of an adequate showing with regard to 

any one factor may be sufficient, given the weight or lack 

of it assigned the other factors, to justify the denial.”); cf.

Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. United States, 823 F.2d 505, 

509 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (reversing a grant of a preliminary injunction where the CIT’s “finding of irreparable injury was 

clearly erroneous,” without consideration of the other three 

factors).

CONCLUSION

We have considered Sumec’s remaining arguments and 

find them unpersuasive. Accordingly, the Opinion and Order of the U.S. Court of International Trade is

AFFIRMED

COSTS

No costs.