NOT RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION

File Name: 24a0045n.06

Case No. 23-3484

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

TREVA KIRKBRIDE,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

ANTERO RESOURCES CORP., 

Defendant-Appellee.

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ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED 

STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR 

THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF 

OHIO

OPINION

Before: BATCHELDER, CLAY, and DAVIS, Circuit Judges.

ALICE M. BATCHELDER, Circuit Judge. The plaintiff appeals the district court’s 

dismissal for failure to state a claim in an action alleging breach of contract. We AFFIRM.

I.

As pertinent here, Treva Kirkbride is the lessor and Antero Resources Corporation is the 

lessee in an oil-and-gas lease that requires Antero to make royalty payments to Kirkbride, as the 

sole trustee of the R and K Trust. The lease also has a pre-lawsuit-notice provision, which states 

that “service of said notice shall be a condition precedent to the commencement of any action by 

[Kirkbride] for breach of any obligation or covenant hereunder and no such action shall be 

commenced before ninety days from [Antero’s] receipt of written notice.” On May 24, 2022,

Kirkbride sued Antero in federal court, as a putative class action, for breach of contract, claiming 
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that Antero had not paid all of the royalties due under the lease. She did not provide Antero with 

any notice before filing the lawsuit.1 

Without filing an answer, Antero moved to dismiss because Kirkbride had not satisfied the 

lease’s pre-lawsuit-notice requirement (condition precedent). But Kirkbride replied that, under 

Ohio law, her service of the complaint satisfied the condition precedent. The district court 

disagreed and held that when “a contract requires a party to give pre-suit notice of an alleged 

breach of that contract, and the party fails to give such notice, dismissal is appropriate.” Kirkbride 

v. Antero Res. Corp., No. 2:22-cv-2251, 2023 WL 3321223, at *2 (S.D. Ohio, May 9, 2023)

(relying on Au Rustproofing Ctr., Inc. v. Gulf Oil Corp., 755 F.2d 1231, 1237 (6th Cir. 1985) (“It 

is well established under Ohio contract law that a . . . right of action requiring notice as a condition 

precedent cannot be enforced unless the notice provided for has been given.” (citations omitted))). 

In addressing Kirkbride’s arguments, the district court explained that this was not “a mere 

technical noncompliance with the Notice Requirement”; but rather “a wholesale failure to comply 

with—or even attempt to comply with—the Notice Requirement.” Id. The district court further 

emphasized that “the Lease expressly requires pre-suit notice”—but Kirkbride “filed suit on May 

24, 2022, [and] did not serve the Complaint on [Antero] until June 1, 2022. Thus, as the Complaint 

was served on [Antero] after [Kirkbride] initiated this action, by definition, it cannot be pre-suit

notice.” Id. Finally, the district court rejected Kirkbride’s contention that Northfield Park 

1 On June 1, 2022, Kirkbride served Antero with the original (May 24) complaint. On June 9, Kirkbride filed 

an amended complaint, and on July 15, she filed a second amended complaint. Antero moved to dismiss on August 

3 (which was 63 days after receiving service of the original complaint) and Kirkbride filed a response on August 31 

(91 days after service), claiming that she had given Antero notice 90 days earlier, via the original complaint.

On September 19, the district court issued an opinion and order in which it found that Kirkbride had not 

alleged (in any of her three complaints) that she had satisfied the lease’s pre-lawsuit-notice condition precedent, and 

ordered her to file a third amended complaint that would do so. On September 21, Kirkbride filed a third amended 

complaint. And on October 5, Antero moved to dismiss that complaint, again based on the notice provision. 

On May 9, 2023, the district court granted Antero’s motion and dismissed the lawsuit. On June 1, Kirkbride 

filed notice of the present appeal, which was docketed in this court on June 6, 2023.
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Associates v. Northeast Ohio Harness, 521 N.E.2d 466 (Ohio Ct. App. 1987), stands for the broad 

proposition that service of a complaint, standing alone, necessarily satisfies (or overcomes) a prelawsuit-notice requirement. Kirkbride, 2023 WL 3321223, at *2. The district court explained that 

Northfield Park considered a different contract and “different facts,” as it “discusses ‘numerous’

verbal and written notices of alleged wrongful conduct prior to the lawsuit.” Id. 

The district court dismissed the action and Kirkbride appeals.2

II.

“We review de novo a district court’s decision to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure 

to state a claim.” Elec. Merch. Sys. LLC v. Gaal, 58 F.4th 877, 882 (6th Cir. 2023). “In analyzing 

a 12(b)(6) motion, the court must construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff 

and accept all [factual] allegations as true.” Id. (quotation marks and citation omitted).

Kirkbride’s basic contention is that post-lawsuit notice satisfies a contract’s pre-lawsuit 

notice requirement. According to Kirkbride, Ohio law renders pre-lawsuit notice requirements 

unenforceable because service of the complaint in a breach-of-contract lawsuit constitutes de facto 

notice, thereby satisfying the contract’s notice requirement, making the absence of pre-lawsuit 

notice harmless, and overcoming a defense based on that requirement (condition precedent). 

That contention is obviously questionable on its face. And none of the five opinions that 

Kirkbride cites in her brief actually holds any such thing. See MRI Software, L.L.C. v. W. Oaks 

Mall FL, L.L.C., 116 N.E.3d 694, 700-01 (Ohio Ct. App. 2018) (holding that multiple emails and 

first class letters, to which the defendant had responded, satisfied actual notice even though they 

were not sent by “certified mail, return receipt” as specified in the contract); Triangle Props., Inc. 

2 On appeal, Kirkbride has moved this court to take judicial notice of certain documents. Antero did not 

oppose that motion. We grant the motion and accept those documents into the present record. 
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v. Homewood Corp., 3 N.E.3d 241, 257-58 (Ohio Ct. App. 2013) (holding that the amended 

contract had dispensed with the notice requirement, but “[e]ven if written notice w[ere] required,” 

the voicemail proved actual notice and, because Triangle had “substantially complied with its 

contract obligations,” this “failure to provide written notice did not excuse Homewood from 

performing under the contract”); Stonehenge Land Co. v. Beazer Homes Invests., L.L.C., 893 

N.E.2d 855, 862-63 (Ohio Ct. App. 2008) (holding that a letter to Beazer’s attorney, who received 

and acted upon it, satisfied the notice requirement even though it was not addressed to a Beazer 

employee named Logsdon, as was specified in the contract); Roger J. Au & Son, Inc. v. Ne. Ohio 

Reg’l Sewer Dist., 504 N.E.2d 1209, 1211 (Ohio Ct. App. 1986) (finding the requirement that Au 

provide written notice of “extremely difficult soil conditions” was satisfied by actual or 

constructive notice, inasmuch as “[c]ommunication, written and oral, between Au and NORSD 

about problems resulting from these conditions was continuous, and NORSD had numerous people 

representing it on site throughout Au’s performance who were aware of the problems”). These 

cases state the unremarkable proposition that actual notice can overcome a party’s technical noncompliance with the contractually specified means of notice. None of these cases suggests that a 

lawsuit complaint can serve as pre-lawsuit notice sufficient to satisfy a contract’s mutually-agreedupon pre-lawsuit-notice requirement, i.e., condition precedent. 

In her briefing, Kirkbride focuses on Northfield Park and insists—despite the district 

court’s explanation to the contrary—that “[t]he facts in this [present] case are essentially the same 

as those presented in Northfield Park.” Apt. Br. at 11. But upon reading Northfield Park, we 

cannot agree. In Northfield Park, 521 N.E.2d at 469, the plaintiff owned a horse racing track and 

allowed the defendant to use the track via two leases: the NEOH lease and the Painesville lease. 

The notice provision of the leases required the plaintiff-lessor to provide a 10-day notice (and 
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opportunity to rectify) before repossessing the property or suing for damages. Id. at 472. After 

providing three written notices (over two years) and numerous verbal warnings “once or twice per 

week over an extended period of time,” the plaintiff-lessor repossessed the property and filed suit. 

Id. at 473. The defendant-lessee answered that the lessor had not complied with the notice 

requirements, arguing primarily that the lessor gave notice too soon or waited too long (i.e., 

claiming that “if it had received written notice of these breaches on [the day of the repossession]

it would have cured them in ten short days”), id., and that the notice was not sufficiently specific 

(i.e., “the lease . . . required any notice to [the lessee] to state specifically that if the defaults were 

not cured within ten days, [the lessor] would proceed to dispossess [the lessee] of the premises”), 

id. at 473-74. The court rejected both arguments.

As relevant here, the defendant-lessee also argued that, even if the lessor had properly 

terminated the NEOH lease, “there was no effective notice of default with respect to any default 

under the Painesville lease.” Id. at 475. Given that this was the same defendant-lessee on both 

overlapping leases, the court found that the defendant had actual notice as to its actions that had 

breached both leases, and summarily rejected this argument. Id. Kirkbride misreads or 

misrepresents an isolated sentence in the opinion as if it says that the lessor proffered—and the 

court accepted—the “second amended complaint” (which was filed at least three weeks after the 

repossession and the initial complaint) as the formal notice to satisfy the Painesville lease notice 

requirement. But that is not a reasonable or even plausible reading of the opinion. 

In rejecting the defendant-lessee’s lack-of-notice claim, the Northfield Park opinion says 

the defendant “certainly had notice of its alleged defaults under its [Painesville] lease with [the 

plaintiff] when it received the second amended complaint in the action below. It did not have just 

several days to cure these defaults, but several months. This it did not do.” Id. (emphasis added). 
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That is, by the time that “it received the second amended complaint,” sometime after November 

29, the defendant had already received four written notices and countless (weekly) verbal 

warnings, and had been dispossessed of the property (and been sued) under its other lease. Given 

such overwhelming actual notice, the defendant “certainly” had received notice by this time. There 

is nothing to suggest that the lawsuit complaint, standing alone, constituted the notice.

Kirkbride asserts in her briefing that: “The Ohio Court of Appeals [in Northfield Park]

correctly held that a technical non-compliance with the written notice requirement should not be 

strictly applied where the lessee received actual notice of its contractual defaults, had ample time 

to cure those defaults, but refused to do so.” Apt. Br. at 12 (citing Northfield Park, 521 N.E.2d at 

475). Fair as that is, it is certainly not the holding from Northfield Park. But even if it were, 

Kirkbride takes an enormous leap to contend that, even without any other notice at all, the mere 

service of the complaint in a breach-of-contract lawsuit constitutes actual notice sufficient to 

satisfy the contract’s pre-lawsuit-notice requirement and overcome a defense based on that 

provision. Northfield Park comes nowhere close to supporting that contention. 

Lastly, Kirkbride argues that had she complied with the lease’s 90-day pre-lawsuit notice 

provision, her four-year statute of limitations would have expired. While this posed a dilemma for 

Kirkbride, she cites no authority to support her theory that an expiring statute of limitations excuses 

her failure to provide pre-lawsuit notice. Nothing suggests that Kirkbride made a good-faith effort 

to comply with the pre-lawsuit notice provision: She had four years to bring her claims under the 

applicable statute of limitations. And she was not short of the required 90 days’ notice by just a 

few days or even weeks—she made no attempt to provide any pre-lawsuit notice at all. 

The lease between Kirkbride and Antero required written notice 90 days before filing a 

lawsuit. Kirkbride did not provide any notice at all—not actual notice, constructive notice, or 
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technically deficient notice. Consequently, Kirkbride did not satisfy the contractual requirement 

(condition precedent) for bringing the lawsuit and the district court properly dismissed.

III.

For the forgoing reasons, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.