1

07

- 58 01

- cr , 08- 13 87

- cr U SA v. Ioni a M anagem ent 1 U N IT E D S T A T E S C O U R T O F A P P E A LS 2 3 F O R T H E S E C O N D C IR C U IT 4 5

____________________________________ 6 7 August Term, 2008 8 9 (Argued: Novembe r 21, 2008 Dec ided: J anuar y 20, 2009) 10 11 Docke t Nos. 07-5801-c r, 08-1387- cr 12 13

____________________________________ 14 15 UNI TED STATES OF AMERI CA, 16 17 Appellee , 18 19 20 – v. – 21 22 I ONIA MANAG EMENT S.A., 23 24 De fe nd an t- Ap pe lla nt. 25

____________________________________ 26 27 Be fore : McLAUGHL I N, CALAB RESI , L I VI

NGSTON, Circ uit

J ud ge s. 28

____________________________________ 29 30 Appea l from a jury verdic t in the United States District Court for the District of 31 Connecticut (Ar

terton, J. ) convic ting De fenda nt-Appellant I onia Mana g ement S.A. of violating 32 the Ac t to Pr e ve nt P oll uti on on Shi ps (“ APP S” ) b y

fa ili ngto “ ma int a in” an o il r e c or d b oo k whil e 33 in U.S. waters a s require d by 33 C.F.R. § 151.25. We join the Fifth Circuit in holding that the 34 APPS imposes a duty on subject ships to ensure that their oil recor d books are acc urate (or at 35 least not knowing ly inacc urate ) upon ente ringthe ports or naviga ble wate rs of the United States.We rec ite only an abbr eviated ve rsion of the fa cts here , as the full bac kg round is not nece ssary 1 for r eac hing the leg al issue pre sented in this case . Be cause we r eview a jury verdic t, we view the fac ts and evidenc e in the lig ht most favorable to the verdic t. 2 1 We find that this requirement c omplies with int ernational law, is supported by the plain text of 2 the applica

ble re gulation, and is nece ssary to advanc e the a ims of the international tre aties 3 g overningpollution i n marine e nvironments. Acc ording ly , the conviction is AF FI RMED. 4

_____________________________________ 5 6 SANDRA S. GL OVER, Assitant United States Attorney (Will iam 7 M. Br own, J r., Assistant United States Attorney , on the brief ), for 8 Nora R. Dannehy , ActingUnited States Attorney , District of 9 Conne c tic ut, Ne w H ave n, Conn. , a nd JOHNL . SM EL TZ ER, 10 Attorney (L ana N . Pettus, Attorney , on the brief ), for R o n a l d J. 11 Tenpa s, Assistant Attorney Gene ral, Environme nt and Natur al 12 Resource s Division, W ashing ton, D.C., for Appellee

. 13 14 I RWI N H. SCHWAR TZ, Sh er y l Gor don M cClo ud, Se at t l e, Wa. , for 15 Defendant- Appellant

. 16 17 ANDREW WEI SSM ANN, Jenner & Bloc k L L P, New Yor k, N.Y., 18 for Amici Curiae Th e Cha mbe r o f C omm e rc e of

the Un ite d St ate s, 19 Th e Was hin g ton L e g a l F ound atio n, Th e As so c iatio n o f C or po rate 20 Couns e l, T he Natio na l A sso c iatio n o f C ri min a l D e fe ns e L awye rs , 21 The National Association of Manuf actur ers, a

nd The Ne w York 22 State As so c iatio n o f C ri min a l D e fe ns e L awye rs . 23

_____________________________________ 24 PER C URI AM : 25 Def

endant- Appellant I onia Mana g ement S.A. (“ I onia”) appea ls from a jury verdic t 26 convictingit of, inte r a lia , v iol atin gthe Ac t to Pr e ve nt P oll uti on on Shi ps (“ APP S” ) b y

fa ili ngto 27 “maintain” a

n oil recor d book (“O RB”) while in U.S. water s. The cha rg es in this case de rive 28 from eve nts aboard the M/T Kriton (“ Kriton ”), a

600-foot oil tanker

manag ed (but not owne d) by 29 I onia that flies under the flagof the B ahama s. I onia is incorporated in L iberia a nd headqua

rtere d 1 30 in Gree ce. D uringthe per iod named in the indictment (January 2006 to April 2007), the Kriton3 1 de liv e re d o il a

nd pe tr ole um p ro du c ts t o p or ts a lon gthe e a st c oa st o f t he Un ite d St ate s. Whil e 2 makingthese de liveries, I onia’s eng ine room cr ew, unde r the dire ction and par ticipation of the 3 Chief Eng ineer s and Second Eng ineer , routinely discharg ed oily

waste w ater

into the high se as 4 throug h a “ma g ic hose” desig ned to by pass the vesse l’s Oily

Water Separ ator, whic h would have 5 clea

ned the wa ste to prepa

re it for disposal as requir ed by

law. F urthermor e, the Kriton ’s cr ew 6 made f

alse e ntries in the ORB to c oncea l such dischar g es, and obstruc ted a f eder al investig ation 7 (a) by

hiding the “ mag ic hose” from Coast Guar d inspectors duringa Mar ch 20, 2007, inspec tion 8 and

(b ) b y lyingto C oa st Gua

rd of fi c ia ls. Th e Go ve rnme nt b ro ug ht f our s e pa ra te ind ic tme nts 9 ag ainst I onia in J une 2007—in the District of Connec ticut, the Easter n District of Ne w York, the 10 Southern District of F lorida, and the District of the United States Vir g in I slands. The 11 indictments, which wer e consolidate d for tria l in Connecticut, collectively char g ed I onia with one 12 count of c onspiracy (18 U.S.C. § 371), thirteen c ounts under the APPS (33 U.S.C. § 1908(a)), 13 three counts of fa lsifying r ecor ds in a fede ral investig ation (18 U.S.C. § 1519), and one count of 14 obstruction of justice (18 U .S.C. § 1505). After tria l, the jury found I onia guilty

on all counts. 15 I onia now appe als that conviction, ar g uing: ( 1) that the District Court er red in instructing 16 the jury

that I onia could be f

ound liable for violatingthe APPS, 33 U.S .C. § 1908(a), f or fa iling 17 to “maintain” a

n ORB whe n the Kriton ’s cr ew o n l y possessed the fa lsified ORB a nd did not 18 make any

false e ntries when it wa s in U.S. waters; (2) that the jury instruction on vicarious 19 corpor ate liability was e rrone ous and construc tively amende d the indictment, and that the 20 evidenc e wa s insufficient to establish re sp on de at s up e rio r criminal liability ; (3) that the District 21 Court constructively amende d the indictment when it fa iled to instruct the jury that it had to find 22 “ mate ri a l” fa lsi fi c atio n to c onvic t un de r 1 8 U .S. C. § 15 19 ; and (4 ) t hat th e Di str ic t Co ur

t e rr e d in4 1 sentenc ing by

not properly

g roupingthe cr imes, relying on disputed f acts, a nd considering 2 extraterritorial infor mation. 3 I onia’s ar g ument about the APPS concer ns an issue that this Court has not y et addr essed. 4 We theref

ore inter pret for the first time the re g ulation that require s subject ships to “maintain” an 5 ORB. 33 C.F .R. § 151.25(a). In doing so, w e join the Fif th Circuit in holdi ngthat this provision 6 imp os e s a

duty on sh ips , u po n e nte ri ngthe po rt s o r n avig a ble wate rs of

the Un ite d St ate s, to 7 e ns ur e that it s O RB is a c c ur ate (o r at le a st n ot k no wi ng ly ina c c ur ate ). We f

ind that th is 8 require ment complies with international law a s require d by 33 U.S.C. § 1912, which provides 9 that “[a]ny

action take n under [the APPS] shall be take n in acc ordanc e with international law.” 10 In addition, it is supported by the re g ulation’s plain text and is nec essar y to advanc e the a ims of 11 the international treaties g overningpollution on t he hig h seas. Ac cording ly , we c onclude that the 12 District Court did not err in its jury instruction. 13 Wit h respe ct to the re maining issues on a ppeal, we addre ss them summarily as I onia has 14 failed to de monstrate that ther e we re a ny err ors base d on the established pr ece dents of our 15 Cir c uit

. 16 17 I. The Ac t t o P r e ve ntP oll ut ion on Shi ps 18 A. Sta tutor

yFram e wor

k 19 Congr ess ena cted the A PPS , 33 U.S.C. §§ 1901-1912, to impl ement two re lated mar ine 20 environmenta l treaties to which the United States is a par ty : (1) the 1973 International 21 Convention for the Preve ntion of Poll ution from Ships, Nov. 2, 1973, 1340 U.N.T.S. 184, and (2) 22 the Protocol of 1978 Relatingto the International Convention for the Preve ntion of Poll ution5 1 from Ships, Feb. 17, 1978, 1340 U .N.T.S. 61. United States v. J ho , 534 F.3d 398, 401 ( 5th Cir. 2 2008). These two international c onventions, jointl y ref err ed to as MARPOL , aim “to ac hieve the 3 complete e limination of int ernational polluti on of the mar ine environme nt by oil and other 4 harmful substanc es,” MARPOL , 1340 U.N.T.S. at 128, and c onsequently addre ss how 5 ocea

ng oing ve ssels are to dispose of wastes g ener ated onboa rd. 6 Specifica lly , MARPOL ’s Annex Icontains re g ulations for the pre vention of oil polluti on. 7 United States v. Abrogar , 4 59 F .3 d 4 30 , 4 32 (3 d Ci r. 20 06 ). Duri ngno rm a l op e ratio n, ve sse ls 8 like the Kriton acc umulate larg e volumes of oily waste w ater

in their bilge s, eng ine rooms, and 9 mecha

nical spac es. The pr ovisions of Annex Iprohibit ships from discharg ing the se wa stes at 1 0 s ea , ex ce p tun d er ce rt ai np re s cr i b edco n d i t i o n s . Fo r i n s t an ce , a v es s el m ay o n l y d i s ch ar ge en 11 route if the dischar g ed mater ial is processe d throug h specifie d oil filtration equipment, such as an 12 Oi ly

Wat e r S e pa

rator , th at tr a

ps mos t of

the oil . M ARPOL , r e g . 4 (c ), 13 40 U. N. T. S. at 67 ; Id. 13 Reg . 9, 1340 U.N.T.S. at 202. More over, Annex Imandates that vessels rec ord all oil transfe r 14 operations, including over board discha

rg e of bilg e water, in an O RB that is reta ined on boar d and 15 available for inspec tion by the “c ompetent authority” of a ny g overnme nt party

to MARPOL

. Id

. 16 re g . 2 0, 13 40 U. N. T. S. at 21 1- 12 ; see also Abrograr , 4 5 9 F

. 3 d at 4 3 2 ( e xp la in in gth at An n e x I 17 require s that the ORB inc lude re cords of all transfe rs of oil, disposals of oily waste g ener ated on 18 the vessel, the disposal of sludge , emer g ency

discharg es, amongothers). 19 MARPOLis not a self-e x ecutingtreaty ; instead, ea ch par ty ag ree s to “g ive ef

fec t” to it. 20 MARPOL , art. 1(1) , 1340 U.N.T.S. at 63, 184. In particula r, ea ch par

ty to the treaty

ag ree s to set 21 up rules for

ships that fly

that party ’s flag , and ea ch is responsible f or ce rtifying that such ships 22 comply

with the treaty

rules. Parties to MARPOLare require d to set sanctions for violations by6 1 ships flying the ir flag“whe reve r the violation occ urs.” Id . Art. 4(1) , 1340 U.N.T.S. at 185-86. 2 When another c ountry observe s or suspects that a ship is viol atingthe treaty , Article 6( 2) 3 provides that a por t state should send the flagstate a r eport of those possible violations so t hat 4 proce eding s may

be initiated in the flagstate. Id. at 187. 5 Th e Un ite d St ate s la w e xec uti ngMA RPO L

—th e APP S—a

uth or ize s th e Coa st Gua

rd to 6 “pre scribe a

ny nece ssary

or desire d regulations to carr y out the provisions of . . . MARPOL .” 33 7 U.S.C. § 1903(c)(1) . Pursuant to this authority , the Coast Guar d has issued re g ulations that 8 g ener ally

trac k the re quirements set for th in Annex I . The pa

rticular A PPS regulation at issue 9 here is 33 C.F.R. § 151.25(a), which states that “[e]ach oil tanker of 150 g ross tons and above

. . . 10 shall maintai n an [ORB]” (empha sis added), which it must keep “re adily available for 11 inspection,” id. at 15 1. 25 (i ); see also Abrogar , 459 F.3d at 432 (explaining that member states 12 c on du c t in sp e c tio ns to e ns ur e c omp lia nc e in t he ir po rt s a nd wate rs , a nd tha t a sh ip’ s f a ilure to 13 c omp ly

wi th M ARPOL

re qu ir e me nts c an f

or m a ba sis fo r r e fu sin gto l e t a sh ip e nte r p or

t, 14 ref

err ing the matter to the fla gstate, or, whe re a ppropriate , prosec uting the violation in the 15 United States). The re a re two pe rtinent limit ations to the application of the A PPS . First, the 16 rec ord book re quirements of 33 C.F .R. § 151.25 apply to U.S.-reg istered ships wher ever they are 17 (i nc lud ingbe y on d U .S. wate rs ), but to any fo re ig n- fl a g g e d s hip s o nly “ wh ile in t

he navig a ble 18 water s of the United States, or while at a por t or terminal under

the jurisdiction of the United 19 State s. ” 33 C.F .R. § 1 51 .0 9( a )( 1) -( 5) ; see also 33 U.S.C. § 1902(a)(2) . Second, the APPS states 20 that “[a]ny

action take n under [the APPS] shall be take n in acc ordanc e with international law.” 21 33 U. S.C. § 1 91 2; see also Jho , 534 F.3d at 402. 22 B. Failure to “Maintai n” an Oil Record Book7 1 Th e c rux of t he dis pute be fo re us fo c us e s o n th e wo rd s “ sh a ll m a int a in” in t he APP S 2 regulations reg ardingORBs. I onia ar g ues that the wor d “maintain” oblig ates it only to keep 3 possession of an ORB , while the Gove rnment submits that the APP S requires I onia to keep the 4 ORB a ccur ately . Shortly afte r I onia filed its appea l in this case , the Fif th Circuit issued an 5 opinion in United States v. J ho , 534 F.3d 398 ( 5th Cir. 2008), which pre sented a simil ar f act 6 scena

rio and e ssentially

identical ar g uments. In Jho , a cr ew membe r tipped off the Coast Guar d 7 that the Chief Eng ineer had manipulated some of the ship’s pollution-detec tion equipment so that 8 it would not recog nize discharg es with hig her oil conte nt than allowed unde r U.S. law. Id. at 9 400. The indictments cha rg ed the ope rators of

the fore ign- flag g ed ship with failingto “maintain” 10 an ORB under 33 C.F .R. § 151.25. Id. at 401. As in the ca se sub judice , the def endants a rgued 11 that international lawprohibited the g overnme nt from prosec uting these offe nses that, they 12 alleg ed, occ urre d on the hig h seas. Id. at 40 3. Th e F if th C ir c uit , r e ve rs ingthe dis tr ic t c ourt , 13 disag ree d. I t first held that the district court wa s incorre ct in concludingthat the alleg ed conduc t 14 —failingto “maintain” a n ORB—oc curr ed outside of U.S. waters. Id. at 402-03. The court 15 rea soned that if the r equire ment to “maintain” a n ORB include d only

an oblig ation to rec ord 16 entries whe n discharg es we re ma de (a n obligation violated on the high se as), a nd not to keep the 17 bo ok

a c c ur ate (a

n o bli g atio n e xiste nt at U .S. po rt s) , th e n th e re g ulatio n w ou ld b e “ at od ds wi th 18 MA RPO Land

Con g re ss’ c le ar i nte nt u

nd e r t he APP S to pr e ve nt p oll uti on at se a a c c or din gto 19 MARPOL .” Id. at 40 3. B e c a us e “ [a]c c ur ate oil re c or d b oo ks are ne c e ssa ry to c arr y out th e g oa ls 20 of MARPOLand the APPS,” the cour t found if re cord books “ did not have to be ‘ maintained’ 21 wh ile in t

he po rt s o r n avig a

ble wate rs of

the Un ite d St ate s, the n a

fo re ig n- fl a g g e d v e sse l c ou ld 22 avoid application of the rec ord book re quirements simply by falsify ing a ll of its record book8 1 information just before entry into a port or navig able waters,” a nd thus avoid detec tion. Id. 2 Co n s e qu e n tl y , th e F if th Ci r c u it h e ld th at t h e r e qu ir e me n t t o “ ma inta in ” anO RB “ im p o s [e s ] a 3 duty

upon a for eig n-flag g ed vesse l to ensure that its oil recor d book is acc urate (or at least not 4 knowing ly

inacc urate ) upon ente ringthe ports of naviga ble wate rs of the United States.” Id. 5 Fur

thermore , the Jho court re jected the defe ndants’ ar g ument that international law— 6 i.e., the law of

the flagdoctrine e mbodied in the United Nations Convention on the L aw of the 7 Sea (“ UNCL OS”) a nd MARPOL— limit ed the g overnme nt’s jurisdiction to prosecute violations 8 of domestic law c ommitt ed in port. Id. at 40 9. B e c a us e the fa ilure to m a int a in t he ORB 9 occur

red in U.S. waters, ther e wa s no obligation to let the flagstate prose cute the violation. The 10 Fifth Circuit noted that the “ Supreme Court has r ecognized that the law of the f lagdoctrine doe s 11 not completely

trump a sover eig n’s terr itorial jurisdiction to prosecute violations of its laws: The 12 law of the flagdoctrine is chie fly applicable to ships on the high sea s, where there is no territorial 13 sovere ign; a

nd as re spects ships in foreign territoria l water s it has litt le application bey ond what 14 is affirmatively

or tac itly permitted by

the local sove reig n.” Id. at4 0 6 (qu o t i n g Cun ar d S.S. Co. 15 v. Me llon , 262 U.S. 100, 123 (1923)) ( alterations omi tted) (inter nal quotation marks omitted). 16 Acc ording ly , the cour t found that the ORB offe nses wer e cha rg ed “in a ccor dance with” the law 17 of the fla g . Id. 18 We ag ree for substantially the re asons stated by

the Fif th Circuit in Jho . Any

other 19 re a din gwo uld

de fe at th e purp os e of

MA RPO Land

the APP S, a

nd wo uld be inc on sis te nt w ith 20 international law . The lawof the fla gdoctrine de pends on member states beingable to re port 21 violations to flag states. I f ships such as the Kriton di d n othav e to mai nt ain an acc urat e OR B, 22 member state s would be seve rely hamper ed in their a

bility to report violations to the flagstate for9 1 e nf

or c e me nt, and

the int e rn atio na l sy ste m of re po rt ingand

a c c ounta bil ity un de r M ARPOL

wo uld 2 collapse. 3 The re adingthe Fif th Circuit adopted in Jho also is strongly supported by

the plain text of 4 the re g ulation. W

ebster’s Third New International Dictionary, Unabridged (2002) de fines 5 “maintain” a s, inte r a lia , “ to k e e p in a s tate o f r e p a ir , e f f ic ie n c y , o r

v a li d it y . . . . ” Inth e c o n te xt 6 of a re g ulatio n im

po sin gre c or d- ke e pin gre qu ir e me nts , th e duty to “ ma int a in” pla inl y

me ans a 7 d u ty t o m a i n t a i na

r e a s o n a b l y c om ple teand ac c uratere c or d. No re a so na ble re a de r o f t

his 8 re g ulatio n c ou ld c on c lud e , g ive n th e c on te xt, th at th e re g ulatio n me re ly imp os e s a

n o bli g atio n to 9 prese rve the ORB in its exi sting state. 10 We theref ore hold that the A PPS ’s re quirement that subjec t ships “maintain” an ORB , 33 11 C.F.R. § 151.25, mandates that these ships ensure that their ORB s are acc urate (or at least not 12 knowing ly

inacc urate ) upon ente ringthe ports or naviga ble wate rs of the United States. 13 This require ment is in compliance with international law, supported by the plain text of the 14 regulation, and nec essar y to advanc e the a ims of the international tre aties g overninginternational 15 pollution i n marine e nvironments. Acc ording ly , the District Court did not err in instructingthe 16 jur

y on the APP S c ha

rg e s. 17 18 I I . Re mai n i n g Cl a i ms 19 I onia’s re maining c laims do not require the Court to interpret new are as of law

and, 20 he nc e , c an b e a dd re sse d s umm ari ly . We a ssume the pa rt ie s’ fa mil iari ty wi th t he a dd iti on a l f

a c ts, 21 proce dural history , and scope of the issues per tinent to these rema ining c laims. 22 A. Corporate Cri minal Liabi lity (Respondeat Superior)10 1 We find that I onia’s cla im that there wa s not sufficient evide nce to c onvict it on a 2 respondeat superior theory to be meritless. The Court r eviews c halleng es to the suffic iency of 3 the evidenc e de novo , Un ite d S tates v . Yann ott i , 5 41 F .3 d 1 12 , 1 20 (2 d Ci r. 20 08 ), a ff ir min gif 4 “af

ter view ing the evidenc e in the lig ht most favorable to the prosec ution, any rational trier of 5 fac t could have f

ound the essential e lements of the c rime beyond a re asonable doubt,” Jack son v. 6 Vi rg ini a , 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979). The rec ord re flec ts that there wa s ample evide nce f or a jury 7 to have r easona

bly found that the Kriton ’s cr ew a cted within the scope of their e mploy ment. The 8 cre w member s acte d within their authority to maintain the eng ine room, dischar g e wa ste, and 9 rec ord re levant information, when they used the “ mag ic hose.” They testified that they

acte d at 10 the direc tion of their supervisors not just (a) in the discharg ing of the oil, and (b) in the making 11 and maintainingof the fa lse ORB e ntries, but also (c) in ly ing to the Coa st Guard. The jury 12 c ou ld, mor e ov e r, inf e r f ro m th e e xpe rt

te sti mony

a bo ut t he ma int e na

nc e and e xpe ns e inv olv e d in 13 using the Oil Water Separator that the cr ew use d the by pass hose to bene fit I onia and 14 subsequently

lied to protect the c ompany . 15 I onia’s appe al that the jury char g e on respondeat superior was e rrone ous and 16 constructively

amende d the indictment also fails. I onia did not challeng e the instruction below, 17 so we re view for

plain err or. Johnson v. U nited States , 520 U.S. 461, 466-67 (1997) ( explaining 18 that showing “plain er ror” involves provingan (1) err or, (2) that is plain, and (3) a ffe cted the 19 appellant’ s substantial rights). I onia contends that the District Court erre d beca use, inte r a lia , it 20 failed to instruct the jury that corpor ate c riminal liabilit y can only stem from the a ctions of so21 called “ manag eria l” employ ees. Tha t contention seems at odds with our pr ece dents in United 22 States v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp. , 882 F.2d 656, 660 ( 2d Cir. 1989), and United States11 1 v. Ge orge F. Fish, Inc

. , 154 F.2d 798, 801 ( 2d Cir. 1946) (per curiam). But r eg ardle ss of these, 2 there was ove rwhe lming evide nce that the Kriton ’s Chief Eng ineer s specific ally direc ted cr ew 3 members to use the “mag ic hose,” and so I onia’s ar g ument is without m erit in any event. 4 F ur

the rm or e , w e re fu se to a do pt t he su g g e sti on

tha t th e pr os e c uti on , in

or de r t o e sta

bli sh 5 vicar ious liabili ty , should have to prove as a se parate eleme nt in its case -in-chie f that the 6 c or

po ratio n la c ke d e ff

e c tiv e po lic ie s and

pr oc e dure s to de te r a

nd de te c t c ri min a l a c tio ns by its 7 e mp l o ye e s . W e n o t e th atth i s ar g u m e n ti s m a d e o n l y b y amici curiae and not by I onia, and so we 8 are not obligate d to consider it. B ut the argument, whoeve r made it, is unavailing. Addingsuch 9 an ele ment is contrar y to the prec edent of

our Circuit on this issue. See Twentieth Century Fox 10 Film Corp. , 882 F. 2d at 660 (holding that a compliance prog ram, “ howeve r extensive, does not 11 immun ize the c or po ratio n f ro m li a bil ity wh e n it s e mpl oye e s, a c tin gwi thi n th e sc op e of the ir 12 a uth or ity , f

a il t o c omp ly

wi th t he law” ). An d th is r e ma ins so re g ard le ss o f a sse rt e d n e w Su pr e me 13 Court

c a se s in oth e r a re a s o f t he law. As the Di str ic t Co ur t in str uc te d th e jur

y he re , a c or po rate 14 c omp lia

nc e pr og ra

m ma y be re le va nt t o whe the r a

n e mpl oye e wa s a c tin gin t he sc op e of

his 15 employ

ment, but it is not a sepa

rate element. 16 B. Falsification Under 18 U.S.C. § 1519 17 I on ia

ne xt as se rt s th at th e Di str ic t Co ur t’ s jury c ha rg e a s to fa lsi fi c atio n und e r 1 8 U .S. C. 18 § 1519 constructively amende d the indictment by failingto instruct the jury that the fa lsification 19 had to be “ materia l.” B eca use I onia re quested the instruc tion given by the District Court on the 20 § 1 51 9 c ounts , it ha s li ke ly

wa ive d a ny argume nt c on c e rn inga

c on str uc tiv e ame ndme nt. See 21 Un ite d S

tates v . G iov an e lli , 464 F.3d 346, 351 ( 2d Cir. 2006) (per curiam) (“[I ]f a party

invited 22 the cha

rg e . . . she ha s waived a

ny rig ht to appellate r eview of the cha rg e.” ( internal quotation12 1 m ar

k s o m i t t e d ) )

. In any

event, howe ver, a

constructive a

mendment occ urs only

when the tr ial 2 evidenc e and jur

y instructions “so modify ” the ter ms of an indictment that “ther e is a substantial 3 lik e lih oo d th at th e de fe nd ant m ay have be e n c onvic te d o f a n o ff e ns e oth e r t

ha n th at c ha rg e d in 4 the indictment.” United States v. Mollica , 849 F.2d 723, 729 ( 2d Cir. 1988) (interna l quotation 5 marks omitted). In consideringthis question, courts “have constantly permitted sig nificant 6 flexibi lity

in proof, provide d that the def endant wa s g iven notice of the c or e of c rim ina lit yto be 7 proven at trial.” United States v. Rigas , 490 F.3d 208, 228 ( 2d Cir. 2007) (footnote omitted) 8 (interna l quotation marks omitted). Here , I onia was on notice of the “ core criminality ” to be 9 pr ov e n at tr ia l. M or e ov e r, the e vid e nc e sh ow s th at th e fa lsi fi c atio n in thi s c a se wa s in dis puta

bly 10 materia l, and thus I onia’s rig hts were not substantially aff ecte d. 11 C. Sentenc ing 12 L astly , I onia appe als its sentence , arguing that the District Court made seve ral proc edura l 13 err ors that war

rant a rema nd. I onia primarily

argues that the District Court er red in its g rouping 14 analy sis by

not following Sente ncingGuidelines Section 3D1.2. The District Court, however , 15 was not sentenc ing pur suant to this section, and was not re quired to do so bec ause the re w ere no 16 g uidelines applica ble to the org anizational offense at issue. Acc ording ly , the District Court 17 “dete rmine[d] an appr opriate f ine by applying the provisions of 18 U.S.C. §§ 3553 and 3572.” 18 See U.S.S.G. §§ 8C2.1, 8C 2.10. In announcingthe sentenc e, the District Court stated: “ And I 19 want you to understand that I in no way

felt constra ined and c onfined or ma ndated [by

the 20 Guidelines].” The District Court also explained how the se ntence was a ppropriate to serve the 21 “dete rre nt[ ,] puni shment and public messag e func tion” for a company that had “pr eviously

been 22 c onvic te d o f a

lik e c ri me ” and

“ a pp are ntl y fa ile d to se e the se ri ou sn e ss” of its ob lig atio ns . T hu s,13 1 the District Court was not distrac ted by any alleg ed er

roneous Guide lines calc ulation or 2 g rouping . The other sentenc ing c halleng es ar e similarly without merit. Given that a fine of $4.9 3 milli on is also substantively rea sonable in this case , there is no reason to disturb the District 4 Court’s sentenc e. 5 6 III. Conclusion 7 We have c are fully considere d all of I onia’s cla ims, and we find them to be w ithout merit. 8 Acc ording ly , the judg ment of the District Court and the jury verdic t are AFF I RMED.