NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential 

United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit 

__________________________ 

RONALD F. BOUSQUET, 

Claimant-Appellant, 

v. 

ERIC K. SHINSEKI, SECRETARY OF VETERANS 

AFFAIRS, 

Respondent-Appellee. 

__________________________ 

2011-7017 

__________________________ 

Appeal from the United States Court of Appeals for 

Veterans Claims in Case No. 08-1279, Chief Judge Bruce 

E. Kasold. 

___________________________ 

Decided: May 19, 2011 

___________________________ 

DARRYL F. SMITH, Sutherland Asbill & Brennan, LLP, 

of Atlanta, Georgia, argued for the claimant-appellant. 

With him on the brief was THOMAS W. CURVIN. 

J. HUNTER BENNETT, Trial Attorney, Commercial Litigation Branch, Civil Division, United States Department 

of Justice, of Washington, DC, argued for the respondent-
BOUSQUET v. DVA 2

appellee. With him on the brief were TONY WEST, Assistant Attorney General, JEANNE E. DAVIDSON, Director, 

and KIRK T. MANHARDT, Assistant Director. 

__________________________ 

Before BRYSON, SCHALL, and PROST, Circuit Judges. 

PER CURIAM. 

Ronald F. Bousquet appeals from a decision of the 

Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims (“the Veterans 

Court”) upholding a decision of the Board of Veterans’ 

Appeals that denied Mr. Bousquet’s request for a waiver 

of recovery of home-loan guaranty indebtedness to the 

Department of Veterans Affairs (“DVA”). The DVA had 

guaranteed a home loan for Mr. Bousquet. He defaulted 

on the loan, leaving the DVA with an obligation to the 

lender. In cases in which the DVA attempts to recover its 

loss from the veteran, the veteran is entitled by statute to 

seek a waiver of the obligation to repay the loss. 38 

U.S.C. § 5302(b). Mr. Bousquet sought such a waiver. 

After evidentiary proceedings before a DVA regional 

office, the Board of Veterans’ Appeals held that Mr. 

Bousquet was not entitled to a waiver under 38 C.F.R. § 

1.965(b)(2) because he had acted in bad faith in creating 

the indebtedness in question. On Mr. Bousquet’s appeal, 

the Veterans Court affirmed, holding that the evidence 

was sufficient to support the Board’s findings and that the 

Board did not shift the burden of proof on the issue of bad 

faith. Mr. Bousquet now appeals to this court, arguing 

that the Board improperly shifted the burden of proof to 

him to disprove bad faith. 

This court’s jurisdiction to review decisions of the 

Veterans Court is limited to “the validity of the decision of 

the Court on a rule of law or of any statute or regulation 

. . . or any interpretation thereof (other than a determina-
3 BOUSQUET v. DVA

tion as to a factual matter) that was relied on by the 

Court in making the decision.” 38 U.S.C. § 7292(a). The 

question whether the agency or the veteran bears the 

burden of proof in a waiver proceeding with respect to the 

issue of bad faith is an issue of law, but that question of 

law was well settled before this case and was not at issue 

here. Reyes v. Nicholson, 21 Vet. App. 370, 377 (2007). 

The Veterans Court did not rely on an interpretation of 

that rule of law in making its decision other than applying the settled principle that the burden of proof on the 

issue of bad faith rests on the agency and concluding that 

the Board’s decision was consistent with that principle. 

Mr. Bousquet’s argument comes down to asserting that 

the Board misapplied that principle because of the way it 

assessed the evidence. That is in essence a challenge to 

the sufficiency of the evidence, or at most a challenge to 

the manner in which the Board conducted its review of 

the evidence, neither of which is within the jurisdiction of 

this court to review. We therefore dismiss this appeal for 

lack of jurisdiction. 

No costs. 

DISMISSED