* Pursuant to 5 TH C IR

. R . 47.5, the Court has determined that

this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except

under the limited circumstances set forth in 5 TH C IR . R. 47.5.4.

1 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 98-60051

Summary Calendar

JILL M. DUBAZ,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

VERSUS

JOHNSON CONTROLS WORLD SERVICES, INC.,

Defendant-Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court

For the Southern District of Mississippi

(1:96-CV-374-GR)

November 20, 1998

Before DAVIS, DUHÉ and PARKER, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: *

Jill Dubaz (“Dubaz”) appeals the grant of summary judgment for

Johnson Controls World Services, Inc. (“Johnson Controls”) on her

Title VII sex discrimination in employment and retaliation claims.

We affirm.

FACTS2

Viewing the summary judgment evidence in the light most

f avorable to Dubaz, we distilled the following facts from the

record. Dubaz worked at Johnson Controls’ predecessor company

beginning in March 1985. She was employed as a Class 4130 welder

and performed structural steel “stick” welding. She was the only

female welder and the only Class 4130 welder employed by Johnson

Controls. She was not certified for nor did she have the ability

to perform

the other types of welding required for a Class 4140

welder.

In January 1994, Dubaz participated in a lawsuit (the “Bush

suit”) by providing deposition testimony on behalf of a plaintiff

in th at case. She testified in her deposition that she had been

sexually harassed by a shop leader in another Johnson Controls

department. Some co-workers did not want to work or associate with

Dubaz after her t estimony. Dubaz characterizes their motive as

retaliation, while th ey claim they were afraid she would falsely

accuse them of sexual harassment.

In June 1995, Johnson Controls decided to discontinue funding

for its Class 4130 welding position. At that time, Dubaz was the

only individual employed as a 4130 welder and the only female

welder employed by Johnson Controls. Dubaz was notified that she

would have to become certified as a Class 4140 welder if she wanted

to continue as a welder with Johnson Controls. Johnson Controls

paid her fees to enroll in a training program and rea rranged her

work schedule so that she could continue to work and attend school.

She did not feel that she was ready and therefore refused to take3

the certification test by October 1, 1998, as required. Johnson

C ontrols advised her that she could bid on a different job at

Johnson Controls or that she could reapply for a welding position

when she achieved proper certification. Dubaz declined to do

either, and her employment was terminated.

SEX DISCRIMINATION

Dubaz has the burden of establishing a prima facie case of

discrimination or retaliation. S ee St. Mary’s Honor Center v.

Hicks

, 509 U.S. 502, 515-517 (1993). In a reduction of work force

case, a prima facie case is established if: ( 1) plaintiff is a

member of a protected group; (2) she was adversely affected by the

employer’s decision; (3) she was qualified to assume another

position at the time of the termination and (4) the employer

intended to discriminate in reaching its decision. See Woodhouse

v. Magnolia Hosp.

, 92 F.3d 248, 252 (5th Cir. 1996). Dubaz did not

present summary judgment evidence that she was qualified to assume

another position with Johnson controls. It undisputed that she was

unqualified to fill the Class 4140 welder position, and she refused

to bid for other jobs as she was advised to do.

Dub az argues on appeal that the district court erred in

treating her case as a reduction in work force claim. She takes

the position that the elimination of the Class 4130 welder position

was a pretext for terminating her and her claim should be analyzed

as a “straight discharge case.” To prevail on this theory, Dubaz

must establish a fact dispute on each element of a prima facie case

of unlawful discharge: (1) she was a member of a protected group;4

(2) she was qualified for, and adequately performed, her job; (3)

she was termi nated from that job; and (4) her employer had a

continued need for someone to perform the same work after she was

terminated. S ee Hicks

, 509 U.S. at 508. Dubaz’s appeal focuses on

the fourth element, claim ing that Johnson Controls continued to

have a need for someone to do stick welding. Dubaz is correct that

Johnson Controls did need employees to do the type of welding she

was qualified to do. However, as the district court noted, there

is no evidence that anyone, male or female, was employed doing

solely stick welding work after D ubaz left Johnson Controls.

Rather, the stick welding was divided among the other welders who

were each required to other types of welding as well. Dubaz’s

arguments concerning what she perceived as potential cost savings

engendered by continuing to fund the less skilled welder position

does not create a genuine issue of fact regarding whether Johnson

Controls had a continued need for workers who were capable of doing

solely stick welding. Title VII does not allow a court to sit as

a super-personnel department and micromanage a company’s business

decisions. S ee Benningfield v. City of Houston

,

___ F.3d

___, 1998

WL 685661 (5th Cir. 1998).

For the foregoing reasons we affirm the summary judgment for

Johnson Controls on Dubaz’s discrimination claim.

RETALIATION

Dubaz’s retaliation claim fails as well. A retaliation claim

has three elements: (1) the employee engaged in protected activity

u nder Title VII; (2) the employer took adverse employment act ion5

against the employee; and (3) a causal connection exists between

the protected activity and the adverse employment action. M attern

v. Eastman Kodak Co.

, 104 F.3d 702, 705 (5th Cir. 1997). Dubaz did

engage in protecte d activity under Title VII when she offered

deposition te stimony in the B ush lawsuit and her termination

clearly qualifies as adverse employment action.

Dubaz points to two incidents as evidence of retaliatory

intent in the decision not to fund the Class 4130 welder position:

(1) a letter of reprimand put in her file in Fe bruary 1994 by a

supervisor named McArthur; and (2) a statement by Freeman, the

employee she testified sexually harassed her, that he was “going to

get that bitch fired any way he could.” Freeman had no supervisory

authority over Dubaz; in fact he did not even work in her

department. Further, neither McArthur nor Freeman were involved in

the decision to stop funding the Class 4130 welder position. Horne

made that decision af ter an independent investigation. Finally,

Dubaz was laid off twenty months after she testified, during which

time Johnson Controls paid for special training, accommodated her

scheduling need s and encouraged her to bid on other jobs in an

effort to avoid termination. This evidence does not create a

genuine issue of material fact concer ning retaliation. S ee

generally Burfield v. Brown, Moore & Flint, Inc.

, 51 F.3d 583, 590

(5th Cir. 1995)(finding no causal connectio n between protected

activity fifteen m onths earlier and plaintiff’s loss of

employment).

W e therefore affirm the district court’s grant of summa r y6

judgment for Johnson Controls on Dubaz’s retaliation claim.

AFFIRMED.