[DO NOT PUBLISH]

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eleventh Circuit

____________________

No. 21-10612

Non-Argument Calendar

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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

LENA D. COTTON,

PROFESSIONAL ACCOUNTING LDC, LLC,

Defendants-Appellants.

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2 Opinion of the Court 21-10612

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Florida

D.C. Docket No. 9:17-cv-80518-DMM

____________________

Before LAGOA, BRASHER, and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: 

Appellants, Lena Cotton and Professional Accounting 

LDC, LLC (“PALDC”), appeal the district court’s permanent injunction enjoining them from, among other things, preparing 

federal tax returns. The district court cited two sources of authority for its power to issue this injunction: (1) the court’s inherent 

power to enforce its orders through a finding of civil contempt 

and (2) the court’s statutory authority under I.R.C. §§ 7402(a), 

7407, and 7408. Appellants argue on appeal that the district court 

erred in two ways. First, it erred by finding Appellants in contempt because evidence showed that they had made good faith 

efforts to substantially comply with the district court’s orders. 

Second, it abused its discretion by issuing a broad permanent injunction that barred them from preparing tax returns.

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I. 

District courts have “inherent power to enforce compliance with their lawful orders through civil contempt.” Citronelle–Mobile Gathering, Inc. v. Watkins, 943 F.2d 1297, 1301 (11th 

Cir. 1991). We review a district court’s finding of civil contempt 

for abuse of discretion. Id. We also review a district court’s decision to grant an injunction and the scope of the injunction for 

abuse of discretion. Angel Flight of Ga., Inc. v. Angel Flight Am., 

Inc., 522 F.3d 1200, 1208 (11th Cir. 2008). “Determinations of law 

are reviewed de novo, while the findings of fact that support an 

injunction are reviewed for clear error.” SEC v. ETS Payphones, 

Inc., 408 F.3d 727, 731 (11th Cir. 2005).

A district court abuses its discretion if it applies an incorrect 

legal standard, applies the law in an unreasonable or incorrect 

manner, follows improper procedures in making the determination, or makes findings of fact that are clearly erroneous. Klay v. 

United Healthgroup, Inc., 376 F.3d 1092, 1096 (11th Cir. 2004); see 

also McMahan v. Toto, 256 F.3d 1120, 1128 (11th Cir. 2001) 

(“[T]he abuse of discretion standard of review recognizes 

that . . . there is a range of choice for the district court and so long 

as its decision does not amount to a clear error of judgment we 

will not reverse even if we would have gone the other way had 

the choice been ours to make.”). An abuse of discretion may also 

occur when “the district court imposes some harm, disadvantage, 

or restriction upon someone that is unnecessarily broad or does 

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not result in any offsetting gain to anyone else or society at large.” 

Klay, 376 F.3d at 1096.

We may affirm the district court’s injunction on any 

ground that appears in the record. Mitsubishi Int’l Corp. v. Cardinal Textile Sales, Inc., 14 F.3d 1507, 1517 (11th Cir. 1994) (citing 

United States v. Arthur Young & Co., 465 U.S. 805, 814 n.12, 104 

S. Ct. 1495, 1501 n.12 (1984)). Here, the district court cited two 

bases for its authority—its inherent contempt power and its statutory authority under the Internal Revenue Code—and we may 

affirm on either ground.

Because we write only for the parties who are familiar with 

the facts and proceedings in this case, we relate only those facts 

necessary to understand our decision.

II. 

Appellants’ first argument on appeal is that the district 

court erred by finding them in contempt. A court may find a party in contempt “only upon a showing that the alleged contempt is 

clear and convincing.” Ga. Power Co. v. NLRB, 484 F.3d 1288, 

1291 (11th Cir. 2007). “The clear and convincing evidence must 

establish that: (1) the allegedly violated order was valid and lawful; (2) the order was clear and unambiguous; and (3) the alleged 

violator had the ability to comply with the order.” Id. Here, Appellants concede that the district court’s injunction is (1) valid and 

lawful and (2) clear and unambiguous, and they only dispute their 

ability to comply. A party may “demonstrate an inability to comUSCA11 Case: 21-10612 Date Filed: 01/20/2022 Page: 4 of 12
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ply only by showing that they have made ‘in good faith all reasonable efforts to comply.’” Citronelle–Mobile Gathering, Inc., 

943 F.2d at 1301 (quoting United States v. Ryan, 402 U.S. 530, 534, 

91 S. Ct. 1580, 1583 (1971)).

Appellants assert that they substantially complied with the 

district court’s orders; that, while some of their actions may have 

been imprudent, they acted in good faith; and that the district 

court improperly held them accountable for the actions of independent third parties (the Non-Parties). However, our review of 

the district court’s decision (Dist. Ct. Doc. 156), the briefs of the 

parties, and the record evidence persuades us that Appellants’ arguments are wholly without merit.

It is true, and the district court so found, that Appellants 

did substantially comply with discrete parts of the district court’s 

prior orders. However, after a comprehensive discussion of the 

evidence, the district court found:

In addition to attempting to circumvent my prior Orders 

through Non-Parties by, in effect, employing and overseeing Non-Parties and then retaining a great deal of the profits on the returns prepared by them, Defendants committed other violations of my prior Orders [then listing same].

Dist. Ct. Doc. 156 at 11. Earlier in the decision, the district court 

had previewed this finding:

Based on the testimony at the hearing and my credibility 

assessments of the same, I find that, since March 4, 2019, 

Defendants, individually and through Non-Parties, have atUSCA11 Case: 21-10612 Date Filed: 01/20/2022 Page: 5 of 12
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tempted to circumvent the terms of the Injunction and the 

March 4, 2019 and August 15, 2019 Orders and have, in 

some cases, violated the restrictions placed upon them by 

those Orders . . . .

Dist. Ct. Doc. 156 at 4. While Appellants’ briefs on appeal point 

to a few provisions of the Orders with which they arguably did 

substantially comply, and while they assert in conclusory fashion 

that they did not control or supervise the Non-Parties and otherwise acted in good faith, the Appellants fall far short of persuading 

us that the district court’s findings were clearly erroneous.

In sum, we readily reject Appellants’ first argument that 

the district court erred by finding them in contempt.1

 

1 Moreover, as noted in the Government’s response brief, the district court 

relied not only on its inherent powers to enforce its orders through a finding 

of civil contempt, but also on its statutory authority under I.R.C. § 7402(a). 

We agree that the district court also had statutory authority under § 7402(a) 

to issue the instant injunction, and we agree that § 7402(a) constitutes a separate and independent ground for affirmance. Section 7402(a) of the Internal 

Revenue Code grants district courts broad authority to issue injunctions, 

among other remedies, “as may be necessary or appropriate for the enforcement of the internal revenue laws.” See United States v. Askins & Miller Orthopaedics, P.A., 924 F.3d 1348, 1354 (11th Cir. 2019) (“Section 7402(a) 

of the Internal Revenue Code grants federal district courts an array of powers to aid in enforcing the tax laws . . . .”); United States v. Ernst & Whinney, 

735 F.2d 1296, 1300 (11th Cir. 1984) (“The language of § 7402(a) encompasses 

a broad range of powers necessary to compel compliance with the tax 

laws.”). A district court may issue an injunction under § 7402(a) without 

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III. 

Appellants’ second argument on appeal is that the district 

court abused its discretion by issuing an overbroad injunction that

permanently enjoined them from preparing federal tax returns. 

We review both the district court’s decision to grant an injunction 

and the scope of the injunction for abuse of discretion. Angel 

Flight, 522 F.3d at 1208. We review the district court’s determinations of law de novo, and its findings of fact underlying the injunction for clear error. ETS Payphones, 408 F.3d at 731. Here, 

we cannot conclude that the district court abused its discretion by 

finding that the enjoined party “has violated a particular Internal Revenue 

Code section.” Ernst & Whinney, 735 F.2d at 1300. A district court’s “decision to issue an injunction under § 7402(a) is governed by the traditional factors shaping the district court’s use of the equitable remedy.” Id. at 1301. 

The party requesting a permanent injunction must prove (1) irreparable injury, (2) inadequate remedies at law, (3) the equitable remedy is warranted by 

the balance of hardships between the plaintiff and defendant, and (4) the 

permanent injunction would not disserve the public interest. Angel Flight, 

522 F.3d at 1208.

Here, the Appellants do not dispute that § 7402(a) authorized the district 

court to issue the permanent injunction. Rather, Appellants argue that the 

district court relied primarily on its contempt power when it issued the permanent injunction and that a narrower injunction would be more appropriate because contempt power is intended only to ensure compliance, not to 

punish good faith compliance efforts that fall short. We address and reject 

this argument of Appellants as part of our discussion in the next section 

which addresses Appellants’ second argument.

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issuing the injunction or by deciding to bar Appellants permanently from preparing federal tax returns.

The district court thoroughly explained how the permanent injunction satisfied the four equitable principles that govern 

injunctions under I.R.C. § 7402(a). First, it found that the Government has shown irreparable harm because Defendants had repeatedly violated the district court’s prior orders, causing financial 

harm to the U.S. Treasury and undermining public trust in the tax 

system. Absent a permanent injunction, the Government would 

be forced to expend further resources to monitor Appellants. 

Second, Appellants had already violated two prior court orders, 

showing that a permanent injunction is needed because other 

remedies had been inadequate. Third, the balance of hardships 

weighs in favor of the Government. Appellant Cotton has a separate job in the healthcare industry that the injunction does not affect. Additionally, Appellants had every opportunity to comply 

with the district court’s prior orders. Notably, the third injunction the district court issued warned Appellants that if they violated that order, “the remedy shall be a permanent ban on tax return 

preparation.” Fourth, a permanent injunction serves the public 

interest because Appellants’ conduct negatively impacted the federal tax system.

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Appellants do not expressly contest the district court’s 

weighing or consideration of these equitable factors.2

 Instead, 

they assert three errors: (1) that the permanent injunction could 

have been narrower pursuant to I.R.C. § 7407(b); (2) that the 

permanent injunction does not give Appellants an opportunity to 

purge their prior violations; and (3) that the injunction was overly 

broad in requiring Appellants to surrender their preparer tax identification numbers (“PTIN”) and their electronic filing identification numbers (“EFIN”). None of these arguments, though, persuade us to conclude that the district court abused its discretion 

when weighing the four equitable factors that govern injunctions 

authorized by I.R.C. § 7402(a). Ernst & Whinney, 735 F.2d at 

1301.

First, Appellants’ reference to I.R.C. § 7407(b)(2) does not 

change how we evaluate the district court’s authority under 

§ 7402(a). Section 7407(b) authorizes district courts to issue injunctions if three conditions are met: “first, the defendant must be 

a tax preparer; second, the conduct complained of must fall with2 In their reply brief, Appellants say, “Cotton and PALDC do not dispute that 

Internal Revenue Code, Section 7402(a) authorizes the court to enjoin an 

individual and an entity from preparing federal tax returns if the four prongs 

mentioned above are proven by clear and convincing evidence.” Appellants 

then go on to argue that the district court misused its contempt power. But 

at no point do Appellants explicitly argue either that the district court 

(a) abused its discretion in evaluating the four equitable factors or (b) clearly 

erred by finding certain facts.

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in one of the four areas of proscribed conduct, § 7407(b)(1); and 

third, the court must find that an injunction is ‘appropriate to 

prevent the recurrence’ of the proscribed conduct, § 7407(b)(2).” 

Ernst & Whinney, 735 F.2d at 1303. Appellants interpret this to 

mean that a district court may only issue a permanent injunction 

under § 7407(b) “if it finds that a narrower injunction would be 

insufficient to prevent further interference with the administration of tax laws.” But even if Appellants are correctly interpreting 

§ 7407(b)’s limitations on district courts’ authority under 

§ 7407(b), such a limitation does not in turn restrict district courts’ 

authority under § 7402(a). The plain text of § 7402(a) says as 

much: “The remedies hereby provided are in addition to and not 

exclusive of any and all other remedies of the United States in 

such courts or otherwise to enforce [the internal revenue] laws.” 

Moreover, and most significantly, the district court expressly 

found that “Defendants’ continued violations of my Orders indicate that any remedy short of a permanent injunction on return 

preparation is inadequate.” Dist. Ct. Doc. 156 at 14. In other 

words, the district court expressly found that a narrower injunction would not be appropriate. We cannot conclude that the district court abused its discretion in this regard. Ample evidence 

supports the district court’s conclusion that a narrower injunction 

would be inadequate. Appellants had three opportunities to 

comply with three prior injunctions, and Appellants were found 

to have attempted to circumvent each. In addition, the prior injunctions expressly warned Appellants that violations could result 

in a permanent ban on their ability to prepare federal tax returns.

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Second, we reject Appellants’ argument that the injunction 

must be quashed because it does not afford them an opportunity 

to purge. Because § 7402(a) provides ample authority for the district court’s permanent injunction in this case, we need not decide 

whether a district court’s inherent power to enforce its orders 

through contempt must always provide an opportunity to purge, 

even when the court has found that any lesser remedy would be 

inadequate. And, as noted above, ample evidence supports the 

district court’s conclusion that “any remedy short of a permanent 

injunction” would be inadequate.

Third, although the Government addresses this argument—i.e., that the district court abused its discretion by requiring Appellants to surrender their PTINs and EFINs—we doubt 

that Appellants have adequately preserved the alleged error for 

our review. The Government requested that the district court 

enter an injunction requiring Appellants to surrender their PTINs 

and EFINs on three separate occasions: (1) in its initial complaint, 

(2) after the evidentiary hearing March 1, 2019 regarding the 

Government’s first and second show cause motions, and (3) after 

the evidentiary hearing on September 30, 2020 regarding the 

Government’s third show cause motion. Therefore, Appellants 

had ample warning that the district court might require them to 

surrender their PTINs and EFINs. But Appellants did not address 

this possibility until their Motion for Clarification and Reconsideration, which they filed after the district court entered the Final 

Injunction at issue here.

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In any event, we readily conclude that the district court did 

not abuse its discretion. We noted above that Appellants repeatedly attempted to circumvent the district court’s injunctions. A 

PTIN is necessary for a person to prepare returns for others, and 

an EFIN is necessary for a person to file returns electronically. 

Requiring surrender of those numbers is a common provision in 

similar contexts. It aids in enforcing the restrictions in the Final 

Injunction and aids the Government’s efforts in monitoring compliance.3

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district 

court is

AFFIRMED.

3 The district court permanently enjoined Appellants from (1) preparing federal tax returns and (2) transferring or selling their customer lists to a group 

of Non-Parties with whom Appellants were affiliated. In their briefs, Appellants argue that the injunction barring them from preparing federal tax returns is overbroad, but they say almost nothing concerning the second aspect 

of the injunction. Accordingly, we cannot conclude that the district court 

abused its discretion by prohibiting Appellants from transferring or selling 

their customer lists to the specified group of Non-Parties in the order.

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