United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued September 24, 2009 Decided May 28, 2010 

No. 08-7142 

BRITT A. SHAW, ET AL., 

APPELLANTS

v. 

MARRIOTT INTERNATIONAL, INC., 

APPELLEE

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the District of Columbia 

(No. 1:05-cv-01138-GK) 

Paul D. Cullen Sr. argued the cause for appellants. With 

him on the briefs was Joyce E. Mayers. Daniel E. Cohen

entered an appearance. 

Charles P. Scheeler argued the cause for appellee. With 

him on the brief were Holly Drumheller Butler, Bruce V. 

Spiva, and Kathleen R. Hartnett. Benjamin S. Boyd entered an 

appearance. 

Before: SENTELLE, Chief Judge, and GRIFFITH and 

KAVANAUGH, Circuit Judges. 
2 

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge GRIFFITH. 

GRIFFITH, Circuit Judge: Plaintiffs brought this action 

under the District of Columbia consumer protection statute to 

challenge the pricing practices of Marriott’s Russian hotels. 

The district court granted summary judgment in favor of 

Marriott. We affirm in part and reverse in part. 

I. 

The plaintiffs allege a scheme by Marriott International 

to overcharge guests at its Russian hotels. Customers 

reserving rooms at Marriott hotels in Russia received their 

rate quotes in U.S. dollars. Marriott did not inform customers 

until checkout that payment would be due in Russian rubles, 

which the hotels calculated at an exchange rate less favorable 

than the official rate set by the Central Bank of Russia. As a 

result, guests paid up to 18 percent more than the price they 

had been quoted when making their reservations. 

Plaintiff Britt Shaw’s experience shows how Marriott’s 

system worked. In April 2005, Shaw made a one-night 

reservation at the Marriott Renaissance Moscow during a 

business trip for his law firm. He was quoted a price of $425. 

When Shaw checked out of the hotel, he learned that he could 

only pay in rubles, not in dollars. Marriott used its own 

exchange rate of $1 to 32 rubles and charged Shaw 13,600 

rubles for what he had been told would be a $425 room. At 

that day’s official exchange rate of $1 to 27.7543 rubles, 

13,600 rubles equaled $490. Shaw paid $65 more than the 

price quoted to him when he reserved his room. The 

remaining plaintiffs were treated similarly. 
3 

Shaw and the other plaintiffs filed suit in District of 

Columbia Superior Court on behalf of themselves and 

similarly situated customers. They alleged Marriott’s pricing 

practices violated the District of Columbia Consumer 

Protection Procedures Act (CPPA), D.C. CODE §§ 28-3901 to 

-3913 (2009), and constituted unjust enrichment. Marriott 

removed the case to federal district court under 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1332(d) (2006). 

The other named plaintiffs are the Center for Strategic 

and International Studies (CSIS), a Washington, D.C. think 

tank that funded its employees’ professional travel to Russia; 

Sarah Mendelson, a CSIS employee whose business takes her 

frequently to Russia; and Neal Charness, a Michigan resident 

who stayed at Marriott hotels during personal visits to Russia. 

Plaintiffs moved for class certification, and the parties 

filed cross-motions for summary judgment. The district court 

granted summary judgment for Marriott, mooting the motion 

for class certification. Shaw v. Marriott Int’l, Inc., 570 F. 

Supp. 2d 78, 89 (D.D.C. 2008). The court held that CSIS, 

Shaw, and Mendelson were not “consumers” entitled to 

protection under the CPPA because CSIS was a business 

entity and Shaw and Mendelson stayed at Marriott’s Russian 

hotels only for business purposes. Id. at 85. The court also 

held that Charness, as a Michigan resident, could not invoke 

the protection of the CPPA because D.C. law did not govern 

his dispute with Marriott, a Delaware corporation 

headquartered in Maryland. Id. at 88. Finally, the court 

granted summary judgment for Marriott on plaintiffs’ unjust 

enrichment claim. Id. at 89. 

On appeal, plaintiffs drop their claim of unjust 

enrichment and challenge only the district court’s reading and 
4 

application of the CPPA. We have jurisdiction under 28 

U.S.C. § 1291, conclude that Shaw and Mendelson lack 

standing to pursue their actions in federal court, and affirm 

the judgment of the district court on the claims of CSIS and 

Charness. 

II. 

At the outset, Marriott argues that CSIS, Mendelson, and 

Shaw lack standing to bring this suit. “Because the question 

of standing goes to our jurisdiction over the case, we must 

consider it first.” AT&T Corp. v. FCC, 317 F.3d 227, 237 

(D.C. Cir. 2003). To be heard in federal court, every plaintiff 

must satisfy the “irreducible constitutional minimum” of 

Article III standing: injury-in-fact, causation, and 

redressability. Young Am.’s Found. v. Gates, 573 F.3d 797, 

799 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (quoting Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 

504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992)). To demonstrate standing on a 

motion for summary judgment, a plaintiff “must set forth by 

affidavit or other evidence specific facts,” establishing each of 

these three elements. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561 (internal 

quotation marks omitted). 

Marriott contends that it could not have caused any harm 

to CSIS and Mendelson because CSIS employees stayed only 

at Marriott-franchised hotels, which are not owned and 

operated by Marriott, but by independent corporations. CSIS 

and Mendelson have met their burden. They have proffered 

evidence that Marriott was responsible for their loss because 

it exercises some control over the franchised hotels, including 

capping the rates they charge for rooms. See Plaintiffs’ 

Statement of Undisputed Facts ¶¶ 9–11, 20, 28–32. 
5 

CSIS has standing. It used its own funds to pay for stays 

at Marriott’s Russian hotels, and suffered pecuniary harm as a 

result of Marriott’s pricing practices. See Ciba-Geigy Corp. v. 

EPA, 801 F.2d 430, 438 n.10 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (“[E]conomic 

loss clearly constitutes a distinct and palpable injury . . . .”) 

(internal quotation marks omitted). Damages under the CPPA 

would remedy that loss. Article III requires no more. 

Whether Shaw and Mendelson have standing is more 

complicated. They concede having suffered no pecuniary 

injury because their employers paid for their hotel stays. See 

Reply Br. at 27–28. Nonetheless, they maintain that they have 

suffered a legally cognizable injury because Marriott invaded 

their interest in being free from improper trade practices, an 

interest protected under the CPPA. The deprivation of such a 

statutory right may constitute an injury-in-fact sufficient to 

establish standing, even though the plaintiff “would have 

suffered no judicially cognizable injury in the absence of [the] 

statute.” Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 514 (1975); see also 

Zivotofsky ex rel. Ari Z. v. Sec’y of State, 444 F.3d 614, 619 

(D.C. Cir. 2006) (“Although it is natural to think of an injury 

in terms of some economic, physical, or psychological 

damage, a concrete and particular injury for standing purposes 

can also consist of the violation of an individual right 

conferred on a person by statute.”). 

But the violation of a statute can create the particularized 

injury required by Article III only when “an individual right” 

has been “conferred on a person by statute.” Zivotofsky, 444 

F.3d at 619. The question is whether Shaw and Mendelson are 

within the class of individuals protected by the CPPA. To 

answer that, we must apply the substantive law of the District 

of Columbia. Smith v. Wash. Sheraton Corp., 135 F.3d 779, 

782 (D.C. Cir. 1998). “Our duty, then, is to achieve the same 
6 

outcome we believe would result if the District of Columbia 

Court of Appeals considered this case.” Novak v. Capital 

Mgmt. & Dev. Corp., 452 F.3d 902, 907 (D.C. Cir. 2006). 

The CPPA provides that “[a] person . . . may bring an 

action under this chapter in the Superior Court of the District 

of Columbia seeking relief from the use by any person of a 

trade practice in violation of a law of the District of 

Columbia.” 28 D.C. CODE § 3905(k)(1). Though the statute 

defines “person” broadly, id. § 3901(a)(1), the District of 

Columbia Court of Appeals has held that the CPPA protects 

only consumers, see Ford v. ChartOne, Inc., 908 A.2d 72, 81 

(D.C. 2006); Dist. Cablevision Ltd. P’ship v. Bassin, 828 

A.2d 714, 717 (D.C. 2003). 

 We first look to the statute’s text to determine whether 

Shaw and Mendelson engaged in “consumer” transactions 

within the meaning of the Act. The CPPA defines “consumer” 

both as a noun and an adjective. In relevant part, the noun 

“consumer” means “a person who does or would . . . receive 

consumer goods or services,” D.C. CODE § 28-3901(a)(2), or 

“a person who does or would provide the economic demand 

for” “any act which does or would create, alter, repair, 

furnish, make available, provide information about, or, 

directly or indirectly, solicit or offer for or effectuate, a sale, 

lease or transfer, of consumer goods or services,” id. 

§ 3901(a)(2), (6). When used as an adjective, as in the phrase 

“consumer goods,” the word means “primarily for personal, 

household, or family use.” Id. § 3901(a)(2). We read these 

provisions together to define “consumer” as a person who 

receives or demands goods or services that are primarily for 

personal, household, or family use. 
7 

Precedent from the District of Columbia Court of 

Appeals confirms this reading of the Act. In Ford v. 

ChartOne, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals held 

that a person who had purchased his medical records for the 

purpose of future litigation had engaged in a consumer 

transaction under the CPPA because pursuing compensation 

for injuries was a personal motive. 908 A.2d at 83. Ford also 

noted with approval a district court decision that held that a 

cab driver’s purchase of gasoline was not covered by the 

CPPA, id. at 84 n.12, because it was made “in connection 

with his role as an independent businessman,” and not 

primarily for personal use, id. at 81 (quoting Mazanderan v. 

Indep. Taxi Owners’ Ass’n, 700 F. Supp. 588, 591 (D.D.C. 

1988)). These cases teach that purpose is the touchstone of the 

CPPA’s definition of “consumer” and that the statute does not 

reach transactions intended primarily to promote business or 

professional interests. 

Plaintiffs argue that the District of Columbia Court of 

Appeals has not always focused on the purpose of the 

transaction, but has looked instead to the role of the purchaser 

within the supply chain. In Adam A. Weschler & Son, Inc. v. 

Klank, the court held that an individual who purchased an 

antique chest for resale was not a consumer under the CPPA. 

561 A.2d 1003, 1005 (D.C. 1989). In dicta, the court, 

focusing on the difference between retail and wholesale 

purchasers, stated that if a “purchaser is not engaged in the 

regular business of purchasing this type of goods or service 

and reselling it, then the transaction will usually fall within 

the Act.” Id. (emphasis added). But usually does not mean 

always, and an individual who purchases a good without the 

intent to resell is not always a consumer. That is why the Ford 

court indicated that the CPPA would not apply to a business’s 

purchase of office supplies, “even though such goods would 
8 

not be resold.” 908 A.2d at 84 n.12 (citing Mazanderan, 700 

F. Supp. at 591). 

Under the CPPA, an employer’s payment for its 

employee’s hotel stay is not meaningfully different than its 

purchase of a stapler for the office. Both are done for a 

business purpose. Shaw stayed in Marriott’s Moscow hotels 

only while meeting with his law firm’s clients, and 

Mendelson did so only while travelling on behalf of CSIS. 

Appellants’ Br. at 8–9. Both stayed in the hotels to further the 

business purposes of their employers. They did not engage in 

consumer transactions within the meaning of the Act and are 

not entitled to its protections. Because they lack any rights 

under the Act, they could not have suffered any injury-in-fact 

stemming from a violation of the statute. They accordingly 

lack Article III standing to sue in federal court. 

Following oral argument, plaintiffs filed a motion asking 

us to direct the district court to remand the entire case to the 

District of Columbia Superior Court should we conclude that 

plaintiffs lack standing. See Appellants’ Motion to Remand at 

1 (Oct. 5, 2009) (moving “for a mandate directing that the 

District Court remand this matter to the Superior Court for the 

District of Columbia” (emphasis added)). Section 1447(c) of 

Title 28 provides that a “case” removed from state court 

“shall be remanded” “[i]f at any time before final judgment it 

appears that the district court lacks subject matter 

jurisdiction.” 

Plaintiffs’ argument for remand is foreclosed by 

Wisconsin Department of Corrections v. Schacht, 524 U.S. 

381 (1998). In Schacht, the Supreme Court refused the very 

remand the plaintiffs seek. Schacht held that § 1447(c) did not 

require a district court to relinquish its removal jurisdiction 
9 

over a case with multiple claims once it determined that one 

of the claims was barred by the Eleventh Amendment. Id. at 

392. Because “[a]n ordinary reading of the language indicates 

that [§ 1447(c)] refers to an instance in which a federal court 

‘lacks subject matter jurisdiction’ over a ‘case,’ and not 

simply over one claim within a case,” § 1447(c) does not 

require remand of the entire case in these circumstances. Id.

(quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c)). The federal court may hear the 

claims for which federal jurisdiction exists. Cf. Lee v. Am. 

Nat’l Ins. Co., 260 F.3d 997, 1006 (9th Cir. 2001) 

(determining, in a case in which a plaintiff lacked standing to 

sue only one of multiple defendants, that Schacht prohibited 

remand of the entire case). We therefore remand the claims of 

Shaw and Mendelson to the district court so that it may 

determine the appropriate disposition. 

III. 

CSIS and Charness challenge the district court’s grant of 

summary judgment against them. We will affirm the district 

court’s grant of summary judgment where, viewing the record 

in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, there is 

no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is 

entitled to judgment as a matter of law. FED. R. CIV. P. 56; see 

U.S. Postal Serv. v. Am. Postal Workers Union, 553 F.3d 686, 

692 (D.C. Cir. 2009). 

Marriott argues that CSIS cannot state a claim under the 

CPPA because its employees stayed in Marriott’s Russian 

hotels only to further its business purposes and did not engage 

in “consumer transactions” within the meaning of the Act. We 

agree. As we already discussed in concluding that Shaw and 

Mendelson lack standing, the CPPA does not protect 

businesses engaged in commercial activity. See Part II, supra. 
10 

CSIS employees stayed in Marriott’s Russian hotels to 

promote the policy objectives of CSIS, not “primarily for 

personal, household, or family” reasons. D.C. CODE § 28-

3901(a)(2). CSIS engaged in no consumer transactions within 

the meaning of the CPPA, so we affirm the district court’s 

grant of summary judgment to Marriott on CSIS’s claim. 

We also agree with Marriott that Charness cannot state a 

claim under the CPPA. Charness invokes the protection of the 

Act even though he is a resident of Michigan, Marriott is a 

Delaware corporation headquartered in Maryland, and 

nothing related to the dispute between the two occurred in the 

District of Columbia. 

We apply the law of the forum—in this case, the District 

of Columbia—to determine whether the law of the District of 

Columbia—in this case, the CPPA—reaches this dispute. See 

Muir v. Navy Fed. Credit Union, 529 F.3d 1100, 1107 (D.C. 

Cir. 2008). District of Columbia courts apply two tests to 

determine which jurisdiction’s law should govern a dispute: a 

“governmental interests analysis” and a “most significant 

relationship” test. See Oveissi v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 573 

F.3d 835, 842 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (discussing Hercules & Co. v. 

Shama Rest. Corp., 566 A.2d 31, 40–41 & n.18 (D.C. 1989)); 

see, e.g., Washkoviak v. Student Loan Mktg. Ass’n, 900 A.2d 

168, 180 (D.C. 2006) (following this approach when making 

choice-of-law determinations under the CPPA). Although 

these tests may at times produce conflicting results, in this 

case both confirm that D.C. law does not govern Charness’s 

dispute with Marriott. 

The “governmental interests analysis” requires the court 

to “evaluate the governmental policies underlying the 

applicable laws and determine which jurisdiction’s policy 
11 

would be most advanced by having its law applied to the facts 

of the case under review.” Hercules, 566 A.2d at 41. The 

District of Columbia has an interest in protecting its own 

citizens from being victimized by unfair trade practices and 

an interest in regulating the conduct of its business entities. 

The Act speaks to both. But Charness is not a citizen of the 

District and neither the Russian Marriott hotels nor their 

corporate head is a business entity located in the District. The 

District has little interest in the resolution of their dispute. 

Charness fares no better under the most significant 

relationship test. When using this test, the District of 

Columbia Court of Appeals looks to the factors set forth in 

the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws: (1) “the place 

where the injury occurred”; (2) “the place where the conduct 

causing the injury occurred”; (3) “the domicile, residence, 

nationality, place of incorporation and place of business of the 

parties”; and (4) “the place where the relationship, if any, 

between the parties is centered.” RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 

CONFLICT OF LAWS § 145(2) (1971); see Oveissi, 573 F.3d at 

842. Neither Charness’s injury nor Marriott’s conduct 

occurred in the District of Columbia. Neither party has a 

domicile, residence, place of incorporation, or principal place 

of business in Washington, and it is clear that the relationship 

between them is not centered in the District. In sum, the 

Restatement factors confirm that D.C. law does not apply. 

Charness contends that the District of Columbia has an 

interest in applying the CPPA to Marriott in this case because 

Marriott held itself out as a resident of the District. Marriott 

does list a D.C. address on its website and on corporate 

documents, but all mail sent to that address is forwarded to 

Bethesda. The company has no corporate office in 

Washington, D.C. and the call centers and Internet servers 
12 

through which plaintiffs made their reservations are not in the 

District. Although we are willing to assume Marriott’s 

representations give the District of Columbia some interest in 

this dispute, that interest does not outweigh the interest of 

Maryland in ensuring corporations domiciled there do not 

mislead consumers or of Michigan in protecting its citizens 

from unfair trade practices. Moreover, Marriott’s 

representations do not implicate any of the Restatement

factors. 

Charness argues that no constitutional principles would 

be offended were he permitted to invoke the CPPA against 

Marriott. That may be so, but it is no answer to the more 

fundamental question: Does the CPPA protect him on these 

facts? As we have said, it does not. We therefore affirm the 

district court’s grant of summary judgment for Marriott. 

IV. 

We reverse the judgment entered against plaintiffs Shaw 

and Mendelson because they lack standing to sue in federal 

court. We remand those claims to the district court for further 

proceedings consistent with this opinion. We affirm the 

judgment in favor of Marriott with respect to the remaining 

plaintiffs. 

So ordered.