alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
EXHIBIT 32.2
                                  ------------

                  CERTIFICATION OF PRINCIPAL FINANCIAL OFFICER
                       PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350


In  connection  with  the  accompanying  Quarterly  Report  on  Form  10-QSB  of
NanoPierce  Technologies,  Inc.  for  the  quarter  ended September 30, 2005, I,
Kristi  J.  Kampmann,  Chief Financial Officer of NanoPierce Technologies, Inc.,
hereby  certify  pursuant  to  18  U.S.C.  Section  1350, as adopted pursuant to
Section  906  of  the  Sarbanes-Oxley  Act  of  2002,  to  my  knowledge,  that:

          a)   such  Quarterly Report on Form 10-QSB of NanoPierce Technologies,
               Inc.  for  the  quarter  ended September 30, 2005, fully complies
               with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities
               Exchange Act of 1934; and

          b)   the information contained in such Quarterly Report on Form 10-QSB
               of  NanoPierce Technologies, Inc. for the quarter ended September
               30,  2005,  fairly  presents,  in  all  material  respects,  the
               financial  condition  and  results  of  operations  of NanoPierce
               Technologies, Inc.





                                   /s/Kristi J. Kampmann
                                   ---------------------------------
                                   Kristi J. Kampmann,
                                   Chief Financial Officer


Date: November 18, 2005


               A  signed  original of this written statement required by Section
               906  has  been provided to NanoPierce Technologies, Inc. and will
               be retained by NanoPierce Technologies, Inc. and furnished to the
               Securities  and  Exchange  Commission  or its staff upon request.
[Federal Register Volume 66, Number 4 (Friday, January 5, 2001)]
[Notices]
[Page 1085]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 01-386]


-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE

International Trade Administration

[A-580-834]


Notice of Extension of Time Limit for Preliminary Results of 
Antidumping Duty Administrative Review: Stainless Steel Sheet and Strip 
in Coils From Korea

AGENCY: Import Administration, International Trade Administration, 
Department of Commerce.

ACTION: Notice of extension of time limit for the preliminary results 
of antidumping duty administrative review.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SUMMARY: The Department of Commerce (``Department'') is extending the 
time limit for the preliminary results of the review of stainless steel 
sheet and strip in coils from the Republic of Korea. This review covers 
the period January 4, 1999 through June 30, 2000.

EFFECTIVE DATE: January 5, 2001.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Laurel LaCivita, AD/CVD Enforcement 
Group III, Office 9, Import Administration, International Trade 
Administration, U.S. Department of Commerce, 14th Street and 
Constitution Avenue, NW., Washington, DC 20230; telephone: (202) 482-
4243.

The Applicable Statute

    Unless otherwise indicated, all citations to the statute are 
references to the provisions effective January 1, 1995, the effective 
date of the amendments made to the Tariff Act of 1930 (``the Act'') by 
the Uruguay Round Agreements Act (``URAA'').

Extension of Time Limit for Preliminary Results

    Because of the complex issues enumerated in the Memorandum from 
Edward C. Yang to Joseph A. Spetrini, Extension of Time Limit for the 
Preliminary Results of Administrative Review of Certain Stainless Steel 
Sheet and Strip in Coils from Korea, on file in the Central Records 
Unit (CRU) of the Main Commerce Building, Room B-099, we find that it 
is not practicable to complete this review by the scheduled deadline of 
April 2, 2001. Therefore, in accordance with section 751(a)(3)(A) of 
the Act, the Department is extending the time period for issuing the 
preliminary results of review by 90 days until July 2, 2001.

    Dated: December 29, 2000.
Joseph A. Spetrini,
Deputy Assistant Secretary, AD/CVD Enforcement Group III.
[FR Doc. 01-386 Filed 1-4-01; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 3510-DS-P
#### German Rocael Gonzalez FLORES, Petitioner, v. Eric H. HOLDER, Jr., Attorney General, Respondent.

No. 10-1403.

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted: Oct. 4, 2010.

Decided: Nov. 2, 2010.

Arnedo S. Valera, Law Offices of Val-era & Associates, Fairfax, Virginia, for Petitioner. Tony West, Assistant Attorney General, Blair T. O’Connor, Assistant Director, Joseph D. Hardy, Office of Immigration Litigation, United States Department of Justice, Washington, D.C., for Respondent.

Before NIEMEYER, DUNCAN, and KEENAN, Circuit Judges.

Petition dismissed by unpublished PER CURIAM opinion.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

PER CURIAM:

German Rocael Gonzalez Flores, a native and citizen of Guatemala, petitions for review of an order of the Board of Immigration Appeals (“Board”) dismissing his appeal from the immigration judge’s denial of his application for cancellation of removal. For the reasons set forth below, we dismiss the petition for review.

Under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)® (2006), entitled “Denials of discretionary relief,” *658“no court shall have jurisdiction to review any judgment regarding the granting of relief under section ... 1229b,” which is the section governing cancellation of removal. In this case, the immigration judge found, and the Board explicitly agreed, that Gonzalez Flores failed to meet his burden of establishing that his United States citizen children would suffer exceptional and extremely unusual hardship if he is returned to Guatemala. We conclude that this determination is clearly discretionary in nature, and we therefore lack jurisdiction to review challenges to this finding. *See, e.g., Barco-Sandoval v. Gonzales,*516 F.3d 35, 36 (2d Cir.2008); *Memije v. Gonzales,*481 F.3d 1163, 1164 (9th Cir.2007); *Martinez v. U.S. Att’y Gen.,*446 F.3d 1219, 1221-22 (11th Cir.2006); *Meraz-Reyes v. Gonzales,*436 F.3d 842, 843 (8th Cir.2006); *see also Obioha v. Gonzales,*431 F.3d 400, 405 (4th Cir.2005) (“It is quite clear that the gatekeeper provision [of § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i) ] bars our jurisdiction to review a decision of the BIA to actually deny a petition for cancellation of removal.”). Indeed, we have concluded that the issue of hardship is committed to agency discretion and thus is not subject to appellate review. *Okpa v. INS,*266 F.3d 313, 317 (4th Cir.2001).

Accordingly, we dismiss the petition for review.* We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

PETITION DISMISSED.

*

 We note that Gonzalez Flores raises no color-able questions of law or constitutional claims that fall within the exception set forth in 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D) (2006) (stating that no provision limiting judicial review “shall be construed as precluding review of constitutional claims or questions of law raised upon a petition for review filed with an appropriate court of appeals”).
NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

 v. 

SHANE MICHAEL COURTNEY, 

Defendant-Appellant.

No. 18-30159 

D.C. No. 2:17-cr-00018-DLC 

MEMORANDUM*

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Montana

Dana L. Christensen, Chief Judge, Presiding

Submitted February 19, 2019**

Before: FERNANDEZ, SILVERMAN, and WATFORD, Circuit Judges.

Shane Michael Courtney appeals from the district court’s judgment and 

challenges his guilty-plea conviction and 66-month sentence for possession of 

child pornography, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(5)(B), (b)(2). Pursuant to 

Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), Courtney’s counsel has filed a brief 

 

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent 

except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision 

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

FILED

FEB 21 2019

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
2 18-30159 

stating that there are no grounds for relief, along with a motion to withdraw as 

counsel of record. We have provided Courtney the opportunity to file a pro se 

supplemental brief. No pro se supplemental brief or answering brief has been 

filed.

Our independent review of the record pursuant to Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 

75, 80 (1988), discloses no arguable grounds for relief as to Courtney’s conviction. 

We accordingly affirm Courtney’s conviction.

Courtney waived the right to appeal his sentence. Because the record 

discloses no arguable issue as to the validity of the sentencing waiver, we dismiss 

Courtney’s appeal as to his sentence. See United States v. Watson, 582 F.3d 974, 

986-88 (9th Cir. 2009).

Counsel’s motion to withdraw is GRANTED.

AFFIRMED in part; DISMISSED in part.
```

[Congressional Bills 103th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 1714 Introduced in House (IH)]

103d CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                H. R. 1714

 To provide that determinations relating to annuity benefits under the 
 Civil Service Retirement System or the Federal Employees' Retirement 
System for survivors of individuals separating before October 1, 1993, 
 shall be made in accordance with applicable provisions of law, as in 
                       effect on March 31, 1993.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                             April 7, 1993

   Mr. Wynn introduced the following bill; which was referred to the 
               Committee on Post Office and Civil Service

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
 To provide that determinations relating to annuity benefits under the 
 Civil Service Retirement System or the Federal Employees' Retirement 
System for survivors of individuals separating before October 1, 1993, 
 shall be made in accordance with applicable provisions of law, as in 
                       effect on March 31, 1993.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. REQUIREMENT THAT CERTAIN SURVIVOR ANNUITY DETERMINATIONS BE 
              MADE BASED ON APPLICABLE PROVISIONS OF LAW AS IN EFFECT 
              ON MARCH 31, 1993.

    (a) Requirement.--
            (1) In general.--Any determination relating to survivor 
        annuity benefits under the provisions of subchapter III of 
        chapter 83 or chapter 84 of title 5, United States Code 
        (including determinations relating to eligibility for benefits, 
        the amount of any benefits payable, and the commencement and 
        termination dates of any such benefits) shall, with respect to 
        a survivor whose benefits are based (or would be based) on 
        service of an employee or Member of Congress described in 
        paragraph (2), be made in accordance with applicable provisions 
        of law, as in effect on March 31, 1993.
            (2) Condition.--This subsection shall apply only if, or to 
        the extent that, the survivor annuity involved is based (or 
        would be based) on the service of an employee or Member of 
        Congress whose date of death or retirement is before October 1, 
        1993.
    (b) Specific-Reference Requirement.--Nothing in this Act shall be 
considered superseded by any provision of law enacted after the date of 
the enactment of this Act, except if, or to the extent that, the 
relevant provisions of this Act are specifically referenced.

SEC. 2. DEFINITIONS.

    For the purpose of this Act, the terms ``survivor'', ``employee'', 
and ``Member of Congress'' have the same respective meanings as are 
given them under subchapter III of chapter 83 or chapter 84 of title 5, 
United States Code, as applicable.

                                 <all>
```
<TABLE> <S> <C>



<ARTICLE> 5

<LEGEND>
THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM THE
REGISTRANT'S FORM 10-Q FOR THE PERIOD ENDED JUNE 30, 2000 AND IS QUALIFIED IN ITS
ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE TO SUCH FINANCIAL STATEMENTS INCLUDED IN SUCH REPORT.
</LEGEND>

<CIK>  0000827086
<NAME> CARLYLE INCOME PLUS, L.P. - II


<S>                     <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>           6-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>       DEC-31-2000
<PERIOD-END>            JUN-30-2000

<CASH>                               742,145
<SECURITIES>                               0
<RECEIVABLES>                          3,822
<ALLOWANCES>                               0
<INVENTORY>                                0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                     745,967
<PP&E>                                     0
<DEPRECIATION>                             0
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                       806,011
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                 19,363
<BONDS>                                    0
<COMMON>                                   0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                      0
<PREFERRED>                                0
<OTHER-SE>                           786,648
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>         806,011
<SALES>                                    0
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                      37,098
<CGS>                                      0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                              0
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                     122,054
<LOSS-PROVISION>                           0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                         0
<INCOME-PRETAX>                     (84,956)
<INCOME-TAX>                               0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                 (57,529)
<DISCONTINUED>                             0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                            0
<CHANGES>                                  0
<NET-INCOME>                        (57,529)
<EPS-BASIC>                           (1.68)
<EPS-DILUTED>                         (1.68)


</TABLE>
```

[Congressional Bills 103th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 2056 Introduced in House (IH)]

103d CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                H. R. 2056

 To designate the Federal building located at 600 Princess Anne Street 
in Fredericksburg, Virginia as the ``Samuel E. Perry Postal Building.''

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                              May 11, 1993

 Mr. Bateman introduced the following bill; which was referred to the 
               Committee on Post Office and Civil Service

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
 To designate the Federal building located at 600 Princess Anne Street 
in Fredericksburg, Virginia as the ``Samuel E. Perry Postal Building.''

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. DESIGNATION.

    The Federal building located at 600 Princess Anne Street in 
Fredericksburg, Virginia, and known as the Main Post Office, shall be 
known as the ``Samuel E. Perry Postal Building''.

SEC. 2. REFERENCES.

    Any reference in a law, map, regulation, document, paper, or other 
record of the United States to the Federal building referred to in 
section 1 shall be deemed to be a reference to the ``Samuel E. Perry 
Postal Building''.

                                 <all>
```
#### William HOUSTON, Petitioner-Appellant, v. D.K. SISTO, Respondent—Appellee.

No. 08-17711.

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted Nov. 29, 2010.*

Filed Dec. 7, 2010.

Meredith Fahn, San Jose, CA, for Petitioner-Appellant.

William Houston, Represa, CA, pro se.

Brian R. Means, Deputy Attorney General, Sacramento, CA, for Respondent-Appellee.

Before: SCHROEDER, THOMAS, and GOULD, Circuit Judges.

*

 The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R.App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM **

Habeas petitioner William Houston challenges his California state conviction of two counts of robbery. He contends that he was denied his Sixth Amendment right to self-representation. The state court of appeal’s finding that his request was untimely and its affirmance of the trial court’s denial of the request for self-representation did not violate any clearly established Supreme Court precedent. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). The Supreme Court in *Faretta v. California,*422 U.S. 806, 95 S.Ct. 2525, 45 L.Ed.2d 562 (1975), confirmed that the right to represent oneself is embedded in the Sixth Amendment, *id.*at 819, 95 S.Ct. 2525, but the request for *196self-representation must be unequivocal and timely, *id.*at 835-36, 95 S.Ct. 2525. A request for self-representation must not be a tactic to secure delay. *Armant v. Marquez,*772 F.2d 552, 555 (9th Cir.1985).

The record supports the state court’s finding that petitioner’s request was intended to cause delay. Petitioner had withdrawn his earlier request for self-representation, and renewed it only on the day set for trial. *See Fritz v. Spalding,*682 F.2d 782, 784-85 (9th Cir.1982) (stating that in deciding whether a *Faretta*motion was made for the purpose of delay, courts must consider the events preceding the motion to determine whether defendant could reasonably be expected to have made the motion earlier). Here, petitioner could, and did, make a request earlier. The second request was appropriately viewed as a delaying tactic.

AFFIRMED.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS

OF TEXAS

NO. WR-81,805-01

EX PARTE DARQUEL DAMAR TIBBS, Applicant

ON APPLICATION FOR A WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

CAUSE NO. CR32866-A IN THE 75 DISTRICT COURT

TH

FROM LIBERTY COUNTY

Per curiam.

O R D E R

Applicant was convicted of manufacture or delivery of a controlled substance and sentenced to

fifteenyears’imprisonment. He filed this applicationfor awritofhabeas corpusinthe countyofconviction,

and the district clerk forwarded it to this Court. See TEX. CODECRIM. PROC. art. 11.07. 

Applicant contendsthat he was denied hisright to anappealafter his adjudication hearingbecause

counselfailed to timely file a notice of appeal. Applicant has alleged facts that, if true, might entitle himto

relief. Garza v. Idaho, 139 S. Ct. 738 (2019); Ex parte Axel, 757 S.W.2d 369 (Tex. Crim. App.

1988); Jones v. State, 98 S.W.3d 700 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003). Accordingly, the record should be
2

developed. The trial court is the appropriate forum for findings of fact. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art.

11.07, § 3(d). The trial court shall order adjudication counsel to respond to Applicant’s claim. In

developing the record, the trial court may use any meansset out inArticle 11.07, § 3(d). If the trial court

elects to hold a hearing, itshalldetermine whether Applicant isindigent. IfApplicant is indigent and wants

to be represented by counsel, the trialcourtshallappoint counselto represent himat the hearing. See TEX.

CODECRIM. PROC. art. 26.04. If counsel is appointed or retained, the trial court shall immediately notify

this Court of counsel’s name.

The trial court shall make findings of fact and conclusions of law as to whether Applicant was

denied hisright to anappealbecause trialcounselfailed to timelyfile a notice ofappeal. The trialcourt may

make any other findings and conclusions that it deems appropriate in response to Applicant’s claim.

The trial court shall make findings of fact and conclusions of law within ninety days from the date

of this order. The district clerk shall then immediately forward to this Court the trial court’s findings and

conclusions and the record developed on remand, including, among other things, affidavits, motions,

objections, proposed findings and conclusions, orders, and transcriptsfromhearings and depositions. See

TEX.R.APP. P. 73.4(b)(4). Anyextensions oftime must be requested bythe trialcourt and obtained from

this Court.

Filed: October 21, 2020

Do not publish
NUMBER 13-94-00290-CV

COURT OF APPEALS

THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

CORPUS CHRISTI - EDINBURG

______________________________________________________________

WALTER L. BRIONES, Appellant,

v.

COMMERCIAL METALS COMPANY, Appellee. 

_____________________________________________________________

On Appeal from the 94th District Court

of Nueces County, Texas.

______________________________________________________________

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Before Chief Justice Valdez and Justices Garza and Vela

Memorandum Opinion Per Curiam

This appeal was abated by this Court on August 4, 1994, due to the bankruptcy of

one of the parties to this appeal. See 11 U.S.C. § 362; see generally TEX. R. APP. P. 8.

Since the abatement there has been no activity in this appeal. On March 5, 2009, the

Court ordered the parties to file an advisory regarding the status of the appeal and, if

applicable, a motion to reinstate the appeal or a motion to dismiss the appeal. The order
2

notified the parties that failure to respond to the order would result in reinstatement and

dismissal of the appeal for want of prosecution. 

The parties have failed to respond. Accordingly, we reinstate and dismiss the

appeal for want of prosecution. See TEX. R. APP. P. 42.3(b).

PER CURIAM

Memorandum Opinion delivered and

filed this the 9th day of April, 2009.
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee v. Lonnie Allen TRUITT, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 13-30858

Summary Calendar.

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

April 30, 2014.

Camille Ann Domingue, Assistant U.S. Attorney, Brett L. Grayson, Assistant U.S. Attorney, U.S. Attorney’s Office, Lafayette, LA, for Plaintiff-Appellee.

Cristie Gautreaux Gibbens, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Federal Public Defender’s Office, Lafayette, LA, for Defendant-Appellant.

Before HIGGINBOTHAM, DENNIS, and GRAVES, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: *

Lonnie Allen Truitt pleaded guilty to one count of production of child pornography and was sentenced at the high end of the advisory guidelines sentencing range to 600 months of imprisonment and a life term of supervised release. On appeal, he argues that his sentence is substantively unreasonable because it is greater than necessary to fulfill the statutory sentencing goals. He contends that the district court abused its discretion by considering facts beyond those directly necessary to support his conviction and because his childhood was filled with abuse.

We review the “substantive reasonableness of the sentence imposed under an abuse-of-discretion standard.” *Gall v. United States, 552*U.S. 38, 51, 128 S.Ct. 586, 169 L.Ed.2d 445 (2007). “[A] sentence within a properly calculated Guideline range is presumptively reasonable.” *United States v. Alonzo,*435 F.3d 551, 554 (5th Cir.2006).

Truitt’s sexual contact with his 15 year old victim was relevant conduct because it was “part of the same course of conduct or common scheme or plan as the offense of conviction.” U.S.S.G. § lB1.3(a)(2). Truitt has not rebutted the presumption that his guidelines sentence is reasonable or demonstrated that sentencing him at the high end of the guidelines range was an abuse of discretion. The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.

*

 Pursuant to 5th Cm. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir. R. 47.5.4.