United States Court of Appeals

For the Eighth Circuit

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No. 16-1960

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United States of America

lllllllllllllllllllll Plaintiff - Appellee

v.

Bessie Marie Anderson

lllllllllllllllllllll Defendant - Appellant

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Appeal from United States District Court 

for the District of Minnesota - St. Paul

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 Submitted: March 6, 2017

 Filed: April 14, 2017

[Unpublished]

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Before WOLLMAN, MELLOY, and SHEPHERD, Circuit Judges.

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PER CURIAM.

Bessie Marie Anderson pleaded guilty to one count of bank fraud, in violation

of 18 U.S.C. § 1344, and one count of aggravated identity theft, in violation of 18

U.S.C. § 1028A. Applying the United States Sentencing Guidelines (Guidelines), the
district court determined that Anderson’s advisory sentencing range for the bank 1

fraud count was 15 to 21 months’ imprisonment and sentenced Anderson to 18

months’ imprisonment on that count, rejecting her request for probation. The district

court imposed the mandatory 24-month consecutive sentence for the aggravated

identity theft count, see 18 U.S.C. § 1028A, for a total sentence of 42 months’

imprisonment.

Anderson contendsthat the district court committed procedural error by failing

to adequately explain its reasons for choosing the sentence that it did. Because she

did not raise this objection at sentencing, we review only for plain error. See United

States v. Chavarria-Ortiz, 828 F.3d 668, 671 (8th Cir. 2016). 

The record makes clear that the district court considered and rejected

Anderson’s arguments for a downward variance on the bank fraud count. In her

sentencing memorandum, Anderson set forth her personal history, including that she

had always worked to support herself and her son, sometimes working two or three

jobs to make ends meet. During the sentencing hearing, defense counsel explained

that the offense conduct was out of character for Anderson, whose criminal history

category was I and who had never before committed any theft, despite working as a

cashier and as a personal care attendant for the elderly. Anderson herself expressed

remorse for the crime that she had committed and for the impact that her

imprisonment would have on her son. The government argued that a sentence within

the Guidelines range would be appropriate, however, in light of offense conduct that

“involved a months-long spree where Anderson used the account numbers and

identities of victims to get cash advances and buy other merchandise.”

The Honorable David S. Doty, United States District Judge for the District of 1

Minnesota.

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In imposing sentence, the district court explained that it “ha[d] taken into

account the nature and circumstances of the instant offense, as well asthe history and

characteristics of the defendant” and found that the total 42-month sentence was

“sufficient, but not greater than necessary, to afford an adequate deterrence of future

criminal conduct.” The district court later rejected Anderson’s written motion for

reconsideration, in which she reiterated the arguments that she had made during the

sentencing hearing. We conclude that the district court’s explanation, though brief,

was adequate in this case. The record shows that the court considered the parties’

arguments and ultimately determined that the circumstances did not warrant a

downward variance. See Chavarria-Ortiz, 828 F.3d at 671 (“[W]here a matter is

conceptually simple, and the record makes clear that the sentencing judge considered

the evidence and arguments, the law does not require the judge to write orsay more.”

(citing Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 359 (2007))).

Anderson also argues that the sentence was substantively unreasonable. We

consider the totality of the circumstances when reviewing the substantive

reasonableness of a sentence, and we will not reverse absent a showing that the

district court abused its discretion. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007). A

district court abuses its discretion when it “fails to consider a relevant factor that

should have received significant weight, gives significant weight to an improper or

irrelevant factor, or considers only the appropriate factors but commits a clear error

of judgment in weighing those factors.” United States v. Johnson, 688 F.3d 444, 448

(8th Cir. 2012) (quoting United States v. Moore, 565 F.3d 435, 438 (8th Cir. 2009)).

Anderson contends that the district court failed to give adequate weight to her

personal history and circumstances. She also argues thatshe isless culpable than the

her coconspirators, many of whom received sentences similar to hers. In light of the

district court’s discretion “to weigh the § 3553(a) factors in each case and assign

some factors greater weight than others in determining an appropriate sentence,”

United States v. Bridges, 569 F.3d 374, 379 (8th Cir. 2009), we find no error in the

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court’s decision to impose a Guidelines-range sentence, to which we may apply a

presumption of reasonableness. See Chavarria-Ortiz, 828 F.3d at 672. Anderson has

not rebutted that presumption. See United States v. Jokhoo, 806 F.3d 1137, 1142 (8th

Cir. 2015) (noting that the district court considered the § 3553(a) factors and

concluding that the defendant did not rebut the presumption of reasonableness given

to his Guidelines-range sentence).

The sentence is affirmed.

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