NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

SANDRA L. BENNETT,

Plaintiff

- Appellant,

v. CAROLYN W. COLVIN, Acting Commissioner of Social Security,

Defendant

- Appellee. No. 13

- 35821
D.C. No. 3:12

- cv - 05382

- RAJ

MEMORANDUM *

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Washington Richard A. Jones, District Judge, Presiding Submitted July 10, 2015 ** Seattle, Washington Before: NGUYEN and FRIEDLAND, Circuit Judges and ZOUHARY, *** District Judge.
Sandra Bennett appeals from the district court’s affirmance of the denial of

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36

- 3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

*** The Honorable Jack Zouhary, District Judge for the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Ohio, sitting by designation. 

# FILED

JUL 16 2015
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLER K U.S. COURT OF APPEAL S2

Social Security disability benefits. We affirm.

The A dministrative L aw J udge (“ALJ”) gave “specific and legitimate
reasons that are suppor ted by substantial evidence,” B ayliss v. Barnhart , 427 F.3d 1211, 1216 (9th Cir. 2005), for discounting the opinion of Bennett’s treating
physician. Substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s finding that the treating
physician’s opinion was inconsistent with the medical record and Bennett’s work
history. Any error s in the ALJ’s additional reasoning were harmless. See Molina

v. Astrue , 674 F.3d 1104, 1115 (9th Cir. 2012).
The ALJ properly gave specific, clear, and convincing reasons for
disbelieving Benn ett’s subjective complaints of pain. See id. at 1112. Bennett’s work history and layoff date were sufficient reasons to support the ALJ’s adverse
credibility determination. See Bray v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin. , 554 F.3d
1219, 1227 (9th Cir. 2009); Bru ton v. Massanari , 268 F.3d 824, 828 (9th Cir. 2001). Any error in the ALJ’s additional reasoning was harmless. See Bray , 554

F.3d at 1227. The ALJ properly gave a germane reason for discounting Bennett’s
husband’s testimony. See Molina , 674 F.3d at 1111. The inconsistency between

Bennett’s abilities and her husband’s testimony is a germane reason to discount her3

husband’s testimony. See Carmickle v. Comm’r
, Soc. Sec. Admin. , 533 F.3d 1155,
1164 (9th Cir. 2008).
Substantial evidence supports the ALJ ’s finding that Bennett’ s impairments

do not meet or equal any listing. And t he ALJ was not required to explain why Bennett’s impairments do not equal Listing 1.04, because Bennett did not present
evidence in an effort to establish medical equivalence. See Burch v. Barnhart , 400 F.3d 676, 683 (9th Cir. 2005); Lewis v. Apfel , 236 F.3d 503, 514 (9th Cir.
2001). Bennett’s argument that the ALJ erred in determining Bennett’s residual
functional capacity rises and falls with other arguments that we have alr eady
rejected. In the same vein, a n ALJ’s hypothetical to a vocational expert need s only to include those limitations that are supported by substantial evidence, see Bayliss , 427 F.3d at 1217 , so Bennett’s challenge s to the ALJ’s hypothetical ’s
assumptions fail for the same reasons that we have already expressed

. Cf. Stubbs

Danielson v. Astrue , 539 F.3d 1169, 1175

- 76 (9th Cir. 2008). Bennett has waived her argument that the vocational expert’s testimony

conflicts with Medical

- Vocational Rule 201 .00(f) by raising this argument for the
first time on appeal

. See Greger v. Barnhart , 464 F.3d 968, 973 (9th Cir. 2006).4

Similarly, by failing to raise the argument “specifically and distinctly” in her
opening brief, Bennett has waived her contention tha t the ALJ erred in failing to
find (at step two) that Bennett’s depression and anxiety were severe impairments.

See Mills v. United States , 742 F.3d 400, 409 n.9 (9th Cir. 2014)

.
AFFIRMED.