J - S35006 - 17 2017 PA Super 212

COMMONWEALTH OF PENN SYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA Appellee
v. PAUL DAVID WEIMER Appellant No. 1042 WDA 2016

Appeal from the PCRA Order July 12 , 2016 In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County Criminal Division at No(s): CP - 02 - CR - 0011522 - 2010, CP - 02 - CR - 0011523 - 2010, CP - 02 - CR - 0011535 - 2010 BEFORE: LAZARUS, J., RANSOM, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E. * OPINION BY LAZARUS, J.: FILED JULY 7, 2017 Paul David Weimer appeals from the trial court’s order dismissing his petition filed pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act (PCRA), 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9541 - 9546. In 2011, Weimer was found guilty by a jury of 21 criminal counts relating to his sexual abuse of three adolescent boys, R.Z., M.G., and J.D. After careful review, we reverse the PCRA order, vacate the judgments of sentence for all three victims, 1 and remand for resentencing. A p rior panel of this Court aptly set forth the procedural history of this case as follows:

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* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
1 See No. CC 201022522 (R.Z.); No. CC201011523 (M.G.); and No. CC 20101153 5 (J.D.).J - S35006 - 17

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[Weimer, who was forty years old,] was arrested on [August 5, 2010] and eventually charged, regarding [victim, J.D.] at 11535 - 2010, with involuntary deviate sexual int ercourse (“IDSI”), unlawful contact with the minor, statutory sexual assault, indecent assault, furnishing liquor to minors, and two counts of corruption of minors; he was charged regarding [victim, J.C.] at 11524 - 2010, with unlawful contact with a minor, corruption of minors and open lewdness; regarding [victim, R.Z.], he was charged at 11522 - 2010 with two counts of rape, IDSI, unlawful contact with a minor, two counts of statutory sexual assault, endangering the welfare of children, corruption of minors, and furnishing liquor to minors; [and] regarding [victim, M.G.], he was charged at 11523 - 2010 with IDSI, indecent assault, endangering the welfare of children, and corruption of minors. [* * *]. At the conclusion of the jury trial, [Weimer] was acq uitted of all charges regarding [J.C.]; regarding [J.D.], he was convicted of furnishing liquor to minors, unlawful contact with a minor and two counts of corruption of minors, and acquitted of IDSI, statutory sexual assault and indecent assault; regarding [R.Z.], he was convicted of IDSI, unlawful contact with a minor, two counts of statutory sexual assault, endangering the welfare of children, corruption of minors, furnishing alcohol to minors, and acquitted of two counts of rape; regarding [M.G.], he was convicted of IDSI, indecent assault, endangering the welfare of children, and corruption of minors. Commonwealth v. Weimer , 133 WDA 2012 (Pa. Super. unpublished memorandum filed 8/1/13). The Commonwealth gave notice of its intent to seek imposition of t he 10 - year mandatory minimum sentence for the IDSI convictions, pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S. § 9718(a). Prior to sentencing, the court held a hearing where it determined that Weimer met the criteria to be classified as a SexuallyJ - S35006 - 17

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Violent Predator (SVP) under th is Commonwealth’s version of Megan’s Law. 2 On March 13, 2012, Weimer was sentenced to an aggregate term of imprisonment of 25
- 50 years. Specifically, the court sentenced Weimer to: consecutive sentences of 10
- 20 years of incarceration on each count of I DSI with regard to R.Z. and M.G., and a consecutive term of 5
- 10 years of incarceration for unlawful contact with a minor with regard to J.D. 3 Weimer filed post
- trial motions that were denied on August 2, 2012, save for the court granting Weimer two days of credit. Weimer filed a timely direct appeal; our Court affirmed his judgment of sentence on August 1, 2013. On November 27, 2013, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied Weimer’s petition for allowance of appeal. On April 7, 2014, Weimer filed a pro se PCRA petition. On April 14, 2014, the court appointed PCRA Counsel, Thomas Farrell, Esquire. On May 28, 2014, the court granted counsel’s petition to appoint an investigator. On February 25, 2015, the trial court gave Weimer Pa.R.Crim.P. 907 notice of its intent to dismiss the petition without a hearing. On June 16, 2015,

____________________________________________ 2 See 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9791 - 9799.9. On December 20, 2011, the legislature enacted the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA), effective in one year, or December 20, 2012. Thus, at the time Weimer was sentenced, SORNA was not yet in effect. However, under SORNA he is now classified as a Tier III offender who will be a lifetime registrant. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9799.14(d)(4), 9799.15(a)(3). 3 No further penalty was imposed on the remaining charges for which Weimer was convicted.J - S35006 - 17

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Attorney Farrell filed an amended PCRA petition on behalf of Weimer. On July 12, 2016, the court dismissed Weimer’s petition. This timely collateral appeal follows. On appeal, Weim er presents the following issues for our consideration: (1) Whether trial counsel gave ineffective assistance for failing to file a motion to withdraw, when there was a conflict of interest? (2) Whether trial counsel gave ineffective assistance for failing to supp ress evidence under the Fourth Amendment and Article I, Section 8[,] of the Pennsylvania Constitution? (3) Whether trial counsel gave ineffective assistance for failing to object to the trial court’s instruction that the Commonwealth did not have to prove beyo nd a reasonable doubt the date of the crime when the date of the crime was significant as to the age of the victim? (4) Whether the trial court imposed an illegal sentence for the charges of involuntary deviate sexual intercourse when the trial court imposed m andatory sentences of ten to twenty years pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S. § 9718, which has been held to be facially unconstitutional? (5) Whether the trial court imposed an illegal sentence of five to ten years of incarceration for unlawful contact with a minor? (6) Whether the notice of intent to dismiss that was issued by the PCRA Court violated Rule 907(1) of the Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal Procedure? The standard of review of an order dismissing a PCRA petition is whether that determination is supported by the evidence of record and is free of legal error. The PCRA court’s findings will not be disturbed unless there is no support for the findings in the certified record. Commonwealth v. Johnston , 42 A.3d 1120, 1126 (Pa. Super. 2012).J - S35006 - 17

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We rely upon the opinion , authored by the Honorable Donna Jo McDaniel, to affirm issues one through three on appeal. First, Weimer has failed to show how either Attorney Collins or Attorney Allman “actively represented conflicting interests.” Cuyler v. Sullivan , 446 U.S. 335 (1 980). Moreover, to the extent that Weimer alleges Attorney Collins was ineffective in failing to file a motion to withdraw, we note that Weimer suffered no prejudice from this alleged misstep, where the trial court specifically concluded that it would not have granted such motion and where Attorney Allman adequately represented Weimer at trial. Second, Weimer cannot demonstrate that he was prejudiced by counsel’s failure to seek to suppress a printout of an email exchange between himself and victim, J.C., which was introduced on J.C.’s redirect examination. The defense had, in fact, introduced the contents of that same email exchange, including a picture of a man later identified as J.C.’s friend, during cross
- examination and also had it entered as a defe nse exhibit at trial. Third, the trial court did not need to charge the jury that it was required to determine, beyond a reasonable doubt, the exact date that the incidents occurred where the jury was instructed that, for purposes of the charged offenses, it did need to find that victims were under the age of sixteen when considering the IDSI offenses. In his fourth issue on appeal, Weimer contends that his mandatory minimum sentences, imposed pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S. § 9718(a), are illegalJ - S35006 - 17

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“where the manda tory sentencing structure [of section 9718] is facially unconstitutional.” Appellant’s Brief, at 46. Our Supreme Court has held section 9718 “irremediably unconstitutional on its face, non
- severable, and void” under the principles espoused in Alleyne . 4 See Commonwealth v. Wolfe , 140 A.3d 651, 663 (Pa. 2016). 5 Moreover, because Weimer’s judgment of sentence became final after Alleyne was decided, he is entitled to relief on his timely filed PCRA petition. See Commonwealth v. Ruiz , 131 A.3d 54, 59 - 60 ( Pa. Super. 2015) (defendant can raise Alleyne challenge in timely PCRA petition so long as judgment of sentence not yet final when Alleyne decided on June 17, 2013); but see Commonwealth v. Washington , 142 A.3d 810, 820 (Pa. 2016) (Supreme Court has also h eld that Alleyne does not apply retroactively to cases pending on collateral review where judgment of sentence became final before Alleyne decided). 6 Accordingly, the

____________________________________________ 4 Alleyne v. United States , 133 S. Ct. 2151, 2155 (2013) (holding that “[a]ny fact that, by law, increases the penalty for a crime is an ‘element’ that must be submitted to the jury and found beyond a reasonable doubt.”). 5 We note that the trial court incorrectly cites to Commonwealth v. Matteson , 96 A.3d 1064 (Pa. Super. 2014), to conclude that section 9718 does not violate Alleyne principles. In Wolfe , supra , our Supreme Court held that “[ Commonwealth v. ] Newman abrogated this Court’s decision in Matteson ” and that a sentence applying section 9718 is illegal. Id. 140 A.3d at 806. 6 Although we recognize the apparent viability of Commonwealth v. Ruiz , 131 A.3d 54 (Pa. Super. 2015), which held that a defendant could succeed on an Alleyne challenge in a timely PCRA petition if the defendant’s (Footnote Continued Next Page)J - S35006 - 17

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judgments of sentence as to offenses committed against R.Z. and M.G. (CC 201011522 and C C 201011523, respectively) must be vacated and remanded to the trial court for resentencing without application of the mandatory minimum sentence under section 9718. In his next issue, Weimer contends that the trial court imposed an illegal sentence of 5
- 10 years of imprisonment on the unlawful contact with a minor conviction with regard to victim J.D. Specifically, Weimer argues that because the jury was never instructed as to what crime(s) Weimer committed for purposes of engaging in the unlawful conduc t under section 6318, the lowest graded offense of which he was acquitted (indecent assault (M - 2)) must be assumed and the grading of the offense under section 6318(b)(2) should be no more than a third - degree felony. 7 Unlawful contact with a minor is de fined as: (a) Offense defined.
— A person commits an offense if he is intentionally in contact with a minor, or a law enforcement officer acting in the performance of his duties who has assumed (Footnote Continued)

_______________________ judgment of sentence was not final at the time Alleyne was decided, the viability of that decision is currently under review. See Commonwealth v. Dimatteo , 2017 Pa. LEXIS 378 (filed 2/15/17) (grantin g petition for allowance of appeal, in case applying Ruiz , and denoting issue as whether decision conflicts with Washington and whether the panel “ordered inappropriate relief, in that, the panel vacated that portion of the plea defendant challenged and re manded for resentencing” and noted that “defendant . . . is not [entitled to relief].”).
7 We note that the proper grading of an offense is a challenge to the legality of a sentence. Commonwealth v. Tustin , 888 A.2d 843 (Pa. Super. 2005).J - S35006 - 17

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the identity of a minor, for the purpose of engaging in an ac tivity prohibited under any of the following, and either the person initiating the contact or the person being contacted is within this Commonwealth: (1) Any of the offenses enumerated in Chapter 31 (relating to sexual offenses). (2) Open lewdness as def ined in section 5901 (relating to open lewdness). (3) Prostitution as defined in section 5902 (relating to prostitution and related offenses). (4) Obscene and other sexual materials and performances as defined in section 5903 (relating to obscene and oth er sexual materials and performances). (5) Sexual abuse of children as defined in section 6312 (relating to sexual abuse of children). (6) Sexual exploitation of children as defined in section 6320 (relating to sexual exploitation of children). 18 Pa.C.S . § 6318(a). See Commonwealth v. Felder , 75 A.3d 513, 517 (Pa. Super. 2013) (subsection 6318(a) sets forth specific crimes that may constitute forms of unlawful contact). A section 6318 offense is graded as follows: (b) Grading.
— A violation of subsect ion (a) is: (1) an offense of the same grade and degree as the most serious underlying offense in subsection (a) for which the defendant contacted the minor; or (2) a felony of the third degree; whichever is greater. 18 Pa.C.S. § 6318(b). In order to be convicted under section 6318, a defendant does not have to be convicted of the underlying offense for which he contacted theJ - S35006 - 17

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minor. Commonwealth v. Reed , 9 A.3d 1138 (Pa. 2010). In other words, the offenses designated in sections 6318(a)(1)
- (6) are not predicate offenses for the offense of unlawful contact with a minor. Id. Rather, a defendant is guilty under section 6318 if he or she contacts the minor for the purpose of engaging in the prohibited behaviors criminalized in Chapter 31 and 18 Pa.C.S §§ 5901, 5902, 5903, 6312, and 6320 of the Crimes Code. In fact, the Commonwealth need not even separately charge a defendant with an underlying offense set forth in sections 6318(a)(1)
- (6). However, if the Commonwealth does charge a defendant with an offen se under sections 6318(a)(1) - (6) , an acquittal is relevant for purposes of grading the section 6318 offense at sentencing under subsection 6318(b). Id. Instantly, the trial court charged the jury, regarding the unlawful contact conviction as follows: The defendant is charged with three counts of unlawful contact with a minor. The alleged victims are [J.C.], [J.D.] and [R.Z.]. In order to find the defendant guilty of this offense, you must find that each of the following elements has been proven beyond a reasonable doubt. First, that the defendant was intentionally in contact with a minor. Second, that the contact was for the purposes of engaging in an unlawful act; that is, the crimes listed in the information. And, third, that either the defendant or th e person being contacted is within this Commonwealth. Contact is any direct or indirect communication by any means. A minor is an individual under the age of 18. N.T. Jury Trial, 8/18/11, at 721 - 22 (emphasis added). See Commonwealth v. Reed , 9 A.3d 1138 (Pa. 2010) (tying grading of sectionJ - S35006 - 17

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6318 conviction to how Commonwealth charges and presents its case to jury). Here, the bill of information, 8 which is relevant to how the jury was to determine Weimer’s guilt regarding the crime of unlawful contact, s tates: The District Attorney of ALLEGHENY County, by this information charges that on (or about) Wednesday, the 1 st day of March, 2006, through on (or about) Tuesday, the 17th day of August, 2010 in the said County of ALLEGHENY, PAUL DAVID WEIMER hereinaft er called actor, did commit the crime or crimes indicated herein, that is Count 2 UNLAWFUL CONTACT WITH MINOR Felony 2 The actor intentionally contacted a minor namely, John Doe, age 14 for the purpose of arranging actual or simulated sexual activity or nudity for the purpose of sexual stimulation or gratification of another person as defined in section 6320 [ 9 ] namely, Involuntary

____________________________________________ 8 Notably, in the criminal complaint, the Commonwealth charged Weimer with unlawful contact with a minor under a different subsection, as follows: 18 [Pa.C.S. §] 6318[(a)(1)] UNLAWFUL CONTACT WITH MINOR - FELONY 1 OFFENSE ENUMERATED IN CHAPTER 31 Fl 1 COUNT The actor i ntentionally contacted a minor namely, A KNOWN 14 YEAR - OLD MALE for the purpose of engaging in the activity of INVOLUNTARY DEVIATE SEXUAL INTERCOURSE in violation of 18 [§]Pa.C.S. §6318(a)(1). 9 Section 6320 delineates the crime of “sexual exploitation of children,” not involuntary deviate sexual intercourse, which is found at 18 Pa.C.S. § 3123(a)(1). Sexual exploitation of children is defined as: (a) Offense defined.
— A person commits the offense of sexual exploitation of children if he procures for another person (Footnote Continued Next Page)J - S35006 - 17

- 11 - Deviate Sexual Intercourse, in violation of Section 6318(a)(6) of the Pennsylvania Crimes Code, Act of December 6, 1972, 18 Pa .C.S. §6318 (a)(6), as amended[.] Criminal Information, 10/14/10, at 1 (emphasis added). In Commonwealth v. Aikens , 139 A.3d 244 (Pa. Super. 2016), 10 our Court recently addressed a similar grading issue with regard to the defendant’s unlawful contact with a minor conviction under section 6318(a)(1). In Aikens , the Commonwealth filed its information charging the defendant with: unlawful contact with a minor, corruption of minors, IDSI, statutory sexual assault, and indecent exposure. The defendant was fou nd guilty of the unlawful contact and corruption charges; the jury acquitted him of IDSI and the remaining charges were nolle prossed . The (Footnote Continued)

_______________________ a child under 18 years of age for the purpose of sexual exploitation. (b) Penalty.
— An offense under this section is a felony of the second degree. (c) Definitions.
— As used in this section, the following words and phrases shall have the meanings given to them in this subsection: “Procure.”
— To obtain or make available for sexual exploitation. “Sexual exploitation.”
— Actual or simulated sexual activity or nudity arranged for the purpose of sexual stimulation or gratification of any person. 10 We note that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court recently granted allowance of appeal in Aikens limited to the issue of whether “the court illegally sentence[d] Aikens on unlawful contact with a minor graded as an F
- 1 when it should have been graded as an F - 3”? See Commonwealth v. Aikens , 268 EAL 2016 (Pa. filed 11/2/16).J - S35006 - 17

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trial court graded the defendant’s section 6318 conviction as a first
- degree felony, based on its charge to the jury , which stated: [Defendant] has been charged with unlawful contact with a minor. To find [Defendant] guilty of this offense, you must find that each of the following elements has been proven beyond a reasonable doubt: First, that [Defendant] was intentio nally in contact for the purpose of engaging in an unlawful act
– and in this case, that unlawful act is alleged to be [IDSI] , the crime that we just discussed, that I just defined for you[.] Id. at 247 - 48 (emphasis in original). The Court concluded that because the trial court’s charge made it clear to the jury that the defendant was only accused of contacting the minor for one specific offense, IDSI, when the jury returned a verdict of guilt under section 6318, “it must have concluded, as a matter of fa ct, that [Defendant] contacted the victim for the purpose of engaging in IDSI.” Id. at 248. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the grading of the section 6318 offense as a first
- degree felony where “the jury did find that a first
- degree felony was the ‘most serious underlying offense . . . for which the defendant contacted the minor.’” Id. Unlike the case in Aikens , here the trial court did not charge the jury with regard to the specific offense for which Weimer was accused of contacting the victim for pur poses of section 6318. Therefore, we do not know the “most serious underlying offense . . . for which Weimer contacted the minor” for purposes of grading the offense under section 6318(b). See Felder , supra at 517 (“language of section 6318 expressly req uires a factual determination of the crime ‘for which the defendant contacted theJ - S35006 - 17

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minor’ in order to determine proper grading.”). Because of this, the trial court would have had to have guessed what crime Weimer sought to commit when he contacted the min or. This is neither permitted nor intended under the statute. Reed , supra ; Aikens , supra . Based on these facts, we conclude that the section 6318(b)(2) default third - degree felony grading should have been applied where Weimer was acquitted of all charge d section 6318(a) offenses, Reed , supra , and where the court’s charge to the jury did not make it clear for which section 6318(a) offense Weimer was accused of contacting the minor. See Aikens , supra at 644 (where sentencing court would have to guess at which offense defendant sought to commit under section 6318, “[w]e cannot countenance that result.”). 11 Thus, the court’s 5
- 10 year sentence of imprisonment for Weimer’s unlawful contact conviction wit h regard to victim J.D. is illegal where a third - degree felony under section 6318(b)(2) carries a statutory

____________________________________________ 11 Moreover, even if the jury had read the information for purposes of determining what, if any, of the crimes listed in it may have constituted the underlying offense for which Weimer contacted J.D., our decision about grading the offense would not change. The discrepancies in the Commonwealth’s bill of information create further confusion with regard to exactly which subsection of section 6318, and its delineated crimes, the Commonwealth intended to use as the “underlying offense.” While the information states that Weimer contacted J.D. for “the purpose of arranging actual or simulated sexual activity or nudity for the purpose of sexual stimulation or gratification of another person as defined in section 6320,” the information later states that the underlying offense is the crime of IDSI, found at section 3123. See supra nn.9 - 10. These crimes not onl y have differing elements, but are also graded differently.J - S35006 - 17

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maximum sentence of seven years’ imprisonment. Accordingly, we vacate the judgment of sentence as it relates to victim J.D. (CC 201011535) and reman d for resentencing. In his final issue on appeal, Weimer contends that he is entitled to relief due to the court’s defective Rule 907 notice of its intent to dismiss his PCRA petition without a hearing. Specifically, Weimer asserts that because the cour t’s notice failed to explain the reasons for the intended dismissal and what defects, if any, were in his petition, he has effectively been denied his right to file an amended petition to correct any defects under Pa.R.Crim.P. 905(a). Weimer is correct in asserting that a Rule 907 pre - dismissal notice affords a petitioner the opportunity to seek leave to amend his petition and correct any material defects. Commonwealth v. Rykard , 55 A.3d 1177, 1189 (Pa. Super. 2012) (citing Commonwealth v. Williams , 782 A .2d 517, 526 (Pa. 2001)). The ultimate goal of this process is to permit merit review by the PCRA court of potentially arguable claims. Id. While the trial court’s Rule 907 notice did not specifically list the court’s reasons for its intent to dismiss Weimer’s petition or any perceived defects in Weimer’s petition, we recognize that the court had previously granted counsel the opportunity to amend Weimer’s pro se petition and also granted Weimer leave to submit pro se supplements to his petition. More over, in the four and one
- half months that elapsed between the Rule 907 notice and the order dismissing Weimer’s petition, the court acceptedJ - S35006 - 17

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numerous filings submitted on Weimer’s behalf, including a supplemental petition certifying witnesses, pro se and counseled responses and objections to the Rule 907 notice, and a supplemental PCRA petition. The court acknowledged that it considered “the responses filed to [its] notice of intention to dismiss.” Order Dismissing Post Conviction Petition without a Hear ing, 7/12/16. 12 Under these circumstances, we find no merit to this issue on appeal. See Commonwealth v. Albrecht , 720 A.2d 693 (Pa. 1998) (under Pa.R.Crim.P. 1507(a), predecessor to Rule 907, Supreme Court found no defect in notice of intent to dismiss P CRA petition without hearing where petitioner could not demonstrate violation of rule because he was afforded both further proceedings and opportunity to present arguments in support of petition, which is all rule requires). Order reversed. Judgments of sentence vacated. Case remanded for resentencing consistent with this opinion. Jurisdiction relinquished. 13

____________________________________________ 12 To the extent that Weimer filed pro se supplemental petitions in the court below, we note that the record reflects that he was still represented by Attorney Farrell. Although counsel filed a mo tion to withdraw, the trial court never granted that motion. In fact, Attorney Farrell remains listed as counsel on appeal. See Pa.R.Crim.P. 576(a)(4) ( pro se filings of represented litigants); Commonwealth v. Ellis , 626 A.2d 1137 (Pa. 1993). 13 We instr uct the parties to attach a copy of Judge McDaniel’s opinion in the event of further proceedings in the matter.J - S35006 - 17

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Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq. Prothonotary
Date: 7/7/2017M i c h ae l S tr e i l y, DD A Offi ce o f th e D i s tric t Att o rn ey 40 1 Courth o u se 436 Grant Str eet Pi tts bur g h , PA 15219 T h o ma s N. Farr e ll , Es q . 100 R oss Str ee t , Sui te 1 Pitt s bur g h , PA 15 2 1 9 Co pie s m ail e d t o: Fi led B y: H o n . D o nn a J o M c D a niel 

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. §63 1 0. 1 (a) conclusion of th e Commonweal th' s case, this Court granted the D efendant's Motion for J udg m ent of Acqu i ttal at the Fal se Imp risonment charge and d enied it at all o ther counts. The jury r etu rne d a verdic t of Not Guilty t o the Rape charges at CC 20 l O 11 522 and th e ID S I , In dece nt Assau lt and Statutory Sexual Assau l t c h arges at CC 201011535 an d guil ty of all

r emai ni n g c h arges. Th e Defendant nex t appeared befo r e thi s Court on March 1 3 , 2012 , when he
was fou n d t o be a Sexuall y Vio l ent Predat or and was sentenced to two (2) co n secu ti ve terms of imp ri sonme nt of 1 0 t o 20 year s and one ( 1 ) consecutive term of imprisonment of five (5) to 10 years , for an agg r egate sentence of 25-50 years . P ost-Sentence Motio n s were granted as t o the sente n c in g c r edi t issue and d e ni e d i n all othe r respects . The j ud gment of sente n ce was affirmed by th e S up erior Court on A u gust 1. 2013 and the D efe n dant's subseque n t Peti ti on for Allowance of Ap peal w a s de n ied on November 27, 20 1 3. No further acti o n was t ake n u n til April 7 , 2014 when th e Defe n dant fi l ed a pro se P ost Conv i cti on Re li ef Ac t P e tition. Thomas Farre ll , Esquire, was appoin t ed t o represent the D efendant an d an Amende d P CRA P etition was fi l ed o n J une 16, 2015. Afte r r eviewing the Amended Petitio n and r ecord and the Conunonweal th ' s response thereto , thi s Co urt gave notice of i t s inten t to dismiss the Pe tition on F ebru ary 25 , 2016. Afte r again reviewing the record in l i g h t of the Defendant's R esponse to the Notice of Inte n t , this Court dismissed the Amen d e d Petiti on w i th o u t a heari ng on Ju l y 1 2 , 20 1 6. This appeal fo ll owed. A jury trial was held before thi s Court in August, 2011. At the and li ved i n his home
. Furn i s h ing Liqu or to Mino r s 9 in relation to various inc i dents with three young men w h o visited3 1 0 R efe r e n ce is m a d e to th e oft

- ci te d qu ote fro m Ju dge Al di sert : "With a decade an d a h al f of fe d eral ap p ellate co u rt e xp erie nc e b ehin d me , I can say th at e v e n whe n we revers e a tri al court , i t i s rare that a b ri ef successfully d e mo nstr ates th at the tri al c ourt co mmi tte d m o r e th an one or two reve r s ib le erro r s .. . When I read an appellan t ' s b ri ef th at c o ntain s t e n or tw e l ve p o in t s, a p res u mpti o n ari s e s th at th er e i s n o me rit to an y of them
. I do no t say that th is i s an irr eb uttabl e p r esu mp ti o n , b u t it i s a pr es umption n everth eless that re du ce s the effec ti v e n ess of ap pe ll ate ad v oc acy. App e llate a d voc a cy is m eas ur ed b y effec tivene s s , no t loquaciou s n ess . " Aldi se rt , The Ap p e ll ate Bar : Pro f ess i o n al Co mp ete n ce and Pr ofess i onal R es p o n s ibil ity - a V i ew from th e J aund ice d E y e of O n e App e llate J u dg e , 11 C ap . U
. L.R ev . 4 45 , 45 8 (19 8 2). s uch error. " C o mmon we alth v . Gib so n , l 9 A.3 d 5 1 2, 525

- 26 ( P a . 2 01 1 ). " The l aw pre s um es that i s a re a so nabl e pr o b abili ty th at th e re s ult of th e pr oceedi n gs wo uld have be e n di ff e rent ab s ent i s o f ar g u ab l e m erit ; (2) n o r easo n able bas i s ex i s te d for c ou n s e l's ac tion or ina c tio n; an d (3) ther e Pe titio ner mu s t dem o nstrate , b y a pr epon d er ance of the ev id e nc e, th at: (1 ) the und erl y i ng cl aim coun s e l. In ord e r t o e s t abli s h a cl aim for th e in e ff e c ti ve ass i s t ance o f co u ns e l , " a PCRA I n iti all y , th e D efe ndan t rai ses a numb er o f c l aim s dire c t ed t o th e in e ff ec ti ve ass i s t anc e of s om e i ss u es and r e -ord ered th e m fo r e ase of re v i ew. T h ey are a d dr esse d a s fo ll ows: On app eal , the D efe ndan t r ai s e s nin e (9) 1 0 claims o f e rro r. Thi s Court ha s co mb i ned De f end ant to h ave s e x w ith him a s we ll (T. T. , p. 230) th e D e fendan t i ndu c ed him in to in v itin g ove r anoth e r b oy , Ri c k Z immerman , in ord e r fo r th e the y oun g te e nag er s p erf o rm e d o ral sex o n the D efe nd an t (T.T., p. 222). D i a z al s o tes tifi e d that sex " four s ome " whil e th e D efe ndant watc h e d ( T. T., p . 220) , and h a d Di az watc h w h i l e other of Defend ant ( T. T. , p. 22 6 ) , indu c ed Di a z and thr e e oth er yo un g tee n ag e b oys into hav i ng an or al ( T.T. , p . 2 1 6) , pe rfo rm e d an al se x o n hi m ( T. T. , p . 2 18 ) , fo r ce d Di az to p erfo rm oral sex o n th e ( Tri al Tr ans crip t , p . 2 16, 2 2 9 ) , tou c h e d hi s pri vat e parts ( T. T
. . p . 22 1 ), pe rfo rm ed oral sex o n him ti m es w hen h e w a s at th e D e fend an t's h o u se , Di az t esti fi e d that th e D efe nd an t g ave him liqu or b e twee n th e ages of 1 3 and 1 5 , J aso n Diaz di d o dd jo b s at th e D efe n dant's h o u se . A t v ario u s B y way o f a b ri e f rev i ew , th e evi d ence presen t ed at trial es tabli s h ed that w h en he was4 Attorn ey Mic h e ll e C o lli n s of the Pub l i c D efe nd e r 's Offi ce w a s in i ti all y appoi n t e d t o repr ese nt the D efen dant b ut pri or t o tri al , the De fe nd ant b ec ame di s sati s fi e d w ith h e r per s on aJly and s ent h er a l e tter d e mandin g th at s h e w ithdr aw. A tt o rn ey Co llin s di d n o t w ithdr aw but in stea d
tran s f e rred th e c ase t o an o th e r Publi c D efe nder , Carri e A llm an , Es qu i re. Attorn e y A ll man repre se nted th e D e f

e ndant throu g h tri al and
. a cco r di n g t o co rr espo nd e n ce s ub mi tte d b y the D efe ndan t, h e r e m ain e d pl ease d w ith h e r se rvi ces until h e w as convi c ted at whi c h point he b ecam e di ss ati s fi e d w ith h e r . cou n s e l w as not ineff

e cti v e , and the app e llant b ears th e bur de n o f pro vi n g oth erw i s e . .. [ I ] f the i ss ue und erl y in g the c h ar ge o f ineff ec ti ve n ess is n o t o f ar g uab l e merit , co un se l w ill not b e de e med in e ffe c tiv e for failin g t o pur s u e a m e ritl ess i s s u e... A l so , i f th e prej ud ice p r on g o f th e in e ff e ctiv e ne ss s tandard i s not met , ' th e cl aim may b e di s mi sse d o n th at b as i s al o ne and (th e re i s

n o ] n ee d [ t o] d e t e rmin e w h e ther th e [arg u abl e m eri t] an d [c lien t's i nter es t s ] prong s hav e been
rn e t. " " C o mm o n w e alth v. Kh alil , 80 6 A .2 d 415 , 4 2 1- 2 ( P a . S up er. 20 0 2)
. " W i th r eg ard to the

r e a s on abl e ba s i s pron g, [ th e app e ll at e c ourt] w ill co n c lud e th at c o un se l 's c h os en s tr ategy lacked

a re asonab l e b as i s onl y if the p etition e r p r oves th at th e alte rn ati ve s tr ate g y n o t e l e cte d o ffere d a pote nti al fo r s ucc ess su b s t an ti all y great er than the co ur s e a c utel y pur s ued." Commonw e alth v. Bu s an e t , 54 A. 3 d 3 5. 46 (P a . 20 1 2). 1
. In effecti v e Assist

an ce of Co u ns e l - Mot io n to Wi th dra w Ini tiall y, th e D ef

en dan t arg ue s that hi s fi r st app o in te d att orney , Mic hell e Co llin s, Es qu ire ,
was in effec ti ve for failin g to file a M o tion to Withdr aw from h er repre se nt ation
. Thi s cl ai m is

m e ritl ess.5 It is well e stabli s hed that " th e ri g ht t o appointe d co un se l d o e s n o t in cl ude the ri g ht to

co un se l o f th e d efe ndant 's ch o i c e ." Co mm o n wealth v. A lb re cht , 720 A.2 d 6 9 3, 7 09 ( P a . 19 9 8 )
. A ddi tion all y , the dec is ion o f " wh e ther t o g rant a defend ant 's p e tition to replace c ou rt appointe d

coun s el i s a deci s ion w hi c h is le f t to the so u n d d isc re tion o f th e tri al c o urt . As a ge n eral rule , ho weve r , a def

e ndant mu s t s ho w i rre conci l able diff e ren ce s betw e en him s elf and hi s court

appointed coun se l b efo r e a trial co urt w i ll b e re ve r se d for abu s e of di sc r e ti on in refu s in g to
app o in t n ew c oun s el. C o mm o n we alth v . Floyd , 93 7 A. 2d 494 , 4 9 7 (P a. Super
. 2 007 ), internal

c itation s omitte d. Our court s hav e held th at '"s ub s tanti al r eas on s ' o r ' irre c o n c il able diff e r e n ces'
w arrantin g app oi ntm e nt of n ew c o uns e l ar e n ot es t abli s h e d w h er e th e d e fend ant merel y aJleg es a
s trai n e d r e lati o n s hip with c oun s el , wh ere ther e i s a diff eren ce of opi nion in trial s tr at eg y , wh ere the d e fendant l ac k s co nfid e n c e i n co un se l' s ab i lity , or w h ere th e re i s br ev ity of pretrial
co mmun ic ations. Id. That the D e fend ant no w see k s to rais e an in eff ec ti veness cl aim again s t Att orn ey C ollin s i s so m ew hat c o nfus in g t o thi s Court. T h e D efe nd ant ' s o wn pl e adings indic ate that his conflict with Attorne y Collin s wa s per s on al to her and no t wi th the Public D efen der 's O ffice a s a w h o le , and that o n ce Att o rne y A llm an , al so from the Publ i c D e fe n der ' s O ffi ce , took ove r the ca s e , the Defend ant w as sati s fi e d with the tr an sfe r . In ord e r t o s u s tai n a cl aim fo r i n effecti ve a ssis t ance, th e D efe nd an t w ould have to est ablish th at h a d Attorn e y C ollin s filed a form al Moti o n t o Withdr aw , rath e r than s imp l y tran s ferring the cas e t o an o th e r att o rn ey. th e res ult wou ld h av e bee n diff e r e nt. Th e D efe ndant fai l s t o es tabli s h that thi s C ourt w o uld have eve n g rante d th e Moti o n to Wi thdraw, l e t alone the
rem ainin g el e m e nts o f hi s in e ff ec ti ve n ess c l aim
. It i s no t thi s C ourt 's pr acti ce to all ow6

defendan t s t o s eri all y request ne w att o rne ys for r eas on s of irr ec on c ilable differe nc es ( w hich in thi s cas e app e ar e d t o b e th e D e f e ndan t's p erso n al co nfli ct w i th A ttorn ey Co ll i n s and n o t an error

o r omi s s i o n o n h er p art ) and thi s C o urt can s ay w ith certainty that h a d s uch a Motion b ee n pre se nted , thi s Court w ould h ave d e ni e d it. Thu s , Attorn ey Co ll i n s· a c tions in tr ans ferring the

c ase to A tt o rne y Al lman i n h er o ffi ce actuall y re s ulte d in th e De fe ndant ge ttin g th e relief he
wante d ( a new attorn ey) , which h e would o th erw i se no t h av e bee n ab le t o do
. F o r h e r part , Att o rn ey A llman perfo rm e d ab l y an d w ell at tri al and th e D e fendan t's righ ts and int e re s t s were well

- repre sented ( and indeed , the De fe ndant wa s plea se d with her se rvic es up until th e gu i lty

v erdi c t). Wh ate ve r th e di s p u t e b etwee n th e D e f e ndant and A tto rn ey C o llin s, it did no t imp e de th e D e fendant ' s ri g ht to a fair trial and to e ff ec tiv e couns e l in Attorne y Allman
. This claim is merit les s. 2. I neffective Assist

an ce of Co un se l - Mo ti o n to S u p press Next , the De fe ndant ar g ue s that trial c oun s el was ineffe cti v e for failin g to file a M o ti o n to S up p re ss an e mail b etwee n the De fe ndant and v ictim J o rdan C ampb e ll b ec ause it was not included a s a s ubject o f the s earch warrant e xec ute d at the Def e nd an t 's h o m e. Again , thi s cl aim is m e ritl ess. At tri al , durin g th e cros s- examin ation o f v ictim J o rd an Camp bell , Attorne y A llman que s tioned th e witn ess re g ardin g a do c um e nt w h ic h i n cl ud e d a ph o t o o f a m an (lat e r identified a s the w itn ess' friend , C huck) abo ve an e m ail fr o m the De fe nd ant t o Campb e ll dated April 29 , 2 010
. The e mail wa s p ri n te d in i t s e ntire ty an d was co mp l e te l y l egi bl e. That do c um e nt wa s
m arke d as D e fen se E xhi b i t A and was lat e r admitte d
. Th e n , o n re- dir ec t , the C ommonwe alth7 MS
. ALLM AN: Ye s , Y o ur H o n o r . I'll g r ab my sti c ke r s. TH E C O U R T: C an we mark that as Def e n se A, pl ease, fo r purpo s e s o f the record
. A
. I t o ld him th at w e h a d hun g out , not that h e ha d a c tuall y had an y s o rt o f s ex ual r e lati o n s hip. 

### Q. Did y ou ever tell Mr. W e im e r th at yo u h a d a sex ual r e lati o n s hip w ith Chuck ? A. N o . Q. N o t prior to Mr
. We i m e r ? A. No. Q. Did yo u have an y re lation s hip with C hu c k o f a s e x ual nature ? A. He had e xpre ss e d doub ts about hi s sex u ali ty. Q. I s he homos e xu al ? Do yo u kn o w ? A. Y es. Q
. Okay . S o h e ' s an a dult m ale , as w e ll ? A. Chu ck i s 3 2
. Q. Ho w o ld 's Chuck ? A. This i s my friend , C huck
. Q. Who 's that per so n ? A
. ( Jordan C ampb e ll ): Y es . Q
. ( M s . A llman ): Mr
. C ampb e ll , d o y ou r ec o g nize th e p e r s on in that picture at all ? Co mmonw e alth 's E x hibit 7 : m arke d and admitted a text-only c o py o f the s ame e m ail (w ith o u t th e picture) a s8 A. I do n 't r ecal l. Q
. D o yo u re m e mb er i f yo u res p o nd e d t o thi s? A. I do n' t really r eme mb er . I be li eve I had jus t woken u p an d di scovere d th at I had that em ai l o n e m o rnin g. Q
. An d do yo u r eme mbe r the contex t beh i nd ge ttin g thi s em ai l ? A. Y es. Q. A n d i n th e rec ipi e nt spo t th e r e , th at's your e m ail, ri ght? A
. Yes. 

### Q

. Ok ay. A nd th at's hi s e mail as yo u kn ew it ? A. Y es. Q
. Ok ay. A nd you u n de r s t ood it to be fro m Pau J ? A. T his e m ail i s fro m P aul
. 

### Q

. A nd w h o w as thi s e m ai l fro m ? THE C O U R T: Ok ay. M R. SC H ULTE: I ' m goi n g t o m ark - thi s w ill be Co mm o n w e al th 's Ex hib i t 7
. s kipp e d seven b efore. T HE C O URT : C an y o u t e ll m e wh at e xhib i t w e're o n , pl ease? A. ( J o rd an Campb e ll) : I be li eve so, yes. Q. ( Mr
. S chu lt e): I' m goi n g to show y ou a tex t o f th at e m ail. D o yo u re m e mbe r ge tti n g th at e m ai l ? RE D I REC T EXAMI NA T I O N MR
. SC H UL T E: Ju s t a very f ew ques ti o n s. No furth e r qu es tio ns o f this w i tness, Yo ur H o n o r.9

trial both as a gen e ral propositio n an d for a laundry l ist o f p ercei v ed e xample s of ineffectivene s s Th e D e fe n dant now av ers that Attorney A ll man fail e d to z e alou s l y ad v ocat e for h im at a d v o c ate for hi m at tri al. A g ain , thi s claim i s m eritl es s. T h e D efendant al s o arg u e s th at trial coun se l w as ine ff e c ti ve i n fail in g to zealou s l y 3
. In e ff ec ti ve A ss i s tan c e of Co uns e l - Ze alou s A dvo c acy s uppression. Thi s claim mu s t al s o fail. h a s utt erly fai led to e s tab l i s h hi s claim th at co u nse l wa s ineffectiv e for failin g to s eek the e mail ' s email fir s t hi mself and wa s s ub s eque n tl y a c quitted o f al l char g e s relatin g to Jordan Campb e l1 , he p r ejudi ce from the Co mm o n w e al th ' s u s e of th e email. In s ofar a s th e Defendant intr o du c e d the all c h arge s re latin g t o v ictim Jordan C ampbell an d he h a s thu s utterly failed to e s tablis h any Mo reover, the Defendant ' s argument al so c o mpl e te l y di s reg ar ds that he w as a c quitted o f p r e judic e d b y the Commo n w ealth 's l ater u s e of the s ame email. in tr odu ced the emai l him s elf before the C ommonw ealth did , he c ann o t claim that he was b e for e th e text-only co p y wa s i n trodu ced by the Commonw e al th
. Because the D efendant c o mpletely di s re g ard s that the emai l was pr es en t ed and marke d as an exhib i t by defe n s e cou n s el s uppressio n o f the e mai l as p re s ente d b y th e C o mmonwealth
. How ev er , thi s ar g um e n t T he Defendant n o w argu es that trial coun se l wa s i neffecti v e for fail i n g to seek ( Trial T r anscript, p. 84- 8 6)
. T HE C O U RT : Ye s. It w i ll be admitted. MR. SCHULTE: Your H onor , I 've marked thi s a s Commonw e alth 's E x hi b it 7 , and Pd move for it s admis s io n . A n d may I b ri efl y publish i t ? Q. O k ay.JO To th e e x tent that th e D e fe n dant s eek s to rai se a claim r egar din g M s. Allm an's c o nduct in ge n er al , th at claim i s al s o m eritl e s s. Af ter pres idin g at tri al and h av in g th e o pportuni ty to ob se rve Ms
. Al lman 's c onduct both b e fore and durin g tri al , thi s C ourt fe e l s th at M s. A l lman w as ob vi ou s l y w e ll-prepare d for tri al , th at s h e en gage d in e ff ec ti ve wi tn ess ex amin ation s, b o th o n d i re c t and cr os s - ex amination , that s h e m a d e ap p ro pri at e and e ff ecti v e ar g um e n ts and , ul tim at e ly , that s h e pre s e nt e d the be s t d e fens e s h e c o uld w i th th e fact s s h e was g i ve n . It i s al so imp ortant to
n o t e th at s he di d se c u re acqu ittal s o n the m ost s erio u s c h arges. I t is und e r s tandab le th at the D efe ndant i s up s et b y the g uilty ve rdict s , h owe v er , th e m e re fac t that so m e of th e ve rdi c t s w ere g ui l ty doe s n ot mean th at coun se l w a s ineff ecti ve. As di sc u ss ed ab o ve and b e lo w , th er e was no ba s i s for a finding o f ineffecti v e n ess o n an y o f th e s pe c ifi c alle gatio n s , no r is ther e a b as i s for a .findin g o f cumu l ative ineffe c ti ve a s s i s tan ce. Th is c l aim mu st al so fail. whi c h wer e not ex pl ain ed, disc u ss e d or anal yze d
. " Wh e n a c o urt ha s to g u ess w hat i s sue s an app e ll ant i s ap pe alin g , th at i s n o t e n oug h fo r m eani n g ful re v iew. Wh e n an appellant fail s adequ atel y to id e n ti fy in a co n c i se mann e r th e i ss u e s so u g ht t o b e pur s ued on app eal , the trial

c ou rt i s imp e ded i n it s pr e parati on o f a l eg al anal ys i s which i s pertinent to tho se i ss u es . In o ther

w ord s, a Co n c i se S tat e m e nt which i s to o vag u e t o allow the court to id e nti fy th e i ss u e s r ai se d o n app e al i s th e fun cti o n al e qui valent of n o C on c i se S t at e m e nt at al l. " C o mmon wealth v . Re eves, 9 0 7 A.2 d 1 , 2 ( P a . S uper . 2 006 ) , c itin g Co mmonw e al th v. Do w ling , 78 A.2 d 68 3, 6 86-7 ( Pa .Su per . 200 1 ). Gi v e n th e l a ck o f exp l anati on or r ev ie w, th i s Co urt i s unable to p rov id e any

m e aningful an al ys i s o f th e De fe ndan t's laundry li s t of p erc ei v ed w ron gs. As s uch , the se c lai m s
o f error ar e w ai ve d.11

4. Ine

ff ective A s si s tan c e of Co un se l - F ailure to C

all Witn ess N e x t , th e Defendant ar g u es that trial coun s el wa s in e ffectiv e in failin g to pre se nt the testimon y of E li zab e th Bero e s , Esqu ir e be c au se "s h e w a s ab l e t o c all in t o qu es tion th e credibility
o f mu l ti pl e Comm o nw e al th witn e sse s " (D e fe n dant 's Amended PCRA Petition , Se c tion I V ). As it sp e cificall y r e lat es to a claim for i ne ffe cti ve n es s fo r the failure to call a witness , the petitioner must establ i s h that "( I) th e witne s s ex i ste d ; ( 2) th e w itn ess w a s avai lable to te s ti fy fo r the def e n se; (3 ) c oun se l kn ew o f , o r s hou l d have kno w n o f , th e existenc e of th e witn e ss ; (4) the witne s s was willin g to te s tify for th e d e fen s e ; and ( 5 ) the ab s ence o f the tes ti m o n y of the w itne s s
w a s so prejudi c ial a s t o hav e denied th e d e fe n dant a fair trial. " C o mmonwealth v. Matia s , 63 A. 3d 807 , 8 1 0-811 (P a. Super. 2013)
. " I n e ff ec ti ve n ess fo r failin g to call a w i tne ss w i ll n ot b e found

w h er e a d efe ndant fai ls to pro v ide affidavits from the all eged witne ss e s indi cating availability and w ill in g nes s to c oop er at e with the d e f e n se ." C ommon wealth v. O ' Bid o s , 849 A. 2 d 2 4 3, 2 49 ( Pa.Super. 2 004 )
. " F ai lu r e to call a witn es s i s not p er s c in e ffe c ti v e as s i s tan ce o f c ou n se l , fo r
s u c h a d e ci s ion implic ate s matter s o f trial s trategy . I t i s [ th e peti ti o n er ' s] b u rden to d e monstrate th at trial couns e l h ad no re asonab l e basis for d e c l inin g to call [a parti c ul ar p e r s on] as a w itn ess.

' G e nerall y , wh ere matt e r s o f s trat egy and t a ctic s are co nc e rn e d , c ou n s el' s a ss istance is deemed
co n s titutio n ally eff

e c tiv e i f he c ho se a parti c u l ar co ur se th at h a d so m e rea so n abl e ba s i s d es igned t o e ff ec tu ate hi s cl ien t' s i nteres t s . ' A cl a im o f in e ff e c ti ve n e ss ge n e r a ll y c a n no t s u c c e e d t hr o u g h co m pa rin g, in hind

s i g ht , th e tri a l s tr a t e gy e mpl

o ye d w ith a

lt e rn a ti ves n ot pur s u ed. " Comm o nw e alth v. Hammond, 9 5 3 A. 2d 544 , 5 5 8 (Pa .S uper. 200 8 ), empha sis add e d
. Her e , th e De fe n d ant av er s only that tri al co un se l w a s ine ff e c tiv e in failin g to c all A tt o rn ey Beroes becau se s he would
.. c all into qu esti o n th e credibility o f multip l e1 2

Common wealth witne ss e s" (D e fendan t's A m e nd e d PCRA P e titi o n . Se c tion IV )
. Th e D e fendan t d o e s not provid e any s pecific s re g ardin g th e s ub s t ance o f h er tes ti m o n y, no r h as h e atta c hed an affid av it from Attorney B e roe s indicatin g the s ub s tance o f h er te s timon y and that s h e w a s w illin g and av ailabl e to te s tify for th e d e fen s e . Th e Defend ant ' s ar g umen t that Attorn e y Beroe s wa s

s i g hte d in th e courtroom durin g tri al d oes n o t m e an th at s h e was av ail abl e and w illing t o te s ti fy

on hi s b e hal f. Given th e co mple t e ab se n ce o f an y s p ec ific information re g arding what Attorney Beroe s'
te s timon y would h av e be e n , an y ev iden c e th at it wo uld h av e c han ged th e res ult or it s ab s enc e d epri v ed th e D e fendant of a fair tri al , and any proo f that sh e w as willing and avai lable t o t es ti fy

on th e D e f

en d an t 's beh al f

, th e D efe ndant h as u tt erly failed to es tabli s h hi s claim for ineffecti v e
a ss i s tanc e of counsel in thi s r egard
. Thi s cl ai m mus t al so fail. 5. In effec ti ve Ass i s tan c e o /C oun se l < Ju ry In s truc ti ons The D e f e nd ant al so arg ue s th at thi s Co urt erre d in in s tru c tin g the jury that it did not need to determine th e d ate the in c id e nt s o cc urred b eyo nd a rea s on abl e do u bt. Agai n , this claim i s
m erit l e s s . Wh e n r ev ie wing a c hallenge t o jury in s truction s, " it i s th e function of [th e appellate] court to determine wh e th e r th e r ec o r d s upp o rt s th e trial c ourt ' s d ec i s ion. In e xamining th e pr o pri e ty of the in s truction s a trial c ourt p re se nt s t o a j ury, [ the app e llat e court 's ] sco p e o f re v ie w is to determine wh e ther th e trial co urt co mmitted a cl ear abu s e o f di scr etion or an error of law which controlled th e outc o m e o f th e case. A j u ry c har ge wi ll be dee med err o n eo u s o nl y if th e
c har ge a s a whol e i s inadequate , not clear or ha s a te nd e n cy to mi s l ea d o r co nfu s e , r ath er than clari fy, a m aterial i ss ue . A c h arge i s co n s id er e d a dequat e unle s s th e ju ry wa s palp abl y mi s led b y1 3 C as e law h as f

urth er 'e s t ab l i s hed th at th e Co mm o n weal th mu st be aff o rd e d b ro ad l ati tude wh e n att e mptin g to fix th e d at e o f offen s e s which inv o lve a continu o us co ur s e o f criminal co ndu ct'.
. . T hi s i s es p ec iall y tru e w h e n the c ase in v ol v e s a s e xual offen se ag ain s t a c hi l d v ictim
. However , 'due proce ss i s not re du c ib l e to a math e mati c al fo rmula ,' and the C o mm o n weal th does n o t al ways n ee d to pro ve a s pecifi c d ate of an alle ge d cri me ... Additio nall y , ' indi c tm e n ts must b e re a d in a co mmo n s e n se m anner and ar e no t to b e c o n s tru e d in an o v erl y technical se n se'
. .. P ermi ss ibl e leeway re g ardin g th e dat e v aries with , inter al ia, th e n atur e of th e c rim e and th e ri g ht s o f th e accu s ed
... It i s the duty of th e pro s ecu tion to ' fi x the dat e wh e n an all e ged off e n s e o c curre d w ith r eas on abl e ce rtai nty' ... T h e purp os e of so a d v i s i n g a d efe nd ant of the d ate w h e n an off

e nse i s alle ge d to h av e be e n committe d is to p ro v id e him with s u ffic i e nt noti c e t o me et th e char ges an d prepar e a de fe n se . P a .R. C rim.Pro
. 5 60 , e mphasi s add e d.

(3) th e dat e when the offe n se i s al l ege d to have be e n commi tte d if the prec i s e date is kn ow n , an d the d ay o f the wee k i f it i s an esse n ti al element of th e off

e ns e c har ge d. provid e d th at i f the pre ci se dat e is not kn o wn o r i f the o ff

e n s e i s a co n tinu i n g one , an alleg ati o n that it wa s committe d on or about an y date w ith i n th e p eri od fixed b y th e st atute o f limitation s s h all be s uffi c i e n t; (b ) T h e inform ati o n sh all b e s ign e d b y th e att o rne y fo r th e C o mmonwealth and s hall b e v ali d and s uffi c i e nt in l aw i f i t c on tain s : R ul e 560. In fo rm a tion : F ilin g , Cont e nt s, F u n c tion P e nn sy l v ani a law r eg ardin g the d at e o f a c ri me i s we ll -s ettled : Commo n wealth v . Sandu s ky , 7 7 A. 3 d 6 63 , 667 ( P a . S up er. 2 0 13). requ es ted char ge do es n o t require r ev er sal unl ess the Appell ant w as prejudiced b y that r efu s al. " not re qui re d t o g i ve every c har ge th at i s re qu este d b y th e partie s and it s refusal t o g ive a C on sequ e n tl y, th e tri al co urt h as w i de di sc re ti o n in fa s hi o nin g j ury instru c ti o n s . Th e tri al c ou rt i s what th e tri al jud ge s aid or ther e i s an o mi s s i o n w h ic h i s t an t am o un t t o fundam e n t al error .1 4

c l aim mu s t al so fail. wa s an ac curat e s t at e m e nt of l aw , c oun se l w as n ot in effec ti ve for fail ing to c h all e n ge it. T hi s th e o ff en s e s , b ec au s e it was not. B e c au se th e jury i nstru c ti o n was cons i s te nt wi th th e statu te and This Co urt did n o t e rr in g i v in g th e in stru ction th at dat e was n o t an es s e ntial e l e ment of ( T.T. pp. 71 0 , 715-716 , 7 2 0-7 2 1 ). I n ord e r to find the defe nd an t gu il ty of i n vo lunt ary d ev i at e s ex ual i n te r co ur se , y ou mus t find th at th e fo ll ow in g e l em e nts h ave b ee n m e t b ey ond a re a so nabl e doubt. First , th at th e defe nd ant h a d dev i at e s exual i n te r cour s e wi th th e c hi l dren
. S e c o nd , th at the c hildre n we r e un d e r the age of 1 6. Thir d, th at th e de fendant wa s fo ur o r m o r e year s o ld er th an th e c hil dre n . An d , fourth , th at th e d efe ndant and c hild w er e n ot married to o n e an o th er ....

.. . D o n ' t l e t th e nam e of thi s c rime , inv olun tary d eviate sex ual interc our se , mi s l ea d yo u . It i s imm ateri al t o th e c h arge of invo lunt ary d ev iate sex ual in t er co ur se w i th a child un de r I 6 that the c h i ld d id n ot ob j ec t o r res i st or e ve n th at th e ch i ld conse n te d
. Wh e n a ch i ld i s un de r 1 6 , th e law tre at s d eviat e sex u al in t er co ur s e a s in vo lunt ary, eve n i f th e ch ild i s a wi lli ng partne r . . . . Th e de fe nd ant i s c h arge d wi th thr ee c ount s o f involun tary d ev i ate sex ual int e r cou r se. T her e are three all eg ed v i ctim s. O n e v i c tim would appl y to e a c h c o unt. T h e all ege d v i c tim s ar e Mari o G o r so p , Ja so n Di az, Rick Zi mmerman . ... Th e i nd ic tm ent s alle ge th at th e c rime s w e r e co mmitt e d b etwee n M arc h o f 2 00 6 an d A u g u s t o f 2 010
. Y o u ar e not b o un d b y an y o f the se d at es that are all ege d in the i nform ati o n. It is not an esse nti al e l e ment o f an y of th e cri m es c har g ed
. Y ou may find th e defe nd ant g u i l ty i f yo u ar e satisfi ed b eyo nd a r e a so n ab l e d o ubt th at h e co mmitt e d th e c rim e c h ar ge d in th e indi c tmen t , eve n thou g h yo u are no t s ati s fi e d th at h e co mmi tte d it on a parti c ular dat e that is all ege d in th e indi ctm e nt ... THE C O U RT: It i s n o t th e d efe nd ant's b ur de n to pr ove th at h e i s no t gu il ty. In s t ea d, i t i s the C omm o nwealth that al ways has th e burd en of p r ov in g eac h an d e ve ry e lemen t o f the c rime s ch arge d be yo nd a re a so n ab l e d ou b t. A p ers on a cc u se d o f a c ri m e i s n o t re quired t o pr ese nt ev id e n ce o r t o p r ove anythin g i n h is own d e fe n se . .. At th e co nclu s ion of th e tri al , thi s C o u rt in stru cte d th e ju ry , i n p art . a s fo ll ows: C o mmonw e alth v. Br o ok s , 7 A. 3 d 8 52 , 8 5 7-8 ( P a . S u p e r . 20 1 0).1 5

fa ct( s) that wa s n o t s ubmitt e d t o the jury . See , e . g. , Commonweal th v . New m an , 99 A.3d 86 increa s e the mi nimum sent e n c e , ar e u nconstituti o nal b e cau s e the y requir e proo f o f an addi ti o n al mandatory minimum sentencin g s ch e me s, w hi c h re qu ire c ertain fa c tu al finding s t o trigg e r or S u pr e m e Court ' s de c i s i o n i n A ll eyn e v. U nited S tat es, 13 3 S
. C t. 21 5 1 ( 20 1 3 ) , h o lding th at 

### Our appellat e c ourt s hav e rec e ntl y authored a l in e of ca s es fo ll owing the U n ited State s

1 8 Pa
. C. S. § 3 J 25(a )(

1 ) throu g h ( 6

) ( re la tin g to a gg ravate d in d e ce nt a ss ault

) - not le s s th a n

fiv e y ears . 1 8 Pa . C. S. § 3 1 23 ( re la tin g to i nvo l u ntar y d e vi ate sex ual interc our se) - n o t l e ss than te n yea r s. 1 8 Pa
. CS. § 31 2 1 (a )( l)
. (2 ), ( 3) , ( 4) and ( 5 ) ( re lating to rap e)

- not l ess th an te n ye ar

s . 1 8 Pa.CS. § 2 7

02(a )( l) and (4 ) ( relatin g to a g gr a vate d a ss ault

) - n o t l e s s t h a n two ye ar

s . (1 ) A p er

s on con v i c ted o

f th e f oll owi n g offe n ses w h e n th e v i c t i m i s less than 16 y ear

s of a g e s hall be se nte nc e d to a m a nd a tory te rm of impri s onment asfollow s : (a)
. Mandator

yse nte nc e . - §9 718. Sente nc es

f o r off e n s e s ag a in s t i n

fant p e rs o ns. se nte nc e s: S ectio n 9718 of our Ju d ic i al Code provides for th e fo ll ow i n g mandatory mi ni mum error. How e ver , a r eview of th e rec o r d reveal s that this claim i s meritle ss. of the i neff

e ctive assi s t ance of c ounse l in hi s Amended P eti ti o n , he no w s i mp l y ave r s trial court In voluntary D ev i ate S e xuaJ I n tercour se ch ar ge s. Althou g h he in i ti all y fr am e d this i s sues in term s The D e fendant next ave rs th at thi s C ourt impo s ed an illegal mandatory se n te nce at the 6
. Ill e gal Sentence - Involunt a ry D e viate Sex ual inte rcours e16 ' The Alle y ne d ec i s i o n . .. re nd e r s th ose P e nn sy l vania mand at ory mi nimu m se nt e n c in g s tatute s th at do n o t p e rt ain to prio r con v i c ti on s con s tituti o nally info rm in s of ar a s the y p ermi t a jud ge t o aut o m ati call y in c r ease a d e f e nd an t 's se nten c e b as ed on a prep o nd eranc e of th e evid e nc e s t and ard. '
. .. Howe ve r , the Si x th A me n dm e nt concern s p r esen t in A lle yne ar e n o t i mpli cate d in thi s case. H e re , Mattes on w as charged with ag grav ated indec e nt a ssault of a child , which re quire s , in te r alia, th at th e v i c tim is l ess th an 1 3 y e ars o f age . See 1 8 P a.C.S
. A. § 31 25. T he vi c tim te s tifi e d th at s h e wa s 11 year s old at th e ti m e of th e in c iden t. .. The j u ry r ec ei ved an in s truc tion that i t w a s re quire d t o find that th e v i c tim was le ss jud g m e nt of se ntenc e, th e Sup erior Co urt s tate d : mandatory minimum sentencin g schem es wer e, in g ener al , un co n s titutional
. In affirmin g the ch arge. He app e aled , claiming that hi s s ente nc e was ille g al pur s uant t o Alleyn e and that minimum term of impri s onment of IO to 2 0 y ears at the A gg rav ated Indec e nt A ss ault o f a C hild A ss ault o f a C hild and Indecen t A ssault o f a P e r s on U nd er 1 3
. He wa s s ent e nced to a mandatory 10 6 4 ( P a .Sup e r. 2 014). In Mattes on , the d e fendant wa s c o nvicted of A ggrav ated Ind e c e nt Our S uperi o r Court addre s s e d thi s identic al i ssu e in C ommon we alth v . M atteson , 96 A.3d doubt. an e lem e nt o f the off

en se, th e j ury ha d alr e ad y ma de th e r e qui s ite findin g be y ond a re as onable was und e r a ge 16
. Bec au s e th e fa cto r w h ic h gave rise to th e m an d atory minimum s ent e nc e was s upra, b e cau se the c rim es for w hi c h he was co n v i c t e d requir e d th e jury ' s fi ndin g that th e vic tim How e ver , th e D e fendan t's cas e i s di s ti n gu i s h abl e fro m N e w man , V alen tine and W o lfe , a ge . minimum s e ntence pur s uant t o 42 Pa
. C
. S .A
. §9 718( a) , wh ere th e v i c tim was under 16 y ear s of c oncerned senten c ing enhanc e ment s for firearms v i o lati o n s and Wol fe c o n c ern e d a mand at o ry C o mm o nw e alth v. Wolfe , 106 A .3 d 800 (Pa
. Sup er . 2 014 )
. Ne wman and Val e ntine both (Pa.Sup er. 2 0 I 4 ), Commonwealth v. Valentin e, 101 A. 3 d 80 l ( Pa.Sup e r . 2014) and1 7 (a). Offen s e defined - A per s on c om mi ts an offe n se 

### if h e i s i n te nti o n all y in co n tac t wi th a min o r, or a law enforcem e n t officer a c ti n g in the p e r for man ce of hi s du ties w h o h a s ass um ed th e ide nti ty of a mino r, f or t h e pu r po s e of e ngagi n g in a n act i v i ty proh i bited unde r any of the follow in g , §63 1 8. U

nl awf ul c onta c t wit h mi nor C hildre n) pu r s uant t o §63 18 (a)( 6 ) , a s fo l l o w s: T h e D efe nd an t wa s c h ar ge d w i th U nl awful C ont act w ith a M i n or ( S ex ual Ex p l o itatio n o f Stat e m e n t o f Err o r s C omp l ain e d of o n Appeal , p . 2)
. T hi s cl ai m i s me ri tl ess . th e gra d e o f th e c rim e of u nlawf u l c on ta c t a fe l o n y o f th e third-d e gre e " ( D e fen d an t's C o nc i s e th e v i c tim p u r s u an t t o 1 8 P a. C.S
. §3 1 26( a ) ( 8 ), a mi s dem e an o r o f th e seco nd -de gr ee , whic h mad e b a sed u pon variou s th e o ri es o f th e Co mm o n weal th i nc l udi n g th at App e llan t i ndec e ntl y assau l ted C o n t a c t with a Min o r c h ar g e " w h e n App e lJ ant w a s c on v i cte d o f u n l aw ful co nta c t wi th a min or T h e D efe n d ant n e x t av er s th at thi s C o u rt i mp os ed an i ll eg al se n t ence at th e U nl awfu l 7
. Ill ega l Sentence - U n lawful Co nt

act of a M

i no r m e ritless. re qui s it e fa ctu al fi ndi n g t o sati sfy A lle yne and s o th e se nte nces we re n o t i ll eg al. Thi s cl ai m i s commi s s i on o f the c rim e s . B y fin din g th e D efend an t g u i l ty o f th es e o ff e n s e s , th e j u ry m a d e th e j ury 's pr e l i mi n ary fi n din g th at th e v i ctim s we r e und e r th e a g e of 1 6 at th e ti me o f th e se n t e n c e s fo r I n volu nt ary D e v i at e Se xual In ter co urse w i th a C h ild
. Th es e off e n s e s re qu ir e d th e In th e i ns tan t case , the D e fe n dant w a s s e nt e n c ed t o tw o (2) man d at o ry minimum C ommonw e alth v . M atteso n , 96 A.3 d 1 0 6 4 , 1 06 6 -1 06 7 ( P a.Su p e r . 2014). th an 1 3 y e ars of age... Th e r efore , b y find in g Matteson g u i lty o f agg r av at e d in dec en t a s sault of a ch ild b e yon d a r ea so n ab l e d o u bt , th e j ury s pecificall y fo und th e e l eme n t r e quir e d to imp os e th e m and atory mi ni mum s e nt en c e . .. T hu s , the re qui reme n t s o f A ll e vn e h ave b e en m et an d Mattes o n' s claim i s w i th o u t m eri t.1 8

fail. as a seco nd-d egree f

e l o n y and se n tence d th e D efe nd an t ap p r o pri at e l y ther e on . T hi s cl ai m mu st C hildr e n , a s ec o nd

- de g r e e f e lon y. Thi s Co urt did n o t err in gra di n g th e U nlawfu l Co n tact c h arge U nl aw fu l Co n tac t c har ge ap pr o priat e l y assu m ed the unde rl y in g g r a din g of S e xual E xpl o it ation o f C hi l dr e n i s, b y s tatut e, a felony of th e seco nd d eg ree . Thu s , p ur suant t o §63 1 8 (b)( l ), th e Cont a ct w ith a Mi no r , re l ati n g t o Sex u al Exploitati o n of Ch ildre n . Sex u al Ex pl o itation of Her e, th e D e fendan t was c har ge d w ith and c o n v i c te d of s ub sec ti o n (a)(6) o f Un l awfu l 18 P a . C.S.A. § 6 320. (b). P ena l ty. - An offense u n der th i s sec t io n is a fel ony of t

h e second deg ree. (a). Offense defined. - A person co mm its t he offense of sexu al ex p lo it a t i o n o f children if he p rocures fo r another pe r son a child under 18 years of age fo r th e pu r

p ose of sex u al exploitation. § 6 32 0. S ex ual ex

pl o itat io n of c hildre n S e x u al ex p l oitatio n o f chi ldre n is fu rther enu m erat e d in our C rime s Cod e a s follo ws: 1 8 P a . C.S
. A. §63 18. w hi c he ve r is g re ater. (2). a felony of th e third degree; (]). an offense of the sa m e grade and degree as the m os t se ri ou s un derly i ng offense in subsection (a) fo r whic h the defe n da n t co nt ac ted the m i no r

; or (b). Gradi n g. - A v i o lati o n of subsec t io n ( a} is: (6). Sexual exploi t

a ti on of children as defi n ed in section 6320 (relat i ng to sexual exploitation of children)
. a nd e ith e r th e person initialing the contac t or th e person being co n tacted is w ithin thi s Co mm o n we alt h:1 9

Am e nd e d Petiti on in re s pon s e to the No ti ce of Intent t o Di s mi ss , thi s cl aim is belied b y th e A s to the D e fend ant ' s claim th at thi s Co urt "re fu se d t o allo w" him to file a s e c ond Pro ce dure
. Thi s cl aim i s m e ritl ess . se em s to s ug g e s t. Rath e r , th e O r d er w a s appropriate and in ac co rdan ce with th e Rule s of it. Rule 907 doe s not requir e a l e n g th y an aly s i s of the r easo n s for th e di s mi ss al , as the D e fendant The Order note d the docum e nt s re v ie we d and g av e the appropri at e n o ti ce o f th e in te nt t o di s mi ss A re vi e w o f th e rec o rd d e m o n s tr at es th at th e Ord er met th e r e quir e m e nt s of Rule 9 07. BY THE C OURT : s/M cD ani e l, J
. The P e tition e r may re s pond t o th e prop ose d di s mi ss al w ithin 2 0 days of the date o f thi s n o tic e in acc o rdanc e with Pa.R. C rim
. P
. Rul e 9 0 7
. A N D N OW , to- w it , thi s 2 5 d ay of F ebruary , 20 16 , petitioner is hereb y put on notice that aft e r a th o rou g h r ev i ew o f th e r ec ord w hi c h included th e Amended Petition filed b y appointed co un s el , th e C omm o nw e alth 's R es p o n se and th e Defendant ' s pro se S upplemen ts; thi s C o urt i nte nd s to di s mi ss th e p etiti o n wi thout a h e aring. N OT I CE OF INTE N TION TO DI S MI SS P C RA PETIT I ON WITHO U T A H E ARING A m e nd e d PCRA Petition without a he aring. Th at Orde r stated : On February 2 5 , 2016 , thi s C ourt filed a N oti c e of I nte nt t o Di s mi ss th e Defendant ' s Am e nded Petition
. Thi s claim i s meritle ss. Dismis s th e Am e nd e d Petition and in " r efus in g to all ow" th e Defendant to fil e a Seco n d Finall y , th e D e fendant argue s that thi s Court erre d in filin g a def e ctive Notice oflntent to 8. Trial Court Error2 0

Dated: Oc t ober 1 3 , 2016 r eco rd
. After th e N oti c e o f Int e n t t o Di s mi ss was fil e d on F eb ru ary 25 , 20 1 6 , thi s C o urt ac c ept e d
th e fo llo w in g finding s fro m the De fe ndant: • Re s p o n se t o No tic e o flnt e nt to Di smi s s, M arc h 11 , 20 16 , b y A tt orney F arrell ;
• Obj ectio n t o Noti ce of [ nte nt to Di s mi ss , Mar c h 16 , 2 016 , b y th e D efen dan t; an d

• S uppl e me ntal P etitio n in S upport of P C RA , M ar c h 18 , 2 0 16 , b y the D efe ndant. T hi s Cou rt di d rev ie w and co n s id e r th e D efe nd ant ' s pro s e and c o un s el e d filin gs and

no te d th e s am e in it s Ord e r d is mi ssi ng th e P etiti o n o n Jul y 1 2, 2 01 6. Thu s, th e D efe ndant ' s clai m th at thi s Co urt r efuse d to all ow hi m t o res p o nd to th e No tic e o f Intent t o Di s mi ss i s fal se and so mu s t fail. A c c o rdin g l y , fo r th e ab ove reas on s o f fac t and l aw, th is Co urt ' s Ord e r o f J ul y 1 2, 2 016 , which di s mi sse d the D efe nd ant's A m en d ed P os t Conv i cti o n R e li e f A c t P etiti o n w ithout a he arin g, mu st be affirm e d
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