IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 08-30477

PRINCESS P. LACAZE, 

Petitioner-Appellant,

v.

WARDEN LOUISIANA CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTE FOR WOMEN, 

also known as Mariana Leger,

Respondent-Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the Western District of Louisiana

Before SMITH, WIENER, and ELROD, Circuit Judges. 

JENNIFER WALKER ELROD, Circuit Judge:

Princess P. LaCaze (hereinafter “LaCaze”), Louisiana prisoner # 403264,

was convicted in state court of second-degree murder and sentenced to life

imprisonment. LaCaze filed a habeas petition in federal district court pursuant

to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, which was denied. This court then granted a certificate of

appealability on two issues: first, whether the State withheld Brady material

concerning a promise made to LaCaze’s co-defendant, see Brady v. Maryland,

373 U.S. 83 (1963), and second, whether the trial court unconstitutionally denied

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

F I L E D

June 29, 2011

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

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her an impartial jury, see Ross v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 81 (1988). We REVERSE

and REMAND with instructions to grant the writ. 

I.

Meryland Robinson, a long-time friend of the victim, was driven by his

fourteen-year-old son to the home of Michael LaCaze (hereinafter “Michael

LaCaze”) in Natchitoches Parish, Louisiana under the guise of returning a gun

that Robinson had borrowed. Robinson shot Michael LaCaze through the

shoulder, killing him. After the shooting, Robinson tossed items from the

victim’s desk onto the floor to make it look like a botched robbery. Princess

LaCaze, the victim’s wife, was not home at the time of the shooting. 

Although LaCaze initially denied any knowledge regarding her husband’s

death, she later told the police that he may have arranged his own death due to

his failing kidneys. She admitted that she knew beforehand that Robinson

planned to kill her husband. Michael LaCaze had previously told her he would

never be dependent on a machine to stay alive, and was scheduled to begin

dialysis within days of the murder. Still later, she admitted that she had called

Robinson the day of the murder, and he told her that “it would be taken care of

that day” and not to return to her home until seven o’clock that evening. She

also admitted that she had been having an extramarital relationship with

Robinson at the time of the shooting, but again maintained that Michael LaCaze

had sought Robinson’s help in ending his life due to his declining health. 

Soon after Robinson killed Michael LaCaze, LaCaze began seeing another

man. It was only after LaCaze had Robinson arrested for knocking on the wall

of her house at night that Robinson made a statement implicating LaCaze,

contrary to his prior repeated denials of her involvement. Based on his

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statement, both parties were indicted in January 1998 for second-degree murder. 

Prior to trial, LaCaze filed a motion for discovery of any evidence “which

in any way and to any extent” was favorable to her, specifically including “the

existence and substance of any and all agreements or understandings,

assurances or representations, formal or informal, oral or written, confected

between the prosecution and any and all persons involved in the case in any

manner.” The State responded that Robinson had agreed to testify at LaCaze’s

trial in exchange for the reduction of his charge from second-degree murder to

manslaughter and a sentence of forty years’ imprisonment. The State

maintained that it knew of “no direct exculpatory evidence,” but provided as

potentially favorable evidence that Robinson initially denied involvement in the

crime and gave an alibi to a deputy. The State never disclosed, however, that it

had assured Robinson that his son would not be prosecuted if he agreed to make

a statement implicating LaCaze. 

Pursuant to his plea agreement, Robinson testified at LaCaze’s trial. 

Robinson and Michael LaCaze had been friends for over twenty years. Robinson

became close to Princess LaCaze through his friendship with her husband, and

eventually, they began having an extramarital affair. Robinson testified that

LaCaze told him that Michael LaCaze treated her badly. He explained that,

when he began his involvement with LaCaze, “nothing else mattered”; he

“couldn’t do nothing else but focus on her and she . . . just meant everything.” 

Robinson then testified that LaCaze asked him if he knew anyone who

would kill her husband, and he told her he would ask around. Finally, he agreed

to do it himself. Telephone records reflect that she called him from a pay phone

the morning of the shooting. Robinson testified that the purpose of that call was

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to confirm the plan and to coordinate when she should come home. Later that

day, Robinson went with his son, Rodney Robinson, to the LaCazes’ house. He

knocked on the door, greeted Michael LaCaze, and went back to his car to

retrieve his gun. Upon returning to the house, Robinson shot him from the

doorway.

Robinson admitted that Michael LaCaze had told him he would not go on

dialysis and had asked him to end his life about one year before the murder. He

also testified that he had witnessed him tell LaCaze that he did not want to have

surgery. In fact, another witness, Glenda Froreich, testified that Michael

LaCaze had told her five or six months prior to his death that he definitely did

not want medical attention to help him live longer. He mentioned suicide, and

he and Froreich discussed Froreich’s own attempted suicide by overdosing on

pills. He told her he did not plan to do it that way. Nonetheless, Robinson

testified that the real reason he killed Michael LaCaze was because LaCaze had

requested that he do so.

A few days after the murder, Robinson cut up the gun and scattered it

around town, throwing a piece of it in the river, which he told LaCaze. The man

LaCaze began dating shortly after Michael LaCaze’s death testified that LaCaze

told him she “wished [the police] would leave her alone,” because the “gun was

in the river.”

In its opening statement, the State told the jury that Robinson was the

most important part of its case. It asked that the jury find him credible,

explaining, “there may be some talk and there was probably some talk about

deals and he’s lying because he got a deal, well as far as I’m concerned, folks,

forty years and being seventy something years old before you get out of jail is a

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life sentence. And he’s doing time.” The prosecutor then previewed the most

important parts of Robinson’s testimony, including that LaCaze frequently asked

Robinson to kill her husband and that LaCaze knew that Robinson had cut up

the gun and thrown it in the river. In closing argument, the State again

emphasized Robinson’s credibility, saying he had “never seen anybody pour the

truth out from their soul like I saw him and you saw it too.” After the defense

emphasized Robinson’s sentencing agreement during its closing argument, the

State reiterated on rebuttal that Robinson would not have lied to obtain his

forty-year plea agreement, which was basically a life sentence. The prosecutor

said, “It’s really the rest of his natural life. And that’s the earliest he’ll get out. 

He may be seventy-six if he lives that long before he gets out. So when [the

defense] talks about [us] cutting a deal with him, that ain’t much of a deal. That

ain’t much of a deal.”

The jury found Princess LaCaze guilty of second-degree murder based on

a finding of “specific intent,” which required a showing that “the circumstances

indicate that the offender actively desired the prescribed criminal consequence

to follow from her act or failure to act.” She subsequently received a mandatory

sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of probation, parole, or

suspension of sentence. State v. LaCaze, 759 So. 2d 773, 776 (La. App. 3d Cir.

1999). On direct appeal, the Louisiana Third Circuit Court of Appeal affirmed

her conviction, id. at 789, and the Louisiana Supreme Court denied her writ of

certiorari, State v. LaCaze, 770 So. 2d 359 (La. 2000). 

LaCaze then sought post-conviction relief in state court based on the

undisclosed understanding between the prosecutor and Robinson. The trial

court denied her request, finding that the assurance Robinson received from the

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prosecutor was immaterial, but the Louisiana Third Circuit Court of Appeal

remanded the case for an evidentiary hearing. 

The trial court held two evidentiary hearings. At the first hearing,

Robinson’s attorney, Mike Bonnette, testified that he sought certain assurances

prior to Robinson’s giving his statement to the police. Bonnette was “concerned”

about Robinson’s statement “because there was a possibility of him implicating

his son.” So, before Robinson gave his statement, he received assurances from

Danny Hall, an investigator with the district attorney’s office, that his son would

not be prosecuted. LaCaze’s trial attorney then testified that, although he

requested all such information, the State never disclosed that assurance. Had

he known about the assurance, he said, he “certainly would have tried to crossexamine him on that and I would have felt that it was relevant.” Later, Hall

testified that, although he remembered meeting with Robinson and Bonnette,

he could not remember what was said but did remember that he did not make

any assurance to Robinson. At the second evidentiary hearing, Robinson

testified that, before he agreed to give a statement, he asked Danny Hall “over

and over again” that his son not be prosecuted. He testified that he probably

would not have given a statement without the assurance that his son would not

be prosecuted.

The Louisiana trial court concluded that “the evidentiary hearing

testimony proves without doubt to this Court that while the 14 year old son of

Meryland Robinson did in fact drive his father to and from the home of the

murdered victim,” the son had no part in the planning of and did not participate

in the murder, so “[t]here was nothing for the prosecutor to pin any hope of

conviction on even if charges were in fact brought against the youngster.” The

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trial court further found, however, that “Meryland Robinson did express his

concern as to whether his 14 year old son would be arrested. He was assured

that his son would not be arrested.” Nonetheless, the trial court found that

“there was no written ‘deal’” concerning Robinson’s son. The court also found

that Robinson agreed to testify because of his agreement to plead guilty to

manslaughter, not because of the assurance he received related to his son. The

trial court denied relief because “[t]he totality of the evidence [was] so

overwhelming in favor of the finding of guilty by the jury that the evidence

relating to the 14 year old young man is irrelevant.” 

LaCaze appealed that decision to the Louisiana Third Circuit Court of

Appeal, which ruled that the trial court erred in denying her application for

post-conviction relief and remanded the case for a new trial. The Louisiana

Supreme Court reversed in a two-paragraph, per curiam opinion, with two

judges noting that they “would grant [the writ] and docket.” State v. LaCaze,

947 So. 2d 716, 717 (La. 2007). The court observed that “[t]he undisclosed

revelation that the state’s main witness, [LaCaze’s] former extramarital lover,

sought protection for his young son from criminal charges arising out of the same

incident before he made a statement to the police was relevant to the witness’s

credibility as a possible motive for his testimony as a state witness at trial.” Id.

The Louisiana Supreme Court concluded, however, that LaCaze had not

satisfied the third element of the Brady analysis, materiality, for two reasons:

first, because Robinson’s agreement to plead guilty to manslaughter for a lesser

sentence was revealed to the jury, along with his criminal record, and second,

because his testimony was corroborated. Id. The court pointed to the testimony

of LaCaze’s new boyfriend, which the court characterized as testimony that

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LaCaze “told him she would evade charges because the murder weapon was

unrecoverable,” and to the defendant’s admission that she had discussed her

husband’s alleged death wish with Robinson and knew Robinson planned “to

take care of it.” Id. The court reinstated the defendant’s conviction and

sentence.

After being denied post-conviction relief by the Louisiana Supreme Court,

LaCaze sought habeas relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 in federal district

court, raising twenty-one grounds for relief. Without holding a hearing, the

magistrate judge recommended that the district court deny the writ. With

regard to the Brady claim, the magistrate judge stated that, “[w]eighed against

his criminal history alone, the fact that Robinson sought assurances from the

State that his son would not be prosecuted before he gave a statement to the

police becomes much more significant.” LaCaze v. Leger, No. 07-CV-0236, 2008

WL 1836374, at *6 (W.D. La. April 03, 2008). The magistrate judge nonetheless

determined that the assurance was not material because LaCaze “knew, from

pretrial discovery, that Robinson had pleaded guilty to the reduced charge of

manslaughter and a forty year sentence,” yet “she did not use that evidence to

impeach Robinson at trial.” Id. Had that plea agreement been revealed to the

jury, it would have rendered immaterial the non-disclosure of the assurance

shielding Robinson’s son from prosecution because that information would have

been “essentially cumulative and not material.” Id.

In a short, one-page order, the district court adopted the magistrate

judge’s report and recommendation, dismissed the petition with prejudice, and

denied a certificate of appealability. This court then granted a certificate of

appealability on two issues: (1) whether the State withheld Brady material

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concerning her co-defendant, and (2) whether the trial court unconstitutionally

denied her an impartial jury. 

II.

The Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) provides

that a federal court may not grant habeas relief after adjudication of a claim in

state court unless the adjudication “resulted in a decision that was contrary to,

or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as

determined by the Supreme Court of the United States,” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1),

or “resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of

the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding,”

§ 2254(d)(2). Clearly established federal law comprises “the holdings, as opposed

to the dicta, of [the Supreme] Court’s decisions as of the time of the relevant

state-court decision.” Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412 (2000). A state court

decision is contrary to federal law when it “identifies the correct governing legal

rule from [the Supreme Court’s] cases but unreasonably applies it to the facts of

the particular state prisoner’s case,” id. at 413, or where it “extends a legal

principle from [Supreme Court] precedent to a new context where it should not

apply or unreasonably refuses to extend that principle to a new context where

it should apply,” id. at 407. Thus, under AEDPA’s standard of review, “a federal

habeas court may not issue the writ simply because that court concludes in its

independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision applied clearly

established federal law erroneously or incorrectly. Rather, that application must

also be unreasonable.” Id. at 411. 

We review the state court’s “ultimate decision” for unreasonableness. 

Charles v. Thaler, 629 F.3d 494, 501 (5th Cir. 2011). Here, we review the

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Louisiana Supreme Court’s decision, see id., giving deference to the Louisiana

trial court’s factual findings, see Moody v. Quarterman, 476 F.3d 260, 267-68 

(5th Cir. 2007). Although we review only the ultimate legal determination by

the Louisiana Supreme Court and not whether the court provided exhaustive

reasoning to support the result, “a thorough and well-reasoned state court

opinion may be more likely to be correct and to withstand judicial review . . . .” 

Neal v. Puckett, 286 F.3d 230, 246 (5th Cir. 2002) (per curiam) (en banc).

III.

To show that the state court’s proceeding resulted in a “decision that was

contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established

Federal law,” § 2254(d)(1), LaCaze must show that the prosecution’s failure to

disclose requested impeachment evidence constituted a violation of due process

pursuant to Brady, 373 U.S. at 87, and that the state court’s application of

Brady was unreasonable. See Mahler v. Kaylo, 537 F.3d 494, 499 (5th Cir. 2008). 

LaCaze must show that (1) the prosecution suppressed evidence, (2) the evidence

was favorable to the defense, and (3) the evidence was material. Lawrence v.

Lensing, 42 F.3d 255, 257 (5th Cir. 1994). 

A.

The Louisiana trial court found that the prosecution had suppressed

evidence favorable to LaCaze, satisfying the first and second prongs of the Brady

analysis. Specifically, following an evidentiary hearing, the trial court found

that Robinson “did in fact voice his concern in the investigative stage of the case

about his son being prosecuted” and “was assured that his son would not be

arrested.” Those facts were accepted on appeal. Although the Louisiana Third

Circuit Court of Appeal reversed the trial court’s denial of the writ, it agreed

with the trial court’s findings, saying that “the State failed to disclose

information concerning the plea arrangement made with a critical witness.” 

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State v. LaCaze, KW 05-01170 (La. App. 3 Cir. 2/6/06). The Louisiana Supreme

Court, while reinstating the defendant’s conviction, stated that the prosecution

failed to disclose that “the state’s main witness, [LaCaze’s] extramarital lover,

sought protection for his young son from criminal charges arising out of the same

incident before he made a statement to the police,” which was “relevant to the

witness’s credibility as a possible motive for his testimony as a state witness at

trial.” LaCaze, 947 So. 2d at 717. We defer to the trial court’s findings, which

were accepted by both appellate courts, as we must under AEDPA. See Moody,

476 F.3d at 267-68.

Notwithstanding those findings, the State now contends that the evidence

did not need to be disclosed because Robinson and the district attorney never

actually reached a “deal.” However, the Supreme Court has never limited a

Brady violation to cases where the facts demonstrate that the state and the

witness have reached a bona fide, enforceable deal. In Napue v. Illinois, 360

U.S. 264, 270 (1959), the Supreme Court explained that the key question is not

whether the prosecutor and the witness entered into an effective agreement, but

whether the witness “might have believed that [the state] was in a position to

implement . . . any promise of consideration.” Id.; see Giglio v. United States,

405 U.S. 150, 154-55 (1972); Tassin v. Cain, 517 F.3d 770, 778 (5th Cir. 2008) (“A

promise is unnecessary.”). In fact, “evidence of any understanding or agreement

as to a future prosecution would be relevant to [the witness’s] credibility.” 

Giglio, 405 U.S. at 155. The question is “the extent to which the testimony

misled the jury, not whether the promise was indeed a promise . . . .” Tassin,

517 F.3d at 778 (citing Napue, 360 U.S. at 270). 

Here, Robinson testified that he “asked . . . over and over again” that his

son not be prosecuted, that the prosecutor gave him an assurance that he would

not be, and that Robinson believed him. Indeed, Robinson testified that he

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probably would not have given his statement implicating LaCaze if he had not

received such an assurance. Robinson’s attorney corroborated Robinson’s

testimony, saying that he had “an understanding” with the prosecutor. Thus,

the evidence demonstrates that the assurance impacted Robinson’s decision to

implicate LaCaze, regardless of whether there was any possibility Robinson’s son

would have been prosecuted without that assurance. The prosecution had a duty

to disclose it. 

B.

We now consider the question of materiality. Whether evidence is

material, for purposes of a Brady violation, is a mixed question of law and fact,

which we review de novo. Mahler, 537 F.3d at 500. We review the Louisiana

Supreme Court’s holding to determine whether “the adjudication of the claim

resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable

application of, clearly established Federal law.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1); see

Moody, 476 F.3d at 267. The Louisiana Supreme Court concluded that the

failure to disclose the assurance was immaterial because Robinson’s agreement

to plead guilty to manslaughter for a lesser sentence was revealed to the jury,

and because his testimony was corroborated by other evidence.

“[A] showing of materiality does not require demonstration by a

preponderance that disclosure of the suppressed evidence would have resulted

ultimately in the defendant’s acquittal . . . .” Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 434

(1995). Rather, the question is whether “the favorable evidence could reasonably

be taken to put the whole case in such a different light as to undermine

confidence in the verdict.” Id. at 435; see also Tassin, 517 F.3d at 780. Or, put

another way, whether the defendant “received a fair trial, understood as a trial

resulting in a verdict worthy of confidence” in the absence of the favorable

evidence. Kyles, 514 U.S at 434. “The materiality of Brady material depends

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almost entirely on the value of the evidence relative to the other evidence

mustered by the state.” Rocha v. Thaler, 619 F.3d 387, 396 (5th Cir. 2010)

(quoting United States v. Sipe, 388 F.3d 471, 478 (5th Cir. 2004) (internal

quotation marks omitted)). A Brady violation is more likely to occur when the

impeaching evidence “would seriously undermine the testimony of a key witness

on an essential issue or there is no strong corroboration.” Id. at 397.

The State primarily argues that the undisclosed agreement regarding

Robinson’s son was immaterial because Robinson’s sentencing agreement,

pursuant to which he pleaded guilty to manslaughter and received a forty-year

sentence, was disclosed to the jury. Despite its determination that the nondisclosure was relevant as a possible motive to lie, the Louisiana Supreme Court

accepted this argument, finding that it was immaterial because the “main

source” of Robinson’s bias and motivation to lie, his plea agreement, had been

disclosed. However, this is not the proper legal standard. The materiality

inquiry does not turn on which of two competing sources of bias a court, in

hindsight, determines the jury would have considered more important. Rather,

the inquiry is whether an undisclosed source of bias—even if it is not the only

source or even the “main source”—could reasonably be taken to put the whole

case in a different light. Kyles, 514 U.S. at 434-35. The Louisiana Supreme

Court neither cited nor applied that standard. 

Moreover, in Napue, 360 U.S. at 270, the United States Supreme Court

made clear that an undisclosed source of bias can be material even if it is not the

main source of bias. There, the jury knew that “someone whom [the witness]

had tentatively identified as being a public defender” had promised “to do what

he could” to reduce the witness’s sentence, but was not told that the prosecutor

had promised the same thing. Id. at 268, 270. The Court rejected the idea that

“the fact that the jury was apprised of other grounds for believing that the

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witness . . . may have had an interest in testifying against petitioner turned

what was otherwise a tainted trial into a fair one.” Id. at 270; see also Tassin,

517 F.3d at 780 (holding that the jury’s knowledge of other aggravating factors

justifying the death sentence did not render the failure to disclose exculpatory

evidence as to the other factor immaterial). Likewise, here, the argument that

relief should be denied simply because the jury knew one of two completely

unrelated bases for Robinson to lie cannot be sustained under the Supreme

Court’s precedent in Kyles and Napue. 

Therefore, applying both AEDPA and Kyles, we must consider whether

there was some other reason why the suppressed information was not material. 

At trial, the parties did not dispute that Robinson killed Michael LaCaze. Nor

did they dispute that LaCaze knew in advance that Robinson planned to kill

him. Rather, what the two sides contested, and what was integral to LaCaze’s

defense, was whether she intended for Robinson to kill him. Importantly,

Robinson’s testimony provided the only direct evidence of that intent, as the

other member of an alleged two-member conspiracy.1

Moreover, as in Tassin, the State here “capitalized on this misrepresentation in [its] 1

closing argument” by repeatedly arguing that Robinson had not received a deal that would give

him a reason to lie—which itself shows the materiality of the undisclosed deal. See Tassin,

517 F.3d at 779. In its opening statement, the State told the jury Robinson was critical to its

case. It asked that the jury find him credible, arguing that Robinson’s agreement was a de

facto life sentence and therefore not worth lying to obtain: “There may be some talk and there

was probably some talk about deals and he’s lying because he got a deal, well as far as I’m

concerned, folks, forty years and being seventy something years old before you get out of jail

is a life sentence. And he’s doing time.” In its closing argument, the State emphasized

Robinson’s credibility, saying he had “never seen anybody pour the truth out from their soul

like I saw him and you saw it too,” and then again called Robinson’s sentencing agreement

basically a life sentence on rebuttal. The State’s argument that an unrevealed deal is

immaterial after going to such lengths to emphasize Robinson’s credibility and lack of any

motives for lying at trial simply lacks force.

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In determining that the Brady evidence was not material, the Louisiana

Supreme Court then held that there was sufficient other evidence to support

LaCaze’s conviction, specifically her statement about the gun’s being in the river

and her admitted knowledge of Robinson’s intent to kill her husband, which

rendered the failure to disclose immaterial. LaCaze, 947 So. 2d at 717. Again,

the court used the wrong standard. See Kyles, 514 U.S. at 435 n.8. “[I]t is not

a sufficiency of evidence test.” Id. at 434. Rather, the state court must consider

whether the undisclosed agreement “could reasonably be taken to put the whole

case in such a different light as to undermine confidence in the verdict.” Id. at 2

435. Using that standard, the undisclosed assurance, which the court held was

“relevant” and “a possible motive” for his testimony, LaCaze, 947 So. 2d at 717,

was material. 

Robinson’s testimony was the only direct evidence presented by the State

to show a critical element: LaCaze’s intent to have her husband killed. LaCaze’s

own statements—particularly those in which she admitted she knew Robinson

intended to kill her husband and did nothing to stop it—are damaging, but they

do not establish the requisite mens rea to commit the crime. Knowledge does not

equal intent. See State v. Wiley, 672 So. 2d 185, 187-88 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1996). 

In fact, LaCaze’s statements were consistent with her defense at trial that

Michael LaCaze requested that Robinson kill him, whichshe admitted she knew. 

Further, the testimony by LaCaze’s new boyfriend did not establish her intent,

Although its analysis more closely approximated a sufficiency of the evidence 2

standard, the Louisiana Supreme Court stated the standard as follows: “Evidence is material

[and reversal warranted] only if it is reasonably probable that the result of the proceeding

would have been different had the evidence been disclosed to the defense. A reasonable

probability is one which is sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” But even that

standard, which requires that the evidence probably undermined the result, is not the same

as the lesser standard in Kyles, which requires only that the evidence could have undermined

the result. 

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as the court determined. After-the-fact acknowledgment that she knew where

the murderer hid the murder weapon does not establish her specific intent. See

id.

This case bears a striking resemblance to Tassin, 517 F.3d at 780, in which

this court granted habeas relief based on a Brady violation. There, as here, the

government’s key witness—the only witness testifying to the defendant’s

intent—had received “an understanding” of leniency that the prosecution failed

to disclose. Id. at 779-80. The government’s theory of the case was that

Georgina and Robert Tassin had conspired to commit armed robbery and had

killed the victim in the course of the robbery. As the only other member of the

two-member conspiracy, Georgina’s testimony was “crucial” to the jury’s finding

that Robert had intended to commit armed robbery. If the jury had known of the

prosecutor’s assurance that it would seek a favorable sentence for Georgina, it

“may have chosen to believe Robert’s story over [Georgina’s].” Id. at 780-81. 

Indeed, the court found it “most important[]” that the state capitalized on the

non-disclosure when it argued to the jury that the witness had no reason to lie. 

Id. at 779. Given the absence of evidence supporting the government’s theory

of the case and corroborating Georgina’s testimony, the court found that the nondisclosure was material and granted the writ. 

Likewise, here, Robinson’s testimony was the only direct evidence of

LaCaze’s intent, and disclosure of his bias to the jury might have put the whole

case in a different light. In its opening statement, closing argument, and

rebuttal, the State argued that Robinson had no reason to lie. In circumstances

like these, where “the jury’s estimate of the truthfulness and reliability of [the

witness] may well be determinative of guilt or innocence,” the failure to disclose

Brady information is material. Napue, 360 U.S. at 269; see also Mahler, 537

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F.3d at 503. As in Tassin, the state court’s determination to the contrary was

an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law.

IV.

This case raises a reasonable probability that disclosure of the agreement

between the prosecution and Robinson would have produced a different result. 

Kyles, 514 U.S. at 435. Based on our disposition of LaCaze’s Brady claim, we

need not consider the merits of her claim pursuant to Ross v. Oklahoma, 487

U.S. 81 (1988). We reverse and remand with instruction to grant the writ under

whatever conditions the district court may set. 

REVERSED and REMANDED.

17

Case: 08-30477 Document: 00511524682 Page: 17 Date Filed: 06/29/2011