Filed 12/8/20

CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

THE NORTH RIVER INSURANCE 

COMPANY et al.,

Defendants and Appellants.

F080749

(Super. Ct. No. 1489891)

OPINION

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Stanislaus County. Dawna F. 

Reeves, Judge.

Jefferson T. Stamp for Defendants and Appellants. 

Thomas E. Boze, County Counsel, and Robert J. Taro, Assistant County Counsel, 

for Plaintiff and Respondent. 

-ooOoo-
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Bad Boys Bail Bonds, acting as the agent for The North River Insurance Company 

(collectively, Surety) posted a $30,000 bail bond for the release of criminal defendant 

Gabriel Fontes Rivadeneyra from custody. When Gabriel failed to appear for a scheduled 

hearing, the trial court ordered bail forfeited and later entered summary judgment on the 

bond. In this appeal, Surety contends the trial court erred in denying its motion to vacate 

the void summary judgment.

Surety’s claim of reversible error contains multiple steps. First, Surety makes the 

factual assertion that Gabriel did not appear at the hearing because his visa expired and 

he returned to Mexico to get it renewed, rather than staying in the United States and 

violating federal law. Second, under Surety’s view of Penal Code section 1305, 

subdivision (a),1these facts constitute a “sufficient excuse” for Gabriel’s nonappearance. 

Third, based on the Supreme Court’s description of “the lack of a sufficient excuse for 

the defendant’s nonappearance” as one of the two “jurisdictional prerequisites” that 

“must be met before the trial court may declare a forfeiture” of bail (People v. Safety 

National Casualty Corp. (2016) 62 Cal.4th 703, 710, italics added (Safety National)), 

Surety contends the trial court lacked the jurisdiction necessary to validly declare the bail 

bond forfeited. Fourth, Surety contends this lack of jurisdiction was an absence of 

“fundamental” jurisdiction. Fifth, the absence of fundamental jurisdiction caused the 

order declaring bail forfeited to be void and, thus, the later entered summary judgment 

also was void, not merely voidable. Sixth, because the summary judgment was void, it 

can be collaterally attacked at any time and this court’s earlier affirmance of the summary 

judgment did not render it unassailable. (See People v. The North River Insurance 

Company (July 24, 2019, F075353) [nonpub. opn. affirming summary judgment].) 

For purposes of this appeal, we assume without deciding that (1) Gabriel had a 

“sufficient excuse” for not appearing at the scheduled hearing (§ 1305, subd. (a)) and (2) 

1 All unlabeled references to a statutory provision are to the Penal Code. 
3

the trial court lacked what our Supreme Court described as a “jurisdictional prerequisite” 

to declaring a forfeiture of bail. (Safety National, supra, 62 Cal.4th at p. 710.) We 

publish this opinion to set forth our interpretation of what the Supreme Court meant when 

it referred to the absence of a sufficient excuse as a jurisdictional prerequisite. The 

modifier “jurisdictional” might have referred to jurisdiction in a “fundamental” sense. 

(See People v. American Contractors Indemnity Co. (2004) 33 Cal.4th 653, 660–663 

(American Contractors) [two types of jurisdictional errors: (1) acts done when lacking 

jurisdiction in a fundamental sense and (2) acts in excess of jurisdiction when the court 

has fundamental jurisdiction].) Alternatively, it might have meant the missing 

prerequisite would cause the act of declaring a forfeiture to be “in excess of” the trial 

court’s jurisdiction. (Ibid.) We adopt the latter interpretation and conclude the trial court 

had fundamental jurisdiction because, when it declared the forfeiture of bail, the court 

had subject matter jurisdiction over the bail bond and forfeiture proceeding and had 

personal jurisdiction over Surety. As a result, the order declaring the forfeiture of bail 

was, at most, an act in excess of the statutory authority conferred by section 1305, 

subdivision (a). Consequently, the forfeiture order was not void and the subsequently 

entered summary judgment was not void.

We therefore affirm the judgment.

FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS

In July 2015, Gabriel Fontes Rivadeneyra was charged with felony counts of 

battery inflicting serious bodily injury (§ 243, subd. (d)) and assault likely to produce 

great bodily injury (§ 245, subd. (a)(4)), both with enhancements (§ 12022.7, subd. (a)). 

At a hearing held on August 3, 2015, Gabriel waived time for the preliminary hearing and 

his bail was reduced to $30,000. 
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On August 5, 2015, Surety posted a bail bond in the amount of $30,000 for 

Gabriel’s release. The bond stated Gabriel’s first court appearance was on August 10, 

2015, at 8:30 a.m. Gabriel made that appearance. 

On October 20, 2015, Gabriel and his two codefendants appeared for day three of 

the preliminary hearing. The court set day four for October 22, 2015, and directed the 

defendants appear. The case was not called on that date and the next appearance date 

was November 5, 2015. 

Nonappearance and Forfeiture

On November 5, 2015, Gabriel and the codefendants failed to appear for 

arraignment. The trial court noted Gabriel and his codefendants normally were at the 

court before him and were “usually waiting in the hallway when I come, and I believe 

that they were probably traveling from out of town.” On the question of whether 

forfeiture was required that day, the court stated on the record: “I think I can find good 

cause not to forfeit the bail bond and stay the warrant, and then I can order them to be 

present on the next court date and then forfeit the bail if they are not here. That gives 

them two weeks to get here before their bail bondsman starts to make phone calls and do 

things to property.” The court also ordered the information filed, issued a stayed bench 

warrant in the amount of $100,500, and continued the hearing to November 20, 2015. 

On November 20, 2015, defendants again failed to appear. At the hearing, the 

attorneys representing Gabriel and his codefendants told the court the defendants’ visas 

were set to expire, defendants’ efforts to extend or renew the visas had failed, defendants 

returned to Mexico to avoid violating federal immigration law, and defendants were 

working with the Mexican consulate to get new visas so they could return to California 

and contest the criminal charges. The information provided by the attorneys is not 

described in detail here because we assume the information established Gabriel has a 

sufficient excuse for not appearing at the hearing.
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After hearing from the attorneys, the trial court lifted the stay on the previously 

issued warrants and stated in open court that “each defendants’ bail bond is forfeited.” 

The clerk of the court mailed a timely notice of forfeiture of Gabriel’s bail bond to 

Surety. In June 2016, Surety filed a motion for an extension of the appearance period 

pursuant to section 1305.4. The trial court granted the unopposed motion and extended 

Surety’s deadline for returning defendants to custody to December 14, 2016. 

Motion to Vacate Forfeiture

On December 14, 2016, Surety filed a motion to vacate the forfeiture and 

exonerate bail. As alternatives, the motion requested the tolling of time under section 

1305, subdivision (h) or the extension of time under section 1305.4. Surety argued, 

among other things, (1) the trial court’s order extending the appearance period did not 

comply with section 1305.4 and (2) the district attorney’s delay in deciding not to attempt 

to extradite Gabriel from Mexico violated due process. 

In January 2017, after County’s opposition and Surety’s reply papers were filed, 

the trial court heard oral argument and took the case under submission. On February 10, 

2017, the court issued its ruling from the bench. The court denied the motion to 

exonerate the bond, finding “it was not feasible to extradite any of the three defendants in 

the case.” On February 27, 2017, the trial court entered summary judgment on Gabriel’s 

bail bond. Surety filed a timely appeal. 

First Appeal

Our unpublished opinion of July 24, 2019, concluded the trial court’s extension of 

the appearance period for 152 days and setting its expiration at December 14, 2016, was 

within the discretionary authority granted by section 1305.4 and, therefore, the court did 

not violate the statute. (People v. The North River Insurance Company (Jul. 24, 2019, 

F075353) [nonpub. opn.].) On the procedural due process claim, we applied a threefactor balancing test and concluded due process does not require prosecuting agencies to 
6

notify sureties and bail agents during the appearance period of (1) the agency’s 

determination that extradition is not feasible or (2) the agency’s rationale for that 

determination. Based on these conclusions, we affirmed the summary judgment granted 

on Gabriel’s bail bond. Remittitur was issued in September 2019. 

Surety’s Second Motion and Appeal

In October 2019, Surety filed a motion to vacate the summary judgment entered 

on the forfeited bond, vacate the forfeiture, and exonerate the bond. Surety argued the 

trial court was presented with a sufficient excuse for defendants’ absence on November 

20, 2015, and, therefore, a jurisdictional prerequisite for forfeiture was not satisfied. 

Surety further argued that the lack of jurisdiction rendered the forfeiture and ensuing 

summary judgment void and therefore subject to collateral attack. 

In January 2020, the trial court held a hearing on the motion to vacate the 

summary judgment. At the start of the hearing, the court stated the summary judgment 

had been heard and ruled on in the trial court and the appellate court and then asked 

Surety’s counsel, “Why are we here again?” Counsel stated the issue being presented 

was not the same as the issue litigated in the previous motion. The court acknowledged a 

different argument was being made, but the broader issue of setting aside the summary 

judgment already had been decided. Surety’s counsel then argued that when a 

jurisdictional issue is being raised by a party to the forfeiture, the jurisdictional issue is 

not cancelled by the prior ruling and res judicata would not bar the jurisdictional issue 

from being raised. Counsel for County argued the appellate court’s unqualified 

affirmance in July 2019 caused the trial court to lose all jurisdiction to reopen the case. 

The trial court concluded the hearing by stating: “I don’t see that I have 

jurisdiction and for that reason I’m not going to rehear it. I believe that this Court no 

longer has jurisdiction over the bail issue and the summary judgment issue that I ruled on 
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previously[,] so I’m not hearing it again.” The court’s minute order stated Surety’s 

motion was denied and the “Court does not have jurisdiction.” 

In February 2020, Surety appealed. “An order denying a motion to set aside 

summary judgment on a bail bond forfeiture is an appealable order.” (People v. 

Accredited Surety Casualty Co. (2014) 230 Cal.App.4th 548, 554.)

DISCUSSION

I. Overview of Bail Forfeiture Statutes

A. The Contract

“While bail bond proceedings occur in connection with criminal prosecutions, 

they are independent from and collateral to the prosecutions and are civil in nature. 

[Citation.] ‘The object of bail and its forfeiture is to insure the attendance of the accused 

and his obedience to the orders and judgment of the court.’ ” (American Contractors, 

supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 657.) 

Bail bonds are regarded as contracts between the government and the surety. 

(American Contractors, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 657.) Nonetheless, the forfeiture and 

exoneration of bail bonds is a statutory procedure governed by the Penal Code. The 

statutory procedure for summary judgment was explicitly incorporated into Gabriel’s bail 

bond, which stated: “If the forfeiture of this bond be ordered by the Court, judgment may 

be summarily made and entered forthwith ... as provided by Sections 1305 and 1306 of 

the Penal Code.” 

B. Forfeiture of Bail

The forfeiture of bail is addressed in section 1305, which provides in relevant part: 

“(a)(1) A court shall in open court declare forfeited the undertaking of bail or the money 

or property deposited as bail if, without sufficient excuse, a defendant fails to appear for 

any of the following: [¶] (A) Arraignment. [¶] (B) Trial. [¶] (C) Judgment. [¶] (D) Any 

other occasion prior to the pronouncement of judgment if the defendant’s presence in 
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court is lawfully required. [¶] (E) To surrender himself or herself in execution of the 

judgment after appeal.” (Italics added.) Generally, “[i]f the court fails to declare a 

forfeiture at the time of the defendant’s unexcused absence, it is without jurisdiction to do 

so later.” (Safety National, supra, 62 Cal.4th at p. 710; People v. United Bonding Ins. 

Co. (1971) 5 Cal.3d 898, 907 [“trial court was under a compulsion to ‘thereupon’ declare 

a forfeiture”].)

The general rule that forfeiture must be declared in open court at the time of a 

defendant’s unexcused absence is subject to an exception. Section 1305.1 provides: “If 

the defendant fails to appear ... upon any ... occasion when his or her appearance is 

lawfully required, but the court has reason to believe that sufficient excuse may exist for 

the failure to appear, the court may continue the case for a period it deems reasonable to 

enable the defendant to appear without ordering a forfeiture of bail or issuing a bench 

warrant. [¶] If, after the court has made the order, the defendant, without sufficient 

excuse, fails to appear on or before the continuance date set by the court, the bail shall be 

forfeited and a warrant for the defendant’s arrest may be ordered issued.” Here, the trial 

court invoked this discretionary authority when it continued the November 5, 2015 

hearing to November 20, 2015, to give Gabriel and his codefendants an opportunity to 

appear. 

Whether there is a sufficient excuse for a defendant’s failure to appear “will 

depend upon the circumstances in the individual case.” (People v. United Bonding Ins. 

Co., supra, 5 Cal.3d at p. 906.) Determining what constitutes a sufficient excuse in a 

particular case “rests within the sound discretion of the trial judge.” (Id. at pp. 906–907.) 

“[A] defendant’s failure to appear without explanation is presumptively without sufficient 

excuse and the burden of rebutting such presumption rests with the defendant’s 

representatives or those who are interested in avoiding a forfeiture.” (Id. at p. 907.) 
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Furthermore, “[a] nonappearance once excused does not constitute an excuse for 

subsequent nonappearances.” (Ibid.) 

C. Procedures After Forfeiture

After the trial court has declared a forfeiture of bail in open court, “the clerk of the 

court shall, within 30 days of the forfeiture, mail notice of the forfeiture to the surety [and 

bail agent].” (§ 1305, subd. (b)(1).) The surety shall be released of all obligations under 

the bond if the clerk fails to mail the notice of forfeiture in accordance with section 1305 

within 30 days after the entry of the forfeiture. (§ 1305, subd. (b)(3).)

The bail statute provides sureties with an appearance period in which to either 

produce the criminal defendant in court and have the forfeiture set aside, or demonstrate 

other circumstances requiring the court to vacate the forfeiture. (American Contractors, 

supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 657.) For a bond exceeding $400, the appearance period is 185 

days (180 days, plus five days for service by mail). (§ 1305, subds. (b)(1), (c)(1);

American Contractors, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 658.) On the surety’s motion and a 

showing of good cause, the court may extend the appearance period for up to an 

additional 180 days. (§ 1305.4.) Here, Surety filed such a motion and the court extended 

the appearance period through December 14, 2016. 

“When any bond is forfeited and the period of time specified in Section 1305 has 

elapsed without the forfeiture having been set aside, the court which has declared the 

forfeiture shall enter a summary judgment against each bondsman named in the bond in 

the amount for which the bondsman is bound.” (§ 1306, subd. (a).) “If ... summary 

judgment is not entered within 90 days after the date upon which it may first be entered, 

the right to do so expires and the bail is exonerated.” (§ 1306, subd. (c).) In this case, the 

February 2017 summary judgment was entered during the 90-day period and, thus, the 

timing of its entry is not in question.
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When a summary judgment is “entered ‘in excess of jurisdiction,’ ” it is voidable 

and should be challenged directly. (People v. Allegheny Casualty Co. (2007) 41 Cal.4th 

704, 716, fn. 7.) Voidable judgments, including summary judgments on bail bonds, 

“generally [are] not subject to collateral attack once the judgment is final unless ‘unusual 

circumstances were present which prevented an earlier[, timely] attack.’ ” (American 

Contractors, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 661.) In contrast, “a collateral attack on a final 

judgment may be made at any time when the judgment under challenge is void because of 

an absence of ‘fundamental jurisdiction.’ ” (Allegheny Casualty, supra, at p. 716, fn. 7.) 

Here, Surety cites the foregoing principle as the basis for its second challenge to the 

February 2017 summary judgment, arguing the second challenge is not time-barred 

because the judgment is void due to an absence of fundamental jurisdiction. 

II. Fundamental Jurisdiction

Section 1305, subdivision (a) has been interpreted by our Supreme Court to 

contain “two jurisdictional prerequisites—specifically, the defendant’s failure to appear 

at an enumerated proceeding or on another occasion as ‘lawfully required,’ and the lack 

of a sufficient excuse for the defendant’s nonappearance.” (Safety National, supra, 62 

Cal.4th at p. 710, italics added.) Each prerequisite “must be met before the trial court 

may declare a forfeiture.” (Ibid.) 

A. Contentions

Surety asserts the information about Gabriel’s expired visa and the difficulties in 

getting it renewed presented at the November 2015 hearings requires this court to find 

that sufficient excuse was established as a matter of law. (See § 1305, subd. (a)(1) [court 

shall declare bail bond forfeited “if, without sufficient excuse, a defendant fails to 

appear”].) Next, based on the existence of a sufficient excuse for Gabriel’s 

nonappearance on November 20, 2015, Surety contends the trial court lacked one of the 
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“jurisdictional prerequisites” identified in Safety National and the absence of the 

prerequisite deprived the court of jurisdiction in a fundamental sense.

Surety’s arguments present the legal question of how to interpret the term 

“jurisdictional prerequisite” used by our Supreme Court to describe the lack of a 

sufficient excuse for the defendant’s nonappearance. (Safety National, supra, 62 Cal.4th 

at p. 710; cf. Silverbrand v. County of Los Angeles (2009) 46 Cal.4th 106, 113 [“the filing 

of a timely notice of appeal is a jurisdictional prerequisite”; without it, the appellate 

court must dismiss the appeal], italics added.) We have located, and the parties have 

cited, no published decision deciding whether Safety National used the modifier 

“jurisdictional” in the term “jurisdictional prerequisite” to refer to fundamental

jurisdiction. Accordingly, Surety’s contention presents a question of first impression 

involving the interpretation of a California Supreme Court opinion. 

As described below, we resolve this novel legal question by concluding the term 

“jurisdictional prerequisite” does not refer to jurisdiction in a fundamental sense. (Safety 

National, supra, 62 Cal.4th at p. 710.) Instead, it refers to a statutory condition, the 

absence of which would cause an order declaring the forfeiture of bail to be merely an act 

in excess of the court’s jurisdiction—that is, the power or authority granted to the court 

by the terms of the bail bond and section 1305. 

B. Types of Jurisdictional Errors

Our analysis of what our Supreme Court meant when it used the modifier 

“jurisdictional” to describe section 1305’s prerequisites to forfeiture begins with the basic 

principle that “jurisdictional errors are of two types.” (American Contractors, supra, 33 

Cal.4th at p. 660.) “ ‘Lack of jurisdiction in its most fundamental or strict sense means 

an entire absence of power to hear or determine the case, an absence of authority over the 

subject matter or the parties.’ [Citation.] When a court lacks jurisdiction in a 
12

fundamental sense, an ensuing judgment is void, and ‘thus vulnerable to direct or 

collateral attack at any time.’” (Ibid.) 

Because there are two types of jurisdictional errors, use of the phrase “lack of 

jurisdiction” encompasses more than the lack of jurisdiction in a fundamental sense. 

(American Contractors, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 661.) The phrase “lack of jurisdiction” 

also describes a situation “ ‘where, though the court has jurisdiction over the subject 

matter and the parties in the fundamental sense, it has no “jurisdiction” (or power) to act 

except in a particular manner, or to give certain kinds of relief, or to act without the 

occurrence of certain procedural prerequisites.’ [Citation.] ‘ “[W]hen a statute 

authorizes [a] prescribed procedure, and the court acts contrary to the authority thus 

conferred, it has exceeded its jurisdiction.” ’ [Citation.] When a court has fundamental 

jurisdiction, but acts in excess of its jurisdiction, its act or judgment is merely voidable. 

[Citations.] That is, its act or judgment is valid until it is set aside, and a party may be 

precluded from setting it aside by ‘principles of estoppel, disfavor of collateral attack or 

res judicata.’ [Citation.] Errors which are merely in excess of jurisdiction should be 

challenged directly, for example by motion to vacate the judgment, or on appeal, and are 

generally not subject to collateral attack once the judgment is final unless ‘unusual 

circumstances were present which prevented an earlier and more appropriate attack.’” 

(American Contractors, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 661.) 

A summary of the two types of jurisdictional errors was provided in In re 

Marriage of Goddard (2004) 33 Cal.4th 49, where the Supreme Court stated: “A court 

can lack fundamental authority over the subject matter, question presented, or party, 

making its judgment void, or it can merely act in excess of its jurisdiction or defined 

power, rendering the judgment voidable.” (Id. at p. 56.) Thus, fundamental jurisdiction 

is the power to hear and determine and it necessarily includes the power to decide a 
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question wrong as well as right. (REO Broadcasting Consultants v. Martin (1999) 69 

Cal.App.4th 489, 501.) 

C. Determining the Sufficiency of an Excuse and Declaring a Forfeiture

American Contractors, supra, 33 Cal.4th 653, demonstrates how courts analyze 

and decide whether an error is jurisdictional in a fundamental sense. In that case, the trial 

court entered a summary judgment on a forfeited bail bond on the last day of the 

appearance period. (Id. at p. 659.) The judgment was premature—that is contrary to the 

statute requiring summary judgment to be entered within a 90-day period after the 

appearance period has elapsed. (§ 1306, subds. (a), (c).) The issues considered in 

American Contractors were whether the premature entry rendered the judgment voidable

or void and, if it was merely voidable, whether the judgment was subject to collateral 

attack long after it became final. (American Contractors, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 660.) 

The answer to the first issue about whether the judgment was void or voidable depended 

upon whether the trial court’s failure to comply with section 1306’s timing provision 

deprived the court of jurisdiction in a fundamental sense. (American Contractors, supra, 

33 Cal.4th at pp. 662–663.) To decide this issue, the court “look[ed] first to the language 

of the statute.” (Id. at p. 661; In re Marriage of Goddard, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 54 [to 

determine whether the failure to comply with a statute “is jurisdictional, we begin with 

the language of the statute”].) 

Sections 1305 and 1306 expressly provide that in certain specified circumstances, 

the surety is released of all obligations or the bond is exonerated. (American 

Contractors, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 661; see §§ 1305, subd. (b)(1), 1306, subd. (c).) In 

comparison, there is no similar statutory provision declaring the surety released or the 

bond exonerated by the premature entry of a summary judgment. (American 

Contractors, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 662.) Based on what sections 1305 and 1306 said 

and did not say, the Supreme Court concluded the failure “to follow the procedural 
14

requirements to enter judgment properly did not affect the court’s statutory control and 

jurisdiction over the bond.” (American Contractors, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 662.) 

Accordingly, the court held the trial “court’s failure to comply with section 1306 by 

prematurely entering summary judgment ‘does not effect a fundamental loss of 

jurisdiction, i.e., “an entire absence of power to hear or determine the case, an absence of 

authority over the subject matter of the parties” ’ ” (Ibid.) Thus, the prematurely entered 

“summary judgment was voidable, not void.” (Id. at p. 663.) To summarize, American 

Contractors provides an example of a failure to comply with a requirement of the bail 

forfeiture statute that did not cause a loss of fundamental jurisdiction. 

In this appeal, we employ the approach used in American Contractors and first 

examine the language in sections 1305 or 1306 to see if they state the consequences of 

declaring a forfeiture of bail despite the existence of a sufficient excuse for the 

defendant’s nonappearance. Neither section states the consequences of this particular 

failure to comply with the statutory provisions governing the forfeiture of bail. The 

absence of a specific statutory provision leads us to conclude that a trial court’s failure to 

comply with section 1305 by declaring a forfeiture of bail when a sufficient excuse exists 

for the defendant’s nonappearance does not negate the court’s fundamental jurisdiction. 

(See American Contractors, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 662.) In short, when the trial court 

decided to declare a forfeiture, it had the authority to hear and determine the forfeiture 

issue and its order declaring the forfeiture was, at most, an act in excess of its statutory 

power. Accordingly, we interpret the term “jurisdictional prerequisites” used in Safety 

National to describe the statutory conditions set forth in section 1305, subdivision (a) to 

mean the criteria used to determine whether the court acted within, or in excess of, its 

authority or power. In other words, the modifier “jurisdictional” does not refer to 

jurisdiction in a fundamental sense. Accordingly, for purposes of section 1305, 

subdivision (a), the term “jurisdictional prerequisites” is the equivalent of the term 
15

“statutory prerequisites.” (See e.g., Rosenthal v. Great Western Fin. Securities Corp.

(1996) 14 Cal.4th 394, 413-414 [existence of a valid arbitration “agreement is a statutory 

prerequisite to granting the petition” to compel arbitration].) 

The question of fundamental jurisdiction also can be addressed chronologically by 

identifying when a court obtains (1) subject matter jurisdiction and (2) personal 

jurisdiction. As to personal jurisdiction over Surety, the trial court obtains that type of 

jurisdiction once the surety posts its bond. (People v. North River Ins. Co. (2020) 48 

Cal.App.5th 226, 234.) As to subject matter jurisdiction, in American Contractors the 

Supreme Court accepted the People’s observation that “ ‘a court has jurisdiction over a 

bail bond from the point it is issued until the point it is either satisfied, exonerated, or 

time expires to enter summary judgment after forfeiture.’ ” (American Contractors, 

supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 663.) This subject matter jurisdiction arises from the terms of the 

bail bond contract and section 1305, which authorize the trial court to determine whether 

the statutory prerequisites for the forfeiture of bail exist and to declare a forfeiture of bail 

if those prerequisites are satisfied. Consequently, the trial court had the fundamental 

jurisdiction to consider the forfeiture question and decide it, which necessarily includes 

the power to decide, rightly or wrongly, the question whether there was a sufficient 

excuse for defendant’s nonappearance. (See REO Broadcasting Consultants v. Martin, 

supra, 69 Cal.App.4th 489, 501.) 

D. Exceptional Circumstances

Next, we consider the possibility that the February 2017 summary judgment is 

subject to a collateral attack despite being, at most, voidable. Surety’s opening brief does 

not argue exceptional circumstances precluded it from raising the existence of a sufficient 

excuse earlier. Indeed, in this appeal Surety argued the trial court had enough evidence 

before it in November 2015 to determine a sufficient excuse existed for Gabriel’s failure 

to appear. That evidence was available to Surety in December 2106 when it filed a 
16

timely motion to vacate the forfeiture and exonerate bail. Consequently, we conclude 

Surety was not prevented from raising the existence of a sufficient excuse in a timely 

motion to vacate the forfeiture and no exceptional circumstances exist to render the 

February 2017 summary judgment subject to collateral attack. As a result, Surety’s 

second challenge to that judgment must fail. (American Contractors, supra, 33 Cal.4th at 

pp. 663, 665 [voidable judgment was not subject to collateral attack because the surety 

had the means to challenge the judgment earlier].)

To summarize, (1) the trial court had fundamental jurisdiction when it declared the 

forfeiture, (2) the long-final summary judgment was not void, and (3) the summary 

judgment is not subject to collateral attack. 

DISPOSITION

The summary judgment is affirmed. Respondent shall recover its costs on appeal.

SMITH, J.

WE CONCUR:

FRANSON, A.P.J.

SNAUFFER, J.