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Filed 12/19/22 Cronin v. Pacific Gas & Electric Co. CA1/5

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for 

publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or 

ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. 

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FIVE

ADAM CRONIN,

Plaintiff and Appellant,

v.

PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC

COMPANY,

Defendant and Respondent.

 A162715

 (City and County of San

 Francisco Super Ct.

 No. CGC18567919)

Appellant Adam Cronin appeals from a trial court order granting 

respondent Pacific Gas and Electric Company’s motion for summary 

judgment as to four causes of action in appellant’s employment 

discrimination suit.1 According to appellant, there remain triable issues of 

material fact related to respondent’s termination of appellant’s employment, 

an act alleged by appellant to have violated the California Family Rights Act 

(CFRA), the Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA), Labor Code2 section 

432.7, and public policy. We find no such issues in the record and affirm the 

judgment accordingly.

1 The order also granted summary judgment as to another cause of 

action not at issue in this appeal.

2 All subsequent references to statute are to the Labor Code, unless 

otherwise noted.
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I. BACKGROUND

In February 2017, appellant was working for respondent as a programs

manager when he filed an internal discrimination claim against supervisor 

Alan Jones and Jones’s manager, Earle Davis. The complaint alleged that by 

promoting a less qualified person and denying an appeal of an unfavorable 

performance assessment, Jones and Davis had discriminated against 

appellant for exercising his rights under CFRA. Davis subsequently became 

aware of appellant’s intent to file complaints with the Department of Fair 

Employment and Housing3 on the same grounds. 

The next month, respondent’s corporate security department began an 

investigation arising from allegations in a criminal complaint filed against 

appellant in Solano County Superior Court. Those allegations suggested that 

appellant might have violated respondent’s Code of Conduct by tampering 

with an electricity meter without authorization. When respondent’s 

corporate investigator Kevin Griswold attended appellant’s arraignment, he 

heard the superior court judge order appellant to stay away from a certain 

address. In the course of his investigation, Griswold learned that the address 

was home to appellant’s ex-girlfriend, who accused appellant of entering her 

property without permission, severing two electricity meters, and throwing 

them in a ditch outside. 

Appellant denied vandalizing the meters. When police found 

appellant’s fingerprints on them, appellant claimed to have been “helping 

with” the meters at an earlier time in order to address a potential safety 

hazard. In an interview with Griswold, appellant repeated that claim, saying 

that he “removed the meters a couple of weeks before the vandalism” incident 

3 Effective June 30, 2022 the Department of Fair Employment and 

Housing was renamed the Civil Rights Department. (Stats. 2022, ch. 48, § 4.)
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in order to look for burn marks consistent with a connection issue in the 

meter socket. Respondent’s Code of Conduct advises employees not to 

“install, rearrange, remove, or tamper with company metering or service 

equipment without proper approval and authorization,” but no work order 

was ever issued for appellant’s removal of his ex-girlfriend’s meters. 

Griswold wrote a report summarizing the findings of his investigation 

and referring to a separate “crime report prepared by the Solano County 

Sheriff’s Office” in relation to the vandalism incident. Griswold’s report 

concludes that even if appellant’s claims were true, his admitted actions 

“would still have been a violation of the . . . Code of Conduct.” The same 

report featured prominently in a meeting held in early May by Vice President 

of Customer Operations Scott Sanford, who reviewed the report’s contents 

and discussed them with Davis and corporate security personnel. Sanford 

decided to terminate appellant’s employment based on his admitted removal 

of electrical meters in violation of the Code of Conduct. 

After receiving notice of his termination, appellant filed the 

employment discrimination suit at issue here. Respondent moved for 

summary judgment, which was granted on April 21, 2021. This appeal 

followed.

II. DISCUSSION

A. Standard of Review

“ ‘A trial court properly grants a motion for summary judgment where 

“all the papers submitted show that there is no triable issue as to any 

material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter 

of law.” (Code Civ. Proc. § 437c, subd. (c).) “Because this case comes before 

us after the trial court granted a motion for summary judgment, we take the 

facts from the record that was before the trial court when it ruled on that 
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motion. [Citation.] ‘ “We review the trial court’s decision de novo, 

considering all the evidence set forth in the moving and opposing papers 

except that to which objections were made and sustained.” ’ [Citation.] We 

liberally construe the evidence in support of the party opposing summary 

judgment and resolve doubts concerning the evidence in favor of that 

party.” ’ ” (Hampton v. County of San Diego (2015) 62 Cal.4th 340, 347, 

quoting Hartford Casualty Ins. Co. v. Swift Distribution, Inc. (2014) 59 

Cal.4th 277, 286.)

However, “[w]e need not concern ourselves with the trial court’s 

reasons for granting summary judgment.” (Le Bourgeois v. Fireplace Mfg.

(1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 1049, 1057, fn. 10.) “ ‘[W]here there is no genuine 

issue of material fact, the appellate court should affirm the judgment of the 

trial court if it is correct on any theory of law applicable to the case, including 

but not limited to the theory adopted by the trial court. [Citations.] Thus, we 

must affirm so long as any of the grounds urged by [the moving party], either 

here or in the trial court, entitles it to summary judgment.’ ” (Ibid., quoting 

Western Mutual Ins. Co. v. Yamamoto (1994) 29 Cal.App.4th 1474, 1481.)4

B. First and Second Causes of Action (Violation of CFRA and 

FEHA)

In his first cause of action, appellant alleged that his termination of 

employment was a “violation of FEHA/CFRA” insofar as it interfered with his 

rights to family care and medical leave under Government Code section 

12945.2. In his second cause of action, appellant alleged that the termination 

violated FEHA by both discriminating and retaliating against him for 

availing himself of the same leave. For the purposes of both causes of action, 

4 We therefore pass over appellant’s insistence that the trial court’s 

order was “based on ‘confus[ion]’” or “ignor[ance].” Even if it were, that would 

be irrelevant to the inquiry here.
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appellant contended that the “reasons given” for the termination were 

“pretextual.” 

“In an employment discrimination case, an employer may move for 

summary judgment against a discrimination cause of action with evidence of 

a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse employment action.

[Citation.] A legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason is one that is unrelated to 

prohibited bias and that, if true, would preclude a finding of discrimination.

[Citation.] The employer’s evidence must be sufficient to allow the trier of 

fact to conclude that it is more likely than not that one or more legitimate, 

nondiscriminatory reasons were the sole basis for the adverse employment 

action.” (Featherstone v. Southern California Permanente Medical Group

(2017) 10 Cal.App.5th 1150, 1158 (Featherstone).)

“By presenting such evidence, the employer shifts the burden to the 

plaintiff to present evidence that the employer's decision was motivated at 

least in part by prohibited discrimination. [Citation.] The plaintiff's evidence 

must be sufficient to support a reasonable inference that discrimination was 

a substantial motivating factor in the decision. [Citation.] The stronger the 

employer’s showing of a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason, the stronger 

the plaintiff’s evidence must be in order to create a reasonable inference of a 

discriminatory motive.” (Featherstone, supra, 10 Cal.App.5th at 

pp. 1158–1159.)

Here, respondent moved for summary judgment with evidence showing 

that appellant “was terminated for admittedly violating the PG&E Employee 

Code of Conduct, specifically the provision stating: ‘Don’t install, rearrange, 

remove, or tamper with company metering or service equipment without 

proper approval and authorization.’ ” That evidence included the Code of 

Conduct, the corporate security report documenting appellant’s admission 
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that he had “removed the meters” at his ex-girlfriend’s house “a few weeks 

before the vandalism” incident, and respondent’s letter informing appellant 

that his “employment [was] being terminated as a result of violations of the 

Company Code of Conduct.” In particular, the letter cited the fact that 

appellant had “[t]ampered/removed company assets (metering service 

equipment) without proper approval and authorization.” 

An affidavit sworn by Griswold confirmed the security report’s account 

of appellant’s admission. Further evidentiary support appears in the record 

of appellant’s deposition, in which appellant testified that he removed the 

meter in question in “October of 2015.” In another affidavit, Sanford declared 

that he made the decision to terminate appellant’s employment on the basis 

of the corporate security report’s conclusion that appellant had violated the 

Code of Conduct by removing a meter. According to the affidavit, Sanford 

was “not aware of any PG&E employee similarly situated, i.e., a PG&E 

employee who admitted in the course of a corporate security investigation 

that they had tampered with a meter without a PG&E work order or 

authorization, who was not terminated.” Sanford spoke to Davis, who 

separately declared that appellant’s “employment was terminated because he 

violated [the] provision of the Code of Conduct” cited repeatedly here. 

This evidence was sufficient to allow the trial court to “conclude that it 

is more likely than not that [a] legitimate, nondiscriminatory” reason—

removing a meter in violation of the Code of Conduct—was “the sole basis for” 

terminating appellant’s employment. (Featherstone, supra, 10 Cal.App.5th at 

p. 1158.) As a result, respondent shifted to appellant the burden “to present 

evidence that the employer’s decision was motivated at least in part by 

prohibited discrimination.” (Id. at pp. 1158–1159.)
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The only such evidence here relates to Sanford’s conversation with 

Davis in anticipation of terminating appellant’s employment. As appellant 

notes, he had filed against Davis a CFRA discrimination complaint that was 

still pending at the time Sanford made his decision. In turn, appellant 

contends that Davis’s discussion with Sanford shows that Sanford’s decision 

was motivated by the CFRA complaint and the issues raised therein. As we 

have already observed, however, the “stronger the employer’s showing of a 

legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason, the stronger the plaintiff’s evidence 

must be in order to create a reasonable inference of a discriminatory motive.” 

(Featherstone, supra, 10 Cal.App.5th at p. 1159.)

Here, respondent produced overwhelming evidence in support of its 

position that appellant’s employment was terminated for his admitted 

removal of a meter. In contrast, appellant’s evidence does nothing to rebut 

respondent’s contention. Appellant did not, for example, introduce evidence 

contradicting Sanford’s suggestion that no similarly situated employee had 

ever been treated differently. At most, appellant’s evidence raises the mere 

possibility that Davis had an improper motive, without supporting any 

reasonable inference imputing that motive to Sanford, who was the ultimate 

decision-maker. For that reason, appellant’s evidence is not strong enough to 

create a reasonable inference of discriminatory motive.

As a curiosity, we also note appellant’s self-serving statement that he 

removed the meter to check for a “serious safety issue,” and thus, could not 

have violated a Code of Conduct that urges employees to “put[] safety first” 

and to “ ‘look[] for and interven[e] to stop unsafe acts.’ ” The evidentiary 

value of such statements is minute. In the first place, even if the Code of 

Conduct were so poorly written as to include such a broad “safety” loophole—

effectively blessing any otherwise-forbidden act when it is accompanied by 
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some subjective and self-attested belief about safety—it would not support an 

inference that appellant’s termination for violating the Code of Conduct was

discriminatory. Secondly, when he removed his ex-girlfriend’s meter, 

appellant was not “intervening to stop” any act, unsafe or otherwise; he was 

committing an act, and one expressly proscribed by the Code of Conduct at 

that. We are therefore unpersuaded by appellant’s argument from the Code’s 

alleged inconsistency.

In sum, the trial court did not err in granting summary judgment as to 

appellant’s first and second causes of action.

C. Third Cause of Action (Wrongful Termination in Violation of 

Section 432.7)

In his third cause of action, appellant alleged that his termination 

violated section 432.7, forbidding any employer to “utilize, as a factor in 

determining any condition of employment including . . . termination, . . . any 

record of arrest or detention that did not result in conviction.” On appeal, 

appellant argues that there is a triable issue of material fact as to whether 

respondent utilized the police report concerning his ex-girlfriend’s vandalized 

meter as a factor in Sanford’s decision to terminate appellant’s employment. 

As appellant observes, Sanford relied on Griswold’s security report, which

noted an “inconsistency . . . between [appellant’s] statement provided to 

[Griswold] on May 2, 2017, and what he told Solano County Deputy J. Harris 

on December 12, 2015.” And when deposed, Griswold testified that he 

learned of appellant’s statement to the sheriff’s deputy from the sheriff’s 

crime report about the vandalized meter. 

However, “[t]he purpose of . . . section [432.7] is to prevent the misuse 

of criminal offender records information; it does not prohibit an employer 

from disciplining an employee where the employer independently 
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investigates the conduct giving rise to the arrest or detention.” (Pinheiro v. 

Civil Service Com. for County of Fresno (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 1458, 1471, 

fn. 3.) Here, the security report relied upon by Sanford was the product of 

Griswold’s independent investigation. Crucially, that investigation included 

questioning appellant about the sheriff’s crime report. During Griswold’s 

interview with appellant, appellant “admitted he had read the Crime Report . 

. . .” He “was asked if he committed the crime described in the . . . crime 

report . . . .” 

It was in this context that Griswold asked appellant whether, “if 

additional investigation was conducted,” there would “be any reason his 

cellular phone would indicate he was in the area of his ex-girlfriend’s house” 

at the time of the crime. Such a question about “additional investigation” 

presupposes an initial investigation and would make little sense unless that 

initial investigation had recorded appellant’s statement that he was not “in 

the area of his ex-girlfriend’s house.” Thus, Griswold’s question was aimed 

clearly at probing the veracity of appellant’s previous statement recorded in 

the crime report Griswold and appellant were then discussing. And when 

Griswold posed that question, appellant had every opportunity to disclaim 

the statements ascribed to him by the crime report. In this way, even 

appellant’s previous statements to police were investigated independently by 

Griswold.

For that reason, there is no triable issue of material fact as to whether 

the sheriff’s crime report was a factor in Sanford’s decision, which was based 

on the corporate security report recounting Griswold’s independent 

investigation. In sum, the trial court did not err in granting summary 

judgment on that basis.
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D. Fifth Cause of Action (Wrongful Termination in Violation of 

Public Policy)

As for appellant’s fifth cause of action—a common law claim alleging 

wrongful termination in violation of public policy—respondent rightly 

observes that it “has no independent life.” “[W]hen a plaintiff relies upon a 

statutory prohibition to support a common law cause of action for wrongful 

termination in violation of public policy, the common law claim is subject to 

statutory limitations affecting the nature and scope of the statutory 

prohibition, but the common law claim is not subject to statutory procedural 

limitations affecting only the availability and scope of nonexclusive statutory 

remedies.” (Stevenson v. Superior Court (1997) 16 Cal.4th 880, 904.) Here, 

as we have already concluded, summary judgment was properly granted as to 

appellant’s statutory claims, and for substantive reasons—not procedural 

ones. As a result, appellant cannot prevail on his common law claim.

III. DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed.
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_________________________

Wiseman, J. *

We concur:

_________________________

Simons, Acting P.J.

_________________________

Burns, J.

Cronin v. Pacific Gas and Electric Co. / A162715

* Retired Associate Justice of the Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate 

District, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the 

California Constitution.