# FILED
September 09, 1997 Cecil Crowson, Jr . App ellate C ou rt Clerk 

## IN THE COU RT OF CR IMINA L A PPEA LS OF TENN ESSEE AT JAC KSON AU GUST SESSION , 1997

JOHNNY L EE MUKES, ) ) No. 02C01-9610-CR-00320 Appellant ) ) SHELBY COUNTY vs. ) ) Hon. JOHN P. COLTON, JR., Judge STA TE OF TENN ESSEE, ) ) (Post-Conviction) Ap pellee )
For the Appell ant : For the Appell ee : JOHNNY L EE MUKES, PR O SE CHA RLES W. BUR SON Reg. No. 123 75-076 Attorney Gen eral and Repor ter F.C.I. Memphis P. O. Box 3455 0 (Beale-A) MICHA EL J. FA HEY, II Memphis, TN 38184- 0550 Assistant Attorney Gener al Criminal J ustice Division 450 James Roberts on Parkway Nashvil le, TN 37243-0493
WILLIAM GIBBONS Distric t Attorney General ROBERT CARTER Asst. Dist rict Attorney General Criminal J ustice Complex Suite 301, 201 Popl ar Street Memphis, TN 381 03

OPINION FILE D: AFFIRMED

David G . Hayes Judge1 Al th ough th e pos t- conv ic ti on pe ti ti on i ncl uded i n t he r ecor d bef ore th is court o nl y at ta cks the ap pe llan t's 1 98 4 c on vic tion s f or ag gr av ate d a ss au lt, th e a rg um en t pr es en ted by b oth pa rtie s in their re spe ctive b riefs e nco m pas ses all prior fe lony co nviction s of th e ap pellan t, infranote 2, used to enhance his sent ences for his subse quent f ederal convi cti ons. The t ri al court not ed thateach of t he appel lant 's pr ior stat e convi cti ons were chal lenged in sepa rate post- convi cti on peti ti ons, but were assi gned the same docket num ber when f il ed. Accordingl y, the court addr essed the ap pe llan t's c olle ctiv e c ha llen ge s in its d en ial.

2 The federal present ence report i ncluded in t he record indi cates t hat t he fol lowi ng pri or fel ony convi cti ons of t he appel lantwere used f or federal sent encing enhancement purposes: 03/01/76 Robb ery 04/24/80 Carry ing a Pist ol 07/24/84 Ag gr av ate d A ss au lt 07/24/84 Ag gr av ate d A ss au lt 03/05/87 Possession Cont rol led Subst ance w/ I ntent 03/05/87 Possession Cont rol led Subst ance w/ I ntent 03/05/87 Convicted F elon in Posses sion of Firearm 01/12/88 Possession Cont rol led Subst ance w/ I ntent
3 In accor dance wit h Federal Sentenci ng Guidel ine, the appe ll ant r eceiv ed thr ee cri minal hist orypoints for hi s 1976 convi cti on for robbery ; two cri minal hi story points for hi s 1980 convi cti on for c arrying a pisto l; three c rim inal histo ry points for his 198 4 co nviction s for agg rava ted a ssa ult; 

## 2 OPINION
The appellant, Johnn y Lee Mukes , appeals the or der of the Shelby County Criminal Court dismissing his pro se petition for post-convic tion relief. I n this appeal, theappellant rai ses numerous issues whic h can collect ively be summarized as

challengi ng the tria l court's ruling th at the petition for postconvicti on relief is t ime barred. 1



## After a revi ew of the recor d, we affirm the l ower cour t's denial of postconvicti on relief.

Between March 1, 1976, and Januar y 12, 1988, the appellant entered guilty pleas to and was convic ted of numerous felonies in the State of Tennessee. 2 

## In 1990, the appel lant was convicted i n the federal dist rict court for the Western District of Tenness ee of possession of a controlled substance with intent to distrib ute, ca rrying a fire arm in a d rug traf fickin g offe nse, an d being a felon in possession of a firearm. His prior state convictions, the subject of this appeal, were subsequently used to enhan ce the sentences impose d for these federal convictions. 3

## The appellant i s currentl y incarcerated at the Fede ralthre e cri minal hi story points for hi s 1987 convi cti ons for p ossession wit h int ent t o sell and bei ng a fel on in possession of a fi rearm; and t hree cri minal hi story points for hi s 1988 convi cti on for possession wit h int ent t o sell . 28 U. S.C.A. § 994(a) (1) ( W est 1993) ; Federa l Sent encing Guidelines §§ 4A 1.2 (1995).

4 The appell ant al leges t hat hi s guil ty pleas fai led t o comply wi th t he consti tut ional m andates of Boyki n v. Alabama , 395 U. S. 238, 89 S.Ct. 1709 (1969) , and Stat e v. Mackey , 553 S.W .2d 337 ( Tenn. 1977). Specif ical ly , he cont ends thathe was not inf ormed that t he resul ti ng con victions from thes e gu ilty pleas co uld be con side red f or su bse que nt se nten cing enh anc em ent. Eve n if the a ppe llant's cla im was not tim e ba rred , he w ould not h ave a co gniza ble cla im for po stcon viction re lief. Bo ykin req uire s th e inte ntion al re linqu ishm en t or a ba nd on m en t of th e a cc us ed 's right ag ains t self-inc rim ination , the righ t to co nfro nt on e's a ccu ser s, an d the right to a trial by jury. Id . The al legat ion made by the appel lant , however , suggest s a vi olat ion ofthe mandates of Mackey , 553 S. W .2d at341 and Stat e v. McClint ock , 732 S. W .2d 268, 273 (Tenn. 1987), not Bo ykin . Fa ilure to g ive ad vic e n ot r eq uir ed by Bo ykin , i .e. ,fai lur e to i nform the accused t hat t he resul ti ng judgment of convi cti on coul d be used i n the f utur e to enha nce puni shment for subsequent co nvi cti ons, i s not a p roper ground forpost- convi cti on rel iefbecause th e omission doe s no t, by itself, rise to the lev el of c ons titutional er ror. See Ha tm ak er v. S tate , No. 03C01- 950 6-C R-0 016 9 (T enn . Crim . App . at Kn oxv ille, Oct. 1 8, 19 96), perm. to appe al den ied , ( Apr. 14 , 199 7) (c iting T enn . Co de A nn. § 40-3 0-10 5; Stat e v. Prin ce , 781 S.W .2d 846. 853 (T enn. 1989); Stat e v. Neal , 810 S.W .2d 131, 140 (T enn. 1991)).

5 Th e ap pellan t had until July 1, 1 989 ; April 5, 1 990 ; and Jan uary 1 3, 19 91, re spe ctively, to fil e an appro priate petit ion for post-conviction reli ef. 

## 3 Correction al Instituti on in Memphis, Tennessee. On July 9, 1996, the appell ant filed a pro se

petition for post-convic tion relief al leging t hat his gui lty pleas entered for his respective state con victions were not knowingly and voluntarily entered. 4

## On July 30, 1 996, th e trial cou rt, withou t an evide ntiary hea ring, dismissed the p etition as bei ng barred by the statute of li mitations.
The record suppor

ts the trialcourt's findi ng that the peti tion is time- barred. The limitations period on the appel lant's clai ms began to run on July 1, 1986, for convicti ons entered pri or to this date, on April 5, 1987, for his convictions for poss essi on of a con tro lle d sub stan ce w ith inte nt an d fel on i n pos sess ion of a fire arm, and o n Feb ruar y 12 , 198 8, for

hisconvict ion for p osse ssi on of a controlled s ubstance wi th intent. SeeTenn. Code Ann. § 40- 30-102 (repeal ed 1995); see also Passarella v . State , 891 S.W .2d 619, 624 (Tenn . Crim. App.), perm. to appeal deni ed , (Tenn. 1994). Thus , the appellant had three year s from these respecti ve dates in which to fil e a cognizable claim for post-convic tion rel ief. 5 

## Tenn. Code Ann. § 40- 30-102. The petiti on in the instan t case was filed on July 9, 1996, wellpast the three year statute of li mitations; thus , the appellant is "barred" from s eeking post- convicti on relief.

## 4 Nonetheless, the appe llant makes several arguments in support of his position that hi s petition i s not time-bar red. First, the appellant contends that he was not "incustody" at the time of filing , and, therefore, th e three year statute of limitations does not apply to him. A perso n confined to a f ederal penitentiary is considered "in custody" within the mean ing of Tenn. Code Ann . § 40-30-102 if the possibil ity ex ists that a state convic tion has placed a restraint on his liber ty. See Passarella , 891 S.W.2d at 622. The appellant's Tennessee convic tions were subsequently used to enhance his current f ederal sentence, and, thus, placed a "restr

aint" upon his l iberty. This issue is without merit.
Next, the ap pellant contends that, due to his

confinement in the federa l correction facility, he was "w ithout access to the Tennessee Code Annotated," theref ore, he was unaware o f the t hree year li mitatio n period . Lack of knowledge does not excus e late filing s. Skinner v . State , No. 02C01-940 3-CC-00039 (Tenn. Crim. App. at Jackson, Jul y 13, 1994), perm. to appeal deni ed , (Tenn. Oct. 10, 1994) (c iting Willis v. State , No. 01C01-921 1-CR-00359 (Tenn. Crim. App. at Nashvil le, Oct. 21, 199 3), perm. to appeal deni ed , (Tenn. Mar. 7, 1994)). This contention is also wit hout merit.
We also reject the appellant' s argument that the new Post-Convic

tion Procedure Act, eff ective May 10, 1995, grants an additional one year period, un til May 10, 1996, to file a post- convicti on petition. A consensus of this court agre es that the new act doesnot revi ve prev iously t ime-barred post-convic tion relief claims. See, e. g. , Wolfenbarger v. State , No. 03C01-960 3-CC-00124 (Tenn. Crim. App. at Knoxvil le, Apr. 1, 1997 ); Carter v . State , No. 01C01-9511-CC00398 (Tenn. Cri m. App. at Nashville, Feb. 13, 1997); Pendleton v. State , No. 01C01-9604-CR -00158 (Tenn. Crim. App. at Nash ville, Feb. 13, 1997); Blak e v. State , No. 03C01-960 3-CR-00110 (Tenn. Crim. App. at Knoxvi lle, Feb. 12, 1997); Koprowskiv. State , No. 03C01-951 1-CC-00365 (Tenn. Crim. App. at

## 5

Knoxvil le, Jan. 28, 1997)

. But see Carter v . State , No. 03C01-950 9-CC-00270 (Tenn. Crim. Ap p. at Knoxv ille, July 11, 1996), perm. to appeal g ranted , (Tenn. Dec. 2, 1996). Even thoug h the instant peti tion was fil ed after the effective date of the new Act, the applicable three year statute of limi tations barred the appellant post- convicti on relief prio r to May 10, 1995. The 1995 Act will not revive a claim w hich is alr eady time-bar red.
Finally , we summari ly reje ct the appellant 's contentions that (1) appl ication of the three year statute of limitations to his pre-1986 convictions is unconstitutional , see State v. Masucci , 754 S.W .2d 90 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1 988); and (2) the three year statute of limitations procedurally denied him his constitutionalrights b ecause he was unaware of his

ground for post-convic tion relief, see Brown v . State , 928 S.W.2d 453, 457 (Tenn. Crim. App .), perm. to appeal denied , (Tenn. 1996).
Accordingl y, we affirm the judgment of the trial cour t and hold that the appellant's pet ition for post- convicti on relief is t ime-barred by the applicabl e three year statute of limitations.

____________________________________ DAVID G. HA YES, Judge

CONCUR:

_______________________________ JERRY L. SMI TH, Jud ge

______________________________

## 6

THOMAS T. W OODALL , Judge