[Cite as Steele v. Steele , 2021-Ohio-148.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT CHAMPAIGN COUNTY

JESSICA P. STEELE Petitioner-Appellee

v. KENNETH A. STEELE, II

Res pondent-Appellant : : : : : : : : : : Appellate Case No. 2020-CA-3

Trial Court Case No. 2019-DR-258 (Appeal from Common Pleas Court – Domestic Relations Division)

. . . . . . . . . . . O P I N I O N Rendered on the 22nd day of January, 2021.

. . . . . . . . . . . LUCINDA WELLER, Atty. Reg. No. 0070667, 525 Jefferson Avenue, S uite 400, Toledo, Ohio 43604 Attorney for Petitioner-Appellee GREGG LEWIS, Atty. Reg. No. 0041229, 625 City Park Avenue, Colu mbus, Ohio 43206 Attorney for Respondent-Appellant

. . . . . . . . . . . . .

DONOVAN, J.-2-

{¶ 1} Kenneth A. Steele, II appeals from the trial court’s order gran ting a petition for a civil stalking protection order filed by his former wife, Jessica P. Steele. The court granted an order of protection for the parties’ minor child, to be in effect for five years. Mr. Steele cannot challenge on appeal the trial court’s grant o f a civil protection order because he failed to file objections in the trial court, as req uired by Civ.R. 65.1. As such, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed. {¶ 2} This Court recently discussed an amendment to Civ. R. 65.1 as f ollows: “When a magistrate has denied or granted a protection order aft er a full hearing, the court may adopt the magistrate's denial or gr anting of the protection order upon review of the order and a determination t hat there is

no error of law or other defect evident on the face of the orde r.” Civ.R. 65.1(F)(3)(c)(ii). “[T]he magistrate's grant or denial of a pr otection order after a full hearing is not effective until adopted by the cour t.” Heimann v.

Heekin , 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-130613, 2014-Ohio-4276, ¶ 7, citing Civ.R. 65.1(F)(3)(c). A trial court's adoption, modification, or reje ction of a magistrate's denial or granting of a protection order after a f ull hearing becomes effective when it is signed by the court and filed with the clerk. Civ.R. 65.1(F)(3)(c)(v). Pursuant to Civ.R. 65.1(G), a trial court's decision to adopt a magistrate's decision that grants or denies a [civil protection order] is a final, appealable order. However, as of July 1, 2016, the rule require s a party to file timely objections to the trial court's order prior to fili ng an appeal. See-3- Civ.R. 65.1(G). Written objections must be filed within 14 day s of the filing of the trial court's order. Civ.R. 65.1(F)(3)(d)(i). Since the July 1, 2016 changes to Civ.R. 65.1(G), several appel late districts have held that an appeal must be dismissed if timely objections

were not filed. See, e.g., Casto v. Lehr , 5th Dist. Tuscarawas No. 2020 AP 02 0002, 2020-Ohio-3777, ¶ 19; Hetrick v. Lockwood , 6th Dist. Sandusky No. S-17-014, 2018-Ohio-118; J.S. v. D.E. , 7th Dist. Mahoning No. 17 MA 0032, 2017-Ohio-7507; K.R. v. T.B. , 10th Dist. Franklin No. 17AP-302, 2017-Ohio-8647; Post v. Leopardi , 11th Dist. Trumbull No. 2019-T-0061,

2020-Ohio-2890

. In contrast, this court has not found the failure to file obje ctions to be jurisdictional. See, e.g., Fecke v. Sizemore , 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 28536, 2020-Ohio-2851 (affirming a protection order due to appe llant's failure to file objections); Whatley v. Canales , 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 28382, 2020-Ohio-213; Runkle v. Stewart , 2d Dist. Miami No. 2018-CA-27, 2019-Ohio-2356 (noting that the failure to file objections requ ired dismissal, but nonetheless affirming the trial court's [protection order] due to failure to file objections); Anderson v. Gregory , 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 28277,

2019-Ohio-2346. See also Danison v. Blinco , 3d Dist. Crawford No. 3-18- 19, 2019-Ohio-2767. Nevertheless, a party may not challenge th e protection order on appeal if objections were not filed. Id. Florenz v. Omalley , 2020-Ohio-4487, __ N.E.3d __, ¶ 7-10 (2d Dist.). {¶ 3} Civ.R. 65.1 is clear that magistrate decisions after a full he aring are not-4- subject to the requirements in Civ.R. 53(D)(2) or (3). Florenz at ¶ 12, citing Civ.R. 65.1(F)(3)(b) and Runkle at ¶ 7. Further, a protection order “need not comply with Civ .R. 53(D)(3)(a)(iii), which requires a magistrate decision to ‘indi cate conspicuously that a party shall not assign as error on appeal the court's adoption of any factual finding or legal conclusion, * * * unless the party timely and specifically obje cts to that factual finding or legal conclusion as required by Civ.R. 53(D)(3)(b).’ ” Id

. {¶ 4} The protection order herein, on the final page, stated: “ NOTICE OF FINAL

APPEALABLE ORDER Copies of this Order, which is a final appealable order, were served on the parties indicated pursuant to Civ.R. 65.1(C)(3) o n 23 day of DEC, 2020.” A separate “Notice of Final Appealable Order” was also filed wi th the protection order. {¶ 5} In Florenz , this Court described the protection order at issue therein as

follows: * * * [T]he [protection order] highlighted portions of Civ.R. 6 5.1. It stated that the magistrate's order was not governed by Civ.R. 5 3(D), timely objections did not stay the execution of the order, objections had to conform to Civ.R. 65.1(F)(3)(d), the trial court's adoption of the magi strate's order was not effective until signed by the court and filed with the clerk, and “[n]otwithstanding the provisions of any other rule, an order e ntered by this court under Civ.R. 65.1(F)(3)(c) is a final appealable order th at can be appealed upon issuance of the order.” In our view, the notification regarding Civ.R. 65.1 suggested that objections were optional and that the order could be appealed i mmediately without filing objections. Specifically, the inclusion of the language from-5- Civ.R. 65.1(G) indicating that the order could be immediately a ppealed was misleading in the absence of additional information that timely objections were required prior to filing an appeal. While the magistrate w as not required by rule to inform the parties about the need to object , the decision to provide some information about Civ.R. 65.1 to the parties tr iggered an obligation to provide complete and accurate information.

Florenz at ¶ 13-14. {¶ 6} This Court affirmed the trial court’s decision, noting as foll ows: Even if we were to consider Omalley's arguments in light of the Civ.R. 65.1 language in the [civil protection order], we would neverth eless find no basis to reverse the order. Omalley failed to provide a transc ript of the full hearing before the magistrate, as required by Civ.R. 65.1(F)(3) (d)(iv). In the absence of a written transcript of the hearing, we have no record of the evidence presented to the magistrate, and we cannot speculate w hat testimony was given at that hearing. Williams v. Foster , 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 28416, 2019-Ohio-4601, ¶ 10, citing Miller v. Tye , 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 26277, 2015-Ohio-199, ¶ 90. Rather, we must pre sume that the evidence supported the magistrate's findings. See Kahler v. Eytcheson , 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 23523, 2012-Ohio-208, ¶ 34.

Id . at ¶ 15. {¶ 7} It is clear that, in the absence of objections, Mr. Steele may not challenge the trial court’s decision on appeal. However, we again express co ncern about the trial court’s language in its protection order, which merely provides that the order is final and-6- appealable, and accordingly suggests that objections are not re quired. We caution that a trial court’s judgment granting or denying a civil protection order should not imply that objections are unnecessary or optional. The final sentence of Civ.R. 65.1(G) provides: “a party must timely file objections to such an order under div ision (F)(3)(d) of this rule prior to filing an appeal, and the timely filing of such object ions shall stay the running of the time for appeal until the filing of the court's ruling on t he objections.” We are concerned that the court partially advised the parties that the protection order was final and appealable, but failed to fully advise them that objections are nevertheless required.

As we noted in Florenz , the court is obligated to provide complete and accurate

information. {¶ 8} Finally, we note that pursuant to R.C. 3113.31, either party m ay move to modify or terminate a civil protection order. R.C. 3113.31(E)( 8)(b) provides: * * * The moving party has the burden of proof to show, by a preponderance of the evidence, that modification or termination of the protection order or consent agreement is appropriate because ei ther the protection order or consent agreement is no longer needed or be cause the terms of the original protection order or consent agreement are no longer appropriate. “When ruling on a motion to terminate a [civil protection order ], a trial court must consider ‘all relevant factors,’ including the factors identified in R.C . 3113.31(E)(8)(c).” Brown v.

Naff , 2d Dist. Miami No. 2011-CA-17, 2012-Ohio-1770, ¶ 10. {¶ 9} The order of the trial court is affirmed.

. . . . . . . . . . . . .-7- FROELICH, J. and HALL, J., concur.

Copies sent to:

Lucinda Weller Gregg Lewis Hon. Brett A. Gilbert