This opinion will be unpublished and 

may not be cited except as provided by 

Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2014). 

STATE OF MINNESOTA 

IN COURT OF APPEALS 

A15-1995 

Hope Amundsen, 

Respondent, 

vs. 

Great Glory Auto, Inc., 

Appellant, 

Kehnny Alabi, et al., Defendants. 

Filed May 23, 2016 

Remanded 

Smith, Tracy, Judge 

Ramsey County District Court 

File No. 62-CV-14-8184 

Steven T. Appelget, Appelget Law Office, St. Paul, Minnesota (for respondent) 

Mark K. Thompson, MKT Law PLC, Minneapolis, Minnesota; and Ayodele M. Ojo, 

Ayodele M. Ojo and Associates, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant) 

 Considered and decided by Reyes, Presiding Judge; Ross, Judge; and Smith, 

Tracy, Judge. 

U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N 

SMITH, TRACY, Judge 

 Appellant Great Glory Auto, Inc. appeals the district court’s denial of its motion 

for relief from default judgment under Minnesota Rule of Civil Procedure 60.02. 
2 

Because the district court did not address Great Glory’s argument under rule 60.02(a) and 

the record is insufficient to review for an abuse of discretion, we remand. 

FACTS 

 In her complaint against Great Glory, respondent Hope Amundsen alleged as 

follows. Amundsen saw an advertisement for a used vehicle and contacted “Amin,” the 

supposed seller. After exchanging messages with the seller and seeing the vehicle, 

Amundsen entered into a written purchase contract, which listed Kehnny Alabi as the 

seller. Amundsen also received a dealer-reassignment form, indicating that Great Glory 

owned the vehicle. Later, Amundsen learned that the title to her vehicle had been issued 

to Great Glory and that the title was branded “prior salvage.” 

 Amundsen sued Great Glory, Alabi, and an individual named Amin Lot Fallu, 

alleging claims for failing to disclose the vehicle’s salvage-title history and common-law 

fraud.1

 Amundsen did not name Great Glory’s owner, Ifechide Adigwe, in the complaint. 

Amundsen alleged that Alabi and Fallu were Great Glory’s agents and that they 

misrepresented the vehicle’s salvage-title history. 

 After a process server unsuccessfully attempted to serve Great Glory at its 

corporate office, Amundsen used substitute service to serve Great Glory via certified mail 

through the Minnesota Secretary of State. See Minn. Stat. § 5.25, subd. 1 (2014). Great 

Glory failed to answer, so Amundsen moved for default judgment. The district court 

granted Amundsen’s motion, dismissed Amundsen’s claims against the individual 

defendants, and docketed the judgment. 

 

1

 Amundsen’s complaint alleges that Fallu and Alabi may be the same person. 
3 

 Great Glory, through its owner, moved to vacate the default judgment under 

Minnesota Rule of Civil Procedure 60.02(a) and (c). Amundsen responded on the merits 

of the motion and also argued that Great Glory’s motion should be dismissed because 

Great Glory, a Minnesota corporation, was not represented by a licensed attorney. Great 

Glory retained counsel who submitted an amended motion and memorandum, again 

seeking relief under rule 60.02(a) and (c). 

 The district court denied Great Glory’s motion to vacate. The district court 

summarily determined that rule 60.02(a) did not apply because Great Glory’s arguments 

about Amundsen’s failure to effect proper service raised an issue only under rule 

60.02(c), which provides for relief in the case of “[f]raud . . . , misrepresentation, or other 

misconduct of an adverse party.” The district court denied relief under rule 60.02(c) 

because Amundsen attempted to serve Great Glory at its registered office and only then 

attempted substitute service through the secretary of state. 

 Great Glory appeals. 

D E C I S I O N 

 Great Glory challenges the district court’s denial of its motion for relief from 

default judgment under Minn. R. Civ. P. 60.02(a). Generally, a district court has broad 

discretion to grant or deny relief from judgment under rule 60.02. Northland Temps., Inc. 

v. Turpin, 744 N.W.2d 398, 402 (Minn. App. 2008), review denied (Minn. Apr. 29, 

2008). A district court’s decision to vacate judgment under rule 60.02 “will not be 

reversed absent an abuse of that discretion.” Meyer v. Best W. Seville Plaza Hotel, 562 

N.W.2d 690, 694 (Minn. App. 1997), review denied (Minn. June 26, 1997). 
4 

 A party may obtain relief from a final judgment on the basis of “[m]istake, 

inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect.” Minn. R. Civ. P. 60.02(a). A party’s 

ability to obtain relief under rule 60.02 is determined by applying a four-factor test. 

Northland Temps., 744 N.W.2d at 402. The test requires consideration of whether the 

moving party has “(1) a reasonable defense on the merits; (2) a reasonable excuse for the 

failure or neglect to answer; (3) acted diligently after notice of entry of the judgment; and 

(4) demonstrated that no prejudice will occur to the judgment creditor.” Id. “Default 

judgments are to be liberally reopened to promote resolution of cases on the merits.” 

Imperial Premium Fin., Inc. v. GK Cab Co., 603 N.W.2d 853, 857 (Minn. App. 2000) 

(quotation omitted). 

 Great Glory and Amundsen dispute Great Glory’s right to relief under rule 

60.02(a). But the district court conducted no analysis of the rule 60.02 factors. 

Generally, we do not address matters not considered and decided by the district court. 

Thiele v. Stich, 425 N.W.2d 580, 582 (Minn. 1988). Moreover, when, as here, the district 

court has broad discretion, Minnesota appellate courts have demanded a well-developed 

record for review. See In re Amitad, Inc., 397 N.W.2d 594, 596 (Minn. App. 1986) 

(“Where the [district] court has broad discretion, the Minnesota Supreme Court has 

demonstrated persistence in demanding findings to explain the [district] court’s exercise 

of discretion.”); see also Stich v. Stich, 435 N.W.2d 52, 53 (Minn. 1989) (remanding for 

further findings because “[e]ffective appellate review . . . is possible only when the 

[district] court has issued sufficiently detailed findings of fact to demonstrate its 

consideration of all factors”). 
5 

The district court concluded that rule 60.02(a) did not apply because Great Glory’s 

assertion of “abuse of process and a fraud upon the court” only implicated rule 60.02 (c). 

Great Glory’s original motion to vacate and its amended motion, however, explicitly 

requested relief under rule 60.02(a) and addressed all four rule 60.02 factors. The only 

mention of Amundsen’s service methods was in Great Glory’s discussion of its 

reasonable excuse for failing to answer. The district court’s failure to make findings on 

Great Glory’s request for relief under rule 60.02(a) left a record that is insufficient for us 

to conduct “[e]ffective appellate review.” See Stich, 435 N.W.2d at 53. Consequently, 

we remand for the district court to consider and make findings on Great Glory’s rule 

60.02(a) motion and to determine whether relief from judgment is warranted. 

Remanded.