IN THE SUPREME COURT OF

CALIFORNIA

CHARLES E. WARD et al.,

Plaintiffs and Appellants,

v.

UNITED AIRLINES, INC.,

Defendant and Respondent.

S248702

Ninth Circuit

16-16415

Northern District of California

3:15-cv-02309-WHA

FELICIA VIDRIO et al.,

Plaintiffs and Appellants,

v.

UNITED AIRLINES, INC.,

Defendant and Respondent.

Ninth Circuit

17-55471

Central District of California

2:15-cv-07985-PSG-MRW
June 29, 2020

This opinion precedes companion case S248726, 

also filed on June 29, 2020.

Justice Kruger authored the opinion of the Court, in which 

Chief Justice Cantil-Sakauye and Justices Chin, Corrigan, Liu, 

Cuéllar, and Groban concurred.
WARD v. UNITED AIRLINES, INC.

S248702

Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J.

From the air, the borders that divide state from state 

disappear. But in our federalist system, those borders still 

matter—even for those who make their living flying the 

friendly skies. In these consolidated cases and Oman v. Delta 

Air Lines, Inc. (June 29, 2020, S248726) ___ Cal.5th ___, we

confront questions about how the laws of a single state might 

apply to employees who perform duties across the country, on 

behalf of an employer in the business of connecting the world.

Plaintiffs are pilots and flight attendants for a global 

airline based outside California. Plaintiffs reside in California 

but perform most of their work in airspace outside California’s 

jurisdiction. They are not paid according to California wage 

law, but instead according to the terms of a collective 

bargaining agreement entered under federal law. The United 

States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has asked us to 

decide whether, given these circumstances, the airline is 

required to provide plaintiffs with wage statements that meet 

the various requirements of California law.

We conclude that whether plaintiffs are entitled to 

California-compliant wage statements depends on whether 

their principal place of work is in California. For pilots, flight 

attendants, and other interstate transportation workers who 

do not perform a majority of their work in any one state, this 

test is satisfied when California serves as their base of work 
WARD v. UNITED AIRLINES, INC.

Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J.

2

operations, regardless of their place of residence or whether a 

collective bargaining agreement governs their pay.

I.

The consolidated cases before us arise from three class

actions filed against defendant United Airlines, Inc. United is 

an air carrier that provides service between airports across the 

country and around the world, including to and from numerous 

airports in California. United is incorporated in Delaware and

headquartered in Illinois, with a substantial administrative 

presence in Texas. Plaintiff Charles Ward is a pilot for United, 

while plaintiffs Felicia Vidrio and Paul Bradley are flight 

attendants. All three are California residents. (Ward v. 

United Airlines, Inc. (9th Cir. 2018) 889 F.3d 1068, 1071.)

Ward filed an action in state court on behalf of pilots, 

while Vidrio and Bradley each filed separate state court 

actions on behalf of flight attendants. All three flight crew 

members alleged that United’s wage statements fail to provide 

them all the information required by Labor Code section 226

(section 226), in the format required by that provision. (See 

§ 226, subd. (a).) Specifically, the flight crew members 

complained that although United issues them at least two 

wage statements a month, the wage statements do not (1) list a 

street address for United, instead providing only a post office 

box, or (2) include the hours worked and all applicable hourly 

rates that make up employee pay for the pay period, instead

listing only the total amounts earned in various pay categories. 

The crew members sought civil penalties under the Labor Code 

Private Attorneys General Act of 2004 (Lab. Code, § 2698 et 

seq.) on a representative basis; statutory penalties under

section 226, subdivision (e) on a classwide basis; and injunctive 
WARD v. UNITED AIRLINES, INC.

Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J.

3

relief (Ward v. United Airlines, Inc., supra, 889 F.3d at 

p. 1071).

United removed all three actions to federal court. In the 

Ward case, the district judge certified a class consisting of

pilots who reside in California and pay California income 

taxes.1 (Ward v. United Airlines, Inc. (N.D.Cal., Mar. 23, 2016, 

No. 3:15-cv-02309-WHA) 2016 U.S.Dist. Lexis 38896.) A 

different district judge consolidated the Vidrio and Bradley

cases and certified a similarly defined class of California-based 

flight attendants. (Vidrio v. United Airlines, Inc. (C.D.Cal., 

Aug. 23, 2016, No. 2:15-cv-07985-PSG-MRW) 2016 U.S.Dist.

Lexis 189537.)

In each case, the district court granted summary 

judgment to United. The district court in Ward held that the 

geographic reach of California wage and hour law—including 

section 226—is governed by a “ ‘job situs test,’ which considers 

where an employee ‘principally’ worked.” (Ward v. United 

Airlines, Inc. (N.D.Cal., July 19, 2016, No. 3:15-cv-02309-WHA) 

2016 U.S.Dist. Lexis 94803, p. *10.) Because it was 

undisputed that under the district court’s test the members of 

 

1 Under federal law, airline employees who work in more 

than two states are subject to the income tax laws of either the 

state where they reside or the state where they earn more than 

50 percent of their airline pay. (49 U.S.C. § 40116(f)(2).) “For 

pilots and flight attendants, United applies state income tax 

laws based on the employee’s residence because it determined 

that pilots and flight attendants ‘rarely, if ever, perform more 

than half their work in any one state.’ ” (Ward v. United 

Airlines, Inc., supra, 889 F.3d at pp. 1070–1071.)
WARD v. UNITED AIRLINES, INC.

Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J.

4

the pilot class did not work principally in California, the court 

ruled that section 226 did not apply.

Several months later, the district court in Vidrio reached 

the same conclusion. (Vidrio v. United Airlines, Inc. (C.D.Cal., 

Mar. 15, 2017, No. 2:15-cv-07985-PSG-MRW) 2017 U.S.Dist. 

Lexis 40609.) The Vidrio court noted that since Ward was 

decided, other federal courts had also considered whether flight 

crew members may bring claims under California’s wage and 

hour laws when most of the work is performed outside the 

state. In some of these cases, the courts had interpreted 

relevant California precedent to call for a different approach 

from the “job situs” test applied in Ward; in determining 

whether California law applies, these courts had weighed

various factors in addition to job situs, including the parties’ 

states of residence. (Vidrio, at pp. *12–*13.) The Vidrio court 

concluded that United would prevail under both the “job situs”

test and the wider-ranging multifactor approach, since the 

Vidrio class members do not work principally in California and 

“United’s ties to California are minimal relative to its overall 

business . . . .” (Id. at pp. *14–*15.) Absent greater employer 

ties to California, the court concluded, “[T]he class members’ 

residency and receipt of wage statements in California is 

insufficient to obtain the benefits of California wage and hour 

laws when the work is principally performed outside of the 

state.” (Id. at p. *15.)

Both sets of plaintiffs sought review, and the Ninth 

Circuit consolidated the appeals for purposes of oral argument. 

After argument, the Ninth Circuit ordered supplemental 

briefing addressing the Industrial Wage Commission (IWC) 

wage order regulating the transportation industry, IWC wage 

order No. 9–2001 (Wage Order No. 9). That wage order
WARD v. UNITED AIRLINES, INC.

Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J.

5

extends various protections—including certain wage statement 

requirements—to transportation workers. But the wage order 

exempts from its protections employees who have entered into 

a collective bargaining agreement under and in accordance 

with the provisions of the Railway Labor Act, a federal statute

governing labor relations in the railroad and airline industries. 

(See Wage Order No. 9, § 1(E); 45 U.S.C. § 151 et seq.) United 

pilots and flight attendants are parties to such a collective 

bargaining agreement.

After briefing was completed, the Ninth Circuit issued an 

order asking this court to resolve two unsettled questions of 

California law critical to the resolution of the crew members’ 

section 226 claims. (Ward v. United Airlines, Inc., supra, 889 

F.3d at p. 1070.) Those questions, which we have reframed 

slightly (see Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.548(f)(5)), are:

(1) Wage Order No. 9 exempts from its wage statement 

requirements an employee who has entered into a collective

bargaining agreement in accordance with the Railway Labor 

Act. (See Cal. Code Regs., tit. 8, § 11090, subd. 1(E).) Does the 

Railway Labor Act exemption in Wage Order No. 9 bar a wage 

statement claim brought under section 226 by an employee 

who is covered by a collective bargaining agreement?

(2) Does section 226 apply to wage statements 

provided by an out-of-state employer to an employee who 

resides in California, receives pay in California, and pays

California income tax on his or her wages, but who does not 

work principally in California or any other state?

II.

Section 226 requires an employer to supply each 

employee, “semimonthly or at the time of each payment,” a 
WARD v. UNITED AIRLINES, INC.

Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J.

6

written wage statement listing the employer’s name and 

address; identifying the pay period; itemizing the total hours

worked, applicable hourly rates, hours worked at each rate, 

gross and net wages earned, and any deductions taken; and 

disclosing other prescribed information. (§ 226, subd. (a).) 

Violations may result in penalties of up to $4,000 for each 

injured employee, as well as an award of costs and attorney’s

fees. (Id., subd. (e)(1).)

The Ninth Circuit’s first question is whether, as United 

argues, the plaintiff crew members fall outside the protections

of section 226 because they are parties to a collective 

bargaining agreement entered in accordance with the Railway 

Labor Act. United’s argument is not based on the language of 

section 226—which says nothing at all about collective

bargaining agreements—but on the language of the 

transportation industry wage order, Wage Order No. 9. 

Wage Order No. 9 is one of 18 wage orders promulgated 

by the IWC in response to the Legislature’s 1913 directive to 

“investigate various industries and promulgate wage orders 

fixing for each industry” rules governing wages, hours, and

working conditions. (Brinker Restaurant Corp. v. Superior 

Court (2012) 53 Cal.4th 1004, 1026.) The wage orders remain 

in effect alongside the body of law enacted by the Legislature 

and codified in the Labor Code; the two sources of authority 

establish complementary regulations governing wage and hour 

claims. (Ibid.) 

Like the other wage orders, Wage Order No. 9 sets out 

certain wage statement requirements that overlap with (but 

are narrower than) the requirements of section 226. (Wage 

Order No. 9, § 7(B); see, e.g., Cal. Code Regs., tit. 8, §§ 11010, 
WARD v. UNITED AIRLINES, INC.

Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J.

7

subd. 7(B), 11020, subd. 7(B), 11030, subd. 7(B).)2 As relevant 

here, it also provides that, subject to certain exceptions not 

pertinent here, “this order shall not be deemed to cover those 

employees who have entered into a collective bargaining 

agreement under and in accordance with the provisions of the 

Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. Sections 151 et seq.” (Wage 

Order No. 9, § 1(E).) 

Because Ward and the other members of the certified 

classes have entered into such a collective bargaining 

agreement, it is undisputed that United need not comply with

the itemized statement requirements of the wage order. But 

by its terms, the wage order exemption applies only to the 

requirements of “this order” (Wage Order No. 9, § 1(E)); the 

exemption does not purport to control application of any other 

provision of law. And, as already noted, section 226 itself 

contains no similar exemption. United nonetheless contends 

we should imply one. We reject the contention.

We begin with the text of the statute. Section 226 does 

contain exemptions for several categories of workers. (E.g., 

§ 226, subds. (d) [personal services employees], (i) [government 

employees], (j) [employees who are also exempt from minimum 

wage and overtime].) But the statute contains nothing like 

Wage Order No. 9’s Railway Labor Act exemption. This 

 

2 For example, while both the wage orders and statute 

require itemization of deductions from pay, only the statute 

requires the employer to list gross and net wages, hours

worked, and applicable hourly rates of pay. (Compare § 226, 

subd. (a) items (1), (2), (4), (5), (9) with Wage Order No. 9, 

§ 7(B).)
WARD v. UNITED AIRLINES, INC.

Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J.

8

omission is all the more telling because section 226 does 

expressly reference several other IWC wage order exemptions. 

For example, the statute provides that an employer need not 

specify total hours worked for salaried employees “exempt from 

payment of overtime under . . . any applicable order of the 

Industrial Welfare Commission.” (§ 226, subd. (j)(1).) The 

same is true for several other categories of employees exempt 

from payment of minimum wage and overtime under IWC 

wage orders. (§ 226, subd. (j)(2)(A) [administrative exemption],

(B) [outside sales exemption], (D) [family member exemption],

(F) [commercial fishing exemption], (G) [national service

program exemption].) It would have been easy enough for the

Legislature to adopt the Railway Labor Act exemption as well,

but it did not. The Legislature’s incorporation of some (but not 

all) wage order exemptions strongly suggests that any omission 

was intentional.

We may also look beyond the text to consider the 

functional relationship between the Legislature’s and IWC’s 

regulation of wage statements, but we find no basis for

United’s importation argument there either. Section 226, 

which predated the IWC wage order provision, has always 

been the primary source of employers’ obligations to supply 

compliant wage statements. First enacted in 1943, section 226 

was initially crafted to require only that employers provide

written statements showing any deductions from employees’ 

pay. (See Stats. 1943, ch. 1027, § 1, p. 2965.)3 Since then, 

 

3 The original version provided: “Every employer shall 

semimonthly or at the time of each payment of wages furnish

each of his employees either as a part of the check, draft, or
WARD v. UNITED AIRLINES, INC.

Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J.

9

however, the Legislature has repeatedly expanded the scope of 

both section 226’s requirements and the remedies for 

noncompliance. In 1963, the Legislature amended the statute 

to mandate that statements include the pay period and 

identifying information for the employee and employer. (Stats. 

1963, ch. 1080, § 1, p. 2541.) In 1976, the Legislature amended 

section 226 to add a damages remedy for violations of the 

statute. (§ 226, former subd. (b), as amended by Stats. 1976,

ch. 832, § 1, p. 1900.) The Legislature would later add 

requirements that the statement show both gross and net 

wages (Stats. 1978, ch. 1247, § 3, p. 4059), hours worked 

(Stats. 1984, ch. 486, § 1, p. 1990) or piece-rate units earned 

(Stats. 2000, ch. 876, § 6, p. 6508), and any applicable hourly 

rates (ibid.). All told, the Legislature has revisited the statute 

more than a dozen times since 1976. (See 44 West’s Ann. Lab. 

Code (2019 supp.) foll. § 226, p. 231.) The end result is a 

comprehensive statute that contains not only detailed 

requirements for the contents of wage statements, but also

recordkeeping and inspection requirements (§ 226, subds. (a)–

(c)) and extensive remedies for noncompliance, including 

statutory penalties recoverable by the Labor Commissioner 

(id., subd. (f)) as well as injunctive relief, damages, statutory 

penalties, and attorney’s fees for employee claimants (id., 

subds. (e)(1), (f), (h)). 

 

voucher paying the employee’s wages, or separately, an 

itemized statement in writing showing all deductions made 

from such wages; provided, all deductions made on written 

orders of the employee may be aggregated and shown as one

item.” (Stats. 1943, ch. 1027, § 1, p. 2965.)
WARD v. UNITED AIRLINES, INC.

Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J.

10

With respect to wage statement regulation, the IWC 

wage orders have always played a background role relative to 

section 226. In 1957, more than a decade after section 226 was 

first enacted, the IWC incorporated the then-existing version of 

section 226 into its wage orders, requiring that employers 

supply “at the time of payment of wages an itemized statement 

in writing showing gross wages paid and all deductions from 

such wages.” (IWC wage order No. 9–57, § 7(b).) Later, in 

1976, the IWC updated its wage orders to incorporate the 

additional requirements introduced by the 1963 amendments 

to section 226, including the requirement that a statement 

include the pay period and identifying information for the 

employee and employer. (See IWC wage order No. 9–76, 

§ 7(B).) That was the last time the IWC altered the substance 

of the wage statement requirements. Although the Legislature

has made many more changes to section 226 since then, the 

wage orders have not kept pace. Rather, the current version of 

the wage order still tracks the version of section 226 the 

Legislature adopted in 1963. (Compare Wage Order No. 9, 

§ 7(B) with former § 226, as amended by Stats. 1963, ch. 1080, 

§ 1, pp. 2540–2541.)

The Railway Labor Act exemption was added to the 

transportation industry wage order in 1976. (IWC wage order 

No. 9–76, § 1(D); see Wage Order No. 9, § 1(E) [carrying 

forward the same language without amendment].) The IWC 

“found that it would be difficult to enforce standards for 

employees crossing state lines and that the exempted

employees were better protected by their collective bargaining 

agreements pursuant to the Railway Labor Act.” (IWC,

Statement of Findings by the IWC of the State of Cal. in 

Connection with the Revision in 1976 of Its Orders Regulating
WARD v. UNITED AIRLINES, INC.

Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J.

11

Wages, Hours, and Working Conditions (Aug. 13, 1976) p. 6 

(IWC 1976 Statement of Findings).)

In other Labor Code provisions, the Legislature has 

demonstrated its willingness to craft exemptions for employees 

under collective bargaining agreements when it believes such 

exemptions are warranted. For example, in 1970, the 

Legislature added just such an exception to Labor Code section 

204. (Lab. Code, § 204, subd. (c) [“However, when employees 

are covered by a collective bargaining agreement that provides 

different pay arrangements [than the prompt payment 

deadlines imposed in § 204], those arrangements shall apply to 

the covered employees”]; see Stats. 1970, ch. 1237, §§ 3–4, 

pp. 2225–2226; Stats. 1970, ch. 1260, §§ 2–3, pp. 2279–2280.) 

The Legislature has done likewise in Labor Code sections 510, 

512, and 514. (See Lab. Code, §§ 510, subd. (a)(2) [exempting 

from overtime statute work schedules “adopted pursuant to a 

collective bargaining agreement”], 514 [exempting from 

statutes regulating overtime and working hours “an employee 

covered by a valid collective bargaining agreement” when 

certain additional conditions are met]; Gerard v. Orange Coast

Memorial Medical Center (2018) 6 Cal.5th 443, 456 [“Since 

2000, the Legislature has amended [Labor Code] section 512 

several times to exempt various classes of employees covered 

by collective bargaining agreements from the prohibition 

against the waiver of second meal periods for employees 

working more than 12 hours”; citing examples].)

Despite numerous opportunities, however, the 

Legislature has never followed the IWC’s lead and enacted an 

exemption to section 226 for employees operating under a 

collective bargaining agreement entered under the Railway 

Labor Act. We see no basis for importing the Railway Labor 
WARD v. UNITED AIRLINES, INC.

Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J.

12

Act exemption when the Legislature itself has not chosen to do 

so. Given the number of times the Legislature has revisited 

and revised section 226 since the Railway Labor Act exemption

was first promulgated in 1976, we can be sure that the 

Legislature’s failure to adopt the exemption is not for want of 

attention to the statute.

Despite all this, United argues that we must import the 

Railway Labor Act exemption into section 226 in order to 

harmonize the wage order and statute. United is correct that 

courts must strive to harmonize the IWC’s wage orders and the 

statutory provisions of the Labor Code where possible, just as 

we would strive to harmonize any two sets of legal provisions 

governing the same subject. (Brinker Restaurant Corp. v. 

Superior Court, supra, 53 Cal.4th at pp. 1026–1027.) But we 

are not persuaded that importing the wage order’s Railway

Labor Act exemption into section 226 is the right way to go 

about that task. Notwithstanding United’s contrary claim, to 

read section 226 in accordance with its plain terms creates no 

necessary conflict with the IWC’s choice to exempt employees 

covered by a relevant collective bargaining agreement from 

virtually all of the provisions of the transportation industry 

wage order. No one disputes that the exemption remains fully 

operative with respect to matters other than wage statements

and thus continues to shield employers from wage order 

provisions imposing recordkeeping requirements, uniform and 

equipment requirements, suitable seating requirements, and 

the like. (E.g., Wage Order No. 9, §§ 7(A), 9, 14.) Even as to 

the wage order’s wage statement requirements, the exemption 

has an important role to play insofar as it shields employers 

from sanctions for any violation of these requirements that 

might otherwise apply. (See Lab. Code, § 1199, subd. (c) 
WARD v. UNITED AIRLINES, INC.

Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J.

13

[making violation of an IWC wage order a misdemeanor].) In 

short, it is entirely possible to give effect to both the plain 

terms of the statute and to the terms of the wage order. 

Because there is no necessary conflict between the two, there is 

no reason to harmonize them in the manner United proposes. 

(See, e.g., Dicon Fiberoptics, Inc. v. Franchise Tax Bd. (2012) 

53 Cal.4th 1227, 1236–1237.)

United’s argument for importing the wage order 

exemption into section 226 relies principally on Collins v. 

Overnite Transportation Co. (2003) 105 Cal.App.4th 171

(Collins), in which the Court of Appeal held that a different 

wage order exemption operated to exempt an employer from 

compliance with statutory overtime requirements. But the 

statutory and regulatory context was meaningfully different

for reasons thoroughly addressed in the Collins opinion, and 

Collins neither holds nor suggests that every wage order 

exemption must be read into every corresponding provision of 

the Labor Code in order to harmonize the two bodies of law. 

The plaintiffs in Collins were a class of truck drivers who 

sought overtime compensation under the Labor Code. In its 

defense, their employer invoked the so-called motor carrier 

exemption contained in the transportation industry wage 

order. (IWC wage order No. 9–90, § 3(H); see Wage Order

No. 9, § 3(L) [exempting truck drivers whose hours are 

regulated by the federal Department of Transportation].) That

plaintiffs’ claim was an overtime claim matters, because the

history of overtime regulation in California is essentially the 

reverse of the history of wage statement regulation: The IWC 

has long had overtime rules in place pursuant to its delegated 

authority to regulate hours, pay, and working conditions (see, 

e.g., IWC wage order No. 9–52, § 3(a) [defining overtime pay 
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Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J.

14

obligations]), while the Legislature is a relatively recent 

entrant to the field. That entry came in response to 1998 IWC 

wage orders that weakened overtime protections; in 1999, to 

reverse these changes, the Legislature codified certain 

minimum protections (Lab. Code, § 510, as amended by Stats. 

1999, ch. 134, § 4, p. 1821; §§ 511–515, as enacted by Stats. 

1999, ch. 134, §§ 5–9, pp. 1821–1825; see Brinker Restaurant 

Corp. v. Superior Court, supra, 53 Cal.4th at p. 1037), on which 

the plaintiff truck drivers in Collins then relied. But the 

Legislature also expressly ratified most existing exemptions to 

overtime protections already contained in any wage orders, 

including the motor carrier exemption, in newly enacted Labor 

Code section 515. (See Lab. Code, § 515, subd. (b) [the IWC 

need not revisit pre-1998 “exemption[s] from provisions 

regulating hours of work”].) Because the new Labor Code 

overtime provisions expressly ratified existing IWC 

exemptions, and because to conclude otherwise would work an 

implied repeal of a long-standing wage order provision, the 

Collins court rejected the drivers’ argument that they were 

entitled to statutory overtime notwithstanding the motor

carrier exemption. (Collins, supra, 105 Cal.App.4th at 

pp. 179–180 & fn. 4.)

Here, in contrast to Collins, the statutory provision at 

issue was not enacted to serve as an adjunct to the relevant 

IWC wage orders; section 226 both predated the wage

statement requirements of the wage orders and has long 

exceeded them in its substantive and remedial scope. Unlike 

the statutory overtime provision at issue in the Collins

decision, section 226 contains no indication that the 

Legislature intended to embrace all of the IWC exemptions 

wholesale; on the contrary, section 226’s incorporation of 
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Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J.

15

certain IWC exemptions (but not others) suggests a different 

approach. And the presumption against implied repeals that 

played a central role in Collins has no relevance here; section 

226, a statute enacted in 1943, could not have impliedly 

repealed a wage order exemption first created in 1976. Collins, 

in short, offers no support for United’s argument for importing 

the Railway Labor Act exemption into section 226 when the 

Legislature has not chosen to do so.

Finally, and in any event, United’s argument fails

because plaintiffs’ claims relate solely to wage statement 

requirements that are not covered by the wage order. The 

wage order does not require employers to list their address or 

to state hours worked and applicable hourly rates, which is 

what plaintiffs have asked for here.

4

 Even if the wage order 

exemption could be read to excuse compliance with section 226 

to the extent its requirements overlap the wage order’s, we 

have no basis for concluding the IWC intended to exempt, or 

the Legislature authorized it to exempt, employers from 

additional requirements beyond those in the wage order. In 

sum, we conclude the Legislature did not intend the wage

order exemption to foreclose plaintiffs’ section 226 claims.

 

4 As noted, Wage Order No. 9 was last amended in 1976. 

The three wage statement requirements at issue in this case 

were added to section 226 after that time. (See Stats. 1978, 

ch. 1247, § 3, p. 4059 [adding employer address requirement]; 

Stats. 1984, ch. 486, § 1, p. 1990 [adding hours worked 

requirement]; Stats. 2000, ch. 876, § 6, p. 6508 [adding hourly 

rates requirement].)
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Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J.

16

III.

We turn to the Ninth Circuit’s second question: Whether

plaintiffs are entitled to wage statements prepared in

compliance with section 226 of California’s Labor Code, even 

though they perform most of their work outside California.

A.

In debating the coverage of section 226’s wage statement 

requirements, the parties rely heavily on a pair of longstanding presumptions about the intended geographic reach of 

legislative enactments. The first of these is a presumption

against extraterritoriality—that is, a presumption that state 

law is intended to apply only within state borders. Of course, 

legislatures can, and do, regulate beyond their territorial 

borders in appropriate circumstances. (Skiriotes v. Florida

(1941) 313 U.S. 69, 77–79; Tidewater Marine Western, Inc. v. 

Bradshaw (1996) 14 Cal.4th 557, 565–566 (Tidewater); People 

v. Weeren (1980) 26 Cal.3d 654, 666; cf., e.g., Rest.4th Foreign 

Relations Law, § 402 [describing certain recognized bases for 

the United States to regulate persons and conduct outside its 

territory].) But courts ordinarily will not give extraterritorial 

effect to legislative enactments absent an affirmative 

indication that such was the Legislature’s intent. (See, e.g.,

Sullivan v. Oracle Corp. (2011) 51 Cal.4th 1191, 1207

(Sullivan); North Alaska Salmon Co. v. Pillsbury (1916) 174 

Cal. 1, 4; cf. EEOC v. Arabian American Oil Co. (1991) 499 

U.S. 244, 248 [describing similar presumption against 

extraterritoriality governing the acts of Congress].) The rule, 

which reflects an assumption that a legislature generally 

legislates with domestic concerns in mind (Foley Bros. v. 

Filardo (1949) 336 U.S. 281, 285), also serves the incidental 
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Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J.

17

purpose of avoiding unintended conflicts with other sovereigns

(North Alaska Salmon Co., at p. 5; see Arabian American Oil 

Co., at p. 248; Diamond Multimedia Systems, Inc. v. Superior 

Court (1999) 19 Cal.4th 1036, 1059–1060, fn. 20).

The presumption against extraterritoriality has a mirrorimage relative in the form of a presumption in favor of 

intraterritorial application. Employing this presumption, 

courts ordinarily interpret California statutes to apply to 

conduct occurring anywhere within California’s borders, absent 

evidence a more limited scope was intended. (See, e.g.,

Tidewater, supra, 14 Cal.4th at p. 578; People v. Weeren, supra, 

26 Cal.3d at pp. 669–670.)

The parties dispute how these presumptions apply in this 

case. United argues that to apply any provision of California 

labor law to crew members who work primarily outside 

California would constitute an extraterritorial application of 

California law, which we presume the Legislature did not 

intend. The crew members, by contrast, implicitly rely on the 

mirror-image presumption: They argue that because they live

in California and are paid in California (as evidenced by the 

fact they pay California income taxes), requiring United to 

send them California-compliant wage statements would not 

violate the presumption against extraterritoriality but would 

instead constitute a run-of-the-mill intraterritorial application 

of state law.

There is an element of truth to both views, which 

suggests that framing the issue solely as whether the crew 

members’ section 226 claims violate the presumption against 

extraterritoriality is not a particularly helpful way to approach 

the issue in this case. In our modern, interconnected economy, 
WARD v. UNITED AIRLINES, INC.

Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J.

18

many legal transactions and relationships span multiple 

jurisdictions. That goes double for the claims of the employees 

here, whose very livelihoods consist of moving back and forth 

across state and international borders. From any given state’s

perspective, these employees’ claims may well have both

extraterritorial and intraterritorial elements. Unless we are 

prepared to conclude that any extraterritorial effect at all is 

sufficient to bar application of California law, or, conversely, 

that any intraterritorial effect at all is sufficient to justify it, 

we cannot resolve this case based on territorial presumptions

alone.

We made this very point in Tidewater, supra, 14 Cal.4th 

557, in which we resolved a dispute over the application of 

IWC wage order overtime provisions to maritime workers 

employed in the Santa Barbara Channel. We there resisted 

the employers’ argument that the reach of the IWC’s wage 

orders was necessarily limited by California’s territorial 

boundaries. “In some circumstances,” we noted, “state 

employment law explicitly governs employment outside the 

state’s territorial boundaries. (Lab. Code, §§ 3600.5, 5305 

[California workers’ compensation law applies to workers hired 

in California but injured out of state].) The Legislature may 

have similarly intended extraterritorial enforcement of IWC 

wage orders in limited circumstances, such as when California

residents working for a California employer travel temporarily 

outside the state during the course of the normal workday but 

return to California at the end of the day. On the other hand, 

the Legislature may not have intended IWC wage orders to 

govern out-of-state businesses employing nonresidents, though

the nonresident employees enter California temporarily during 

the course of the workday.” (Tidewater, at pp. 577–578.) We 
WARD v. UNITED AIRLINES, INC.

Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J.

19

therefore declared ourselves “not prepared . . . to hold that 

IWC wage orders apply to all employment in California, and 

never to employment outside California.” (Id. at p. 578.)

Because we ultimately concluded the employees in 

Tidewater did work exclusively in California, we had no need 

to press the issue further. But since Tidewater, a considerable 

body of out-of-state case law has done just that. Courts have 

concluded, for example, that in some circumstances one state’s 

law may well govern work performed in another state—or, 

conversely, that another state’s laws do not govern work 

performed partly in that state.5

 

5 See, e.g., Dow v. Casale (2013) 83 Mass.App.Ct. 751, 756 

[989 N.E.2d 909, 913] (Massachusetts wage law applied to

traveling salesperson of Massachusetts employer, even though 

salesperson resided in Florida and performed work in more 

than 19 states); Solouk v. European Copper Specialties, Inc.

(S.D.N.Y., May 2, 2019, No. 14cv8954 (DF)) 2019 U.S.Dist. 

Lexis 81267, pp. *47–*50 (New York labor law could apply to 

work performed in New Jersey incident to public works project 

in Manhattan); Heng Guo Jin v. Han Sung Sikpoom Trading 

Corp. (E.D.N.Y., Sept. 21, 2015, No. 13-CV-6789 (CBA) (LB)) 

2015 U.S.Dist. Lexis 125961, pp. *23–*26 (New York minimum 

wage and overtime law might apply to New York-based 

delivery truck driver who made deliveries both in and out of 

state); Hernandez v. NJK Contractors, Inc. (E.D.N.Y., May 1, 

2015, No. 09-CV-4812 (RER)) 2015 U.S.Dist. Lexis 57568, 

pp. *121–*122 (presumption against extraterritorial 

application of New York labor law would not preclude New 

York-based workers’ recovery under that law for travel time to 

and from job site in neighboring state); Bostain v. Food Exp., 

Inc. (2007) 159 Wn.2d 700, 712–713 [153 P.3d 846, 852] 

(Washington overtime law applied to Washington-based 

interstate truck driver, even when driving out of state).
WARD v. UNITED AIRLINES, INC.

Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J.

20

In our most recent discussion of this issue, we held that 

California’s overtime laws applied to nonresident employees of 

a California corporation who worked in California for “full days 

and weeks” at a time. (Sullivan, supra, 51 Cal.4th at p. 1201.) 

In so holding, we rejected the employer’s argument that the 

overtime laws of the employees’ home state necessarily 

followed them into California, creating a conflict with 

California law. (Id. at p. 1198.) But we did not hold that the 

employment laws of another state can never apply to work 

performed in California. Nor, for that matter, did we hold 

either that California’s employment laws always apply to every 

minute or hour of work performed in this state or that these 

laws never apply when work is performed in part out of state. 

(See id. at pp. 1199–1200 [discussing Tidewater, supra, 14 

Cal.4th 557].) Finally, we did not suggest the same conclusion 

necessarily applies to every aspect of wage and hour law. 

While we held California’s overtime law does apply to “full 

days and weeks of work performed here by nonresidents,” we 

declined to assume California law would also govern “the 

content of an out-of-state business’s pay stubs, or the 

treatment of its employees’ vacation time.” (Sullivan, at 

p. 1201.) In such cases, California may well have a lesser 

interest in applying its own laws, and the laws of another 

jurisdiction might instead control. (Ibid.)

From these cases, we derive two general lessons. First, 

when it comes to the regulation of interstate employment, it is 

not sufficient to ask whether the relevant law was intended to 

operate extraterritorially or instead only intraterritorially, 

because many employment relationships and transactions will 

have elements of both. The better question is what kinds of 

California connections will suffice to trigger the relevant 
WARD v. UNITED AIRLINES, INC.

Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J.

21

provisions of California law. And second, the connections that 

suffice for purposes of one statute may not necessarily suffice 

for another. There is no single, all-purpose answer to the 

question of when state law will apply to an interstate 

employment relationship or set of transactions. As is true of 

statutory interpretation generally, each law must be 

considered on its own terms.

B.

With this background in mind, we consider the 

geographic scope of the labor protection in section 226. Again, 

the statute regulates the information an employer must give 

its employees when it pays wages. “An employer, semimonthly 

or at the time of each payment of wages, shall furnish to his or 

her employee” in connection with each wage payment “an 

accurate itemized statement in writing” disclosing nine 

categories of information, including the pay period, hours 

worked, applicable hourly rates, gross and net wages earned, 

and any deductions taken. (§ 226, subd. (a).) Section 226 

contains no language specifying its intended geographic scope. 

As earlier noted, the statute excludes certain employers,

including most government employers (id., subd. (i)), and 

certain employees, including domestic childcare providers and 

others providing some personal services (id., subd. (d)). There 

are, however, no express inclusions or exclusions based on any 

particular set of geographic considerations.

To gain insight into the question, then, we consider

section 226’s aims and its role in the surrounding statutory

scheme. The core purpose of section 226 is “to ensure an

employer ‘document[s] the basis of the employee compensation 

payments’ to assist the employee in determining whether he or 
WARD v. UNITED AIRLINES, INC.

Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J.

22

she has been compensated properly.” (Soto v. Motel 6 

Operating, L.P. (2016) 4 Cal.App.5th 385, 390, quoting Gattuso 

v. Harte-Hanks Shoppers, Inc. (2007) 42 Cal.4th 554, 574; see 

Henry M. Lee Law Corp. v. Superior Court (2012) 204 

Cal.App.4th 1375, 1388 [the statute vindicates the public 

policy in favor of full and prompt payment of earned wages]; 

Dept. of Industrial Relations, DLSE Opn. Letter 

No. 2002.05.17 (May 17, 2002) p. 3 [§ 226 “is designed to 

provide the employee with a record of hours worked, and to

assist the employee in determining whether he [or she] has 

been compensated properly for all of his or her hours 

worked”].) Section 226 is part of a matrix of laws intended to

ensure workers are correctly and adequately compensated for

their work. From this we reasonably infer that the relevant

geographic connection for purposes of determining what state

law applies is where that work occurs.

The increment of work covered by section 226 is also 

relevant to the inquiry. Unlike, for example, the overtime laws

at issue in Sullivan, section 226 does not operate at an hourly, 

daily, or even weekly level. (See § 226, subd. (a).) Section 226 

does not dictate what the employee is paid for any given period 

of time, but instead how the pay will be documented, requiring

that certain information be provided to the employee each pay 

period (typically a period of about two weeks). (§ 226, 

subd. (a); see Lab. Code, § 204, subd. (a).) Section 226 appears 

to contemplate that the information supplied will be 

comprehensive, embracing all hours, wages, and deductions for 

the given pay period (see, e.g., § 226, subd. (a), item (2) [“total 

hours worked”], item (4) [“all deductions”], item (6) [“the 

inclusive dates of the period for which the employee is paid”], 

item (9) [“all applicable hourly rates”]), and thus that a single 
WARD v. UNITED AIRLINES, INC.

Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J.

23

state’s law will govern what information must be furnished to 

the employee about wages earned over the course of that

period. While Sullivan raises the possibility that an 

employee’s substantive compensation might be governed by 

different states’ laws depending on where and how much the

employee worked during a given pay period, the wage 

statement statute does not admit of the same possibility. The 

statute does not appear to contemplate, for example, that an 

employee who works in 10 different jurisdictions over the 

course of a single pay period should receive 10 different wage 

statements, each prepared according to the laws of a different 

state.6 Any work-location-based test for section 226 must 

reconcile the possibility that some employees may perform 

their work in more than one jurisdiction with the legislative 

desire for a single statement documenting employee pay. 

Based on these considerations, United proposes we adopt

a “job situs” test, borrowing a phrase from federal case law 

interpreting a provision of federal labor law. (See Oil Workers 

v. Mobil Oil Corp. (1976) 426 U.S. 407, 414 (Oil Workers) 

[under federal labor law, “it is the employees’ predominant job 

situs rather than a generalized weighing of factors or the place 

of hiring” that determines whether a state’s right-to-work law 

may apply].) Under this test, a jurisdiction’s labor laws would 

apply to workers who perform all or most of their work in the 

jurisdiction. This makes sense for section 226, United says, 

because the statute’s primary concern is with the general 

 

6 Nor does Ward propose such an interpretation. The 

plaintiffs in Oman v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., supra, ___ Cal.5th 

___, do, however, and we address the argument in that case.
WARD v. UNITED AIRLINES, INC.

Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J.

24

regulation of the payment of employees within the context of 

an established employment relationship, and “the center of 

[that] relationship is the job situs, the place where the work 

that is the very raison d’être of the relationship is performed.” 

(Oil Workers, at p. 417.) 

We agree with the basic premise of this argument: 

Application of section 226 logically depends on whether the 

employee’s principal place of work is in California.

7 That test 

is certainly satisfied when the employee spends the majority of 

his or her working hours in California. But this case 

demonstrates why that answer is only a partial one. These

plaintiffs, like many transportation workers, do not perform

the bulk of their work in any one state.8 United argues that 

that is the end of the story; they are not entitled to the 

protections of California wage statement law. But if every 

state were to adopt the same rule, then many transportation-

 

7 This aligns section 226 with the many Labor Code 

provisions that by their terms reflect an overarching legislative 

concern with regulating work performed in this state, as 

opposed to elsewhere. (See, e.g., Lab. Code, §§ 1173, 1174,

1193.5.)

8 Neither Tidewater nor Sullivan dealt with such a 

circumstance. In Tidewater, we determined that the 

employees worked exclusively in California. (Tidewater, supra, 

14 Cal.4th at pp. 578–579.) And in Sullivan, although the

employees worked in various states, for the specific period of 

time at issue under the laws in question—days or weeks under 

the overtime laws—they worked entirely in California. 

(Sullivan, supra, 51 Cal.4th at p. 1196.) Here, the relevant 

time frame is a pay period, and in every pay period these 

employees not only worked in many states, but also did not 

work most of their time in any single state.
WARD v. UNITED AIRLINES, INC.

Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J.

25

sector employees—from interstate truck drivers to train 

conductors to the airline employees here—would not be 

entitled to the protections of any state’s law: Effectively, 

because these employees work in many jurisdictions, they 

would receive the protections of none.

That conclusion would conflict with the approach we 

traditionally have taken to the employee protections of the 

Labor Code. California’s wage and hour laws are remedial in 

nature and must be liberally construed in favor of affording

workers protection. (Dynamex Operations West, Inc. v. 

Superior Court (2018) 4 Cal.5th 903, 953; Brinker Restaurant 

Corp. v. Superior Court, supra, 53 Cal.4th at pp. 1026–1027; 

Murphy v. Kenneth Cole Productions, Inc. (2007) 40 Cal.4th 

1094, 1103.) But equally important, to deny section 226’s 

protections to interstate transportation workers would conflict 

with what we know of the history preceding section 226’s 1943 

enactment (Stats. 1943, ch. 1027, § 1, p. 2965), which reveals

that this class of workers was the inspiration for the new law

and its primary intended beneficiary. Specifically, the history

shows the measure was introduced at the behest of railroad

employees who, receiving checks that showed only the net

amount they were paid, had no way to verify whether this

amount was correct. (See, e.g., Sen. Gannon, author of Assem.

Bill No. 295 (1943 Reg. Sess.) letter to Governor Earl Warren,

May 13, 1943, p. 1 (Gannon Letter) [“A.B. 295 was introduced

by me at the request of thousands of employees of the Southern

Pacific Company”]; James H. Anderson, Dining Car Employees

Local 582 and Credit Union Ltd., letter to Governor Earl

Warren in support of Assem. Bill No. 295 (1943 Reg. Sess.)

May 21, 1943; Charles Elsey, The Western Pacific Railroad

Company, letter to Governor Earl Warren in opposition to
WARD v. UNITED AIRLINES, INC.

Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J.

26

Assem. Bill No. 295 (1943 Reg. Sess.) May 18, 1943.) The 

author of the bill represented that these workers were among 

“the comparatively few working men in California” who did not 

already receive such statements. (Gannon Letter, at p. 2.) 

This background suggests the Legislature intended to extend 

section 226’s protections—within reason—to workers who 

perform at least some of their work in California, even if they 

do not perform all or most of their work in California.

To determine how far these protections extend, we return 

to the central insight that has long guided courts seeking to 

discern the geographic scope of legislative enactments: that 

the Legislature ordinarily does not intend for its enactments to 

create conflicts with other sovereigns. We can infer from this 

that the Legislature intended for section 226 to apply to 

workers whose work is not performed predominantly in any 

one state, provided that California is the state that has the 

most significant relationship to the work. For interstate 

transportation workers and others who do not work more than 

half the time in any one state, we conclude this principle will 

be satisfied if the worker performs some work here and is 

based in California, meaning that California serves as the 

physical location where the worker presents himself or herself 

to begin work. This is not a new concept in labor law; this is, 

in fact, the same general test that has been applied for some 

decades in the field of unemployment insurance, where the 

Legislature has paid focused attention to the problem of 

coverage for employees whose work is not localized in any one 
WARD v. UNITED AIRLINES, INC.

Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J.

27

state. (See Unemp. Ins. Code, §§ 602–603.)9 Applied to section

226, it means that workers are covered if they perform the 

majority of their work in California; but if they do not perform

the majority of their work in any one state, they will be covered 

if they are based for work purposes in California. This familiar

test supplies clarity and certainty for employers and 

employees, while also appropriately balancing the Legislature’s 

weighty interest in the protection of California workers, 

including interstate transportation workers, with similarly 

 

9 More than half a century ago, to “avoid conflicts and 

overlapping coverage between States with respect to the

service of a single individual for a single employer performed 

in two or more States,” the United States Department of Labor 

described a series of sequential considerations for determining 

an employee’s place of work for purposes of unemployment 

insurance coverage. (U.S. Dept. of Labor, Manual of State 

Employment Security Legislation (1950) p. C–12; see id. at 

pp. 10–11.) Drawing on this guidance, the Legislature adopted 

a test that reaches both employees whose work occurs 

exclusively or primarily in California and those whose work is 

not localized in any one state, but who do some work in 

California and have their base of operations in the state. (See 

Unemp. Ins. Code, §§ 602–603.)

The test identifies additional considerations to consult 

for employees whose work is not localized in any state and who 

have no base of operations. (Unemp. Ins. Code, § 602, 

subd. (b).) Because plaintiffs here appear to have a base of 

operations in a state where they perform some of their work, 

we need not express any view as to whether these or other 

similar considerations should be consulted to determine section 

226’s application for employees who are neither localized nor 

have any established base of operations in any state.
WARD v. UNITED AIRLINES, INC.

Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J.

28

weighty considerations of interstate comity and avoidance of

conflicts of laws.

10

C.

In adopting this approach, we reject several alternative 

approaches proposed by the parties. First, United suggests our 

interpretation of section 226 should take into account the fact 

that plaintiffs perform most of their work in airspace subject to 

the exclusive jurisdiction of the federal government. (See 49 

U.S.C. § 40103(a) [“The United States Government has 

exclusive sovereignty of airspace of the United States”].) 

United’s argument relies heavily on Oil Workers, supra, 426 

U.S. 407, which interpreted a federal labor law authorizing

union or agency shops but allowing individual states to enact 

“right-to-work” laws prohibiting such shops. The specific 

question in Oil Workers concerned how this law should apply to 

employees who spent the majority of their time on oil tankers 

on the high seas. (Id. at p. 420.) There, applying the “job 

situs” test, the high court concluded no state “right-to-work” 

law applied, and the authority to enter an agency shop 

agreement was instead governed exclusively by federal law. 

(Id. at pp. 420–421.) United argues that here, too, no state 

wage statement law should apply to workers who spend the 

majority of their time in federally regulated airspace, and the 

 

10 Consistent with our statute-by-statute approach to 

determining the scope of employment protections (Sullivan, 

supra, 51 Cal.4th at p. 1201), what we say is specific to section 

226 and would not necessarily apply to the state’s minimum 

wage, equal pay, or antiharassment laws, for example.
WARD v. UNITED AIRLINES, INC.

Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J.

29

matter should instead be left to federal law (which currently 

imposes no wage statement requirements).

But this case differs from Oil Workers because that case 

concerned the proper interpretation of a federal law that 

evinced the federal government’s independent interest in 

regulating the subject of the employment law at issue. (Oil 

Workers, supra, 426 U.S. at pp. 420–421.) There was no 

particular reason to conclude Congress would have been averse 

to a test that created an occasional state law vacuum, for in its 

absence, federal law would continue to apply. Here, in 

contrast, we have reason to believe the Legislature would have 

been concerned about providing no protection to employees 

who work in California, with whom California has the most 

significant relationship to the employee’s work, and for whom 

no other law would otherwise apply. And unlike in Oil

Workers, which involved the potential application of state law 

concerning union shop agreements, a matter also regulated 

under federal law (see 29 U.S.C. § 164(b); Oil Workers, at 

p. 409), Congress has not seen fit to enter the area of wage 

statement regulation.

Implicit in United’s argument is the idea that the federal 

government’s interests, too, should factor into our 

consideration of which jurisdiction has the most significant 

connection to the employment relationship for purposes of 

applying section 226, at least when it comes to interstate 

transportation workers who perform most of their work in the 

air instead of on the ground. But as the Legislature that 

enacted the statute undoubtedly understood, in our system of 

federalism, federal law and state law ordinarily coexist. When 

the two overlap, tensions between them are resolved not by 

interstate comity and choice of law principles but by the 
WARD v. UNITED AIRLINES, INC.

Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J.

30

supremacy clause and preemption principles. If the federal 

government prefers that no state law on a particular subject 

apply to workers who spend their time primarily in federal 

airspace, it can legislate and preempt. But in the absence of 

any federal action, we have no reason to think applying 

California law would encroach on federal prerogatives, nor any 

reason rooted in considerations of comity to conclude the 

Legislature would have preferred that workers based in

California go unprotected by section 226.

Ward, for his part, contends that section 226 should 

apply to employees who perform significant work in California 

and are “headquartered” here. But Ward also relies on a 

federal case, Bernstein v. Virgin America, Inc. (N.D.Cal. 2017) 

227 F.Supp.3d 1049, to argue that three additional factors 

should play a role: where the employee resides, pays taxes,

and receives wage payments. Bernstein adopted this

multifactor test based on its reading of Sullivan, supra, 51 

Cal.4th 1191. It inferred from Sullivan that in deciding 

whether a state labor protection applies, a court should 

consider, inter alia, where work was performed, where pay was 

received, where the employer and employee resided, and 

whether work outside the state was of a temporary nature. 

(Bernstein, at p. 1060.) Sullivan, however, did not establish an 

all-purpose multifactor test of this sort. It considered only 

“whether California’s overtime law applies to work performed 

here by nonresidents” (Sullivan, at p. 1196, italics added) and 

answered that question by carefully construing the specific 

statute at issue and determining whether that statute should 

apply to the plaintiffs’ work (id. at pp. 1197–1198), rejecting 

any inference that the conclusion it reached should extend to 
WARD v. UNITED AIRLINES, INC.

Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J.

31

other statutes (id. at p. 1201), each of which would require

their own statutory analyses.

Under section 226, we decline to place weight on the 

three additional factors—residence, receipt of wages, and 

payment of taxes—Ward proposes. To begin with, the extra 

factors he cites beyond residence are entirely derivative of the 

underlying fact of residence: “The California [employees’] 

receipt of wages and wage statements in California is simply a 

consequence of the [employees’] California residency if their 

wage statements are mailed to their mailing addresses in 

California. Similarly, California [employees’] payment of 

California income taxes . . . is also a result of the [employees’] 

California residency.” (Shook v. Indian River Transport Co.

(E.D.Cal. 2017) 236 F.Supp.3d 1165, 1172.)

Nor is residence alone significant. We have already 

established that being a nonresident does not exclude an 

employee from the state’s labor protections, as the employer in 

Sullivan, supra, 51 Cal.4th 1191, had argued. We looked for 

instruction to Labor Code section 1171.5, subdivision (a), which 

guarantees that “[a]ll protections, rights, and remedies 

available under state law, except any reinstatement remedy 

prohibited by federal law, are available to all individuals 

regardless of immigration status who have applied for 

employment, or who are or who have been employed, in this 

state.” We acknowledged that the provision had been adopted 

“to protect undocumented workers from sharp practices.” 

(Sullivan, at p. 1197, fn. 3.) We rejected, however, the 

inference that the Legislature sought only to protect 

undocumented workers from outside the United States: 

“Section 1171.5 . . . cannot reasonably be read as speaking only 

to undocumented workers, given that it was drafted and 
WARD v. UNITED AIRLINES, INC.

Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J.

32

codified as a general preamble to the wage law and broadly 

refers to ‘all individuals’ employed in the state. (Id., subd. (a).) 

More importantly, no reason exists to believe the Legislature 

intended to afford stronger protection under the employment 

laws to persons working illegally than to legal nonresident 

workers.” (Sullivan, at p. 1197, fn. 3.) We interpreted section

1171.5 as expressing an intent to afford all those working in 

California the benefit of the state’s worker protections, without 

regard to residence.

The proposition Ward argues here—residence should 

imply protection—is the inverse of the proposition the 

employer advanced and we rejected in Sullivan, supra, 51 

Cal.4th 1191 (that nonresidence implies nonprotection). Just 

as Labor Code section 1171.5 weighs against finding

nonresidence disqualifying for purposes of applying state labor 

protections, it also weighs against finding residence to be the 

sine qua non for purposes of applying those protections. The 

Legislature expressed a clear intent not to have the 

availability of labor protections turn on legal residency in the 

state. And if we were to read section 1171.5 more narrowly as 

extending California law without regard to residence for those 

working inside the state, while not speaking to the relevance of 

residence for those living here but who work primarily out of 

state, we would still need to find some basis for concluding the 

Legislature intended to extend section 226 to the latter 

category of employees. Application of section 226 to those who

work primarily outside the state, based only on their choice to 

reside here, would create overlap and potential conflict-of-laws 

concerns when California law and the law of the state in which

the employee primarily worked differed. The test we apply 

instead, limiting a California employment statute’s scope to 
WARD v. UNITED AIRLINES, INC.

Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J.

33

circumstances in which California’s relationship to the work is 

more significant than any other state’s, avoids such concerns.

Ward’s proposed application of section 226 based on 

residence would also create significant complications for some 

out-of-state employers. For example, the statute requires that 

“a copy of the [wage] statement and the record of the 

deductions shall be kept on file by the employer for at least

three years at the place of employment or at a central location 

within the State of California.” (§ 226, subd. (a), italics added.) 

The requirement that records be maintained within California, 

and hence within the geographic area over which the 

Department of Labor Standards Enforcement and other state 

agencies have jurisdiction, doubtless is intended to facilitate 

investigation and enforcement of compliance.11 For a business 

that operates, for instance, only in Stateline, Nevada, this 

would require the establishment of a separate records depot in 

California if, for reasons beyond the employer’s control, one or 

more employees elected to reside in the immediately adjacent 

City of South Lake Tahoe, on the California side of the same 

community. If an employee principally works in and is based 

 

11 This language was added in 1987. (Stats. 1987, ch. 976, 

§ 1, p. 3266.) It mirrors similar language that has appeared in 

the IWC’s wage orders since 1968. (See, e.g., IWC wage order 

No. 9–68, § 7(c); Wage Order No. 9, § 7(C).) Explaining the 

requirement, the IWC has said, “With regard to the meaning of 

‘central’ location, the [IWC] will allow required records to be 

kept together at any single location within California, provided 

that they are available to the Division [of Labor Standards

Enforcement]. Enforcement experience has proved this 

requirement to be necessary.” (IWC 1976 Statement of 

Findings, supra, p. 12.)
WARD v. UNITED AIRLINES, INC.

Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J.

34

out of Nevada, and only incidentally works in California, 

Nevada law governing wage statements should apply 

regardless of whether the employee chooses to live across the 

border in California, receive pay here, and pay taxes here. On 

the other hand, if an employee principally works in California 

out of headquarters here, with some incidental work in 

Nevada, section 226 should apply, notwithstanding that the 

employee may elect to live in Nevada. We decline Ward’s

invitation to make employees’ residence a focus of the test for 

determining whether an employer must furnish wage 

statements that comply with California law.

Finally, Ward proposes section 226 should apply, 

whether or not an employee works principally in California, so 

long as the “conduct which gives rise to liability . . . occurs in 

California.” (Diamond Multimedia Systems, Inc. v. Superior

Court, supra, 19 Cal.4th at p. 1059.) Ward asserts that the 

conduct supporting liability under section 226 is the issuance 

of a noncompliant wage statement, and that for the plaintiff 

classes this occurred in California.

There are two difficulties with this argument. First, 

Ward supplies no citation, and upon our independent review 

we discern nothing in the record, to support the assertion that 

United, a corporation incorporated and headquartered 

elsewhere, prepares and issues wage statements in California

(as opposed to such statements simply being received here by

employees who may reside here). Second, a test based on the 

location of the conduct giving rise to liability is hopelessly 

indeterminate when applied to section 226 and similar wage 

and hour protections. Is liability based on preparation of a 

noncompliant statement, in State X, where an employer may 

house its payroll department? Is it in State Y, where the 
WARD v. UNITED AIRLINES, INC.

Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J.

35

statement is received? Or is it in State Z, where corporate

headquarters are located and the decision as to the statement’s 

contents is made? For claims that arise from allegedly 

inadequate wage payments, does the conduct supplying

liability occur where decisions are made, where payments are 

issued, or where payments are received, e.g., wherever an 

employee may have a bank account for direct deposit purposes? 

Looking to the location where the conduct supporting liability 

occurred does not provide a workable test in this context.

Instead, to determine whether section 226 applies, courts 

should consider in the first instance whether the employee 

works the majority of the time in California, or in another 

state. For employees, like those here, who do not work 

principally in any one state, a court should consider 

secondarily whether the employee has a definite base of 

operations in California, in addition to performing at least 

some work in the state for the employer. Thus, if a pilot or 

flight attendant has a designated home-base airport, section 

226 would apply if that airport is in California, and not if it is 

elsewhere. The remaining factors mentioned in the Ninth 

Circuit’s question—employer location, employee residence, 

receipt of pay, and payment of taxes—are not pertinent.

IV.

We answer the Ninth Circuit’s questions as follows:

(1) The Railway Labor Act exemption in Wage Order

No. 9, section 1(E), does not bar a wage statement claim 

brought under section 226 by an employee who is covered by a

collective bargaining agreement.

(2) Section 226 applies to wage statements provided by 

an employer if the employee’s principal place of work is in 
WARD v. UNITED AIRLINES, INC.

Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J.

36

California. This test is satisfied if the employee works a 

majority of the time in California or, for interstate 

transportation workers whose work is not primarily performed 

in any single state, if the worker has his or her base of work 

operations in California.

 KRUGER, J.

We Concur:

CANTIL-SAKAUYE, C. J.

CHIN, J.

CORRIGAN, J.

LIU, J.

CUÉLLAR, J.

GROBAN, J.
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court.

Name of Opinion Ward v. United Airlines, Inc.

__________________________________________________________________________________

Unpublished Opinion

Original Appeal

Original Proceeding XXX on request pursuant to rule 8.548, Cal. Rules of Court

Review Granted

Rehearing Granted

__________________________________________________________________________________

Opinion No. S248702

Date Filed: June 29, 2020

__________________________________________________________________________________

Court: 

County: 

Judge: 

__________________________________________________________________________________

Counsel:

Jackson Hanson, Jeffrey C. Jackson, Kirk D. Hanson; Esner, Chang & Boyer, Stuart B. Esner and Joseph S. 

Persoff for Plaintiffs and Appellants.

Mastagni Holstedt, David E. Mastagni and Isaac S. Stevens for Dan Goldthorpe, James Donovan, Chris 

Bennett, James Isherwood and David Vincent as Amici Curiae on behalf of Plaintiffs and Appellants.

O’Melveny & Myers, Robert Siegel, Adam P. KohSweeney and Susannah K. Howard for Defendant and 

Respondent.

Jones Day, Douglas W. Hall, Shay Dvoretzky and Vivek Suri for Airlines for America as Amicus Curiae 

on behalf of Defendant and Respondent.
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion):

Stuart B. Esner

Esner, Chang & Boyer

234 East Colorado Blvd., Suite 975

Pasadena, CA 91101

(626) 535-9860

Kirk D. Hanson

Jackson Hanson, LLP

2790 Truxton Rd., Suite 140

San Diego, CA 92106

(619) 523-9001

Adam P. KohSweeney

O’Melveny & Myers LLP

2 Embarcadero Center, 28th Floor

San Francisco, CA 94111-3823

(415) 984-8700