EL ECTRONI C CI TATI ON: 2009 FE D App. 0005P (6th Cir.) File Na me: 09b0005p.06

BA NK RU P TC Y A P P ELLA TE P AN EL OF THE SI XT H C IR CU IT

I nre : J OY AN N D UT KIEW I C Z, ) ) Debtor. )

_____________________________________ ) ) J EFF A. MOYER, CHAPTER 7 TRUSTEE, ) ) Appellant, ) ) v. ) No. 09-8001 ) J OY AN N D UT KIEW I C Z, ) ) ) Appellee

. ) )
Appea l from the United States B ankruptc y Court for the Wester

n District of Michig an Case No. 08- 05019 Argued: May

20, 2009
Dec ided and F iled: J uly

6, 2009
B e fo re : F UL TO N, HA RRI S, a nd SHE A- STO NU M, B ank ru ptc y Ap pe llate Pane l Judg e s.

____________________ CO UN SEL
ARG UED: J ef

f A. Moy er, TH E BA

NKRUPTCY GROUP, I NC., Wy oming, Michig an, for Ap pe lla nt. Jon D . Stratma

n, DA VI D A

ND ERS ON & ASS OC I AT ES, P.C. , G ra nd Ra pid s, Michig an, for Ap p el lee. O N B RI E F: J eff A. Moy er, TH E BA

NKRUPTCY GROUP, I NC., Wy omi ng , M ic hig an, fo r A pp e lla nt. Jon D . Stratma

n, DA VI D AND ERS ON & ASS OC I AT ES, P.C., Grand Rapids, Michig an, for Appellee

.- 2- ____________________ OP IN ION

____________________ ARTHUR I . HARRI S, Bankr uptcy Appellate Pane l J udg e. In this case, Jeff A. Moy er, Cha pte r 7 Tr us te e , ( “ Tr

us te e ” ) a pp e a ls a n o rd e r of the ba

nk ru ptc y c ourt ov e rr

uli ng his ob

je c tio n to J oy Dutkiewicz’s (“ Debtor” ) cla im of exempti ons as untimely . For t h e re as o n s that follow, we AF F I RM the or de r o f t

he ba nk ru ptc y c ourt

. I. ISS UE ON AP P EAL
Whether the ba

nkruptcy court e rre d when it found that the Tr ustee’s obje ction to the Debtor’ s
c l a i m o f e x e mp t i o n s w a s u n t i m e l y.

II. JU RI SDI CT ION AND STANDARD OF RE VI EW
Th e B ank ru ptc y Ap pe llate Pane l of the Sixth Cir c uit ha s juri sd ic tio n to de c ide thi s a pp e a l. The United States District Court for the Western District of Michig an has a uthorized appea ls to the Pane l, a nd ne ith e r p art

y ha s time ly e le c te d to hav e thi s app e a l hea rd by the dis tr ic t court

. 28 U. S.C. §§ 15 8( b) (6 ), (c )( 1)

. A fin a l ord e r of the ba nk ru ptc y c ourt may be a

pp e a le d as o f r ig ht p ur su a nt t o 28 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) . An orde r on an obje ction to a debtor’ s claim of exemption is a final order fo r p u rposes of appea l. See B aumgart v. Alam ( In re Alam) , 3 5 9 B

. R. 1 4 2 , 1 4 5 ( B

. A

. P. 6th Cir. 2 0 0 6 ) ( ci t i n g W

ic he ff v . B au mg

ar t ( In re W ic he ff) , 215 B.R. 839, 840 (B .A.P. 6th Ci r. 1998))

. The ba nkruptcy court’s c onclusions of

la w a r e r e v ie wed de novo

. See R iverv iew Trenton R.R. C o
. v. DSC, Ltd. (

In re DSC, Ltd.) , 486 F.3d 940 ( 6th Cir. 2007). “Unde r a de novo s ta ndard of review, the re viewing court de cides a n issue independe ntly

of, and w ithout defere nce to, the tr ial court’s determination.” Menninge r v. Acc redited Home Lenders ( In re M orgeson) , 371 B.R. 798, 800 (B .A.P. 6th Ci r. 2007). The court’s f indings of f

act a re r evi ew ed under the clea rly err oneous standard. See I

n re DSC, Ltd. , 486 F. 3 d at 9 4 4

. “A finding of fa ct is clea rly err oneous ‘whe n althoug h there is evidence to support it, t h e re viewing court on the e ntire evide nce is lef t with the definite a nd firm conviction that a mi stake has been c ommitt ed.’ ” Id. (q u o t i n g Anderson v. City of Be sse me r Ci ty , N.C

. , 470 U.S. 564, 573, 105 S. C t. 1504, 1511 (1985)).- 3- III . F AC TS
The De btor filed a voluntary petition for relief under C hapter 7 of t he Bankruptc y Code on J une 5, 2008. The first meeting of cre ditors w as held on J uly 15, 2008. The De btor appe are d and

answe red que stions of the Trustee. D uring the meeting, t h e T ru s tee r equeste d that the Debtor pr ov ide th e T r

u s t e e w i t h a

c o p y o f t h e D e b t o r ’ s d i v o r c e j u d g m e n t

. A tt h e c o n c l u s i o no f his questions, the Trustee stated:
That’s a ll the questions I have f or y ou at this time. To the extent my revie w of the inf or ma tio n pr ov ide d to me [or up on re c e ipt of the Di vo rc e Judg me nt] c a us e s me to need a ny further information or ne ed t o as k an y further questions I ’ll contac t Mr. Ander sen’s off

ice dire ctly

. Assuming that doesn’t become necessar y , I ’ll close y our file at that time. You sho uld rec eive notice of y our Chapter 7 Dischar g e 3 to 4 mon ths fr om t od ay

dir e c tly fr om t he B ank ru ptc y Cou rt . T ha nk y ou fo r c omi ngin today and g ood luck to y ou.
(J.A. at 34-35.) While the Trustee a sserts that the De btor’s fa ilure to provide a copy of the De btor’s div or c e jud g me nt p ri or

to o r at th e § 3 41 me e tin g re su lte d in the a dmi nis tr a tio n of the De bto r’ s e state be ingde lay e d, he did

no t c a ll a su bs e qu e nt m e e tin g a ft e r r e c e ivi nga c op y of the div or c e jud g me nt. The re cord doe s not refle ct when the Trustee actua lly rec eived a copy of the divorc e judg ment. On September 16, 2008, the Trustee filed his Report of F irst Meeting Held, and on September 29, 2008, he fi le d a n o bje c tio n to the De bto r’ s c la im o f exe mpt ion s. Th e Tr us te e a sse rt e d th a t f

un ds ow e d to the De b t o r under the divorce judgme nt were not exempt as spousal support but rather we re in the nature of a pr operty

settlement.
The De btor did not oppose the Trustee ’s objection on the merits. She contende d, howeve r, that the obj e c ti o nw a s u n ti me ly p u r s u an t t o Ru le 4 0 0 3 ( b ) o f th e F e d e r a l R

u le s o f B an kr u p tc y Procedur e and Taylor v. Free land & Kronz , 503 U.S. 638, 112 S

. C t . 1644 (1992). On November

19, 2008, the bankr

uptcy court he ard or al a rgu m en t on the issue of whe ther the § 341 meeting “conc luded” on J uly 15, 2008. After additional briefing by the parties, the bankruptc y court issued its memorandum of dec ision on Dece mber 30, 2008, holding that the meeting had conc luded on J uly 15, 2008, resulting in the Trustee’s obj ection being untim ely

. The ba nkruptcy court issued a sepa rate order overr uling the T rustee’ s objection on Dec ember 30, 2008.- 4-

T h e T r u s te e f il e d th is ti me ly a

p p e a l o n Ja n u ar

y 9 , 2 0 0 9

. T h e D e b to r f il e d a motion for

cer tification of dire ct appeal t o the S ix th Circuit Court of Appe als on Fe bruar y 23, 2009. This Panel iss ue d a n o rd e r d e nyingtha

t mo tio n o n Apr il 1 3, 20 09 , b e c a us e the mot ion

did no t com

ply wi th R

ule 8001(f) (3)( C) of the Fede ral Rules of B ankruptc y Procedur e. See I

n re Dutkie wicz , 403 B.R. 472 (B .A.P. 6th Ci r. 2009).
IV . D ISC USS ION Upon the filing of a ba

nkruptcy petition all of the debtor’s proper ty become s proper

ty of the bankruptc y

estate. 11 U .S.C. § 541. The Bankr uptcy Code, howeve r, per mits a debtor to provide

a list of exempt prope rty

. 11 U.S.C. § 522(b) , ( l ). Th e lis te d pro pe rt y is al low e d as exe mpt

un le ss a par ty in interest objects. 11 U.S.C. § 522( l ); Taylor , 503 U.S. at 642. Any objection to the initial list of property

claimed a s exempt m ust be made within 30 day s after the conc lusion of the meeting of cr editors, unless furthe r time is gr anted by the court. Fe d. R. Ba nkr. P

. 4003(b). I f an inter ested pa rt y do e s n ot o bje c t w ith in t

he 30 da y s a ft e r t he c on c lus ion

of the me e tin g of

c re dit or s, the pa

rt y is b ar r e d f r o m o b j e c t i n g t o t h e d e b t o r ’ s c l a i m o f e xe mp t i o n s e v e n i f t h e d e b t o r h a s n o “ c olo ra ble statutory basis” for

claiming the exemptions. Taylor , 503 U.S. at 643-44. Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 341, t he United States Trustee mus t convene a meeting of cre ditors within a rea sonable time af ter the or der f

or relief is entere d. Fe dera l Rule of Ba nkruptcy Procedur e 2003 g overns the commence ment and continuance of the meeting of cre ditors. Rule 2 0 03(e) provides that the mee ting “ may be adjour ned fr om time to ti me by

announce ment at the mee ting of the adjourne d date a

nd time without further wr itten notice.” While Rule 2003(e) permits the trustee to adjourn and c ontinue the meeting at s ome l ater date, neither t he B ankruptc y Code nor the F eder al Rules of Ba

nkruptcy Procedur e specify the manner in w hich the meeting is to be “conc luded.” In

re Che rry , 341 B.R. 581, 585 (B ankr. S.D. Te x . 2006). The pa rties her e ag ree that the meeting of cr editors re quired by 11 U.S.C. § 341 was schedule d and held on J uly 15, 2008. They disag ree , howeve r, as to whe n the meeting“conc luded” for purposes of Rule 4003(b). The Trustee contends that the J uly 15, 2008, meeting was a djourned and not conc luded until he filed his Report of F irst Meeting Held on September 16, 2008. The De bt o r a s s e rt s t h a tt h e m e e t i n g c o n c l u d e d o nJu l y 1 5 , 2 0 0 8 , b e c a

u s e t h e T r

u s t e e d i d n o tp r o pe rl y- 5-

adjourn the me eting pursuant to Rule 2003(e) . The ba nkruptcy court he ld that the meeting conclude d

o nJ u l y 1 5 , 2 0 0 8 , an d

o v e r r u l e d t h e T r u s t e e ’ s o b j e c t i o na s u n t i m e l y.
The issue of w hen a § 3 4 1 m ee t ing ha s “conc luded” f or purpose s of Rule 4003(b) ha s not been a ddresse d by

the United States Supreme Court, the S i x th Circuit Court of Appeals, or the Ba nkruptcy Appellate Pane l for the Six th Circuit. How ev er , o t her c ourts, including the Fifth a nd Ninth Circuit Courts of Appea ls, ha ve conside red the issue. At least three approa ches ha ve eme rg ed: the brig ht-line, the debtor’ s burden, a nd the ca se-by -ca se appr oach.
Pursuant to the “bright-line” approa ch, which has bee n adopted by the Ninth Circuit Court of Ap pe a ls, the tr

us te e mus t ann ounc e a

sp e c if ic date to w hic h th e me e tin g is b e inga djo ur ne d w ith in 30 da y s o f t he la st m e e tin g he ld o r t

he me e tin g wi ll b e de e me d to have c on c lud e d o n th e la st d a te it was conve ned. See Sm ith v. Kennedy ( In re Smith) , 235 F.3d 472, 476 ( 9th Cir

. 2000) (“ [A] delay ed announc ement would have to be made at least within thirty day s of the last mee ting he ld; otherwise, the whole purpose of the thirty -day require ment of Rule 4003(b) w ould be frustrated.”) ; In re Friedlande r , 284 B.R. 525, 527 (B ankr. D . Mass. 2002) (w here t rustee f ails to announce an
a djo ur ne d d a te and

tim e wi thi n th ir

ty da y s o f t he date on

wh ic h th e meeting of

c re dit or s w a s la st held, the mee ting is dee med to ha ve conclude d on the last meeting date) ; In re Le v itt , 137 B.R. 881, 883 (B ankr. D. Mass. 1992) (same)

. “As the Supreme Court obser ved in Taylor , ‘[d] eadlines ma y lead to unw elcome results, but the y prompt parties to ac t and they produce finality .’ ” In re Sm ith , 2 3 5 F. 3 d at 4 7 6 (q u o t i n g Taylor , 503 U.S. at 644). In adopting the “br ight- line” appr oach in Sm ith , t h e N i n t h C i rc u i tC o u rt o f A p p ea l s ex p l ai n e d t h at “[ t ] o au t h o ri z e t ru s t ee s t o ad j o u rn m ee t i n gs indefinitely , even w hen it is unlikely that any subsequent mee ting will in fac t be ca lled, would nullify the thirty -day

require ment of Rule 4003(b ) , r e n d e r ingthe holding in Tay lor hollow, and under mining the conc erns e x presse d by the Supreme Court about promptness and finality .” Id . Courts favoring this approac h note that a br ight- line rule provide s cer tainty to trustees as to what assets are to be

a dmi nis te re d, and

a llo ws de bto rs to mov e on wi th the ir fr e sh sta rt by a llo wi nge xemp tio ns to b e c ome final wit hin a definite and relatively short time. See I n re Friedlander , 2 84 B .R. a t 52 7; In re Le v itt , 137 B.R. at 883.
Under the “de btor’s burde n” appr oach, the meeting is concluded e ither whe n the trustee decla res it conclude d, or t he debtor obtains a court order concludingthe § 341 meeting

. Se e In re- 6-

Kos s , 319 B.R. 317, 321 (B ankr. D . Mass. 2005) (holding that meeting is not conclude d until trustee d e c la r e s s o o r c o u rt s o o r d e r s ; r e je c ti n g b r ig h t- li n e a

p p r o a c h p r e v io u s ly a d o p te d b y court in In re Le v itt ); In re Fly nn , 20 0 B .R. 48 1, 48 4 ( B ank r. D. Ma ss. 19 96 ) ( same ); In re Di Gr e go rio , 187 B .R. 273, 276 (B ankr. N .D. I ll. 1995) (holding that meeting can c ontinue indefinitely ; debtor has bur den to move for court to c onclude meeting ; motions to be taken on case -by -ca se basis and ac tion taken “only if debtor objec ts to c ontinuance, and the adjournment is f ound to be ‘a

rbitrar y , capr icious, or

an ab u s e o f d i s cr et i o n ’” ) ( qu o t i n g In re Vanc e , 1 20 B .R. 18 1, 19 6 (B ank r. N. D. Ok la

. 19 90 )) . Co ur ts adopting this approac h express a re luctance to impose a precise deadline, such as t he 30-da y deadline of the brig ht-line approa ch, whe re the statutes and rule s do not provide one . See I n re Flynn , 200 B.R. at 484. Courts following the “de b t o r’ s burden” approa ch ar e conc erne d that consideringthe

rea sonablene ss of the trustee ’s ac tions is t oo uncer tain. Id

. I nstead, these courts believe pla cing the burden on the debtor is justified beca use “t he debtor

has the g reatest interest in conc luding the meeting so as to trig g er the 30-day objection per iod . . . .” In re Di Gr e go rio , 1 87 B .R. a t 27 6. B oth the Fifth and Ninth Circ uit Courts of Appe als have reje cted this approa ch. Se e In re Sm ith , 235 F.3d

a t 47 7 n .4 ; Pe re

s v . S he rm an ( In re Pe re

s) , 530 F.3d 375, 378 ( 5th Cir. 2008).
Th e c a se -b y -c a se a

pp ro a c h, wh ic h h a s bee n ad op te d by the F if th C ir c uit Court of Ap pe a ls, considers the fac ts and circ umstance s on a ca se-by -ca se basis to deter mine whether

a mee ting of

cre ditors was conc lud ed or adjourne d. See I n re Pere s , 5 30 F .3 d at 37 8 ( ho ldi ngc a se -b y -c a se
a pp ro a c h af

fo rd s tru ste e dis c re tio n w hil e re str a ini nga bil ity to i nd e fi nit e ly

po stp on e me e tin g ); Pe tit v. Fe ssenden , 182 B.R. 59, 63 n.4 (D. Me. 1995) (finding appropr iate a rule that rec og nizes need for finality but allows flexibi lity of considering fac ts on a ca se-by -ca se basis); In re Che rry , 3 41 B .R.

a t 58 7 ( a pp lyingc a se -b y -c a se a

pp ro a c h) ; In re J

ames , 260 B.R. 368, 372 (B ankr. E.D .N.C. 2001) (s a me ); In re Br own , 221 B.R. 902, 9 06 (B ankr. M.D. F la. 1998) (c ase- by -ca se appr oach a llows trustees discr etion to perf

orm their dut ies, but with some limi tations based on re asonable ness). The F if th C ir c uit Court of Ap pe a ls h a s id e nti fi e d f our f a c tor s w hich o th er cou rt s h a ve c on sid e re d in deter mining the r easona

blen es s o f a trustee’ s delay in adjourning a mee ting of cre ditors: “(1) the leng th of t he delay ; (2) the complexit y of t he estate; (3) the c ooperativeness of the de btor; and (4) the exis tence of any ambig uity reg arding whether the trustee c ontinued or conc luded the mee ting.” In re Pere s , 530 F.3d at 378. The cas e- b y -c ase a pproac h is gr ounded in an e ffor t to affor d trustees- 7-

discretion y et pre vent them from indefinitely postponing the meeting

. Se e In re Che rry , 3 41 B .R. at 587.
The bankruptc y court in the prese nt c ase stated that it “fa vor[ed] t he ca se-by -ca se appr oach

. . . as more faithful to the text and policy of Rule 2003(e ).” ( J .A. at 121.) The court then w ent on to s ta te : [A] brig ht-line is nece ssary . I t is, t h ere fore , rea sonable to conc lude that the adjournment of the first meeting of cr editors must be ef fe ct ed by some objective no ti fi cat ion

to t he de bto r a

nd c re dit or s, so e a c h k

no ws wh e re that br ig ht l ine fa lls

.

. . . . Rule 4003(b)( 1), with its strict 30 day deadline, is ve ry unforg iving. Fr eela nd & K ronz , supra.
(J.A. at 121.) The c ourt then explained that Rule 2003(e) require s objective notice by the trustee of his intent to adjourn the meeting , notice which must be written unless the t rustee give s specific oral notice of a new date and time for the meeting to ever y one pre sent. The c ourt noted that expressing the ne e d f or fu rt he r que sti on ing or inv e sti g a tio n doe s not b y its e lf c on tin ue the me e tin g wi tho ut a lso providing prompt written notice of adj o u rn m en t

. The ba

nkruptcy court found that the Trustee ’s statements at the mee ting sug g ested only that his investigation wa s not complete and did not “qua lify

as an une quivocal and spe cific or al announc ement . . . to adjourn the First M ee t i n g,” and that no written n o t i ce o f an adjourned date was pr ovided within a re asonable time following the J uly 15, 2008, meeting . There fore , the bankruptcy court held that the meetingconclude d on J uly 15, 2008, and the objection, filed m ore than two months later, was untimely . The Tr ustee a lso arg ued bef

ore the bankr uptcy court that by

analog y to the rules g overning e ntry of judg ments, Fe dera l Rules of Ba n kruptcy

Procedur e 9021 and 5003, the court should adopt the e ntry of the Tr ustee’s Repor

t of First Mee ting He ld f

iled on September 16, 2008, as the date the first meeting was conclude d. The bankruptc y

court re jected this ar g ument. The Trustee did not prese nt this arg ument befor e us, and, there fore , it is waived. See U nited States v. Elder , 90 F. 3d 11 10 , 111 8 (6t h Cir. 19 96 ) ( argume nts not addre ssed ar e dee med waive d).
Th e Tr us te e argue s th a t a lth ou g h th e ba nk ru ptc y c ou rt state d th a t it

fa vo re d th e c a se -b y -c a se approa ch, it nevert h eless applied a brig ht-line test by essentially

requiringthat the Trustee g ive a specific date a

nd time orally

at the meet i n g, o r written notice of an a djourned date within a

rea sonable time after the first meeting

. He also asser ts that the bankruptcy

court fa iled to consider- 8-

the re asonable ness of his ac tions. The Trustee urge s us to hold that his statements at the meeting on J uly 16, 2008, constituted holding the meeting open, that his ac tions were r easona ble, and that the meeting was not conc luded until September 16, 2008, whe n he filed his R ep o rt of F irst Meeting Held.

T h e D e b t o r

u r g e s u s t o a d o p t an e n t i r e l y d i f f e r e n t a p p r o a c h u n d e r w h i c h t h e m e e t i n g a l w a ys conclude s on the date it is initially held. This approa ch, she ur g es, has the a dvantag e of pr oviding

a “ sim ple ru le wi th a

n obje c tiv e sta

nd ard that is e a sil y a

pp lie d. ” (A

pp e lle e ’s B r. a t 7. ) I

n urg ingthi s approa ch, the De btor notes that the B ankruptc y Code and F eder al Rules of B ankruptc y Procedur e do not define the words “meeting ” or “conc luded” and that there fore we must turn to their ordinar y and natur al meaning s. See U.S. v. Mc Bride , 3 62 F .3 d 3 60 , 3 71 (6 th C ir . 2 00 4) (u nd e fi ne d te rm s in statutes should be g iven their ordina ry and natur al meaning ).
Bla ck’s L aw Dic tionary

(“Bla ck’s” ) def

ines “mee ting,” in pertinent par t, as “[a] coming tog e the r o f p e rs on s; a

n a sse mb ly .” B L AC K’ S L AW D I CTI ON AR Y 982 (6th ed. 1990). B lack’ s define s “conc luded” a s “[e]nded; de termined; estopped; pre vented f rom.” Id . at 290. Acc ording to the Debtor, in the contex t of Rule 4003 the word “ conclude d” mea ns “ende d.” She asse rts then that beca use a me eting is a g ather ing of people, a meeting ends or “conc ludes” when those per sons
are no longe r g ather ed. There fore , under a “plain mea

ning” approa ch, adjour

ned mee tings do not constitute a single , continuous meeting , but rather a ser ies of mee tings with ea ch mee ting c oncluding when the ne cessa

ry parties, the tr

ustee a nd debtor, leave

. Consequently , “[b] eca use the end of

the initial meeting in a se ries of me eti n gs i s t h e first ti me at which it ca n be said that a

meeting has ‘c on c lud e d, ’ t

he de a dli ne to o bje c t to e xemp tio ns sh ou ld b e c on str ue d a s a lw ay s r

un nin g fr om t

his date .” (A pp e lle e ’s B r. a t 6. ) Un de r the De bto r’ s pr op os e d a pp ro a c h, the ba

nk ru ptc y c ourt sh ou ld be af firmed be cause the meetingconclude d on the day it was conven ed. W e re ject the De btor’s sug g ested a

pproac h, howeve r, bec au s e t he languag e of Rule 2003( e) doe s not provide for a series of ind ivi du a l mee tin g s. Ra the r, Rul e 20 03 (e ) pr ov ide s: “ The me e tin g may be a djo ur ne d f ro m ti me to time.” Fe d. R. Bankr . P. 2003(e) ( emphasis adde d). The only two circ uit courts to addre ss this i ssue have reje cted the de btor’s burde n approa ch. I n Sm ith , the Ninth Circuit Court of Appea ls rejec ted the appr oach a s paying insuff icient hee d to the Supreme Court’s interest in firm, ex plicit deadlines as e x presse d in Taylor , 503 U.S. at 644, and the- 9-

trustee’ s duty

to keep the ba

nkrupt cy p ro ce s s m o v ing. Se e In re Sm ith , 235 F.3d at 477 n.4. The Fifth Circuit re

jected the approa ch as “ ignor [i ng ] t he cle arly -established policy of t he B ankruptc y Cod e of e nc oura g ingpr omp tne ss i n th e fi lin g of ob je c tio ns to exe mpt ion s, be c a us e it w ou ld p e rm it a trustee to c ontinue a mee ting of cre ditors indefinitely .” In re Pe res , 5 30 F .3 d at 37 8. We l ike wi se
re je c t th e de bto r’ s b ur de n a pp ro a c h. Ho we ve r, on

the fa c ts o f t

his c a se , it

is n ot n e c e ssa

ry fo r u s to adopt either

the brig ht-line or the c ase-b y -c as e ap proac h beca use, under

either a pproac h, the Trustee ’s objection wa s untimely

. Se e Be lls ou th T e le c om m. , I

nc . v . F arris , 5 42 F .3 d 4 99 , 5 05 (6 th C i r
. 2 0 0 8 ) ( d e c i d i n g o n l y w h a t i s n e c e s s ar y t o r e s o l v e c u r

r e n t c a se ); P remier Capital, Inc. v. De Car oli s ( In re De Car oli

s) , 259 B.R. 467, 470-71 ( B.A .P. 1st Cir. 2001) (re jecting the brig ht-line approa ch, but finding it unnece ssary on the facts of the c ase to de cide be tween the case -by -ca se or debtor’s bur den appr oach)

. The only meeting held in this case was on J uly 15, 2008. The Trustee did not announce an adjourne d date within 30 day s from that date

. There fore , under the brig ht-line approa ch, the mee ting

wa s c on c lud e d o n July

15 , 2 00 8, and

the Tr us te e ’s ob je c tio n to the De bto r’ s c la im o f e xemp tio ns , wh ic h was no t fi led un til mor e tha n tw o mo nth s late r, wa s unti me ly . App lyingthe c a se -b y -c a se approa ch and the fac tors set forth by the Fifth Circuit in Peres , we would a g ree with the bankruptc y court that the me eting was c o n cl u d ed o n J u l y 15, 2008. I n arguing that the meeting was not conclude d until S eptember 16, 2008, the Trustee focuse s on the relatively short d elay

of approximately

two months between the initial meeting on July 1 5 , 2008, and the Septembe r 16, 2008, filing of his Repor

t of First Meeting Held, as compar ed to muc h longe r delay s in other ca ses wher e cour

ts have found the actions of trustee s rea sonable. While the delay of appr ox imately

two months here wa s indeed relatively brief, the estate was not complex, and the Debtor was coope rative. More importantly , the Trustee did not state clea rly t h at h e wa s keepingthe meetingopen, which

cre ated a mbiguity as to whethe r he w as continuing or concluding the meeting

. As the bankr uptcy

c ourt state d, e xpre ssi ng the po ssi ble ne e d fo r fu rt he r qu e sti on ing or inv e sti g a tio n do e s no t by its e lf continue the mee ting. F or example, the Trustee ’s possible need f or fur ther infor mation or furthe r qu es t i o n s , ex p re s s edat t h e J u l y 1 5 , 2 0 0 8 , m ee t i n g, m i gh twe l l h av e b ee nh an d l edi n fo rm al l y t h ro u gh Debtor’ s counsel, as the Trustee indicated, or throug h a Rule 2004 examination.
Th is a mbi g uit y a s to wh e the r t

he me e tin g wa s e ve r a djo ur ne d dis tin g uis he s the pr e se nt c a se from the c ases c ited by

the Trustee

. Cf. In re Pere s , 530 F.3d at 376 (undisputed that meeting was- 10-

c on tin ue d w ith ou t a

fo rm a l ann ounc e me nt a s to t he da te of c on tin uatio n) ; Petit v. Fesse nden, 182 B.R. at 62 (U.S. Trustee ended previous m eeting by saying: “‘All rig ht, for probably the t hird time, thi s me e tin g is c on tin

ue d w ith ou t a

date .’ ” ); In re Kos s , 31 9 B .R. a t 32 1 (p art ies d id no t d is pu te wh e the r m e e tin g wa s h e ld ope n for se ve n mo nth s) ; In re Br own , 221 B.R. at 903 ( althoug h no tape

rec ordin g of mee ting e x isted, “Trustee either implicitly or explicitl y

continued the mee ting of

c re dit or s to an uns pe c if

ie d f utu re date ” ); In re Fly nn , 200 B.R. at 482 (undisputed that mee ting ha d be e n c on tin

ue d g e ne ra lly

); In re Di Gr e

go rio , 187 B.R. at 274 n.1 ( attorney repr esenting U.S. Trustee “stated at the meeting , ‘

. . . I ’m g oing to g o ahea d and adjour n the meeting . Iam g oing to c ontinue it g e ne ra lly , I ’m

no t c on c lud ingit. ’” ); In re Hav anec , 175 B.R. 920, 921-22 ( Ba nkr. N.D. O hio 1994) (undisputed that repr esentative of U.S. T rustee stated “for cef ully and publicly ” at the meeting that the meeting was adjourned indefinitely). Had the Trustee clea rly indicated on July

15, 2008, that the

me e tin g wa s b e inghe ld o pe n, a de lay of se ve ra l mo nth s b e fo re c on c lud ingthe me eti ng may we ll have be en ac cepta

ble under the ca se-by -ca se appr oach. Never theless, given the ambiguity reg arding whether the Trustee even c ontinued the meetingto an unspec ifi ed date , we c annot say that the bankruptc y

court e rre d in rul i n g t h at t he § 341 mee ting c oncluded on July 15, 2008, the date the meeting was he ld. See In re Pe res , 530 F.3d at 379 (listing “existence of any ambig uity reg arding whether the t ru s t ee co ntinued or conc luded the mee ting” as a f actor in the case -by -ca se ana ly sis). B e c a u s e t h e T r

u s t e e ’ s o b j e c t i o n t o t h e D e b t o r ’ s c l a i m o f e x e mp t i o n s w a s f

i l e d m o r e t h an3 0 d a ys afte r the § 341 mee ting of cre ditors concluded, it wa s untimely under Rule 4003( b).
V. CO NC LU SION
For th e f o r e g o in g r e a s o n s , th e o r d e r o f th e b an kr

u p tc y c o u rt o v e r

r u li n g th e T r

u s te e’s objection to the Debtor ’s claim of e x emptions is AFFI RMED.