UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 15-4669

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

DAVARES ANTONIO ARCHIE,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of 

South Carolina, at Columbia. Joseph F. Anderson, Jr., Senior

District Judge. (3:14-cr-00667-JFA-1)

Submitted: July 28, 2016 Decided: August 4, 2016

Before GREGORY, Chief Judge, and SHEDD and WYNN, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Joshua Snow Kendrick, KENDRICK & LEONARD, P.C., Greenville, 

South Carolina, for Appellant. John David Rowell, Assistant 

United States Attorney, Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:

Davares Antonio Archie appeals his conviction and 120-month 

sentence imposed following his guilty plea to conspiracy to 

distribute and possess with intent to distribute 500 grams or 

more of cocaine and 280 grams or more of cocaine base, in 

violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846 (2012). On appeal, counsel has 

filed a brief pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 

(1967), stating that there are no meritorious issues for appeal 

but questioning (1) whether the district court erred in 

accepting Archie’s guilty plea, and (2) whether the district 

court imposed an unreasonable sentence. Archie was notified of 

his right to file a pro se supplemental brief but has not done 

so. The Government has declined to file a response brief. For 

the reasons that follow, we affirm.

Before accepting a guilty plea, the trial court must 

conduct a colloquy in which it informs the defendant of, and 

determines that the defendant understands, the nature of the 

charges to which he is pleading guilty, any mandatory minimum 

penalty, the maximum penalties he faces, and the rights he is 

relinquishing by pleading guilty. Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(b)(1); 

United States v. DeFusco, 949 F.2d 114, 116 (4th Cir. 1991). 

The court must ensure that the defendant’s plea is knowing, 

voluntary, and supported by an independent factual basis. Fed. 

R. Crim. P. 11(b)(2), (3). 
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Because Archie did not move to withdraw his guilty plea or 

otherwise preserve error in the plea proceedings, we review the 

adequacy of the plea colloquy for plain error. United States v. 

Massenburg, 564 F.3d 337, 342 (4th Cir. 2009). Archie 

establishes plain error by demonstrating that (1) the district 

court erred, (2) the error was plain, and (3) the error affected 

his substantial rights. Henderson v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 

1121, 1126 (2013). In the guilty plea context, a defendant 

establishes that an error affected his substantial rights if he 

demonstrates a reasonable probability that he would not have 

entered his plea but for the error. United States v. AplicanoOyuela, 792 F.3d 416, 427 (4th Cir. 2015). Even if these 

requirements are met, we will “correct the error only if it 

seriously affects the fairness, integrity or public reputation 

of judicial proceedings.” United States v. Nicholson, 676 F.3d 

376, 381 (4th Cir. 2012) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Here, the district court substantially complied with the 

requirements of Rule 11 in conducting the plea colloquy. 

Although the court made minor omissions during the colloquy, see

Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(b)(1)(K), (O), the record provides no basis 

to conclude that these errors affected Archie’s substantial 

rights. See Aplicano-Oyuela, 792 F.3d at 427. Further, while 

we note that the plea agreement mischaracterized the drug 

weights involved in the conspiracy offense with which Archie was 
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charged, we conclude the record otherwise demonstrates that 

Archie’s guilty plea to the charged offense was both knowing and 

voluntary. 

We review Archie’s sentence for reasonableness, applying “a 

deferential abuse-of-discretion standard.” Gall v. United 

States, 552 U.S. 38, 41 (2007). We must first determine whether 

the district court committed significant procedural error, such 

as incorrect calculation of the Sentencing Guidelines range, 

inadequate consideration of the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2012) 

factors, or insufficient explanation of the sentence imposed. 

United States v. Dowell, 771 F.3d 162, 170 (4th Cir. 2014). If 

we find no procedural error, we also examine the substantive 

reasonableness of the sentence under “the totality of the 

circumstances.” Gall, 552 U.S. at 51. The sentence imposed 

must be “sufficient, but not greater than necessary,” to satisfy 

the goals of sentencing. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). We presume

on appeal that a within-Guidelines sentence is substantively 

reasonable. United States v. Louthian, 756 F.3d 295, 306 (4th 

Cir. 2014). Archie bears the burden to rebut this presumption 

“by showing that the sentence is unreasonable when measured 

against the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors.” Id.

Our review of the record reveals that Archie’s sentence is 

reasonable. The district court properly calculated Archie’s 

Guidelines range, heard sentencing arguments from both parties, 
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and explained its rationale for the sentence it imposed. 

Although the court’s explanation was not lengthy, it 

specifically referenced the § 3553(a) factors and was sufficient 

to justify its decision to sentence Archie to the statutory 

minimum — the precise sentence requested by both Archie and the 

Government. Further, Archie fails to rebut the presumption of 

reasonableness accorded his within-Guidelines sentence. 

In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the entire 

record in this case and have found no meritorious issues for 

appeal. We therefore affirm the district court’s judgment. 

This court requires that counsel inform Archie, in writing, of 

the right to petition the Supreme Court of the United States for 

further review. If Archie requests that a petition be filed, 

but counsel believes that such a petition would be frivolous, 

then counsel may move in this court for leave to withdraw from 

representation. Counsel’s motion must state that a copy thereof 

was served on Archie.

We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal 

contentions are adequately presented in the materials before 

this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED