* P ursuant to 5 TH C IR

. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion

should n ot be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances

set forth in 5 TH C IR

. R. 47.5.4.

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

_______________

No. 96-40154

Summary Calendar

_______________

THE TRANSITIONAL LEARNING CENTER AT GALVESTON,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

VERSUS

METROPOLITAN LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY,

Defendant-Appellant.

_________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Texas

(G-95-17)

_________________________ October 19, 1996

Before SMITH, DUHÉ, and BARKSDALE, Circuit Judges.

JERRY E. SMITH, Circuit Judge: *

Metropolitan Life Insurance Company (“MetLife”) appeals the

award of attorneys’ fees and prejudgme nt interest to the Transitional Learning Community at Galveston (“TLC”) under the Employee

Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (“E RISA”), 29 U.S.C.

§§ 1001-1461 (West 1985 & Supp. 1995). We affirm in part and2

vacate and remand in part.

I.

TLC sued MetLife in state cou rt in November 1994, alleging

that MetLife had failed to reimburse TLC fo r various medical

expenses incurred in connecti on with its treatment of Angela

Sibley, a dependent of an insured under a MetLife medical insurance

policy. MetLife removed this action to federal court on the same

day that the state court, after MetLife had failed to appear,

entered a default judgment on TLC’s claims. The district court

later reformed the state court judgment to reflect the parties’

subsequent agreement to the proper amount of monies owed. Upon

motion, the court awarded TLC attorneys’ fees and pre- and postjudgment interest on the amount of the reformed judgment.

We address first MetLife’s argument that this case should be

dismissed because TLC failed to exhaust its administrative remedies

under the ERISA-regulated plan prior to filing the instant action.

According to MetLife, the disposition of the instant claim had been

held up for over two years because TLC failed to prov i de a

completed Statement of Continued Disability from the plan administrator. Once TLC forwarded the completed statement to MetLife, the

claim was settled promptly.

Although we agree with MetLife that TLC may have failed to

exhaust its administrative remedies, we refuse to dismiss the

instant action, as MetLife did no t raise this objection timely.3

When TLC filed its original action, MetLife had ample opportunity

t o raise its exhaustion defense, and we will not reward it for

failing even to appear in that action. That MetLife chose not to

answer TLC’s complaint in state court, but rather compelled the

state court to enter a default judgment against it, con stituted

waiver of its right to assert an exhaustion defense. The district

court found, properly, that MetLife did not proffer any reasonable

justification for its failure to appear in the state court action,

and thus we do not believe that it is prejudiced unduly by its

failure to assert its defenses timely.

MetLife correctly asserts that we have applied the exhaustion

doctrine in suits arising under ERISA, see Medina v. Anthem Life

Ins. Co. , 983 F.2d 29, 33 (5th Cir.), c ert. denied

, 510 U.S. 816

(1993), but we have never construed the doctrine strictly as a

jurisdictional bar, see id. (noting that plaintiff did not exhaust

her remedies because she had never filed a claim for the disputed

sum); Simmons v. Willcox

, 911 F.2d 1077, 1081 (5th Cir. 1990)

(noting that plaintiff did not exhaust her remedies because she had

failed to file any c laim for benefits with the insurer); M eza v.

General Battery Corp. , 908 F.2d 1262, 1279 (5th Cir. 1990)(noting

that the plaintiff did not exhaust her remedies because she never

requested plan information or applied for benefits prior to filing

suit). Rather, we have held that sound public policy underlies the

application of the doctrine to ERISA, see id. at 1279, and the same1 The five factors are:

(1) the degree of the opposing parties’ culp ability or bad faith;

(2) the ability of the opposing parties to satisfy an a w ard of

attorneys’ fees; (3) whether an award of attorneys’ fees would deter

other persons from acting under similar circumstances; (4) whether

the parties requesting attorneys’ fees sough t to benefit all

participants and beneficiaries of an ERISA plan or to resolve a

significant legal question regar ding ERISA itself; and (5) the

relative merits of the parties’ positions.

Iron Workers Local No. 272 v. Bowen , 624 F.2d 1255, 1266 (5th Cir. 1980).

4 applies in the instant case: MetLife could have facilitated the

prompt and efficient disposition of an ERISA claim by appearing in

state court and raising its exhaustion defense in that forum.

II.

MetLife next challenges the award of attorneys’ fees. We

review this for abuse of discretion. See Ramsey v. Colonial Life

Ins. Co. of Am. , 12 F.3d 472, 480 (5th Cir. 1994).

After review ing the five factors 1 used in this circuit, the

district court concluded that

[t]he record fails to show that any of the first four

factors listed in Bowen weigh significantly in favor of

either granting or denying attorneys’ fees. Nonetheless,

considera tion of the final factor, viewed in light of

Defendant’s initial re fusal to pay Plaintiff the owing

funds and subsequent failure to contest liability in a

proper or reasonable manner, persuades this Court to

award Plaintiff the requested attorneys’ fees.

913 F. Supp. 504, 506-07 (S.D. Tex. 1996) (emphasis added).

MetLife interprets these sentences “clearly [to] state[]” that the

court reached its decision “solely on the basis of the relative5

merits of the parties’ positions.” MetLife next protests that,

because the court failed to assess the merits properly, the award

should be reversed.

We disagree. As a preliminary matter, the district court did

not state expressly that the first four factors were inapposite to

the decision, but rather that none on its own significantly cut in

favor of an award.

“[I]n light of Defendant’s ini tial refusal to pay Plaintiff

the owing funds and subsequent failure to contest liability in a

proper or reasonable manner,” 913 F. Supp. at 506-07, the court

made plain that MetLife’s culpability or bad faith (the first Bowen

factor) became significant when considered along with the merits.

That the court could have been more lucid in its explication of the

Bowen factors is not reversible error as long as such factors guide

the decision-making process. See Harms v. Cavenham Forest Indus.,

984 F.2d 686, 694 (5th Cir.)(“No one of these factors is necessarily decisive, and some may not be apropos in a given case, but

together they are the nuclei of concerns that a court should

address in applying section 502(g).”)(citation omitted), cert.

denied , 510 U.S. 944 (1993).

After reviewing the record with proper defere nce to the

district court’s findings, as required under our limited standard

of review, we disagree with MetLife that the court abused its2 We decline TLC’s invitation to award attorneys’ fees for its work

incurred as part of this appeal. Although we do not believe the district court

abused its discretion in so awarding fees, we do not, on independent review of

the record SS i.e., where we are not bound by the deferential standard of review

on appeal SS find that the Bowen factors counsel in favor of such an award.

3 MetLife’s citations to Ramsey

, Harms

, and Hogan v. Kraft Foods

, 969 F.2d

142, 146 (5th Cir. 1992), are inapposite. In each of these cases, we noted that

where there is a complete lack of any bad faith or culpability on the part of the

defendant, the deterrent purpose that the third Bowen factor purports to serve

is inapplicable. R amsey

, 12 F.3d at 480; Harms , 984 F.2d at 694 n.12; H ogan

, 969 F.2d at 146. As our discussion above notes, however, the record in the

instant case reflects such evidence of bad faith or culpability.

6 discretion in awarding fees. 2 The district court properly could

have found that MetLife’s refusal to reimburse TLC for its expenses

more than two years after it incurred such expenses (settlement of

which expenses was made promptly after TLC’s filing of the instant

action), coupled with its failure to appear in state court, and its

continued contest of jurisdiction based on an exhaustion defense

that could have been raised properly in the state court proceeding,

supported an award of fees based upon Bowen factors (1) and (5). 3

III.

Finally, MetLife challenges the award and amount of prejudgment interest. We review for abuse of discretion. S ee In re Tex.

Gen. Petroleum Corp. , 52 F.3d 1330, 1339 (5th Cir. 1995).

MetLi fe’s first argument SS that the district court erred in

granti ng any prejudgment interest SS is without merit. We have

recognized previously that ERISA does not preclude the district

court from awarding attorneys’ fees and that an award of prejudg-4 MetLife misreads Dependahl v. Falstaff Brewing Corp.

, 653 F.2d 1208, 1219

(8th Cir.), cert. denied

, 454 U.S. 968 (1981), to disallow attorneys’ fees where

the defendant has not had use of the money during the course of the proceedings.

Dependahl does not so require defendant’s use of the money, but rather notes that

such a factor counsel s in favor of a court’s award of “appropriate equitable

relief” under ERISA. Id.

7 ment interest under ERISA furthers the congressional purposes of

the statute. S ee Hansen v. Continental Ins. Co.

, 940 F.2d 971, 984

(5th Cir. 1991). Hence, the decision that fees were appropriate in

the instant case is not an abuse of discretion. 4

MetLife argues correctly, however, that under Texas law, which

we consult for guidance in assessing prejudgment interest in ERISA

claims, see Hansen , 940 F.2d at 984, prejudgment interest accrues

only from the thirtieth day following the date upon which sums

outstanding become “due and payable.” See T EX

. R EV

. C IV

. S TAT

. A NN

.

art. 5069-1.03 (Vernon 1987). The district court failed to make a

finding of the due and payable date for the outstanding charges,

and we are unable to discern such from the record. Thus, although

we affirm the award of prejudgment interest, we vacate the judgment

and remand for a determination of when MetLife’s obligation to pay

TLC for the outstanding claims became due and payable.

AFFIRMED in part, VACATED and REMANDED in part.