[ J
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- 2018 ] IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

MIDDLE DISTRICT

IN THE INTEREST OF: L.J.B, A MINOR

APPEAL OF: A.A

. R , NATURAL MOTHER : : : : : : : : : : : No. 10 M AP 201 8 Appeal from the Order of the Superior Court at No. 884 MDA 201 7 dated 12/27/17 vacating the order of Clinton County Court of Common Pleas, Juvenile Division, dated 5/24/17 at No. CP

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- 2017 and remanding for further proceedings
ARGUED: Septemb er 25 , 2018

CONCURRING O PINION

JUSTICE DOUGHERTY DECIDED: December 28, 2018 I concur in the result and join Chief Justice Saylor’s concurring opinion

. I write separately to emphasize the ambiguous nature of the applicable statutory text which, as exemplified by the divergent conclusions expounded by my colleagues on this Court and
the lower tribunals , may result in reasonable minds reaching disparate interpretations

. As the plurality aptly explains, the Superior Court determined prenatal drug u se may constitute a “recent act” causing or creating the reasonable likelihood of an injury to a child under the CPSL ; thus the “recentness” relates back to the act from the time of the reported injury , regardless of whether a child existed at the time of the act. Under such reasoning, an in dividual need not be a perpetrator at the time of the behavior causing or risking a n injury to a child in order to later be found a perpetrator of child abuse following the injury

. In reversing , the plurality determines an i ndividual must be a perpetrator, i.e ., a person having some statutor il y defined interaction with a child , at the same time as the[ J

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commission of behavior causing or risking the injury; thus , prenatal drug use cannot be construed as child abus e. As the statutory text provides, child abuse requires “intentionally, knowingly or recklessly ... (1) [c]ausing bodily injury to a child through any recent act or failure to act [ , ] ” or “(5) [c]reating a reasonable likelihood of bodily injury to a child through any r ecent act or failure to act.” 23 Pa.C.S. § 6303(b.1)(1), (5) (emphasis added). This statutory definition of child abuse does not contain the word “ perpetrator, ” nor does it reference who may commit child abuse. Indeed , the temporal proximity between a CPSL

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“ perpetrator ” and a CPSL

- defined “recent act or omission ” described by the plurality , though logical, is not defined or referenced anywhere within the statutory text. Further , the intended use of the word “through” within its context here is also unclear: w hether “through any recent act” is intended to temporally link the commission of the act to the injury as occurring within one block of time, or , instead, “through” merely means “by way of , ” casts further ambiguity upon the language conferring a temporal period the plurality determines is clear from the plain language of the statute. For these reasons, I disagree that the plain language of the statute is clear and un ambiguous. In construing a mbiguous statutory language, “we presume to be erroneous any interpretation that leads to an absurd or unreasonable result [

. ] ” Freedom Med. Supply, Inc. v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. , 635 Pa. 86, 131 A.3d 977, 984 (2016); 1 Pa.C.S. § 1922(1). Individuals m ust be able to rely on the law to afford them notice of when, temporally and qualitatively, certain relationships and interactions with children might trigger the consequences of perpetrating child abuse as delineated by the CPSL. Requiring the anticipatio n of the potentially injurious effects of one’s behavior upon a child
who does not exist seems, in my view, manifestly unreasonable , and as Judge Strassburger’s concurrence below illustrates, the myriad of foreseeable circumstances[ J

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fitting well within the plain language of the definition of child abuse extends to situations which are patently absurd. See In re L.B. , 177 A.3d 308, 313

- 14 (Pa. Super. 2017) (Strassburger, J., concurring). Thus, in my view, to the extent the CPSL’s definition of
child abuse enc ompasses an act or omission which predates the existence of a child (even if, at some later point, there is a child who suffers or is at risk of injury as a result of
the act or omission ) it is erroneous. Nevertheless , I agree with the plurality’s assessment of the legislative history and analysis of legislative intent, as well as the statutory construction requiring temporal proximity between the existence of a perpetrator, as the term is defined by the CPSL, and the behavior causing or risking inj ury to an existing child.