### NOT FOR PU BLICA TION

U NIT E D ST A T E S BA NK RU PT CYA PPE L L A T E PA N E L

OF T HE NINT H CIRCU IT In re: A LEK SA N DR

GO LDSHTA D T, Deb to r. EVGHEN IAGAJIU,

A p pellant,

v. HO W A RD M. EHR EN BER G, C hapter 7 Trustee, A p pellee. BA P N o . C C -18-1333-LSTa Bk. N o . 2:15-b k-12692-SK A dv. N o . 2:16-ap-01569-SK

M E M ORA ND U M *

Sub m itted W itho ut O ral A rgum ent A u gust 12, 2019

Filed – Septemb er 4, 2019 A ppeal fro m the U nited States Bankruptcy C o urt fo r the C entral Distric t o f C alifo rnia 

# FIL ED
SEP 4 2019
SUSAN M . SPRAUL, CLERK U. S. B KCY

. APP. PANEL O F T HE N I NT H CI RCUI T

* Thi s di sposi ti on i s not appr opr i ate for publi c ati on. Although i t may be ci ted for whatev er per suasiv e v alue i t may hav e, seeFed. R. App. P. 32.1, i t has no pr ecedenti al v alue, see9th Ci r . BAP Rule 8024-1.H o no rab le Sandra R . K lein, Bankruptc y Judge, Presiding

A ppearanc es: Leslie A . C o hen and J’aim e K . W illiam s o f Leslie C o hen

Law PCo n b rief fo r A p pellant; Daniel A . Lev and A sa S. Ham i o f Sulm eyerKuptez, APro fessio nal C o rpo ratio n o n b r ief fo r A ppellee.

Befo r e: LA FFERTY, SPRA K ER , and TAY LO R

, Bankruptcy Judges.

INT ROD U CT I ON Evghenia Gajiu appeals the b ankruptcy c o urt’s grant o f sum m ary judgm ent in favo r o f the c hapter 7 1 trustee, Ho ward Ehrenb erg. The judgm ent determ ined that real pro perty o w ned b y Ms. Gajiu and the Deb to r, her husb a nd, is c o m m unity pro perty and thus pro perty o f the estate. The b ankruptcy c o u rt fo und that (1) the pro perties were presum ed to b e c o m m unity pro perty despite the fac t that they were held b y the
c o u ple as jo int tenants, and (2) Ms. Gajiu did no t pro duc e evidenc e suffic ient to raise a genuine issue o f m aterial fac tregarding the c harac ter o f the o wnership o f the pro perties. W e A FFIRM.

1 Unless specifi ed other wi s e, all chapterand secti on r efer ences ar e to the Bankr uptcy Code, 11 U.S

. C. §§ 101-1532, all “Rule” r efer ences ar e to the Feder a l Rules of Bankr uptcy Pr ocedur e, and all “Ci v i l Rule” r efer ences ar e to the Feder al Rules of Ci v i l Pr ocedur e. 2F A C T U A L BA CK GROU N D

During their m arriage, Deb to r and Ms. Gajiu purc hased two parc els
o f real pro perty in Lo s A ngeles, C alifo rnia (the “Pro p erties”). They to o k title to the Pro perties as “husb and and wife as jo int tenants.” Spec ific ally, the c o uple purchased pro perty o n A lla R o ad (the “A lla Pro p erty”) in June 2008 and ano ther pro perty o n C ardwell Plac e (the “C ardwell Pro perty”) in N o vemb er 2013. In Septemb er 2008, after purchasing the A lla Pro perty b ut b efo re purchasing the C ardwell Pro perty, the c o uple entered into a po s t-nuptial agreem ent (the “Mo ldo va A greem ent”), 2 which pro vided, in relevant part, that each spo use’s interest in any sub sequently purchased real pro perty
wo uld b e determ ined b y the am o unts their respec tive relatives c o ntrib uted to w ard the purchase. In Feb ruary 2015, Deb to r filed fo r chapter 11 relief, listing the Pro perties o n his schedules as jo intly held with Ms. Gajiu. 3 Ab o ut a year later, the b ankruptcy c o urt appo inted A ppellee Ho ward Ehrenb erg as
chapter 11 trustee (“Trustee”). Thereafter, on Trustee’s m o tio n, the

2 In i ts r u lin g, the bankr uptcy cour t r efer r ed to the post-nupti al agr eement as the “Moldov a Agr eement” because the document was enter ed into i n Moldov a.

3 S hor tly befor e Tr ustee fi led the adv er sar y pr oceeding that i s the subj ect of thi s appeal, Debtor fi led an amended S chedule A. He left blank the column for desi gnati ng for m of owner shi p, and in the pr oper ty descr i pti on he in ser ted the phr ase “S ubj ect to clai ms/r i ghts of Ev gheni a Gaj iu(Debtor ’s spouse).” 3b ankruptcy c o urt c o nverted the c ase to chapter 7, 4 with Mr. Ehrenb erg

c o ntinuing in his c apac ity as trustee. In Dec emb er 2016, Trustee filed an adversary pro c eeding against Ms. Gajiu. In the First and Sec o nd C laim s fo rR elief, Trustee so ught autho r izatio n to sell b o th the estate’s interests and Ms. Gajiu’s interests in the Pro perties. Trustee’s Third C laimfo r R elief so ught a dec laratio n o f the parties’ respec tive o wnership interests in the Pro perties. In A ugust 2017, pursuant tothe parties’ stipulatio n, the c o urt entered judgm ent o n the First and Sec o nd C laim s fo r R elief, autho rizing Trustee to sell the Pro p erties. The Pro perties were b o th so ld, resulting in net pro c eeds to the estate o f appro xim a tely $1.8 m illio n. Trustee thereafter m o ved fo r sum m ary judgm ent o n the Third C laim fo r R elief, seeking a dec laratio n that Ms. Gajiu’s interest in the Pro perties
was c o m m unity pro p erty and pro perty o f the estate. Trustee argued that under C alifo rnia law, the fac t that the c o uple to o k title as jo int tenants was
no t suffic ient to o verc o m e the presum ptio n that pro perty ac quired b y a
c o u ple during m arriage is c o m m unity pro p erty, c iting Bra ce v. S peier (In re Bra ce) , 566 B.R . 13 (9th C ir. BA P 2017). Ms. Gajiu filed an o ppo sitio n, arguing that under the Mo ldo va

4 Tr ustee’s appointment was pr eci pi tated by Debtor ’s (and Ms. Gaj iu’s) unauthor i zed postpeti ti on executi on and r ecor ding of a deed of tr ust on the Car dwell Pr oper ty i n fav or of Ms. Gaj iu’s uncle, pur por tedly to secur e a loan of $500,000. 4A greem ent and C alifo rnia law, her interest in the Pro perties was separate

pro perty b ec ause so m e o f the funds fo r their purchases had b een
c o ntrib uted b y Ms. Gajiu’s relatives. Specific ally, she testified in her dec laratio n that her unc le, Leo nid K o ssino v, had gifted her $444,940 o f the do wn paym ent fo r the C a rdwell Pro perty, and her m o ther, Tatiana Shakgeldyan, had gifted her $287,000 o f the do wn paym ent fo r the A lla Pro perty. She argued that, at a m inim um, there was a genuine issue o f
m aterial fac tregarding her o wnership interests that prec luded sum m ary judgm ent. The b ankruptcy c o urt issued a tentative ruling granting Trustee’s
m o tio n. A fter hearing argum ent, it ado pted that ruling as final. The c o urt
c o nc luded that (1) under C alifo rnia law, Ms. Gajiu’s interest in the Pro perties was presum ptively c o m m unity pro perty; and (2) Ms. Gajiu had
no t reb utted that presum p tio n. Spec ific a lly, the b ankruptcy c o urt fo u nd that the Mo ldo va A greem ent b y its term s did no t apply to the A lla Pro perty b ec ause that pro perty was purchased b efo re the Mo ldo va A greem ent was executed, and the agreem ent stated that it applied o nly to any sub sequently purchased pro perties. A d ditio nally, the c o urt fo und that the Mo ldo va A greem ent was no t b inding o n Trustee b ec ause it was no t
rec o r ded. The b ankruptcy c o urt also fo und that Ms. Gajiu’s do c um entary evidenc e o f “gifts” fro mher relatives, purpo r tedly to purchase the Pro perties, was insuffic ient to c o rrob o rate her dec laratio n testim o ny to that

5effec t.

Thereafter, the b ankruptcy c o urt entered judgm ent fo r Trustee, dec laring that the entirety o f the Pro perties was c o m munity pro perty as o f the petitio n date and thus was pro perty o f the estate; as a result, all o f the sale pro c eeds were pro perty o f the estate. Ms. Gajiu tim ely appealed. JU RISD ICT ION The b ankruptcy c o urt had jurisdic tio n under 28 U .S.C . §§ 1334 and 157(b )(2)(A ). W e have jurisdic tio n under 28 U .S.C . § 158. ISSU E Did the b ankruptcy c o urt err in granting sum m ary judgm ent dec laring that the Pro perties c o -o wned b y Deb to r and his no n-deb to r spo u se were c o m m unity pro perty and thus pro perty o f Deb to r ’s b ankruptcy estate? ST A ND A RD OF RE V I E W W e review de no vo the b ankruptcy c o urt’s grant o f sum m ary judgm ent. Plya m v. Precisio n D ev., LLC (In re Plya m ) , 530 B.R . 456, 461 (9th C ir. BA P 2015). “When we c o nduc t a de no vo review, we lo o k at the m atter anew, the sam e as if it had no t b een heard b efo re, and as if nodec isio n previo usly had b een rendered, giving no deferenc e to the b a nkruptc y
c o u rt’s determ inatio ns.” Ba rnes v. Belice (In re Belice) , 461 B.R . 564, 572–73 (9th C ir. BA P 2011) (c itatio ns o m itted). W e m ust apply the sam e legal

6standards that all federal c o u rts are required toapply in c o nsidering the

pro priety o f sum m a ry judgm ent. Ma rcia no v. Fa hs (In re Ma rcia no ) , 459 B.R
. 27, 35 (9th C ir. BA P 2011), a ff’d , 708 F.3d 1123 (9th Cir. 2013). Sum m ary judgm ent is appro priate “if the m o vant sho ws that there is
no genuine issue as toany m aterial fac t and the m o vant is entitled to judgm ent as a m atter o f law.” W a nk v. Go rdo n (In re W

a nk) , 505 B.R . 878, 886 (9th C ir. BA P 2014) (c iting C ivil Rule 56(a), applic ab le in adversary pro c eedings b y Rule 7056). An issue is genuine if there is eno ugh evidenc e fo r a reaso nab le trier o f fac t to m ake a finding in favo r o f the no n-m o ving party, and an issue is m aterial if it m ight legally affec t the o utc o m e o f the
c ase. Fa r O ut Pro ds., Inc. v. O ska r , 247 F.3d 986, 992 (9th Cir. 2001) (c iting Anderso n v. Liberty Lo bby, Inc. , 477 U .S. 242, 248–49 (1986)). When the party m o ving fo r sum m ary judgm ent wo uld b ear the b urden o f pro o f at trial, it must c o m e fo r ward with evidenc e which wo u ld entitle it to a direc ted verdic t if the evidenc e went unc o ntro verted at trial. In such a c ase, the m o ving party has the initial b urden o f estab lishing the ab senc e o f a genuine issue o f fac t o n each issue m aterial to its c ase. Onc e the m o ving party c o m es fo rward with suffic ient evidenc e, the b urden then m o ves to the o ppo sing party, who m ust present signific ant prob ative evidenc e tending to suppo rt its c laimo r defense. Am o t io n fo r sum m ary judgm ent m ay no t b e defeated, ho wever, b y evidenc e that is m erely c o lo rab le o ris no t signific antly prob ative. C .A.R . Tra nsp. Bro kera

ge Co . v. D a r den R esta ura nts, Inc. , 213 F.3d 474, 480 (9th C ir. 2000) (c itatio ns and internal quo tatio ns o m itted).

7In c o nsidering sum m ary judgm ent, the c o urt is no t perm itted to

weigh the evidenc e. In re W a nk , 505 B.R . at 886. N o r m ay a c o urt m ake
c redib ility determ inatio ns o r m a ke inferenc es o n sum m ary judgm ent, if it is po s sib le to reaso nab ly infer o therwise. S e e Anderso n , 477 U .S. at 255. “The evidenc e o f the no n-m o vant is to b e b elieved, and all justifiab le inferenc es are to b e drawn in his favo r.” Id. D ISCU SSION A . T he bankruptcy c ourt did not err in c onc ludingthat the Properties were in fac t c om m unity property des p ite being held in joint tenanc y. Under C alifo rnia law, the c o m m unity pro perty presum ptio n
emb o died in C alifo rnia Fam ily C o d e § 760 5 generally trum p s the rec o rd title presum ptio n fo und in C alifo rnia Evidenc e C o de § 662. 6 In re Bra ce, 566 B.R . at 19-20; V

a lli v. V a l li (In re Ma rria

ge o f V a lli) , 58 C al. 4th 1396, 1400 (2014). This rule applies no t o nly in m arital disso lutio n pro c eedings, b ut also in o ther c o ntexts, inc luding b ankruptcy. In re Bra ce, 566 B.R . at 20; see
a lso In re O bedia n , 546 B.R . 409, 422 (Bankr. C .D. C al. 2016). The presum ptio n do es no tapply to pro perty ac quired during

5 Cali for ni a Fami ly Code § 760 pr ov i des, “[e]xcept as other wi s e pr ov i ded by statute, all pr oper ty, r eal or per sonal, wher ev er si tuated, acqui r ed by a mar r i ed per son dur in g the mar r i age whi le domi ci led in thi s state i s community pr oper ty.”

6 Cali for ni a Ev i dence Code § 662 pr ov i des: “[t]he ownerof the legal ti tle to pr oper ty i s pr esumed to be the owner of the full benefi ci al ti tle. Thi s pr esumpti on may be r ebutted only by clear and conv incing pr oof.” 8m arriage if the pro perty is: (1) trac eab le to a separate pro perty so urc e;

(2) ac quired b y gift o r b equest; o r (3) earned o r ac c um ulated while the spo u ses are living separate and apart. V a lli , 58 C al. 4th at 1400. Further, “the presum ptio n m a y b e reb utted b y evidenc e that the spo uses agreed to
recharac terize, o r ‘transmute’ the pro perty fro mc o m munity to so m e o ther fo rmo f o wnership. A transmutatio n is no t valid unless ‘m a de in writing b y an express dec laratio n that is m ade, jo ined in, c o nsented to , o r ac c epted b y the spo u se who se interest in the pro perty is adversely affec t ed.’” In re Bra ce, 566 B.R . at 18 (quo ting C alifo rnia Fam ily C o de § 852(a)). In her o pening b rief, Ms. Gajiu do es no t seemto dispute the ho ldings
o f the ab o ve-c ited c ases, b u t she asserts that tho se ho ldings have no t b een ado pted as c o ntro lling law in either C alifo rnia o r the N inth C irc uit, c iting Co llins v. W

o lf , 591 B.R . 752 (S.D. C al. 2018). But V a lliis a C alifo rnia Suprem e C o urt dec isio n. A s such, it is c o ntro lling law in C alifo rnia. A nd altho ugh Bra ce, which expanded V a lli ’s ho lding to the no n-disso lutio n
c o ntext, has no t b een ado pted as c o ntro lling law in the N inth C irc uit, Ms. Gajiu’s citatio n to Co l lins is m isleading. In affirm ing the b ankruptcy
c o u rt’s finding that the c o m m unity presum ptio n applied o ver the fo rmo f title presum ptio n in the no n-disso lutio n c o ntext, the Co llins c o urt expressly rejec ted the appellants’ argum ent to the c o ntrary: A t b o t to m, A ppellants ask this C o urt to do what no C alifo rnia c o u r t has do ne and ho ld that [C alifo rnia Evidenc e C o de] § 662 o verc o m es [C alifo rnia Fam ily C o de] § 760 in a no n-disso lutio n 9c o ntext. Bec ause no C a lifo rnia c o urt has expressly done so, this

C o urt dec lines to ho ld that § 662 o verc o m es the § 760 presum ptio n. O ther federal c o urts have reached sim ilar c o nc lusio ns. Id. at 767–68 (citing In re Bra ce, 566 B.R . at 23; H errerav. Po ns , N o . 17-c v-2392-GPC -N LS, 2018 WL 2229369, at *4 (S.D. C a l. May 16, 2018); In re O bedia n , 546 B.R
. 409). In her reply b rief, Ms. Gajiu argues that the c o m munity pro perty presum ptio n applies o nly in disso lutio n pro c eedings, c iting H a nf v. S um m ers (In re S um m ers) , 332 F.3d 1240, 1243 (9th Cir. 2003), S ch wa ber v. R eed ( In re R eed) , 89 B.R
. 100, 105 (Bankr. C .D. C al. 1988), a ff’d , 940 F.2d 1317 (9th C ir. 1991), and In re C la rk , N o . 10-23496-RA G, 2012 WL 3597410 (Bankr. D. Md. Aug. 20, 2012), a ff’d s ub no m . C la rk

v. Guttm a n , N o . C C B–12–2673, 2013 WL 812017 (D. Md. Marc h 4, 2013). The S um m ers c o urt held that (1) the c o m m unity pro perty presum ptio n m ay b e o verc o m e b y evidenc e that spo u ses purchasing pro perty fro ma third party to o k title as jo int tenants, and (2) the C alifo rnia transmutatio n statutes applied o nly to interspo usal transac t io ns. Tho se c o nc lusio ns have b een rejec ted b y the C alifo rnia Suprem e C o urt. V a lli , 58 C al. 4th at 1405. And R eedand C la rk b o th invo lved C alifo rnia statutes that specific ally applied to pro perty divisio n in a disso lutio n o r legal separatio n c o ntext. Thus these c ases are inappo site. Based o n the fo rego ing, the b ankruptcy c o urt did no t err in

10c o nc luding that Trustee had m et his b urden to sho w that the Pro perties

were presum ptively c o m m unity pro perty. The b u rden then shifted to Ms. Gajiu todem o nstrate that her interest in the Pro perties was her separate pro perty. 7 B. T he bankruptcy c ourt did not err in finding that M s . Gajiu’s ev idenc e was ins uffic ient to rais e a g enuine is s ue of m aterial fac t reg arding

her owners hip interes t. 1. T he M oldov a A g reem ent A s no ted, the Mo ldo va A greem ent was a po s t-m arital pro perty agreem ent entered into b y Ms. Gajiu and Deb to r in Septemb er 2008, a c o py
o f which was attached to Ms. Gajiu’s declaratio n in suppo rt o f her
o ppo sitio n to sum m a ry judgm ent. The agreem ent pro vided, in essenc e, that any funds rec eived fro mfam ily m emb ers wo uld b e the separate pro perty o f the spo use who s e relative pro vided the funds, and that interests in real pro perty purchased in the future with such funds wo uld b e held “in a stric t perc entage ratio to the am o unt rec eived fro ma relative” as

7 Ms. Gaj iu contends that she was pr ej udi ced by the bankr uptcy cour t's r efusal at the Nov ember28 hear ing to gr ant her counsel's or al r equest to stay i ts r uling on the summary j udgment moti on pending the outcome of the Ni nth Ci r cui t appeal of thi s Panel’s deci si on in B race . S he does not elabor ate on thi s asser ti on, r elyi n g i nstead upon her ar gument that she pr esented suffi ci ent ev i dence to r ai se an i ssue of mater i al fact r egar ding the char acter of owner shi p of the Pr oper ti es. In any ev ent, when the stay was r equested, the bankr uptcy cour t had alr eady announced i ts r uling, whi ch i t cor r ectly found r ender ed i t final under Noli v. Comm’r, 860 F.2d 1521 (9th Ci r . 1988), ev en though a wr i tten or der had not yet been enter ed. Ms. Gaj iupoi nts to no author i ty suppor ti ng the conclusi on that the bankr uptcy cour t abused i ts di scr eti on in r efusing to stay the pr oceedings at that poi n t. 11that spo u se’s separate pro perty.

The b ankruptcy c o urt fo und that the Mo ldo va A greem ent did no t apply to the A lla Pro perty, whic h had b een purchased b efo re the agreem ent was executed. Ms. Gajiu do es no t assign erro r to this finding. A s fo r the C ardwell Pro perty, the b ankruptcy c o urt fo und, as discussed b elo w, that the evidenc e presented b y Ms. Gajiu did no t dem o nstrate that funds wired fro mMr. K o ssino v were transferred to Ms. Gajiu o r used fo r the C ardwell Pro perty do wn paym ent. Mo reo ver, the b a nkruptcy c o u r t fo u nd that Trustee was no t b o und b y the Mo ldo va A greem ent b ec ause it had no t b een rec o rded. Under C alifo rnia Fam ily C o de § 852(b ), “[a] transmutatio n o f pro perty is no t effec tive as to third parties witho ut no tic e thereo f unless rec o r ded.” And under C alifo rnia C ivil C o de § 1217, an unrec o rded instrum ent is valid o nly b etween the parties to the instrum ent and tho se who have no tic e o f it. Ms. Gajiu argues that Trustee was b o und b y the Mo ldo va A greem ent despite the fac t that it was unrec o rded, fo r two reaso ns. First, she c o ntends that, under § 541, Trustee stepped intoDeb to r’s sho es when he was appo inted and, as such, is deem ed to have had no tic e o f the agreem ent. Sec o nd, she c o ntends that the agreem ent was disc lo s ed in pleadings filed in the b ankruptcy c ase such that Trustee was put on inquiry no tic e o f its existenc e. A ltho ugh Ms. Gajiu is c o rrec t that a b ankruptcy trustee suc c eeds to a
12deb to r ’ s interests in estate pro perty, inc luding legal c laim s and defenses,

she do es no tpro vide any autho rity estab lishing that a deb to r’s pro perty interests inc lude kno wledge o f an unrec o rded do c um ent. There is sc ant
c ase law o n this questio n o utside the c o ntext o f a trustee’s strong-arm po wers. But in In re R e ed, 89 B.R . at 105, the chapter 7 trustee asserted that pro c eeds fro mthe sale o f deb to r’s real pro perty were c o m m unity pro perty. The trustee relied upo n C alifo rnia C ivil C o de § 4800.1 (repealed in 1992), which pro vided that, fo rpurpo ses o f divisio n o f pro perty upo n disso lutio n
o r legal separatio n, pro perty ac quired during m arriage was presum ed to b e
c o m munity pro perty. The trustee argued that he stepped into the sho es o f the deb to r fo r this purpo se, b ut the b a nkruptc y c o urt rejec ted this
c o ntentio n: Trustee c o ntends that he sho uld no t b e treated as a third party c r edito r, b u trather as Deb to r’s suc c esso r in interest pursuant to11 U .S.C . Sec tio n 541(c )(1). A s a result, Trustee argues that he suc c eeds toDeb to r ’s rights as a spouse and therefo re c an assert the presum ptio n set fo rth in C C Sec tio n 4800.1. This argum ent fails, first, b ec ause a trustee in a Chapter 7 b ankruptcy c ase suc c eeds to a deb to r’s interest in pro perty o nly as a fiduc iary to the deb to r’s c redito rs. Therefo re, a C hapter 7 trustee is m o r e like a c redito rthan a spo use. . . . Id. at 105. S ee a l so O sbo rn v. R ea ves (In re O s bo r n) , N o . A Z -17-1083-KuFs, 2017 WL 5472554, at *8 (9th Cir. BA P N o v. 9, 2017) (rejec ting appellant’s

13c o ntentio n that an unrec o rded m arital pro p erty agreem ent was b inding o n

the chapter 7 trustee when A rizo na law required rec o rdatio n, no ting that “rec o rding statutes are generally fo r the purpo se o f pro viding c o nstruc tive
no tic e to third parties” and to“pro tec t c redito rs who transac t with spo uses that have entered into what wo uld o therwise b e sec r et agreem ents which alter the charac ter o f the spo uses’ m arital pro perty fro mc o m m unity to separate.”). A s fo r the purpo rted inquiry no tic e, no thing in the Deb to r’s o riginal
schedules wo uld have put Trustee o n no tic e o f the Mo ldo va A greem ent. Ms. Gajiu po ints o ut three po st-petitio n do cu m ents that she c o ntends put Trustee o n no tic e o r sho w that he had no tic e: (1) her answer filed in the adversary pro c eeding in January 2017, in which she asserted as an affirm ative defense that she had separate interests in the Pro perties; (2) her
o ppo sitio n to the m o tio n fo r sum m ary judgm ent filed in A pril 2017, in which she stated that the Pro perties were subjec t to a po st-m arital agreem ent; and (3) Trustee’s m o t io n to appro ve a settlem ent agreem ent filed in June 2017, which m entio ned the po st-nuptial agreem ent. A s po inted o ut b y Trustee, the do c um ents at issue were filed well past the petitio n date. Ms. Gajiu po ints to no autho rity that a trustee’s pos tpetition disc o very o f an unrec o rded do cu m ent affec ting real pro perty suffic es to b ind himto its term s. A c c o rdingly, Ms. Gajiu has no t dem o nstrated that the b ankruptcy c o u rt erred in ruling that the Mo ldo va
14A greem ent was no t b inding o n Trustee.

2. Relativ es ’ purported gifts Even witho ut the Mo ldo va A greem ent, Ms. Gajiu c o ntends that she pro duc ed evidenc e suffic ient to raise a genuine issue o f m aterial fac t regarding whether the Pro perties were purchased with her separate funds, i.e., gifts pro vided b y her m o ther and unc le. The b ankruptcy c o urt fo und to the c o ntrary, and o ur independent review o f the evidenc e suppo rts that finding. R egarding the A lla Pro perty, Ms. Gajiu filed a dec laratio n stating “[m ]y m o ther, Tatiana Shakgeldyan, pro vided $287,000 o f the do w n paym ent fo r the purchase o f the A lla Pro perty as a separate pro perty gift to
m e.” She attached what she desc rib ed as “true and c o rrec t c o pies o f the wire and esc ro wdo c um ents” dem o nstrating that tho se funds were put into
esc ro w. Tho se do c um ents c o nsisted o f two pages sho wing that Ms. Gajiu wired $287,000 toan esc ro w o n June 4, 2008, b ut there was no do c um entatio n o f where the funds c am e fro m o r whether the esc ro w
numb er o n the do c u m ents pertained to the A lla Pro p erty. 8 In sho rt, the do c um ents did no t c o r rob o rate Ms. Gajiu’s assertion that her m o ther gave her funds fo r the purchase o f the A lla Pro perty, o r that they were a

8 Ms. Gaj iu also stated in herdeclar ati on that she had contr ibuted funds towar d the Alla Pr oper ty for ongoi ng maintenance, the maj or i ty of the mor tgage payments, and r emodeling costs, but she pr ov i ded no fur ther detai l or documentar y ev i d ence to suppor t that asser ti on. 15“separate pro perty gift.” The b ankruptcy c o u rt fo und that Ms. Gajiu’s

dec laratio n was unc o rrob o rated, self-serving, and c o nc luso ry and thus insuffic ient to c r eate a genuine issue o f m aterial fac t
. Atrial c o urt m ay no t disregard a dec laratio n at the sum m a ry judgm ent stage so lely b ec ause it is unc o rrob o r ated and self-serving. S .E.C
. v. Pha n , 500 F.3d 895, 909 (9th Cir. 2007). But b are assertio ns o f a legal
c o nc lusio n, unsuppo rted b y spec ificfac ts, are insuffic ient to raise a genuine issue o f m aterial fac t. Ba der v. N. Line Layers, Inc. , 503 F.3d 813, 820 n.4 (9th C ir. 2007). Ms. Gajiu’s statement that her m o ther pro vided her funds fo r the A lla Pro perty as a “separate pro perty gift” is a legal c o nc lusio n unsuppo rted b y spec ificfac t s. A s such, the b ankruptcy c o urt did no t err in finding that Ms. Gajiu’s declaratio n did no t raise a genuine issue o f
m aterial fac t
. S ee V

illia rim o v. Alo h a Isla nd Air, Inc. , 281 F.3d 1054, 1059 n.5, 1061 (9th C ir. 2002) (ho lding that the distric t c o urt pro perly disregarded the dec laratio n that inc luded fac ts b eyo nd the dec larant’s perso nal kno wledge and did no t indic ate ho w she knew the fac t s to b e true); F .T.C . v. Publ'g C lea ring H

o use, Inc. , 104 F.3d 1168, 1171 (9th Cir. 1997) (“Ac o nc luso ry, self-serving affidavit, lac king detailed fac ts and any suppo rting evidenc e, is insuffic ient to c r eate a genuine issue o f m aterial fac t .”). A s fo r the C ardwell Pro perty, Ms. Gajiu testified in her dec laratio n that Mr. K o ssino v had pro vided $444,940 o f the do wn paym ent fo r that pro perty “as a separate pro perty gift” to her. She attached “true and

16c o r rec t” c o pies o f b ank statem ents, b ut tho se statem ents did no t identify

the b ank, ac c o u nt numb er, o r ac c o unt ho lder. The statem ents did sho w two inc o m ing wires fro mMr. K o ssino v, o ne o n January 2, 2013 fo r $164,970, and o ne o n Septemb er 13, 2013 fo r $279,970. A s the b ankruptcy c o urt fo und, ho wever, there was no c o r rob o rating evidenc e that any o f tho se funds were transferred to Ms. Gajiu, depo sited into an ac c o unt in her
nam e, o r used tob uy the C ardwell Pro perty. Mo reo ver, Ms. Gajiu’s statement that the funds c o ntrib uted b y Mr. K o ssino v were a separate pro perty gift was c o ntradic ted b y Trustee’s evidenc e. Trustee pro duc ed a c o py o f a deed o f trust in favo r o f Mr. K o ssino v, which was executed b y Deb to r and Ms. Gajiu in Dec emb er 2015 tosecure a lo an o f $500,000. He alsopro duc ed Mr. K o ssino v’s dec laratio n filed in the b ankruptcy c o urt in Feb ruary 2016 in which Mr. K o ssino v stated that he had loaned Deb to r and Ms. Gajiu $500,000 to b uy the C ardwell Pro perty. The c o urt fo und that Ms. Gajiu’s assertion that the funds rec eived fro mMr. K o ssino v were a gift was “b latantly
c o ntradic ted b y the rec o rd” and thus the c o u rt c o uld disregard it. S ee S co tt v. H a r ris , 550 U .S. 372, 380 (2007) (“W hen o ppo sing parties tell two different sto ries, o ne o f which is b latantly c o ntradic t ed b y the rec o rd, so that no reaso nab le jury c o uld b elieve it, a c o urt sho uld no t ado pt that versio n o f the fac ts fo r purpo ses o f ruling o n a m o tio n fo r sum m ary judgm ent.”). Based o n the fo rego ing, the b ankruptcy c o u rt did no t err in

17c o nc luding that Ms. Gajiu’s evidenc e did no t raise a genuine issue o f

m aterial fac tfo r trial. CONCL U SION Fo r all o f these reaso ns, we A FFIRM.

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