10340 Federal Register / Vol. 66, No. 31 / Wednesday, February 14, 2001 / Notices

ARM–24, FAA, 800 Independence

Avenue, SW, Washington, DC 20591,

Telephone (202) 267–9078, FAX (202)

267–5075, or e-mail at

gerri.robinson@faa.gov.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: Notice is

hereby given of a meeting of the Aging

Transport Systems Rulemaking

Advisory Committee to be held at the

Boeing Company, 1200 Wilson Blvd.

Roslyn, Virginia.

The agenda will include

consideration of new taskings to

ATSRAC and discussion on appropriate

membership needed to review and make

recommendations to the FAA, if the

tasks are accepted.

Attendance is open to the interested

public, but will be limited to the

availability of meeting room space. The

FAA will arrange teleconference

capability for individuals wishing to

participate by teleconference if we

receive notification before February 28,

2001. Arrangements to participate by

teleconference can be made by

contacting the person listed in the FOR

FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT section.

Callers outside the Washington

metropolitan area will be responsible for

paying long distance charges.

The public may present written

statements to the committee at any time

by providing 20 copies to the Executive

Director, or by bringing the copies to the

meeting. Public statements will only be

considered if time permits. In addition,

sign and oral interpretation as well as a

listening device can be made available

if requested 10 calendar days before the

meeting.

Issued in Washington, DC on February 8,

2001.

Anthony F. Fazio,

Director, Office of Rulemaking.

[FR Doc. 01–3741 Filed 2–9–01; 3:23 pm]

BILLING CODE 4910–13–M

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Federal Highway Administration

Agency Information Collection

Activities: Submission for OMB Review

AGENCY: Federal Highway

Administration (FHWA), DOT.

ACTION: Notice.

SUMMARY: The FHWA has forwarded the

information collection request described

in this notice to the Office of

Management and Budget (OMB) for

review and comment. We published a

Federal Register Notice with a 60-day

public comment period on this

information collection on November 6,

2000 (65 FR 66578). We are required to

publish this notice in the Federal

Register by the Paperwork Reduction

Act of 1995.

DATES: Please submit comments by

March 16, 2001.

ADDRESSES: You may send comments to

the Office of Information and Regulatory

Affairs, Office of Management and

Budget, 725 17th Street, NW.,

Washington, DC 20503, Attention: DOT

Desk Officer. You are asked to comment

on any aspect of this information

collection, including: (1) Whether the

proposed collection is necessary for the

FHWA’s performance; (2) the accuracy

of the estimated burdens; (3) ways for

the FHWA to enhance the quality,

usefulness, and clarity of the collected

information; and (4) ways that the

burdens could be minimized, including

the use of electronic technology,

without reducing the quality of the

collected information.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Mr.

Tony Solury, (202) 366–5003, Planning

and Environment Core Business Unit,

Federal Highway Administration,

Department of Transportation, 400 7th

Street, SW., Washington, DC 20590–

0001. Office hours are from 7:30 a.m. to

4:30 p.m., Monday through Friday,

except Federal holidays.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

OMB Control Number: 2125–0039

(Expiration Date: April 30, 2001).

Title: Planning and Research Program

Administration.

Abstract: Under the provisions of

Title 23, United States Code, Section

505, two percent of Federal-aid highway

funds in certain categories that are

apportioned to the States are set aside

to be used only for State planning and

research (SPR funds). At least 25

percent of the SPR funds apportioned

annually must be used for research,

development, and technology transfer

activities. In accordance with

government-wide grant management

procedures, a grant application must be

submitted for these funds. In addition,

recipients must submit periodic

progress and financial reports. In lieu of

Standard Form 424, Application for

Federal Assistance, the FHWA uses a

work program as the grant application.

This includes a scope of work and

budget for activities to be undertaken

with FHWA planning and research

funds during the next one-or two-year

period. The information contained in

the work program includes task

descriptions, assignments of

responsibility for conducting the work

effort, and estimated costs for the tasks.

This information is necessary to

determine how FHWA planning and

research funds will be utilized by the

State Transportation Departments and if

the proposed work is eligible for Federal

participation. The content and

frequency of submission of progress and

financial reports specified in 23 CFR

part 420 are as specified in OMB

Circular A–102 and the companion

common grant management regulations.

Respondents: 52 State Transportation

Departments, including the District of

Columbia and Puerto Rico.

Estimated Total Annual Burden:

29,120 hours (560 hours per

respondent).

Authority: The Paperwork Reduction Act

of 1995; 44 U.S.C. Chapter 35, as amended;

and 49 CFR 1.48.

Issued on: February 8, 2001.

James R. Kabel,

Chief, Management Programs and Analysis

Division.

[FR Doc. 01–3734 Filed 2–13–01; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 4910–22–P

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Federal Railroad Administration

Notice of Safety Advisory 2001–01

AGENCY: Federal Railroad

Administration (FRA), Department of

Transportation (DOT).

ACTION: Notice of safety advisory.

SUMMARY: FRA is issuing Safety

Advisory 2001–1 which establishes

recommended minimal guidelines for

the operation of remote control

locomotives.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: John

Conklin, Operating Practices Division,

Office of Safety Assurance and

Compliance, FRA, 1120 Vermont

Avenue, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20590

(telephone 202–493–6318) or Mark

Tessler, Office of Chief Counsel, FRA,

1120 Vermont Avenue, N.W.,

Washington, D.C. 20590 (telephone

202–493–6061)

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION

Background

Remote control locomotives (RCL)

have been in use for a number of years.

The term ‘‘remotely controlled

locomotives’’ or ‘‘remote control

locomotives’’ refers to a locomotive

which, through use of a radio

transmitter and receiver system, can be

operated by a person not physically

located at the controls within the

confines of the locomotive cab. (As used

in this document, the term ‘‘remote

control locomotive’’ does not refer to

use of distributive power, in which a

locomotive or group of locomotives

entrained or at the rear of a train is

Federal Register / Vol. 66, No. 31 / Wednesday, February 14, 2001 / Notices 10341

remotely controlled from the lead

locomotive of a train).

FRA’s first priority in assessing RCL

operations is to ensure that these

operations pose no threat to railroad

workers or the general public. Because

this technology is not widely used in

railroad operations, FRA has limited

data on which to base an objective

safety analysis and must therefore

proceed prudently. It is clear that the

potential for serious injury exists, as it

does in all aspects of railroad

operations. RCL operations have been in

existence in this country for many years;

however, this technology has largely

been confined to in-plant rail

operations. As these operations expand,

some of the traditional ways of

conducting rail movements will be

significantly modified. Under such

circumstances, safety risk factors may

change. It is FRA’s task to ensure that

this transition takes place safely.

Throughout its history, FRA has tried to

encourage and embrace technological

advances in the rail industry.

In 1994, FRA proposed to conduct a

national test program of RCL operations.

FRA held a hearing on February 23,

1995 (FRA Docket No. 94–6), to gather

testimony on the proposed RCL

operating conditions. See 59 FR 59826

(November 18, 1994). Several

manufacturers, labor organizations,

railroads, and their associations

participated in the hearing. The

testimony provided by these

organizations revealed a broad spectrum

of opinion concerning the merits of the

proposed program, the substance of the

program requirements, the resultant

risks to railroad employees, and the

safety of the technology.

Interest in, and use of RCLs by the

railroad industry has intensified since

publication of the Notice of Test

Program and the 1995 public hearing.

FRA believed that RCL technology has

progressed beyond the ‘‘test’’ period and

proposed one final meeting to obtain the

most recent information and comments

on this technology. On July 19, 2000,

FRA held a technical conference to

allow all interested parties the

opportunity to state their concerns and

opinions on RCL operations. The

conference examined all safety aspects

of RCL operations, including (1) Design

standards, (2) employee training, (3)

operating practices and procedures, (4)

test and inspection procedures, and (5)

security and accident/incident reporting

procedures.

The following is a brief discussion of

the material and comments presented at

that conference. Several commentors

expressed concerns in the following

areas: RCL operations in bad weather

conditions, ergonomic issues in the

design of the remote control transmitter

(RCT), electromagnetic field (EMF)

emissions from RCTs, insufficient

clearance when wearing the RCTs in

tight spaces, roadway worker protection

issues, mental and physical stress

associated with RCL operation, and lack

of accurate exposure metrics for

calculating accident rates.

Conversely, several commenters

stated that RCL operations have

enhanced safety performance. Some of

the suggested enhancements included

better visual contact with the leading

end of rail movements, the elimination

of communication error between the

locomotive engineer and ground crew,

and the reduction of yard accidents and

injuries. Several commentors submitted

data that indicate accidents and

incidents dropped dramatically as RCL

operations increased. Although FRA

commends these commentors for their

efforts in gathering such data, FRA notes

that the data used were obtained

without equal exposure metrics to allow

valid comparisons between remote

control and manual operations (i.e.,

comparisons were not equalized for the

number of labor hours and number of

employees). Normalizing safety data is

necessary to clarify our understanding

of the potential safety risks.

Consequently, FRA is taking steps to

incorporate RCL operations into the

accident/incident reporting procedures

required by 49 CFR part 225. See 65 FR

79915, December 20, 2000. FRA is

proposing to modify the instructions for

Forms F 6180.54, 6180.55a, and 6180.57

in its Guide to Preparing Accident/

Incident Reports. Two of the three form

modifications will request that the

‘‘Special Study Block’’ (SSB) of each

form be used to capture (with coded

letters) information pertaining to

accidents/incidents which involve RCL

operations. The third form will capture

the required data with an annotation in

the narrative portion of the form.

In addition, FRA recommends that

railroads maintain appropriate exposure

measures, including total number of

labor hours and total number of

employees by location for both RCL

operations and manual locomotive

operations. Together these measures

will allow FRA to accurately measure

accident and incident rates of both types

of operations and make valid

comparisons between RCL operations

and manual operations. Thus, the

railroads will be able to closely monitor

the safety performance of RCL

operations as they progress. FRA will

then use these data when considering

any future policies on these operations.

FRA notes that many of the ergonomic

design concerns experienced by remote

control operators (RCOs) have been

addressed in the current generation of

RCTs. FRA commends the rail industry

and RCL system manufacturers for their

diligence in addressing the design

concerns of RCOs. As this new

technology expands, the continued

input of the men and women who

operate RCLs will be necessary to

ensure that ergonomic issues and

operating concerns are properly

identified and fully addressed,

consistent with the needs of both RCOs

and the rail industry. Furthermore, we

must be cognizant that gender specific

issues may arise with respect to

ergonomic challenges and solutions.

FRA will, therefore, recommend that

railroads give special consideration to

the unique human/machine interface

problems that may arise during the

proliferation of this technology,

particularly regarding female operators.

FRA has reviewed the furnished data

concerning fatalities that have occurred

during RCL operations on plant

railroads. The data indicate that none of

these fatalities occurred as a direct

result of RCL system failure. All

involved the same scenarios described

in similar fatalities that have occurred

during manual switching operations.

There was no way to determine if these

workers were distracted due to their

added responsibility of conducting RCL

operations. However, FRA will attempt

to reduce possible risk by

recommending that RCOs (1) Should not

ride on rail cars, (2) should not mount

or dismount from moving locomotives

during RCL operations, and (3) should

remain well clear of affected tracks

when in front of a locomotive

movement. FRA also believes that

additional training should be provided

to traditional locomotive engineers who

will be required to operate RCLs and

who have never worked on the ground

during switching operations. These

individuals lack the valuable experience

gained from working around moving

equipment and are less likely to

recognize dangerous situations.

FRA believes that bad weather

conditions, roadway worker protection

procedures, RCT clearance problems,

and mental and physical stress issues

are operational problems that can and

do occur during any railroad operation

and are best addressed through proper

training and through a credible

communication system. There should be

a direct line of communication between

labor and management to quickly

address RCL operating problems and

training needs. Therefore, FRA

recommends that a formal

10342 Federal Register / Vol. 66, No. 31 / Wednesday, February 14, 2001 / Notices

communication procedure should be

developed to ensure that RCL

operational concerns are handled

expeditiously.

In response to concerns expressed by

a number of parties, FRA had previously

asked DOT’s Volpe Center to test the

electromagnetic radiation (EMR)

emissions from an RCL system,

simulating realistic rail yard operating

conditions (since multiple reflections of

radiofrequency radiation from metallic

surfaces, like railcars, can enhance the

primary beam and cause hotspots). An

independent test contractor then tested

EMR levels according to FCC standards

and found that under normal use and

where the manufacturer’s operating

instructions were followed, EMR

emissions and workers’ exposure levels

were in full compliance with applicable

human exposure safety standards

regarding radio frequency radiation.

FRA found no data that would

indicate that electromagnetic field

(EMF) and EMR emissions from RCTs

exceed the accepted human exposure

safety standards in the United States.

FRA and the DOT Volpe Center

technical experts will, however,

continue to monitor the latest studies on

potential health effects from long term

low level environmental and work EMF

and EMR exposures, as well as up-todate applicable Occupational Safety and

Health Administration (OSHA)

standards posted on the web at http://

www.osha-slc.gov/SLTC/

radiofrequencyradiation. Standards and

practices addressing EMF and EMR

emissions can also be found in: FCC,

1997 Evaluating Compliance with FCC

Guidelines for Human Exposure to

Radiofrequency Electromagnetic

Fields,’’ FCC Office of Engineering

Technology (OET), Ed. 97.01, FCC

Bulletin 65, August 1997 and

Supplement C, December 1997. Both

items are posted on the web at http://

www./fcc./gov/oet/rfsafety; IEEE,

C95.1a–1988, ‘‘IEEE Standard for Safety

Levels with Respect to Human Exposure

to Radio Frequency Electromagnetic

Fields, 3 KHz to 300 GHz,’’ Edition 16

and Supplement a, April 1999, to be

ordered from IEEE Customer Service at

1–800–678–IEEE; and the ‘‘American

Conference of Governmental Industrial

Hygienists (ACGIH),’’ TLVs and BEIsThreshold Limit Values for Chemical

Substances and Physical Agents,’’ pp.

150–155 (See http://www.ecgih.org).

FRA intends to ensure that the margin

of safety is maintained in this area and

will take appropriate action if it

becomes apparent that accepted safety

margins are not maintained or if

credible data on potential worker safety

or health hazards from such exposures

become available.

A review of the accident/incident

reports submitted during the technical

conference disclosed communication

failures, speed surges, braking force

problems, and emergency stops during

RCL operations. However, most of the

reports were dated between 1996 and

1997 and pertained primarily to one rail

yard and to a specific group of RCLs in

that yard. FRA believes that current

generation of RCTs have addressed

many of the reported problems with

RCL systems. It has been FRA’s

experience that, as this type of

technology is introduced into railroad

operations, unforeseen problems in

hardware and software design do

develop. As a consequence, FRA

suggests that railroads have procedures

in place to immediately identify and

address such problems to reduce the

risk of accident and/or injury. In

addition, the FRA suggests that railroads

have scientifically valid data gathering

procedures to accurately monitor

accident rates in RCL operations

compared with manual locomotive

operations.

FRA has also reviewed data from the

Occupational Safety and Health

Administration (OSHA) and Mine

Safety and Health Administration

(MSHA) regarding any accidents

investigated involving RCL operations.

The records indicate that there has been

considerable concern by OSHA

regarding protection of rail movements.

The records cite incidents of inplant rail

movements that were not properly

protected in the direction of travel, i.e.,

RCOs were not in position to observe

the track ahead of the movement. MSHA

also reported an accident that was

caused in part by ‘‘the inability of the

remote operator to see the locomotive.’’

These concerns are not new to the rail

industry, which has long adopted

operating rules that require switching

movements to be made at a speed that

will enable the movement to stop within

half the range of vision short of a train,

an engine, a railroad car, people or

equipment fouling the track,

obstructions, a stop signal, or a derail or

switch lined improperly (restricted

speed). Simply put, no movement

should begin unless the track ahead of

that movement is known to be clear.

This would require RCOs to view the

track ahead of the movement each time

a movement is made. Because FRA

believes RCL operations will be

primarily conducted within heavily

congested areas, i.e., railroad yards, and

because FRA wishes to ensure that these

operations are conducted in the safest

possible manner, FRA recommends that

all RCL movements be conducted at

restricted speed, unless specifically

exempted by railroad special

instructions. However, these special

instructions should ensure that a

comparable means of protection is

afforded these movements. FRA notes

that many railroads have limited

exemptions from the provisions of

restricted speed. FRA plans to closely

monitor how railroad operating rules are

modified to accommodate RCL

operations. Safety must not be

compromised by these modifications.

FRA also plans to monitor the accident/

incident rates in areas where RCL

operations exist to ensure that safety is

maintained.

FRA notes that traditional railroad

industry restricted speed rules or their

equivalents were not developed to

protect trespassers or railroad workers

who are not authorized to be on the

track. Therefore, in the interest of safety,

FRA will recommend that the public

and railroad workers in the area should

be notified by clearly visible warning

signs, or by other equally effective

means, that RCL operations exist and

train movements are being conducted

without anyone in the locomotive.

FRA is also concerned about RCO

safety when operations are conducted in

isolated areas. There is no assurance

that emergency aid can be adequately

provided in a timely manner in the

event of an emergency situation.

Therefore, FRA recommends that the

railroad or RCT should provide some

automatic means of communication that

will notify the railroad in the event the

RCO becomes incapacitated, i.e., ‘‘a

worker alarm’’. This automatic

communication feature should also be

capable of determining the nonresponsive RCO’s location to ensure that

emergency help can respond effectively.

Part 240 of title 49 of the Code of

Federal Regulations requires that all

individuals who operate a locomotive

are to be qualified and certified in

accord with the requirements of that

regulations. Therefore, anyone who

operates a locomotive, regardless of the

means used, must be properly trained

and certified. The introduction of

remote control operations is a

significant departure from traditional

on-board locomotive operations. If a

railroad elects to conduct RCL

operations, its locomotive engineer

certification program would have to be

modified to outline the training that will

be required for this type of operation.

This would constitute a material

modification of the program requiring

that the program be submitted to FRA

for approval according to 49 CFR

240.103(e).

Federal Register / Vol. 66, No. 31 / Wednesday, February 14, 2001 / Notices 10343

Because information currently

available to FRA does not lead to the

conclusion that RCL operations should

be prohibited on safety grounds, FRA

has elected to proceed cautiously. The

range of views and safety concerns

expressed underscores the need to

proceed with the implementation of this

new technology in a safe and consistent

manner. The Safety Advisory

announced today is a refinement of

proposed standards contained in the

original Test Program.

Safety Advisory 2001–01

Recommendation: Operation of Remote

Control Locomotives

The following design criteria and

operating procedures are

recommendations only. Compliance is

voluntary. However, railroads are

strongly encouraged to regard these

suggested criterion as a minimum from

which to tailor their own RCL

operations. It should be noted that all of

the design features recommended are

available with the current generation of

remote control technology. In certain

circumstances, due to the design of their

equipment, or differences in operating

practices, a railroad may not be able to

obtain complete consistency with these

recommendations. In those situations

railroads are encouraged to develop

alternative designs or practices which

offer at least equivalent or greater levels

of safety. FRA emphasizes that although

compliance with this Safety Advisory is

voluntary, nothing in this Safety

Advisory is meant to relieve a railroad

from compliance with all existing

railroad safety regulations. Therefore,

when procedures required by regulation

are cited in this Safety Advisory,

compliance is mandatory.

A. Safety Design and Operational

Requirements

1. Each RCT should, at a minimum,

have the following features:

a. directional control;

b. graduated throttle or speed control;

c. graduated locomotive independent

brake application and release;

d. train brake application and release

control;

e. audible warning device control

(horn);

f. audible bell control, if equipped;

g. sand control (unless automatic);

h. headlight control;

i. emergency air brake application

switch;

j. generator field switch or equivalent

to eliminate tractive effort to the

locomotive; and

k. audio or visual indication of wheel

slip/slide.

2. Although an RCT can have the

capability to control, at different times,

different locomotives equipped with

remote-control receivers, it should be

designed to be capable of controlling

only one RCR equipped locomotive at a

time. (A locomotive may consist of one

or more engines operated from a single

control).

3. An RCT having the capability to

control more than one RCL should have

a means to lock in one RCR ‘‘assignment

address’’ to prevent simultaneous

control over more than one locomotive.

4. Each locomotive equipped with an

RCR should respond only to the RCTs

assigned to that receiver.

5. The RCT should be designed to

require at least two separate actions by

the RCO before RCL movement can

begin (in order to prevent accidental

movement).

6. When an RCT’s signal to the RCL

is interrupted for a set period, not to

exceed five seconds, the remote-control

system should cause:

a. full service application of the

locomotive and train brakes; and

b. elimination of locomotive tractive

effort.

7. If an RCT is equipped with an ‘‘on’’

and ‘‘off’’ switch, the switch, when

moved from ‘‘on’’ to ‘‘off’’ position,

should result in:

a. application of the locomotive and

train brakes; and

b. elimination of locomotive tractive

effort.

8. Each RCL should have a distinct

and unambiguous audible or visual

warning device that indicates to nearby

personnel that the locomotive is under

active remote control and subject to

movement.

9. Each RCT should be equipped with

an operator alertness device requiring

manual resetting or its equivalent. It

should incorporate a timing sequence

not to exceed 60 seconds. Failure to

reset the switch within the timing

sequence should result in:

a. application of the locomotive and

train brakes; and

b. elimination of locomotive tractive

effort.

10. Each RCT should have a tilt

feature that, when tilted to a

predetermined angle, should result in:

a. an emergency application of the

locomotive and train brakes; and

b. elimination of locomotive tractive

effort.

Note: If RCL operations are being

conducted in an isolated area, the railroad

should establish timely emergency response

procedures in the event the RCO is

incapacitated. One method that would serve

to meet this recommendation would be to

equip the RCT with capability of transmitting

an emergency signal. The signal should also

be capable of identifying the RCO’s location.

11. If the RCT is equipped with a ‘‘tilt

bypass’’ system enabling the tilt

protection feature to be temporarily

disabled, the bypass feature should

deactivate after 15 seconds, unless

reactivated by the RCO.

12. The RCL should be equipped with

a device that causes an application of

the locomotive and train brakes and

elimination of locomotive tractive effort

whenever the RCL’s main reservoir air

pressure falls below 90 psi or when a

locomotive protection alarm is activated

while the locomotive is in remote

operation. The device should need to be

manually reset on board the RCL.

13. When the air valves and the

electrical selector switch on the RCR are

moved from manual to remote or from

remote to manual modes, an emergency

application of the locomotive and train

brakes should be initiated to prevent

unauthorized use of the system.

14. Railroads which acquire and

utilize RCL equipment should comply

with current human safety exposure

standards for radio frequency radiation

in their workplace. FRA further

recommends that manufacturers should

certify their equipment for compliance

with current EMR exposure safety

standards.

15. Consideration should be given to

the design of the RCT to provide for a

human-machine interface (HMI) that

incorporates basic human factors

principles for the design and operation

of displays, controls, supporting

software functions, and other

components. FRA recommends that

railroads work closely with RCOs when

addressing RCT design and comfort

issues. The overriding goal of the design

should be to minimize the potential for

design-induced error by ensuring that

the RCT is suitable for operators,

including female operators, and their

tasks and environment. RCT systems

that have been designed with humancentered design principles in mind—

system products that keep human

operators as the central, active

component of the system—are more

likely to result in improved safety. This

includes the ergonomic design of the

RCT. See FRA’s 1998 report entitled

‘‘Human Factors Guidelines for

Locomotive Cabs’’ (FRA/ORD–98/03 or

DOT–VNTSC–FRA–98–8). Special

consideration should be given to the

effect of the RCT on the musculoskeletal

system of the RCOs as well as on RCT

harness comfort to avoid distraction

from safety-related duties. Additional

consideration should also be given to

the ‘‘breakaway’’ safety feature of the

RCT harness. The harness should be

10344 Federal Register / Vol. 66, No. 31 / Wednesday, February 14, 2001 / Notices

designed to easily break free of the RCO

in the event the harness becomes

entangled on equipment.

B. Training

Each person operating an RCL must

be certified and qualified in accordance

with 49 CFR Part 240 if conventional

operation of a locomotive under the

same circumstances would require

certification under that regulation.

Training must be provided to all RCOs

subject to the requirements of 49 CFR

Part 240. Additionally, training should

be afforded those RCOs not subject to

the requirements of Part 240 and those

locomotive engineers who have little or

no on-ground experience in switching

operations if they are expected to

conduct RCL operations. All affected

railroad employees should be trained on

RCL operating rules and procedures.

Under Part 240, railroad engineer

certification programs must include

procedures to keep certified engineers

current on methods of safe train

handling, operating rules, condition of

equipment, and personal safety and to

provide initial training for new

engineers on those subjects. § 240.123.

The programs must also include skill

testing in the most demanding type of

service the person will perform.

§ 240.127. Appendix B of Part 240

requires that railroad engineer

certification programs address how the

railroad responds to changes such as the

‘‘introduction of new technology’’ and

‘‘significant changes in operations.’’ In

FRA’s view, it is likely that the

introduction of remote controlled

locomotives on railroads would

typically necessitate a material change

to each railroad’s engineer certification

program. Material modifications must

be submitted to FRA for its review

under 49 CFR 240.103(e).

C. Operating Practices

1. The railroad should establish

written standard operating procedures

tailored to its RCL operations. At a

minimum these procedures should

include:

a. Upon going off duty, each RCO

should place the RCL in manual

operation and properly secure it, unless

control of the RCL is directly given to

a relieving RCO.

b. When operating an RCL, the RCO

should not:

i. ride on a freight car under any

circumstances;

ii. mount or dismount moving

equipment;

iii. operate any other type of

machinery; or

iv. stand or walk within the gage of

the track or foul the track on which the

movement is occurring while physically

located in front of the movement.

c. RCOs should ensure that the track

is clear and properly aligned ahead of

the remotely controlled movement

while it is underway. Therefore, RCL

operations should be operated at

restricted speed not to exceed 20 mph,

i.e., at a speed that will enable stopping

the movement within half the range of

vision assuring that all movements are

protected.

d. The RCO should operate only one

RCL at a time.

e. Prior to performing any function as

prescribed in 49 CFR 218.22(c)(5), the

RCO should apply three point

protection, i.e., fully apply the

locomotive and train brakes, center the

reverser, and place the generator field

switch to the off position (eliminate

locomotive tractive effort capability).

f. Passenger trains should not be

operated by use of a remote-control

device.

2. The railroad must include RCL

operating rules and procedures in its

program required under 49 CFR part

217.

3. The railroad should establish

formal communication procedures to

enable the appropriate railroad officials

to receive and respond to information

pertaining to RCL system failures or

safety problems.

4. The FRA recommends that the

railroad keep a record of the total

number of labor hours and the total

number of employees by location for

both RCL and manual switching

operations to ensure that accidents and

incidents are accurately measured, and

that valid comparisons between the two

types of operations can then be made.

5. The FRA recommends that the

railroad develop and implement a

program specifically designed for RCOs

that addresses the risks associated with

switching operations and train

movements on adjacent tracks. This

program should incorporate the findings

and recommendations of the Switching

Operations Fatality Analysis Working

Group.

D. Security

1. The railroad should have

instructions for the proper storing and

handling of RCTs when not in use or in

the operator’s possession.

2. The operation control handles

located in the RCL cab should be

removed or pinned in place to prevent

accidental or intentional movement

while the RCL is being operated in

remote.

3. The railroad should have strict

procedures in place to ensure that only

the intended RCTs are assigned to the

appropriate RCL.

E. Inspections and Tests

1. The RCL system must be included

as part of the calendar day inspection

required by 49 CFR 229.21, since this

equipment becomes an appurtenance to

the locomotive.

2. Each time an RCT is used for the

first time on each shift, a test of the air

brakes and the RCT’s safety features (tilt

switch and alerter device) should be

conducted. The test would not be

required if the RCT were being directly

transferred from one RCO to another

with no change in remote status.

3. The RCL system (both the RCT and

RCR), should be designed to perform a

self-diagnostic test of the electronic

components of the system. The system

should be designed to immediately ‘‘fail

safe’’ (full service application of the

locomotive and train brakes and the

elimination of locomotive tractive effort)

in the event a failure is detected.

4. The RCL system components that

interface with the mechanical devices of

the locomotive, e.g., air pressure

monitoring devices, pressure switches,

speed sensors, etc., should be inspected

and calibrated as often as necessary, but

not less than the locomotive’s periodic

(92-day) inspection. It is recommended

that records of such inspections and

calibrations be kept.

F. Notification of RCL Use and

Protection of Workers

1. Each RCL should have a tag placed

on the control stand throttle indicating

the locomotive is being used in a remote

control mode. The tag should be

removed when the locomotive is placed

back in manual mode.

2. In areas where RCL operations are

being conducted, warning signs should

be posted indicating that there is no

operator in the control compartment of

the locomotive. These warning signs

should be highly visible and posted at

conspicuous locations so as to maximize

their exposure to those most likely to

encounter RCL operations.

3. Whenever worker protection is

required according to 49 CFR part 218,

the locomotive should be placed into

manual mode and be properly secured.

The appropriate blue signal protection

should then be provided.

G. Accident-Incident Reporting

Procedures

1. All accident and/or incidents

described in 49 CFR part 225 must be

reported to FRA using the appropriate

‘‘remote control’’ reporting codes.

2. Railroads are also reminded that

they are required to comply with the

Federal Register / Vol. 66, No. 31 / Wednesday, February 14, 2001 / Notices 10345

provisions of 49 CFR part 229.17—

Accident reports.

Dated: Issued in Washington D.C.,

February 1, 2001.

Edward R. English,

Director, Office of Safety Assurance and

Compliance.

[FR Doc. 01–3733 Filed 2–13–01; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 4910–06–P

DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY

Fiscal Service

Financial Management Service;

Proposed Collection of Information:

Authorization Agreement for

Preauthorized Payment

AGENCY: Financial Management Service,

Fiscal Service, Treasury.

ACTION: Notice and request for

comments.

SUMMARY: The Financial Management

Service, as part of its continuing effort

to reduce paperwork and respondent

burden, invites the general public and

other Federal agencies to take this

opportunity to comment on a

continuing information collection. By

this notice, the Financial Management

Service solicits comments concerning

the form ‘‘Authorization Agreement for

Preauthorized Payment.’’

DATES: Written comment should be

received on or before April 16, 2001.

ADDRESSES: Direct all written comments

to Financial Management Service, 3700

East West Highway, Programs Branch,

Room 144, Hyattsville, Maryland 20782.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:

Requests for additional information or

copies of the form(s) and instructions

should be directed to Joann Franklin,

Product Promotion Division, 401–14th

Street, S.W., Washington, DC 20227,

(202) 874–7018.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: Pursuant

to the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995,

(44 U.S.C. 3506(c)(2)(A)), the Financial

Management Service solicits comments

on the collection of information

described below.

Title: Authorization Agreement for

Preauthorized Payment.

OMB Number: 1510–0059.

Form Number: SF 5510.

Abstract: This form is used to collect

information from remitters (individuals

and corporations) to authorize

electronic fund transfers from accounts

maintained at financial institutions to

collect monies for government agencies.

Current Actions. Extension of

currently approved collection.

Type of Review: Regular.

Affected Public: Businesses or other

for-profit.

Estimated Number of Respondents:

100,000.

Estimated Time Per Respondent: 15

minutes.

Estimated Total Annual burden

Hours: 25,000.

Comments: Comments submitted in

response to this notice will be

summarized and/or included in the

request for Office of Management and

Budget approval. All comments will

become a matter of public record.

Comments are invited on: (a) Whether

the collection of information is

necessary for the proper performance of

the functions of the agency, including

whether the information shall have

practical utility; (b) the accuracy of the

agency’s estimate of the burden of the

collection of information; (c) ways to

enhance the quality, utility, and clarity

of the information to be collected; (d)

ways to minimize the burden of the

collection of information on

respondents, including through the use

of automated collection techniques or

other forms of information technology;

and (e) estimates of capital or start-up

costs and costs of operation,

maintenance and purchase of services to

provide information.

Dated: February 8, 2001.

Bettsy H. Lane,

Assistant Commissioner, Federal Finance.

[FR Doc. 01–3669 Filed 2–13–01; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 4810–35–M

DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY

Fiscal Service

Surety Companies Acceptable on

Federal Bonds: Name Change—Signet

Star Reinsurance Company

AGENCY: Financial Management Service,

Fiscal Service, Department of the

Treasury.

ACTION: Notice.

SUMMARY: This is Supplement No. 10 to

the Treasury Department Circular 570;

2000 Revision, published June 30, 2000,

at 40868.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:

Surety Bond Branch at (202) 874–6905.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: Signet

Star Reinsurance Company, has

formally changed its name to Berkley

Insurance Company, effective December

31, 2000. The Company was last listed

as an acceptable surety on Federal

bonds at 65 FR 40899, June 30, 2000.

A Certificate of Authority as an

acceptable surety on Federal bonds,

dated today, is hereby issued under

Sections 9304 to 9308 of Title 31 of the

United States Code, to Berkley

Insurance Company, Wilmington,

Delaware. The new Certificate replaces

the Certificate of Authority issued to the

Company under its former name. The

underwriting limitation of $22,118,000

established for the Company as of July

1, 2000, remains unchanged until June

30, 2001.

Certificates of Authority expire on

June 30, each year, unless revoked prior

to that date. The Certificates are subject

to subsequent annual renewal as long as

the Company remains qualified (31 CFR

Part 223). A list of qualified companies

is published annually as of July 1, in the

Department Circular 570, which

outlines details as to underwriting

limitations, areas in which licensed to

transact surety business and other

information. Federal bond-approving

officers should annotate their reference

copies of the Treasury Circular 570,

2000 Revision, at page 40874 to reflect

this change.

The Circular may be viewed and

downloaded through the Internet at

http://www.fms.treas.gov/c570/

index.html. A hard copy may be

purchased from the Government

Printing Office (GPO), Subscription

Service, Washington, DC, telephone

(202) 512–1800. When ordering the

Circular from GPO, use the following

stock number: 048–000–00536–5.

Questions concerning this notice may

be directed to the U.S. Department of

the Treasury, Financial Management

Service, Financial Accounting and

Services Division, Surety Bond Branch,

3700 East-West Highway, Room 6A04,

Hyattsville, MD 20782.

Dated: January 26, 2001.

Wanda J. Rogers,

Financial Accounting and Services Division,

Financial Management Service.

[FR Doc. 01–3668 Filed 2–12–01; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 4810–35–M

DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY

Internal Revenue Service

Proposed Collection; Comment

Request for Form 8873

AGENCY: Internal Revenue Service (IRS),

Treasury.

ACTION: Notice and request for

comments.

SUMMARY: The Department of the

Treasury, as part of its continuing effort

to reduce paperwork and respondent

burden, invites the general public and

other Federal agencies to take this

opportunity to comment on proposed