In The 

Court of Appeals 

Seventh District of Texas at Amarillo

________________________

No. 07-17-00257-CR 

________________________

CHRISTOPHER RAYMOND CISNEROS, APPELLANT 

 

V. 

 

THE STATE OF TEXAS, APPELLEE 

 

 

On Appeal from the 286th District Court 

Hockley County, Texas 

Trial Court No. 15-07-8332; Honorable Pat Phelan, Presiding 

 

March 19, 2019 

 

MEMORANDUM OPINION 

 

Before QUINN, CJ., and PIRTLE and PARKER, JJ. 

Appellant, Christopher Raymond Cisneros, was convicted following a jury trial of 

possession of a controlled substance (methamphetamine) in an amount of one gram or 

more but less than four grams, enhanced.1 He was sentenced by the trial court to fifteen 

 

1 See TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 481.115(c) (West 2017) (a felony of the third degree). 

Punishment level was enhanced to that of a felony of the second degree by virtue of a prior felony conviction 

for DWI, third or more, in August 2005. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 12.42(a) (West Supp. 2018). 
2

years confinement and assessed a $1,000 fine. In a single issue, Appellant asserts that 

law enforcement officers did not have reasonable suspicion or probable cause to detain 

or arrest him. We affirm the trial court’s judgment. 

BACKGROUND

In July 2015, an indictment issued alleging that on or about May 7, 2015, Appellant 

intentionally and knowingly possessed a controlled substance, methamphetamine, in an 

amount of one gram or more but less than four grams. In June, the State filed its Notice 

of Intent to Use Prior Convictions to Enhance the Classification and/or Range of 

Punishment of the Indicted Offense alleging that in 2005, Appellant was finally convicted 

of the felony offense of driving while intoxicated, third or more. Appellant subsequently 

filed a motion to suppress alleging that law enforcement officers did not have reasonable 

suspicion or probable cause to search the residence or Appellant. The motion was 

overruled by the trial court following the jury trial. 

The State’s evidence at trial was that multiple officers responded to a call regarding 

a possible burglary in progress at 10:00 a.m. Officer Jim Dukantnik contacted the suspect 

who advised him that he owned the residence and explained that he had left earlier that 

morning without his keys. Officer Andrew Mosteller arrived with a detective and 

immediately observed someone running in the alley toward a house that was in a state of 

disrepair, unoccupied, and uninhabitable. A neighbor was also pointing the officers in the 

direction of the abandoned house. 

Officers Dukantnik and Mosteller entered the house and announced their 

presence. They could hear noises in a back room. When they investigated the noises, 
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they discovered Appellant. He was sweating profusely and crouched down. When 

addressed by the officers, he was unresponsive. When Officer Dukantnik began 

advancing toward Appellant, he made a motion toward a medium-size boot knife attached 

to his belt. The officer feared for his safety and believed Appellant was a danger to himself 

and others. He disarmed Appellant, handed the knife over to the other officer, performed 

a quick pat-down search for other weapons, and handcuffed Appellant. 

When Appellant emerged from the house, he was met by Officer Jermaine Davis. 

She asked Appellant if she could search him and he agreed. When she patted him down, 

she felt a bulge inside his change pocket and upon examination, discovered what was 

later identified as methamphetamine and drug paraphernalia. Appellant was then placed 

under arrest. 

STANDARD OF REVIEW

We review a trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress evidence on appeal under 

an abuse of discretion standard. State v. Cortez, 543 S.W.3d 198, 203-04 (Tex. Crim. 

App. 2018). As long as the record supports the trial court’s determinations of historical 

facts and mixed questions of law and fact that rely on credibility, we grant those 

determinations almost total deference. Id.; State v. Kerwick, 393 S.W.3d 270, 273 (Tex. 

Crim. App. 2013). We review the trial court’s application of law to the facts de novo. 

Wiede v. State, 214 S.W.3d 17, 25 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). Further, when, as in this case, 

the trial court does not make formal findings of fact, we uphold the trial court’s ruling on 

any theory of law applicable to the case and presume the court made implicit findings in 

support of its ruling if the record supports those findings. State v. Ross, 32 S.W.3d 853, 

855-56 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000). 
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ANALYSIS

Appellant asserts the trial court abused its discretion when it overruled his motion 

to suppress all the State’s evidence. In support, he contends (1) the officers did not have 

a reasonable suspicion or probable cause to search the abandoned house or Appellant

and (2) the State failed to prove Appellant did not have permission to be in the building. 

We disagree.

ABANDONED HOUSE 

Regarding his assertion that the fruits of the warrantless search of the abandoned 

house should have been suppressed, we need only note that since Appellant made no 

showing that he had any reasonable expectation of privacy in the house or that he had a 

right of ownership or possession of the house, he has no standing to challenge the validity 

of the search. See Thomas v. State, 681 S.W.2d 672, 676 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th 

Dist.] 1984, pet. ref’d) (citing Goehring v. State, 627 S.W.2d 159 (Tex. Crim. App. 1982)). 

See also Henderson v. State, No. 01-99-00567-CR, 2000 Tex. App. LEXIS 3995, at *7-9 

(Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2000, no pet.) (mem. op.) (not designated for publication)

(“The accused has the burden of proving facts establishing a legitimate expectation of 

privacy.”).

DETENTION 

A police officer’s interaction with a citizen can be classified as an encounter, 

detention, or seizure. See Harper v. State, 217 S.W.3d 672, 675 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 

2007, no pet.). An investigative detention is a confrontation of a citizen by law 

enforcement officers wherein a citizen yields to a display of authority and is temporarily 

detained for purposes of investigation. Id. (citing Johnson v. State, 912 S.W.2d 227, 235 
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(Tex. Crim. App. 1995)). During an investigative detention, an officer may employ force 

necessary to affect the reasonable goals of the detention: investigation, maintenance of 

the status quo, and officer safety. Rhodes v. State, 945 S.W.2d 115, 117 (Tex. Crim. 

App. 1997). Moreover, an officer may conduct a limited pat-down search of the outer 

clothing for weapons during an investigative detention if the officer fears for his safety or 

that of others. Martinez v. State, 304 S.W.3d 642, 652-53 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2010, 

pet. ref’d).

An investigative detention is permitted if it is supported by reasonable suspicion. 

Citizen v. State, 39 S.W.3d 367, 370 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2001, no pet.). 

Reasonable suspicion is a particularized and objective basis for suspecting the person is, 

has been, or soon will be engaged in criminal activity. Id. (citing Crockett v. State, 803 

S.W.2d 308, 311 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991)). The test for reasonable suspicion focuses 

solely on whether an objective basis exists for the detention. Tutson v. State, 530 S.W.3d 

322, 328 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2017, no pet.).2 

Here, Appellant was detained in an abandoned house for the purpose of officer 

safety after he had fled there as law enforcement officers were arriving to investigate a 

possible burglary in progress. In the house, he was discovered sweating profusely,

unresponsive, crouched down, and he made a motion toward a weapon on his belt. 

Under these circumstances, the officers had a reasonable suspicion authorizing them to 

 

2 An officer has reasonable suspicion if the officer has specific, articulable facts that, combined with 

rational inferences from those facts, would lead the officer to reasonably conclude that the person detained 

is, has been, or soon will be engaged in criminal activity. Kerwick, 393 S.W.3d at 273. A determination 

must be based on the totality of the circumstances, and reasonable suspicion may exist even if the 

circumstances presented are as consistent with innocent activity as with criminal activity. Id. 
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detain Appellant and remove any weapons that might pose a threat to officer safety, 

pending further investigation. 

Probable Cause to Arrest

Once outside the abandoned house, Appellant consented to the search of his 

person by Officer Davis. Meekins v. State, 340 S.W.3d 454, 458 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011) 

(a warrantless search conducted without probable cause is not illegal if the search is 

conducted with the person’s voluntary consent). During the search, Officer Davis found 

what appeared to be drug paraphernalia and methamphetamine on Appellant’s person. 

The substance later tested positive for methamphetamine. This information provided 

probable cause for Appellant’s subsequent arrest. Lewis v. State, 412 S.W.3d 794, 801

(Tex. App.—Amarillo 2013, no. pet.) (“Probable cause for a warrantless arrest exists 

when the arresting officer possesses reasonably trustworthy information sufficient to 

warrant a reasonable belief that an offense has been or is being committed.”).

Based upon our review of the record, we find that the trial court did not abuse its 

discretion by denying Appellant’s motion to suppress evidence. Accordingly, Appellant’s 

single issue is overruled. 

CONCLUSION

The trial court’s judgment is affirmed. 

Patrick A. Pirtle

 Justice

 

Do not publish.