This memorandum opinion was not selected for pub lication in the New Mexico Appellate Reports. Please see Rule 12-405 NMRA for restricti ons on the citation of unpublished memorandum opinions. Please also note that this electronic memorandum opinion may contain computer-generated errors or other deviations fr om the official paper version filed by the Court of Appeals and does not include the filing date. IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO 1 WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A., 2 Plaintiff-Appellee, 3 v. No. A-1-CA-36057 4 STEVE ALVERSON, 5 Defendant-Appellant, 6 and 7 DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY-INTERNAL 8 REVENUE SERVICE, 9 Defendant. 10 APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF SANTA FE COUNTY 11 David K. Thomson, District Judge 12 Snell & Wilmer L.L.P. 13 Sandra A. Brown 14 Steven J. Lucero 15 Jeannette Martinez Whittaker 16 Albuquerque, NM 17 for Appellee 18 Steve Alverson 19 Santa Fe, NM 202 Pro Se Appellant 1 MEMORANDUM OPINION 2 SUTIN, Judge. 3 {1} In this foreclosure case, De fendant Steve Alverson (Homeowner), a self4 represented litigant, appeals from the district court’s final order denying his motion 5 to dismiss and motion to vacate, entered December 2, 2016. [DS 2; 3 RP 462-65] In 6 our notice of proposed summary disposition, we proposed to affirm. In response to 7 this Court’s notice, Defendant filed a memorandum in opposition that we have duly 8 considered

. For the reasons stated in the notice of proposed disposition and in this 9 opinion, we affirm. 10 {2} Issues 1, 3-5: Homeowner’s central contention, ra ised in Issues 1, 3, 4, and 5, 11 was that Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (Wells Far go) did not have standing to foreclose on 12 his property. [DS 5-6] In our notice of propos ed disposition, we noted that the district 13 court entered its judgment, decree of forecl osure, appointment of special master and 14 order for sale on May 8, 2014. Homeowner did not file a timely notice of appeal from 15 this judgment, and the appeal currently before this Court is from the denial of 16 Homeowner’s motion for relief from judgm ent under Rule 1-060(B) NMRA. [CN 2] 17 As such, we limited our review to the distri ct court’s denial of Homeowner’s Rule 1- 18 060(B) motion. [CN 2-3] See Marquez v. Larrabee , 2016-NMCA-087, ¶ 9, 382 P.3d 193 968 (explaining that because the notice of appeal was timely only as to the district 1 court’s denial of the defendants’ motion to set aside the default judgment under Rule 2 1-060 and not as to the district court’s order granting the plaintiff’s motion for a 3 default judgment, this Court would address only the district court’s denial of the 4 motion to set aside the default judgment). Homeowner does not challenge our decision 5 to limit our review to the denial of his Rule 1-060(B) motion. [ See generally MIO] 6 {3} With respect to the standing arguments raised in Homeowner’s Rule 1-060(B) 7 motion, we proposed to conclude that th e prudential standing requirement was waived 8 in this case by Homeowner’s failure to tim ely appeal from the foreclosure judgment, 9 and standing cannot be the basis for the co llateral attack here under Rule 1-060(B). 10 [CN 3] See Deutsche Bank Nat’l Trust Co. v. Johnston , 2016-NMSC-013, ¶ 34, 369 11 P.3d 1046 (holding that “a final judgment . . . to enforce a promissory note . . . is not 12 voidable under Rule 1-060(B) due to a lack of prudential standing”). 13 {4} In response, Homeowner asserts that Rule 1-060(B)(6) “[p]rovides that a 14 judgment may be vacated for ‘any other reas on[,]’” and substantial justice requires 15 vacation of the judgment in this case. [MIO 1-2] While Rule 1-060(B)(6) provides that 16 “the court may relieve a party or his legal representative from a final judgment, order, 17 or proceeding for . . . any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the 18 judgment[,]” Homeowner has not demonstrated that he is entitled to such relief in this 194 case. See Farmers, Inc. v. Dal Mach. & Fabricating, Inc. , 1990-NMSC-100, ¶ 8, 111 1 N.M. 6, 800 P.2d 1063 (stating that the appellate courts presum e that the district court 2 is correct and the burden is on the appellant to clearly demonstrate that the lower court 3 erred). 4 {5} Issue 2 : In his docketing statement, Homeow ner also claimed that the district 5 court erred in denying his Rule 1-060(B) motion on due process grounds. [DS 5] He 6 claimed that he did not receive notice of the pleadings filed between November 2, 7 2013 and July 21, 2014. [DS 5; see also 3 RP 378-81, 404-08] 8 {6} Because his due process challenge concer ned factual issues, we reviewed the 9 district court’s order for an abuse of discretion. [CN 3-4] See Edens v. Edens , 10 2005-NMCA-033, ¶ 13, 137 N.M. 207, 109 P.3d 295 (“We generally review the trial 11 court’s ruling under Rule 1-060(B) for an abuse of discretion except in those instances 12 where the issue is one of pure law.” (int ernal quotation marks and citation omitted)); 13 Sims v. Sims , 1996-NMSC-078, ¶ 65, 122 N.M. 618 , 930 P.2d 153 (“An abuse of 14 discretion occurs when a ruling is clear ly contrary to the logical conclusions 15 demanded by the facts and circumstances of the case.”). In response, Homeowner 16 claims that his due process challenge rais es questions of law and the proper standard 17 of review is de novo. [MIO 2-3] Howeve r, Homeowner continues to argue only a 18 factual issue—whether he received corre spondence from Wells Fargo for periods of 195 time from November 2013 through July 2014. [MIO 1] Therefore, we are not 1 convinced that the proper standard of review is de novo. 2 {7} In our notice of proposed disposition, we noted that Wells Fargo stated below 3 that attorney N. Ana Gardner entered her appearance, without limitation, on October 4 16, 2012, on behalf of Home owner; no order permitting her withdrawal had been 5 entered; and Wells Fargo served Ms. Gar dner with notice of all pleadings after 6 October 16, 2012 in this matter. [CN 4] See Rule 1-005(B) NMRA (“Whenever under 7 these rules service is required or permitte d to be made upon a party represented by an 8 attorney, the service shall be made upon th e attorney unless service upon the party is 9 ordered by the court.”); Rule 1-089(B)(1) NMRA (“An atto rney shall obtain a court 10 order permitting withdrawal when . . . the attorney has appeared without 11 limitation[.]”). We further noted that Wells Fargo stated that after Homeowner filed 12 his “Notice of Dismissal of Attorney” on November 1, 2013, “a ll subsequent filings 13

were served upon [Homeowner] as a pro-se party at the address he himself indicated 14 was the appropriate address fo r service of pleadings.” [CN 5] In light of the foregoing, 15 we suggested that we could not conclude that the districtcourt abused its discretion 16 in denying Homeowner’s Rule 1-060(B) motion on due process grounds. [CN 5] 17 {8} In response, Homeowner claims that, per his affidavit filed in district court on 18 September 3, 2014, he did not receive correspondence from Wells Fargo “after 196 November 1, 2013 [until] Ju ly 28[,] 2014,” and Homeowner attached a copy of the 1 affidavit to his memorandum in opposition. [MIO 1, 4-5] Homeowner further 2 contends that Wells Fargo did not rebut the information contained in his affidavit, and 3 therefore, “[i]t is undisputed that [he] di d not receive proper notice and was therefor[e] 4 denied due process.” [MIO 1-2] As discussed in the notice of proposed disposition and 5 in this opinion, the record does not support these arguments. 6 {9} Accordingly, for the reasons set forth in our notice of proposed disposition and 7 herein, we affirm. 8 {10} IT IS SO ORDERED. 9

__________________________________ 10 JONATHAN B. SUTIN, Judge 11 WE CONCUR: 12

_______________________________ 13 MICHAEL E. VIGIL, Judge 14

_______________________________ 15 JULIE J. VARGAS, Judge 16