[Cite as State v. Farrow , 2023
- Ohio
- 682.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT LAWRENCE COUNTY

State of Ohio , : Case No. 2 2 CA 12 Plaintiff

- Appell ant , : DECISION AND JUDGMENT ENTRY v. : Quazaa S. Farrow, : RELEASED 3/01/2023 Defendant

- Appell ee

. :

______________________________________________________________________ APPEARANCES : Brigham M. Anderson, Lawrence County Prosecutor, Ironton, Ohio , for appellant. Steven H. Eckstein, Washington Court House, Ohio , for appellee.

______________________________________________________________________ Hess , J. {¶1} The state of Ohio appeals from a judgment of the Lawrence County Court of Common Pleas granting Defendant

- Appellee Quaz a a S. F arrow’s motion to suppress
evidenc e obtained through a warrantless search of a vehicle in which Farrow was a passenger. The state contends that the trial court erred in determining that the trooper’s stop consisted of two separate searches and not one continuous search. The trooper
initial ly stopped the vehicle for an expired tags violation but detected a strong odor of raw marijuana when he approached the driver. The trooper called for a backup officer to assist him, placed the driver and passenger , Farrow , in handcuffs in the back of his patrol car after informing them both of their Miranda rights, and he and the backup officer searched
the passenger compartment of the vehicle. Neither officer found any marijuana or other illegal drugs. The backup officer left to respond to another call. The trooper returned theLawrence App. No. 2 2 CA1 2 2

driver and Farrow to the vehicle but detained them while he called for another backup offi cer and reviewed the audio and video recording made of them while they were in the back of the patrol car. After reviewing the recordings and further questioning the driver, the trooper and backup officer performed a second search of the vehicle, including a search of the engine compartment. They discovered marijuana in the passenger compartment and methamphetamine and heroin hidden near the headlight in the engine compartment. {¶2} The trial court determined that after the first search of the vehicle’s
passeng er compartment resulted in no discovery of contraband, the trooper’s reasonable suspicion of criminal activity was dispelled, and he was required under the Fourth Amendment to release the driver and Farrow. The trial court determined that the trooper
would need a new reasonable suspicion of criminal activity before he could detain them for purposes of reviewing the video and audio recordings. In other words, the trial court
determined that the trooper had no reasonable suspicion of criminal activity after h is first search of the passenger compartment of the vehicle turned up empty and his review of the audio and video recordings was a “fishing expedition” for evidence of a crime. {¶3} We find that the trooper was engaged in one continuous search. The fact
that th e trooper detected a strong odor of raw marijuana allowed him to conduct an expansive search of the vehicle, beyond the passenger compartment and into the tru n k and engine compartments. The trooper’s continued detention of the driver and Farrow
while he re viewed the audio and video recording , and asked follow

- up questions of the driver, aided him in his efforts to target his search to locate what he continued toLawrence App. No. 2 2 CA1 2 3

reasonably suspect was contraband hidden somewhere in the vehicle. Therefore, we
sustain the sta te’s assignment of error and reverse t h e trial court’s judgment.
I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY {¶4} T he Lawrence County grand jury indicted Quazaa S. Farrow on one count of aggravated trafficking in drugs in violation of R.C. 2925. 03 (A) (2)(C)(1)(d) , a first

- degree felony , one count of aggravated possession of drugs in violation of R.C. 2925.11(A)(C)(1)(c), a second

- degree felony, and one count of possession of heroin in violation of R.C. 2925.11(A)(C)(6)(d), a second

- degree felony. Farro w filed a motion to suppress the evidence obtained from the warrantless search of the vehicle on the ground that it was an unconstitutionally prolonged detention because the “raw odor of marijuana alone does not constitute probable cause for the search of a vehicle

. ” The state did not file a written response to Farrow’s motion but asserted its arguments at the suppression hearing

. 1 {¶5} At the suppression hearing, Trooper Malone of the Ohio State Highway Patrol testified that he was travelling westbound on U.S. 52 when a vehicle passed him with expired tags. Trooper Malone stopped the vehicle and as he approached it and spoke
to the drive r, he “detected a strong order of raw marijuana.” He testified that he has considerable experience and training i n the detection of raw and burnt marijuana by smell. He ordered the driver to exit the vehicle, informed her that he detected a strong odor of raw marijuana, and asked her if she used marijuana. The driver stated that she had smoked marijuana the previous day, but Trooper Malone did not detect any signs of

1 The state preserved all of the arguments it presented on appeal when it presented them during closing arguments at the suppre ssion hearing . E.g., State v. Werder , 6 th Dist. Fulton No. F

- 19

- 008, 2020

- Ohio

2865, ¶ 37

- 39 (a state waives arguments it nei ther raises in a written response to a motion to suppress nor presents at the suppression hearing).Lawrence App. No. 2 2 CA1 2 4

impairment and did not perform a sobriety test. During that same interaction, Trooper
Malon e asked the driver if there was anything illegal in the vehicle, which she denied but also stated, “I don’t want to get caught in the crossfire.” Trooper Malone testified that he informed the driver of her Miranda rights, handcuffed her, patted her down, a nd placed her in the back of his patrol car. Trooper Malone requested a backup officer to the scene and ordered Farrow out of the car, spoke briefly to him, informed him of his Miranda rights, handcuffed him, patted him down, and placed him in the back of the patrol car with the
driver. Trooper Malone testified that Farrow had the odor of raw marijuana on his person and a large amount of cash in his pocket. {¶6} A Lawrence County Sheriff’s Deputy arrived to assist, and he and Trooper
Malone searched the passen ger compartment of the vehicle based on Trooper Malone’s detection of the strong odor of marijuana but did not find any marijuana or other illegal drugs. The d eputy left to respond to another call. Trooper Malone removed the handcuffs from the driver and Farrow, returned them to the vehicle, called for an additional backup officer, and reviewed the audio and video recording of the conversation between Farrow
and the driver while they were detained in the patrol car. {¶7} The recording further confirmed Trooper Malone’s suspicion that there were drugs hidden somewhere in the vehicle. Trooper Malone testified that law enforcement typically review the audio and video re cording from the patrol car once probable cause has been established. He testified, “I felt that there was, you know, potential to have drug activity going on * * * we watch this video to see if, you know, if they’ve just said anything
to each other * * * anything that would lead me to believe that there’s definitely drugs in the car * * * because I hadn’t found anything yet and it was an overwhelming odor of weedLawrence App. No. 2 2 CA1 2 5

in the car.” Trooper Malone testified that the driver stated, “I’m going to jail” and Farrow
stated that “ he would l o ose [sic] his money in his pocket if they claimed it.” Trooper Malone placed Farrow back in the patrol car, returned to the vehicle, and asked the driver why she made the statement about going to jail. The driver said she thought Fa rrow might have drugs and that when Farrow was at her house, she came out of her house and the
hood was up on her car. Trooper Malone and the second backup officer placed the driver back in the patrol c ar and searched the passenger compartment again “becau se at this time, I hadn’t found anything and there’s still a strong odor of marijuana.” They found a bag of marijuana under the front passenger seat. They searched under the hood in the engine compartment of the vehicle and found approximately 90 grams of methamphetamine and approximately 17 grams of heroin in a small opening near the
passenger - side headlight

. {¶8} T r ooper Malone testified that a fter a brief conversation with Farrow, he released the driver without issuing a warning or citation for her expired ta gs 2 and transported Farrow to the Lawrence County Jail. {¶9} Following t he hearing, the trial court issued a thorough , reasoned, and well

researched opinion. The trial court found that Trooper Malone had probable cause to stop the vehicle for expired tags and thus the initial traffic stop was constitutional. The trial court also found that when Trooper Malone detected a strong odor of raw marijuana emanating from the vehicle, he had probable cause to expand the scope of the initial stop

2 T he fact that the officer d id not issue a citation for expired tags is not important. The Supreme Court of Ohio has stated that “the constitutionality of a prolonged traffic stop does not depend on the issuance of a citation.” State v. Batchili , 113 Ohio St.3d 403, 2007

- Ohio

- 2204, 865 N.E.2d 1282, ¶ 20

- 21. “The failure to issue a traffic citation when there is an indication of a potentially far more significant crime is easily excused when more pressing issues are being addressed.” Id.Lawrence App. No. 2 2 CA1 2 6

and search the driver, F arrow, and the vehicle. However, after the officers found no evidence of marijuana in the passenger compartment , the trial court found: It is at this point where Constitutional concerns begin to surface. The time per mitted to complete the purpose of this stop (expired tags), and the subsequent probable cause search of the v ehicle (stemming from the detection of the strong odor of raw marijuana) had concluded. But instead of issuing a citation or warning (verbal or written) to the driver for her expire d tags, Trooper Malone took the handcuffs off the defendant and driver, and returned them to their vehicles. Trooper Malone then watched the recording f rom the in

- cruiser camera and testified that the conversations between the defendant and the driver whi le detained supported his suspicion that there were drugs in the vehicle. But at this point in time, Trooper Malone needed a reasonable articulable suspicion of criminal activity to extend the stop before he took the time to play the video. Instead, Troope r Malone testified that what he observed on the video provided the basis for his suspicion of criminal activity following the completion of the initial search of the vehicle.

* * * After Trooper Malone searched the vehicle and failed to find any eviden ce of illegal activity, he was required by the Constitution to conclude the stop and not extend it longer than what was reasonably necessary to effectuate its purpose. When he removed the defendant and driver from his patrol car, took off their handcuffs a nd placed them back in the vehicle, but did not allow them to leave the scene, he extended the stop beyond the time reasonably required to complete his search, and the stop became an unlawful violation of the defendant’s rights under the Fourth Amendment t o the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 14 of the Ohio Constitution. Holding otherwise would be a complete deterioration of the Rights afforded under our State and Federal Constitutions and would give law enforcement the ability to conduct the fishing expeditions reference by the Forth [sic] District in State v. Jones [, 2022

- Ohio

- 561, 185 N.E.3d 131 (4 th Dist.)]

.

* * * Accordingly, the Court finds that the defendant’s detention was prolonged beyond what was reasonably needed to conduct the traffic stop and the first search of the vehicle based upon the detection of the strong odor of raw marijuana . Therefore, his continued detention of the defendant after the initial search of the vehicle constituted an illegal seizure. For the foregoin g reasons, the defendant[’s] Motion to Suppress is hereby GRANTED

.Lawrence App. No. 2 2 CA1 2 7

{¶10} The state appealed.

II. ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR {¶11} The state presents the following assignment of error : I. The T rial C ourt E rred when it granted Defendant

- Appellee’s Motion to Suppress by determining that the Trooper’s stop consisted of two separate searches and not one continuous search.

I II

. LEGAL ANALYSIS A. Standard of Review {¶12} The Supreme Court of Ohio recently reiterated the standard of review of a motion to suppress: Appellate review of a ruling on a motion to suppress presents a mixed question of law and fact. An appellate court must accept the trial court's findings of fact if they are supported by competent, credible evidence. But the appellate court must decide the legal questions de novo. (Citations omitted.) State v. Turner

, 163 Ohio St.3d 421, 2020

- Ohio

- 6773, 170 N.E.3d 842, ¶ 14.

B. Motion to Suppress {¶13} “The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and the Ohio Constitution, Article I, Section 14, prohibit unreasonabl e searches and seizures.” State
v. Emerson , 134 Ohio St.3d 191, 2012

- Ohio

- 5047, 981 N.E.2d 787, ¶ 15. A traffic stop initiated by a law enforcement officer constitutes a seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. Thus, a traffic stop must comply with the Fourth Amendment's general reasonableness requirement. An officer's decision to stop a vehicle is reasonable when the officer has probable cause or reasonable suspicion to believe that the driver has committed, or is committing a crime, including a minor traffic violation. Whren v.Lawrence App. No. 2 2 CA1 2 8

United States, 517 U.S. 806, 809

– 810, 116 S.Ct. 1769, 135 L.Ed.2d 89 (1996) ; State v. Jones, 2022

- Ohio

- 561, 185 N.E.3d 131, ¶ 15

- 17 (4 th Dist.). {¶14} An investigative stop may last no longer than necessary to accomplish the initial goal of the stop : [T]he tolerable duration of police inquiries in the traffic

- stop context is determined by the seizure's “ mission ”

— to address the traffic violation that warranted the stop and attend to related safety concerns. Because addressing the infraction is the purpose of the stop, it may “ last no longer than is necessary to effectuate th[at] purpose.” Authority for the seizure thus ends when tasks tied to the traffic infraction are

— or reasonably should have been

— completed

. Rodriguez v. United States , 575 U.S. 348, 354, 191 L.Ed.2d 492, 135 S.Ct. 1609 (2015). The United States Supreme Court has explained that tasks tied to traf fic infractions include: (1) determining whether to issue a traffic ticket, (2) checking the driver’s license, (3) determining the existence of outstanding warrants, (4) inspecting the vehicle’s registration, and (5) examining proof of insurance. “These ch ecks serve the same objective as enforcement of the traffic code: ensuring that vehicles on the road are operated safely and responsibly.” Id . at 355 ; S tate v. Aguirre , 4 th Dist. Gallia No. 03CA5,
2003

- Ohio

- 4909, ¶ 36 (during a traffic violation stop, mot orist may be detained for a period of time sufficient to issue a citation “and to perform routine procedures such as a computer check on the motorist’s driver’s license, registration, and vehicle plates”). {¶15} After the reasonable time for the original traffi c stop has elapsed, the officer must have “ ‘a reasonable articulable suspicion of illegal activity to continue the detention.’
” State v. Jones at ¶ 22, quoting State v. Ramos , 155 Ohio App.3d 396, 2003

- Ohio

- 6535, 801 N.E.2d 523, ¶ 13 (2d Dist.).Lawrence App. No. 2 2 CA1 2 9

When a police officer's objective justification to continue detention of a person stopped for a traffic violation for the purpose of searching the person's vehicle is not related to the purpose of the original stop, and when that continued detention is not based on any articulable facts giving rise to a suspicion of some illegal activity justifying an extension of the detention, the continued detention to conduct a search constitutes an illegal seizure. State v. Robinette , 80 Ohio St.3d 234, 685 N.E.2d 762 (1997 ), paragraph one of syllabus ; State v. Venham , 96 Ohio App.3d 649, 656, 645 N.E.2d 831, 835 (4th Dist.1994) (“If, after talking to a driver, a reasonable police officer would be satisfied that there had been no unlawful activity, the driver must be permitted to continue on his way.”) However, if “the officer ascertained reasonably articulable facts giving rise to a suspicion of criminal activity, the officer may then further detain and implement a more in

- depth investigation of the individual.” Robinette at 241. Any further detention may last as long as the reasonable suspicion of criminal activity continues:
I f circumstances attending an otherwise proper stop should give rise to a reasonable suspicion of some other illegal activity, different from the suspected illegal activity that triggered the stop, then the vehicle and the driver may be detained for as long as that new articulable and reasonable suspicion continues . Under these conditions, the continued detention is lawful, even if the officer is satisfied that the suspicion which initially justified the stop has dissipated. However, the lawfulness of the in itial stop will not support a ‘fishing expedition’ for evidence of another crime. (Citations omitted.) (Emphasis added.) State v. Venham, 96 Ohio App.3d 649, 655, 645 N.E.2d 831, 834 (4th Dist.1994) {¶16} The continued investigatory detention does not violate t he Fourth Amendment as long as it is objectively justified by the circumstances. Robinette at 241. The length of time for the continued detention is governed by the totality of the
circumstances: “The officer may detain the vehicle for a period of time rea sonably necessary to confirm or dispel [the officer’s] suspicions of criminal activity. ”Lawrence App. No. 2 2 CA1 2 10

“ Once the officer is satisfied that no criminal activity has occurred, then the vehicle's occupants must be released.”

“ In determining whether a detention is reasonable, the court must look at the totality of the circumstances.” The totality of the circumstances approach “allows officers to draw on their own experience and specialized training to make inferences from and deductions about the cumulative informat ion available to them that ‘might well elude an untrained person.’ ” (Citations omitted.) State v. Williams , 12 th Dist. Clinton No. CA2009

- 08

- 014, 2010

- Ohio

- 1523, ¶ 18. {¶17} In situations where the continued detention is based on the officer’s detection of th e odor of marijuana, t he scope of the search depends upon whether the officer detects the smell of raw or burnt marijuana. If the officer only detects the smell of burnt marijuana, the search must be confined to the passenger compartment of the
vehicle and cannot extend to the trunk or engine compartment:
A trunk and a passenger compartment of an automobile are subject to different standards of probable cause to conduct searches. In State v. Murrell (2002), 94 Ohio St.3d 489, 764 N.E.2d 986, syllabus, this court held that “[w]hen a police officer has made a lawful custodial arrest of the occupant of an automobile, the officer may, as a contemporaneous incident of that arrest, search the passenger compartment of that automobile.” (Emphasis added.) The court was conspicuous in limiting the search to the passenger compartment. The odor of burnt marijuana in the passenger compartment of a vehicle does not, standing alone, establish probable cause for a warrantless search of the trunk of the vehicle. Unite d States v. Nielsen (C.A.10, 1993), 9 F.3d 1487. No other factors justifying a search beyond the passenger compartment were present in this case. The officer detected only a light odor of marijuana, and the troopers found no other contraband within the pas senger compartment. The troopers thus lacked probable cause to search the trunk of Farris's vehicle. Therefore, the automobile exception does not apply in this case. State v. Farris , 109 Ohio St.3d 519, 2006

- Ohio

- 3255, 849 N.E.2d 985, ¶ 51

- 52 . “ This
propo sition is established by the common sense observation that an odor of burningLawrence App. No. 2 2 CA1 2 11

marijuana would not create an inference that burning marijuana was located in a trunk.” State v. Gonzales , 6th Dist. Wood No. WD

- 07

- 060, 2009

- Ohio

- 168, ¶ 21

. {¶18} Whe n an officer det ects a strong odor of raw marijuana emanating from the vehicle, the officer is justified in extending the search beyond the vehicle’s passenger compartment to other areas of the vehicle. If, during a valid stop, an officer qualified to recognize the smell of raw marijuana detects an overwhelming odor of raw marijuana, the officer is justified in believing that the vehicle contains a large amount of raw marijuana. If no large amount of raw marijuana is seen in the passenger compartment, the officer is justi fied in believing that a large amount of raw marijuana may be found in a container or compartment

— includ ing the trunk. Gonzales at ¶ 23. “[W]hen a police officer has probable cause to believe a vehicle contains evidence of a crime, the officer may conduct a warrantless search of every part of the vehicle and its contents, including all movable containers and packages, that could logically conceal the objects of the search.” State v. Maddox , 2021

- Ohio

- 586, 168 N.E.3d 613, ¶ 20 (10th Dist.), citing United S tates v. Ross , 456 U.S. 798, 102 S.Ct. 2157, 72 L.Ed.2d 572 (1982). {¶19} Here Trooper Malone testified that he detected a strong odor of raw marijuana emanating from the vehicle and , when asked about her use of marijuana , the
driver admitted she had smoked mari juana the day before. Based on this, Trooper Malone had probable cause to suspect contraband was hidden in the vehicle. Adding to the totality of the circumstances, the driver made an unusual comment about not wanting to be “caught in the crossfire” when asked about the presence of illegal drugs in the
vehicle. Although Trooper Malone was unable to locate contraband in the initial search of the passenger compartment, h e testified that he continued to susp ect the contraband
was hidden somewhere in the vehicle. When Trooper Malone was asked on cross

-Lawrence App. No. 2 2 CA1 2 12

examination why he did not let the driver and Farrow go after he found nothing after his first search of the passenger compartment, 3 he testified, “Because I still believed that there was something I wasn’t finding. * * * I had probable cause to search * * * and I felt there was drugs there. It would be a borderline dereliction of duty if I just cut someone loose before I conducted, what I felt like, a thorough investigation. ” H e was entitled to
review the au dio and video recording of the driver and Farrow for any assistance it might provide in locating hidden contraband, and conduct a warrantless search of the entire vehicle, including any containers, the trunk, and the en gine compartment. His reasonable
susp icions were not dispelled merely because he did not locate contraband in the search of the passenger compartment. Therefore, he did not need a new articulable and reasonable suspicion to review the audio and video recording and conduct a second,
more thoro ugh search of the vehicle. {¶20} In State v. Harper , 4 th Dist. Scioto No. 21CA3965, 2022

- Ohio

- 4357, a trooper stopped a Dodge van after it crossed over the white fog line twice. The v ehicle ’s plates did not match the Dodge van, but instead matched a Toyota. Additionally, the passenger lacked identification and both the driver and passenger gave the trooper suspicious information about their plans. One claimed they were travelling to West Virginia to do “masonry work” and the other called it “missionary work.” The trooper called for a backup officer and, while waiting for information from dispatch to confirm the passenger’s identity, the trooper walked his canine around the vehicle. The dog alerted

3 The record identifies the vehicle as a “Spor ts Utility Vehicle,” but it is unclear whether the initial search of the passenger compartment included the trunk area. Because the trooper detected the odor of raw marijuana, the distinction between the trunk and passenger compartment is not relevant to o ur analysis. State v. Gonzales, 6 th Dist. Wood No. WD

- 07

- 060, 2009

- Ohio

- 168, ¶ 24.Lawrence App. No. 2 2 CA1 2 13

on the driver’s side back do or area and both driver and passenger were informed of their
Miranda rights and placed in the back of the patrol car. Id. at ¶ 2

- 3. {¶21} For the next three hours, the trooper and the backup officer searched the

van , starting and stopping their searches after re viewing the audio and video recordings of the driver and passenger in the patrol car : The troopers initially searched the interior of the van while Harper and Allen waited in the back seat of the cruiser. While in the cruiser, the men were being video a nd audio recorded as they watched the search take place. When the troopers failed to locate drugs hidden in the interior of the van during the initial part of the search, they removed the men from the cruiser, had them get back into their van, and the troo pers then reviewed the video and audio footage from inside the cruiser. The troopers repeated this pattern twice: placing the men in the cruiser, searching the van, removing the men from the cruiser, reviewing video footage, and then resuming the search. B ased upon statements and body movements of the men, they then resumed their search of the van to areas that seemed to be of interest to the men based upon their conversation in the back of the cruiser. Finally, the troopers located a black package that con tained eleven different baggies with a total of approximately 1000 pills that were later determined to be oxycodone. The package was hidden behind an interior panel located on the rear passenger side of the van near the wheel well.
Id. at ¶ 4. {¶22} The defend ant in Harper raised the same defense as Farrow does here. He argued that the initial search of the van was based upon the probable cause that arose from the canine alert, “but that once the initial search of the van was concluded without finding any contr aband, ‘there was no constitutional basis to further detain him or search the vehicle again and that subsequent searches of the vehicle were the result of an illegally prolonged detention.’” Id. at ¶ 20. {¶23} We found that the canine alert, like the trooper’s d etection of the odor of raw marijuana here, gave probable cause to search the vehicle for contraband. “This probable
cause extended to the entire vehicle and there was no time limit in conducting the search .”Lawrence App. No. 2 2 CA1 2 14

(Emphasis added.) Id. at ¶ 38. 4 See also State v. Williams , 4 th Dist. Highland No. 12CA7,
2013

- Ohio

- 594, ¶ 26

- 27 (officers were permitted to stop a vehicle search, move the vehicle to an impound lot, and continue their search under safer conditions without obtaining a warrant because the same pro bable cause that existed at the time of the initial search still existed at the impound lot). {¶24} I n State v. Maddox, 2021

- Ohio

- 586, 168 N.E.3d 613, ¶ 20 (10th Dist.) the defendant raised a similar argument that suspicions had been dispelled and a new
articul able reasonable suspicion was required before he could be further detained and
the vehicle searched

. In Maddox , the police officer stopped a vehicle after the driver , Maddox, failed to use his turn signal. Upon approaching the vehicle, the officer detected the odor of raw marijuana emanating from the vehicle. After the officer told Maddox he smelled raw marijuana, Maddox admitted he had marijuana in his pocket and voluntarily
surrender ed a small amount of it . The officer searched the vehicle and discovered cocaine, heroin, and a firearm. Maddox filed a motion to suppress on the ground that the officer’s reasonable suspicion that the vehicle contained contraband was dispelled when Maddox produced the small quantity of marijuana. Maddox argued that after he t urned over the marijuana, the officer needed a new articulable and reasonable suspicion to conduct the search of the vehicle. {¶25} The appellate court held that the odor of raw marijuana gave the officer probable cause to search “every part of the vehicle and its contents, including all movable containers and packages, that could logically conceal the objects of the search. ” Id . at ¶

4 Our decision in State v. Harper was issued on November 28, 2022. Thus, the trial court did not have the benefit of this decision when it rendered its decision in August 20 22 . Likewise , the parties did not have the benefit of it when they prepared their appellate briefs.Lawrence App. No. 2 2 CA1 2 15

20. It rejected Maddox’s argument that his voluntary surrender of the marijuana dispelled the officer’s suspicion and removed any probable cause to continue a search of the
vehicle. We find no merit in appellant's argument at the suppression hearing that once appellant voluntarily surrendered the marijuana, the officers were required to stop their investigation and simply charge appellant with misdemeanor drug possession. To the contrary, when appellant voluntarily surrendered the marijuana, officers had probable cause to believe appellant's vehicle contained other evidence of a crime. The subsequent warrantless search of the vehicle was conducted pursuant to the automobile exception. Under the rule of law advocated by appellant, a vehicle operator might avoid a search of the vehicle for illegal drugs during a lawful traffic stop by voluntarily surrendering a small amount o f an illegal substance to law enforcement. Ohio law does not support such an absurd result.
Maddox at ¶ 23. {¶26} Similarly, we find that Trooper Malone’s suspicion that contraband was hidden in the vehicle was not dispelled simply because he was unable to loc ate any in his initial search of the passenger compartment. To conclude otherwise would mean that an officer who detects the odor of raw marijuana but does not find it in the passenger compartment would not be allowed to search the trunk, engine, or contai ners stored in the trunk or hidden in the engine compartment. Ohio law does not support this result and instead supports a thorough search of the entire vehicle. Maddox, supra; State v.
Donaldson , 6th Dist. Wood No. WD

- 18

- 034, 2019

- Ohio

- 232, ¶ 25 ; State v. Lynn , 12th Dist. Butler Nos. CA2017

- 08

- 129, CA2017

- 08

- 132, 2018

- Ohio

- 3335, ¶ 20; State v. Gartrell , 2014

- Ohio

- 5203, 24 N.E.3d 680, ¶ 72 (3d Dist.). {¶27} We find the trooper’s initial stop for expired tags was constitutional and he
did not violate the Fourth A mendment by expanding the scope of the stop based on the strong odor of raw marijuana emanating from the vehicle. The scope and duration of theLawrence App. No. 2 2 CA1 2 16

stop was tailored to its underlying justification

– an articulable and reasonable suspicion
that the vehicle con tained contraband. The trooper’s reasonable suspicions were not dispelled after h e failed to locate contraband during his initial search of the passenger compartment because the odor of raw marijuana entitles law enforcement to search the
entire vehicle . T he trooper did not unconstitutionally extend the duration of the stop to review the audio and video recording of the driver and Farrow while they were in the back of the patrol car

. His review of the recording and subsequent question s to the driver
allowed the trooper to focus his search for the suspected contraband on the engine compartment where he found heroin and methamphetamines hidden near the headlight.
I V. CONCLUSION {¶28} We sustain the state’s sole assignment of error and reverse the trial court’s judgment. JUDGMENT REVERSED

.Lawrence App. No. 2 2 CA1 2 17

JUDGMENT ENTRY
It is ordered that the JUDGMENT IS REVERSED and that a ppell ee shall pay the costs. The Court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal. It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of t his Court directing the LAWRENCE COUNTY COURT OF COMMON PLEAS to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. Smith, P.J. & Wilkin, J.: Concur in Judgment and Opinion.

For the Court

BY: ________________________ Michael D. Hess, Judge

NOTICE TO COUNSEL Pursuant to Local Rule No. 14, this document constitutes a final judgment entry and the time period for further appeal commences from the date of filing with the clerk.