Docket No. 92777–Agenda 18–September 2002.

In re MARY ANN P. (The People of the State of Illinois,

								Appellant, v. Mary Ann P., Appellee).

Opinion filed Novembewr r 21, 2002.

	JUSTICE FITZGERALD delivered the opinion of the court:

	This appeal concerns the operation of section 2–107.1 of the

Mental Health and Developmental Disabilities Code (Code) (405

ILCS 5/1–100 et seq. (West 2000)). Section 2–107.1 permits the circuit court, upon the filing of a petition and following an

evidentiary hearing, to enter an order authorizing the

administration of involuntary treatment to a recipient of mental

health services. The involuntary treatment involved in this case is

the administration of psychotropic medication. The issue we

consider is whether section 2–107.1 requires the use of a special

verdict form, so that the jury may “selectively authorize” the

involuntary administration of only those medications it deems

appropriate. For the reasons discussed below, we conclude that

section 2–107.1 does not permit selective authorization of

psychotropic medication. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of

the appellate court and affirm the judgment of the trial court.

BACKGROUND

	On March 13, 2000, the State filed a petition in the circuit

court of Kane County, pursuant to section 2–107.1 of the Code,

seeking an order authorizing the involuntary administration of

psychotropic medication to respondent, Mary Ann P., for a period

of 90 days. The petition was signed by Dr. Donna Luchetta,

respondent’s treating psychiatrist at the Elgin Mental Health Center

(EMHC) from December 1998 to June 2000. The petition listed six

medications: Zeprexa, Orap, Haldol, Haldol decanoate, Cogentin,

and Ativan. On the preprinted petition form, Zeprexa was listed as

the “1st choice,” and the other five medications were listed as

“Alternatives.” The petition also identified a dosage range for each

drug and the tests and procedures necessary for administration of

the drugs.

	At the hearing on the State’s petition, Dr. Luchetta testified

that respondent had been transferred from Northwest Community

Hospital to the EMHC on December 28, 1998, and involuntarily

admitted on the petition of her mother. This was not the first time

respondent had been admitted to the EMHC. According to Dr.

Luchetta, respondent suffers from paranoid schizophrenia, a

psychotic disorder marked by paranoid and somatic delusions,

disorganized thought processes, and impaired social and

occupational functioning. Dr. Luchetta described respondent’s

delusions and the ways in which her ability to function had

deteriorated.

	Dr. Luchetta further testified that, beginning in July or August

1999, as the result of a prior court proceeding, respondent was

involuntarily administered psychotropic medication. Prolixin was

initially administered but was discontinued after it caused

parkinsonism, a temporary syndrome characterized by symptoms

similar to those associated with Parkinson’s disease. In late August

1999, Zeprexa was administered, which lessened respondent’s

delusions. In September 1999, Orap was also administered, which

significantly diminished respondent’s delusions. While medicated,

and for a short time afterwards, respondent was pleasant,

appropriate, and well-engaged. Respondent was able to participate

successfully in EMHC workshops. She was no longer agitated,

hostile, intrusive, or argumentative. Respondent told Dr. Luchetta

that she felt better. Toward the end of the involuntary medication

period in October 1999, respondent told Dr. Luchetta that she

would like a trial period without medication. Subsequently, in

November 1999, her medications were tapered off. On several

occasions thereafter, Dr. Luchetta recommended that respondent

resume medication. Respondent refused every treatment

recommendation, and by March 2000 she was again psychotic and

delusional. At the time of the hearing, respondent was unable to

work and provide for her own basic needs.

	Dr. Luchetta testified at length about the benefits and potential

side effects of each medication listed in the petition. Dr. Luchetta

stated that Zeprexa was her “first choice” in medication. She

explained that Zeprexa is a relatively new atypical antipsychotic

drug that resolves psychosis by changing the balance of natural substances in the nervous system, particularly dopamine. Possible

side effects include weight gain, constipation, dry mouth,

hypotension, and a movement disorder known as tardive

dyskinesia. Dr. Luchetta’s second medication choice was Orap.

Although Orap is prescribed primarily for the treatment of

Tourette’s Syndrome or tic disorders, it also resolves psychosis by

decreasing the amount of dopamine in the system. Orap can also

induce tardive dyskinesia. Dr. Luchetta testified that, during the

period in 1999 when respondent was being treated with Zeprexa

and Orap, she experienced minimal side effects and did not exhibit

any signs of tardive dyskinesia.

	The next two medications listed in the petition were Haldol,

a typical antipsychotic medication, and Haldol decanoate, the

injectable form of Haldol. Dr. Luchetta testified that Haldol

decanoate can last up to four weeks in the patient’s system and is

beneficial in cases where the patient is unwilling to take medication

on a daily basis. Haldol can produce significant side effects,

including tardive dyskinesia, which occurs in approximately one of

100 patients, and neuroleptic malignant syndrome, a condition that

adversely affects regulation of a person’s body temperature and

occurs in approximately one of 1,000 patients. Haldol can also

produce parkinsonism and extrapyramidal side affects, i.e., acute muscle contracture. Dr. Luchetta stated that the drug Cogentin,

also listed in the petition, blocks some of these extrapyramidal side

effects. The most common side effect of Cogentin is blurred vision,

a condition that can be monitored.

	The final medication listed in the petition was Ativan, a mild

tranquilizer. Dr. Luchetta testified that administration of a small

amount of Ativan can greatly reduce the dosages of antipsychotic

medications administered and, in turn, prevent many of the side

effects. The antianxiety effects of Ativan, which is available in

injectable form, also help persuade an otherwise unwilling patient

to take medications, such as Zeprexa and Orap, which are in tablet

or liquid form.

	In addition, Dr. Luchetta testified that the side effects of any

medication can be monitored through observation and testing,

including a complete blood count, a thyroid function test,

urinalysis, a comprehensive metabolic profile, and an electrocardiogram. The medications would be administered in the

lowest effective dose. It was Dr. Luchetta’s opinion that the

benefits of the medications outweigh the harmful side effects and

that respondent lacks the capacity to make a reasoned or informed

decision about such treatment. On several occasions Dr. Luchetta

attempted to discuss with respondent the advantages and

disadvantages of the medications listed in the petition, but

respondent refused to discuss treatment, or responded by swearing,

walking away, or talking about an unrelated matter. Finally, Dr.

Luchetta testified that less restrictive services, such as an

outpatient program or counseling, are not viable options.

	Dr. Nageswara Rao Nagarakanti, respondent’s treating

psychiatrist at the time of the hearing, also testified. He agreed with

the medication recommendations set forth in the petition and had

attempted, on three or four occasions, to discuss these medications

with respondent. She denied having a mental illness and told Dr.

Nagarakanti that she did not need any medication. In light of her

psychosis, Dr. Nagarakanti did not believe that respondent had the

ability to understand the advantages and disadvantages of the

medications.

	The State called respondent as its final witness. She testified

that she had been “abducted, drugged and detained” at the EMHC

by a man she had never met. Upon questioning by the State,

respondent recounted her cancer-related surgery and stated that

she had seen no proof that the cancer had not recurred. Dr.

Luchetta had earlier testified that respondent had cervical cancer

in 1982, but that a test performed in September 1999 showed

normal results. When asked about other physical ailments,

respondent testified that the EMHC had sent her to a dentist, she

had teeth removed, and she was given an overdose of penicillin or

some other medication. Respondent stated that, rather than being

treated at the EMHC, she should have been taken to an oncologist

for an examination of the lump in her throat.

	Respondent further testified that Dr. Nagarakanti only wants

to sell her drugs and that “[w]hen something does not agree with

what [Dr. Luchetta’s] diagnosis is, it disappears.” Respondent

stated that she observed her case worker and other people going through her medical records and “things being discarded into the

garbage.”

	Respondent also made reference to being restrained at the

EMHC and described various incidents in which she had been

injured by other patients. She indicated that the EMHC staff is not

responsive when such incidents occur.

	Finally, respondent testified that she did not want to be

medicated because it caused her pain, although she also stated that

the pain occurs both on and off the medication. She also indicated

that the medication made her dry and constipated, caused her nose

to bleed, blurred her vision, and impaired her concentration.

	Respondent called no witnesses and the trial court denied her

motion for a directed verdict. Following deliberations, the jury

returned a verdict in favor of the State and against respondent,

finding her to be “someone who qualifies for the involuntary

administration of psychotropic medication.” The trial court entered

an order authorizing the administration of psychotropic medication

for a period not to exceed 90 days. The order listed the six

medications and dosage ranges. Respondent appealed, arguing that

she was denied her right to due process when the trial court

improperly instructed the jury under the 1998 version of section

2–107.1, and when the trial court gave the jury a general verdict

form that did not permit it to specify which medications were

appropriate.

	With one justice dissenting, the appellate court reversed. No.

2–00–1130 (unpublished order under Supreme court Rule 23).

Citing In re Nancy M., 317 Ill. App. 3d 167 (2000), the appellate court held that the jury was required to specify in its verdict which

medications were appropriate, and that the general verdict form

“failed to show that the jury clearly intended to authorize the

administration of all six medications listed in the trial court’s

subsequent written order.” The dissenting justice disagreed, citing

the reasons set forth in his dissent in In re Frances K., 322 Ill. App. 3d 203, 211-13 (2001) (Grometer, J., dissenting). In that case, the

dissenting justice criticized Nancy M., stating that, “under the holding of Nancy M., the jury is, in effect, being asked to prescribe the medication and treatment” and that “[s]uch a requirement ***

goes far beyond the clear legislative scheme.” Frances K., 322 Ill. App. 3d at 213. The appellate court found it unnecessary to

consider respondent’s argument that the jury was instructed under

the wrong version of section 2–107.1.

	We allowed the State’s petition for leave to appeal (see 177

Ill. 2d R. 315(a)), and allowed the Illinois State Medical Society

and the Illinois Psychiatric Society to file an amicus curiae brief in support of the State (see 155 Ill. 2d R. 345).

ANALYSIS

I

	At the outset, we observe that this case is moot. Section

2–107.1 provides that an order authorizing the administration of

involuntary treatment shall, in no event, be effective for more than

90 days. 405 ILCS 5/2–107.1(a–5)(5) (West 2000).1 The trial court’s order granting the petition for involuntary administration

of psychotropic medication was entered on September 18, 2000.

The 90 days have long since passed and the trial court’s

order–valid or invalid–no longer has any force or effect. Thus, it is

impossible for this court to grant effectual relief to either party, and

any decision we render is essentially an advisory one. See In re Barbara H., 183 Ill. 2d 482, 490 (1998); In re A Minor, 127 Ill. 2d 247, 255 (1989). Generally, a reviewing court will not consider

moot or abstract questions or render advisory decisions.

Steinbrecher v. Steinbrecher, 197 Ill. 2d 514, 523 (2001); Barbara H., 183 Ill. 2d at 491. We find, however, that this case qualifies for review under the “public interest exception” to the mootness

doctrine. The criteria for application of this exception are: (1) the

public nature of the question; (2) the desirability of an authoritative

determination for the purpose of guiding public officers; and (3)

the likelihood that the question will recur. In re Adoption of Walgreen, 186 Ill. 2d 362, 365 (1999); Radazewski v. Cawley, 159 Ill. 2d 372, 376 (1994). This case satisfies all three criteria.

	First, the procedures which must be followed and the proofs

that must be made before a court may authorize involuntary treatment to recipients of mental health services are matters of a

public nature and of substantial public concern. See generally In re C.E., 161 Ill. 2d 200, 213-19 (1994) (discussing the state’s parens patriae interest in furthering the treatment of mentally ill persons and the liberty interests implicated where treatment is involuntarily

administered). The question we consider here–whether the Code

permits selective authorization of psychotropic medication–is

likewise a matter of substantial public concern. Second, an

authoritative determination is desirable in light of the conflict in the

case law on this issue. Compare Nancy M., 317 Ill. App. 3d at 178- 79 (holding that the jury was required to make findings, either in

special interrogatories or in its verdict, as to whether the benefits

of a particular medication outweighed the harm), and Frances K., 322 Ill. App. 3d at 209-10 (following Nancy M. and holding that the verdict form, which did not include any space for the jury to

determine the medications or doses to be administered, required

reversal), with In re R.W., 332 Ill. App. 3d 901, 911 (2002) (holding that section 2–107.1 does not require a specialized verdict

addressing each particular medication), petition for leave to appeal

pending No. _____. Finally, because of the relatively short duration

of involuntary treatment orders, the circumstances present in this

case will recur. Review is, therefore, appropriate.

II

	Section 2–107.1 of the Code sets forth the standards and

procedures that must be satisfied for the administration of

“[a]uthorized involuntary treatment” to adult recipients of mental

health services. “Authorized involuntary treatment” is defined as

“psychotropic medication or electro-convulsive therapy [ECT],

including those tests and related procedures that are essential for

the safe and effective administration of the treatment.” 405 ILCS

5/1–121.5 (West 2000). Section 2–107.1 applies where a person

who is receiving mental health services is unable to make a decision

in his or her own behalf regarding the administration of

psychotropic medication or ECT.ETC. See C.E., 161 Ill. 2d at 228. The procedures set forth in this section of the Code ensure that

involuntary treatment will be used for therapeutic purposes only and not simply as a means to manage or discipline recipients of

mental health services. See C.E., 161 Ill. 2d at 218-19.

	Proceedings under section 2–107.1 are initiated by the filing

of a petition in the circuit court. The court is required to hold an

evidentiary hearing on the petition within the prescribed period.

See 405 ILCS 5/2–107.1(a–5)(2) (West 2000) (setting forth the

initial time frame and allowable continuances). Significantly,

section 2–107.1 provides that authorized involuntary treatment

shall not be administered unless it is determined, by clear and

convincing evidence, that the following seven factors are present:

			“(A) That the recipient has a serious mental illness or

developmental disability.

			(B) That because of said mental illness or developmental

disability, the recipient exhibits any one of the following:

(i) deterioration of his or her ability to function, (ii)

suffering, or (iii) threatening behavior.

			(C) That the illness or disability has existed for a period

marked by the continuing presence of the symptoms set

forth in item (B) of this subdivision (4) or the repeated

episodic occurrence of these symptoms.

			(D) That the benefits of the treatment outweigh the

harm.

			(E) That the recipient lacks the capacity to make a

reasoned decision about the treatment.

			(F) That other less restrictive services have been

explored and found inappropriate.

			(G) If the petition seeks authorization for testing and

other procedures, that such testing and procedures are

essential for the safe and effective administration of the

treatment.” 405 ILCS 5/2–107.1(a–5)(4) (West 2000).

The focus of this appeal is factor (D): “That the benefits of the

treatment outweigh the harm.”

	Consistent with the appellate court’s decision, respondent

maintains that a special verdict form is required in a section

2–107.1 hearing so that the jury may selectively authorize the

involuntary administration of only those medications it has determined are more beneficial than harmful. See Nancy M., 317 Ill. App. 3d at 178-79; Frances K., 322 Ill. App. 3d at 209-10. The State argues that section 2–107.1 only requires the jury to pass on

the propriety of the treatment as a whole and that the legislature

did not intend for jurors to “pick and choose” among the medicinal

components of the treatment. According to the State, the use of a

special verdict form, listing specific medications and dosages,

would allow the jury to invade the province of qualified and

knowledgeable physicians. See Frances K., 322 Ill. App. 3d at 213 (Grometer, J., dissenting); R.W., 332 Ill. App. 3d at 911 (finding the dissent in Francis K. persuasive). Whether section 2–107.1 permits selective authorization of psychotropic medication, and

thus requires the use of a special verdict form, is a matter of

statutory construction. Our review, therefore, proceeds de novo. People ex rel. Devine v. $30,700 United States Currency, 199 Ill. 2d 142, 148-49 (2002).

	The primary rule of statutory construction is to ascertain and

give effect to the intent of the legislature. Belleville Toyota, Inc. v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc., 199 Ill. 2d 325, 342 (2002); Lulay v. Lulay, 193 Ill. 2d 455, 466 (2000). The most reliable indicator of the legislature’s intent is the language used in the

statute, which must be given its plain and ordinary meaning. Where

the statutory language is clear and unambiguous, it will be given

effect without resort to other aids of construction. Lulay, 193 Ill. 2d at 466. Based on the plain language of section 2–107.1, we hold

that the statute does not permit selective authorization of

psychotropic medication.

	Section 2–107.1(a–5)(4)(D)   requires the fact finder to

consider, inter alia, whether the benefits of the recommended “treatment” outweigh the harm. 405 ILCS 5/2–107.1(a–5)(4)(D)

(West 2000). Although treatment with psychotropic medication

may involve the administration of a single drug (see, e.g., In re Miller, 301 Ill. App. 3d 1060, 1065-66 (1998)), treatment frequently involves the administration of several medications (see, e.g., R.W., 332 Ill. App. 3d at 903-04; In re Williams, 305 Ill. App. 3d 506, 507-08 (1999); In re Barry B., 295 Ill. App. 3d 1080, 1083 (1998); In re Perona, 294 Ill. App. 3d 755, 767 (1998)). Nothing in the language of section 2–107.1 indicates that where the treatment involves more than one medication, the legislature

intended the jury to parse the treatment and choose among the

various medications. Similarly, nothing in the language of section

2–107.1 indicates that the legislature intended treatment orders to

authorize something less than what the treating physician has

prescribed. Accordingly, where, as here, the recommended

treatment consists of multiple medications–some to be

administered alternatively, some to be administered in combination,

and some to be administered only as needed to counter side

effects–it is only this treatment, in its entirety, that may be

authorized.

	Respondent contends that because the statute does not

expressly prohibit selective authorization, it is impliedly allowed.

We disagree. Statutes should be construed in a manner that avoids

absurd, unreasonable, unjust or inconvenient results. In re B.C., 176 Ill. 2d 536, 543 (1997); Collins v. Board of Trustees of the Firemen’s Annuity & Benefit Fund, 155 Ill. 2d 103, 110 (1993). Construing the statute to permit selective authorization of only

certain medications would permit the jury to substitute a treatment

different from the one recommended by the testifying physician and

set forth in the petition. As this court has recognized, however, the

diagnosis and treatment of mental health disorders is a “ ‘highly

specialized area of medicine which is better left to the experts.’ ”

C.E., 161 Ill. 2d at 229, quoting In re Ingersoll, 188 Ill. App. 3d 364, 368 (1989). Indeed, section 2–107.1 vests the physician

authorized to administer the involuntary treatment “complete

discretion” not to administer the treatment. 405 ILCS 5/2–107.1(a–5)(6) (West 2000). It is thus not for the trial court or

the jury to “develop a course of treatment and then dictate that

course to the treating physician. That would constitute role

reversal.” In re Gwendolyn N., 326 Ill. App. 3d 427, 431 (2001). In the words of amici curiae, allowing the layperson jury to determine which of the various medications should be involuntarily

administered “dangerously approaches the practice of medicine.”

Certainly the legislature could not have intended such an

unreasonable result.

	The appellate court’s decision in Nancy M., cited by respondent as well as the appellate court below, does not persuade us that selective authorization is permitted under the statute. In

Nancy M., the circuit court, following a jury trial, entered an order authorizing the involuntary administration of three psychotropic

medications. The appellate court reversed, agreeing with the

respondent that the verdict form should have listed each requested

medication and that the general verdict form failed to afford the

jurors an opportunity to determine which medication the

respondent should have been involuntarily administered. Nancy M., 317 Ill. App. 3d at 176-79. The Nancy M. decision, in turn, was based on the reasoning and analysis in In re Len P., 302 Ill. App. 3d 281 (1999). In Len P., the respondent challenged the trial court’s involuntary treatment order because it failed to specify the

drugs to be administered and the dosages, contrary to the express

requirements of the Code. See 405 ILCS 5/2–107.1(a–5)(6) (West

2000). The appellate court reversed. The appellate court noted that

the type of medication to be used is a necessary component of the

State’s burden to prove that the benefits of the medication

outweigh the harm. The physician’s testimony on this subject,

however, was vague. Because the trial transcript could not provide

the essential information missing from the trial court’s order, the

error was more substantive than procedural, and reversal was

required. Len P., 302 Ill. App. 3d at 285-86.

	Plainly, the issue addressed in Len P. is not the same issue we address in the instant case. Len P. considered only whether the circuit court’s treatment order must be reversed where neither the

order, nor the trial transcript, provided the required specificity as

to the medications and dosages. Here, we consider whether the

statute permits the fact finder in a section 2–107.1 proceeding to

parse the recommended treatment and selectively authorize only

certain requested medications. Because Nancy M. relied on Len P., and Len P. considered a different issue than the one raised in this case, Nancy M. does not provide a sound basis for construing section 2–107.1 in the manner advanced by respondent and set

forth in the appellate court’s order. Further, to the extent Nancy M. and subsequent cases conflict with our holding today, they are

overruled.

	Respondent also argues that the statute’s requirement that

treatment orders specify the medications and dosages authorized is evidence that the legislature intended selective authorization of

medication. We disagree. In light of the substantially invasive

nature of involuntary treatment, the liberty interests implicated

when a person is medicated against his or her will, and the potential

for misuse of psychotropic medication (see C.E., 161 Ill. 2d at 213- 15), we believe that the specificity requirement for involuntary

treatment orders reflects the legislature’s legitimate concern that

only qualified health care professionals, familiar with the

respondent’s mental and physical status, be permitted to administer

the treatment and that the respondent, as well as the treaters, be

notified of the exact nature of the treatment authorized. See Williams, 305 Ill. App. 3d at 510-11; Miller, 301 Ill. App. 3d at 1072; accord In re Cynthia S., 326 Ill. App. 3d 65, 68-69 (2001). That the legislature has prudently provided for specificity in

treatment orders entered by the trial court does not lead to the

conclusion, however, that the legislature intended a similar

requirement in the verdict form so that the jury may decide which

of the medicinal components of the proposed treatment should be

administered. 

	We note first that the legislature has employed different

language in the subsection requiring specificity in treatment orders

and the subsection addressing the findings necessary before

involuntary treatment may be authorized. The subsection setting

forth the requirements for treatment orders states:

			“An order issued under this subsection *** shall

designate the persons authorized to administer the

authorized involuntary treatment under the standards and

procedures of this subsection ***. Those persons shall

have complete discretion not to administer any treatment

authorized under this Section. The order shall also specify

the medications and the anticipated range of dosages that

have been authorized.” 405 ILCS 5/2–107.1(a–5)(6)

(West 2000).

In contrast, the subsection addressing the findings required before

involuntary treatment may be authorized states that “involuntary

treatment shall not be administered to the recipient unless it has

been determined by clear and convincing evidence that *** the

benefits of the treatment outweigh the harm.” 405 ILCS 5/2–107.1(a–5)(4)(D) (West 2000). It is a basic rule of statutory

construction that, “by employing certain language in one instance

and wholly different language in another, the legislature indicates

that different results were intended.” In re K.C., 186 Ill. 2d 542, 549-50 (1999). Accordingly, we will not assign the same meaning

to these two subsections or engraft the specificity requirement from

one subsection onto the other subsection.

	In addition, we note that the legislature has seen fit to amend

the Code numerous times, and that the legislature amended section

2–107.1 in 1997, adding the express requirement that treatment

orders specify the medications and dosages. See Pub. Act 90–538,

eff. December 1, 1997. Had the legislature also intended to permit

selective authorization of medication, it could have done so. The

legislature has not seen fit to amend the statute in this fashion, and

we will not, under the guise of statutory construction, inject this

provision into the statute. See People ex rel. Devine, 199 Ill. 2d at 150-51 (court will not depart from plain language of statute by

reading into it exceptions, limitations or conditions not expressed

by the legislature); People v. Tucker, 167 Ill. 2d 431, 437 (1995) (court would not rewrite statute under guise of statutory

construction).

	Respondent argues in the alternative that section 2–107.1 of

the Code must be construed in harmony with other statutes relating

to the same subject matter. See People v. Maya, 105 Ill. 2d 281, 286-87 (1985). Respondent directs our attention to the Powers of

Attorney for Health Care Law (755 ILCS 45/4–1 et seq. (West 2000)) and the Mental Health Treatment Preference Declaration

Act (755 ILCS 43/1 et seq. (West 2000)).

	The Powers of Attorney for Health Care Law allows an

individual, the “principal,” to designate a “trusted agent *** to

make personal and health care decisions” in the event the principal

becomes disabled. 755 ILCS 45/4–1 (West 2000). Health care

powers that the individual may delegate to his or her agent

“include, without limitation, all powers an individual may have to

be informed about and to consent to or refuse or withdraw any

type of health care for the individual.” 755 ILCS 45/4–3 (West

2000). The agent’s authority “may extend beyond the principal’s

death if necessary to permit anatomical gift, autopsy or disposition of remains.” 755 ILCS 45/4–3 (West 2000). The agent has the

same access to the principal’s medical and mental health records as

the principal would have. 755 ILCS 45/4–7(c) (West 2000).

	The Mental Health Treatment Preference Declaration Act

allows an “adult of sound mind” to make an advance “declaration

of preferences or instructions regarding mental health treatment.”

755 ILCS 43/10(1) (West 2000). The declaration may include

“consent to or refusal of mental health treatment.” 755 ILCS

43/10(1) (West 2000). “Mental health treatment” includes, among

other things, treatment with psychotropic medication. 755 ILCS

43/5(7) (West 2000). The declaration may designate an adult to act

as “attorney-in-fact” to make decisions about treatment when the

declarant is incapable. 755 ILCS 43/15, 43/30 (West 2000). The

form of declaration set forth in the statute provides that the

declarant may indicate that he or she consents to, or does not

consent to, the administration of particular psychotropic

medications. 755 ILCS 43/75 (West 2000). A declaration

designating an attorney-in-fact remains in effect until it is revoked

or the attorney withdraws. 755 ILCS 43/10(2), 50, 70 (West

2000).

	Respondent contends that the foregoing statutes, and section

2–107.1, all relate to the provision of health care treatment and

should be construed in a single fashion. Specifically, respondent

contends that the fact finders in a section 2–107.1 proceeding, like

the “surrogate decision makers” in the foregoing statutes, must be

allowed to selectively authorize only some of the medications

comprising the prescribed treatment plan.

	Although the Powers of Attorney for Health Care Law, the

Mental Health Treatment Preference Declaration Act, and the

Code each provide a mechanism for making treatment decisions

where an individual is deemed incapable of doing so, the jury in a

section 2–107.1 proceeding functions differently than an

individual’s “trusted agent” (755 ILCS 45/4–1 (West 2000)) or

“attorney-in-fact” (755 ILCS 43/15 (West 2000)). The jury in a

section 2–107.1 proceeding has no prior relationship with the

respondent, no prior knowledge of the respondent’s preferences

regarding mental health treatment, and no on-going relationship

with the respondent or the respondent’s treating physicians. Rather, the jury functions within the framework of an adversarial

proceeding and is called upon, as an impartial fact finder, to make

a single decision regarding the respondent’s mental health

treatment based solely on the evidence and argument presented at

the hearing. Once the jury renders its verdict, the jury is discharged

and its limited involvement with the respondent’s health care

ceases. These significant differences persuade us that section

2–107.1 should not be construed to provide the jury the same

powers expressly accorded to an individual’s “trusted agent” or

“attorney-in-fact.” Consequently, we will not read section 2–107.1

to permit selective authorization of medication.

	Respondent additionally argues that prohibiting selective

authorization of medication could result in a petitioner requesting

authority to administer an “unlimited” number of medications, thus

“forcing” fact finders to condone a physician’s “mere

experimentation.” Although we are aware of the potential for

misuse of psychotropic medication (see C.E., 161 Ill. 2d at 215), we do not share respondent’s fear that mental health patients will

be subjected to “mere experimentation” if trial judges and juries are

not allowed to selectively choose which medications should be

administered. The specificity requirement for involuntary treatment

orders (405 ILCS 5/2–107.1(a–5)(6) (West 2000)) precludes a

court from entering an order permitting an “unlimited” number of

medications to be administered to the respondent. Further, the

statute’s requirement that the petitioner demonstrate, by clear and

convincing evidence, “[t]hat the benefits of the treatment outweigh

the harm” (405 ILCS 5/2–107.1(a–5)(4)(D) (West 2000)) militates

against the petitioner presenting a treatment plan that is so ill-

defined as to constitute mere experimentation.  Finally,

respondent’s concern that, in the absence of selective

authorization, physicians will be permitted to experiment on their

mental health patients is contrary to respondent’s position that the

“complete discretion” physicians enjoy under the Code (405 ILCS

5/2–107.1(a–5)(6) (West 2000)) actually ensures that

improvidently entered treatment orders pose no risk to the patient.

Accordingly, we reject respondent’s “mere experimentation”

argument.

	Because we hold that section 2–107.1 of the Code does not

permit selective authorization of psychotropic medication, we also

hold that a special verdict form, listing each individual medication

and accompanying dosage range, is not required in a section

2–107.1 proceeding. Thus, a general verdict form, like the one

used in this case, comports with the statute. By signing the general

verdict form, the jury necessarily found that the State had proved

each of the factors set forth in section 2–107.1, including that “the

benefits of the treatment outweigh the harm.” 405 ILCS

5/2–107.1(a–5)(4)(D) (West 2000).

III

	As a final matter, we consider whether remand to the appellate

court is appropriate. As indicated earlier, respondent raised two

issues in the appellate court. Based on the appellate court’s ruling

on the selective-authorization issue, the court found it unnecessary

to consider respondent’s argument that she was denied due process

when the trial court instructed the jury pursuant to the 1998

version of section 2–107.1, rather than, presumably, the version in

effect at the time of the proceeding in 2000. Respondent has not

pressed this argument before this court and we find it unnecessary

to remand this matter to the appellate court for consideration of

this issue.

	A reviewing court’s determination of whether the jury was

properly instructed can have no effect on the outcome of the case

in light of the significant time that has passed since the 90-day

treatment order was entered. Thus, the issue is moot. See Barbara H., 183 Ill. 2d at 490-91. Further, it is highly unlikely that the claimed error would recur. Thus, it does not qualify for review

under the recognized exceptions to the mootness doctrine. See In re A Minor, 127 Ill. 2d at 257-58. Assuming arguendo that this issue was appropriate for review, based on our examination of the

record, the claimed error in the jury instructions would not have

affected the outcome of the proceeding.

CONCLUSION

	As discussed above, we conclude that (i) the issue of selective

authorization of psychotropic medication under section 2–107.1 of

the Code qualifies for review under the public interest exception to

the mootness doctrine; (ii) the Code cannot reasonably be

construed to permit selective authorization of psychotropic

medication and, thus, a special verdict form is not required in a

section 2–107.1 proceeding; and (iii) remand to the appellate court

is unnecessary. Consequently, we reverse the judgment of the

appellate court and affirm the judgment of the circuit court.

Appellate court judgment reversed;

circuit court judgment affirmed.