FILED 


MARCH 13, 2014 


In the Office of the Clerk of Court 


W A State Court of Appeals, Division III 


IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON 


DIVISION THREE 


STATE OF WASHINGTON, 

Respondent, 

I 

v. 

EULOGIO CASTRO ROMERO, 

Appellant. 

) No. 31224-1-111 

) 

) 

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) 

) UNPUBLISHED OPINION 

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J Brown, J.-Eulogio Castro Romero appeals his convictions for possessing 

I 

I methamphetamine and possessing a firearm without an alien firearm license. He 

contends the trial court erred in admitting his custodial interrogation statements to a 

federal immigration agent and insufficient evidence supports his conviction for 

possessing a firearm without an alien firearm license. We affirm. 

FACTS 

Law enforcement executed a search warrant at Mr. Romero's residence on July 

15,2012 around 10:30 p.m. Moses Lake Police Officer Raymond Bernard read Mr. 

Romero his Miranda1 rights from a department issued card. Mr. Romero responded that 

he understood and gave statements. The search results partly included 

methamphetamine on Mr. Romero's bedside table and a firearm under his mattress. 

1 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694 (1966). 
No. 31224-1-111 

State v. Romero 

The next day, around 10 to 18 hours later, United States Immigration and Customs 

Enforcement Agent Jaime Waite took additional statements from Mr. Romero while he 

was in jail without giving fresh Miranda warnings. The trial court admitted these 

statements at trial after denying Mr. Romero's CrR 3.5 motion to suppress them. A jury 

found him guilty as charged of possessing methamphetamine and possessing a firearm 

without an alien firearm license. He appealed. 

ANALYSIS 

A. Miranda Warnings 

The issue is whether the trial court erred in admitting Mr. Romero's custodial 

interrogation statements to Agent Waite. Mr. Romero solely contends his statements 

are inadmissible because Agent Waite obtained them without giving fresh Miranda 

warnings. We review the adequacy of Miranda warnings de novo. State v. CamposCerna, 154 Wn. App. 702, 708, 226 P.3d 185 (2010). We review CrR 3.5 factual 

findings for substantial evidence. State v. Broadaway, 133 Wn.2d 118, 131,942 P.2d 

363 (1997). Substantial evidence supports a factual finding if "a sufficient quantity of 

evidence [exists] in the record to persuade a fair-minded, rational person of the truth of 

the finding." State v. Hill, 123 Wn.2d 641,644,870 P.2d 313 (1994). 

Generally, in addition to due process protections against use of coerced 

statements, the State may not admit as trial evidence any statements a suspect makes 

during custodial interrogation unless it proves, by a preponderance of evidence, the 

suspect received fully effective Miranda warnings and knowingly, intelligently, and 

2 

No. 31224-1-111 

State v. Romero 

voluntarily waived his or her Miranda rights before making the statements.2 Miranda v. 

Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 478-79,86 S. Ct. 1602, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694 (1966); Colorado v. 

Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 168, 107 S. Ct. 515, 93 L. Ed. 2d 473 (1986). Mr. Romero 

does not invoke due process protections here. The State does not dispute that his 

conversation with Agent Waite constituted custodial interrogation.3 

"[C]ourts have generally rejected a per se rule as to when a suspect must be 

readvised of his rights after the passage of time or a change in questioners." United 

States v. Andaverde, 64 F.3d 1305, 1312 (1995) (citing Wyrick v. Fields, 459 U.S. 42, 

49,103 S. Ct. 394, 74 L. Ed. 2d 214 (1982». Instead, courts evaluate the totality of the 

circumstances in determining whether law enforcement needed to give the suspect 

fresh Miranda warnings. See, e.g., United States v. Rodriguez-Preciado, 399 F .3d 

1118, 1128-30 (9th. Cir. 2005) (holding Miranda warnings were still effective after 16 

hours); Guam v. Dela Pena, 72 F.3d 767,769-70 (9th Cir. 1995) (holding Miranda 

warnings were still effective after 15 hours); Puplampu v. United States, 422 F.2d 870, 

870 (9th Cir. 1970) (holding Miranda warnings were still effective after two days); 

Maguire v. United States, 396 F.2d 327,331 (9th Cir. 1968) (holding Miranda warnings 

2 At a minimum, Miranda warnings must inform a suspect "that he has the right 

to remain silent, that anything he says can be used against him in a court of law, that he 

has the right to the presence of an attorney, and that if he cannot afford an attorney one 

will be appointed for him." 384 U.S. at 479. 

3 A suspect is in custody when law enforcement formally arrests the suspect or 

similarly restrains his or her freedom so that a reasonable person under the 

circumstances would not feel free to terminate the encounter and leave. Thompson v. 

Keohane, 516 U.S. 99,112, 116 S. Ct. 457,133 L. Ed. 2d 383 (1995). A suspect is 

subject to interrogation when law enforcement expressly questions the suspect or 

initiates some functional equivalent, including words or conduct that law enforcement 

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No. 31224-1-111 

State v. Romero 

were still effective after three days); State v. Blanchey, 75 Wn.2d 926, 931, 454 P.2d 

841 (1969) (holding Miranda warnings were still effective after four days). 

Considering these judicial opinions, we conclude the original Miranda warnings 

were still effective 10 to 18 hours later, when Mr. Romero made his custodial 

interrogation statements to Agent Waite. A sufficient quantity of evidence exists in the 

record to persuade a fair-minded, rational person that Mr. Romero received fully 

effective Miranda warnings and knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived his 

Miranda rights before making his statements. Substantial evidence supports the CrR 

3.5 factual findings. The trial court did not err in admitting Mr. Romero's custodial 

interrogation statements to Agent Waite. 

B. Evidence Sufficiency 

The issue is whether sufficient evidence supports Mr. Romero's conviction for 

possessing a firearm without an alien firearm license. He contends the State did not 

prove he lacked the license. 

The State must prove all essential elements of a charged crime beyond a 

reasonable doubt. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364, 90 S. Ct. 1068,25 L. Ed. 2d 368 

(1970). Evidence is sufficient to support a guilty finding if '''after viewing the evidence in 

the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the 

essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.'" State v. Green, 94 Wn.2d 

216,221,616 P.2d 628 (1980) (emphasis omitted) (quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 

U.S. 307, 319, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 61 L. Ed. 2d 560 (1979». An evidence sufficiency 

should know are reasonably likely to elicit his or her incriminating response. Rhode 

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No. 31224-1-111 

State v. Romero 

challenge "admits the truth of the State's evidence and all inferences that reasonably 

can be drawn therefrom." State v. Salinas, 119 Wn.2d 192,201,829 P.2d 1068 (1992). 

We defer to the jury's assessment of witness credibility and evidence weight. State v. 

CafVer, 113 Wn.2d 591, 604, 781 P.2d 1308,789 P.2d 306 (1989). 

A person is guilty of possessing a firearm without an alien firearm license if the 

person "carr[ies] or possess[es] any firearm," is not "a lawful permanent resident," and 

has not "obtained a valid alien firearm license." RCW 9.41.171. To apply for an alien 

firearm license, a person must provide "a copy of the applicant's passport and visa 

showing the applicant is in the country legally." RCW 9.41.173(4). Because Mr. 

Romero admitted he lacked any "papers" authorizing him to be in the country, a rational 

jury could reasonably infer he could not provide a copy of his passport and visa showing 

he was in the country legally. Report of Proceedings at 136. It was impossible for him 

to have obtained a valid alien firearm license because his immigration status 

categorically prohibited him from doing so. Therefore, the State produced sufficient 

evidence for the jury to find he lacked the license. In sum, sufficient evidence supports 

Mr. Romero's conviction for possessing a firearm without an alien firearm license. 

Affirmed. 

A majority of the panel has determined this opinion will not be printed in the 

Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 300-01, 100 S. Ct. 1682,64 L. Ed. 2d 297 (1980). 

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~ No. 31224-1-111 

State v. Romero 

j Washington Appellate Reports, but it will be filed for public record pursuant to RCW 

2.06.040. 

WE CONCUR: 


orsrno.C.J. 

Brown, J. 

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