2016 UT App 99

THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

CHANDRA PRAKASH BHONGIR,

Appellant,

v.

VIDISHA MANTHA,

Appellee.

Opinion

No. 20140707-CA

Filed May 12, 2016

Third District Court, West Jordan Department

The Honorable Charlene Barlow

No. 124400853

Jerry Salcido and Spencer J. Salcido, Attorneys

for Appellant

Steven C. Russell, Attorney for Appellee

SENIOR JUDGE PAMELA T. GREENWOOD authored this Opinion, in 

which JUDGES J. FREDERIC VOROS JR. and KATE A. TOOMEY

concurred.

1

GREENWOOD, Senior Judge:

¶1 Chandra Prakash Bhongir (Husband) appeals the district 

court’s grant of Vidisha Mantha’s (Wife) motion to set aside the 

parties’ supplemental divorce decree, the court’s subsequent 

entry of temporary orders and a modified decree of divorce, and 

its denial of Husband’s motion to set aside the temporary orders. 

We affirm but remand on the limited issue of the reasonableness 

of the attorney fees the district court ordered Husband to pay.

 

1. Senior Judge Pamela T. Greenwood sat by special assignment 

as authorized by law. See generally Utah R. Jud. Admin. 11-

201(6).
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BACKGROUND

¶2 Husband and Wife were married in India in February 

2011. Husband was living in Utah and, in March, Wife moved to 

Utah to be with him. By July the marriage ‚was troubled‛ and 

Wife returned to India. In January of the following year, Wife 

returned to Utah and lived at the YWCA. On May 4, 2012, 

Husband filed for divorce. Throughout their brief marriage, the 

two lived together for a total of only five months.

¶3 The district court executed a supplemental divorce decree

(the Decree) in April 2013, which incorporated the parties’ 

stipulated settlement agreement. The Decree contained the 

statement, ‚Each party is fully capable of supporting themselves, 

and therefore, neither party shall be awarded spousal support.‛

¶4 Wife soon filed a motion to set aside the Decree under 

rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, arguing that she 

was not able to support herself and that the contrary indication

in the Decree was a mistake. See Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b)(1).

2 The 

district court granted the motion, finding that ‚there was a 

mistake in signing the stipulation as the parties signed 

something that was not true relating to [Wife] having no need of 

alimony‛ and that ‚there was no meeting of the minds when the 

stipulation was signed.‛ The district court eventually entered 

temporary orders, which were incorporated into another 

supplemental divorce decree (the Supplemental Decree), 

requiring Husband to pay Wife alimony of $1,000 per month for 

five months—the length of time the parties had lived together 

while married. The court also required Husband to pay a portion 

of Wife’s attorney fees.

 

2. An amended version of rule 60 of the Utah Rules of Civil 

Procedure went into effect on May 1, 2016. For purposes of this 

appeal, we use the version of rule 60 in effect prior to May 1, 

2016.
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¶5 Husband moved—and the district court declined—to set 

aside the temporary orders on the ground of fraud, arguing Wife 

had perjured herself regarding having a work visa. This appeal 

followed.

ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶6 Husband raises four issues for our review. First, he asserts 

that it was error for the district court to set aside the Decree on 

the ground of mistake. Second, he argues that the district court 

erroneously denied his rule 60(b) motion to set aside the 

temporary orders on the basis of fraud. Third, he contends that 

the award of alimony in the Supplemental Decree should be set 

aside. And fourth, he claims that the award of attorney fees and 

costs was erroneous. We review each of these issues for abuse of 

discretion. See Ostler v. Buhler, 957 P.2d 205, 206 (Utah 1998) (a 

district court’s rulings on motions made pursuant to rule 60(b) 

are reviewed for abuse of discretion); Dobson v. Dobson, 2012 UT 

App 373, ¶ 7, 294 P.3d 591 (alimony awards are reviewed for 

abuse of discretion); Stonehocker v. Stonehocker, 2008 UT App 11, 

¶ 10, 176 P.3d 476 (attorney fees awarded in a divorce 

proceeding ‚are within the *district+ court’s sound discretion‛

(citation and internal quotation marks omitted)).

ANALYSIS

¶7 ‚In a divorce proceeding, the trial court may make such 

orders concerning property distribution and alimony as are 

equitable. The trial court has broad latitude in such matters, and 

orders distributing property and setting alimony will not be 

lightly disturbed.‛ Jones v. Jones, 700 P.2d 1072, 1074 (Utah 1985) 

(citation omitted). After considering each of the issues raised on 

appeal, we conclude that the district court acted within this 

broad latitude, and we therefore decline to disturb its orders

with the sole exception of the order of attorney fees. We vacate 
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the court’s ruling on attorney fees and remand for further 

proceedings. 

I. The District Court’s Grant of Wife’s Rule 60(b) Motion

¶8 The district court did not abuse its discretion when it set 

aside the Decree on the grounds of mistake. Rule 60(b) of the 

Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides that a district court ‚may 

in the furtherance of justice relieve a party or his legal 

representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for 

. . . mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect.‛ Utah 

R. Civ. P. 60(b)(1).

¶9 Within ninety days after the entry of the Decree, Wife 

filed a motion pursuant to rule 60(b), asking the district court to 

set aside the Decree because, among other reasons, her ‚gross 

monthly income is zero.‛ She contended that her lack of income 

rendered the Decree’s provision that ‚*e+ach party is fully 

capable of supporting themselves . . . clearly wrong.‛3 The 

district court agreed, finding that ‚there was a mistake in 

signing the stipulation as the parties signed something that was 

not true relating to *Wife+ having no need of alimony.‛

¶10 Husband now complains that Wife impermissibly used 

rule 60(b) to correct a legal error. In his view, the district court’s 

finding ‚that the statement is a mistake, based upon the fact that 

 

3. Wife’s motion also argued that she was ‚in the United States 

on a visa that does not allow her to work.‛ The district court 

ultimately determined that this statement was false. Wife was 

sanctioned for her misrepresentation, which is discussed in more 

detail infra ¶¶ 14–19. For purposes of this section, we discuss 

only the facts that Wife was not working and had no monthly 

income, which were the facts that drove the district court’s order 

setting aside the Decree.
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[Wife] is not able to support herself, is a legal conclusion.‛ We 

disagree.

¶11 The court did not set aside the Decree solely because of a

legal error. Instead, it set aside the Decree because the Decree 

contained a factual mistake, and that factual mistake affected the 

court’s legal conclusion that neither party should be required to 

pay alimony. This is exactly how rule 60(b) is intended to

operate. See Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b); see also Goode v. Goode, 624 

N.E.2d 788, 791–92, 795–96 (Ohio Ct. App. 1993) (where spousal 

support award was based on stipulation containing mutual 

mistake as to the wife’s income, the trial court erred by denying 

the husband’s motion for relief under rule 60(b) of the Ohio 

Rules of Civil Procedure).

¶12 On appeal, Husband does not challenge the district 

court’s factual finding that Wife could not support herself 

during the time for which alimony was awarded. See infra ¶ 19. 

He instead rests his argument on the proposition that Wife 

should have been precluded from using rule 60(b) to redress this 

mistake. But by its very language, the rule operates to correct 

mistakes. See Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b)(1). And here, the Decree’s 

alimony determination was premised on the fact that Wife could 

support herself. That was not actually the case. The simplest way 

to describe this situation is to say that the Decree contained a 

mistake, and thus this correction fits within the confines of rule 

60(b). Further, given the ‚liberal standard for application of Rule 

60(b) in divorce cases,‛ Boyce v. Boyce, 609 P.2d 928, 931 (Utah 

1980), we cannot conclude that the district court acted in error.

See id. (indicating that ‚a court should modify a prior decree 

when the interests of equity and fair dealing . . . so require‛).

¶13 Wife used the appropriate remedy when she requested 

relief from judgment under rule 60(b), which provides for relief 

from final judgments when a mistake has been made. We 

therefore determine the district court did not abuse its discretion

by granting Wife’s motion to set aside the Decree. See Begum v. 
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Begum, 2015 UT App 67, ¶ 17, 347 P.3d 25 (‚The district court has 

‘broad discretion’ in ruling on rule 60(b) motions ‘because most 

are equitable in nature, saturated with facts, and call upon 

judges to apply fundamental principles of fairness that do not 

easily lend themselves to appellate review.’‛ (citation omitted)).

II. The District Court’s Denial of Husband’s Rule 60(b) Motion

¶14 Husband contends that the district court should have 

granted his rule 60(b) motion to set aside the temporary orders 

because Wife had made fraudulent statements to the court. As 

we did with the district court’s decision to grant Wife’s motion, 

‚*w+e review a district court’s denial of a rule 60(b) motion for 

relief from judgment for an abuse of discretion.‛ Lindsay v. 

Walker, 2015 UT App 184, ¶ 14, 356 P.3d 195 (citation and 

internal quotation marks omitted).

¶15 After granting Wife’s rule 60(b) motion and setting aside 

the Decree, the district court held a hearing to determine 

whether Wife should receive alimony. Wife misrepresented to 

the court that she was not able to work in the United States 

when, in fact, she possessed a work visa.4 The district court 

initially found that Wife ‚was not employed at the time of the 

hearing although she stated she was ‘preparing’ to apply for a 

work visa.‛ It then ordered that Husband pay Wife ‚spousal 

support for the duration of the time that they lived together in 

the marriage, i.e., five months‛ and determined that Husband 

was capable of providing $1,000 per month for the five months.

 

4. Wife also initially indicated, in response to an interrogatory, 

that she had only a high school education. But in court she 

testified to having an MBA. There is no indication in the record 

that the district court based any portion of its decision on Wife’s 

level of education.
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It also awarded Wife her attorney fees for work done through 

December 4, 2013.5

¶16 Husband’s motion pursuant to rule 60(b) alleged that 

Wife had committed fraud. The district court agreed that Wife 

‚did commit fraud by lying under oath to the Court‛ but 

determined that ‚the fraudulent testimony was not related to the 

reasons why the Court awarded [Wife] alimony and attorney 

fees.‛ The district court accordingly denied Husband’s motion. 

But the court also concluded that Wife ‚is in contempt of Court 

for her perjury and should be sanctioned for her actions.‛ 

Accordingly, in the Supplemental Decree—which incorporated 

the temporary orders—the district court sanctioned Wife by 

imposing a thirty-day suspended jail term and a $1,000 fine, of 

which it suspended $750.

¶17 Husband is correct that rule 60(b) ‚provides for relief 

from a judgment where fraud has been established.‛ But the rule 

does not require relief when fraud has been established. Instead, 

the rule is permissive: the court may provide relief. See Utah R. 

Civ. P. 60(b).

¶18 At the root of Husband’s argument are his assertions that 

the district court ‚erred in allowing for *Wife+ to be awarded 

alimony, attorney’s fees, and costs, despite [her] attempts to hide 

the fact that she is able to work in the United States and produce 

income,‛ and that his motion to set aside was therefore ‚proper 

since it is unjust for [Wife] to receive an order based upon 

fraud.‛ But Husband misapprehends the issue. Even if we 

 

5. December 4, 2013, is the date the parties appeared before the 

district court commissioner, who made recommendations 

regarding alimony and attorney fees. Each party objected to the 

recommendations, and the district court then ruled on the 

objections and entered the order on which Husband based his 

rule 60(b) motion. That order was entered March 13, 2014.
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agreed that the district court ‚made the wrong call, it was, in its 

essence, a discretionary call—and one that was within the broad 

range of discretion entrusted to [it].‛ See Gunn Hill Dairy Props., 

LLC v. Los Angeles Dep't of Water & Power, 2015 UT App 261, ¶ 24, 

361 P.3d 703 (Orme, J., concurring specially). In other words, we 

affirm the district court’s denial of Husband’s motion regardless 

of whether ‚we think it was the right decision but because of our 

deferential standard of review.‛

6 See id. ¶ 21.

¶19 Here, it is clear that the district court was aware of the 

fraud; made its orders regarding alimony, costs, and fees with 

that awareness; and declined to disturb those orders when 

presented with Husband’s rule 60(b) motion. The district court 

explained that Wife’s fraud did not affect its order regarding 

alimony, costs, or attorney fees, and we have no reason to doubt 

 

6. There is at least some indication in our jurisprudence that the 

nature of Wife’s fraud is sufficient to decide this issue. In Rice v. 

Rice, 212 P.2d 685, 688 (Utah 1949), our supreme court declared, 

‚That perjury is intrinsic fraud and not therefore the basis of 

setting aside a judgment is well recognized.‛ Id. at 688. But in 

McBride v. Jones, 615 P.2d 431 (Utah 1980), the court appears to 

have stepped back slightly from that pronouncement, indicating 

that Rice stood for the proposition ‚that intrinsic fraud will not 

usually be grounds for setting aside a judgment.‛ Id. at 433 & n.4 

(emphasis added). Then, in Pepper v. Zions First National Bank, 

N.A., 801 P.2d 144 (Utah 1990), our supreme court referred to the 

‚distinction between extrinsic and intrinsic fraud‛ as one based 

on ‚artificial analysis.‛ Id. at 148. We note that the more recent 

cases discussing intrinsic fraud were not concerned with rule 

60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure but instead focused on 

a litigant’s ability to collaterally attack a judgment on the basis of 

fraud. See, e.g., id. Because we decide this case based upon the 

district court’s discretion to handle Wife’s fraud through the 

sanctions imposed, we need not explore further the operation of 

any remaining distinction between extrinsic and intrinsic fraud.
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this explanation. It reasoned that Husband filed for divorce in 

May 2012, and five months of alimony would provide for Wife 

until October 2012. Because Wife did not, in fact, have a visa to 

work during that time—she obtained the visa approximately one 

year later—‚a five-month alimony would have covered a time 

when she could not work.‛ The district court indicated that 

Wife’s behavior was ‚more a contempt of court issue [and] that I 

should assess her some kind of penalty that goes into the court 

rather than something that goes to whether I believe that she 

should have a very minimal amount . . . of support.‛ Because 

Wife’s fraud did not affect the district court’s decision to award 

alimony, the court had the discretion to leave that decision

unaffected and address Wife’s misconduct through other means, 

such as the sanctions it imposed. 

III. The Alimony Award

¶20 Husband separately argues that even if the district court 

properly set aside the Decree, it erred when it entered an 

alimony award on Wife’s behalf. Insofar as Husband’s argument 

focuses on Wife’s perjury, we conclude that Section II, supra, 

resolves any question regarding the propriety of the district 

court’s handling of that issue. Beyond the issue of Wife’s perjury, 

Husband inconsistently argues both that the district court failed 

to make a finding regarding Wife’s ability to produce income 

and that the district court erred in making such a finding. He 

also asserts that the district court abused its discretion when it 

awarded Wife alimony because ‚the parties were only married 

for five months before separating.‛ We briefly consider each 

contention in turn.

¶21 In determining alimony, the district court was required to 

consider Wife’s financial condition and needs, her earning 

capacity or ability to produce income, and Husband’s ability to 

provide support. Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5(8)(a) (LexisNexis 

2013); accord Bakanowski v. Bakanowski, 2003 UT App 357, ¶ 8, 80 

P.3d 153. Husband appears to take issue with the second factor, 
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arguing that the district court ‚erred in not making a finding of 

*Wife’s+ ability to produce income.‛ But he then asserts that the 

district court ‚erred in making a finding as to *Wife’s+ ability to 

produce income based on the information that [Wife] does have 

a work visa.‛ The contradictory nature of these arguments places 

them in the category of ‚inadequately briefed issues,‛ which 

‚*w+e will not address.‛ See Sanpete Am., LLC v. Willardsen, 2011 

UT 48, ¶ 64 n.14, 269 P.3d 118; see also State v. Thomas, 961 P.2d 

299, 305 (Utah 1998) (explaining that a reviewing court will not 

consider an issue when ‚the overall analysis of the issue is so 

lacking as to shift the burden of research and argument‛ to the 

appellate court).

¶22 Husband’s assertion that the district court ‚abused its 

discretion in awarding alimony when the parties were only 

married for five months before separating‛ is also inadequately 

briefed. He cites no authority other than the statutory allowance 

that ‚when a marriage of short duration dissolves, and no 

children have been conceived or born during the marriage, the 

court may consider restoring each party to the condition which 

existed at the time of the marriage.‛ Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-

5(8)(h). But Husband fails to indicate how this statute should 

guide our decision in this case. Without further development of 

this issue, we see no reason to depart from the principle that ‚an 

award of alimony up to the length of the marriage falls within 

the trial court’s ‘broad discretion.’‛ See Kidd v. Kidd, 2014 UT 

App 26, ¶ 53, 321 P.3d 200 (citation omitted).

IV. Award of Costs and Attorney Fees

¶23 Finally, we address the district court’s decision to order 

Husband to pay Wife’s attorney fees. We first consider 

Husband’s contention that the district court failed to make the 

requisite finding of reasonableness, and we then consider 

Husband’s contention that the district court should have instead 

required Wife to pay his attorney fees.
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¶24 To award costs and attorney fees in conjunction with an 

award of alimony, ‚the trial court must base the award on 

evidence of the receiving spouse’s financial need, the payor 

spouse’s ability to pay, and the reasonableness of the requested 

fees.‛ Childs v. Childs, 967 P.2d 942, 947 (Utah Ct. App. 1998). A 

trial court’s findings must include a finding that the requested 

fees are reasonable. See Morgan v. Morgan, 795 P.2d 684, 688 

(Utah Ct. App. 1990). Husband contends that the costs and 

attorney fees award was erroneous because ‚there was no 

finding as to the reasonableness of the requested fees.‛7 We 

acknowledge that, here, Wife’s attorney provided the district 

court with an affidavit outlining the ‚reasonable‛ amount of 

costs and attorney fees incurred, but ‚there [was] no 

independent attempt by the court to characterize the fee as 

reasonable.‛ See id. While we do not conclude that the district 

court’s award of costs and fees was an abuse of discretion, we do 

agree that the court failed to make the requisite finding of 

reasonableness. We therefore remand for the limited purpose of 

allowing the district court to address the issue of reasonableness 

and to enter related findings. Id. 

¶25 As to Husband’s suggestion that the district court should 

have required Wife to pay his attorney fees, we are not 

persuaded. The court explicitly found that Wife could not pay 

her own attorney fees. It further found that Husband ‚can pay 

attorney fees.‛ It would have been illogical to require Wife, a 

party who could not afford her own attorney fees, to pay fees on 

behalf of Husband, who had no financial need to have his 

attorney fees paid. The district court did not abuse its discretion 

by avoiding this result. See Nielson v. Nielson, 826 P.2d 1065, 1068 

(Utah Ct. App. 1991) (determining that where a party ‚did not 

 

7. Husband also revisits his argument that Wife’s perjury should 

have prevented the district court from ruling in Wife’s favor, 

which we do not readdress.
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have the ability to pay‛ another’s fees, the trial court did not 

abuse its discretion by denying an attorney-fee award).

CONCLUSION

¶26 The district court did not abuse its discretion when it 

granted Wife’s motion to set aside the Decree under rule 60(b) of 

the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, when it denied Husband’s 

similar motion to set aside the temporary orders, when it 

awarded Wife alimony in the Supplemental Decree, or when it 

declined to require Wife to pay Husband’s costs and attorney 

fees. Nevertheless, the district court failed to enter a specific 

finding as to the reasonableness of the attorney fees it awarded 

to Wife. We remand for the limited purpose of entering such a 

finding.