J-S43008-14

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*Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court. 

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37 

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF 

PENNSYLVANIA 

 Appellee 

v.

SHARIFFA STEPHENS 

 Appellant No. 2930 EDA 2013 

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence August 13, 2013

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0002834-2012 

MC-51-CR-0043809-2011

BEFORE: GANTMAN, P.J., ALLEN, J., and FITZGERALD, J.* 

MEMORANDUM BY GANTMAN, P.J.: FILED AUGUST 04, 2014 

 Appellant, Shariffa Stephens, appeals from the judgment of sentence 

entered in the Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas, following her 

bench trial conviction for aggravated assault, simple assault, recklessly 

endangering another person (“REAP”), and criminal conspiracy.1

 We affirm. 

 The relevant facts and procedural history of this appeal are as follows. 

On October 13, 2011, Appellant and two cohorts drove to an area near 2100 

South Olden Street in Philadelphia, where Saprina Jackson was taking a 

walk. Appellant and her companions exited the vehicle together and quickly 

____________________________________________ 

1

 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2702(a), 2701(a), 2705, and 903, respectively. 
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approached Ms. Jackson. Appellant, or one of her cohorts, immediately 

struck Ms. Jackson in the head with a brick several times, causing Ms. 

Jackson to fall to the ground. For approximately ten to fifteen minutes, 

Appellant and her cohorts punched and kicked Ms. Jackson as she lay on the 

ground. The attack ended when one of Appellant’s cohorts took Ms. 

Jackson’s pocketbook. Appellant and her cohorts returned to the vehicle and 

fled the scene together. 

That same day, the police drove to Appellant’s home to question 

Appellant after they received information that connected Appellant and two 

other women, Nicole Doughty and Kayana Blunt, with the earlier incident. 

When the police asked Appellant if she knew anything about the incident, 

Appellant simply described the incident as a “fair fight.” When the police 

asked Appellant if she knew where to find Ms. Doughty and Ms. Blunt, 

Appellant told the police that Ms. Doughty and Ms. Blunt were upstairs in 

Appellant’s home. Upon questioning, Ms. Doughty and Ms. Blunt also 

maintained that whatever happened was a fair fight. The police handcuffed 

Appellant, Ms. Doughty, and Ms. Blunt, and drove them to the hospital, 

where Ms. Jackson was receiving treatment. After Ms. Jackson positively 

identified Appellant, Ms. Doughty, and Ms. Blunt as the women who had 

attacked her and took her pocketbook, the police arrested Appellant, Ms. 

Doughty, and Ms. Blunt. Subsequently, the police searched Appellant’s 

residence and discovered Ms. Jackson’s pocketbook.
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 Following a one-day bench trial on April 24, 2013, the court found 

Appellant guilty of aggravated assault, simple assault, REAP, and criminal 

conspiracy. On August 13, 2013, the court sentenced Appellant to an 

aggregate term of twenty-four (24) to forty-eight (48) months’ 

imprisonment, followed by forty-two (42) months’ probation. On August 20, 

2013, Appellant timely filed post-sentence motions, which the court 

subsequently denied by order dated August 21, 2013. Appellant timely filed 

a notice of appeal on September 10, 2013. The court ordered Appellant on 

September 25, 2013, to file a concise statement of errors complained of on 

appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b). Appellant timely complied. 

 Appellant raises the following issues for our review: 

WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT FOUND 

[APPELLANT] GUILTY [OF] AGGRAVATED ASSAULT, 

SIMPLE ASSAULT AND RECKLESS ENDANGERING OF 

ANOTHER PERSON (REAP) WHEN IN FACT THE EVIDENCE 

PRESENTED ESTABLISHED THAT [APPELLANT] WAS 

MERELY PRESENT WHILE THE OTHER CHARGED CODEFENDANTS, KAYLA BLUNT AND NICOLE DOUGHTY, HIT 

THE [VICTIM], SAPRINA JACKSON, WITH A BRICK AND 

KICKED HER REPEATEDLY. [MS.] JACKSON TESTIFIED 

THAT IT WAS HER BELIEF THAT [APPELLANT] WAS NOT 

INVOLVED AND TRIED TO BREAK UP THE FIGHT. 

WHETHER [THE] TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT FOUND 

[APPELLANT] GUILTY [OF] CONSPIRACY TO COMMIT 

AGGRAVATED ASSAULT WHEN THE EVIDENCE WAS 

INSUFFICIENT TO ESTABLISH THAT [APPELLANT] AND 

HER CO-DEFENDANTS, KAYLA BLUNT AND NICOLE 

DOUGHTY ACTED WITH INTENT OF PROMOTING OR 

FACILITATING THE COMMISSION OF THE OFFENSE AND 

THE EVIDENCE DID NOT ESTABLISH THAT DEFENDANTS 

WERE IN AGREEMENT TO COMMIT A CRIME. THE 

EVIDENCE PRESENTED WAS THAT [APPELLANT] WAS 
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MERELY PRESENT AND ATTEMPTED TO BREAK UP THE 

FIGHT BETWEEN CO-DEFENDANTS AND MS. JACKSON. 

WHETHER [THE] COURT ERRED IN FINDING [APPELLANT] 

GUILTY, WHICH WAS AGAINST THE WEIGHT OF THE 

EVIDENCE SINCE IT WAS CLEAR THAT THE [VICTIM], MS. 

JACKSON, EXONERATED [APPELLANT] WITH HER 

TESTIMONY BY STATING THAT SHE BELIEVED 

[APPELLANT] WAS MERELY PRESENT AND ATTEMPTED TO 

BREAK-UP THE ALTERCATION BETWEEN THE [VICTIM] 

AND THE CO-DEFENDANTS WHO SHE TESTIFIED WERE 

MORE INVOLVED [THAN] [APPELLANT]. MORE 

IMPORTANTLY BASED ON EVIDENCE ILLUMINATING CODEFENDANT, KAYLA BLUNT’S, CLEAR INVOLVEMENT SHE 

WAS FOUND NOT GUILTY BY THE COURT ON ALL 

CHARGES. 

(Appellant’s Brief at 3). 

In her first issue, Appellant argues Ms. Jackson’s own testimony 

consistently exonerated Appellant. Appellant claims Ms. Jackson repeatedly 

stated that Appellant was not part of the group that attacked her. 

Furthermore, Appellant contends Ms. Jackson suggested Appellant tried to 

break up the fight. Appellant also asserts police officer testimony regarding 

Appellant’s description of the incident as a “fair fight” does not contradict 

Ms. Jackson’s testimony. Appellant concludes the evidence was insufficient 

to convict Appellant of aggravated assault, simple assault, and REAP; and 

this Court should reverse. 

 In her second issue, Appellant argues Ms. Jackson testified that 

Appellant tried to break up the fight rather than aid the assailants. 

Appellant contends the evidence actually gives rise to the inference that 

Appellant worked to stop the crime rather than facilitate it. Furthermore, 
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Appellant contends the court’s finding that Appellant’s co-defendant, Ms. 

Blunt, was not guilty on all counts is contrary to the court’s finding that 

Appellant did participate in a criminal conspiracy to commit aggravated 

assault. Appellant concludes the evidence was insufficient to convict 

Appellant of criminal conspiracy; and this Court should reverse and dismiss 

the case with prejudice. 

 In her third issue, Appellant argues the victim consistently testified 

that Appellant tried to break up the fight and Appellant’s co-defendant 

participated in the attack. Appellant avers her conviction and co-defendant’s 

acquittal are inconsistent with Ms. Jackson’s testimony. Appellant complains 

the court’s findings are so contrary to the testimony that they can be 

justified only by concluding the court was confused about the identity of 

each co-defendant. Appellant suggests her conviction shocks one’s sense of 

justice and is made even more shocking when one considers the court found 

her co-defendant not guilty. Appellant concludes her conviction was against 

the weight of the evidence, and this Court should invalidate the verdict and 

dismiss the case with prejudice. 

A challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence implicates the following 

legal principles: 

The standard we apply in reviewing the sufficiency of the 

evidence is whether viewing all the evidence admitted at 

trial in the light most favorable to the verdict winner, there 

is sufficient evidence to enable the fact-finder to find every 

element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. In 

applying [the above] test, we may not weigh the evidence 
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and substitute our judgment for the fact-finder. In 

addition, we note that the facts and circumstances 

established by the Commonwealth need not preclude every 

possibility of innocence. Any doubts regarding a 

defendant’s guilt may be resolved by the fact-finder unless 

the evidence is so weak and inconclusive that as a matter

of law no probability of fact may be drawn from the

combined circumstances. The Commonwealth may sustain 

its burden of proving every element of the crime beyond a 

reasonable doubt by means of wholly circumstantial 

evidence. Moreover, in applying the above test, the entire 

record must be evaluated and all evidence actually 

received must be considered. Finally, the [finder] of fact 

while passing upon the credibility of witnesses and the 

weight of the evidence produced, is free to believe all, part 

or none of the evidence. 

Commonwealth v. Barnswell Jones, 874 A.2d 108, 120-21 (Pa.Super. 

2005) (quoting Commonwealth v. Bullick, 830 A.2d 998, 1000 (Pa.Super. 

2003)). 

Our standard of review for a challenge to the weight of the evidence is 

as follows: 

The weight of the evidence is exclusively for the finder of 

fact who is free to believe all, part, or none of the evidence 

and to determine the credibility of the witnesses. An 

appellate court cannot substitute its judgment for that of 

the finder of fact. Thus, we may only reverse the lower 

court’s verdict if it is so contrary to the evidence as to 

shock one’s sense of justice. Moreover, where the trial 

court has ruled on the weight claim below, an appellate 

court’s role is not to consider the underlying question of 

whether the verdict is against the weight of the evidence. 

Rather, appellate review is limited to whether the trial 

court palpably abused its discretion in ruling on the weight 

claim. 

Commonwealth v. Champney, 574 Pa. 435, 444, 832 A.2d 403, 408 

(2003), cert. denied, 542 U.S. 939, 124 S.Ct. 2906, 159 L.Ed.2d 816 (2004) 
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(internal citations omitted). We also observe: 

A challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence is entirely 

distinct from a challenge to the weight of the evidence. 

The distinction between these two challenges is 

critical. A claim challenging the sufficiency of the 

evidence, if granted, would preclude retrial under the 

double jeopardy provisions of the Fifth Amendment 

to the United States Constitution, and Article I, 

Section 10 of the Pennsylvania Constitution, whereas 

a claim challenging the weight of the evidence if 

granted would permit a second trial. 

A claim challenging the sufficiency of the evidence is 

a question of law. Evidence will be deemed sufficient

to support the verdict when it establishes each 

material element of the crime charged and the 

commission thereof by the accused, beyond a 

reasonable doubt. Where the evidence offered to 

support the verdict is in contradiction to the physical 

facts, in contravention to human experience and the 

laws of nature, then the evidence is insufficient as a 

matter of law. When reviewing a sufficiency claim 

the court is required to view the evidence in the light 

most favorable to the verdict winner giving the 

prosecution the benefit of all reasonable inferences 

to be drawn from the evidence. 

A motion for new trial on the grounds that the 

verdict is contrary to the weight of the evidence, 

concedes that there is sufficient evidence to sustain 

the verdict. Thus, the trial court is under no 

obligation to view the evidence in the light most 

favorable to the verdict winner. An allegation that

the verdict is against the weight of the evidence is 

addressed to the discretion of the trial court. A new 

trial should not be granted because of a mere conflict 

in the testimony or because the judge on the same 

facts would have arrived at a different conclusion. A 

trial judge must do more than reassess the 

credibility of the witnesses and allege that he would 

not have assented to the verdict if he were a juror. 

Trial judges, in reviewing a claim that the verdict is 
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against the weight of the evidence do not sit as the 

thirteenth juror. Rather, the role of the trial judge is 

to determine that notwithstanding all the facts, 

certain facts are so clearly of greater weight that to 

ignore them or to give them equal weight with all the 

facts is to deny justice. 

Commonwealth v. Smith, 853 A.2d 1020, 1028 (Pa.Super. 2004) (quoting 

Commonwealth v. Widmer, 560 Pa. 308, 318-20, 744 A.2d 745, 751-52 

(2000) (internal citations omitted)). See Commonwealth v. Wilson, 825 

A.2d 710, 713-14 (Pa.Super. 2003) (holding sufficiency of evidence review 

does not include assessment of credibility; review of witness testimony 

constitutes weight of evidence challenge; because defendant’s sufficiency of 

evidence challenge implicated review of witness credibility, claim was 

actually weight challenge and deemed waived, for failure to preserve it in 

Pa.R.Crim.P. 607 motion before trial court). 

The Crimes Code defines aggravated assault in relevant part as 

follows: 

§ 2702. Aggravated assault 

(a) Offense defined.ろA person is guilty of aggravated 

assault if he: 

(1) attempts to cause serious bodily injury to another, or 

causes such injury intentionally, knowingly or recklessly 

under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to 

the value of human life; 

* * * 

18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2702(a)(1). The court must evaluate each case on its own 

particular facts, but under appropriate circumstances, even a single punch to 
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the face can constitute aggravated assault. Commonwealth v. Lewis, 911 

A.2d 558, 564 (Pa.Super. 2006). Probative circumstances in this inquiry 

have included evidence that the assailant was disproportionately larger or 

stronger than the victim, that the assailant had to be restrained from 

escalating the attack, that the assailant had a weapon or other implement to 

aid the attack, or that the assailant made statements before, during, or after 

the attack which might indicate an intent to inflict further injury. 

Commonwealth v. Bruce, 916 A.2d 657, 663 (Pa.Super. 2007), appeal 

denied, 593 Pa. 754, 932 A.2d 74 (2007). Evidence showing that an 

appellant intended to strike a dazed and helpless victim again can establish 

intent to cause serious bodily injury. Id. The Pennsylvania Crimes Code 

defines simple assault as follows: 

§ 2701 Simple Assault 

(a) Offense defined.—A person is guilty of assault if 

he: 

(1) attempts to cause or intentionally, knowingly or 

recklessly causes bodily injury to another; 

(2) negligently causes bodily injury to another with a 

deadly weapon; 

(3) attempts by physical menace to put another in 

fear of imminent serious bodily injury; or 

* * * 

18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2701(a)(1)-(3). 

The Pennsylvania Crimes Code defines the offense of REAP as follows: 
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“A person commits a misdemeanor of the second degree if he recklessly 

engages in conduct which places or may place another person in danger of 

death or serious bodily injury.” 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2705. “Serious bodily injury” 

is defined as, “[b]odily injury which creates a substantial risk of death or 

which causes serious, permanent disfigurement, or protracted loss or 

impairment of the function of any bodily member or organ.” 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 

2301. A person is guilty of REAP when that person: (1) possessed a mental 

state of recklessness; (2) committed a wrongful act; and (3) created the 

danger of death or serious bodily injury in the performance of the wrongful 

act. Commonwealth v. Emler, 903 A.2d 1273, 1278 (Pa.Super. 2006). 

This statutory provision was directed against reckless

conduct entailing a serious risk to life or limb out of

proportion to any utility the conduct might have. The 

crime of REAP is a crime of assault which requires the 

creation of danger. As such, ...there must be an actual 

present ability to inflict harm. 

Commonwealth v. Reynolds, 835 A.2d 720, 727-28 (Pa.Super. 2003). 

“The mens rea for recklessly endangering another person is ‘a conscious 

disregard of a known risk of death or great bodily harm to another person.’” 

Commonwealth v. Martuscelli, 54 A.3d 940, 949 (Pa.Super. 2012). 

Section 903(a)(1) of the Crimes Code provides: 

§ 903 Criminal Conspiracy 

(a) Definition of conspiracy.—A person is guilty of 

conspiracy with another person or persons to commit a 

crime if with the intent of promoting or facilitating its 

commission he: 
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(1) agrees with such person or persons that they or one 

or more of them will engage in conduct which constitutes 

such crime or an attempt or solicitation to commit such 

crime; 

* * * 

(b) Scope of conspiratorial relationship.ふIf a person 

guilty of conspiracy, as defined by subsection (a) of this

section, knows that a person with whom he conspires to 

commit a crime has conspired with another person or 

persons to commit the same crime, he is guilty of 

conspiring with such other person or persons, to commit 

such crime whether or not he knows their identity. 

18 Pa.C.S.A. § 903(a)(1), (b). To sustain a conviction for criminal 

conspiracy, the Commonwealth must establish the defendant: 1) entered 

into an agreement to commit or aid in an unlawful act with another person 

or persons; 2) with a shared criminal intent; and 3) an overt act was done in 

furtherance of the conspiracy. Jones, supra at 121. Additionally: 

Circumstantial evidence may provide proof of the 

conspiracy. The conduct of the parties and the 

circumstances surrounding such conduct may create a 

“web of evidence” linking the accused to the alleged 

conspiracy beyond a reasonable doubt. An agreement can 

be inferred from a variety of circumstances including, but 

not limited to, the relation between the parties, knowledge 

of and participation in the crime, and the circumstances

and conduct of the parties surrounding the criminal 

episode. These factors may coalesce to establish a 

conspiratorial agreement beyond a reasonable doubt 

where one factor alone might fail. 

Id. at 121-22. 

The essence of a criminal conspiracy is the common 

understanding that a particular criminal objective is to be 

accomplished. Mere association with the perpetrators, 

mere presence at the scene, or mere knowledge of the 
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crime is insufficient. Rather, the Commonwealth must 

prove that the defendant shared the criminal intent, i.e.,

that the [defendant] was an active participant in the

criminal enterprise and that he had knowledge of the 

conspiratorial agreement. The defendant does not need to 

commit the overt act; a co-conspirator may commit the 

overt act. 

Commonwealth v. Lambert, 795 A.2d 1010, 1016 (Pa.Super. 2002), 

appeal denied, 569 Pa. 701, 805 A.2d 521 (2002) (internal citations and 

quotation marks omitted) (emphasis added). Circumstances such as an 

association between alleged conspirators, knowledge of the commission of 

the crime, presence at the scene of the crime, and/or participation in the 

object of the conspiracy, are relevant to prove a conspiracy, when “viewed in 

conjunction with each other and in the context in which they occurred.” Id. 

 After a thorough review of the record, the briefs of the parties, the 

applicable law, and the well-reasoned opinion of the Honorable Chris R. 

Wogan, we conclude Appellant’s issues merit no relief. The trial court 

opinion comprehensively discusses and properly disposes of the questions 

presented. (See Trial Court Opinion, filed October 28, 2013, at 2-6) 

(finding: (1) victim identified Appellant as member of group that exited 

vehicle together; one member of group struck victim in head with brick; one 

or more than one member of group struck victim several more times with 

brick; all members of group surrounded victim and punched and kicked 

victim while victim lay on ground; assault continued until one member of 

group took victim’s pocketbook; victim positively identified Appellant as 
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assailant; victim could not explicitly identify which blows she received from 

individual group members, but evidence was sufficient to establish 

Appellant’s involvement in assault; severity of blows rose to level required 

for aggravated assault, even if Appellant did not use brick to beat victim; 

Appellant was properly convicted of aggravated assault, simple assault, 

REAP; (2) victim identified Appellant as having exited vehicle with other 

women; victim’s testimony that all women from vehicle surrounded her 

during assault is sufficient for finding that Appellant was engaged in conduct 

of assault; all women, including Appellant, left scene of crime together in 

vehicle they arrived in after they took victim’s pocketbook; victim’s 

testimony that Appellant exited van with other women, remained present at 

scene, surrounded victim, and fled from scene with other women sufficiently 

established Appellant did aid in commission of crime; Appellant was properly 

convicted of conspiracy to commit aggravated assault; (3) testimony by 

victim and police officers was sufficient to establish crime; record does not 

show verdict so contrary to evidence as to shock one’s sense of justice; new 

trial is not imperative and justice was properly served). Accordingly, we 

affirm on the basis of the trial court opinion. 

 Judgment of sentence affirmed. 
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Judgment Entered. 

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq. 

Prothonotary 

Date: 8/4/2014 
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