## IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA

CHARLES E. WARD et al., Plaintiffs and Appellants,

v. UNITED AIRLINES, INC., Defendant and Respondent.

S248702

Ninth Circuit
16

- 16415

Northern District of California
3:15

- cv

- 02309

- WHA

FELICIA VID R I O et al.,
Plaintif fs and Appellants,

v. UNITED AIRLINES, INC.

, Defendant and Respondent.

Ninth Circuit
17

- 55471

Central District of California
2:15

- cv

- 07985

- PSG

- MR WJune 29 , 2020

This opinion precedes companion case S248726,

al s o filed on June 2 9 , 2020.

Justice Kruge r authored the opinion of the Court, in which
Chief Justice Cantil

- Sakauye and Justices Chin, Corrigan, Li u, Cu é llar, and Groban concurred.WARD v. UNITED AIRLINES, INC

. S248702

Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J.

From the air, the borders that divide s tate fro m state disappear. But in our federali st system
, those borders still

matter

— even for those who make their living flying the friendly skies

. In these consolidated cases and Oman v. Delta Air Lines, Inc. ( J une 29
, 2020, S248726)

__ _ Cal.5th ___

, w e confront questions a b o u t how the laws of a s i n g le sta te might apply to employees who perform duties across the country

, on behalf of an employer in the business of connecting the world.
Plaintiffs are pilots and flight attendants for a global
airline bas e d outside California. P laintiffs res id e i n Cal if ornia
but perform most of their work in airspace outside California’s jurisdiction . The y are not paid according to California wage law, but instead according to the terms of a colle ctive bargaining agreeme n t entered under feder a l law

. The Uni te d
S ta tes C ourt of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has asked us to
decide whether , given these circumstances, the airline is required to provide plaintiffs with wage statements that meet the vari ous requirements of Cali f ornia law.

We conclud e t hat whether p la int if fs ar e entitled to
California

- compliant wage statements depends on whether
their principal place of work is in California

. For pilots, flight attendants, and other interstate transportation workers who do not p e rform a majority of t h e i r work in any o ne st ate
, this
test is satisfied when California serves as the ir base of workWARD v. UNITED AIR LINES, IN C. Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J.

2 operations , regardless of their place of residence or whether a collective bargaining agreement governs their pay

. I.

The consolidated cas e s before us arise from t hree clas s

a c ti ons f ile d against d efendant United Airlines, Inc. United is
an air carrier that provides service between airports across the country and around the world , including to and from numerous airports in California

. Unit e d is incorporated in Delaware and
h e a dq uar te red i n Illinois

, with a substantial administrative presence in Texas. Plaintiff Charles Ward i s a pilot for United

, while plaintiffs Felicia Vidrio and Paul Bradley a re flight

atten dants. All three are Califor n ia residents. ( Ward v.
United Ai r l i n es , I

nc

. ( 9t h Cir. 2018) 889 F.3d 1068, 1071.)
Ward filed an action in state court on behalf of pilots

, while Vidrio and Bradley each filed separate state court actions on behalf of flight attendants. All three flight crew members alleg ed that Unite d ’ s wa ge st at eme nt s fail to provide
them all the information required by Labor Code section 226 (section 226)

, in the format required by that provision . (See § 226, subd. (a) .) Specifically, th e flight crew members complai n ed that although United issue s t h e m a t lea st tw o wage statements a month, the wage statements d o not (1) list a
street address for United, instead providing only a post office
box

, or (2) include the hour s worked and all applicable hourly
rates that ma ke u p employee pay for the pay peri o d

, in st ead
l ist in g only the total amounts earned in various pay categories.
The crew members sought civil penalties under the Labor Code Private Attorneys General Act of 2004 ( Lab. Cod e, § 2698 et seq.) on a representative basis ; statutory penalties unde r

s ect io n 2 26 , s ub division (e) on a classwide basis ; and injunctiveWARD v. UNITED AIR LINES, IN C. Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J.

3 relief ( Ward v. United Airlines, Inc.

, supra , 889 F.3d at

p. 1071)

. United removed all three action s to federal court. In the
Ward case, the district judge certified a class consisting o f

p ilot s who r esi de in California and pay California income

taxes. 1 ( Ward v. United Airlines, Inc. (N.D.Cal. , Mar. 23, 2016
, No. 3: 15

- cv

- 02309

- WHA ) 2016 U.S.Dist. L exis 38896

. ) A
different district judge consolidated the Vi d rio and Bradley
cases and ce r t i fied a s imi la rly d efined class of California

- based flight attendants

. ( Vidrio v. United Airlines, Inc. (C.D.Cal.

, Aug. 23, 2016, No. 2:1 5

- cv

- 0 7985

- PSG

- MRW ) 2016 U.S.Dis t.
L exis 189537

. )

In each case , the district court gran t ed summary judgment t o United

. The d is tri ct c o ur t in Ward held that the geographic reach of California wage and hour law

— including
section 226

— is governed by a “ ‘job situs test,’ which considers where an employee ‘principally’ worked.” ( Ward v. United
A irlines, Inc. (N.D. C a l

. , July 19, 201 6
, No

. 3: 1 5

- cv

- 02309

- WHA ) 2016 U.S.Dist. Lexis 94803, p. *10 .) Because it was undisputed that under the district court ’ s test the members of

1 Under fe deral law, ai rline empl oyees who work in more t han two st ates are subject to the income tax laws of either th e state where they reside or t he state where they earn mor e than 50 percent of their airli ne pay. (49 U.S.C. § 40116(f ) (2).) “For pilots and f

l ig ht att endants , United a pplies sta te income tax law s ba sed on the employee’s residence because it determined t hat pilots and flight att endan ts ‘rarely, if ever, perform more than half th eir work in an y one state.’ ” ( Ward v. Uni t ed Airlines, Inc.

, supra , 8 89 F.3 d at pp

. 1070

– 107 1.)WARD v. UNITED AIR LINES, IN C. Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J.

4 the pilot class did not work principally in California

, the court ruled that section 2 2 6 did not apply.

Se veral m onths la ter , t he district court in Vid rio reached
the same conclusion. ( Vidrio v. United Airlines, Inc. (C.D.Cal.

, Mar. 15, 2017 , No. 2 : 15

- cv

- 0 7 985

- PSG

- MRW ) 2017 U.S.Dist.
L exis 40609 .) The Vidrio co u r t noted that sin c e Ward was decided, other f

ed eral courts h ad al so considered whether fl ight

c rew members may bring claims under California’s wage and hour laws when most of the work is performed outside the state. In some of these cases, the courts h a d interpreted
relev a nt California preceden t t o call for a diff er ent approach
from the “

job situs” test applied in Ward ; in determining whether California law applies, these courts had weighed
various facto rs in addition to job situs

, including the parties’

st at es of residen c e . ( Vidrio

, at pp. *12

– *13 .) The Vidrio court concluded that U nited would prevail under both the “ job situs ”
test and the wider

- ranging multi factor approach , since the
Vidrio cl as s members do not work principally in California and “United’s ties to Calif o rnia are m i nimal relative to its overall
busine ss

. . . . ” ( Id. at pp

. *14

– * 15 .) Absent greater employer
ties to Calif

ornia

, the court concluded, “ [T] he class members’
residenc y and receipt of wage statements in California is
insuffici e n t to obtain the b enefits of California wa ge and hour
laws when t he work is principally performed outside of the state.” ( Id. at p. *15

. )

Both sets of plaintiffs sought review

, and the Ninth
Circ ui t consolidated the appeals for purp o s e s of oral argument

. After argument, t he Nin th Circuit ordered supplemental
bri efing addressing the Industrial Wage Commission (IWC) wage order regulating the tran s portation industry

, IWC wage
order No. 9

– 2001 ( Wage Or der No. 9 ) . That wage orderWARD v. UNITED AIR LINES, IN C. Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J.

5 extend s v a rious protections

— including certain w age statement requirements

— to transportat ion wo rkers . But the wage order exempts from its protections employees who hav e ent e red into a collective bargaining agreement under and i n accordance with the provisions of t h e Railway Labor Act , a federal statut e governing labor relations in the railroa d and airline industries

. ( See Wage Order No. 9
, § 1(E); 45 U.S.C. § 151 et se q .) U nited pilots and flight attendants are parties to su ch a collective bargaining agreement.

A f t er brief ing was completed , the Ninth Circuit issued an order asking this court to re solve two unsettled questions of
California law critical to the resolutio n of t he crew members’
section 226 claims. ( Ward v. Unite d Airlines , Inc.

, supra , 889
F.3d at p

. 1 070.) Those questions, which w e hav e reframed slightly (see Cal. Rules of Cou rt, ru le 8.548(f)(5)) , are : ( 1 ) Wage Order No. 9 exempts from its wage statemen t

req u irements an employee who has entered into a collecti ve bargaining agreement in accordance w i t h the Railway Labor
Act. (See Ca l. C ode Regs., tit. 8, § 11090 , su bd. 1 (E ).) Does the
R ailway Labor Act exemption in Wage Order No. 9 bar a wage

statement claim brought under section 226 by an employee
who is cove re d by a collective bargaining agr e e m ent ?
(2) D oes section 226 apply to wage s ta tements provided by an out

- of

- state emp loyer to an employee who resides in California, receives pay in California, and pays California income tax on his or her wages, but who d oe s not work principally in Calif o r n ia or any other st ate?

II.

Section 226 re q uires an employer to supply each employee

, “sem imonthly or at the time of each payment

, ” aWARD v. UNITED AIR LINES, IN C. Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J.

6 written wage statement listin g the employer’s name and address; identifying the pay per io d ; itemizing the total hours

wo r ked, applicable hourly rate s , hours worked a t each rate, gross and net wages earned, and an y deductions taken ; and disclosing other prescribed information. (§ 226, subd

. (a).) Violations may result in penalties of up to $4 ,000 for each injured employ e e, as well as an award of costs a nd attorney’s fees. ( Id. , subd. (e)(1).)

The Ninth Cir cuit’s first question is whether , as United

argues, the plaintiff crew members fall o utside the protections
of section 226 because they a re parties to a collective
bar g ai n ing agreement entered in accor dance with th e Railway
Labor Act

. United’s argument is not b ased on the language of
section 226

— which says nothing at all about colle ctive bargaining agreement s

— but on the language of the

tra ns portation industry wage orde r , W age Order No. 9.
Wag e Order No. 9 is one o f 18 wage orders promulgated by the IWC i n resp onse to the Legislature’s 191 3 directive to “investigate various industri es an d promulgate wage orders fixing for each industry” ru le s governing wages, hours, an d

w o rking conditions. ( Br inker Restaurant Corp

. v. Superior
Court (2012) 53 Cal.4th 1004 , 1026 .) The wage orders remain in effect alongside the body of law enacted by the L egislature and codified in the Labor Code; the two s ou rces of authority
establish c om p lementary regulatio ns governing wage and ho u r claims . ( Ibid .)

L ike the other wage orders

, Wage Order No. 9 sets out certain wage statement requirements that over lap w i th ( but
are narrower than ) the requirements of secti on 226. (Wage
Order No. 9, § 7 (B ) ; see, e.g., Cal. Code Regs., tit. 8, §§ 11 0 10
,WARD v. UNITED AIR LINES, IN C. Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J.

7 su bd. 7 (B), 11020 , subd. 7 (B), 11030
, subd. 7 (B ).) 2 As relevant here, i t also provides that, subject to certain exc eptio n s not pertinent here, “this o rder shall not be deeme d to cover those emplo y ee s who have entered into a collective bargaining

a gre e ment under and in accordance with the pro vision s of the Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. Sections 151 et seq

. ” (Wage
Order No. 9
, § 1(E).)

Because Ward and the other members of th e certified
classes ha v e en tered into such a collective bargaining

agreeme nt
, it is undisputed that United need not com ply wi th the itemized statement requirements of the wage order . But by its ter ms, t h e wage order exemption applies only to the requireme nt s of “this o rder” (W a ge O rder No. 9, § 1(E)) ; the exemption does not pur por t to control application of any other

prov ision of law

. And, as already noted, section 226 itself
contains no similar ex empti o n. United nonetheless contends

we should imply one

. We reject th e conten t io n

. We begin with the text of the statute . Sectio n 2 2 6 does
contain exempt ions for several cat egorie s of workers

. (E.g., § 226, subds. (d) [personal services employees] , (i ) [go v ernment employees] , (j) [employees who are also exem pt from minimum

wage a n d ov ertime] .) But the statute contains no thing lik e W a ge Order No. 9’s Railway Labor Act exempt ion

. This

2 For example, whil e b oth the wage orders and statute require itemization of dedu ctions from pay, only the stat ute requires the employer to list gross and ne t wages, hours worked, and applicable hourl y rates of pay. (Compare § 226,

s ubd. (a ) item s (1 ), (2), (4), (5), (9) wi th Wage Order No. 9, § 7(B).)WARD v. UNITED AIR LINES, IN C. Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J.

8 omission is all the more telling because section 226 does expressly refer e nce several other IWC wage order exemptions

. For ex am ple, t he statute pro v id es that an employer need not specify total hours wor k ed for salaried employees “exempt from

pa yment of overtime under

. . . any applicable order of the
Industrial Welfare Co mmiss i on

. ” ( § 226 , subd. (j)(1 ).) The
same is true for s ev eral other categ o ri es of employees exempt from payment of minimum wage and o vertime under IWC wage orders. ( § 226
, s ubd. ( j)(2) (A) [administrative exemption], (B) [outside sales exemption], (D) [ famil y member exempt ion], (F) [commercial fishing exemptio n ]

, (G) [ nat i on al service

program exemption ]

. ) It would have been easy enoug h for the Legislature to adopt the Railway Labor Act exemption as well,
but it did not. The Legislature’s incorporation of so m e (but not all) wage order exemptions strongly sugge st s that any om is sion
was intentional

. We may also l ook beyond the text to co n sider the
functional relationship between the L egislature’s and IWC’s regulation of wage statement s , but we find no basi s for United’s importation argument there either

. Section 2 26
, which pr ed ated the IWC wage order provision

, has always
been the primar y source of employers’ obligations to supp ly

com pl iant wage statements

. First enacted in 1943, secti on 226 was initially craf

t ed to require only that employers provide
written st at ement s sh o wi ng any deductions from employees’ pay. (See Stats. 1943, ch. 1 0 27, § 1, p. 2965.) 3 Since then,

3 The original version provided: “ Eve ry employer shall semim onthly or at the time of e ac h payment of wages fur ni s h

eac h of his emp l oyees either as a p art of the check, draft, orWARD v. UNITED AIR LINES, IN C. Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J.

9 however, the L egislature has repeatedly expanded the scope of
both section 226’s requir ement s and the remedies for noncompliance

. In 1963, the L eg islature a me nd ed the statute

to mandate that statements include the pay per i od a nd identifying information for the em ployee and employer. (Stats. 1963, ch. 1080, § 1, p. 2541.) In 1976, the Legi slatu r e amended section 226 to add a damages remedy for vi ol ations of th e statute. ( § 226, former subd. (b)

, as amended by Stats. 1976

, ch. 832, § 1, p. 1900

. ) T he Legislature would later add requirements that the stateme nt show both gross and net

wages (Stat s . 1978, ch. 1247, § 3, p. 4059), hours worked (Stats

. 19 8 4, c h. 486, § 1, p. 1990) or piece

- rate units earned (Stats. 2000, ch. 8 7 6, § 6, p. 6508), and any applicable hour ly

rat es ( ibid. ). All told, the Legislature h as revisited the statute
more tha n a d o zen times since 1976. (See 44 West’s Ann. Lab.
Code ( 2 01 9 supp.) foll. § 226, p. 231.) The end result is a comprehensive statut e t hat contains not only detailed requirem ents f

or the contents of wage statements, bu t also recordkeeping and inspection requ i rements ( § 226, subds. (a)

– (c)) and extensive remedi e s fo r noncompliance, including statutory penalties recoverable by the Labor C om missioner ( id. , subd. (f)) as well as i njunct ive relief , damages, statutory penalties, and attorney’s fees for employe e cla i mants ( id

. , subds. (e)(1), (f), (h) )

.

vouch er payi ng the emp loyee ’s wage s, or separa tel y, a n itemized statement in writing showing all deductions made fr om such wages; pro vided , all deductions made on wri tten orders of the employee may be aggr egated and shown as on e item. ” (Stats. 1943, c h

. 1027, § 1, p. 2965.)WARD v. UNITED AIR LINES, IN C. Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J.

10 With respect t o w ag e statement regulation, t he IWC wage orders have always played a backg r ou nd role relative to
section 226 . In 19 57, mo re than a decade after section 226 was first enacted, the IWC incorporate d the then

- existing version of
section 226 in t o its wage o r d e rs , requiring that employers supply “at the time of payment of wages an it e mi zed statement in writing showin g gross wages paid and all deductions from such wages .” (IWC wage order No. 9

– 57, § 7( b).) Later, in 1976, the IWC updated its wage orders to i nc or porate the additional requirements introduced by the 1963 amendments

to s e ct ion 226, including the requirem ent that a sta tement include the pay period and identifying information for the employe e and employer. (See IWC wage order No. 9

– 76, § 7(B). ) T ha t was the last time the IWC altered the substance of the wage statement req u ir ements. Although the Legislatu re has m a d e ma ny more changes to section 226 since then

, the

wage orders have not kept pace

. Rather, the current version of
the wage order s ti ll t racks the version of section 226 the Legislature adopted in 1963. (Compare Wa ge Order No. 9, § 7(B) with for mer § 22 6, as amended by Stats. 1963, ch. 1080, § 1, p p

. 2540

– 2541.)

T he Railway Labor Act e x emption was added to the transportation industry w ag e order in 1976. (IWC wage order
No. 9

– 76, § 1(D) ; see Wage Order No. 9, § 1 ( E) [carrying
forward the same language wi thout amendment] .) The IWC
“found that it would be difficult to enforce standa rds f o r employees crossing state lines and that the ex em pt ed employees were better protected by their collective bargaining agreements p ur suant to the Railway Labor A ct .” ( IWC

, State ment of Findings by the IWC of the State of Cal

. in
Connection with the R evisi o n in 1976 of Its Orders Regula ti ngWARD v. UNITED AIR LINES, IN C. Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J.

11 W ages, Hours, and W orking Conditions (Aug. 13, 1976) p. 6 (IWC 1976 Statement of Findings).)

I n other Labor Code provisions, t he Legisla ture h as demonstrated its willingness to craft exemptions for employees
under c ollec t ive bargaining agreements when i t be lieves such

exem pt ions are warranted . For example, in 1970, the Legislature added just such a n exception to Labor Code se ction 204. ( Lab. C ode, § 204, subd. (c) [“However, when employees are covered by a collecti ve ba r gaining agreement that provi de s d if ferent pay arrang em ents [than the prompt payment deadlines imposed in § 204], those arrangemen t s shall apply to
the covered employees”]; see S tats. 1970, ch. 1237, §§ 3

– 4,

pp. 2225

– 2226; Stats. 1970, ch. 1260, §§ 2

– 3, pp

. 2279

– 2280.) The Legislatur e has d one likewise in L ab or Code sections 510, 512, and 514. (See Lab. Code, §§ 510, subd. (a)(2) [ e xempting
from overtime statu te work sched ules “ adopted pursuant to a collective bargaining agreement”], 514 [exempting f rom

s t atutes regulating overtime a nd wo rk ing hours “an emp lo yee covered by a valid collective bargaining agreement” when
certain additi o nal conditions are met]; Ger ard v. Orange Coast
Memorial Medical Center (2018) 6 Cal.5th 443, 456 [“Since 2000, the Legi slatu r e has amended [Labor Code] s ec tio n 512
several times t o exempt various classes of employees covered by collective bargaining agre e ments from the prohibition

a gainst the wa iver o f second meal periods for employees working more than 12 hours”; citing e xampl e s].)

D espite numerous opport un iti es , however, the
Le gi slature has never follow ed the IWC’s lead and enact ed an exemption to secti o n 226 for emplo yees operating under a
col lectiv e bargaining agreement entered under the Railway
Labor Act. We see no basis f o r importi ng the Railway LaborWARD v. UNITED AIR LINES, IN C. Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J.

12 Act exemption w he n t he L egislature itself has not chosen to do

so. Given the number of times the L e gislat ure has r evisited
and revised secti on 226 since the Railway Labor Act exemption was first promulgated in 1976 , we can b e sure tha t the Legislature’s failure to ado pt th e ex em ption is not for want of
attention to the statute.
Despite all this, United argues that we must import the Railway La bor Ac t exemption into section 226 in order to harmonize the wage order and statute. United i s corr ect that

courts must strive to ha rm on iz e the IWC’s wage orders and the statutory provisions of the Labor Code wher e possible

, just as we would strive to har monize any two sets of legal provisions governing the same subject. ( Brinker Restau r ant Corp. v. Su perior Court , supra, 53 Ca l. 4th at pp

. 1026

– 1027.) But we are not persuaded that importing the wage order’s Railw a y Labor Act exemp tion into section 226 is the r ight way to go about that task. Notwithstanding United’s contrary claim, to

r e ad sectio n 226 in accordance wi th it s plain terms cr ea tes no necessary conflict with the IWC’s choice to exempt employees
covered by a relevant col lective bargaining agree ment f rom virtually all of the provisions of the transportation industry wage order. No one d ispute s that the exemp ti on re mains fully

op er ative with respect to matters other than wage statements
and thus continues to shield employ ers from wage order provi sions imposing recordkeeping requirements, uniform and equipment requirements, suita b le seatin g requ irements, and

t he li ke

. (E.g., Wage Or der No. 9, § § 7(A), 9, 14.) E ven as to the wage order’s wage statement req u irements, the ex emption has an important role t o play insofar as it shields employers
from sanctions for any violation of the s e require ments that might othe rw ise a pply

. ( S ee Lab

. Code, § 1199, subd. (c)WARD v. UNITED AIR LINES, IN C. Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J.

13 [making violation of an IWC wage order a misdemeano r ]

. ) In short, i t is entirely possible to give effect to both the plain terms of the statute and to the terms of the wage ord e r. Becau se the re is no necess ar y c on flict between t he two
, there is

no reason to harmonize the m in the manne r United proposes. ( See, e.g., Dic on Fiberoptics, Inc. v. Fra nchise Tax Bd. (2012) 53 Cal.4th 1227, 1236

– 1237.)

United ’s argument for importing t h e wage or der

ex emption into se cti on 226 relies princ ip ally on Collins v.
Overnite Transportation Co. (2003) 105 Cal.App.4th 171 ( C ollins ) , in wh ich the Court of Appeal hel d that a different wage order exemption operated to exempt an employer from complian c e with st atutor y overtime re qu ire me nts. But the

sta tu tory and regulatory context was meaningfully different
for reasons thorough l y addressed i n the Collins opinion , and
C ollins neither holds nor suggests that every wage order exemption must be read into e very corr espond ing pr ovi sio n of
th e Labor Code in or de r to harmonize the two bodi es of law.

The plaintiff

s in Collins were a cl a ss of truck d rivers who sought overtime c ompens ation under the Labor Code

. In its defense, their employer invoked the so

- cal l ed motor carrie r

exem pti on co ntain ed in the transpor ta tion industry wage
order

. (IWC wage order No. 9

– 90, § 3(H); see Wage Order
No. 9, § 3(L) [exempting truck drivers wh ose ho urs are regulated by the federal Department of Transportation].) That plainti f fs’ claim was a n ov ert ime c laim matters, because the
h istory of overtime regulation in California is essentially the

reverse of t h e history of wage statement regulation : T he IW C has long had overtime rules in place pursuant to its delegated authority to r egulate h ours, pay, an d w or king conditions (see,

e.g ., IWC wage order No. 9

– 52, § 3(a) [defining overtime payWARD v. UNITED AIR LINES, IN C. Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J.

14 obligations]), whil e the Legislat ure is a relatively recent

e ntrant to the field

. That entry came in response to 1998 IWC wage orders that weake n ed overti me pro te cti ons ; in 19 99, to reverse these c ha nges , the Legislature codif ied certain minimum protections (Lab. Code, § 51 0 , as amended by Stats. 1999, ch. 134, § 4 , p. 1 821; §§ 511

– 515, as enacted by Stats. 1999, ch. 134, §§ 5

– 9, pp. 1821

– 1825; se e Brinker Restau ra nt Cor p. v. S uperior Court

, supra , 53 Cal.4th a t p. 1037)

, on which the plaintiff truck drivers in Collins then r elied

. But t he Legislature also expressl y rati fied most existing exemptions to overtime protections already contained in any wage orde rs , in cl udi ng th e mot or carrier exemptio n, in newly ena cted Labor
Code section 515 . (See Lab. Code, § 515, subd. (b) [t h e IWC
need no t revisit pre

- 1998 “exemptio n[s] f rom provisions regulating hours of work”].) Because the new Labor Code
overti m e provisi ons ex pr ess ly ra tifie d existing IWC exempti on s, and because to conclude otherwise would work an implied repeal of a long

- standing wage order provision, the
Collin s cour t rejected the drivers’ argument that they were
entitled to statutory overtime notwithst anding t he mot or

carr ier exemption . ( Colli ns , supra , 105 Cal.App.4th at

pp. 179

– 180 & fn. 4.)
Here, in contrast to Coll i ns , the statu tory provision at
issue was not en acted to serve as an adjunct to the relevant IWC wage ord ers; section 226 both predated the wa ge
st ate me nt re quirements of the wage o rders and has long
exceeded the m in its substantive and remedial scope. U n l ike
the statu tory overtime provision at i ssue i n the Collins decision, section 226 contains no indicatio n that the Legislatur e intended to em br ace al l of th e IWC exemptions
whole sa le; on the contrary

, section 226’s incorporation ofWARD v. UNITED AIR LINES, IN C. Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J.

15 certain IWC exemptions ( but not other s) suggests a different

appr oach

. And the presumption against implied repeals that played a central role in Col l ins has n o rele va nce he re ; sec tion 226, a statute en ac ted in 1943, could not have impliedly repealed a wage order exemption first created in 19 76

. Collins

, in short, offe rs no support for United’s argument for importing the Railway Labor Act exemption in t o section 226 w he n t he
Le gisla ture has not chosen to d o so. Finally, and in any event, United’s argument fail s because plaintiffs ’ claims relat e solely to wage statement

r equire ments that are not covered by the wage order . T he wage order does not require employers to li st th eir a ddres s or to state hours wo rk ed and applicable hourly rates , which is what plaintiffs have asked for her e

. 4 Even if t he wage order exemption co ul d be r ead to excuse compliance with section 226 to the extent its requirements overl a p the wag e orde r’ s, we ha ve no basis for conclud ing th e IWC intended to exempt, or the Legislature authorized it to exempt, emplo y ers from
addi tional requirements beyond t hose i n the wage order. In

sum, w e conclude the Legislature did not intend the wage
order exe mption t o f

ore cl ose p laintiffs’ section 226 c laims.

4 As noted, Wa ge Order No. 9 was last amend ed in 1976. The three wage statement requirements a t issue in this ca se

we re added to section 226 afte r that time. (See Stats. 1978, ch. 124 7, § 3, p. 4059 [addin g employer address requir e me nt]; S tats. 1 984, ch. 4 86, § 1, p. 1990 [adding ho urs worked
req uirement]; Stats. 2000, ch. 876, § 6, p. 6508 [addin g hourly rates req uirem ent].)WARD v. UNITED AIR LINES, IN C. Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J.

16 I II.

We turn to the Ninth Circuit’s second question: Whether plaint i ff s are entit led to wage statements prepa red in compliance with section 226 of California’s Labor Code, even though they perf

o rm most o f t hei r work o ut side California.

A.

In deb at ing the coverage of section 226’s wage statement requirements

, the parties r el y heavily o n a pair of long

standing pr esumpt ion s about the intended geographic reach of legislative enactments . The first of these is a p re sumpti on agai nst extraterritorialit y

— that is, a presumption that state law is intended to apply only within stat e borders. Of course, l egislatures can, a nd do, regulate beyond their territorial borders in appropriate circumstances. ( Ski r iotes v. Flo rid a (1941) 3 13 U. S. 69, 77

– 79; Tidewate r Marine Western, Inc. v.
Brad shaw (1996) 14 Cal.4th 557, 565

– 566 ( Tidewater ) ; People
v. We eren (1980) 26 Cal.3d 654, 6 66; cf

. , e.g., Rest .4th Foreign Relations Law, § 402 [describing certain recognized b ases for
the Un it ed Sta te s to regulate persons and c on duct outside its territory ]. ) But c ourts ordinarily will not give extrater r itorial
effec t to legislative enactments absent an affirmative
indication that such was the L egislature’s intent. (See, e.g.

, Sullivan v. Or ac le Cor p. (201 1) 51 Cal.4th 1191, 12 07 ( Sullivan ); North Alaska Salmon Co. v. Pillsbury (1916) 174 Cal. 1, 4; cf. EEOC v. Arabi an American Oil Co. (1991) 4 99 U.S . 244, 248 [describing similar presumption against extraterritoriality governi n g the a ct s o f C ong re ss].) The rule,
which reflects an assumption that a legislature generally legislates with domestic concerns i n mind ( Foley Bros. v.
Filardo (1949) 336 U.S. 281, 285) , also serves the incidentalWARD v. UNITED AIR LINES, IN C. Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J.

17 purpose of avoiding unintended conflicts with ot he r s ove rei gn s ( No rth A laska Salmon Co. , at p

. 5; see Arabian American Oil
Co. , at p. 248; Diamond Multimedia Systems, Inc

. v. Superior
Court (1999) 19 Cal.4th 1036

, 1059

– 1060, fn. 20)

. Th e presumption against extraterritoriality has a mirror

image relativ e in the f or m of a pre sumption in favor of
in tr aterritorial application

. Employing this presumption

, courts ordinarily in t erpret Calif ornia statutes to apply to

co nduct occurring anywhere within California’s border s , absent
evidence a more limited scope was i nten de d. (See , e. g., Tidewater

, supra , 1 4 Cal.4th at p. 578; People v. Weeren

, supra , 26 Cal.3d at pp. 669

– 670

. )

The p arties dispu te how these presumptions app ly in this case. United argues that to apply any provision o f California
labor law t o crew me mb ers wh o work prima rily outside
California w ould constitute an extraterritorial application of California law, which we presume the Legislature did not
intend. The cr ew members, by contrast, implicitly rely on the
mirror

- image presumption: The y argue th at bec au se they live
in California and are pa id in California (as evidenced by the fact they pay California income taxes )

, requiring United to
send them Californi a

- comp liant wage statements would not violate the presumption against extraterritori a lity bu t w ould
i ns tead const itute a run

- of

- the

- mill in tra territorial application
of state law.

There is a n element of truth to bo t h views

, wh ich suggests that framing the issue solely as whether the crew
members’ section 226 claims violate the presumption again st

e x trate r ri torial ity is not a particularly he lp ful way to approach
the issue in this case. I n our modern, inter connected e conomy,WARD v. UNITED AIR LINES, IN C. Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J.

18 man y legal transactions and relat ionshi ps span multiple jurisdictions. That goes double for the claims of the employ e es he re , w hose v er y liveliho ods consist of moving ba ck and forth

across state and international borders

. F rom any given state’s

p erspective, the se employees’ claims may w ell ha ve both
extraterritorial and intraterritorial elements . Unless we are

prepare d to c on cl u de th a t any extrat erritorial effect at all i s sufficient to bar application of California law, or , conversely,
that any intraterrit orial effect at all is suffici ent to justify it,

we cannot resolve this case based on t erritorial presumption s alo n e.
We mad e this ve r y point i n Tidewater

, supra , 14 C al .4th 557, in which we resolved a dispute over the app lication of IWC wage o r der overtim e provisions to maritime worke rs

emp loyed in the Santa Barbara Channel. We there resisted
the employers’ argument that the r each o f the IWC’s wage orders was necessar il y limited by California ’s territorial
boundaries . “I n some circumstances,” we noted, “ state employment law explicitl y gove rns employment outside the
state’s territorial boundaries

. (Lab. Code, §§ 360 0 .5, 5 305 [ Calif o rn ia workers ’ compensation law appli es to workers hired in California but injured out of st ate].) The Legislatur e may have s imilarly intended extraterrito rial e nforcement of IWC wage orders in limited circumstances, such as when Californi a resi dent s work i ng for a Cal ifornia employer travel te mporarily outside the state during the course of the normal workday but

ret u rn to Calif

ornia at the end of the day. On the other hand, the Legislature may not have intended IWC wage orders to

govern o u t

- of

- stat e busi n es ses employ ing nonresidents, though

t he nonresident employees enter California temporarily during
the course of t he workday

. ” ( Tidewater

, at pp. 577

– 578. ) WeWARD v. UNITED AIR LINES, IN C. Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J.

19 therefore declared ourselves “ not prepared

. . . to hold that IWC wage orders a pply to a l l emp l oy ment in Ca lifornia, and

never to e mp loyment outside California.” ( Id. at p. 578.)
Because we ultimately conclu d ed the empl oyees in
Tidewater did work ex clusiv ely in California, we had no need to press the issue further. But since Tidew a ter , a co n sider a bl e body of out

- of

- state case l aw ha s done just that

. Courts have
concluded , for example, t hat in some circumsta n ces one sta te’s law may well govern work perfor med in another state

— or, conversely, that another state’s laws do not govern w o rk

pe rfor m ed pa r tl y in that state. 5

5 See, e.g., Dow v. Casale (2013) 83 M ass.App.Ct. 751, 756 [ 989 N.E.2d 909, 913 ] ( Massachusetts wage law a p pl ied to travel ing salesp erson of Massachusetts e mpl oyer , even tho ugh salesperson resided in Florida and performed wor k in more than 19 state s); Solouk v. European Coppe r Specialties, Inc

. (S.D.N.Y., May 2, 2 019, No. 14cv8954 (DF) ) 2019 U.S.Dist. Lexis 81 2 67
, pp. *47

– *50 (New York labor law could a pply t o

w ork performed in New Jersey incident to public works proj ect i n Manhattan); Heng Guo Jin v . Han Sung Sikpoom Trading Corp. (E.D.N.Y., S ept. 21, 2015, No. 1 3

- CV

- 6789 (CBA) (LB)) 2 0 15 U.S.Dist. Lexis 12596 1
, pp. *2 3

– *26 ( New Yor k m inimum wage and overtime la w mi ght apply to New York

- based deliv ery truck driver who made de liveries both in and out of state); Hernandez v . NJK Contractors, Inc

. (E.D.N.Y., May 1, 2015, No. 09

- CV

- 4812 (RE R )) 2015 U.S.Dist. Lexis 5 75 68,
pp

. *121

– *122 (pres umption ag ainst extrater rit o ria l application of New York labo r law would not preclude New York

- based workers’ re covery under that law for travel time to and from job site in neighboring state); Bostain v. F ood Exp., Inc. ( 2007) 15 9 W n .2d 7 00, 712

– 713 [153 P.3d 8 46, 852] (Washingt on ov er time law applied to Washin gton

- based interstate truck driver, even when drivi ng out of state).WARD v. UNITED AIR LINES, IN C. Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J.

20 In our most rece nt discussion of th is issue , we held that California’s overtime laws appl ied t o nonresi dent employees of
a California c orpora tion who worked in California for “full days and weeks” at a time. ( Sullivan

, su pra , 51 Cal .4 th at p. 1 201 .)
In so h olding, we re je cted the employer’s argument that the
overtime laws of the employees’ home s tate nece ssarily
follow ed them into Calif ornia

, creating a conflict with
California law

. ( Id. at p. 1198.) But we did not h o ld that t he

e mp loyment la ws of another state can nev er apply to work performed in California . Nor, for that matter, did we hold

e ither tha t California’s employment laws a lways apply to every
minute or hour of work performed in this stat e or that these
la w s never a pply w hen work i s performed in part out of st ate

. (See id. at pp. 1199

– 1200 [ discussing Tidewater

, supra , 14 Cal.4th 55 7 ]

. ) Final ly, we did not suggest the same concl usion necessarily applies to every aspect of wage and hour law.
W hile we held C alifo r ni a’s o v ertime law does apply to “full days a nd weeks of work performed here by nonresidents,” we
declined to assume Calif o rnia law w ould also govern “the

content o f an o ut

- of

- state business’s pay stubs, or the treatment of its employees’ vacation t i me.” ( S ull iv a n , at

p. 12 01.) In such cases, Calif or nia may well have a lesser interest in applying its own laws , and the law s o f another jurisdiction might instead cont rol

. ( Ibid. )
From these cases, we derive two general lessons. First,
when it comes t o the re gul at i on of inter state employment, it is

no t sufficient to ask whether the relevant law was intended to operate extrater r itorially or instead only intraterritoria lly

, b ecause many employment relationships and transac tions will
have elements of bo t h

. Th e b ett er question is what kinds of
California co nnections will suffice to trigger the relevantWARD v. UNITED AIR LINES, IN C. Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J.

21 provisions of California law

. And s eco nd, the connections that
suffic e for purposes of one statute may not necessarily suff ice
for another. There is no s i ngle, al l

- p ur p ose answer to the question of when st at e law will apply to an interstate employment relationship or set of transac t ion s . As is true of statutory interpreta tion g enerally, each law must be
considered on its own terms.

B.

With this backgroun d in mi n d, we c o nsider the geographic scope of the la bo r protection in section 226. Again,

t he statute regulates the information a n employer must give its employees when i t pays wages. “An employer, semimonthly or at the time of each payment of wages, sh a l l fur n is h t o h is or
her e mployee” in connection wit h each wage payment “an
accurate itemized statemen t in writing” disclosing ni n e categori es of information, including th e pay period, hours worked, applicable hourly rate s , gross and net wages earned,
and a ny de d uc tio ns taken. (§ 226, subd. (a).) Section 22 6 contains no language specifying its intended g eographic scope. As earlie r noted, t h e statute excludes certain empl oyers, including most government employers ( id.

, subd. (i)), and certain employees, i n cludi n g dom es t ic child ca re providers and others pro vi ding some personal services ( id. , subd. (d)). There are, however, no expre s s inclusi ons or exclusions based on any

p articu lar set of geographic considerations.

To gain insight into the question, then, we c ons id er

s ec tion 226’s aims and its role in the s ur rounding statutory scheme. The core purpose of section 226 is “to ensure a n employer ‘document[s] the basis of the e mploye e compensation payments’ to assist the employee in determining whether he orWARD v. UNITED AIR LINES, IN C. Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J.

22 s h e ha s b ee n co mp ensated pr operly.” ( Soto v. Motel 6 Op erating, L.P. (2016) 4 Cal.App.5th 385, 390, quoting Gattuso
v. Harte

- Hanks Shoppers, Inc. (2007) 42 Cal.4th 554, 574 ; see Henry M. Lee Law Corp. v. Superior Court (2012) 204 Cal.App.4th 1375, 1388 [th e sta tut e vi nd ic ates the p ublic policy in favor of fu ll and prompt p ayment of earned wages]; Dept. of Industrial Relations, DLSE O p n. Letter
No. 2002.05.17 (May 17, 2002) p

. 3 [§ 226 “ is designed to provide the employee with a record of hours worked, and t o

ass ist t he e mp loyee in determining whether he [or s he ] has been compensated properly for all of h is or her hours worked”]. ) Sec t ion 226 is part of a matrix of laws inte n ded to

ensure workers are correctly and adequately compensated for
the ir work. From this we r ea so na bly infer that the relevant geographi c co nnection for purposes of determining what state law applies is where that work occurs

. The increment of work cover e d by s ection 226 is also
relevant to the inquiry

. Unlike, for example, the overtime laws

at i ss ue i n Sullivan , section 226 does not oper at e at an hourly, daily, or even weekly level. (See § 226, subd. (a).) Sect i on 226 does not dictate what the employe e is pa id for any given period of time, but i nstead how the pay will be documented, r e qui ring

t h at ce rtain information be provided to the em ployee eac h pay period (typically a period of about two weeks). (§ 226,

su b d. (a); see Lab. Code, § 204, subd. (a).) Sect i on 226 appears to contemplate that the information supplied will be comprehen s ive , em br a ci ng all hours, wages, and deductions for
th e given pa y period ( see, e.g., § 226, subd. (a) , ite m (2 ) [“total
hours wor k ed”], item (4) [“all deductions”], item ( 6) [“t he
inclusive dates of the period for which the employee is paid”],
item (9) [ “ a ll appl ic able h ourly rates”]), and thus that a singl eWARD v. UNITED AIR LINES, IN C. Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J.

23 state’s law wil l govern what inf ormation must be furnished to the employee a bout wages earned over the course of that perio d. While Sullivan rais es the possibility that an employee’s substantive comp e n sa tion mi ght be governed by
differ ent states’ laws d ep ending on where and how much the employee worked during a given pay period, the wage
statement statute does not admit of th e same possibility. Th e statute does not appear to contemplate, for example, t ha t an

em ployee who works in 10 di fferent jurisdicti on s over the

cour se of a single pa y period should receive 10 different wage

s t atements , each prepared according to the laws o f a different

state. 6 Any work

- location

- based test for secti on 226 m ust

recon c ile the p ossibility that some employees may perform
th eir wor k in more than one jurisdiction with the legislative
desire for a si n gle statement documenting employee pay

. Base d on these considerations, United proposes we adopt

a “job situ s” test, borrowin g a phrase from federal case law interpretin g a provi si on of f ederal labor law. (See Oil Workers v. Mobil Oil Corp. (1976) 426 U. S . 407, 414 ( Oil Workers ) [under federal l abor l aw, “it is the employees’ predominant job
situs rath er t han a g eneral ized weig h ing of fa ctors or the place
of hiring” that determin es whethe r a state’s right

- to

- work law may apply].) Under this test, a juris d iction’s labor laws would apply to worker s wh o perform all or most of their work in the jurisdictio n

. This ma kes se nse for s e ction 226

, United says,
because the statute ’s primar y concern is with the general

6 N or does Ward propose such an int erpretation. T he plaintiffs in Oman v. Del t a Air Lines, Inc

. , supra ,

_ _ _ Cal .5th

__ _, do, however, a nd we address the ar gu me nt in that case.WARD v. UNITED AIR LINES, IN C. Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J.

24 regulation of the payment of employees within t h e context of an established employment re lati on ship, and “the center of [that] relationship is the job situs

, the pl ace where the work that is the very raiso n d’être of the relat io nship i s performed.” ( Oil Workers , at p. 417.)

W e agree with the basic p r emise of this argument : Application of s ecti on 226 logically depends on whether the employee’s pri ncip al pl ac e of w ork is in Californi a

. 7 T hat test
is certainly satisfied when th e em ployee spends the majority of his or her working hours in California. B ut this case demonstrates why that ans wer is on ly a partial one. These plaintiffs

, like many tr ansp ortat io n work ers, do no t perform
th e bulk of their work in any one state. 8 Un it ed a rgues that that is the end of the story; they are not entitled to the

p r otections of California wage statement law

. Bu t if every state were to adopt the same rule, the n ma ny tr an sporta tion

-

7 This a ligns section 226 with the many Labor Code provision s that by their terms reflect an overarching legislat ive concern with regulating work performed i n this state, as opposed to elsew here. (See, e.g. , Lab. Code, §§ 1173, 11 74, 1 19 3.5.)

8 Neither Tidewater nor Sullivan dealt with such a circumstance. In Ti dewater , we determined that the employees wo rked excl usively in California. ( Tidewater

, supra , 1 4 Cal.4th at pp. 578

– 579

. ) And i n Sulli van , altho ugh the employees worked in v ar ious states, for the speci fic period of time at issue under the laws in questi on

— days or weeks unde r the overtime laws

— the y worked entirely in California. ( Sullivan

, supra , 5 1 Cal.4th at p. 1196.) H er e, the releva nt time fr ame is a pay period, an d in eve ry pay period these emplo yees not only worked in many states, but also did not

wor k most of their time i n any single state

.WARD v. UNITED AIR LINES, IN C. Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J.

25 secto r employe es

— from interstate truck drivers to train
cond uc tors to the airline employees here

— would not be entitled to the protections of any state’s law : Effectively

, beca use these employees work in many jurisdictions, they
would rec eive th e prot ectio ns of none.

T h at conclusion would conflict with the approach w e
tr aditionally have taken to the employee protections of the
Labor Code. C alifornia’s wage and hour laws are rem edia l in nature and must be liberally construed in favor o f af fordi ng worke rs pr otect ion. ( D y namex Operations West, Inc. v. Superior Court (2 018) 4 Cal.5th 903, 953; Brinker Restaurant Corp. v. Superior Court

, supra , 53 Cal.4th at pp. 1026

– 1027; Murphy v. Ken neth Cole Productions, Inc. (2007) 40 Cal.4th 1094, 11 03.) But e qually impo rtant
, to den y section 226’s protections to interstate trans po rtat ion workers would conflict with what we know of the history preceding s e ction 226’s 1943

enactment (Stats. 194 3, c h. 10 27, § 1, p. 2965)

, which reveals
that this class of w orker s was th e ins pirat ion for t he new law
and its primary intended beneficiar y

. Sp ecifically, the history
shows t he measure was introduced at the behest o f railroad employees who, receiving ch ecks that showed only the net

amount they were paid, had n o wa y to ve rify w he the r thi s
amount was correct. (See, e.g., Sen. Gannon, author of Ass em. Bill No. 295 (1943 Reg. Sess.) letter to Gov ernor Earl Warren

, May 1 3, 1943, p. 1 (Gannon Letter ) [“A.B. 2 95 was in troduced by me at the request of thousands o f em p loyees of t he Sou thern
Paci fic Company”] ; James H. Anderson, Dining Car Employees
Lo ca l 582 and Credit Union Ltd.

, letter to Gov ernor Earl
Warren in support of Assem. Bill No. 295 ( 1943 Reg. Sess .)
Ma y 21, 1 943; Charles Els ey, The W estern Pacific Railroad Company

, le tter t o Gov ernor Earl Warren in opposition toWARD v. UNITED AIR LINES, IN C. Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J.

26 Assem. Bill No. 295 (1943 R eg. Sess.) May 18, 19 43.) The author of the bill represented that these wo r kers were amon g “t he comparatively few wo rking men in California” who did not already receive su ch statem en ts. ( Ganno n Let ter
, at p. 2.) This background suggests the Legislatur e inten ded to extend

sec tion 226’s protections

— within reason

— to workers who

p e rform at least som e of their work in C ali fornia , even if they do not perform all or most of thei r work in C alifo r nia

. T o de termine how far these protections e xt end , we return to the central insight that has long guid ed courts seeking to discern the geogra p hic scope of legislative ena ctme nts: that
the Legis lat ure ordinarily does not intend for its enact ments to

cr eate conf

li cts w i th oth er s overei gns. We can in fe r from this that the Legislature intended for section 22 6 to apply to workers whose work is not performed pr edominantly in a ny

o ne state , provi ded t hat California is the state that has the

most s ignificant relations hi p to t he wor k

. For interstate transp or tation workers and others who do not work more than
half the time in any one state, we conclude this principle will
be satisfied if th e wo rker perfo rms some work here and is
based in Califo rni a , meaning that California serves as the physical location wh e r e the worker present s himsel f or herself

to begin work

. This is not a new concept in labor law; this is, in fact, the same general test th at ha s bee n ap plied for s ome decad es in the field of un employment insuran ce, where the Legislature has pai d fo cuse d at tention to the probl em of coverage for employees whose work is not localized in any oneWARD v. UNITED AIR LINES, IN C. Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J.

27 state. (See Unemp. In s. Code, §§ 602

– 603.) 9 Applied t o sec tion 226, it m e ans that wor kers are covered i f they perform th e majority of their work in Califo rn ia ; bu t if they do not perform the majority of their work in any one state, they will be covered if they a re based for w ork purposes in California. This fami liar test supp l ies clari ty and certainty for employers and

emp loyees

, while also appropriately b al an c ing t he Legislature’s weigh ty interest in the protection of California workers

, including interstate t r ansportation w orkers, with similarly

9 More than half a century ago, to “ avoid conf lic t s and overlapping cov era g e betwee n State s w ith res pect to the

ser v ice of a si ngle individual for a single employer performed in two or more State s , ” the United St ates Department of Labor described a seri es of seq uential considerations for determining

an e m ployee’s place of wo rk f o r purpos es of u nemploymen t insuranc e coverage

. ( U.S . De pt. of Labor, Manual of State Employment Security Legislation (1950 ) p. C

– 12; see id. at
pp. 10

– 11.) Drawing on this guid ance, the Legislature adopted a test that reaches bo t h employees whose wo rk o c cu rs

exc lusivel y or prima rily in Ca lifornia an d t ho s e wh ose work is not localiz ed in any one state, but who do some work i n California a nd have their base of operations in the st ate. (Se e Unemp. Ins. Code, §§ 602

– 603.)
The test i dentifies additiona l con s id eratio ns to c onsult for employee s whose work is n o t lo calized in any state an d who have no base of operations. (Unemp. Ins. Code, § 6 02
, subd. (b).) Because plaintiffs here a ppear to have a base of operations in a state where t hey perform some of thei r w ork,

w e need not expres s any vie w as to whet her t h ese or other similar consid erations should be consulted to determine s ection 226’s a pplication for employees who are neither l ocalized nor have any established base of operations in any state

.WARD v. UNITED AIR LINES, IN C. Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J.

28 weighty co nside rati ons of int e rstate co mit y and avoidance of
conflicts of laws

. 10

C.
In adopting this approach, w e r eje ct se veral alternative

a pproaches proposed by the parties. First, United suggests our interpretatio n of section 2 26 should take into account the fa ct that plaintiffs p erform most of their work in a irspace subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of t he f e der al go vernment. (See 49 U.S.C. § 40103(a) [“The United States Government has exclusive sovereignty o f airspace of the United States”].)
United’s ar gum ent relies heav il y on Oi l Wo rkers

, supra , 426
U .S. 407, which interpreted a federal labor law aut ho ri z ing

un io n or agency shops but allow ing individual states to enact “right

- to

- work” laws prohibiting such shops

. The s pecific question in Oil Workers co nce rned how this l aw should app ly to employees who spent the majority of their time on oil tankers

o n th e hi gh se as. ( Id. at p. 420

. ) There, applying the “job situs” test, the high court concluded no state “ right

- to

- work ”
law applied, and the a uthority t o e nter an agency sh op
agre eme nt was instead gover ned exclusively by federal law

. ( Id. at pp. 420

– 4 21 .) Un ite d argues that here, t oo, no state wage statement law should apply to workers who spend the majori t y of their ti me in federally regulated airspace

, and the

10 Co nsist e nt with our sta tute

- by

- st atute app roach to det erm in i ng t he scope of employment protections ( Sullivan

, supra , 51 Cal.4th at p. 1201), wha t we say is specific to section 226 and wo uld not n ecessarily apply to the state’s minimum
wag e , e qual pay , or anti har a s sment laws

, for e xa mple

.WARD v. UNITED AIR LINES, IN C. Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J.

29 matter s ho uld ins tea d be left to federal law (which currently imposes no wage statement re qu ir e men ts)

. But this case diffe rs from Oil Workers because th at case concerned the proper interpretation of a federal law that
evinced the federal governme nt ’s i ndependent i nt erest i n

r egulating the subjec t of the employment law at issue. ( Oil
Workers

, s up ra , 42 6 U .S . at pp. 420

– 421

. ) There was no particular reason to conclude Congress would have been averse

t o a test that created a n occasional state law v acuu m , for in its
ab sence, f

ederal law would conti nue to apply . Here, in
contrast, we have reason t o be l iev e t he Legislature would have
been concerned about providing no protection to employees
who work in C a lifornia, wit h whom Cal ifornia has the most sig nifi cant relations hi p to th e employee’s work, and for whom no other law would otherwise apply

. And un li k e i n O il
Workers , which inv olved the potential application of state law concerning union shop agreement s , a matter al so regulated under federal law (s e e 2 9 U.S.C. § 164( b) ; Oil W orkers , at

p. 409), Con gress has not seen fit to enter the area of wage

s ta te m ent re gu lation.
Implicit in United’s argument is the idea that the federal government’s interests, too, should factor into our consideration of which j uri sdiction has th e most si gnificant
connection to the employment relationship for purposes of apply in g s ect ion 2 26
, at l east when i t comes to interstate transportation workers who perform most of their work i n the
air ins tead of on the ground . But as th e Le gislature that

en acted t he statute undoubtedly understood, in our system of federalism, federal l aw a n d s tat e law ordinarily coex ist . When the two overlap, tensions between them are resolved not by
inters t ate comity an d choice of law principles but by theWARD v. UNITED AIR LINES, IN C. Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J.

30 supremacy clau se and pr eemption principles . I f the federal government prefers that no state law o n a pa rti cu lar subject apply t o workers who spend their time primarily in federal airspace, it can legisla t e and preempt

. But i n the absence of any f eder al action, we have n o re aso n to think applying
Cal ifornia law would encroach on federal prerogatives

, no r an y

r ea son rooted in consi derations of comity to conclude the Legislature would have preferred that wo r kers based in California go unprotected by sect ion 226

. Ward , for h is p art
, contend s that section 226 should apply to employees who perform signifi ca nt wor k i n California
and are “ headquartered ” here. But Ward also relies on a federal case, Bernstein v. V irgin America , Inc. (N.D.Cal. 2017)
227 F.S upp. 3d 1049, to argue th at t hre e additio nal factors
sh ould play a role: where the employee resides

, pay s ta x es,

an d receives wage payme nt s. Bernstein adopted this multifactor test based on its reading of Sulliv a n , supra , 51 Cal.4th 1191. It inferred fro m Su llivan that in dec id ing
whe ther a state labor prot ection applies, a court should consider, inter ali a, w h ere wo rk was performed, whe re pay was received, where the employer and employee resided, and
whether wo r k outside the state was of a temporary natu re. ( Bern stein , at p. 1 060. ) Sullivan , however, did not establish an
all

- purpose multifactor test of t hi s s ort

. It considered only “w hether California’s overtime law applies to work performed here by nonreside n ts” ( Sullivan , at p. 1196, italics added) and

a nswer ed that ques tio n b y ca refully construing the specific statute at issue and determining whether th at sta tut e should apply to th e plaintiffs’ work ( id. at pp. 1197

– 1198), rejecting any inference that the c o nclusion it reached should extend toWARD v. UNITED AIR LINES, IN C. Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J.

31 other sta t utes ( id. at p. 1 201 ), each of which would require their own statutory analyses.
Under section 226, we d e cli ne to place weight on t he
three additional factors

— residence, receipt of wages, and payment of taxes

— Ward propose s. To begin with, the extra
f acto r s he cites beyond re sid ence are entirely derivativ e of the underlying fact of residence: “ The Calif or ni a [e mpl oy ees’] receipt of w ages and wage statements in California is simply a consequence of the [employ e es’] Califor nia residency if their

wage s t atem e nts are mailed to th eir mai ling addresses in
Calif ornia. Similarly, California [employees’] payment o f
C ali for ni a income taxes .

. . is also a result of the [employees’] California residency.” ( Shook v. Ind i an River Tra nsport Co. (E.D.Cal. 2017) 23 6 F.S u pp.3d 1165, 1172. )

N or is r esidence alone signific ant. We have already established that being a non re si d ent do es not exclude an

em ployee from the state’s labor protections, as the employer in
Sullivan

, supra , 51 Cal.4th 1191, had argued. We looked f or i n struction to Labo r C ode sec tion 1171 .5, subdivisio n (a), which guarantees that “[a]ll protections, r ig ht s , a nd re medies
available u nder state law, except any reinstatement remedy prohibited by federal law, ar e available t o all individuals regardless o f im m igration status w ho hav e ap plied for employment, o r who are or who have been employed, in this

state .” W e a ckn ow ledged that the pr ovision had been adopted “to protect undocumented workers from sharp practice s .” ( Sulliva n , at p. 1197, fn. 3.) We re j ecte d , however, the
in fer enc e th at the Legislature soug ht only to protect
undocumented workers from outsi de t h e U nit ed States:

“ Section 1171.5 .

. . cannot reasonably be read as speaking only
to undocumented work e rs, given th at it was drafted andWARD v. UNITED AIR LINES, IN C. Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J.

32 codifie d as a general preamble to th e wa ge law and broadly
refe rs to ‘all individuals’ employed in the state. ( I d.

, s ubd . ( a) .) More important ly, no reason exists to believe the Legislature intended to afford stronger p r otection und er the employment laws to per s ons w orking illegally tha n t o le gal nonresident
workers .” ( Sullivan , at p. 1197, fn. 3.) We interpreted s ec t ion

11 71 .5 as expressing a n intent to afford all those working in California the benefit of the state’s worker prote ctions, without regard to resi denc e

. The proposition Wa rd argu es here

— residence shoul d impl y protection

— is the inverse of the propositi on t h e

e mpl oy er advanced and w e rejected in Sullivan

, supra , 51 Cal.4th 1191 (that nonresidence implies nonp r otection). Just
as Labor Code secti on 1 171. 5 w eighs against f indin g

nonre sidence disqualifying f or purposes of applying state labor protections, i t al s o w eig hs against finding residence to be the sine qua non for purposes of applying those protections. T he Legisla ture expressed a clear int ent not to have the
availa bilit y of la bor protections turn on legal residency in the

state. And i f w e we r e t o r ead section 1171.5 more narrowly as extending California law without regard to residence for those working i nside the state

, while not spe akin g to the rele vance of

r e sidenc e for those li ving here but who work primarily out of state, we would sti ll n e ed to find some basis fo r concluding the Legislature intended to extend section 226 to the latter

ca tegory of emp l oyees

. A p plicat ion of section 226 to those who work primaril y outsi de the state, based only on thei r ch oice to
reside her e , would create overlap and poten ti al c o n flict

- o f

- laws
concerns when California law and the law of the state in which the employee pr i marily work ed differed . The test we a pply
i nst ead, limiting a California emp loyment statute’s scope toWARD v. UNITED AIR LINES, IN C. Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J.

33 circumstances in whic h Califo rnia’s relationshi p to the w o rk is more significant than any other state’s, avoids such concerns.

Ward’s pr oposed appl ica t ion of sect ion 226 based on
residence would als o cr eate significant complicat ions for some

out

- of

- state employers. For examp le , the statute requires t hat “a cop y of the [wage] statement and the record of the deductions shall be kept on fi le by the emp loy e r for at le ast thr ee years at the pla ce of e mpl oyme nt or at a central locatio n within the State of California .” (§ 226, subd

. (a), i talics added.)
Th e requirem e nt that records be maintained within California, and hence within the geograp hi c area over wh i ch the
D epartm ent of L abor S tandards E nforc e men t an d other state agencies hav e jurisdiction, doubtless is intended to facilit at e inve stigation and enforcement of compliance. 11 For a busine ss that operates, for instance, only in Stateline, N evada, this

wou l d require th e es tablishment of a separate re cor ds d epot in California if, for reasons beyond the employer’s control, one or

m or e empl oyees elected to reside in t h e immediately adjacent
Cit y of South Lake Tahoe, on the California side of th e same

commun ity

. If an empl oyee principally works in and is ba sed

11 This language was add e d in 1 987. (Stats. 1987, ch. 976, § 1, p. 32 66.) It mirrors similar language that has appeared in th e IWC’s wage orders since 1968. (S ee, e.g., IWC wage order No. 9

– 68, § 7(c); W age Order No. 9, § 7(C). ) Explaini n g the

re quirem ent, the IWC has said, “ Wit h re gard to the meaning of ‘central’ loca tion, the [IWC] will allow required records t o be kept to gether at any single locatio n within California, provided that they are availab l e to the Division [of Lab o r Standard s Enfor ce ment]. Enforcement experien c e ha s pr oved this requirement to be necessary .” (IWC 1976 Statement of Findings, supra , p

. 12.)WARD v. UNITED AIR LINES, IN C. Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J.

34 out of Nevada

, and only in cidentally works in California,
Nevada law governing wage statements s ho uld ap ply

re g ardless of whether the employee chooses to live across the
border in Cal iforn ia, receive pay h ere, a nd pay taxes here. On
the o ther hand, if an employee prin cipal ly works in California

out of headquarters here

, with some incidental work in
Ne vada, sectio n 226 should apply, notwithstanding that the empl oyee may elect to live i n Nev ada. We decline Ward’s invitation to make employee s’ r esiden ce a fo cus of the te st fo r determ ining whether an em ployer must furnish wage statements that comply wit h Califo rnia l a w. Finally, Ward proposes section 226 should app ly

, whether or not an em ploye e works principa l ly in California, so long as the “ cond uct wh ich giv es rise to li abili ty .

. . occurs in
Californ ia.” ( Diamond Multimedia Systems, Inc. v. Superior
C ourt , supra , 19 Cal.4th at p. 1059.) Ward asserts that the

c onduct supporting liabil ity u nder section 226 is the issuance of a noncompliant wage state men t
, a nd that for t he pl aintiff
classes this occurr ed in California.

There are two difficulties with t hi s argu ment. First, Ward supplies no citation, and upon our i ndependent review
we dis cern nothing in the r e cord, to support the assertion th at
Un ited, a c orpo ration incorp orate d and he adquartered
elsewhe re, prepares and issues wage statements in Californ ia (as o pposed to such statements simply being received here by employees who may resid e her e). Second, a t e st bas ed on the
location of the c onduc t givi ng rise to liability is h opelessl y indeterminate whe n applied to section 226 and similar wage
and hour pr otecti ons. I s liability based on preparation of a noncomplia nt statement
, in S tate X , whe re an employer m a y hous e its payroll department ? Is it in St ate Y, where theWARD v. UNITED AIR LINES, IN C. Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J.

35 sta tement is rec eived ? Or is it in State Z, where corporate headquarters are located an d the decisi o n as to the statement’s
contents is made? For c laims that arise from al leged ly inadequate wa g e paym ents, does the conduct supp lying
liabi lit y oc cur w here dec isions are ma de, where payments are issued, or where payments are received, e.g., w he rever an

emp l oyee may have a bank account for direct deposit purposes?
L ooking to th e l oc at ion where the c onduct supporting liability

occur red d oes no t p rovi de a workable test in this context.
Instead, to determine whether section 226 applies , courts should consider i n the fi rs t inst ance whether the employee
works the majority of th e tim e in C alifornia

, or in another

state . For employees , like those he re, who do n ot wo rk pri ncipal ly i n any one state, a court should consider

s econdarily whether the employee has a defi n ite base o f

oper ations in California, in addition to performing at leas t

some work in the sta t e for the employer

. Thus, if a pilot or
fli gh t att endant has a designate d ho m e

- base airpo rt, section
22 6 would apply if that airport is in California

, and not i f it is
elsewhere. The re ma ining factors mentioned in the Ninth
C ircuit’s que stion

— emplo yer l o cation, employee residence, receipt of pay, an d pay ment of taxes

— are not pert i nent.

IV.

We answer the Ni nth Circuit’s questions as follo ws: (1) The Railway Labor Act exemption in Wage Ord er No. 9 , section 1(E), does not bar a w age statemen t claim
bro ught u nder section 226 by an employee who is cover ed by a collective bargaining agr e ement. (2) S ection 226 app lies to wage statements provided by an employer if the em p loyee ’ s principal place of work is inWARD v. UNITED AIR LINES, IN C. Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J.

36 Cal ifornia

. This test is satisfied if the employee wor k s a majority of the time in California or, f or inte rstate transportation workers whose work is not primarily performed in any single state, if the wor ker has his or her base of work

o perations in California

. KRUGE R , J.

We Concur:
CANTIL

- SAKAUY E , C. J. CHIN, J. CORRIG A N , J. LIU, J. CU É LLAR, J. GROBAN , J.See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court.

Name of Opinion Ward v. United Airlines, Inc.

______________________________________________________ _ ___________________________ Unpublished Opinion Original Appeal Original Proceeding XXX on request pursuant to rule 8.548, Cal. Rules of Court Review Granted Rehearing Granted

______________________ ______________________________________________________ _ _____ Opinion No. S 24 8702 Date Filed: June 29, 2020

__________________________________________________________________________________
Court: County: Judge:

__________________________________________________________________________________
C o unsel:

Jackson Hanson, Jeffrey C. Jackson, Kirk D. Hanson; Esner, Chang & Boyer

, Stuart B. Esner and Joseph S. Persoff for Plaintiffs and Appellants.

Mastagni Holstedt, David E. Mastagni and Isaac S. Stevens for Dan Goldthorpe, James Donovan, Chris Benn e tt, James Isherwood and David Vincent as Amici Curiae on behalf of Plaintiff s and Appellants.

O’Melveny & Myers, Robert Siegel, Adam P. Koh S weeney and Susannah K. Howard for Defendant and Respondent.

Jones Day, Douglas W. Hall, Shay Dvoretzky and Vivek S uri for Airlines for America as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Defendant and Respondent.Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publicatio n with opinion):

Stuar t B. Esner Esner, Chang & Boyer 234 East Colorado Blvd., Suite 975 Pasa d ena, CA 91101 (626) 535

- 9860

Kirk D. Hanson Jackson Hanson, LLP 2790 Truxton Rd., Suite 140 San Diego, CA 92106 (619) 523

- 9001

Adam P. KohSweeney O’Melveny & Myers LLP 2 Embarcadero Center

, 2 8th Floor San Francisco, CA 94111

- 3823 (415) 984

- 8700