Filed 2/16/21

CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SEVEN

HARRY ROUSSOS et al.,

Plaintiffs and 

Respondents,

v.

THEODOSIOS ROUSSOS,

Defendant and Appellant.

 B293358

 (Los Angeles County

 Super. Ct. No. BS170767)

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los

Angeles County, Gregory W. Alarcon, Judge. Reversed and 

remanded with directions.

Nossaman, Jennifer L. Meeker and Maya G. Hamouie for 

Defendant and Appellant.

RMO, Scott E. Rahn, Sean D. Muntz and David G. Greco 

for Theocharis Roussos as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Defendant 

and Appellant.

Kesselman Brantly Stockinger, S.V. Stuart Johnson and 

Ryan Davis for Plaintiffs and Respondents.

Theodosios (Ted) Roussos appeals from a judgment 

confirming an arbitration award removing the managing director
2

of two corporations, owned by Ted and his brother Harry Roussos

as cotrustees of two trusts, and appointing the director proposed

by Harry.

1 Ted contends the arbitration award must be vacated 

because of the arbitrator’s refusal to recuse himself after Ted 

timely served his disqualification notice. Harry contends Ted 

waived his right to object to the arbitrator because five years 

earlier the parties had agreed the specified arbitrator would have

binding authority to arbitrate all issues. However, the arbitrator 

was still a “proposed neutral arbitrator” for the present 

arbitration under Code of Civil Procedure sections 1281.9 and 

1281.91,2 and under section 1281.91, subdivision (b)(1), the 

arbitrator was required to disqualify himself upon Ted’s timely 

service of a notice of disqualification. We conclude the parties 

cannot contract away California’s statutory protections for 

parties to an arbitration, including mandatory disqualification of 

a proposed arbitrator upon a timely demand. We reverse and 

remand.

3

1 Because the Roussos family members share the same last 

name, we refer to them by their first names to avoid confusion.

2 Further statutory references are to the Code of Civil 

Procedure.

3 Ted also contends on appeal the arbitration agreement, 

entered in 2012, did not cover the parties’ 2016 disputes; the 

signatures on the arbitration agreement were not properly 

authenticated; and Harry and his wife Christine Roussos failed to 

join indispensable parties. Because we reverse based on the 

required disqualification of the arbitrator, we do not address the

other issues.
3

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A. The Trusts and Business Entities

Harry and Ted are brothers and cotrustees of the S.M.B. 

Investor Associates Irrevocable Trust (SMB Trust) and the O.F. 

Management Irrevocable Trust (OF Trust). As cotrustees of the 

two trusts, Harry and Ted had management roles and financial 

interests in multiple interrelated companies (the Roussos 

entities). As cotrustees of the SMB Trust, Harry and Ted held 

ownership interests in Dazum Limited (Dazum), Velnor Overseas 

Ltd. (Velnor), S.M.B. Management, Inc. (SMB Management), and 

S.M.B. Investor Associates, L.P. (SMB LP). As cotrustees of the 

OF Trust, they held ownership interests in Fenbe, Ltd. (Fenbe), 

Kelroad International, Inc. (Kelroad), Liro, Inc. (Liro), and O.F. 

Enterprises Ltd., L.P. (OF LP). In 2017 OF LP owned two

apartment buildings on Abbot Kinney Boulevard and Paloma 

Avenue in Venice and a third apartment building in Colton. Liro 

owned a vacant lot on Abbot Kinney Boulevard and an apartment 

building on Ocean Front Walk in Venice.

B. Harry and Christine’s Demand for Arbitration and Motion 

To Compel Arbitration

On August 31, 2017 Harry and his wife Christine Roussos

demanded arbitration pursuant to a December 2012 arbitration 

agreement signed by Christine, Harry (individually and on behalf 

of OF LP and SMB LP), Ted (individually and on behalf of OF LP 

and SMB LP), and two individuals signing on behalf of Liro, 

Kelroad, Fenbe, Dazum, Velnor, and SMB Management. The 

arbitration agreement provided the parties “stipulate and agree 

not to contest that Judge John P. Shook will arbitrate all issues 
4

with binding authority” over them. In their arbitration demand, 

Harry and Christine requested the appointment of a single 

director for Velnor, Dazum, Kelroad and Fenbe; a stay of any

distribution of cash or sale of assets held by Liro, OF LP, and 

SMB Management; and an order requiring Sarah Daly, the

director of Liro and SMB Management, to keep Harry, Ted, and 

other Roussos entities informed as to the business operations of 

Liro, SMB Management, SMB LP, and OF LP. According to the 

demand, the arbitrator (Judge Shook) had previously appointed 

Daly to serve as the director of SMB Management and Liro, but 

he did not appoint a director for Velnor, Dazum, Kelroad, or 

Fenbe. The demand also alleged Daly was acting inappropriately 

with respect to her role as director of SMB Management and Liro.

Harry and Christine’s demand for arbitration followed a prior 

arbitration in which the arbitrator ordered partition by sale of six 

properties held by OF LP, SMB LP, and Liro (the first

arbitration).

4

On September 8, 2017 Harry and Christine filed a petition 

to compel arbitration naming Ted, SMB LP, OF LP, SMB 

Management, and Liro as respondents after they objected to the 

arbitrator’s jurisdiction to resolve the dispute.

5 On October 6 

Harry and Christine filed a motion to compel arbitration, which 

the trial court granted on March 5, 2018. The trial court ordered 

the parties to “arbitrate the controversies between them, 

4 The first arbitration is the subject of Ted’s appeal in 

Roussos v. Roussos (Feb. 2, 2021, B293356) (nonpub. opn.).

5 Harry and Christine later dismissed SMB LP and OF LP 

from the petition.
5

including the entire Petition scope, in accordance with their 

agreement to arbitrate.”

C. The Arbitrator’s Disclosure and Ted’s Notice of 

Disqualification

On March 13, 2018 Judge Shook served on the parties a 

disclosure report that disclosed two matters in which he had

served as an arbitrator: (1) a March 2016 matter involving Ted, 

Harry, Christine, and the Roussos entities; and (2) the first 

arbitration involving Harry, Christine, and Ted resulting in a

September 2016 arbitration award. The cover letter to counsel

stated, “[D]isclosures are being made for the prior sixty months 

pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure Sections 1281.6 and 1281.9.” 

The disclosure also provided, “To further comply with CCP 

section 1281.85 as adopted by the Judicial Council of California 

and effective as of July 1, 2002 ARC [(Alternative Resolution 

Centers)] makes the following disclosure: If selected as a neutral 

arbitrator the Arbitrator selected in the instant matter will 

entertain and accept offers of permitted employment or new 

professional relationships from parties, attorneys, or law firms 

involved in a case while this case is pending. ARC will entertain 

offers of permitted employment or new professional 

relationships—for example, as a neutral arbitrator or mediator—

from parties or attorneys involved in this case while this case is 

pending.” The letter concluded, “[I]t is the position of ARC that 

the foregoing constitutes a complete and thorough disclosure. 

Proceeding to hearing in this matter shall be deemed 

acknowledgment of said disclosures and your acceptance of the 

arbitrator.”
6

On March 22, 2018 Ted served a notice of disqualification 

of Judge Shook as the arbitrator based on the disclosure report

pursuant to section 1281.91, subdivision (b). Ted asserted the 

arbitrator’s prior rulings and awards, as well as his relationships 

with Ted’s prior attorney and Harry and Christine’s attorney,

could affect the arbitrator’s neutrality. The arbitrator denied 

Ted’s disqualification request.

D. The Arbitration Award

As part of the 2018 arbitration, Harry and Christine moved 

to remove and replace Daly as the director of SMB Management

and Liro. The arbitrator had appointed Daly on June 6, 2016 to 

serve as director of SMB Management and Liro upon Ted’s 

nomination, but at the time of the 2018 arbitration both Harry 

and Ted sought her removal and replacement. After a hearing, 

on March 30, 2018 the arbitrator revoked his prior appointment 

of Daly and removed her from her position as director of SMB 

Management and Liro. The arbitrator set an evidentiary hearing 

to consider Harry’s and Ted’s nominations of individuals to serve 

as the director of the Roussos entities.

After a hearing, on May 18, 2018 the arbitrator in his final 

amended award appointed David Kaplan, Harry’s choice of 

director, as the acting director for all of the Roussos entities.

E. The Trial Court’s Confirmation of the Arbitration Award

On June 6, 2018 Harry and Christine filed a petition and 

motion to confirm the amended arbitration award. On June 18 

Ted filed an answer to the petition, requesting the trial court 

vacate the award. Ted also filed an opposition to the motion to 

confirm the amended arbitration award. Ted contended the 
7

award must be vacated because the arbitrator failed to disqualify 

himself upon timely receipt of Ted’s notice of disqualification. 

Ted also argued Harry and Christine had not authenticated the 

arbitration agreement because Harry’s declaration did not aver 

he saw an authorized agent of the Roussos entities sign the 

arbitration agreement; the arbitration agreement only covered 

the issues in dispute in 2012, not the present dispute; the 

arbitrator exceeded his powers by issuing an award that went

beyond the arbitration demand (removal of Daly); and the award 

was void because the two trusts were not joined as indispensable 

parties.

On August 1, 2018 the trial court granted Harry and 

Christine’s motion to confirm the amended arbitration award. 

On August 31 the court entered judgment confirming the 

amended arbitration award and ordering Ted to pay Harry and 

Christine $51,289.85 in attorneys’ fees incurred to confirm the 

award. Ted timely appealed.

DISCUSSION

A. The Disclosure and Disqualification Requirements of the 

Arbitration Act and Ethics Standards for Neutral 

Arbitrators

“The California Arbitration Act (§ 1280 et seq.) ‘represents 

a comprehensive statutory scheme regulating private arbitration 

in this state.’” (Haworth v. Superior Court (2010) 50 Cal.4th 372, 

380; accord, Moncharsh v. Heily & Blase (1992) 3 Cal.4th 1, 9.)

“In 2001 the Legislature ‘significantly revised the disclosure 

requirements and procedures for disqualifying arbitrators 

pursuant to private or contractual arbitration’ and directed the 
8

Judicial Council to adopt ethical standards for neutral 

arbitrators. [Citations.] ‘The 2001 legislation arose out of a 

perceived lack of rigorous ethical standards in the private 

arbitration industry. Cosponsored by the Governor and the 

Judicial Council, the bill sought to provide “basic measures of 

consumer protection with respect to private arbitration, such as 

minimum ethical standards and remedies for the arbitrator’s 

failure to comply with existing disclosure requirements.”’” 

(Honeycutt v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A. (2018) 25 Cal.App.5th 

909, 921, fn. omitted (Honeycutt); accord, Azteca Construction, 

Inc. v. ADR Consulting, Inc. (2004) 121 Cal.App.4th 1156, 1162, 

1165 (Azteca).)

“The statutory scheme, in seeking to ensure that a neutral 

arbitrator serves as an impartial decision maker, requires the 

arbitrator to disclose to the parties any grounds for 

disqualification. Within 10 days of receiving notice of his or her 

nomination to serve as a neutral arbitrator, the proposed 

arbitrator is required, generally, to ‘disclose all matters that 

could cause a person aware of the facts to reasonably entertain a 

doubt that the proposed neutral arbitrator would be able to be 

impartial.’ (§ 1281.9, subd. (a).)”

6 (Haworth v. Superior Court, 

6 Section 1281.9, subdivision (a), provides in pertinent part, 

“In any arbitration pursuant to an arbitration agreement, when a 

person is to serve as a neutral arbitrator, the proposed neutral 

arbitrator shall disclose all matters that could cause a person 

aware of the facts to reasonably entertain a doubt that the 

proposed neutral arbitrator would be able to be impartial, 

including all of the following: [¶] (1) The existence of any 

ground specified in Section 170.1 for disqualification of a 

judge. . . . [¶] (2) Any matters required to be disclosed by the 
9

supra, 50 Cal.4th at p. 381, fn. omitted; accord, Gray v. Chiu 

(2013) 212 Cal.App.4th 1355, 1361.)

Section 1281.91, subdivision (b), provides, “(1) If the 

proposed neutral arbitrator complies with Section 1281.9, the 

proposed neutral arbitrator shall be disqualified on the basis of 

the disclosure statement after any party entitled to receive the 

disclosure serves a notice of disqualification within 15 calendar 

days after service of the disclosure statement. [¶] (2) A party 

shall have the right to disqualify one court-appointed arbitrator 

without cause in any single arbitration, and may petition the 

court to disqualify a subsequent appointee only upon a showing of 

cause.” As the Court of Appeal explained in Azteca, supra,

121 Cal.App.4th at page 1163, the disqualification provision 

“confers on both parties the unqualified right to remove a 

proposed arbitrator based on any disclosure required by law 

which could affect his or her neutrality. [Citation.] There is no 

good faith or good cause requirement for the exercise of this right, 

nor is there a limit on the number of proposed neutrals who may 

be disqualified in this manner. [Citation.] As long as the 

objection is based on a required disclosure, a party’s right to 

remove the proposed neutral by giving timely notice is absolute.” 

(Fn. omitted; accord, Luce, Forward, Hamilton & Scripps, LLP v. 

ethics standards for neutral arbitrators adopted by the Judicial 

Council pursuant to this chapter. . . . [¶] . . . [¶] (4) The names 

of the parties to all prior or pending noncollective bargaining 

cases involving any party to the arbitration or lawyer for a party 

for which the proposed neutral arbitrator served or is serving as 

neutral arbitrator, and the results of each case arbitrated to 

conclusion, including the date of the arbitration award, 

identification of the prevailing party, the names of the parties’ 

attorneys and the amount of monetary damages awarded, if any.”
10

Koch (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 720, 729 (Luce).) “[A party’s]

demand for disqualification of a proposed neutral arbitrator 

therefore ha[s] the same practical effect as a timely peremptory 

challenge to a superior court judge under section 170.6—

disqualification is automatic, the disqualified judge loses 

jurisdiction over the case and any subsequent orders or 

judgments made by him or her are void.” (Azteca, at pp. 1169-

1170.) However, “disqualification based on a disclosure is an 

absolute right only when the disclosure is legally required.” 

(Luce, at p. 735.)

Neutral arbitrators (proposed or serving) are also required 

to comply with the ethics standards for neutral arbitrators 

adopted by the Judicial Council. (§ 1281.85, subdivision (a); see 

Cal. Ethics Standards for Neutral Arbitrators in Contractual 

Arbitration (Ethics Standards).) Further, section 1281.85, 

subdivision (c), provides that “[t]he ethics requirements and 

standards of this chapter are nonnegotiable and shall not be 

waived.” The Judicial Council adopted the ethics standards in 

2002, explaining the purpose of the standards: “For arbitration 

to be effective there must be broad public confidence in the 

integrity and fairness of the process. Arbitrators are responsible 

to the parties, the other participants, and the public for 

conducting themselves in accordance with these standards so as 

to merit that confidence.” (Ethics Standards, std. 1(b).) Standard 

2(a)(1)(A) and (B) clarifies that the standards apply to arbitrators 

selected by the parties or appointed by the court.

Ethics Standards, standard 7(d) requires a “proposed 

arbitrator or arbitrator” to “disclose all matters that could cause 

a person aware of the facts to reasonably entertain a doubt that 

the arbitrator would be able to be impartial.” Standard 7(d) 
11

includes as examples of required disclosures a family, “significant 

personal,” or attorney-client relationship with a party or lawyer

in the arbitration; a financial or other interest in the outcome of 

the arbitration; prior service as an arbitrator for a party or 

lawyer; and knowledge of “disputed evidentiary facts concerning 

the proceeding.” (Std. 7(d)(2)-(4), (7), (11)-(13).) Standard 7(e) 

requires the arbitrator to disclose other matters relating to 

professional discipline and the arbitrator’s inability to conduct 

and complete the arbitration in a timely manner.

Although the mandatory disqualification provisions of 

section 1281.91, subdivision (b)(1), apply only to a “proposed 

neutral arbitrator,” any neutral arbitrator (proposed or serving) 

“shall disqualify himself or herself upon the demand of any party 

made before the conclusion of the arbitration proceeding” if any 

ground for disqualification in section 170.1 exists. (§ 1281.91, 

subd. (d).) Section 170.1, in turn, provides specific grounds for 

disqualification for a judge (and thus an arbitrator), including

personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts concerning the 

proceeding, specified relationships with parties or lawyers in the 

proceeding, or a financial interest in the subject matter of the 

proceeding. (§ 170.1, subd. (a)(1)(A), (3)(A), (4)-(5).) Further, 

section 170.1, subdivision (a)(6)(A), provides for disqualification if 

“(i) The judge believes his or her recusal would further the 

interests of justice. [¶] (ii) The judge believes there is a 

substantial doubt as to his or her capacity to be impartial. [¶] 

[Or,] (iii) A person aware of the facts might reasonably entertain 

a doubt that the judge would be able to be impartial.” The trial 

court must vacate an arbitration award if the arbitrator “was 

subject to disqualification upon grounds specified in Section 

1281.91 but failed upon receipt of timely demand to disqualify 
12

himself or herself as required by that provision.” (§ 1286.2, subd. 

(a)(6)(B).) “‘On its face, the statute leaves no room for discretion. 

If a statutory ground for vacating the award exists, the trial court 

must vacate the award.’” (Honeycutt, supra, 25 Cal.App.5th at

pp. 924-925; accord, Luce, supra, 162 Cal.App.4th at p. 730.)

B. Standard of Review

“‘“On appeal from an order confirming an arbitration 

award, we review the trial court’s order (not the arbitration 

award) under a de novo standard. [Citations.] To the extent that 

the trial court’s ruling rests upon a determination of disputed 

factual issues, we apply the substantial evidence test to those 

issues.”’” (ECC Capital Corp. v. Manatt, Phelps & Phillips, LLP

(2017) 9 Cal.App.5th 885, 900; accord, Douglass v. Serenivision, 

Inc. (2018) 20 Cal.App.5th 376, 386; see Haworth v. Superior 

Court, supra, 50 Cal.4th at p. 383 [reviewing de novo whether 

trial court properly vacated arbitration award based on 

arbitrator’s failure to disclose certain circumstances].) We also 

review de novo “legal issue[s] involving statutory construction 

and the ascertainment of legislative intent.” (Azteca, supra,

121 Cal.App.4th at p. 1164.)

C. The Award Must Be Vacated Based on the Arbitrator’s 

Failure To Disqualify Himself Upon Ted’s Timely Demand

As discussed, on March 13, 2018 Judge Shook disclosed two 

arbitrations in March and September 2016 involving the parties 

and their lawyers in which Judge Shook was the neutral 

arbitrator, pursuant to section 1281.9, subdivision (a). Ted 

timely served his notice of disqualification based on the 

disclosures on March 22, 2018—nine days after service of the 
13

disclosure report. Harry and Christine contend in their 

supplemental briefing7 that Judge Shook was not required to 

make disclosures under section 1281.9, subdivision (a), and Ted 

did not have a right to disqualify Judge Shook under section 

1281.91, subdivision (b)(1), because both provisions apply only to 

a “proposed neutral arbitrator.” Harry and Christine assert 

Judge Shook was the appointed arbitrator, not a “proposed” 

arbitrator because the parties had agreed in their 2012 

arbitration agreement that Judge Shook would arbitrate “all 

issues” arising among the parties. Ted responds that even 

though the parties agreed in 2012 that Judge Shook would serve 

as the arbitrator and he had presided over the first arbitration, 

he still was “proposed” for purposes of this arbitration because he 

could have declined the engagement or become unavailable, or 

matters could have arisen since the initial agreement that would 

have affected his impartiality.

We agree with Ted that Judge Shook was a “proposed 

neutral arbitrator” subject to the disclosure and disqualification 

requirements of sections 1281.9 and 1281.91. As the cover letter 

to his disclosure report made clear, the disclosures were made to 

the parties to confirm their acceptance of Judge Shook as the 

arbitrator. The letter provided, for example, that Judge Shook 

would entertain and accept offers of employment with the parties 

and attorneys while the arbitration was pending “[i]f selected as 

a neutral arbitrator.” Similarly, the letter concluded that if the 

parties proceeded to the scheduled hearing, that would “be 

7 On January 8, 2021 we requested the parties provide 

supplemental briefing on whether Judge Shook was a “proposed 

neutral arbitrator” pursuant to section 1281.91, subdivision 

(b)(1). The parties filed supplemental briefs on January 18.
14

deemed acknowledgment of . . . your acceptance of the 

arbitrator.”

As the proposed neutral arbitrator, Judge Shook was 

legally required to make the disclosures set forth in his disclosure 

report, and Ted had an absolute right to disqualify him without 

cause. (Luce, supra, 162 Cal.App.4th at p. 735; Azteca, supra,

121 Cal.App.4th at p. 1163; see § 1281.91, subd. (b)(1).) But 

despite Ted’s notice of disqualification, the arbitrator refused to 

disqualify himself. The trial court was therefore required to 

vacate the award under section 1286.2, subdivision (a)(6)(B),

because the arbitrator “was subject to disqualification upon 

grounds specified in Section 1281.91, but failed upon receipt of 

timely demand to disqualify himself or herself as required by that 

provision.”

Harry and Christine contend the trial court properly 

confirmed the arbitration award because Ted stipulated in the 

arbitration agreement for Judge Shook to serve as the arbitrator 

and “not to contest that Judge John P. Shook will arbitrate all 

issues with binding authority,” so Ted could not withdraw his 

consent simply because the arbitrator ruled against him. But the 

parties to an arbitration agreement cannot contract away their 

statutory right to disqualify an arbitrator pursuant to section 

1281.91. (Azteca, supra, 131 Cal.App.4th at p. 1160.)

The Court of Appeal’s opinion in Azteca is instructive. 

There, the parties agreed to private arbitration pursuant to 

construction industry dispute resolution procedures that 

provided, upon receiving an objection to an arbitrator, the 

American Arbitration Association (AAA) would make a conclusive 

determination whether to disqualify the arbitrator. (Azteca, 

supra, 121 Cal.App.4th at p. 1160.) Plaintiff Azteca 
15

Construction, Inc., demanded disqualification of the proposed 

arbitrator pursuant to section 1281.91, but the AAA decided 

there was no good cause for the disqualification and affirmed the 

appointment of the arbitrator. The trial court denied Azteca’s 

motion to vacate the arbitration award, finding Azteca had 

waived its right to disqualify the arbitrator by agreeing to the 

AAA rules. (Azteca, at p. 1162.) The Court of Appeal reversed, 

explaining, “While the parties may be free to contract among 

themselves for alternative methods of dispute resolution, such 

contracts would be valueless without the state’s blessing. 

Because it imbues private arbitration with legal vitality by 

sanctioning judicial enforcement of awards, the state retains 

ultimate control over the ‘structural aspect[s] of the arbitration’ 

process. [Citation.] The critical subject of arbitrator neutrality is 

a structural aspect of the arbitration and falls within the 

Legislature’s supreme authority. [¶] Finally, the neutrality of 

the arbitrator is of such crucial importance that the Legislature 

cannot have intended that its regulation be delegable to the 

unfettered discretion of a private business.” (Id. at pp. 1167-

1168.) “Only by adherence to the Act’s prophylactic remedies can 

the parties have confidence that neutrality has not taken a back 

seat to expediency.” (Id. at p. 1168.)

We agree with the reasoning in Azteca. Although federal 

and state law favor enforcement of valid arbitration agreements

(Armendariz v. Foundation Health Psychcare Services, Inc. (2000) 

24 Cal.4th 83, 97), the California Supreme Court has emphasized 

that certain “‘minimum levels of integrity’ [must] be achieved if 

the [arbitration] arrangement in question is to pass judicial 

muster” (Graham v. Scissor-Tail, Inc. (1981) 28 Cal.3d 807, 825; 

accord, Armendariz, at p. 103; see Honeycutt, supra, 
16

25 Cal.App.5th at p. 931 [“The public deserves and needs to know 

that the system of private justice that has taken over large 

portions of California law produces fair and just results from 

neutral decision makers.”]). As discussed, section 1281.9 is 

designed to ensure the neutrality of the arbitrator by enabling a 

party to disqualify the arbitrator for failure to make a required 

disclosure or based on the disclosures. It is true, as argued by 

Harry and Christine, that Ted agreed Judge Shook would serve 

as the arbitrator, and nothing in the disclosure revealed 

information not previously known to Ted (that is, that Judge 

Shook was the arbitrator in the two previous matters). But 

section 1281.91 makes clear the arbitrator “shall” be disqualified 

upon the timely service of a notice of disqualification based on the 

disclosure statement, without requiring a showing of good cause.

Under Harry and Christine’s reading of section 1281.91, 

once the parties agreed not to contest Judge Shook serving as the 

arbitrator, the parties would be limited in their ability to object to 

Judge Shook based on any changed circumstances since the

parties had stipulated to the arbitration agreement in December

2012. For example, Judge Shook could have accepted repeat

referrals from the attorneys for one side of the dispute with the 

opposing party having limited recourse despite the possible 

impact of the referrals on his neutrality.

8 This would be contrary 

8 Ted could still have challenged Judge Shook based on any 

ground for disqualification under section 170.1 (applicable to 

proposed and serving arbitrators). The acceptance of repeat 

referrals could fall within section 170.1, subdivision (a)(6)(A)(iii) 

(“[a] person aware of the facts might reasonably entertain a doubt 

that the judge would be able to be impartial”), but this provision 

would not provide the certainty of disqualification afforded by the 
17

to the intent of the Legislature in enacting section 1281.9 and 

1281.91 “to inform and protect participants in arbitration, and to 

promote public confidence in the arbitration process.” (Ethics 

Standards, std. 1(a); see Azteca, supra, 121 Cal.App.4th at

p. 1167.)

Harry and Christine’s reliance on Fininen v. Barlow (2006) 

142 Cal.App.4th 185, 190-191 (Fininen) and Dornbirer v. Kaiser 

Foundation Health Plan, Inc. (2008) 166 Cal.App.4th 831, 846 

(Dornbirer) to argue the trial court has discretion whether to 

vacate an arbitration award under section 1286.2, subdivision 

(a)(6), is misplaced. In Fininen, the arbitrator disclosed he had 

previously mediated a construction collection dispute involving 

appellant Mark Barlow, but the arbitrator failed to provide any

specifics of the prior mediation. (Fininen, at p. 188.) Following 

the disclosures, Barlow and the opposing party waived any 

potential conflicts. (Ibid.) The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial 

court’s denial of Barlow’s motion to vacate the arbitration award

because Barlow was a party to the nondisclosed case on which he 

had access to his own file, consented to proceed with the 

arbitration based on the incomplete information, and waited until 

after the arbitrator ruled against him to object to the arbitrator. 

(Id. at p. 190.) On these facts the court concluded it would be 

“absurd to construe section 1286.2, subdivision (a)(6) to require 

that the arbitration award be vacated based on an incomplete or 

untimely disclosure.” (Id. at pp. 190-191.)

mandatory disqualification provision of section 1281.91, 

subdivision (b)(1). We are not suggesting Judge Shook took any 

actions that created an actual conflict or affected his impartiality, 

only that Ted had a right to disqualify him based on the 

disclosure statement.
18

Similarly, in Dornbirer, an arbitrator disclosed numerous 

prior arbitrations involving defendant Kaiser Permanente or its 

counsel, but the arbitrator’s disclosure did not contain complete 

information on the details of the arbitrations, including the dates, 

the names of the attorneys, and the specifics of the award. 

(Dornbirer, supra, 166 Cal.App.4th at pp. 840-841.) The Court of 

Appeal concluded the incomplete disclosures under section 1281.9

did not support vacatur because the plaintiff was on notice prior 

to the arbitration of the missing information but consented to the 

arbitration and failed to raise an objection until after the 

arbitrator ruled in favor of Kaiser. (Dornbirer, at p. 846.) The 

Court of Appeal explained the plaintiff’s remedy for the 

arbitrator’s “failure to meet the statutory disclosure 

requirements was to disqualify him on that basis before the 

arbitration commenced, not after the arbitration was over.” 

(Ibid.)

Unlike the appellants in Fininen and Dornbirer, Ted served 

a timely disqualification notice before commencement of the

arbitration. Further, both cases concerned the materiality of 

incomplete disclosures under section 1281.91, subdivision (a), for 

purposes of disqualification, not the absolute right to 

disqualification under section 1281.91, subdivision (b)(1) and (2), 

under which a party has a right to disqualify an arbitrator 

without cause one time in a single arbitration. Ted properly 

exercised his right to disqualify the arbitrator.

DISPOSITION

The judgment is reversed and remanded with directions for 

the trial court to vacate its order granting the petition to confirm 
19

the arbitration award, and to enter a new order vacating the 

award. Ted Roussos is to recover his costs on appeal.

FEUER, J.

We concur:

PERLUSS, P. J.

SEGAL, J.