[Cite as State v. Ullrich, 2022-Ohio-2392.]

COURT OF APPEALS

LICKING COUNTY, OHIO

FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

STATE OF OHIO JUDGES:

Hon. William B. Hoffman, P.J.

 Plaintiff-Appellee Hon. John W. Wise, J.

Hon. Patricia A. Delaney, J.

-vsCase No. 2021 CA 00065

BRUNO R. ULLRICH

 Defendant-Appellant O P I N I O N

CHARACTER OF PROCEEDINGS: Appeal from the Licking County Court of 

Common Pleas, Case No. 20-CR-00522

JUDGMENT: Affirmed

DATE OF JUDGMENT ENTRY: July 11, 2022

APPEARANCES:

For Plaintiff-Appellee For Defendant-Appellant

CLIFFORD J. MURPHY APRIL F. CAMPBELL

Assistant Prosecuting Attorney Campbell Law, LLC

20 North Second Street – 4

th Floor 46 1⁄2 North Sandusky Street

Newark, Ohio 43055 Delaware, Ohio 43015
Licking County, Case No. 2021 CA 00065 2

Hoffman, P.J.

{¶1} Defendant-appellant Bruno Ullrich appeals his conviction and sentence 

entered by the Licking County Court of Common Pleas, on one count of assault, in 

violation of R.C. 2903.13(A), a misdemeanor of the first degree, following a bench trial. 

Plaintiff-appellee is the state of Ohio.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND FACTS

{¶2} On October 8, 2020, the Licking County Grand Jury indicted Appellant on 

one count of felonious assault, in violation of R.C. 2903.11(A)(1), a felony of the second 

degree (“Count 1”); and one count of assault, in violation of R.C. 2903.13(A), a felony of 

the second degree (“Count 2”). Appellant appeared before the trial court for arraignment 

on October 27, 2020, and entered a plea of not guilty to the Indictment.

{¶3} On January 22, 2021, Appellant filed a Motion to Suppress and Request for 

Dismissal on Fourth Amendment grounds. The trial court conducted an evidentiary 

hearing on March 26, 2021. The trial court denied Appellant’s motion to suppress and 

motion to dismiss via Decision and Order filed June 14, 2021. The matter was scheduled 

for jury trial, but Appellant subsequently waived his right to trial by jury. The trial court 

conducted a bench trial on August 3, 2021.

{¶4} The following evidence was adduced at trial:

{¶5} Brittany Burwell testified she lives at 198 South William Street, Johnstown, 

Licking County, Ohio, and has resided there for four years. Burwell stated, on the evening 

of September 25, 2020, she walked outside to get a paintbrush and heard “horrific 

screaming – um – like somebody was being hurt. It was not good screaming at all.” 

Transcript of Aug. 3, 2021 Bench Trial at 17. She called her husband outside, and he 

agreed they should call the police. Burwell’s 9-1-1 call was played for the trial court. 
Licking County, Case No. 2021 CA 00065 3

While she was still on the phone with dispatch, officers arrived at the scene. As Burwell 

spoke with a police officer, the screaming began again. Burwell recalled “her [neighbor] 

actually coming out of the house screaming – um – that there was a fire and that she 

needed firefighters – um – but there was no fire.” Id. at 18.

{¶6} Officer Randall Fox with the Johnstown Police Department testified he was 

working on September 25, 2020, and was dispatched to 198 South Williams Street in 

regards to a disturbance. Officer Fox initially spoke with Burwell then proceeded to 

investigate screaming coming from 184 South Williams Street, the house next door. 

Officer Fox observed a bare-chested man, who was subsequently identified as Appellant, 

standing in the doorway and looking confused. The officer looked over the privacy fence 

because he still could hear a woman screaming. He observed a woman, who was later 

identified as Robyn Duckworth, laying on the ground. She was “actively bleeding and 

covered in blood, had her shirt stained from her – uh – neck and shoulder area.” Id. at 

21-22.

{¶7} When Officer Fox encountered Duckworth, she was covered in blood and 

screaming for help. Duckworth stated she was dizzy. Officer Fox described her as visibly 

upset and crying. She had blood streaming down her face. Duckworth told Officer Fox 

she was assaulted by Appellant. She indicated she had been struck multiple times 

including being struck in the head with a blunt or glass object. Duckworth explained as 

she tried to flee the home, Appellant prevented her from doing so. Officer Fox recalled 

Duckworth told him Appellant put “his hand over her mouth or around her throat to prevent 

her from screaming out for help.” Id. at 24. 
Licking County, Case No. 2021 CA 00065 4

{¶8} Officer Fox testified he spoke with Appellant that evening. The officer noted 

Appellant appeared to be intoxicated and smelled of alcoholic beverage. He asked 

Appellant “multiple times what was going on.” Id. Officer Fox recalled, “He just stood 

there confused as to like – he didn’t understand why I was asking him what was going on 

when there was something clearly going on at that very moment.” Id. at 24-25. When 

medics arrived, Officer Fox asked Appellant to step outside of the privacy fence and speak 

with Sergeant Hatfield. Medics transported Duckworth to St. Ann’s Hospital. Deputy 

Chief Smart was also at the scene.

{¶9} Appellant refused officers’ request to enter the home to search for the object 

with which Duckworth had been struck. He became agitated when officers asked his 

permission to do so. Appellant attempted to go back inside the house, but was instructed 

by officers to stay outside because they needed to speak with him. Appellant was 

eventually transported to the Licking County Justice Center. Officer Fox proceeded to 

the hospital to speak with Duckworth.

{¶10} Officers obtained a search warrant for the residence. Inside a bag tucked 

behind the front door, officers found an alcoholic beverage bottle with blood on it. A purse 

with blood marks on the side was found near the front door. Officer Fox described the 

residence as “very messy” and “it appeared that a [sic] altercation took place.” Id at 31.

{¶11} Deputy Chief Rusty Smart testified he was working on September 25, 2020, 

when he was called by Officer Hatfield, Sergeant Hatfield by the time of trial, in reference 

to a female screaming for help. Deputy Chief Smart responded to 184 South Williams 

Street. When he arrived at the scene, he observed Officer Hatfield speaking with 
Licking County, Case No. 2021 CA 00065 5

Appellant. Deputy Chief Smart looked over the gate and observed Officer Fox and medics 

tending to a female with blood all over her head and hair. 

{¶12} Deputy Chief Smart was speaking with Brittany Burwell, who had placed the 

9-1-1 call, when he heard Appellant yelling at Officer Hatfield. Appellant was attempting 

to enter his residence. Deputy Chief Smart asked Appellant to return to the driveway to 

speak with the officers. Appellant refused. As Deputy Chief Smart opened the gate 

leading toward the residence, Appellant came off the porch and held the gate shut. A 

struggle ensued, resulting in Appellant striking Deputy Chief Smart in the face. The

officers took Appellant to the ground and handcuffed him. Appellant was placed in the 

cruiser and transported to the Licking County Justice Center.

{¶13} Matthew Martin, a firefighter medic with the Monroe Township Fire 

Department, testified he was working on September 25, 2020, when he was dispatched 

to 184 South Williams Street in response to a traumatic injury. When he arrived, Martin 

observed a female sitting on a side porch between the driveway and the house. Martin 

indicated “she had a moderate amount of blood – uh – kind of matted in her hair.” Id. at 

64. Martin described the woman as alert and awake. The woman denied any illegal drug 

use, but admitted to consuming alcohol. The woman informed Martin she and Appellant 

had been in a fight during which Appellant picked up an object and struck her in the head. 

{¶14} Martin and another medic attempted to clean up the blood to establish the 

extent of Duckworth’s injuries. Martin observed a zigzag puncture laceration 

approximately three-quarters of an inch long to the front of Duckworth’s forehead, and 

swelling approximately an inch in diameter, further back, on the side of Duckworth’s head. 

Medics moved Duckworth to a cot and placed her in the ambulance. Martin described 
Licking County, Case No. 2021 CA 00065 6

Duckworth as “pretty hysterical – um – pretty anxious, very talkative throughout the entire 

contact. Um – again, she had been drinking alcohol. Uh – her speech was a little slurred, 

pupils were a little sluggish to respond, and because of that and not being able to rule out 

head injury, recommended transport to St. Ann’s.” Id. at 65. Martin authenticated the 

report he prepared following the call.

{¶15} Robinette Bowman, a floor nurse in the emergency department of St. Ann’s 

Hospital, was working on September 25, 2020, when Duckworth was brought in for 

treatment. Bowman authenticated Duckworth’s medical records. Duckworth informed 

Bowman she and Appellant had been drinking and he started hitting her over the head 

with an unknown object and kicked her multiple times. Duckworth admitted she was 

fearful of Appellant and acknowledged a history of abuse including recent physical 

violence and abuse. Bowman observed Duckworth’s injuries and described those injuries 

as depicted in photographs entered into evidence. Doctors used staples to close the fourcentimeter laceration on Duckworth’s head.

{¶16} After the state rested its case, Appellant made an oral Crim. R. 29 motion 

for acquittal, which the trial court overruled.

{¶17} Appellant testified on his own behalf. Appellant stated Duckworth, who was 

living in Toledo, called and asked if she could stay with him because she was having a 

problem with her brother and mother. Duckworth arrived at Appellant’s residence 

between 5 and 6 p.m. on September 25, 2020, and, according to Appellant, immediately 

began drinking. Appellant explained he did not drink because he was preparing food for 

the dogs and wanted to catch a flight the next day. At approximately 10 p.m., Appellant 

told Duckworth he was going to bed, but agreed to have a shot with Duckworth 
Licking County, Case No. 2021 CA 00065 7

beforehand due to her insistence. Appellant indicated Duckworth was intoxicated, but he 

had no idea how much she had consumed. 

{¶18} After Appellant went to bed, he heard a noise coming from the kitchen. He 

got out of bed and walked to the kitchen. Appellant observed Duckworth sitting on a stool 

at the counter. Duckworth was holding a bottle and Appellant tried to coax her into giving 

it to him. As Appellant reached for the bottle, Duckworth grabbed his private parts, 

causing him to fall over the garbage can and land in front of the refrigerator. Duckworth 

fell in the opposite direction against a cabinet. Appellant called to Duckworth, but she did 

not respond. Appellant recalled Duckworth crawling towards, then out, the door, “all the 

time she was – she was insanely loud – um – yelling * * * like hysteric.” Id. at 89. Appellant 

observed blood near the cabinet. Appellant denied striking or kicking Duckworth.

{¶19} Appellant described his interaction with the officers. He explained when the 

officers began to question him, he immediately thought, “They pinned this on you, so you 

have to go back in,” and walked back into the fenced-in area, towards the house. Id. at 

91. Appellant added Officer Fox opened the gate, and Appellant asked him to keep it 

closed because of the dogs. Thereafter, Deputy Chief Smart became “very aggressive 

really and – and he pulled me over the fence * * * he grabbed my hand – or my arm so –

um – what was – what I said stay out and he grabbed me. * * * he pulled me out and I 

think he was – uh – shouting I don’t need a warrant buddy and they put me on the ground 

and arrested me.” Id. at 95.

{¶20} The defense rested upon conclusion of Appellant’s cross-examination.

{¶21} The state called Sergeant Paul Hatfield in rebuttal. Sergeant Hatfield 

testified, on September 25, 2020, he was dispatched to the area of 184 South Williams 
Licking County, Case No. 2021 CA 00065 8

Street to assist Officer Fox. Sergeant Hatfield confirmed he was wearing his body camera 

that day. A portion of the video from Sergeant Hatfield’s body camera was played. 

{¶22} After hearing the evidence, the trial court found Appellant guilty of the lesser 

included offense on Count 1, to wit: assault, in violation of R.C. 2903.13(A), a 

misdemeanor of the first degree, and not guilty on Count 2, felony 2 assault. The trial 

court sentenced Appellant to 180 days in the Licking County Justice Center, suspended 

180 days of the sentence, and placed him on probation for a period of one year. The trial 

court memorialized Appellant’s conviction and sentence via Judgment of Conviction filed 

August 3, 2021.

{¶23} It is from his conviction and sentence Appellant appeals, raising the 

following assignments of error:

I. ULLRICH’S ASSAULT CONVICTION SHOULD BE REVERSED 

BECAUSE THE TRIAL COURT SHOULD NOT HAVE ADMITTED THE 

DECLARANT-VICTIM STATEMENTS UNDER ANY EXCEPTION TO THE 

HEARSAY RULES.

II. ULLRICH’S ASSAULT CONVICTION SHOULD BE REVERSED 

BECAUSE THE STATEMENTS MADE BY THE VICTIM WERE 

INTRODUCED IN VIOLATION OF THE CONFRONTATION CLAUSE.

III. THE STATE’S EVIDENCE THAT ULLRICH COMMITTED 

ASSAULT WAS LEGALLY INSUFFICIENT AS A MATTER OF LAW.
Licking County, Case No. 2021 CA 00065 9

IV. THE TRIAL COURT’S DECISION TO FIND ULLRICH GUILTY 

OF ASSAULT SHOULD BE REVERSED, BECAUSE THE EVIDENCE 

WEIGHED MANIFESTLY AGAINST CONVICTING ULLRICH OF IT.

I

{¶24} In his first assignment of error, Appellant argues the trial court erred in 

admitting the statements made by the declarant-victim Robyn Duckworth under the 

excited utterance exception to the hearsay rule. 

{¶25} “A trial court is vested with broad discretion in determining the admissibility 

of evidence in any particular case, so long as such discretion is exercised in line with the 

rules of procedure and evidence.” Rigby v. Lake Cty., 58 Ohio St.3d 269, 271, 569 N.E.2d 

1056 (1991). An abuse of discretion is more than a mere error in judgment; it is a 

“perversity of will, passion, prejudice, partiality, or moral delinquency.” Pons v. Ohio State 

Med. Bd., 66 Ohio St.3d 619, 621, 614 N.E.2d 748 (1993).

{¶26} Evid.R. 803 provides:

The following are not excluded by the rule against hearsay, 

regardless of whether the declarant is available as a witness: * * *

(2) Excited utterance. A statement relating to a startling event or 

condition made while the declarant was under the stress of excitement 

caused by the event or condition.
Licking County, Case No. 2021 CA 00065 10

{¶27} A trial court may admit a hearsay statement under the excited utterance 

exception under the following circumstances:

(a) there was some occurrence startling enough to produce a 

nervous excitement in the declarant, which was sufficient to still his 

reflective faculties and thereby make his statements and declarations the 

unreflective and sincere expression of his actual impressions and beliefs, 

and thus render his statement of declaration spontaneous and unreflective,

(b) the statement or declaration, even if not strictly contemporaneous 

with its exciting cause, was made before there had been time for such 

nervous excitement to lose a domination over his reflective faculties so that 

such domination continued to remain sufficient to make his statements and 

declarations the unreflective and sincere expression of his actual 

impressions and beliefs,

(c) the statement or declaration related to such startling occurrence 

or the circumstances of such starling occurrence, and

(d) the declarant had an opportunity to observe personally the 

matters asserted in his statement or declaration.' “

State v. Jones, 135 Ohio St.3d 10, 2012–Ohio–5677, 984 N.E.2d 

948, ¶ 166, quoting Potter v. Baker, 162 Ohio St. 488, 124 N.E.2d 140 

(1955), paragraph two of the syllabus. Accord State v. Taylor, 66 Ohio St.3d 

295 (1993).
Licking County, Case No. 2021 CA 00065 11

{¶28} Appellant asserts the trial court erred in admitting Duckworth’s statements 

under the excited utterance exception to the hearsay rule because the state failed to 

establish a lack of time between the startling event and Duckworth’s statements, and 

failed to establish the circumstances surrounding Duckworth’s statements eliminated the 

possibility of fabrication. Appellant focuses on the first words Officer Fox heard 

Duckworth utter, “Please call 9-1-1, there’s a fire.” Tr. at 27. Appellant submits, because 

“Officer Fox quickly deduced upon approach however that, in fact, there was no fire, * * * 

within one minute of the officer’s interaction with the declarant, it was clear that the 

circumstances objectively indicated that the declarant had time to fabricate.” Brief of 

Appellant at 5. We disagree.

{¶29} Excited utterances are deemed “reliable because they do not entail an 

opportunity for the declarant to reflect, thus reducing the chance to fabricate or distort the 

truth.” State v. Lukacs, 188 Ohio App.3d 597, 2010-Ohio-2364, 936 N.E.2d 506, ¶ 20. 

The amount of time which elapses “between the statement and the event is relevant but 

not dispositive of” whether a declarant's statement occurred while still under the stress of 

the startling occurrence. Jones, supra at ¶ 168, quoting Taylor, supra at 303; State v. 

Wallace, 37 Ohio St.3d 87, 90, 524 N .E.2d 466 (1988). “There is no per se amount of 

time after which a statement can no longer be considered to be an excited utterance.” 

Taylor, supra at 303. Instead, “[t]he central requirements are that the statement must be 

made while the declarant is still under the stress of the event and the statement may not 

be a result of reflective thought.” Id.

{¶30} Brittany Burwell testified, on the evening of September 25, 2020, she 

walked outside to get a paintbrush and heard “horrific screaming – um – like somebody 
Licking County, Case No. 2021 CA 00065 12

was being hurt. It was not good screaming at all.” Tr at 17. She called to her husband 

to come outside, and he agreed they should call the police. While she was still on the 

phone with dispatch, officers arrived at the scene. As Burwell spoke with a police officer, 

the screaming began again. 

{¶31} Officer Fox was dispatched to 198 South Williams Street, Johnstown, Ohio, 

in response to a 9-1-1 disturbance call. While Officer Fox was speaking with Burwell, he 

heard screaming coming from 184 South Williams Street, the house next door. The officer 

proceeded to the residence and observed Appellant, standing in the doorway, looking 

confused. The woman’s screaming continued. Officer Fox looked over the privacy fence 

and saw Robyn Duckworth, laying on the ground. Duckworth was “actively bleeding and 

covered in blood, had her shirt stained from her – uh – neck and shoulder area.” Tr. at 

21-22. Officer Fox described Duckworth as “covered in blood, she’s screaming out for 

help * * * she claimed that she was dizzy * * * she was visibly upset and crying and blood 

coming down her face.” Id. at 23.

{¶32} Matthew Martin, the medic who responded to the call, described Duckworth 

as “pretty hysterical – um – pretty anxious, very talkative throughout the entire contact.” 

Id. at 64. 

{¶33} We find the testimony establishes Duckworth was in a frantic, excited state 

from the time Burwell initially heard Duckworth’s screams and placed the 9-1-1 call until 

well after officers and medics arrived. In addition, we have reviewed the body camera 

video footage of the officers responding to the scene and find the footage depicts a clearly 

distraught and hysterical Duckworth. There is nothing in the record to demonstrate

Duckworth had time to fabricate the assault. The fact there was no fire despite Duckworth 
Licking County, Case No. 2021 CA 00065 13

yelling such does not prove she had time to fabricate the events she subsequently 

described to Officer Fox. 

{¶34} Based upon the foregoing, we find the trial court did not abuse its discretion 

in admitting Duckworth’s statements under the excited utterance exception to the hearsay 

rule.

{¶35} Appellant’s first assignment of error is overruled.

II

{¶36} In his second assignment of error, Appellant argues the admission of the 

Duckworth’s statements violated his rights under the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth 

Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 10 of the Ohio 

Constitution.

{¶37} In Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 124 S.Ct. 1354, 158 L.Ed.2d 177 

(2004), the United States Supreme Court concluded the Sixth Amendment prohibits the 

introduction of testimonial statements by a non-testifying witness, unless the witness is 

“unavailable to testify, and the defendant had had a prior opportunity for crossexamination.” Id. at 54. Applying that definition to the facts in Crawford, the High Court 

held statements by a witness during police questioning at the station house were 

testimonial and thus could not be admitted. Id.

{¶38} In Davis v. Washington and Hammon v. Indiana, 547 U.S. 813, 126 S.Ct. 

2266, 165 L.Ed.2d 224 (2006), which were decided together, the United States Supreme 

Court concluded statements are not testimonial if the primary purpose of the interrogation 

by law enforcement was to enable police to respond to an ongoing emergency. 

Statements are testimonial when the circumstances objectively indicate there is no such 
Licking County, Case No. 2021 CA 00065 14

ongoing emergency, and the primary purpose of the interrogation is to establish past 

events which are potentially relevant to later criminal prosecution. Id. at 822.

{¶39} The existence of an “ongoing emergency” at the time of the encounter is 

among the most important circumstances informing the interrogation’s “primary purpose.” 

Michigan v. Bryant, 562 U.S. 344, 361, 131 S.Ct. 1143, 179 L.Ed.2d 93 (2011). Whether 

an emergency exists and is ongoing is a highly context-dependent inquiry. Id. at 363. An 

assessment of whether an emergency threatening the police and public is ongoing cannot 

narrowly focus on whether the threat to the first victim has been neutralized because the 

threat to the first responders and public may continue. Id.

{¶40} A victim’s medical condition is also important to the primary purpose inquiry 

to the extent it sheds light on the victim’s ability to have any purpose at all in responding 

to police questions and on the likelihood any such purpose would be testimonial. Id. at 

364–365. The victim’s condition also provides an important context for first responders to 

judge the existence and magnitude of a continuing threat to the victim, themselves, and 

the public. Id. at 365. 

{¶41} Finally, another factor to consider pursuant to the “primary purpose” test is 

the encounter's informality. Id. at 366. Formality suggests the absence of an emergency, 

but informality does not necessarily indicate the presence of an emergency or the lack of

testimonial intent. Id. However, the court distinguished the facts in Bryant, where the 

questioning occurred in an exposed public area, before emergency medical services 

arrived, and in a disorganized fashion, from the formal station-house interrogation in 

Crawford. Id. In addition to the circumstances in which an encounter occurs, the 
Licking County, Case No. 2021 CA 00065 15

statements and actions of both the declarant and interrogators provide objective evidence 

of the primary purpose of the interrogation. Id. at 367. 

{¶42} Police officers in our society function as both first responders and criminal 

investigators and their dual responsibilities may mean they act with different motives 

simultaneously or in quick succession. Id. at 368. Similarly, victims are also likely to have 

mixed motives when making statements to the police. Id. During an ongoing emergency, 

a victim is most likely to want the threat to her and to other potential victims to end, which 

does not necessarily mean the victim wants or envisions prosecution of the assailant. Id.

A victim may want the attacker to be incapacitated temporarily or rehabilitated. Id.

Alternatively, a severely injured victim may have no purpose at all in answering questions 

posed, and may provide answers which are simply reflexive. Id. at 368-69. The victim's 

injuries might be so debilitating as to prevent her from thinking sufficiently clearly to 

understand the purpose of her statements to police. Id.

{¶43} In the case sub judice, the state introduced footage from Officer Fox’s 

bodycam. In that footage and audio, Duckworth can be heard crying for help. Officer Fox 

approaches a fence and calls, “Hey, what’s going on guys?” Duckworth responds, 

“There’s a problem. We need police. Don’t listen to him.” Officer Fox asks Duckworth 

what happened as he opens the gate, Duckworth advises the officer they have been 

drinking and she needs medical assistance. Duckworth is sprawled head first down the 

porch steps. Her shirt is covered in blood. Appellant is standing nearby. As Officer Fox 

radios for medics, Duckworth hysterically recounts the issues the couple has been 

experiencing. Officer Fox asks, “What exactly happened tonight?” Duckworth answers, 

“I’m not safe.” Officer Fox continues to question her. Duckworth tells the officer Appellant 
Licking County, Case No. 2021 CA 00065 16

started hitting her with glass objects and other objects, and she “started screaming like a 

siren.” Officer Fox turns to Appellant and asks his name. Appellant denies hitting 

Duckworth and did not know how she was injured. Officers call Appellant to step out 

beyond the privacy fence and speak with them. Duckworth tells Officer Fox Appellant 

has been hitting her with various objects and she cannot get off the ground. 

{¶44} Medics arrive and begin to treat Duckworth. Duckworth cries hysterically 

throughout the encounter. She complains of being “very nauseous.” She repeatedly 

states Appellant kept hitting her “with various objects.” Officer Fox does not question 

Duckworth once medics arrive.

{¶45} We find Duckworth’s statements to Officer Fox were non-testimonial under 

the primary purpose test. When Officer Fox arrived at the residence, his primary purpose 

was to determine how to address an ongoing emergency from his standpoint as a first 

responder. See, Bryant, supra, at 1160. Officer Fox sought information from Duckworth 

in order to obtain appropriate medical assistance for her injuries, to determine whether 

the threat of immediate danger had subsided, and to identify who assaulted her. See, 

State v. Little, 3rd Dist. No. 1-16-29, 2016-Ohio-8398, 78 N.E.3d 323, ¶ 21. Further, this 

interview was informal, taking place on the porch of Appellant’s residence where Officer 

Fox first encountered Duckworth. Id.; see also, State v. Knecht, 12th Dist. Warren No. 

CA2015–04–037, 2015-Ohio-4316, ¶ 25.

{¶46} Based upon the foregoing, we find the trial court did not err in finding 

Duckworth’s statements to Officer Fox were non-testimonial and the admission of such 

did not violate the Confrontation Clause. 

{¶47} Appellant’s second assignment of error is overruled. 
Licking County, Case No. 2021 CA 00065 17

III, IV

{¶48} In his third assignment of error, Appellant contends his conviction was 

based upon insufficient evidence. In his fourth assignment of error, Appellant challenges 

his conviction as against the manifest weight of the evidence. 

{¶49} An appellate court's function when reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence 

is to determine whether, after viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the 

prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime 

proven beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Jenks, 61 Ohio St. 3d 259, 574 N.E.2d 492, 

paragraph two of the syllabus (1991).

{¶50} In determining whether a verdict is against the manifest weight of the 

evidence, the appellate court acts as a thirteenth juror and “in reviewing the entire record, 

weighs the evidence and all reasonable inferences, considers the credibility of witnesses, 

and determines whether in resolving conflicts in evidence the jury ‘clearly lost its way and 

created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the conviction must be reversed and 

a new trial ordered.’ ” State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St. 3d 380, 387, 1997-Ohio-52, 678 

N.E.2d 541, quoting State v. Martin, 20 Ohio App. 3d 172, 175, 485 N.E.2d 717 (1983).

{¶51} Appellant was convicted of assault, in violation of R.C. 2903.13(A), which 

provides:

No person shall knowingly cause or attempt to cause physical harm 

to another or to another's unborn.

{¶52} R.C. 2901.01(A)(3) defines “physical harm” as follows:
Licking County, Case No. 2021 CA 00065 18

“Physical harm to persons” means any injury, illness, or other 

physiological impairment, regardless of its gravity or duration.

{¶53} With respect to his assertion the state’s evidence was legally insufficient, 

Appellant argues, “no statement by the declarant-witness Robyn Duckworth should have 

been admitted at [his] trial * * * Without the declarant’s statements, the State had no 

evidence that [Appellant] committed assault against Duckworth, even in a light most 

favorable to it.” Brief of Appellant at 8. Appellant further submits his conviction was 

against the manifest weight of the evidence because “without the statements by 

declarant-victim, erroneously introduced under the excited utterance exception, and in 

violation of Ullrich’s right to confront her, there is no evidence by which Ullrich could be 

convicted of assault.” Id. at 9. Appellant continues, “the inference that Duckworth

fabricated the facts and Ullrich spoke truthfully, was more believable and persuasive.” Id. 

{¶54} Having found Duckworth’s statements were properly admitted, supra, we 

find, viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution, a rational trier of 

fact could find the essential elements of assault proven beyond a reasonable doubt. We 

further find Appellant’s conviction was not against the manifest weight of the evidence.

{¶55} As set forth in our Statement of the Case and Facts, supra, Officer Fox 

arrived at 198 South Williams Street on September 25, 2020, in response to a 

disturbance. While Officer Fox was speaking with Burwell, he heard screaming coming 

from the house next door. The officer walked to the residence and observed Appellant, 

standing in the doorway and looking confused. Officer Fox then looked over the privacy 

fence, as he still could hear a woman screaming, and observed Duckworth, laying on the 
Licking County, Case No. 2021 CA 00065 19

ground, “actively bleeding and covered in blood, had her shirt stained from her – uh –

neck and shoulder area.” Tr. at 21-22.

{¶56} Duckworth was screaming for help, complaining she was dizzy. Officer Fox 

described her as visibly upset and crying. She had blood streaming down her face. 

Duckworth told Officer Fox she was assaulted by Appellant. She indicated she had been 

struck multiple times including being struck in the head with a blunt or glass object. 

Duckworth explained as she tried to flee the home, Appellant prevented her from doing 

so. Officer Fox recalled Duckworth told him Appellant put “his hand over her mouth or 

around her throat to prevent her from screaming out for help.” Id. at 24. 

{¶57} Medic Matthew Martin was dispatched to 184 South Williams Street on 

September 25, 2020, in response to a traumatic injury. When he arrived, Martin observed 

Duckworth sitting on a side porch between the driveway and the house. Duckworth “had 

a moderate amount of blood – uh – kind of matted in her hair.” Id. at 64. Duckworth 

informed Martin she and Appellant had been in a fight during which he struck her in the 

head with something. 

{¶58} After Martin and another medic cleaned up the blood to establish the extent 

of Duckworth’s injuries, they observed a zigzag puncture laceration approximately threequarters of an inch long to the front of Duckworth’s forehead, and swelling approximately 

an inch in diameter, further back, on the side of Duckworth’s head. Medics moved 

Duckworth to a cot and placed her in the ambulance. Duckworth was “pretty hysterical –

um – pretty anxious, very talkative throughout the entire contact. * * * her speech was a 

little slurred, pupils were a little sluggish to respond, and because of that and not being 

able to rule out head injury,” she was transported to St. Ann’s Hospital. Id. at 65. 
Licking County, Case No. 2021 CA 00065 20

{¶59} Nurse Robinette Bowman was working in the emergency department of St. 

Ann’s Hospital when Duckworth was brought in for treatment. Duckworth informed 

Bowman she and Appellant had been drinking and he started hitting her over the head 

with an unknown object and kicked her multiple times. Bowman observed Duckworth’s 

injuries and described those injuries as depicted in photographs entered into evidence. 

Doctors used staples to close the four-centimeter laceration on Duckworth’s head.

{¶60} Based upon the foregoing and the entire record in this matter, we find 

Appellant’s conviction was not based upon insufficient evidence and was not against the 

manifest weight of the evidence.

{¶61} Accordingly, Appellant’s third and fourth assignments of error are overruled.

{¶62} The judgment of the Licking County Court of Common Pleas is affirmed.

By: Hoffman, P.J.

Wise, John, J. and

Delaney, J. concur