NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL

AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF ARIZONA, Respondent,

v.

ARKEEM DURANT COLEMAN, Petitioner.

No. 1 CA-CR 14-0495 PRPC

Petition for Review from the Superior Court in Maricopa County

No. CR2009-005080-001

The Honorable Bruce R. Cohen, Judge

REVIEW GRANTED; RELIEF DENIED

COUNSEL

Maricopa County Attorney's Office, Phoenix

By Diane Meloche

Counsel for Respondent

Maricopa County Public Defender's Office, Phoenix

By Tennie B. Martin, Mikel Steinfeld

Counsel for Petitioner
STATE v. COLEMAN

Decision of the Court

2

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Presiding Judge Diane M. Johnsen, Judge Lawrence F. Winthrop and Judge 

Randall M. Howe delivered the following decision. 

PER CURIAM:

¶1 Petitioner Arkeem Durant Coleman petitions this court for 

review from the dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief. We have 

considered the petition for review and, for the reasons stated below, grant 

review and deny relief. We have jurisdiction pursuant to Arizona Rule of 

Criminal Procedure 32.9(c) and Arizona Revised Statutes ("A.R.S.") section 

13-4239(C) (2016).1

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 

¶2 Coleman pled guilty to first-degree murder, an offense he 

committed in 2009 when he was 17 years old. The superior court sentenced 

Coleman to a stipulated term of life imprisonment with a possibility of 

parole after 25 years. While the applicable sentencing statute provided for

the possibility of parole after 25 years, as relevant here, the legislature 

abolished parole in 1993 when it amended A.R.S. § 41-1604.06 (2016). See

A.R.S. § 13-751(A) (2009) (sentences for first-degree murder); 1993 Ariz. 

Sess. Laws, ch. 255, § 86 (1st Reg. Sess.) (amending A.R.S. § 41-1604.06). 

Therefore, at the time the court sentenced Coleman, the only way Coleman 

could obtain release after 25 years was through commutation of his 

sentence or pardon. See A.R.S. §§ 31-402(C) (2016), -443 (2016). A 

sentencing scheme that abolishes parole for life sentences and provides for 

release based only on executive clemency does not provide a meaningful 

opportunity for release from a life sentence. See Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 

48, 57, 79 (2010).

¶3 Coleman filed a successive notice of post-conviction relief in 

which he challenged his sentence based on the Supreme Court's decision in 

Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012). Miller held that a "mandatory life 

[sentence] without parole for those under the age of 18 at the time of their 

crimes violates the Eighth Amendment's prohibition on 'cruel and unusual 

 

1 Absent material revision after the date of an alleged offense, we cite 

a statute's current version.
STATE v. COLEMAN

Decision of the Court

3

punishments.'" Id. at 2460. Coleman argued Miller was a significant change 

in the law that required resentencing.

¶4 The superior court consolidated Coleman's petition with 

those of a number of other petitioners who raised identical claims. The 

court ordered the parties to brief whether Miller was retroactive and 

whether the petitioners had cognizable claims given that they had not yet

served 25 years of their sentences.

2 The court then held a hearing on the 

consolidated claims, after which it denied relief. The court held in relevant 

part that Miller was a significant change in the law and was retroactive; that 

because Arizona law allowed for commutation or pardon after 25 years, it 

did not mandate life sentences without a possibility of parole for juveniles;

but that commutation or clemency did not provide meaningful 

opportunities for release to offenders sentenced to life with the possibility 

of release. The court further held, however, that the then-recent passage of 

House Bill ("H.B.") 2593, which reestablished parole for juvenile offenders 

sentenced to life imprisonment with a possibility of parole, resolved any 

issues as to whether Coleman's sentence "violated the letter and spirit of 

Miller." Coleman now seeks review. We review the superior court's 

summary dismissal of a Rule 32 proceeding for abuse of discretion. State v. 

Amaral, 239 Ariz. 217, 219, ¶ 9 (2016).

DISCUSSION

¶5 In his petition for review, Coleman argues the superior court 

deprived him of the opportunity to challenge H.B. 2593 more fully. He

argues the court should have granted relief and ordered resentencing so 

that during those resulting proceedings, Coleman could investigate and 

present claims that H.B. 2593 and the resulting statutory changes were not 

retroactive, violated the prohibition against ex post facto laws and did not 

otherwise satisfy Miller.

3

 

2 The superior court's minute entry references a petition for postconviction relief filed July 1, 2013, which contained "several arguments." 

The record on review contains no such petition. The record contains only 

Coleman's notice of post-conviction relief and the brief he filed pursuant to 

the court's order.

3 H.B. 2593 was signed into law less than two weeks before oral 

argument in the superior court. H.B. 2593, 51st Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 

2014). Coleman did not raise these issues before the oral argument.
STATE v. COLEMAN

Decision of the Court

4

¶6 We deny relief. First, Miller is a significant change in the law 

and is retroactive. Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718, 736 (2016); State 

v. Valencia, 239 Ariz. 255, 259, ¶ 17 (App. 2016). Second, "A State may 

remedy a Miller violation by permitting juvenile homicide offenders to be 

considered for parole, rather than by resentencing them." Montgomery, 136 

S. Ct. at 736. Assuming arguendo that Coleman's sentence violated Miller, 

H.B. 2593 and the resulting statutory changes remedied that violation

because they permit "juvenile homicide offenders to be considered for 

parole[.]" See id. Through H.B. 2593, the legislature enacted A.R.S. § 13-716

(2016) and amended A.R.S. § 41-1604.09(I) (2016). 2014 Ariz. Sess. Laws, ch. 

156, §§ 2-3 (2d Reg. Sess.). Arizona law now provides:

Notwithstanding any other law, a person who is sentenced to 

life imprisonment with the possibility of release after serving 

a minimum number of calendar years for an offense that was 

committed before the person attained eighteen years of age is 

eligible for parole on completion of service of the minimum 

sentence, regardless of whether the offense was committed on 

or after January 1, 1994. 

A.R.S. § 13-716. Further, any person sentenced to life imprisonment and 

who is eligible for parole pursuant to A.R.S. § 13-716 is now expressly 

subject to the parole eligibility provisions of A.R.S. § 41-1604.09. A.R.S. § 

41-1604.09(I)(2). Addressing Coleman's other contentions, this court has 

already considered and rejected arguments regarding the retroactivity of 

H.B. 2593 and the resulting legislative changes. See State v. Vera, 235 Ariz. 

571, 576, ¶¶ 21-22 (App. 2014) (H.B. 2593 not impermissibly retroactive and 

does not impermissibly infringe "on the role of the judiciary").

¶7 In sum, Coleman now has a meaningful opportunity to be 

placed on parole once he completes 25 years of his sentence. This remedies 

any theoretical violation of Miller.

CONCLUSION

¶8 For the reasons stated, we grant review and deny relief.