* Pursuant to 5 T H C IR

. R. 47.5, the court has determined that th i s

opinion s h ould not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5 TH C IR . R. 47.5.4. United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit 

## FILED
December 12, 2005
Charles R. Fulbruge III Clerk UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

_______________________
No. 05-30549 Summary Calendar

_______________________ IRLIN C. THOMAS,
Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus

JO ANNE B. BARNHART, Commissioner of the Social Security Administration

Defendant-Appellee.

_________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Louisiana

No. 1:03-CV-1158

________________________________________________________________ Before JONES, WIENER, and DEMOSS, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: *

Appellant Irli n C. Thomas appeals the district court’s

decision dismissing her case as moot. We dismiss this appeal as

frivolous. See 5 th Circuit Local Rule 42.2.

In November 1992, Ms. Thomas was awarded supplemental
security income (“SSI”) under Title XVI of the Social Security Act.
On August 1, 2001, the Social Security Administration determined

that Thomas’s disa bility had ceased and that she no longer

qualified for SSI. Thomas appealed the finding, and Administrative2

Law Judge (“ALJ”) Curlee upheld the finding of disability cessation

on November 20, 2002. Thomas subsequently sought judicial review

of ALJ Curlee’s dec ision in the district court under 42 U.S.C. §

405(g).
During the pendency of her district c ourt case, Thomas
reapplied for SSI. In a decision dated October 29, 2004, ALJ

Markart reopened and revised ALJ Curlee’s November 2002 decision

and found that Thomas had been disabled since August 1, 2001. As

a result of the finding, ALJ Markart fully restored Thomas’s SSI as
of the date payments had ceased, August 1, 2001. In light of the

full restoration of SSI, the Commissioner moved to dismiss Thomas’s

district court case pursuant to F ED

. R. C IV

. P. 12(b)(1) on the

basis that there was no longer an issue to be resolved by the
district court. The district court subsequently entered judgment

dismissing with prejudice Thomas’s case as moot.

Thomas appeals the district court’s judgment, arguing

that: 1) the district court should not have relied upon ALJ

Markart’s decision because it was not part of the record, 2) the

district court did not explain the basis for its finding of

mootness, and 3) ALJ Markart improperly reopened ALJ Curlee’s

November 2002 decision.

We review the district court’s 12(b)(1) decision de novo.

LeClerc v. Webb , 41 F.3d 405, 413 (5th Cir. 2005). First, the

district court properly relied upon ALJ Markart’s decision in

deciding the 12(b)(1) motion. S ee Ramming v. United States , 2813

F.3d 158, 161 (5th Cir. 2001). Second, in response to the 12(b)(1)

motion, Thomas failed to carry her burden and make a showing that

subject-matter juri sdiction continued to exist after her SSI had

been fully restored by ALJ Marart’s decision. S ee id. Finally,

under 20 C.F.R. § 416.1488(b), ALJ Markart was authorized to reopen

ALJ Curlee’s decision. There is no possible doubt that the

district court correctly dismissed Thomas’s case as moot. This

appeal is frivolous.

DISMISSED.