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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

Docket No. 49244

STATE OF IDAHO,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

DAVID JAMES WEST,

Defendant-Appellant.

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Filed: April 14, 2023

Melanie Gagnepain, Clerk

THIS IS AN UNPUBLISHED

OPINION AND SHALL NOT

BE CITED AS AUTHORITY

Appeal from the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District, State of Idaho, Ada

County. Hon. Patrick J. Miller, District Judge. 

Judgment of conviction for possession of a controlled substance, affirmed.

Eric D. Fredericksen, State Appellate Public Defender; Jacob L. Westerfield, 

Deputy Appellate Public Defender, Boise, for appellant. 

Hon. Raúl R. Labrador, Attorney General; John C. McKinney, Deputy Attorney 

General, Boise, for respondent. 

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BRAILSFORD, Judge

David James West appeals from his judgment of conviction for felony possession of a 

controlled substance, Idaho Code § 37-2732(c). West argues the district court erred in denying his 

motion to suppress evidence because he contends an officer unlawfully prolonged the traffic stop. 

We affirm.

I.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

West does not contest the district court’s very detailed factual findings. Those findings 

show that in January 2021, Officer Green observed a vehicle with an “odd” traffic pattern and 

began following it. While Officer Green was following the vehicle, he observed several traffic 

violations, including that the vehicle failed to use the closest available lane while turning, failed to 

signal before transitioning from lane to lane, and twice crossed over the dotted line by 
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approximately one foot into the oncoming lane of traffic. After the vehicle parked at a gas station, 

Officer Green activated his lights; parked behind the vehicle; and contacted the driver, West.

West identified himself and provided his driver’s license; Officer Green requested West’s 

proof of insurance and vehicle registration; and West then asked why he was stopped by Officer 

Green. While conversing about the traffic violations Officer Green had observed, West continued 

to search for the vehicle’s registration and proof of insurance. While West searched for this 

documentation, Officer Green asked West whether he was on probation or parole; West replied he 

was on probation; and Officer Feldner appeared at West’s driver’s side door. 

When West was unable to find his registration, he asked Officer Green to look up the 

registration. Officer Green responded he would not be able to look up proof of insurance, and

West continued to search for proof of insurance. During West’s continued search, Officer Green

asked for consent to search the vehicle. West responded, “I have nothing to hide, do whatever you 

want.” About two minutes later, West provided some documentation of his insurance, and Officer 

Green instructed West to “sit tight” and returned to the patrol vehicle.

Once in the patrol vehicle, Officer Green began inputting information into his Mobile Data 

Terminal. At 3:09:14 a.m., Officer Green accessed the website for the Idaho Department of 

Correction’s online offender search (IDOC) database, mistyped the search, attempted again, and 

successfully accessed the database. Officer Green double-checked West’s driver’s license to 

verify his name and queried the database for information about him. The database returned a 

result, which Officer Green read aloud for the benefit of his on-body camera, stating that West was 

on parole.

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 Officer Green then closed the database at 3:10:14 a.m., one minute after his initial 

attempt to access the database.

After accessing and querying the IDOC database, Officer Green accessed the police 

department’s internal database for information about West. The returned information showed that 

West’s vehicle registration was valid. It also showed West’s criminal history, and Officer Green 

noted aloud, “So, no insurance issues. Okay.” After scrolling through the information on his 

screen, Officer Green began writing a traffic citation for West at 3:11:15 a.m.

1 The record is unclear whether West was on probation as he stated or on parole as Officer 

Green stated when receiving information from the IDOC database. The district court found that 

“neither the officers nor [West] were certain of [his] parole or probation status.”
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At the same time that Officer Green was in his patrol vehicle accessing the IDOC and 

internal police department databases and writing a traffic citation, Officer Feldner and Officer 

Lane, a drug-dog handler who had arrived at the scene, were conversing with West, who remained 

in his vehicle. During this time, Officer Feldner inquired whether West “had anything illegal in 

the car,” and Officer Lane indicated he was going to conduct an exterior drug-dog sniff of West’s 

vehicle and needed West to exit the vehicle.

Before allowing West to exit the vehicle, however, Officer Feldner inquired whether West 

had any weapons on him or had “anything illegal in [his] pockets.” When West did not respond 

directly to this latter question, Officer Feldner continued to press West for an answer. At 

approximately 3:10:30, West admitted he had a needle on him. Subsequently, West admitted that 

the needle was “loaded,” meaning it contained a controlled substance, and that he had a controlled 

substance on his person, including the type and amount of that substance. After discussing the 

controlled substance in West’s possession, he exited the vehicle at 3:11:27 a.m. and was arrested. 

Meanwhile, after West’s arrest, Officer Green remained in his patrol vehicle processing the traffic 

citation for West and exited the patrol vehicle at 3:15:09 a.m. After discussing the citation with 

West, Officer Green served it on West at 3:16:32 a.m., completing the traffic stop.

The State charged West with possession of a controlled substance and possession of drug 

paraphernalia and alleged a persistent violator enhancement. West filed a motion to suppress, 

arguing, among other things, that Officer Green unlawfully extended the duration of the traffic 

stop when he searched West’s probationary status on the IDOC database before writing the traffic 

citation. At the evidentiary hearing, both Officers Green and Feldner testified, and the district 

court admitted their body camera videos into evidence. Following the suppression hearing, the 

court denied West’s motion. The court found Officer Green’s inquiry into West’s probationary 

status in the IDOC database “was unrelated to the purpose of the stop but was nevertheless 

permissible.” In support of this conclusion, the court ruled “Officer Green acted diligently and 

made the inquiry within the time he reasonably should have been able to issue a citation.”

Following the denial of his suppression motion, West pled guilty to possession of a 

controlled substance and reserved his right to appeal the denial. West timely appeals. 
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II.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

The standard of review of a suppression motion is bifurcated. When a decision on a motion 

to suppress is challenged, we accept the trial court’s findings of fact that are supported by 

substantial evidence, but we freely review the application of constitutional principles to the facts 

as found. State v. Atkinson, 128 Idaho 559, 561, 916 P.2d 1284, 1286 (Ct. App. 1996). At a 

suppression hearing, the power to assess the credibility of witnesses, resolve factual conflicts, 

weigh evidence, and draw factual inferences is vested in the trial court. State v. Valdez-Molina, 

127 Idaho 102, 106, 897 P.2d 993, 997 (1995); State v. Schevers, 132 Idaho 786, 789, 979 P.2d 

659, 662 (Ct. App. 1999). 

III.

ANALYSIS

West argues the district erred in denying his suppression motion because Officer Green 

“did not have reasonable suspicion to justify a deviation from the original purpose of the traffic 

stop” to check West’s probationary status. The State argues “new reasonable suspicion developed 

before the traffic stop actually ended,” i.e., West admitted to possessing drug paraphernalia, and 

as a result, Officer Green’s minute-long inquiry into West’s probationary status did not unlawfully 

extend the stop. In support, the State relies on State v. Riley, 170 Idaho 572, 514 P.3d 982 (2022), 

which the Idaho Supreme Court issued after West filed his opening brief in this appeal. West 

replies the State improperly raises for the first time on appeal its argument that the stop was 

“legally extended because new reasonable suspicion developed before the traffic stop actually 

ended.”

A. Issue Preservation

As an initial matter, we address West’s argument that the State failed to preserve its 

appellate argument. Appellate court review is limited to the evidence, theories, and arguments 

that were presented below. State v. Garcia-Rodriguez, 162 Idaho 271, 275, 396 P.3d 700, 704 

(2017). A party’s specific arguments may evolve over time without raising the issue of 

preservation, as long as the substantive issue was properly raised before the trial court. State v. 

Hoskins, 165 Idaho 217, 224, 443 P.3d 231, 238 (2019); State v. Gonzalez, 165 Idaho 95, 98, 439 

P.3d 1267, 1270 (2019). A party preserves an issue for appeal by properly presenting the issue 

with argument and authority to the trial court and noticing it for hearing or if the trial court issues 
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an adverse ruling. State v. Miramontes, 170 Idaho 920, 924-25, 517 P.3d 849, 853-54 (2022). 

“Both are not required.” Id. at 925, 517 P.3d at 854. 

We disagree with West that the State failed to preserve its appellate argument. For 

example, in opposition to West’s suppression motion, the State argued “the purpose of a traffic 

stop is not permanently fixed at its inception for the duration of the detention, but may be 

transformed by evolving circumstances.” In support, the State cited State v. Hays, 159 Idaho 476, 

362 P.3d 551 (Ct. App. 2015).2 In Hays, this Court addressed whether an officer’s action of 

interacting with another officer for fifty-six seconds during a stop regarding a drug-dog sniff

unlawfully extended that stop before Hays admitted possessing marijuana and transformed the 

stop’s purpose into a drug investigation. Id. at 483, 362 P.3d at 558. The State argued that even 

if the officers’ communications about the drug-dog sniff delayed the completion of the traffic 

citation (and thus the traffic stop), Hays admitted to possessing marijuana “before the citation 

should have been completed.” Id. at 484, 362 P.3d at 559. In other words, because Hays produced 

the marijuana “before the citation was actually completed, there was no unlawful extension of the 

stop.” Id. 

This Court agreed with the State’s argument in Hays, noting the traffic stop’s purpose 

transformed into a drug investigation before the traffic citation was issued and before it should 

have reasonably been issued. Id. Because the State in this case cited Hays to the trial court and 

noted a stop’s purpose may be transformed, the State preserved for appeal its argument that “new 

reasonable suspicion developed before the traffic stop actually ended.” See Miramontes, 170 Idaho 

920, 924-25, 517 P.3d 849, 853-54 (holding “a party preserves an issue for appeal by properly 

presenting the issue with the argument and authority to the trial court and noticing it for hearing”).3

B. New Reasonable Suspicion

2 West argues State v. Hays, 159 Idaho 476, 362 P.3d 551 (Ct. App. 2015), “is no longer 

good law” in light of State v. Linze, 161 Idaho 605, 389 P.3d 150 (2016), and State v. Pylican, 167 

Idaho 745, 477 P.3d 180 (2020). We only discuss the State’s reliance on Hays, however, to 

demonstrate that the State preserved its appellate argument. In doing so, we do not decide the 

continuing validity of Hays, except to note that since Hays, the Idaho Supreme Court has continued 

to develop the law addressing the constitutionality of officers’ deviations from the purpose of 

traffic stops.

3 Although the record does not indicate the State noticed West’s suppression motion for a 

hearing, the district court held a hearing on the motion.
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West argues Officer Green unlawfully prolonged the duration of the traffic stop when he 

checked West’s probationary status in the IDOC database. A stop by an officer constitutes a 

seizure of the vehicle’s occupants and implicates the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition against 

unreasonable searches and seizures. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653 (1979); State v. 

Atkinson, 128 Idaho 559, 561, 916 P.2d 1284, 1286 (Ct. App. 1996). Under the Fourth 

Amendment, an officer may stop a vehicle to investigate possible criminal behavior if there is a 

reasonable and articulable suspicion that the vehicle is being driven contrary to traffic laws. United 

States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417 (1981); State v. Flowers, 131 Idaho 205, 208, 953 P.2d 645, 

648 (Ct. App. 1998).

A traffic-related seizure violates the Fourth Amendment if prolonged beyond the time 

reasonably required to complete the “mission” of issuing a ticket. Rodriguez v. United States, 575

U.S. 348, 350-51 (2015); State v. Karst, 170 Idaho 219, 223, 509 P.3d 1148, 1152 (2022). In other 

words, “a police stop exceeding the time needed to handle the matter for which the stop was made 

violates the Constitution’s shield against unreasonable seizures.” Rodriguez, 575 U.S. at 350; see

Karst, 170 Idaho at 224, 509 P.3d at 1153; State v. Linze, 161 Idaho 605, 608, 389 P.3d 150, 153

(2016).

Authority for a traffic-related seizure ends when the tasks related to the infraction are, or 

reasonably should have been, completed. Rodriguez, 575 U.S. at 354; Linze, 161 Idaho at 609,

389 P.3d at 154. Tasks related to a traffic stop include, but are not limited to, addressing the traffic 

violation precipitating the stop; determining whether to issue a traffic ticket; and making ordinary 

inquiries incident to the stop, such as checking the driver’s license and proof of insurance. 

Rodriguez, 575 U.S. at 354-55. Additionally, an officer may also “take certain negligibly 

burdensome precautions in order to complete his mission safely, such as asking for the driver and 

passenger to exit the vehicle and conducting a criminal record check.” State v. Hale, 168 Idaho 

863, 867, 489 P.3d 450, 454 (2021) (quotation omitted).

When an officer deviates from the tasks related to the traffic infraction, the traffic stop may 

be unconstitutionally delayed or prolonged. See, e.g., Karst, 170 Idaho at 227, 509 P.3d at 1156

(ruling officer unlawfully delayed stop by taking nineteen seconds to request a drug-dog unit); 

Linze, 161 Idaho at 607, 389 P.3d at 152 (ruling officer unlawfully delayed stop by serving backup 

function for officer conducting drug-dog sniff). The Idaho Supreme Court, however, has held in

Riley, 170 Idaho at 578, 514 P.3d at 988, that determining whether an officer’s deviation 
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unlawfully prolonged a stop focuses on whether the conduct adds time “to the overall duration of 

the traffic stop.” In Riley, Officer Kingland stopped Riley for a traffic violation. Id. at 574, 514 

P.3d at 984. The Court found Officer Kingland deviated twice from the stop’s purpose, including 

an eight-second deviation to inquire whether Riley had illegal substances in her vehicle and 

another twenty-second deviation to converse with backup officers who had arrived on the scene. 

Id. at 577, 514 P.3d at 987. Subsequent to these deviations, a drug dog alerted on Riley’s vehicle 

providing reasonable suspicion for a drug investigation. Id. at 580, 514 P.3d at 990.

The Riley Court reiterated the inquiry focuses on whether the officer’s deviation prolongs 

or adds time “to the overall duration of the traffic stop.” Id. Focusing on the overall duration of 

the stop, the Court concluded that despite Officer Kingland’s deviations from the stop, he did not 

prolong it unlawfully. Id. The Court reasoned that when the drug dog alerted on Riley’s vehicle, 

it created new reasonable suspicion for a separate investigation before Officer Kingland completed 

the stop. Id. Because Officer Kingland required forty-eight seconds to complete the traffic stop 

after the drug dog alerted, the twenty-eight-second deviation did not unlawfully prolong the stop. 

Id. In other words, even if the twenty-eight-second deviation had not occurred, Officer Kingland 

would not have completed the stop until twenty seconds after the drug dog alerted, providing

reasonable suspicion to conduct a drug investigation. Id. Accordingly, the Court concluded the 

deviations did not prolong or add time to the overall duration of the stop. Id.

As in Riley, Officer Green’s deviation to check West’s probationary status did not 

unlawfully prolong the traffic stop.4 The district court found this deviation lasted one minute from 

3:09:14 a.m. until 3:10:14 a.m. Meanwhile, at 3:10:30 a.m., West admitted to Officer Feldner that 

West had drug paraphernalia, i.e., a needle, in his possession, which provided new reasonable 

suspicion for a separate drug investigation. Officer Green did not complete writing the traffic 

citation until 3:15:09 a.m. and served it at 3:16:32 a.m. See State v. Galindo, ___ Idaho ___, ___, 

522 P.3d 1284, 1288 (Ct. App. 2022) (ruling stop is completed when officer prepares, serves, and 

4 For purposes of this appeal, the State does not dispute that Officer Green’s inquiry into 

West’s probationary status deviated from the tasks of the traffic stop. See State v. Burgess, 165 

Idaho 109, 114, 440 P.3d 455, 460 (Ct. App. 2018) (holding task of verifying passenger’s probation 

status unlawfully extended traffic stop but noting neither United States Supreme Court nor Idaho 

Supreme Court has addressed whether inquiry into driver’s probation or parole status is within 

scope of permissible inquiries).
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explains traffic citation). West does not dispute these findings.5 Based on these findings, even 

assuming Officer Green had not deviated from the stop’s purpose for one minute, he would not 

have completed the stop until 3:15:32 a.m. (3:16:32 a.m. minus sixty seconds), which would have 

occurred after West’s admission to possession of drug paraphernalia. Accordingly, Officer 

Green’s deviation did not prolong the stop unlawfully.

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IV.

CONCLUSION

The district court did not err by denying West’s suppression motion. Accordingly, we 

affirm his judgment of conviction.

Chief Judge LORELLO and Judge HUSKEY CONCUR. 

5 West contends “the district court in this case performed none of the extensive analysis 

adopted by the district court in Riley in measuring whether the deviations by the police unlawfully 

extended the traffic stop.” The district court in this case, however, did make very detailed, 

extensive factual findings allowing for consideration of the State’s argument that Officer Green’s 

one-minute deviation did not unlawfully prolong the traffic stop.

6 Because we conclude Officer Green did not unlawfully prolong the traffic stop, we do not 

address the State’s assertion West consented to the search.