NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION. 

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL 

AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE 

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

In re the Matter of: 

ANGELA T. BURK, Petitioner/Appellee, 

v.

DENNIS E. TEUFEL, Respondent/Appellant. 

UDALL SHUMWAY PLC, Real Party in Interest/Appellee

No. 1 CA-CV 15-0117 FC 

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County 

Nos. FN 2008-002605 and FN 2008-091601 (CONSOLIDATED) 

The Honorable John R. Hannah, Judge 

REVERSED 

COUNSEL 

Udall Shumway PLC, Mesa 

By Steven H. Everts and David R. Schwartz 

Counsel for Real Party in Interest/Appellee 

Dickinson Wright PLLC, Phoenix 

By Leonce A. Richard, III 

Counsel for Respondent/Appellant
BURK v. TEUFEL 

Decision of the Court 

2

MEMORANDUM DECISION 

Presiding Judge Andrew W. Gould delivered the decision of the Court, in 

which Judge John C. Gemmill and Judge Margaret H. Downie joined. 

G O U L D, Judge: 

¶1 Dennis Teufel (“Husband”) appeals the family court’s order 

approving a settlement agreement and amending the decree to 

incorporate the agreement. Because the court did not make findings 

regarding a substantial change in circumstances or the existence of 

conditions justifying the reopening of the decree as required by Arizona 

Revised Statute (“A.R.S.”) section 25-327, we conclude it did not have the 

authority to modify the decree by incorporating the settlement agreement. 

We therefore reverse. 

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 

¶2 Husband and his former spouse, Angela Burk (“Wife”), filed 

for divorce in August 2008. From this case’s inception, the parties have 

disagreed about division of property and the amount of spousal 

maintenance to be awarded to Wife. Following a 2-day trial, the family 

court made an equitable division of the parties’ property and ordered 

Husband to pay Wife $250,000.00 in spousal maintenance. Additionally, 

based on the disparity of income between the parties and the 

unreasonable positions taken by Husband during the litigation, the court 

ordered Husband to pay 100% of Wife’s attorneys’ fees pursuant to A.R.S. 

§ 25-324. 

¶3 Immediately following entry of the decree, the parties began 

filing motions seeking to change the decree. Husband filed an appeal of 

the decree and the court’s denial of his motion for new trial. During the 

pendency of Husband’s appeal, the parties continued to litigate the 

decree’s property distribution orders. 
BURK v. TEUFEL 

Decision of the Court 

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¶4 In May 2010, Husband and Wife entered into a settlement 

agreement.1 The settlement agreement, by its express terms, modified the 

decree. The agreement stated it was the intent of the parties to settle all of 

the claims “raised in their divorce,” including “all rights and obligations 

under” the decree. The agreement also stated that “[e]xcept as otherwise 

expressly modified by the terms of this [a]greement, the parties hereby 

affirm and accept . . . the Court’s orders set forth” in the decree. 

¶5 The settlement agreement changed the property distribution 

in the decree. For example, the agreement modified the terms by which 

Wife obtained ownership of the parties’ Iowa residence. Wife also gave 

up her portion of interest in the Atlantis timeshare that had been awarded 

to her under the decree. In addition, the agreement changed the division 

of frequent flier miles, tax credits, furniture, personal property, and the 

parties’ obligations regarding their marital residence. 

¶6 The agreement also resolved the parties’ dispute over 

interest owed on Wife’s spousal maintenance award, and provided terms 

for Husband to pay the balance of spousal maintenance owed to Wife. 

Additionally, the parties agreed to pay their own legal expenses and 

waived all attorneys’ fees claims “of any nature with regard to any 

statutes of the state of Az.” 

¶7 After the parties entered the settlement agreement, Husband 

filed a notice of settlement with the court; attached to the notice was a 

copy of the agreement. Husband lodged a form of order with the court 

entitled “Order Approving and Adopting Parties’ Agreements Modifying 

Terms of the Decree of Dissolution.” Husband subsequently dismissed 

his appeal of the decree. 

¶8 The law firm that had represented Wife was not involved in 

negotiating or drafting the settlement agreement. When the firm received 

the notice of settlement, it filed a statement with the court seeking 

payment of $44,000 in fees incurred to enforce Husband’s compliance with 

the decree. The firm sought payment of these fees from money garnished 

 

1 There are two different copies of the settlement agreement in the 

record. The court determined the agreement offered by Wife as an exhibit 

at the hearing was the written version of the agreement. We defer to the 

superior court’s finding in this regard and treat the settlement agreement 

notarized on May 6, 2010, and filed as an exhibit, as the parties’ settlement 

agreement. See McNeil v. Hoskyns, 236 Ariz. 173, 176, ¶ 13 (App. 2014) 
BURK v. TEUFEL 

Decision of the Court 

4

from Husband and held in its trust account on Wife’s behalf. The court 

denied the firm’s request, stating Wife’s attorneys did not have a security 

or lien interest in the funds held in the trust account for Wife because Wife 

did not have an ownership interest in the funds. 

¶9 The law firm appealed the court’s ruling, and this court 

affirmed, rejecting the firm’s lien claim. However, because the issue was 

beyond the scope of the appeal, we did not address the firm’s argument 

the settlement agreement should be set aside. Rather, we remanded the 

case to the court to determine whether the settlement agreement was 

dispositive of Wife’s remaining claim for fees, and whether to order 

disbursement of the remaining funds in the trust account to Husband. 

¶10 On remand, the court examined the settlement agreement. 

Wife sought to set the settlement agreement aside as “unfair” pursuant to 

A.R.S. § 25-317 and Sharp v. Sharp, 179 Ariz. 205 (App. 1994). Husband 

argued the settlement agreement was a post-decree agreement, and 

therefore not subject to A.R.S. § 25-317. 

¶11 The court reviewed the settlement agreement under A.R.S. § 

25-317. It concluded it had the authority and obligation to review the 

settlement agreement to determine whether it was validly entered, and 

was fair and equitable. The court also placed the burden of proving the 

agreement was fair and equitable on Husband. Upon examination, the 

court found the settlement agreement was valid and binding on the 

parties. It also found the agreement was fair and equitable except for the 

provisions attempting to relieve Husband of his obligation to pay Wife’s 

attorneys’ fees. Accordingly, the court struck the provisions in the 

agreement waiving Wife’s claims for attorneys’ fees. Finally, the court 

amended the decree “by incorporating into it the [s]ettlement [a]greement 

as amended.”2

 

2 In its order, the court also found that Wife was “entitled to have 

Husband pay her reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs for the post-decree 

period before and after the entry of the settlement agreement.” To this 

end, the court ordered Husband to pay to Wife $40,000 from Wife’s 

attorney’s trust account for the reasonable fees incurred between entry of 

the divorce decree and September 30, 2010. The court also found Wife 

was entitled to an award of fees for the current litigation over the 

settlement agreement and ordered Wife’s attorney to file an affidavit for 
BURK v. TEUFEL 

Decision of the Court 

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¶12 Husband filed a motion for new trial objecting to the court’s 

review of the agreement pursuant to A.R.S. § 25-317. The court denied 

Husband’s motion, and he timely appealed. 

DISCUSSION 

I. Standard of Review 

¶13 We review the superior court’s interpretation and 

application of court rules and statutory provisions de novo. See Egan v. 

Fridlund-Horne, 221 Ariz. 229, 232, ¶ 8 (App. 2009); Allstate Indem. Co. v. 

Ridgely, 214 Ariz. 440, 442, ¶ 8 (App. 2007). A superior court’s 

interpretation of an unambiguous agreement is also a question of law we 

review de novo. In re Marriage of Pownall, 197 Ariz. 577, 580, ¶ 7 (App. 

2000). 

II. Modification of the Divorce Decree 

¶14 Husband argues the post-decree settlement agreement is 

valid and the family court did not have the authority to review the 

agreement pursuant to A.R.S. § 25-317 and Sharp v. Sharp, 179 Ariz. 205 

(App. 1994). However, we need not reach this issue because, under the 

facts of this case, the court was not permitted to amend the decree by 

incorporating the settlement agreement into the decree. 

¶15 A trial court’s authority to terminate or modify the property 

division in a divorce decree is governed by A.R.S. § 25-327. See Schmidt v. 

Schmidt, 158 Ariz. 496, 498 (App. 1988). Pursuant to A.R.S. § 25-327(A), 

the property disposition order in a decree may only be revoked or 

modified if the court finds the existence of conditions justifying reopening 

a judgment. A.R.S. § 25-327(A); LaPrade v. LaPrade, 189 Ariz. 243, 246 

(1997); Schmidt, 168 Ariz. at 498; see Ariz. R. Fam. Law. P. Rule 85(C) 

(listing the grounds for reopening a decree). 

¶16 By its express terms, the agreement modifies the property 

division in the decree. Indeed, Husband submitted the agreement to the 

court seeking an order adopting the agreement and modifying the terms 

of the decree. However, prior to entering the agreement, neither party 

sought to reopen the decree or petitioned the court to make findings in 

compliance with A.R.S. § 25-327(A). 

 

those fees. Upon receipt of counsel’s affidavit, the court awarded 

$28,243.58 in fees to be paid by Husband directly to Wife’s attorney. 
BURK v. TEUFEL 

Decision of the Court 

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¶17 Under these circumstances, the court did not have the 

authority to modify the decree by incorporating the settlement agreement. 

The court made its modification without first reopening the decree or 

making any findings of a substantial and continuing change of

circumstances justifying reopening the decree. Pursuant to A.R.S. § 25-

327(A), this was error, and we must vacate the court’s order.3 Schmidt, 158 

Ariz. at 498 (stating a court is required to find at least one of the Rule 60(c) 

conditions exist before it can modify a provision as to property 

disposition). Accordingly, we reverse the court’s order approving the 

settlement agreement and incorporating the agreement into the decree.

III. Attorneys’ Fees on Appeal

¶18 Appellee, Wife’s law firm, requests an award of attorneys’ 

fees for Wife pursuant to A.R.S. § 25-324. The firm reasons that it stands 

in the shoes of Wife for purposes of the appeal, and Wife is entitled to an 

award under § 25-324 due to the substantial disparity of financial 

resources between Wife and Husband. 

¶19 A.R.S. § 25-324 does not require that a party prevail in order 

to be awarded fees. The record shows a substantial disparity of income 

and assets between Husband and Wife. Having considered the parties’ 

financial resources and the reasonableness of the positions taken, we find 

that Wife is entitled to an award of reasonable fees incurred on appeal 

pursuant to A.R.S. § 25-324. We direct her to file a fee application in 

compliance with ARCAP 21. 

 

3 Husband relies on LaPrade v. LaPrade, 189 Ariz. 243 (1997), to argue 

that he and Wife had the independent ability to enter post-decree 

contracts that modify the divorce decree’s property division regardless of 

the court’s authority to do so. Husband’s reading of LaPrade omits the 

important fact that the parties contracted to modify the provisions of a 

settlement agreement that was incorporated, but not merged, into their 

divorce decree. 189 Ariz. at 249. Under the circumstances before us, 

where the trial court exceeded its authority to modify the divorce decree 

without making the requisite findings, we decline to so extend LaPrade.
BURK v. TEUFEL 

Decision of the Court 

7

CONCLUSION 

¶20 Because the family court’s order approving the settlement 

agreement and modifying the decree was barred by A.R.S. § 25-327(A), we 

reverse.