NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

BRADLEY L. NELSON, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

 v. 

HIBU, INC., FKA Yellowbook, Inc., 

Defendant-Appellee.

No. 18-15330 

D.C. No. 4:13-cv-00956-DCB 

MEMORANDUM*

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Arizona

David C. Bury, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted February 19, 2019**

Before: FERNANDEZ, SILVERMAN, and WATFORD, Circuit Judges. 

Bradley L. Nelson appeals pro se from the district court’s summary 

judgment in his action alleging federal employment claims. We have jurisdiction 

under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo. Am. Tower Corp. v. City of San 

Diego, 763 F.3d 1035, 1043 (9th Cir. 2014). We affirm.

 

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent 

except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision 

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

FILED

FEB 26 2019

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
2 18-15330 

The district court properly granted summary judgment on Nelson’s claims 

arising from his January 27, 2011 and December 6, 2011 Equal Employment 

Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) charges because these claims were barred by 

the applicable statute of limitations. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1); Scholar v. 

Pac. Bell, 963 F.2d 264, 266-67 (9th Cir. 1992) (90-day deadline to file a Title VII 

action “constitutes a statute of limitations” and if plaintiff “fails to file within [the] 

90-day period, the action is barred”). We reject as meritless Nelson’s contention 

that the continuing violations doctrine applies. 

The district court properly granted summary judgment on Nelson’s

disability, age, and sex discrimination claims, as well as Nelson’s retaliation claim, 

because Nelson failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether the 

legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for defendant’s actions were pretextual. See

Curley v. City of N. Las Vegas, 772 F.3d 629, 632 (9th Cir. 2014) (burden-shifting 

framework applies to disability discrimination claim under the Americans with 

Disabilities Act); Shelley v. Geren, 666 F.3d 599, 606-08 (9th Cir. 2012) (burdenshifting framework applies to age discrimination claims under the Age 

Discrimination in Employment Act); Porter v. Cal. Dep’t of Corr., 419 F.3d 885, 

894 (9th Cir. 2005) (burden-shifting framework applies to Title VII retaliation 

claims); Villiarimo v. Aloha Island Air, Inc., 281 F.3d 1054, 1061-62 (9th Cir. 

2002) (burden-shifting framework applies to sex discrimination claims under Title 
3 18-15330 

VII; circumstantial evidence of pretext must be specific and substantial).

The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Nelson’s motion 

for a discovery continuance because Nelson failed to demonstrate that he suffered 

any actual and substantial prejudice. See Laub v. U.S. Dep’t of Interior, 342 F.3d 

1080, 1093 (9th Cir. 2003) (“A district court is vested with broad discretion to 

permit or deny discovery, and a decision to deny discovery will not be disturbed 

except upon the clearest showing that the denial of discovery results in actual and 

substantial prejudice to the complaining litigant.” (citation and internal quotation 

marks omitted)).

AFFIRMED.