FILED

August 20, 1998

Cecil Crowson, Jr.

Appellate C ourt Clerk

 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS

AT KNOXVILLE

FIRST TENNESSEE BANK NATIONAL ) BLOUNT CIRCUIT

ASSOCIATION, ) C. A. NO. 03A01-9711-CV-00514

 )

 Plaintiff-Appellee )

 )

 )

 )

vs. ) HON. W. DALE YOUNG

 ) JUDGE

 )

 )

 )

RONALD A. WHITE, BERYL A. WHITE,) AFFIRMED AND REMANDED

and DEBRA K. WHITE, )

 )

 Defendants-Appellants )

F. D. GIBSON, Maryville, for Appellants.

GORDON D. FOSTER, Lacy & Winchester, Knoxville, for Appellee.

O P I N I O N

McMurray, J.

This action was instituted in th e Chancery Court for Blount

County seeking to revive, by scire facias, a judgm ent previously

obtained by th e p laintiff against the defendants. The previous

judgment had been obtained in the Circuit Court of Blount County.

The chancellor elected to order this action transferred to the
2

circuit court rather than dispose of the matter in chancery court.

The chancery court action was filed less than ten (10) years after

the previous judgment was obtained in circuit court. Ten (10)

years had expi red, h owever, before the action was transferred to

the circuit court. The defendants moved to dismiss the circuit

court action on the grounds that t he te n year statute of limitations for judgments as provided in T.C.A. § 28-3-110 had expired.

The motion was overruled. Thereafter, judgment was entered

reviving and extending the previ ous ju dgment for a new statutory

period. This appeal resulted. We affirm the judgment of the trial

court.

O n this appeal, the appellants ask us to review the following

issues:

1 . I s the scire facias action barred by T.C.A. § 28-3-

110?

2 . I s th e c omplaint void due to lack of proper process?

W e will first consider the sec ond i ssue. The issue was not

raised in the trial court. It is well-settled that issu es not

raised at the trial level will not be considered for the first time

o n appeal. Book-Mart of Florida v. National Book Warehouse , 917

S.W.2d 691, 694 (Tenn. App. 1995); Sparks v. Metropolitan Gov't of

Nashville and Davidson County , 771 S.W.2d 430, 434 (Tenn. App.
3

1989). There is an exception, however. The issue of jurisdiction

can be raised at any time. See Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure,

Rule 12.08 and Arnold v. Gouvitsa , 735 S.W.2d 458 (Tenn. App.

1987). Thus, the issue of jurisdiction is properly before the

court. The re are two general areas of jurisdiction. One is

subject matter jurisdiction and the other is jurisdiction over the

person. Subject matter jurisdiction is the basis for the court's

authority to act and cannot be waived. See Landers v. Jones , 872

S.W.2d 674, 675 (Tenn. 1994). Obviously, the court, under the

circumstan ces of this case has subject matter jurisdiction. (As

hereinafter noted, this is simply an action on a debt.)

W e will next examine the matter of person al j urisdiction.

Unlike subject matter jurisdiction, personal juris dict ion can be

waived. The general rule is state d in Dixie Sav. Stores, Inc. v.

Turner , 767 S.W.2d 408 (Tenn. App. 1988):

A party's objections to personal jurisdiction and

venue ar e deem ed waived unless they are raised in a

timely manner. Kane v. Kane , 547 S.W.2d 559, 560 (Tenn.

1977) (venue); Felty v. Chillicothe Realty Co ., 175 Tenn.

315, 318, 134 S.W.2d 153, 154 (1939) (personal jurisdiction). Thus, if a party makes a gen eral a ppearance and

does not take issue with venue, adequacy of servic e of

process, personal jurisdiction, or other similar matters,

the courts customarily find that the party has waived its

objections to the se m atters. Tennessee Dep't. of Human

Serv's v. Daniel , 659 S.W.2d 625, 626 (Tenn. App. 1983)

(personal jurisdiction); Walkup v. Covington , 18 Tenn.
4

App. 117 , 126, 73 S.W.2d 718, 723-24 (1933) (defect in

process).

Id. at page 410.

Rule 12, Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure has tempered the

common law rule to a certain extent. A party may now preserve an

issue relating to personal jurisdiction when it is joined with

another defense in a responsive motion or pleading. See T.R.C.P.,

Rule 12.02. Such was not done in this case. Therefore, under the

above authorities, the filing of a motion to dismiss on the grounds

that the statute of limitations has expired without reservation or

a n alternative ground challen ging t he sufficiency of process

constitutes a general appearance and the party so appearing waives

the deficiency (if any) and submits to the personal jurisdiction of

the court.

We find no merit in the appellants' second issue.

W e will examine and analyze the first issue under the same

circumstances that it was presented to the trial court. The

defendants' motion is based upon the following grounds:

1 . Judgment in this cause was rendered on October 22,

1985. [The original judgment].

2 . O n October 16, 1995, an orig inal action was filed

in Chancery Court for Blount County styled Writ of

Scire Fa c ias between the same parties seeking to
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rev ive this judgment under provisions of T.C.A. §

25-4-101 et seq., and T.C.A. § 28-3-110.

3 . A n order of T r a nsfer was ordered by Chancellor

Chester S. Rainwater, Jr., and was entered December

4, 1995.

4 . No original action was taken in this case prior to

October 22, 1995 and no Writ of Sci re Facias was

filed in this case prior to October 22, 1995.

5 . T h e cu rrent action, being a transfer from Cause

#95-104 of the Chanc e ry Court for Blount County,

T enne ssee is barred by the Statute of Limitations

codified in T.C.A. § 28-3-110 and should be dismissed.

It is most significant to note that there is no challenge to

the sufficiency of the process in chancer y cou rt. The thrust of

the appellants' argument is that no process issued from the circuit

court until after the statute of limitations had expired and that

the chancery court was lacking in jurisdiction since the original

judgment sought to be revived was in the circuit court. We find no

merit in this contention. As noted in the appellants' brief, the

"lead process" in this matter was the i ssua nce of a show cause

notice which was served on the appellants on October 20, 1995. The

record bears out this fact. The lead process was issued from the

chancery court and was served and returned in accordance with Rule

3, Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure.

Rule 4, prescribes the method of the issuance, form and return

o f a summons. There is no specific form of a summons prescribed or
6

required. A summons must contain certain information as enumerated

in Rule 4.02. The leading process issued from the chancery court

o n the original complaint in this action substantially complies

with the requirements of Rule 4.02. We find that substantial

compliance is sufficient provided it is adequate to comply with due

process requirements.

Basic due process requires "notice reasonably

calculated under all the circumstances, to apprise

int ere sted parties" of the claims of the opposing

parties. Mullane v. Central, Hanover Trust Co ., 339 U.S.

3 0 6 , 314, 94 L. Ed. 865, 70 S. Ct. 652 (1950). T h e

purpose of due process requirements is to notify the

individual in advance in order to allow adequate preparation and reduce surprise. Memphis Light, Gas, and Water

Division v. Craft , 436 U.S. 1, 14, 56 L. Ed. 2d 30, 98 S.

Ct. 1554 (1978).

McC lellan v. Board of Regents of the State Univ. , 921 S.W.2d 6 8 4

(Tenn. 1996).

W e find that the leading process issued from the chancery

court was sufficient to satisfy due process requirements. Further,

there has been no showing of prejudice to the defendants in any way

caused b y the way and manner in which the leading process wa s

issued and served.

Our next inquiry is whether th e c hancery court had subject

matter jurisdiction to entertain this action when it was originally

filed there. Our supreme court has established that actions to

renew a judgment are actions upon a debt. Shephard v. Lanier , 241
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S.W.2d 587 (Tenn. 1951). Such actions may be brought by complaint

in chancery. Gibson's Suits in Chancery § 501, (William H. Inman

ed., 6th ed. 1982).

Additionally, T.C.A. § 21-1-502 provides as follows:

21-1-502. Suits related to actions in other courts. — The

chancery court in which shall be brought any suit or

proceeding in which complainant seeks relief predicated

upon, closely related to, or growing out of, matters or

things theretofore adjudicated by final judgment or

decree of the circuit or any other court, whether or not

the circuit or other court retained jurisdiction of the

cause for the purpose of enforcing or modifying the final

judgment or decree, in the sound discretion of the judge

or chancellor of the chancery court, either sua sponte ,

o r upon motion of any defendant, may transfer the suit or

proceeding to the court in which such matters or things

were theretofore finally adjudicated; provided, that the

circuit or other cour t shall have jurisdiction thereof

concurrent with the chancery court; and provided further,

that it shall be made to appear to the chancery court

that the transfer of the suit or proceeding to the

circu i t or other court will not cause unnecessary

hardship or inconvenience to the parties thereto, their

counsel, or witnesses, or unreasonable delay in the final

hearing or disposition of the suit or proceeding.

Under the above quoted statute, jurisdiction of the chancery

court is not reasonably open to question. We are of the opinion and

hold that the filing of the complaint in the chancery court tolled

the statute of limitations found in T.C.A. § 28-3-110 and that the

appellants were not prejudiced by the transfer of the case to the

circuit court.
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Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court in all

respects. Costs are assessed to the appellants and this c ase i s

remanded to the trial court.

_____________________________________

 Don T. McMurray, Judge

CONCUR:

_______________________________

Herschel P. Franks, Judge

_______________________________

William H. Inman, Senior Judge
 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS

AT KNOXVILLE

FIRST TENNESSEE BANK NATIONAL ) BLOUNT CIRCUIT

ASSOCIATION, ) C. A. NO. 03A01-9711-CV-00514

 )

 Plaintiff-Appellee )

 )

 )

 )

vs. ) HON. W. DALE YOUNG

 ) JUDGE

 )

 )

 )

RONALD A. WHITE, BERYL A. WHITE,) AFFIRMED AND REMANDED

and DEBRA K. WHITE, )

 )

 Defendants-Appellants )

JUDGMENT

This appeal came on to be heard upon the reco rd from the

Circui t Cou rt of Blount County and briefs filed on behalf of the

respective parties, oral argument having been waived. Upon

consideration thereof, this Court is of the opinion that there was

no reversible error in the trial court.

W e affirm the judgment of the trial court in all respects.

Costs are assessed to the appellants and this case is remanded to

the trial court.

 PER CURIAM