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STATE OF MICHIGAN 

COURT OF APPEALS 

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, 

 Plaintiff-Appellee, 

UNPUBLISHED 

December 22, 2016 

v No. 329383 

Wayne Circuit Court 

KARLTON TERRY LEWIS, LC No. 15-002576-02-FH 

 Defendant-Appellant. 

Before: JANSEN, P.J., and CAVANAGH and BOONSTRA, JJ. 

JANSEN, P.J. (dissenting). 

 I respectfully dissent. I conclude that Simpson’s conduct of turning directly in front of or 

swerving into the path of an oncoming vehicle while intoxicated constituted gross negligence 

and superseded defendant’s conduct such that the causal link between defendant’s conduct and 

the victim’s death was broken. Therefore, I would reverse defendant’s conviction and sentence, 

and remand for entry of an order of conviction for operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated, 

MCL 257.625(1), and for resentencing. 

 The sole issue is whether defendant’s conduct constituted a proximate cause of the 

victim’s death. As explained in the majority opinion, proximate cause exists when the victim’s 

injury is a “ ‘direct and natural result’ ” of the defendant’s conduct. People v Schaefer, 473 Mich 

418, 436; 703 NW2d 774 (2005) (citation omitted). In determining whether a defendant was a 

proximate cause of the victim’s injury, it is necessary to determine whether there existed an 

intervening cause that superseded the defendant’s actions, breaking the causal link between the 

defendant’s conduct and the victim’s injury. Id. at 436-437. The test to determine whether an 

intervening cause superseded the defendant’s conduct is whether the intervening cause was 

reasonably foreseeable. Id. at 437. As the majority recognizes, ordinary negligence is 

reasonably foreseeable, but gross negligence on the part of a third party is not. Id. at 437-438. 

Our Supreme Court has defined “gross negligence” as “ ‘wantonness and disregard of the 

consequences which may ensue, and indifference to the rights of others that is equivalent to a 

criminal intent.’ ” Id. at 438 (citation omitted). 

 In People v Feezel, 486 Mich 184, 188; 783 NW2d 67 (2010) (opinion by CAVANAGH,

J.), the defendant was convicted of operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated, second offense, 

MCL 257.625(1), among other convictions. The defendant was driving in the early hours of the 

morning when he struck and killed a pedestrian who was walking in the middle of the road with 
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his back to oncoming traffic. Id. at 188-189. The victim was extremely intoxicated at the time

he was hit. Id. Our Supreme Court determined that the fact that the victim was intoxicated at the 

time he was hit was relevant to the issue of proximate causation, specifically with regard to 

whether he was conducting himself in a grossly negligent manner at the time he was hit. Id. at 

198-199. Our Supreme Court stated: 

[w]hile intoxication may explain why a person acted in a particular manner, being 

intoxicated, by itself, is not conduct amounting to gross negligence. In this case, 

however, the victim’s extreme intoxication was highly probative of the issue of 

gross negligence, and therefore causation, because the victim’s intoxication would 

have affected his ability to perceive the risks posed by his conduct and diminished 

his capacity to react to the world around him. [Id. at 199.] 

 I conclude that Simpson was grossly negligent when she turned or swerved in front of an 

oncoming vehicle while intoxicated, and Simpson’s actions superseded defendant’s conduct. 

The majority recognizes that, for the purposes of MCL 257.625(4), gross negligence is presumed 

when an individual “acted knowingly in consuming an intoxicating liquor or a controlled 

substance, and acted voluntarily in deciding to drive after such consumption.” People v Lardie, 

452 Mich 231, 251, 256; 551 NW2d 656 (1996), overruled in part on other grounds by Schaefer, 

473 Mich at 433. In this case, it is undisputed that Simpson was operating her motor vehicle 

while intoxicated and that she voluntarily decided to drive after knowingly consuming alcohol. 

Like the victim in Feezel, Simpson’s intoxication would have affected her ability to perceive the 

risks posed by her conduct and diminished her ability to react to the world around her. See 

Feezel, 486 Mich at 199. 

 Further, Simpson’s conduct of turning in front of or swerving directly into oncoming 

traffic while intoxicated was the result of her gross negligence. Simpson’s conduct amounted to 

more than simply a judgment call regarding the speed of the oncoming car.1

 Instead, Simpson’s 

actions of driving while intoxicated and turning or swerving into oncoming traffic demonstrated 

a wantonness and disregard for the consequences which may ensue from her actions, and 

indifference to the rights of others. Although defendant was driving while intoxicated at a high 

rate of speed, defendant drove straight through an amber light, and he had the right of way. It 

was not reasonably foreseeable that an intoxicated driver would cross the center line of the road 

into oncoming traffic or turn directly into the path of an oncoming car. Therefore, I conclude 

that the victim’s death was not the natural and direct result of defendant’s conduct. Accordingly, 

I believe that the trial court’s findings were clearly erroneous and that the verdict was against the 

 

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 The majority points out that Simpson’s expert testified that Simpson could not judge the speed 

of defendant’s vehicle and that it is more difficult to judge the speed of an oncoming vehicle at 

night. However, Simpson’s expert explained that when a driver is intoxicated, his or her vision 

and perception may be affected due to the alcohol. Also, the expert did not opine regarding the 

effect that Simpson’s intoxication would have had on her ability to judge the speed of 

defendant’s vehicle or her ability to make the decision to turn or swerve in front of an oncoming 

car. 
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great weight of the evidence. For the reasons stated, I would reverse defendant’s conviction and 

sentence, and remand for entry of an order of conviction for operating a motor vehicle while 

intoxicated and resentencing for that conviction. 

 

/s/ Kathleen Jansen