alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 08-1399

PATRICK J. MUHAMMAD,

Plaintiff - Appellant,

v.

MARYLAND COURT OF APPEALS; ROBERT M. BELL; IRMA S. RAKER; ALAN M. WILNER; DALE R. CATHELL; GLENN T. HARRELL, JR.; LYNNE ANN BATTAGLIA; CLAYTON GREENE, JR., all to be located at Robert C. Murphy Court of Appeals Building, 361 Rowe Boulevard Annapolis, MD 21401; STATE OF MARYLAND; BOB ERHLICH, Governor; OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL; GARY W. KUC; MELVIN HIRSHMAN; MARIANNE LEE; ATTORNEY GRIEVANCE COMMISSION OF MARYLAND; JOHN DOE 3; JOHN DOE NEWSPAPER; JANE DOE NUMBER 2; MARVIN J. GARBIS, in his individual and professional capacities; CATHERINE C. BLAKE, in her individual and professional capacities; JANE DOE NEWSPAPER,

Defendants - Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Maryland, at Baltimore. Catherine C. Blake, District Judge. (1:06-cv-03444-CCB)

Submitted: December 16, 2008 Decided: December 19, 2008

Before WILKINSON, MICHAEL, and KING, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.Patrick J. Muhammad, Appellant Pro Se. William Ferris Brockman, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF MARYLAND, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellees.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

23 PER CURIAM:

Patrick J. Muhammad appeals the district court’s

orders dismissing his civil rights complaint for lack of subject

matter jurisdiction and for failure to state a claim upon which

relief could be granted, and denying reconsideration of that

order. We have reviewed the record and find no reversible

error. Accordingly, we affirm for the reasons stated by the

district court. See Muhammad v. Md. Ct. of Appeals , No. 1:06-

cv-03444-CCB (D. Md. Feb. 11 & Mar. 6, 2008). We dispense with

oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are

adequately presented in the materials before the court and

argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED
TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DISTRICT, AT AUSTIN

NO. 03-06-00761-CR

Roberto Alonzo Jr., Appellant

v.

The State of Texas, Appellee

FROM THE COUNTY COURT AT LAW NO. 2 OF WILLIAMSON COUNTY

NO. 05-7936-2, HONORABLE TIMOTHY L. WRIGHT, JUDGE PRESIDING

M E M O R A N D U M O P I N I O N

Roberto Alonzo Jr. pleaded no contest to driving while intoxicated after his pretrial

motion to suppress was overruled. There was a plea bargain, which was followed. The plea

documents in the clerk’s record contain a waiver of appeal signed by Alonzo with this handwritten

addition: “This is a plea-bargain case. I waive only those matters not raised by written motion and

those matters not raised in the pretrial hearing.”

The trial court has certified that this “is a plea-bargain case, and the defendant has NO

right of appeal” and also that “the defendant has waived the right of appeal except for pretrial

issues.” The first statement is incorrect. The second, while not incorrect under the circumstances,

is an awkward way of saying that Alonzo has the right to appeal matters raised by written motion

filed and ruled on before trial. See Tex. R. App. P. 25.2(a)(2)(A). Using the form promulgated by

the court of criminal appeals, the court should have certified that this is a plea-bargain case, but
2

matters were raised by written motion filed and ruled on before trial and not withdrawn or waived,

and the defendant has the right of appeal. See certification form in notes following Tex. R. App. P.

25.2 (West 2003).

The appeal is abated for the trial court to prepare and file an amended certification

of the right of appeal. Tex. R. App. P. 25.2(f). A supplemental clerk’s record containing the

amended certification shall be tendered for filing no later than December 28, 2006.

___________________________________________

W. Kenneth Law, Chief Justice

Before Chief Justice Law, Justices Puryear and Pemberton

Filed: December 14, 2006

Do Not Publish
<PAGE>   1

                                                                  EXHIBIT 10.8.1




                                  AMENDMENT

                                   OF THE

                      PULITZER RETIREMENT SAVINGS PLAN


     The second sentence of Section 3.01(a) of the Pulitzer Retirement
Savings Plan is amended to read as follows, effective January 1, 1997:

             "The designated percentage must be at least 1% and
             not more than 16% (10% in the case of Participants
             who are Highly Compensated Employees)."



                                           PULITZER PUBLISHING COMPANY


  9/16/97                                  /s/  Ronald H. Ridgway
-----------                                ------------------------------
   Date                                         Ronald H. Ridgway
                                                Senior Vice President - Finance
Opinion issued June 11, 2013

In The 

## Court of Appeals For The 

## First District of Texas

———————————— NO. 01
- 13
- 00484
- CV

——————————— IN RE RETAKA ROMEO NELSON , Relator

Original Proceeding on Petition for Writ of Mandamus

MEMORANDUM OPINION On June 10 , 201 3 , the r elator filed a petition for writ of mandamus , challenging the trial court’s order striking his jury demand

. * He also filed a emergency motion for temporary relief. The relator did not provide a record of the

* The underlying case is In the Matter of the Marriage of Retaka Romeo Nelson and Shannon Brochette Nelson , No. 2012

- 04063 , in the 308th District Court of Harris County, Texas, the Honorable James Lombardino presiding.2 ruling of which he complains

. See T EX
. R. A PP
. P. 52.3(k)(1)(A ); Walker v. Packer , 827 S.W.2d 833, 837 (Tex. 1992) (the relator has the burden to provide the court with a sufficient record to establish the right to mandamus relief). W e deny the emergency motion and the petition for writ of mandamus

.

PER CURIAM Panel consists of Justices Sharp, Massengale , and Huddle

.
#### Lorenzo BUNCH, Jr., Petitioner-Appellant, v. Gene M. JOHNSON, Director of the Virginia Department of Corrections, Respondent-Appellee.

No. 10-6733.

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted: Dec. 16, 2010.

Decided: Dec. 27, 2010.

Lorenzo Bunch, Jr., Appellant Pro Se. Eugene Paul Murphy, Office of the Attorney General of Virginia, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellee.

Before GREGORY, DUNCAN, and DAVIS, Circuit Judges.

*775Dismissed by unpublished PER CURIAM opinion.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

PER CURIAM:

Lorenzo Bunch, Jr., seeks to appeal the district court’s order accepting the recommendation of the magistrate judge and denying relief on his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (2006) petition. The order is not appeal-able unless a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of appealability. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1) (2006). A certificate of appealability will not issue absent “a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2) (2006). When the district court denies relief on the merits, a prisoner satisfies this standard by demonstrating that reasonable jurists would find that the district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims is debatable or wrong. *Slack v. McDaniel,*529 U.S. 473, 484, 120 S.Ct. 1595, 146 L.Ed.2d 542 (2000); *see Miller-El v. Cockrell,*537 U.S. 322, 336-38, 123 S.Ct. 1029, 154 L.Ed.2d 931 (2003). When the district court denies relief on procedural grounds, the prisoner must demonstrate both that the dispositive procedural ruling is debatable, and that the petition states a debatable claim of the denial of a constitutional right. *Slack,*529 U.S. at 484-85, 120 S.Ct. 1595. We have independently reviewed the record and conclude that Bunch has not made the requisite showing. Accordingly, we deny a certificate of appealability and dismiss the appeal. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

*DISMISSED.*
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE O F FLORIDA FIFTH DISTRICT N OT FINAL UNTIL TIME E XPIRES TO FILE MOTION FOR REHEARING AND DISPOSITION THEREOF IF FILED DO NALD ANDERSON , A ppellant ,
v. Case No. 5D 22

- 2159 LT Case No. 2005

- CF

- 3218 STAT E OF FLORIDA ,

Appellee

. ________________________________/ Decisio n filed November 2 9, 2 022 3.850 Appeal from the Circuit Court for Seminole County , Melissa S outo , Judge. Donald Anderson, Sanford, pro se. No Appearance for Appellee.

PER CURIAM.
AFFIRMED.
LAMBERT, C.J., WALLIS and EISNAUGLE , JJ., concur.
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Tyrone WILLIAMS, Jr., a/k/a TJ, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 14-6068.

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted: April 17, 2014.

Decided: April 22, 2014.

Tyrone Williams, Jr., Appellant Pro Se. William David Muhr, Assistant United States Attorney, V. Kathleen Dougherty, Office of the United States Attorney, Norfolk, Virginia, for Appellee.

Before WILKINSON, KING, ánd DUNCAN, Circuit Judges.

Dismissed by unpublished PER CURIAM opinion.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

PER CURIAM:

Tyrone Williams, Jr., seeks to appeal the district court’s order denying relief on his 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (2012) motion and a subsequent order denying his Fed.R.Civ.P. 59(e) motion to alter or amend judgment. The orders are not appealable unless a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of appealability. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(B) (2012). A certificate of appealability will not issue absent “a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2) (2012). When the district court denies relief on the merits, a prisoner satisfies this standard by demonstrating that reasonable jurists would find that the district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims is debatable or wrong. *Slack v. McDaniel,*529 U.S. 473, 484, 120 S.Ct. 1595, 146 L.Ed.2d 542 (2000); *see Miller-El v. Cockrell,*537 U.S. 322, 336-38, 123 S.Ct. 1029, 154 L.Ed.2d 931 (2003). When the district court denies relief on procedural grounds, the prisoner must demonstrate both that the dispositive procedural ruling is debatable, and that the motion states a debatable claim of the denial of a constitutional right. *Slack,*529 U.S. at 484-85, 120 S.Ct. 1595.

*207We have independently reviewed the record and conclude that Williams has not made the requisite showing. Accordingly, we deny a certificate of appealability and dismiss the appeal. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

*DISMISSED.*
**FEDERALMINE SAFETY AND HEALTH REVIEW COMMISSION**

 

SUNSHINE ACT NOTICE

 

BAC 6735-01

 

December 30, 2015

 

 

TIMEAND DATE:                10:00 a.m., Thursday, January 14, 2016

 

PLACE:                                  TheRichard V. Backley Hearing Room, Room 511N, 1331 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW,Washington, DC 20004 (enter from  F Street entrance)

 

STATUS:                                Open

 

MATTERSTO BE 

CONSIDERED:                     TheCommission will consider and act upon the following in open session: *Secretaryof Labor v. Hibbing Taconite Company,*Docket Nos. LAKE 2013-231-RM, et al.**(Issues include whether the Judge erred in upholding failure to abate orders.)

 

 

Any person attending this meeting who requires specialaccessibility features and/or auxiliary aids, such as sign languageinterpreters, must inform the Commission in advance of those needs. Subject to29 C.F.R. § 2706.150(a)(3) and § 2706.160(d).

 

 

CONTACTPERSON 

FOR MORE INFO:                EmogeneJohnson (202) 434-9935 / (202) 708-9300 for TDD

                                                Relay/ 1-800-877-8339 for toll free.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

                                                __________________________________

                                                SarahL. Stewart

                                                DeputyGeneral Counsel
#### David T. LASHGARI and Marje H. Lashgari, Plaintiffs—Appellants, v. William J. BRATTON, LAPD, Chief; et al., Defendants—Appellees, and John Erdert; et al., Defendants.

No. 09-56289.

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted Dec. 14, 2010.*

Filed Jan. 7, 2011.

David T. Lashgari, Marietta, GA, pro se.

Marje H. Lashgari, Los Angeles, CA, pro se.

Blithe Smith Bock, Susan Kawala, Esquire, Los Angeles City Attorney’s Office, Sandra Isabel Barrientos, Deputy Attorney General, AGCA-Office of the California Attorney General, Alexis Amber, Peter Osinoff, Bonne, Bridges, Mueller, O’Keefe & Nichols, Lisa Darling-Alderton, Esquire, Woolls & Peer, Los Angeles, CA, Clayton C. Averbuck, Esquire, Jennifer Gysler, Monroy, Averbuck and Gysler, Westlake Village, CA, for Defendants-Appellees.

Before: GOODWIN, WALLACE, and THOMAS, Circuit Judges.

*

 The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R.App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM **

David T. Lashgari and Marje H. Lashgari appeal pro se from the district court’s orders dismissing their 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action for failure to prosecute and denying their motion for reconsideration. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review for abuse of discretion. *United Nat’l Ins. Co. v. Spectrum Worldwide, Inc.,*555 F.3d 772, 780 (9th Cir.2009) (reconsideration); *Pagtalunan v. Galaza, 291*F.3d 639, 640-41 (9th Cir.2002) (failure to prosecute). We affirm.

The district court did not abuse its discretion by dismissing the action for failure to prosecute after it warned the Lashgaris that noncompliance with its order to file an amended complaint could result in dismissal and it granted an extension of time to comply, and the Lashgaris failed to amend *57their complaint for approximately six months after the deadline for doing so. *See Pagtalunan,*291 F.3d at 642-43 (discussing factors that district courts must consider before dismissing under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b))

The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying the motion for reconsideration because the Lashgaris failed to provide a sufficient basis for reconsideration. *See United Nat’l Ins. Co.,*555 F.3d at 780 (listing bases for reconsideration).

Because we affirm the district court’s dismissal under Rule 41(b), we do not consider the Lashgaris’ challenges to the district court’s interlocutory orders. *See Al-Torki v. Kaempen,*78 F.3d 1381, 1386 (9th Cir.1996).

The Lashgaris’ remaining contentions are unpersuasive.

AFFIRMED.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
[Federal Register Volume 66, Number 247 (Wednesday, December 26, 2001)]
[Notices]
[Page 66429]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 01-31624]


-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF LABOR

Employment and Training Administration

[TA-W-38,809]


Blue Mountain Products Pendleton, OR; Notice of Affirmative 
Determination Regarding Application for Reconsideration

    By letter of July 17, 2001, the petitioner requested administrative 
reconsideration of the Department of Labor's Notice of Negative 
Determination Regarding Eligibility to Apply for Worker Adjustment 
Assistance, petition TA-W-38,809. The denial notice was signed on June 
18, 2001 and published in the Federal Register on July 5, 2001 (66 FR 
35462).
    The Department has reviewed the request for reconsideration and has 
determined that further clarification of a survey response from a major 
customer of the subject firm would be appropriate.

Conclusion

    After careful review of the application, I conclude that the claim 
is of sufficient weight to justify reconsideration of the Department of 
Labor's prior decision. The application is, therefore, granted.

    Signed at Washington, DC this 11th day of December 2001.
Edward A. Tomchick,
Director, Division of Trade, Adjustment Assistant.
[FR Doc. 01-31624 Filed 12-21-01; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4510-30-M
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 10-6370

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

THOMAS EDWARD CARGILL,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of 

Maryland, at Greenbelt. Roger W. Titus, District Judge. (8:08-

cr-00204-RWT-1; 8:09-cv-03055-RWT)

Submitted: October 14, 2010 Decided: October 21, 2010

Before MOTZ, KING, and DAVIS, Circuit Judges.

Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Thomas Edward Cargill, Appellant Pro Se. Michael Joseph Leotta, 

Assistant United States Attorney, Baltimore, Maryland, for 

Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
2

PER CURIAM:

Thomas Edward Cargill seeks to appeal the district 

court’s order dismissing as untimely his 28 U.S.C.A. § 2255 

(West Supp. 2010) motion. The order is not appealable unless a 

circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of appealability. 

28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1) (2006). A certificate of appealability 

will not issue absent “a substantial showing of the denial of a 

constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2) (2006). When the 

district court denies relief on the merits, a prisoner satisfies 

this standard by demonstrating that reasonable jurists would 

find that the district court’s assessment of the constitutional 

claims is debatable or wrong. Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 

484 (2000); see Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 336-38 

(2003). When the district court denies relief on procedural 

grounds, the prisoner must demonstrate both that the dispositive 

procedural ruling is debatable, and that the motion states a 

debatable claim of the denial of a constitutional right. Slack, 

529 U.S. at 484-85. We have independently reviewed the record 

and conclude that Cargill has not made the requisite showing. 

Accordingly, we deny a certificate of appealability and dismiss 

the appeal. We further deny Cargill’s request for transcripts 

at government expense. We dispense with oral argument because 

the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the 
3

materials before the court and argument would not aid the 

decisional process.

DISMISSED
EXHIBIT 31.1

                    CERTIFICATION OF CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER

I, Carl Spana, certify that:

1. I have reviewed this annual report on Form 10-K of Palatin Technologies,
Inc.;

2. Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a
material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements
made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not
misleading with respect to the period covered by this report;

3. Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial
information included in this report, fairly present in all material respects the
financial condition, results of operations and cash flows of the registrant as
of, and for, the periods presented in this report;

4. The registrant's other certifying officer(s) and I are responsible for
establishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in
Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) for the registrant and have:

(a) Designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such disclosure
controls and procedures to be designed under our supervision, to ensure that
material information relating to the registrant, including its consolidated
subsidiaries, is made known to us by others within those entities, particularly
during the period in which this report is being prepared;

(b) Evaluated the effectiveness of the registrant's disclosure controls and
procedures and presented in this report our conclusions about the effectiveness
of the disclosure controls and procedures, as of the end of the period covered
by this report based on such evaluation; and

(c) Disclosed in this report any change in the registrant's internal control
over financial reporting that occurred during the registrant's most recent
fiscal quarter (the registrant's fourth fiscal quarter in the case of an annual
report) that has materially affected, or is reasonably likely to materially
affect, the registrant's internal control over financial reporting; and

5. The registrant's other certifying officer(s) and I have disclosed, based on
our most recent evaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to the
registrant's auditors and the audit committee of the registrant's board of
directors (or persons performing the equivalent functions):

(a) All significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or
operation of internal control over financial reporting which are reasonably
likely to adversely affect the registrant's ability to record, process,
summarize and report financial information; and

(b) Any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other
employees who have a significant role in the registrant's internal control over
financial reporting.

Date:  September 29, 2003

/s/  Carl Spana
Carl Spana, Chief Executive Officer
Exhibit 32.1  CERTIFICATION  PURSUANT TO THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350 AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002   I, Francis L. Simola, Chairman, President and CEO of PowerCold Corporation (the Company) do hereby certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that, to my knowledge:  1.  This Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q of the Company for the period ended June 30, 2005 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission (the report), fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and  2.  The information contained in the report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.  Dated: August 1, 2006  /s/ Francis L. Simola Francis L. Simola Chairman, President and CEO
In The

Court of Appeals

Sixth Appellate District of Texas at Texarkana

No. 06-13-00170-CR

CLAYTON MARQUIS RICKS, Appellant

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

On Appeal from the 102nd District Court

Red River County, Texas

Trial Court No. CR01943

Before Morriss, C.J., Carter and Moseley, JJ.
2

O RDER

Clayton Marquis Ricks appeals from his conviction of burglary of a habitation. The 

clerk’s record was filed August 21, 2013, and the reporter’s record was filed November 8, 

making the appellant’s brief due December 9. This deadline was extended twice by this Court 

on appellant’s motion, resulting in the current due date of January 29, 2014. Appellant has now 

filed a third motion to extend seeking an additional thirty-day extension of the briefing deadline.

We have reviewed appellant’s third motion to extend time as well as the appellate record, 

and we find no compelling information to convince us that this brief requires more time to 

prepare. The motion to extend time to file appellant’s brief is overruled.

We order appellant’s counsel, Jason L. Horton, to file appellant’s brief with this Court on 

or before February 19, 2014.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

BY THE COURT

Date: February 4, 2014
DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA

FOURTH DISTRICT

CLARENCE MARTIN,

Appellant,

v.

STATE OF FLORIDA,

Appellee.

No. 4D18-3440

[April 15, 2020]

Appeal from the Circuit Court for the Seventeenth Judicial Circuit, 

Broward County; Bernard I. Bober, Judge; L.T. Case No. 16-

008462CF10A.

Carey Haughwout, Public Defender, and Ian Seldin, Assistant Public 

Defender, West Palm Beach, for appellant.

Ashley Moody, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Jessenia J. 

Concepcion, Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach, for appellee.

PER CURIAM.

Affirmed. See Guzman v. State, 42 So. 3d 941 (Fla. 4th DCA 2010).

WARNER, DAMOORGIAN and KUNTZ, JJ., concur.

* * *

Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.