## In the Court of Appeals Second Appellate District of Texas at Fort Worth

___________________________ No. 02

- 19

- 00218

- CR

___________________________

On Appeal from Cr iminal District Court N o. 3 Tarrant County, Texas Trial Court No. 1529236D

Before Birdwell , Bassel, and Womack, JJ. Memorandum Opinion by Justice Bassel 

### R EGINALD 

### B YRD 

### , Appel lant

V


### . T HE 

### S TATE OF 

### T EXAS2 MEMORANDUM OPINION
I. Introduction Appellant Reginald Byrd appeals from the revocation of h is community supervisio n and the resulting six

- year sentence after he plead ed true to violating five

c ommunity

- supervision conditions. In a single issue , Byrd argues that the trial court
violated his federal due

- proces s rights because the alle ged v iolation s w ere based on his inability to afford transportation

. B ecause there is a prepon derance of evidence to support at least one violation that was not based on Byrd ’ s ability to afford transportation , we hold that the trial cour t did not violate Byrd ’ s due

- process rights
and did not abuse its discretio n by revoking his community supervisi on. Acc ordingly , we affi rm. II. Background On September 4, 201 8, Byrd pleaded guilty, pur suant to a plea agreement, to the third

- degree felony of driving while intox icated (DWI)

– felony repetition. See Tex.
Pen al Code Ann. § 49.09. Following the terms o f this plea, th e trial court found Byrd guilty, sentenced him to six years ’ incar ceration and ordered him to pay a $400 fine , suspended i mposition of the senten ce but not the fine, and placed him on community
sup ervision for four years. The trial court im pose d nu merous community

- supervision
conditions , including the requirements that B yrd repor t monthly to his community

supervision o fficer , that he submit valid urine samples when requested, that he3 success fully complete the DWI victim

- impact panel and the DWI repe at

- offender program, and that he submit to ele ctronic alcohol monitori ng. On January 11, 2 019, the State filed a petition to proceed to revo ke community supervision , alleging that Byrd h ad failed :

• To report to his community

- supervision officer at a ny time during the months of October, Nove mber, and December 2018;

• T o provide a urine sample on or about September 12, 201 8, and September 14, 2018;

• To enro ll in the DWI repeat

- offender program;

• To attend the victim

- impact panel on or about September 25, 2018; and

• To ins tall the IN HOM elect r onic monitor by September 19, 2018.
At the revocation h e aring , Byrd pleaded “ true ” to each of the allegations i n the
Stat e ’ s petition. Byrd testified that when he was placed on c ommunity super vision, the plan was for h is common

- law wife , Cassandra, to pro vide transportation

. B yrd initially agreed that Cassandra had travel ed back and forth to Nort h Carolina to visit her ailing daughter , but then he clarif ied that “ she di d it once

-- on ce then she

-- she
got a U

- Haul [, ] and they drove back. ” The timing of these events is not clear f rom the record. Byrd testified that he reported to the comm unity

- supe rvision office on A l ta mesa Boul evard on Sep t ember 12 and w as told to submit a urine sample at

a n other location. Byrd tes tified that there was not a lab at the Altamesa o ffice. Byrd4 said that there “ wasn ’ t enough time in the day ” to take t he bus to the o ther location. By rd testified that he w as instructe d to go back two days later on September 14, 2018,
and was told that h e had already viol ated a condition of his communi ty supervision by

not going for the urine test on September 12

. B yrd s aid that he did not have any money for tran sportation o n September 14, so he “ violated again. ” Byrd testified that
he did not know t o a sk the probation depart ment for bus passe s becaus e he did not
know that they offered them an d because “ [i]t was all new to [him ]

. ” Byrd explained that he had not attended the DWI repeat

- offender program because the class located on the bus route had starte d “ a day or two ” before he had
contacted “ them ” a nd the other class was not on the bus route

. When the class
located on the bus route ended, t here was a break before the next c lass started , and by that time, he was in jail

. By rd testified that he did not complete the victim

- impact panel

. He ex plained

t hat a lthough he coul d t ake the bus to the class, the bus schedule di d not provid e a route for him to get home from the c lass

. Byrd said that he told his probation officer that he could not afford the up

fron t fee for the in

- home interlock dev i ce that h e wa s ordered t o install. Byrd
testified that he had no p ower at h is home because h e was not able to pay the electricity bill. Queinton Waldon, a probation officer , t estified that with regard to the location
fo r submi tting urine samples, all who are on commun ity supervision are “ give n the5 o ption to either submit the urine test at the main office, which is downtown here at the central probation office, or they can do it at the office that they are assigned

. ”
Wal don said that Byrd was given the option of the do w ntown facility because “ he [ was ] closer to downtown. ” Waldo n testified that Byrd could hav e s u bmitted a u rine sample at the A l tamesa l ocation o n September 12 wh ile he was t here for his in take meeting

. Af te r hearing testimony from Byrd and Waldon, the tri al court found the allegations in the S t ate ’ s petition to be t rue and sen tenced B yrd to six years ’
confi nement. Byrd then perfected this appeal.
III. St an dard o f Review We review an order revoking communit y supervision under an abuse

- of

discretion standa rd. See Hacker v. State , 389 S.W.3d 860, 865 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013). In a revocation proceeding, the State must prove by a preponderance of the evidence

t hat th e defendant violated at least one of the term s and conditions of co mmunity supervision. Bryan t v. State , 391 S.W.3d 86, 93 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012); Rickels v. State , 202 S.W.3d 759, 763

– 64 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006). The trial court is the sole judge of
the w itnesses’ credibility and the weight to be gi ven their testimony, a nd we review the
evidence i n the ligh t most favorable to the trial court’s ruling. Hacker , 389 S.W.3d at 865 ; Cardona v. State , 665 S.W.2d 492, 493 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984). If the State fails to meet its burden of proof, the trial co urt abuses its discret ion by revoking community

s upervision. Cardona , 665 S.W.2d at 493

– 94. A finding of a single violation of6 community supervision is sufficient to suppo rt a revocation. See Smith v. State , 286 S.W.3d 333, 342 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009). Further, a defend ant ’ s plea of true generally
is sufficient on its own to support a trial court ’ s decision to revoke community supervision. See Tapia v. State , 462 S. W.3d 2 9, 31 n.2 (Tex. Crim. App. 201 5); Leonard
v. State , 385 S.W.3d 570, 576 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012) (op. on re h ’ g)

. IV. A Single Vi olati on W hen Transportation W as N ot a n I ssue Supports Revocation
I n his single issue , Byrd argues that the trial court abused i ts discretion by revoking his communit y supervision and sente ncing him to six years ’ confinement.
S pecifically, Byrd argues that he was unable to abide by the conditions of his community supervision because he lacked transportati on and could not make other

ar rangemen ts due to his pover ty. Byrd thus argue s that he wa s denied his due

- pro cess right s because the t rial court failed to mak e the required inquiries regarding Byrd ’ s inability to afford transportation.
As set forth abo ve , Byrd pleaded “ true ” to all five violations alleged in the
State ’ s petit ion. Thus, Byrd pleaded true to the allegation in paragraph 2 of the State ’ s petition that he had failed to provide a urine sample on or abo ut September 12, 201 8, and September 14 , 2018

. The record revealed that Byrd had appeared at the Altamesa probatio n office on September 12, 2018 ; that he was requested to provide a urine sample ; and t hat he had failed to provide a urine samp le. Byrd does not dispute these
facts. In stead, he r elies on his testimony that the Al tames a probation office did not7 hav e a la b , that he was told to go to an other probation office to provide his urine sample , and th at the bus could not get him to that office before i t closed . The trial
court, as the sole judge of the witnesses’ credibility and the weight to be given their
testim ony , was free to disbelieve Byrd ’ s te stimony and to instead believe Waldon ’ s testimony that Byrd could have su bmitted his urine sample at the Altames a probation
office

. See Hacker , 38 9 S.W.3d at 865; Ca rdona , 665 S.W.2d at 493. Because Byrd was already a t a probation office on September 12 that would have accepted a urine sample had he pr ovided one, h is due

- process argument

— that he was unable to compl y with his community

- supervisio n conditions because he lacked transportation
due to his poverty

— does not a pply to this violation

. See, e.g. , R owley v. S t ate , No. 02

- 17

- 00107

- CR , 2017 WL 58951 84, at *2 (Tex. App.

— F o rt Worth Nov. 30, 2017, no pet. ) (mem. op., not designated for publicati on) ( overruling app ellant ’ s issue , which

assert ed that his due

- process righ ts were violated when his community s upervision
was revoked based on an inability to p ay , beca use his co mmunity

- service violation did
not involve his inability t o pay) ; c f. Adams v. State , No. 11

- 12

- 00337

- CR , 2015 WL 581753, at *2 (Tex. App.

— Eastla nd Feb. 5, 2015 , no pet.) (mem. op., not desi gnated
for publication ) (determini ng that it need not consider appellant ’ s due

- process contention because the evidence was sufficient to prove t hat appellant had violated at least one term of his community supervision t hat was unrelated to his failure to p ay). Reviewing the eviden ce in the light most fa vorable to the trial court ’ s ruli ng, we hold that the S t ate proved by a preponderance of the ev i dence that Byrd violated the8 con dition of his comm unity supervision that r equired him to submit to random
urina lysis testi ng by failing to submit a urine sample on September 12, 2019

. 1
Acc ordingly, we hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretio n by r evoking Byrd ’ s community supervision and sent encing him to six years ’ conf inement. See
Striblin v. State , No s . 04

- 17

- 00825

- CR, 04

- 17

- 00835

- CR , 2018 WL 662 4894, at *2

– 3 (Tex. App.

— San Antonio Dec. 19, 20 18, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publ ication ) (holding that trial court did not abuse it s discretion by revo king appellant ’ s community supervision on the ground that he had failed to submit a urine sample on a single date ); McWilliams v. State , No. 02

- 14

- 00142

- CR, 2014 WL 7204509, at *2 (Tex. App.

— Fort Worth Dec. 18, 2014, pet . ref ’ d) (mem. o p., not designated for
p ublication) (same). We therefore ove rrule B yrd ’ s sole issue.
V . Conclusion Having o verruled Byrd ’ s sole issue, we aff irm the trial court ’ s judgment

. /s/ Dabney Bassel Dabney Bassel Justice
Do No t Publish Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b)
Delivered : November 7, 2019

1 Although the specific cond iti on requiring Byrd to submit urine samples upon request by his prob ation officer also contains a provision requiring him to pay for such tests, the State did not allege , and the trial court did not find, that Byrd had violated t he conditions of his commu nit y supervision by failing to pay for urine tests.