FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL

STATE OF FLORIDA

_____________________________

No. 1D17-2094

_____________________________

MAGNOLIA FLORIDA TAX 

CERTIFICATES, LLC, a Florida 

limited liability company, et al.,

Appellants/Cross-Appellees,

v.

FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF 

REVENUE, et al.,

Appellees/Cross-Appellants.

_____________________________

On appeal from the Circuit Court for Leon County.

Terry P. Lewis, Judge.

June 22, 2018

PER CURIAM.

In this appeal and cross-appeal from a summary final 

judgment, three issues have been raised for our consideration: (1) 

whether the trial court erred in entering summary judgment 

against Appellants on count II of their complaint challenging the 

deposit requirement imposed upon bidders for tax certificates in 

Broward, Miami-Dade, and Orange Counties; (2) whether the trial 

court erred in entering summary judgment against Appellants on 

count III of their complaint challenging the affidavit requirement

imposed upon bidders for tax certificates in Broward County; and 

(3) whether the trial court erred in denying a motion to abate the 
2

proceedings until Appellants/Cross-Appellees complied with the 

registration requirements of the Fictitious Name Act. We affirm as 

to the third issue without further discussion. We also affirm as to 

the first and second issues for the reasons that follow. 

In challenging the imposition of a separate deposit upon each 

of their general partnerships bidding for tax certificates, 

Appellants’ initial brief advances the following arguments: (1) the 

deposit is unreasonable because it exceeds the amount necessary 

to recoup readvertising costs; (2) the deposit is inefficient because 

it requires the tax collector’s office to reissue refunds of large sums; 

(3) the deposit is contrary to legislative intent because it 

discourages open competition and participation in auctions; and 

(4) the trial court misinterpreted section 197.432(7), Florida 

Statutes, by failing to consider that a third-party surety is 

permitted to post a deposit on behalf of bidders that is calculated 

based upon a percentage of the bidding group’s expected 

purchases. Appellants failed to preserve any of these arguments, 

which were not raised below. See Aills v. Boemi, 29 So. 3d 1105, 

1109 (Fla. 2010) (holding that the specific legal ground upon which 

a claim is based must be raised at trial and a claim different than 

that will not be heard on appeal); Sunset Harbour Condo. Ass’n v.

Robbins, 914 So. 2d 925, 928 (Fla. 2005) (holding that an issue 

must be presented to the lower court and the specific legal 

argument or ground to be argued on appeal must be part of that 

presentation if it is to be considered preserved); Adkison v. Morey, 

43 Fla. L. Weekly D550 (Fla. 1st DCA Mar. 8, 2018) (holding that 

the argument made on appeal was waived because it was never 

presented to the trial court). Because we cannot address these 

arguments for the first time on appeal, we affirm the summary 

judgment against Appellants on count II of their complaint.

In challenging the pre-bidding documentation required by 

Broward County insofar as it requires all business entities—as 

opposed to natural persons—to provide an affidavit concerning 

certain information about the entity, including its name, the type 

of entity, its state of origin, and information concerning its 

employer identification number (EIN), Appellants assert that such 

a requirement is not authorized by section 197.432, Florida 

Statutes. However, Broward County is a charter county that has 

the power to “enact county ordinances not inconsistent with 
3

general law.” Art. VIII, § 1(g), Fla. Const. A local government 

enactment is inconsistent with state law if it directly conflicts with 

a state statute or if the legislature has preempted a particular 

subject area. Sarasota Alliance for Fair Elections, Inc. v. 

Browning, 28 So. 3d 880, 886 (Fla. 2010). Although section 197.432 

provides general procedures for tax certificate sales, it does not 

specify how tax collectors are to ascertain the identities of bidders 

or set out what information may be requested of bidders. 

Accordingly, it cannot be said that the affidavit requirement 

imposed in Broward County is inconsistent with any provision of 

section 197.432. Moreover, there is nothing in the language of 

section 197.432 that expressly or impliedly preempts Broward 

County from imposing an affidavit requirement to ascertain or 

verify the identity of bidders at tax certificate sales. Accordingly, 

the trial court correctly concluded as a matter of law that Broward 

County had discretion to impose an affidavit requirement on 

bidders in order to carry out its statutory duty to conduct tax 

certificate sales.

To the extent Appellants claim that the affidavit requirement

is contrary to legislative intent and discriminates against nonnatural persons, these claims are without merit. There is nothing 

in section 197.432 expressing an intent to allow business entities 

to use hundreds of thousands of “shell” bidders to gain an unfair 

advantage at tax certificate sales. Moreover, Appellants have 

failed to demonstrate that the disparate treatment between 

natural and non-natural persons is improper. A constitutional 

challenge that does not involve a fundamental right or suspect 

classification is evaluated under the rational basis test, which 

merely requires the existence of a conceivably rational basis for the 

enacting governmental body to believe that the challenged 

legislation would further a legitimate governmental purpose. WCI 

Communities, Inc. v. City of Coral Springs, 885 So. 2d 912, 914 

(Fla. 4th DCA 2004). Here, Broward County’s affidavit 

requirement helps ensure that all bidders are bona fide business 

organizations created under the laws of some state and not sham 

entities using names made up for the sole purpose of manipulating

the lottery selection process to resolve tie bids. Requiring each 

bidder to identify itself and attest that it did not obtain its EIN for 

the purpose of gaining advantage in a tax certificate sale in 

contravention of Internal Revenue Service directives is rationally 
4

related to the county’s legitimate interest in ensuring the fairness 

of tax certificate sales. Accordingly, we affirm the summary 

judgment entered against Appellants on count III of their 

complaint.

AFFIRMED.

LEWIS, ROBERTS, and JAY, JJ., concur.

_____________________________

Not final until disposition of any timely and 

authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or 

9.331.

_____________________________

Douglas Manson and William S. Bilenky of Manson Bolves 

Donaldson Varn, P.A., Tampa, for Appellants/Cross-Appellees.

John A. Tucker, IV, of Foley & Lardner LLP, Jacksonville; Robert 

H. Hosay, James A. McKee, and Benjamin J. Grossman of Foley & 

Lardner LLP, Tallahassee, for Appellee Anne M. Gannon, Palm 

Beach County Tax Collector. 

Vanessa Thomas of Forman, Hanratty, Thomas & Montgomery, 

Ocala, for Appellee George Albright, Marion County Tax Collector.

Andrew J. Meyers, Broward County Attorney; Mark A. Journey, 

Scott Andron, and Joseph K. Jarone, Assistant County Attorneys, 

Fort Lauderdale, for Appellee Broward County. 

Douglas C. Spears and Benjamin C. Iseman of Swann Hadley 

Stump Dietrich & Spears, P.A., Winter Park, for Appellee Scott 

Randolph as Orange County Tax Collector.

Abigail Price-Williams, Miami-Dade County Attorney, and Ileana 

Cruz, Assistant County Attorney, Miami, for Appellee/CrossAppellant Marcus Saiz De La Mora, Miami-Dade County Tax 

Collector. 
5

Timothy R. Qualls of Young Qualls, P.A., Tallahassee, for 

remaining Appellee Tax Collectors.