15-3502

Snyder v. Colvin

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

SUMMARY ORDER

RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED

ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE

PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A

DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN

ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST

SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.

1 At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals

2 for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United

3 States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York,

on the 30th 4 day of June, two thousand sixteen.

5

6 PRESENT: DENNIS JACOBS,

7 REENA RAGGI,

8 DENNY CHIN,

9 Circuit Judges.

10

11 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -X

12 CHASITY SNYDER, 

13 Plaintiff-Appellant,

14

15 -v.- 15-3502

16

17 CAROLYN COLVIN,

18 Commissioner of Social Security, 

19 Defendant-Appellee.

20 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -X

21

22 FOR APPELLANT: MARK SCHNEIDER, Plattsburgh, New

23 York.

24

25 FOR APPELLEES: FERGUS KAISER, Special Assistant

26 U.S. Attorney (with Stephen P.

27 Conte, Regional Chief Counsel –

28 Region II Office of the General

1
1 Counsel Social Security

2 Administration, on the brief),

3 for Richard S. Hartunian, United

4 States Attorney for the Northern

5 District of New York.

6

7 Appeal from a judgment of the United States District

8 Court for the Northern District of New York (Suddaby, C.J.).

9

10 UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED

11 AND DECREED that the judgment of the district court be

12 AFFIRMED. 

13

14 Plaintiff Chasity Snyder appeals from the district

15 court’s affirmance of a decision of the Commissioner of

16 Social Security (“Commissioner”) denying her application for

17 Social Security disability benefits. We review the

18 administrative record de novo, and will uphold the

19 Commissioner’s decision if it is supported by substantial

20 evidence and the correct legal standards were applied. See

21 Talavera v. Astrue, 697 F.3d 145, 151 (2d Cir. 2012)

22 (“Substantial evidence . . . . means such relevant evidence

23 as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a

24 conclusion.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Zabala v.

25 Astrue, 595 F.3d 402, 408 (2d Cir. 2010). We assume the

26 parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, the

27 procedural history, and the issues presented for review.

28

29 1. The plaintiff argues that the district court

30 applied an incorrect standard of review, but does not

31 support the argument with record evidence or citation to any

32 portion of the district court ruling. The standard of

33 review is “very deferential.” Brault v. Soc. Sec. Admin.,

34 Comm’r, 683 F.3d 443, 448 (2d Cir. 2012). “Issues not

35 sufficiently argued in the briefs are considered waived and

36 normally will not be addressed on appeal.” City of Syracuse

37 v. Onondaga Cty., 464 F.3d 297, 308 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal

38 quotation marks omitted).

39

40 2. The ALJ acknowledged that the plaintiff’s cervical

41 condition, obesity, and depression were impairments, but

42 found that they did not rise to the level of a disability. 

43 The plaintiff argues that she was disabled by the

44 “combination” of her spinal disorders, mental impairments,

45 obesity, and other “exertional and non-exertional

46 limitations.” However, the ALJ considered her impairments

47 in combination, as well as separately. See Rivers v.

2
1 Astrue, 280 F. App’x 20, 23 (2d Cir. 2008) (summary order)

2 (rejecting allegations that the ALJ failed to consider

3 impairments in combination where record showed that each

4 ailment and its cumulative effects was considered).

5

6 3. Snyder argues that the ALJ gave too much weight to

7 the medical opinion of the consulting psychologist. The

8 opinion of a treating physician is not binding if it is

9 contradicted by substantial evidence, and a consulting

10 physician report may constitute such evidence. See Mongeur

11 v. Heckler, 722 F.2d 1033, 1039 (2d Cir. 1983). Here, the

12 consulting psychologist opinion was consistent with other

13 medical evidence and was supported by substantial evidence;

14 the ALJ therefore did not err in affording his opinion great

15 weight.

16

17 4. Snyder argues that the ALJ erred by not crediting

18 her testimony. The Commissioner is not obligated to credit

19 a claimant’s testimony about her limitations and symptoms,

20 but has discretion to evaluate the claimant’s credibility in

21 light of the evidence in the record. See Genier v. Astrue,

22 606 F.3d 46, 50 (2d Cir. 2010). The ALJ determined that,

23 while Snyder’s medically determinable impairments could

24 reasonably be expected to cause the alleged symptoms,

25 Snyder’s statements concerning the intensity, persistence,

26 and limiting effects of these symptoms were not entirely

27 credible. The ALJ specifically analyzed Snyder’s claims of

28 neck pain, arm numbness, obesity, and depression; as to each

29 condition, the ALJ cited specific medical evidence in the

30 record and concluded that the alleged limitations were

31 without support. Accordingly, the ALJ sufficiently

32 explained the credibility determination and committed no

33 error. 

34

35 5. Snyder argues that the ALJ erroneously relied upon

36 the lack of “formal mental health treatment” to deny her

37 appeal. The ALJ considered and discussed Snyder’s “history

38 of treatment for depression,” which included prescription

39 antidepressants from her primary care physician. The ALJ’s

40 credibility assessment observed that the plaintiff never

41 sought “formal mental health treatment” (such as counseling

42 or psychiatric care). Although an ALJ may find a plaintiff

43 less credible if she failed to seek medical treatment, an

44 ALJ is obligated to consider any explanation a plaintiff may

45 have for such failure, see SSR 16-3p, 81 Fed. Reg. 14,166,

46 14,170-71 (Mar. 16, 2016), and here the ALJ did not consider

3
1 any reasons why the plaintiff did not seek “formal mental

2 health treatment.” 

3

4 Despite this error, the credibility determination was

5 supported by other substantial record evidence as discussed

6 above. Furthermore, the lack of formal mental health

7 treatment was just one of multiple factors considered in

8 assessing the plaintiff’s credibility, including that

9 Snyder’s allegations were unsupported by objective medical

10 evidence, and so any error was harmless.

11

12 6. Snyder argues that the Commissioner did not satisfy

13 her burden to show at Step 5 that she could not perform work

14 in the national economy. When the hypothetical posed to the

15 vocational expert is based on a residual functional capacity

16 finding that is supported by substantial evidence, the

17 hypothetical is proper and the ALJ is entitled to rely on

18 the vocational expert’s testimony. See Dumas v. Schweiker,

19 712 F.2d 1545, 1554 (2d Cir. 1983); see also Salmini v.

20 Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 371 F. App’x 109, 114 (2d Cir. 2010)

21 (summary order). Here, the ALJ’s hypothetical to the

22 vocational expert closely paralleled the ALJ’s residual

23 functional capacity finding, which was supported by

24 substantial evidence. Accordingly, the plaintiff’s

25 challenge fails.

26

27 For the foregoing reasons, and finding no merit in the

28 plaintiff’s other arguments, we hereby AFFIRM the judgment

29 of the district court.

30

31 FOR THE COURT:

32 CATHERINE O’HAGAN WOLFE, CLERK

33

4