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STATE OF MICHIGAN 

COURT OF APPEALS 

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, 

 Plaintiff-Appellee, 

UNPUBLISHED 

May 26, 2015 

v No. 312070 

Wayne Circuit Court 

SAMER NASSIB ZAHR, LC No. 11-008606-FH 

 Defendant-Appellant. 

Before: MURPHY, P.J., and STEPHENS and GADOLA, JJ. 

PER CURIAM. 

 Defendant appeals as of right his bench trial convictions of seven counts of false 

pretenses with intent to defraud involving a value of $20,000 to $50,000, MCL 750.218(5)(a), 

and passing false title to a motor vehicle, MCL 257.254.1 For all eight of his convictions, the 

trial court sentenced defendant to five years’ probation with 12 months to be served in the 

Wayne County Jail. We affirm defendant’s convictions, but, under the authority of MCL 

769.1k(1)(b)(iii), we remand for a determination of the factual basis for $600 in court costs 

imposed by the trial court; defendant’s sentences are otherwise affirmed. 

 This case arises from defendant’s involvement in a series of loan applications filed in 

2005 and 2006. Between June and August of 2005, defendant sold four homes to his mother, 

Rajaa Zahr.2

 Rajaa applied for mortgages to purchase the homes through a “stated income” loan 

program under which applicants were required to report their income, but did not have to provide 

any independent proof of income. Mortgage broker Linda Khemmoro communicated with 

 

1

 Defendant was also charged with, but acquitted of, second-degree money laundering, MCL 

750.411n, conducting a criminal enterprise, MCL 750.159i(1), and conspiring to conduct a 

criminal enterprise, MCL 750.159i(4). 

2

 Rajaa and defendant’s wife, Chirine Ghandour, were charged and tried with defendant as 

codefendants. The trial court acquitted Rajaa of conducting a criminal enterprise, conspiring 

with defendant to conduct a criminal enterprise, and of four counts of false pretenses. Ghandour 

was also acquitted of one count of false pretenses. 
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defendant almost exclusively in completing the loan applications for Rajaa. Defendant 

represented to Khemmoro that Rajaa’s income was $9,550 a month. 

 In August 2005, defendant applied for a business loan for his company, Flexible 

Transport, which rents vehicles for special events under the name Luxury Limousine. The loan 

was backed by the Small Business Administration (SBA). Although defendant is Flexible 

Transport’s sole owner and corporate office holder, defendant identified his wife, Chirine 

Ghandour, as the president and 90% owner of the company on the loan application. 

 In May 2006, defendant applied for another SBA backed loan for his second business, 

Zahr’s Real Estate Investments, which manages and leases residential properties. Defendant 

stated on the loan application that he intended to use the loan as working capital for Zahr’s Real 

Estate Investments. Upon receiving a $100,000 loan, however, defendant transferred $95,000 of 

the loan proceeds to Luxury Limousine. 

 Four of defendant’s seven false pretenses convictions arose from his misrepresentation of 

Rajaa’s income during the mortgage application process, while another two were based on 

defendant’s misstatements on the SBA loan applications. Defendant argues that the evidence 

was insufficient to support these six convictions.3

 

 With respect to a claim that the evidence was insufficient to sustain a conviction, this 

Court, addressing a sufficiency argument in the context of a bench trial, stated in People v 

Kanaan, 278 Mich App 594, 618-619; 751 NW2d 57 (2008), as follows: 

 We review claims of insufficient evidence de novo. When ascertaining 

whether sufficient evidence was presented in a bench trial to support a conviction, 

this Court must view the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution and 

determine whether a rational trier of fact could find that the essential elements of 

the crime were proven beyond a reasonable doubt. This Court will not interfere 

with the trier of fact's role of determining the weight of the evidence or the 

credibility of witnesses. Circumstantial evidence and reasonable inferences that 

arise from such evidence can constitute satisfactory proof of the elements of the 

crime. All conflicts in the evidence must be resolved in favor of the prosecution. 

[Citations omitted.] 

 To establish false pretenses, in general, the prosecution must show: “(1) a false 

representation as to an existing fact; (2) knowledge by [the defendant] of the falsity of the 

representation; (3) use of the false representation with an intent to deceive; and (4) detrimental 

reliance on the false representation by the victim.” People v Bearss, 463 Mich 623, 627; 625 

NW2d 10 (2001) (citation omitted); see also MCL 750.218(1) (“A person who, with the intent to 

defraud or cheat makes or uses a false pretense to . . . .”). Concerning the real property sales, the 

 

3

 The seventh false pretenses conviction arose from defendant’s misrepresentation concerning his 

ownership of a Hummer, which defendant used in his limousine business. Defendant does not 

challenge this conviction, nor does he challenge the false title conviction under MCL 257.254. 
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trial court found that defendant falsely reported Rajaa’s income to Khemmoro as $9,550 a month 

“with the intent to deceive, to place Rajaa Zahr in a higher income level so that the loan was 

virtually rubber stamped, [and] likely to be granted.” The trial court credited Rajaa’s 2005 tax 

return as showing that her true annual income was $35,246 (roughly $2,937 per month). 

 Defendant argues that there was insufficient evidence to prove that his statements 

concerning Rajaa’s income were false. According to defendant, the trial court merely 

“suppos[ed]” that the statements regarding income “had to be false at the time [they were] made, 

given the ultimate discrepancy between stated income and actual income [as reflected on Rajaa’s 

2005 tax return].” Defendant confuses sufficiency of the evidence with the concept of inferences 

drawn from circumstantial evidence. Once again, “ ‘[c]ircumstantial evidence and reasonable 

inferences arising from that evidence can constitute satisfactory proof of the elements of a 

crime.’ ” People v Carines, 460 Mich 750, 757; 597 NW2d 130 (1999) (citation omitted). 

Rajaa’s 2005 tax return showing an income of $35,246 was circumstantial proof that the $9,550 

a month figure repeatedly offered by defendant was inaccurate, leading to a very reasonable 

inference that defendant had stated Rajaa’s income falsely and did so with an intent to deceive 

lenders into approving her for a mortgage. As the finder of fact, the trial court was free to 

conclude that Rajaa’s tax return constituted reliable proof of her actual income. See People v 

Unger, 278 Mich App 210, 228-229; 749 NW2d 272 (2008) (the factfinder is free to believe or 

disbelieve any of the evidence and deference is afforded to the factfinder in weighing the 

evidence). We agree with the trial court that the significant difference between the income 

reported on the loan applications ($114,600 a year) and the income shown on the tax return 

($35,246 a year) suggests more than “sloppy bookkeeping.” 

 Other evidence also supported the trial court’s finding that defendant falsified his 

mother’s income with deceptive intent. Michigan State Police Trooper Christopher Correveau 

testified that when he attempted to interview Rajaa, defendant interrupted and “demanded to 

know the nature of the interview,” seeking to keep his mother out of the loan discussions. 

Defendant and Rajaa also initially confirmed that the reported income of $9,550 a month was 

accurate when Correveau first presented them with one of the loan applications. Yet when 

shown a copy of Rajaa’s 2005 tax return with an income of roughly $35,000, defendant and 

Rajaa backtracked, claiming that the income on the tax return was accurate and that Rajaa had 

never signed the loan application. The evidence was sufficient to support the trial court’s finding 

that defendant had falsely reported Rajaa’s income. 

 Next, defendant argues that even if the income statements were false, he should not be 

responsible for them, because Rajaa was the loan borrower. Defendant overlooks his nearly 

exclusive role in the deception. Khemmoro testified that she communicated only with defendant 

in completing all of the loan applications and that he consistently reported Rajaa’s income as 

$9,550 a month. It was defendant, not Rajaa, who gave Khemmoro a letter certifying that Rajaa 

was employed and that her monthly earnings were $9,550. And as noted above, defendant 

eventually told Correveau that his mother did not sign the loan application. In addition to the 

significant discrepancy between the income defendant reported and Rajaa’s actual income, the 

trial court could infer defendant’s intent to deceive and defraud because defendant benefitted 

from the home sales. See People v Reigle, 223 Mich App 34, 39-40; 566 NW2d 21 (1997) 

(“[The] [d]efendant’s knowledge and intent can be inferred from the entire evidence.”); see also 

People v Guthrie, 262 Mich App 416, 419; 686 NW2d 767 (2004) (minimal circumstantial 
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evidence is sufficient to prove a defendant’s intent). Shortly after defendant received a deposit 

from the closing of a home sale, he would transfer a significant portion of the proceeds to 

Flexible Transport’s bank account, thereby financing his limousine business. The evidence was 

sufficient to support the trial court’s finding that defendant made the false representations with 

deceptive intent. And defendant was not relieved of criminal liability simply because Rajaa was 

the “borrower” with respect to the loans. Contrary to defendant’s argument, his guilt was not 

based on him being Rajaa’s “legally bound agent,” in the sense that he was being held 

responsible as an agent for Rajaa’s wrongdoing. Rather, it was defendant’s own self-serving 

criminal acts, as clearly reflected in the evidence, that gave rise to the convictions. Finally, while 

the element is not addressed by defendant, there was also sufficient evidence of detrimental 

reliance. 

 Defendant makes the same argument regarding the SBA loan application for Flexible 

Transport, which identified Ghandour as the president and 90% owner of the company: “it was 

Ms. Ghandour who applied, signed for[,] and personally guaranteed the loan[,] and it is only Ms. 

Ghandour who can legally be held criminally responsible for her actions.” Defendant is 

incorrect. Corporate filings and tax statements showed that defendant was the sole officer and 

owner of Flexible Transport. The SBA loan application made clear that “each proprietor, 

partner, office director, [or] holder of twenty percent or more” of the company applying had to 

be identified on the 1919 SBA Form and had to act as an individual guarantor for the loan. 

Business banking officer Jose Diaz recalled explaining these requirements to defendant and 

Ghandour. And although Diaz was unsure whether it was defendant or his wife who identified 

Ghandour as the president and 90% owner of Flexible Transport, he testified that defendant was 

the main source of information during the loan discussions. Defendant also contacted Diaz once 

the Flexible Transport loan was under investigation, and again reached out to Diaz “a couple of 

times” within the three months of trial. Such conduct demonstrates defendant’s awareness of his 

own wrongdoing. See, e.g., People v Roscoe, 303 Mich App 633, 642; 846 NW2d 402 (2014) 

(the defendant’s request that his wife look into the victim’s medical records, along with his 

Internet searches concerning the crime and review of local death notices, demonstrated 

consciousness of guilt). Moreover, the false statements on the loan application were not limited 

to the identification of Flexible Transport’s ownership and management. The trial court also 

found that defendant “inflated the 2002 gross sales receipts,” by representing that Flexible 

Transport had earned $335,000 in gross receipts when its tax return showed gross receipts of 

only $194,665. Defendant does not challenge this finding. The evidence was sufficient to 

sustain defendant’s conviction for false pretenses in connection with the SBA loan application 

for Flexible Transport. 

 Defendant also contends that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction for 

false pretenses in connection with the SBA loan for Zahr’s Real Estate Investments. The trial 

court found that defendant committed false pretenses with regard to this loan by transferring the 

loan proceeds to Luxury Limousine instead of using it for the purpose identified on the SBA loan 

application. Defendant admits “that the majority of the funds from the Zahr Real Estate loan 

went to the Luxury Limousine business,” but argues that this was not improper because “nothing 

in the record [indicates] that [defendant] was told or had any personal knowledge that he could 

not use the funds for another business.” This is untrue. Defendant signed a “Business Loan and 

Security Agreement” as part of the SBA loan application, which specifically prohibited the 

transfer of loan funds to another company, unless done in the ordinary course of business. In the 
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same month that the $100,000 loan was distributed to Zahr’s Real Estate Investments, the 

company issued four checks worth a total of $95,000 to Luxury Limousine. The trial court could 

reasonably infer that these transfers were not done in the ordinary course of business. Further, 

defendant made a second misrepresentation on the loan application, claiming Zahr’s Real Estate 

Investments grossed $890,000 in total sales receipts for 2004, when tax documentation from the 

same year showed actual gross sales receipts of only $35,240. Defendant does not dispute the 

finding that his report of the gross sales receipts was false. The evidence was sufficient to 

support defendant’s conviction of false pretenses in connection with the SBA loan application 

for Zahr’s Real Estate Investments. 

 Finally, defendant argues that the trial court lacked authority under MCL 769.1k to 

impose $600 in court costs as part of his sentence. Given the Legislature’s amendment of MCL 

769.1k, which now authorizes the imposition of “any cost reasonably related to the actual costs 

incurred by the trial court[,]” §§ 1k(1)(b)(iii), and considering the amendment’s valid retroactive 

effect encompassing the date of defendant’s sentencing, People v Konopka, __ Mich App __; __ 

NW2d __, issued March 3, 2015 (Docket No. 319913), there is general authority to impose court 

costs in this case. However, remand is necessary “for determination of the factual basis for the 

costs imposed pursuant to MCL 769.1k(1)(b)(iii).” Konopka, slip op at 16. 

 Affirmed with respect to defendant’s convictions, but remanded for a determination of 

the factual basis for the $600 in court costs imposed by the trial court; defendant’s sentences are 

otherwise affirmed. We do not retain jurisdiction. 

/s/ William B. Murphy 

/s/ Cynthia Diane Stephens 

/s/ Michael F. Gadola