In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

No. 08-1600

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

DENNIS JAMES WOODEN,

Defendant-Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the

Northern District of Indiana, South Bend Division.

No. 3:07-CR-00082-RLM—Robert L. Miller, Jr., Chief Judge.

ARGUED OCTOBER 15, 2008—DECIDED DECEMBER 29, 2008

Before EASTERBROOK, Chief Judge, and COFFEY and

WOOD, Circuit Judges.

EASTERBROOK, Chief Judge. Early one Saturday morning

the 911 system in South Bend, Indiana, received this

call from a pay phone:

I would like to report a black male with a silver

hand gun. He was arguing with his, ah, girlfriend,

or whatever. . . . They were walking toward [the]

7-Eleven on Miami [Street]. He’s tall. He’s wearing
2 No. 08-1600

a black jacket and blue jean pants. He has the gun

on a holster. And I seen him pull it out.

Police quickly spotted the couple but did not see an

ongoing argument; they were eating snack food. But

Officer Gary Reynolds thought that an armed domestic

quarrel could resume at any time and stopped the pair.

A pat-down found the gun, just as the caller had described

it. The safety was off; the serial number had been obliterated. Wooden entered a conditional guilty plea to possessing a firearm despite a felony conviction, 18 U.S.C.

§922(g)(1), and a second count based on the missing serial

number, 18 U.S.C. §922(k). The sentence, 30 months’

imprisonment, is modest for these offenses.

Whether the gun should have been suppressed as the

fruit of an unlawful search is the question reserved for

appeal by the conditional plea. Wooden concedes that

the call would have provided adequate support for a

Terry stop (see Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968)) if the

caller had given his name. But he contends that, because

the call was anonymous and the police did not verify any

details other than innocuous ones (such as his position

and clothing), the holding of Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266

(2000), requires application of the exclusionary rule. The

district court found otherwise, concluding that 911 calls

reporting an ongoing crime must be treated differently.

So we held in United States v. Drake, 456 F.3d 771, 775

(7th Cir. 2006). See also United States v. Hicks, 531 F.3d

555, 558–59 (7th Cir. 2008) (reporting that every court of

appeals that has considered the subject has concluded

that J.L. does not cover anonymous reports of ongoing

crime that require immediate action to ensure public
No. 08-1600 3

safety). Wooden wants us to abrogate Drake and Hicks,

but we think them sound.

Terry and its successors hold that a stop supported by

articulable suspicion is “reasonable” under the fourth

amendment. See, e.g., Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 123

(2000); United States v. Chaidez, 919 F.2d 1193 (7th Cir.

1990). Articulable suspicion can be established by an

anonymous tip if the police corroborate enough of the

tipster’s information to imply that the tipster must

possess inside knowledge about the details that the

police could not otherwise observe. See Alabama v. White,

496 U.S. 325 (1990), and the discussion in J.L., 529 U.S. at

270–71. Knowing a tipster’s name increases the chance

that he can be held accountable (both state and federal

governments make it a crime to tell material lies to lawenforcement officials), and knowledge that a tipster has

inside information likewise increases the chance that

the report of crime is accurate.

But people who report crimes do not invariably claim

“inside information” (as the tipsters in J.L. and White did).

The caller in this case told us how he knew that Wooden

had a gun: he saw Wooden draw it from its holster in

public. Corroboration of other information (such as

whether a tall man near the 7-Eleven store was wearing

a black jacket and blue jeans) would not make this claim

more plausible—but then, the assertions of eyewitnesses

to crime generally do not need corroboration, or a history

of other accurate reports, to be believed. See, e.g., Gramenos

v. Jewel Companies, Inc., 797 F.2d 432 (7th Cir. 1986); cf.

Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983) (a tipster’s history of
4 No. 08-1600

providing reliable information is not essential to

probable cause).

Doubtless greater confidence can be achieved when

police know a caller’s identity, for then, as the Court

observed in J.L., the threat of penalties for lies makes

information more reliable. Yet as a practical matter a

name given by a caller does not make the tip less anonymous. Suppose that the 911 call in this case had begun:

“My name is John Jenkins, and I would like to report. . .”.

That a caller gives a name does not mean that he is John

Jenkins (either the President of Notre Dame or any other

John Jenkins). Caller ID does not solve this problem

for public phones or even home phones, which can be

used by multiple people (including guests at a party);

some subscribers block the service. Cell phones, which

almost always use caller ID, can be stolen. And it would

undermine the goal of the 911 system to require a caller

to prove his identity, perhaps by coming to the station

with a driver’s license or passport, before the police react

to the information. When crime is in progress, prompt

action is essential. The fourth amendment prohibits

unreasonable searches and seizures, and it has long been

understood that, when the police believe that a crime is

in progress (or imminent), action on a lesser degree of

probability, or with fewer procedural checks in advance,

can be reasonable. See, e.g., Brigham City v. Stuart, 547

U.S. 398 (2006).

J.L. dealt with a situation in which there was no apparent need for haste, in which the caller did not describe

how he knew that J.L. was armed, and in which the tip

was not recorded (so the police may have misunder-
No. 08-1600 5

stood the details). The police could take their time to

gather more information, and the Court held that an

immediate stop was unreasonable. Our case, by contrast, arises from a recorded 911 call that revealed how

the caller knew about the crime and that implied a need

for dispatch. Wooden observes that the couple was chatting amicably by the time the police arrived, but the

officer explained that domestic violence comes and goes;

a man who pulls a gun on his wife or girlfriend may do

it again at any moment. (There is also a risk that an

armed man may threaten the woman with him that,

unless she “acts natural” when the police arrive, she will

be beaten or shot later.)

A 911 system designed to provide an emergency response to telephonic tips could not operate if the police

had to verify the identity of all callers and test their

claim to have seen crimes in progress. A process of testing

would frustrate the expedition that often is essential to

protect lives and safety. A system that follows an “act fast,

verify later” approach creates risks of unjustified action

and makes it possible for someone holding a grudge to

cause trouble. All of this goes into the calculus of reasonableness, together with the fact that Terry stops are brief,

and people can quickly go on their way if the call proves

to be unfounded. So we reiterate the holding of Drake

and Hicks that a need for dispatch can make reasonable

a stop that would not be reasonable if the police had

time to investigate at leisure.

The district court did not err in concluding that the

circumstances reported to the police implied a need for

haste, and that a report by a person claiming to have
6 No. 08-1600

seen a gun drawn in public provided articulable

suspicion for a Terry stop and frisk.

After Wooden’s arrest, the person who made the 911

call was identified. Wooden maintains that the caller

held a grudge against him and lied when he said that

Wooden had drawn his gun on the street—though the

caller did know that Wooden was packing heat. But the

police are entitled to act on what is known at the time;

information turned up later neither vindicates nor condemns a search.

A constitutional obligation to defer action pending

an investigation into the possibility that a 911 caller may

be out to cause mischief would cripple the emergencyresponse system; far better to act quickly and later prosecute any mischief-makers who can be caught. Judges

must not underestimate the value of deterrence for 911

callers, as well as for those who may be committing

other crimes, for as this case shows callers’ identity may

be pinned down with enough time, whether or not

they identify themselves. If this 911 call was an effort by

someone who knew an incriminating fact (that Wooden

was carrying a gun) to mislead the police by asserting

something else that was not true (that Wooden had drawn

his gun to intimidate a companion), the best remedy is

to prosecute the caller rather than allow a gun-toting

felon to escape punishment. The judgment of the district

court therefore is

AFFIRMED.

12-29-08