[DO NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

 ________________________

No. 15-14417

 ________________________

D.C. Docket No. 1:13-cv-21697-JAL

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

versus

TWENTY-NINE PRE-COLUMBIAN AND COLONIAL ARTIFACTS FROM 

PERU, et al.,

Defendants,

JEAN COMBE-FRITZ,

Claimant - Appellant.

 ________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Florida

 ________________________

(June 2, 2017)

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Before HULL, MARCUS, and CLEVENGER,* Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

Jean Combe-Fritz appeals from the district court’s final judgment of 

forfeiture of a number of artifacts confiscated from him by U.S. Customs and 

Border Protection (“CBP”) when he arrived at Miami International Airport from 

Peru. CBP seized the items pursuant to both the Convention on Cultural Property 

Implementation Act (“CPIA”), 19 U.S.C. §§ 2601–13, which limits the importation 

of “archaeological and ethnological material” of a foreign State Party; and 19 

U.S.C. § 1595a(c), which restricts the importation of items “contrary to law.” 

Upon review of the record, and with the benefit of oral argument from counsel for 

the parties, we affirm.

I. FACTS & PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Mr. Combe-Fritz, a Peruvian citizen, arrived at Miami International Airport 

from Lima, Peru, on August 21, 2010. During Mr. Combe-Fritz’s secondary 

screening examination, CBP officers identified a number of items—various 

textiles, figurines, and other articles—that were deemed to require further 

evaluation from an import specialist. CBP confiscated the items and issued a 

Detention Notice and Custody Receipt to Mr. Combe-Fritz. He returned to Peru 

shortly thereafter.

 * The Honorable Raymond C. Clevenger, United States Circuit Judge for the Federal 

Circuit, sitting by designation.

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On February 15, 2012, CBP issued Mr. Combe-Fritz and his counsel two 

separate notices of seizure and possible forfeiture of the seized items. One of the 

notices stated that some of the confiscated items were “Archaeological and 

Ethnological Material from Peru,” seized pursuant to 19 U.S.C § 2609 and 19 

C.F.R. § 12.104e, and subject to summary forfeiture proceedings. The second 

notice indicated that other items were “stolen cultural property from Peru” and, 

therefore, were seized and subject to forfeiture under 19 U.S.C. § 1595a(c)(1)(A). 

Mr. Combe-Fritz submitted a claim of interest for the seized items and paid the 

requisite bond, and CBP referred the case to the U.S. Attorney’s office (“the 

government”) to initiate judicial forfeiture proceedings. See 19 U.S.C. § 1608.

On May 10, 2013, the government filed a complaint (“first complaint”) for 

civil forfeiture in rem against “twenty-nine pre-Columbian and Colonial artifacts 

from Peru,” pursuant to 19 U.S.C. § 2609, part of the CPIA. The first complaint 

alleged that Dr. Carol Damian, an expert in Latin American and Pre-Columbian 

art,” had reviewed the seized items and opined that twenty-nine of them 

“appear[ed] to be designated archeological and ethnological material,” the 

importation of which is limited under the CPIA.1

 It also alleged that Luis Chang, 

Minister Counselor of the Embassy of Peru, had reviewed photographs of the 

 1 The Fourth Circuit’s case Ancient Coin Collectors Guild v. U.S. Customs & Border 

Prot., Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 698 F.3d 171, 175–77 (4th Cir. 2012), provides a concise 

overview of the CPIA and its history. 

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twenty-nine items and, like Dr. Damian, believed them to be protected articles of 

Peruvian cultural heritage, exported without authorization from the government of 

Peru. 

On July 19, 2013, the government filed a second complaint (“second 

complaint”) for civil forfeiture in rem against “Three Artifacts Constituting 

Cultural Property from Peru,” pursuant to 19 U.S.C. § 1595a(c)(1)(A).2 The 

second complaint alleged that three of the seized items (not included in the first 

complaint) were Peruvian cultural property, and, under Peruvian law, the 

unauthorized exportation of the defendant property caused ownership of the items 

to revert to the government of Peru. As with the first complaint, the second 

complaint alleged that Luis Chang had reviewed the three items and believed them 

to be the cultural property of Peru, exported without the government’s permission. 

Consequently, the government’s second complaint alleged that “the removal of the 

defendant property from Peru was illegal; ownership of the property had reverted 

to the people of Peru; and the three artifacts constitute property stolen, smuggled or 

clandestinely imported into the United States.” 

Mr. Combe-Fritz filed verified claims of interest in response to each of the 

government’s complaints, and the district court consolidated the cases. On 

 2 “Merchandise which is introduced or attempted to be introduced into the United States 

contrary to law shall be treated as follows: (1) The merchandise shall be seized and forfeited if 

it—(A) is stolen, smuggled, or clandestinely imported or introduced . . . .” 19 U.S.C. 

§ 1595a(c)(1)(A). 

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September 16, 2013, Mr. Combe-Fritz filed a motion to dismiss the consolidated 

forfeiture action, arguing that (1) the district court lacked jurisdiction because the 

Court of International Trade (“CIT”) possessed exclusive jurisdiction over the 

case, (2) CBP’s procedures prior to referring the case to the U.S. Attorney did not 

comport with due process, and (3) the government failed to state a claim in its 

complaints. 

While the motion to dismiss was pending, the district entered a scheduling 

order setting discovery deadlines. The government noticed Mr. Combe-Fritz’s 

deposition for March 13, 2014. Mr. Combe-Fritz moved to stay discovery until the 

district court ruled on his motion to dismiss, but the magistrate judge denied the 

stay motion, ordering that the parties proceed with discovery and that Mr. CombeFritz’s deposition “go forward at this time.” The parties repeatedly attempted to 

reschedule the deposition, but Mr. Combe-Fritz ultimately cancelled agreed-upon

dates on three occasions, citing concerns that he could be arrested while in the 

United States because he had not received a U.S. visa to travel from Peru. The 

government noticed Mr. Combe-Fritz’s deposition for June 12, 2014, and filed a 

motion to compel his attendance. At the hearing regarding the government’s 

motion to compel, Mr. Combe-Fritz’s counsel explained that his client had 

received a visa and would attend the June 12 deposition voluntarily. 

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On June 6, 2014, the government emailed Mr. Combe-Fritz’s attorney to 

review some logistical matters regarding the upcoming deposition, including 

advising that counsel explain Mr. Combe-Fritz’s Fifth Amendment privilege to 

him ahead of time, in order to avoid confusion and delay. Consequently, Mr. 

Combe-Fritz insisted that the government grant him immunity or agree to a 

protective order. The government refused, and the scheduled June 12 deposition 

was postponed to June 30, but Mr. Combe-Fritz did not appear for his deposition 

on this date.

Mr. Combe-Fritz filed three motions on July 3, 2014. First, Mr. CombeFritz filed a motion for a protective order and immunity, seeking limitations on the 

use of his deposition testimony and any documents relating thereto. Second, Mr. 

Combe-Fritz filed a motion to stay forfeiture proceedings until the resolution of 

any criminal inquiry against him. Third, Mr. Combe-Fritz filed a motion to amend 

the scheduling order, either by reassigning the case to the “Complex Track,” under 

Southern District of Florida Local Rule 16.1(a)(2), (3), or by extending the 

discovery deadline. 

On August 6 and 7, 2014, the district court denied Mr. Combe-Fritz’s

motion to stay without prejudice, finding his Fifth Amendment concerns “too 

speculative and hypothetical,” and denied his motion to amend the scheduling 

order. The magistrate judge, however, granted Mr. Combe-Fritz a partial 

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protective order, concluding that, despite the government’s representations that 

there was no federal criminal investigation pending against him, Mr. CombeFritz’s concerns were “not entirely without merit and [could not] be entirely

discounted.” Therefore, although finding that the “purported grounds for 

protective order are largely speculative, conclusory, and vague,” the magistrate 

judge ordered that Mr. Combe-Fritz’s deposition testimony and other produced 

documents “may be used only in connection with this case” and were not to be 

used in any potential criminal investigation. The magistrate judge did not 

otherwise limit the government’s conduct of discovery or require the government 

to confer immunity to Mr. Combe-Fritz. 

On September 11, 2014, the district court denied Mr. Combe-Fritz’s motion 

to dismiss, filed in September 2013. The district court concluded that the CIT did 

not possess exclusive jurisdiction over the matter, that CBP had complied with its 

due process obligations, and that the government had adequately stated a claim in 

both of its complaints. 

On December 17, 2014, the government moved in limine to preclude Mr. 

Combe-Fritz from testifying at trial, in light of his refusal to sit for his deposition. 

On January 16, 2015, the government additionally filed a motion for sanctions “up 

to and including dismissal of [Mr. Combe-Fritz’s] claim” for discovery 

misconduct. The magistrate judge granted the motion in limine on February 3, 

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2015, ordering: “[Mr. Combe-Fritz] must appear for his deposition within ten days 

of this Order, or he will be excluded from testifying at trial.” The magistrate judge 

declined to grant the government’s motion for additional sanctions. Mr. CombeFritz did not appear for his deposition within ten days of the magistrate judge’s 

order.

On April 2, 2015, the district court sua sponte issued an order to show cause 

why it should not strike Mr. Combe-Fritz’s claims of interest with prejudice. The 

district court recited Mr. Combe-Fritz’s repeated failures to sit for his deposition, 

the lesser sanctions that had already been considered and applied, and Mr. CombeFritz’s lack of evidence to establish his own standing. The district court 

specifically addressed Mr. Combe-Fritz’s self-incrimination concerns:

To the extent that [Mr. Combe-Fritz] has avoided 

appearing for his deposition based on a Fifth Amendment 

concern that answers to deposition questions might tend 

to incriminate him, this would not give him the right to 

simply not appear at all for a deposition. Instead it would 

give him the ability to assert his Fifth Amendment 

privilege on a question-by-question basis at the 

deposition. Claimant cannot simply refuse to even appear 

for a deposition based on a fear, even if legitimate, of 

criminal prosecution based on his deposition testimony.

On May 15, 2015, following responses from both parties, the district court 

explained that Mr. Combe-Fritz had “continuously disregarded his discovery 

obligations as a party in this case” and that his “complete failure to actively engage 

in the discovery process ha[d] prejudiced [the government’s] ability to pursue this 

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litigation.” Accordingly, the district court ordered Mr. Combe-Fritz to sit for 

deposition in Miami within thirty days (June 15, 2015) or face dismissal of his 

claims. On June 11, 2015, Mr. Combe-Fritz filed a motion for reconsideration of 

the court’s order compelling his deposition. In the motion, he argued that 

appearing for deposition would be a “waste of judicial resources” because he 

would be invoking his Fifth Amendment privilege and that the district court’s 

order was “unnecessary.” Mr. Combe-Fritz did not appear for his deposition on or 

before June 15, 2015.

On August 4, 2015, the district court denied Mr. Combe-Fritz’s motion for 

reconsideration and found that he had willfully frustrated the discovery process and 

failed to comply with direct court orders—therefore, as a sanction for his discovery 

abuses, the district court struck and dismissed his claims of interest with prejudice, 

pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37. The district court explained that 

the severe sanction was “warranted to ensure the integrity of the discovery process 

and the administration of justice.” 

The government moved for final judgment of forfeiture on August 14, 2015. 

The court granted the motion and entered final judgment on August 24, 2015. 

Later the same day, Mr. Combe-Fritz filed a response to the government’s motion

for final judgment and, because the court had already granted the motion, also 

requested that the entry of judgment be vacated. The court summarily denied the 

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request. Mr. Combe-Fritz moved for reconsideration, which the court also denied

on the grounds that he was no longer a party to the case. 

This appeal followed.

II. DISCUSSION

Mr. Combe-Fritz raises a host of complaints regarding the district court’s 

rulings. As an initial matter, Mr. Combe-Fritz contends that the district court 

lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the action in its entirety because exclusive 

jurisdiction lay with the CIT. Additionally, Mr. Combe-Fritz raises challenges to 

both CBP’s procedures and the district court’s conduct of the forfeiture litigation—

including the striking of his claims of interest, which resulted in the ultimate 

judgment of forfeiture. We discuss these issues in turn.

A. Subject Matter Jurisdiction

We are obligated to consider, as a threshold inquiry, whether subject matter 

jurisdiction properly lay with the district court. See United States v. Salmona, 810 

F.3d 806, 810 (11th Cir. 2016) (“Without subject matter jurisdiction, a court has no 

power to decide anything except that it lacks jurisdiction.”). Questions concerning 

a district court’s exercise of subject matter jurisdiction are reviewed de novo. 

Mesa Valderrama v. United States, 417 F.3d 1189, 1194 (11th Cir. 2005). 

As a general rule, the federal district courts possess original jurisdiction over 

forfeiture proceedings, “except matters within the jurisdiction of the [CIT] under 

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section 1582 of this title.”3 28 U.S.C. § 1355(a). Mr. Combe-Fritz contends that 

the CIT possessed exclusive jurisdiction over the CPIA-based forfeiture, not as a 

result of § 1582 but, rather, according to § 1581. Under 28 U.S.C. § 1581(i), the 

CIT “shall have exclusive jurisdiction of any civil action commenced against the 

United States . . . that arises out of any law of the United States providing 

for . . . (3) embargoes or other quantitative restrictions on the importation of 

merchandise; or (4) administration and enforcement” of such an embargo or 

quantitative restriction. 28 U.S.C. § 1581(i)(3), (4) (emphasis added). Mr. 

Combe-Fritz argues that the CPIA effectively creates an embargo by restricting the 

importation into the United States of certain foreign goods.

We need not reach the question of whether the CPIA in fact creates an 

embargo as recognized by § 1581(i)(3) because we agree with the district court that 

the government’s in rem forfeiture action cannot be characterized as a “civil action 

commenced against the United States,” a necessary precondition under the statute. 

28 U.S.C. § 1581(i). Regardless of his belief that it is legal fiction to label the 

twenty-nine items seized under the CPIA as “guilty property,” Mr. Combe-Fritz 

cannot overcome the plain fact that the instant forfeiture proceedings were 

 3 “The [CIT] shall have exclusive jurisdiction of any civil action which arises out of an 

import transaction and which is commenced by the United States—(1) to recover a civil penalty 

under section 592, 593A, 641(b)(6), 641(d)(2)(A), 704(i)(2), or 734(i)(2) of the Tariff Act of 

1930; (2) to recover upon a bond relating to the importation of merchandise required by the laws 

of the United States or by the Secretary of the Treasury; or (3) to recover customs duties.” 28 

U.S.C. § 1582.

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commenced by the United States, against the defendant property. See United 

States v. One-Sixth Share, 326 F.3d 36, 40 (1st Cir. 2003) (“Because civil 

forfeiture is an in rem proceeding, the property subject to forfeiture is the 

defendant. Thus, defenses against the forfeiture can be brought only by third 

parties, who must intervene.”). This was not a case “commenced against the 

United States.” 

Therefore, the general rule that district courts have original jurisdiction over 

forfeiture proceedings brought by the government is properly applied in this case. 

B. Rule 37 Sanctions

District courts have broad authority and discretion to fashion sanctions 

against parties who fail to engage in discovery (e.g., a party’s failure to attend its 

own deposition) or otherwise disobey court orders. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(b), (d). 

Such sanctions include “striking pleadings in whole or in part” or “rendering a 

default judgment against the disobedient party.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2)(A); see 

also Buchanan v. Bowman, 820 F.2d 359, 361 (11th Cir. 1987). We have 

recognized, however, that “[t]he decision to dismiss a claim or enter default 

judgment ‘ought to be a last resort—ordered only if noncompliance with discovery 

orders is due to willful or bad faith disregard for those orders.’” United States v. 

Certain Real Prop. Located at Route 1, Bryant, Ala., 126 F.3d 1314, 1317 (11th 

Cir. 1997) (quoting Cox v. Am. Cast Iron Pipe Co., 784 F.2d 1546, 1556 (11th Cir.

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1986)). We review the district’s court imposition of sanctions for abuse of 

discretion. Betty K Agencies, Ltd. v. M/V MONADA, 432 F.3d 1333, 1337 (11th 

Cir. 2005).

Based on the procedural history recited above, we cannot say that the district 

court abused its discretion in striking and dismissing Mr. Combe-Fritz’s claims of 

interest. See Guideone Elite Ins. Co. v. Old Cutler Presbyterian Church, Inc., 420 

F.3d 1317, 1325 (11th Cir. 2005) (“[W]hen employing an abuse of discretion 

standard, we will leave undisturbed a district court’s ruling unless we find that the 

district court has made a clear error of judgment, or has applied the wrong legal 

standard.”). The facts show that, over the course of more than a year, Mr. CombeFritz consistently shirked his obligation to appear for his deposition, depriving the 

government of a meaningful opportunity to explore his claims of interest. Despite 

having both the government’s assurances that there was no federal criminal 

investigation pending against him and a limited protective order from the 

magistrate judge, Mr. Combe-Fritz continued to cite hypothetical selfincrimination concerns as his only reason for not appearing. This was unavailing.

In addition to attempts to accommodate Mr. Combe-Fritz’s Fifth 

Amendment concerns, the district court and magistrate judge repeatedly gave Mr. 

Combe-Fritz chances to avoid dismissal, exhausting other, less severe sanctions. 

In response to the government’s motion in limine and motion for sanctions, the 

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magistrate judge ordered that “[Mr. Combe-Fritz] must appear for his deposition 

within ten days of this Order, or he will be excluded from testifying at trial.” The

threat of this lesser sanction was not sufficient, and Mr. Combe-Fritz ignored it. 

Then, following its order to show cause why the court should not strike Mr. 

Combe-Fritz’s claims of interest, the district court issued an order compelling his

deposition within thirty days, providing him a final opportunity to cure his 

discovery misconduct. Following well-established law, the district court 

specifically explained that Mr. Combe-Fritz could not rely on his Fifth 

Amendment concerns, even if legitimate, to avoid being deposed. See United 

States v. Roundtree, 420 F.2d 845, 852 (5th Cir. 1969) (“[E]ven if the danger of 

self-incrimination is great, [a party’s] remedy is not to voice a blanket refusal to 

produce his records or to testify. Instead, he must present himself with his records 

for questioning, and as to each question and each record elect to raise or not to 

raise the defense. . . . [A] blanket refusal is unacceptable . . . .” (internal footnote 

omitted)).4

 And the district court warned that, should Mr. Combe-Fritz fail to 

appear within thirty days, “it may be grounds for dismissal of his claim.” 

As we have already noted, Mr. Combe-Fritz did not sit for his deposition 

within the thirty-day deadline. Instead he chose to file a motion for 

reconsideration, in which he again asserted an improper “blanket refusal” to sit in 

 4 This Court adopted as binding precedent all Fifth Circuit decisions prior to October 1, 

1981. See Bonner v. City of Prichard, Ala., 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th Cir. 1981).

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light of his self-incrimination concerns and argued that requiring his deposition 

would be a “waste of judicial resources.” Consequently, the district court 

determined that, “[w]hile the issue of whether [Mr. Combe-Fritz] had actually 

violated a specific Court discovery order may have been at one time ‘at least 

slightly, ambiguous,’ that is no longer the case. Claimant has willfully violated the 

Court’s Order to Compel and is solely at fault for the violation.” 

Mr. Combe-Fritz’s conduct went beyond simple negligence, 

misunderstanding, or an inability to comply with court orders. The record amply 

supports the district court’s conclusion that Mr. Combe-Fritz’s “failure to appear 

on several occasions for his deposition was willful and in bad faith.” As such, we 

see no abuse of discretion in the district court’s order striking and dismissing Mr. 

Combe-Fritz’s claims of interest. 

Moreover, because the district court acted within its discretion in striking 

Mr. Combe-Fritz’s claims, we need not address Mr. Combe-Fritz’s remaining 

challenges, both to CBP’s procedures and to the district court’s numerous other 

rulings. See, e.g., United States v. $239,500 in U.S. Currency, 764 F.2d 771, 773 

(11th Cir. 1985) (holding that the district court’s Rule 37 dismissal, resulting in 

dismissal of the claimant’s claims in a forfeiture action, “left no issue before the 

court as to the forfeiture and left [claimants] without standing to contest the merits 

of the Government's claim.”); United States v. $49,000 Currency, 330 F.3d 371, 

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375–76 (5th Cir. 2003) (holding that the district court’s Rule 37 sanction, resulting 

in default judgment against claimant, was proper and “dispositive,” making further

inquiry into other issues raised on appeal unnecessary).

The district court’s entry of final judgment of forfeiture in the consolidated 

forfeiture action is therefore affirmed.

AFFIRMED.

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