Filed 5/28/14 P. v. Sarkissyan CA2/6 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.111.5.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SIX

THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.
HOVANES SARKISSYAN,
Defendant and Appellant. 2d Crim. No. B248373 (Super. Ct. No . 2011018935) (Ventura County)

Hovanes Sarkissyan appeals his conviction by jury of two counts of attempted premeditated murder (P en. Code, §§ 664/187, subd. (a)) 1 with special findings that he personally inflicted great bodily injury on Andrew Martin. (§ 12022.7, subd. (a).) The trial court sentenced appellant to 53 year s to life state prison. Appellant claims, among other things, that the trial court abused its discretion in not granting a new trial
based on ineffective assistance of trial counsel . We modify the judgment to reflect that a mandatory $80 court security fee (§ 1465.8, subd . (a)(1)) and a $60 criminal conviction assessment (Gov. Code, § 70373 ) were imposed. The judgment, as modified, is affirmed. Facts & Procedural History On the evening of May 19, 2011, appe llant talked to his ex-girlfriend, Charlotte Sinclair, at Camino Real Park in Ve ntura. Charlotte's friends approached and

1 All statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise stated.2 chastised appellant about his vi olent relationship with Charlotte . Angry, appellant left the park and returned with two men who stabbe d Charlotte's friends, Alexander Myers and Andrew Martin. During the attack, appellant dropped his car keys and cell phone. Appellant returned minutes later to retrie ve the keys and phone and spoke to Jacob Blackwell, Charlotte's cousin. Earlier that evening, Charlotte, Blackwell, Alexander Myers, Andrew Martin, Kaitlinn Farris, Cheyenne Laws, an d Janessa Trujillo consumed alcohol, marijuana and prescription medication in the park. Charlotte saw appellant walking a dog and called out his ni ckname, "Johnny." Myers and Blackwell were concerned about Charlotte's safety because appellant had physically harmed Charlotte in the past. Myers sent Martin a phone text message at 7:55 p.m. saying: "We're mee ting up with Johnny, keep watch." Myers approached and called appellant a woman be ater. Angry words were exchanged and appellant left the park in a s ilver four-door vehicle. The group stayed in the park. Us ing Myers' phone, Charlotte texted appellant several times. At 8:40 p.m. Ch arlotte spoke to appellant on the phone. Charlotte told everyone to l eave because appellant was coming back with some guys to fight. Charlotte changed shoes in case she had to run or fi ght. Fearing for Charlotte's safety, Blackwell called Charlotte 's sister, Katherine Sinclai r, to pick Charlotte up. A few minutes later, three men dresse d in dark pants and hoodies rushed the group and stabbed Myers and Martin mu ltiple times. Blackwell saw appellant and a second man on top of Martin. As one of the men brandished a knife at Blackwell, appellant yelled, "Let's go, let's go, let's go."
Katherine Sinclair arrived moments later and saw appellant and two men standing by a silver car in the parking lot. Katherine took Myer s, who was critically wounded, to the hospital. Blackwell picked up his friends' be longings and found appellant's cell phone. At 9:00 p.m., Blackwell used the phone to call Charlotte who had Blackwell's phone. Returning to the pa rk, Charlotte exchanged Blackwe ll's phone for appellant's3 phone. A minute or two later, appellant ap proached Blackwell and picked up his car keys. Appellant asked where his cell phone wa s. Blackwell said that Charlotte had it.
Andrew Martin stumbled home and was transported to the hospital. Martin told the police that a man w ith glasses whose name starte d with "J" exchanged words with Myers. Martin said th at J returned with two men and attacked the group. Blackwell identified appellant in a phot o lineup and said that appellant was wearing glasses, a zipped up ho odie, and black plants. He de scribed the two other men as Hispanic "gang-banger" types who wore ho oded sweatshirts and dark pants. Charlotte's sister, Katherine, told the police that appellant was in the parking lot. Katherine identified a picture of appellant on Facebook and feared that appellant would harm her for talking to the police. Appellant lived a quarter mile from the park, about a 10 minute walk. The police arrested him on May 25, 2011 at home. A silver four-door Honda was parked in
front of his house. At trial, Blackwell identified appellant as one of the assailants. Myers recalled exchanging words with appellant but had no memory of the stabbing. Katherine was reluctant to testify and mini mized her prior statements. Appellant defended on the theory that it was a case of misidentification. Although no witnesses testified for the defense, the jury was instructed that appellant did not have to prove he was elsewhere wh en the crimes were committed. (CALCRIM 3400.) 2 Before sentencing, appellant retained new counsel and m oved for new trial on the ground that he was denied effective assi stance of counsel at trial. Appellant

2 The jury received a CALCRIM 3400 alibi instruction that stated: "The People must prove that the defendant comm itted the crimes charged in this case. The defendant contends he did not commit th ese crimes. The People must prove that the defendant was present and committed the crimes with which he is charged. The defendant do es not need to prove he was elsewhere at the time of th e crime. [¶] If you have a reasonable doubt about whether the defendant was present wh en the crime was committed, you must find him not guilty."4 claimed that his trial attorney , Wolfgang Kovach, failed to ca ll appellant's mother and her boyfriend as alibi witnesses. The trial c ourt conducted a multi-day evidentiary hearing and denied the motion, finding that Kovach made a reasonable strategic decision not to call family members as alibi witn esses. In an eight-page or der, the trial court found that appellant had not shown deficient pe rformance or resulting prejudice. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, appellant must
show both deficient performance and resulting prejudice. ( Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668, 687 [80 L.Ed.2d 674, 693]; People v. Fairbank (1997) 16 Cal.4th 1223, 1241.) "A defendant must prove prejudice that is a " ' "demonstrable reality," not simply speculation.' [Citations.]" ( Ibid .) Because the trial judge is the best situated to determine the competency of de fendant's trial counsel, the tr ial court's decision is entitled to great weight. ( People v. Wallin (1981) 124 Cal.App.3d 479, 483.) "Absent a showing of clear and unmistakable abuse, we will not disturb his [or her] decision. [Citations]" ( Ibid .)
Alibi Witnesses Appellant argues that Kovach was c onstitutionally ineffective in not calling his mother, Anahid Aiv azyan, his sister (Gay ane Sarkissyan), and th e mother's boyfriend (Nieves Perez) as alibi witnesse s. At the hearing on the ne w trial motion, Aivazyan said that she got home from work at 8:34 p.m., ma de dinner, and that appellant was playing video games in his bedroom. Aivazyan clai med that appellant was at home the entire evening. Aivazyan's boyfriend, Pere z, said that he got home at 6:00 p.m. and either saw or heard appellant in the house. Perez claimed that appellant walked the dog at 6:30 p.m., returned 10 minutes late r, and stayed home the rest ofthe evening. On crossexamination, Perez acknowledged that he was not in the same room with appellant and did not have appellant under constant observation. Gayane Sarkissyan, appellant's sister, declared that she told Kovach that Aivazyan and Perez could testify that appella nt was home the eveni ng of May 19, 2011.5 The sister lived in Azusa and heard about the stabbing six days later when appellant was
arrested. Kovach told the sister that Ai vazyan was too emotional and the prosecution
would "eat her alive" if she testified. For tactical reasons, Kovach decided not to call Aivazyan as a trial witness because she lacked credibility and could be easily impeached. Aivazyan gave
inconsistent statements to Ve ntura Police Detective Sarah Sta rr and was a poor witness at the preliminary hearing. After the hearing, Kovach told Aivazyan that she was too emotional and would be a poor trial witness.
Kovach's concerns were well founded. In a taped interview, Aivazyan told
Detective Starr that she return ed home in the afternoon rath er than 8:35 p.m. Aivazyan was vague about appellant's whereabouts and sa id "I see him in the house all the time" and "[h]e was in the house, yeah. " Aivazyan told Detective Starr that appellant did not go out that evening. Aivazyan's statement conflicted w ith the boyfriend's (Nieves Perez) statement that appellant took the dog for a ten minute walk. Perez denied that appellant was driving the silver Honda but that was refuted by appe llant's sister, appellant's mother, and Charlotte. When Ka therine Sinclair arrived at th e park to pickup Charlotte, appellant and two men were st anding by a silver car. Kovach reasonably believed that Ai vasyan's and Pere z's testimony would undermine the mistaken identity defense. Perez's and Aivazyan's testimony was at odds with the phone records and ey ewitness testimony that appellant encountered the victims earlier in the park, left in a rage, phoned Charlotte at 8:40 p.m., and returned with two
men and attacked the victims. The time line was short: Myers was admitted to the hospital at 9:03 p.m.. Kovach, as a matter of trial tactics, reasonably believed that Aivasyan's and Perez's testimony would bolste r the People's case and show that appellant had the opportunity to commit th e crimes. Appellant lived a quar ter a mile from the park, was seen in the park, and had a motiv e to stab the victims. In the words of the trial court,
"this was not a close case and there is not a reasonable probability th at the result of the6 proceeding would have been different had the . . . [alibi] testimony been presented at the original trial." We agree. Appellant was seen in the park before, during, and after the stabbing. The phone records, lost cell phone, and lost car ke ys were damning evidence. Appellant returned to the park to retrieve his keys, spoke to Blackwell, and left word for
Charlotte to return hi s phone. Without the car keys, appellant could not drive home. That was corroborated by Katherine Sinclair who saw appellant and two men standing by
the silver car.
In In re Alcox (2006) 137 Cal.App.4th 657, 6 65-666, we held that the tactical decision not to develop an alibi defe nse is not ineffective assistance of counsel where counsel reasonably fears the alibi w itness would open th e door to further incriminating evidence . The same analysis applies he re. Attorney Kovach reasonably believed the testimony of biased family memb ers would cause more harm than good. Appellant's reliance on Luna v. Cambra (9th Cir. 2002) 306 F.3d 954 is misplaced. There, defendant testified that he was asleep when a robbery and stabbing
were committed. Defense counsel failed to co ntact defendant's mother and sister who would have corroborated defendant. ( Id. , at p. 961.) Counsel also failed to interview and subpoena a man who confessed to the robbery ( Id. , at p. 962.) On review, the federal court concluded that the testimony of thre e alibi witnesses would have significantly altered the evidentiary pos ture of the case. ( Id. , at p. 966.) "It is hard to conceive how a criminal defendant is not prejudiced when his attorney wholly fails to investigate
evidence that he was not at th e scene of the crime and that another man was guilty of the crime for which he was charged." ( Id. , at p. 967.)
Unlike Luna v. Cambra, supra, there is no defense witness who could say that appellant was not at the park. Appellant's ineffective assistance of counsel claim is based on hindsight and speculation. Kovach reasonably believed that calling Aivazyan as
a defense witness would undermine the miside ntification defense and alibi instruction that "defendant does not have to prove he was elsewhere at time of the crime." (CALCRIM 3400.) Kovach me t with Aivazyan a dozen times and discussed how her7 testimony would hurt appellant's case. At the hearing on the motion for new trial,
Kovach stated that "fro m all the . . . interviews that I read and heard, they all . . . saw Mr. Hovanes there in the park walking his dog. There was really no dispute of that." In reviewing ineffective assistance of counsel claims, appellate courts do not generally second-guess coun sel's tactical decisions. ( People v. Hinton (2006) 37 Cal.4th 839, 876; People v. Holt (1997) 15 Cal.4th 619, 703.) Where the issue is raised in a motion for new trial, we defer to the trial court's finding that appellant received adequate representation. ( People v. Andrade (2000) 79 Cal.App.4th 651, 660.) " 'After all, the trial court is in the best position to make an initial determin ation, and intelligently
evaluate whether counsel's acts or omissi ons were those of a reasonably competent attorney.' [Citation.]" ( Ibid .) Here the trial court found: "Defendant's home was within 10 minutes from the park . . . and the evidence was uncontroverted that the Defendant was at the park prior to the crimes. . . . [¶] Having presided ov er the trial and the evidentiary hearing on the mo tion for new trial, the court is not persuaded that the Defendant was prejudiced by trial court's performance." Appellant complains that it was Kovach 's first felony trial and that he was too inexperienced to try an attempted murder case. 3 Lack of trial experience does not in
and of itself establish in competence. (See e.g., Smith v. Superior Court (1968) 68 Cal.2d 547, 552-553, fn. 1.) While other counsel might have objected to so me of the evidence and the prosecutor's comments, not doing so is not equatable with constitutional error. Minor deficiencies in counsel's perform ance did not affect the verdict. Uncharged Domestic Violence Appellant argues that the trial cour t erred in receiving evidence of uncharged acts of domestic violence. (Evid. Code, § 1101, subd. (b).) Before trial, the prosecution advised the trial court that the evidence wo uld show that the victims

3 Kovach testified that that he has practi ced law since 2000 and th at 90 percent of his practice is devoted to criminal defense work. Kovach handled at least six jury trials and negotiated pleas in hundreds of cases before appellant's trial.8 chastised appellant about his vi olent relationship with Charlotte . The People's theory was that the uncharged domestic vi olence evidence would show that appellant was angered by the remarks and the motive for the stabbings was revenge. The trial court responded, "Since it is being framed as an [Evidence Code section] 1101 [issue], . . . I'll need to make a ruling on it and hear Mr. Kovach out on it." Appellant did not request a hearing or object to the evidence, waiving the alleged error. (Evid. Code, § 353; People v.
Partida (2005) 37 Cal.4th 428, 433-434.) Appellant claims that the prosecuto r engaged in misconduct during opening statement when she referred to appellant's a nd Charlotte's violent re lationship and stated
that the evidence would show that Myers approached appella nt and Charlotte because he was concerned there was going to be troubl e. Appellant did not object, forfeiting the alleged error. ( People v. Schmeck (2005) 37 Cal.4th 240, 286; People v. Seaton (2001) 26 Cal.4th 599, 682.) On the merits, there was no prosecutor ial misconduct or prejudice. During the opening statement, a prosecut or may make fair comments on what the evidence will show as long as those comments are not deceptive, unfair, or reprehensible. ( People v. Farnam (2002) 28 Cal.4th 107, 168.) Appe llant's related claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel and derivative federal c onstitutional claims fail as a matter of law. ( People v. Coffman and Marlow (2004) 34 Cal.4th 1, 84; People v. Boyette (2002) 29 Cal.4th 381, 424.) Responding to the prosecution's opening statement, defense counsel told the jury that the evidence would show that Blackwell and Myer s made "taunting remarks at [appellant], calling him a wife beater, ca lling him a woman beater with no basis whatsoever. [¶] . . . The facts will show that Charlotte Sinclair became very upset, not only at Jacob Blackwell and Alexander Myers for coming over there and interfering with her business [but for] making [appellant] leave . . . ." Kovach told th e jury that appellant left the park and three "gang-bangers" we aring hooded sweatshir ts and dark pants attacked the group. Appellant asserts that the unchar ged domestic violence evidence was prejudicial but forfeited the claim. (Evid. Code, § 353; People v. Partida (2005) 379 Cal.4th 428, 433-434.) Prior bad acts eviden ce is not admissible to prove criminal disposition but may be received to prove motiv e, intent, plan, know ledge, identity, or the absence of mistake or accident. (E vid. Code, § 1101, subd, (b); People v. Ewoldt (1994) 7 Cal.4th 380, 393-394 & fn. 1.) As long as there is a direct relationship between the prior bad act and an element of the charged offense, introduction of that evidence is proper. (See People v. Barnett (1998) 17 Cal.4th 1044, 1118 [motive]. Appellant's prior act of domestic violence was probative of mo tive and explained what sparked the deadly assault. ( Ibid .; People v. Fuiava (2012) 53 Cal.4th 622, 666 .) "[E]vidence of motive
makes the crime understandable and renders the inferences regarding defendant's intent more reasonable." ( People v. Roldan (2005) 35 Cal.4th 646, 707.) The trial court did not
abuse its discretion in conc luding that the probative va lue of the domestic violence evidence substantially outweig hed the potential for prejudice. (Evid. Code § 352; People v. Olguin (1994) 31 Cal.App.4th 1 355, 1369.) Appellant makes no showing that the ruling, express or implied, was arbitrary, whim sical, or capricious as a matter of law. ( People v. Linkenauger (1995) 32 Cal.App.4t h 1603, 1614.) Appellant asserts that he was denied a fair trial but federal due process rights are not implicated where the prior bad acts evidence is relevant and admissible to show intent, motive, or why a witn ess is reluctant to testify. ( People v. Catlin (2001) 26 Cal.4th 81, 122-123; People v. Martinez (2003) 113 Cal.App.4th 400 , 414.) It is settled that the application of ordinary rules of evidence under state law does not violate a federal constitutional right to present a de fense or right to a fair trial. ( People v. Dement (2011) 53 Cal.4th 1, 52; People v. Fudge (1994) 7 Cal.4th 1075, 1102-1103.)
Prosecutorial Miscondu ct - Final Argument Appellant asserts, for the first time on appeal, that the prosecutor engaged in prejudicial misconduct in arguing that "m otive in this case is big, ladies and gentlemen. Don't mistake it. It is very big. . . . It is why this defendant does this because of his anger, because of the way that he deal s with things, his violence, because he wants to send a message on to these kids not to mess w ith him, that he's serious, that he's going10 to take action. And he wants revenge agai nst Alex [Myers] for confronting him in the park. " Appellant did not object, forfeiting the alleged error. The test for misconduct is whether the prosecutor employed deceptive or reprehensible methods to persuade the jury. ( People v. Dennis (1998) 17 Cal.4th 468, 522.) Prosecutors have wide
latitude to discuss and draw infere nces from the tria l evidence. ( Ibid .) We do not look to isolated words or phases, but view the stat ements in the context of the argument as a whole. ( Ibid .) Here there is no reasonable likelihood that the comments misled the jury or rendered the trial fundamentally unfair. ( People v. Morales (2001) 25 Cal.4th 34, 47; People v. Samayoa (1997) 15 Cal.4th 795, 841; People v. Booker (2011) 51 Cal.4th 141, 186.) The jury was instructed that nothing the atto rneys say is evidence (CALCRIM 222), and that the domestic violence eviden ce was to be consid ered for the limited purpose of determining motive. (CALCRIM 37 5.) The trial court instructed: "Do not
conclude from this evidence that the defend ant has a bad character or is disposed to commit crime." It is presum ed that the jury understood a nd followed the instructions. ( People v. Morales, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 47.) Assuming that evidentiary or prosecutorial error occurred, it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. ( People v. Hardy (1992) 2 Cal. 4th 86, 173; People v. Harris (1989) 47 Cal.3d 1047, 1083.) The testimony about appellant's and Charlotte's violent relationship was weak and refuted by Charlotte at trial. Although th e uncharged domestic
violence evidence tended to show motive for the reta liatory attack, the focal point of the case was the assailants' identity. The defense theory was that the prosecution witnesses
were biased and too intoxicated to make a credible identification. Testimony about uncharged acts of domestic violen ce and the prosecutor's refere nces to that evidence did not deny appellant a fair trial. The ev idence was overwhelming. The eyewitness testimony and phone records show that appellant encountered Charlotte and the victims at 8:00 p.m. Appellant argued w ith Myers and left the park. Charlotte and appellant texted one another at 8:21 and 8:24 p.m. At 8:40 p.m. appellant called and said that he was coming back with some guys to fight. Appe llant and two men arrived a few minutes later11 and stabbed the victims. As appellant ran to the silver car, he dropped his car keys and phone. At 9:00 and 9:02 p.m., calls were made from appellant's phone to Blackwell's phone. The calls corroborated Blackwell's testimony that appe llant returned to the park to retrieve his keys and the phone shortly after the stabbing. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Appellant argues that trial counsel was constitutionally ineffective in not objecting to the prosecutor's closing remarks that appellant "deals with things" in a violent manner. Failure to object rarely constitutes constitutionally ineffective legal representation. ( People v. Boyette (2002) 29 Cal.4th 381, 42 4.) Kovach may have believed that an objection wo uld draw the jury's atten tion to motive and the jury
instruction that intent and/or mental stat e may be proved by circumstantial evidence. (CALCRIM 225; see e.g., People v. Hinton (2006) 37 Cal.4th 839, 878; People v. Catlin (2001) 26 Cal.4th 81, 165.) Where trial coun sel is confronted with difficult and nuanced tactical decisions, we do not se cond guess counsel's decision no t to object to an isolated remark. ( People v. Montoya (2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 1139. 1147-1148.) Kovach reasonably believed, as a matte r of trial tactics, that the most
credible defense was misidentification. Ko vach argued that th ree unidentified "gangbangers" stabbed the victims and that Andrew Martin only saw the a ssailant's glasses. Kovach argued that the prosec ution witnesses were too into xicated to identify appellant and told the jury that the domestic violence evid ence had nothing to do with the case. Charlotte testified that appellant "never comm itted any violence against her. . . ." When appellant returned to fetch his phone and car keys, he was calm and there was no blood
on his clothes or shoes. Kova ch argued that Blackwell's desc ription of appellant's clothes (dark pants and a zipped-up hoodie) conflicted with Katherine Sincla ir's statement that appellant was wearing jeans and a flannel shirt. It struck a cord with the jury. During jury deliberations, the jury re quested a read back of Blackw ell's and Myer's testimony. Appellant dwells on "what-ifs" and sp eculative defense scenarios but courts are not in the business of "second-guessing" defense counsel's tactical decisions. ( In re Alcox, supra, 137 Cal.App.4th at p. 6 65.) Kovach did not have a constitutional duty to12 make groundless objections or call biased witnesses that would undermine appellant's only viable defense. ( People v. Osband (1996) 13 Cal.4h 622, 678; People v. Mendoza (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 918, 924.) "The benchmark for judging any claim of
ineffectiveness must be whet her counsel's conduct so undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process that the trial ca nnot be relied on as having produce a just result." ( Strickland v. Washington
, supra, 466 U.S. at p. 686 [ 80 L.Ed.2d at pp. 692- 693].) Having reviewed the entire record, we cannot say that appellant was denied competent and effective representation. None of the alleged errors cited by appellant, either singularly or cumulatively, were prejudic ial or denied appellant a fair trial. "A
defendant is entitled to a fair tria l, not a perfect one. [Citation.]" ( People v. Mincey (1992) 2 Cal.4th 408, 454.) Sentencing Errors Appellant asserts, and the Attorney General agrees, that the abstract of judgment erroneously lists Apr il 19, 2013, as the date of co nviction. April 19, 2013, is the date sentence was pronounced. The superi or court clerk is directed to amend the abstract of judgment to reflect that appella nt was convicted on Augu st 30, 2011, the date the guilty verdict was entered. (See People v. Davis (2010) 185 Cal.App. 4th 998, 1001.) We modify the judgment to reflect that a mandatory $80 court secu rity fee (§ 1465.8, subd. (a)(1)) and $60 criminal conviction assessment (Gov. Code, § 70373) were imposed. (See People v. Woods (2010) 191 Cal.App.4th 269, 272 [imposition of court security fee and court facility assessment are mandatory]; People v. Rodriguez (2012) 207 Cal.App.4th 1540, 1543, fn. 3 [mandatory security fees and assessments may be imposed on appeal].) Appellant complains that the April 19, 2013 minute order states "You are to pay Prob Investigation fee of $1,754" even though the fee was not imposed at the sentencing hearing. (§ 1203.1b.) Where there is a discrepancy between the oral pronouncement of judgment and the minute or der, the oral pronouncement of judgment controls. ( People v. Farell (2002) 28 Cal.4th 381, 384, fn. 2.) Section 1203.1b required13 that the trial court determine appellant's ability to pay and the payment amount. ( Brown v. Superior Court (2002) 101 Cal.App.4th 313, 321.) Without a finding of appellant's ability to pay, imposition of a probation investigation fee is unauthorized. ( People v.
Hall (2002) 103 Cal.App. 4th 889, 894.)
Conclusion The clerk of the superior court is dire cted to: (1) strike the $1,754 probation investigation fee from the April 19, 2013 minu te order; (2) amend the April 19, 2013 minute order and abstract of judgment to refl ect the imposition of a $80 court security fee (§ 1465.8, subd. (a)(1) and a $60 criminal conviction assessment (Gov. Code, § 70373); (3) amend the abstract of judgment to reflect an August 30, 2011 conviction date; and (4) forward a certified copy of the amended ab stract of judgment to the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation. The judgment, as modified, is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

YEGAN, J.

We concur:

GILBERT, P.J.

PERREN, J.14 Kevin G. DeNoce, Judge
Superior Court County of Ventura

________________ ______________

Sylvia Whatley Beckham, under appo intment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

Kamala D. Harris, Attorney Genera l, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Steven E. Mercer, Marc A. Kohn, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.