[Cite as State v. Reeves, 2015-Ohio-299.]

 Court of Appeals of Ohio 

EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT 

COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA 

JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION 

No. 100560 

STATE OF OHIO 

PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE 

vs. 

DONALD R. REEVES 

DEFENDANT-APPELLANT 

JUDGMENT: 

APPLICATION DENIED 

Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas 

Case No. CR-13-571787-A 

Application for Reopening 

Motion No. 479982 

RELEASE DATE: January 26, 2015 

FOR APPELLANT 
Donald Reeves 

#644-480 

Belmont Correctional Institution 

P.O. Box 540 

St. Clairsville, OH 43950 

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE 

Timothy J. McGinty 

Cuyahoga County Prosecutor 

By: Anthony T. Miranda 

Assistant County Prosecutor 

Justice Center, 8th Floor 

1200 Ontario Street 

Cleveland, OH 44113 
TIM McCORMACK, J.: 

{¶1} Donald R. Reeves has filed a timely application for reopening pursuant to App.R. 

26(B). Reeves is attempting to reopen the appellate judgment that was rendered by this court in 

State v. Reeves, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 100560, 2014-Ohio-3497, which affirmed his plea of 

guilty and sentence to the offenses of attempted felonious assault, felonious assault, and 

compelling prostitution. For the following reasons, we decline to reopen Reeves’s original 

appeal. 

{¶2} In order to establish a claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, Reeves 

is required to establish that the performance of his appellate counsel was deficient and the 

deficiency resulted in prejudice. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 688, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 

L.Ed.2d 674 (1984); State v. Bradley, 42 Ohio St.3d 136, 538 N.E.2d 373 (1989), cert. denied, 

497 U.S. 1011, 110 S.Ct. 3258, 111 L.Ed.2d 767. 

{¶3} In Strickland, the United States Supreme Court held that a court’s scrutiny of an 

attorney’s work must be highly deferential. The court further stated that it is all too tempting for 

a defendant to second-guess his attorney after conviction and that it would be too easy for a court 

to conclude that a specific act or omission was deficient, especially when examining the matter in 

hindsight. Thus, a court must indulge a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within 

the wide range of reasonable professional assistance; that is, the defendant must overcome the 

presumption that, under the circumstances, the challenged action might be considered sound trial 

strategy. Strickland. 

{¶4} Herein, Reeves raises seven proposed assignments of error in support of App.R. 

26(B) application for reopening: 
1) The trial court erred to the prejudice of defendant-appellant when it sentenced 

him to consecutive periods of incarceration for a total of 17 years; 

2) The trial court erred by allowing the government to breach its plea agreement 

with Mr. Reeves; 

3) The trial court erred when it ignored the following: that no principle of 

procedural due process is more clearly established than that notice of the specific 

charge, and a change to be heard in a trial of the issues raised by that charge, if 

desired, are among the constitutional rights of every accused in a criminal 

proceeding in all courts, state or federal; 

4) The trial court imposed a sentence contrary to law and violated appellant’s due 

process rights when it imposed a maximum sentence upon appellant that was 

inconsistent with and disproportionate to the sentencing imposed upon like 

defendants. The trial court abused its discretion by sentencing the defendant to 

the maximum sentence contrary to law and in violation of the Ohio Constitution 

and Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution; 

5) The trial court abused its discretion in finding that the following factors, 

making this offense more serious than the norm, were present in this case; (1) the 

defendant caused serious physical harm to the victim, and (2) the defendant’s 

relationship with the victim facilitated the offense; 

6) Appellant’s conviction was against the manifest weight of the evidence; and 

7) Defendant’s sentence was void because the court failed to merge two offenses 

which were allied, the trial court, contrary to R.C. 2941.25, imposed a sentence on 

both counts instead of merging both counts and imposing a sentence on one; res 

judicata did not bar consideration of this issue, as correcting this error in 

defendant’s sentence was both fair and just and res judicata should not be used to 

permit a void sentence to stand. 

{¶5} Reeves, however, has failed to present any argument with regard to his seven 

proposed assignments of error. Thus, Reeves has failed to demonstrate how appellate counsel’s 

performance was deficient and that he was prejudiced by appellate counsel’s claimed 

deficiencies. 
{¶6} In State v. Kelly, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 74912, 2000 Ohio App. LEXIS 2907 

(June 21, 2000), this court established that the mere recitation of assignments of error is not 

sufficient to meet the burden to prove that the applicant’s appellate counsel was deficient for 

failing to raise the issues he now presents or that there was a reasonable probability that the 

applicant would have been successful if the present issues had been considered in the original 

appeal. See also State v. Jones, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 99703, 2014-Ohio-4467; State v. 

Hawkins, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 90704, 2009-Ohio-2246. The failure of Reeves to present any 

argument with regard to his seven proposed assignments of error results in the failure to 

demonstrate that his appellate counsel was deficient and that he was prejudiced by the alleged 

deficiency. State v. Freeman, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 95511, 2011-Ohio-5151. 

{¶7} It must also be noted that a guilty plea is a complete admission of the defendant’s 

guilt. A counseled plea of guilty, that is voluntarily and knowingly given, removes the issue of 

factual guilt from the case. State v. Siders, 78 Ohio App.3d 699, 605 N.E.2d 1283 (11th 

Dist.1992). When a defendant enters a plea of guilty, he waives all appealable errors that might 

have occurred at trial unless the errors precluded the defendant from entering a knowing and 

voluntary plea. State v. Barnett, 73 Ohio App.3d 244, 596 N.E.2d 1101 (2d Dist.1991), citing 

State v. Kelley, 57 Ohio St.3d 127, 566 N.E.2d 658 (1991). A plea of guilty even waives the 

right to claim that a defendant was prejudiced by ineffective counsel, except to any defects that 

caused the plea to be less than knowing and voluntary. Id. at 249; see also State v. Ketterer, 111 

Ohio St.3d 70, 2006-Ohio-5283, 855 N.E.2d 48. 

{¶8} Upon direct appeal, the issues of a knowing and voluntary plea of guilty and 

sentencing were raised and addressed by this court. This court found that “Reeves did, in fact, 

knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently enter a guilty plea to the charges of felonious assault in 
violation of R.C. 2903.11(B)(1), as well as the other three charges.” Reeves, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga 

No. 100560, 2014-Ohio-3497, at ¶ 17. Thus, the fact that Reeves entered a knowing and 

voluntary plea of guilty waived all appealable error unrelated to the entry of the plea. Ketterer, 

supra. 

{¶9} In addition, this court found no error associated with the trial court’s sentence and 

held that: 

Further, Reeve’s convictions resulted from a plea agreement. Because there was 

no agreement by the parties that the trial court should not consider the dismissed 

charges, and because trial courts routinely consider these matters in sentencing, 

the court’s consideration of the underlying facts in this case was proper. In 

receiving 17 years incarceration on the four counts to which he pleaded guilty as 

part of the plea agreement, rather than the possible 127 years incarceration 

without the plea agreement, Reeves received the benefit of the bargain. See

Frankos, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 78072, 2001 Ohio App. LEXIS 3712, at *7. 

Finally, there is no indication in the record that the trial court’s sentence was 

reflective of any improper sentencing factors. There are no statements clearly 

indicating that the dismissed charges were the sole basis for the sentence, and 

Reeves’s sentence was within the statutory parameters. 

In light of the above, we find that the record supports the conclusion that the trial 

court considered the relevant sentencing factors before imposing sentence, and the 

sentence was not solely based on unproven conduct. The sentence is therefore 

not contrary to law. See Clayton, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 99700, 2014-Ohio-112. 

Reeves at ¶ 34-36. 

{¶10} Therefore, we find no prejudice as claimed by Reeves vis-a-vis his proposed 

assignments of error that deal with the trial court’s sentence. 
{¶11} Accordingly, the application for reopening is denied. 

TIM McCORMACK, JUDGE 

MARY EILEEN KILBANE, P.J., and 

MELODY J. STEWART, J., CONCUR