1 

Whether Individuals May Be Required to Provide 

Basic Identifying Information in Order to Access 

the Financial Disclosure Reports Made Available 

on Agency Websites During the Period Governed 

by Section 11(a) of the STOCK Act 

A procedure under which prospective viewers are required to provide basic identifying information 

similar to that described in section 105(b)(2) of the Ethics in Government Act in order to access 

financial disclosure reports made available under section 11(a) of the Stop Trading on Congressional 

Knowledge Act is consistent with both these statutes. 

This procedure may be implemented by Executive Branch agencies at the direction of the Office of 

Government Ethics, pursuant to its authority under section 402 of the Ethics in Government Act to 

prescribe procedures governing the public availability of financial disclosure reports. 

The interim regime established by section 11(a) of the Stop Trading on Congressional Knowledge Act 

terminates upon implementation of the permanent public disclosure system on the Office of Government Ethics website required by section 11(b). Section 11(b)(2) makes clear that viewers may not 

be required to provide identifying information in order to view reports made available through that 

system. 

August 22, 2012 

MEMORANDUM OPINION FOR THE ACTING DIRECTOR

OFFICE OF GOVERNMENT ETHICS

The Stop Trading on Congressional Knowledge Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-

105, 126 Stat. 291, also known as the STOCK Act, requires the President to ensure 

that financial disclosure reports filed pursuant to title I of the Ethics in Government Act of 1978 (“EIGA”) (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. app., EIGA §§ 101–

111 (2006 & Supp. IV 2010)), are made available to the public electronically. For 

an initial interim period, the President must ensure that the reports are made 

available through the official websites of Executive Branch agencies. See STOCK 

Act, § 11(a), 126 Stat. at 298–99. This interim period begins on September 30, 

2012, and ends no later than October 4, 2013. See Act of Aug. 16, 2012, Pub. L. 

No. 112-173, § 1, 126 Stat. 1310, 1310; STOCK Act § 11(b)(1), 126 Stat. at 299.1

Thereafter, the President must provide public access to the reports through a 

database on the website of the Office of Government Ethics (“OGE”). See STOCK 

Act § 11(b), 126 Stat. at 299. You have asked for our opinion whether, during the 

 1

 The STOCK Act originally required that the first stage of internet access begin on August 31, 

2012. STOCK Act, § 11(a)(1), 126 Stat. at 298. The STOCK Act was subsequently amended to move 

this deadline to the end of September. Pub. L. No. 112-173, § 1, 126 Stat. at 1310. As noted below, 

section 11(b)(6) of the STOCK Act permits the Director of the Office of Government Ethics to extend 

the October 4, 2013, deadline for commencing the second stage of internet access. 
Opinions of the Office of Legal Counsel in Volume 36 

2 

interim period when reports are made available on agency websites under section 

11(a), prospective viewers may be required to provide basic identifying information similar to the information described in section 105(b)(2) of the EIGA, 

5 U.S.C. app., EIGA § 105(b)(2), in order to access the reports. See Letter for 

Virginia A. Seitz, Assistant Attorney General, Official of Legal Counsel, from 

Don W. Fox, Acting Director, OGE at 1 (July 13, 2012) (“Request Letter”). We 

conclude that such a procedure would be consistent with the STOCK Act and the 

EIGA and could be implemented by Executive Branch agencies at the direction of 

OGE, pursuant to its authority under section 402 of the EIGA, 5 U.S.C. app., 

EIGA § 402 (2006), to prescribe procedures governing the public availability of 

financial disclosure reports. We note, however, that the interim regime established 

by section 11(a) of the STOCK Act terminates upon implementation of the 

permanent public disclosure system on the OGE website required by section 11(b). 

STOCK Act § 11(a)(4), 126 Stat. at 299. As we explain below, section 11(b)(2) of 

the STOCK Act makes clear that viewers may not be required to provide identifying information in order to view reports made available through that system. See 

infra pp. 14–15. 

I. 

Section 101 of the EIGA requires certain officers and employees in the Executive Branch to file financial disclosure reports containing detailed information 

about their income, assets, liabilities, and financial transactions. See 5 U.S.C. app., 

EIGA §§ 101–102. Section 105(a) of the EIGA requires that each executive 

agency and supervising ethics office “make available to the public” those reports, 

in accordance with section 105(b). Id. § 105(a). Section 105(b)(1) provides that 

any person seeking to inspect or copy a report must be permitted to do so. Id. 

§ 105(b)(1). Section 105(b)(2), however, provides that a report 

may not be made available under this section to any person nor may 

any copy thereof be provided under this section to any person except 

upon a written application by such person stating— 

(A) that person’s name, occupation and address; 

(B) the name and address of any other person or organization on 

whose behalf the inspection or copy is requested; and 

(C) that such person is aware of the prohibitions on the obtaining 

or use of the report. 

Id. § 105(b)(2). Section 105(c)(1) of the EIGA sets forth the prohibitions on 

obtaining or using reports: 
Whether Individuals May Be Required to Provide Basic Identifying Information 

3 

It shall be unlawful for any person to obtain or use a report— 

(A) for any unlawful purpose; 

(B) for any commercial purpose, other than by news and communications media for dissemination to the general public; 

(C) for determining or establishing the credit rating of any individual; or 

(D) for use, directly or indirectly, in the solicitation of money for 

any political, charitable, or other purpose. 

Id. § 105(c)(1). 

The EIGA assigns the Director of OGE various responsibilities in connection 

with the financial disclosure reports and with preventing conflicts of interest on 

the part of officers and employees of the Executive Branch. Of particular relevance to your inquiry, the EIGA provides that “[t]he responsibilities of the 

Director shall include—(1) developing . . . rules and regulations establishing 

procedures for the . . . public availability of financial statements filed by officers 

and employees in the executive branch” pursuant to the EIGA. Id. § 402(b)(1).2

The EIGA further provides that the “Director shall . . . ensure that each executive 

agency has established written procedures relating to how the agency is to . . . , if 

applicable, make publicly available, financial disclosure statements filed by any of 

its officers or employees,” id. § 402(d)(1), and “shall ensure that each agency’s 

procedures are in conformance with all applicable requirements, whether established by law, rule, regulation, or Executive order.” Id. § 402(d)(2). 

 2

 Section 402(b)(1), which was enacted as part of the original EIGA in 1978, states that the disclosure statements are “required by title II of [the EIGA.]” Id. The EIGA was substantially amended by 

the Ethics Reform Act of 1989 (“1989 Act”), however; and, in that process, title II was repealed, and 

the provisions governing the filing of disclosure reports by Executive Branch officers and employees 

were moved to title I. See Ethics Reform Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-194, title II, secs. 201–202, 103 

Stat. 1716, 1724–44. We have found nothing in either the text of the 1989 Act or its legislative history 

suggesting that this revision was intended to affect the Director’s authority under section 402(b)(1) to 

prescribe rules and regulations governing the public availability of financial disclosure reports filed by 

Executive Branch officers and employees. On the contrary, section 111 of the EIGA, as added by the 

1989 Act, expressly assigns the Director responsibility for administering the provisions of the newly 

enacted title I with regard to those officials. 5 U.S.C. app., EIGA § 111(1). We therefore conclude that 

the 1989 Act did not impair the Director’s rulemaking authority under section 402(b)(1). See Hawaii v. 

Office of Hawaiian Affairs, 556 U.S. 163, 175 (2009) (“[R]epeals by implication are not favored and 

will not be presumed unless the intention of the legislature to repeal [is] clear and manifest.”) (brackets 

in original; citation omitted). Accordingly, section 402(b)(1)’s reference to “title II” of the EIGA 

should be understood as a reference to the provisions governing disclosure reports by Executive Branch 

officials currently located in title I. 
Opinions of the Office of Legal Counsel in Volume 36 

4 

The STOCK Act imposes enhanced requirements regarding the public availability of financial disclosure reports. Specifically, it establishes a two-stage 

process for making reports available to the public through the internet. The first 

stage is described in section 11(a) of the Act. That provision requires that, not later 

than September 30, 2012, “the President shall ensure” that financial disclosure 

reports filed by Executive Branch employees pursuant to title I of the EIGA “are 

made available to the public on the official websites of the respective executive 

branch agencies not later than 30 days after such forms are filed.” STOCK Act 

§ 11(a)(1), 126 Stat. at 298; Pub. L. No. 112-173, § 1, 126 Stat. at 1310. The 

interim requirements of section 11(a)(1) terminate upon the implementation of the 

second stage, a “public disclosure system established under subsection (b)” of 

section 11. Id. § 11(a)(4), 126 Stat. at 299. 

Paragraph (1) of section 11(b) describes the general contours of that public 

disclosure system. It requires that, not later than October 4, 2013 (eighteen months 

after enactment of the STOCK Act), unless that deadline is extended pursuant to 

section 11(b)(6), “the President, acting through the Director of [OGE], shall 

develop systems to enable” (A) “electronic filing” of the financial disclosure 

reports required by the EIGA and (B) “public access” to reports filed by Executive 

Branch officials “through databases that—(i) are maintained on the official 

website of [OGE]; and (ii) allow the public to search, sort, and download data 

contained in the reports.” Id. § 11(b)(1), 126 Stat. at 299. 

Paragraph (2) of subsection (b) addresses the information that may be required 

from individuals seeking access to financial disclosure reports under section 11. It 

states: 

No login shall be required to search or sort the data contained in the 

reports made available by this subsection. A login protocol with the 

name of the user shall be utilized by a person downloading data contained in the reports. For purposes of filings under this section, section 105(b)(2) of the Ethics in Government Act of 1978 (5 U.S.C. 

App. 105(b)(2)) does not apply. 

Id. § 11(b)(2), 126 Stat. at 299. 

II. 

In our view, during the interim period governed by section 11(a) of the STOCK 

Act, Executive Branch agencies may implement that section’s electronic disclosure requirement through a procedure that requires individuals to provide information similar to that specified in section 105(b)(2) of the EIGA before accessing 

a financial disclosure report via an agency website. OGE may prescribe that 

procedure under section 402 of the EIGA, which authorizes it to establish rules 

governing the public availability of financial disclosure reports. 
Whether Individuals May Be Required to Provide Basic Identifying Information 

5 

A. 

As noted, your letter requests our opinion about the implementation of section 

11(a) of the STOCK Act. In the letter, you first raise the possibility that section 

105(b)(2) of the EIGA—which requires a requester to supply certain identifying 

information in order to obtain access to a report—continues to apply when reports 

are made available on agency websites pursuant to section 11(a). See Request 

Letter at 2 n.1. If section 105(b)(2) applied in that circumstance, then the answer 

to your inquiry would be straightforward: A procedure requiring an individual 

seeking access to a report via a website to first provide the identifying information 

specified in section 105(b)(2) would clearly be permissible; indeed, that procedure 

would be statutorily mandated. See 5 U.S.C. app., EIGA § 105(b)(2) (stating that a 

report “may not be made available . . . except upon a written application” including the specified information). We do not, however, believe that to be the natural 

reading of the statutory scheme. 

Instead, we believe that under the best reading of the pertinent provisions, 

EIGA section 105(b)(2) does not apply when reports are made available on agency 

websites pursuant to section 11(a) of the STOCK Act. To be sure, the STOCK Act 

does not repeal section 105(b)(2). The preconditions to disclosure set forth in 

section 105(b)(2) therefore continue to apply when individuals seek to inspect or 

obtain copies of reports through non-electronic means (such as in person or by 

mail). But section 105(b)(2) applies only when a report or copy thereof is “made 

available under this section,” id., i.e., under section 105 of the EIGA. And a report 

that is made available via the internet pursuant to section 11(a) of the STOCK Act 

has not been “made available under” section 105 of the EIGA, as that phrase is 

naturally understood. Thus, section 105(b)(2), by its own terms, is inapplicable to 

reports made available under section 11(a) of the STOCK Act. 

In any event, even assuming that section 105(b)(2) would otherwise apply to 

reports made available under section 11(a) of the STOCK Act, section 11(b)(2) of 

the STOCK Act states that, “[f]or purposes of filings under this section, section 

105(b)(2) of the Ethics in Government Act of 1978 (5 U.S.C. App. 105(b)(2)) does 

not apply.” 126 Stat. at 299 (emphasis added). That provision renders the conditions on disclosure in section 105(b)(2) inapplicable to reports governed by section 

11 of the STOCK Act, including reports made available pursuant to section 11(a). 

In context, the phrase “[f]or purposes of filings under this section” is best read 

to mean “for purposes of reports governed by this section.” The term “filings” 

appears to refer to financial disclosure reports, which the STOCK Act uses 

varying terminology to describe. Compare, e.g., STOCK Act § 11(a)(1), 126 Stat. 

at 298 (referring to the disclosure reports as “forms”) with id. § 11(b)(1), 126 Stat. 

at 299 (referring to them as “reports”). Section 105(b)(2) addresses public access 

to reports after they have been filed with the relevant agencies, at which point the 

reports are appropriately called “filings.” See Black’s Law Dictionary 705 (9th ed. 

2009) (defining “filing” as “[a] particular document . . . in the file of a . . . record 
Opinions of the Office of Legal Counsel in Volume 36 

6 

custodian”). The term “under,” when used in a statute, frequently means “governed by” or “subject to the requirements of.” See Fla. Dep’t of Revenue v. 

Piccadilly Cafeterias, Inc., 554 U.S. 33, 39 (2008); The American Heritage 

Dictionary of the English Language 1874 (4th ed. 2006) (“American Heritage 

Dictionary”) (definitions 7–10 of “under”); Webster’s Third New International 

Dictionary of the English Language 2487 (1993) (“Webster’s Dictionary”) 

(definitions 8b, 9b, and 10a of “under”). 

The term “section” is best understood as referring to section 11 of the STOCK 

Act in its entirety, including section 11(a). Congress ordinarily adheres to a 

hierarchical scheme when subdividing statutory sections and referencing those 

sections and their subdivisions. Koons Buick Pontiac GMC, Inc. v. Nigh, 543 U.S. 

50, 60 (2004). Thus, Congress generally uses the term “section” to refer to a 

statutory section as whole and the term “subsection” to refer to one of the section’s 

first-level subdivisions, which are typically preceded by lower case letters, such as 

“(a)” or “(b).” See id. at 60–61. Congress appears to have followed that practice in 

the STOCK Act, including in section 11. See, e.g., STOCK Act, § 6(b), 126 Stat. 

at 294 (referring to “subsection (a)”); id. § 11(a)(4), 126 Stat. at 299 (distinguishing between “this subsection” and “subsection (b)”); id. § 14, 126 Stat. at 300–01 

(referring to “section 6 of this Act”). The Supreme Court has, on rare occasions, 

concluded that a statutory reference to “section” or “subsection” was a drafting 

error and should be disregarded. See, e.g., Dir., Workers’ Comp. Programs v. 

Rasmussen, 440 U.S. 29, 41 (1979) (concluding that use of the term “subsection” 

was “plainly in error” where the provision referred to “[d]eterminations under this 

subsection” and no determinations were made under the subsection). We see no 

indication, however, that Congress made a drafting error here. On the contrary, as 

we have noted, in drafting the STOCK Act, Congress appears to have observed the 

distinction between the terms “section” and “subsection” throughout. We therefore 

believe that section 11(b)(2) of the STOCK Act makes clear that section 105(b)(2) 

of EIGA does not apply for purposes of disclosure reports governed by section 11 

of the STOCK Act. Accordingly, the EIGA’s requirement that a requester seeking 

financial disclosure reports supply specified identifying information is inapplicable when reports are made available pursuant to section 11(a). 

In your Request Letter, you identify a potential alternative reading of the statement in section 11(b)(2) that “[f]or purposes of filings under this section, section 

105(b)(2) of the Ethics in Government Act of 1978 (5 U.S.C. App. 105(b)(2)) does 

not apply.” 126 Stat. at 299 (emphasis added). See Request Letter at 2 n.1. Under 

that reading, this statement declares that section 105(b)’s preconditions for 

disclosure are inapplicable only for reports actually filed pursuant to requirements 

imposed by section 11. Id. You note that while section 11(b) requires the filing of 

reports, because it imposes a new electronic filing requirement, STOCK Act 

§ 11(b)(1)(A), 126 Stat. at 299, section 11(a) primarily addresses public access to 

reports that have already been filed. Request Letter at 2 n.1. You therefore suggest 

that section 105(b)(2)’s requirements would, as a practical matter, be inapplicable 
Whether Individuals May Be Required to Provide Basic Identifying Information 

7 

when an individual seeks access to reports filed under section 11(b), but that the 

requirements would continue to apply when an individual seeks access to reports 

under section 11(a). Id. In our view, however, this alternative reading of section 

11(b)(2) has significant weaknesses. 

For the alternative reading to be correct, “filings” would have to refer to “submissions” of financial disclosure reports, rather than to the reports themselves, and 

“under” would have to mean “as required by,” rather than “governed by.” Those 

are plausible meanings of “filings” and “under.” See STOCK Act § 11(b)(1)(A), 

126 Stat. at 299 (referring to “electronic filing of reports”); Kasten v. Saint-Gobain 

Performance Plastics Corp., 131 S. Ct. 1325, 1331 (2011) (noting that “file” can 

mean “to place among official records as prescribed by law”); Kucana v. Holder, 

558 U.S. 233, 244 (2010) (noting that “under” can mean “pursuant to” or “by 

reason of the authority of”); Webster’s Dictionary at 849 (definition 3a(1) of 

“file”) (“to deliver (as a legal paper or instrument) after complying with any 

condition precedent (as the payment of a fee) to the proper officer for keeping on 

file among the records of his office”); id. at 2487 (definition 8a of “under”) 

(“required by”). But taken in context, those meanings do not seem as likely as the 

meanings that we have ascribed to the terms. 

Moreover, the alternative reading has two serious flaws: First, it provides no 

explanation for Congress’s use of the word “section,” as opposed to the word 

“subsection,” in section 11(b)(2). Under the alternative reading, the provision 

would have the same meaning regardless of which word Congress used. Therefore, if Congress had intended the alternative reading, Congress presumably would 

have used the word “subsection,” the word it used earlier in section 11(b)(2); but 

Congress did not do so. 

In addition, the alternative reading rests on the mistaken premise that section 

11(b) is the only provision in section 11 that requires “filings.” Contrary to that 

premise, one provision in section 11(a) also requires filings: Section 11(a)(3) 

states that “transaction disclosure[s] required by section 103(l) of the [EIGA] . . . 

shall be filed not later than the date required by that section.” STOCK Act 

§ 11(a)(3), 126 Stat. at 299 (emphasis added). Thus, the practical effect of the 

alternative reading would be that section 105(b)(2)’s preconditions on disclosure 

would be inapplicable both when an individual seeks reports under section 11(b) 

and when an individual seeks transaction reports under section 11(a). The 

preconditions would continue to apply when an individual seeks access to other

disclosure reports under section 11(a). We have found no basis for this counterintuitive reading in the legislative history and cannot conceive of any reason why 

Congress would have adopted such a patchwork scheme of conditions on disclosure. 

For these reasons, we conclude that, pursuant to section 11(b)(2) of the STOCK 

Act, the requirements for disclosure in section 105(b)(2) do not apply during the 

interim period when reports are made available on agency websites under section 

11(a). 
Opinions of the Office of Legal Counsel in Volume 36 

8 

B. 

Because section 105(b)(2) does not apply, agencies have no statutory obligation 

to condition a requester’s access to reports made available under section 11(a) on 

the requester’s provision of the information specified in section 105(b)(2). 

Nonetheless, the fact that agencies are not obligated to impose that condition does 

not mean that agencies are prohibited from imposing the condition through the 

exercise of discretion if they otherwise have the authority to do so. And, in our 

view, agencies have the authority, subject to the direction of OGE, to require that 

individuals seeking access to financial disclosure reports during the period 

governed by section 11(a) of the STOCK Act provide basic identifying information like the items specified in section 105(b)(2). 

 As an initial matter, we believe that section 11(a) of the STOCK Act, in conjunction with section 402 of the EIGA, authorizes the agencies that receive 

financial disclosure reports from their officers and employees to establish, under 

the direction of OGE, appropriate procedures governing how the reports are made 

available on agency websites. Section 11(a) imposes on the President the obligation to “ensure” that the reports are “made available to the public on the official 

websites of the respective executive branch agencies.” STOCK Act § 11(a)(1), 

126 Stat. at 298. The President could not fulfill that obligation unless the Executive Branch had authority to develop and implement appropriate procedures to 

make the reports available. Section 11(a) thus necessarily implies that the 

Executive Branch has that authority. 

The STOCK Act does not assign the authority to establish procedures for complying with section 11(a) to any specific component of the Executive Branch. The 

nature of the obligation, however, together with EIGA section 402, makes clear 

that the authority lies with the various Executive Branch agencies that receive the 

reports, subject to the direction of OGE. Because the reports must be made 

available on the websites of the “respective executive branch agencies,” those 

agencies are logical repositories of the authority to establish procedures governing 

how the reports are made available. Moreover, the EIGA confirms that each 

agency generally has the authority to establish “procedures relating to how the 

agency is to . . . make publicly available[] financial disclosure statements filed by 

any of its officers or employees.” 5 U.S.C. app., EIGA § 402(d)(1). The EIGA 

makes clear, however, that OGE also has authority to “establish[] procedures” 

governing the “public availability” of financial disclosure reports, id. § 402(b)(1), 

and that OGE may use that authority to superintend the procedures established by 

the agencies and ensure their “conformance with all applicable requirements,” 

including requirements prescribed by OGE, id. § 402(d)(2). 

The procedures governing how reports are made available on agency websites 

may incorporate reasonable prerequisites to or limitations on access, provided that 

those prerequisites are consistent with section 11(a)’s command that the reports be 

“made available,” as well as with any other applicable legal requirements. See 
Whether Individuals May Be Required to Provide Basic Identifying Information 

9 

generally Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 843–45 

(1984) (explaining that, when an agency has been delegated authority to fill a gap 

in a statute, the agency’s action is controlling if Congress has not addressed the 

point at issue and the agency’s action is reasonable); e.g., United States ex rel. 

Touhy v. Regan, 340 U.S. 462, 468 (1951) (holding that a statute authorizing the 

Attorney General to prescribe regulations for “the custody, use, and preservation 

of the records, papers, and property” of the Department of Justice, 5 U.S.C. § 22 

(1946), empowered the Attorney General to promulgate a regulation that reserved 

to himself the decision whether to release documents in response to a subpoena). 

C. 

1. 

In our view, requiring prospective viewers to provide basic information, similar 

to the information listed in EIGA section 105(b)(2), before accessing reports is a 

reasonable limitation consistent with section 11(a)’s general command that the 

reports be “made available to the public” on agency websites. STOCK Act 

§ 11(a)(1), 126 Stat. at 298. “Available” means “accessible” or “obtainable.” See

American Heritage Dictionary at 123 (definitions 1 and 2); Webster’s Dictionary

at 150 (definition 4). Thus, reports are made “available” if prospective viewers 

may access or obtain the reports upon presentation of basic identifying information. 

Significantly, section 105 of the EIGA supports the conclusion that requiring 

prospective viewers to provide information like that specified in section 105(b)(2) 

before they may access reports is consistent with section 11(a)’s command that 

reports be “made available to the public.” Section 105’s public availability 

requirement is phrased in virtually identical language, see 5 U.S.C. app., EIGA 

§ 105(a) (stating that each agency shall “make available to the public” each report 

filed with the agency); yet section 105(b)(2) requires an individual to provide the 

specified information as a precondition to inspecting or copying a report. See id. 

§ 105(b)(2). Thus, section 105 demonstrates that Congress considered a requirement that prospective viewers provide such information before accessing reports 

to be consistent with a command that reports be “made available to the public.” 

 Moreover, when Congress enacts a new statute using language that has a settled meaning, the new statute is generally construed to embody that settled 

meaning. See Evans v. United States, 504 U.S. 255, 260 n.3 (1992) (“[A]s Justice 

Frankfurter advised, ‘if a word is obviously transplanted from another legal 

source, whether the common law or other legislation, it brings the old soil with 

it.’”) (quoting Felix Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the Reading of Statutes, 47 

Colum. L. Rev. 527, 537 (1947)). Because section 11(a) incorporates language 

that was understood to be consistent with a requirement that prospective viewers 
Opinions of the Office of Legal Counsel in Volume 36 

10 

provide basic identifying information before accessing reports, section 11(a) also 

should be construed as consistent with that requirement. 

 Other statutory provisions confirm that if Congress had intended to preclude 

OGE and other agencies from requiring prospective viewers to provide basic 

identifying information before accessing reports made available under section 

11(a), Congress would have done so explicitly. For example, section 11(b)(2) of 

the STOCK Act states that “[n]o login shall be required to search or sort the data 

contained in the reports made available by this subsection.” 126 Stat. at 299. As 

we explain in more detail below, that provision does not address whether identifying information may be required to access reports made available under section 

11(a), because the provision applies only to reports made available under section 

11(b). See infra pp. 14–15. The provision strongly suggests, however, that a 

requirement that prospective viewers provide identifying information is permissible in this context absent an express statement to the contrary. Otherwise there 

would have been no need for Congress to add the provision in order to preclude 

OGE and other agencies from requiring a login to search or sort reports made 

available under section 11(b). See Corley v. United States, 556 U.S. 303, 314 

(2009) (statutes should be construed to avoid rendering any of their provisions 

superfluous). 

In other statutes as well, where Congress has intended to prohibit a requirement 

that users provide identifying information before availing themselves of a feature 

on agency websites, Congress has made that prohibition explicit. Thus, the 

Inspector General Reform Act of 2008, which requires the website of the Office of 

the Inspector General of each agency to include a link that allows individuals to 

report fraud, waste, or abuse, expressly provides that individuals using the links 

“shall not be required to provide personally identifying information.” Pub. L. No. 

110-409, sec. 13(a), § 8L(b)(2)(A), 122 Stat. 4302, 4316 (Oct. 14, 2008). 

Finally, a procedure under which prospective viewers must provide basic identifying information and acknowledge the legal prohibitions on obtaining and using 

reports is a reasonable way to achieve the purposes of section 11(a) of the STOCK 

Act, consistent with the limitations on public access to financial disclosure reports 

imposed by the EIGA. Although section 11(a) of the STOCK Act aims to enhance 

public access to financial disclosure reports by making those reports accessible via 

the internet, see, e.g., 158 Cong. Rec. S195 (daily ed. Jan. 31, 2012) (statement of 

Sen. Begich); id. at S196 (statement of Sen. Lieberman); id. at S1979 (daily ed. 

Mar. 22, 2012) (statement of Sen. Lieberman), section 11(a) and the rest of the 

STOCK Act leave in place the restrictions on obtaining and using reports imposed 

by EIGA section 105(c)(1). Conditioning access to reports via agency websites on 

the provision of basic information, including an acknowledgement of those 

restrictions, would facilitate enforcement of the restrictions without impairing 
Whether Individuals May Be Required to Provide Basic Identifying Information 

11 

section 11(a)’s goal of making reports available via the internet during the interim 

period before implementation of the permanent disclosure system required by 

section 11(b).3

For these reasons, we believe that a procedure requiring prospective viewers to 

provide basic identifying information, such as the items listed in EIGA section 

105(b)(2), before accessing disclosure reports via agency websites would be a 

reasonable means of implementing section 11(a) of the STOCK Act. 

2. 

An argument can be constructed, based on the legislative history of the EIGA, 

that such a procedure is not a permissible method for implementing section 11(a). 

In our view, however, that argument is not persuasive. 

The versions of the EIGA originally passed by the Senate and considered on 

the floor of the House of Representatives contained provisions, similar to current 

section 105(b)(2), that required prospective viewers to provide basic identifying 

information before accessing reports. See S. 555, 95th Cong. § 305(c) (as passed 

by Senate, June 27, 1977); 124 Cong. Rec. 30,434, 30,436 (1978) (H.R. 13850, 

95th Cong. § 104(c) (1978)) (considered as substitute to H.R. 1, 95th Cong. 

(1978)) (requirement with respect to reports by congressional officials); 124 Cong. 

Rec. at 30,468 (H.R. 13850, 95th Cong. § 205(b)(1)) (requirement with respect to 

reports by Executive officials); 124 Cong. Rec. at 32,028 (H.R. 13850, 95th Cong. 

§ 305(b)(1)) (requirement with respect to reports by judicial officials). Those 

provisions were, however, removed before final passage of the EIGA. See 124 

Cong. Rec. at 30,447 (amendment, offered by Rep. Frenzel, striking the requirement with respect to reports by congressional officials); H.R. Rep. No. 95-1756, at 

24–25, 37–38 (1978) (Conf. Rep.) (Conference Committee agreement removing 

the requirements with respect to reports by Executive Branch and judicial 

employees); Ethics in Government Act of 1978, Pub. L. 95-521, §§ 104, 205, 305, 

92 Stat. 1824, 1832–33, 1846–47, 1859 (legislation as enacted). In offering the 

amendment to strike the requirement with respect to reports by congressional 

officials, Representative Frenzel stated that the amendment revised the section 

governing public availability of reports “so that a person requesting” access to a 

 3

 As we explain in Part II.D, Congress imposed limitations on the collection of identifying information from prospective users during the second stage of internet access, once a permanent database 

(with search, sort, and download capability) is established on the OGE website. Nonetheless, requiring 

identifying information during the first stage (before establishment of the permanent OGE database) 

would facilitate a smooth transition to the second stage by providing enhanced protections against 

potential misuse of the reports while the President determines whether to exempt from the disclosure 

requirements certain filers who may be particularly vulnerable to misuse of their reports. See infra pp. 

14–15. 
Opinions of the Office of Legal Counsel in Volume 36 

12 

report “may not or need not be required to leave his name and organization.” 124 

Cong. Rec. at 30,447. 

The following year, the Director of OGE testified before a congressional subcommittee that, based on this drafting history, OGE did not believe that it had 

authority to require an individual to provide his name as a condition of receiving a 

report. See Financial Disclosure Provisions of the Ethics in Government Act of 

1978: Hearing on H.R. 2805 Before the Subcomm. on Human Resources of the H. 

Comm. on the Post Office and Civil Service, 96th Cong. 9–10 (1979). Congress 

subsequently amended the EIGA to add requirements that prospective viewers 

provide basic identifying information before accessing reports, see Act of June 13, 

1979, Pub. L. No. 96-19, § 8, 93 Stat. 37, 41–42, and those requirements were 

consolidated in section 105(b)(2) as part of the EIGA’s reorganization in 1989, see 

supra note 2; 1989 Act, sec. 202, § 105, 103 Stat. at 1738. 

Based on this history, it could be argued that (1) the EIGA, as originally enacted (without section 105(b)(2)), did not permit OGE and other agencies to require 

prospective viewers of reports to provide identifying information; (2) section 

11(b)(2) of the STOCK Act, by declaring that section 105(b)(2) does not apply to 

reports made available under section 11(a), effectively restores the EIGA as 

originally enacted for reports made available under section 11(a); and (3) OGE 

and other agencies therefore do not have authority to condition access to reports 

under section 11(a) on the requester’s providing basic identifying information. We 

believe, however, that this argument has several fatal defects. 

First, it is not accurate to view section 11(b)(2) as effectively restoring the 

EIGA as originally enacted. As we explained above, section 11(b)(2) does not 

repeal section 105(b)(2). Section 105(b)(2) remains a part of the EIGA and 

continues to apply at least when reports are accessed through means other than the 

internet access mandated by section 11. See supra p. 5. And, as described above, 

section 105(b)(2) supports the conclusion that OGE and other agencies may 

require prospective viewers of reports under section 11(a) to provide identifying 

information. See supra p. 9. In addition, section 11(b)(2) contains other provisions 

besides the declaration that section 105(b)(2) does not apply to reports made 

available under section 11(a). As explained above, one of those other provisions, 

the login prohibition for searching and sorting reports made available under 

section 11(b), also supports the permissibility of a requirement that prospective 

viewers provide identifying information before viewing reports under section 

11(a). See supra p. 10. 

 Second, we do not believe that the legislative history establishes that the EIGA 

as originally enacted prohibited OGE and other agencies from conditioning access 

to Executive Branch financial disclosure reports on the requester’s providing basic 

identifying information. The provisions that were removed from the EIGA during 

the legislative process would have required agencies to impose that condition. 

Congress’s decision not to require agencies to impose the condition does not 

establish that Congress also intended to prohibit OGE and other agencies from 
Whether Individuals May Be Required to Provide Basic Identifying Information 

13 

imposing the condition as an exercise of their discretion to establish procedures 

implementing the public availability requirement. The floor statement by Representative Frenzel suggests that he may have believed that the deletion of the 

requirement meant that the condition could not be imposed. But floor statements, 

even by amendment sponsors, are of limited utility in interpreting legislative 

provisions. See Consumer Prods. Safety Comm’n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. 

102, 118 (1980) (“[O]rdinarily even the contemporaneous remarks of a single 

legislator who sponsors a bill are not controlling in analyzing legislative history.”); 

Zuber v. Allen, 396 U.S. 168, 186 (1969) (“Floor debates reflect at best the 

understanding of individual Congressmen.”). Moreover, Representative Frenzel’s 

statement concerned only the deletion of the requirement with respect to reports 

filed by congressional officials. The requirement that access to Executive Branch 

reports be conditioned on the requester’s providing identifying information was 

retained in the bill passed by the House, see 124 Cong. Rec. at 32,024, 32,028 

(S. 555, 95th Cong. § 205(b)(1) (Sept. 27, 1978)), and was deleted in the HouseSenate Conference. The Conference Report does not discuss the deletion and gives 

no indication that the conferees understood the deletion to preclude OGE and other 

agencies from deciding, in their discretion, to condition access to Executive 

Branch reports on the provision of identifying information. See H.R. Rep. No. 95-

1756. 

As noted above, the Director of OGE later testified that he interpreted this 

legislative history to preclude any requirement that prospective viewers provide 

identifying information, and Congress in 1979 subsequently added that requirement to the EIGA. Those events, however, constitute, at most, subsequent 

legislative history about the meaning of the EIGA as originally enacted, and 

“‘subsequent legislative history is a “hazardous basis for inferring the intent of an 

earlier” Congress.’” Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227, 238 (1999) (quoting 

Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. LTV Corp., 496 U.S. 633, 650 (1990) (quoting, in 

turn, United States v. Price, 361 U.S. 304, 313 (1960)). Moreover, the 1979 

enactment establishes only that Congress wanted to require that prospective 

viewers provide identifying information; the 1979 enactment does not indicate 

whether Congress believed that agencies could have imposed the requirement on 

their own volition. 

Finally, the argument based on this legislative history turns on Congress’s 

decision not to include a particular provision in the EIGA as originally enacted. 

The argument is not anchored in the statutory text that was in fact enacted. And 

“courts have no authority to enforce [a] principl[e] gleaned solely from legislative 

history that has no statutory reference point.” Shannon v. United States, 512 U.S. 

573, 584 (1994) (brackets in original; citation omitted). This aspect of the legislative history of the EIGA thus does not alter our conclusion that conditioning 

access to disclosure reports on the requester’s providing basic identifying information, similar to the information listed in EIGA section 105(b)(2), would be a 

reasonable means of implementing section 11(a) of the STOCK Act. 
Opinions of the Office of Legal Counsel in Volume 36 

14 

D. 

Even though that procedure would be a reasonable means of implementing 

section 11(a) of the STOCK Act, the procedure would not be permissible if some 

other provision of the STOCK Act or the EIGA prohibited it. The only provision 

of either statute that could be construed to contain such a prohibition, however, is 

the first sentence in section 11(b)(2) of the STOCK Act, and the text of that 

provision is best read not to contain such a prohibition. 

As discussed above, the provision states that “[n]o login shall be required to 

search or sort the data contained in the reports made available by this subsection.” 

STOCK Act § 11(b)(2), 126 Stat. at 299 (emphasis added). The prohibition on 

requiring a “login” to “search or sort” the data in the reports is, in our view, 

tantamount to a prohibition on requiring prospective viewers to provide identifying information before viewing the reports. The ordinary meaning of “login” is 

“[t]he process of identifying oneself to a computer, usually by entering one’s 

username and password.” American Heritage Dictionary at 1029; accord Random 

House Dictionary of the English Language 1130 (2d ed. 1987) (definition 17a of 

“log”). A prohibition on requiring a prospective user to provide identifying 

information before “search[ing] or sort[ing]” data necessarily includes a prohibition on requiring a prospective user to provide such information before taking the 

lesser step of viewing the data. 

Nonetheless, we believe that the login prohibition applies only when prospective viewers seek access to a financial disclosure report under the second stage of 

the process mandated by section 11—the permanent public disclosure system 

required by subsection (b). The login prohibition does not apply when prospective 

viewers seek access to reports during the first stage, when reports are accessible 

via websites pursuant to subsection (a). The login prohibition, by its plain terms, 

applies only to reports “made available by this subsection.” STOCK Act 

§ 11(b)(2), 126 Stat. at 299. The phrase “this subsection” refers to subsection (b) 

of section 11, not section 11 as a whole. As explained above, Congress generally 

uses the term “subsection” to refer to a first-level subdivision of a statutory 

section, rather than the section as a whole, and Congress generally adhered to that 

practice in the STOCK Act, including in section 11. See supra p. 6. 

Although, as noted above, Congress may sometimes make drafting errors and 

use the term “subsection” when it actually means “section,” again we do not 

believe that Congress erred here. On the contrary, as set forth above, Congress 

carefully adhered to the distinction between the terms “section” and “subsection” 

throughout the STOCK Act. See supra p. 6. Moreover, Congress could reasonably 

have concluded that OGE and other agencies should have discretion to require that 

prospective users provide identifying information in order to access financial 

disclosure reports during the eighteen-month period before establishment of the 

permanent database required by subsection (b). As members of Congress recognized, broader public access to financial disclosure reports increases the risk that 
Whether Individuals May Be Required to Provide Basic Identifying Information 

15 

the officers and employees who file those reports may be subject to misuse of their 

personal information for unlawful or other nefarious purposes. See, e.g., 158 

Cong. Rec. S1979 (daily ed. Mar. 22, 2012) (statement of Sen. Levin). Requiring 

prospective viewers to supply identifying information and to acknowledge the 

restrictions on using reports provides some deterrent against misuse of the 

information in the reports. Allowing OGE and other agencies to maintain that 

deterrent during the eighteen-month period before establishment of the permanent 

database serves a valuable purpose: During that time, the President could evaluate 

whether some categories of officers and employees may be particularly vulnerable 

to misuse of their information, see id. (statement of Sen. Levin) (suggesting that 

law enforcement, military, and intelligence officers may be particularly vulnerable), and, if necessary, invoke statutory provisions that allow him to exempt from 

public disclosure reports filed by certain officers and employees. See, e.g., 

5 U.S.C. app., EIGA § 105(a)(1) (allowing the President to exempt from public 

disclosure reports filed by individuals engaged in intelligence activities); 158 

Cong. Rec. S1980 (daily ed. Mar. 22, 2012) (colloquy between Senators Reid and 

Lieberman stating that this exemption authority applies to section 11 of the 

STOCK Act). 

For these reasons, we conclude that the login prohibition in the first sentence of 

section 11(b)(2) does not prohibit OGE and other agencies from requiring that 

prospective viewers provide basic identifying information before they may access 

financial disclosure reports made available during the interim period governed by 

subsection (a). 

III. 

In sum, a procedure under which prospective viewers are required to provide 

information similar to that described in section 105(b)(2) of the EIGA in order to 

access financial disclosure reports made available under section 11(a) of the 

STOCK Act is consistent with both the STOCK Act and the EIGA. In our 

judgment, this procedure may be implemented by Executive Branch agencies at 

the direction of OGE pursuant to its authority under section 402 of the EIGA to 

prescribe procedures governing the public availability of financial disclosure 

reports. 

 VIRGINIA A. SEITZ 

 Assistant Attorney General 

 Office of Legal Counsel