alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
NUMBER 13-15-00023-CV

COURT OF APPEALS

THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

CORPUS CHRISTI - EDINBURG 

____________________________________________________________

JOHN SHOLTIS, Appellant,

v.

JESSE RODRIGUEZ AND 

IRMA RODRIGUEZ, Appellees.

____________________________________________________________

On appeal from the County Court 

of Live Oak County, Texas.

____________________________________________________________

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Before Justices Benavides, Perkes, and Longoria

Memorandum Opinion Per Curiam

Appellant, John Sholtis, attempted to perfect an appeal from the trial court’s order 

denying his motion to recuse the trial court judge in trial court cause number CV01590. 

Because this order is not an appealable order, we dismiss for want of jurisdiction.
2

Upon review of the documents before the Court, it appeared that the order from 

which this appeal was taken was not an appealable order. On January 13, 2015, the 

Clerk of this Court notified appellant of this defect so that steps could be taken to correct 

the defect, if it could be done. Appellant was advised that, if the defect was not corrected 

within ten days from the date of receipt of this Court’s letter, the appeal would be 

dismissed. Appellant failed to respond to the Court’s notice. 

In terms of appellate jurisdiction, appellate courts only have jurisdiction to review 

final judgments and certain interlocutory orders identified by statute. Lehmann v. HarCon Corp., 39 S.W.3d 191, 195 (Tex. 2001). See Shadowbrook Apartments v. AbuAhmad, 783 S.W.2d 210, 211 (Tex. 1990) (holding that order denying motion for judgment 

nunc pro tunc is not appealable). An order denying a motion to recuse may be reviewed 

only on appeal from a final judgment. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 18a(j)(1)(a). 

The Court, having fully reviewed and considered the documents herein, concludes 

that the order appealed from fails to invoke our appellate jurisdiction and is of the opinion 

that the cause should be dismissed. The appeal is hereby DISMISSED FOR WANT OF 

JURISDICTION. See TEX. R. APP. P. 42.3(a).

PER CURIAM

Delivered and filed the

26th day of February, 2015.
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<NAME> STRATEGIC DIAGNOSTICS, INC.
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</TABLE>
Of the Tenth Circuit, sitting by designation. *

Not For Publication in West's Federal Reporter

Citation Limited Pursuant to 1st Cir. Loc. R. 32.3 

United States Court of Appeals

For the First Circuit

No. 06-1800

LOUIS VUITTON MALLETIER,

Plaintiff, Appellee,

v.

TITO MORALES d/b/a PARIS BAG COLLECTION,

Defendant, Appellant.

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO

[Hon. Jay A. García-Gregory, U.S. District Judge]

Before

 Howard, Circuit Judge,

Baldock, and Stahl, Senior Circuit Judges. *

Reichard & Calaf, P.S.C., Federico Calaf-Legrand, and Vicente

A. Sequeda-Torres on brief, for appellee.

Julio E. Gil De Lamadrid for appellant.

January 10, 2007
-2-

Per Curiam. This appeal derives from an action brought

by appellee Louis Vuitton Malletier against a host of vendors in

Puerto Rico, including appellant Tito Morales (d/b/a Paris Bags),

alleging that the vendors were selling counterfeit Louis Vuitton

merchandise. In due course, the district court entered judgment

against Morales, enjoined him from violating appellee's trademark

rights, and ordered that he pay $50,000 in damages. Morales

appeals.

Morales's arguments merit only a brief discussion.

First, Morales challenges the sufficiency of the evidence that

appellee introduced to support its claim. This argument fails to

comprehend that the district court entered a default judgment

against him. Thus, Morales was deemed to have conceded the truth

of appellee's factual allegations, see In re Home Restaurants,

Inc., 285 F.3d 111, 114 (1st Cir. 2002), which were adequate to

establish liability. Second, Morales contends that appellee failed

to establish actual damages. But this contention is also beside

the point because the district court awarded appellee statutory

damages. See 15 U.S.C. § 1117(c). Lastly, Morales argues that the

district court never acquired personal jurisdiction over him

because appellee's amended complaint was never properly served upon

him. This argument ignores the fact that Morales was initially

served with a "John Doe" complaint and appeared to contest

appellee's request for a preliminary injunction on the strength
In light of our conclusions, appellee's motion to file a 1

supplemental brief is denied.

-3-

thereof. Morales presents no coherent theory as to how the

improper service of a later filing (which, other than specifically

identifying prior "John Does," was identical to the original

complaint) divested the district court of personal jurisdiction

over him. And, in any event, Morales fails to question the

district court's alternative conclusion that any challenge to

personal jurisdiction was waived as untimely. See Fed R. Civ. P.

12(h). 

The judgment of the district court is affirmed. See Loc.

R. 27(c). Costs are awarded to appellee.1
<PAGE>


                                                                  Exhibit 21.1
                           Subsidiaries of the Company

Wholly-Owned Corporate Subsidiaries of the Company:
        BPAC Texas, Inc. (Delaware) (Unconsolidated)
        BPP/Arrowhead, Inc. (Delaware) (Consolidated)
        BPP/Crenshaw-Imperial, Inc. (Delaware) (Consolidated)
        BPP/Golden State Acquisitions, Inc. (Delaware) (Consolidated)
        BPP/Mountaingate, Inc. (Delaware) (Consolidated)
        BPP/Northwest Acquisitions, Inc. (Delaware) (Consolidated)
        BPP/Puente Hills, Inc. (Delaware) (Consolidated)
        BPP/Riley, Inc. (California) (Consolidated)
        BPP/Simi Valley, Inc. (Delaware) (Consolidated)
        BPP/Valley Central, Inc. (Delaware) (Consolidated)
        Burnham Pacific L.P., Inc. (Delaware) (Consolidated)

Corporations in which the Company holds an interest:
        BPP Services, Inc.

Partnerships in which the Company holds interests:
        BPAC Texas, L.P. (Delaware) (Unconsolidated)
        BPP/Arrowhead, L.P. (Delaware) (Consolidated)
        BPP/Cameron Park, L.P. (California) (Consolidated)
        BPP/Crenshaw-Imperial, L.P. (Delaware) (Consolidated)
        BPP/East Palo Alto, L.P. (California) (Consolidated)
        BPP/Hilltop, L.P. (California) (Consolidated)
        BPP/Marin, L.P. (California) (Consolidated)
        BPP/Mission Viejo, L.P. (California) (Consolidated)
        BPP/Pleasant Hill, L.P. (California) (Consolidated)
        BPP/Richmond, L.P. (California) (Consolidated)
        BPP/Riley, L.P. (California) (Consolidated)
        BPP/Simi Valley, L.P. (Delaware) (Consolidated)
        BPP/Valley Central, L.P. (California) (Consolidated)
        BPP/Van Ness, L.P. (California) (Consolidated)
        Burnham Pacific Operating Partnership, L.P. (Delaware) (Consolidated)
        BPP/Van Ness Operating Company, L.P. (California) (Consolidated)

Limited Liability Companies in which the Company holds an interest:
        BPAC Texas GP, LLC (Delaware) (Unconsolidated)
        BPP/Golden State Acquisitions, L.L.C. (Delaware) (Consolidated)
        BPP/Northwest Acquisitions, L.L.C. (Delaware) (Consolidated)
        BPP/Puente Hills, L.L.C. (Delaware) (Consolidated)
        BPP Retail, LLC (Delaware) (Unconsolidated)
        Burnham Pacific Employees LLC (Delaware) (Consolidated)
        Ladera Center Associates, LLC (Delaware) (Unconsolidated)
        Margarita Plaza Associates, LLC (Delaware) (Unconsolidated)
        Historic Van Ness, LLC (California) (Unconsolidated)
        BPP/Van Ness Operating Company, LLC (California) (Unconsolidated)
NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff

- Appellee,

v.

SHANE MICHAEL COURTNEY,

Defendant

- Appellant. No. 18

- 30159

D.C. No. 2:17

- cr

- 00018

- DLC

MEMORANDUM *

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Montana

Dana L. Christensen, Chief Judge, Presiding

Submitted February 19, 2019 **

Before: FERNANDEZ, SILVERMAN, and WATFORD, Circuit Judges.

Shane Michael C ourtney appeals from the district court’s judgment and

challenges his guilty

- plea conviction and 66

- month sentence for possession of

child pornography, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252A (a)(5)(B), (b)(2)

. Pursuant to

And ers v. California , 386 U.S. 738 (1967), Courtney ’s counsel has filed a brief

* This d isposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent

except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36

- 3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). 

# FILED

FEB 21 2019

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLER K

U.S. COURT OF APPEAL S2 18

- 30159

stating that there are no grounds for relief, along with a motion to withdraw as

counsel of record. We have provided Courtney the opportunity to file a pro se

supplemental brief. No pro se supplemental brief or answering brief has been

filed.

Our independent review of the record pursuant to Penson v. Ohio , 488 U.S.

75, 80 (1988), discloses no arguable grounds for relief as to Courtney ’s conviction.

We accordingly affirm Courtney ’s conviction.

Courtney waived the right to appeal his sentence. Because the record

discloses no arguable issue as to the validity of the sentencing waiver, we dismiss

Courtney ’s appeal as to his sente nce. See United States v. Watson , 582 F.3d 974,

986

- 88 (9th Cir. 2009).

Counsel’s motion to withdraw is GRANTED.

AFFIRMED in part; DISMISSED in part.
**MP** IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA No. DA 19 -0370 STATE OF MONTANA,

Plaintiff and Appellee, v. MICKEY RODNEY PAYNE ,

Defendant and Appellant.

**ORDER** Upon consideration of Appellee ’ s motion for a 3 0 -day extension of time, and good cause appearing therefor, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Appellee is gran ted an extension of time to and including Dec em

ber 1 4 , 2020 , within which to prepare, serve, and file its response brief.

Electronically signed by: Mike McGrath Chief Justice, Montana Supreme Court

November 5 2020

11/05/2020

Case Number: DA 19-0370
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Donald WESLEY, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 13-6612.

United States Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit.

May 20, 2014.

Before ROGERS and COOK, Circuit Judges; MURPHY, District Judge.*

*

 The Honorable Stephen J. Muiphy, III, United States District Judge for the Eastern District of Michigan, sitting by designation.

PER CURIAM.

Donald Wesley, a federal prisoner, appeals through counsel the 100-month sentence imposed following his guilty plea to a charge of being a felon in possession of a firearm.

In the presentence report, Wesley’s guidelines sentencing range was calculated at 100 to 120 months. Wesley filed a request for a downward variance. At the sentencing hearing, defense counsel argued that the death of Wesley’s father, when Wesley was a teenager, explained why Wesley had drifted into criminal activity. He argued that the firearm was discovered during a traffic stop of a car in which Wesley was a passenger, and not during the commission of another crime. *440Wesley also spoke, and argued that he had reformed since his prior criminal history when he was young. The district court rejected the request for a downward variance and sentenced Wesley at the bottom of the guidelines range. On appeal, Wesley argues that the district court failed to address the relevant sentencing factors.

A failure to address the sentencing factors can be both a substantive and procedural error. *United States v. Conatser,*514 F.3d 508, 519-20 (6th Cir.2008). We review the sentence for reasonableness under an abuse-of-discretion standard. *United States v. Jeter,*721 F.3d 746, 756 (6th Cir.2013). A within-range sentence is accorded a rebuttable presumption of substantive reasonableness. *United States v. Brown,*579 F.3d 672, 677 (6th Cir.2009).

The transcript of the sentencing hearing shows that the district court was not persuaded that Wesley had reformed since his criminal history when he was young and that he was only involved in a traffic stop that led to the discovery of the firearm. The record showed that Wesley was stopped in relation to an investigation of a gang shooting, and that Wesley had an outstanding warrant for a charge of selling cocaine within 1000 feet of a school. The district court discussed the serious nature of the offense, Wesley’s history, and the need for the sentence to promote respect for the law, provide just punishment, act as a deterrent, protect the public, and provide needed training and treatment. While the district court did not specifically mention the death of Wesley’s father, a sentencing court is not required to address explicitly every argument in every case. *See United States v. Gale,*468 F.3d 929, 940 (6th Cir.2006).

Therefore, no abuse of discretion is apparent that would rebut the presumed reasonableness of this sentence at the bottom of the guidelines range. The district court’s judgment is affirmed.
EXHIBIT 32.1
 CERTIFICATION OF THE CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER PURSUANT TO
18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906
OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002
  (1)
    
    The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 ; and(2)
    
    The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material
respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company at and for
the periods indicated.
  /s/ Robert L. ButchofskyRobert L. ButchofskyPresident and Chief Executive Officer

(Principal Executive Officer)
EXHIBIT 32
                                   ----------

                  CERTIFICATION OF PRINCIPAL FINANCIAL OFFICER
                       PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350


In  connection  with  the  accompanying  Quarterly  Report  on  Form  10-QSB  of
NanoPierce Technologies, Inc. for the quarter ended March 31, 2004, I, Kristi J.
Kampmann,  Chief  Financial  Officer  of  NanoPierce  Technologies, Inc., hereby
certify  pursuant  to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906
of  the  Sarbanes-Oxley  Act  of  2002,  to  my  knowledge,  that:

     a)   such  Quarterly Report on Form 10-QSB of NanoPierce Technologies, Inc.
          for  the  quarter  ended  March  31,  2004,  fully  complies  with the
          requirements  of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act
          of  1934;  and

     b)   the  information  contained in such Quarterly Report on Form 10-QSB of
          NanoPierce  Technologies,  Inc.  for the quarter ended March 31, 2004,
          fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and
          results  of  operations  of  NanoPierce  Technologies,  Inc.





                                   /s/Kristi J. Kampmann
                                   ----------------------------------
                                   Kristi J. Kampmann,
                                     Chief Financial Officer


Date:  May 17, 2004



               A  signed  original of this written statement required by Section
               906  has  been provided to NanoPierce Technologies, Inc. and will
               be retained by NanoPierce Technologies, Inc. and furnished to the
               Securities  and  Exchange  Commission  or its staff upon request.


<PAGE>
**Certification of the Chief Executive Officer** **Exhibit 31.1**
     I, Douglas D. Burkett, certify that:
1. I have reviewed this report on Form 10-Q for the quarter ended April 30,2004 of Zila, Inc.;
2. Based on my knowledge, this report for the quarter ended April 30, 2004does not contain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to statea material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of thecircumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading withrespect to the period covered by this report;
3. Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financialinformation included in this quarterly report, fairly present in all materialrespects the financial condition, results of operations and cash flows of theregistrant as of, and for, the periods presented in this report;
4. The registrant’s other certifying officer and I are responsible forestablishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined inExchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) for the registrant and have:
     a) designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such disclosurecontrols and procedures to be designed under our supervision, to ensure thatmaterial information relating to the registrant, including its consolidatedsubsidiaries, is made known to us by others within those entities, particularlyduring the period in which this report is being prepared;
     b) evaluated the effectiveness of the registrant’s disclosure controls andprocedures and presented in this report our conclusions about the effectivenessof the disclosure controls and procedures, as of the end of the period coveredby this report based on such evaluation; and
     c) disclosed in this report any change in the registrant’s internal controlover financial reporting that occurred during the registrant’s most recentfiscal quarter that has materially affected, or is reasonably likely tomaterially affect, the registrant’s internal control over financial reporting;and
5. The registrant’s other certifying officer and I have disclosed, based on ourmost recent evaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to theregistrant’s auditors and the audit committee of registrant’s board ofdirectors (or persons performing the equivalent functions):
     a) all significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design oroperation of internal control over financial reporting which are reasonablylikely to adversely affect the registrant’s ability to record, process,summarize and report financial information; and
     b) any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or otheremployees who have a significant role in the registrant’s internal controlsover financial reporting.
Date: June 10, 2004   /s/ Douglas D. Burkett, Ph. D.    Douglas D. Burkett, Ph. D.  Chief Executive Officer
[Exhibit 32.1]


   CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350 AS ADOPTED
    PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002


    The undersigned hereby certifies, pursuant  to 18 U.S.C.
Section 1350, as  adopted pursuant  to  Section 906  of  the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of  2002, that this Quarterly  Report  on
Form 10-Q for  the quarter  ended  December 31, 2005  fully
complies  with the requirements of  Section  13(a)  or 15(d)
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended, and  the
information contained in such report fairly presents, in all
material respects,  the financial condition and  results  of
operations of the Company.


This 13th day of February, 2006.


/S/Wm. Lee Popham
-------------------------------------
Wm. Lee Popham
Chairman, Chief Executive Officer
and Chief Financial Officer
##### 



EXHIBIT 32.2
 CERTIFICATION BY THE CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER PURSUANT TO
18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906
OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002
  (1)
    
    The Form 10-Q fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78m(a) or 78o(d)); and(2)
    
    The information contained in the Form 10-Q fairly presents, in all material
respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.
  /s/ Cameron NelsonCameron NelsonVice President, Finance &Chief Financial Officer(Principal Financial and Accounting Officer)
 46
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<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
This schedule contains summary financial information extracted from the Balance
Sheet, and Income Statement and is qualified in its entirety by reference to
such financial statements.
</LEGEND>
<MULTIPLIER> 1
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   YEAR
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                              DEC-31-1998
<PERIOD-END>                                   DEC-31-1998
<CASH>                                         10,975,528
<SECURITIES>                                   0
<RECEIVABLES>                                  0
<ALLOWANCES>                                   0
<INVENTORY>                                    0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                               11,559,847
<PP&E>                                         5,047,108
<DEPRECIATION>                                 2,254,840
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 36,587,066
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                          2,098,019
<BONDS>                                        0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                          0
<PREFERRED>                                    0
<COMMON>                                       132,106
<OTHER-SE>                                     15,856,941
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                   36,587,066
<SALES>                                        0
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                               12,576,469
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<TOTAL-COSTS>                                  24,366,399
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                               17,794,103
<LOSS-PROVISION>                               0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                             10,500
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                (29,584,033)
<INCOME-TAX>                                   106,170
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                            (29,690,203)
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