DA19-0157INTHESUPREMECOURTOFTHESTATEOFMONTANA2021MT165NSTATEOFMONTANA,PlaintiffandAppellee,v.JACQUELINEBLACK,DefendantandAppellant.FILEDJUL062021BowenGreenwoodClerkofSupremeCourtStateofMontanaAPPEALFROM:DistrictCourtoftheThirdJudicialDistrict,InandFortheCountyofPowell,CauseNo.DC-16-58HonorableRayJ.Dayton,PresidingJudgeCOUNSELOFRECORD:ForAppellant:RyanP.Archibald,BitterrootLaw,PLLC,Hamilton,MontanaForAppellee:Filed:AustinKnudsen,MontanaAttorneyGeneral,C.MarkFowler,AssistantAttorneyGeneral,Helena,MontanaKathrynMcEnery,PowellCountyAttorney,DeerLodge,MontanaSubmittedonBriefs:March3,2021Decided:July6,2021Clerk07/06/2021Case Number: DA 19-0157Chief Justice

Mike McGrath

delivered

the Opinion

of the Court. ¶1 Pursuant

to Section

I, Paragraph

3(c), Montana

Supreme

Court Internal Operating Rules,

this

case

is decided

by memorandum

opinion

and shall

not

be cited

and does

not serve

as precedent.

Its case

title, cause number,

and disposition

shall

be included

in this Court's quarterly

list

of noncitable

cases published

in the Pacific Reporter

and Montana Reports. ¶2 Jacqueline

Black appeals

from

her conviction

by

a jury

of the offense

of conspiracy to commit transferring

illegal articles,

a felony pursuant

to

§§ 45-4-102

and 45-7-307, MCA.

We affirm. ¶3

Black

was charged

with attempting

to transport

illegal articles

into Montana

State Prison (MSP)

along

with

two co-conspirators.

Between

February

and March

2014,

Black communicated

over

30 times

with Terry

Lloyd Cowan (Cowan),

an inmate

at MSP,

often discussing

Suboxone

and

its transport

into MSP.

On March

6, 2014, Cowan received

a package

with

what

was

later identified

by

the crime

lab

as Buprenorphine/Naloxene, cornmonly

known

as Suboxone,

a dangerous

drug pursuant

to

§ 50-32-226(2)(g),

MCA. On March

9, 2014,

Black attempted

to visit Cowan

but was

not permitted

entrance.

Black was subsequently

charged. ¶4 Previously

Black

had been

on probation

for other charges,

and

on October

16, 2017, the parties

signed

a stipulation

agreeing

not

to discuss

Black's

prior

bad

acts

at trial.

The District

Court ordered

that

the parties

refrain

entirely

from presenting

any evidence

on 2"[a]ny wrongful

act, allegation

of rnisconduct,

warrant,

arrest, charge,

or conviction

of [Black]

for which

she

is not charged

in this case." ¶5

On June

4, 2018,

the State

filed

a trial brief which included

its exhibit

list.

The State planned

to introduce

as evidence

the visitor

log that Black

signed

when

she atternpted

to visit MSP.

The

log listed Black's

prior felony conviction,

and

the State offered

to redact that portion.

The

State asserted "Defendant

has

not indicated

it wishes

any

of

the evidence

— including

the recorded

phone

calls

— redacted,

and

the State intends

on playing them

in their entirety."

Defense

counsel

did

not respond. ¶6

In

a pretrial conference,

the District

Court discussed

the audio recordings

and possible prejudice

to Black.

The court stated,

"We

have

a stipulation.

We're

not going

to hear about

any other convictions

or anything

else. We've

agreed

to that, right?"

The State responded, [Your]

honor

there

is reference

to

it

in these

audio recordings

as I've

uh, restated

in the Pre-Trial Conference

um, however,

I've done

my best

to um, mitigate

that

in the timefrarnes

I'm intending

on playing.

Um,

it doesn't specifically

list

uh, what

Ms. Black

was

in custody

for

in-- under probation for

I think

is actually

the um, phrase. The State

also responded

that

it had redacted

Black's

felony reference

on the visitor

log

for MSP. Defense

counsel

stated

that

he knew

what

the audio

tapes contained

and

had

no objections

to what

the State

was going

to play

for

the jury regarding

Black. ¶7

In opening statements,

the State explained

that Cowan

and Justin Basaraba (Basaraba)

conspired

with Black

to transport

drugs

into MSP.

The State

told

the jury

that Cowan

and Basaraba

would

both

be witnesses

at trial. Basaraba

agreed

to testify

for

the State

in exchange

for dismissal

of the charge

he faced

as

a co-conspirator.

Cowan

was

still 3inprisonandinitiallyagreedtotestifyfortheState.TheStateadvisedthejurytopaycloseattentiontothederneanoroftheco-conspiratorsandconsidertheirmotivationsintestifying.Theevidentiarybasisforconviction,theStateexplained,wouldbebasedonthecontentsofrecordedphonecallsandBlack'svisitstotheprison.DefensecounselexplainedthatthepackageCowanreceivedwithSuboxonehadareturnaddresstoKellyClarkson,andthatCowanandBlackwerefriendsbutthatBasarabanevermetBlack.¶8Oncehewasonthestand,Cowanstatedthathewasadvisedbyanattorneynottotestifyandhethereforerefusedtotestify.BasarabatestifiedthatheandCowanwerecellmatesatMSP,andwhilethere,CowantaughthimhowtotransportSuboxonebymail.BasarabatestifiedaboutthemethodthatCowantaughthimandexplained,"Noungluethebottornflapofamanilamailingenvelopeandre-glueitwiththeSuboxonestripsinthereandthensenditin."CowanalsotoldBasarabaabouthisfriendBlack.BasarabatestifiedthatCowanreferredtoBlackasboth"Jackie"and"Jacqueline."¶9OnceBasarabawasreleasedfromMSP,CowancalledhimtorequestheassistintransportingSuboxoneintoMSP.CowanwantedBasarabatoexplaintoBlackhowtotransportSuboxonebymail.CowancommunicatedthistoBlackonarecordedlinemanythnes,includingaskingherrepeatedlytocontactBasarabaforinstructions.BasarabasubsequentlyspokewithapersonwhoidentifiedherselfasBlackandrelayedtheinstructionsfromCowanonhowtotransportSuboxone.Oncross-examinationBasarabasaidthathedidnotknowwhetherthepersonhespoketoonthephonewasBlack,orjustsomeoneusinghernameashehadnevermetherinperson.HealsoexplainedthatontherecordedcallswithCowan,CowancalledSuboxone"strippers".4¶10TheStatepresentedtheaudiorecordingsofBlackspeakingwithCowanaswellasrecordingsofCowanspeakingwithBasaraba.CowanandBasarabaspokeaboutSuboxone,althoughasBasarabatestified,CowanoftenreferredtoSuboxoneas"strippers."TheydiscussedplanningtotransportSuboxoneintoMSP.IntherecordingoftheinitialcalltheStatepresented,BasarabadidnotunderstandwhatCowanwasaskinghimtodowhenhereferredto"strippers,"butCowanexplainedbydescribingthe"strippers"theyhadinShelbyononeoccasion.BasarabathenrecognizedwhatCowanwasspeakingaboutandmentionedthatthe"strippers"had"beadingpatterns."AtthatpointBasarabaagreedtoexplaintoBlackhowto"getitallready,"referringtosendingSuboxone.¶11BasarabaandBlackdidnotconnectforsometimeandCowancalledBasarabarepeatedlytoaskwhetherhehadspokenwithBlack.EventuallyBasarabaandBlackconnected,andCowanconfirmedbythankinghimfor"telling[Black]howtodothat."BasarabatoldCowanthatitwasnoproblemandaskedifitworkedoutallright.Cowanrespondedhappilywithlaughter.¶12TherecordingsconfirmthatCowanaskedBlacktocontactBasaraba.InitiallyBlackdidnotunderstandwhatCowanwasaskinghertodo,andCowanassuredherthatonceshereceivedtheletterhehadsentandaftershespoketoBasarabashewouldunderstand.CowangrewincreasinglyagitatedthatBlackhadnotreachedouttoBasaraba.CowanandBlackalsodiscussedBlack'srecentprobationandrelatedtreatment.Defensecounseldidnotobjecttotheadmissionofanyoftherecordingsattrial.5¶13 Testimony

from

an investigator

and

a mailroom supervisor

from

MSP corroborated that Suboxone

was

sent

to Cowan,

that Black

visited

Cowan

twice,

and

that Black

and Cowan

spoke

on the phone

over

30 tirnes. ¶14

In closing arguments,

defense

counsel

argued

that

the State

did

not provide evidence to prove

that Black

was actually

the

one who

sent

the envelope

with Suboxone

to Cowan. The State

did

not check

for DNA

on

the envelope,

nor

did they analyze

the handwriting, and

the return address

on

the envelope

said

it came

from Cowan's

sister's

house.

At

the conclusion

of the trial,

the State presented

the Court

with

over

20 proposed

jury instructions including

one

that stated

that Cowan

was Black's co-conspirator

and

was charged

for that crime. Defense

counsel

did

not object

to that instruction

and declined

to present

any jury instructions. ¶15

Black

argues

on appeal

that

the State committed prosecutorial

rnisconduct

by presenting

evidence

of

her prior

bad

acts

at trial

after stipulating

not

to

do

so. Section

46-20 104(2),

MCA,

bars review

of alleged

errors

not objected

to

at trial.

Thus, we decline

to review

the claim

here. ¶16

Black

argues

further

that

her counsel

was ineffective

because

he failed

to present the jury instructions

that

he was obligated

to present regarding co-conspirator

testimony. ¶17 Section 26-1-303(4),

MCA, requires

that

"the

jury

is

to

be instructed

by

the court on

all proper occasions

that

.

.

. the testimony

of

a person

legally accountable

for

the acts of the accused

ought

to

be viewed

with distrust."

State

v. Kougl,

2004

MT 243,

¶ 20,

323 Mont.

6, 97 P.3d 1095;

State

v. Rose,

1998

MT 342,

292 Mont.

350,

972 P.2d

321. 6¶18Moreover,aco-conspirator'stestimonyrnustbecorroboratedwithotherevidencepursuantto§46-16-213,MCA,whichstates:Apersonmaynotbefoundguiltyofanoffenseonthetestimonyofoneresponsibleorlegallyaccountableforthesameoffense,asdefinedin45-2-301,unlessthetestimonyiscorroboratedbyotherevidencethatinitselfwithouttheaidofthetestimonyoftheoneresponsibleorlegallyaccountableforthesameoffensetendstoconnectthedefendantwiththecommissionoftheoffense.Ifcounselrequestsjuryinstructionsthatarerequiredbystatute,thedistrictcourtisobligatedtogranttherequest.Kougl,¶17;Rose,¶18;seealso§26-1-303,MCA.Counselcanbefoundineffectivewhentheyfailtoaskthejurytobeinstructedtoviewalegally-accountableperson'stestimonywithsuspicionwhentheyhavenoplausiblejustificationnottodoso.Kougl,¶17(citingRose,¶20).¶19InKougl,weheldthatwherethepartiesagreedthatthedefendanthadaccomplices,theirstatuswasnotindispute,andthereforetheywereaccomplicesasamatteroflaw.Kougl,¶20(citingStatev.Johnson,276Mont.447,451-53,918P.2d293,295-96(1996)."Byfailingtoaskthecourttotellthejurorsthatthelawdemandstheyviewtheaccomplices'testimonywithdistrust,trialcounselfailedtousethelawtostrikeattheheartoftheState'scase."Kougl,¶20.Ontheotherhand,ifthejuryinstructionwouldconflictwithadefensepresented,itcouldbetacticalnottopresentajuryinstructionaboutaccomplicetestimony.Statev.Johnson,257Mont.163,163,848P.2d499,498(1996),overruledbyCityofHelenav.Franforter,2018MT193,392Mont.277,423P.3d581.¶20TherighttoeffectiveassistanceofcounselisguaranteedbytheSixthAmendmenttotheUnitedStatesConstitution,asincorporatedthroughtheFourteenthAmendmentand7byArticleII,Section24,oftheMontanaConstitution.Weuseatwo-prongtestinevaluatingineffectiveassistanceofcounselclaims.Heathv.State,2009MT7,¶17,348Mont.361,202P.3d118;Stricklandv.Washington,466U.S.668,104S.Ct.2052(1984).UndertheStricklandtest,apartymustestablishthattheirattorneywasdeficient,andthattheattorney'sdeficientperformancewasprejudicialanddeprivedthepartyofafairtrial.Heath,¶17;Dawsonv.State,2000MT219,¶20,301Mont.135,10P.3d49.Thedefendantmustshowthatthereisareasonablepossibilitythatwithoutcounsel'sunprofessionalerrors,theresultoftheproceedingwouldhavebeendifferent.Heath,¶17(citationsomitted).¶21Generally,westartbyaskingwhycounseldidordidnotperformasallegedandthenrefertotherecordtoanswerthisquestion.Kougl,¶14(citationomitted).Sometimesitisunnecessarytoaskwhybecausethereisnoplausiblejustificationforwhatcounseldid.Kougl,¶15.¶22Here,theState'scasedidrelysignificantlyonthefactthatbothCowanandBasarabacommunicatedwithBlackaboutgatheringdrugsandtransportingthemintoMSP.CowanorchestratedthetransportandBasarabawaskeyinteachingBlackhowtosendtheSuboxone.Basaraba'stestimonywasaniajorcomponentoftheState'sevidencelinkingBlacktotheconspiracyandconfirmedthatCowanaskedBasarabatoteachBlackhowtomailSuboxonetoCowaninMSPandthatBasarabadidso.ButwhenCowanrefusedtotestify,Basaraba'stestinionywastheonlytestimonylinkingBlacktotheconspiracyandBasarabahadnevermetBlack.AfterCowanrefusedtotestify,itisplausiblethatdefensecounseldecidedtoavoidbringingattentiontoBlackaspartofthe8conspiracy.Basedontherecord,thedefensestrategymayhavebeenthatBlackwasnotinvolvedintheconspiracy.Inanyevent,wedonothaveabasisintherecordtodeterminewhetherfailuretorequesttheconspiracy-basedinstructionwasdeficientperformance.¶23Black'scounselwasnotineffectivebasedontherecord.BlackcanaddresstheissueinapetitionforpostconvictionreliefwiththeDistrictCourtifshesochooses.¶24WehavedeterrninedtodecidethiscasepursuanttoSectionI,Paragraph3(c)ofourInternalOperatingRules,whichprovidesformemorandumopinions.IntheopinionoftheCourt,thecasepresentsaquestioncontrolledbysettledlaworbytheclearapplicationofapplicablestandardsofreview.¶25Affirmed.WeConcur:Justices9ChiefJustice