IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF ARIZONA

JESSIE D.,

Appellant,

v.

DEPARTMENT OF CHILD SAFETY, F.V., M.D., M.D., C.D.,

Appellees.

No. CV-19-0321-PR

Filed October 8, 2021

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County

The Honorable Joseph C. Kreamer, Judge

No. JD34609

AFFIRMED

Memorandum Decision of the Court of Appeals, Division One

No. 1 CA-JV 19-0073

Filed November 14, 2019

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL:

Thomas A. Vierling (argued), Vierling Law Offices, Phoenix, Attorney for 

Jessie D.

Mark Brnovich, Arizona Attorney General, Drew C. Ensign, Section Chief

Counsel, Civil Appeals Section, Dawn R. Williams (argued), Toni M. 

Valadez, Sandra L. Nahigian, Assistant Attorneys General, Phoenix, 

Attorneys for Department of Child Safety
JESSIE D. V. DCS, et al.

Opinion of the Court

2

JUSTICE BEENE authored the Opinion of the Court, in which CHIEF 

JUSTICE BRUTINEL, VICE CHIEF JUSTICE TIMMER, JUSTICE LOPEZ, 

and JUDGE STARING* joined.** JUSTICE BOLICK concurred in part and in 

the judgment.

JUSTICE BEENE, Opinion of the Court:

¶1 Under A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(4), a court may terminate a parentchild relationship if the parent is convicted of a felony and the resulting 

prison sentence “is of such length that the child will be deprived of a normal 

home for a period of years.” In Michael J. v. Arizona Department of Economic 

Security, 196 Ariz. 246, 251–52 ¶ 29 (2000), we set forth the relevant factors 

a juvenile court should consider in making this determination. Those 

factors include, but are not limited to:

(1) the length and strength of any parent-child relationship 

existing when incarceration begins, (2) the degree to which 

the parent-child relationship can be continued and nurtured 

during the incarceration, (3) the age of the child and the 

relationship between the child’s age and the likelihood that 

incarceration will deprive the child of a normal home, (4) the 

length of the sentence, (5) the availability of another parent to 

provide a normal home life, and (6) the effect of the 

deprivation of a parental presence on the child at issue.

∗ Justice William G. Montgomery has recused himself from this 

case. Pursuant to article 6, section 3 of the Arizona Constitution, the 

Honorable Christopher P. Staring, Judge of the Arizona Court of Appeals, 

Division Two, was designated to sit in this matter.

** Although Justice Andrew W. Gould (Ret.) participated in the 

oral argument in this case, he retired before issuance of this Opinion and 

did not take part in its drafting.
JESSIE D. V. DCS, et al.

Opinion of the Court

3

Id. These have come to be known as the “Michael J. factors.”

¶2 Although the juvenile court misapplied two Michael J. factors

in this case, substantial evidence exists to support termination. 

Accordingly, we affirm the court’s order terminating the parent-child 

relationship.

BACKGROUND

¶3 Jessie D. (“Father”) and Joana V. (“Mother”) had four children 

together. In August 2016, while Father was living with Mother and the 

children, their house caught fire, and they became homeless. Mother and 

the children moved into a homeless shelter, but Father was not permitted 

to live there due to an outstanding warrant. In December, Father was 

arrested, and in July 2017, he was convicted of two counts of aggravated 

driving under the influence and sentenced to seven years’ incarceration 

with a maximum release date of December 2022. At the time of his 

incarceration, the children ranged in age from 1.5 to 7 years old.

¶4 In August 2017, the Department of Child Safety (“DCS”) 

removed the children from Mother’s care because of homelessness, 

domestic violence, and substance-abuse issues. A month later, the court 

found the children dependent as to Father.

¶5 In June 2018, DCS moved to terminate Father’s parental rights 

to the children under § 8-533(B)(4).1 The juvenile court held a termination 

hearing in November, during which the DCS case manager and Father 

testified. Following the hearing, the court found by clear and convincing 

evidence that Father’s sentence was of sufficient length to deprive the 

children of a normal home for a period of years. The court further found 

that DCS had shown by a preponderance of the evidence that termination 

of Father’s parental rights would be in the children’s best interests. 

Accordingly, the juvenile court terminated Father’s rights to the children.

1 Mother’s parental rights have been terminated and she is not a 

party to this appeal.
JESSIE D. V. DCS, et al.

Opinion of the Court

4

¶6 Father appealed. The court of appeals affirmed the juvenile 

court’s termination. Jessie D. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, No. 1 CA-JV 19-0073, 

2019 WL 6003238, at *1 ¶ 1 (Ariz. App. Nov. 14, 2019) (mem. decision). In 

conducting its review, the court of appeals analyzed the juvenile court’s 

application of the Michael J. factors. Id. at *2–3 ¶¶ 6–16. It found that 

reasonable evidence supported each finding and concluded that the court 

did not abuse its discretion in evaluating the factors. Id. at *3 ¶ 14. The 

court also concluded that reasonable evidence supported the juvenile

court’s finding that severance was in the children’s best interests. Id. at ¶ 19.

¶7 We granted review on the following issues: (1) whether 

substantial evidence exists in the record to support the juvenile court’s 

finding that Father’s conviction and length of sentence of imprisonment 

was of such a length as to deprive the children of a normal home for a 

period of years, and (2) whether substantial evidence exists in the record to 

support the juvenile court’s finding that termination of Father’s parental 

rights would be in the children’s best interests. We have jurisdiction 

pursuant to article 6, section 5(3) of the Arizona Constitution.

DISCUSSION

¶8 Parents enjoy a fundamental liberty interest in “the care, 

custody, and management” of their children. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 

745, 753 (1982). But this right is not inalienable. See, e.g., In re Appeal in

Maricopa Cnty. Juv. Action No. JD-561, 131 Ariz. 25, 27–28 (1981) (“The state 

has a vital interest in the status of the parent-child relationship and, because 

of the importance of this interest, the state may intrude into the parent-child 

relationship to protect the welfare of the child and the state’s own interest 

in the welfare of its citizens.”). A court may terminate “parental rights 

under certain circumstances, so long as the parents whose rights are to be 

severed are provided with ‘fundamentally fair procedures’ that satisfy due 

process requirements.” Kent K. v. Bobby M., 210 Ariz. 279, 284 ¶ 24 (2005)

(quoting Santosky, 455 U.S. at 754). “Arizona’s severance statute satisfies 

due process because the statutory grounds are ‘synonymous with parental 

unfitness.’” Jessica P. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 249 Ariz. 461, 470 ¶ 31 (App. 

2020) (quoting Alma S. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 245 Ariz. 146, 150 ¶ 9 (2018)), 

vacated on other grounds by Jessica P. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, CV-20-0241-PR, 

2020 WL 8766053, at *1 (Ariz. Dec. 15, 2020). In Arizona, ”[t]o justify 
JESSIE D. V. DCS, et al.

Opinion of the Court

5

termination of the parent-child relationship, the [juvenile] court must find, 

by clear and convincing evidence, at least one of the statutory grounds set 

out in section 8-533, and also that termination is in the best interest of the 

child.” Michael J., 196 Ariz. at 249 ¶ 12.

¶9 As previously indicated, under § 8-533(B)(4), a juvenile court

may terminate the parent-child relationship if the parent is convicted of a 

felony and “the sentence of that parent is of such length that the child will 

be deprived of a normal home for a period of years.” “The ‘normal home’ 

. . . relates to [Father’s] obligation to provide a normal home, a home in 

which the . . . father has a presence, and it does not refer to a ‘normal home’ 

environment created by [others].” In re Appeal in Maricopa Cnty. Juv. Action 

No. JS-5609, 149 Ariz. 573, 575 (App. 1986). There is “no ‘bright line’ 

definition of when a sentence is sufficiently long to deprive a child of a 

normal home for a period of years.” Michael J., 196 Ariz. at 251 ¶ 29. Rather, 

the inquiry is individualized and fact specific. The juvenile court must 

consider “all relevant factors,” including the previously mentioned Michael 

J. factors. Id. at 251–52 ¶ 29. Termination, however, may be appropriate 

even if some of the Michael J. factors do not support the severance of 

parental rights. Indeed, “[a] lack of evidence on one or several of the 

Michael J. factors may or may not require reversal or remand on a severance 

order.” Christy C. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 214 Ariz. 445, 450 ¶ 15 (App. 

2007).

¶10 We review the court’s termination decision for an abuse of 

discretion and will affirm unless no reasonable evidence supports the 

court’s findings. Mary Lou C. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 207 Ariz. 43, 47 ¶ 8 

(App. 2004). “Because the juvenile court is in the best position to weigh 

evidence and assess witness credibility, we accept the juvenile court’s 

findings of fact if reasonable evidence and inferences support them, and 

will affirm a severance order unless it is clearly erroneous.” Demetrius L. v. 

Joshlynn F., 239 Ariz. 1, 3 ¶ 9 (2016). However, “we review de novo legal 

issues requiring the interpretation and application of § 8-533.” Ariz. Dep’t 

of Econ. Sec. v. Rocky J., 234 Ariz. 437, 440 ¶ 12 (App. 2014).
JESSIE D. V. DCS, et al.

Opinion of the Court

6

I.

¶11 The first Michael J. factor requires a juvenile court to consider

“the length and strength of any parent-child relationship existing when 

incarceration begins.” Michael J., 196 Ariz. at 251–52 ¶ 29. When 

considering the temporal aspect of this factor, the court should take into 

account the time the parent and child had spent together before 

incarceration. Additionally, when evaluating the stability of the parentchild relationship, the court should consider whether the parent cared for 

the child, both physically and financially, and whether the parent resided 

with the child or regularly visited the child if they did not live together.

¶12 Here, the juvenile court found that the evidence regarding 

this factor was “limited and conflicting,” but concluded that “the 

relationship was not particularly strong.” The court based its decision on 

the following evidence: (1) Father did not live with the children before his 

incarceration; (2) Father’s description of his relationship with the children 

before he was incarcerated—taking them to the park, building things with 

them, and teaching them to draw—suggested that Father was not the 

“primary caretaker” for the children; (3) Father was absent for a large 

portion of the lives of two of his children because of incarceration; and 

(4) the children’s apparent lack of interest in their Father since being placed 

in DCS’s care. While we agree with the juvenile court that the evidence 

regarding this factor was “limited and conflicting”—particularly based on 

the differing testimony regarding the parent-child bond from Father and 

the DCS case manager—we conclude that the court misapplied this Michael 

J. factor.

¶13 Although the juvenile court considered the amount of time 

Father spent with the children before his incarceration and discussed the 

strength of their relationship, it reasoned that the first Michael J. factor was 

not established because Father “was not a primary caretaker for these 

children.” Michael J. does not mandate, and we have never held, that the 

length and strength of the parent-child relationship hinges on a parent’s

“primary caretaker” status. A finding that a parent is not the “primary 

caretaker” does not necessarily mean the parent did not also care for, or 

establish a bond with, a child. Further, the court incorrectly faulted Father 
JESSIE D. V. DCS, et al.

Opinion of the Court

7

for not “actually living with the children” when Father testified that he was 

not permitted to stay in the homeless shelter with his family, so he slept 

outside the shelter in his car. The court also wrongly faulted Father for 

having six other children, which the court found limited Father’s time to 

build relationships with the children at issue here. Parents with a large 

number of children can still form bonds with those children. Because it is 

not clear from the court’s order that it properly considered the length and 

strength of the relationship between Father and the children, it misapplied 

the first Michael J. factor.

¶14 The second Michael J. factor addresses “the degree to which 

the parent-child relationship can be continued and nurtured during the 

incarceration.” Id. at 252 ¶ 29. In addressing this factor, the juvenile court 

should “consider not only the parent-child relationship at the time the 

incarceration commences but also, how and whether that relationship may 

be maintained during the incarceration.” Jeffrey P. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 

239 Ariz. 212, 215 ¶ 13 (App. 2016).

¶15 Here, the juvenile court found:

[T]he parent-child relationship cannot be meaningfully 

continued while [F]ather is incarcerated. All four children are 

very young. . . . The frequent, meaningful contact required 

for a parent to build and maintain a bond is virtually, if not 

completely, impossible in a prison setting. Father cannot 

interact with the children in a home, school or recreational 

setting. . . . He cannot observe them with friends or in a social 

setting. He cannot reasonably parent.

¶16 We conclude that the juvenile court misapplied this Michael J.

factor. The focus of the court’s inquiry should be “how and whether” a 

parental relationship can be maintained during Father’s incarceration. Id.

But the court concluded that the factor was not met because Father was

unable to interact with the children in more traditional settings (i.e., home, 

school, and recreational). While the court is correct that Father will be 

unable to parent in the conventional manner while incarcerated, its analysis 

failed to address whether Father’s relationship with the children could be 
JESSIE D. V. DCS, et al.

Opinion of the Court

8

maintained while he was in prison. For this reason, the juvenile court 

misapplied the second Michael J. factor.

¶17 The juvenile court’s rationale and conclusion regarding this 

factor renders it self-fulfilling and implies that incarcerated parents could 

never adequately maintain a parent-child relationship with their young

children. This implication is contrary to law. As previously stated,

maintaining a relationship with one’s children while incarcerated would

undoubtedly be a difficult task, but an incarcerated parent can maintain a 

bond with a child in other ways, such as through visits, phone calls, letters, 

pictures, and gifts. See Michael J., 196 Ariz. at 251 ¶ 24. And it is crucial to 

remember that parents’ right to the custody and control of their children is 

fundamental and “does not evaporate simply because they have not been 

model parents or have lost temporary custody of their child to the State.” 

Santosky, 455 U.S. at 753.

¶18 Although § 8-533(B)(4) does not impose an explicit duty on 

DCS to provide reunification services, the absence of a statutory duty does 

not obviate the state’s obligation to provide these services. Arizona courts 

have previously recognized a requirement to engage in reunification efforts 

“on constitutional grounds as a necessary element of any state attempt to 

overcome . . . the ‘fundamental liberty interest of the natural parents in the 

care, custody and management of their child.’” Mary Ellen C. v. Ariz. Dep’t 

of Econ. Sec., 193 Ariz. 185, 192 ¶ 32 (App. 1999) (quoting Santosky, 455 U.S. 

at 753). Providing reunification services is imperative in severance 

proceedings because “[t]he combined effect of the fundamental character of 

a parent’s right to his child and the severity and permanence of termination 

dictates that the court sever the parent-child relationship only in the most 

extraordinary circumstances, when all other efforts to preserve the relationship 

have failed.” In re Appeal in Maricopa Cnty. Juv. Action No. JA 33794, 171 Ariz. 

90, 91–92 (App. 1991) (emphasis added).

¶19 Here, the juvenile court correctly relied on existing precedent 

when it concluded that DCS was not required to provide reunification 

services to Father. See James H. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 210 Ariz. 1, 2 ¶ 6

(App. 2005). However, the rationale for denying incarcerated parents 

reunification services as expressed in James H. is not persuasive. In that 
JESSIE D. V. DCS, et al.

Opinion of the Court

9

case, the court of appeals concluded that in the “case of a lengthy prison 

sentence . . . reunification efforts were not required because prolonged 

incarceration is something neither [DCS] nor the parent could ameliorate 

through reunification services.” Id. at 3 ¶ 9.

¶20 James H.’s categorical refusal to provide reunification services 

to parents serving lengthy sentences is contrary to the well-settled axiom 

that “severance of the parent-child relationship should be resorted to ‘only 

when concerted effort to preserve the relationship fails.’” In re Appeal in 

Maricopa Cnty. Juv. Action No. JS-5209 & No. JS-4963, 143 Ariz. 178, 189 (App. 

1984) (quoting In re Appeal in Maricopa Cnty. Juv. Action No. S-111, 25 Ariz.

App. 380, 387 (1975), overruled on other grounds by In re Appeal in Yavapai 

Cnty. Juv. Action No. J-8545, 140 Ariz. 10, 14 (1984)). Because parents

incarcerated for a lengthy period still possess a fundamental liberty interest 

in the care, custody, and management of their children, Troxel v. Granville, 

530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000), DCS must make diligent efforts to preserve the family 

by providing services to assist parents in maintaining a bond with their 

children.

¶21 We are mindful that requiring DCS to provide reunification 

services to an incarcerated parent is a departure from prior Arizona law, 

although it is a constitutional requirement under Santosky. If DCS seeks to 

terminate parental rights under § 8-533(B)(4)’s provision addressing the 

parent’s length of felony sentence, and an incarcerated parent requests 

reunification services, such as visitation, and providing the services will not 

endanger the child, DCS must make reasonable efforts to provide these

services. DCS’s obligation to provide services to an incarcerated parent is 

not without limits. It must, however, initiate measures designed to address 

an incarcerated parent’s desire to maintain a parent-child relationship. At 

bottom, incarceration does not automatically render a parent unfit and DCS 

“has a responsibility to assist parents, incarcerated or not, who face 

termination of their rights.” Michael J., 196 Ariz. at 253 ¶ 38 (Zlaket, C.J., 

concurring in part and dissenting in part).

¶22 The juvenile court correctly analyzed and applied the 

remaining Michael J. factors. On the third factor—the age of the child and 

the relationship between the child’s age and the likelihood that 
JESSIE D. V. DCS, et al.

Opinion of the Court

10

incarceration will deprive the child of a normal home—reasonable evidence 

supported the court’s conclusion that given the children’s ages, 1.5 to 7

years old, it was “virtually impossible to maintain anything approaching a 

normal parent-child relationship.” On the fourth factor—length of 

sentence—the court correctly considered the total length of Father’s 

sentence, including time to complete parent aide services, and found that a 

realistic reunification date would be “mid to late 2023 at the earliest.” This 

finding was supported by exhibits and testimony taken during the hearing. 

On the fifth factor—the availability of another parent to provide a normal 

life—the court properly concluded that another parent is not available 

because Mother’s rights had been terminated. On the sixth factor—the 

effect of deprivation of a parental presence—the court appropriately found, 

based on the testimony provided at the hearing, that the children would 

“essentially be left adrift if Father’s rights are not severed.”

¶23 Although there was conflicting evidence offered at the 

termination hearing, we do not reweigh the evidence because the court “is 

in the best position to weigh the evidence, observe the parties, judge the 

credibility of witnesses, and resolve disputed facts.” Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec. 

v. Oscar O., 209 Ariz. 332, 334 ¶ 4 (App. 2004). Father asserts that the 

juvenile court abused its discretion in terminating his parental rights 

because he was not afforded sufficient time to reunify with the children and 

was not provided visitation services. The record belies this claim. Father 

intermittently requested visitation with his children and the court directed 

DCS to follow up on Father’s request, but he also stated at three separate 

hearings that he had “no objection” to the court’s finding that DCS had 

“offered, made referrals, provided, and/or requested” transportation and 

visitation services for him and the children.

¶24 Notably, Father sent letters to the children and engaged in 

phone calls that DCS’s psychologist determined were inappropriate based 

on the substance of the conversations and the children’s undesirable

behaviors after communicating with Father. As a result, DCS determined

that providing Father’s letters to the children or allowing them to engage in 

phone calls was not in their best interests. Although DCS should have 

informed Father about its decision not to forward his letters or allow phone 

calls with the children so he could have challenged this decision, or written 
JESSIE D. V. DCS, et al.

Opinion of the Court

11

additional letters that did not discuss the topics DCS found inappropriate,

this omission did not affect the propriety of the court’s decision to sever 

Father’s parental rights given the totality of the record.

¶25 Here, the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in

determining that Father’s sentence was of such length to deprive the 

children of a normal home for a period of years.

II.

¶26 Once the juvenile court finds by clear and convincing 

evidence that a statutory ground for termination exists, the court must then

determine by a preponderance of the evidence whether severance is in the 

child’s best interests. Alma S., 245 Ariz. at 149–50 ¶ 8. Here, Father contends 

that there was “insufficient evidence” to support the court’s best-interests 

finding. We disagree.

¶27 In a best-interests inquiry, “we can presume that the interests 

of the parent and child diverge because the court has already found the 

existence of one of the statutory grounds for termination by clear and 

convincing evidence.” Id. at 150 ¶ 12 (quoting Kent K., 210 Ariz. at 286 ¶ 35). 

Accordingly, after the court finds “that a parent is unfit, the focus shifts to 

the interests of the child as distinct from those of the parent,” and the 

“child’s interest in stability and security” becomes the court’s foremost 

concern. Id. (first quoting Kent K., 210 Ariz. at 285 ¶ 31; and then quoting 

Demetrius L., 239 Ariz. at 4 ¶ 15). Termination of a parent’s rights “is in the 

child’s best interests if either: (1) the child will benefit from severance; or (2) 

the child will be harmed if severance is denied.” Id. at ¶ 13. Among the 

factors that the court may consider when making this determination are 

whether: “1) an adoptive placement is immediately available; 2) the existing 

placement is meeting the needs of the child[ren]; and 3) the children are 

adoptable.” Raymond F. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 224 Ariz. 373, 379 ¶ 30 

(App. 2010) (internal citations omitted).

¶28 Here, the juvenile court found that the children were placed 

with a family that is willing to adopt. Additionally, the court determined 

that the children would benefit from termination because their adoption 
JESSIE D. V. DCS, et al.

Opinion of the Court

12

would allow them to remain together in “a stable, loving environment, and 

would be able to achieve permanency.” The court went on to conclude that 

maintaining the parent-child relationship would be harmful to the children 

because the length of Father’s imprisonment would impede the possibility 

of maintaining a normal parent-child relationship.

¶29 Viewing the record in the light most favorable to upholding 

the court’s best-interests finding, Demetrius L., 239 Ariz. at 2 ¶ 2, and 

applying our deferential standard of review, id. at 3 ¶ 9, we conclude that 

reasonable evidence supports the juvenile court’s best-interests finding.

CONCLUSION

¶30 Because reasonable evidence supports the juvenile court’s 

findings, we affirm the court’s order terminating Father’s parental rights.
JESSIE D. V. DCS, et al.

JUSTICE BOLICK, concurring in part and in the judgment

13

BOLICK, J., concurring in part and in the judgment:

¶31 I cannot join the opinion in full as I disagree that Arizona’s 

termination of parental rights statute, as applied by this Court’s rules and 

opinions, satisfies due process requirements. Supra ¶ 8. To the contrary, it 

falls far short, often depriving parents of their fundamental rights. See, e.g.,

Trisha A. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 247 Ariz. 84, 92–95 ¶¶ 33–48, 100 ¶ 73 (2019) 

(Bolick, J., dissenting) (“[T]he process our state has constructed creates the 

very real prospect that parents will lose their children not because they 

deserve to, but because they are unable to effectively defend their rights in 

a system that is stacked hopelessly against them.”); Alma S., 245 Ariz. at 

154–55 ¶¶ 30–36 (Bolick, J., concurring in the result); Brenda D. v. Dep’t of 

Child Safety, 243 Ariz. 437, 450 ¶ 48 (2018) (Timmer, J., dissenting in part and 

concurring in part); Marianne N. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 243 Ariz. 53, 59 ¶ 33 

(2017) (Eckerstrom, J., dissenting).

¶32 The outcome in this case is harsh but not unwarranted. The 

father strove mightily to preserve a relationship with his children, even 

apparently sleeping in his car outside a homeless shelter after the family 

home burned down in order to remain close to his children. Even while 

incarcerated, he tried to maintain communication with his children, 

although it appears that DCS failed to fulfill its constitutional obligation to 

facilitate such contact. But when a parent commits a felony and is sentenced 

to lengthy incarceration, and the other parent is not present, the risk of 

forfeiting parental rights is necessarily great.

¶33 In this decision, the Court has begun to reattach the standards 

for termination of parental rights to their essential due process moorings, 

in two significant and commendable ways. First, it tightens the factors that 

should be considered in terminating a child’s relationship with an 

incarcerated parent, so that they are no longer “self-fulfilling” such that 

“incarcerated parents could never adequately maintain a parent-child 

relationship with their young children,” an implication the Court correctly 

concludes is “contrary to law.” Supra ¶ 17.

¶34 Second, the Court makes clear that DCS must facilitate, and 

certainly may not affirmatively thwart, a parent’s efforts to maintain a 
JESSIE D. V. DCS, et al.

JUSTICE BOLICK, concurring in part and in the judgment

14

relationship with his or her children while in custody. Supra ¶¶ 18–21; see 

Santosky, 455 U.S. at 747–78; Michael J., 196 Ariz. at 253 ¶ 38 (Zlaket, C.J., 

concurring in part and dissenting in part) (criticizing the predecessor 

agency to DCS for its failure to facilitate reunification). I trust that in future 

cases, lower courts will require DCS to facilitate maintaining the parental 

relationship as it is constitutionally required to do, and that this Court will 

overturn termination orders where DCS fails to do so.

¶35 For the foregoing reasons, I concur with the substance and 

outcome of the Court’s opinion.