17-1888 Charlery v. Department of Education UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT SUMMARY ORDER Rulings by summary order do not have precedential effect. Citation to a summary order filed on or after January 1, 2007, is permitted and is governed by Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 32.1 and this Court’s Local Rule 32.1.1. When citing a summary order in a document filed with this Court, a party must cite either the Federal Appendix or an electronic database (with the notation “Summary Order”). A party citing a summary order must serve a copy of it on any party not represented by counsel. At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United Stat es Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York, on the 12 th day of September, two thousand eighteen. Present: BARRINGTON D. PARKER, PETER W. HALL, RAYMOND J. LOHIER, JR., Circuit Judges

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Jacqueline Charlery, Plaintiff-Appellant ,

v. City of New York Department of Education, Board of Education of the City Sc hool District of the City of New York, Defendants-Appellees.

For Plaintiff-Appellant : S ARAH G RUBER (Proloy K. Das, on the brief ), Murtha Cullina, LLP, Hartford, CT. For Defendants-Appellees : Q IAN J ULIE W ANG , of Counsel (Richard P. Dearing, Fay S. Ng, on the brief ), for Zachary W. Carter, 17-1888-cv2 Corporation Counsel for th e City of New York, New York, NY. Appeal from a decision entered May 15, 2017, and judgment entered May 16, 2017, in the Southern Distri ct of New Yo rk (Oetken, J. ). UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the district court’s decision and judgment are AFFIRMED

. Jacqueline Charlery filed this action ag ainst the defendants asserting claims for discrimination and retaliation in violat ion of the Americans with Disabilities Act and the Rehabilitation Act. The defendants filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings, which the district court, after givi ng notice to the parties, converted into a motion for summary judgment. The court th en found that Charlery had released her federal discrimination and retaliation claims in an agreement settling an earlier personal injury lawsuit against the same defendants, granted that motion, and entered judgment in the defendants’ favor. This is Charlery’s appeal. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural history, the arguments presented on appeal, and the district court’s rulings, which we reference only to explain ou r decision. “[T]he validity of a release is a peculiarly fact-sensitive inquiry.” Livingston v. Adirondack Beverage Co. , 141 F.3d 434, 437–38 (2d Cir. 1998). We note at the outset of our analysis that appearing directly above the signature line on the release is language stating “ THE UNDERSIGNED HAS READ THE FOREGOING RELEASE AND FULLY UNDERSTANDS IT. ” Dist. Ct. Dkt. No. 22-3 at 2. At the3 same time, however, “[w]e employ a ‘totalit y of the circumstances’ test to determine whether a release of . . . claims is knowing and voluntary.” Livingston , 141 F.3d at 438. The relevant factors cour ts should consider include: 1) the plaintiff’s education and business experience, 2) the amount of time the plaintiff had possession of or access to the agreement before signing it, 3) the role of plaintiff in deciding the terms of the agreement, 4) the clarity of the agreement, 5) whether the plaintiff was represented by or consulted with an attorney, and 6) whether the consideration given in exchange for the waiver exceed s employee benefits to which the employee was already entitled by contract or law. Id. (quotation marks omitted). The district court did not err when asse ssing these factors and concluding that Charlery’s waiver was knowing and voluntary. For the first factor, Charlery, being a teacher, is a well-educated, trained professional. The second and third factors—the amount of time Charlery had the agreement and the role she played in deciding its terms—weigh in favor of a finding that th e waiver was not knowing and voluntary. In her affidavit, Charlery stated that she had read the agreement and signed the release the same day she received it and al though she was represented by counsel in the settlement of the lawsuit, she played no role in negotiating the terms of the release. The fourth factor—the clarity of the agreement—favors a finding that the waiver was knowing and voluntary. The agreement stated that Charlery was releasing the defendants from “any and a ll claims” for “any matter, cause or thing whatsoever that occurred through the date” the release was execut ed. Dist. Ct. Dkt. No. 22-3 at 2. The fifth factor also weighs in favor of finding a knowing and voluntary waiver because Charlery was represented by co unsel in that lawsuit. The sixth factor is inapplicable to this case because neither lawsuit was for employee benefits that4 Charlery claimed she was entitled by contract or law to receive; each lawsuit was for an alleged violation of rights or for breaches of duties of care entitling her to money damages. Balancing the totality of the circumstances , we conclude, as the district court did, that in executing the release Char lery knowingly and voluntary waived her federal discrimination and retaliation claims. For those reasons, the district court did not err when it entered summary judgment in favor of the defendants on those federal claims. We have considered Charlery’s remain ing arguments and find them to be either forfeited 1 or without merit. The district court’s decision and judgment are AFFIRMED

. FOR THE COURT: Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk

1 Specifically, Charlery failed to raise in the district court any argument relating to the scope of the general waiver.