United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

Chicago, Illinois 60604

Submitted August 30, 2022*

Decided September 8, 2022 

Before

DIANE S. SYKES, Chief Judge

ILANA DIAMOND ROVNER, Circuit Judge

DIANE P. WOOD, Circuit Judge

No. 21-2807 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v. 

DeANGELO D. FOSTER, 

Defendant-Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District 

Court for the Central District of Illinois. 

No. 21-CR-10006-001 

James E. Shadid, 

Judge. 

O R D E R

The district judge sentenced DeAngelo Foster to 84 months’ imprisonment for 

unlawfully possessing a firearm and ordered the federal sentence to run consecutive to 

anticipated state sentences for multiple unrelated charges. Foster argues that the judge 

did not adequately explain the partially consecutive sentence, but the explanation for 

the length of the sentence also justified its consecutive nature, and so we affirm.

*

 We granted the parties’ joint motion to waive oral argument, and the appeal is 

therefore submitted on the briefs and the record. FED. R. APP. P. 34(a)(2)(C), (f). 

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION

To be cited only in accordance with FED. R. APP. P. 32.1
No. 21-2807 Page 2 

In February 2021, Foster—who was on probation and had two previous felony 

convictions and multiple pending state charges—drove a stolen car in a hazardous 

manner, crashed it, and fled from police officers before arrest. The arresting officers 

found a loaded, stolen firearm in Foster’s possession when they caught him. For this 

conduct, Foster incurred more state charges (including reckless driving), and he 

pleaded guilty in federal court to one count of being a felon in possession of a firearm

under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g). 

After Foster’s conviction, neither side filed sentencing memoranda or objections 

to the presentence investigation report, which, as relevant here, suggested concurrent 

sentences for related cases in Peoria County and noted that the judge had discretion to 

run the federal sentence concurrently or consecutively with the other anticipated state 

sentences. At the sentencing hearing, the parties agreed that the applicable range of 

imprisonment under the Sentencing Guidelines was 63 to 78 months. 

Foster presented several arguments for a shorter sentence. He discussed his 

young age (24 at the time of the incident), lack of education, difficult upbringing, and 

mental-health struggles. He further argued that his criminal-history score of VI was 

overstated because several prior offenses were nonviolent and traffic-related. Foster’s 

lawyer asked for a sentence of time served, emphasizing that “the amount of time that 

this Court sentences him to in light of 13 other pending cases ranging in seriousness is 

not likely to have any positive impact upon him ... [o]r on society.” The judge 

responded that he would not consider the pending state charges because he could not 

assume that sentences would be imposed in those cases. Foster then agreed that the 

pending cases should not be used as “aggravation” and revised his suggested sentence 

to “the low end of the Guidelines ... to run concurrently with his yet-undisposed cases.” 

Foster provided no additional arguments for a concurrent sentence, highlighting

instead his need for mental-health, educational, and vocational programs in prison. 

The judge proceeded to weigh the factors under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). Starting with 

Foster’s history and characteristics, the judge acknowledged that traffic violations 

represented much of Foster’s criminal history, but further observed that “none of the 

penalties that were imposed on those cases were sufficient to deter continued criminal 

conduct.” As for the current federal offense, the judge identified several aggravating 

factors: (1) Foster’s dangerous driving of a stolen vehicle; (2) the stolen handgun; and

(3) the fact that the gun had been used in a burglary and a shooting before it came into 

Foster’s possession. Given those factors, and the government’s arguments for a longer 

sentence up to the statutory maximum of 120 months, the judge rejected Foster’s 
No. 21-2807 Page 3 

argument that a longer sentence would not have a positive impact on him or on society. 

Instead, he decided that a slight upward variance from the Guidelines was warranted

and selected a sentence of 84 months’ imprisonment and 3 years’ supervised release. He 

explained that this sentence would be sufficient but not greater than necessary to 

further the purposes of federal sentencing. 

Immediately after, the judge ran through the pending state cases and said that 

Foster would serve his federal sentence consecutively with state sentences for unrelated 

offenses but concurrent to any future state sentence for the same conduct. Finally, as 

Foster requested, the judge recommended a facility that would allow him to participate 

in mental-health, substance-abuse, vocational, and educational programs. 

On appeal, Foster argues that the judge erred by not explaining the partially

consecutive sentence. District judges have discretion to decide whether a federal 

sentence should run consecutively or concurrently with an anticipated state sentence. 

Setser v. United States, 566 U.S. 231, 244 (2012) (discussing 18 U.S.C. § 3584(a)). In making 

this decision, they must consider factors in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), respond to the 

defendant’s principal mitigation arguments, and explain the choice enough to enable 

meaningful appellate review. See 18 U.S.C. § 3584(b); United States v. Nania, 724 F.3d 

824, 838 (7th Cir. 2013). We apply de novo review to assertions of procedural errors, 

such as omitting these steps. United States v. Sandidge, 784 F.3d 1055, 1065 (7th Cir. 2015). 

The record shows no procedural error because the judge’s analysis of Foster’s 

mitigation arguments and the statutory sentencing factors applied to the sentence’s

length as well as its partially consecutive nature. Judges are not required to provide a 

“second full explanation” of the § 3553(a) factors to justify a consecutive sentence. 

United States v. Sanchez, 814 F.3d 844, 849 (7th Cir. 2016). Rather, the explanations for the 

length of the sentence can carry over to the consecutive-versus-concurrent question if 

the judge so intends. See Sandidge, 784 F.3d at 1066. Here, the judge rejected Foster’s 

argument that a longer sentence would have no positive impact when he imposed an 

above-guidelines sentence. No separate explanation was needed for simultaneously

rejecting the passing request for a concurrent sentence, which also would have reduced

Foster’s overall time in prison. See id. The timing further shows that the judge’s 

explanation applied broadly; he said the term of imprisonment would run 

consecutively just after announcing its overall length. See id. (announcing length and 

consecutive run in same sentence). 

Finally, Foster argues that United States v. Jackson, 546 F.3d 465 (7th Cir. 2008), 

requires remand when a judge does not expressly justify a consecutive sentence. But the 
No. 21-2807 Page 4 

court in Jackson remanded because the judge did not address a principal mitigation 

argument in favor of a concurrent sentence. See id. at 470–72. In contrast, Foster 

provided no arguments for a concurrent sentence beyond those he raised in support of

a shorter sentence generally. See Sandidge, 784 F.3d at 1066. Indeed, the suggestion of 

fully concurrent sentences was conclusory enough not to warrant much response; there 

were no written arguments and only counsel’s single request for concurrent sentences.

See United States v. Kappes, 782 F.3d 828, 846–47 (7th Cir. 2015) (a single, passing request 

for a shorter term of supervised release is not a principal argument requiring discussion 

by the sentencing judge). Although we do not suggest that Foster waived the argument, 

the judge reasonably focused on the overall length of the sentence, just as Foster did. 

AFFIRMED