### IN THE COURT OF 

### APPEALS OF

### TIIE STATE OF 

### IDAHO
Docket 

### No,39094 

### STATE OF 

### IDAI{O, Plaintiff-ResPondent'



### BRETT J.

### JACOBSON, Defendant-APPellant. 2012 

### Opinion 

### No.37 Filed: 

### July 6' 2012 Stephen 

### W. KenYon, 

### Clerk ) ) 

### ) ) ) ) ) ) ) 

### AppealfromtheDistrictCourtoftheSeventhJudicialDistrict,Stateofldaho' 

### -Cilt..

## Co*ty. Hon. Dane 

### H' Watkins, Jr., 

### District Judge; 

### Hon' 

### H' Charles 

### L' Roos, Magistrate. 

### Appellate decision

## of the district court dismissal, reversed. reversing magistrate 

### court's order 

### of

Givens Pursley, 

### LLP; Alexander P. 

### Mcl-aughlin' Boise, for appellant'


### Hon' Lawrence G. Wasden, 

### Attomey General; 

### Mark W. olson, Deputy 

### Attorney General, Boise, for resPondent. 

### LANSING, Judge 

### BrettJ.Jacobsonappealsfiomthedistrictcourt'sappellatedecisionthatreversedthe magistrate court,s order dismissing misdemeanor charges

### for violation 

### of Idaho's speedy

### trial statute, 

### Idaho 

### code 

## $ 19-3501.

## we reverse

### the district court's decision 

### and reinstate the magistrate's order of dismissal. 

### L BACKGROUND onJune26'20lo,Jacobsonwasarrestedandcitedforthreemisdemeanoroffenses.He 

### wasarraign'edandpleadednotgulltytothechargesonJune28.Jacobson'scounselfileda notice 

### of appearance, a speedy 

### trial demand, and a demand 

### for aswom oomplaint on July

## 9' On 

### August2,acriminalcomplaintwasfrled.InAugust,themagistratesetthetrialforJanuary14, 20ll.onJanuary4,however,JacobsonmovedtodismissthechargesonthegroundthattheState had

### failed to bring him to

### trial within six months 

### from the entry 

### of his 

### not 

### guilty plea as

mandated by Idaho Code 

### $ 19-3501(4). 

### At a hearing, the magishate explained that the court had used the

### 'ISTARS" court computer tracking system to automatically select a

### trial date compliant 

### with Idaho Code $ 19-3501, but the date of

### filing of the formal complaint was incorrectly entered

asthe starting date 

### for the six-month period instead of the correct date of June 28,

### which was the date

### of Jacobson's not 

### guilty 

### plea. The magistrate court concluded that 

### its error 

### did not, under 

### the statutory standard, 

### constitute good cause

### for thefailure 

## to bring Jacobson 

### to trial by December 28, 2010, 

### which was

### six months 

### from the entry 

### of his not guilty 

### ple4 and the court therefore dismissed the charges. The State appealed the dismissal ordertothe district 

### court. That court, after conducting a balancing 

### of factors applicable to constitutional speedy

### trial inquiries underthe federal and Idaho constitutions, reversed. Jacobson appeals tothis Court, seeking reinstatement of the magistrate's order of dismissal. 

## il. STAI{DARD OF 

### REVIEW Whether a legal excuse has been shown

### for a delay

### of trial beyond the statutory period 

### allowed 

### by Idaho Code

### $ 19-3501 

### is a matter 

### for

### judicial determination 

### upon

### the facts and circumstances of each case. State v. 

### Clark,135 Idaho 

### 255,260,16 P.3d 

### 931,936 (2000). A

### trial judge does 

### not have unbridled discretion 

### to find good cause, however, and 

### on appeal 

### we

### will independently review the lower court's 

### decision. Id. 

## ilI. ANALYS$ In Idaho, 

### criminal defendants 

### enjoy both constitutional and statutory entitlements 

### to a speedy

## trial. The 

### right 

### to a speedy 

### trial is guaranteed by 

### the Sixth Amendment 

### to the United States 

### Constitution and 

### Article 

## I, Section 13

### of the Idaho 

### Constitution. These constitutional protections are supplemented 

### by Idaho Code 

### $ 19-3501, 

### which sets specific 

### time 

### limits within 

### which 

## a criminal defendanf 

### must 

### be brought

## to

# trial. As relevant 

## to the misdemeanor prosecutions here, the statute provides:



### The court, unless

### good cause

### to the contrary 

### is shown, 

### must order the prosecution or indictment to be dismissed, in the

### following cases:

### (4) 

## If a defendant, charged 

### with a misdemeanor offense, whose 

### trial has



### not been postponed upon 

### his application, 

### is not brought 

### to

### trial within six (6) months from the date thatthe defendant enters a plea of not

### guiltywith the court. 

### I.C. $ 19-3501(4). Underthis statute, the State bearsthe burdento demonstrate good cause

### for a failure to 

### bring a defendant to

### trialwithin the six-month 

### limit. Clark, 135 Idaho at258, 16 P.3d at934: State v. 

### Livas,147 Idaho

### 547,549,211P.3d792,794 (Ct. App. 2009). 

### ln Barker 

### v. Wingo,407 

### U.S. 514 (1972), the 

### United States Supreme 

### Court addressed application 

### of the speedy 

### trial right guaranteed 

### by the 

### Sixth Amendment and chose a

### flexible approach 

### for assessing whether 

### a speedy

### trial has been 

### unconstitutionnlly 

### denied. The Court adopted 

### a balancing test 

### in which the conduct 

### of the defendant and 

### the prosecution are

### to be considered, and the Court identified four primary factors to beweighed 

### in determining whether a particular defendant has been deprived 

### ofhis Sixth Amendment speedy

### trial 

### right: 

## (l) the lengrh 

### ofthe delay; (2) the reason for the delay; (3) whether the defendant asserted the right to a speedy 

### trial; and (4) the prejudice to the defendant. See 

### Barker,407 U.S. at 

### 530. This same balancing test was adopted 

### by the Idaho Supreme Court

### for determining whether the speedy

### trial guarantee 

### of the Idaho Constitution has been

### violated. See State v. 

### Lindsay,96 Idaho

### 474,476,531 P.2d 236,238 

### (r975). 

### ln State v. Russell, 

### l08ldaho 58,

### 62,696 P.2d 909, 913 (1985), our Supreme Court also adoptedthe 

### Barker citerila and balancing test to address assertedviolations 

### of Idaho Code 

### $ 19- 

### 3501, and numerous appellate decisions thereafter 

### utilized that 

### testwhere

### aviolation 

### of the statute was

### claimed. See, e.g., State v.

### Cotant,123 Idaho 

### 787,788,852P.2d 1384, 1385 (1993); state v.

### sindak, 116 Idaho 185, 187,

### 774P.2d 895, 897 (1989); State v.

### McNew,l3l Idaho 268, 

### 271,954P.2d686,689(Ct.App. 1998); Statev. Reutzel,130 

### Idaho88,94,936P.2d1330, 1336 (Ct.

### App. 1997); State v. Rodriquez-Perez, 129 Idaho 29, 37-38,921 P.2d 

### 206,214-15 (Ct. 

### App' 1996);Statev. Beck, 

### l28 

### Idaho416,4l9,9l3 P.2d 1186,

## ll89(Ct. Af'p. 1996). However, 

### in Clark, a 2000 decision,

### the Idaho Supreme 

### Court undertook 

### to 

### reexamine'\rhat 'good cause'

means 

### in the context 

### of I.C. 

### $ 19-3501." Clark, 135 Idaho

### at 259, 

### 16P.3d at 

### 935. The Court thereupon abandoned 

### the Russell approach 

### of wholesale incorporation 

### of the Barlcer balancing test when enforcing the speedy

### trial rights confened by Section 

### 19-3501. The Court saidthat to evaluate the

### justification for bringing a defendant to

### trial after the statutory six-month time 

### limit,

. . .we believe that athorough analysis 

### of the reasons for the delay represents the soundest 

### method

### for determining

### what constitutes 

### good 

### cause. We thereforeconclude that good cause means that there is a substantial reason that rises to the level 

### ofa legal excuse 

### for the

### delay. See Stale v.Johnson, 119 Idaho

### 56,58,803 P.2d 

### 557,559 (Ct.

### App. 1990); State v. 

### Stuart, 113 Idaho ar 494, 

### 496,745 P.zd 

### 1l15, 1l 17 

### (Ct.App. 1987). Becausethere 

### is not a

### fixed rule 

### for determining good cause 

### for the delay

### of a

### trial, the matter 

### is 

### initially left to the discretion 

### of the

### trial

## court. See

### Johnson, 

### 119 Idaho 

### at 58, 803 P.2d

### at 559; lState v. 

### Naccarato,l26 Idaho 10, 13, 878 P.2d 184, 187 (Ct.

### App. 1994)h seealso People 

### v. Johnson,26 Cal. 

### 3d 557, 162 

### Cal. 

### Rptr.431,606 P.2d 

### 738,746 (1980); Gallimore v. 

### State,944P.2d939,943 (Okla. Crim. 

### App. 1997). 

### But as the Iowa Supreme Court noted 

### in Stale v. Petersen, the reason 

### for the delay 

### "cannot be evaluated 

### entirely 

### in avacuum." 288 

### N.W.2d 332,

### f35 (Iowa 1980). The good causedetermination may take 

### into account 

### the factors 

### listedin 

### Barker. Tl:re Barkcr factors, however, considered only as sunounding circumstances

. . . are important,

## if at 

### all, only insofar as

### they bear 

### on the sufficiency

### of the reason 

### itself. The shortness 

### of the period, the

### failure of the defendant to demand a speedy 

### trial, andthe absence 

### of prejudice are legitimate considerations only insofar asthey affect the strenglh 

### of the reason 

### for delay. This means that, towhatever extent the delay has been a short one, 

### or the defendant has not demanded a speedy 

### trial, or is not prejudiced, aweaker reason

### will constitute good cause. On the other hand, 

### if the delay has been a long one,or 

### if the defendant has demanded

### a speedy 

### trial, 

### or is prejudiced, 

### a stronger reason is necessary to constitute good cause. .ld. 

### Clark,l35ldaho at260, 16 P.3d at 936. 

### ln Clark, the Court ultimately held 

### that the State's asserted reasons

### for the delay--the prosecutor's successful motion 

### to vacate atimely-set 

### trial date

### to accommodate the schedule 

### of the complaining witness andthe magistrate's failure 

### to reset the

### trial within the statutory period because 

### of "court congestion"--did not, either separately 

### or together, constitute good cause

### for the State's failure to bring the defendant to

### trial in six 

### months. 

### Id. at260-61,16P.3dat936-37. Notably absent 

### from the 

### Clark Court's analysis 

### is any discussion

### or weighing 

### of the 

### Barker factors. 

### In its 

### only post-Clark decision 

### on the issue, 

### our Supreme 

### Court held that 

### the State's pursuit

### ofan interlocutory appeal challenging the district court's orders granting defense motions 

### to exclude evidence 

### did constitute statutory good cause 

### for delay 

### of

### trial. State 

### v. Young, 136Idaho 

### l13, 115-16,29 P.3d 

### 949,951-52 

### (2001).' Again, the Court 

### did not discuss

### or weigh the



### Barker factorc in reaching its decision. Our Supreme Court's non-application 

### of the 

### Barker factors, other than the reason 

### for the delay, 

### in Clark and Young 

### is significant. We take 

### this to mean that wherethe reason 

### for the delay is

### well defined, and that reason on its face clearly does, or clearly does not, constitute good cause, there 

### is no occasion 

### to consider the other 

### Barker factors 

### in assessing a claimed

### violation 

### of Idaho Code 

### $ 19-3501. This comports 

### with the Supreme 

### Court's statement 

### in Clark 

## that"if the reason 

### for the delay is suffrcientthe other 

### lBarkerl factors are not needed. 

### If the reason

### for the delay 

### is insufficientthe other factors 

### will not avail to avoid 

### dismissal." Clark, 135 Idaho at 260, 16 P.3d at 936 (quoting State v. Nelson,600 

### N.W.2d 598,601 (Iowa 1999)). We conclude that resort 

### to the other 

### Barker factors 

### will be appropriate 

### primarily 

### in close cases aswhere,

### for example, there are 

### multiple reasons for the delay attributableto boththe State and the defendant

or thesuffrciency

### ofthe reasonto constitute "good cause" is genuinely subject to disagreement. We also conclude that good causeclearly was not demonstrated 

### in this case. The reason 

### for the delay was the magistrate 

### court's enor in determining the deadline 

### for a

### trial date

### within the statutory 

### period.2 

### If, asour Supreme 

### Court held 

### in Clark, a

### trial court's overcrowded 

### trial calendar does 

### not constitute 

### good cause, 

### then 

### the mistake 

### that occurred here, 

### which might properly be characterized as negligence, cannot amount 

### to good cause

### justif,ing the delay 

### of a defendant's 

### trial beyond the Idaho Code

### $ 19-3501 

### time 

## limit. Therefore, the magistrate court correctly dismissed the charges. Because the reason 

### for the delay 

### is on 

### its face 

### insufficient, the 

# ' A recent case, State v. 

### Folk,

## l5l Idaho 

### 327,331-32,256P.}d735,739-40 (2011), was decided by the Idaho Supreme Court on adifferent basis. There, the defendant's felony 

### trial was scheduled 

### within the statutory period but the

### trial was postponed when his counsel

### withdrew and 

### his newly appointed 

### public defender was unable

### to be ready

### for

### trial as 

### scheduled. 

### Trial was then reset

### within the statutory period 

### but was later reset and delayed several more times, 

### with trial not occurring 

### until nearly oneyear after the information was

### filed. The Supreme Court held that despitethefact that the

### trial was 

### initially rescheduled

### within thesix-month period, because 

### the 

### first rimely

### trial setting was "posrponed 

### upon Defendant's 

### application," the Protection 

### of Idaho Code $ 19-3501 wasforever waived. 

# 2 Although 

### not noted 

### by the magistrate 

### court 

### in 

## is ruling, the prosecutor also 

### failed to independently check 

### the statutory 

### time 

### limit and 

### bring 

## it to the 

### court's attention 

### in time to remedy the 

### error. The duty to

### timely bring a defendant to

### trial lies 

### with the State, meaning both rhe prosecution and the

### trial coutt. State v. Lopez, 144 Idaho

### 349,354, 160 P.3d 1284, 1289 

### (Ct. App.2007).

### disrict conrt 

### ered by condrcting

# t Boker balmcing test

### to determine 

### whetber Jacobson's



### statutory speedy

## tial dsht had been

## violaed- An utter absence

## of good cause 

### cannot be "ortrweighed" 

### by otfrrer

## Bttpr

# fulrs. Therefore, 

### the

### distict court's appellate 

### decision 

### rwersingthe magisfiare's order 

## of dismissal is reverse4 and ttre

### nagistme's order of dismissal is reinstated. Judge GUTIERREZ and Judge MELAI.{SON 

### CONCIIR.

6