NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

ERIKA PILAR LOZA-RODRIGUEZ, 

Petitioner, 

 v. 

WILLIAM P. BARR, Attorney General, 

Respondent.

No. 18-70451 

Agency No. A088-746-763 

MEMORANDUM*

On Petition for Review of an Order of the

Board of Immigration Appeals

Submitted October 14, 2020**

San Francisco, California

Before: McKEOWN and NGUYEN, Circuit Judges, and WHALEY,*** District 

Judge.

Erika Pilar Loza-Rodriguez challenges the Board of Immigration Appeals’ 

determination that she is not eligible for the petty offense exception under 8 U.S.C. 

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent 

except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision 

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

*** The Honorable Robert H. Whaley, United States District Judge for the 

Eastern District of Washington, sitting by designation.

FILED

NOV 3 2020

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
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§ 1182(a)(2)(A)(ii)(II). We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252 and review the 

legal determinations regarding a noncitizen’s eligibility for cancellation of removal 

de novo. Camacho-Cruz v. Holder, 621 F.3d 941, 942 n.1 (9th Cir. 2010). We deny 

the petition for review. 

1. Factual Background. Loza-Rodriguez is a Mexican citizen who entered 

the United States without inspection. In June 2009, she pleaded guilty to attempted 

battery with substantial bodily harm, a gross misdemeanor under Nevada law. The 

court imposed an 11-month suspended sentence with 18 months’ probation. She 

completed the sentence without incident and ultimately served no jail time. In 

January 2013, the Department of Homeland Security initiated removal proceedings 

against Loza-Rodriguez for her unlawful presence in the United States. LozaRodriguez applied for cancellation of removal, arguing that her prior conviction 

satisfied the petty offense exception.

2. Petty offense exception. Cancellation of removal for certain nonpermanent 

residents is available when the applicant can show she has been physically present 

in the United States for a continuous period of at least 10 years, has been a person 

of good moral character during that time frame, has not been convicted of certain 

specified offenses, and has established that removal would result in exceptional and 

extremely unusual hardship to the noncitizen’s spouse, parent, or child who is a 

United States citizen or lawful permanent resident. 8 U.S.C. §1229b(b)(1). The 
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Immigration Judge determined Loza-Rodriguez was not eligible for cancellation of 

removal because she had been convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude and

that she did not qualify for the petty offense exception.

Under the petty offense exception, noncitizens who have committed only one 

crime involving moral turpitude are not deemed inadmissible when “the maximum 

penalty possible for the crime of which the [noncitizen] was convicted . . . did not 

exceed imprisonment for one year and, if the [noncitizen] was convicted of such 

crime, the [noncitizen] was not sentenced to a term of imprisonment in excess of 6 

months (regardless of the extent to which the sentence was ultimately executed).” 8 

U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(ii)(II). Under the statute’s plain language—“regardless of 

the extent to which the sentence was ultimately executed”—Loza-Rodriguez does 

not qualify for the exception because the sentence exceeded six months.

Relying on United States v. Gonzalez, 506 F.3d 940, 944–45 (9th Cir. 2007)

(en banc), Loza-Rodriguez contends that because this court has held that a suspended 

sentence does not constitute a “term of imprisonment” for purposes of United States 

Sentencing Guidelines § 4A1.2(c)(1), her 11-month suspended sentence should not 

count in the present context for purposes of removability. This argument is 

unavailing in this context, where the statutory language is clear. Moreover, Congress 

has specifically stated what it means by “term of imprisonment” in reference to 

inadmissibility determinations. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(48)(B) (“Any reference to a 
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term of imprisonment or a sentence with respect to an offense is deemed to include 

the period of incarceration or confinement ordered by a court of law regardless 

of any suspension of the imposition or execution of that imprisonment or sentence in 

whole or in part.”) (emphasis added). 

Petition for review is DENIED.