The Hon orable David S. Doty, United States District Judge for the District o f 1 Minnesota. United States Court of Appeals FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT



### ___________ No. 97-1155

___________ United States of America, * * Appellee, * * Appeal from the United States v. * District Court for the * District of Minnesota. S.A., * * Appellant. *

___________ Submitted: October 22, 1997 Filed: November 17, 1997

___________ Before FAGG, WOLLMAN, and MORRIS SHEPPARD ARNOLD, Circuit Judges.

___________ WOLLMAN, Circuit Judge.
S. A., a federally adjudicated juvenile delinquent, appeals from an order of th e district court committing him to the custody of the United States Attorney Genera l

1 purs uant to 18 U.S.C. § 4246. The district court found that S.A. suffers from a mental disease or defect and that, as a result, he poses a substantial risk of either bodily injury to another person o r serious damage to the property of another. The district court held, therefore, that civil commitment was warranted under section 4246. S.A. raises twoThe Hon orable John B. Jones, United States District Judge for the District o f 2 South Dakota. We note that S.A.’s conduct, had it been committed by an adult, would hav e 3 constituted arson in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1153 and 81. 

### -2- issues on appeal. First, he asserts that the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction beca use juvenile detainees are not subject to civil commitment under section 4246

. Second, S.A. argues that, assuming that jurisdiction was proper, the district court erred in determining that he was mentally ill and dangerous. We affirm.

I.
S.A., a Native American male, has an extensive history of psych ological problems. In 1 988, at the age of twelve, he was referred to Charter Hospital in Sioux Falls, South Dakota, after exhibiting signs of depression. One year later, S.A.’s mother placed him in Mc Kennan Hospital in Sioux Falls after a suicidal incident involving a firearm. H e was placed in McKennan again in 1990 following an overdose of prescriptio n medication.

On A ugust 24, 1992, S.A. was adjudicated a juvenile delinquent by the distric t court after he set his brother’s stereo on fire. S.A. was placed on probation until the age 2 3 of twenty-one. Nearly a year later, on August 11, 1993, the court found that S.A. ha d violated the terms of his probation and placed him in the custo dy of the Attorney General until the age of twenty-one.

S.A

. has since been confined to various juvenile detention and mental healt h facilities. He has encountered problems at each, displaying poor behavior control an d violent tendenci es. In 1993, at the age of eighteen, S.A. was diagnosed as suffering from major depr ession with psychotic features. S.A.’s mental health problems peaked in 1995 while h e was confined at the Lake Region Correction Center in Devil’s Lake, Nort h Dakota. At that time, he reported hearing voices and stated that he believed that there18 U.S.C. § 5039 prohibits juvenile offenders from being placed in the general 4 prison population with adult prisoners. 

### -3- were “beings out there trying to hurt h im.” Because of his severe psychological problems, S.A. was tr ansferred from Devil’s Lake to the Federal Medical Center in Rochester , Minnesota (FMC-Rochester).

S.A. arr ived at FMC-Rochester in January of 1996. Because of his juvenile status he was placed in that facility’s Special Housing Unit. During his stay at FMC-Rochester, 4 S.A. cont inued to experience serious psychological difficulties. He reported visual an d auditory hallucinations that commanded him to act violen tly, and he requested to be placed on constant watch (suic ide watch) on eight separate occasions. Dr. Mary Alice Conroy, a forensi c psychologist with the Bureau of Prisons, treated S.A. at FMC-Rochester an d diagnosed him as suffering from paranoid schizophrenia.
S.A. was scheduled for release from FMC-Rochester on April 24, 1996. In February of that year, upon Dr. Conroy’s certification, the Unite d States filed a petition to determine pres ent mental condition of an imprisoned person due for release, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 4246. Th e petition alleged that S.A. was mentally ill and dangerous and sought t o commit him indefinitely. S.A. moved to dismiss the petition, arguing that no jurisdiction existed under section 4246 to civilly commit a juvenile detainee due for release.

After con ducting a hearing on the issue, the magistrate judge issued a report an d
recomm endation, which concluded that section 4246 did not provide jurisdiction ove r juvenile detainees and recommended that S.A.’s motion to di smiss be granted. The district court rejected the recommendation and granted the government’s petition on the merits.The Juvenile Justice and DelinquencyPrevention Act is codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 5 5031-5042. 

### -4- II.

S.A

. first raises a matter of statutory interpretation. He argues that 18 U.S.C. § 4246, which provides for the civil commitment of offenders du e for release, does not apply to individuals being held pursuant to the Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act (hereinaf ter “Juvenile Act”) . We review this question of subject matter jurisdiction d e 5

novo. See Clarinda Home Health v. Shalala , 100 F.3d 526, 528 (8th Cir. 1996).
Our starting point in interpreting a statute is always the language of the statute itself. See United States v. Talley , 16 F.3d 972 , 975 (8th Cir. 1994). If the plain language of the st atute is unambiguous, that language is conclusive absent clear legislative intent to th e contrar y. See id. Therefore, if the intent of Congress can be clearly discerned from th e statute’s language, the judicial inquiry must end. See Citicasters v. McCaskill , 89 F.3 d 1350, 1354-55 (8th Cir. 1996). If, on the other hand, the language of a statute i s ambiguous, we should consider “the purpose, the subject matter and the condition of affairs which led to it s enactment.” Lambur v. Yates , 148 F.2d 137, 139 (8th Cir. 1945). When the meaning of a statute is questionable, it should be given a sensible construction an d construed to effectuate the underlying purposes of the law. See id.

The general statutory scheme setting forth the procedures for involuntary civi l commitm ent

of federal detainees is found at 18 U.S.C. §§ 4241-4247. Section 424 6 provides for the indefinite hospitalization of a person who is due for release but who, as the result of a mental illness, poses a significant danger to the general public. See Unite d States v. Steil , 916 F.2d 485, 487 (8th Cir. 1990) (citing United States v. Gold , 790 F.2d 235, 237 (2d Cir. 1986)). Under section 4246(a), the director of a facil ity housing a person “whose sentence is about to expire” may certify that the person suffers from “a

### -5-

ment al disease or defect as a result of which his release would create a substantial risk of bodily injury to another person or serious damage to property of another, and that suitable arrangem ents for State custody and care . . . are not available.” Upon the filing of such a certificate, the district court must hold a hearing to determine if the individual is mentally ill and dangerous. See id. If the court finds by clear and convincing evidence that th e person is suffering from a mental disease or defect and that, as a result, his release would create a substantial risk of injury t o persons or property, the court must commit the person to the custody of the Attorney General. See 18 U.S.C. § 4246(d).

S.A. contends that section 4246' s reference to a “person whose sentence is about to expire” functions as an expres s limitation on the class of individuals subject to the statute. He argues that use of the word “sentence” limits the class of federal detainees subject to
co mmitment

to adult detainees serving criminal sentences. In view of his status as a juvenile offender, S.A.’s incarceration is considered a term of civil detention rather than
a criminal sentence. Thus, S.A. argues, the district court has no authority to commit him under section 4246.

We are not convinced that the word “sentence” in section 4246 sh ould be given such
a restrictive interpretation. “Sentence,” although most often used to define the period of
con finement

imposed for violation of a criminal statute, is also used in a much broade r
sense as a generic term to describe any term of detention, including those served b y juveniles. The Juvenile Act itself employs “sentence” when referring to the period o f confinement that a juvenile offender mu st serve. See 18 U.S.C. § 5038(f). Our cases also routinely use “sentence” to describe the period of confinement imposed upon federall y adjudicated juvenile delinquents. See, e.g. , Uni ted States v. Juvenile PWM , 121 F.3d 382, 383 (8th Cir. 1997); United States v. Crawford , 83 F.3d 964, 966 (8th Cir. 1996), cert

. denied , 117 S. Ct. 258 (1996); United States v. Early , 77 F.3d 242, 24 4-45 (8th Cir. 1996); United State s v. Allen , 64 F.3d 411, 413 (8th Cir. 1995). Moreover, the Federa l Sentencing Guidelines refer to the detention of a juvenile as a “sentence” and permit the inclusion of a “juvenile sentence” in calculating a defendant’s criminal history.

### -6-

See U.S .S.G. § 4A1.2(d)(2). The word “sentence,” as used in section 4246, thu s encompasses more than simply criminal sentences being served by adult offenders.
S.A. also argues that if Congress had intended to include juveniles within the scope of section 4246, it would have done so expressly. In support of this contention, he cite s provisi ons of the Juvenile Act in which Congress has expressly incorporated adul t procedures. See, e.g. , 18 U.S.C. § 5037(a) (release and detention provisions of Chapte r 207 are to be applied in juvenile proceedings); 18 U.S.C. § 5037(b)(2) (probatio n p r ovisions found at 18 U.S.C. §§ 3563-3565 are applicable in juvenile proceedings). As S.A. notes, neither the Juvenile Act (18 U.S.C. §§ 5031-504 2) nor the statutory scheme for involuntary commitment (18 U.S.C. §§ 4241-4247) expressly provides that the involuntary commitment procedures are applicable to juveniles.

To hold t hat juveniles in federal custody are not subject to commitment unde r section 4246 would co ntradict the basic policy considerations that form the foundation of thi s provision. Under the federal involuntary commitment scheme, the district court i s trusted wi th “an awesome responsibility to the public to ensure that a clinical patient’ s release is safe.” United States v. Bilyk , 949 F.2d 25 9, 261 (8th Cir. 1991) (quoting United States v. C lark , 893 F.2d 1277, 1282 (11th Cir. 1990)). Section 4246 is specificall y desig ned to avert the public danger likely to ensue from the release of mentally ill an d dangerous detainees. See United States v. Moses , 106 F.3d 1273, 1280 (6th Cir. 1997). The statute is a mechanism intended to provide a safeguard to the general public and t o ensure that mentally ill and dangerous individuals receive proper treatment. These concerns are not diminished merely because a detainee is a juvenile rather than an adult offender.
S.A. urges us to give credence to the general policy of fed eral abstention in the areas of juvenile law and civil commitment of the mentally ill . He argues that Congress intended for federal jurisdiction over juvenile matters to be e xtremely limited and that federal courts were not intended to deal with large numbers of juvenile offenders. Similarly, S.A. asserts that civil commitment of the mentally ill is traditionally a matterBecause S.A. was a Nat ive American juvenile and because his conduct occurred 6 on the reservation, federal jurisdiction was proper pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 5032 and 18 U.S.C. § 1153. Indeed, after the district court granted the government’s petition, the Sout h 7 Dakot a Human Services Center in Yankton, South Dakota, agreed to accept S.A. fo r treatment. The record reveals that on January 3, 1997, the district court approved a condition al discharge of S.A. pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 4246(e) and placed S.A. in th e South Dakota Human Services Center for inpatient treatment. 

### -7- of state concern and that thefederal government’s civil commitment authority is therefore quite narrow. Relying on this po licy of abstention, S.A. suggests that section 4246 should be construed narrowly to exclude juveniles.

S.A. is correct in noting that federal authority in these areas is limited. Althoug h federaljurisdiction over juvenile matters is generally the exception rather than the rule, it must be recognized that S.A. is already enmeshed in the federal system. He has bee n 6 adjudic ated a juvenile delinquent by a federal court and is in the custody of the Unite d States Attorn ey General. This is not a case, then, that presents the question of the initia l involvement

by the federal government in a matter of solely state or local concern. S.A. has been in federal con finement for a half decade now, not initially because of any mental problem, but because of his adjudication as a juvenile delinquent.

Our int erpretation of section 4246 to include civil commitment authority ove r federally adjudicate d juveniles does not infringe upon the right of states to civilly commit mentally ill individuals. By its own terms, section 4246 applies only in those uniqu e situ ations where suitable arrangements for state care and custody are unavailable. A s indicated above, to initiate commitment proceedings the d irector of the facility must certify that no suitable state arran gements are available. Even after an individual is committed to the custo dy of the Attorney General, section 4246(d) requires that the detainee must b e released to the state of his domicile if that state will assume responsibility for his custody, care, and treatment. Thus, civil commitment under section 4246 oc curs “only in those rare 7 circumstances where a person has no permanent

### -8-

residence or there are no State authorities willing to accept him for commitment.” H.R

. Rep. No. 98-1030, at 250 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3432.

The director of FM C-Rochester certified that suitable state arrangements were not available. S.A. did not challenge that assertion, but now sug gests that reading section 4246 to include federal juvenile detainees would somehow infringe upon the states’ civi l commit ment

powers. We disagree. The civil commitment authority of a state is no t infringed by a commitment which occurs when state facilities are unavailable. See Steil , 916 F.2d at 488 (“placement in an appropriate state institution . . . depends upon finding a state institution that is willing to accept [the detainee]”).

III.

S.A. also argues that the government failed to prove that he is mentally ill an d dangerous, conten ding that the evidence does not support a finding that his release would create a substantial risk of injury to persons or property. In addition, he asserts that an y level of dangerousness that might exist is not a “result of” his mental illness.

We ha ve recognized that the government must satisfy a three-prong inquiry whe n seeking a civil commitment under 18 U.S.C. § 4246. See United States v. Ecker , 30 F.3d 966, 970 (8th Cir. 1994). The government must demonstrate: (1) a mental disease o r defect; (2) dangerousness if rele ased; and (3) the absence of suitable state placement. See id. S .A. concedes that he suffers from a mental illness or defect and does not dispute the unavailability of suitable state facilities. Thus, our only question for review is whether the district court erred in determining that S.A. is dangerous.

Sectio n 4246(d) requires the government to prove dangerousness by clear an d convincing evidence. See United States v. Evanoff , 10 F.3d 559, 560 (8th Cir. 1993). We review the district court’s determination of dangerousness for clear error. See Ecker , 30 F.3d at 970; Evanoff , 10 F.3d at 560; Steil , 916 F.2d at 487.One of the letters, written in January of 1996 to a police detective, stated, “I am 8 very violent and deserve incarceration to protect the people of the free wor ld. Please give me my day in North Dakota Court or I will do another more serious crime with a gun to have my day in North Dako ta Court, and I will do it. Arrest me now for assaulting with my fists or arrest me for assaulting with a firearm.” S.A. complied with his medication regimen w hile in the structured atmosphere of 9 FMC-Rochester , but admits past deviations from his prescriptions, stating that he often believed that he no longer needed the medication after his symptoms had disappeared. 

### -9- We conclud e that S.A.’s contention that the government failed to demonstrate that he is dangerous is without merit. As noted above, the record reveals that S.A. has a long hi story of violent and aggressive behavior and mental instability. During his stays a t various juvenile correction facilities, he has repeatedly assaulted both staff members and other detainees and has shown a penchant for the destruction o f property. S.A. experiences visual and auditory hallucinations, some of which urge him to act violently. He ha s reported that he is being “torn apart by demons” an d that he hears voices which come from “the abyss.” As recently as one week before the hearing, S.A. reported hearing such voices and stated a desire to “gouge his eyes out.” S.A. also has an extensive history of drug and alcoh ol abuse. Furthermore, he wrote two letters while at FMC-Rochester professing his violent tendencies and threatening to commit future crimes. Although medication i s 8 helpful in c ontrolling S.A.’s condition, there is evidence that S.A. has shown a reluctance to continue medication on his own volition. 9
Although S .A. argues that his recent behavior has been vastly improved, that fac t alone does not require a finding that S.A. is not dangerous. See Evanoff , 10 F.3d at 563 (“the recency or remoteness of any particular activity simply affects the weight the court will gi ve to that particular evidence”). Overt acts of violence are not required t o demonstrate dangerousness. See Ecker , 30 F.3d at 970. Furthermore, S.A. has spent most of his time at FMC-Rochester in isolation and has therefore had minimal contact wit h others and, conseque ntly, minimal opportunity to engage in violent behavior. The violent nature of S.A.’s visual and auditory halluc inations and his actual prior violent behavior are sufficient to support a finding that he is dangerous. See Steil , 916 F.2d at

### -10-

487-88 (violent delusions a nd threats were sufficient to prove dangerousness even though detainee never had opportunity to act on them). We conclude, therefore, that the district court did not commit clear error in finding that S.A. was dangerous.
Similarly, S.A.’s assertion that any dangero usness was not the “result of” his mental condition is meritl ess. Although the record does not indicate that Dr. Conroy specifically stated that S.A.’s me ntal condition “caused” his violent behavior, she did state that S.A.’s dangerousness was “directl y connected” with his mental illness and that his condition was
a “signifi cant factor” contributing to his violent behavior. This testimony is more tha n suf ficient to support a finding that S.A.’s dangerousness was a result of his menta l condition.
The judgment is affirmed.


### A true copy.

Attest:
CLERK, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT.