FI L ED U.S. COURT OF A P P E A LS E LE V EN T H C IR C U IT SEPTEMBER 27, 2006 THOMAS K. KAH

N CL ERK

Honora ble J ohn R. Gibson, United States Circuit J udg e for the Eig hth Circuit, sit ting by * desig nation. [PUBLIS H]

IN THE UN ITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FO R T HE EL EV EN TH CIRC UI T

____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ N o. 04- 1374 0

____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ D. C. Docket N o. 04-00003 -CV -H LM- 4 SHIRLEY W ILLIAMS, GALE PELFREY, BONNIE JONES, LORA SISSON, ind ivi dua lly

and o n be ha lf

of ac la ss, Pl ai nti ff s- Appe lle es , ve rs us MOHAW K INDUSTRIES, INC., D ef en dant- Appe llant.

____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ __ Appeal f rom the United State s District Court fo r the N orthe rnD istri ct

of G eo rg ia

____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ _ (S ep te m be r 27, 200 6) ON REM AN D F ROM THE UNITE D STATES SUPREME COURT Be fo re A N D E RS O N , H U L L and G IB SO N , Ci rc uit Jud ge s. * PE R CU RIA M:2

Inthi s c as e, pla int if

fs -a ppe lle es S hir le y

W ill iam s, G al e Pe lf

re y , Bo nni e Jone s, and L or a Si sso n are c ur re nt o r fo rm er

hourl y e m plo y ee s of

de fe ndantap pe llant M ohaw k I ndus tr ie s, I nc . ( “ Moh awk” ). T he pla int if fs f ile d th is c la ssac tio n c om

pla int a lle gin g th at

Mo haw k’ s w ide spr ea d and know ing e m plo ym en t an d harb or ing of

il le ga l w orke rs a llo w ed

Mo haw k to r ed

uc e la bor c ost s by de pr es sin g w ag es f

or it s le ga l ho ur ly

e m plo y ee s and d isc our ag ing w orke r’ sco m pe nsatio n c la im s, in vio la tio n of f ed er al and s ta te RI CO statut es . T he pla int if fs a lso a lle ge d th at

Mo haw k w as unj ust ly

e nr ic he d by

the low er

w ag es it pa id, a s w el l a s th e re duc ed num be r of w orke r’ s- co m

pe nsatio n c la im s it

pa id. T he dis tr ic t c ourt de nie d inpart and g rante d inpart

Mo haw k’ s 12 (b )( 6) m oti on, and th is in te rlo cu to ry

ap pe al fol lo wed . A ft er r ev ie wand o ra l arg um en t, thi s C ourt a ff irm ed in part and r ev er se d in part . W ill iam s v. Mo haw k I ndus . , I nc . , 411 F . 3d 1 252 (1 1thCi r. 200 5) . Appe llant Moh awk th enf

ile d an a ppl ic at ionf

or w ri t of c er tio rari on tw o qu es tio ns: 1. Whe the r a de fe ndant cor por at ion an d its age nts can c onst itu te an “ e n t e r

p r i s e ” u n d e r

th e R a c k e t e e r

I n f l u e n c e dan dC o rr

upt O rg an iz at ion s A ct , 18 U . S. C. §§ 1961 -1 968 (“ RI CO ”) , in lig ht o f the se ttl ed r ule that a RI CO de fe ndant m ust “ co nduc t” or “part ic ipate in” the af fa ir s of som e larg er

e nte rp ri se and n ot j ust

it s own a ff

ai rs .3 2. Whe the r pla int i f

f s s t at e p r o x i m at el y

c au se d in j ur ie s to bus ine ss or property

by alleging that th e h ourly

wa ges they

volun tarily

acce pted were t oo lo w. T he U nit ed

S ta te s S upr em e Co urt gr an te d th e ap pe llant’ s pe tit ionf or w ri t of cert io rari “ li m it edto Ques ti on 1 p res en te d b y th e p et it io n.” W il li am s v . Mo ha wk Indus., I nc., 546 U.S . __, 126 S. Ct. 830 (200 5). Af ter oral argum ent, howe ver, the Suprem e Court entere d a sum m ary , thre ese nte nc e or de r that ( 1) dis m iss ed the w ri t a s im

pr ovi de ntl y

gr an te d a s to Q ue sti on 1, and ( 2) va cate d th e j udgm en t of our pr ior opi nio n and r em an de d th e ca se to thi s Co urt “ fo r furthe r co nsi de ratio n inli ght of A nz a v. I de al S te el S uppl y Co rp . , ___ U. S. , 126 S. Ct. 1991 (2006).” W illiam s v. Mohaw k Indust ries, Inc. , ___ U. S. ___, 126 S. Ct. 2016 (2006). Thi s ca se is no w bef

or e th e Co ur t o n re m an d fr om th e Supr em e Co ur t. Af ter the re m and, this Court ordered supplem ental briefing as to not on ly Anza , b u ta l s o th e i n t e rv e n i n g d e c i s i o nb y t h e G e o r g i aS up r e me C o u rti nWi l l i a ms Ge neral Corp. v. S tone, 280 Ga. 631, 632 S.E .2d 376 (2006 ). A fter f urther co nsi de ratio n, thi s C ourt no wr ei nst at es it s pr ior opi nio n inpart

and m odi fi es it

in part a s f oll ow s. I. BACK GROUNDAt thi s p oint in

the lit ig atio n, we mus t a ssume the fa c ts s e t f or th i n th e pla int if

fs ’ 1 c omp la int are tr ue . Se e An za, __

U. S. _ _, 12 6 S. Ct. at 19 94 (s tatin gthat on a mot ion to d ism iss , the cour t must “acc ept as true the fa ctual alleg ations in the amende d complaint”); Mar sh v. B utl e r C ounty , 2 68 F .3 d 1 01 4, 10 23 (1 1th Cir . 2 00 1) (e n b anc ) ( se tti ngfo rt h th e fa c ts i n th e c a se by “ [a]c c e pti nga ll w e ll- ple a de d f a c tua l a lle g atio ns (w ithre a so na ble inf e re nc e s d ra wn fa vo ra bly to P la int if

fs ) i n th e c omp la int

a s tr ue ” ). B e c a

us e we mus t a c c e pt t

he a lle g atio ns of

pla int if fs ’ complaint as true, what we se t out in thi s opinion as “the fa cts” for Rule 12(b)(6) purposes may no t be the a c tua l f

a c ts. 4 Mohawk is the second largest carpet and rug m anufacturer in the United States and has over 30,000 em ploy ees. A ccording to th e plaintiffs, M ohawk has co nspi re d w ithr ec ru iti ng a ge nc ie s to hir e an d harb or il le ga l w orke rs in ane ff

ort t o ke ep la bor c ost s a s lo wa s po ssi ble . F or e xam ple , a cc or din g to the pla int if fs ’ 1 co m pla int , Moh awk e m

plo y ee s have tr av el ed

to the U nit ed

S ta te s B or de r , i n c l u d ing area s near Br own sville, T exas, to re cruit undocu m ented aliens that rece nt ly hav e en te redth e Uni te d S ta te s i n v io la ti on of f e d e r a l law. These e m ploy ees and other persons have transported u n d o cu m ented aliens from

these border towns to North Georgia so that those aliens m ay pr oc ur e em

plo ym en t at Moh awk. Mo haw k ha s m ad e vari ous inc en tiv e paym ents to em

ploy ees and other rec ruiters for locating workers that Moh awk e ve ntu al ly

e m plo y s and h ar

bor s. Furtherm ore, “ [v] arious recr uiters, including Moh aw k em ploy ees, have provided hous ing to the se il le ga l w orke rs upo n th ei r ar ri va l i n N orth G eo rg iaand h av e he lp edth em

fin d i ll eg al em

pl oym en t wi th Mo ha wk.” Ad di ti on al ly, Mo ha wk know ing ly

or r ec kle ssl y

a cc ep ts f ra udul en t do cum en ta tio n f

ro m the il le ga l a lie ns.5

The plaintiffs f

urther allege that Mohaw k has concealed its efforts to hire an d harb or

il le ga l a lie ns b y

de str oy ing doc um en ts and a ssi sti ng i lle ga l w orke rs in ev ad ing de te ct ionby

lawe nf or ce m en t. A cc or din g to pla int if fs ’ c om pla int , Mohawk takes steps to shi eld those illegal aliens from detection by , am ong o ther thi ngs, he lpi ng the m

e va de de te ct iondur ing lawe nf or ce m en t se ar ch es and ins pe ct ion s a t M ohaw k’ s f ac ili tie s. A cc or din g to the c om

pla int , Mo haw k’ s w ide spr ea d and know ing em ploym ent and harboring of illegal workers has perm itted Mohawk to reduce la bor c ost s. Mo haw k ha s do ne so b y r ed uc ing the num

be r of le ga l w orke rs it

m ust hi re an d, t he reb y , in crea si ng th e labo r po ol of l eg al work ers fro m whi ch Mo ha wk hir es . T his pr ac tic e pe rm its Mo haw k to de pr es s th e w ag es it pay s it s le ga l ho ur ly w orke rs . F i n a l l y, th e p l a i n t i f

f s a l l e g e th a tM o h aw ki s “a b l e t o s a v e s ub s t an t i a l s u ms of m on ey ” b y

pa y in g i ts work ers reduc edwage s. Fu rth erm or e, Mo ha wk k no ws that i lle ga l w orke rs are le ss l ike ly to fi le w orke r’ s- co m

pe nsatio n c la im s, and, the re fo re , Mo haw k is able to save a ddi tio na l m oni es . A cc or din g to the pla int if fs , th es e b en efi ts co ns ti tu te un jus t en ric hm en t u nd er s ta te law. Moh awk f

ile d aRu le 12( b) (6 ) m oti on t o di sm iss the pla int if fs ’ c om pla int for fa ilure to state a claim . The district court deter m ined that the plain tiffs hadTh is C ourt re vie ws the de nia l of

a Rul e 12 (b )( 6) mot ion

“ de no vo , a

pp lyingthe same 2 standard a s the district court did.” Hof fman-Pugh v. Ramsey , 312 F.3d 1222, 1225 ( 11th Cir. 2002). A c omplaint should notbe dismissed pursuant to Rule 12(b)( 6) “unle ss it appear s beyond doubt that the plaintiff ca n prove no se t of fac ts in support of his claim.” Be ck v. De loitte & Touche , 144 F.3d 732, 735 ( 11th Cir. 1998) (interna l quotation marks and citation omitted). 6 state d ac la im

und er both f ed er al and s ta te RI CO statut es , a s w el l a s ac la im f or unj ust e nr ic hm en t un de r state lawf or pay ing le ga l w orke rs low er w ag es be ca

use of the illegal worker s Mohawk em ploy ed. How ever, the district court dism issed the plaintiffs’ unjust-enrichm ent claim insofar as it w as based on the reduced n u mb e r o f wo rk e r ’s - c o mp e n s a t i o nc l a i ms M o h aw kwa s f o r c e dt o p ay. 2 II. F EDE RA L RICO C LAIM S Purs uant t o 18 U . S. C. § 19 62( c) , it is ill eg al “ fo r any

pe rs on e m

plo y ed by or as soc ia te d w ithany

e nte rp ri se e nga ge d in , or the a ct ivi tie s of

w hic h a ff

ec t, int er state or

f or ei gn c om

m er ce , to co nduc t or

part ic ipate , dir ec tly

or ind ir ec tly , in th e co nd uc t o f su ch en te rp ris e’s affa irs th ro ug h apa tt ern of r ack et eeri ng act iv it y . .

. . ” 18 U . S. C. § 19 62( c) . T hus, in or de r to e sta bli sh a f ed er al c ivi l R IC O vio la tio n under § 196 2(c), the plaintiffs “ m ust satisfy

four elem ents of proof: ‘ (1) conduct (2 ) of an e nte rp ri se ( 3) thr oughapa tte rn( 4) of r ac ke te er ing a ct ivi ty . ’ ” Jone s v. Childers, 18 F. 3d 89 9, 910 (11th Cir. 1994) (quotin g Sedim a, S. P. R.L . v. Im rex Co . , 473 U . S. 479 , 496 , 105 S . Ct . 327 5, 328 5 ( 1985 )) . T he se r equir em en ts a ppl y whether the RICO claim

is civil or crim inal in nature.7

Inc ivi l c as es , how ev er , RI CO pla int if fs m ust a lso sa tis fy

the r equir em en ts of 18 U . S. C. § 19 64( c) . S ec tio n 19 64( c) state s th at “ [a ] ny pe rs on i nj ur ed

in his busi ne ss o r pr ope rty

by r ea son of

” RI CO ’ s su

bst an tiv e pr ovi sio ns h as the r igh t t o

“ re co ve r thr ee fo ld the dam ag es he sus ta ins . . . . ” 18 U . S. C. § 19 64( c) . T hus, unde r § 19 64( c) , c ivi l R IC O c la im an ts, suc h a s th e pla int if fs he re , m ust sho w( 1) the r equis ite inj ur

y to “ busi ne ss o r pr ope rty , ” an d ( 2) that su chinj ur y w as “by re as on o f” the sub stanti ve RI CO vio la tio n. W e dis cu ss e ac h of the se r equir em en ts in t ur n. A. Patt ern of Racketee ring A ctivity A s m en tio ne d a

bove , the re are f

our r equir em ents unde r § 19 62( c) . B ec au se el em en ts ( 3) and ( 4) – apa tte rnof r ac ke te er ing a ct ivi ty

– are e as ily

m et in thi s ca se ( at le as t at the m oti on- to- dis m iss sta ge ), w e ad dr es s th em f ir st.

“ A‘ pa tte rnof

r ac ke te er ing a ct ivi ty , ’ f

or pur pose s of the RI CO A ct ,

‘ re qui re s a t l ea st tw o a ct s of r ac ke te er ing a ct ivi ty . ’ ” Co x v. A dm ’ r U . S. S te el & Carn eg ie , 17 F . 3d 1 386, 139 7 ( 11th C ir . 199 4) , m odi fi ed on o the r gr ound s by

30 F. 3d 1 347 (1 1thCi r. 199 4) . “ A n a ct of r ac ke te er ing is co m

m onl y r ef er re d to a s a

‘ predicate ac t.’ A‘ pattern’ of rac keteering activity is shown when a r acketeer co m m its a t l ea st tw o di sti nc t bu t r el at ed pr ed ic at e ac ts. ” Ma iz v. V ir an i, 253 F . 3d 641, 671 (11t h Cir. 2001 ) (quotation m arks, citations, and brackets om itted). “ If8

dis tin ct statut or y vio la tio ns are f

ound , the pr ed ic at e ac ts w ill be c onsi de re d to be dis tin ct ir re spe ct ive of

the c ir cum stanc es und er

w hic h th ey

aro se . ” Co x, 17 F . 3d at 1397 (qu otation m arks, citations, and em phasis o m itted). Ac cording to 1 8 U. S. C. § 196 1(1)(F) , “ ‘ rackete ering activity ’ m eans any act w hic h is ind ic ta

ble und er the I m m igr at ionand N at ion al ity A ct , se ct ion274 (relating to bringing in and harboring certain aliens), . . . if the act indictable under suc h se ct ionof

suc h A ct w as c om m itt ed f or the pur pose of f inanc ia l ga in. ” I n th is ca se , the pla int if

fs have a lle ge d th at

the de fe ndant h as e nga ge d inan op enand ongo ing pa tte rnof

vio la tio ns o f se ct ion274 of the I m m igr at ionand N at ion al ity A ct . I n part ic ular, pla int if fs a lle ge that M ohaw k ha s vi olate d and c ont inu es to vio la te : ( 1) 8 U . S. C. § 13 24( a) (3 )( A ), w hic h m ak es it af ed er al c ri m e to

“ know ing ly

hir e[ ] f or e m plo ym en t at l ea st 1 0 in div idu al s w itha ct ua l kn ow le dge th atth e in di vi du al s ar e al ie ns ” dur in g atwel ve -m on th pe rio d; (2) 8 U.S.C. § 1324 (a )( 1) (A )( iii ), w hic h m ak es it af ed er al c ri m e to “ co nc ea l[ ] , harb or [] , or shi el d from detection, or attem

pt[] to conceal, harbor or shield from detection” aliens that have illegally

entered the United States; and (3) 8 U. S. C. § 132 4(a)( 1)(A )(iv), w hic h m ak es it

af ed er al c ri m e to “ en co ur ag e[ ] or ind uc e[ ] an a lie n to c om e to, enter, or reside in the U nited States, knowing or in reckless disregard of the f act that such com ing to , e ntry , or residence is or w ill be in vio lation of law. ”There is no dispute that these predic ate a cts, if they occur red, a re r elated. See Pelletier v. 3 Z weife l, 921 F.2d 1465, 1496-97 ( 11th Cir. 1991) (“Pre dicate a cts are related if they have the same or sim ila r p ur po se s, re su lts , p art ic ipa

nts , v ic tim s, or

me tho ds of

c omm iss ion , o r o the rw ise are interre lated by

distinguishing c hara cter istics and are not isolated events.” ( internal quotation marks and c itation omit ted)). 9 Ac cording to th e plaintiffs’ com plaint, Mohawk has com

m itted hun dreds, even tho usands, of

vio la tio ns o f fe de ra l i m

m igr at ionlaw s. C onse que ntl y , w e co nc lud e th atth e p la in ti ffs ha ve pro pe rly all eg eda “pa tt ern of r ack et eeri ng act iv it y .” 3 B. C on du ctof

an En te rp ri se W ithr eg ar d to e le m en ts ( 1) and ( 2) of the f our -p ar t t es t un de r § 19 62( c) , the pla int if fs m ust e sta bli sh “ co nduc t of

an e nte rp ri se ” an d th at

the e nte rp ri se ha d a co m m on g oa l. S ee U nit ed

S ta te s v. T urke tte , 452 U . S. 576 , 583 , 101 S . Ct . 252 4, 2528 -2 9 ( 1981 ) (“ T he e nte rp ri se is ane nti ty , f or pr es en t purp ose s agr oup of pe rs ons as soc ia te d to ge the r fo r a co m m on p ur pose of e nga gin g inac our se of co nduc t. ”) . F urthe rm or e, Mo haw k “ m ust part ic ipate in the ope ratio n or m an ag em en t of

the e nte rp ri se it se lf

. ” Re ve s v. E rn st & Y oung , 507 U . S. 170 , 185 , 113 S. Ct. 1163 , 1173 (1993). A n e nte rp ri se “ inc lud es any ind ivi dua l, partne rs hip , c or por at ion , association, or other legal entity , and any union or group of indi vidu als associated in fact although n ot a legal entity .” 18 U. S. C. § 196 1(4). As stated in U nited St at es v. G old in I ndus tr ie s, I nc . , 219 F . 3d 1 271, 127 5 ( 11th C ir . 200 0) , “ the10

ex ist en ce of

an e nte rp ri se is pr ove d by e vid en ce of

an on goi ng o rg an iz at ion , fo rm al or inf orm al , and b y

e vid en ce that the vari ous as soc ia te s f unc tio n a s a continu ing un it.” ( internal quotatio n m arks and citation om itted). F urtherm ore,

“ the de fi nit ive f

ac tor in de te rm ini ng the e xis te nc e of aRI CO e nte rp ri se is the existence of an association of indiv idual entiti es, how ever loose or inform al, that furn ish es ave hic le f

or the c om m iss ionof

tw o or m or e pr ed ic at e cr im es , that i s, the pa tte rnof r ac ke te er ing a ct ivi ty

r equis ite to the RI CO vio la tio n. ” I d. I nth i s c a s e , th e p l a i n t i f

f s h a v e a l l e g e dth a tM o h aw kan dth i r d - p arty t e mp ag en ci es /r ec ru ite rs have c onsp ir ed to vio la te f

ed er al im m igr at ionlaw s, de str oy docum entation, and harbor illegal worker s. S pecifically , the plaintiffs allege that [e ] ac h r ec ru ite r is p ai d a fe e fo r ea chw orke r it supp lie s to Mo haw k, and som e of tho se r ec ru ite rs w ork c losel yw ithMo haw k to m ee t i ts em plo ym en t ne ed by o ffering apoo l of il le ga l w orke rs w ho c anbe d i s p at ched to a particular Mohaw k facility on sho rt notice as the need ar ise s. S om e re cr

uit er s f ind w orke rs in the Br ow nsvi lle , T ex as are a an d tran s p ort them

to Georgia. O thers, like T PS, have relatively form al relationship s with the com pany in which they

em ployillegal worker s an d th enloan or o th erwi se pr ovi de the m to Moh awk f

or af ee . T he se r e c r u i t e r s ar e s o met i mes a s s i s t e db y M o h aw ke mp l o ye e s w h o c arry a supp ly of soc ia l se curi ty

c ar ds f or use w he n apr ospecti ve or e xis tin g e mp l o ye e n e e d s t o a s s u me an e wi d e n t i ty. G ive n th e Ru le 12( b) (6 ) sta ge of the li tig at ion , the pla int if fs ’ c om pla int m ust be taken as true, and it has sufficiently alleged an “ enterprise” under RI CO; that is an association-in -fac t betwee n Mohawk and third-party rec ruiters. This Court has11

never re quired anything other than a “ loose or inform al” association of distin ct en tit ie s. Mo haw k and the thi rd -p ar ty r ec ru ite rs are dis tin ct

e nti tie s th at , a t l ea st according to the com

plaint, are engaged in a conspiracy to bring ill egal wor

kers int o th is c ountry

f or Mo haw k’ s be ne fi t. A s su ch , the c om pla int suf fi ci en tly al le ge s an “ en te rp ris e” u nd er RI CO. A s f or the c om m on p ur pose , the pla int if

fs ’ c om pla int a lle ge s th at

“ [t ] he re cr uit er s and M ohaw k sh ar e the c om m on p ur pose of obt ai nin g il le ga l w orke rs f or em plo ym en t by

Mo haw k. ” T he c om

pla int f urthe r al le ge s th at

“ [e ] ac h r ec ru ite r is pa id a f ee f or e ac h w orke r it supp lie s to Mo haw k” and tha t “ Moh awk ha s m ad e various incentiv e paym ents to em ploy ees and other rec ruiters for locating workers that M ohaw k e ve ntu al ly

e m plo y s and h ar

bor s. ” F urthe rm or e, “ [t ] he a ct s of rackete ering activity

com m itted by Mohawk have the sam e or sim ilar obje ctive: the r ed uc tio n of w ag es pa id t o M ohaw k’ s ho ur ly w orkf or ce . ” Wha t i s c le ar

f ro m the c om pla int is that e ac h m em

be r of the e nte rp ri se is al le ge dly r ea pin g alarg e ec onom ic be ne fi t f

ro m Mo haw k’ s e m

plo ym en t of

il le ga l w orke rs . In United State s v. Church, 955 F.2d 688, 698 (11t h Cir. 1992 ), this Court co nc lu de d t ha t t he co m

m on pu rp os e o f m ak in g m on ey was s uf fic ie nt un de r RIC O. Be ca use the c om

pla int c le ar ly a lle ge s th at

the m em be rs of the e nte rp ri se stand t o ga in s uf fi ci en t f inanc ia l be ne fi ts f

ro m Mo haw k’ s w ide spr ea d e m plo ym en t and12

harb or ing of

il le ga l w orke rs , the pla int if fs have pr ope rl y

a lle ge d a“ co m

m on pu rp os e” fo r th e p ur

po se s o f RIC O. Furthe rm or e, Mo haw k “ m ust part ic ipate in the ope ratio n or m an ag em en t of the e nte rp ri se it se lf

. ” Re ve s, 507 U . S. a t 18 5, 113 S . Ct . a t 11 73. T ha t i s, Mohawk “ m

ust have som e part in directing” the af fairs of the e nterprise. Id. at 179, 113 S. Ct. at 1170. H owever , the S uprem e Court has cautioned that “ RICO l i ab i l i ty i s n o tl i m i t edt o th o s e w i th p ri m ary re s p o n s i b i l i ty fo r t h e e n t er p ri s e’s affa irs . . . .” Id . In t he ir c om pl ai nt , th e p la in ti ffs all eg e th at“ Mo ha wk pa rti ci pa te s i n t he op erat io n a ndm an ag em en t o f th e aff ai rs of t he en te rp ris e . . . ,” w hic h in cl ude s so m e dir ec tio n ov er the r ec ru ite rs . Wha te ve r dif fi cu lti es the plaintiffs m ay

have in provin g such an allegation , they have sufficiently

alleged that M ohaw k is e nga ge d inthe ope ratio n or m an ag em en t of

the e nte rp ri se . A ga in, at thi s st ag e in the li tig at ion , w e sim ply c annot say w he the r the pla int if

fs w ill be ab le to es ta

bli sh tha t M ohaw k ha d “ som e part in dir ec tin g” the a ff

ai rs of the en te rp ri se . H ow ev er , the y have a lle ge d su ff

ic ie nt a ct s to sur

viv e a Ru le 12( b) (6 ) m oti on. A cc or din gly , w e co nc lud e that the pla int if fs ’ c om pla int state s ac la im

that i s co gni za ble und er § 19 62( c) . I n so doi ng, w e not e that the a lle ga tio ns i n th is c as e ar e sim ilar to those in ca se s r ec en tly de ci de d by

the S ec ond, S ixth, and N inth13

Circuits. S ee T rollinger v. T y son Food s, 370 F. 3d 60 2 (6th Cir. 2004) (for m er em ploy ees alleging em

ploy er used illegal im

m igrants in order to depress wages); Mendoza v. Z irkle Fruit Co. , 301 F. 3d 11 63 (9th Cir. 2002) (legally docum ented w orke rs a lle gin g th at

e m plo y er s le ve ra ge d hi ri ng o f undo cum en te d w orke rs in or de r to de pr es s wag es ); C omm erci al Cle an in g S erv s., L.L.C. v. Co li n S erv s. Sys., Inc. , 271 F. 3d 37 4 (2d Cir. 2001 ) (c om pany alleging com

petitor hired undo cum en te d w orke rs in or de r to unde rb id c om pe tin g f irm s) . I n e ac h of

the se de ci sio ns, the c ir cu it co urt de te rm ine d th at , a t the Ru le 12( b) (6 ) sta ge , the plaintiffs had alleged sufficient dam ages to be perm itted to pu rsue their RI CO cl ai m s . Al th o u g h n o n e o f t h e o p i n i o n s s p ec i fi ca l l y ad dre s s ed§ 1 9 6 2 (c )’s requirem ents, ea ch of these cases has e ssentiallythe sam e fa ctual basis for RIC O lia bil ity a s th e co m

pla int be fo re thi s C ourt. W e re co gni ze that the above c onc lus ionput s our ci rc uit in co nf lic t w iththe Seventh Circuit’ s decision in Baker v. IB P, Inc. , 357 F. 3d 68 5 (7th Cir. 2004), ce rt . de nie d, 125 S . Ct . 412 ( 2004 ). I n B ak er , an e m plo y ee s’ c la ss- ac tio n law sui t al le ge d th at

am eat- pr oc es sin g f

ac ili ty c onsp ir ed

w ithr ec ru ite rs ( an d aCh ine se a id group), and violated RICO by em ploy ing un docum ented, illegal w orkers in an ef fo rt to dr ive down e m

plo y ee w ag es . T he S ev en th C ir cu it co nc lud ed that the em plo y ee s’ uni on w as ane ce ssary party to the law sui t. I d. a t 69 0- 91.14

How ever, the Seventh Circuit in Baker also conclud ed that there w as

“ another fatal problem ” w ith the com plaint. Id. at 691. A lthou gh statin g that an

“ en te rp ri se ” ar gua

bly e xis te d, the S ev en th C ir cu it de te rm ine d th at the re w as not

a co m m on p ur pose a m ong the e nti tie s inthe e nte rp ri se . I d. a t 69 1. S pe ci fi ca lly , the Seventh Circuit stated that the em ploy er “ wants to p ay

lower wa ges; the recr

uiters w an t t o be pa id m or e fo r se rv ic es r en de re d ( tho ugh [the e m plo y er ] w oul d li ke to pay the m le ss) ; the Ch ine se Mu tua l A id A sso ci at ionw an ts t o a ssi st m em be rs of it s ethni c gr oup. T he se are div er ge nt g oa ls. ” I d. a t 69 1. Inour c ir cu it, how ev er , the re ha s ne ve r be enany r equir em en t tha t the

“ com m on pu rpose” of the enterprise be the sole purpos e of ea ch and every m em ber of the enter

prise. In fac t, it m ay

often be the case that differe nt m em bers of aRI CO e nte rp ri se w ill e nj oy dif fe re nt b en ef

its f ro m the c om m iss ionof pr ed ic at e act s. Th is fact , ho wev er, i s i ns uf fic ie nt to de feat a ci vi l RI CO cl ai m . Rathe r, a ll that i s r equir ed is that the e nte rp ri se have ac om m on p ur pose . I n th is ca s e, th e c o m

p l ai n tal l eg es th at Mo h aw kan dth e r ec ru i t er s , u n d erMo h aw k ’s direction, w orked togeth er to re cruit illegal worker s to com e to Ge orgia and that they had the com

m on pu rpose of providin g illegal workers to Mohawk so that Moh awk c oul d r ed

uc e its la bor c ost s and the r ec ru ite rs c oul d ge t pa id. T his com m onalityis all that this circuit’ s case lawrequires. See Church, 955 F.2d at15

698. A ga in, w hil e the pla int if fs m ay be una ble to pr ove suc h a lle ga tio ns at tri al , w e cannot

say a t this 12( b) (6 ) sta ge of

the li tig at ionthat the y

have f ai le d to properly allege a c omm on pu rpose. W e re co gni ze that the Bake r Co urt a lso c onc lud ed that the re w as no w ay

to es ta bli sh tha t the e m

plo y er “ ope rate [d ] or

m an ag e[ d] th[ e] e nte rp ri se thr ougha pa tt ern of r ack et eeri ng act iv it y .” Bak er, 3 57 F.3dat 6 91 (em ph as is om it te d) . H ow ev er , a s th is C ourt ha s no te d, “ the S upr em e Co urt ha s y et to de lin eate the ex ac t bo undari es of

the ope ratio n or

m an ag em en t t es t. ” U nit ed S ta te s v. S tarr ett, 55 F . 3d 1 525, 154 6 ( 11th C ir . 199 5) . A lth oughthe e xa ct boundari es have not been established, it is pos sible that the plain tiffs w ill be able to establish that Moh awk pl ay ed

som e part

in dir ec tin g th e af

fa ir s of the e nte rp ri se . Whe the r the pla int if fs ult im at el y

e sta bli sh s uf fi ci en t e vid en ce to m ee t the boundari es of the o p e r a t i o n - o r - man a g e men tt e s ti s aqu e s t i o nb e s tan s w e r e da tth e s u mm aryj udgm en t st ag e or

a t tri al . A cc or din gly , w e co nc lud e that the pla int if fs have sufficiently

alleged conduct that m ay potentiallysatisfy

the operation-orman a g e me n tt e s t . A s s u c h , th e p l a i n t i f f s ar e e n t i t l e dt o c o n t i n u e w i th th e i r c l a i ms at this juncture. Having review ed the four elem ents of § 196 2(c), we turn to § 19 64(c). C. Injury to “ Bus in es s o r Pro pert y” Int eres t Under RICO16

A s in dic at ed

above , RI CO ’ s c ivi l- sui t pr ovi sio n st at es that “ [a ] ny pe rs on inj ur ed in his bus ine ss o r pr ope rty by r ea son of

” RI CO ’ s su

bst an tiv e pr ovi sio ns ha s t he rig ht to “ reco ve r th reef ol d t he da m ag es he su st ai ns . . . .” 18 U.S.C. § 1964 (c ). “ T he te rm s ‘ busi ne ss o r pr ope rty ’ are , of c our se , w or ds o f lim itatio n w hic h pr ec lud e [c er

ta in f orm s of ] r ec ove ry . ” D oe v. Ro e, 958 F . 2d 7 63, 767 ( 7th Cir. 1992 ). H owever , R ICO is to be “ liberally construed,” Se dim a, 473 U.S . at 497-98 , 105 S. Ct. at 3285-86 (1985). A ccordingly , w e m ust determ ine whether the plaintiffs have a “busin ess or property ” interest that could be injured under RI CO . W e ne ed

not r ea chw he the r pla int if

fs have apr ope rty

int er es t be ca

use plaintiffs clearly

have alleged a business int erest af fecte d by Mohawk’ s alleged RI CO vio la tio ns. Indeed, this case is sim ilar to the Ninth Circuit’ s Mendoza decision, wher e le ga lly doc um en te d a gr ic ult

ur al w orke rs sue d f

ru it gr ow er s un de r RI CO a lle gin g that the gr ow er s de pr es se d w ag es by hir ing il le ga l w orke rs . I n M en doz a, the de fe ndant c la im ed

that the e m

plo y ee s w oul d have to showa“ ‘ pr ope rty r igh t’ in the lost wages[] by

showing that th ey

we re prom ised or contracted for higher w ag es . ” Me ndoz a, 301 F . 3d at 11 68 n . 4. T he N inth C ir cu it co nc lud ed that this ar gum en t w as m isp la ce d, poi nti ng o ut tha t the pla int if fs ’ c la im did not im pli cate pr oc ed ur al due pr oc es s. I d. R athe r, the N inth C ir cu it co nc lud ed that “ w ha t i s17

re qui re d is pr ec ise ly

w ha t the e m

plo y ee s a lle ge he re : a

le ga l e nti tle m en t t o busi ne ss r el at ion s un ham pe re d by sc he m es pr ohi bit ed

by the RI CO pr ed ic at e statutes.” I d. (c itations om itted). G iven that a relationship clear ly exists between pla int if f w orke rs and the ir

e m plo y er , Mo haw k, w e co nc lud e that a sim ilar busi ne ss int er es t e xis ts i n th is c as e, and tha t the e m plo y ee s’ a lle ge d in

j ur y to the ir bus ine ss interests satisfies the busi ness-interest requirem ent. C onsequ ently , the plaintiffs have a lle ge d asuf

fi ci en t i nj ur

y to a busi ne ss i nte re st t o purs ue the ir RI CO c la im s. D. “By Reason Of” t he S ubstant ive RIC O V iolations W e nowtur

n to the “by

r ea son of

” re qui re m en t c ont ai ne d in§ 19 64( c) . T he

“ by rea son of” requirem ent im plicates two concepts: (1) a sufficiently direct inj ury so that a plaintiff has standi ng to su e; and (2) proxim ate ca use. S ee T rollinger, 370 F. 3d at 61 2 ( “ RI CO ’ s c ivi l- sui t pr ovi sio n im pose s tw o di sti nc t bu t overlapping lim itations on claim ants – stand ing and p roxim ate ca use.”) ; Gr een Le af Nursery

v. E .I . D uPont De N em ours & Co., 341 F.3d 1292 , 1307 (11th Cir. 2003 ), c er

t. de nie d, 124 S . Ct . 209 4 ( 2004 ) (“ [O ] ne or m or e of the pr ed ic at e ac ts [i n aRI CO c la im ] m

ust not onl y be the ‘ but

f or ’ c au se of

the inj ur y , but the pr oxi m at e ca

use a s w el l. ” (c itatio ns o m itt ed )) ; M en doz a, 301 F . 3d at 11 68- 72 (c onc lud ing that the pla int if fs ha d satis fi ed

both “ statut or

y ” an d “ co nst itu tio na l”As the Six th Circuit aptly explained, 4 the tw o c on c e pts ov e rl a

p a nd that is pa rt ic ula rl y tr ue in t he c onte xt of

c ivi l RI CO claims. As a g ener al matter, the y overla p beca use a pla intiff who lacks standing to vindicate a de rivative injury also will be unable to show pr ox imate ca use. And as a matter of RI CO law, the two c oncepts ove rlap be cause they both gr ow out of the “ by re a so n o f” lim itatio n in

RI CO – n ame ly , th e re qu ir e me nt t hat c la ima

nts establish that their injury

was “ by rea son of” a

RI CO predicate ac t violation. The “by rea son of” limitation, in other words, bundles tog ether a var iety of “judicia l tools,” some of which a

re tra ditionally

employ ed to dec ide ca

usation questions and so me of wh ic h a re e mpl oye d to de c ide sta nd ingqu e sti on s. Ho lme s, 50 3 U .S. at 26 8, 11 2 S. Ct. [at

13 18 ] (“ He re we us e ‘p ro ximate c a us e ’ t o la be l g e ne ri c a lly the judicial tools used to limi t a per son' s responsibility for the c onsequenc es of that person' s own ac ts. At bottom , the notion of proxim ate c ause r efle cts ideas of what justice de mands, or of what is administratively possible and conve nient.”) (quotation omitted) . . . . Trollinge r, 370 F .3d at 613. 18 standi ng r equir em en ts o f RI CO ). D es pit e som e sig nif ic an t ov er la

p, w e ad dr es s th e p r o x i mat e c au s e an ds t an d i n g c o n c e p t s s e p ar a t e l y. 4 (i ) P ro xim at e C au se It is w el l- es ta

bli she d th at

RI CO pla int if

fs m ust pr ove pr oxi m at e ca

usatio n in or de r to r ec ove r. A nz a v. I de al S te el S uppl y Co rp . , __ U . S. __, 126 S . Ct . 199 1 (2006); Holm es v. S ec. Investor Prot. Corp., 503 U.S . 258, 112 S. Ct. 1311 (1992); Co x, 17 F . 3d at 13 99 ( ci ta tio ns o m itt ed ). A nz a m ak es c le ar that c ourts s houl d sc ru tin iz e pr oxi m at e ca

usatio n a t the ple ad ing sta ge and c ar ef ull y e va luate whe th er t he in

jury pled was p ro xi m at el y cau se d b y

th e cl ai m edRICO v io la ti on s. See An za, _

_ U.S. at__ , 12 6 S . Ct. at19 97 .An za a lso e xpla ins that “ Con g re ss m od e le d § 19 64 (c ) [i n th e RI CO statut e ] on t he c ivi l- 5 action provision of the f

eder al antitrust laws, § 4 of the Clay ton Act.” __ U.S. at __, 126 S. Ct. at 19 96 (q uo tatio n ma

rk s and c itatio n o mitte d) . In b oth fe de ra l RI CO and

fe de ra l anti tr

us t c a se s, “ pr oximate c a

us e is n ot . . . the same thi nga s a so le c a us e ,” and it i s e no ugh f

or the pla int if

f t o plead a nd prove that the defe ndant’s tortious or injurious conduct wa s a “substantial fa ctor in the sequenc e of r esponsible ca usation.” Cox v. Adm’r U.S. Steel & Carneg ie, 17 F.3d 1386, 1399 (11th Cir. 1994) (RI CO), modified on other grounds by 30 F.3d 1347 ( 11th Cir. 1994). 19 More im portantly , in A nza, the United States S uprem e Court instructed that

“ [w ] hen a court evaluates a R ICO claim for proxim ate ca

usation , the c entral qu es t i o ni tm

u s tas ki s wh et h erth e a l l eg edv i o l at i o nl edd i re ct l y t o th e p l ai n t i ff ’s i n j u r i e s . ” A n z a , _

_ U . S . a t_ _ , 1 2 6 S . C t . a t1 9 9 8 . T h i s c e n tr a l qu e s t i o ns t e ms fr om the S upr em e Co urt’ s e ar lie r de ci sio n inH olm es , w hic h e xam ine d “ the co m m on- lawf

ound at ion s of

the pr oxi m at e- ca

use r equir em en t” and s pe ci fi ca lly the

“ de m an d f

or som e dir ec t r el at ionbe tw ee n th e inj ur y a sse rt ed and the inj ur iou s co nduc t a lle ge d. ” A nz a, __ U . S. a t __ , 126 S . Ct . a t 19 96 ( quot ing H olm es , 503 U . S. a t 26 9, 112 S . Ct . a t 13 18) . A lth oughA nz a doe s no t r equir e pla int if fs to show that the injurious condu ct is the sole cause of the inj ury asserted, Anza

does em pha siz e that i n R IC O c as es the re m ust be “ som e dir ec t r el at ion ” be tw ee n th e inj ur y a lle ge d and the inj ur iou s c ondu ct in or de r to s howpr oxi m at e ca use . I d. 5 Ine va luatin g w he the r the r equis ite c au sa l c onne ct ione xis ts, A nz a al so ins tr uc ts tha t c ourts s houl d c onsi de r the “ m oti va tin g pr inc ipl e[ s] ” be hin d th e dir ec tne ss c om

pone nt o f the pr oxi m at e- ca use standard

in RI CO c as es . “ O ne20

m oti va tin g pr inc ipl e is the dif fi cu lty that c anari se w he n ac ourt atte m pts to ascerta in the dam ages caused by som e re m ote action.” Anza, __ U. S. at __, 126 S. Ct . a t 19 97. S ta te d anothe r w ay , “ the le ss d ir ec t an in j ur y is, the m or e dif

fi cu lt it be co m es to as ce rt ai n th e am ount of pla int if f’ s dam ag es a ttr ibu ta

ble to the vio la tio n, a s di sti nc t f

ro m oth er , ind ep en de nt f

ac tor s. ” H olm es , 503 U . S. a t 26 9, 112 S. Ct. at 1318. T his rem oteness concern is heigh tened when RI CO suits are br ough t by

e co nom ic c om

pe tit or s se ek ing dam ag es f or los t sa le s be ca

use tho se ty pe s of c la im s, “ if

le ft unc he ck ed , c oul d bl ur

the li ne be tw ee n R IC O and the an titru st l aw s. ” A nz a, __ U . S. a t __ , 126 S . Ct . a t 19 98. A nothe r co nsi de ratio n is the r isk of dup lic at ive r ec ove ri es . “ T he re qui re m en t of

adir ec t c au sa l c onne ct ionis es pe ci al ly w ar rante d w he re the im m ed ia te vic tim s of

an a lle ge d R IC O vio la tio n c anbe e xpe ct ed to vin dic at e the la ws b y pu rs ui ng th ei r own cla im s.” An za, _ _ U.S. at__ , 12 6 S . Ct. at19 98 . As also aptly expressed in Holm es, “ directly injure d victim s can generally be counted o nt o v i n d i c a t e th e l awa s p r i v a t e a t t o rn e ys g e n e r a l , w i th o u tan y o f th e p r o b l e ms attendant upo n suits by

plaintiffs injured m ore re m otely .” H olm es, 503 U. S. at 269- 70, 112 S . Ct . a t 13 18. Turning back to this case, w e conclude that the plaintiffs have alleged su ffi ci en t p ro xi m at e cau se to wit hs ta ndde fen da nt Mo ha wk’s m ot io n t o d is m is s.21

A cc or din g to the ir

c om pla int , Mo haw k ha s hi re d il le ga l w orke rs “ [i ] n an e ff ort t o ke ep la bor c ost s a s lo wa s po ssi ble . ” F urthe rm or e, “ Moh awk’ s e m plo ym en t and harb or ing of

larg e num

be rs of il le ga l w orke rs ha s e nable d M ohaw k to de pr es s wa ges and thereby

pay all of its hourly

em ploy ees, includin g legally em ploy ed w orke rs w ho are m em

be rs of the c la ss, w ag es that are low er than th ey w oul d be if Mohawk did not eng age in this illegal con duct.” A gain, the com plaint alleges that

“ Mohawk’ s widespread e m ploym ent and harboring of illegal workers has su bs ta nt ia ll y

an d u nl awfu ll y

in crea se d t he supp ly of worke rs fro m whi ch Mo ha wk m akes up its ho urly

workfor ce. T his un lawf

ul expansio n of the labor pool h as perm itted Mohawk to depress the wages that it pay s all its hou rly em ploy ees . . . . ” Th e p l ai n t i ff

s al s o al l eg e t h at “ [o ]n e p u rp o s e a n di n t en d edef fe ct o f M o h aw k ’s wi d es p re adempl o ym en tan dh arb o ri n g o f i l l eg al wo rk er s i s t o d ep ri v e M o h aw k ’s hourlyworkfor ce of any

indiv idual or collective bargaining power” and that they

“ were i nju redby dire ctan d p ro xi m at e rea so n o f Mo ha wk’s i ll eg al co nd uc t.” G ive n th es e al le ga tio ns, w hic h w e m ust a ssum e ar e tr

ue a t this Ru le 12( b) (6 ) sta ge of

the li tig at ion , it

is cl ear that the pla int if

fs have a lle ge d a sufficiently

direct re lation between their claim ed injury and the alleged RICO vio la tio ns. I n sh ort, a cc or din g to the c om pla int , Mo haw k’ s w ide spr ea d sc he m e of know ing ly

hir ing and h ar

bor ing il le ga l w orke rs ha s th e pur pose and d ir ec t r es ultThe Supreme Court quoted this same point in S ure- Tan, Inc. v. NL RB, 467 U.S. 883, 6 89 2- 93 , 1 04 S. Ct . 2 80 3, 28 09 (1 98 4) (q uo tin gsame , a

nd a dd ingthat a

“ pr ima ry purp os e in restric ting immigr ation is to preserve jobs for Amer ican wor kers; immigr ant aliens a

re the ref ore admitted to work in this country only if they ‘will not adverse ly

aff ect the w ag es and w orking conditions of the worke rs in the United States similarly employ ed.’” (citation omitted)). 22 of de pr es sin g th e w ag es pa id t o th e pla int if fs . S im ply put , w hol es al e ill eg al hir ing de pr es se s wag es forth e le ga l wo rk ers in no rth Geor gi a whe re Mo ha wk i s l oc at ed . Ac cording to p laintiffs, Mohaw k’ s illegal condu ct had a substantial and d irect ef fe ct on w ag es that M ohaw k pay s to le ga l w orke rs . S ee D eC an as v. Bi ca , 424 U. S. 351, 356-57, 96 S. Ct. 933, 937 (197 6) (explaining th at “ acce ptance by illegal aliens of j obs on subst andard term s as to wages and working cond ition s can se ri ousl y de pr es s w ag e sc al es and w orkin g c ondi tio ns o f ci tiz en s and l eg al ly adm itt ed a lie ns” ). Whil e D eC an as is not aRI CO c as e, pla int if

fs poi nt o ut tha t the 6 Su pr em e Co urt ha s a lr ea dy

r ec ogni ze d adir ec t c or

re la tio n be tw ee n il le ga l hi ri ng an d lo w er w ag es . Inr es pons e, Mo haw k a sse rt s th at oth er e co nom ic f

ac tor s c ontri but e to the pla int if fs ’ w ag es , that i lle ga l hi ri ng i s j ust one of m yri ad f ac tor s a ff ec tin g w ag es , an d th at the re fo re pla int if

fs have not

sa tis fi ed A nz a’ s pr oxi m at e- ca

use re qui re m en ts. H ow ev er , pla int if fs pe rs ua siv el y

r ep ly that M ohaw k’ s arg um en t igno res that Mohawk’ s conduct h as grossly distorted th ose norm al m arket for ces by e m plo y ing li te ra lly

tho usands of

il le ga l, und oc um en te d a lie ns at i ts23

m anuf ac tur ing f ac ili tie s innor

th G eo rg ia , thu s de pr ivi ng p la int if fs of “busi ne ss relations unh am

pered by schem es prohibit ed by

the RICO predicate statutes. ” Pl ai nti ff s su bm it that the ir

c om pla int f oc use s ononl y

w ha t i s ha

ppe nin g inthe p ar t i cu l arn arro w l ab o r mark et th at Mo h aw kd o m i n at es i nn o rt h Ge o rg i a. We ag re e w ithpla int if

fs that the ir

c om pla int a lle ge s asuf

fi ci en tly dir ec t i nj ur

y to sa tis fy A nz a an d H olm es , e spe ci al ly giv en the r ec ogni tio n of

adir ec t c or

re la tio n be tw ee n il le ga l hi ri ng and l ow er w ag es . Mor e im portantl y , a s pl ai nti ff

s po int out , in both H olm es and A nz a, the Suprem e Court em

phasized that dis m issal was appropriate bec ause a m ore direct victim could bring suit. For e xam ple, the A nza plaintiff alleged that N ational Steel S uppl y , a

com petitor, had stopped p ay ing sales taxes to th e N ewYork tax authority , subm itted fraudulent docum ents to the tax auth ority , and used it s tax savin gs t o lo w er

pr ic es . T he pla int if

f sue d f or tr eb le dam ag es f

or sa le s lo st t o National. T he Suprem e Court concluded that NewYork, which lost the tax re ve nue due to N at ion al ’ s f ra udul en t c ondu ct , w as the dir ec t vi ct im w ho c oul d br ing sui t and n ot the pla int if f. A nz a, __ U . S. a t __ , 126 S . Ct . a t 19 97. I nde ed , the state of N ewYork c ould“be expected to pursue appropriate rem edies.” Id. at

__, 126 S . Ct . a t 19 98. N at ion al ’ s de ci sio n to low er pr ic es to its c ust om er s and win sales fr om

the plaintiff wa s “ entirely distin ct from

the alleged RIC O24

vi ol at io n” of m ai l an d wi re fra udas t o t ax es owedto th e New York t ax au th or it y . Id . a t __ , 126 S . Ct . a t 19 97. L ike w ise , in H olm es , the pla int if f’ s in j ur y w as m er el y

de ri va tiv e of

apr ior inj ur y to thi rd part ie s ( br oke r de al er s) w ho h ad f ile d th ei r ow n su it. H olm es , 503 U . S. a t 27 1, 273 , 112 S . Ct . a t 13 19- 20; se e al so A sso ci at ed Co ntr ac tor s v. Ca l. St at e Co unc il of

Carp en te rs , 459 U . S. 519 , 541 , 103 S . Ct . 897 , 910 ( 1983 ) (identify ing alternative plainti ffs w ith m ore direct c laim s). The co nc ern s ex pr es se d i n An za an d Ho lm es are n ot pre se nt in th is cas e. T he re is no m or e dir ec t i nj ur ed party w ho c oul d br ing sui t. Mo haw k po sit s th e U nit ed S ta te s a s th e onl y

oth er vic tim be ca use of it s in te re st i n e nf

or ci ng im m igr at ionlaw s. B ut a s pl ai nti ff s a ptl y poi nt o ut, the U nit ed

S ta te s is re spon sib le f

or a ll fe de ra l c ri m ina l l aw s whic h in cl ude s R IC O ’ s othe r pr ed ic at e ac ts. U nde r Moh awk’ s th eo ry , the U nit ed S ta te s w oul d arg uably

be the m ost direct victim

of all RI CO predicate, crim inal acts. Congress, however , crim inalized the em

ploym ent of illegal worker s in part to protect legal worker s. I t is consis tent with civil RICO ’ s purpos es — to expand enforcem ent bey ond federal prosecutors with lim ited pub lic resources — to turn victim s (here, Mohawk’ s legal worker s) into prosecuto rs as private attorney s general seeking to elim inate illegal hir ing a ct ivi ty

by the ir ow n e m plo y er . S ee Ro te lla

v. W ood, 528 U . S. 549 , 557 ,25

120 S. Ct. 1075 , 1082 (2000) (acknowledging th at the very “ objec t of civil RICO is . . . to tur

n [ vic tim s] int o pr ose cu tor s, pr ivate a tto rn ey s ge ne ra l de dic at ed to el im inatin g r ac ke te er ing a ct ivi ty ” (quot at ionm ar ks and c itatio n om itt ed )) ; se e al so Re ite r v. S onot one Co rp . , 442 U . S. 330 , 344 , 99 S . Ct . 232 6, 233 3 ( 1979 ) (p ri va te an titru st s uit s “pr ovi de asig nif ic an t su ppl em en t t o th e lim ite d r es our ce s ava ila ble at the D epartm ent of Justice”). Anz a’s co nc ern ab ou t s pe cu la ti ve da m ag es , “ in tri cat e, un cert ai n i nju rie s,” and unwieldy

apportionm ent are not im plicated in this case bec ause plaintiffs allege an inj ury

fundam entally

differ ent from

that in Anza. T he plaintiff in Anza w as ac om

pe tit or sui ng f or dam ag es f

or los t op portun ity

or los t sa le s. I n c ontra st, pla int if fs are Mo haw k’ s own e m plo y ee s who s ee k to r ec ove r the dim inu tio n in w ag es the y

r ec ei ve dir ec tly

f ro m Mo haw k. F urthe r, A nz a’ s c onc er n a bout blurring th e line betwe en RICO and antitrust laws is wholly m issin g here. W e also rec ogni ze that Mohaw k asserts that the cause of plaintiffs’ alleged harm s is a set of actions (pay ing lo we r w ages) “ entirely distin ct” fr om

the alleged RICO violatio n (hiring illegal workers). W e disagree. A s noted earlier, it has l o n g b e e nr e c o g n i z e dth a th i r i n g i l l e g a l w o rk e r s o ns ub s t an d ar dw a g e t e rms de pr es se s th e w ag e sc al es of le ga l w orke rs . Mo re ove r, pla int if fs are not sui ng about th e hiring of illegal workers on the w est coast depressing th e w ages of legal26

w orke rs on the e as t c oa st. R athe r, pla int if fs ’ c om pla int is a narr owone about

a sin gle e m plo y er ’ s – M ohaw k’ s – h ir ing of tho usands of

il le ga l w orke rs a t i ts m anuf ac tur ing f ac ili tie s innor

th G eo rg iade pr es sin g th e w ag es of le ga l w orke rs of th e s a me e mp l o ye r , M o h aw k , a tth e s a me man u f a c tu r i n g f a c i l i t i e s i nth e s a me lim ited geographical area. A ccordingly , under the particular fac tual circum stances of thi s c as e, w e co nc lud e that pl ai nti ff s’ c om pla int sa tis fi es the dir ec t r el at ion shi p requirem ent im

posed byHolm es and Anza ’ s interpretation of the “ by rea son of” language in th e fe deral RI CO statute. Our c onclusi on is cons istent with the two other circ uits to have addressed this prox im ate ca

use issue in RICO dec ision s invo lving schem es to depress wages of le ga l w orke rs by

w ide spr ea d hi ri ng o f ill eg al w orke rs . S ee T ro lli nge r, 370 F . 3d at 619 ; M en doz a, 301 F . 3d at 11 71- 72. InT ro lli nge r, the S ixth C ir cu it co nsi de re d asit ua tio n inw hic h f

orm er T y son em pl oyees a t a p ou lt ry

pro ces si ng pl an t s ue d t he ir f orm er em pl oyer un de r RIC O, al le gin g th at

the use of

il le ga l w orke rs pe rm itt ed the e m plo y er to low er w ag es via th e co ll ect iv e-b arg ai ni ng ag reem en t wi th th e u ni on rep res en ti ng th e em pl oyees. T he S ixth C ir cu it, r ev ie w ing the dis tr ic t c our t’ s di sm iss al of

the e m plo y ee s’ co m pla int und er Ru le 12( b) (6 ), de te rm ine d th at “ at thi s pr el im inary

sta ge in the pr oc ee din g” it

c oul d no t c onc lud e that the re w as no l ike lih ood of suc ce ss o n th eAs noted ea rlier, in Mendoza, the N inth Ci rcuit wa s fac ed with a similar suit in which 7 leg ally documented a g ricultural wor kers sue d fruit g rowe rs under RI CO alleg ing that the g rowe rs depre ssed wag es by

hiringillega l-immigra

nt worker s. 301 F.3d at 1166. Under a lmost t he exact same le g a l th e or

y a s a dv anc e d in

thi s c a se , th e Me nd oza

Court c on c lud e d th at th e pla int if fs ’ “ca usation alleg ations are sufficie nt at this stage .” I d. at 1172. 27 m er its . I d. a t 61 9. T he S ixth C ir cu it expla ine d th at it r em ai ne d po ssi ble that the le ga l- w orke r pla int if

fs m igh t pr ove the f

oll ow ing a lle ga tio ns i n th ei r co m pla int : (1 ) that T y so n hi red suf

fi ci en t num

be rs of il le ga l a lie ns t o im

pa ct the legal em ploy ees’ wa g es ; (2) that eac h additio nal illegal worker hired in to the barg ai nin g un it by T y son ha s am ea sur ab le im pa ct on the barg ai ne d- fo r w ag e- sc ale; (3 ) that the il le ga l i m m igr an ts a lle ge dly br ough t i nto thi s coun tr

y thr ough T y son’ s e ff

orts a llo w ed

T y son not

to co m p et e w i th o th erb u s i n es s es fo r u n s k i l l edl ab o r; an d(4 ) t h at Tyso n ’s legal worker s did no t “ choose” to rem ain at T y son for less m oney than oth er busi ne sse s off

er ed , but ha d no ch oic e in the m atte r giv enthe hir ing needs of the other busin esses in the a re a an d the influx o f illegal im m igr an ts at T y son’ s f

ac ili tie s. Whil e T y son’ s pr oxi m at e- ca use ar gum en t m ay

w el l ca rry th e day

a t the sum

m ar y -j udgm en t st ag e, it re qui re s m or e as sis tanc e than th e co m pla int a lon e pr ovi de s. One other circuit has reac hed the sam e re sult on som ew hat sim ilar fact s . . . Men do za . . . . T ro lli nge r, 370 F . 3d at 61 9. 7 A lth oughthe pla int if

fs ’ e vid en ce in thi s c as e m ay not ult im at el y

pr ove the pr oxi m at e- ca

use r equir em en t, w e co nc lud e that the pla int if fs ’ c om pla int state s a sufficiently

direct re lation between their alleged inj ury and Mohawk’ s alleged u n l aw f u l p r e d i c a t e a c t s t o wi th s t an dM o h aw k ’s mo t i o nt o d i s mi s s . C o n s e qu e n t l y, we j oin th e Sixth and Ninth Circuits in conclud ing th at em ploy ees such as the ones28

in this case have a lleged sufficient proxim ate ca use to proceed with their RI CO cl ai m s. (ii) Statu tory Stand ing L as tly , w e ad dr es s R IC O ’ s st at uto ry standi ng l im itatio n th at

a lso gr ow s ou t of the “by r ea son of

” lim itatio n in§ 19 64( c) . “ [T ] he te st f or RI CO standi ng i s whether the alleged injury wa s directly

caused by

the RICO violatio n, not whether suc h harm

w as r ea sona

bly f or es ee ab le . ” Bi ve ns G ar de ns O ff ic e Bl dg. , I nc . v. Barnett Banks of Fla., Inc. , 140 F. 3d 89 8, 908 (11th Cir. 1998); see also Sedim a, 473 U . S. a t 49 6- 97, 105 S . Ct . a t 32 85 ( “ [T ] he pla int if f onl y ha s st an din g if

, and can on ly r ec ove r to the e xte nt tha t, he ha s be eninj ur ed in his bus ine ss o r pr ope rty by the c ondu ct

c onst itu tin g th e vio la tio n” and the pla int if f’ s dam ag es m

ust “ fl ow from the com m issio n of the predicate a cts.”) ; Gr een L eaf Nurser y , 341 F. 3d at 1307 (stating that plain tiffs m ust sh ow a “ direct re lation between the injur y asserted and the injurious conduct” and that we ask “ whether the alleged conduct wa s ‘ aim ed prim arily ’ at a third party ” (quotation m arks and citations om itted)); Bi ve ns, 140 F . 3d at 90 6 ( co nc lud ing that a party w hose a lle ge d in

j ur ie s r es ult

f ro m

“ the m isf ortun es vis ite d up on a

thi rd pe rs on b y

the de fe ndant’ s a ct s la ck s st an din g to pursu e a c laim

under RICO ” (quotation m arks and citation om itted)); Pelletier v. Z we ifel, 921 F.2d 1465 , 1497 (11th Cir. 1991) (stating that th e plaintiff hasThis Court has more ofte n evaluated the “by rea son of” r equire ment primarily as par t of 8 its pr oximate -c a

us e ana ly sis , a s o pp os e d to the dis tin c t c on c e pt o f s tand ing . H ow e ve r, de sp ite signif ic ant o ve rl a

p, we mus t a lso e xami ne wh e the r t he pla int if

fs ’ i nju ry is s uf fi c ie ntl y dir e c t to p erm i ts t an d i n g. 29 RI CO standi ng i f he sho w s “ a ca usa l c onne ct ionbe tw ee n hi s in j ur y and a pr ed ic at e ac t” ). T hus, w e m ust e va luate w he the r the pla int if fs ’ inj ur y is 8 sufficiently

direct to give plaintiffs standi ng to su e for M ohawk’ s alleged RICO vio la tio ns. Both the Sixth andNinth Circuits have expressly concluded that legal worke rs ha ve su ffi ci en tl y di rect in juri es forRICO s ta nd in g i n s im il ar ca se s. Tr o l l i n g er , 3 7 0 F. 3 dat6 1 5 -1 8 ; Me n d o za , 3 0 1 F. 3 dat1 1 7 0 . Th e N i n th Ci rc u i t ’s Mendoza decision is p articularly we ll-reasoned and instructive on the statutory standin g issu e. A s m en tio ne d e ar lie r, the Me ndoz a pla int if fs w er e le ga l w orke rs w ho cl ai m ed that the pur

pose and r es ult

of the de fe ndants ’ sc he m e of hir ing undo cum ented im

m igrants was to depress the w ages of legally docum ented em plo y ee s. T he N inth C ir cu it co nc lud ed that the pla int if

fs ha d st at

uto ry standi ng because “ we are unable to dis cern a m ore direct victim

of the illegal conduct.” Me ndoz a, 301 F . 3d at 11 70. T he N inth C ir cu it expla ine d: T h e d o c u me n t e de mp l o ye e s h e r e d o n o tc o mp l a i no f ap a s s e d - o nh arm. T he y a lle ge that the sc he m e ha d th e pu rp ose and d ir ec t r es ult of30

depressing th e w ages paid to them by the grower s. Thus, a s the district court correc tly

determ ined, “plaintiffs have stated a claim that they are th e d ire ctvi ct im s o f th e il le ga l h iri ng sch em e.”

. . . W e also note that the und ocum ented worker s cannot “ be counted on t o br ing sui t f

or the law ’ s vi ndi catio n. ” A s th e dis tr ic t c ourt no te d, the fa ct that RI CO spe ci fi ca lly pr ovi de s th at

il le ga l hi ri ng i s apr ed ic at e of fe nse ind ic at es that Co ng re ss c ont em plate d th e en fo rc em en t of the im m igration laws through law suits like this on e. Id. ( internal citations om itted). T he Ninth Circuit further stated that the w orke rs m

ust be a llo w ed to m ak e the ir

c as e thr oughpr es en ta tio n of ev ide nc e, inc lud ing expe rt s w ho w ill te sti fy ab out the la bor m ar ke t, the ge ogr ap hic m ar

ke t, and the e ff

ec ts o f the il le ga l sc he m e. Q ue sti ons regarding the relevant labor m arket and the growers’ power within that m ar ke t are e xc ee din gl y co m ple x and b es t a ddr es se d by e co nom ic expe rt s and o the r ev ide nc e at alate r sta ge in the pr oc ee din gs. Id . a t 11 71. Pl ai nti ff s’ c om pla int c le ar ly a lle ge s th at

Mo haw k ha s e nga ge d in w ide spr ea d and know ing hir ing and h ar bor ing of il le ga l a lie ns w iththe e xpr es s pur pose and d ir ec t r es ult

of low er ing the w ag es of

le ga l w orke rs . F or

e xam ple , the co m p l ai n tal l eg es th at “ [o ]n e p u rp o s e a n di n t en d edef fe ct o f M o h aw k ’s wi d es p re adempl o ym en tan dh arb o ri n g o f i l l eg al wo rk er s i s t o d ep ri v e M o h aw k ’s hourlyworkfor ce of any

indiv idual or collective bargaining power. ” T he plaintiffs al so a lle ge that “ [t ] he a ct s of r ac ke te er ing a ct ivi ty

c om m itt ed by Mo haw k have the sam e or sim ilar obj ec tiv e: the r ed uc tio n of w ag es pa id t o M ohaw k’ s ho ur ly31

w orkf or ce . ” F urthe rm or e, the pla int if fs “ w er e inj ur ed

by dir ec t and p ro xim at e reas on of M oh awk ’s il le ga l co nd uc t.” Gi ve n t hi s s ta ge of t he li ti ga ti on , we conclude that the plain tiffs have sufficiently alleged that Mohawk’ s illegal co nduc t w as a im ed

pr im ar ily a t the m . C onse que ntl y , the dis tr ic t c ourt c or re ct ly denied Mohawk’ s 12(b)(6) m otion as it relate s to the plaint iffs’ feder al civil RICO c l a i m. II I. ST ATE LAW RICO U nde r the G eo rg iaRI CO statut e, “ [i ] t i s un law fu l f or any pe rs on, thr ougha pa tte rnof r ac ke te er ing a ct ivi ty

or pr oc ee ds d er ive d th er ef

ro m , to ac qui re or m aintain, directly

or indirectly , any

interest in or control of any enterprise, rea l pr ope rty , or

pe rs ona l pr ope rty

of any na tur e, inc lud ing m one y . ” O . C. G . A . 16- 14- 4( a) . U nli ke f

ed er al c ivi l R IC O , the G eo rg iaRI CO statut e doe s no t r equir e pr oof of an “ en te rp ri se . ” Co bb C ounty v. Jon es G ro up, P . L . C. , 460 S . E . 2d 5 16, 520 -2 1 (G a. Ct . App. 199 5) . R athe r, und er G eo rg iaRI CO , the pla int if fs ne ed onl y es ta bli sh r ac ke te er ing a ct ivi ty ; tha t i s, “ a pla int if f m ust sho wthat the de fe ndant com m itted predicate offe nses (set forth in O. C.G .A . § 16-14-3(9)) at least twice .” Id. at 521 (quo tation m arks and citation om itted). W it h re ga rdto th ei r st at e-l aw RICO c la im , th e p la in ti ffs rel y on 18 U.S.C. § 1546 ( re la tin g to the f

ra ud and m isu se of

vis as , pe rm its , and o the r doc um en ts) f orAcc ordingto O.C.G.A. § 16-14-3( 9)(A) (xx ix ), “r acke teer ing a ctivity ” is define d as 9 “conduc t defined a s ‘ra ckete eringactivity ’ under 18 U.S.C. S ection 1961(1) (A), ( B) , (C), and (D).” The only

“ra ckete eringactivity” conta ined in 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1)(A) , (B ), (C), or (D) on which the plaintiffs r ely

is § 1546. To the extent the plaintiffs attempt to rely on § 1324, as they do wi th t he ir fe de ra l c ivi l RI CO c la ims , s uc h a c la im i s b arr e d und e r t

he Ge or g ia

RI CO statut e be c a us e § 1 32 4 is lis te d a s a

“ ra c ke te e ri ngof

fe ns e ” in 1 8 U .S. C. § 19 61 (1 )( F ), and no t in subsections (A) , (B ), (C), or (D). 32 the ir pr ed ic at e of

fe nse s. D es pit e be ing li m ite d to § 15 46, the pla int if fs have 9 al le ge d su ff

ic ie ntl y num er ous vio la tio ns t o satis fy the r ac ke te er ing a ct ivi ty re qui re m en t un de r G eo rg iastate law . I n f ac t, a cc or din g to the c om pla int ,

“ Moh awk ha s c om

m itt ed hun dr ed s, pr oba

bly tho usands, of

vio la tio ns o f . . . 18 U.S.C. § 1 54 6 a s p artof i ts pa tt ern of r ack et eeri ng act iv it y .” T he re are , how ev er , tw o is sue s un de r the G eo rg iaRI CO statut e that w ar rant furthe r dis cu ssi on: ( 1) w he the r a co rp or at ionis a “pe rs on” w ho m ay be sue d f or pur pose s of the G eo rg iaRI CO statut e; and ( 2) w he the r the pla int if fs have sufficiently

alleged proxim ate ca

use to have standi ng to b ring a Ge orgia RICO sui t. A. Whe ther Corp or at io ns May be Sue d Under Geo rg ia RICO T he G eo rg iaS upr em e Co urt r ec en tly answ er ed

the pr ec ise que sti on o f w h e th e r ac o r p o r a t i o nmay b e s u e du n d e r th e G e o r g i aR I C O s t a tu t e . S e e Wi l l i a ms G e n . C o r p . v . S t o n e , 2 8 0 G a . 6 3 1 , 6 3 2 S . E . 2 d3 7 6 ( 2 0 0 6 ) . T h e G e o r g i aS up r e me Co urt no te d th at

the pr ohi bit ion s inthe G eo rg iaRI CO A ct appl y to “ any pe rs on”33

unde r O . C. G . A . § 16 -1 4- 4. W ill iam s, 280 G a. a t 63 1, 632 S . E . 2d at 37 7. T he te rm “pe rs on, ” how ev er , is not de fi ne d inthe de fi nit ionse ct ionof the G eo rg ia R I C O A c t . S e e O . C . G . A . § 1 6 - 1 4 - 3 ( d e f i n i t i o ns e c t i o n ) . T h e G e o r g i aS up r e me Co urt po int ed

out that, non ethe le ss, the G eo rg iale gis la tur e ha d “ se t f orth the de sir ed appl ic at ionof

the te rm [ pe rs on] in the de fi nit ionse ct ionpr om ulg at ed f or use in the ti tle [ T itl e 16] w hic h in cl ude s th e G eo rg iaRI CO A ct . ” W ill iam s, 280 G a. a t 63 1, 632 S . E . 2d at 37 7. T he G eo rg iaS upr em e Co urt e xpl ai ne d th at the de fi nit ionse ct ionf

or use in T itl e 16 o f the G eo rg iaCo de is O . C. G . A . § 16 -1 - 3(12). I d. T he Ge orgia Suprem e Court then quoted § 16-1-3(12), which provid es that “ person” includes an in divid ual, a publi c or private c orporation, an inc or por at ed a sso ci at ion , gov er

nm en t, gov er

nm en t a ge nc y , partne rs hip , or uni nc or por at ed a sso ci at ion . I d. a t 63 2, 632 S . E . 2d at 37 7. A ddi tio na lly , the G eo rg iaS upr em e Co urt ob se rv ed that “ the de fi nit ionse ct ionof the e nti re G eo rg ia Co de not es that ‘ pe rs on’ inc lud es ac or por at ion , ” ci tin g O . C. G . A . § 1- 3- 3( 14) . I d. at 632 , 632 S . E . 2d at 37 8 ( quot at ionm ar ks o m itt ed ). A cc or din gly , the G eo rg ia Suprem e Court concluded that a corporation is su bje ct to and m ay be sued und er G eo rg ia ’ s R IC O A ct . I d. a t 63 1, 632 S . E . 2d at 37 7. T he G eo rg iaS upr em e Co urt i n W ill iam s a lso e xpr es sly r ej ec te d th e argum ent, which Mohawk m akes here, that O. C.G .A . § 16-2-22, which placesIn inte rp re tin ga state law, fe de ra l c ourt s a pp ly the de c isi on s o f t

hat st ate ’s highe st 10 court. See CSX Transp., Inc. v. Trism Specia liz ed Carr iers, Inc., 182 F .3d 788, 789 (11th Cir. 1999). 34 lim its on c or

por at e cr im ina l l ia

bil ity , sho uld

appl y to ci vil sui ts whic h st em f ro m cr im ina l l awvio la tio ns. I d. a t 63 2- 33, 632 S . E . 2d at 37 8. I nst ea d, the G eo rg ia Su pr em e Co urt e xpr es sly

he ld tha t “ O . C. G . A . § 16 -2 -2 2 do es not pe rt ai n to c ivi l su it s b ro ug ht un de r th e Geo rg iaciv il RICO Act .” Id . In l ig ht of Wil li am s, we conclude that Moh aw k, a corporation, m ay be sued und er the G eorgia RIC O st atut e. W e n ow turn t o t he ne xt qu es ti on of s ta nd in g.

10 B . S t a n d i n g t o Pu r s u e S t a t e - L a w RI C O Cl a i ms A s w ithF ed er al RI CO c la im s, und er G eo rg ia ’ s R IC O statut e, “ [a ] ny pe rs on who is injure d by

rea son of any

violatio n of” G eorgia’ s RICO statute “ shall have a ca use of a ct ionf or thr ee ti m es the a ct

ua l dam ag es sus ta ine d . . . . ” O . C. G . A . § 16 - 14- 6( c) ( em

pha sis a dde d) . “ [B ] ec au se the state RI CO a ct is m ode le d up on and closely analogous to the federa l RICO statute,” G eorgia courts “ lookto federa l au tho ri ty ” in d et er

m ini ng R IC O standi ng. Ma ddox v. S o. E ng’ g C o. , 500 S . E . 2d 591, 594 ( G a. Ct . App. 199 8) ( quot at ionm ar ks and c itatio n om itt ed ). W e al re ady have c onc lud ed

that the pla int if

fs have a lle ge d su ff

ic ie nt i nj ur

y to pur sue the ir fe de ra l R IC O c la im s, and a cc or din gly , w e co nc lud e that the y have a lle ge d a sufficient injury

to pursue their state RICO claim s as we ll. A lthou gh un derPlaintiffs also seek injunctive re lief under the Geor g ia RI CO Act which a llows any 11 “ag g rieve d person” to sue for injunctive r elief, w ithout requiringan injury “by rea son of” the illega l conduct. Compare O.C.G.A. § 16-14- 6(b) with O.C.G.A. § 16- 14-6(c ). Thus, we need not discuss Anza and Mohawk’ s proxi mate-c ause a rguments as to plaintiffs’ cla ims for inj un c tiv e re lie f u

nd e r t he Ge or g ia

RI CO Ac t. 35 Geo rg ialaw t he pl ai nt iff

s ar e li m it edto pre di cat e act s ar is in g o ut of 1 8 U.S.C. § 1546 , w e co nc lud e that the pla int if fs ’ a lle gatio ns are ne ith er ind ir ec t no r too rem ot e to sat is fy

Geor gi a’s pr ox im at e-ca us e req ui rem en t u nd er s ta te -la w RICO. Se e Ma ddox , 500 S . E . 2d at 59 4 ( “ Insho rt , the langua ge ‘ by r ea son of

’ im pose s a proxim ate ca

usation requirem ent on the plain tiff. ” (c itation o m itted)); id. ( A pl ai nt iff “ m us t s ho w a cau sa l co nn ect io n b et ween hi s i nju ry an d apre di cat e act .” (citation om itted)). 11 IV. UNJ UST ENRI CHMENT T he pla int if

fs ’ c om pla int c la im s th at

Mo haw k’ s il le ga l c ondu ct pe rm its it

“ to reap substanti al w age savings” because Mohawk pay s plaintiffs lower w ages than it w oul d othe rw ise be f

or ce d to pay . T he re fo re , a cc or din g to the pla int if fs ’ co m pla int , Mo haw k ha s be enunj ust ly e nr ic he d un de r state law . P la int if fs a lso cl ai m that M ohaw k ha s be enunj ust ly e nr ic he d be ca

use the hir ing of

il le ga l a lie ns ha s le d to ar ed

uc ed num be r of w orke r’ s- co m

pe nsatio n c la im s. B othof pla int if fs ’ state -l awunj ust -e nr ic hm en t c la im s f ai l.36

H er e, the pla int if

fs w er e al l pa id an a gr ee d- uponw ag e. I n e sse nc e, the pla int if fs have ac ontra ct

to w ork f or the de fe ndant and w er e pa id the a gr ee d- upon wa ge. In Ge orgia, “ [u] njust enrichm ent is an equitable concept and app lies when as am atte r of

f ac t the re is no l eg al c ontra ct . . . . ” S t. P au l M er cury

I ns. Co . v. Meeks, 508 S.E . 2d 646, 648 (Ga . 1998) (quotation m arks and citation om itted); se e Bo ne m

v. Go lf C lu b o f Ga., Inc ., 59 1 S .E. 2d46 2, 4 67 -6 8 (Ga . Ct. Ap p. 2 00 3) . In this case, there w as a legal c ontract as a m atter of f act (i. e. , if

the plaintiffs wer e no t p ai d, t he y

co ul d s ue forbre ach of t he em pl oym en t co nt ract ). See, e.g ., Surg iJe t, I nc . v. H ic ks, 511 S . E . 2d 1 94, 195 ( G a. Ct . App. 199 9) ; B ra zz ea l v. Com m ercia l Cas. Ins. C o., 180 S.E . 853, 853 (G a. Ct. App. 1935 ). T herefor e, the re c anbe no unj ust

e nr ic hm en t. C onse que ntl y , the pla int if fs ’ unj ust -e nr ic hm en t cl ai m a s it r el at ed to Moh awk’ s purp orte d savin gs f ro m low er w ag es sho uld

have be endis m iss ed . As f or plaintiffs’ claim s that hiring illegal worker s resulted in fewe r w orke r’ s- co m

pe nsatio n c la im s, the re is no r ea sona ble a lle ga tio n th at

thi s f ac t, even if true, is connected to the plain tiffs rec eiving lo we r w ages. To put it another w ay , the f

ac t tha t M ohaw k m ay

have inc re as ed

pr of its by low er ing the num

be r of w orke r’ s- co m

pe nsatio n c la im s it

pa id i s no t r el at ed

to wha t w ag es Mo haw k pa id37

the pla int if

fs . C onse que ntl y , the dis tr ic t c ourt c or re ct ly de te rm ine d th at

the p l a i n t i f f s d i dn o th a v e s t an d i n g t o a s s e rtth i s c l a i m.

V. CO NC LUS ION For all the above re asons, we conclude that the dis trict court properly denied Moh awk’ s R

ule 12( b) (6 ) m oti on a s it

r el at ed to both th e pla int if

fs ’ f ed er al and state RI CO c la im s. F urthe rm or e, the dis tr ic t c ourt pr ope rl y dis m iss ed

the pl ai nt iff s’ un jus t-e nr ic hm en t cl ai m

as i t re la te d t o wo rk er’s co m pe ns at io n. H ow ev er , the dis tr ic t c ourt sh oul d have a lso dis m iss ed the pla int if

fs ’ unj ust enri ch m en t c la im

a s it r el at ed to the a gr ee d- uponw ag es that pl ai nti ff s r ec ei ve d. AF FIRMED IN P AR T, REV ERS ED IN P AR T, AN D REMA ND ED FOR FU RTH ER PR OCE EDIN GS.