The HONORABLE JOHN B. JONES, United States District

1

Judge for the District of South Dakota sitting by designation.

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

 ___________

 No. 96-1348

 ___________

Donald Crittenden, *

 *

 Plaintiff/Appellee, *

 *

General Accident Insurance *

Company, *

 *

 Intervenor/Plaintiff/ *

 Appellee, *

 * Appeals from the United States

 v. * District Court for the

 * Eastern District of Arkansas.

Tri-State Thermo King, Inc., *

 *

 Defendant/Appellant, *

 *

Great Dane Trailer, Tennessee, *

Inc., *

 *

 Defendant. *

 ___________

 Submitted: January 13, 1997

 Filed: March 3, 1997

 ___________

Before BOWMAN and MURPHY, Circuit Judges, and JONES, District

1

Judge.

 ___________

JONES, District Judge.

 This action was brought by Donald Crittenden ("Crittenden")

against Tri-State Thermo King, Inc. ("Tri-State") and Great Dane

Trailers, Inc. ("Great Dane") on theories of strict liability and
2

negligence. The jury found for the defendants on the strict
3

liability theory and for the plaintiff on the negligence theory. 

Tri-State appeals. We affirm.

 I. Background

 Crittenden was a truck driver for Forrest City Grocery Company

of Forrest City, Arkansas ("Forrest City Grocery"). Forrest City

Grocery ordered a refrigerated trailer from Great Dane and selected

a Thermo King refrigeration unit to be installed on the trailer by

Tri-State. 

 Tri-State installed the refrigeration unit in a space cut out

by Great Dane. When installed, the refrigeration unit was

approximately eleven feet off the ground. The reset button was

located on the refrigeration unit. 

 On the early morning of October 22, 1992, Crittenden realized

that the refrigeration unit had stopped running, and tried to get

the unit to operate again by pushing the reset button. In order to

access and press the reset button, Crittenden had to climb up the

cab of the tractor, and brace himself between the tractor and the

trailer. There were no handholds, footholds, or ladders on the

trailer that Crittenden could use to reach the button. His foot

slipped, and he fell backwards to the ground, sustaining serious

injury.

 In this appeal, Tri-State asserts that there was no evidence

to support the finding of the jury that it was negligent, that the

trial judge erred in instructing the jury, and that the jury's

verdict in its favor on the strict liability claim precludes a

verdict for Crittenden on his negligence claim. 
4
5

 II. Decision. 

 We review jury findings under a highly deferential standard.

We resolve all conflicts in favor of Crittenden, giving him the

benefit of all reasonable inferences and assuming as true all facts

supporting Crittenden which the evidence tended to prove. See C.L

Maddox, Inc. v. Benham Group, Inc., 88 F.3d 592, 602 (8th Cir.

1996). We will affirm the jury's findings if a reasonable jury

could differ as to the conclusions to be drawn. Id. A jury's

determination of a fact question will not be reversed by the

appellate court where such determination is supported by

substantial evidence. Leathers v. United States, 471 F.2d 856 (8th

Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 932 (1973). 

 Tri-State's first argument on appeal is that there was no

evidence to support the finding of the jury that it was negligent.

Contrary to Tri-State's assertions, there was substantial evidence

to support the jury's verdict that Tri-State's negligence was the

proximate cause of Crittenden's injuries. Crittenden presented

substantial evidence that Tri-State knew or should have known that

an operator would need to access the reset button and that there

were no safe means to do so, but nevertheless installed the unit on

the trailer eleven feet off the ground. 

 Crittenden presented substantial evidence that an operator of

a refrigerated tractor trailer would have to press the reset button

in the ordinary course of operation. In addition to his own

testimony to that effect, the jury also heard testimony from Allen

Cohn, Transportation Director of Forrest City Grocery, and TriState President Mike Rivalto. Cohn testified that he instructed

his drivers to press the reset button, after Tri-State's own

service personnel told him to do so. Rivalto also testified that

the driver of a refrigerated tractor trailer would need to restart

the refrigeration unit by pressing the reset button in order to
6

protect the load. 
7

 Crittenden also presented substantial evidence that Tri-State

knew or had reason to know that the placement of the reset button

eleven feet off the ground, with no means of access, was dangerous.

As there were no handholds, footholds, or ladders on the trailer

that could be used to access the reset button, a driver of a

refrigerated tractor trailer would need to brace himself between

the cab of the tractor and the trailer. In fact, Rivalto testified

that he had fallen on two separate occasions while attempting to

press the reset button. The evidence clearly established that TriState knew of the dangerous condition created when the reset button

was located so far off the ground with no safe means of access. 

 Finally, it was not disputed that in spite of what it knew or

should have known, Tri-State installed the unit on the trailer so

that the reset button was located eleven feet off the ground. The

jury, therefore, could have properly found that Tri-State was

negligent in installing the refrigeration unit with no means of

safely accessing the reset button. The judgment of the district

court on Crittenden's negligence claim is affirmed.

 Tri-State's second argument on appeal is that the trial judge

erroneously instructed the jury in Instruction 22. A review of the

instructions and Tri-State's objection during settlement of the

instructions establishes that this instruction related only to the

strict liability theory. Since the jury found for Tri-State on

this theory, any error in the instruction would clearly be

harmless.

 Tri-State's third argument on appeal is that the jury verdict

in its favor on the strict liability claim precludes a verdict for

Crittenden on his negligence claim. Under Arkansas law, however,

the finding by the jury for Tri-State on the strict liability

theory does not preclude a finding that Tri-State was negligent. 

See W.M. Bashlin Co. v. Smith, 277 Ark. 406, 414, 643 S.W.2d 526,
8

529 (1982). As the Arkansas Supreme Court stated in W. M. Bashlin
9

Co., the plaintiff "need not bear the burden of proving both

theories of liability, it is enough that he prove either." 277

Ark. at 414, 643 S.W.2d at 529 (citing Sterner v. U.S. PlywoodChampion Paper, Inc., 519 F.2d 1352 (8th Cir. 1975)). Furthermore,

the Arkansas Supreme Court has stated that in claims of liability

based on negligence, "whether one knew or should have known of a

potential danger is a necessary constituent of fault. The common

law has recognized a duty under such circumstances well before

product liability was enacted in Arkansas in 1973." Schichtl v.

Slack, 293 Ark. 281, 284, 737 S.W.2d 628, 630 (1987) (citing Green

v. Equitable Powder Mfg. Co., 95 F. Supp. 127 (W.D. Ark. 1951);

Dulin v. Circle F Industries, Inc., 558 F.2d 456 (8th Cir. 1977)).

As discussed above, Crittenden presented substantial evidence that

Tri-State was negligent in installing the refrigeration unit with

no means of safely accessing the reset button.

 The Court has carefully considered Tri-State’ s other claims

of error and finds them to be without merit.

 Conclusion

 For the foregoing reasons, we hold that there was substantial

evidence to support the jury's verdict that Tri-State was negligent

and that any error in instructing the jury was harmless. 

Accordingly, the judgment of the district court is affirmed.

 A true copy.

 Attest:

 CLERK, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT.