UNITED STAT ES COURT OF AP P EALS FOR VETERANS CLAIMS

N OS
. 98-2219 AND 99-1164
K EI TH D. S NYD ER , A PP EL L ANT /P ETI TI ONER ,
V
. H ER SH EL W. G OBER , A C TI NG S EC RE T A RY O F V ET ER A N S A FF A I RS , A PPEL L EE /R ES PO NDE NT
.

P A T RI CK D. M C C REA RY , I NTER VE NOR
.

On Ap pe a l f ro m th e B oa

rd of Ve te ra ns ' Ap pe a ls
On Petition for Ex traordina ry Relief (De cided Oc tober 6, 2000 )

Kenneth M. Carpenter , of Topeka , Kansa s, was on the plea dings f or the a ppellant/petitioner. Leigh A. Bradley , G e ne ra l Co un se l; Ro n G arv in , Ass ist ant G e ne ra l Co un se l; Michae l A. Le on ar d , Deputy Assistant Gener al Counsel; and Ed war d v. Cas sid

y , J r. , all of Washington, D.C., we re on the ple a din g s f

or the a pp e lle e /r e sp on de nt.
Pa tri c k D. Mc Cre ar

y , pr o s e . Be fore KRAMER, STEI

NB ERG, and GREENE, Judges

. STEI NB ERG, Judge : Be fore the Court are two case s now consolidated: (1) An appea l of a No ve mbe r 2 5, 19 98 , B oa

rd of Ve te ra

ns ' Ap pe a ls (B VA or B oa

rd ) de c isi on that ( A) de nie d e lig ibi lity for dire ct pay

ment of attorne y

fee s to attorney Keith D. Sny der ( the attorne y ) by the Secr etar

y from past-due be nefits awa

rded to his client, veteran P atrick D . McCrea ry , as to the vete ran' s succe ssful claim for D epar

tment of Vete rans Affa irs (VA) service connec tion f or a neuropsychiatric disorder and (B ) re duced to $0, a s unrea sonable, atto rn ey fe es, ca lled for in the f ee a g ree ment for repr esentation before VA, as to the r estorat i o n of a 40% rating for a low-bac k disorder a

nd for a rating for total disability

based on individual unemploy ability (TDIU) (Recor d (R.) at 3); and (2) a2

petition (as amende d) for

extraordinary

relief in the nature of m andamus for the C ourt to order dir ect pay ment by the S ec retary

of attorne y

fee s from past-due benef its awarde d to the veter an for repr esentation carr ied out befor e this Court. Also b ef o re t he Court in the appe al ca se is the Secre tary ' s motion seeking Court r eview of the fe e ag ree ment for the attorney ' s repr esentation before t h e C o u rt in connec tion with McCreary v. De rwinski , 1 Vet.App. 618 ( 1991) (table ). F or the following rea sons, t h e C o u rt will vacate the B VA dec ision, deny the petition, and deny

the Secre tary ' s motion.

I. Bac kgr ound I n J une 1989, the ve tera

n filed a c laim for a r ati n g ab o v e 4 0 % for a service -conne cted lumbosacra l strain. See R. at 27. I n Dec ember 1989, the Cleveland, O hio, VA Reg ional Offic e (RO) denied that c laim and reduced the veter an' s rating to 20%, ef fec tive in March 1990; that de cision was ba se d o n a May 19 89 VA me dic a l ce nte r (V AM C) tr e a tme nt re po rt and a No ve mbe r 1 98 9 V AM C examination report that re ported that the ve tera n had quit sever al jobs beca use of his back pain. R. at 18-19. In J anuar

y 1990, the veter an filed a Notice of Disagr eeme nt (also si g ned by his mother) as to th at d eci si on andst ate d, in ter ali a, t hat "hi s n erve s [ were] very bad becau se of th e pai n h e is in ". R. at 21-22. A Februa

ry 1990 Statement of t he C ase (SOC) list ed as e vidence , inter alia, the May 19 89 VA MC r e po rt

that had no te d tha t the ve te ra n ha d "n ot wo rk e d sinc e 19 85 "

. R. at 27 . In h is Marc h 19 90 Sub sta

nti ve Ap pe a l to the B oa

rd (a lso sig ne d b y

his mot he r) , th e ve te ra

n s ta te d th a t hi s back condition kept hi m from "holding down a job" and that his nervous condition, for which he had been pr escr ibed medication, was ca used by his back pa in. R. at 31. I n a De cembe r 28, 1990, B VA d ec i s i o n , the B oard de nied a c laim for an inc rea sed rating

a bo ve 20 % f

or a lum bo sa c ra l stra in. R. at 41 . T he Court no te s th a t th e B VAde c isi on wa s a c tua lly prec ipitated by

a cla im for a rating incre ase (above 40%) and involved an appe al of a rating reduc tion (fr om 40% to 20%) that ha d been imposed by the Dec ember

1989 RO decision (R. at 18-19). Cf. Pey ton v. Derwinski , 1 Ve t

. Ap p
. 2 8 2 , 2 8 6 (1 9 9 1 ) ( "[ t ] h i s i s a r at i n g-r edu ct i o nca s e, n o ta r at i n ginc re a se c a se " ); see also Dofflemy er v. D erwinski , 2 Vet.App. 277, 279- 80 (1992). On March 2 7 , 1 9 9 1, the veter an appe aled pr o se to this Court the Dece mber 1990 B VA decision (R. at 41). Se e Mc Cre ar y , su pra . I n May 1991, the veter an ente red into a f ee a g ree ment3

with the attorney

for r epre sentation befor e VA on the veter an' s "c laim for vete rans be nefits bef ore [VA] ". R. at 43- 44. I n J une 1991, the attorne y filed with this Court an appea ranc e as c ounsel for the veter an in that appe al to the Court and filed a fee ag ree ment, also dated Ma y 29, 1991, as to that

re pr e se ntatio n. Ea c h f

e e a g re e me nt p ro vid e d f

or a c on tin g e nc y

fe e of 20 % t o b e wi thh e ld a

nd pa id direc tly to the attorney

by the Secr etar

y from any past-due benef

its a war ded to the veter an " following execution of this ag ree ment". R. at 43; Petition, Exhi bit 2 at 1; Sec reta ry ' s J une 29, 1999, Motion, Attachment at 1. The attorne y ap p ar en t l y al s o filed those fe e ag ree ments with a VARO in J une 1991. See R. at 62, 65, 137, 157. I n October 1991, the par ties filed with this Court a joint motion for r emand ( R. at 46-49) a nd the C ourt g rante d that motion and vacated the Dec ember 1990 BV A decision and r emande d the matter (R. at 51). That j oint motion for remand requested that the Court direc t the Boa

rd (1) "to obtain further development of the evidenc e . . . to deter

mine the nature and de g re e of the [ve te ra

n' s] di sa bil ity and [to] is su e a

ne w f ina l de c isi on " ; ( 2) " to r e mand the [ve te ra

n' s] claim for inc rea sed rating due to [TDI U] raised in his [S ]ubst antive [ A]ppeal

. . . and [ to] direc t the RO to assist the [ veter an] in developing a cl ai m for increa sed rating due to [ TDIU] or any other be ne fi ts that [th e ve te ra

n] may be e nti tle d to by re a so n of t he e vid e nc e the n o f r e c or d" ; and (3 ) " to consider the eff

ect of pain on the [vetera

n' s] di sability ." R. at 47-48. On re mand from the Court, the B oard c hara cter ized the issues as follows: (1) " Restoration of a 4 0 p ercen t ev alu ati on f o r l um bo sacr al s tr ain , cu rren tl y eval uat ed 2 0 p ercen t d is abl in g"; (2) " I ncre ased e valuation, in excess of 40 per cent, f or lumbosacr al stra i n , curr ently evaluated 20 pe rc e nt d isa

bli ng " ; and (3 ) " To ta l dis a bil ity e va luatio n b a se d o n in div idu a l un e mpl oy a bil ity du e to service -conne cted disability ". R. at 55. I n J anuar y 1992, the Board remande d those claims to the RO . R. a t 58 -5 9. I n a

n A pr il 1 99 3 d e c isi on , th e RO de nie d th os e thr e e c la ims (R . at 73 -7 9) , a nd in May 1993 the RO issued a Supplemental SOC (SS OC) as to those thre e cla ims (R. at 83). I n J une 1993, the attorne y

notified the vete ran that he did "not wa nt to continue p u rs u i n g this" matter on behalf of the ve tera

n and that he w as " returning[t he vete ran' s] VA recor ds" to him. R. at 152. I n a De c e mbe r 1 99 3 B VAdecis io n, th e B oa rd no te d th a t th e ve te ra

n h a d r a ise d a

fo ur th claim, one f

or ser vice c onnection for

a psy chiatric disorder, as sec ondary to the service -conne cted lumbosacra l-strain cla im, and rema nded that matter for further development. R. at 99-102. After further development of

the evidenc e ( see R. at 105, 111-12), the RO denied those four claims and4

issue d an ad d i t i o n al SSOC. R . at 105-07, 110-20. I n Aug ust 1995, the BVArema nded the psy chiatric , rating -re storation, and rating- incre ase c laims fo r additi onal VA e x aminations and defe rre d its decision on the TDIU claim until development of those three "ine x tricably intertwined" claims was complete. R. at 126- 30. I n Fe bruar y 1998, the RO g rante d a rating incre ase to 40% for lum bo sa c ra l stra in, e ff

e c tiv e on Marc h 1, 199 0; aw ard e d ser vic e c on ne c tio n for

c hr on ic dy sth y

mic ( d e p r e s s i v e ) d i s o r d e r , a s s i g n i n g a r a t i n g o f 5 0 % , e f f e c t i v e o nA p r i l 5 , 1 9 9 0 ; an d aw ar d e d a T D IU rating , eff ective on O ctober

16, 1991. R. at 132-35. I n a Marc h 1 99 8 let ter

to t he a tto rn e y , o f w hic h a

c op y wa s se nt t o th e ve te ra

n, the RO acknow ledg ed re ceipt of the fee ag ree ment for the attorney ' s repr esentation of t h e v et era n and

no ti fi ed h im th at "pay

men t of att orn ey fees fro m p ast -du e ben efi ts is su bj ectto revi ew b y th e Board ". R. at 137-42. I n April 1998, the RO notified the veter an that it ha d awa rded him a lump-sum amount of $1 36 ,9 51 .0 0 in

pa st- du e be ne fi ts f

or the thr e e awa

rd s, pa id h im $ 10 9, 56 0. 80 , a nd wi thh e ld $ 2 7 , 3 9 0

. 2 0 a s a

" p o t e n t i a l 2 0 % c o n t i n g e n tf e e " t o b e p a i d

d i r e c t l y t o t h e a t t o r

n e y b y t h e S e c r e t a r

y. R. at 144-46. I n that notification letter, the RO notified the veter an that his ca s e wa s being tr ans fe rr e d to the B oa

rd fo r a " de te rm inatio n of el ig ibi lity fo r pay me nt of a tto rn e y

fe e s f ro m any pa stdue bene fits." R. at 146. The veter an there afte r asked the Boa rd for an explanation a s to why the 20% had be en withheld in light of the fa ct that the attorne y had re signe d from the c ase. R. at 151- 52. I nan Au gu s t1 9 9 8 l et t er , t h e B o ar d n o t i fi edt h e a t t o r n e y a n d t h e v et er an t h at i twa s co n s i d er i n g a reduc tion of the attorney ' s fee on the g round t hat the attorne y had not " eng ag ed in any repr esentational activity

on behalf

of [the vetera

n] before V A af

ter August 1993"; that he a nd the

v et er an h ad the right to submit arg ument and evide nce a s to that matter; and that the B oard's deter mination would cover only the fe e ag ree ment for repr esentation be fore VA bec ause the Boa rd d i d n o th a v e j u r i s d i c t i o n o v e r f e e a g r e e m e n t s f

o r r e p r e s e n t a t i o nb e f

o r e t h e C o u rt

. R

. a t1 5 4

- 5 5

. In September 1998, the attorney responde d, arguing, in e ssence, that the fe e ag ree ment for repr esentation b efore the Court provide d a basis for the direc t pay

ment of the full 20% w ithheld. R. at 15 7- 59 . T he ve te ra

n a lso re sp on de d to the B oa rd , ass e rt ing that the a tto rn e y sh ou ld n ot b e pa id the withheld 20%. R. at 161-64. I n a No vember

25, 1998, BV A dec ision as to eligibility for pa y ment of attorne y

fee s from past-due be nefits and the r easona bleness of a

ny u n d erly ing f

ee a g ree ment, the B oard ( 1) denie d5

elig ibil ity for pa y ment of attorne y

fee s from past-due benef its as to the neuropsy chiatric -disorder claim and ( 2) re duced to $0, a s u n re as o nable, attorney fee s, called f

or in the fe e ag ree ment for

re p resentation before VA, as to the r estoration of a 40% rating f

or a low- back disorde r and f or a TDIU rating. R. at 3. ( The B oard mixed up these ac tions when it summariz ed them at the e nd of its decision. See R. at 14.) Although the B oard note d that the attorne y had " asser

ted that VA ha [d] the authority

to pay the fee for service s he had r ender ed the ve tera n while re prese nting him bef ore the Court", the Boa

rd concluded that it "ma

y revie w only

the contra ct for se rvice s befor e VA" and that "[r]eview of [fee ] agr eeme nts [ for r epre sentation befor e the Court] is ex clusiv el y within the province of the Court." R. at 3, 6. On Dec ember

2, 1998, the attorne y

appea led that B VA dec ision through other counsel. On J une 29, 1999, the Sec reta ry filed a motion in that appeal, se eking Court reviewof the fe e ag ree ment for the attorney ' s repr esentation before the Court in c onnection with the October 1991 Court remand in Mc Cre ar

y , su pra . As a basis for his motion, the S ecr etar y asser ts that the C ourt' s revie w of the

rea sonabl en es s of the fe e ag ree ment "ma y result in a prompt, favorable deter mination for the

a pp e lla nt w hic h w ou ld m oo t th is a pp e a l and c on se rv e jud ic ia l re so ur c e s" ; the Se c re tary c ite s In the Matter of the Fee Agreem ent of Mason , 13 Vet.App. 79, 86 ( 1999) ( Mason FeeAgreem ent) (holding that " wh e re a tto rn e y

su c c e ssf ull y re pr e se nts a VA c la ima nt be fo re thi s Court

. . . , th e Se c re tary is ob lig a te d [un de r c e rt a in ci rc ums tanc e s] to pa y dir e c tly to t he a tto rn e y

20 % o f t he pa st- du e be ne fi ts

awa rd e d o n th e ba sis of

the c la im o r a

pp lic a tio n f

or be ne fi ts un der lyi ng

theiss ue s su c c essf

ull y ap pe ale d to thi

s Co ur t ") . Motion at 2-3. On J uly 12, 1999, the attorney filed a re sponse opposing the Secr etar

y ' s motion on t he g rounds that the Court la cks jurisdiction to review the fee ag ree ment beca use there is no BVA de cision as to that ag ree ment and that the S ec retary has alleg ed no er

ror in the fee ag ree ment for repre sentation befor e the Court and the moti on is, theref ore, a reque st for

an a dv iso ry

op ini on fr om t his Court

. Also on J uly

12, 1999, the attorne y

filed t hroug h counsel a petition for e x traordina ry relief in the nature of mandamus, seeking a Court orde r (1) that the Secr etar y show ca use as to why

he has failed to pa

y to the attorney

the withheld attorne y

fee s; and (2) e ither (A) that the Secr etar y m ake immediate pay

ment of the withh el d at t o rn ey fee s or (B ) that the B oard dire ct the RO to make a decision so that the attorne y may file a N otice of D isag ree ment (NOD ) as to his entitlement to direct6

pay ment of a 20% -conting ency fee for his succ essful re prese ntation of the vete ran in this Court. On J uly 28, 1999, the Court order ed the Secre tary to file a response to the petition. The Secr etar y has filed a r esponse, a

nd the attorney has filed a reply

. On Octobe r 1, 1999, the Court consolidated the

a pp e a l and pe tit ion c a se s and

su bmi tte d th e m to thi s p ane l. On Octobe r 18, 1999, the attorney filed an a

mended pe tition for ext ra o rd i n ar y relief and attache d a copy

of an O ctober

1, 1999, letter to the ve tera n from the RO. That letter stated: A che ck, date d September 17, 1999, in the amount of $27,390.20 wa s issued to y ou. Yo u c on fi rm e d o n Se pte mbe r 2 3, 19 99 , th a t y ou had recei ve d a nd ne g oti a te d th is chec k.
Th e re is a mot ion be fo re the Un ite d St a te s Co ur t of Ap pe a ls f

or Vet e ra ns Cla ims petitioning for

pay ment of attorne y

fee s to Keith D. Sny der, A ttorney at L aw. The $ 2 7 , 3 9 0

. 2 0 r e p r e s e n t s p a s t

- d u e b e n e f i t s th a ta r e p o t e n t i a l l y p aya

b l e t o t h e a t t o r

n e y. We require that y ou return the $27,390.20. These funds do not belon g to you. The issue of pay

ment of atto rney

fee s from past-due benef its is s till i n litigation. I f the Court de te rm ine s that Mr

. Snyde r is no t e nti tle d to pa y me nt of the se fu

nd s, the y wi ll be ref unded to y ou at that time. Y our cooperation will

greatly assist in the liti

gation pr oc ess. Amended Petition, Ex hibit 1 (empha sis a dded). ( There is no indication that the vetera n has re turned any such funds to VA.) I n th e Oc tob e r 199 9 ame nd e d pe tit ion , th e a tto rn e y re qu e sts re lie f b a se d o n th e " ine xplic a ble action" by

the RO in payin g t o the veter an the pr eviously withheld 20% of the ve tera n' s past-due benef its; specifically , he re quests that the Court ( 1) order the Secre tary to show cause as to why he rele ased the previously withheld 20%; (2) find that the pay ment to the veteran of that 20% was " an
a c t of ' ba d f a ith ' by the Se c re tary " ; ( 3) c on sid e r s anc tio ns a g a ins t t he S ecr e tary fo r t hat pa y me nt; (4) " direc t the Secret ar y to cre ate a n overpa y ment in the veter an' s acc ount"; and ( 5) orde r the Secre tary to pay that 20% t o the attorney

or orde r the Sec reta

ry to show cause why

a wr it should not be issued. On Dec ember 23, 1999, the Court, inter alia, g rante d intervenor status to the vetera n. Snyder

v . W est , 13 Vet.App. 244, 248-49 (1999) (per curiam order) . On Fe bruar y 10, 2000, the Secr etar

y filed a motion to stay

proce eding s in this case pendingthis Court's dec ision in Sc ate s v . W est , 13 Vet.App. 304, 305 (2000) (en banc or der g ranting motion for en banc decision), a nd on April 11,7

2000, the Court g rante d t h at m o tion and stay ed the matter pending the outcome of Scates and

acc epted f or filing a brief t hat t he attorney had submitted on Marc h 3, 2000, as to the appe al. Snyder

v . W est , 13 Vet.App. 416, 417 ( 2000) (pe r cur iam order ). In that brief ( Br ief at 22, 41), the attorne y
su b mi ts n u me r o u s a rg uments and make s ref

ere nce to the Sec reta

ry ' s relianc e on VA G ener al Counsel Prece dent Opinion 27-92 (De c. 9, 1992) [hereinaf ter G.C. Prec. 27-92] in In the Matter of the Fe e Agreem ent of Cox , 10 Vet.App. 361 ( 1997) ( Co x Fee Agree ment II ), vacate d in part on other gr ou nd s su b n om . Co

xv . W est , 1 49 F .3 d 1 36 0 13 63 , 13 65 -66 (F e d. Cir . 1 99 8) (a ff ir min g a ll holdings; vac ating only

for c onsideration of a sserted f acts oc curr ing a fter this Court' s opinion), for the proposition that he could not pay the attorne y pursuant to a direc t-pay conting ency -fe e ag ree ment wher e the Sec reta

ry had alr eady

paid " the complete a

mount of past-due be nefits . . . t o the claimant." Id. at 365 (quoting G.C. Prec. 27- 92). On Aug ust 14, 2000, the Court issued a unanimous en b an c opini on in Scates v . Gober , __ Vet.App. __, No. 97-875, 2000 WL1141097 (Aug . 14, 2000) (e n banc) . Henc e, the Court now lifts the stay

and proc eeds w ith this appea l and petition. Bec ause Scates is disposi tive of the a ppeal and Mason Fee

Agreem ent

and ot h er authority

are dispositi ve of the petition, because counsel for the attorne y

was c ounsel for Mr . Mason in both Scates and Mason FeeAgreem ent , b e c a us e the se matters have been pending befor e the Court now for well over a y ear (petition) and a lmost t wo y ear s (appe al), a

nd beca use the Court' s opinion today will vacate t he BVA decision on appea l and direc t the B oard to dismiss the matter re fer red to it by

the RO and will deny

the petiti o n i n o rder

for the mat t er s to procee d befor e the Cleve land RO, the Court does not believe that further pleading s are neede d

. A n y f

u rth e r p le a d in g s ma

y b e f il e d a t th e RO o r th e B o ar d , a s n e c e s s ar y , b y any of the parties, a nd n o o n e's rig hts are a dverse ly aff ecte d by our ac tion today

as to the merits of the f

eea g re e me nt i ssu e s.

II. Ana lys is A. Appeal from BV

A Decision The Scates case involved, as does the instant a ppeal, " a dire ct-pa y

m en t conting ency -fe e ag ree ment", a s to which " the ag ency of orig inal jurisdiction [ (i.e., the RO)] ne ver made a dec ision

conce rning the awa

rd of the withheld attorney fee s to the intervenor under [38 U.S.C. §] 511(a) " a nd,8

in st ead, "th e R O fo rw a r d ed t he m att er t o t he Bo ard f or 'a de ter mi nat io n o f el igi bi li ty .'" Scates ,

_ _ V e t. A p p
. a t

_

_ , 2 0 0 0 WL 1 1 4 1 0 9 7 , a t * 2 ; R. a t 1 4 6

. T h e Co u rt held in S cates that the deter mination of entitlement or elig ibilit y for attorney fee s under direc t-pay ment co n t inge ncy -fe e ag ree ments must first be addre ssed by the RO. Scates , su

pra . A c c or din g ly , th e Court wi ll v a c a te the a pp e a le d Nov e mbe r 199 8 BV A de c isi on " fo r wa nt of or ig ina l jur isd ic tio n to dec ide e lig ibi lity fo r d ir e c t pa

y me nt o f a wi thh e ld c on tin g e nc y fe e un de r [se c tio n] 59 04 (d )" and re mand the ma tte r " to th e Board wi th di rect io ns to di sm is s tha t mat ter as referred to th e Boardby th e R O." Scates , su

pr a . J ust as the Court noted in Scates , th e ma tte r o f t he Se c re tary ' s d ir e c t pay

me nt o f a tto rn e y fe e s in thi s
case "r emains pending before the S ecr etar y by virtue of the f

ee a g ree ment[s] filed in this case" , ibid. , and all par

ties will be able to ra ise any issues they

wish befor e the RO. B. P e tit ion fo r Writ o

f M and amus "T he re medy

of mandamus is a drastic one, to be invoked only in ext raor dinary

situations." Ke rr v . U nit e d S tates D ist ric t Co ur t , 426 U.S. 394, 402 (1976). Be fore a court may issue a wr it, a pe tit ion e r m

us t de mon str a te (1 ) a c le ar a nd ind isp uta ble ri g ht t o th e wr it a

nd (2 ) a la c k o f a de qu a te alternative means to obtain the re lief soug ht. See Cox FeeAgreem ent II , 10 Vet.App. at 370 (holding that th is Cou rt has a

uth or ity , in

a pp ro pr ia te c ir c ums tanc e s, to i ssu e wr its un de r A ll Wr its Ac t, 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a)). H ence , a petitioner must satisfy both prong s in order to obtain e x traordina ry relief

. Se e He rrm an n v . B ro wn , 8 Ve t

. Ap p
. 6 0 , 6 2 (1 9 9 5 ) ( ap p l y i n g K e r r "t wo p ro n g test") ; Erspamer v. D erwinski , 1 Vet.App. 3, 9 ( 1990) (same). Th e statut or

y pr ov isi on

g ov e rn ingfe e a g re e me nts is s e c tio n 5 90 4, wh ic h p ro vid e s: (d) ( 1) When a cl ai m an t and an attorney have e ntere d into a fee ag ree ment descr ibed in para g raph ( 2) of this subsection, the total fe e pay ab l e t o the attorne y may not exceed 20 per cent of the total amount of any past-due be nefits awa

rded on the basis of the c laim. (2) ( A) A fe eag

re e ment ref err ed to in para g raph ( 1) is one unde r whic h the total am ount

of the fee

pay able to the attorney -- (i) i s to be paid to the attorn ey b y th e Se c r e ta r y d ir e c tl y f

r o m any past-due be nefits awa

rded on the basis of the c laim; and (ii) is conting ent on whethe r or not the matter is r esolved in a manner favor able to the c laimant.9 (B ) For purp o s e s o f

s u b p ar a g r a p h ( A ) o f th is p ar a g r a

p h , a c la im s h a ll be considere d to have been resolved in a manner favor able to the claimant if all or any part of the relief

soug ht is gra

nted. (3) To the ext ent that past-due benef its are a war ded in any

proce eding befor e the Se c re tary , the B oa

rd of Ve te ra

ns ' Ap pe a ls, or

the Un ite d St a te s Co ur

t of Ap pe a ls fo r V e te ra

ns Cla ims , the Secretary may direct that pay ment of an y at t o rn ey s' fee under a fee arr ang ement desc ribed in par ag raph ( 1) of this subsection be made out of such past-due benef

its. I n n o ev en t may

the Secr etar

y withhold for the purpose of such pay ment any portion of benef its pa y able for a period a fter the date of the final decision of the Sec reta

ry , the B oard of

Veter ans' Appea ls, or Court o f Ap peals for Veter ans Claims making ( or orde ring the making of) the a war d. 38 U.S.C. § 5904(d) (empha sis added). Th e imp le me nti ngre g ulatio n p ro vid e s in pe rt ine nt p art : (1) Subject to the require ments of the other pa rag raphs of

this section, . . . the claimant or a

ppellant and a

n attorney -at-la

w may enter int o a f e e a g ree ment providing that pay ment for the servic es of the attorney -at-la w will be made dir ectly

to the a tto rn e y -at- law b y

the De pa rtme nt o f Ve te ra

ns Af fa ir s out of

any pa st- du e be ne fi ts awa rded a s a re sult of a succ essful appe al t o t h e Bo ard of Veter ans' Appea ls or an ap p el l at e c o u rt o r a s a r es u l to f a re o p en ed cl ai m b ef o re t h e D ep ar t m en tfo l l o wi n g a pr ior de nia l of su c h be ne fi ts by the B oa rd of Ve te ra

ns ' Ap pe a ls or

an a pp e llate c ourt

. S u c h ana g r e e m e nt will

be honored

by the Depa

rtment only

if the following conditions are me t . . . . 38 C.F.R. § 20.609(h) ( 1999) (e mphasis added)

. The pe tition and amende d p eti tion togethe r re quest eig ht elements of r elief, w hich bre ak down, in eff

ect, into six reque sts for re lief: (1) Direc t pa y ment of attorney fee s; (2) an RO de cision

a s to dir e c t pa

y me nt o f atto rn e y

fe e s; ( 3) a

de te rm inatio n th a t pa

y me nt t o th e ve te ra

n o f the wi thh e ld 20% wa s made in " bad fa i t h "; (4 ) sanc tions ag ainst the Secre tary for e rrone ous pay

ment to the veter an of the withheld 20%; (5) c reation o f an overpay ment in the veter an' s acc ount for pay ment to him of the wit hheld 20%; and (6) a contempt order ag ainst the S ecr etar y for f ailure to pa

y attorney fe e s d ir e c tly . T he Court

wi ll f ir st dis c us s the fi ft

h re qu e st an d w ill g ro up the thi rd , f ourt h, and sixth elements into a sing le discussion. 1. Pe tit ion fo r Cre ati

on o f O v e rp ayment. The attorn ey petitions the Court for a wr it of

ma nd a mus t o r e qu i r e t h e S e c r e t ar y t o c r e a t e ano v e r

p ay m e n tan d ano f f s e tp u r s u an tt o 3 8 U

. S

. C. § 5314 ag ainst the veter an as to the 20% previously withheld but later errone ously disbursed t o the10

veter an. This re quested relief is premised on the S ecr etar y ' s historic relianc e on the G.C . Prec. 27- 92 ( See Cox Fee Agreem ent II

, 10 Vet.App. at 365) holding that the Secre tary cannot pa

y an attorne y purs ua nt t o a dir e c t- pa y c on tin g e nc y

a g re e me nt w he re the Se c re tary ha s alr e a dy pa id t he c omp le te amount of past-due benef its to the claimant client. As set for th above, of

course , in order f

or such

a wr it to be issued the petitioner must show both that he ha s an indisputable rig ht to the writ and that no alternative is availab l e t o o b t ai n the re lief soug ht. See Cox Fee Agreem ent II

, su pra . I f the Ge ne ra l Co un se l' s h old ingis c or re c t and the re is a ba r to th e ri ght of

the a tto rn e y

in t his c a se to

rec eive dire ct pay

ment of attorne y

fee s from VA beca u s e o f VA' s wrong ful disbursement to the veter an of f

unds that were to be wit hheld pursuant to such an ag ree ment, there may be a r ight to the relief reque sted. Wit h such re lief, pay ment to the attorney

could be made out of funds rec ouped by VAfr om t

he ve te ra n w ith ou t fo rc ingthe a tto rn e y to w a it f or the of fs e t to be g in u

nti l th e ou tc ome of the Scates rema

nd in this case. As to the second pr ong that a petitioner must demonstrate to obtain an ex traordina ry writ -- lack of adequate alter

native mea

ns to obtain the relief

soug ht -- it is not clear e x actly what re medy might be a

vailable f rom VA to a V A claimant suc h as the attorney here who see ks to h av e an overpa y ment decla

red by VA aga inst a VA-be nefits re cipient. Cf. Ma gg itt v . W est , 202 F.3d 1370, 1377 (F ed. Cir. 2000) (" [i ]f ex haustion [of a dminist rative reme dies] will result in pr ejudicial dela y to the individual, or if t h er e i s ' some doubt as to whether the ag ency

was e mpowere d to gr ant ef fe ct i v e r el i ef

, ' [ McCarthy v . Madigan , 503 U.S. 140, 146-48 (1992) ], t he doctr ine [of exhausti on] should not be invoked" ). Henc e, we turn initially to the first prong . The Court will deny the re lief

so ug ht b e c a

us e the pe tit ion

fa ils on the fi rs t pr on g -- the pe tit ion e r ha s no t, fo r the fo llo wi ngre a so ns , demonstrated a

n indisputable rig ht to the cre ation of such an ove rpay ment. A writ must be denied as to this element of the e x traordina ry re l ief soug ht beca

use we hold that the Secre tary is alrea dy ob lig e d, if

the statut or

y and re g ulator y re qu ir e me nts are me t, to pay a tto rn e y fe e s in an a pp ro pr ia te amount direc tly

to the attorney

without reg ard to any rec oupment of any overpa y ment to the veter an. We n ote a t th is p oin t th a t w e make no de te rm inatio n a s to wh e the r the a tto rn e y wo uld be e nti tle d to the full 20% (or

any portion thereof

) of the past-due benef

its tot al awa

rded f or all three claims. See Mason Fee Agree ment , 13 Vet.App. at 86 (holding that direct pa y ment of attorne y

fee s for11

re pr e se ntatio n b e fo re the Court is to b e ma de " on the ba sis of

the c la im o r a

pp lic a tio n f

or be ne fi ts

un de rly ing

theiss ue s su c c essf ull yap pe ale d to thi

s Co ur t ")

. a. Interpr eta t

ion of statu tory provision: Th e fi rs t qu e sti on in d e te rm ini ngwh e the r a wr it

may be iss ue d d ir e c tin g the c re a tio n o f a n o ve rp ay me nt i s w he the r t

he Se c re tary

is o bli g e d b y

statut e or by regulation to withhold 20% of the veter an' s past-due benef its and to pay

an appr opriate a

mount

o f attorne y

f e e s d ir e c tl y

to th e a tt o r

n e y if th e s tatu to r y an d r e g u lato r y r e qu ir e me n ts ar e me t. We would normally

beg in with the statute. "I f the intent of Cong ress is clea r, that i s t h e en d o f the matter; for

the cour t, as well as the ag ency , must g ive eff ect to the unambig uously

expressed intent of C on gress ." Che v ro n, U. S. A. , I nc . v . Na tu ra l Resou rc es D e fe ns e Cou nc il , 467 U.S. 837, 842 (1984). A de termination as to the plain meaningof a statute ne cessa rily require s an examination of the spec ific languag e in questi on within the overa ll structure of the statutory scheme

. See G ardner v. De rwinski , 1 Vet.App. 584, 586 ( 1991), aff 'd sub nom . Gar

dn e r v. B ro wn , 5 F.3d 1456 ( Fe d. Cir. 1993), a ff 'd 51 3 U .S. 11 5 ( 19 94 ); se e als o S mi th ( W ill iam ) v . B ro wn , 35 F.3d 1516, 1522- 23 (F ed. Cir. 1994). Section 5904(d) pr ovides in para g raph ( 3) t hat " the Secr etar y may direc t that pay

ment of any attorney ' s fe e u n d er a

fee arr ang ement desc ribed in par ag raph ( 1) . . . be ma de out of . . . pa st-due be ne fi ts" that "a

re awa rd e d in any pr oc e e din g be fo re the Se c re tary , the B oa rd of Ve te ra ns ' Ap pe a ls, or the Court of Appe als for V eter ans Claims", a nd para g raph ( 2)(A) provides that " a fe e ag ree ment ref err ed to in para g raph (1) i s one under which the total amount of the fee pay able to the attorney

. . . is t o b e pa id t o th e a tto rn e y by the Se c re tary

dir e c tly fr om a ny pa st- du e be ne fi ts a

wa rd e d o n th e ba sis of the c laim". 38 U.S.C. § 5904(d)( 3), (2)

. Am on g oth e r thi ng s, se c tio n 59 04 (d ) is an e xce pti on to th e ass ig nme nt- of -V A- be ne fi ts statutory prohibition, which provides: " Pay ments of bene fit s d u e or to bec ome due unde r any law administered by

the Secr etar

y shall not be assig nable except to the extent spec ifically authorized by law .
. . ." 38 U. S.C. § 5 30 1( a ); see Aronson v . Derwinski , 3 Ve t

. Ap p
. 1 6 2 , 164 (1992) (s e c tio n5 3 0 1 ( a ) " d o e s n o tc o n s t i tu t e a l i m i t a t i o no nt h e S e c r e t ar y ' s o b l i g a t i o n " u n d e r

3 8 C

. F .R. § 2 0. 609( h) to p ay

a tto rn e y fe e s d ir e c tly

); se e als o W

ingo v . W est , 12 Vet.App. 305, 306 ( 1999) (sec tion 5301(a) prohibits a ssignment of past-due benef its e x cept that Secre tary may withhold VA benef its for purpose of

pay ment of attorne y fee s under specific conditions). By providing "e x cept12

to the extent specifically

authorized by

law" , the lang uag e of section 5301(a) clea rly contemplated the possibilit y

of the e nactment of

a statutory

exception. 38 U.S.C. § 5301(a ). Such an e x ception could be e nacte d by

lang uag e either

direc ting or

permitting the Secre tary

to assign V A bene fits. A re view of the leg islative history made in the c ommitt ees' explan at o ry s t atement on the leg islation that became the Vete rans' J udicial Review A ct (VJRA), Pub.L . 100-687, 102 Stat. 4105- 22 (1988), a

nd the Senate f

loor manag er' s remar

ks reve als either a

mbiguity on this point (being unclea r whether the Secre tary must pay or whe ther the f

ee a g ree ment must so provide, see 1 3 4 C o n g. Rec. 31,473, 31 , 4 7 4 (1 9 8 8) (Explanatory Statement on the Compromise Ag ree ment on S. 11, As Amended, the "V eter ans' J udicial Review Act ") ; 1 3 4 Cong. Rec . 31,461 (1988) ( statement by Senator Cra

nston)), or some sug g estion that the authority is permissive ( see 134 Cong. Rec . at 31,475; 134 Cong. Rec . 31 , 4 6 1 (statement of Senator Cra

nston)). None of this history , howeve r,
c o n t a i n s an y e

xp re ss decla ration on the m andator

y versus discr etionary

point. I n 1998, the Senatepa sse d b ill , S. 11 , 1 00 th C on g . ( 19 88 ), that be c a me the VJRA or ig inate d the pa st- du e -b e ne fi ts wi thh old -a

nd -p ay pr ov isi on and e xpre ssl y ma de that a uth or ity mand a tor y (" the Ad min ist rator sh a ll direc t that pay

ment . . . be made ") . S. Rep. N o. 100-418, at 19-20 (1988) (setting forth re ported bill). The Senate Commi ttee repor t de scribed that provision as mandatory (" the Administrator is require d to direct pa

y ment")

. Id. at 69. The H ouse-pa ssed bill, H.R. 5288, 100th C ong . (1998) , had no compar able pr ovision reg ardingdirec t VA pay ment out of past-due be nefits. Ther e is no explanation in the commi ttees' explanatory statement on the compromise leg islation as t o why the " shall" w as chang ed to " may " by

the committees and the n by Congr ess i n the compromise ag ree ment adopted as the VJRA and now contained in 38 U.S.C. § 5904(d)( 3). VJR A, Pub. L . No. 100-687, § 104(a ), 102 Stat. at 4108. As the Court conc ludes in Cox v. Gobe r , _ _ V e t.A pp . _ _, __ , N os . 9 5- 10 68 and

99 -1 25 0, sli p op. at 6 (Oc t. 6, 20 0 0 ) (per curiam) ( Cox III ), issued conc urre ntly

today by the Court, there might be room for

disag ree ment as to whe t h er s ection 5904(d) standing alone r equire s, or mere ly g ives discretion to, the Secr etar y to c arr y out the withhold-and-pa y provisions of

the statute. Compare In the Ma tte r o

f F e e Ag re e me nt o f Sm ith , 4 Ve t.A

pp . 4 87 , 4 93 -9 4 ( 19 93 ) ( c on c lud ingthat 38 U. S.C. § 5904(d) is m andator

y requiringthe Secr etar

y to comply

with the withhold-and-pa y provisions of that statute), vacate d on other grounds sub nom. In the Matter of Fee Agre eme nt of W ick , 40 F.3d13

367 (F ed. Cir. 1994) ( W ick Fe e Agree ment

), with In theMa tte r of Fe e Ag re e me nt o f Sm ith , 1 V e t.A pp . 4 92 , 5 04 -0 5 ( 19 91 ) ( Ste inb e rg , J., c on c ur ri ng ) ( c on c lud ingthat secti on 59 04 (d ) i s discretionar

y , but that the t h en -p en ding r eg ulation, 38 C.F.R. § 20.609(h), would make the Secre tary ' s obligation to honor section 5904(d) a g ree ments mandatory ). b. Secretary's obligat

io ns u nder im

plem enting r egulation : Howeve r, there can be no doubt and we conclude , as did the Court in Aronson , su pra , and as does the Court in Cox III today , that the S e c r e t ar y i s o b l i g e d

b y h i s o w nr e g u l a t i o nt o p ay t h e a t t o r n e y u n d e r a w i t h h o l d

- an d

- p ay c o n t i n g e n c yfe e a g re e me nt if the statut or y and re g ulator y re qu ir e me nts are me t. T hat is be c a us e the Se c re tary

is

no le ss o bli g a te d to take a pa rt ic ula r ac tio n w he n th e du ty

is c re a te d b y

re g ulatio n p ur su ant t o e xpre ss statutory authorization than when it is cre ated by statute. The law is clea r that an a g ency

is bound to follow its own reg ulations as long a s they are in force

. See V

itarelli v. Seaton , 359 U.S. 535, 539- 40 (1 95 9) ; Servic e v. D ulles , 354 U.S. 363, 383-89 (1957); United States ex r el

. A cc a r di

v . S ha ug hn essy , 347 U. S. 2 60 , 2 65 -6 8 ( 19 54 ); Schafrath v. De rwinski , 1 Vet.App. 589, 592 ( 1991) (B oa rd no t fr e e to ig no re re g ulatio n a do pte d b y VA ); se e als o G riv ois v . B ro wn , 6 Vet.App. 136, 140 (1 9 9 4 ) ( ci t i n g Vi tar e lli , su pra , f or pr op os iti on th at pro cedure s mu st b e pr ov ide d to a ll s imi larl y situated VA c laimants). I n th is c on ne c tio n, we str e ss t hat th e Se c re tary ' s obli g a tio n an d the a tto rn e y ' s r ig ht do derive from the statute. Without such express statutory sanction, th e S ecretar

y , as noted in Part I I .B.1.a

. above, would be prohibited by the anti-assig nment provision of 38 U.S.C. § 5301(a) fr om honoring any such direc t-pay

ment fee -ag ree ment provision. Henc e, the attorney ' s rig ht is directly depende nt on the statutory

authority in section 5904(d) a

nd would not exi st without t hat statutory provision. T h e S ec re t ary

h as t h e f u l l au t h o ri t y , i n d ee d t h e o b l i g at i o n , t o p ay t h e a t t o rn ey

o u to f V A's entitlement acc ount (t h e compensation and pension ac count) just as it does to pay any other VA claimant out of that acc ount, w hich is r outinely funded by defic iency appropr iation w hen the amount appropr iated to that a ccount in any fiscal y ear

proves inade quate c ome the end of a fisca l y ear , see , e.g. , 54 Comp. Gen. 393, 395 (1974) ( "should a pplicable appropriation be exhausted, a def iciency appropr iation would be nec essar y prior to pay

ment of additional cla ims"). Where VA make s an
e rr on e ou s p ay

me nt t o a par

tic ula r be ne fi c iary

fr om t he c omp e ns a tio n a

nd pe ns ion a c c ount, that in no way impa i rs i t s au t hority

and oblig ation to pay

from that fund the amount that is owed to the14

corr ect be nefic iary . Whether or not the Sec reta ry decide s to seek to re coup the e rrone ous pay ment is an entirely

differ ent matter. See 38 U.S.C. § 5314 (providing Secre tary with authority to "de duct the amount of the indebtedness of any person who has been deter mined to be indebted to the United States by virtue of suc h person' s participation in a benefits prog ram a dminist ere d by the Secr etar

y from future pay

ments made to such pe rson under any law administere d by t h e S ecretar y ") . The Secre tary ' s historic relianc e on G.C. Prec . 27-92 (Dece mber 9, 1992) (c oncluding that "V A has no leg al authority to pa

y attorney fee s when pay

ment of the complete amount of past-due be nefits has been ma de to the cla imant") is plainly in conflict with the binding opinions of the Comptroller Gene ral discussed below, and he nce is invalid. See Cox III , __ Ve t.A

pp . at __ , s lip op . at 9 ( " G. C. Prec. 27- 92 is plainly

in conflict with the binding opinions of the Comptroller Gene ral and ther efor e cannot stand" ). T h e b o t t o m l i n e i s t h at t h e e rr o n eo u s p ay m en t 's ex i s t en ce i s i m m at er i al t o t h e S ec re t ary 's

re sp on sib ili ty

to m a ke the pa

y me nt t o w hic h th e re is l awf ul e nti tle me nt. Th is p ri nc iple is f ir mly embedde d in the decisions of t he C omptroller Genera l of the United States. E.g. , 2 Comp. Gen. 102, 1 0 6 (1922) ( wher e Ve tera ns' Bur eau ma de er

roneous pa

y ment to person not entitled there to and wh e re ano the r p e rs on

is c le arl y e nti tle d to that pa

y me nt, it i s th e " du ty " of

the Di re c tor

of Ve te ra ns ' Bur eau to " make pa

y ment to the rightful claimant

. . . irrespe ctive of recove ry by the g overnme nt of the a mou nt e rr on e ou sly

pa id . . . e ve n th ou g h it inv olv e s th e g ov e rnme nt i n a do ub le pa

y me nt, provided, of c ourse, ther e has been no contributing neg lige nce or other fa ult charg eable to the person

c la imi ngthe pa

y men t") ; se e als o 66 Com p. Ge n. 61 7, 61 9 ( 19 87 ) ( same , a s to pa y me nt t o A rm y
c on str uc tio n c on tr a c tor ); 37 Com p. Ge n. 13 1, 13 3 (19 57 ) ( same , a s to pa y me nt o f d e a th g ratui ty under Ser

vicemen' s and Ve tera

ns' Survivor Be nefits Act); 19 Comp. Gen. 104, 105 (1939) ( same, as to Social Security

Act pay ment). Acc ording ly , the Court holds that, if the fee ag ree ment has met the statutory and re g ulatory require ments, the Secre tary is require d to make pay

ment to the appellant in this case of any portion of the 20% to whic h h e i s fo u n d to be entitled. See Cox III , _ _ V e t.A pp . at __ , s lip op . at 10 ; see also Mason Fee A greem ent , 13 Vet.App. at 86. Henc e, bec ause the re is no conne ction betwee n any overpa y ment by the Secr etar

y to the veter an and a

ny conting ency

fee that the S ecr etar

y might under the circ umstan ces here be obligated to pay direc tly to the attorney , the attorne y , "w ho car ries the15

bu rden in th is mat ter , h as n ot adeq uat ely est ab l i s h e d a cle ar an d i nd is pu tab le r ight to a wri t", Cos tan za v . W

est , 1 2 V e t.A

pp . 1 33 , 1 34 (1 99 9) (p e r c ur iam or de r) , as to that spe c if ic re lie f s ou g ht, and the Court ma

y not or der such mandamus relief. See Cox Fee Agreem ent II

, 10 Vet.App. at 370. We note in this reg ard that, beca use we have held that the attorney has not established a

clea r and indisputable rig ht to a writ order ing the Secre tary to cre ate a

n overpa y ment ag ainst the veter an, the pe tit ion fo r s uc h a wr it mus t f

a il a nd we ne e d n ot a dd

re ss w he the r t

he a tto rn e y

a lso la c ks an a de qu a te alternative means to obtain the spec ific re lief (ove rpay ment decla

ration) soug ht. Se e Eb e rt v . B ro wn , 4 V e t.A pp . 4 34 , 4 37 (1 99 3) ; c

f. M ag git t , su pra . 2. Petition for RO decision. Re g ard ingthe a tto rn e y ' s p e tit ion tha t th e Court

or de r t he RO to issue a dec ision as to his di rec t -p aym ent claim, the B oard c oncluded that it did not have jurisdictio nto c o n s id e r

th e f e e a g r e e me n t f

o r r e p r e s e n tati o nb e f

o r e th e Co u rt, a lb e it

f o r a r eason differ ent from that g iven by the Court in in part I I .A. of this opinion. R

. at 6

. No n et heless, as conclude d in part I I .A., above , the Court is directing the B oard to send the direc t-pay ment claim bac k to the R O as to repre sentation befor e both VA a nd the Court. Henc e, that cla im will t hen be pe nding be fo re the RO , a s to bo th fe e a g re e me nts

. Th e a tto rn e y

c an o bta in d ir e c t pa

y me nt fr om the Se c re tary of on ly a tot a l of 20 % o f t he pa stdue bene fits for all of his r epre sentation of the ve tera n (whe ther be fore the Court or VA)

. Se e In re Fe e Ag re e me nt o f Sm ith , 7 Vet.App. 92, 92 ( 1994) (en banc order denying en banc revie w) ( Sm ith Fee Agreem ent) ( Ste inb e rg , J., dis se nti ng ); Smith I , 1 Vet.App. at 509-10 (Steinber g , J ., concur ring ). I f the attorney wer e fully succe ssful as to one of the fe e ag ree ments, it would become unne cessa ry for him to pursue VAaction as to the othe r fe e ag ree ment. The Court also notes that prior to Mason Fee Agreem ent , su

pra , it would appea

r t hat recourse to the R O would have been f utile, as the B VA decision conc luded (R. at 6). See Cox Fee Agreem ent II

, 10 Vet.App. at 375 (" [i ]t is well-set t l ed under [the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C . § 1651(a) ,] t hat a pe titioner need not pursue an al t er n ative

re m ed y t hat is futile") . I n Mason FeeAgreem ent , h o w e v e r , th e Co u rt r e ma n d e d to th e B o ar d

the question whether

as to a pa rticular c laim (for a TDIU rating ) the 20% of past-due be nefits wer e owe d to the attorney

in connec tion with his repr esentation before this Court. The Court's rema nd of that

ma tte r e sta

bli sh e d th a t th e Se c re tary ha s ju ri sd ic tio n to c on sid e r t

hat matt er, and , c on sis te nt w ith Scates , su pra , such a que stion should first be considere d by the RO.16

The attorney , "w ho car

ries the bur den in this matter," has provided " no evidenc e esta blishing that letters, telephone ca lls, visi ts to appropriate authorities, or other eff orts have be en under

taken" to seek a decision by the R O. Cos tan za v . W est , 12 Vet.App. 133, 134 ( 1999) (pe r cur iam order ). Henc e, he is not entitled to extraordinary relief beca use t he ex haustion of his remedie s may secur e the re lie f h e ult imate ly se e ks , and , if no t, h e ha s th e re me dy

of tim e ly a pp e a l a s o f r ig ht t o th is C ourt

. See Cox Fee Agreem ent II

, 10 Vet.App. at 374 (" [a] petitioner who ha s administrative alternatives and who loses them by

failing to pursue them is not entit l ed t o a writ of mandamus") ( citing Anderson v. Comm'r of In t er n a l R ev enue , 693 F.2d 844, 846 ( 9th Cir. 1979)). Acc ording ly , the Court ho lds that th e a tto rn e y

ha s n ot y e t exha

us te d his ad

min ist rativ e re me die s ( by

se e kin g an RO decision subseque nt to Mason FeeAgreem ent), and the Court will therefor e deny the instant petition as t o his reque st for a Court order direc ting the RO to make a decision as to this matter. The Court notes that afte r the RO has ma de its decision on any aspec t of this direct-pa

y ment claim (including the re asonable ness of the f ee on the fac ts of this case ), i f either the attorney or t he vete ran disag ree s wi t h t h at decision, he ma y then file a

n NOD a s to that RO decision. See 3 8 U

. S. C. § 7105A (provision for f

iling NOD in simul taneously contested c laims). 3. Petition for Direct Payment by Secre tary. The attorney reque sts that the Court order the Secre tary to pay the attorne y

fee s to the attorney for his repr esentation befor e this Court. The Court conclude s, howeve r, that the attorney has not shown that he ha s no adequate alter native reme dy

as to that pay

ment. See part I I .B.2., a

bove. 4. Pe tit ion s f or Sanc tio ns, Cont

e mpt Orde r, and

"Bad Fai th" D e te rm in atio n ag

ain st Secretary. The Court will deny the att o rn ey ' s reque sts for sanc tions, a contempt order , and a deter mination that the Secre tary acte d in "ba d faith" . We do s o o n t h e g round that, althoug h the Secre tary err ed in pay

ing out the previously withheld 20%, that err oneous pay ment does not aff

ect the attorney ' s rig ht to direct pay ment of attorne y

fee s in an appropr iate amount under the fe e
a g re e me nt f

or re pr e se ntatio n be fo re the Court if the statut or y and re g ulator y re qu ir e me nts are me t. See part I I .B.1., a

bove. C. R e v ie w of

Fe eAgre e ment f

or Re pr ese nta tio n Be

fo re Cour t The Sec reta

ry reque sts in connection with this a ppeal that the Court r eview the fee ag ree ment for r epre sentation befor e the Court. There ar e t h re e cir cumstance s under whic h this Court m ay17

revie w a f ee a g ree ment. First, pursua nt to 38 U.S.C . § 5904(c) , the Court may revie w a finding or order of the B oard a s to a fee ag ree ment for se rvice s befor e VA, as long as that B VA finding or orde r has bee n timely

appea led to this Court. See 38 U. S.C. § 590 4( c )( 2) ; 38 U.S. C. § 72 63 (d ); Smith I , su pra (Steinberg , J ., concur ring ). That avenue of revie w i s a basis for jurisdiction only wher e the

rea sonablene ss or excessiveness of the fee is in disput e, se e Cox v . W est , 149 F.3d at 1 3 64, and wher e the f

ee a g ree ment to be revie wed is one for repr esentation be fore VA. 38 U.S.C. § 5904(c)(2)

. Be cause the S ecr etar

y reque sts that the Court revie w the fe e ag ree ment as to repr esentation before the Court , ju

ri sd ic tio n b a se d o n s e c tio ns 59 04 (c )( 2) and 72 63 (d ), a s to re vie w of the re a so na ble ne ss of a f ee a g ree ment for r epre sentation before VA , i s n ot impli cate d, and the Court thus lacks jurisdiction under those sec tions, see 38 U.S.C. § 5904(c)(2) ; Cox v . W est , 149 F.3d at 1364. Se c on d, the Court may re vie w a fe e a g re e me nt a

nd the a tte nd ant c ir c ums tanc e s a s to a c la im fo r pa y me nt un de r 38 U. S.C. § 59 04 (d ) purs ua nt to a de c isi on by the Se c re tary under 3 8 U. S .C. § 511(a)

. Se e Cox

v . W est , 149 F.3d at 1365. Be cause this avenue of review is based on que stions arising under 38 U.S.C. § 511(a) , an appe llant must have filed an N OD as to a n RO decision on that section 5904(d) claim, in order for the Court to have jurisdiction, see 38 U.S.C. §§ 7104(a ), 7105(a ), (c) , 7252(a) , 7263(c) , (d); Cox v . W est , su pra ; Scates , __ Vet.App. at __, 2000 WL 1141097, at *2. Be cause the RO has not m ade a dec ision as to this matter a nd there can be no NOD, the Court lac ks jurisdiction under sec tion 5904(d). Se e Cox v . W est and Scates , both su

pra . Third, the Court, on its own motion or the motion of either party , may revie w a fee ag ree ment that a per son who repr esents an a ppellant bef

ore the Court is required to file w ith the Court at the time that the appea l is filed. See 38 U. S.C. § 7 26 3( c ); Fr itz v . W est , 13 Vet.App. 190, 192 ( 1999); Car pe nte r ( An ge lin e ) v . W est , 12 Vet.App. 52, 5 3 (1998), appeal dismissed sub nom. Carpenter ( Angeline) v. Gobe r , _

_ F .3 d _ _, No . 9 9- 71 28 , 2 00 0 WL 14 56 45 1 ( F e d. Cir . Se pt. 29 , 2 00 0) ; Shaw v. Gobe r , 1 0 V e t.A

pp . 4 98 , 5 02 (1 99 7) ; U .S. V ET
. A PP
. R. 46 (d )( 2) (B ). Th e langua g e of 38 U. S.C. § 7 26 3( c ) p re su

pp os e s th a t any

re vie w u nd e r t his se c tio n w ill be lim ite d to fe e a g re e me nts in a pp e a ls that are curr ently

pending befor e the Court. See W ick Fe e Agree ment , 40 F.3d at 371 (holding that

se c tio n 72 63 aut ho rize s th is C ourt to r e vie w f

e e a g re e me nts wh e n a

pp e a l is pr op e rl y

be fo re thi s Court and wh e n f e e a g re e me nt ha s bee n fil e d with Court a t time a pp e a l is fi le d) ; In the Matter of the Fee Agreem ent of Bates , 10 Vet.App. 547, 547-48 (1997) (dismissing petit ion as to fee -ag ree ment18

ma tte r w he re a

pp lic a ti on

fo r a tto rn e y fe e s und e r t

he Eq ua l A c c e ss t o Just ic e Ac t, 2 8 U .S. C. § 2 4 1 2 (d), had been dismissed base d on parties' joint mot ion after neg otiated settlement wa s
rea ched) . The a

ppeal to this Court that g ener ated the fee ag ree ment for services before the C ourt that is the s ubject of the S ecr etar y ' s motion was disposed of in October 1991, when the Court g rante d the parties' j o i n t m o t ion for re mand. See U. S. V ET
. A PP
. R. 41(b) ( "or der on c onsent dismissi ng or
r e ma n d in g a c a s e w il l a ls o c o n s ti tute th e ma ndate" ); Mc Cre ar y , su pra (re mand orde r issued October 2 8 , 1 9 9 1). Given that the Mc Cre ar y appea l is no longer

pending befor e the Court, that appea l cannot for

m the basis for the Court' s jurisdiction to review the f ee agreement under section 7263(c ). As to t he ins tant p e tit ion , e ve n if it w e re to p ro vid e a

ba sis fo r t

he Court ' s juri sd ic tio n to revie w the fe e ag ree ment for r epre sentation befor e the Court, as note d above, the questions of the attorney ' s entitlement and elig ibilit y un d er s ec tion 5904 (e.g ., final B VA dec ision, retention of att o r n e y w it h in o n e y e ar a f te r B V A d e c is io n , f

e e a g r e e me n t t

h a t s p e c if ie s d ir e c t p ay

me n t b y the Se c re tary , to ta l a tto rn e y

fe e is c on tin g e nt a

nd a mou nt i s f or no mor e tha

n 2 0% of pa st- du e be ne fi ts

awa rded) and , as to the re prese ntation in this Court, of what portion of the past-due be nefits wer e

" awa rd e d o n th e ba sis of

the c la im o r a

pp lic a tio n f

or be ne fi ts un de rlying th e issue s su c c essf

ull y ap pe ale d to thi

s Co ur t ") based on a

fee ag ree ment for r epre sentation befor e the Court ar e questions that should be considere d by the RO in the first instance , see Sc ates and Mason FeeAgreem ent , b oth

su pra . Any revie w by

this Court of the rea sonablene ss of that fee ag ree ment would be pre mature until entitl ement and e ligibility are first deter

min ed

. Cf. Smith Fee Agree ment , 7 Vet.App. at 91 (dictum stating that fee ag ree ment s fo r represe ntation in this Court are "r eviewa ble by this Court

a lon e fo r r e a so nab le ne ss" ); bu t c f. i d . at 94-95 (Steinber g , J ., dissenting f rom denial of e n banc consideration). Acc ording ly , the C ourt will deny the S ecr etar y ' s J une 1999 motion seekingCourt

re vie w o f t

he fe e a g re e me nt a s to re pr e se ntatio n b e fo re the Court

.

III. Conclusi on Up on c o n s i d e r a tio n o f t

he fo re g oin g ana ly sis , th e re c or d o n a pp e a l, a nd the pa rt ie s' ple a din g s, th e C o u rt v ac ates the N ovember 1998 BV A dec ision for lack of orig inal jurisdiction to decide elig ibilit y for dire ct pay

ment of a w ithheld continge ncy fee under 38 U.S.C. § 5904(d) and re mands19

the matter to the B oar d wi t h d i re ctions to dismi ss the claim for dir ect- pay ment fee elig ibilit y

as ref err ed to the Boa

rd by the RO. See Scates , su

pra . Upon furthe r such c onsideration, bec ause the petitioner has not demonstrated, as to any of the re lief soug ht, bot h that he has a clea r and indisputable rig ht to the writ and that his administrative re m ed i es have been e x hausted, the Court denies the pe tition as amende d. Finally , the Court de nies the Secre tary ' s J une 1999 motion for Court

re vie w o f t

he fe e a g re e me nt f

or re pr e se ntatio n b e fo re the Cou rt , b e c a us e that matte r s ho uld

or ig inate at the RO. ON APPEAL , BV A DECI SI ON VACATE D WI TH DI RECTI ONS; PETI TI ON DEN I ED. DATED: