### COURT OF APPEALS

DECISION

DATED AND FILED

June 23, 2021

Sheila T. Reiff

Clerk of Court of Appeals NOTICE

This opinion is subject to further editing. If published, the official version will appear in the bound volume of the Official Reports.

A party may file with the Supreme Court a petition to review an adverse decision by the Court of Appeals. See W IS

. S TAT . § 808.10

and R ULE 809.62.

Appeal No. 2020AP35 Cir. Ct. No. 2018CV332

STATE OF WISCONSIN IN COURT OF APPEALS

DISTRICT II

T INA T RAHAN ,

P LAINTIFF

- A PPELLANT

- C ROSS

- R ESPONDENT ,

S TONE M ANOR C ONDOMINIUM A SSOCIATION , I NC .,

P LAINTIFF

- C O

- A PPELLANT

- C ROSS

- R ESPONDENT ,

V

.

A LBERT J. H INTON , AS T RUSTEE OF THE A LBERT J. H INTON &

G ERALDINE L. H INTON J OINT R EVOCABLE T RUST D ATED A UGUST 24,

1998 AND G ERALDINE H INTON , AS T RUSTEE OF THE A LBERT J.

H INTON & G ERALDINE L. H INTON J OINT R EVOCABLE T RUST D ATED
A UGUST 24, 1998,

D EFENDANTS

- R ESPONDENTS

- C ROSS

- A PPELLANTS

.

APPEAL and CROSS

- APPEAL from a judgment of the circuit court

for Walworth County: DANIEL STEVEN JOHNSON , Judge. A ffirmed

.No. 2020AP35

2 Before Neubauer, C.J., Reilly, P.J., and Davis, J.

Per curiam opinions may not be cited in any court of this state as precedent

or authority, except for the limited purposes specified in W IS

. S TAT

. R ULE 809.23(3).

¶ 1 PER CURIAM. This action invo lves the interpretation of a ten

- foot

lake easement (the easement) granted to Albert Hinton in 1973. Tina Trahan

, a

current owner of the servient estate, and Stone Manor Condominium Association,

Inc. argue that, as a matter of law

, a pier is not allowed under the easement

. 1

Stone Manor challenges t he trial court ’s finding on partial summary judgment that

the easement implicitly allowed for some sort of pier

. The court held that a

material question of fact existed as to whether the Hintons’ pier complie d with the

terms of the easement. Following a four

- day trial, t he jury found th at the Hinton s ’

pier was reasonable and that the Hinton s had not committed a trespass or a

nuisance in the use of the easement

. Stone Manor appeals from the final judgment

in f avor of the Hintons. The Hinton s cross

- appeal the court’s denial of their claim

preclusion and prescriptive easement arguments.

1 Trahan owns six of the seven condominium units in a converted historic house located along the shores of Lake Geneva. Stone Manor owns the common elements surrounding the

condominium. We will refer to the Plaintiffs

- Appellants

- Cross

- Respondents as “Stone Manor.” Albert and Geraldine Hinton own property near Stone Manor, and prior to the creation of the easement, the Hintons were co

- owners with others in Geraldine Hinton’s family

— the Kurlands. We will refer to the Hintons and the Kurlands collectively an d individually as “the Hintons.”No. 2020AP35

3 ¶ 2 We affirm

. Prior to April 9, 1994, Wisconsin recognized the ability

of a riparian landowner 2 to convey riparian rights by easement. 3 Konneker v.

Romano , 2010 WI 65, ¶27, 326 Wis. 2d 268, 785 N.W.2d 432

. A landowner’s

r iparian rights include the right to construct a pier. Id

. As will be shown below,

the Hi nton s ’ pre

- 1994 easement, while being silent as to whether a pier was

allowed, did co nvey riparian rights to the Hinton s , including the right (subject to

Department of Natural Resources (DNR) regulations and express terms of the

2 “ ‘ R iparian’ means ‘ [o]f, relating to, or located on the bank of a river or stream (or occasionally another body of water, such as a lake).’” Konneker v. Romano , 2010 WI 65, ¶ 5 n.5, 326 Wis. 2d 268, 785 N.W.2d 432 (al ternation in original) ( citing Riparian

, B LACK ’ S L AW

D ICTIONARY (7th ed. 1999) )

. “ In the legal sense, a landowner whose property borders on a body

of water has ‘ riparian rights, ’ meaning ‘ the right to make reasonable use of the water. ’ ” Id.

3 In Stoesser v. Shore Drive P artner ship , 172 Wis. 2d 660, 494 N.W.2d 204 (1993), superseded by statute

, W IS

. S TAT

. § 30.133 (2019

- 20)

, as recognized in ABKA Partner ship v.

DNR , 2002 WI 106, ¶60, 255 Wis. 2d 486, 648 N.W.2d 854, our supreme court explained:

Riparian rights are well defined in Wisconsin law. They include: the right to reasonable use of the waters for domestic, agricultural and recreational purposes; the right to use the shoreline and have access to the waters; the right to any lands

formed by accretion or reliction; the right to have water flow to the land without artificial obstruction; the limited right to intrude upon the lake bed to construct devices for protection from erosion; and the right now conditioned by statute, to construct a

p ier or similar structures in aid of navigation.

Stoesser , 172 Wis. 2d at 666 n.2 (citing Cassidy v. DNR , 132 Wis. 2d 153, 159, 390 N.W.2d 81 (Ct. App. 1986)). All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2019

- 20 version unless

otherwise noted.

“Beginning on April 9, 1994, ... no owner of riparian land that abuts a navigable water may grant by an easement or by a similar conveyance any riparian right in the land to another person, except for the right to cross the land in order to have access to th e navigable water.” W IS

. S TAT

. § 30.133(1). Additionally, the “right to cross the land may not include the right to place any structure ... in the navigable water.” Id. Section 30.133 was the legislative response to

Stoesser , which held that riparian rig hts can be conveyed by easement to non riparian landowners.

Konneker , 326 Wis. 2d 268, ¶36 ; ABKA P’ship , 255 Wis. 2d 486, ¶60; but see W IS

. S TAT

. § 30.131.No. 2020AP35

4 easement) to place a pier in the lake bed. As the Hinton s had riparian rights to

place a pier, the only questio n was one of fact for the jury: was the Hinton s ’ pier

reasonable given the express terms of the easement? The evidence presented at

trial was sufficient to support the jury’s verdict

.

Facts

¶ 3 On September 10, 1973

, the Hinton s conveyed by warranty deed a

parcel of land that they owned, adjacent to Stone Manor

, to Stone Manor’s

predecessors in interest. It is further un dispute d that within that conveyance the

Hinton s reserved to themselves and their heirs and assigns a ten

- foot easement

over th e property :

Excepting and reserving from the above des cribed real

estate to the Granto rs and each of them and each of his or her heirs and assigns a permanent easement upon the South

t en ( 10) feet of said above described real estate or, if said South ten ( 10) feet is not passable then such 10 foot easement may be used at any point in the above described real estate, such easement to be used for passage of vehicles and persons on and acr oss said real estate to the shore of Lake Geneva, said easement to be appurtenant to
the Grantors’ real estate located on the East side of Willow

Street across from the above des cribed parcel being sold;

Granto r Hinton, his heirs and assigns, also retains the right to maintain either an existing boat buoy in the lake in front of the above described easement or a boat lift station on the

shore of Lake Geneva at lake end of easement and to store

a small row boat on the shore of Lake Geneva at the l ake

end of said easement; Granto rs and each of them, their heirs and assigns, shall also have the right to park not more than two vehicles at the same time on said easement; provided that use of said easement or rights s hall not interfere with Grantee’s driveway or p arking lot on the land

above described.

The above easement herein reserved with all of its provisions shall run with the land and shall inure to the

benefit and use o f each of the above named Granto rs as the owners of contiguous land lying on the East side of Willow Street, their h eirs and assigns.No. 2020AP35

5 (Emphasis added.)

¶ 4 Stone Manor brought suit against the Hintons in 2018. Stone Manor

sought judgment declaring the easement unenforceable, an injunction, and

judgment on its nuisance and trespass claims. The Hintons counterclaimed for a

declaration of an express easement, or in the alter native, a prescriptive easement.

The parties filed cross

- motions for summary judgment. After a hearing, t he trial

court granted partial summary judgment to the Hintons, denying the motion to the

extent that it sought dismissal of Stone Manor’s claims, but declaring that the

“[e] asement provides the Hintons with the right to place and maintain a pier to get

from the s hore of Geneva Lake to their boat lift station.” 4 The court determined

that there was an issue of fact as to whether the current pier was reasonable under

the easement. After a trial, the jury found in favor of the Hintons on all issues, and

the court en tered judgment.

Standard of Review

¶ 5 The question presented in this appeal requires us to review a

decision on summary judgment and the interpretation of a deed of easement.

Whether the trial court properly granted partial summary judg ment is a question of

law that this court reviews de novo, and we apply the same methodology used by

4 The trial court held a second summary judgment hearing on two additional issues: the prescriptive easement counterclaim and the Hintons’ claim preclusion argument. The Hintons filed a motion for summary judgment on the issue of claim preclusion, arguing that the predecessor in interest to Stone Manor filed a lawsuit in 1982 seeking an injunction requiring the Hintons to remove the pier and restraining them from maintaining a pier on the property. The

Hintons asserted the 1973 easement as an affirmative defense an d argued that the Hintons “had maintained a ‘walkway’ to his boat lift off the Easement for ten years prior to the 1982 Action.” The court dismissed the 1982 action with prejudice for failure of the plaintiffs to appear at trial. There was a delay in ale rting the court to the claim preclusion issue

, as the Hintons allegedly forgot about the 1982 action. The court denied summary judgment on both issues.No. 2020AP35

6 the trial court. Konneker

, 326 Wis. 2d 268, ¶22 ; see also W IS

. S TAT

. § 802.08.

“ Summary judgment is appropriate only where there is no genuine issue of

material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. ”

Konneker

, 326 Wis. 2d 268, ¶ 22 (citation omitted ).

¶ 6 W hether a deed is ambiguous is a question of law that we review

independently

, and if ambiguous, then th e intent behind the langua ge presents a

question of fact. Id.

, ¶23. T he construction of an unambig uous deed is a question

of law. Id

.

Discussion

¶ 7 “An easement grants a right to use another’s land.” Garza v.

American Transmission Co

. , 2017 WI 35, ¶23, 374 Wis. 2d 555, 893 N.W.2d 1

(citing Konneker , 326 Wis. 2d 268, ¶ 25). The “dominant estate” (the Hintons)

enjoys those privileges granted pursuant to the easement, and the “servient estate”

(Stone Manor) permits the exercise of those privileges. See i d. “ While the

servient estate may not unreasonably interfere with the do minant estate’ s right to

use the easement, ‘ [t]he use of the easement must be in accordance with and

confined to the te rms and purposes of the grant. ’” Konneker

, 326 Wis. 2d 268,

¶25 (alter ation in original) (quoting Stoesser v. Shore Drive P’ship

, 172 Wis. 2d

660, 668, 494 N.W.2d 204 (1993) ) ; Hunter v. McDonald , 78 Wis. 2d 338, 343,

254 N.W.2d 282 (1977).

¶ 8 As the Hinton s’ easement was created by deed

, we look to that

instrument in construing the rela tive rights of the landowners. Konneker

, 326

Wis. 2d 268, ¶26. “‘ Deeds are construed as are other instruments ’ ; accordingly,

‘ the purpose of the court is to ascertain the intention of the parties. ’” Id

. (quoting

Rikkers v. Ryan

, 76 Wis. 2d 185, 188, 251 N.W.2d 25 (1977) )

. Th e informationNo. 2020AP35

7 contained in the four corner s of the deed serve as the primary source to discern the

parties’ intent

. Id. “ I f the langua ge is unambiguous, it would be improper to

resort to extrinsic evidence to ascertain the parties’ intent. ” Id. Conversely, if the

deed is ambiguous, meaning that it is susceptible to more than one reasonable

interpretation, then we may look to extrinsic evidence to ascertain the parties’

intent. Id.

¶ 9 In Konneker

, the issue was whether a “lakefront easement, created

by a deed that is othe rwise silent as to the easement’ s use and purpose, grants

riparian rights, i ncluding the right to construct and maintain a pier .” Id. , ¶ ¶ 2 , 27

.

As our supreme court stated in Konneker

, “one of” “ the riparian rights ,” that c ould

be conveyed to non riparian owners prior to 1994, was the right to place a pier

. Id.

,
¶27. However, t he court made clear that the conveyance of riparian rights does

not “inherently” all ow for construction of a pier

— rather, the question is whether

the conveyance of riparian rights includes the right to construct and maintain a

pier, which depends on the terms and purpose s of the easement. Id.

, ¶27 n n

. 9, 11

.

¶ 10 In Konneker

, t he court found the deed ambiguous, as the easement

language was “othe rwise silent as to the easement’ s use and purpose ” : “In

particular, it is not clear from the deed whether the parties intended the easement

holder to have riparian rights, including the right to construct and maintain a pier.

Accordingly, the deed is ambiguous, and th e court must resort to extrinsic

evidence to ascertain the parties’ intent.” Id. , ¶¶5

- 6, 30 . The court concluded that

summary judgment was not a proper remedy to either the dominant or servient

estate

, as genuine issues of material fact existed as to whe ther the parties creating

the deed intended the easement holder to have riparian rights , including the ability

to have a pier

. Id.

, ¶

¶32

- 33

.No. 2020AP35

8 ¶ 11 In the case before us, unlike in Konneker

, the language of the

easement is clear that the Hintons were granted riparian rights , and that the

purpose was to use the lake shore for access to the lake and for boating . W e, like

the trial court, conclude that the Hintons’ deed is unambiguous; thus, we look to

the four corner s of the deed. The deed clearly grants the Hinton s some riparian

rights

, as the deed grants the Hinton s access to Geneva Lake (“ passage of vehicles

and persons on and across said real estate to the shore of Lake Geneva ”) as well as

the “right to maintain either an existi ng boat buoy in the lake in front of the above

described easement or a boat lift station ” in the lake bed. Thus, as the trial court

found, the plain language indicates that the purpose of the easement was to

provide access to Geneva Lake for boating. The 1973 easement thus provides the

riparian right to place a pier. See Stroesser

, 172 Wis. 2d at 668, 670 (the deed

expressly providing the right “ to use the lake shore for bathing, boating or kindred

purposes ” granted riparian rights to access the lake from the lake shore ).

¶ 12 While the above analysis is dispositive, we further reject Stone

Manor’s argument that the easement’s explicit reference to a row boat and boat lift

effectively e liminates access via a pier

. “W e have long recognized that, implied in

every easement, unless otherwise stated, is the right of the dominant estate to do

what is reasonably necessary to enjoy the easement. ” Garza

, 374

Wis. 2d 555, ¶29

. The court in Garza explained,

[T]he holder of an easement

... is entitled to use the
servient estate in a manner that is reasonably necessary for
the convenient enjoyment of the servitude. The manner, frequency, and intensity of the use may change over time to take advantage of developments in tech nology and to accommodate normal development of the dominant estate

or enterprise benefited by the servitude.

Id. (citation omitted ).No. 2020AP35

9 ¶ 13 Beyond the easement’s grant of riparian rights that include the right

to construct and maintain a pier, the pier placed by the Hintons was “reasonably

necessary ” to enjoy the easement under its plain terms. As the Hintons argue on

appeal, “[b]y arguing that the E asement allows no pier at all, Stone Manor is

saying that the E asement contemplates that the Hintons will wade into Geneva

Lake to get to their boat lift, lower their boat, and clamber over the sides of the

boat from the water. This is not a p lausible interpretation of the E asement.” We

agree. 5 By example, i n Hunter v. Keys , 229 Wis. 2d 710, 712, 600 N.W.2d 269

(Ct. App. 1999) , we concluded that “the grant of an access and egress easement

necessarily implies the right to create and maintain a suitable access way.”

Despite a lack of language allo wing the holder of the easement to fill in wetlands

or pave a road, we found these actions reasonably necessary to accomplish the

purpose of the easement. Id. at 715

- 1 7 ; see also Garza , 374 Wis. 2d 555, ¶ ¶39

- 40

( despite explicit contradictory language in easement calling for “wood pole

structures,” court concluded that allowing other materials like steel was consistent

with the easement’s purpose). The pier was reasonably necessary to enjoy the

purpose of the easement.

¶ 14 Stone Manor separately argues that the court erroneously exercised

its discretion when it prevented an expert from testifying that “a pier is not

necessary for use of the 1973 Easement.” We review a trial court’s decision to

exclude expert testimony under the erroneo us exercise of discretion standard.

5 Stone M an o r acknowledges that the boat lift must be in the water to be us ed. Nevertheless, they c ontend the Hintons could also use a row boat to get to their boat lift, contemplating that, instead of wading in the water, the Hintons could climb from one boat to

another , including transporting gear and supplies . We find this interpretation to be equal ly implausible, as doing so would not only be difficult, particularly for those who are elderly or less agile, but would also be, at times, unwieldy and unsafe.No. 2020AP35

10 Seifert v. Balink , 2017 WI 2, ¶93, 372 Wis. 2d 525, 888 N.W.2d 816

. We need

not fully analyze this argument given our conclusions above . T he only issue for

the jury was whether the pier placed by the Hinton s was reaso nable given the

language of the easement. The parties presented evidence as to the reasonableness

of the Hinton s ’ pier. Stone Manor’s expert’s opinion that “ a pier is not necessary

for use of the 1973 Easement” was not the question before the jury

, and therefore

the court did not erroneously exercise its discretion in excluding that opinion. 6

(Emphasis added.)

¶ 15 Finally, Stone Manor appeal s from the trial court’s denial of its

motions after verdict pursuant to W IS

. S TAT

. § 805.14( 5 )(c). Stone Manor argues

that the jury’s answers to Question s No. 1 and 3 should have been changed from

“ n o” to “yes

, ” as “the jury’s answers ignored what was undisputed evidence and

despite what should have been a ruling on a point of law.” 7 “When consider ing a

motion to change the jury’ s answers to verdict questions, we view the evidence in

the light most favorable to the verdict and affirm the verdict if it is supported by

any credible evidence.” Kubichek v. Kotecki , 2011 WI App 32, ¶14, 332 Wis. 2d

6 The trial court also made clear that it questione d the expert’s conclusions as they

contain ed “no explanation” as to why the Hintons did not need a pier. We see no error in the

c ourt’s exercise of discretion.

7 Question No. 1 asked, “Have the Hintons violated the E asement by placing, maintaining and using a boat lift and pier that are wider th an the Hintons’ riparian zone?” Question No. 3 asked, “Have the Hintons violated the E asement by placing their pier into Geneva Lake and attaching their boat lift in its current placement?” The jury answered both of these questions in the negative.

To the extent that Stone Manor is arguing that the questions should have never gone to the jury, as they involved a question of law, we note that the record indicates that Stone Manor never objected to these special verdict questions; in fact, they requested them. Failure to object at the jury instruction or verdict conference stage “constitutes a waiver of any error in the proposed

instructions or verdict.” W IS

. S TAT

. § 805.13(3)

. As Stone Manor’s arguments also focus on the sufficiency of the evidence, we will address its arguments.No. 2020AP35

11 522, 796 N.W.2d 858 ; see also W IS

. S TAT

. § 805.14 (1). “The standard of review

is even more stringent where, as here, th e [trial] court upheld the jury’ s findings on

motions after verdict. ” Kubichek , 332 Wis. 2d 522, ¶14. We will uphold the

jury’s verdict absent “ a complete failure of proof that the verdict must be based on

speculation.” Id. (quoting Coryell v. Conn , 88 Wis. 2d 310, 315, 276 N.W.2d 723

(1979))

.

¶ 16 A s addressed above, given the conclusion that the Hintons were

within their rights to construct a pier, the question before the jury was whether the

pier, as constructed

, was consistent with the language of the easement. We

conclude that the jury’s verdict was s upported by c redible evidence. Jeff Reed

,

owner of Reed Construction, a company that does work building, placing, and

repairing piers and rock sea walls on Geneva Lake

, testified at trial

. He explained

that he had worked on a previous version of the Hintons’ pier dec ades earlier in

the 1980s when he was in his teens

. According to Reed and based on his

experience in the industry, the current location of the Hintons’ boat lift, and thus

implicitly the attached pier, is reasonable for use of their boat , given water levels

and fluctuations. Reed further testified that in his opinion, the Hintons ’ pier does

not “interfere[] with the riparian rights of any other riparian owners,” including

Stone Ma nor, and that he had no “problems” maneuvering “big barges” between

the Hintons’ pier and Stone Manor’s pier to do his work each year. See Garza

,

374 Wis. 2d 555, ¶29 ( “ Unless authorized by the terms of the servitude, the holder

is not entitled to cause unreasonable damage to the servient estate or interfere

unreasonably with its enjoyment. ” (citation omitted) ). Accordingly, there was

some evidence from which the jury could conclude that the current placement of

the pier was reasonable and not a violation of the terms of the easement

.No. 2020AP35

12 ¶ 17 Specifically, Stone M anor takes issue with the “riparian zone”

language in Question No. 1, explaining that the expert witness testified as to the

size of the riparian zone based on W IS

. A DMIN

. C ODE § NR 326.07(2), which he

fo und to be no wider than the ten

- foot width of the ea sement. 8 Stone Manor

suggests that the expert’s testimony was uncontroverted. As the trial court

recognized, the language of the easement does not include any discussion of a

“riparian zone.” Further, Stone Manor did not present any credible evidence th at

the parties intended to incorporate a riparian zone within the terms of the

easement, nor has Stone Manor cited any legal authority for the conclusion that the

easement limits the water access to a certain riparian zone

. As the Hintons had

riparian rig hts and the easement itself did not expressly prohibit the pier, then the

issue of the placement and size of the pier is under DNR control. 9

¶ 18 T here was contradictory evidence presented at trial in this case

, and

the jury was within its right to accept or disregard a witness’s testimony. See

Weiss v. United Fire & Cas. Co. , 197 Wis. 2d 365, 389

- 90, 541 N.W.2d 753

(1995) (“When there is any credible evidenc e to support a jury’s verdict, ‘ even

though it be contradicted and the contradictor y evidence be stronger and more

convincing, nevertheless the verdict ... must stand. ’ ” (citation omitted) ); Brogan

8 The present pier extends “65 feet into Geneva Lake.” W hile the Hintons state it is “12

feet wide ,” w e note that the photos show a much narrower pier at the shoreline, but with the boat lift at its side, the width appears to be twelve feet at the end of the pier

.

9 “[ W ISCONSIN S TAT

. ch.] 30 embodies a system of regulation of Wisconsin’s navigable waters pursuant to the public trust doctrine.” ABKA P’ship , 255 Wis. 2d 486, ¶11 . “Regulation and enforcement of this public tr ust rests with both the legislature and the DNR.” Id. , ¶12; see also W IS

. A DMIN

. C ODE § NR 326.07 (indicating “the department shall” utilize the proscribed methods “to determine whether a pier or boat shelter interferes with the right of an adjacent ripar ian ” ). Thus, the DNR and the legislature decide if one’s use of riparian rights violate a riparian owner’s rights.No. 2020AP35

13 v. Industrial Cas. Ins. Co. , 132 Wis. 2d 229, 239, 392 N.W.2d 439 (Ct. App.

1986) (“When the parties offer conflicting testimony by qualified experts, the

issue becomes one of weight of the testimony and credibility of the witnesses,

which is within the province of the jury. The jury may accept or disregard expert

testimony.” ( citation omitted )). The jury finding can be summar ized in its

negat ive answer to Question No. 3 of the special verdict, which asked: “Have the

Hintons violated the E asement by placing their pier into Geneva Lake and

attaching their boat lift in its current placement? ” W e see no error in the court’s

failure to grant Ston e Manor’s motions after verdict.

¶ 19 In this case, the installation and use of a pier to access the boat lift is

directly related to the purpose for which the easement was created: access to the

lake for boating. As the court was correct that a pier was contemplated by the

terms and purposes of the easement and as sufficient evidence supports the jury’s

verdict as to the reasonableness of the pier, we affirm.

Cross

- Appeal

¶ 20 The Hintons cross

- appeal in the alternative

, claiming that Stone

Manor’s action was subject to claim preclusion and that they have a prescriptive

easement for the pier . The court disagreed, conclud ing that claim preclusion did

not apply and that the Hinton s ’ assertion of a prescriptive easement fail ed as a

matter of law. The Hintons note in their brief that as their cross

- appeal is “in the

alternative,” if we affirm the judgment on the jury’s verdict “there will be no need

to address the cross

- appeal issues.” We n eed not reach the cross

- appeal. A s we

affirm the judgment in favor of the Hintons, a determination on the Hintons ’

alternative arguments will have no bearing on the issues in the case

. OnlyNo. 2020AP35

14 dispos itive issues need be addressed. See Lake Delavan Prop. Co., LLC v. City of

Delavan , 2014 WI App 35, ¶14, 353 Wis. 2d 173, 844 N.W.2d 632.

¶ 21 No costs to either party.

By the Court.

— Judgment affirmed.

This opinion will not be published. See W IS

. S TAT

.

R ULE 809.23(1)(b)5.