J. S03007/16

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION – SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA :

:

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

v. :

:

IRVIN GOULBOURNE, : No. 644 EDA 2015

:

 Appellant :

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence, January 28, 2015,

in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County

Criminal Division at No. CP-51-CR-0001843-2013

BEFORE: FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E., OTT AND JENKINS, JJ. 

MEMORANDUM BY FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.: FILED MARCH 15, 2016

Irvin Goulbourne appeals from the judgment of sentence entered 

January 28, 2015, following his conviction in a waiver trial of possession of a 

controlled substance, possession with intent to deliver a controlled 

substance, and possession of paraphernalia.1 We affirm.

The suppression court provided the following:

On August 3, 2012, approximately 3:48 p.m., 

Police Officer Shaun McPhillips testified that while on 

duty with his partner, Officer Wissman, their tour of 

duty took them to the area of the 1900 block of 

Sansom Street in response to a radio flash about a 

male who had committed a burglary earlier in the 

day. The flash the officers had received was a black 

male with an orange shirt and orange sneakers and 

also put over the radio was that two firearms were 

taken. Approximately one hour and forty minutes 

after the flash came out for the burglary, Officer 

 

1 35 Pa.C.S.A. § 780-113(a)(16), (30) & (32), respectively.
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McPhillips testified that they observed the Appellant 

walking westbound on Sansom Street wearing an 

orange shirt, khaki shorts, and orange sneakers. 

The officers then observed the Appellant enter a bar, 

O’Shea’s Tavern, at 1907 Sansom Street. The 

officers went into the bar and approached the 

Appellant and identified themselves as police 

officers. They then asked the Appellant to exit the 

bar and the Appellant complied. Once outside the 

bar, the officers told Appellant that he had been 

stopped for meeting a description of a prior burglary 

and they asked the Appellant for his identification. 

Appellant claimed he did not have any identification 

so the officers then asked for his name and date of 

birth for an NCIC/PCIC check. Appellant provided 

the name of Reginald Goldberg but no results came 

back for that name.

Officer McPhillips testified that at that point 

based on the fact that Defendant provided a name 

that was not coming up on the system that he met 

the general flash of the burglary, the officers decided 

to bring the Appellant to the 9th District for further 

investigation. Officer McPhillips testified that it was 

his intent to get fingerprints of the Appellant to 

verify his identity and determine if he had any 

outstanding warrants. For safety purposes, 

Officer McPhillips patted Appellant down before 

placing him in the marked patrol vehicle. When 

Officer McPhillips conducted the pat down, he felt a 

plastic bag of “soft powder” that was knotted, which 

Officer McPhillips testified he knew based on his 

experience to immediately be narcotics. Upon 

arrest, the officers recovered one clear bag with 

alleged cocaine, one Marlboro cigarette box with 

thirty four clear bags of alleged cocaine, one green 

mint tin canister containing ten clear bags of alleged 

cocaine, and one brown marijuana grinder, as well as 

$1,010.00 in currency.

Trial court opinion, 6/4/15 at 2-3 (citations omitted).

Appellant raises the following issues for our review:
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A. Did not the lower court err in denying 

Appellant’s motion to suppress evidence where 

Appellant was subjected to an unconstitutional 

investigatory detention outside the bar without 

reasonable suspicion, the detention was 

continued without either reasonable suspicion 

or probable cause to believe that Appellant had 

committed the crime of giving a false name, 

and he was frisked without objectively 

reasonable suspicion that he was armed and 

dangerous[?]

B. Even if there was a lawful basis to conduct a 

Terry frisk, did not the lower court err in 

denying Appellant’s motion to suppress 

evidence where there was insufficient evidence 

under the plain feel rule to permit the officer to 

seize a small soft bag from Appellant’s pants 

pocket?

C. Did not the lower court err in denying 

Appellant’s motion to suppress evidence where 

law enforcement officers’ actions in taking 

Appellant into the police station for 

fingerprinting and identification check was a 

full blown arrest, which was not supported by 

probable cause, and the resulting search and 

seizure from his person was not incident to a 

lawful arrest?

Appellant’s brief at 3.

Our standard of review for challenges to the denial of a suppression 

motion is as follows: 

Our standard of review in addressing a challenge to 

the denial of a suppression motion is limited to 

determining whether the suppression court’s factual 

findings are supported by the record and whether 

the legal conclusions drawn from those facts are 

correct. Because the Commonwealth prevailed

before the suppression court, we may consider only 

the evidence of the Commonwealth and so much of 
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the evidence for the defense as remains 

uncontradicted when read in the context of the 

record as a whole. Where the suppression court’s 

factual findings are supported by the record, we are 

bound by these findings and may reverse only if the 

court’s legal conclusions are erroneous. Where . . . 

the appeal of the determination of the suppression 

court turns on allegations of legal error, the 

suppression court’s legal conclusions are not binding 

on an appellate court, whose duty it is to determine 

if the suppression court properly applied the law to 

the facts. Thus, the conclusions of law of the courts 

below are subject to our plenary review.

Commonwealth v. McAdoo, 46 A.3d 781, 783-784 (Pa.Super. 2012), 

quoting Commonwealth v. Hoppert, 39 A.3d 358, 361-362 (Pa.Super. 

2012) (citations omitted).

Here, appellant complains that the suppression court erred in denying 

appellant’s suppression motion because the investigatory detention and 

subsequent frisk were not supported by reasonable suspicion, there was an 

insufficient basis under the plain feel rule for the officer to seize a plastic bag 

containing narcotics from appellant’s person, and the police lacked probable 

cause to take appellant to the police station for fingerprinting and an 

identification check. These issues constitute purely factual issues on appeal. 

As noted in McAdoo, supra, this court is bound by the suppression court’s 

factual findings so long as the record supports those findings.

Our careful review of the record reveals that Officer McPhillips’ 

testimony, found credible by the suppression court, provides ample support 

for the suppression court’s factual determinations. Specifically, appellant’s 
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clothing and proximity to the burglary location justified the officer’s 

encounter in the bar. This coupled with appellant’s failure to provide 

identification outside of the bar supported the reasonable suspicion 

necessary for further investigation and detention. The information regarding 

the theft of guns in the robbery justified the Terry frisk, and the experience 

of Officer McPhillips allowed him to immediately identify contraband on plain 

feel. Following the discovery of the contraband, nothing further was 

required to support arresting appellant, and he was properly taken into 

custody for identification and fingerprinting. We are bound to those 

determinations, and, therefore, find that the suppression court did not err in 

denying appellant’s motion to suppress evidence.

Judgment of sentence affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 3/15/2016