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IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE

KABIR ABUBAKAR,

Appellant,

v.

HIGHLINE AFTERMARKET 

ACQUISITIONS

and

UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE 

APPEAL BOARD 

Appellees.

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) C.A. No. N21A-03-002 CLS

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Date Submitted: August 12, 2021

Date Decided: September 28, 2021

Upon Appellant’s Appeal from a Decision of the Unemployment Insurance Appeal 

Board. AFFIRMED.

ORDER

Kabir Abubakar, Pro Se, Appellant. 

Victoria Groff, Esquire, Delaware Department of Justice, Wilmington, Delaware,

19801, Attorney for Appellee, Delaware Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board. 

Lauren P. DeLuca, Esquire, Connolly Gallagher LLP, Wilmington, Delaware, 

19801, Attorney for Appellee, Highline Aftermarket Acquisitions. 

SCOTT, J.
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INTRODUCTION

Before this Court is Appellant Kabir Abubakar (“Appellant”) appeal from the 

decision of the Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board (the “Board”) affirming the 

decision of the Appeals Referee and finding the Appellant voluntarily left his 

employment at Highline Aftermarket Acquisitions (“Employer”) without good 

cause in connection with his work, disqualifying him from unemployment benefits.

The Court has reviewed the parties’ submissions and the record below. For the 

following reasons, the Board’s decision is AFFIRMED.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL CONTEXT

Appellant was employed by Employer from February 3, 2020, until March 24, 

2020, at which time Appellant quit because he was experiencing COVID-19 

symptoms. At the time he quit, Appellant was employed as a Production Specialist.

On May 17, 2020, after having no contact with Employer, Appellant filed for 

unemployment.

Claims Deputy’s Determination

On June 25, 2020, the Claims Deputy found Appellant had the burden, in a 

resignation situation, to show good cause for quitting on March 24, 2020. The 

Appellant admitted he quit his employment when he felt sick with symptoms of 

COVID-19. He never made Employer aware of his symptoms and was not advised 

to leave employment by a medical provider. The Claims Deputy further found his 
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leaving to be personal and not attributed to work. The Claims Deputy ruled 

Appellant was disqualified from receiving benefits pursuant to 19 Del. C. § 3314(1), 

because Appellant’s reason for quitting did not meet the burden of showing good 

cause, as he did not leave due to a substantial reduction in hours or wages, or a 

substantial deviation in the original agreement of hire or change in working 

conditions to Appellant’s detriment. Appellant timely appealed the Claim Deputy’s 

determination and added two exhibits to bolster his claim.1 A hearing was heard 

before an Appeals Referee on July 28, 2020. 

Hearing Before the Appeals Referee

At the hearing, Appellant testified on March 24, 2020, he quit his job after 

experiencing COVID-19 symptoms. He attested to experiencing flu like symptoms, 

which caused him to visit the emergency room. No COVID-19 tests were readily 

available, so it is unconfirmed whether he had the virus. Appellant testified he 

continued to go to work because he did not have confirmation he had the virus, but 

when he lost his sense of smell on the job, he quit. He did not inform Employer he

suspected he had contracted COVID-19 to not cause “panic”. Appellant then had 

1 The first exhibit was a copy of “SLOW THE SPREAD PRESIDENT TRUMP’S 

CORONAVIRUS GUIDELINES FOR AMERICA” telling Americans to stay 

home if they are sick, issued by the White House and the Centers for Disease 

Control and Prevention. The second exhibit was a screenshot of Delaware 

Department of Labor FAQs about eligibility for unemployment if an employee was 

quarantined. 
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no further contact with Employer. He claims he followed the guidance of healthcare

professional or a public official as the government published broadly “If you are 

sick, stay home” and he is entitled to unemployment benefits because he had to 

quarantine as published by the Delaware Department of Labor. 

Appeals Referee’s Determination

By decision dated July 27, 2020, the Appeals Referee affirmed the decision 

of the Claims Deputy. The Appeals Referee found Appellant began experiencing 

symptoms of COVID-19 and went to the Emergency Room. Appellant was unable 

to obtain a COVID-19 test to verify his condition. Appellant continued to work until 

he was unable to smell. He did not want to “panic” his Employer, so Appellant quit 

and did not contact his Employer from that point on. The Appellant had the burden 

to prove he left employment for good cause. Under Delaware law, Appellant is 

required to make a good faith effort to exhaust administrative remedies with his 

employer before he can be awarded unemployment benefits. The Appeals Referee 

found it to be undisputed Appellant stopped reporting to work due to his belief he 

had COVID-19 and did not contact or inform his employer of the circumstances of 

his absence. Appellant failed to exhaust or even explore administrative remedies 

with his Employer as he failed to make contact with Employer. The Appeals Referee 

ruled Appellant left his work voluntarily without good cause attributed to such work

and consequently disqualified from receipt of unemployment benefits. On July 30, 
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2020, Appellant appealed the Referee’s decision. A hearing was held before the 

Board on October 21, 2020. 

Appeals Board’s Decision

By decision dated December 21, 2020, the Board affirmed the Referee’s 

determination. The Board agreed Appellant must have first exhausted 

administrative remedies with Employer and he needed to at least notify employer of 

the problem and request a solution. Appellant quit his employment without 

notifying Employer, Appellant failed to prove “good cause” in quitting his job. On 

December 31, 2020, Appellant sent an email to the Board with a request to reargue 

the merits of his appeal, bringing forth the same evidence and arguments argued at 

the hearing on October 21, 2020.

Appeal Board’s Denial of Appellant’s Rehearing

The Board treated Appellant’s December 31, 2020, email as request to rehear 

his appeal. By decision dated February 19, 2021, the Board denied Appellant request 

to rehear his appeal. The Board held it had already heard the argument’s Appellant 

asserted in his re-argument request and did not find his arguments to be persuasive 

and Appellant had an affirmative duty to inform his employer he was sick before 

leaving. This appeal follows. 
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PARTIES CONTENTIONS

On appeal, Appellant grounds for his appeal were in deciding the outcome of 

his case, the Board looked only at the letter of the law, not the spirit of the law. Upon 

further investigation, the Court understands the spirit of the law to mean what the 

law intends to serve. Additionally, Appellant’s grounds for appeal include the Board

treated the COVID-19 pandemic as a normality for the purposes of administrative 

remedies, the Board ignored directives it gave to claimants in its FAQs arguing no 

requirement was imposed to insist on informing one’s employer about a health 

condition that he could not provide proof for, and the Board treated COVID-19 as 

an issue that a typical employee has all the answers for.

In Appellant’s Opening Brief, filed on June 23, 2021, Appellant argues he

voluntarily quit for good cause because his work environment presented a 

“hazardous condition”, and he abandoned his job due to “clearly necessitous and 

compelling” personal circumstances because his “health issues were time sensitive.”

In support of his arguments, Appellant relies solely on the Maryland Unemployment 

Decisions Digest, found on Maryland Government Department of Labor, Licensing 

& Regulation, which does not bind this Court. This Court considered the 

administrative caselaw cited, however, the facts of the caselaw cited does not address 

issues similar to COVID-19 and the circumstances presented before this Court. 
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The Board advised the Court by letter it would not file an Answering Brief 

because the Board understands Appellant “is challenging the Board’s decision on its 

merits.” As such, the Board does not intend to participate further in this appeal.

Appellee Employer filed an Answering Brief on July 13, 2021. Employer 

argues the Board’s findings of fact are supported by substantial record evidence as 

every factual finding relevant to the Board’s decision were admissions by Appellant. 

Employer further argues the Board’s conclusions of law are free from legal error 

because the Board correctly held under 19 Del. C. § 3314(1) Appellant needed to 

first exhaust all reasonable alternatives to resolve the problem before voluntarily 

leaving. Appellant failed to notify employer of his problem before quitting. 

Appellant filed a Reply Brief on July 27, 2021, which did not set forth any 

further arguments, rather rehashing the previous points made. 

STANDARD OF REVIEW

On appeal from the Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board, the Superior 

Court must determine if the Board's factual findings are supported by substantial 

evidence in the record and free from legal error.2 Substantial evidence is “such 

relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a 

2 Unemployment Ins. Appeal Bd. v. Duncan, 621 A.2d 340, 342 (Del.1993).
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conclusion.”3 The Court must review the record to determine if the evidence is 

legally adequate to support the Board's factual findings.4 The Court does not “weigh 

evidence, determine questions of credibility or make its own factual evidence 

findings.”5

When a discretionary ruling of the Board is appealed, the Court’s scope of 

review is “limited to whether the Board abused its discretion.”6In this instant case, 

this Court will review the Board's decision to determine whether the Board's refusal 

to reconsider Appellant's appeal was an abuse of discretion.

DISCUSSION

In administrative appeals cases, this Court has recognized that it may “exhibit 

some degree of leniency toward a pro se litigant to see his case is fully and fairly 

heard.”7 However, pro se litigants are still expected to adhere to the rules and

requirements of this Court.8“There is no different set of rules for pro se plaintiffs, 

3 Histed v. E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co., 621 A.2d 340, 342 (citing Olney v. 

Cooch, 425 A.2d 610, 614 (1981)).

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Johnson v. Chrysler Corp., 213 A.2d 64, 66 (Del.1965).

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Id. at 67.

6 Funk v. Unemployment Ins. Appeal Bd., Del.Supr., 591 A.2d 222, 225 (1991).

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Jackson v. Unemployment Ins. Appeal Bd., 1986 WL 11546, at *2 

(Del.Super.Sept. 24, 1986).

8 See Von Fegyverneky v. CFT Ambulance Serv., 2012 WL 2700464, at *3, n.17 

(Del.Super. June 28, 2012) citing Draper v. Medical Center of Delaware, 767 A.2d 

796, 799 (Del.2001).
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and the trial court should not sacrifice the orderly and efficient administration of 

justice to accommodate an unrepresented plaintiff.”9

I. The Board’s Decision is Supported by Substantial Evidence.

The issue before the Court is whether the Board erred when it found Appellant 

quit without good cause in connection to his work, subsequently denying 

unemployment benefits. Under 19 Del. C. § 3314(1), an individual will not qualify 

for unemployment benefits if the individual leaves their employment “voluntarily 

without good cause attributable to such work....”10 The former employee hears the 

burden of proof to establish entitlement to benefits.11 “Good cause” is illustrated 

where “(i) an employee voluntarily leaves employment for reasons attributable to 

issues within the employer’s control and under circumstances in which no 

reasonably prudent employee would have remained employed, and (ii) the employee 

first exhausts all reasonable alternatives to resolve the issues before voluntarily 

terminating his or her employment.”12 The Board’s decision Appellant quit without 

good cause rests on his failure to exhaust all reasonable alternatives before he 

9 Draper v. Medical Center of Delaware, 767 A.2d 796, 799 (Del.2001).

10 19 Del. C. § 3314(1).

11 Longobardi v. Unemployment Ins. Appeal Bd., 287 A.2d 690, 692 (Del. Super. 

Ct. 1971). 

12 Thompson v. Christiana Care Health Sys., 25 A.3d 778, 782-83 (Del. 2011).
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voluntarily left. For an individual to exhaust all reasonable alternatives before 

voluntarily terminating his or her employment, 

the employee must at least notify the employer of the problem and request a 

solution. The employee “must also bring the problem to the attention of 

someone with the authority to make the necessary adjustments, describe the 

problem in sufficient detail to allow for resolution, and give the employer 

enough time to correct the problem.”13

The Board’s decision that Appellant quit without good cause was supported 

by substantial evidence. Before rending its decision, the Board reviewed the 

following evidence: the evidence presented to the Referee, the Referee’s Decision, 

Appellant’s Notice of Appeal of the Referee’s Decision, and the testimony of the 

hearing held on October 21, 2020. Among the evidence before the Board in this 

case was Appellant’s own testimony admitting he did not contact Employer when 

he quit due to the development of COVID-19 symptoms in March 2020. It is 

undisputed Appellant did not contact Employer regarding his reason for leaving and 

explained he did not contact his Employer because he would not get medical leave 

if requested as the Employer’s medical leave policies did not comply with his 

hesitancy. 

The Board appropriately applies 19 Del. C. § 3314(1). To be entitled to 

employment benefits, Appellant had the burden to prove he left his employment with 

13 Id. at 785 quoting Calvert v. State, Dept. of Labor & Workforce Develop., Empl. 

Sec. Div., 251 P.3d 990, 1001–1002 (Alaska 2011).
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good cause attributed to his work. For Appellant to have proven good cause, he must

have exhausted all reasonable administrative remedies and at the very least, 

Appellant needed to inform of his employer of his situation before leaving. It is 

undisputed he did not even contact Employer when or even after Appellant decided 

to leave his employment.

II. The Board’s decision to deny Appellant’s request for rehearing is not 

an abuse of discretion. 

A ruling on a motion for a rehearing is entirely within the Board's discretion.14

Therefore, the Board's decision will be reversed only if the Board abused its 

discretion by acting “arbitrarily or capriciously” or by “exceed [ing] the bounds of 

reason in view of the circumstances and ignor[ing] recognized rules of law or 

practice so as to produce injustice.”15 Here, the Board denied a rehearing because, 

as the Board found, it had already heard the arguments Appellant wanted to reiterate 

and the Board did not find those arguments to be convincing. Therefore, there was 

14 Straley v. Advance Staffing, Inc., 984 A.2d 124 (Del. 2009) citing Tesla Indus., 

Inc. v. Bhatt, 2007 WL 2028460, at *2 (Del.Super. June 28, 2007); see also Funk, 

591 A.2d at 225 (“Section 3320 grants the Board wide discretion over the 

unemployment insurance benefits appeal process.”); 19 Del. C. § 3321(a); UIAB 

Rule 7.1 (“The grant or denial of a motion for rehearing is solely within the 

discretion of the Board.”).

15 PAL of Wilmington v. Graham, No. CIV.A. 07A-05-008JRJ, 2008 WL 2582986, 

at *4 (Del. Super. Ct. June 18, 2008) quoting Nardi v. Lewis, 2000 WL 303147, at 

*2 (Del.Super.Ct. Jan.26, 2000).
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no basis for the Board to exercise its discretion and hear re-argument on the same 

issues brought before the Board with no proffer of additional evidence.

CONCLUSION

The Board did not abuse its discretion by disqualifying Appellant from 

unemployment benefits because there is substantial evidence to support the 

conclusion Appellant quit without good cause. The Board did not err as a matter of 

law. The Board also did not abuse its discretion in denying Appellant’s request to 

reargue his appeal. Accordingly, the decision of the Board is AFFIRMED. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

/s/ Calvin L. Scott

The Honorable Calvin L. Scott, Jr.