IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI
N O. 2014-KA-00288-COA FREDERICK DEVON PRITCHETT A/K/A FREDERICK PRITCHETT A/K/A FREDERICK D. PRITCHETT APPELLANT

v. STATE OF MISSISSIPPI APPELLEE

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 02/19/2014 TRIAL JUDGE: HON. LESTER F. W I LLIAMSON JR. COURT FROM W HICH APPEALED: LAUDERDALE COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT: OFFICE OF STATE PUBLIC DEFENDER BY: GEORGE T. HOLMES HUNTER NOLAN AIKENS ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE: OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL BY: BARBARA W AKELAND BYRD DISTRICT ATTORNEY: BILBO MITCHELL NATURE OF THE CASE: CRIMINAL - FELONY TRIAL COURT DISPOSITION: CONVICTED ON COUNT I, AGGRAVATED ASSAULT ON A LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICER, AND COUNT II, ROBBERY, AND SENTENCED AS A HABITUAL OFFENDER TO THIRTY YEARS ON COUNT I, AND FIFTEEN YEARS ON COUNT II, W I TH THE SENTENCES TO RUN CONSECUTIVELY IN THE CUSTODY OF THE MISSISSIPPI DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS W I THOUT ELIGIBILITY FOR PAROLE OR PROBATION DISPOSITION: AFFIRMED - 08/04/2015 MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED: MANDATE ISSUED: BEFORE IRVING, P.J., BARNES AND FAIR, JJ. BARNES, J., FOR THE COURT:¶1. O n D e c e mb e r 2 0 , 2 0 12, Frederick Pritchett, a n inm a te at the Lauderdale C o u n t y

Correctional F acility , was being held tem porarily in a booking c ell f or m edical observation,

as he had com

plained of chest p a in earlier that day

. Penny McCracken, a correctional of f icer

em ploy e d by the Lauderdale County S herif f ’s Departm ent, was on duty

. Pritchett requested

a cup of w ater f

rom McCracken, but when she opened the cell door t o h a n d h i m the water, Pritchett grabbed McCracken’s a rm and attem pted to pull her into the cell. McCracken began

scream ing and slam m ed the c ell door on her arm to try to release Pritchett’s hold. However, Pritchett escaped the cell a nd g rabbed McCracken i n a c h oke hold. During the struggle, McCracken m anaged to kick the cell door shut and hide the key s . ¶2. McCracken m anaged to escape Pritchett’s hold and ran to the b ooking d esk to call f or assistance. W hile s he was m aking the call, Pritchett l unged towards her. W hen he did so, h e stealthily grabbed McCracken’s cell phone. By the tim e the other of

f i cers responded to the call, Pritchett had backed away f rom McCracken. H e stood b y his cell door, y elling that he did not do any

t hing and a ccusing McCracken of throwing water on him

. A f ter P ritchett was returned t o his cell, McCracken noticed her cell phone was m issing. O f f i c e r s searched Pritchett’s cell and discovered the phone hidden underneath a m attress. The entire incident was captured by

a surveillance cam era, and this video evidence was later adm itted at trial. ¶3. McCracken, who was treated at a nearby hospital, suf f ered bleeding, bruising, and a black ey e. She had u ndergone cosm etic f acial surgery three day s p rior to the incident and had

sutures and staples as a r esult of the surgery . H o w e v e r , M cCracken a n d the o ther of f i cers stated that all her injuries were a result of the attack by

Pritchett.

2¶4. A f

t er a jury trial in the L auderdale County Circuit Court o n February 18- 1 9 , 2 0 1 4 , Pritchett was convicted of aggravated assault o n a law enf orceme n t o f

f i c e r (Count I) and robbery (Count II). The trial c o u r t s e n tenced Pritchett as a habitual of f ender under Mississippi Code Annotated section 99-19-81 (Supp. 2014) to thirty y ears in the custody

of the Mississippi Departm ent of Corrections f or Count I, a nd f

i f teen y ears f

or C ount II, with the sentences to run consecutively

. ¶5. Pritchett f

i led a mo t i o n f

o r a new trial, w hich the trial court denied. On appeal, Pritchett challenges the weight and suf f iciency of evidence. 1 Upon review, we f ind no error and af f irm the judgm e nt. STANDARD OF REVIEW ¶6. As stated, Pritchett claim s on appea l t h a t t he suf f iciency and weight of the evidence adm itted a t trial d o not s upport his convictions. “Motions f or a dir e c t e d verdict and a [ judgm ent notwithstanding the verdict] both challenge the suf f iciency of the evidence.”
W ilson v. State , 101 So. 3d 1 182, 1185 (¶9) ( Miss. Ct. App. 2012) (citing Bush v. State , 895
So. 2d 836, 8 4 3 ( ¶ 1 6 ) ( M i s s. 2005)). The relevant inquiry on review “is whether, af ter viewing t he evidence in the light m ost f avorable to the p rosecution, any rational trier of f a c t could have f

ound the essential elem ents of t he crim e b ey o nd a reasonable doubt.” Bush , 895
So. 2d at 843 ( ¶16) (quoting J ackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 3 07, 315 (1979 )). A m otion f or

1 A lth o u g h P ritch ett d id n o t ch allen g e th e su f f icien cy o f th e ev id en c e in h i s m o tio n f o r a n ew trial, h e d id raise th e issu e in h is m o tio n f o r a d irected v erd i ct at trial, af ter w h ich th e d ef en se rested . T h eref

o re, th e issu e is n o t

p r o ced u rally

b arred

. S

ee Wa les v. S ta te , 7 3 S o . 3 d 1 1 1 3 , 1 1 2 0 (¶1 9 ) (M iss. 2 0 1 1 ) (ad d ressin g th e d ef en d a n t ’s ch allen g e o f su f f icien cy o f th e ev id en ce o n ap p eal, as h e asserted th e i ssu e in a m o tio n f o r d irected v erd ict a t trial an d “p resen t ed n o ev i d en ce in h is d ef en se”). 3a new trial, however, addresses the weight of the e vidence, a nd the ver d i ct will only b e

disturbed on review if “ it i s so contrary to t he overwhelm ing weight of t he evidence that to allow it to stand would sanction an unconscionable injustice.” Id . at 844 (¶18).
DISCUSSION
I. Whether the w e ight and sufficiency of the evide n c e supported Pritchett’s conviction for Cou n t I, aggravated assault o n a law enforcem ent officer. ¶7. Mississippi Code Annotated section 97-3-7(2)(a)(i) (Rev. 2014) states that “[ a] person is guilty of aggravated assault if he

. . . a ttem pts to cause serious bodily injury to another[ .]” Pritchett claim s that the evidence was insuf f icient to s upport his conviction f o r Count I, “as it f ailed t o e s t a b l i s h b e y ond a reasonable d oubt t hat [ he] attem pted to cause serious bodily injury to M cCracken.” He f urth e r a s s erts t hat “[ t ]he overwhelm ing weight of the evidence established that [ he] was guilty at m ost of

sim ple assault on a law enf

orcem e nt of

f icer.” ¶8. The s u r v e i l l a n c e v i d e o a d mi t t e d i n t o e v i d e n c e s h ows t hat Pritchett grabbed McCracken, threw h er a round, and choked her. She was scream ing, “Please, no!” in obvious
f ear f or h er lif e. Af ter the attack was over, she told the of f icers who responded to her distress call: “ He about killed m e.” McCracken testif i ed that she t hought Pritchett was going to drag her i nto the cell, rape her, and kill her. The video supp o r t s this testim ony ; Pritchett did

attem pt to drag McCracken i nto the cell, but she kept f ighting him u ntil she could break l oose of his hold. ¶9. One of the of

f i cers who responded to the c a ll f or assist a nce, Dillon Pace, stated that af ter the incident, McCracken had “blood com ing f rom h er e ars” and “was cry ing and scared

4and couldn’t really f o rm sentences that great.” Of f icer Henry Shaf

f er also testif

i ed that later that evening, Pritchett told him “he tried to kill that b*tch.” ¶10. Accordingly , we f

ind that the suf

f iciency and weight of t

h e e v i d e n c e s u

p p o r t Pritchett’s conviction f

or aggravated assault.
II. Whether the w e ight and sufficiency of the evidenc e s upported Pritchett’s conviction for Count II, robbery . ¶11. Mississippi Code Annotated section 97-3-73 ( Rev. 2014) def ines robbery as the taking of “the personal p roperty of another, in his presence or f rom his person and against his will, by violence to his person o r by putt i n g s u c h p e r s o n in f ear of som e im m ediate injury to h is person[ .]” The jury instruction pertaining to Count II stated that, should the jury “ f ind f rom the evidence in this case bey ond a reasonable doubt that: On or a bout Decem

ber 20, 2012, in L auderdale County , Mississippi; the Def endant, F rederick Devon P ritchett, did willf ully and u nlawf

ully take personal property of Penny McCracken, to-wit a cell phone, f rom her
person or presence and against her will by violence to her p erson o r by putting h er in f ear of
im m ediate injury

to her person,” then Pritchett should be f ound guilty

of robbery

. ¶12. Noting that robbery i s a specif ic-intent crim e, Pritchett c o n t e n d s t h a t the evidence
f ailed “to establish bey ond a r e asonable doubt th at [ his] specif ic i ntent i n assaulting McCracken was to gain possession of her cell phone, or that [ his] f orce or putting [ her] in f

ear caused McCracken to r elinquish possession of h er phone.” W e f ind no m erit t o P ritchett’s claim

. The surveillance video showed that af ter McCracken kicked the c e ll door shut and hid the key s, Pritc h e t t e v e n t u ally r eleased her, a llowing McCracken to run to the desk and
f rantically call f

or help. W hen she did so, Pritchett cam e over t o the d esk and continued h is

5assault by lunging toward M c C r a cken, causing her to resum e scream ing. It was in that

instance that he grabbed her cell phone. ¶13. “[ Q]uestions of crim inal intent, such as whether a def e ndant possessed t h e s p e c if i c intent to permanently dep r i v e another of his p roperty , are f or t he trier of f

act to resolve.”
Faust v. State , 113 So. 3d 614, 618 (¶15) (Miss. Ct. App. 2013) (quoting W illiams v. State,
590 So. 2 d 1374, 1379 (Miss. 1991)). T he evidence clearly established that Pritchett intended

to d eprive McCracken of her cell phone and that McCrack e n w a s i n f ear f or her lif e when Pritchett took her phone. There was also testim ony by the other of f icers that McCracken

rem ained panicked and f

r ightened, even af

t er the im m ediate threat had passed. ¶14. W e f

urther f i nd t hat the f

act McCracken did not k

now t he cell phone was m issing until af ter the danger h ad passed is of no consequence. “There i s nothing i n Mississ i ppi C ode Annotated section 97-3-73 t h a t suggests the v ictim m ust be aware t hat his or her personal property is being t aken, and a victim ’s lack o f awareness d ue to a perpetrator’s actions does

n ot take him outside of t he robbery statute.” Anderson v. State , 5 So. 3d 1088, 1 0 9 6 ( ¶ 1 4 ) (Miss. Ct. App. 2007) (citing W heeler v. State, 826 So. 2d 731, 735 (¶9) (Miss. 2002)). ¶15. Consequently , we f ind t hat the s uf

f i cien c y a n d w eight o f t he evidence support the jury ’s verdict that Pritchett was guilty of robbery

. ¶16. THE JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT OF LAUDERDALE COUNTY OF CONVICT I O N OF COUNT I, AGGRAVATED ASSAULT ON A LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICER, AND COUNT II, ROBBERY, AND SENTENCE AS A HABITUAL O F F ENDER OF THIRTY Y EARS FOR COUNT I, AND FIFTEEN YEARS FOR COUNT II, WITH THE SENTENCES TO RUN CONSECUTIVELY IN THE CUSTODY OF THE MISS I S S I PPI DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS WITHOUT ELIGIBILITY FOR PAROLE OR PR O B ATION, IS AFFIRMED. ALL COSTS OF THIS APPEAL ARE ASSESSED TO LAUDERDALE COUNTY.

6IRVING AND GRIFFIS, P.JJ., ISHEE, CARLTON, MA XW ELL, FAIR AND

WILSON, JJ., CONCUR. JAMES, J., CONCURS IN PART WITHOUT SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION. LEE, C.J., NOT PARTICIPATING.

7