J-A31008-14 & J-A31009-14

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

IN RE: ADOPTION OF S.W.C., IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

APPEAL OF: C.C.,

Appellant No. 939 MDA 2014

Appeal from the Decree May 5, 2014

In the Court of Common Pleas of York County

Orphans' Court at No(s): 2013-0119

IN THE INTEREST OF: S.W.C., A MINOR, IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

APPEAL OF: C.C., FATHER,

Appellant No. 933 MDA 2014

Appeal from the Order Entered May 6, 2014

In the Court of Common Pleas of York County

Juvenile Division at No(s): CP-67-DP-0000103-2012

BEFORE: BOWES, OTT, and STABILE, JJ.

MEMORANDUM BY BOWES, J.: FILED DECEMBER 15, 2014

C.C. (“Father”) appeals from the order wherein the trial court changed 

the permanency goal for his son, S.W.C., from reunification to adoption and 

also from the decree that terminated his parental rights. As the appeals flow 
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from identical facts and Father submitted one brief that combined both 

aspects of his arguments, we address the appeals collectively, and affirm.1 

S.W.C. was born during May 2009 from an ongoing relationship 

between R.L. (“Mother”) and Father. York County Office of Children and 

Youth, Services (“CYS”) became involved with the family during May of 2012 

due to allegations that Father sexually abused S.W.C.’s older half-sister over 

a four-year period. Father was determined to be an indicated perpetrator of 

abuse. On June 4, 2012, the victim, S.W.C., and another half-sibling, who 

subsequently leveled allegations of abuse against Father, were placed 

together in emergency shelter care. The latter allegations of abuse were 

also substantiated. However, Father was never charged with any crimes as 

a result of either allegation of sexual abuse. On June 11, 2012, the juvenile 

court adjudicated the three children dependent. The children remained 

together in the foster home, which is now a pre-adoptive resource. 

The original permanency goal was reunification. In order to achieve 

reunification, CYS crafted a family service plan (“FSP”) that directed Father, 

inter alia, to maintain contact with CYS, complete a sex offender evaluation 

and treatment recommendations, attend sex offender counseling until 

successfully discharged, participate in joint counseling with Mother if deemed 

necessary, and maintain a safe home. See CYS Exhibit 1. Three 

____________________________________________

1

 On the same date, the trial court terminated the parental rights of R.L., 

S.W.C.’s birth mother. We address the appeal from that order separately.
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permanency review hearings occurred at approximate six-month intervals 

between the June 2012 adjudication and October 2013. See Stipulation of 

Counsel, 1/3/14, at 2-3. During two hearings each, the juvenile court found 

that Father was in moderate compliance with the plan and that he made 

minimal progress toward alleviating the circumstances that necessitated 

CYS’s intervention. Id. at 2-3. At all of the hearings, the juvenile court 

determined that CYS made reasonable efforts to finalize S.W.C.’s 

permanency goal, i.e., reunification. Id. at 2-3. 

On October 30, 2013, CYS filed a petition to change S.W.C.’s 

permanency goal from reunification to adoption and filed a petition to 

terminate Mother and Father’s parental rights. The court convened 

evidentiary hearings on January 10 and February 27, 2014. CYS presented 

testimony from the family’s caseworker and a family advocate who was 

associated with Catholic Charities. Father testified on his own behalf. 

On May 5, 2014, the trial court granted CYS’s petition, terminated 

Father’s parental rights, and changed S.W.C.’s permanency goal to adoption. 

The trial court concluded that CYS established the statutory grounds to 

terminate parental rights outlined in § 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), and (8) and (b). 

This timely appeal and a concomitantly-filed Rule 1925(b) statement 

followed. 

Father asserts seven questions for our review. We condense the first 

five issues, which Father argues collectively, into the following query: 

Whether the trial court erred in finding that CYS established the statutory 
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grounds for terminating his parental rights pursuant to § 2511(a)(1), (2), 

(5), and (8) when Father cooperated with CYS, demonstrated his parenting 

ability, and sought services to remedy the conditions that led to S.W.C.’s 

placement due to CYS’s failure to provide him adequate assistance and 

services. See Father’s brief at 5-6. 

We reiterate the remaining issues as listed in Father’s statement of 

questions presented. 

VI. Whether the trial court erred in finding that [CYS] 

established by clear and convincing evidence that termination of 

parental rights would best serve the needs and welfare of the 

child since the trial court discounted the bond the child had with 

the Father. 

VII. Whether the trial court erred in changing the goal from 

reunification to placement for adoption where a bond exists 

between the father and his child and the father continues to 

work and cooperate with [CYS] to promote reunification despite 

[CYS’s] failure to fully engage the father and provide services 

that would aid reunification. 

Id. at 6. 

For judicial convenience, we review at the outset Father’s complaint 

concerning the order changing S.W.C.’s permanency goal from reunification 

to adoption. The following principles are relevant.

In cases involving a court’s order changing the [court-ordered] 

goal . . . to adoption, our standard of review is abuse of 

discretion. To hold that the trial court abused its discretion, we 

must determine its judgment was manifestly unreasonable, that 

the court disregarded the law, or that its action was a result of 

partiality, prejudice, bias or ill will. While this Court is bound by 

the facts determined in the trial court, we are not tied to the 

court’s inferences, deductions and conclusions; we have a 

responsibility to ensure that the record represents a 
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comprehensive inquiry and that the hearing judge has applied 

the appropriate legal principles to that record. Therefore, our 

scope of review is broad. 

In re S.B., 943 A.2d 973, 977 (Pa.Super. 2008) (citations omitted); see 

also In re R.J.T., 9 A.3d 1179, 1190 (Pa. 2010). 

Additionally, this issue is controlled by the Juvenile Act, 42 Pa.C.S. 

§ 6301-6375, which was amended in 1998 to conform with the federal 

Adoption and Safe Families Act (“ASFA”), 42 U.S.C. § 671-679. In In re 

M.S., 980 A.2d 612, 615 (Pa.Super. 2009) citing 42 Pa.C.S. § 6301(b)(1), 

we explained,

Both statutes are compatible pieces of legislation 

seeking to benefit the best interest of the child, not 

the parent. . . . ASFA promotes the reunification of 

foster care children with their natural parents when 

feasible. . . . Pennsylvania’s Juvenile Act focuses 

upon reunification of the family, which means that 

the unity of the family shall be preserved “whenever 

possible.”

As such, child welfare agencies are required to make reasonable efforts to 

return a foster child to his or her biological parent. In re N.C., 909 A.2d 

818, 823 (Pa.Super. 2006). When those efforts fail, the agency “must 

redirect its efforts towards placing the child in an adoptive home.” Id. 

During permanency review hearings, trial courts must address the 

following considerations relevant to the child’s well-being. 

(f) Matters to be determined at permanency hearing.—

At each permanency hearing, a court shall determine all of the 

following:
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(1) The continuing necessity for and appropriateness of 

the placement.

(2) The appropriateness, feasibility and extent of 

compliance with the permanency plan developed for the 

child.

(3) The extent of progress made toward alleviating the 

circumstances which necessitated the original placement.

(4) The appropriateness and feasibility of the 

current placement goal for the child.

(5) The likely date by which the placement goal for the 

child might be achieved.

(5.1) Whether reasonable efforts were made to finalize 

the permanency plan in effect.

(6) Whether the child is safe.

. . . .

(9) If the child has been in placement for at least 15 of 

the last 22 months or the court has determined that 

aggravated circumstances exist and that reasonable 

efforts to prevent or eliminate the need to remove the 

child from the child’s parent, guardian or custodian or to 

preserve and reunify the family need not be made or 

continue to be made, whether the county agency has filed 

or sought to join a petition to terminate parental rights 

and to identify, recruit, process and approve a qualified 

family to adopt the child[.]

(f.1) Additional determination.--Based upon the 

determinations made under subsection (f) and all relevant 

evidence presented at the hearing, the court shall determine one 

of the following:

(1) If and when the child will be returned to the 

child's parent, guardian or custodian in cases where the 

return of the child is best suited to the safety, protection 

and physical, mental and moral welfare of the child. 
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(2) If and when the child will be placed for 

adoption, and the county agency will file for termination 

of parental rights in cases where return to the child's 

parent, guardian or custodian is not best suited to the 

safety, protection and physical, mental and moral welfare 

of the child. 

42 Pa.C.S. § 6351(f)(1)-(6) and (9), (f.1) (1) and (2) (emphases added). 

As we have indicated, “[t]hese statutory mandates clearly place the trial 

court’s focus on the best interests of the child.” In re S.B., supra at 978 

(citation omitted). Importantly, “[s]afety, permanency, and well-being of 

the child must take precedence over all other considerations.” Id. (citation 

omitted; emphasis in original). Moreover, the burden is on the child welfare 

agency “to prove the change in goal would be in the child’s best interest.” 

In re D.P., 972 A.2d 1221, 1227 (Pa.Super. 2009). 

Instantly, Father argues that, since he showed an interest in his son, 

complied with some components of the FSP, and proffered evidence that he 

could satisfy the child’s housing needs, he made sufficient progress toward 

reunification to warrant maintaining the status quo. Father’s assertion 

highlights the juvenile court’s two findings of Father’s “moderate” 

compliance following the permanency review hearings. Father stresses that 

his development occurred despite homelessness and what he characterizes 

as a dearth of assistance from CYS. Thus, he argues that the juvenile court 

committed an abuse of discretion in changing S.W.C.’s permanency goal 

from reunification to adoption. He concludes, “The weight of the evidence 
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indicates that [he] . . . appeared very close to reunification with the minor 

child.” Father’s brief at 30. For the following reasons, we disagree. 

Notwithstanding Father’s protestations to the contrary, the certified 

record demonstrates that Father was not on the verge of reunification with 

S.W.C. Indeed, while Father’s compliance with the protocols outlined in 

the FSP was twice determined to be moderate, his progress toward actually 

alleviating the circumstances that necessitated CYS’s intervention was found 

to be minimal on two occasions. See Stipulation of Counsel, 1/3/14, at 2-3. 

Moreover, we reject Father’s attempt to transfer the blame for his 

ineffectiveness to CYS. As we discuss further, infra, the agency provided 

Father every service that he requested and nothing was refused or denied. 

Additionally, while Father complains that CYS failed to form a “reunification 

team” to assist him, he never requested that relief. N.T., 1/10/14, at 39-40. 

In fact, although Father ultimately followed his counsel’s cues and testified 

that he believed he would have benefited from a team of providers, Father’s 

initial reaction to counsel’s inquiry about the prospects of a team approach 

was, “Well, I like to do things on my own.” N.T., 2/27/14, at 100-101. 

Likewise, Father failed to complete the sex offender evaluation that he 

started with the Commonwealth Clinical Group. Id. at 97, 116-117. He 

initiated the evaluation process, but he was discharged after he failed to 

respect appropriate boundaries with his therapist. Id. at 116-117. 

Approximately fourteen months after the adjudication of dependency, Father 
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eventually completed a sexual abuse evaluation through a different service 

provider. N.T., 2/27/14, at 97-98. Even then, however, he failed to fulfill 

the recommended outpatient sex-offender treatment or therapeutic 

polygraph evaluation. N.T., 1/10/14, at 39; N.T., 2/27/14, at 100. 

Apparently, by the time he completed the sexual abuse evaluation, he 

believed that the loss of his son was a fait accompli. N.T., 2/27/14, at 118. 

S.W.C. was adjudicated dependent during June 2012, when he was 

three years old. Approximately two years later, when CYS filed the petition 

for the goal change, he remained in foster care with no firm prospect of 

reunification with Father. S.W.C. is currently five years old and deserves 

permanency. The trial court considered the factors outlined in § 6351(f)(1)-

(9), and concluded that it was in S.W.C.’s best interest to change his 

permanency goal from reunification to adoption. The juvenile court 

acknowledged that Father attended visitation regularly, held stable 

employment for approximately one year, and eventually completed the 

required sexual abuse evaluation, albeit late. However, during that same 

period that his son languished in what is now a pre-adoptive foster home, 

Father failed to maintain stable housing, refused to accept responsibility for 

his sexual abuse of S.W.C.’s older half-sisters, and declined to complete the 

recommended sexual offender’s treatment regimen. Based on the 

foregoing, we conclude that the juvenile court properly weighed S.W.C.’s 

need for safety and permanency over all other considerations, and that it did 
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not abuse its discretion in concluding that changing the placement goal to 

adoption served his best interests. Accordingly, we will not disturb it. 

Next, we address whether the trial court erred in terminating Father’s 

parental rights pursuant to Pa.C.S. § 2511(a) and (b). We apply the 

following standard of review to an order terminating parental rights:

In cases concerning the involuntary termination of parental

rights, our review is limited to a determination of whether the 

decree of the termination court is supported by competent 

evidence. Adoption of B.D.S., 494 Pa. 171, 431 A.2d 203, 207 

(1981). The party petitioning for termination “must prove the 

statutory criteria for that termination by at least clear and 

convincing evidence.” In re T.R., 502 Pa. 165, 465 A.2d 642, 

644 (1983). Clear and convincing evidence is defined as 

“testimony that is so clear, direct, weighty, and convincing as to 

enable the trier of fact to come to a clear conviction, without 

hesitancy, of the truth of the precise facts in issue.” Matter of 

Sylvester, 521 Pa. 300, 555 A.2d 1202, 1203–04 (1989).

In re Adoption of L.J.B., 18 A.3d 1098, 1107 (Pa. 2011). As the ultimate 

trier of fact, the trial court is empowered to make all determinations of 

credibility, resolve conflicts in the evidence, and believe all, part, or none of 

the evidence presented. In re A.S., 11 A.3d 473, 477 (Pa.Super. 2010). 

“If competent evidence supports the trial court's findings, we will affirm even 

if the record could also support the opposite result.” Id.

Requests to involuntarily terminate a biological parent’s parental rights 

are governed by 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511, which provides in pertinent part as 

follows:

(a) General rule.--The rights of a parent in regard to a child 

may be terminated after a petition filed on any of the following 

grounds:
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(1) The parent by conduct continuing for a period of at 

least six months immediately preceding the filing of the 

petition either has evidenced a settled purpose of 

relinquishing parental claim to a child or has refused or 

failed to perform parental duties. 

(2) The repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, 

neglect or refusal of the parent has caused the child to be 

without essential parental care, control or subsistence 

necessary for his physical or mental well-being and the 

conditions and causes of the incapacity, abuse, neglect or 

refusal cannot or will not be remedied by the parent. 

. . . .

(5) The child has been removed from the care of the 

parent by the court or under a voluntary agreement with 

an agency for a period of at least six months, the 

conditions which led to the removal or placement of the 

child continue to exist, the parent cannot or will not 

remedy those conditions within a reasonable period of 

time, the services or assistance reasonably available to the 

parent are not likely to remedy the conditions which led to 

the removal or placement of the child within a reasonable 

period of time and termination of the parental rights would 

best serve the needs and welfare of the child. 

. . . .

(8) The child has been removed from the care of the 

parent by the court or under a voluntary agreement with 

an agency, 12 months or more have elapsed from the date 

of removal or placement, the conditions which led to the 

removal or placement of the child continue to exist and 

termination of parental rights would best serve the needs 

and welfare of the child. 

. . . .

(b) Other considerations.--The court in terminating the rights 

of a parent shall give primary consideration to the 

developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfare of the 

child. The rights of a parent shall not be terminated solely on 

the basis of environmental factors such as inadequate housing, 
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furnishings, income, clothing and medical care if found to be 

beyond the control of the parent. With respect to any petition 

filed pursuant to subsection (a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall not 

consider any efforts by the parent to remedy the conditions 

described therein which are first initiated subsequent to the 

giving of notice of the filing of the petition.

23 Pa.C.S. § 2511.

The test for terminating parental rights consists of two parts. In In re 

L.M., 923 A.2d 505, 511 (Pa.Super. 2007), we explained:

Initially, the focus is on the conduct of the parent. The party 

seeking termination must prove by clear and convincing 

evidence that the parent's conduct satisfies the statutory 

grounds for termination delineated in Section 2511(a). Only if 

the court determines that the parent's conduct warrants 

termination of his or her parental rights does the court engage in 

the second part of the analysis pursuant to Section 2511(b): 

determination of the needs and welfare of the child under the 

standard of best interests of the child. One major aspect of the 

needs and welfare analysis concerns the nature and status of the 

emotional bond between parent and child, with close attention 

paid to the effect on the child of permanently severing any such 

bond.

We need only agree with the trial court’s decision as to one subsection of 23 

Pa.C.S. § 2511(a) and the subsection (b) analysis in order to affirm the 

termination of parental rights. In re B.L.W., 843 A.2d 380, 384 (Pa.Super. 

2004) (en banc). Herein, the certified record supports the trial court’s 

determination that CYS established the statutory grounds to terminate 

Father’s parental rights pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(8) and (b). 

Hence, we do not address the remaining statutory grounds.

We have explained our review of the evidence pursuant to 

§ 2511(a)(8), as follows: 
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In order to terminate parental rights pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. 

§ 2511(a)(8), the following factors must be demonstrated: (1) 

The child has been removed from parental care for 12 months or 

more from the date of removal; (2) the conditions which led to 

the removal or placement of the child continue to exist; and (3) 

termination of parental rights would best serve the needs and 

welfare of the child. 

In Re Adoption of M.E.P., 825 A.2d 1266, 1275-1276 (Pa.Super. 2003). 

Thus, in order to satisfy the requirements of § 2511(a)(8) in the case 

at bar, CYS was required to produce clear and convincing evidence that: (1) 

S.W.C. has been removed from Father for at least twelve months; (2) the 

conditions which led to the child’s removal continue to exist; and (3) 

involuntary termination of parental rights would best serve S.W.C.’s needs 

and welfare. See In re Adoption of R.J.S., 901 A.2d 502 (Pa.Super. 

2006). 

Similar to the arguments leveled in opposition to the order changing 

S.W.C.’s permanency goal, Father argues that terminating his parental rights 

is not warranted because he maintained visitation, purchased gifts for his 

son’s birthday, overcame the obstacles associated with homelessness, 

completed sex offender evaluation, and endured the lack of CYS assistance. 

Additionally, in an attempt to support the proposition that the conditions that 

led to S.W.C.’s placement ceased to exist, he points to his employment 

history and recent procurement of appropriate housing. Again, no relief is 

due. 

Initially, we observe that the record does not sustain Father’s claims 
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that CYS abandoned him or failed to provide him adequate assistance. As it 

relates to Father’s housing predicament throughout the dependency 

proceedings, the following facts are relevant. Father was incarcerated 

briefly during May 2012 for violating a protection from abuse order that 

precluded him from contacting Mother and her children. He was released 

but later re-incarcerated for a parole violation between October 31, 2012 

and December 29, 2012. After his release from prison, Father lived for more 

than one year with acquaintances in Biglerville, Pennsylvania. Prior to his 

incarceration, Father was essentially homeless between the spring and fall of 

2012. However, by the time that Father testified at the evidentiary hearing 

on CYS’s petition to terminate his parental rights, Father had obtained a 

two-bedroom residence in Fairfield, Pennsylvania.

Father criticizes CYS for failing to proffer an array of reunification 

services to assist him in finding an appropriate residence. Karen Beard, the 

caseworker assigned to S.W.C., confirmed that Father was not provided 

assistance to rectify his homelessness. N.T., 1/10/14, at 96. To her 

knowledge, CYS did not assign a team to help him obtain housing. Id. Nor 

did she know whether Father was referred to any housing assistance 

programs. Id. at 96. However, she explained that CYS did, in fact, perform 

background checks on Father’s housemates, Mindy Caski and Charles 

Bowers. Id. at 96-97. Although the investigations did not return any prior 

criminal records, the home was never considered as a placement option for 
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S.W.C. because, by the time Father found a stable home with his friends, he 

was no longer a viable placement option. Id. at 97-98. Accordingly, she 

never inspected that home to determine if it would be a suitable residence 

for S.W.C. Id. at 97. 

Moreover, to the extent that Father assails CYS’s efforts generally, the 

record reveals that CYS provided Father a range of case management 

services, referrals to Commonwealth Clinical Group and Triad Treatment 

Specialists, and transportation to and supervision of visitations. Id. at 39. 

Father eventually completed the sex offender evaluation through Triad 

Treatment Specialists, but he nonetheless failed to enroll in the 

recommended treatment programs. Furthermore, Ms. Beard testified that, 

to her knowledge, Father did not request that the agency assign a service 

team to assist him. Id. at 39-40. Likewise, she could not identify any 

requested services that the agency refused to provide to Father. Id. at 39-

40. 

In relation to Father’s specific complaints regarding the manner in 

which the agency conducted visitation and administered the FSP, Ms. Beard 

testified that she supervised Father’s visitations with S.W.C. since July of 

2013. Id. at 87. She explained that the supervised visitation never 

progressed beyond agency supervision because Father’s housemates, whom 

Father proposed to supervise the visitations, were not committed to the 

supervision procedures and Father did not proffer any other alternatives. 
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Id. at 118, 125. 

Ms. Beard also outlined her interactions with Father during the 

dependency proceedings. She received the assignment during June of 2013 

and first met Father on July 25, 2013. Id. at 87. While she spoke with 

Father briefly to reschedule a visitation, she explained that she never 

reviewed the FSP goals with Father because the plan had been 

communicated to him before she was assigned to the family. Id. at 88, 89-

90. Instead, following the September 17, 2013 permanency meeting 

attended by Father, Ms. Beard advised Father’s then-counsel to instruct 

Father to adhere to the agency’s directions. Id. at 88-89. In total, CYS 

mailed three FSPs to Father, and he never contacted the agency about the 

documents or requested clarification. Id. at 124. Additionally, he never 

mentioned the FSPs during the weekly visitations with S.W.C. Id. 

CYS is not entirely blameless. Ms. Beard confirmed that Father was 

not invited to the blended perspectives meeting during February 2013 or a 

family group decision-making meeting that occurred the ensuing April. 

Similarly, CYS failed to inform Father of S.W.C.’s mental health evaluation 

scheduled for October 9, 2013, and it does not appear from CYS’s 

documentation that Father was provided a copy of the evaluation report. 

Id. at 114. Upon further examination, however, Ms. Beard clarified that the 

child’s evaluator mailed to Father a copy of the letter scheduling the 

evaluation. Id. at 121. Nevertheless, Father failed to contact CYS in order 
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to address the pending evaluation. Id. In fact, during the nineteen months 

prior to the evidentiary hearing that S.W.C. was in placement, Father failed 

to ask CYS about any specific concerns or issues with his son. Id. at 122. 

In the same manner that Father failed to take the initiative to become 

involved in his son’s mental health evaluation, Father willfully stood on the 

sidelines throughout most of the dependency proceedings. Stated simply, 

the record bears out that Father never asked CYS about any of the 

information that he now claims the agency withheld from him. N.T., 

2/27/14, at 113. He did not attempt to identify S.W.C.’s physicians or 

request that CYS inform him when the child was scheduled for appointments 

or therapy. Id. He also conceded that, although he consistently attended 

the permanency review hearings, he failed to assert during those 

proceedings that he felt that CYS was failing him. Id. at 114. Moreover, 

Father was fully aware of his right to ask questions and proffer statements 

during the hearings. Id. at 133. Accordingly, for all of the foregoing 

reasons, and mindful of the juvenile court’s consistent findings that CYS 

made reasonable efforts to assist reunification, we reject Father’s attempt to

call CYS’s administration of this case into question. While the agency’s 

interaction with Father was not the desired model of communication, the 

agency certainly did not abandon Father in his efforts to reunify with S.W.C. 

Father’s argument to the contrary is unpersuasive. 

Next, we examine whether the trial court erred in concluding that CYS 
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satisfied its burden of proving the statutory grounds to terminate Father’s 

parental rights under § 2511(a)(8). First, it is undisputed that CYS satisfied 

the threshold requirement of § 2511(a)(8) since S.W.C. had been removed 

for approximately seventeen months on the date that CYS filed its petition to 

terminate Father’s parental rights. Furthermore, as discussed below, the 

certified record reveals that the pertinent condition that led to S.W.C.’s 

removal from the home in June 2012, i.e., the risks associated with Father’s 

untreated sexual proclivities, continued to exist and that terminating 

Father’s parental rights would best serve S.W.C.’s needs and welfare. 

Between October 2012 and October 2013, Father provided S.W.C. a 

bicycle for his birthday and children’s books. N.T., 1/10/14, at 43-44. He 

did not send him any other gifts or cards during that period. Id. at 43. 

Father was not involved in his son’s preschool activities beyond one 

Winterfest event at the child’s Head Start program. Id. at 45, 92. Likewise, 

he did not participate in S.W.C.’s therapy sessions or inquire about when the 

sessions or other medical appointments were scheduled. Id. at 46. 

Additionally, Father was not involved with his son’s then-recent diagnoses of 

oppositional defiant disorder (“ODD”) and adjustment disorder with anxiety. 

Id. at 45-46. While there is a concern that S.W.C. also may have attention 

deficit hyperactivity disorder (“ADHD”), his scheduled neuropsychological 

evaluation had not occurred when the evidence was presented. Id. at 46. 

Although Ms. Beard informed Father of the appointment, she did not invite 
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him to the evaluation because the future of Father’s parental status was 

uncertain. Id. at 92. 

Father attended sex offender counseling with Commonwealth Clinical 

Group, but he was unsuccessfully discharged during November 2012 

following an incident where he made physical contact with a therapist. Id. 

at 107-108, 113-114; N.T., 2/27/14, at 115-116. Additionally, the agency 

does not have any documentation that he completed sexual offender 

therapy, the sexual history polygraph test, or the ABEL sexual offender 

screen as recommended by the FSP. N.T., 1/10/14, at 122-123. Critically, 

since the initial phase of the FSP, Father’s inability to finish the sex offender 

evaluation was an ongoing issue. Id. at 123. CYS transmitted information 

to Father concerning a sex offender assessment at Triad Treatment 

Specialists as an alternative to the evaluation terminated by Commonwealth 

Clinical Group. Nevertheless, Father did not comply with the requirement for 

his sexual evaluation until August 2013, approximately six weeks before CYS 

filed the underlying petitions. Id. at 123. By that juncture, however, the 

agency was no longer in a position to commit further resources to Father. 

Id. at 123, 135. 

Upon learning of the agency’s decision to shift its focus toward 

adoption, Father declined to submit to the therapeutic polygraph or to 

pursue the treatment regimen recommend by the Triad Treatment 

evaluators. N.T., 2/27/14, at 118. Hence, Father not only failed to make 
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progress addressing the issues that led to S.W.C.’s placement, but also 

failed to avail himself of the services that the agency could have provided. 

He delayed completing the sexual offender evaluation, and, upon completing 

that assessment, he refused to engage in the recommended treatment 

regimen. Father’s rejection of the treatment protocols underscores the fact 

that he has yet to resolve the issues that prevented him from caring for his 

son. 

In light of these facts, Ms. Beard concluded that it was in S.W.C.’s best 

interest to prepare the child for adoption into a safe and stable home where 

he would receive adequate care and protection. N.T., 1/10/14, at 58. She 

agreed that “fundamentally we’re in the same position today as we were 

when the agency became involved with this family in 

addressing . . . [Father’s] sexual abuse issues[.]” Id. at 59. She testified 

that there is still a lot that remains to be accomplished and that she cannot 

discern a light at the end of the tunnel. Id. 

The foregoing evidence sustains the trial court’s determination that 

CYS proved by clear and convincing evidence the statutory grounds to 

terminate Father’s parental rights to S.W.C. pursuant to § 2511(a)(8). 

S.W.C. has been removed from Father for at least twelve months; the 

conditions that led to S.W.C.’s removal continue to exist; and, as discussed 

infra, involuntary termination of parental rights would best serve S.W.C.’s 

needs and welfare. Accordingly, we find that the record supports the trial 
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court’s conclusion that CYS satisfied the statutory requirements to terminate 

Father’s parental rights pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(8). 

Next, we address whether the trial court abused its discretion in 

finding that CYS presented sufficient evidence to demonstrate by clear and 

convincing evidence that terminating Father’s parental rights and 

permanently severing the existing bond between him and S.W.C. would best 

serve the child’s needs and welfare pursuant to § 2511(b). While the 

Adoption Act does not mandate that the trial court consider the effect of 

permanently severing parental bonds, our case law requires it where a bond 

exists to some extent. See In re E.M., 620 A.2d 481, 485 (Pa. 1993). 

The extent of the trial court’s bond-effect analysis depends upon the 

circumstances of a particular case. In re K.Z.S., 946 A.2d 753, 763 

(Pa.Super. 2008). We have emphasized that, while a parent’s emotional 

bond with his child is a major aspect of the § 2511(b) best-interest analysis, 

it is nonetheless only one of many factors to be considered by the trial court 

when determining what is in the best interest of the child. In re K.K.R.-S., 

958 A.2d 529, 535-536 (Pa.Super. 2008). Indeed, the mere existence of an 

emotional bond does not preclude the termination of parental rights. See In 

re T.D., 949 A.2d 910 (Pa.Super. 2008) (trial court’s decision to terminate 

parental rights was affirmed where court balanced strong emotional bond 

against parents’ inability to serve needs of child). 

As we explained in In re K.Z.S., supra at 763 (emphasis omitted),
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In addition to a bond examination, the court may equally 

emphasize the safety needs of the child under subsection (b), 

particularly in cases involving physical or sexual abuse, severe 

child neglect or abandonment, or children with special needs. 

The trial court should also examine the intangibles such as the 

love, comfort, security and stability the child might have with the 

foster parent. Another consideration is the importance of 

continuity of relationships to the child and whether the parent 

child bond, if it exists, can be severed without detrimental 

effects on the child. All of these factors can contribute to the 

inquiry about the needs and welfare of the child.

See also In re A.S., 11 A.3d 473, 483 (Pa.Super. 2010) (orphans’ court 

can emphasize safety needs, consider intangibles, such as love, comfort, 

security, and stability child might have with the foster parent, and 

importance of continuity of existing relationships). 

Herein, the trial court concluded that severing the parental bond and 

freeing S.W.C. for adoption was in the child’s best interest because the 

parental bond that nurtures safety, security, and permanency exists 

between S.W.C. and his foster parents rather than with Father. See Trial 

Court Opinion, 5/6/14, at 32. Our review of the certified record confirms the 

trial court’s conclusion. 

Initially, we review Ms. Beard’s testimony concerning S.W.C.’s 

development in foster care. Ms. Beard related that S.W.C. was four years 

old as of the date of the evidentiary hearing. N.T., 1/10/14, at 44. He 

engages in negative behaviors associated with his ODD, adjustment 

disorder, and potential ADHD diagnosis. Id. at 46. His scheduled 

neuropsychological evaluation had not occurred when the evidence was 
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presented. Id. S.W.C. was referred for play therapy but remains on a 

waiting list. He has been in a Head Start program since September 2013. 

Id. at 44. He is excelling in the classroom; however, he still experiences 

disruptive outbursts. N.T., 2/27/14, at 12. 

Next, we address the nature of S.W.C.’s bond with Father. Ms. Beard 

testified that Father has weekly supervised visitation with S.W.C. from 6:00 

p.m. to 7:30 p.m. on Thursday evenings, and that Father attended the 

visitations consistently when he was not incarcerated. N.T., 1/10/14, at 29, 

122. The visitations were briefly scheduled for twice per week, but it was 

scaled back after the schedule proved too demanding for S.W.C. Id. at 102. 

Ms. Beard supervised approximately seven of Father’s visitations with 

S.W.C. Id. at 99. S.W.C. is happy to see Father during the visitations and 

greets him excitedly, “daddy, daddy, daddy.” Id. at 34. Although 

Ms. Beard observed a bond between Father and S.W.C., she characterized 

that relationship as akin to playmates. Id. at 35, 100. She explained, 

“[Father] appears sometimes like they [have] more like a playmate bond, 

like sometimes he also appears a little hesitant to discipline [S.W.C.] or be 

firm with him at times.” Id. For example, on one occasion, Father failed to 

admonish his son for running down the hallway in the agency’s offices. Id. 

at 100. When Father does correct his son, it takes multiple prompts to get 

the child back on track. Id. at 35. There was also an issue with Father 

ignoring CYS’s request to bring more appropriate snacks than candy and 
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junk food for his son to eat during the evening visitations. Id. at 100-101. 

Despite the agency’s appeal for healthier options, Father persisted in 

supplying S.W.C. with large quantities of junk food, chocolate, and sugary 

snacks. Id. at 101-102. 

Emily Verschoor, the family advocate that Catholic Charities assigned 

to this matter, testified that she was involved with the case between July 

2013 and December 2013. Id. at 138. Her duties were, inter alia, to assist 

with reunification and support CYS generally. Id. at 139. While she never 

supervised any of Father’s visitations with his son, she noted that, during 

the first two months of supervising Mother’s scheduled biweekly visitations 

with S.W.C. and his sisters, she observed that S.W.C. consistently requested 

to visit Father during those periods. Id. at 173. She further noted that 

S.W.C. was “crestfallen” when the requests were denied. Id. at 174. 

In relation to the connections S.W.C. shares with his half-sisters and 

pre-adoptive foster family, Ms. Beard stated that she visited S.W.C. and his 

half-sisters in the family’s home once per month since she received this 

assignment. Id. at 33. She indicated that S.W.C. is particularly attached to 

his half-sisters, especially the younger girl, and the foster parents are 

committed to adopting all three children. Id. at 36, 49-50. Similarly, 

Ms. Beard testified that S.W.C. bonded with all of the members of the foster 

family, and he is very happy in the home. Id. at 33. Ms. Beard added that 

S.W.C. enjoyed a particularly close relationship with his foster father, and 
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that, unlike his relationship with Father, S.W.C. followed his foster parents’ 

prompts. Id. at 35. Ms. Beard also pointed out that S.W.C. has never 

inquired about Father during her visits to the foster home. Id. at 35. In 

fact, she opined the child’s bonds were comparatively stronger with his 

foster parents than Father. Id. at 36. In sum, she concluded that S.W.C. 

would not suffer any long-term negative impacts if the court terminated 

Father’s parental rights. Id. at 36, 59.

As highlighted by the foregoing evidence, the certified record supports 

the trial court’s needs and welfare analysis pursuant to § 2511(b). Although 

a bond exists between S.W.C. and Father, that bond is analogous to 

playmates rather than a father and son. While S.W.C. is excited to see 

Father during the supervised visitations and clearly prefers that interaction 

over Mother’s company, S.W.C. does not look to either parent for guidance 

and he did not ask about Father outside of the supervised visitation. Id. at 

35. 

The evidence confirms that, in contrast to the affable relationship and 

playful interactions that S.W.C. enjoys with Father, S.W.C.’s primary 

attachments are to his pre-adoptive foster parents and his two half-siblings, 

whose adoption into the same family is pending. The meaningful bonds with 

the foster family reveal the hallmarks of healthy parent-child and sibling 

relationships, including closeness, security and emotional attachment. The 

fact that S.W.C.’s primary emotional attachment is with his foster parents 
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rather than Father is a significant factor in evaluating his developmental and 

emotional needs and welfare. See In re K.Z.S., supra (“the bond between 

[the child] and [foster mother] is the primary bond to protect, given [the 

child’s] young age and his very limited contact with Mother”). Hence, we do 

not disturb the trial court’s determination that permanently severing the 

friendship-type bond between Father and S.W.C. will not be detrimental to 

the child.

In sum, mindful of the additional factors that we indicated should be 

emphasized during the needs-and-welfare analysis in In re K.Z.S., supra at 

763, such as “the love, comfort, security and stability the child might have 

with the foster parent” and the importance of continuing that beneficial 

relationship, we find that the record confirms that terminating Father’s 

parental rights best satisfies S.W.C.’s developmental, physical, and 

emotional needs and welfare. We emphasize that it is highly beneficial that 

S.W.C. and his half-sisters share the same pre-adoptive foster home.

For all of the foregoing reasons, we affirm the trial court order 

changing S.W.C.’s permanency goal and the decree terminating Father’s 

parental rights to S.W.C. pursuant to § 2511(a)(8) and (b). 
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Order and decree affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 12/15/2014