In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit ____________

No. 04-3189

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

MATTHEW QUEEN,

Defendant-Appellant.

____________

Appeal from the United States District Court for the

Southern District of Indiana, Indianapolis Division.

No. 03 CR 163—Larry J. McKinney, Chief Judge.

____________

ARGUED JANUARY 26, 2005—DECIDED MAY 12, 2005

____________

Before POSNER, MANION, and WOOD, Circuit Judges.

MANION, Circuit Judge. Matthew Queen repeatedly

falsified his address on Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives (ATF) Form 4473 when buying guns,

and eventually entered a conditional guilty plea to one

count of making a false statement to a federal firearms

dealer, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(a)(6). The district court

sentenced Queen to 21 months’ imprisonment and three

years’ supervised release. He argues on appeal, as he did in

his motion to dismiss the indictment, that providing a false
2 No. 04-3189

address on a form 4473 is not a crime because a person’s

address is not “a fact material to the lawfulness of the sale”

of a firearm.

I.

Between late December 2000 and July 2001, Queen

purchased 39 firearms from federally licensed dealers in the

State of Indiana. The guns cost more than eleven thousand

dollars, and at least eleven of them later were recovered at

crime scenes in the Detroit and Chicago areas. Gun sale

records linked the purchases back to Queen. For each

purchase Queen completed an ATF Form 4473 requiring

him to provide his “Residence Address,” defined on the

form as “No., Street, City, County, State, ZIP Code.” On the

forms he represented his address as 2072 Egret Court in

Indianapolis, Indiana. Queen in fact had once lived in an

apartment at 2072 Egret Court, but he did not live at this

address when he completed the forms and bought the guns

because he was evicted on December 18, 2000, for nonpayment of rent. Neither the government nor Queen presented

evidence of his true address at the time of the gun purchases.

Queen moved to dismiss pursuant to Fed. R. Crim. P.

12(b)(3)(B), arguing that the indictment fails to allege an

offense because, according to Queen, the address given in

completing a Form 4473 is not material to the lawfulness of

the sale of a firearm. The district court denied Queen’s motion on the ground that every court to address the issue has

rejected Queen’s position. Queen then entered a conditional

guilty plea, reserving the right to appeal the district court’s

denial of his motion to dismiss, and to withdraw his guilty

plea if he prevails on appeal.
No. 04-3189 3

II.

We review de novo Queen’s challenge to the sufficiency of

the indictment. United States v. Daniels, 387 F.3d 636, 638

(7th Cir. 2004). In Queen’s view, the only fact about residence that is material to the lawfulness of a gun sale is the

buyer’s state of residence, a matter about which he told the

truth.

Queen’s only authority for his position is a district court

opinion that has not been accepted by any circuit and in fact

is not even good law in the district where the case was decided. He cites United States v. Benton, 329 F. Supp. 331, 332

(D. N.H. 1971), in support of his argument that “what is at

issue in a firearms transaction is the state the purchaser lives

in, not the street he lives on within that state.” Benton held

in 1971 that because no provision of the recently enacted

Gun Control Act explicitly required a gun purchaser to

disclose his true address, the accuracy of any address

actually given could not be material to the lawfulness of the

sale unless the government first proves that the buyer was

not a resident of the same state as the dealer. 329 F. Supp at

332. This is so, according to the Benton court, because only

the buyer’s state of residence, not his specific address within

the state, is relevant to the legality of the purchase. See id.; 18

U.S.C. § 922(b)(3).

We reject Queen’s argument that gun buyers may lie

about a street address so long as they live within the state

where the gun is sold. Section 922(a)(6) requires a buyer to

provide truthful information to a dealer about any fact material to the lawfulness of a firearm sale. 18 U.S.C. § 922 (a)(6).

Section 922(b)(5) of Title 18 in turn requires the dealer to

record the buyer’s place of residence, thus making a firearm

sale by a gun dealer illegal unless the dealer notes the
4 No. 04-3189

buyer’s “place of residence” in records the dealer is required

to maintain. Lastly, the Gun Control Act’s implementing

regulations require that a dealer record the buyer’s “residence address (including county or similar political subdivision)” on Form 4473, which specifically asks for “No.,

Street, City, County, State, [and] ZIP Code.” 27 C.F.R.

§ 478.124; ATF Form 4473. A false street address is therefore

material to the lawfulness of the sale because, when the

seller falsely represents his address on the form, the dealer

fails to record the buyer’s address, in violation of § 922(b)(5).

We are not alone in holding that an incorrect street

address on an ATF 4473 Form is material. In United States v.

Crandall, 453 F.2d 1216 (1st Cir. 1972), the First Circuit

upheld a conviction under § 922(b)(6) where the defendant

supplied a false name, address, and date of birth but was

not otherwise a prohibited buyer. These false representations were material, the court explained, because residency

is among the information that § 922(b)(5) obligates a seller

to record. Id at 1217. The Fifth Circuit followed this logic in

a case even more like ours, United States v. Gudger, 472 F.2d

566 (5th Cir. 1972), and explicitly held that giving a false

residence address is a material misrepresentation even if the

buyer lived within the state where the gun was sold. 472

F.2d at 567-68. The Fourth and Ninth Circuits, too, have held

that falsifying a residence address is a material misrepresentation. See United States v. Behenna, 552 F.2d 573, 576 (4th Cir.

1977) (“Had the indictment . . . been drawn in different

form, Behenna’s false statement as to his residence address

would have been sufficient to establish a violation of

[§ 922(a)(6)].” (emphasis in original)); United States v. Buck, 548

F.2d 871, 876 (9th Cir. 1977) (“Falsification of identity is an

element of 18 U.S.C. § 922(a)(6) and may be proved by evidence of use of a false name, age or place of residence.”).
No. 04-3189 5

III.

Lying about a street address on an ATF Form 4473 is a

material misrepresentation that violates § 922(a)(6). Queen’s

indictment was therefore sufficient to support his conviction.

AFFIRMED.

A true Copy:

Teste:

 _____________________________

Clerk of the United States Court of 

Appeals for the Seventh Circuit 

USCA-02-C-0072—5-12-05