In the 

United States Court of Appeals 

For the Seventh Circuit ____________________

Nos. 15‐2212, 15‐2929 & 15‐3615

RUSLANA MELNIK, also known as

RUSLANA GNATYUK, et al.,

Petitioners,

v.

JEFFERSON B. SESSIONS III, Attorney  

General of the United States,

Respondent.

____________________

Petitions for Review of Orders of the  

Board of Immigration Appeals

Nos. A906‐207‐913 & A099‐197‐430

____________________

ARGUED FEBRUARY 6, 2018 — DECIDED MAY 25, 2018

____________________

Before RIPPLE, SYKES, and BARRETT, Circuit Judges.

RIPPLE, Circuit Judge. Ruslana Melnik and Mykhaylo Gnat‐

yuk, a married couple who are citizens of Ukraine, petition

for review of decisions of the Board of Immigration Appeals

(“Board”). The Board dismissed their appeal from the deci‐

sion of an immigration judge, denying their applications for

asylum and ordering their removal from the United States.
2 Nos. 15‐2212, 15‐2929 & 15‐3615

The Board also denied their subsequent motions to reconsider

the dismissal and to reopen proceedings, as well as their mo‐

tions to reconsider those denials.1 We have consolidated their

timely petitions for review. For the reasons set forth in this

opinion, we deny the petitions.

I

BACKGROUND

A.

Mr. Gnatyuk entered the United States on a visitor’s visa

in 2003 and overstayed. Ms. Melnik joined him a year later,

but immigration authorities apprehended her on entry be‐

cause they determined that she had presented a fraudulent

passport. After she requested asylum and passed a credible

fear interview, authorities referred her case to the Asylum Of‐

fice of United States Citizenship and Immigration Services.

The Government later denied her affirmative application for

asylum and placed her in removal proceedings. A delay of

nearly a decade ensued. Mr. Gnatyuk also filed his own af‐

firmative application for asylum in 2010, but the Government

denied this application as well, placed Mr. Gnatyuk in re‐

moval proceedings, and consolidated the two cases.

The record reveals that, for the six years preceding their

travel to the United States, Ms. Melnik and Mr. Gnatyuk op‐

erated a clothing business in Ukraine. In the course of their

                                                 

1 The Board’s jurisdiction was predicated on 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.1(d), 1003.2.

Our jurisdiction is predicated on 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(5).  
Nos. 15‐2212, 15‐2929 & 15‐3615 3

work, they traveled to Poland and Hungary to purchase

clothing. They then resold this merchandise in a market in

their hometown in Western Ukraine. Ms. Melnik testified

that, during that period, men, whom she described as “rack‐

eteers,” victimized them through extortion.2 She claimed that,

in an effort to force them to hand over money, these individ‐

uals beat Mr. Gnatyuk on multiple occasions and once set his

car on fire. She further testified that they went to the local po‐

lice but that the authorities did nothing. She also stated that

they closed their business and decided to live separately to

ensure her safety and the safety of her daughter, who contin‐

ues to live in Ukraine.

Ms. Melnik said that she feared returning to Ukraine be‐

cause she now lives in the west and “the racketeers and eve‐

rybody, they don’t like western people.”3 Addressing the sit‐

uation in Ukraine after her departure, Ms. Melnik told the im‐

migration judge that her husband’s brother‐in‐law had been

a recent victim of extortion and beating, although she did not

know who was responsible. She described her hometown as

“destroyed” and identified photos of “burning places” in her

village, but she could not say what had happened or why.4

She also stated that she owed money for the false Ukrainian

passport that she had used to travel to the United States. She

claimed that her family had faced “constant threats” after her

                                                 

2 A.R. at 219. Citations to the Administrative Record refer to the record in

case number 15‐3615.

3 Id. at 223.  

4 Id.
4 Nos. 15‐2212, 15‐2929 & 15‐3615

departure.5 She later stated, however, that individuals de‐

manded money from her mother once in 2004, but there had

been no repetition of the incident in later years. She explained

this isolated incident by noting that her mother lives “in the

village” and that the racketeers live in the town.6 She there‐

fore does not experience routine harassment because the rack‐

eteers “don’t go [to] the village.”7

Mr. Gnatyuk also testified. He said that the racketeers de‐

manded a “tax” every month,8 and that he had suffered mul‐

tiple injuries over time, including a broken finger and stitches

on his head because of his unwillingness to comply.9 He

claimed that when he had complained to the police, they ar‐

rested him along with the racketeers and placed them in the

same cell. He also claimed that there were few economic op‐

portunities in Ukraine and that he had come to the United

States to live in a country “that takes care of its residents” and

has police that will “come up and help you if you’re in trou‐

ble.”10 In reply to a question about the recent extortion of his

brother‐in‐law, Mr. Gnatyuk said that he believed the men

who had extorted him “now ... all have government

badges.”11 Finally, he spoke about his life in the United States.

                                                 

5 Id. at 228.

6 Id. at 230.

7 Id.  

8 Id. at 236. Ms. Melnik’s statement indicated that it was roughly $250 a

month. Id. at 338.

9 Id.

10 Id. at 237.  

11 Id. at 238.
Nos. 15‐2212, 15‐2929 & 15‐3615 5

He described a business he had built, comprising fifteen

trucks and drivers. He estimated its value as one million dol‐

lars.

The petitioners also called a friend who is a Ukrainian

priest, Fr. Kalynyuk. He stated that before Mr. Gnatyuk came

to the United States, he had lived with Fr. Kalynyuk’s brother

for safety and that the police were unable to protect him. He

believed Mr. Gnatyuk would be killed if he returned.

B.

Both petitioners requested asylum before the immigration

judge. The immigration judge first determined that Mr. Gnat‐

yuk’s application in 2010 was untimely and that, he had not

established changed circumstances to justify his late filing.

The immigration judge therefore ruled that although he

would consider only Mr. Gnatyuk’s application for withhold‐

ing of removal, he would consider him a derivative applicant

on his wife’s application for asylum.

Reaching the merits of the petitioners’ claims, the immi‐

gration judge recognized that they have a “generalized fear of

returning to the Ukraine because of the present country con‐

ditions,” which he described as an “upheaval.”12 He further

acknowledged that, at the time of his decision, the Depart‐

ment of Homeland Security was not deporting to Ukraine

even those with final orders of removal. This action, he fur‐

ther noted, was an exercise of discretion on the part of the De‐

partment and was not a matter within his purview.  

                                                 

12 Id. at 108.
6 Nos. 15‐2212, 15‐2929 & 15‐3615

After an examination of our case law, the immigration

judge determined that the petitioners’ proffered social group

of “business owners in the Ukraine who have been extorted

by criminal elements and not protected by the government”13

was not cognizable under the Immigration and Nationality

Act. He explained that characterizing the group in this man‐

ner amounted to defining it primarily by the harm suffered in

the past, which was “circular.”14 When the prior harm was re‐

moved from the definition, the proffered social group became

all small business owners, a group that was, in the immigra‐

tion judge’s view, “too broad.”15 The judge could find, more‐

over, no motivation for the group’s victimization other than

profit.

The judge also expressed skepticism about the petitioners’

documentary evidence. The material lacked a substantial up‐

date since the original filings in 2004 and 2010. He also ques‐

tioned the credibility of Mr. Gnatyuk’s claim that the police

had arrested him when he complained about the extortion. In

the judge’s view, evidence of the beating of Mr. Gnatyuk’s

brother‐in‐law by criminal elements in Ukraine did not estab‐

lish that the present government would not protect the peti‐

tioners if they returned.

Finally, the immigration judge remarked that the couple

had resided in the United States for more than ten years

“largely due to the ineffectiveness of the Department of

                                                 

13 Id. at 109.

14 Id. at 110.

15 Id.
Nos. 15‐2212, 15‐2929 & 15‐3615 7

Homeland Security and the Immigration courts.”16 The judge

estimated that an appeal to the Board might take years and

informed the petitioners that, if country conditions in Ukraine

change or there are materially changed circumstances, they

may request a further hearing.

The immigration judge denied Ms. Melnik’s request for

asylum and Mr. Gnatyuk’s application for withholding of re‐

moval. Because neither petitioner argued that the Ukrainian

government would harm them upon their return, they could

obtain no relief under the Convention Against Torture.

C.

The Board dismissed the petitioners’ appeal. It first agreed

with the immigration judge’s determination that Mr. Gnat‐

yuk’s petition for asylum was untimely and added that his

assertion of worsened conditions did not constitute “changed

or extraordinary circumstances” that would excuse untimely

filing. In the Board’s view, the changes described by

Mr. Gnatyuk did not affect materially “either his eligibility for

relief or ability to ... file [an] application based upon his fear

of harm from racketeers that originally caused him to flee to

the United States.”17

The Board then turned to the merits of the appeal. It

agreed with the immigration judge that the petitioners had

not established the requisite past persecution or well‐founded

                                                 

16 Id. at 111.

17 Id. at 90.
8 Nos. 15‐2212, 15‐2929 & 15‐3615

fear of future persecution necessary for relief under the stat‐

ute. The Board agreed with the immigration judge’s conclu‐

sion that the proffered group was defined primarily “by its

members’ shared experience of past persecution.”18 Even if

the proffered social group were cognizable under the statute,

continued the Board, the petitioners had not demonstrated

that their membership in that group was, or would be, a cen‐

tral reason for their persecution. The petitioners had not

shown that the threats and demands for money that they ex‐

perienced “were made for any purpose other than enriching

the extortionists.”19 The Board also denied withholding be‐

cause the petitioners had failed to meet even the lower burden

applicable to asylum.

The petitioners moved to reopen and to reconsider the

Board’s decision. The Board denied reconsideration because

the petitioners had not identified an error of fact or law in the

prior decision. It denied reopening because the petitioners did

not establish that the new evidence would likely change the

result in the case. The petitioners had submitted a death cer‐

tificate of Mr. Gnatyuk’s business partner who had remained

in Ukraine. Noting that the document provided no details

about the circumstances surrounding the death, the Board

concluded that the document “does not sufficiently demon‐

strate that there exists a reasonable possibility that the [peti‐

tioners] would be targeted for harm rising to the level of per‐

secution on account of their membership in a particular social

                                                 

18 Id. at 91.

19 Id.  
Nos. 15‐2212, 15‐2929 & 15‐3615 9

group or other protected ground.”20 The petitioners filed a

timely petition for review.

The petitioners also sought reconsideration of the Board’s

ruling on their motions. Again, the Board concluded that they

had not identified an error of fact or law. Mr. Gnatyuk and

Ms. Melnik filed a timely petition for review from this deci‐

sion.

II

DISCUSSION

A.

Mr. Gnatyuk first asks that we review the immigration

judge’s determination, approved by the Board on its review,

to pretermit his request for asylum because it was untimely.

We have no jurisdiction to review this question. Section

1158(a)(2)(B) of Title 8, United States Code, requires asylum

applicants to demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence

that their asylum applications are filed within one year of

their arrival in the United States. Subsection (2)(D) allows for

certain limited exceptions where the “alien demonstrates to

the satisfaction of the Attorney General either the existence of

changed circumstances which materially affect the appli‐

cant’s eligibility for asylum or extraordinary circumstances

relating to the delay in filing an application.”    8 U.S.C.

§ 1158(a)(2)(D). However, § 1158(a)(3) specifically provides

that “[n]o court shall have jurisdiction to review any determi‐

                                                 

20 Id. at 29.  
10 Nos. 15‐2212, 15‐2929 & 15‐3615

nation of the Attorney General under paragraph 2.” We re‐

tain, of course, limited jurisdiction to review constitutional

claims and questions of law. See Bitsin v. Holder, 719 F.3d 619,

625 (7th Cir. 2013) (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D)).

Mr. Gnatyuk’s attempts to obtain relief despite this juris‐

dictional bar are without merit. He first submits that his re‐

marriage to his wife in 2012 “brings him within the one year

filing requirement of his wife.”21 This assertion is correct only

in the sense that his marriage permits him to assert derivative

eligibility on his wife’s asylum application. Both the immigra‐

tion judge and the Board acknowledged this derivative right

and adjudicated the case on this premise. This derivative right

has no effect, however, on the timeliness of his own applica‐

tion.

Mr. Gnatyuk also contends that his asylum application

was timely based on a change in circumstances. He first con‐

tends that the relevant regulation, which interprets the statute

to allow delayed filings only when they occur within a “rea‐

sonable period” of a change in circumstances, is ultra vires

and overly restrictive. See 8 C.F.R. § 1208.4(a)(4)(ii). He also

contends that even if the regulation is valid, he filed within a

“reasonable period.” His arguments are not responsive, how‐

ever, to the position of the agency. It did not fault Mr. Gnat‐

yuk for taking too much time to proffer evidence of changed

circumstances upon which he relied, specifically the conflict

between Russia and Ukraine and the unexplained death of

Mr. Gnatyuk’s relative. It merely concluded that these

changes were not material to his claim that he was a target for

extortion by criminal elements. It determined that he had

                                                 

21 Pet’rs’ Br. 34.
Nos. 15‐2212, 15‐2929 & 15‐3615 11

failed to identify material changed circumstances affecting his

eligibility. This fact‐based determination is precisely the sort

of finding removed from our review by 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(3).

See, e.g., Minghai Tian v. Holder, 745 F.3d 822, 826 (7th Cir.

2014) (“Tian does not ask us to adjudicate constitutional

claims or questions of law relating to the timeliness of his asy‐

lum application. Instead, he asks us to review the Board’s fac‐

tual determination that there existed no changed or extraor‐

dinary circumstances to excuse his late filing.”).

B.

We now turn to the petitioners’ substantive claims for re‐

lief. As the case comes to us, Ms. Melnik seeks review of the

Board’s denial of both her asylum and withholding of re‐

moval claims. Because we have no jurisdiction to review the

Board’s decision that his asylum claim is untimely, Mr. Gnat‐

yuk only can seek review of the Board’s denial of his with‐

holding of removal claim. The petitioners rely on the same ar‐

guments and the same evidence with respect to both claims.

To be eligible for asylum, a petitioner must demonstrate

that she is a refugee within the meaning of the Immigration

and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(A). That statute de‐

fines a refugee as an alien “who is unable or unwilling to re‐

turn to” the country of his nationality because of “a well‐

founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, na‐

tionality, membership in a particular social group, or political

opinion.” 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42); see also id. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(i).

Ms. Melnik rests her asylum claim on membership in a

particular social group. To qualify for asylum on this basis, an
12 Nos. 15‐2212, 15‐2929 & 15‐3615

alien must: (1) identify the particular social group; (2) estab‐

lish that she is a member of that group; and (3) establish that

the persecution or her well‐founded fear of persecution is

based on her membership in that group. Escobar v. Holder, 657

F.3d 537, 545 (7th Cir. 2011).

“Whether a group constitutes a particular social group un‐

der the Immigration and Nationality Act is a question of law

that we review de novo, while giving Chevron deference to the

Board’s reasonable interpretation set forth in precedential

opinions interpreting the statute.” Cece v. Holder, 733 F.3d 662,

668 (7th Cir. 2013) (en banc). The statute does not contain a

specific definition of a “social group.” “[T]he Board has de‐

scribed it as a group whose members share ‘common charac‐

teristics that members of the group either cannot change, or

should not be required to change because such characteristics

are fundamental to their individual identities,’” Escobar, 657

F.3d at 545 (quoting Gatimi v. Holder, 578 F.3d 511, 514 (7th

Cir. 2009)), and that definition is entitled to deference, Cece,

733 F.3d at 669; see also Gonzales v. Thomas, 547 U.S. 183 (2006)

(per curiam).22

                                                 

22 Crafting a workable and comprehensive definition of “social group” has

been an understandably difficult task for the Board. Its initial approach,

outlined in Matter of Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211, 232–33 (BIA 1985),

acknowledged “the ambiguity and the potential breadth of the phrase

‘particular social group.’” Matter of M‐E‐V‐G‐, 26 I. & N. Dec. 227, 231 (BIA

2014). Consequently, the Board “favored a case‐by‐case determination of

the particular kind of group characteristics that would qualify under the

Act.” Id. However, this “flexible approach” to addressing “the ambiguity

and the potential breadth of the phrase” has “led to confusion and a lack

of consistency.” Id. The Board has made efforts to clarify further the stand‐

ard. See id. at 231–33. Many circuits deferred to the Board’s addition of
Nos. 15‐2212, 15‐2929 & 15‐3615 13

Before the Board, the petitioners proffered their social

group as that of business owners targeted for extortion and

not protected by the government. The Board also considered

their contention that their additional wealth and

westernization upon returning from the United States would

make them targets upon their return. The Board held that

these groups were not cognizable under the statute because

the defining characteristic was primarily the fact of its

members’ prior persecution.23 We, like the Board, have held

consistently that where a group shares no common

characteristic other than the fact that its members have been

persecuted, it does not qualify as a social group. See Escobar,

657 F.3d at 545 (citing multiple prior circuit cases and In re

C‐A‐, 23 I. & N. Dec. 951, 956 (BIA 2006)). Indeed, the Board

has drawn support from the Guidelines of the United Nations

High Commissioner for Refugees, which stated that members

                                                 

these requirements. We, along with our colleagues in the Third Circuit,

rejected portions of the Board’s further requirements. See Cece v. Holder,

733 F.3d 662, 668–69, 668 n.1 (7th Cir. 2013) (en banc); Valdiviezo‐Galdamez

v. Attʹy Gen., 663 F.3d 582 (3d Cir. 2011) (rejecting the Board’s “particular‐

ity” and “social visibility” requirements). These decisions prompted addi‐

tional efforts at clarification from the Board. See Matter of M‐E‐V‐G‐, 26

I. & N. Dec. at 229; Matter of W‐G‐R‐, 26 I. & N. Dec. 208 (BIA 2014), aff’d in

part, vacated in part sub nom. Reyes v. Lynch, 842 F.3d 1125 (9th Cir. 2016).

We have not had the occasion to consider the Board’s most recent efforts

in this regard, and we need not do so today. The Board relied on neither

the “social visibility” nor the “particularity” requirement in its disposition

of this case, and the petitioners have not addressed these requirements.  

23 In their brief to this court, the petitioners suggest more than a page of

additional formulations of a social group they believe satisfies the statute.

See Pet’rs’ Br. 29–30. Those groups that the petitioners did not present to

the agency are not properly exhausted, and we will not consider them. See

Arobelidze v. Holder, 653 F.3d 513, 516–17 (7th Cir. 2011).  
14 Nos. 15‐2212, 15‐2929 & 15‐3615

of a social group “share a common characteristic other than

their risk of being persecuted.” See In re C‐A‐, 23 I. & N. Dec. at

956 (quoting U.N. Doc. HCR/GIP/02/02 (May 7, 2002)

(“UNHCR Guidelines”)). Applying these principles, we

already have rejected claims where the primary factor that

unites the victims of persecution is wealth or perceived

wealth. See Orellana‐Arias v. Sessions, 865 F.3d 476, 485–86 (7th

Cir. 2017) (citing numerous cases from this circuit and others).

Our cases have required consistently a shared characteristic

other than the convenience or opportunity of targeting

someone with an ability to pay. See, e.g., Tapiero de Orejuela v.

Gonzales, 423 F.3d 666, 672 (7th Cir. 2015) (rejecting the IJ’s

characterization of the petitioner’s social group as based on

wealth alone and accepting the class of “the educated,

landowning class of cattle farmers” targeted by the FARC).

Here, other than prior victimization for extortion, the only

common characteristic of members of the proffered class is

their status as small business owners. The petitioners pre‐

sented no objective evidence that small business owners are

of any particular interest to the extortionists. They are simply

a convenient target of a criminal element looking for a source

of income. On this point, our decision in Escobar, 657 F.3d 537,

is instructive. There, a Colombian national, who owned a

trucking business and who was associated actively with the

Liberal Party in that country, had his trucks commandeered

by the revolutionary group known as FARC. Under threat of

death, this organization forced Escobar, on several occasions,

to carry its shipments in his trucks. An opposing group, sus‐

pecting that he was collaborating with FARC, also made a

threat to kill him. He went into hiding, but FARC came look‐

ing for him and burned his trucks. Caught between these

competing death threats, Escobar fled Colombia and traveled
Nos. 15‐2212, 15‐2929 & 15‐3615 15

to the United States where he sought asylum. The Board de‐

nied relief. In its view, FARC’s burning of the trucks was

simply a nonphysical economic injury of insufficient severity

to warrant characterization as persecution.

We granted Escobar’s petition and reversed the decision

of the Board. We took issue with the Board’s characterization

of Escobar’s experience as simply an encounter with a crimi‐

nal element that wanted his trucks. Such a “sanitized” per‐

spective, we held, did not take into account the entirety of the

situation. Id. at 544. Escobar had contended that he was a

member of a social group of truck owners who, “because of

their anti‐FARC views and actions, have collaborated with

law enforcement and refused to cooperate with FARC.” Id. at

545. We ruled that such a group qualified as a “social group”

within the meaning of the statute. We rejected the Govern‐

ment’s argument that Escobar’s characterization failed be‐

cause an individual can cease to be a truck driver and, there‐

fore, the group did not involve an immutable characteristic.

We stressed that the group, as defined by Escobar, involved

all truckers who in the past had favored the government over

FARC, a characteristic that simply was incapable of change.

In short, Escobar belonged to a group that possessed an asset

that FARC needed and wanted to keep out of enemy hands.

That characteristic simply cannot be changed. His combina‐

tion of skill and his political history was immutable, even if

his choice of profession was not.

In reaching our decision in Escobar, we contrasted the sit‐

uation there with an earlier unpublished order of this court

where we had denied a petition because the proffered group

was simply those individuals who had sought police protec‐

tion from a gang. This group, we noted, had no common link
16 Nos. 15‐2212, 15‐2929 & 15‐3615

other than the violence suffered by its members. Id. at 545–46

(discussing Poroj‐Mejia v. Holder, 397 F. App’x 234 (7th Cir.

2010)).

Escobar demonstrates the kind of shared characteristics,

beyond a history of persecution, that permit recognition as a

social group. The petitioners’ proffered group, by contrast,

simply does not make the requisite showing. Accordingly, the

Board’s conclusion that the petitioners did not demonstrate

membership in a social group cognizable under the statute is

consistent with its approach to the definition of social group

and equally consistent with our case law.

We also agree with the Board’s further conclusion that,

even were the proffered group cognizable, the petitioners

have not established a nexus between small‐business‐group

membership and their targeting by the criminal group. The

petitioners have submitted no evidence that these criminals

have any particular animus toward small business owners as

small business owners. The small business owners simply

have money that the criminals want. As the Board stated,

“[a]bsent some demonstration of a causal link, there is no rea‐

son to infer that the threats and demands for money experi‐

enced by the respondents were made for any purpose other

than enriching the extortionists, which would not constitute

persecution on account of a protected ground.”24 Substantial

evidence therefore supports the Board’s determination that

the persecution was not “on account of” membership in a par‐

ticular social group. See Bathula v. Holder, 723 F.3d 889, 901–02

                                                 

24 A.R. at 91.
Nos. 15‐2212, 15‐2929 & 15‐3615 17

(7th Cir. 2013) (applying the substantial evidence standard to

the question of nexus).25

C.

We next examine whether the Board erred in denying the

petitioners’ motion to reconsider or their motion to reopen.

On a motion to reopen, the Board considers not only whether

an alien’s proffered changed circumstances or new evidence

satisfy the standard for reopening, 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1), but

also whether the evidence establishes a prima facie claim for

the relief sought, Moosa v. Holder, 644 F.3d 380, 384–85 (7th

Cir. 2011). We review the Board’s decision on a motion to re‐

open for an abuse of discretion. Id. at 384.

In support of their motion for reopening, the petitioners

submitted a death certificate of Mr. Gnatyuk’s former busi‐

ness partner. The certificate does not describe the circum‐

stances of the partner’s death. An affidavit submitted by

Mr. Gnatyuk merely adds that his partner was “killed”;26 it

gives no further explanation. The affidavit also adds that

Mr. Gnatyuk opposes recent Russian actions in Ukraine and

                                                 

25 The petitioners also asserted that they might be targeted as modern,

westernized, wealthy returnees. The Board rejected that variation “[f]or

the same reasons,” id. at 91, and we see no error in that conclusion. The

petitioners have provided no evidence that it is animus, rather than op‐

portunism, that motivated their targeting by the racketeers. Furthermore,

because withholding of removal requires the same showings, see 8 U.S.C.

§ 1231(b)(3), the Board committed no error in denying relief to the peti‐

tioners on these applications.

26 A.R. at 43.
18 Nos. 15‐2212, 15‐2929 & 15‐3615

fears that his political views would further subject him to per‐

secution if forced to return. The petitioners submitted no ob‐

jective evidence of the current state of affairs in Ukraine, the

targeting of political opponents of the Russian actions, or any‐

thing to substantiate further their claims. The Board did not

abuse its discretion in determining that the limited new evi‐

dence did not demonstrate a reasonable possibility that the

petitioners could establish that they would suffer harm rising

to the level of persecution. The Board made no mention of the

additional claim in the affidavit that the changes in Ukraine

could give rise to a claim based on political opinion. However,

the petitioners’ single line in an affidavit asserting such an en‐

tirely new factual basis for a claim, with no evidence to sub‐

stantiate that it is a reasonable fear in light of current events,

is not enough to have required the Board to act.

On the subject of reconsideration, the petitioners again did

not demonstrate prior factual or legal error in the Board’s de‐

cision. Instead, they essentially reassert their earlier argu‐

ments. The Board did not abuse its discretion in denying re‐

consideration.27

Conclusion

The petitions for review are denied.

                                                 

27 The petitioners make a variety of arguments claiming that they were

denied a fair hearing before an impartial arbiter. See Pet’rs’ Br. 46. These

arguments are conclusory in nature and therefore without merit.