IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 09-50727

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellant

v.

CAREMARK, INC.; CAREMARK INTERNATIONAL, INC.; CAREMARK

INTERNATIONAL HOLDINGS, INC.; MEDPARTNERS, INC.,

Defendants - Appellees

Consolidated with

No. 09-51053

STATE OF ARKANSAS; STATE OF CALIFORNIA; STATE OF ILLINOIS;

STATE OF LOUISIANA; STATE OF TEXAS; STATE OF DELAWARE;

STATE OF MASSACHUSETTS; DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA; JANAKI

RAMADOS,

Plaintiffs - Appellants

v.

CAREMARK, INC.; CAREMARK INTERNATIONAL, INC.; CAREMARK

INTERNATIONAL HOLDINGS, INC.; MEDPARTNERS, INC.,

Defendants - Appellees

Appeals from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Texas

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

F I L E D

February 24, 2011

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

Case: 09-50727 Document: 00511392890 Page: 1 Date Filed: 02/24/2011
Nos. 09-50727, 09-51053

Before BARKSDALE, DENNIS, and HAYNES, Circuit Judges.

HAYNES, Circuit Judge:

The United States (the “Government”) and the States of Arkansas,

California, Illinois, Louisiana, Texas, Delaware, and Massachusetts, as well as

the District of Colombia and the relator (collectively, the “State Appellants”)

sued Caremark, Inc., Caremark International Holdings, Inc., and Caremark Rx,

Inc., f/k/a Medpartners, Inc. (collectively “Caremark”), claiming that Caremark

violated the False Claims Act (“FCA”) by unlawfully denying requests for

reimbursement made by state Medicaid agencies. The district court entered a

Rule 54(b) final judgment disposing of all of the Government’s FCA claims. It

also entered several partial summary judgment orders against the State

Appellants.

On appeal, the Government argues that the district court erred in holding

that: (1) Caremark did not impair an obligation to the Government within the

meaning of the FCA when it denied reimbursement requests from state Medicaid

agencies; (2) the Government’s complaint-in-intervention did not relate back to

the relator’s complaint; and (3) Caremark did not make false statements when

it rejected state Medicaid agencies’ reimbursement requests on grounds that

precluded the agencies from recovering money owed to the program.

In a separate appeal, the State Appellants sought and received from the

district court a certification order under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) on eight of the

district court’s orders granting partial summary judgment to Caremark or

denying the State Appellants’ motions for summary judgment, and we permitted

the State Appellants’ interlocutory appeal. The State Appellants argue that the

district court erred in holding that: (1) Caremark, Inc. v. Goetz, 480 F.3d 779 (6th

Cir. 2007), only established that Medicaid was the “payor of last resort”; (2) plan

restrictions are not false statements under the FCA if they exist in the client’s

2

Case: 09-50727 Document: 00511392890 Page: 2 Date Filed: 02/24/2011
Nos. 09-50727, 09-51053

plan; (3) Caremark’s good faith confusion about the applicable law was legally

relevant to the element of falsity, which is a necessary element for FCA liability;

(4) the out-of-network, preauthorization, and “billed-submitted” examples of

Caremark’s denials of reimbursement requests were not false; and (5)

Caremark’s conduct was not actionable under the Arkansas Medicaid Fraud

False Claims Act (the “Arkansas FCA”). We consolidated the appeals.

1

We AFFIRM the district court’s conclusion that Caremark did not make

“false” statements when it stated that it rejected reimbursement requests based

on restrictions that were contained in a client’s plan. Additionally, we hold that

the district court correctly held that out-of-network restrictions are substantive

limitations that can be applied to Medicaid.

However, we REVERSE the district court’s holding that the Government

cannot bring a claim under 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(7) under the facts alleged

because we conclude that Caremark may be held liable under that section for

causing the state Medicaid agencies to make false statements to the

Government. Additionally, we VACATE the district court’s holding that the

Government’s complaint-in-intervention does not relate back to the relator’s

complaint, as this conclusion has been superseded by statute. We also VACATE

the district court’s decision that preauthorization requirements are substantive

limitations that can be applied to Medicaid. Finally, we REVERSE the district

court’s holding that the Arkansas FCA does not allow liability for reverse false

claims. We REMAND for proceedings consistent with this opinion.

The district court’s certification order indicated three issues as to which certification 1

was appropriate: (1) whether Caremark’s statements “are not false as a matter of law”; (2)

whether the orders in question properly construe and apply the legal standard clarified by the

Sixth Circuit in Goetz; and (3) whether Caremark’s conduct is actionable under the Arkansas

FCA. We note that “it is the order, not the question, that is appealable” on an interlocutory

appeal such that we can consider all issues material to the certified order.

Castellanos-Contreras v. Decatur Hotels LLC, 622 F.3d 393, 398-99 (5th Cir. 2010) (en banc).

Nevertheless, where an issue is not fully developed in the district court, we may decline to

reach it. See Sw. Bell Tel., L.P. v. City of Hous., 529 F.3d 257, 263 (5th Cir. 2008).

3

Case: 09-50727 Document: 00511392890 Page: 3 Date Filed: 02/24/2011
Nos. 09-50727, 09-51053

I. BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Caremark is a pharmacy benefits management company (“PBM”) that

administers pharmacy benefits for its clients, which include insurance

companies, managed care organizations, and public and private health plans and

organizations. Caremark’s role is to manage its clients’ plans in accordance with

each plan’s provisions. Each plan has benefits and restrictions, such as only

covering prescriptions filled at certain pharmacies or requiring preauthorization

for a prescription to be covered by the plan.

A. Statutory Background

Some people who are eligible under a plan administered by a PBM are also

eligible for Medicaid. These individuals, referred to as dual-eligible individuals,

2

sometimes identify themselves at a pharmacy as Medicaid recipients instead of

privately-insured individuals, thus resulting in a state Medicaid agency paying

the bill. However, if the state Medicaid agency discovers that a Medicaid

recipient is a dual-eligible individual, the agency must seek reimbursement from

the private insurer (known as a “third party”) under federal law. 42 U.S.C.

§ 1396(a)(25). In addition to requiring state Medicaid agencies to seek

reimbursement from third parties, federal law directs the States to enact laws

that require Medicaid recipients to assign their rights to receive payments from

any third party to the state Medicaid agency. 42 C.F.R. §§ 433.137-.254 (2009).

State Medicaid agencies receive substantial funding from the Government.

See 42 C.F.R. § 433.140; Ark. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs. v. Ahlborn, 547

U.S. 268, 275 (2006) (“The [Medicaid] program is a cooperative one; the Federal

Government pays between 50% and 83% of the costs the State incurs for patient

care . . . .”). However, the Government does not provide federal funding (known

as federal financial participation or “FFP”) if a State is able to recover funds

In this opinion, the phrase “dual eligible” does not mean an individual covered by both 2

Medicare and Medicaid, as the term is sometimes used.

4

Case: 09-50727 Document: 00511392890 Page: 4 Date Filed: 02/24/2011
Nos. 09-50727, 09-51053

from a third party. 42 C.F.R. § 433.140; Ahlborn, 547 U.S. at 289. Additionally,

if the Government provides FFP and the State later recovers from a third party,

federal law requires the State to return a portion of the reimbursement to the

Government. 42 C.F.R. § 433.140(c).

B. Plaintiffs’ Claims

In 1999, the relator, a former Caremark employee, filed a qui tam action

on her own behalf and on behalf of the United States, Arkansas, California,

Florida, Illinois, Louisiana, Tennessee, and Texas, claiming that Caremark

violated the FCA and similar state laws by making false statements to avoid

liability to the Government and state Medicaid agencies. In 2005, the United

States, Arkansas, Florida, Louisiana, and Tennessee intervened, and California

intervened in 2006. The relator and intervenors claim that Caremark

unlawfully denied or rejected reimbursement requests for dual-eligible

individuals, and such actions resulted in losses to the Government and the state

Medicaid agencies because they had to pay claims that should have been covered

by Caremark. The plaintiffs alleged, among other things, that Caremark

assigned “dummy codes” instead of actual pharmacy codes to claims for which

Medicaid requested a reimbursement resulting in the unlawful denial of the

state Medicaid agencies’ requests. The plaintiffs also alleged that Caremark

improperly applied card-presentation, timely-filing, and out-of-network plan

restrictions to reject reimbursement requests from state Medicaid agencies.

C. Declaratory Judgment: Caremark, Inc. v. Goetz

After this suit was filed, Caremark brought a declaratory judgment action

in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee to clarify

whether certain pre-existing restrictions were enforceable against Tennessee

Medicaid (“TennCare”). Caremark, Inc. v. Goetz, 395 F. Supp. 2d 683 (M.D.

Tenn. 2005). Caremark asked the district court to address three restrictions: (1)

5

Case: 09-50727 Document: 00511392890 Page: 5 Date Filed: 02/24/2011
Nos. 09-50727, 09-51053

card-presentation restrictions; (2) timely-filing limitations; and (3) out-ofnetwork limitations. Id. at 688.

3

The card-presentation restriction requires a plan participant to present a

Caremark card at the time of the sale to be covered by the plan. Some plans

allow a participant who fails to present a card at the point of sale to submit a

request for reimbursement after the fact, which is referred to as a “paper claims”

benefit. TennCare and the Government argued that the card-presentation

requirement discriminated against Medicaid because Medicaid could not ensure

that a dual-eligible participant presented his or her Caremark card at the point

of sale. They argued that applying this restriction to dual-eligible individuals

resulted in the state Medicaid agencies and the Government paying for

prescriptions that should have been covered by Caremark’s clients.

Timely-filing limitations impose a restriction on the number of days a plan

participant has to submit a request for reimbursement. TennCare and the

Government argued that timely-filing limitations discriminate against Medicaid

because it is often impossible for state Medicaid agencies to meet the filing

deadlines.

Out-of-network limitations provide that plan participants are not covered

or are covered at lower rates when the participants fill a prescription at a

pharmacy outside of the plan’s network. Again, TennCare and the Government

argued that this limitation could not be lawfully applied to Medicaid because

Medicaid could not ensure that a dual-eligible individual filled a prescription at

an in-network pharmacy.

In addressing these claims, the district court distinguished between

“procedural” and “substantive” restrictions and concluded that substantive

The United States District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee granted the 3

Government’s motion to intervene but denied its motion to transfer the case to the Western

District of Texas. Goetz, 395 F. Supp. 2d at 685.

6

Case: 09-50727 Document: 00511392890 Page: 6 Date Filed: 02/24/2011
Nos. 09-50727, 09-51053

restrictions could be applied to a state Medicaid agency, but procedural

restrictions that discriminated against Medicaid could not. Id. at 694. The

district court held that the card-presentation and timely-filing restrictions were

procedural and discriminated against Medicaid. Therefore, they could not be

applied to state Medicaid agencies. Id. at 696. The district court did not address

the out-of-network restrictions because TennCare and the Government conceded

that such restrictions could be applied to Medicaid. Id. at 693 & nn.3-4.

The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Caremark, Inc. v. Goetz, 480 F.3d 779 (6th Cir.

2007). The court elaborated on the distinction between procedural and

substantive restrictions, concluding that procedural restrictions were those that

“deal only with the manner or mode of requesting coverage” while substantive

restrictions deal with the “type or quantum of benefits available to a beneficiary

under the plan.” Id. at 788. Additionally, only procedural restrictions that

4

discriminate against Medicaid are not enforceable against Medicaid. Id.

According to the Sixth Circuit, Caremark could not “shift[] responsibility [to pay

medical bills] onto the government by contractual fiat[.]” Id. (quoting Evanston

Hosp. v. Hauck, 1 F.3d 540, 543 (7th Cir. 1993)). The Sixth Circuit found that

by enforcing the card-presentation and timely-filing restrictions, Caremark was

inappropriately shifting the burden to pay for dual-eligible individuals’

pharmacy benefits from Caremark to TennCare. Id. at 789.

D. Summary Judgment Motions

In 2007, after the Sixth Circuit’s Goetz opinion was released, both sides

filed motions for summary judgment in this case. On August 27, 2008, the

district court issued an order granting in part and denying in part Caremark’s

motion for partial summary judgment against the Government and denying the

Government’s motion for summary judgment (the “Main Order”). United States

For the action at hand, the district court concluded that Goetz was the law of the case

4

and applied Goetz’s procedural-versus-substantive analysis to the FCA claims.

7

Case: 09-50727 Document: 00511392890 Page: 7 Date Filed: 02/24/2011
Nos. 09-50727, 09-51053

ex rel. Ramadoss v. Caremark Inc., 586 F. Supp. 2d 668, 689 (W.D. Tex. 2008).

The district court also granted Caremark’s motions for partial summary

judgment against the State Appellants and denied the State Appellants’ motions

for summary judgment. On June 19, 2009, the district court granted the

Government’s motion for entry of a partial final judgment pursuant to Federal

Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b), concluding that the Main Order “fully dispose[d]

of all claims asserted by the United States, on behalf of the Centers for Medicare

and Medicaid Services (“CMS”), to recover monies allegedly due to Medicaid.”

On October 2, 2009, the district court entered a certification order to the State

Appellants permitting them to appeal the eight partial summary judgment

orders. The Government and the State Appellants timely appealed to this court,

and we permitted the State Appellants’ interlocutory appeal.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW AND JURISDICTION

We review a grant of summary judgment de novo, applying the same

standard as the district court. Gen. Universal Sys. v. HAL Inc., 500 F.3d 444,

448 (5th Cir. 2007). Summary judgment is appropriate if the moving party can

show that “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant

is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a). The evidence

5

must be viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. United Fire

& Cas. Co. v. Hixson Bros., Inc., 453 F.3d 283, 285 (5th Cir. 2006). Additionally,

because we have jurisdiction over the State Appellants’ appeal pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 1292(b), our “review only extends to controlling questions of law.”

Castellanos-Contreras, 622 F.3d at 397. “Further, the court’s inquiry is limited

to the summary judgment record before the trial court.” Id.

Effective December 1, 2010, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 has been amended,

5

and the summary judgment standard is now reflected in Rule 56(a). The amended Rule 56

contains no substantive change to the summary judgment standard. Therefore, we cite to the

amended rule.

8

Case: 09-50727 Document: 00511392890 Page: 8 Date Filed: 02/24/2011
Nos. 09-50727, 09-51053

The district court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1345, and

1367, as well as 31 U.S.C. § 3732. We have jurisdiction over the Government’s

appeal of the final judgment pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. The district court

entered a Rule 54(b) partial final judgment against the Government on June 18,

2009. This partial judgment covered two issues: (1) “the United States’ claims

asserted under the [FCA] for the recovery of monies allegedly due to Medicaid”;

and (2) “the United States’ common law claim of recoupment for moneys allegedly

due Medicaid.”

We have jurisdiction over the State Appellants’ appeal pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 1292(b), which gives a district judge discretion to certify an order that

“involves a controlling question of law as to which there is substantial ground for

difference of opinion” and where the judge concludes “that an immediate appeal

from the order may materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation

. . . .” The district judge certified all eight of its partial summary judgment orders

to this court. We have discretion to grant the district court’s certification order.

United States v. Garner, 749 F.2d 281, 286 (5th Cir. 1985). This court granted the

State Appellants’ petition for leave to appeal and consolidated it with the

Government’s appeal.

III. DISCUSSION

A. Did Caremark violate § 3729(a)(7) when it denied reimbursement

requests from state Medicaid agencies?

Claims under 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(7) require proof that the defendant

“knowingly makes, uses, or causes to be made or used, a false record or statement

to conceal, avoid, or decrease an obligation to pay or transmit money or property

to the Government.” 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(7). This is known as a reverse false

6

Unless otherwise noted, citations to 31 U.S.C. § 3729 refer to the statute as it applied 6

to Caremark’s conduct prior to 2009, before Congress amended this section in the Fraud

Enforcement and Recovery Act of 2009 (“FERA” or “the 2009 amendments”). We cite to the

session laws when referring to FERA. The majority of FERA’s provisions took effect on May

9

Case: 09-50727 Document: 00511392890 Page: 9 Date Filed: 02/24/2011
Nos. 09-50727, 09-51053

claim because the effect of the defendant’s knowingly false statement is a failure

to pay the Government when payment is required. A direct claim, on the other

hand, occurs when a false claim for payment is submitted to the Government.

United States ex rel. Bain v. Ga. Gulf Corp., 386 F.3d 648, 652 (5th Cir. 2004). In

this case, the Government contends that Caremark made false statements to the

state Medicaid agencies—who receive over half of their funding from the

Government—that allowed Caremark to fraudulently avoid making payments to

the state Medicaid agencies. This is known as an indirect reverse false claim

because the defendant allegedly knowingly made a false statement to a third

party, knowing that its statement would “conceal, avoid, or decrease” an obligation

to the Government. 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(7).

The Government appeals the district court’s conclusion that “Caremark does

not have any obligation to the Government for denials of reimbursement requests

that Caremark submitted to state Medicaid agencies.” United States ex rel.

Ramadoss, 586 F. Supp. 2d at 692. The Government makes two arguments as to

why the district court was incorrect: (1) the Government provides direct funding

for state Medicaid agencies, and because defrauding a state Medicaid agency has

a direct impact on the Government, it is the same as defrauding the Government

itself; and (2) even if Caremark did not owe an “obligation” to the Government,

7

its false statements caused the state Medicaid agencies to make false statements

to the Government, which is itself a violation of 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(7). Because

20, 2009 (with several exceptions, one of which is noted later in this opinion). See Pub. L. No.

111-21, 123 Stat. 1617, 1625 (2009).

Caremark relies heavily on Allison Engine Co. v. United States ex rel. Sanders, 553 7

U.S. 662 (2008), to support its argument that an obligation to a federally-funded entity is not

an obligation to “the Government.” We find it unnecessary to address whether Allison Engine

would require such a conclusion, however, because we conclude that Caremark may

nonetheless be held liable under § 3729(a)(7) for causing the state Medicaid agencies to impair

their obligations to the Government.

10

Case: 09-50727 Document: 00511392890 Page: 10 Date Filed: 02/24/2011
Nos. 09-50727, 09-51053

we agree with the Government on the second point, we need not address the first

point.

The Government argues that even if Caremark does not owe an “obligation”

directly to “the Government,” it may be held liable for causing the States to impair

their obligations to the Government. Section 3729(a)(7) provides that a person

8

who causes a false statement to be made “to conceal, avoid, or decrease an

obligation to pay or transmit money or property to the Government” is liable

under the FCA. 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(7); see also United States ex rel. Riley v. St.

Luke’s Episcopal Hosp., 355 F.3d 370, 378 (5th Cir. 2004) (“The FCA applies to

anyone who knowingly assists in causing the government to pay claims grounded

in fraud, without regard to whether that person has direct contractual relations

with the government.” (internal quotations and citations omitted)).

Two cases have interpreted § 3729(a)(7) to allow liability for indirect reverse

false claims. See United States ex rel. Hunt v. Merck-Medco Managed Care,

L.L.C., 336 F. Supp. 2d 430, 444-45 (E.D. Pa. 2004); United States ex rel. Koch v.

Koch Indus., Inc., 57 F. Supp. 2d 1122, 1128-29 (N.D. Okla. 1999). In Hunt, the

relator claimed that Merck-Medco, a PBM, violated the FCA by making false

statements to Blue Cross/Blue Shield, a health insurance company that provided

health insurance to federal employees. Hunt, 336 F. Supp. 2d at 444. MerckMedco argued that it did not owe an obligation to the Government because its

obligation was to Blue Cross/Blue Shield and the statute required the obligation

We reject Caremark’s argument that the Government failed to raise this issue to the 8

district court. The Government made this argument in its opposition to summary judgment

and in additional briefing to the district court after the district judge told the parties that he

agreed with Caremark’s argument on this issue. Because this material issue was raised in the

district court and is therefore encompassed in its orders granting Caremark summary

judgment, we have jurisdiction over this issue although the district court did not expressly

discuss it. See Yamaha Motor Corp. v. Calhoun, 516 U.S. 199, 205 (1996) (noting that under

28 U.S.C. § 1292, “the appellate court may address any issue fairly included within the

certified order because it is the order that is appealable, and not the controlling question

identified by the district court” (internal quotations omitted)).

11

Case: 09-50727 Document: 00511392890 Page: 11 Date Filed: 02/24/2011
Nos. 09-50727, 09-51053

to be owed directly to the Government. Id. The Court rejected this “direct privity”

argument, ruling that the statute allowed liability if the party caused a false

statement “to be made or used.” Id. The court concluded that “[t]he fact that

Medco may not have been in direct contractual privity with the Government . . .

is not an automatic bar to § 3729(a)(7) liability.” Id. The court accepted the

Government’s argument that because “any contractual penalties owing from

Medco to Blue Cross [were] required by law to be turned over to the Government,

. . . the distinction between Medco and Blue Cross [was] legally worthless.” Id.

Because of this “unique relationship,” the “predictable, even certain, consequence

of its actions (or inactions) would and could be to reduce the amount of money

owed to a party (Blue Cross) that it knew was in direct contractual privity with

the Government.” Id.

Similarly, in Koch, the relator argued that the defendants violated

§ 3729(a)(7) by making false statements to a party who had mineral leases with

the Government. Koch, 57 F. Supp. 2d at 1124. The defendants argued that they

could not be held liable under § 3729(a)(7) because they made statements to the

lessee, not to the Government. Id. at 1127. The court disagreed, noting that the

defendants’ false measurements may have “caused the lessee or operator to

understate its royalty obligation to the Government.” Id. at 1129 (emphasis

added). The court rejected the defendants’ argument that “because subsection

(a)(7) and (c) [which defined the term “claim” for purposes of the FCA] were added

at the same time, the absence of any reverse false claim language in subsection

(c) conclusively demonstrates that Congress did not intend the FCA to impose

liability for indirect reverse false claims.” Id. at 1128. The court noted that

“[w]hile it is true that Congress did not explicitly include indirect reverse false

claims within the gambit of the FCA, it is not clear to this Court that Congress

intended to exclude them.” Id. at 1129. Instead, the court concluded that

12

Case: 09-50727 Document: 00511392890 Page: 12 Date Filed: 02/24/2011
Nos. 09-50727, 09-51053

Congress’s intent was to expand the FCA “to reach further to protect the

Government from fraud due to false filings.” Id. at 1128.

We have also interpreted a prior version of the FCA to encompass indirect

reverse false claims. Smith v. United States, 287 F.2d 299 (5th Cir. 1961). In

Smith, the defendant made false claims for payment to the Beaumont Housing

9

Authority (“BHA”) and also made false statements to the BHA to avoid financial

obligations. Id. at 300, 303-04. The court accepted the indirect reverse false claim

theory because “the False Claims Act applies even where there is no direct liability

running from the Government to the claimant.” Id. at 304 (emphasis added). The

court reasoned that had the BHA “not made these payments and had they not

been reflected in the quarterly reports, the Government, in one quarter, would

have received more rent and in the other would have made a lesser payment. The

expenses were therefore ultimately borne by the United States Treasury.” Id.

The States have a legal duty to return federal funds if they are able to

recover from third parties. 42 C.F.R. § 433.140 (“If the State receives FFP in

Medicaid payments for which it receives third party reimbursement, the State

must pay the Federal government a portion of the reimbursement . . . .”). The

States also have a legal duty to seek reimbursement from a third party for dualeligible individuals. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(25)(A) (requiring the States to “take all

reasonable measures to ascertain the legal liability of third parties” and to seek

reimbursement for medical assistance to the extent of any third party’s legal

liability); 42 C.F.R. § 433.139(b)(1) (requiring the state agency to reject a claim

and return it to a third party for a determination of the amount of liability).

We note that the district court rejected the Government’s reliance on Smith because 9

it incorrectly concluded that the lessee leased directly from the Government. However, Smith

was not a case against the lessee, but against the lessee’s chief executive. 287 F.2d at 300.

The executive argued that he did not personally “make or cause to be made . . . any claim upon

or against the Government . . . .” Id. at 304. As noted above, we held that the FCA “applies

even where there is no direct liability running from the Government to the claimant.” Id.

13

Case: 09-50727 Document: 00511392890 Page: 13 Date Filed: 02/24/2011
Nos. 09-50727, 09-51053

These requirements impose an obligation on the States to the Government. If

Caremark made false statements that an individual is not covered by a plan, these

false statements would cause the state Medicaid agencies to pay for the

prescription and seek reimbursement from the Government rather than from

Caremark. This, in turn, would cause the States to receive and to keep federal

funds to which they would not otherwise be entitled. Caremark’s actions therefore

could have impaired the States’ obligation to the Government under 42 U.S.C.

§ 1396a(a)(25). The Smith, Hunt, and Koch cases are instructive because they all

allow FCA liability for knowingly making a false statement that will cause a third

party to impair its obligation to the federal government. Smith, 287 F.2d at 304;

Hunt, 336 F. Supp. 2d at 444-45; Koch, 57 F. Supp. 2d at 1128-29. The statute

does not require that the statement impair the defendant’s obligation; instead, it

requires that the statement impair “an obligation to pay or transmit money or

property to the Government.” 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(7) (emphasis added). We hold

that if the Government is able to prove that Caremark knowingly made false

statements to the States knowing that these statements could cause the States to

impair their obligation to the Government, Caremark will be liable under

§ 3729(a)(7). Because Caremark’s allegedly false statements could have caused

the state Medicaid agencies to impair their obligations to the Government, we

conclude that the district court erred in granting summary judgment to Caremark

on its § 3729(a)(7) claims based upon the argument that the statute, on its face,

does not apply to Caremark in the circumstances presented here.

B. When a relator initiates an FCA suit in which the Government later

intervenes, does the Government’s complaint-in-intervention relate

back to the relator’s complaint?

Caremark concedes that the district court’s analysis has been superceded

by statute, and we agree. In FERA, Congress specified that the Government’s

complaint-in-intervention “shall relate back to the filing date of the complaint of

the person who originally brought the action, to the extent that the claim of the

14

Case: 09-50727 Document: 00511392890 Page: 14 Date Filed: 02/24/2011
Nos. 09-50727, 09-51053

Government arises out of the conduct, transactions, or occurrences set forth, or

attempted to be set forth, in the prior complaint of that person.” Pub. L. No.

111-21, § 4(b), 123 Stat. 1617 (2009). Unlike other sections of FERA, Congress

specifically stated that this provision “shall apply to cases pending on the date of

enactment.” Id. § 4(f). Because this case was pending on the date FERA was

enacted, the Government’s complaint-in-intervention relates back to the relator’s

complaint. Therefore, we vacate the district court’s order on this issue.

C. Did Caremark make false statements when it rejected Medicaid

reimbursement requests based on restrictions that were contained

in a client’s plan?

Both the State Appellants and the Government argue that the district court

erred in holding that statements “where Caremark denied Medicaid

reimbursement requests based on restrictions that were contained in a client’s

plan” were not “false” statements subject to liability through application of

§ 3729(a)(7). The State Appellants challenge the district court’s conclusion that

a true statement cannot be false under the FCA. They argue that a factually true

statement can still be false if it is “legally impermissible.” The Government

challenges the district court’s conclusion that a claim is not false when there is a

legitimate good faith disagreement about the applicable law. It argues that an

ambiguity in the governing law does not preclude falsity; rather, the existence of

an ambiguity concerns whether the defendant acted knowingly, which is a distinct

element under the FCA. Thus, we focus our attention in this section on “false”

rather than “knowingly.”

Our analysis of this question is hampered by the fact that we are deciding

this case on an extremely limited record. The State Appellants’ appeal is a

certified appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b), and our review only extends to

“controlling questions of law.” Castellanos-Contreras, 622 F.3d at 397. The

Government’s appeal is pursuant to a Rule 54(b) final judgment, but because the

Government’s claims were disposed of early in the case, the record was not fully

15

Case: 09-50727 Document: 00511392890 Page: 15 Date Filed: 02/24/2011
Nos. 09-50727, 09-51053

developed. The district court’s opinion merely held that factually true statements

made prior to Goetz, when the law was unclear, cannot constitute a false

statement for purposes of the FCA. Not raised in this appeal is the question of

whether factually true statements can be false post-Goetz, as the district court has

not yet reached this issue.

Since false is the opposite of true, statements that are factually true are not

false statements about the facts. Indeed, neither the State Appellants nor the

Government argue that the statements at issue in this appeal were factually

incorrect. Instead, they argue that Caremark’s true statements that it denied

requests for reimbursement because the participants’ plans did not have a paper

claims provision were untrue because Caremark was not legally permitted to deny

those requests. The State Appellants rely on United States v. Bourseau, 531 F.3d

1159 (9th Cir. 2008), to support their argument. In Bourseau, the Ninth Circuit

noted that “courts decide whether a claim is false or fraudulent by determining

whether a defendant’s representations are accurate in light of applicable law.” Id.

at 1164.

We need not decide whether we agree with Bourseau’s analysis because we

decline to go farther than the matter addressed by the district court—whether

stating that a request was denied for a reason stated in a client’s plan is a “false

statement.” We conclude it is not. If, indeed, Caremark went further and stated

that its conduct was in compliance with the law or otherwise certified the legal

effect of its actions, that may present a different question, one we do not reach.

Therefore, we reject the State Appellants’ and the Government’s argument that

the district court erred in holding factually true statements, without more, were

not false for purposes of the FCA.

D. Did the district court err in its interpretation of Goetz?

The State Appellants argue that the district court erred in concluding that

“beyond availing that Medicaid is the ‘payor of last resort,’ Goetz did not establish

16

Case: 09-50727 Document: 00511392890 Page: 16 Date Filed: 02/24/2011
Nos. 09-50727, 09-51053

that Medicaid regulations specifically prevent PBMs from applying existing

restrictions.” United States ex rel. Ramadoss, 586 F. Supp. 2d at 689. We decline

to address the district court’s interpretation of Goetz as a stand-alone issue.

Instead, we will address it as part of the analysis of the substantive contentions

on appeal.

E. Did the district court err in applying the Goetz procedural-versussubstantive test to out-of-network, preauthorization, and billedamount plan restrictions?

Both the State Appellants and the Government argue that the district court

erred in applying Goetz to the facts of this case because Caremark’s reliance on

out-of-network and preauthorization requirements are false as a matter of law

under Goetz. The State Appellants also argue that the district court erred in

finding that Caremark’s “billed/submitted amount” and “amount billed used for

pricing” (referred to as the “billed-amount” restrictions) were not false under

Goetz. We address each argument below.

1. Out-Of-Network Restrictions

Addressing a specific example of an allegedly false statement, the district

court held that an out-of-network “restriction is substantive as it affects the type

or quantum of coverage under a plan, instead of the manner or mode of

reimbursement” because it “[l]imit[s] the pharmacies at which a plan participant

can fill prescriptions . . . .” United States ex rel. Ramadoss, 586 F. Supp. 2d at 710.

The district court noted that this has “nothing to do with the manner or mode of

seeking reimbursement.” The Government essentially concedes that out-ofnetwork restrictions are not at issue in this appeal. The Government merely

argues that the district court erred to the extent that it would apply this reasoning

to “Caremark’s practice with respect to Medicaid reimbursement requests to

which it did assign . . . dummy code[s].”

17

Case: 09-50727 Document: 00511392890 Page: 17 Date Filed: 02/24/2011
Nos. 09-50727, 09-51053

We conclude that this point of error is meritless because the district court

made clear that “for claims that actually allege Caremark made a false statement,

for example, that a reimbursement request was denied based on a restriction that

was not in a corresponding plan [e.g., dummy codes], those claims may be

permissible under the FCA.” Id. at 686 n.20. The district court granted summary

judgment on the out-of-network example mentioned by the Government in its brief

because there was evidence that Caremark did not use a “dummy code” in

processing that particular claim. There was evidence that the prescription was

processed at an out-of-network pharmacy, so Caremark’s statement that it denied

the reimbursement request for that reason was not false. The Government does

not deny that this was the correct ruling on this particular example; therefore, its

complaint on this issue is without merit.

2. Preauthorization Requirements

The district court also held that preauthorization is a “substantive

restriction as it affects the type or quantum of coverage under a plan, instead of

the mode or manner of reimbursement.” United States ex rel. Ramadoss, 586 F.

Supp. 2d at 715. The Government argues that because Medicaid cannot comply

with a preauthorization requirement, “Caremark cannot lawfully apply the

restriction to deny reimbursement requests.” The Government claims that the

preauthorization requirement is procedural because it “deals only with the

manner or mode of requesting coverage.”

We conclude that further factual development on this issue is necessary.

From this limited record, we cannot determine whether the preauthorization

requirement functions as a “‘procedural’ roadblock[]to reimbursement,” Goetz, 395

F. Supp. 2d at 694, or a substantive limitation on coverage. For example, if

Caremark’s preauthorization requirement involves a decision about whether to

grant or deny requests for certain medications based on the medical needs of its

members, the requirement may be considered substantive. By contrast, if

18

Case: 09-50727 Document: 00511392890 Page: 18 Date Filed: 02/24/2011
Nos. 09-50727, 09-51053

preauthorization merely functions as a box to be checked in order for a patient to

obtain a drug, entailing no discretion on the part of Caremark about whether the

request should be granted, the restriction may be procedural. On this limited

record, we cannot make this determination; therefore, we remand for further

factual development.

3. Billed-Amount Restrictions

Texas argues that the district court erred in concluding that Caremark did

not make false statements when it rejected requests for reimbursement from

Texas Medicaid because “Texas failed to provide the billed/submitted charge and

the Medicaid paid/allowed amounts.” We conclude that it is unnecessary to

address this issue because Texas did not dispute the district court’s conclusion

that the Texas FCA did not contain a provision allowing reverse false claims prior

to September 1, 2005. The denials for reimbursement requests that Texas now

challenges occurred from 1999 to 2000. Because these are alleged reverse false

claims that occurred prior to 2005, they would not be allowed under the district

court’s unchallenged interpretation of the Texas FCA. Therefore, we do not

address them.

F. Did the district court err in concluding that Caremark’s conduct is

not actionable under the Arkansas FCA?

The district court held that the Arkansas FCA does not allow reverse false

claims. As noted above, a reverse false claim is a false statement that enables a

party to avoid making a payment to the government. The district court reasoned

that “[u]nlike the federal False Claims Act . . . , the Arkansas [FCA] does not

contain a reverse false claims provision.” See No. SA-99-CA-00914-WRF, United

States ex rel. Ramadoss v. Caremark Inc., Order Denying Arkansas’ Motion for

Summary Judgment and Granting in Part Caremark’s Cross Motion for Partial

Summary Judgment at 3 (W.D. Tex. Aug. 27, 2008). It also noted that “the

Arkansas FCA is more narrowly tailored and only creates liability for false claims

19

Case: 09-50727 Document: 00511392890 Page: 19 Date Filed: 02/24/2011
Nos. 09-50727, 09-51053

or applications used to secure benefits or payments from Arkansas Medicaid

(rather than avoiding a payment to Arkansas Medicaid).” Id.

In its relevant provisions, the Arkansas FCA provides for a claim against

any person who: “[k]nowingly makes or causes to be made any false statement or

representation of a material fact in any application for any benefit or payment

under the Arkansas Medicaid program,” ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-77-902(1) (2003);

“knowingly makes or causes to be made any false statement or representation of

a material fact for use in determining rights to a benefit or payment,” id. § 20-77-

902(2); “[h]aving knowledge of the occurrence of any event affecting his or her

initial or continued right to any benefit or payment or the initial or continued

right to any benefit or payment of any other individual in whose behalf he or she

has applied for or is receiving a benefit or payment knowingly conceals or fails to

disclose that event with an intent fraudulently to secure the benefit or payment

either in a greater amount or quantity than is due or when no benefit or payment

is authorized,” id. § 20-77-902(3); “[k]nowingly makes or causes to be made or

induces or seeks to induce the making of any false statement or representation of

a material fact . . . [w]ith respect to information required pursuant to applicable

federal and state law, rules, regulations, and provider agreements,” id. § 20-77-

902(8)(B); or “[k]nowingly makes or causes to be made any false statement or

representation of a material fact in any application for benefits or for payment in

violation of the rules, regulations, and provider agreements issued by the program

or its fiscal agents,” id. § 20-77-902(10).

Based on the text of the statute, we conclude that the district court did not

err in holding that Sections 20-77-902(1), (2), (3), and (10) cannot be interpreted

to allow liability for a reverse false claim. These subsections use the terms

“benefit” and “payment,” both of which imply a payment or transfer of services

from the State of Arkansas to an individual, rather than a means to avoid an

obligation to pay money to the State of Arkansas. Although Arkansas correctly

20

Case: 09-50727 Document: 00511392890 Page: 20 Date Filed: 02/24/2011
Nos. 09-50727, 09-51053

argues that some federal courts (including the Fifth Circuit) interpreted the pre1986 version of § 3729(a) to encompass reverse false claims even though it did not

include an express provision for such claims, see, e.g., Smith, 287 F.2d 299,

Caremark’s argument that Arkansas enacted the Arkansas FCA after Congress

amended § 3729(a) to include a provision for reverse false claims liability is

persuasive. Arkansas could have included a section that mirrored § 3729(a)(7),

but it chose not to do so.

However, we conclude that the district court erred in finding that no

provision of Section 20-77-902 of the Arkansas FCA could allow liability for a

reverse false claim. For example, under Section 20-77-902(8)(B), Caremark could

be held liable for knowingly making a false statement with respect to information

required to be provided under either Arkansas or federal law. ARK. CODE ANN.

§ 20-77-902(8)(B) (2003). Section 20-77-306 of the Arkansas Code provides that

third parties (such as Caremark) are legally liable to reimburse Medicaid for the

full amount of “any medical cost of an injury, disease, disability, or condition

requiring medical treatment for which Medicaid has paid, or has assumed liability

to pay . . . .” ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-77-306(b) (2009).

Section 20-77-902(8)(B) is even broader than the language found in both the

pre-1986 version of 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a) and the current version of § 3729(a)(7),

which requires proof that the person “knowingly ma[de], use[d], or cause[d] to be

made or used, a false record or statement to conceal, avoid, or decrease an

obligation to pay or transmit money or property to the Government.” Section 20-

77-902(8)(B) of the Arkansas FCA makes no mention of an “obligation”; it merely

requires proof that the person make a false statement “[w]ith respect to

information required pursuant to applicable federal and state law, rules,

regulations, and provider agreements.” ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-77-902(8)(B) (2003).

Therefore, we reverse the district court’s conclusion that reverse false claims could

not be actionable under Section 20-77-902(8)(B) of the Arkansas FCA.

21

Case: 09-50727 Document: 00511392890 Page: 21 Date Filed: 02/24/2011
Nos. 09-50727, 09-51053

IV. CONCLUSION

We AFFIRM the district court’s entry of summary judgment for Caremark

on the Government’s and the State Appellants’ claims that Caremark made false

statements when it cited restrictions that were contained in a client’s plan as the

reason for rejecting reimbursement requests. We also AFFIRM the district court’s

conclusion that out-of-network restrictions are substantive limitations that can

be applied to Medicaid. However, we REVERSE the district court’s conclusions

that (1) the Government cannot bring a claim under 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(7); and

(2) the Arkansas FCA does not allow liability for reverse false claims.

Additionally, we VACATE the district court’s decisions regarding whether the

Government’s complaint-in-intervention relates back to the relator’s complaint

and whether preauthorization restrictions are substantive. We REMAND for

proceedings consistent with this opinion.

22

Case: 09-50727 Document: 00511392890 Page: 22 Date Filed: 02/24/2011