14-1050 Liang v. Lynch BIA Nelson, IJ A087 794 036 

### UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS **FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT** 

## SUMMARY ORDER

**RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED**  **ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT**  = **S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED**  **WITH THIS**  **COURT, A**  **PARTY MUST**  **CITE EITHER**  **THE FEDERAL**  **APPENDIX OR**  **AN ELECTRONIC**  **DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING TO A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY**  **OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL. At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for**  1 **the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States** 2 **Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York, on the** 3 **1 st**  **day of July, two thousand fifteen.** 4 5 **PRESENT:** 6 **JOHN M. WALKER, JR.,** 7 **REENA RAGGI,** 8 **SUSAN L. CARNEY,** 9 Circuit Judges. 10

**_____________________________________** 11 12 **LI QIANG LIANG, AKA LIQIANG LIANG,** 13 Petitioner **,** 14 15 **v. 14-1050** 16 **NAC** 17 18 **LORETTA E. LYNCH, UNITED STATES** 19 **ATTORNEY GENERAL,** 20 Respondent **.** 21

**_____________________________________** 22 23 **FOR PETITIONER:** Lee Ratner, New York, New York. 24 25 **FOR RESPONDENT:** Joyce R. Branda, Acting Assistant 26 Attorney General; Mary Jane Candaux, 272 Assistant Director; Jeremy M. 1 Bylund, Trial Attorney, Office of 2 Immigration Litigation, U.S. 3 Department of Justice, Washington, 4 D.C. 5 6 UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a 7 Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby 8 ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the petition for review is 9

DENIED. 10 Petitioner Li Qiang Liang, a native and citizen of the 11 People’s Republic of China, seeks review of a March 21, 2014 12 decision of the BIA affirming a June 21, 2012 decision of an 13 Immigration Judge (“IJ”), denying Liang’s application for 14 asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention 15 Against Torture (“CAT”). In re Li Qiang Liang, No. A087 794 16 036 (B.I.A. Mar. 21, 2014), aff’g No. A087 794 036 (Immig. Ct. 17 N.Y. City June 21, 2012). We assume the parties’ familiarity 18 with the underlying facts and procedural history in this case. 19 Under the circumstances of this case, we have reviewed the 20 IJ’s decision as modified by the BIA, i.e., minus the basis for 21 denying relief that was not considered by the BIA (untimely 22 asylum application). Xue Hong Yang v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice , 233 426 F.3d 520, 522 (2d Cir. 2005). Furthermore, we do not review 1 the agency’s determination that Liang failed to satisfy his 2 burden to demonstrate a well-founded fear of persecution on 3 account of his practice of Falun Gong in the United States 4 because he has not challenged the agency’s decision to that 5 extent. Accordingly, the only issue before us is the adverse 6 credibility determination. The applicable standards of review 7 are well established. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B); Xiu Xia Lin v. 8 Mukasey , 534 F.3d 162, 165-66 (2d Cir. 2008). 9 The agency may, “[c]onsidering the totality of the 10 circumstances,” base a credibility finding on an asylum 11 applicant’s demeanor, the plausibility of his account, and 12 inconsistencies in his statements and other record evidence 13 “without regard to whether” they go “to the heart of the 14 applicant’s claim.” 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii); Xiu Xia 15 Lin , 534 F.3d at 163-64. Substantial evidence supports the 16 agency’s determination that Liang was not credible based 17 primarily on the implausibility of his account. 18 “It is well settled that, in assessing the credibility of 19 an asylum applicant’s testimony, an IJ is entitled to consider 204 whether the applicant’s story is inherently implausible.” 1 Wensheng Yan v. Mukasey , 509 F.3d 63, 66 (2d Cir. 2007). When, 2 as here, “an adverse credibility finding is based partly or 3 entirely on implausibility, [the court] review[s] the entire 4 record, not whether each unusual or implausible feature of the 5 account can be explained or rationalized.” Ying Li v. BCIS , 6 529 F.3d 79, 82 (2d Cir. 2008). 7

In Ying Li , we declined to disturb an IJ’s determination 8 that an asylum applicant’s account was implausible because 9 “[t]he picture that emerge[d] [wa]s of a student who promoted 10 Falun Gong among her classmates (but did not practice it), who 11 was harassed by local officials (alo ne among her family), who 12 met with a Falun Gong practitioner repeatedly and openly 13 (although he was never arrested), and who successfully quit the 14 country using her own passport (despite allegations of 15 nationwide persecution).” Id. at 83. Similar to the 16 petitioner in Ying Li , Liang presented an account that permitted 17 “an inference of fabrication.” Id. ; Siewe v. Gonzales , 480 18 F.3d 160, 168-69 (2d Cir. 2007) (providing that an 19 implausibility finding that is based on “speculation that 205 inheres in inference is not ‘bald’ if the inference is made 1 available to the factfinder by record facts, or even a single 2 fact, viewed in the light of common sense and ordinary 3 experience.”). 4 The IJ identified the following implausible aspects of 5 Liang’s account. Liang was detained and beaten when officials 6 discovered that his aunt’s neighbor (a Falun Gong practitioner) 7 had hidden at Liang’s parents’ house, but Liang’s parents were 8 neither questioned nor detained. Four years later, Liang (who 9 did not practice Falun Gong in China) risked arrest by 10 distributing Falun Gong materials for a friend. Once caught, 11 Liang’s parents helped him escape detention. And, although 12 officials knew of his parents’ involvement in his escape, they 13 never questioned or detained his parents. Liang did not seek 14 medical treatment for injuries sustained when he was beaten in 15 detention, but he did seek medical treatment for a cold while 16 a fugitive. The record from this medical visit was Liang’s 17 proof that he timely applied for asylum within one year of his 18 entry to the United States. Liang did not provide compelling 196 explanations for the implausibility of his account. See Majidi 1 v. Gonzales , 430 F.3d 77, 80 (2d Cir. 2005). 2 The adverse credibility determination was further 3 supported by Liang’s evasive demeanor and inconsistent 4 statements regarding whether he sought medical attention after 5 his detentions. See Xiu Xia Lin , 534 F.3d at 165-66; cf. Li 6 Hua Lin v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice , 453 F.3d 99, 109 (2d Cir. 2006) 7 (“We can be still more confident in our review of observations 8 about an applicant’s demeanor where, as here, they are supported 9 by specific examples of inconsistent testimony.”). The agency 10 also reasonably relied on Liang’s failure to provide credible 11 evidence to rehabilitate his testimony. See Biao Yang v. 12 Gonzales , 496 F.3d 268, 273 (2d Cir. 2007). 13 Given the implausibility, demeanor, inconsistency, and 14 corroboration findings, the agency’s adverse credibility 15 determination is supported by substantial evidence. See 16 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii); Paul v. Gonzales , 444 F.3d 148, 17 156-57 (2d Cir. 2006). That finding is dispositive of Liang’s 18 claims for asylum, withholding of removal, and CAT relief 19 insofar as they were based on his activities in China. 207 For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is 1 DENIED. As we have completed our rev iew, any stay of removal 2 that the Court previously granted in this petition is VACATED, 3 and any pending motion for a stay of removal in this petition 4 is DISMISSED as moot. Any pending request for oral argument 5 in this petition is DENIED in accordance with Federal Rule of 6 Appellate Procedure 34(a)(2), and S econd Circuit Local Rule 7 34.1(b). 8

FOR THE COURT: 9 Catherine O = Hagan Wolfe, Clerk 10