* This order and judgment is not binding precedent, e xcept under the

doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and col lateral estoppel. The court generally disfavors the citation of orders and judg ments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under the terms and condi tions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3. 

## F I L E D United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit 

### JUN 3 1998 

### PATRICK FISHER Clerk UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

TENTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee, No. 97-6120

v. W.D. Oklahoma TAYOUN LEESHAW BELL,

Defendant - Appellant. (D.C. No. CR-96-84-T)

ORDER AND JUDGMENT *

Before SEYMOUR , Chief Judge, ANDERSON , and LUCERO , Circuit Judges.

After examining the briefs and appellate record, th is panel has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. The c ase is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.-2-

Tayoun Leeshawn Bell pleaded guilty to possession w ith intent to distribute approximately nine ounces of cocaine base, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). He now appeals the sentence imposed, contending that the district court erred (1) by refusing to decrease his offense level based on his minor role as provided in U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2, and (2) by increasing his offense level for possession of a weapon pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(1). We affi rm. Respecting his first claim of error, Bell contends that the district court improperly relied on hearsay evidence when it deter mined he was not entitled to a downward adjustment based on his role in the offens e. He also contends that there was no evidence placing him in Oklahoma City during the relevant times. We review a trial court’s findings concerning a def endant’s role in a particular offense for clear error. United States v. Santistevan , 39 F.3d 250, 253 (10th Cir. 1994). A finding of fact is clearly err oneous if it is without support in the record. Id. However, a sentencing court’s factual findings may be supported by hearsay statements as long as the statements pos sess some “minimal indicia of reliability,” United States v. Browning , 61 F.3d 752, 755 (10th Cir. 1995), and the defendant bears the burden of establishing, by a pr eponderance of the evidence, his entitlement to an offense level reduction under§ 3B1.2. Santistevan , 39 F.3d
at 253.-3-

In this case, Bell presented no evidence to supporthis claim that his role was only minor. At the sentencing hearing, the inv estigating detective testified regarding information he had received from three lo wer-level distributors and participants who either witnessed transactions or o btained substantial amounts of crack cocaine from Bell. Although the detective’s testimony at the sentencing hearing was more detailed on this issue, the three interviewed persons had previously testified at a related trial over which the sentencing judge had presided, and their court testimony was consistent with their statements to the detective. The detective’s testimony summarizing h is interviews, together with the witnesses’ testimony at the related trial and B ell’s own admissions to the parole officer writing the Presentence Investigatio n Report (“PSR”), is sufficiently reliable to establish that Bell was mo re than a minor participant in the drug distribution ring. See R. Vol. II at 18-21 (containing the detective’s testimony at the sentencing hearing which summarize d his interviews with various witnesses); see also PSR, R. Vol. IV ¶¶ 19-20 (setting forth Bell’s adm itted participation in five trips and related transaction s involving the transportation and distribution of a total of 351⁄2 ounces of crack coca ine); related Case No. 97-6167, R. Vol. III at 85-86, 105, 115 (setting forth the w itnesses’ trial testimony regarding Bell’s role). Accordingly, the district court did not err in refusing to decrease Bell’s offense level pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2.-4-

As his second claim of error, Bell complains that t here was no evidence linking him to any weapon, and there was no evidenc e linking any weapon to any drug offense. Guideline § 2D1.1(b)(1) requires a two level increase in the offense level if a dangerous weapon “was possessed.” The a ccompanying commentary provides that “[t]he adjustment should be applied i f the weapon was present, unless it is clearly improbable that the weapon was connected with the offense.” Id. , comment. (n.3). We have previously held that the government initially bears the burden of establishing, by a preponderance of t he evidence, the temporal and physical proximity of the weapon to the drug offens e. See United States v. Lang , 81 F.3d 955, 964 (10th Cir. 1996). This burden may be satisfied by evidence showing that the weapon was in the same general loc ation where drugs were stored or where the drug transactions occurred. On ce the government meets its burden of showing proximity, the burden shifts to t he defendant to show that the enhancement should not apply because it is “clearly improbable” the weapon was connected with the offense. Id. The district court’s ruling that a § 2D1.1(b)(1) enhancement is applicable is a finding of fact thatwe review for clear error. United States v. Underwood , 938 F.2d 1086, 1091 (10th Cir. 1991). At the sentencing hearing, the investigating detect ive recounted the information he had received from Burgundy Pierce, awitness who had been present during several drug transactions involving Bell. According to Pierce’s-5-

statements, Bell would routinely obtain a 9mm semia utomatic pistol whenever he arrived in Oklahoma City with drugs. Pierce also a dvised the detective that Bell kept a rifle at her home along with a quantity of c ocaine, and this information was further corroborated in the detective’s interviews with another drug distributor, Ahmad Davis. See R. Vol. II at 10-11, 14-15. Additionally, at a re lated trial, Pierce testified that Bell had a gun in the apartme nt where drugs were distributed and also had a shotgun or rifle which he kept at he r house. See Case No. 97-6167, R. Vol. III at 82-83. Bell presented no o pposing evidence, but simply argued that the evidence presented was insufficientto support the enhancement. We disagree. The district court did not err in fin ding that a § 2D1.1(b)(1) offense level increase applied.
AFFIRMED. ENTERED FOR THE COURT
Stephen H. Anderson Circuit Judge