[Cite as In re J.C. , 2021-Ohio-1874.]

COURT OF APPEALS DELAWARE COUNTY, OHIO FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

: JUDGES: : : Hon. John W. Wise, P.J. : Hon. Patricia A. Delaney, J. : Hon. Earle E. Wise, Jr., J. IN RE J.C. : : Case No. 20 CAF 12 0057 : : : : : O P I N I O N

CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING: Appeal from the Delaware County Court of Common Pleas, Juvenile Division, Case No. 19-01-0037AB

JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED

DATE OF JUDGMENT ENTRY:

APPEARANCES: June 2, 2021

For Mother-Appellant: For DCDJFS-Appellee:

DONALD G. WORLY MEGAN A. HAMMOND 43 E. Central Ave. 145 N. Union St., 3rd Floo r Delaware, OH 43015 Delaware, OH 43015[Cite as In re J.C. , 2021-Ohio-1874.]

Delaney, J. {¶1} Appellant-Mother appeals the November 30, 2020 judgment en try of the Delaware County Court of Common Pleas, Juvenile Division awardi ng permanent custody of her minor child, J.C. to the Appellee-Delaware Count y Department of Job and Family Services.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY Union County Proceedings {¶2} Appellant-Mother is the biological mother of J.C., born on October 14, 2018. At the time of J.C.’s birth, Mother was residing in Union Count y. On October 18, 2018, Union County Child Protective Services filed an ex-parte order to have J.C. placed in its temporary custody due to concerns about Mother’s ability to car e for J.C. When Mother was a child, she was diagnosed with mild intellectual disabilit y and post-traumatic stress disorder. Union County CPS observed that Mother was not able to properly meet the needs of J.C. in the areas such as feeding and diapering due to Mother’s cognitive delays. Familial placement was not possible because Mother’s family had prior involvement with Children’s Services and the biological Father of J.C. had a cri minal history and admittedly used drugs. J.C. was placed with a foster family. Mother had su pervised visitation. {¶3} The Union County Court of Common Pleas, Juvenile Division, held an adjudication hearing on January 7, 2019, where the court dismis sed the case for lack of evidence on the issue of dependency. On January 8, 2019, J.C. w as returned to Mother’s custody. At this time, she resided in Delaware County.[Cite as In re J.C. , 2021-Ohio-1874.] Delaware County Proceedings {¶4} On January 8, 2019, Appellee-Delaware County Department of Job and Family Services (“DCDJFS”) received a referral regarding J.C. D CDJFS opened a case

and two caseworkers visited with Mother in her home. Mother res ided in the home with her boyfriend, W.L. and another couple. The caseworkers observe d the home was in poor condition and Mother struggled to care for J.C. due to Mother’s cognitive delays and lack of support. After investigation, it was determined there was no familial placement available. DCDJFS made an oral motion for ex-parte removal and temporary custody of J.C. The Delaware County Court of Common Pleas, Juvenile Divisi on granted the exparte removal. J.C. was placed in the care of the foster family residing in Union County. {¶5} On January 9, 2019, DCDJFS filed a Complaint of Dependency . The shelter care hearing was held on January 9, 2019. Counsel represented m other. The magistrate found there was probable cause for J.C.’s removal. The magistra te ordered a Guardian ad Litem be appointed for both Mother and J.C. {¶6} On January 11, 2019, the trial court appointed a Court App ointed Special Advocate (“CASA”) for J.C. {¶7} DCDJFS filed a case plan with the trial court on February 6, 2019. The case plan required Mother to engage in the following activities: (1) undergo an assessment with Delaware County Board of Developmental Disabilities to det ermine if she qualified for services; (2) follow any recommendations for ongoing servic es or community support; (3) find and maintain stable housing with the ability to ensure her financial needs; and (4) attending a parenting program of her choice or utilize the M.O. M.S. program. Mother was[Cite as In re J.C. , 2021-Ohio-1874.] given supervised weekly visitation with J.C. Father was also li sted on the case plan, but he asked to be removed from the case plan in April 2019. {¶8} On February 22, 2019, counsel for Mother filed a motion to determine Mother’s competence to stand trial. The trial court denied the motion. {¶9} The adjudication hearing was held on April 4, 2019. The ma gistrate found J.C. was a dependent child under R.C. 2151.04(C). The case plan filed on February 6, 2019 was adopted as a court order. Mother did not file objectio ns to the April 4, 2019 Magistrate’s Decision. {¶10} On April 5, 2019, J.C. was placed with a foster-to-adopt family located in Delaware County. {¶11} Mother’s GAL filed an Application for Appointment of Guar dian of Alleged Incompetent on June 7, 2019 with the Delaware County Probate Co urt. On September 6, 2019, the Delaware County Probate Court found Mother was incomp etent and incapable of taking care of her individual activities of daily living due to a diagnosed mild developmental disability. It appointed Mother’s GAL as her Guar dian. {¶12} Mother’s second child, H.L., was born on April 28, 2020. H.L.’s father was W.L., Mother’s boyfriend. DCDJFS was granted temporary custody of H.L. shortly after the child’s birth due to the same concerns underlying J.C.’s re moval. H.L. is not the subject of this appeal. {¶13} DCDJFS filed a motion for permanent custody on June 2, 20 20, and an amended motion for permanent custody on June 4, 2020. The motio n stated that J.C. had been in the temporary custody of DCDJFS for 12 or more months o f a consecutive 22- month period and that the child could not be placed with either Mother or Father within a[Cite as In re J.C. , 2021-Ohio-1874.]

reasonable time. The motion further stated it was in the best i nterests of J.C. to be placed in the permanent custody of DCDJFS. {¶14} The trial court held a pretrial on the amended motion for permanent custody on June 8, 2020. At the pretrial, counsel for Mother requested a parenting assessment to help determine what Mother was capable of as a parent and the e xtent of her disabilities. Mother’s Guardian retained Dr. Jamie Adkins, a forensic psychol ogist, to perform a competency evaluation of Mother on July 29, 2020. Dr. Adkins fi led her report with the trial court on September 9, 2020. Permanent Custody Hearing {¶15} The trial court held the hearing on the amended motion fo r permanent custody on September 25, 2020 and November 23, 2020. The follow ing evidence was adduced at the hearing. {¶16} Melissa Barber, ongoing caseworker with DCDJFS, testified as to her experiences working with Mother and J.C. Barber’s main concern for Mother was her cognitive ability to properly care for J.C. After developing th e case plan, Barber testified the role of DCDJFS was to provide information and referral to s ervices, but DCDJFS could not assist Mother in getting those services. For example, Barbe r referred Mother to the Delaware County Board of Developmental Disabilities (“DCBDD”) f or an assessment to determine whether she was eligible for services. Mother did not have a driver’s license or stable housing and DCBDD could assist Mother obtaining transpor tation and housing. {¶17} Mother completed her assessment with DCBDD. It was determ ined that she was eligible for several services through DCBDD, including hous ing assistance, transportation, and in-home services to help with cooking and b asic household tasks.[Cite as In re J.C. , 2021-Ohio-1874.] {¶18} Stable housing was of major concern for Mother. For Mothe r to engage in other services, Mother required stable housing. Barber was assi gned as the case worker in February 2019. Since her time on the case, Mother had moved eight to ten times, residing with her biological family, J.C.’s original foster par ents, or friends. Mother was working with Emily Froehlich, a service and support administrat or with the DCBDD, to obtain housing and other services through DCBDD. Due to Mother’ s needs, the housing through DCBDD included a health provider in the home 24/7 and r oommates. With the help of Mother’s Guardian, they started looking for housing in December 2019 but could not find the appropriate housing situation and it was difficult coordinate with Mother due to her transportation limitations. When the pandemic started, h ousing became unavailable. Mother was disenrolled from DCBDD in May 2020, but she reenrolled in August 2020. {¶19} By the time of the hearing, Mother had not obtained stabl e housing. Froelich stated there was a housing available for Mother in Delaware, bu t she was not sure it would be appropriate for J.C. The goal of DCBDD was to get Moth er into stable housing appropriate for Mother so she could start obtaining services, t hen they would work on finding housing that was appropriate for Mother and J.C. {¶20} The other important aspect of the case plan was Mother’s parenting skills. DCDJFS does not offer any parenting classes. DCDJFS referred Mo ther to the M.O.M.S. program, but the program was not tailored for her needs because she did not have stable housing or a child in her care. Mother was offered parenting cl asses through Early Intervention, but Mother declined. All parties agreed that due to Mother’s cognitive delays,[Cite as In re J.C. , 2021-Ohio-1874.] Mother needed one-on-one parenting training, but the DCDJFS, th e DCBDD, and the CASA were not aware of any program offering that service. {¶21} After the permanent custody motion was filed, counsel for Mother requested a psychological evaluation to determine Mother’s cognitive abil ity to parent. The assessment conducted by Dr. Jamie Adkins was filed on September 9, 2020. Dr. Adkins testified as to her assessment of Mother and her ability to par ent. Dr. Adkins first administered the Wechsler test, an adult intelligence scale. Mo ther’s full-scale score was 65, which placed her in the middle intellectual functioning dis ability range. Her verbal comprehension was 61, which was in the middle intellectual func tioning range; her perceptual reasoning was 81, which was in the range of a low av erage to borderline; her working memory was 58 and her processing speed was 79. {¶22} Dr. Adkins next attempted to administer the Parent Stress Inventory to Mother but was not able to complete the test. The test looks at how a parent handles the basic stresses of being a parent or navigate the nuances that c ome with parenting. It was a written test that was above Mother’s reading comprehension le vel. {¶23} Based on her assessment of Mother, it was Dr. Adkins’ opi nion that at the time of the assessment, Mother did not have the current ability to independently care for her children. Mother had a traumatic childhood, complicated by her intellectual functioning, which prevented her from modeling what parenting s hould be and how to meet a child’s needs. Dr. Adkins recognized that Mother had the desire to be a good parent. Mother would need intensive intervention, training, and modeling on a continuous basis to learn to meet her children’s ever-developing needs. Th e parenting training

sessions would be three to five times a week. Dr. Adkins felt t hat after six months of[Cite as In re J.C. , 2021-Ohio-1874.]

intensive intervention, Mother should be reevaluated to determi ne if Mother had made any progress. In the best-case scenario, if Mother made progres s after the six-month review, Dr. Adkins opined that it would be a minimum of one to two years of true interventions, learning, and monitoring to gain more time with supervision for Mother to be independent in certain roles. {¶24} Barber considered Dr. Adkins’ assessment and felt the cas e plan goals were like the recommendations in the assessment. When asked why the DCDJFS filed the motion for permanent custody before the two-year mark, Barb er testified the motion was filed due to Mother’s lack of progress on the case plan and that Mother was no longer

linked with services. {¶25} Barber and Foster Mother next testified as to their exper iences with J.C. On April 5, 2019, J.C. was placed with a foster-to-adopt family wh en she was six months old. At the time of the hearing, J.C. was 23 months old. The family lived in Powell in Delaware County. Foster Mother and Foster Father have been married for 2 3 years and have a 9- year-old adopted son. The parents work outside the home. Barber has observed the foster family with J.C. at least 15 times. J.C. is bonded with the family and refers to her foster parents as “mommy” and “daddy.” The foster family has pr ovided for J.C.’s medical care and therapeutic needs. {¶26} Mother has attended every supervised visitation with J.C. , even during the pandemic. The foster family facilitated visitation with Mother during the pandemic by meeting in a park. Mother was appropriate and interacted with J .C. She brought her toys, fed her, and changed her diaper. J.C. was happy to see Mother a nd had no behavioral[Cite as In re J.C. , 2021-Ohio-1874.] issues after leaving visitation. There was no dispute that Moth er loved J.C. and wanted to be her parent. {¶27} The Guardian ad Litem for J.C. was opposed to permanent c ustody. The GAL supported legal custody to foster parents and/or extending temporary custody for six months. Foster parents, however, did not want only legal custod y of J.C. The GAL was appointed in January 2019, but she met with J.C. and the foster parents once in January 2020 before issuing her report. {¶28} The CASA for J.C. testified that she observed Mother duri ng two visitations, and she visited the foster home monthly. Her testimony regardin g her observations was like Barber’s testimony. The CASA had requested a parenting ass essment of Mother and

Dr. Adkins’ assessment confirmed her observations of Mother. Th e CASA was concerned that Mother’s cognitive delays affected Mother’s ability to par ent, especially in the ability

to think ahead on how to handle the child’s needs in the future . The CASA recommended that permanent custody be awarded to DCDJFS. Judgment Entry {¶29} On November 30, 2020, the trial court issued an extremely detailed and thoroughly analyzed 24-page judgment entry granting permanent c ustody of J.C. to the

DCDJFS. The trial court first f ound that J.C. had been in the t emporary custody of the DCDJFS for 12 or more months out of a 22-month period. {¶30} The trial court next analyzed whether the child could be placed with the parents in a reasonable time. The trial court acknowledged that this case was different than other permanent custody matters where the parent has a dru g addiction or abuses their child. The trial court stated,[Cite as In re J.C. , 2021-Ohio-1874.]

This case, and this factor in particular, turn on the potential timeline for a parent with a developmental disability who loves her child and wishes to parent. The Court must keep two things in mind in its decision- making process. First, a developmental disability does not prohibit a parent from caring for their child, and indeed, the Court has been involved in many cases with parents who have a diagnosis of a developmental disa bility and who are loving, successful parents, and who raise happy, health y children in a safe environment. Conversely, while the presence of a deve lopmental disability diagnosis changes the services that a parent may nee d, and the interventions that may be appropriate, it does not modify other considerations in a case. That is, the Court must still conside r whether a child is safe, whether the parent is capable of providing the a ppropriate environment, and perhaps most importantly in this case, does no t affect the stated purpose under the law of providing permanency for a chil d and not keeping a young child in legal limbo indefinitely. (Judgment Entry, Nov. 30, 2020). {¶31} The trial court next found J.C. could not be placed with Mother in a reasonable time pursuant to R.C. 2151.414(D)(2). Mother had bee n referred to DCBDD, but Mother failed to utilize the services, resulting in her bei ng removed from active service status. She recently reengaged with services through the DCBDD, but the trial court found her failure to take advantage of the services triggered R.C. 21 51.414(E), which states the court “shall consider parental utilization of medical, psychiat ric, psychological, and other

social and rehabilitative services and material resources that were made available to the[Cite as In re J.C. , 2021-Ohio-1874.] parents for the purpose of changing parental conduct to allow t hem to resume and maintain parental duties.” {¶32} The trial court next considered Mother’s argument that sh e should be allowed time to work toward the goals outlined in Dr. Adkins’ a ssessment. The trial court found R.C. 2151.414(E)(4) provided that if a parent’s intellect ual disability was so severe that it makes the parent unable to provide an adequate permanen t home for the child at the present time and, as anticipated, within one year after the court holds the permanent custody hearing, the trial court must grant the requested relie f. There was no dispute Mother’s developmental disability was severe enough that she co uld not parent at the current time. The trial court relied upon Dr. Adkins’ assessmen t that it would take a minimum of one to two years of intensive intervention for Mothe r to learn parenting skills.

It found DCDJFS made reasonable efforts towards reunification b y connecting Mother with services addressing her developmental disability, but Moth er did not take advantage

of the services to their fullest extent. {¶33} The trial court finally found it was in the best interest s of J.C. to be placed in the permanent custody of DCDJFS. {¶34} It is from the trial court’s judgment entry that Mother n ow appeals.

ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR {¶35} Mother raises four Assignments of Error: {¶36} “I. WHETHER THERE WAS INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT

THE TRIAL COURT FINDING J.C. DEPENDENT. THE TRIAL COURT DECISIO N IS

NOT REFLECTED IN THE TRANSCRIPT.[Cite as In re J.C. , 2021-Ohio-1874.] {¶37} “II. WHETHER THE JUDGMENT ENTRY OF THE TRIAL COURT WAS AN

ABUSE OF DISCRETION AND AGAINST THE MANIFEST WEIGHT OF THE

EVIDENCE WHEN IT DECIDED THAT THE DELAWARE COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF

JOB AND FAMILY SERVICES MADE REASONABLE EFFORTS TO PREVENT

REMOVAL OF J.C. FROM ASHLEY CAUDILL AND/OR TO REUNIFY THE CHILD WITH

HER MOTHER. THE TRIAL COURT DECISION IS NOT REFLECTED IN THE

TRANSCRIPT. {¶38} “II. WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT DECISION IS AN

UNCONSTITUTIONAL APPLICATION OF THE LAW. THE TRIAL COURT DECISI ON IS REFLECTED IN THE TRANSCRIPT AT T. PAGE 345, LINES 1-13. {¶39} “IV. THE TRIAL COURT DECISION WAS NOT IN THE BEST INTERES T

OF THE CHILD AND AGAINST THE MANIFEST WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE IN THAT

IT DID NOT EXTEND THE CASE FOR SIX MONTHS TO GIVE THE MOTHER TI ME TO

WORK WITH AN INDIVIDUAL PARENTING INSTRUCTOR AS HAD BEEN RECOMMENDED BY DR. ADKINS. T. PAGE 290, LINES 1-2 AND T. PAGE 2 83, LINES

17-23. THE TRIAL COURT DECISION IS NOT REFLECTED IN THE TRANSCR IPT.”

ANALYSIS I. Dependency {¶40} Mother contends in her first Assignment of Error that the re was insufficient evidence to support the adjudication of dependency. We disagree

. {¶41} The adjudication hearing on the complaint for dependency was held on April 4, 2019. The magistrate issued the Magistrate’s Decision on Apr il 19, 2019, which adjudicated J.C. a dependent child pursuant to R.C. 2151.04(C). The judge countersigned[Cite as In re J.C. , 2021-Ohio-1874.] the Magistrate’s Decision to approve the same as an order of th e court but notified the parties that written objections to the Magistrate’s Decision mu st be filed within 14 days. Written objections would stay the enforcement of the order. {¶42} Mother did not file objections to the April 19, 2019 Magi strate’s Decision adjudicating J.C. a dependent child. Juv.R. 40(D)(3)(b) control s decisions by a magistrate in juvenile cases. The rule provides, in relevant part: (3) Magistrate's Decision; Objections to Magistrate's Decision.

* * * (b) Objections to Magistrate's Decision. (i) Time for Filing. A party may file written objections to a m agistrate's decision within fourteen days of the filing of the decision, wh ether or not the court has adopted the decision during that fourteen-day period as permitted by Juv.R. 40(D)(4)(e)(i). If any party timely files objections, any other party may also file objections not later than ten days after the firs t objections are filed. If a party makes a timely request for findings of fact a nd conclusions of law, the time for filing objections begins to run when the m agistrate files a decision that includes findings of fact and conclusions of la w. (ii) Specificity of Objection. An objection to a magistrate's d ecision shall be specific and state with particularity all grounds for objection

. (iii) Objection to Magistrate's Factual Finding; Transcript or Affidavit. An objection to a factual finding, whether or not specifically des ignated as a finding of fact under Juv.R. 40(D)(3)(a)(ii), shall be supporte d by a transcript of all the evidence submitted to the magistrate relevant to tha t finding or an[Cite as In re J.C. , 2021-Ohio-1874.]

affidavit of that evidence if a transcript is not available. Wi th leave of court, alternative technology or manner of reviewing the relevant evid ence may be considered. The objecting party shall file the transcript or affidavit with the court within thirty days after filing objections unless the court extends the time in writing for preparation of the transcript or other good cause. If a party files timely objections prior to the date on which a tran script is prepared, the party may seek leave of court to supplement the o bjections. (iv) Waiver of Right to Assign Adoption by Court as Error on Ap peal. Except for a claim of plain error, a party shall not assign as error o n appeal the court's adoption of any factual finding or legal conclusion, wh ether or not specifically designated as a finding of fact or conclusion of l aw under Juv.R. 40(D)(3)(a)(ii), unless the party has objected to that finding or conclusion as required by Juv.R. 40(D)(3)(b). {¶43} We find that except for a claim of plain error, Mother ca nnot assign as error the trial court’s adoption of the magistrate’s adjudication of dependency because Mother did not object to that finding or conclusion as required by Juv .R. 40(D)(3)(b). Mother does not raise plain error in her appellate brief, nor can Mother de monstrate plain error because she did not file a transcript of the April 4, 2019 adjudication hearing. Stanley v. Parker , 5th Dist. Muskingum No. CT2020-0050, 2021-Ohio-1701, ¶ 46. {¶44} An appellant is required to provide a transcript for appe llate review. Knapp

v. Edwards Laboratories , 61 Ohio St.2d 197, 199, 400 N.E.2d 384 (1980). Such is necessary because the appellant shoulders the burden of demonstrating error by[Cite as In re J.C. , 2021-Ohio-1874.]

reference to matters within the record. See, State v. Skaggs , 53 Ohio St.2d 162, 163, 372 N.E.2d 1355 (1978). {¶45} This principle is embodied in App.R. 9(B), which states i n relevant part: If the appellant intends to urge on appeal that a finding or co nclusion is unsupported by the evidence or is contrary to the weight of the evidence, the appellant shall include in the record a transcript of all e vidence relevant to the findings or conclusion. App.R. 9(B). {¶46} Where portions of the transcript necessary for the resolu tion of assigned errors are omitted from the record, an appellate court has noth ing to pass upon. As Mother cannot demonstrate those errors, the Court has no choice but to presume the validity of the lower court's proceedings. State v. Ridgway , 5th Dist. Stark No. 1998CA00147, 1999 WL 100349 (Feb. 1, 1999), citing Knapp, supra

. {¶47} On this record, we must presume there was sufficient evid ence for the adjudication of dependency. Mother’s first Assignment of Error is overruled.

II. and III. Reasonable Efforts and Mother’s Second Child {¶48} In her second Assignment of Error, Mother contends the DC DJFS did not

make reasonable efforts towards reunification with J.C. We also consider Mother’s third Assignment of Error that argues the trial court’s treatment of H.L., Mother’s second child, when compared to J.C., violates the Equal Protection Clause. Sh e claims that in contrast to the reunification efforts for J.C., DCDJFS is making more ef fort to reunite Mother with

H.L. {¶49} R.C. 2151.414(B)(1) states permanent custody may be grant ed to a public or private agency if the trial court determines by clear and co nvincing evidence at a[Cite as In re J.C. , 2021-Ohio-1874.] hearing held pursuant to division (A) of R.C. 2151.414, that it is in the best interest of the child and any of the following apply: (a) The child is not abandoned or orphaned * * * and the child cannot be placed with either of the child's parents within a reasonable t ime or should not be placed with the child's parents. (b) The child is abandoned. (c) The child is orphaned, and there are no relatives of the ch ild who are able to take permanent custody. (d) The child has been in the temporary custody of one or more public children services agencies or private child placing agencies fo r twelve or more months of a consecutive twenty-two-month period* * * (e) The child or another child in the custody of the parent or parents from whose custody the child has been removed has been adjudicated a n abused, neglected, or dependent child on three separate occasio ns by any

court in this state or another state. {¶50} Therefore, R.C. 2151.414(B) provides a two-pronged analys is the trial court is required to apply when ruling on a motion for permanen t cust ody. In practice, the trial

court will determine whether one of the four circumstances deli neated in R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(a) through (d) is present before proceeding to a determination regarding

the best interest of the child. {¶51} A trial court's decision to grant permanent custody of a child must be supported by clear and convincing evidence. The Ohio Supreme Co urt has defined “clear and convincing evidence” as “[t]he measure or degree of proof t hat will produce in the[Cite as In re J.C. , 2021-Ohio-1874.]

mind of the trier of fact a firm belief or conviction as to the allegations sought to be established. It is intermediate, being more than a mere prepond erance, but not to the extent of such certainty, as required beyond a reasonable doubt , as in criminal cases.”

Cross v. Ledford , 161 Ohio St. 469, 120 N.E.2d 118 (1954); In re: Adoption of Holcomb , 18 Ohio St.3d 361, 481 N.E.2d 613 (1985). In reviewing whether the trial court based its decision upon clear and convincing evidence, “a reviewing court will examine the record

to determine whether the trier of facts had sufficient evidence before it to satisfy the requisite degree of proof.” State v. Schiebel , 55 Ohio St.3d 71, 74, 564 N.E.2d 54 (1990); See also, C.E. Morris Co. v. Foley Constr. Co ., 54 Ohio St.2d 279, 376 N.E.2d 578 (1978). If the trial court's judgment is “supported by some competent, credible evidence going to all the essential elements of the case,” a reviewing court may not reverse that judgment.

Schiebel , 55 Ohio St.3d at 74. {¶52} Moreover, “an appellate court should not substitute its j udgment for that of the trial court when there exists competent and credible eviden ce supporting the findings

of fact and conclusion of law.” Id . Issues relating to the credibility of witnesses and the weight to be given the evidence are primarily for the trier of fact. As the court explained

in Seasons Coal Co. v. Cleveland , 10 Ohio St.3d 77, 80, 461 N.E.2d 1273 (1984): The underlying rationale of giving deference to the findings of the trial court rests with the knowledge that the trial judge is best able to view the witness es and observe their demeanor, gestures, and voice inflections, and use these observ ations in weighing the credibility of the proffered testimony. Moreover, deferring to the trial court on matters of credibility is “crucial in a child custody case, where there ma y be much evident in the parties' demeanor and attitude that does not translate to the r ecord well.” Davis v.[Cite as In re J.C. , 2021-Ohio-1874.]

Flickinger , 77 Ohio St.3d 415, 419, 674 N.E.2d 1159 (1997); see, also, In re: Christian , 4th Dist. Athens No. 04CA10, 2004-Ohio-3146; In re: C.W., 2nd D ist. Montgomery No. 20140, 2004-Ohio-2040. {¶53} The trial court determined that pursuant to R.C. 2151.414 (B)(1)(d), J.C. had been in the temporary custody of DCDJFS for twelve months of a consecutive twentytwo-month period. Mother does not dispute this fact. This Court has adopted the position that proof of temporary custody with an agency for twelve or mo re months of a consecutive twenty-two-month period alone is sufficient to awar d permanent custody.

Matter of O.M ., 5th Dist. Coshocton No. 20CA0017, 2021-Ohio-1310, 2021 WL 14 24200, ¶ 33 citing In the Matter of A.S., V.S., and Z.S. , 5th Dist. Delaware No. 13 CAF 050040, 2013-Ohio-4018. Therefore, a finding that grounds existed for p ermanent custody cannot be against the manifest weight of the evidence. Matter of L.G ., 5th Dist. Stark No. 2020- CA-00139, 2021-Ohio-743, ¶ 36. The trial court also determined that J.C. could not be placed with Mother within a reasonable time. As to both determi nations, Mother argues DCDJFS did not make reasonable efforts to prevent the removal o f J.C., eliminate the continued removal of J.C. from Mother’s home, and did not make it possible for Mother and child to reunify. {¶54} Prior to an award of permanent custody to a public childr en services agency, the trial court must determine whether the agency has m ade “reasonable efforts to prevent the removal of the child from the child's home, to e liminate the continued removal of the child from the child's home, or to make it possi ble for the child to return safely home.” R.C. 2151.419(A)(1).[Cite as In re J.C. , 2021-Ohio-1874.] {¶55} Although R.C. Chapter 2151 does not define “reasonable ef forts,” courts construe the term to mean “ ‘[t]he state's efforts to resolve t he threat to the child before removing the child or to permit the child to return home after the threat is removed[.]’ ” In

re T.B.-W ., 9th Dist. Summit No. 27544, 2015-Ohio-992, ¶ 15, quoting In re C.F., 113 Ohio St.3d 73, 2017-Ohio-1104, ¶ 28, quoting Will L. Crossley, Defining Reasonable Efforts: Demystifying the State's Burden Under Federal Child Protection Legislation , 12 B.U.Pub.Int.L.J. 259, 260 (2003). “In a reasonable efforts dete rmination, the issue is not whether the agency could have done more, but whether it did eno ugh to satisfy the

reasonableness standard under the statute.” In re C.M ., 9th Dist. Summit No. 24380, 2009-Ohio-943, ¶ 21 (Citation omitted). Matter of A.H ., 5th Dist. Licking No. 2020 CA 00072, 2021-Ohio-1577, 2021 WL 1784353, ¶¶ 36-37 {¶56} Mother argued before the trial court that the assessment of Dr. Adkins was proof that DCDJFS failed to make reasonable efforts towards uni fication. She also

contended the failure to make reasonable efforts is evident whe n the case plan for J.C. and H.L., Mother’s second child, are compared. H.L. was born on April 28, 2020. The child was placed in the temporary custody of DCDJFS on April 29 , 2020. Dr. Adkins completed her assessment of Mother on July 30, 2020 and it was filed on September 9, 2020. An adjudication hearing on the complaint for dependency a s to H.L. was held on October 7 and 12, 2020. On October 12, 2020, the Magistrate’s D ecision adjudicated H.L. dependent under R.C. 2151.04(C). The Magistrate’s Decision orde red DCDJFS to investigate the availability of one-on-one parenting services l ike those recommended in

Dr. Adkins’ assessment and assist Mother with referrals and enr ollment into the programs

once located.[Cite as In re J.C. , 2021-Ohio-1874.] {¶57} In its November 30, 2020 judgment entry, the trial court responded to Mother’s argument as to the reasonable efforts of the DCDJFS fo r reunification: Counsel for Mother, and the Guardian ad Litem, did their best t o present the report of Dr. Adkins as a positive for the Mother, and as p roof that the Department had failed to make reasonable efforts toward reunifi cation. But the Department cannot have failed to comply with recommendation s that were not made, nor even requested, until after the motion for p ermanent custody was filed, and after the child had been in foster care for nearly a year and a half. The parents, their counsel, Mother’s guardian, the GAL, and the CASA were all invited to case plan meetings, and provid ed notice of numerous hearings and case reviews, there was ample opportun ity to request modifications, additions, and deletions to the reunific ation efforts outlined in the case plan. The lack of progress occasioned by t he Mother’s frequent changes of residence (nine times since the birth of th e child), declination of services offered through the DCBDD, and decision not to take advantage of housing opportunities presented to her. While the assessment of Dr. Adkins may have arrived in time to formulate different o pportunities for [Mother’s] younger child, in this matter the report of Dr. Adkins is actually what conclusively makes the Department’s case for permanent cus tody as it nearly exactly mirrors the statutory findings that instruct the Court to grant the motion, namely that the child cannot be reunified at this t ime, and could not possibility [sic] be reunified within the next twelve month s. * * *[Cite as In re J.C. , 2021-Ohio-1874.]

DCDJFS has made reasonable efforts to reunite the child with th e parents in the above captioned case. * * * DCDJFS diligently acted to r emedy the reasons for removal in the above captioned case. The Court woul d be remiss if it did not highlight the testimony of the case worker that in situations involving a parent with developmental disabilities, the Department relies on outside organizations, particularly the DC BDD, to provide services. But the Court does not find that this affects the conclusion as to reasonable efforts. The Department cannot be all things t o all persons, and routinely relies on outside providers in areas of mental he alth, drug and alcohol abuse, educational assistance, and more. The Department made efforts to connect Mother to the Board, to help with housing, t o provide transportation vouchers, and to find the assessor when the Cour t ordered

the assessment. (Judgment Entry, Nov. 30, 2020). We find the record in this cas e supports the trial court’s

conclusion that the DCDJFS made reasonable efforts to reunite J .C. and Mother. {¶58} Mother points to the case plan for H.L., which incorporat ed Dr. Adkins’ suggestions, to argue the efforts towards reunification are dif ferent between the siblings and therefore unreasonable for J.C. “The equal protection requi rement prevents the government from ‘treating differently persons who are in all re spects alike.’” Taylor-Jones v. Kettering Medical Center , 2021-Ohio-738, -- N.E.3d – , ¶ 21 (2nd Dist.) quoting Burnett

v. Motorists Mut. Ins. Co. , 118 Ohio St.3d 493, 2008-Ohio-2751, 890 N.E.2d 307, ¶ 30. While J.C. and H.L. are siblings, they are not in all respects alike. J.C. was born on October 14, 2018 and H.L. was born on April 28, 2020. When J.C. was born, Mother had[Cite as In re J.C. , 2021-Ohio-1874.]

no permanent residence, she did not have a case plan, she was n ot working with DCBDD, and she did not have a Guardian. J.C. was placed in the tempora ry custody of DCDJFS on January 9, 2019. When H.L. was born, one year and three mont hs after J.C. was placed in the temporary custody of DCDJFS, Mother had a case pl an, she had been working with the DCBDD, she was working on obtaining stable hou sing, and she had a Guardian for support. {¶59} Dr. Adkins’ assessment was filed on September 9, 2020. Th e assessment stated that under a best-case scenario, Mother could possibly b e ready to care for a child after one to two years of intensive intervention. At the time o f the assessment, J.C. had been in the temporary custody of the DCDJFS for one year and ei ght months. H.L. had been in the temporary custody of DCDJFS for 134 days. DCDJFS di d not treat the siblings differently. Time was the deciding factor in this case in all r egards. {¶60} We find the record supports the trial court’s conclusion that DCDJFS made reasonable efforts to reunify Mother and J.C. Mother’s second a nd third Assignments of

Error are overruled.

IV. Best Interests {¶61} Mother contends in her fourth Assignment of Error that re cord does not support the trial court’s finding it was in the best interests of J.C. to be placed in the permanent custody of DCDJFS. We disagree. {¶62} R.C. 2151.414(D) governs “best interests” and states the following: (D) In determining the best interest of a child at a hearing he ld pursuant to division (A) of this section or for the purposes of division (A )(4) or (5) of section 2151.353 or division (C) of section 2151.415 of the Rev ised Code,[Cite as In re J.C. , 2021-Ohio-1874.] the court shall consider all relevant factors, including, but n ot limited to, the following: (1) The interaction and interrelationship of the child with the child's parents, siblings, relatives, foster caregivers and out-of-home provider s, and any other person who may significantly affect the child; (2) The wishes of the child, as expressed directly by the child or through the child's guardian ad litem, with due regard for the maturity of the child; (3) The custodial history of the child, including whether the c hild has been in the temporary custody of one or more public children service s agencies or private child placing agencies for twelve or more months of a consecutive twenty-two month period ending on or after March 18, 1999; (4) The child's need for a legally secure permanent placement a nd whether that type of placement can be achieved without a grant of perma nent custody to the agency; (5) Whether any of the factors in divisions (E)(7) to (11) of t his section apply in relation to the parents and child. {¶63} There is no question in this case that Mother loves her c hild. Mother has attended all visitation with J.C. J.C. appears happy when she i s with Mother during

visitation and the witness described them as bonded. {¶64} J.C. is too young to express her wishes, but the witnesse s testified that she was bonded with her foster family and adjusted to her foster ho me. The foster parents are meeting her medical and therapeutic needs. She has resided with her foster family[Cite as In re J.C. , 2021-Ohio-1874.] since April 5, 2019. She calls her foster parents “mommy” and “ daddy.” The foster family was interested in adopting J.C. {¶65} The parties do not dispute that Mother could not immediat ely and independently care for J.C. due to her developmental disability . Mother may be able to independently care for J.C. after one to two years of intensive intervention. The GAL recommended that temporary custody be extended for six months o r legal custody granted to the foster parents. The foster parents did not want legal custody of J.C.; they

asked the trial court to determine whether the DCDJFS should be entitled to permanent custody. The trial court is not required to follow a GAL's reco mmendation; it has discretion to follow or reject it. In re A.M ., 5th Dist. Licking No. 18-CA-83, 2019-Ohio-1578, 2019 WL 1894488, ¶ 48 citing Pasco v. Pasco , 5th Dist. Delaware No. 2018 CAF 06 0047, 2019- Ohio-1099, citing Clyburn v. Gregg , 4th Dist. Ross No. 11CA3211, 2011–Ohio–5239, ¶ 47; Hammons v. Hammons , 5th Dist. Delaware No. 13 CAF 07 0053, 2014–Ohio–221, ¶ 12. In this case, the trial court stated it chose to follow the recommendation of the CASA. {¶66} The Court agrees this is a challenging case based on Moth er’s developmental disability. Mother loves her child and wants to b e her parent. The best interest determination, however, focuses on the child, not the parent. In re C.T ., 5th Dist. Licking No. 2020 CA 00014, 2020-Ohio-4965, 2020 WL 6147171, ¶ 5 7 citing In re N.B ., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 101390, 2015-Ohio-314, at ¶ 59. The tria l court’s judgment entry reflects the complexity of this case and the record supports th e trial court’s decision that it was in the best interest of J.C. to grant permanent custody to the DCDJFS. {¶67} Mother’s fourth Assignment of Error is overruled.[Cite as In re J.C. , 2021-Ohio-1874.]

CONCLUSION {¶68} The judgment of the Delaware County Court of Common Pleas , Juvenile Division, is affirmed. By: Delaney, J., Wise, John, P.J. and Wise, Earle, J., concur.