NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL

AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF ARIZONA, Appellee,

v.

GABRIEL JOHN SANCHEZ, Appellant.

No. 1 CA-CR 13-0920

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County

No. CR2011-008279-001

The Honorable Roland J. Steinle, Judge

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Phoenix

By Joseph T. Maziarz

Counsel for Appellee

Office of the Legal Advocate, Phoenix

By Sara Xochitl Orozco, Frances J. Gray

Counsel for Appellant
STATE v. SANCHEZ

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MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge Patricia K. Norris delivered the decision of the Court, in which 

Presiding Judge Margaret H. Downie and Judge Randall M. Howe joined.

N O R R I S, Judge:

¶1 Gabriel John Sanchez appeals his convictions and sentences 

for first-degree murder and related charges, arguing the superior court 

should have excluded improper opinion evidence, was biased, and 

imposed an illegal sentence for his conviction for first-degree murder. We 

disagree with each argument and affirm his convictions and sentences.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND1

¶2 At trial, the State presented substantial evidence Sanchez shot 

and killed the victim, Angel, in the doorway of Sanchez’s estranged wife’s 

house. Sanchez then threatened at gunpoint others at the house who had 

witnessed him approach the house, heard the gunshot, and saw Angel lying 

dead on the floor. Sanchez’s sister helped Sanchez put Angel’s body in the 

trunk of her car and then drove Sanchez to the Salt River Pima Maricopa 

Indian Reservation, where he left Angel’s body.

¶3 The jury found Sanchez guilty of premeditated murder, 

aggravated assault, and other related charges. The superior court 

sentenced Sanchez to natural life for the first-degree murder.

DISCUSSION 

I. Evidentiary Error

¶4 Sanchez first argues the superior court committed reversible 

error in overruling his objection to what he argues on appeal was improper 

opinion evidence because it was not based on the witness’s personal 

knowledge or observation. During cross-examination by defense counsel,

the witness testified Sanchez had telephoned him “the day that he 

murdered Angel.” Sanchez objected, asserting the testimony was 

 

1We view the trial evidence in the light most favorable to 

sustaining the jury’s verdicts. See State v. Nelson, 214 Ariz. 196, 196, ¶ 2, 150 

P.3d 769, 769 (App. 2007).
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“unresponsive” to his question, “When was that day you talked with your 

brother? Do you remember the day?” 

¶5 Because Sanchez failed to object at trial on the ground he 

argues on appeal, we review for fundamental error only. See State v. 

Henderson, 210 Ariz. 561, 567, ¶ 19, 115 P.3d 601, 607 (2005); State v. Hamilton, 

177 Ariz. 403, 408, 868 P.2d 986, 991 (App. 1993) (“[A]n objection to the 

admission of evidence on one ground will not preserve issues relating to 

the admission of that evidence on other grounds.”). Further, Sanchez bears 

the burden of establishing fundamental and prejudicial error. See 

Henderson, 210 Ariz. at 567-68, ¶¶ 22, 26, 115 P.3d at 607-08. 

¶6 Here, even assuming the witness’s testimony was improper, 

Sanchez has failed to show resulting prejudice. To prove prejudice, a 

defendant must show that absent the error, a reasonable jury could have 

reached a different result. Id. at 569, ¶ 27, 115 P.3d at 609. On this record, 

a reasonable jury could not have reached a different result. Other trial 

evidence overwhelmingly demonstrated Sanchez had murdered Angel and 

dumped his body in the desert. Further, the witness had testified in the 

State’s case-in-chief that during the telephone call, Sanchez had told him he 

did not have to worry about Angel’s relationship with his daughter

because, “I took care of him so you never have to see him again.” On this 

record, the witness’s statement could not have caused the prejudice 

necessary for reversal on fundamental error review. 

II. Judicial Bias

¶7 Sanchez next argues the trial judge was biased—as evidenced 

in the aggregate—by threatening to remove Sanchez from the courtroom if 

he continued to talk to defense counsel while the judge was speaking; 

overruling defense counsel’s objections and criticizing defense counsel 

regarding the propriety of his questions to several witnesses; and 

instructing the jury it should take into account the victims’ right to attend 

trial in setting its deliberation schedule. Although the parties dispute 

which standard of review we should apply to this issue, we do not need to 

resolve that question because the record fails to demonstrate prejudice or 

bias as necessary for reversal under any applicable standard of review.

¶8 A defendant has a due process right “to have the trial 

presided over by a judge who is completely impartial and free of bias or 

prejudice.” State v. Carver, 160 Ariz. 167, 172, 771 P.2d 1382, 1387 (1989); see 

also State v. Ellison, 213 Ariz. 116, 128, ¶ 35, 140 P.3d 899, 911 (2006). A trial 

judge is presumed to be free from bias and prejudice, and a defendant bears 

the burden of establishing bias and prejudice by a preponderance of the 
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evidence. See Ellison, 213 Ariz. at 128, ¶ 37, 140 P.3d at 911. To overcome 

the presumption of judicial impartiality, the record must demonstrate “a 

hostile feeling or spirit of ill-will, or undue friendship or favoritism” toward 

one of the parties. State v. Myers, 117 Ariz. 79, 86, 570 P.2d 1252, 1259 (1977). 

¶9 First, the record does not demonstrate the judge was

prejudiced or biased when, outside the presence of the jury, he became 

exasperated because Sanchez was speaking to his lawyer at the same time 

the judge was speaking. The judge told Sanchez, “When I’m speaking, sir, 

you better pay attention to me,” and then, “If you’re going to show me 

disrespect and you’re not going to act appropriate in this courtroom, then 

I’ll just go over to the Central Court Building and put you in a room in the 

back and you can view the proceedings on T.V.”

¶10 The next morning, at Sanchez’s request, defense counsel 

requested clarification as to how Sanchez had acted inappropriately, and

for reassurance that the court could still be fair and impartial and was “not 

totally biased against [Sanchez].” The judge responded, “I was talking, and 

he was engaging in a conversation with you[,] distracting you. . . . When 

I’m talking, I expect people to pay attention. It’s rude behavior. As a Judge 

of the Superior Court, I’m entitled to respect, and lawyers are not to engage 

in that kind of conduct. . . . But throughout this case, when I’m ruling, he’s 

talking to you all the time. And you can’t listen to both.” The judge insisted

he could be fair and impartial, and stated, “just because I’m enforcing the 

rules does not mean that I can’t be fair and impartial.” The judge revisited 

the issue later that morning, telling defense counsel, “If you want to accuse 

me of being unfair in the future, you better have some facts to support it.”

¶11 On this record, the judge’s remarks did not evidence bias or 

prejudice; they represented annoyance and exasperation at having his 

impartiality questioned. Annoyance and exasperation, however, do not 

equal judicial bias. See Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 555-56, 114 S. Ct. 

1147, 1157, 127 L. Ed. 2d 474 (1994) (“Not establishing bias or partiality, 

however, are expressions of impatience, dissatisfaction, annoyance, and 

even anger, that are within the bounds of what imperfect men and women 

. . . sometimes display.”).

¶12 Second, the record does not demonstrate the judge was

prejudiced or biased because he overruled defense counsel’s objections and 

questioned the propriety of defense counsel’s questions. “Within reason, a 

judge does not display bias or cause prejudice when acting sua sponte to 

control the courtroom and the trial.” State v. Bible, 175 Ariz. 549, 595, 858 

P.2d 1152, 1198 (1993); see also Liteky, 510 U.S. at 556, 114 S. Ct. at 1157 (“A 

judge’s ordinary efforts at courtroom administration—even a stern and 
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short-tempered judge’s ordinary efforts at courtroom administration” do 

not establish bias or prejudice.). The instances in which the judge overruled 

defense counsel’s objections, or interrupted defense counsel’s examination 

of a witness, appear to have occurred in an effort to control the evidence 

that would be admitted at trial. Moreover, “judicial rulings alone almost 

never constitute a valid basis for a bias or partiality motion, without 

showing either an extrajudicial source of bias or any deep-seated 

favoritism.” Ellison, 213 Ariz. at 129, ¶ 40, 140 P.3d at 912 (citations omitted) 

(internal punctuation omitted). Sanchez makes no claim of “extrajudicial 

source of bias” and the record fails to show the judge’s conduct in 

controlling the trial represented the “deep-seated favoritism” required to 

constitute a valid basis for claims of bias or prejudice. 

¶13 Third, the record does not demonstrate the judge was

prejudiced or biased when, in explaining the deliberation schedule to the 

jury, he instructed it to consider the victims’ right to attend the trial, 

including when it returned its verdict, as it would take time to “get 

everybody back into the [court]room.” The court explained it usually 

required 45 minutes to an hour to notify everyone of a verdict and this could 

pose a problem if the jury reached a verdict late in the afternoon. The 

court’s instruction was, under the circumstances, appropriate and practical.

¶14 In summary, the record fails to support Sanchez’s claim of 

judicial bias. 

III. Sentencing Error

¶15 Finally, Sanchez argues the superior court imposed an illegal 

sentence when it sentenced him to natural life for first-degree murder 

without first finding a “valid” aggravating circumstance. Because Sanchez 

did not raise this objection in the superior court, we review for fundamental 

error, see supra ¶ 5, although we acknowledge an illegal sentence constitutes 

fundamental error. See State v. Kasic, 228 Ariz. 228, 231, ¶ 15, 265 P.3d 410, 

413 (App. 2011). The superior court did not, however, impose an illegal 

sentence when it sentenced Sanchez to natural life because of his “criminal 

history.”

¶16 When Sanchez murdered Angel on April 27, 2011, Arizona 

law authorized a court to decide whether to impose a natural life or a life 

sentence when a person had been convicted of first-degree murder but not 

sentenced to death. See generally Ariz. Rev. Stat. (“A.R.S.”) § 13-752(Q) 

(2010). Section 13-752(Q) provided: 
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If the death penalty was not alleged or was 

alleged but not imposed, the court shall 

determine whether to impose a sentence of life 

or natural life. In determining whether to 

impose a sentence of life or natural life, the 

court:

1. May consider any evidence introduced 

before sentencing or at any other sentencing 

proceeding.

2. Shall consider the aggravating and 

mitigating circumstances listed in § 13-701 and 

any statement made by a victim.

¶17 On its face, A.R.S. § 13-752(Q) did not require a court to make 

any explicit finding of any aggravating circumstance before imposing a 

natural life sentence. Instead, it authorized a court to “consider” any 

“evidence introduced before sentencing” and any of the aggravating and 

mitigating circumstances “listed in § 13-701.” Id. Further, in State v. Fell, 

the Arizona Supreme Court held that a guilty verdict of first-degree murder 

alone authorized a natural life sentence, without any additional factual 

finding. 210 Ariz. 554, 558, ¶ 15, 115 P.3d 594, 598 (2005). In so holding, the 

court emphasized that under Arizona’s sentencing statutes, a court had 

“discretion to sentence an offender within a range—from life to natural 

life—for non-capital first-degree murder,” and the Legislature’s 

enumeration of factors a court could consider when imposing a sentence 

within that range did not render life imprisonment the “statutory 

maximum” for purposes of Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 120 S. Ct.

2348, 147 L. Ed. 2d 435 (2000), and Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 124 S. 

Ct. 2531, 159 L. Ed. 2d 403 (2004). Fell, 210 Ariz. at 558-59, ¶¶ 14-18, 115 

P.3d at 598-99. Although, as Sanchez notes, in 2009 the Legislature 

amended the sentencing statutes at issue in Fell, those amendments—which 

are applicable here—are still controlled by Fell. Here, as in Fell, the jury’s 

verdict alone exposed Sanchez to a possible sentence of natural life. See 

A.R.S. § 13-751(A) (2010). And, here, as in Fell, it was within the superior 

court’s discretion to impose a natural life sentence without making any 

additional factual findings. See A.R.S. § 13-752(Q).

¶18 Further, we reject Sanchez’s argument that the United States 

Supreme Court essentially overruled Fell in Miller v. Alabama, __ U.S. __, 132 

S. Ct. 2455, 183 L. Ed. 2d 407 (2012), and Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 130 

S. Ct. 2011, 176 L. Ed. 2d 825 (2010). In Miller, the Supreme Court held “the 

Eighth Amendment forbids a sentencing scheme that mandates life in 
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prison without possibility of parole for juvenile offenders.” __ U.S. at __, 

132 S. Ct. at 2469. And, in Graham, the Supreme Court held the Eighth 

Amendment “prohibits the imposition of a life without parole sentence on 

a juvenile offender who did not commit homicide.” 560 U.S. at 82, 130 S. Ct. 

at 2034. These cases have no impact on the continuing vitality of Fell.

CONCLUSION

¶19 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm Sanchez’s convictions 

and sentences.