Daniel M. Mensah v. MCT Federal Credit Union, No. 54, Sept. Term, 2015 Opinion by 

Battaglia, J. 

JUDGMENT – GARNISHMENT – MD. RULE 3-646

Garnishment of wages under Sections 15-601 through 15-606 of the Commercial Law 

Article is valid when the Maryland court has original, continuing and ancillary 

jurisdiction over the judgment debtor and the judgment debtor’s employer/garnishee has 

sufficient contact with the State. 
Circuit Court for Montgomery County, 

Maryland 

Case No. 8976DCA

Argued: January 12, 2016

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS

OF MARYLAND 

No. 54 

September Term, 2015 

DANIEL M. MENSAH

v. 

MCT FEDERAL CREDIT UNION 

Barbera, C.J. 

Battaglia 

Greene

Adkins

McDonald

Watts 

Hotten, 

JJ.

Opinion by Battaglia, J.

 

 Filed: February 24, 2016 
Daniel M. Mensah, Petitioner, while living in Maryland, in 2006, opened a 

personal line of credit as well as a credit card account with MCT Federal Credit Union 

(“MCT”), Respondent. Mr. Mensah, over the next several years, accumulated $19,657.66 

in credit card debt and amassed $14,951.55 on the line of credit. MCT filed two 

complaints in 2010 against Mr. Mensah in the District Court of Maryland for 

Montgomery County, one for the outstanding balance on the credit card account and 

another for the money owed on the line of credit. Mr. Mensah, by the time of the filings, 

had moved to Texas. After several failed attempts at service of Mr. Mensah, substitute 

service was achieved. Mr. Mensah failed to answer either complaint, and MCT was 

awarded default judgments in the amount of $21,270.12 on the credit card claim and 

$15,848.64 on the line of credit. Mr. Mensah failed to note any appeal. 

MCT, in 2013, secured two writs of garnishment in the same actions from the 

District Court pursuant to Sections 15-601 through 15-606 of the Commercial Law 

Article, Maryland Code (1978, 2013 Repl. Vol.), as implemented by Rule 3-646.1 The 

 

1

In 2013 Rule 3-646 provided, as it does now, in relevant part:

(a) Applicability. This Rule governs garnishment of wages under Code, 

Commercial Law Article, §§ 15-601 through 15-606. 

(b) Issuance of Writ. The judgment creditor may obtain issuance of a writ 

of garnishment by filing in the same action in which the judgment was 

obtained a request that contains (1) the caption of the action, (2) the amount 

owed under the judgment, (3) the name and last known address of the 

judgment debtor, and (4) the name and address of the garnishee. Upon 

filing of the request, the clerk shall issue a writ of garnishment directed to 

the garnishee together with a blank answer form provided by the clerk.

(continued ...)
2

writs were served on the resident agent2 of Mr. Mensah’s employer, BASF,3 as well as on 

its payroll department in New Jersey. Although BASF answered and did not contest the

garnishment, Mr. Mensah filed motions to quash the writs, arguing that his wages, earned 

solely for work he performed in Texas, were not subject to garnishment in Maryland. The 

District Court denied both motions to quash, and Mr. Mensah appealed to the Circuit 

Court for Montgomery County, which affirmed. 

Mr. Mensah petitioned this Court for certiorari, which was granted in Mensah v. 

MCT Federal Credit Union, 444 Md. 638, 120 A.3d 766 (2015), to answer the following 

questions: 

I. Does Maryland law allow a judgment creditor (MCT) to garnish wages 

earned by a judgment-debtor employee (Mensah) exclusively for 

services/work performed in Texas pursuant to a Writ issued by a Maryland 

Court?

 

(... continued)

* * * 

(d) Service. The writ and answer form shall be served on the garnishee in 

the manner provided by Chapter 100 of this Title for service of process to 

obtain personal jurisdiction and may be served in or outside the county. 

Upon issuance of the writ, a copy of the writ shall be mailed to the debtor's 

last known address. Subsequent pleadings and papers shall be served on the 

creditor, debtor, and garnishee in the manner provided by Rule 1-321. 

Rule 3-646. 

2

 BASF was required to designate a resident agent under Section 7-203 of the 

Corporations and Associations Article. Md. Code Ann., § 7-203 of the Corporations and 

Associations Article. 

3

 BASF is a multi-national company producing and marketing chemicals with operations 

throughout the world and the United States. https://www.basf.com/us/en.html 

(https://perma.cc/TQR8-JH8H). BASF maintains a training center located in Maryland. 

http://www.refinish.basf.us/facilities (https://perma.cc/YAT3-QQUB).
3

II. Does Maryland law allow a judgment creditor (MCT) to garnish wages 

earned by a judgment-debtor employee (Mensah) exclusively for 

services/work performed in Texas pursuant to a Writ issued by a Maryland 

Court and served on an employer in New Jersey?[4]

The underlying judgments for $21,270.12 and $15,848.64 secured by MCT against 

Mr. Mensah are not in issue, because no appeal was taken by Mr. Mensah to challenge 

them. The sole issue before us involves judgment enforcement, i.e. whether the District 

Court in its continuing and ancillary jurisdiction could order wages earned outside of 

Maryland by a non-resident judgment debtor to be subject to garnishment served upon an 

employer with continuous and systematic business in Maryland. 5 We shall answer yes to 

this question.

One opportunity to garnish wages outside of the jurisdiction in which a money 

judgment has been entered is to enroll the judgment in the “foreign” jurisdiction, pursuant 

to the Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act (“UEFJA”), which was approved 

by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws in 1948 and 

revised in 1964. See Unif. Enforcement of Foreign Judgment Act (revised 1964) 13 

U.L.A. 156 (2002). The UEFJA enables a party awarded a judgment in one state to 

enforce that judgment in another state by recording or “enrolling” the judgment in the 

 

4

 Because the Writ of Garnishment also was served on BASF’s resident agent in 

Maryland, we need not reach this issue. Md. Code Ann. (1975, 2013 Repl. Vol.), § 1-

401(a) of the Corporations and Associations Article (service on a resident agent 

“constitutes effective service of process” on the corporation). 

5

 Mr. Mensah had moved to vacate the judgments entered in the District Court based 

upon improper service of process, but his motions were denied. The Circuit Court 

affirmed the denial; Mensah did not include this issue in his Petition for Certiorari. 

Accordingly, there is no issue before us as to whether the District Court had personal 

jurisdiction over Mr. Mensah when it entered the judgments. 
4

latter state.6 The enrolled “foreign” judgment is then treated as though it were a judgment 

of the receiving state.

7

Maryland adopted the 1964 revision of the UEFJA with modification in Chapter 

497 of the Maryland Laws of 1987. Codified in Sections 11-801 through 11-807 of the 

Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article, Maryland Code (1987, 2013 Repl. Vol.), the 

UEFJA offers a judgment creditor holding a valid judgment from another state or 

 

6Section 2 of the UEFJA provides: 

Section 2. [Filing and Status of Foreign Judgments.] A copy of any foreign 

judgment authenticated in accordance with the act of Congress or the 

statutes of this state may be filed in the office of the Clerk of any [District 

Court of any city or county] of this state. The Clerk shall treat the foreign 

judgment in the same manner as a judgment of the [District Court of any 

city or county] of this state. A judgment so filed has the same effect and is 

subject to the same procedures, defenses and proceedings for reopening, 

vacating, or staying as a judgment of a [District Court of any city or 

county] of this state and may be enforced or satisfied in like manner. 

Unif. Enforcement of Foreign Judgment Act (revised 1964) 13 U.L.A. 163 (2002). 

7

 The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws summarized the 

effect of the UEFJA as follows: 

A state that enacts the Revised Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments 

Act permits enforcement of a judgment of another state upon the mere act 

of filing it in the office of a Clerk of Court. The act of filing the foreign 

judgment gives it the effect of being a judgment of the court in the state in 

which it is filed. The process of enforcement then goes forward as if the 

judgment is a domestic one. 

http://www.uniformlaws.org/ActSummary.aspx?title=Enforcement%20of%20Foreign%2

0Judgments%20Act (https://perma.cc/5FWR-AA8S).
5

jurisdiction a way to enforce that judgment in Maryland.

8 The judgment creditor may file, 

or enroll, the judgment in a court in Maryland, where the judgment will then be treated as 

though it were a judgment of the Maryland court and may, among other things, seek its 

enforcement.9 Notice of the enrollment of the judgment must be provided to the judgment 

debtor.10

 

8

 A “foreign” judgment is “a judgment, decree, or order of a court of the United States or 

of any other court that is entitled to full faith and credit in this state.” Md. Code Ann.

(1987, 2013 Repl. Vol.), § 11-801 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article. 

9

 Section 11-802 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article, Maryland Code (1987, 

2013 Repl. Vol.), provides: 

In general

(a)(1)(i) Except as provided in subparagraphs (ii) and (iii) of this paragraph, 

a copy of any foreign judgment authenticated in accordance with an act of 

Congress or statutes of this State may be filed in the office of the clerk of a 

circuit court.

(ii) If the face amount of the judgment is $2,500 or less, the copy 

shall be filed with the clerk of the District Court.

(iii) If the face amount of the judgment is not more than a 

jurisdictional amount described in § 4-401 of this article, but 

more than $2,500, the copy may be filed either with the clerk of 

the District Court or in the office of the clerk of a circuit court.

(2) The clerk shall treat the foreign judgment in the same manner as a 

judgment of the court in which the foreign judgment is filed. 

Effect of foreign judgment 

(b) A filed foreign judgment has the same effect and is subject to the same 

procedures, defenses, and proceedings for reopening, vacating, staying, 

enforcing, or satisfying as a judgment of the court in which it is filed. 

10 Section 11-803 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article, Maryland Code (1987, 

2013 Repl. Vol.), provides, in relevant part: 

* * * 

(continued ...)
6

The State of Texas also has adopted the 1964 revision of the UEFJA, codified in 

1985 in Sections 35.001 through 35.008 of the Texas Civil Practices and Remedies Code. 

Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code §§ 35.001–35.008. Despite the ability to enroll the 

Maryland judgment in Texas, however, MCT did not do so. Apparently, Section 28 of 

Article 16 of the Texas Constitution prohibits a wage garnishment for any purpose other 

than the enforcement of child support or spousal maintenance.11 Tex. Const. Art. 16 § 28. 

To that end, Section 42.001 of the Texas Property Code exempts “current wages for 

personal services, except for the enforcement of court-ordered child support 

payments[.]”12 Tex. Prop. Code § 42.001(b)(1).

 

(... continued)

Notice of filing foreign judgment

(b)(1) The clerk promptly shall mail notice of the filing of the foreign 

judgment to the judgment debtor at the address given and shall note the 

mailing in the docket. 

* * * 

11 Section 28 of Article 16 of the Texas Constitution provides: 

No current wages for personal service shall ever be subject to garnishment, 

except for the enforcement of court-ordered: 

(1) child support payments; or

(2) spousal maintenance.

12 Section 42.001 of the Texas Property Code provides, in relevant part: 

(a) Personal property, as described in Section 42.002, is exempt from 

garnishment, attachment, execution, or other seizure if: 

(1) the property is provided for a family and has an aggregate fair 

market value of not more than $100,000 , exclusive of the amount of 

any liens, security interests, or other charges encumbering the 

property; or 

(continued ...)
7

An alternative garnishment method that MCT sought to utilize involved the 

satisfaction of the money judgment through wage attachment served on the employer’s, 

BASF, Maryland resident agent, pursuant to Sections 15-601 et seq. of the Commercial 

Law Article, Maryland Code (1978, 2013 Repl. Vol.). “Wages,” for the purpose of 

attachment, is defined as “all monetary remuneration paid to any employee for his 

employment” in Section 15-601(c) of the Commercial Law Article, without any 

indication as to where the remuneration must be earned. The term “employee”, 

referenced in Section 15-601(c), “includes an employee whether he is a resident or 

nonresident of the State.” (emphasis added). All wages of an employee that are and 

become payable are subject to a lien to satisfy the judgment: 

(a) When an attachment is levied against the wages of a judgment debtor, it 

shall constitute a lien on all attachable wages that are payable at the time 

the attachment is served or which become payable until the judgment, 

interest, and costs, as specified in the attachment, are satisfied.

(b) Any waiver of the limitations contained in § 15-601.1(b)(1) and (2) of 

this subtitle is void. 

Section 15-602 of the Commercial Law Article. 

 

(... continued)

(2) the property is owned by a single adult, who is not a member of a 

family, and has an aggregate fair market value of not more than 

$50,000, exclusive of the amount of any liens, security interests, or 

other charges encumbering the property. 

(b) The following personal property is exempt from seizure and is not 

included in the aggregate limitations prescribed by Subsection (a):

(1) current wages for personal services, except for the enforcement of 

court-ordered child support payments[.] 
8

Maryland Rule 3-646 “governs garnishment of wages under Code, Commercial 

Law Article, §§ 15-601 through 15-606.” Rule 3-646(a). The Rule, under subsection (b), 

permits a judgment creditor, by “filing in the same action in which the judgment was 

obtained” a request, including the caption of the action, the money owed under the 

judgment, the name and address of the judgment debtor and the name and address of the 

garnishee—a third party who possesses property of the debtor, generally the debtor’s 

employer in a situation involving wage garnishment—to obtain a writ of garnishment. 

The writ, when issued, must contain the information from the judgment creditor’s request 

and inform the garnishee regarding its need to answer, as well as inform the judgment 

debtor of his right to contest the garnishment. Rule 3-646(c). 

Upon issuance, the writ of garnishment and an answer form are served upon the 

garnishee, and a copy is mailed to the judgment debtor. Rule 3-646(d). Subsection (e) of 

3-646 pertains to the response by the garnishee, and requires an answer within 30 days 

indicating whether the debtor is an employee, and, if so, the current pay rate and any 

existing wage liens. The garnishee is also permitted, under subsection (e), to assert any 

defenses it may have or any that might be available to the debtor, and the judgment 

debtor may, at any time, assert a defense or an objection to the garnishment. 

In the event that the garnishee does not timely answer, the judgment creditor may 

move for a contempt order under subsection (f). The garnishee may deny that the debtor 

is an employee. If either the garnishee or the debtor asserts a defense or objection, a 

hearing is required. Rule 3-646(g). Subsection (i) sets forth the procedure for the 

garnishee’s withholding and remittance of the wages to the judgment creditor, who must 
9

account for the payments received in accordance with subsection (j). Should the debtor’s 

employment cease, the garnishment terminates 90 days thereafter. Rule 3-646(k). 

A wage garnishment obviously, thus, continues from, and is ancillary to, the 

original judgment entered by a court and is not itself an original action. See Medical Mut. 

Liability Ins. Soc. of Maryland v. Davis, 389 Md. 95, 883 A.2d 158 (2005) (discussing 

garnishment of property, other than wages, in the Circuit Court under Rule 2-645).13 In 

Davis, we stated: 

Although once the issue is joined between the judgment creditor and the 

garnishee, the garnishment proceeding proceeds as any original action, with 

the judgment creditor as plaintiff and the garnishee as defendant and is 

governed by the rules applicable to civil actions, such actions are not 

original actions, independent of the actions out of which the judgments 

sought to be enforced emanate. Garnishment proceedings, rather, are 

certainly related to, and, indeed are ancillary to such actions. Thus, the 

amount of the judgments obtained in the underlying action, to which the 

garnishment action relates and, indeed, depends, is information necessary 

for the issuance of a writ of garnishment. Also, the judgment itself 

conclusively establishes the judgment debtor's obligation to the judgment 

creditor. Indeed, the purpose of a garnishment proceeding is to satisfy 

money judgments with property of the judgment debtor that is in the hands 

of third persons. Pursuant to that purpose, garnishment proceedings 

necessarily must determine whether the garnishee has any funds, property 

or credits which belong to the judgment debtor. 

Id. at 117, 883 A.2d at 171 (emphasis added). See also Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. 

Ruby, 312 Md. 413, 418, 540 A.2d 482, 484 (1988); Livingston v. Naylor, 173 Md. App. 

488, 510, 920 A.2d 34, 47 (2007).

 

13 Rule 2-645 governs the garnishment of property in the Circuit Court, and is 

procedurally similar to Rule 3-646, which governs wage garnishment in the District 

Court. 
10 

Mr. Mensah and MCT differ as to the extent of the reach of the wage garnishments 

ordered by the District Court of Maryland in this case because of Mr. Mensah’s Texas 

residency, both relying on two cases involving wage garnishment, one decided by this 

Court, Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 312 Md. at 413, 540 A.2d at 482, and the other by 

the Court of Special Appeals, Livingston, 173 Md. App. at 488, 920 A.2d at 34. In 

Goodyear, Patricia Ruby was awarded an absolute divorce from Robert Ruby, as well as 

custody of their children and child support. Mr. Ruby, who was a resident of Texas, was 

served in Maryland with the original complaint, but failed to appear for any of the 

proceedings. He subsequently failed to pay child support, and Mrs. Ruby requested a 

wage garnishment of her former husband’s earnings, pursuant to Sections 10-120 through 

10-126 of the Family Law Article, Maryland Code (1984), in the Circuit Court for Prince 

George’s County, from which she had obtained the divorce and award of child support. 

The Circuit Court issued the writ, and Mr. Ruby’s employer’s, Goodyear, resident agent

was served with the wage garnishment. 

Goodyear, however, sought to quash the wage garnishment in the Circuit Court, 

arguing that the request for the garnishment was a new claim for relief that would have 

required personal jurisdiction over both Mr. Ruby and Goodyear.14 The Circuit Court 

 

14 We identified two issues in the case: 

The first is whether the use of first class mail was sufficient to afford 

adequate notice of the proceedings to the alleged debtor, a resident of 

Texas. The second is whether the non-resident employer, The Goodyear 

Tire and Rubber Company (Goodyear), has sufficient contacts with this 

(continued ...)
11 

disagreed, as did we. We concluded that the wage garnishment did not constitute a new 

cause of action but was within the exercise of the continuing, ancillary jurisdiction of the 

circuit court: 

The right to exercise personal jurisdiction over Mr. Ruby arose when he 

was served with the original complaint, and extended to all the relief sought 

by that complaint. Moreover, the enforcement and modification of relief 

granted pursuant to that complaint remains within the continuing 

jurisdiction of the circuit court, subject to any due process requirement that 

the party against whom the modification or enforcement is sought be given 

reasonable notice and an opportunity to be heard. 

Id. at 418, 540 A.2d at 484. As a result, we determined that the relief entered in the case 

against Mr. Ruby remained within the continuing jurisdiction of the circuit court and that 

“service of the notice [of garnishment] by ordinary mail was sufficient” to meet the 

requirements of due process. Id. at 420, 540 A.2d at 485. 

We also addressed whether there were sufficient contacts between Goodyear and

Maryland to warrant the exercise of personal jurisdiction over it. Although the record was 

inadequate to establish Goodyear’s Maryland contacts, we recognized “there may be 

contacts reflecting continuous and systematic general business conduct that will be 

sufficient to support the exercise of jurisdiction over a claim that neither arises out of nor 

is directly related to the conduct of the [garnishee] within the forum.” Id. at 422, 540 

 

(... continued)

State to justify the exercise of judicial jurisdiction over it in a matter wholly 

unrelated to those contacts. 

Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Ruby, 312 Md. 413, 415, 540 A.2d 482, 482-83 (1988). 
12 

A.2d at 486. We remanded the case to explore whether Goodyear’s contacts in Maryland 

reflected continuous and systematic general business conduct. 

In the second case, Livingston, 173 Md. App. at 488, 920 A.2d at 34, a money 

judgment obtained by Mr. Naylor from a North Carolina court for $50,000, resulting 

from injuries sustained when Livingston assaulted Mr. Naylor and robbed him, was 

enrolled in Maryland under the UEFJA. Id. at 490-91, 920 A.2d at 35-36. Although Mr. 

Naylor had begun garnishment proceedings in North Carolina, wages were exempt from 

garnishment in that state, which led him to enroll the judgment in Maryland. Id. at 491-

92, 920 A.2d at 36. 

Livingston, a resident of North Carolina, had worked several years for Marriott at 

its various locations in North Carolina, Virginia and, briefly, Maryland. Livingston had 

served as an interim manager at several Marriott hotels in Maryland in 2004, for a short 

time, prompting Mr. Naylor to seek enforcement of his judgment in this state. Id. at 492, 

920 A.2d at 36. Livingston and Marriott challenged Maryland’s exercise of jurisdiction 

regarding the enrolled judgment and moved to quash the writ. Id. at 492, 920 A.2d at 36-

37. The primary issue before the Court of Special Appeals was whether, pursuant to the 

enrolled foreign judgment, Maryland could affect garnishment of wages of a non-resident 

extraterritorially in North Carolina. 

Our intermediate appellate court eventually determined that the Maryland courts, 

when enforcing an enrolled judgment, could not order the garnishment of wages earned 

in North Carolina. An enrolled judgment, though valid, was subject to defenses in 

enforcement: 
13 

The Court of Appeals recognized in Smith Pontiac that there is a 

“distinction between recognition and enforcement” of a foreign judgment. 

“While this Court must recognize this judgment [domesticated in Maryland 

pursuant to the UEFJA] as a valid Maryland judgment, this Court also may 

inquire into post-judgment defenses in order to determine the extent to 

which it is enforceable.”

Id. at 500-01, 920 A.2d at 42 (internal citation omitted) (alteration original), quoting 

Mike Smith Pontiac, GMC, Inc. v. Mercedes-Benz of North America, Inc., 356 Md. 542, 

562, 741 A.2d 462, 472-73 (1999). 

The Court of Special Appeals, however, recognized a distinction between a 

Maryland court’s jurisdiction when enforcing a judgment entered in a case originating in 

Maryland and a judgment enrolled in Maryland, taking into account two Supreme Court 

cases which had not been discussed in Goodyear, those being Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 

U.S. 186, 97 S. Ct. 2569, 53 L. Ed. 2d 683 (1977), and Rush v. Savchuk, 444 U.S. 320, 

100 S. Ct. 571, 62 L. Ed. 2d 516 (1980), both cases involving pre-judgment garnishment. 

In Shaffer, Heitner, a non-resident shareholder had brought a derivative action in 

Delaware against Greyhound Corporation, its wholly owned subsidiary and several 

officers and directors, none of whom was a resident of Delaware. Id. at 189-90, 97 S. Ct. 

at 2572, 53 L. Ed. 2d at 688-89. Heitner alleged that, as a result of violating their duties 

to Greyhound, the officers and directors caused Greyhound to engage in activities that 

lead to its liability for damages in a private antitrust suit and a fine in a criminal contempt 
14 

action. Id. In addition, Heitner moved for, and was granted, a sequestration order15 on the 

defendant’s property located in Delaware, which consisted of Greyhound’s stock 

certificates which, under Delaware law, were deemed to be located in Delaware 

regardless of their actual physical location. Id. at 190-92, 97 S. Ct. at 2572-73, 53 L. Ed. 

2d at 689-90. The defendants asserted that they lacked sufficient contacts with Delaware 

and, therefore, the court lacked jurisdiction over them and that the ex parte sequestration 

violated due process. Id. at 193, 97 S. Ct. at 2573-74, 53 L. Ed. 2d at 691. The Supreme 

Court concluded that, where the personal jurisdiction asserted by the state is in rem, 

based upon the presence of property owned by the defendant within the state, the mere 

presence of the property alone is not sufficient to confer jurisdiction. Id. at 209, 97 S. Ct. 

at 2582, 53 L. Ed. 2d at 701 (“Thus although the presence of the defendant’s property in a 

State might suggest the existence of other ties among the defendant, the State, and the 

litigation, the presence of the property alone would not support the State’s jurisdiction.”). 

Due process, therefore, according to the Court, required an inquiry into “the relationship 

among the defendant, the forum, and the litigation”. Id. at 204, 97 S. Ct. at 2580, L. Ed. 

2d at 698. The primary issue in that case involved pre-judgment attachment, but the Court 

left open the question of whether an inquiry into personal jurisdiction is required for postjudgment enforcement, stating in footnote 36: 

Once it has been determined by a court of competent jurisdiction that the 

defendant is a debtor of the plaintiff, there would seem to be no unfairness 

 

15 A sequestration order, provided for under Delaware Law, permitted the court to compel 

the appearance of non-resident defendants by seizing their property. Shaffer v. Heitner, 

443 U.S. 186, 190 n.4, 97 S. Ct. 2569, 2572 n.4, 53 L. Ed. 2d 683, 689 n.4 (1977). 
15 

in allowing an action to realize on that debt in a State where the defendant 

has property, whether or not that State would have jurisdiction to determine 

the existence of the debt as an original matter.

Id. at 210 n.36, 97 S. Ct. at 2583 n.36, L. Ed. 2d at 702 n.36. 

In the second case, Rush, 444 U.S. at 322, 100 S. Ct. at 574, 62 L. Ed. 2d at 521, 

the Supreme Court revisited the issue of a state’s exercise of jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant in a pre-judgment attachment context. In the case, Savchuk, as a 

passenger in a car driven by Rush, was injured when they were involved in an automobile 

accident. Id. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company insured the car driven 

by Rush under a policy issued in Indiana, which had a guest statute. Id. Any claim 

brought by Savchuk would have been barred. Id. Savchuk, however, had moved with his 

parents to Minnesota the year after the accident and sued Rush, in Minnesota, by 

“attempt[ing] to obtain quasi in rem jurisdiction by garnishing State Farm’s obligation 

under the insurance policy to defend and indemnify Rush[,]” as State Farm also did 

business in Minnesota. Id. at 322, 100 S. Ct. at 574-75, 62 L. Ed. 2d at 521. 

The Supreme Court referred to its decision in Shaffer requiring sufficient contacts 

between the forum and the non-resident defendant in addition to the presence of the 

defendant’s property in the forum and inquired into Rush’s contacts with Minnesota. Id.

at 328, 100 S. Ct. at 577, 62 L. Ed. 2d at 524. Although State Farm was present in 

Minnesota, Rush had no control over that decision. Id. at 329, 100 S. Ct. at 577, 62 L. Ed. 

2d at 525. In addition, no significant contacts existed between the litigation and 

Minnesota (as the accident had occurred in Indiana), nor did the presence of State Farm’s 
16 

obligation provide a viable basis for any contact between Rush and the State. Id. As such, 

the Supreme Court concluded that:

Here, however, the defendant has no contacts with the forum, and the Due 

Process Clause does not contemplate that a state may make binding a 

judgment . . . against an individual or corporate defendant with which the 

state has no contacts, ties, or relations.

Id. at 332-33, 100 S. Ct. at 579, 62 L. Ed. 2d at 528 (emphasis original) (internal 

quotation omitted). The presence, therefore, of a garnishee in the forum state was not 

alone sufficient for the court to exercise personal jurisdiction over a non-resident 

defendant absent any other contacts with the forum state. 

In addressing the implications in Livingston of Shaffer and Rush, the Court of 

Special Appeals noted that, “The Maryland appellate courts have not, to date, addressed 

note 36 of Shaffer and the extent to which Shaffer imposes any jurisdictional limits upon 

post-judgment collection proceedings[,]” and pointed to several cases that distinguished 

Shaffer and Rush when post-judgment garnishment was sought under an original 

judgment in the recovery state. Livingston, 173 Md. App. at 510, 920 A.2d at 47. The 

cases cited included Smith v. Lorillard, Inc., 945 F.2d 745 (4th Cir. 1991), Levi Strauss & 

Company v. Crockett Motor Sales, Inc., 739 S.W.2d 157 (Ark. 1987), State Department 

of Revenue v. Control Data Corporation, 713 P.2d 30 (Or. 1986). The Livingston opinion 

also referred to our opinion in Goodyear, which the Court of Special Appeals noted had 

not explicitly addressed Shaffer. Id. at 511, 920 A.2d at 48. 

The Court of Special Appeals, then, determined that there was “a lack of fair play 

and substantial justice” in allowing the garnishment of wages, pursuant to a judgment 
17 

only enrolled in Maryland, earned by a non-resident working at a location wholly outside 

the State of Maryland, “in the absence of some other connection between Maryland and 

either the [non-resident] wage-earner or the underlying controversy that resulted in the 

original [out of state] judgment[.]” Id. at 517, 920 A.2d at 51 (emphasis added). The court 

then distinguished the facts in Livingston from a garnishment resulting from an original 

judgment entered in a Maryland court: 

In this case, we are not dealing with a situation in which Maryland had any 

prior contact with the underlying litigation, in contrast to the employees 

whose wages were garnished pursuant to a court’s ancillary or continuing 

jurisdiction[.]

Id. at 520, 920 A.2d at 53. As a result, the Court of Special Appeals concluded that, “the 

only res owned by Livingston within the borders of this State and properly garnishable in 

this State would be the wage obligation owed to Livingston for services rendered while 

Livingston was physically present in this State.” Id. at 521, 920 A.2d at 54. Thus, 

although the intermediate appellate court determined that the North Carolina judgment 

was valid and properly enrolled, our brethren only enforced the wage garnishment on 

wages earned in Maryland, because the wages earned in North Carolina were beyond the 

reach of a judgment only enrolled in Maryland.

Juxtaposing these two cases, it becomes apparent that the two are complementary, 

and both guide and inform the present case: 

Brief facts:

Goodyear

A resident plaintiff was 

awarded a default judgment 

in the Circuit Court for 

Prince George’s County 

Livingston v. Naylor

A non-resident plaintiff 

enrolled a North Carolina 

default judgment in 

Maryland seeking to garnish
18 

against a non-resident 

defendant. The plaintiff

sought to enforce her 

judgment through garnishment

of the defendant’s wages, 

earned in Texas, from his 

employer in Maryland.

wages owed to the nonresident judgment debtor by 

his employer. The nonresident judgment debtor 

briefly worked in Maryland 

for the employer, but 

currently resides in and 

earns wages for work 

performed in North 

Carolina.

1. Sufficiency of contacts 

between the State and the 

garnishee or judgment 

debtor.

The Court of Appeals 

focused on the sufficiency 

of the contact between 

Maryland and the garnishee 

in order to determine the 

fairness of exercising 

jurisdiction over the 

garnishee. Due to the 

inadequacy of the record 

regarding Marriott’s 

contacts with Maryland, the 

case was remanded for 

further proceedings.

The Court of Special 

Appeals focused on the 

sufficiency of the contact 

between Maryland and the 

judgment debtor to ensure 

that fair play and substantial 

justice were not lacking. 

The court determined 

Livingston’s contact with 

Maryland supported the 

exercise of jurisdiction over 

him and his wages, but only 

to the extent of wages 

earned in Maryland.

2. The connection, if any, 

between Maryland and

the underlying controversy.

The request for child 

support arose from, and was 

ancillary to, the original 

judgment of divorce entered 

by the Circuit Court for 

Prince George’s County.

The judgment was an 

enrolled judgment from a 

North Carolina court; 

Maryland had no 

connection with the 

underlying controversy that 

gave rise to the judgment. 

3. Jurisdiction over the nonresident defendant in light 

of Shaffer and Rush.

The Court of Appeals did 

not address jurisdiction in 

light of Shaffer and Rush. 

The Court of Special 

Appeals considered the 

application of the principles 

in Shaffer to post-judgment 

jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant in the 

context of a foreign enrolled 

judgment. 
19 

Mr. Mensah argues, of course, that the result in Livingston bars MCT from 

garnishing any wages earned by him outside of Maryland, while MCT suggests that 

Goodyear is dispositive. We determine that consideration of the tenets of Goodyear and 

Livingston, guided by what the Supreme Court held in Shaffer and Rush, leads to a 

conclusion that MCT’s post-judgment garnishment of Mr. Mensah’s wages earned in 

Texas was an appropriate exercise of the original and ancillary jurisdiction of the district 

court that had entered judgment against Mr. Mensah, which also had jurisdiction over the 

garnishee, BASF, as a result of the garnishee’s continuous and systematic business 

conduct in Maryland.

Goodyear is “on all fours” with the present case and gilded with BASF’s business 

presence in Maryland as well as its assent to the wage garnishments. 

Livingston’s complementary analysis supports a post-judgment garnishment of 

wages earned in a different state which arose from the continuing and ancillary 

jurisdiction of the district court.16

 

16 The cases cited by the Court of Special Appeals in Livingston regarding post-judgment 

garnishment of a non-resident’s wages earned outside of the state, when the state has a 

connection to the underlying litigation, support our conclusion. Smith v. Lorillard, Inc., 

945 F.2d 745 (4th Cir. 1991); Levi Strauss & Company v. Crockett Motor Sales, Inc., 739 

S.W.2d 157 (1987); State Department of Revenue v. Control Data Corporation, 713 P.2d 

30 (Or. 1986). In Smith, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the post-judgment garnishment of a 

non-resident judgment debtor’s wages ordered by a Kentucky court pursuant to two 

judgments entered in Kentucky and served upon the garnishee in Kentucky. 945 F.2d at 

746 (“Shaffer sets limits only on the original assertion of in rem and quasi in rem

jurisdiction over non-resident defendants, not on the imposition of an ancillary order of 

garnishment flowing from a judgment for which the court originally had in personum

(continued ...)
20 

In conclusion, MCT could enforce the money judgments against Mr. Mensah 

through garnishments of Mr. Mensah’s wages earned in Texas through the exercise of the 

original and ancillary jurisdiction of the district court that entered the judgments and 

because of BASF’s business contacts in the State. 

JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT 

COURT FOR MONTGOMERY 

COUNTY AFFIRMED; COSTS IN 

THIS COURT AND THE CIRCUIT 

COURT TO BE PAID BY THE 

PETITIONER. 

 

(... continued)

jurisdiction over the creditor of the garnishee (i.e., the defendant in the underlying action 

against whom the judgment was obtained).”). The Supreme Court of Arkansas, in Levi 

Strauss, affirmed the trial court’s exercise of jurisdiction when it ordered the postjudgment garnishment of a non-resident’s out of state wages pursuant to an Arkansas 

judgment. 739 S.W.2d at 159 (“We would first note that [the judgment creditor] did not 

initiate the garnishment action as a means by which to adjudicate a claim against [the 

debtor]; it had already obtained a judgment against [the debtor] at the time she lived and 

worked in Arkansas. . . . Suffice it to say, [the debtor’s] contacts, past and present, with 

this state are sufficient for us to sustain the trial court’s exercise of jurisdiction in the 

garnishment proceeding below.”). In Control Data Corp., the Supreme Court of Oregon 

affirmed the tax court’s garnishment of a non-resident’s wages earned in Minnesota 

pursuant to a judgment obtained in Oregon by the Department of Revenue. 713 P.2d at 32 

(“Here the creditor, the Department of Revenue, did not attach assets in the forum state as 

a way of getting jurisdiction to adjudicate a claim against an absent debtor. This creditor 

already has a judgment against the debtor, a judgment for unpaid taxes on income earned 

in Oregon while the debtor lived in Oregon. The Department seeks only to collect this 

judgment by reaching an asset belonging to the debtor in the hands of Control Data, a 

third party that unquestionably is present in Oregon.”).