IB 

Union Calendar No. 486 

117TH CONGRESS 

2D SESSION H. R. 3524 

[Report No. 117–667, Part I] 

To revitalize and reassert United States leadership, investment, and 

engagement in the Indo-Pacific region and globally. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

MAY 25, 2021 

Mr. MEEKS introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee 

on Foreign Affairs, and in addition to the Committees on Financial Services, Ways and Means, the Judiciary, and Intelligence (Permanent Select), for a period to be subsequently determined by the Speaker, in each 

case for consideration of such provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of 

the committee concerned 

DECEMBER 30, 2022 

Reported from the Committee on Foreign Affairs with an amendment 

[Strike out all after the enacting clause and insert the part printed in italic] 

DECEMBER 30, 2022 

Committees on Financial Services, Ways and Means, the Judiciary, and Intelligence (Permanent Select) discharged; committed to the Committee of 

the Whole House on the State of the Union and ordered to be printed 

[For text of introduced bill, see copy of bill as introduced on May 25, 2021] 


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A BILL 

To revitalize and reassert United States leadership, investment, and engagement in the Indo-Pacific region and 

globally. 


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1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE; TABLE OF CONTENTS. 

4 (a) SHORT TITLE.—This Act may be cited as the ‘‘En5 suring American Global Leadership and Engagement Act’’ 

6 or the ‘‘EAGLE Act’’. 

7 (b) TABLE OF CONTENTS.—The table of contents for 

8 this Act is as follows: 

Sec. 1. Short title; table of contents. 

Sec. 2. Definitions. 

Sec. 3. Findings. 

Sec. 4. Statement of policy. 

Sec. 5. Sense of Congress. 

Sec. 6. Rules of construction. 

TITLE I—INVESTING IN AMERICAN COMPETITIVENESS 

Subtitle A—Science and Technology 

Sec. 101. Authorization to assist United States companies with global supply 

chain diversification and management. 

Sec. 102. Report on national technology and industrial base. 

Subtitle B—Global Infrastructure and Energy Development 

Sec. 111. Appropriate committees of Congress defined. 

Sec. 112. Sense of Congress on international quality infrastructure investment 

standards. 

Sec. 113. Supporting economic independence from the People’s Republic of China. 

Sec. 114. Strategy for advanced and reliable energy infrastructure. 

Sec. 115. Report on the People’s Republic of China’s investments in foreign energy development. 

Subtitle C—Economic Diplomacy and Leadership 

Sec. 121. Findings on regional economic order. 

Sec. 122. Review of trade and economic engagement globally of the People’s Republic of China. 

Sec. 123. Report on entrenching American economic diplomacy in the Indo-Pacific. 

Sec. 124. Sense of Congress on the need to bolster American leadership in the Asia 

Pacific Economic Cooperation. 

Sec. 125. Strategy on deterrence of economic coercion. 

Sec. 126. Sense of Congress on digital technology issues. 

Sec. 127. Digital trade agreements. 

Sec. 128. Digital connectivity and cybersecurity partnership. 

Sec. 129. Sense of Congress on ideological competition. 


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Subtitle D—Financial Diplomacy and Leadership 

Sec. 131. Findings on Chinese financial industrial policy. 

Sec. 132. Report on importance of American financial strength for global leadership. 

Sec. 133. Review of Chinese companies on United States capital markets. 

Sec. 134. Report on diplomatic and economic implications of changes to crossborder payment and financial messaging systems. 

TITLE II—INVESTING IN ALLIANCES AND PARTNERSHIPS 

Subtitle A—Strategic and Diplomatic Matters 

Sec. 201. Appropriate committees of Congress defined. 

Sec. 202. United States commitment and support for allies and partners in the 

Indo-Pacific. 

Sec. 203. Boosting Quad cooperation. 

Sec. 204. Establishment of Quad Intra-Parliamentary Working Group. 

Sec. 205. Statement of policy on cooperation with ASEAN. 

Sec. 206. Young Southeast Asian Leaders Initiative. 

Sec. 207. Sense of Congress on negotiations with G7 and G20 countries. 

Sec. 208. Enhancing the United States-Taiwan partnership. 

Sec. 209. Taiwan diplomatic review. 

Sec. 210. Taiwan Peace and Stability Act. 

Sec. 211. Taiwan International Solidarity Act. 

Sec. 212. Taiwan Fellowship Program. 

Sec. 213. Increasing Department of State personnel and resources devoted to the 

Indo-Pacific. 

Sec. 214. Report on bilateral efforts to address Chinese fentanyl trafficking. 

Sec. 215. Facilitation of increased equity investments under the Better Utilization of Investments Leading to Development Act of 2018. 

Sec. 216. Expanding investment by United States International Development Finance Corporation for vaccine manufacturing. 

Sec. 217. Ensuring United States diplomatic posts align with American strategic 

national security and economic objectives. 

Sec. 218. Authorization of appropriations for the Fulbright-Hays Program. 

Sec. 219. Supporting independent media and countering disinformation. 

Sec. 219A. Global Engagement Center. 

Sec. 219B. Report on origins of the COVID–19 pandemic. 

Sec. 219C. Extension of Asia Reassurance Initiative Act of 2018. 

Sec. 219D. Investment, trade, and development in Africa and Latin America and 

the Caribbean. 

Sec. 219E. China Watcher Program. 

Sec. 219F. Liu Xiaobo Fund for Study of the Chinese Language. 

Sec. 219G. Oversight of funds made available through the American Rescue Plan 

Act of 2021. 

Sec. 219H. Requirements relating to vaccine branding. 

Subtitle B—International Security Matters 

Sec. 221. Appropriate committees of Congress. 

Sec. 222. Additional funding for international military education and training 

in the Indo-Pacific. 

Sec. 223. Statement of policy on maritime freedom of operations in international 

waterways and airspace of the Indo-Pacific and on artificial 

land features in the South China Sea. 


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Sec. 224. Report on capability development of Indo-Pacific allies and partners. 

Sec. 225. Statement of policy regarding the threat posed by the Chinese Communist Party to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. 

Sec. 226. Identification of PLA–supported institutions. 

Subtitle C—Multilateral Strategies to Bolster American Power 

Sec. 231. Findings on multilateral engagement. 

Sec. 232. Statement of policy on America’s multilateral engagement. 

Sec. 233. Support for Americans at the United Nations. 

Sec. 234. Junior professional officers. 

Sec. 235. Report on American employment in international organizations. 

Subtitle D—Regional Strategies to Bolster American Power 

Sec. 241. Statement of policy on cooperation with allies and partners around the 

world. 

PART I—WESTERN HEMISPHERE

Sec. 242. Sense of Congress regarding United States-Canada relations. 

Sec. 243. Sense of Congress regarding China’s arbitrary imprisonment of Canadian citizens. 

Sec. 244. Strategy to enhance cooperation with Canada. 

Sec. 245. Strategy to strengthen economic competitiveness, governance, human 

rights, and the rule of law in Latin America and the Caribbean. 

Sec. 246. Engagement in international organizations and the defense sector in 

Latin America and the Caribbean. 

Sec. 247. Defense cooperation in Latin America and the Caribbean. 

Sec. 248. Engagement with civil society in Latin America and the Caribbean regarding accountability, human rights, and the risks of pervasive 

surveillance technologies. 

Sec. 249. Caribbean energy initiative as alternative to China’s Belt and Road 

Initiative. 

Sec. 250. United States-Caribbean Resilience Partnership. 

Sec. 251. Countering China’s educational and cultural diplomacy in Latin America. 

Sec. 252. Narcotics trafficking in Latin America and the Caribbean. 

PART II—TRANSATLANTIC RELATIONSHIPS

Sec. 255. Sense of Congress on transatlantic relationships. 

Sec. 256. Strategy to enhance transatlantic cooperation with respect to the People’s Republic of China. 

Sec. 257. Enhancing transatlantic cooperation on promoting private sector finance. 

Sec. 258. Report and briefing on cooperation between China and Iran and between China and Russia. 

PART III—SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIA

Sec. 261. Sense of Congress on South and Central Asia. 

Sec. 262. Strategy to enhance cooperation with South and Central Asia. 

Sec. 263. Indian Ocean region strategic review. 


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PART IV—AFRICA

Sec. 271. Assessment of political, economic, and security activity of the People’s 

Republic of China in Africa. 

Sec. 272. Increasing the competitiveness of the United States in Africa. 

Sec. 273. Digital security cooperation with respect to Africa. 

Sec. 274. Support for Young African Leaders Initiative. 

Sec. 275. Africa broadcasting networks. 

Sec. 276. Africa energy security and diversification. 

PART V—MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA

Sec. 281. Strategy to counter Chinese influence in, and access to, the Middle East 

and North Africa. 

Sec. 282. Sense of Congress on Middle East and North Africa engagement. 

Sec. 283. Sense of Congress on People’s Republic of China-Iran relationship. 

PART VI—ARCTIC REGION

Sec. 285. Arctic diplomacy. 

Sec. 286. Statement of policy regarding observer status for Taiwan on the Arctic 

Council. 

PART VII—OCEANIA

Sec. 291. Statement of policy on United States engagement in Oceania. 

Sec. 292. Oceania strategic roadmap. 

Sec. 293. Oceania Security Dialogue. 

Sec. 294. Oceania Peace Corps partnerships. 

PART VIII—PACIFIC ISLANDS

Sec. 295. Short title. 

Sec. 296. Findings. 

Sec. 297. Statement of policy. 

Sec. 298. Definition. 

Sec. 299. Authority to consolidate reports; form of reports. 

Sec. 299A. Diplomatic presence in the Pacific Islands. 

Sec. 299B. Coordination with regional allies and partners. 

Sec. 299C. Climate resilient development in the Pacific Islands. 

Sec. 299D. International law enforcement academy for the Pacific Islands. 

Sec. 299E. Security assistance for the Pacific Islands. 

Sec. 299F. Countering transnational crime. 

Sec. 299G. Emergency preparedness initiative for the Pacific Islands. 

Sec. 299H. Peace Corps in the Pacific Islands. 

TITLE III—INVESTING IN OUR VALUES 

Sec. 301. Statement of Congress on the continued violation of rights and freedoms 

of the people of Hong Kong. 

Sec. 302. Authorization of appropriations for promotion of democracy in Hong 

Kong. 

Sec. 303. Hong Kong people’s freedom and choice. 

Sec. 304. Export prohibition of munitions items to the Hong Kong police force. 

Sec. 305. Sense of Congress on treatment of Uyghurs and other ethnic minorities 

in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region. 

Sec. 306. Prevention of Uyghur forced labor. 

Sec. 307. Uyghur human rights protection. 


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Sec. 308. Removal of members of the United Nations Human Rights Council that 

commit human rights abuses. 

Sec. 309. Policy with respect to Tibet. 

Sec. 310. United States policy and international engagement on the succession or 

reincarnation of the Dalai Lama and religious freedom of Tibetan Buddhists. 

Sec. 311. Development and deployment of internet freedom and Great Firewall 

circumvention tools for the people of Hong Kong. 

Sec. 312. Authorization of appropriations for protecting human rights in the People’s Republic of China. 

Sec. 313. Modifications to and reauthorization of sanctions with respect to human 

rights violations. 

Sec. 314. Sense of Congress condemning anti-Asian racism and discrimination. 

Sec. 315. Annual reporting on censorship of free speech with respect to international abuses of human rights. 

Sec. 316. Policy toward the XXIV Olympic Winter Games and the XIII 

Paralympic Winter Games. 

Sec. 317. Review and controls on export of items with critical capabilities to enable human rights abuses. 

Sec. 318. Sense of Congress on commercial export control policy. 

Sec. 319. Imposition of sanctions with respect to systematic rape, coercive abortion, forced sterilization, or involuntary contraceptive implantation in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region. 

Sec. 320. Sense of Congress regarding censorship of political speech. 

Sec. 321. Report on manner and extent to which the Government of China exploits Hong Kong to circumvent United States laws and protections. 

Sec. 322. Sense of Congress regarding annual Country Reports on Human Rights 

Practices. 

Sec. 323. Sense of Congress regarding press freedom in the People’s Republic of 

China. 

Sec. 324. United States Special Envoy for Xinjiang Province. 

Sec. 325. China Censorship Monitor and Action Group. 

Sec. 326. Public disclosure on BIS licensing information. 

TITLE IV—INVESTING IN OUR ECONOMIC STATECRAFT 

Sec. 401. Sense of Congress regarding the People’s Republic of China’s industrial 

policy. 

Sec. 402. Economic defense response teams. 

Sec. 403. Countering overseas kleptocracy. 

Sec. 404. Annual report on Chinese surveillance companies. 

TITLE V—ENSURING STRATEGIC SECURITY 

Sec. 501. Cooperation on a strategic nuclear dialogue. 

Sec. 502. Report on United States efforts to engage the People’s Republic of China 

on nuclear issues and ballistic missile issues. 

Sec. 503. Countering the People’s Republic of China’s proliferation of ballistic 

missiles and nuclear technology to the Middle East. 

TITLE VI—INVESTING IN A SUSTAINABLE FUTURE 

Sec. 601. Ensuring national security and economic priorities with the People’s 

Republic of China and other countries account for environmental 

issues and climate change. 


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Sec. 602. Enhancing security considerations for global climate disruptions. 

Sec. 603. Balancing accountability and cooperation with China. 

Sec. 604. Promoting responsible development alternatives to the People’s Republic 

of China’s Belt and Road Initiative. 

Sec. 605. Using climate diplomacy to better serve national security and economic 

interests. 

Sec. 606. Driving a global climate change resilience strategy. 

Sec. 607. Addressing international climate change mitigation, adaptation, and 

security. 

Sec. 608. Reducing the negative impacts from black carbon, methane, and highGWP hydrofluorocarbons. 

Sec. 609. Building United States economic growth and technological innovation 

through the Green Climate Fund. 

Sec. 610. Ensuring a whole-of-government response to climate action. 

Sec. 611. Working with international partners to reduce deforestation. 

Sec. 612. Controlling the export of electronic waste to protect United States supply chains. 

1 SEC. 2. DEFINITIONS. 

2 In this Act: 

3 (1) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMIT4 TEES.—Unless otherwise defined, the term ‘‘appro5 priate congressional committees’’ means— 

6 (A) the Committee on Foreign Relations of 

7 the Senate; and 

8 (B) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the 

9 House of Representatives. 

10 (2) CCP.—The term ‘‘CCP’’ means the Chinese 

11 Communist Party. 

12 (3) PEOPLE’S LIBERATION ARMY; PLA.—The 

13 terms ‘‘People’s Liberation Army’’ and ‘‘PLA’’ mean 

14 the armed forces of the People’s Republic of China. 

15 (4) PRC; CHINA.—The terms ‘‘PRC’’ and 

16 ‘‘China’’ mean the People’s Republic of China. 


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1 SEC. 3. FINDINGS. 

2 Congress makes the following findings: 

3 (1) The People’s Republic of China (PRC) is 

4 leveraging its political, diplomatic, economic, mili5 tary, technological, and ideological power to become a 

6 strategic, near-peer, global competitor of the United 

7 States. The policies increasingly pursued by the PRC 

8 in these domains are contrary to the interests and 

9 values of the United States, its partners, and much 

10 of the rest of the world. 

11 (2) A number of policies being pursued by the 

12 PRC— 

13 (A) threaten the future character of the 

14 international order and are shaping the rules, 

15 norms, and institutions that govern relations 

16 among states; 

17 (B) will put at risk the ability of the 

18 United States to secure its national interests; 

19 and 

20 (C) will put at risk the future peace, pros21 perity, and freedom of the international commu22 nity in the coming decades. 

23 (3) After normalizing diplomatic relations with 

24 the PRC in 1979, the United States actively worked 

25 to advance the PRC’s economic and social develop26 ment to ensure that it participated in, and benefited 


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1 from, the free and open international order. The 

2 United States pursued these goals and contributed to 

3 the welfare of the Chinese people by— 

4 (A) increasing the PRC’s trade relations 

5 and access to global capital markets; 

6 (B) promoting the PRC’s accession to the 

7 World Trade Organization; 

8 (C) providing development finance and 

9 technical assistance; 

10 (D) promoting research collaboration; 

11 (E) educating the PRC’s top students; 

12 (F) permitting transfers of cutting-edge 

13 technologies and scientific knowledge; and 

14 (G) providing intelligence and military as15 sistance. 

16 (4) It is now clear that the PRC has chosen to 

17 pursue state-led, mercantilist economic policies, an 

18 increasingly authoritarian governance model at home 

19 through increased restrictions on personal freedoms, 

20 and an aggressive and assertive foreign policy. These 

21 policies frequently and deliberately undermine United 

22 States interests and are contrary to core United 

23 States values and the values of other nations, both in 

24 the Indo-Pacific and beyond. In response to this stra25 tegic decision of the CCP, the United States has been 


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1 compelled to reexamine and revise its strategy to2 wards the PRC and reanimate its defense of the inter3 national order. 

4 (5) The General Secretary of the CCP and the 

5 Chairman of the People’s Republic of China, Xi 

6 Jinping, has elevated the ‘‘Great Rejuvenation of the 

7 Chinese Nation’’ as central to the domestic and for8 eign policy of the PRC. His program demands— 

9 (A) strong, centralized CCP leadership; 

10 (B) concentration of military power; 

11 (C) a dominant role for the CCP in the 

12 state and the economy; 

13 (D) an aggressive foreign policy seeking 

14 control over broadly asserted territorial claims; 

15 and 

16 (E) the denial of any universal values and 

17 individual rights that are deemed to threaten the 

18 CCP. 

19 (6) The PRC views its Leninist model of govern20 ance as superior to, and at odds with, the constitu21 tional models of the United States and other democ22 racies. This approach to governance is lauded by the 

23 CCP as essential to securing the PRC’s status as a 

24 global leader, and to shaping the future of the world. 

25 In a 2013 speech, General Secretary Xi said, ‘‘We 


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1 firmly believe that as socialism with Chinese charac2 teristics develops further . . . it is . . . inevitable that 

3 the superiority of our socialist system will be increas4 ingly apparent . . . [and] our country’s road of devel5 opment will have increasingly greater influence on the 

6 world.’’. 

7 (7) The PRC’s objectives are to first establish re8 gional hegemony over the Indo-Pacific and then to use 

9 that dominant position to propel the PRC to become 

10 the ‘‘leading world power’’, shaping an international 

11 order that is conducive to the its interests. Achieving 

12 these objectives requires turning the PRC into a 

13 wealthy nation under strict CCP rule by using a 

14 strong military and advanced technological capability 

15 to pursue the PRC’s objectives, regardless of other 

16 countries’ interests. 

17 (8) The PRC is reshaping the current inter18 national order, which is built upon the rule of law 

19 and free and open ideals and principles, by con20 ducting global information and influence operations, 

21 seeking to redefine international laws and norms to 

22 align with the objectives of the CCP, rejecting the le23 gitimacy of internationally recognized human rights, 

24 and seeking to co-opt the leadership and agenda of 

25 multinational organizations for the benefit of the 


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1 PRC and other authoritarian regimes at the expense 

2 of the interests of the United States and the inter3 national community. 

4 (9) The PRC is encouraging other countries to 

5 follow its model of development and governance. Dur6 ing the 19th Party Congress in 2017, General Sec7 retary Xi said that the PRC could serve as a model 

8 of development for other countries by utilizing ‘‘Chi9 nese wisdom’’ and a ‘‘Chinese approach to solving 

10 problems’’. 

11 (10) The PRC is promoting its governance model 

12 and attempting to weaken other models of governance 

13 by— 

14 (A) undermining democratic institutions; 

15 (B) subverting financial institutions; 

16 (C) coercing businesses to accommodate the 

17 policies of the PRC; and 

18 (D) using disinformation to disguise the na19 ture of the actions described in subparagraphs 

20 (A) through (C). 

21 (11) The PRC is progressing toward becoming 

22 the global leader in science and technology. In May 

23 2018, General Secretary Xi said that for the PRC to 

24 reach ‘‘prosperity and rejuvenation’’, it needs to ‘‘en25 deavor to be a major world center for science and inVerDate Sep 11 2014 21:34 Dec 30, 2022 Jkt 039200 PO 00000 Frm 00013 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6203 E:\BILLS\H3524.RH H3524

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1 novation’’. The PRC has invested the equivalent of 

2 billions of dollars into education and research and de3 velopment and established joint scientific research 

4 centers and science universities. 

5 (12) The PRC’s drive to become a ‘‘manufac6 turing and technological superpower’’ and to promote 

7 ‘‘innovation with Chinese characteristics’’ is coming 

8 at the expense of human rights and longstanding 

9 international rules and norms with respect to eco10 nomic competition, and presents a challenge to 

11 United States national security and the security of 

12 allies and like-minded countries. In particular, the 

13 PRC advances its illiberal political and social poli14 cies through mass surveillance, social credit systems, 

15 and a significant role of the state in internet govern16 ance. Through these means, the PRC increases direct 

17 and indirect government control over its citizens’ ev18 eryday lives. Its national strategy of ‘‘civil-military 

19 fusion’’ mandates that civil and commercial research, 

20 which increasingly drives global innovation, is lever21 aged to develop new military capabilities. 

22 (13) The PRC is using legal and illegal means 

23 to achieve its objective of becoming a manufacturing 

24 and technological superpower. The PRC uses state-di25 rected industrial policies in anticompetitive ways to 


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1 ensure the dominance of PRC companies. The CCP 

2 engages in and encourages actions that actively un3 dermine a free and open international market, such 

4 as intellectual property theft, forced technology trans5 fers, regulatory and financial subsidies, and manda6 tory CCP access to proprietary data as part of busi7 ness and commercial agreements between Chinese and 

8 foreign companies. 

9 (14) The policies referred to in paragraph (13) 

10 are designed to freeze United States and other foreign 

11 firms out of the PRC market, while eroding competi12 tion in other important markets. The heavy subsidiza13 tion of Chinese companies includes potential violation 

14 of its World Trade Organization commitments. In 

15 May 2018, General Secretary Xi said that the PRC 

16 aims to keep the ‘‘initiatives of innovation and devel17 opment security . . . in [China’s] own hands’’. 

18 (15) The PRC is advancing its global objectives 

19 through a variety of avenues, including its signature 

20 initiative, the Belt and Road Initiative (referred to in 

21 this section as ‘‘BRI’’), which is enshrined in the Chi22 nese Constitution and includes the Digital Silk Road 

23 and Health Silk Road. The PRC describes BRI as a 

24 straightforward and wholly beneficial plan for all 

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1 nomic relations with the PRC at its center, making 

2 it the most concrete geographical representation of the 

3 PRC’s global ambitions. BRI increases the economic 

4 influence of state-owned PRC firms in global markets, 

5 enhances the PRC’s political leverage with govern6 ment leaders around the world, and provides greater 

7 access to strategic nodes such as ports and railways. 

8 Through BRI, the PRC seeks political deference 

9 through economic dependence. 

10 (16) The PRC is executing a plan to establish re11 gional hegemony over the Indo-Pacific and displace 

12 the United States from the region. As a Pacific 

13 power, the United States has built and supported en14 during alliances and economic partnerships that se15 cure peace and prosperity and promote the rule of 

16 law and political pluralism in a free and open Indo17 Pacific. In contrast, the PRC uses economic and mili18 tary coercion in the region to secure its own interests. 

19 (17) The PRC’s military strategy seeks to keep 

20 the United States military from operating in the 

21 Western Pacific and erodes United States security 

22 guarantees. 

23 (18) The PRC is aggressively pursuing exclusive 

24 control of critical land routes, sea lanes, and air 

25 space in the Indo-Pacific in the hopes of eventually 


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1 exercising greater influence beyond the region. This 

2 includes lanes crucial to commercial activity, energy 

3 exploration, transport, and the exercise of security op4 erations in areas permitted under international law. 

5 (19) The PRC seeks so-called ‘‘reunification’’ 

6 with Taiwan through whatever means may ultimately 

7 be required. The CCP’s insistence that so-called ‘‘re8 unification’’ is Taiwan’s only option makes this goal 

9 inherently coercive. In January 2019, General Sec10 retary Xi stated that the PRC ‘‘make[s] no promise 

11 to renounce the use of force and reserve[s] the option 

12 of taking all necessary means’’. Taiwan’s embodiment 

13 of democratic values and economic liberalism chal14 lenges General Secretary Xi’s goal of achieving na15 tional rejuvenation. The PRC plans to exploit Tai16 wan’s dominant strategic position in the First Island 

17 Chain and to project power into the Second Island 

18 Chain and beyond. 

19 (20) In the South China Sea, the PRC has exe20 cuted an illegal island-building campaign that threat21 ens freedom of navigation and the free-flow of com22 merce, damages the environment, bolsters the PLA 

23 power projection capabilities, and coerces and intimi24 dates other regional claimants in an effort to advance 

25 its unlawful claims and control the waters around 


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1 neighboring countries. Despite General Secretary Xi’s 

2 September 2015 speech, in which he said the PRC 

3 was not militarizing the South China Sea, during the 

4 2017 19th Party Congress, General Secretary Xi an5 nounced that ‘‘construction on islands and reefs in 

6 the South China Sea have seen steady progress’’. 

7 (21) The PRC is rapidly modernizing the PLA 

8 to attain a level of capacity and capability superior 

9 to the United States in terms of equipment and con10 duct of modern military operations by shifting its 

11 military doctrine from having a force ‘‘adequate [for] 

12 China’s defensive needs’’ to having a force ‘‘commen13 surate with China’s international status’’. Ultimately, 

14 this transformation could enable China to impose its 

15 will in the Indo-Pacific region through the threat of 

16 military force. In 2017, General Secretary Xi estab17 lished the following developmental benchmarks for the 

18 advancement of the PLA: 

19 (A) A mechanized force with increased 

20 informatized and strategic capabilities by 2020. 

21 (B) The complete modernization of China’s 

22 national defense by 2035. 

23 (C) The full transformation of the PLA into 

24 a world-class force by 2050. 


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1 (22) The PRC’s strategy and supporting policies 

2 described in this section undermine United States in3 terests, such as— 

4 (A) upholding a free and open international 

5 order; 

6 (B) maintaining the integrity of inter7 national institutions with liberal norms and val8 ues; 

9 (C) preserving a favorable balance of power 

10 in the Indo-Pacific; 

11 (D) ensuring the defense of its allies; 

12 (E) preserving open sea and air lanes; 

13 (F) fostering the free flow of commerce 

14 through open and transparent markets; and 

15 (G) promoting individual freedom and 

16 human rights. 

17 (23) The global COVID–19 pandemic has inten18 sified and accelerated these trends in the PRC’s be19 havior and therefore increased the need for United 

20 States global leadership and a competitive posture. 

21 The PRC has capitalized on the world’s focus on the 

22 COVID–19 pandemic by— 

23 (A) moving rapidly to undermine Hong 

24 Kong’s autonomy, including imposing a so-called 

25 ‘‘national security law’’ on Hong Kong; 


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1 (B) aggressively imposing its will in the 

2 East and South China Seas; 

3 (C) increasing its territorial aggression in 

4 South Asia, including against India; and 

5 (D) engaging in a widespread and govern6 ment-directed disinformation campaign to ob7 scure the PRC Government’s efforts to cover up 

8 the seriousness of COVID–19, sow confusion 

9 about the origination of the outbreak, and dis10 credit the United States, its allies, and global 

11 health efforts. 

12 (24) The CCP’s disinformation campaign re13 ferred to in paragraph (24)(D) has included— 

14 (A) concerted efforts, in the early days of 

15 the pandemic, to downplay the nature and scope 

16 of the outbreak in Wuhan in the PRC, as well 

17 as cases of person-to-person transmission; 

18 (B) claims that the virus originated in 

19 United States biological defense research at Fort 

20 Detrick, Maryland; 

21 (C) Chinese state media reports insinuating 

22 a possible link between the virus and other 

23 United States biological facilities; and 


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1 (D) efforts to block access to qualified inter2 national infectious disease experts who might 

3 contradict the CCP’s narrative. 

4 (25) In response to the PRC’s strategy and poli5 cies, the United States must adopt a policy of stra6 tegic competition with the PRC to protect and pro7 mote our vital interests and values. 

8 (26) The United States policy of strategic com9 petition with respect to the People’s Republic of 

10 China is part of a broader strategic approach to the 

11 Indo-Pacific and the world that aligns with coopera12 tion with United States allies and partners to ad13 vance shared values and interests and to preserve and 

14 enhance a free, open, democratic, inclusive, rules15 based, stable, and diverse region. 

16 (27) The Asia Reassurance Initiative Act of 2018 

17 (Public Law 115–409) contributed to a comprehensive 

18 framework for promoting United State security inter19 ests, economic interests, and values in the Indo-Pa20 cific region, investing $7,500,000,000 over 5 years— 

21 (A) to support greater security and defense 

22 cooperation between the United States and allies 

23 and partners in the Indo-Pacific region; 


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1 (B) to advance democracy and the protec2 tion and promotion of human rights in the Indo3 Pacific region; 

4 (C) to enhance cybersecurity cooperation be5 tween the United States and partners in the 

6 Indo-Pacific; 

7 (D) to deepen people-to-people engagement 

8 through programs such as the Young Southeast 

9 Asian Leaders Initiative and the ASEAN Youth 

10 Volunteers program; and 

11 (E) to enhance energy cooperation and en12 ergy security in the Indo-Pacific region. 

13 SEC. 4. STATEMENT OF POLICY. 

14 (a) OBJECTIVES.—It is the policy of the United States 

15 to pursue the following objectives: 

16 (1) The United States global leadership role is 

17 sustained and its political system and major founda18 tions of national power are secured for the long-term 

19 in the political, economic, technological, and military 

20 domains. 

21 (2) The United States position as an indispen22 sable power in the Indo-Pacific and globally is sus23 tained through diplomacy, multilateralism, and en24 gagement. 


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1 (3) The United States deters military confronta2 tion with the PRC and both nations work to reduce 

3 the risk of conflict. 

4 (4) The United States and its allies maintain a 

5 stable balance of power in the Indo-Pacific with 

6 China. The United States and its allies maintain un7 fettered access to the region, including through free8 dom of navigation and the free flow of commerce, con9 sistent with international law and practice. 

10 (5) The allies and partners of the United 

11 States— 

12 (A) maintain confidence in United States 

13 leadership and its commitment to the Indo-Pa14 cific region; 

15 (B) can withstand and combat subversion 

16 by the PRC; and 

17 (C) work closely with the United States in 

18 setting global rules, norms, and standards that 

19 benefit the international community. 

20 (6) The combined economic and military 

21 strength of the United States and its allies and part22 ners demonstrates to the PRC that the risks of at23 tempts to dominate other states outweigh the potential 

24 benefits. 


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1 (7) The United States leads the free, open, and 

2 rules-based international order, which comprises resil3 ient states and institutions that uphold and defend 

4 principles, such as sovereignty, rule of law, indi5 vidual freedom, and human rights. The international 

6 order is strong enough to withstand attempts at desta7 bilization by illiberal and authoritarian actors. 

8 (8) The key rules, norms, and standards of inter9 national engagement in the 21st century are main10 tained, including— 

11 (A) the protection of human rights, commer12 cial engagement and investment, and technology; 

13 and 

14 (B) that such rules, norms, and standards 

15 are in alignment with the values and interests of 

16 the United States, its allies and partners, and 

17 other stakeholders in the liberal international 

18 order. 

19 (9) The United States counters attempts by the 

20 PRC to— 

21 (A) undermine open and democratic soci22 eties; 

23 (B) distort global markets; 

24 (C) manipulate the international trade sys25 tem; 


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1 (D) coerce other nations via economic, 

2 cyber, and military means; or 

3 (E) use its technological advantages to un4 dermine individual freedoms or other states’ na5 tional security interests. 

6 (10) The United States deters military con7 frontation with the PRC and both nations work to re8 duce the risk of conflict. 

9 (b) POLICY.—It is the policy of the United States, in 

10 pursuit of the objectives set forth in subsection (a)— 

11 (1) to strengthen the United States domestic 

12 foundation by reinvesting in market-based economic 

13 growth, education, scientific and technological inno14 vation, democratic institutions, and other areas that 

15 improve the ability of the United States to pursue its 

16 vital economic, foreign policy, and national security 

17 interests; 

18 (2) to pursue a strategy of strategic competition 

19 with the PRC in the political, diplomatic, economic, 

20 development, security, informational, and techno21 logical realms to maximize the United States’ 

22 strengths and increase the costs for the PRC of harm23 ing the interests and values of the United States and 

24 its partners and allies; 


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1 (3) to lead a free, open, and secure international 

2 system characterized by the rule of law, open markets 

3 and the free flow of commerce, and a shared commit4 ment to security and peaceful resolution of disputes, 

5 human rights, good and transparent governance, and 

6 freedom from coercion; 

7 (4) to strengthen and deepen United States alli8 ances and partnerships by pursuing greater bilateral 

9 and multilateral cooperative initiatives that advance 

10 shared interests and values and bolster partner coun11 tries’ confidence that the United States is and will re12 main a strong, committed, and reliable partner that 

13 respects the views and interests of its allies and 

14 friends; 

15 (5) to encourage and collaborate with United 

16 States allies and partners in boosting their own capa17 bilities and resiliency to pursue, defend, and protect 

18 shared interests and values, free from coercion and ex19 ternal pressure; 

20 (6) to pursue fair, reciprocal treatment and 

21 healthy, constructive competition in United States22 China economic relations by— 

23 (A) advancing policies that harden the 

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1 gal commercial or trading practices and the co2 ercion of United States businesses; and 

3 (B) improving United States laws and reg4 ulations as necessary to prevent any PRC at5 tempts to harm United States economic competi6 tiveness; 

7 (7) to demonstrate the value of private sector-led 

8 growth in emerging markets around the world, in9 cluding through the use of United States Government 

10 tools that— 

11 (A) support greater private sector invest12 ment and advance capacity-building initiatives 

13 that are grounded in the rule of law; 

14 (B) promote open markets; 

15 (C) establish clear policy and regulatory 

16 frameworks; 

17 (D) improve the management of key eco18 nomic sectors; 

19 (E) combat corruption; 

20 (F) foster and support greater collaboration 

21 with and among partner countries and the 

22 United States private sector to develop secure 

23 and sustainable infrastructure; and 

24 (G) support American workers and create 

25 American jobs; 


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1 (8) to play a leading role in advancing inter2 national rules and norms that foster free and recip3 rocal trade and open and integrated markets; 

4 (9) to conduct vigorous commercial diplomacy in 

5 support of United States companies and businesses in 

6 partner countries that seek fair competition; 

7 (10) to ensure that the United States is second 

8 to none in the innovation of critical and emerging 

9 technologies, such as next-generation telecommuni10 cations, artificial intelligence, quantum computing, 

11 semiconductors, and biotechnology, by— 

12 (A) providing necessary investment and 

13 concrete incentives for the private sector to accel14 erate development of such technologies; 

15 (B) modernizing export controls and invest16 ment screening regimes and associated policies 

17 and regulations; 

18 (C) enhancing the role of the United States 

19 in technical standards-setting bodies and avenues 

20 for developing norms regarding the use of emerg21 ing critical technologies; 

22 (D) reducing United States barriers and in23 creasing incentives for collaboration with allies 

24 and partners on the research and co-development 

25 of critical technologies; 


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1 (E) collaborating with allies and partners 

2 to protect critical technologies by— 

3 (i) coordinating and aligning export 

4 control measures; 

5 (ii) building capacity for defense tech6 nology security; 

7 (iii) safeguarding chokepoints in stra8 tegically critical supply chains; and 

9 (iv) ensuring diversification; and 

10 (F) designing major defense capabilities for 

11 export to vetted allies and partners; 

12 (11) to collaborate with like-minded democracies 

13 and other willing partners to promote ideals and 

14 principles that— 

15 (A) advance a free and open international 

16 order; 

17 (B) strengthen democratic institutions; 

18 (C) protect and promote human rights; and 

19 (D) uphold a free press and fact-based re20 porting; 

21 (12) to develop comprehensive strategies and 

22 policies to counter PRC disinformation campaigns; 

23 (13) to demonstrate effective leadership at the 

24 United Nations, its associated agencies, and other 

25 multilateral organizations and ensure the integrity 


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1 and effectiveness of these organizations in facilitating 

2 solutions to global challenges; 

3 (14) to advocate for the defense of fundamental 

4 freedoms and human rights in the United States rela5 tionship with the PRC; 

6 (15) to cooperate with allies, partners, and mul7 tilateral organizations that sustain and strengthen a 

8 free and open order and address regional and global 

9 challenges posed by the Government of the PRC re10 garding— 

11 (A) violations and abuses of human rights; 

12 (B) restrictions on religious practices; and 

13 (C) the undermining and abrogation of 

14 treaties, other international agreements, and 

15 other international norms related to human 

16 rights; 

17 (16) to expose the PRC’s use of corruption, re18 pression, and coercion to attain unfair economic ad19 vantages or compel other nations to defer to its polit20 ical and strategic objectives in ways that threaten the 

21 United States or its allies and partners; 

22 (17) to maintain United States access to the 

23 Western Pacific, including through necessary invest24 ments in United States military capabilities, policies, 

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1 operation, exercises, and interoperability with allies 

2 and partners; 

3 (18) to deter the PRC from— 

4 (A) initiating armed conflict; 

5 (B) coercing nations; or 

6 (C) using grey-zone tactics below the level of 

7 armed conflict; 

8 (19) to strengthen United States-PRC military9 to-military communication and improve both mili10 tary and civilian crisis avoidance and management 

11 procedures to de-conflict operations and reduce the 

12 risk of unwanted conflict, including through high-level 

13 visits and recurrent exchanges between civilian and 

14 military officials and other measures, in alignment 

15 with United States interests; and 

16 (20) to strengthen stability and reduce sus17 picions, cooperate with the PRC when interests align, 

18 including through bilateral or multilateral means and 

19 at the United Nations, as appropriate, and especially 

20 in the following areas— 

21 (A) global fight against climate change; 

22 (B) nuclear security; and 

23 (C) global financial stability. 


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1 SEC. 5. SENSE OF CONGRESS. 

2 It is the sense of Congress that the execution of the pol3 icy described in section 3(b) requires the following actions: 

4 (1) Revitalizing American leadership globally 

5 and in the Indo-Pacific will require the United 

6 States— 

7 (A) to marshal sustained political will to 

8 protect its vital interests, promote its values, and 

9 advance its economic and national security ob10 jectives; and 

11 (B) to achieve this sustained political will, 

12 persuade the American people and United States 

13 allies and partners of— 

14 (i) the current challenges facing the 

15 international rules based order; and 

16 (ii) the need for long-term investments 

17 and engagement to defend shared interests 

18 and values. 

19 (2) The United States must coordinate closely 

20 with allies and partners to compete effectively with 

21 the PRC, including to encourage allies and partners 

22 to assume, as appropriate, greater roles in balancing 

23 and checking aggressive PRC behavior. 

24 (3) Effective United States strategy toward 

25 China requires— 


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1 (A) bipartisan cooperation within Congress; 

2 and 

3 (B) frequent, sustained, and meaningful col4 laboration and consultation between the executive 

5 branch and Congress. 

6 (4) The United States must ensure close integra7 tion among economic and foreign policymakers and 

8 provide support to the private sector, civil society, 

9 universities and academic institutions, and other rel10 evant actors in free and open societies to enable such 

11 actors— 

12 (A) to collaborate to advance common inter13 ests; and 

14 (B) to identify appropriate policies— 

15 (i) to strengthen the United States and 

16 its allies; and 

17 (ii) to promote a compelling vision of 

18 a free and open order. 

19 (5) The United States must ensure that all Fed20 eral departments, agencies, and overseas missions are 

21 organized and resourced to effectively defend and ad22 vance United States interests, by— 

23 (A) dedicating more personnel in the Indo24 Pacific region, at posts around the world, and in 

25 Washington, DC; 


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1 (B) placing greater numbers of foreign serv2 ice officers, international development profes3 sionals, members of the foreign commercial serv4 ice, intelligence professionals, and other United 

5 States Government personnel in the Indo-Pacific 

6 region; and 

7 (C) ensuring that this workforce has the 

8 training, demonstrated proficiency in language 

9 and culture, technical skills, and other com10 petencies required to advance a successful strat11 egy in relation to the PRC. 

12 (6) The United States must place renewed pri13 ority and emphasis on strengthening the nonmilitary 

14 instruments of national power, including diplomacy, 

15 information, technology, economics, foreign assistance 

16 and development finance, commerce, intelligence, and 

17 law enforcement, which are crucial for addressing the 

18 challenges posed by the PRC. 

19 (7) The United States must sustain military ca20 pabilities necessary to achieve United States political 

21 objectives in the Indo-Pacific, including— 

22 (A) promoting regional security in the 

23 Indo-Pacific; 

24 (B) reassuring allies and partners while 

25 protecting them from coercion; and 


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1 (C) deterring PRC aggression and pre2 venting unwanted conflict. 

3 (8) Competition with the PRC requires skillful 

4 adaptation to the information environment of the 21st 

5 century. United States public diplomacy and mes6 saging efforts must effectively— 

7 (A) promote the value of partnership with 

8 the United States; and 

9 (B) counter CCP propaganda and 

10 disinformation that threatens United States in11 terests. 

12 SEC. 6. RULES OF CONSTRUCTION. 

13 (a) APPLICABILITY OF EXISTING RESTRICTIONS ON

14 ASSISTANCE TO FOREIGN SECURITY FORCES.—Nothing in 

15 this Act shall be construed to diminish, supplant, supersede, 

16 or otherwise restrict or prevent responsibilities of the United 

17 States Government under section 620M of the Foreign As18 sistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2378d) or section 362 of 

19 title 10, United States Code. 

20 (b) NO AUTHORIZATION FOR THE USE OF MILITARY

21 FORCE.—Nothing in this Act may be construed as author22 izing the use of military force. 


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1 TITLE I—INVESTING IN 

2 AMERICAN COMPETITIVENESS 

3 Subtitle A—Science and Technology 

4 SEC. 101. AUTHORIZATION TO ASSIST UNITED STATES COM5 PANIES WITH GLOBAL SUPPLY CHAIN DIVER6 SIFICATION AND MANAGEMENT. 

7 (a) AUTHORIZATION TO CONTRACT SERVICES.—The 

8 Secretary of State, in coordination with the Secretary of 

9 Commerce, is authorized to establish a program to facilitate 

10 the contracting by the Department of State for the profes11 sional services of qualified experts, on a reimbursable fee 

12 for service basis, to assist interested United States persons 

13 and business entities with supply chain management issues 

14 related to the People’s Republic of China (PRC), includ15 ing— 

16 (1) exiting from the PRC market or relocating 

17 certain production facilities to locations outside the 

18 PRC; 

19 (2) diversifying sources of inputs, and other ef20 forts to diversify supply chains to locations outside of 

21 the PRC; 

22 (3) navigating legal, regulatory, or other chal23 lenges in the course of the activities described in para24 graphs (1) and (2); and 


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1 (4) identifying alternative markets for produc2 tion or sourcing outside of the PRC, including 

3 through providing market intelligence, facilitating 

4 contact with reliable local partners as appropriate, 

5 and other services. 

6 (b) CHIEF OF MISSION OVERSIGHT.—The persons con7 tracted to perform the services described in subsection (a) 

8 shall— 

9 (1) be under the authority of the United States 

10 Chief of Mission in the country in which they are 

11 hired, in accordance with existing United States laws; 

12 (2) coordinate with Department of State and De13 partment of Commerce officers; and 

14 (3) coordinate with United States missions and 

15 relevant local partners in other countries as needed to 

16 carry out the services described in subsection (a). 

17 (c) PRIORITIZATION OF MICRO-, SMALL-, AND ME18 DIUM-SIZED ENTERPRISES.—The services described in sub19 section (a) shall be prioritized for assisting micro-, small20 , and medium-sized enterprises with regard to the matters 

21 described in subsection (a). 

22 (d) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—There is 

23 authorized to be appropriated $15,000,000 for each of fiscal 

24 years 2022 through 2026 for the purposes of carrying out 

25 this section. 


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1 (e) PROHIBITION ON ACCESS TO ASSISTANCE BY FOR2 EIGN ADVERSARIES.—None of the funds appropriated pur3 suant to this section may be provided to an entity— 

4 (1) under the foreign ownership, control, or in5 fluence of the Government of the PRC or the CCP, or 

6 other foreign adversary; 

7 (2) determined to have beneficial ownership from 

8 foreign individuals subject to the jurisdiction, direc9 tion, or influence of foreign adversaries; and 

10 (3) that has any contract in effect at the time of 

11 the receipt of such funds, or has had a contract with12 in the previous one year that is no longer in effect, 

13 with— 

14 (A) the Government of the PRC; 

15 (B) the CCP; 

16 (C) the PLA; 

17 (D) an entity majority-owned, majority18 controlled, or majority-financed by the Govern19 ment of the PRC, the CCP, or the PLA; or 

20 (E) a parent, subsidiary, or affiliate of an 

21 entity described in subparagraph (D). 

22 (f) DEFINITIONS.—The terms ‘‘foreign ownership, con23 trol, or influence’’ and ‘‘FOCI’’ have the meanings given 

24 to those terms in the National Industrial Security Program 


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1 Operating Manual (DOD 5220.22–M), or a successor docu2 ment. 

3 SEC. 102. REPORT ON NATIONAL TECHNOLOGY AND INDUS4 TRIAL BASE. 

5 (a) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Congress 

6 that— 

7 (1) a more streamlined, shared, and coordinated 

8 approach, which leverages economies of scale with 

9 major allies, is necessary for the United States to re10 tain its lead in defense technology; 

11 (2) allowing for the export, re-export, or transfer 

12 of defense-related technologies and services to members 

13 of the national technology and industrial base (as de14 fined in section 2500 of title 10, United States Code) 

15 would advance United States security interests by 

16 helping to leverage the defense-related technologies and 

17 skilled workforces of trusted allies to reduce the de18 pendence on other countries, including countries that 

19 pose challenges to United States interests around the 

20 world, for defense-related innovation and investment; 

21 and 

22 (3) it is in the interest of the United States to 

23 continue to increase cooperation with Australia, Can24 ada, and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and 

25 Northern Ireland to protect critical defense-related 


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1 technology and services and leverage the investments 

2 of like-minded, major ally nations in order to maxi3 mize the strategic edge afforded by defense technology 

4 innovation. 

5 (b) REPORT.— 

6 (1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 90 days after 

7 the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of 

8 State shall submit a report to the appropriate con9 gressional committees that— 

10 (A) describes the Department of State’s ef11 forts to facilitate access among the national tech12 nology and industrial base to defense articles 

13 and services subject to the United States Muni14 tions List under section 38(a)(1) of the Arms 

15 Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2778(a)(1)); and 

16 (B) identifies foreign legal, regulatory, for17 eign policy, or other challenges or considerations 

18 that prevent or frustrate these efforts, to include 

19 any gaps in the respective export control regimes 

20 implemented by United Kingdom of Great Brit21 ain and Northern Ireland, Australia, or Canada. 

22 (2) FORM.—This report required under para23 graph (1) shall be unclassified, but may include a 

24 classified annex. 


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1 Subtitle B—Global Infrastructure 

2 and Energy Development 

3 SEC. 111. APPROPRIATE COMMITTEES OF CONGRESS DE4 FINED. 

5 In this subtitle, the term ‘‘appropriate committees of 

6 Congress’’ means— 

7 (1) the Committee on Foreign Relations and the 

8 Committee on Appropriations of the Senate; and 

9 (2) the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the 

10 Committee on Appropriations of the House of Rep11 resentatives. 

12 SEC. 112. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON INTERNATIONAL QUAL13 ITY INFRASTRUCTURE INVESTMENT STAND14 ARDS. 

15 (a) SENSE OF CONGRESS ON COLLABORATIVE STAND16 ARDS.—It is the sense of Congress that the United States 

17 should initiate collaboration among governments, the pri18 vate sector, and civil society to encourage the adoption of 

19 the standards for quality global infrastructure development 

20 advanced by the G20 at Osaka in 2018, including with re21 spect to the following issues: 

22 (1) Respect for the sovereignty of countries in 

23 which infrastructure investments are made. 

24 (2) Anti-corruption. 

25 (3) Rule of law. 


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1 (4) Human rights and labor rights. 

2 (5) Fiscal and debt sustainability. 

3 (6) Social and governance safeguards. 

4 (7) Transparency. 

5 (8) Environmental and energy standards. 

6 (b) SENSE OF CONGRESS ON COMMITMENT TO CO7 OPERATION.—It is the sense of Congress that the United 

8 States should launch a series of fora around the world show9 casing the commitment of the United States and partners 

10 of the United States to high-quality development coopera11 tion, including with respect to the issues described in sub12 section (a). 

13 SEC. 113. SUPPORTING ECONOMIC INDEPENDENCE FROM 

14 THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA. 

15 (a) FINDING.—It is in the national interest of the 

16 United States to establish a coordinated interagency strat17 egy to marshal the resources of the United States Govern18 ment to provide foreign countries with financing that 

19 strengthens independent economic capacity and therefore 

20 reduces a foreign government’s need to enter into agree21 ments with the People’s Republic of China (PRC), includ22 ing to obtain support from its Belt and Road Initiative. 

23 (b) STRATEGY.— 

24 (1) AUTHORITY.—Not later than 180 days after 

25 the date of the enactment of this Act, the President 


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1 shall develop and submit a strategy to the relevant 

2 congressional committees to use the resources of Fed3 eral agencies to counteract offers of assistance and fi4 nancing from the PRC to foreign governments that 

5 are of strategic importance to the United States. 

6 (2) COMPONENTS OF STRATEGY.—The strategy 

7 shall— 

8 (A) identify primary sectors where the 

9 United States could provide a competitive ad10 vantage to increase a country’s economic inde11 pendence; 

12 (B) select countries with corresponding eco13 nomic needs, with priority given to those who 

14 are vulnerable to Chinese economic influence; 

15 (C) identify any corresponding existing fi16 nancing available from United States Govern17 ment entities to prioritize and devise specific fi18 nancing tailored to the needs of such foreign gov19 ernments if none are currently available; 

20 (D) identify any cooperative and com21 plementary assistance and financing from 

22 friendly foreign governments, including coordi23 nated assistance and co-financing; 

24 (E) create a streamlined decision-making 

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1 cil, to devise financing and make agency deci2 sions and commitments on a timely basis to sup3 port United States competitive offers; 

4 (F) establish a formal G7+European Com5 mission Working Group to develop a comprehen6 sive strategy to develop alternatives to the PRC’s 

7 Belt and Road Initiative for development fi8 nance; and 

9 (G) integrate existing efforts into the strat10 egy, including efforts to address the Government 

11 of the PRC’s use of the United Nations to ad12 vance the Belt and Road Initiative, including 

13 the proliferation of memoranda of understanding 

14 between the PRC and United Nations funds and 

15 programs regarding the implementation of the 

16 Belt and Road Initiative. 

17 (3) PARTICIPATING AGENCIES.—Participating 

18 Federal agencies should include the Department of 

19 State, Department of the Treasury, United States 

20 Agency for International Development (USAID), 

21 United States International Development Finance 

22 Corporation, Millennium Challenge Corporation, 

23 United States Trade and Development Agency, De24 partment of Commerce, and other Federal depart25 ments and agencies as appropriate. 


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1 (4) EXECUTION OF STRATEGY.—The President 

2 should issue an Executive Order to implement the 

3 strategy and make such changes in agency regulations 

4 and procedures as are necessary to put the strategy 

5 into effect. 

6 (5) RELEVANT CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES.— 

7 In this section, the term ‘‘relevant congressional com8 mittees’’ means— 

9 (A) the Committee on Appropriations, the 

10 Committee on Foreign Affairs, and the Com11 mittee on Financial Services of the House of 

12 Representatives; and 

13 (B) the Committee on Appropriations, the 

14 Committee on Foreign Relations, and the Com15 mittee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs 

16 of the Senate. 

17 (c) AUTHORITY.—The Secretary of State, in coordina18 tion with the Administrator of the USAID, is authorized 

19 to establish or continue an initiative, to be known as the 

20 ‘‘Infrastructure Transaction and Assistance Network’’, 

21 under which the Secretary of State, in consultation with 

22 other relevant Federal agencies, including those represented 

23 on the Global Infrastructure Coordinating Committee, may 

24 carry out various programs to advance the development of 


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1 sustainable, transparent, and high-quality infrastructure 

2 worldwide in the Indo-Pacific region by— 

3 (1) strengthening capacity-building programs to 

4 improve project evaluation processes, regulatory and 

5 procurement environments, and project preparation 

6 capacity of countries that are partners of the United 

7 States in such development; 

8 (2) providing transaction advisory services and 

9 project preparation assistance to support sustainable 

10 infrastructure; and 

11 (3) coordinating the provision of United States 

12 assistance for the development of infrastructure, in13 cluding infrastructure that uses United States manu14 factured goods and services, and catalyzing invest15 ment led by the private sector. 

16 (d) TRANSACTION ADVISORY FUND.—As part of the 

17 ‘‘Infrastructure Transaction and Assistance Network’’ de18 scribed under subsection (c), the Secretary of State is au19 thorized to provide support, including through the Trans20 action Advisory Fund, for advisory services to help boost 

21 the capacity of partner countries to evaluate contracts and 

22 assess the financial and environmental impacts of potential 

23 infrastructure projects, including through providing serv24 ices such as— 

25 (1) legal services; 


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1 (2) project preparation and feasibility studies; 

2 (3) debt sustainability analyses; 

3 (4) bid or proposal evaluation; and 

4 (5) other services relevant to advancing the devel5 opment of sustainable, transparent, and high-quality 

6 infrastructure. 

7 (e) STRATEGIC INFRASTRUCTURE FUND.—— 

8 (1) IN GENERAL.—As part of the ‘‘Infrastructure 

9 Transaction and Assistance Network’’ described under 

10 subsection (c), the Secretary of State is authorized to 

11 provide support, including through the Strategic In12 frastructure Fund, for technical assistance, project 

13 preparation, pipeline development, and other infra14 structure project support. 

15 (2) JOINT STRATEGIC INFRASTRUCTURE

16 PROJECTS.—Funds authorized for the Strategic Infra17 structure Fund should be used in coordination with 

18 the Department of Defense, the International Develop19 ment Finance Corporation, like-minded donor part20 ners, and multilateral banks, as appropriate, to sup21 port joint infrastructure projects that are in the na22 tional security interest of the United States and vul23 nerable to strategic competitors. 

24 (f) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—There is 

25 authorized to be appropriated, for each of fiscal years 2022 


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1 to 2026, $75,000,000 to the Infrastructure Transaction and 

2 Assistance Network, of which $20,000,000 should be made 

3 available for the Transaction Advisory Fund. 

4 SEC. 114. STRATEGY FOR ADVANCED AND RELIABLE EN5 ERGY INFRASTRUCTURE. 

6 (a) IN GENERAL.—The President shall direct a com7 prehensive, multi-year, whole of government effort, in con8 sultation with the private sector, to counter predatory lend9 ing and financing, including in the form of providing sup10 port to companies incorporated in the People’s Republic of 

11 China (PRC) that engage in such activities, by the Govern12 ment of the PRC in the energy sectors of developing coun13 tries. 

14 (b) POLICY.—It is the policy of the United States to— 

15 (1) regularly evaluate current and forecasted en16 ergy needs and capacities of developing countries, and 

17 analyze the presence and involvement of PRC state18 owned industries and other companies incorporated 

19 in the PRC, Chinese nationals providing labor, and 

20 financing of energy projects, including direct financ21 ing by the PRC government, PRC financial institu22 tions, or direct state support to state-owned enter23 prises and other companies incorporated in the PRC; 

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1 tor reforms, to expand the development and deploy2 ment of advanced energy technologies in developing 

3 countries; 

4 (3) offer financing, loan guarantees, grants, and 

5 other financial products on terms that advance do6 mestic economic and local employment opportunities, 

7 utilize advanced energy technologies, encourage pri8 vate sector growth, and, when appropriate United 

9 States equity and sovereign lending products as alter10 natives to the predatory lending tools offered by Chi11 nese financial institutions; 

12 (4) pursue partnerships with likeminded inter13 national financial and multilateral institutions to le14 verage investment in advanced energy technologies in 

15 developing countries; and 

16 (5) pursue bilateral partnerships focused on the 

17 cooperative development of advanced energy tech18 nologies with countries of strategic significance, par19 ticularly in the Indo-Pacific region, to address the ef20 fects of energy engagement by the PRC through preda21 tory lending or other actions that negatively impact 

22 other countries. 

23 (c) ADVANCED ENERGY TECHNOLOGIES EXPORTS.— 

24 Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of 

25 this Act, and annually thereafter for 5 years, the Secretary 


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1 of State, in consultation with the Secretary of Energy, shall 

2 submit to the appropriate committees of Congress a United 

3 States Government strategy to increase United States ex4 ports of advanced energy technologies to— 

5 (1) improve energy security in allied and devel6 oping countries; 

7 (2) create open, efficient, rules-based, and trans8 parent energy markets; 

9 (3) improve free, fair, and reciprocal energy 

10 trading relationships; and 

11 (4) expand access to affordable, reliable energy. 

12 SEC. 115. REPORT ON THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA’S 

13 INVESTMENTS IN FOREIGN ENERGY DEVEL14 OPMENT. 

15 (a) IN GENERAL.—No later than 180 days after the 

16 date of the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter 

17 for 5 years, the Secretary of State shall submit to the appro18 priate committees of Congress a report that— 

19 (1) identifies priority countries for deepening 

20 United States engagement on energy matters, in ac21 cordance with the economic and national security in22 terests of the United States and where deeper energy 

23 partnerships are most achievable; 

24 (2) describes the involvement of the Government 

25 of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and compaVerDate Sep 11 2014 21:34 Dec 30, 2022 Jkt 039200 PO 00000 Frm 00050 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6203 E:\BILLS\H3524.RH H3524

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1 nies incorporated in the PRC in the development, op2 eration, financing, or ownership of energy generation 

3 facilities, transmission infrastructure, or energy re4 sources in the countries identified in paragraph (1); 

5 (3) evaluates strategic or security concerns and 

6 implications for United States national interests and 

7 the interests of the countries identified in paragraph 

8 (1), with respect to the PRC’s involvement and influ9 ence in developing country energy production or 

10 transmission; and 

11 (4) outlines current and planned efforts by the 

12 United States to partner with the countries identified 

13 in paragraph (1) on energy matters that support 

14 shared interests between the United States and such 

15 countries. 

16 (b) PUBLICATION.—The assessment required in sub17 section (a) shall be published on the Department of State’s 

18 website. 

19 Subtitle C—Economic Diplomacy 

20 and Leadership 

21 SEC. 121. FINDINGS ON REGIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER. 

22 Congress makes the following findings: 

23 (1) The United States played a leadership role 

24 in constructing the architecture, rules, and norms 

25 governing the international economic order following 


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1 the Second World War, yielding decades of domestic 

2 economic and geopolitical prosperity and stability. 

3 (2) In 2017, the United States withdrew from 

4 the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), an economic 

5 pact that was negotiated by 12 countries that covered 

6 40 percent of the world economy, leading the 11 re7 maining Asia-Pacific countries to sign the Com8 prehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pa9 cific Partnership (CPTPP) the following year, setting 

10 high-standard rules for regional economic engage11 ment. 

12 (3) In 2020, the 10 countries of the Association 

13 of Southeast Asian Nations along with South Korea, 

14 China, Japan, Australia, and New Zealand signed 

15 the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership 

16 (RCEP), the world’s biggest trade deal in terms of 

17 GDP. 

18 (4) Reduced United States economic engagement 

19 has led United States allies and partners to question 

20 the United States’ commitment to the Indo-Pacific re21 gion. Despite its distortive and unfair trade practices, 

22 the People’s Republic of China is taking advantage of 

23 this vacuum by deepening its partnerships in the re24 gion and promoting its own state-led economic model. 


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1 (5) The United States is increasingly on the out2 side looking in with regards to economic pacts in the 

3 Indo-Pacific. United States absence from these agree4 ments puts it at both a strategic and competitive dis5 advantage in the region and allows competitors to ex6 pand their economic influence at the United States’ 

7 expense. 

8 (6) Given that these partnerships and agree9 ments will define the rules and norms that will gov10 ern regional commerce over the coming decades, the 

11 United States is currently not well positioned to 

12 shape the coming economic landscape. 

13 (7) It is in the United States’ vital interest to 

14 upgrade its economic engagement and leadership in 

15 the Indo-Pacific and develop concrete steps to 

16 strengthen its commercial diplomacy to fully par17 ticiple in the region’s economic dynamism. 

18 SEC. 122. REVIEW OF TRADE AND ECONOMIC ENGAGEMENT 

19 GLOBALLY OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF 

20 CHINA. 

21 (a) REPORT.—Not later than 180 days after the date 

22 of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, in co23 ordination with the United States Trade Representative 

24 and the Secretary of Commerce, shall submit a report to 

25 the appropriate congressional committees that describes the 


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1 global trade and investment diplomacy and engagement of 

2 the People’s Republic of China (PRC) over the past decade, 

3 including any bilateral or plurilateral trade and invest4 ment agreements it has signed, and their impact on the 

5 United States economy, American companies and workers, 

6 as well as on the countries that have entered into agree7 ments with the PRC and the global economy as a whole. 

8 (b) MATTERS TO BE INCLUDED.—The report shall in9 clude the following: 

10 (1) A survey and comparison of the PRC’s inter11 national economic practices, which will— 

12 (A) provide an overview of the PRC’s dis13 tortive trade policies; 

14 (B) list the PRC’s trade and investment 

15 agreements globally, both agreements it has 

16 signed or entered into and any ongoing negotia17 tions it has with individual countries or groups 

18 of countries; 

19 (C) detail the other mechanisms the PRC 

20 uses to advance its international economic objec21 tives, including economic and commercial dia22 logues and BRI related activities; 

23 (D) compare the United States and Chinese 

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1 ment with major global economies, United States 

2 allies, and for each region of the world; and 

3 (E) outline what further steps the PRC may 

4 take in the Indo-Pacific region to bolster its eco5 nomic position and influence. 

6 (2) An evaluation of the impacts of the PRC’s 

7 trade and investment policies, including— 

8 (A) the impact of these trade and invest9 ment agreements on the PRC’s economy, with a 

10 focus on its trade and investment profile, the im11 pact on the PRC’s economic growth and per-cap12 ita income, and the impact on the profitability 

13 and market share of Chinese companies and 

14 SOEs; 

15 (B) the impact of these agreements on the 

16 PRC’s political and diplomatic relations with 

17 the countries it entered into agreements with and 

18 by region; and 

19 (C) the impact of the PRC’s trade and in20 vestment relationships with other countries on 

21 the market share of United States companies. 

22 SEC. 123. REPORT ON ENTRENCHING AMERICAN ECONOMIC 

23 DIPLOMACY IN THE INDO-PACIFIC. 

24 (a) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Congress 

25 that United States national interests and the primacy of 


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1 United States power in the Indo-Pacific are intimately tied 

2 to the following economic objectives: 

3 (1) Deepening United States trade and invest4 ment relationships in the region, especially with key 

5 allies and partners. 

6 (2) Confirming American leadership and par7 ticipation in global regional economic organizations 

8 and fora, including the Asia-Pacific Economic Co9 operation (APEC) and the World Trade Organization 

10 (WTO). 

11 (3) Leveraging bilateral and plurilateral sectoral 

12 agreements on trade and investment, as well as nego13 tiations at the WTO to reassert United States eco14 nomic leadership by writing the rules of the road on 

15 critical economic questions. 

16 (4) Building secure and resilient supply chains 

17 for industries critical for United States national in18 terest, including semiconductors, vaccines, and per19 sonal protective equipment. 

20 (5) Showcasing the benefits and appeal of a 

21 market-based economic model. 

22 (b) REPORTING.—Not later than 180 days after the 

23 date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, 

24 in coordination with the United States Trade Representa25 tive and the Secretary of Commerce, shall submit a report 


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1 to the appropriate committees of Congress that presents the 

2 steps the United States is taking and plans to take to 

3 achieve the objectives outlined in subsection (a) and in4 cludes specific action plans for the following: 

5 (1) Enhancing United States trade and invest6 ment relationships in the region bilaterally and 

7 plurilaterally, especially with United States allies 

8 and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations. 

9 (2) Reenergizing APEC as a critical component 

10 of the region’s economic architecture. 

11 (3) Work to ensure that the United States ab12 sence from the Comprehensive and Progressive Agree13 ment for Trans-Pacific Partnership and the Regional 

14 Comprehensive Economic Partnership do not under15 mine the United States’ ability to shape regional 

16 trade and investment rules. 

17 (4) Working with allies and partners to build re18 silient and trusted supply chains especially for crit19 ical and emerging technologies, including semiconduc20 tors, and products and components critical for na21 tional health, including vaccines and related mate22 rials and personal protective equipment. 

23 (5) Driving the formation and adoption of high24 standards and rules for the region in the following 

25 areas: 


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1 (A) Advanced technologies and the digital 

2 sphere. 

3 (B) Labor practices and environmental 

4 standards. 

5 (C) Intellectual property rights. 

6 (6) Developing roadmaps for how to counter the 

7 PRC’s unfair trade and economic practices, with a 

8 specific focus on— 

9 (A) subsidies and unfair competition by 

10 state-owned enterprises; and 

11 (B) corruption and politicized infrastruc12 ture. 

13 (c) APPROPRIATE COMMITTEES OF CONGRESS DE14 FINED.—In this section, the term ‘‘appropriate committees 

15 of Congress’’ means— 

16 (1) the Committee on Foreign Relations and the 

17 Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs; 

18 and 

19 (2) the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the 

20 Committee on Energy and Commerce. 

21 SEC. 124. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON THE NEED TO BOLSTER 

22 AMERICAN LEADERSHIP IN THE ASIA PACIFIC 

23 ECONOMIC COOPERATION. 

24 It is the sense of Congress that— 


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1 (1) the United States has benefitted from the re2 gional economic integration agenda of the Asia Pa3 cific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum since its 

4 inception in 1989; 

5 (2) APEC is a hub of trade and commerce for 

6 21 member economies that, as of 2018, accounted for 

7 60 percent of global GDP and 48 percent of global 

8 trade; 

9 (3) APEC has contributed to the reduction in 

10 trade barriers, harmonization of regulations, and en11 hanced access to global value chains, while raising the 

12 profile of critical topics such as fair trade, sustain13 ability, gender parity, and inclusive growth; 

14 (4) it is in the United States interest to engage 

15 and lead at APEC to push for an open and inclusive 

16 regional economy that benefits United States workers, 

17 consumers, and businesses and better integrates the 

18 United States economy with others in the region; 

19 (5) when the United States last hosted APEC in 

20 2011, it was able to promote United States interests, 

21 while reassuring allies and partners about its strong 

22 commitment to the region in the economic arena; 

23 (6) today, APEC can again be used as a forum 

24 to make progress on several United States priorities, 


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1 that are shared by United States allies and partners, 

2 including— 

3 (A) making regional commerce more inclu4 sive; 

5 (B) fostering innovation and digitization; 

6 and 

7 (C) addressing climate change and environ8 mental protection; 

9 (7) hosting APEC would provide a tremendous 

10 opportunity to leverage American leadership to shape 

11 the regional economic agenda; 

12 (8) hosting APEC would allow the United States 

13 to advance several of its own priorities in the region, 

14 including to— 

15 (A) expand the participation of APEC 

16 stakeholders to include labor groups, environ17 mental advocates, and other part of civil society; 

18 (B) upgrade APEC’s work to empower and 

19 promote small and medium enterprises; 

20 (C) spotlight best practices and plans to up21 grade skills for the next-generation of technology 

22 jobs; 

23 (D) advance a climate and sustainable 

24 trade and development agenda with a focus on 


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1 green technologies, infrastructure and finance; 

2 and 

3 (E) advance work on digital trade, includ4 ing by expanding rules on data privacy, pro5 moting digital inclusiveness and promoting the 

6 free flow of data; and 

7 (9) with no host confirmed for 2023, the United 

8 States should immediately announce its interest to 

9 host APEC in 2023 and work with the APEC Secre10 tariat and like-minded APEC members to build sup11 port. 

12 SEC. 125. STRATEGY ON DETERRENCE OF ECONOMIC COER13 CION. 

14 (a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 1 year after the date 

15 of the enactment of this Act, the President shall submit to 

16 the appropriate congressional committees a whole-of-govern17 ment strategy to deter Chinese economic coercion against 

18 third countries that includes the following: 

19 (1) An explanation of the means available to the 

20 United States, with the cooperation of allies, to enable 

21 a country with a smaller economy to withstand such 

22 coercion. 

23 (2) A description of the role that the Secretary 

24 of State, acting through the Under Secretary of State 

25 for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs, will play in 


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1 the imposition of reputational costs on the PRC for 

2 conducting economic coercion. 

3 (3) Role clarity for the Secretary of State, the 

4 Administrator of the United States Agency for Inter5 national Development, the Secretary of Defense, the 

6 head of each element of the intelligence community 

7 (as such term is defined by section 3 of the National 

8 Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3003)), the Secretary 

9 of the Treasury, the Secretary of Commerce, the 

10 United States Trade Representative, and the United 

11 States International Development Finance Corpora12 tion in implementing such strategy. 

13 (b) UPDATE.—Not later than 2 years after the date 

14 of the submission of the strategy under subsection (a), and 

15 every 2 years thereafter for 8 years, the President shall sub16 mit to the appropriate congressional committees an assess17 ment of the implementation and effectiveness of the strategy, 

18 lessons learned from the past year, and planned changes 

19 to the strategy. 

20 (c) FORM.—The strategy and update required by sub21 sections (a) and (b), respectively, shall be submitted in clas22 sified form with an unclassified summary. 

23 (d) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES DE24 FINED.—In this section, the term ‘‘appropriate congres25 sional committees’’ means— 


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1 (1) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Com2 mittee on Energy and Commerce, and the Committee 

3 on Ways and Means of the House of Representatives; 

4 and 

5 (2) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the 

6 Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transpor7 tation, and the Committee on Banking, Housing, and 

8 Urban Affairs of the Senate. 

9 SEC. 126. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON DIGITAL TECHNOLOGY 

10 ISSUES. 

11 (a) LEADERSHIP IN INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS SET12 TING.—It is the sense of Congress that the United States 

13 must lead in international bodies that set the governance 

14 norms and rules for critical digitally enabled technologies 

15 in order to ensure that these technologies operate within a 

16 free, secure, interoperable, and stable digital domain. 

17 (b) COUNTERING DIGITAL AUTHORITARIANISM.—It is 

18 the sense of Congress that the United States, along with al19 lies and partners, should lead an international effort that 

20 uses all of the economic and diplomatic tools at its disposal 

21 to combat the expanding use of information and commu22 nications technology products and services to surveil, re23 press, and manipulate populations (also known as ‘‘digital 

24 authoritarianism’’). 


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1 (c) FREEDOM OF INFORMATION IN THE DIGITAL

2 AGE.—It is the sense of Congress that the United States 

3 should lead a global effort to ensure that freedom of infor4 mation, including the ability to safely consume or publish 

5 information without fear of undue reprisals, is maintained 

6 as the digital domain becomes an increasingly integral 

7 mechanism for communication. 

8 (d) EFFORTS TO ENSURE TECHNOLOGICAL DEVELOP9 MENT DOES NOT THREATEN DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE OR

10 HUMAN RIGHTS.—It is the sense of Congress that the 

11 United States should lead a global effort to develop and 

12 adopt a set of common principles and standards for critical 

13 technologies to ensure that the use of such technologies can14 not be abused by malign actors, whether they are govern15 ments or other entities, and that they do not threaten demo16 cratic governance or human rights. 

17 SEC. 127. DIGITAL TRADE AGREEMENTS. 

18 It is the sense of Congress that— 

19 (1) as the COVID–19 pandemic accelerated 

20 United States dependence on digital tools, inter21 national rules around digital governance and trade 

22 have remained largely piecemeal; 

23 (2) the People’s Republic of China is operating 

24 under and advancing a set of digital rules that are 


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1 contrary to United States values and interests, and 

2 those of United States allies and partners; 

3 (3) a patchwork of plurilateral, trilateral, and 

4 bilateral digital trade agreements, including the Com5 prehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pa6 cific Partnership, the Singapore-Australia Digital 

7 Trade Agreement, and the Singapore-New Zealand8 Chile Digital Economy Partnership Agreement have 

9 emerged, creating a set of rules that the United States 

10 should be driving; 

11 (4) the United States has already underscored 

12 the need for such agreements by signing the U.S.- 

13 Japan Digital Trade Agreement in October 2019 and 

14 including a robust digital trade or e-commerce chap15 ter in the United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement; 

16 (5) a regional deal on digital governance and 

17 trade would allow the United States to unite a group 

18 of like-minded economies around common standards 

19 and norms, including the principles of openness, in20 clusiveness, fairness, transparency, and the free flow 

21 of data with trust, that are increasingly vital for the 

22 global economy; 

23 (6) such an agreement would facilitate the cre24 ation of common rules and standards that govern 

25 cross-border data flows, the protection of privacy, and 


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1 cybersecurity at a time of growing digital 

2 vulnerabilities for individuals, businesses, and insti3 tutions around the world; 

4 (7) such an agreement would facilitate the par5 ticipation of small and medium-sized enterprises in 

6 the global economy through trade facilitation meas7 ures, including e-marketing, e-invoicing and e-pay8 ment; and 

9 (8) the United States Trade Representative, in 

10 consultation with the Secretary of State should nego11 tiate bilateral and plurilateral agreements or ar12 rangements relating to digital trade with the like13 minded countries in the Indo-Pacific region, the Eu14 ropean Union, the member countries of the Five Eyes 

15 intelligence-sharing alliance, and other partners and 

16 allies, as appropriate. 

17 SEC. 128. DIGITAL CONNECTIVITY AND CYBERSECURITY 

18 PARTNERSHIP. 

19 (a) DIGITAL CONNECTIVITY AND CYBERSECURITY

20 PARTNERSHIP.—The President is authorized to establish a 

21 program, to be known as the ‘‘Digital Connectivity and Cy22 bersecurity Partnership’’ to help foreign countries— 

23 (1) expand and increase secure Internet access 

24 and digital infrastructure; 


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1 (2) adopt policies and regulatory positions that 

2 foster and encourage open, interoperable, reliable, and 

3 secure internet, equitable access, the free flow of data, 

4 multi-stakeholder models of internet governance, and 

5 pro-competitive and secure information and commu6 nications technology (ICT) policies and regulations; 

7 (3) promote and protect human rights and 

8 counter corruption and predatory behavior through9 out communications and cybersecurity policy and im10 plementation; 

11 (4) guard against privacy abuses, cybercrime, 

12 disinformation and misinformation, and the use of 

13 digital technology and services to carry out criminal 

14 activity or human rights violations; 

15 (5) bolster the role of civil society in informing 

16 ICT policy and regulations; 

17 (6) promote exports of United States ICT goods 

18 and services and increase United States company 

19 market share in target markets; 

20 (7) promote the innovation and diversification of 

21 ICT goods and supply chain services to be less reliant 

22 on imports from the People’s Republic of China; 

23 (8) build cybersecurity capacity, expand inter24 operability, and promote best practices for a national 

25 approach to cybersecurity; and 


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1 (9) enhance the security of their digital infra2 structure to facilitate better information sharing with 

3 the United States and United States allies and part4 ners, as appropriate. 

5 (b) IMPLEMENTATION PLAN.—Not later than 180 days 

6 after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary 

7 of State and the Administrator of the United States Agency 

8 for International Development shall jointly submit to the 

9 appropriate congressional committees an implementation 

10 plan for the 3-year period beginning on the date of the sub11 mission of the plan to advance the goals identified in sub12 section (a). The implementation plan shall also include a 

13 description of interagency responsibilities to carry out im14 plementation, a description of any barriers to successful im15 plementation, and a description of any additional resources 

16 or authorities needed for successful implementation. 

17 (c) CONSULTATION.—In developing the implementa18 tion plan required by subsection (b), the Secretary of State 

19 and the Administrator of the United States Agency for 

20 International Development shall consult with— 

21 (1) the appropriate congressional committees; 

22 (2) leaders of the United States industry; 

23 (3) civil society leaders with expertise in tech24 nology, telecommunications, cybersecurity, economic 


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1 development and competitiveness, and human rights, 

2 including from the Open Technology Fund; 

3 (4) representatives from relevant United States 

4 Government agencies; and 

5 (5) representatives from like-minded allies and 

6 partners. 

7 (d) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—There is 

8 authorized to be appropriated such sums as necessary for 

9 each of fiscal years 2022 through 2026 to carry out this 

10 section. 

11 SEC. 129. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON IDEOLOGICAL COMPETI12 TION. 

13 It is the sense of Congress that National Security Advi14 sor Jake Sullivan correctly observed that the United States 

15 and likeminded democracies are in an ideological competi16 tion with the People’s Republic of China, under the direc17 tion and control of the Chinese Communist Party, when he 

18 stated, ‘‘China is essentially making the case that the Chi19 nese model is better than the American model. . . This is 

20 not any longer some kind of implied contrast. It is an ex21 plicit statement that there is an alternative model to the 

22 democratic market economy model that the United States 

23 has been advancing over the course of decades.’’. 


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1 Subtitle D—Financial Diplomacy 

2 and Leadership 

3 SEC. 131. FINDINGS ON CHINESE FINANCIAL INDUSTRIAL 

4 POLICY. 

5 Congress makes the following findings: 

6 (1) The People’s Republic of China operates a 

7 system of state-owned financial institutions including 

8 retail banks, investment banks, asset managers, and 

9 insurers which are given favorable treatment under 

10 Chinese law while foreign financial institutions have 

11 strict restrictions on their ability to operate in the 

12 PRC. 

13 (2) In order to join the World Trade Organiza14 tion (WTO) in 2001, the PRC Government committed 

15 to opening the credit card payment business to for16 eign firms by 2006. 

17 (3) After years of the PRC refusing to open its 

18 payment market, the United States brought a case 

19 against the PRC before the WTO. In 2012, the WTO 

20 mandated that the PRC open its card payment mar21 ket to global competitors. 

22 (4) Even after the WTO’s ruling, the PRC Gov23 ernment refused to comply with the ruling and main24 tained a rule that required all yuan-denominated 

25 payment cards to use the PRC’s Union Pay network. 


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1 Only in 2020, after the Chinese payment market had 

2 grown to $27 trillion, did the PRC Government ap3 prove the application of foreign firms to enter the 

4 market. 

5 (5) The PRC continues to maintain aggressive 

6 capital controls, limiting access to the Chinese market 

7 to foreign investors while hamstringing its own citi8 zens ability to control their money. 

9 (6) On November 5, 2018, Chinese President Xi 

10 Jinping announced that the PRC would launch a 

11 technology innovation stock exchange. The Shanghai 

12 Stock Exchange STAR Market launched on July 22, 

13 2019. 

14 (7) On October 24, 2020, Chinese billionaire 

15 Jack Ma referred to ‘‘pawnshop mentality’’ of state16 owned banks. Shortly thereafter, the initial public of17 fering of his firm Ant Financial was canceled by Chi18 nese regulators. 

19 (8) The PRC Government is pioneering the use 

20 of a fully digitized yuan, which is set to be the 

21 world’s first central bank backed digital currency, 

22 and the People’s Bank of China and the Hong Kong 

23 Monetary Authority have already begun testing the 

24 cross-border functionality of the digital currency. 


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1 SEC. 132. REPORT ON IMPORTANCE OF AMERICAN FINAN2 CIAL STRENGTH FOR GLOBAL LEADERSHIP. 

3 (a) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Congress 

4 that— 

5 (1) the dominance of the dollar as the global re6 serve currency has yielded significant benefits to the 

7 United States and the American people by allowing 

8 the United States to maintain economic independ9 ence, better control its monetary policy, and finance 

10 government outlays; 

11 (2) American global leadership has benefited 

12 from the United States monetary stability, credit13 worthiness, deep capital markets, and financial tech14 nology innovations; 

15 (3) effective diplomacy and safeguarding of 

16 American national security rely on the United States 

17 role as the global financial leader, hub of global trade, 

18 and source of economic opportunity; 

19 (4) by cracking down on dissent in the key fi20 nancial center of Hong Kong, driving the creation of 

21 a technology focused stock exchange, and pushing for22 ward a Central Bank digital currency, the People’s 

23 Republic of China is attempting to become the leading 

24 hub of finance in the world; and 


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1 (5) the United States must maintain its position 

2 as a global financial leader to continue its broader 

3 global leadership role around the world. 

4 (b) REPORT.—Not later than 180 days after the date 

5 of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, in co6 ordination with the Secretary of the Treasury, shall submit 

7 to the appropriate committees of Congress a report that— 

8 (1) lists and examines the benefits to American 

9 foreign policy that derive from the United States fi10 nancial leadership and the dollar’s status as the 

11 world’s global reserve currency; 

12 (2) describes the actions taken by the People’s 

13 Republic of China that could cement China’s role as 

14 the world’s leading financial center; 

15 (3) analyzes the possible impact on American 

16 national security and foreign policy were the yuan to 

17 supplant the dollar as the world’s leading reserve cur18 rency; 

19 (4) outlines how the United States can work dip20 lomatically with allies, partners, and other nations to 

21 preserve a financial system that is free, open, and 

22 fair; and 

23 (5) identifies steps the United States can take to 

24 preserve its status as the world’s leading financial 


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1 center and maintain the dollar’s position as the glob2 al reserve currency. 

3 (c) APPROPRIATE COMMITTEES OF CONGRESS DE4 FINED.—In this section, the term ‘‘appropriate committees 

5 of Congress’’ means— 

6 (1) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the 

7 House of Representatives; 

8 (2) the Committee on Financial Services of the 

9 House of Representatives; 

10 (3) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the 

11 Senate; and 

12 (4) the Committee on Banking, Housing, and 

13 Urban Affairs of the Senate. 

14 SEC. 133. REVIEW OF CHINESE COMPANIES ON UNITED 

15 STATES CAPITAL MARKETS. 

16 (a) FINDINGS.— 

17 (1) Beginning in the 1990s, a wave of Chinese 

18 companies sought to raise capital and list shares on 

19 American stock markets. 

20 (2) In 2011 and 2012, more than 100 Chinese 

21 firms were delisted from the New York Stock Ex22 change as a result of fraud, accounting scandals, and 

23 other corporate governance failures. 

24 (3) Following extensive diplomatic efforts by the 

25 United States Government, the Public Company AcVerDate Sep 11 2014 21:34 Dec 30, 2022 Jkt 039200 PO 00000 Frm 00074 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6203 E:\BILLS\H3524.RH H3524

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1 counting Oversight Board (PCAOB) signed a memo2 randum of understanding with the China Securities 

3 Regulatory Commission and the China Ministry of 

4 Finance for the production and exchange of audit 

5 documents. 

6 (4) Despite signing the agreement, Chinese regu7 lators continue to hinder the PCAOB’s access to rel8 evant documents that are necessary for the PCAOB to 

9 carry out its enforcement duties. 

10 (5) In August 2020, the Department of State 

11 sent a letter to American universities warning about 

12 national security implications related to Chinese 

13 stock holdings. 

14 (6) In December 2020, Congress passed and the 

15 President signed the Holding Foreign Companies Ac16 countable Act (Public Law 116–222), which requires 

17 foreign companies listed on American stock markets 

18 to comply with PCAOB auditing rules within three 

19 years. Under the legislation, issuers not in compliance 

20 within three years will be delisted. 

21 (b) REPORT.— 

22 (1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days after 

23 the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of 

24 State, in coordination with the Secretary of the 

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1 sional committees a report that describes the costs and 

2 benefits to the United States posed by the presence of 

3 companies incorporated in the People’s Republic of 

4 China (PRC) that are listed on American stock ex5 changes or traded over the counter, in the form of 

6 American depository receipts. 

7 (2) MATTERS TO BE INCLUDED.—The report 

8 shall— 

9 (A) identify companies incorporated in the 

10 PRC that— 

11 (i) are listed or traded on one or sev12 eral stock exchanges within the United 

13 States, including over-the-counter market 

14 and ‘‘A Shares’’ added to indexes and ex15 change-traded funds out of mainland ex16 changes in the PRC; and 

17 (ii) based on the factors for consider18 ation described in paragraph (3), have 

19 knowingly and materially contributed to— 

20 (I) activities that undermine 

21 United States national security; 

22 (II) serious abuses of internation23 ally recognized human rights; or 


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1 (III) a substantially increased fi2 nancial risk exposure for United 

3 States-based investors; 

4 (B) describe the activities of the companies 

5 identified pursuant to subparagraph (A), and 

6 their implications for the United States; and 

7 (C) develop policy recommendations for the 

8 United States Government, State governments, 

9 United States financial institutions, United 

10 States equity and debt exchanges, and other rel11 evant stakeholders to address the risks posed by 

12 the presence in United States capital markets of 

13 the companies identified pursuant to subpara14 graph (A). 

15 (3) FACTORS FOR INCLUSION OF A COMPANY.— 

16 In completing the report under paragraph (1), the 

17 President shall consider whether a company should be 

18 identified pursuant to paragraph (2)(A) because the 

19 company has— 

20 (A) materially contributed to the develop21 ment or manufacture, or sold or facilitated pro22 curement by the PLA, of lethal military equip23 ment or component parts of such equipment; 


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1 (B) contributed to the construction and 

2 militarization of features in the South China 

3 Sea; 

4 (C) been sanctioned by the United States or 

5 has been determined to have conducted business 

6 with sanctioned entities; 

7 (D) engaged in an act or a series of acts of 

8 intellectual property theft; 

9 (E) engaged in corporate or economic espio10 nage; 

11 (F) contributed to the proliferation of nu12 clear or missile technology in violation of United 

13 Nations Security Council resolutions or United 

14 States sanctions; 

15 (G) contributed to the repression of religious 

16 and ethnic minorities within the PRC, including 

17 in Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region or 

18 Tibet Autonomous Region; 

19 (H) contributed to the development of tech20 nologies that enable censorship directed or di21 rectly supported by the Government of the PRC; 

22 or 

23 (I) contributed to other activities or behav24 ior determined to be relevant by the President. 


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1 (4) FACTORS FOR MAKING POLICY RECOMMENDA2 TIONS.—In completing the report under paragraph 

3 (1), the President shall weigh the national security 

4 implications and consider the following factors identi5 fied pursuant to paragraph (3) (except that such re6 port should exclude from its analysis the delisting or 

7 potential delisting of companies from United States 

8 markets as a result of failing to retain a Public Com9 pany Accounting Oversight Board-registered public 

10 accounting firm as required by section 104 of the 

11 Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (15 U.S.C. 7214)): 

12 (A) The possibility that banning or 

13 delisting companies from United States markets 

14 could lead to an outflow of companies to list in 

15 the PRC. 

16 (B) The possibility that banning or 

17 delisting companies from United States markets 

18 could impact the status of the United States as 

19 the world’s leading capital markets center, par20 ticularly vis-a`-vis the PRC. 

21 (C) The impact on American foreign policy 

22 and national security if United States leadership 

23 in capital markets was weakened vis-a`-vis the 

24 PRC. 


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1 (c) REPORT FORM.—The report required under sub2 section (b) shall be submitted in unclassified form. 

3 (d) PUBLICATION.—The report required under sub4 section (b) shall be made accessible to the public online 

5 through relevant United States Government websites. 

6 SEC. 134. REPORT ON DIPLOMATIC AND ECONOMIC IMPLI7 CATIONS OF CHANGES TO CROSS-BORDER 

8 PAYMENT AND FINANCIAL MESSAGING SYS9 TEMS. 

10 (a) REPORT.— 

11 (1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days after 

12 the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of 

13 State, in coordination with the Secretary of the 

14 Treasury, shall submit to the appropriate congres15 sional committees a report on the diplomatic and eco16 nomic implications of cross-border payment systems. 

17 (2) MATTERS TO BE INCLUDED.—The report re18 quired under paragraph (1) shall— 

19 (A) assess the extent to which American di20 plomacy and global leadership hinge upon the 

21 current infrastructure and existing ecosystem of 

22 cross-border payment and financial messaging 

23 systems; 


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1 (B) examine the durability of the Society 

2 for Worldwide Interbank Financial Tele3 communication cooperative; 

4 (C) review and analyze ways in which the 

5 Cross Border Interbank Payment Systems, 

6 cryptocurrencies, and central bank digital cur7 rencies could erode this system; and 

8 (D) analyze how changes to global cross-bor9 der payment systems could undermine United 

10 States national security interests including im11 pacts on the efficacy of sanctions, the countering 

12 of terrorist finance, and the enforcement of anti13 money laundering provisions. 

14 (b) REPORT FORM.—The report required under sub15 section (a)(1) shall be submitted in unclassified form. 

16 (c) PUBLICATION.—The report under subsection (a)(1) 

17 shall be made accessible to the public online through rel18 evant United States Government websites. 


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1 TITLE II—INVESTING IN 

2 ALLIANCES AND PARTNERSHIPS 

3 Subtitle A—Strategic and 

4 Diplomatic Matters 

5 SEC. 201. APPROPRIATE COMMITTEES OF CONGRESS DE6 FINED. 

7 In this subtitle, the term ‘‘appropriate committees of 

8 Congress’’ means— 

9 (1) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the 

10 Committee on Armed Services, and the Committee on 

11 Appropriations of the Senate; and 

12 (2) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Com13 mittee on Armed Services, and the Committee on Ap14 propriations of the House of Representatives. 

15 SEC. 202. UNITED STATES COMMITMENT AND SUPPORT FOR 

16 ALLIES AND PARTNERS IN THE INDO-PACIFIC. 

17 (a) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Congress 

18 that— 

19 (1) the United States treaty alliances in the 

20 Indo-Pacific provide a unique strategic advantage to 

21 the United States and are among the Nation’s most 

22 precious assets, enabling the United States to advance 

23 its vital national interests, defend its territory, ex24 pand its economy through international trade and 

25 commerce, establish enduring cooperation with allies 


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1 while seeking to establish new partnerships, prevent 

2 the domination of the Indo-Pacific and its sur3 rounding maritime and air lanes by a hostile power 

4 or powers, and deter potential aggressors; 

5 (2) the Governments of the United States, Japan, 

6 South Korea, Australia, the Philippines, and Thai7 land are critical allies in advancing a free and open 

8 order in the Indo-Pacific region and tackling chal9 lenges with unity of purpose, and have collaborated to 

10 advance specific efforts of shared interest in areas 

11 such as defense and security, economic prosperity, in12 frastructure connectivity, and fundamental freedoms; 

13 (3) the United States greatly values other part14 nerships in the Indo-Pacific region, including with 

15 India, Singapore, Indonesia, Taiwan, New Zealand, 

16 and Vietnam, as well as its trilateral and quadrilat17 eral dialogues, and regional architecture such as the 

18 Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), 

19 and the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation, which 

20 are essential to further shared interests; 

21 (4) the security environment in the Indo-Pacific 

22 demands consistent United States and allied commit23 ment to strengthening and advancing alliances so 

24 that they are postured to meet these challenges, and 

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1 ships, economic, commercial, technological, and secu2 rity cooperation, consistent and tangible commit3 ments, high-level and extensive consultations on mat4 ters of mutual interest, mutual and shared coopera5 tion in the acquisition of key capabilities important 

6 to allied defenses, and unified mutual support in the 

7 face of political, economic, or military coercion; 

8 (5) fissures in the United States alliance rela9 tionships and partnerships benefit United States ad10 versaries and weaken the collective ability to advance 

11 shared interests; 

12 (6) the United States must work with allies to 

13 prioritize human rights throughout the Indo-Pacific 

14 region; 

15 (7) as the report released in August 2020 by the 

16 Expert Group of the International Military Council 

17 on Climate and Security (IMCCS), entitled ‘‘Climate 

18 and Security in the Indo-Asia Pacific’’ noted, the 

19 Indo-Pacific region is one of the regions most vulner20 able to climate impacts, and as former Deputy Under 

21 Secretary of Defense for Installations and Environ22 ment Sherri Goodman, Secretary General of IMCCS, 

23 noted, climate shocks act as a threat multiplier in the 

24 Indo-Pacific region, increasing humanitarian re25 sponse costs and impacting security throughout the 


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1 region as sea levels rise, fishing patterns shift, food 

2 insecurity rises, and storms grow stronger and more 

3 frequent; 

4 (8) the United State should continue to engage 

5 on and deepen cooperation with allies and partners 

6 of the United States in the Indo-Pacific region, as 

7 laid out in the Asia Reassurance Initiative Act (Pub8 lic Law 115–409), in the areas of— 

9 (A) forecasting environmental challenges; 

10 (B) assisting with transnational coopera11 tion on sustainable uses of forest and water re12 sources with the goal of preserving biodiversity 

13 and access to safe drinking water; 

14 (C) fisheries and marine resource conserva15 tion; and 

16 (D) meeting environmental challenges and 

17 developing resilience; 

18 (9) the Secretary of State, in coordination with 

19 the Secretary of Defense and the Administrator of the 

20 United States Agency for International Development, 

21 should facilitate a robust interagency Indo-Pacific cli22 mate resiliency and adaptation strategy focusing on 

23 internal and external actions needed— 

24 (A) to facilitate regional early recovery, risk 

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1 pacts on strategic interests of the United States 

2 and partners and allies of the United States in 

3 the region; and 

4 (B) to address humanitarian and food secu5 rity impacts of weather-related changes in the re6 gion; and 

7 (10) ASEAN centrality and ASEAN-led mecha8 nisms remain essential to the evolving institutional 

9 architecture of the Indo-Pacific region. 

10 (b) STATEMENT OF POLICY.—It shall be the policy of 

11 the United States— 

12 (1) to deepen diplomatic, economic, and security 

13 cooperation with and among United States allies in 

14 the Indo-Pacific, as appropriate, including through 

15 diplomatic engagement, regional development, energy 

16 security and development, scientific and health part17 nerships, educational and cultural exchanges, intel18 ligence-sharing, and other diplomatic and defense-re19 lated initiatives; 

20 (2) to uphold the United States multilateral and 

21 bilateral treaty obligations, including— 

22 (A) defending Japan consistent with the 

23 Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security Be24 tween the United States of America and Japan, 

25 done at Washington, January 19, 1960, and all 


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1 related and subsequent bilateral security agree2 ments and arrangements concluded on or before 

3 the date of enactment of this Act; 

4 (B) defending the Republic of Korea con5 sistent with the Mutual Defense Treaty Between 

6 the United States and the Republic of Korea, 

7 done at Washington, October 1, 1953, and all re8 lated and subsequent bilateral security agree9 ments and arrangements concluded on or before 

10 the date of enactment of this Act; 

11 (C) defending the Philippines consistent 

12 with article IV of the Mutual Defense Treaty Be13 tween the United States and the Republic of the 

14 Philippines, done at Washington, August 30, 

15 1951, and all related and subsequent bilateral se16 curity agreements and arrangements concluded 

17 on or before the date of enactment of this Act; 

18 (D) defending Thailand consistent with the 

19 Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty (‘‘Ma20 nila Pact’’), done at Manila, September 8, 1954, 

21 understanding thereto the Thanat-Rusk commu22 nique of 1962, and all related and subsequent bi23 lateral security agreements and arrangements 

24 concluded on or before the date of enactment of 

25 this Act; and 


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1 (E) defending Australia consistent with the 

2 Security Treaty Between Australia and the 

3 United States of America, done at San Fran4 cisco, September 1, 1951, and all related and 

5 subsequent bilateral security agreements and ar6 rangements concluded on or before the date of en7 actment of this Act; 

8 (3) to strengthen and deepen the United States’ 

9 bilateral and regional partnerships, including with 

10 India, Taiwan, ASEAN, and New Zealand; 

11 (4) to cooperate with allies and partners to pro12 mote human rights across the Indo-Pacific region bi13 laterally and through regional and multilateral fora 

14 and pacts; 

15 (5) to strengthen and advance diplomatic, eco16 nomic, and security cooperation with regional part17 ners, such as Taiwan, Vietnam, Malaysia, Singapore, 

18 Indonesia, and India; and 

19 (6) to collaborate and cooperate on the sustain20 able development of the Mekong River Basin, includ21 ing by providing support for environmental conserva22 tion and protection initiatives in the Mekong sub-re23 gion and through assistance to Cambodia, Laos, Thai24 land, and Vietnam, whose governments comprise the 

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1 forts should focus on increasing MRC member coun2 tries’ capacity in the sustainable conservation and 

3 management of natural resources. 

4 SEC. 203. BOOSTING QUAD COOPERATION. 

5 (a) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Congress 

6 that— 

7 (1) as a Pacific power, the United States should 

8 continue to strengthen its cooperation with Australia, 

9 India, and Japan, (commonly referred to as the 

10 Quadrilateral Security Dialogue or ‘‘Quad’’) to en11 hance and implement a shared vision to meet regional 

12 challenges and to promote a free, open, inclusive, re13 silient, and healthy Indo-Pacific, characterized by re14 spect for democratic norms, rule of law, and market15 driven economic growth, and that is free from undue 

16 influence and coercion; 

17 (2) the United States should expand dialogue 

18 and cooperation through the Quad with a range of 

19 partners to support the rule of law, freedom of navi20 gation and overflight, peaceful resolution of disputes, 

21 democratic values, and territorial integrity, and to 

22 uphold peace and prosperity and strengthen demo23 cratic resilience in the Indo-Pacific; 

24 (3) the recent pledge from the first-ever Quad 

25 leaders meeting on March 12, 2021, to respond to the 


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1 economic and health impacts of COVID–19, including 

2 expanding safe, affordable, and effective vaccine pro3 duction and equitable access, and to address shared 

4 challenges, including in cyberspace, critical tech5 nologies, counterterrorism, quality infrastructure in6 vestment, and humanitarian assistance and disaster 

7 relief, as well as maritime domains, further advances 

8 the important cooperation among Quad nations that 

9 is so critical to the Indo-Pacific region; 

10 (4) building upon their announced commitment 

11 to finance 1,000,000,000 or more COVID–19 vaccines 

12 by the end of 2022 for use in the Indo-Pacific region, 

13 the United States International Development Finance 

14 Corporation, the Japan International Cooperation 

15 Agency, and the Japan Bank for International Co16 operation, including through partnerships other mul17 tilateral development banks, should also venture to fi18 nance development and infrastructure projects in the 

19 Indo-Pacific region that are competitive, transparent, 

20 and sustainable; 

21 (5) the United States should participate in the 

22 Resilient Supply Chain Initiative launched by Aus23 tralia, Japan, and India in 2020, along with similar 

24 initiatives that relocate supply chains in the health, 

25 economic, and national security sectors to the United 


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1 States, its Quad partners, and other like-minded 

2 countries; and 

3 (6) the formation of a Quad Intra-Parliamen4 tary Working Group could— 

5 (A) sustain and deepen engagement between 

6 senior officials of the Quad countries on a full 

7 spectrum of issues; and 

8 (B) be modeled on the successful and long9 standing bilateral intra-parliamentary groups 

10 between the United States and Mexico, Canada, 

11 and the United Kingdom, as well as other formal 

12 and informal parliamentary exchanges. 

13 (b) REPORTING REQUIREMENT.— 

14 (1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days after 

15 the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of 

16 State shall submit to the appropriate congressional 

17 committees a strategy for bolstering engagement and 

18 cooperation with the Quad. 

19 (2) MATTERS TO BE INCLUDED.—The strategy 

20 required by paragraph (1) shall include the following: 

21 (A) A description of how the United States 

22 intends to demonstrate democratic leadership in 

23 the Indo-Pacific through quadrilateral engage24 ment with India, Japan, and Australia on 

25 shared interests and common challenges. 


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1 (B) A summary of— 

2 (i) current and past Quad initiatives 

3 across the whole of the United States Gov4 ernment, including to promote broad based 

5 and inclusive economic growth, trade, and 

6 investment, and to advance technology co7 operation, energy innovation, climate miti8 gation and adaptation, physical and digital 

9 infrastructure development, education, dis10 aster management, and global health secu11 rity; 

12 (ii) proposals shared among Quad 

13 countries to deepen existing security co14 operation, intelligence sharing, economic 

15 partnerships, and multilateral coordination; 

16 and 

17 (iii) initiatives and agreements under18 taken jointly with Quad countries, in addi19 tion to other like-minded partners in the 

20 Indo-Pacific, on areas of shared interest. 

21 (C) A description of efforts to jointly— 

22 (i) expand ongoing COVID–19 co23 operation to prepare for the next pandemic 

24 by focusing on medium-term vaccine and 


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1 medical supply production and building a 

2 broader dialogue on global public health; 

3 (ii) combat economic coercion, deepen 

4 regional economic engagement and integra5 tion, and strengthen regional rules and 

6 standards around trade and investment; 

7 (iii) strengthen climate actions on 

8 mitigation, adaptation, resilience, tech9 nology, capacity-building, and climate fi10 nance; 

11 (iv) facilitate the development of qual12 ity infrastructure in the Indo-Pacific 

13 through joint financing, investment, tech14 nical assistance, and standards setting; 

15 (v) enhance joint maritime security 

16 and maritime domain awareness initiatives 

17 to protect the maritime commons and sup18 port international law and freedom of navi19 gation in the Indo-Pacific; and 

20 (vi) develop international technology 

21 standards and share or co-develop new in22 novative technologies of the future. 


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1 SEC. 204. ESTABLISHMENT OF QUAD INTRA-PARLIAMEN2 TARY WORKING GROUP. 

3 (a) ESTABLISHMENT.—Not later than 30 days after 

4 the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State 

5 shall seek to enter into negotiations with the governments 

6 of Japan, Australia, and India (collectively, with the 

7 United States, known as the ‘‘Quad’’) with the goal of 

8 reaching a written agreement to establish a Quad Intra9 Parliamentary Working Group to facilitate closer coopera10 tion on shared interests and values. 

11 (b) UNITED STATES GROUP.— 

12 (1) IN GENERAL.—At such time as the govern13 ments of the Quad countries enter into a written 

14 agreement described in subsection (a) to establish a 

15 Quad Intra-Parliamentary Working Group, there 

16 shall be established a United States Group, which 

17 shall represent the United States at the Quad Intra18 Parliamentary Working Group. 

19 (2) MEMBERSHIP.— 

20 (A) IN GENERAL.—The United States 

21 Group shall be comprised of not more than 24 

22 Members of Congress. 

23 (B) APPOINTMENT.—Of the Members of 

24 Congress appointed to the United States Group 

25 under subparagraph (A)— 


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1 (i) half shall be appointed by the 

2 Speaker of the House of Representatives 

3 from among Members of the House, not 

4 fewer than four of whom shall be members 

5 of the Committee on Foreign Affairs; and 

6 (ii) half shall be appointed by the 

7 President Pro Tempore of the Senate, based 

8 on recommendations of the majority leader 

9 and minority leader of the Senate, from 

10 among Members of the Senate, not fewer 

11 than four of whom shall be members of the 

12 Committee on Foreign Relations (unless the 

13 majority leader and minority leader deter14 mine otherwise). 

15 (3) MEETINGS.— 

16 (A) IN GENERAL.—The United States 

17 Group shall seek to meet not less frequently than 

18 annually with representatives and appropriate 

19 staff of the legislatures of Japan, Australia, and 

20 India, and any other country invited by mutual 

21 agreement of the Quad countries. 

22 (B) LIMITATION.—A meeting described in 

23 subparagraph (A) may be held— 

24 (i) in the United States; 


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1 (ii) in another Quad country during 

2 periods when Congress is not in session; or 

3 (iii) virtually. 

4 (4) CHAIRPERSON AND VICE CHAIRPERSON.— 

5 (A) HOUSE DELEGATION.—The Speaker of 

6 the House of Representatives shall designate the 

7 chairperson or vice chairperson of the delegation 

8 of the United States Group from the House from 

9 among members of the Committee on Foreign Af10 fairs. 

11 (B) SENATE DELEGATION.—The President 

12 Pro Tempore of the Senate shall designate the 

13 chairperson or vice chairperson of the delegation 

14 of the United States Group from the Senate from 

15 among members of the Committee on Foreign 

16 Relations. 

17 (5) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.— 

18 (A) IN GENERAL.—There is authorized to be 

19 appropriated $1,000,000 for each fiscal years 

20 2022 through 2025 for the United States Group. 

21 (B) DISTRIBUTION OF APPROPRIATIONS.— 

22 (i) IN GENERAL.—For each fiscal year 

23 for which an appropriation is made for the 

24 United States Group, half of the amount 

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1 gation from the House of Representatives 

2 and half of the amount appropriated shall 

3 be available to the delegation from the Sen4 ate. 

5 (ii) METHOD OF DISTRIBUTION.—The 

6 amounts available to the delegations of the 

7 House of Representatives and the Senate 

8 under clause (i) shall be disbursed on vouch9 ers to be approved by the chairperson of the 

10 delegation from the House of Representa11 tives and the chairperson of the delegation 

12 from the Senate, respectively. 

13 (6) PRIVATE SOURCES.—The United States 

14 Group may accept gifts or donations of services or 

15 property, subject to the review and approval, as ap16 propriate, of the Committee on Ethics of the House of 

17 Representatives and the Committee on Ethics of the 

18 Senate. 

19 (7) CERTIFICATION OF EXPENDITURES.—The 

20 certificate of the chairperson of the delegation from 

21 the House of Representatives or the delegation of the 

22 Senate of the United States Group shall be final and 

23 conclusive upon the accounting officers in the audit24 ing of the accounts of the United States Group. 


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1 (8) ANNUAL REPORT.—The United States Group 

2 shall submit to the Committee on Foreign Affairs of 

3 the House of Representatives and the Committee on 

4 Foreign Relations of the Senate a report for each fis5 cal year for which an appropriation is made for the 

6 United States Group, including a description of its 

7 expenditures under such appropriation. 

8 SEC. 205. STATEMENT OF POLICY ON COOPERATION WITH 

9 ASEAN. 

10 It is the policy of the United States to— 

11 (1) stand with the nations of the Association of 

12 Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) as they respond to 

13 COVID–19 and support greater cooperation in build14 ing capacity to prepare for and respond to pandemics 

15 and other public health challenges; 

16 (2) support high-level United States participa17 tion in the annual ASEAN Summit held each year; 

18 (3) reaffirm the importance of United States19 ASEAN economic engagement, including the elimi20 nation of barriers to cross-border commerce, and sup21 port the ASEAN Economic Community’s (AEC) 

22 goals, including strong, inclusive, and sustainable 

23 long-term economic growth and cooperation with the 

24 United States that focuses on innovation and capac25 ity-building efforts in technology, education, disaster 


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1 management, food security, human rights, and trade 

2 facilitation, particularly for ASEAN’s poorest coun3 tries; 

4 (4) urge ASEAN to continue its efforts to foster 

5 greater integration and unity within the ASEAN 

6 community, as well as to foster greater integration 

7 and unity with non-ASEAN economic, political, and 

8 security partners, including Japan, the Republic of 

9 Korea, Australia, the European Union, and India; 

10 (5) recognize the value of strategic economic ini11 tiatives such as United States-ASEAN Connect, which 

12 demonstrates a commitment to ASEAN and the AEC 

13 and builds upon economic relationships in the region; 

14 (6) support ASEAN nations in addressing mari15 time and territorial disputes in a constructive man16 ner and in pursuing claims through peaceful, diplo17 matic, and, as necessary, legitimate regional and 

18 international arbitration mechanisms, consistent with 

19 international law, including through the adoption of 

20 a code of conduct in the South China Sea that rep21 resents the interests of all parties and promotes peace 

22 and stability in the region; 

23 (7) urge all parties involved in the maritime and 

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1 ing the Government of the People’s Republic of 

2 China— 

3 (A) to cease any current activities, and 

4 avoid undertaking any actions in the future, 

5 that undermine stability, or complicate or esca6 late disputes through the use of coercion, intimi7 dation, or military force; 

8 (B) to demilitarize islands, reefs, shoals, 

9 and other features, and refrain from new efforts 

10 to militarize, including the construction of new 

11 garrisons and facilities and the relocation of ad12 ditional military personnel, material, or equip13 ment; 

14 (C) to oppose actions by any country that 

15 prevent other countries from exercising their sov16 ereign rights to the resources in their exclusive 

17 economic zones and continental shelves by enforc18 ing claims to those areas in the South China Sea 

19 that lack support in international law; and 

20 (D) to oppose unilateral declarations of ad21 ministrative and military districts in contested 

22 areas in the South China Sea; 

23 (8) urge parties to refrain from unilateral ac24 tions that cause permanent physical damage to the 

25 marine environment and support the efforts of the 


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1 National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration 

2 and ASEAN to implement guidelines to address the 

3 illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing in the re4 gion; 

5 (9) urge ASEAN nations to develop a common 

6 approach to encourage China and the Philippines to 

7 comply with the decision of the Permanent Court of 

8 Arbitration’s 2016 ruling in favor of the Republic of 

9 the Philippines in the case against the People’s Re10 public of China’s excessive maritime claims; 

11 (10) reaffirm the commitment of the United 

12 States to continue joint efforts with ASEAN to halt 

13 human smuggling and trafficking in persons and 

14 urge ASEAN to create and strengthen regional mech15 anisms to provide assistance and support to refugees 

16 and migrants; 

17 (11) support the Mekong-United States Partner18 ship; 

19 (12) support newly created initiatives with 

20 ASEAN nations, including the United States-ASEAN 

21 Smart Cities Partnership, the ASEAN Policy Imple22 mentation Project, the United States-ASEAN Innova23 tion Circle, and the United States-ASEAN Health 

24 Futures; 


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1 (13) encourage the President to communicate to 

2 ASEAN leaders the importance of promoting the rule 

3 of law and open and transparent government, 

4 strengthening civil society, and protecting human 

5 rights, including releasing political prisoners, ceasing 

6 politically motivated prosecutions and arbitrary 

7 killings, and safeguarding freedom of the press, free8 dom of assembly, freedom of religion, and freedom of 

9 speech and expression; 

10 (14) support efforts by organizations in ASEAN 

11 that address corruption in the public and private sec12 tors, enhance anti-bribery compliance, enforce bribery 

13 criminalization in the private sector, and build bene14 ficial ownership transparency through the ASEAN– 

15 USAID PROSPECT project partnered with the South 

16 East Asia Parties Against Corruption (SEA–PAC); 

17 (15) support the Young Southeast Asian Leaders 

18 Initiative as an example of a people-to-people part19 nership that provides skills, networks, and leadership 

20 training to a new generation that will create and fill 

21 jobs, foster cross-border cooperation and partnerships, 

22 and rise to address the regional and global challenges 

23 of the future; 

24 (16) support the creation of initiatives similar to 

25 the Young Southeast Asian Leaders Initiative for 


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1 other parts of the Indo-Pacific to foster people-to-peo2 ple partnerships with an emphasis on civil society 

3 leaders; 

4 (17) acknowledge those ASEAN governments that 

5 have fully upheld and implemented all United Na6 tions Security Council resolutions and international 

7 agreements with respect to the Democratic People’s 

8 Republic of Korea’s nuclear and ballistic missile pro9 grams and encourage all other ASEAN governments 

10 to do the same; and 

11 (18) allocate appropriate resources across the 

12 United States Government to articulate and imple13 ment an Indo-Pacific strategy that respects and sup14 ports the crucial role of ASEAN and supports 

15 ASEAN as a source of well-functioning and problem16 solving regional architecture in the Indo-Pacific com17 munity. 

18 SEC. 206. YOUNG SOUTHEAST ASIAN LEADERS INITIATIVE. 

19 (a) SHORT TITLE.—This section may be cited as the 

20 ‘‘Young Southeast Asian Leaders Initiative Act’’ or the 

21 ‘‘YSEALI Act’’. 

22 (b) YOUNG SOUTHEAST ASIAN LEADERS INITIATIVE.— 

23 (1) ESTABLISHMENT.—There is established in 

24 the Department of State the Young Southeast Asian 

25 Leaders Initiative (‘‘YSEALI’’) program. 


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1 (2) GOALS.—The YSEALI program shall seek to 

2 build to capacity of young leaders in Southeast Asia 

3 to— 

4 (A) support young leaders from Southeast 

5 Asia by offering professional development and a 

6 global network to share expertise, including in 

7 the areas of civic engagement, economic em8 powerment and social entrepreneurship, edu9 cation and environmental issues; and 

10 (B) further strengthen the enduring part11 nership between the United States and Southeast 

12 Asia and connect United States experts with 

13 YSEALI participants. 

14 (3) YSEALI PROGRAMS.— 

15 (A) YSEALI ACADEMIC FELLOWS PRO16 GRAM.—There is established the YSEALI Aca17 demic Fellows Program to bring students from 

18 YSEALI partner countries to the United States 

19 for the purposes of building practical expertise, 

20 leadership skills, and professional networks relat21 ing to one or more of the YSEALI themes. The 

22 Secretary of State may award fellowships under 

23 the Academic Fellows Program to eligible indi24 viduals based on the following: 


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1 (i) Citizenship and residency in a 

2 YSEALI partner country. 

3 (ii) Status as a full-time under4 graduate student, or recent graduate of col5 lege, university, or other institutions of 

6 higher learning. 

7 (iii) Other criteria determined appro8 priate by the Secretary. 

9 (B) YSEALI PROFESSIONAL FELLOWS PRO10 GRAM.—There is established the YSEALI Profes11 sional Fellows Program to bring professionals 

12 from YSEALI partner countries to the United 

13 States for the purposes of building practical ex14 pertise, leadership skills, and professional net15 works relating to one or more of the YSEALI 

16 themes. The Secretary of State may award fel17 lowships under the Professional Fellows Program 

18 to eligible individuals based on the following: 

19 (i) Citizenship and residency in a 

20 YSEALI partner country. 

21 (ii) Status as an emerging leader in 

22 government, civil society, or the private sec23 tor, and demonstrated expertise relating to 

24 one or more of the YSEALI themes. 


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1 (iii) Current employment, and two or 

2 more years of professional work experience 

3 relevant to one or more YSEALI themes. 

4 (iv) Other criteria determined appro5 priate by the Secretary. 

6 (C) OTHER INITIATIVES.—The Secretary of 

7 State may designate other initiatives as YSEALI 

8 initiatives under this section if they advance the 

9 goals of the YSEALI program as described in 

10 paragraph (2). 

11 (4) ACTIVITIES.— 

12 (A) UNITED STATES-BASED ACTIVITIES.— 

13 The Secretary of State shall oversee all United 

14 States-based activities carried out under the 

15 YSEALI program, including the participation of 

16 YSEALI Academic Fellows in a program at a 

17 United States university or college, and the par18 ticipation of YSEALI Professional Fellows at 

19 United States private and public sector organi20 zations for individually-tailored work place21 ments. Both fellowships may include site visits, 

22 professional networking opportunities, leadership 

23 training, community service, and organized cul24 tural activities, as appropriate. 


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1 (B) SOUTHEAST ASIA-BASED ACTIVITIES.— 

2 The Secretary of State should continue to sup3 port overseas initiatives of the program, includ4 ing the following: 

5 (i) Quality leadership training, profes6 sional development, and networking oppor7 tunities for YSEALI alumni. 

8 (ii) Reciprocal exchanges for YSEALI 

9 Professional Fellows Program’s United 

10 States professional hosts and interlocutors 

11 to support post-United States exchange ac12 tion plans and other related public diplo13 macy goals, as appropriate. 

14 (iii) Opportunities for networking with 

15 YSEALI alumni and professionals and ex16 perts who are American and Southeast 

17 Asian. 

18 (iv) The YSEALI Regional Workshop 

19 program, offering networking, mentoring, 

20 hands-on training, and the tools necessary 

21 to lead communities in addressing eco22 nomic, environmental, educational, and 

23 civic engagement issues. 

24 (v) The YSEALI Seeds for the Future 

25 program, providing small, competitive 


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1 grants to young leaders in Southeast Asia 

2 to improve their communities, countries, 

3 and the region towards one or more of the 

4 themes of civic engagement, economic em5 powerment and social entrepreneurship, 

6 education, or environmental issues. 

7 (vi) The YSEALI Academy at Ful8 bright University Vietnam, offering execu9 tive-level seminars for entry to mid-level 

10 professionals around the themes of tech11 nology and innovation, public policy, and 

12 entrepreneurship. 

13 (vii) The YSEALI Women’s Leader14 ship Academy Program, enhancing people15 to-people ties and engagement with young 

16 and emerging leaders by promoting gender 

17 equality and advancing the status of women 

18 and girls, such as in the public health sector 

19 (C) ALUMNI PLATFORM.—The Secretary of 

20 State is authorized to convene current YSEALI 

21 participants and YSEALI alumni through a 

22 platform to promote networking opportunities 

23 within the YSEALI community. 

24 (D) IMPLEMENTATION.—To carry out this 

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1 sular posts, the Secretary of State, and agency 

2 external partners managing and implementing 

3 the YSEALI program— 

4 (i) shall promote United States policy 

5 goals in Southeast Asia by providing tools 

6 and resources to help young Southeast 

7 Asian leaders develop important skills and 

8 connections, including through online cam9 paigns and public diplomacy initiatives; 

10 (ii) shall establish a system for moni11 toring, evaluating, and improving the 

12 YSEALI program; and 

13 (iii) may accept financial contribu14 tions from foundations, corporations, pri15 vate donors, program partners, and imple16 menting agency external partners intended 

17 to foster the goals of the YSEALI program. 

18 (5) REPORTS.— 

19 (A) STRATEGY.—The Secretary of State 

20 shall submit to the appropriate congressional 

21 committees a strategy for implementing the 

22 YSEALI program, including the following: 

23 (i) YSEALI program goals, targets, 

24 and planned outcomes for each year and, 

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1 erally during the duration of its implemen2 tation. 

3 (ii) The continuation of YSEALI pro4 gram monitoring and evaluation plan, in5 cluding metrics for measuring YSEALI pro6 gram progress identification of annual 

7 YSEALI program goals, and targets. 

8 (B) ANNUAL REPORTS.—Not later than 1 

9 year after the date of the enactment of this sec10 tion, and annually thereafter for 4 years, the 

11 Secretary of State shall submit to the appro12 priate congressional committees and publish on a 

13 publicly available website of the Department a 

14 report on— 

15 (i) YSEALI program progress and an 

16 assessment of the metrics, goals, targets, and 

17 outcomes described in subparagraph (A)(i), 

18 including information relating to YSEALI 

19 program implementation and outcome ac20 tivities during the year covered by each re21 port; and 

22 (ii) recommendations for improvements 

23 or amendments to the YSEALI program 

24 and strategy, if any, that would improve 


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1 their effectiveness during subsequent years 

2 of YSEALI program implementation. 

3 (C) FINAL REPORT.—Not later than the 

4 date of the submission of the last report required 

5 under subparagraph (B), the Secretary of State 

6 shall submit to the appropriate congressional 

7 committees a final assessment report that evalu8 ates YSEALI program implementation and out9 comes during the entire duration of YSEALI 

10 program operation, including recommendations 

11 regarding whether the YSEALI program should 

12 be reauthorized and any changes that would im13 prove its effectiveness. 

14 (6) DEFINITIONS.—In this section: 

15 (A) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMIT16 TEES.—The term ‘‘appropriate congressional 

17 committees’’ means— 

18 (i) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of 

19 the House of Representatives; 

20 (ii) the Committee on Appropriations 

21 of the House of Representatives; 

22 (iii) the Committee on Foreign Rela23 tions of the Senate; and 

24 (iv) the Committee on Appropriations 

25 of the Senate. 


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1 (B) IMPLEMENTING AGENCY EXTERNAL

2 PARTNERS.—The term ‘‘implementing agency ex3 ternal partners’’ means any external partner 

4 that is not a United States Government agency, 

5 and may include one or more of the following en6 tities: 

7 (i) Local or multinational corpora8 tions. 

9 (ii) Nongovernmental organizations. 

10 (iii) Universities. 

11 (iv) Regional institutions. 

12 (C) YSEALI THEME.—The term ‘‘YSEALI 

13 theme’’ means— 

14 (i) civic engagement; 

15 (ii) economic empowerment and social 

16 entrepreneurship; 

17 (iii) education; 

18 (iv) environmental issues; or 

19 (v) any other theme included by the 

20 Secretary of State. 

21 (D) YSEALI PARTNER COUNTRIES.—The 

22 term ‘‘YSEALI partner countries’’ includes each 

23 member country of the Association of Southeast 

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1 propriate to include in the programs established 

2 under this section. 

3 SEC. 207. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON NEGOTIATIONS WITH G7 

4 AND G20 COUNTRIES. 

5 It is the sense of Congress that the President, acting 

6 through the Secretary of State, should initiate an agenda 

7 with G7 and G20 countries on matters relevant to economic 

8 and democratic freedoms, including relating to the fol9 lowing: 

10 (1) Trade and investment issues and enforce11 ment. 

12 (2) Building support for international infra13 structure standards, including standards agreed to at 

14 the G20 summit in Osaka in 2018. 

15 (3) The erosion of democracy and human rights. 

16 (4) The security of 5G telecommunications. 

17 (5) Anti-competitive behavior, such as intellec18 tual property theft, massive subsidization of compa19 nies, and other policies and practices. 

20 (6) Predatory international sovereign lending 

21 that is inconsistent with Organisation for Economic 

22 Cooperation and Development and Paris Club prin23 ciples. 

24 (7) International influence campaigns. 

25 (8) Environmental standards. 


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1 (9) Coordination with like-minded regional part2 ners that are not in the G7 and G20. 

3 SEC. 208. ENHANCING THE UNITED STATES-TAIWAN PART4 NERSHIP. 

5 (a) STATEMENT OF POLICY.—It is the policy of the 

6 United States— 

7 (1) to support the close economic, political, and 

8 security relationship between Taiwan and the United 

9 States and recognize Taiwan as a vital part of the 

10 approach to the United States Indo-Pacific; 

11 (2) to advance the security of Taiwan and its de12 mocracy a vital national security interest of the 

13 United States; 

14 (3) to reinforce all existing United States Gov15 ernment commitments to Taiwan, consistent with the 

16 Taiwan Relations Act (Public Law 96–8), the three 

17 joint communiques, and the ‘‘Six Assurances’’; 

18 (4) to support Taiwan’s implementation of its 

19 asymmetric defense strategy, including the priorities 

20 identified in Taiwan’s Overall Defense Concept; 

21 (5) to urge Taiwan to increase its defense spend22 ing in order to fully resource its defense strategy; 

23 (6) to conduct regular transfers of defense arti24 cles to Taiwan in order to enhance Taiwan’s self-de25 fense capabilities, particularly its efforts to develop 


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1 and integrate asymmetric capabilities, such as anti2 ship, coastal defense, anti-armor, air defense, ad3 vanced command, control, communications, com4 puters, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance, 

5 and resilient command and control capabilities, into 

6 its military forces; 

7 (7) to advocate and actively advance Taiwan’s 

8 meaningful participation in international organiza9 tions, including the World Health Assembly, the 

10 International Civil Aviation Organization, the Inter11 national Criminal Police Organization, and other 

12 international bodies as appropriate; 

13 (8) to advocate for information sharing with 

14 Taiwan in the International Agency for Research on 

15 Cancer; 

16 (9) to promote meaningful cooperation among 

17 the United States, Taiwan, and other like-minded 

18 partners; 

19 (10) to enhance bilateral trade, including poten20 tially through new agreements or resumption of talks 

21 under the Trade and Investment Framework Agree22 ment; 

23 (11) to actively engage in trade talks in pursu24 ance of a bilateral free trade agreement; 


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1 (12) to expand bilateral economic and techno2 logical cooperation, including improving supply 

3 chain security; 

4 (13) to support United States educational and 

5 exchange programs with Taiwan, including by pro6 moting the study of Chinese language, culture, his7 tory, and politics in Taiwan; and 

8 (14) to expand people-to-people exchanges be9 tween the United States and Taiwan. 

10 (b) SUPPORTING UNITED STATES EDUCATIONAL AND

11 EXCHANGE PROGRAMS WITH TAIWAN.— 

12 (1) ESTABLISHMENT OF THE UNITED STATES13 TAIWAN CULTURAL EXCHANGE FOUNDATION.—The 

14 Secretary of State should consider establishing an 

15 independent nonprofit entity that— 

16 (A) is dedicated to deepening ties between 

17 the future leaders of Taiwan and the United 

18 States; and 

19 (B) works with State and local school dis20 tricts and educational institutions in the United 

21 States to send high school and university stu22 dents to Taiwan to study the Chinese language, 

23 culture, history, politics, and other relevant sub24 jects. 


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1 (2) PARTNER.—State and local school districts 

2 and educational institutions, including public univer3 sities, in the United States are encouraged to partner 

4 with the Taipei Economic and Cultural Representa5 tive Office in the United States to establish programs 

6 to promote an increase in educational and cultural 

7 exchanges. 

8 SEC. 209. TAIWAN DIPLOMATIC REVIEW. 

9 (a) FINDINGS.—Congress finds the following: 

10 (1) Pursuant to the Taiwan Relations Act (22 

11 U.S.C. 3301(b)(1)), it is the policy of the United 

12 States to ‘‘promote extensive, close, and friendly com13 mercial, cultural, and other relations between the peo14 ple of the United States and the people of Taiwan’’. 

15 (2) In May 2019, the Taiwanese counterpart to 

16 the American Institute in Taiwan, the Coordination 

17 Council for North American Affairs, was renamed the 

18 ‘‘Taiwan Council for U.S. Affairs’’. 

19 (3) It is the policy of the United States to refer 

20 to Taiwan as ‘‘Taiwan’’, not ‘‘Taipei’’ or ‘‘Chinese 

21 Taipei’’. 

22 (4) The Taipei Economic and Cultural Rep23 resentative Office is inaptly named as it works to cul24 tivate the extensive, close, and friendly commercial, 

25 cultural, and other relations between the people of the 


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1 United States and the people, organizations, and en2 terprises of Taiwan, not merely those in Taipei. 

3 (b) NEGOTIATIONS TO RENAME TECRO.—Reflective of 

4 the substantively deepening ties between Taiwan and the 

5 United States, the Secretary of State shall seek to enter into 

6 negotiations with appropriate officials of the Taipei Eco7 nomic and Cultural Representative Office in the United 

8 States with the objective of renaming its office in Wash9 ington, D.C., the Taiwan Representative Office in the 

10 United States, and its subsidiary offices in the United 

11 States, accordingly. 

12 SEC. 210. TAIWAN PEACE AND STABILITY ACT. 

13 (a) SHORT TITLE.—This section may be cited as the 

14 ‘‘Taiwan Peace and Stability Act’’. 

15 (b) DEFINITIONS.—In this section: 

16 (1) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMIT17 TEES.—The term ‘‘appropriate congressional commit18 tees’’ means— 

19 (A) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the 

20 House of Representatives; and 

21 (B) the Committee on Foreign Relations of 

22 the Senate. 

23 (2) INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION.—The term 

24 ‘‘international organization’’ includes United Nations 

25 funds, programs, specialized agencies, entities, and 


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1 bodies, as well as other organizations outside of the 

2 United Nations system that the Secretary of State de3 termines appropriate, in consultation with other rel4 evant Federal departments and agencies. 

5 (3) ONE-CHINA PRINCIPLE.—The term ‘‘One6 China Principle’’ means only the PRC’s policy to7 ward Taiwan. 

8 (4) CIVIL SOCIETY ORGANIZATIONS.—The term 

9 ‘‘civil society organizations’’ means international 

10 civil society organizations that are critical to main11 taining Taiwan’s international space and enabling 

12 Taiwan to play a positive and constructive role in the 

13 global community. 

14 (5) POTENTIAL PLA CAMPAIGNS.—The term ‘‘po15 tential PLA campaigns’’ means— 

16 (A) a naval blockade of Taiwan; 

17 (B) an amphibious assault and ground in18 vasion of Taiwan, especially such invasion de19 signed to accomplish a fiat accompli before inter20 vention is possible; or 

21 (C) a seizure of one or more of Taiwan’s 

22 outlying islands. 

23 (c) FINDINGS.—Congress makes the following findings: 

24 (1) The United States has consistently sought to 

25 advance peace and stability in East Asia as a central 


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1 element of United States foreign policy toward the re2 gion. 

3 (2) The Government of the People’s Republic of 

4 China (PRC), especially since the election of Tsai 

5 Ing-Wen in 2016, has conducted a coordinated cam6 paign to weaken Taiwan diplomatically, economi7 cally, and militarily in a manner that threatens to 

8 erode United States policy and create a fait accompli 

9 on questions surrounding Taiwan’s future. 

10 (3) In order to ensure the longevity of United 

11 States policy and preserve the ability of the people of 

12 Taiwan to determine their future independently, it is 

13 necessary to reinforce Taiwan’s diplomatic, economic, 

14 and physical space. 

15 (4) Taiwan has provided monetary, humani16 tarian, and medical assistance to combat diseases 

17 such as AIDS, tuberculosis, Ebola, and dengue fever 

18 in countries around the world. During the COVID– 

19 19 pandemic, Taiwan donated millions of pieces of 

20 personal protective equipment and COVID–19 tests to 

21 countries in need. 

22 (5) Since 2016, the Gambia, Sa ̃o Tome ́ and 

23 Principe, Panama, the Dominican Republic, Burkina 

24 Faso, El Salvador, the Solomon Islands, and Kiribati 


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1 have severed diplomatic relations with Taiwan in 

2 favor of diplomatic relations with China. 

3 (6) Taiwan was invited to participate in the 

4 World Health Assembly (WHA), the decision-making 

5 body of the World Health Organization, as an ob6 server annually between 2009 and 2016. Since the 

7 2016 election of President Tsai, the PRC has increas8 ingly resisted Taiwan’s participation in the WHA. 

9 Taiwan was not invited to attend the WHA in 2017, 

10 2018, 2019, 2020, or 2021. 

11 (7) The Taipei Flight Information Region re12 portedly served 1,750,000 flights and 68,900,000 pas13 sengers in 2018 and is home to Taiwan Taoyuan 

14 International Airport, the 11th busiest airport in the 

15 world. Taiwan has been excluded from participating 

16 at the International Civil Aviation Organization 

17 since 2013. 

18 (8) United Nations General Assembly Resolution 

19 2758 (1971) does not address the issue of representa20 tion of Taiwan and its people at the United Nations, 

21 nor does it give the PRC the right to represent the 

22 people on Taiwan. 

23 (d) STATEMENT OF POLICY.—It is the policy of the 

24 United States to— 


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1 (1) maintain the position that peace and sta2 bility in the Western Pacific are in the political, secu3 rity, and economic interests of the United States, and 

4 are matters of international concern; and 

5 (2) work with allies and partners to promote 

6 peace and stability in the Indo-Pacific and deter 

7 military acts or other forms of coercive behavior that 

8 would undermine regional stability. 

9 (e) SENSE OF CONGRESS ON TAIWAN’S MEANINGFUL

10 PARTICIPATION IN THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY.—It is 

11 the sense of Congress that— 

12 (1) Taiwan is free, democratic, and prosperous, 

13 is home to 23,500,000 people, and is an important 

14 contributor to the global community; 

15 (2) multiple United States Government Adminis16 trations have taken important steps to advance Tai17 wan’s meaningful participation in international or18 ganizations and to enhance cooperation with Taiwan 

19 to provide global public goods, including through de20 velopment assistance, humanitarian assistance, and 

21 disaster relief in trilateral and multilateral fora; 

22 (3) nonetheless, significant structural, policy, 

23 and legal barriers remain to advancing Taiwan’s 

24 meaningful participation in the international com25 munity; and 


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1 (4) efforts to share Taiwan’s expertise with other 

2 parts of the global community could be further en3 hanced through a systematic approach, along with 

4 greater attention from Congress and the American 

5 public to such efforts. 

6 (f) STRATEGY TO SUPPORT TAIWAN’S MEANINGFUL

7 PARTICIPATION IN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS.— 

8 (1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days after 

9 the date of the enactment of this section, the Secretary 

10 of State, in consultation with other Federal depart11 ments and agencies as appropriate, shall submit to 

12 the appropriate congressional committees a strategy— 

13 (A) to advance Taiwan’s meaningful par14 ticipation in a prioritized set of international 

15 organizations; and 

16 (B) that responds to growing pressure from 

17 the PRC on foreign governments, international 

18 organizations, commercial actors, and civil soci19 ety organizations to comply with its ‘‘One-China 

20 Principle’’ with respect to Taiwan. 

21 (2) MATTERS TO BE INCLUDED.—The strategy 

22 required under paragraph (1) shall include— 

23 (A) an assessment of the methods the PRC 

24 uses to coerce actors to into adhering to its ‘‘One25 China Principle’’, including those employed 


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1 against governments, international organiza2 tions, and civil society organizations and pres3 sure on commercial actors, to the extent relevant 

4 in the context of Taiwan’s meaningful participa5 tion international organizations; 

6 (B) an assessment of the policies of foreign 

7 governments toward the PRC and Taiwan, to 

8 identify likeminded allies and partners who 

9 might become public or private partners in the 

10 strategy; 

11 (C) a systematic analysis of all inter12 national organizations, as practicable, to iden13 tify those that best lend themselves to advancing 

14 Taiwan’s participation, including— 

15 (i) the organization’s policy on the re16 quirements to obtain membership and ob17 server status, as well as the foundational 

18 documents defining membership require19 ments and observer status within the orga20 nization; 

21 (ii) the organization’s participation 

22 rules; 

23 (iii) the processes for developing mem24 bership requirements and participation 

25 rules; 


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1 (iv) the policies of current members re2 garding Taiwan’s political status; and 

3 (v) the organization’s relative reliance 

4 on contributions from the PRC and how it 

5 may affect internal decision-making; 

6 (D) an evaluation of the feasibility and ad7 visability of expanding economic, security, and 

8 diplomatic engagement with countries that have 

9 demonstrably strengthened, enhanced, or up10 graded relations with Taiwan, where it aligns 

11 with United States interests; 

12 (E) a survey of international organizations 

13 that have allowed Taiwan’s meaningful partici14 pation, including an assessment of whether any 

15 erosion in Taiwan’s engagement has occurred 

16 within those organizations and how Taiwan’s 

17 participation has positively strengthened the ca18 pacity and activity of these organizations, pro19 viding positive models for Taiwan’s inclusion in 

20 other similar forums; 

21 (F) a list of not more than 20 international 

22 organizations at which the United States Gov23 ernment will prioritize using its voice, vote, and 

24 influence to advance Taiwan’s meaningful par25 ticipation over the three-year period following 


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1 the date of enactment of this Act, to be derived 

2 from the organizations identified pursuant to 

3 subparagraph (C); and 

4 (G) a description of the diplomatic strate5 gies and the coalitions the United States Govern6 ment plans to develop to implement subpara7 graph (F). 

8 (3) FORM.—The strategy required under para9 graph (1) shall be submitted in classified form but 

10 may include an unclassified summary. 

11 (4) CONSULTATION.—The Secretary of State 

12 shall consult with the appropriate congressional com13 mittees— 

14 (A) not later than 90 days after the date of 

15 enactment of this Act, with respect to the inter16 national organizations identified pursuant to 

17 paragraph (2)(C); and 

18 (B) not later than 180 days after the date 

19 of the submission of the strategy required under 

20 paragraph (1), and every 180 days thereafter for 

21 2 years, regarding the development and imple22 mentation of the strategy required. 

23 (g) EXPANDING UNITED STATES-TAIWAN DEVELOP24 MENT COOPERATION.— 


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1 (1) IN GENERAL.—No later than 120 days after 

2 the date of the enactment of this Act, the Adminis3 trator of the United States Agency for International 

4 Development (USAID), in consultation with the 

5 United States International Development Finance 

6 Corporation (DFC), shall submit to the appropriate 

7 congressional committees a report on cooperation with 

8 Taiwan on trilateral and multilateral development 

9 initiatives, through the American Institute in Taiwan 

10 as appropriate. 

11 (2) MATTERS TO BE INCLUDED.—The report re12 quired in paragraph (1) shall include the following: 

13 (A) A comprehensive review of existing co14 operation mechanisms and initiatives between 

15 USAID or DFC and relevant departments and 

16 agencies in Taiwan, including, but not limited 

17 to Taiwan’s International Cooperation and De18 velopment Fund (ICDF). 

19 (B) An assessment of how USAID and DFC 

20 development cooperation with relevant depart21 ments and agencies in Taiwan compares to com22 parable cooperation with partners of similar eco23 nomic size and foreign assistance capacity. 


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1 (C) An analysis of the opportunities and 

2 challenges the cooperation described in subpara3 graph (A) has offered to date, including— 

4 (i) opportunities collaboration has of5 fered to expand USAID’s and DFC’s ability 

6 to deliver assistance into a wider range 

7 communities; 

8 (ii) sectors where USAID, DFC, ICDF, 

9 other relevant agencies and departments in 

10 Taiwan, or the organizations’ implementing 

11 partners, have a comparative advantage in 

12 providing assistance; and 

13 (iii) opportunities to transition virtual 

14 capacity building events relevant depart15 ments and agencies in Taiwan, through the 

16 Global Cooperation and Training Frame17 work and other forums, into in-person, en18 during forms of development cooperation. 

19 (D) An assessment of any legal, policy, 

20 logistical, financial, or administrative barriers 

21 to expanding cooperation in trilateral or multi22 lateral development, including— 

23 (i) availability of personnel at the 

24 American Institute in Taiwan responsible 


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1 for coordinating development assistance co2 operation; 

3 (ii) volume of current cooperation ini4 tiatives and barriers to expanding it; 

5 (iii) diplomatic, policy, or legal bar6 riers facing the United States or other part7 ners to including Taiwan in formal and in8 formal multilateral development cooperation 

9 mechanisms; 

10 (iv) resource or capacity barriers to ex11 panding cooperation facing the United 

12 States or Taiwan; and 

13 (v) geopolitical barriers that com14 plicate United States-Taiwan cooperation 

15 in third countries. 

16 (E) Recommendations to address the chal17 lenges identified in subparagraph (D). 

18 (F) A description of any additional re19 sources or authorities that expanding cooperation 

20 might require. 

21 (3) FORM.—The strategy required in paragraph 

22 (1) shall be submitted in unclassified form but may 

23 include a classified annex. 


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1 (h) SENSE OF CONGRESS ON EXPANDING UNITED

2 STATES ECONOMIC RELATIONS WITH TAIWAN.—It is the 

3 sense of the Congress that— 

4 (1) expanding United States economic relations 

5 with Taiwan has benefited the people of both the 

6 United States and Taiwan; and 

7 (2) the United States should explore opportuni8 ties to deepen, and where possible expand, economic 

9 ties between Taiwan and the United States, through 

10 dialogue, and by developing the legal templates re11 quired to support potential future agreements. 

12 (i) SENSE OF CONGRESS ON PEACE AND STABILITY

13 IN THE TAIWAN STRAIT.—It is the sense of Congress that— 

14 (1) PRC attempts to intimidate Taiwan, includ15 ing through high rates of PRC sorties into air space 

16 near Taiwan, and PRC amphibious assault exercises 

17 near Taiwan, jeopardizes the long-standing United 

18 States position that differences in cross-Strait rela19 tions must be resolved peacefully; 

20 (2) given the potential for a cross-Strait conflict 

21 to be highly destructive and destabilizing, any in22 crease in the risk of conflict demands attention and 

23 obligates leaders to reinforce deterrence, as the most 

24 viable means to prevent war; 


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1 (3) Taiwan should continue to implement its 

2 asymmetric defense strategy, including investing in 

3 cost-effective and resilient capabilities, while also 

4 strengthening recruitment and training of its reserve 

5 and civil defense forces, and those capabilities in6 clude, but are not limited to, coastal defense cruise 

7 missiles; and 

8 (4) while enhancing deterrence, it is also essen9 tial to maintain open and effective crisis communica10 tion and risk reduction mechanisms, as a means to 

11 reduce the risk of misunderstanding and ultimately, 

12 conflict. 

13 (j) STRATEGY TO ENHANCE DETERRENCE OVER A

14 CROSS-STRAIT CONFLICT.— 

15 (1) IN GENERAL.—No later than 90 days after 

16 the date of enactment of this Act, the President shall 

17 submit to the appropriate congressional committees a 

18 whole-of-government strategy to enhance deterrence 

19 over a cross-Strait military conflict between the PRC 

20 and Taiwan. 

21 (2) MATTERS TO BE INCLUDED.—The strategy 

22 shall include the following: 

23 (A) A comprehensive review of existing dip24 lomatic, economic, and military tools to establish 


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1 deterrence over a cross-Strait conflict and an as2 sessment of their efficacy. 

3 (B) An examination of the present and fu4 ture capabilities of the United States and Tai5 wan to respond to the potential PLA campaigns 

6 against Taiwan in 5, 10, and 15 years. The 

7 analysis shall include an assessment of the 

8 progress Taiwan has made in developing the 

9 cost-effective and resilient capabilities needed to 

10 respond to its strategic environment, as well as 

11 any additional personnel, procurement, or train12 ing reforms required. 

13 (C) An evaluation of the feasibility of ex14 panding coordination with United States allies 

15 and partners to enhance deterrence over a cross16 Strait conflict. The review shall include a review 

17 of the following matters: 

18 (i) Expanding coordination of public 

19 or private messaging on deterrence vis-a`-vis 

20 Taiwan. 

21 (ii) Coordinating use of economic tools 

22 to raise the costs of PRC military action 

23 that could precipitate a cross-Strait con24 flict. 


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1 (iii) Enhancing codevelopment and co2 deployment of military capabilities related 

3 to deterrence over a cross-Strait conflict, or 

4 enhancing coordination on training of Tai5 wan’s military forces. 

6 (D) Recommendations on significant addi7 tional diplomatic, economic, and military steps 

8 available to the United States Government, uni9 laterally and in concert with United States allies 

10 and partners, to enhance the clarity and credi11 bility of deterrence over a cross-Strait conflict. 

12 (E) A description of any additional re13 sources or authorities needed to implement the 

14 recommendations identified in subparagraph 

15 (D). 

16 (3) FORM.—The strategy required in paragraph 

17 (1) shall be submitted classified form but may include 

18 an unclassified annex. 

19 (4) CONSULTATION.—Not later than 90 days 

20 after the date of enactment of this Act, and not less 

21 frequently than every 180 days thereafter for 7 years, 

22 the President (or a designee), as well as representa23 tives from the agencies and departments involved in 

24 developing the strategy required in paragraph (1), 

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1 mittees regarding the development and implementa2 tion of the strategy required in this subsection. The 

3 representatives from the relevant agencies and depart4 ments shall be at the Under Secretary level or above. 

5 (k) STRENGTHENING TAIWAN’S CIVILIAN DEFENSE

6 PROFESSIONALS.— 

7 (1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days after 

8 the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of 

9 State, in consultation with the Secretary of Defense, 

10 shall present to the appropriate congressional com11 mittees a plan for strengthening the community of ci12 vilian defense professionals in Taiwan, facilitated 

13 through the American Institute in Taiwan as appro14 priate. 

15 (2) MATTERS TO BE INCLUDED.—The plan re16 quired by paragraph (1) shall include the following: 

17 (A) A comprehensive review of existing 

18 United States Government and non-United 

19 States Government programmatic and funding 

20 modalities to support Taiwan’s civilian defense 

21 professionals in pursuing professional develop22 ment, educational, and cultural exchanges in the 

23 United States, including— 


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1 (i) opportunities through Department 

2 of State-supported programs, such as the 

3 International Visitor Leaders Program; and 

4 (ii) opportunities offered through non5 governmental institutions, such as think 

6 tanks, to the extent the review can prac7 ticably make such an assessment. 

8 (B) A description of the frequency that ci9 vilian defense professionals from Taiwan pursue 

10 or are selected for the programs reviewed pursu11 ant to subparagraph (A). 

12 (C) An analysis of any funding, policy, ad13 ministrative, or other barriers preventing greater 

14 participation from Taiwan’s civilian defense 

15 professionals in the opportunities identified pur16 suant to subparagraph (A). 

17 (D) An evaluation of the value expanding 

18 the opportunities reviewed pursuant to subpara19 graph (A) would offer for strengthening Taiwan’s 

20 existing civilian defense community, and for in21 creasing the perceived value of the field for young 

22 professionals in Taiwan. 

23 (E) An assessment of options the United 

24 States Government could take individually, with 

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1 ments, or nongovernmental partners, to expand 

2 the opportunities reviewed pursuant to subpara3 graph (A). 

4 (F) A description of additional resources 

5 and authorities required by the options assessed 

6 pursuant to subparagraph (E). 

7 (3) FORM.—The plan required by paragraph (1) 

8 shall be submitted in unclassified form but may in9 clude a classified annex. 

10 SEC. 211. TAIWAN INTERNATIONAL SOLIDARITY ACT. 

11 (a) SHORT TITLE.—This section may be cited as the 

12 ‘‘Taiwan International Solidarity Act’’. 

13 (b) CLARIFICATION REGARDING UNITED NATIONS

14 GENERAL ASSEMBLY RESOLUTION 2758.—Subsection (a) of 

15 section 2 of the Taiwan Allies International Protection and 

16 Enhancement Initiative (TAIPEI) Act of 2019 (Public Law 

17 116–135) (relating to diplomatic relations with Taiwan) 

18 is amended by adding at the end the following new para19 graphs: 

20 ‘‘(10) United Nations General Assembly Resolu21 tion 2758 (1971) established the representatives of the 

22 Government of the People’s Republic of China as the 

23 only lawful representatives of China to the United 

24 Nations. The resolution did not address the issue of 

25 representation of Taiwan and its people in the United 


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1 Nations or any related organizations, nor did the res2 olution take a position on the relationship between the 

3 People’s Republic of China and Taiwan or include 

4 any statement pertaining to Taiwan’s sovereignty. 

5 ‘‘(11) The United States opposes any initiative 

6 that seeks to change Taiwan’s status without the con7 sent of the people.’’. 

8 (c) UNITED STATES ADVOCACY FOR INTERNATIONAL

9 ORGANIZATIONS TO RESIST THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF

10 CHINA’S EFFORTS TO DISTORT THE ‘‘ONE CHINA’’ POSI11 TION.—Section 4 of the Taiwan Allies International Protec12 tion and Enhancement Initiative (TAIPEI) Act of 2019 

13 (relating to the policy of the United States regarding Tai14 wan’s participation in international organizations) is 

15 amended— 

16 (1) in paragraph (2), by striking ‘‘and’’ after the 

17 semicolon at the end; 

18 (2) in paragraph (3), by striking the period at 

19 the end and inserting ‘‘; and’’; and 

20 (3) by adding at the end the following new para21 graph: 

22 ‘‘(4) to instruct, as appropriate, representatives 

23 of the United States Government in all organizations 

24 described in paragraph (1) to use the voice, vote, and 

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1 nizations to resist the People’s Republic of China’s ef2 forts to distort the decisions, language, policies, or 

3 procedures of such organizations regarding Taiwan.’’. 

4 (d) OPPOSING THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA’S

5 EFFORTS TO UNDERMINE TAIWAN’S TIES AND PARTNER6 SHIPS INTERNATIONALLY.—Subsection (a) of section 5 of 

7 the Taiwan Allies International Protection and Enhance8 ment Initiative (TAIPEI) Act of 2019 (relating to strength9 ening ties with Taiwan) is amended— 

10 (1) in paragraph (2), by striking ‘‘and’’ after the 

11 semicolon at the end; 

12 (2) in paragraph (3), by striking the period at 

13 the end and inserting ‘‘; and’’; and 

14 (3) by adding at the end the following new para15 graph: 

16 ‘‘(4) encourage, as appropriate, United States al17 lies and partners to oppose the People’s Republic of 

18 China’s efforts to undermine Taiwan’s official diplo19 matic relationships and its partnerships with coun20 tries with which it does not maintain diplomatic re21 lations.’’. 

22 (e) REPORT ON THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA’S

23 ATTEMPTS TO PROMOTE ITS ‘‘ONE CHINA’’ POSITION.— 

24 (1) IN GENERAL.—Subsection (b) of section 5 of 

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1 hancement Initiative (TAIPEI) Act of 2019 (relating 

2 to strengthening ties with Taiwan) is amended by in3 serting before the period at the end the following: ‘‘, 

4 as well as information relating to any prior or ongo5 ing attempts by the People’s Republic of China to un6 dermine Taiwan’s membership or observer status in 

7 all organizations described in section (4)(1) and Tai8 wan’s ties and relationships with other countries in 

9 accordance with subsection (a) of this section’’. 

10 (2) EFFECTIVE DATE.—The amendment made by 

11 paragraph (1) shall take effect on the date of the en12 actment of this Act and apply beginning with the 

13 first report required under subsection (b) of section 5 

14 of the Taiwan Allies International Protection and 

15 Enhancement Initiative (TAIPEI) Act of 2019, as 

16 amended by paragraph (1), that is required after such 

17 date. 

18 SEC. 212. TAIWAN FELLOWSHIP PROGRAM. 

19 (a) SHORT TITLE.—This section may be cited as the 

20 ‘‘Taiwan Fellowship Act’’. 

21 (b) FINDINGS; PURPOSES.— 

22 (1) FINDINGS.—Congress finds the following: 

23 (A) The Taiwan Relations Act (Public Law 

24 96–8; 22 U.S.C. 3301 et seq.) affirmed United 

25 States policy ‘‘to preserve and promote extensive, 


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1 close, and friendly commercial, cultural, and 

2 other relations between the people of the United 

3 States and the people on Taiwan, as well as the 

4 people on the China mainland and all other peo5 ples of the Western Pacific area’’. 

6 (B) Consistent with the Asia Reassurance 

7 Initiative Act of 2018 (Public Law 115–409), the 

8 United States has grown its strategic partner9 ship with Taiwan’s vibrant democracy of 

10 23,000,000 people. 

11 (C) Despite a concerted campaign by the 

12 People’s Republic of China to isolate Taiwan 

13 from its diplomatic partners and from inter14 national organizations, including the World 

15 Health Organization, Taiwan has emerged as a 

16 global leader in the coronavirus global pandemic 

17 response, including by donating more than 

18 2,000,000 surgical masks and other medical 

19 equipment to the United States. 

20 (D) The creation of a United States fellow21 ship program with Taiwan would support— 

22 (i) a key priority of expanding people23 to-people exchanges, which was outlined in 

24 President Donald J. Trump’s 2017 Na25 tional Security Strategy; 


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1 (ii) President Joseph R. Biden’s com2 mitment to Taiwan, ‘‘a leading democracy 

3 and a critical economic and security part4 ner’’, as expressed in his March 2021 In5 terim National Security Strategic Guid6 ance; and 

7 (iii) April 2021 guidance from the De8 partment of State based on a review re9 quired under the Taiwan Assurance Act of 

10 2020 (subtitle B of title III of division FF 

11 of Public Law 116–260) to ‘‘encourage U.S. 

12 government engagement with Taiwan that 

13 reflects our deepening unofficial relation14 ship’’. 

15 (2) PURPOSES.—The purposes of this section 

16 are— 

17 (A) to further strengthen the United States18 Taiwan strategic relationship and broaden un19 derstanding of the Indo-Pacific region by tempo20 rarily assigning officials of agencies of the 

21 United States Government to Taiwan for inten22 sive study in Mandarin Chinese and placement 

23 as Fellows with the governing authorities on 

24 Taiwan or a Taiwanese civic institution; 


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1 (B) to expand United States Government 

2 expertise in Mandarin Chinese language skills 

3 and understanding of the politics, history, and 

4 culture of Taiwan and the Indo-Pacific region 

5 by providing eligible United States personnel the 

6 opportunity to acquire such skills and under7 standing through the Taiwan Fellowship Pro8 gram established under subsection (c); and 

9 (C) to better position the United States to 

10 advance its economic, security, and human 

11 rights interests and values in the Indo-Pacific re12 gion. 

13 (c) TAIWAN FELLOWSHIP PROGRAM.— 

14 (1) DEFINITIONS.—In this section: 

15 (A) AGENCY HEAD.—The term ‘‘agency 

16 head’’ means, in the case of the executive branch 

17 of United States Government, or in the case of 

18 a legislative branch agency specified in subpara19 graph (B), the head of the respective agency. 

20 (B) AGENCY OF THE UNITED STATES GOV21 ERNMENT.—The term ‘‘agency of the United 

22 States Government’’ includes the Government Ac23 countability Office, the Congressional Budget Of24 fice, the Congressional Research Service, and the 

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1 view Commission of the legislative branch, as 

2 well as any agency of the executive branch. 

3 (C) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMIT4 TEES.—The term ‘‘appropriate congressional 

5 committees’’ means— 

6 (i) the Committee on Appropriations, 

7 the Committee on Foreign Affairs, and the 

8 Committee on Armed Services of the House 

9 of Representatives; and 

10 (ii) the Committee on Appropriations 

11 and the Committee on Foreign Relations of 

12 the Senate. 

13 (D) DETAILEE.—The term ‘‘detailee’’ means 

14 an employee of an agency of the United States 

15 Government on loan to the American Institute in 

16 Taiwan, without a change of position from the 

17 agency at which such employee is employed. 

18 (E) IMPLEMENTING PARTNER.—The term 

19 ‘‘implementing partner’’ means any United 

20 States organization described in section 

21 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 

22 and exempt from tax under section 501(a) of 

23 such Code that— 

24 (i) is selected through a competitive 

25 process; 


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1 (ii) performs logistical, administrative, 

2 and other functions, as determined by the 

3 Department of State and the American In4 stitute of Taiwan, in support of the Taiwan 

5 Fellowship Program; and 

6 (iii) enters into a cooperative agree7 ment with the American Institute in Tai8 wan to administer the Taiwan Fellowship 

9 Program. 

10 (2) ESTABLISHMENT OF TAIWAN FELLOWSHIP

11 PROGRAM.— 

12 (A) ESTABLISHMENT.—The Secretary of 

13 State shall establish the ‘‘Taiwan Fellowship 

14 Program’’ (referred to in this section as the 

15 ‘‘Program’’) to provide a fellowship opportunity 

16 in Taiwan of up to two years for eligible United 

17 States citizens through the cooperative agreement 

18 established in subparagraph (B). The Secretary 

19 of State, in consultation with appropriate coun20 terparts at the American Institute in Taiwan 

21 and the implementing partner, may modify the 

22 name of the Program. 

23 (B) COOPERATIVE AGREEMENTS.— 

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1 priated pursuant to the authorization under 

2 paragraph (6)(A) to enter into an annual 

3 or multi-year cooperative agreement with 

4 an appropriate implementing partner. 

5 (ii) FELLOWSHIPS.—The Secretary of 

6 State, in consultation with the American 

7 Institute in Taiwan and, as appropriate, 

8 the implementing partner, shall award to 

9 eligible United States citizens, subject to 

10 available funding— 

11 (I) not fewer than five fellowships 

12 during the first two years of the Pro13 gram; and 

14 (II) not fewer than ten fellowships 

15 during each of the remaining years of 

16 the Program. 

17 (C) INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENT; IMPLE18 MENTING PARTNER.—Not later than 30 days 

19 after the date of the enactment of this Act, the 

20 American Institute in Taiwan, in consultation 

21 with the Secretary of State, shall— 

22 (i) begin negotiations with the Taipei 

23 Economic and Cultural Representative Of24 fice, or with another appropriate entity, for 

25 the purpose of entering into an agreement 


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1 to facilitate the placement of fellows in an 

2 agency of the governing authorities on Tai3 wan; and 

4 (ii) begin the process of selecting an 

5 implementing partner, which— 

6 (I) shall agree to meet all of the 

7 legal requirements required to operate 

8 in Taiwan; and 

9 (II) shall be composed of staff who 

10 demonstrate significant experience 

11 managing exchange programs in the 

12 Indo-Pacific region. 

13 (D) CURRICULUM.— 

14 (i) FIRST YEAR.—During the first year 

15 of each fellowship under this subsection, 

16 each fellow should study— 

17 (I) the Mandarin Chinese lan18 guage; 

19 (II) the people, history, and polit20 ical climate on Taiwan; and 

21 (III) the issues affecting the rela22 tionship between the United States and 

23 the Indo-Pacific region. 

24 (ii) SECOND YEAR.—During the second 

25 year of each fellowship under this section, 


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1 each fellow, subject to the approval of the 

2 Secretary of State, the American Institute 

3 in Taiwan, and the implementing partner, 

4 and in accordance with the purposes of this 

5 section, shall work in— 

6 (I) a parliamentary office, min7 istry, or other agency of the governing 

8 authorities on Taiwan; or 

9 (II) an organization outside of the 

10 governing authorities on Taiwan, 

11 whose interests are associated with the 

12 interests of the fellow and the agency of 

13 the United States Government from 

14 which the fellow had been employed. 

15 (E) FLEXIBLE FELLOWSHIP DURATION.— 

16 Notwithstanding any requirement under this sec17 tion, the Secretary of State, in consultation with 

18 the American Institute in Taiwan and, as ap19 propriate, the implementing partner, may award 

20 fellowships that have a duration of between nine 

21 months and two years, and may alter the cur22 riculum requirements under subparagraph (D) 

23 for such purposes. 


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1 (F) SUNSET.—The Program shall terminate 

2 ten years after the date of the enactment of this 

3 section. 

4 (3) PROGRAM REQUIREMENTS.— 

5 (A) ELIGIBILITY REQUIREMENTS.—A 

6 United States citizen is eligible for a fellowship 

7 under this section if he or she— 

8 (i) is an employee of the United States 

9 Government; 

10 (ii) has at least two years of experience 

11 in any branch of the United States Govern12 ment; 

13 (iii) has received at least one exem14 plary performance review in his or her cur15 rent United States Government role within 

16 at least the last three years prior to begin17 ning the fellowship; 

18 (iv) has a demonstrated professional or 

19 educational background in the relationship 

20 between the United States and countries in 

21 the Indo-Pacific region; and 

22 (v) has demonstrated his or her com23 mitment to further service in the United 

24 States Government. 


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1 (B) RESPONSIBILITIES OF FELLOWS.—Each 

2 recipient of a fellowship under this section shall 

3 agree, as a condition of such fellowship— 

4 (i) to maintain satisfactory progress in 

5 language training and appropriate behavior 

6 in Taiwan, as determined by the Depart7 ment of State, the American Institute in 

8 Taiwan and, as appropriate, its imple9 menting partner; 

10 (ii) to refrain from engaging in any 

11 intelligence or intelligence-related activity 

12 on behalf of the United States Government; 

13 and 

14 (iii) to continue Federal Government 

15 employment for a period of not less than 

16 four years after the conclusion of the fellow17 ship, or for not less than two years for a fel18 lowship that is one year or shorter. 

19 (C) RESPONSIBILITIES OF IMPLEMENTING

20 PARTNER.— 

21 (i) SELECTION OF FELLOWS.—The im22 plementing partner, in close coordination 

23 with the Secretary of State and the Amer24 ican Institute in Taiwan, shall— 


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1 (I) make efforts to recruit fellow2 ship candidates who reflect the diver3 sity of the United States; 

4 (II) select fellows for the Program 

5 based solely on merit, with appropriate 

6 supervision from the Department of 

7 State and the American Institute in 

8 Taiwan; and 

9 (III) prioritize the selection of 

10 candidates willing to serve a fellowship 

11 lasting one year or longer. 

12 (ii) FIRST YEAR.—The implementing 

13 partner should provide each fellow in the 

14 first year (or shorter duration, as jointly 

15 determined by the Secretary of State and 

16 the American Institute in Taiwan, for those 

17 who are not serving a two-year fellowship) 

18 with— 

19 (I) intensive Mandarin Chinese 

20 language training; and 

21 (II) courses in the politic, culture, 

22 and history of Taiwan, China, and the 

23 broader Indo-Pacific. 

24 (iii) WAIVER OF REQUIRED TRAIN25 ING.—The Secretary of State, in coordinaVerDate Sep 11 2014 21:34 Dec 30, 2022 Jkt 039200 PO 00000 Frm 00150 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6203 E:\BILLS\H3524.RH H3524

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1 tion with the American Institute in Taiwan 

2 and, as appropriate, the implementing 

3 partner, may waive any of the training re4 quired under clause (ii) to the extent that a 

5 fellow has Mandarin Chinese language 

6 skills, knowledge of the topics described in 

7 clause (ii)(II), or for other related reasons 

8 approved by the Secretary of State and the 

9 American Institute in Taiwan. If any of the 

10 training requirements are waived for a fel11 low serving a two-year fellowship, the train12 ing portion of his or her fellowship may be 

13 shortened to the extent appropriate. 

14 (iv) OFFICE; STAFFING.—The imple15 menting partner, in consultation with the 

16 Secretary of State and the American Insti17 tute in Taiwan, shall maintain an office 

18 and at least one full-time staff member in 

19 Taiwan to— 

20 (I) liaise with the American Insti21 tute in Taiwan and the governing au22 thorities on Taiwan; and 

23 (II) serve as the primary in-coun24 try point of contact for the recipients 


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1 of fellowships under this section and 

2 their dependents. 

3 (v) OTHER FUNCTIONS.—The imple4 menting partner should perform other func5 tions in association in support of the Pro6 gram, including logistical and administra7 tive functions, as included in the coopera8 tive agreement entered into pursuant to 

9 paragraph (2)(B) by the Secretary of State 

10 and the American Institute in Taiwan. 

11 (D) NONCOMPLIANCE.— 

12 (i) IN GENERAL.—Any fellow who fails 

13 to comply with the requirements under this 

14 section shall reimburse the American Insti15 tute in Taiwan for— 

16 (I) the Federal funds expended for 

17 the fellow’s participation in the fellow18 ship, as set forth in clauses (ii) and 

19 (iii); and 

20 (II) interest accrued on such 

21 funds (calculated at the prevailing 

22 rate). 

23 (ii) FULL REIMBURSEMENT.—Any fel24 low who violates clause (i) or (ii) of sub25 paragraph (B) shall reimburse the AmerVerDate Sep 11 2014 21:34 Dec 30, 2022 Jkt 039200 PO 00000 Frm 00152 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6203 E:\BILLS\H3524.RH H3524

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1 ican Institute in Taiwan in an amount 

2 equal to the sum of— 

3 (I) all of the Federal funds ex4 pended for the fellow’s participation in 

5 the fellowship; and 

6 (II) interest on the amount speci7 fied in subclause (I), which shall be 

8 calculated at the prevailing rate. 

9 (iii) PRO RATA REIMBURSEMENT.— 

10 Any fellow who violates subparagraph 

11 (B)(iii) shall reimburse the American Insti12 tute in Taiwan in an amount equal to the 

13 difference between— 

14 (I) the amount specified in clause 

15 (ii); and 

16 (II) the product of— 

17 (aa) the amount the fellow 

18 received in compensation during 

19 the final year of the fellowship, 

20 including the value of any allow21 ances and benefits received by the 

22 fellow; multiplied by 

23 (bb) the percentage of the pe24 riod specified in subparagraph 

25 (B)(iii) during which the fellow 


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1 did not remain employed by the 

2 United States Government. 

3 (E) ANNUAL REPORT.—Not later than 90 

4 days after the selection of the first class of fellows 

5 under this section and annually thereafter for 10 

6 years, the Secretary of State shall offer to brief 

7 the appropriate congressional committees regard8 ing the following: 

9 (i) An assessment of the performance of 

10 the implementing partner in fulfilling the 

11 purposes of this section. 

12 (ii) The number of applicants each 

13 year, the number of applicants willing to 

14 serve a fellowship lasting one year or 

15 longer, and the number of such applicants 

16 selected for a fellowship. 

17 (iii) The names and sponsoring agen18 cies of the fellows selected by the imple19 menting partner and the extent to which 

20 such fellows represent the diversity of the 

21 United States. 

22 (iv) The names of the parliamentary 

23 offices, ministries, other agencies of the gov24 erning authorities on Taiwan, and nonVerDate Sep 11 2014 21:34 Dec 30, 2022 Jkt 039200 PO 00000 Frm 00154 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6203 E:\BILLS\H3524.RH H3524

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1 governmental institutions to which each fel2 low was assigned. 

3 (v) Any recommendations, as appro4 priate, to improve the implementation of 

5 the Program, including added flexibilities 

6 in the administration of the program. 

7 (vi) An assessment of the Program’s 

8 value upon the relationship between the 

9 United States and Taiwan or the United 

10 States and Asian countries. 

11 (F) ANNUAL FINANCIAL AUDIT.— 

12 (i) IN GENERAL.—The financial 

13 records of any implementing partner shall 

14 be audited annually in accordance with 

15 generally accepted auditing standards by 

16 independent certified public accountants or 

17 independent licensed public accountants 

18 who are certified or licensed by a regulatory 

19 authority of a State or another political 

20 subdivision of the United States. 

21 (ii) LOCATION.—Each audit under 

22 clause (i) shall be conducted at the place or 

23 places where the financial records of the im24 plementing partner are normally kept. 


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1 (iii) ACCESS TO DOCUMENTS.—The 

2 implementing partner shall make available 

3 to the accountants conducting an audit 

4 under clause (i)— 

5 (I) all books, financial records, 

6 files, other papers, things, and prop7 erty belonging to, or in use by, the im8 plementing partner that are necessary 

9 to facilitate the audit; and 

10 (II) full facilities for verifying 

11 transactions with the balances or secu12 rities held by depositories, fiscal 

13 agents, and custodians. 

14 (iv) REPORT.— 

15 (I) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 

16 180 days after the end of each fiscal 

17 year, the implementing partner shall 

18 provide a report of the audit conducted 

19 for such fiscal year under clause (i) to 

20 the Secretary of State and the Amer21 ican Institute in Taiwan. 

22 (II) CONTENTS.—Each audit re23 port under subclause (I) shall— 

24 (aa) set forth the scope of the 

25 audit at issue; 


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1 (bb) include such statements, 

2 along with the auditor’s opinion 

3 of those statements, as may be 

4 necessary to present fairly the im5 plementing partner’s assets and 

6 liabilities, surplus or deficit, with 

7 reasonable detail; 

8 (cc) include a statement of 

9 the implementing partner’s in10 come and expenses during the 

11 year; and 

12 (dd) include a schedule of— 

13 (AA) all contracts and 

14 cooperative agreements re15 quiring payments greater 

16 than $5,000; and 

17 (BB) any payments of 

18 compensation, salaries, or 

19 fees at a rate greater than 

20 $5,000 per year. 

21 (III) COPIES.—Each audit report 

22 shall be produced in sufficient copies 

23 for distribution to the public. 

24 (4) TAIWAN FELLOWS ON DETAIL FROM GOVERN25 MENT SERVICE.— 


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1 (A) IN GENERAL.— 

2 (i) DETAIL AUTHORIZED.—With the 

3 approval of the Secretary of State, an agen4 cy head may detail, for a period of not 

5 more than two years, an employee of the 

6 agency of the United States Government 

7 who has been awarded a fellowship under 

8 this Act, to the American Institute in Tai9 wan for the purpose of assignment to the 

10 governing authorities on Taiwan or an or11 ganization described in paragraph 

12 (2)(D)(ii)(II). 

13 (ii) AGREEMENT.—Each detailee shall 

14 enter into a written agreement with the 

15 Federal Government before receiving a fel16 lowship, in which the fellow shall agree— 

17 (I) to continue in the service of 

18 the sponsoring agency at the end of fel19 lowship for a period of at least four 

20 years (or at least two years if the fel21 lowship duration is one year or short22 er) unless such detailee is involuntarily 

23 separated from the service of such 

24 agency; and 


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1 (II) to pay to the American Insti2 tute in Taiwan any additional ex3 penses incurred by the United States 

4 Government in connection with the fel5 lowship if the detailee voluntarily sep6 arates from service with the sponsoring 

7 agency before the end of the period for 

8 which the detailee has agreed to con9 tinue in the service of such agency. 

10 (iii) EXCEPTION.—The payment 

11 agreed to under clause (ii)(II) may not be 

12 required of a detailee who leaves the service 

13 of the sponsoring agency to enter into the 

14 service of another agency of the United 

15 States Government unless the head of the 

16 sponsoring agency notifies the detailee be17 fore the effective date of entry into the serv18 ice of the other agency that payment will be 

19 required under this subsection. 

20 (B) STATUS AS GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEE.— 

21 A detailee under this paragraph— 

22 (i) is deemed, for the purpose of pre23 serving allowances, privileges, rights, senior24 ity, and other benefits, to be an employee of 

25 the sponsoring agency; 


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1 (ii) is entitled to pay, allowances, and 

2 benefits from funds available to such agen3 cy, which is deemed to comply with section 

4 5536 of title 5, United States Code; and 

5 (iii) may be assigned to a position 

6 with an entity described in paragraph 

7 (2)(D)(ii)(I) if acceptance of such position 

8 does not involve— 

9 (I) the taking of an oath of alle10 giance to another government; or 

11 (II) the acceptance of compensa12 tion or other benefits from any foreign 

13 government by such detailee. 

14 (C) RESPONSIBILITIES OF SPONSORING

15 AGENCY.— 

16 (i) IN GENERAL.—The agency of the 

17 United States Government from which a 

18 detailee is detailed should provide the fellow 

19 allowances and benefits that are consistent 

20 with Department of State Standardized 

21 Regulations or other applicable rules and 

22 regulations, including— 

23 (I) a living quarters allowance to 

24 cover the cost of housing in Taiwan; 


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1 (II) a cost of living allowance to 

2 cover any possible higher costs of living 

3 in Taiwan; 

4 (III) a temporary quarters sub5 sistence allowance for up to seven days 

6 if the fellow is unable to find housing 

7 immediately upon arriving in Taiwan; 

8 (IV) an education allowance to 

9 assist parents in providing the fellow’s 

10 minor children with educational serv11 ices ordinarily provided without charge 

12 by public schools in the United States; 

13 (V) moving expenses to transport 

14 personal belongings of the fellow and 

15 his or her family in their move to Tai16 wan, which is comparable to the allow17 ance given for American Institute in 

18 Taiwan employees assigned to Taiwan; 

19 and 

20 (VI) an economy-class airline 

21 ticket to and from Taiwan for each fel22 low and the fellow’s immediate family. 

23 (ii) MODIFICATION OF BENEFITS.—The 

24 American Institute in Taiwan and its im25 plementing partner, with the approval of 


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1 the Department of State, may modify the 

2 benefits set forth in clause (i) if such modi3 fication is warranted by fiscal cir4 cumstances. 

5 (D) NO FINANCIAL LIABILITY.—The Amer6 ican Institute in Taiwan, the implementing 

7 partner, and any governing authorities on Tai8 wan or nongovernmental entities in Taiwan at 

9 which a fellow is detailed during the second year 

10 of the fellowship may not be held responsible for 

11 the pay, allowances, or any other benefit nor12 mally provided to the detailee. 

13 (E) REIMBURSEMENT.—Fellows may be de14 tailed under clause (A)(ii) without reimburse15 ment to the United States by the American Insti16 tute in Taiwan. 

17 (F) ALLOWANCES AND BENEFITS.— 

18 Detailees may be paid by the American Institute 

19 in Taiwan for the allowances and benefits listed 

20 in subparagraph (C). 

21 (5) GAO REPORT.—Not later than one year be22 fore the sunset of the Program pursuant to paragraph 

23 (2)(F), the Comptroller General of the United States 

24 shall transmit to the Committee on Foreign Relations 

25 of the Senate and the Committee on Foreign Affairs 


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1 of the House of Representatives a report that includes 

2 the following: 

3 (A) An analysis of United States Govern4 ment participants in the Program, including the 

5 number of applicants and the number of fellow6 ships undertaken, and the places of employment. 

7 (B) An assessment of the costs and benefits 

8 for participants in the Program and for the 

9 United States Government of such fellowships. 

10 (C) An analysis of the financial impact of 

11 the fellowship on United States Government of12 fices that have detailed fellows to participate in 

13 the Program. 

14 (D) Recommendations, if any, on how to 

15 improve the Program. 

16 (6) FUNDING.— 

17 (A) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIA18 TIONS.—There are authorized to be appropriated 

19 to the American Institute in Taiwan— 

20 (i) for fiscal year 2022, $2,900,000, of 

21 which $500,000 should be made available to 

22 an appropriate implementing partner to 

23 launch the Program; and 

24 (ii) for fiscal year 2023, and each suc25 ceeding fiscal year, $2,400,000. 


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1 (B) PRIVATE SOURCES.—The implementing 

2 partner selected to implement the Program may 

3 accept, use, and dispose of gifts or donations of 

4 services or property in carrying out such pro5 gram, subject to the review and approval of the 

6 American Institute in Taiwan. 

7 SEC. 213. INCREASING DEPARTMENT OF STATE PERSONNEL 

8 AND RESOURCES DEVOTED TO THE INDO-PA9 CIFIC. 

10 (a) FINDINGS.—Congress makes the following findings: 

11 (1) In fiscal year 2020, the Department of State 

12 allocated $1,500,000,000 to the Indo-Pacific region in 

13 bilateral and regional foreign assistance resources, in14 cluding as authorized by section 201(b) of the Asia 

15 Reassurance Initiative Act of 2018 (Public Law 115– 

16 409; 132 Stat. 5391), and $798,000,000 in the fiscal 

17 year 2020 diplomatic engagement budget. These 

18 amounts represent only 5 percent of the diplomatic 

19 engagement budget and only 4 percent of the total De20 partment of State-USAID budget. 

21 (2) Over the last 5 years the diplomatic engage22 ment budget and personnel levels in the Indo-Pacific 

23 averaged only 5 percent of the total, while foreign as24 sistance resources averaged only 4 percent of the total. 


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1 (3) In 2020, the Department of State began a 

2 process to realign certain positions at posts to ensure 

3 that its personnel footprint matches the demands of 

4 great-power competition, including in the Indo-Pa5 cific. 

6 (b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Congress 

7 that— 

8 (1) the size of the United States diplomatic corps 

9 must be sufficient to meet the current and emerging 

10 challenges of the 21st century, including those in the 

11 Indo-Pacific region and elsewhere; 

12 (2) robust Chinese-language skills are necessary 

13 for the success of the United States diplomatic corps 

14 and integral to its ability to meet national security 

15 objectives; 

16 (3) the increase must be designed to meet the ob17 jectives of an Indo-Pacific strategy focused on 

18 strengthening the good governance and sovereignty of 

19 countries that adhere to and uphold the rules-based 

20 international order; and 

21 (4) the increase must be implemented with a 

22 focus on increased numbers of economic, political, and 

23 public diplomacy officers, representing a cumulative 

24 increase of at least 200 Foreign Service officer gener25 alists, to— 


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1 (A) advance free, fair, and reciprocal trade 

2 and open investment environments for United 

3 States entities, and engaged in increased com4 mercial diplomacy in key markets; 

5 (B) better articulate and explain United 

6 States policies, strengthen civil society and 

7 democratic principles, enhance reporting on glob8 al activities, promote people-to-people exchanges, 

9 and advance United States influence; and 

10 (C) increase capacity at small- and me11 dium-sized embassies and consulates in the Indo12 Pacific and other regions around the world, as 

13 necessary. 

14 (c) STATEMENT OF POLICY.—It shall be the policy of 

15 the United States to— 

16 (1) ensure Department of State funding levels 

17 and personnel footprint in the Indo-Pacific reflect the 

18 region’s high degree of importance and significance to 

19 United States political, economic, and security inter20 ests; and 

21 (2) increase diplomatic engagement and foreign 

22 assistance funding and the quantity of personnel 

23 dedicated to the Indo-Pacific region respective to the 

24 Department of State’s total budget. 


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1 (d) ACTION PLAN.—Not later than 180 days after the 

2 date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State 

3 shall provide to the appropriate congressional committees 

4 of Congress an action plan that includes the following ele5 ments: 

6 (1) Identification of requirements to advance 

7 United States strategic objectives in the Indo-Pacific 

8 and the personnel and budgetary resources for the De9 partment of State needed to satisfy such objectives, as10 suming an unconstrained resource environment. 

11 (2) A plan to increase the portion of the Depart12 ment’s budget dedicated to the Indo-Pacific in terms 

13 of DE and FA focused on development, economic, and 

14 security assistance. 

15 (3) A plan to increase the number of positions 

16 at posts in the Indo-Pacific region and bureaus with 

17 responsibility for the Indo-Pacific region, including a 

18 description of increases at each post or bureau, a 

19 breakdown of increases by cone, and a description of 

20 how such increases in personnel will advance United 

21 States strategic objectives in the Indo-Pacific region. 

22 (4) A plan to increase the number of Chinese23 language speakers and translation specialists at posts 

24 in the Indo-Pacific region and within bureau offices 


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1 with responsibility for the Indo-Pacific region, in2 cluding in INR. 

3 (5) A description of any staffing or other train4 ing or personnel reforms that may be required to 

5 quickly increase departmental capacity to address the 

6 inter-disciplinary, interconnected opportunities and 

7 challenges presented in the Indo-Pacific, including 

8 but not limited to issues related to climate change, 

9 public health, supply chains, cybersecurity, and dig10 ital technology issues. 

11 (6) Defined concrete and annual benchmarks 

12 that the Department will meet in implementing the 

13 action plan. 

14 (7) A description of any barriers to imple15 menting the action plan and recommendations to ad16 dress these barriers, noting whether additional au17 thorities or resources from Congress is needed to ad18 dress these barriers. 

19 (e) UPDATES TO REPORT AND BRIEFING.—Every 180 

20 days after the submission of the action plan described in 

21 subsection (d) for not more than 3 years, the Secretary of 

22 State shall submit an update and brief the appropriate con23 gressional committees on the implementation of such action 

24 plan, with supporting data and including a detailed assess25 ment of benchmarks reached. 


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1 (f) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—There is 

2 authorized to be appropriated, for fiscal year 2022, 

3 $2,000,000,000 in bilateral and regional foreign assistance 

4 resources to carry out the purposes of part I and chapter 

5 4 of part II of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 

6 2151 et seq., 2346 et seq.) to the Indo-Pacific region and 

7 $1,250,000,000 in diplomatic engagement resources to the 

8 Indo-Pacific region. 

9 (g) INCLUSION OF AMOUNTS APPROPRIATED PURSU10 ANT TO ASIA REASSURANCE INITIATIVE ACT OF 2018.— 

11 Amounts authorized to be appropriated under subsection (f) 

12 include funds authorized to be appropriated pursuant to 

13 section 201(b) of the Asia Reassurance Initiative Act of 

14 2018 (Public Law 115–409). 

15 (h) BENCHMARKS UPDATE.—Not later than 2 years 

16 after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary 

17 of State shall report to the appropriate congressional com18 mittees on the extent to which the strategic objectives de19 scribed in the action plan in subsection (d) have been satis20 fied or progress toward such satisfaction has been made. 

21 SEC. 214. REPORT ON BILATERAL EFFORTS TO ADDRESS 

22 CHINESE FENTANYL TRAFFICKING. 

23 (a) CHINA’S CLASS SCHEDULING OF FENTANYL AND

24 SYNTHETIC OPIOID PRECURSORS.—Not later than 180 

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1 retary of State and Attorney General shall submit to the 

2 appropriate congressional committees a written report de3 tailing— 

4 (1) a description of United States Government 

5 efforts to gain a commitment from the Government of 

6 the People’s Republic of China (PRC) to submit un7 regulated fentanyl precursors such as 4–AP to con8 trols; 

9 (2) a plan for future steps the United States 

10 Government will take to urge the PRC to combat il11 licit fentanyl production and trafficking originating 

12 in the PRC; 

13 (3) an assessment of the intersection between il14 licit fentanyl trafficking originating in China and il15 licit environmental trade and possible relationships of 

16 trade-based money laundering; and 

17 (4) an assessment of the intersection between il18 licit fentanyl trafficking originating in China and 

19 counterfeit medicines and medical supplies in the 

20 United States. 

21 (b) FORM OF REPORT.—The report required under 

22 subsection (a) shall be submitted in unclassified form with 

23 a classified annex. 


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1 SEC. 215. FACILITATION OF INCREASED EQUITY INVEST2 MENTS UNDER THE BETTER UTILIZATION OF 

3 INVESTMENTS LEADING TO DEVELOPMENT 

4 ACT OF 2018. 

5 (a) APPLICABILITY OF FEDERAL CREDIT REFORM ACT

6 OF 1990.—Section 1421(c) of the Better Utilization of In7 vestments Leading to Development Act of 2018 (22 U.S.C. 

8 9621(c)) is amended by adding at the end the following: 

9 ‘‘(7) APPLICABILITY OF FEDERAL CREDIT RE10 FORM ACT OF 1990.— 

11 ‘‘(A) IN GENERAL.—Subject to subpara12 graphs (B) and (C), support provided under 

13 paragraph (1) with respect to a project shall be 

14 considered to be a Federal credit program that is 

15 subject to the Federal Credit Reform Act of 1990 

16 (2 U.S.C. 661 et seq.) for purposes of applying 

17 the requirements of such Act to such support. 

18 ‘‘(B) DETERMINATION OF COST.— 

19 ‘‘(i) IN GENERAL.—For purposes of 

20 section 502(5) of the Federal Credit Reform 

21 Act of 1990 (2 U.S.C. 661a(5) et seq.) the 

22 cost of support provided under paragraph 

23 (1) with respect to a project shall be the net 

24 present value, at the time when funds are 

25 disbursed to provide the support, of the fol26 lowing estimated cash flows: 


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1 ‘‘(I) The purchase price of the 

2 support. 

3 ‘‘(II) Dividends, redemptions, and 

4 other shareholder distributions during 

5 the term of the support. 

6 ‘‘(III) Proceeds received upon a 

7 sale, redemption, or other liquidation 

8 of the support. 

9 ‘‘(IV) Adjustments for risk of esti10 mated losses, if any. 

11 ‘‘(ii) CHANGES IN TERMS INCLUDED.— 

12 The estimated cash flows described in sub13 clauses (I) through (IV) of clause (i) shall 

14 include the effects of changes in terms re15 sulting from the exercise of options included 

16 in the agreement to provide the support. 

17 ‘‘(C) REESTIMATE OF COST.—When the esti18 mated cost of support provided under paragraph 

19 (1) with respect to a project made in a single fis20 cal year is reestimated in a subsequent year, the 

21 difference between the reestimated cost and the 

22 previous cost estimate shall be paid from the bal23 ances available in the Corporate Capital Account 

24 established under section 1434.’’. 


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1 (b) MAXIMUM CONTINGENT LIABILITY.—Section 1433 

2 of the Better Utilization of Investments Leading to Develop3 ment Act of 2018 (22 U.S.C. 9633) is amended by striking 

4 ‘‘$60,000,000,000’’ and inserting ‘‘$100,000,000,000’’. 

5 (c) FUNDING FOR CORPORATE CAPITAL ACCOUNT.— 

6 Section 1434(b) of the Better Utilization of Investments 

7 Leading to Development Act of 2018 (22 U.S.C. 9634(b)) 

8 is amended— 

9 (1) in paragraph (5), by striking ‘‘and’’ at the 

10 end; 

11 (2) by redesignating paragraph (6) as para12 graph (7); and 

13 (3) by inserting after paragraph (5) the fol14 lowing: 

15 ‘‘(6) receipts of reestimated costs received pursu16 ant to section 1421(c); and’’. 

17 (d) REPORT.—Not later than 180 days after the date 

18 of the enactment of this Act, the Chief Executive Officer of 

19 the United States International Development Finance Cor20 poration shall submit to the appropriate congressional com21 mittees and the Committee on Appropriations of the House 

22 of Representatives and the Senate a report on— 

23 (1) a plan to expand the Corporation’s financing 

24 to support United States national security and devel25 opment priorities in critical regions; and 


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1 (2) the budgetary, staffing, and programmatic 

2 resources that would be required in order to carry out 

3 the plan required by this subsection. 

4 SEC. 216. EXPANDING INVESTMENT BY UNITED STATES 

5 INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT FINANCE 

6 CORPORATION FOR VACCINE MANUFAC7 TURING. 

8 (a) IN GENERAL.—The Development Finance Corpora9 tion is authorized to provide financing to entities in India 

10 and in other less developed countries to increase vaccine 

11 manufacturing capacity for the following purposes: 

12 (1) Manufacturing Stringent Regulatory Author13 ization (SRA) or World Health Organization (WHO) 

14 Emergency Use Listing COVID–19 vaccines. 

15 (2) Manufacturing SRA or WHO Emergency 

16 Use Listing therapeutics used to treat symptoms re17 lated to COVID–19. 

18 (3) Manufacturing critical medical supplies 

19 needed for preventing, detecting and treating COVID– 

20 19, including ventilators, personal protective equip21 ment, oxygen, diagnostics, therapeutics and vaccines. 

22 (b) REPORTING REQUIREMENT.—Not later than 180 

23 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Chief 

24 Executive Officer of the Development Finance Corporation, 


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1 in coordination with the Secretary of State, shall provide 

2 a report to the appropriate congressional committees— 

3 (1) outlining the countries where DFC financing 

4 could be most impactful for vaccine manufacturing 

5 and to achieve the goal of manufacturing 1 billion 

6 COVID–19 vaccines by 2022; 

7 (2) including a detailed explanation of the 

8 United States and partner country interests served by 

9 the United States providing support to such projects; 

10 (3) including a detailed description of any sup11 port provided by other United States allies and part12 ners to expand the initiatives outlined in subsection 

13 (a); and 

14 (4) including a detailed description of any sup15 port provided by the People’s Republic of China in 

16 support of the initiatives outlined in subsection (a). 

17 (c) FORM OF REPORT.—The report required by sub18 section (b) shall be submitted in unclassified form with a 

19 classified annex if necessary. 

20 SEC. 217. ENSURING UNITED STATES DIPLOMATIC POSTS 

21 ALIGN WITH AMERICAN STRATEGIC NA22 TIONAL SECURITY AND ECONOMIC OBJEC23 TIVES. 

24 (a) FINDING.—With 276 embassies and other rep25 resentative offices globally, China now has more diplomatic 


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1 posts around the world than any other country, including 

2 the United States. Many of Beijing’s new missions can be 

3 found in countries that recently broke ties with Taiwan 

4 (Burkina Faso, the Dominican Republic, El Salvador, the 

5 Gambia, and Sa ̃o Tome ́ and Principe) or do not have any 

6 United States diplomatic physical presence despite these 

7 countries asking for increased United States engagement 

8 and investment (Antigua and Barbuda and Dominica). 

9 (b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Congress, 

10 that the Department of State should conduct an assessment 

11 of all United States diplomatic missions and posts to verify 

12 such missions and posts align with United States national 

13 security and economic interests, as well as ensuring that 

14 these locations position the United States appropriately 

15 with its strategic competitors to advance the national inter16 est in every country worldwide, including those countries 

17 currently lacking any physical United States diplomatic 

18 presence, whether an embassy, consulate general, or prin19 cipal officer post. 

20 (c) REPORTING.—Not later than 180 days after the 

21 date of the enactment of this Act and biennially thereafter 

22 for 4 years, the Secretary of State shall submit to the appro23 priate congressional committees a report assessing the num24 ber, location, and objectives of each of its diplomatic mis25 sions and posts worldwide, including an assessment of any 


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1 gaps that exist compared to other country strategic competi2 tors. The Secretary of State shall coordinate with the heads 

3 of other Federal departments and agencies having an over4 seas presence at any United States diplomatic mission or 

5 post to ensure such assessment reflects all Federal Govern6 ment equities and viewpoints. 

7 SEC. 218. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS FOR THE 

8 FULBRIGHT-HAYS PROGRAM. 

9 There are authorized to be appropriated, for the 5-year 

10 period beginning on October 1, 2021, $105,500,000, to pro11 mote education, training, research, and foreign language 

12 skills through the Fulbright-Hays Program, in accordance 

13 with section 102(b) of the Mutual Educational and Cultural 

14 Exchange Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2452(b)). 

15 SEC. 219. SUPPORTING INDEPENDENT MEDIA AND COUN16 TERING DISINFORMATION. 

17 (a) AUTHORIZATION OF USAGM APPROPRIATIONS.— 

18 There is authorized to be appropriated for the United States 

19 Agency for Global Media $100,000,000 for each of fiscal 

20 years 2022 through 2026, for ongoing and new programs 

21 to support local media, build independent media, combat 

22 CCP disinformation inside and outside of the People’s Re23 public of China, invest in technology to subvert censorship, 

24 and monitor and evaluate such programs, of which— 


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1 (1) not less than $50,000,000 shall be directed to 

2 a grant to Radio Free Asia language services; 

3 (2) not less than $20,000,000 shall be made 

4 available to serve populations in China through Man5 darin, Cantonese, Uyghur, and Tibetan language 

6 services; and 

7 (3) not less than $5,500,000 shall be made avail8 able for digital media services— 

9 (A) to counter propaganda of non-Chinese 

10 populations in foreign countries; and 

11 (B) to counter propaganda of Chinese popu12 lations in China through ‘‘Global Mandarin’’ 

13 programming. 

14 (b) SUPPORT FOR LOCAL MEDIA.—The Secretary of 

15 State, acting through the Assistant Secretary of State for 

16 Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, and the Adminis17 trator of the United States Agency for International Devel18 opment, acting through the Assistant Administrator for De19 velopment, Democracy, and Innovation, shall jointly sup20 port and train foreign journalists on investigative tech21 niques necessary to ensure public accountability, promote 

22 transparency, fight corruption, and support the ability of 

23 the public to develop informed opinions about pressing 

24 issues facing their countries. 


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1 (c) INTERNET FREEDOM PROGRAMS.—The Bureau of 

2 Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor shall continue to 

3 support internet freedom programs. 

4 (d) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—There is 

5 authorized to be appropriated to the Department of State 

6 and United States Agency for International Development 

7 $170,000,000 for each of fiscal years 2022 through 2026, 

8 for ongoing and new programs in support of press freedom, 

9 training, and protection of journalists. Amounts appro10 priated pursuant to this authorization are authorized to re11 main available until expended and shall be in addition to 

12 amounts otherwise authorized to be appropriated to support 

13 press freedom, training, and protection of journalists. 

14 SEC. 219A. GLOBAL ENGAGEMENT CENTER. 

15 (a) FINDING.—Congress established the Global Engage16 ment Center to ‘‘direct, lead, and coordinate efforts’’ of the 

17 Federal Government to ‘‘recognize, understand, expose, and 

18 counter foreign state and non-state propaganda and 

19 disinformation globally’’. 

20 (b) EXTENSION.—Section 1287(j) of the National De21 fense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017 (22 U.S.C. 

22 2656 note) is amended by striking ‘‘the date that is 8 years 

23 after the date of the enactment of this Act’’ and inserting 

24 ‘‘December 31, 2027’’. 


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1 (c) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Congress 

2 that the Global Engagement Center should expand its co3 ordinating capacity of diplomatic messaging through the 

4 exchange of liaison officers with Federal departments and 

5 agencies that manage aspects of identifying and countering 

6 foreign disinformation, including the Office of the Director 

7 of National Intelligence and Special Operations Com8 mand’s Joint MISO Web Operations Center. 

9 (d) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—There is 

10 authorized to be appropriated $150,000,000 for fiscal year 

11 2022 for the Global Engagement Center to counter foreign 

12 state and non-state sponsored propaganda and 

13 disinformation. 

14 SEC. 219B. REPORT ON ORIGINS OF THE COVID–19 PAN15 DEMIC. 

16 (a) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Congress 

17 that— 

18 (1) it is critical to understand the origins of the 

19 COVID–19 pandemic so the United States can better 

20 prepare, prevent, and respond to pandemic health 

21 threats in the future; 

22 (2) given the impact of the COVID–19 pandemic 

23 on all Americans, the American people deserve to 

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1 ment possesses about the origins of COVID–19, as ap2 propriate; 

3 (3) it is critical for independent experts to have 

4 full access to all pertinent human, animal, and envi5 ronmental data, biological sample, research, and per6 sonnel involved in the early stages of the outbreak rel7 evant to determining how this pandemic emerged; 

8 (4) Congress shares the concerns expressed by the 

9 United States Government and 13 other foreign gov10 ernments that the international team of experts dis11 patched to the People’s Republic of China by the 

12 World Health Organization (WHO) to study the ori13 gins of the SARS–CoV–2 virus was ‘‘significantly de14 layed and lacked access to complete, original data 

15 and samples’’; 

16 (5) the March 30, 2021, statement by the Direc17 tor-General of the WHO, Dr. Tedros Adhanom 

18 Ghebreyesus, further affirms that the investigative 

19 team had encountered ‘‘difficulties’’ in accessing nec20 essary raw data, that ‘‘we have not yet found the 

21 source of the virus’’, and that ‘‘all hypotheses remain 

22 on the table’’; 

23 (6) the G7 communique expressing support for 

24 full implementation of the International Health Reg25 ulations, including ‘‘a timely, transparent, expert-led, 


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1 and science-based WHO-convened Phase 2 COVID–19 

2 Origins study including, as recommended by the ex3 perts’ report, in China’’ is a valuable commitment by 

4 the United States and its allies to investigating the 

5 origins of COVID–19 in order to better prepare for 

6 future pandemics; and 

7 (7) Congress supports the effort announced by 

8 President Biden, directing the intelligence community 

9 to conduct a 90 day review to further analyze infor10 mation pointing to the origins of COVID–19. 

11 (b) REPORT REQUIRED.—Not later than 180 days 

12 after enactment of this Act, the President shall submit to 

13 the appropriate committees of Congress a report consisting 

14 of— 

15 (1) an assessment of the most likely source or or16 igin of the SARS–CoV–2 virus, including a detailed 

17 review of all information the United States possesses 

18 that it has identified as potentially relevant to the 

19 source or origin of the SARS–CoV–2 virus, including 

20 zoonotic transmission and spillover, or other sources 

21 of origin, transmission, or spillover, based on the in22 formation the United States Government has to date; 

23 (2) its level of confidence in its assessment; and 

24 (3) challenges identified to its ability to make 

25 such an assessment. 


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1 (c) FORM.—The report required by subsection (b) shall 

2 be submitted in unclassified form but may include a classi3 fied annex. 

4 (d) APPROPRIATE COMMITTEES OF CONGRESS DE5 FINED.—In this section, the term ‘‘appropriate committees 

6 of Congress’’ means— 

7 (1) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the 

8 Senate; 

9 (2) the Select Committee on Intelligence of the 

10 Senate; 

11 (3) the Committee on Health, Education, Labor, 

12 and Pensions of the Senate; 

13 (4) the Committee on Energy and Natural Re14 sources of the Senate; 

15 (5) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the 

16 House of Representatives; 

17 (6) the Permanent Select Committee on Intel18 ligence of the House of Representatives; and 

19 (7) the Committee on Energy and Commerce of 

20 the House of Representatives. 

21 SEC. 219C. EXTENSION OF ASIA REASSURANCE INITIATIVE 

22 ACT OF 2018. 

23 (a) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Congress 

24 that— 


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1 (1) the Indo-Pacific region is home to many of 

2 the world’s most dynamic democracies, economic op3 portunities, as well as many challenges to United 

4 States interests and values as a result of the growth 

5 in authoritarian governance in the region and by 

6 broad challenges posed by nuclear proliferation, the 

7 changing environment, and deteriorating adherence to 

8 human rights principles and obligations; 

9 (2) the People’s Republic of China poses a par10 ticular threat as it repeatedly violates internationally 

11 recognized human rights, engages in unfair economic 

12 and trade practices, disregards international laws 

13 and norms, coerces its neighbors, engages in malign 

14 influence operations, and enables global digital 

15 authoritarianism; 

16 (3) the Asia Reassurance Initiative Act of 2018 

17 (‘‘ARIA’’) enhances the United States’ commitment in 

18 the Indo-Pacific region by— 

19 (A) expanding its defense cooperation with 

20 its allies and partners; 

21 (B) investing in democracy and the protec22 tion of human rights; 

23 (C) engaging in cybersecurity initiatives; 

24 and 


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1 (D) supporting people-to-people engagement 

2 and other shared priorities; and 

3 (4) the 2019 Department of Defense Indo-Pacific 

4 Strategy Report concludes that ARIA ‘‘enshrines a 

5 generational whole-of-government policy framework 

6 that demonstrates U.S. commitment to a free and 

7 open Indo-Pacific region’’. 

8 (b) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—The Asia 

9 Reassurance Initiative Act of 2018 (Public Law 115–409) 

10 is amended— 

11 (1) in section 201(b), by striking 

12 ‘‘$1,500,000,000 for each of the fiscal years 2019 

13 through 2023’’ and inserting ‘‘$2,000,000,000 for each 

14 of fiscal years 2022 through 2026’’; 

15 (2) in section 215(b), by striking ‘‘2023’’ and in16 serting ‘‘2026’’; 

17 (3) in section 306(a)— 

18 (A) in paragraph (1), by striking ‘‘5 years’’ 

19 and inserting ‘‘8 years’’; and 

20 (B) in paragraph (2), by striking ‘‘2023’’ 

21 and inserting ‘‘2026’’; 

22 (4) in section 409(a)(1), by striking ‘‘2023’’ and 

23 inserting ‘‘2026’’; 

24 (5) in section 410— 


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1 (A) in subsection (c), by striking ‘‘2023’’ 

2 and inserting ‘‘2026’’; and 

3 (B) in subsection (d), in the matter pre4 ceding paragraph (1), by striking ‘‘2023’’ and 

5 inserting ‘‘2026’’; and 

6 (6) in section 411, by striking ‘‘2023’’ and in7 serting ‘‘2026’’. 

8 SEC. 219D. INVESTMENT, TRADE, AND DEVELOPMENT IN AF9 RICA AND LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIB10 BEAN. 

11 (a) STRATEGY REQUIRED.— 

12 (1) IN GENERAL.—The President shall establish 

13 United States strategies to promote, facilitate, and in14 crease trade and investment and development in Afri15 ca and Latin America and the Caribbean. 

16 (2) FOCUS OF STRATEGY.—The strategy required 

17 by paragraph (1) shall focus on increasing two-way 

18 trade and investment with Africa and Latin America 

19 and the Caribbean by 200 percent in real dollar value 

20 by the date that is 5 years after the date of the enact21 ment of this Act. 

22 (3) SUBMISSION TO CONGRESS.— 

23 (A) UNITED STATES STRATEGY TO PRO24 MOTE TWO-WAY TRADE AND INVESTMENT IN AF25 RICA, LATIN AMERICA, AND THE CARIBBEAN.— 


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1 Not later than 180 days after the date of the en2 actment of this Act, the President, in consulta3 tion with the heads of the relevant Federal de4 partments and agencies, shall submit to the ap5 propriate congressional committees and make 

6 publicly available a government-wide strategy 

7 for Africa, to be known as the Prosper Africa 

8 Strategy, and for Latin America and the Carib9 bean, that provides detailed descriptions of how 

10 the United States intends to fulfill the policy ob11 jectives described in paragraph (2). The strate12 gies shall— 

13 (i) support and be aligned with other 

14 existing United States Government strate15 gies; and 

16 (ii) include specific and measurable 

17 goals, benchmarks, performance metrics, 

18 timetables, and monitoring and evaluation 

19 plans to ensure the accountability and effec20 tiveness of all policies and initiatives car21 ried out under the strategy. 

22 (B) SPECIFIC PLANS FOR DEPARTMENTS

23 AND AGENCIES.—The strategies submitted pursu24 ant to subparagraph (A) shall also include spe25 cific implementation plans, in coordination with 


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1 the recommendations and activities of the Eco2 nomic Diplomacy Action Group under section 

3 708 of the Championing American Business 

4 Through Diplomacy Act of 2019 (22 U.S.C. 

5 9904), from each of the relevant Federal depart6 ments and agencies that describes— 

7 (i) the anticipated contributions of the 

8 department or agency, including technical, 

9 financial, and in-kind contributions, to im10 plement the strategies; 

11 (ii) the efforts of the department or 

12 agency to ensure that the policies and ini13 tiatives carried out pursuant to the strate14 gies are designed to achieve maximum im15 pact and effectiveness; and 

16 (iii) recommendations on necessary re17 sources, including staffing, to expand efforts 

18 to promote trade and investment between 

19 the United States and Africa, and the 

20 United States and Latin America and the 

21 Caribbean. 

22 (C) INTERAGENCY COORDINATION.—The 

23 strategies submitted pursuant to subparagraph 

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1 tion of agency-specific plans described in sub2 paragraph (B), particularly as it relates to ad3 vancing two-way trade and investment trans4 actions and business enabling environment re5 forms. 

6 (b) REPORT.—Not later than 180 days after the sub7 mission of the strategies required by subsection (a)(3), and 

8 annually thereafter until 2026, the President shall submit 

9 to the appropriate congressional committees a report, in co10 ordination with the report required by section 707 of the 

11 Championing American Business Through Diplomacy Act 

12 of 2019 (22 U.S.C. 9903) that— 

13 (1) summarizes and evaluates the implementa14 tion of United States diplomatic efforts and foreign 

15 assistance programs, projects, and activities to ad16 vance the policy objectives set forth in subsection 

17 (a)(2); 

18 (2) describes the nature and extent of the coordi19 nation among the relevant Federal departments and 

20 agencies, including summary of activities and engage21 ments of the Economic Diplomacy Action Group; and 

22 (3) describes the monitoring and evaluation 

23 tools, mechanisms, and indicators to assess progress 

24 made on the policy objectives of this section. 


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1 (c) EXECUTIVE DIRECTORS FOR AFRICA AND LATIN

2 AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN TRADE AND INVESTMENT.— 

3 The President shall designate an individual to serve as the 

4 Executive Director for Trade and Investment Strategy in 

5 Africa, also known as the Prosper Africa Executive Direc6 tor, and an individual to serve as Executive Director for 

7 Trade and Investment Strategy in Latin America and the 

8 Caribbean to— 

9 (1) oversee the development and implementation 

10 of the strategies required by subsection (a); and 

11 (2) coordinate developing and implementing the 

12 strategy with the Office of the United States Trade 

13 Representative, the Office of Management and Budget, 

14 and the relevant departments and agencies. 

15 (d) BUSINESS DEVELOPMENT EXCHANGES WITH AF16 RICA AND LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN.—It is the 

17 sense of Congress that, not later than one year after the 

18 date of the enactment of this Act, high-level officials of rel19 evant departments and agencies of the United States Gov20 ernment with responsibility for promoting trade, invest21 ment, financing, and development should conduct joint ac22 tivities to advance the strategies described in subsection(a), 

23 including business development exchanges with public and 

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1 ica, and the Caribbean who are focused on promoting two2 way trade and investment. 

3 (e) TRAINING, INTERAGENCY COORDINATION, AND IN4 FORMATION SHARING.—The President shall develop a 

5 plan— 

6 (1) to standardize the training received by 

7 United States and Foreign Commercial Service offi8 cers, economic officers of the Department of State, 

9 and economic officers of the United States Agency for 

10 International Development with respect to the pro11 grams and procedures of the Export-Import Bank of 

12 the United States, the United States International 

13 Development Finance Corporation, the Small Busi14 ness Administration, and the United States Trade 

15 and Development Agency; and 

16 (2) to ensure that— 

17 (A) not later than one year after the date 

18 of the enactment of this Act— 

19 (i) all personnel referred to in para20 graph (1) receive the training described in 

21 that paragraph; and 

22 (ii) relevant departments and agencies 

23 share information on trade and investment 

24 transactions facilitated by the United States 


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1 Government and funded by the public or 

2 private sector; 

3 (B) not later than 60 days after the date of 

4 the enactment of this Act, the Administrator of 

5 USAID and the Chief Executive Officer of DFC 

6 shall develop a plan to enhance coordination and 

7 expedite information sharing that includes— 

8 (i) a process for sharing of information 

9 in a timely fashion, and at least monthly, 

10 on— 

11 (I) active and early stage leads on 

12 transactions initiated, promoted, or fa13 cilitated by DFC; 

14 (II) transactions deemed ineligible 

15 for DFC support or not being pursued 

16 by DFC for other reasons; and 

17 (III) transaction opportunities 

18 identified by USAID or other relevant 

19 United States departments and agen20 cies submitted for DFC consideration; 

21 and 

22 (ii) any training required for DFC, 

23 USAID, or other interagency staff to imple24 ment the plan; 


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1 (C) the Executive Directors and their ap2 pointed staff shall be responsible for coordinating 

3 implementation of this plan; and 

4 (D) DFC and USAID shall, in consultation 

5 with the Executive Directors and Congress, iden6 tify targets for DFC’s financial commitments 

7 and any private capital mobilized to finalize a 

8 transaction. 

9 (f) DATA SHARING PLATFORM.— 

10 (1) ESTABLISHMENT.—The Administrator of 

11 USAID shall, in consultation with the Executive Di12 rectors and relevant department and agencies, estab13 lish an interoperable digital platform maintained by 

14 the staff of the Executive Directors to— 

15 (A) facilitate interagency information shar16 ing and collaboration on trade and investment 

17 transactions; and 

18 (B) ensure relevant department and agen19 cies use such platform to review, track, and de20 velop consensus on transactions and their rel21 ative priorities. 

22 (2) COORDINATION.—The Executive Directors 

23 shall coordinate regularly with the leadership of rel24 evant Federal department and agencies to— 

25 (A) advance and finalize transactions; or 


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1 (B) provide a written justification for any 

2 transaction deemed ineligible for United States 

3 Government financing under existing authori4 ties. 

5 (g) DEFINITIONS.—In this section: 

6 (1) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMIT7 TEES.—The term ‘‘appropriate congressional commit8 tees’’ means— 

9 (A) the Committee on Foreign Relations of 

10 the Senate; 

11 (B) the Committee on Appropriations of the 

12 Senate; 

13 (C) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the 

14 House of Representatives; and 

15 (D) the Committee on Appropriations of the 

16 House of Representatives. 

17 (2) RELEVANT FEDERAL DEPARTMENTS AND

18 AGENCIES.—The term ‘‘relevant Federal departments 

19 and agencies’’ includes— 

20 (A) the Department of State; 

21 (B) the Department of the Treasury; 

22 (C) the Department of Commerce; 

23 (D) the United States Agency for Inter24 national Development (USAID); 

25 (E) the Millennium Challenge Corporation; 


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1 (F) the United States International Devel2 opment Finance Corporation (DFC); 

3 (G) the United States Trade and Develop4 ment Agency; 

5 (H) the United States African Development 

6 Foundation; 

7 (I) the Export Import Bank; 

8 (J) the Small Business Administration; 

9 (K) the Department of Agriculture; and 

10 (L) any other entity deemed appropriate by 

11 the President. 

12 (3) EARLY-STAGE LEAD.—The term ‘‘early-stage 

13 lead’’ means a prospective transaction which is being 

14 evaluated by DFC staff, prior to DFC holding an in15 ternal screening meeting or accepting an application. 

16 (4) TWO-WAY TRADE AND INVESTMENT.—The 

17 term ‘‘two-way trade and investment’’ means United 

18 States exports to Africa and Latin America and the 

19 Caribbean, United States public and private invest20 ment in Africa and Latin America and the Carib21 bean, exports from Africa and Latin America and the 

22 Caribbean to the United States, and Africa and Latin 

23 America and the Caribbean investment in the United 

24 States. 


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1 SEC. 219E. CHINA WATCHER PROGRAM. 

2 (a) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary of State, acting 

3 through the Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and 

4 Pacific Affairs, and in coordination with relevant offices 

5 and bureaus of the Department of State, shall implement 

6 a ‘‘China Watcher Program’’ within the Department of 

7 State to— 

8 (1) monitor and combat Chinese malign influ9 ence across economic and political sectors in foreign 

10 countries; and 

11 (2) augment the capacity of United States Gov12 ernment engagement with foreign countries and re13 gional and international economic and political orga14 nizations and institutions relating to policy coordina15 tion regarding China and such Chinese malign influ16 ence. 

17 (b) PLACEMENT.—In carrying out the China Watcher 

18 Program under this section, the Secretary of State shall 

19 place Foreign Service officers in positions in select United 

20 States diplomatic and consular posts, at the discretion of 

21 the Secretary of State, to engage both Chinese and third22 country nationals, including host governments, on the mat23 ters described in subsection (a). 

24 (c) ANNUAL REPORT.—Each diplomatic or consular 

25 post with a China Watcher Program shall produce an an26 nual report outlining the steps each such post has taken 


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1 to advance the mission, trends observed, and the nature and 

2 extent of Chinese foreign direct investment and influence 

3 in key economic and political sectors, including technology, 

4 manufacturing, transportation, energy, metals, agriculture, 

5 and real estate. 

6 (d) AUTHORIZATION OF ANNUAL APPROPRIATIONS.— 

7 There is authorized to be appropriated $5,000,000 for fiscal 

8 year 2022 and each fiscal year thereafter to carry out this 

9 section. 

10 SEC. 219F. LIU XIAOBO FUND FOR STUDY OF THE CHINESE 

11 LANGUAGE. 

12 (a) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Congress 

13 that— 

14 (1) as a substitute to Confucius Institutes, the 

15 United States Government should invest heavily into 

16 alternative programs and institutions that ensure 

17 there remains a robust pipeline of Americans learning 

18 China’s many languages; and 

19 (2) in a 21st century that will be dominated by 

20 a strategic competition between the United States and 

21 China, it is in the national security interests of the 

22 United States to ensure that Americans continue to 

23 invest in Chinese language skills, as well as Tibetan, 

24 Uyghur, and Mongolian languages, while ensuring 


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1 they can do so in a context free of malign political 

2 influence from foreign state actors. 

3 (b) ESTABLISHMENT OF THE LIU XIAOBO FUND FOR

4 STUDY OF THE CHINESE LANGUAGE.—The Secretary of 

5 State shall establish in the Department of State the ‘‘Liu 

6 Xiaobo Fund for Study of the Chinese Language’’ to fund 

7 study by United States persons of Mandarin and Cantonese 

8 Chinese, Tibetan, Uyghur, Mongolian, and other contem9 porary spoken languages of China, abroad or in the United 

10 States. 

11 (c) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—There are 

12 authorized to be appropriated to the Department of State 

13 for fiscal year 2021 and every fiscal year thereafter, 

14 $10,000,000 to carry out the Liu Xiaobo Fund for Study 

15 of the Chinese Language. 

16 (d) REQUIRED ACTIVITIES.—Amounts authorized to be 

17 appropriated pursuant to subsection (c) shall— 

18 (1) be designed to advance the national security 

19 and foreign policy interests of the United States, as 

20 determined by the Secretary of State; 

21 (2) favor funding mechanisms that can maxi22 mize the total number of United States persons given 

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1 nese, Tibetan, Uyghur, Mongolian, and other contem2 porary spoken languages of China; 

3 (3) favor funding mechanisms that provide op4 portunities for such language study to areas tradi5 tionally under-served by such opportunities; 

6 (4) be shaped by an ongoing consultative process 

7 taking into account design inputs of— 

8 (A) civil society institutions, including Chi9 nese diaspora community organizations; 

10 (B) language experts in Mandarin and 

11 Cantonese Chinese, Tibetan, Uyghur, Mongolian, 

12 and other contemporary spoken languages of 

13 China; 

14 (C) organizations representing historically 

15 disadvantaged socioeconomic groups in the 

16 United States; and 

17 (D) human rights organizations; and 

18 (5) favor opportunities to fund the study of Man19 darin and Cantonese Chinese, Tibetan, Uyghur, Mon20 golian, and other contemporary spoken languages of 

21 China at Alaska Native-serving institutions, Asian 

22 American and Native American Pacific Islander-serv23 ing institutions, Hispanic-serving institutions, his24 torically Black college or universities, Native Amer25 ican-serving nontribal institutions, Native HawaiianVerDate Sep 11 2014 21:34 Dec 30, 2022 Jkt 039200 PO 00000 Frm 00199 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6203 E:\BILLS\H3524.RH H3524

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1 serving institutions, Predominantly Black institu2 tions, Tribal Colleges or Universities. 

3 (e) REPORT.— 

4 (1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 120 days after 

5 the date of the enactment of this Act and annually 

6 thereafter for five years, the Secretary of State, in 

7 consultation with the heads of appropriate Federal 

8 departments and agencies, as appropriate, shall sub9 mit to the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House 

10 of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Re11 lations of the Senate a report detailing activities and 

12 disbursements made to carry out this Act over the im13 mediately preceding academic year. 

14 (2) REPORT CONTENTS.—Each report required 

15 under paragraph (1) shall include details on— 

16 (A) which institutions, programs, or entities 

17 received funds through the Liu Xiaobo Fund for 

18 Study of the Chinese Language; 

19 (B) funds distribution disaggregated by in20 stitution, program, or entity, including identi21 fication of the State or country in which such 

22 institution, program, or entity is located; 

23 (C) the number of United States persons 

24 who received language study under the Liu 

25 Xiaobo Fund for Study of the Chinese Language, 


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1 and the average amount disbursed per person for 

2 such study; 

3 (D) a comparative analysis of per dollar 

4 program effectiveness and efficiency in allowing 

5 United States persons to reach conversational 

6 proficiency Mandarin or Cantonese Chinese, Ti7 betan, Uyghur, Mongolian, or other contem8 porary spoken languages of China; 

9 (E) an analysis of which of the languages 

10 referred to in subparagraph (D) were studied 

11 through the funding from the Liu Xiaobo Fund 

12 for Study of the Chinese Language; and 

13 (F) any recommendations of the Secretary 

14 of State for improvements to the authorities, pri15 orities, or management of the Liu Xiaobo Fund 

16 for Study of the Chinese Language. 

17 (f) INTERAGENCY FUNDS TRANSFERS AUTHORIZA18 TION.—Amounts authorized to be appropriated to the Sec19 retary of State to carry out this Act are authorized to be 

20 transferred to the heads of other appropriate Federal de21 partments and agencies for similar purposes, subject to 

22 prior notification to the Committee on Foreign Affairs of 

23 the House of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign 

24 Relations of the Senate. Such heads shall consult with the 


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1 Secretary in the preparation of the report required under 

2 subsection (e). 

3 (g) LIMITATIONS.—Amounts authorized to be appro4 priated to carry out this Act may only be made available 

5 for the costs of language study funded and administration 

6 incurred by the Department of State or programs carried 

7 out by the Department of State (or by another Federal de8 partment or agency pursuant to subsection (f)) to carry out 

9 this section. 

10 (h) DEFINITIONS.—In this section: 

11 (1) ALASKA NATIVE-SERVING INSTITUTION.—The 

12 term ‘‘Alaska Native-serving institution’’ has the 

13 meaning given such term in section 317(b) of the 

14 Higher Education Act of 1965 (20 U.S.C. 1059d(b)). 

15 (2) ASIAN AMERICAN AND NATIVE AMERICAN PA16 CIFIC ISLANDER-SERVING INSTITUTION.—The term 

17 ‘‘Asian American and Native American Pacific Is18 lander-serving institution’’ has the meaning given 

19 such term in section 371(c) of the Higher Education 

20 Act of 1965 (20 U.S.C. 1067q(c)). 

21 (3) HISPANIC-SERVING INSTITUTION.—The term 

22 ‘‘Hispanic-serving institution’’ has the meaning given 

23 such term in section 502 of the Higher Education Act 

24 of 1965 (20 U.S.C. 1101a). 


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1 (4) HISTORICALLY BLACK COLLEGE OR UNIVER2 SITY.—The term ‘‘historically Black college or univer3 sity’’ means a part B institution described in section 

4 322(2) of the Higher Education Act of 1965 (22 

5 U.S.C. 1061(2)). 

6 (5) NATIVE AMERICAN-SERVING NONTRIBAL IN7 STITUTION.—The term ‘‘Native American-serving 

8 nontribal institution’’ has the meaning given such 

9 term in section 371(c) of the Higher Education Act 

10 of 1965 (20 U.S.C. 1067q(c)). 

11 (6) NATIVE HAWAIIAN-SERVING INSTITUTION.— 

12 The term ‘‘Native Hawaiian-serving institution’’ has 

13 the meaning given such term in section 317(b) of the 

14 Higher Education Act of 1965 (20 U.S.C. 1059d(b)). 

15 (7) PREDOMINANTLY BLACK INSTITUTION.—The 

16 term ‘‘Predominantly Black institution’’ has the 

17 meaning given such term in section 371(c) of the 

18 Higher Education Act of 1965 (20 U.S.C. 1067q(c)). 

19 (8) TRIBAL COLLEGE OR UNIVERSITY.—The term 

20 ‘‘Tribal College or University’’ has the meaning given 

21 such term in section 316(b) of the Higher Education 

22 Act of 1965 (20 U.S.C. 1059c(b)). 


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1 SEC. 219G. OVERSIGHT OF FUNDS MADE AVAILABLE 

2 THROUGH THE AMERICAN RESCUE PLAN ACT 

3 OF 2021. 

4 (a) AUTHORITIES AND CONDITIONS.—Amounts au5 thorized and appropriated under title X of the American 

6 Rescue Plan Act of 2021 (Public Law 117–2) to carry out 

7 the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2151 et seq.) 

8 shall be subject to the applicable authorities and conditions 

9 for funds made available to carry out the Foreign Assist10 ance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2151 et seq.) and division K 

11 of Public Law 116–260. 

12 (b) OVERSIGHT AND ACCOUNTABILITY.—Amounts au13 thorized and appropriated under sections 10001 and 10002 

14 of American Rescue Plan Act of 2021 may be transferred 

15 to the Inspector General of the Department of State and 

16 the Inspector General of the United States Agency for Inter17 national Development to expand the capacity of such In18 spectors General to conduct effective oversight of the foreign 

19 assistance programs and activities under such Act. 

20 (c) UNITED STATES CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE GLOBAL

21 FUND TO FIGHT AIDS, TUBERCULOSIS, AND MALARIA

22 COVID–19 RESPONSE MECHANISM.—United States con23 tributions to the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis, 

24 and Malaria COVID–19 Response Mechanism under section 

25 10003(a)(2) of American Rescue Plan Act of 2021— 


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1 (1) shall be meaningfully leveraged in a manner 

2 that incentivizes other public and private donor con3 tributions; and 

4 (2) shall be subject to the reporting and with5 holding requirements under subsections (c), 

6 (d)(4)(A)(ii), (d)(4)(C), (d)(5), (d)(6), (f), and (g) of 

7 section 202 of the United States Leadership Against 

8 HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria Act of 2003 

9 (22 U.S.C. 7622). 

10 SEC. 219H. REQUIREMENTS RELATING TO VACCINE BRAND11 ING. 

12 The President shall ensure that every vaccine donated 

13 or otherwise procured and financed by the United States 

14 Government shall be clearly branded with the United States 

15 flag. 

16 Subtitle B—International Security 

17 Matters 

18 SEC. 221. APPROPRIATE COMMITTEES OF CONGRESS. 

19 In this subtitle, the term ‘‘appropriate committees of 

20 Congress’’ means— 

21 (1) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the 

22 Committee on Armed Services, and the Committee on 

23 Appropriations of the Senate; and 


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1 (2) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Com2 mittee on Armed Services, and the Committee on Ap3 propriations of the House of Representatives. 

4 SEC. 222. ADDITIONAL FUNDING FOR INTERNATIONAL MILI5 TARY EDUCATION AND TRAINING IN THE 

6 INDO-PACIFIC. 

7 There is authorized to be appropriated for each of fis8 cal years 2022 through fiscal year 2026 for the Department 

9 of State, out of amounts authorized to be appropriated or 

10 otherwise made available for assistance under chapter 5 of 

11 part II of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 

12 2347 et seq.) (relating to international military education 

13 and training assistance), $45,000,000 for activities in the 

14 Indo-Pacific region in accordance with this subtitle. Funds 

15 may be disbursed only after vetting of individuals proposed 

16 to be trained, consistent with sections 502B and 620M of 

17 the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2304 and 

18 2378d). 

19 SEC. 223. STATEMENT OF POLICY ON MARITIME FREEDOM 

20 OF OPERATIONS IN INTERNATIONAL WATER21 WAYS AND AIRSPACE OF THE INDO-PACIFIC 

22 AND ON ARTIFICIAL LAND FEATURES IN THE 

23 SOUTH CHINA SEA. 

24 (a) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—Congress— 


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1 (1) condemns coercive and threatening actions or 

2 the use of force to impede freedom of navigation oper3 ations in international airspace by military or civil4 ian aircraft, to alter the status quo, or to destabilize 

5 the Indo-Pacific region; 

6 (2) urges the Government of the People’s Repub7 lic of China to refrain from implementing the de8 clared East China Sea Air Defense Identification 

9 Zone (ADIZ), or an ADIZ in the South China Sea, 

10 where contrary to freedom of overflight in inter11 national airspace, and to refrain from taking similar 

12 provocative actions elsewhere in the Indo-Pacific re13 gion; 

14 (3) reaffirms that the 2016 Permanent Court of 

15 Arbitration decision is final and legally binding on 

16 both parties and that the People’s Republic of China’s 

17 claims to offshore resources across most of the South 

18 China Sea are unlawful; and 

19 (4) condemns the People’s Republic of China for 

20 failing to abide by the 2016 Permanent Court of Ar21 bitration ruling, despite the PRC’s obligations as a 

22 state party to the United Nations Convention on the 

23 Law of the Sea. 

24 (b) STATEMENT OF POLICY.—It shall be the policy of 

25 the United States to— 


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1 (1) reaffirm its commitment and support for al2 lies and partners in the Indo-Pacific region, includ3 ing with respect to the mutual defense treaties with 

4 Indo-Pacific allies; 

5 (2) oppose claims that impinge on the rights, 

6 freedoms, and lawful use of the sea, or the airspace 

7 above it, that are available to all countries, and op8 pose the militarization of new and reclaimed land 

9 features in the South China Sea; 

10 (3) continue certain policies with respect to the 

11 PRC claims in the South China Sea, specifically— 

12 (A) that PRC claims in the South China 

13 Sea, including to offshore resources across most 

14 of the South China Sea, are unlawful; 

15 (B) that the PRC cannot lawfully assert a 

16 maritime claim vis-a`-vis the Philippines in 

17 areas that the Permanent Court of Arbitration 

18 found to be in the Philippines’ Exclusive Eco19 nomic Zone (EEZ) or on its continental shelf; 

20 (C) to reject any PRC claim to waters be21 yond a 12 nautical mile territorial sea derived 

22 from islands it claims in the Spratly Islands; 

23 and 

24 (D) that the PRC has no lawful territorial 

25 or maritime claim to James Shoal; 


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1 (4) urge all parties to refrain from engaging in 

2 destabilizing activities, including environmentally 

3 harmful and provocative land reclamation; 

4 (5) ensure that disputes are managed without in5 timidation, coercion, or force; 

6 (6) call on all claimants to clarify or adjust 

7 claims in accordance with international law; 

8 (7) uphold the principle that territorial and 

9 maritime claims, including territorial waters or terri10 torial seas, must derive from land features and other11 wise comport with international law; 

12 (8) oppose the imposition of new fishing regula13 tions covering disputed areas in the South China Sea, 

14 regulations which have raised tensions in the region; 

15 (9) support an effective Code of Conduct, if that 

16 Code of Conduct reflects the interests of Southeast 

17 Asian claimant countries and does not serve as a ve18 hicle for the People’s Republic of China to advance its 

19 unlawful maritime claims; 

20 (10) reaffirm that an existing body of inter21 national rules and guidelines, including the Inter22 national Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea, 

23 done at London October 12, 1972 (COLREGs), is suf24 ficient to ensure the safety of navigation between the 


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1 United States Armed Forces and the forces of other 

2 countries, including the People’s Republic of China; 

3 (11) support the development of regional institu4 tions and bodies, including the ASEAN Regional 

5 Forum, the ASEAN Defense Minister’s Meeting Plus, 

6 the East Asia Summit, and the expanded ASEAN 

7 Maritime Forum, to build practical cooperation in 

8 the region and reinforce the role of international law; 

9 (12) encourage the deepening of partnerships 

10 with other countries in the region for maritime do11 main awareness and capacity building, as well as ef12 forts by the United States Government to explore the 

13 development of appropriate multilateral mechanisms 

14 for a ‘‘common operating picture’’ in the South China 

15 Sea among Southeast Asian countries that would 

16 serve to help countries avoid destabilizing behavior 

17 and deter risky and dangerous activities; 

18 (13) oppose actions by any country to prevent 

19 any other country from exercising its sovereign rights 

20 to the resources of the exclusive economic zone (EEZ) 

21 and continental shelf by making claims to those areas 

22 in the South China Sea that have no support in 

23 international law; and 

24 (14) assure the continuity of operations by the 

25 United States in the Indo-Pacific region, including, 


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1 when appropriate, in cooperation with partners and 

2 allies, to reaffirm freedom of navigation and over3 flight and other lawful uses of the sea. 

4 SEC. 224. REPORT ON CAPABILITY DEVELOPMENT OF INDO5 PACIFIC ALLIES AND PARTNERS. 

6 (a) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Congress 

7 that— 

8 (1) the Secretary of State should expand and 

9 strengthen existing measures under the United States 

10 Conventional Arms Transfer Policy to provide capa11 bilities to allies and partners consistent with agreed12 on division of responsibility for alliance roles, mis13 sions and capabilities, prioritizing allies and part14 ners in the Indo-Pacific region in accordance with 

15 United States strategic imperatives; 

16 (2) the United States should design for export to 

17 Indo-Pacific allies and partners capabilities critical 

18 to maintaining a favorable military balance in the 

19 region, including long-range precision fires, air and 

20 missile defense systems, anti-ship cruise missiles, land 

21 attack cruise missiles, conventional hypersonic sys22 tems, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance 

23 capabilities, and command and control systems con24 sistent with law, regulation, policy, and international 

25 commitments; 


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1 (3) the United States should pursue, to the max2 imum extent possible, anticipatory technology secu3 rity and foreign disclosure policy on the systems de4 scribed in paragraph (2); 

5 (4) the Secretary of State, in coordination with 

6 the Secretary of Defense, should— 

7 (A) urge allies and partners to invest in 

8 sufficient quantities of munitions to meet contin9 gency requirements and avoid the need for ac10 cessing United States stocks in wartime; and 

11 (B) cooperate with allies to deliver such mu12 nitions, or when necessary, to increase allies’ ca13 pacity to produce such munitions; and 

14 (5) it is in the United States interest to not au15 thorize arms transfers or security cooperation to gov16 ernments that demonstrate patterns of gross violations 

17 of human rights if such arms or security cooperation 

18 could be used to commit or support such violations. 

19 (b) APPROPRIATE COMMITTEES OF CONGRESS.—In 

20 this section, the term ‘‘appropriate committees of Congress’’ 

21 means— 

22 (1) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the 

23 Committee on Armed Services, and the Committee on 

24 Appropriations of the Senate; and 


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1 (2) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Com2 mittee on Armed Services, and the Committee on Ap3 propriations of the House of Representatives. 

4 (c) REPORT.— 

5 (1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 90 days after 

6 the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of 

7 State, in consultation with the Secretary of Defense, 

8 shall submit to the appropriate committees of Con9 gress a report that describes United States priorities 

10 for building more capable security partners in the 

11 Indo-Pacific region. 

12 (2) MATTERS TO BE INCLUDED.—The report re13 quired under paragraph (1) shall— 

14 (A) provide a priority list of defense and 

15 military capabilities that Indo-Pacific allies and 

16 partners must possess for the United States to be 

17 able to achieve its military objectives in the 

18 Indo-Pacific region; 

19 (B) identify, from the list referred to in sub20 paragraph (A), the capabilities that are best pro21 vided, or can only be provided, by the United 

22 States; 

23 (C) identify— 


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1 (i) actions required to expedite fielding 

2 the capabilities identified in subparagraph 

3 (B); and 

4 (ii) steps needed to fully account for 

5 and a plan to integrate all means of United 

6 States foreign military sales, direct com7 mercial sales, security assistance, and all 

8 applicable authorities of the Department of 

9 State and the Department of Defense; 

10 (D) assess the requirements for United 

11 States security assistance, including Inter12 national Military Education and Training, in 

13 the Indo-Pacific region, as a part of the means 

14 to deliver critical partner capability require15 ments identified in subparagraph (B); 

16 (E) assess the resources necessary to meet 

17 the requirements for United States security as18 sistance, and identify resource gaps; 

19 (F) assess the major obstacles to fulfilling 

20 requirements for United States security assist21 ance in the Indo-Pacific region, including re22 sources and personnel limits, foreign legislative 

23 and policy barriers, and factors related to spe24 cific partner countries; 


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1 (G) identify limitations on the ability of the 

2 United States to provide such capabilities, in3 cluding capabilities identified under subpara4 graph (B), because of existing United States 

5 treaty obligations, United States policies, includ6 ing sections 502B and 620M of the Foreign As7 sistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2304 and 

8 2378d), or other regulations; 

9 (H) recommend improvements to the process 

10 for developing requirements for United States 

11 partner capabilities; and 

12 (I) identify required jointly agreed rec13 ommendations for infrastructure and posture, 

14 based on any ongoing mutual dialogues. 

15 (3) FORM.—The report required under this sub16 section shall be unclassified, but may include a classi17 fied annex. 

18 SEC. 225. STATEMENT OF POLICY REGARDING THE THREAT 

19 POSED BY THE CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY 

20 TO THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZA21 TION. 

22 It is the policy of the United States to— 

23 (1) urge NATO allies to work closely with like24 minded partners, in particular with the European 

25 Union, to protect critical infrastructure, strengthen 


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1 resilience, maintain a technological edge, and address 

2 the challenges to the rules-based international order 

3 posed by the Chinese Communist Party; 

4 (2) encourage NATO allies to explore how to 

5 monitor and defend against any activity of the Chi6 nese Communist Party that could impact collective 

7 defense, military readiness, or resilience in the Su8 preme Allied Commander Europe’s Area of Responsi9 bility, including by identifying vulnerabilities of key 

10 sectors and supply chains, in coordination with the 

11 European Union; 

12 (3) push for NATO allies to establish a consult13 ative body to bring together such allies, and other in14 stitutions and partners as relevant, to exchange infor15 mation, share experiences, and discuss all aspects of 

16 such allies’ security interests with respect to the Chi17 nese Communist Party; and 

18 (4) prioritize urging all NATO allies to share the 

19 burden that comes with collective security in an in20 creasingly complex security environment by reaching 

21 by 2024 the pledge set at the 2014 Wales Summit to 

22 spend two percent of GDP on defense spending and 

23 20 percent of annual defense spending on major new 

24 equipment. 


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1 SEC. 226. IDENTIFICATION OF PLA–SUPPORTED INSTITU2 TIONS. 

3 (a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 60 days after the 

4 date of the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter, 

5 the Secretary of State shall publish and disseminate to 

6 United States institutions and places of study a list identi7 fying the research, engineering, and scientific institutions 

8 that the Secretary determines are affiliated with, or funded 

9 by, the Chinese People’s Liberation Army. 

10 (b) FORM.—The list published and disseminated under 

11 subsection (a) shall be unclassified and publicly accessible, 

12 but may include a classified annex. 

13 Subtitle C—Multilateral Strategies 

14 to Bolster American Power 

15 SEC. 231. FINDINGS ON MULTILATERAL ENGAGEMENT. 

16 Congress finds the following: 

17 (1) Every UN member state is legally required to 

18 finance the UN’s core budget in order to ensure that 

19 these missions are properly resourced, and assessment 

20 rates are renegotiated every three years by the UN 

21 General Assembly. 

22 (2) While the United States is the largest single 

23 financial contributor to the UN system, the current 

24 model is beneficial because it requires all UN member 

25 states, no matter how big or small, to help shoulder 


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1 the UN’s regular and peacekeeping budgets at speci2 fied levels. 

3 (3) Failing to meet our financial commitments 

4 to the UN also empowers the PRC, which has raised 

5 our annual shortfalls to claim we are not a reliable 

6 partner and is seeking to leverage its own contribu7 tions to the regular budget and peacekeeping in ways 

8 that run counter to United States interests and val9 ues. 

10 (4) The People’s Republic of China is now the 

11 second largest financial contributor to UN peace12 keeping, having gone from an assessment rate of just 

13 3 percent in 2008 to more than 15 percent today, and 

14 is the ninth largest troop-contributor to UN missions, 

15 providing more personnel than the other four perma16 nent members of the Security Council combined. 

17 (5) With greater engagement comes greater influ18 ence, and PRC diplomats have sought to use their ex19 panded clout to push back against the human rights, 

20 civilian protection, and gender-based violence aspects 

21 of UN peacekeeping mandates, using United States 

22 funding shortfalls as a pretext. 

23 (6) The PRC has also used its growing clout to 

24 fill key posts at UN agencies: Chinese nationals cur25 rently occupy the top posts of four of the UN’s 15 speVerDate Sep 11 2014 21:34 Dec 30, 2022 Jkt 039200 PO 00000 Frm 00218 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6203 E:\BILLS\H3524.RH H3524

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1 cialized agencies, while the United States occupies 

2 only one. 

3 (7) From 2021 to 2022, there will be 15 elections 

4 for the heads of UN specialized agencies and five for 

5 major UN funds and programs. With the exception of 

6 the World Food Programme, none are currently led by 

7 Americans. 

8 (8) A 2020 Department of State Inspector Gen9 eral Inspection found that the Bureau for Inter10 national Organizations did not have a standard oper11 ating procedure for tracking and promoting the em12 ployment of American Citizens in the UN system, and 

13 their recommendation to the department to establish 

14 one remains open. 

15 SEC. 232. STATEMENT OF POLICY ON AMERICA’S MULTILAT16 ERAL ENGAGEMENT. 

17 It is the policy of the United States that— 

18 (1) the Permanent Representative of the United 

19 States to the United Nations serves as a standing 

20 member of the cabinet; 

21 (2) assessed dues to multilateral organizations be 

22 paid in full in a timely fashion; 

23 (3) Federal agencies utilize all the authorities 

24 under section 3343 of title 5, United States Code, and 

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1 lating to detail and transfer of Federal employees to 

2 international organizations), to detail or transfer em3 ployees to relevant international organizations; 

4 (4) the Secretary of State should assist the De5 partment of State and other Federal agencies in car6 rying out paragraph (3) to the fullest extent; 

7 (5) the Secretary of State should support quali8 fied American candidates in their bid to win election 

9 to United Nations-related leadership positions; and 

10 (6) the Secretary of State should support the 

11 placement of Junior Professional Officers sponsored 

12 by the United States in United Nations-affiliated 

13 agencies. 

14 SEC. 233. SUPPORT FOR AMERICANS AT THE UNITED NA15 TIONS. 

16 (a) ESTABLISHMENT.—The Secretary of State is au17 thorized to establish within the Department of State’s Bu18 reau of International Organization Affairs an Office of 

19 Multilateral Strategy and Personnel. 

20 (b) DUTIES.—The office established under subsection 

21 (a) of this section shall be responsible for— 

22 (1) promoting United States leadership and par23 ticipation in the United Nations system, with a focus 

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1 cising increased influence in and determining the 

2 agenda of the United Nations system; 

3 (2) establishing and implementing a standard 

4 operating procedure for the promotion and efficient 

5 tracking of United States citizen employment at the 

6 United Nations and other international organizations 

7 that includes Mission Geneva; 

8 (3) monitoring the pipeline of United Nations 

9 jobs and identifying qualified United States citizens 

10 and other qualified nationals to promote for such po11 sitions; 

12 (4) tracking leadership changes in United Na13 tions Secretariat, funds, programs, and agencies, and 

14 developing strategies to ensure that coalitions of like15 minded countries are assembled to ensure leadership 

16 races are not won by countries that do not share 

17 United States interests; 

18 (5) eliminating current barriers to the employ19 ment of United States citizens in the United Nations 

20 Secretariat, funds, programs, and agencies; and 

21 (6) increasing the number of qualified United 

22 States candidates for leadership and oversight posi23 tions at the United Nations Secretariat, funds, pro24 grams, agencies, and at other international organiza25 tions. 


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1 SEC. 234. JUNIOR PROFESSIONAL OFFICERS. 

2 (a) INCREASE IN JUNIOR PROFESSIONAL OFFICER PO3 SITIONS.—The Secretary of State should increase the num4 ber of Junior Professional Officer positions sponsored by 

5 the United States within the United Nations system. 

6 (b) REPORT.—Not later than December 31 of each 

7 year, the Secretary of State shall provide the appropriate 

8 congressional committees information regarding the 

9 amount of funding each bureau has designated during the 

10 immediately preceding fiscal year for Junior Professional 

11 Officer positions in the United Nations system and the 

12 number of such positions that exist as of the end of the prior 

13 fiscal year. 

14 SEC. 235. REPORT ON AMERICAN EMPLOYMENT IN INTER15 NATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS. 

16 (a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days after the 

17 date of the enactment of this Act and annually thereafter, 

18 the Secretary of State, in consultation with the heads of 

19 other Federal departments and agencies as appropriate, 

20 shall develop and submit to the appropriate congressional 

21 committees a report on how many Federal employees are 

22 currently detailed or transferred to an international orga23 nization during the immediately preceding 1-year period 

24 and a strategy for increasing the number of Federal em25 ployees so detailed or transferred. 


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1 (b) MATTERS TO BE INCLUDED.—Each report re2 quired by subsection (a) shall include the following: 

3 (1) The number of Federal employees detailed or 

4 transferred to an international organization under 

5 section 3343 of title 5, United States Code, and sub6 part C of title 5, Code of Federal Regulations (relat7 ing to the detail and transfer of Federal employees to 

8 international organizations), including— 

9 (A) an identification of the Federal agency 

10 from which such employees were detailed or 

11 transferred; and 

12 (B) an identification of the international 

13 organizations to and from which such employees 

14 have been so detailed or transferred. 

15 (2) A list of international organizations to and 

16 from which the United States previously detailed or 

17 transferred Federal employees. 

18 Subtitle D—Regional Strategies to 

19 Bolster American Power 

20 SEC. 241. STATEMENT OF POLICY ON COOPERATION WITH 

21 ALLIES AND PARTNERS AROUND THE WORLD. 

22 It is the policy of the United States— 

23 (1) to strengthen alliances and partnerships with 

24 like-minded countries around the globe; and 


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1 (2) to work in collaboration with such allies and 

2 partners— 

3 (A) to address significant diplomatic, eco4 nomic, and military challenges posed by the Peo5 ple’s Republic of China (PRC); 

6 (B) to deter the PRC from pursuing mili7 tary aggression; 

8 (C) to promote the peaceful resolution of ter9 ritorial disputes in accordance with inter10 national law; 

11 (D) to promote private sector-led long-term 

12 economic development while countering efforts by 

13 the Government of the PRC to leverage predatory 

14 economic practices as a means of political and 

15 economic coercion in the Indo-Pacific region and 

16 beyond; 

17 (E) to promote the values of democracy and 

18 human rights, including through efforts to end 

19 the repression by the PRC of political dissidents, 

20 Uyghurs and other Muslim minorities, Tibetan 

21 Buddhists, Christians, and other ethnic minori22 ties; 

23 (F) to respond to the crackdown by the 

24 PRC, in contravention of the commitments made 

25 under the Sino-British Joint Declaration of 1984 


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1 and the Basic Law of Hong Kong, on the legiti2 mate aspirations of the people of Hong Kong; 

3 and 

4 (G) to counter the PRC Government’s efforts 

5 to spread disinformation in the PRC and beyond 

6 with respect to its response to COVID–19. 

7 PART I—WESTERN HEMISPHERE 

8 SEC. 242. SENSE OF CONGRESS REGARDING UNITED 

9 STATES-CANADA RELATIONS. 

10 It is the sense of Congress that— 

11 (1) the United States and Canada have a unique 

12 relationship based on shared geography, extensive per13 sonal connections, deep economic ties, mutual defense 

14 commitments, and a shared vision to uphold democ15 racy, human rights, and the rules based international 

16 order established after World War II; 

17 (2) the United States and Canada can better ad18 dress the People’s Republic of China’s economic, polit19 ical, and security influence through closer cooperation 

20 on counternarcotics, environmental stewardship, 

21 transparent practices in public procurement and in22 frastructure planning, the Arctic, energy and 

23 connectivity issues, trade and commercial relations, 

24 bilateral legal matters, and support for democracy, 

25 good governance, and human rights; 


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1 (3) amidst the COVID–19 pandemic, the United 

2 States and Canada should maintain joint initiatives 

3 to address border management, commercial and trade 

4 relations and infrastructure, a shared approach with 

5 respect to the People’s Republic of China, and 

6 transnational challenges, including pandemics, energy 

7 security, and environmental stewardship; 

8 (4) the United States and Canada should en9 hance cooperation to counter Chinese disinformation, 

10 influence operations, economic espionage, and propa11 ganda efforts; 

12 (5) the People’s Republic of China’s infrastruc13 ture investments, particularly in 5G telecommuni14 cations technology, extraction of natural resources, 

15 and port infrastructure, pose national security risks 

16 for the United States and Canada; 

17 (6) the United States should share, as appro18 priate, intelligence gathered regarding— 

19 (A) Huawei’s 5G capabilities; and 

20 (B) the PRC government’s intentions with 

21 respect to 5G expansion; 

22 (7) the United States and Canada should con23 tinue to advance collaborative initiatives to imple24 ment the January 9, 2020, United States-Canada 


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1 Joint Action Plan on Critical Minerals Development 

2 Collaboration; and 

3 (8) the United States and Canada should 

4 prioritize cooperation on continental defense and in 

5 the Arctic, including by modernizing the North Amer6 ican Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) sensor 

7 architecture to provide effective warning and tracking 

8 of threats by peer competitors, including long-range 

9 missiles and high-precision weapons, to the Northern 

10 Hemisphere. 

11 SEC. 243. SENSE OF CONGRESS REGARDING CHINA’S ARBI12 TRARY IMPRISONMENT OF CANADIAN CITI13 ZENS. 

14 It is the sense of Congress that— 

15 (1) the Government of the People’s Republic of 

16 China’s apparent arbitrary detention and abusive 

17 treatment of Canadian nationals Michael Spavor and 

18 Michael Kovrig in apparent retaliation for the Gov19 ernment of Canada’s arrest of Meng Wanzhou is deep20 ly concerning; 

21 (2) the Government of Canada has shown inter22 national leadership by— 

23 (A) upholding the rule of law and com24 plying with its international legal obligations, 

25 including obligations pursuant to the ExtraVerDate Sep 11 2014 21:34 Dec 30, 2022 Jkt 039200 PO 00000 Frm 00227 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6203 E:\BILLS\H3524.RH H3524

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1 dition Treaty Between the United States of 

2 America and Canada, signed at Washington De3 cember 3, 1971; and 

4 (B) launching the Declaration Against Ar5 bitrary Detention in State-to-State Relations, 

6 which has been endorsed by 57 countries and the 

7 European Union, and reaffirms well-established 

8 prohibitions under international human rights 

9 conventions against the arbitrary detention of 

10 foreign nationals to be used as leverage in coun11 try-to-country relations; and 

12 (3) the United States continues to join the Gov13 ernment of Canada in calling for the immediate re14 lease of Michael Spavor and Michael Kovrig and for 

15 due process for Canadian national Robert 

16 Schellenberg. 

17 SEC. 244. STRATEGY TO ENHANCE COOPERATION WITH 

18 CANADA. 

19 (a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days after the 

20 date of the enactment of this Act, the President shall submit 

21 to the appropriate congressional committees, and the Com22 mittees on Armed Services of the Senate and the House of 

23 Representatives, a strategy that describes how the United 

24 States will enhance cooperation with the Government of 


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1 Canada in managing relations with the Government of the 

2 People’s Republic of China. 

3 (b) ELEMENTS.—The strategy required under sub4 section (a) shall— 

5 (1) identify key policy points of convergence and 

6 divergence between the United States and Canada in 

7 managing relations with the People’s Republic of 

8 China in the areas of technology, trade, economic 

9 practices, cyber security, secure supply chains and 

10 critical minerals, and illicit narcotics; 

11 (2) include a description of United States devel12 opment and coordination efforts with Canadian coun13 terparts to enhance the cooperation between the 

14 United States and Canada with respect to— 

15 (A) managing economic relations with the 

16 People’s Republic of China; 

17 (B) democracy and human rights in the 

18 People’s Republic of China; 

19 (C) technology issues involving the People’s 

20 Republic of China; 

21 (D) defense issues involving the People’s Re22 public of China; and 

23 (E) international law enforcement and 

24 transnational organized crime issues; 


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1 (3) detail diplomatic efforts and future plans to 

2 work with Canada to counter the People’s Republic of 

3 China’s projection of an authoritarian governing 

4 model around the world; 

5 (4) detail diplomatic, defense, and intelligence 

6 cooperation to date and future plans to support Ca7 nadian efforts to identify cost-effective alternatives to 

8 Huawei’s 5G technology; 

9 (5) detail diplomatic and defense collaboration— 

10 (A) to advance joint United States-Cana11 dian priorities for responsible stewardship in the 

12 Arctic Region; and 

13 (B) to counter the People’s Republic of Chi14 na’s efforts to project political, economic, and 

15 military influence into the Arctic Region; and 

16 (6) detail diplomatic efforts to work with Can17 ada to track and counter the People’s Republic of Chi18 na’s attempts to exert influence across the multilat19 eral system. 

20 (c) FORM.—The strategy required under this section 

21 shall be submitted in an unclassified form that can be made 

22 available to the public, but may include a classified annex, 

23 if necessary. 

24 (d) CONSULTATION.—Not later than 90 days after the 

25 date of the enactment of this Act and not less frequently 


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1 than every 180 days thereafter for five years, the Secretary 

2 of State shall consult with the appropriate congressional 

3 committees, and the Committees on Armed Services of the 

4 Senate and the House of Representatives, regarding the de5 velopment and implementation of the strategy required 

6 under this section. 

7 SEC. 245. STRATEGY TO STRENGTHEN ECONOMIC COMPETI8 TIVENESS, GOVERNANCE, HUMAN RIGHTS, 

9 AND THE RULE OF LAW IN LATIN AMERICA 

10 AND THE CARIBBEAN. 

11 (a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days after the 

12 date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, 

13 in consultation, as appropriate, with the Secretary of the 

14 Treasury, the Secretary of Commerce, the Administrator of 

15 the United States Agency for International Development 

16 (USAID), the Attorney General, the United States Trade 

17 Representative, and the Chief Executive Officer of the 

18 United States International Development Finance Corpora19 tion, shall submit to the appropriate congressional commit20 tees, the Committee on Ways and Means and the Committee 

21 on Appropriations of the House of Representatives, and the 

22 Committee on Finance and the Committee on Appropria23 tions of the Senate a multi-year strategy for increasing 

24 United States economic competitiveness and promoting 

25 good governance, human rights, and the rule of law in 


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1 Latin American and Caribbean countries, particularly in 

2 the areas of— 

3 (1) investment; 

4 (2) equitable, inclusive, and sustainable develop5 ment; 

6 (3) commercial relations; 

7 (4) anti-corruption activities; and 

8 (5) infrastructure projects. 

9 (b) ADDITIONAL ELEMENTS.—The strategy required 

10 under subsection (a) shall include a plan of action, includ11 ing benchmarks to achieve measurable progress, to— 

12 (1) enhance the technical capacity of Latin 

13 American and Caribbean countries to advance the 

14 sustainable and inclusive development of equitable 

15 economies; 

16 (2) reduce trade and non-tariff barriers between 

17 such countries; 

18 (3) facilitate a more open, transparent, and com19 petitive environment for United States businesses in 

20 the region; 

21 (4) establish frameworks or mechanisms to re22 view long term financial sustainability and security 

23 implications of foreign investments in strategic sec24 tors or services, including transportation, commu25 nications, natural resources, and energy; 


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1 (5) establish competitive, transparent, and inclu2 sive infrastructure project selection and procurement 

3 processes that promote transparency, supplier diver4 sity, open competition, financial sustainability, ad5 herence to robust global standards, and the employ6 ment of a diverse local workforce and management; 

7 (6) strengthen legal structures critical to robust 

8 democratic governance, fair competition, combatting 

9 corruption, and ending impunity; and 

10 (7) enhance transparent, affordable, and equi11 table access to the internet and digital infrastructure 

12 in the Western Hemisphere. 

13 (c) BRIEFING REQUIREMENT.—Not later than one 

14 year after the date of the enactment of this Act and annu15 ally thereafter for five years, the Secretary of State, after 

16 consultation with the Secretary of the Treasury, the Sec17 retary of Commerce, the Attorney General, the United 

18 States Trade Representative, and the leadership of the 

19 United States International Development Finance Corpora20 tion, shall brief the congressional committees specified in 

21 subsection (a) regarding the implementation of this section, 

22 including examples of successes and challenges. 


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1 SEC. 246. ENGAGEMENT IN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZA2 TIONS AND THE DEFENSE SECTOR IN LATIN 

3 AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN. 

4 (a) APPROPRIATE COMMITTEES OF CONGRESS DE5 FINED.—In this section, the term ‘‘appropriate committees 

6 of Congress’’ means— 

7 (1) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the 

8 Senate; 

9 (2) the Select Committee on Intelligence of the 

10 Senate; 

11 (3) the Committee on Armed Services of the Sen12 ate; 

13 (4) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the 

14 House of Representatives; 

15 (5) the Permanent Select Committee on Intel16 ligence of the House of Representatives; and 

17 (6) the Committee on Armed Services of the 

18 House of Representatives. 

19 (b) REPORTING REQUIREMENT.— 

20 (1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 90 days after 

21 the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of 

22 State, in coordination with the Director of National 

23 Intelligence, the Director of the Central Intelligence 

24 Agency, and the Defense Intelligence Agency, shall 

25 submit to the appropriate committees of Congress a 

26 report that assesses the nature, intent, and impact on 


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1 United States strategic interests of Chinese diplomatic 

2 activity aimed at influencing the decisions, proce3 dures, and programs of multilateral organizations in 

4 Latin America and the Caribbean, including the 

5 World Bank, International Monetary Fund, Organi6 zation of American States, and the Inter-American 

7 Development Bank. 

8 (2) DEFENSE SECTOR.—The report required 

9 under paragraph (1) shall include an assessment of 

10 the nature, intent, and impact on United States stra11 tegic interests of Chinese military activity in Latin 

12 America and the Caribbean, including military edu13 cation and training programs, weapons sales, and 

14 space-related activities in the military or civilian 

15 spheres, such as— 

16 (A) the satellite and space control station 

17 the People’s Republic of China constructed in 

18 Argentina; and 

19 (B) defense and security cooperation carried 

20 out by the People’s Republic of China in Latin 

21 America and the Caribbean, including sales of 

22 surveillance and monitoring technology to gov23 ernments in the region such as Venezuela, Cuba, 

24 Ecuador, and Colombia, and the potential use of 


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1 such technologies as tools of Chinese intelligence 

2 services. 

3 (3) FORM.—The report required under para4 graph (1) shall be submitted in unclassified form and 

5 include classified annexes. 

6 SEC. 247. DEFENSE COOPERATION IN LATIN AMERICA AND 

7 THE CARIBBEAN. 

8 (a) IN GENERAL.—There is authorized to be appro9 priated to the Department of State $13,500,000 for the 

10 International Military Education and Training Program 

11 for Latin America and the Caribbean for each of fiscal 

12 years 2022 through 2026. 

13 (b) MODERNIZATION.—The Secretary of State shall 

14 modernize and strengthen the programs receiving funding 

15 in accordance with subsection (a) to ensure that such pro16 grams are vigorous, substantive, and the preeminent choice 

17 for international military education and training for Latin 

18 American and Caribbean partners. 

19 (c) REQUIRED ELEMENTS.—The programs referred to 

20 in subsection (a) shall— 

21 (1) provide training and capacity-building op22 portunities to Latin American and Caribbean secu23 rity services; 

24 (2) provide practical skills and frameworks for— 


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1 (A) improving the functioning and organi2 zation of security services in Latin America and 

3 the Caribbean; 

4 (B) creating a better understanding of the 

5 United States and its values; and 

6 (C) using technology for maximum effi7 ciency and organization; 

8 (3) promote and ensure that security services in 

9 Latin America and the Caribbean respect civilian au10 thority and operate in compliance with international 

11 norms, standards, and rules of engagement, including 

12 a respect for human rights, and full compliance with 

13 requirements under section 620M of the Foreign As14 sistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2378d; commonly re15 ferred to as the ‘‘Leahy law’’); and 

16 (4) receive funds only after vetting of individuals 

17 proposed to be trained, consistent with sections 502B 

18 and 620M of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 

19 U.S.C. 2304 and 2378d). 


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1 SEC. 248. ENGAGEMENT WITH CIVIL SOCIETY IN LATIN 

2 AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN REGARDING 

3 ACCOUNTABILITY, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND THE 

4 RISKS OF PERVASIVE SURVEILLANCE TECH5 NOLOGIES. 

6 (a) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Congress 

7 that— 

8 (1) the Government of the People’s Republic of 

9 China is exporting its model for internal security and 

10 state control of society through advanced technology 

11 and artificial intelligence; and 

12 (2) the inclusion of communication networks and 

13 communications supply chains with equipment and 

14 services from companies with close ties to or that are 

15 susceptible to pressure from governments or security 

16 services without reliable legal checks on governmental 

17 powers can lead to breaches of citizens’ private infor18 mation, increased censorship, violations of human 

19 rights, and harassment of political opponents. 

20 (b) DIPLOMATIC ENGAGEMENT.—The Secretary of 

21 State shall conduct diplomatic engagement with govern22 ments and civil society organizations in Latin America and 

23 the Caribbean to— 

24 (1) help identify and mitigate the risks to civil 

25 liberties posed by technologies and services described 

26 in subsection (a); and 


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1 (2) offer recommendations on ways to mitigate 

2 such risks. 

3 (c) INTERNET FREEDOM PROGRAMS.—The Chief Exec4 utive Officer of the United States Agency for Global Media, 

5 who may work through the Open Technology Fund of the 

6 Agency, and the Secretary of State, working through the 

7 Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor’s Internet 

8 Freedom and Business and Human Rights Section, shall 

9 expand and prioritize efforts to provide anti-censorship 

10 technology and services to journalists in Latin America and 

11 the Caribbean, in order to enhance their ability to safely 

12 access or share digital news and information. 

13 (d) SUPPORT FOR CIVIL SOCIETY.—The Secretary of 

14 State, in coordination with the Administrator of the United 

15 States Agency for International Development, shall work 

16 through nongovernmental organizations to— 

17 (1) support and promote programs that support 

18 internet freedom and the free flow of information on19 line in Latin America and the Caribbean; 

20 (2) protect open, interoperable, secure, and reli21 able access to internet in Latin America and the Car22 ibbean; 

23 (3) provide integrated support to civil society for 

24 technology, digital safety, policy and advocacy, and 


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1 applied research programs in Latin America and the 

2 Caribbean; 

3 (4) train journalists and civil society leaders in 

4 Latin America and the Caribbean on investigative 

5 techniques necessary to ensure public accountability 

6 and prevent government overreach in the digital 

7 sphere; 

8 (5) assist independent media outlets and journal9 ists in Latin America and the Caribbean to build 

10 their own capacity and develop high-impact, in-depth 

11 news reports covering governance and human rights 

12 topics; 

13 (6) provide training for journalists and civil so14 ciety leaders on investigative techniques necessary to 

15 improve transparency and accountability in govern16 ment and the private sector; 

17 (7) provide training on investigative reporting of 

18 incidents of corruption and unfair trade, business, 

19 and commercial practices; 

20 (8) assist nongovernmental organizations to 

21 strengthen their capacity to monitor the incidents and 

22 practices described in paragraph (7); and 

23 (9) identify local resources to support the pre24 ponderance of activities that would be carried out 

25 under this subsection. 


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1 SEC. 249. CARIBBEAN ENERGY INITIATIVE AS ALTERNATIVE 

2 TO CHINA’S BELT AND ROAD INITIATIVE. 

3 (a) FINDINGS.—Congress makes the following findings: 

4 (1) The countries of the Caribbean are heavily 

5 reliant upon imported oil to provide for approxi6 mately 90 percent of their energy production. 

7 (2) The level of dependence is even higher includ8 ing— 

9 (A) Jamaica, which relies on oil for 95.9 

10 percent of its electricity; 

11 (B) Barbados, which relies on oil for 96 

12 percent of its electricity; 

13 (C) The Virgin Islands, which relies on oil 

14 for nearly 100 percent of its electricity; and 

15 (D) St. Lucia, which relies on oil for 100 

16 percent of its electricity. 

17 (3) Overreliance on imported fossil fuels has had 

18 a detrimental effect on economic development, growth, 

19 and competitiveness in the Caribbean. 

20 (4) Since 1970, more than 80 percent of Carib21 bean coral reefs have been lost due to coastal develop22 ment and pollution. Soot particulates and climate 

23 change caused by burning fossil fuels have seriously 

24 damaged coral reefs, which are a significant source of 

25 tourism dollars, fishing, biodiversity, and natural 

26 beauty. 


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1 (5) Air pollution caused by burning oil for elec2 tricity— 

3 (A) has serious health impacts in the form 

4 of higher rates of asthma and other lung ail5 ments; and 

6 (B) can also exacerbate climate change. 

7 (6) The Caribbean region is particularly vulner8 able to sea level rise and stronger storms. 

9 (7) Between 2005 and 2018, the dependence of 

10 the countries of the Caribbean on oil was perpetuated 

11 by the Venezuelan-led Petrocaribe oil alliance, 

12 which— 

13 (A) offered preferential terms for oil sales; 

14 and 

15 (B) supplies some countries with up to 40 

16 percent of their energy production needs. 

17 (8) The ongoing domestic economic crisis and 

18 political turmoil in Venezuela has forced the Govern19 ment of Venezuela to retract its commitments to the 

20 Petrocaribe oil alliance and step away as a regional 

21 power. Only Cuba still receives preferential 

22 Petrocaribe pricing on fuel exports from Venezuela, 

23 while other Petrocaribe member countries are experi24 encing a destabilized flow of oil. 


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1 (9) China has spent more than $244,000,000,000 

2 on energy projects worldwide since 2000, 25 percent 

3 of which was spent in Latin America and the Carib4 bean. Although the majority of this spending was for 

5 oil, gas, and coal, China has also been the largest in6 vestor in clean energy globally for almost a decade. 

7 (10) The World Bank estimates that the Carib8 bean will need $12,000,000,000 in power investments 

9 through 2035. 

10 (11) Renewable energy technology costs have de11 creased dramatically in recent years, offering a more 

12 viable economic alternative for energy production. 

13 Solar energy prices have fallen by 80 percent since 

14 2008, causing significant market growth, and accord15 ing to data released by the International Renewable 

Energy Agency, 1 16 ⁄3 of global power capacity is based 

17 in renewable energy. 

18 (12) In 2016, the International Monetary Fund 

19 estimated that transportation accounted for 36 per20 cent of the total primary energy consumed in the Car21 ibbean subregion. 

22 (13) According to the United Nations Environ23 ment Programme, Latin America and the Caribbean 

24 could achieve annual savings of $621,000,000,000 and 

25 a reduction of 1,100,000,000 tons of CO2 by 2050 if 


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1 the region’s energy and transport sectors reach net 

2 zero emissions. 

3 (14) The Caribbean has an abundance of onshore 

4 and offshore resources needed for renewable energy, 

5 including sun, wind, geothermal, and some hydro6 power production capacity. 

7 (15) The United States Government is deeply en8 gaged in providing technical and policy assistance to 

9 countries of the Caribbean on energy issues through— 

10 (A) the Energy and Climate Partnership of 

11 the Americas; 

12 (B) Connecting the Americas 2022; and 

13 (C) bilateral assistance programs. 

14 (16) On February 19, 2014, at the North Amer15 ican Leaders’ Summit, President Barack Obama, 

16 Prime Minister Stephen Harper of Canada, and 

17 President Enrique Pen ̃a Nieto of Mexico reaffirmed 

18 their commitment to bring affordable, reliable, and 

19 increasingly renewable power to the Caribbean, while 

20 opening wider markets for clean energy and green 

21 technology. 

22 (17) On June 19, 2015, President Barack 

23 Obama announced the Caribbean Energy Security 

24 Initiative, which would partner with individual 

25 countries— 


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1 (A) to transform its energy sector; 

2 (B) to work to increase access to finance, 

3 good governance, and diversification; and 

4 (C) to maximize the impact of existing 

5 donor effects. 

6 (18) On May 4, 2016, at the United States-Car7 ibbean-Central American Energy Summit, the energy 

8 security task force formally launched the Caribbean 

9 Sustainable Energy Roadmap and Strategy (C– 

10 SERMS) as a mechanism to manage regional coordi11 nation and action on energy security and agreed to 

12 expand the regional market and transmission system. 

13 (19) The United States has an important oppor14 tunity— 

15 (A) to deepen this engagement; 

16 (B) to work as a partner with Caribbean 

17 countries on a more regional and coordinated 

18 basis; 

19 (C) to help ease the region’s dependence on 

20 imported oil; and 

21 (D) to promote affordable alternative 

22 sources of energy. 

23 (b) DEFINITIONS.—In this section: 


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1 (1) CARIBBEAN COUNTRIES.—The term ‘‘Carib2 bean countries’’ means countries in the Caribbean re3 gion, but does not include Cuba or Venezuela. 

4 (2) CARIBBEAN GOVERNMENTS.—The term ‘‘Car5 ibbean governments’’ means the national governments 

6 of the Caribbean countries. 

7 (c) STATEMENT OF POLICY.—It is the policy of the 

8 United States to help Caribbean countries— 

9 (1) achieve greater energy security and improve 

10 domestic energy resource mobilization; 

11 (2) lower their dependence on imported fuels; 

12 (3) eliminate the use of diesel, heavy fuel oil, 

13 other petroleum products, and coal for the generation 

14 of electricity; 

15 (4) increase production of renewable energy; and 

16 (5) meet the greenhouse gas mitigation goals of 

17 their national determined contributions to the Paris 

18 Agreement. 

19 (d) STRATEGY.— 

20 (1) SUBMISSION.—Not later than 120 days after 

21 the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of 

22 State, in coordination with the Administrator of the 

23 United States Agency for International Development 

24 (USAID), shall submit to the appropriate congres25 sional committees a multi-year strategy that describes 


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1 how the Department of State will promote regional 

2 cooperation with Caribbean countries— 

3 (A) to lower dependence on imported fuels, 

4 grow domestic clean energy production in the re5 gion, strengthen regional energy security, and 

6 lower energy sector greenhouse gas emissions; 

7 (B) to decrease dependence on oil in the 

8 transportation sector; 

9 (C) to increase energy efficiency, energy 

10 conservation, and investment in alternatives to 

11 imported fuels; 

12 (D) to improve grid reliability and mod13 ernize electricity transmission networks; 

14 (E) to advance deployment of innovative so15 lutions to expand community and individuals’ 

16 access to electricity; 

17 (F) to help reform energy markets to en18 courage good regulatory governance and to pro19 mote a climate of private sector investment; and 

20 (G) to mitigate greenhouse gas emissions 

21 from the energy and transportation sector. 

22 (2) ELEMENTS.—The strategy required under 

23 subsection (a) shall include— 

24 (A) a thorough review and inventory of 

25 United States Government activities that are 


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1 being carried out bilaterally, regionally, and in 

2 coordination with multilateral institutions— 

3 (i) to promote energy and climate secu4 rity in the Caribbean region; and 

5 (ii) to reduce the region’s reliance on 

6 oil for electricity generation; 

7 (B) opportunities for marshaling regional 

8 cooperation— 

9 (i) to overcome market barriers result10 ing from the small size of Caribbean energy 

11 markets; 

12 (ii) to address the high transportation 

13 and infrastructure costs faced by Caribbean 

14 countries; 

15 (iii) to ensure greater donor coordina16 tion between governments, multilateral in17 stitutions, multilateral banks, and private 

18 investors; and 

19 (iv) to expand regional financing op20 portunities to allow for lower cost energy 

21 entrepreneurship; 

22 (C) measures to ensure that each Caribbean 

23 government has— 

24 (i) an independent utility regulator or 

25 equivalent; 


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1 (ii) affordable access by third party in2 vestors to its electrical grid with minimal 

3 regulatory interference; 

4 (iii) effective energy efficiency and en5 ergy conservation; 

6 (iv) programs to address technical and 

7 nontechnical issues; 

8 (v) a plan to eliminate major market 

9 distortions; 

10 (vi) cost-reflective tariffs; and 

11 (vii) no tariffs or other taxes on clean 

12 energy solutions; and 

13 (D) recommendations for how United States 

14 policy, technical, and economic assistance can be 

15 used in the Caribbean region— 

16 (i) to advance renewable energy devel17 opment and the incorporation of renewable 

18 technologies into existing energy grids and 

19 the development and deployment of micro20 grids where appropriate and feasible to 

21 boost energy security and reliability, par22 ticularly to underserved communities; 

23 (ii) to increase the generation of clean 

24 energy sufficiently to replace and allow for 


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1 the retirement of obsolete fossil fuel energy 

2 generation units in Caribbean countries; 

3 (iii) to create regional financing op4 portunities to allow for lower cost energy 

5 entrepreneurship; 

6 (iv) to deploy transaction advisors in 

7 the region to help attract private investment 

8 and break down any market or regulatory 

9 barriers; and 

10 (v) to establish a mechanism for each 

11 host government to have access to inde12 pendent legal advice— 

13 (I) to speed the development of en14 ergy-related contracts; and 

15 (II) to better protect the interests 

16 of Caribbean governments and citizens. 

17 (3) CONSULTATION.—In devising the strategy 

18 under this subsection, the Secretary of State shall 

19 work with the Secretary of Energy and shall consult 

20 with— 

21 (A) the Secretary of the Interior; 

22 (B) the Secretary of Commerce; 

23 (C) the Secretary of the Treasury; 

24 (D) the Board of Directors of the Export25 Import Bank of the United States; 


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1 (E) the Board of Directors of the Develop2 ment Finance Corporation; 

3 (F) the Administrator of the United States 

4 Agency for International Development; 

5 (G) the Caribbean governments; 

6 (H) the Inter-American Development Bank; 

7 (I) the World Bank Group; and 

8 (J) the Caribbean Electric Utility Services 

9 Corporation. 

10 SEC. 250. UNITED STATES-CARIBBEAN RESILIENCE PART11 NERSHIP. 

12 (a) FINDINGS.—Congress makes the following findings: 

13 (1) The United States shares with the Caribbean 

14 a collective vulnerability to natural disasters, which 

15 affects the lives and the economies of our citizens. 

16 (2) The April 9, 2021, eruption of the La 

17 Soufriere volcano is another reminder of the devasta18 tion caused by the many natural disasters the Carib19 bean confronts each year and the region’s vulner20 ability to external shocks. Hurricane Dorian, the 

21 largest storm to hit the region, wiped out large parts 

22 of the northern Bahamas in 2019, and Hurricanes 

23 Maria and Irma devastated multiple islands across 

24 the region in 2017, including Puerto Rico. According 

25 to IMF research, of the 511 plus disasters worldwide 


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1 to hit small states since 1950, around two-thirds 

2 (324) have been in the Caribbean. 

3 (3) This region is seven times more likely to ex4 perience a natural disaster than elsewhere. And, when 

5 one occurs, it will incur as much as six times more 

6 damage. 

7 (4) Extreme weather events and other environ8 mental impacts will only worsen over the coming 

9 years, and if not addressed, we will see only increas10 ing economic shocks on these countries, driving irreg11 ular migration. 

12 (5) While the United States has considerable ex13 pertise and capacity in assisting countries with dis14 aster response, there remains a need for stronger part15 nerships that build regional resilience through effi16 cient and interoperable platforms, protecting people 

17 and speeding recovery. 

18 (6) The People’s Republic of China has dramati19 cally increased its engagement in the Caribbean in 

20 the past five years, including offering loans and 

21 grants related to disaster response and resilience and 

22 sought to acquire property rights in the Caribbean 

23 that would be detrimental to United States national 

24 security interests. 


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1 (7) In 2019, the United States launched a new 

2 U.S.-Caribbean Resilience Partnership to deepen co3 operation and investment to strengthen our disaster 

4 resilience throughout the Caribbean region, includ5 ing— 

6 (A) to streamline early warning response 

7 networks and formalize communication channels; 

8 (B) to enhance, encourage, and work col9 laboratively on further developing aviation dis10 aster resilience plans and partnerships; 

11 (C) to prioritize regional technical exchange 

12 in energy planning, risk reduction, and resil13 ience; 

14 (D) to increase communications network 

15 interoperability between Caribbean partners and 

16 the United States; 

17 (E) to utilize storm surge mapping data 

18 and share real-time information in preparation 

19 for potential damage resulting from tropical cy20 clones and tsunamis; 

21 (F) to use meteorological services to 

22 strengthen and deepen physical and communica23 tions infrastructure, data collection networks, 

24 and human and technical capacity throughout 


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1 the region, as well as interactions with the pub2 lic; 

3 (G) to understand that while the use of 

4 international and military and civil defense as5 sets in disaster response may only be considered 

6 as a last resort, when local, national, and inter7 national civilian capabilities are overwhelmed, 

8 civil-military coordination should occur, in sup9 port of the affected nation; 

10 (H) to develop a framework that would gov11 ern the deployment of international military and 

12 civil defense assets in disaster response when 

13 local, national, and international civilian capa14 bilities are overwhelmed, in support of the af15 fected nation; 

16 (I) to seek common mechanisms for ensur17 ing rapid disaster response and recovery, includ18 ing waiving or expediting diplomatic clearances, 

19 waiving of or reducing customs fees, stream20 lining overflight and airspace clearance, and en21 suring that the first responders have the ability 

22 to rapidly respond to disasters in other coun23 tries; 

24 (J) to promote the integration and coordi25 nation of regional response mechanisms in the 


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1 Caribbean, including through the Caribbean Dis2 aster Emergency Management Agency, the Re3 gional Security System, United States Govern4 ment Agencies, and allies in ways that facilitate 

5 more effective and efficient planning, mitigation, 

6 response, and resilience to natural disasters; 

7 (K) to share best practices in improved 

8 building codes with national disaster organiza9 tions, including building better programs, at re10 gional, national and community levels; and 

11 (L) to promote community-based disaster 

12 preparedness and mitigation activities, particu13 larly in underserved communities, with the aim 

14 of increasing broad public participation and re15 silience. 

16 (b) POLICY.—It is the policy of the United States to 

17 help Caribbean countries— 

18 (1) increase their resilience and adapt to natural 

19 disasters and the impacts of severe weather events and 

20 a changing environment; 

21 (2) partner with United States Federal, State, 

22 and local agencies and engage in technical coopera23 tion, dialogue, and assistance activities; 


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1 (3) harmonize standards and practices related to 

2 paragraphs (1) and (2) to promote increased invest3 ment and integration; 

4 (4) increase investment from United States com5 panies in the Caribbean on resilience-building, adap6 tation, and climate-related mitigation efforts; 

7 (5) promote regional cooperation and ensure ef8 forts by the United States, Caribbean countries, and 

9 international partners complement each other; and 

10 (6) further assist with the efforts described in 

11 subsection (a)(7). 

12 (c) STRATEGY.—Not later than 180 days after the date 

13 of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, in co14 ordination with the heads of other Federal departments and 

15 agencies, shall submit to the appropriate congressional com16 mittees a multi-year strategy that describes how the Depart17 ment of State will achieve the policies described in sub18 section (b). 

19 (d) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—There are 

20 authorized to be appropriated for activities, programs, tech21 nical assistance, and engagement under this section the fol22 lowing: 

23 (1) $20,000,000 for fiscal year 2022. 

24 (2) $25,000,000 for fiscal year 2023. 


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1 (3) $30,000,000 for fiscal year 2024 and each 

2 fiscal year thereafter. 

3 (e) REPORTING AND MONITORING.— 

4 (1) IN GENERAL.—Of the amounts authorized to 

5 be appropriated each fiscal year pursuant to sub6 section (d), at least five percent of all programming 

7 funding allocation shall support and be directed to8 ward reporting, monitoring, and assessment of effec9 tiveness. 

10 (2) ENGAGEMENT AND COLLABORATION.—The 

11 Department of State shall ensure that at least 20 per12 cent of amounts authorized to be appropriated pursu13 ant to subsection (d) directly support the training of, 

14 engagement with, collaboration with, and exchange of 

15 expertise on resilience between United States Federal, 

16 State, and local officials and their Caribbean govern17 ment counterparts. Such amounts should also sup18 port, as appropriate, increased academic, civil soci19 ety, media, and private sector engagement in the 

20 fields of resilience-building, adaptation, and mitiga21 tion. 

22 SEC. 251. COUNTERING CHINA’S EDUCATIONAL AND CUL23 TURAL DIPLOMACY IN LATIN AMERICA. 

24 (a) FINDINGS.—Congress finds the following: 


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1 (1) According to a report by the National En2 dowment for Democracy, China has spent the equiva3 lent of billions of dollars to shape public opinion and 

4 perceptions around the world through thousands of 

5 people-to-people exchanges, cultural activities, edu6 cational programs, and the development of media en7 terprises and information initiatives with global 

8 reach. 

9 (2) Educational and exchange programs are a 

10 core element of United States public diplomacy, ele11 vating our culture, policies, and interests worldwide. 

12 (3) These programs provide students with access 

13 to international knowledge, an opportunity to learn 

14 foreign languages, and a unique environment for de15 veloping cultural understanding, all of which are val16 uable skills in today’s global economy. 

17 (4) 90 percent of ECA’s appropriation is spent 

18 in the United States or invested directly in American 

19 citizens or American organizations. 

20 (b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Congress 

21 that— 

22 (1) China’s efforts to mold public opinion and 

23 influence educational institutions undermine United 

24 States’ influence in Latin America and the Caribbean 


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1 and threaten democratic institutions and practices in 

2 the region; 

3 (2) the United States Government should expand 

4 current educational and cultural exchange programs 

5 in Latin America and the Caribbean, which are cost6 effective and strengthen people-to-people diplomacy, to 

7 promote national security and foreign policy interests 

8 of the United States; and 

9 (3) educational exchanges foster linguistic, cul10 tural, and educational skills that advance United 

11 States economic competitiveness, strengthen alliances, 

12 and support democracies worldwide. 

13 (c) STRATEGY.—Not later than 180 days after the date 

14 of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, acting 

15 through the Assistant Secretary of State for Educational 

16 and Cultural Affairs, and in coordination with the Assist17 ant Administrator for the Bureau of Economic Growth, 

18 Education, and Environment at the United States Agency 

19 for International Development, shall devise a strategy— 

20 (1) to evaluate and expand existing programs 

21 and, as necessary, design and implement new edu22 cational, professional, and cultural exchanges and 

23 other programs to— 

24 (A) create and sustain mutual under25 standing with other countries necessary to adVerDate Sep 11 2014 21:34 Dec 30, 2022 Jkt 039200 PO 00000 Frm 00259 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6203 E:\BILLS\H3524.RH H3524

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1 vance United States foreign policy goals by culti2 vating people-to-people ties among current and 

3 future global leaders that build enduring net4 works and personal relationships; and 

5 (B) promote United States national secu6 rity interests and values, including through the 

7 expansion of exchange visitor programs such as 

8 international visitor leadership programs and 

9 the Young Leaders of the Americas Initiative, as 

10 well as professional capacity building programs 

11 that prioritize building skills in entrepreneur12 ship, promoting transparency, and technology; 

13 (2) to ensure that exchange programs for Ameri14 cans abroad and international visitors attract a di15 verse pool of participants, including from underrep16 resented, marginalized, and low-income communities; 

17 and 

18 (3) to evaluate, expand, and strengthen existing 

19 programs, and, as necessary, design and implement 

20 new basic and higher education programs in Latin 

21 America and the Caribbean, in accordance with the 

22 United States Strategy on International Basic Edu23 cation and the United States Agency for Inter24 national Development Education Policy, to enable all 

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1 ity education and skills needed to be productive mem2 bers in society, which will lead to better individual 

3 and societal outcomes. 

4 (d) REPORT WITH INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENT.—Not 

5 later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this 

6 Act, the Secretary of State shall, in coordination with the 

7 Director of National Intelligence, submit to the appropriate 

8 congressional committees a report that assesses the nature 

9 and impact of the People’s Republic of China’s educational 

10 and cultural sector activity in Latin America and the Car11 ibbean, its impact on United States’ strategic interests, and 

12 recommendations for the United States Government to ex13 pand people-to-people ties. 

14 SEC. 252. NARCOTICS TRAFFICKING IN LATIN AMERICA AND 

15 THE CARIBBEAN. 

16 It is the sense of Congress that— 

17 (1) narcotics trafficking continues to pose a secu18 rity threat to the countries and peoples of Latin 

19 America and the Caribbean; 

20 (2) other forms of transnational organized crime, 

21 including arms trafficking, human smuggling, money 

22 laundering, and illicit financing, are drivers of irreg23 ular migration; 

24 (3) narcotics trafficking is fueled by governments 

25 that fail to curb the illicit drug trade by adequately 


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1 regulating the legal trade of non-fentanyl opioids and 

2 precursor chemicals used to produce fentanyl, 

3 fentanyl analogs, and other synthetic drugs; 

4 (4) further, governments that do not cooperate 

5 sufficiently on financial investigations and prosecu6 tions, withhold information with respect to money 

7 laundering crimes, or are determined to facilitate il8 licit activities, particularly by transnational orga9 nized criminal organizations, should be held account10 able; 

11 (5) as noted in the International Narcotics Con12 trol Strategy Report 2020, China ‘‘has not cooperated 

13 sufficiently on financial investigations and does not 

14 provide adequate responses to requests for financial 

15 investigation information’’; 

16 (6) the United States should apply economic and 

17 other targeted financial sanctions with respect to in18 dividuals engaged in financial crimes and money 

19 laundering that fosters narcotics trafficking in the 

20 countries of Latin America and the Caribbean; and 

21 (7) the United States should look to policies to 

22 hold accountable countries that fail to sufficiently in23 vestigate financial crimes and money laundering that 

24 foster narcotics trafficking in the countries of Latin 

25 America and the Caribbean. 


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1 PART II—TRANSATLANTIC RELATIONSHIPS 

2 SEC. 255. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON TRANSATLANTIC RELA3 TIONSHIPS. 

4 It is the sense of Congress that— 

5 (1) the United States, European Union, the 

6 United Kingdom, and other European countries are 

7 close partners, sharing values grounded in democracy, 

8 human rights, transparency, and the rules-based 

9 international order established after World War II; 

10 (2) without a common approach by the United 

11 States, European Union, the United Kingdom, and 

12 other European countries on connectivity, trade, 

13 transnational challenges, and support for democracy 

14 and human rights, the People’s Republic of China 

15 will continue to increase its economic, political, and 

16 security leverage in Europe; 

17 (3) the People’s Republic of China’s deployment 

18 of assistance to European countries following the 

19 COVID–19 outbreak showcased a coercive approach to 

20 aid, but it also highlighted Europe’s deep economic 

21 ties to the People’s Republic of China; 

22 (4) as European countries seek to recover from 

23 the economic toll of the COVID–19 outbreak, the 

24 United States must stand in partnership with Europe 

25 to support our collective economic recovery, reinforce 


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1 our collective national security, and defend shared 

2 values; 

3 (5) the United States, European Union, the 

4 United Kingdom, and other European countries 

5 should coordinate on joint strategies to diversify reli6 ance on supply chains away from the People’s Repub7 lic of China, especially in the medical and pharma8 ceutical sectors; 

9 (6) the United States, European Union, the 

10 United Kingdom, and other European countries 

11 should leverage their respective economic innovation 

12 capabilities to support the global economic recovery 

13 from the COVID–19 recession and draw a contrast 

14 with the centralized economy of the People’s Republic 

15 of China; 

16 (7) the United States, United Kingdom, and Eu17 ropean Union should accelerate efforts to de-escalate 

18 their trade disputes, including negotiating a United 

19 States-European Union trade agreement that benefits 

20 workers and the broader economy in both the United 

21 States and European Union; 

22 (8) the United States, European Union, and 

23 Japan should continue trilateral efforts to address the 

24 security, economic, democracy, and human rights 

25 challenges posed by the People’s Republic of China; 


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1 (9) the United States, European Union, the 

2 United Kingdom, and other European countries 

3 should enhance cooperation to counter People’s Re4 public of China disinformation, influence operations, 

5 and propaganda efforts; 

6 (10) the United States and Europe share serious 

7 concerns with the repressions being supported and ex8 ecuted by the Government of the People’s Republic of 

9 China, and should continue implementing measures 

10 to address the Government of the People’s Republic of 

11 China’s specific abuses in Tibet, Hong Kong, and 

12 Xinjiang, and should build joint mechanisms and 

13 programs to prevent the export of China’s authori14 tarian governance model to countries around the 

15 world; 

16 (11) the United States and Europe should re17 main united in their shared values against attempts 

18 by the Government of the People’s Republic of China 

19 at the United Nations and other multilateral organi20 zations to promote efforts that erode the Universal 

21 Declaration of Human Rights, like the ‘‘community of 

22 a shared future for mankind’’ and ‘‘democratization 

23 of international relations’’; 

24 (12) the People’s Republic of China’s infrastruc25 ture investments around the world, particularly in 


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1 5G telecommunications technology and port infra2 structure, could threaten democracy across Europe 

3 and the national security of key countries; 

4 (13) as appropriate, the United States should 

5 share intelligence with European allies and partners 

6 on Huawei’s 5G capabilities and the intentions of the 

7 Government of the People’s Republic of China with 

8 respect to 5G expansion in Europe; 

9 (14) the European Union’s Investment Screening 

10 Regulation, which came into force in October 2020, is 

11 a welcome development, and member states should 

12 closely scrutinize PRC investments in their countries 

13 through their own national investment screening 

14 measures; 

15 (15) the President should actively engage the Eu16 ropean Union on the implementation of the Export 

17 Control Reform Act regulations and to better har18 monize United States and European Union policies 

19 with respect to export controls; 

20 (16) the President should strongly advocate for 

21 the listing of more items and technologies to restrict 

22 dual use exports controlled at the National Security 

23 and above level to the People’s Republic of China 

24 under the Wassenaar Arrangement; 


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1 (17) the United States should explore the value 

2 of establishing a body akin to the Coordinating Com3 mittee for Multilateral Export Controls (CoCom) that 

4 would specifically coordinate United States and Eu5 ropean Union export control policies with respect to 

6 limiting exports of sensitive technologies to the Peo7 ple’s Republic of China; and 

8 (18) the United States should work with counter9 parts in Europe to— 

10 (A) evaluate United States and European 

11 overreliance on goods originating in the People’s 

12 Republic of China, including in the medical and 

13 pharmaceutical sectors, and develop joint strate14 gies to diversify supply chains; 

15 (B) develop a common strategy for pro16 moting energy security and economic growth in 

17 eastern Europe and the Balkans that addresses 

18 shared concerns related to China’s Belt and 

19 Road Initiative in these regions, including com20 plementary investments in the Three Seas Initia21 tive Fund for clean energy and digital 

22 connectivity projects; 

23 (C) counter PRC efforts to use COVID–19- 

24 related assistance as a coercive tool to pressure 

25 developing countries by offering relevant United 


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1 States and European expertise and assistance; 

2 and 

3 (D) leverage the United States and Euro4 pean private sectors to advance the post-COVID– 

5 19 economic recovery. 

6 SEC. 256. STRATEGY TO ENHANCE TRANSATLANTIC CO7 OPERATION WITH RESPECT TO THE PEOPLE’S 

8 REPUBLIC OF CHINA. 

9 (a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days after the 

10 date of the enactment of this Act, the President shall brief 

11 the appropriate congressional committees, the Committee on 

12 Armed Services of the Senate, and the Committee on Armed 

13 Services of the House of Representatives on a strategy for 

14 how the United States will enhance cooperation with the 

15 European Union, NATO, and European partner countries 

16 with respect to the People’s Republic of China. 

17 (b) ELEMENTS.—The briefing required under sub18 section (a) shall include the following elements with respect 

19 to the strategy referred to in such subsection: 

20 (1) An identification of the senior Senate-con21 firmed Department of State official who leads United 

22 States efforts to cooperate with the European Union, 

23 NATO, and European partner countries to advance a 

24 shared approach with respect to the People’s Republic 

25 of China. 


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1 (2) An identification of key policy points of con2 vergence and divergence between the United States 

3 and European allies and partners with respect to the 

4 People’s Republic of China in the areas of technology, 

5 trade, and economic practices. 

6 (3) A description of efforts to advance shared in7 terests with European counterparts on— 

8 (A) security and economic challenges with 

9 respect to the People’s Republic of China; 

10 (B) democracy and human rights challenges 

11 with respect to the People’s Republic of China; 

12 (C) technology issues with respect to the 

13 People’s Republic of China; 

14 (D) defense issues with respect to the Peo15 ple’s Republic of China; and 

16 (E) developing a comprehensive strategy to 

17 respond to the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) 

18 established by the Government of the People’s Re19 public of China. 

20 (4) A description of the coordination mechanisms 

21 among key regional and functional bureaus within 

22 the Department of State and Department of Defense 

23 tasked with engaging with European allies and part24 ners on the People’s Republic of China. 


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1 (5) A detailing of diplomatic efforts up to the 

2 date of the briefing and future plans to work with 

3 European allies and partners to counter the Govern4 ment of the People’s Republic of China’s advancement 

5 of an authoritarian governance model around the 

6 world. 

7 (6) A detailing of the diplomatic efforts made up 

8 to the date of the briefing and future plans to support 

9 European efforts to identify cost-effective alternatives 

10 to Huawei’s 5G technology. 

11 (7) A detailing of how United States public di12 plomacy tools, including the Global Engagement Cen13 ter of the Department of State, will coordinate efforts 

14 with counterpart entities within the European Union 

15 to counter Chinese propaganda. 

16 (8) A description of the staffing and budget re17 sources the Department of State dedicates to engage18 ment between the United States and the European 

19 Union on the People’s Republic of China and provide 

20 an assessment of out-year resource needs to execute 

21 such strategy. 

22 (9) A detailing of diplomatic efforts to work with 

23 European allies and partners to track and counter 

24 Chinese attempts to exert influence across multilateral 

25 fora, including at the World Health Organization. 


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1 (c) FORM.—The briefing required under section (a) 

2 shall be classified. 

3 (d) CONSULTATION.—Not later than 180 days after the 

4 date of the enactment of this Act and annually thereafter 

5 for three years, the Secretary of State shall consult with 

6 the appropriate congressional committees, the Committee on 

7 Armed Services of the Senate, and the Committee on Armed 

8 Services of the House of Representatives regarding the devel9 opment and implementation of the elements described in 

10 subsection (b). 

11 SEC. 257. ENHANCING TRANSATLANTIC COOPERATION ON 

12 PROMOTING PRIVATE SECTOR FINANCE. 

13 (a) IN GENERAL.—The President should work with 

14 transatlantic partners to build on the agreement among the 

15 Development Finance Corporation, FinDev Canada, and 

16 the European Development Finance Institutions (referred 

17 to as the ‘‘DFI Alliance’’) to enhance coordination on 

18 shared objectives to foster private sector-led development 

19 and provide market-based alternatives to state-directed fi20 nancing in emerging markets, particularly as related to the 

21 People’s Republic of China’s Belt and Road Initiative 

22 (BRI), including by integrating efforts such as— 

23 (1) the European Union Strategy on Connecting 

24 Europe and Asia; 


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1 (2) the Three Seas Initiative and Three Seas Ini2 tiative Fund; 

3 (3) the Blue Dot Network among the United 

4 States, Japan, and Australia; and 

5 (4) a European Union-Japan initiative that has 

6 leveraged $65,000,000,000 for infrastructure projects 

7 and emphasizes transparency standards. 

8 (b) STANDARDS.—The United States and the Euro9 pean Union should coordinate and develop a strategy to en10 hance transatlantic cooperation with the OECD and the 

11 Paris Club on ensuring the highest possible standards for 

12 Belt and Road Initiative contracts and terms with devel13 oping countries. 

14 SEC. 258. REPORT AND BRIEFING ON COOPERATION BE15 TWEEN CHINA AND IRAN AND BETWEEN 

16 CHINA AND RUSSIA. 

17 (a) APPROPRIATE COMMITTEES OF CONGRESS DE18 FINED.—In this section, the term ‘‘appropriate committees 

19 of Congress’’ means— 

20 (1) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the Se21 lect Committee on Intelligence, the Committee on 

22 Armed Services, the Committee on Commerce, 

23 Science, and Transportation, the Committee on En24 ergy and Natural Resources, the Committee on Bank25 ing, Housing, and Urban Affairs, the Committee on 


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1 Finance, and the Committee on Appropriations of the 

2 Senate; and 

3 (2) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Per4 manent Select Committee on Intelligence, the Com5 mittee on Armed Services, the Committee on Energy 

6 and Commerce, the Committee on Financial Services, 

7 the Committee on Ways and Means, and the Com8 mittee on Appropriations of the House of Representa9 tives. 

10 (b) REPORT AND BRIEFING REQUIRED.— 

11 (1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days after 

12 the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of 

13 National Intelligence shall, in coordination with the 

14 Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, the Sec15 retary of Commerce, the Secretary of Energy, the Sec16 retary of the Treasury, and such other heads of Fed17 eral agencies as the Director considers appropriate, 

18 submit to the appropriate committees of Congress a 

19 report and brief such committees on cooperation be20 tween— 

21 (A) the People’s Republic of China and the 

22 Islamic Republic of Iran; and 

23 (B) the People’s Republic of China and the 

24 Russian Federation. 


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1 (2) CONTENTS.—The report and briefing under 

2 paragraph (1) shall include the following elements: 

3 (A) An identification of major areas of dip4 lomatic energy, infrastructure, banking, finan5 cial, economic, military, and space coopera6 tion— 

7 (i) between the People’s Republic of 

8 China and the Islamic Republic of Iran; 

9 and 

10 (ii) between the People’s Republic of 

11 China and the Russian Federation. 

12 (B) An assessment of the effect of the 

13 COVID–19 pandemic on such cooperation. 

14 (C) An assessment of the effect that United 

15 States compliance with the Joint Comprehensive 

16 Plan of Action (JCPOA) starting in January 

17 14, 2016, and United States withdrawal from 

18 the JCPOA on May 8, 2018, had on the coopera19 tion described in subparagraph (A)(i). 

20 (D) An assessment of the effect on the co21 operation described in subparagraph (A)(i) that 

22 would be had by the United States reentering 

23 compliance with the JCPOA or a successor 

24 agreement and the effect of the United States not 


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1 reentering compliance with the JCPOA or reach2 ing a successor agreement. 

3 (3) FORM.—The report submitted under para4 graph (1) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but 

5 may include a classified annex. 

6 (c) SENSE OF CONGRESS ON SHARING WITH ALLIES

7 AND PARTNERS.—It is the sense of Congress that the Direc8 tor of National Intelligence and the heads of other appro9 priate Federal departments and agencies should share with 

10 important allies and partners of the United States, as ap11 propriate, the findings of the report required under sub12 section (b). 

13 PART III—SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIA 

14 SEC. 261. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON SOUTH AND CENTRAL 

15 ASIA. 

16 It is the sense of Congress that— 

17 (1) the United States should continue to stand 

18 with friends and partners, while also working to es19 tablish new partners in South and Central Asia as 

20 they contend with efforts by the Government of the 

21 People’s Republic of China to interfere in their re22 spective political systems and encroach upon their 

23 sovereign territory; and 

24 (2) the United States should reaffirm its commit25 ment to the Comprehensive Global Strategic PartnerVerDate Sep 11 2014 21:34 Dec 30, 2022 Jkt 039200 PO 00000 Frm 00275 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6203 E:\BILLS\H3524.RH H3524

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1 ship with India and further deepen bilateral defense 

2 consultations and collaboration with India commen3 surate with its status as a major defense partner. 

4 SEC. 262. STRATEGY TO ENHANCE COOPERATION WITH 

5 SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIA. 

6 (a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days after the 

7 date of the enactment of this Act, the President shall submit 

8 to the appropriate congressional committees, the Committee 

9 on Armed Services of the Senate and, the Committee on 

10 Armed Services of the House of Representatives a strategy 

11 for how the United States will engage with the countries 

12 of South and Central Asia, including through the C5+1 

13 mechanism, with respect to the People’s Republic of China. 

14 (b) ELEMENTS.—The strategy required under sub15 section (a) shall include the following elements: 

16 (1) A detailed description of the security and 

17 economic challenges that the People’s Republic of 

18 China (PRC) poses to the countries of South and Cen19 tral Asia, including border disputes with South and 

20 Central Asian countries that border the People’s Re21 public of China, and PRC investments in land and 

22 sea ports, transportation infrastructure, and energy 

23 projects across the region. 

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1 frastructure and other sectors in South and Central 

2 Asia. 

3 (3) A detailed description of bilateral and re4 gional efforts to work with countries in South Asia on 

5 strategies to build resilience against PRC efforts to 

6 interfere in their political systems and economies. 

7 (4) A detailed description of United States diplo8 matic efforts to work with the Government of Afghani9 stan on addressing the challenges posed by PRC in10 vestment in the Afghan mineral sector. 

11 (5) A detailed description of United States diplo12 matic efforts with the Government of Pakistan with 

13 respect to matters relevant to the People’s Republic of 

14 China, including investments by the People’s Republic 

15 of China in Pakistan through the Belt and Road Ini16 tiative. 

17 (6) In close consultation with the Government of 

18 India, identification of areas with respect to which 

19 the United States Government can provide diplomatic 

20 and other support as appropriate for India’s efforts 

21 to address economic and security challenges posed by 

22 the People’s Republic of China in the region. 

23 (7) A description of the coordination mechanisms 

24 among key regional and functional bureaus within 

25 the Department of State and Department of Defense 


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1 tasked with engaging with the countries of South and 

2 Central Asia on issues relating to the People’s Repub3 lic of China. 

4 (8) A description of the efforts being made by 

5 Federal departments and agencies, including the De6 partment of State, the United States Agency for 

7 International Development, the Department of Com8 merce, the Department of Energy, and the Office of 

9 the United States Trade Representative, to help the 

10 countries of South and Central Asia develop trade 

11 and commerce links that will help those countries di12 versify their trade away from the People’s Republic of 

13 China. 

14 (9) A detailed description of United States diplo15 matic efforts with Central Asian countries, Turkey, 

16 and any other countries with significant populations 

17 of Uyghurs and other ethnic minorities fleeing perse18 cution in the People’s Republic of China to press 

19 those countries to refrain from deporting ethnic mi20 norities to the People’s Republic of China, protect eth21 nic minorities from intimidation by Chinese Govern22 ment authorities, and protect the right to the freedoms 

23 of assembly and expression. 

24 (c) FORM.—The strategy required under section (a) 

25 shall be submitted in an unclassified form that can be made 


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1 available to the public, but may include a classified annex 

2 as necessary. 

3 (d) CONSULTATION.—Not later than 120 days after the 

4 date of the enactment of this Act and not less often than 

5 annually thereafter for five years, the Secretary of State 

6 shall consult with the appropriate congressional commit7 tees, the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate, and 

8 the Committee on Armed Services of the House of Represent9 atives regarding the development and implementation of the 

10 strategy required under subsection (a). 

11 SEC. 263. INDIAN OCEAN REGION STRATEGIC REVIEW. 

12 (a) FINDINGS.—Congress makes the following findings: 

13 (1) The Indian Ocean region is a vitally impor14 tant part of the Indo-Pacific where the United States 

15 has political, economic, and security interests. 

16 (2) The United States has an interest in working 

17 with partners in the Indo-Pacific, including India, 

18 Japan, and Australia, to address regional governance, 

19 economic connectivity, and security challenges includ20 ing threats to freedom of navigation. 

21 (b) STATEMENT OF POLICY.—As a part of the United 

22 States engagement in the Indo-Pacific, it shall be the policy 

23 of the United States to strengthen engagement with the 

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1 ernments, civil society, and private sectors in such countries 

2 to— 

3 (1) promote United States political engagement 

4 with such region, including through active participa5 tion in regional organizations, and strengthened dip6 lomatic relations with United States partners in such 

7 region; 

8 (2) enhance United States economic connectivity 

9 and commercial exchange with such region; 

10 (3) defend freedom of navigation in such region 

11 from security challenges, including related to piracy; 

12 (4) support the ability of governments and orga13 nizations in such region to respond to natural disas14 ters; 

15 (5) support and facilitate the role of regional al16 lies and partners as net providers of security to such 

17 region and as partners to the United States in ad18 dressing security challenges in such region, including 

19 through assistance to such allies and partners to build 

20 capacity in maritime security and maritime domain 

21 awareness; 

22 (6) continue to build the United States-India re23 lationship in order to regularize security cooperation 

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1 cess, communication, and navigation, including 

2 through foundational agreements; and 

3 (7) promote cooperation with United States al4 lies in the Indo-Pacific, including Japan and Aus5 tralia, and major defense partners, including India, 

6 and NATO allies, including the United Kingdom and 

7 France, to support a rules-based order in such region. 

8 (c) STRATEGY.— 

9 (1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days after 

10 the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of 

11 State, in coordination with the Secretary of Defense 

12 and the Administrator of the United States Agency 

13 for International Development (USAID), shall submit 

14 to the appropriate committees of Congress a multi15 year strategy for United States engagement to sup16 port United States interests in the Indian Ocean re17 gion. Such strategy shall— 

18 (A) define United States political, economic, 

19 and security interests in the Indian Ocean re20 gion; 

21 (B) outline challenges to the interests of the 

22 United States in such region; 

23 (C) outline efforts to improve cooperation 

24 between the United States and members of the 

25 Quad, including India, Japan, and Australia, 


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1 through coordination in diplomacy and develop2 ment priorities, joint military exercises and op3 erations, and other activities that promote 

4 United States political, economic, and security 

5 interests; 

6 (D) outline efforts to support economic 

7 connectivity in such region, including through 

8 the United States-India-Japan Trilateral Infra9 structure Working Group, the Asia-Africa 

10 Growth Corridor, and other efforts to expand 

11 and enhance connectivity across the Indo-Pacific, 

12 including with the countries of Southeast Asia, 

13 that maintain high standards of investment and 

14 support for civil society and people-to-people 

15 connectivity; 

16 (E) describe how the United States can en17 gage with regional intergovernmental organiza18 tions and entities, including the Indian Ocean 

19 Rim Association, to promote United States polit20 ical, economic, and security interests in such re21 gion; 

22 (F) review the United States diplomatic 

23 posture in such region, including an assessment 

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1 bassy or diplomatic mission, and an assessment 

2 of ways to improve the cooperation with the 

3 Maldives, the Seychelles, and Comoros; 

4 (G) review United States diplomatic agree5 ments with countries in such region that facili6 tate United States military operations in such 

7 region, including bilateral and multilateral 

8 agreements, and describe efforts to expand 

9 United States cooperation with such countries 

10 through the negotiation of additional agreements; 

11 and 

12 (H) include a security assistance strategy 

13 for such region that outlines priorities, objectives, 

14 and actions for United States security assistance 

15 efforts to governments of countries in such region 

16 to promote United States political, economic, 

17 and security interests in such region. 

18 (2) INCLUSION.—The strategy required under 

19 paragraph (1) may be submitted as a part of any 

20 other strategy relating to the Indo-Pacific. 

21 (3) REPORT ON IMPLEMENTATION.—Not later 

22 than one year after the submission of the strategy re23 quired under paragraph (1) and one year thereafter, 

24 the Secretary of State shall submit to the appropriate 


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1 congressional committees a report on progress made 

2 toward implementing such strategy. 

3 (d) UNITED STATES-CHINA ECONOMIC AND SECURITY

4 REVIEW COMMISSION.— 

5 (1) IN GENERAL.—Subparagraph (E) of section 

6 1238(c)(2) of the Floyd D. Spence National Defense 

7 Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2001 (22 U.S.C. 

8 7002(c)(2)) is amended— 

9 (A) by inserting ‘‘, including in the Indian 

10 Ocean region’’ after ‘‘deployments of the People’s 

11 Republic of China military’’; and 

12 (B) by adding at the end the following new 

13 sentence: ‘‘In this subparagraph, the term ‘In14 dian Ocean region’ means the Indian Ocean, in15 cluding the Arabian Sea and the Bay of Bengal, 

16 and the littoral areas surrounding the Indian 

17 Ocean.’’. 

18 (2) EFFECTIVE DATE.—The amendments made 

19 by paragraph (1) shall take effect on the date of the 

20 enactment of this Act and apply beginning with the 

21 first report required under section 1238 of the Floyd 

22 D. Spence National Defense Authorization Act for 

23 Fiscal Year 2001 (as amended by such paragraph) 

24 that is submitted after such date. 

25 (e) DEFINITIONS.—In this section: 


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1 (1) APPROPRIATE COMMITTEES OF CONGRESS.— 

2 The term ‘‘appropriate committees of Congress’’ 

3 means the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the 

4 Committee on Armed Services of the House of Rep5 resentatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations 

6 and the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate. 

7 (2) INDIAN OCEAN REGION.—The term ‘‘Indian 

8 Ocean region’’ means the Indian Ocean, including the 

9 Arabian Sea and the Bay of Bengal, and the littoral 

10 areas surrounding the Indian Ocean. 

11 PART IV—AFRICA 

12 SEC. 271. ASSESSMENT OF POLITICAL, ECONOMIC, AND SE13 CURITY ACTIVITY OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUB14 LIC OF CHINA IN AFRICA. 

15 (a) APPROPRIATE COMMITTEES OF CONGRESS DE16 FINED.—In this section, the term ‘‘appropriate committees 

17 of Congress’’ means— 

18 (1) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the 

19 Committee on Armed Services, and the Select Com20 mittee on Intelligence of the Senate; and 

21 (2) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Com22 mittee on Armed Services, and the Permanent Select 

23 Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representa24 tives. 


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1 (b) INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENT.—Not later than 180 

2 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Sec3 retary of State shall, in coordination with the Director of 

4 National Intelligence, submit to the appropriate committees 

5 of Congress a report that assesses the nature and impact 

6 of the People’s Republic of China’s political, economic, 

7 socio-cultural, and security sector activity in Africa, and 

8 its impact on United States strategic interests, including 

9 information relating to— 

10 (1) the amount and impact of direct investment, 

11 loans, development financing, oil-for-loans deals, and 

12 other preferential trading arrangements; 

13 (2) the involvement of People’s Republic of China 

14 (PRC) state-owned enterprises in Africa; 

15 (3) the amount of African debt held by the PRC; 

16 (4) the involvement of PRC private security, 

17 technology and media companies in Africa; 

18 (5) the scale and impact of PRC arms sales to 

19 African countries; 

20 (6) the scope of PRC investment in and control 

21 of African energy resources and minerals critical for 

22 emerging and foundational technologies; 

23 (7) an analysis on the linkages between PRC’s 

24 aid and assistance to African countries and African 


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1 countries supporting PRC geopolitical goals in inter2 national fora; 

3 (8) the methods, tools, and tactics used to facili4 tate illegal and corrupt activity, including trade in 

5 counterfeit and illicit goods, to include smuggled ex6 tractive resources and wildlife products, between Afri7 ca and the PRC; 

8 (9) the methods and techniques that the PRC 

9 uses to exert undue influence on African governments 

10 and facilitate corrupt activity in Africa, including 

11 through the CCP’s party-to-party training program, 

12 and to influence African multilateral organizations; 

13 and 

14 (10) an analysis of the soft power, cultural and 

15 educational activities undertaken by the PRC and 

16 CCP to seek to expand its influence in Africa. 

17 SEC. 272. INCREASING THE COMPETITIVENESS OF THE 

18 UNITED STATES IN AFRICA. 

19 (a) APPROPRIATE COMMITTEES OF CONGRESS DE20 FINED.—In this section, the term ‘‘appropriate committees 

21 of Congress’’ means— 

22 (1) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the 

23 Committee on Appropriations, and the Committee on 

24 Finance of the Senate; and 


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1 (2) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Com2 mittee on Appropriations, and the Committee on 

3 Ways and Means of the House of Representatives. 

4 (b) STRATEGY REQUIREMENT.—Not later than 180 

5 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Sec6 retary of State shall, in consultation with the Secretary of 

7 the Treasury, the Secretary of Commerce, the Attorney Gen8 eral, the United States Trade Representative, the Adminis9 trator of the United States Agency for International Devel10 opment, and the leadership of the United States Inter11 national Development Finance Corporation, submit to the 

12 appropriate committees of Congress a report setting forth 

13 a multi-year strategy for increasing United States economic 

14 competitiveness and promoting improvements in the invest15 ment climate in Africa, including through support for— 

16 (1) democratic institutions and the rule of law, 

17 including property rights; and 

18 (2) improved transparency, anti-corruption ef19 forts, and good governance. 

20 (c) ELEMENTS.—The strategy submitted pursuant to 

21 subsection (a) shall include— 

22 (1) a description and assessment of barriers to 

23 United States investment in Africa for United States 

24 businesses, including a clear identification of the dif25 ferent barriers facing small-sized and medium-sized 


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1 businesses, and an assessment of whether existing pro2 grams effectively address such barriers; 

3 (2) a description and assessment of barriers to 

4 African diaspora investment in Africa, and rec5 ommendations to overcome such barriers; 

6 (3) an identification of the economic sectors in 

7 the United States that have a comparative advantage 

8 in African markets; 

9 (4) a determination of priority African countries 

10 for promoting two-way trade and investment and an 

11 assessment of additional foreign assistance needs, in12 cluding democracy and governance and rule of law 

13 support, to promote a conducive operating environ14 ment in priority countries; 

15 (5) an identification of opportunities for stra16 tegic cooperation with European allies on trade and 

17 investment in Africa, and for establishing a dialogue 

18 on trade, security, development, and environmental 

19 issues of mutual interest; and 

20 (6) a plan to regularly host a United States-Af21 rica Leaders Summit to promote two-way trade and 

22 investment, strategic engagement, and security in Af23 rica. 


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1 (d) ASSESSMENT OF UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

2 HUMAN RESOURCES CAPACITY.—The Comptroller General 

3 of the United States shall— 

4 (1) conduct a review of the number of Foreign 

5 Commercial Service Officers and Department of State 

6 Economic Officers at United States embassies in sub7 Saharan Africa; and 

8 (2) develop and submit to the appropriate con9 gressional committees an assessment of whether 

10 human resource capacity in such embassies is ade11 quate to meet the goals of the various trade and eco12 nomic programs and initiatives in Africa, including 

13 the African Growth and Opportunity Act and Pros14 per Africa. 

15 SEC. 273. DIGITAL SECURITY COOPERATION WITH RESPECT 

16 TO AFRICA. 

17 (a) APPROPRIATE COMMITTEES OF CONGRESS DE18 FINED.—In this section, the term ‘‘appropriate committees 

19 of Congress’’ means— 

20 (1) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the 

21 Committee on Armed Services, and the Select Com22 mittee on Intelligence of the Senate; and 

23 (2) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Com24 mittee on Armed Services, and the Permanent Select 


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1 Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representa2 tives. 

3 (b) INTERAGENCY WORKING GROUP TO COUNTER PRC 

4 CYBER AGGRESSION IN AFRICA.— 

5 (1) IN GENERAL.—The President shall establish 

6 an interagency Working Group, which shall include 

7 representatives of the Department of State, the De8 partment of Defense, the Office of the Director of Na9 tional Intelligence, and such other agencies of the 

10 United States Government as the President considers 

11 appropriate, on means to counter PRC cyber aggres12 sion with respect to Africa. 

13 (2) DUTIES.—The Working Group established 

14 pursuant to this subsection shall develop and submit 

15 to the appropriate congressional committees a set of 

16 recommendations, such as for— 

17 (A) bolstering the capacity of governments 

18 in Africa to ensure the integrity of their data 

19 networks and critical infrastructure, where ap20 plicable; 

21 (B) providing alternatives to Huawei; 

22 (C) an action plan for United States embas23 sies in Africa to provide assistance to host-coun24 try governments with respect to protecting their 

25 vital digital networks and infrastructure from 


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1 PRC espionage, including an assessment of staff2 ing resources needed to implement the action 

3 plan in embassies in Africa; 

4 (D) utilizing interagency resources to 

5 counter PRC disinformation and propaganda in 

6 traditional and digital media targeted to Afri7 can audiences; and 

8 (E) helping civil society in Africa counter 

9 digital authoritarianism and identifying tools 

10 and assistance to enhance and promote digital 

11 democracy. 

12 SEC. 274. SUPPORT FOR YOUNG AFRICAN LEADERS INITIA13 TIVE. 

14 (a) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Congress 

15 that— 

16 (1) the Young African Leaders Initiative, 

17 launched in 2010, is a signature effort to invest in the 

18 next generation of African leaders; 

19 (2) Africa is a continent of strategic importance 

20 and it is vital for the United States to support strong 

21 and enduring partnerships with the next generation 

22 of African leaders; and 

23 (3) the United States Government should 

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1 cluding through efforts to enhance leadership skills, 

2 encourage entrepreneurship, strengthen public admin3 istration and the role of civil society, and connect 

4 young African leaders continentally and globally 

5 across the private, civic, and public sectors. 

6 (b) YOUNG AFRICAN LEADERS INITIATIVE PRO7 GRAM.— 

8 (1) IN GENERAL.—There is established in the De9 partment of State the Young African Leaders Initia10 tive (‘‘YALI’’) program. 

11 (2) PURPOSE.—The YALI program shall seek to 

12 build the capacity of young African leaders in sub13 Saharan Africa in the areas of business, civic engage14 ment, or public administration, including through ef15 forts to— 

16 (A) support young African leaders by offer17 ing professional development, training, and net18 working opportunities, particularly in the areas 

19 of leadership, innovation, civic engagement, elec20 tions, human rights, entrepreneurship, good gov21 ernance, and public administration; and 

22 (B) provide increased economic and tech23 nical assistance to young African leaders to pro24 mote economic growth and strengthen ties be25 tween United States and African businesses. 


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1 (3) FELLOWSHIPS.—The YALI program shall 

2 award fellowships under the Mandela Washington 

3 Fellowship for Young African Leaders program to 

4 young African leaders ages 18 to 35 who have dem5 onstrated strong capabilities in entrepreneurship, in6 novation, public service, and leadership, and who 

7 have had a positive impact in their communities, or8 ganizations, or institutions. 

9 (4) REGIONAL LEADERSHIP CENTERS.—The 

10 YALI program shall seek to establish regional leader11 ship centers in sub-Saharan Africa to offer training 

12 to young African leaders ages 18 to 35 who have dem13 onstrated strong capabilities in entrepreneurship, in14 novation, public service and leadership, and who have 

15 had a positive impact in their communities, organi16 zations, or institutions. 

17 (5) ACTIVITIES.— 

18 (A) UNITED STATES-BASED ACTIVITIES.— 

19 The Secretary of State, in coordination with the 

20 Administrator for the United States Agency for 

21 International Development and the heads of 

22 other relevant Federal departments and agencies, 

23 shall oversee all United States-based activities 

24 carried out under the YALI program, including 

25 the following: 


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1 (i) The participation of Mandela 

2 Washington fellows in a six-week Leader3 ship Institute at a United States university 

4 or college in business, civic engagement, or 

5 public management, including academic 

6 sessions, site visits, professional networking 

7 opportunities, leadership training, commu8 nity service, and organized cultural activi9 ties. 

10 (ii) The participation by Mandela 

11 Washington fellows in an annual Mandela 

12 Washington Fellowship Summit, to provide 

13 such Fellows the opportunity to meet with 

14 United States leaders from the private, pub15 lic, and non-profit sectors. 

16 (B) AFRICA-BASED ACTIVITIES.—The Sec17 retary of State, in coordination with the Admin18 istrator for the United States Agency for Inter19 national Development and the heads of other rel20 evant Federal departments and agencies, should 

21 continue to support YALI programs in sub-Sa22 haran Africa, including the following: 

23 (i) Access to continued leadership 

24 training and other professional development 

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1 lowship for Young African Leaders alumni 

2 upon their return to their home countries, 

3 including online courses, technical assist4 ance, and access to funding. 

5 (ii) Training for young African leaders 

6 at regional leadership centers established in 

7 accordance with paragraph (4), and 

8 through online and in-person courses offered 

9 by such centers. 

10 (iii) Opportunities for networking and 

11 engagement with— 

12 (I) other alumni of the Mandela 

13 Washington Fellowship for Young Afri14 can Leaders; 

15 (II) alumni of programs at re16 gional leadership centers established in 

17 accordance with paragraph (4); and 

18 (III) United States and like19 minded diplomatic missions, business 

20 leaders, and others as appropriate. 

21 (C) IMPLEMENTATION.—To carry out this 

22 paragraph, the Secretary of State, in coordina23 tion with the Administrator of the United States 

24 Agency for International Development and the 

25 heads of other relevant Federal departments and 


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1 agencies shall seek to partner with the private 

2 sector to pursue public-private partnerships, le3 verage private sector expertise, expand net4 working opportunities, and identify funding op5 portunities as well as fellowship and employment 

6 opportunities for participants in the YALI pro7 gram. 

8 (6) IMPLEMENTATION PLAN.—Not later than 180 

9 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the 

10 Secretary of State, in coordination with the Adminis11 trator of the United States Agency for International 

12 Development and the heads of other relevant Federal 

13 departments and agencies, shall submit to the appro14 priate congressional committees a plan for imple15 menting the YALI program, including the following: 

16 (A) A description of clearly defined pro17 gram goals, targets, and planned outcomes for 

18 each year and for the duration of implementa19 tion of the program. 

20 (B) A strategy to monitor and evaluate the 

21 program and progress made toward achieving 

22 such goals, targets, and planned outcomes. 

23 (C) A strategy to ensure the program is pro24 moting United States foreign policy goals in Af25 rica, including ensuring that the program is 


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1 clearly branded and paired with robust public 

2 diplomacy efforts. 

3 (7) REPORT.—Not later than 1 year after the 

4 date of the enactment of this Act, and annually there5 after for 5 years, the Secretary of State, in coordina6 tion with the Administrator of the United States 

7 Agency for International Development, shall submit 

8 to the appropriate congressional committees and pub9 lish in a publicly accessible, internet–based form, a 

10 report on the following: 

11 (A) The progress made toward achieving the 

12 goals, targets, and planned outcomes described in 

13 paragraph (6)(A), including an overview of the 

14 program implemented in the previous year and 

15 an estimated number of beneficiaries. 

16 (B) An assessment of how the YALI pro17 gram is contributing to and promoting United 

18 States-Africa relations, particularly in areas of 

19 increased private sector investment, trade pro20 motion, support to civil society, improved public 

21 administration, and fostering entrepreneurship 

22 and youth empowerment. 

23 (C) Recommendations for improvements or 

24 changes to the program and implementation 

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1 ness during subsequent years of implementation 

2 of the program. 

3 (8) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES

4 DEFINED.—In this subsection, the term ‘‘appropriate 

5 congressional committees’’ means— 

6 (A) the Committee on Foreign Affairs and 

7 the Committee on Appropriations of the House of 

8 Representatives; and 

9 (B) the Committee on Foreign Relations 

10 and the Committee on Appropriations of the 

11 Senate. 

12 (9) SUNSET.—The requirements of this section 

13 shall terminate on the date that is 5 years after the 

14 date of the enactment of this Act. 

15 SEC. 275. AFRICA BROADCASTING NETWORKS. 

16 Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment 

17 of this Act, the Chief Executive Officer of the United States 

18 Agency for Global Media shall submit to the appropriate 

19 congressional committees a report on the resources and 

20 timeline needed to establish within the Agency an organiza21 tion the mission of which shall be to promote democratic 

22 values and institutions in Africa by providing objective, ac23 curate, and relevant news and information to the people 

24 of Africa and counter disinformation from malign actors, 

25 especially in countries in which a free press is banned by 


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1 the government or not fully established, about the region, 

2 the world, and the United States through uncensored news, 

3 responsible discussion, and open debate. 

4 SEC. 276. AFRICA ENERGY SECURITY AND DIVERSIFICA5 TION. 

6 (a) STATEMENT OF POLICY.—It is the policy of the 

7 United States to support increased access to energy in Afri8 ca and reduce Africa’s energy dependence on countries that 

9 use energy reliance for undue political influence such as the 

10 Russian Federation and the People’s Republic of China. 

11 (b) FINDINGS.—Congress finds the following: 

12 (1) Lack of access to energy remains a signifi13 cant barrier to economic advancement and oppor14 tunity in Africa. As of 2018, an estimated 

15 789,000,000 people, the vast majority of them in sub16 Saharan Africa, lacked access to any modern elec17 tricity. Even in the region’s most advanced econo18 mies, average annual per capita electricity consump19 tion is often under 200 kilowatt-hours, less than what 

20 is needed to power a typical refrigerator. Only a 

21 small fraction of the 12,000,000 young Africans who 

22 enter the job market each year find employment; and 

23 the cost and reliability of electricity remain top con24 straints to job creation and economic competitiveness. 


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1 (2) The United States’ global strategic competi2 tors have stepped in to address this disparity and fi3 nance energy sector development across Africa. China 

4 is the single largest trading partner for African coun5 tries in aggregate, and the largest bilateral lender for 

6 public sector loans across Africa. Approximately 65 

7 percent of Chinese lending to Africa goes to infra8 structure, and between 2013–2020, the energy sector 

9 consistently accounted for the largest share of all in10 vestment under China’s Belt and Road Initiative. 

11 (3) Reliable, affordable, and sustainable power is 

12 the foundation for all modern economies and nec13 essary for increasing growth and employment. 

14 (4) Increasing energy supply in low- and lower 

15 middle-income countries is necessary in the next dec16 ades in order to meet human, social, security, and 

17 economic needs. 

18 (5) Addressing energy poverty, powering inclu19 sive economies, and making energy systems resilient 

20 in low- and lower middle-income countries will re21 quire diversified power systems and a mix of tech22 nologies that align with local conditions, resources, 

23 and needs. 

24 (c) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Congress 

25 that countries in Africa continue to be important partners 


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1 to the United States and the DFC should continue to make 

2 investments in sub-Saharan Africa to facilitate technologies 

3 that contribute to energy security and reliable, affordable, 

4 and sustainable power in low and lower middle-income 

5 countries. 

6 (d) AMENDMENT.—Section 3 of the Electrify Africa 

7 Act of 2015 (Public Law 114–121; 22 U.S.C. 2293 note) 

8 is amended— 

9 (1) in paragraph (8), by striking ‘‘and’’ at the 

10 end; 

11 (2) in paragraph (9), by striking the period and 

12 inserting a semicolon; and 

13 (3) by inserting after paragraph (9) the fol14 lowing: 

15 ‘‘(10) advance United States foreign policy and 

16 development goals by assisting African countries to 

17 reduce their dependence on energy resources from 

18 countries that use energy dependence for undue polit19 ical influence, such as the Russian Federation or the 

20 People’s Republic of China, which have used energy 

21 and financial resources to influence other countries; 

22 ‘‘(11) promote the energy security of allies and 

23 partners of the United States by encouraging the de24 velopment of accessible, transparent, and competitive 


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1 energy markets that provide diversified sources and 

2 reliable, affordable, and sustainable power; 

3 ‘‘(12) encourage United States public and pri4 vate sector investment in African energy infrastruc5 ture projects to bridge the gap between energy security 

6 requirements and commercial demand in a way that 

7 is consistent with the region’s capacity; and 

8 ‘‘(13) help facilitate the export of United States 

9 energy resources, technology, and expertise to global 

10 markets in a way that benefits the energy security of 

11 allies and partners of the United States, including in 

12 Africa.’’. 

13 PART V—MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA 

14 SEC. 281. STRATEGY TO COUNTER CHINESE INFLUENCE IN, 

15 AND ACCESS TO, THE MIDDLE EAST AND 

16 NORTH AFRICA. 

17 (a) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Congress 

18 that— 

19 (1) the People’s Republic of China is upgrading 

20 its influence in the Middle East and North Africa 

21 through its energy and infrastructure investments, 

22 technology transfer, and arms sales; 

23 (2) the People’s Republic of China seeks to estab24 lish military or dual use facilities in geographically 

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1 ca to further its Belt and Road Initiative at the ex2 pense of United States national security interests; 

3 and 

4 (3) the export of certain communications infra5 structure from the People’s Republic of China de6 grades the security of partner networks, exposes intel7 lectual property to theft, threatens the ability of the 

8 United States to conduct security cooperation with 

9 compromised regional partners, and furthers China’s 

10 authoritarian surveillance model. 

11 (b) STRATEGY REQUIRED.— 

12 (1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days after 

13 the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of 

14 State, in consultation with the Secretary of Defense, 

15 the Administrator of the United States Agency for 

16 International Development, and the heads of other ap17 propriate Federal agencies, shall jointly develop and 

18 submit to the appropriate congressional committees 

19 and the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate 

20 and the House of Representatives a strategy for coun21 tering and limiting the People’s Republic of China’s 

22 influence in, and access to, the Middle East and 

23 North Africa. 

24 (2) ELEMENTS.—The strategy required under 

25 paragraph (1) shall include— 


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1 (A) an assessment of the People’s Republic 

2 of China’s intent with regards to increased co3 operation with Middle East and North African 

4 countries and how such cooperation fits into its 

5 broader global strategic objectives; 

6 (B) an assessment of how governments 

7 across the region are responding to the People’s 

8 Republic of China’s efforts to increase its mili9 tary presence in their countries; 

10 (C) efforts to improve regional cooperation 

11 through foreign military sales, financing, and ef12 forts to build partner capacity and increase 

13 interoperability with the United States; 

14 (D) an assessment of the People’s Republic 

15 of China’s joint research and development with 

16 the Middle East and North Africa, impacts on 

17 the United States’ national security interests, 

18 and recommended steps to mitigate the People’s 

19 Republic of China’s influence in such area; 

20 (E) an assessment of arms sales and weap21 ons technology transfers from the People’s Repub22 lic of China to the Middle East and North Afri23 ca, impacts on United States’ national security 

24 interests, and recommended steps to mitigate the 


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1 People’s Republic of China’s influence in such 

2 area; 

3 (F) an assessment of the People’s Republic 

4 of China’s military sales to the region, including 

5 lethal and non-lethal unmanned aerial systems; 

6 (G) an assessment of People’s Republic of 

7 China military basing and dual-use facility ini8 tiatives across the Middle East and North Africa, 

9 impacts on United States’ national security in10 terests, and recommended steps to mitigate the 

11 People’s Republic of China’s influence in such 

12 area; 

13 (H) efforts to improve regional security co14 operation with United States allies and partners 

15 with a focus on— 

16 (i) maritime security in the Arabian 

17 Gulf, the Red Sea, and the Eastern Medi18 terranean; 

19 (ii) integrated air and missile defense; 

20 (iii) cyber security; 

21 (iv) border security; and 

22 (v) critical infrastructure security, to 

23 include energy security; 

24 (I) increased support for government-to-gov25 ernment engagement on critical infrastructure 


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1 development projects, including ports and water 

2 infrastructure; 

3 (J) efforts to encourage United States pri4 vate sector and public-private partnerships in 

5 healthcare technology and foreign direct invest6 ment in non-energy sectors; 

7 (K) efforts to expand youth engagement and 

8 professional education exchanges with key part9 ner countries; 

10 (L) specific steps to counter increased in11 vestment from the People’s Republic of China in 

12 telecommunications infrastructure and diplo13 matic efforts to stress the political, economic, and 

14 social benefits of a free and open internet; 

15 (M) efforts to promote United States private 

16 sector engagement in and public-private partner17 ships on renewable energy development; 

18 (N) the expansion of public-private partner19 ship efforts on water, desalination, and irriga20 tion projects; and 

21 (O) efforts to warn United States partners 

22 in the Middle East and North Africa of the risks 

23 associated with the People’s Republic of China’s 

24 telecommunications infrastructure and provide 


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1 alternative ‘‘clean paths’’ to the People’s Repub2 lic of China’s technology. 

3 (c) FORM.—The strategy required under section (b) 

4 shall be submitted in an unclassified form that can be made 

5 available to the public, but may include a classified annex 

6 as necessary. 

7 SEC. 282. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON MIDDLE EAST AND 

8 NORTH AFRICA ENGAGEMENT. 

9 (a) FINDINGS.—Congress makes the following findings: 

10 (1) The United States and the international 

11 community have long-term interests in the stability, 

12 security, and prosperity of the people of the Middle 

13 East and North Africa. 

14 (2) In addition to and apart from military and 

15 security efforts, the United States should harness a 

16 whole of government approach, including bilateral 

17 and multilateral statecraft, economic lines of effort, 

18 and public diplomacy to compete with and counter 

19 PRC influence. 

20 (3) A clearly articulated positive narrative of 

21 United States engagement, transparent governance 

22 structures, and active civil society engagement help 

23 counter predatory foreign investment and influence 

24 efforts. 


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1 (b) STATEMENT OF POLICY.—It is the policy of the 

2 United States that the United States and the international 

3 community should continue diplomatic and economic ef4 forts throughout the Middle East and North Africa that sup5 port reform efforts to— 

6 (1) promote greater economic opportunity; 

7 (2) foster private sector development; 

8 (3) strengthen civil society; 

9 (4) promote transparent and democratic govern10 ance and the rule of law; and 

11 (5) promote greater regional integration and 

12 intraregional cooperation, including with Israel. 

13 SEC. 283. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF 

14 CHINA-IRAN RELATIONSHIP. 

15 It is the sense of Congress that the People’s Republic 

16 of China’s economic relationship with Iran, including oil 

17 purchases in violation of United States sanctions, under18 mines United States efforts to compel Iran to abandon its 

19 malign activities. 

20 PART VI—ARCTIC REGION 

21 SEC. 285. ARCTIC DIPLOMACY. 

22 (a) SENSE OF CONGRESS ON ARCTIC SECURITY.—It 

23 is the sense of Congress that— 

24 (1) the rapidly changing Arctic environment— 


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1 (A) creates new national and regional secu2 rity challenges due to increased military activity 

3 in the Arctic; 

4 (B) heightens the risk of the Arctic emerging 

5 as a major theater of conflict in ongoing stra6 tegic competition; 

7 (C) threatens maritime safety as Arctic lit8 toral countries have inadequate capacity to pa9 trol the increased vessel traffic in this remote re10 gion, which is a result of diminished annual lev11 els of sea ice; 

12 (D) impacts public safety due to increased 

13 human activity in the Arctic region where search 

14 and rescue capacity remains very limited; and 

15 (E) threatens the health of the Arctic’s frag16 ile and pristine environment and the unique and 

17 highly sensitive species found in the Arctic’s ma18 rine and terrestrial ecosystems; and 

19 (2) the United States should reduce the con20 sequences described in paragraph (1) by— 

21 (A) evaluating the wide variety and dy22 namic set of security and safety risks developing 

23 in the Arctic; 

24 (B) developing policies and making prep25 arations to mitigate and respond to threats and 


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1 risks in the Arctic, including by continuing to 

2 work with allies and partners in the Arctic re3 gion to deter potential aggressive activities and 

4 build Arctic competencies; 

5 (C) adequately funding the National Earth 

6 System Prediction Capability to substantively 

7 improve weather, ocean, and ice predictions on 

8 the time scales necessary to ensure regional secu9 rity and trans-Arctic shipping; 

10 (D) investing in resources, including a sig11 nificantly expanded icebreaker fleet, to ensure 

12 that the United States has adequate capacity to 

13 prevent and respond to security threats in the 

14 Arctic region; and 

15 (E) pursuing diplomatic engagements with 

16 all states in the Arctic region to reach an agree17 ment for— 

18 (i) maintaining peace and stability in 

19 the Arctic region; 

20 (ii) fostering cooperation on steward21 ship and safety initiatives in the Arctic re22 gion; 

23 (iii) ensuring safe and efficient man24 agement of commercial maritime traffic in 

25 the Arctic; 


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1 (iv) promoting responsible natural re2 source management and economic develop3 ment; and 

4 (v) countering China’s Polar Silk 

5 Road initiative; 

6 (vi) examining the possibility of recon7 vening the Arctic Chiefs of Defense Forum; 

8 and 

9 (vii) reducing black carbon and meth10 ane emissions in the Arctic Region, includ11 ing by working with observers of the Arctic 

12 Council, including India and the People’s 

13 Republic of China, to adopt mitigation 

14 plans consistent with the findings and rec15 ommendations of the Arctic Council’s 

16 Framework for Action on Black Carbon and 

17 Methane. 

18 (b) STATEMENT OF POLICY.—It is the policy of the 

19 United States— 

20 (1) to recognize only the states specified in sub21 section (c)(1) as Arctic states, and to reject all other 

22 claims to such status; and 

23 (2) that the militarization of the Arctic poses a 

24 serious threat to Arctic peace and stability, and the 

25 interests of United States allies and partners. 


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1 (c) DEFINITIONS.—In this section: 

2 (1) ARCTIC STATES.—The term ‘‘Arctic states’’ 

3 means Russia, Canada, the United States, Norway, 

4 Denmark (including Greenland), Finland, Sweden, 

5 and Iceland. 

6 (2) ARCTIC REGION.—The term ‘‘Arctic Region’’ 

7 means the geographic region north of the 66.56083 

8 parallel latitude north of the equator. 

9 (d) DESIGNATION OF AMBASSADOR AT LARGE FOR

10 ARCTIC AFFAIRS.—There is established within the Depart11 ment of State an Ambassador at Large for Arctic Affairs 

12 (referred to in this section as the ‘‘Ambassador’’), appointed 

13 in accordance with paragraph (1). 

14 (1) APPOINTMENT.—The Ambassador shall be 

15 appointed by the President, by and with the advice 

16 and consent of the Senate. 

17 (2) DUTIES.— 

18 (A) DIPLOMATIC REPRESENTATION.—Sub19 ject to the direction of the President and the Sec20 retary of State, the Ambassador is authorized to 

21 represent the United States in matters and cases 

22 relevant to the Arctic Region in— 

23 (i) contacts with foreign governments, 

24 intergovernmental organizations, and spe25 cialized agencies of the United Nations, the 


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1 Arctic Council, and other international or2 ganizations of which the United States is a 

3 member; and 

4 (ii) multilateral conferences and meet5 ings relating to Arctic affairs. 

6 (B) CHAIR OF THE ARCTIC COUNCIL.—The 

7 Ambassador shall serve as the Chair of the Arctic 

8 Council when the United States holds the Chair9 manship of the Arctic Council. 

10 (3) POLICIES AND PROCEDURES.—The Ambas11 sador shall coordinate United States policies related 

12 to the Arctic Region, including— 

13 (A) meeting national security, economic, 

14 and commercial needs pertaining to Arctic af15 fairs; 

16 (B) protecting the Arctic environment and 

17 conserving its biological resources; 

18 (C) promoting environmentally sustainable 

19 natural resource management and economic de20 velopment; 

21 (D) strengthening institutions for coopera22 tion among the Arctic states; 

23 (E) involving Arctic indigenous people in 

24 decisions that affect them; 


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1 (F) enhancing scientific monitoring and re2 search on local, regional, and global environ3 mental issues; 

4 (G) integrating scientific data on the cur5 rent and projected effects of climate change in 

6 the Arctic Region and ensure that such data is 

7 applied to the development of security strategies 

8 for the Arctic Region; 

9 (H) making available the methods and ap10 proaches on the integration of climate science to 

11 other regional security planning programs in the 

12 Department of State to better ensure that broad13 er decision-making processes may more ade14 quately account for the effects of climate change; 

15 and 

16 (I) reducing black carbon and methane 

17 emissions in the Arctic Region. 

18 (e) ARCTIC REGION SECURITY POLICY.—The Ambas19 sador shall develop a policy, to be known as the ‘‘Arctic 

20 Region Security Policy’’, to assess, develop, budget for, and 

21 implement plans, policies, and actions— 

22 (1) to bolster the diplomatic presence of the 

23 United States in Arctic states, including through en24 hancements to diplomatic missions and facilities, 

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1 lated to Arctic security, and coordination of United 

2 States initiatives and assistance programs across 

3 agencies to protect the national security of the United 

4 States and its allies and partners; 

5 (2) to enhance the resilience capacities of Arctic 

6 states to the effects of environmental change and in7 creased civilian and military activity by Arctic states 

8 and other states that may result from increased acces9 sibility of the Arctic Region; 

10 (3) to assess specific added risks to the Arctic Re11 gion and Arctic states that— 

12 (A) are vulnerable to the changing Arctic 

13 environment; and 

14 (B) are strategically significant to the 

15 United States; 

16 (4) to coordinate the integration of environ17 mental change and national security risk and vulner18 ability assessments into the decision making process 

19 on foreign assistance awards with Greenland; 

20 (5) to advance principles of good governance by 

21 encouraging and cooperating with Arctic states on 

22 collaborative approaches— 

23 (A) to responsibly manage natural resources 

24 in the Arctic Region; 


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1 (B) to share the burden of ensuring mari2 time safety in the Arctic Region; 

3 (C) to prevent the escalation of security ten4 sions by mitigating against the militarization of 

5 the Arctic Region; 

6 (D) to develop mutually agreed upon multi7 lateral policies among Arctic states on the man8 agement of maritime transit routes through the 

9 Arctic Region and work cooperatively on the 

10 transit policies for access to and transit in the 

11 Arctic Region by non-Arctic states; and 

12 (E) to facilitate the development of Arctic 

13 Region Security Action Plans to ensure stability 

14 and public safety in disaster situations in a hu15 mane and responsible fashion; 

16 (6) to evaluate the vulnerability, security, sur17 vivability, and resiliency of United States interests 

18 and non-defense assets in the Arctic Region; and 

19 (7) to reduce black carbon and methane emis20 sions in the Arctic. 

21 SEC. 286. STATEMENT OF POLICY REGARDING OBSERVER 

22 STATUS FOR TAIWAN ON THE ARCTIC COUN23 CIL. 

24 It is the policy of the United States to urge that Tai25 wan be given observer status on the Arctic Council. 


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1 PART VII—OCEANIA 

2 SEC. 291. STATEMENT OF POLICY ON UNITED STATES EN3 GAGEMENT IN OCEANIA. 

4 It shall be the policy of the United States— 

5 (1) to elevate the countries of Oceania as a stra6 tegic national security and economic priority of the 

7 United States Government; 

8 (2) to promote civil society, the rule of law, and 

9 democratic governance across Oceania as part of a 

10 free and open Indo-Pacific region; 

11 (3) to broaden and deepen relationships with the 

12 Freely Associated States of the Republic of Palau, the 

13 Republic of the Marshall Islands, and the Federated 

14 States of Micronesia through robust defense, diplo15 matic, economic, and development exchanges that pro16 mote the goals of individual countries and the entire 

17 region; 

18 (4) to work with the Governments of Australia, 

19 New Zealand, and Japan to advance shared alliance 

20 goals of the Oceania region concerning health, envi21 ronmental protection, disaster resilience and pre22 paredness, illegal, unreported and unregulated fish23 ing, maritime security, and economic development; 

24 (5) to participate, wherever possible and appro25 priate, in existing regional organizations and inter26 national structures to promote the national security 


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1 and economic goals of the United States and countries 

2 of Oceania; 

3 (6) to invest in a whole-of-government United 

4 States strategy that will enhance youth engagement 

5 and advance long-term growth and development 

6 throughout the region, especially as such relates to 

7 protecting marine resources that are critical to liveli8 hoods and strengthening the resilience of the countries 

9 of Oceania against current and future threats result10 ing from extreme weather and severe changes in the 

11 environment; 

12 (7) to deter and combat acts of malign foreign 

13 influence and corruption aimed at undermining the 

14 political, environmental, social, and economic sta15 bility of the people and governments of the countries 

16 of Oceania; 

17 (8) to improve the local capacity of the countries 

18 of Oceania to address public health challenges and 

19 improve global health security; 

20 (9) to help the countries of Oceania access mar21 ket-based private sector investments that adhere to 

22 best practices regarding transparency, debt sustain23 ability, and environmental and social safeguards as 

24 an alternative to state-directed investments by author25 itarian governments; 


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1 (10) to ensure the people and communities of 

2 Oceania remain safe from the risks of old and degrad3 ing munitions hazards and other debris that threaten 

4 health and livelihoods; 

5 (11) to cooperate with Taiwan by offering 

6 United States support for maintaining Taiwan’s dip7 lomatic partners in Oceania; and 

8 (12) to work cooperatively with all governments 

9 in Oceania to promote the dignified return of the re10 mains of members of the United States Armed Forces 

11 who are missing in action from previous conflicts in 

12 the Indo-Pacific region. 

13 SEC. 292. OCEANIA STRATEGIC ROADMAP. 

14 (a) OCEANIA STRATEGIC ROADMAP.—Not later than 

15 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the 

16 Secretary of State shall submit to the appropriate congres17 sional committees a strategic roadmap for strengthening 

18 United States engagement with the countries of Oceania, 

19 including an analysis of opportunities to cooperate with 

20 Australia, New Zealand, and Japan, to address shared con21 cerns and promote shared goals in pursuit of security and 

22 resiliency in the countries of Oceania. 

23 (b) ELEMENTS.—The strategic roadmap required by 

24 subsection (a) shall include the following: 


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1 (1) A description of United States regional goals 

2 and concerns with respect to Oceania and increasing 

3 engagement with the countries of Oceania. 

4 (2) An assessment, based on paragraph (1), of 

5 United States regional goals and concerns that are 

6 shared by Australia, New Zealand, and Japan, in7 cluding a review of issues related to anti-corruption 

8 efforts, maritime and other security issues, environ9 mental protection, fisheries management, economic 

10 growth and development, and disaster resilience and 

11 preparedness. 

12 (3) A review of ongoing programs and initiatives 

13 by the Governments of the United States, Australia, 

14 New Zealand, and Japan in pursuit of shared re15 gional goals and concerns. 

16 (4) A review of ongoing programs and initiatives 

17 by regional organizations and other related intergov18 ernmental structures aimed at addressing shared re19 gional goals and concerns. 

20 (5) A plan for aligning United States programs 

21 and resources in pursuit of shared regional goals and 

22 concerns, as appropriate. 

23 (6) Recommendations for additional United 

24 States authorities, personnel, programs, or resources 

25 necessary to execute the strategic roadmap. 


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1 (7) Any other elements the Secretary of State 

2 considers appropriate. 

3 SEC. 293. OCEANIA SECURITY DIALOGUE. 

4 (a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than one year after the 

5 date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State 

6 shall brief the appropriate committees of Congress on the 

7 feasibility and advisability of establishing a United States8 based public-private sponsored security dialogue (to be 

9 known as the ‘‘Oceania Security Dialogue’’) among the 

10 countries of Oceania for the purposes of jointly exploring 

11 and discussing issues affecting the economic, diplomatic, 

12 and national security of the Indo-Pacific countries of Oce13 ania. 

14 (b) REPORT REQUIRED.—The briefing required by 

15 subsection (a) shall, at a minimum, include the following: 

16 (1) A review of the ability of the Department of 

17 State to participate in a public-private sponsored se18 curity dialogue. 

19 (2) An assessment of the potential locations for 

20 conducting an Oceania Security Dialogue in the ju21 risdiction of the United States. 

22 (3) Consideration of dates for conducting an 

23 Oceania Security Dialogue that would maximize par24 ticipation of representatives from the Indo-Pacific 

25 countries of Oceania. 


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1 (4) A review of the funding modalities available 

2 to the Department of State to help finance an Oce3 ania Security Dialogue, including grant-making au4 thorities available to the Department of State. 

5 (5) An assessment of any administrative, statu6 tory, or other legal limitations that would prevent the 

7 establishment of an Oceania Security Dialogue with 

8 participation and support of the Department of State. 

9 (6) An analysis of how an Oceania Security 

10 Dialogue could help to advance the Boe Declaration 

11 on Regional Security, including its emphasis on the 

12 changing environment as the greatest existential 

13 threat to countries of Oceania. 

14 (7) An evaluation of how an Oceania Security 

15 Dialogue could help amplify the issues and work of 

16 existing regional structures and organizations dedi17 cated to the security of the Oceania region, such as 

18 the Pacific Island Forum and Pacific Environmental 

19 Security Forum. 

20 (8) An analysis of how an Oceania Security 

21 Dialogue would help with implementation of the stra22 tegic roadmap required by section 292 and advance 

23 the National Security Strategy of the United States. 

24 (c) INTERAGENCY CONSULTATION.—To the extent 

25 practicable, the Secretary of State may consult with the 


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1 Secretary of Defense and, where appropriate, evaluate the 

2 lessons learned of the Regional Centers for Security Studies 

3 of the Department of Defense to determine the feasibility 

4 and advisability of establishing the Oceania Security Dia5 logue. 

6 SEC. 294. OCEANIA PEACE CORPS PARTNERSHIPS. 

7 (a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than one year after the 

8 date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of the Peace 

9 Corps shall submit to the appropriate congressional com10 mittees a report on strategies to reasonably and safely ex11 pand the number of Peace Corps volunteers in Oceania, 

12 with the goals of— 

13 (1) expanding the presence of the Peace Corps to 

14 all currently feasible locations in Oceania; and 

15 (2) working with regional and international 

16 partners of the United States to expand the presence 

17 of Peace Corps volunteers in low-income Oceania 

18 communities in support of climate resilience initia19 tives. 

20 (b) ELEMENTS.—The report required by subsection (a) 

21 shall— 

22 (1) assess the factors contributing to the current 

23 absence of the Peace Corps and its volunteers in Oce24 ania; 


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1 (2) examine potential remedies that include 

2 working with United States Government agencies and 

3 regional governments, including governments of 

4 United States allies— 

5 (A) to increase the health infrastructure and 

6 medical evacuation capabilities of the countries 

7 of Oceania to better support the safety of Peace 

8 Corps volunteers while in such countries; 

9 (B) to address physical safety concerns that 

10 have decreased the ability of the Peace Corps to 

11 operate in Oceania; and 

12 (C) to increase transportation infrastruc13 ture in the countries of Oceania to better support 

14 the travel of Peace Corps volunteers and their ac15 cess to necessary facilities; 

16 (3) evaluate the potential to expand the deploy17 ment of Peace Corps Response volunteers to help the 

18 countries of Oceania address social, economic, and de19 velopment needs of their communities that require 

20 specific professional expertise; and 

21 (4) explore potential new operational models to 

22 address safety and security needs of Peace Corps vol23 unteers in the countries of Oceania, including— 

24 (A) changes to volunteer deployment dura25 tions; and 


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1 (B) scheduled redeployment of volunteers to 

2 regional or United States-based healthcare facili3 ties for routine physical and behavioral health 

4 evaluation. 

5 (c) VOLUNTEERS IN LOW-INCOME OCEANIA COMMU6 NITIES.— 

7 (1) IN GENERAL.—In examining the potential to 

8 expand the presence of Peace Corps volunteers in low9 income Oceania communities under subsection (a)(2), 

10 the Director of the Peace Corps shall consider the de11 velopment of initiatives described in paragraph (2). 

12 (2) INITIATIVES DESCRIBED.—Initiatives de13 scribed in this paragraph are volunteer initiatives 

14 that help the countries of Oceania address social, eco15 nomic, and development needs of their communities, 

16 including by— 

17 (A) addressing, through appropriate resil18 ience-based interventions, the vulnerability that 

19 communities in Oceania face as result of extreme 

20 weather, severe environmental change, and other 

21 climate related trends; and 

22 (B) improving, through smart infrastruc23 ture principles, access to transportation and 

24 connectivity infrastructure that will help address 

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1 nities in Oceania confront as a result of poor or 

2 nonexistent infrastructure. 

3 (d) OCEANIA DEFINED.—In this section, the term 

4 ‘‘Oceania’’ includes the following: 

5 (1) Easter Island of Chile. 

6 (2) Fiji. 

7 (3) French Polynesia of France. 

8 (4) Kiribati. 

9 (5) New Caledonia of France. 

10 (6) Nieu of New Zealand. 

11 (7) Papua New Guinea. 

12 (8) Samoa. 

13 (9) Vanuatu. 

14 (10) The Ashmore and Cartier Islands of Aus15 tralia. 

16 (11) The Cook Islands of New Zealand. 

17 (12) The Coral Islands of Australia. 

18 (13) The Federated States of Micronesia. 

19 (14) The Norfolk Island of Australia. 

20 (15) The Pitcairn Islands of the United King21 dom. 

22 (16) The Republic of the Marshal Islands. 

23 (17) The Republic of Palau. 

24 (18) The Solomon Islands. 

25 (19) Tokelau of New Zealand. 


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1 (20) Tonga. 

2 (21) Tuvalu. 

3 (22) Wallis and Futuna of France. 

4 PART VIII—PACIFIC ISLANDS 

5 SEC. 295. SHORT TITLE. 

6 This part may be cited as the ‘‘Boosting Long-term 

7 U.S. Engagement in the Pacific Act’’ or the ‘‘BLUE Pacific 

8 Act’’. 

9 SEC. 296. FINDINGS. 

10 Congress finds the following: 

11 (1) The Pacific Islands— 

12 (A) are home to roughly 10 million resi13 dents, including over 8.6 million in Papua New 

14 Guinea, constituting diverse and dynamic cul15 tures and peoples; 

16 (B) are spread across an expanse of the Pa17 cific Ocean equivalent to 15 percent of the 

18 Earth’s surface, including the three sub-regions 

19 of Melanesia, Micronesia, and Polynesia; and 

20 (C) face shared challenges in development 

21 that have distinct local contexts, including cli22 mate change and rising sea levels, geographic 

23 distances from major markets, and vulnerability 

24 to external shocks such as natural disasters. 


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1 (2) The United States is a Pacific country with 

2 longstanding ties and shared values and interests 

3 with the Pacific Islands, including through the Com4 pacts of Free Association with the Freely Associated 

5 States, the Republic of the Marshall Islands, the Fed6 erated States of Micronesia, and the Republic of 

7 Palau. 

8 (3) The United States has vital national security 

9 interests in the Pacific Islands, including— 

10 (A) protecting regional peace and security 

11 that fully respects the sovereignty of all nations; 

12 (B) advancing economic prosperity free 

13 from coercion through trade and sustainable de14 velopment; and 

15 (C) supporting democracy, good governance, 

16 the rule of law, and human rights and funda17 mental freedoms. 

18 (4) Successive United States administrations 

19 have recognized the importance of the Pacific region, 

20 including the Pacific Islands, in high-level strategic 

21 documents, including the following: 

22 (A) The 2015 National Security Strategy, 

23 which first declared the rebalance to Asia and 

24 the Pacific, affirmed the United States as a Pa25 cific nation, and paved the way for subsequent 


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1 United States engagement with the Pacific Is2 lands, including several new policies focused on 

3 conservation and resilience to climate change an4 nounced in September 2016. 

5 (B) The 2017 National Security Strategy, 

6 which includes a commitment to ‘‘shore up frag7 ile partner states in the Pacific Islands region to 

8 reduce their vulnerability to economic fluctua9 tions and natural disasters’’. 

10 (C) The 2019 Indo-Pacific Strategy Report, 

11 which identified the Pacific Islands as ‘‘critical 

12 to U.S. strategy because of our shared values, in13 terests, and commitments’’ and committed the 

14 United States to ‘‘building capacity and resil15 ience to address maritime security; Illegal, Unre16 ported, and Unregulated fishing; drug traf17 ficking; and resilience to address climate change 

18 and disaster response’’. 

19 (5) The United States has deepened its diplo20 matic engagement with the Pacific Islands through 

21 several recent initiatives, including— 

22 (A) the Pacific Pledge, which provided an 

23 additional $100,000,000 in 2019 and 

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1 vides annually to the region to support shared 

2 priorities in economic and human development, 

3 climate change, and more; and 

4 (B) the Small and Less Populous Island 

5 Economies (SALPIE) Initiative launched in 

6 March 2021 to strengthen United States collabo7 ration with island countries and territories, in8 cluding in the Pacific Islands, on COVID–19 

9 economic challenges, long-term economic develop10 ment, climate change, and other shared interests. 

11 (6) The Boe Declaration on Regional Security, 

12 signed by leaders of the Pacific Islands Forum in 

13 2018, affirmed that climate change ‘‘remains the sin14 gle greatest threat to the livelihoods, security, and 

15 wellbeing of the peoples of the Pacific’’ and asserted 

16 ‘‘the sovereign right of every Member to conduct its 

17 national affairs free of external interference and coer18 cion’’. 

19 (7) The Asian Development Bank has estimated 

20 that the Pacific Islands region needs upwards of $2.8 

21 billion a year in investment needs through 2030, in 

22 addition to $300 million a year for climate mitiga23 tion and adaptation over the same period. 

24 (8) The Pacific Islands swiftly enacted effective 

25 policies to prevent and contain the spread of the 


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1 Coronavirus Disease 2019 (commonly referred to as 

2 ‘‘COVID–19’’) pandemic to their populations. The 

3 United States has provided over $130,000,000 in as4 sistance to the Pacific Islands for their COVID–19 re5 sponse. However, priorities must be met to ensure 

6 continued success in preventing the spread of the 

7 COVID–19 pandemic, achieving swift and widespread 

8 vaccinations, and pursuing long-term economic recov9 ery in the Pacific Islands, including through— 

10 (A) expanding testing capacity and acquisi11 tion of needed medical supplies, including avail12 able COVID–19 vaccines and supporting vac13 cination efforts, through a reliable supply chain; 

14 (B) planning for lifting of lockdowns and 

15 reopening of economic and social activities; and 

16 (C) mitigating and recovering from the im17 pacts of the COVID–19 pandemic on the health 

18 system and the reliance on food and energy im19 ports as well as lost tourism revenue and other 

20 economic and food security damages caused by 

21 the pandemic. 

22 (9) Since 1966, thousands of Peace Corps volun23 teers have proudly served in the Pacific Islands, 

24 building strong people-to-people relationships and 

25 demonstrating the United States commitment to peace 


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1 and development in the region. Prior to the COVID– 

2 19 pandemic, the Peace Corps maintained presence in 

3 four countries of the Pacific Islands. Peace Corps vol4 unteers continue to be in high demand in the Pacific 

5 Islands and have been requested across the region. 

6 SEC. 297. STATEMENT OF POLICY. 

7 It is the policy of the United States— 

8 (1) to develop and commit to a comprehensive, 

9 multifaceted, and principled United States policy in 

10 the Pacific Islands that— 

11 (A) promotes peace, security, and prosperity 

12 for all countries through a rules-based regional 

13 order that respects the sovereignty and political 

14 independence of all nations; 

15 (B) preserves the Pacific Ocean as an open 

16 and vibrant corridor for international maritime 

17 trade and promotes trade and sustainable devel18 opment that supports inclusive economic growth 

19 and autonomy for all nations and addresses so20 cioeconomic challenges related to public health, 

21 education, renewable energy, digital connectivity, 

22 and more; 

23 (C) supports regional efforts to address the 

24 challenges posed by climate change, including by 

25 strengthening resilience to natural disasters and 


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1 through responsible stewardship of natural re2 sources; 

3 (D) improves civil society, strengthens 

4 democratic governance and the rule of law, and 

5 promotes human rights and the preservation of 

6 the region’s unique cultural heritages; 

7 (E) assists the Pacific Islands in preventing 

8 and containing the spread of the COVID–19 

9 pandemic and in pursuing long-term economic 

10 recovery; and 

11 (F) supports existing regional architecture 

12 and international norms; 

13 (2) to support the vision, values, and objectives 

14 of existing regional multilateral institutions and 

15 frameworks, such as the Pacific Islands Forum and 

16 the Pacific Community, including— 

17 (A) the 2014 Framework for Pacific Region18 alism; 

19 (B) the 2018 Boe Declaration on Regional 

20 Security; and 

21 (C) the Boe Declaration Action Plan; 

22 (3) to extend and renew the provisions of the 

23 Compacts of Free Association and related United 

24 States law that will expire in 2023 for the Republic 

25 of the Marshall Islands and the Federated States of 


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1 Micronesia and in 2024 for the Republic of Palau un2 less they are extended and renewed; and 

3 (4) to work closely with United States allies and 

4 partners with existing relationships and interests in 

5 the Pacific Islands, such as Australia, Japan, New 

6 Zealand, and Taiwan, in advancing common goals. 

7 SEC. 298. DEFINITION. 

8 In this part, the terms ‘‘Pacific Islands’’ means the 

9 Cook Islands, the Republic of Fiji, the Republic of Kiribati, 

10 the Republic of the Marshall Islands, the Federated States 

11 of Micronesia, the Republic of Nauru, Niue, the Republic 

12 of Palau, the Independent State of Papua New Guinea, the 

13 Independent State of Samoa, the Solomon Islands, the 

14 Kingdom of Tonga, Tuvalu, and the Republic of Vanuatu. 

15 SEC. 299. AUTHORITY TO CONSOLIDATE REPORTS; FORM OF 

16 REPORTS. 

17 (a) AUTHORITY TO CONSOLIDATE REPORTS.—Any re18 ports required to be submitted to the appropriate congres19 sional committees under this part that are subject to dead20 lines for submission consisting of the same units of time 

21 may be consolidated into a single report that is submitted 

22 to the appropriate congressional committees pursuant to 

23 such deadlines and that contains all information required 

24 under such reports. 


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1 (b) FORM OF REPORTS.—Each report required by this 

2 part shall be submitted in unclassified form but may con3 tain a classified annex. 

4 SEC. 299A. DIPLOMATIC PRESENCE IN THE PACIFIC IS5 LANDS. 

6 (a) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Congress 

7 that— 

8 (1) the strategic importance of the Pacific Is9 lands necessitates an examination of whether United 

10 States diplomatic, economic, and development engage11 ment and presence in the Pacific Islands region is 

12 sufficient to effectively support United States objec13 tives and meaningful participation in regional fora; 

14 (2) improving shared understanding of and 

15 jointly combatting the transnational challenges perti16 nent to the Pacific Islands region with countries of 

17 the Pacific Islands and regional partners such as 

18 Australia, New Zealand, Japan, and Taiwan is vi19 tally important to our shared long-term interests of 

20 stability, security, and prosperity; 

21 (3) the United States should seek to participate 

22 in and support efforts to coordinate a regional re23 sponse toward maritime security, including through 

24 continued United States and Pacific Islands partici25 pation in the Pacific Fusion Centre in Vanuatu and 


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1 Information Fusion Centre in Singapore, and robust 

2 cooperation with regional allies and partners; and 

3 (4) the United States Government should commit 

4 to sending appropriate levels of representation to re5 gional events. 

6 (b) REPORT.— 

7 (1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days after 

8 the date of the enactment of this Act and annually 

9 thereafter for five years, the Secretary of State, in 

10 consultation with the Secretary of Commerce and the 

11 Administrator of the United States Agency for Inter12 national Development, shall submit to the appro13 priate congressional committees a report on the diplo14 matic and development presence of the United States 

15 in the Pacific Islands. 

16 (2) ELEMENTS.—The report required by para17 graph (1) shall include the following: 

18 (A) A description of the Department of 

19 State, United States Agency for International 

20 Development, United States International Devel21 opment Finance Corporation, Millennium Chal22 lenge Corporation, and United States Commer23 cial Service presence, staffing, programming, 

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1 lands, including programming and resourcing 

2 not specifically allocated to the Pacific Islands. 

3 (B) A description of gaps in such presence, 

4 including unfilled full-time equivalent positions. 

5 (C) A description of limitations and chal6 lenges such gaps pose to United States strategic 

7 objectives, including— 

8 (i) gaps in support of the Pacific Is9 lands due to operations being conducted 

10 from the United States Agency for Inter11 national Development offices in Manila and 

12 Suva; and 

13 (ii) gaps in programming and 

14 resourcing. 

15 (D) A strategy to expand and elevate such 

16 presence to fill such gaps, including by estab17 lishing new missions, expanding participation 

18 in regional forums, and elevating United States 

19 representation in regional forums. 

20 (c) AUTHORITY TO ENHANCE DIPLOMATIC AND ECO21 NOMIC ENGAGEMENT.—The Secretary of State and the Sec22 retary of Commerce are authorized to hire locally employed 

23 staff in the Pacific Islands for the purpose of promoting 

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1 mercial engagement between the United States and the Pa2 cific Islands. 

3 (d) REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION STRAT4 EGY.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enact5 ment of this Act, and every five years thereafter, the Admin6 istrator of the United States Agency for International De7 velopment shall submit to the appropriate congressional 

8 committees a regional development cooperation strategy for 

9 the Pacific Islands. 

10 SEC. 299B. COORDINATION WITH REGIONAL ALLIES AND 

11 PARTNERS. 

12 (a) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary of State shall consult 

13 and coordinate with regional allies and partners, such as 

14 Australia, Japan, New Zealand, Taiwan, and regional in15 stitutions such as the Pacific Islands Forum and the Pacific 

16 Community, with respect to programs to provide assistance 

17 to the Pacific Islands, including programs established by 

18 this Act, including for purposes of— 

19 (1) deconflicting programming; 

20 (2) ensuring that any programming does not ad21 versely affect the absorptive capacity of the Pacific Is22 lands; and 

23 (3) ensuring complementary programs benefit 

24 the Pacific Islands to the maximum extent prac25 ticable. 


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1 (b) FORMAL CONSULTATIVE PROCESS.—The Secretary 

2 of State shall establish a formal consultative process with 

3 such regional allies and partners to coordinate with respect 

4 to such programs and future-years programming. 

5 (c) REPORT.—Not later than 180 days after the date 

6 of the enactment of this Act and annually thereafter, the 

7 Secretary of State shall submit to the appropriate congres8 sional committees and the Armed Services Committees of 

9 the Senate and the House of Representatives a report that 

10 includes— 

11 (1) a review of ongoing efforts, initiatives, and 

12 programs undertaken by regional allies and partners, 

13 including multilateral organizations, to advance pri14 orities identified in this Act; 

15 (2) a review of ongoing efforts, initiatives, and 

16 programs undertaken by non-allied foreign actors that 

17 are viewed as being potentially harmful or in any 

18 way detrimental to one or more countries of the Pa19 cific Islands; 

20 (3) an assessment of United States programs in 

21 the Pacific Islands and their alignment and 

22 complementarity with the efforts of regional allies and 

23 partners identified in paragraph (1); and 

24 (4) a review of the formal consultative process 

25 required in subsection (b) to summarize engagements 


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1 held and identify opportunities to improve coordina2 tion with regional allies and partners. 

3 SEC. 299C. CLIMATE RESILIENT DEVELOPMENT IN THE PA4 CIFIC ISLANDS. 

5 (a) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Congress 

6 that— 

7 (1) the United States Government should lever8 age the full range of authorities and programs avail9 able to assist the Pacific Islands in achieving their 

10 development goals; 

11 (2) United States development assistance should 

12 seek to build on existing public and private sector in13 vestments while creating new opportunities toward a 

14 favorable environment for additional such invest15 ments; and 

16 (3) United States development efforts should be 

17 coordinated with and seek to build on existing efforts 

18 by like-minded partners and allies and regional and 

19 international multilateral organizations. 

20 (b) STRATEGY.—The Secretary of State, in coordina21 tion with the Administrator of the United States Agency 

22 for International Development, the Secretary of the Treas23 ury, and the Chief Executive Officer of the United States 

24 International Development Finance Corporation, shall de25 velop and implement a strategy to— 


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1 (1) invest in and improve critical infrastructure, 

2 including transport connectivity, information and 

3 communications technology, food security, coastal 

4 zone management, marine and water resource man5 agement, and energy security and access to electricity 

6 in the Pacific Islands, with an emphasis on climate 

7 resiliency and sustainable development; 

8 (2) provide technical assistance to assist local 

9 government and civil society leaders assess risks to 

10 local infrastructure, especially those posed by climate 

11 change, consider and implement risk mitigation ef12 forts and policies to strengthen resilience, and evalu13 ate proposed projects and solutions for their efficacy 

14 and sustainability; and 

15 (3) support investment and improvement in eco16 system conservation and protection for the long-term 

17 sustainable use of ecosystem services, especially those 

18 that mitigate effects of climate change and those that 

19 support food security and livelihoods. 

20 (c) CONDUCT OF STRATEGY.—The strategy developed 

21 under this section shall be coordinated with like-minded 

22 partners and allies, regional and international multilateral 

23 organizations, and regional frameworks for development in 

24 the Pacific Islands. 


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1 (d) INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS.—The 

2 Secretary of the Treasury shall direct the representatives 

3 of the United States to the World Bank Group, the Inter4 national Monetary Fund, and the Asian Development Bank 

5 to use the voice and vote of the United States to support 

6 climate resilient infrastructure projects in the Pacific Is7 lands. 

8 (e) REPORT.— 

9 (1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days after 

10 the date of the enactment this Act and annually there11 after, the Secretary of State shall submit to the ap12 propriate congressional committees, the Committee on 

13 Natural Resources of the House of Representatives, 

14 and the Committee on Energy and Natural Resources 

15 of the Senate a report on foreign infrastructure devel16 opments in the Pacific Islands. 

17 (2) MATTERS TO BE INCLUDED.—The report re18 quired by paragraph (1) shall include— 

19 (A) a review of foreign infrastructure devel20 opments in the Pacific Islands by non-United 

21 States allies and partners; 

22 (B) assessments of the environmental im23 pact and sustainability of such developments; 

24 and 


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1 (C) an analysis of the financial sustain2 ability of such developments and their impacts 

3 on the debt of host countries in the Pacific Is4 lands. 

5 (f) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—There are 

6 authorized to be appropriated $50,000,000 for each of the 

7 fiscal years 2022 through 2026 to carry out this section. 

8 SEC. 299D. INTERNATIONAL LAW ENFORCEMENT ACADEMY 

9 FOR THE PACIFIC ISLANDS. 

10 (a) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary of State shall develop 

11 and implement a plan to expand coverage of the Inter12 national Law Enforcement Academies (ILEA) program for 

13 the Pacific Islands, including by— 

14 (1) expanding coverage of the regional program 

15 located in Bangkok, Thailand, to the Pacific Islands; 

16 or 

17 (2) establishing a new regional program for the 

18 Pacific Islands. 

19 (b) MATTERS TO BE INCLUDED.—The plan required 

20 by subsection (a) shall include consultation and coordina21 tion with existing regional law enforcement entities, includ22 ing the Pacific Islands Chiefs of Police and civil society, 

23 including those focused on human rights and specializing 

24 in victim-centered approaches, and take into consideration 


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1 costs of implementation, effectiveness, and capacity of the 

2 Pacific Islands to participate in the ILEA program. 

3 (c) BRIEFING REQUIRED.—Not later than 180 days 

4 after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary 

5 of State shall provide the appropriate congressional com6 mittees a briefing on the plan developed under this section. 

7 SEC. 299E. SECURITY ASSISTANCE FOR THE PACIFIC IS8 LANDS. 

9 (a) STRATEGY.— 

10 (1) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary of State, with 

11 the concurrence of the Secretary of Defense and in co12 ordination with the Secretary of Homeland Security, 

13 shall develop and implement a comprehensive strategy 

14 to provide assistance to and build the capacity of 

15 local civilian and national security institutions of the 

16 Pacific Islands for purposes of— 

17 (A) enhancing maritime security and mari18 time domain awareness to address challenges 

19 such as illegal, unreported, and unregulated fish20 ing; 

21 (B) assisting local law enforcement in de22 tecting, preventing, and combatting human and 

23 drug trafficking and other forms of transnational 

24 crime; 


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1 (C) participating in efforts by regional in2 stitutions and frameworks to coordinate and fa3 cilitate cooperation on shared security challenges; 

4 and 

5 (D) expanding information sharing and to 

6 work toward operational coordination and inter7 operability among Pacific Island maritime secu8 rity forces, including through regional fusion 

9 centers. 

10 (2) PROGRAMS AND AUTHORITIES DESCRIBED.— 

11 The strategy required by this subsection shall build on 

12 but not be limited to the following programs and au13 thorities: 

14 (A) The International Military Education 

15 and Training program. 

16 (B) The Foreign Military Financing pro17 gram. 

18 (C) The authority to build the capacity of 

19 foreign security forces under section 333 of title 

20 10, United States Code. 

21 (D) The authority to provide excess defense 

22 articles under section 516 of the Foreign Assist23 ance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2321j). 

24 (E) The Department of Defense State Part25 nership Program. 


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1 (3) NATIONAL POLICE FORCES AND COAST

2 GUARDS.—The national police forces and coast guards 

3 of the Pacific Islands are eligible to receive assistance 

4 under the programs and authorities described in 

5 paragraph (2) (other than the programs and authori6 ties described in subparagraphs (A), (D), and (F) of 

7 paragraph (2)) for purposes of the strategy required 

8 by this subsection. 

9 (b) MATTERS TO BE INCLUDED.—The strategy re10 quired by subsection (a) shall seek to preserve peace and 

11 regional stability in the Pacific Islands and take into con12 sideration and seek to build upon but not duplicate existing 

13 assistance provided by United States allies and partners. 

14 (c) REPORT.— 

15 (1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days after 

16 the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary 

17 shall submit to the appropriate congressional commit18 tees a report that contains the strategy developed 

19 under this section. 

20 (2) MATTERS TO BE INCLUDED.—The report re21 quired by paragraph (1) shall include— 

22 (A) an assessment of security challenges to 

23 the Pacific Islands; 

24 (B) an analysis of demonstrated needs of 

25 the Pacific Islands for assistance; 


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1 (C) a review of existing security assistance 

2 programs in the Pacific Islands, including pro3 grams and efforts provided by United States al4 lies and partners; 

5 (D) a plan for programs for training, 

6 equipping, and sustainment, including excess de7 fense equipment and related materials; 

8 (E) a list of militaries, national police 

9 forces, coast guards, and other national security 

10 forces of the Pacific Islands receiving assistance 

11 under the strategy; 

12 (F) a review of existing cross-border mari13 time law enforcement operations (commonly 

14 known as ‘‘shiprider agreements’’) with the Pa15 cific Islands, an assessment of additional 

16 resourcing needs to enhance operational capac17 ity, and a plan to improve on these programs 

18 and operations; 

19 (G) a review of existing Department of De20 fense State Partnership Programs with the Pa21 cific Islands and an assessment of additional op22 portunities to leverage Department of Defense 

23 State Partnership Programs to address national 

24 security, law enforcement, disaster relief and 

25 emergency management, and related priorities; 


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1 (H) a review of current efforts and progress 

2 in removing unexploded ordnance in the Pacific 

3 Islands and an assessment of additional 

4 resourcing needed to ensure continued progress, 

5 including to support coordination with regional 

6 efforts and those of United States allies and 

7 partners; 

8 (I) a review of existing regional fusion cen9 ters and other cooperative intelligence sharing ef10 forts in the Pacific Islands to address maritime 

11 security, transnational crime, natural disasters, 

12 and other security challenges and an assessment 

13 of opportunities for the United States to partici14 pate in such efforts, including by allocating staff 

15 and supplying resourcing; 

16 (J) measures to evaluate success for the 

17 strategy; and 

18 (K) a detailed assessment of appropriations 

19 required to achieve the objectives for the strategy 

20 in future years. 

21 (3) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES

22 DEFINED.—In this subsection, the term ‘‘appropriate 

23 congressional committees’’ means— 

24 (A) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the 

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1 mittee on Transportation and Infrastructure of 

2 the House of Representatives; and 

3 (B) the Committee on Foreign Relations, 

4 the Committee on Armed Services, and the Com5 mittee on Commerce, Science, and Transpor6 tation of the Senate. 

7 SEC. 299F. COUNTERING TRANSNATIONAL CRIME. 

8 (a) RATIFICATION OF INTERNATIONAL LEGAL INSTRU9 MENTS.— 

10 (1) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary of State shall 

11 prioritize efforts to assist the Pacific Islands in rati12 fying and implementing international legal conven13 tions related to transnational crime, such as— 

14 (A) the Convention on International Trade 

15 in Endangered Species of Wildlife Fauna and 

16 Flora; 

17 (B) the Agreement on Port State Measures; 

18 and 

19 (C) relevant protocols supplementing the 

20 United Nations Convention Against 

21 Transnational Organized Crime, such as— 

22 (i) the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress, 

23 and Punish Trafficking in Person, Espe24 cially Women and Children; and 


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1 (ii) the Protocol Against the Smug2 gling of Migrants by Land, Sea, and Air. 

3 (2) BIENNIAL REPORT.—Not later than 180 days 

4 after the date of the enactment of this Act and every 

5 two years thereafter as appropriate, the Secretary of 

6 State shall submit to the appropriate congressional 

7 committees a report on— 

8 (A) the status of the progress of each coun9 try of the Pacific Islands toward ratifying and 

10 implementing international legal conventions re11 lated to transnational crime; and 

12 (B) United States plans for assisting those 

13 countries that have yet to fully ratify such con14 ventions with their respective ratification efforts. 

15 (b) UPDATES OF CERTAIN REPORTS.—The Secretary 

16 of State, in coordination with other Federal agencies as ap17 propriate, shall identify and update existing reports to in18 clude forms of transnational crime affecting the Pacific Is19 lands, such as— 

20 (1) the International Narcotics Control Strategy 

21 report; 

22 (2) the Improving International Fisheries Man23 agement report; and 

24 (3) the Trafficking in Persons report. 

25 (c) ILLEGAL LOGGING AND ASSOCIATED TRADE.— 


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1 (1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days after 

2 the date of the enactment of this Act and annually 

3 thereafter, the Secretary of State, in coordination 

4 with the heads of relevant Federal agencies, shall sub5 mit to appropriate congressional committees a report 

6 that identifies countries of the Pacific Islands that are 

7 countries of concern with respect to illegal logging 

8 and associated trade. 

9 (2) ELEMENTS.—The report required by para10 graph (1) shall include the following: 

11 (A) A description of the impact illegal log12 ging and associated trade have had on local com13 munities, good governance, and biodiversity, in14 cluding an identification of those foreign coun15 tries that may be financing or in any other 

16 manner supporting illegal logging activities. 

17 (B) A description of efforts taken by coun18 tries identified under paragraph (1) to comply 

19 and take appropriate corrective action to miti20 gate illegal logging, and an evaluation of the 

21 progress of those efforts. 

22 (C) A description of steps taken by the 

23 heads of relevant Federal agencies to assist the 

24 Pacific Islands in adopting and implementing 

25 international measures comparable to those of 


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1 the United States, such as the Lacey Act, to re2 duce impacts of illicit logging. 

3 (3) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES

4 DEFINED.—In this subsection, the term ‘‘appropriate 

5 congressional committees’’ means— 

6 (A) the Committee on Foreign Affairs and 

7 the Committee on Ways and Means of the House 

8 of Representatives; and 

9 (B) the Committee on Foreign Relations 

10 and the Committee on Finance of the Senate. 

11 (d) ILLEGAL, UNREPORTED, AND UNREGULATED

12 FISHING.—Section 3553 of the National Defense Authoriza13 tion Act for Fiscal Year 2020 (16 U.S.C. 8033) is amend14 ed— 

15 (1) in paragraph (7), by striking ‘‘and’’ at the 

16 end; 

17 (2) by redesignating paragraph (8) as para18 graph (9); and 

19 (3) by inserting after paragraph (7) (as amend20 ed) the following: 

21 ‘‘(8) an assessment of gaps or limitations in the 

22 ability of the United States to effectively assist pri23 ority regions and priority flag states relating to IUU 

24 fishing due to resource constraints and the additional 


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1 resources necessary to overcome those constraints; 

2 and’’. 

3 SEC. 299G. EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS INITIATIVE FOR 

4 THE PACIFIC ISLANDS. 

5 (a) IN GENERAL.—The Administrator of the United 

6 States Agency for International Development shall develop 

7 and implement an initiative to assist the Pacific Islands 

8 in enhancing their preparedness for and resilience to nat9 ural disasters and other emergencies. 

10 (b) CONDUCT OF PROGRAM.—The program developed 

11 under this section shall include— 

12 (1) education and training programs on natural 

13 disaster prevention and preparedness for emergency 

14 management professionals in the Pacific Islands, in15 cluding by leveraging the expertise of nonprofit orga16 nizations and institutions of higher education in the 

17 United States; 

18 (2) technical assistance, including through 

19 grants and cooperative agreements for qualified 

20 United States and local nongovernmental organiza21 tions, to enhance early warning systems, emergency 

22 management and preparedness procedures, and post23 disaster relief and recovery; and 


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1 (3) coordination of existing disaster mitigation 

2 and response plans in the region, including by United 

3 States allies and partners in the region. 

4 (c) REPORT.— 

5 (1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than one year after 

6 the date of the enactment of this Act, the Adminis7 trator shall submit to the appropriate congressional 

8 committees a report on the program developed under 

9 this section. 

10 (2) MATTERS TO BE INCLUDED.—The report re11 quired by paragraph (1) shall include— 

12 (A) an assessment of disaster risks in the 

13 Pacific Islands and existing local and regional 

14 capacity to respond to such risks; 

15 (B) a review of existing efforts by United 

16 States allies and partners to provide assistance 

17 and training for natural disaster preparedness 

18 and emergency management; and 

19 (C) objectives, means of implementation, 

20 and measures of success for the initiative. 

21 (3) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES

22 DEFINED.—In this subsection, the term ‘‘appropriate 

23 congressional committees’’ means— 


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1 (A) the Committee on Foreign Affairs and 

2 the Committee on Natural Resources of the 

3 House of Representatives; and 

4 (B) the Committee on Foreign Relations 

5 and the Committee on Energy and Natural Re6 sources of the Senate. 

7 (d) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—There are 

8 authorized to be appropriated $40,000,000 for each of the 

9 fiscal years 2022 through 2026 to carry out this section. 

10 SEC. 299H. PEACE CORPS IN THE PACIFIC ISLANDS. 

11 (a) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Congress 

12 that— 

13 (1) the presence of the Peace Corps in the Pacific 

14 Islands should be expanded and the Peace Corps 

15 should reopen its programs in as many of the Pacific 

16 Islands as possible, including where it has previously 

17 operated but has suspended operations; 

18 (2) consulting like-minded regional allies and 

19 partners, such as Australia, New Zealand, Japan, 

20 and Taiwan is crucial for identifying and overcoming 

21 challenges for increased Peace Corps presence in the 

22 Pacific Islands; 

23 (3) the Peace Corps, whose mission is to promote 

24 world peace and friendship in part by helping the 

25 people of interested countries in meeting their need 


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1 for trained men and women, provides an invaluable 

2 opportunity to connect the American people with the 

3 people of the Republic of the Marshall Islands, the 

4 Federated States of Micronesia, and the Republic of 

5 Palau; and 

6 (4) the Peace Corps should promptly reopen its 

7 programs in the Republic of the Marshall Islands, the 

8 Federated States of Micronesia, and the Republic of 

9 Palau. 

10 (b) REPORT.—Not later than 180 days after the date 

11 of the enactment of this Act, the Director of the Peace Corps 

12 shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a 

13 report that includes— 

14 (1) a comparative analysis of the Peace Corps 

15 presence in the Pacific Islands region to other regions 

16 of the world, including a cost-benefit analysis of 

17 placement in the region versus elsewhere globally; 

18 (2) analysis of current impediments to Peace 

19 Corps expansion in the Pacific Islands region; 

20 (3) outcomes of consultations among United 

21 States agencies, and with regional allies and part22 ners, on areas in which cooperation can reduce factors 

23 limiting Peace Corps expansion, particularly those 

24 related to medical transportation and personal safety; 

25 and 


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1 (4) a plan and timeline for implementing out2 comes identified in paragraph (3) to facilitate expan3 sion of Peace Corps presence in the region, where ap4 propriate. 

5 TITLE III—INVESTING IN OUR 

6 VALUES 

7 SEC. 301. STATEMENT OF CONGRESS ON THE CONTINUED 

8 VIOLATION OF RIGHTS AND FREEDOMS OF 

9 THE PEOPLE OF HONG KONG. 

10 (a) FINDINGS.—Congress finds the following: 

11 (1) Despite international condemnation, the 

12 Government of the People’s Republic of China 

13 (‘‘PRC’’) continues to disregard its international 

14 legal obligations under the Joint Declaration of the 

15 Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain 

16 and Northern Ireland and the Government of the Peo17 ple’s Republic of China on the Question of Hong 

18 Kong (‘‘Joint Declaration’’), in which the PRC com19 mitted that— 

20 (A) Hong Kong would enjoy a high degree 

21 of autonomy; 

22 (B) for at least 50 years the ‘‘social and 

23 economic systems in Hong Kong’’ would remain 

24 unchanged; and 


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1 (C) the personal rights and freedoms of the 

2 people of Hong Kong would be protected by law. 

3 (2) As part of its continued efforts to undermine 

4 the established rights of the Hong Kong people, the 

5 PRC National People’s Congress Standing Committee 

6 (‘‘Standing Committee’’) passed and imposed upon 

7 Hong Kong oppressive and intentionally vague na8 tional security legislation on June 30, 2020, that 

9 grants Beijing sweeping powers to punish acts of 

10 ‘‘separating the country, subverting state power, and 

11 organizing terroristic activities’’. 

12 (3) The legislative process by which the Standing 

13 Committee imposed the national security law on 

14 Hong Kong bypassed Hong Kong’s local government 

15 in a potential violation of the Basic Law of the Hong 

16 Kong Special Administrative Region of the People’s 

17 Republic of China (‘‘Basic Law’’), and involved un18 usual secrecy, as demonstrated by the fact that the 

19 legislation was only the second law since 2008 that 

20 the Standing Committee has passed without releasing 

21 a draft for public comment. 

22 (4) On July 30, 2020, election officials of the 

23 Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (HKSAR) 

24 disqualified twelve pro-democracy candidates from 

25 participating in the September 6 Legislative Council 


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1 elections, which were subsequently postponed for a 

2 year until September 5, 2021, by citing the public 

3 health risk of holding elections during the COVID–19 

4 pandemic. 

5 (5) On July 31, 2020, in an attempt to assert 

6 extraterritorial jurisdiction, the HKSAR Government 

7 announced indictments of and arrest warrants for six 

8 Hong Kong activists living overseas, including United 

9 States citizen Samuel Chu, for alleged violations of 

10 the national security law. 

11 (6) On November 11, 2020, the HKSAR Govern12 ment removed four lawmakers from office for allegedly 

13 violating the law after the Standing Committee 

14 passed additional legislation barring those who pro15 moted or supported Hong Kong independence and re16 fused to acknowledge PRC sovereignty over Hong 

17 Kong, or otherwise violates the national security law, 

18 from running for or serving in the Legislative Coun19 cil. 

20 (7) On December 2, 2020, pro-democracy activ21 ists Joshua Wong, Agnes Chow, and Ivan Lam were 

22 sentenced to prison for participating in 2019 protests. 

23 (8) Ten of the twelve Hong Kong residents (also 

24 known as ‘‘the Hong Kong 12’’) who sought to flee by 

25 boat from Hong Kong to Taiwan on August 23, 2020, 


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1 were taken to mainland China and sentenced on De2 cember 30, 2020, to prison terms ranging from seven 

3 months to three years for illegal border crossing. 

4 (9) On December 31, 2020, Hong Kong’s highest 

5 court revoked bail for Jimmy Lai Chee-Ying, a pro6 democracy figure and publisher, who was charged on 

7 December 12 with colluding with foreign forces and 

8 endangering national security under the national se9 curity legislation. 

10 (10) On January 4, 2021, the Departments of 

11 Justice in Henan and Sichuan province threatened to 

12 revoke the licenses of two lawyers hired to help the 

13 Hong Kong 12. 

14 (11) On January 5, 2021, the Hong Kong Police 

15 Force arrested more than fifty opposition figures, in16 cluding pro-democracy officials, activists, and an 

17 American lawyer, for their involvement in an infor18 mal July 2020 primary to select candidates for the 

19 general election originally scheduled for September 

20 2020, despite other political parties having held simi21 lar primaries without retribution. 

22 (12) On April 22, 2021, a Hong Kong court con23 victed Choy Yuk-ling, a video producer with Radio 

24 Television Hong Kong, in relation to her investigative 

25 reporting on the Hong Kong police. 


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1 (13) On June 24, 2021, Apple Daily, Hong 

2 Kong’s only surviving pro-democracy newspaper, 

3 published its final edition following months of intimi4 dation and repression by the HKSAR Government, 

5 including through the arrest of its senior editors, po6 lice raids on its offices, and the freezing of its finan7 cial assets. 

8 (b) STATEMENT OF CONGRESS.—Congress— 

9 (1) condemns the actions taken by the Govern10 ment of the People’s Republic of China (‘‘PRC’’) and 

11 the Government of the Hong Kong Special Adminis12 trative Region (‘‘HKSAR’’), including the adoption 

13 and implementation of national security legislation 

14 for Hong Kong through irregular procedures, that vio15 late the rights and freedoms of the people of Hong 

16 Kong that are guaranteed by the Joint Declaration 

17 and its implementing document, the Basic Law; 

18 (2) reaffirms its support for the people of Hong 

19 Kong, who face grave threats to their rights and free20 doms; 

21 (3) calls on the Governments of the PRC and 

22 HKSAR to— 

23 (A) respect and uphold— 


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1 (i) commitments made to the inter2 national community and the people of Hong 

3 Kong under the Joint Declaration; and 

4 (ii) the judicial independence of the 

5 Hong Kong legal system; and 

6 (B) release pro-democracy activists and 

7 politicians arrested under the national security 

8 law; and 

9 (4) encourages the President, the Secretary of 

10 State, and the Secretary of the Treasury to coordinate 

11 with allies and partners and continue United States 

12 efforts to respond to developments in Hong Kong, in13 cluding by— 

14 (A) providing protection for Hong Kong 

15 residents who fear persecution; 

16 (B) supporting those who may seek to file a 

17 case before the International Court of Justice to 

18 hold the Government of the PRC accountable for 

19 violating its binding legal commitments under 

20 the Joint Declaration; 

21 (C) encouraging allies and partner coun22 tries to instruct, as appropriate, their respective 

23 representatives to the United Nations to use their 

24 voice, vote, and influence to press for the ap25 pointment of a United Nations special mandate 


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1 holder to monitor and report on human rights 

2 developments in Hong Kong; 

3 (D) ensuring the private sector, particularly 

4 United States companies with economic interests 

5 in Hong Kong, is aware of risks the national se6 curity legislation poses to the security of United 

7 States citizens and to the medium and long-term 

8 interest of United States businesses in Hong 

9 Kong; 

10 (E) continuing to implement sanctions au11 thorities, especially authorities recently enacted 

12 to address actions undermining the rights and 

13 freedoms of the Hong Kong people, such as the 

14 Hong Kong Autonomy Act (Public Law 116– 

15 149) and the Hong Kong Human Rights and 

16 Democracy Act of 2019 (Public Law 116–76), 

17 with respect to officials of the Chinese Com18 munist Party, the Government of the PRC, or 

19 the Government of the HKSAR who are respon20 sible for undermining such rights and freedoms; 

21 and 

22 (F) coordinating with allies and partners to 

23 ensure that such implementation of sanctions is 

24 multilateral. 


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1 SEC. 302. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS FOR PRO2 MOTION OF DEMOCRACY IN HONG KONG. 

3 (a) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—There is 

4 authorized to be appropriated $10,000,000 for fiscal year 

5 2022 for the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and 

6 Labor of the Department of State to promote democracy in 

7 Hong Kong. 

8 (b) ADMINISTRATION.—The Secretary of State shall 

9 designate an office with the Department of State to admin10 ister and coordinate the provision of such funds described 

11 in subsection (a) within the Department of State and across 

12 the United States Government. 

13 SEC. 303. HONG KONG PEOPLE’S FREEDOM AND CHOICE. 

14 (a) DEFINITIONS.—For purposes of this section: 

15 (1) JOINT DECLARATION.—The term ‘‘Joint Dec16 laration’’ means the Joint Declaration of the Govern17 ment of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and 

18 Northern Ireland and the Government of the People’s 

19 Republic of China on the Question of Hong Kong, 

20 signed on December 19, 1984, and entered into force 

21 on May 27, 1985. 

22 (2) PRIORITY HONG KONG RESIDENT.—The term 

23 ‘‘Priority Hong Kong resident’’ means— 

24 (A) a permanent resident of Hong Kong 

25 who— 


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1 (i) holds no right to citizenship in any 

2 country or jurisdiction other than the Peo3 ple’s Republic of China (referred to in this 

4 section as the ‘‘PRC’’), Hong Kong, or 

5 Macau as of the date of enactment of this 

6 Act; 

7 (ii) has resided in Hong Kong for not 

8 less than the last ten years as of the date of 

9 enactment of this Act; and 

10 (iii) has been designated by the Sec11 retary of State or Secretary of Homeland 

12 Security as having met the requirements of 

13 this subparagraph, in accordance with the 

14 procedures described in subsection (f) of this 

15 section; or 

16 (B) the spouse of a person described in sub17 paragraph (A), or the child of such person as 

18 such term is defined in section 101(b)(1) of the 

19 Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 

20 1101(b)(1)), except that a child shall be an un21 married person under twenty-seven years of age. 

22 (3) HONG KONG NATIONAL SECURITY LAW.—The 

23 term ‘‘Hong Kong National Security Law’’ means the 

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1 cial Administrative Region that was passed unani2 mously by the National People’s Congress and signed 

3 by President Xi Jinping on June 30, 2020, and pro4 mulgated in the Hong Kong Special Administrative 

5 Region (referred to in this section as ‘‘Hong Kong 

6 SAR’’) on July 1, 2020. 

7 (4) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMIT8 TEES.—The term ‘‘appropriate congressional commit9 tees’’ means— 

10 (A) the Committee on Foreign Affairs and 

11 the Committee on the Judiciary of the House of 

12 Representatives; and 

13 (B) the Committee on Foreign Relations 

14 and the Committee on the Judiciary of the Sen15 ate. 

16 (b) FINDINGS.—Congress finds the following: 

17 (1) The Hong Kong National Security Law pro18 mulgated on July 1, 2020— 

19 (A) contravenes the Basic Law of the Hong 

20 Kong Special Administrative Region (referred to 

21 in this Act as ‘‘the Basic Law’’) that provides in 

22 Article 23 that the Legislative Council of Hong 

23 Kong shall enact legislation related to national 

24 security; 


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1 (B) violates the PRC’s commitments under 

2 international law, as defined by the Joint Dec3 laration; and 

4 (C) causes severe and irreparable damage to 

5 the ‘‘one country, two systems’’ principle and 

6 further erodes global confidence in the PRC’s 

7 commitment to international law. 

8 (2) On July 14, 2020, in response to the promul9 gation of the Hong Kong National Security Law, 

10 President Trump signed an Executive order on Hong 

11 Kong normalization that, among other policy actions, 

12 suspended the special treatment of Hong Kong per13 sons under U.S. law with respect to the issuance of 

14 immigrant and nonimmigrant visas. 

15 (3) The United States has a long and proud his16 tory as a destination for refugees and asylees fleeing 

17 persecution based on race, religion, nationality, polit18 ical opinion, or membership in a particular social 

19 group. 

20 (4) The United States also shares deep social, 

21 cultural, and economic ties with the people of Hong 

22 Kong, including a shared commitment to democracy, 

23 to the rule of law, and to the protection of human 

24 rights. 


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1 (5) The United States has sheltered, protected, 

2 and welcomed individuals who have fled authori3 tarian regimes, including citizens from the PRC fol4 lowing the violent June 4, 1989, crackdown in 

5 Tiananmen Square, deepening ties between the people 

6 of the United States and those individuals seeking to 

7 contribute to a free, open society founded on democ8 racy, human rights, and the respect for the rule of 

9 law. 

10 (6) The United States has reaped enormous eco11 nomic, cultural, and strategic benefits from wel12 coming successive generations of scientists, doctors, 

13 entrepreneurs, artists, intellectuals, and other free14 dom-loving people fleeing fascism, communism, vio15 lent Islamist extremism, and other repressive 

16 ideologies, including in the cases of Nazi Germany, 

17 the Soviet Union, and Soviet-controlled Central Eu18 rope, Cuba, Vietnam, and Iran. 

19 (7) A major asymmetric advantage of the United 

20 States in its long-term strategic competition with the 

21 Communist Party of China is the ability of people 

22 from every country in the world, irrespective of their 

23 race, ethnicity, or religion, to immigrate to the 

24 United States and become American citizens. 


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1 (c) STATEMENT OF POLICY.—It is the policy of the 

2 United States— 

3 (1) to reaffirm the principles and objectives set 

4 forth in the United States-Hong Kong Policy Act of 

5 1992 (Public Law 102–383), specifically that— 

6 (A) the United States has ‘‘a strong interest 

7 in the continued vitality, prosperity, and sta8 bility of Hong Kong’’; 

9 (B) ‘‘support for democratization is a fun10 damental principle of United States foreign pol11 icy’’, and therefore ‘‘naturally applies to United 

12 States policy toward Hong Kong’’; 

13 (C) ‘‘the human rights of the people of Hong 

14 Kong are of great importance to the United 

15 States and are directly relevant to United States 

16 interests in Hong Kong and serve as a basis for 

17 Hong Kong’s continued economic prosperity’’; 

18 and 

19 (D) Hong Kong must remain sufficiently 

20 autonomous from the PRC to ‘‘justify treatment 

21 under a particular law of the United States, or 

22 any provision thereof, different from that ac23 corded the People’s Republic of China’’; 


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1 (2) to continue to support the high degree of au2 tonomy and fundamental rights and freedoms of the 

3 people of Hong Kong, as enumerated by— 

4 (A) the Joint Declaration; 

5 (B) the International Covenant on Civil 

6 and Political Rights, done at New York, Decem7 ber 19, 1966; and 

8 (C) the Universal Declaration of Human 

9 Rights, done at Paris, December 10, 1948; 

10 (3) to continue to support the democratic aspira11 tions of the people of Hong Kong, including the ‘‘ulti12 mate aim’’ of the selection of the Chief Executive and 

13 all members of the Legislative Council by universal 

14 suffrage, as articulated in the Basic Law; 

15 (4) to urge the Government of the PRC, despite 

16 its recent actions, to uphold its commitments to Hong 

17 Kong, including allowing the people of Hong Kong to 

18 govern Hong Kong with a high degree of autonomy 

19 and without undue interference, and ensuring that 

20 Hong Kong voters freely enjoy the right to elect the 

21 Chief Executive and all members of the Hong Kong 

22 Legislative Council by universal suffrage; 

23 (5) to support the establishment of a genuine 

24 democratic option to freely and fairly nominate and 

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1 lishment of open and direct democratic elections for 

2 all members of the Hong Kong Legislative Council; 

3 (6) to support the robust exercise by residents of 

4 Hong Kong of the rights to free speech, the press, and 

5 other fundamental freedoms, as provided by the Basic 

6 Law, the Joint Declaration, and the International 

7 Covenant on Civil and Political Rights; 

8 (7) to support freedom from arbitrary or unlaw9 ful arrest, detention, or imprisonment for all Hong 

10 Kong residents, as provided by the Basic Law, the 

11 Joint Declaration, and the International Covenant on 

12 Civil and Political Rights; 

13 (8) to draw international attention to any viola14 tions by the Government of the PRC of the funda15 mental rights of the people of Hong Kong, as provided 

16 by the International Covenant on Civil and Political 

17 Rights, and any encroachment upon the autonomy 

18 guaranteed to Hong Kong by the Basic Law and the 

19 Joint Declaration; 

20 (9) to protect United States citizens and long21 term permanent residents living in Hong Kong, as 

22 well as people visiting and transiting through Hong 

23 Kong; 

24 (10) to maintain the economic and cultural ties 

25 that provide significant benefits to both the United 


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1 States and Hong Kong, including the reinstatement of 

2 the Fulbright exchange program with regard to Hong 

3 Kong at the earliest opportunity; 

4 (11) to coordinate with allies, including the 

5 United Kingdom, Australia, Canada, Japan, and the 

6 Republic of Korea, to promote democracy and human 

7 rights in Hong Kong; and 

8 (12) to welcome and protect in the United States 

9 residents of Hong Kong fleeing persecution or other10 wise seeking a safe haven from violations by the Gov11 ernment of the PRC of the fundamental rights of the 

12 people of Hong Kong. 

13 (d) TEMPORARY PROTECTED STATUS FOR HONG KONG

14 RESIDENTS IN THE UNITED STATES.— 

15 (1) DESIGNATION.— 

16 (A) IN GENERAL.—For purposes of section 

17 244 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 

18 U.S.C. 1254a), Hong Kong shall be treated as if 

19 it had been designated under subsection (b)(1)(C) 

20 of such section, subject to the provisions of this 

21 section. 

22 (B) PERIOD OF DESIGNATION.—The initial 

23 period of the designation referred to in subpara24 graph (A) shall be for the 18-month period begin25 ning on the date of enactment of this Act. 


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1 (2) ALIENS ELIGIBLE.—As a result of the des2 ignation made under subsection (a), an alien is 

3 deemed to satisfy the requirements under paragraph 

4 (1) of section 244(c) of the Immigration and Nation5 ality Act (8 U.S.C. 1254a(c)), subject to paragraph 

6 (3) of such section, if the alien— 

7 (A) was a permanent resident of Hong 

8 Kong at the time such individual arrived into 

9 the United States and is a national of the PRC 

10 (or in the case of an individual having no na11 tionality, is a person who last habitually resided 

12 in Hong Kong); 

13 (B) has been continuously physically 

14 present in the United States since the date of the 

15 enactment of this Act; 

16 (C) is admissible as an immigrant, except 

17 as otherwise provided in paragraph (2)(A) of 

18 such section, and is not ineligible for temporary 

19 protected status under paragraph (2)(B) of such 

20 section; and 

21 (D) registers for temporary protected status 

22 in a manner established by the Secretary of 

23 Homeland Security. 

24 (3) CONSENT TO TRAVEL ABROAD.— 


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1 (A) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary of Home2 land Security shall give prior consent to travel 

3 abroad, in accordance with section 244(f)(3) of 

4 the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 

5 1254a(f)(3)), to an alien who is granted tem6 porary protected status pursuant to the designa7 tion made under paragraph (1) if the alien es8 tablishes to the satisfaction of the Secretary of 

9 Homeland Security that emergency and extenu10 ating circumstances beyond the control of the 

11 alien require the alien to depart for a brief, tem12 porary trip abroad. 

13 (B) TREATMENT UPON RETURN.—An alien 

14 returning to the United States in accordance 

15 with an authorization described in subparagraph 

16 (A) shall be treated as any other returning alien 

17 provided temporary protected status under sec18 tion 244 of the Immigration and Nationality Act 

19 (8 U.S.C. 1254a). 

20 (4) FEE.— 

21 (A) IN GENERAL.—In addition to any other 

22 fee authorized by law, the Secretary of Homeland 

23 Security is authorized to charge and collect a fee 

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1 tion and Nationality Act by a person who is 

2 only eligible for such status by reason of para3 graph (1). 

4 (B) WAIVER.—The Secretary of Homeland 

5 Security shall permit aliens to apply for a waiv6 er of any fees associated with filing an applica7 tion referred to in subparagraph (A). 

8 (e) TREATMENT OF HONG KONG RESIDENTS FOR IM9 MIGRATION PURPOSES.—Notwithstanding any other provi10 sion of law, during the five fiscal year period beginning 

11 on the first day of the first full fiscal year after the date 

12 of enactment of this Act, Hong Kong shall continue to be 

13 considered a foreign state separate and apart from the PRC 

14 as mandated under section 103 of the Immigration and Na15 tionality Act of 1990 (Public Law 101–649) for purposes 

16 of the numerical limitations on immigrant visas under sec17 tions 201, 202, and 203 of the Immigration and Nation18 ality Act (8 U.S.C. 1151, 1152, and 1153). 

19 (f) VERIFICATION OF PRIORITY HONG KONG RESI20 DENTS.— 

21 (1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days after 

22 the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of 

23 State, in consultation with the Secretary of Home24 land Security, shall publish in the Federal Register, 

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1 ignation of Priority Hong Kong Residents. Notwith2 standing section 553 of title 5, United States Code, 

3 the rule shall be effective, on an interim basis, imme4 diately upon publication, but may be subject to 

5 change and revision after public notice and oppor6 tunity for comment. The Secretary of State shall fi7 nalize such rule not later than one year after the date 

8 of the enactment of this Act. Such rule shall establish 

9 procedures— 

10 (A) for individuals to register with any 

11 United States embassy or consulate outside of the 

12 United States, or with the Department of Home13 land Security in the United States, and request 

14 designation as a Priority Hong Kong Resident; 

15 and 

16 (B) for the appropriate Secretary to verify 

17 the residency of registered individuals and des18 ignate those who qualify as Priority Hong Kong 

19 Residents. 

20 (2) DOCUMENTATION.—The procedures described 

21 in paragraph (1) shall include the collection of— 

22 (A) biometric data; 

23 (B) copies of birth certificates, residency 

24 cards, and other documentation establishing resi25 dency; and 


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1 (C) other personal information, data, and 

2 records deemed appropriate by the Secretary. 

3 (3) GUIDANCE.—Not later than 90 days after the 

4 date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of 

5 State shall issue guidance outlining actions to en6 hance the ability of the Secretary to efficiently send 

7 and receive information to and from the United 

8 Kingdom and other like-minded allies and partners 

9 for purposes of rapid verification of permanent resi10 dency in Hong Kong and designation of individuals 

11 as Priority Hong Kong Residents. 

12 (4) REPORT.—Not later than 90 days after the 

13 date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of 

14 State shall submit to the appropriate congressional 

15 committees, the Committee on the Judiciary of the 

16 House of Representatives, and the Committee on the 

17 Judiciary of the Senate a report detailing plans to 

18 implement the requirements described in this sub19 section. 

20 (5) PROTECTION FOR REFUGEES.—Nothing in 

21 this section may be construed to prevent a Priority 

22 Hong Kong Resident from seeking refugee status 

23 under section 207 of the Immigration and Nation24 ality Act (8 U.S.C. 1157) or requesting asylum under 

25 section 208 of such Act (8 U.S.C. 1158). 


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1 (g) REPORTING REQUIREMENTS.— 

2 (1) IN GENERAL.—On an annual basis, the Sec3 retary of State and the Secretary of Homeland Secu4 rity, in consultation with other Federal agencies, as 

5 appropriate, shall submit to the appropriate congres6 sional committees, the Committee on the Judiciary of 

7 the House of Representatives, and the Committee on 

8 the Judiciary of the Senate a report detailing for the 

9 previous fiscal year— 

10 (A) the number of Hong Kong SAR resi11 dents who have applied for United States visas 

12 or immigration benefits, disaggregated by visa 

13 type or immigration benefit, including asylum, 

14 refugee status, temporary protected status, and 

15 lawful permanent residence; 

16 (B) the number of approvals, denials, or re17 jections of applicants for visas or immigration 

18 benefits described in subparagraph (A), 

19 disaggregated by visa type or immigration ben20 efit and basis for denial; 

21 (C) the number of pending refugee and asy22 lum applications for Hong Kong SAR residents, 

23 and the length of time and reason for which such 

24 applications have been pending; and 


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1 (D) other matters determined relevant by 

2 the Secretaries relating to efforts to protect and 

3 facilitate the resettlement of refugees and victims 

4 of persecution in Hong Kong. 

5 (2) FORM.—Each report under paragraph (1) 

6 shall be submitted in unclassified form and published 

7 on a text-searchable, publicly available website of the 

8 Department of State and the Department of Home9 land Security. 

10 (h) STRATEGY FOR INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION ON

11 HONG KONG.— 

12 (1) IN GENERAL.—It is the policy of the United 

13 States— 

14 (A) to support the people of Hong Kong by 

15 providing safe haven to Hong Kong SAR resi16 dents who are nationals of the PRC following the 

17 enactment of the Hong Kong National Security 

18 Law that places certain Hong Kong persons at 

19 risk of persecution; and 

20 (B) to encourage like-minded nations to 

21 make similar accommodations for Hong Kong 

22 people fleeing persecution by the Government of 

23 the PRC. 

24 (2) PLAN.—The Secretary of State, in consulta25 tion with the heads of other Federal agencies, as apVerDate Sep 11 2014 21:34 Dec 30, 2022 Jkt 039200 PO 00000 Frm 00380 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6203 E:\BILLS\H3524.RH H3524

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1 propriate, shall develop a plan to engage with other 

2 countries, including the United Kingdom, on coopera3 tive efforts to— 

4 (A) provide refugee and asylum protections 

5 for victims of, and individuals with a fear of, 

6 persecution in Hong Kong, either by Hong Kong 

7 authorities or other authorities acting on behalf 

8 of the PRC; 

9 (B) enhance protocols to facilitate the reset10 tlement of refugees and displaced persons from 

11 Hong Kong; 

12 (C) identify and prevent the exploitation of 

13 immigration and visa policies and procedures by 

14 corrupt officials; and 

15 (D) expedite the sharing of information, as 

16 appropriate, related to the refusal of individual 

17 applications for visas or other travel documents 

18 submitted by residents of the Hong Kong SAR 

19 based on— 

20 (i) national security or related grounds 

21 under section 212(a)(3) of the Immigration 

22 and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(3)); 

23 or 

24 (ii) fraud or misrepresentation under 

25 section 212(a)(6)(C) of the Immigration 


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1 and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 

2 1182(a)(6)(C)). 

3 (3) REPORT.—Not later than 90 days after the 

4 date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of 

5 State, in consultation with the heads of other Federal 

6 agencies, as appropriate, shall submit to the appro7 priate congressional committees, the Committee on the 

8 Judiciary of the House of Representatives, and the 

9 Committee on the Judiciary of the Senate a report on 

10 the plan described in paragraph (2). 

11 (i) REFUGEE STATUS FOR CERTAIN RESIDENTS OF

12 HONG KONG.— 

13 (1) IN GENERAL.—Aliens described in paragraph 

14 (2) may establish, for purposes of admission as a ref15 ugee under sections 207 of the Immigration and Na16 tionality Act (8 U.S.C. 1157) or asylum under section 

17 208 of such Act (8 U.S.C. 1158), that such alien has 

18 a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, 

19 religion, nationality, membership in a particular so20 cial group, or political opinion by asserting such a 

21 fear and a credible basis for concern about the possi22 bility of such persecution. 

23 (2) ALIENS DESCRIBED.— 

24 (A) IN GENERAL.—An alien is described in 

25 this subsection if such alien— 


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1 (i) is a Priority Hong Kong Resident 

2 and— 

3 (I) had a significant role in a 

4 civil society organization supportive of 

5 the protests in 2019 and 2020 related 

6 to the Hong Kong National Security 

7 Law and the encroachment on the au8 tonomy of Hong Kong by the PRC; 

9 (II) was arrested, charged, de10 tained, or convicted of an offense aris11 ing from their participation in an ac12 tion as described in section 206(b)(2) 

13 of the United States-Hong Kong Policy 

14 Act of 1992 (22 U.S.C. 5726(b)(2)) 

15 that was not violent in nature; or 

16 (III) has had their citizenship, 

17 nationality, or residency revoked for 

18 having submitted to any United States 

19 Government agency a nonfrivolous ap20 plication for refugee status, asylum, or 

21 any other immigration benefit under 

22 the immigration laws (as defined in 

23 section 101(a) of the Immigration and 

24 Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1101(a))); 


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1 (ii) is a Priority Hong Kong Resident 

2 spouse or child of an alien described in 

3 clause (i); or 

4 (iii) is the parent of an alien described 

5 in clause (i), if such parent is a citizen of 

6 the PRC and no other foreign state. 

7 (B) OTHER CATEGORIES.—The Secretary of 

8 Homeland Security, in consultation with the 

9 Secretary of State, may designate other cat10 egories of aliens for purposes of establishing a 

11 well-founded fear of persecution under paragraph 

12 (1) if such aliens share common characteristics 

13 that identify them as targets of persecution in 

14 the PRC on account of race, religion, nation15 ality, membership in a particular social group, 

16 or political opinion. 

17 (C) SIGNIFICANT ROLE.—For purposes of 

18 subclause (I) of paragraph (2)(A)(i), a signifi19 cant role shall include, with respect to the pro20 tests described in such clause— 

21 (i) an organizing role; 

22 (ii) a first aid responder; 

23 (iii) a journalist or member of the 

24 media covering or offering public com25 mentary; 


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1 (iv) a provider of legal services to one 

2 or more individuals arrested for partici3 pating in such protests; or 

4 (v) a participant who during the pe5 riod beginning on June 9, 2019, and ending 

6 on June 30, 2020, was arrested, charged, 

7 detained, or convicted as a result of such 

8 participation. 

9 (3) AGE OUT PROTECTIONS.—For purposes of 

10 this subsection, a determination of whether an alien 

11 is a child shall be made using the age of the alien on 

12 the date an application for refugee or asylum status 

13 in which the alien is a named beneficiary is filed 

14 with the Secretary of Homeland Security. 

15 (4) EXCLUSION FROM NUMERICAL LIMITA16 TIONS.—Aliens provided refugee status under this 

17 subsection shall not be counted against the numerical 

18 limitation on refugees established in accordance with 

19 the procedures described in section 207 of the Immi20 gration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1157). 

21 (5) REPORTING REQUIREMENTS.— 

22 (A) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 90 days 

23 after the date of the enactment of this Act and 

24 every 90 days thereafter, the Secretary of State 

25 and the Secretary of Homeland Security shall 


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1 submit to the appropriate congressional commit2 tees, the Committee on the Judiciary of the 

3 House of Representatives, and the Committee on 

4 the Judiciary of the Senate a report on the mat5 ters described in subparagraph (B). 

6 (B) MATTERS TO BE INCLUDED.—Each re7 port required by subparagraph (A) shall include, 

8 with respect to applications submitted under this 

9 section— 

10 (i) the total number of refugee and asy11 lum applications that are pending at the 

12 end of the reporting period; 

13 (ii) the average wait-times for all ap14 plicants for refugee status or asylum pend15 ing— 

16 (I) a prescreening interview with 

17 a resettlement support center; 

18 (II) an interview with United 

19 States Citizenship and Immigration 

20 Services; and 

21 (III) the completion of security 

22 checks; 

23 (iii) the number of approvals, referrals 

24 including the source of the referral, denials 

25 of applications for refugee status or asylum, 


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1 disaggregated by the reason for each such 

2 denial; and 

3 (iv) the number of refugee circuit rides 

4 to interview populations that would include 

5 Hong Kong SAR completed in the last 90 

6 days, and the number planned for the subse7 quent 90-day period. 

8 (C) FORM.—Each report required by sub9 paragraph (A) shall be submitted in unclassified 

10 form, but may include a classified annex. 

11 (D) PUBLIC REPORTS.—The Secretary of 

12 State shall make each report submitted under 

13 this paragraph available to the public on the 

14 internet website of the Department of State. 

15 (j) ADMISSION FOR CERTAIN HIGHLY SKILLED HONG

16 KONG RESIDENTS.— 

17 (1) IN GENERAL.—Subject to subsection (c), the 

18 Secretary of Homeland Security, or, notwithstanding 

19 any other provision of law, the Secretary of State in 

20 consultation with the Secretary of Homeland Secu21 rity, may provide an alien described in subsection (b) 

22 with the status of a special immigrant under section 

23 101(a)(27) of the Immigration and Nationality Act 

24 (8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(27)), if the alien— 


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1 (A) or an agent acting on behalf of the 

2 alien, submits a petition for classification under 

3 section 203(b)(4) of such Act (8 U.S.C. 

4 1153(b)(4)); 

5 (B) is otherwise eligible to receive an immi6 grant visa; 

7 (C) is otherwise admissible to the United 

8 States for permanent residence (excluding the 

9 grounds for inadmissibility specified in section 

10 212(a)(4) of such Act (8 U.S.C. (a)(4))); and 

11 (D) clears a background check and appro12 priate screening, as determined by the Secretary 

13 of Homeland Security. 

14 (2) ALIENS DESCRIBED.— 

15 (A) PRINCIPAL ALIENS.—An alien is de16 scribed in this subsection if— 

17 (i) the alien— 

18 (I) is a Priority Hong Kong Resi19 dent; and 

20 (II) has earned a bachelor’s or 

21 higher degree from an institution of 

22 higher education; and 

23 (ii) the Secretary of Homeland Secu24 rity determines that such alien’s relocation 


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1 to the United States would provide a sig2 nificant benefit to the United States. 

3 (B) SPOUSES AND CHILDREN.—An alien is 

4 described in this subsection if the alien is the 

5 spouse or child of a principal alien described in 

6 paragraph (1). 

7 (3) NUMERICAL LIMITATIONS.— 

8 (A) IN GENERAL.—The total number of 

9 principal aliens who may be provided special 

10 immigrant status under this section may not ex11 ceed 5,000 per year for each of the five fiscal 

12 years beginning after the date of the enactment 

13 of this Act. The Secretary of Homeland Security 

14 may, in consultation with the Secretary of State, 

15 prioritize the issuance of visas to individuals 

16 with a bachelor’s or higher degree in science, 

17 technology, engineering, mathematics, medicine, 

18 or health care. 

19 (B) EXCLUSION FROM NUMERICAL LIMITA20 TIONS.—Aliens provided immigrant status under 

21 this section shall not be counted against any nu22 merical limitation under section 201, 202, 203, 

23 or 207 of the Immigration and Nationality Act 

24 (8 U.S.C. 1151, 1152, 1153, and 1157). 


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1 (4) ELIGIBILITY FOR ADMISSION UNDER OTHER

2 CLASSIFICATION.—No alien shall be denied the oppor3 tunity to apply for admission under this section sole4 ly because such alien qualifies as an immediate rel5 ative or is eligible for any other immigrant classifica6 tion. 

7 (5) TIMELINE FOR PROCESSING APPLICATIONS.— 

8 (A) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary of State 

9 and the Secretary of Homeland Security shall 

10 ensure that all steps under the control of the 

11 United States Government incidental to the ap12 proval of such applications, including required 

13 screenings and background checks, are completed 

14 not later than one year after the date on which 

15 an eligible applicant submits an application 

16 under subsection (a). 

17 (B) EXCEPTION.—Notwithstanding para18 graph (1), the relevant Federal agencies may 

19 take additional time to process applications de20 scribed in paragraph (1) if satisfaction of na21 tional security concerns requires such additional 

22 time, provided that the Secretary of Homeland 

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1 ments for status as a special immigrant under 

2 this section and has so notified the applicant. 

3 (k) TERMINATION.—Except as provided in section 6 

4 of this Act, this section shall cease to have effect on the date 

5 that is five years after the date of the enactment of this 

6 Act. 

7 SEC. 304. EXPORT PROHIBITION OF MUNITIONS ITEMS TO 

8 THE HONG KONG POLICE FORCE. 

9 Section 3 of the Act entitled ‘‘An Act to prohibit the 

10 commercial export of covered munitions items to the Hong 

11 Kong Police Force’’, approved November 27, 2019 (Public 

12 Law 116–77; 133 Stat. 1173), is amended by striking ‘‘on 

13 December 31, 2021.’’ and inserting the following: ‘‘on the 

14 date on which the President certifies to the appropriate con15 gressional committees that— 

16 ‘‘(1) the Secretary of State has, on or after the 

17 date of the enactment of this paragraph, certified 

18 under section 205 of the United States-Hong Kong 

19 Policy Act of 1992 that Hong Kong warrants treat20 ment under United States law in the same manner 

21 as United States laws were applied to Hong Kong be22 fore July 1, 1997; 

23 ‘‘(2) the Hong Kong Police have not engaged in 

24 gross violations of human rights during the 1-year pe25 riod ending on the date of such certification; and 


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1 ‘‘(3) there has been an independent examination 

2 of human rights concerns related to the crowd control 

3 tactics of the Hong Kong Police and the Government 

4 of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region has 

5 adequately addressed those concerns.’’. 

6 SEC. 305. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON TREATMENT OF 

7 UYGHURS AND OTHER ETHNIC MINORITIES 

8 IN THE XINJIANG UYGHUR AUTONOMOUS RE9 GION. 

10 (a) FINDINGS.—Congress makes the following findings: 

11 (1) The Uyghurs are one of several predomi12 nantly Muslim Turkic groups living in the Xinjiang 

13 Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR) in the north14 west of the People’s Republic of China (PRC). 

15 (2) Following Uyghur demonstrations and unrest 

16 in 2009 and clashes with government security per17 sonnel and other violent incidents in subsequent 

18 years, PRC leaders sought to ‘‘stabilize’’ the XUAR 

19 through large-scale arrests and extreme security meas20 ures, under the pretext of combatting alleged ter21 rorism, religious extremism, and ethnic separatism. 

22 (3) In May 2014, the PRC launched its ‘‘Strike 

23 Hard Against Violent Extremism’’ campaign, which 

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1 tional human rights violations against minorities in 

2 the XUAR under the pretext of fighting terrorism. 

3 (4) In August 2016, Chinese Communist Party 

4 (CCP) Politburo member Chen Quanguo, former Tibet 

5 Autonomous Region (TAR) Party Secretary, known 

6 for overseeing intensifying security operations and 

7 human rights abuses in the TAR, was appointed as 

8 Party Secretary of the XUAR. 

9 (5) Beginning in 2017, XUAR authorities have 

10 sought to forcibly ‘‘assimilate’’ Uyghurs and other 

11 Turkic minorities into Chinese society through a pol12 icy of cultural erasure known as ‘‘Sinicization’’. 

13 (6) Since 2018, credible reporting including from 

14 the BBC, France24, and the New York Times has 

15 shown that the Government of the PRC has built mass 

16 internment camps in the XUAR, which it calls ‘‘voca17 tional training’’ centers, and detained Uyghurs and 

18 other groups in them and other facilities. 

19 (7) Since 2015, XUAR authorities have arbi20 trarily detained an estimated 1,500,000 Uyghurs— 

21 12.5 percent of the XUAR’s official Uyghur popu22 lation of 12,000,000—and a smaller number of other 

23 ethnic minorities in the ‘‘vocational training’’ centers 

24 and other detention and pre-detention facilities. 


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1 (8) In 2017, the XUAR accounted for less than 

2 two percent of the PRC’s total population but 21 per3 cent of all arrests in China. 

4 (9) The Atlantic, Radio Free Asia, and other 

5 sources have revealed that detainees are forced to re6 nounce many of their Islamic beliefs and customs and 

7 repudiate Uyghur culture, language, and identity. 

8 (10) Investigations by Human Rights Watch and 

9 other human rights organizations have documented 

10 how detainees are subject to political indoctrination, 

11 forced labor, crowded and unsanitary conditions, in12 voluntary biometric data collection, both medical ne13 glect and intrusive medical interventions, food and 

14 water deprivation, beatings, sexual violence, and tor15 ture. 

16 (11) Research by the Australian Strategic Policy 

17 Institute suggests that, since late 2019, many detain18 ees have been placed in higher security facilities and 

19 convicted of formal crimes. 

20 (12) Human Rights Watch has reported that the 

21 PRC uses data collection programs, including facial 

22 recognition technology, to surveil Uyghurs in the 

23 XUAR and to identify individuals whom authorities 

24 may detain. 


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1 (13) PRC authorities have placed countless chil2 dren whose parents are detained or in exile in state3 run institutions and boarding schools without the 

4 consent of their parents. 

5 (14) New York Times reporting revealed that nu6 merous local PRC officials who did not agree with the 

7 policies carried out in XUAR have been fired and im8 prisoned. 

9 (15) Associated Press reporting documented 

10 widespread and systemic efforts by PRC authorities 

11 to force Uyghur women to take contraceptives or to 

12 subject them to sterilization or abortion, threatening 

13 to detain those who do not comply. 

14 (16) PRC authorities prohibit family members 

15 and advocates inside and outside China from having 

16 regular communications with relatives and friends 

17 imprisoned in the XUAR, such as journalist and en18 trepreneur Ekpar Asat. 

19 (17) PRC authorities have imposed pervasive re20 strictions on the peaceful practice of Islam in the 

21 XUAR, to the extent that Human Rights Watch as22 serts the PRC ‘‘has effectively outlawed the practice of 

23 Islam’’. 

24 (18) Individuals who are not detained in camps 

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1 sions, subjected to movement restrictions, mass sur2 veillance systems, involuntary biometric data collec3 tion, and other human rights abuses. 

4 (19) International media, nongovernmental or5 ganizations, scholars, families, and survivors have re6 ported on the systemic nature of many of these abuses. 

7 (20) On June 26, 2020, a group of 50 inde8 pendent United Nations experts jointly expressed 

9 alarm over China’s deteriorating human rights 

10 record, including its repression in Xinjiang, and 

11 called on the international community ‘‘to act collec12 tively and decisively to ensure China respects human 

13 rights and abides by its international obligations’’. 

14 (21) On October 6, 2020, 39 United Nations 

15 member countries issued a public statement con16 demning human rights violations by PRC authorities 

17 and calling on the PRC to allow the United Nations 

18 High Commissioner for Human Rights unfettered ac19 cess to Xinjiang. 

20 (22) The United States Congress passed the 

21 Uyghur Human Rights Policy Act of 2020 (Public 

22 Law 116–145). 

23 (23) The United States Congress passed the Glob24 al Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act (sub25 title F of title XII of Public Law 114–328; 22 U.S.C. 


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1 2656 note), which has been used to sanction PRC offi2 cials and entities for their activities in the XUAR. 

3 (24) The United States Government has imple4 mented additional targeted restrictions on trade with 

5 Xinjiang and imposed visa and economic sanctions 

6 on PRC officials and entities for their activities in 

7 the XUAR. 

8 (25) The United States Government has docu9 mented human rights abuses and violations of indi10 vidual freedoms in the XUAR, including in the 2019 

11 Department of State Report on International Reli12 gious Freedom. 

13 (26) On January 19, 2021, during his confirma14 tion hearing, Secretary of State Antony Blinken testi15 fied that ‘‘forcing men, women, and children into con16 centration camps, trying to in effect reeducate them 

17 to be adherents to the Chinese Communist Party—all 

18 of that speaks to an effort to commit genocide’’. 

19 (27) On January 19, 2021, Secretary of the 

20 Treasury Janet L. Yellen, during her confirmation 

21 hearing, publicly stated that China is guilty of ‘‘hor22 rendous human rights abuses’’. 

23 (28) On January 27, 2021, in response to a 

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1 retary Blinken stated that his ‘‘judgement remains 

2 that genocide was committed against the Uyghurs’’. 

3 (29) On March 10, 2021, in response to a ques4 tion on Xinjiang during his testimony before the 

5 Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Rep6 resentatives, Secretary Blinken reiterated, ‘‘We‘ve 

7 been clear, and I’ve been clear, that I see it as geno8 cide, other egregious abuses of human rights, and we’ll 

9 continue to make that clear.’’. 

10 (30) The 2020 Department of State Country Re11 ports on Human Rights Practices: China states that 

12 ‘‘[g]enocide and crimes against humanity occurred 

13 during the year against the predominantly Muslim 

14 Uyghurs and other ethnic and religious minority 

15 groups in Xinjiang’’. 

16 (b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Congress 

17 that— 

18 (1) the atrocities committed by the PRC against 

19 Uyghurs and other predominantly Muslim Turkic 

20 groups in Xinjiang, including forced labor, sexual vi21 olence, the internment of over 1,000,000 individuals, 

22 and other horrific abuses must be condemned; 

23 (2) the President, the Secretary of State, and the 

24 United States Ambassador to the United Nations 

25 should speak publicly about the ongoing human rights 


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1 abuses in the XUAR, including in formal speeches at 

2 the United Nations and other international fora; 

3 (3) the President, the Secretary of State, and the 

4 United States Ambassador to the United Nations 

5 should appeal to the United Nations Secretary-Gen6 eral to take a more proactive and public stance on the 

7 situation in the XUAR, including by supporting calls 

8 for an investigation and accountability for individ9 uals and entities involved in abuses against the peo10 ple of the XUAR; 

11 (4) the United States should continue to use tar12 geted sanctions and all diplomatic tools available to 

13 hold those responsible for the atrocities in Xinjiang to 

14 account; 

15 (5) United States agencies engaged with China 

16 on trade, climate, defense, or other bilateral issues 

17 should include human rights abuses in the XUAR as 

18 a consideration in developing United States policy; 

19 (6) the United States supports Radio Free Asia 

20 Uyghur, the only Uyghur-language news service in 

21 the world independent of Chinese government influ22 ence; and 

23 (7) the United States recognizes the repeated re24 quests from the United Nations High Commissioner 


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1 for Human Rights for unfettered access to the XUAR 

2 and the PRC’s refusal to comply, and therefore— 

3 (A) PRC authorities must allow unfettered 

4 access by the United Nations Office of the High 

5 Commissioner for Human Rights to the XUAR; 

6 (B) the United States should urge collabo7 rative action between the United States Govern8 ment and international partners to pressure 

9 PRC authorities to allow unfettered access to the 

10 XUAR; 

11 (C) the President, the Secretary of State, 

12 and the United States Ambassador to the United 

13 Nations should simultaneously outline a strategy 

14 to investigate the human rights abuses and 

15 crimes that have taken place in the XUAR, col16 lect evidence, and transfer the evidence to a com17 petent court; and 

18 (D) United States partners and allies 

19 should undertake similar strategies in an effort 

20 to build an international investigation outside of 

21 the PRC if PRC authorities do not comply with 

22 a United Nations investigation in the XUAR. 

23 SEC. 306. PREVENTION OF UYGHUR FORCED LABOR. 

24 (a) STATEMENT OF POLICY.—It is the policy of the 

25 United States— 


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1 (1) to prohibit the import of all goods, wares, ar2 ticles, or merchandise mined, produced, or manufac3 tured, wholly or in part, by forced labor from the Peo4 ple’s Republic of China and particularly any such 

5 goods, wares, articles, or merchandise produced in the 

6 Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (commonly re7 ferred to as ‘‘Xinjiang’’ or ‘‘XUAR’’) of China; 

8 (2) to encourage the international community to 

9 reduce the import of any goods made with forced 

10 labor from the People’s Republic of China, particu11 larly goods mined, manufactured, or produced in the 

12 XUAR; 

13 (3) to coordinate with Mexico and Canada to ef14 fectively implement Article 23.6 of the United States15 Mexico-Canada Agreement to prohibit the importa16 tion of goods produced in whole or in part by forced 

17 or compulsory labor, which includes goods produced 

18 in whole or in part by forced or compulsory labor in 

19 the People’s Republic of China; 

20 (4) to actively work to prevent, publicly de21 nounce, and end human trafficking as a horrific as22 sault on human dignity and to restore the lives of 

23 those affected by human trafficking, a modern form of 

24 slavery; 


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1 (5) to regard the prevention of atrocities as in its 

2 national interest, including efforts to prevent torture, 

3 enforced disappearances, severe deprivation of liberty, 

4 including mass internment, arbitrary detention, and 

5 widespread and systematic use of forced labor, and 

6 persecution targeting any identifiable ethnic or reli7 gious group; and 

8 (6) to address gross violations of human rights 

9 in the XUAR through bilateral diplomatic channels 

10 and multilateral institutions where both the United 

11 States and the People’s Republic of China are mem12 bers and with all the authorities available to the 

13 United States Government, including visa and finan14 cial sanctions, export restrictions, and import con15 trols. 

16 (b) PROHIBITION ON IMPORTATION OF GOODS MADE

17 IN THE XUAR.— 

18 (1) IN GENERAL.—Except as provided in para19 graph (2), all goods, wares, articles, and merchandise 

20 mined, produced, or manufactured wholly or in part 

21 in the XUAR of China, or by persons working with 

22 the XUAR government for purposes of the ‘‘poverty 

23 alleviation’’ program or the ‘‘pairing-assistance’’ pro24 gram which subsidizes the establishment of manufac25 turing facilities in the XUAR, shall be deemed to be 


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1 goods, wares, articles, and merchandise described in 

2 section 307 of the Tariff Act of 1930 (19 U.S.C. 1307) 

3 and shall not be entitled to entry at any of the ports 

4 of the United States. 

5 (2) EXCEPTION.—The prohibition described in 

6 paragraph (1) shall not apply if the Commissioner of 

7 U.S. Customs and Border Protection— 

8 (A) determines, by clear and convincing evi9 dence, that any specific goods, wares, articles, or 

10 merchandise described in paragraph (1) were not 

11 produced wholly or in part by convict labor, 

12 forced labor, or indentured labor under penal 

13 sanctions; and 

14 (B) submits to the appropriate congres15 sional committees and makes available to the 

16 public a report that contains such determina17 tion. 

18 (3) EFFECTIVE DATE.—This section shall take ef19 fect on the date that is 120 days after the date of the 

20 enactment of this Act. 

21 (c) ENFORCEMENT STRATEGY TO ADDRESS FORCED

22 LABOR IN THE XUAR.— 

23 (1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 120 days after 

24 the date of the enactment of this Act, the Forced 

25 Labor Enforcement Task Force, established under secVerDate Sep 11 2014 21:34 Dec 30, 2022 Jkt 039200 PO 00000 Frm 00403 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6203 E:\BILLS\H3524.RH H3524

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1 tion 741 of the United States-Mexico-Canada Agree2 ment Implementation Act (19 U.S.C. 4681), shall 

3 submit to the appropriate congressional committees a 

4 report that contains an enforcement strategy to effec5 tively address forced labor in the XUAR of China or 

6 products made by Uyghurs, Kazakhs, Kyrgyz, Tibet7 ans, or members of other persecuted groups through 

8 forced labor in any other part of the People’s Repub9 lic of China. The enforcement strategy shall describe 

10 the specific enforcement plans of the United States 

11 Government regarding— 

12 (A) goods, wares, articles, and merchandise 

13 described in subsection (b)(1) that are imported 

14 into the United States directly from the XUAR 

15 or made by Uyghurs, Kazakhs, Kyrgyz, Tibetans, 

16 or members of other persecuted groups in any 

17 other part of the People’s Republic of China; 

18 (B) goods, wares, articles, and merchandise 

19 described in subsection (b)(1) that are imported 

20 into the United States from the People’s Republic 

21 of China and are mined, produced, or manufac22 tured in part in the XUAR or by persons work23 ing with the XUAR government or the Xinjiang 

24 Production and Construction Corps for purposes 


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1 of the ‘‘poverty alleviation’’ program or the 

2 ‘‘pairing-assistance’’ program; and 

3 (C) goods, wares, articles, and merchandise 

4 described in subsection (b)(1) that are imported 

5 into the United States from third countries and 

6 are mined, produced, or manufactured in part 

7 in the XUAR or by persons working with the 

8 XUAR government or the Xinjiang Production 

9 and Construction Corps for purposes of the ‘‘pov10 erty alleviation’’ program or the ‘‘pairing-assist11 ance’’ program. 

12 (2) MATTERS TO BE INCLUDED.—The strategy 

13 required by paragraph (1) shall include the following: 

14 (A) A description of the actions taken by 

15 the United States Government to address forced 

16 labor in the XUAR under section 307 of the Tar17 iff Act of 1930 (19 U.S.C. 1307), including a de18 scription of all Withhold Release Orders issued, 

19 goods detained, and fines issued. 

20 (B) A list of products made wholly or in 

21 part by forced or involuntary labor in the XUAR 

22 or made by Uyghurs, Kazakhs, Kyrgyz, Tibetans, 

23 or members of other persecuted groups in any 

24 other part of the People’s Republic of China, and 

25 a list of businesses that sold products in the 


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1 United States made wholly or in part by forced 

2 or involuntary labor in the XUAR or made by 

3 Uyghurs, Kazakhs, Kyrgyz, Tibetans, or mem4 bers of other persecuted groups in any other part 

5 of the People’s Republic of China. 

6 (C) A list of facilities and entities, includ7 ing the Xinjiang Production and Construction 

8 Corps, that source material from the XUAR or 

9 by persons working with the XUAR government 

10 or the Xinjiang Production and Construction 

11 Corps for purposes of the ‘‘poverty alleviation’’ 

12 program or the ‘‘pairing-assistance’’ program, a 

13 plan for identifying additional such facilities 

14 and entities, and facility- and entity-specific en15 forcement plans, including issuing specific With16 hold Release Orders to support enforcement of 

17 subsection (b), with regard to each listed facility 

18 or entity. 

19 (D) A list of high-priority sectors for en20 forcement, including cotton, tomatoes, 

21 polysilicon, and a sector-specific enforcement 

22 plan for each high-priority sector. 

23 (E) A description of the additional re24 sources necessary for U.S. Customs and Border 


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1 Protection to effectively implement the enforce2 ment strategy. 

3 (F) A plan to coordinate and collaborate 

4 with appropriate nongovernmental organizations 

5 and private sector entities to discuss the enforce6 ment strategy for products made in the XUAR. 

7 (3) FORM.—The report required by paragraph 

8 (1) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may 

9 include a classified annex, if necessary. 

10 (4) UPDATES.—The Forced Labor Enforcement 

11 Task Force shall provide briefings to the appropriate 

12 congressional committees on a quarterly basis and, as 

13 applicable, on any updates to the strategy required by 

14 paragraph (1) or any additional actions taken to ad15 dress forced labor in the XUAR, including actions de16 scribed in this section. 

17 (5) SUNSET.—This section shall cease to have ef18 fect on the earlier of— 

19 (A) the date that is eight years after the 

20 date of the enactment of this Act; or 

21 (B) the date on which the President submits 

22 to the appropriate congressional committees a 

23 determination that the Government of the Peo24 ple’s Republic of China has ended mass intern25 ment, forced labor, and any other gross violaVerDate Sep 11 2014 21:34 Dec 30, 2022 Jkt 039200 PO 00000 Frm 00407 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6203 E:\BILLS\H3524.RH H3524

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1 tions of human rights experienced by Uyghurs, 

2 Kazakhs, Kyrgyz, and members of other Muslim 

3 minority groups in the XUAR. 

4 (d) DETERMINATION RELATING TO CRIMES AGAINST

5 HUMANITY OR GENOCIDE IN THE XUAR.— 

6 (1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 90 days after 

7 the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of 

8 State shall— 

9 (A) determine if the practice of forced labor 

10 or other crimes against Uyghurs, Kazakhs, 

11 Kyrgyz, and members of other Muslim minority 

12 groups in the XUAR of China can be considered 

13 systematic and widespread and therefore con14 stitutes crimes against humanity or constitutes 

15 genocide as defined in subsection (a) of section 

16 1091 of title 18, United States Code; and 

17 (B) submit to the appropriate congressional 

18 committees and make available to the public a 

19 report that contains such determination. 

20 (2) FORM.—The report required by paragraph 

21 (1)— 

22 (A) shall be submitted in unclassified form 

23 but may include a classified annex, if necessary; 

24 and 


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1 (B) may be included in the report required 

2 by subsection (e). 

3 (e) DIPLOMATIC STRATEGY TO ADDRESS FORCED

4 LABOR IN THE XUAR.— 

5 (1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 90 days after 

6 the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of 

7 State, in coordination with the heads of other appro8 priate Federal departments and agencies, shall submit 

9 to the appropriate congressional committees a report 

10 that contains a United States strategy to promote ini11 tiatives to enhance international awareness of and to 

12 address forced labor in the XUAR of China. 

13 (2) MATTERS TO BE INCLUDED.—The strategy 

14 required by paragraph (1) shall include— 

15 (A) a plan to enhance bilateral and multi16 lateral coordination, including sustained engage17 ment with the governments of United States 

18 partners and allies, to end forced labor of 

19 Uyghurs, Kazakhs, Kyrgyz, and members of 

20 other Muslim minority groups in the XUAR; 

21 (B) public affairs, public diplomacy, and 

22 counter-messaging efforts to promote awareness 

23 of the human rights situation, including forced 

24 labor in the XUAR; and 


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1 (C) opportunities to coordinate and collabo2 rate with appropriate nongovernmental organi3 zations and private sector entities to raise 

4 awareness about forced labor made products from 

5 the XUAR and to provide assistance to Uyghurs, 

6 Kazakhs, Kyrgyz, and members of other Muslim 

7 minority groups in the XUAR, including those 

8 formerly detained in mass internment camps in 

9 the region. 

10 (3) ADDITIONAL MATTERS TO BE INCLUDED.— 

11 The report required by paragraph (1) shall also in12 clude— 

13 (A) to the extent practicable, a list of— 

14 (i) entities in the People’s Republic of 

15 China or affiliates of such entities that di16 rectly or indirectly use forced or involun17 tary labor in the XUAR; and 

18 (ii) foreign persons that acted as 

19 agents of the entities or affiliates of entities 

20 described in clause (i) to import goods into 

21 the United States; and 

22 (B) a description of actions taken by the 

23 United States Government to address forced 

24 labor in the XUAR under existing authorities, 

25 including— 


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1 (i) the Trafficking Victims Protection 

2 Act of 2000 (Public Law 106–386; 22 

3 U.S.C. 7101 et seq.); 

4 (ii) the Elie Wiesel Genocide and 

5 Atrocities Prevention Act of 2018 (Public 

6 Law 115–441; 22 U.S.C. 2656 note); and 

7 (iii) the Global Magnitsky Human 

8 Rights Accountability Act (22 U.S.C. 2656 

9 note). 

10 (4) FORM.—The report required by paragraph 

11 (1) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may 

12 include a classified annex, if necessary. 

13 (5) UPDATES.—The Secretary of State shall in14 clude any updates to the strategy required by para15 graph (1) in the annual Trafficking in Persons report 

16 required by section 110(b) of the Trafficking Victims 

17 Protection Act of 2000 (22 U.S.C. 7107(b)). 

18 (6) SUNSET.—This section shall cease to have ef19 fect the earlier of— 

20 (A) the date that is eight years after the 

21 date of the enactment of this Act; or 

22 (B) the date on which the President submits 

23 to the appropriate congressional committees a 

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1 ment, forced labor, and any other gross viola2 tions of human rights experienced by Uyghurs, 

3 Kazakhs, Kyrgyz, and members of other Muslim 

4 minority groups in the XUAR. 

5 (f) IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS RELATING TO FORCED

6 LABOR IN THE XINJIANG UYGHUR AUTONOMOUS RE7 GION.— 

8 (1) REPORT REQUIRED.— 

9 (A) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days 

10 after the date of the enactment of this Act and 

11 not less frequently than annually thereafter, the 

12 President shall submit to the appropriate con13 gressional committees a report that identifies 

14 each foreign person, including any official of the 

15 Government of the People’s Republic of China, 

16 that the President determines— 

17 (i) knowingly engages in, is responsible 

18 for, or facilitates the forced labor of 

19 Uyghurs, Kazakhs, Kyrgyz, and members of 

20 other Muslim minority groups in the 

21 XUAR; and 

22 (ii) knowingly engages in, contributes 

23 to, assists, or provides financial, material 

24 or technological support for efforts to con25 travene United States law regarding the 


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1 importation of forced labor goods from the 

2 XUAR. 

3 (B) FORM.—The report required under sub4 paragraph (A) shall be submitted in unclassified 

5 form, but may contain a classified annex. 

6 (2) IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS.—The President 

7 shall impose the sanctions described in paragraph (3) 

8 with respect to each foreign person identified in the 

9 report required under paragraph (1)(A). 

10 (3) SANCTIONS DESCRIBED.—The sanctions de11 scribed in this subsection are the following: 

12 (A) ASSET BLOCKING.—The President shall 

13 exercise all of the powers granted to the Presi14 dent under the International Emergency Eco15 nomic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.) to the 

16 extent necessary to block and prohibit all trans17 actions in property and interests in property of 

18 a foreign person identified in the report required 

19 under paragraph (1)(A) if such property and in20 terests in property— 

21 (i) are in the United States; 

22 (ii) come within the United States; or 

23 (iii) come within the possession or con24 trol of a United States person. 


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1 (B) INELIGIBILITY FOR VISAS, ADMISSION, 

2 OR PAROLE.— 

3 (i) VISAS, ADMISSION, OR PAROLE.— 

4 An alien described in paragraph (1)(A) 

5 is— 

6 (I) inadmissible to the United 

7 States; 

8 (II) ineligible to receive a visa or 

9 other documentation to enter the 

10 United States; and 

11 (III) otherwise ineligible to be ad12 mitted or paroled into the United 

13 States or to receive any other benefit 

14 under the Immigration and Nation15 ality Act (8 U.S.C. 1101 et seq.). 

16 (ii) CURRENT VISAS REVOKED.— 

17 (I) IN GENERAL.—An alien de18 scribed in paragraph (1)(A) is subject 

19 to revocation of any visa or other entry 

20 documentation regardless of when the 

21 visa or other entry documentation is or 

22 was issued. 

23 (II) IMMEDIATE EFFECT.—A rev24 ocation under subclause (I) shall— 


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1 (aa) take effect immediately; 

2 and 

3 (bb) automatically cancel 

4 any other valid visa or entry doc5 umentation that is in the alien’s 

6 possession. 

7 (4) IMPLEMENTATION; PENALTIES.— 

8 (A) IMPLEMENTATION.—The President may 

9 exercise all authorities provided under sections 

10 203 and 205 of the International Emergency 

11 Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1702 and 

12 1704) to carry out this section. 

13 (B) PENALTIES.—The penalties provided 

14 for in subsections (b) and (c) of section 206 of 

15 the International Emergency Economic Powers 

16 Act (50 U.S.C. 1705) shall apply to a foreign 

17 person that engages in an activity described in 

18 paragraph (1)(A) to the same extent that such 

19 penalties apply to a person that commits an un20 lawful act described in subsection (a) of such sec21 tion 206. 

22 (5) WAIVER.—The President may waive the ap23 plication of sanctions under this section with respect 

24 to a foreign person identified in the report required 

25 under paragraph (1)(A) if the President determines 


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1 and certifies to the appropriate congressional commit2 tees that such a waiver is in the national interest of 

3 the United States. 

4 (6) EXCEPTIONS.— 

5 (A) EXCEPTION FOR INTELLIGENCE ACTIVI6 TIES.—Sanctions under this section shall not 

7 apply to any activity subject to the reporting re8 quirements under title V of the National Secu9 rity Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3091 et seq.) or any 

10 authorized intelligence activities of the United 

11 States. 

12 (B) EXCEPTION TO COMPLY WITH INTER13 NATIONAL OBLIGATIONS AND FOR LAW ENFORCE14 MENT ACTIVITIES.—Sanctions under paragraph 

15 (3)(B) shall not apply with respect to an alien 

16 if admitting or paroling the alien into the 

17 United States is necessary— 

18 (i) to permit the United States to com19 ply with the Agreement regarding the Head20 quarters of the United Nations, signed at 

21 Lake Success June 26, 1947, and entered 

22 into force November 21, 1947, between the 

23 United Nations and the United States, or 

24 other applicable international obligations; 

25 or 


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1 (ii) to carry out or assist law enforce2 ment activity in the United States. 

3 (7) TERMINATION OF SANCTIONS.—The President 

4 may terminate the application of sanctions under this 

5 section with respect to a foreign person if the Presi6 dent determines and reports to the appropriate con7 gressional committees not less than 15 days before the 

8 termination takes effect that— 

9 (A) information exists that the person did 

10 not engage in the activity for which sanctions 

11 were imposed; 

12 (B) the person has been prosecuted appro13 priately for the activity for which sanctions were 

14 imposed; 

15 (C) the person has credibly demonstrated a 

16 significant change in behavior, has paid an ap17 propriate consequence for the activity for which 

18 sanctions were imposed, and has credibly com19 mitted in the future to not engage in such activ20 ity; or 

21 (D) the termination of the sanctions is in 

22 the national security interests of the United 

23 States. 

24 (8) SUNSET.—This section, and any sanctions 

25 imposed under this section, shall terminate on the 


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1 date that is five years after the date of the enactment 

2 of this Act. 

3 (9) DEFINITIONS OF ADMISSION; ADMITTED; 

4 ALIEN.—In this section, the terms ‘‘admission’’, ‘‘ad5 mitted’’, and ‘‘alien’’ have the meanings given those 

6 terms in section 101 of the Immigration and Nation7 ality Act (8 U.S.C. 1101). 

8 (g) DISCLOSURES TO THE SECURITIES AND EX9 CHANGE COMMISSION OF CERTAIN ACTIVITIES RELATED TO

10 THE XINJIANG UYGHUR AUTONOMOUS REGION.— 

11 (1) POLICY STATEMENT.—It is the policy of the 

12 United States to protect American investors, through 

13 stronger disclosure requirements, alerting them to the 

14 presence of Chinese and other companies complicit in 

15 gross violations of human rights in United States 

16 capital markets, including American and foreign 

17 companies listed on United States exchanges that en18 able the mass internment and population surveillance 

19 of Uyghurs, Kazakhs, Kyrgyz, and other Muslim mi20 norities and source products made with forced labor 

21 in the XUAR. Such involvements represent clear, ma22 terial risks to the share values and corporate reputa23 tions of certain of these companies and hence to pro24 spective American investors, particularly given that 

25 the United States Government has employed sanctions 


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1 and export restrictions to target individuals and enti2 ties contributing to human rights abuses in the Peo3 ple’s Republic of China. 

4 (2) DISCLOSURE OF CERTAIN ACTIVITIES RELAT5 ING TO THE XINJIANG UYGHUR AUTONOMOUS RE6 GION.—Section 13 of the Securities Exchange Act of 

7 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78m) is amended by adding at the 

8 end the following new subsection: 

9 ‘‘(s) DISCLOSURE OF CERTAIN ACTIVITIES RELATING

10 TO THE XINJIANG UYGHUR AUTONOMOUS REGION.— 

11 ‘‘(1) IN GENERAL.—Each issuer required to file 

12 an annual or quarterly report under subsection (a) 

13 shall disclose in that report the information required 

14 by paragraph (2) if, during the period covered by the 

15 report, the issuer or any affiliate of the issuer— 

16 ‘‘(A) knowingly engaged in an activity with 

17 an entity or the affiliate of an entity engaged in 

18 creating or providing technology or other assist19 ance to create mass population surveillance sys20 tems in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Re21 gion (commonly referred to as ‘Xinjiang’ or 

22 ‘XUAR’) of China, including any entity in23 cluded on the Department of Commerce’s ‘Entity 

24 List’ in the XUAR; 


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1 ‘‘(B) knowingly engaged in an activity with 

2 an entity or an affiliate of an entity building 

3 and running detention facilities for Uyghurs, 

4 Kazakhs, Kyrgyz, and other members of Muslim 

5 minority groups in the XUAR; 

6 ‘‘(C) knowingly engaged in an activity with 

7 an entity or an affiliate of an entity described 

8 in section 306(e)(3)(A)(i) of the Ensuring Amer9 ican Global Leadership and Engagement Act, in10 cluding— 

11 ‘‘(i) any entity engaged in the ‘pair12 ing-assistance’ program which subsidizes the 

13 establishment of manufacturing facilities in 

14 the XUAR; or 

15 ‘‘(ii) any entity for which the Depart16 ment of Homeland Security has issued a 

17 ‘Withhold Release Order’ under section 307 

18 of the Tariff Act of 1930 (19 U.S.C. 1307); 

19 or 

20 ‘‘(D) knowingly conducted any transaction 

21 or had dealings with— 

22 ‘‘(i) any person the property and in23 terests in property of which were sanctioned 

24 by the Secretary of State for the detention 

25 or abuse of Uyghurs, Kazakhs, Kyrgyz, or 


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1 other members of Muslim minority groups 

2 in the XUAR; 

3 ‘‘(ii) any person the property and in4 terests in property of which are sanctioned 

5 pursuant to the Global Magnitsky Human 

6 Rights Accountability Act (22 U.S.C. 2656 

7 note); or 

8 ‘‘(iii) any person or entity responsible 

9 for, or complicit in, committing atrocities 

10 in the XUAR. 

11 ‘‘(2) INFORMATION REQUIRED.— 

12 ‘‘(A) IN GENERAL.—If an issuer described 

13 under paragraph (1) or an affiliate of the issuer 

14 has engaged in any activity described in para15 graph (1), the information required by this 

16 paragraph is a detailed description of each such 

17 activity, including— 

18 ‘‘(i) the nature and extent of the activ19 ity; 

20 ‘‘(ii) the gross revenues and net profits, 

21 if any, attributable to the activity; and 

22 ‘‘(iii) whether the issuer or the affiliate 

23 of the issuer (as the case may be) intends to 

24 continue the activity. 


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1 ‘‘(B) EXCEPTION.—The requirement to dis2 close information under this paragraph shall not 

3 include information on activities of the issuer or 

4 any affiliate of the issuer activities relating to— 

5 ‘‘(i) the import of manufactured goods, 

6 including electronics, food products, textiles, 

7 shoes, and teas, that originated in the 

8 XUAR; or 

9 ‘‘(ii) manufactured goods containing 

10 materials that originated or are sourced in 

11 the XUAR. 

12 ‘‘(3) NOTICE OF DISCLOSURES.—If an issuer re13 ports under paragraph (1) that the issuer or an affil14 iate of the issuer has knowingly engaged in any activ15 ity described in that paragraph, the issuer shall sepa16 rately file with the Commission, concurrently with the 

17 annual or quarterly report under subsection (a), a 

18 notice that the disclosure of that activity has been in19 cluded in that annual or quarterly report that identi20 fies the issuer and contains the information required 

21 by paragraph (2). 

22 ‘‘(4) PUBLIC DISCLOSURE OF INFORMATION.— 

23 Upon receiving a notice under paragraph (3) that an 

24 annual or quarterly report includes a disclosure of an 


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1 activity described in paragraph (1), the Commission 

2 shall promptly— 

3 ‘‘(A) transmit the report to— 

4 ‘‘(i) the President; 

5 ‘‘(ii) the Committee on Foreign Affairs 

6 and the Committee on Financial Services of 

7 the House of Representatives; and 

8 ‘‘(iii) the Committee on Foreign Rela9 tions and the Committee on Banking, Hous10 ing, and Urban Affairs of the Senate; and 

11 ‘‘(B) make the information provided in the 

12 disclosure and the notice available to the public 

13 by posting the information on the Internet 

14 website of the Commission. 

15 ‘‘(5) INVESTIGATIONS.—Upon receiving a report 

16 under paragraph (4) that includes a disclosure of an 

17 activity described in paragraph (1), the President 

18 shall— 

19 ‘‘(A) make a determination with respect to 

20 whether any investigation is needed into the pos21 sible imposition of sanctions under the Global 

22 Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act 

23 (22 U.S.C. 2656 note) or section 306(f) of the 

24 Ensuring American Global Leadership and En25 gagement Act or whether criminal investigations 


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1 are warranted under statutes intended to hold 

2 accountable individuals or entities involved in 

3 the importation of goods produced by forced 

4 labor, including under section 545, 1589, or 

5 1761 of title 18, United States Code; and 

6 ‘‘(B) not later than 180 days after initi7 ating any such investigation, make a determina8 tion with respect to whether a sanction should be 

9 imposed or criminal investigations initiated 

10 with respect to the issuer or the affiliate of the 

11 issuer (as the case may be). 

12 ‘‘(6) ATROCITIES DEFINED.—In this subsection, 

13 the term ‘atrocities’ has the meaning given the term 

14 in section 6(2) of the Elie Wiesel Genocide and Atroc15 ities Prevention Act of 2018 (Public Law 115–441; 22 

16 U.S.C. 2656 note).’’. 

17 (3) SUNSET.—Section 13(s) of the Securities Ex18 change Act of 1934, as added by paragraph (2), is re19 pealed on the earlier of— 

20 (A) the date that is eight years after the 

21 date of the enactment of this Act; or 

22 (B) the date on which the President submits 

23 to the appropriate congressional committees a 

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1 ment, forced labor, and any other gross viola2 tions of human rights experienced by Uyghurs, 

3 Kazakhs, Kyrgyz, and members of other Muslim 

4 minority groups in the XUAR. 

5 (4) EFFECTIVE DATE.—The amendment made by 

6 paragraph (2) shall take effect with respect to reports 

7 required to be filed with the Securities and Exchange 

8 Commission after the date that is 180 days after the 

9 date of the enactment of this Act. 

10 (h) DEFINITIONS.—In this section: 

11 (1) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMIT12 TEES.—The term ‘‘appropriate congressional commit13 tees’’ means— 

14 (A) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the 

15 Committee on Financial Services, and the Com16 mittee on Ways and Means of the House of Rep17 resentatives; and 

18 (B) the Committee on Foreign Relations, 

19 the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban 

20 Affairs, and the Committee on Finance of the 

21 Senate. 

22 (2) ATROCITIES.—The term ‘‘atrocities’’ has the 

23 meaning given the term in section 6(2) of the Elie 

24 Wiesel Genocide and Atrocities Prevention Act of 

25 2018 (Public Law 115–441; 22 U.S.C. 2656 note). 


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1 (3) CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY.—The term 

2 ‘‘crimes against humanity’’ includes, when committed 

3 as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed 

4 against any civilian population, with knowledge of 

5 the attack— 

6 (A) murder; 

7 (B) deportation or forcible transfer of popu8 lation; 

9 (C) torture; 

10 (D) extermination; 

11 (E) enslavement; 

12 (F) rape, sexual slavery, or any other form 

13 of sexual violence of comparable severity; 

14 (G) persecution against any identifiable 

15 group or collectivity on political, racial, na16 tional, ethnic, cultural, religious, gender, or other 

17 grounds that are universally recognized as im18 permissible under international law; and 

19 (H) enforced disappearance of persons. 

20 (4) FORCED LABOR.—The term ‘‘forced labor’’ 

21 has the meaning given the term in section 307 of the 

22 Tariff Act of 1930 (19 U.S.C. 1307). 

23 (5) FOREIGN PERSON.—The term ‘‘foreign per24 son’’ means a person that is not a United States per25 son. 


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1 (6) PERSON.—The term ‘‘person’’ means an in2 dividual or entity. 

3 (7) MASS POPULATION SURVEILLANCE SYS4 TEM.—The term ‘‘mass population surveillance sys5 tem’’ means installation and integration of facial rec6 ognition cameras, biometric data collection, cell phone 

7 surveillance, and artificial intelligence technology 

8 with the ‘‘Sharp Eyes’’ and ‘‘Integrated Joint Oper9 ations Platform’’ or other technologies that are used 

10 by Chinese security forces for surveillance and big11 data predictive policing. 

12 (8) UNITED STATES PERSON.—The term ‘‘United 

13 States person’’ means— 

14 (A) a United States citizen or an alien law15 fully admitted for permanent residence to the 

16 United States; or 

17 (B) an entity organized under the laws of 

18 the United States or any jurisdiction within the 

19 United States, including a foreign branch of 

20 such an entity. 

21 SEC. 307. UYGHUR HUMAN RIGHTS PROTECTION. 

22 (a) SHORT TITLE.—This section may be cited as the 

23 ‘‘Uyghur Human Rights Protection Act’’. 

24 (b) FINDINGS.—Congress makes the following findings: 


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1 (1) The Government of the People’s Republic of 

2 China (PRC) has a long history of repressing Turkic 

3 Muslims and other Muslim minority groups, particu4 larly Uyghurs, in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous 

5 Region (commonly referred to as ‘‘Xinjiang’’ or 

6 ‘‘XUAR’’), also known as East Turkestan. Central 

7 and regional PRC government policies have system8 atically discriminated against these minority groups 

9 by denying them a range of civil and political rights, 

10 particularly freedom of religion. Senior Chinese Com11 munist Party (CCP) officials bear direct responsi12 bility for these gross human rights violations. 

13 (2) PRC government abuses include the arbi14 trary detention of more than 1,000,000 Uyghurs, eth15 nic Kazakhs, Kyrgyz, and members of other Muslim 

16 minority groups, separation of working age adults 

17 from their children and elderly parents, and the inte18 gration of forced labor into supply chains. Those held 

19 in detention facilities and internment camps in the 

20 XUAR have described forced political indoctrination, 

21 torture, beatings, food deprivation, sexual assault, co22 ordinated campaigns to reduce birth rates among 

23 Uyghurs and other Turkic Muslims through forced 

24 sterilization, and denial of religious, cultural, and 

25 linguistic freedoms. Recent media reports indicate 


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1 that since 2019, the PRC government has newly con2 structed, expanded, or fortified at least 60 detention 

3 facilities with higher security or prison-like features 

4 in Xinjiang. 

5 (3) The PRC government’s actions against 

6 Uyghurs, ethnic Kazakhs, Kyrgyz, and members of 

7 other Muslim minority groups in the XUAR violate 

8 international human rights laws and norms, includ9 ing— 

10 (A) the International Convention on the 

11 Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimina12 tion, to which the PRC has acceded; 

13 (B) the Convention against Torture and 

14 Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment 

15 or Punishment, which the PRC has signed and 

16 ratified; 

17 (C) The Convention on the Prevention and 

18 Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, which the 

19 PRC has signed and ratified; 

20 (D) the International Covenant on Civil 

21 and Political Rights, which the PRC has signed; 

22 and 

23 (E) the Universal Declaration of Human 

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1 tion’s Force Labor Convention (no. 29) and the 

2 Abolition of Forced Labor Convention (no. 105). 

3 (c) REFUGEE PROTECTIONS FOR CERTAIN RESIDENTS

4 OF THE XUAR.— 

5 (1) POPULATIONS OF SPECIAL HUMANITARIAN

6 CONCERN.—The Secretary of State, in consultation 

7 with the Secretary of Homeland Security, shall des8 ignate, as Priority 2 refugees of special humanitarian 

9 concern— 

10 (A) aliens who were nationals of the PRC 

11 and residents of the XUAR on January 1, 2021; 

12 (B) aliens who fled the XUAR after June 

13 30, 2009, and reside in other provinces of the 

14 PRC or in a third country where such alien is 

15 not firmly resettled; and 

16 (C) the spouses, children, and parents (as 

17 such terms are defined in subsections (a) and (b) 

18 of section 101 of the Immigration and Nation19 ality Act (8 U.S.C. 1101)) of individuals de20 scribed in subparagraphs (A) and (B), except 

21 that a child shall be an unmarried person under 

22 27 years of age. 

23 (2) PROCESSING OF XUAR REFUGEES.—The 

24 processing of individuals described in paragraph (1) 


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1 for classification as refugees may occur in the PRC 

2 or a third country. 

3 (3) ELIGIBILITY FOR ADMISSION AS A REF4 UGEE.— 

5 (A) IN GENERAL.—Aliens described in sub6 paragraph (B) may establish, for purposes of ad7 mission as a refugee under section 207 of the Im8 migration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1157) 

9 or asylum under section 208 of such Act (8 

10 U.S.C. 1158), that such alien has a well-founded 

11 fear of persecution on account of race, religion, 

12 nationality, membership in a particular social 

13 group, or political opinion by asserting such a 

14 fear and asserting a credible basis for concern 

15 about the possibility of such persecution. 

16 (B) ALIENS DESCRIBED.—An alien is de17 scribed in this subsection if such alien has been 

18 identified as a person of special humanitarian 

19 concern pursuant to paragraph (1) and— 

20 (i) has experienced persecution in the 

21 XUAR by the PRC government, includ22 ing— 

23 (I) forced and arbitrary detention 

24 including in an internment or re-edu25 cation camp; 


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1 (II) forced political indoctrina2 tion, torture, beatings, food depriva3 tion, and denial of religious, cultural, 

4 and linguistic freedoms; 

5 (III) forced labor; 

6 (IV) forced separation from fam7 ily members; 

8 (V) other forms of systemic 

9 threats, harassment, and gross human 

10 rights violations; or 

11 (VI) has been formally charged, 

12 detained, or convicted on account of 

13 their peaceful actions as described in 

14 the Uyghur Human Rights Policy Act 

15 of 2020 (Public Law 116–145). 

16 (ii) is currently a national of the PRC 

17 whose residency in the XUAR, or any other 

18 area within the jurisdiction of the PRC, 

19 was revoked for having submitted to any 

20 United States Government agency a non21 frivolous application for refugee status, asy22 lum, or any other immigration benefit 

23 under United States law. 

24 (C) ELIGIBILITY FOR ADMISSION UNDER

25 OTHER CLASSIFICATION.—An alien may not be 


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1 denied the opportunity to apply for admission as 

2 a refugee or asylum under this section solely be3 cause such alien qualifies as an immediate rel4 ative of a national of the United States or is eli5 gible for admission to the United States under 

6 any other immigrant classification. 

7 (4) PRIORITY.—The Secretary of State shall 

8 prioritize bilateral diplomacy with third countries 

9 hosting former residents of the XUAR and who face 

10 significant diplomatic pressures from the PRC gov11 ernment. 

12 (5) REPORTING REQUIREMENTS.— 

13 (A) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days 

14 after the date of the enactment of this Act and 

15 every 90 days thereafter, the Secretary of State 

16 and the Secretary of Homeland Security shall 

17 submit to the appropriate congressional commit18 tees, the Committee on the Judiciary of the 

19 House of Representatives, and the Committee on 

20 the Judiciary of the Senate a report on the mat21 ters described in subparagraph (B). 

22 (B) MATTERS TO BE INCLUDED.—Each re23 port required by subparagraph (A) shall include, 

24 with respect to applications submitted under this 

25 section— 


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1 (i) the total number of applications 

2 that are pending at the end of the reporting 

3 period; 

4 (ii) the average wait-times and number 

5 of applicants who are currently pending— 

6 (I) a pre-screening interview with 

7 a resettlement support center; 

8 (II) an interview with United 

9 States Citizenship and Immigration 

10 Services; 

11 (III) the completion of security 

12 checks; 

13 (IV) receipt of a final decision 

14 after completion of an interview with 

15 United States Citizenship and Immi16 gration Services; and 

17 (iii) the number of denials of applica18 tions for refugee status, disaggregated by the 

19 reason for each such denial. 

20 (C) FORM.—Each report required by para21 graph (1) shall be submitted in unclassified 

22 form, but may include a classified annex. 

23 (D) PUBLIC REPORTS.—The Secretary of 

24 State shall make each report submitted under 


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1 this subsection available to the public on the 

2 internet website of the Department of State. 

3 (d) STATEMENT OF POLICY ON ENCOURAGING ALLIES

4 AND PARTNERS TO MAKE SIMILAR ACCOMMODATIONS.—It 

5 is the policy of the United States to encourage United States 

6 allies and partners to make accommodations similar to the 

7 accommodations made in this section for residents of the 

8 XUAR who are fleeing oppression by the PRC Government. 

9 (e) TERMINATION.—This section shall terminate on the 

10 date that is ten years after the date of the enactment of 

11 this Act. 

12 SEC. 308. REMOVAL OF MEMBERS OF THE UNITED NATIONS 

13 HUMAN RIGHTS COUNCIL THAT COMMIT 

14 HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES. 

15 The President shall direct the Permanent Representa16 tive of the United States to the United Nations to use the 

17 voice, vote, and influence of the United States to— 

18 (1) reform the process for removing Member 

19 States of the United Nations Human Rights Council 

20 that commit gross and systemic violations of human 

21 rights, including— 

22 (A) lowering the threshold vote at the 

23 United Nations General Assembly for removal to 

24 a simple majority; 


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1 (B) ensuring information detailing the 

2 Member State’s human rights record is publicly 

3 available before the vote on removal; and 

4 (C) making the vote of each country on the 

5 removal from the United Nations Human Rights 

6 Council publicly available; 

7 (2) reform the rules on electing members to the 

8 United Nations Human Rights Council to ensure 

9 United Nations Member States that have committed 

10 gross and systemic violations of human rights are not 

11 elected to the Human Rights Council; and 

12 (3) oppose the election to the United Nations 

13 Human Rights Council of any United Nations Mem14 ber State— 

15 (A) currently designated as a country en16 gaged in a consistent pattern of gross violations 

17 of internationally recognized human rights pur18 suant to section 116 or section 502B of the For19 eign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2151n or 

20 2304); 

21 (B) the government of which the Secretary 

22 of State currently determines has repeatedly pro23 vided support for international terrorism pursu24 ant to— 


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1 (i) section 1754(c) of the National De2 fense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 

3 2019; 

4 (ii) section 620A of the Foreign Assist5 ance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2371); 

6 (iii) section 40 of the Arms Export 

7 Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2779A); or 

8 (iv) any other provision of law; 

9 (C) currently designated as a Tier 3 coun10 try under the Trafficking Victims Protection Act 

11 of 2000 (22 U.S.C. 7101 et seq.); 

12 (D) the government of which is identified on 

13 the list published by the Secretary of State pur14 suant to section 404(b) of the Child Soldiers Pre15 vention Act of 2008 (22 U.S.C. 2370c–1(b)) as a 

16 government that recruits and uses child soldiers; 

17 or 

18 (E) the government of which the United 

19 States determines to have committed genocide or 

20 crimes against humanity. 

21 SEC. 309. POLICY WITH RESPECT TO TIBET. 

22 (a) RANK OF UNITED STATES SPECIAL COORDINATOR

23 FOR TIBETAN ISSUES.—Section 621 of the Tibetan Policy 

24 Act of 2002 (22 U.S.C. 6901 note) is amended— 


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1 (1) by redesignating subsections (b), (c), (d), and 

2 (e), as subsections (c), (d), (e), and (f), respectively; 

3 and 

4 (2) by inserting after subsection (a) the following 

5 new subsection: 

6 ‘‘(b) RANK.—The Special Coordinator shall either be 

7 appointed by the President, with the advice and consent of 

8 the Senate, or shall be an individual holding the rank of 

9 Under Secretary of State or higher.’’. 

10 (b) TIBET UNIT AT UNITED STATES EMBASSY IN BEI11 JING.— 

12 (1) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary of State shall 

13 establish a Tibet Unit in the Political Section of the 

14 United States Embassy in Beijing, People’s Republic 

15 of China (PRC). 

16 (2) OPERATION.—The Tibet Unit established 

17 under paragraph (1) shall operate until such time as 

18 the Government of the PRC permits— 

19 (A) the United States Consulate General in 

20 Chengdu, PRC, to reopen; or 

21 (B) a United States Consulate General in 

22 Lhasa, Tibet, to open. 

23 (3) STAFF.— 

24 (A) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary shall— 


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1 (i) assign not fewer than two United 

2 States direct-hire personnel to the Tibet 

3 Unit established under paragraph (1); and 

4 (ii) hire not fewer than one locally en5 gaged staff member for such unit. 

6 (B) LANGUAGE TRAINING.—The Secretary 

7 shall make Tibetan language training available 

8 to the personnel assigned under subparagraph 

9 (A), consistent with the Tibetan Policy Act of 

10 2002 (22 U.S.C. 6901 note). 

11 SEC. 310. UNITED STATES POLICY AND INTERNATIONAL EN12 GAGEMENT ON THE SUCCESSION OR REIN13 CARNATION OF THE DALAI LAMA AND RELI14 GIOUS FREEDOM OF TIBETAN BUDDHISTS. 

15 (a) REAFFIRMATION OF POLICY.—It is the policy of 

16 the United States, as provided under section 342(b) of divi17 sion FF of the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2021 (Pub18 lic Law 116–260), that any ‘‘interference by the Govern19 ment of the People’s Republic of China or any other govern20 ment in the process of recognizing a successor or reincarna21 tion of the 14th Dalai Lama and any future Dalai Lamas 

22 would represent a clear abuse of the right to religious free23 dom of Tibetan Buddhists and the Tibetan people’’. 

24 (b) INTERNATIONAL EFFORTS TO PROTECT RELIGIOUS

25 FREEDOM OF TIBETAN BUDDHISTS.—The Secretary of 


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1 State should engage with United States allies and partners 

2 to— 

3 (1) support Tibetan Buddhist religious leaders’ 

4 sole religious authority to identify and install the 

5 15th Dalai Lama; 

6 (2) oppose claims by the Government of the Peo7 ple’s Republic of China (PRC) that the PRC has the 

8 authority to decide for Tibetan Buddhists the 15th 

9 Dalai Lama; and 

10 (3) reject interference by the Government of the 

11 PRC in the religious freedom of Tibetan Buddhists. 

12 SEC. 311. DEVELOPMENT AND DEPLOYMENT OF INTERNET 

13 FREEDOM AND GREAT FIREWALL CIR14 CUMVENTION TOOLS FOR THE PEOPLE OF 

15 HONG KONG. 

16 (a) FINDINGS.—Congress makes the following findings: 

17 (1) The People’s Republic of China (PRC) has 

18 repeatedly violated its obligations under the Joint 

19 Declaration by suppressing the basic rights and free20 doms of the people of Hong Kong. 

21 (2) On June 30, 2020, the National People’s 

22 Congress passed a ‘‘National Security Law’’ that fur23 ther erodes Hong Kong’s autonomy and enables au24 thorities to suppress dissent. 


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1 (3) The Government of the PRC continues to uti2 lize the National Security Law to undermine the fun3 damental rights of the Hong Kong people through 

4 suppression of the freedom of speech, assembly, reli5 gion, and the press. 

6 (4) Article 9 of the National Security Law au7 thorizes unprecedented regulation and supervision of 

8 internet activity in Hong Kong, including expanded 

9 police powers to force internet service providers to 

10 censor content, hand over user information, and block 

11 access to platforms. 

12 (5) On January 13, 2021, the Hong Kong 

13 Broadband Network blocked public access to HK 

14 Chronicles, a website promoting pro-democracy view15 points, under the authorities of the National Security 

16 Law. 

17 (6) On February 12, 2021, internet service pro18 viders blocked access to the Taiwan Transitional Jus19 tice Commission website in Hong Kong. 

20 (7) Major tech companies, including Facebook, 

21 Twitter, WhatsApp and Google, have stopped review22 ing requests for user data from Hong Kong authori23 ties. 

24 (8) On February 28, 2021, 47 pro-democracy ac25 tivists in Hong Kong were arrested and charged 


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1 under the National Security Law on the charge of 

2 ‘‘conspiracy to commit subversion’’. 

3 (b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Congress 

4 that the United States should— 

5 (1) support the ability of the people of Hong 

6 Kong to maintain their freedom to access information 

7 online; and 

8 (2) focus on investments in technologies that fa9 cilitate the unhindered exchange of information in 

10 Hong Kong in advance of any future efforts by the 

11 Chinese Communist Party— 

12 (A) to suppress internet access; 

13 (B) to increase online censorship; or 

14 (C) to inhibit online communication and 

15 content-sharing by the people of Hong Kong. 

16 (c) HONG KONG INTERNET FREEDOM PROGRAM.— 

17 (1) WORKING GROUP.— 

18 (A) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary of State is 

19 authorized to establish a working group to de20 velop a strategy to bolster internet resiliency and 

21 online access in Hong Kong. 

22 (B) MEMBERSHIP.—The working group 

23 under subparagraph (A) shall consist of— 


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1 (i) the Under Secretary of State for Ci2 vilian Security, Democracy, and Human 

3 Rights; 

4 (ii) the Assistant Secretary of State for 

5 East Asian and Pacific Affairs; 

6 (iii) the Chief Executive Officer of the 

7 United States Agency for Global Media and 

8 the President of the Open Technology Fund 

9 of the Agency; and 

10 (iv) the Administrator of the United 

11 States Agency for International Develop12 ment. 

13 (2) HONG KONG INTERNET FREEDOM PRO14 GRAMS.— 

15 (A) DEPARTMENT OF STATE.—The Sec16 retary of State shall establish a Hong Kong 

17 Internet Freedom Program in the Bureau of De18 mocracy, Human Rights, and Labor in the De19 partment of State. 

20 (B) OPEN TECHNOLOGY FUND.—The Presi21 dent of the Open Technology Fund of the United 

22 States Agency for Global Media is authorized to 

23 establish a Hong Kong Internet Freedom Pro24 gram. 


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1 (C) OPERATION.—The Programs referred to 

2 in subparagraphs (A) and (B) shall operate 

3 independently, but in strategic coordination with 

4 other entities in the working group under para5 graph (1). The Open Technology Fund shall re6 main independent from Department of State di7 rection in its implementation of the Program of 

8 such Fund, and any other internet freedom pro9 grams. 

10 (3) INDEPENDENCE.—During the period begin11 ning on the date of the enactment of this Act and end12 ing on September 30, 2023, the Hong Kong Internet 

13 Freedom Programs described in paragraph (2) shall 

14 be carried out independently from any other internet 

15 freedom programs relating to the People’s Republic of 

16 China carried out by the Department of State or the 

17 Open Technology Fund of the United States Agency 

18 for Global Media, as the case may be, in order that 

19 such Hong Kong Internet Freedom Programs may 

20 focus on supporting liberties presently enjoyed by the 

21 people of Hong Kong. 

22 (4) CONSOLIDATION OF DEPARTMENT OF STATE

23 PROGRAM.—Beginning on October 1, 2023, the Sec24 retary of State may— 


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1 (A) consolidate the Hong Kong Internet 

2 Freedom Program of the Department of State 

3 with any other internet freedom programs relat4 ing to the People’s Republic of China carried out 

5 by the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, 

6 and Labor; or 

7 (B) continue to carry out the Program in 

8 accordance with paragraph (3). 

9 (5) CONSOLIDATION OF OPEN TECHNOLOGY FUND

10 PROGRAM.—Beginning on October 1, 2023, the Presi11 dent of the Open Technology Fund of the United 

12 States Agency for Global Media may— 

13 (A) consolidate the Hong Kong Internet 

14 Freedom Program of the Fund with any other 

15 internet freedom programs relating to the Peo16 ple’s Republic of China carried out by the Fund; 

17 or 

18 (B) continue to carry out the Program in 

19 accordance with paragraph (3). 

20 (d) SUPPORT FOR INTERNET FREEDOM TECHNOLOGY

21 PROGRAMS.— 

22 (1) GRANTS AUTHORIZED.— 

23 (A) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary of State, 

24 working through the Bureau of Democracy, 

25 Human Rights, and Labor, and President of the 


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1 Open Technology Fund of the United States 

2 Agency for Global Media, are each separately 

3 and independently authorized to award grants 

4 and contracts to private organizations to support 

5 and develop programs in Hong Kong that pro6 mote or expand— 

7 (i) an open, interoperable, reliable and 

8 secure internet; and 

9 (ii) the online exercise of human rights 

10 and fundamental freedoms of individual 

11 citizens, activists, human rights defenders, 

12 independent journalists, civil society orga13 nizations, and marginalized populations in 

14 Hong Kong. 

15 (B) GOALS.—The goals of the programs de16 veloped pursuant to grants awarded pursuant to 

17 subparagraph (A) should be— 

18 (i) to make the internet available in 

19 Hong Kong; 

20 (ii) to increase the number of the tools 

21 in the technology portfolio; 

22 (iii) to promote the availability of such 

23 technologies and tools in Hong Kong; 


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1 (iv) to encourage the adoption of such 

2 technologies and tools by the people of Hong 

3 Kong; 

4 (v) to scale up the distribution of such 

5 technologies and tools throughout Hong 

6 Kong; 

7 (vi) to prioritize the development of 

8 tools, components, code, and technologies 

9 that are fully open-source, to the extent 

10 practicable; 

11 (vii) to conduct research on repressive 

12 tactics that undermine internet freedom in 

13 Hong Kong; 

14 (viii) to ensure digital safety guidance 

15 and support is available to repressed indi16 vidual citizens, human rights defenders, 

17 independent journalists, civil society orga18 nizations and marginalized populations in 

19 Hong Kong; and 

20 (ix) to engage United States private 

21 industry, including e-commerce firms and 

22 social networking companies, on the impor23 tance of preserving internet access in Hong 

24 Kong. 


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1 (C) GRANT RECIPIENTS.—Grants awarded 

2 pursuant to subparagraph (A) shall be distrib3 uted to multiple vendors and suppliers through 

4 an open, fair, competitive, and evidence-based 

5 decision process— 

6 (i) to diversify the technical base; and 

7 (ii) to reduce the risk of misuse by bad 

8 actors. 

9 (D) SECURITY AUDITS.—New technologies 

10 developed using grants awarded pursuant to sub11 paragraph (A) shall undergo comprehensive secu12 rity audits to ensure such technologies are secure 

13 and have not been compromised in a manner 

14 detrimental to the interests of the United States 

15 or to individuals or organizations benefitting 

16 from programs supported by the Open Tech17 nology Fund. 

18 (2) FUNDING SOURCE.—The Secretary of State is 

19 authorized to expend funds made available to the 

20 Human Rights and Democracy Fund of the Bureau 

21 of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor of the De22 partment of State for each of fiscal years 2022 and 

23 2023 for grants authorized under paragraph (1) by 

24 any entity in the working group established under 

25 subsection (c)(1). 


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1 (3) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.— 

2 (A) OPEN TECHNOLOGY FUND.—In addition 

3 to the funds authorized to be expended pursuant 

4 to paragraph (2), there are authorized to be ap5 propriated to the Open Technology Fund of the 

6 United States Agency for Global Media 

7 $5,000,000 for each of fiscal years 2022 and 

8 2023 for grants to carry out this subsection. 

9 Such amounts are in addition to any amounts 

10 authorized to be appropriated for the Open Tech11 nology Fund under section 1299P of the Na12 tional Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 

13 2021 (Public Law 116–283). 

14 (B) BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HUMAN

15 RIGHTS, AND LABOR.—In addition to the funds 

16 authorized to be expended pursuant to para17 graph (2), there are authorized to be appro18 priated to the Office of Internet Freedom Pro19 grams of the Bureau of Democracy, Human 

20 Rights, and Labor of the Department of State 

21 $10,000,000 for each of fiscal years 2022 and 

22 2023 to carry out this subsection. 

23 (C) AVAILABILITY.—Amounts authorized to 

24 be appropriated pursuant to subparagraphs (A) 

25 and (B) shall remain available until expended. 


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1 (e) STRATEGIC PLANNING REPORT.—Not later than 

2 120 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the 

3 Secretary of State and the working group under subsection 

4 (c)(1) shall submit to the appropriate congressional com5 mittees a classified report that— 

6 (1) describes the Federal Government’s plan to 

7 bolster and increase the availability of Great Firewall 

8 circumvention and internet freedom technology in 

9 Hong Kong during fiscal year 2022; 

10 (2) outlines a plan for— 

11 (A) supporting the preservation of an open, 

12 interoperable, reliable, and secure internet in 

13 Hong Kong; 

14 (B) increasing the supply of the technology 

15 referred to in paragraph (1); 

16 (C) accelerating the dissemination of such 

17 technology; 

18 (D) promoting the availability of internet 

19 freedom in Hong Kong; 

20 (E) utilizing presently-available tools in the 

21 existing relevant portfolios for further use in the 

22 unique context of Hong Kong; 

23 (F) expanding the portfolio of tools in order 

24 to diversify and strengthen the effectiveness and 

25 resiliency of the circumvention efforts; 


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1 (G) providing training for high-risk groups 

2 and individuals in Hong Kong; and 

3 (H) detecting analyzing, and responding to 

4 new and evolving censorship threats; 

5 (3) includes a detailed description of the tech6 nical and fiscal steps necessary to safely implement 

7 the plans referred to in paragraphs (1) and (2), in8 cluding an analysis of the market conditions in Hong 

9 Kong; 

10 (4) describes the Federal Government’s plans for 

11 awarding grants to private organizations for the pur12 poses described in subsection (d)(1)(A); 

13 (5) outlines the working group’s consultations re14 garding the implementation of this section to ensure 

15 that all Federal efforts are aligned and well coordi16 nated; and 

17 (6) outlines the Department of State’s strategy to 

18 influence global internet legal standards at inter19 national organizations and multilateral fora. 

20 (f) DEFINITIONS.—In this section: 

21 (1) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMIT22 TEES.—The term ‘‘appropriate congressional commit23 tees’’ means— 


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1 (A) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the 

2 Committee on Appropriations, and the Select 

3 Committee on Intelligence of the Senate; and 

4 (B) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the 

5 Committee on Appropriations, and the Perma6 nent Select Committee on Intelligence of the 

7 House of Representatives. 

8 (2) JOINT DECLARATION.—The term ‘‘Joint Dec9 laration’’ means the Joint Declaration of the Govern10 ment of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and 

11 Northern Ireland and the Government of the People’s 

12 Republic of China on the Question of Hong Kong, 

13 done at Beijing on December 19, 1984. 

14 SEC. 312. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS FOR PRO15 TECTING HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE PEOPLE’S 

16 REPUBLIC OF CHINA. 

17 (a) IN GENERAL.—Amounts authorized to be appro18 priated or otherwise made available to carry out section 

19 409 of the Asia Reassurance Initiative Act of 2019 (Public 

20 Law 115–409) should include programs that prioritize the 

21 protection and advancement of the freedoms of association, 

22 assembly, religion, and expression for women, human rights 

23 activists, and ethnic and religious minorities in the People’s 

24 Republic of China (PRC). 


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1 (b) USE OF FUNDS.—Amounts appropriated pursuant 

2 to section 409 of the Asia Reassurance Initiative Act of 

3 2019 (Public Law 115–409) may be used to fund non4 governmental agencies within the Indo-Pacific region that 

5 are focused on the issues described in subsection (a). 

6 (c) CONSULTATION REQUIREMENT.—In carrying out 

7 this section, the Assistant Secretary of Democracy, Human 

8 Rights and Labor shall consult with the appropriate con9 gressional committees and representatives of civil society re10 garding— 

11 (1) strengthening the capacity of the organiza12 tions referred to in subsection (b); 

13 (2) protecting members of the groups referred to 

14 in subsection (a) who have been targeted for arrest, 

15 harassment, forced sterilizations, coercive abortions, 

16 forced labor, or intimidation, including members re17 siding outside of the PRC; and 

18 (3) messaging efforts to reach the broadest pos19 sible audiences within the PRC about United States 

20 Government efforts to protect freedom of association, 

21 expression, assembly, and the rights of ethnic minori22 ties. 


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1 SEC. 313. MODIFICATIONS TO AND REAUTHORIZATION OF 

2 SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO HUMAN 

3 RIGHTS VIOLATIONS. 

4 (a) DEFINITIONS.—Section 1262 of the Global 

5 Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act (Subtitle F 

6 of title XII of Public Law 114–328; 22 U.S.C. 2656 note) 

7 is amended by striking paragraph (2). 

8 (b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—(1) The Global Magnitsky 

9 Human Rights Accountability Act (Subtitle F of title XII 

10 of Public Law 114–328; 22 U.S.C. 2656 note) is amended 

11 by inserting after section 1262 the following new section: 

12 ‘‘SEC. 1262A. SENSE OF CONGRESS. 

13 ‘‘It is the sense of Congress that the President should 

14 establish and regularize information sharing and sanctions15 related decision making with like-minded governments pos16 sessing human rights and anti-corruption sanctions pro17 grams similar in nature to those authorized under this sub18 title.’’; and 

19 (2) The table of contents in section 2(b) and in title 

20 XII of division A of the National Defense Authorization Act 

21 for Fiscal Year 2017 (Public Law 114–328) are each 

22 amended by inserting after the items relating to section 

23 1262 the following: 

‘‘Sec. 1262A. Sense of Congress.’’. 

24 (c) IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS.— 


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1 (1) IN GENERAL.—Subsection (a) of section 1263 

2 of the Global Magnitsky Human Rights Account3 ability Act (Subtitle F of title XII of Public Law 

4 114–328; 22 U.S.C. 2656 note) is amended to read as 

5 follows: 

6 ‘‘(a) IN GENERAL.—The President may impose the 

7 sanctions described in subsection (b) with respect to any 

8 foreign person that the President determines, based on cred9 ible information— 

10 ‘‘(1) is responsible for or complicit in, or has di11 rectly or indirectly engaged in, serious human rights 

12 abuse or any violation of internationally recognized 

13 human rights; 

14 ‘‘(2) is a current or former government official, 

15 or a person acting for or on behalf of such an official, 

16 who is responsible for or complicit in, or has directly 

17 or indirectly engaged in— 

18 ‘‘(A) corruption; or 

19 ‘‘(B) the transfer or facilitation of the 

20 transfer of the proceeds of corruption; 

21 ‘‘(3) is or has been a leader or official of— 

22 ‘‘(A) an entity, including a government en23 tity, that has engaged in, or whose members have 

24 engaged in, any of the activities described in 


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1 subparagraph (A) or (B) related to the tenure of 

2 the leader or official; or 

3 ‘‘(B) an entity whose property and interests 

4 in property are blocked pursuant to this section 

5 as a result of activities related to the tenure of 

6 the leader or official; 

7 ‘‘(4) has materially assisted, sponsored, or pro8 vided financial, material, or technological support 

9 for, or goods or services to or in support of— 

10 ‘‘(A) an activity described in subparagraph 

11 (A) or (B) that is conducted by a foreign person; 

12 ‘‘(B) a person whose property and interests 

13 in property are blocked pursuant to this section; 

14 or 

15 ‘‘(C) an entity, including a government en16 tity, that has engaged in, or whose members have 

17 engaged in, an activity described in subpara18 graph (A) or (B) conducted by a foreign person; 

19 or 

20 ‘‘(5) is owned or controlled by, or acts or is pur21 ported to act for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, 

22 a person whose property and interests in property are 

23 blocked pursuant to this section.’’. 


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1 (2) CONSIDERATION OF CERTAIN INFORMA2 TION.—Subsection (c)(2) of such section is amended 

3 by inserting ‘‘corruption and’’ after ‘‘monitor’’. 

4 (3) REQUESTS BY CONGRESS.—Subsection (d) of 

5 such section is amended— 

6 (A) in paragraph (1), in the matter pre7 ceding subparagraph (A), by striking ‘‘subsection 

8 (a)’’ and inserting ‘‘subsection (a)(1)’’; 

9 (B) in paragraph (2)— 

10 (i) in subparagraph (A)— 

11 (I) in the subparagraph heading, 

12 by striking ‘‘HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLA13 TIONS’’ and inserting ‘‘SERIOUS

14 HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSE OR VIOLATIONS

15 OF INTERNATIONALLY RECOGNIZED

16 HUMAN RIGHTS’’; and 

17 (II) by striking ‘‘described in 

18 paragraph (1) or (2) of subsection (a)’’ 

19 and inserting ‘‘described in subsection 

20 (a)(1) relating to serious human rights 

21 abuse or any violation of internation22 ally recognized human rights’’; and 

23 (ii) in subparagraph (B)— 

24 (I) in the matter preceding clause 

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1 graph (3) or (4) of subsection (a)’’ and 

2 inserting ‘‘described in subsection 

3 (a)(1) relating to corruption or the 

4 transfer or facilitation of the transfer 

5 of the proceeds of corruption’’; and 

6 (II) by striking ‘‘ranking member 

7 of’’ and all that follows through the pe8 riod at the end and inserting ‘‘ranking 

9 member of one of the appropriate con10 gressional committees.’’. 

11 (d) REPORTS TO CONGRESS.—Section 1264(a) of the 

12 Global Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act (Sub13 title F of title XII of Public Law 114–328; 22 U.S.C. 2656 

14 note) is amended— 

15 (1) in paragraph (5), by striking ‘‘; and’’ and 

16 inserting a semicolon; 

17 (2) in paragraph (6), by striking the period at 

18 the end and inserting ‘‘;’’; and 

19 (3) by adding at the end the following: 

20 ‘‘(7) a description of additional steps taken by 

21 the President through diplomacy, international en22 gagement, and assistance to foreign or security sectors 

23 to address persistent underlying causes of serious 

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1 try in which foreign persons with respect to which 

2 sanctions have been imposed under section 1263 are 

3 located; and 

4 ‘‘(8) a description of additional steps taken by 

5 the President to ensure the pursuit of judicial ac6 countability in appropriate jurisdictions with respect 

7 to those foreign persons subject to sanctions under sec8 tion 1263 for serious human rights abuse, violations 

9 of internationally recognized human rights, and cor10 ruption.’’. 

11 (e) REPEAL OF SUNSET.—(1) Section 1265 of the 

12 Global Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act (Sub13 title F of title XII of Public Law 114–328; 22 U.S.C. 2656 

14 note) is repealed. 

15 (2) The table of contents in section 2(b) and in title 

16 XII of division A of the National Defense Authorization Act 

17 for Fiscal Year 2017 (Public Law 114–328) are each 

18 amended by striking the items relating to section 1265. 

19 SEC. 314. SENSE OF CONGRESS CONDEMNING ANTI-ASIAN 

20 RACISM AND DISCRIMINATION. 

21 (a) FINDINGS.—Congress makes the following findings: 

22 (1) Since the onset of the COVID–19 pandemic, 

23 crimes and discrimination against Asians and those 

24 of Asian descent have risen dramatically worldwide. 

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1 tonio Guterres said ‘‘the pandemic continues to un2 leash a tsunami of hate and xenophobia, scapegoating 

3 and scare-mongering’’ and urged governments to ‘‘act 

4 now to strengthen the immunity of our societies 

5 against the virus of hate’’. 

6 (2) Asian American and Pacific Island (AAPI) 

7 workers make up a large portion of the essential 

8 workers on the frontlines of the COVID–19 pandemic, 

9 making up 8.5 percent of all essential healthcare 

10 workers in the United States. AAPI workers also 

11 make up a large share—between 6 percent and 12 

12 percent based on sector—of the biomedical field. 

13 (3) The United States Census notes that Ameri14 cans of Asian descent alone made up nearly 5.9 per15 cent of the United States population in 2019, and 

16 that Asian Americans are the fastest-growing racial 

17 group in the United States, projected to represent 14 

18 percent of the United States population by 2065. 

19 (b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Congress 

20 that— 

21 (1) the reprehensible attacks on people of Asian 

22 descent and concerning increase in anti-Asian senti23 ment and racism in the United States and around the 

24 world have no place in a peaceful, civilized, and toler25 ant world; 


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1 (2) the United States is a diverse country with 

2 a proud tradition of immigration, and the strength 

3 and vibrancy of the United States is enhanced by the 

4 diverse ethnic backgrounds and tolerance of its citi5 zens, including Asian Americans and Pacific Island6 ers; 

7 (3) the United States Government should encour8 age foreign governments to use the official and sci9 entific names for the COVID–19 pandemic, as rec10 ommended by the World Health Organization and the 

11 Centers for Disease Control and Prevention; and 

12 (4) the United States Government and other gov13 ernments around the world must actively oppose rac14 ism and intolerance, and use all available and appro15 priate tools to combat the spread of anti-Asian racism 

16 and discrimination. 

17 SEC. 315. ANNUAL REPORTING ON CENSORSHIP OF FREE 

18 SPEECH WITH RESPECT TO INTERNATIONAL 

19 ABUSES OF HUMAN RIGHTS. 

20 Section 116(d) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 

21 (227 U.S.C. 2151n(d)) is amended— 

22 (1) in paragraph (11)(C), by striking ‘‘and’’ at 

23 the end; 

24 (2) in paragraph (12)(C)(ii), by striking the pe25 riod at the end and inserting a semicolon; and 


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1 (3) by adding at the end the following: 

2 ‘‘(13) wherever applicable, instances in which the 

3 government of each country has attempted to 

4 extraterritorially intimidate or pressure a company 

5 or entity to censor or self-censor the speech of its em6 ployees, contractors, customers, or associated staff 

7 with regards to the abuse of human rights in such 

8 country, or sought retaliation against such employees 

9 or contractors for the same, including any instance in 

10 which the Government of the People’s Republic of 

11 China has sought to extraterritorially censor or pun12 ish speech that is otherwise legal in the United States 

13 on the topics of— 

14 ‘‘(A) repression and violation of funda15 mental freedoms in Hong Kong; 

16 ‘‘(B) repression and persecution of religious 

17 and ethnic minorities in China, including in the 

18 Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region and the 

19 Tibet Autonomous Region; 

20 ‘‘(C) efforts to proliferate and use surveil21 lance technologies to surveil activists, journalists, 

22 opposition politicians, or to profile persons of 

23 different ethnicities; and 

24 ‘‘(D) other gross violations of human rights; 

25 and 


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1 ‘‘(14) wherever applicable, instances in which a 

2 company or entity located in or based in a third 

3 country has censored or self-censored the speech of its 

4 employees, contractors, customers, or associated staff 

5 on the topic of abuse of human rights in each country 

6 or sought to retaliate against such employees for the 

7 same, due to intimidation or pressure from or the fear 

8 of intimidation by the foreign government.’’. 

9 SEC. 316. POLICY TOWARD THE XXIV OLYMPIC WINTER 

10 GAMES AND THE XIII PARALYMPIC WINTER 

11 GAMES. 

12 (a) FINDINGS.—Congress finds the following: 

13 (1) In October 2020, 39 countries at the United 

14 Nations Third Committee of the General Assembly ap15 pealed for action on the mass arbitrary detentions 

16 and other crimes against the Uyghur Muslim popu17 lation of the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region. 

18 (2) The 2018 concluding observations of the 

19 United Nations Committee on the Elimination of Ra20 cial Discrimination decried reports of mass arbitrary 

21 detention of Uyghurs. 

22 (3) Over 400 international nongovernmental or23 ganizations have joined together to decry the mass ar24 bitrary detentions of Uyghurs in the Xinjiang Uyghur 

25 Autonomous Region. 


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1 (4) The Olympic Charter states that the practice 

2 of sport ‘‘is a human right’’ that ‘‘shall be secured 

3 without discrimination of any kind, such as race, col4 our, sex, sexual orientation, language, religion, polit5 ical or other opinion, national or social origin, prop6 erty, birth or other status’’, a right that by definition 

7 cannot be secured in a country in which over 

8 1,000,000 people are imprisoned in camps because of 

9 their race, language, and religion. 

10 (5) The 2008 Olympics in Beijing were accom11 panied by widespread tracking, arrest, and intimida12 tion of foreign journalists and bloggers, as well as re13 strictions on movement of journalists, contrary to ex14 plicit commitments made by the Government of the 

15 People’s Republic of China (PRC) to the Inter16 national Olympic Committee. 

17 (6) The Government of the PRC denied visas for 

18 some journalists granted press accreditation for the 

19 2008 Olympic Games, and the Beijing Organising 

20 Committee of the Olympic Games repeatedly refused 

21 to address incidents involving freedom of expression. 

22 (7) The International Olympic Committee faced 

23 broad criticism for failing to adequately anticipate 

24 infringements by the Government of the PRC’s on 

25 freedom of expression and press for international 


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1 media and 2008 Olympics participants, and failing 

2 to hold the Government of the PRC to their own com3 mitments to safeguard human rights during the 2008 

4 games. 

5 (b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Congress 

6 that the International Olympic Committee should— 

7 (1) consider that the Olympic Charter’s prin8 ciples of solidarity and nondiscrimination are hard 

9 to reconcile with holding the 2022 Winter Games in 

10 a country the government of which stands credibly ac11 cused of perpetrating crimes against humanity and 

12 genocide against ethnic and religious minorities; 

13 (2) take into account the recent precedent of the 

14 2008 games, at which Olympic athletes, spectators, 

15 and international media had their fundamental free16 doms severely challenged, and the likely limitations 

17 the Government of the PRC will seek to enforce on 

18 participants speaking out about ongoing persecution 

19 of the Uyghurs and other human rights abuses in the 

20 PRC, despite repeated commitments by the Govern21 ment of the PRC; 

22 (3) emphasize that the International Olympic 

23 Committee is not opposed to moving an Olympic 

24 competition in all circumstances, and should imme25 diately rebid the 2022 Winter Olympic Games to be 


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1 hosted by a country that recognizes and respects 

2 human rights; 

3 (4) affirm the International Olympic Commit4 tee’s— 

5 (A) desire to stay above politics does not 

6 permit turning a blind eye to mass atrocity 

7 crimes, which cannot and should not be dis8 missed as mere political concerns; and 

9 (B) commitment to the fundamental rights 

10 instruments of the international system, which 

11 are beyond partisan or domestic policy, and 

12 upon which the success of the entire Olympic 

13 project depends; 

14 (5) propose a set of clear, executable actions to 

15 be taken by the International Olympic Committee 

16 upon infringement of freedom of expression by a host 

17 country’s government during any Olympics event, in18 cluding the 2022 Winter Olympics, against athletes, 

19 participants, and international media; and 

20 (6) rescind Rule 50 of the Olympic Charter, 

21 which restricts the freedom of expression by athletes 

22 when competing during Olympics events, and affirm 

23 the rights of athletes to political and other speech dur24 ing athletic competitions, including speech that is 

25 critical of their host countries. 


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1 (c) STATEMENT OF POLICY.—It shall be the policy of 

2 the United States— 

3 (1) to implement a presidential and cabinet level 

4 diplomatic boycott of the XXIV Olympic Winter 

5 Games and the XIII Paralympic Winter Games in 

6 the PRC; 

7 (2) to encourage other nations, especially demo8 cratic partners and allies, to do the same; and 

9 (3) to call for an end to the Chinese Communist 

10 Party’s ongoing human rights abuses, including the 

11 Uyghur genocide. 

12 SEC. 317. REVIEW AND CONTROLS ON EXPORT OF ITEMS 

13 WITH CRITICAL CAPABILITIES TO ENABLE 

14 HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES. 

15 (a) STATEMENT OF POLICY.—It is the policy of the 

16 United States to use export controls to the extent necessary 

17 to further the protection of internationally recognized 

18 human rights. 

19 (b) REVIEW OF ITEMS WITH CRITICAL CAPABILITIES

20 TO ENABLE HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES.—Not later than 180 

21 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, and as 

22 appropriate thereafter, the Secretary, in coordination with 

23 the Secretary of State, the Director of National Intelligence, 

24 and the heads of other Federal agencies as appropriate, 

25 shall conduct a review of items subject to controls for crime 


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1 control reasons pursuant to section 742.7 of the Export Ad2 ministration Regulations. 

3 (c) CONTROLS.—In furtherance of the policy set forth 

4 in subsection (a), not later than 60 days after completing 

5 the review required by subsection (b), the Secretary, in co6 ordination with the heads of other Federal agencies as ap7 propriate, shall determine whether additional export con8 trols are needed to protect human rights, including wheth9 er— 

10 (1) controls for crime control reasons pursuant 

11 to section 742.7 of the Export Administration Regula12 tions should be imposed on additional items, includ13 ing items with critical capabilities to enable human 

14 rights abuses involving— 

15 (A) censorship or social control; 

16 (B) surveillance, interception, or restriction 

17 of communications; 

18 (C) monitoring or restricting access to or 

19 use of the internet; 

20 (D) identification of individuals through fa21 cial or voice recognition or biometric indicators; 

22 or 

23 (E) DNA sequencing; or 

24 (2) end-use and end-user controls should be im25 posed on the export, reexport, or in-country transfer 


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1 of certain items with critical capabilities to enable 

2 human rights abuses that are subject to the Export 

3 Administration Regulations if the person seeking to 

4 export, reexport, or transfer the item has knowledge, 

5 or the Secretary determines and so informs that per6 son, that the end-user or ultimate consignee will use 

7 the item to enable human rights abuses. 

8 (d) COOPERATION OF OTHER AGENCIES.—Upon re9 quest from the Secretary, the head of a Federal agency shall 

10 provide full support and cooperation to the Secretary in 

11 carrying out this section. 

12 (e) INTERNATIONAL COORDINATION ON CONTROLS TO

13 PROTECT HUMAN RIGHTS.—It shall be the policy of the 

14 United States to seek to secure the cooperation of other gov15 ernments to impose export controls that are consistent, to 

16 the extent possible, with the controls imposed under this sec17 tion. 

18 (f) CONFORMING AMENDMENT.—Section 1752(2)(A) of 

19 the Export Control Reform Act of 2018 (50 U.S.C. 20 

20 4811(2)(A)) is amended— 

21 (1) in clause (iv), by striking ‘‘; or’’ and insert22 ing a semicolon; 

23 (2) in clause (v), by striking the period and in24 serting ‘‘; or’’; and 

25 (3) by adding at the end the following: 


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1 ‘‘(vi) serious human rights abuses.’’. 

2 (g) DEFINITIONS.—In this section: 

3 (1) END-USER; KNOWLEDGE; ULTIMATE CON4 SIGNEE.—The terms ‘‘end-user’’, ‘‘knowledge’’, and 

5 ‘‘ultimate consignee’’ have the meanings given those 

6 terms in section 772.1 of the Export Administration 

7 Regulations. 

8 (2) EXPORT; EXPORT ADMINISTRATION REGULA9 TIONS; IN-COUNTRY TRANSFER; ITEM; REEXPORT.— 

10 The terms ‘‘export’’, ‘‘Export Administration Regula11 tions’’, ‘‘in-country transfer’’, ‘‘item’’, and ‘‘reexport’’ 

12 have the meanings given those terms in section 1742 

13 of the Export Control Reform Act of 2018 (50 U.S.C. 

14 4801). 

15 (3) SECRETARY.—The term ‘‘Secretary’’ means 

16 the Secretary of Commerce. 

17 SEC. 318. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON COMMERCIAL EXPORT 

18 CONTROL POLICY. 

19 It is the sense of Congress that the President should 

20 reexamine United States commercial export control policy 

21 for any country, including the People’s Republic of China, 

22 that is known to supply arms or dual use items to any 

23 country the government of which has been designated pursu24 ant to any applicable provision of law as a state sponsor 


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1 of terrorism or to any entity designated by the Secretary 

2 of State as a foreign terrorist organization. 

3 SEC. 319. IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO 

4 SYSTEMATIC RAPE, COERCIVE ABORTION, 

5 FORCED STERILIZATION, OR INVOLUNTARY 

6 CONTRACEPTIVE IMPLANTATION IN THE 

7 XINJIANG UYGHUR AUTONOMOUS REGION. 

8 (a) IN GENERAL.—Section 6(a)(1) of the Uyghur 

9 Human Rights Policy Act of 2020 (Public Law 116–145; 

10 22 U.S.C. 6901 note) is amended by inserting after sub11 paragraph (E) the following: 

12 ‘‘(F) Systematic rape, coercive abortion, 

13 forced sterilization, or involuntary contraceptive 

14 implantation policies and practices.’’. 

15 (b) EFFECTIVE DATE; APPLICABILITY.—The amend16 ment made by subsection (a)— 

17 (1) takes effect on the date of the enactment of 

18 this Act; and 

19 (2) applies with respect to the first report re20 quired by section 6(a)(1) of the Uyghur Human 

21 Rights Policy Act of 2020 submitted after such date 

22 of enactment. 

23 SEC. 320. SENSE OF CONGRESS REGARDING CENSORSHIP 

24 OF POLITICAL SPEECH. 

25 (a) FINDINGS.—Congress finds the following: 


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1 (1) The People’s Republic of China censors polit2 ical speech of throughout the country through many 

3 means including through mass censorship of the 

4 Internet, the Great Firewall, radical curtailment of 

5 the freedom of the press. 

6 (2) The PRC employs several other means to sti7 fle dissent including instigating private person to tar8 get dissenting individuals and private companies to 

9 target offending companies. 

10 (b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Congress 

11 that— 

12 (1) censorship of political speech in China is 

13 contrary to the human rights of the Chinese people; 

14 (2) censorship of political speech, whether con15 ducted by the government, or private or quasi-private 

16 entities is antithetical to United States values and in17 terests; and 

18 (3) the democratic way to conduct political dis19 putes is through argument and persuasion, not force 

20 or political speech. 


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1 SEC. 321. REPORT ON MANNER AND EXTENT TO WHICH THE 

2 GOVERNMENT OF CHINA EXPLOITS HONG 

3 KONG TO CIRCUMVENT UNITED STATES LAWS 

4 AND PROTECTIONS. 

5 Title III of the United States-Hong Kong Policy Act 

6 of 1992 (22 U.S.C. 5731 et seq.) is amended by adding at 

7 the end the following: 

8 ‘‘SEC. 303. REPORT ON MANNER AND EXTENT TO WHICH 

9 THE GOVERNMENT OF CHINA EXPLOITS 

10 HONG KONG TO CIRCUMVENT UNITED 

11 STATES LAWS AND PROTECTIONS. 

12 ‘‘(a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days after the 

13 date of the enactment of this section, the Secretary of State 

14 shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a 

15 report on the manner and extent to which the Government 

16 of China uses the status of Hong Kong to circumvent the 

17 laws and protections of the United States. 

18 ‘‘(b) ELEMENTS.—The report required by subsection 

19 (a) shall include the following: 

20 ‘‘(1) In consultation with the Secretary of Com21 merce, the Secretary of Homeland Security, and the 

22 Director of National Intelligence— 

23 ‘‘(A) an assessment of how the Government 

24 of China uses Hong Kong to circumvent United 

25 States export controls; and 


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1 ‘‘(B) a list of all significant incidents in 

2 which the Government of China used Hong Kong 

3 to circumvent such controls during the reporting 

4 period. 

5 ‘‘(2) In consultation with the Secretary of the 

6 Treasury and the Secretary of Commerce— 

7 ‘‘(A) an assessment of how the Government 

8 of China uses Hong Kong to circumvent duties 

9 on merchandise exported to the United States 

10 from the People’s Republic of China; and 

11 ‘‘(B) a list of all significant incidents in 

12 which the Government of China used Hong Kong 

13 to circumvent such duties during the reporting 

14 period. 

15 ‘‘(3) In consultation with the Secretary of the 

16 Treasury, the Secretary of Homeland Security, and 

17 the Director of National Intelligence— 

18 ‘‘(A) an assessment of how the Government 

19 of China uses Hong Kong to circumvent sanc20 tions imposed by the United States or pursuant 

21 to multilateral regimes; and 

22 ‘‘(B) a list of all significant incidents in 

23 which the Government of China used Hong Kong 

24 to circumvent such sanctions during the report25 ing period. 


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1 ‘‘(4) In consultation with the Secretary of Home2 land Security and the Director of National Intel3 ligence, an assessment of how the Government of 

4 China uses formal or informal means to extradite or 

5 coercively move individuals, including United States 

6 persons, from Hong Kong to the People’s Republic of 

7 China. 

8 ‘‘(5) In consultation with the Secretary of De9 fense, the Director of National Intelligence, and the 

10 Director of Homeland Security— 

11 ‘‘(A) an assessment of how the intelligence, 

12 security, and law enforcement agencies of the 

13 Government of China, including the Ministry of 

14 State Security, the Ministry of Public Security, 

15 and the People’s Armed Police, use the Hong 

16 Kong Security Bureau and other security agen17 cies in Hong Kong to conduct espionage on for18 eign nationals, including United States persons, 

19 conduct influence operations, or violate civil lib20 erties guaranteed under the laws of Hong Kong; 

21 and 

22 ‘‘(B) a list of all significant incidents of 

23 such espionage, influence operations, or viola24 tions of civil liberties during the reporting pe25 riod. 


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1 ‘‘(c) FORM OF REPORT; AVAILABILITY.— 

2 ‘‘(1) FORM.—The report required by subsection 

3 (a) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may 

4 include a classified index. 

5 ‘‘(2) AVAILABILITY.—The unclassified portion of 

6 the report required by subsection (a) shall be posted 

7 on a publicly available internet website of the Depart8 ment of State. 

9 ‘‘(d) DEFINITIONS.—In this section: 

10 ‘‘(1) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMIT11 TEES.—The term ‘appropriate congressional commit12 tees’ means— 

13 ‘‘(A) the Committee on Foreign Relations, 

14 the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban 

15 Affairs, the Committee on Finance, and the Se16 lect Committee on Intelligence of the Senate; and 

17 ‘‘(B) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the 

18 Committee on Financial Services, the Permanent 

19 Select Committee on Intelligence, and the Com20 mittee on Ways and Means of the House of Rep21 resentatives. 

22 ‘‘(2) FOREIGN NATIONAL.—The term ‘foreign na23 tional’ means a person that is neither— 

24 ‘‘(A) an individual who is a citizen or na25 tional of the People’s Republic of China; or 


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1 ‘‘(B) an entity organized under the laws of 

2 the People’s Republic of China or of a jurisdic3 tion within the People’s Republic of China. 

4 ‘‘(3) REPORTING PERIOD.—The term ‘reporting 

5 period’ means the 5-year period preceding submission 

6 of the report required by subsection (a). 

7 ‘‘(4) UNITED STATES PERSON.—The term 

8 ‘United States person’ means— 

9 ‘‘(A) a United States citizen or an alien 

10 lawfully admitted for permanent residence to the 

11 United States; or 

12 ‘‘(B) an entity organized under the laws of 

13 the United States or of any jurisdiction within 

14 the United States, including a foreign branch of 

15 such an entity.’’. 

16 SEC. 322. SENSE OF CONGRESS REGARDING ANNUAL COUN17 TRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRAC18 TICES. 

19 It is the sense of Congress that the Department of 

20 State’s annual Country Reports on Human Rights Prac21 tices should include relevant information regarding whether 

22 a particular country has provided assistance to the PRC 

23 or any entity under the influence of the Chinese Communist 

24 Party in its genocide against the Uyghurs, including 

25 through the forcible repatriation of Uyghurs to the PRC 


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1 without reasonable opportunity for them to be assessed and 

2 protected as refugees. 

3 SEC. 323. SENSE OF CONGRESS REGARDING PRESS FREE4 DOM IN THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA. 

5 (a) FINDINGS.—Congress finds that the People’s Re6 public of China maintains one of the worst media environ7 ments in the world and seeks to curtail political speech in8 side and outside the country, including by— 

9 (1) targeting independent and foreign media in 

10 China through systematic harassment including the 

11 denial of visas to foreign journalists, imprisonment, 

12 the denial of medical care to imprisoned journalists, 

13 and curtailing access to legal representation; 

14 (2) pervasively monitoring and censoring online 

15 and social media content, including through the ban16 ning of virtual private networks; 

17 (3) using the full force of the State to stifle inter18 nal dissent including dissent online, particularly dis19 sent that could lead to political change and content 

20 that criticizes China’s leaders, however trivial, report21 edly even to the point of censoring comparisons of Xi 

22 Jingping’s looks with Winnie the Pooh; 

23 (4) spreading propaganda to foreign audiences 

24 through the United Front Work Department and re25 lated activities; 


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1 (5) seeking to intimidate American-based jour2 nalists working for Radio Free Asia and reporting on 

3 gross human rights violations in China’s Xinjiang 

4 Uyghur Autonomous Region by jailing or otherwise 

5 harassing members of their families; and 

6 (6) championing a ‘‘sovereign Internet’’ model 

7 and exporting technology to enhance the ability of 

8 like-minded authoritarian regimes to suppress dissent 

9 online and monitor the activity of their people. 

10 (b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Congress 

11 that— 

12 (1) the freedom of the press is an unalienable 

13 right that is necessary for citizens to hold their gov14 ernment to account; 

15 (2) the PRC should cease its repression of jour16 nalists, citizen journalists, news organizations; and 

17 (3) the PRC should cease the censorship of polit18 ical satire, including comparisons of Xi Jingping’s 

19 looks with Winnie the Pooh. 

20 SEC. 324. UNITED STATES SPECIAL ENVOY FOR XINJIANG 

21 PROVINCE. 

22 (a) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary of State shall estab23 lish within the Department of State the position of United 

24 States Special Envoy for Xinjiang Province (in this section 

25 referred to as the ‘‘Special Envoy’’). 


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1 (b) APPOINTMENT.—The Secretary may appoint an 

2 individual to the position of Special Envoy from among 

3 officers and employees of the Department of State. The Sec4 retary may allow such officer or employee to retain the posi5 tion (and the responsibilities associated with such position) 

6 held by such officer or employee prior to the appointment 

7 of such officer or employee to the position of Special Envoy. 

8 (c) DUTIES.—The Special Envoy shall coordinate dip9 lomatic, political, public diplomacy, financial assistance, 

10 sanctions, counterterrorism, security resources, and congres11 sional reporting requirements within the United States 

12 Government to respond to the gross violations of universally 

13 recognized human rights occurring in Xinjiang Province of 

14 the People’s Republic of China, including by addressing— 

15 (1) the mass detentions of Uyghurs and other 

16 predominantly Muslim ethnic minorities; 

17 (2) the deployment of technologically advanced 

18 surveillance and police detection methods; and 

19 (3) the counterterrorism and counter-radicalism 

20 claims used to justify the policies of the Chinese Gov21 ernment in Xinjiang Province. 


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1 SEC. 325. CHINA CENSORSHIP MONITOR AND ACTION 

2 GROUP. 

3 (a) REPORT ON CENSORSHIP AND INTIMIDATION OF

4 UNITED STATES PERSONS BY THE GOVERNMENT OF THE

5 PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA.— 

6 (1) REPORT.— 

7 (A) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 90 days 

8 after the date of the enactment of this Act, the 

9 Secretary of State shall select and seek to enter 

10 into an agreement with a qualified research enti11 ty that is independent of the Department of 

12 State to write a report on censorship and in13 timidation in the United States and its posses14 sions and territories of United States persons, 

15 including United States companies that conduct 

16 business in the People’s Republic of China, which 

17 is directed or directly supported by the Govern18 ment of the People’s Republic of China. 

19 (B) MATTERS TO BE INCLUDED.—The re20 port required under subparagraph (A) shall— 

21 (i) assess major trends, patterns, and 

22 methods of the Government of the People’s 

23 Republic of China’s efforts to direct or di24 rectly support censorship and intimidation 

25 of United States persons, including United 

26 States companies that conduct business in 


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1 the People’s Republic of China, which are 

2 exercising their right to freedom of speech; 

3 (ii) assess, including through the use of 

4 illustrative examples, as appropriate, the 

5 impact on and consequences for United 

6 States persons, including United States 

7 companies that conduct business in the Peo8 ple’s Republic of China, that criticize— 

9 (I) the Government of the People’s 

10 Republic of China; 

11 (II) the Chinese Communist 

12 Party; 

13 (III) the authoritarian model of 

14 government of the People’s Republic of 

15 China; or 

16 (IV) a particular policy advanced 

17 by the Chinese Communist Party or 

18 the Government of the People’s Repub19 lic of China; 

20 (iii) identify the implications for the 

21 United States of the matters described in 

22 clauses (i) and (ii); 

23 (iv) assess the methods and evaluate 

24 the efficacy of the efforts by the Government 

25 of the People’s Republic of China to limit 


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1 freedom of expression in the private sector, 

2 including with respect to media, social 

3 media, film, education, travel, financial 

4 services, sports and entertainment, tech5 nology, telecommunication, and internet in6 frastructure interests; 

7 (v) include policy recommendations for 

8 the United States Government, including 

9 recommendations regarding collaboration 

10 with United States allies and partners, to 

11 address censorship and intimidation by the 

12 Government of the People’s Republic of 

13 China; and 

14 (vi) include policy recommendations 

15 for United States persons, including United 

16 States companies that conduct business in 

17 China, to address censorship and intimida18 tion by the Government of the People’s Re19 public of China. 

20 (C) APPLICABILITY TO UNITED STATES AL21 LIES AND PARTNERS.—To the extent practicable, 

22 the report required under subparagraph (A) 

23 should identify implications and policy rec24 ommendations that are relevant to United States 

25 allies and partners facing censorship and intimiVerDate Sep 11 2014 21:34 Dec 30, 2022 Jkt 039200 PO 00000 Frm 00483 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6203 E:\BILLS\H3524.RH H3524

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1 dation directed or directly supported by the Gov2 ernment of the People’s Republic of China. 

3 (2) SUBMISSION OF REPORT.— 

4 (A) IN GENERAL.—Not later than one year 

5 after the date of the enactment of this Act, the 

6 Secretary of State shall submit the report writ7 ten by the qualified research entity selected pur8 suant to paragraph (1)(A) to the appropriate 

9 congressional committees. 

10 (B) PUBLICATION.—The report referred to 

11 in subparagraph (A) shall be made accessible to 

12 the public online through relevant United States 

13 Government websites. 

14 (3) FEDERAL GOVERNMENT SUPPORT.—The Sec15 retary of State and other Federal agencies selected by 

16 the President shall provide the qualified research enti17 ty selected pursuant to paragraph (1)(A) with timely 

18 access to appropriate information, data, resources, 

19 and analyses necessary for such entity to write the re20 port described in paragraph (1) in a thorough and 

21 independent manner. 

22 (b) CHINA CENSORSHIP MONITOR AND ACTION

23 GROUP.— 

24 (1) CERTIFICATION.—Upon receipt and review of 

25 the report described in subsection (a), the President 


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1 shall make a determination on whether the Govern2 ment of the People’s Republic of China engages in the 

3 censorship and intimidation of United States persons, 

4 including United States companies that conduct busi5 ness in the People’s Republic of China, which are ex6 ercising their right to freedom of speech, taking into 

7 account the contents of the report and other informa8 tion available to the government of the United States. 

9 (2) IN GENERAL.—If there is a determination 

10 under paragraph (1) that the Government of the Peo11 ple’s Republic of China engages in the censorship and 

12 intimidation of United States persons, including 

13 United States companies that conduct business in the 

14 People’s Republic of China, which are exercising their 

15 right to freedom of speech, the President shall estab16 lish an interagency task force, which shall be known 

17 as the ‘‘China Censorship Monitor and Action 

18 Group’’ (referred to in this section as the ‘‘Task 

19 Force’’). 

20 (3) MEMBERSHIP.—If, upon receipt and review 

21 of the report described in subsection (a), he deems it 

22 in the national interest, the President shall— 

23 (A) appoint the chair of the Task Force 

24 from among the staff of the National Security 

25 Council; 


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1 (B) appoint the vice chair of the Task Force 

2 from among the staff of the National Economic 

3 Council; and 

4 (C) direct the head of each of the following 

5 executive branch agencies to appoint personnel to 

6 participate in the Task Force: 

7 (i) The Department of State. 

8 (ii) The Department of Commerce. 

9 (iii) The Department of the Treasury. 

10 (iv) The Department of Justice. 

11 (v) The Office of the United States 

12 Trade Representative. 

13 (vi) The Office of the Director of Na14 tional Intelligence, and other appropriate 

15 elements of the intelligence community (as 

16 defined in section 3 of the National Secu17 rity Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3003)). 

18 (vii) The Federal Communications 

19 Commission. 

20 (viii) The United States Agency for 

21 Global Media. 

22 (ix) Other agencies designated by the 

23 President. 

24 (4) RESPONSIBILITIES.—The Task Force shall— 


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1 (A) oversee the development and execution of 

2 an integrated Federal Government strategy to 

3 monitor and address the impacts of efforts di4 rected, or directly supported, by the Government 

5 of the People’s Republic of China to censor or in6 timidate, in the United States or in any of its 

7 possessions or territories, any United States per8 son, including United States companies that 

9 conduct business in the People’s Republic of 

10 China, which are exercising their right to free11 dom of speech; and 

12 (B) submit the strategy developed pursuant 

13 to subparagraph (A) to the appropriate congres14 sional committees not later than 120 days after 

15 the date of the enactment of this Act. 

16 (5) MEETINGS.—The Task Force shall meet not 

17 less frequently than twice per year. 

18 (6) CONSULTATIONS.—The Task Force should 

19 regularly consult, to the extent necessary and appro20 priate, with— 

21 (A) Federal agencies that are not rep22 resented on the Task Force; 

23 (B) independent agencies of the United 

24 States Government that are not represented on 

25 the Task Force; 


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1 (C) relevant stakeholders in the private sec2 tor and the media; and 

3 (D) relevant stakeholders among United 

4 States allies and partners facing similar chal5 lenges related to censorship or intimidation by 

6 the Government of the People’s Republic of 

7 China. 

8 (7) REPORTING REQUIREMENTS.— 

9 (A) ANNUAL REPORT.—The Task Force 

10 shall submit an annual report to the appropriate 

11 congressional committees that describes, with re12 spect to the reporting period— 

13 (i) the strategic objectives and policies 

14 pursued by the Task Force to address the 

15 challenges of censorship and intimidation of 

16 United States persons while in the United 

17 States or any of its possessions or terri18 tories, which is directed or directly sup19 ported by the Government of the People’s 

20 Republic of China; 

21 (ii) the activities conducted by the 

22 Task Force in support of the strategic objec23 tives and policies referred to in clause (i); 

24 and 


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1 (iii) the results of the activities referred 

2 to in clause (ii) and the impact of such ac3 tivities on the national interests of the 

4 United States. 

5 (B) FORM OF REPORT.—Each report sub6 mitted pursuant to subparagraph (A) shall be 

7 unclassified, but may include a classified annex. 

8 (C) CONGRESSIONAL BRIEFINGS.—Not later 

9 than 90 days after the date of the enactment of 

10 this Act, and annually thereafter, the Task Force 

11 shall provide briefings to the appropriate con12 gressional committees regarding the activities of 

13 the Task Force to execute the strategy developed 

14 pursuant to paragraph (3)(A). 

15 (c) SUNSET.—This section shall terminate on the date 

16 that is five years after the date of the enactment of this 

17 Act. 

18 (d) DEFINITIONS.—In this section: 

19 (1) QUALIFIED RESEARCH ENTITY.—The term 

20 ‘‘qualified research entity’’ means an entity that— 

21 (A) is a nonpartisan research organization 

22 or a federally funded research and development 

23 center; 


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1 (B) has appropriate expertise and analyt2 ical capability to write the report required under 

3 section 3; and 

4 (C) is free from any financial, commercial, 

5 or other entanglements, which could undermine 

6 the independence of such report or create a con7 flict of interest or the appearance of a conflict of 

8 interest, with— 

9 (i) the Government of the People’s Re10 public of China; 

11 (ii) the Chinese Communist Party; 

12 (iii) any company incorporated in the 

13 People’s Republic of China or a subsidiary 

14 of such company; or 

15 (iv) any company or entity incor16 porated outside of the People’s Republic of 

17 China that is believed to have a substantial 

18 financial or commercial interest in the Peo19 ple’s Republic of China. 

20 (2) UNITED STATES PERSON.—The term ‘‘United 

21 States person’’ means— 

22 (A) a United States citizen or an alien law23 fully admitted for permanent residence to the 

24 United States; or 


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1 (B) an entity organized under the laws of 

2 the United States or any jurisdiction within the 

3 United States, including a foreign branch of 

4 such an entity. 

5 SEC. 326. PUBLIC DISCLOSURE ON BIS LICENSING INFOR6 MATION. 

7 The Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Rep8 resentatives shall make aggregate statistics on licensing in9 formation, ensuring all confidential business information 

10 is protected, for PRC companies on the Entity List con11 tained in the Export Administration Regulations available 

12 to the public. 

13 TITLE IV—INVESTING IN OUR 

14 ECONOMIC STATECRAFT 

15 SEC. 401. SENSE OF CONGRESS REGARDING THE PEOPLE’S 

16 REPUBLIC OF CHINA’S INDUSTRIAL POLICY. 

17 It is the sense of Congress that— 

18 (1) the challenges presented by a nonmarket 

19 economy like the economy of the People’s Republic of 

20 China (PRC), which has captured such a large share 

21 of global economic exchange, are in many ways un22 precedented and require sufficiently elevated and sus23 tained long-term focus and engagement; 

24 (2) in order to truly address the most detri25 mental aspects of Chinese Communist Party (CCP)- 


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1 directed mercantilist economic strategy, the United 

2 States must adopt policies that— 

3 (A) expose the full scope and scale of intel4 lectual property theft and mass subsidization of 

5 Chinese firms, and the resulting harm to the 

6 United States, foreign markets, and the global 

7 economy; 

8 (B) ensure that PRC companies face costs 

9 and consequences for anticompetitive behavior; 

10 (C) provide options for affected United 

11 States persons to address and respond to unrea12 sonable and discriminatory CCP-directed indus13 trial policies; and 

14 (D) strengthen the protection of critical 

15 technology and sensitive data, while still fos16 tering an environment that provides incentives 

17 for secure but open investment, innovation, and 

18 competition; 

19 (3) the United States must work with its allies 

20 and partners and multilateral venues and fora— 

21 (A) to reinforce long-standing generally ac22 cepted principles of fair competition and market 

23 behavior and address the PRC’s anticompetitive 

24 economic and industrial policies that undermine 

25 decades of global growth and innovation; 


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1 (B) to ensure that the PRC is not granted 

2 the same treatment as that of a free-market econ3 omy until it ceases the implementation of laws, 

4 regulations, policies, and practices that provide 

5 unfair advantage to PRC firms in furtherance of 

6 national objectives and impose unreasonable, dis7 criminatory, and illegal burdens on market8 based international commerce; and 

9 (C) to align policies with respect to curbing 

10 state-directed subsidization of the private sector, 

11 such as advocating for global rules related to 

12 transparency and adherence to notification re13 quirements, including through the efforts cur14 rently being advanced by the United States, 

15 Japan, and the European Union; 

16 (4) the United States and its allies and partners 

17 must collaborate to provide incentives to their respec18 tive companies to cooperate in areas such as— 

19 (A) advocating for protection of intellectual 

20 property rights in markets around the world; 

21 (B) fostering open technical standards; and 

22 (C) increasing joint investments in overseas 

23 markets; and 

24 (5) the United States should develop policies 

25 that— 


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1 (A) insulate United States entities from 

2 PRC pressure against complying with United 

3 States laws; 

4 (B) together with the work of allies and 

5 partners and multilateral institutions, counter 

6 the potential impact of the blocking regime of the 

7 PRC established by the Ministry of Commerce of 

8 the PRC on January 9, 2021, when it issued 

9 Order No. 1 of 2021, entitled ‘‘Rules on Counter10 acting Unjustified Extraterritorial Application 

11 of Foreign Legislation and other Measures’’; and 

12 (C) plan for future actions that the Govern13 ment of the PRC may take to undermine the 

14 lawful application of United States legal au15 thorities, including with respect to the use of 

16 sanctions. 

17 SEC. 402. ECONOMIC DEFENSE RESPONSE TEAMS. 

18 (a) PILOT PROGRAM.—Not later than 180 days after 

19 the date of the enactment of this Act, the President shall 

20 develop and implement a pilot program for the creation of 

21 deployable economic defense response teams to help provide 

22 emergency technical assistance and support to a country 

23 subjected to the threat or use of coercive economic measures 

24 (in this section referred to as a ‘‘partner country’’) and to 

25 play a liaison role between the legitimate government of 


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1 that country and the United States Government. Such as2 sistance and support may include the following activities: 

3 (1) Reducing the partner country’s vulnerability 

4 to coercive economic measures. 

5 (2) Minimizing the damage that such measures 

6 by an adversary could cause to the partner country. 

7 (3) Implementing any bilateral or multilateral 

8 contingency plans that may exist for responding to 

9 the threat or use of such measures. 

10 (4) In coordination with the partner country, de11 veloping or improving plans and strategies by the 

12 country for reducing vulnerabilities and improving 

13 responses to such measures in the future. 

14 (5) Assisting the partner country in dealing with 

15 foreign sovereign investment in infrastructure or re16 lated projects that may undermine the partner coun17 try’s sovereignty. 

18 (6) Assisting the partner country in responding 

19 to specific efforts from an adversary attempting to 

20 employ economic coercion that undermines the part21 ner country’s sovereignty, including efforts in the 

22 cyber domain, such as efforts that undermine cyberse23 curity or digital security of the partner country or 

24 initiatives that introduce digital technologies in a 


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1 manner that undermines freedom, security, and sov2 ereignty of the partner country. 

3 (7) Otherwise providing direct and relevant 

4 short-to-medium term economic or other assistance 

5 from the United States and marshalling other re6 sources in support of effective responses to such meas7 ures. 

8 (b) REPORTS REQUIRED.— 

9 (1) REPORT ON ESTABLISHMENT.—Upon estab10 lishment of the pilot program required by subsection 

11 (a), the Secretary of State shall provide the appro12 priate congressional committees with a detailed report 

13 and briefing describing the pilot program, the major 

14 elements of the program, the personnel and institu15 tions involved, and the degree to which the program 

16 incorporates the elements described in subsection (a). 

17 (2) FOLLOW-UP REPORT.—Not later than one 

18 year after the date on which the report required by 

19 paragraph (1) is submitted, the Secretary of State 

20 shall provide the appropriate congressional commit21 tees with a detailed report and briefing describing the 

22 operations over the previous year of the pilot program 

23 established pursuant to subsection (a), as well as the 

24 Secretary’s assessment of its performance and suit25 ability for becoming a permanent program. 


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1 (3) FORM.—Each report required under this sub2 section shall be submitted in unclassified form, but 

3 may include a classified annex. 

4 (c) DECLARATION OF AN ECONOMIC CRISIS RE5 QUIRED.— 

6 (1) NOTIFICATION.—The President may activate 

7 an economic defense response team for a period of 180 

8 days under the authorities of this section to assist a 

9 partner country in responding to an unusual and ex10 traordinary economic coercive threat by an adversary 

11 of the United States upon the declaration of a coer12 cive economic emergency, together with notification to 

13 the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and 

14 the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of 

15 Representatives. 

16 (2) EXTENSION AUTHORITY.—The President may 

17 activate the response team for an additional 180 days 

18 upon the submission of a detailed analysis to the com19 mittees described in paragraph (1) justifying why the 

20 continued deployment of the economic defense re21 sponse team in response to the economic emergency is 

22 in the national security interest of the United States. 

23 (d) SUNSET.—The authorities provided under this sec24 tion shall expire on December 31, 2026. 


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1 (e) RULE OF CONSTRUCTION.—Neither the authority 

2 to declare an economic crisis provided for in subsection (d), 

3 nor the declaration of an economic crisis pursuant to sub4 section (d), shall confer or be construed to confer any au5 thority, power, duty, or responsibility to the President other 

6 than the authority to activate an economic defense response 

7 team as described in this section. 

8 (f) APPROPRIATE COMMITTEES OF CONGRESS DE9 FINED.—In this section, the term ‘‘appropriate congres10 sional committees’’ means— 

11 (1) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the 

12 Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 

13 the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transpor14 tation, the Committee on Energy and Natural Re15 sources, the Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition, and 

16 Forestry, and the Committee on Finance of the Sen17 ate; and 

18 (2) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Com19 mittee on Financial Services, the Committee on En20 ergy and Commerce, the Committee on Agriculture, 

21 and the Committee on Ways and Means of the House 

22 of Representatives. 

23 SEC. 403. COUNTERING OVERSEAS KLEPTOCRACY. 

24 (a) FINDINGS.—Congress finds the following: 


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1 (1) Authoritarian leaders in foreign countries 

2 abuse their power to steal assets from state institu3 tions, enrich themselves at the expense of their coun4 tries’ economic development, and use corruption as a 

5 strategic tool both to solidify their grip on power and 

6 to undermine democratic institutions abroad. 

7 (2) Global corruption harms the competitiveness 

8 of United States businesses, weakens democratic gov9 ernance, feeds terrorist recruitment and transnational 

10 organized crime, enables drug smuggling and human 

11 trafficking, and stymies economic growth. 

12 (3) Illicit financial flows often penetrate coun13 tries through what appear to be legitimate financial 

14 transactions, as kleptocrats launder money, use shell 

15 companies, amass offshore wealth, and participate in 

16 a global shadow economy. 

17 (4) The Government of the Russian Federation is 

18 a leading model of this type of kleptocratic system, 

19 using state-sanctioned corruption to both erode demo20 cratic governance from within and discredit democ21 racy abroad, thereby strengthening the authoritarian 

22 rule of Vladimir Putin. 

23 (5) Corrupt individuals and entities in the Rus24 sian Federation, often with the backing and encour25 agement of political leadership, use stolen money— 


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1 (A) to purchase key assets in other coun2 tries, often with a goal of attaining monopolistic 

3 control of a sector; 

4 (B) to gain access to and influence the poli5 cies of other countries; and 

6 (C) to advance Russian interests in other 

7 countries, particularly those that undermine con8 fidence and trust in democratic systems. 

9 (6) Systemic corruption in the People’s Republic 

10 of China (PRC), often tied to, directed by, or backed 

11 by the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party 

12 (CCP) and the Government of the PRC is used— 

13 (A) to provide unfair advantage to certain 

14 PRC economic entities; 

15 (B) to increase other countries’ economic de16 pendence on the PRC to secure greater deference 

17 to the PRC’s diplomatic and strategic goals; and 

18 (C) to exploit corruption in foreign govern19 ments and among other political elites to enable 

20 PRC state-backed firms to pursue predatory and 

21 exploitative economic practices. 

22 (7) Thwarting these tactics by Russian, Chinese, 

23 and other kleptocratic actors requires the inter24 national community to strengthen democratic govern25 ance and the rule of law. International cooperation in 


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1 combating corruption and illicit finance is vital to 

2 such efforts, especially by empowering reformers in 

3 foreign countries during historic political openings 

4 for the establishment of the rule of law in those coun5 tries. 

6 (8) Technical assistance programs that combat 

7 corruption and strengthen the rule of law, including 

8 through assistance provided by the Department of 

9 State’s Bureau of International Narcotics and Law 

10 Enforcement Affairs and the United States Agency for 

11 International Development, and through programs 

12 like the Department of Justice’s Office of Overseas 

13 Prosecutorial Development, Assistance and Training 

14 and the International Criminal Investigative Train15 ing Assistance Program, can have lasting and signifi16 cant impacts for both foreign and United States in17 terests. 

18 (9) There currently exist numerous international 

19 instruments to combat corruption, kleptocracy, and 

20 illicit finance, including— 

21 (A) the Inter-American Convention against 

22 Corruption of the Organization of American 

23 States, done at Caracas March 29, 1996; 

24 (B) the Convention on Combating Bribery 

25 of Foreign Public Officials in International 


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1 Business Transactions of the Organisation of 

2 Economic Co-operation and Development, done 

3 at Paris December 21, 1997 (commonly referred 

4 to as the ‘‘Anti-Bribery Convention’’); 

5 (C) the United Nations Convention against 

6 Transnational Organized Crime, done at New 

7 York November 15, 2000; 

8 (D) the United Nations Convention against 

9 Corruption, done at New York October 31, 2003; 

10 (E) Recommendation of the Council for 

11 Further Combating Bribery of Foreign Public 

12 Officials in International Business Transactions, 

13 adopted November 26, 2009; and 

14 (F) recommendations of the Financial Ac15 tion Task Force comprising the International 

16 Standards on Combating Money Laundering 

17 and the Financing of Terrorism and Prolifera18 tion. 

19 (b) DEFINITIONS.—In this section: 

20 (1) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMIT21 TEES.—The term ‘‘appropriate congressional commit22 tees’’ means— 

23 (A) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the 

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1 fairs, the Committee on Finance, and the Com2 mittee on the Judiciary of the Senate; 

3 (B) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the 

4 Committee on Financial Services, the Committee 

5 on Ways and Means, and the Committee on the 

6 Judiciary of the House of Representatives. 

7 (2) FOREIGN ASSISTANCE.—The term ‘‘foreign 

8 assistance’’ means foreign assistance authorized under 

9 the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2251 

10 et seq.). 

11 (3) FOREIGN STATE.—The term ‘‘foreign state’’ 

12 has the meaning given such term in section 1603(a) 

13 of title 28, United States Code. 

14 (4) INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY.—The term ‘‘in15 telligence community’’ has the meaning given such 

16 term in section 3(4) of the National Security Act of 

17 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3003(4)). 

18 (5) PUBLIC CORRUPTION.—The term ‘‘public cor19 ruption’’ includes the unlawful exercise of entrusted 

20 public power for private gain, such as through brib21 ery, nepotism, fraud, extortion, or embezzlement. 

22 (6) RULE OF LAW.—The term ‘‘rule of law’’ 

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1 vate, including the state, are accountable to laws that 

2 are— 

3 (A) publicly promulgated; 

4 (B) equally enforced; 

5 (C) independently adjudicated; and 

6 (D) consistent with international human 

7 rights norms and standards. 

8 (c) STATEMENT OF POLICY.—It is the policy of the 

9 United States— 

10 (1) to leverage United States diplomatic engage11 ment and foreign assistance to promote the rule of 

12 law; 

13 (2)(A) to promote international instruments to 

14 combat corruption, kleptocracy, and illicit finance, 

15 including instruments referred to in subsection (a)(9), 

16 and other relevant international standards and best 

17 practices, as such standards and practices develop; 

18 and 

19 (B) to promote the adoption and implementation 

20 of such laws, standards, and practices by foreign 

21 states; 

22 (3) to support foreign states in promoting good 

23 governance and combating public corruption; 

24 (4) to encourage and assist foreign partner coun25 tries to identify and close loopholes in their legal and 


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1 financial architecture, including the misuse of anony2 mous shell companies, free trade zones, and other legal 

3 structures, that are enabling illicit finance to pene4 trate their financial systems; 

5 (5) to help foreign partner countries to inves6 tigate, prosecute, adjudicate, and more generally com7 bat the use of corruption by malign actors, including 

8 authoritarian governments, particularly the Govern9 ment of the Russian Federation and the Government 

10 of the People’s Republic of China, as a tool of malign 

11 influence worldwide; 

12 (6) to assist in the recovery of kleptocracy-related 

13 stolen assets for victims, including through the use of 

14 appropriate bilateral arrangements and international 

15 agreements, such as the United Nations Convention 

16 against Corruption, done at New York October 31, 

17 2003, and the United Nations Convention against 

18 Transnational Organized Crime, done at New York 

19 November 15, 2000; 

20 (7) to use sanctions authorities, such as the Glob21 al Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act (sub22 title F of title XII of the National Defense Authoriza23 tion Act for Fiscal Year 2017 (Public Law 114–328; 

24 22 U.S.C. 2656 note)) and section 7031(c) of the De25 partment of State, Foreign Operations, and Related 


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1 Programs Appropriations Act, 2020 (division G of 

2 Public Law 116–94), to identify and take action 

3 against corrupt foreign actors; 

4 (8) to ensure coordination between relevant Fed5 eral departments and agencies with jurisdiction over 

6 the advancement of good governance in foreign states; 

7 and 

8 (9) to lead the creation of a formal grouping of 

9 like-minded states— 

10 (A) to coordinate efforts to counter corrup11 tion, kleptocracy, and illicit finance; and 

12 (B) to strengthen collective financial de13 fense. 

14 (d) ANTI-CORRUPTION ACTION FUND.— 

15 (1) ESTABLISHMENT.—There is established in 

16 the United States Treasury a fund, to be known as 

17 the ‘‘Anti-Corruption Action Fund’’, only for the pur18 poses of— 

19 (A) strengthening the capacity of foreign 

20 states to prevent and fight public corruption; 

21 (B) assisting foreign states to develop rule 

22 of law-based governance structures, including ac23 countable civilian police, prosecutorial, and judi24 cial institutions; 


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1 (C) supporting foreign states to strengthen 

2 domestic legal and regulatory frameworks to 

3 combat public corruption, including the adoption 

4 of best practices under international law; and 

5 (D) supplementing existing foreign assist6 ance and diplomacy with respect to efforts de7 scribed in subparagraphs (A), (B), and (C). 

8 (2) FUNDING.— 

9 (A) TRANSFERS.—Beginning on or after the 

10 date of the enactment of this Act, if total crimi11 nal fines and penalties in excess of $50,000,000 

12 are imposed against a person under the Foreign 

13 Corrupt Practices Act of 1977 (Public Law 95– 

14 213) or section 13, 30A, or 32 of the Securities 

15 Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78m, 78dd–1, 

16 and 78ff), whether pursuant to a criminal pros17 ecution, enforcement proceeding, deferred pros18 ecution agreement, nonprosecution agreement, a 

19 declination to prosecute or enforce, or any other 

20 resolution, the court (in the case of a conviction) 

21 or the Attorney General shall impose an addi22 tional prevention payment equal to $5,000,000 

23 against such person, which shall be deposited in 

24 the Anti-Corruption Action Fund established 

25 under paragraph (1). 


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1 (B) AVAILABILITY OF FUNDS.—Amounts de2 posited into the Anti-Corruption Action Fund 

3 pursuant to subparagraph (A) shall be available 

4 to the Secretary of State only for the purposes 

5 described in paragraph (1), without fiscal year 

6 limitation or need for subsequent appropriation. 

7 (C) LIMITATION.—None of the amounts 

8 made available to the Secretary of State from the 

9 Anti-Corruption Action Fund may be used in10 side the United States, except for administrative 

11 costs related to overseas program implementation 

12 pursuant to paragraph (1). 

13 (3) SUPPORT.—The Anti-Corruption Action 

14 Fund— 

15 (A) may support governmental and non16 governmental parties in advancing the purposes 

17 described in paragraph (1); and 

18 (B) shall be allocated in a manner com19 plementary to existing United States foreign as20 sistance, diplomacy, and anti-corruption activi21 ties. 

22 (4) ALLOCATION AND PRIORITIZATION.—In pro23 gramming foreign assistance made available through 

24 the Anti-Corruption Action Fund, the Secretary of 


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1 State, in coordination with the Attorney General, 

2 shall prioritize projects that— 

3 (A) assist countries that are undergoing his4 toric opportunities for democratic transition, 

5 combating corruption, and the establishment of 

6 the rule of law; and 

7 (B) are important to United States na8 tional interests. 

9 (5) TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE PROVIDERS.—For 

10 any technical assistance to a foreign governmental 

11 party under this section, the Secretary of State, in co12 ordination with the Attorney General, shall prioritize 

13 United States Government technical assistance pro14 viders as implementers, in particular the Office of 

15 Overseas Prosecutorial Development, Assistance and 

16 Training and the International Criminal Investiga17 tive Training Assistance Program at the Department 

18 of Justice. 

19 (6) PUBLIC DIPLOMACY.—The Secretary of State 

20 shall announce that funds deposited in the Anti-Cor21 ruption Action Fund are derived from actions 

22 brought under the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act to 

23 demonstrate that the use of such funds are— 

24 (A) contributing to international anti-cor25 ruption work; and 


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1 (B) reducing the pressure that United 

2 States businesses face to pay bribes overseas, 

3 thereby contributing to greater competitiveness of 

4 United States companies. 

5 (7) REPORTING.—Not later than 1 year after the 

6 date of the enactment of this Act and not less fre7 quently than annually thereafter, the Secretary of 

8 State shall submit a report to the appropriate con9 gressional committees that contains— 

10 (A) the balance of the funding remaining in 

11 the Anti-Corruption Action Fund; 

12 (B) the amount of funds that have been de13 posited into the Anti-Corruption Action Fund; 

14 and 

15 (C) a summary of the obligation and ex16 penditure of such funds. 

17 (8) NOTIFICATION REQUIREMENTS.—None of the 

18 amounts made available to the Secretary of State 

19 from the Anti-Corruption Action Fund pursuant to 

20 this section shall be available for obligation, or for 

21 transfer to other departments, agencies, or entities, 

22 unless the Secretary of State notifies the Committee 

23 on Foreign Relations of the Senate, the Committee on 

24 Appropriations of the Senate, the Committee on For25 eign Affairs of the House of Representatives, and the 


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1 Committee on Appropriations of the House of Rep2 resentatives, not later than 15 days in advance of 

3 such obligation or transfer. 

4 (e) INTERAGENCY ANTI-CORRUPTION TASK FORCE.— 

5 (1) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary of State, in co6 operation with the Interagency Anti-Corruption Task 

7 Force established pursuant to paragraph (2), shall 

8 manage a whole-of-government effort to improve co9 ordination among Federal departments and agencies 

10 and donor organizations with a role in— 

11 (A) promoting good governance in foreign 

12 states; and 

13 (B) enhancing the ability of foreign states 

14 to combat public corruption. 

15 (2) INTERAGENCY ANTI-CORRUPTION TASK

16 FORCE.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the 

17 enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall es18 tablish and convene the Interagency Anti-Corruption 

19 Task Force (referred to in this section as the ‘‘Task 

20 Force’’), which shall be composed of representatives 

21 appointed by the President from appropriate depart22 ments and agencies, including the Department of 

23 State, the United States Agency for International De24 velopment, the Department of Justice, the Department 

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1 rity, the Department of Defense, the Department of 

2 Commerce, the Millennium Challenge Corporation, 

3 and the intelligence community. 

4 (3) ADDITIONAL MEETINGS.—The Task Force 

5 shall meet not less frequently than twice per year. 

6 (4) DUTIES.—The Task Force shall— 

7 (A) evaluate, on a general basis, the effec8 tiveness of existing foreign assistance programs, 

9 including programs funded by the Anti-Corrup10 tion Action Fund, that have an impact on— 

11 (i) promoting good governance in for12 eign states; and 

13 (ii) enhancing the ability of foreign 

14 states to combat public corruption; 

15 (B) assist the Secretary of State in man16 aging the whole-of-government effort described in 

17 paragraph (1); 

18 (C) identify general areas in which such 

19 whole-of-government effort could be enhanced; 

20 and 

21 (D) recommend specific programs for for22 eign states that may be used to enhance such 

23 whole-of-government effort. 

24 (5) BRIEFING REQUIREMENT.—Not later than 1 

25 year after the date of the enactment of this Act and 


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1 not less frequently than annually thereafter through 

2 the end of fiscal year 2026, the Secretary of State 

3 shall provide a briefing to the appropriate congres4 sional committees regarding the ongoing work of the 

5 Task Force. Each briefing shall include the participa6 tion of a representative of each of the departments 

7 and agencies described in paragraph (2), to the extent 

8 feasible. 

9 (f) DESIGNATION OF EMBASSY ANTI-CORRUPTION

10 POINTS OF CONTACT.— 

11 (1) EMBASSY ANTI-CORRUPTION POINT OF CON12 TACT.—The chief of mission of each United States 

13 embassy shall designate an anti-corruption point of 

14 contact for each such embassy. 

15 (2) DUTIES.—The designated anti-corruption 

16 points of contact designated pursuant to paragraph 

17 (1) shall— 

18 (A) coordinate, in accordance with guidance 

19 from the Interagency Anti-Corruption Task 

20 Force established pursuant to subsection (e)(2), 

21 an interagency approach within United States 

22 embassies to combat public corruption in the for23 eign states in which such embassies are located 

24 that is tailored to the needs of such foreign 

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1 ments and agencies with a presence in such for2 eign states, such as the Department of State, the 

3 United States Agency for International Develop4 ment, the Department of Justice, the Department 

5 of the Treasury, the Department of Homeland 

6 Security, the Department of Defense, the Millen7 nium Challenge Corporation, and the intelligence 

8 community; 

9 (B) make recommendations regarding the 

10 use of the Anti-Corruption Action Fund and 

11 other foreign assistance funding related to anti12 corruption efforts in their respective countries of 

13 responsibility that aligns with United States 

14 diplomatic engagement; and 

15 (C) ensure that anti-corruption activities 

16 carried out within their respective countries of 

17 responsibility are included in regular reporting 

18 to the Secretary of State and the Interagency 

19 Anti-Corruption Task Force, including United 

20 States embassy strategic planning documents 

21 and foreign assistance-related reporting, as ap22 propriate. 

23 (3) TRAINING.—The Secretary of State shall de24 velop and implement appropriate training for the 

25 designated anti-corruption points of contact. 


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1 (g) REPORTING REQUIREMENTS.— 

2 (1) REPORT OR BRIEFING ON PROGRESS TOWARD

3 IMPLEMENTATION.—Not later than 180 days after the 

4 date of the enactment of this Act, and annually there5 after for the following 3 years, the Secretary of State, 

6 in consultation with the Administrator of the United 

7 States Agency for International Development, the At8 torney General, and the Secretary of the Treasury, 

9 shall submit a report or provide a briefing to the ap10 propriate congressional committees that summarizes 

11 progress made in combating public corruption and in 

12 implementing this Act, including— 

13 (A) identifying opportunities and priorities 

14 for outreach with respect to promoting the adop15 tion and implementation of relevant inter16 national law and standards in combating public 

17 corruption, kleptocracy, and illicit finance; 

18 (B) describing— 

19 (i) the bureaucratic structure of the of20 fices within the Department of State and 

21 the United States Agency for International 

22 Development that are engaged in activities 

23 to combat public corruption, kleptocracy, 

24 and illicit finance; and 


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1 (ii) how such offices coordinate their 

2 efforts with each other and with other rel3 evant Federal departments and agencies; 

4 (C) providing a description of how the pro5 visions under paragraphs (4) and (5) of sub6 section (d) have been applied to each project 

7 funded by the Anti-Corruption Action Fund; 

8 (D) providing an explanation as to why a 

9 United States Government technical assistance 

10 provider was not used if technical assistance to 

11 a foreign governmental entity is not imple12 mented by a United States Government technical 

13 assistance provider; 

14 (E) describing the activities of the Inter15 agency Anti-Corruption Task Force established 

16 pursuant to subsection (e)(2); 

17 (F) identifying— 

18 (i) the designated anti-corruption 

19 points of contact for foreign states; and 

20 (ii) any training provided to such 

21 points of contact; and 

22 (G) recommending additional measures that 

23 would enhance the ability of the United States 

24 Government to combat public corruption, 

25 kleptocracy, and illicit finance overseas. 


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1 (2) ONLINE PLATFORM.—The Secretary of State, 

2 in conjunction with the Administrator of the United 

3 States Agency for International Development, should 

4 consolidate existing reports with anti-corruption com5 ponents into a single online, public platform that in6 cludes— 

7 (A) the Annual Country Reports on Human 

8 Rights Practices required under section 116 of 

9 the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 

10 2151n); 

11 (B) the Fiscal Transparency Report re12 quired under section 7031(b) of the Department 

13 of State, Foreign Operations and Related Pro14 grams Appropriations Act, 2019 (division F of 

15 Public Law 116–6); 

16 (C) the Investment Climate Statement re17 ports; 

18 (D) the International Narcotics Control 

19 Strategy Report; 

20 (E) any other relevant public reports; and 

21 (F) links to third-party indicators and com22 pliance mechanisms used by the United States 

23 Government to inform policy and programming, 

24 as appropriate, such as— 


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1 (i) the International Finance Corpora2 tion’s Doing Business surveys; 

3 (ii) the International Budget Partner4 ship’s Open Budget Index; and 

5 (iii) multilateral peer review anti-cor6 ruption compliance mechanisms, such as— 

7 (I) the Organisation for Economic 

8 Co-operation and Development’s Work9 ing Group on Bribery in International 

10 Business Transactions; 

11 (II) the Follow-Up Mechanism for 

12 the Inter-American Convention 

13 Against Corruption; and 

14 (III) the United Nations Conven15 tion Against Corruption, done at New 

16 York October 31, 2003. 

17 SEC. 404. ANNUAL REPORT ON CHINESE SURVEILLANCE 

18 COMPANIES. 

19 (a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days after the 

20 date of the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter 

21 until 2040, the Secretary of State, in coordination with the 

22 Director of National Intelligence, shall submit to the Com23 mittee on Foreign Affairs and Permanent Select Committee 

24 on Intelligence of the House of Representatives, and the 

25 Committee on Foreign Relations and the Select Committee 


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1 on Intelligence of the Senate, a report with respect to per2 sons in China that the Secretary determines— 

3 (1) have operated, sold, leased, or otherwise pro4 vided, directly or indirectly, items or services related 

5 to targeted digital surveillance to— 

6 (A) a foreign government or entity located 

7 primarily inside a foreign country where a rea8 sonable person would assess that such transfer 

9 could result in a use of the items or services in 

10 a manner contrary to human rights; or 

11 (B) a country or any governmental unit 

12 thereof, entity, or other person determined by the 

13 Secretary of State, in a notice published in the 

14 Federal Register, to have used items or services 

15 for targeted digital surveillance in a manner 

16 contrary to human rights; or 

17 (2) have materially assisted, sponsored, or pro18 vided financial, material, or technological support 

19 for, or items or services to or in support of, the activi20 ties described in paragraph (1). 

21 (b) MATTERS TO BE INCLUDED.—The report required 

22 by subsection (a) shall include the following: 

23 (1) The name of each foreign person that the Sec24 retary determines— 


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1 (A) meets the requirements of subsection 

2 (a)(1); and 

3 (B) meets the requirements of subsection 

4 (a)(2). 

5 (2) The name of each intended and actual recipi6 ent of items or services described in subsection (a). 

7 (3) A detailed description of such items or serv8 ices. 

9 (4) An analysis of the appropriateness of includ10 ing the persons listed in (b)(1) on the entity list 

11 maintained by the Bureau of Industry and Security. 

12 (c) CONSULTATION.—In compiling data and making 

13 assessments for the purposes of preparing the report re14 quired by subsection (a), the Secretary of State shall consult 

15 with a wide range of organizations, including with respect 

16 to— 

17 (1) classified and unclassified information pro18 vided by the Director of National Intelligence; 

19 (2) information provided by the Bureau of De20 mocracy, Human Rights, and Labor’s Internet Free21 dom, Business and Human Rights section; 

22 (3) information provided by the Department of 

23 Commerce, including the Bureau of Industry and Se24 curity; 


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1 (4) information provided by the advisory com2 mittees established by the Secretary to advise the 

3 Under Secretary of Commerce for Industry and Secu4 rity on controls under the Export Administration 

5 Regulations, including the Emerging Technology and 

6 Research Advisory Committee; 

7 (5) information on human rights and technology 

8 matters, as solicited from civil society and human 

9 rights organizations through regular consultative 

10 processes; and 

11 (6) information contained in the Country Re12 ports on Human Rights Practices published annually 

13 by the Department of State. 

14 (d) FORM AND PUBLIC AVAILABILITY OF REPORT.— 

15 The report required by subsection (a) shall be submitted in 

16 unclassified form. The report shall be posted by the Presi17 dent not later than 14 days after being submitted to Con18 gress on a text-based, searchable, and publicly available 

19 internet website. 

20 (e) DEFINITIONS.—In this section: 

21 (1) TARGETED DIGITAL SURVEILLANCE.—The 

22 term ‘‘targeted digital surveillance’’ means the use of 

23 items or services that enable an individual or entity 

24 to detect, monitor, intercept, collect, exploit, preserve, 

25 protect, transmit, retain, or otherwise gain access to 


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1 the communications, protected information, work 

2 product, browsing data, research, identifying infor3 mation, location history, or online and offline activi4 ties of other individuals, organizations, or entities, 

5 with or without the explicit authorization of such in6 dividuals, organizations, or entities. 

7 (2) FOREIGN PERSON.—The term ‘‘foreign per8 son’’ means an individual or entity that is not a 

9 United States person. 

10 (3) IN A MANNER CONTRARY TO HUMAN

11 RIGHTS.—The term ‘‘in a manner contrary to human 

12 rights’’, with respect to targeted digital surveillance, 

13 means engaging in targeted digital surveillance— 

14 (A) in violation of basic human rights, in15 cluding to silence dissent, sanction criticism, 

16 punish independent reporting (and sources for 

17 that reporting), manipulate or interfere with 

18 democratic or electoral processes, persecute mi19 norities or vulnerable groups, or target advocates 

20 or practitioners of human rights and democratic 

21 rights (including activists, journalists, artists, 

22 minority communities, or opposition politi23 cians); or 


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1 (B) in a country in which there is lacking 

2 a minimum legal framework governing its use, 

3 including established— 

4 (i) authorization under laws that are 

5 accessible, precise, and available to the pub6 lic; 

7 (ii) constraints limiting its use under 

8 principles of necessity, proportionality, and 

9 legitimacy; 

10 (iii) oversight by bodies independent of 

11 the government’s executive agencies; 

12 (iv) involvement of an independent 

13 and impartial judiciary branch in author14 izing its use; or 

15 (v) legal remedies in case of abuse. 

16 TITLE V—ENSURING STRATEGIC 

17 SECURITY 

18 SEC. 501. COOPERATION ON A STRATEGIC NUCLEAR DIA19 LOGUE. 

20 (a) STATEMENT OF POLICY.—It is the policy of the 

21 United States— 

22 (1) to pursue, in coordination with United 

23 States allies and partners, arms control negotiations 

24 and sustained and regular engagement with the Peo25 ple’s Republic of China (PRC)— 


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1 (A) to enhance understanding of each oth2 er’s respective nuclear policies, doctrine, and ca3 pabilities; 

4 (B) to improve transparency; and 

5 (C) to help manage the risks of miscalcula6 tion and misperception; 

7 (2) to formulate a strategy to engage the Govern8 ment of the PRC on relevant issues that lays the 

9 groundwork for a constructive arms control frame10 work, including— 

11 (A) fostering dialogue on arms control lead12 ing to the convening of strategic security talks; 

13 (B) negotiating norms for outer space; 

14 (C) developing pre-launch notification re15 gimes aimed at reducing nuclear miscalculation; 

16 and 

17 (D) expanding lines of communication be18 tween both governments for the purposes of re19 ducing the risks of conventional war and in20 creasing transparency; 

21 (3) to pursue relevant negotiations in coordina22 tion with United States allies and partners to ensure 

23 the security of United States and allied interests to 

24 slow the PRC’s military modernization and expan25 sion, including on— 


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1 (A) ground-launched cruise and ballistic 

2 missiles; 

3 (B) integrated air and missile defense; 

4 (C) hypersonic missiles; 

5 (D) intelligence, surveillance, and recon6 naissance; 

7 (E) space-based capabilities; 

8 (F) cyber capabilities; and 

9 (G) command, control, and communica10 tions; and 

11 (4) to ensure that the United States policy con12 tinues to reassure United States allies and partners. 

13 (b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Congress 

14 that— 

15 (1) it is in the interest of the United States and 

16 China to cooperate in reducing risks of conventional 

17 and nuclear escalation; 

18 (2) a physical, cyber, electronic, or any other 

19 People’s Liberation Army (PLA) attack on United 

20 States early warning satellites, other portions of the 

21 nuclear command and control enterprise, or critical 

22 infrastructure poses a high risk to inadvertent but 

23 rapid escalation; 

24 (3) the United States and its allies and partners 

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1 ations in space, the employment of cyber capabilities, 

2 and the military use of artificial intelligence, as an 

3 element of risk reduction regarding nuclear command 

4 and control; and 

5 (4) United States allies and partners should 

6 share the burden of promoting and protecting norms 

7 regarding the weaponization of space, highlighting 

8 unsafe behavior that violates international norms, 

9 such as in rendezvous and proximity operations, and 

10 promoting responsible behavior in space and all other 

11 domains. 

12 SEC. 502. REPORT ON UNITED STATES EFFORTS TO ENGAGE 

13 THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA ON NU14 CLEAR ISSUES AND BALLISTIC MISSILE 

15 ISSUES. 

16 (a) REPORT ON THE FUTURE OF UNITED STATES17 PRC ARMS CONTROL.—Not later than 180 days after the 

18 date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, 

19 in coordination with the Secretary of Defense and the Sec20 retary of Energy, shall submit to the appropriate congres21 sional committees a report, and if necessary a separate clas22 sified annex, that outlines the approaches and strategies 

23 such Secretaries will pursue to engage the Government of 

24 the People’s Republic of China (PRC) on arms control and 

25 risk reduction, including— 


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1 (1) areas of potential dialogue between the Gov2 ernments of the United States and the PRC, includ3 ing on ballistic, hypersonic glide, and cruise missiles, 

4 conventional forces, nuclear, space, and cyberspace 

5 issues, as well as other new strategic domains, which 

6 could reduce the likelihood of war, limit escalation if 

7 a conflict were to occur, and constrain a destabilizing 

8 arms race in the Indo-Pacific region; 

9 (2) how the United States Government can en10 gage the Government of the PRC in a constructive 

11 arms control dialogue; 

12 (3) identifying strategic military capabilities of 

13 the PRC that the United States Government is most 

14 concerned about and how limiting these capabilities 

15 may benefit United States and allied security inter16 ests; 

17 (4) mechanisms to avoid, manage, or control nu18 clear, conventional, and unconventional military es19 calation between the United States and the PRC; 

20 (5) the personnel and expertise required to effec21 tively engage the PRC in strategic stability and arms 

22 control dialogues; and 

23 (6) opportunities and methods to encourage 

24 transparency from the PRC. 


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1 (b) REPORT ON ARMS CONTROL TALKS WITH PRC.— 

2 Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of 

3 this Act, the Secretary of State, in consultation with the 

4 Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of Energy, shall sub5 mit to the appropriate congressional committees a report 

6 that describes— 

7 (1) a concrete plan for arms control talks with 

8 the PRC; 

9 (2) if a bilateral arms control dialogue does not 

10 arise, what alternative plans the Department of State 

11 envisages for ensuring the security of the United 

12 States and its allies through international arms con13 trol negotiations; 

14 (3) effects on the credibility of United States ex15 tended deterrence assurances to allies and partners if 

16 arms control negotiations do not materialize and the 

17 implications for regional security architectures; 

18 (4) efforts at engaging the PRC to join arms con19 trol talks, whether on a bilateral or international 

20 basis; and 

21 (5) the interest level of the Government of PRC 

22 in joining arms control talks, whether on a bilateral 

23 or international basis, including through— 

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1 nent members of the United Nations Security 

2 Council, to observe a United States-Russian Fed3 eration New START Treaty on-site inspection to 

4 demonstrate the security benefits of transparency 

5 into strategic nuclear forces; 

6 (B) discussions on how to advance inter7 national negotiations on the fissile material cut8 off; 

9 (C) an agreement with the PRC that allows 

10 for advance notifications of ballistic missile 

11 launches, through the Hague Code of Conduct or 

12 other data exchanges or doctrine discussions re13 lated to strategic nuclear forces; 

14 (D) an agreement not to target or interfere 

15 in nuclear command, control, and communica16 tions (commonly referred to as ‘‘NC3’’) infra17 structure; or 

18 (E) any other cooperative measure that ben19 efits United States-PRC strategic stability. 

20 (c) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES DE21 FINED.—In this section, the term ‘‘appropriate congres22 sional committees’’ means— 

23 (1) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the 

24 Committee on Armed Services, and the Committee on 

25 Energy and Natural Resources of the Senate; and 


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1 (2) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Com2 mittee on Armed Services, and the Committee on En3 ergy and Commerce of the House of Representatives. 

4 SEC. 503. COUNTERING THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHI5 NA’S PROLIFERATION OF BALLISTIC MIS6 SILES AND NUCLEAR TECHNOLOGY TO THE 

7 MIDDLE EAST. 

8 (a) MTCR TRANSFERS.—Not later than 30 days after 

9 the date of the enactment of this Act, the President shall 

10 submit to the appropriate congressional committees a writ11 ten determination, and any documentation to support that 

12 determination detailing— 

13 (1) whether any foreign person in the People’s 

14 Republic of China (PRC) knowingly exported, trans15 ferred, or engaged in trade of any item designated 

16 under Category I of the MTCR Annex to any foreign 

17 person in the previous three fiscal years; and 

18 (2) the sanctions the President has imposed or 

19 intends to impose pursuant to section 11B(b) of the 

20 Export Administration Act of 1979 (50 U.S.C. 

21 4612(b)) against any foreign person who knowingly 

22 engaged in the export, transfer, or trade of that item 

23 or items. 

24 (b) PRC’S NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE COOPERATION.— 

25 Not later than 30 days after the date of the enactment of 


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1 this Act, the President shall submit to the appropriate com2 mittees of Congress a report detailing— 

3 (1) whether any foreign person in the PRC en4 gaged in cooperation with any other foreign person in 

5 the previous three fiscal years in the construction of 

6 any nuclear-related fuel cycle facility or activity that 

7 has not been notified to the International Atomic En8 ergy Agency and would be subject to complementary 

9 access if an Additional Protocol was in force; and 

10 (2) the policy options required to prevent and re11 spond to any future effort by the PRC to export to 

12 any foreign person an item classified as ‘‘plants for 

13 the separation of isotopes of uranium’’ or ‘‘plants for 

14 the reprocessing of irradiated nuclear reactor fuel ele15 ments’’ under Part 110 of the Nuclear Regulatory 

16 Commission export licensing authority. 

17 (c) FORM OF REPORT.—The determination required 

18 under subsection (b) and the report required under sub19 section (c) shall be unclassified with a classified annex. 

20 (d) DEFINITIONS.—In this section: 

21 (1) The term ‘‘appropriate congressional com22 mittees’’ means— 

23 (A) the Select Committee on Intelligence 

24 and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the 

25 Senate; and 


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1 (B) the Permanent Select Committee on In2 telligence and the Committee on Foreign Affairs 

3 of the House of Representatives. 

4 (2) FOREIGN PERSON; PERSON.—The terms ‘‘for5 eign person’’ and ‘‘person’’ mean— 

6 (A) a natural person that is an alien; 

7 (B) a corporation, business association, 

8 partnership, society, trust, or any other non9 governmental entity, organization, or group, that 

10 is organized under the laws of a foreign country 

11 or has its principal place of business in a foreign 

12 country; 

13 (C) any foreign governmental entity oper14 ating as a business enterprise; and 

15 (D) any successor, subunit, or subsidiary of 

16 any entity described in subparagraph (B) or (C). 

17 TITLE VI—INVESTING IN A 

18 SUSTAINABLE FUTURE 

19 SEC. 601. ENSURING NATIONAL SECURITY AND ECONOMIC 

20 PRIORITIES WITH THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC 

21 OF CHINA AND OTHER COUNTRIES ACCOUNT 

22 FOR ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES AND CLIMATE 

23 CHANGE. 

24 (a) FINDINGS.—Congress finds the following: 


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1 (1) The Special Report: Global Warming of 

2 1.5°C, published by the Intergovernmental Panel on 

3 Climate Change on October 8, 2018, and the Fourth 

4 National Climate Assessment, first published by the 

5 United States Global Change Research Program in 

6 2018, concluded that— 

7 (A) the release of greenhouse gas emissions, 

8 most notably the combustion of fossil fuels and 

9 the degradation of natural resources that absorb 

10 atmospheric carbon from human activity, are the 

11 dominant causes of climate change during the 

12 past century; 

13 (B) changes in the Earth’s climate are— 

14 (i) causing sea levels to rise; 

15 (ii) increasing the global average tem16 perature of the Earth; 

17 (iii) increasing the incidence and se18 verity of wildfires; and 

19 (iv) intensifying the severity of extreme 

20 weather, including hurricanes, cyclones, ty21 phoons, flooding, droughts, and other disas22 ters that threaten human life, healthy com23 munities, and critical infrastructure. 


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1 (2) An increase in the global average tempera2 ture of 2 degrees Celsius compared to pre-industri3 alized levels would cause— 

4 (A) the displacement, and the forced inter5 nal migration, of an estimated 143,000,000 peo6 ple in Latin America, South Asia, and Sub-Sa7 haran Africa by 2050 if insufficient action is 

8 taken (according to the World Bank); 

9 (B) the displacement of an average of 

10 17,800,000 people worldwide by floods every year 

11 (according to the Internal Displacement Moni12 toring Centre) because of the exacerbating effects 

13 of climate change; 

14 (C) more than $500,000,000,000 in lost an15 nual economic output in the United States (a 10 

16 percent contraction from 2018 levels) by 2100 

17 (according to the Fourth National Climate As18 sessment); 

19 (D) an additional 100,000,000 people 

20 worldwide to be driven into poverty by 2030 (ac21 cording to the World Bank); 

22 (E) greater food insecurity and decreased 

23 agricultural production due to climate change’s 

24 effects on the increased frequency and intensity 

25 of extreme weather events; 


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1 (F) the proliferation of agricultural pests 

2 and crop diseases, loss of biodiversity, degrading 

3 ecosystems, and water scarcity; and 

4 (G) more than 350,000,000 additional peo5 ple worldwide to be exposed to deadly heat stress 

6 by 2050. 

7 (3) According to the International Energy Agen8 cy, the United States, China, India, and the Euro9 pean Union (including the United Kingdom) account 

10 for more than 58 percent of global greenhouse gas 

11 emissions. China, which is the world’s top greenhouse 

12 gases emitter and has an outsized impact on the 

13 United States’ core interest in climate stability— 

14 (A) is likely to achieve its carbon emissions 

15 mitigation pledge to the Paris Agreement, con16 tained in its 2015 nationally determined con17 tribution, to ‘‘peak’’ emissions around 2030 

18 ahead of schedule; 

19 (B) announced, on September 22, 2020, and 

20 restated on April 22, 2021, a pledge to achieve 

21 carbon neutrality by 2060; 

22 (C) announced on April 22, 2021, its intent 

23 to strictly control coal fired power generation 

24 projects, as well as strictly limit the increase in 

25 coal consumption over the 14th five year plan 


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1 period and phase it down in the 15th five year 

2 plan period; and 

3 (D) however, remains uncommitted to inter4 nationally recognized metrics for achieving these 

5 goals. 

6 (b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Congress 

7 that— 

8 (1) to address the climate crisis, the United 

9 States must leverage the full weight of its diplomatic 

10 engagement and foreign assistance to promote our na11 tional security and economic interests related to cli12 mate change; 

13 (2) in the absence of United States leadership on 

14 global issues driving international climate-related 

15 policymaking, it would lead to a substantial and 

16 harmful decline in the Nation’s global competitive17 ness; 

18 (3) promoting international instruments on cli19 mate action and other relevant international stand20 ards and best practices, as such standards and prac21 tices develop, serve the interests of the American peo22 ple and protect United States environmental resources 

23 and the planet; 

24 (4) promoting the adoption and implementation 

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1 ards, and practices by foreign states ensures a level 

2 playing field for United States businesses and other 

3 stakeholders; 

4 (5) working with international allies and part5 ners to promote environmental justice and climate 

6 justice serves the American people’s interests; 

7 (6) finding common ground with the People’s 

8 Republic of China (PRC) on climate action where 

9 possible is important, but the United States must also 

10 continue to hold the PRC accountable where its ac11 tions undermine the interests of the United States 

12 and its allies and partners; 

13 (7) and in furtherance of the previous clauses, 

14 the United States should— 

15 (A) explore opportunities for constructive 

16 cooperation on climate action initiatives with 

17 the PRC and other countries while ensuring the 

18 United States maintains its competitive advan19 tage in climate-related fields of expertise and in20 dustry, including— 

21 (i) support for international coopera22 tive policies, measures, and technologies to 

23 decarbonize industry and power, including 

24 through circular economy, energy storage 


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1 and grid reliability, carbon capture, and 

2 green hydrogen; and 

3 (ii) increased deployment of clean en4 ergy, including renewable and advanced nu5 clear power; green and climate resilient ag6 riculture; energy efficient buildings; green, 

7 and low-carbon transportation; 

8 (B) cooperate on addressing emissions of 

9 methane and other non-CO2 greenhouse gases; 

10 (C) cooperate on addressing emissions from 

11 international civil aviation and maritime activi12 ties; 

13 (D) reduce emissions from coal, oil, and 

14 gas; 

15 (E) implement the Paris Agreement that 

16 significantly advances global climate ambition 

17 on mitigation, adaptation, and support; 

18 (F) coordinate among relevant federal, state, 

19 and local departments and agencies on climate 

20 action related initiatives; 

21 (G) provide resources, authorities and sup22 port for enhancing United States ambition and 

23 commitment to solving the climate crisis includ24 ing climate action specific assistance and multi25 lateral fund contributions; and 


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1 (H) integrate considerations for climate 

2 change into broader United States foreign policy 

3 decision-making and the United States national 

4 security apparatus. 

5 (c) PURPOSE.—The purpose of this section is to pro6 vide authorities, resources, policies, and recommended ad7 ministrative actions— 

8 (1) to restore United States global leadership on 

9 addressing the climate crisis and make United States 

10 climate action and climate diplomacy a more central 

11 tenet of United States foreign policy; 

12 (2) to improve the United States commitment to 

13 taking more ambitious action to help mitigate global 

14 greenhouse gas emission and improve developing 

15 countries’ resilience and adaptation capacities to the 

16 effects of climate change; 

17 (3) to ensure the United States maintains com18 petitive advantage over global strategic competitors in 

19 diplomacy and new technological development; 

20 (4) to encourage the pursuit of new bilateral co21 operation agreements with other world powers on ini22 tiatives to advance global clean energy innovation 

23 and other measures to mitigate global greenhouse gas 

24 emissions and improve climate change adaptation ca25 pacities; 


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1 (5) to ensure that the United States national se2 curity apparatus integrates critically important data 

3 on the compounding effects that climate change is 

4 having on global security risks by enhancing our un5 derstanding of how, where, and when such effects are 

6 destabilizing countries and regions in ways that may 

7 motivate conflict, displacement, and other drivers of 

8 insecurity; and 

9 (6) to authorize funding and programs to sup10 port a reaffirmation of the United States’ commit11 ments to international cooperation and support for 

12 developing and vulnerable countries to take climate 

13 action. 

14 (d) DEFINITIONS.—In this title: 

15 (1) CLEAN ENERGY.—The term ‘‘clean energy’’ 

16 means— 

17 (A) renewable energy and related systems; 

18 (B) energy production processes that emit 

19 zero greenhouse gas emissions, including nuclear 

20 power; 

21 (C) systems and processes that capture and 

22 permanently store greenhouse gas emissions from 

23 fossil fuel production and electricity generation 

24 units; and 


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1 (D) products, processes, facilities, or systems 

2 designed to retrofit and improve the energy effi3 ciency and electricity generated from electrical 

4 generation units, while using less fuel, less or 

5 fewer power production resources, or less feed6 stocks. 

7 (2) CLIMATE ACTION.—The term ‘‘climate ac8 tion’’ means enhanced efforts to reduce greenhouse gas 

9 emissions and strengthen resilience and adaptive ca10 pacity to climate-induced impacts, including— 

11 (A) climate-related hazards in all countries; 

12 (B) integrating climate change measures 

13 into national policies, strategies and planning; 

14 and 

15 (C) improving education, awareness-rais16 ing, and human and institutional capacity with 

17 respect to climate change mitigation, adaptation, 

18 impact reduction, and early warning. 

19 (3) CLIMATE CRISIS.—The term ‘‘climate crisis’’ 

20 means the social, economic, health, safety, and secu21 rity impacts on people, and the threats to biodiversity 

22 and natural ecosystem health, which are attributable 

23 to the wide-variety of effects on global environmental 

24 and atmospheric conditions as a result of disruptions 

25 to the Earth’s climate from anthropogenic activities 


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1 that generate greenhouse gas emissions or reduce nat2 ural resource capacities to absorb and regulate atmos3 pheric carbon. 

4 (4) CLIMATE DIPLOMACY.—The term ‘‘climate 

5 diplomacy’’ means methods of influencing the deci6 sions and behavior of foreign governments and peoples 

7 through dialogue, negotiation, cooperation, and other 

8 peaceful measures on or about issues related to ad9 dressing global climate change, including— 

10 (A) the mitigation of global greenhouse gas 

11 emissions; 

12 (B) discussion, analysis, and sharing of sci13 entific data and information on the cause and 

14 effects of climate change; 

15 (C) the security, social, economic, and polit16 ical instability risks associated with the effects of 

17 climate change; 

18 (D) economic cooperation efforts and trade 

19 matters that are related to or associated with cli20 mate change and greenhouse gas mitigation from 

21 the global economy; 

22 (E) building resilience capacities and 

23 adapting to the effects of change; 

24 (F) sustainable land use and natural re25 source conservation; 


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1 (G) accounting for loss and damage attrib2 uted to the effects of climate change; 

3 (H) just transition of carbon intense econo4 mies to low or zero carbon economies and ac5 counting for laborers within affected economies; 

6 (I) technological innovations that reduce or 

7 eliminate carbon emissions; and 

8 (J) clean energy and energy systems. 

9 (5) CLIMATE FINANCING.—The term ‘‘climate fi10 nancing’’ means the transfer of new and additional 

11 public funds from developed countries to developing 

12 countries for projects and programs that— 

13 (A) reduce or eliminate greenhouse gas 

14 emissions; 

15 (B) enhance and restore natural carbon se16 questration; and 

17 (C) promote adaptation to climate change. 

18 (6) CLIMATE SECURITY.—The term ‘‘climate se19 curity’’ means the effects of climate change on— 

20 (A) United States national security con21 cerns and subnational, national, and regional 

22 political stability; and 

23 (B) overseas security and conflict situations 

24 that are potentially exacerbated by dynamic en25 vironmental factors and events, including— 


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1 (i) the intensification and frequency of 

2 droughts, floods, wildfires, tropical storms, 

3 and other extreme weather events; 

4 (ii) changes in historical severe weath5 er, drought, and wildfire patterns; 

6 (iii) the expansion of geographical 

7 ranges of droughts, floods, and wildfires 

8 into regions that had not regularly experi9 enced such phenomena; 

10 (iv) global sea level rise patterns and 

11 the expansion of geographical ranges af12 fected by drought; and 

13 (v) changes in marine environments 

14 that effect critical geostrategic waterways, 

15 such as the Arctic Ocean, the South China 

16 Sea, the South Pacific Ocean, the Barents 

17 Sea, and the Beaufort Sea. 

18 (7) GREEN CLIMATE FUND.—The term ‘‘Green 

19 Climate Fund’’ means the independent, multilateral 

20 fund— 

21 (A) established by parties to the United Na22 tions Framework Convention on Climate Change; 

23 and 


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1 (B) adopted by decision as part of the fi2 nancial mechanism of the United Nations 

3 Framework Convention on Climate Change. 

4 (8) PARIS AGREEMENT.—The term ‘‘Paris Agree5 ment’’ means the annex to Decision 1/CP.21 adopted 

6 by the 21st Conference of Parties of the United Na7 tions Framework Convention on Climate Change in 

8 Paris, France, on December 12, 2015. 

9 (9) RESILIENCE.—The term ‘‘resilience’’ means 

10 the ability of human made and natural systems (in11 cluding their component parts) to anticipate, absorb, 

12 cope, accommodate, or recover from the effects of a 

13 hazardous event in a timely and efficient manner, in14 cluding through ensuring the preservation, restora15 tion, or improvement of its essential basic structures 

16 and functions. It is not preparedness or response. 

17 SEC. 602. ENHANCING SECURITY CONSIDERATIONS FOR 

18 GLOBAL CLIMATE DISRUPTIONS. 

19 (a) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary of State, in consulta20 tion with the heads of other relevant Federal agencies, shall 

21 conduct biennial comprehensive evaluations of present and 

22 ongoing disruptions to the global climate system, includ23 ing— 

24 (1) the intensity, frequency, and range of nat25 ural disasters; 


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1 (2) the scarcity of global natural resources, in2 cluding fresh water; 

3 (3) global food, health, and energy insecurities; 

4 (4) conditions that contribute to— 

5 (A) intrastate and interstate conflicts; 

6 (B) foreign political and economic insta7 bility; 

8 (C) international migration of vulnerable 

9 and underserved populations; 

10 (D) the failure of national governments; 

11 and 

12 (E) gender-based violence; and 

13 (5) United States and allied military readiness, 

14 operations, and strategy. 

15 (b) PURPOSES.—The purposes of the evaluations con16 ducted under subsection (a) are— 

17 (1) to support the practical application of sci18 entific data and research on climate change’s dy19 namic effects around the world to improve resilience, 

20 adaptability, security, and stability despite growing 

21 global environmental risks and changes; 

22 (2) to ensure that the strategic planning and 

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1 count for heightened and dynamic risks and chal2 lenges associated with the effects of climate change; 

3 (3) to improve coordination between United 

4 States science agencies conducting research and fore5 casts on the causes and effects of climate change and 

6 United States national security agencies; 

7 (4) to better understand the disproportionate ef8 fects of global climate disruptions on women, girls, 

9 indigenous communities, and other historically 

10 marginalized populations; and 

11 (5) to inform the development of the climate se12 curity strategy described in subsection (d). 

13 (c) SCOPE.—The evaluations conducted under sub14 section (a) shall— 

15 (1) examine developing countries’ vulnerabilities 

16 and risks associated with global, regional, and local17 ized effects of climate change; and 

18 (2) assess and make recommendations on nec19 essary measures to mitigate risks and reduce 

20 vulnerabilities associated with effects, including— 

21 (A) sea level rise; 

22 (B) freshwater resource scarcity; 

23 (C) wildfires; and 

24 (D) increased intensity and frequency of ex25 treme weather conditions and events, such as 


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1 flooding, drought, and extreme storm events, in2 cluding tropical cyclones. 

3 (d) CLIMATE SECURITY STRATEGY.—The Secretary 

4 shall use the evaluations required under subsection (a)— 

5 (1) to inform the development and implementa6 tion of a climate security strategy for the Bureau of 

7 Conflict and Stabilization Operations, the Bureau of 

8 Political-Military Affairs, embassies, consulates, re9 gional bureaus, and other offices and programs oper10 ating chief of mission authority, including those with 

11 roles in conflict avoidance, prevention and security 

12 assistance, or humanitarian disaster response, preven13 tion, and assistance; and 

14 (2) in furtherance of such strategy, to assess, de15 velop, budget for, and (upon approval) implement 

16 plans, policies, and actions— 

17 (A) to account for the impacts of climate 

18 change to global human health, safety, govern19 ance, oceans, food production, fresh water and 

20 other critical natural resources, settlements, in21 frastructure, marginalized groups, and economic 

22 activity; 

23 (B) to evaluate the climate change vulner24 ability, security, susceptibility, and resiliency of 


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1 United States interests and non-defense assets 

2 abroad; 

3 (C) to coordinate the integration of climate 

4 change risk and vulnerability assessments into 

5 all foreign policy and security decision-making 

6 processes, including awarding foreign assistance; 

7 (D) to evaluate specific risks to certain re8 gions and countries that are— 

9 (i) vulnerable to the effects of climate 

10 change; and 

11 (ii) strategically significant to the 

12 United States; 

13 (E) to enhance the resilience capacities of 

14 foreign countries to the effects of climate change 

15 as a means of reducing the risks of conflict and 

16 instability; 

17 (F) to advance principles of good govern18 ance by encouraging foreign governments, par19 ticularly nations that are least capable of coping 

20 with the effects of climate change— 

21 (i) to conduct climate security evalua22 tions; and 

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1 bility and public safety in disaster situa2 tions in a humane and responsible fashion; 

3 (G) to evaluate the vulnerability, security, 

4 susceptibility, and resiliency of United States in5 terests and nondefense assets abroad; 

6 (H) to build international institutional ca7 pacity to address climate security implications 

8 and to advance United States interests, regional 

9 stability, and global security; and 

10 (I) other activities that advance— 

11 (i) the utilization and integration of 

12 climate science in national security plan13 ning; and 

14 (ii) the clear understanding of how the 

15 effects of climate change can exacerbate se16 curity risks and threats. 

17 (e) REPORT.—Not later than 180 days after the date 

18 of the enactment of this Act and every two years thereafter 

19 for the following 20 years, the Secretary of State, in con20 sultation with the heads of other relevant Federal depart21 ments and agencies shall submit to the Committee on For22 eign Relations and the Committee on Appropriations of the 

23 Senate and the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Com24 mittee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives 


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1 an unclassified report, with a classified annex if necessary, 

2 that includes— 

3 (1) a review of the efforts, initiatives, and pro4 grams in support of the strategy in subsection (c), as 

5 well as— 

6 (A) an assessment of the funding expended 

7 by relevant Federal departments and agencies on 

8 emerging events exacerbated by climate change 

9 and the legal, procedural, and resource con10 straints faced by the Department of State and 

11 the United States Agency for International De12 velopment throughout respective budgeting, stra13 tegic planning, and management cycles to sup14 port the prevention of and response to emerging 

15 events exacerbated by climate change; 

16 (B) current annual global assessments of 

17 emerging events exacerbated by climate change; 

18 (C) recommendations to further strengthen 

19 United States capabilities described in this sec20 tion; and 

21 (D) consideration of analysis, reporting, 

22 and policy recommendations by civil society, 

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1 vent and respond to emerging events exacerbated 

2 by climate change; 

3 (2) recommendations to ensure shared responsi4 bility by— 

5 (A) enhancing multilateral mechanisms for 

6 preventing, mitigating, and responding to emerg7 ing events exacerbated by climate change; and 

8 (B) strengthening regional organizations; 

9 and 

10 (3) the implementation status of the rec11 ommendations included in the review under para12 graph (1). 

13 (f) REPORT BY THE DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTEL14 LIGENCE.—The Director of National Intelligence is encour15 aged to include, in the Director’s annual (or more often as 

16 appropriate) unclassified testimony, accompanied by a 

17 classified annex, if necessary, to Congress on threats to 

18 United States national security— 

19 (1) a review of countries and regions at risk of 

20 emerging events exacerbated by climate change; and 

21 (2) whenever possible, specific identification of 

22 countries and regions at immediate risk of emerging 

23 events exacerbated by climate change. 


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1 SEC. 603. BALANCING ACCOUNTABILITY AND COOPERATION 

2 WITH CHINA. 

3 It is the sense of Congress that— 

4 (1) successful mitigation of global greenhouse gas 

5 emissions and changes to the environment require 

6 global cooperation and coordination of efforts, as well 

7 as holding other countries such as the People’s Repub8 lic of China (PRC) accountable for their actions and 

9 commitments to ensure a level playing field with the 

10 United States and its allies and partners; 

11 (2) other countries look toward the United States 

12 and the PRC, as the world’s largest emitters and larg13 est economies, for leadership by example to effectively 

14 mitigate greenhouse gas emissions, develop and deploy 

15 energy generation technologies, and integrate sustain16 able adaptation solutions to the inevitable effects of 

17 climate change; 

18 (3) given the volume of the PRC’s greenhouse gas 

19 emissions and the scientific imperative to swiftly re20 duce global greenhouse gas emissions to net-zero emis21 sions around 2050, China should— 

22 (A) revise its long-term pledge; 

23 (B) seek to immediately peak its emissions; 

24 (C) begin reducing its greenhouse gas emis25 sions significantly to meet a more ambitious 

26 long-term 2050 reductions target; and 


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1 (D) update its nationally determined con2 tribution along a trajectory that aligns with 

3 achieving a more ambitious net-zero by 2050 

4 emissions target; 

5 (4) it is in the United States national interest 

6 to emphasize the environment and climate change in 

7 its bilateral engagement with the PRC, as global cli8 mate risks cannot be mitigated without a significant 

9 reduction in PRC domestic and overseas emissions; 

10 (5) the United States and the PRC, to the extent 

11 practicable, should coordinate on making and deliv12 ering ambitious pledges to reduce greenhouse gas 

13 emissions, with aspirations towards achieving net 

14 zero greenhouse gas emissions by 2050; 

15 (6) the United States and its allies and partners 

16 should work together, using diplomatic and economic 

17 tools, to hold the PRC accountable for any failure by 

18 the PRC— 

19 (A) to increase ambition in its 2030 nation20 ally determined contribution, in line with net 

21 zero greenhouse gas emissions by 2050 before the 

22 26th Conference of the Parties to the UNFCCC 

23 scheduled for November 2021 and meeting a 

24 more ambitious nationally determined contribu25 tion; 


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1 (B) to work faithfully to uphold the prin2 ciples, goals, and rules of the Paris Agreement; 

3 (C) to avoid and prohibit efforts to under4 mine or devolve the Paris Agreement’s rule or 

5 underlying framework, particularly within areas 

6 of accountability transparency, and shared re7 sponsibility among all parties; 

8 (D) to eliminate greenhouse gas intensive 

9 projects from the PRC’s Belt and Road Initiative 

10 and other overseas investments, including— 

11 (i) working with United States allies 

12 and partners to eliminate support for coal 

13 power production projects in the Belt and 

14 Road Initiative; 

15 (ii) providing financing and project 

16 support for cleaner and less risky alter17 natives; and 

18 (iii) undertaking ‘‘parallel initiatives’’ 

19 to enhance capacity building programs and 

20 overseas sustainable investment criteria, in21 cluding in areas such as integrated energy 

22 planning, power sector reform, just transi23 tion, distributed generation, procurement, 

24 transparency, and standards to support 


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1 low-emissions growth in developing coun2 tries; and 

3 (E) to phase out existing coal power plants 

4 and reduce net coal power production; 

5 (7) the United States should pursue confidence6 building opportunities for the United States and the 

7 PRC to undertake ‘‘parallel initiatives’’ on clean en8 ergy research, development, finance, and deployment, 

9 including through economic and stimulus measures 

10 with clear, mutually agreed upon rules and policies 

11 to protect intellectual property, ensure equitable, non12 punitive provision of support, and verify implementa13 tion, which would provide catalytic progress towards 

14 delivering a global clean energy transformation that 

15 benefits all people; 

16 (8) the United States should pursue cooperative 

17 initiatives to reduce global deforestation, including ef18 forts to shift toward the import and consummation of 

19 forest and agricultural commodities that are produced 

20 in a manner that does not contribute to deforestation; 

21 and 

22 (9) the United States should pursue appropriate 

23 scientific cooperative exchanges and research that 

24 align with United States interests and those of its 

25 international partners and allies, provide reciprocity 


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1 of access, protect intellectual property rights, and pre2 serve the values and human rights interests of the 

3 American people. 

4 SEC. 604. PROMOTING RESPONSIBLE DEVELOPMENT AL5 TERNATIVES TO THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF 

6 CHINA’S BELT AND ROAD INITIATIVE. 

7 (a) IN GENERAL.—The President should seek opportu8 nities to partner with multilateral development finance in9 stitutions to develop financing tools based on shared devel10 opment finance criteria and mechanisms to support invest11 ments in developing countries that— 

12 (1) support low carbon economic development; 

13 and 

14 (2) promote resiliency and adaptation to envi15 ronmental changes and natural disasters. 

16 (b) PARTNERSHIP AGREEMENT.—The Chief Executive 

17 Officer of the United States International Development Fi18 nance Corporation should seek to partner with other multi19 lateral development finance institutions and development 

20 finance institutions to leverage the respective available 

21 funds to support low carbon economic development, which 

22 may include clean energy including renewable and nuclear 

23 energy projects, environmental adaptation, and resilience 

24 activities in countries. 

25 (c) CO-FINANCING OF INFRASTRUCTURE PROJECTS.— 


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1 (1) AUTHORIZATION.—Subject to paragraph (2), 

2 the Secretary of State, the Administrator of the 

3 United States Agency for International Development, 

4 and the heads of other relevant Federal agencies are 

5 authorized to co-finance infrastructure, resilience, and 

6 environmental adaptation projects that advance the 

7 development objectives of the United States overseas 

8 and provide viable alternatives to projects that would 

9 otherwise be included within the People’s Republic of 

10 China’s Belt and Road Initiative. 

11 (2) CONDITIONS.—Co-financing arrangements 

12 authorized pursuant to paragraph (1) may not be ap13 proved unless— 

14 (A) the projects to be financed— 

15 (i) promote the public good; 

16 (ii) promote United States national se17 curity or economic interests; 

18 (iii) promote low carbon emissions, in19 cluding clean energy renewable and nuclear 

20 energy projects; and 

21 (iv) will have substantially lower envi22 ronmental impact than the proposed Belt 

23 and Road Initiative alternative; and 

24 (B) the Committee on Foreign Relations of 

25 the Senate and the Committee on Foreign Affairs 


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1 of the House of Representatives are notified not 

2 later than 15 days in advance of entering into 

3 such co-financing arrangements. 

4 SEC. 605. USING CLIMATE DIPLOMACY TO BETTER SERVE 

5 NATIONAL SECURITY AND ECONOMIC INTER6 ESTS. 

7 (a) IN GENERAL.—The President and the Secretary of 

8 State shall prioritize climate action and climate diplomacy 

9 in United States foreign policy by— 

10 (1) ensuring diplomacy, support, and inter11 agency coordination for bilateral and multilateral ac12 tions to address the climate crisis; and 

13 (2) improving coordination and integration of 

14 climate action across all bureaus and United States 

15 missions abroad. 

16 (b) CLIMATE ACTION INTEGRATION.—The Secretary of 

17 State shall— 

18 (1) prioritize climate action and clean energy 

19 within the bureaus and offices under the leadership of 

20 the Under Secretary for Economic Growth, Energy, 

21 and the Environment; 

22 (2) ensure that such bureaus and offices are co23 ordinating with other bureaus of the Department of 

24 State regarding the integration of climate action and 


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1 climate diplomacy as a cross-cutting imperative 

2 across the Department of State; 

3 (3) encourage all Under Secretaries of State— 

4 (A) to assess how issues related to climate 

5 change and United States climate action are in6 tegrated into their operations and programs; 

7 (B) to coordinate crosscutting actions and 

8 diplomatic efforts that relate to climate action; 

9 and 

10 (C) to make available the technical assist11 ance and resources of the bureaus and offices 

12 with relevant expertise to provide technical as13 sistance and expert support to other bureaus 

14 within the Department of State regarding cli15 mate action, clean energy development, and cli16 mate diplomacy; 

17 (4) manage the integration of scientific data on 

18 the current and anticipated effects of climate change 

19 into applied strategies and diplomatic engagements 

20 across programmatic and regional bureaus of the De21 partment of State and into the Department of State’s 

22 decision making processes; 

23 (5) ensure that the relevant bureaus and offices 

24 provide appropriate technical support and re25 sources— 


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1 (A) to the President, the Secretary of State, 

2 and their respective designees charged with ad3 dressing climate change and associated issues; 

4 (B) to United States diplomats advancing 

5 United States foreign policy related to climate 

6 action; and 

7 (C) for the appropriate engagement and in8 tegration of relevant domestic agencies in inter9 national climate change affairs, including 

10 United States participation in multilateral fora; 

11 and 

12 (6) carry out other activities, as directed by the 

13 Secretary of State, that advance United States cli14 mate-related foreign policy objectives, including global 

15 greenhouse gas mitigation, climate change adaptation 

16 activities, and global climate security. 

17 (c) RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE UNDER SECRETARY OF

18 STATE FOR POLITICAL AFFAIRS.—The Under Secretary of 

19 State for Political Affairs shall ensure that all foreign mis20 sions are— 

21 (1) advancing United States bilateral climate di22 plomacy; 

23 (2) engaging strategically on opportunities for 

24 bilateral climate action cooperation with foreign gov25 ernments; and 


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1 (3) utilizing the technical resources and coordi2 nating adequately with the bureaus reporting to the 

3 Under Secretary of State for Economic Growth, En4 ergy and the Environment. 

5 (d) REPORT.—Not later than 200 days after the date 

6 of the enactment of this Act, the Under Secretary of State 

7 for Economic Growth, Energy, and the Environment, in co8 operation with the Under Secretary of State for Political 

9 Affairs, shall submit to the appropriate congressional com10 mittees a report that— 

11 (1) assesses how climate action and United 

12 States climate diplomacy is integrated across the Bu13 reaus of the Department of State; and 

14 (2) includes recommendations on strategies to 

15 improve cross bureau coordination and understanding 

16 of United States climate action and climate diplo17 macy. 

18 (e) EFFECT OF ELIMINATION OF POSITIONS.—If the 

19 positions of Under Secretary of State for Economic Growth, 

20 Energy, and the Environment and the Undersecretary of 

21 State for Political Affairs are eliminated or undergo name 

22 changes, the responsibilities of such Under Secretaries 

23 under this section shall be reassigned to other Under Secre24 taries of State, as appropriate. 

25 (f) CLIMATE CHANGE OFFICERS.— 


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1 (1) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary of State shall 

2 establish and staff Climate Change Officer positions. 

3 Such Officers shall serve under the supervision of the 

4 appropriate chief of mission or the Under Secretary 

5 for Economic Growth, Energy, and the Environment 

6 of the Department of State, as the case may be. The 

7 Secretary shall ensure each embassy, consulate, and 

8 diplomatic mission to which such Officers are as9 signed pursuant to paragraph (2) has sufficient addi10 tional and appropriate staff to support such Officers. 

11 (2) ASSIGNMENT.—Climate Change Officers shall 

12 be assigned to the following posts: 

13 (A) United States embassies, or, if appro14 priate, consulates. 

15 (B) United States diplomatic missions to, 

16 or liaisons with, regional and multilateral orga17 nizations, including the United States diplo18 matic missions to the European Union, African 

19 Union, Organization of American States, Arctic 

20 Council, and any other appropriate regional or21 ganization, and the United Nations and its rel22 evant specialized agencies. 

23 (C) Other posts as designated by the Sec24 retary. 


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1 (3) RESPONSIBILITIES.—Each Climate Change 

2 Officer shall— 

3 (A) provide expertise on effective approaches 

4 to— 

5 (i) mitigate the emission of gases 

6 which contribute to global climate change 

7 and formulate national and global plans for 

8 reducing such gross and net emissions; and 

9 (ii) reduce the detrimental impacts at10 tributable to global climate change, and 

11 adapt to such impacts; 

12 (B) engage and convene, in a manner that 

13 is equitable, inclusive, and just, with individuals 

14 and organizations which represent a government 

15 office, a nongovernmental organization, a social 

16 or political movement, a private sector entity, an 

17 educational or scientific institution, or any other 

18 entity concerned with— 

19 (i) global climate change; the emission 

20 of gases which contribute to global climate 

21 change; or 

22 (ii) reducing the detrimental impacts 

23 attributable to global climate change; 


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1 (C) facilitate engagement by United States 

2 entities in bilateral and multilateral cooperation 

3 on climate change; and 

4 (D) carry out such other responsibilities as 

5 the Secretary may assign. 

6 (4) RESPONSIBILITIES OF UNDER SECRETARY.— 

7 The Under Secretary for Economic Growth, Energy, 

8 and the Environment of the Department of State 

9 shall, including by acting through the Bureau of 

10 Oceans and International Environmental and Sci11 entific Affairs of the Department of State— 

12 (A) provide policy guidance to Climate 

13 Change Officers established under this subsection; 

14 (B) develop relations with, consult with, 

15 and provide assistance to relevant individuals 

16 and organizations concerned with studying, 

17 mitigating, and adapting to global climate 

18 change, or reducing the emission of gases which 

19 contribute to global climate change; and 

20 (C) assist officers and employees of regional 

21 bureaus of the Department of State to develop 

22 strategies and programs to promote studying, 

23 mitigating, and adapting to global climate 

24 change, or reducing the emission of gases which 

25 contribute to global climate change. 


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1 (g) ACTIONS BY CHIEFS OF MISSION.—Each chief of 

2 mission in a foreign country shall— 

3 (1) develop, as part of annual joint strategic 

4 plans or equivalent program and policy planning, a 

5 strategy to promote actions to improve and increase 

6 studying, mitigating, and adapting to global climate 

7 change, or reducing the emission of gases which con8 tribute to global climate change by— 

9 (A) consulting and coordinating with and 

10 providing support to relevant individuals and 

11 organizations, including experts and other pro12 fessionals and stakeholders on issues related to 

13 climate change; and 

14 (B) holding periodic meetings with such rel15 evant individuals and organizations relating to 

16 such strategy; and 

17 (2) hold ongoing discussions with the officials 

18 and leaders of such country regarding progress to im19 prove and increase studying, mitigating, and adapt20 ing to global climate change, or reducing the emission 

21 of gases which contribute to global climate change in 

22 a manner that is equitable, inclusive, and just in such 

23 country; and 

24 (3) certify annually to the Secretary of State 

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1 ations related to climate change adaptation and miti2 gation, sustainability, and the environment were in3 corporated in activities, management, and operations 

4 of the United States embassy or other diplomatic post 

5 under the director of the chief of mission. 

6 (h) TRAINING.—Not later than 180 days after the date 

7 of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall 

8 establish curriculum at the Department of State’s Foreign 

9 Service Institute that supplements political and economic 

10 reporting tradecraft courses in order to provide employees 

11 of the Department with specialized training with respect 

12 to studying, mitigating, and adapting to global climate 

13 change, or reducing the emission of gases which contribute 

14 to global climate change. Such training shall include the 

15 following: 

16 (1) Awareness of the full range of national and 

17 subnational agencies, offices, personnel, statutory au18 thorities, funds, and programs involved in the inter19 national commitments of the United States regarding 

20 global climate change and the emission of gases which 

21 contribute to global climate change, the science of 

22 global climate change, and methods for mitigating 

23 and adapting to global climate change. 

24 (2) Awareness of methods for mitigating and 

25 adapting to global climate change and reducing the 


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1 emission of gases which contribute to global climate 

2 change that are equitable, inclusive, and just. 

3 (3) Familiarity with United States agencies, 

4 multilateral agencies, international financial institu5 tions, and the network of donors providing assistance 

6 to mitigate and adapt to global climate change. 

7 (4) Awareness of the most frequently announced 

8 goals and methods of the entities specified in sub9 section (f)(3)(B). 

10 (i) CONTRACTING.—Contracting and agreements offi11 cers of the Department of State, and other United States 

12 embassy personnel responsible for contracts, grants, or ac13 quisitions, shall receive training on evaluating proposals, 

14 solicitations, and bids, for considerations related to sustain15 ability and adapting to or mitigating impacts from climate 

16 change. 

17 (j) REPORTING.—Not later than 180 days after the 

18 date of the enactment of this Act and biennially thereafter, 

19 the Secretary of State shall submit to the appropriate con20 gressional committees a report that includes a detailed 

21 breakdown of posts at which staff are assigned the role of 

22 Climate Change Officer, the responsibilities to which they 

23 have been assigned, and the strategies developed by the chief 

24 of mission, as applicable. 


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1 (k) CLIMATE CHANGE SUPPORT AND FINANCING.—The 

2 Secretary of State shall facilitate the coordination among 

3 the Department of State and other relevant Federal depart4 ments and agencies toward contributing technical coopera5 tion, engagement, development finance, or foreign assistance 

6 relevant to United States international climate action and 

7 in support of United States climate diplomacy. 

8 (l) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Congress 

9 that climate diplomacy tools as described in this section are 

10 critical for demonstrating the commitment to include cli11 mate changes issues as core tenets of foreign policy prior12 ities, as well as preserving the United States’ role as a glob13 al leader on climate change action. 

14 SEC. 606. DRIVING A GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE RESIL15 IENCE STRATEGY. 

16 (a) AMENDMENT.—Section 117 of the Foreign Assist17 ance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2151p) is amended— 

18 (1) in subsection (b)— 

19 (A) by inserting ‘‘(1)’’ after ‘‘(b)’’; and 

20 (B) by adding at the end the following: 

21 ‘‘(2)(A) The President is authorized to furnish assist22 ance to programs and initiatives that— 

23 ‘‘(i) promote resilience among communities fac24 ing harmful impacts from climate change; and 


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1 ‘‘(ii) reduce the vulnerability of persons affected 

2 by climate change. 

3 ‘‘(B) There shall be, in the Department of State, a Co4 ordinator of Climate Change Resilience.’’; and 

5 (2) by adding at the end the following: 

6 ‘‘(d)(1) The Secretary of State, in coordination with 

7 the Administrator of the United States Agency for Inter8 national Development, shall establish a comprehensive, inte9 grated, 10-year strategy, which shall be referred to as the 

10 ‘Global Climate Change Resilience Strategy’, to mitigate the 

11 impacts of climate change on displacement and humani12 tarian emergencies. 

13 ‘‘(2) The Global Climate Change Resilience Strategy 

14 shall— 

15 ‘‘(A) focus on addressing slow-onset and rapid16 onset effects of events caused by climate change, con17 sider the effects of events caused by climate change, 

18 and describe the key features of successful strategies to 

19 prevent such conditions; 

20 ‘‘(B) include specific objectives and multisectoral 

21 approaches to the effects of events caused by climate 

22 change; 

23 ‘‘(C) promote United States national security 

24 and economic interests while leading international 

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1 sence of United States leadership would lead to a sub2 stantial and harmful decline in the nation’s global 

3 competitiveness; 

4 ‘‘(D) promote international instruments on cli5 mate action and other relevant international stand6 ards and best practices, as such standards and prac7 tices develop, that serve the interests of the American 

8 people and protect United States environmental re9 sources and the planet; 

10 ‘‘(E) promote the adoption and implementation 

11 of such international climate-related agreements, 

12 standards, and practices by foreign states; 

13 ‘‘(F) work with United States allies and part14 ners to ensure a level playing field exists when it 

15 comes to climate action and to encourage and assist 

16 foreign countries to make similar or even greater com17 mitments than the United States; 

18 ‘‘(G) describe approaches that ensure national 

19 leadership, as appropriate, and substantively engage 

20 with civil society, local partners, and the affected 

21 communities, including marginalized populations 

22 and underserved populations, in the design, imple23 mentation, and monitoring of climate change pro24 grams to best safeguard the future of those subject to 

25 displacement; 


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1 ‘‘(H) assign roles for relevant Federal agencies to 

2 avoid duplication of efforts, while ensuring that— 

3 ‘‘(i) the Department of State is responsible 

4 for— 

5 ‘‘(I) leading the Global Climate Change 

6 Resilience Strategy; 

7 ‘‘(II) establishing United States foreign 

8 policy; 

9 ‘‘(III) advancing diplomatic and polit10 ical efforts; and 

11 ‘‘(IV) guiding security assistance and 

12 related civilian security efforts to mitigate 

13 climate change threats; 

14 ‘‘(ii) the United States Agency for Inter15 national Development is— 

16 ‘‘(I) responsible for overseeing pro17 grams to prevent the effects of events caused 

18 by climate change; 

19 ‘‘(II) the lead implementing agency for 

20 development and related nonsecurity pro21 gram policy related to building resilience 

22 and achieving recovery; and 

23 ‘‘(III) responsible for providing over24 seas humanitarian assistance to respond to 

25 international and internal displacement 


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1 caused by climate change and to coordinate 

2 the pursuit of durable solutions for climate3 displaced persons; and 

4 ‘‘(iii) other Federal agencies support the ac5 tivities of the Department of State and the 

6 United States Agency for International Develop7 ment, as appropriate, with the concurrence of the 

8 Secretary of State and the Administrator of the 

9 United States Agency for International Develop10 ment; 

11 ‘‘(I) describe programs that agencies will under12 take to achieve the stated objectives, including descrip13 tions of existing programs and funding by fiscal year 

14 and account; 

15 ‘‘(J) identify mechanisms to improve coordina16 tion between the United States, foreign governments, 

17 and international organizations, including the World 

18 Bank, the United Nations, regional organizations, 

19 and private sector organizations; 

20 ‘‘(K) address efforts to expand public-private 

21 partnerships and leverage private sector resources; 

22 ‘‘(L) describe the criteria, metrics, and mecha23 nisms for monitoring and evaluation of programs and 

24 objectives in the Global Climate Change Resilience 

25 Strategy; 


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1 ‘‘(M) describe how the Global Climate Change 

2 Resilience Strategy will ensure that programs are 

3 country-led and context-specific; 

4 ‘‘(N) establish a program to monitor climate and 

5 social conditions to anticipate and prevent climate 

6 and environmental stressors from evolving into na7 tional security risks; 

8 ‘‘(O) include an assessment of climate risks in 

9 the Department of State’s Quadrennial Diplomacy 

10 and Development Review; and 

11 ‘‘(P) prioritize foreign aid, to the extent prac12 ticable, for international climate resilience in support 

13 of this Global Climate Change Resilience Strategy. 

14 ‘‘(3) Not later than 270 days after the date of the en15 actment of this subsection, and annually thereafter, the 

16 President shall submit a report to the Committee on For17 eign Relations of the Senate and the Committee on Foreign 

18 Affairs of the House of Representatives, based in part on 

19 the information collected pursuant to this section, that de20 tails the Global Climate Change Resilience Strategy. The 

21 report shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may in22 clude a classified annex, if necessary. 

23 ‘‘(4) Not later than 180 days after the date of the en24 actment of this subsection, the Secretary of State and the 

25 Coordinator of Global Climate Change Resilience shall brief 


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1 the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the 

2 Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representa3 tives regarding the progress made by the Federal Govern4 ment in implementing the Global Climate Change Resil5 ience Strategy. 

6 ‘‘(5)(A) Not later than 270 days after the date of the 

7 enactment of this subsection, and annually thereafter, the 

8 Comptroller General of the United States, in cooperation 

9 and consultation with the Secretary of State, shall produce 

10 a report evaluating the progress that the Federal Govern11 ment has made toward incorporating climate change into 

12 department and agency policies, including the resources 

13 that have been allocated for such purpose. 

14 ‘‘(B) The report required under subparagraph (A) 

15 shall assess— 

16 ‘‘(i) the degree to which the Department of State 

17 and the United States Agency for International De18 velopment (USAID) are— 

19 ‘‘(I) developing climate change risk assess20 ments; and 

21 ‘‘(II) providing guidance to missions on 

22 how to include climate change risks in their inte23 grated country strategies; 


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1 ‘‘(ii) whether the Department of State and 

2 USAID have sufficient resources to fulfill the require3 ments described in paragraph (2); and 

4 ‘‘(iii) any areas in which the Department of 

5 State and USAID may lack sufficient resources to 

6 fulfill such requirements.’’. 

7 (b) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—There are 

8 authorized to be appropriated such sums as may be nec9 essary to carry out this Global Climate Change Resilience 

10 Strategy. 

11 SEC. 607. ADDRESSING INTERNATIONAL CLIMATE CHANGE 

12 MITIGATION, ADAPTATION, AND SECURITY. 

13 (a) DEFINITIONS.—In this section: 

14 (1) CONVENTION.—The term ‘‘Convention’’ 

15 means the United Nations Framework Convention on 

16 Climate Change, done at New York May 9, 1992, and 

17 entered into force March 21, 1994. 

18 (2) MOST VULNERABLE COMMUNITIES AND POPU19 LATIONS.—The term ‘‘most vulnerable communities 

20 and populations’’ means communities and popu21 lations that are at risk of substantial adverse effects 

22 of climate change and have limited capacity to re23 spond to such effects, including women, impoverished 

24 communities, children, indigenous peoples, and infor25 mal workers. 


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1 (3) MOST VULNERABLE DEVELOPING COUN2 TRIES.—The term ‘‘most vulnerable developing coun3 tries’’ means, as determined by the Administrator of 

4 the United States Agency for International Develop5 ment, developing countries that are at risk of substan6 tial adverse effects of climate change and have limited 

7 capacity to respond to such effects, considering the 

8 approaches included in any international treaties 

9 and agreements. 

10 (4) PROGRAM.—The term ‘‘Program’’ means the 

11 International Climate Change Adaptation, Mitiga12 tion, and Security Program established pursuant to 

13 subsection (c). 

14 (b) PURPOSE.—The purpose of this section is to pro15 vide authorities for additional, new, current, and ongoing 

16 bilateral and regional international development assistance, 

17 and, as appropriate, to leverage private resources, in sup18 port of host country driven projects, planning, policies, and 

19 initiatives designed to improve the ability of host coun20 tries— 

21 (1) to primarily produce reliable renewable en22 ergy and reduce or mitigate carbon emissions from 

23 the power sector while facilitating the transition in 

24 key global markets from electricity generated from fos25 sil fuel power to low-cost clean energy sources, in a 


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1 manner that is equitable for workers and commu2 nities; 

3 (2) to adapt and become more resilient to cur4 rent and forecasted effects of climate change; and 

5 (3) to employ— 

6 (A) sustainable land use practices that 

7 mitigate desertification and reduce greenhouse 

8 gas emissions from deforestation and forest deg9 radation; and 

10 (B) agricultural production practices that 

11 reduce poverty while improving soil health, pro12 tecting water quality, and increasing food secu13 rity and nutrition. 

14 (c) ESTABLISHMENT OF PROGRAM.—The Secretary of 

15 State, in coordination with the Secretary of the Treasury 

16 and the Administrator of the United States Agency for 

17 International Development (USAID), shall establish a pro18 gram, to be known as the ‘‘International Climate Change 

19 Adaptation, Mitigation, and Security Program’’, to provide 

20 bilateral and regional assistance to developing countries for 

21 programs, projects, and activities described in subsection 

22 (e). 

23 (d) SUPPLEMENT NOT SUPPLANT.—Assistance pro24 vided under this section shall be used to supplement, and 

25 not to supplant, any other Federal, State, or local resources 


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1 available to carry out activities that fit the characteristics 

2 of the Program. 

3 (e) POLICY.—It shall be the policy of the United States 

4 to ensure that the Program provides resources to developing 

5 countries, particularly the most vulnerable communities 

6 and populations in such countries, to support the develop7 ment and implementation of programs, projects, and activi8 ties that— 

9 (1) reduce greenhouse gas emissions through the 

10 integration and deployment of clean energy, including 

11 transmission, distribution, and interconnections to re12 newable energy, while facilitating the transition from 

13 electricity generated from fossil fuel power to low-cost 

14 renewable energy sources, in a manner that is equi15 table for workers and communities; 

16 (2) address financial or other barriers to the 

17 widespread deployment of clean energy technologies 

18 that reduce, sequester, or avoid greenhouse gas emis19 sions; 

20 (3) improve the availability, viability, and ac21 cessibility of zero emission vehicles, including support 

22 for design and development of transportation net23 works and land use practices that mitigate carbon 

24 emissions in the transportation sector; 


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1 (4) support building capacities that may in2 clude— 

3 (A) developing and implementing meth4 odologies and programs for measuring green5 house gas emissions and verifying emissions 

6 mitigation, including building capacities to con7 duct emissions inventories and meet reporting 

8 requirements under the Paris Agreement; 

9 (B) assessing, developing, and implementing 

10 technology and policy options for greenhouse gas 

11 emissions mitigation and avoidance of future 

12 emissions, including sector-based and cross-sector 

13 mitigation strategies; 

14 (C) enhancing the technical capacity of reg15 ulatory authorities, planning agencies, and re16 lated institutions in developing countries to im17 prove the deployment of clean energy technologies 

18 and practices, including through increased trans19 parency; 

20 (D) training and instruction regarding the 

21 installation and maintenance of renewable en22 ergy technologies; and 

23 (E) activities that support the development 

24 and implementation of frameworks for intellec25 tual property rights in developing countries; 


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1 (5) improve resilience, sustainable economic 

2 growth, and adaptation capacities in response to the 

3 effects of climate change; 

4 (6) promote appropriate job training and access 

5 to new job opportunities in new economic sectors and 

6 industries that emerge due to the transition from fos7 sil fuel energy to clean energy; 

8 (7) reduce the vulnerability and increase the re9 silience capacities of communities to the effects of cli10 mate change, including effects on— 

11 (A) water availability; 

12 (B) agricultural productivity and food secu13 rity; 

14 (C) flood risk; 

15 (D) coastal resources; 

16 (E) biodiversity; 

17 (F) economic livelihoods; 

18 (G) health and diseases; 

19 (H) housing and shelter; and 

20 (I) human migration; 

21 (8) help countries and communities adapt to 

22 changes in the environment through enhanced commu23 nity planning, preparedness, and growth strategies 

24 that take into account current and forecasted regional 

25 and localized effects of climate change; 


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1 (9) conserve and restore natural resources, eco2 systems, and biodiversity threatened by the effects of 

3 climate change to ensure such resources, ecosystems, 

4 and biodiversity are healthy and continue to provide 

5 natural protections from the effects of climate change 

6 such as extreme weather; 

7 (10) provide resources, information, scientific 

8 data and modeling, innovative best practices, and 

9 technical assistance to support vulnerable developing 

10 countries to adapt to the effects of climate change; 

11 (11) promote sustainable and climate-resilient 

12 societies, including through improvements to make 

13 critical infrastructure less vulnerable to the effects of 

14 climate change; 

15 (12) encourage the adoption of policies and 

16 measures, including sector-based and cross-sector poli17 cies and measures, that substantially reduce, seques18 ter, or avoid greenhouse gas emissions from the do19 mestic energy and transportation sectors of developing 

20 countries; 

21 (13) reduce deforestation and land degradation 

22 to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and implement 

23 sustainable forestry practices; 

24 (14) promote sustainable land use activities, in25 cluding supporting development planning, design, 


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1 and construction with respect to transportation sys2 tems and land use; 

3 (15) promote sustainable agricultural practices 

4 that mitigate carbon emissions, conserve soil, and im5 prove food and water security of communities; 

6 (16) foster partnerships with private sector enti7 ties and nongovernmental international development 

8 organizations to assist with developing solutions and 

9 economic opportunities that support projects, plan10 ning, policies, and initiatives described in subsection 

11 (b); 

12 (17) provide technical assistance and strengthen 

13 capacities of developing countries to meet the goals of 

14 the conditional nationally determined contributions of 

15 those countries; 

16 (18) establish investment channels designed to le17 verage private sector financing in— 

18 (A) clean energy; 

19 (B) sustainable agriculture and natural re20 source management; and 

21 (C) the transportation sector as described in 

22 paragraph (3); and 

23 (19) provide technical assistance and support for 

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1 nomic growth opportunities while preserving critical 

2 habitats and natural carbon sinks. 

3 (f) PROVISION OF ASSISTANCE.— 

4 (1) IN GENERAL.—The Administrator of USAID, 

5 in consultation with other Federal departments and 

6 agencies, shall provide assistance under the Pro7 gram— 

8 (A) in the form of bilateral assistance pur9 suant to the requirements under subsection (g); 

10 (B) to multilateral funds or international 

11 institutions with programs for climate mitiga12 tion or adaptation in developing countries con13 sistent with the policy described in subsection 

14 (e); or 

15 (C) through a combination of the mecha16 nisms specified in subparagraphs (A) and (B). 

17 (2) LIMITATION.— 

18 (A) CONDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION TO MULTI19 LATERAL FUNDS OR INTERNATIONAL INSTITU20 TIONS.—In any fiscal year, the Administrator of 

21 USAID may provide up to 40 percent of the as22 sistance available to carry out the Program to 1 

23 or more multilateral funds or international in24 stitutions that meet the requirements of subpara25 graph (B). 


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1 (B) MULTILATERAL FUND OR INTER2 NATIONAL INSTITUTION ELIGIBILITY.—A multi3 lateral fund or international institution is eligi4 ble to receive assistance under subparagraph 

5 (A)— 

6 (i) if— 

7 (I) such fund or institution is es8 tablished pursuant to— 

9 (aa) the Convention; or 

10 (bb) an agreement negotiated 

11 under the Convention; or 

12 (II) the assistance is directed to 1 

13 or more multilateral funds or inter14 national development institutions, pur15 suant to an agreement negotiated 

16 under the Convention; and 

17 (ii) if such fund or institution— 

18 (I) specifies the terms and condi19 tions under which the United States is 

20 to provide assistance to the fund or in21 stitution, and under which the fund or 

22 institution is to provide assistance to 

23 recipient countries; 

24 (II) ensures that assistance from 

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1 tution and the principal and income of 

2 the fund or institution are disbursed 

3 only— 

4 (aa) to support projects, 

5 planning, policies, and initiatives 

6 described in subsection (b); 

7 (bb) consistent with the pol8 icy described in subsection (e); 

9 and 

10 (cc) in regular consultation 

11 with relevant governing bodies of 

12 the fund or institution that— 

13 (AA) include representa14 tion from countries among 

15 the most vulnerable devel16 oping countries; and 

17 (BB) provide public ac18 cess. 

19 (C) CONGRESSIONAL NOTIFICATION.—The 

20 Secretary of State, the Administrator of USAID, 

21 or the Secretary of the Treasury shall notify the 

22 appropriate congressional committees not later 

23 than 15 days before providing assistance to a 

24 multilateral fund or international institution 

25 under this subsection. 


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1 (3) LOCAL CONSULTATIONS.—Programs, projects, 

2 and activities supported by assistance provided under 

3 this subsection shall require consultations with local 

4 communities, particularly the most vulnerable com5 munities and populations in such communities, and 

6 indigenous peoples in areas in which any programs, 

7 projects, or activities are planned to engage such com8 munities and peoples through adequate disclosure of 

9 information, public participation, and consultation, 

10 including full consideration of the interdependence of 

11 vulnerable communities and ecosystems to promote 

12 the resilience of local communities. 

13 (g) BILATERAL ASSISTANCE.— 

14 (1) IN GENERAL.—Except to the extent incon15 sistent with this subsection, the administrative au16 thorities under the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 

17 U.S.C. 2151 et seq.) shall apply to the implementa18 tion of this subsection to the same extent and in the 

19 same manner as such authorities apply to the imple20 mentation of such Act in order to provide the Admin21 istrator of USAID with the authority to provide as22 sistance to countries, including the most vulnerable 

23 developing countries, for programs, projects, and ac24 tivities consistent with the purposes described in sub25 section (b) and the policy described in subsection (e). 


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1 (2) CONSIDERATIONS.—In carrying out this sub2 section, the Administrator shall ensure that— 

3 (A) the environmental impact of proposed 

4 programs, projects, and activities is considered 

5 through adequate consultation, public participa6 tion, and public disclosure of relevant informa7 tion; and 

8 (B) programs, projects, and activities under 

9 this subsection— 

10 (i) avoid environmental degradation, 

11 to the maximum extent practicable; and 

12 (ii) are aligned, to the maximum ex13 tent practicable, with broader development, 

14 poverty alleviation, or natural resource 

15 management objectives and initiatives in 

16 the recipient country. 

17 (3) COMMUNITY ENGAGEMENT.—The Adminis18 trator shall seek to ensure that— 

19 (A) local communities, particularly the 

20 most vulnerable communities and populations in 

21 areas in which any programs, projects, or activi22 ties are carried out under this subsection, are en23 gaged in the design, implementation, monitoring, 

24 and evaluation of such programs, projects, and 


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1 activities through disclosure of information, pub2 lic participation, and consultation; and 

3 (B) the needs and interests of the most vul4 nerable communities and populations are ad5 dressed in national or regional climate change 

6 adaptation plans developed with USAID sup7 port. 

8 (4) CONSULTATION AND DISCLOSURE.—For each 

9 country receiving assistance under this subsection, the 

10 Administrator shall establish a process for consulta11 tion with, and disclosure of information to, local, na12 tional, and international stakeholders regarding any 

13 programs, projects, or activities carried out under 

14 this subsection. 

15 (h) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—There is 

16 authorized to be appropriated to carry out this section 

17 $2,000,000,000 for fiscal year 2022 and each fiscal year 

18 thereafter. 

19 SEC. 608. REDUCING THE NEGATIVE IMPACTS FROM BLACK 

20 CARBON, METHANE, AND HIGH-GWP 

21 HYDROFLUOROCARBONS. 

22 (a) DEFINITION.—In this section, the term ‘‘high-GWP 

23 HFC’’ means newly manufactured hydrofluorocarbons with 

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1 ment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 

2 Change. 

3 (b) IN GENERAL.—The President shall direct the 

4 United States representatives to appropriate international 

5 bodies and conferences to use the voice, vote, and influence 

6 of the United States, consistent with the broad foreign pol7 icy goals of the United States, to advocate that each such 

8 body or conference— 

9 (1) commit to significantly increasing efforts to 

10 reduce black carbon, methane, and high-GWP HFC; 

11 (2) invest in and develop alternative energy 

12 sources, industrial and agricultural processes, appli13 ances, and products to replace sources of black carbon, 

14 methane, and high-GWP HFC; 

15 (3) enhance coordination with the private sec16 tor— 

17 (A) to increase production and distribution 

18 of clean energy alternatives, industrial processes, 

19 and products that will replace sources of black 

20 carbon, methane, and high-GWP HFC; 

21 (B) to develop action plans to mitigate 

22 black carbon, methane, and high-GWP HFC 

23 from various private sector operations; 


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1 (C) to encourage best technology, methods, 

2 and management practices for reducing black 

3 carbon, methane, and high-GWP HFC; 

4 (D) to craft specific financing mechanisms 

5 for the incremental costs associated with miti6 gating black carbon, methane, and high-GWP 

7 HFC pollutants; and 

8 (E) to grow economic opportunities and de9 velop markets, as appropriate, for reducing black 

10 carbon, methane, tropospheric ozone, and 

11 hydrofluorocarbons; 

12 (4) provide technical assistance to foreign regu13 latory authorities and governments to remove unnec14 essary barriers to investment in short-lived climate 

15 mitigation solutions, including— 

16 (A) the use of safe and affordable clean en17 ergy; 

18 (B) the implementation of policies requiring 

19 industrial and agricultural best practices for 

20 capturing or mitigating the release of methane 

21 from extractive, agricultural, and industrial 

22 processes; and 

23 (C) climate assessment, scientific research, 

24 monitoring, and technological development ac25 tivities; 


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1 (5) develop and implement clear, accountable, 

2 and metric-based targets to measure the effectiveness 

3 of projects described in paragraph (4); and 

4 (6) engage international partners in an existing 

5 multilateral forum (or, if necessary, establish through 

6 an international agreement a new multilateral 

7 forum) to improve global cooperation for— 

8 (A) creating tangible metrics for evaluating 

9 efforts to reduce black carbon, methane, and 

10 high-GWP HFC; 

11 (B) developing and implementing best prac12 tices for phasing out sources of black carbon, 

13 methane, and high-GWP HFC, including ex14 panding capacity for innovative instruments to 

15 mitigate black carbon, methane, and high-GWP 

16 HFC at the national and subnational levels of 

17 foreign countries, particularly countries with lit18 tle capacity to reduce greenhouse gas emissions 

19 and deploy clean energy facilities, and countries 

20 that lack sufficient policies to advance such de21 velopment; 

22 (C) encouraging the development of stand23 ards and practices, and increasing transparency 

24 and accountability efforts for the reduction of 

25 black carbon, methane, and high-GWP HFC; 


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1 (D) integrating tracking and monitoring 

2 systems into industrial processes; 

3 (E) fostering research to improve scientific 

4 understanding of— 

5 (i) how high concentrations of black 

6 carbon, methane, and high-GWP HFC affect 

7 human health, safety, and our environment; 

8 (ii) changes in the amount and re9 gional concentrations of black carbon and 

10 methane emissions, based on scientific mod11 eling and forecasting; 

12 (iii) effective means to sequester black 

13 carbon, methane, and high-GWP HFC; and 

14 (iv) other related areas of research the 

15 United States representatives deem nec16 essary; 

17 (F) encouraging the World Bank, the Inter18 national Monetary Fund, and other inter19 national finance organizations— 

20 (i) to prioritize efforts to combat black 

21 carbon, methane, and high-GWP HFC; and 

22 (ii) to enhance transparency by pro23 viding sufficient and adequate information 

24 to facilitate independent verification of 

25 their climate finance reporting; 


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1 (G) encouraging observers of the Arctic 

2 Council (including India and China) to adopt 

3 mitigation plans consistent with the findings 

4 and recommendations of the Arctic Council’s 

5 Framework for Action on Black Carbon and 

6 Methane; 

7 (H) collaborating on technological advances 

8 in black carbon, methane, and high-GWP HFC 

9 pollutant mitigation, sequestration and reduc10 tion technologies; and 

11 (I) advising foreign countries, at both the 

12 national and subnational levels, regarding the 

13 development and execution of regulatory policies, 

14 services, and laws pertaining to reducing the cre15 ation and the collection and safe management of 

16 black carbon, methane, and high-GWP HFC. 

17 (c) ENHANCING INTERNATIONAL OUTREACH AND

18 PARTNERSHIP OF UNITED STATES AGENCIES INVOLVED IN

19 GREENHOUSE GAS REDUCTIONS.— 

20 (1) FINDING.—Congress recognizes the success of 

21 the United States Climate Alliance and the green22 house gas reduction programs and strategies estab23 lished by the Environmental Protection Agency’s Cen24 ter for Corporate Climate Leadership. 


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1 (2) AUTHORIZATION OF EFFORTS TO BUILD FOR2 EIGN PARTNERSHIPS.—The Secretary of State shall 

3 work with the Administrator of the Environmental 

4 Protection Agency to build partnerships, as appro5 priate, with the governments of foreign countries and 

6 to support international efforts to reduce black car7 bon, methane, and high-GWP HFC. 

8 (d) NEGOTIATION OF NEW INTERNATIONAL AGREE9 MENTS AND REASSERTION OF TARGETS IN EXISTING

10 AGREEMENTS.—Not later than 1 year after the date of the 

11 enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall submit 

12 a report to Congress that— 

13 (1) assesses the potential for negotiating new 

14 international agreements, new targets within existing 

15 international agreements or cooperative bodies, and 

16 the creation of a new international forum to mitigate 

17 globally black carbon, methane, and high-GWP HFC 

18 to support the efforts described in subsection (b); 

19 (2) describes the provisions that could be in20 cluded in such agreements; 

21 (3) assesses potential parties to such agreements; 

22 (4) describes a process for reengaging with Can23 ada and Mexico regarding the methane targets agreed 

24 to at the 2016 North American Leaders’ Summit; and 


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1 (5) describes a process for reengaging with the 

2 countries of the Arctic Council regarding the methane 

3 and black carbon targets that were negotiated in 2015 

4 through the Framework for Action. 

5 (e) CONSIDERATION OF BLACK CARBON, METHANE, 

6 AND HIGH-GWP HFC IN NEGOTIATING INTERNATIONAL

7 AGREEMENTS.—In negotiating any relevant international 

8 agreement with any country or countries after the date of 

9 the enactment of this Act, the President shall— 

10 (1) consider the impact black carbon, methane, 

11 and high-GWP HFC are having on the increase in 

12 global average temperatures and the resulting global 

13 climate change; 

14 (2) consider the effects that climate change is 

15 having on the environment; and 

16 (3) ensure that the agreement strengthens efforts 

17 to eliminate black carbon, methane, and high-GWP 

18 HFC from such country or countries. 

19 (f) PLAN TO REDUCE BLACK CARBON EMISSIONS

20 FROM SHIPS.—Consistent with strategies adopted by the 

21 International Maritime Organization to reduce greenhouse 

22 gas emissions from ships, the Secretary of State, in con23 sultation with the Secretary of Transportation, the Sec24 retary of Commerce, the Administrator, and the Com25 mandant of the Coast Guard, shall develop a comprehensive 


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1 plan to reduce black carbon emissions from ships based on 

2 appropriate emissions data from oceangoing vessels. The 

3 plan shall provide for such reduction through— 

4 (1) a clean freight partnership; 

5 (2) limits on black carbon emissions; and 

6 (3) efforts that include protection of access to 

7 critical fuel shipments and emergency needs of coastal 

8 communities. 

9 (g) ESTABLISHMENT OF INTERAGENCY WORKING

10 GROUP ON BLACK CARBON, METHANE, AND HIGH-GWP 

11 HFC POLLUTANT MITIGATION.— 

12 (1) ESTABLISHMENT.—Not later than 90 days 

13 after the date of enactment of this Act, the President 

14 shall establish a task force, to be known as the Inter15 agency Working Group on Black Carbon, Methane, 

16 and High-GWP HFC Pollutant Mitigation. 

17 (2) MEMBERSHIP.—The members of the Working 

18 Group shall include the head (or a designee thereof) 

19 of each relevant Federal agency. 

20 (3) DUTIES.—The Working Group shall— 

21 (A) not later than 180 days after the date 

22 of enactment of this Act, submit to the appro23 priate congressional committees a report that in24 cludes specific plans of each relevant Federal 

25 agency— 


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1 (B) look for opportunities with other coun2 tries to promote alternatives to high-GWP HFC, 

3 and transition over time to equipment that uses 

4 safer and more sustainable alternatives to high5 GWP HFC; 

6 (C) review the policy recommendations 

7 made by— 

8 (i) the Intergovernmental Panel on Cli9 mate Change; 

10 (ii) the United States Climate Alli11 ance; 

12 (iii) the Interagency Strategy to Re13 duce Methane Emissions; 

14 (iv) the Council on Climate Prepared15 ness and Resilience; 

16 (v) the Clean Cooking Alliance; 

17 (vi) the International Maritime Orga18 nization; and 

19 (vii) other relevant organizations and 

20 institutions; and 

21 (D) develop an action plan to reduce black 

22 carbon, methane, and high-GWP HFC pollutants 

23 that incorporates any appropriate proposals or 

24 recommendations made by the entities referred to 

25 in subparagraph (C). 


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1 SEC. 609. BUILDING UNITED STATES ECONOMIC GROWTH 

2 AND TECHNOLOGICAL INNOVATION 

3 THROUGH THE GREEN CLIMATE FUND. 

4 (a) GREEN CLIMATE FUND.— 

5 (1) FINDINGS.—Congress finds that— 

6 (A) climate change most severely impacts 

7 vulnerable and disadvantaged communities in 

8 the United States and around the world; 

9 (B) it is the responsibility of the United 

10 States Government to work with and press other 

11 countries to address environmental justice and 

12 climate justice; 

13 (C) the report of the United Nations Envi14 ronment Programme entitled ‘‘Climate Change 

15 and the Cost of Capital in Developing Coun16 tries’’, dated May 2018, found that, in the 10 

17 years prior to the publication of the report, cli18 mate vulnerability has cost the 20 nations most 

19 affected by catastrophes rooted in climate change 

20 an additional $62,000,000,000 in interest pay21 ments alone; 

22 (D) individuals and families, particularly 

23 communities of color, indigenous communities, 

24 and low-income communities, that are on the 

25 frontlines of climate change across the globe are 


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1 often in close proximity to environmental 

2 stressors or sources of pollution; 

3 (E) the communities described in subpara4 graph (D)— 

5 (i) are often the first exposed to the 

6 causes and impacts of climate change; and 

7 (ii) have the fewest resources with 

8 which to mitigate those impacts or to relo9 cate; 

10 (F) all efforts to adapt to and mitigate cli11 mate change must include specific protections for 

12 and acknowledgment of the harm of climate 

13 change to communities of color, indigenous peo14 ples, women, and other frontline communities 

15 and marginalized peoples around the world; 

16 (G) in Paris, on December 12, 2015, the 

17 parties to the United Nations Framework Con18 vention on Climate Change adopted the Paris 

19 Agreement, a benchmark agreement— 

20 (i) to combat climate change; 

21 (ii) to accelerate and intensify the ac22 tions and investments needed for a sustain23 able low carbon future; and 

24 (iii) that acknowledges, ‘‘Parties 

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1 mate change, respect, promote and consider 

2 their respective obligations on human 

3 rights, the right to health, the rights of in4 digenous peoples, local communities, mi5 grants, children, persons with disabilities 

6 and people in vulnerable situations and the 

7 right to development, as well as gender 

8 equality, empowerment of women and inter9 generational equity’’; 

10 (H) the Paris Agreement— 

11 (i) notes the importance of ‘‘climate 

12 justice’’ when mitigating and adapting to 

13 climate change; and 

14 (ii) recognizes ‘‘the need for an effective 

15 and progressive response to the urgent 

16 threat of climate change’’; 

17 (I) it is imperative for all countries to un18 dertake mitigation activities to rapidly meet the 

19 goal of limiting global warming to not more 

20 than 1.5 degrees Celsius; 

21 (J) developed countries have the greatest ca22 pacity to mitigate their greenhouse gas emis23 sions, while— 


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1 (i) developing countries have the least 

2 capacity to engage in mitigation activities; 

3 and 

4 (ii) the capacity of developing coun5 tries to engage in mitigation activities is 

6 less than the national mitigation potential 

7 of those developing countries; 

8 (K) the determination for the fair share of 

9 mitigation and adaptation activities for each 

10 country must take into account— 

11 (i) the historic greenhouse gas emis12 sions of each country; and 

13 (ii) the current capacity of each coun14 try to both mitigate greenhouse gas emis15 sions and adapt to climate impacts; 

16 (L) developed countries that have histori17 cally emitted a disproportionately high share of 

18 greenhouse gas emissions, and reaped the eco19 nomic benefits of those polluting activities, have 

20 a corresponding disproportionately greater re21 sponsibility to engage in global mitigation and 

22 adaptation activities, as compared to less indus23 trialized countries that have historically polluted 

24 far less; 


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1 (M) the only realistic way for less industri2 alized countries to meet their full mitigation po3 tential is through international climate financ4 ing by more developed countries; 

5 (N) in the 2009 Copenhagen Accord, devel6 oped countries committed to jointly mobilize, 

7 starting in 2020, $100,000,000,000 per year in 

8 public climate financing (as well as private in9 vestment and other alternative forms of finance), 

10 for developing countries, a commitment re11 affirmed in 2015 in Decision 1/CP.21 of the 

12 United Nations Framework Convention on Cli13 mate Change, Adoption of the Paris Agreement; 

14 (O) the $100,000,000,000 commitment de15 scribed in subparagraph (N) was a political 

16 compromise that falls short of the actual financ17 ing needs for climate action in developing coun18 tries; 

19 (P) Bloomberg New Energy Finance has es20 timated that the transition to renewable energy 

21 sources in developing countries will require hun22 dreds of billions of dollars annually; 

23 (Q) the United Nations Environment Pro24 gramme has estimated that adaptation needs re25 lating to climate change in developing countries 


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1 may be as much as $300,000,000,000 annually 

2 by 2030; 

3 (R) the Green Climate Fund was created in 

4 2010 by 194 countries to serve as a crucial fi5 nancing mechanism to help developing countries 

6 limit or reduce greenhouse gas emissions and 

7 adapt to climate change; 

8 (S) in 2015, the United Nations Framework 

9 Convention on Climate Change agreed that the 

10 Green Climate Fund should serve the goals of the 

11 Paris Agreement, which states that ‘‘developed 

12 country Parties shall provide financial resources 

13 to assist developing country Parties with respect 

14 to both mitigation and adaptation in continu15 ation of their existing obligations under the Con16 vention’’; 

17 (T) the Green Climate Fund is an essential 

18 institution for climate financing, as the Green 

19 Climate Fund ensures— 

20 (i) balanced governance between devel21 oped and developing countries; 

22 (ii) stakeholder engagement and dis23 course; 

24 (iii) a balanced approach between 

25 mitigation and adaptation; 


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1 (iv) fair and equal labor and working 

2 conditions; 

3 (v) conservation of biodiversity and 

4 critical habitats; and 

5 (vi) strong environmental, social, and 

6 gender protections; 

7 (U) the Green Climate Fund— 

8 (i) promotes and protects human rights 

9 and the rights of marginalized groups, in10 cluding indigenous peoples, women, chil11 dren, and people with disabilities; and 

12 (ii) continues to take steps to strength13 en protection for marginalized groups; 

14 (iii) the United States committed 

15 $3,000,000,000 of the first $10,000,000,000 

16 raised for the initial resource mobilization 

17 period of the Green Climate Fund, though 

only 1 18 ⁄3 of this pledge was fulfilled, leaving 

19 the United States the only country to fall 

20 substantially short of a commitment of a 

21 country to the Green Climate Fund; and 

22 (V) the Green Climate Fund is a fully oper23 ational and proven institution supporting well 

24 over 100 projects and programs in developing 

25 countries around the world. 


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1 (2) STATEMENT OF POLICY.—It is the policy of 

2 the United States to provide climate financing— 

3 (A) as an essential part of the global effort 

4 to combat climate change; and 

5 (B) that— 

6 (i) upholds the principles of environ7 mental justice and climate justice; 

8 (ii) supports programs and projects de9 veloped by recipient countries and commu10 nities; 

11 (iii) is designed and implemented with 

12 the free, prior, and informed consent of in13 digenous peoples and other impacted com14 munities; 

15 (iv) promotes gender equality as essen16 tial in all of the projects and programs sup17 ported by climate financing; 

18 (v) includes best practices for environ19 mental and social safeguards to ensure that 

20 projects and programs supported by climate 

21 financing respect fundamental human 

22 rights; and 

23 (vi) addresses both mitigation and ad24 aptation as essential aspects of responding 

25 to climate change. 


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1 (b) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—There are 

2 authorized to be appropriated for contributions to the Green 

3 Climate Fund $4,000,000,000 for each of the fiscal years 

4 2022 and 2023. 

5 (c) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Congress 

6 that the climate financing needs to achieve the greenhouse 

7 gas emissions reductions required to keep the planet at or 

8 below 1.5 degrees Celsius of global warming are signifi9 cantly greater than the amount of funds authorized to be 

10 appropriated under subsection (a). 

11 SEC. 610. ENSURING A WHOLE-OF-GOVERNMENT RESPONSE 

12 TO CLIMATE ACTION. 

13 (a) ESTABLISHMENT.—The Secretary of State shall es14 tablish a Climate Impacts Task Force (referred to in this 

15 section as the ‘‘Task Force’’) with the mandate to— 

16 (1) monitor climate and related impacted social 

17 conditions to anticipate and prevent climate and en18 vironmental stressors from evolving into national se19 curity risks; 

20 (2) monitor and assess climate action under21 taken by other countries in response to national strat22 egies and international commitments, and coordinate 

23 closely with allies and partners to ensure a coordi24 nated response against any state or non-state actors, 

25 including the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and 


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1 PRC companies, undermining global climate objec2 tives, norms, and practices; 

3 (3) strengthen the efforts of the Department of 

4 State and the United States Government to act 

5 proactively to mitigate the human harms and poten6 tial for national security risks resulting from emerg7 ing events exacerbated by climate change; and 

8 (4) assist other Federal departments and agen9 cies, foreign partners, and multilateral organizations 

10 in their efforts to do the same. 

11 (b) LEADERSHIP.—The Secretary of State shall des12 ignate a senior career official, as appropriate, of the De13 partment of State to serve as the Chair of the Task Force. 

14 Such official shall report to the Secretary of State. 

15 (c) RESPONSIBILITIES.—Under the direction of the 

16 Chair, the Task Force shall— 

17 (1) meet regularly to ensure that events exacer18 bated by climate change and the risk of emerging 

19 events exacerbated by climate change throughout the 

20 world are adequately considered and addressed; 

21 (2) facilitate the development and execution of 

22 policies and tools to enhance the capacity of the 

23 United States to prevent and respond to emerging 

24 events exacerbated by climate change worldwide; 


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1 (3) monitor developments throughout the world 

2 that heighten the risk of emerging events exacerbated 

3 by climate change; 

4 (4) identify gaps in United States foreign policy 

5 related to the prevention of and response to emerging 

6 events exacerbated by climate change with respect to 

7 certain regions or particular countries; 

8 (5) incorporate lessons learned from past United 

9 States efforts to prevent and respond to emerging 

10 events exacerbated by climate change and other im11 pacts that are comparable in scope or severity; 

12 (6) provide the Secretary of State with rec13 ommendations and potential improvements to poli14 cies, programs, resources, and tools related to the pre15 vention of and response to emerging events exacer16 bated by climate change; 

17 (7) coordinate the Department of State’s engage18 ment in interagency processes led by the National Se19 curity Council that share the Task Force’s objectives; 

20 (8) conduct outreach not less frequently than bi21 annually, with representatives of nongovernmental or22 ganizations dedicated to the prevention of and re23 sponse to emerging events exacerbated by climate 

24 change and other appropriate parties, to— 


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1 (A) receive assistance relating to the Task 

2 Force’s efforts to address emerging events exacer3 bated by climate change and develop new or im4 proved policies, programs, resources, and tools; 

5 and 

6 (B) provide a public understanding of the 

7 work of the Task Force; 

8 (9) in carrying out paragraphs (1) through (9), 

9 focus on particular ways for the United States to de10 velop, strengthen, and enhance its capabilities to— 

11 (A) monitor, receive early warning of, and 

12 coordinate responses to potential emerging events 

13 exacerbated by climate change; 

14 (B) engage allies and partners, including 

15 multilateral and regional institutions, to build 

16 capacities and mobilize action for preventing 

17 and responding to emerging events exacerbated 

18 by climate change; 

19 (C) encourage the deployment of civilian 

20 advisors to prevent and respond to emerging 

21 events exacerbated by climate change; 

22 (D) increase the capacity of and develop 

23 doctrine for the United States Foreign Service, 

24 civil service, Armed Forces, development profes25 sionals, and other actors to engage in the full 


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1 spectrum of activities to prevent and respond to 

2 emerging events exacerbated by climate change; 

3 (E) develop and implement tailored foreign 

4 assistance programs that address and mitigate 

5 the risks of emerging events exacerbated by cli6 mate change; 

7 (F) ensure intelligence collection, analysis, 

8 and sharing of appropriate information; and 

9 (G) address any other issues that the Task 

10 Force determines appropriate; 

11 (10) in carrying out paragraphs (1) through (9), 

12 receive support from bureaus and offices of the De13 partment of State, as the Secretary of State deter14 mines appropriate; and 

15 (11) facilitate annual coordination between the 

16 Department of State and other appropriate depart17 ments and agencies to ensure international and do18 mestic climate change objectives are aligned. 

19 (d) COMPOSITION.—The Task Force shall— 

20 (1) seek to ensure that its efforts complement and 

21 support interagency processes led by the National Se22 curity Council that share the Task Force’s objectives; 

23 and 

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1 ant Secretary level or higher, from all such executive 

2 departments, agencies, or offices as the Chair may 

3 designate. 

4 (e) REPORT.—Not later than 180 days after the date 

5 of the enactment of this Act and every 2 years thereafter 

6 for the following 10 years, the Secretary of State, in con7 sultation with the Task Force, shall submit to the Com8 mittee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on Appro9 priations of the Senate and the Committee on Foreign Af10 fairs and the Committee on Appropriations of the House 

11 of Representatives an unclassified report, with a classified 

12 annex if necessary, that includes— 

13 (1) a review, in consultation with the designated 

14 representatives specified in subsection (d), consisting 

15 of— 

16 (A) an evaluation of the efficacy of current 

17 efforts based on United States and locally identi18 fied indicators, including capacities and con19 straints for United States Government-wide de20 tection, early warning and response, informa21 tion-sharing, contingency planning, and coordi22 nation of efforts to prevent and respond to 

23 emerging events exacerbated by climate change; 

24 (B) an assessment of the funding expended 

25 by relevant Federal departments and agencies on 


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1 emerging events exacerbated by climate change 

2 and the legal, procedural, and resource con3 straints faced by the Department of State and 

4 the United States Agency for International De5 velopment throughout respective budgeting, stra6 tegic planning, and management cycles to sup7 port the prevention of and response to emerging 

8 events exacerbated by climate change; 

9 (C) current annual global assessments of 

10 emerging events exacerbated by climate change; 

11 (D) recommendations to further strengthen 

12 United States capabilities described in subpara13 graph (A); and 

14 (E) consideration of analysis, reporting, 

15 and policy recommendations by civil society, 

16 academic, and other nongovernmental organiza17 tions and institutions to prevent and respond to 

18 emerging events exacerbated by climate change; 

19 (2) recommendations to ensure shared responsi20 bility by— 

21 (A) enhancing multilateral mechanisms for 

22 preventing, mitigating, and responding to emerg23 ing events exacerbated by climate change; and 

24 (B) strengthening regional organizations; 

25 and 


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1 (3) the implementation status of the rec2 ommendations included in the review under para3 graph (1). 

4 (f) BRIEFINGS AND MATERIALS.—The Chair and 

5 members of the Task Force shall, not less frequently than 

6 annually, provide briefings and materials to the Committee 

7 on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the Committee on 

8 Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives. 

9 (g) REPORT BY THE DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTEL10 LIGENCE.—The Director of National Intelligence is encour11 aged to include, in his or her annual (or more often as ap12 propriate) unclassified testimony, accompanied by a classi13 fied annex, if necessary, to Congress on threats to United 

14 States national security— 

15 (1) a review of countries and regions at risk of 

16 emerging events exacerbated by climate change; and 

17 (2) whenever possible, specific identification of 

18 countries and regions at immediate risk of emerging 

19 events exacerbated by climate change. 

20 (h) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Congress 

21 that rapid and robust climate change response mechanisms, 

22 including the establishment of the Task Force, are critical 

23 for ensuring other countries remain accountable to their cli24 mate action commitments as well as preserving the national 

25 security and economic interests of the United States. 


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1 SEC. 611. WORKING WITH INTERNATIONAL PARTNERS TO 

2 REDUCE DEFORESTATION. 

3 (a) FINDINGS.—Congress finds the following: 

4 (1) The People’s Republic of China (PRC) is 

5 having a substantial impact on the most important 

6 forest ecosystems in the world, and illegal logging and 

7 agricultural expansion have caused the massive forest 

8 loss. According to the World Resources Institute, the 

9 PRC has become the world’s leading importer and 

10 consumer of timber products, soybeans, and palm oil, 

11 as well as the largest manufacturing and export coun12 try of forest products. 

13 (2) In 2016, the PRC imported logs from more 

14 than 100 countries in the world. According to a Glob15 al Witness report, between January 2013 and April 

16 2020, Chinese financial institutions provided more 

17 than $22.5 billion to major companies that produce 

18 and trade commodities at high risk of driving defor19 estation. These commodities include beef, soy, palm 

20 oil, paper, pulp, rubber, and timber. 

21 (3) Further, the growing international demand 

22 for such agricultural commodities causes the majority 

23 of deforestation emissions globally, and most of the as24 sociated land-clearing violates applicable national or 

25 local laws. According to a 2021 Forest Trends report, 


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1 at least 69 percent of forest land converted to pasture 

2 or cropland was cleared illegally. 

3 (4) The growing demand for timber and agricul4 tural commodities has accelerated unsustainable—and 

5 often illegal—logging and the trade of timber prod6 ucts, which harms the countries in which it takes 

7 place by siphoning away government tax revenue, 

8 transforming the livelihoods of communities depend9 ent on forests, and hurting legal businesses’ competi10 tiveness. Further, illegal logging and illegal conver11 sion of forest to agricultural land threatens biodiver12 sity and accelerates deforestation and forest degrada13 tion in key timber supply countries, undermining 

14 United States and global climate goals. 

15 (5) The United States should work with inter16 national partners to ensure that Chinese and other 

17 banks factor into lending practices the environmental 

18 and social impact of the companies they finance. This 

19 should include pressuring the PRC and other coun20 tries to revise regulations to require the banking sec21 tor not to finance companies linked to deforestation 

22 and include rigorous checks on the companies oper23 ating in sectors or regions where there is a high risk 

24 of deforestation to ensure they are not associated with 

25 deforestation. 


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1 (b) DEFINITIONS.—In this section: 

2 (1) ADMINISTRATOR.—Except as otherwise ex3 pressly provided, the term ‘‘Administrator’’ means the 

4 Administrator of the United States Agency for Inter5 national Development. 

6 (2) DEFORESTATION.—The term ‘‘deforestation’’ 

7 means a change in land use from a forest (including 

8 peatlands) to any other land use. 

9 (3) DEVELOPING COUNTRY.—The term ‘‘devel10 oping country’’ means a country eligible to receive of11 ficial development assistance according to the income 

12 guidelines of the Development Assistance Committee 

13 of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 

14 Development. 

15 (4) EMISSIONS REDUCTIONS.—The term ‘‘emis16 sions reductions’’ means greenhouse gas emissions re17 ductions achieved from reduced or avoided deforest18 ation under this section. 

19 (5) FOREST.— 

20 (A) IN GENERAL.—The term ‘‘forest’’ means 

21 a terrestrial ecosystem, including wetland forests, 

22 comprised of native tree species generated and 

23 maintained primarily through natural ecological 

24 and evolutionary processes. 


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1 (B) EXCLUSION.—The term ‘‘forest’’ does 

2 not include plantations, such as crops of trees 

3 planted by humans primarily for the purposes of 

4 harvesting. 

5 (6) FOREST DEGRADATION.—The term ‘‘forest 

6 degradation’’ is any reduction in the carbon stock of 

7 a forest due to the effects of human land-use activities, 

8 including such land-use activities on peatlands. 

9 (7) INTACT FOREST.—The term ‘‘intact forest’’ 

10 means an unbroken expanse of natural ecosystems 

11 within the global extent of forest cover that— 

12 (A) covers an area of at least 500 square 

13 kilometers and is at least 10 kilometers in each 

14 direction; and 

15 (B) contains forest and non-forest eco16 systems minimally influenced by human eco17 nomic activity and large enough that all native 

18 biodiversity, including viable populations of 

19 wide-ranging species, could be maintained. 

20 (9) LEAKAGE.—The term ‘‘leakage’’ means the 

21 unexpected loss of anticipated carbon benefits due to 

22 the displacement of activities in a project area to 

23 areas outside the project, resulting in carbon emis24 sions. 


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1 (10) LEAKAGE PREVENTION ACTIVITIES.—The 

2 term ‘‘leakage prevention activities’’ means activities 

3 in developing countries that are directed at preserving 

4 existing forest carbon stocks, including forested wet5 lands and peatlands that might, absent such activi6 ties, be lost through leakage. 

7 (11) NATIONAL DEFORESTATION REDUCTION AC8 TIVITIES.—The term ‘‘national deforestation reduc9 tion activities’’ means activities in developing coun10 tries that reduce a quantity of greenhouse gas emis11 sions from deforestation that is calculated by meas12 uring actual emissions against a national deforest13 ation baseline established pursuant to subparagraphs 

14 (B) and (C) of subsection (d)(4). 

15 (12) SUBNATIONAL DEFORESTATION AND FOREST

16 DEGRADATION REDUCTION ACTIVITIES.—The term 

17 ‘‘subnational deforestation and forest degradation re18 duction activities’’ means activities in developing 

19 countries that reduce a quantity of greenhouse gas 

20 emissions from deforestation and forest degradation 

21 that is calculated by measuring actual emissions 

22 using an appropriate baseline, or an alternative de23 termined under subsection (d)(4)(B)(ii), established 

24 by the Administrator at the State or provincial level. 


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1 (c) PURPOSES.—The purposes of this section are to 

2 provide United States assistance to developing countries to 

3 develop, implement, and improve actions that reduce defor4 estation and forest degradation or conserve or restore forest 

5 ecosystems— 

6 (1) to protect the value of forest ecosystems with 

7 respect to permanent carbon capture and sequestra8 tion in a manner in which such value is measurable, 

9 reportable, and verifiable; and 

10 (2) in a manner that— 

11 (A) is consistent with and enhances the im12 plementation of complementary United States 

13 policies that support the good governance of for14 ests, biodiversity conservation, and environ15 mentally sustainable development; 

16 (B) takes into consideration the views and 

17 participation of local communities and most vul18 nerable communities and populations, particu19 larly forest-dependent communities; and 

20 (C) incorporates the right to free prior and 

21 informed consent of indigenous peoples. 

22 (d) EMISSIONS REDUCTIONS THROUGH REDUCED DE23 FORESTATION.— 

24 (1) ESTABLISHMENT OF PROGRAM.—Not later 

25 than 1 year after the date of the enactment of this 


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1 Act, the Administrator, in consultation with other ap2 propriate agencies, shall establish a program to pro3 vide assistance to reduce deforestation in developing 

4 countries and its impacts, in accordance with this 

5 section. 

6 (2) OBJECTIVES.—The objectives of the program 

7 established under paragraph (1) shall be— 

8 (A) to achieve— 

9 (i) emissions reductions of at least 

10 7,000,000,000 tons of carbon dioxide equiva11 lent in 2025; 

12 (ii) cumulative emissions reductions of 

13 at least 11,000,000,000 tons of carbon diox14 ide equivalent by December 31, 2030; and 

15 (iii) additional emissions reductions in 

16 subsequent years; 

17 (B) to build capacity to reduce deforestation 

18 at a national level in developing countries expe19 riencing deforestation, which may include— 

20 (i) preparing developing countries to 

21 participate in international markets for 

22 international offset credits for reduced emis23 sions from deforestation; 

24 (ii) supporting the development of 

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1 sure effective, efficient, and equitable ben2 efit-sharing of the proceeds of such credits 

3 issued by national and subnational govern4 ments; and 

5 (iii) promoting and expanding land ti6 tling initiatives and programs in other 

7 countries; 

8 (C) to preserve forest carbon stocks in coun9 tries where such forest carbon may be vulnerable 

10 to leakage, particularly in developing countries 

11 with largely intact native forests; 

12 (D) to build the scientific knowledge and in13 stitutional capacity to help developing coun14 tries— 

15 (i) monitor the effects of climate 

16 change on their forests; 

17 (ii) develop and implement strategies 

18 to conserve their forests; and 

19 (iii) support forest-dependent commu20 nities adapt to climate change; 

21 (E) to the extent practicable, to reduce de22 forestation in ways that reduce the vulnerability 

23 and increase the resilience to climate effects for 

24 forests and forest-dependent communities; 


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1 (F) to prevent degradation and fragmenta2 tion of forests and other intact ecosystems, par3 ticularly in tropical countries, including by pro4 viding assistance or supporting policies to— 

5 (i) conserve, protect, and restore the in6 tegrity of such ecosystems; and 

7 (ii) support the rights of Indigenous 

8 People and local communities and their 

9 ability to continue their effective steward10 ship of their intact traditional lands and 

11 territories; 

12 (G) to build capacity to address illegal de13 forestation for agricultural commodities; and 

14 (H) to remove subsidies that favor deforest15 ation; 

16 (e) REQUIREMENTS FOR INTERNATIONAL DEFOREST17 ATION REDUCTION PROGRAM.— 

18 (1) ELIGIBLE COUNTRIES.— 

19 (A) IN GENERAL.—Except as provided in 

20 subparagraph (B), the Administrator may pro21 vide assistance under this section only with re22 spect to a developing country that— 

23 (i) the Administrator, in consultation 

24 with other appropriate agencies, deter25 mines— 


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1 (I) is experiencing deforestation 

2 or forest degradation; or 

3 (II) has standing forest carbon 

4 stocks that may be at risk of deforest5 ation or degradation; 

6 (ii) has the legal regimes, standards, 

7 and safeguards to ensure that the rights and 

8 interests of indigenous peoples and forest-de9 pendent communities are protected in ac10 cordance with the standards established 

11 under paragraph (4); and 

12 (iii) has entered into a bilateral or 

13 multilateral agreement or arrangement with 

14 the United States, or is part of an inter15 national program supported by the United 

16 States to prevent deforestation, that estab17 lishes the conditions of participation by the 

18 country in the program established under 

19 this section, which shall include an agree20 ment to meet the standards established 

21 under paragraph (4) for the activities to 

22 which such standards apply. 

23 (B) EXCEPTION.—A developing country 

24 that does not meet the requirement described in 

25 paragraph (1)(A)(ii) may receive assistance 


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1 under this section for the purpose of building ca2 pacity to meet such requirement. 

3 (2) AUTHORIZED ACTIVITIES.—Subject to the re4 quirements of this section, in providing assistance 

5 under this section, the Administrator may support 

6 activities to achieve the objectives described in sub7 section (c)(2), such as— 

8 (A) national deforestation reduction activi9 ties; 

10 (B) subnational deforestation and forest 

11 degradation reduction activities, including pilot 

12 activities, policies, and measures that reduce 

13 greenhouse gas emissions and are subject to sig14 nificant uncertainty; 

15 (C) activities to measure, monitor, and 

16 verify deforestation, avoided deforestation, and 

17 rates of deforestation, including, if applicable, 

18 spatially explicit land use plans that identify in19 tact and primary forest areas and managed for20 est areas; 

21 (D) leakage prevention activities; 

22 (E) the development and implementation of 

23 measurement, monitoring, reporting, and 

24 verification capacities and governance structures, 

25 including legal regimes, standards, processes, 


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1 and safeguards, as established under paragraph 

2 (4), to enable a country to quantify emissions re3 ductions for purposes of purchasing or trading 

4 subnational emissions reduction credits in car5 bon markets; 

6 (F) the identification of, and actions to ad7 dress, the drivers of land use emissions; 

8 (G) programs that would exclude from the 

9 United States illegally harvested timber or prod10 ucts made from illegally harvested timber, in ac11 cordance with and consistent with the objectives 

12 of the Lacey Act Amendments of 1981 (16 U.S.C. 

13 3371 et seq.); 

14 (H) the development and strengthening of 

15 governance capacities to reduce deforestation and 

16 other land use emissions and to combat illegal 

17 logging and associated trade, including the devel18 opment of systems for independent monitoring of 

19 the efficacy of forest law enforcement and in20 creased enforcement cooperation, including joint 

21 efforts with Federal agencies, to enforce the 

22 Lacey Act Amendments of 1981 (16 U.S.C. 3371 

23 et seq.); 

24 (I) programs to help countries strengthen 

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1 pacity to trace and make publicly available the 

2 origin of agricultural commodities associated 

3 with tropical deforestation, such as beef, soy, 

4 palm oil, paper, pulp, cocoa, and rubber; 

5 (J) the development and strengthening of 

6 governance capacities and associated implemen7 tation activities to combat illegal deforestation 

8 related to the production of agricultural com9 modities, such as those described in subpara10 graph (I); 

11 (K) the provision of incentives for policy re12 forms to achieve the objectives described in sub13 section (c)(2); 

14 (L) the development of pilot projects— 

15 (i) to examine where mitigation and 

16 adaptation activities in forest ecosystems 

17 coincide; and 

18 (ii) to explore means for enhancing the 

19 resilience of forest ecosystems and forest-de20 pendent communities; 

21 (M) the promotion of mechanisms to deliver 

22 resources for local action and to address the 

23 needs, rights, interests, and participation of local 

24 and indigenous communities; 


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1 (N) the promotion of land tenure and ti2 tling programs, including legal recognition and 

3 effective protection of the land tenure, access and 

4 use rights of Indigenous People and local com5 munities; and 

6 (O) the monitoring and evaluation of the 

7 results of the activities conducted under this sec8 tion. 

9 (3) MECHANISMS.—The Administrator shall 

10 apply the administrative authorities under the For11 eign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2151 et seq.), 

12 except to the extent inconsistent with the provisions of 

13 this section, to the same extent and in the same man14 ner as such authorities apply to the implementation 

15 of such Act in order to support activities to achieve 

16 the objectives described in subsection (c)(2) by— 

17 (A) developing and implementing programs 

18 and project-level activities that achieve such ob19 jectives; 

20 (B) to the extent practicable, giving priority 

21 in any review process to activities under para22 graph (2)(A); and 

23 (C) as appropriate, considering multi-year 

24 funding arrangements in carrying out the pur25 poses of this section. 


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1 (4) STANDARDS.—The Administrator, in con2 sultation with other appropriate agencies, shall estab3 lish program standards that— 

4 (A) ensure that emissions reductions 

5 achieved through supported activities— 

6 (i) are additional, measurable, 

7 verifiable, and monitored; 

8 (ii) account for leakage, uncertainty, 

9 and permanence; and 

10 (iii) at a minimum, meet the stand11 ards established under the emissions unit 

12 criteria of the Carbon Offsetting and Reduc13 tion Scheme for International Aviation 

14 (CORSIA) developed by the International 

15 Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO); 

16 (B) require— 

17 (i) the establishment of a national de18 forestation baseline for each country with 

19 national deforestation reduction activities 

20 that is used to account for reductions 

21 achieved from such activities; or 

22 (ii) if a developing country has estab23 lished policies and taken measures to reduce 

24 emissions from disturbed peatlands, defor25 estation, or forest degradation, but has not 


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1 established a national baseline, the provi2 sion of a credible, transparent, accurate, 

3 and conservative alternative for quantifying 

4 emissions; 

5 (C) provide that each national deforestation 

6 baseline established under subparagraph (B)(i)— 

7 (i) is national, or subnational on an 

8 interim basis, in scope; and 

9 (ii) is consistent with nationally ap10 propriate mitigation commitments or ac11 tions with respect to deforestation, taking 

12 into consideration— 

13 (I) the average annual historical 

14 deforestation rates of the country dur15 ing a period of at least 5 years; and 

16 (II) the applicable drivers of de17 forestation and other factors to ensure 

18 additionality; 

19 (iii) establishes a trajectory that would 

20 result in zero net deforestation by not later 

21 than 20 years after the date on which the 

22 baseline is established; 

23 (iv) is adjusted over time to account 

24 for changing national circumstances; and 


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1 (v) is designed to account for all sig2 nificant sources of greenhouse gas emissions 

3 from deforestation in the country; 

4 (D) with respect to assistance provided for 

5 activities described in subparagraph (A) or (B) 

6 of paragraph (2), require emissions reductions to 

7 be achieved and verified before the provision of 

8 any assistance under this section; 

9 (E) with respect to accounting for sub10 national deforestation and forest degradation re11 duction activities that lack the standardized or 

12 precise measurement and monitoring techniques 

13 needed for a full accounting of changes in emis14 sions or baselines, or are subject to other sources 

15 of uncertainty, apply a conservative discount 

16 factor to reflect the uncertainty regarding the 

17 levels of reductions achieved; 

18 (F) ensure that activities under this section 

19 are designed, carried out, and managed— 

20 (i) using forest management practices 

21 that, in an open and transparent process— 

22 (I) improve the livelihoods of for23 est communities in a manner that pro24 motes the maintenance of intact forests, 

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1 stores native forest species and eco2 systems while avoiding the introduc3 tion of invasive nonnative species; 

4 (II) maintain natural biodiver5 sity, resilience, and carbon storage ca6 pacity of forests; 

7 (III) to the extent practicable, do 

8 not adversely affect the permanence of 

9 forest carbon stocks or emissions reduc10 tions; 

11 (IV) include broad stakeholder 

12 participation and the free prior and 

13 informed consent of affected indigenous 

14 peoples; and 

15 (V) take into account the needs 

16 and interests of local communities, for17 est-dependent communities, indigenous 

18 peoples, and vulnerable social groups; 

19 (ii) in consultation with, and with the 

20 full and effective participation of, local 

21 communities, indigenous peoples, and for22 est-dependent communities in affected areas, 

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1 plementation, monitoring, and evaluation of 

2 activities; and 

3 (iii) with equitable sharing of profits 

4 and benefits derived from the activities with 

5 local communities, indigenous peoples, and 

6 forest-dependent communities; and 

7 (G) with respect to assistance for all activi8 ties under this section, seek to ensure the estab9 lishment and enforcement of legal regimes, stand10 ards, processes, and safeguards by the country in 

11 which the activities are conducted, as a condition 

12 of such assistance or as a proposed activity for 

13 which such assistance may be provided, which— 

14 (i) protect the rights and interests of 

15 local communities, indigenous peoples, for16 est-dependent communities, human rights 

17 defenders, and vulnerable social groups; and 

18 (ii) promote consultations with local 

19 communities, indigenous peoples, and for20 est-dependent communities in affected areas, 

21 as partners and primary stakeholders, be22 fore and during the design, planning, im23 plementation, monitoring, and evaluation of 

24 activities under this section; and 


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1 (iii) ensure equitable sharing of profits 

2 and benefits from incentives for emissions 

3 reductions or leakage prevention with local 

4 communities, indigenous peoples, and for5 est-dependent communities. 

6 (5) SCOPE.— 

7 (A) REDUCED EMISSIONS.—The Adminis8 trator shall include reduced emissions from forest 

9 degradation and disturbance of peatlands within 

10 the scope of activities under this section. 

11 (B) EXPANSION OF AUTHORIZED ACTIVI12 TIES.—If the Administrator determines, in con13 sultation with other appropriate agencies, that 

14 sufficient methodologies and technical capacities 

15 exist to measure, monitor, and account for the 

16 emissions referred to in subparagraph (A), the 

17 Administrator may expand the authorized ac18 tivities under this section, as appropriate, to in19 clude reduced soil carbon-derived emissions asso20 ciated with deforestation and degradation of for21 ested wetlands and peatlands, consistent with a 

22 comprehensive approach to maintaining and en23 hancing forests, increasing climate resiliency, re24 ducing emissions, and increasing removals of 

25 greenhouse gases. 


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1 (6) ACCOUNTING.—The Administrator shall use 

2 a publicly accessible registry to account for and reg3 ister the emissions reductions achieved through assist4 ance provided under this section each year, after ap5 propriately discounting for uncertainty and other rel6 evant factors as required by the standards established 

7 under paragraph (4). 

8 (7) INTERNATIONAL DEFORESTATION REDUCTION

9 PROGRAM INSURANCE ACCOUNT FOR NONCOMPLETION

10 OR REVERSAL.—In furtherance of the objectives de11 scribed in subsection (c)(2), the Administrator shall 

12 develop and implement a program that— 

13 (A) addresses noncompletion or reversal 

14 with respect to any greenhouse gas emissions 

15 that were not, or are no longer, sequestered; and 

16 (B) may include a mechanism to hold in re17 serve a portion of the amount allocated for 

18 projects to support the program. 

19 (8) EXTENSION OF ASSISTANCE.— 

20 (A) IN GENERAL.—The Administrator may 

21 extend, for an additional 5 years, the period dur22 ing which assistance is authorized for activities 

23 supported by assistance under this section, if the 

24 Administrator determines that— 


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1 (i) the country in which the activities 

2 are conducted is making substantial 

3 progress toward adopting and implementing 

4 a program to achieve reductions in deforest5 ation measured against a national baseline; 

6 (ii) the greenhouse gas emissions reduc7 tions achieved as a result of the activities 

8 are not resulting in significant leakage; 

9 (iii) such greenhouse gas emissions re10 ductions are being appropriately discounted 

11 to account for any leakage that is occurring; 

12 and 

13 (iv) such extension would further ad14 vance or ensure achievement of the objectives 

15 of the activities. 

16 (B) ASSISTANCE FOR SUBNATIONAL DEFOR17 ESTATION AND FOREST DEGRADATION REDUC18 TION ACTIVITIES.— 

19 (i) IN GENERAL.—If the Administrator 

20 extends the period during which assistance 

21 is authorized for activities under subpara22 graph (A), the Administrator shall deter23 mine, based on the criteria specified that 

24 subparagraph, whether such assistance 

25 should include assistance for subnational 


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1 deforestation and forest degradation reduc2 tion activities. 

3 (ii) CONTINUED ASSISTANCE.—The Ad4 ministrator may extend the period during 

5 which assistance is authorized for sub6 national deforestation and forest degrada7 tion reduction activities beyond the 5-year 

8 period described in subparagraph (A) in 

9 order to further the objectives described in 

10 subparagraph (B) or (C) of subsection 

11 (c)(2). 

12 (9) COORDINATION WITH FOREIGN ASSIST13 ANCE.—Subject to the direction of the President, the 

14 Administrator shall, to the extent practicable and 

15 consistent with the objectives described in subsection 

16 (c)(2), seek to align activities under this section with 

17 broader development, poverty alleviation, or natural 

18 resource management objectives and initiatives in 

19 countries receiving assistance under this section. 

20 (10) ASSISTANCE AS SUPPLEMENT.—The provi21 sion of assistance for activities under this section 

22 shall be used to supplement, and not to supplant, any 

23 other Federal, State, or local support available to 

24 carry out activities under this section. 


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1 (11) FUNDING LIMITATION.—Of the funds made 

2 available to carry out this section in any fiscal year, 

3 not more than 7 percent may be used for the adminis4 trative expenses of the United States Agency for Inter5 national Development in support of activities de6 scribed in paragraph (2). Such amount shall be in 

7 addition to other amounts otherwise available for 

8 such purposes. 

9 (f) LEGAL EFFECT.— 

10 (1) IN GENERAL.—Nothing in this section may 

11 be construed to supersede, limit, or otherwise affect 

12 any restriction imposed by Federal law (including 

13 regulations) on any interaction between an entity lo14 cated in the United States and an entity located in 

15 a foreign country. 

16 (2) ROLE OF THE SECRETARY OF STATE.—Noth17 ing in this section may be construed to affect the role 

18 of the Secretary of State or the responsibilities of the 

19 Secretary under section 622(c) of the Foreign Assist20 ance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2382(c)). 

21 (g) INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS.—The 

22 President shall direct the United States representatives to 

23 the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and 

24 other international financial institutions (as defined in sec25 tion 1701(c) of the International Financial Institutions Act 


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1 (22 U.S.C. 262r(c)) to prioritize efforts to combat deforest2 ation. 

3 SEC. 612. CONTROLLING THE EXPORT OF ELECTRONIC 

4 WASTE TO PROTECT UNITED STATES SUPPLY 

5 CHAINS. 

6 (a) FINDINGS.—Congress finds the following: 

7 (1) It is in the national security interests of the 

8 United States to ensure that the export of electronic 

9 waste does not become the source of counterfeit goods 

10 that may reenter electronics supply chains in the 

11 United States, and for other purposes. 

12 (2) A 2012 Senate Armed Services Committee 

13 Report ‘‘discovered counterfeit electronic parts from 

14 China in the Air Force’s largest cargo plane, in as15 semblies intended for Special Operations helicopters, 

16 and in a Navy surveillance plane among 1,800 cases 

17 of bogus parts’’. 

18 (3) Further, exporting such material has often 

19 resulted in environmental damage because of illegal 

20 dumping or inadequate environmental regulations in 

21 other countries for ensuring their safe and secure dis22 posal. 

23 (4) China, the single largest producer of elec24 tronic waste, is on track for its e-waste industry to 

25 total $23,800,000,000 by 2030, given its high supply 


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1 of used products, demand for recycled materials, and 

2 capacity to transport these materials. 

3 (5) As the second largest producer of electronic 

4 waste, the United States has a strong economic and 

5 national security incentive to enhance domestic e6 waste recycling capacity rather than exporting to 

7 China and other countries. 

8 (6) Given China’s lack of regulations and worker 

9 protections, workers in the e-waste industry have been 

10 exposed to over 1,000 harmful substances, including 

11 lead and mercury, endangering the health and 

12 wellbeing of workers. 

13 (b) DEFINITIONS.—In this section: 

14 (1) ELECTRONIC WASTE.— 

15 (A) IN GENERAL.—The term ‘‘electronic 

16 waste’’ means any of the following used items 

17 containing electronic components, or fragments 

18 thereof, including parts or subcomponents of such 

19 items: 

20 (i) Computers and related equipment. 

21 (ii) Data center equipment (including 

22 servers, network equipment, firewalls, bat23 tery backup systems, and power distribution 

24 units). 


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1 (iii) Mobile computers (including note2 books, netbooks, tablets, and e-book readers). 

3 (iv) Televisions (including portable 

4 televisions and portable DVD players). 

5 (v) Video display devices (including 

6 monitors, digital picture frames, and port7 able video devices). 

8 (vi) Digital imaging devices (including 

9 printers, copiers, facsimile machines, image 

10 scanners, and multifunction machines). 

11 (vii) Consumer electronics— 

12 (I) including digital cameras, 

13 projectors, digital audio players, cel14 lular phones and wireless internet com15 munication devices, audio equipment, 

16 video cassette recorders, DVD players, 

17 video game systems (including portable 

18 systems), video game controllers, signal 

19 converter boxes, and cable and satellite 

20 receivers; and 

21 (II) not including appliances that 

22 have electronic features. 

23 (viii) Portable global positioning sys24 tem navigation devices. 


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1 (ix) Other used electronic items that 

2 the Secretary determines to be necessary to 

3 carry out this section. 

4 (B) EXEMPT ITEMS.—The term ‘‘electronic 

5 waste’’ does not include— 

6 (i) exempted electronic waste items; 

7 (ii) electronic parts of a motor vehicle; 

8 or 

9 (iii) electronic components, or items 

10 containing electronic components, that are 

11 exported or reexported to an entity under 

12 the ownership or control of the person ex13 porting or reexporting the components or 

14 items, with the intent that the components 

15 or items be used for the purpose for which 

16 the components or items were used in the 

17 United States. 

18 (2) EXEMPTED ELECTRONIC WASTE ITEMS.— 

19 (A) IN GENERAL.—The term ‘‘exempted 

20 electronic waste items’’ means the following: 

21 (i) Tested, working used electronics. 

22 (ii) Low-risk counterfeit electronics. 

23 (iii) Recalled electronics. 

24 (B) DEFINITIONS.—In this paragraph: 


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1 (i) TESTED, WORKING USED ELEC2 TRONICS.—The term ‘‘tested, working used 

3 electronics’’ means any used electronic items 

4 that— 

5 (I) are determined, through test6 ing methodologies established by the 

7 Secretary, to be— 

8 (aa) fully functional for the 

9 purpose for which the items were 

10 designed; or 

11 (bb) in the case of multi12 function devices, fully functional 

13 for at least one of the primary 

14 purposes for which the items were 

15 designed; 

16 (II) are exported with the intent 

17 to reuse the products as functional 

18 products; and 

19 (III) are appropriately packaged 

20 for shipment to prevent the items from 

21 losing functionality as a result of dam22 age during shipment. 

23 (ii) LOW-RISK COUNTERFEIT ELEC24 TRONICS.—The term ‘‘low-risk counterfeit 


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1 electronics’’ means any electronic compo2 nents or items that— 

3 (I) have been subjected to destruc4 tion processes that render the items un5 usable for their original purpose; and 

6 (II) are exported as a feedstock, 

7 with no additional mechanical or hand 

8 separation required, in a reclamation 

9 process to render the electronic compo10 nents or items recycled consistent with 

11 the laws of the foreign country per12 forming the reclamation process. 

13 (iii) RECALLED ELECTRONICS.—The 

14 term ‘‘recalled electronics’’ means any elec15 tronic items that— 

16 (I) because of a defect in the de17 sign or manufacture of the items— 

18 (aa) are subject to a recall 

19 notice issued by the Consumer 

20 Product Safety Commission or 

21 other pertinent Federal authority 

22 and have been received by the 

23 manufacturer or its agent and re24 paired by the manufacturer or its 

25 agent to cure the defect; or 


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1 (bb) have been recalled by the 

2 manufacturer as a condition of 

3 the validity of the warranty on 

4 the items and have been repaired 

5 by the manufacturer or its agent 

6 to cure the defect; and 

7 (II) are exported by the manufac8 turer of the items. 

9 (iv) FEEDSTOCK.—The term ‘‘feed10 stock’’ means any raw material constituting 

11 the principal input for an industrial proc12 ess. 

13 (3) COUNTERFEIT GOOD.—The term ‘‘counterfeit 

14 good’’ means any good on which, or in connection 

15 with which, a counterfeit mark is used. 

16 (4) COUNTERFEIT MILITARY GOOD.—The term 

17 ‘‘counterfeit military good’’ means a counterfeit good 

18 that— 

19 (A) is falsely identified or labeled as meet20 ing military specifications; or 

21 (B) is intended for use in a military or na22 tional security application. 

23 (5) COUNTERFEIT MARK.—The term ‘‘counterfeit 

24 mark’’ has the meaning given that term in section 

25 2320 of title 18, United States Code. 


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1 (6) EXPORT ADMINISTRATION REGULATIONS.— 

2 The term ‘‘Export Administration Regulations’’ 

3 means the regulations set forth in subchapter C of 

4 chapter VII of title 15, Code of Federal Regulations, 

5 or successor regulations. 

6 (7) EXPORT; REEXPORT.—The terms ‘‘export’’ 

7 and ‘‘reexport’’ have the meanings given such terms 

8 in section 1742 of the Export Control Reform Act of 

9 2018 (50 U.S.C. 4801). 

10 (8) SECRETARY.—The term ‘‘Secretary’’ means 

11 the Secretary of Commerce. 

12 (9) USED.—The term ‘‘used’’, with respect to an 

13 item, means the item has been operated or employed. 

14 (c) PROHIBITION.—Except as provided in subsections 

15 (c) and (d), no person or entity may export or reexport 

16 electronic waste or exempted electronic waste items. 

17 (d) EXPORT PROHIBITION EXEMPTIONS.—A person or 

18 entity may export or reexport exempted electronic waste 

19 items, but only if the following requirements are met: 

20 (1) REGISTRATION.—The person or entity is list21 ed on a publicly available registry maintained by the 

22 Secretary. 

23 (2) FILING OF EXPORT INFORMATION.—For each 

24 export transaction, the person or entity files in the 

25 Automated Export System, in accordance with part 


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1 758 of the Export Administration Regulations (or 

2 any corresponding similar regulation or ruling), elec3 tronic export information that contains at least the 

4 following information: 

5 (A) A description of the type and total 

6 quantity of exempted electronic waste items ex7 ported. 

8 (B) The name of each country that received 

9 the exempted electronic waste items for reuse or 

10 recycling. 

11 (C)(i) The name of the ultimate consignee to 

12 which the exempted electronic waste items were 

13 received for reclamation, recall, or reuse; and 

14 (ii) documentation and a declaration that 

15 such consignee has the necessary permits, re16 sources, and competence to manage the exempted 

17 electronic waste items as reusable products or re18 cyclable feedstock and prevent its release as a 

19 counterfeit good or counterfeit military good. 

20 (3) COMPLIANCE WITH EXISTING LAWS.—The ex21 port or reexport of exempted electronic waste items 

22 otherwise comply with applicable international agree23 ments to which the United States is a party and with 

24 other trade and export control laws of the United 

25 States. 


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1 (4) EXPORT DECLARATIONS AND REQUIRE2 MENTS.—The exempted electronic waste items are ac3 companied by— 

4 (A) documentation of the registration of the 

5 exporter required under paragraph (1); 

6 (B) a declaration signed by an officer or 

7 designated representative of the exporter assert8 ing that the exempted electronic waste items meet 

9 the applicable requirements for exempted elec10 tronic waste items under this section; 

11 (C) a description of the contents and condi12 tion of the exempted electronic waste items in the 

13 shipment; 

14 (D) for tested, working electronics, a de15 scription of the testing methodologies and test re16 sults for each item; 

17 (E) the name of the ultimate consignee and 

18 declaration of the consignee’s applicable permits, 

19 resources, and competence to process or use the 

20 items as intended; and 

21 (F) with respect to low-risk counterfeit elec22 tronics only and when required by the importing 

23 country, the written consent of the competent au24 thority of the receiving country to allow the 

25 products in such country. 


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1 (e) EXCEPTION FOR PERSONAL USE.—The Secretary 

2 may provide for an exception to the requirements of this 

3 section, subject to such recordkeeping requirements as the 

4 Secretary may impose, for the export or reexport of 5 or 

5 fewer items that are or contain electronic components in6 tended for personal use. 

7 (f) EFFECTIVE DATE.— 

8 (1) IN GENERAL.—Subject to paragraph (2), this 

9 section shall take effect upon the expiration of the 1- 

10 year period beginning on the date of the enactment of 

11 this Act. 

12 (2) MODIFICATION OF EAR.—The Secretary shall, 

13 not later than the effective date under paragraph (1), 

14 ensure that the Export Administration Regulations 

15 are modified to carry out this section. 

16 (g) PENALTIES FOR VIOLATIONS.—Any person who 

17 violates this section or the regulations issued under sub18 section (e)(2) shall be subject to the same penalties as those 

19 that apply to any person violating any other provision of 

20 the Export Administration Regulations. 


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Union Calendar No. 486 

117TH CONGRESS 

2D SESSION H. R. 3524 

[Report No. 117–667, Part I] 

A BILL 

To revitalize and reassert United States leadership, 

region and globally. investment, and engagement in the Indo-Pacific 

DECEMBER 30, 2022 

Reported from the Committee on Foreign Affairs with an 

amendment 

DECEMBER 30, 2022 

Committees on Financial Services, Ways and Means, the 

printed House on the State of the Union and ordered to be charged; committed to the Committee of the Whole Judiciary, and Intelligence (Permanent Select) disVerDate Sep 11 2014 21:34 Dec 30, 2022 Jkt 039200 PO 00000 Frm 00650 Fmt 6651 Sfmt 6651 E:\BILLS\H3524.RH H3524

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