NUMBER 13-10-00043-CR

COURT OF APPEALS

THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

CORPUS CHRISTI – EDINBURG

 

DONALD RAY JONES, Appellant,

v.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee.

 

On appeal from the 156th District Court

of Live Oak County, Texas.

 

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Before Justices Rodriguez, Benavides, and Vela

Memorandum Opinion by Justice Benavides

Donald Ray Jones pleaded guilty to possession of a controlled substance. See TEX.

HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 481.115 (Vernon 2010). He was sentenced to two years’

imprisonment in the Texas Department of Criminal Justice—Institutional Division, which

the trial court suspended and placed him three years of community supervision. 
 The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has held that “the pro se response need not comply with the 1

rules of appellate procedure in order to be considered. Rather, the response should identify for the court

those issues which the indigent appellant believes the court should consider in deciding whether the case

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Jones’s appellate counsel, concluding that "there are no arguable grounds to be

advanced on appeal," filed an Ander’s brief in which he reviewed the merits, or lack

thereof, of the appeal. Jones filed a pro se response. We affirm.

I. DISCUSSION

Pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967), appellant’s

court-appointed appellate counsel has filed a brief with this Court, stating that his review

of the record yielded no grounds or error upon which an appeal can be predicated.

Although counsel’s brief does not advance any arguable grounds of error, it does present

a professional evaluation of the record demonstrating why there are no arguable grounds

to be advanced on appeal. See In re Schulman, 252 S.W.3d 403, 407 n.9 (Tex. Crim.

App. 2008) (“In Texas, an Anders brief need not specifically advance ‘arguable’ points of

error if counsel finds none, but it must provide record references to the facts and

procedural history and set out pertinent legal authorities.”) (citing Hawkins v. State, 112

S.W.3d 340, 343-44 (Tex. App.–Corpus Christi 2003, no pet.)); Stafford v. State, 813

S.W.2d 503, 510 n.3 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991). 

In compliance with High v. State, 573 S.W.2d 807, 813 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.]

1978), appellant's counsel has carefully discussed why, under controlling authority, there

are no errors in the trial court's judgment. Counsel has informed this Court that he has:

(1) examined the record and found no arguable grounds to advance on appeal; (2) served

a copy of the brief and counsel’s motion to withdraw on appellant; and (3) informed

appellant of his right to review the record and to file a pro se response within thirty days.1
presents any meritorious issues.” In re Schulman, 252 S.W .3d 403, 409 n.23 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008) (quoting

Wilson v. State, 955 S.W .2d 693, 696-97 (Tex. App.–W aco 1997, no pet.)).

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See Anders, 386 U.S. at 744; Stafford, 813 S.W.2d at 510 n.3; see also In re Schulman,

252 S.W.3d at 409 n.23. 

II. INDEPENDENT REVIEW

Upon receiving an Anders brief, we must conduct a full examination of all the

proceedings to determine whether the case is wholly frivolous. Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S.

75, 80 (1988). We have reviewed the entire record, counsel's brief, and appellant’s pro se

response and have found nothing that would arguably support an appeal. See Bledsoe

v. State, 178 S.W.3d 824, 826-28 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005) (“Due to the nature of Anders

briefs, by indicating in the opinion that it considered the issues raised in the briefs and

reviewed the record for reversible error but found none, the court of appeals met the

requirement of Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 47.1.”); Stafford, 813 S.W.2d at 509.

Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

III. MOTION TO WITHDRAW

In accordance with Anders, appellant’s attorney has asked this Court for permission

to withdraw as counsel for appellant. See Anders, 386 U.S. at 744; see also In re

Schulman, 252 S.W.3d at 408 n.17 (citing Jeffery v. State, 903 S.W.2d 776, 779-80 (Tex.

App.–Dallas 1995, no pet.) (noting that “[i]f an attorney believes the appeal is frivolous, he

must withdraw from representing the appellant. To withdraw from representation, the

appointed attorney must file a motion to withdraw accompanied by a brief showing the

appellate court that the appeal is frivolous.”) (citations omitted)). We grant counsel’s

motion to withdraw. Within five days of the date of this Court’s opinion, counsel is ordered
 No substitute counsel will be appointed. Should appellant wish to seek further review of this case 2

by the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, he must either retain an attorney to file a petition for discretionary

review or file a pro se petition for discretionary review. Any petition for discretionary review must be filed within

thirty days from the date of either this opinion or the last timely motion for rehearing that was overruled by this

Court. See TEX. R. APP. P. 68.2. Any petition for discretionary review must be filed with this Court, after which

it will be forwarded to the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals. See TEX. R. APP. P. 68.3; 68.7. Any petition for

discretionary review should comply with the requirements of Rule 68.4 of the Texas Rules of Appellate

Procedure. See TEX. R. APP. P. 68.4.

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to send a copy of the opinion and judgment to appellant and to advise appellant of his right

to file a petition for discretionary review. See TEX. R. APP. P. 48.4; see also In re 2

Schulman, 252 S.W.3d at 412 n.35; Ex parte Owens, 206 S.W.3d 670, 673 (Tex. Crim.

App. 2006). 

__________________________

GINA M. BENAVIDES,

Justice

Do not publish.

See TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).

Delivered and filed the

8th day of July, 2010.