J-S53010-19

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

MICHAEL A. GLOVER 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 2696 EDA 2018

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered April 27, 2018

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at 

No(s): CP-51-CR-0003671-2016

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

MICHAEL A. GLOVER 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 2698 EDA 2018

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered April 27, 2018

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at 

No(s): CP-51-CR-0003669-2016

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

MICHAEL A. GLOVER 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 2701 EDA 2018

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered April 27, 2018

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at 

No(s): CP-51-CR-0003670-2016

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA :

:

 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA
J-S53010-19

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v.

MICHAEL A. GLOVER 

Appellant

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: No. 2703 EDA 2018

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered April 27, 2018

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at 

No(s): CP-51-CR-0003672-2016

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA 

 v.

MICHAEL A. GLOVER 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 2705 EDA 2018

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered April 27, 2018

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at 

No(s): CP-51-CR-0003675-2016

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

MICHAEL GLOVER 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 2706 EDA 2018

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered April 27, 2018

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at 

No(s): CP-51-CR-0008021-2016

BEFORE: OLSON, J., STABILE, J., and NICHOLS, J.

MEMORANDUM BY OLSON, J.: FILED DECEMBER 06, 2019
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Appellant, Michael A. Glover, appeals from the judgment of sentence 

entered on April 27, 2018, as made final by the denial of Appellant’s 

post-sentence motion on August 20, 2018. We affirm. 

The trial court ably summarized the underlying facts of this case:

CP-51-CR-0003675-2016

On February 1, 2016, [K.M. (hereinafter “the Victim”)] left 

work to go out to lunch. . . . As [the Victim] walked outside, 

she was wearing earbuds and talking on the phone with her 

cousin. When she was about to get into her car, she noticed 

[Appellant,] with whom she was in a relationship from March 

to October of 2015[,] reversing toward her in his vehicle. He 

exited his car and grabbed the top of [the Victim’s] car door

before she was able to close it. In response to [the Victim] 

telling [Appellant] he should not be there, [Appellant] threw 

a teddy bear and a card inside of her car. [The Victim]

continued to tell [Appellant] to leave. [Appellant] then 

allowed [the Victim] to get into her car and close the door....

[The Victim] drove around the corner and [Appellant] pulled 

around to her right side so that she was unable to drive any 

further. [Appellant] exited his car and jumped into the 

passenger seat of [the Victim’s] car. He began yelling at [the 

Victim], asking her to whom she was speaking on the phone. 

[The Victim] instructed her cousin to call the police. She 

honked the car horn in an effort to draw attention. At this 

time, [Appellant] grabbed her cell phone, which was attached 

to the earbuds she was wearing. When [the Victim]

attempted to retrieve it, [Appellant] hit the right side of her 

forehead with the bottom of the phone[, causing the Victim 

to suffer “a knot on [her] forehead.” N.T. Trial, 2/9/18, at 

46-47]. After she attempted to hit him and grab his glasses, 

[Appellant] got out of [the Victim’s] car. He left in his car with 

[the Victim’s] cell phone. . . .

[The Victim] drove toward police officers who told her to pull 

over so they could speak to her. [The Victim was, however, 

w]orried that [Appellant] might go to the school her children 
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attended, [so the Victim] drove back to work to tell her boss 

that she would be leaving for the day. . . .

[When the Victim arrived at her work parking place, she 

stopped her vehicle and, before she could exit, Appellant]

pulled his car up to the side of [her] car so that she could not 

open her door. He leaned over and began hitting [the 

Victim’s] car window with a screwdriver. She rolled down the 

window, but [Appellant] did not stop. Finally, [the Victim]

honked the car horn again and [Appellant] drove away. 

CP-51-CR-0008021-2016

On February 8, 2016, [the Victim] obtained a final Protection 

From Abuse [(“PFA”)] order[,] . . . valid until February 7, 

2019[,] against [Appellant]. The PFA [order] prohibited 

[Appellant] from abusing, harassing, stalking, or threatening 

her. In addition, [Appellant] was forbidden from having any

contact with [the Victim] by telephone or through a third 

party. Lastly, [Appellant] was evicted from [a certain 

residence]. . . .

On March 1, 2016, [the Victim] received several emails from 

[Appellant]. In these emails, [Appellant] threatened to kill 

[the Victim], and [Appellant] sent [the Victim] photos of her 

home and workplace. . . . 

CP-51-CR-0003669-2016

On March 12, 2016, at approximately 2:00 a.m., [the Victim] 

received several phone calls. The police arrived at [the 

Victim’s] house in response to a call, which [the Victim] 

explained likely came from [Appellant]. [Appellant] also left 

various threatening voicemails, including threats to kill her.

CP-51-CR-0003670-2016 & CP-51-CR-0003671-2016

In an incident that occurred later on March 12, 2016, [the 

Victim] was sitting on her front porch with her sister

[(hereinafter “the Sister”)]. . . . [The Sister] noticed a car 

driving slowly on the one-way street. When it stopped, [the 

Sister] realized it was [Appellant]. [Appellant] exited his car 

and began striking [the Victim’s] car window with an object 

resembling a baton, while yelling out profanities. . . .
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Both [the Victim and the Sister] ran toward [Appellant] and 

sprayed him with pepper spray. [Appellant] got back into his 

car and began driving away while holding onto [the Victim]

by her hoodie. [The Victim] was dragged until [the Sister]

threw a pepper spray can at [Appellant’s] car. [Appellant] 

then quickly reversed in his car toward [the Sister], who was 

standing in the middle of the street. [The Sister] jumped out 

of the way and [Appellant] drove away. . . .

[The Victim and the Sister] followed [Appellant] in [the 

Victim’s] car in an effort to get his license plate number. 

While they were looking for [Appellant], he came speeding 

toward the passenger side of their car. [The Victim] was able 

to swerve so that [Appellant] struck only the back of her car. 

As a result of this incident, [the Victim] sustained back pain 

and [the Sister] experienced wrist soreness.

CP-51-CR-0003672-2016

On March 14, 2016, [the Victim] was at an auto-repair shop 

in Philadelphia. She was sitting in the waiting area looking 

down at her phone when [Appellant] entered the shop and

grabbed the phone from her. He then punched her in the 

eye. [The Victim] fell out of her chair and onto the ground...

[Appellant] appeared to be leaving but then came back 

toward [the Victim]. [The Victim] lifted a plastic chair and 

held it out in front of her to keep [Appellant] away. He pushed 

against the chair, causing [the Victim] to fall backwards into 

glass causing it to shatter. [Appellant] then ran outside and 

broke at least two more windows on [the Victim’s] car.

Trial Court Opinion, 4/26/19, at 2-4 (citations and some capitalization 

omitted).

Following a bench trial, the trial court found Appellant guilty of the 

following crimes: 
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 at CP-51-CR-0003675-2016 (hereinafter “Docket Number 3675-2016”), 

robbery, theft by unlawful taking, receiving stolen property, possessing 

instruments of crime (“PIC”), simple assault, and harassment;

1

 at CP-51-CR-0008021-2016 (hereinafter “Docket Number 8021-2016”), 

stalking, terroristic threats, and harassment;2

 at CP-51-CR-0003669-2016 (hereinafter “Docket Number 3669-2016”), 

stalking, contempt for violation of order or agreement, terroristic 

threats, and harassment;3

 at CP-51-CR-0003670-2016 (hereinafter “Docket Number 3670-2016”), 

aggravated assault, stalking, contempt for violation of order or 

agreement, PIC, simple assault, recklessly endangering another person 

(“REAP”), and harassment;

4

 at CP-51-CR-0003671-2016 (hereinafter “Docket Number 3671-2016”), 

aggravated assault, PIC, simple assault, and REAP;5 and, 

____________________________________________

1 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 3701(a)(1)(iv), 3921(a), 3925(a), 907(a), 2701(a), and 

2709(a)(1), respectively.

2 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2709.1(a)(1), 2706(a)(1), and 2709(a)(1), respectively.

3 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2709.1(a)(1), 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 6114(a), and 18 Pa.C.S.A. 

§§ 2706(a)(1) and 2709(a)(4), respectively.

4 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2702(a) and 2709.1(a)(1), 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 6114(a), and 18 

Pa.C.S.A. §§ 907(a), 2701(a), 2705, and 2709(a)(4), respectively.

5 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2702(a), 907(a), 2701(a), and 2705, respectively.
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 at CP-51-CR-0003672-2016 (hereinafter “Docket Number 3672-2016”), 

robbery, stalking, theft by unlawful taking, receiving stolen property, 

contempt for violation of order or agreement, terroristic threats, simple 

assault, and harassment.6

On April 27, 2018, the trial court sentenced Appellant to serve an 

aggregate term of seven to 14 years in prison, followed by five years of 

probation, for his convictions. N.T. Sentencing, 4/27/18, at 40-44.

On August 20, 2018, the trial court denied Appellant’s post-sentence 

motion and Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal. Appellant’s statement of 

questions involved raises the following, general claim to this Court:

Did the [trial] court err by convicting Appellant of numerous 

charges for which the Commonwealth did not present 

sufficient evidence?

Appellant’s Brief at 3 (some capitalization omitted).

Appellant’s general claim of error encompasses seven specific claims of 

evidentiary insufficiency. In particular, Appellant argues that the evidence 

was insufficient to support his convictions for: 1) robbery, at Docket Number 

3675-2016, because the Victim “did not testify to any contemporaneous 

threats or any bodily injury she suffered[; n]or did [the Victim] testify that 

she was in fear of immediate bodily injury;” 2) PIC, at Docket Number 

3675-2016, because “[t]he evidence presented did not prove that Appellant 

____________________________________________

6 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 3701(a)(1)(iv), 2709.1(a)(1), 3921(a), and 3925(a), 23 

Pa.C.S.A. § 6114(a), and 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2706(a)(1), 2701(a), and 

2709(a)(4), respectively.
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possessed the phone with the intent to employ it criminally;” 3) aggravated 

assault, at Docket Number 3670-2016, because the Commonwealth did not 

prove that Appellant attempted to cause the Victim serious bodily injury; 4) 

aggravated assault, at Docket Number 3671-2016, because the 

Commonwealth did not prove that Appellant attempted to cause the Sister 

serious bodily injury; 5) PIC, at Docket Number 3671-2016, because the 

Commonwealth did not prove that Appellant “used the vehicle criminally” 

towards the Sister; 6) robbery, at Docket Number 3672-2016, because the 

Commonwealth did not prove that Appellant used force to take the phone; 

and, 7) stalking, at Docket Number 3672-2016, because the Commonwealth 

did not prove that Appellant engaged in a “course of conduct” towards the 

Victim. See Appellant’s Brief at 12-20.7

____________________________________________

7 The trial court ordered Appellant to file and serve a concise statement of 

errors complained of on appeal, pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate 

Procedure 1925(b). Appellant complied with the trial court’s order and raised 

the following claims in his Rule 1925(b) statement:

1. On [Docket Number 3675-2016], the evidence was

insufficient to prove the following convictions: 

a. robbery, as the evidence did not establish that the

[Victim] suffered injury or was put in fear of injury; and

b. [PIC], as the evidence did not establish that Appellant 

intended to employ the cell phone criminally.

2. On [Docket Number 3670-2016], the evidence was 

insufficient to prove the following convictions:
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We review Appellant's sufficiency of the evidence challenges under the 

following standard:

The standard we apply in reviewing the sufficiency of the 

evidence is whether viewing all the evidence admitted at trial 

in the light most favorable to the verdict winner, there is 

sufficient evidence to enable the fact-finder to find every 

element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. In applying 

____________________________________________

a. aggravated assault, as the evidence did not establish 

that the [Victim] suffered serious bodily injury or that 

Appellant attempted to cause such injury; and

b. [PIC], as the evidence did not establish that Appellant 

intended to employ the car criminally.

3. On [Docket Number 3671-2016], the evidence was

insufficient to prove the following convictions:

a. aggravated assault, as the evidence supported a 

finding that Appellant was merely reckless in his conduct 

and the evidence was insufficient to prove any heightened

standard; and

b. [PIC], as the evidence did not establish that Appellant 

intended to employ the car criminally.

4. On [Docket Number 3672-2016], the evidence was

insufficient to prove the following convictions: 

a. robbery, as the evidence did not support that the

[Victim] suffered serious bodily injury, or that she was 

threatened or placed in fear of such injury; and

b. stalking, as the bills of information charged Appellant

on this docket with a single criminal act, and the charge

of stalking is expressly directed at courses of conduct and 

not single acts.

Appellant’s Rule 1925(b) Statement, 10/31/18, at 1-2 (some capitalization 

omitted).
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the above test, we may not weigh the evidence and substitute 

our judgment for [that of] the fact-finder. In addition, we 

note that the facts and circumstances established by the 

Commonwealth need not preclude every possibility of 

innocence. Any doubts regarding a defendant's guilt may be 

resolved by the fact-finder unless the evidence is so weak 

and inconclusive that as a matter of law no probability of fact 

may be drawn from the combined circumstances. The 

Commonwealth may sustain its burden of proving every 

element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt by means 

of wholly circumstantial evidence. Moreover, in applying the 

above test, the entire record must be evaluated and all 

evidence actually received must be considered. Finally, the 

trier of fact while passing upon the credibility of witnesses 

and the weight of the evidence produced, is free to believe 

all, part or none of the evidence.

Commonwealth v. Brown, 23 A.3d 544, 559–560 (Pa. Super. 2011) (en 

banc), quoting Commonwealth v. Hutchinson, 947 A.2d 800, 805–806 (Pa. 

Super. 2008).

First, Appellant claims that the evidence was insufficient to support his 

robbery conviction at Docket Number 3675-2016. 

Appellant was convicted of robbery under 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3701(a)(1)(iv). 

In relevant part, Section 3701 declares:

(1) A person is guilty of robbery if, in the course of 

committing a theft, he:

. . .

(iv) inflicts bodily injury upon another or threatens 

another with or intentionally puts him in fear of immediate 

bodily injury[.]

. . .
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(2) An act shall be deemed “in the course of committing a 

theft” if it occurs in an attempt to commit theft or in flight 

after the attempt or commission.

18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3701.

The term “bodily injury” is defined as “[i]mpairment of physical condition 

or substantial pain.” 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2301.

According to Appellant, the evidence was insufficient to support his 

robbery conviction because the Victim “did not testify to any contemporaneous 

threats or any bodily injury she suffered[; n]or did [the Victim] testify that 

she was in fear of immediate bodily injury.” Appellant’s Brief at 12-13. This 

claim fails.

As we have held, to sustain a robbery conviction under subsection 

3701(a)(1)(iv), the victim does not need to testify as to her subjective state 

of mind. We explained:

In determining whether all of the elements of the crime of 

robbery have been met, a reviewing court will consider the 

defendant's intent and actions and not necessarily the 

subjective state of mind of the victim. Whether the victim 

was in fact put in fear under such circumstances [is] not 

controlling.

Commonwealth v. Davison, 177 A.3d 955, 957 (Pa. Super. 2018) 

(quotations and citations omitted); see also Commonwealth v. 

Leatherbury, 473 A.2d 1040, 1042 (Pa. Super. 1984) (holding: “[w]hen 

appellant and another young man came up behind [an] elderly man who was 

walking alone at 1:15 in the morning, grabbed him by both arms, and 

demanded his money and his wallet, the trier of the facts could infer that the 
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young men intended to acquire the victim's money by placing him in fear of 

immediate bodily injury. Neither the fact that they did not inflict bodily injury 

nor that they were unsuccessful in obtaining the victim's money was 

controlling. An aggressive act intended to place the victim in fear that he was 

in danger of immediate physical harm was sufficient to elevate an attempted 

theft to robbery, 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3701(a)(1)(iv). Whether the victim was in 

fact put in fear under such circumstances [is] not controlling”).

Further, as is relevant to the current issue, the language of Section

3701(a)(1)(ii) is substantively identical to that contained in Section 

3701(a)(1)(iv). Compare 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3701(a)(1)(ii) (“A person is guilty 

of robbery if, in the course of committing a theft, he: . . . (ii) threatens another 

with or intentionally puts him in fear of immediate serious bodily injury”), with

18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3701(a)(1)(iv) (“A person is guilty of robbery if, in the course 

of committing a theft, he: . . . (iv) . . . threatens another with or intentionally 

puts him in fear of immediate bodily injury”). This Court has held that, to 

determine whether the victim has been placed in fear of serious bodily injury

for purposes of Section 3701(a)(1)(ii), a court must utilize an objective 

standard. We explained:

The evidence is sufficient to convict a defendant of robbery 

under [Section 3701(a)(1)(ii)] if the evidence demonstrates 

aggressive actions that threatened the victim's safety. The 

court must focus on the nature of the threat posed by an 

assailant and whether he reasonably placed a victim in fear 

of immediate serious bodily injury. Additionally, this Court 

has held that the threat need not be verbal. . . .
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When determining whether a victim has been placed in fear 

of serious bodily injury, this Court uses an objective 

standard; therefore, the victim's subjective state of mind 

during the robbery is not dispositive. Commonwealth v. 

Kubis, 978 A.2d 391, 398 (Pa. Super. 2009) (concluding that 

the nature of appellant's threat to stab the victim was such 

that a reasonable person in the victim's position would fear 

for his life or safety even though no knife was physically 

produced during robbery).

Commonwealth v. Valentine, 101 A.3d 801, 807 (Pa. Super. 2014)

(quotations, corrections, and some citations omitted).

Since the pertinent language in Sections 3701(a)(1)(ii) and 

3701(a)(1)(iv) is substantively identical, Valentine’s above-quoted analysis 

and holding is equally applicable to Section 3701(a)(1) (iv). As such, to 

determine whether a defendant “threaten[ed] another with or intentionally 

put[] him in fear of immediate bodily injury” for purposes of Section 

3701(a)(1)(iv), this Court must utilize an objective standard. See id.

The evidence in the case at bar demonstrates that, on February 1, 2016, 

the Victim was driving her vehicle on the road when Appellant drove his vehicle 

next to hers and cut her off. N.T. Trial, 2/9/18, at 14. Appellant then jumped 

out of his vehicle, jumped into the Victim’s passenger-side seat, and began 

yelling at her. Id. The Victim, who was having a cell phone conversation with 

her cousin at the time, told her cousin to call the police. Id. at 14-15. In 

response, Appellant grabbed the Victim’s cell phone, which caused the 

earbuds to rip out of her ears, and hit the Victim in her forehead with the cell 

phone. Id. at 15. 
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Regardless of whether Appellant actually caused the Victim “bodily 

injury,” Appellant’s aggressive and frightening actions would have placed a

reasonable person in the Victim’s position in fear of immediate bodily injury. 

As such, the evidence was sufficient to support Appellant’s robbery conviction 

under Section 3701(a)(1)(iv). See Davison, 177 A.3d at 957; Valentine, 

101 A.3d at 807. Appellant’s claim to the contrary fails.

Next, Appellant claims that the evidence was insufficient to support his 

PIC conviction at Docket Number 3675-2016.

Section 907 of the Crimes Code generally defines PIC in the following 

manner:

(a) Criminal instruments generally.--A person commits a 

misdemeanor of the first degree if he possesses any 

instrument of crime with intent to employ it criminally.

18 Pa.C.S.A. § 907(a).

In relevant part, the statute defines “instrument of crime” as: 

“[a]nything used for criminal purposes and possessed by the actor under 

circumstances not manifestly appropriate for lawful uses it may have.” 18 

Pa.C.S.A. § 907(d).

Appellant was convicted of PIC for possessing the Victim’s cell phone 

with the intent to employ it criminally.8 See Commonwealth’s Information at 

____________________________________________

8 The Commonwealth claims that the PIC conviction was based upon 

Appellant’s possession of the screwdriver, which he used to attack the Victim’s 

car window, and not the cell phone. Commonwealth’s Brief at 12. The 

Commonwealth is mistaken. Certainly, the criminal information specified that, 
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Docket Number 3675-2016, at Count 4; Trial Court Opinion, 4/26/19, at 6.

On appeal, Appellant claims that the evidence was insufficient to support this

conviction because the Commonwealth failed to prove that he possessed the 

phone “with the intent to employ it criminally.” Appellant’s Brief at 13. 

However, the evidence demonstrates that Appellant struck the Victim in the 

head with the cell phone. N.T. Trial, 2/9/18, at 15. And, since Appellant used 

the cell phone to assault the Victim, the evidence is sufficient to prove that

Appellant, in fact, employed the phone criminally.9 Thus, Appellant’s 

sufficiency claim fails.

Third, Appellant claims that the evidence is insufficient to support his 

aggravated assault conviction at Docket Number 3670-2016.

____________________________________________

for purposes of the PIC charge, the “instrument of crime” was the “phone.” 

Commonwealth’s Information at Docket Number 3675-2016, at Count 4 

(some capitalization omitted). Further, in addressing Appellant’s sufficiency 

challenge to his PIC conviction, the trial court’s opinion analyzed whether 

Appellant possessed the phone with the intent to employ it criminally. Trial 

Court Opinion, 4/26/19, at 6 (“[e]vidence that [Appellant] held [the Victim’s] 

cell phone in his hand and used it to strike the right side of her forehead was 

sufficient to sustain the conviction for [PIC]”).

9 Appellant claims the evidence demonstrates that he did not assault the 

Victim with the cell phone; instead, he claims, the “entire struggle was a 

spontaneous and unpredictable event.” Appellant’s Brief at 13. This argument

necessarily fails, as it does not view the evidence in the light most favorable 

to the Commonwealth. See Brown, 23 A.3d at 559–560 (“[t]he standard we 

apply in reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence is whether viewing all the 

evidence admitted at trial in the light most favorable to the verdict winner, 

there is sufficient evidence to enable the fact-finder to find every element of 

the crime beyond a reasonable doubt”).
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The trial court found Appellant guilty of aggravated assault under 18 

Pa.C.S.A. § 2702(a)(1). This subsection states:

A person is guilty of aggravated assault if he: 

(1) attempts to cause serious bodily injury to another, or 

causes such injury intentionally, knowingly or recklessly 

under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to 

the value of human life[.]

18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2702(a)(1).

“Serious bodily injury” is defined as: “[b]odily injury which creates a 

substantial risk of death or which causes serious, permanent disfigurement, 

or protracted loss or impairment of the function of any bodily member or 

organ.” 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2301.

On appeal, Appellant claims that the evidence was insufficient to support 

his aggravated assault conviction, as the Commonwealth did not prove that 

he attempted to cause the Victim serious bodily injury. Appellant’s Brief at 

14-16. This claim is frivolous.

Our Supreme Court has summarized:

“A person commits an attempt when, with intent to commit 

a specific crime, he does any act which constitutes a 

substantial step toward the commission of that crime.” 18 

Pa.C.S.A. § 901(a). An attempt under § 2702(a)(1) requires 

a showing of some act, albeit not one causing serious bodily 

injury, accompanied by an intent to inflict serious bodily 

injury. 

“A person acts intentionally with respect to a material 

element of an offense when . . . it is his conscious object to 

engage in conduct of that nature or to cause such a result.”

18 Pa.C.S.A. § 302(b)(1)(i). As intent is a subjective frame 

of mind, it is of necessity difficult of direct proof. The intent 
J-S53010-19

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to cause serious bodily injury may be proven by direct or 

circumstantial evidence. 

[In Commonwealth v. Alexander, 383 A.2d 887 (Pa. 

1978), the Pennsylvania Supreme Court] created a totality of 

the circumstances test, to be used on a case-by-case basis, 

to determine whether a defendant possessed the intent to 

inflict serious bodily injury. Alexander provided a list, albeit 

incomplete, of factors that may be considered in determining 

whether the intent to inflict serious bodily injury was present, 

including evidence of a significant difference in size or 

strength between the defendant and the victim, any restraint 

on the defendant preventing him from escalating the attack, 

the defendant's use of a weapon or other implement to aid 

his attack, and his statements before, during, or after the 

attack which might indicate his intent to inflict injury. 

Alexander, [383 A.2d] at 889. Alexander made clear that 

“simple assault combined with other surrounding 

circumstances may, in a proper case, be sufficient to support 

a finding that an assailant attempted to inflict serious bodily 

injury, thereby constituting aggravated assault. . . .

Commonwealth v. Matthew, 909 A.2d 1254, 1257 (Pa. 2006) (some 

quotations, citations, and corrections omitted).

The trial court thoroughly explained why Appellant’s sufficiency claim is 

frivolous:

Here, there was sufficient evidence to conclude that 

[Appellant] took a substantial step toward inflicting serious 

bodily injury when he got into his car, held onto [the Victim]

by her hoodie, and began driving. He dragged her "a couple 

of feet" before dropping her, and only did so because [the 

Sister] threw a pepper spray can at his vehicle. Throughout 

the incident, [Appellant] laughed, yelled out profanities, and 

"threaten[ed] to kill [them] the whole entire time." . . .

After [Appellant] drove away, [the Victim and the Sister]

attempted to follow him in their vehicle. [Appellant] sped

toward them. As his vehicle was approaching the passenger 

side of their vehicle, [the Victim] was able to swerve out of 
J-S53010-19

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the way causing [Appellant] to only hit the rear of her vehicle. 

. . .

[Appellant’s] actions, coupled with his statements during 

these incidents, were sufficient proof of his attempt to cause 

serious bodily injury.

Trial Court Opinion, 4/26/19, at 7-8 (citations omitted).

We agree with the trial court’s analysis and conclude that Appellant’s

claim of error fails.

For his fourth and fifth claims on appeal, Appellant contends that the 

evidence was insufficient to sustain his aggravated assault and PIC convictions

at Docket Number 3671-2016. These convictions were based upon Appellant’s 

action of driving his vehicle directly at the passenger-side of the Victim’s car, 

while the Sister was sitting in the passenger’s seat of the Victim’s car. 

According to Appellant, the evidence merely proved that Appellant acted 

“reckless[ly], not criminal[ly].” Appellant’s Brief at 16-17. 

Appellant’s claims are frivolous. Viewing the evidence in the light most 

favorable to the Commonwealth, the evidence demonstrates that Appellant 

intentionally used his vehicle as a deadly weapon and specifically intended to 

use that deadly weapon to, first, strike the Sister while she was standing in 

the street and, then, when the Sister got into the passenger’s seat of the 

Victim’s car, Appellant attempted to drive his vehicle into the passenger-side 

of the Victim’s car. 

The evidence is thus sufficient to establish that Appellant used his 

vehicle in a criminal manner, in an attempt to cause the Sister serious bodily 

injury. Hence, the evidence is sufficient to sustain Appellant’s aggravated 
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assault and PIC convictions at Docket Number 3671-2016. Appellant’s fourth 

and fifth claims on appeal fail.

Appellant next claims that the evidence was insufficient to support his 

robbery conviction at Docket Number 3672-2016. Within his brief, Appellant 

argues that the evidence was insufficient because it “failed to establish[] the 

force – however slight – necessary to sustain any gradation of robbery.” 

Appellant’s Brief at 17. This claim is waived, as Appellant did not raise it in 

his Rule 1925(b) statement. See Appellant’s Rule 1925(b) Statement, 

10/31/18, at 1-2 (contending that the evidence was insufficient to support his 

robbery conviction because “the evidence did not support that the [Victim] 

suffered serious bodily injury, or that she was threatened or placed in fear of 

such injury”); Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)(4)(vii) (“[i]ssues not included in the [Rule 

1925(b)] Statement . . . are waived”).

Finally, Appellant posits that the evidence was insufficient to support his 

stalking conviction at Docket Number 3672-2016.

Appellant was convicted of stalking under 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2709.1(a)(1), 

which states:

A person commits the crime of stalking when the person...:

(1) engages in a course of conduct or repeatedly commits 

acts toward another person, including following the 

person without proper authority, under circumstances 

which demonstrate either an intent to place such other 

person in reasonable fear of bodily injury or to cause 

substantial emotional distress to such other person. . . .

18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2709.1(a)(1).
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Appellant contends that the evidence did not demonstrate that he

engaged in a “course of conduct” here. The claim is meritless.

Section 2709.1 defines the term “course of conduct” to mean: “[a]

pattern of actions composed of more than one act over a period of time, 

however short, evidencing a continuity of conduct.” 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2709.1(f). 

Further, as we have held:

[c]ourse of conduct is established by proof of two related but 

separate events. . . . The elements of stalking are not 

established until the occurrence of a second prohibited act 

and any additional acts extend the course of conduct. These 

additional acts, in conjunction with the prior acts, also create 

a new “course of conduct” and are, by definition, stalkings. . 

.

[S]talking, as defined by the legislature, occurs with each act 

involved in an established course of conduct, and forms the 

basis for an independent charge. Each stalking, including the 

first, is a certifiable count, capable of sustaining a separate 

conviction and sentence. Each act, constituting the course of 

conduct leading to arrest and trial, is not merely cumulative 

evidence of stalking but a stalking in and of itself.

Commonwealth v. Leach, 729 A.2d 608, 611-612 (Pa. Super. 1999) 

(emphasis omitted).

The evidence presented at trial established that, from February 1, 2016 

until March 14, 2016, Appellant engaged in a loathsome and outrageous

course of conduct that he directed at the Victim and that was intended to place 

the Victim in reasonable fear of bodily injury and to cause her substantial 

emotional distress. Appellant’s final acts in this horrid chain of events 

occurred on March 14, 2016, when Appellant violated the PFA order by 
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approaching the Victim in an automobile repair shop – where the Victim was 

having a car window repaired that Appellant had broken two days prior. It 

was in this shop that Appellant took the Victim’s cell phone out of her hand, 

punched her in the eye, pushed her into glass shelves, and then ran outside 

and broke at least two more windows on her vehicle. N.T. Trial, 2/9/18, at 

47-51. Simply stated, this final, charged event was “not merely cumulative

evidence of stalking but a stalking in and of itself.” See Leach, 729 A.2d at 

612. Appellant’s final claim on appeal thus fails.

Judgment of sentence affirmed. Jurisdiction relinquished.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 12/6/19