DA 12-0290

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA

2012 MT 285N

WAYNE and JENNIFER POSSELT,

husband and wife,

 Plaintiffs and Appellees,

 v.

BRADFORD E. POWERS and

LORI LEE GRIMSRUD POWERS,

 Defendants.

LORI LEE GRIMSRUD,

 Cross-Claimant and Appellant,

 v.

BRADFORD E. POWERS,

 Cross-Defendant.

APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Nineteenth Judicial District,

In and For the County of Lincoln, Cause No. DV-07-238

Honorable James B. Wheelis, Presiding Judge

COUNSEL OF RECORD:

For Appellant:

James C. Bartlett, Attorney at Law; Kalispell, Montana

For Appellees:

Amy N. Guth, Attorney at Law; Libby, Montana

Submitted on Briefs: October 2, 2012

December 11 2012
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 Decided: December 11, 2012

Filed:

__________________________________________

Clerk
3

Justice Jim Rice delivered the Opinion of the Court. 

¶1 Pursuant to Section I, Paragraph 3(d), Montana Supreme Court Internal Operating Rules, 

this case is decided by memorandum opinion and shall not be cited and does not serve as 

precedent. Its case title, cause number, and disposition shall be included in this Court’s quarterly 

list of noncitable cases published in the Pacific Reporter and Montana Reports.

¶2 Lori Lee Grimsrud appeals from the order entered by the Nineteenth Judicial District

Court, Lincoln County, granting summary judgment to Wayne and Jennifer Posselt. The District 

Court ordered that Posselts were entitled to specific performance of the written contract they 

entered with Bradford E. Powers for purchase of Powers’ interest in 7 acres of real property 

located in Lincoln County. Powers had been awarded the interest in 2000 by the Lake County 

District Court in a proceeding dissolving his marriage with Lori Lee Grimsrud. Grimsrud had 

been awarded the remaining 2.37 acres of the 9.37 acres of jointly-held Lincoln County marital 

property, pursuant to a property settlement agreement prepared by Grimsrud. Powers defaulted 

and did not participate in the dissolution proceeding. The dissolution court approved the 

property settlement agreement, which provided that the parties would “execute quit claim deeds 

if necessary to convoy [sic] all of their interest in the above property.” However, no deeds 

between Powers and Grimsrud were ever recorded.

¶3 In 2006, Powers sold his interest in the 7 acres to Posselts. Under the Buy-Sell 

Agreement, Posselts were to pay for the costs of surveying the property and dividing the acreage 

into two parcels as ordered in the dissolution decree. When Grimsrud did not cooperate in 

effectuating the property division, Posselts initiated this action, praying for specific performance 

of the Buy-Sell Agreement against Powers, and alleging interference with performance of the 

agreement by Grimsrud. Powers did not defend and his default was entered. Grimsrud answered 
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in opposition to Posselts’ claims and cross-claimed against Powers for damages, alleging breach 

of oral commitments concerning the property that Powers had made to Grimsrud after the 

dissolution.

¶4 The District Court granted summary judgment to Posselts, ordering specific performance 

of their Buy-Sell Agreement with Powers and dismissing Posselts from the proceeding. Citing

the Statute of Frauds, the court rejected Grimsrud’s argument that she and Powers had partially 

performed a post-dissolution oral agreement to dispose of the property. The court denied 

certification of the summary judgment order as final for purposes of appeal, and permitted 

Grimsrud to proceed on her damage claims against Powers. After trial, Grimsrud was awarded 

$84,715.66 in compensatory damages, punitive damages, and attorney fees. Grimsrud’s 

judgment against Powers has not been challenged on appeal.

¶5 Grimsrud posits on appeal that the dissolution decree neither divested joint title from 

Grimsrud and Powers nor re-configured the property between them. She argues that these issues 

were left open to be decided by “the dissolution court sit[ting] in equity to decide fairness based 

on subsequent events.” Grimsrud thus concludes that the Lincoln County District Court lacked 

subject matter jurisdiction to address Posselts’ contract claims until determinations concerning 

the property were made within the dissolution proceeding and statutory procedures governing 

division of property were completed. She argues that the summary judgment and the subsequent 

judgment in her favor against Powers are inconsistent. Further, Grimsrud argues that the District 

Court erred in its application of the Statute of Frauds.

¶6 We have determined to decide this case pursuant to Section I, Paragraph 3(d) of our 

Internal Operating Rules, which provides for noncitable memorandum opinions. The issues in 
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this case are legal. Having reviewed the briefs and the record, we are not persuaded by Grimsrud 

that the District Court committed reversible error in its interpretations of law.

¶7 Affirmed.

/S/ JIM RICE

We concur: 

/S/ MIKE McGRATH

/S/ MICHAEL E WHEAT

/S/ BRIAN MORRIS

/S/ BETH BAKER