COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Chief Judge Moon, Judges Fitzpatrick and Annunziata 

Argued at Salem, Virginia 

TROY EUGENE BRAXTON 

 MEMORANDUM OPINION* BY 

v. Record No. 2006-96-3 JUDGE ROSEMARIE ANNUNZIATA 

 JULY 15, 1997 

COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 

 FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF LYNCHBURG 

Mosby G. Perrow, III, Judge 

 Elizabeth P. Murtagh, Assistant Public 

Defender, for appellant. 

 Kimberley A. Whittle, Assistant Attorney 

General (James S. Gilmore, III, Attorney 

General, on brief), for appellee. 

 Following a jury trial, appellant, Troy Eugene Braxton, was 

convicted of possession of cocaine with intent to distribute. On 

appeal, he contends that the trial court erred in refusing to 

suppress evidence obtained following his warrantless arrest and 

that the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction. We 

disagree and affirm his conviction. 

 I. 

 A confidential informant told Investigator Dance that 

appellant was engaged in felonious activity. The informant 

identified himself to Dance, and Dance, who knew the informant, 

considered the informant to be reliable. The informant had 

provided Dance previous information which had proven reliable and 

 

 *Pursuant to Code § 17-116.010 this opinion is not 

designated for publication. 
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led to a conviction in another case. Dance testified that the 

informant was familiar with crack cocaine. 

 The informant told Dance that he had seen appellant possess 

crack cocaine within the preceeding fifteen minutes. The 

informant identified appellant by name and told Dance that 

appellant was riding in a cream-colored, Gray Top Cab, number 

seven, driven by Frank Morris, in the Old Forest Road area of 

Lynchburg. Dance conveyed this information to Officer Hollyfield 

and directed Hollyfield to stop the cab and arrest appellant. 

Because the cab was on the move, Dance determined that he had no 

time to obtain an arrest warrant, which, he testified, would take 

about an hour. 

 Within minutes of receiving Dance's report, Hollyfield 

spotted the cab Dance had described at an intersection on Old 

Forest Road. Hollyfield stopped the cab and, as he approached 

it, identified appellant in the back seat. Hollyfield opened the 

cab's rear door and grabbed appellant by the arm as he ordered 

him to exit the cab. Appellant resisted, but with the help of 

another officer, Hollyfield pulled appellant from the cab, 

arresting him for possession of cocaine. In the course of 

removing appellant from the cab, Hollyfield observed a white 

object fall from appellant's person to the floorboard directly 

below. The object was recovered and later proved to contain 

10.84 grams of cocaine. 

 The officers transported appellant to the station house 
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where he executed a waiver of his Miranda rights. Appellant then 

told Dance that the crack had come from an individual known as 

"Shorty," for whom appellant "had been selling . . . for a little 

while." Appellant stated that he had paid for the cocaine and 

that "Shorty" did not "front" him the cocaine. When Dance asked 

how much appellant was selling "at the time," appellant 

responded, "[Y]ou know how much I'm selling, Dance." 

 Testifying as an expert witness, Dance stated that a gram of 

crack was worth $150 to $175 and that 10.84 grams of crack was 

worth over $1,500. He testified that crack is typically sold in 

$10, $20, and $40 rocks and that he had never known a crack user 

to buy in bulk. Dance testified that a user would typically get 

fifteen "hits" or dosages from a single gram. 

 Testifying in his defense, appellant admitted that he 

possessed the cocaine. He maintained, however, that he had 

purchased the crack for his own personal use and did not intend 

to sell it. Appellant denied telling Dance that he sold drugs 

for Shorty. He also testified that a gram of crack is worth 

about $30 and that a user would get only two or three hits per 

gram. Finally, appellant testified that he would have smoked the 

entire amount of crack that evening. On rebuttal, Dance 

testified that in his experience he had never known anyone who 

could smoke over ten grams of crack at once. 

II. MOTION TO SUPPRESS 

 There is no dispute that Hollyfield arrested appellant 
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without a warrant when he stopped the cab and removed him from 

it. The issue is whether the arrest was supported by probable 

cause. The arrest was lawful if Hollyfield had probable cause to 

believe that a felony had been or was being committed by 

appellant. See McKoy v. Commonwealth, 212 Va. 224, 225, 183 

S.E.2d 153, 155 (1971). "`[T]he test of constitutional validity 

is whether at the moment of arrest the arresting officer had 

knowledge of sufficient facts and circumstances to warrant a 

reasonable man in believing that an offense has been committed.'" 

DePriest v. Commonwealth, 4 Va. App. 577, 583-84, 359 S.E.2d 

540, 542 (1987), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 985 (1988) (quoting 

Bryson v. Commonwealth, 211 Va. 85, 86-87, 175 S.E.2d 248, 250 

(1970)). 

 "[W]hen an officer receives from a known reliable informant 

a report that a felony is being committed that is so detailed as 

to raise an inference either of personal observation or of 

acquisition of the information in a reliable way then the officer 

has probable cause to arrest." McKoy, 212 Va. at 227, 183 S.E.2d 

at 156. Generally, the two elements of particular significance 

in cases involving informant information are: (1) the reliability 

of the informant him or herself; and (2) the inherent reliability 

of the informant's information as determined by the nature and 

detail of the circumstances described and any independent 

corroboration of those circumstances. See id.; Illinois v. 

Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 233-35, 241-43 (1983). 
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 In the present case, appellant does not dispute that the 

informant, previously known to Dance, was himself reliable. See

McKoy, 212 Va. at 226, 183 S.E.2d at 155; Wright v. Commonwealth, 

222 Va. 188, 191, 278 S.E.2d 849, 852 (1981). Cf. Hardy v. 

Commonwealth, 11 Va. App. 433, 434, 399 S.E.2d 27, 28 (1990) 

(information received from anonymous, unknown source); Carter v. 

Commonwealth, 9 Va. App. 310, 313, 387 S.E.2d 505, 507 (1990) 

(reliability of unnamed informant not established). Indeed, 

Dance's unrefuted testimony established the informant's 

reliability. See Huff v. Commonwealth, 213 Va. 710, 714-15, 194 

S.E.2d 690, 694 (1973). 

 Furthermore, the informant's description was replete with 

detail. See McKoy, 212 Va. at 226, 183 S.E.2d at 156. The 

description identified appellant by name and placed him in a 

particular cab, identified by color, cab company, number and 

driver, on a particular street, at a particular time. The 

information further described the felonious activity appellant 

was alleged to have been committing; viz., possessing cocaine. 

Cf. Motley v. Commonwealth, 17 Va. App. 439, 441, 437 S.E.2d 232, 

233 (1993) (where the police radio dispatch advised officer to be 

on the lookout for an individual fitting the defendant's 

description but gave no explanation as to why that individual was 

sought). As the Supreme Court found in McKoy, the detail in the 

informant's description here "could scarcely [have been] gleaned 

except by personal observation." See McKoy, 212 Va. at 226, 183 
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S.E.2d at 156. Finally, before he arrested appellant, Hollyfield 

was able to confirm much of the informant's information; viz., 

that appellant occupied the cream-colored, Gray Top cab, number 

seven. 

 In short, the detailed information provided by a known and 

reliable informant and significantly corroborated by Hollyfield 

provided Hollyfield probable cause to arrest appellant.1

 II. 

 Appellant admits possession of the cocaine but contends that 

the evidence is insufficient to establish that he intended to 

distribute it. 

 Where the sufficiency of the evidence is 

challenged on appeal, that evidence must be 

construed in the light most favorable to the 

Commonwealth, giving it all reasonable 

inferences fairly deducible therefrom. In so 

doing, we must discard the evidence of the 

accused in conflict with that of the 

Commonwealth, and regard as true all the 

credible evidence favorable to the 

Commonwealth and all fair inferences that may 

be drawn therefrom. 

Cirios v. Commonwealth, 7 Va. App. 292, 295, 373 S.E.2d 164, 165 

(1988) (citations omitted). The jury's verdict will not be set 

aside unless it appears that it is plainly wrong or without 

evidence to support it. Code § 8.01-680; Traverso v. 

 

 1The fact that Dance received the information from the 

informant and conveyed it to Hollyfield who actually made the 

arrest is not material. See White v. Commonwealth, 24 Va. App. 

234, 240, 481 S.E.2d 486, 489 (1997) (citing United States v. 

Laughman, 618 F.2d 1067, 1072 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 447 U.S. 

925 (1980)). 
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Commonwealth, 6 Va. App. 172, 176, 366 S.E.2d 719, 721 (1988). 

"It is fundamental that `the credibility of witnesses and the 

weight accorded their testimony are matters solely for the fact 

finder who has the opportunity of seeing and hearing the 

witnesses.'" Collins v. Commonwealth, 13 Va. App. 177, 179, 409 

S.E.2d 175, 176 (1991) (quoting Schneider v. Commonwealth, 230 

Va. 379, 382, 337 S.E.2d 735, 736-37 (1985)). Where the trier of 

fact finds a defendant's testimony to be incredible, it is 

entitled to infer that the defendant lied to conceal his guilt. 

See Speight v. Commonwealth, 4 Va. App. 83, 88, 354 S.E.2d 95, 98 

(1987) (en banc). 

 Appellant contends that his statements to Dance cannot 

support his conviction. He contends that his statements referred 

only to past activities and therefore had no bearing on the 

present case. We disagree. Appellant clearly spoke in the 

present tense when he stated, "[Y]ou know how much I'm selling, 

Dance." Moreover, to the extent appellant's statement that he 

"had been selling [drugs for Shorty] for a little while," could 

be construed as representing only past transactions, it could be 

reasonably inferred that appellant also intended to sell the 

cocaine he possessed. 

 Appellant's further contention that his statements cannot 

support his conviction because they were uncorroborated is not 

supported in the record. Even assuming appellant's statements 

had to be corroborated, they were. Dance's expert testimony 
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concerning the quantity of cocaine appellant possessed and the 

nature of local drug transactions created a reasonable inference 

that the cocaine appellant purchased was not intended for 

personal use. Furthermore, appellant denied he told Dance he had 

been selling for Shorty. This conflict in the testimony raised a 

credibility question that the jury resolved against appellant, 

and, from that determination, the jury was entitled to infer that 

appellant was lying to conceal his guilt. In sum, the evidence 

was sufficient to support appellant's conviction for possession 

with intent to distribute. 

 The decision of the trial court is accordingly affirmed. 

Affirmed.