Present: Carrico, C.J., Compton, Lacy, Hassell, Keenan, and 

 Kinser, JJ., and Whiting, Senior Justice 

LAURA L. DOSS 

 OPINION BY 

v. Record No. 970703 CHIEF JUSTICE HARRY L. CARRICO 

 October 31, 1997 

JAMCO, INC. 

 UPON A QUESTION OF LAW CERTIFIED BY THE UNITED STATES 

 DISTRICT COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA 

 By a "STIPULATED ORDER OF CERTIFICATION" entered April 9, 

1997, the United States District Court for the Western District 

of Virginia (Lynchburg Division) certified to this Court, 

pursuant to our Rule 42, the following question of law: 

 Does Va. Code § 2.1-725(D) prohibit a common law cause 

of action based upon the public policies reflected in 

the Virginia Human Rights Act, Va. Code § 2.1-714 et

seq.? 

By order dated April 28, 1997, we accepted the certified question 

of law. 

 The question arose when, on December 23, 1996, Laura L. Doss 

(Doss) filed in the District Court a two-count complaint alleging 

that her former employer, Jamco, Inc. (Jamco), had unlawfully 

terminated her employment "because of her sex and because she was 

pregnant." In Count 1, which is not involved in this proceeding, 

 Doss sought to recover damages for Jamco's alleged violation of 

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. § 2000e et

seq.). In Count 2, which is implicated here, Doss sought to 

recover damages for Jamco's alleged violation of "the statutorily 

expressed public policy of the Commonwealth of Virginia as 

embodied in the Virginia Human Rights Act (Va. Code § 2.1-714 et

seq.) and as expressed in Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 
1964 (42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq.) and elsewhere." 

 The relevant facts are recited in the stipulated order of 

certification, as follows: 

 [Doss] was hired by [Jamco] and agreed to begin work on 

March 11, 1996. . . . [P]rior to reporting to work for 

[Jamco] on March 11, 1996, [Doss] learned that she was 

pregnant. Upon reporting for work, [Doss] told [Jamco's] 

employees who were to be her supervisors about her 

pregnancy. . . . [O]n March 12, 1996, [Jamco's] supervisors 

informed [Doss] that her employment was being terminated 

because her maternity leave would cause her to be out during 

the Company's busy time which was unacceptable to [Jamco]. 

 We note that Doss grounds her claim for unlawful discharge 

upon the public policy of Virginia as embodied in the Virginia 

Human Rights Act and "as expressed in Title VII of the Civil 

Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq.) and elsewhere." 

However, in answering the certified question, we are limited by 

the terms of the certification order to "the public policies 

reflected in the Virginia Human Rights Act." Therefore, we 

express no opinion concerning the public policy of Virginia as it 

might be articulated in sources other than the Virginia Human 

Rights Act. 

 Ever since this Court decided Stonega Coal and Coke Co. v. 

Louisville and Nashville R.R., 106 Va. 223, 55 S.E. 551 (1906), 

Virginia has adhered to the rule that when an employment contract 

provides for the rendition of services but its intended duration 

cannot be determined from its provisions, "either party is 

ordinarily at liberty to terminate it at will on giving 

reasonable notice of his intention to do so." Id. at 226, 55 

S.E. at 552. However, the rule is not absolute. Bowman v. State 

Bank of Keysville, 229 Va. 534, 539, 331 S.E.2d 797, 801 (1985). 
 In Bowman, which predated the adoption of the Virginia Human 

Rights Act, we recognized a limited exception to the employmentat-will rule. This exception allowed two bank employees who were 

also stockholders of the bank corporation to maintain a common 

law action in tort against their employer. The employees were 

discharged after failing to heed a threat from the employer that 

their employment would be terminated if they failed to vote their 

stock according to the wishes of corporate management. Such 

action by the employer, we said, violated the public policy 

established by Va. Code § 13.1-32 (now Va. Code § 13.1-662), 

which contemplated "that the right to vote [shares of stock] 

shall be exercised free of duress and intimidation imposed on 

individual stockholders by corporate management." Id. at 540, 

331 S.E.2d at 801. 

Bowman was followed by Miller v. SEVAMP, Inc., 234 Va. 462, 

362 S.E.2d 915 (1987), where the events giving rise to the 

litigation predated the adoption of the Virginia Human Rights 

Act. There, the employee alleged that her termination was in 

retaliation of her appearance as a witness at a co-employee's 

grievance hearing. The trial court sustained a demurrer to the 

employee's motion for judgment, and we affirmed. We noted the 

exception recognized in Bowman that allows recovery for 

"discharges which violate public policy, that is, the policy 

underlying existing laws designed to protect the property rights, 

personal freedoms, health, safety, or welfare of the people in 

general." Id. at 468, 362 S.E.2d at 918. We held, however, that 

the Bowman exception was not applicable because the "retaliatory 
act [of discharging the employee] would impinge only upon private 

rights established by the employer's internal regulations [and] 

would have no impact upon any public policy established by 

existing laws for the protection of the public generally." Id., 

362 S.E.2d at 919. 

 At its 1987 session, the General Assembly adopted the 

Virginia Human Rights Act (the Act). 1987 Va. Acts ch. 581 

(Chapter 43 of Title 2.1 of the Code of Virginia, §§ 2.1-714 

through -725). In 1996, when Doss's termination occurred, Va. 

Code § 2.1-715 provided that "[i]t is the policy of the 

Commonwealth of Virginia . . . [t]o safeguard all individuals 

within the Commonwealth from unlawful discrimination because of 

race, color, religion, national origin, sex, age, marital status 

or disability . . . in employment . . . ."1

 Following adoption of the Act, this Court considered the 

case of Lockhart v. Commonwealth Educ. Sys. Corp., 247 Va. 98, 

439 S.E.2d 328 (1994).2 Lockhart involved the claims of two 

female at-will employees who alleged they were wrongfully 

discharged from employment, one because of her race and the other 

because of her sex. The claims of both employees were dismissed 

on demurrer, and this Court reversed. After citing Va. Code 

§ 2.1-715 as declarative of the "Commonwealth's strong public 

 

 1At its 1997 session, the General Assembly amended 

Va. Code § 2.1-715 by adding "pregnancy, childbirth or 

related medical conditions" to the list of unlawful 

bases for discrimination in employment. 

 2Wright v. Donnelly & Co., Record No. 930205, was 

decided at the same time as Lockhart and by the same 

opinion. 
policy against employment discrimination based upon race or 

gender," 247 Va. at 105, 439 S.E.2d at 331, the Court stated as 

follows: 

 We recognize that the Virginia Human Rights Act 

does not create any new causes of action. Code § 2.1-

725. Here, we do not rely upon the Virginia Human 

Rights Act to create new causes of action. Rather, we 

rely solely on the narrow exception that we recognized 

in 1985 in Bowman, decided two years before the 

enactment of the Virginia Human Rights Act. 

Id. Accordingly, the Court held that the two employees had "pled 

viable causes of action." Id. at 104, 439 S.E.2d at 331.3

Lockhart was decided in 1994. At the 1995 session of the 

General Assembly, a bill was introduced that would have had the 

effect of overruling Lockhart. (S. 1025.) Two versions 

submitted as amendments in the nature of substitutes expressly 

stated their purpose was the "nullification" of Lockhart. (S. 

1025, Committee Amendment in the Nature of a Substitute; S. 1025, 

Floor Amendment in the Nature of a Substitute.) However, in its 

enacted form, the legislation did not employ the "nullification" 

language, but amended Va. Code § 2.1-725 in several respects. 

 As originally enacted, Va. Code § 2.1-725 provided as 

 

 3Subsequent to Lockhart, this Court applied the 

original version of the Virginia Human Rights Act in 

deciding Bailey v. Scott-Gallaher, Inc., 253 Va. 121, 

480 S.E.2d 502 (1997) (maintenance of common law action 

in tort allowed for wrongful discharge based upon 

gender), and Bradick v. Grumman Data Sys. Corp., 254 Va. 

156, 486 S.E.2d 545 (1997) (maintenance of common law 

action in tort allowed for wrongful discharge based upon 

disability). We decided another wrongful discharge case 

post-Lockhart, but disallowed a common law recovery 

because the employee was unable to identify any Virginia 

statute establishing a public policy that was violated 

by the employer. Lawrence Chrysler Plymouth Corp. v. 

Brooks, 251 Va. 94, 465 S.E.2d 806 (1996). 
follows: 

 Nothing in this chapter creates, nor shall it be 

construed to create, an independent or private cause of 

action to enforce its provisions. Nor shall the 

policies or provisions of this chapter be construed to 

allow tort actions to be instituted instead of or in 

addition to the current statutory actions for unlawful 

discrimination. 

 The 1995 amendments deleted the second sentence of Va. Code 

§ 2.1-275, made the first sentence subsection A, and changed its 

language. The subsection reads as follows: "Nothing in this 

chapter creates, nor shall it be construed to create, an 

independent or private cause of action to enforce its provisions, 

except as specifically provided in subsections B and C of this 

section." 

 Subsections B and C are new. They create a statutory cause 

of action against an employer of more than five but less than 

fifteen persons. Subsection B provides that no such employer 

shall discharge an employee "on the basis of race, color, 

religion, national origin or sex, or of age if the employee is 

forty years or older."4

 Subsection C provides that "[t]he 

employee may bring an action in a general district or circuit 

court having jurisdiction over the employer who allegedly 

discharged the employee in violation of this section." A court 

 

 4The stipulated order of certification notes that, 

because Jamco employs more than fifteen persons, it is 

not subject to a claim under Va. Code § 2.1-725(B) and 

(C). 

 At its 1997 session, the General Assembly added 

"pregnancy, childbirth or related medical conditions" to 

the prohibited bases for discharge listed in Va. Code 

§ 2.1-725(B). 
may award up to twelve months back pay, with interest, and the 

award may be increased or decreased if either party engages in 

tactics to delay resolution of the complaint. A court may also 

award attorney's fees from the amount recovered, not to exceed 

twenty-five percent of the back pay awarded, but the court shall 

not award other damages, compensatory or punitive, nor shall it 

order reinstatement of the employee. 

 Subsection D, upon which the certified question focuses, is 

also new. It provides in pertinent part as follows: 

 Causes of action based upon the public policies reflected in 

 this chapter shall be exclusively limited to those actions, 

 procedures and remedies, if any, afforded by applicable 

 federal or state civil rights statutes or local ordinances. 

 Doss maintains, in effect, that nothing has changed. She 

says that Lockhart remains the controlling law and that all the 

General Assembly accomplished with its 1995 amendments to the Act 

is the creation of a statutory cause of action against employers 

of more than five but less than fifteen persons. 

 Doss points out that the cause of action recognized in 

Bowman and Lockhart "is a tort action arising solely under common 

law." She says that although the General Assembly may abrogate 

or alter the common law, its intent to do so must be plainly 

manifested, Peoples Sec. Life Ins. Co. v. Arrington, 243 Va. 89, 

92, 412 S.E.2d 705, 707 (1992), and she insists that the 1995 

amendments to the Act do not manifest an intent to alter the 

common law as articulated in Lockhart. 

 Doss maintains that despite the language in the original 

version of Va. Code § 2.1-725 disavowing the creation of an 
independent or private cause of action, this Court had no trouble 

finding in Lockhart that the Act did not prohibit a Bowman-type 

action in tort for the unlawful termination of employment. And 

Doss says that nothing in new subsection D supports such a 

prohibition. Indeed, she opines, with the 1995 deletion of the 

language in the second sentence of Va. Code § 2.1-725 abjuring 

tort actions, "any alleged prohibition against Lockhart-type tort 

claims [is made] even less clear." 

 Furthermore, Doss submits, if a statute is ambiguous, the 

court may resort to legislative history and the enactment process 

to ascertain legislative intent. Doss says that the language in 

the Act is ambiguous and that we should examine the enactment 

process involving the 1995 amendments to ascertain their meaning. 

 Doss says such an examination would reveal that while the 

original 1995 bill and its subsequent substitute amendments all 

contained clear declarations of intent to nullify Lockhart, these 

declarations were not retained in the final enacted version of 

the bill. Hence, the fair inference to be drawn, Doss concludes, 

is that the General Assembly did not intend to nullify Lockhart. 

 The issue, then, is whether, in the enactment of the 1995 

amendments, the General Assembly plainly manifested an intent to 

abrogate or alter the common law with respect to causes of action 

for unlawful termination of employment. Settled principles guide 

our resolution of this issue. 

 When the legislature has spoken plainly it is not the 

function of courts to change or amend its enactments 

under the guise of construing them. The province of 

construction lies wholly within the domain of 

ambiguity, and that which is plain needs no 

interpretation. 
Winston v. City of Richmond, 196 Va. 403, 407-08, 83 S.E.2d 728, 

731 (1954). 

 In the absence of ambiguity, a court may look only to the 

words of the statute to determine its meaning, and when the 

meaning is plain, resort to rules of construction, legislative 

history, and extrinsic evidence is impermissible. Harrison & 

Bates, Inc. v. Featherstone Assoc., 253 Va. 364, 368, 484 S.E.2d 

883, 885 (1997); Va. Dept. of Labor v. Westmoreland Coal Co., 233 

Va. 97, 99, 353 S.E.2d 758, 760 (1987); Brown v. Lukhard, 229 Va. 

316, 321, 330 S.E.2d 84, 87 (1985). 

 We disagree with Doss that the Act as amended in 1995 is 

ambiguous. What we said of the statute involved in Harrison & 

Bates applies with equal force to the enactment involved here: 

 Nothing in the language of this statute is 

inherently difficult to comprehend, of doubtful import, 

or lacking in clarity and definiteness. Accordingly, 

it is not necessary to look beyond the plain language 

of the statute to ascertain its underlying legislative 

intent. 

253 Va. at 369, 484 S.E.2d at 886. 

 In our opinion, in amending the Act by adding subsection D 

to Va. Code § 2.1-725 in 1995, the General Assembly plainly 

manifested its intention to alter the common law rule with 

respect to "[c]auses of action based upon the public policies 

reflected in [the Act]." (Emphasis added.) And, just as 

plainly, the General Assembly altered the common law rule by 

providing that such causes of action "shall be exclusively 

limited to those actions, procedures and remedies, if any, 

afforded by applicable federal or state civil rights statutes or 
local ordinances." (Emphasis added.) 

 This is what the Act as amended says, and this is the 

meaning that must be given to the Act to carry out the clear 

intent of the General Assembly. To say, as Doss would have us 

say, that the 1995 amendments changed nothing would render 

meaningless the General Assembly's use of the words "exclusively 

limited" and reduce to an absurdity its creation of a statutory 

cause of action against employers of more than five but less than 

fifteen persons. 

 The rules of statutory interpretation argue against 

reading any legislative enactment in a manner that will 

make a portion of it useless, repetitious, or absurd. 

On the contrary, it is well established that every act 

of the legislature should be read so as to give 

reasonable effect to every word . . . . 

Jones v. Conwell, 227 Va. 176, 181, 314 S.E.2d 61, 64 (1984). 

 Finally, in her reply brief, Doss cites Va. Code § 2.1-717, 

a part of the Act, which provides in part as follows: 

 The provisions of this chapter shall be construed 

liberally for the accomplishment of the policies 

herein. Nothing contained in this chapter shall be 

deemed to repeal, supersede or expand upon any of the 

provisions of any other state or federal law relating 

to discrimination because of race, color, religion, 

national origin, sex, age, marital status or 

disability.[5

] 

 Doss argues that, in this Code section, the Act creates "its 

own rule of statutory construction," and, under the rule, the Act 

"cannot be used as the basis for repealing or superseding the 

common-law expressed in Bowman and Lockhart." The Act, however, 

 

 5A 1997 amendment to Va. Code § 2.1-717 added 

"pregnancy, childbirth or related medical conditions" to 

the list of unlawful bases for discrimination in 

employment. 
is not the basis for the General Assembly's authority to abrogate 

or alter the common law. The basis for the General Assembly's 

authority is found in Va. Code § 1-10, which provides as follows: 

 The common law of England, insofar as it is not 

repugnant to the principles of the Bill of Rights and 

Constitution of this Commonwealth, shall continue in 

full force within the same, and be the rule of 

decision, except as altered by the General Assembly. 

(Emphasis added.) To adopt Doss's argument would lead to the 

conclusion that, in enacting Va. Code § 2.1-717, the General 

Assembly effectively repealed or superseded Va. Code § 1-10 

insofar as its authority to alter the common law with respect to 

a substantial class of cases is concerned, and that would be an 

unreasonable conclusion to reach. So we reject Doss's argument. 

 Finding that, in enacting the 1995 amendments to Va. Code 

§ 2.1-725, the General Assembly plainly manifested an intent to 

abrogate the common law with respect to causes of action for 

unlawful termination of employment based upon the public policies 

reflected in the Act, we will answer the certified question in 

the affirmative. 

Certified question answered in the affirmative.