The Honor able Amul R. Thapa r, United States Dist ri ct J u d ge fo r the Ea stern District of * Kentucky , sitti ng by

desig nation. NO T R EC OM M EN DE D F OR F UL L- TEX T P UB LIC AT ION F ile Nam e: 09a0152n.06 F iled: F ebruary 20, 2009 No. 06-1569 UN ITED STA TES C OU RT OF AP P EA LS F OR THE SI XT H C IR CU IT
GR EG OR

Y A L EX AN DE R, Pe tit ion e r- Ap pe lla

nt,
v. DAVI D SMI TH, WARDEN, Respondent-Appe llee. ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) OnAp p e a l f

r o m t h e U n it e d St ates D is tr ic t C o u rt f

o r th e E a s te rn District of Michig an

Be fore : BO GGS, Chief J udg e; KETHL EDGE, Circuit J udg e; and TH APAR, District J udg e. * PER CU RI AM . G re g or

y Al e xan de r w a s c on vic te d o f f ir st- de g re e mur de r and

se nte nc e d to life imprisonment without the possibili ty of parole
. He appea ls the fede ral district cour t’s dismiss al of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus, which he filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Be cause we find that all of the c laims now befor e us wer e proce durally defa ulted and that the pe titioner has fa iled to demonstrate c ause an d p rejudice or a misca rriag e of justice, w e af

firm the district cour

t’s dismiss al. I On J uly 2, 1998, a circ uit c ourt jury in Ca lhoun County , Michig an convic ted the petitioner of fi rs t- de g re e mur de r, ste mmi ng fr om the sh oo tin g of Te rm a in Wat so n on May 2, 19 96 , in B a ttl eNo. 06-1569

Al e xan de r v . Sm ith

This claim did not rest on any alleg ed violation of t h e S i x t h Am endment. Rather , the 1 pet i t i o n er’ s appellate counsel a rgued only

that the endor sement ca

me too late and pr ejudiced the defe nse, violating Alexander’s r ight to d u e p ro cess a nd a fa ir trial. See P eople v . Alexande r , No. 213899 (Mich. Ct. App. Fe b. 8, 2000) (holding that the claim was proce durally defa ulted and that in any case trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing Post el l t o t es t ify , beca use the prosec ution only

lear ned of Postell’s exist ence during the trial and en d o rs ed him as soon as possible). - 2 - Creek, Mic higa

n. On direc t reviewbefor e the Michig an Court of Appe als, he ra ised six claims, ea ch arguing that the proce eding s had violated his rig hts. I n particula r, he ar g ued that (1) the prosec ution improperly

infring ed on his r ight under the Fifth and Four teenth Amendments not to testify , (2) the trial court e rre d in allowing the p ro s ec u t i o n to endorse A ntonio Pos tell, an incar cer ated f ellow pr iso ne r, a s a

wi tne ss a ft er sev era l da

y s o f t ri a l, (3 ) t he tr ia l c ourt

a bu se d it s d isc re tio n w he n it 1 allowed Postell to te stify , (4) the prosec ution imprope rly made a “community

protec tion” argument during hi s cl o s i n g argume nt, (5) the tria l court improper ly order ed re stitut ion, and (6) his trial counsel wa s ineffe ctive for failing to challeng e defenda nt’s financ ial ability to make restitution. The Michig an C o u rt o f Appeals denied all of his cla ims and aff irmed his conviction. People v

. Alexande r , No. 213899 (Mich. Ct. App. F eb. 8, 2000). The M i ch i gan S u preme Court in turn de c lin e d h is r e qu e st f

or le ave to a pp e a l, statin g that it

did no t be lie ve the qu e sti on s p re se nte d s ho uld be re viewed. People v . Alexande r , 463 Mich. 860 (2000). On c oll a te ra l r e vie w i n state and fe de ra l c ourt , the pe tit ion e r ra ise d thi rt e e n s e pa ra te c la ims
. Three of t hese claims were previously raised on dir ect r eview, a nd ten additional claims we re r aised for the f irst time in collateral proc eeding s. Claim I : The prose cution violated the petitioner’ s constitutional rights in commenting on the petitioner’s de cision not to testify in his own defense
.No. 06-1569

Al e xan de r v . Sm ith

- 3 - Claim I I : T he state trial court’s decision to allow Postell to testi fy violated the petitioner’ s ri g ht t o d ue pr oc e ss a

nd a fa ir tr ia l. Cla im I I I : Pr os e c uto r m a de a “commun ity

pr ote c tio n” argume nt d

ur ingc los ingargume nts that denied the pe titioner due proc ess. Cla im IV: Th e us e of

Pos te ll’ s te sti mony

a t t he pet iti on e r’ s tr ia l vi olate d h is Si xth Am e ndme nt r ig ht t o c ouns e l. Claim V: The court’s dismissal for c ause of the only Afric an-A merica n juror violated the pe tit ion e r’ s r ig ht t o a

n im pa rt ia l jury and fa ir tr ia l. Cl ai m VI: T h e failure of the c ourt to conduct a hear ing a

nd investigate a juror ’s prior relationship wit h Postell vi olated the pe titioner’s rig ht to an impartial jury and fa ir trial. Claim VI I : The fa ilure of the state and de fense to pr esent a cr itical res g estae witness violated the pe tit ion e r’ s r ig ht t o d

ue pr oc e ss a

nd a fa ir tr ia l. Claim VI I I : The prose cution’s use of f alse testimony

by two witnes s es v i o l ated the pe tit ion e r’ s r ig ht t o d

ue pr oc e ss a

nd a fa ir tr ia l. Claim: I X: The pe titioner was denie d his right to ef fec tive assistance of counse l. C l ai m X: T h e p et i t i o n er

i s en t i t l edt o an ev i d en t i ary h ea ri n g. Claim XI : Trial court violated the petitioner’ s constitutional rights in failing to establish that the petitioner’s w aiver

of his rig ht to testify

on his own behalf w as fr ee , k n o wing , and int e lli g e nt. Claim XI I : The cumulative e ffe ct of e rror s committed during the petitioner’s trial de mon str a te he did

no t r e c e ive a

fa ir tr ia l. Claim XI I I : The petitioner has demonstrated cause and prejudice for failing to raise the a bove claims at his orig inal trial or on dire ct re view. As requir ed, the pe titioner first filed this motion for relief from the judgme nt in the Circuit Court of Calho u n Co u n ty , M ic h ig an , w h e r e h e w a s c o n v ic te d
. O n Se p te mb e r 1 8 , 2 0 0 1 , th e Ci r cuit Court de c lin e d th is pe tit ion in a one -s e nte nc e or de r, c on c lud ing , “ the re is i ns uf fi c ie nt me rit in any

of theNo. 06-1569

Al e xan de r v . Sm ith

Wit h respe ct to claims I throug h I I I , the Unit ed S tates di strict court noted that the Michig an 2 Court of Appea ls d enied these claims as proc edura lly defa ulted on direc t reviewand that the pe tit ion e r h a d f

a ile d to de mon str a te ine ff e c tiv e a ssi sta

nc e of tr ia l c ouns e l. Withre sp e c t to c la ims V thr ou g h V I I Iand

X thr ou g h XI I , th e c ourt he ld t hat th e pe tit ion e r h a d f

a ile d to de mon str a te ine ff e c tiv e ne ss o f e ith e r t

ri a l or a pp e llate c ouns e l f

or de fa ult ingthe se c la ims
. - 4 - g rounds set for

th in the Motion.” (Emphasis added). Alexander then a ppeale d to the Michig an Court of Appea ls. On November 30, 2001, that court declined t o g ive Alexander “ leave to appea l,” statin g that A le xan de r f

a ile d to me e t th e burd e n o f e sta bli sh inge nti tle me nt t o r e lie f unde r M CR 6
. 5 0 8(D). People v . Alexande r , No. 236770 (Mich. Ct. App. Nov. 30, 2001). A lexander then appea led, for the second time, to the Michig an Supreme Court. Echoing the cour t o f ap p eals, the Michig an S upreme Court issued a form order rea ding, “the delay ed application for lea ve to appe al from the Novem b er 3 0 , 2 0 01 decision of the Court of Appea ls is considered, a nd it is DENI ED, be c a us e the de fe nd ant h a s f

a ile d to me e t th e burd e n of es ta bli sh ing e nti tle me nt to re lie f u nd e r M CR 6.508(D).” People v . Alexande r , 467 Mich. 854 (2002). On Dec ember

6, 2002, Alexander filed a pe tition for habea s corpus in United States District Court for the Ea s t er n District of Michig an. The district court dismissed claims Ithroug h I I I , V thr ou g h V I I I , a

nd X thr ou g h X I I , f

ind ingthat the state c ourt inv ok e d anind e pe nd e nt a nd a de qu a te proce dural ba

r to revie w and that the pe titioner failed t o d em o n s trate c ause a nd prejudice for the d e f a u l t
. T h e c o u rta l s o d i s m i s s e d t h e p o rt i o n o f t h e p e t i t i o n e r ’ s i n e f f e c t i v e n e s s c l a i m s ( c l a i m s IX 2 and XI I I ) that we re unr elated to the alleg ed Six th A mendment violation se t f orth in Claim I V. The court re fer

red the case to a mag istrate judg e for an evide ntiary

hear ing into the petitioner’s re maining claims. The mag istrate judg e, in turn, conduc ted an e videntiary hear ing wi t h re s pect to theNo. 06-1569

Al e xan de r v . Sm ith

I n a slig ht wrinkle, the mag istrate judge advised the district court that the state cour t had not 3 pr op e rl y inv ok e d a

pr oc e dura l ba

r i n de nying the pe tit ion e r’ s SixthAm e ndme nt c la im. Th is r e su lt c o n t r a d i c t s t h e d i s t r i c tc o u rt ’ s t r e a t m e n to f t h e s a m e s t a t e c o u rt o r d e r d e n yi n g c l a i m s V t h r o u g h V III and XI throug h XI I as proce durally defa ulted. Despite this a

nomalous result, the district co urt adopted the ma g istrate judg e’s c onclusions without dis cussion or re vision of its previous order. - 5 - pe tit ion e r’ s c la im that hi s Sixth Am e ndme nt ri g hts we re vio late d by the us e of a ja ilh ou se wi tne ss who testified at his orig inal trial about com m ents he said we re ma de by Alexander a fter judicia l proce eding s had begun. I n particula r, the mag istrate judge soug ht to resolve f actua l questions about whether the jailhouse witness wa s a st ate ag ent, and whether the l ocal police or prosecutors enlisted the prisoner

to solicit i ncri m i nating comments from Ale x ander during his murder trial. The mag istrate judg e filed a

repor t concludingthat the pol ice and prosec utors had not enlisted or eve n
encour ag ed the witness to e licit incr iminating comments from the petitioner, an d t h u s , t he d ef en d an t ’s S i x t h Am en dm en tri gh t s h adn o tb ee nv i o l at ed
. T h e d i s t ri ct co u rt ad o p t ed th es e f i n d i n gs
an d d e n i e d t h e p e t i t i o n e r ’ s r e m a i n i n g c l a i m s . A l e x an d e r r e q u e s t e d a c e rt i f i c a t e o f a p p e a l a b i l i t y, 3 which the district cour

t denied with re spect to cla ims Ithroug h I I I . A ce rtificate of appe alability was g rante d only

with respec t to Cl aims I V throug h I X and XI throug h XI I I
. II There are two issues now before us with respe ct to those claims for which the petitioner w as g rante d a c e rti f

ic a te o f a p p e a la b il it y . F ir s t, w e mu s t d e te r

mi n e w h e th e r th e s e c la im s h a v e been proce durally defa

ulted and whether the state court invoked the defa ult a s a basis for denying r elief in c oll a te ra l pr oc e e din g s. Se c on d, if the re ma ini ngc la ims we re pr oc e dura lly de fa ult e d, we mus t de te rm ine wh e the r t

he pe tit ion e r h a s d e mon str a te d c a us e and pr e jud ic e fo r d e fa

ult ing the c la ims , inNo. 06-1569

Al e xan de r v . Sm ith

- 6 - which ca se we can r eview the merits, or if a f undamental misca

rri age of justice will result absent further considera

tion of the claims. We addre ss eac h of these que stions in t urn. A. Pr oc e dura l D e fa

ult Th is c ourt

ha s o utl ine d a

fo ur -p art te st t o d e te rm ine wh e the r a c la im ha s bee n p ro c e dura lly defa ulted in state court. Ma up in v . S mi th , 785 F.2d 135 (6th Cir. 1986)
. First, we must deter mine whether there is a state proc edura l rule applicable to the petitioner’s claim and whether the petitioner failed to c omply

with that rule. Id. at 138. Second, we must determine wh et h er t h e s t ate court actua lly invoked this rule, apply ing it as a basis for dec lining to g rant re lief fr om the judgme nt. Ibid. Wit h respe ct to Michig an state pr ocee dings, this fa ctor is often litigated bec ause of the tendenc y

of
s t at e c o u rt s t o d en y

re l i ef i nco l l a t e ra l p ro ce ed i n gs wi t ha f o rm o n e- s en t en ce o rd er

ci t i n g a proce dural rule wi t h o ut further explanation. See Simpson v . Jones , 238 F.3d 399 ( 6th Cir. 2000); Burroughs v. Mak

owski , 28 2 F .3 d 41 0, 41 4 (6 th C ir . 2 00 2) ; Ab e la v. Ma rti n , 380 F.3d 915 ( 6th Cir. 20 04 ). Th ir d, the pr oc e dura l r ule mus t be an ad e qu a te and ind e pe nd e nt g ro un d on whi c h the state
can r ely to fore close review of a fe dera l constituti onal claim. Ma up in , 785 F.2d at 138. This part is c ompli cat e d w he n a

state c ourt

inv ok e s th e pr oc e dura l ba sis fo r d e c lin ingre vie w, bu t a lso
a dd re sse s o r r e fe re nc e s th e me ri ts. “ An a lte rn a tiv e ho ldi ngin whic h a state pro cedu ral ba

r i s a sufficie nt basis for the state court’s judg ment is adequate to prec lude a c laim from being raised on habea s revie w, even when the state court also relies on fede ral law.” Simpson , 238 F.3d at 408-09. To be “ a de qu a te ,” a

state ru le mus t be “fi rm ly est abli sh e d a nd re g ula rl y fo llo we d at th e tim e it i s applied.” Ab e la , 3 80 F .3 d at 92 1; W ill iam s v . Co

y le , 260 F.3d 684, 693 (6th Cir. 2001). And to beNo. 06-1569

Al e xan de r v . Sm ith

- 7 - “indepe ndent,” the state cour t must “actually

[h av e] relied on the rule to bar the claim at issue.” Ab e la , 380 F.3d at 921. Fo u rth, a de faulted c laim cannot be c onsidered unle ss the petitioner ca n show cause and prejudice from the allege d claim, or a mi scar riag e of justice. Ma up in , 785 F.2d at 138. A petitioner proc edura lly defa ults claims for habe as re lief if the petitioner has not presente d tho se c la ims to t

he state c ourt s in

a c c or da nc e wi th the state ’s pr oc e dura l ru le s. I f t he pe tit ion e r f

a ils to present a

claim in state cour

t, then that proce dural de fault ca rries ove r to fede ral proc eeding s. Whether a state court found the petitioner’s claim to be proc edura lly defa ulted is a question of l aw that this court revie ws de novo. Couch v. J abe , 9 51 F .2 d 9 4, 96 (6 th C ir . 1 99 1) ; Ab e la , 380 F.3d at 922. There is no sugg estion, even by the petitioner, tha t t h e claims now bef ore us we re br ou g ht u p at tr ia l or on dir e c t re vie w. Th e y we re ra ise d f or the fi rs t ti me in c oll a te ra l pr oc e e din g s, and ther efor e they wer e defa ulted under MCR 6.508(D) , which stipulates a state court “may not gr ant relief to the defe ndant if the motion .
. . (3) alleg es g rounds for relief , other than j u ri s d i ctional defe cts, which c ould have be en ra ised on [direct] appeal.” A s a re sult, there is littl e doubt that the first fac tor of finding a proce dural defa ult is well-founde d. There is a lso lit tle doubt as to the third fac tor, which que ries whe ther the pr ocedur al bar was adequate and indepe ndent. B oth the Michig an Sup re me Court

and the c ourt of a pp e a ls c ite d M CR 6 .5 08 (D ), wh ic h the Sixth C ir c uit ha s r e pe a te dly held constitutes an ade quate a nd independe nt state proce dural g round for eclosingrevie w of fe dera l claims. Se e Ho war

d v . B ou c ha rd , 4 05 F .3 d 459 , 477 (6 th C ir . 2 00 5) ; Go nz ale s v . E lo , 233 F.3d 348 (6 th C ir . 2 00 0) ; Lub e rd

a v . Tr ipp e tt , 2 11 F .3 d 100 4 (6t h Cir. 20 00 ). B ols te ri ng thi s c on c lus ion is the fa ct that MCR 6.508(D) has be en “r egularly followed a s of 1990,” thus m akingit adequate
.No. 06-1569

Al e xan de r v . Sm ith

- 8 - Simpson , 2 38 F .3 d at 40 7. B e c a us e no oth e r c on c lus ion

is p ro vid e d b y

the se c ourt s, it i s a lso
a pp are nt t hat MC R 6. 50 8( D) wa s the e xclu siv e ba sis of the c ourt s’ de c isi on s, and the re fo re the re is no i s s u e, as i n o ther c ases, a bout whether

the rule at issue is an independe nt basis for the c ourt’s conclusion. See, e .g. , id. at 408-09. Wit h respe ct to the sec ond fac tor—whethe r the last state c ourt invoked the proc edura l g rounds as a

basis for the de fault—there is disagr eeme nt am o n g t h e par ties. Both the Michig an Supreme Court and c ourt of appe als denied relief in single sentenc e orde rs, citing MCR 6.508(D). Th e fi rs t c ourt

to c on sid e r A le xan de r’ s c oll a te ra l atta c k o n h is c on vic tio n, ho we ve r, do e s a pp e ar t o have a dd re sse d th e me ri ts. I n d e nyingAl e xan de r’ s mo tio n f or relief , th e Ca lho un

County Cir c uit Court did no t a pp e ar t o b a se its de c isi on on pr oc e dura l g ro un ds . T he ord er pro cla im e d, “ the re is ins uf fi c ie nt me rit in a

ny of the g rounds set for

th in the Motion.” (Emphasis added) . I t further cited MCR 6.504(B)( 2), which pe rmits a judge to dismi ss a ca se I f it plainly ap p ears from the f ace of the mate rials desc ribed in subrule ( B) (1) that the defe ndant is not entitled to r elief, the court shall deny the motion without di rec ting f urther proce eding s. The order must include a conc ise statement of the rea sons for the de nial. The cler k shall serve a copy

of the orde r on the de fenda nt and the prose cutor. The court may dismiss some reque sts f

or relief or g rounds for relief while direc ting a response or f u rther pr oc e e din g s w ithre sp e c t to oth e r s pe c if ie d g ro un ds
. Although pr ocedur al re asons might pr ovide a bas i s for dismissal under MCR 6.504(B )(2) , by no
means a re the y an exclusive g rounds for doingso. We must determine whether the Michig an Supreme Court decision is an explained order , or if we must re fer

to the court of a

ppeals or circ uit c ourt decisions in divining whethe r a pr ocedur al ba r h a s b e e n invo ke d. Th e tr a dit ion a l r ule ha s b e e n th a t th is c ourt wi ll o nly loo k to the la st s tateNo. 06-1569

Al e xan de r v . Sm ith

Simpson does mention the Michig an Court of A p p eals de cision in setting for th the case ’s 4 proce dural history , but does not rely on this in rende ring its decision. 238 F.3d at 402- 03. To the contra ry , it held that courts must confine themselves only to the l ast state court’s judgme nt when the - 9 - court to consider

the petitioner’s c ollatera l cl ai m s for the pur poses of makingthis determination. The Supreme Court expl ained in Y lst v. Nunnemake r : I f an e arlier

opinion ‘ fairly appea

r[s] to r est primarily

upon fede ral law ,’ we will presume that no proce dural de fault has be en invoked by a subseque nt unex p l ai n ed o rder that leave s the judgme nt or its consequenc es i n p l ac e. S imilarly wher e, as he re, the last rea soned opinion on the claim explicitly

impo s es a pr ocedur al def ault, we will pre sume that a late r dec ision re je c tin g the c la im d id n ot s ile ntl y dis re g ard that ba r a nd c on sid e r t

he me ri ts.
5 0 1 U. S
. 7 9 7 , 8 0 3 (1 9 9 1 ) ( ci t i n g Coleman v. Thompson , 501 U.S. 722, 740 ( 1991)). This c ourt has repe atedly

held that eve n a one- sentenc e dec ision, citing MCR 6. 5 0 8 (D ), constitutes a re asoned decision invoking a proc edura l bar. In Simpson , for e x ample, this cour t h eld a terse orde r by the Michig an S upreme Court ref ere ncing MCR 6.508(D), near ly identical to the one at issue in this case , was suff icient to bar f

eder al habe as re view abse nt s o m e s h o wi ng of ca use and pr ejudice or

a miscarr iag e of justice. 238 F .3d at 407-08. The petitioner in Simpson argued that “the state court did not ‘clea

rly and expressly ’ state that its judg ment was based on a state proc edura l rule.” Ibid. Yet this court re

jected that sugg estion, holding, that a state cour t order that refe rs to MCR 6.508(D), without f urther e x planation, was ne verthe less “not unexplained.” Id. at 407-08. And be cause the order of the Michig an Supreme Court constituted a dec ision “bas ed solely on the state proc edura l rule [such that] the ‘clea

rly and expressly ’ re quirement [did] not apply ,” id. at 408, the cour t did not look bey ond the Michig an Supreme Court order, to lowe r state court decisions, to determine whether the petitioner’s c laims were proce durally defa ulted. Id. at 407-08. 4No. 06-1569

Al e xan de r v . Sm ith

decision is explained. Id. at 408. - 10 - Two y ear s later this court r eac hed the same conc lusion in Burroughs v. Mak owski , a c a se in which t h e M i ch i gan S u

p re m e C o u rt i s s u eda s i m i l ar o n e- s en t en ce o rd er

i n v o k i n g M C R

6.508(D) a

nd denying relief

. 282 F.3d at 414. Noting the f ull impl ications of Simpson , w e o b s e r v e d t h a to n l y a ref ere nce to subsec tion MC R 6
. 508(D)( 3), which r elates to “ g rounds for r elief, othe r than j u ri s d i ctional def

ects,” would have unambiguously indicated the c ourt’s dec ision rested on a p ro cedural bar
. Ibid. Fo l l o wi n g Simpson , h o w e v e r , th e c o u rt h e ld th a t a mo r e s p e c if

ic o r d e r w as
unnece ssary . “Thoug h the ruling was brie f and did not expli citly ref ere nce MCR 6.508(D) (3), we deter mined [i n Simpson ] t hat the Michig an Supreme Court’s statement explained its order.” Ibid. Compli catingmatters is an a ppare nt confl i ct wit hin this circuit’s prec edent a bout when Michig an state c ourts have invoke d a proc edura l bar, t h u s denying the petitioner fe dera l habea s revie w unless he c an show c ause a nd prejudice or a miscarriag e of justice. The holding of our 2004 decision, Ab e la v . M

ar tin , conflicts with these still ear lier dec isions from our circ uit. 380 F.3d 915. I n Ab e la , th is c ourt

wa s a sk e d w he the r t

he Mic hig an Su

pr e me Court

inv ok e d a

pr oc e dura l ba

r i n denying the petitioner’s claims in collater al proceeding s. I n that case , the Michig an Supreme Court iss ue d a on e-s ent ence o rder , ref

eren cin g MC R 6 .5 08 (D) an d d eny in g revi ew o f t he p eti tio ne r’ s c la im. Id. at 920. In this respec t, the fac ts of Abela are wholly consistent with Simpson and Burroughs
. Ye t, thi s c ourt

he ld t he state c ourt

ha d n ot i nv ok e d a

state pr oc e dura l ba

r, be c a us e “ the state c ourt s below the supre me cour

t never invoked a p ro cedural bar here , but rather

repe atedly

ruled on the merits.” Id. at 923. I ndeed, in Ab e la , bo th the Mic hig an Co ur t of Ap pe a ls a

nd the c ounty

Cir c uitNo. 06-1569

Al e xan de r v . Sm ith

- 11 - Court refe renc ed the mer its. Ibid. Whe n the Mic hig an Supr e me Court or de r m e re ly

re fe re nc e s MC R 6.508(D), Abela states a fede ral court must look bey ond the one- sentenc e orde r and c onsider whe ther

“ the la st reasoned state cour t judgment” ref

ere nces the merits. Ibid. (Emphasis adde d)

. Th e re are a

numbe r o f f

a c ts that di sti nguis h th e c a se no w b e fo re us fr om Ab e la , b ut i t is unclea r whe ther these differ ence s are leg ally rele vant o r shoul d control our a naly sis. W hile the Michig an Supreme Court orders in Abela and this case are indisti ng uishable, the state co urt of
a pp e a ls d e c isi on s are dif

fe re nt. I n r

uli ngup on

Ab e la ’s pe tit ion , th e Mi chig an Co ur t of Ap pe a ls ref ere nced the merits. I n the ca se at bar, howeve r, the state court of appea ls issued a formulaic or der along the s am e l i n es of the Mic higa n Supreme Court, re fer encingMCR 6.508(D) and makingno
me nti on of the me rits . But it

is unc le ar whe the r t

his sh ou ld b e the e nd

of our a na ly sis . A ft e r a ll, Abela states that we look to lowe r cour t decisions for guidance when the Mic higa n Supreme Court d e n i e s a c l a i m w i t hanu n e xp l a i n e d r e f e r e n c e t o M C R

6
. 5 0 8 ( D ) , an d

t h e r e i s n o r e a s o nt o a s s ume this same rule should not apply when the state cour

t o f appea ls issues such an orde r. Put another way , if the s tate s u

p r e me c o u rt’ s o r d e r is n o t a “ r e a s o n e d d e c is io n , ” th e n th e s a me o r d e r f r o m the state cour t of appe als should not be treated as such e ither. Reviewingthe Circuit Court’s denial of Alexander’s c laim, the court doe s in fact refe renc e the merits, which sugg ests if Abela c on tr ols thi s court’s a naly sis, we should not hold that the state court proper ly invoked a proce dural bar i n denying Alexander’s pe tition. For this reason, we must determine whe ther Abela conflicts with Simpson and Burroughs
. Although Abela purports to rely upon the fa ct that “the proce dural fa cts of Simpson and Burroughs
are distinguishable f

rom our ca se,” Ab e la , 380 F.3d at 923, our ea rlier c ases he ld that the proc edura lNo. 06-1569

Al e xan de r v . Sm ith

- 12 - distinctions cited in Abela wer e leg ally irrele vant. In Simpson , this court mentions the content of the Michig an Court of Appe als and Circuit Court order s in outli ning the fac ts of the case, but does not rely on these orders in any way in rea chingthe conc lusion that Michigan Supre me Court’s judg ment is “proper ly

explained.” Simpson , 238 F.3d at 408. L ikewise, in Burroughs , the cour t mentions the Court of Ap pe a ls o rd e r, but note s th a t Simpson held the Michig an Supreme Court order w as an “explained” de cision. 282 F. 3 d at 4 1 4 . Whil e Abela require s that the content of the se pre vious order s be consider ed and w eig hed, Simpson and Bu rro ug hs sta nd fo r t he pr op os iti on

that th e y mus t be disreg arde d. Abela simply cannot be rec onciled with this court’s ea rlier de cisions in Simpson or in Burroughs
. The Six th Circuit’s rules state that published pane l opinions ar e binding on all subsequent panels. 6th C ir. R. 206(c). “ A pane l of this Court cannot overr ule the dec ision of another pa nel. The prior dec ision remains controlling authority unless an inc o n s i stent decision of the U nited States Supreme Court re quires modification of the dec ision or t his Court sit ting e n banc ove rrules the prior decision.” Sa lm i v . Se c ’y of He alt h & Hu ma n Se rv

s. , 7 74 F .2 d 6 85 , 6 89 (6 th C ir .1 98 5) ; se e als o United States v. Mastromatteo , 538 F .3 d 535 , 545 (6 th C ir . 2 00 8) (d isr e g ard ingthe ru le se t f or th i n tw o p ub lis he d o pin ion s in fa vo r of a c on tr ary ru le e sta bli sh e d by an e arl ie r c a se re so lvi ngthe same issue); United States v. Moody , 206 F.3d 609, 615 ( 6th Cir. 2000) (“Althoug h we f ind the dissent’s
rea soning c onvincing , we must follow the pre cede nt [ established by an ea rlier de cision].” )
. Wh e the r
or no t Abela is c or

re c t “ is n ot o ur

pla c e to s ay ” ins of

ar a s A b e la c on fl ic ts w ithsti ll e arl ie r c a se s. Da rra h v . Ci ty

of O ak Pa rk, 255 F.3d 301, 309- 10 (6th Cir. 2001). Rather, we m ust apply the prior decision, bec ause a

later pa nel ca nnot overturn this court’ s prec edent. W ith respec t to the case at bar ,No. 06-1569

Al e xan de r v . Sm ith

I n a ca se dec ided af

ter Abela involving nearly the same f

acts, the same re sult was rea ched 5 without comment about the appa rent c onflict in our

prec edent. Mu ns on v . Ka ptu re , 384 F.3d 310, 314 (6th Cir. 2004) (“Munson argues t hat t he last explained state court judgme nt is the trial court’s opinion denying his post-c onviction motion for relief
. I n that opinion, the c ourt relied on pr ocedur al de fa ult in r e je c tin g on ly

on e of his c la ims ; i t den ie d th e oth e r c la ims on the ir me ri ts. Con tr ary

to Munson’s asser

t i o n , h o weve r, the last explained state c ourt judg ment in this case is the Michig an Sup re me Court ’s or de r d e nying re vie w of Muns on ’s c la ims ba se d upo n his fa ilure to c omp ly wi th Rule 6.508(D).” ). - 13 - we hold Simpson and Bu rro ug hs control our analy sis, and that the Michig an Supreme Court’s order denying A lexader re lief fr om the judgme nt constitutes an explained orde r invoking an indepe ndent and ade quate pr ocedur al bar to relief. 5 B. Cause and Prejudice I f a state prisoner has “defaulted his fede ral claims in state cour t pursuant to an indepe ndent and adequate state proc edura l rule,” Coleman , 5 0 1 U
. S
. a t 7 5 0 ( 1 9 9 1 ) , f e d e r a l h a b e a s re vie w i s ba rr e d unle ss t

he pe tit ion e r “c an de mon str a te c a us e fo r the de fa

ult and a c tua l pr e

jud ic e a s a

re su lt of the a lle g e d v iol a tio n o f f e de ra l la w, or c an d e mon str a te that f

a ilure to c on sid e r the c la ims wi ll result in a funda

mental misc ar ri age o f justice.” Coev . B e ll , 161 F.3d 320, 329 ( 6th Cir. 1998). Although A lexander conte nds he is innocent and that a m i scar riag e of justice w ill result absent fe de ra l r e vie w, h e do e s n ot c ome c los e to m e e tin g his burd e n in de mon str a tin g his c on vic tio n f itsNo. 06-1569

Al e xan de r v . Sm ith

The cate g ory of case s involving “funda mental miscarr iag e of justice” is a narr ow exception, 6 inapplicable he re. Sc hlu

p v. De lo , 513 U.S. 298 (1995). A f eder al cour

t may only g rant ha beas on a c la im de fa

ult e d in state c ourt wh e n e ith e r “ ne w re lia ble e vid e nc e . . . that wa s no t pr e se nte d a t tr ia l” indicates no re asonable juror would have convicted the petitioner or when the petitioner ca n show that a constitutional violation not pre viously raised “proba bly resulted in the conviction of one who is a ctually innocent.” Id. at 324, 327. The only new e vidence prese nted involves a c ritical witness’s testimony , rec anting his claim that Alexander had made incriminating comments to him during the orig inal trial. Given that the district c ourt expli citly held this testim ony was unpe rsuasive, a

nd there is n o e vid e nc e su g g e sti ng thi s c on c lus ion wa s in c le ar e rr or , we ho ld that Al e xan de r ha s n ot m e t hi s burden. L ikewise, thoug h he asse rts his innocence in briefi n g, h e d o es not prese nt evidence ind ic a tin g his c on vic tio n “ pr ob a bly re su lte d” in the c on vic tio n of som e on e wh o is a c tua lly inn oc e nt. There fore he is not entitled to the avenue of re lief set out in Schlup
. - 14 - within the quite narrow , latter set o f cases. We theref ore pr ocee d to addre ss whether he has 6 demonstrated c ause a

nd prejudice with respec t to each of his claims. Th e pe tit ion e r c ite s in e ff

e c tiv e ne ss o f t

ri a l and a pp e llate c ouns e l as ca

us e fo r d e fa

ult ingthe se claims. “B oth the perf

ormanc e and pr ejudice components of t he ineffec tiveness i nquiry are mix ed questions of law a

nd fac t entitled to de novo revie w.” Com bs v . Co y le , 205 F.3d 269, 278 ( 6th Cir. 2000). Ineff

ectivene ss is analy

zed under the two-par

t te st se t forth in Strickland v. W ashington , 466 U.S. 668 (1984). First, “defe ndant m ust show that counsel’s r epre sentation fell below a n objective standard of

rea sonablene ss.” Id. a t 68 8. I n un de rt a kin g thi s re vie w of the re c or d, th is cou rt mus t

“ ind ulg e a str on g pr e su

mpt ion that c ouns e l’ s condu c t f a lls wi thi n th e wi de ra

ng e of re a so na ble profe ssional assistance.” Id. a t 68 9. Ne xt, th e pe tit ion e r “ mus t sh owthat th e re is a re a so na ble probability

that, but for counse l’s unprofe ssional error s, the result of the p r o c eedingwould have be en differ ent.” Id. at 694. Under this court’s pre cede nt, a reasonable pr obability “does not mea

n a
cer tainty , or eve n a prepondera nt likelihood of a differ ent out come . . . .” Matthews v. Abramajtys ,No. 06-1569

Al e xan de r v . Sm ith

- 15 - 319 F.3d 780, 790 ( 6th Cir. 2003). But it must be “a pr obability sufficie nt to undermine c onfidenc e in the outcome.” Strickland , 466 U.S. at 694. Th e pe tit ion e r a lso de fa

ult e d h is c la ims in h is fi rs t a pp e a l a s a matte r o f r ig ht, inc lud inghis ineffe ctive assistanc e of trial counsel claim, so he must demonstrate ca use and pr ejudice w ith respec t to this failure as we ll. Munson , 384 F.3d at 315 n.2 (noting a cla im of ineffe ctive assistanc e of tria l counsel may

be broug ht on direct a

ppeal in Mic higa

n). Criminal defenda

nts are e ntitled to effec tive appellate counsel in their first appea l as a matter of rig ht. Evitts v. Lucey , 469 U.S. 387, 396 (1985). The inquiry , howeve r, var ies slightly from whe ther trial counsel is ineffe ctive. I n rec og nition of the fac t that a def

endant may

be m o re l i k ely

to preva il on appeal by

raising only

his most compelling claims, the mere failure of appel l ate c ounsel to bring up ever y “non-f rivolous” claim on beha lf of a client doe s not render

his ass i s t ance ineff

ective. Jones v . Barnes , 463 U.S. 745, 551-52 (1983). To preva il in showing ca

use, the pe titioner would have to de monstrate that the issue not presente d “wa s clea rly strong er than the i ssues that counsel did prese nt.” Smith v. Robbins , 528 U.S. 259, 288- 89 (2 00 0) ; J

os hu a v . D e W

itt , 341 F.3d 430, 441 (6th Cir. 2003). Moreover , the petitioner must show there is “a re asonable probability , but for counsel’s unre asonable failure . . . he would have preva iled on his appea l.” Sm ith , 528 U.S. at 285. 1. Six th Amendment Claim (Claim I V) Th e pe tit ion e r c on te nd s that his c ouns e l’ s fa ilure to ob je c t to te sti mony by An ton io P os te ll, a fe llow inmate who elicited incr iminati ng comments from him in the absenc e of c ounsel, constitutes ineffe ctive assistanc e of c ounsel. Postell met with detectives, in the midst of Alexander’s tria l, on J u n e 2 6 , 1 9 9 8
. A n d

t h r e e d ays l a t e r o nJ u n e 2 9 , 2 0 0 8 , h e m e tw i t hp r o s e c u t o r s , an d a g r e e d t o t e s t i f y.No. 06-1569

Al e xan de r v . Sm ith

- 16 - I f P o s t el l had an a g ree ment with prosecutor s to elicit, or if they encour ag ed him to elicit, the statements, admis sion of hi s testimony violated Alex ander ’s S ix th Amendment rig ht to counsel. At the pe tit ion e r’ s o ri g inal tr ia l, P os te ll s a id n o s uc h r e latio ns hip e xiste d. Pos te ll l a te r r e c ante d th is testimony in the fede ral ha

beas pr ocee ding, pr ofessingthat a q u i d pro quo did exist wher eby he would elicit incriminating statements from Alexander. As the petitioner notes, “ Postell’s testim ony at the hea ring befor e this Court [ the fe dera l district cou rt], if believed, cle arly would establish an ag ency rela t i o n s h i p and entitlement to re lief.” B r. Appe llant at 29. Howeve r, the district cour t
e xplic itl y fo un d Po ste ll’ s tes tim ony a t the e vid e nti ary he ari ng wa s not cr e dib le
. To the e xten t Po ste ll
re c ante d th e c la ims he ma de a t Al e xan de r’ s tr ia l, the ma g ist rate jud g e fo un d Po ste ll’ s te sti mony to be “illog ical,” “ internally inconsistent,” uncor

roborated b y o ther e vidence , inspired by the risk of retribution, and less plausible than both a video taped statement made pr ior to Alexander’s c riminal trial and his testimony

at that trial. F oll ow ingthe e vid e nti ary he ari ng , a

ma g istra te jud g e ma de a

numbe r o f f

a c tua l f ind ing s, adopted by

the district court, that a re diamet ri ca lly

opposed to the conc lusions the petitioner proposes we adopt in these proc eeding s. The most critical of these finding s were that no ag ree ment exis ted betwe en Postell and the State and that no gove rnment employ ee a sked, sug g ested, or e ven
encour ag ed Postell to elicit incriminating stateme nts from Alexander. The district court also found that Po ste ll h a d n e ve r b e fo re be e n a “ pr oa c tiv e inf

or mant” and

ha d ne ve r b e fo re re c e ive d a de a l in
re tur n f or inf or matio n or hi s tes tim ony . Rathe r, Pos te ll “ a c te d s ole ly on his ow n in iti a tiv e in communicatingwith Greg ory Alexander at the Calhoun County J ail, ” an d t h at the police a nd prosec utors had no wa

y of knowingthat Postell “could or would eng ag e Alexander in uncounselledNo. 06-1569

Al e xan de r v . Sm ith

- 17 - communications relating to the murder of Trema in (sic) Watson.” Communication betwee n the two prisoners wa s not inevitable or for esee able, a s evidenc ed by the fa cts that Postell and Alexander we re housed in separ ate c ells on differ ent levels of the Ca lhoun County J ail and that they

communicated throug h the ventil at ion sy stem. There is no good r eason to find f ault, let alone c lear

err or, in the
ma g istrate jud g e ’s fi nd ing s, wh ic h w e re a do pte d by the dis tr ic t court
. Gi ve n the se fa c tua l f ind ing s, we p r o c e e d to c o n s id e r w h e th e r A le xan d e r ’ s c o n s ti tuti o n a l r igh ts w e r e v io late d b y a dmission of Postell’s testimony , and conse quently , whether his counsel’s assistanc e ca n be dee med ineff

ective in failing to object. The Six th Amendment provides that, “the accuse d shall enjoy the right
. . . to have A ssistance of Counsel for his defenc e.” U.S. Const. amend VI
. This rig ht is trig g ere d “‘at or afte r the time that j u d i ci al p ro ce ed i n gs h av e be en i n i t i at ed
. . . wh et h er b y wa y o f f o rm al ch ar ge, p re l i m i n ary h ea ri n g, i n d i ct m ent, information, or a rra ignme nt.’” Fellers v. U nited States , 5 4 0 U
. S. 5 1 9 , 5 2 3 ( 2 0 04) (q u o t i n g Brewer v. W

illiams , 430 U.S. 387, 398 (1977)). Once the Six th Amendment has attached, the g overnme nt may not “deliber ately elicit” incr iminating stateme nts from the def endant without the pre sence of his attorney
. Se e Uni ted St at es v . H e nr y , 447 U.S. 264, 270 (1980) (outlining the deliberate-e licitation st a

n d a r d )
. Un li k e a

d e f e n d a n t’ s F if th A me n dment rig hts, the Six th Amendment is impl icated e ven whe n an under cover office r or unidentified informant ac ting at the behest of the state questions the def

endant. Massiah v. United States , 377 U. S. 201 , 206 (1 96 4)
. I n othe r w or ds , admission of statements made e ven whe n the def endant doe s not know he is being interrog ated c an violate the Six th Amendment. Ibid.No. 06-1569

Al e xan de r v . Sm ith

- 18 - The Supreme C o u rt h as cau t i o n ed , “t h e S i x t hAm en dm en ti s n o tv i o l at edwh en ev er
— b y l uck
or ha pp e ns tanc e —th e State ob ta ins inc ri min a tin g state me nts fr om t he a c c us e d a ft e r t

he ri g ht t o counsel ha s attache d.” Maine v . Moulton , 4 74 U. S. 1 59 , 1 76 (1 98 5) . Rathe r, the Con sti tu ti on is implicated when the police sug g est an infor mant rec ord conve rsations and he lp an informant rec ord
conver sations with the defe ndant. Ibid. A def endant’ s Six th Amendment right i s also likely to be violated when a

n informant ha s an ar

rang ement alr eady

in place w ith the state at the time of the
conver sation, and perhaps is compensated on a c ontinge nt basis. He nr y , 447 U.S. at 270. I n perha ps its broadest cha

rac terization of the rig hts protected by the Six th Amendment, the Supreme Court has
s tate d th a t, “ [b ]y

inte n ti o n a ll y

c r e a ti n g a

s it u a ti o nli k e ly

to in d u c e H e n r y to ma k e in c r iminating statements without the assistance of counsel, the Gover nment violated Henr

y ’s Six th Amendment rig ht to counsel.” Id. at 274. There is no dispute that Alex ander ’s Six th Amendment rig ht to counsel had attache d at the time of his statements to Post ell. The iss ue before us is whether Alexander’s counsel was ineffe ctive for not ar g uing that admission of Post ell’s t es t i mony in fac t violated the Six th Amendment eve n though he was not ac ting as an ag ent of state. B eca use Massiah and

Sixth C ir c uit

pr e c e de nt s imp ly do not give rise to a doctrine of implied state ag ency or allow for a findingthat state ag ency exis ted
a s a matte r o f l aw und e r t

he se c ir c ums tanc e s, we ho ld c ouns e l w a s n ot i ne ff e c tiv e in f a ili ngto r a ise thi s c la im. I t is sim

ply no t c le ar u

nd e r t hes e cir c ums tanc e s th a t A le xan de r’ s c on sti tut ion a l r ig hts
we re vio late d. F e w d e c isi on s re cog nize a do c tr ine of

imp lie d s tate a g e nc y , a bs e nt e xpre ss
e nc oura g e me nt o r a g re e me nt b y the po lic e , a

nd wh a t la w d oe s e xist s ug g est s it wou ld not a pp ly under the circ umstances pr esente d in this case.No. 06-1569

Al e xan de r v . Sm ith

- 19 - The pe titioner relies upon a Ninth Circuit case, Ra nd olp h v . Ca lif

or nia , 3 80 F .3 d 1 13 3 ( 9th Cir. 2004), in contendinghis c ounsel was ineffe ctive in not raising the Six th Amendment issue at trial and on a

ppeal. Randolph does s u gges t s tate ag ency may be implied by

the totality

of the circ umstances. B ut this ca se was decide d six y ear s after Alexander’s or igina l trial and it ref lects an extension, not an application, of Massiah
. Our j ur isp ru de nc e wo uld no t ne c e ssa

ri ly fo llo w the Ni nth Cir c uit
. T h e S u

p r e m e C o u rt h a s n e v e r h e l d t h a t an i n f o r m an t w a s a c t i n g o n b e h a l f o f the sta te resultin g i n a Massiah violation merely beca use dete ctives or pr osecutors “ should have known” a pa rt ic ula r i nf or mant “ b e l i e ve d th a t he wo uld

re c e ive le nie nc y

if he e lic ite d in c ri min a tin g state me nts ” from the de fenda

nt. Id. at 1147. I n rea ching this c onclusion, the Ninth Circuit cre ates a n aff irmative du ty on the pa rt of de te c tiv e s o r p ro se c uto rs to e ns ur e inf or mants un de rs tand

wh e the r o r n ot t

he y wi ll
rec eive a deal in exchang e for

el i ci t i n g s t at ements. Even if such a r ule is justified, it would be inapplicable he re, w here the informant ha s never befor e testified pursuant to a deal with prosecutor s and did no t share a ce ll with the petitioner such that conve rsation could be r easona bly anticipated b et we en t h e t wo p ar t i es . T h at co m m u n i ca t i o n b et we en P o s t el l an d

Al ex an d er

t o o k p l ac e t h ro u gh the ventilation sy stem bolsters the notion their communication wa s unfore seea ble. Fa ilure of his t rial and appellate counsel to prese nt a novel leg al ar g ument when the c asela w is ambiguous doe s not constitute ineffec tive assistance . The Supreme Court has held, “the Constit ution gua

rante es cr iminal defenda

nts only a fa ir trial and a

competent attorney . I t does not insure that def

ense c ounsel will recog nize and raise e very conce ivable constitutional claim.” En gle v. Isaac , 456 U.S. 107, 134 (1982). P erha ps Alexander’s Si x th Amendment claim is strong er tha n other c l aims raised in his first appe al as a matter of r ight, but fa iling to ra ise a c laim that does notNo. 06-1569

Al e xan de r v . Sm ith

- 20 - follow log ically

or enta il an ine v it a

b lee xte n s io n

o f p r e e x isting Six th Amendment jurisprudenc e does not rende r his a

ppellate or trial counsel ineffe ctive. The petitioner can cite no case s at the time of his origina l trial rec og nizi ng the doctrine he now sa y s his counsel had a

duty to raise. Eve n if the do c tr ine ha d b e e n a c c e pte d b y the c ou rt , it s app lic a tio n to the fa c ts at ba r w ou ld r e ma in h ig hly questionable. The se fa cts demonstrate t h at t h e petitioner c annot come c lose to satisfying the constitutional standard of inef fec tivenes s. Consequently , we must let the state’ s denial of ha beas with respec t to this claim stand. 2. J uror Dismissal (Claim V) Th e pe tit ion e r’ s ne xt c la im is that the dis mis sa l of the on ly bla c k jur or fo r c a us e , in t he mid st of the c riminal proce eding s, violated his rig hts. Bec ause de fense counsel did not object to the dismiss al of the juror and his appellate counsel also did not raise this issue, the petitioner must show
cause and pre

judice for this failure be fore this court may addre ss the merit of the claim. He can do neither. Th e re we re se ve ra l r e a so ns fo r t he c ourt to d ism iss the jur or

in q ue sti on and for de fe ns e counsel not to object. The juror appa rently told bailiff that he was afr aid t hat if he r emained on the j u ry , h e w o u l d

l o s e h i s j o b
. He al s o t o l d

t h e b ai l i ff

t h at h e w as n o tfe el i n g we l l
. J A 33 7 a. T h e j u d ge noted that the juror ha d been obse rved, on se vera l occa sions, “t o b e s itting with his ey es closed,” and he be lieved ther e wa s rea son to question whether he had bee n “p ay i n g attention” to the proce eding s. The prose cutor a lso claimed the juror in question had been heard “letting out moans and g roans” at s ever al poi nts in the proceeding s, and appear ed to be in pain. W hen intervie wed by the judg e (in the pr esenc e of both attorney s), t he juror claimed he had bee n rele ased f rom the hospitalNo. 06-1569

Al e xan de r v . Sm ith

- 21 - nine day s ear lier due to he art trouble. T his juror contra dicted himself about his hea lth and whether he had f ormed in opinion in the case . At first he said he felt fine, then he insisted, “ Ifee l rea l bad like Iam now.” L ikewise, the dismissed juror insi sted he had not formed any conclusion as to the defe ndant’s innoce nce or g uilt. How ev er , later in the discussion, he told the judg e that he ha d fo rm e d a pr e c on c e ive d b e lie f re g ard ing the de fe nd ant’ s g uil t or inn oc e nc e , but he did no t in dic a te whether this belief was i n fa vor of or ag ainst the defe ndant. He a lso seemed to be pa ranoid,
a pp are ntl y be lie vin g that tw o me n w ho a pp ro a c he d h im in the jur

y a sse mbl y ro om t o a sk

the tim e
we re po ssi bly

a thr e a t to his we ll- be ing or a me mbe r of his fa mil y . I n the pr e se nc e of

bo th c ouns e l, the jur or “ e xpre sse d .
. . fe arf

ul fe e lin g s abo ut or a sso c iate d with his se rv ic e s, ” te lli ng on e c ouns e l, “he did not wa

nt to die.” Th e pe tit ion e r i n th is c a se ha s n ot s uf fi c ie ntl y e xpla ine d w hy

de fe ns e c ouns e l’s f

a ilure to ob je c t to the dis mis sa l of

thi s juro r, or

a pp e llate c ouns e l’ s f

a ilure to r a ise thi s is su e on a pp e a l, constitut e s in e f

f e c ti v e a s s is ta

n c e . T h e r e w e r e ma

ny r e a s o n s f

o r th e d e f e n s e to w an t t

h is ju r or dismiss ed, including evidenc e that he w as not pay ing attention, that he was para noid, and per

haps most im portantly , that he did not want to serve on the j ury . Even if objecting w ould have ke pt the
on ly bla c k ju ro r o n th e jur

y , c omp e te nt c ouns e l mi g ht f e ar t hat su c h a jur or wo uld ir ra tio na lly vo te to convict irre spective of

the evidenc e or that he might be lieve the de fen d an t wa s behind the two men who he be lieved thre atene d him. I n light of the record, the pe titioner cannot de monstrate that the fa ilure to object to the dismissal of the only black juror , absent any evidenc e that the juror’ s rac e
wa s th e ba sis of

the dis mis sa l or

that th e dis mis sa l w ou ld a dv e rs e ly imp a c t hi s c lie nt, amou

nts to ine ff e c tiv e a ssi sta

nc e . T hus, the pe tit ion e r h a s n ot d e mon str a te d c a us e fo r t he fa ilure to r a ise thi sNo. 06-1569

Al e xan de r v . Sm ith

- 22 - claim in ear lier proc eeding s, or that there is a re as o n ab l e probability the outcome of

his trial or appea l would have diff

ere d had this claim bee n raised. 3
. J u r o r F a m i l i ar i t y

w i t h a P r o s e c u t i o nW i t n e s s ( C l a i m V I) Th is c la im a lle g e s that the fa ilure to re qu e st a he ari ngre g ard inga

jur or ’s re latio ns hip wi th a witness and he r potential bi as amounts to ineffe ctive assistanc e of c ounsel. Prior to Postell’s te sti mony , o ne of

the jur or s in fo rm e d the tr ia l cou rt sh e tho ug ht she kn e w Po ste ll. B e c a us e Pos te ll was not identified a s a witness at the outset of the t rial, his name wa s not read to the jur y . The juror indicated that she could weig h his te stimony by the same standards as any other witness and said she was not we ll acquainted w ith Pos tell and had not seen him for “a long time.” Neither

the prosec utor or def ense counsel asked the j uror any questions, and the juror was permitted t o rema in on the jury and no fur

ther he aringwas he ld. Under these c ircumstance s, a cour t is not obl iga

ted to hold such a hear ing a nd the def endant’ s rig hts were not violated. “This court has specifically held that not all communications with jurors
war rant a hear ing for a determination of potential bias,” espec ially when the de fense counsel, a s here , do e s n ot r e qu e st s uc h a

he ari ng , th e c on ta c t oc c ur re d pr ior to t

he tr ia l, a nd the c omm

un ic a tio n d id not conce rn any

of the issues pending befor e the jury
. W hite v . S mi th , 984 F.2d 163, 166 ( 6th Cir. 1993). Indeed, he aring s are only require d when ther e is an a lleg ation of contact or unauthorized communication that “pr esents a likelihood of aff ecting the ver dict.” Un ite d S tates v . F ro st , 125 F.3d 34 6, 37 7 ( 6th

Cir . 1 99 7) . Wh e n c on ta c t be tw e e n a jur or and a pr os pe c tiv e wi tne ss w a s “ e xtre me ly limit ed [in] nature ,” ther e is no such need for such a proc eedingand no pre sumption of prejudice. United States v. W

alton , 908 F.2d 1289, 1297 ( 6th Cir.), cert. de nied , 4 98 U. S. 9 90 (1 99 0) ; UnitedNo. 06-1569

Al e xan de r v . Sm ith

- 23 - States v. He rndon , 1 56 F .3 d 6 29 , 6 35 (6 th C ir . 199 8)
. To de mon str a te a jur or ’s pr ior c on ta c t w ith a witness violated de fenda nt’s constitutional rights, the pe tit i o n er would have ha d to show the relationship gave rise to an “extraneous influence
. . . [t hat] taints t he deliber ations with information not subject to a trial’s pr ocedur al safe g uards.” Herndon , 156 F. 3 d at 636 (holding that a district court a bused its discretion in denying a party ’s request for a

hear ing when juror a

nd party had prior business dealing s). Be cause there is no evidenc e in the rec ord or juror ’s own testimony to sugg est an “ extraneous influence ” existed, counsel’s f ailure to ra ise it at trial does not amount to ineffe ctive assistanc e. And
e ve n if the c la im w e re no t f

ri vo lou s su c h that the pe tit ion e r ha d de mon str a te d ca us e fo r the de fa

ult , there is no evidence whatsoeve r e s tablishing pre judice fr om the court’s f ailure to investig ate the juror’s pa

rtiality . Finally , the petitioner ha s also fa i l ed to establish cause and pre judice for

the defa ult at the state appe llate level, be cause this claim is not “clear ly strong er” to t hose ra ised on appea l. 4
. F a i l u r e t o P r o d

u c e a R e s G e s t a e W i t n e s s ( C l a i m V II) Th e pe tit ion e r’ s n e xt ha

be a s c la im a lle g es th at hi s cou ns e l w a s in e ff

e c tiv e in f

a ili ngto produce Gino Fa

mbro as a witness, denying him due proce ss a nd a fair trial. The pe titioner contends Fambro could have testified that he sa w other men shoot the victim. There is nothing in the rec ord to su g g e st why F ambr o wa s no t c a lle d. L ike the pe tit ion e r’ s oth e r c la ims , th is was pro cedur a lly defa ulted on direc t revie w. Ot h er wi tnesses testified that six people shot at the victim, which sug g ests Fa

mbro’s testimony

could be r eco n cil ed with the petitioner’ s g uilt. S ince the pe titioner does not eve n su gg est Fa

mbro would have testified that Alexander did not shoot the victim, thereNo. 06-1569

Al e xan de r v . Sm ith

- 24 - is no reason to c onclude F ambro’s testimony was ex culpatory , let alone that it would have resulted in a diffe rent jury

verdic t. There fore the petitioner ha s failed to demonstrate that counse l was ineff ective in f

ailing to pr oduce the witness or that he suf fer ed pre judice assuming this fell below ob je c tiv e ly re a so na ble c on du c t. A

bs e nt t his sh ow ing , w e c ann ot e va luate thi s d e fa ult e d c la im. 5
. U s e o f A l l e g e d l y

P e r j u r e d T e s t i m o n y

( C l a i m V III ) Next, the petitioner contends that the prosec utor used fa lse testimony of Jeffre y Rag land and Antonio Post ell in securing the petit ioner’s conviction. To preva il, the petitioner “must show that the s tatements were material, t hat t hey wer e actually false, and t hat t he prosecution knew they wer e false.” United States v. Hawkins , 969 F.2d 1 69, 175 (6th Cir. 1992). The f act that two other wi tne sse s’ te sti mony

dif fe re d f ro m Ra g land ’s a

nd Pos te ll’ s te sti mony

do e s n ot n e c e ssa

ri ly ind ic a te their testimony

was pe rjured. N ot only

has t he petiti oner failed to show the testimony in question was fa lse, he ha s failed to s h o w t h at p ro secution had a ny rea son to believe it was f alse or that the prosec ution knew the stateme nts were false. See F o l ey v. P a rker , 488 F.3d 377, 391- 92 (6th Cir. 2007). I n fac t, the petit ioner’s argument disreg ards evidence sug g esting this testim ony was true : as the ma g istrate jud g e ob se rv e d, “ Pos te ll’ s te sti mony c or ro bo rate d Ra g land ’s te sti mony , a nd Pos te ll claimed that his only source of information was Petitioner.” Since this finding was not in clea r er ror, de fe ns e c ouns e l’ s f

a ilure to o bje c t to the c la im at t he pe tit ion e r’ s o ri g ina l tr ia l do e s n ot c on sti tut e ineffe ctive assistanc e of c ounsel and re view of this claim is barr ed. 6
. W a i v e r

o f R i g h tt o T e s t i f

y ( C l a i m X I) The pe titioner’s next habeas cla im involves the trial court’s failure to obta in a n on-the-r ecor d
w a i v e r t h a tA l e x an d e r ’ s d e c i s i o nn o tt o t e s t i f y w a s m a d e f

r e e l y, k n o w i n g l y, an d

i n t e l l i g e n t l y.No. 06-1569

Al e xan de r v . Sm ith

- 25 - Appellate c ounsel’s fa ilure to raise this claim was not ineffe ctive, because the law doe s not require such a r ecor d. The Six th Circuit has stated expli ci t l y , t ri al courts ar e not “r equire d to su a s po nte addre ss a silent defe ndant and inquire whether the defe ndant knowingly and intentionally waived the
r ig h t to te stify .” Un i t ed States v. W ebber , 2 08 F .3 d 5 45 , 5 51 (6 th C ir . 2 00 0) . In r e a c hin g thi s conclusion, this court fur

ther he ld that trial courts need not document the de fenda nt’s waiver

on the
rec ord. Ibid. Since fa ilure to raise a fr i v o l ous claim is not objectively unrea sonable a

nd cannot establish prejudice , the petitioner ha s failed to demonstrate he is entitled to revie w of this claim. 7
. C u m u l a t i v e E f

f e c t( C l a i m X II) The pe titioner argues that the c umulative eff ect of the errors committed in the cour se of the pe tit io n e r ’ s t r i a l d e p r i v e d h i m o f a f a i r t r i a l
. L i k e h i s o t h e r

c l a i m s , t h i s c l a i mi s p r o c e du ra lly de fa ult e d. Al tho ug h Su

pr e me Court

pr e c e de nt has no t ackno wl e dg e d a dis tin c t r ig ht t o c umu late
err ors, the Six th Circuit has rec og nized that even when no one error “ may in itself be re versible, the totality of the err or” can deny a defe ndant his rig ht to due proce ss. Se e Lorra inev . Co y le , 291 F.3d 41 6, 44 7 ( 6th

Cir .) (n oti ng that the Sup re me Court ha s ne ve r he ld t hat di sti nc t c on sti tut ion a l c la ims can be cumulated) , opinion correc ted on denial of reh’g , 3 07 F .3 d 4 59 (2 00 2) ; United States v. May , 69 F.3d 116, 123 ( 6th Cir. 1995)
. Many of his c laims a ppear to be novel, frivolous, or unpe rsuasive. Cum ula t i n g t h e m t h e r e f

o r e d o e s n o ta l t e r

t h e an a l y s i s . E v e na s s u m i n g t h i s ar g u m e n ti s “ c le a rl y strong er” than those arguments appellate counsel did pr esent on direc t r eview, this claim fails since the pe tit ion e r h a s n ot d e mon str a te d a “ re a so na ble pr ob a bil ity” of su c c e ss i n h is ap pe a l eve n ha d th e se
c la ims be e n p re se nte d. At the ve ry le a st, the y are no ve l and no t th e kin d o f s lam- dunk argume nts that would establish a re asonable probability of succ ess.No. 06-1569

Al e xan de r v . Sm ith

- 26 - 8. I neff ective A ssistance of T rial Counsel (Claim I X) I n addition to being ine ffe ctive for failing to raise the c onstitut ional objections alre ady dis c us se d a

bo ve , th e pe tit ion e r c la ims tha t tr ia l c ouns e l’s perf

or manc e wa s d e fi c ie nt b e c a us e counsel: (1) failed to seek a continuanc e whe n prosec utor moved to endorse Postell as a witness; (2) fa ile d to ve ri fy

and pr od uc e wo rk re c or ds fo r t

he pet it io ne r’ s a lib i w itn e ss; (3 ) f a ile d to ob

je c t to pr os e c uto r’ s im

pr op e r r e mark s d

ur ing vo ir dir e and c los ing argume nts ; (4 ) ma de c on c e ssi on s in his op e nin g state me nt t

hat re du c e d the burd e n o f p ro of ; ( 5) ma de inf

lammator y state me nts duri ngvo ir dire; (6) failed to object to rea sonable doubt instruction and failed to reque st a ca utionary instruction on use of a

n informant; and ( 7) fa iled to object to cert ain evidentiar y err ors. The only

theory of ineffe ctiveness r aised on dire ct re view is not be fore us, so this c laim is proce durally defa ulted except insofar a s the petitioner ca n demonstrate c ause a

nd prejudice
. The pe titioner cites ineff ectivene ss of his appellate co u n s el as c ause, but he does not
e la bo rate on many of the se c la ims and

ha s f a ile d to meet h is b ur de n in sh ow inga

“ re a so na ble probability ” that the r esult of his a ppeal would have been differ ent had he prese nted this ineffe ctive claim. Sm ith , 528 U.S. at 285. There is no indication that work re cords f or an a lib i witness wer e so critical or

exculpatory

that had counse l obtained and introduced them it would likely have a ffe cted the ver dict, espec ially in lig ht of testimony putting the petitioner at the scene of the c rime. L ikewise, there is no reason to be lieve that, even had trial c ounsel rec eived a continuance , Postell’s testim ony would have be en excluded. Af ter a ll, the evidence strong ly indicates he was not actingon behalf of the po lic e or

de te c tiv e s, and

a dmi ssi on of his te sti mony did no t vi olate the pe tit ion e r’ s Sixth Amendment rig hts. Finally , the fa ilure t o object to improper statements during voir dire a nd closingNo. 06-1569

Al e xan de r v . Sm ith

- 27 - arguments or to make c erta in evidentiary objections—notwithstanding r eason to doubt t he merit of these c laims—does not on its own establish a rea sonable proba bility of a diff ere nt outcome on an inef f e c ti v e a s s is ta

n c e c la im
. N o n e o f th e o mi s s io n s a ll e g e d b y th e p e ti ti o n e r w o u ld e s tablish a
re a so na ble pr ob a bil ity of a dif fe re nt o utc ome on

a pp e a l, a nd the re fo re c ann ot e xcu se the de fa ult
. III F or the fo re g oin g re a so ns , th e dis tr ic t c ourt or de r d ism iss in g Al ex and e r’ s p e tit ion is AFF I RMED.