F OR P UBLICATION



### UNIT E D ST AT E S CO URT O F APPE AL S FO R T H E NINT H CIRCUIT

N A V A J O N A T I O N , Plaintiff-Appellant

,

v

.

D E P A R T M E N T O F T H E I

N T E R I O R ; R Y A N Z I N K E * , Secretary

of the I nterior; U

N I T E D S T A T E S B U R

E A U O F R E C L A M A T I O N ; B U R E A U O F I N D I A N A F F A I R S , Defendants-Appellees

,

S T A T E O F A R

I Z O N A ; C E N T R A L A R I Z O N A W A T E R C O N S E R

V A T I O N D I S T R I C T ; A R I Z O N A P O W E R A U T H O R

I T Y ; S A L T R I V E R P R

O J E C T A G R I C U L T U R

A L I M P R O V E M E N T A N D P O W E R D I S T R

I C T ; S A L T R I V E R V A L L E Y W A T E R U S E R S ’ A S S O C I A T I O N ; I M P E R I A L I R R I G A T I O N D I S T R I C T ; M E T R

O P O L I T A

N W A T E R D I S T R I C T O F S O U T H E R

N C A L I F O R

N I A ; C O A C H E L L

A V A L L E Y W A T E R D I S T R

I C T ; S T A T E O F N E V A D A ; C O L O R

A D O R I V E R C O M M I S S I O N O F N E V A D A ; N o. 14-16864

D.C. No. 3:03-cv-00507- GMS

OPI NI ON

* W e su b stitu te Ry an Z in ke f

o r p red ecesso r Sally J ew ell as a Def en d an t- A p p ellee p u rsu an t to Fed . R. A p p . P . 4 3 (c)(2 ).N A V A J O N A T I O N V

. D E P ’ T O F I N T E R I O R 2

S O U T H E R

N N E V A D A W A T E R A U T H O R

I T Y ; S T A T E O F C O L O R A D O , Intervenor-Defendants-Appellees.

A ppeal from the United States District Court for the District of Ariz o na G. Murray Snow, District J u dg e, Presiding

Arg ued and Submitted F ebruary 14, 2017 San F rancisco, California

F iled December 4, 2017

B efore: Ronald M. Gould and Marsha S. B erz o n, Circuit J udg es, and Marvin J

. Garbis, * * District J udg e.

Opinion by J udg e B e rz on

** T h e Ho n o rab le Marv in J . Garb i s, Un ited States D istrict Ju d g e f or th e District o f

Mary lan d , sittin g b y

d esig n atio n

.N A V A J O N A T I O N V

. D E P ’ T O F I N T E R I O R 3

SUMMARY * * *

Standing / Sovereign Im m unity / Water Rights

The panel affirmed in p art, and reversed in part, t h e district co u r t ’s dismissal of the Navajo Nation’s Second Amended Complaint, and denial of the N ation’s F ed. R. Civ. P. 60(b) motion for reli ef

, in their challeng e to the Department of the I nterior’s p ublish e d Guidelines in 2001 and 2008 clarify

ing how it w ould make “surplus” a nd “shortag e” determinations for delivery to W e stern states o f the waters of the Colorado River.

The Nation is a federally recog niz e d tribe, and the United States is trustee of the Nation’s tribal lands. T h e Navajo Reservation covers parts of Ariz ona, New Mex ico, and U tah, and lies a lmost entirely w ithin the drainag e b a s i n of the Colorado River.

The Department of the I nte r i o r , throug h the B ureau o f Reclamation, o perates dams and reservoirs t h a t control the flow of the Colorado’s waters.

The pane l affirmed the district c o urt’s dismissal of the Nation’s National Environmental Policy Act claims for lack of Ar t i c l e I I I standing

. The panel h e ld that, althoug h the district c ourt c onsidered the Nation’s interests in adequate
water too n arrowly

, it a g reed w ith the dis t r i ct court that the Nation failed to show it “reasonably probable” that the new

*** T h is su m m ary co n stitu

t es n o p art o f th e o p in io n o f th e co u rt. It h as b een p rep ared b y

co u rt staf

f f o r th e co n v en i en ce o f

th e read er.N A V A J O N A T I O N V

. D E P ’ T O F I N T E R I O R 4

G u i d e l i n e s threatened either the Nation’s unadjudicated wa t e r rig hts or its practical water needs.

The panel held that the N ation’s b reach of trust claim was not b arred by sovereig n immunity

, and remanded to the d i strict court to consider the claim on its merits. The p a n el held that the broad waiver of sovereig n immunity found in § 702 of the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”) waived sovereig n immunity f

or a ll n o n

- m o n etary claims, and § 704 of the APA’s f

inal a g ency action r equirement constrained only actions br o u gh t u n der the APA. T he panel concluded that the Nation’s breach of trust claim soug ht relief other than
money d a m a g es, and the waiver of sovereig n immunity in § 702 applied squarely

to the claim.

B e cause the panel reversed the dist ri c t court’s d ismissal of the N ation’s bre a c h o f t r ust claim, the panel h eld that the Nation’s appeal from the district court’s denial of i t s R u l e 60(b) motion was moot to the ex tent it s o ug h t to amend its complaint to plead additional or alternative wa i v e rs o f sovereig n immunity

. The p anel held that the Nation was not entitled to relief under Rule 60(b) to amend its pleading s for its National Environmental Policy Act alleg ations.

COUNSEL

Scott B

. M cElroy (arg

ued) and Alice E

. W alker, McElroy Mey er W alker & Condon P.C., B o ulde r , C olorado; M. Kathry n H oover and Stanley M. Polla ck, Navajo Nation Department of J u stice, W indow Rock, Ariz ona; for PlaintiffAppellant.N A V A J O N A T I O N V

. D E P ’ T O F I N T E R I O R 5

Eliz abeth Ann Peterson (arg ue d ), Edward S. Geldermann, Ellen J

. D urkee, and William B

. L a z a r us, Attorney s; J ohn C. Cruden, Assistant Attorney G e n e r a l; United States Department of J ustice, W ashing ton, D.C.; Scott B e r gs t rom and Robert F

. Snow, Office of the Solicitor, United S t at e s Department o f the I nterior, W a shing ton, D.C.; for Defendants-Appellees.

L

. W illiam Staudenmaier I I I (arg ued), Phoenix

, Ariz ona, for I ntervenor-Defendants-Appellees.

Michael J

. Pearce, Mag uire Pearce & Storey PL L C, Phoenix

, Ariz ona; Kelly B rown and Kenneth C. Slowinski, Ch i ef Counsel, Ariz ona D epartment o f W ater Resources, Phoenix

, Ariz ona; for I nter v e nor-Defendants-Appellees State o f Ariz ona and Ariz ona Power Authority

.

J ohn B

. Weldon, J r

. and L isa M. McKnig ht, Salmon L ewis & W e ldon PL C, Phoenix

, Ariz ona; for Intervenor-DefendantsAppellees Salt River Project Ag ricultur a l I mprovement a nd Power District and Salt River Valley W a t er Users’ Association.

Stuart Somac h and Robert H offman, Somach Simmons & Dunn, Sacramento, California; for for I ntervenor-DefendantAppellee Central Ariz o na W ater Conservation District.

L auren J

. Caster, Special Deputy Counsel, and Greg ory L

. Adams, F enner m o r e Craig P.C., Phoenix

, Ariz ona; J ennifer T. Crandell, Spe c i al Counsel A ttorney General; Adam Paul L ax a lt, Attorney General; Office of the Nevada A t torney Gen e r al; for I n tervenor-Defendant-Appellee State of N evada; Colorado R i ver Commission of Nevada; Southern Nevada W a ter Authority

.N A V A J O N A T I O N V

. D E P ’ T O F I N T E R I O R 6

A d am C. Kear, Chief Deputy General Counsel; J oseph A

. Venderhorst, Assistant General Couns e l ; Marcia Scully

, General Counsel; Th e M e tropolitan W ater District o f Southern California, L os Ang eles, California; for for I ntervenor-Defendant-App e llee Metropolitan W ater District of Southern California.

Steven B

. A bbott, Redw i n e and Sherrill, Riverside, California, for I ntervenor-Defendant-Appellee Coachella Valley W ater District.

J oanna M. Smith Hoff, Assistant Counsel, I mperial I rrig ation District, I mperial, C a l ifornia; Charles T. Dumars, L aw & Resource Planning Associates P.C., Albuquerque, New M e x i co ; fo r I n t e rv e n o r- De f e n d a n t

- A p p e l l e e I m p e r i al I rrig ation District.

S t e v en G

. Martin and Steven M. Anderson, B est B est & Krieg er L L P, Riverside, C alifornia, for I ntervenorDefendants-Appellees Coachella Valley W ate r D istrict a nd The Metropolitan W ater District of Southern California.

Shanti Rosset, Assistant Attorney General; Karen M. Kwon, F irst Assistant Attorney G eneral; Cy nthia Coffman, Attorney General; Attorney General’s O ffice, Denver, Colorado; for I ntervenor-Defendant-Appellee State of Colorado.N A V A J O N A T I O N V

. D E P ’ T O F I N T E R I O R 7

OP INION

B ERZ ON, Circuit J udg e :

The Department of the I nterior (“Interior” or “the Secretary ” ) oversees the control, storag e , and delivery to the W e stern states of the waters of the Colorado River. I n most
y ears, each state in the Colorado River B asin receives a fix ed
amount o f wat e r f

r om the river; in “ surplus” a nd “shortag e”
y ears, that amount chang es. I n t h e face of unprecedented droug ht and ever-increasing demand for water, I n terior published g uidelines in 2001 and 2008 to clarify how it would make these “ s u r

p lus” and “ shortag e” determinations from
y ear to y ear. This case concerns c halleng e s to those
g uidelines by the Nava

jo N ation (“Nation”), a federally
recog niz ed I ndian tribe.

The Nation occupies vast reservation lands along the Colorado River but has no judicially d e c r eed rig ht to its
waters. Ag g r ieved by its lack of enforceable r ig hts to Colorado River water, the Nation file d s u it to challeng e the surplus a nd shortag e g uidelines, all eg ing principally that I nterior neg lected to consi d e r the g uidelines’ impact on its potential, but as-y et unadjudicated, water rig hts in t h e Colorado River and so violated the N ational Environmental Policy Act (“NEPA”). The Nation also charg ed I nterior with

more broadly breaching the trust duties the g overnment owes the Nation by failing to account for or safeg uard th e t r i b e ’s interests in and rig hts to w ater in the river. T he district court rejected a ll of the Nation’s challeng e s, which are n ow raised anew here.N A V A J O N A T I O N V

. D E P ’ T O F I N T E R I O R 8

I. BACK G R OUND

A. The Navajo Nation

The Nation is a federally recog niz ed I ndian tribe whose reservation lands sprawl o ver 13 million ac r e s in the A m e r i c a n S o u t h w e s t

. 1 T h e N a v a j o R e s e r v a t i o n (“Reservation”), the larg est I ndian reservation in the United States, was established by treaty in 1868 and g rew piecemeal between 18 6 8 a n d 1934, as lands were a dded to it by treaty , ex e c utive order, and statute. The Reservation covers parts o f Ariz ona , N e w Mex ico, a n d Utah, and lies almost entirely within the d

rainag e basin of the C o lorado River, 2 which demarcates m u c h of the Reservation’s western boundary

. Aside from the federal g overnment, the Nation is the larg e st riparian landowner along the Colorado.

The United States is trustee of the Nation’s tribal lands and r esources. United States v. Mitchell

, 463 U

. S

. 206, 225 (1983). The Nation’s claims in this actio n a r i s e either directly or derivatively from the alleg e d breach of fiduciary responsibilities created by this trust relationship.

1 T h ese f acts are d raw

n f ro m t h e co m p l ain t, w h ich w e accep t as tru e f o r p u rp o ses o f rev i ew in g a m o tio n t o d is m i s s f or lack o f su

b j ect- m atter j u risd ictio n

. S

ee Co u rth o u se News S

erv. v. Pla n et , 7 5 0 F.3 d 7 7 6
, 7 8 0 (9 th Cir. 2 0 1 4 ).

2 A r i v er “ d rain s” th e s u rf ace w ater th at f

lo w s in to it; a “ d rai n a g e b asin ” is th e w

h o le tract o f lan d “ dr a i n ed b y a riv er an d its trib u taries.” W E BST E R ’ S T HI RD N E W I NT ’ L D I CT I ONA RY 1 8 2 , 6 8 5 (1 9 7 1 ).N A V A J O N A T I O N V

. D E P ’ T O F I N T E R I O R 9

B. The Law of

the River

The Colorado River beg ins in the mountains of Colorado and flows nearly 1,300 miles to the Sea of Cortez
, adjacent to the Sonoran D esert in Mex ico, draining a n area amounting to almost one-twelfth of the continental U nited States. Arizona

v. California

, 373 U .S. 546, 552 (1963). “Much of this larg e basin is so arid t h a t i t is, as it alway s has been, larg ely dependent u p on manag ed use of the waters of the Colorado River Sy stem to make it productive and inhabitable.” Id.

B e cause of the Colorado’s importance to the W est, river
water is pervasively manag ed, reg ulated, and contested. I n t e rior, throug h the B ureau o f Reclamation, operates lar ge dams and r eservoirs that control the f low of the Color ad o ’s
waters. Addit i o n a lly

, federal statutory law and reg ulations, Supreme Court decrees, interstate c ompacts, state and federal

common law, and treaties foreig n a nd d o m e stic affect the allocation a

nd manag ement of the River’s waters

. T h i s by z a ntine leg al reg ime is known as “The L aw of the River,” the relevant portions of which we summariz e below.

i. The 1922 Compact 3

I n 1922, seven states entered into an interstate compact to g overn the g ross allocation of water from the Colorado River. The states wanted to assure that the Colorado bec ame a

3 T h e C o u rt m ay tak e j u d icial n o tice of co m p acts, statu t es, an d
reg u latio n s n o t in clu d ed in t he p l a in tif f ’ s co m p lain t. S ee, e.g

. , Ca ch i l Deh e Ba nd o

f W in tu n In d ia n s o

f th e C o l u sa In d ia n Cmty. v. Ca l ifo rn ia
, 5 4 7 F.3 d 9 62
, 9 6 8 n .4 (9 th Cir. 2 0 0 8 ) (n o ticin g trib al- state co m p acts); Un ited Sta tes v. W

o o d s , 3 3 5 F.3 d 9 9 3
, 1 0 0 1 (9 t h Cir. 20 0 3) (h o ld in g i t

w as p ro p er f

o r th e d istrict co u

rt to n o tice p u

blish ed ag en cy

reg u latio n s).N A V A J O N A T I O N V

. D E P ’ T O F I N T E R I O R 10

reg ular, dependable s o u r ce of water; they recog niz ed that doing so would require a reg ional or national solution. 4

The Colorado River Compact (“1922 Compact”) entered into by the a ffected stat e s d i v i d ed the river in two a t L ee F erry , Ariz ona. 1922 Compact art. I I
, reprinted in 70 Cong

. Rec. 324 (Dec. 10
, 1 928). The “Upper B asin” States 5 (Colorado, New Mex ico, Utah, and W y oming ) a nd the “L ower B asin” States ( Ariz ona, C a lifornia, and Nevada) would e ach b e e n t i tled to 7.5 million acre-feet per y e ar (“mafy ”) of water. 6 Id. a

rts. I I –I I I . This suit concerns water in the L ower B asin only . The Compact stated that it did not establish, alter, or impair any present perfected r ig hts within the States, id. art VI I I
, n or “affect[ ] the ob l i gations of the United States of America to I n d i a n tribes,” id. art VI I

. Commissioners f

rom e ach state sig ned the compact, b ut it became effective under its terms only if ratified by Cong ress and the leg islature of each sig natory state. Id. art XI

.

4 S e e A rizo n a v. Ca lifo rn ia
, 3 73 U.S. at 5 5 4. Fears o f o v e r

ap p ro p riatio n b y Calif

o rn ia pla y e d a ro le in th e co m p act as w ell. Id

. at 5 5 6

.

5 T h e Co m

p act ref ers to states o f th e “ Up p er Div isio n ” a n d “Lo w er Div isio n ,” s ee i d

. art. II. W e in stead fo l l o w t h e cu sto m o f th e S u p rem e Co u rt an d ref

er to A rizo n a, C alif

o rn i a, an d Nev ad a c o l lectiv ely as th e

“ L o w e r B a s i n ” states. S ee, e.g

. , Arizo n a v. Ca lifo rn ia
, 3 7 3 U.S. at 5 5 8

– 5 9

.

6 A n acre- f

o o t is th e v o l u m e o f w ater th at w o u ld co v er an acre o f lan d
to th e d ep th

o f o n e f o o t. W E BST E R ’ S T HI RD N E W I NT ’ L D I CT I ONA RY 1 9

.N A V A J O N A T I O N V

. D E P ’ T O F I N T E R I O R 11

ii. The Boulder Canyon Project Act

I n 1928, Cong ress addresse d the manag ement of the C o lorado River throug h the B oulder Cany on Project Ac t , 43 U.S.C. § 617 et seq. The Act conditionally approved the 1922 Compact and authoriz ed the Secretary o f the I nterior to construct a massive dam at B oulder Cany on (now the Hoover Dam) and the attendant water delivery infr a s t ructure (a reservoir, n ow L ake Mead, and delivery canals) to effectuate the allocati ons laid out in the 1922 Compact. 4 3 U .S.C. § 6 1 7. The Act a l s o a l lowed the Secretary to e nter into
contracts with users for the storag e and d e livery of water in the Project’s reservoir. Id. § 617d.

Most relevant for o u r purposes, the Act authoriz ed the three L o wer B asin States t o n e go tiate a second compact divvy in g up their 7.5 mafy share of the Colorado’s water—4.4 to California, 2 .8 to Ariz o n a , a n d 0.3 (i.e., 300,000 afy

) to Nevada. I f entered into, this ag reement would take effect once all three states had rat i f i e d the 1922 Compact. Id. § 617c(a).

The B oulder Cany on Project Act became effective in 1929, after six of t h e s e v en states r atified the Compact, see id.

, and California “irrevocably and unconditionally ” covenanted t o l i mit its consumption to 4.4 mafy

. 7 A riz o na did not ratify the 1922 Compact
, s o the L ower B asin states

never ag reed to the second compact that would have

7 S e e Ac t o f March 4
, 1 9 29
, i n Statu tes an d A m en d m en ts to th e Calif o rn ia Co d es, ch

. 1 6
, 4 8th Sess i o n ( 1 9 2 9), at 3 8

– 3 9

. T h e B o u ld er C a n y o n Pro j ect A ct lo w ered th e 19 2 2 Co m p act’ s ratif

icatio n th resh o l d : six
states w o u ld su f

f ice f o r ratif icatio n as lo n g as Calif

o rn ia w as am o n g th em

an d co m m i tted to a ceilin g o n its ap p ortio n m en t. S ee 4 3 U.S.C. § 6 1 7 c(a).N A V A J O N A T I O N V

. D E P ’ T O F I N T E R I O R 12

apportioned the 7.5 mafy among the three states. See Arizona

v. California

, 373 U.S. a t 561–62. The Secretary nonetheless entered into w ater contracts with the L ower B asin states. 8 Id. at 562.

iii. Arizona v. California

Conflict over L o wer B asin water continued b etween Ariz ona and Calif

ornia, coming to a boil in 1952 when Ariz ona sued California in an orig inal action in the Supreme Court. The United States inte r v en ed to represent federal interests, including the interests of 25 I ndian tribes, 9 and other B asin States intervened as well. B ased on the report, finding s, and recommended decree o f a Special Master, see Arizona v. California

, 373 U .S. a t 551, the Court issued a decree clarify

ing each state’s rig hts to L ower B asi n water. See A rizona v

. California

, 376 U.S. 3 4 0 (1964) (“1964 Decree”).

T h e 1 9 64 Decree a ffirmed the provisional apport i o n m e n t s set out in the B oulder Cany on Project Act. I n y ears when the Secretary determined that 7 .5 maf of w ater was available for release to the L ower B asin states, N evada was entitled to 0.3 mafy ; A riz ona to 2.8 mafy ; and California to the lion’s share, 4.4 mafy

. 1964 Decree art. I I (B )(1), 3 76 U.S. at 342. The Decree a lso p arceled out the relative shares each L ower B asin

8 W h ile th e S ecretary co n tracted w ith A rizo n a an d Nev a d a fo r th eir sh ares as laid o u

t in th e Bo u ld er Can y o n P ro j ect A ct, 4 3 U.S.C. § 6 1 7 c(a), it co n tracted to d eliv er 5 .3 6 m af y to Calif o rn ia, sig n if

ican tly m o re t

h an th e 4 .4 m af y th e A ct co n tem

plated

. Arizo n a v. Ca lifo rn ia , 3 7 3 U.S. at 5 6 2

.

9 S ee Fin d in g s o f Fact an d Co n clu sio n s of L aw P ro po sed b y th e Un i ted S tates o f A m eric a , a t 5 1
, Arizo n a v. Ca lifo rn ia
, 3 73 U.S. 5 4 6 (1 9 6 3) (No . 9 , Orig i n al).N A V A J O N A T I O N V

. D E P ’ T O F I N T E R I O R 13

State would g et in y ears in which, “as de t ermined by the Secretary of the I nterior,” there was surplus water a vailable. 1 0 1964 Decree a

rt. I I (B )(2), 376 U.S. at 342. I f, i n stead, the Secretary determined in a gi v e n y e ar that there was a shortage of water—less than 7.5 maf available in the L ower B asin—the Decree required the B ureau of Reclamation first
to “provid[ e] for satisfaction of present perfected rig hts in the order of their priority dates without reg ard to state lines.” Id.
art. I I ( B )(3), 376 U.S. a t 342. Then, “after consultation with the parties to major delivery contracts and s u c h representatives as the resp e c t ive States may desig nate, [ the Secretary ] may apportion the amount remaining a vailable for consumptive use in su c h manner as is consistent with the B oulder Cany on Project A ct,” the Decree, a nd other applicable federal statutes. Id.

iv. W inters rights

I n a d d ition to partitioning the Colorado River waters among the three L ower B asin States, the 1964 Decree adjudicated the “ W

inters rig h ts” of five I ndian trib es. W inters v

. United States held that “when the Fe d eral Government withdraws its land from the public domain a nd

reserves it for a f

ederal p urpose, the Governm e nt, b y implication, reserves appurtenant water then unappropriated
to the ex te n t needed to accomplish the purpose of the reservation.” Cappaert v. United States
, 426 U.S. 128, 138 (1976); see a lso W

inters v. United States , 207 U.S. 564, 577 (1908). The rig hts to this w ater—als o called “reserved rig hts”—vest on the orig inal date of withdrawal of the land

10 Calif o rn ia w o u ld receiv e 50 % o f th e s u rp lu s, A rizo n a 4 6 %
, a n d Nev ad a 4 %. S

ee 1 9 6 4 Decree art. II(B )(2 ), 3 7 6 U.S. at 3 4 2

.N A V A J O N A T I O N V

. D E P ’ T O F I N T E R I O R 14

and trump the rig hts of later appropr i a t ors. 1 1 Cappaert
, 426 U.S. at 138. F o r I ndian reservations, courts l o o k t o the treaties, ex e cuti v e orders, a nd statutes that set aside reservation land for the t r i b e in question. 1 2 W inters rig hts, unlike water rig hts g ained throug h prior appropriation, are not lost throu gh n on-use. Colville Confederated Tribes v

. W alton , 647 F .2d 42, 51 (9th Cir. 1981).

I n Arizona v. California

, the S u p r e me Court r e affirmed the vitality of the W

inters doctrine, noting that “most o f the [ reservation] lands were of the desert kind—hot, scorching sands—and

. . . water from the [ Colorado] would be essential
to the life of the I ndian p eople a nd to the animals they hunted and the crops they raised.” 373 U

. S

. a t 5 9 9. The Decree

a warded five tribes a rig h t to L ower B asin w a t e r commensurate with the “practic a b l y irrig able acreag e” o f each tribe’s reserv ation. Id. at 600; 1964 Decree art. I I (D), 376 U.S. at 343–45. F ollowing the Special Master’s lead, the Court d eclined to reach the claims of the other twenty tribes, including the Navajo N ation’s. See 373 U.S. at 595. The Decree made clear, however, that it did not affect “[ t] he rig hts

or priorities, ex cept a s specific pr o v i s i o n is made herein, o f
any I nd i a n Reservation.” Id. a rt. VI I I (C), 376 U.S. at 352–53.

11 Mo st w ater rig h ts are acq u ired th ro u g h ap p ro p riatio n

. “ Un d er th e d o ctrin e o f p rio r ap p ro p riatio n , th e f irst to d iv ert a n d u s e w ater b en ef icially estab lish es a rig h t to i ts co n tin u ed u se as l o n g as th e w ater is b en ef icially d iv erted .” Ca

p p a ert , 4 2 6 U.S. at 1 3 9 n .5

.

12 S ee, e.g

. , Ag ua Ca lien te Ba n d o f Ca h uilla In d ia n s v

. Co a ch ella V a l l ey W a ter Dist.
, 8 4 9 F.3 d 12 6 2
, 12 65 (9 th Cir. 2 0 1 7 ) (d atin g th e

reserv atio n o f w ater f

ro m th e Ex ecu tiv e Ord ers t h at w i th drew lan d f

o r th e trib e), petitio n fo r

cert. filed

(U.S. J u ly

3 , 2 0 17 ) (No . 1 7

- 4 2 ).N A V A J O N A T I O N V

. D E P ’ T O F I N T E R I O R 15

The Supreme Court retained jurisdiction over the suit, 1964 Decree a

rt. I X, 376 U.S. at 353, and, over the nex t few decades, announced several sequ els to the orig inal opinion. See, e.g. , Arizona v. California

, 460 U.S. 605 (1983) (holding that res judicata barred re-opening the quantification o f tribes’ W inters rig h ts); Arizona v. California

, 530 U.S. 392 (2000) (holding that res judicata d id not bar c e rtain c laims stemmi n g from reservation boundary disputes); Arizona v

. California

, 547 U.S. 150 (2006) (consolidating prior d ecrees and implementing the water r ig hts settlement concerning o ne I ndian reservation).

C. T he Nation’s Rights to Water in the Colorado River

Under the W

inters doctrine, when setting aside lands for the Navajo Nation, the United States impliedly reserved for the tribe “ the waters without which thei r l a n d s would [be] useless.” Arizona v

. California

, 373 U.S. at 6 0 0

. As noted above, in the first iteration o f Arizon a v

. California

, the Special Master—and the Supreme Court—declined to reach the W inters c laim put f

orward on b ehalf of the Nation. 1 3 Id.
at 595. The Nation has in the l a s t h alf-century repeatedly

13 T h e Natio n attem

pted to in terv en e i n th e su it o n its o w n b eh alf

, b u t th e Un i ted States su ccessf u lly o pp o sed th e m otio n

. S

ee Resp o n se o f

th e Un i ted States to th e Mo tio n o n B eh alf of th e Nav aj o T rib e o f In d ian s f or L eav e to In terv en e, Arizo n a v. C a l i f o rn i a , 3 73 U.S. 5 4 6 (1 9 6 3) (No

. 8
, Orig in al). T h e claim f

i led on b eh alf o f th e Natio n w as f o r w ater in t h e L ittle Co l o rad o Riv er, a trib u tary o f th e L o w er Co lo rad o R i v er. S ee Fin d in g s o f Fact an d C o n clu sio n s of L aw P ro p o sed b y

th e Un i t ed States

o f A m erica, su

p ra n o te 9
, at 5 8. T h e S pecial Master, an d t h e Co u r t , d eclin ed to reach “ p articu larly th o se [claim s] relatin g to trib u taries.” Arizo n a v. Ca lifo rn i a , 3 7 3 U.S. at 5 9 5

.N A V A J O N A T I O N V

. D E P ’ T O F I N T E R I O R 16

asserted its rig ht to water in the L o we r C o l o ra do, 1 4 but its potential water rig hts in the L ower Colorado have never been adjudicated or quantified.

D. Im plem enting the Law of the River

The Secretary “is vested with conside r a b le control over the apportionment of Colorado River waters , ” Arizona v

. California

, 373 U.S. at 593, and is g enerally responsible for the manag ement and d elivery of water f r o m the Colorado pursuant to the L aw of the River. Each state’s water portion is dictated by the 1964 Decree, as is the allocation of surplus
water ; Arizona v. California accords discretion to the

14 T h e Natio n h as b een , an d is, activ ely seek in g ad d itio n al w ater f or th e Reserv atio n in sev eral f oru m s. T h e Natio n ’ s rig h t s t o w ater f ro m th e L ittle Co l orad o Riv er, w h ich f lo w s th ro u g h

eastern A rizo n a an d w estern New Mex ico

,

are b ein g co n sid ered in an o n g o in g ad j u d icatio n in Ar izo n a s tate co u rt. S ee I n r e G e n era l Ad

ju d i ca tio n o

f All Rig h ts to Use W

ater in Little Co lo ra d o River S ys. & S o u r ce , No

. CV 6 4 1 7 (A riz. Su p er. C t., A

p ach e Cty .). T h e Natio n fi l e d i ts claim i n t h at ad j u d icatio n in 1 9 8 5

. S

ee Statem en t o f C laim an t T h e Nav aj o Natio n , In r e Gen era l Ad ju dica tio n , No

. CV 6 4 1 7 (No v

. 2 7
, 1 9 8 5). T h e N atio n m ay also receiv e an allo catio n

o f w ater f

ro m th e Ce n t r a l A rizo n a P ro j ect (“ CA P ”), a m aj or d iv ersio n

can al in A rizo n a. In th e A rizo n a W ater Settlem en ts A ct o f 2 00 4
, P u b

. L

. N o

. 1 0 8- 4 5 1
, 1 1 8 Stat. 3 4 7 8
, 3 4 8 7 (2 00 4 ), Co n g ress d irected th e S e c r e t a r y to set asid e a s p ecif

ied am o u n t of

w ater f ro m th e CA P f

o r d istrib u tio n

to th e Nav aj o Natio n

—6 ,4 1 1 af

y —sh o u ld th e Natio n o b tain rig h ts t h ro u g h

o n g o in g settlem en t n e g o t iatio n s

. C o n g ress co n d itio n ed th e Natio n ’ s

access to CA P w ater o n ap p ro v al o f a w ater rig h ts settlem en t b y C o n g ress b ef o re 2 0 3 0 . No su ch settlem en t h as b een reach ed to d ate.

Fin ally

, th e Natio n req u ested th at th e Secretary o f th e In terio r co n t ract

w ith th e Natio n fo r an y o f th e w ater allo cated to A rizo n a n o t co m m i tted
to o th er u sers. T h e Secretary h as n o t ag reed to su ch a co n tract.N A V A J O N A T I O N V

. D E P ’ T O F I N T E R I O R 17

Secretary to apportion shortfalls in y ears of shortag e, see id.
at 593–94. The 1964 Decree also commits the determination of surplus and shortage y ears to the Secretary

. See 1964 Decree, art. I I (B )(2)–(3), 376 U.S. at 342.

The Colorado River B asin Project Act of 1968 r equired the Secretary to ado p t c riteria for the coordinated
manag ement of L ake Mead a nd L ake Powell, t he reservoirs under the Secretary ’s manag em en t in the L o wer B asin. See 43 U.S.C. 1552(a)–(b). These “ Operating Criteri a ” f o r the

co o r d i n ated manag ement of the storag e reservoirs in the L ower B a sin help the Secretary determine whether to declare

a shortag e or surplus in any g iven y ear. See Colorado River Reservoirs: Coordinated Long-Range Operation
, 35 F ed. Reg

. 8951 (J une 10, 1970). B efore adopting the challeng ed
g uidelines, the Secretary made y ear-to-y ear determinations about declaring a shortag e o r surplus, relying on a vary ing combination of factors, including the y ear-end water levels in L ake Mead and L ake Powell, potential ru n

- o f f conditions, and projected water demands. S ee Colorado R i ver I

n terim Surplus Guidelines

, 66 F ed. Reg

. 7772, 7774 (J an. 25, 2 001) (describing the factors the Secre t ar y historically considered in making shortag e and surplus declarations). T h is a d h oc approach bred uncertainty about the possibility of surplus or

s h o rtag e in any particular y e ar, which g rew untenable a s demand for surplus water increased. Id.

. To partially remedy this problem, the Secretary first d ecided to adopt more specific, objective c r i t e r i a f o r m aking the annual determinations reg arding surplus water. Id.

. Guidelines for determining shortag es came later.N A V A J O N A T I O N V

. D E P ’ T O F I N T E R I O R 18

E. The Challenged Surplus a nd Shortage G uidelines

i. Surplus Guidelines

I n 2001, the Secretary a dopted the Colorado River I n terim Surplus G uidelines (“Surplus Guidelines”). The Guidelines would “determine the condi t i o n s under which the Secretary would declare the availability of surplus water f or use within” the L ower B as i n s t ates every y e ar. See Surplus Guidelines

, 66 F ed. Re g. a t 7773. This declaration and allocation of a surplus, if there was o ne, were to be consistent with the 1964 Decree, the Colorado River B asin Project Act
, and the Operating Criteria adopted pursuant to that Act. The Surplus Guideline s aimed to provide g reater consistency a nd predictability in the Secretary ’s surplus declarations from
y ear to y ear, in lig ht of g rowing (and competing ) demands for surplus water, and of California’s c o n t inued diversion o f

more than its allotted 4.4 mafy share of L owe r Ba s i n water. See id. at 7773–74.

The Surplus Guidelines peg g ed the surplus declaration to the y ear-end water level in L ake M e a d

. S e e id. a t 7775. I f that water level equaled o r e x c eeded the hig hest “tier,” 1 5 surplus water would b e made available for all ty pes of water

u s e s

. At o r b elow the lowest “tier,” a “Normal” o r “Shortag e” y ear would be declared and no s u r plus water would b e released. At the middle tier, water wou l d be released subject to use r estrictions. See i d

. a t 7780. These “interim” g uidelines were set to e x pire in 2016. See id. at 7773–74, 7780–81.

15 T h e th ree “ tiers” co r r e sp o n d to th ree w ater su rf ace elev atio n s in L ak e Mead

. S

u r p lu s Gu id

elin es , 6 6 Fed . Reg . at 7 7 75

.N A V A J O N A T I O N V

. D E P ’ T O F I N T E R I O R 19

B e fore adopting the Surplus G u i d elines and issuing the Record of Decision, the Secretary published a draft environmental impact statement (“EI S”) asse s s ing the environmental impacts o f four alternatives along with the “No-Action Al ternative.” See Colorado River I n terim Surplus Criteria, Notice of Availability of Draft EIS
, 65 F ed. Reg

. 42,028, 42,029 (J u ly 7, 2000). I n December 2000, a fter receiving comments on its d raft, the Secretary issued his final EI S (“F EI S”), 1 6 and one month later its Record of Decision, adopting the preferred alternative as the Surplus Guidelines. See Surplus Guidelines , 66 F ed. Reg . at 7772.

Durin g the development of the EI S, the Secretary consulted w ith various I ndian tri b e s whose lands or water

resources lay in the L ower B asin. See F ina l Environmental Impact Statement, Colorado River In terim Surplus Criteria (“ Surplus Guidelines FEIS ”), Ex ecutive Summary
, at 3 3
, 44. B oth the Navajo Nation and the Colora d o River B asin Ten Tribes Part nership, of which the Nation is a member, submitted comments on the draft, calli n g it “fundamentally flawed” and “deeply a

nd f atally flawed.” Surplus Guidelines FEIS at B -187, B -196. The N a t i o n complained that the proposed Surplus Guidelines d id not account for its unquantified rig h ts in the L ower B asin and fostered reliance by third parties o n w a t er to which it was, or would o r could be, entitled. Id. at B

- 187 to B -190. The Ten Tribes objected
to the lack o f consideration of “I ndian Trust A s s ets” a nd claimed that the Guidelines would g e nerally frustrate the

16 T h e fu ll Su

rp lu s Gu id elin es FEIS is av ailab le at Fin a l En viro n men ta l Imp a ct S ta temen t: Co lo ra do River In terim S u rp l u s Criteria
, h ttp s://w

w w .u sb r.g o v / lc/reg io n

/g 4 0 0 0 /su rp lu s/SURP L US_ FEI S.h tm l (last u

p d ated J an . 1 6, 2 0 0 7 ).N A V A J O N A T I O N V

. D E P ’ T O F I N T E R I O R 20

development and protection of I ndian water rights. Id. a t B

196 to B -215.

The Secretary responded that it was actively assisting tribes in obtaining their water r ig hts, and it disag reed that the Guidelines would hamper o r d e crease incentives to develop I ndian water rig h ts in the L ower B asin. Id. at B -189; B -203
to B -205. “The Department d o e s n ot believe this proposed action would preclude the Tribes or a ny entitleme nt holder from using their Colorado River entitlement. The interim surplus criteria will not alter the quantity or priority of Tribal entitlements.” Id. at B -204.

ii. Shortage Guidelines

The adoption of criteria for declarations of surplus water in the Colorado River coincided with the driest eig ht-y e ar period in the r ecorded history of the Ri v e r

. S ee Colorado River Interim Guidelines for Lower Basin Shorta g e s and Coordinated Operations f o r Lake Powell and Lake Mead (“ Short a g e Guidelines ”), 73 F e d

. Reg

. 19,873 (Apr. 11, 20 0 8 )

. This historic droug ht, combined with increasing demand f or river wate r , led the Secretary to implement
g uidelines for declaring

shortag e s as well. These g uidelines would, l i k e t h e S u rp l u s G u i d elines, offer g reater predictability to mainstream Colorado water users reg arding
t h e supply of w ater in a ny g iven y ear. The Sho r t a ge Guidelines also created mechanisms to e ncourag e water banking and conservation that w ould provide g r eater y ear-toy ear f lex ibility for the S ec r e t a r y a nd water users. See Final Environmental Impact Statement, Shortage GuidelinesN A V A J O N A T I O N V

. D E P ’ T O F I N T E R I O R 21

(“ Shortage Guidelines FEIS ”), Ex ecutive Summary
, a t ES-1 to ES-2. 1 7

I n 2 008, the Secretary adopted the Shortag e Guidelines and issued an a ccompany ing Record of Decision

. S ee Shortage G u i d

e l ines
, 73 F ed. Reg

. at 19,873. L ike the Surplus Guideline s, the Shortag e G uidelines linked the Secretary ’ s declaration of a shortag e t o the level of water in L ake Mead

. S

ee id. a t 1 9,874; Shortage Guidelines FEIS
, Ex ecutive Summary
, at ES-6. The Shortag e Guidelines also implemented procedures for the coordinated operation of the L ake Mead and L ake Powell reservoirs in times of low water and shortag e. See Shortage Guidelines

, 73 F ed. Reg

. at 19,874.

B e y ond d elineating when and how the S e c r etary would declare a shortag e, the Shortag e Guidelines also provided for the creation of “I ntentionally Created Surplus” (“I CS”) water. W a ter users could bank I CS w ater by ei t h e r ( i ) conserving
water throug h a variety of measures 1 8 or (ii) importing water f rom outside the Colorado (“non-sy stem water”) into t h e L ower B asin sy stem. Id. at 19,877, 19,883, 19,887. The Guidelines also modified the Surplus Guidelines a nd

ex tended them throug h 2026. Id. at 19,874.

17 T h e f u ll Sh o rtag e Gu id elin es FEIS is av ailab le at Co lo r a d o River In terim G u id

elin es fo r Lo wer Ba sin S h orta g es an d Co o rd i na ted Op era tio n s fo r La kes Po we l l a nd Mea d : Fin a l En viro nmen ta l Imp a ct S t a t e m e n t , h t t p s : / / w w w

. u s b r

. g o v

/ l c / r e g i o n / p r o g r a m s / s t r a t e g i e s / F E I S / # V o l I (last u p d ated No v . 2 0 0 7 ).

18 T h ese m easu res in clu d e f allo w i n g f ield s, l in in g can als, d esalin atin g

n o n

- riv er w ater, o r im

plem en tin g o t

h e r “ ex trao rd in ary co n serv atio n

m easu res.” Id

. at 1 9 ,8 8 6

.N A V A J O N A T I O N V

. D E P ’ T O F I N T E R I O R 22

I n its comments o n the draft E I S for the Shortag e Guidelines, the Nation larg ely reiterated its objections to the Surplus Guidelines. See Shortage Guidelines FEIS

, vol. I V
, at I T-103 to I T-108. T h e FE I S included a discussion o f I ndian Trust Assets, including water rig h ts. 1 9 See id. at 3–87. The Shortag e Guidelines FE I S r ecog niz ed that the Nation’s unquantified W

inters rig hts in the L ower B asin constituted an I ndian Trust A sset, and n oted that the Nat i o n m aintains that

some portion of its W

inters rig hts wi l l n e e d to be satisfied from the Colorado River. Id. at 3–96. U ltimately , however, the F E I S concluded that “ [ t] he proposed federal action would
not result in any substantive effects on [ I n dian Trust Assets]

. ” See id. at 5–12. T o the Nation’ s concerns about possible injury to its unquantified water rig hts, the Secretary responded:

No v ested water r ig ht of any kind, quantified

or u nqu a n tified, including federally reserved I ndian rig hts to Colorado River water

. . . will be altered a s a result of any of the alternatives under consideration.

To the ex tent that additional Tribal water rig hts are developed, established or quantified during the in t e rim period of the proposed federal action, the United States will manag e Colorado Rive r facilities to deliver water

19 T h e FEIS also co n sid ered p o t e n tial im p acts o n trib al h isto ric
p ro p erties, trib al sacred sites, cu l tu ral reso u rces, an d bio lo g ical reso u rces. S ee Sh o rtag e Gu id elin es FEIS at 4

- 2 4 4 to 4

- 25 0

.N A V A J O N A T I O N V

. D E P ’ T O F I N T E R I O R 23

consistent with such a dditional water rig h ts, if
any , pursuant to federal law.

See id. at 4-249.

II. P ROCEDURAL HISTORY

The Nation f

iled its i n i tial complaint ag a inst the Departmen t o f the I nterior, the Secretary
, the B ureau o f Reclamation, and the B ureau of I ndian Affairs ( collectively “F ederal Defend a n t s ” ) in March 2003. The Nation challeng ed u nder the A dministrative Procedure Act (“APA”), 5 U.S.C. §§ 701–706, the 2001 Surplus Guidelines, 2 0 alleg ing that the Secretary ’s failure adequately to consider and protect the Nation’s rig hts to, and interest in, water violate d the National Environmental Poli c y Act (“NEPA”), 42 U .S.C. § 4321 e t seq. The Nation further alleg e d t h a t the United States had breached its trust oblig ation s to the Nation b y failing to consider o r protect the Nation’s water rig hts while
manag ing the Colorado River.

Variou s states and local g overnment entities from Califor n i a , Ariz ona, Nevada, and Colorado intervened a s defendants. 2 1 I n Oc tober 2004, on the joint motion of the

20 T h e Natio n also ch allen g ed sev eral oth er ag en cy actio n s i n i ts

co m plain t. On ly th e Natio n ’ s F irst, Seco n d

, an d Sev en th Claim s f or relief are at issu e o n

ap p eal.

21 Fro m A rizo n a, t

h e in terv en ors are th e S tate o f A rizo n a, Salt Riv er P ro j ect Ag ricu ltu

ral Im p ro v em en t an d P o w er District, Salt Riv er W ater Users’ A sso ciatio n , an d Cen tral A riz o n a W ater Co n s erv atio n District; f ro m Calif orn ia, t h e Co ach ella Valley Water District, Im p erial Irrig atio n District, an d th e Metro p o litan W ater District o f So u th ern Calif o rn i a; an d fr o m Nev ad a, th e State o f Nev ad a, Co lo rad o Riv er Co m m issio n o fN A V A J O N A T I O N V

. D E P ’ T O F I N T E R I O R 24

parties, the district court stay ed pr o ceeding s to allow for settlement neg otiations.

I n 2013, after almost a decade of unsuccessful settlement
neg otiations, the district c ourt lifted the stay and the litig ation started anew. The Nation twice a mended its complaint, adding a challeng e to the 2008 Shortag e Guidelines, and the district court t h e n gr anted motions to dismiss the Nation’s Second Amended Complaint without p rejudice, holding that the Nation l a c k e d A rticle I I I standing to bring its N EPA cl a i m s and that its breach of trust claim was barred b y sovereig n immunity

. At the h earing on the m o t i o n s to dismiss, the district court inquired whether, if necessary

, the Nation p r e f

e rred a dismissal with leave to amend the complaint or a dismissal with p r ejudice. Notwithstanding the Nation’s ex pressed preference for d ismissal with leave to amend, the district court ultimately dismissed without le ave to amend and without prejudice.

The Nation filed a Rule 60(b)(6) motion for rel ief from the f inal judg ment, contending that b e cause t h e r e levant
statute o f limitations had run, t h e dismissal was effectively with prejudice. I n the Nation’s view, the district court should have re-opened the proceeding s a nd g ranted it leave to f

urther amend its complai n t

. T h e district court denied that motion. The Nation appeals both orders.

Nev ad a, an d S o u

t h ern Nev ad a W ater A u th o rity

. T h e State o f Co lo rad o also in terv en ed

. T h e A rizo n a, Calif o rn ia, an d Nev ad a In terv en orDef en d an ts each f

iled sep arat e a n sw e rin g b rief s in th i s ap p eal, an d Co lo rad o j o in ed th e arg u m en t s s et o u t in th e A rizo n a an d Nev ad a b rief s.N A V A J O N A T I O N V

. D E P ’ T O F I N T E R I O R 25

III. STANDING

The district court dismissed the Nation’s N EPA claims, holding that the alleg ed harm to the Nation’s unquanti f ied W in t ers rig hts was too speculative to confer standing

. Althoug h the d istrict c o u r t considered the Nation’s interests in a d equate water too narrowly

, we ag ree that the Nation failed to show it “reasonably probable” that t h e new Guidelines threatened its in t e r ests in obtaining adequate
water. See Citizens for B ett e r F orestry v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric.
, 3 41 F

. 3d 961, 969–70 (9th Cir. 2003). A c cording ly

, we affirm the district court’s dismissal of the NEPA claims.

A. Legal Standards

“[ S] tanding is an essentia l a n d unchang ing part of the case-or-controversy requirement of A rticl e I I I .” Lujan v

. Defs. of W

ildlife

, 5 04 U.S. 555, 560 (19 9 2 )

. T o establish standing

, a plaintiff must demonstrate “ ( 1 ) a concrete a nd
p a rticulariz ed injury that is ‘actual or imminent, not conjectural or hy

pothetical’; ( 2) a causal connection b etween the injury and the defendant’s challeng ed conduct; and ( 3) a likelihood that a favorable decision will redress that injury

. ” Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe of I ndians v. Nev. D ep’t of W ildlife

, 724 F .3d 1181, 1187 (9th Cir. 2013) (quoting Lujan
, 504 U.S. at 560–61). Our review of standing is de novo. City of Sausalito v. O’Neill

, 386 F .3d 1186, 1196–9 7 (9th Cir. 2004).

W h ere pla i n t i ffs a lleg e a “procedural injury ”—that is, that the g o vernment’s violation of a procedural requirement could impair some separate interest of the plaintiffs’—the “normal

s t a n d ar ds for

. . . [ the] immediacy ” of injury are relax e d. Lujan
, 504 U.S. at 572 n .7. A p laintiff alleg ing proceduralN A V A J O N A T I O N V

. D E P ’ T O F I N T E R I O R 26

harm c an d emonstrate injury in fact b y showing (i) the ag ency violated certain procedural rules, (ii) those r ules protect a

c oncrete interest of the plaintiff, and (iii) it is “reasonab l y pr o b able” that the c h alleng ed action threatens that concrete interest. Citizens for Better Forestry , 341 F .3d at 969–70.

The universe of interests procedurally protected by N EPA is b road: birdwatchers’ and o utdoorsmen’s i nterests in their ability to “picnic, birdwatch, walk, and swim” in a particular
area, Cantrell v. City of Long Beach , 241 F .3d 674, 681 (9th Cir. 2001); municipalities’ interests “as varied a s [ their] responsibilities, powers, and assets,” City of Sausalito

, 386 F

. 3 d at 1 197, inc l u d ing h arm to w ater resources, see Churchill Cty. v. Babbitt

, 150 F .3d 1072, 1079 (9th Cir. 1 998) (identify ing harms such a s “ u n known c hang e s to the underg round water supply sy s tem, and reduced quality o f local drinking water”); and, as here, I ndian tribes’ interest in assuring w ater is available on their reservat i o n lands, see P y ramid Lake Paiute
, 724 F .3d at 1188 (“[ T] he Tribe’s interest in max imiz ing f

lows to Py

rami d L a k e

. . . is w ell established.”). I n any instance, tho u g h

, the plaintiff must assert that the procedural violation could harm an interest specific to it, not an abstract interest in assuring that NEPA’s procedural requirements for considering enviro n m ental impacts a

re followed. “A free-float i n g assertion of a procedural violation, without a concrete link to the interest protected by the p rocedural rules, d o es not c o n s titute an injury in fact.” Ashley Creek P h o s p h a t e Co. v. Norton
, 420 F .3d 934, 938 (9th Cir. 2005).

Althoug h standing inquiries are inherently fact-specific,

we have laid d own some g uideposts for d etermining whether it is “reasonably probabl e ” t h a t a g ency action threatens a plaintiff’s interests. F or one thing

, the imminence inquiry isN A V A J O N A T I O N V

. D E P ’ T O F I N T E R I O R 27

“less demanding ” for procedural harms. H all v. Norton
, 266 F .3d 969, 976 (9t h Cir. 2001). The challeng ed action need not immediately or directl y cause the harm a s a firstorder effect. “[ T] hat the potential injury would be the result of a chain of events need n o t doom the standing claim.” Idaho Conservation League
, 956 F .2d at 1515. “The relevant inquiry

. . . is whether there is a ‘reasonable probability ’ that the chall e n ge d procedural violation will harm the plaintiffs’
concrete i n t erests, not how many steps must occur before such harm occurs.” Citizens for Better Forestry
, 3 41 F

. 3 d at 975 (internal citations omitted).

Notwithstanding this relax ed standard, injury in fact requires a likelihood that the challeng ed action, if ultimately taken, would threaten a plaintiff’s interests. W here a p laintiff
cannot “ex p lain in any way h o w t heir [ interests] may be affected” by a g ency action, it has not suffered an injury in fact. Nuclear I

nfo. & Res. Serv. v. N

u c l e ar R e

gulatory Comm’n (“

NIRS ”), 457 F .3d 941, 953 (9th Cir. 2 006) (emphasis in orig inal). So, althoug h a c onting ent “chain o f events” c an create a “reasonably p robable” threat to a pl a i n t iff’s interests, a purely speculative sequence o f

occurrences will not meet this standa r d

. S e e Bell v

. Bonneville Power Admin.

, 340 F .3d 945, 951 (9th Cir. 2003).

B. Discussion

The N avajo N ation proposes for standing purposes that it has suffered two sorts of injuries. The Guidelines, the Nation maintains, (1) “do[ ] not account for the unquantified rights o f the Navajo N ation to the waters of the L ower B asin of the Colorado River” and (2) disreg ard “the unmet needs o f t he Navajo Nation and tribal members for water from the L ower B asin.” The two interests are distinct: the former a r i ses outN A V A J O N A T I O N V

. D E P ’ T O F I N T E R I O R 28

of the Nation’s potential reserved water rig hts under W inters

v. United S

tates , while the latter is a freestanding interest in

an adequate water s u p ply for the Nation that ex ists

n otwithstanding the lack of a d e c reed rig ht to water. T h e district court’s analy sis f o cused only on the threat to the former interest. W e consider each in turn.

i. Injury to the Nation’s unquantified W inters rights

The Nati o n ’ s f

irst alleg ed injury is to its as-y etunquantified water rig hts unde r W i nters v. United States
, disc u s sed in Part I .B .iv supra

. The parties ag ree that the Nation may have unquantified W inters rig hts in some b ody o f
water. 2 2 Unquantified W

inters rig hts in the L ower B asin are

s u f f i c i e n t l y c o n cr e t e i n t e r e s t s , t h e i m p a i r m e n t o f which—coupled with a procedural violation—g ives rise to standing under N EPA. S ee Citize n s f

o r Better F

o restry , 341 F .3d at 969–70. I ndeed, interests in water less concrete than unquantified W

inters rig hts have formed the basis for standing in the past. I n Laub v. U.S. Department of I nterior
, 342 F .3d 1080, 1086 (9th Cir. 2003), for ex ample, the “loss of affordable irrig ation water” for fa r mers was a concrete

2 2 W h en th e Un ited States in terv en ed in Arizo n a v. Ca lifo rn ia as tru s tee o n b eh alf o f th e Natio n (am o n g oth er trib es), it p resen ted ev id en ce th at th e Natio n h ad 8 ,4 9 0 acres o f irrig ab le lan d o n w h ich to base a W in ters claim

. See su

p ra n o t es 9 & 1 3 a n d acco m p an y i n g tex t. T h is claim , h o w ev er, w as n o t ad j u d icated

.

In th e ru n

- u

p to th e p resen t

litig atio n , th e trib e sen t to th e B u reau o f Reclam atio n , d u rin g th e co n su ltatio n p ro cess o n th e Gu id elin es, a “ w ater b u d g et” o f 7 6 ,7 3 2 af

y th at w o u ld n eed to be satisf ied o u t o f th e Co lo rad o Riv er. T h e d ef

en d an ts co n ten d th at w

h atev er w ater rig h ts th e Natio n h as

u n d er W in t ers m ig h t b e satisf

i ed f ro m so u rces o th er th an th e L o w er B asin

o f th e Co lo rad o

.N A V A J O N A T I O N V

. D E P ’ T O F I N T E R I O R 29

interest sufficient for NEPA standing

. The precise scope a nd
status of the Nation’s possible W inters rig hts do not concern

u s ; it is enoug h to establish standing to demonstrate t h at however those rig h ts a

re del i n e ated, they are threatened b y the Guidelines. B ut the Na t i o n , we conclude, cannot so establish.

The Guidelines do not act directly upon the Na t i o n ’s unquantified water rig hts, nor could they

. 2 3 So how could the Guidelines injure these rig hts?

The Nation alleg e s that the Secretary ’s actions will c reate

a complex and difficult-to-reverse c o mbination of third-party reliance and p o litical inertia that will frustrate future attempts by the Nation to secure and enjoy i t s W inters rig hts. I n support of its alleg a tion, the N ation posits the following chain of events: the Guidelines will “establish[ ] a sy stem of reliance upon the Colorado River that e nsures that entities other than the Navajo Nation will continue to r e l y o n water supplies claimed by

, reserved for, n eeded by

, and potentially belong ing to” it. T h is r eliance wil l m a k e it “increasing ly difficult” to satisfy the Nation’s water rig hts from the L ower B asin, and will “limit the Navajo Nation’s future options” for securing water, notwit hstanding the seniority o f its rig hts. Even with senior rig hts, “the complex proces s of bring ing
water to the R e s ervation in a contentious political climate” will cast a pall of uncertainty over the Nation’s entitlement.

23 “ T h ese Gu id elin es are n o t in ten d ed to , an d d o n ot

. . . [a]f f ect th e rig h ts o f an y h old er o f p resen t p erf ected rig h t s or reserv ed rig h t s, w h ich rig h ts sh all b e satisf

ied w ith in t

h e ap p o rtio n m en t o f th e State w ith in w h ich th e u se is m a d e , a n d in th e L o w er B asin

, i n acco rd an ce w ith th e Co n so lid ated Decree.” S

ee Sh o rtag e Gu id elin es, 7 3 Fed

. Reg

. at 1 9 ,8 8 4

.N A V A J O N A T I O N V

. D E P ’ T O F I N T E R I O R 30

F urther developing its hy p o thetical scena r i o, the Nation
arg ues that the United States will not be “inclined” to re-open the iss u e o f water allocation in the Colorado, having forg ed

a multi-state consensus for the Guidelines that “appeased the L ower B asin states.” The Secretary ’s assurance that he w i l l
manag e the C o l o r ado consistent with any W inters rig hts quantified or obtai ned in the future “ig nores political a nd practical realities,” namely the “disincentive” for the United States to pro t e ct the Nation’s water rig hts created by this
sy stem of reliance.

Critically

, the Nation d oes not contend that the Guidelines legally impair an y u n q u antified rig hts it has in L ower B asin
water. I t is common g round a mong all affect e d that if the Nation obtained decreed rig hts in the L ower Colorado B a sin, that entitleme n t would trump a ll claims with a later priority date, “reg ardless of whether that water has been developed o r relied upon by third parties with jun ior priority dates.” Rather, the Nation’s fear is that the Guideline s threaten to solidify a w eb of reliance interests and incentives th a t , as a practical matter, may prevent the Na t i o n (or disincline the United States, as its trustee) from enjoy ing or p ursuing those decreed rig

hts.

W h et her or not the Nation’s realpolitik p redictions have

some truth to them, the posited injury to t h e Nation’s unquant i f ied W inters rig hts due to the Guidelines is too sp e c ulative to confer standing

. The string of conting encies connecting the Guidelines to the frustration of the Natio n ’s rig hts is not only long —not disqualify ing i n itself—but spindly

, too. The Nation’s alleg ations about the future development of reliance interests, and the g overnmen t ’s intransig ence in upsetting these inte r e s t s in pursuit of theN A V A J O N A T I O N V

. D E P ’ T O F I N T E R I O R 31

Nation’s unadjudicat ed water r ig hts, are supported by “ no facts, fig ures, or data.” S

ee Bell , 340 F .3d at 951.

For ex a mple, the N ation offers no support f o r i t s alleg ation that the United States will shirk its trust duties for f e a r o f u p setting the water rig hts apple-cart. F rom the Secretary ’ s stated attempt to avoid “destabiliz ing litig ation,” and to g ain consensus among the B asin States for the challeng ed Guidelines, the N ation predicts that t h e U nited States w ould no long er be inclined to pursue water rig h ts for the Nation if such actions necessitated a reallocation of rig hts or potentially

upset the multi-state consensus underly ing the Guidelines. B ut t he tribe offers no actual support for this conjecture—no statements by any government officials, for

ex a mple, and no pattern of su c h behavior in the past. 2 4

I nstead, the Nation attempts to shore up its alleg ations b y invoking the “presum[ ption] that g eneral alleg ations embrace those specific facts that are necessary to support the claim” at t h e p leading stag e. Lujan
, 504 U.S. at 561 ( citations omitted). “Conclusory alleg ations and unreasonab l e inferences, h owever, are insuffic i e n t t o defeat a motion to d i s miss.” S

anders v. Brown
, 504 F .3d 903, 910 (9th C i r. 2007). “ W e do not

. . . assume the truth of leg al conclusions

m e r e l y because they are cast in the form of factua l alleg ations,” and, most especially

, where our jurisdiction is at stake, “[ w] e cannot c onstrue the complaint so liberally as t o

24 T h e co m

p lain t d o es n o t s p ell o u

t th is t h eo ry —th at th e Un ited States

w ill b e d isin clin ed to rev isit w ater rig h ts ad j u d icatio n s af

ter th e G u id elin es

are im p lem en t ed

—w ith an y clar i t y

. N ev erth eless, w e co n stru e th e

co m plain t, f av o rab ly to th e Natio n , to em b race th ese alleg atio n s o f in j u ry

. W e n o t e th at at oth er j u n ctu res as w ell w e h av e relied o n th e b r i e fs o n ap p eal to clarif

y t h e c o m

plain t, i n co m

p lian ce w ith o u r o b lig atio n to

co n stru e th e co m

p lain t f av o rab ly to th e p lain tif

f

.N A V A J O N A T I O N V

. D E P ’ T O F I N T E R I O R 32

ex tend our jurisdiction bey ond its cons titutional limits.” W

. Mining Council v. W

att , 643 F .2d 618, 624 (9th Cir. 1981).

The Nation need not provide smoking -g un alleg a tions o f harm. B ut mere “ specula t i o n or ‘subjective apprehension’ about future harm [ does not] support standing .” Mayfield v. Uni t e d S tates , 599 F .3d 964, 970 (9th Cir. 2010) (citing Friends of the Earth, I

nc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs

. ( TOC)

, Inc.
, 528 U .S. 167, 184 (2000)). I nstead, the Na t i o n must plausibly alleg e that adoption of the Guidelines will in some fa shion impede the ascertainment and declaration of the Nation’s W

inters rig hts. That it has not done. 2 5

Absent more concrete all e g a t i o n s, the Nation cannot show that “harm to [ its] concrete interests”—her e , i ts possible W inters rig hts—“is reasonably probable,” Citizens for Better Forestr y , 3 4 1 F .3d at 9 75, and therefore that it has suffered the injury needed for standing

.

25 We also qu estio n w

h eth er th e Gu id

elin es create relian ce in t e r e s ts

o v e r a n d ab o v e th e p re- ex istin g th ird

- p arty relian ce on t h e f u lly
ap p ro p riated (o r o v erap p ro p riated ) w ater o f th e C o lo rad o R iv er. T h e g ro ss allo catio n s o f w ater in t h e 1 9 6 4 Decree w o u ld seem prim aril y resp on s ib le f

o r relian ce o n L o w er B asin w a t e r

. Un less t h e Natio n can sh o w th at th e Gu id elin es are creatin g n ew o r a d d itio n a l relian ce in t erests, it can n o t d em o n strate it to b e reaso n ab ly pro b ab le t h at th e G u id elin es th em selv es p o se an y th reat to th e Natio n ’ s in terests. S ee Bell

, 3 4 0 F.3 d at 9 5 1 (em p ha s i z i n g th at th e a m en d m en ts t o t h e p o w er d eliv ery co n tracts,

an d n ot th e co n tracts th em selv es, w ere th e ag en cy actio n s in q u estio n , an d th e am en d m en t s alo n e d id n o t th reaten th e p lain tif f ’ s in terests). S

ee a l so Sh o rtag e Gu id elin es, 7 3 Fed

. Reg

. at 19 ,8 7 3 (d escrib in g th e relian ce o f th e W est o n th e Co lo rad o Riv er f

o r d rin k in g w ater an d ag ricu ltu re).N A V A J O N A T I O N V

. D E P ’ T O F I N T E R I O R 33

ii. I n j u r y t o t h e N

a t i o n ’ s g e n e r a l iz e d i n t e r es t i n Lower Basin water

I n a ddition to its u nadjudicated W inters rig hts, the Nation articulated a different interest—a g eneraliz ed intere s t i n availability for its us e o f w a t er in the L ower B a sin—that, it alleg ed, the G uidelines could adversely affect. W e reaffirm that t h e i n t e rests upon which a NEPA plaintiff bases its standing need not be leg al entitlements or substantive rig hts, and that an impairment as a p ractical matter of a ccess to adequat e w a t er for use on o ne’s land can qualify

. We hold, howe v e r , that the Nation ag ain failed to trace a reasonably probable link between this second interest in wa ter availability and the Guidelines, and so lacks standing under this theory

of injury as well.

The complaint does adequately alleg e an interest in water availability aside from the tribe’s right to water under W inters

. I t states, for ex ample, that t h e Guidelines will “adversely affect[ ] the water supply a vailable t o satisfy the N a v ajo Nation’s rig hts or to otherwise m eet its need s , ” (emphasis added) and that the Secret a r y ’ s actions “ fail to protect the Navajo Nation’s rig hts to and its interests in water from the L ower B asin of the Colorado River” (e m p h a s i s added). Peppered throug hout the co m p l a int as well a re mentions of the Nation’s “ needs and rig hts” (emphasis added). The Nation’s repeated i n vocation of this d istinct
concrete interest—its g eneraliz e d n eed for wate r from the L ower B a s i n , i n dependent of any rig hts to it—offers an alternative b asis upon w hich the Nation could have standing

.

This interest, unlike unquantified W inters r ig hts—which depend on the special status of the N ation’s home as federally

r e s erved land—is similar to that of any larg e landowner, o rN A V A J O N A T I O N V

. D E P ’ T O F I N T E R I O R 34

municipality

, or other potential L ower B asin water user. I ndeed, the Nation is the larg est r iparian landowner along the Colorado River apart from the United States.

I f such an interest in adequate water were, to a reasonable probability

, potentially injured by a proposed federal action, the Nation would have standing to c h a l l e ng e N EPA compliance. To support NEPA standing

, the interest affected need not b e “ a substantive rig ht sounding in property o r contract,” althoug h it must be “distinct f rom the interest h eld by the public at larg e,” Cantrell

, 2 41 F .3d at 681 (citing Lujan
, 504 U .S. at 562–63). Cantrell

, for ex ample, h e ld that birdwatchers had leg a lly p rotected aesthetic interests in a bird habitat located on a closed naval station, even thoug h th e y lacked a leg al rig ht of access to the base and viewed the birds from “areas in and around the station.” Id. a t 680. Closer to this case, we reg

ularly recog niz e concrete interests in access
t o w a ter althoug h the plaintiff has no decreed or c ontractual rig ht to water. See Laub

, 342 F .3d at 1 0 8 6 (t h e “ loss o f affordable irrig ation water” for ag r icultu ral uses resulting from increased competition for irrig ation water was sufficient injury to a cog niz able interest for stand ing under N EPA); Pyramid Lake Paiute , 724 F .3d at 1187–88.

So t h e Nation’s lack of decreed rig hts to L ower B asin

w a t e r d o e s not matter for standing

. I ts interest in, and need for, the w ater is a cog n iz able interest—much like the farmers’ interests in Laub —which, when threatened, may support standing under NEPA.

Our question, then, is whether the Nation has alleg ed a “reasonably probable” threat from the Guidelines to its interest in accessing L ower B asin water. Citizens for BetterN A V A J O N A T I O N V

. D E P ’ T O F I N T E R I O R 35

Forestry
, 341 F .3d at 969. I f that interest is not imperiled b y the Guidelines, the Nation has suffered no injury

.

At the outset, we rejec t the N ation’s reiterated arg ument that the Guidelines impair the Nation’s interests in, and need for, L o wer B asin water b y establishing a sy stem of third-party reliance that will make it harder to satisfy this need. F or the

same r easons laid out in Part I I I

. B .i with reg ard to the Nation’s W

inters rig hts, these a lleg ations are too speculative to demonstrate injury

to any of the Nation’s interests.

B u t the Nation also alleg es—albeit sparsely —another, different sort of injury to its g en e r aliz ed interest in L ower B asin water: there will simply be less of it available. The Surplus Guidelines, the Nation mai n t ains, will “adversely affect[ ] the water supply available to

. . . meet [ the Nation’s] needs” by “allocat[ ing ] all of the surplus w aters o f the Colorado River” each y

ear. As for the Shortag e Guidelines:

The N a tion’s use of mainstream water in the L o w e r B a sin will be charg ed ag ainst Ariz ona’s L o wer B asin apportionment, a nd Ariz o n a is particularly vulnerable to water shortag es, so the Nation reasonably fears that

ex c es sive I CS development 2 6 or an increased likelihood of a [ declared] short a ge will adversely aff

e c t its lands by reducing the availability of local water supplies needed to make them productive and livable.

(emphasis added) (internal citations omitted).

26 Fo r an ex p lan atio n o f ICS, see su p ra n o te 1 8 an d acco m

p a n y in g tex t

.N A V A J O N A T I O N V

. D E P ’ T O F I N T E R I O R 36

The constraints imposed by th e L a w of the River affect the plausibility of these aver m e n ts concerning the Guidelines’ possible impact on the wa t e r a vailable to the Nation. A s noted above, the Nation’s use of mainstream water “shall be charg ed to [ Ariz ona’s] apportionment.” 1964 Decree a r t

. I I (B )(4), 3 76 U.S. at 3 4 3

. Ariz ona’s apportionment, as set out in the 1922 Compact and reaffirmed in the 1964 Decree, is 2.8 mafy

. Id. art. I I (B )(1), 376 U

. S

. at 342. I n times o f shortag e, the Colorado River B asin Project Act subordinates the water rig h ts of Ariz ona’s larg est mainstream diverter, the Central Ariz o na Project (“CAP”), to those of California

us e r s

. 2 7 See 43 U.S.C. § 1521(b). I n flush y e ars, the 1964 Decree g rants Ariz o na 46% of the L ower B asin surplus water. 1964 Decree a

rt. I I (B )(2), 376 U. S

. a t 342. So the broad
contours of water allocation, and indeed many o f the specific
ones, are settled b y ex isting law; the Guidelines merely shade in the details.

W ith those parameters in mind, we conclude that the Nation h a s n ot plausibly a lleg ed that the Guidelines themselves—indepe n dently of the pre-ex isting water allotments—will impair the tribe’s interest in the availability of L ower B asin water. Cons t r ued a s liberally as possible in the Nation’s favor, the complaint does not e x p lain why o r ho w t h e Secretary ’s decisions o n surplus and shortag e declarations, or the Shortag e G uidelines’ rules on the banking of I CS water, threaten to reduce the amount of w a t e r available to the Nation.

Ariz ona’s relative allotment of surplus water is fix ed b y t h e 1 964 Decree. See id. The G uidelines do not m a k e a n y

27 T h e C en tral A rizo n a P ro j ect d iv erts m o re th an 1 .2 m af y of A rizo n a’ s 2 .8 m af

y allo catio n

. S

h o rta g e Gu i d

elin es FEIS , at 3

– 3 5

.N A V A J O N A T I O N V

. D E P ’ T O F I N T E R I O R 37

allotments during ti m e s o f surplus o r shortag e; they only ascertain the paramet e rs f or d eclaring whether there is a surplus or shortag e. And it is another statutory provision, not the Guidelines, that trig g e r s a statutory prioritiz ation scheme that disadvantag es Ariz ona. See 43 U.S.C. § 1521(b).

Given the disadvantag e to Ariz ona in times of shortag e , how the Secretary determines a shortag e could, in theory

, reduce the availability of local water supplies. F or instance, if the Guidelines declared a shortag e more often than would

some o ther method of determ i n ing a shortag e, part o f Ariz ona’s allotment (the CAP water) w ould be subordinated
t o C alifornia’s needs, pursuant to the Colorado River B asin Project Act, more often than under the alternative approach, and less water would be a vailable on the tribe’s land. B u t the Nation’s complaint does n ot an y w h e re alleg e that the Guidelines do, in fact, result in “an increased likelihood of a shortag e” as c ompared to a lternatives; it say s only that “the likelihood o f a shortag e d etermination would be different under e ach of the a lternatives in the g uid e lines proposed in the EI S.” F air enoug h. B u t it does not follow, as the Nation asserts, that the ex istence of a n ar r a y o f alternatives itself makes it “reasonably probable that unex plored effects threaten the Navajo Nation’s interests.”

The Nation’s alleg a tions reg a rding the I CS provisions o f the Shortag e Guidelines are equally unavailing

. The Nation do e s not sketch out why I CS development—the b anking o f

ex tra water saved or procured by water users—will be

ex c e ssive, or how that development would reduce available
water supplies for the Nation and thus threaten its interests in said water. W e note that, u nder the Shortag e Guide l i n es, states and users can o n ly “bank” water by offsetting their
water consumption in some other way

. See 73 F ed. Reg. atN A V A J O N A T I O N V

. D E P ’ T O F I N T E R I O R 38

19,886. B ecause the only water that can be banked this way is water saved by users for the purpose of banking it
, t he Nation’s arg ument that the w ater would otherwise be available to meet the N ation’s needs is difficult to understand.

Ultimately

, the Nation has not shown why the Guidelines threaten injury t o i ts interests in having water available to meet its needs, as compared t o a n y available alternative. General r eferences to the “risk o f overlooking harmful effects”—without describing these effects—or to a “certain [ e] ffect [on] the outcome o f t h [ e] efforts” by the Nation to

secure water—without any description of that effect—do not suffice.

The c ases cited by t h e N ation in its discussion of the reasonably probable threat t o i t s interests do not support its position to the contrary

. Rather, those cases reiterate t h e requirement that plaintiffs must identify how the challeng ed action threatens, to a reasonable probability

, some separate interest belong ing to them, and determined that the plaintiffs had done so.

Douglas County v

. Babbitt

, 48 F

. 3 d 1495, 1501 (9th Cir. 1995), for ex ample, co n c e rn ed a county ’s alleg ation that its lands “could be threatened by how the adjoining federal lands [ were] manag ed” with r e spect to pest, disease, and fire control. W e held the alleg atio n sufficient to demonstrate standing b ecause “ a concrete interest

. . . could [ h a v e b e en] harmed” by the ch a l l e n g ed action. Churchill County
, 150 F .3d at 1079, similarly held that an increased risk o f “ fire haz a rds, airborne particles, [ and] erosion,” among other thing s, made it “reasonably probable” that a transfer of water rig hts threatened county land. And in Pyramid Lake P aiute Tribe

, 724 F

. 3d at 1188, it was common g roun d t h a t theN A V A J O N A T I O N V

. D E P ’ T O F I N T E R I O R 39

transfer of water ri gh t s would “ reduce[ ] flows to Py r amid L ake” a nd thereby injure the Tribe’s interests in max imiz ing flows to the lake. The p laintiffs in those c a s es thus affirmatively d emonstra t ed that ag ency action would, to a reasonable probability , harm their interests.

W e do not doubt the Nation’s needs f or w ater, o r its skepticism that its needs a nd rig h ts will be front a

nd c enter a s the Secretary a

nd other stakeholders v ie for water rig hts in the
y ears to come. “The United Stat e s h i s t o rically has not been vig orous in litig ating to e s t ablish or preserve I ndian water rig hts.” W illiam C. Canby

, J r., A M E R I C A N I N D I A N L A W 504 (6th e d. 2015). 2 8 More than half a c entury has passe d s i n c e the N ation’s W

i n ters rig hts were first put forward for adjudication in Arizona v. Ca l i f ornia
, and they g o unquantified still.

I n short, the challeng ed Guidelines d o n o t , as far as the Nation has alleg ed, present a reasonable probability o f threat
to either the Nation’s unadjudicated water r ig hts o r its practical water needs. W e therefore a f f i r m the dismissal o f the Nation’s NEPA claims for lack of standing

.

IV. SOVEREIG N IMMUNITY

The district court dismissed the Nation’s b re ach of trust claim b e c ause the United States had not waived sovereig n immunity f

or that claim. The Nation alleg ed, as a breach o f trust, I nterior’s failure “ t o determine the ex tent and quantity of water rig hts

. . . or oth erwise determine the a mount o f
water w hich the [ Nation] requires from the L ower Ba s in to

28 “ T h e trib es th em selv es can b rin g su it, b u t th e co st o f su ch litig atio n is f req u en tly p ro h ib itiv e.” Id

. at 5 0 4

– 0 5

.N A V A J O N A T I O N V

. D E P ’ T O F I N T E R I O R 40

meet the needs of the [ N ation] .” The Nation’s breach of trust claim is thus predica t ed not on an affirmative action but rather a failure to act.

The broad w aiver of immunity found in § 702 of the APA did not apply

, the district court h eld, because this C o u rt’s decisions construing the scope of § 702 limited its waiver to (i) challeng es to “final ag ency action” and (ii) constitutional claims. B ecause the Nation “fa i l[ ed] to challeng e any particular final ag ency action or bring a constitutional claim,” the district court held, it c o uld not avail itsel f of § 702’s waiver.

W e now review, and clarify , the scope of that waiver.

A. Legal Background

“The United States, a s sovereig n, is immune f ro m s uit

save as it consents to be sued.” United States v

. Sherwood

, 312 U.S. 584, 586 (1941) (citations omitted). As the contours of any such waiver define a court’s a u t hority to entertain a suit ag ainst the g o vernment, id.

, e a ch claim ag a i n s t the
g overnment must r est up o n an applicable waiver o f immunity

. W e review whether sovereig n immunity is waived de novo. O rff v. United States
, 358 F .3d 1137, 1142 (9th Cir. 2004).N A V A J O N A T I O N V

. D E P ’ T O F I N T E R I O R 41

Cong r ess has enacted several broad w aivers of the United States’ sovereig n immunity

. 2 9 The waiver here a t issue appears in § 702 of the APA, which provides:

[ 1] A person suffering leg al wrong because o f
ag ency action, or adverse l y affected o r ag g r ieved by a g ency acti o n within the meaning of a relevant statu t e , is entitled to judicial review thereof. [ 2] A n action in a court of the United States seeking relief other
t h a n money damag es and stating a claim that

an ag ency or an officer or emp l o y e e thereof acted or f ailed to act in an official capacity

. . . shall n ot be dismissed nor relief therein be denied on the g r ound that it is ag ainst the United States.

5 U.S.C. § 702.

Section 7 02, notably

, does double duty

, ne s t ling a broad waiver of sovereig n immunity (its second sentence) within an “omnibus judicial-review provision, w hich permits suit for violations of numerous stat utes

. . . that do not themselves include causes of a c tion for judicial review.” Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc.
, 134 S. Ct. 1377, 1389 (2014). W e are mainly concerned here with the waiver, but,

as will appear, th e r e l a t i onship between the § 702 cause o f

29 S ee, e.g

. , Fed eral T o rt Claim s A ct, 2 8 U.S.C. § 13 4 6 (b )(1 ) (w aiv in g im m u n ity as to certain to rts co m

m itted b y g o v ern m en t em

p lo y ees actin g in th e sco pe o f th eir em

p lo y m en t); T u ck er A ct, 2 8 U.S.C. § 1 4 9 1 (a)(1 ) (w aiv in g i m

m u n i ty as to co n tract clai m s a n d claim s f o r d am ag es n o t

so u n d in g in to rt).N A V A J O N A T I O N V

. D E P ’ T O F I N T E R I O R 42

action and the § 702 wa i v er is key to making sense of our cases in this area.

The first sentence of § 702—the “ omnibus” mechanism for review of ag ency action by cou rts—was the sum a nd substance of the judicial review provision of the APA as orig inally enacted in 1946. S ee A dministrative Procedure Act, Pub. L

. No. 79-404 § 1 0 ( a )

, 60 Stat. 237, 243 (1946) (codi f i e d as amended at 5 U.S.C. § 702). The second

s e ntence—which waives sovereig n immunity in cas e s “seeking relief other than m o n ey damag es” for wrong s

comm i t ted by ag encies, their officers, and their employ ees, 5 U.S.C. § 702—was ad d e d in 1 976 to clear up a morass o f federal sovereig n immunity jurisprudence, which a t the time

was “illog ical,” a “ thankless” undertaking f or federal courts, and “a mass of confusion

. . . [ and] confusion compounded.” H.R. Rep. No. 94-1656, at 6–8 (19 7 6 ) (internal citations omitted). I n addition to ending “the injustice a nd inconsistency ” beg at by the doctrinal confusion, id. at 10, the amendment aimed to “ b roaden the avenues f o r judicial r eview of ag ency a ction b y eliminating the defense o f sovereig n immunity in cases covered by the a mendment.” Bowen v

. Massachusetts

, 487 U .S. 8 79, 891–92 ( 1988). J ust how broad those avenues are is our issue.

B. Ninth Circuit Law on § 702

A p erceived conflict between two of our o p inions construing § 702 lies at the root of this appeal. Compare The Presbyterian Church (

U.S.A.) v. U

nited States
, 870 F .2d 518, 524 ( 9th Cir. 1989) (holding that “[ n ] o thing in t h e lang uag e of [ § 7 02] sug g ests that the waiver of sovereig n immunity

is limited to cases challeng ing

. . . ‘ag ency action’”), with Gallo Cattle Co. v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric.

, 159 F .3d 1194, 1198 (9thN A V A J O N A T I O N V

. D E P ’ T O F I N T E R I O R 43

Cir. 1 998) (noting § 702’s “ w aiver of sov e reig n immunity contains several limitations,” including § 704’s r equirement that the challenge d conduct be “final ag e ncy action” o r ag ency action otherwise revi e w ab le by statute). A panel o f this Court pronounced these two cases “directly contrary ” to

one another, and could fi n d “ n o way to disting uish them,” but, resolving the c a se b efore it on other g rounds, declined to call the case en banc to harmoniz e the perceived intra-circuit conflict. Se e Gros Ventre Tribe v. United States
, 469 F .3d 801, 8 0 9 ( 9th Cir. 2006); see also EEOC v. Peabody W

. Coal Co.
, 610 F .3d 1070, 1086 (9th C i r

. 2010) (noting the same “tension” between the same two decisions but aga in finding

no need to resolve it). As we f ace the issue s q u a r e l y , we delve into P resby t erian Church and Gallo Cattle in some detail.

Presbyterian Church h eld that § 7 02 waive d s o v ereig n immunity f

or the p laintiff c h urches’ F irst an d Fourth Amendment claims ag ainst the (now-defunct) I mmi gr a tion and N aturaliz ation Service (I NS). 870 F .2 d a t 5 2 6 (9th Cir. 1989). T he claims in Presbyterian Church arose from the di s p atch of I

NS ag ents to a ttend, and furtively record, worship services at four Ariz ona churches as the ag ents were investig ating the sanctuary movement, which was aiding refug ees f

leeing civil w ar i n Central America. Id. at 520. The I NS prevailed in district court on its arg ument that § 702 waived sovereig n imm u n i ty only for claims challeng ing “ag ency action” as d efined in 5 U .S.C. § 551(13). Under that definition, “‘ag ency a ction’ includes the whole or a p art o f an ag ency rule, order, license, sanction, relief, or the equivalent

or denial thereof, or failure to act.” Id. at 524–25. The I NS’s
arg ument was premised o n the first sentence of § 702, which
g rants judicial review to “ p e rson[ s] suffering leg al wrongN A V A J O N A T I O N V

. D E P ’ T O F I N T E R I O R 44

because o f ag ency

action, or adversely

affected or ag g rieved by ag ency action.” 5 U.S.C. § 702.

W e reversed, interpreting the second sentence of § 702 as,

on its face, “an unqualified waiver of sovereig n immunity in actions seeking nonmonetary relief.” Presbyterian C hurch

, 870 F

. 2d at 525. Presbyterian Church noted that the second
sentence o f § 702 does not use the term “ag ency action.” Id. And the leg islative history of the waiver provisi o n, which Presbyterian Church survey e d a t l eng th, evinced Cong ress’ intent to “eliminate the sovereig n immunity def e n s e in all equitable actions for specific relief” ag ainst t h e federal
g overnment. Id. at 525 (quoting H.R. Rep. No

. 9 4

- 1 6 5 6, at 9 (1976)) (emphasis omitted). W h a t e v er restrictions were imposed b y the first s e n t e nce’s limitation of judicial r eview
to “ a g ency action” were absent in the broad waiver leg islated three d e cades later, we concluded. Id. a t 525. Presbyterian Church pronounced that reading in an “ag ency action” limitation to that second, independentl y enacted provision both “offend[ e d] the plain meaning of the amendment” a nd flew in the face of the drafting history

. Id.

Gallo Cattle Co. v

. U

.S. D epartment of Agriculture

, 159 F

. 3d 1 194 (9th Cir. 1998), pointed in a d i f ferent direction, stating that “ the APA’s w a i v er of sovereig n immunity contains sev e ra l limitations,” including a proviso in § 704 that only “final ag e n cy a c t i o n” and ag ency action otherwise reviewable by statute are subject to judicial review. 3 0 Id. at 1198. Gallo Cattle concerne d a dairy

30 Sectio n 70 4 p ro v id es: “ A g en cy actio n m ad e rev i ew ab le b y statu te

an d f in al ag en cy

actio n f o r w h ich th ere is n o o th er ad eq u ate rem ed y in a

co u rt are su

b j ect to j u d icial rev iew

. A p relim in ar y , p r o c ed u ral, orN A V A J O N A T I O N V

. D E P ’ T O F I N T E R I O R 45

producer w ho soug ht r e v iew in federal district court of a denial by a

n administrative board of its petition f o r i n t erim relief. Id. at 1195–96. Gallo Cattle proposed pay ing t h e monetary assessments it wa s challeng ing on F irst Amendment g rounds into escr o w , rather than to the dairy board, pending the out come of its constitutional challeng e

. Id. The district court held that it lacked jurisdiction over the claim because the statute go v e r ning the dairy assessments allowed review only after the Secretary of Ag ricu l t ure h ad decided the merits o f Gallo’s petition, id. at 1197–98, and this Court affirmed.

R e levant to our a

naly sis, we rejected Gallo Cattl e ’s alternative ar gu ment that the APA provided a source o f jurisdiction, holding that there was n o “final ag ency action” under § 704. Id

. a t 1 1 98–99. The Court identified the final
ag ency action requirement of § 704 a s a “ l imitation[ ] ” on § 702’s waiver of sovereig n immunity

, id. at 1 1 9 8, and thus

a “ jurisdictional” requirement of suit. S e e id. at 1199 (holding that the lack of final a g ency a ction meant § 704 “could not vest the district court with juris d i ct ion to r eview the order”); id. at 1200 (same).

How could there b e this limitation, when recently we h ad said there was “no such limitatio n ” ? Presbyterian Church

, 870 F .2d at 525. Nota b l y

— a nd inex plicably

— Gallo Cattle did not cite or discuss Presbyterian Church

. S t ill, notwithstanding the dictum in Gros V entre Tribe

, 469 F .3d at 809, that there is “no way to d isting u ish” these “ directly contrary ” holding s, a panel of this Court recently did just that.

in term ed iate ag en cy

actio n o r ru lin g n o t d i rectly rev iew ab le is su b j ect to

rev iew o n th e rev iew

o f th e f in al ag en cy

actio n .” 5 U.S.C. § 7 0 4

.N A V A J O N A T I O N V

. D E P ’ T O F I N T E R I O R 46

Veterans for Comm o n S e nse v

. Shinseki (“ V

CS I ”), 644 F .3d 845 (9th Cir

. 2011), opinion vacated on reh’g en banc

, 678 F .3d 1013 (9th Cir. 2012), untang led t h e Gallo Cattle

- Presbyterian Church knot. Gallo’s claim for interim relief, 3 1 it noted, was broug ht directly under the APA—specifically

, the f

irst sentence of § 702, which g rants judicial review to those people “‘suf f e r i n g leg al wrong because of ag ency

action, or adversely affected or ag g rieved by ag ency action.’” VCS I
, 644 F .3d at 865–66 ( q uoting 5 U.S.C. § 702). APA claims, as outlined in the first sentence of § 70 2
, are subject to “§ 704’s limitation o n what ag ency action is reviewable—meaning su bject to ‘judicial review’ under the f

irst s en t e n c e o f § 702.” Id. at 866. Claims not g rounded in t h e APA, like the constitutional claims in Presbyterian Church and VCS I
, “do[ ] not depend o n the

cause o f action found in the first sentence of § 702” and thus § 704’s limitation does not apply to them. Id. at 867. According to VCS I

, then, the limitation on the APA’s w aiver of sovereig n immunity d iscussed in Gallo Cattle is simply that a court is foreclosed by § 704 from e ntertaining c laims brought under the APA seeking review of non-f i n al ag ency action (and not otherwise permit t e d b y law). 3 2 “[ N] o such limitation,” Presbyterian Church

, 870 F .2d at 525, applies to

o t h e r ty pes o f claims (like the c onstitutional c laims i n Presbyterian Church ).

31 Gallo ap p ealed t o t

h e d istrict co u rt o n ly f

ro m th e Secretary ’ s d en i al

o f in t erim relief

—th e e s c r o w in g of th e disp u ted assessm en ts. T h e Secretary h ad n o t y et p assed o n , an d so Gallo d id n o t ap p eal, th e m erits of its First A m en d m en t ch allen g e. Ga llo Ca ttle , 1 5 9 F.3 d at 1 1 9 8

.

32 In ad d itio n to m ak in g rev i ew ab le f in al ag en cy actio n , th e A P A
p erm i ts s u it to “ co m

p el ag en cy actio n u n law f u lly w ith h eld or

u n reaso n ab ly

d elay ed .” 5 U.S.C. § 7 0 6

.N A V A J O N A T I O N V

. D E P ’ T O F I N T E R I O R 47

VCS I was vacated upon r ehearing en banc, so its analy sis does not stand as the law of the circuit. 3 3 B ut we b elieve the panel opinion persuasively reconciled Gallo Cattle a nd Presbyterian Church and so follow its lead.

F irst, the tex t of the second sentence of § 702 contains no limitation to “ final ag ency action,” to A PA cases, or to APA and constitutional cases. W e read statutes as written, subject
to v e ry limited ex ceptions, none of which apply here. 3 4 A s there is n o basis for reading into the amendment to § 702 lang uag e that is not there, we should not do so. And, a s VCS I c oncluded, n othing i n Gallo Cattle requires us to adopt an atex tual reading of § 702, as Gallo Cattle concerned a cause of action under the APA. W e therefore hold, a s did VCS I
, that § 702 waives sovereig n immuni t y f or all n on-monetary claims; § 704’s final a g ency action requir e ment constrains only actions broug ht under the APA.

The district court concluded otherwise, view i n g Presbyterian Church as a n ex ception to § 704 for constitutional claims only

. B y so holding

, t h e d istrict court took the wrong path.

W h at Presbyterian Church actually determined was that when Cong r ess amended § 702 by adding its second sentence, it enacted an “unqualified” waiver of sovereig n immunity in

33 Vetera n s fo r Co mmo n S en s e v. S h in seki

, 6 7 8 F.3 d 1 0 1 3 (9 th Cir. 2 0 1 2 ) (en b an c).

34 “ It is w ell estab lish ed th at w h en th e statu t e’ s lan g u ag e is p lain

, th e

so le f u n ctio n o f th e co u rts—at l east w h ere th e d i sp o sitio n req u ired b y th e tex t is n o t ab su

rd —is to en f

o rce it acco rd in g to i ts term s.” La mie v. U .S

. Tr. , 5 4 0 U.S. 5 2 6 , 5 3 4 (2 0 04 ).N A V A J O N A T I O N V

. D E P ’ T O F I N T E R I O R 48

“all actions seeking relief from official misconduct ex cept for
money damag es.” Presbyterian Church

, 870 F .2d a t 525. This Court has long so u nderstood the opinion—that is, a s holding that § 702 w aives “whatever sovereig n immunity the United States enjoy ed fro m p r ospective relief” with respect to “any action for injunctive relief.” Cabrera v. Martin
, 973 F

. 2d 735, 741 (9 t h Cir. 1992) (citing Presbyterian Church

, 870 F .2d at 5 2 4–25) (emphasis omitted); see also Hill v

. U nited States
, 571 F .2d 1098, 1102 (9th C i r

. 1 9 78) (“[ Section 7 0 2 ] i s c ast as a blanket waiver of sovereig n immunity as to a broad categ ory of actions aga i n st the
g overnment”); Clinton v. Babbitt

, 180 F .3d 108 1
, 1 087 (9th Cir. 1999) ( holding t h a t § 702 f latly “ex pressly w aived” immunity for non-statutory claims for “nonmonetary relief
ag ainst the United States”).

Gallo Cattle is fully c onsistent with this understanding o f Presbyterian Church

, a

nd o f § 702, as Gallo Cattle addressed

a claim broug ht directly under the APA. E v en if sovereig n immunity is waived for c laims not invol ving “final ag ency action,” § 704’s requirement that to proceed under the APA,
ag ency action must be final or otherwise reviewable b y statute is an independent element w i t hout which courts may not d etermine APA claims. Section 7 0 2
, notably

, ex pressly
preserves the § 704 limitations, among many others, b y provi d ing that nothing in § 702 “affects other limitations on judicia l re v i e w or the p ower or duty of the court to dismiss
any a ction or d e n y relief on a ny other appropriate leg al o r equitable g round.” 5 U .S.C. § 702; se e a l s o Darby v

. Cisneros
, 509 U.S. 137, 153 (1993) (noting that the f inality requirement for actions broug ht under the APA, 5 U .S.C. § 704, is u n d i minished by § 702’s w aiver o f sovereig n immunity ).N A V A J O N A T I O N V

. D E P ’ T O F I N T E R I O R 49

Read this way , Gallo Cattle has much to say about t h e elements of the APA cause of action, and little to say about sovereig n immunity

. 3 5 As noted, missing from Gallo Cattle is a ny discussion o f Presbyt erian Church

. This sig nificant omission is further evide nce that Gallo Cattle g overns only in c ase s where, unlike Presbyterian Church

, the APA supplies the cause of acti o n

. F or non-APA claims, “it is Presby t e r ian Church and n o t Gallo Cattle that controls.” VCS I , 644 F

. 3d at 866.

Our conclusion— t hat the second sentence of § 702 waives sovereig n immunity broadly for all caus e s of action that meet its terms, w h i le § 704’s “final ag e ncy action” limitation applies only t o APA claims—is consistent with

case law in a lmost all our sibling circuits. I n Trudeau v. F TC
, for ex a mple, the D.C. Circuit rejected a g overnment ag e ncy ’s
arg ument that § 702’s waiver is “ restricted to c o n d u c t that falls within th[ e] compass” of final ag ency action. 456 F .3d 178, 186 (D.C. Cir. 2006). The court n oted, as have we, that the lang uag e o f the APA “provides no support” for a cramped reading of the waiver incorporating § 70 4 ’ s final ag ency action requirement, and that the l e gi slative history likewise offers no basis for that p osition. Id. at 187. Rather, both the statutory lang u ag e and i t s h i story counsel a broad waiver o f “any ” and “all” immunity f or non-mo netary claims. Id.

35 W e d raw co n f

id en ce f ro m th is co u rt’ s v ary in g ch aracterizatio n s of th e issu e i n Ga llo Ca t t l e : w h eth er th e A P A “ v ested [th e co u rt] w i th j u risd ictio n ,” 1 5 9 F.3 d at 1 19 6 ; th e co u rt “ h ad j u risd i ctio n to rev iew ” th e d en ial o f relief “ p u rsu an t to th e j u d icial rev iew p ro v isio n s o f th e [A P A ],” id

. at 1 1 9 8 ; th e o rd er w as “ rev i ew ab l e ,” id

. ; o r th e A PA “ v est[ed ] th e d istrict co u rt w ith j u risd ictio n to rev iew th e ord er,” id

. at 1 1 9 9

. O n ly o n ce d o es Ga l lo C

a t tle ch aracterize th e issu e as o n e o f so v ereig n im m u n ity

. Id

. at 1 1 9 8

.N A V A J O N A T I O N V

. D E P ’ T O F I N T E R I O R 50

( i nternal citations omitted). O ther c ircuits are in near

unanimity

. 3 6

I n sum, pig eonholing Presbyterian Church as a case about constitutional claims a lone, as the district court did, is
not supported b y the statute, the lang u a g e of the case, or any of our case law interpreting the statute, before or a fter Presbyterian Church . I nstead, we read G allo Cattle in lig ht of its facts to be a case primarily about the justiciabili ty o f APA c laims challeng ing non-final action. This reading does
not trench at all upon Presbyterian Church or our other cases recog niz ing that § 702 enacted a broad, unqual i f i e d w aiver for a l l n o n-monetary c laims for r elief ag ainst federal

36 S ee Red La ke Ba n d o

f C h ip pewa In d ia ns v. Ba rlo w , 8 4 6 F.2 d 4 7 4
, 4 7 5

– 7 6 (8 th Cir. 1 9 8 8 ) (rej ectin g th e arg u m en t th at § 7 0 2 ’ s w aiv er “ ex ists

o n ly to allo w rev iew o f a f in al ag en cy d ecisio n ” in In d ian tru st claim s an d h o ld in g th at it d ep en d s o n ly “ o n th e su it ag ain st th e g o v ern m en t b ein g on e f o r n o n

- m o n etary relief

”); Tr e a s u r e r o

f N .J. v. U.S

. Dep ’t o

f Trea su ry , 6 8 4 F.3 d 38 2
, 4 0 0 (3 d Cir. 2 0 1 2 ) (“ Sectio n 7 0 4 co n cern s w h eth er a p lain tif f h as a cau se o f actio n u n d er th e A P A t h at can su rv iv e a m o tio n to d ism iss u n d er Ru le 1 2 (b )(6 ) b u t d o es n o t p ro v id e a b asis f o r d ism issal on g ro u n d s o f so v ereig n im m u n ity ” ) ; M

i ch ig a n v. U.S

. Army C o rp s o f En g ’ rs , 6 6 7 F.3 d 7 6 5
, 7 7 5 (7 th Cir. 20 1 1 ) (“ [T ]h e co n d itio n s o f § 7 0 4 af f ect th e rig h t o f actio n co n tain ed in th e f irst sen ten ce o f § 70 2
, b u t th ey d o n o t lim it th e w aiv er o f im m u n ity in § 7 0 2 ’ s seco n d sen t en ce.”) (citin g VCS I
, 6 4 4 F.3 d at 8 66

– 6 8); Mu niz-Mu n iz v. U.S

. Bo rd er Pa tro l

, 7 4 1 F.3 d 6 6 8
, 6 7 2 (6 th Cir. 2 0 1 3 ) (sam e); Dela n o Fa rms Co

. v. C a l. Ta b le Gra

p e Co mm ’ n , 6 5 5 F.3 d 1 3 37
, 1 34 4 (Fed

. Cir. 2 0 1 1 ) (sam e); see a l so Un ited S ta tes v. Mitch ell

, 4 6 3 U.S. 2 0 6
, 2 27 & n .3 2 (1 9 83 ) (n o tin g t h at C o n g ress

“ en acted a g en eral co n se n t ” in § 70 2 to claim s f o r d eclarato ry an d in j u n ctiv e relief in a case alleg in g b reach o f f id u ciary d u ty reg ard i n g trib al tim b er reso u rces). T h e Fif

th Circu it ap pears to b e alo n e in h o ld in g to th e

co n trary

. See Ala ba ma -Co u sh a t ta Trib e o f Texa s v. Un ited Sta tes , 7 5 7 F

. 3 d 4 8 4
, 48 9 (5 t

h Cir. 20 1 4 ) (“ th e p l ain tif f m u st id en tif

y s o m e

‘ ag en cy actio n ’ af

f ectin g ” i t as d ef

in ed u n d er 5 U.S.C. § 5 5 1 (1 3 ) to av ail itself o f § 7 0 2 ’ s w aiv er).N A V A J O N A T I O N V

. D E P ’ T O F I N T E R I O R 51

ag encies. And, our reading b est squares the holding s o f Presbyterian C

h u r c h and Gallo Cattle in lig ht of the tex t o f § 702, the leg islative history of the provision, and the strong weig ht of authority

in the federal courts.

C. The Nation’s Breach of Trust Claim s

Here, th e Nation in its breach of trust claim ag ainst I nterior seek s “relief other than money damag es” for c laims “that an ag ency or an officer or employ ee thereo f a c t e d o r failed to act in an o fficial capacity

. ” 5 U.S.C. § 7 02. The waiver of sovereig n immunity in § 702 applies squarely to the Nation’s breach of trust claim.

The district court ex pressed some tentative views on the merits of this claim but ultim a t e l y rested its d ismissal squarely o n the bar of sovereig n i m munity

. W e therefore remand to the district court to consider full y t h e Nation’s breach of t r ust claim in the first instance, after entertaining
any request to amend the claim more fully to flesh it out.

V. RULE 60(B) RELIEF F ROM JUDG MENT

After the district court entered judg ment ag ai n s t the Nation, the Nation moved for relief under F e d e r a l R ule o f Civil Procedure 60(b)(6), seeking to re-open the proceeding s

so that it could a mend its pleading s. Where n o n e o f R ule 60 ( b)’s five enumerated circumstances applies, its catch-all provision permits a court to g rant relief f or “any other reason that jus t i f i es relief.” F ed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(6). The district
court denied the motion because the Nation had failed to cure its pleading d eficiencies in previous amendments, d i d n ot

ex p lain why its c laims would be time-barred after d ismissal without prejudice, and did n o t spell out with sufficientN A V A J O N A T I O N V

. D E P ’ T O F I N T E R I O R 52

specificity how it intended to amend its c o m p l a i nt. “W e review the d istrict court’s denial o f a Rule 60(b) m o t i o n for

an abuse of discretion

. ” Delay v. Gordon

, 475 F

. 3d 1039, 1043 (9th Cir. 2007).

Be c a use w e reverse the district court’s dismissal of the Nation’s breach of trust claim, its appeal from the district court’s denial of its 60(b) motion is moot t o t h e ex tent the Nation soug ht t o amend its complaint to plead additional o r alternative w aivers of sovereig n immunity

. See Thompson v

. Calderon , 151 F .3d 918, 920 (9th Cir. 1998) (en banc). Our affirmance of the dist r i c t c ourt’s dismissal of the Nation’s NEPA c laims, however, r e q uires us to address this appeal insofar as the Nation soug ht to replead those claims.

A court should “freely g ive leave [ to amend] when justice

so requires,” F ed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2), a policy “to b e a pplied with ex treme liberality

. ” Morongo Band of Mission Indians

v. Rose
, 8 93 F .2d 1074, 1079 (9th Cir. 1990). B ut “after final judg ment h a s b e e n entered, a Rule 15(a) motion may be considered only

if the judg ment is first r eopened under Rule 59 or 60.” Lindauer v. Rogers
, 9 1 F .3d 1 355, 1356 (9th Cir. 1996).

I n c ontrast to the “freely

g ive[ n ] ” dispensation to amend in Rule 15, Rule 60(b) relief should b e g ranted “sparing ly ” to avoid “ m a n i fest injustice” and “ only w here ex traordinary circumstances prevented a party from taking timely a ction to prevent or correct an erroneous judg ment.” United States v

. Alpine Land & Reservoir Co.
, 984 F

. 2 d 1047, 1049 (9th Cir. 1993) (emphasis added). “Rule 6 0(b)(6) relief normally will
not b e g ranted unless the moving party is able to show both injury a nd that circumsta n c e s bey ond its control prevented timely action to protect its interests.” Id. A fter judg ment,N A V A J O N A T I O N V

. D E P ’ T O F I N T E R I O R 53

then, “our policy of promoting the f inality of judg ments”

s o m e w h a t d isplaces Rule 15’s openhandedness. Lindauer

, 9 1 F .3d at 1357.

Con t r a r y to the district court, we do think the Nation sufficiently e x plained why the d istrict c ourt’s dism i s s a l o f claims was effectively

with prejudice—because the relevant
statutes of limitations had r u n o n those claims. See 28 U .S.C. § 2 4 0 1 ( a ) (six -y ear statute of limitations ag ainst the United States). N onetheless, the d istrict court did not abuse its discretion in deny ing the Nation relief from final judg ment to allow leave to amend.

The N ation amended its complaint twice before the court dismissed its claims. Althoug h th e Nation arg ues that it amended its c o mplaint each time for other r easons, 3 7 it h ad

a m ple opportunity at those junctures to address t h e deficiencies in its pleading —deficiencies which, at l e a s t at the time th e S econd Amended Complaint was filed, the defendants had identified in their motions to dismiss. See Premo v. Martin
, 119 F .3d 764, 772 ( 9th Cir. 1997); W eeks

v. Bayer
, 246 F .3d 1231, 1 236 (9th C i r

. 2 001). The Nation also had time after filing its Second Amended Complaint, but before the court dismissed its claims, to seek further leave to amend. See Premo
, 119 F .3d at 7 7 2 ( noting the plaintiff’s “amp l e o p p ortunity to file an amended complaint w ith new alleg ations before the court issued its final j udg ment”). B ased on the Na tion’s past failures to amend its complaints and its present failure specifically to ident i f y how it would amend its pleading to overcome its standing probl ems, the

37 T h e Natio n

f i rst am en ded its co m

p lain t to b rin g it u

p to d ate af

ter

a n early d ecad e- lo n g stay p en d in g u n su ccessf

u l settlem en t talk s. It l ater

am en d ed th e co m

p lain t to v o lu n tarily

strik e o n e o f

its claim s.N A V A J O N A T I O N V

. D E P ’ T O F I N T E R I O R 54

district court reasonably concluded t h a t t he Nation had not neg ated futility

.

Given the Nation’s opportunities (and failures) to amend, the district c ourt acted within its discretion in refusing postjudg ment leave to amend.

VI. CONCLUSION

The Nation lacks A rticle I I I standing for its NEPA c laims and is not e ntitled to relief from judg ment under Rule 60(b) to amend its pleading s as to those alleg ations. The Nation’s breach of trust c laim, however, is not barred b y sovereig n immunity

. A s t h e d ismissal of that claim on sovereig n immunity g rounds was unwarranted, we r emand to the district
court to consi d er the claim on its merits, after entertaining
any request to amend it.

AF F IRMED IN P A RT, REVERSED IN P ART, AND REMANDED.