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*********************************************** 
MARIE FAIN v. BETHANY BENAK ET AL.

(AC 43898)

Alvord, Cradle and Eveleigh, Js.

Syllabus

The plaintiff sought to recover damages for personal injuries that she sustained when her vehicle was struck by a vehicle driven by the defendant

B, an employee of the defendant Department of Administrative Services.

The plaintiff alleged that her injuries were the result of B’s negligence.

Following a trial to the court, the court rendered judgment in favor of

the plaintiff and awarded damages. The plaintiff filed a motion for

reconsideration as to her claimed future medical expenses, and attached

to that motion a letter from her treating physician, G, which had been

admitted as a full exhibit at trial. The letter stated that it was more

probable than not that the plaintiff would require future medical treatment. The court granted the plaintiff’s motion, awarded additional damages, and the defendant Department of Administrative Services appealed

to this court. Held:

1. The defendant Department of Administrative Services could not prevail

on its claim that the trial court erred in declining to apply the unavoidable

accident doctrine, which was based on its claim that B was not negligent

because she experienced a sudden emergency caused by the blowout

of her left front tire: because the court found that B was negligent and

caused the collision with the plaintiff’s vehicle, the accident could not

be considered unavoidable as a matter of law; the court determined

that B was negligent in the way in which she operated the vehicle and

that her actions were the proximate cause of the plaintiff’s injuries, and,

because these findings were inapposite to a determination that the

record could support a finding that the negligence of neither party was

involved, the court correctly determined that its finding of negligence

necessarily precluded a finding that the accident was unavoidable.

2. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in granting the plaintiff’s motion

for reconsideration after it determined that she had presented sufficient

evidence to support an award of damages for future medical expenses:

G’s letter and certain additional evidence presented at trial supported

a conclusion that the plaintiff would incur future medical expenses and

also provided evidence as to the specific costs of those expenses; this

evidence took the plaintiff’s claimed future medical expenses out of the

realm of speculation, provided a degree of medical certainty that she

would need future care, and presented sufficient evidence from which

the court could approximate the costs of future medical treatment.

Argued March 10—officially released July 13, 2021

Procedural History

Action to recover damages for personal injuries the

plaintiff sustained as a result of the named defendant’s

alleged negligence, brought to the Superior Court in

the judicial district of New London, where the action

was withdrawn as to the named defendant; thereafter,

the case was tried to the court, Knox, J.; judgment for

the plaintiff, from which the defendant Department of

Administrative Services appealed to this court; subsequently, the court, Knox, J., granted the plaintiff’s

motion for reconsideration and awarded the plaintiff

additional damages, and the defendant Department of

Administrative Services amended its appeal; thereafter,

the court, Knox, J., denied the motion for reconsideration and to set aside the judgment filed by the defendant

Department of Administrative Services, and the defendant Department of Administrative Services amended
its appeal. Affirmed.

James E. Coyne, for the appellant (defendant Department of Administrative Services).

Charles K. Norris, with whom, on the brief, was

Anthony D. Sutton, for the appellee (plaintiff).
Opinion

ALVORD, J. The defendant Department of Administrative Services1 appeals from the judgment of the trial

court rendered in favor of the plaintiff, Marie Fain, in

this negligence action following a trial to the court. On

appeal, the defendant claims that the court erred in (1)

declining to apply the ‘‘unavoidable accident doctrine’’

to the facts of the case and (2) granting the plaintiff’s

motion for reconsideration after it determined that she

presented sufficient evidence to support an award of

damages for future medical expenses. We affirm the

judgment of the trial court.

The following facts, as found by the court in its memorandum of decision, and procedural history are relevant

to our discussion of the claims on appeal. On the morning of June 5, 2017, the plaintiff was driving south on

Flanders Road in East Lyme. The plaintiff was traveling

at the posted speed limit of thirty-five miles per hour.

The plaintiff drove this route daily during her commute

to her job as a school teacher. That morning, a vehicle

operated by the defendant’s employee, Bethany Benak,

struck the plaintiff’s vehicle.2 The collision happened

suddenly and without warning; the two vehicles were

heading in opposite directions and were in their respective lanes when Benak’s vehicle crossed into the plaintiff’s lane, the southbound lane, and struck the plaintiff’s

vehicle. On impact, the plaintiff’s vehicle spun and

entered the northbound lane, where it collided with

another vehicle. Finally, the plaintiff’s vehicle came to

a stop at a stone wall. On the basis of the plaintiff’s

testimony, which the court found was credible, the

court determined that during the course of the accident,

Benak’s vehicle crossed the center line and did not

slow down.

Just prior to the accident, Benak heard a popping

sound, and the vehicle she was operating pulled to the

left,3

toward the southbound lane of traffic. At trial, the

police officer who responded to the scene testified that

Benak’s front left tire appeared to have blown out, and

the court found that there was a tear in the tire. At the

time the tire burst, Benak did not know the speed at

which she was traveling, whether she had applied her

vehicle’s brakes, or how far she was from the plaintiff’s

vehicle.

After the accident, an ambulance transported the

plaintiff to the emergency department of a hospital. The

plaintiff sustained a fractured hip, a bruised kidney,

and a fractured arm as a result of the accident. Due to

the nature of the fracture, her arm required surgery to

attach a plate and screws to the broken bone. The

plaintiff remained hospitalized for four days before

being discharged to a rehabilitative center for two

weeks. Because of the fracture in her hip, the plaintiff

was ‘‘non-weight bearing’’ for approximately two
months and, as a result, spent much of her time in a

bed or a wheelchair. In addition to these physical ailments, the plaintiff was unable to take part in her normal

summertime activities and was unable to properly care

for herself or her family. Furthermore, the plaintiff was

unable to return to work as an elementary school

teacher until December, 2017, six months after the accident. At the time of trial, two and one-half years after

the accident, the plaintiff continued to experience pain

as a result of her injuries.

On August 15, 2018, the plaintiff commenced the present action. In the plaintiff’s operative complaint, filed

on December 2, 2019, she alleged that Benak was negligent and claimed that the defendant was liable for the

plaintiff’s damages pursuant to General Statutes § 52-

556.4 The case was tried to the court, Knox, J., on

December 12 and 13, 2019. Both parties submitted posttrial briefs. On January 15, 2020, the court issued its

memorandum of decision, in which it found that Benak

had negligently operated her vehicle and had caused the

collision with the plaintiff’s vehicle. The court rendered

judgment in favor of the plaintiff and awarded damages

in the amount of $344,867.33. This award included compensation for economic damages in the amount of

$84,867.335 and noneconomic damages in the amount

of $260,000.

In its memorandum of decision, the court found that it

was reasonably probable that the plaintiff would require

future surgery and physical therapy; however, the court

also found that there was ‘‘insufficient evidence upon

which to determine future medical expenses.’’ On January 23, 2020, the plaintiff filed a motion for reconsideration as to her claimed future medical expenses and

attached a letter from her treating physician, Daniel

Gaccione, which was admitted into evidence as a full

exhibit during trial. The defendant objected to the plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration. While the motion was

pending, the defendant filed this appeal. On February

11, 2020, the trial court granted the plaintiff’s motion for

reconsideration and awarded the plaintiff an additional

$14,250 in damages for future medical expenses.6

On February 3, 2020, while the plaintiff’s motion for

reconsideration remained pending, the defendant filed

a motion for reconsideration, reargument and to set

aside the judgment in favor of the plaintiff. On February

17, 2020, the court denied the defendant’s motion. The

defendant thereafter amended its appeal. Additional

facts will be set forth as necessary.

I

The defendant first claims that the trial court erred

in refusing to apply the ‘‘unavoidable accident doctrine’’

to the facts of the case. In particular, the defendant

argues that the court should have applied the ‘‘unavoidable accident doctrine’’ because ‘‘the blowout of the tire
was not foreseeable and amount[ed] to an unavoidable

accident.’’ We disagree.

Before we address the substance of the defendant’s

first claim, we set forth the appropriate standard of

review. The defendant maintains that whether a court

should apply the ‘‘unavoidable accident doctrine’’ is a

question of law subject to plenary review. The plaintiff,

on the other hand, maintains that our review is guided

by the abuse of discretion standard.

‘‘The scope of our appellate review depends upon

the proper characterization of the rulings made by the

trial court. To the extent that the trial court has made

findings of fact, our review is limited to deciding

whether such findings were clearly erroneous. When,

however, the trial court draws conclusions of law, our

review is plenary and we must decide whether its conclusions are legally and logically correct and find support in the facts as they appear in the record.’’ (Internal

quotation marks omitted.) DeLeo v. Equale & Cirone,

LLP, 202 Conn. App. 650, 659, 246 A.3d 988, cert. denied,

336 Conn. 927, 247 A.3d 577 (2021).

In its memorandum of decision, the court set forth

its determination with respect to the applicability of the

‘‘unavoidable accident doctrine’’ as follows: ‘‘In Shea v.

Tousignant, [172 Conn. 54, 372 A.2d 151] (1976), the

court held that liability cannot be imposed on the operator of a vehicle who has a sudden medical emergency

resulting in the loss of control of the vehicle. See also

Smith v. Czescel, [12 Conn. App. 558, 533 A.2d 223, cert.

denied, 206 Conn. 803, 535 A.2d 1316] (1987). The court

rejects the application of the ‘unavoidable accident’

doctrine for the following reasons. First, there is no

claim that Benak experienced a sudden medical emergency which prevented her . . . [from] maintain[ing]

control of the vehicle. This court will not by analogy

extend the doctrine to a mechanical issue with the

vehicle. Second, and more significantly, the court finds

that the plaintiff has sustained her burden of proof that

the driver of the state vehicle negligently operated her

vehicle and caused the collision with the plaintiff’s vehicle in one or more of the ways set forth in the operative

complaint.’’

The defendant does not argue clear error with respect

to the court’s factual finding that there was no claim

that Benak experienced a sudden medical emergency

that prevented her from controlling her vehicle or its

factual finding that Benak negligently operated her vehicle. Rather, the defendant claims only that the court

erred in declining to apply the concept of unavoidable

accident to these facts. Our resolution of this issue

depends on whether the court properly declined to

apply the ‘‘unavoidable accident doctrine’’ to the facts of

this case.7 Therefore, our standard of review is plenary.

Having established the standard of review, we turn
to the defendant’s claim that the court erred in refusing

to apply the ‘‘unavoidable accident doctrine.’’ The plaintiff responds that the ‘‘court’s decision to not apply the

unavoidable accident doctrine to the evidence adduced

at trial was correct, as the trial court clearly and

unequivocally found that the defendant’s operator was

negligent as alleged by the plaintiff in the operative

complaint.’’ We agree with the plaintiff.

The following additional facts are relevant to our

resolution of this claim. In the trial court’s memorandum of decision, the court expressly credited the plaintiff’s testimony that ‘‘the state vehicle when it was

approaching the plaintiff’s vehicle crossed the center

line and failed to slow down.’’ The court found that

‘‘the plaintiff [had] sustained her burden of proof that

the driver of the state vehicle negligently operated her

vehicle and caused the collision with the plaintiff’s vehicle in one or more of the ways set forth in the operative

complaint.’’ Further, the court determined that Benak’s

negligence was the proximate cause of the plaintiff’s

damages.

In her operative complaint, the plaintiff alleged that

Benak was negligent in a number of ways. The allegations relate to Benak’s actions after her tire blew out,

with the exception of the allegation that she failed to

adhere to the speed limit in the time leading up to the

accident. 8 Failing to remain in her lane, failing to brake,

and general inattentiveness while driving are among

the allegations.9

On the basis of these theories of liability and the

evidence presented at trial, the court determined that

the plaintiff proved that Benak ‘‘negligently operated

her vehicle and caused the collision with the plaintiff’s

vehicle . . . .’’ On the basis of the court’s conclusion

that the plaintiff proved that Benak negligently operated

her vehicle, the court ‘‘[rejected] the application of the

‘unavoidable accident’ doctrine’’ to the facts of the case.

The court elucidated that there was ‘‘no claim that

Benak experienced a sudden medical emergency which

prevented her [from] maintain[ing] control of the vehicle,’’ and it declined to extend ‘‘by analogy . . . the

doctrine to a mechanical issue with the vehicle.’’

On appeal, the defendant argues that, because Benak

‘‘experienced a sudden, unexpected emergency, caused

by the blowout of her left front tire causing her to cross

over the centerline of the highway and go partially into

the lane in which the plaintiff was operating her vehicle,’’ she was not negligent. It is the defendant’s position

that, ‘‘in order for the plaintiff to prevail the plaintiff

would have had to have produced evidence that . . .

Benak had some ‘premonition, warning, or advanced

notice’ that the tire on the subject vehicle was about

to blow out.’’ This argument is premised on the defendant’s claim that the ‘‘unavoidable accident doctrine’’

precludes liability. However, this argument is not
responsive to the plaintiff’s allegations or to the court’s

findings.

The defendant does not challenge on appeal the trial

court’s findings aside from its claim that the ‘‘unavoidable accident doctrine’’ precludes a finding of negligence and its related claim that, in order to prevail at

trial, the plaintiff needed to prove that Benak knew

of the impending blowout or negligently caused it to

occur.10 Ultimately, because the court found that Benak

was negligent, the accident cannot be considered

unavoidable or inevitable as a matter of law.

In support of its claim, the defendant relies on Professors Prosser and Keeton’s definition of ‘‘unavoidable

accident,’’ which provides that ‘‘[a]n unavoidable accident is an occurrence which is not intended and which,

under all the circumstances, could not have been foreseen or prevented by the exercise of reasonable precautions. That is, an accident is considered unavoidable or

inevitable at law if it was not proximately caused by

the negligence of any party to the action, or to the

accident. . . . [T]he driver of an automobile who suddenly loses control of the car because the driver is

seized with a heart attack, a stroke, a fainting spell, or

an epileptic fit is not liable, unless the driver knew that

he might become ill, in which case he may have been

negligent in driving the car at all.’’ (Footnotes omitted.)

W. Keeton et al., Prosser and Keeton on the Law of

Torts (5th Ed. 1984) § 29, p. 162.

In Connecticut, this concept has been incorporated

into a model jury instruction, which provides: ‘‘The

defendant claims that any injury suffered by the plaintiff

was the result of an unusual or unexpected event and

was not the result of either party’s negligence. If you

find that the alleged injuries and/or losses in question

did not result from either the defendant’s or the plaintiff’s negligence but were caused solely by some other

happening, then the defendant is not liable to the plaintiff.’’ Connecticut Civil Jury Instructions 3.6-16, available at https://www.jud.ct.gov/JI/Civil/Civil.pdf (last visited July 7, 2021). Our Supreme Court has condoned

this instruction only in the context of a driver losing

consciousness while operating a motor vehicle. See

Shea v. Tousignant, supra, 172 Conn. 56, 58 (directing

trial court to provide instruction on remand in case

in which defendant passed out or fell asleep without

warning). Additionally, on more than one occasion, the

court has expressed disapproval of the charge. See, e.g.,

Tomczuk v. Alvarez, 184 Conn. 182, 190–91, 439 A.2d

935 (1981); see also W. Keeton et al., supra, § 29, p. 163

(noting that instructions on doctrine have fallen into

disfavor in many states).

The concept of unavoidable accident does not excuse

a defendant from liability. Rather, it contextualizes the

question of whether an actor has been negligent. See

Tomczuk v. Alvarez, supra, 184 Conn. 190–91. Indeed,
our Supreme Court has explained that ‘‘[a]n instruction

on unavoidable accident serves no useful purpose and

functions to confuse and mislead the jury and direct

their attention from the primary issues of negligence,

proximate cause and burden of proof. An additional,

unnecessary instruction on the concept of unavoidable

accident would only complicate the rules concerning

negligence, proximate cause and burden of proof which

must be explained to the jury. Instructions concerning

unavoidable accident usually should be given only when

the record can support a finding that the negligence of

neither party is involved. When a foundation has been

established it still remains within the sound discretion

of the trial judge to determine whether an unavoidable

accident charge is appropriate. Even if we assume an

abuse of discretion, instructions on negligence, proximate cause and burden of proof could operate as a

sufficient substitute for the unavoidable [accident]

charge so as to preclude us from finding error.’’ Id.; see

also Barrese v. DeFillippo, 45 Conn. App. 102, 108–109,

694 A.2d 797 (1997).

In the present case, the court, acting as the fact finder,

determined that Benak was negligent in the way in

which she operated her vehicle, noting issues with her

speed and braking, and that her actions were the proximate cause of the plaintiff’s injuries. Because these

findings are inapposite to a determination that ‘‘the

record can support a finding that the negligence of

neither party is involved’’; (internal quotation marks

omitted) Barrese v. DeFillippo, supra, 45 Conn. App.

108; the court correctly determined that its finding of

negligence necessarily precluded a finding that the accident was unavoidable.11

II

The defendant’s second claim is that the court erred

in granting the plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration and

in increasing the award of damages to include future

medical expenses. We disagree.

The question of whether to grant a motion for reconsideration ‘‘is within the sound discretion of the court.’’

Shore v. Haverson Architecture & Design, P.C., 92

Conn. App. 469, 479, 886 A.2d 837 (2005), cert. denied,

277 Conn. 907, 894 A.2d 988 (2006). ‘‘The standard of

review regarding challenges to a court’s ruling on a

motion for reconsideration is abuse of discretion. As

with any discretionary action of the trial court . . . the

ultimate [question for appellate review] is whether the

trial court could have reasonably concluded as it did.’’

(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id.

The following additional facts are relevant to our

resolution of this claim. As discussed previously, the

court, in its memorandum of decision, determined that

there was insufficient evidence on which to determine

future medical expenses. In support of her motion for
reconsideration, the plaintiff attached a letter from her

physician, which was admitted as a full exhibit during

the trial. Gaccione stated in his letter: ‘‘With [regard]

to further treatment, there is a better than 50 [percent]

chance that it may be necessary to remove [the plaintiff’s] left forearm hardware in the future. In addition,

she may require physical therapy treatment for up to

[ten] visits on an annual basis for the next several years

while she continues to recover from her right hip and

lower back injuries. In other words, it is more probable

than not that she would require this treatment related

to her left ulna and right acetabular fracture/lumbar

sprain in the future.’’ Gaccione went on to state that

future arm surgery would cost between $6000 and $8000

and that physical therapy usually costs between $100

and $150 per visit. At trial, the plaintiff also introduced

a summary of her physical therapy visits showing that

she already had incurred $4987 in physical therapy bills;

this exhibit was entered into evidence in full. Additionally, in its initial memorandum of decision, the court

found that the plaintiff had a life expectancy of thirtyseven years. Upon review of the plaintiff’s motion and

over the defendant’s objection, the court found ‘‘that

the plaintiff offered sufficient evidence of the reasonable cost of future medical expenses for the surgical

removal of hardware for the right acetabular fracture

and physical therapy treatments. The court award[ed]

the plaintiff future medical expenses in the sum total

of $14,250.’’

On appeal, the defendant argues that because the

letter from Gaccione ‘‘does not provide the court . . .

with sufficient evidence to make a reasonable estimate

of the cost of such treatment . . . [and] does not provide the court with sufficient evidence upon which to

calculate how much physical therapy is going to be

necessary and for how long . . . the award of . . .

future medical expenses is not supported by the evidence . . . .’’ We disagree.

‘‘Damages for the future consequences of an injury

can never be forecast with certainty.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Marchetti v. Ramirez, 240 Conn.

49, 56, 688 A.2d 1325 (1997). Accordingly, an award

of future medical expenses should be ‘‘based upon an

estimate of reasonable probabilities, not possibilities.

. . . The obvious purpose of this requirement is to prevent the [fact finder] from awarding damages for future

medical expenses based merely on speculation or conjecture. Because, however, [f]uture medical expenses

do not require the same degree of certainty as past

medical expenses . . . [i]t is not speculation or conjecture to calculate future medical expenses based upon

the history of medical expenses that have accrued as

of the trial date . . . when there is also a degree of

medical certainty that future medical expenses will

be necessary.’’ (Citations omitted; emphasis in original;

internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 54–55.
In Marchetti, the plaintiff’s treating physician

‘‘expressed the opinion that the plaintiff [would] require

future medical treatment for his injuries.’’ Id., 55.

Although the physician could not estimate the costs of

that future treatment, our Supreme Court determined

that the jury reasonably could have awarded the plaintiff damages for future medical expenses because ‘‘the

evidence established that the plaintiff had received

medical treatment for his injuries on a regular basis

since the date of the accident,’’ and because the plaintiff

established life expectancy and total costs of treatment

as of the date of trial. Id., 56.

In the present case, Gaccione’s letter and the additional evidence presented at trial support a conclusion

that the plaintiff would incur future medical expenses

and also provided evidence as to the costs of her future

medical expenses. Specifically, the plaintiff submitted

evidence of the treatment she likely would need in the

future (follow-up arm surgery and physical therapy),

the costs of such treatment (between $6000 and $8000

for the arm surgery and between $100 and $150 per

physical therapy appointment), the approximate length

of time she would need physical therapy (several years),

her past medical expenses (including $4987 for physical

therapy), and her life expectancy (thirty-seven years).

This evidence took the plaintiff’s claimed future medical

expenses out of the realm of speculation, provided ‘‘a

degree of medical certainty’’ that she would need future

care, and presented sufficient evidence from which the

court could approximate the costs of future medical

treatment. (Emphasis omitted; internal quotation marks

omitted.) Marchetti v. Ramirez, supra, 240 Conn. 55.

Thus, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in

granting the motion for reconsideration and in

determining that this evidence was sufficient to support

the award of future medical expenses.

The judgment is affirmed.

In this opinion the other judges concurred.

1 Although the plaintiff’s complaint originally also named Bethany Benak

as a defendant, the plaintiff subsequently withdrew her complaint against

Benak, and Benak is not a party to this appeal. We refer in this opinion to

the Department of Administrative Services as the defendant.

2 The defendant admits that Benak ‘‘was operating a vehicle owned and

insured by the defendant . . . and with its full permission and consent,’’

and that her operation of the vehicle was in the course of her employment

when the accident occurred.

3

In its memorandum of decision, the court stated that Benak testified

that ‘‘prior to the impact, she heard a pop-like sound and experienced the

car pull to the right,’’ but, as noted by the defendant in its principal appellate

brief, Benak’s testimony indicates that the vehicle pulled to the left and into

the other lane of traffic.

4 General Statutes § 52-556 provides: ‘‘Any person injured in person or

property through the negligence of any state official or employee when

operating a motor vehicle owned and insured by the state against personal

injuries or property damage shall have a right of action against the state to

recover damages for such injury.’’

5 The award of economic damages included compensation for medical

bills ($59,699.05), lost wages ($23,289), and expenses incurred to modify

the plaintiff’s home to accommodate her wheelchair ($1909.28).
6 The defendant filed a motion for articulation and rectification as to the

court’s award of damages for future medical expenses. The court denied

the motion. The defendant did not seek review of the court’s ruling denying

its motion for articulation.

7 We note that a trial court’s denial of a request to charge the jury on

unavoidable accident is subject to abuse of discretion review. See Tomczuk

v. Alvarez, 184 Conn. 182, 190–91, 439 A.2d 935 (1981); see also Barrese v.

DeFillippo, 45 Conn. App. 102, 108–109, 694 A.2d 797 (1997). In the present

case, however, plenary review is appropriate to address the applicability of

the unavoidable accident concept in light of the court’s unchallenged findings

of negligence.

8 The plaintiff’s allegations in her operative complaint are as follows:

Benak (1) ‘‘[f]ailed to grant one half of the highway to the plaintiff’s vehicle

in violation of’’ General Statutes § 14-231; (2) ‘‘[f]ailed to pass to the right

of the plaintiff’s vehicle in violation of’’ § 14-231; (3) ‘‘[f]ailed to grant the

right of way to the plaintiff’s motor vehicle’’; (4) ‘‘[f]ailed to grant one half

of the highway to the plaintiff’s motor vehicle’’; (5) ‘‘[f]ailed to operate her

motor vehicle upon the right in violation of’’ General Statutes § 14-230; (6)

‘‘[f]ailed to keep a proper and reasonable lookout for other motor vehicles

on the highway’’; (7) ‘‘[f]ailed to apply her brakes in time to avoid a collision

although by a proper and reasonable exercise . . . of her faculties, she

could and should have done so’’; (8) ‘‘[f]ailed to turn her motor vehicle so

as to avoid a collision with the plaintiff’s motor vehicle’’; (9) ‘‘[f]ailed to

sound her horn or otherwise warn the plaintiff of the impending collision’’;

(10) ‘‘[f]ailed to take reasonable precautions to avoid the collision’’; (11)

‘‘[f]ailed to keep her motor vehicle under proper and reasonable control’’;

(12) ‘‘[w]as inattentive and failed to keep and maintain a reasonable and

proper lookout’’; (13) ‘‘[o]perated her motor vehicle at an excessive rate of

speed in violation of’’ General Statutes §14-219; (14) ‘‘[o]perated her motor

vehicle at a rate of speed greater than was reasonable, having regard to

traffic, highway, weather, and other conditions, in violation of’’ General

Statutes §14-218a; (15) ‘‘[o]perated her motor vehicle at an excessive rate

of speed under the circumstances then and there existing’’; (16) ‘‘[o]perated

her motor vehicle on the left side of the highway in violation of’’ General

Statutes §§ 14-235 and 14-234; (17) ‘‘[d]rove her motor vehicle on the left

side of the highway into the path of the plaintiff’s vehicle; and (18) ‘‘[f]ailed

to operate her motor vehicle within her single lane of traffic in violation

of’’ General Statutes § 14-236.

9 At no point does the plaintiff claim that Benak negligently caused the

blowout or that she had notice of the impending mechanical problem.

10 The defendant asserts that this issue is based on a question of law,

indicating that it does not dispute the trial court’s factual findings.

11 Because the court found that the plaintiff’s injuries were a result of

Benak’s negligence and were not caused by an unavoidable accident, we

need not address whether this concept applies to mechanical issues.