No. 96-518 

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 

IN RE THE MARRIAGE OF 

DEBRA ANN HARSELL, 

Petitioner and Respondent, 

and 

DENNIS MIRL HARSELL, 

Respondent and Appellant. 

APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Fourth Judicial District, 

In and for the County of Missoula, 

The Honorable Douglas G. Harkin, Judge presiding 

COUNSEL OF RECORD: 

For Appellant: 

Dennis Mirl Harsell, Pro Se, San Lorenzo, 

California 

For Respondent: 

Byron W. Boggs, Attorney at Law, Missoula, 

Montana 

Filed: 

Submitted on Briefs: December 19, 1996 

Decided : February 6, 1997 
Justice Karla M. Gray delivered the Opinion of the Court 

Pursuant to Section I, Paragraph 3(c), Montana Supreme Court 

1995 Internal Operating Rules, the following decision shall not be 

cited as precedent and shall be published by its filing as a public 

document with the Clerk of the Supreme Court and by a report of its 

result to State Reporter Publishing Company and West Publishing 

Company. 

Dennis Mirl Harsell, appearing pro se, appeals from the denial 

by the Fourth Judicial District Court, Missoula County, of his 

motion to reconsider. We affirm. 

The issue on appeal is whether the District Court abused its 

discretion in denying Dennis' motion to reconsider. 

BACKGROUND 

The marriage of Dennis Mirl Harsell (Dennis) and Debra Ann 

Harsell (Debra) was dissolved by the District Court on May 11, 

1987. The decree incorporated the parties' Marital and Property 

Settlement Agreement which provided, in pertinent part, that Debra 

be awarded sole custody of the minor child Jaime Nichole Harsell 

(Jaime), subject to liberal visitation by Dennis, and that Dennis 

pay child support in the amount of $100 per month and maintain 

major medical and hospital insurance covering Jaime. Dennis and 

Debra were each to be responsible for one-half of any medical 

expenses incurred on Jaime's behalf which were not covered by 

insurance. Dennis was to receive the income tax exemption for 

Jaime as long as his child support payments remained current. In 

1989, the parties filed a stipulation in the District Court 

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increasing the child support payments to $175. 

On February 8, 1996, Debra filed a motion to modify child 

support. She alleged that the costs of raising Jaime had increased 

substantially, that Dennis' income had increased substantially, 

that Dennis had been receiving the benefit of the income tax 

exemption for Jaime even though he was paying substantially less 

than 50% of her support, and that Dennis had neither provided 

medical insurance for Jaime nor paid uncovered medical bills. 

Debra requested that the amount of child support due from Dennis be 

increased to the amount required by the Montana Child Support 

Guidelines (Guidelines), that she be granted the right to claim 

Jaime as an income tax exemption, and that Dennis again be required 

to provide medical insurance and pay one-half of uncovered medical 

expenses. 

On May 31, 1996, Debra moved for a default ruling on her 

motion on the basis of Dennis' failure to respond; absent a 

financial affidavit from Dennis upon which child support due under 

the Guidelines could be calculated, she requested that the District 

Court set Dennis' support obligation at $250 per month. On June 

4, 1996, the District Court granted Debra's motion to modify child 

support by default and awarded her the relief requested. 

On June 10, 1996, Dennis filed a motion for extension of time 

to respond to Debra's motion to modify child support. He recounted 

therein that he had attempted to respond earlier via certified 

letter to the presiding judge and only later learned that judges do 

not accept such certified mail; according to Dennis, he then 
attempted to file his letter as his formal response to Debra's 

motion, but the letter was returned on March 11, 1996, for lack of 

conformance to applicable rules of practice. While he sought a 10- 

day extension of time, to and including June 20, 1996, within which 

to respond to Debra's motion either through counsel or pro se, in 

essence he was requesting that his default be vacated. The 

District Court denied Dennis' motion for extension of time the same 

day it was filed. 

On June 7.1, 1996, Dennis moved the District Court to 

reconsider its denial of his June 10 motion. He reasserted the 

matters mentioned in his earlier motion and that he had not been 

told " [iln all this time" that a response to Debra's motion was 

required within a specified time period. He also stated that he 

had "vital information" about the motion to modify of which the 

court should be aware; none of the "vital information" was set 

forth in the motion or in a sworn affidavit. The District Court 

denied Dennis' motion for reconsideration on June 24, 1996. 

On July 1, 1996, Dennis filed al'Response to Motion to Modify 

Child Support." On July 16, he filed a notice of appeal from the 

District Court's denial of his motion requesting reconsideration of 

the court's earlier denial of his motion to set aside the default 

and for extension of time to respond. 

On August 12, 1996, Dennis moved the District Court for a 

"stay of execution of judgment" pending his appeal. On August 15, 

1996, the District Court granted a stay conditioned on payment by 

Dennis to the Clerk of the District Court of all sums owed, to be 
held by the Clerk and not disbursed to Debra until further order of 

the court. The same day, but apparently after the District Court's 

grant of the conditional stay, Debra filed her opposition to 

Dennis' motion for a stay; she also requested that Dennis be 

required to post a supersedeas bond pending appeal 

On August 20, Dennis filed a "Motion to Find Respondent in 

Contempt of Court," in which he asserted that Debra was denying his 

telephonic visitation with Jaime. Five days later, Dennis filed 

another motion for contempt, which was identical to the earlier 

motion except that he changed an incorrect designation of Debra as 

"Respondentw in the earlier motion. On August 27, 1996, the 

District Court vacated its order granting a conditional stay. 

Did the District Court abuse its discretion in denying 

Dennis' motion to reconsider? 

We observe at the outset that Dennis' brief on appeal is 

approximately three pages long and contains neither a statement of 

the case, a statement of the facts, a statement of the issues on 

appeal, citation to legal authority in support of arguments 

asserting legal error by the District Court, nor legal analysis. 

All of these are requirements for a brief on appeal to this Court, 

as set forth in Rule 23, M.R.App.P.; none has been met here. 

We understand that Dennis is appearing pro se and that his 

understanding of legal procedures and requirements is less than 

adequate. We also understand the importance to Dennis of the child 

support issue raised by Debra's motion to modify and that he feels 

that he has been wronged by the actions of the District Court in 

this case. Moreover, we attempt to make reasonable accommodations 

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for persons appearing pro se. 

We are, however, a court of law whose obligation is to 

determine the legal issues presented by the parties to an appeal 

under controlling legal principles. We cannot frame the issues for 

the appealing party, cite to the legal authorities which arguably 

might support that party's position, and construct the legal 

analysis--pursuant to those authorities--which we might then find 

persuasive on behalf of that party. To do so would convert this 

Court into an advocate for one party, in total derogation of our 

role as the interpreter and applier of the law. Furthermore, while 

such actions might appear entirely fair to--and from the standpoint 

of--a pro se litigant, they would nullify the rights of the 

opposing party to a decision by an objective and impartial 

appellate tribunal. 

The only issue before us is whether the District Court erred 

in denying Dennist motion for reconsideration of its denial of his 

motion for extension of time to respond. Our standard in reviewing 

a district court's ruling on such posttrial or postjudgment motions 

is whether the court abused its discretion. See Larson v. K-Mart 

Corp. (1990), 241 Mont. 428, 430-31, 787 P.2d 361, 362 (citation 

omitted). Moreover, under Rule 2(b) of the Uniform District Court 

Rules, failure to respond to a motion may subject the motion to a 

summary ruling. The language of Rule 2(b) clearly vests discretion 

in a district court with regard to whether an unanswered motion 

will be subject to a summary ruling, and we also review a trial 

court's Rule 2(b) ruling under an abuse of discretion standard. 
Maberry v. Gueths (1989), 238 Mont. 304, 309, 777 P.2d 1285, 1289. 

Here, Dennis did not file a response to Debra's motion to 

modify child support for four months and, indeed, until after that 

motion had been granted by default. He not only does not contend 

that he was unaware of her motion, he concedes that he received it 

on February 8, 1996. It was his obligation to file a timely and 

appropriate response, either pro se or through an attorney. He did 

not do so over an extended period of time and his complaint that no 

one advised him of the necessity of responding within a specified 

period of time is to no avail. Neither district court personnel 

nor opposing counsel are obligated to provide such guidance to a 

party to a legal matter. "The law helps the vigilant before those 

who sleep on their rights." Section 1-3-218, MCA. 

Moreover, Dennis' "responses," when ultimately filed via his 

motion for extension of time and his later motion for 

reconsideration, contain no substantive basis requiring or even 

suggesting that reopening Debra's motion would be appropriate. He 

neither contends, nor makes a showing, that the $250 child support 

ordered by the District Court exceeds that required by the 

Guidelines. Furthermore, while he contends that it would be a 

"great hardship" to carry the medical insurance for Jaime which was 

ordered by the District Court in 1987, this implicit concession 

that he has not complied with the decree incorporating this 

provision of the Marital and Property Settlement Agreement to which 

he agreed a decade ago rings hollow at this point in the 

proceedings and is hardly a persuasive argument in favor of bending 
applicable rules and procedures in order to give him his day in 

court. Nor does the statement in Dennis' motion for 

reconsideration that he has "vital information" relating to the 

motion to modify custody provide a basis for determining that the 

District Court abused its discretion in denying the motion to 

reconsider. None of the supposedly vital information was disclosed 

via affidavit or otherwise, and courts are not required to reopen 

matters based on such conclusory and unsupported statements. 

We hold that the District Court did not abuse its discretion 

in denying Dennis' motion for reconsideration. 

Affirmed. 

We concur: