NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPI RES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION AND, IF FILED, DETERMINED

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL

OF FLORIDA

SECOND DISTRICT

B.R., a child, ) ) Petitioner, ) ) v. ) Case No. 2D14-385 ) STATE OF FLORIDA, ) ) Respondent. ) ___________________________________ ) Opinion filed August 15, 2014. Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus to the Circuit Court for Hillsborough County; Manuel Lopez, Judge. Julianne M. Holt, Public Defender, and Kevin Z. Temaul, Assistant Public Defender, Tampa, for Petitioner. Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General,Tallahassee, and Elba Caridad MartinSchomaker, Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, for Respondent.

DAVIS, Chief Judge. B.R., a juvenile, filed a pet ition for writ of habeas corpus seeking release from the detention center where she was being held under a secu re detention order. We denied relief in a previous order and now write to explain o ur decision.- 2 - Following a January 13, 2014, adjudicatory hearing on two alleg ations of violation of probation, the trial court entered an order placin g B.R. in secure detention pending a disposition hearing scheduled for January 28, 2014. B.R. was not in secure detention at the time of this adjudicatory hearing. On January 22, 2014, the court heard argument on the permissible length of detention following an ad judicatory hearing. B.R. maintained that she could only be held for seventy-two hours wi th a possible seventytwo-hour extension under section 985.26(5), Florida Statutes (2 013). The State argued that under the plain language of section 985.26(3), B.R. could be detained for up to fifteen days. During that hearing, a representative from the D epartment of Juvenile Justice testified that B.R. had a history of absconding, failin g to appear, and failing to comply with the court's previous orders. The representative ex plained that "[B.R.] told

us the last time we were in c ourt in August, that she promised to comply with your

orders and she didn't . . . she just ran to Lakeland." The cou rt found that B.R. presented a substantial risk of not appearing at her disposition hearing and that under section 985.26(3), she could be held in secure detention for fifteen da ys after her adjudicatory hearing. B.R. filed an emergency petiti on for writ of habeas corpus on January 27, 2014, alleging that pursuant to section 985.26(5), her continue d detention was illegal because she was not in secure detention at the time of the adju dicatory hearing. The State responded that under the plain language of section 985.26 (3), B.R. could be held in secure detention for up to fifteen days. We agree. "[T]he power to place juveniles charged with or found to have committed delinquent acts in secure detention is entirely statutory, and strict compliance with the- 3 - statute is necessary." K.T.E. v. Lofthiem, 915 So. 2d 767, 770 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005) (citation omitted). Additionally, "[r]elated statutory provisi ons must be read together to achieve a consistent whole, and . . . [w]here possible, courts must give full effect to all statutory provisions and construe related statutory provisions in harmony with one another." Larimore v. State, 2 So. 3d 101, 106 (Fla. 2008) (al terations in original) (quoting Heart of Adoptions, In c. v. J.A., 963 So. 2d 189, 199 (Fla. 2007)) (internal quotation marks omitted). Section 985.24 provides that all detention care determinations must be based on certain findings enumerated in the statute and may not be based on other expressly prohibited findings. The enumerated legitimate findi ng applicable to B.R.'s case is that the juvenile "[p]resents a substantial risk of not appearing at a subsequent hearing." § 985.24(1)(a). Based on that finding, the relevant period at issue in the instant case is the time between B.R.'s adjudicatory hearing an d her disposition. As such, the applicable statute is section 985.26(3), which provid es in part that "a child may not be held in secure, nonsecure, or home detention care for mo re than [fifteen] days following the entry of an order of adjudication." Accordingly, the trial court did not err in concluding that B.R. could be held in secure detention for fift een days following her adjudication. Consequently, we reject B.R.'s c ontention that section 985.26(5 ) applies here solely because she was not in secure detention at the time of her adjudication. That section provides that [a] child who was not in secure detention at the time of the adjudicatory hearing, but for whom residential commitment is anticipated or recommended, may be placed under a special detention order for a period not to exceed [seventy-two]- 4 - hours, excluding weekends and legal holidays, for the purpose of conducting a comprehensive evaluation as provided in s. 985.185. By its plain language, subsection (5) is a narrow exception to section subsection (3) that only applies when (1) the "child . . . was not in secure detention at the time of the adjudicatory hearing," (2) "residential commitm ent is anticipated or recommended" for the child, and (3) the detention is explicitly "for the purpose of conducting a comprehensive evaluation." § 985.26(5). While B. R. did allege that she was not in secure detention at the time of the adjudicatory hea ring, she did not allege that residential commitment was anticipated or recommended or t hat the purpose of her detention was to conduct a comprehensive evaluation. And the i nstant record contains

no indication of either of these circumstances. Failing to meet all three of the criteria set forth in sectio n 985.26(5) must therefore preclude its applicat ion over the more general provis ions of section 985.26(3) in order to achieve a consistent result. See Larimore, 2 So. 3 d at 106. For instance, under B.R.'s reading of the statute, if a juvenile with a risk assessment instrument (RAI) score of twelve points or higher is placed in secure detention but is subsequently released pending adjudication because an adjudicatory hearing d id not take place within twenty-one days under section 985.26(2), then the juvenile coul d only be held in secure detention for seventy-two hours after the adjudicatory hearing under section 985.26(5), while a child with a similar RAI but whose adjudicatory hearing did commence within the proper timeframe could be held up to fifteen days simply becaus e there was no preadjudicatory gap in his or her detention. We decline to ado pt a reading of the statute

that would lead to such an inconsistent result.- 5 - Accordingly, we clarify that when detention is already author ized based on a risk assessment of the child, section 985.26(5) does not act as a limit on the court's authority to place the juvenile into secure detention simply be cause he or she was not in secure detention at the time of the adjudicatory hearing. Inst ead, when residential commitment is anticipated or recommended, section 985.26(5) mer ely authorizes the court to place juveniles for whom secure detention might not ot herwise have been authorized into secure detention while necessary evaluations fo r the court's ultimate disposition are conducted. But the court may order qualified j uveniles into secure detention for up to fifteen days under section 985.26(3), even though the juvenile may not have actually been in secure detention at the time of the a djudicatory hearing. 1

MORRIS and SLEET, JJ., Concur.

1 We also note that B.R. failed to attach her RAI to her petition or allege that she did not qualify for secure detention. Normally, we wo uld deny the petition without prejudice for B.R. to refile her petition with the RAI attached. See State v. S.M., 131 So. 3d 780, 785 (Fla. 2013). But the record clearly indica tes that B.R. was not entitled to be released from all forms of detention. If her RA I showed a score of twelve or more points, then she qualified for secure detention, see J. L.T. v. Dep't of Juvenile Justice, 104 So. 3d 1257, 1258-59 (Fla. 2d DCA 2013), and becau se she violated her probation she qualified for home detention regardless of her RA I score, see § 985.255(1)(h); see also S.M., 131 So. 3d at 785. Therefore, al though attaching the RAI may have shown that she did not qualify for a certain level of detention, that issue was not raised by B.R., and it is now moot in the instant case. Ho wever, we note that similar considerations in future cases may require an additional examin ation of the type of detention for which a juvenile qualifies if such an issue is pr operly alleged and not precluded by the record.