IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI N O. 2016-CP-01245-COA MONROE RANDLE A/K/A MONRO RANDLE APPELLANT

v. STATE OF MISSISSIPPI APPELLEE DATE OF JUDGMENT: 08/02/2016 TRIAL JUDGE: HON. JAMES T. KITCHENS JR. COURT FROM W HICH APPEALED: CLAY COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: MONROE RANDLE (PRO SE) ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE: OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL BY: KAYLYN HAVRILLA MCCLINTON NATURE OF THE CASE: CIVIL - POSTCONVICTION RELIEF DISPOSITION: AFFIRMED - 09/26/2017 MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED: MANDATE ISSUED: BEFORE GRIFFIS, P.J., WILSON AND WESTBROOKS, JJ. WESTBROOKS, J., FOR THE COURT: ¶1. Monroe Randle appeals the denial of his petition f or p ostconviction relief

(PCR) in the C i r c u i t C ourt of C lay County

. In a prior appeal, this Court f o und that the circuit court had erroneously ruled that it lacked jurisdiction t o determ ine w hether the Mississippi Parole Board’s decision was correct. R andle v. State , 210 So. 3d 1022, 1023 (¶6) (Miss. Ct. App. 2015). W e rem anded Randle’s cause to the circuit court f o r a n evidentiary hearing. Id. Following the hearing, the circuit court denied Randle’s PCR petition, f inding that the parole board had reasonable cause to revoke Randle’s parole. Finding no error, we af f irm

. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY ¶2. In January 1980, Randle pled guilty to capital m urder and w a s s e n t e n c e d t o lif e inprison. Randle was paroled on February 24, 2010, and w as allowed to r eside in O hio via an

interstate com

pact, as codif

ied in Mississippi Code Annotated section 47-7-81 (Rev. 2015). On May 18 , 2 0 1 2 , Randle was arrested in Ohio and charged with: (1) threatening serious bodily harm to his half

- brother and his half

-brother’s g irlf

r iend, and (2) possession of a gun. ¶3. Randle’s half

-brother, Danny

W oods, and W oods’s girlf riend, R obin Graham , gave written statem ents to Randle’s Ohio parole of f icer. W o ods and Graham c laim e d that Randle had been stalking Graham , m aking s e x u a l advances, calling her cell phone, and leaving threatening voicem ail m essages. Graham play ed the voicem ail m essages f o r the parole of f icer. Randle reported to h is p arole of f ic e r a nd a dm itted calling Graham and leaving threatening m essages on her phone. Randle was then arrested f o r violating his pa role. Randle signed a docum ent entitled “notif ication of release violation hearing.” ¶4. That docum e nt reite r a t e d R a n d l e ’ s right to testif y , present witnesses or evidence, conf ront and cross-exam i ne witnesses, and additional rights. T he notif ication also apprised Randle of the accusations a gainst him , a nd Randle adm itted to each c harge with m itigation. He also signed a “ waiver of p r obable c ause hearing/f or interstate com

pact of f enders only .” That w aiver relinquished R andle’s right to a prelim inary hearing. By s i g n i ng the waiver, Randle also adm itted to com m itting the alleged violations and that probable c ause was f ound. ¶5. Randle returned to Mississippi and went bef ore the paro l e b o a r d f

o r a revocation hearing. Following the hearing, the parole b oard revoked Randle’s p arole based on his arrest f or simp l e a s s a u l t and f

irearm possession. Aggrieved with the revocation of his parole, Randle f iled a num

ber of m otions challenging the validity of the parole board’s decision.

2¶6. Randle f iled a PCR petition in the circuit court, but the court erroneously ruled it did
not have jurisdiction to review the parole board’s decision. That ruling was appealed to this Court, and we rem a nded Randle’s cause back to the circuit court f or an evidentiary hearing. Randle , 210 So. 3d at 1023 (¶6). A t the evidentiary hearing, parole-board attorney s f or the Mi s s issippi Departm ent of Corrections (MDOC) presented W oods’s and Graham ’s
statem ents, Randle’s Ohio-arrest inf orm a tion, an em ail s tating that Randle waived his probable-cause hearing and adm itted guilt, Randle’s signed notif i cation of r elease-violation hearing, his signed w aiver of proba b l e-cause hearing, and the prelim inary -revocationhearing report. ¶7. MDOC also p r esented the t estim ony of Robert W entworth, a hearing of f icer with the parole board. W entworth stated that if a parolee on an interstate c om pact is a rrested, the State of M ississippi m

ust f irst determ ine whether the arresting state would r e v o k e the of f ende r ’ s p a r ole. If the arresting state would revoke the of f e nder’s parole, the State of Mississippi m

ust “retake” or bring the of f ender back to the state f

or a parole-board hearing. ¶8. W e ntworth s tated that retake was m andatory f o r Randle’s case, because Ohio would have revoked R andle’s parole. As a result, Mississippi was required to bring Randle back
to the s tate f

or a parole-revocation hearing. According to W entworth, the parole board was presented with evidence that Randle lef t f ive threatening voicem ail m essages f or Graham

. The board was a lso presented with W oods’s and Graham ’s written statem ents. W oods and Graham stated that they

were both concerned f

o r their saf

ety and f e ared that Randle m ight phy sically

harm them

.

3¶9. According to W entworth, jurisdictions involved in an in t e r s t a t e c o mp a c t d o not

usually p urs u e t he pending charges if they f eel the threat posed by the of f ender/parolee is alleviated. For that reason, W entworth stated that i s was not uncomm on f or Ohio to ref

use to p ursue charges af

ter R a n dle was taken b y the state that paroled him

. W entworth stated that it was i r r e l e v a n t w hether Randle was of f icially charged on those c rim e s because they

wer e c r i mi n al acts, whether pursued or n ot. W e ntworth reiterated that the evidence of Randle’s adm ission o f g u ilt “with m i tigation,” the w itness statem ents, and the statem ents of Randle’s parole of

f icer that he listened to the voicem ail m essages, resulted in the revocation of Randle’s parole. ¶10. During R a n d l e ’ s e v i d e n t i a ry hearing f or his PCR petition, Randle argued that the parole board erred in revoking his parole, because he was neither charged with nor c onvicted of the alleged crim e s. R andle challenged the credibility of W oods’s and Graham ’s
statem ents and asserted that he did not intend to adm it to the of f enses or waive his right to a prelim inary

hearing. ¶11. At the c onclusion o f the evidentiary hearing, the circuit judge notif ied the parties that he would review the appropriate s tandards of law a n d render a decision. On August 2, 2016, the c o u r t d e n ied Randle’s PCR petition, concluding that the parole board had r easonable

cause to revoke Randle’s parole based upon th e e v i d e n c e p resented, including Randle’s adm ission of

guilt. Randle appeals.

STANDARD OF REVIEW ¶12. An appellate court w ill not reverse a t r i a l court’s dism issal of a PCR m o tion unless

4the trial court’s d e cision was clearly erroneous. Fortenberry v. State , 151 So. 3d 222, 224

(¶5) (Miss. Ct. A pp. 2014) (c i t i n g Means v. State , 43 So. 3d 438, 441 (¶6) (Miss. 2010)). The Mississippi Suprem e Court h a s held that “ bef ore one released o n p arole m ay be returned
to c ustody , [ the State] m

ust [ show] that he has violated the term s and conditions of parole.” Elkins v. State , 116 So. 3d 185, 186 (¶8) (Miss. Ct. App. 2013). DISCUSSION ¶13. Randle asserts that h is parole was im perm issibly revoked, because the evidence relied upon w as insuf

f icient a nd legally d ef

ective. Randle f

urther a r gues that the circuit judge exhibited bias when he r ef erenced Randle’s two prior f elony convictions during the hearing. Randle contends that the circuit court violated his constitutional rights when it determ ined that the parole board did not err in revoking his parole. W e disagree. ¶14. At Randle ’ s evidentiary hearing, M DOC’s attorney presented evidence that Randle

was arrested f

or sim ple assault by threat and f or possession of a f

irearm

. M DOC presented evidence of Randle’s adm ission of guilt “ w i t h mi tigation” to comm itting the of f enses. W o ods’s and G raham ’s vict im statem ents and the testim ony of a p arole-board hearing of f icer

were also presented during the hearing. W entworth t estif ied that the board received evidence that R andle lef

t f ive threatening m essages on Graham ’s v oicem ail. Additionally , evidence that Randle waived a probable-cause hearing in Ohio was subm itted to the circuit court. The circuit court f

o u nd that there was no im plication that the board did not f ollow the law. Moreo ver, the circuit court f ound that the board had reasonable c ause to revoke Randle’s

5parole, because he adm itted to the charges and turned him self in to the police. 1 W e agree. ¶15. R a n d l e a l s o a r g u e s t h a t t h e w r itten statem ents by W oods and Graham w e r e insuf f icient to prove he violated his parole, because he w as neither indicted f or nor c onvicted of the c harges. Nevertheless, W entworth testif ied that, though crim inal charges m ay not be pursued f or a crim inal act, the revocation of parole does not necessitate an i n dictm ent or conviction of

the crim e s charged. Our s uprem e court has f ound that “[ a] probationer does
not have to be convicted of a crim e to be i n v iolation of h is probation b ut, rather, probation

m ay be r evoked when it i s m ore likely than not that a violation has occurred.” McCalpin v. State , 166 So. 3d 24, 26-27 (¶7) (Miss. 2013). A parolee does not have to be convicted of crim es charged to establish a violation of parole. This argum ent is without m erit. ¶16. Randle also argues that W oods’s and Graham ’s statem ents were inadm issible under the Mississippi Rules of Evidence. Randle asserts that the statem e nts m ade by Graham and W o ods were h earsay . H owever, this Court has previously f o und that the Mississippi Rules of Evidence do not apply to proceedings “granting or revoking probation.” Forshee v. State , 853 So. 2d 136, 140 (¶18) (Miss. Ct. App. 2003) (citing Y ounger v . State , 749 So. 2d 219, 221 (¶9) ( Mis s. Ct. App. 1999)). “Theref ore, the r ule barring hearsay does not apply , and hearsay evidence is properly

adm ittable in such hearings.” Id. ¶17. Lastly , Randle argues he was unf airly prejudiced when the circuit court ref erred to his prior f elony convictions. H e c laim s that the court’s a ctions am ounted to revers i b l e e r r or, because m entioning his prior convictions illustrated bias. H o wever, the circuit judge

1 T h o u g h th e circu i t co u rt f o u n d th a t R an d le t u r n e d h i m s elf in to a p o lice o f f icer, R a n d le actu ally tu rn ed h im s elf in to h is O h io p aro le o f f icer. 6m entioned Randle’s prior convictions when discussing the genesis of Randle’s PCR petition.

There is no indication that the m ere ref erence to R andle’s prior c onviction dem onstrates bias. W e f ind that this argum ent is without m erit. ¶18. “[ P]rior to com

pletion o f the revocation hearing the S tate m ust of f er a ctual proof

that the petitioner [ m ore likely than not] comm itted an act violating the term s a nd conditions of his p a r o l e, and the m ere f act that he was arrested and charged with a crim e m ay hardly suf f i ce.” Elkins , 116 S o . 3 d a t 188-89 ( ¶13) ( quotations o m itted). During revocation hearings, the State h as to prove b y a p reponderance of the evidence that the parolee violated parole. Id. at (¶14). T he circuit court considered the evidence presented to the parole board during Randle’s revocation h earing. Randle a dm itted to Graham ’s and W oods’s allegations and waived his right to a p r elim i nary hearing. Graham a nd W oods m ade written statem ents to Randle’s Ohio parole of f icer a nd play ed the f

ive voicem a il m essages that Randle adm itted
to m aking. As a result, the circuit court f ound that the p arole board h ad reasonable cause to

rev o k e R a n d l e ’ s parole. Theref o re, we f ind that the circuit court d id n ot err in deny ing Randle’s PCR petition. ¶19. AFFIRMED. LEE, C .J., IRVING A ND GRIFFIS, P.JJ., BARNES , CARLTON, FAIR, WILSON AND GREENLEE, JJ., CONCUR.

7