N os . 03- 41049- ag ( L)

Z u l u a g a M a r t i n e z v . I NS 1 U N IT E D S T A T E S C O U R T O F A P P E A LS 2 F OR THE S EC OND C IR C U IT 3

_______________ 4 5 August Term, 2006 6 7 (Argued: April 18, 2007 Dec ided: April 23, 2008) 8 9 Docke t Nos. 03-41049-a g(L ), 05-3319- ag(CON) 10

_______________ 11 12 13 L EO NAR DO Z UL UAGA M ARTI NEZ , 14 Petitioner, 15 16 —v.— 17 18 I MMI GR ATI ON AN D N ATUR AL I Z ATI ON S ERV I CE , 19 20 Re sp on de nt. 21

_______________ 22 23 B e f o r e : 24 W AL KE R , S TR AUB , and B.D

. P ARKE R , 25 Cir c uit Judg e s. 26

_______________ 27 Petitioner, a leg al per manent re sident alien, see ks review of a de cision of the B oard of 28 Immigration Appeals af firmingthe immigration judge’ s denial of c ance llation of removal f or 29 failure to satisfy

the seve n-y ear

continuous residenc e re quirement of the now-re peale d I NA § 30 212(c) , 8 U.S.C. § 1182(c) (r epea led 1996). B eca use petitioner’ s removal pr ocee dings w ere 31 initiated after

the ef fec tive date of

the I lleg al Immigration Reform and Immigra tion 32 Responsibili ty

Act of 1996 ( “I I RI RA”), the a g ency retroa ctively

applied I I RI RA’s perma

nent 33 provisions, including the “ criminal-of fense stop-time rule,” 8 U .S.C. § 1229b(d)(1)(B ). The2 1 ag ency

deter mined that pursuant to this rule, petitioner’s c ommissi on of a c riminal offe nse on 2 April 9, 1995 terminated his pe riod of continuous re sidence one month befor e he c ould achieve 3 the re qu isi te se ve n ye ars . 4 We hold that § 1229b(d)(1)( B) as applied to pe titioner is not impermissibly retroa ctive 5 and deny

the petition. 6 J udg e STRAUB concur s in a separ ate opinion. 7

_________________________________ 8 L EO NAR DO Z UL UAGA M ARTI NEZ , pro se, F raming ham, Mass., for Petitioner

. 9 10 L I ZA S M U R C IA , Assistant United States Attorney (Ter ranc e P. Fly

nn, United 11 States Attorney for the Wester

n District of Ne w York

, on the brief

), B uffa lo, N.Y., for 12 Respondent

. 13 14 N ANC Y M OR AW E TZ , Wa sh ing ton Squ are L e g a l Se rv ic e s, Ne w Y or k Univ e rs ity 15 School of L aw, Ne w York, N .Y., Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner

. 16

_________________________________ 17 J ohn M. Walker, J r., Circuit J udg e: 18 Petitioner, a leg al per manent re sident alien, see ks review of a de cision of the B oard of 19 Immigration Appeals af firmingthe immigration judge’ s denial of c ance llation of removal f or 20 failure to satisfy

the seve n-y ear

continuous residenc e re quirement of the now-re peale d I NA § 21 212(c) , 8 U.S.C. § 1182(c) (r epea led 1996). B eca use petitioner’ s removal pr ocee dings w ere 22 initiated after

the ef fec tive date of

the I lleg al Immigration Reform and Immigra tion 23 Responsibili ty

Act of 1996 ( “I I RI RA”), the a g ency retroa ctively

applied I I RI RA’s perma

nent 24 provisions, including the “ criminal-of fense stop-time rule,” 8 U .S.C. § 1229b(d)(1)(B ). The 25 ag ency

deter mined that pursuant to this rule, petitioner’s c ommissi on of a c riminal offe nse on3 1 April 9, 1995 terminated his pe riod of continuous re sidence one month befor e he c ould achieve 2 the re quisite seven year s. Petiti oner a sks us to review that de termination. 3 BACK GR OUND 4 Petitioner L eonar do Z uluag a Mar tinez (“Z uluag a”) , a native a nd citizen of Colombi a, 5 enter ed the United States in Apr il 1985. He bec ame a leg al per manent re sident on Dec ember 1, 6 19 90 . O n Apr il 9 , 1 99 5, Z ulu a g a wa s a rr e ste d in Ma ssa c hu se tts fo r p os se ssi on of he ro in. Th is 7 led to his conviction, in May 1998, based on a

guilty plea to illeg al possession of drug s and three 8 counts of assa

ult and battery , under Ma ssachuse tts law, for whic h he wa s sentence d to an 18 9 month t e rm

of imp ri so nme nt. 10 In J une 1998, the Immigration and Natura liz ation Service (“I NS”) ser ved Z uluag a with a 11 notice to appe ar, c harg ing him as r emovable unde r Immigration and Nationality Act (“ I NA”) § 12 237(a) (2)( B) (i), for having“bee n convicted of a violation of . . . any

law or r egulation of a State . 13 . . relating to a c ontrolled substance .” 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a) (2)( B) (i). In Marc h 1999, petitioner 14 was c onvicted a se cond time for illeg al possession of her oin in violation of Massachusetts law, 15 followingan ar

rest on Nove mber 21, 1997. The I NS thereupon c harg ed Z uluag a as be ing 16 additionally

remova ble as a n ag g ravated fe lon pursuant to I NA § 237(a )(2) (A)( iii), 8 U.S.C. § 17 12 27 (a )( 2) (A )( iii ), ba se d o n th e May 19 98 c onvic tio ns fo r a ssa ult and batte ry , a nd purs ua nt t o 18 I NA § 237(a )(2) (B )(i), ba sed on the Mar ch 1999 her oin conviction. 19 In May

1999, at a he aringbefor e the Immigration J udg e (“ I J ”), Z uluag a admitted to all of 20 the above convictions. The I J then found (1) that Z uluag a wa s removable from the United States 2 1 an d

(2 ) t h atth e a s s au l tan d

b at t ery o ff en s es we re aggr av at edfe l o n i es ; th e l at t er m ak i n g Zu l u aga4 1 statutorily

ineligible f

or ca ncellation of r emoval under I NA § 240A( a). See 8 U.S.C. § 2 1229b(a) (3). The I J order ed Z uluag a re moved to Colombi a. 3 Z ulu a g a

a pp e a le d to the B oa

rd of Immi g ra tio n App e a ls ( “ B IA” ). In O c tob e r 1 99 9, wh ile 4 that a

pp e a l w a s p e nd ing , th e Ma ssa c hu se tts state c ourt g ra nte d Z ulu a g a ’s mot ion

to v a c ate his 5 assault and battery convictions bec ause the trial court ha d failed to wa rn him about the 6 immigration consequenc es of the ple a. The BIA initially dismiss ed Z uluag a’s a

ppeal, but 7 su bs e qu e ntl y

g ra nte d h is m oti on

to r e op e n b a se d o n M a ssa c hu se tts ’s va c atur to a llo w Z ulu a g a

to 8 purs ue c anc e llatio n o f r e mov a l. 9 The I J , on rema nd, then deter

mined what lies at the he art of this appe al: that Z uluag a wa s 10 still statutorily

ineligible f

or ca ncellation of r emoval bec ause he had fa iled to achieve seven year s 11 of continuous lawf ul permane nt residenc e, as r equire d under I NA § 240A( a)( 2), 8 U.S.C. § 12 1229b(a) (2). The I J found that bec ause Z uluag a had e ntere d the country illega lly without 13 inspection, his period of law ful reside nce did not beg in until M ay 4, 1988, the date he applied for 14 temporar

y resident status. The I J further deter mined that by

operation of the stop-time rule of 15 I NA § 240A( d)(1) , 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(d)(1)( B) , which bec ame e ffe ctive ac cordingto I I RI RA on 16 April 1, 1997, Z uluag a’s pe riod of continuous re sidence ended on A pril 9, 1995 when he 17 committed his first drugoffe nse, a month short of the se ven year s of continuous lawful 18 perma

nent re sidence nece ssary

for c ance llation eligibility . The I J denied Z uluag a’s a pplication 19 for c ance llation of removal a nd the B IA summarily

aff irmed. 20 Th e dis tr ic t c ourt , u po n a ha be a s p e tit ion , r e tur

ne d th e c a se to t

he I J, via the B IA, to 21 deter

mine whether

Z uluag a mig ht have be en admitted ea rlier than Ma

y 4, 1988. But, a fter5 1 c on sid e ri ngfu

rt he r e vid e nc e on

the iss ue , th e I J con fi rm e d h is o ri g ina l de te rm inatio n, a g a in 2 de nie d r e lie f, and

or de re d r e mov a l. 3 Z uluag a then moved f or re consideration of the I J ’s dec ision, not arguing that the May 4, 4 1998 startingdate f or the seve n y ear

period wa s improper, but that the application of the stop5 time rule which c ut off the pe riod just short of the seven year s was impermissibly retroa ctive. 6 The I J declined r econside ration, re lying on the BIA’s dec ision in I n re Per ez, 22 I . & N . Dec . 689 7 (B

. I

. A. 1 9 9 9 ) ( en b an c) , wh i ch h adap p l i edth e s t o p -t i m e r u l e t o o ff en s es p re ce d i n g th e p as s age 8 of I I RI RA. 9 In November 2003, the B IA re

jected Z uluag a’s a

ppeal. The BIA af

firmed the I J ’s 10 conclusion that Z uluag a had f ailed to demonstrate the re quisite seven year s of continuous 11 residenc e prior to the c ommissi on of his crime on A pril 9, 1995. Relying a lso on In re Per ez, the 12 BIA conc luded that the stop-time rule a pplied to Z uluag a’s situation and pre cluded c ance llation 13 of re moval. Z uluag a timely filed a pe tition for reviewof the B IA’s dec ision. 14 DI SCU SSIO N 15 Z uluag a does not c halleng e the a g ency ’s fa ctual dete rmination that his continuous 16 residenc e “c lock” be g an to run on May 4, 1988, but he ar gues that it did not stop on April 9, 17 1995. Z uluag a maintains that the c riminal-offe nse stop-time rule, whic h beca me ef fec tive on 18 Ap ri l 1, 19 97 , is imp e rm iss ibl y re tr oa c tiv e a s a

pp lie d to c ri min a l c on du c t th at pr e c e de d it s 19 enac tment. Z uluag a asks us to conc lude (1) that the commission of the offe nse on April 9, 1995 20 did not stop t he ac crua l of his seven year s of per manent re sidence and (2) that he is there fore 21 elig ible for c ance llation of removal. As a conseque nce, he asks us to remand to the B IA for6 1 fu rt he r r e mand

to t he I J for a de te rm inatio n a s to wh e the r a fa vo ra ble e xer c ise of

dis c re tio n is 2 war

rante d. 3 A. Im m igration F ram ework in 1995 4 Un de r t

he imm ig ratio n la

ws in e ff e c t in Ap ri l 19 95 , whe n Z ulu a g a c omm itt e d th e of

fe ns e 5 at issue, leg al per

manent re sidents who wer e subjec t to deportation, but who had re sided in the 6 United States for se ven conse cutive year s, were elig ible to apply for a discretionar

y waiver of 7 de po rt atio n und e r I NA§ 2 12 (c ). Se e 8 U .S. C. § 11 82 (c ) ( re pe a le d 1 99 6) (“ Al ie ns lawf ull y 8 admitted for pe rmane nt residenc e who tempor arily proce eded a

broad voluntar ily

and not under 9 an orde r of de portation, and who a re r eturningto a lawf

ul unrelinquished domicile of seve n 1 0 co n s ec u t i v e y ea rs , m ay b e a dm i t t edi nth e d i s cr et i o no f t h e A t t o rn ey Ge n er al

. . . . ”)

. Al th o u gh 11 “§ 212(c ) wa s literally applicable only

to exclusi on proce eding s,” the B IA interpre ted the 12 provision “to authorize any perma nent re sident alien with ‘a la wful unre linquished domicile of 13 seven c onsecutive year s’ to apply for a discretionar

y waiver from depor

tation.” I NS v. St. C y

r, 14 533 U.S. 289, 295 (2001) (c iting In re Silva, 16 I . & N . Dec . 26, 30 (B .I .A. 1976) (a dopting 15 position of Fra

ncis v. I NS, 532 F.2d 268 (2d Cir. 1976)) ). 16 “The decision of whe ther to aw ard se ction 212(c) relief involved only

a bala ncingof the 17 ‘adve rse f

actor s evidenc ing a

n alien’s unde sirability

as a pe rmane nt resident with the socia l and 18 humane c onsiderations pre sented in his behalf to determine whether

the g rantingof [a section 19 212(c) waiver ] appear[ed] in the best interests of this country .’” K ai TungChan v. Gantne r, 464 20 F.3d 289, 295 ( 2d Cir. 2006) (per curiam) (quotingIn re Ma rin, 16 I . & N . Dec . 581, 584 (B .I .A. 2 1 1 9 7 8 ) ) ( a l t e r at i o n s i no r i g i n a l )

. A l th o u g hth e d e c i s i o nt o g r an t§ 2 1 2 ( c ) r e l i e f w a s u l t i m at e l y a7 1 discretionar

y one, a “ substantial perc entag e” of applications we re grante d. St. C y r, 533 U.S. at 2 296 (notingthat betwee n 1989 and 1995, over 10,000 applicants obtaine d § 212(c) relief ). 3 Under

the pre -I I RI RA sy stem then in exi stence , aliens ac crue d time toward their r equire d 4 period of c ontinuous residence and phy sical pre sence until they applied for

relief from 5 deportation. See Are nas-Ye pes v. Gonzales, 421 F .3d 111, 115 n.4 (2d Cir. 2005). This ga ve 6 a lie ns an in c e nti ve to d e lay the ir de po rt atio n p ro c e e din g s unti l th e y c ou ld f ulf ill the re qu isi te 7 seven year s. See Suassuna v. I NS, 342 F.3d 578, 581 (6th Cir. 2003). B efor e I I RI RA, the 8 acc rual of time towa rds seve n y ear s of continuous reside nce w as not stopped by the commission 9 of a c rime. 10 B. The Illegal Imm igration Reform and I m m igration Responsib ility Act of 1996 11 I I RI RA, which wa s enac ted on September 30, 1996 and we nt into effec t on April 1, 1997, 12 eliminated the § 212(c ) wa iver, a nd repla ced it with ca

ncellation of r emoval, “a

more strict 13 proce dure.” United States v. J ohnson, 391 F.3d 67, 70 (2d Cir. 2004) . Under I NA § 240A( a), 14 wh ic h r e pla c e d I

NA§ 2 12 (c ), a

le g a l pe rm ane nt r e sid e nt a lie n mu st s atis fy thr e e c on dit ion s to 15 qualify

for c ance llation of removal r elief: the a lien (1) must have been “ lawfully admitted for 16 perma

nent re sidence for not less than 5 year s,” (2) must have “r esided in the United States 17 continuously

for 7 year s after

havingbeen a dmitted in any status,” and ( 3) must “not [have] been 18 c onvic te d o f a

ny a g g ra vate d f e lony .” 8 U .S. C. § 12 29 b( a ). Th e on ly on e of the se c on dit ion s in 19 dispute here is the continuous residenc y require ment of I

NA § 240A( a)( 2). 20 C. Whether A ppl ication of 8 U.S .C. § 1229b(d)(1)( B) to Z ulu aga’s Case R aises 21 Re tr oa c ti vity C onc e r ns A t A ll 22 In a dd iti on to i ns tit uti ngthi s n e w c anc e lla

tio n o f r e mov a l sc he me , h ow e ve r, I I RI RA8 1 established a ne w stop-time rule in I NA § 240A( d)(1) for c alculatingan alien’ s period of 2 continuous residenc e or phy sical pre sence . I t is thi s rule that the g overnme nt say s operates to cut 3 off Z uluag a’s c ontinuous residence period a nd there by

destroy s his eligibility

for c ance llation of 4 re mov a l. 5 The rule provides in re levant par t that “any

period of c ontinuous residence or continuous 6 phy sical pre sence in the United States shall be dee med to end . . . whe n the alien ha s committed 7 an off

ense r efe rre d to in section 1182(a) (2) of this ti tle that rende rs the alien . . . r emovable f rom 8 the United States.” 8 U .S.C. § 1229b(d)(1)(B ) (e mphasis added) . Thus, it is t he date of the 9 commission of the offe nse – not the date of the subseque nt conviction – that matters for purposes 10 of computingan alien’ s period of c ontinuous residence . See Ta blie v. Gonzales, 471 F.3d 60, 62 11 (2d Cir. 2006) (“ Under subsection 240A(d) (1), c alled the ‘ stop-time rule,’ the a lien’s continuous 12 residenc y

or phy sical pre sence ends, for purposes of c ance llation of removal, on the da te he 13 commits a qualifying of fense or on the date a notice to appea r is filed.” ( emphasis adde d)). I f the 14 stop-time rule applies to Z uluag a’s situation, he is inelig ible for c ance llation of removal. 15 Howeve r, bec ause § 1229b( d)(1) (B ) did not exi st at the time Z uluag a committed the off ense, w e 16 mus t a sc e rt a in whe the r t he sto p- tim e ru le is o r i s n ot i mpe rm iss ibl y re tr oa c tiv e a s a

pp lie d to his 17 case . See L and g ra f v . U SIF ilmPr od s. , 5 11 U. S. 2 44 , 2 65 (1 99 4) (r e c iti ngthe g e ne ra l pr inc ipl e 18 that “the leg al ef

fec t of conduc t should ordinarily be asse ssed under

the law that e x isted when the 19 conduct took plac e” ( quoting Ka iser Aluminum & Chem. Corp. v. B onjorno, 494 U.S. 827, 855The g overnme nt argues that our holdingin Domond v. I NS, 244 F.3d 81 (2d Cir. 2001) 1 require s a diffe rent re sult on thi s score . The g overnme nt is incorrec t. In Domond, we he ld that the ag g ravated fe lony

bar of the Antiterror ism and Effe ctive De ath Penalty Act (“ AEDPA”) , Pub. L . No. 104-132, § 440(d) , 110 Stat. 1214, 1227 (1996), was not re troac tive as applied to a n alien whose c riminal conduct pre -date d AEDPA, but whose c onviction came a fter A EDPA’s e na c tme nt. 24 4 F .3 d a

t 86 . T his wa s so be c a

us e “ [w]hi le the un de rl yingc ri min a l c on du c t is cruc ial to the conviction, it is not t he conduc t that bars re lief under the statutory

scheme .” I d. By contra st, under § 1229b(d) (1)( B) , it is t he under lying c riminal act – not the c onviction – that trig g ers disqualification from relief . In this case, the unde rlying c riminal conduct took plac e on April 9, 1995. Be cause the trig g eringconduct he re took plac e prior to the e ffe ctive date of the act, Domond is inapposite. 9 1 (1990) ( Scalia, J., concurring )) ( emphasis adde d)). 1 2 D. Ret roact ivity Analysis und er Landgraf 3 In L andg raf , the seminal ca se on re troac tivity , the Supreme Court c onfirmed the 4 continuing via

bility of the c enturies- old presumption ag ainst retroa ctive leg islation, emphasizi ng 5 that “ [e]le me nta

ry c on sid e ratio ns of

fa ir ne ss d ic tate that in div idu a ls s ho uld have an o pp or

tun ity 6 to k

no w what th e law i s and

to c on fo rm

the ir c on du c t a c c or din g ly ; se ttl e d e xpe c tatio ns sh ou ld 7 no t be lightl y

dis ru pte d. ” I d. at 26 5. At

the same tim e , th e Court a c kn ow le dg e d th at Co ngre ss 8 had the powe r, within constitutional li mits, t o enac t laws with retroa ctive ef fec t. I t also observe d 9 that “ [r]e tr oa c tiv ity pr ov isi on s [in

c ivi l le g isl atio n] of

te n s e rv e e nti re ly

be nign a nd le g iti mate 10 purposes, whe ther to re spond to emerg encie s, to corre ct mistakes, to preve nt circumve ntion of a 11 new statute in the inter val immediately

prec edingits passag e, or simply to give compre hensive 12 eff

ect to a ne w law Cong ress c onsiders salutar y .” I d. at 267-68. 13 Ba sed on the a bove princ iples, the L andg raf Court articulate d a two-step te st for 14 de te rm ini ngwh e n a statut e c ou ld b e a

pp lie d r e tr oa c tiv e ly . In th e fi rs t st e p, the c ourt mus t 15 a sc e rt a in, us ingthe or din ary too ls o f s tatut or

y c on str uc tio n, “ wh e the r C on g re ss h a s e xpre ssl y10 1 presc ribed the statute’ s proper rea ch.” I d. at 280; see a lso F e rn and e z-V arg a s v . G on zal e s, 2 __U.S.__, 126 S.C t. 2422, 2428 (2006). I f the a nswer is yes, the inquiry

is over, and “ there is no 3 need to r esort to judicial def ault rules.” L andg raf

, 511 U.S. at 280. I f, ho we ve r, “ the statut e 4 contains no such e x press c ommand,” the c ourt must move on to the second step a nd decide 5 whether

application of the statute would have a g enuinely “re troac tive eff

ect.” I d. This is not 6 a lw ay s a

sim ple ta sk , b e c a

us e “ [a] s tatut e [is n ot i mpe rm iss ibl y re tr oa c tiv e ] me re ly

be c a us e it i s 7 applied in a c ase a rising f rom conduc t antedatingthe statute’s e nactment, or upsets expectations 8 based in prior

law.” I d. at 269 (c itation omit ted). Rather , the cour t must assess “the nature and 9 extent of the chang e in the law a nd the degree of conne ction betwee n the oper ation of the ne w 10 rule a

nd a re levant past e vent,” a nd deter mine “whe ther the ne w provision attache s new leg al 11 conseque nces to e vents completed be fore its enactment.” I d. at 269-70. I f so, then the tra ditional 12 pr e sumpt ion

a g a ins t r e tr oa c tiv ity

pe rt a ins and

the ne w s tatut e mus t be c on str ue d “ a s in a

pp lic a ble 13 to t

he e ve nt o r a c t in

qu e sti on ow ingto t

he ‘a bs e n[c e of

] a c le ar i nd ic atio n f

ro m Co ngre ss t

hat it 14 intended such a

result.’” Fe rnande z-Varg as, 126 S. Ct. at 2428 (quoting St. Cy r, 533 U.S. at 316) 15 (alter ation in orig inal). 16 17 1. Land graf Step One: Whether C ongress Has Expressly Com m anded T hat § 18 1229b(d)(1)(B) Be A ppl ied to P re- IIRIRA Conduct 19 20 Our a

na ly sis a s to wh e the r C on g re ss e xpre ssl y pr os c ri be d th at th e statut e a pp ly 21 re tr oa c tiv e ly

be g ins wi th a

n e xami natio n o f t

he te xt. Se e Rob ins on

v. She ll O il Co ., 51 9 U .S. 22 337, 340 (1997). And on this scor e both par ties ag ree that nothing in the languag e of 8 U .S.C. § 23 1229b(d)( 1), or a ny other provision of the I

NA, explicitly

direc ts that the criminal-off ense stop-11 1 tim e ru le be a

pp lie d to pr e -I I RI RAc on du c t. S ig nif ic antl y , Co ngre ss d id i nc lud e e xpre ss 2 statements in I I RI RA mandatingthe re troac tive application of othe r provisions, such as the 3 expanded def

inition of ag g ravated fe lony . See I I RI RA § 321(b), 110 Stat. at 3009-628 4 (“N otwithstanding a ny other provision of law

(includingany

eff ective da te), the te rm 5 [“ag g ravated fe lony ”] applies reg ardle ss of whethe r the c onviction was ente red be fore , on, or 6 afte r [September 30, 1996].”); see a lso St . Cy r, 533 U.S. at 318-19. The absenc e of suc h an 7 e xpre ss s tate me nt w ithre sp e c t to § 1 22 9b (d )( 1) (B ) i nd ic ate s “ that Co ngre ss d id n ot d e fi nit ive ly 8 decide the issue of [the provision] ’s re troac tive application to pre -ena ctment [conduct].” St. C y r, 9 53 3 U .S. at 32 0 ( qu otatio n ma rk s o mitte d) . We thu s d o n ot f ind that Co ngre ss h a s e xpre ssl y 10 presc ribed the statute’ s rea ch. 11 Despite the a bsence of a c lear

text ual command in § 1229b(d) (1)( B) , the g overnme nt 12 argue s th at Co ng re ss p la inl y int e nd e d f

or the c ri min a l- of

fe ns e sto p- tim e ru le to a

pp ly 13 retroa ctively . The g overnme nt finds this i ntent in the transitional rule of I I RI RA § 309(c) (5). 14 The g overnme nt further contends that this Court’s rec ent dec ision in Tablie, which interpre ted 15 I I RI RA § 309(c) (5), c ompels denial of Z uluag a’s pe tition. 16 I I RI RA § 309(c) (5) a nd Tablie, howe ver, a

re not dispositive of this case. Unlike Tablie, 17 this case is a pe rmane nt rule ca se: Be cause the proc eeding s ag ainst Z uluag a we re not pending 18 when I I RI RA was ena cted or when it went into ef

fec t, the transitional rules do not apply . See 19 Are nas-Ye pes, 421 F .3d at 115; see a lso 143 Cong. Rec . S12658-01, at S12660 (1997) (“ Section 20 203 modifies cer tain transitional rules esta blished by

I I RI RA with reg ard to suspension of 21 deportation and canc ellation of re moval. The c hang es state that the ‘ stop tim e’ r ule establishedWe n ote that th e Ni nth Cir c uit ha s d e c lin e d to fo llo w G arc ia -R amir e z’s a pp ro a c h in 2 subsequent dec isions. S ee V alenc ia-Alva rez v. Gonzales, 469 F.3d 1319, 1326- 27, 1327 n.10 (9th Cir. 2006) (findingthe languag e of I I RI RA insufficiently clea r to infer an intent on the par

t of Cong ress to make § 1229b(d)( 1)(B ) re troac tively applicable in permane nt-rule c ases) ; Sin ote sCruz v. Gonz ales, 468 F .3d 1190, 1199-201 (9th Cir. 2006) (c oncludingthat the question of § 1229b(d)( 1)(B )’s tempora l rea ch could not be r esolved at step one of L andg raf beca use the languag e of the perma

nent provision “is ambiguous with respec t to its retroa ctivity ,” and the “tra nsitional rule does not clea rly indicate that it is to be applied re troac tively to part B of § 1229b(d)( 1) in all circ umstances” ). 12 1 by that Act in sec tion 240A of the I NA shall apply

g ener ally to individuals i n deportation 2 proce eding s befor e Apr il 1, 1997, with certain e x ceptions.”) (empha sis added). Thus the 3 perma

nent provisions of I I RI RA g overn Z uluag a’s pe tition, s ee Kuhali v. Reno, 266 F .3d 93, 99 4 (2d Cir. 2001), and, a s alrea dy discussed, nothing in those provisions clear ly mandates the 5 re tr oa c tiv e a

pp lic atio n o f § 12 29 b( d) (1 )( B ) t o p re -I I RI RAc on du c t. 6 The g overnme nt nextargues that eve n if the transitional rule doe s not technica lly g overn 7 th is c a s e , it

w o u ld b e “ in c o n g r

u o u s ” to “ h o ld

th at t h e s to p - ti me r

u le d o e s n o t a

p p ly to [Z u lu a g a ], 8 wher e this Court has held that it applied to Tablie.” Gover nment’s Reply

Brief at 13. To avo id 9 thi s in c on g ru ity , th e g ov e rnme nt a sk s u s to tr e at Z ulu a g a ’s c a se a s if it w e re a tr ans iti on a l- ru le 10 case and, in support, cites two c ases f rom other c ircuits, Gar cia- Ramirez v. Gonzales, 423 F.3d 11 935 (9th Cir. 2005) (pe r cur iam), and H eave n v. Gonzales, 473 F.3d 167 ( 5th Cir. 2006). 12 We decline, howe ver, to follow the path taken by the Fif th and Ninth Circuits.

2 13 As sumin gthat it

wo uld be “ inc on g ru ou s” fo r t

he sto p- tim e ru le to a

pp ly re tr oa c tiv e ly

in 14 tr ans iti on a l c a se s b ut n ot p e rm ane nt- ru le c a se s, that f a c t do e s n ot g ive us lic e ns e to a rt if ic ia lly 15 stretch the tr ansitional rules to cove r this case . As one c ourt corr ectly observe d, “[s] ection 16 30 9( c )( 5) sh ow s . . . that w he n Co ng re ss w ante d th e [sto p- tim e ] pr ov isi on to a pp ly re tr oa c tiv e ly13 1 to a

lim ite d c ate g or

y of c a se s – de po rt atio n c a se s p e nd ingwh e n I I RI RAtoo k e ff e c t – i t sa id s o 2 clea

rly .” He nry

v. Ashcrof

t, 175 F. Supp. 2d 688, 694 (S.D.N.Y. 2001). Congress c ould have 3 done the same for pe rmane nt-rule c ases, but did not. We will not i nfer from this silence 4 cong ressional intent for § 1229b(d)( 1)(B ) to apply retroa ctively

in this case. 5 Amicus c ouns e l, o n th e oth e r h and , a rgue s th at Co ngre ss i nte nd e d th e op po sit e : th at § 6 12 29 b( d) (1 )( B ) n ot b e a pp lie d to pr e -I I RI RAc on du c t in pe rm ane nt- ru le c a se s b e c a us e “ the pla in 7 languag e of the I I RI RA addre ssing the a pplicability

of diffe rent ba

rs to relief

shows that 8 Con g re ss u se d e xpre ss l angua g e wh e n it c ho se to l imi t r e lie f b a se d o n p a st e ve nts ,” and be c a us e 9 “a ba ckwa

rd lookinginterpre tation would produce absurd r esults.” Amicus B rief of Nanc y 10 Morawitz at 13. To the extent that there is any ambiguity , amicus counsel a sserts that the rule of 11 lenity

require s that the ambiguity be re solved in Z uluag a’s f avor. We disagree . 12 The a

bsence of express languag e g oing to the te mporal scope of a ne w statutory provision 13 may

indicate that Cong ress fa iled to specifica lly consider the issue. I t does not, howeve r, evinc e 14 a c le ar i nte nt t o b ar t

he a pp lic atio n o f a

ne w p ro vis ion

to a ny c a se that so me ho w i mpl ic ate s p a st 15 conduct or

prior eve nts. W hile there is a judicial presumption ag ainst retroa ctive application, 16 that presumption operates only afte r the c ourt deter

mines, in step two of the L andg raf ana ly sis , 17 that the provision would have a n impermissible retroa ctive ef fec t as applied to the c ase at hand. 18 In other wor ds, silence or ambiguity

in the statutory

textand history

require s the court to move 19 on to step two, not to declare a victory for the oppone nt of retr oactivity at step one. See St. C y

r, 20 533 U.S. at 320. 21 Amicus counsel’ s absurdity argument is flawed f

or the same rea son. The cr itical inquiry14 1 at step one of L andg raf is “whethe r Cong ress ha s expressly presc ribed the statute’ s proper rea ch.” 2 L and g ra f, 51 1 U .S. at 28 0. B a se d o n th e re le va nt t e xt, w e c on c lud e that it ha s n ot. Th e re fo re , to 3 deter

mine whether

§ 1229b(d)( 1)(B ) may

be applied to Z uluag a’s 1995 of fense , we must proce ed 4 to step two of the L andg raf i n qu i r y. 5 6 2. Land graf Step Tw o: WhetherAppli cation of § 1229b (d)(1)( B) to 7 Z ulua ga ’s P r e -I IRIR A C onduc t W oul d P r oduc e an I m pe r m iss ible 8 Ret roact ive Eff ect 9 10 B e fo re a dd re ssi ngthe me ri ts o f s te p tw o, we pa us e to c on sid e r t

he e xtent of

de fe re nc e , if 11 any , th at is ow e d to the B IA’ s d e c isi on in I n r e Pe re z, 2 2 I . & N. De c . 6 89 , in wh ic h th e B IA h e ld 12 that the stop-time rule doe s not have a n impermissible retroa ctive ef fec t as applied to an a lien 13 wh os e c ri min a l c on du c t oc c ur re d p ri or to I I RI RA ’s pa ssa g e . 2 2 I . & N. De c . at 69 1. In g e ne ra l, 14 wh e n Co ngre ss h a s d e le g ate d a uth or ity to a n a g e nc y to a dmi nis te r a

statut e , a nd “ the statut e is 15 silent or ambiguous with respec t to [ a] specific issue,” we must ac cord substantial de fer ence to a 16 rea sonable interpr etation g iven by the ag ency

and ca nnot “simply

impose [our] own construc tion 17 on

the statut e .” Che vr on , U .S. A. , Inc . v . N atur a l Re s. De f. Counc il, Inc ., 46 7 U .S. 837, 843 18 (1 98 4) . “ Th e B IA, thr ou g h p ow e rs de le g ate d b y the Attor ne y Ge ne ra l, e nf

or c e s a nd int e rp re ts 19 the I

NA and thus ha s the authority to fill statutory

g aps with rea sonable interpr etations.” B lake, 20 498 F.3d at 100 (citing8 U.S.C. § 1103(a)). 21 As we ha ve dete rmined, I I RI RA is sil ent with respe ct to the spec ific issue in this case – § 22 1229b(d)( 1)(B ) re troac tivity . Thoug h statutory silence w ould ordinarily

trig g er Chevr on 23 defe renc e, this principle does not hold whe n the issue is retroa ctivity , for a statute that is silent15 1 “with re spect to re troac tive application is construe d under [the Supreme Court’s] prec edent to be 2 unambig uously

prospec tive” in ef

fec t. St. C y

r, 533 U.S. at 320 n.45. Ac cording ly , “ther e is, for 3 Chevron purposes, no ambiguity in such a statute f

or an a g ency

to resolve.” I d.; see a lso 4 Hende rson v. I

NS, 157 F.3d 106, 130 (2d Cir. 1998) (“[U]nder ordinar y rules of statutory 5 construction, a statute that is silent with respect to re troac tivity is not ‘ambiguous.’ ”). What 6 re ma ins to b e de te rm ine d is wh e the r t he pr ov isi on

wo uld have an im

pr op e r r e tr oa c tiv e e ff

e c t in 7 the pa

rt ic ula r c a se ; th at in qu ir

y , h ow e ve r, do e s n ot c on c e rn the so rt of statut or y g a p th at Co ng re ss 8 has desig nated the B IA to fill, nor a matter in which the B IA has pa

rticular e x pertise. Cf. Gill v. 9 I NS, 420 F.3d 82, 89 ( 2d Cir. 2005) (“B eca use the B IA has e x pertise a pplying a nd construing 10 immigration law, we a ffor d Chevron def ere nce to its construc tion of undefined statutory terms . . 11 . .”). We ther efor e dec line to defe r to the B IA’s opinion in In re Per ez and proc eed to make our 12 own deter

mination under L andg raf ’s sec ond step. 13 In L and g ra f, the Sup re me Court e xpla ine d th at a

statut e is i mpe rm iss ibl y

re tr oa c tiv e if

it 14 “take s awa

y or impairs vested r ights a cquire d under e x isting laws, or cre ates a new oblig ation, 15 imposes a new duty , or attac hes a ne w disability , in respec t to transactions or c onsiderations 16 alre ady

past.” 511 U.S. at 269 (quotation marks omitted). Each of the identified e ffe cts is “a 17 sufficie nt, rather

than a ne cessa

ry , condition for invokingthe pre sumption aga inst retroac tivity .” 18 Hu g he s A ir c ra ft

Co. v. Un ite d St ate s e x re l. S c hume r, 52 0 U .S. 93 9, 94 7 ( 19 97 ) ( e mph a sis in 19 orig inal). In applying this fr amewor k we must exercise our

“commonsense , functional judg ment 20 a bo ut whe the r t

he ne w p ro vis ion

atta c he s n e w l e g a l c on se qu e nc e s to e ve nts c omp le te d b e fo re its 21 enac tment.” St. Cy r, 533 U.S. at 321 (quotation mar ks omitt ed). O ur ana ly sis is further16 1 “informe d and guided by familiar c onsiderations of f air notice , rea sonable re liance, a nd settled 2 expectations.” I d. (quotation marks omitted). 3 Exe rc isi ngou r “ c omm on se ns e , f

un c tio na l ju dg me nt” le a ds us to c on c lud e that § 4 1229b(d)( 1)(B ) would not have an impermissible retr oactive e ffe ct if applied to Z uluag a’s 1995 5 of fe ns e . A s th e Sup re me Court ha s o bs e rv e d, wh e the r “ a pa rt ic ula r a pp lic atio n is re tr oa c tiv e wi ll 6 depen[d] upon what one consider s to be the dete rminative eve nt by which re troac tivity

or 7 prospec tivity

is to be calc ulated.” Re public Nat’l B ank of Miami v. United States, 506 U.S. 80, 8 100 (1992) ( Thomas, J ., concur ring ) (e mphasis and alter ation in orig inal) (inter nal quotation 9 marks and c itation omit ted). As discusse d above, the deter minative event he re ha

ppened when 10 Z uluag a committed the drugoffe nse and not whe n he wa s convicted. See L andg raf , 511 U.S. at 11 265 (“[T]he leg al ef fec t of conduc t should ordinarily be asse ssed under

the law that e x isted when 12 the conduc t took place.” (interna l quotation omit ted)). And while we note that it is som etimes 13 proper

to find that the deter

minative event is a date subsequent to the unde rlying c riminal act 14 when ther e is “re levant sec ondary conduct,” see St. Cy

r v. I NS, 229 F.3d 406, 418 (2d Cir. 2000) 15 (empha sis added), the re w as no such se condar y conduct he re. A fter pe titioner committed the 16 of

fe ns e , h e did

no mor e tha

n p a ssi ve ly

awa it the outc ome of

his pr os e c uti on . Cf

. id . ( fi nd ingdate 17 of under lying c riminal conduct to be a n inappropriate trig g er f

or re troac tivity

analy sis when there 18 was a

later “ decision to enter

a guilty plea to [the] crime”(e mphasis added) (interna l quotation 19 marks and c itation omit ted)). 20 Be cause the trig g er f or re troac tivity

analy sis here is the date that Z uluag a committed theZ uluag a does not a ppear to argue that his ca se fa lls withi n J ustice Story ’s categ ory of 3 retroa ctivity

perta ining to the c ance llation of “vested r ights.” In any event, suc h an ar gument wo uld be wi tho ut m e ri t be c a

us e the Sup re me Court

ha s c a uti on e d th at “ c anc e llatio n o f r e mov a l . . . [and other] putative claims to relief a re not ‘ve sted rig hts,’ a ter m that describe s something more substantial than inchoate expectations and unre alized opportunities.” Fe rnande z-Varg as v. Gonzales, 126 S. Ct. 2422, 2432 n.10 (2006). 17 1 dr ugof fe ns e , h e c ann ot s ho w that th e ne w l aw atta c he s a ne w d isa bil ity on pa st a c ts. 3 2 De po rt atio n is the c on se qu e nc e he re c e ive s u po n r e tr oa c tiv e a

pp lic atio n o f t

he sto p- tim e ru le jus t 3 as it is the conseque nce he would have r ece ived immediately followinghis criminal conduct. 4 The instant petitioner c ommitt ed the of fense befor e mee ting the se ven-year residenc y 5 require ment for suspension of de portation, he be came elig ible for de portation. See Immigration 6 and Nationality

Act (“ I NA”) § 237(a) (2)( B) (I ), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)( 2)(B )(I ) (“ Any alien who at 7 any

time after

admission has been c onvicted of a violation of . . . any

law . . . re lating to a 8 controlled substanc e . . . other than a sing le offe nse involving [a small amount of mar ijuana for 9 on e ’s own u se ] is d e po rt a ble .” ). Th at is , if

pe tit ion e r h a d b e e n c a

ptu re d a nd su c c e ssf ull y 10 prosec uted — by plea, a dverse jury

verdic t, or otherwise — and the I NS had obtained a 11 deportation order pr omptly afte r he c ommitt ed the of fense , he could have bee n deporte d without 12 the possibilit y

of re lief bec ause he would not, at that time, have a ccr ued the se ven year s require d 13 by

the re peale d I

NA § 212(c ). It was only the time require d to bringan off ender to justi ce that 14 pushed the disposition of his case be y ond the seve n-y ear threshold. B ut this l apse of time, in the 15 absenc e of c ircumstance s requiringadditional retroa ctivity scrutiny , such as subseque nt conduct 16 in relianc e on the then- exis ting state of the lawor the c reation of a vested r ight a fter the criminal 17 act, doe s not crea te a mate rial diffe renc e for retroa ctivity

purposes be tween a

n alien in Z uluag a’s18 1 situation and an alien who was succ essfully convicted a

nd deporte d prior to ac cruingseven year s 2 of continuous re sidence

. 3 Our viewis supported by the fa cts of L andg raf itself. There , the Supreme Court 4 c on sid e re d th e re tr oa c tiv ity of § 1 02 of the Civ il Ri g hts Ac t of

19 91 , whic h “ signif

ic antl y 5 expand[ ed] the monetary relief ” ava ilable to plaintiffs who prove d intentional employ ment 6 discrimination under Title VI Iof the Civil Ri g hts Act of 1964. L andg raf , 511 U.S. at 253. Prior 7 to the 1991 Act, Title VI Iplaintiffs could only rec over ba ckpay ; after

war ds, as a r esult of § 102, 8 plaintiffs who won a backpa y awa rd could re cover

compensatory

and punitive damag es as we ll. 9 See id. at 253-54. The Court acknowle dg ed that “c oncer ns of unfa ir surprise a

nd upsetting 10 expectations [were] attenuated in the c ase of intentional employ

ment discrimination, which ha[d] 11 been unla

wful for more than a

g ener ation” prior to the 1991 A ct. I d. at 283 n.35. The Court 12 no ne the le ss c on c lud e d th at “ the ne w c omp e ns ator y dama g e s p ro vis ion

wo uld op e ra te 13 ‘re trospectively ’ if it wer e applied to c onduct occ urringbefor e [the enac tment of the 1991 Ac t] ,” 14 be c a

us e it w ou ld p la c e a

ne w l e g a l bu

rd e n o n p a st c on du c t: 15 Un lik e c e rt a in o the r f or ms o f r e lie f, c omp e ns ator y dama g e s a

re qu int e sse nti a lly 16 backw ard looking . . . . In this case, the e vent to which the ne w damag es provision 17 re late s is the dis c ri min ator y c on du c t of

re sp on de nts ’ a g e nt John Wil liams; if 18 applied her e, that provision would attac h an important newleg al burde n to that 19 conduct. The new da mag es re medy

in § 102, we conc lude, is the kind of 20 provision that does not apply to events ante datingits enactment in the a bsence of 21 c le ar c on g re ssi on a l inte nt. 22 L andg raf

, 511 U.S. at 282-83. 23 The re lationship between the conseque nces of a new law and the conduct pr e-dating the 24 new law

is an important one for

retroa ctivity

analy sis. See L andg raf

, 511 U.S. at 270 (“TheTh e c on c ur re nc e argue s, in e sse nc e , th at r e lia nc e is the on ly

fa c tor re le va nt t o 4 retroa ctivity

analy sis in im migr ation case s in this C ircuit. That is, the conc urre nce a rgues that “in our Circuit, petitioners . . . must show that they detrimentally

relied on the prior law.” But we ha ve neve r stated that pe titioners must show reliance in ever y case . Whil e it is clear

that relianc e has pla

y ed an importa

nt role in our re troac tivity case s in the immi g ration conte x t, the fa c t th at on e fa c tor

may be de te rm inativ e in c e rt a in c a se s d oe s n ot m e an th at it is the on ly deter minative fac tor in ever

y case . Indeed, in Domond v. I NS, 244 F.3d 81 (2d Cir. 2001), w e undertook the same ana ly sis as the majority opinion now takes. Afte r statingthat the question befor e the c ourt was “ whether the lack of

discretionar

y relief applies to aliens whose criminal conduct pr e-dates ena ctment of AED PA,” and a fter f inding that the statute was ambiguous, we proce eded unde r L andg raf ’s sec ond step to asce rtain whe ther the statute “ imposes ‘new le g al conseque nces to e vents completed be fore its enactment.’” I d. at 85 (interna l citation omitt ed). We also said we would “ rely on ‘fa miliar considerations of fair notice , rea sonable re liance, a nd settled expectations’ for

guidance in determiningretroa ctive ef fec t.” I d. (interna l citation omitted). Under L andg raf ’s sec ond step in Domond we then he ld “that Section 440(d) imposes no ne w l e g a l c on se qu e nc e s o n a lie ns lik e Do mon d who se c on du c t pr e -d ate s A ED PA, but w ho se convictions came af

ter AED PA’s enac tment.” I d. (empha sis added). The panel in Domond rea ched this conc lusion, as the majority opinion does, beca

use “[d]eportation was alwa y s the conseque nce” of the pe titioner’s criminal conduc t. Finally afte r eng ag ing in the f

oreg oing 19 1 conclusion that a pa rticular r ule oper ates ‘r etroa ctively ’ come s at the end of a proc ess of 2 judgme nt conce rningthe nature and extent of the cha ng e in the law a

nd the degree of conne ction 3 be tw e e n th e op e ratio n o f t he ne w r ule and a re le va nt p a st e ve nt. ” ). An d what w a s p re se nt i n 4 L andg raf

, but is absent here , is chang ed conse quence s. See id. at 283. The statute in L andg raf 5 was impermissibly retroa ctive bec ause it would allow the r ecove ry of compe nsatory

damag es that 6 we re no t r e c ov e ra

ble un de r t

he law that e xiste d whe n th e c on du c t at is su e oc c ur re d. In c ontr a st, 7 I I RI RA, as applied to petitioner he re, did not cha ng e the c onsequenc e of pe titioner’s criminal ac t. 8 Z uluag a’s c ommissi on of the c rime cha rg ed immediately

place d him in a categ ory of aliens 9 elig ible for de portation upon conviction. 1 0 O ur

d e c i s i o nr e m a i n s s o un d

w h e nr e a s o n a

b l e r e l i an c e i s t ak e ni n t o c o n s i d e r at i o n . In 4re a so nin gwe a dd e d: “ [n]or do e s D omo nd ’s los s o f t

he Se c tio n 2 12 (c ) h e ari ng s in the se c ir c ums tanc e s r a ise the same re lia nc e and e xpe c tatio n c on c e rn s r a ise d in St. Cy r. ” I d. (e mph a sis a dd e d) . A s th e c on

jun c tio n “ no r” ind ic ate s, re lia nc e wa s n ot e ve n th e fi rs t, m uc h le ss t he on ly fac tor the Court ana ly

zed under L andg raf

’s sec ond step. We theref ore disagree with our colleague that re liance is the sole f actor considere d in our jurisprudenc e in immigration cases ra isi ngre tr oa c tiv ity

c on c e rn s. 20 1 many

case s reg ardingimpermissible retroa ctivity in the immigration context , the issue of re liance 2 pla

y s a c e ntr a l r ole in t

he c ourt ’s ana ly sis . In St . Cy r, the Sup re me Court

e mph a size d th at St. 3 Cy r, and ma ny others in his situation, had pled guilty and wa ived their right to a trial in relianc e 4 on the continued a vailability

of § 212(c ) re lief. See St. C y r, 53 3 U .S. at 323 (“ Relying upon 5 settled prac tice, the a dvice of counsel, a

nd perha ps even a ssuranc es in open c ourt that the entry of 6 the plea w ould not forec lose § 212(c) relief , a g reat number of de fenda nts in [ petitioners’] 7 position agr eed to plea d guilty .”). F ollowing St. Cy r, this Court has likewise foc used on the 8 conce pt of detrimental r eliance in analy zing the ef

fec t of I I RI RA’s repe al of § 212(c ) on aliens 9 previously

convicted of

ag g ravated fe lonies. See Rankine v. Reno, 319 F .3d 93, 100 (2d Cir. 10 2003) (holdingthat the re peal of § 212(c) was not impermissibly retroa ctive as a

pplied to aliens 11 who wer e convic ted followingjury trial prior to the re peal, be cause they could not show that they 12 “chose to go to tria l in reliance on the ava ilability of § 212(c ) re lief”) . But see Restre po v. 13 McElroy , 369 F.3d 627, 634 ( 2d Cir. 2004) (cla rifying that the repe al could have an improper 14 retroa ctive ef

fec t as to an alien who, afte r losing a t trial, “dec id[ ed] to forg o the immediate filing 15 of a 212( c) a

pplication based on the considere d and re asonable expectation that he would be 16 permitted to file a strong er a pplication for 212( c) r elief at a later time”); see a lso Wil son v. 17 Gonzales, 471 F.3d 111, 122 ( 2d Cir. 2006) (re quiringthat aliens who c laim to have “de lay edSee St. C y r v. I NS, 229 F.3d 406, 418 (2d Cir. 2000) ( “‘[I ]tis the conviction, not the 5 un de rl yingc ri min a l a c t, t hat tr ig g e rs the dis qu a lif

ic atio n f ro m § 2 12 (c ) r e lie f. ’ T hu s, in consideringwhether

the cha ng es to the ava ilability

of discre tionary

relief would alter the leg al eff ect of conduct that pr edate s the AEDPA and I I RI RA’s ena ctment, our a naly sis focuses on the decision to enter

a guilty plea to a c rime – not on the cr iminal conduct – that qualifies the a lien for r emoval under

the immigration laws.” (c itation omit ted)); se e a lso id. at 419 (“ [A] leg al re sid e nt who is c ha

rg e d w itha

c ri me that r e nd e rs him

re mov a ble fr om t he Un ite d St ate s c are fu lly c on sid e rs the imm ig ratio n c on se qu e nc e s o f h is o r h e r c onvic tio n a nd , s pe c if ic a lly , th e ava ila

bil ity of discre tionary

relief from re moval. I t is not unreasonable to attribute knowledg e of the availability

of re lief to a leg al re sident beca use it is a common require ment that defe nse counse l and the c ourt advise a

criminal def

endant of the immigration consequenc es of a guilty plea.” ). 21 1 filing a

n aff irmative § 212(c ) application to buil d a strong er c ase w arr antingthe g rantingof that 2 relief

” to make a

n individualiz ed showingof re liance)

. 3 When, as in the above case s, the rele vant conduc t is a leg al dec ision – e.g ., the dec ision 5 4 to plead guilty

or g o to trial – it makes sense to foc us on whether the alien de trimentally

relied 5 up on

the the n- e xistin glaw i n ma kin gthe de c isi on . O n th e oth e r h and , it make s n o s e ns e at a ll t o 6 a sk

wh e the r a

n a lie n, in c omm itt inga

dr ugtr a ff ic kin gof fe ns e , a c te d w ith“ an inte nti on to 7 prese rve [his or her] elig ibilit y for r elief unde r § 212(c ),” Rankine , 319 F.3d at 100, or in an 8 eff ort to “conf

orm[] his or her c onduct ac cordingto the availability of re lief,” St. Cy

r, 229 F .3d 9 at 420. Cf. St. C y r, 229 F .3d at 418 (notingthe absurdity of the notion that aliens committed 10 drugcrimes in re liance on the continued ava ilability of discre tionary

relief ). We there fore 11 conclude that Z uluag a ca nnot show a protec table re liance inter est here

. 12 Moreove r, eve n if Z uluag a we re to have somehow improba bly relied on the absenc e of 13 the stop-time rule whe n he committed the off ense, a s expl ained a

bove, the r etroa ctive application 14 of the stop-time rule did not alter the leg al conse quence of his actions. And ther e wa s no 15 su

bs e qu e nt r e lia

nc e be c a us e Z ulu a g a

did no t late r e nte r i nto a

tr ans a c tio n o r e ng a g e in c on du c t in22 1 relianc e on the a

vailability

of discre tionary

relief . See Rankine v. Reno, 319 F .3d 93, 100 (2d 2 Cir. 2003) (“[P] etitioners neither did any thing nor surre ndere d any

rig hts that would give rise to a 3 compar able r eliance interest.”) . Petitioner did nothing except wa it while the criminal justice 4 proce ss ran its course

. 5 Additionally , takinginto account “ familiar c onsiderations of f air notice . . . and settled 6 expectations,” I

NS v. St. C y

r, 533 U.S. 289, 321 (2001)( internal quotation marks a nd citation 7 omitted), we fa il to see how either of these guiding pr inciples was c ontrave ned in the instant 8 case . Fa ir notice wa s not violated beca use the lawwas c erta in at the time Z uluag a ac ted. He 9 would have be en depor table without possibili ty

of discre tionary

relief had he be en convic ted 10 befor e he a ccr

ued seve n y ear s. See 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)( 2)(B )(i). And settled expectations wer e 11 not disrupted beca use, assumingthat Z uluag a expected a ny thing with re spect to depor tation 12 when he committed the offe nse, his expectation could not have be en any thing other

than that he 13 was subjec t to deportation without the opportunity for discr etionary

relief

. 14 In s um, we c on c lud e that a pp lying§ 1 22 9b (d )( 1) (B ) t o Z ulu a g a ’s pr e -I I RI RAof fe ns e 15 would not produce an impermissible retr oactive e ffe ct, and thus for eclose s his eligibility for § 16 212(c) relief

. 17 CO NC LU SION 18 F or

the fo re g oin gre a so ns , the petition for re view is DENI ED. 19 20 2123 1 S TR AUB , Circuit Judge , co n cu rr i n g: 2 Iwrite sepa rate ly beca use I disag ree with the majority that retroa ctive application of the 3 stop-time rule to Z uluag a’s c ase “ did not chang e the c onsequenc e of pe titioner’s criminal ac t.” 4 Ne ve rt

he le ss, be c a

us e Z ulu a g a

c ann ot m e e t th is C ir c uit ’s re qu ir e me nt t hat he sh owa c tua l, 5 detrimental re liance on the prior law in or der to de monstrate impermissible retr oactive e ffe ct (a 6 re qu ir e me nt t

hat, a s e xpla ine d in

mor e de ta il b e low , is the su bje c t of c on sid e ra

ble c ontr ov e rs y 7 and

may be ri pe fo r r e -e xami natio n o r r e vie w) , I mus t c on c ur

in t he jud g me nt. 8 I

. 9 Ia g re e wi th t he ma jor ity that Co ngre ss h a s n ot e xpre ssl y c omm and e d th at th e c ri min a l10 of

fe ns e sto p- tim e ru le in 8 U. S.C. § 1 22 9b (d )( 1) (B ) b e a pp lie d r e tr oa c tiv e ly

so that w e mus t 11 a dd

re ss Langraf

step two. I t is at the determination of whether the new stop-time r

ule attac hes 12 adver se leg al conse quence s or new disa biliti es to past ac ts where the majority and I part wa y s. 13 In concludingthat retroa ctive application of the stop-time rule “did not cha ng e the 14 conseque nce of

petitioner’s c riminal act,” the majority rea sons: “The instant petitioner 15 committed the offe nse bef ore me etingthe seve n-y ear residenc y

require ment for suspension of 16 de po rt atio n, he be c ame e lig ibl e fo r d e po rt atio n. ” On thi s sc or e , th e ma

jor ity is s imp ly wr on ga s a 17 matte r o f l aw. Se c tio n 2 37 (a )( 2) (B )( i) of the I NA , und e r whic h Z ulu a g a wa s c ha rg e d w ith 18 remova

bility , states, in rele vant par t: “Any alien who at any

time after

admission has been 19 convic ted

of a violation of . . . a

ny law . . . re lating to a

controlled substanc e . . . is deporta ble.” 8 20 U. S.C. § 1 22 7( a )( 2) (B )( i) (e mph a sis a dd e d) ; se e als o Th om v . A sh c ro ft , 369 F.3d 158, 170 ( 2d 21 Cir. 2004) (Unde rhill, J ., dissenting) (“The instant before the jury returns its ver dict, the24 1 defe ndant is subject to no immigration consequenc e; the instant afte r, he is subjec t to an 2 immigration consequenc e.”) , cert. de nied , 5 46 U. S. 8 28 (2 00 5) ; Rankine v . Reno , 319 F.3d 93, 3 99 (2d Cir.) (“ Unless and until they were c onvicted of their unde rlying c rimes, the petitioners 4 could not be depor ted.” ( emphasis adde d)), cert. de nied , 5 40 U. S. 9 10 (2 00 3) ; St. Cy r v . I NS , 229 5 F.3d 406, 418 ( 2d Cir. 2000) (“[I ]tis the conviction, not the underly ing c riminal act, that trig g ers 6 the disqualification fr om § 212(c) r elief.” (interna l quotation marks omitted)), aff’d , 5 33 U. S. 7 28 9 ( 20 01 ); accord Atk inson v. Att’y Ge n. , 4 79 F .3 d 2 22 , 2 31 n. 8 ( 3d Cir . 2 00 7) (“ [A]bs e nt a 8 leg al deter

mination of g uilt, the alien is not subject to deportation or in nee d of sec tion 212(c) 9 relief

.”). A ccor dingly , at the time Z uluag a committed his offense , he wa s not deportable, a s the 10 ma

jor ity su g g e sts . It w a s o nly

a ft e r h is convic tion that Z uluag a bec ame de portable. And at the 11 time he was c onvicted, and ultimately place d into removal proc eeding s, Z uluag a had c lear ly met 12 the se ve n- y e ar r e sid e nc y re qu ir e me nt. 13 Under

the prior law , there fore , the timing of the commission of his offense pose d no bar 14 whatsoeve r to Z uluag a’s a bility to apply for a waiver of depor tation, which he c ould do at any 15 time before a fina l order of remova l was ente red, so longas that final or der of remova l was 16 enter ed af

ter he had ac quired his seve n y ear s of re sidency , which in this case it cle arly was. See 17 Arenas-Yepes v. Gonzales , 421 F.3d 111, 115 n.4 ( 2d Cir. 2005) (“Prior to I I RI RA, aliens 18 acc rued time towa rd the c ontinuous phy sical pre sence in the United States requir ement until they 19 applied fo r s u s p en s i o no f d ep o rt at i o n . Ins h o rt , th e c o m m en ce m en to f d ep o rt at i o np ro ce ed i n gs 20 had no ef

fec t on this accrua l.” (e mphasis added) (interna l quotation marks omitted)). Howe ver, 21 the new stop-time r ule, re troac tively

applied, would prohibit Z uluag a fr om obtaining r elief f romThe majority ag ain er rs when it states that Z uluag a “w ould have be en depor table without 1 po ssi bil ity

of dis c re tio na

ry re lie f h a d h e be e n c onvic te d b e fo re he a c c ru e d s e ve n ye ars .” In f a c t, Z uluag a would only

have be en depor

table “w ithout possi bility of discre tionary

relief ” had he been c onvicted, ser

ved with an NT A, and or dere d remove d befor e he ha d acc rued his seve n y ear s residenc y , which occ urre d one month afte r he c ommitt ed the of fense

. See A renas-Y

epes , 421 F.3d at 115. 25 1 re mov a l fro m t

hetim e hec om mi tte d th e off e ns e , reg ardle ss of when he was c onvicted, ser ved 2 with an NTA, or

order ed re moved. Retroac tively applying the stop-time rule make s the timing of 3 his offense deter

minative, and ther efor e attac hes newand adve rse leg al conse quence s and new 4 disabiliti es to past ac ts. See I NS v. St. Cyr , 533 U.S. 289, 325 (2001). 5 T h e m aj o ri ty h i n ges i t s d ec i s i o no nth e u n l i k el y h y p o th et i ca l p o s s i b i l i ty

th atZu l u aga 6 could have been c onvicted, plac ed into remova l proce eding s, and orde red r emoved, a ll within t he 7 o n e m o n tha f

t e r h e c o m m i t t e d

th e o f f e n s e an d b e f o r e h e a c qu i r e d

h i s s e v e nye ar s o f

r e s i d e n c y. A

1 8 far more likely

scena rio reve als the majority ’s flaw ed re asoning . Had Z uluag a bee n convicted of 9 his April 1995 offense and plac ed into remova l proce eding s at any time betwee n May

1995, 10 wh e n h e a c c ru e d h is s e ve n ye ars of re sid e nc e , a

nd Ap ri l 1, 19 97 , th e date I I RI RAbe c ame 11 eff

ective, Z uluag a unquestionably would have be en elig ible to apply for suspension of 12 deportation. See 8 U .S. C. § 11 82 (c ) ( re pe a le d 1 99 6) ; Arenas-Yepes , 421 F.3d at 115 n.4. 13 Acc ording ly , the delay in “time require d to bringan off ender to justi ce” was just as much, if not 14 more, a

detriment to Z uluag a’s c ase a s it was a bene fit. 15 In any

event, r esort to hy

pothetical sce narios is unnec essar y here , beca

use the e vents that 16 actua lly

transpire d in Z uluag a’s c ase de monstrate cle arly that retroa ctive application of the stop17 time rule imposed “ne w leg al conse quence s” to Z uluag a’s pa st conduct. St. Cyr , 533 U.S. at 321.26 1 At the time Z uluag a wa s convicted a nd place d into removal proc eeding s, he would have been 2 elig ible to apply

for suspension of de portation under the prior law, be cause he had c lear ly met the 3 se ve n- y e ar r e sid e nc y re qu ir e me nt. Whe n th e I J re tr oa c tiv e ly a pp lie d th e ne w s top -t ime ru le to h is 4 pre- I I RI RA conduct, howe ver, Z uluag a wa s stripped of that elig ibilit y . Ifail to see how 5 retroa ctive application of the new stop-time rule did not impos e a “ new leg al conse quence [] ” or 6 “new

disability ,” St. Cyr , 533 U.S. at 321, to a past ac t that Z uluag a wa s “helpless to undo,” 7 Fernandez- Vargas v. Gonzales , 548 U.S. 30, 126 S.C t. 2422, 2432 (2006). See also Landgraf v. 8 US

I F ilm Prod s. , 511 U.S. 244, 269 (1994). 9 Ithe re fo re dis a g re e wi th t he ma jor ity ’s vie w that r e tr oa c tiv e a pp lic atio n o f t

he sto p- tim e 10 rule “ did not chang e the c onsequenc e of pe titioner’s criminal ac t.” Although I I RI RA did not 11 chang e the impac t of Z uluag a’s of fense on the initial determination of depor tability , it chang ed 12 the conse quence of the timing of his criminal ac t by eliminating the possibility of re lief fr om 13 remova l that was pre viously available to him. See St. Cyr , 533 U.S. at 325 (“The re is a c lear 14 differ ence , for the pur poses of re troac tivity

analy sis, between f

acingpossible deportation and 15 fac ing c erta in deportation.”) . Acc ording ly , in my view, apply

ing § 1229b( d)(1) (B ) to Z uluag a’s 16 pre- I I RI RA offe nse attac hes unfor esee n, and seve re, le g al conse quence s to past conduct that 17 c ann ot b e un do ne . A nd sin c e the re is n o c le ar i nd ic atio n in I I RI RAthat Co ngre ss “ a ff ir mativ e ly 18 considere d the potential unfa irness of r etroa ctive application and deter mined that it is an 19 acc eptable pr ice to pay for the c ounterva iling bene fits,” Landgraf , 511 U.S. at 272–73, the 20 pr e sumpt ion

a g a ins t r e tr oa c tiv ity

c ouns e ls a g a ins t a llo wi ng§ 1 22 9b (d )( 1) (B ) t o a pp ly to p a st 21 conduct. Ne verthe less, as explained below, be cause Z uluag a ca nnot demonstrate the ty

pe of27 1 detrimental re liance r equire d by our pre cede nt, Imust concur in the major ity ’s findingthat he 2 c ann ot d e mon str ate imp e rm iss ibl e re tr oa c tiv e e ff e c t. 3 II. 4 Our p os t- St. Cyr decisions make c lear

that, even in c ases whe re a new immigr ation law 5 attache s new leg al conse quence s to past conduct, in our Circuit, petitioners see king to show that 6 the new la

w was imper

missibl y applied to their c ase r etroa ctively must show that they 7 detrimentally

relied on the prior law. 8 In St. Cyr , the Supreme Court wa s asked to dec ide whethe r the re peal of § 212(c) relief 9 c ou ld b e re tr oa c tiv e ly a pp lie d to pe tit ion e rs wh o h a d p le d guil ty to t he ir re mov a ble c ri me s w hil e 10 § 2 12 (c ) w a s st ill in e ff e c t. A lth ou g h th e Court

fo un d th at th e pr ov isi on

c ou ld n ot b e re tr oa c tiv e ly 11 applied, empha siz ing that St. C y r, and ma ny others in his situation, had pled guilty and wa ived 12 their rig ht to a trial in relianc e on the c ontinued availability of § 212(c ) re lief, the Court stopped 13 short of statingthat such re liance must alwa y s be shown in orde r to sustain a findingof 14 impermissible retroa ctivity . Neve rtheless, in Rankine , a pa ne l of thi s Co ur t, r e a so nin gthat it 15 c ou ld n ot “ ig no re the str on gsigna ls s e nt i n [th e Sup re me Court ’s de c isi on ] that a lie ns wh o c ho se 16 to g o to tr ia l are in a dif fe re nt p os iti on

wi th r e sp e c t to I I RI RAtha n a lie ns lik e St. Cy

r who c ho se 17 to plead guilty ,” held that be cause aliens who we re c onvicted at tria l before repe al of § 212(c ) 18 could not show that they “detr imentally

chang ed [their] posi tion in reliance on continued 19 e lig ibi lity

fo r § 21 2( c ) r e lie f, ” the ne w l aw w a s n ot i mpe rm iss ibl y re tr oa c tiv e a s a

pp lie d to the m. 20 319 F.3d at 99–100. Reasoningthat what such pe titioners “truly relied upon w as their c laim of 21 innocenc e,” the panel f ound it “difficult to conclude , as wemu st to fi nd im pe rm iss ibleIndeed, the “new leg al conse quence s” for

the petitioners in Rankinewer e the same as 2 those for St. Cy

r. The only

differ ence betwee n the two is that while St. Cy r had ple d guilty

prior to enac tment of the newlaw, the pe titioners in Rankinewer e convic ted at trial prior to enac tment of the ne w law. 28 1 re tro ac tiv ity , that the petitioners chose to go to tria l in reliance on the ava ilability of § 212(c ) 2 relief

.” Id . at 100–02 (e mphasis added) . Significa ntly , afte r findingthat petitioners could not 3 sh owde tr ime nta l r e lia nc e on the pr ior law, the ana ly sis e nd e d. Th is C ourt did no t g o o n to 4 examine “whethe r the ne w provision attache s new leg al conse quence s to events completed 5 befor e its enac tment,” Landgraf , 5 1 1 U

. S

. at2 6 9

– 7 0 , w h i c hi tm o s tc e rt a i n l y d i d

. A c c o r d i n g l y, 2 6 in this case, althoug h in my view application of the stop-time rule attac hes newleg al 7 conseque nces to Z uluag a’s c rime, Rankinefo re c los e s r e lie f. Un de r o ur pr e c e de nt, in o rd e r t o 8 su c c e ssf

ull y argue that th e ru le is i mpe rm iss ibl y re tr oa c tiv e a s a

pp lie d to his c a se , Z ulu a g a mus t 9 show that he de trimentally relied on the prior rule , which, as shown be low, he ca nnot do. 1 0 Fo l l o wi n g Rankine , sever al dec isions from this C ourt have further made c lear

that we 11 require a showingof ac tual detrimental re liance. See , e.g. , in chron. order , Swa by v . A sh c ro ft , 12 357 F.3d 156, 162 ( 2d Cir. 2004) (“We hold that the de cision to go to trial, a s a matter of law, 13 fore closes any

argument of detrimenta l relianc e on the availability of § 212(c ) re lief, and that 14 I I RI RA’s repe al of § 212(c ) is not impermissibl y retroa ctive in its application to petitioner.”) ; 15 Restrepo v . McElroy , 369 F.3d 627, 637 ( 2d Cir. 2004) (findingthat petitioners who for went 16 “filingan af

firmative [§ 212(c) ] application in the hope of building a strong er r ecor d and filingat 17 a later

date” could show detrimenta l relianc e under Rankine ); Boatswain v. Gonzales , 414 F.3d 18 413, 419 (2d Cir.) (“ [I n Rankine ], we looked for some indication of a quid pro quo , or re asonedWhil e this passag e appe ars to sug g est that the Supreme Court in Fernandez- Vargas 3 require d a showingof detrimenta l relianc e, as e x plained in more de tail in section I I Ibelow, I believe suc h a sug g estion is unsupportable. Contrary to the majority ’s asser

tion, Iin no way

intend to sugg est that “re liance is the 4 only fac tor rele vant to retroa ctivity analy sis in im migr ation case s in this C ircuit,” or that it is the “sole fa ctor c onsidered in our jurisprudenc e in immigration cases r aisingretroa ctivity conce rns.” Rather, my

view is that under our

prec edent a

showingof re liance is ne cessa ry , though not alway s sufficient, to demonstrate impermissible retroa ctive ef fec t. Some other fac tor—for e xamp le fa ilure to s ho w r e tr oa c tiv e a pp lic atio n o r e ff

e c t of the ne w l aw— c ou ld a lso do om a petitioner’s c laim. See , e.g. , Fernandez- Vargas , 126 S. Ct . at 2434 (“ Be cause we c onclude that § 241(a) (5) ha s no retroa ctive ef fec t when applied to a liens like Fe rnande z-Varg as, we aff irm the jud g me nt o f t

he Court of Ap pe a ls. ” ); Puello v. BCIS, 511 F.3d 324, 333 ( 2d Cir. 2007) (“Puello’s claim is without merit because the amendme nts were not applied re troac tively to him.”). To the e xtent th e ma

jor ity argue s th at ou

r C ourt do e s n ot r e qu ir e a

sh ow ingof

re lia nc e in 29 1 exchang e, whe rein the individual whose se ttled expectations were in question relied on a 2 potential benef

it in st ructuringhis conduct.”) , cert. de nied , 5 46 U. S. 9 45 (2 00 5) ; W ilson v. 3 Gonzales , 4 71 F .3 d 1 11 , 1 22 (2 d Ci r. 20 06 ) ( “ Th e pr e c e de nti a l e vo lut ion fr om St. Cyr , to 4 Rankine , to Restrepo , throug h to Fernandez- Vargas , ma ke s c le ar t

hat th e c ontin

ue d ava ila

bil ity 5 of § 212(c ) re lief depe nds on the relianc e of those now seekingthe bene fit of that re lief.”) ; 3 6 W alc ott v . Ch e rto ff , 517 F.3d 149, 155 ( 2d Cir. 2008) (“[W] e hold that § 212(c ) re lief re mains 7 available to an alien or dere d remove d for a pre- AEDPA convic tion that was on appe al when the 8 AEDPA took eff

ect, pr ovided that the alien c an prove detrimental re liance of the ty pe re cog nized 9 in Restrepo . . . . [T] he prope r inquiry is whether, pr ior to the AEDPA’s pa ssag e, an a lien 10 rea sonably

and detr imentally

confor med his conduct to the then- preva iling law by making 11 c ho ic e s inte nd e d to pr e se rv e or he ig hte n h is c ha

nc e s o f r e c e ivi ng§ 2 12 (c ) r e lie f. ” ); Singh v. 12 Mukase

y , No. 07-1688-a g , — F.3d —, 2008 WL658239, at *5 (2d Cir. Mar . 14, 2008) (stating 13 that “ W

ilson require s” a “ showingof detrimenta l relianc e”)

. 4ca s es wh er e n ew l ega l co n s equ en ce s h av e a t t ac h edt o p as tac t s , th i s co n t en t i o n

—th o u gh appea ling f

or the re asons set for

th in section I I Ibelow—is, in my view, unsupportable

. Domond v . I NS , 2 44 F .3 d 8 1 ( 2d

Cir . 2 00 1) , r e lie d o n b y

the ma jor ity , w a s d e c ide d b e fo re the Sup re me Court decided St. Cyr , a

nd , a s st ate d a

bo ve , o ur po st- St. Cyr

prec edent—r elying on the “strong signa ls” we pe rce ived the Supreme Court to have sent out in St. Cyr —h a s si nc e he ld t

hat a showingof re liance is re quired. Rankine , 319 F.3d at 99. Indeed, Rankinecannot be rea d in any other manne r. See , e.g. , Thom , 369 F.3d at 163 n.6. Moreover , the manner in which we he ld that Domond rema ins good la

w af ter St. Cyr

further demonstrates that after St. Cyr , relianc e is viewe d as a r equire ment in our Circuit. Se e Kha n v . A sh c ro ft , 352 F.3d 521, 523 ( 2d Cir. 2003) (“[W] here as in St. Cyr [], th e a lie n’ s p le a of guil ty pr ior to t he pa ssa g e of

AE DPA§ 4 40 (d ) c ou ld have be en ente red in re liance on the possibili ty of beingg rante d a § 212(c ) discre tionary waiver of depor tation, in Domond

we noted that, in contrast, ‘it ca nnot rea sonably

be ar gued that aliens co m m i t t edcr i m es i nre l i an ce o n ’ s u ch a p o s s i b i l i ty . ” ( qu o t i n g Domond, 2 4 4 F

. 3 d at8 6 ) )

. F i n a l l y, the majority

does not, and in my

view ca nnot, square the contention that re liance is not re quired with the rea soning a

nd holding of Rankineand its pr og e ny

(a s se t f or th a bo ve ), no r d oe s it addre ss decisions from other circ uits (as set forth be low), which ha ve explicitly

rec og nized our c ontr ov e rs ia l r e lia

nc e re qu ir e me nt. 30 1 Mo re ov e r, we have fu rt he r h e ld t hat, a s a g e ne ra l matte r, pe tit ion e rs mus t sh owthat th e ir 2 relianc e wa s individualiz ed and subje ctive, not mere ly objective. See W

ilson , 4 7 1 F

. 3 d

at1 2 2

. In 3 Restrepo , while we f ound that petitioners who for went “f iling an a ffirmative [§ 212(c)] 4 application in the hope of building a strong er r ecor d and filingat a late r date ” could show the 5 typ e o f

d e tr i m e n t a l r e l i an c e r e qu i r e d b y Rankine , we lef

t open the question of whe ther a n alien 6 “must make a

n individualized showingthat he dec ided to forg o an opportunity to file for 212( c) 7 relief

in relianc e on his ability

to file at a later date . . . or whe ther, instead, a categorical 8 presumption of re liance by any alien who mig ht have a

pplied for 212( c) r elief when it was 9 av a i l a

b l e , b u td i d

n o td o s o , i s m o r e a

p p r o p r i at e . ” 3 6 9 F

. 3 d

at6 3 7

– 3 9

. InW

ilson , we a

nswere d 10 this question, holdi ngthat, as a g ener al matter, the former is require d. 471 F.3d a

t 122. 11 He re , Z ulu a g a c ann ot s ho w the ty

pe of ind ivi du a lize d, de tr ime nta l r e lia nc e on pr e -I I RI RA 1 2 l awr e qu i r e d

b y Rankineand W

ilson . A s th e ma

jor ity c or re c tly state s, the op e ra

tiv e e ve nt i nWhil e we have r ejec ted this argument as “bor der[ing] on the absur d,” I note that whethe r 5 it should be rejec ted at all is subject to dispute. See , e.g. , Thom , 3 69 F .3 d at 16 8 n .2 (Und e rh ill , J., d iss e nti ng ) ( “ Ino te that th is o ft -q uo te d p a ssa g e is o ne that c on fl ic ts w ithmy ‘s ound ins tin c ts’ as a judg e. I f it is, indeed, absurd to sug g est that a pe rson contemplatingthe commission of a crime c onsiders the potential c onsequenc es of c riminal conduct, then Cong ress a nd the SentencingCommi ssion surely are misguided in their a

ttempts to deter cr ime throug h incre ased se nte nc e s. Ire sp e c tf

ull y su g g e st that it

is f ar f ro m a bs ur d to be lie ve the pr os pe c t of c e rt a in deportation, rather tha

n possible deportation, mig ht well deter a sig nificant number

of aliens fr o mco m m i t t i n g aggr av at edfe l o n i es . ” ( ci t i n g Landgraf , 5 11 U. S. a

t 27 0) ); Restrepo , 369 F.3d at 63 2 n .8 (“ We .

. . no te that, i n th e c onte xt of c ri min a l sa

nc tio ns , s imi lar r e tr oa c tiv e inc re a se s in penalties have bee n considere d to raise se rious conce rns under the Ex P ost Fac to Clause, presumably

beca use they violate notice r ather

than re liance inter ests.” (inter nal citation omitted)); Beharry v . Reno , 183 F. Supp. 2d 584, 590 (E.D.N .Y. 2002) (Weinstein, J.) (“The c ourt of appea ls’ argument in Domond . . . might be vie wed by

some as missing the ma

rk.”) , rev’d on jurisdictional

grounds , 3 29 F .3 d 5 1 ( 2d Cir . 2 00 3) ; see also St. Cyr , 229 F.3d at 419 (“[L ]awful perma nent re sidents are ty

pically part of a resident a lien community and ar e likely

awa re of what happens to other

members of

the community

who eng ag e in cr iminal conduct.”)

. Z ulu a g a argue s th at “ [h]a d h e be e n a wa re at th e tim e he e nte re d h is guil ty ple a that hi s 6 elig ibilit y for r elief f

rom remova l would be pre termitted, he would have conside red f oreg oing the plea.” Even if we wer e to view the c onviction as the oper ative eve nt for dete rmining whether 31 1 Z uluag a’s c ase is his commission of the crime. H oweve r, any argument that Z uluag a committed 2 the cr ime in relianc e on his future elig ibilit y for suspension of de portation under pr e-I I RI RA law 3 is forec losed by

our pre cede nt. In Domond, rely ing on our

decision in St. Cyr , w e state d th at “ it 4 wo uld

bo rd e r o n th e a

bs ur d to argue that [th e pe tit ion e r] w ou ld h ave de c ide d n ot t o c omm it a 5 crime if he had known that he . . . could fa ce de portation without the availability of a 6 dis c re tio na

ry wa ive r o f d e po rt atio n. ” 24 4 F .3 d at 86 (a lte ratio ns and int e rn a l qu otatio n ma

rk s 7 omi tte d) ; see also Khan , 3 52 F .3 d at 52 4–25 (h old ingthat Domond rema ins good la

w af ter the 8 Sup re me Court ’s St. Cyr d ec i s i o nan d

ex p l i ci t l y

ci t i n g Domond

with approva l on this poi nt). 5 9 Acc ording ly , Z uluag a ca nnot show that application of the stop-time r ule to his case w as 10 imp e rm iss ibl e un de r o ur pr e c e de nt. 6settled expectations wer e upset, howe ver, suc h an ar gument is forec losed by our pre cede nt. See Domond, 2 44 F .3 d at 86 (h old ingthat a lie ns wh o e nte re d guil ty ple a s a ft e r t

he ne w l aw w e nt i nto e ff e c t c ou ld n ot e sta

bli shimp e rm iss ibl e re tr oa c tiv ity ); Khan , 352 F.3d at 524 (“ St. Cyr II , like Domond, evaluated aliens’ e x pectations in l ight of ‘the time of their

plea un de r th e lawthe n in effect

. ’” ) ( ci t i n g St. Cyr , 533 U.S. at 326) (e mphasis added) . Z uluag a and a micus advanc e no oth e r r e lia

nc e argume nts . A c c or din g ly , I take no vie w a s to wh e the r Z ulu a g a might h ave so me other c olorable r eliance claim under Restrepo , W ilson , o r th e i r p r o g e n y. 32 1 III

. 2 The re quirement that pe titioners arguing imper missibl e re troac tivity

show individualiz ed, 3 de tr ime nta l r e lia

nc e on the pr ior law i s th e su

bje c t of a c on sid e ra

ble amou nt o f c ontr ov e rs y 4 amon g , w ith in, and surr ound ingthe c ourt s o f a pp e a ls. 5 As various c ourts have note d, the re quirement ha s not been imposed by , and in fa ct 6 appea

rs to run af

oul of, Supreme Court re troac tivity case law. In Landgraf

, the Supreme Court 7 wa s a sk e d to de c ide wh e the r p ro vis ion s o f t he Civ il Ri g hts Ac t of

19 91 pe rm itt inga

pla int if f t o 8 rec over da

mag es for unlawful discr imination could be retroa ctively applied to the ac tions of 9 Ba rbar a L andg raf

’s employ er. The Court found that “the ne w compensatory damag es provision 10 would operate ‘re trospectively ’ if it wer e applied to c onduct occ urringbefor e [enac tment of the 11 1991 Act]” bec ause it would “attach an importa nt new leg al burde n to that conduct.” 511 U .S. at 12 28 2– 83 . A s th e Th ir d Ci rc uit late r o bs e rv e d, “ [i]n d e te rm ini ngthat th e ame nd me nt d id n ot a

pp ly 13 to pendingcase s, the Court did not base its decision on the spec ific conduc t of L andg raf ’s 14 employ er or

on any relianc e that either

L andg raf or her employ er ma

y have ha d on the state of the 15 law whe n discriminatory conduct oc curr ed.” Atkinson , 479 F.3d at 228. “Instead, the Court made 16 a g ener al ana ly sis of the impact of the a mendment, findingretroa ctivity improper be cause the 17 amendment instituted a leg al cha ng e that attac hed a ne w leg al burde n to the proscr ibed conduc t.”33 1 Id .; see also He m v. M aurer , 458 F.3d 1185, 1192 ( 10th Cir. 2006) (“The fac ts of Lan dg ra f its e lf 2 be lie any

no tio n th at th e Sup re me Court re qu ir e s a

sh ow ingof

a c tua l r e lia

nc e a s a pr e re qu isi te to 3 sustain a re troac tivity challeng e.”) . The Lan dg

ra f Court acc ording ly

aff irmed that “‘ ever

y statute, 4 which take s awa

y or impairs vested r ights a cquire d under e x isting laws, or cre ates a new 5 obligation, impos es a ne w duty , or attac hes a ne w disability , in respec t to transactions or 6 co n s i d er at i o n s al re ady p as t , mu s tb e d ee m edre tro s p ec t i v e. ’” 5 1 1 U. S

. at2 6 9 (qu o t i n g Society for 7 Propagation of the Gospel v. W heele r , 2 2 F

. C a s . 7 5 6 , 7 6 7 ( C

. C

. N

. H

. 1 8 1 4 ) (N o . 1 3 , 1 5 6 ) ( S t o r y, 8 J .)). 9 Simi larly , in Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United States ex rel. Schume r , 520 U.S. 939 (1997), 10 the Supreme Court he ld that a 1986 amendme nt to the False Claims Act (FCA) , which 11 e lim inate d c e rt a in d e fe ns e s to su its un de r t he F CA , c ou ld n ot b e re tr oa c tiv e ly a pp lie d to su its 12 based on pr e-e nactment c onduct. Id . at 94 7–48 . “ Th e re [wa s], h ow e ve r, no c on sid e ra tio n in 13 Hu

gh es of whe ther Hughes Airc raf t, in particular, or

any defe ndant, in g ener al, in an F CA action 14 might have relied on the former law in conduc ting business with the g overnme nt.” Atkinson , 479 15 F.3d at 229. “It was the ne w leg al burde n imposed on events past, rather than the relianc e on the 16 former

law by the per son aff

ecte d, which wa s the basis for holdingthat the 1986 amendme nt 17 would not be applied r etroa ctively .” Id .; see also He m , 458 F.3d at 1193 (“ Hu gh es A irc ra

ft

. . . 18 sim ila

rl y fa ile d to imp os e any

re lia nc e re qu ir e me nt o n r e tr oa c tiv ity c ha lle ng e s. ” ); Olatunji v. 19 As hc ro

ft , 3 87 F .3 d 3 83 , 3 91 (4 th C ir . 2 00 4) (e xpla ini ngthat Hu gh es A irc ra

ft confirms that 20 “ Lan dg ra f did not intend to im pose a r equire ment of re liance” beca use there the Court held that 21 “elimination of ce rtain def enses to qui tam suits under the F alse Claims Act could not be a pplied34 1 retroa ctively

to Hug hes Airc raf

t . . . without

eve n a single word of discussion as to whether 2 Hughes Aircraft—or, for that matt er, similarly situated governme nt contractors—had relied on 3 the eliminated defe nse to its detriment ”). Mor eover , the Hu gh es A irc ra

ft Court stated that 4 Landgraf

’s de sc ri pti on

wa s n ot “ the e xclu siv e de fi nit ion of pr e sumpt ive ly

imp e rm iss ibl e 5 retroa ctive leg islation,” and thus, eac h of the identified e ffe cts is “a sufficient , rathe r than a 6 ne c essa ry , condition for invokingthe pre sumption aga inst retroac tivity .” 520 U.S. at 947. 7 Re c e nt S up re me Court c a se s in the imm igra

tio n c onte xt do n ot c a st d ou bt o n th is 8 interpre tation. I n St. Cyr , as stated a bove, the Supre me Court admittedly considere d the fa ct that 9 aliens had r elied on the a vailability

of § 212(c ) re lief in dec iding to plea d guilty ; however , the 10 Court

sto pp e d s ho rt

of statin gthat su c h r e lia

nc e wa s r e qu ir e d f

or a fi nd ingof

imp e rm iss ibl e 11 retroa ctivity

. See Olatu nji , 3 87 F .3 d at 39 3 ( statin gthat “ St. Cy r did not purport to add a 12 subjective re liance r equire ment,” but rather that the Court in St. Cyr emphasized petitioner’s 13 relianc e bec ause it indicate d “‘a n obvious and seve re re tro ac t i v e e ff ec t

. ’” (c i t i n g St. Cyr , 533 14 U.S. at 325)). And, in Fernandez- Vargas , the Supreme Court he ld that an I I RI RA provision for 15 the re ins tate me nt o f r e mov a l or de rs a g a ins t a lie ns ill e g a lly re e nte ri ngc ou ld b e pe rm iss ibl y 16 applied to aliens who r eente red the United States befor e I I RI RA beca me ef fec tive. 126 S. Ct . at 17 2434. Howeve r, the Court base d its holdi ngnot on relianc e g rounds, but on the findingthat the 18 new law

does not impose new leg al conse quence s on past conduct that c ould not be undone. The 19 Court rea soned, “[i] t is . . . the alien’s choic e to continue his illeg al pre sence , afte r illeg al re entry 20 and af

ter the e ffe ctive date of the ne w law, that subjec ts him t o the new a nd less g ener ous leg al 21 reg ime, not a past ac t that he is helpless to undo.” Id . at 24 32 ; see also He m , 458 F.3d at 1198–9935 1 (“The problem with Fe rnande z-Varg as’ Landgraf argument, the majority

rea soned, wa s that 2 § 2 41 (a )( 5) did

no t a ff e c t hi s pa st c on du c t.” ). As the Te nth Cir c uit ob se rv e d, “ [c]o ns ist e nt w ith 3 . . . the Lan dg

ra f case s, the [ Fernandez- Vargas ] C ourt neve r conve rts ‘detrimenta l relianc e’ on 4 prior law into a pr ere quisite for sustaininga re troac tivity claim. Rather, the retroa ctivity inquiry 5 rema ins the two part inquiry established in Landgraf

, to g e the r w itha

str on gpr e sumpt ion

a g a ins t 6 retroa ctive application, with no dis cussion of re liance e ven appe aringuntil the Court sum marizes 7 the per

tinent fac ts of St. C y

r.” Hem , 4 5 8 F. 3 d

at1 1 9 8

– 9 9 (c i t i n g Fernandez- Vargas , 126 S. Ct . at 8 24 28 ); se e als o U

nite d S tates v . D e Ho rta Ga rc ia , No. 07-2060, — F .3d —, 2008 WL656909, at 9 *6 (7 th C ir . M ar. 13 , 2 00 8) (R ov ne r, J., c on c ur ri ng ) ( “ [T]he re are ind e e d r e fe re nc e s to re lia nc e in 10 the Sup re me Court ’s re tr oa c tiv ity pr e c e de nts . T hat is no t surp ri sin g , f or re lia nc e a lw ay s lo oms in 11 the ba c kgro un d a s a re a so n e xpla ini ngthe Court ’s lon g sta nd ingpr e sumpt ion

that w he n Co ng re ss 12 enac ts a new la

w, it does not intend for the la w to apply

retroa ctively

unless it makes that intent 13 clea

r. . . . B ut no Supreme Court dec ision requires or turns on proof that the pa rty contesting 14 retroa ctive application of new leg islation actually relied to his detriment on prior law in setting 15 his own course of conduc t.” (interna l citations omit ted)). 16 Whil e so me c ourt s o f a pp e a ls h ave fo un d th e Sup re me Cou rt do c tr ine to b e c le ar o n th is 17 matter, other

courts have disag ree d as to whethe r detrimenta l relianc e should be a require ment at 18 a ll, and

if so , whe the r s ub

je c tiv e , in div idu a lize d r e lia nc e mus t be sh own a s o pp os e d to me re ly 19 objective r eliance . The Third a nd Four th Circuits, for example, have state d that no showingof 20 relianc e is requir ed. See, e .g. , Atkinson , 479 F.3d 231 ( “[W ]e conclude that relianc e is but one 21 consideration in assessing whe ther a statute attac hes newleg al conse quence s to past events.”) ;36 1 Olatu nji , 3 87 F .3 d at 38 8 ( “ [W]e h old that r e lia nc e (whe the r s ub

je c tiv e or ob je c tiv e ) i s n ot a 2 require ment of impermissible retroa ctivity . . . .”). 3 In reje ctinga re liance r equire ment, the Four th Circuit in Olatu nji

focuse d on the 4 presumption ag ainst retroa ctivity set forth in Landgraf

, rea soning, “ we do not believe that 5 su bje c tiv e re lia

nc e is, or ou g ht t o b e , r e le va

nt t o th e qu e sti on

of wh e the r a

pa rt ic ula r s tatut e is 6 imp e rm iss ibl y

re tr oa c tiv e , a s su c h is ne ith e r d ic tate d b y Sup re me Court

pr e c e de nt n or

re late d to 7 the pre sumption of cong ressional intent under lying the bar a g ainst retroa ctivity .” 387 F .3d at 389. 8 The c ourt furthe r re asoned: 9 Whether the pa rticular pet i t i o n er did or did not subjectively rely upon the prior 10 statut e or sc he me ha s noth ing wh ate ve r to do w ithCon g re ss’ int e nt— the ve ry ba sis 11 for the pr esumption ag ainst statutor y re t roactivity . I t is one thing to indulg e in the 12 su

pp or ta ble pr e sumpt ion

that Co ngre ss i nte nd s it s enac tme nts no t to op e rate 13 retroa ctively ; it is another altog ether to indulge the quite differ ent, and unsupporte d 14 and unsupportable , presumption that Congr ess so intends, but o nly wher e the 15 pa

rt ic ula r p e tit ion ingpa

rt y c an p ro ve that he su

bje c tiv e ly re lie d on th e pr ior statut e 16 to h is d e tr ime nt. In o the r w or ds , whe re Con g re ss h a s a pp are ntl y g ive n n o th ou g ht t o 17 the qu e sti on of re tr oa c tiv ity

wh ate ve r, the re is no ba sis fo r i nf e rr ingthat Co ngre ss’ 1 8 int e nt

w a s an y m o r e nu an c e d

th anth ats t atu t e s s h o u l d n o tb e h e l d

t o app ly 19 re tr oa c tiv e ly . A ny thi ngmor e , in th e face of c omp le te c on g re ssi on a l si le nc e , is 20 nothing but judicial leg islation. 21 22 Id . at 394. Acc ording ly , relying on c ase la w from the T hird Circuit, the court c oncluded, 23 “[w]hether a plaintiff did or did not re ly on a prior statutory

scheme is irreleva

nt to whether that 24 scheme in fac t has a re troac tive eff ect on that plaintiff. ‘ I t is,’ as the Third Circuit has noted, ‘ a 25 strang e “pr esumption” . . . that arise s only on so heig htened a

showingas ac tual relianc e.’” Id . at 2 6 3 9 1 (qu o t i n g Po nn ap ula v . A sh c ro ft , 373 F.3d 480, 491 ( 3d Cir. 2004)). Similarly , the Third 27 Circuit in Atkinson re lie d o n Su pr e me Court

pr e c e de nt a

nd the pr e sumpt ion

a g a ins t r e tr oa c tiv ity 28 in concludingthat no showingof re liance is re quired. See479 F.3d at 231.37 1 Th e Sixth, Ni nth , a nd Te nth Cir c uit s, in c ontr a st, have state d th at a sh ow ingof

re lia nc e is 2 require d, but these circ uits only require a showingof objec tively rea sonable re liance. See , e.g. , 3 Thaqi v. Jenifer , 377 F.3d 500, 504 n.2 ( 6th Cir. 2004) (“We note that, unde r St. Cyr , the 4 pe tit ion e r n e e d n ot d e mon str ate a c tua l r e lia nc e up on the imm ig ra

tio n la ws in o rd e r t o 5 de mon str ate an im pe rm iss ibl e re tr oa c tiv e e ff e c t; h e ne e d o nly

be amon ga

c la ss o f a lie ns wh os e 6 guil ty

ple a s ‘ we re lik e ly

fa c ili tate d’ by

the ir c ontin ue d e lig ibi lity

fo r § 21 2( c ) r e lie f. ” ); Camins v. 7 Gonzales , 500 F.3d 872, 884 ( 9th Cir. 2007) (“In deter mining whe ther the attachment of ne w 8 le g a l c on se qu e nc e s to pa st a c tio ns c on fl ic ts w ith fa mil iar c on sid e ratio ns of

fa ir no tic e , r e a so na

ble 9 relianc e, and se ttled expectations, we re quire that re liance on the prior law w ould have be en 10 ob

je c tiv e ly re a so na ble un de r t

he pa rt y ’s c ir c ums tanc e s. ” (c itatio ns and int e rn a l qu otatio n ma

rk s 11 omi tte d) ); Hem , 458 F.3d at 1187 (“[W] e conc lude that an objec tive showingof re liance is the 12 appropr iate rule .”). 13 The Te nth Circuit’s decision in Hem ex t en s i v el y s et s fo rt hth e r ea s o n i n g fo r r equ i ri n g a 14 petitioner to show objective r eliance—as opposed to the individualized or ac tual detrimental 15 relianc e re quired in this Circuit. Compare 458 F.3d at 1197, with W ilson , 471 F.3d at 122. As set 16 forth above , and similar to the Third and F ourth Circuits, the court in Hem rea soned that the 17 Supreme Court has ne ver r equire d a showingof ac tual relianc e. See H em , 4 5 8 F

. 3 d

at 1 1 9 7 ( “ [I ]n 18 none of the rec ent re troac tivity case s . . . did the Supreme Court conf er dispositive weight upon 19 the petitioner’s a ctual strate g ic dec isions. And, although St. Cyr g ive s r e lia

nc e a c e ntr a l r ole in i ts 20 retroa ctivity

analy sis, the Court there c onspicuously applies its holding to all petitioners who 2 1 t o o k

gu i l ty p l e a s b e f

o r e th e e f f e c t i v e d at e o f

II R IR A

— i r

r e s p e c t i v e o f

an y s h o w i n gth atS t

. C yr38 1 himself actua lly

relied on the availability

of § 212(c ) re lief.”) . Fur

ther, re lying on r easoningset 2 forth by

the Third Circuit in Po nn ap ula , 373 F.3d at 489–90, the court in Hem expli citly reje cted 3 our re asoningin Rankine , a s f oll ow s: 4 First, with the exception of a single passingref ere nce to a

nother c ase, Rankine never 5 on ce men tions the pr e sumpt ion a g a ins t r e tr oa c tiv ity . A s th e Cou rt ma de c le ar i n 6 Lan dg

ra f and its prog eny , howeve r, t his presumption informs ever y step of the 7 Lan dg

ra f inquiry . Second, the pa rticu l arstrateg ic dec isions of the individual 8 p e t i t i o n e r s ar e g i v e nd i s p o s i t i v e w e i g h ti nth e r e tr o a c t i v i ty an a l ys i s , n o tw h e th e r th e y, 9 as a c lass, fac ed new leg al consequence s to their completed c onduct. Fina lly , Rankine 10 appea

rs to turn the pre sumption aga inst re troac tivity on its he ad by demandingthat 11 pe tit ion e rs po in t to c on du c t on the ir pa rt that r e fl e c ts a

n inte nti on

to p re se rv e the ir 12 e lig ibi lity fo r r e lie f u

nd e r § 21 2( c ) b y

g oin gto t

ri a l. 13 14 458 F.3d at 1196 (alterations, citations, and internal quotation marks omitted). Ac cording ly , the 15 court in Hem “ c on fi de nt[l y ]” f oll ow e d “ the ob

je c tiv e re lia

nc e a pp ro a c h to re tr oa c tiv ity

. . . in 16 deter

mining whe ther the r epea l of § 212(c) has re troac tive eff ects.” Id . at 1199. 17 On

the oth e r s ide of

thi s sp lit , a lon gwi th o ur Cir c uit , th e F ir st, F if

th, and Se ve nth 18 Circuits require that petitioners show individualiz ed, subjec tive detrimental re liance. See , e.g. , 19 Di as v . I

NS , 311 F.3d 456, 458 ( 1st Cir. 2002) (holding that I I RI RA’s repe al of § 212(c ) wa s not 20 impermissibly

retroa ctive to petitioners who did not re ly on pre- I I RI RA law bec ause the 2 1 “r et ro ac t i v i ty

an al y s i s mu s ti n cl u d e a nex am i n at i o no f r el i an ce ”) (c i t i n g Mattis v. Reno , 212 F.3d 22 31 , 3 8 ( 1s t Cir . 2 00 0) (Ape tit ion e r m us t ha ve “ a c tua lly

and re a so na bly re lie d” on

the ava ila

bil ity 23 of re lief for

I I RI RA’s repe al of § 212(c ) to have retroa ctive ef fec t.), abrogated on other grounds 24 by St. Cyr , 533 U.S. at 325–26), cert. de nied , 5 39 U. S. 9 26 (2 00 3) ; Carranza-De Salinas v. 25 Gonzales , 477 F.3d 200, 205 ( 5th Cir. 2007) (“[T]hi s circuit re quires an a pplicant who alleg es 26 continued elig ibilit y for § 212( c) r elief to de monstrate ac tual, subjective re liance on the39 1 pr e -I I RI RAstate of the law t o b e e lig ibl e fo r r e lie f f ro m it s r e tr oa c tiv e a

pp lic atio n. ” ); DeHo rta 2 Ga rc ia , 2008 WL656909, at *3 (“ [W ]e require [] a showingof spec ific fa cts demonstrating 3 a c tua l r e lia

nc e .” ); se e als o B ro ok

s v . A sh c ro

ft , 283 F.3d 1268, 1274 ( 11th Cir. 2002) (finding 4 meritless petitioner’s Equa l Protection claim, bec ause, unlike a liens who plead guilty prior to the 5 enac tment of I I RI RA, petitioner, who wa s convicted at trial, “did not so choose to re ly upon the 6 ag ree d upon terms of a plea” and bec ause his ca se did not prese nt “the same conce rns of qu id p ro 7 quo , benef

it for an e x chang e, betwe en a de fenda nt and the g overnme nt”). 8 Ev e n w ith in t he se Cir c uit s, ho we ve r, ind ivi du a l ju dg e s h ave e xpre sse d d isa g re e me nt w ith 9 the ac tual relianc e re quirement. F or example, in Thom , J udg e Calabr esi noted that we re he 10 “ jud g ingon

a c le an s late , [he ] wo uld

re a d th e Sup re me Court ’s se min a l de c isi on on c ivi l 11 retroa ctivity , Landgraf [] —at a minimum—to say that, wher e Cong ress ha s not made its intent 12 clea

r, cour ts should presume that any civil statute that would be consider ed ex post facto in the 13 c ri min a l c onte xt wa s me ant t o a pp ly pr os pe c tiv e ly

on ly .” 36 9 F .3 d at 16 3 n .6 . Jud g e Ca la br e si 14 e xpla ine d th at “ [t]his re a din gwo uld be pa rt ic ula rl y a pp ro pr iate in c a se s whe re , a s h e re , th e c ivi l 15 law i n q

ue sti on imp os e s c on se qu e nc e s v e ry lik e tho se of

c ri min a l pe na lti e s, ” and

that he “ wo uld 16 expect that the Supreme Court’s f uture de cisions in this field will confirm such r eading s of 17 Landgraf

.” Id . L ikewise, in his dissenting opinion in Thom , J udg e Unde rhill argued that 18 “[a]lt houg h there is no denying that considerations of relianc e ar e ofte n illumi natingin making 19 retroa ctivity

deter minations (indeed, the presenc e of re lia nc e may ve ry we ll p ro vid e the mos t 20 compellingindication of unfa ir retr oactivity ), ‘de trimental relianc e’ is not the sine qua non of 21 retroa ctivity

analy sis. . . . The exist ence of re liance suppor ted the holdingin St. Cyr , but the40 1 holding in St. Cyr

does not requir e the e x istence of relianc e.” Id . at 167–73. Simil arly , in a 2 concur

ringopinion in DeHo rta Ga rc ia , 2 00 8 WL 65 69 09 , at *6 , Jud g e Rovne r o f t he Se ve nth 3 Circuit stated, “the F ourth Circuit’s opinion in Olatu nji . . . makes a

compellingcase for the 4 proposition that reliance is not properly an ele ment of the re troac tivity inquiry .” Judge Rovner 5 fu rt he r o pin e d th at “ [t]o th e e xtent th at r e lia nc e ou g ht t o p lay

any ro le in t he re tr oa c tiv ity 6 analy sis, it i s objective rather than subjec tive relianc e that should be c onsidered,” and she 7 c on c lud e d th at “ the pr e c e de nts that st and in D e Ho rt a

Ga rc ia ’s path m ay

be inc or re c t and sh ou ld 8 be re -visited.” Id . at *7–8. Di str ic t ju dg e s w ith in o ur Cir c uit have a lso e xpre sse d th e ir 9 disag ree ment with the relianc e re quirement. See , e.g. , Be ha rry , 183 F. Supp. 2d at 591 10 (Weinstein, J .) (“ Domond . . . should be rec onsidered a s the courts interpr et and de velop the 11 Supreme Court’s more rec ent immigration rulings and the require ments of international law.”) ; 12 Mohamme d v. Re no , 205 F. Supp. 2d 39, 47 (E.D.N .Y.) (G leeson, J.) (“Implicit in [ Domond ’s ] 13 conclusion is the pre mise that an impermissible retroa ctive ef fec t under Lan dg

ra f oc c ur s o nly 14 wh e re a

pe rs on ha s k no wl e dg e of

the law at th e tim e of

his a c tio ns and

a c tua lly re lie s o n it

. 15 Lan dg

ra f simply does not support—indeed, it would under mine—that rationale .”), stay pending 16 appeal vac ated , 3 09 F .3 d 9 5, 10 3 ( 2d Cir . 2 00 2) (r e c ognizi ng“ the po ssi bil ity that th e Sup re me 17 Court

might i nte rp re t it s St. Cy r opinion more expansively than we ha

ve”)

. 18 I V. 19 As the above illust rate s, whether —and to what e x tent—a showingof re liance on the prior 20 law is requir ed to demonstrate impermissible retroa ctive ef fec t of a ne w law is the subjec t of 21 much debate and, pe rhaps, “ should be re- visited” or re viewed. Se e DeHo rta Ga rc ia , 2 0 0 8 WL41 1 656909, at *8 (Rovner , J ., concur ring ). Ne verthe less, for the moment, a n individualiz ed showing 2 of ac tual relianc e is requir ed in our Circuit, and this, Z uluag a is unable to de monstrate. 3 Acc ording ly , while I disag ree with the majority that application of the stop-time rule imposes no 4 ne w l e g a l c on se qu e nc e s o n Z ulu a g a ’s pa st c on du c t, I mus t c on c ur

in t he jud g me nt.