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### STATE OF MICHIGAN

COURT OF APPEALS

RONALD W. LECH II,

Plaintiff/Counter-DefendantAppellee/Cross-Appellant, FOR PUBLICATION April 26, 2016 9:05 a.m.

v No. 320028 Livingston Circuit Court HUNTMORE ESTATES CONDOMINIUM ASSOCIATION, LC No. 08-024045-CH

Defendant/Counter-Plaintiff,

and

JACOBSON ORE CREEK LAND DEVELOPMENT, L.L.C., and SCOTT R. JACOBSON, d/b/a S. R. JACOBSON LAND DEVELOPMENT, L.L.C.,

Defendants-Appellants/CrossAppellees.

ON REMAND

Before: O’C ONNELL , P.J., and F ORT H OOD and G ADOLA , JJ.

O’C ONNELL , P.J.
This appeal concerns whether defendants, Jacobson Ore Creek La nd Development, L.L.C., and Scott R. Jacobson, (collectively “the developers”) are entitled to judgment interest under MCL 600.6013 on costs awarded as offer of judgment sancti ons under MCR 2.405. This Court previously reversed the tr ial court’s award of judgment i nterest on the sanctions award. Lech v Huntmore Estates Condo Ass’n , 310 Mich App 258, 259; 871 NW2d 551 (2015), vacated in part, 498 Mich 968 (2016). Our Supreme Court vacated the po rtion of this Court’s opinion holding that the developers were not entitled to judgment inter est on the sanctions award and remanded the case to this Court fo r reconsideration of this iss ue in light of Ayar v Foodland Distributors , 472 Mich 713, 717; 698 NW2d 875 (2005). Lech v Huntmore Estates Condo Ass’n , 498 Mich 968 (2016). Becau se we conclude that Ayar does not mandate a different result,-2- we again reverse the trial court’ s award of judgment interest o n the sanctions award under MCL 600.6013.

I. STANDARD OF REVIEW
This Court reviews de novo the interpretation and application of statutes. McCormick v Carrier , 487 Mich 180, 188; 795 NW2d 517 (2010). We also review de novo the interpretation and application of our court rules. In re McCarrick/Lamoreaux Minors , 307 Mich App 436, 445; 861 NW2d 303 (2014). We use the same rules of interpretation to interpret statutes a nd court rules. Id . at 446. We give the words of rules and statutes their plain and o rdinary meanings. Id . See also McCormick , 487 Mich at 192. We construe legal terms according to their legal meanings. See Feyz v Mercy Mem Hosp , 475 Mich 663, 673; 719 NW2d 1 (2006). We determine the intent of the court rule “from an examination of the court rule itself and its place within the structure of the Michigan Court Rules as a whole.” Haliw [ v Sterling Hts ], 471 Mich [700,] 706[; 691 NW2d 753 (2005)]. [ Lech , 310 Mich App at 259.]

II. ANALYSIS
We again conclude that the deve lopers are not entitled to reco ver judgment interest on their sanctions award under MCL 600.6013. Ayar does not require a contrary holding.

MCL 600.6013(1) provides that “[i]nterest is allowed on a mone y judgment recovered in a civil action, as provided in t his section.” The purpose of M CL 600.6013 is “to compensate the prevailing party for the expenses incurred in bringing an actio n and for the delay in receiving money damages.” In re Forfeiture of $176,598 , 465 Mich 382, 386 n 9; 633 NW2d 367 (2001). A money judgment in a civil acti on is a judgment “that orders t he payment of a sum of money, as distinguished from an order directing an act to be done or prop erty to be restored or transferred.” Id . at 386. There are several types of civil awards that are not a money judgment in a civil action, including money awards in drug forfeitures, divorce jud gments, awards of back pay for wrongful discharge, and awards r eflecting payment of a forced s hare in an estate. Id . at 388.

Ayar concerned “when interest begins to accrue, pursuant to MCL 600 .6013(8), on costs and attorney fees imposed for rejecting a mediation evaluation, MCR 2.403(O)(1), (6).” Ayar
, 472 Mich at 714. 1 In Ayar , the plaintiffs filed a complaint against the defendants for d amages arising out of a commercial relationship. Id . at 715. After the case proceeded to trial, the plaintiffs attained a substantial verdict. Id . The trial court entered a judgment that included prejudgment interest, as well as “costs and attorney fees to be assessed, if any.” Id . The trial court later entered an order ass essing costs and mediation sanc tions under MCR 2.403(O), calculated from the date tha t the complaint was filed. Id

.

1 The Supreme Court noted in Ayar that the court rule was amended in 2000 to refer to “case evaluation” rather than “mediation,” but because the mediation in Ayar occurred in 1995, the Supreme Court used the term “m ediation” in its opinion in that case. Ayar , 472 Mich at 714 n 1.-3- This Court reversed and remanded for a redetermination of the amount of interest. Id

. We concluded that judgment interest was allowed on mediation sa nctions, but determined that the trial court should calculate interest from the date of the judgment because, “before that date, no mediation award existed upon whi ch interest could be calcula ted.” Id

. Our Supreme Court reversed this Court’s judgment and reinstate d the trial court’s order. Id . at 714. It reasoned that M CL 600.6013(8) calculates interest from the date of filing the complaint on the entire judgmen t amount, including attorney fee s and costs. Id . at 716. Thus, “[t]he statute plainly states that interest on a money judgment is calculated from the date of filing the complaint.” Id . While this Court was correct in applying the judgment intere st statute to the mediation sanctions, we erred by treating them as an additional claim for damages:
The mediation process is an integral part of the proceeding com menced when plaintiffs filed their complaint . The realization of mediation sanctions is tied directly to the amount of the ve rdict rendered with regard to t hat complaint. MCR 2.403(O)(1). Indeed, the award of prejudgment interest on medi ation sanctions is part of the final judgment against defendants. At all times du ring which interest was assessed, plaintiffs’ claim ag ainst defendants was in dispu te. [ Id .]
The Supreme Court ultimately conc luded that courts properly app ly judgment interest under MCL 600.6013(8) to “attorney fees and costs ordered as mediatio n sanctions under MCR 2.403(O) from the filing of the complaint against the liable de fendant.” Id . at 717-718.
This case is distinguishable from Ayar , which concerned whether a plaintiff can recover prejudgment interest on a money judgement under MCL 600.6013(8) from the date of filing the complaint. The developers in this case did not file a complain t. They did not attain a money judgment. Instead, they defende d against a complaint and obtai ned summary disposition. The trial court’s sanctions order was an order directing an action to be done—payment of the other party’s attorney fees and costs—not an order providing for a mo ney judgment in a civil action. Because the developer in this case did not “incur expenses in b ringing an action” and “suffered no delay in receiving money damages,” an award of prejudgment i nterest would not serve the purpose of the statute. We conc lude that, by its plain languag e, MCL 600.6013 does not apply in such circumstances, and Ayar does not mandate a different result.

We reverse and remand. We do not retain jurisdiction.

/s/ Peter D. O’Connell /s/ Karen M. Fort Hood /s/ Michael F. Gadola