RENDERED: MAY 17, 2024; 10:00 A.M.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

Commonwealth of Kentucky

Court of Appeals

NO. 2022-CA-1309-MR

JEVONTAYE TAYLOR APPELLANT

APPEAL FROM FAYETTE CIRCUIT COURT

v. HONORABLE JULIE MUTH GOODMAN, JUDGE

ACTION NO. 17-CR-00328-001

COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY APPELLEE

OPINION

AFFIRMING

**   **  **

BEFORE: EASTON, KAREM, AND TAYLOR, JUDGES.

KAREM, JUDGE: Jevontaye Taylor, pro se, appeals from the Fayette Circuit 

Court’s order denying his motion to vacate sentence under Kentucky Rules of 

Criminal Procedure (RCr) 11.42. Upon careful review, we affirm.

The underlying facts of the case were set forth by the Kentucky 

Supreme Court on direct appeal:
-2-

The Commonwealth’s primary witness in this case, 

Chaka Hausley, is Taylor and his co-defendant 

Quandarious’ aunt. On the night of the robbery Chaka 

and the victim, Myrna Curtis, got into an argument at 

Myrna’s apartment. After the argument, Myrna gave 

Chaka a ride home. Ten to fifteen minutes after she 

returned to her apartment, Myrna heard a knock on her 

front door. Myrna opened the door and saw Chaka who 

said she left her headphones in the apartment. Myrna left

the screen door locked and went to retrieve the 

headphones from her bedroom.

When Myrna opened the screen door to give the 

headphones to Chaka, two men rushed the door, and one 

put a gun to Myrna’s forehead. The gunman told Myrna 

to shut up and backed her up against a wall. While 

Myrna was being held at gunpoint, the second man began 

stealing Myrna’s wallet with about $60 dollars in it, her 

cell phone, and a small Bluetooth speaker.

The robbers then ran out of the apartment and left 

the scene. Chaka started to leave too, but Myrna 

followed her and asked why Chaka had [let] someone rob 

her. Chaka replied, “what was I supposed to do, protect 

you over somebody with a gun?” At that point Myrna 

went to a nearby friend’s house and called the police.

Chaka left the scene before the police arrived.

The lead detective in this case, Detective Merker, 

learned from the responding officer’s report that Chaka 

was present at the time of the robbery and facilitated 

getting Myrna to open the door. Because of this, Det. 

Merker met with Chaka at her workplace about two 

weeks after the robbery. Chaka told Det. Merker that her 

nephews, Taylor and Quandarious, were the ones who 

robbed Myrna, but she did not know they planned to do 

so. She also told him they threatened to kill her if she 

went to the police. Based on this information Det. 

Merker obtained arrest warrants for the brothers. They 

were arrested about a week later at their home.
-3-

The day after they were arrested, Det. Merker went 

to the detention center to get a statement from them.

Quandarious told Det. Merker he drove Chaka to 

Myrna’s apartment, but he denied any involvement in the 

robbery. Taylor declined to speak with Det. Merker.

Taylor v. Commonwealth, No. 2018-SC-000178-MR, 2019 WL 2462780, at *1 

(Ky. Jun. 13, 2019).

Taylor was thereafter convicted by a jury of first-degree robbery, 

principal, or complicitor, and being a second-degree persistent felony offender. He 

received a total sentence of twenty years and was ordered to pay $300 in restitution

to Myrna jointly and severally with Quandarious. On direct appeal, the Supreme 

Court affirmed his conviction but reversed the order of restitution because the trial 

court failed to hold an adversarial hearing as required by constitutional due 

process. Id. at *4. The case was remanded for further proceedings on that issue 

alone.

On June 11, 2020, Taylor filed a motion pro se to vacate his 

conviction pursuant to RCr 11.42, and a motion for an evidentiary hearing. He 

claimed that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to request a lesser-included 

instruction to the first-degree robbery charge and for failing to argue that the jury 

instructions denied Taylor a unanimous verdict. Taylor was appointed counsel

who filed a notice of submission on the pleadings which stated that Taylor’s pro se

motion adequately alleged the facts underlying his claims and renewed the request 
-4-

for an evidentiary hearing. The Commonwealth filed a response; Taylor’s counsel 

filed a reply; and the Commonwealth filed a sur-reply. The trial court entered an 

order denying Taylor’s motion without a hearing. This appeal by Taylor followed.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

In a motion brought under RCr 11.42, “[t]he movant has the burden of 

establishing convincingly that he or she was deprived of some substantial right 

which would justify the extraordinary relief provided by [a] post-conviction 

proceeding.” Simmons v. Commonwealth, 191 S.W.3d 557, 561 (Ky. 2006), 

overruled on other grounds by Leonard v. Commonwealth, 279 S.W.3d 151, 159 

(Ky. 2009) (citation omitted). An RCr 11.42 motion “is limited to issues that were 

not and could not be raised on direct appeal.” Id.

A successful petition for relief under RCr 11.42 for ineffective 

assistance of counsel must meet the twin prongs of “performance” and “prejudice” 

provided in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2064,

80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984); accord Gall v. Commonwealth, 702 S.W.2d 37, 39-40 

(Ky. 1985). “First, the defendant must show that counsel’s performance was 

deficient. This requires showing that counsel made errors so serious that counsel 

was not functioning as the ‘counsel’ guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth 

Amendment.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, 104 S. Ct. at 2064. “Second, the 

defendant must show that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense. This 
-5-

requires showing that counsel’s errors were so serious as to deprive the defendant 

of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable.” Id.

An evidentiary hearing on the motion is required only “if there is a 

material issue of fact that cannot be conclusively resolved, i.e., conclusively 

proved or disproved, by an examination of the record.” Fraser v. Commonwealth, 

59 S.W.3d 448, 452 (Ky. 2001) (citations omitted); RCr 11.42(5). On appeal, 

“[o]ur review is confined to whether the motion on its face states grounds that are 

not conclusively refuted by the record and which, if true, would invalidate the 

conviction.” Lewis v. Commonwealth, 411 S.W.2d 321, 322 (Ky. 1967).

ANALYSIS

Taylor raises the following arguments on appeal: (1) general 

allegations of ineffective assistance of trial counsel as well as a specific allegation 

that his trial counsel failed to introduce into evidence a video recording of Chaka

stating she lied to the police; (2) his trial counsel failed to require the 

Commonwealth to meet its burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt by 

producing the gun used in the robbery; (3) his trial counsel failed to request lesserincluded instructions to the charge of first-degree robbery; and (4) the jury 

instructions denied him the right to a unanimous verdict.
-6-

i. General allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel

Taylor raises several allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel

which he describes as “lack of personal knowledge, leading, improper character 

evidence, inconsistent statement and unfairly prejudicial.” These allegations,

which presumably relate to the admissibility of some of the evidence at trial, are so 

lacking in specificity that we are unable to conduct a meaningful review. RCr 

11.42(2) requires the movant to “state specifically the grounds on which the 

sentence is being challenged and the facts on which the movant relies in support of 

such grounds.” RCr 11.42(2). “Conclusory allegations that counsel was 

ineffective without a statement of the facts upon which those allegations are based 

do not meet the rule’s specificity standard and so ‘warrant a summary dismissal of 

the motion.’” Roach v. Commonwealth, 384 S.W.3d 131, 140 (Ky. 2012) (quoting

Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 56, 106 S. Ct. 366, 88 L. Ed. 2d 203 (1985)). 

Taylor does raise one specific allegation regarding a video recording

he claims his mother sent to him, showing Chaka stating that she did not know 

why she lied to the police that Jevontaye and Quandarious robbed Myrna. He 

argues that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to introduce the video into 

evidence. Taylor claims his attorney told him he sent the video to the assistant 

Commonwealth Attorney, who told him the video was “no good” and Taylor’s 

mother could be “locked up” for recording someone without her knowledge. 
-7-

Our review of the record indicates that this claim concerning the video

recording, as well as the general allegations regarding the evidence, were not 

presented in the RCr 11.42 motion and consequently were not addressed by the

trial court in its order. It is axiomatic that “[a] new theory of error cannot be raised 

for the first time on appeal.” Springer v. Commonwealth, 998 S.W.2d 439, 446 

(Ky. 1999) (citations omitted). We recognize that “[p]ro se pleadings are not 

required to meet the standard of those applied to legal counsel[,]” Beecham v. 

Commonwealth, 657 S.W.2d 234, 236 (Ky. 1983), but an appellate court is simply 

“without authority to review issues not raised in or decided by the trial court.” Ten 

Broeck Dupont, Inc. v. Brooks, 283 S.W.3d 705, 734 (Ky. 2009) (citations 

omitted).

Taylor further states that the attorney who represented him in his postconviction proceedings filed a motion to withdraw and then filed a reply in the RCr 

11.42 action. Taylor claims that the firm that employed this attorney discovered he 

was communicating with the prosecutor and removed him. He further asserts that 

the attorney thereafter went to work at the Commonwealth Attorney’s office. 

Taylor does not explain how his case was prejudiced by his attorney’s alleged

actions. In any event, “[t]here is no constitutional right to an attorney in state postconviction proceedings. Consequently, a petitioner cannot claim constitutionally 

ineffective assistance of counsel in such proceedings.” Bowling v. Commonwealth, 
-8-

981 S.W.2d 545, 552 (Ky. 1998) (quoting Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 

752, 111 S. Ct. 2546, 2566, 115 L. Ed. 2d 640 (1991)).

ii. Burden of proof

Taylor argues that his trial counsel failed to require the 

Commonwealth to meet its burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt because the 

Commonwealth never produced the deadly weapon used in the robbery and Myrna 

did not identify whether Taylor or Quandarious had the handgun. After pointing 

out that the weapon was not recovered because the defendants fled with it after the 

robbery, the trial court held that Myrna’s testimony was sufficient proof of the 

existence of a deadly weapon, in reliance on Wiley v. Commonwealth, 348 S.W.3d 

570 (Ky. 2010). In Wiley, the appellant challenged the sufficiency of the evidence

supporting his conviction for the first-degree robbery of a gas station. The gas 

station clerk testified that Wiley approached the checkout counter to pay for a soft 

drink, then drew a firearm and demanded money from the cash register, while 

holding the gun two inches from her face. Id. at 577. The weapon was not 

recovered. The Kentucky Supreme Court ruled that the clerk’s testimony 

constituted sufficient evidence to permit the jury to decide whether Wiley 

possessed a deadly weapon for purposes of the robbery charge because it

established that the clerk saw the gun, recognized it as “real,” and described it as 

such. Id. “[I]n circumstances where the alleged ‘weapon’ is never recovered and 
-9-

its authenticity cannot be readily established . . . [t]he victim’s description of the 

item would ordinarily provide sufficient evidence to permit the jury to decide

whether it was among the sort of items declared by the legislature to be a ‘deadly 

weapon.’” Wilburn v. Commonwealth, 312 S.W.3d 321, 329 (Ky. 2010). 

Myrna’s testimony that one of her assailants placed a gun to her head 

and backed her against the wall was sufficient evidence to prove the existence of a 

deadly weapon. Her testimony was bolstered by Chaka’s testimony that one or 

both of the defendants had guns on their persons when they drove to Myrna’s 

apartment. Because the evidence presented at trial was more than sufficient to 

prove the existence of a deadly weapon, a defense objection on these grounds 

would have been futile. Moreover, Taylor’s trial counsel did challenge the 

sufficiency of the evidence on multiple grounds in a motion for a directed verdict 

at the close of proof and in a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. 

Thus, Taylor is unable to meet the first “performance” prong of the test for 

ineffective assistance of counsel for this claim. 

iii. Jury instructions

The jury found both defendants guilty of robbery, first degree, 

principal, or complicitor. Taylor argues he was entitled to an instruction on 

robbery, second degree, and an instruction on burglary. 
-10-

“[I]t is the duty of the trial court in a criminal case to instruct the jury 

on the whole law of the case, RCr 9.54(1), and this rule requires instructions 

applicable to every state of the case deducible from or supported to any extent by 

the testimony.” Thomas v. Commonwealth, 170 S.W.3d 343, 348-49 (Ky. 2005)

(citations omitted). “An instruction on a lesser included offense is required if the 

evidence would permit the jury to rationally find the defendant not guilty of the 

primary offense, but guilty of the lesser offense.” Id. (citations omitted). 

A person is guilty of second-degree robbery when “in the course of 

committing theft, he uses or threatens the immediate use of physical force upon 

another person with intent to accomplish the theft.” KRS1 515.030(1). “A person 

is guilty of first-degree robbery when the elements of second-degree robbery are 

met and the prosecution proves that either the perpetrator:

(1) is armed with a deadly weapon,

(2) uses or threatens immediate use of a dangerous 

instrument, or

(3) causes physical injury to the victim.”

Johnson v. Commonwealth, 327 S.W.3d 501, 505-06 (Ky. 2010) (quoting KRS 

515.020(1) (emphasis in original)).

The question for purposes of the viability of a second-degree robbery 

instruction is whether a reasonable jury could believe Javontaye and Quandarious

1 Kentucky Revised Statutes.
-11-

went to the apartment and threatened the immediate use of physical force upon 

Myrna but were not armed with a deadly weapon. Myrna’s testimony was clear 

that one of the men stuck the gun through her screen door, pointed it at her 

forehead, told her to “shut the f*** up,” and backed her against the wall. Chaka

could not recall which of her nephews had a gun but that she did see a gun, it was 

possible they both had guns, and they forced their way into the apartment with a 

gun or guns after Myrna opened the door. There was simply no evidence from 

which the jury could conclude that the two assailants were unarmed and that the 

crime was committed without a deadly weapon as required for a second-degree 

robbery instruction. A defendant is not entitled to a second-degree robbery charge 

when a firearm has been brandished. Swain v. Commonwealth, 887 S.W.2d 346, 

348 (Ky. 1994). As the trial court aptly stated in its order denying the RCr 11.42 

motion, the evidence showed the victim was robbed by Taylor and his brother at 

gunpoint and therefore there was no factual basis for any offense other than firstdegree robbery. “Thus, if the instructions were not in error, an evidentiary hearing 

to determine why defense counsel did not object to them would be futile and 

pointless.” Commonwealth v. Davis, 14 S.W.3d 9, 11 (Ky. 1999), as modified

(Jan. 20, 2000).

As to Taylor’s contention that he was entitled to an instruction on 

burglary, this argument was never presented to the trial court. It may be resolved 
-12-

on similar grounds to the argument regarding a second-degree robbery instruction. 

“[A] person is guilty of second-degree burglary when ‘with the intent to commit a 

crime, he knowingly enters or remains unlawfully in a dwelling’ but he is only 

guilty of first-degree burglary if, in addition to proving the elements of seconddegree burglary, the prosecution shows that either:

(1) he is armed with a deadly weapon or explosives,

(2) he uses or threatens immediate use of a dangerous 

instrument, or

(3) he causes the victim physical injury.”

Johnson, 327 S.W.3d at 506 (quoting KRS 511.030 and KRS 511.020) (footnotes 

omitted).

First-degree burglary is a class B felony, as is first-degree robbery, so 

there would have been no advantage to such an instruction. KRS 511.020(2). A 

second-degree burglary instruction would have required the jury to find that Taylor 

and Quandarious entered Myrna’s apartment without a deadly weapon or without 

the use or threat of use of a dangerous instrument. Such an instruction would not 

be supported by the evidence and Taylor’s trial counsel was not ineffective for not 

requesting such an instruction.

Taylor also argues that the jury instructions were flawed for failing to 

provide definitions of principal and complicitor. This argument was never 

presented to the trial court. Our review indicates that a full definition of 
-13-

“complicity” was provided in the instructions and the concepts of principal and 

complicitor were clearly explained within the instructions on the charges 

themselves. Consequently, we see no grounds to support a finding that trial 

counsel was ineffective for failing to request the inclusion of separate formal 

definitions of these terms. 

iv. Unanimous verdict

Finally, Taylor claims he was denied the right to a unanimous verdict.

The jury was instructed as to each defendant on the following charges: robbery,

first degree; complicity to robbery, first degree; and robbery, first degree, principal

or complicitor. Complicity is defined in pertinent part as follows:

A person is guilty of an offense committed by another 

person when, with the intention of promoting or 

facilitating the commission of the offense, he:

(a) Solicits, commands, or engages in a conspiracy with 

such other person to commit the offense; or

(b) Aids, counsels, or attempts to aid such person in 

planning or committing the offense; or

(c) Having a legal duty to prevent the commission of the 

offense, fails to make a proper effort to do so.

KRS 502.020(1).

Taylor argues that in order to charge a person as a principal or 

complicitor, one individual must be charged with the original underlying charge. 

But “[c]omplicity is not a separate offense. It is rather an alternative theory of the 
-14-

charged offense.” Futrell v. Commonwealth, 471 S.W.3d 258, 277 (Ky. 2015)

(citation omitted). Kentucky precedent holds that the principal/complicitor 

combination instruction of the type offered in this case does not create a “no

unanimous verdict issue ‘as long as the evidence [is] sufficient to support a 

combination instruction.’” Halvorsen v. Commonwealth, 671 S.W.3d 68, 73 (Ky.

2023) (quoting Capstraw v. Commonwealth, 641 S.W.3d 148, 158 (Ky. 2022)).

“[W]here both alternatives are supported by the evidence, combination 

principal/accomplice instructions . . . are proper.” Futrell, 471 S.W.3d at 277-78.

This concept is illustrated in Futrell, wherein an appeal was brought 

by a woman and her boyfriend who were both convicted of murdering her infant 

son. They were the only two people who had access to the child when the murder 

was committed and “a reasonable juror could have been convinced that either 

Appellant or both of them inflicted the fatal injuries.” Futrell, 471 S.W.3d at 271.

Therefore, because either or both of them could have been found guilty as the 

principal, the Kentucky Supreme Court held that a combination instruction was 

appropriate. “Combination instructions – instructions incorporating alternative 

theories of a single crime – are appropriate, we have many times held, when, but 

only when, the evidence supports all of the alternatives.” Id. at 277 (citations 

omitted). 
-15-

Chaka testified that both defendants went to Myrna’s apartment and at 

least one of them was armed. Myrna testified that one of them placed the gun 

against her forehead and threatened her while the other robbed her of various 

items. This testimony constituted sufficient evidence to support the finding that 

either Taylor or Quantarious threatened Myrna with the handgun and the other 

acted in complicity. Therefore, the instruction on first-degree robbery, principal,

or complicitor, was proper and did not violate jury unanimity. Taylor’s counsel 

was not ineffective for not objecting to this instruction because it comports fully 

with our case law. See Caudill v. Commonwealth, 120 S.W.3d 635, 666 (Ky. 

2003), as modified (Feb. 5, 2004) (“The unanimity requirement was not violated 

because both theories were supported by the evidence[.]”).

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Fayette Circuit Court’s order denying 

Taylor’s RCr 11.42 motion is affirmed. 

ALL CONCUR.

BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:

Jevontaye Taylor, pro se

Eddyville, Kentucky 

BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:

Daniel Cameron

Attorney General of Kentucky

Joseph A. Beckett

Assistant Attorney General

Frankfort, Kentucky