### FILED MARCH 13,2014 In theOfficeoftheClerkofCourt W AStateCourtofAppeals,Division III

IN THE COURTOFAPPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON DIVISION THREE STATE OFWASHINGTON, Respondent, 

# I v. EULOGIO CASTRO ROMERO, Appellant. ) No. 31224-1-111 ) ) ) ) ) ) UNPUBLISHED OPINION ) ) 

## J Brown, J.-Eulogio Castro Romero appeals his convictions for possessing 

# I 

# I methamphetamine and possessing a firearm without an alien firearm license. He contends thetrial court erred in admitting his custodial interrogation statementsto a federal immigration agentand insufficientevidence supports his conviction for possessing a firearm without an alien firearm license. Weaffirm. FACTS Law enforcement executed a search warrantat Mr. Romero's residence on July 15,2012around 10:30 p.m. Moses Lake Police Officer Raymond Bernard read Mr. Romero his Miranda1 rights from a department issued card. Mr. Romero responded that he understood and gave statements. The search results partly included methamphetamine on Mr. Romero's bedside table and a firearm under his mattress.

1 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 16 

### L. Ed. 2d 694 (1966).No. 31224-1-111 State v. Romero The next day, around 10to 18 hours later, United States Immigration and Customs EnforcementAgent JaimeWaite took additional statementsfrom Mr. Romero while he
was in jail without giving fresh Miranda warnings. The trial court admitted these statements attrial afterdenying Mr. Romero's CrR 3.5 motion to suppress them. Ajury found him guilty as charged ofpossessing methamphetamine and possessing a firearm without an alien firearm license. He appealed. ANALYSIS A. Miranda Warnings The issue is whetherthe trial court erred in admitting Mr. Romero's custodial interrogation statements to AgentWaite. Mr. Romero solely contends his statements
are inadmissible because AgentWaite obtained them without giving fresh Miranda warnings. We reviewthe adequacy ofMiranda warnings de novo. State v. CamposCerna, 154 Wn. App. 702, 708, 226 P.3d 185 (2010). We review CrR 3.5 factual findings forsubstantial evidence. State v. Broadaway, 133Wn.2d 118, 131,942 P.2d 363 (1997). Substantial evidence supports a factual finding if"a sufficient quantity of evidence [exists] in the record to persuade a fair-minded, rational person ofthe truth of thefinding." State v. Hill, 123Wn.2d 641,644,870 P.2d 313 (1994). Generally, in addition to due process protections against use ofcoerced statements, the State may not admit as trial evidence any statements a suspect makes during custodial interrogation unless it proves, by a preponderance ofevidence, the suspect received fully effective Miranda warnings and knowingly, intelligently, and



### 2No. 31224-1-111 State v. Romero voluntarily waived his or her Miranda rights before making the statements.2 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 478-79,86 S. Ct. 1602, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694 (1966); Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 168, 107 S. Ct. 515, 93 L. Ed. 2d 473 (1986). Mr. Romero does not invoke due process protections here. The State does notdisputethat his conversation with AgentWaite constituted custodial interrogation.3 "[C]ourts have generally rejected a perse rule as to when a suspect must be readvised ofhis rights afterthe passage oftime ora change in questioners." United States v. Andaverde, 64 F.3d 1305, 1312 (1995) (citing Wyrick v. Fields, 459 U.S. 42, 49,103 S. Ct. 394, 74 L. Ed. 2d 214 (1982». Instead, courts evaluatethe totality ofthe circumstances in determining whether law enforcement needed to givethe suspect fresh Miranda warnings. See, e.g., UnitedStates v. Rodriguez-Preciado, 399 F.3d 1118, 1128-30 (9th. Cir. 2005) (holding Miranda warnings were still effective after 16 hours); Guam v. Dela Pena, 72 F.3d 767,769-70 (9th Cir. 1995) (holding Miranda warnings were still effective after 15 hours); Puplampu v. United States, 422 F.2d 870, 870 (9th Cir. 1970) (holding Miranda warnings were still effective aftertwo days); Maguire v. UnitedStates, 396 F.2d 327,331 (9th Cir. 1968) (holding Miranda warnings

2 Ata minimum, Miranda warnings must inform a suspect "that he hasthe right to remain silent, thatanything he says can be used against him in a court oflaw, that he hasthe right to the presence ofan attorney, and that if he cannot afford an attorney one will be appointed for him." 384 U.S. at479. 3 A suspect is in custody when lawenforcementformally arrests the suspect or similarly restrains his or herfreedom so that a reasonable person underthe circumstances would notfeel free to terminatethe encounterand leave. Thompson v. Keohane, 516 U.S. 99,112, 116 S. Ct. 457,133 L. Ed. 2d 383 (1995). A suspect is subjectto interrogation when law enforcement expressly questionsthe suspector initiates somefunctional equivalent, including words orconduct that law enforcement 

### 3No. 31224-1-111 State v. Romero
were still effective afterthree days); State v. Blanchey, 75 Wn.2d 926, 931, 454 P.2d 841 (1969) (holding Miranda warnings were still effective afterfour days). Considering thesejudicial opinions, we concludethe original Miranda warnings
were still effective 10to 18 hours later, when Mr. Romero made his custodial interrogation statements to AgentWaite. A sufficientquantity ofevidence exists in the record to persuade a fair-minded, rational person that Mr. Romero received fully effective Miranda warnings and knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived his Miranda rights before making his statements. Substantial evidence supports the CrR 3.5 factual findings. The trial court did not err in admitting Mr. Romero's custodial interrogation statements to AgentWaite. B. Evidence Sufficiency The issue is whethersufficient evidence supports Mr. Romero's conviction for possessing a firearm without an alien firearm license. He contends the State did not prove he lacked the license. The State must prove all essential elements ofa charged crime beyond a reasonable doubt. In

### re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364, 90 S. Ct. 1068,25 L. Ed. 2d 368 (1970). Evidence is sufficient to support a guilty finding if'''afterviewing the evidence in the light mostfavorable to the prosecution, any rational trier offact could have found the essential elements ofthe crime beyond a reasonable doubt.'" State v. Green, 94 Wn.2d 216,221,616 P.2d 628 (1980) (emphasis omitted) (quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 61 L. Ed. 2d 560 (1979». An evidence sufficiency
should know are reasonably likelyto elicit his or her incriminating response. Rhode 

### 4No. 31224-1-111 State v. Romero challenge "admits the truth ofthe State's evidence and all inferences that reasonably
can be drawn therefrom." State 

### v. Salinas, 119Wn.2d 192,201,829 P.2d 1068 (1992). We defertothejury's assessment ofwitness credibility and evidence weight. State

### v. CafVer, 113 Wn.2d 591, 604, 781 P.2d 1308,789 P.2d 306 (1989). A person is guilty ofpossessing a firearm without an alien firearm license ifthe person "carr[ies] or possess[es] anyfirearm," is not "a lawful permanent resident," and has not "obtained a valid alien firearm license." RCW 9.41.171. To apply for an alien firearm license, a person must provide "a copy ofthe applicant's passport and visa showing the applicant is in the country legally." RCW 9.41.173(4). Because Mr. Romero admitted he lacked any "papers" authorizing him to be in the country, a rational jurycould reasonably infer he could not provide a copy of his passport and visa showing hewas in the country legally. Report of Proceedings at 136. Itwas impossiblefor him to have obtained a valid alien firearm license because his immigration status categorically prohibited him from doing so. Therefore, the State produced sufficient evidence for thejuryto find he lacked the license. In sum, sufficientevidence supports Mr. Romero's conviction for possessing a firearm without an alien firearm license. Affirmed. A majority ofthe panel has determined this opinion will not be printed in the

Islandv. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 300-01, 100 S. Ct. 1682,64 L. Ed. 2d 297 (1980). 

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# 1 t t !**~** No. 31224-1-111 State v. Romero 

# j Washington Appellate Reports, but it will be filed for public record pursuantto RCW 2.06.040.

WE CONCUR:



# orsrno.C.J. Brown, 

### J.



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