I 

117TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION H. R. 3524 

To revitalize and reassert United States leadership, investment, and 

engagement in the Indo-Pacific region and globally. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

MAY 25, 2021 

Mr. MEEKS introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee 

on Foreign Affairs, and in addition to the Committees on Financial Services, Ways and Means, the Judiciary, and Intelligence (Permanent Select), for a period to be subsequently determined by the Speaker, in each 

case for consideration of such provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of 

the committee concerned 

A BILL 

To revitalize and reassert United States leadership, investment, and engagement in the Indo-Pacific region and 

globally. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE; TABLE OF CONTENTS. 

4 (a) SHORT TITLE.—This Act may be cited as the 

5 ‘‘Ensuring American Global Leadership and Engagement 

6 Act’’ or the ‘‘EAGLE Act’’. 

7 (b) TABLE OF CONTENTS.—The table of contents for 

8 this Act is as follows: 


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Sec. 1. Short title; table of contents. 

Sec. 2. Definitions. 

Sec. 3. Statement of policy. 

Sec. 4. Sense of Congress. 

Sec. 5. Rules of construction. 

TITLE I—INVESTING IN AMERICAN COMPETITIVENESS 

Subtitle A—Science and Technology 

Sec. 101. Authorization to assist United States companies with global supply 

chain diversification and management. 

Subtitle B—Global Infrastructure and Energy Development 

Sec. 111. Appropriate committees of Congress defined. 

Sec. 112. Sense of Congress on international quality infrastructure investment 

standards. 

Sec. 113. Supporting economic independence from China. 

Sec. 114. Strategy for advanced and reliable energy infrastructure. 

Sec. 115. Report on the People’s Republic of China’s investments in foreign energy development. 

Sec. 116. Ensuring the International Development Finance Corporation is positioned to achieve national security, economic, and development 

objectives. 

Subtitle C—Economic Diplomacy and Leadership 

Sec. 121. Findings on regional economic order. 

Sec. 122. Review of PRC trade and economic engagement globally. 

Sec. 123. Report on entrenching American economic diplomacy in the Indo-Pacific. 

Sec. 124. Sense of Congress on the need to bolster American leadership in 

APEC. 

Sec. 125. Sense of Congress on digital technology issues. 

Sec. 126. Digital trade agreements. 

Sec. 127. Digital connectivity and cybersecurity partnership. 

Subtitle D—Financial Diplomacy and Leadership 

Sec. 131. Findings on Chinese financial industrial policy. 

Sec. 132. Report on importance of American financial strength for global leadership. 

Sec. 133. Review of Chinese companies on United States capital markets. 

Sec. 134. Report on diplomatic and economic implications of changes to crossborder payment and financial messaging systems. 

TITLE II—INVESTING IN ALLIANCES AND PARTNERSHIPS 

Subtitle A—Strategic and Diplomatic Matters 

Sec. 201. Appropriate committees of Congress defined. 

Sec. 202. United States commitment and support for allies and partners in the 

Indo-Pacific. 

Sec. 203. Boosting Quad cooperation. 

Sec. 204. Establishment of Quad Intra-Parliamentary Working Group. 

Sec. 205. Statement of policy on cooperation with ASEAN. 

Sec. 206. United States representation in standards-setting bodies. 


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Sec. 207. Sense of Congress on negotiations with G7 and G20 countries. 

Sec. 208. Enhancing the United States-Taiwan partnership. 

Sec. 209. Taiwan Fellowship Program. 

Sec. 210. Increasing Department of State personnel and resources devoted to 

the Indo-Pacific. 

Sec. 211. Diplomatic and economic efforts to deter PRC use of force against 

Taiwan. 

Sec. 212. Report on bilateral efforts to address Chinese fentanyl trafficking. 

Sec. 213. Facilitation of increased equity investments under the Better Utilization of Investments Leading to Development Act of 2018. 

Sec. 214. Expanding investment by United States International Development 

Finance Corporation for vaccine manufacturing. 

Sec. 215. Ensuring United States diplomatic posts align with American strategic national security and economic objectives. 

Sec. 216. Authorization of appropriations for the Fulbright-Hays Program. 

Sec. 217. Supporting independent media and countering disinformation. 

Sec. 218. Global Engagement Center. 

Subtitle B—International Security Matters 

Sec. 221. Definitions. 

Sec. 222. Additional funding for international military education and training 

in the Indo-Pacific. 

Sec. 223. Statement of policy on maritime freedom of operations in international waterways and airspace of the Indo-Pacific and on artificial land features in the South China Sea. 

Sec. 224. Report on capability development of Indo-Pacific allies and partners. 

Subtitle C—Multilateral Strategies to Bolster American Power 

Sec. 231. Findings on multilateral engagement. 

Sec. 232. Statement of policy on America’s multilateral engagement. 

Sec. 233. Support for Americans at the United Nations. 

Sec. 234. Report on American employment in international organizations. 

Subtitle D—Regional Strategies To Bolster American Power 

Sec. 241. Statement of policy on cooperation with allies and partners around 

the world. 

PART I—WESTERN HEMISPHERE

Sec. 242. Sense of Congress regarding United States-Canada relations. 

Sec. 243. Sense of Congress regarding the Government of China’s arbitrary imprisonment of Canadian citizens. 

Sec. 244. Strategy to enhance cooperation with Canada. 

Sec. 245. Strategy to strengthen economic competitiveness, governance, human 

rights, and the rule of law in Latin America and the Caribbean. 

Sec. 246. Engagement in international organizations and the defense sector in 

Latin America and the Caribbean. 

Sec. 247. Defense cooperation in Latin America and the Caribbean. 

Sec. 248. Engagement with civil society in Latin America and the Caribbean 

regarding accountability, human rights, and the risks of pervasive surveillance technologies. 

Sec. 249. Caribbean energy initiative as alternative to China’s Belt and Road 

Initiative. 


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Sec. 250. U.S.-Caribbean resilience partnership. 

PART II—TRANSATLANTIC RELATIONSHIPS

Sec. 255. Sense of Congress on Transatlantic relationships. 

Sec. 256. Strategy to enhance transatlantic cooperation with respect to the 

People’s Republic of China. 

Sec. 257. Enhancing Transatlantic cooperation on promoting private sector finance. 

Sec. 258. Report and briefing on cooperation between China and Iran and between China and Russia. 

PART III—SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIA

Sec. 261. Sense of Congress on South and Central Asia. 

Sec. 262. Strategy to enhance cooperation with South and Central Asia. 

Sec. 263. Indian Ocean Region Strategic Review. 

PART IV—AFRICA

Sec. 271. Assessment of political, economic, and security activity of the People’s 

Republic of China in Africa. 

Sec. 272. Increasing the competitiveness of the United States in Africa. 

Sec. 273. Digital security cooperation with respect to Africa. 

Sec. 274. Increasing personnel in United States embassies in sub-Saharan Africa focused on the People’s Republic of China. 

Sec. 275. Support for Young African Leaders Initiative. 

Sec. 276. Africa broadcasting networks. 

Sec. 277. Expansion of authorities of the United States International Development Finance Corporation in sub-Saharan Africa. 

PART V—MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA

Sec. 281. Strategy to counter Chinese influence in, and access to, the Middle 

East and North Africa. 

Sec. 282. Sense of Congress on Middle East and North Africa engagement. 

PART VI—ARCTIC REGION

Sec. 285. Arctic diplomacy. 

PART VII—OCEANIA

Sec. 291. Statement of policy on United States engagement in Oceania. 

Sec. 292. Oceania strategic roadmap. 

Sec. 293. Oceania Security Dialogue. 

Sec. 294. Oceania Peace Corps partnerships. 

PART VIII—PACIFIC ISLANDS

Sec. 295. Short title. 

Sec. 296. Findings. 

Sec. 297. Statement of policy. 

Sec. 298. Definitions. 

Sec. 299. Authority to consolidate reports; form of reports. 

Sec. 299A. Diplomatic presence in the Pacific Islands. 

Sec. 299B. Coordination with regional allies. 

Sec. 299C. Climate resilient development in the Pacific Islands. 


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TITLE III—INVESTING IN OUR VALUES 

Sec. 301. Sense of Congress on the continued violation of rights and freedoms 

of the people of Hong Kong. 

Sec. 302. Authorization of appropriations for promotion of democracy in Hong 

Kong. 

Sec. 303. Hong Kong people’s freedom and choice. 

Sec. 304. Export prohibition of munitions items to the Hong Kong police force. 

Sec. 305. Sense of Congress condemning the ongoing genocide and crimes 

against humanity against Uyghurs and other minority groups. 

Sec. 306. Prevention of Uyghur forced labor. 

Sec. 307. Uyghur human rights protection. 

Sec. 308. Removal of members of the United Nations Human Rights Council 

that commit human rights abuses. 

Sec. 309. Policy with respect to Tibet. 

Sec. 310. United States policy and international engagement on the succession 

or reincarnation of the Dalai Lama and religious freedom of 

Tibetan Buddhists. 

Sec. 311. Development and deployment of internet freedom and Great Firewall 

circumvention tools for the people of Hong Kong. 

Sec. 312. Authorization of appropriations for protecting human rights in the 

People’s Republic of China. 

Sec. 313. Repeal of sunset applicable to authority under Global Magnitsky 

Human Rights Accountability Act. 

Sec. 314. Sense of Congress condemning anti-Asian racism and discrimination. 

Sec. 315. Annual reporting on censorship of free speech with respect to international abuses of human rights. 

TITLE IV—INVESTING IN OUR ECONOMIC STATECRAFT 

Sec. 401. Sense of Congress regarding the PRC’s industrial policy. 

Sec. 402. Economic defense response teams. 

Sec. 403. Countering overseas kleptocracy. 

TITLE V—ENSURING STRATEGIC SECURITY 

Sec. 501. Cooperation on a strategic nuclear dialogue. 

Sec. 502. Report on United States efforts to engage the People’s Republic of 

China on nuclear issues and ballistic missile issues. 

Sec. 503. Countering China’s proliferation of ballistic missiles and nuclear technology to the Middle East. 

TITLE VI—INVESTING IN A SUSTAINABLE FUTURE 

Sec. 601. Ensuring national security and economic priorities with China and 

other countries account for environmental issues and climate 

change. 

Sec. 602. Enhancing security considerations for global climate disruptions. 

Sec. 603. Balancing accountability and cooperation with China. 

Sec. 604. Promoting responsible development alternatives to the Belt and Road 

Initiative. 

Sec. 605. Using climate diplomacy to better serve national security and economic interests. 

Sec. 606. Driving a global climate change resilience strategy. 

Sec. 607. Addressing international climate change mitigation, adaptation, and 

security. 


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Sec. 608. Reducing the negative impacts from black carbon, methane, and highGWP hydrofluorocarbons. 

Sec. 609. Building United States economic growth and technological innovation 

through the Green Climate Fund. 

1 SEC. 2. DEFINITIONS. 

2 In this Act: 

3 (1) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMIT4 TEES.—Unless otherwise defined, the term ‘‘appro5 priate congressional committees’’ means— 

6 (A) the Committee on Foreign Relations of 

7 the Senate; and 

8 (B) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of 

9 the House of Representatives. 

10 (2) CCP.—The term ‘‘CCP’’ means the Chinese 

11 Communist Party. 

12 (3) PEOPLE’S LIBERATION ARMY; PLA.—The 

13 terms ‘‘People’s Liberation Army’’ and ‘‘PLA’’ mean 

14 the armed forces of the People’s Republic of China. 

15 (4) PRC; CHINA.—The terms ‘‘PRC’’ and 

16 ‘‘China’’ mean the People’s Republic of China. 

17 SEC. 3. STATEMENT OF POLICY. 

18 (a) OBJECTIVES.—It is the policy of the United 

19 States to pursue the following objectives: 

20 (1) The United States global leadership role is 

21 sustained and its political system and major founda22 tions of national power are secured for the long-term 


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1 in the political, economic, technological, and military 

2 domains. 

3 (2) The United States position as an indispen4 sable power in the Indo-Pacific and globally is sus5 tained through diplomacy, multilateralism, and en6 gagement. 

7 (3) The United States deters military con8 frontation with the PRC and both nations work to 

9 reduce the risk of conflict. 

10 (4) The United States and its allies maintain a 

11 stable balance of power in the Indo-Pacific with 

12 China. The United States and its allies maintain un13 fettered access to the region, including through free14 dom of navigation and the free flow of commerce, 

15 consistent with international law and practice. 

16 (5) The allies and partners of the United 

17 States— 

18 (A) maintain confidence in United States 

19 leadership and its commitment to the Indo-Pa20 cific region; 

21 (B) can withstand and combat subversion 

22 by the PRC; and 

23 (C) work closely with the United States in 

24 setting global rules, norms, and standards that 

25 benefit the international community. 


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1 (6) The combined weight of the United States 

2 and its allies and partners is strong enough to dem3 onstrate to the PRC that the risks of attempts to 

4 dominate other states outweigh the potential bene5 fits. 

6 (7) The United States leads the free and open 

7 international order, which comprises resilient states 

8 and institutions that uphold and defend principles, 

9 such as sovereignty, rule of law, individual freedom, 

10 and human rights. The international order is 

11 strengthened to withstand attempts at destabiliza12 tion by illiberal and authoritarian actors. 

13 (8) The key rules, norms, and standards of 

14 international engagement in the 21st century are 

15 maintained, including— 

16 (A) the protection of human rights, com17 mercial engagement and investment, and tech18 nology; and 

19 (B) that such rules, norms, and standards 

20 are in alignment with the values and interests 

21 of the United States, its allies and partners, 

22 and other stakeholders in the liberal inter23 national order. 

24 (9) The United States counters attempts by the 

25 PRC to— 


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1 (A) undermine open and democratic soci2 eties; 

3 (B) distort global markets; 

4 (C) manipulate the international trade sys5 tem; 

6 (D) coerce other nations via economic and 

7 military means; or 

8 (E) use its technological advantages to un9 dermine individual freedoms or other states’ na10 tional security interests. 

11 (10) The United States deters military con12 frontation with the PRC and both nations work to 

13 reduce the risk of conflict. 

14 (b) POLICY.—It is the policy of the United States, 

15 in pursuit of the objectives set forth in subsection (a)— 

16 (1) to strengthen the United States domestic 

17 foundation by reinvesting in market-based economic 

18 growth, education, scientific and technological inno19 vation, democratic institutions, and other areas that 

20 improve the ability of the United States to pursue 

21 its vital economic, foreign policy, and national secu22 rity interests; 

23 (2) to maximize the United States strengths in 

24 the political, diplomatic, economic, development, 

25 military, informational, and technological realms in 


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1 order to safeguard United States interests and the 

2 values of United States allies and partners, and to 

3 strengthen incentives for the PRC to collaborate in 

4 addressing common global and regional challenges; 

5 (3) to lead a free, open, and secure inter6 national system characterized by the rule of law, 

7 open markets and the free flow of commerce, and a 

8 shared commitment to security and peaceful resolu9 tion of disputes, human rights, good and transparent 

10 governance, and freedom from coercion; 

11 (4) to strengthen and deepen United States alli12 ances and partnerships by pursuing greater bilateral 

13 and multilateral cooperative initiatives that advance 

14 shared interests and values and bolster partner 

15 countries’ confidence that the United States is and 

16 will remain a strong, committed, and reliable partner 

17 that respects the views and interests of its allies and 

18 friends; 

19 (5) to encourage and collaborate with United 

20 States allies and partners in boosting their own ca21 pabilities and resiliency to pursue, defend, and pro22 tect shared interests and values, free from coercion 

23 and external pressure; 


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1 (6) to pursue fair, reciprocal treatment and 

2 healthy, constructive competition in United States3 China economic relations by— 

4 (A) advancing policies that harden the 

5 United States economy against unfair and ille6 gal commercial or trading practices and the co7 ercion of United States businesses; and 

8 (B) improving United States laws and reg9 ulations as necessary to prevent any PRC at10 tempts to harm United States economic com11 petitiveness; 

12 (7) to demonstrate the value of private sector13 led growth in emerging markets around the world, 

14 including through the use of United States Govern15 ment tools that— 

16 (A) support greater private sector invest17 ment and advance capacity-building initiatives 

18 that are grounded in the rule of law; 

19 (B) promote open markets; 

20 (C) establish clear policy and regulatory 

21 frameworks; 

22 (D) improve the management of key eco23 nomic sectors; 

24 (E) combat corruption; and 


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1 (F) foster and support greater collabora2 tion with and among partner countries and the 

3 United States private sector to develop secure 

4 and sustainable infrastructure; 

5 (8) to play a leading role in advancing inter6 national rules and norms that foster free and recip7 rocal trade and open and integrated markets; 

8 (9) to conduct vigorous commercial diplomacy 

9 in support of United States companies and busi10 nesses in partner countries that seek fair competi11 tion; 

12 (10) to ensure that the United States is second 

13 to none in the innovation of critical and emerging 

14 technologies, such as next-generation telecommuni15 cations, artificial intelligence, quantum computing, 

16 semiconductors, and biotechnology, by— 

17 (A) providing necessary investment and 

18 concrete incentives for the private sector to ac19 celerate development of such technologies; 

20 (B) modernizing export controls and in21 vestment screening regimes and associated poli22 cies and regulations; 

23 (C) enhancing the role of the United 

24 States in technical standards-setting bodies and 


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1 avenues for developing norms regarding the use 

2 of emerging critical technologies; 

3 (D) reducing United States barriers and 

4 increasing incentives for collaboration with al5 lies and partners on the research and co-devel6 opment of critical technologies; 

7 (E) collaborating with allies and partners 

8 to protect critical technologies by— 

9 (i) coordinating and aligning export 

10 control measures; 

11 (ii) building capacity for defense tech12 nology security; 

13 (iii) safeguarding chokepoints in stra14 tegically critical supply chains; and 

15 (iv) ensuring diversification; and 

16 (F) designing major defense capabilities 

17 for export to vetted allies and partners; 

18 (11) to collaborate with like-minded democ19 racies and other willing partners to promote ideals 

20 and principles that— 

21 (A) advance a free and open international 

22 order; 

23 (B) strengthen democratic institutions; 

24 (C) protect and promote human rights; 

25 and 


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1 (D) uphold a free press and fact-based re2 porting; 

3 (12) to develop comprehensive strategies and 

4 policies to counter PRC disinformation campaigns; 

5 (13) to demonstrate effective leadership at the 

6 United Nations, its associated agencies, and other 

7 multilateral organizations and ensure the integrity 

8 and effectiveness of these organizations in facili9 tating solutions to global challenges; 

10 (14) to advocate for the defense of fundamental 

11 freedoms and human rights in the United States re12 lationship with the PRC; 

13 (15) to cooperate with allies, partners, and mul14 tilateral organizations that sustain and strengthen a 

15 free and open order and address regional and global 

16 challenges posed by the Government of the PRC re17 garding— 

18 (A) violations and abuses of human rights; 

19 (B) restrictions on religious practices; and 

20 (C) the undermining and abrogation of 

21 treaties, other international agreements, and 

22 other international norms related to human 

23 rights; 

24 (16) to expose the PRC’s use of corruption, re25 pression, and coercion to attain unfair economic adVerDate Sep 11 2014 22:42 Jun 24, 2021 Jkt 019200 PO 00000 Frm 00014 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\H3524.IH H3524

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1 vantages or compel other nations to defer to its po2 litical and strategic objectives in ways that threaten 

3 the United States or its allies and partners; 

4 (17) to maintain United States access to the 

5 Western Pacific, including through necessary invest6 ments in United States military capabilities, policies, 

7 and concepts in the Indo-Pacific, as well as robust 

8 cooperation, exercises, and interoperability with al9 lies and partners; 

10 (18) to deter the PRC from— 

11 (A) initiating armed conflict; 

12 (B) coercing nations; or 

13 (C) using malign grey-zone tactics to 

14 achieve national goals; 

15 (19) to attempt to strengthen United States16 PRC military-to-military communication and im17 prove both military and civilian crisis avoidance and 

18 management procedures to de-conflict operations 

19 and reduce the risk of unwanted conflict; and 

20 (20) to strengthen stability and reduce sus21 picions, cooperate with the PRC when interests 

22 align, including through bilateral or multilateral 

23 means and at the United Nations, as appropriate, 

24 and especially in the following areas— 

25 (A) global fight against climate change; 


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1 (B) nuclear security; and 

2 (C) global financial stability. 

3 SEC. 4. SENSE OF CONGRESS. 

4 It is the sense of Congress that the execution of the 

5 policy described in section 3(b) requires the following ac6 tions: 

7 (1) Revitalizing American leadership globally 

8 and in the Indo-Pacific will require the United 

9 States— 

10 (A) to marshal sustained political will to 

11 protect its vital interests, promote its values, 

12 and advance its economic and national security 

13 objectives; and 

14 (B) to achieve this sustained political will, 

15 persuade the American people and United 

16 States allies and partners of— 

17 (i) the current challenges facing the 

18 international rules based order; and 

19 (ii) the need for long-term invest20 ments and engagement to defend shared 

21 interests and values. 

22 (2) The United States must coordinate closely 

23 with allies and partners to compete effectively with 

24 the PRC, including to encourage allies and partners 


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1 to assume, as appropriate, greater roles in balancing 

2 and checking aggressive PRC behavior. 

3 (3) Effective United States strategy toward 

4 China requires— 

5 (A) bipartisan cooperation within Con6 gress; and 

7 (B) frequent, sustained, and meaningful 

8 collaboration and consultation between the exec9 utive branch and Congress. 

10 (4) The United States must ensure close inte11 gration among economic and foreign policymakers 

12 and provide support to the private sector, civil soci13 ety, universities and academic institutions, and other 

14 relevant actors in free and open societies to enable 

15 such actors— 

16 (A) to collaborate to advance common in17 terests; and 

18 (B) to identify appropriate policies— 

19 (i) to strengthen the United States 

20 and its allies; and 

21 (ii) to promote a compelling vision of 

22 a free and open order. 

23 (5) The United States must ensure that all 

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1 sions are organized and resourced to effectively de2 fend and advance United States interests, by— 

3 (A) dedicating more personnel in the Indo4 Pacific region, at posts around the world, and 

5 in Washington, DC; 

6 (B) placing greater numbers of foreign 

7 service officers, international development pro8 fessionals, members of the foreign commercial 

9 service, intelligence professionals, and other 

10 United States Government personnel in the 

11 Indo-Pacific region; and 

12 (C) ensuring that this workforce has the 

13 training, demonstrated proficiency in language 

14 and culture, technical skills, and other com15 petencies required to advance a successful strat16 egy in relation to the PRC. 

17 (6) The United States must place renewed pri18 ority and emphasis on strengthening the nonmilitary 

19 instruments of national power, including diplomacy, 

20 information, technology, economics, foreign assist21 ance and development finance, commerce, intel22 ligence, and law enforcement, which are crucial for 

23 addressing the challenges posed by the PRC. 


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1 (7) The United States must sustain military ca2 pabilities necessary to achieve United States political 

3 objectives in the Indo-Pacific, including— 

4 (A) promoting regional security in the 

5 Indo-Pacific; 

6 (B) reassuring allies and partners while 

7 protecting them from coercion; and 

8 (C) deterring PRC aggression and pre9 venting unwanted conflict. 

10 (8) Competition with the PRC requires skillful 

11 adaptation to the information environment of the 

12 21st century. United States public diplomacy and 

13 messaging efforts must effectively— 

14 (A) promote the value of partnership with 

15 the United States; and 

16 (B) counter CCP propaganda and 

17 disinformation that threatens United States in18 terests. 

19 SEC. 5. RULES OF CONSTRUCTION. 

20 (a) APPLICABILITY OF EXISTING RESTRICTIONS ON

21 ASSISTANCE TO FOREIGN SECURITY FORCES.—Nothing 

22 in this Act shall be construed to diminish, supplant, super23 sede, or otherwise restrict or prevent responsibilities of the 

24 United States Government under section 620M of the 


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1 Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2378d) or sec2 tion 362 of title 10, United States Code. 

3 (b) NO AUTHORIZATION FOR THE USE OF MILITARY

4 FORCE.—Nothing in this Act may be construed as author5 izing the use of military force. 

6 TITLE I—INVESTING IN 

7 AMERICAN COMPETITIVENESS 

8 Subtitle A—Science and 

9 Technology 

10 SEC. 101. AUTHORIZATION TO ASSIST UNITED STATES COM11 PANIES WITH GLOBAL SUPPLY CHAIN DIVER12 SIFICATION AND MANAGEMENT. 

13 (a) AUTHORIZATION TO CONTRACT SERVICES.—The 

14 Secretary of State, in coordination with the Secretary of 

15 Commerce, is authorized to establish a program to facili16 tate the contracting by the Department of State for the 

17 professional services of qualified experts, on a reimburs18 able fee for service basis, to assist interested United States 

19 persons and business entities with supply chain manage20 ment issues related to the PRC, including— 

21 (1) exiting from the PRC market or relocating 

22 certain production facilities to locations outside the 

23 PRC; 


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1 (2) diversifying sources of inputs, and other ef2 forts to diversify supply chains to locations outside 

3 of the PRC; 

4 (3) navigating legal, regulatory, or other chal5 lenges in the course of the activities described in 

6 paragraphs (1) and (2); and 

7 (4) identifying alternative markets for produc8 tion or sourcing outside of the PRC, including 

9 through providing market intelligence, facilitating 

10 contact with reliable local partners as appropriate, 

11 and other services. 

12 (b) CHIEF OF MISSION OVERSIGHT.—The persons 

13 hired to perform the services described in subsection (a) 

14 shall— 

15 (1) be under the authority of the United States 

16 Chief of Mission in the country in which they are 

17 hired, in accordance with existing United States 

18 laws; 

19 (2) coordinate with Department of State and 

20 Department of Commerce officers; and 

21 (3) coordinate with United States missions and 

22 relevant local partners in other countries as needed 

23 to carry out the services described in subsection (a). 

24 (c) PRIORITIZATION OF MICRO-, SMALL-, AND ME25 DIUM-SIZED ENTERPRISES.—The services described in 


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1 subsection (a) shall be prioritized for assisting micro-, 

2 small-, and medium-sized enterprises with regard to the 

3 matters described in subsection (a). 

4 (d) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—There is 

5 authorized to be appropriated $15,000,000 for each of fis6 cal years 2022 through 2026 for the purposes of carrying 

7 out this section. 

8 (e) PROHIBITION ON ACCESS TO ASSISTANCE BY

9 FOREIGN ADVERSARIES.—None of the funds appropriated 

10 pursuant to this section may be provided to an entity— 

11 (1) under the foreign ownership, control, or in12 fluence of the Government of the People’s Republic 

13 of China or the Chinese Communist Party, or other 

14 foreign adversary; 

15 (2) determined to have beneficial ownership 

16 from foreign individuals subject to the jurisdiction, 

17 direction, or influence of foreign adversaries; and 

18 (3) that has any contract in effect at the time 

19 of the receipt of such funds, or has had a contract 

20 within the previous one year that is no longer in ef21 fect, with— 

22 (A) the Government of the People’s Repub23 lic of China; 

24 (B) the Chinese Communist Party; 

25 (C) the Chinese military; 


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1 (D) an entity majority-owned, majority2 controlled, or majority-financed by the Govern3 ment of the People’s Republic of China, the 

4 CCP, or the Chinese military; or 

5 (E) a parent, subsidiary, or affiliate of an 

6 entity described in subparagraph (D). 

7 (f) DEFINITIONS.—The terms ‘‘foreign ownership, 

8 control, or influence’’ and ‘‘FOCI’’ have the meanings 

9 given to those terms in the National Industrial Security 

10 Program Operating Manual (DOD 5220.22–M), or a suc11 cessor document. 

12 Subtitle B—Global Infrastructure 

13 and Energy Development 

14 SEC. 111. APPROPRIATE COMMITTEES OF CONGRESS DE15 FINED. 

16 In this subtitle, the term ‘‘appropriate committees of 

17 Congress’’ means— 

18 (1) the Committee on Foreign Relations and 

19 the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate; and 

20 (2) the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the 

21 Committee on Appropriations of the House of Rep22 resentatives. 


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1 SEC. 112. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON INTERNATIONAL QUAL2 ITY INFRASTRUCTURE INVESTMENT STAND3 ARDS. 

4 (a) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con5 gress that the United States should initiate collaboration 

6 among governments, the private sector, and civil society 

7 to encourage the adoption of the standards for quality 

8 global infrastructure development advanced by the G20 at 

9 Osaka in 2018, including with respect to the following 

10 issues: 

11 (1) Respect for the sovereignty of countries in 

12 which infrastructure investments are made. 

13 (2) Anti-corruption. 

14 (3) Rule of law. 

15 (4) Human rights and labor rights. 

16 (5) Fiscal and debt sustainability. 

17 (6) Social and governance safeguards. 

18 (7) Transparency. 

19 (8) Environmental and energy standards. 

20 (b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con21 gress that the United States should launch a series of fora 

22 around the world showcasing the commitment of the 

23 United States and partners of the United States to high24 quality development cooperation, including with respect to 

25 the issues described in subsection (a). 


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1 SEC. 113. SUPPORTING ECONOMIC INDEPENDENCE FROM 

2 CHINA. 

3 (a) FINDINGS.—It is in the national interest of the 

4 United States to establish a coordinated interagency strat5 egy to marshal the resources of the United States Govern6 ment to provide foreign countries with financing that 

7 strengthens independent economic capacity and therefore 

8 reduce a foreign government’s need to enter into agree9 ments with China, including support from its Belt and 

10 Road Initiative. 

11 (b) STRATEGY.— 

12 (1) AUTHORITY.—Within 180 days of enact13 ment of this Act, the President should develop and 

14 submit a strategy to the relevant congressional com15 mittees to utilize the resources of Federal agencies 

16 to counteract offers of assistance and financing from 

17 China to foreign governments that are of strategic 

18 importance to the United States. 

19 (2) COMPONENTS OF STRATEGY.—The strategy 

20 should— 

21 (A) identify primary sectors where the 

22 United States could provide a competitive ad23 vantage to increase a country’s economic inde24 pendence; 

25 (B) select countries with corresponding 

26 economic needs, with priority given to those 


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1 who are vulnerable to Chinese economic influ2 ence; 

3 (C) identify any corresponding existing fi4 nancing available from United States Govern5 ment entities to prioritize and devise specific fi6 nancing tailored to the needs of such foreign 

7 governments if none are currently available; 

8 (D) identify any cooperative and com9 plementary assistance and financing from 

10 friendly foreign governments, including coordi11 nated assistance and co-financing; 

12 (E) create a streamlined decision-making 

13 process, directed by the National Security 

14 Council, to devise financing and make agency 

15 decisions and commitments on a timely basis to 

16 support United States competitive offers; 

17 (F) establish a formal G7+European Com18 mission Working Group to develop a com19 prehensive strategy to develop alternatives to 

20 the People’s Republic of China’s Belt and Road 

21 Initiative for development finance; and 

22 (G) integrate existing efforts into the 

23 strategy, including efforts to address the Gov24 ernment of the People’s Republic of China’s use 

25 of the United Nations to advance the Belt and 


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1 Road Initiative, including the proliferation of 

2 memoranda of understanding between the Peo3 ple’s Republic of China and United Nations 

4 funds and programs regarding the implementa5 tion of the Belt and Road Initiative. 

6 (3) PARTICIPATING AGENCIES.—Participating 

7 Federal agencies should include the Department of 

8 State, Department of the Treasury, USAID, DFC, 

9 MCC, USTDA, Department of Commerce, and other 

10 Federal departments and agencies as appropriate. 

11 (4) EXECUTION OF STRATEGY.—The President 

12 should issue an Executive order to implement the 

13 strategy and make such changes in agency regula14 tions and procedures as are necessary to put the 

15 strategy into effect. 

16 (5) RELEVANT CONGRESSIONAL COMMIT17 TEES.—For the purposes of this subsection, the 

18 phrase ‘‘relevant congressional committees’’ shall 

19 mean the House and Senate Committees on Appro20 priations, the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, 

21 the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, the 

22 House Committee on Financial Services, and the 

23 Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban 

24 Affairs. 


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1 (c) AUTHORITY.—The Secretary of State in coordina2 tion with the USAID Administrator is authorized to estab3 lish or continue an initiative, to be known as the ‘‘Infra4 structure Transaction and Assistance Network’’, under 

5 which the Secretary of State, in consultation with other 

6 relevant Federal agencies, including those represented on 

7 the Global Infrastructure Coordinating Committee, may 

8 carry out various programs to advance the development 

9 of sustainable, transparent, and high-quality infrastruc10 ture worldwide in the Indo-Pacific region by— 

11 (1) strengthening capacity-building programs to 

12 improve project evaluation processes, regulatory and 

13 procurement environments, and project preparation 

14 capacity of countries that are partners of the United 

15 States in such development; 

16 (2) providing transaction advisory services and 

17 project preparation assistance to support sustainable 

18 infrastructure; and 

19 (3) coordinating the provision of United States 

20 assistance for the development of infrastructure, in21 cluding infrastructure that utilizes United States 

22 manufactured goods and services, and catalyzing in23 vestment led by the private sector. 

24 (d) TRANSACTION ADVISORY FUND.—As part of the 

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1 scribed under subsection (c), the Secretary of State is au2 thorized to provide support, including through the Trans3 action Advisory Fund, for advisory services to help boost 

4 the capacity of partner countries to evaluate contracts and 

5 assess the financial and environmental impacts of poten6 tial infrastructure projects, including through providing 

7 services such as— 

8 (1) legal services; 

9 (2) project preparation and feasibility studies; 

10 (3) debt sustainability analyses; 

11 (4) bid or proposal evaluation; and 

12 (5) other services relevant to advancing the de13 velopment of sustainable, transparent, and high14 quality infrastructure. 

15 (e) STRATEGIC INFRASTRUCTURE FUND.—— 

16 (1) IN GENERAL.—As part of the ‘‘Infrastruc17 ture Transaction and Assistance Network’’ described 

18 under subsection (c), the Secretary of State is au19 thorized to provide support, including through the 

20 Strategic Infrastructure Fund, for technical assist21 ance, project preparation, pipeline development, and 

22 other infrastructure project support. 

23 (2) JOINT INFRASTRUCTURE PROJECTS.— 

24 Funds authorized for the Strategic Infrastructure 

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1 partment of Defense, the International Development 

2 Finance Corporation, like-minded donor partners, 

3 and multilateral banks, as appropriate, to support 

4 joint infrastructure projects. 

5 (3) STRATEGIC INFRASTRUCTURE PROJECTS.— 

6 Funds authorized for the Strategic Infrastructure 

7 Fund should be used to support strategic infrastruc8 ture projects that are in the national security inter9 est of the United States and vulnerable to strategic 

10 competitors. 

11 (f) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—There is 

12 authorized to be appropriated, for each of fiscal years 

13 2022 to 2026, $75,000,000 to the Infrastructure Trans14 action and Assistance Network, of which $20,000,000 

15 should be provided for the Transaction Advisory Fund. 

16 SEC. 114. STRATEGY FOR ADVANCED AND RELIABLE EN17 ERGY INFRASTRUCTURE. 

18 (a) IN GENERAL.—The President shall direct a com19 prehensive, multi-year, whole of government effort, in con20 sultation with the private sector, to counter predatory 

21 lending and financing by the Government of the People’s 

22 Republic of China, including support to companies incor23 porated in the PRC that engage in such activities, in the 

24 energy sectors of developing countries. 


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1 (b) POLICY.—It is the policy of the United States 

2 to— 

3 (1) regularly evaluate current and forecasted 

4 energy needs and capacities of developing countries, 

5 and analyze the presence and involvement of PRC 

6 state-owned industries and other companies incor7 porated in the PRC, Chinese nationals providing 

8 labor, and financing of energy projects, including di9 rect financing by the PRC government, PRC finan10 cial institutions, or direct state support to state11 owned enterprises and other companies incorporated 

12 in the PRC; 

13 (2) pursue strategic support and investment op14 portunities, and diplomatic engagement on power 

15 sector reforms, to expand the development and de16 ployment of advanced energy technologies in devel17 oping countries; 

18 (3) offer financing, loan guarantees, grants, 

19 and other financial products on terms that advance 

20 domestic economic and local employment opportuni21 ties, utilize advanced energy technologies, encourage 

22 private sector growth, and, when appropriate United 

23 States equity and sovereign lending products as al24 ternatives to the predatory lending tools offered by 

25 Chinese financial institutions; 


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1 (4) pursue partnerships with likeminded inter2 national financial and multilateral institutions to le3 verage investment in advanced energy technologies 

4 in developing countries; and 

5 (5) pursue bilateral partnerships focused on the 

6 cooperative development of advanced energy tech7 nologies with countries of strategic significance, par8 ticularly in the Indo-Pacific region, to address the 

9 effects of energy engagement by the PRC through 

10 predatory lending or other actions that negatively 

11 impact other countries. 

12 (c) ADVANCED ENERGY TECHNOLOGIES EXPORTS.— 

13 Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment 

14 of this Act, and annually thereafter for 5 years, the Sec15 retary of State, in consultation with the Secretary of En16 ergy, shall submit to the appropriate congressional com17 mittees a United States Government strategy to increase 

18 United States exports of advanced energy technologies 

19 to— 

20 (1) improve energy security in allied and devel21 oping countries; 

22 (2) create open, efficient, rules-based, and 

23 transparent energy markets; 

24 (3) improve free, fair, and reciprocal energy 

25 trading relationships; and 


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1 (4) expand access to affordable, reliable energy. 

2 SEC. 115. REPORT ON THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA’S 

3 INVESTMENTS IN FOREIGN ENERGY DEVEL4 OPMENT. 

5 (a) IN GENERAL.—No later than 180 days after the 

6 date of the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter 

7 for 5 years, the Secretary of State shall submit to the ap8 propriate congressional committees a report that— 

9 (1) identifies priority countries for deepening 

10 United States engagement on energy matters, in ac11 cordance with the economic and national security in12 terests of the United States and where deeper en13 ergy partnerships are most achievable; 

14 (2) describes the involvement of the PRC gov15 ernment and companies incorporated in the PRC in 

16 the development, operation, financing, or ownership 

17 of energy generation facilities, transmission infra18 structure, or energy resources in the countries iden19 tified in paragraph (1); 

20 (3) evaluates strategic or security concerns and 

21 implications for United States national interests and 

22 the interests of the countries identified in paragraph 

23 (1), with respect to the PRC’s involvement and in24 fluence in developing country energy production or 

25 transmission; and 


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1 (4) outlines current and planned efforts by the 

2 United States to partner with the countries identi3 fied in paragraph (1) on energy matters that sup4 port shared interests between the United States and 

5 such countries. 

6 (b) PUBLICATION.—The assessment required in sub7 section (a) shall be published on the Department of State’s 

8 website. 

9 SEC. 116. ENSURING THE INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT 

10 FINANCE CORPORATION IS POSITIONED TO 

11 ACHIEVE NATIONAL SECURITY, ECONOMIC, 

12 AND DEVELOPMENT OBJECTIVES. 

13 (a) IN GENERAL.— 

14 (1) When establishing the U.S. International 

15 Development Finance Corporation (DFC), Congress 

16 sought to facilitate the participation of private sector 

17 capital and skills in the economic development of 

18 countries with low- or lower-middle-income econo19 mies and countries transitioning from nonmarket to 

20 market economies in order to complement United 

21 States assistance and foreign policy objectives. 

22 (2) The priority for such support has been and 

23 remains intended for less developed countries with a 

24 low-income economy or a lower-middle-income econ25 omy; however, using income as a discriminator for 


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1 which countries merit investment will not often cap2 ture other important factors, such as the wealth dis3 parity within a country, vulnerability to external 

4 shocks including from natural disasters, and United 

5 States foreign policy and national security concerns. 

6 For this reason, Congress has currently authorized 

7 DFC investment in less developed countries with an 

8 upper-middle-income economy where the President 

9 certifies to the appropriate congressional committees 

10 that such support furthers the national economic or 

11 foreign policy interests of the United States and 

12 such support is designed to produce significant de13 velopmental outcomes or provide developmental ben14 efits to the poorest population of that country. 

15 (3) It is the intent of Congress that this flexi16 bility in DFC directed assistance be made available 

17 to all countries, including those with so-called high18 income economies such as the Bahamas, Barbados, 

19 Chile, Trinidad and Tobago, and other allies and 

20 partners exceeding the Gross National Income per 

21 Capita definition threshold for high-income country. 

22 Otherwise, previously eligible partner countries find 

23 themselves now ineligible. 

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1 come countries under the European Energy Security 

2 and Diversification Act of 2019, which gives the 

3 DFC the authority to work in Europe and Eurasia 

4 on energy and energy related investments regardless 

5 of the income status of the countries. 

6 (5) While continuing to prioritize DFC invest7 ment in low and lower-middle income countries, it is 

8 the sense of Congress that the DFC should support 

9 investments in certain projects in both upper-middle 

10 income and high-income countries that address key 

11 national security and economic interests. The DFC 

12 is authorized to and should support projects in any 

13 country regardless of income status when not doing 

14 so would damage the United States interest or those 

15 of its allies and partners vis-a`-vis its global strategic 

16 competitors. 

17 (b) AMENDMENT.—To address the objectives in para18 graph (1) above, section 1412 of Public Law 115–254 per19 taining to the United States International Development 

20 Finance Corporation is amended, replacing the text under 

21 section 1412(c) with the following: by striking subsection 

22 (c) and inserting the following: 

23 ‘‘(c) SUPPORT IN UPPER-MIDDLE-INCOME AND

24 HIGH-INCOME COUNTRIES/THE LESS DEVELOPED COUN25 TRY FOCUS.— 


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1 ‘‘(1) IN GENERAL.—The Corporation shall 

2 prioritize the provision of support under title II in 

3 less developed countries with a low-income economy 

4 or a lower-middle-income economy. 

5 ‘‘(2) SUPPORT IN UPPER-MIDDLE-INCOME AND

6 HIGH-INCOME COUNTRIES.—The Corporation shall 

7 restrict the provision of support under title II in 

8 countries with an upper-middle-income or high-in9 come economy unless— 

10 ‘‘(A) the President certifies to the appro11 priate congressional committees that such sup12 port furthers the national economic, foreign pol13 icy, or development interests of the United 

14 States; and 

15 ‘‘(B) such support is designed to produce 

16 significant developmental outcomes or provide 

17 developmental benefits to the poorest, 

18 marginalized, or equity-disadvantaged popu19 lation groups of that country.’’. 

20 Subtitle C—Economic Diplomacy 

21 and Leadership 

22 SEC. 121. FINDINGS ON REGIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER. 

23 Congress makes the following findings: 

24 (1) The United States played a leadership role 

25 in constructing the architecture, rules, and norms 


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1 governing the international economic order following 

2 the Second World War, yielding decades of domestic 

3 economic and geopolitical prosperity and stability. 

4 (2) In 2017, the United States withdrew from 

5 the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), an economic 

6 pact that was negotiated by 12 countries that cov7 ered 40 percent of the world economy, leading the 

8 11 remaining Asia-Pacific countries to sign the 

9 Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for 

10 Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) the following 

11 year, setting high-standard rules for regional eco12 nomic engagement. 

13 (3) In 2020, the 10 countries of the Association 

14 of Southeast Asian Nations along with South Korea, 

15 China, Japan, Australia, and New Zealand signed 

16 the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership 

17 (RCEP), the world’s biggest trade deal in terms of 

18 GDP. 

19 (4) Reduced United States economic engage20 ment has led United States allies and partners to 

21 question the United States commitment to the Indo22 Pacific region. Despite its distortive and unfair trade 

23 practices, the People’s Republic of China is taking 

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1 ships in the region and promoting its own state-led 

2 economic model. 

3 (5) The United States is increasingly on the 

4 outside looking in with regards to economic pacts in 

5 the Indo-Pacific. United States absence from these 

6 agreements puts it at both a strategic and competi7 tive disadvantage in the region and allows competi8 tors to expand their economic influence at the 

9 United States expense. 

10 (6) Given that these partnerships and agree11 ments will define the rules and norms that will gov12 ern regional commerce over the coming decades, the 

13 United States is currently not well positioned to 

14 shape the coming economic landscape. 

15 (7) It is in the United States vital interest to 

16 upgrade its economic engagement and leadership in 

17 the Indo-Pacific and develop concrete steps to 

18 strengthen its commercial diplomacy to fully par19 ticiple in the region’s economic dynamism. 

20 SEC. 122. REVIEW OF PRC TRADE AND ECONOMIC ENGAGE21 MENT GLOBALLY. 

22 (a) REPORT.—Not later than 180 days after the date 

23 of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, in 

24 coordination with the Office of the U.S. Trade Represent25 ative and the Department of Commerce, shall submit a 


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1 report to the appropriate congressional committees that 

2 describes the PRC’s global trade and investment diplo3 macy and engagement over the past decade, including any 

4 bilateral or plurilateral trade and investment agreements 

5 it has signed, and their impact on the United States econ6 omy, American companies and workers, as well as on the 

7 countries that have entered into agreements with the PRC 

8 and the global economy as a whole. 

9 (b) MATTERS TO BE INCLUDED.—The report shall 

10 include the following: 

11 (1) A Survey and Comparison of China’s inter12 national economic practices, which will— 

13 (A) provide an overview of the PRC’s dis14 tortive trade policies; 

15 (B) list the PRC’s trade and investment 

16 agreements globally, both agreements it has 

17 signed or entered into and any ongoing negotia18 tions it has with individual countries or groups 

19 of countries; 

20 (C) detail the other mechanisms the PRC 

21 uses to advance its international economic ob22 jectives, including economic and commercial 

23 dialogues and BRI related activities; 

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1 vestment with major global economies, United 

2 States allies, and for each region of the world; 

3 and 

4 (E) outline what further steps China may 

5 take in the Indo-Pacific region to bolster its 

6 economic position and influence. 

7 (2) An evaluation of the impacts of China’s 

8 trade and investment policies, including— 

9 (A) the impact of these trade and invest10 ment agreements on China’s economy, with a 

11 focus on its trade and investment profile, the 

12 impact on China’s economic growth and per13 capita income; and the impact on the profit14 ability and market share of Chinese companies 

15 and SOEs; 

16 (B) the impact of these agreements on 

17 China’s political and diplomatic relations with 

18 the countries it entered into agreements with 

19 and by region; and 

20 (C) the impact of China’s trade and invest21 ment relationships with other countries on the 

22 market share of United States companies. 


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1 SEC. 123. REPORT ON ENTRENCHING AMERICAN ECO2 NOMIC DIPLOMACY IN THE INDO-PACIFIC. 

3 (a) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con4 gress that United States national interests and the pri5 macy of United States power in the Indo-Pacific are inti6 mately tied to the following economic objectives: 

7 (1) Deepening United States trade and invest8 ment relationships in the region, especially with key 

9 allies and partners. 

10 (2) Confirming American leadership and par11 ticipation in global regional economic organizations 

12 and fora, including APEC and the WTO. 

13 (3) Leveraging bilateral and plurilateral sec14 toral agreements on trade and investment, as well as 

15 negotiations at the WTO to reassert United States 

16 economic leadership by writing the rules of the road 

17 on critical economic questions. 

18 (4) Building secure and resilient supply chains 

19 for industries critical for United States national in20 terest, including semiconductors and vaccines and 

21 PPE. 

22 (5) Showcasing the benefits and appeal of a 

23 market-based economic model. 

24 (b) REPORTING.—Not later than 180 days after the 

25 date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, 

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1 resentative and the Department of Commerce, shall sub2 mit a report to the appropriate congressional committees 

3 that presents the steps the United States is taking and 

4 plans to take to achieve the objectives outlined in sub5 section (a) above and includes specific action plans for the 

6 following: 

7 (1) Enhancing American trade and investment 

8 relationships in the region bilaterally and 

9 plurilaterally, especially with American allies and 

10 ASEAN. 

11 (2) Reenergizing APEC as a critical component 

12 of the region’s economic architecture. 

13 (3) Work to ensure that the United States ab14 sence from CPTPP and RCEP do not undermine 

15 the United States ability to shape regional trade and 

16 investment rules. 

17 (4) Working with allies and partners to build 

18 resilient and trusted supply chains especially for 

19 critical and emerging technologies, including semi20 conductors, and products and components critical 

21 for national health, including vaccines and related 

22 materials, and PPE. 

23 (5) Driving the formation and adoption of high24 standards and rules for the region in the following 

25 areas: 


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1 (A) Advanced technologies and the digital 

2 sphere. 

3 (B) Labor practices and environmental 

4 standards. 

5 (C) Intellectual property rights. 

6 (6) Developing roadmaps for how to counter the 

7 PRC’s unfair trade and economic practices, with a 

8 specific focus on— 

9 (A) subsidies and unfair competition by 

10 state-owned enterprises; and 

11 (B) corruption and politicized infrastruc12 ture. 

13 (c) APPROPRIATE COMMITTEES OF CONGRESS DE14 FINED.—In this section, the term ‘‘appropriate commit15 tees of Congress’’ means— 

16 (1) the Committee on Foreign Relations and 

17 the Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Af18 fairs; and 

19 (2) the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the 

20 Committee on Energy and Commerce. 

21 SEC. 124. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON THE NEED TO BOLSTER 

22 AMERICAN LEADERSHIP IN APEC. 

23 It is the sense of Congress that— 

24 (1) the United States has benefitted from the 

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1 cific Economic Cooperation forum since its inception 

2 in 1989; 

3 (2) APEC is a hub of trade and commerce for 

4 21 member economies that, as of 2018, accounted 

5 for 60 percent of global GDP and 48 percent of 

6 global trade; 

7 (3) APEC has contributed to the reduction in 

8 trade barriers, harmonization of regulations, and en9 hanced access to global value chains, while raising 

10 the profile of critical topics such as fair trade, sus11 tainability, gender parity, and inclusive growth; 

12 (4) it is in the United States interest to engage 

13 and lead at APEC to push for an open and inclusive 

14 regional economy that benefits United States work15 ers, consumers, and businesses and better integrates 

16 the United States economy with others in the region; 

17 (5) when the United States last hosted APEC 

18 in 2011, it was able to promote United States inter19 ests, while reassuring allies and partners about its 

20 strong commitment to the region in the economic 

21 arena; 

22 (6) today, APEC can again be used as a forum 

23 to make progress on several United States priorities, 

24 that are shared by United States allies and partners, 

25 including— 


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1 (A) making regional commerce more inclu2 sive; 

3 (B) fostering innovation and digitization; 

4 and 

5 (C) addressing climate change and environ6 mental protection; 

7 (7) hosting APEC would provide a tremendous 

8 opportunity to leverage American leadership to 

9 shape the regional economic agenda; 

10 (8) hosting APEC would allow the United 

11 States to advance several of its own priorities in the 

12 region, including to— 

13 (A) expand the participation of APEC 

14 stakeholders to include labor groups, environ15 mental advocates, and other part of civil soci16 ety; 

17 (B) upgrade APEC’s work to empower and 

18 promote small and medium enterprises; 

19 (C) spotlight best practices and plans to 

20 upgrade skills for the next-generation of tech21 nology jobs; 

22 (D) advance a climate and sustainable 

23 trade and development agenda with a focus on 

24 green technologies, infrastructure and finance; 

25 and 


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1 (E) advance work on digital trade, includ2 ing by expanding rules on data privacy, pro3 moting digital inclusiveness and promoting the 

4 free flow of data; and 

5 (9) with no host confirmed for 2023, the United 

6 States should immediately announce its interest to 

7 host APEC in 2023 and work with the APEC Secre8 tariat and like-minded APEC members to build sup9 port. 

10 SEC. 125. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON DIGITAL TECHNOLOGY 

11 ISSUES. 

12 (a) LEADERSHIP IN INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS

13 SETTING.—It is the sense of Congress that the United 

14 States must lead in international bodies that set the gov15 ernance norms and rules for critical digitally enabled tech16 nologies in order to ensure that these technologies operate 

17 within a free, secure, interoperable, and stable digital do18 main. 

19 (b) COUNTERING DIGITAL AUTHORITARIANISM.—It 

20 is the sense of Congress that the United States, along with 

21 allies and partners, should lead an international effort 

22 that utilizes all of the economic and diplomatic tools at 

23 its disposal to combat the expanding use of information 

24 and communications technology products and services to 


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1 surveil, repress, and manipulate populations (also known 

2 as ‘‘digital authoritarianism’’). 

3 (c) FREEDOM OF INFORMATION IN THE DIGITAL

4 AGE.—It is the sense of Congress that the United States 

5 should lead a global effort to ensure that freedom of infor6 mation, including the ability to safely consume or publish 

7 information without fear of undue reprisals, is maintained 

8 as the digital domain becomes an increasingly integral 

9 mechanism for communication. 

10 (d) EFFORTS TO ENSURE TECHNOLOGICAL DEVEL11 OPMENT DOES NOT THREATEN DEMOCRATIC GOVERN12 ANCE OR HUMAN RIGHTS.—It is the sense of Congress 

13 that the United States should lead a global effort to de14 velop and adopt a set of common principles and standards 

15 for critical technologies to ensure that the use of such 

16 technologies cannot be abused by malign actors, whether 

17 they are governments or other entities, and that they do 

18 not threaten democratic governance or human rights. 

19 SEC. 126. DIGITAL TRADE AGREEMENTS. 

20 It is the sense of Congress that— 

21 (1) as the COVID–19 pandemic accelerated our 

22 dependence on digital tools, international rules 

23 around digital governance and trade have remained 

24 largely piecemeal; 


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1 (2) the People’s Republic of China is operating 

2 under and advancing a set of digital rules that are 

3 contrary to United States values and interests, and 

4 those of United States allies and partners; 

5 (3) a patchwork of plurilateral, trilateral, and 

6 bilateral digital trade agreements, including the 

7 Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for 

8 Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP), the Singapore9 Australia Digital Trade Agreement, and the Singa10 pore-New Zealand-Chile Digital Economy Partner11 ship Agreement have emerged, creating a set of 

12 rules that the United States should be driving; 

13 (4) the United States has already underscored 

14 the need for such agreements by signing the U.S.- 

15 Japan Digital Trade Agreement in October 2019 

16 and including a robust digital trade or e-commerce 

17 chapter in the USMCA; 

18 (5) a regional deal on digital governance and 

19 trade would allow the United States to unite a group 

20 of like-minded economies around common standards 

21 and norms, including the principles of openness, in22 clusiveness, fairness, transparency, and the free flow 

23 of data with trust, that are increasingly vital for the 

24 global economy; 


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1 (6) such an agreement would facilitate the cre2 ation of common rules and standards that govern 

3 cross-border data flows, the protection of privacy, 

4 and cybersecurity at a time of growing digital 

5 vulnerabilities for individuals, businesses, and insti6 tutions around the world; 

7 (7) such an agreement would facilitate the par8 ticipation of SMEs in the global economy through 

9 trade facilitation measures, including e-marketing, e10 invoicing and e-payment; and 

11 (8) the United States Trade Representative, in 

12 consultation with the Coordinator for Cyber Diplo13 macy at the Department of State should negotiate 

14 bilateral and plurilateral agreements or arrange15 ments relating to digital trade with the like-minded 

16 countries in the Indo-Pacific region, the European 

17 Union, the member countries of the Five Eyes intel18 ligence-sharing alliance, and other partners and al19 lies, as appropriate. 

20 SEC. 127. DIGITAL CONNECTIVITY AND CYBERSECURITY 

21 PARTNERSHIP. 

22 (a) DIGITAL CONNECTIVITY AND CYBERSECURITY

23 PARTNERSHIP.—The President is authorized to establish 

24 a program, to be known as the ‘‘Digital Connectivity and 

25 Cybersecurity Partnership’’ to help foreign countries— 


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1 (1) expand and increase secure Internet access 

2 and digital infrastructure in emerging markets; 

3 (2) adopt policies and regulatory positions that 

4 foster and encourage open, interoperable, reliable, 

5 and secure internet, the free flow of data, multi6 stakeholder models of internet governance, and pro7 competitive and secure information and communica8 tions technology (ICT) policies and regulations; 

9 (3) promote exports of United States ICT 

10 goods and services and increase United States com11 pany market share in target markets; 

12 (4) promote the diversification of ICT goods 

13 and supply chain services to be less reliant on PRC 

14 imports; and 

15 (5) build cybersecurity capacity, expand inter16 operability, and promote best practices for a national 

17 approach to cybersecurity. 

18 (b) IMPLEMENTATION PLAN.—Not later than 180 

19 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Sec20 retary of State and the Administrator of the United States 

21 Agency for International Development shall jointly submit 

22 to the appropriate committees of Congress an implementa23 tion plan for the coming three years to advance the goals 

24 identified in subsection (a). 


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1 (c) CONSULTATION.—In developing the action plan 

2 required by subsection (b), the Secretary of State and 

3 USAID Administrator shall consult with— 

4 (1) the appropriate congressional committees; 

5 (2) leaders of the United States industry; 

6 (3) other relevant technology experts, including 

7 the Open Technology Fund; 

8 (4) representatives from relevant United States 

9 Government agencies; and 

10 (5) representatives from like-minded allies and 

11 partners. 

12 (d) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—There is 

13 authorized to be appropriated such sums as necessary for 

14 each of fiscal years 2022 through 2026 to carry out this 

15 section. 

16 Subtitle D—Financial Diplomacy 

17 and Leadership 

18 SEC. 131. FINDINGS ON CHINESE FINANCIAL INDUSTRIAL 

19 POLICY. 

20 Congress makes the following findings: 

21 (1) The People’s Republic of China operates a 

22 system of state-owned financial institutions including 

23 retail banks, investment banks, asset managers, and 

24 insurers which are given favorable treatment under 

25 Chinese law while foreign financial institutions have 


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1 strict restrictions on their ability to operate in 

2 China. 

3 (2) On October 24, 2020, Chinese billionaire 

4 Jack Ma referred to ‘‘pawnshop mentality’’ of state5 owned banks. Shortly thereafter, the initial public 

6 offering of his firm Ant Financial was canceled by 

7 Chinese regulators. 

8 (3) In order to join the World Trade Organiza9 tion (WTO) in 2001, the Chinese Government com10 mitted to opening the credit card payment business 

11 to foreign firms by 2006. 

12 (4) After years of China refusing to open its 

13 payment market, the United States brought a case 

14 against China before the WTO. In 2012, the WTO 

15 mandated China to open its card payment market to 

16 global competitors. 

17 (5) Even after the WTO’s ruling, the PRC Gov18 ernment refused to comply with the ruling and 

19 maintained a rule that required all yuan-denomi20 nated payment cards to utilize China’s Union Pay 

21 network. Only in 2020, after the Chinese payment 

22 market had grown to $27 trillion, did the PRC Gov23 ernment approve the application of foreign firms to 

24 enter the market. 


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1 (6) The PRC continues to maintain aggressive 

2 capital controls, limiting access to the Chinese mar3 ket to foreign investors while hamstringing its own 

4 citizens ability to control their money. 

5 (7) On November 5, 2018, Chinese President 

6 Xi Jinping announced that China would launch a 

7 technology innovation stock exchange. The Shanghai 

8 Stock Exchange STAR Market launched on July 22, 

9 2019. 

10 (8) The PRC Government is pioneering the use 

11 a fully digitized yuan, which is set to be the world’s 

12 first central bank backed digital currency, and the 

13 People’s Bank of China and the Hong Kong Mone14 tary Authority have already begun testing the cross15 border functionality of the digital currency. 

16 SEC. 132. REPORT ON IMPORTANCE OF AMERICAN FINAN17 CIAL STRENGTH FOR GLOBAL LEADERSHIP. 

18 (a) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con19 gress that— 

20 (1) the dominance of the dollar as the global re21 serve currency has yielded significant benefits to the 

22 United States and the American people by allowing 

23 the United States to maintain economic independ24 ence, better control its monetary policy, and finance 

25 government outlays; 


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1 (2) American global leadership has benefited 

2 from the United States monetary stability, credit3 worthiness, deep capital markets, and financial tech4 nology innovations; 

5 (3) effective diplomacy and safeguarding of 

6 American national security rely on the United States 

7 role as the global financial leader, hub of global 

8 trade, and source of economic opportunity; 

9 (4) by cracking down on dissent in the key fi10 nancial center of Hong Kong, driving the creation of 

11 a technology focused stock exchange, and pushing 

12 forward a Central Bank digital currency, the Peo13 ple’s Republic of China is attempting to become the 

14 leading hub of finance in the world; and 

15 (5) the United States must maintain its posi16 tion as a global financial leader to continue its 

17 broader global leadership role around the world. 

18 (b) REPORT.—Not later than 180 days after the date 

19 of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, in 

20 coordination with the Secretary of the Treasury, shall sub21 mit a report to the appropriate congressional committees 

22 that— 

23 (1) lists and examines the benefits to American 

24 foreign policy that derive from the United States fiVerDate Sep 11 2014 22:42 Jun 24, 2021 Jkt 019200 PO 00000 Frm 00055 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\H3524.IH H3524

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1 nancial leadership and the dollar’s status as the 

2 world’s global reserve currency; 

3 (2) describes the actions taken by the People’s 

4 Republic of China that could cement China’s role as 

5 the world’s leading financial center; 

6 (3) analyzes the possible impact on American 

7 national security and foreign policy were the yuan to 

8 supplant the dollar as the world’s leading reserve 

9 currency; 

10 (4) outlines how the United States can work 

11 diplomatically with allies, partners, and other na12 tions to preserve a financial system that is free, 

13 open, and fair; and 

14 (5) identifies steps the United States can take 

15 to preserve its status as the world’s leading financial 

16 center and maintain the dollar’s position as the glob17 al reserve currency. 

18 (c) APPROPRIATE COMMITTEES OF CONGRESS DE19 FINED.—In this section, the term ‘‘appropriate commit20 tees of Congress’’ means— 

21 (1) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the 

22 House of Representatives; 

23 (2) the Committee on Financial Services of the 

24 House of Representatives; 


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1 (3) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the 

2 Senate; and 

3 (4) the Committee on Banking, Housing, and 

4 Urban Affairs of the Senate. 

5 SEC. 133. REVIEW OF CHINESE COMPANIES ON UNITED 

6 STATES CAPITAL MARKETS. 

7 (a) REPORT.— 

8 (1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days 

9 after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Sec10 retary of State, in coordination with the Secretary of 

11 the Treasury, shall submit a report to the appro12 priate congressional committees that describes the 

13 costs and benefits to the United States posed by the 

14 presence of companies incorporated in the PRC that 

15 are listed on American stock exchanges or traded 

16 over the counter in the form of American depository 

17 receipts. 

18 (2) MATTERS TO BE INCLUDED.—The report 

19 shall— 

20 (A) identify companies incorporated in the 

21 PRC that— 

22 (i) are listed or traded on one or sev23 eral stock exchanges within the United 

24 States, including over-the-counter market 

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1 change-traded funds out of mainland ex2 changes in the PRC; and 

3 (ii) based on the factors for consider4 ation described in paragraph (3), have 

5 knowingly and materially contributed to— 

6 (I) activities that undermine 

7 United States national security; 

8 (II) serious abuses of internation9 ally recognized human rights; or 

10 (III) a substantially increased fi11 nancial risk exposure for United 

12 States-based investors; 

13 (B) describe the activities of the companies 

14 identified pursuant to subparagraph (A), and 

15 their implications for the United States; and 

16 (C) develop policy recommendations for the 

17 United States Government, State governments, 

18 United States financial institutions, United 

19 States equity and debt exchanges, and other 

20 relevant stakeholders to address the risks posed 

21 by the presence in United States capital mar22 kets of the companies identified pursuant to 

23 subparagraph (A). 

24 (3) FACTORS FOR INCLUSION OF A COMPANY.— 

25 In completing the report under paragraph (1), the 


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1 President shall consider whether a company identi2 fied pursuant to paragraph (2)(A)— 

3 (A) has materially contributed to the devel4 opment or manufacture, or sold or facilitated 

5 procurement by the PLA, of lethal military 

6 equipment or component parts of such equip7 ment; 

8 (B) has contributed to the construction 

9 and militarization of features in the South 

10 China Sea; 

11 (C) has been sanctioned by the United 

12 States or has been determined to have con13 ducted business with sanctioned entities; 

14 (D) has engaged in an act or a series of 

15 acts of intellectual property theft; 

16 (E) has engaged in corporate or economic 

17 espionage; 

18 (F) has contributed to the proliferation of 

19 nuclear or missile technology in violation of 

20 United Nations Security Council resolutions or 

21 United States sanctions; 

22 (G) has contributed to the repression of re23 ligious and ethnic minorities within the PRC, 

24 including in Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Re25 gion or Tibet Autonomous Region; 


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1 (H) has contributed to the development of 

2 technologies that enable censorship directed or 

3 directly supported by the Government of the 

4 PRC; and 

5 (I) has contributed to other activities or 

6 behavior determined to be relevant by the Presi7 dent. 

8 (4) FACTORS FOR MAKING POLICY REC9 OMMENDATIONS.—In completing the report under 

10 paragraph (1), the President shall weigh the na11 tional security implications considering the following 

12 factors identified pursuant to paragraph (3)— 

13 (A) the possibility that banning or 

14 delisting companies from our markets could 

15 lead to an outflow of companies to list in the 

16 PRC; 

17 (B) the possibility that banning or 

18 delisting companies from our markets could im19 pact United States leadership in the asset man20 agement industry, particularly vis-a`-vis the 

21 PRC; 

22 (C) the possibility that banning or delisting 

23 companies from our markets could impact the 

24 impact the United States status as the world’s 


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1 leading capital markets center, particularly vis2 `a-vis the PRC; and 

3 (D) the impact on American foreign policy 

4 and national security if United States leader5 ship in capital markets was weakened vis-a`-vis 

6 the PRC. 

7 (b) REPORT FORM.—The report required under sub8 section (b)(1) shall be submitted in unclassified form. 

9 (c) PUBLICATION.—The unclassified portion of the 

10 report under subsection (b)(1) shall be made accessible to 

11 the public online through relevant United States Govern12 ment websites. 

13 SEC. 134. REPORT ON DIPLOMATIC AND ECONOMIC IMPLI14 CATIONS OF CHANGES TO CROSS-BORDER 

15 PAYMENT AND FINANCIAL MESSAGING SYS16 TEMS. 

17 (a) REPORT.— 

18 (1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days 

19 after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Sec20 retary of State, in coordination with the Secretary of 

21 the Treasury, shall submit a report to the appro22 priate congressional committees on the diplomatic 

23 and economic implications of cross-border payment 

24 systems. 


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1 (2) MATTERS TO BE INCLUDED.—The report 

2 shall— 

3 (A) assess the extent to which American 

4 diplomacy and global leadership hinge upon the 

5 current infrastructure and existing ecosystem of 

6 cross-border payment and financial messaging 

7 systems; 

8 (B) examine the durability of the Society 

9 for Worldwide Interbank Financial Tele10 communication cooperative; 

11 (C) review and analyze ways in which the 

12 Cross Border Interbank Payment Systems 

13 (CIPS), cryptocurrencies, and central bank dig14 ital currencies could erode this system; and 

15 (D) analyze how changes to global cross16 border payment systems could undermine 

17 United States national security interests includ18 ing impacts on the efficacy of sanctions, the 

19 countering of terrorist finance, and the enforce20 ment of anti-money laundering provisions. 

21 (b) REPORT FORM.—The report required under sub22 section (a)(1) shall be submitted in unclassified form. 

23 (c) PUBLICATION.—The unclassified portion of the 

24 report under subsection (a)(1) shall be made accessible to 


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1 the public online through relevant United States Govern2 ment websites. 

3 TITLE II—INVESTING IN 

4 ALLIANCES AND PARTNERSHIPS 

5 Subtitle A—Strategic and 

6 Diplomatic Matters 

7 SEC. 201. APPROPRIATE COMMITTEES OF CONGRESS DE8 FINED. 

9 In this subtitle, the term ‘‘appropriate committees of 

10 Congress’’ means— 

11 (1) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the 

12 Committee on Armed Services, and the Committee 

13 on Appropriations of the Senate; and 

14 (2) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the 

15 Committee on Armed Services, and the Committee 

16 on Appropriations of the House of Representatives. 

17 SEC. 202. UNITED STATES COMMITMENT AND SUPPORT 

18 FOR ALLIES AND PARTNERS IN THE INDO-PA19 CIFIC. 

20 (a) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con21 gress that— 

22 (1) the United States treaty alliances in the 

23 Indo-Pacific provide a unique strategic advantage to 

24 the United States and are among the Nation’s most 

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1 vance its vital national interests, defend its territory, 

2 expand its economy through international trade and 

3 commerce, establish enduring cooperation with allies 

4 while seeking to establish new partnerships, prevent 

5 the domination of the Indo-Pacific and its sur6 rounding maritime and air lanes by a hostile power 

7 or powers, and deter potential aggressors; 

8 (2) the Governments of the United States, 

9 Japan, the Republic of Korea, Australia, the Phil10 ippines, and Thailand are critical allies in advancing 

11 a free and open order in the Indo-Pacific region and 

12 tackling challenges with unity of purpose, and have 

13 collaborated to advance specific efforts of shared in14 terest in areas such as defense and security, eco15 nomic prosperity, infrastructure connectivity, and 

16 fundamental freedoms; 

17 (3) the United States greatly values other part18 nerships in the Indo-Pacific region, including with 

19 India, Singapore, Indonesia, Taiwan, New Zealand, 

20 and Vietnam as well as its trilateral and quadrilat21 eral dialogues, and regional architecture such as the 

22 Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), 

23 and the Asia-Pacific Economic Community (APEC), 

24 which are essential to further shared interests; 


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1 (4) the security environment in the Indo-Pacific 

2 demands consistent United States and allied com3 mitment to strengthening and advancing alliances so 

4 that they are postured to meet these challenges, and 

5 will require sustained political will, concrete partner6 ships, economic, commercial, technological, and secu7 rity cooperation, consistent and tangible commit8 ments, high-level and extensive consultations on 

9 matters of mutual interest, mutual and shared co10 operation in the acquisition of key capabilities im11 portant to allied defenses, and unified mutual sup12 port in the face of political, economic, or military co13 ercion; 

14 (5) fissures in the United States alliance rela15 tionships and partnerships benefit United States ad16 versaries and weaken the collective ability to advance 

17 shared interests; 

18 (6) the United States must work with allies to 

19 prioritize human rights throughout the Indo-Pacific 

20 region; 

21 (7) as the report released in August 2020 by 

22 the Expert Group of the International Military 

23 Council on Climate and Security (IMCCS), titled 

24 ‘‘Climate and Security in the Indo-Asia Pacific’’ 

25 noted, the Indo-Pacific region is one of the regions 


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1 most vulnerable to climate impacts and as former 

2 Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Installations 

3 and Environment Sherri Goodman, Secretary Gen4 eral of IMCCS, noted, climate shocks act as a threat 

5 multiplier in the Indo-Pacific region, increasing hu6 manitarian response costs and impacting security 

7 throughout the region as sea levels rise, fishing pat8 terns shift, food insecurity rises, and storms grow 

9 stronger and more frequent; 

10 (8) the United State should continue to engage 

11 on and deepen cooperation with allies and partners 

12 of the United States in the Indo-Pacific region, as 

13 laid out in the Asia Reassurance Initiative Act (Pub14 lic Law 115–409), in the areas of— 

15 (A) forecasting environmental challenges; 

16 (B) assisting with transnational coopera17 tion on sustainable uses of forest and water re18 sources with the goal of preserving biodiversity 

19 and access to safe drinking water; 

20 (C) fisheries and marine resource conserva21 tion; and 

22 (D) meeting environmental challenges and 

23 developing resilience; 

24 (9) the Secretary of State, in coordination with 

25 the Secretary of Defense and the Administrator of 


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1 the United States Agency for International Develop2 ment, should facilitate a robust interagency Indo-Pa3 cific climate resiliency and adaptation strategy fo4 cusing on internal and external actions needed— 

5 (A) to facilitate regional early recovery, 

6 risk reduction, and resilience to weather-related 

7 impacts on strategic interests of the United 

8 States and partners and allies of the United 

9 States in the region; and 

10 (B) to address humanitarian and food se11 curity impacts of weather-related changes in the 

12 region; and 

13 (10) ASEAN centrality and ASEAN-led mecha14 nisms remain essential to the evolving institutional 

15 architecture of the Indo-Pacific region. 

16 (b) STATEMENT OF POLICY.—It shall be the policy 

17 of the United States— 

18 (1) to deepen diplomatic, economic, and secu19 rity cooperation between and among the United 

20 States, Japan, the Republic of Korea, Australia, the 

21 Philippines, and Thailand, as appropriate, including 

22 through diplomatic engagement, regional develop23 ment, energy security and development, scientific 

24 and health partnerships, educational and cultural exVerDate Sep 11 2014 22:42 Jun 24, 2021 Jkt 019200 PO 00000 Frm 00067 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\H3524.IH H3524

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1 changes, intelligence-sharing, and other diplomatic 

2 and defense-related initiatives; 

3 (2) to uphold the United States multilateral 

4 and bilateral treaty obligations, including— 

5 (A) defending Japan consistent with the 

6 Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security Be7 tween the United States of America and Japan, 

8 done at Washington, January 19, 1960, and all 

9 related and subsequent bilateral security agree10 ments and arrangements concluded on or before 

11 the date of enactment of this Act; 

12 (B) defending the Republic of Korea con13 sistent with the Mutual Defense Treaty Be14 tween the United States and the Republic of 

15 Korea, done at Washington, October 1, 1953, 

16 and all related and subsequent bilateral security 

17 agreements and arrangements concluded on or 

18 before the date of enactment of this Act; 

19 (C) defending the Philippines consistent 

20 with article IV of the Mutual Defense Treaty 

21 Between the United States and the Republic of 

22 the Philippines, done at Washington, August 

23 30, 1951, and all related and subsequent bilat24 eral security agreements and arrangements conVerDate Sep 11 2014 22:42 Jun 24, 2021 Jkt 019200 PO 00000 Frm 00068 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\H3524.IH H3524

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1 cluded on or before the date of enactment of 

2 this Act; 

3 (D) defending Thailand consistent with the 

4 Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty (‘‘Ma5 nila Pact’’), done at Manila, September 8, 

6 1954, understanding thereto the Thanat-Rusk 

7 communique of 1962, and all related and subse8 quent bilateral security agreements and ar9 rangements concluded on or before the date of 

10 enactment of this Act; and 

11 (E) defending Australia consistent with the 

12 Security Treaty Between Australia and the 

13 United States of America, done at San Fran14 cisco, September 1, 1951, and all related and 

15 subsequent bilateral security agreements and 

16 arrangements concluded on or before the date 

17 of enactment of this Act; 

18 (3) to strengthen and deepen the United States 

19 bilateral and regional partnerships, including with 

20 India, Taiwan, ASEAN, and New Zealand; 

21 (4) to cooperate with Japan, the Republic of 

22 Korea, Australia, the Philippines, and Thailand to 

23 promote human rights bilaterally and through re24 gional and multilateral fora and pacts; and 


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1 (5) to strengthen and advance diplomatic, eco2 nomic, and security cooperation with regional part3 ners, such as Taiwan, Vietnam, Malaysia, Singapore, 

4 Indonesia, and India. 

5 SEC. 203. BOOSTING QUAD COOPERATION. 

6 (a) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con7 gress that— 

8 (1) as a Pacific power, the United States should 

9 continue to strengthen its cooperation with Aus10 tralia, India, and Japan, (through the Quadrilateral 

11 Security Dialogue or ‘‘Quad’’) to enhance and imple12 ment a shared vision to meet regional challenges and 

13 to promote a free, open, inclusive, resilient, and 

14 healthy Indo-Pacific, characterized by respect for 

15 democratic norms, rule of law, and market-driven 

16 economic growth, and is free from undue influence 

17 and coercion; 

18 (2) the United States should expand dialogue 

19 and cooperation through the Quad with a range of 

20 partners to support the rule of law, freedom of navi21 gation and overflight, peaceful resolution of disputes, 

22 democratic values, and territorial integrity, and to 

23 uphold peace and prosperity and strengthen demo24 cratic resilience in the Indo-Pacific; 


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1 (3) the recent pledge from the first-ever Quad 

2 leaders meeting on March 12, 2021, to respond to 

3 the economic and health impacts of COVID–19, in4 cluding expanding safe, affordable, and effective vac5 cine production and equitable access, and to address 

6 shared challenges, including in cyberspace, critical 

7 technologies, counterterrorism, quality infrastructure 

8 investment, and humanitarian assistance and dis9 aster relief, as well as maritime domains, further ad10 vances the important cooperation among Quad na11 tions that is so critical to the Indo-Pacific region; 

12 (4) building upon their announced commitment 

13 to finance 1,000,000,000 or more COVID–19 vac14 cines by the end of 2022 for use in the Indo-Pacific 

15 region, the United States International Development 

16 Finance Corporation, the Japan International Co17 operation Agency, and the Japan Bank for Inter18 national Cooperation, including through partnerships 

19 other multilateral development banks, should also 

20 venture to finance development and infrastructure 

21 projects in the Indo-Pacific region that are competi22 tive, transparent, and sustainable; 

23 (5) the United States should participate in the 

24 Resilient Supply Chain Initiative launched by Aus25 tralia, Japan, and India in 2020, along with similar 


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1 initiatives that relocate supply chains in the health, 

2 economic, and national security sectors to the 

3 United States, its Quad partners, and other like4 minded countries; and 

5 (6) the formation of a Quad Intra-Parliamen6 tary Working Group could— 

7 (A) sustain and deepen engagement be8 tween senior officials of the Quad countries on 

9 a full spectrum of issues; and 

10 (B) be modeled on the successful and long11 standing bilateral intra-parliamentary groups 

12 between the United States and Mexico, Canada, 

13 and the United Kingdom, as well as other for14 mal and informal parliamentary exchanges. 

15 (b) REPORTING REQUIREMENT.— 

16 (1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days 

17 after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Sec18 retary of State shall develop and submit a com19 prehensive strategy for bolstering engagement and 

20 cooperation with the Quad and submit a report to 

21 the appropriate congressional committees laying out 

22 the strategy. 

23 (2) MATTERS TO BE INCLUDED.—The strategy 

24 required by subsection (a) shall include the fol25 lowing: 


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1 (A) A description of how the United States 

2 intends to demonstrate democratic leadership in 

3 the Indo-Pacific through quadrilateral engage4 ment with India, Japan, and Australia on 

5 shared interests and common challenges. 

6 (B) A summary of— 

7 (i) current and past Quad initiatives 

8 across the whole of the United States Gov9 ernment, including to promote broad based 

10 and inclusive economic growth, trade, in11 vestment, and to advance technology co12 operation, energy innovation, climate miti13 gation and adaptation, physical and digital 

14 infrastructure development, education, dis15 aster management, and global health secu16 rity; 

17 (ii) proposals shared among Quad na18 tions to deepen existing security coopera19 tion, intelligence sharing, economic part20 nerships, and multilateral coordination; 

21 and 

22 (iii) initiatives and agreements under23 taken jointly with Quad nations plus other 

24 like-minded partners in the Indo-Pacific on 

25 areas of shared interest. 


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1 (C) A description of efforts to jointly— 

2 (i) expand ongoing COVID–19 co3 operation to prepare for the next pandemic 

4 by focusing on medium-term vaccine and 

5 medical supply production and building a 

6 broader dialogue on global public health; 

7 (ii) combat economic coercion, deepen 

8 regional economic engagement and integra9 tion, and strengthen regional rules and 

10 standards around trade and investment; 

11 (iii) strengthen climate actions on 

12 mitigation, adaptation, resilience, tech13 nology, capacity-building, and climate fi14 nance; 

15 (iv) facilitate the development of qual16 ity infrastructure in the Indo-Pacific 

17 through joint financing, investment, tech18 nical assistance, and standards setting; 

19 (v) enhance joint maritime security 

20 and maritime domain awareness initiatives 

21 to protecting the maritime commons and 

22 supporting international law and freedom 

23 of navigation in the Indo-Pacific; and 


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1 (vi) develop international technology 

2 standards and share or co-develop new in3 novative technologies of the future. 

4 SEC. 204. ESTABLISHMENT OF QUAD INTRA-PARLIAMEN5 TARY WORKING GROUP. 

6 (a) ESTABLISHMENT.—Not later than 30 days after 

7 the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of 

8 State shall seek to enter into negotiations with the govern9 ments of Japan, Australia, and India (collectively, with the 

10 United States, known as the ‘‘Quad’’) with the goal of 

11 reaching a written agreement to establish a Quad Intra12 Parliamentary Working Group for the purpose of acting 

13 on the recommendations of the Quad Working Groups de14 scribed in section 203(6) and to facilitate closer coopera15 tion on shared interests and values. 

16 (b) UNITED STATES GROUP.— 

17 (1) IN GENERAL.—At such time as the govern18 ments of the Quad countries enter into a written 

19 agreement described in subsection (a), there shall be 

20 established a United States Group, which shall rep21 resent the United States at the Quad Intra-Par22 liamentary Working Group. 

23 (2) MEMBERSHIP.— 


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1 (A) IN GENERAL.—The United States 

2 Group shall be comprised of not more than 24 

3 Members of Congress. 

4 (B) APPOINTMENT.—Of the Members of 

5 Congress appointed to the United States Group 

6 under subparagraph (A)— 

7 (i) half shall be appointed by the 

8 Speaker of the House of Representatives 

9 from among Members of the House, not 

10 less than 4 of whom shall be members of 

11 the Committee on Foreign Affairs; and 

12 (ii) half shall be appointed by the 

13 President pro tempore of the Senate, based 

14 on recommendations of the majority leader 

15 and minority leader of the Senate, from 

16 among Members of the Senate, not less 

17 than 4 of whom shall be members of the 

18 Committee on Foreign Relations (unless 

19 the majority leader and minority leader de20 termine otherwise). 

21 (3) MEETINGS.— 

22 (A) IN GENERAL.—The United States 

23 Group shall seek to meet not less frequently 

24 than annually with representatives and appro25 priate staff of the legislatures of Japan, AusVerDate Sep 11 2014 22:42 Jun 24, 2021 Jkt 019200 PO 00000 Frm 00076 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\H3524.IH H3524

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1 tralia, and India, and any other country invited 

2 by mutual agreement of the Quad countries. 

3 (B) LIMITATION.—A meeting described in 

4 subparagraph (A) may be held— 

5 (i) in the United States; 

6 (ii) in another Quad country during 

7 periods when Congress is not in session; or 

8 (iii) virtually. 

9 (4) CHAIRPERSON AND VICE CHAIRPERSON.— 

10 (A) HOUSE DELEGATION.—The Speaker of 

11 the House of Representatives shall designate 

12 the chairperson or vice chairperson of the dele13 gation of the United States Group from the 

14 House from among members of the Committee 

15 on Foreign Affairs. 

16 (B) SENATE DELEGATION.—The President 

17 pro tempore of the Senate shall designate the 

18 chairperson or vice chairperson of the delega19 tion of the United States Group from the Sen20 ate from among members of the Committee on 

21 Foreign Relations. 

22 (5) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.— 

23 (A) IN GENERAL.—There is authorized to 

24 be appropriated $1,000,000 for each fiscal year 


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1 2022 through 2025 for the United States 

2 Group. 

3 (B) DISTRIBUTION OF APPROPRIATIONS.— 

4 (i) IN GENERAL.—For each fiscal year 

5 for which an appropriation is made for the 

6 United States Group, half of the amount 

7 appropriated shall be available to the dele8 gation from the House of Representatives 

9 and half of the amount shall be available 

10 to the delegation from the Senate. 

11 (ii) METHOD OF DISTRIBUTION.—The 

12 amounts available to the delegations of the 

13 House of Representatives and the Senate 

14 under clause (i) shall be disbursed on 

15 vouchers to be approved by the chairperson 

16 of the delegation from the House of Rep17 resentatives and the chairperson of the del18 egation from the Senate, respectively. 

19 (6) PRIVATE SOURCES.—The United States 

20 Group may accept gifts or donations of services or 

21 property, subject to the review and approval, as ap22 propriate, of the Committee on Ethics of the House 

23 of Representatives and the Committee on Ethics of 

24 the Senate. 


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1 (7) CERTIFICATION OF EXPENDITURES.—The 

2 certificate of the chairperson of the delegation from 

3 the House of Representatives or the delegation of 

4 the Senate of the United States Group shall be final 

5 and conclusive upon the accounting officers in the 

6 auditing of the accounts of the United States Group. 

7 (8) ANNUAL REPORT.—The United States 

8 Group shall submit to the Committee on Foreign Af9 fairs of the House of Representatives and the Com10 mittee on Foreign Relations of the Senate a report 

11 for each fiscal year for which an appropriation is 

12 made for the United States Group, which shall in13 clude a description of its expenditures under such 

14 appropriation. 

15 SEC. 205. STATEMENT OF POLICY ON COOPERATION WITH 

16 ASEAN. 

17 It is the policy of the United States to— 

18 (1) stand with the nations of the Association of 

19 Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) as they respond 

20 to COVID–19 and support greater cooperation in 

21 building capacity to prepare for and respond to 

22 pandemics and other public health challenges; 

23 (2) support high-level United States participa24 tion in the annual ASEAN Summit held each year; 


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1 (3) reaffirm the importance of United States2 ASEAN economic engagement, including the elimi3 nation of barriers to cross-border commerce, and 

4 support the ASEAN Economic Community’s (AEC) 

5 goals, including strong, inclusive, and sustainable 

6 long-term economic growth and cooperation with the 

7 United States that focuses on innovation and capac8 ity-building efforts in technology, education, disaster 

9 management, food security, human rights, and trade 

10 facilitation, particularly for ASEAN’s poorest coun11 tries; 

12 (4) urge ASEAN to continue its efforts to fos13 ter greater integration and unity within the ASEAN 

14 community, as well as to foster greater integration 

15 and unity with non-ASEAN economic, political, and 

16 security partners, including Japan, the Republic of 

17 Korea, Australia, the European Union, and India; 

18 (5) recognize the value of strategic economic 

19 initiatives like United States-ASEAN Connect, 

20 which demonstrates a commitment to ASEAN and 

21 the AEC and builds upon economic relationships in 

22 the region; 

23 (6) support ASEAN nations in addressing mar24 itime and territorial disputes in a constructive man25 ner and in pursuing claims through peaceful, diploVerDate Sep 11 2014 22:42 Jun 24, 2021 Jkt 019200 PO 00000 Frm 00080 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\H3524.IH H3524

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1 matic, and, as necessary, legitimate regional and 

2 international arbitration mechanisms, consistent 

3 with international law, including through the adop4 tion of a code of conduct in the South China Sea 

5 that represents the interests of all parties and pro6 motes peace and stability in the region; 

7 (7) urge all parties involved in the maritime 

8 and territorial disputes in the Indo-Pacific region, 

9 including the Government of the People’s Republic 

10 of China— 

11 (A) to cease any current activities, and 

12 avoid undertaking any actions in the future, 

13 that undermine stability, or complicate or esca14 late disputes through the use of coercion, in15 timidation, or military force; 

16 (B) to demilitarize islands, reefs, shoals, 

17 and other features, and refrain from new ef18 forts to militarize, including the construction of 

19 new garrisons and facilities and the relocation 

20 of additional military personnel, material, or 

21 equipment; 

22 (C) to oppose actions by any country that 

23 prevent other countries from exercising their 

24 sovereign rights to the resources in their exclu25 sive economic zones and continental shelves by 


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1 enforcing claims to those areas in the South 

2 China Sea that lack support in international 

3 law; and 

4 (D) to oppose unilateral declarations of ad5 ministrative and military districts in contested 

6 areas in the South China Sea; 

7 (8) urge parties to refrain from unilateral ac8 tions that cause permanent physical damage to the 

9 marine environment and support the efforts of the 

10 National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration 

11 and ASEAN to implement guidelines to address the 

12 illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing in the 

13 region; 

14 (9) urge ASEAN member states to develop a 

15 common approach to encourage China and the Phil16 ippines to comply with the decision of the Perma17 nent Court of Arbitration’s 2016 ruling in favor of 

18 the Republic of the Philippines in the case against 

19 the People’s Republic of China’s excessive maritime 

20 claims; 

21 (10) reaffirm the commitment of the United 

22 States to continue joint efforts with ASEAN to halt 

23 human smuggling and trafficking in persons and 

24 urge ASEAN to create and strengthen regional 


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1 mechanisms to provide assistance and support to 

2 refugees and migrants; 

3 (11) support the Mekong-United States Part4 nership; 

5 (12) support newly created initiatives with 

6 ASEAN countries, including the United States7 ASEAN Smart Cities Partnership, the ASEAN Pol8 icy Implementation Project, the United States9 ASEAN Innovation Circle, and the United States10 ASEAN Health Futures; 

11 (13) encourage the President to communicate 

12 to ASEAN leaders the importance of promoting the 

13 rule of law and open and transparent government, 

14 strengthening civil society, and protecting human 

15 rights, including releasing political prisoners, ceasing 

16 politically motivated prosecutions and arbitrary 

17 killings, and safeguarding freedom of the press, free18 dom of assembly, freedom of religion, and freedom 

19 of speech and expression; 

20 (14) support efforts by organizations in 

21 ASEAN that address corruption in the public and 

22 private sectors, enhance anti-bribery compliance, en23 force bribery criminalization in the private sector, 

24 and build beneficial ownership transparency through 

25 the ASEAN-USAID PROSPECT project partnered 


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1 with the South East Asia Parties Against Corrup2 tion (SEA-PAC); 

3 (15) support the Young Southeast Asian Lead4 ers Initiative as an example of a people-to-people 

5 partnership that provides skills, networks, and lead6 ership training to a new generation that will create 

7 and fill jobs, foster cross-border cooperation and 

8 partnerships, and rise to address the regional and 

9 global challenges of the future; 

10 (16) support the creation of initiatives similar 

11 to the Young Southeast Asian Leaders Initiative for 

12 other parts of the Indo-Pacific to foster people-to13 people partnerships with an emphasis on civil society 

14 leaders; 

15 (17) acknowledge those ASEAN governments 

16 that have fully upheld and implemented all United 

17 Nations Security Council resolutions and inter18 national agreements with respect to the Democratic 

19 People’s Republic of Korea’s nuclear and ballistic 

20 missile programs and encourage all other ASEAN 

21 governments to do the same; and 

22 (18) allocate appropriate resources across the 

23 United States Government to articulate and imple24 ment an Indo-Pacific strategy that respects and sup25 ports the crucial role of ASEAN and supports 


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1 ASEAN as a source of well-functioning and prob2 lem-solving regional architecture in the Indo-Pacific 

3 community. 

4 SEC. 206. UNITED STATES REPRESENTATION IN STAND5 ARDS-SETTING BODIES. 

6 (a) SHORT TITLE.—This section may be cited as the 

7 ‘‘Promoting United States International Leadership in 5G 

8 Act of 2021’’. 

9 (b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con10 gress that— 

11 (1) the United States and its allies and part12 ners should maintain participation and leadership at 

13 international standards-setting bodies for 5th and 

14 future generation mobile telecommunications sys15 tems and infrastructure; 

16 (2) the United States should work with its allies 

17 and partners to encourage and facilitate the develop18 ment of secure supply chains and networks for 5th 

19 and future generation mobile telecommunications 

20 systems and infrastructure; and 

21 (3) the maintenance of a high standard of secu22 rity in telecommunications and cyberspace between 

23 the United States and its allies and partners is a na24 tional security interest of the United States. 


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1 (c) ENHANCING REPRESENTATION AND LEADERSHIP

2 OF UNITED STATES AT INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS3 SETTING BODIES.— 

4 (1) IN GENERAL.—The President shall— 

5 (A) establish an interagency working group 

6 to provide assistance and technical expertise to 

7 enhance the representation and leadership of 

8 the United States at international bodies that 

9 set standards for equipment, systems, software, 

10 and virtually defined networks that support 5th 

11 and future generation mobile telecommuni12 cations systems and infrastructure, such as the 

13 International Telecommunication Union and the 

14 3rd Generation Partnership Project; and 

15 (B) work with allies, partners, and the pri16 vate sector to increase productive engagement. 

17 (2) INTERAGENCY WORKING GROUP.—The 

18 interagency working group described in paragraph 

19 (1)— 

20 (A) shall be chaired by the Secretary of 

21 State or a designee of the Secretary of State; 

22 and 

23 (B) shall consist of the head (or designee) 

24 of each Federal department or agency the 

25 President determines appropriate. 


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1 (3) BRIEFINGS.— 

2 (A) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 

3 days after the date of the enactment of this 

4 Act, and subsequently thereafter as provided 

5 under subparagraph (B), the interagency work6 ing group described in paragraph (1) shall pro7 vide a strategy to the appropriate congressional 

8 committees that addresses— 

9 (i) promotion of United States leader10 ship at international standards-setting bod11 ies for equipment, systems, software, and 

12 virtually defined networks relevant to 5th 

13 and future generation mobile telecommuni14 cations systems and infrastructure, taking 

15 into account the different processes fol16 lowed by the various international stand17 ard-setting bodies; 

18 (ii) diplomatic engagement with allies 

19 and partners to share security risk infor20 mation and findings pertaining to equip21 ment that supports or is used in 5th and 

22 future generation mobile telecommuni23 cations systems and infrastructure and co24 operation on mitigating such risks; 


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1 (iii) China’s presence and activities at 

2 international standards-setting bodies rel3 evant to 5th and future generation mobile 

4 telecommunications systems and infra5 structure, including information on the dif6 ferences in the scope and scale of China’s 

7 engagement at such bodies compared to 

8 engagement by the United States or its al9 lies and partners and the security risks 

10 raised by Chinese proposals in such stand11 ards-setting bodies; and 

12 (iv) engagement with private sector 

13 communications and information service 

14 providers, equipment developers, academia, 

15 federally funded research and development 

16 centers, and other private-sector stake17 holders to propose and develop secure 

18 standards for equipment, systems, soft19 ware, and virtually defined networks that 

20 support 5th and future generation mobile 

21 telecommunications systems and infra22 structure. 

23 (B) SUBSEQUENT BRIEFINGS.—Upon re24 ceiving a request from the appropriate congres25 sional committees, or as determined appropriate 


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1 by the chair of the interagency working group 

2 established pursuant to paragraph (1), the 

3 interagency working group shall provide such 

4 committees an updated briefing that covers the 

5 matters described in clauses (i) through (iv) of 

6 subparagraph (A). 

7 SEC. 207. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON NEGOTIATIONS WITH G7 

8 AND G20 COUNTRIES. 

9 (a) IN GENERAL.—It is the sense of Congress that 

10 the President, acting through the Secretary of State, 

11 should initiate an agenda with G7 and G20 countries on 

12 matters relevant to economic and democratic freedoms, in13 cluding the following: 

14 (1) Trade and investment issues and enforce15 ment. 

16 (2) Building support for international infra17 structure standards, including those agreed to at the 

18 G20 summit in Osaka in 2018. 

19 (3) The erosion of democracy and human 

20 rights. 

21 (4) The security of 5G telecommunications. 

22 (5) Anti-competitive behavior, such as intellec23 tual property theft, massive subsidization of compa24 nies, and other policies and practices. 


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1 (6) Predatory international sovereign lending 

2 that is inconsistent with Organisation for Economic 

3 Cooperation and Development (OECD) and Paris 

4 Club principles. 

5 (7) International influence campaigns. 

6 (8) Environmental standards. 

7 (9) Coordination with like-minded regional part8 ners that are not in the G7 and G20. 

9 SEC. 208. ENHANCING THE UNITED STATES-TAIWAN PART10 NERSHIP. 

11 (a) STATEMENT OF POLICY.—It is the policy of the 

12 United States— 

13 (1) to support the close economic, political, and 

14 security relationship between Taiwan and the United 

15 States and recognize Taiwan as a vital part of the 

16 approach to the United States Indo-Pacific; 

17 (2) to advance the security of Taiwan and its 

18 democracy a vital national security interest of the 

19 United States; 

20 (3) to reinforce all existing United States Gov21 ernment commitments to Taiwan, consistent with 

22 the Taiwan Relations Act (Public Law 96–8), the 

23 three joint communiques, and the ‘‘Six Assurances’’; 


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1 (4) to support Taiwan’s implementation of its 

2 asymmetric defense strategy, including the priorities 

3 identified in Taiwan’s Overall Defense Concept; 

4 (5) to urge Taiwan to increase its defense 

5 spending in order to fully resource its defense strat6 egy; 

7 (6) to conduct regular transfers of defense arti8 cles to Taiwan in order to enhance Taiwan’s self-de9 fense capabilities, particularly its efforts to develop 

10 and integrate asymmetric capabilities, such as anti11 ship, coastal defense, anti-armor, air defense, ad12 vanced command, control, communications, com13 puters, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance, 

14 and resilient command and control capabilities, into 

15 its military forces; 

16 (7) to advocate and actively advance Taiwan’s 

17 meaningful participation in international organiza18 tions, including the World Health Assembly, the 

19 International Civil Aviation Organization, the Inter20 national Criminal Police Organization, and other 

21 international bodies as appropriate; 

22 (8) to advocate for information sharing with 

23 Taiwan in the International Agency for Research on 

24 Cancer; 


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1 (9) to promote meaningful cooperation among 

2 the United States, Taiwan, and other like-minded 

3 partners; 

4 (10) to enhance bilateral trade, including poten5 tially through new agreements or resumption of 

6 talks under the Trade and Investment Framework 

7 Agreement; 

8 (11) to actively engage in trade talks in pursu9 ance of a bilateral free trade agreement; 

10 (12) to expand bilateral economic and techno11 logical cooperation, including improving supply chain 

12 security; 

13 (13) to support United States educational and 

14 exchange programs with Taiwan, including by pro15 moting the study of Chinese language, culture, his16 tory, and politics in Taiwan; and 

17 (14) to expand people-to-people exchanges be18 tween the United States and Taiwan. 

19 (b) SUPPORTING UNITED STATES EDUCATIONAL

20 AND EXCHANGE PROGRAMS WITH TAIWAN.— 

21 (1) ESTABLISHMENT OF THE UNITED STATES22 TAIWAN CULTURAL EXCHANGE FOUNDATION.—The 

23 Secretary of State should consider establishing an 

24 independent nonprofit that— 


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1 (A) is dedicated to deepening ties between 

2 the future leaders of Taiwan and the United 

3 States; and 

4 (B) works with State and local school dis5 tricts and educational institutions to send high 

6 school and university students to Taiwan to 

7 study the Chinese language, culture, history, 

8 politics, and other relevant subjects. 

9 (2) PARTNER.—State and local school districts 

10 and educational institutions, including public univer11 sities, are encouraged to partner with the Taipei 

12 Economic and Cultural Representative Office in the 

13 United States to establish programs to promote an 

14 increase in educational and cultural exchanges. 

15 SEC. 209. TAIWAN FELLOWSHIP PROGRAM. 

16 (a) SHORT TITLE.—This section may be cited as the 

17 ‘‘Taiwan Fellowship Act’’. 

18 (b) FINDINGS; PURPOSES.— 

19 (1) FINDINGS.—Congress finds the following: 

20 (A) The Taiwan Relations Act (Public Law 

21 96–8; 22 U.S.C. 3301 et seq.) affirmed United 

22 States policy ‘‘to preserve and promote exten23 sive, close, and friendly commercial, cultural, 

24 and other relations between the people of the 

25 United States and the people on Taiwan, as 


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1 well as the people on the China mainland and 

2 all other peoples of the Western Pacific area’’. 

3 (B) Consistent with the Asia Reassurance 

4 Initiative Act of 2018 (Public Law 115–409), 

5 the United States has grown its strategic part6 nership with Taiwan’s vibrant democracy of 

7 23,000,000 people. 

8 (C) Despite a concerted campaign by the 

9 People’s Republic of China to isolate Taiwan 

10 from its diplomatic partners and from inter11 national organizations, including the World 

12 Health Organization, Taiwan has emerged as a 

13 global leader in the coronavirus global pandemic 

14 response, including by donating more than 

15 2,000,000 surgical masks and other medical 

16 equipment to the United States. 

17 (D) The creation of a United States fellow18 ship program with Taiwan would support— 

19 (i) a key priority of expanding people20 to-people exchanges, which was outlined in 

21 President Donald J. Trump’s 2017 Na22 tional Security Strategy; 

23 (ii) President Joseph R. Biden’s com24 mitment to Taiwan, ‘‘a leading democracy 

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1 ner’’, as expressed in his March 2021 In2 terim National Security Strategic Guid3 ance; and 

4 (iii) April 2021 guidance from the De5 partment of State based on a review re6 quired under the Taiwan Assurance Act of 

7 2020 (subtitle B of title III of division FF 

8 of Public Law 116–260) to ‘‘encourage 

9 U.S. government engagement with Taiwan 

10 that reflects our deepening unofficial rela11 tionship’’. 

12 (2) PURPOSES.—The purposes of this Act 

13 are— 

14 (A) to further strengthen the United 

15 States-Taiwan strategic relationship and broad16 en understanding of the Indo-Pacific region by 

17 temporarily assigning officials of agencies of the 

18 United States Government to Taiwan for inten19 sive study in Mandarin Chinese and placement 

20 as Fellows with the governing authorities on 

21 Taiwan or a Taiwanese civic institution; 

22 (B) to expand United States Government 

23 expertise in Mandarin Chinese language skills 

24 and understanding of the politics, history, and 

25 culture of Taiwan and the Indo-Pacific region 


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1 by providing eligible United States personnel 

2 the opportunity to acquire such skills and un3 derstanding through the Taiwan Fellowship 

4 Program established under subsection (c); and 

5 (C) to better position the United States to 

6 advance its economic, security, and human 

7 rights interests and values in the Indo-Pacific 

8 region. 

9 (c) TAIWAN FELLOWSHIP PROGRAM.— 

10 (1) DEFINITIONS.—In this section: 

11 (A) AGENCY HEAD.—The term ‘‘agency 

12 head’’ means, in the case of the executive 

13 branch of United States Government, or in the 

14 case of a legislative branch agency specified in 

15 subparagraph (B), the head of the respective 

16 agency. 

17 (B) AGENCY OF THE UNITED STATES GOV18 ERNMENT.—The term ‘‘agency of the United 

19 States Government’’ includes the Government 

20 Accountability Office, the Congressional Budget 

21 Office, the Congressional Research Service, and 

22 the United States-China Economic and Security 

23 Review Commission of the legislative branch, as 

24 well as any agency of the executive branch. 


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1 (C) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COM2 MITTEES.—The term ‘‘appropriate congres3 sional committees’’ means— 

4 (i) the Committee on Appropriations 

5 of the Senate; 

6 (ii) the Committee on Foreign Rela7 tions of the Senate; 

8 (iii) the Committee on Appropriations 

9 of the House of Representatives; 

10 (iv) the Committee on Foreign Affairs 

11 of the House of Representatives; and 

12 (v) the Committee on Armed Services 

13 of the House of Representatives. 

14 (D) DETAILEE.—The term ‘‘detailee’’ 

15 means an employee of an agency of the United 

16 States Government on loan to the American In17 stitute in Taiwan, without a change of position 

18 from the agency at which such employee is em19 ployed. 

20 (E) IMPLEMENTING PARTNER.—The term 

21 ‘‘implementing partner’’ means any United 

22 States organization described in section 

23 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 

24 and exempt from tax under section 501(a) of 

25 such Code that— 


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1 (i) is selected through a competitive 

2 process; 

3 (ii) performs logistical, administrative, 

4 and other functions, as determined by the 

5 Department of State and the American In6 stitute of Taiwan, in support of the Tai7 wan Fellowship Program; and 

8 (iii) enters into a cooperative agree9 ment with the American Institute in Tai10 wan to administer the Taiwan Fellowship 

11 Program. 

12 (2) ESTABLISHMENT OF TAIWAN FELLOWSHIP

13 PROGRAM.— 

14 (A) ESTABLISHMENT.—The Secretary of 

15 State shall establish the ‘‘Taiwan Fellowship 

16 Program’’ (hereafter referred to in this section 

17 as the ‘‘Program’’) to provide a fellowship op18 portunity in Taiwan of up to two years for eligi19 ble United States citizens through the coopera20 tive agreement established in subparagraph (B). 

21 The Department of State, in consultation with 

22 the American Institute in Taiwan and the im23 plementing partner, may modify the name of 

24 the Program. 

25 (B) COOPERATIVE AGREEMENTS.— 


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1 (i) IN GENERAL.—The American In2 stitute in Taiwan shall use amounts au3 thorized to be appropriated pursuant to 

4 paragraph (6)(A) to enter into an annual 

5 or multi-year cooperative agreement with 

6 an appropriate implementing partner. 

7 (ii) FELLOWSHIPS.—The Department 

8 of State, in consultation with the American 

9 Institute in Taiwan and, as appropriate, 

10 the implementing partner, shall award to 

11 eligible United States citizens, subject to 

12 available funding— 

13 (I) not fewer than five fellow14 ships during the first two years of the 

15 Program; and 

16 (II) not fewer than ten fellow17 ships during each of the remaining 

18 years of the Program. 

19 (C) INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENT; IMPLE20 MENTING PARTNER.—Not later than 30 days 

21 after the date of the enactment of this Act, the 

22 American Institute in Taiwan, in consultation 

23 with the Department of State, shall— 

24 (i) begin negotiations with the Taipei 

25 Economic and Cultural Representative OfVerDate Sep 11 2014 22:42 Jun 24, 2021 Jkt 019200 PO 00000 Frm 00099 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\H3524.IH H3524

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1 fice, or with another appropriate entity, for 

2 the purpose of entering into an agreement 

3 to facilitate the placement of fellows in an 

4 agency of the governing authorities on Tai5 wan; and 

6 (ii) begin the process of selecting an 

7 implementing partner, which— 

8 (I) shall agree to meet all of the 

9 legal requirements required to operate 

10 in Taiwan; and 

11 (II) shall be composed of staff 

12 who demonstrate significant experi13 ence managing exchange programs in 

14 the Indo-Pacific region. 

15 (D) CURRICULUM.— 

16 (i) FIRST YEAR.—During the first 

17 year of each fellowship under this sub18 section, each fellow should study— 

19 (I) the Mandarin Chinese lan20 guage; 

21 (II) the people, history, and polit22 ical climate on Taiwan; and 

23 (III) the issues affecting the rela24 tionship between the United States 

25 and the Indo-Pacific region. 


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1 (ii) SECOND YEAR.—During the sec2 ond year of each fellowship under this sec3 tion, each fellow, subject to the approval of 

4 the Department of State, the American In5 stitute in Taiwan, and the implementing 

6 partner, and in accordance with the pur7 poses of this Act, shall work in— 

8 (I) a parliamentary office, min9 istry, or other agency of the governing 

10 authorities on Taiwan; or 

11 (II) an organization outside of 

12 the governing authorities on Taiwan, 

13 whose interests are associated with 

14 the interests of the fellow and the 

15 agency of the United States Govern16 ment from which the fellow had been 

17 employed. 

18 (E) FLEXIBLE FELLOWSHIP DURATION.— 

19 Notwithstanding any requirement under this 

20 section, the Secretary of State, in consultation 

21 with the American Institute in Taiwan and, as 

22 appropriate, the implementing partner, may 

23 award fellowships that have a duration of be24 tween nine months and two years, and may 


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1 alter the curriculum requirements under sub2 paragraph (D) for such purposes. 

3 (F) SUNSET.—The Program shall termi4 nate ten years after the date of the enactment 

5 of this Act. 

6 (3) PROGRAM REQUIREMENTS.— 

7 (A) ELIGIBILITY REQUIREMENTS.—A 

8 United States citizen is eligible for a fellowship 

9 under this section if he or she— 

10 (i) is an employee of the United 

11 States Government; 

12 (ii) has received at least one exem13 plary performance review in his or her cur14 rent United States Government role within 

15 at least the last three years prior to the be16 ginning the fellowship; 

17 (iii) has at least two years of experi18 ence in any branch of the United States 

19 Government; 

20 (iv) has a demonstrated professional 

21 or educational background in the relation22 ship between the United States and coun23 tries in the Indo-Pacific region; and 


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1 (v) has demonstrated his or her com2 mitment to further service in the United 

3 States Government. 

4 (B) RESPONSIBILITIES OF FELLOWS.— 

5 Each recipient of a fellowship under this section 

6 shall agree, as a condition of such fellowship— 

7 (i) to maintain satisfactory progress 

8 in language training and appropriate be9 havior in Taiwan, as determined by the 

10 Department of State, the American Insti11 tute in Taiwan and, as appropriate, its im12 plementing partner; 

13 (ii) to refrain from engaging in any 

14 intelligence or intelligence-related activity 

15 on behalf of the United States Govern16 ment; and 

17 (iii) to continue Federal Government 

18 employment for a period of not less than 

19 four years after the conclusion of the fel20 lowship or for not less than two years for 

21 a fellowship that is one year or shorter. 

22 (C) RESPONSIBILITIES OF IMPLEMENTING

23 PARTNER.— 

24 (i) SELECTION OF FELLOWS.—The 

25 implementing partner, in close coordination 


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1 with the Department of State and the 

2 American Institute in Taiwan, shall— 

3 (I) make efforts to recruit fellow4 ship candidates who reflect the diver5 sity of the United States; 

6 (II) select fellows for the Pro7 gram based solely on merit, with ap8 propriate supervision from the De9 partment of State and the American 

10 Institute in Taiwan; and 

11 (III) prioritize the selection of 

12 candidates willing to serve a fellow13 ship lasting one year or longer. 

14 (ii) FIRST YEAR.—The implementing 

15 partner should provide each fellow in the 

16 first year (or shorter duration, as jointly 

17 determined by the Department of State 

18 and the American Institute in Taiwan for 

19 those who are not serving a two-year fel20 lowship) with— 

21 (I) intensive Mandarin Chinese 

22 language training; and 

23 (II) courses in the politic, cul24 ture, and history of Taiwan, China, 

25 and the broader Indo-Pacific. 


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1 (iii) WAIVER OF REQUIRED TRAIN2 ING.—The Department of State, in coordi3 nation with the American Institute in Tai4 wan and, as appropriate, the implementing 

5 partner, may waive any of the training re6 quired under clause (ii) to the extent that 

7 a fellow has Mandarin Chinese language 

8 skills, knowledge of the topic described in 

9 clause (ii)(II), or for other related reasons 

10 approved by the Department of State and 

11 the American Institute in Taiwan. If any 

12 of the training requirements are waived for 

13 a fellow serving a two-year fellowship, the 

14 training portion of his or her fellowship 

15 may be shortened to the extent appro16 priate. 

17 (iv) OFFICE; STAFFING.—The imple18 menting partner, in consultation with the 

19 Department of State and the American In20 stitute in Taiwan, shall maintain an office 

21 and at least one full-time staff member in 

22 Taiwan— 

23 (I) to liaise with the American 

24 Institute in Taiwan and the governing 

25 authorities on Taiwan; and 


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1 (II) to serve as the primary in2 country point of contact for the recipi3 ents of fellowships under this section 

4 and their dependents. 

5 (v) OTHER FUNCTIONS.—The imple6 menting partner should perform other 

7 functions in association in support of the 

8 Program, including logistical and adminis9 trative functions, as prescribed by the De10 partment of State and the American Insti11 tute in Taiwan. 

12 (D) NONCOMPLIANCE.— 

13 (i) IN GENERAL.—Any fellow who 

14 fails to comply with the requirements 

15 under this section shall reimburse the 

16 American Institute in Taiwan for— 

17 (I) the Federal funds expended 

18 for the fellow’s participation in the 

19 fellowship, as set forth in clauses (ii) 

20 and (iii); and 

21 (II) interest accrued on such 

22 funds (calculated at the prevailing 

23 rate). 

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1 paragraph (B) shall reimburse the Amer2 ican Institute in Taiwan in an amount 

3 equal to the sum of— 

4 (I) all of the Federal funds ex5 pended for the fellow’s participation 

6 in the fellowship; and 

7 (II) interest on the amount speci8 fied in subclause (I), which shall be 

9 calculated at the prevailing rate. 

10 (iii) PRO RATA REIMBURSEMENT.— 

11 Any fellow who violates subparagraph 

12 (B)(iii) shall reimburse the American Insti13 tute in Taiwan in an amount equal to the 

14 difference between— 

15 (I) the amount specified in clause 

16 (ii); and 

17 (II) the product of— 

18 (aa) the amount the fellow 

19 received in compensation during 

20 the final year of the fellowship, 

21 including the value of any allow22 ances and benefits received by 

23 the fellow; multiplied by 

24 (bb) the percentage of the 

25 period specified in subparagraph 


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1 (B)(iii) during which the fellow 

2 did not remain employed by the 

3 United States Government. 

4 (E) ANNUAL REPORT.—Not later than 90 

5 days after the selection of the first class of fel6 lows under this Act, and annually thereafter for 

7 10 years, the Department of State shall offer to 

8 brief the appropriate congressional committees 

9 regarding the following issues: 

10 (i) An assessment of the performance 

11 of the implementing partner in fulfilling 

12 the purposes of this section. 

13 (ii) The number of applicants each 

14 year, the number of applicants willing to 

15 serve a fellowship lasting one year or 

16 longer, and the number of such applicants 

17 selected for the fellowship. 

18 (iii) The names and sponsoring agen19 cies of the fellows selected by the imple20 menting partner and the extent to which 

21 such fellows represent the diversity of the 

22 United States. 

23 (iv) The names of the parliamentary 

24 offices, ministries, other agencies of the 

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1 governmental institutions to which each 

2 fellow was assigned. 

3 (v) Any recommendations, as appro4 priate, to improve the implementation of 

5 the Program, including added flexibilities 

6 in the administration of the program. 

7 (vi) An assessment of the Program’s 

8 value upon the relationship between the 

9 United States and Taiwan or the United 

10 States and Asian countries. 

11 (F) ANNUAL FINANCIAL AUDIT.— 

12 (i) IN GENERAL.—The financial 

13 records of any implementing partner shall 

14 be audited annually in accordance with 

15 generally accepted auditing standards by 

16 independent certified public accountants or 

17 independent licensed public accountants 

18 who are certified or licensed by a regu19 latory authority of a State or another po20 litical subdivision of the United States. 

21 (ii) LOCATION.—Each audit under 

22 clause (i) shall be conducted at the place 

23 or places where the financial records of the 

24 implementing partner are normally kept. 


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1 (iii) ACCESS TO DOCUMENTS.—The 

2 implementing partner shall make available 

3 to the accountants conducting an audit 

4 under clause (i)— 

5 (I) all books, financial records, 

6 files, other papers, things, and prop7 erty belonging to, or in use by, the 

8 implementing partner that are nec9 essary to facilitate the audit; and 

10 (II) full facilities for verifying 

11 transactions with the balances or se12 curities held by depositories, fiscal 

13 agents, and custodians. 

14 (iv) REPORT.— 

15 (I) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 

16 six months after the end of each fiscal 

17 year, the implementing partner shall 

18 provide a report of the audit con19 ducted for such fiscal year under 

20 clause (i) to the Department of State 

21 and the American Institute in Taiwan. 

22 (II) CONTENTS.—Each audit re23 port shall— 

24 (aa) set forth the scope of 

25 the audit; 


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1 (bb) include such state2 ments, along with the auditor’s 

3 opinion of those statements, as 

4 may be necessary to present fair5 ly the implementing partner’s as6 sets and liabilities, surplus or 

7 deficit, with reasonable detail; 

8 (cc) include a statement of 

9 the implementing partner’s in10 come and expenses during the 

11 year; and 

12 (dd) include a schedule of— 

13 (AA) all contracts and 

14 cooperative agreements re15 quiring payments greater 

16 than $5,000; and 

17 (BB) any payments of 

18 compensation, salaries, or 

19 fees at a rate greater than 

20 $5,000 per year. 

21 (III) COPIES.—Each audit report 

22 shall be produced in sufficient copies 

23 for distribution to the public. 

24 (4) TAIWAN FELLOWS ON DETAIL FROM GOV25 ERNMENT SERVICE.— 


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1 (A) IN GENERAL.— 

2 (i) DETAIL AUTHORIZED.—With the 

3 approval of the Secretary of State, an 

4 agency head may detail, for a period of not 

5 more than two years, an employee of the 

6 agency of the United States Government 

7 who has been awarded a fellowship under 

8 this Act, to the American Institute in Tai9 wan for the purpose of assignment to the 

10 governing authorities on Taiwan or an or11 ganization described in paragraph 

12 (2)(D)(ii)(II). 

13 (ii) AGREEMENT.—Each detailee shall 

14 enter into a written agreement with the 

15 Federal Government before receiving a fel16 lowship, in which the fellow shall agree— 

17 (I) to continue in the service of 

18 the sponsoring agency at the end of 

19 fellowship for a period of at least four 

20 years (or at least two years if the fel21 lowship duration is one year or short22 er) unless such detailee is involun23 tarily separated from the service of 

24 such agency; and 


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1 (II) to pay to the American Insti2 tute in Taiwan any additional ex3 penses incurred by the United States 

4 Government in connection with the 

5 fellowship if the detailee voluntarily 

6 separates from service with the spon7 soring agency before the end of the 

8 period for which the detailee has 

9 agreed to continue in the service of 

10 such agency. 

11 (iii) EXCEPTION.—The payment 

12 agreed to under clause (ii)(II) may not be 

13 required of a detailee who leaves the serv14 ice of the sponsoring agency to enter into 

15 the service of another agency of the United 

16 States Government unless the head of the 

17 sponsoring agency notifies the detailee be18 fore the effective date of entry into the 

19 service of the other agency that payment 

20 will be required under this subsection. 

21 (B) STATUS AS GOVERNMENT EM22 PLOYEE.—A detailee— 

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1 niority, and other benefits, to be an em2 ployee of the sponsoring agency; 

3 (ii) is entitled to pay, allowances, and 

4 benefits from funds available to such agen5 cy, which is deemed to comply with section 

6 5536 of title 5, United States Code; and 

7 (iii) may be assigned to a position 

8 with an entity described in paragraph 

9 (2)(D)(ii)(I) if acceptance of such position 

10 does not involve— 

11 (I) the taking of an oath of alle12 giance to another government; or 

13 (II) the acceptance of compensa14 tion or other benefits from any foreign 

15 government by such detailee. 

16 (C) RESPONSIBILITIES OF SPONSORING

17 AGENCY.— 

18 (i) IN GENERAL.—The agency of the 

19 United States Government from which a 

20 detailee is detailed should provide the fel21 low allowances and benefits that are con22 sistent with Department of State Stand23 ardized Regulations or other applicable 

24 rules and regulations, including— 


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1 (I) a living quarters allowance to 

2 cover the cost of housing in Taiwan; 

3 (II) a cost of living allowance to 

4 cover any possible higher costs of liv5 ing in Taiwan; 

6 (III) a temporary quarters sub7 sistence allowance for up to seven 

8 days if the fellow is unable to find 

9 housing immediately upon arriving in 

10 Taiwan; 

11 (IV) an education allowance to 

12 assist parents in providing the fellow’s 

13 minor children with educational serv14 ices ordinarily provided without 

15 charge by public schools in the United 

16 States; 

17 (V) moving expenses to transport 

18 personal belongings of the fellow and 

19 his or her family in their move to Tai20 wan, which is comparable to the al21 lowance given for American Institute 

22 in Taiwan employees assigned to Tai23 wan; and 

24 (VI) an economy-class airline 

25 ticket to and from Taiwan for each 


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1 fellow and the fellow’s immediate fam2 ily. 

3 (ii) MODIFICATION OF BENEFITS.— 

4 The American Institute in Taiwan and its 

5 implementing partner, with the approval of 

6 the Department of State, may modify the 

7 benefits set forth in clause (i) if such 

8 modification is warranted by fiscal cir9 cumstances. 

10 (D) NO FINANCIAL LIABILITY.—The 

11 American Institute in Taiwan, the imple12 menting partner, and any governing authorities 

13 on Taiwan or nongovernmental entities in Tai14 wan at which a fellow is detailed during the sec15 ond year of the fellowship may not be held re16 sponsible for the pay, allowances, or any other 

17 benefit normally provided to the detailee. 

18 (E) REIMBURSEMENT.—Fellows may be 

19 detailed under clause (A)(ii) without reimburse20 ment to the United States by the American In21 stitute in Taiwan. 

22 (F) ALLOWANCES AND BENEFITS.— 

23 Detailees may be paid by the American Insti24 tute in Taiwan for the allowances and benefits 

25 listed in subparagraph (C). 


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1 (5) GAO REPORT.—Not later than one year 

2 prior to the sunset of the Program pursuant to 

3 paragraph (2)(F), the Comptroller General of the 

4 United States shall transmit to the Committee on 

5 Foreign Relations of the Senate and the Committee 

6 on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives 

7 a report that includes the following: 

8 (A) An analysis of United States Govern9 ment participants in the Program, including the 

10 number of applicants and the number of fellow11 ships undertaken, the places of employment. 

12 (B) An assessment of the costs and bene13 fits for participants in the Program and for the 

14 United States Government of such fellowships. 

15 (C) An analysis of the financial impact of 

16 the fellowship on United States Government of17 fices that have detailed fellows to participate in 

18 the Program. 

19 (D) Recommendations, if any, on how to 

20 improve the Program. 

21 (6) FUNDING.— 

22 (A) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIA23 TIONS.—There are authorized to be appro24 priated to the American Institute in Taiwan— 


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1 (i) for fiscal year 2022, $2,900,000, 

2 of which $500,000 should be used by an 

3 appropriate implementing partner to 

4 launch the Program; and 

5 (ii) for fiscal year 2023, and each suc6 ceeding fiscal year, $2,400,000. 

7 (B) PRIVATE SOURCES.—The imple8 menting partner selected to implement the Pro9 gram may accept, use, and dispose of gifts or 

10 donations of services or property in carrying 

11 out such program, subject to the review and ap12 proval of the American Institute in Taiwan. 

13 SEC. 210. INCREASING DEPARTMENT OF STATE PER14 SONNEL AND RESOURCES DEVOTED TO THE 

15 INDO-PACIFIC. 

16 (a) FINDINGS.—Congress makes the following find17 ings: 

18 (1) In fiscal year 2020, the Department of 

19 State allocated $1,500,000,000 to the Indo-Pacific 

20 region in bilateral and regional foreign assistance 

21 (FA) resources, including as authorized by section 

22 201(b) of the Asia Reassurance Initiative Act of 

23 2018 (Public Law 115–409; 132 Stat. 5391), and 

24 $798,000,000 in the fiscal year 2020 diplomatic en25 gagement (DE) budget. These amounts represent 


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1 only 5 percent of the DE budget and only 4 percent 

2 of the total Department of State-USAID budget. 

3 (2) Over the last 5 years the DE budget and 

4 personnel levels in the Indo-Pacific averaged only 5 

5 percent of the total, while FA resources averaged 

6 only 4 percent of the total. 

7 (3) In 2020, the Department of State began a 

8 process to realign certain positions at posts to en9 sure that its personnel footprint matches the de10 mands of great-power competition, including in the 

11 Indo-Pacific. 

12 (b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con13 gress that— 

14 (1) the size of the United States diplomatic 

15 corps must be sufficient to meet the current and 

16 emerging challenges of the 21st century, including 

17 those in the Indo-Pacific region and elsewhere; 

18 (2) the increase must be designed to meet the 

19 objectives of an Indo-Pacific strategy focused on 

20 strengthening the good governance and sovereignty 

21 of states that adhere to and uphold the rules-based 

22 international order; and 

23 (3) the increase must be implemented with a 

24 focus on increased numbers of economic, political, 

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1 lative increase of at least 200 foreign service officer 

2 generalists, to— 

3 (A) advance free, fair, and reciprocal trade 

4 and open investment environments for United 

5 States companies, and engaged in increased 

6 commercial diplomacy in key markets; 

7 (B) better articulate and explain United 

8 States policies, strengthen civil society and 

9 democratic principles, enhance reporting on 

10 global activities, promote people-to-people ex11 changes, and advance United States influence; 

12 and 

13 (C) increase capacity at small- and me14 dium-sized embassies and consulates in the 

15 Indo-Pacific and other regions around the 

16 world, as necessary. 

17 (c) STATEMENT OF POLICY.— 

18 (1) It shall be the policy of the United States 

19 to ensure Department of State funding levels and 

20 personnel footprint in the Indo-Pacific reflect the re21 gion’s high degree of importance and significance to 

22 United States political, economic, and security inter23 ests. 

24 (2) It shall be the policy of the United States 

25 to increase DE and FA funding and the quantity of 


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1 personnel dedicated to the Indo-Pacific region re2 spective to the Department of State’s total budget. 

3 (d) ACTION PLAN.—Not later than 180 days after 

4 the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of 

5 State shall provide to the appropriate committees of Con6 gress an action plan with the following elements: 

7 (1) Identification of requirements to advance 

8 United States strategic objectives in the Indo-Pacific 

9 and the personnel and budgetary resources for the 

10 Department of State needed to meet them, assuming 

11 an unconstrained resource environment. 

12 (2) A plan to increase the portion of the De13 partment’s budget dedicated to the Indo-Pacific in 

14 terms of DE and FA focused on development, eco15 nomic, and security assistance. 

16 (3) A plan to increase the number of positions 

17 at posts in the Indo-Pacific region and bureaus with 

18 responsibility for the Indo-Pacific region, including a 

19 description of increases at each post or bureau, a 

20 breakdown of increases by cone, and a description of 

21 how such increases in personnel will advance United 

22 States strategic objectives in the Indo-Pacific region. 

23 (4) Defined concrete and annual benchmarks 

24 that the Department will meet in implementing the 

25 action plan. 


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1 (5) A description of any barriers to imple2 menting the action plan. 

3 (e) UPDATES TO REPORT AND BRIEFING.—Every 

4 180 days after the submission of the action plan described 

5 in subsection (c) for no more than 3 years, the Secretary 

6 shall submit an update and brief the appropriate commit7 tees of Congress on the implementation of such action 

8 plan, with supporting data and including a detailed assess9 ment of benchmarks reached. 

10 (f) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—There is 

11 authorized to be appropriated, for fiscal year 2022, 

12 $2,000,000,000, under titles III and IV of the Foreign 

13 Assistance Act for the Indo-Pacific region and 

14 $1,250,000,000 in diplomatic engagement resources to the 

15 Indo-Pacific region. 

16 (g) INCLUSION OF AMOUNTS APPROPRIATED PURSU17 ANT TO ASIA REASSURANCE INITIATIVE ACT OF 2018.— 

18 Amounts authorized to be appropriated under subsection 

19 (f) include funds authorized to be appropriated pursuant 

20 to section 201(b) of the Asia Reassurance Initiative Act 

21 of 2018 (Public Law 115–409). 

22 (h) SECRETARY OF STATE.—Not later than 2 years 

23 after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary 

24 of State should report on the extent to which the benchVerDate Sep 11 2014 22:42 Jun 24, 2021 Jkt 019200 PO 00000 Frm 00122 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\H3524.IH H3524

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1 marks described in the action plan in subsection (c) have 

2 been met or progress has been made. 

3 SEC. 211. DIPLOMATIC AND ECONOMIC EFFORTS TO DETER 

4 PRC USE OF FORCE AGAINST TAIWAN. 

5 (a) APPROPRIATE COMMITTEES OF CONGRESS DE6 FINED.—In this section, the term ‘‘appropriate commit7 tees of Congress’’ means— 

8 (1) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the 

9 Committee on Armed Services, and the Select Com10 mittee on Intelligence of the Senate; and 

11 (2) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the 

12 Committee on Armed Services, and the Permanent 

13 Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of 

14 Representatives. 

15 (b) STATEMENT OF POLICY.—In order to deter the 

16 use of force by the People’s Republic of China to change 

17 the status quo on Taiwan, the United States should co18 ordinate with allies and partners to identify and develop 

19 significant economic and diplomatic measures to deter and 

20 impose costs on any such action by the People’s Republic 

21 of China. 

22 SEC. 212. REPORT ON BILATERAL EFFORTS TO ADDRESS 

23 CHINESE FENTANYL TRAFFICKING. 

24 (a) CHINA’S CLASS SCHEDULING OF FENTANYL AND

25 SYNTHETIC OPIOID PRECURSORS.—Not later than 180 


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1 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Sec2 retary of State and Attorney General shall submit to the 

3 appropriate committees of Congress a written report— 

4 (1) detailing a description of United States 

5 Government efforts to gain a commitment from the 

6 Chinese Government to submit unregulated fentanyl 

7 precursors such as 4–AP to controls; and 

8 (2) detailing a plan for future steps the United 

9 States Government will take to urge China to com10 bat illicit fentanyl production and trafficking origi11 nating in China. 

12 (b) FORM OF REPORT.—The report required under 

13 subsection (c) shall be unclassified with a classified annex. 

14 SEC. 213. FACILITATION OF INCREASED EQUITY INVEST15 MENTS UNDER THE BETTER UTILIZATION OF 

16 INVESTMENTS LEADING TO DEVELOPMENT 

17 ACT OF 2018. 

18 (a) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con19 gress that support provided under section 1421(c)(1) of 

20 the Better Utilization of Investments Leading to Develop21 ment Act of 2018 (22 U.S.C. 9621(c)(1)) should be con22 sidered to be a Federal credit program that is subject to 

23 the Federal Credit Reform Act of 1990 (2 U.S.C. 661 et 

24 seq.) for purposes of applying the requirements of such 

25 Act to such support. 


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1 (b) MAXIMUM CONTINGENT LIABILITY.—Section 

2 1433 of the Better Utilization of Investments Leading to 

3 Development Act of 2018 (22 U.S.C. 9633) is amended 

4 by striking ‘‘$60,000,000,000’’ and inserting 

5 ‘‘$100,000,000,000’’. 

6 SEC. 214. EXPANDING INVESTMENT BY UNITED STATES 

7 INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT FINANCE 

8 CORPORATION FOR VACCINE MANUFAC9 TURING. 

10 (a) IN GENERAL.—The Development Finance Cor11 poration is authorized to provide financing to entities in 

12 India and in other less developed countries to increase vac13 cine manufacturing capacity for the following purposes— 

14 (1) manufacturing of Stringent Regulatory Au15 thorization (SRA) or World Health Organization 

16 (WHO) Emergency Use Listing COVID–19 vac17 cines; 

18 (2) manufacturing of SRA or WHO Emergency 

19 Use Listing therapeutics used to treat symptoms re20 lated to COVID–19; and 

21 (3) manufacturing of critical medical supplies 

22 needed for preventing, detecting and treating 

23 COVID–19, including ventilators, personal protective 

24 equipment (PPE), oxygen, diagnostics, therapeutics 

25 and vaccines. 


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1 (b) REPORTING REQUIREMENT.—Not later than 180 

2 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Chief 

3 Executive Officer of the Development Finance Corpora4 tion, in coordination with the Secretary of State, shall pro5 vide a report to the appropriate congressional commit6 tees— 

7 (1) outlining the countries where DFC financ8 ing could be most impactful for vaccine manufac9 turing and to achieve the goal of manufacturing 1 

10 billion COVID–19 vaccines by 2022; 

11 (2) a detailed explanation of the United States 

12 and partner country interests served by the United 

13 States providing support to such projects; 

14 (3) a detailed description of any support pro15 vided by other United States allies and partners to 

16 expand the initiatives outlined in subsection (a); and 

17 (4) a detailed description of any support pro18 vided by China in support of the initiatives outlined 

19 in subsection (a). 

20 (c) FORM OF REPORT.—The report required by sub21 section (a) shall be submitted in unclassified form with 

22 a classified annex if necessary. 


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1 SEC. 215. ENSURING UNITED STATES DIPLOMATIC POSTS 

2 ALIGN WITH AMERICAN STRATEGIC NA3 TIONAL SECURITY AND ECONOMIC OBJEC4 TIVES. 

5 (a) STATEMENT OF POLICY.— 

6 (1) With 276 embassies and other representa7 tive offices globally, China now has more diplomatic 

8 posts around the world than any other country, in9 cluding the United States. Many of Beijing’s new 

10 missions can be found in countries that recently 

11 broke ties with Taiwan (Burkina Faso, the Domini12 can Republic, El Salvador, the Gambia, and Sao 

13 Tome and Principe) or do not have any United 

14 States diplomatic physical presence despite these 

15 countries asking for increased United States engage16 ment and investment (Antigua and Barbuda and 

17 Dominica). 

18 (2) It is the sense of Congress, that the Depart19 ment of State conduct an assessment of all United 

20 States diplomatic posts to verify that they align with 

21 its United States national security and economic in22 terests, as well as ensuring that these locations posi23 tion the United States appropriately with its stra24 tegic competitors to advance the national interest in 

25 every country worldwide, including those countries 

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1 matic presence whether an embassy, consulate gen2 eral, or principal officer post. 

3 (b) REPORTING.—Not later than 180 days after the 

4 date of the enactment of this Act and biennially thereafter, 

5 the Secretary of State shall submit to the Committee on 

6 Foreign Relations of the Senate and the Committee on 

7 Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives a report 

8 assessing the number, location, and objectives of each of 

9 its diplomatic missions and posts worldwide, including an 

10 assessment of any gaps that exist compared to other coun11 try strategic competitors. The Secretary of State shall co12 ordinate with other Department and Agency heads having 

13 an overseas presence at any and all United States diplo14 matic missions to ensure this assessment reflects all Fed15 eral Government equities and viewpoints, and then certify 

16 in writing the findings of this assessment. 

17 SEC. 216. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS FOR THE 

18 FULBRIGHT-HAYS PROGRAM. 

19 There are authorized to be appropriated, for the 5- 

20 year period beginning on October 1, 2021, $105,500,000, 

21 to promote education, training, research, and foreign lan22 guage skills through the Fulbright-Hays Program, in ac23 cordance with section 102(b) of the Mutual Educational 

24 and Cultural Exchange Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2452(b)). 


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1 SEC. 217. SUPPORTING INDEPENDENT MEDIA AND COUN2 TERING DISINFORMATION. 

3 (a) AUTHORIZATION OF USAGM APPROPRIA4 TIONS.—There is authorized to be appropriated, for each 

5 of fiscal years 2022 through 2026 for the United States 

6 Agency for Global Media, $100,000,000 for ongoing and 

7 new programs to support local media, build independent 

8 media, combat PRC disinformation inside and outside of 

9 China, invest in technology to subvert censorship, and 

10 monitor and evaluate these programs. 

11 (b) SUPPORT FOR LOCAL MEDIA.—The Secretary of 

12 State, acting through the Assistant Secretary of State for 

13 Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor and the Adminis14 trator of the United States Agency for International De15 velopment, acting through the Assistant Administrator for 

16 Development, Democracy, and Innovation, shall support 

17 and train journalists on investigative techniques necessary 

18 to ensure public accountability, promote transparency, 

19 fight corruption, and support the ability of the public to 

20 develop informed opinions about pressing issues facing 

21 their countries. 

22 (c) INTERNET FREEDOM PROGRAMS.—The Bureau 

23 of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor shall continue 

24 to support internet freedom programs. 

25 (d) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—There is 

26 authorized to be appropriated to the Department of State 


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1 and United States Agency for International Development, 

2 for each of fiscal years 2022 through 2026, $170,000,000 

3 for ongoing and new programs in support of press free4 dom, training, and protection of journalists. Amounts ap5 propriated pursuant to this authorization are authorized 

6 to remain available until expended and shall be in addition 

7 to amounts otherwise authorized to be appropriated to 

8 support press freedom, training, and protection of journal9 ists. 

10 SEC. 218. GLOBAL ENGAGEMENT CENTER. 

11 (a) FINDING.—Congress established the Global En12 gagement Center to ‘‘direct, lead, and coordinate efforts’’ 

13 of the Federal Government to ‘‘recognize, understand, ex14 pose, and counter foreign state and non-state propaganda 

15 and disinformation globally’’. 

16 (b) EXTENSION.—Section 1287(j) of the National 

17 Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017 (22 

18 U.S.C. 2656 note) is amended by striking ‘‘the date that 

19 is 8 years after the date of the enactment of this Act’’ 

20 and inserting ‘‘December 31, 2027’’. 

21 (c) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con22 gress that the Global Engagement Center should expand 

23 its coordinating capacity of diplomatic messaging through 

24 the exchange of liaison officers with Federal departments 

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1 tering foreign disinformation, including the Office of the 

2 Director of National Intelligence and Special Operations 

3 Command’s Joint MISO Web Operations Center. 

4 (d) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—There is 

5 authorized to be appropriated $150,000,000 for fiscal year 

6 2022 for the Global Engagement Center to counter foreign 

7 state and non-state sponsored propaganda and 

8 disinformation. 

9 Subtitle B—International Security 

10 Matters 

11 SEC. 221. DEFINITIONS. 

12 In this subtitle: 

13 (1) APPROPRIATE COMMITTEES OF CON14 GRESS.—The term ‘‘appropriate committees of Con15 gress’’ means— 

16 (A) the Committee on Foreign Relations, 

17 the Committee on Armed Services, and the 

18 Committee on Appropriations of the Senate; 

19 and 

20 (B) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the 

21 Committee on Armed Services, and the Com22 mittee on Appropriations of the House of Rep23 resentatives. 

24 (2) COMPANY.—The term ‘‘company’’ means 

25 any corporation, company, limited liability company, 


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1 limited partnership, business trust, business associa2 tion, or other similar entity. 

3 (3) OTHER SECURITY FORCES.—The term 

4 ‘‘other security forces’’— 

5 (A) includes national security forces that 

6 conduct maritime security; and 

7 (B) does not include self-described militias 

8 or paramilitary organizations. 

9 SEC. 222. ADDITIONAL FUNDING FOR INTERNATIONAL 

10 MILITARY EDUCATION AND TRAINING IN THE 

11 INDO-PACIFIC. 

12 There is authorized to be appropriated for each of 

13 fiscal years 2022 through fiscal year 2026 for the Depart14 ment of State, out of amounts appropriated or otherwise 

15 made available for assistance under chapter 5 of part II 

16 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2347 

17 et seq.) (relating to international military education and 

18 training (IMET) assistance), $45,000,000 for activities in 

19 the Indo-Pacific region in accordance with this Act. 

20 SEC. 223. STATEMENT OF POLICY ON MARITIME FREEDOM 

21 OF OPERATIONS IN INTERNATIONAL WATER22 WAYS AND AIRSPACE OF THE INDO-PACIFIC 

23 AND ON ARTIFICIAL LAND FEATURES IN THE 

24 SOUTH CHINA SEA. 

25 (a) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—Congress— 


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1 (1) condemns coercive and threatening actions 

2 or the use of force to impede freedom of navigation 

3 operations in international airspace by military or ci4 vilian aircraft, to alter the status quo, or to desta5 bilize the Indo-Pacific region; 

6 (2) urges the Government of the People’s Re7 public of China to refrain from implementing the de8 clared East China Sea Air Defense Identification 

9 Zone (ADIZ), or an ADIZ in the South China Sea, 

10 where contrary to freedom of overflight in inter11 national airspace, and to refrain from taking similar 

12 provocative actions elsewhere in the Indo-Pacific re13 gion; 

14 (3) reaffirms that the 2016 Permanent Court 

15 of Arbitration decision is final and legally binding on 

16 both parties and that the People’s Republic of Chi17 na’s claims to offshore resources across most of the 

18 South China Sea are unlawful; and 

19 (4) condemns the People’s Republic of China 

20 for failing to abide by the 2016 Permanent Court of 

21 Arbitration ruling, despite the PRC’s obligations as 

22 a state party to the United Nations Convention on 

23 the Law of the Sea. 

24 (b) STATEMENT OF POLICY.—It shall be the policy 

25 of the United States to— 


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1 (1) reaffirm its commitment and support for al2 lies and partners in the Indo-Pacific region, includ3 ing to the mutual defense treaties with Indo-Pacific 

4 allies as referenced elsewhere in this Act; 

5 (2) oppose claims that impinge on the rights, 

6 freedoms, and lawful use of the sea, or the airspace 

7 above it, that are available to all nations, and oppose 

8 the militarization of new and reclaimed land features 

9 in the South China Sea; 

10 (3) continue certain policies with respect to the 

11 PRC claims in the South China Sea, namely— 

12 (A) that PRC claims in the South China 

13 Sea, including to offshore resources across most 

14 of the South China Sea, are unlawful; 

15 (B) that the PRC cannot lawfully assert a 

16 maritime claim vis-a`-vis the Philippines in areas 

17 that the Permanent Court of Arbitration found 

18 to be in the Philippines’ Exclusive Economic 

19 Zone (EEZ) or on its continental shelf; 

20 (C) to reject any PRC claim to waters be21 yond a 12 nautical mile territorial sea derived 

22 from islands it claims in the Spratly Islands; 

23 and 

24 (D) that the PRC has no lawful territorial 

25 or maritime claim to James Shoal; 


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1 (4) urge all parties to refrain from engaging in 

2 destabilizing activities, including environmentally 

3 harmful and provocative land reclamation; 

4 (5) ensure that disputes are managed without 

5 intimidation, coercion, or force; 

6 (6) call on all claimants to clarify or adjust 

7 claims in accordance with international law; 

8 (7) uphold the principle that territorial and 

9 maritime claims, including territorial waters or terri10 torial seas, must derive from land features and oth11 erwise comport with international law; 

12 (8) oppose the imposition of new fishing regula13 tions covering disputed areas in the South China 

14 Sea, regulations which have raised tensions in the 

15 region; 

16 (9) support an effective Code of Conduct, if 

17 that Code of Conduct reflects the interests of South18 east Asian claimant states and does not serve as a 

19 vehicle for the People’s Republic of China to advance 

20 its unlawful maritime claims; 

21 (10) reaffirm that an existing body of inter22 national rules and guidelines, including the Inter23 national Regulations for Preventing Collisions at 

24 Sea, done at London October 12, 1972 (COLREGs), 

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1 tween the United States Armed Forces and the 

2 forces of other countries, including the People’s Re3 public of China; 

4 (11) support the development of regional insti5 tutions and bodies, including the ASEAN Regional 

6 Forum, the ASEAN Defense Minister’s Meeting 

7 Plus, the East Asia Summit, and the expanded 

8 ASEAN Maritime Forum, to build practical coopera9 tion in the region and reinforce the role of inter10 national law; 

11 (12) encourage the deepening of partnerships 

12 with other countries in the region for maritime do13 main awareness and capacity building, as well as ef14 forts by the United States Government to explore 

15 the development of appropriate multilateral mecha16 nisms for a ‘‘common operating picture’’ in the 

17 South China Sea among Southeast Asian countries 

18 that would serve to help countries avoid destabilizing 

19 behavior and deter risky and dangerous activities; 

20 (13) oppose actions by any country to prevent 

21 any other country from exercising its sovereign 

22 rights to the resources of the exclusive economic 

23 zone (EEZ) and continental shelf by making claims 

24 to those areas in the South China Sea that have no 

25 support in international law; and 


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1 (14) assure the continuity of operations by the 

2 United States in the Indo-Pacific region, including, 

3 when appropriate, in cooperation with partners and 

4 allies, to reaffirm freedom of navigation and over5 flight and other lawful uses of the sea. 

6 SEC. 224. REPORT ON CAPABILITY DEVELOPMENT OF INDO7 PACIFIC ALLIES AND PARTNERS. 

8 (a) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con9 gress that— 

10 (1) the Secretary of State should expand and 

11 strengthen existing measures under the United 

12 States Conventional Arms Transfer Policy to provide 

13 capabilities to allies and partners consistent with 

14 agreed-on division of responsibility for alliance roles, 

15 missions and capabilities, prioritizing allies and part16 ners in the Indo-Pacific region in accordance with 

17 United States strategic imperatives; 

18 (2) the United States should design for export 

19 to Indo-Pacific allies and partners capabilities crit20 ical to maintaining a favorable military balance in 

21 the region, including long-range precision fires, air 

22 and missile defense systems, anti-ship cruise mis23 siles, land attack cruise missiles, conventional 

24 hypersonic systems, intelligence, surveillance, and re25 connaissance capabilities, and command and control 


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1 systems consistent with law, regulation, policy, and 

2 international commitments; 

3 (3) the United States should pursue, to the 

4 maximum extent possible, anticipatory technology 

5 security and foreign disclosure policy on the systems 

6 described in paragraph (2); and 

7 (4) the Secretary of State, in coordination with 

8 the Secretary of Defense, should— 

9 (A) urge allies and partners to invest in 

10 sufficient quantities of munitions to meet con11 tingency requirements and avoid the need for 

12 accessing United States stocks in wartime; and 

13 (B) cooperate with allies to deliver such 

14 munitions, or when necessary, to increase allies’ 

15 capacity to produce such munitions. 

16 (b) APPROPRIATE COMMITTEES OF CONGRESS.—In 

17 this section, the term ‘‘appropriate committees of Con18 gress’’ means— 

19 (1) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the 

20 Committee on Armed Services, and the Committee 

21 on Appropriations of the Senate; and 

22 (2) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the 

23 Committee on Armed Services, and the Committee 

24 on Appropriations of the House of Representatives. 

25 (c) REPORT.— 


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1 (1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 90 days after 

2 the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary 

3 of State, with the concurrence of the Secretary of 

4 Defense, shall submit to the appropriate committees 

5 of Congress a report that describes United States 

6 priorities for building more capable security partners 

7 in the Indo-Pacific region. 

8 (2) MATTERS TO BE INCLUDED.—The report 

9 required under paragraph (1) shall— 

10 (A) provide a priority list of defense and 

11 military capabilities that Indo-Pacific allies and 

12 partners must possess for the United States to 

13 be able to achieve its military objectives in the 

14 Indo-Pacific region; 

15 (B) identify, from the list referred to in 

16 subparagraph (A), the capabilities that are best 

17 provided, or can only be provided, by the 

18 United States; 

19 (C) identify— 

20 (i) actions required to expedite field21 ing the capabilities identified in subpara22 graph (B); and 

23 (ii) steps needed to fully account for 

24 and a plan to integrate all means of 

25 United States foreign military sales, direct 


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1 commercial sales, security assistance, and 

2 all applicable authorities of the Depart3 ment of State and the Department of De4 fense; 

5 (D) assess the requirements for United 

6 States security assistance, including Inter7 national Military Education and Training, in 

8 the Indo-Pacific region, as a part of the means 

9 to deliver critical partner capability require10 ments identified in subparagraph (B); 

11 (E) assess the resources necessary to meet 

12 the requirements for United States security as13 sistance, and identify resource gaps; 

14 (F) assess the major obstacles to fulfilling 

15 requirements for United States security assist16 ance in the Indo-Pacific region, including re17 sources and personnel limits, foreign legislative 

18 and policy barriers, and factors related to spe19 cific partner countries; 

20 (G) identify limitations on the ability of 

21 the United States to provide such capabilities, 

22 including those identified under subparagraph 

23 (B), because of existing United States treaty 

24 obligations, United States policies, or other reg25 ulations; 


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1 (H) recommend improvements to the proc2 ess for developing requirements for United 

3 States partner capabilities; and 

4 (I) identify required jointly agreed rec5 ommendations for infrastructure and posture, 

6 based on any ongoing mutual dialogues. 

7 (3) FORM.—The report required under this 

8 subsection shall be unclassified, but may include a 

9 classified annex. 

10 Subtitle C—Multilateral Strategies 

11 to Bolster American Power 

12 SEC. 231. FINDINGS ON MULTILATERAL ENGAGEMENT. 

13 Congress finds the following: 

14 (1) Every UN member state is legally required 

15 to finance the UN’s core budget in order to ensure 

16 that these missions are properly resourced, and as17 sessment rates are renegotiated every three years by 

18 the UN General Assembly. 

19 (2) While the United States is the largest single 

20 financial contributor to the UN system, the current 

21 model is beneficial because it requires all UN mem22 ber states, no matter how big or small, to help 

23 shoulder the UN’s regular and peacekeeping budgets 

24 at specified levels. 


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1 (3) Failing to meet our financial commitments 

2 to the UN also empowers the PRC, which has raised 

3 our annual shortfalls to claim we are not a reliable 

4 partner and is seeking to leverage its own contribu5 tions to the regular budget and peacekeeping in 

6 ways that run counter to United States interests and 

7 values. 

8 (4) The People’s Republic of China is now the 

9 second largest financial contributor to UN peace10 keeping, having gone from an assessment rate of 

11 just 3 percent in 2008 to more than 15 percent 

12 today, and is the ninth largest troop-contributor to 

13 UN missions, providing more personnel than the 

14 other four permanent members of the Security 

15 Council combined. 

16 (5) With greater engagement comes greater in17 fluence, and PRC diplomats have sought to use their 

18 expanded clout to push back against the human 

19 rights, civilian protection, and gender-based violence 

20 aspects of UN peacekeeping mandates, using United 

21 States funding shortfalls as a pretext. 

22 (6) The PRC has also used its growing clout to 

23 fill key posts at UN agencies: Chinese nationals cur24 rently occupy the top posts of four of the UN’s 15 


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1 specialized agencies, while the United States occu2 pies only one. 

3 (7) From 2021 to 2022, there will be 15 elec4 tions for the heads of UN specialized agencies and 

5 five for major UN funds and programs. With the ex6 ception of the World Food Programme, none are 

7 currently led by Americans. 

8 (8) A 2020 Department of State Inspector Gen9 eral Inspection found that the Bureau for Inter10 national Organizations did not have a standard oper11 ating procedure for tracking and promoting the em12 ployment of American Citizens in the UN system, 

13 and their recommendation to the department to es14 tablish one remains open. 

15 SEC. 232. STATEMENT OF POLICY ON AMERICA’S MULTI16 LATERAL ENGAGEMENT. 

17 It is the policy of the United States that— 

18 (1) the Special Representative of the United 

19 States to the United Nations serves as a standing 

20 member of the cabinet; 

21 (2) assessed dues to multilateral organizations 

22 be paid in full in a timely fashion; 

23 (3) Federal agencies utilize all the authorities 

24 under section 3343 of title 5, United States Code, 

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1 tions: Detail and Transfer of Federal Employees to 

2 International Organizations to detail or transfer em3 ployees to relevant international organizations; 

4 (4) the Secretary of State shall assist the De5 partment of State and other Federal agencies in car6 rying out paragraph (3) to the fullest extent; 

7 (5) the Secretary of State shall support quali8 fied American candidates in their bid to win election 

9 to UN-related leadership positions; and 

10 (6) the Secretary of State shall support the 

11 placement of Junior Professional Officers (JPOs) 

12 sponsored by the United States in UN-affiliated 

13 agencies. 

14 SEC. 233. SUPPORT FOR AMERICANS AT THE UNITED NA15 TIONS. 

16 (a) ESTABLISHMENT.—The Secretary of State is au17 thorized to establish within the Department of State’s Bu18 reau of International Organization Affairs (IO) an Office 

19 for American Citizens. 

20 (b) DUTIES.—The office established under subsection 

21 (a) of this section will be responsible for— 

22 (1) advocating for the employment of American 

23 citizens by all international organizations of which 

24 the United States is a member, including the United 


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1 Nations and any of its agencies, offices, and other 

2 affiliated entities; 

3 (2) coordinating the interagency support of 

4 non-American candidates for leadership roles within 

5 all international organizations of which the United 

6 States is a member, including the United Nations 

7 and any of its agencies, offices, and other affiliated 

8 entities, when— 

9 (A) no American candidate has been nomi10 nated for election; and 

11 (B) it is determined that providing such 

12 support is in the interest of the United States; 

13 (3) establishing and implementing a standard 

14 operating procedure for the promotion and efficient 

15 tracking of United States citizen employment at the 

16 United Nations and other international organiza17 tions that includes Mission Geneva; 

18 (4) monitoring the pipeline of United Nations 

19 jobs and identifying qualified Americans and other 

20 qualified nationals to promote for these positions; 

21 (5) tracking leadership changes in United Na22 tions secretariat, funds, programs, and agencies, and 

23 developing strategies to ensure that coalitions of 

24 likeminded states are assembled to ensure leadership 


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1 races are not won by countries that do not share 

2 United States interests; 

3 (6) eliminating current barriers to the employ4 ment of United States nationals in the United Na5 tions Secretariat, funds, programs, and agencies; 

6 and 

7 (7) increasing the number of qualified United 

8 States candidates for leadership and oversight posi9 tions at the United Nations Secretariat, funds, pro10 grams, agencies, and at other international organiza11 tions. 

12 SEC. 234. REPORT ON AMERICAN EMPLOYMENT IN INTER13 NATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS. 

14 (a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days after the 

15 date of the enactment of this Act and annually thereafter, 

16 the Secretary of State, in consultation with the heads of 

17 other Federal departments and agencies as appropriate, 

18 shall develop and submit to the appropriate congressional 

19 committees a report on how many Federal employees are 

20 currently detailed or transferred to an international orga21 nization during the immediately preceding 12-month pe22 riod and a one-time strategy for increasing the number 

23 of Federal employees so detailed or transferred. 

24 (b) MATTERS TO BE INCLUDED.—Each report re25 quired by subsection (a) shall include the following: 


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1 (1) The number of Federal employees detailed 

2 or transferred to an international organization under 

3 section 3343 of title 5, United States Code, and sub4 part C of title 5, Code of Federal Regulations: De5 tail and Transfer of Federal Employees to Inter6 national Organizations, and— 

7 (A) an identification of the Federal agency 

8 from which such employees were detailed or 

9 transferred; and 

10 (B) an identification of the international 

11 organizations to and from which such employ12 ees have been detailed or transferred. 

13 (2) A list of international organizations to and 

14 from which the United States previously detailed or 

15 transferred Federal employees. 

16 (c) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES DE17 FINED.—In this section, the term ‘‘appropriate congres18 sional committees’’ means— 

19 (1) The Committee on Foreign Affairs of the 

20 House of Representatives; and 

21 (2) The Committee on Foreign Relations of the 

22 Senate. 


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1 Subtitle D—Regional Strategies To 

2 Bolster American Power 

3 SEC. 241. STATEMENT OF POLICY ON COOPERATION WITH 

4 ALLIES AND PARTNERS AROUND THE WORLD. 

5 It is the policy of the United States— 

6 (1) to strengthen alliances and partnerships 

7 with like-minded countries around the globe; and 

8 (2) to work in collaboration with such allies and 

9 partners— 

10 (A) to address significant diplomatic, eco11 nomic, and military challenges posed by the 

12 People’s Republic of China; 

13 (B) to deter the People’s Republic of 

14 China from pursuing military aggression; 

15 (C) to promote the peaceful resolution of 

16 territorial disputes in accordance with inter17 national law; 

18 (D) to promote private sector-led long-term 

19 economic development while countering efforts 

20 by the Government of the People’s Republic of 

21 China to leverage predatory economic practices 

22 as a means of political and economic coercion in 

23 the Indo-Pacific region and beyond; 

24 (E) to promote the values of democracy 

25 and human rights, including through efforts to 


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1 end the repression by the People’s Republic of 

2 China of political dissidents, Uyghurs and other 

3 Muslim minorities, Tibetan Buddhists, Chris4 tians, and other ethnic minorities; 

5 (F) to respond to the crackdown by the 

6 People’s Republic of China, in contravention of 

7 the commitments made under the Sino-British 

8 Joint Declaration of 1984 and the Basic Law 

9 of Hong Kong, on the legitimate aspirations of 

10 the people of Hong Kong; and 

11 (G) to counter the Chinese Government’s 

12 efforts to spread disinformation in China and 

13 beyond with respect to its response to COVID– 

14 19. 

15 PART I—WESTERN HEMISPHERE 

16 SEC. 242. SENSE OF CONGRESS REGARDING UNITED 

17 STATES-CANADA RELATIONS. 

18 It is the sense of Congress that— 

19 (1) the United States and Canada have a 

20 unique relationship based on shared geography, ex21 tensive personal connections, deep economic ties, 

22 mutual defense commitments, and a shared vision to 

23 uphold democracy, human rights, and the rules 

24 based international order established after World 

25 War II; 


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1 (2) the United States and Canada can better 

2 address the People’s Republic of China’s economic, 

3 political, and security influence through closer co4 operation on counternarcotics, environmental stew5 ardship, transparent practices in public procurement 

6 and infrastructure planning, the Arctic, energy and 

7 connectivity issues, trade and commercial relations, 

8 bilateral legal matters, and support for democracy, 

9 good governance, and human rights; 

10 (3) amidst the COVID–19 pandemic, the 

11 United States and Canada should maintain joint ini12 tiatives to address border management, commercial 

13 and trade relations and infrastructure, a shared ap14 proach with respect to the People’s Republic of 

15 China, and transnational challenges, including 

16 pandemics, energy security, and environmental stew17 ardship; 

18 (4) the United States and Canada should en19 hance cooperation to counter Chinese disinformation, 

20 influence operations, economic espionage, and propa21 ganda efforts; 

22 (5) the People’s Republic of China’s infrastruc23 ture investments, particularly in 5G telecommuni24 cations technology, extraction of natural resources, 


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1 and port infrastructure, pose national security risks 

2 for the United States and Canada; 

3 (6) the United States should share, as appro4 priate, intelligence gathered regarding— 

5 (A) Huawei’s 5G capabilities; and 

6 (B) the PRC government’s intentions with 

7 respect to 5G expansion; 

8 (7) the United States and Canada should con9 tinue to advance collaborative initiatives to imple10 ment the January 9, 2020, United States-Canada 

11 Joint Action Plan on Critical Minerals Development 

12 Collaboration; and 

13 (8) the United States and Canada must 

14 prioritize cooperation on continental defense and in 

15 the Arctic, including by modernizing the North 

16 American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) 

17 sensor architecture to provide effective warning and 

18 tracking of threats by peer competitors, including 

19 long-range missiles and high-precision weapons, to 

20 the Northern Hemisphere. 

21 SEC. 243. SENSE OF CONGRESS REGARDING THE GOVERN22 MENT OF CHINA’S ARBITRARY IMPRISON23 MENT OF CANADIAN CITIZENS. 

24 It is the sense of Congress that— 


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1 (1) the Government of the People’s Republic of 

2 China’s apparent arbitrary detention and abusive 

3 treatment of Canadian nationals Michael Spavor and 

4 Michael Kovrig in apparent retaliation for the Gov5 ernment of Canada’s arrest of Meng Wanzhou is 

6 deeply concerning; 

7 (2) the Government of Canada has shown inter8 national leadership by— 

9 (A) upholding the rule of law and com10 plying with its international legal obligations, 

11 including those pursuant to the Extradition 

12 Treaty Between the United States of America 

13 and Canada, signed at Washington December 

14 3, 1971; and 

15 (B) launching the Declaration Against Ar16 bitrary Detention in State-to-State Relations, 

17 which has been endorsed by 57 countries and 

18 the European Union, and reaffirms well-estab19 lished prohibitions under international human 

20 rights conventions against the arbitrary deten21 tion of foreign nationals to be used as leverage 

22 in state-to-state relations; and 

23 (3) the United States continues to join the Gov24 ernment of Canada in calling for the immediate re25 lease of Michael Spavor and Michael Kovrig and for 


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1 due process for Canadian national Robert 

2 Schellenberg. 

3 SEC. 244. STRATEGY TO ENHANCE COOPERATION WITH 

4 CANADA. 

5 (a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days after the 

6 date of the enactment of this Act, the President should 

7 submit a strategy to the appropriate congressional com8 mittees, and the Committees on Armed Services of the 

9 Senate and the House of Representatives, that describes 

10 how the United States will enhance cooperation with the 

11 Government of Canada in managing relations with the 

12 PRC government. 

13 (b) ELEMENTS.—The strategy required under sub14 section (a) shall— 

15 (1) identify key policy points of convergence 

16 and divergence between the United States and Can17 ada in managing relations with the People’s Repub18 lic of China in the areas of technology, trade, eco19 nomic practices, cyber security, secure supply chains 

20 and critical minerals, and illicit narcotics; 

21 (2) include a description of United States devel22 opment and coordination efforts with Canadian 

23 counterparts to enhance the cooperation between the 

24 United States and Canada with respect to— 


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1 (A) managing economic relations with the 

2 People’s Republic of China; 

3 (B) democracy and human rights in the 

4 People’s Republic of China; 

5 (C) technology issues involving the Peo6 ple’s Republic of China; 

7 (D) defense issues involving the People’s 

8 Republic of China; and 

9 (E) international law enforcement and 

10 transnational organized crime issues. 

11 (3) detail diplomatic efforts and future plans to 

12 work with Canada to counter the PRC’s projection 

13 of an authoritarian governing model around the 

14 world; 

15 (4) detail diplomatic, defense, and intelligence 

16 cooperation to date and future plans to support Ca17 nadian efforts to identify cost-effective alternatives 

18 to Huawei’s 5G technology; 

19 (5) detail diplomatic and defense collabora20 tion— 

21 (A) to advance joint United States-Cana22 dian priorities for responsible stewardship in 

23 the Arctic Region; and 


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1 (B) to counter the PRC’s efforts to project 

2 political, economic, and military influence into 

3 the Arctic Region; and 

4 (6) detail diplomatic efforts to work with Can5 ada to track and counter the PRC’s attempts to 

6 exert influence across the multilateral system. 

7 (c) FORM.—The strategy required under this section 

8 shall be submitted in an unclassified form that can be 

9 made available to the public, but may include a classified 

10 annex, if necessary. 

11 (d) CONSULTATION.—Not later than 90 days after 

12 the date of the enactment of this Act, and not less fre13 quently than every 180 days thereafter for 5 years, the 

14 Secretary of State shall consult with the appropriate con15 gressional committees, and the Committees on Armed 

16 Services of the Senate and the House of Representatives, 

17 regarding the development and implementation of the 

18 strategy required under this section. 

19 SEC. 245. STRATEGY TO STRENGTHEN ECONOMIC COM20 PETITIVENESS, GOVERNANCE, HUMAN 

21 RIGHTS, AND THE RULE OF LAW IN LATIN 

22 AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN. 

23 (a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days after the 

24 date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, 

25 in consultation, as appropriate, with the Secretary of the 


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1 Treasury, the Secretary of Commerce, the Administrator 

2 of USAID, the Attorney General, the United States Trade 

3 Representative, and the Chief Executive Officer of the 

4 United States International Development Finance Cor5 poration, shall submit a multi-year strategy for increasing 

6 United States economic competitiveness and promoting 

7 good governance, human rights, and the rule of law in 

8 Latin American and Caribbean countries, particularly in 

9 the areas of investment, equitable, inclusive, and sustain10 able development, commercial relations, anti-corruption 

11 activities, and infrastructure projects, to— 

12 (1) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the 

13 Senate; 

14 (2) the Committee on Finance of the Senate; 

15 (3) the Committee on Appropriations of the 

16 Senate; 

17 (4) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the 

18 House of Representatives; 

19 (5) the Committee on Ways and Means of the 

20 House of Representatives; and 

21 (6) the Committee on Appropriations of the 

22 House of Representatives. 

23 (b) ADDITIONAL ELEMENTS.—The strategy required 

24 under subsection (a) shall include a plan of action, includ25 ing benchmarks to achieve measurable progress, to— 


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1 (1) enhance the technical capacity of countries 

2 in the region to advance the sustainable and inclu3 sive development of equitable economies; 

4 (2) reduce trade and non-tariff barriers between 

5 the countries of the Americas; 

6 (3) facilitate a more open, transparent, and 

7 competitive environment for United States busi8 nesses in the region; 

9 (4) establish frameworks or mechanisms to re10 view long term financial sustainability and security 

11 implications of foreign investments in strategic sec12 tors or services, including transportation, commu13 nications, natural resources, and energy; 

14 (5) establish competitive, transparent, and in15 clusive infrastructure project selection and procure16 ment processes that promote transparency, supplier 

17 diversity, open competition, financial sustainability, 

18 adherence to robust global standards, and the em19 ployment of a diverse local workforce and manage20 ment; 

21 (6) strengthen legal structures critical to robust 

22 democratic governance, fair competition, combatting 

23 corruption, and ending impunity; and 


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1 (7) enhance transparent, affordable, and equi2 table access to the internet and digital infrastructure 

3 in the Western Hemisphere. 

4 (c) BRIEFING REQUIREMENT.—Not later than 1 year 

5 after the date of the enactment of this Act, and annually 

6 thereafter for 5 years, the Secretary of State, after con7 sultation with the Secretary of the Treasury, the Secretary 

8 of Commerce, the Attorney General, the United States 

9 Trade Representative, and the leadership of the United 

10 States International Development Finance Corporation, 

11 shall brief the congressional committees listed in sub12 section (a) regarding the implementation of this part, in13 cluding examples of successes and challenges. 

14 SEC. 246. ENGAGEMENT IN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZA15 TIONS AND THE DEFENSE SECTOR IN LATIN 

16 AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN. 

17 (a) APPROPRIATE COMMITTEES OF CONGRESS DE18 FINED.—In this section, the term ‘‘appropriate commit19 tees of Congress’’ means— 

20 (1) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the 

21 Senate; 

22 (2) the Select Committee on Intelligence of the 

23 Senate; 

24 (3) the Committee on Armed Services of the 

25 Senate; 


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1 (4) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the 

2 House of Representatives; 

3 (5) the Permanent Select Committee on Intel4 ligence of the House of Representatives; and 

5 (6) the Committee on Armed Services of the 

6 House of Representatives. 

7 (b) REPORTING REQUIREMENT.— 

8 (1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 90 days after 

9 the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary 

10 of State, in coordination with the Director of Na11 tional Intelligence, the Director of the Central Intel12 ligence Agency, and the Defense Intelligence Agency, 

13 shall submit a report to the appropriate congres14 sional committees that assesses the nature, intent, 

15 and impact to United States strategic interests of 

16 Chinese diplomatic activity aimed at influencing the 

17 decisions, procedures, and programs of multilateral 

18 organizations in Latin America and the Caribbean, 

19 including the World Bank, International Monetary 

20 Fund, Organization of American States, and the 

21 Inter-American Development Bank. 

22 (2) DEFENSE SECTOR.—The report required 

23 under paragraph (1) shall include an assessment of 

24 the nature, intent, and impact on United States 

25 strategic interests of Chinese military activity in 


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1 Latin America and the Caribbean, including military 

2 education and training programs, weapons sales, and 

3 space-related activities in the military or civilian 

4 spheres, such as— 

5 (A) the satellite and space control station 

6 the People’s Republic of China constructed in 

7 Argentina; and 

8 (B) defense and security cooperation car9 ried out by the People’s Republic of China in 

10 Latin America and the Caribbean, including 

11 sales of surveillance and monitoring technology 

12 to governments in the region such as Venezuela, 

13 Cuba, Ecuador, and Colombia, and the poten14 tial use of such technologies as tools of Chinese 

15 intelligence services. 

16 (3) FORM.—The report required under para17 graph (1) shall be submitted in unclassified form 

18 and shall include classified annexes. 

19 SEC. 247. DEFENSE COOPERATION IN LATIN AMERICA AND 

20 THE CARIBBEAN. 

21 (a) IN GENERAL.—There is authorized to be appro22 priated to the Department of State $13,500,000 for the 

23 International Military Education and Training Program 

24 for Latin America and the Caribbean for each of fiscal 

25 years 2022 through 2026. 


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1 (b) MODERNIZATION.—The Secretary of State shall 

2 take steps to modernize and strengthen the programs re3 ceiving funding under subsection (a) to ensure that such 

4 programs are vigorous, substantive, and the preeminent 

5 choice for international military education and training for 

6 Latin American and Caribbean partners. 

7 (c) REQUIRED ELEMENTS.—The programs referred 

8 to in subsection (a) shall— 

9 (1) provide training and capacity-building op10 portunities to Latin American and Caribbean secu11 rity services; 

12 (2) provide practical skills and frameworks 

13 for— 

14 (A) improving the functioning and organi15 zation of security services in Latin America and 

16 the Caribbean; 

17 (B) creating a better understanding of the 

18 United States and its values; and 

19 (C) using technology for maximum effi20 ciency and organization; and 

21 (3) promote and ensure that security services in 

22 Latin America and the Caribbean respect civilian 

23 authority and operate in compliance with inter24 national norms, standards, and rules of engagement, 


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1 including a respect for human rights, and full com2 pliance with Leahy Law requirements. 

3 (d) LIMITATION.—Security assistance under this sec4 tion is subject to limitations as enshrined in the require5 ments of section 620M of the Foreign Assistance Act of 

6 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2378d). 

7 SEC. 248. ENGAGEMENT WITH CIVIL SOCIETY IN LATIN 

8 AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN REGARDING 

9 ACCOUNTABILITY, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND THE 

10 RISKS OF PERVASIVE SURVEILLANCE TECH11 NOLOGIES. 

12 (a) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con13 gress that— 

14 (1) the Government of the People’s Republic of 

15 China is exporting its model for internal security 

16 and state control of society through advanced tech17 nology and artificial intelligence; and 

18 (2) the inclusion of communication networks 

19 and communications supply chains with equipment 

20 and services from companies with close ties to or 

21 that are susceptible to pressure from governments or 

22 security services without reliable legal checks on gov23 ernmental powers can lead to breaches of citizens’ 

24 private information, increased censorship, violations 


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1 of human rights, and harassment of political oppo2 nents. 

3 (b) DIPLOMATIC ENGAGEMENT.—The Secretary of 

4 State shall conduct diplomatic engagement with govern5 ments and civil society organizations in Latin America and 

6 the Caribbean to— 

7 (1) help identify and mitigate the risks to civil 

8 liberties posed by technologies and services described 

9 in subsection (a); and 

10 (2) offer recommendations on ways to mitigate 

11 such risks. 

12 (c) INTERNET FREEDOM PROGRAMS.—The Chief Ex13 ecutive Officer of the United States Agency for Global 

14 Media, who may work through the Open Technology 

15 Fund, and the Secretary of State, working through the 

16 Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor’s Inter17 net Freedom and Business and Human Rights Section, 

18 shall expand and prioritize efforts to provide anti-censor19 ship technology and services to journalists in Latin Amer20 ica and the Caribbean, in order to enhance their ability 

21 to safely access or share digital news and information. 

22 (d) SUPPORT FOR CIVIL SOCIETY.—The Secretary of 

23 State, in coordination with the Administrator of the 

24 United States Agency for International Development, shall 

25 work through nongovernmental organizations to— 


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1 (1) support and promote programs that support 

2 internet freedom and the free flow of information 

3 online in Latin America and the Caribbean; 

4 (2) protect open, interoperable, secure, and reli5 able access to internet in Latin America and the 

6 Caribbean; 

7 (3) provide integrated support to civil society 

8 for technology, digital safety, policy and advocacy, 

9 and applied research programs in Latin America 

10 and the Caribbean; 

11 (4) train journalists and civil society leaders in 

12 Latin America and the Caribbean on investigative 

13 techniques necessary to ensure public accountability 

14 and prevent government overreach in the digital 

15 sphere; 

16 (5) assist independent media outlets and jour17 nalists in Latin America and the Caribbean to build 

18 their own capacity and develop high-impact, in-depth 

19 news reports covering governance and human rights 

20 topics; 

21 (6) provide training for journalists and civil so22 ciety leaders on investigative techniques necessary to 

23 improve transparency and accountability in govern24 ment and the private sector; 


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1 (7) provide training on investigative reporting 

2 of incidents of corruption and unfair trade, business 

3 and commercial practices; 

4 (8) assist nongovernmental organizations to 

5 strengthen their capacity to monitor the activities 

6 described in paragraph (7); and 

7 (9) identify local resources to support the pre8 ponderance of activities that would be carried out 

9 under this subsection. 

10 SEC. 249. CARIBBEAN ENERGY INITIATIVE AS ALTER11 NATIVE TO CHINA’S BELT AND ROAD INITIA12 TIVE. 

13 (a) FINDINGS.—Congress makes the following find14 ings: 

15 (1) The countries of the Caribbean are heavily 

16 reliant upon imported oil to provide for approxi17 mately 90 percent of their energy production. 

18 (2) The level of dependence is even higher in19 cluding— 

20 (A) Jamaica, which relies on oil for 95.9 

21 percent of its electricity; 

22 (B) Barbados, which relies on oil for 96 

23 percent of its electricity; 

24 (C) the Virgin Islands, which relies on oil 

25 for nearly 100 percent of its electricity; and 


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1 (D) St. Lucia, which relies on oil for 100 

2 percent of its electricity. 

3 (3) Overreliance on imported fossil fuels has 

4 had a detrimental effect on economic development, 

5 growth, and competitiveness in the Caribbean. 

6 (4) Since 1970, more than 80 percent of Carib7 bean coral reefs have been lost due to coastal devel8 opment and pollution. Soot particulates and climate 

9 change caused by burning fossil fuels have seriously 

10 damaged coral reefs, which are a significant source 

11 of tourism dollars, fishing, biodiversity, and natural 

12 beauty. 

13 (5) Air pollution caused by burning oil for elec14 tricity— 

15 (A) has serious health impacts in the form 

16 of higher rates of asthma and other lung ail17 ments; and 

18 (B) can also exacerbate climate change. 

19 (6) The Caribbean region is particularly vulner20 able to sea level rise and stronger storms. 

21 (7) Between 2005 and 2018, the dependence of 

22 the countries of the Caribbean on oil was perpet23 uated by the Venezuelan-led Petrocaribe oil alliance, 

24 which— 


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1 (A) offered preferential terms for oil sales; 

2 and 

3 (B) supplies some countries with up to 40 

4 percent of their energy production needs. 

5 (8) The ongoing domestic economic crisis and 

6 political turmoil in Venezuela has forced the Govern7 ment of Venezuela to retract its commitments to the 

8 Petrocaribe oil alliance and step away as a regional 

9 power. Only Cuba still receives preferential 

10 Petrocaribe pricing on fuel exports from Venezuela, 

11 while other Petrocaribe member countries are experi12 encing a destabilized flow of oil. 

13 (9) China has spent more than 

14 $244,000,000,000 on energy projects worldwide 

15 since 2000, 25 percent of which was spent in Latin 

16 America and the Caribbean. Although the majority 

17 of this spending was for oil, gas, and coal, China has 

18 also been the largest investor in clean energy glob19 ally for almost a decade. 

20 (10) The World Bank estimates that the Carib21 bean will need $12,000,000,000 in power invest22 ments through 2035. 

23 (11) Renewable energy technology costs have 

24 decreased dramatically in recent years, offering a 

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1 tion. Solar energy prices have fallen by 80 percent 

2 since 2008, causing significant market growth, and 

3 according to data released by the International Renewable Energy Agency, 1 4 ⁄3 of global power capacity 

5 is based in renewable energy. 

6 (12) In 2016, the International Monetary Fund 

7 estimated that transportation accounted for 36 per8 cent of the total primary energy consumed in the 

9 Caribbean subregion. 

10 (13) According to the United Nations Environ11 ment Programme, Latin America and the Caribbean 

12 could achieve annual savings of $621,000,000,000 

13 and a reduction of 1,100,000,000 tons of CO2 by 

14 2050 if the region’s energy and transport sectors 

15 reach net zero emissions. 

16 (14) The Caribbean has an abundance of on17 shore and offshore resources needed for renewable 

18 energy, including sun, wind, geothermal, and some 

19 hydropower production capacity. 

20 (15) The United States Government is deeply 

21 engaged in providing technical and policy assistance 

22 to countries of the Caribbean on energy issues 

23 through— 

24 (A) the Energy and Climate Partnership of 

25 the Americas; 


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1 (B) Connecting the Americas 2022; and 

2 (C) bilateral assistance programs. 

3 (16) On February 19, 2014, at the North 

4 American Leaders’ Summit, President Barack 

5 Obama, Prime Minister Stephen Harper of Canada, 

6 and President Enrique Pen ̃a Nieto of Mexico re7 affirmed their commitment to bring affordable, reli8 able, and increasingly renewable power to the Carib9 bean, while opening wider markets for clean energy 

10 and green technology. 

11 (17) On June 19, 2015, President Barack 

12 Obama announced the Caribbean Energy Security 

13 Initiative, which would partner with individual coun14 tries— 

15 (A) to transform its energy sector; 

16 (B) to work to increase access to finance, 

17 good governance, and diversification; and 

18 (C) to maximize the impact of existing 

19 donor effects. 

20 (18) On May 4, 2016, at the United States21 Caribbean-Central American Energy Summit, the 

22 energy security task force formally launched the 

23 Caribbean Sustainable Energy Roadmap and Strat24 egy (C–SERMS) as a mechanism to manage re25 gional coordination and action on energy security 


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1 and agreed to expand the regional market and trans2 mission system. 

3 (19) The United States has an important op4 portunity— 

5 (A) to deepen this engagement; 

6 (B) to work as a partner with Caribbean 

7 countries on a more regional and coordinated 

8 basis; 

9 (C) to help ease the region’s dependence 

10 on imported oil; and 

11 (D) to promote affordable alternative 

12 sources of energy. 

13 (b) DEFINITIONS.—In this section: 

14 (1) CARIBBEAN COUNTRIES.—The term ‘‘Carib15 bean countries’’ means countries in the Caribbean 

16 region, but does not including Cuba or Venezuela. 

17 (2) CARIBBEAN GOVERNMENTS.—The term 

18 ‘‘Caribbean governments’’ means the national gov19 ernments of the Caribbean countries. 

20 (c) STATEMENT OF POLICY.—It is the policy of the 

21 United States to help Caribbean countries— 

22 (1) achieve greater energy security and improve 

23 domestic energy resource mobilization; 

24 (2) lower their dependence on imported fuels; 


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1 (3) eliminate the use of diesel, heavy fuel oil, 

2 other petroleum products, and coal for the genera3 tion of electricity; 

4 (4) increase production of renewable energy; 

5 and 

6 (5) meet the greenhouse gas mitigation goals of 

7 their national determined contributions to the Paris 

8 Agreement. 

9 (d) STRATEGY.— 

10 (1) SUBMISSION.—Not later than 120 days 

11 after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Sec12 retary of State, in coordination with the Adminis13 trator of USAID, shall submit a multi-year strategy 

14 to the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Sen15 ate and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the 

16 House of Representatives that describes how the De17 partment of State will promote regional cooperation 

18 with Caribbean countries— 

19 (A) to lower dependence on imported fuels, 

20 grow domestic clean energy production in the 

21 region, strengthen regional energy security, and 

22 lower energy sector greenhouse gas emissions; 

23 (B) to decrease dependence on oil in the 

24 transportation sector; 


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1 (C) to increase energy efficiency, energy 

2 conservation, and investment in alternatives to 

3 imported fuels; 

4 (D) to improve grid reliability and mod5 ernize electricity transmission networks; 

6 (E) to advance deployment of innovative 

7 solutions to expand community and individuals’ 

8 access to electricity; 

9 (F) to help reform energy markets to en10 courage good regulatory governance and to pro11 mote a climate of private sector investment; and 

12 (G) to mitigate greenhouse gas emissions 

13 from the energy and transportation sector. 

14 (2) ELEMENTS.—The strategy required under 

15 subsection (a) shall include— 

16 (A) a thorough review and inventory of 

17 United States Government activities that are 

18 being carried out bilaterally, regionally, and in 

19 coordination with multilateral institutions— 

20 (i) to promote energy and climate se21 curity in the Caribbean region; and 

22 (ii) to reduce the region’s reliance on 

23 oil for electricity generation; 

24 (B) opportunities for marshaling regional 

25 cooperation— 


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1 (i) to overcome market barriers result2 ing from the small size of Caribbean en3 ergy markets; 

4 (ii) to address the high transportation 

5 and infrastructure costs faced by Carib6 bean countries; 

7 (iii) to ensure greater donor coordina8 tion between governments, multilateral in9 stitutions, multilateral banks, and private 

10 investors; and 

11 (iv) to expand regional financing op12 portunities to allow for lower cost energy 

13 entrepreneurship; 

14 (C) measures to ensure that each Carib15 bean government has— 

16 (i) an independent utility regulator or 

17 equivalent; 

18 (ii) affordable access by third party 

19 investors to its electrical grid with minimal 

20 regulatory interference; 

21 (iii) effective energy efficiency and en22 ergy conservation; 

23 (iv) programs to address technical and 

24 nontechnical issues; 


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1 (v) a plan to eliminate major market 

2 distortions; 

3 (vi) cost-reflective tariffs; and 

4 (vii) no tariffs or other taxes on clean 

5 energy solutions; and 

6 (D) recommendations for how United 

7 States policy, technical, and economic assist8 ance can be used in the Caribbean region— 

9 (i) to advance renewable energy devel10 opment and the incorporation of renewable 

11 technologies into existing energy grids and 

12 the development and deployment of micro13 grids where appropriate and feasible to 

14 boost energy security and reliability, par15 ticularly to underserved communities; 

16 (ii) to increase the generation of clean 

17 energy sufficiently to replace and allow for 

18 the retirement of obsolete fossil fuel energy 

19 generation units in Caribbean countries; 

20 (iii) to create regional financing op21 portunities to allow for lower cost energy 

22 entrepreneurship; 

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1 ment and break down any market or regu2 latory barriers; and 

3 (v) to establish a mechanism for each 

4 host government to have access to inde5 pendent legal advice— 

6 (I) to speed the development of 

7 energy-related contracts; and 

8 (II) to better protect the inter9 ests of Caribbean governments and 

10 citizens. 

11 (3) CONSULTATION.—In devising the strategy 

12 under this subsection, the Secretary of State shall 

13 work with the Secretary of Energy and shall consult 

14 with— 

15 (A) the Secretary of the Interior; 

16 (B) the Secretary of Commerce; 

17 (C) the Secretary of the Treasury; 

18 (D) the Board of Directors of the Export19 Import Bank of the United States; 

20 (E) the Board of Directors of the Develop21 ment Finance Corporation; 

22 (F) the Administrator of the United States 

23 Agency for International Development; 

24 (G) the Caribbean governments; 


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1 (H) the Inter-American Development 

2 Bank; 

3 (I) the World Bank Group; and 

4 (J) the Caribbean Electric Utility Services 

5 Corporation. 

6 SEC. 250. U.S.-CARIBBEAN RESILIENCE PARTNERSHIP. 

7 (a) FINDINGS.—Congress makes the following find8 ings: 

9 (1) The United States shares with the Carib10 bean a collective vulnerability to natural disasters, 

11 which affects the lives and the economies of our citi12 zens. 

13 (2) The April 9, 2021, eruption of the La 

14 Soufriere volcano is another reminder of the devas15 tation caused by the many natural disasters the Car16 ibbean confronts each year and the region’s vulner17 ability to external shocks. Hurricane Dorian, the 

18 largest storm to hit the region, wiped out large parts 

19 of the northern Bahamas in 2019, and Hurricanes 

20 Maria and Irma devastated multiple islands across 

21 the region in 2017, including Puerto Rico. According 

22 to IMF research, of the 511 plus disasters worldwide 

23 to hit small states since 1950, around two-thirds 

24 (324) have been in the Caribbean. 


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1 (3) This region is seven times more likely to ex2 perience a natural disaster than elsewhere. And, 

3 when one occurs, it will incur as much as six times 

4 more damage. 

5 (4) Extreme weather events and other environ6 mental impacts will only worsen over the coming 

7 years, and if not addressed, we will see only increas8 ing economic shocks on these countries, driving ir9 regular migration. 

10 (5) While the United States has considerable 

11 expertise and capacity in assisting countries with 

12 disaster response, there remains a need for stronger 

13 partnerships that build regional resilience through 

14 efficient and interoperable platforms, protecting peo15 ple and speeding recovery. 

16 (6) The People’s Republic of China has dra17 matically increased its engagement in the Caribbean 

18 in the past five years, including offering loans and 

19 grants related to disaster response and resilience 

20 and sought to acquire property rights in the Carib21 bean that would be detrimental to United States na22 tional security interests. 

23 (7) In 2019, the United States launched a new 

24 U.S.-Caribbean Resilience Partnership to deepen co25 operation and investment to strengthen our disaster 


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1 resilience throughout the Caribbean region, includ2 ing— 

3 (A) to streamline early warning response 

4 networks and formalize communication chan5 nels; 

6 (B) to enhance, encourage, and work col7 laboratively on further developing aviation dis8 aster resilience plans and partnerships; 

9 (C) to prioritize regional technical ex10 change in energy planning, risk reduction, and 

11 resilience; 

12 (D) to increase communications network 

13 interoperability between Caribbean partners and 

14 the United States; 

15 (E) to utilize storm surge mapping data 

16 and share real-time information in preparation 

17 for potential damage resulting from tropical cy18 clones and tsunamis; 

19 (F) to use meteorological services to 

20 strengthen and deepen physical and commu21 nications infrastructure, data collection net22 works, and human and technical capacity 

23 throughout the region, as well as interactions 

24 with the public; 


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1 (G) to understand that while the use of 

2 international and military and civil defense as3 sets in disaster response may only be considered 

4 as a last resort, when local, national, and inter5 national civilian capabilities are overwhelmed, 

6 civil-military coordination should occur, in sup7 port of the affected nation; 

8 (H) to develop a framework that would 

9 govern the deployment of international military 

10 and civil defense assets in disaster response 

11 when local, national, and international civilian 

12 capabilities are overwhelmed, in support of the 

13 affected nation; 

14 (I) to seek common mechanisms for ensur15 ing rapid disaster response and recovery, in16 cluding waiving or expediting diplomatic clear17 ances, waiving of or reducing customs fees, 

18 streamlining overflight and airspace clearance, 

19 and ensuring that the first responders have the 

20 ability to rapidly respond to disasters in other 

21 countries; 

22 (J) to promote the integration and coordi23 nation of regional response mechanisms in the 

24 Caribbean, including through the Caribbean 

25 Disaster Emergency Management Agency, the 


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1 Regional Security System, United States Gov2 ernment Agencies, and allies in ways that facili3 tate more effective and efficient planning, miti4 gation, response, and resilience to natural disas5 ters; 

6 (K) to share best practices in improved 

7 building codes with national disaster organiza8 tions, including building better programs, at re9 gional, national and community levels; and 

10 (L) to promote community-based disaster 

11 preparedness and mitigation activities, particu12 larly in underserved communities, with the aim 

13 of increasing broad public participation and re14 silience. 

15 (b) POLICY.—It is the policy of the United States to 

16 help Caribbean countries— 

17 (1) increase their resilience and adapt to nat18 ural disasters and the impacts of severe weather 

19 events and a changing environment; 

20 (2) partner with United States Federal, State, 

21 and local agencies and engage in technical coopera22 tion, dialogue, and assistance activities; 

23 (3) harmonize standards and practices related 

24 to paragraphs (1) and (2) to promote increased in25 vestment and integration; 


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1 (4) increase investment from United States 

2 companies in the Caribbean on resilience-building, 

3 adaptation, and climate-related mitigation efforts; 

4 (5) promote regional cooperation and ensure ef5 forts by the United States, Caribbean countries, and 

6 international partners complement each other; and 

7 (6) further assist with the efforts listed under 

8 subsection (a)(7) above. 

9 (c) STRATEGY.—Not later than 180 days after the 

10 date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State 

11 in coordination with other departments and agencies shall 

12 submit a multi-year strategy to the Committee on Foreign 

13 Relations of the Senate and the Committee on Foreign 

14 Affairs of the House of Representatives that describes how 

15 the Department of State will achieve the policy described 

16 in subsection (b) above. 

17 (d) APPROPRIATIONS.—There are authorized to be 

18 appropriated for U.S.-Caribbean Resilience Partnership 

19 activities, programs, technical assistance, and engagement 

20 the following: 

21 (1) $20,000,000 for fiscal year 2022. 

22 (2) $25,000,000 for fiscal year 2023. 

23 (3) $30,000,000 for fiscal year 2024 and there24 after. 

25 (e) REPORTING AND MONITORING.— 


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1 (1) Of the appropriated amount each fiscal 

2 year, at least five percent of all programming fund3 ing allocation must support and be directed toward 

4 reporting, monitoring, and assessment of effective5 ness. 

6 (2) The Department of State will ensure that at 

7 least 20 percent of appropriations for the U.S.-Car8 ibbean Resilience Partnership directly support the 

9 training of, engagement with, collaboration with, and 

10 exchange of expertise on resilience between United 

11 States Federal, State, and local officials and their 

12 Caribbean government counterparts. Funding should 

13 also support as appropriate increased academic, civil 

14 society, media, and private sector engagement in the 

15 fields of resilience-building, adaptation, and mitiga16 tion. 

17 PART II—TRANSATLANTIC RELATIONSHIPS 

18 SEC. 255. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON TRANSATLANTIC RELA19 TIONSHIPS. 

20 It is the sense of Congress that— 

21 (1) the United States, European Union, and 

22 European countries are close partners, sharing val23 ues grounded in democracy, human rights, trans24 parency, and the rules-based international order es25 tablished after World War II; 


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1 (2) without a common approach by the United 

2 States, European Union, and European countries on 

3 connectivity, trade, transnational problems, and sup4 port for democracy and human rights, the People’s 

5 Republic of China will continue to increase its eco6 nomic, political, and security leverage in Europe; 

7 (3) the People’s Republic of China’s deployment 

8 of assistance to European countries following the 

9 COVID–19 outbreak showcased a coercive approach 

10 to aid, but it also highlighted Europe’s deep eco11 nomic ties to the People’s Republic of China; 

12 (4) as European states seek to recover from the 

13 economic toll of the COVID–19 outbreak, the United 

14 States must stand in partnership with Europe to 

15 support our collective economic recovery, reinforce 

16 our collective national security, and defend shared 

17 values; 

18 (5) the United States, European Union, and 

19 European countries should coordinate on joint strat20 egies to diversify reliance on supply chains away 

21 from the People’s Republic of China, especially in 

22 the medical and pharmaceutical sectors; 

23 (6) the United States, European Union, and 

24 European countries should leverage their respective 

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1 al economic recovery from the COVID–19 recession 

2 and draw a contrast with the centralized economy of 

3 the People’s Republic of China; 

4 (7) the United States, United Kingdom, and 

5 European Union should accelerate efforts to de-esca6 late their trade disputes, including negotiating a 

7 United States-European Union trade agreement that 

8 benefits workers and the broader economy in both 

9 the United States and European Union; 

10 (8) the United States, European Union, and 

11 Japan should continue trilateral efforts to address 

12 economic challenges posed by the People’s Republic 

13 of China; 

14 (9) the United States, European Union, and 

15 countries of Europe should enhance cooperation to 

16 counter PRC disinformation, influence operations, 

17 and propaganda efforts; 

18 (10) the United States and European nations 

19 share serious concerns with the repressions being 

20 supported and executed by the Government of the 

21 People’s Republic of China, and should continue im22 plementing measures to address the Government of 

23 the People’s Republic of China’s specific abuses in 

24 Tibet, Hong Kong, and Xinjiang, and should build 

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1 port of China’s authoritarian governance model to 

2 countries around the world; 

3 (11) the United States and European nations 

4 should remain united in their shared values against 

5 attempts by the Government of the People’s Repub6 lic of China at the United Nations and other multi7 lateral organizations to promote efforts that erode 

8 the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, like the 

9 ‘‘community of a shared future for mankind’’ and 

10 ‘‘democratization of international relations’’; 

11 (12) the People’s Republic of China’s infra12 structure investments around the world, particularly 

13 in 5G telecommunications technology and port infra14 structure, could threaten democracy across Europe 

15 and the national security of key countries; 

16 (13) as appropriate, the United States should 

17 share intelligence with European allies and partners 

18 on Huawei’s 5G capabilities and the intentions of 

19 the Government of the People’s Republic of China 

20 with respect to 5G expansion in Europe; 

21 (14) the European Union’s Investment Screen22 ing Regulation, which came into force in October 

23 2020, is a welcome development, and member states 

24 should closely scrutinize PRC investments in their 


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1 countries through their own national investment 

2 screening measures; 

3 (15) the President should actively engage the 

4 European Union on the implementation of the Ex5 port Control Reform Act regulations and to better 

6 harmonize United States and European Union poli7 cies with respect to export controls; 

8 (16) the President should strongly advocate for 

9 the listing of more items and technologies to restrict 

10 dual use exports controlled at the National Security 

11 and above level to the People’s Republic of China 

12 under the Wassenaar Arrangement; 

13 (17) the United States should explore the value 

14 of establishing a body akin to the Coordinating 

15 Committee for Multilateral Export Controls 

16 (CoCom) that would specifically coordinate United 

17 States and European Union export control policies 

18 with respect to limiting exports of sensitive tech19 nologies to the People’s Republic of China; and 

20 (18) the United States should work with coun21 terparts in Europe to— 

22 (A) evaluate United States and European 

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1 ical and pharmaceutical sectors, and develop 

2 joint strategies to diversify supply chains; 

3 (B) counter PRC efforts to use COVID– 

4 19-related assistance as a coercive tool to pres5 sure developing countries by offering relevant 

6 United States and European expertise and as7 sistance; and 

8 (C) leverage the United States and Euro9 pean private sectors to advance the post10 COVID–19 economic recovery. 

11 SEC. 256. STRATEGY TO ENHANCE TRANSATLANTIC CO12 OPERATION WITH RESPECT TO THE PEO13 PLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA. 

14 (a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days after the 

15 date of the enactment of this Act, the President shall brief 

16 the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee 

17 on Armed Services of the Senate and the Committee on 

18 Foreign Affairs and the Committee on Armed Services of 

19 the House of Representatives on a strategy for how the 

20 United States will enhance cooperation with the European 

21 Union, NATO, and European partner countries with re22 spect to the People’s Republic of China. 

23 (b) ELEMENTS.—The briefing required by subsection 

24 (a) shall do the following: 


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1 (1) Identify the senior Senate-confirmed De2 partment of State official that leads United States 

3 efforts to cooperate with the European Union, 

4 NATO, and European partner countries to advance 

5 a shared approach with respect to the People’s Re6 public of China. 

7 (2) Identify key policy points of convergence 

8 and divergence between the United States and Euro9 pean partners with respect to the People’s Republic 

10 of China in the areas of technology, trade, and eco11 nomic practices. 

12 (3) Describe efforts to advance shared interests 

13 with European counterparts on— 

14 (A) economic challenges with respect to the 

15 People’s Republic of China; 

16 (B) democracy and human rights chal17 lenges with respect to the People’s Republic of 

18 China; 

19 (C) technology issues with respect to the 

20 People’s Republic of China; 

21 (D) defense issues with respect to the Peo22 ple’s Republic of China; and 

23 (E) developing a comprehensive strategy to 

24 respond to the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) 


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1 established by the Government of the People’s 

2 Republic of China. 

3 (4) Describe the coordination mechanisms 

4 among key regional and functional bureaus within 

5 the Department of State and Department of Defense 

6 tasked with engaging with European partners on the 

7 People’s Republic of China. 

8 (5) Detail diplomatic efforts up to the date of 

9 the briefing and future plans to work with European 

10 partners to counter the Government of the People’s 

11 Republic of China’s advancement of an authoritarian 

12 governance model around the world. 

13 (6) Detail the diplomatic efforts made up to the 

14 date of the briefing and future plans to support Eu15 ropean efforts to identify cost-effective alternatives 

16 to Huawei’s 5G technology. 

17 (7) Detail how United States public diplomacy 

18 tools, including the Global Engagement Center of 

19 the Department of State, will coordinate efforts with 

20 counterpart entities within the European Union to 

21 counter Chinese propaganda. 

22 (8) Describe the staffing and budget resources 

23 the Department of State dedicates to engagement 

24 between the United States and the European Union 

25 on the People’s Republic of China and provide an 


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1 assessment of out-year resource needs to execute the 

2 strategy. 

3 (9) Detail diplomatic efforts to work with Euro4 pean partners to track and counter Chinese attempts 

5 to exert influence across multilateral fora, including 

6 at the World Health Organization. 

7 (c) FORM.—The briefing required by section (a) shall 

8 be classified. 

9 (d) CONSULTATION.—Not later than 180 days after 

10 the date of the enactment of this Act, and annually there11 after for 3 years, the Secretary of State shall consult with 

12 the appropriate congressional committees regarding the 

13 development and implementation of the elements described 

14 in subsection (b). 

15 SEC. 257. ENHANCING TRANSATLANTIC COOPERATION ON 

16 PROMOTING PRIVATE SECTOR FINANCE. 

17 (a) IN GENERAL.—The President should work with 

18 transatlantic partners to build on the agreement among 

19 the Development Finance Corporation, FinDev Canada, 

20 and the European Development Finance Institutions 

21 (called the DFI Alliance) to enhance coordination on 

22 shared objectives to foster private sector-led development 

23 and provide market-based alternatives to state-directed fi24 nancing in emerging markets, particularly as related to 


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1 the People’s Republic of China’s Belt and Road Initiative 

2 (BRI), including by integrating efforts such as— 

3 (1) the European Union Strategy on Con4 necting Europe and Asia; 

5 (2) the Three Seas Initiative and Three Seas 

6 Initiative Fund; 

7 (3) the Blue Dot Network among the United 

8 States, Japan, and Australia; and 

9 (4) a European Union-Japan initiative that has 

10 leveraged $65,000,000,000 for infrastructure 

11 projects and emphasizes transparency standards. 

12 (b) STANDARDS.—The United States and the Euro13 pean Union should coordinate and develop a strategy to 

14 enhance transatlantic cooperation with the OECD and the 

15 Paris Club on ensuring the highest possible standards for 

16 Belt and Road Initiative contracts and terms with devel17 oping countries. 

18 SEC. 258. REPORT AND BRIEFING ON COOPERATION BE19 TWEEN CHINA AND IRAN AND BETWEEN 

20 CHINA AND RUSSIA. 

21 (a) APPROPRIATE COMMITTEES OF CONGRESS DE22 FINED.—In this section, the term ‘‘appropriate commit23 tees of Congress’’ means— 

24 (1) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the 

25 Select Committee on Intelligence, the Committee on 


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1 Armed Services, the Committee on Commerce, 

2 Science, and Transportation, the Committee on En3 ergy and Natural Resources, the Committee on 

4 Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, the Com5 mittee on Finance, and the Committee on Appro6 priations of the Senate; and 

7 (2) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Per8 manent Select Committee on Intelligence, the Com9 mittee on Armed Services, the Committee on Energy 

10 and Commerce, the Committee on Financial Serv11 ices, the Committee on Ways and Means, and the 

12 Committee on Appropriations of the House of Rep13 resentatives. 

14 (b) REPORT AND BRIEFING REQUIRED.— 

15 (1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days 

16 after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Di17 rector of National Intelligence shall, in coordination 

18 with the Secretary of State, the Secretary of De19 fense, the Secretary of Commerce, the Secretary of 

20 Energy, the Secretary of the Treasury, and such 

21 other heads of Federal agencies as the Director con22 siders appropriate, submit to the appropriate com23 mittees of Congress a report and brief the appro24 priate committees of Congress on cooperation be25 tween the People’s Republic of China and the IsVerDate Sep 11 2014 22:42 Jun 24, 2021 Jkt 019200 PO 00000 Frm 00192 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\H3524.IH H3524

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1 lamic Republic of Iran and between the People’s Re2 public of China and the Russian Federation. 

3 (2) CONTENTS.—The report submitted under 

4 paragraph (1) shall include the following elements: 

5 (A) An identification of major areas of dip6 lomatic energy, infrastructure, banking, finan7 cial, economic, military, and space coopera8 tion— 

9 (i) between the People’s Republic of 

10 China and the Islamic Republic of Iran; 

11 and 

12 (ii) between the People’s Republic of 

13 China and the Russian Federation. 

14 (B) An assessment of the effect of the 

15 COVID–19 pandemic on such cooperation. 

16 (C) An assessment of the effect that 

17 United States compliance with the Joint Com18 prehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) starting in 

19 January 14, 2016, and United States with20 drawal from the JCPOA on May 8, 2018, had 

21 on the cooperation described in subparagraph 

22 (A)(i). 

23 (D) An assessment of the effect on the co24 operation described in subparagraph (A)(i) that 

25 would be had by the United States reentering 


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1 compliance with the JCPOA or a successor 

2 agreement and the effect of the United States 

3 not reentering compliance with the JCPOA or 

4 reaching a successor agreement. 

5 (3) FORM.—The report submitted under para6 graph (1) shall be submitted in unclassified form, 

7 but may include a classified annex. 

8 (c) SENSE OF CONGRESS ON SHARING WITH ALLIES

9 AND PARTNERS.—It is the sense of Congress that the Di10 rector of National Intelligence and the heads of other ap11 propriate Federal departments and agencies should share 

12 the findings of the report submitted under subsection (b) 

13 with important allies and partners of the United States, 

14 as appropriate. 

15 PART III—SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIA 

16 SEC. 261. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON SOUTH AND CENTRAL 

17 ASIA. 

18 It is the sense of Congress that— 

19 (1) the United States should continue to stand 

20 with friends and partners, while also working to es21 tablish new partners in South and Central Asia as 

22 they contend with efforts by the Government of the 

23 People’s Republic of China to interfere in their re24 spective political systems and encroach upon their 

25 sovereign territory; and 


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1 (2) the United States should reaffirm its com2 mitment to the Comprehensive Global Strategic 

3 Partnership with India and further deepen bilateral 

4 defense consultations and collaboration with India 

5 commensurate with its status as a major defense 

6 partner. 

7 SEC. 262. STRATEGY TO ENHANCE COOPERATION WITH 

8 SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIA. 

9 (a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days after the 

10 date of the enactment of this Act, the President shall sub11 mit to the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Com12 mittee on Armed Services of the Senate and the Com13 mittee on Foreign Affairs and the Committee on Armed 

14 Services of the House of Representatives a strategy for 

15 how the United States will engage with the countries of 

16 South and Central Asia, including through the C5+1 

17 mechanism, with respect to the People’s Republic of 

18 China. 

19 (b) ELEMENTS.—The strategy required under sub20 section (a) shall include the following elements: 

21 (1) A detailed description of the security and 

22 economic challenges that the People’s Republic of 

23 China poses to the countries of South and Central 

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1 lic of China, PRC investments in land and sea ports, 

2 transportation infrastructure, and energy projects 

3 across the region. 

4 (2) A detailed description of United States ef5 forts to provide alternatives to PRC investment in 

6 infrastructure and other sectors in South and Cen7 tral Asia. 

8 (3) A detailed description of bilateral and re9 gional efforts to work with countries in South Asia 

10 on strategies to build resilience against PRC efforts 

11 to interfere in their political systems and economies. 

12 (4) A detailed description of United States dip13 lomatic efforts to work with the Government of Af14 ghanistan on addressing the challenges posed by 

15 PRC investment in the Afghan mineral sector. 

16 (5) A detailed description of United States dip17 lomatic efforts with the Government of Pakistan 

18 with respect to matters relevant to the People’s Re19 public of China, including investments by the Peo20 ple’s Republic of China in Pakistan through the Belt 

21 and Road Initiative. 

22 (6) In close consultation with the Government 

23 of India, identification of areas where the United 

24 States Government can provide diplomatic and other 

25 support as appropriate for India’s efforts to address 


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1 economic and security challenges posed by the Peo2 ple’s Republic of China in the region. 

3 (7) A description of the coordination mecha4 nisms among key regional and functional bureaus 

5 within the Department of State and Department of 

6 Defense tasked with engaging with the countries of 

7 South and Central Asia on issues relating to the 

8 People’s Republic of China. 

9 (8) A description of the efforts being made by 

10 Federal departments and agencies, including the De11 partment of State, the United States Agency for 

12 International Development, the Department of Com13 merce, the Department of Energy, and the Office of 

14 the United States Trade Representative, to help the 

15 nations of South and Central Asia develop trade and 

16 commerce links that will help those nations diversify 

17 their trade away from the People’s Republic of 

18 China. 

19 (9) A detailed description of United States dip20 lomatic efforts with Central Asian countries, Turkey, 

21 and any other countries with significant populations 

22 of Uyghurs and other ethnic minorities fleeing perse23 cution in the People’s Republic of China to press 

24 those countries to refrain from deporting ethnic mi25 norities to the People’s Republic of China, protect 


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1 ethnic minorities from intimidation by Chinese gov2 ernment authorities, and protect the right to the 

3 freedoms of assembly and expression. 

4 (c) FORM.—The strategy required under section (a) 

5 shall be submitted in an unclassified form that can be 

6 made available to the public, but may include a classified 

7 annex as necessary. 

8 (d) CONSULTATION.—Not later than 120 days after 

9 the date of the enactment of this Act, and not less than 

10 annually thereafter for 5 years, the Secretary of State 

11 shall consult with the Committee on Foreign Relations, 

12 the Committee on Armed Services, and the Committee on 

13 Appropriations of the Senate and the Committee of For14 eign Affairs, the Committee on Armed Services, and the 

15 Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representa16 tives regarding the development and implementation of the 

17 strategy required under subsection (a). 

18 SEC. 263. INDIAN OCEAN REGION STRATEGIC REVIEW. 

19 (a) FINDINGS.—Congress makes the following find20 ings: 

21 (1) The Indian Ocean region is a vitally impor22 tant part of the Indo-Pacific where the United 

23 States has political, economic, and security interests. 

24 (2) The United States has an interest in work25 ing with partners in the Indo-Pacific, including 


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1 India, Japan, and Australia, to address regional gov2 ernance, economic connectivity, and security chal3 lenges including threats to freedom of navigation. 

4 (b) STATEMENT OF POLICY.—As a part of the 

5 United States engagement in the Indo-Pacific, it shall be 

6 the policy of the United States to strengthen engagement 

7 with the countries in the Indian Ocean region, including 

8 with governments, civil society, and private sectors in such 

9 countries to— 

10 (1) promote United States political engagement 

11 with such region, including through active participa12 tion in regional organizations, and strengthened dip13 lomatic relations with United States partners in 

14 such region; 

15 (2) enhance United States economic 

16 connectivity and commercial exchange with such re17 gion; 

18 (3) defend freedom of navigation in such region 

19 from security challenges, including related to piracy; 

20 (4) support the ability of governments and or21 ganizations in such region to respond to natural dis22 asters; 

23 (5) support and facilitate the role of regional al24 lies and partners as net providers of security to such 

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1 dressing security challenges in such region, including 

2 through assistance to such allies and partners to 

3 build capacity in maritime security and maritime do4 main awareness; 

5 (6) continue to build the United States-India 

6 relationship in order to regularize security coopera7 tion through the negotiation of agreements con8 cerning access, communication, and navigation, in9 cluding through foundational agreements; and 

10 (7) promote cooperation with United States al11 lies in the Indo-Pacific, including Japan and Aus12 tralia, and major defense partners, including India, 

13 and NATO allies, including the United Kingdom and 

14 France, to support a rules-based order in such re15 gion. 

16 (c) STRATEGY.— 

17 (1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days 

18 after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Sec19 retary of State, in coordination with the Secretary of 

20 Defense and the Administrator of the United States 

21 Agency for International Development (USAID), 

22 shall submit to the appropriate congressional com23 mittees a multi-year strategy for United States en24 gagement to support United States interests in the 

25 Indian Ocean region. Such strategy shall— 


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1 (A) define United States political, eco2 nomic, and security interests in the Indian 

3 Ocean region; 

4 (B) outline challenges to the interests of 

5 the United States in such region; 

6 (C) outline efforts to improve cooperation 

7 between the United States and members of the 

8 Quad, including India, Japan, and Australia, 

9 through coordination in diplomacy and develop10 ment priorities, joint military exercises and op11 erations, and other activities that promote 

12 United States political, economic, and security 

13 interests; 

14 (D) outline efforts to support economic 

15 connectivity in such region, including through 

16 the United States-India-Japan Trilateral Infra17 structure Working Group, the Asia-Africa 

18 Growth Corridor, and other efforts to expand 

19 and enhance connectivity across the Indo-Pa20 cific, including with the countries of Southeast 

21 Asia, that maintain high standards of invest22 ment and support for civil society and people23 to-people connectivity; 

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1 tions and entities, including the Indian Ocean 

2 Rim Association, to promote United States po3 litical, economic, and security interests in such 

4 region; 

5 (F) review the United States diplomatic 

6 posture in such region, including an assessment 

7 of United States diplomatic engagement in 

8 countries without a permanent United States 

9 embassy or diplomatic mission, and an assess10 ment of ways to improve the cooperation with 

11 the Maldives, the Seychelles, and Comoros; 

12 (G) review United States diplomatic agree13 ments with countries in such region that facili14 tate United States military operations in such 

15 region, including bilateral and multilateral 

16 agreements, and describe efforts to expand 

17 United States cooperation with such countries 

18 through the negotiation of additional agree19 ments; and 

20 (H) include a security assistance strategy 

21 for such region that outlines priorities, objec22 tives, and actions for United States security as23 sistance efforts to governments of countries in 

24 such region to promote United States political, 

25 economic, and security interests in such region. 


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1 (2) INCLUSION.—The strategy required under 

2 paragraph (1) may be submitted as a part of any 

3 other strategy relating to the Indo-Pacific. 

4 (3) REPORT ON IMPLEMENTATION.—Not later 

5 than one year after the submission of the strategy 

6 required under paragraph (1) and one year there7 after, the Secretary of State shall submit to the ap8 propriate congressional committees a report on 

9 progress made toward implementing such strategy. 

10 (d) UNITED STATES-CHINA ECONOMIC AND SECU11 RITY REVIEW COMMISSION.— 

12 (1) IN GENERAL.—Subparagraph (E) of section 

13 1238(c)(2) of the Floyd D. Spence National Defense 

14 Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2001 (22 U.S.C. 

15 7002(c)(2)) is amended— 

16 (A) by inserting ‘‘, including in the Indian 

17 Ocean region’’ after ‘‘deployments of the Peo18 ple’s Republic of China military’’; and 

19 (B) by adding at the end the following new 

20 sentence: ‘‘In this subparagraph, the term ‘In21 dian Ocean region’ means the Indian Ocean, in22 cluding the Arabian Sea and the Bay of Bengal, 

23 and the littoral areas surrounding the Indian 

24 Ocean.’’. 


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1 (2) EFFECTIVE DATE.—The amendments made 

2 by paragraph (1) shall take effect on the date of the 

3 enactment of this Act and apply beginning with the 

4 first report required under section 1238 of the Floyd 

5 D. Spence National Defense Authorization Act for 

6 Fiscal Year 2001 (as amended by such paragraph) 

7 that is submitted after such date. 

8 (e) DEFINITIONS.—In this section: 

9 (1) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMIT10 TEES.—The term ‘‘appropriate congressional com11 mittees’’ means the Committee on Foreign Affairs 

12 and the Committee on Armed Services of the House 

13 of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign 

14 Relations and the Committee on Armed Services of 

15 the Senate. 

16 (2) INDIAN OCEAN REGION.—The term ‘‘Indian 

17 Ocean region’’ means the Indian Ocean, including 

18 the Arabian Sea and the Bay of Bengal, and the lit19 toral areas surrounding the Indian Ocean. 


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1 PART IV—AFRICA 

2 SEC. 271. ASSESSMENT OF POLITICAL, ECONOMIC, AND SE3 CURITY ACTIVITY OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUB4 LIC OF CHINA IN AFRICA. 

5 (a) APPROPRIATE COMMITTEES OF CONGRESS DE6 FINED.—In this section, the term ‘‘appropriate commit7 tees of Congress’’ means— 

8 (1) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the 

9 Committee on Armed Services, and the Select Com10 mittee on Intelligence of the Senate; and 

11 (2) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the 

12 Committee on Armed Services, and the Permanent 

13 Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of 

14 Representatives. 

15 (b) INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENT.—Not later than 

16 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the 

17 Secretary of State shall, in coordination with the Director 

18 of National Intelligence, submit to the appropriate com19 mittees of Congress a report that assesses the nature and 

20 impact of the People’s Republic of China’s political, eco21 nomic, sociocultural, and security sector activity in Africa, 

22 and its impact on United States strategic interests, includ23 ing— 

24 (1) the amount and impact of direct invest25 ment, loans, development financing, oil-for-loans 

26 deals, and other preferential trading arrangements; 


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1 (2) the involvement of PRC state-owned enter2 prises in Africa; 

3 (3) the amount of African debt held by the Peo4 ple’s Republic of China; 

5 (4) the involvement of PRC private security, 

6 technology and media companies in Africa; 

7 (5) the scale and impact of PRC arms sales to 

8 African countries; 

9 (6) the scope of Chinese investment in and con10 trol of African energy resources and minerals critical 

11 for emerging and foundational technologies; 

12 (7) an analysis on the linkages between Bei13 jing’s aid and assistance to African countries and 

14 African countries supporting PRC geopolitical goals 

15 in international fora; 

16 (8) the methods, tools, and tactics used to fa17 cilitate illegal and corrupt activity, including trade in 

18 counterfeit and illicit goods, to include smuggled ex19 tractive resources and wildlife products, between Af20 rica and China; 

21 (9) the methods and techniques that the Peo22 ple’s Republic of China uses to exert undue influence 

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1 party training program, and to influence African 

2 multilateral organizations; and 

3 (10) an analysis of the soft power, cultural and 

4 educational activities undertaken by the PRC and 

5 CCP to seek to expand its influence in Africa. 

6 SEC. 272. INCREASING THE COMPETITIVENESS OF THE 

7 UNITED STATES IN AFRICA. 

8 (a) APPROPRIATE COMMITTEES OF CONGRESS DE9 FINED.—In this section, the term ‘‘appropriate commit10 tees of Congress’’ means— 

11 (1) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the 

12 Committee on Appropriations, and the Committee on 

13 Finance of the Senate; and 

14 (2) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the 

15 Committee on Appropriations, and the Committee on 

16 Ways and Means of the House of Representatives. 

17 (b) STRATEGY REQUIREMENT.—Not later than 180 

18 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Sec19 retary of State shall, in consultation with the Secretary 

20 of the Treasury, the Secretary of Commerce, the Attorney 

21 General, the United States Trade Representative, the Ad22 ministrator of the United States Agency for International 

23 Development, and the leadership of the United States 

24 International Development Finance Corporation, submit 

25 to the appropriate committees of Congress a report setting 


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1 forth a multi-year strategy for increasing United States 

2 economic competitiveness and promoting improvements in 

3 the investment climate in Africa, including through sup4 port for democratic institutions, the rule of law, including 

5 property rights, and for improved transparency, anti-cor6 ruption and governance. 

7 (c) ELEMENTS.—The strategy submitted pursuant to 

8 subsection (a) shall include— 

9 (1) a description and assessment of barriers to 

10 United States investment in Africa for United States 

11 businesses, including a clear identification of the dif12 ferent barriers facing small-sized and medium-sized 

13 businesses, and an assessment of whether existing 

14 programs effectively address such barriers; 

15 (2) a description and assessment of barriers to 

16 African diaspora investment in Africa, and rec17 ommendations to overcome such barriers; 

18 (3) an identification of the economic sectors in 

19 the United States that have a comparative advan20 tage in African markets; 

21 (4) a determination of priority African coun22 tries for promoting two-way trade and investment 

23 and an assessment of additional foreign assistance 

24 needs, including democracy and governance and rule 


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1 of law support, to promote a conducive operating en2 vironment in priority countries; 

3 (5) an identification of opportunities for stra4 tegic cooperation with European allies on trade and 

5 investment in Africa, and for establishing a dialogue 

6 on trade, security, development, and environmental 

7 issues of mutual interest; and 

8 (6) a plan to regularly host a United States-Af9 rica Leaders Summit to promote two-way trade and 

10 investment, strategic engagement, and security in 

11 Africa. 

12 (d) ASSESSMENT OF UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

13 HUMAN RESOURCES CAPACITY.—The Comptroller Gen14 eral of the United States shall— 

15 (1) conduct a review of the number of Foreign 

16 Commercial Service Officers and Department of 

17 State Economic Officers at United States embassies 

18 in sub-Saharan Africa; and 

19 (2) develop and submit to the appropriate con20 gressional committees an assessment of whether 

21 human resource capacity in such embassies is ade22 quate to meet the goals of the various trade and eco23 nomic programs and initiatives in Africa, including 

24 the African Growth and Opportunity Act and Pros25 per Africa. 


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1 SEC. 273. DIGITAL SECURITY COOPERATION WITH RESPECT 

2 TO AFRICA. 

3 (a) APPROPRIATE COMMITTEES OF CONGRESS DE4 FINED.—In this section, the term ‘‘appropriate commit5 tees of Congress’’ means— 

6 (1) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the 

7 Committee on Armed Services, and the Select Com8 mittee on Intelligence of the Senate; and 

9 (2) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the 

10 Committee on Armed Services, and the Permanent 

11 Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of 

12 Representatives. 

13 (b) INTERAGENCY WORKING GROUP TO COUNTER

14 PRC CYBER AGGRESSION IN AFRICA.— 

15 (1) IN GENERAL.—The President shall establish 

16 an interagency Working Group, which shall include 

17 representatives of the Department of State, the De18 partment of Defense, the Office of the Director of 

19 National Intelligence, and such other agencies of the 

20 United States Government as the President con21 siders appropriate, on means to counter PRC cyber 

22 aggression with respect to Africa. 

23 (2) DUTIES.—The Working Group established 

24 pursuant to this subsection shall develop and submit 

25 to the appropriate congressional committees a set of 

26 recommendations such as for— 


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1 (A) bolstering the capacity of governments 

2 in Africa to ensure the integrity of their data 

3 networks and critical infrastructure where ap4 plicable; 

5 (B) providing alternatives to Huawei; 

6 (C) an action plan for United States em7 bassies in Africa to provide assistance to host8 country governments with respect to protecting 

9 their vital digital networks and infrastructure 

10 from PRC espionage, including an assessment 

11 of staffing resources needed to implement the 

12 action plan in embassies in Africa; 

13 (D) utilizing interagency resources to 

14 counter PRC disinformation and propaganda in 

15 traditional and digital media targeted to Afri16 can audiences; and 

17 (E) helping civil society in Africa counter 

18 digital authoritarianism and identifying tools 

19 and assistance to enhance and promote digital 

20 democracy. 

21 SEC. 274. INCREASING PERSONNEL IN UNITED STATES EM22 BASSIES IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA FOCUSED 

23 ON THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA. 

24 The Secretary of State may station on a permanent 

25 basis Department of State personnel at such United 


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1 States embassies in sub-Saharan Africa as the Secretary 

2 considers appropriate focused on the activities, policies 

3 and investments of the People’s Republic of China in Afri4 ca. 

5 SEC. 275. SUPPORT FOR YOUNG AFRICAN LEADERS INITIA6 TIVE. 

7 (a) FINDING.—Congress finds that youth in Africa 

8 can have a positive impact on efforts to foster economic 

9 growth, improve public sector transparency and govern10 ance, and counter extremism, and should be an area of 

11 focus for United States outreach on the continent. 

12 (b) POLICY.—It is the policy of the United States, 

13 in cooperation and collaboration with private sector com14 panies, civic organizations, nongovernmental organiza15 tions, and national and regional public sector entities, to 

16 commit resources to enhancing the entrepreneurship and 

17 leadership skills of African youth with the objective of en18 hancing their ability to serve as leaders in the public and 

19 private sectors in order to help them spur growth and 

20 prosperity, strengthen democratic governance, and en21 hance peace and security in their respective countries of 

22 origin and across Africa. 

23 (c) YOUNG AFRICAN LEADERS INITIATIVE.— 


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1 (1) IN GENERAL.—There is hereby established 

2 the Young African Leaders Initiative, to be carried 

3 out by the Secretary of State. 

4 (2) FELLOWSHIPS.—The Secretary is author5 ized to continue to support the participation in the 

6 Initiative established under this paragraph, in the 

7 United States, of fellows from Africa each year for 

8 such education and training in leadership and pro9 fessional development through the Department of 

10 State as the Secretary of State considers appro11 priate. The Secretary shall establish and publish cri12 teria for eligibility for participation as such a fellow, 

13 and for selection of fellows among eligible applicants 

14 for a fellowship. 

15 (3) RECIPROCAL EXCHANGES.—Under the Ini16 tiative, United States citizens may engage in such 

17 reciprocal exchanges in connection with and collabo18 ration on projects with fellows under paragraph (1) 

19 as the Secretary considers appropriate. 

20 (4) NETWORKS.—The Secretary is authorized 

21 to continue to maintain an online network that pro22 vides information and online courses for young lead23 ers in Africa on topics related to entrepreneurship 

24 and leadership. 


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1 (5) REGIONAL CENTERS.—The Administrator 

2 of the United States Agency for International Devel3 opment is authorized to establish regional centers in 

4 Africa to provide in-person and online training 

5 throughout the year in business and entrepreneur6 ship, civic leadership, and public management. 

7 (d) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con8 gress that the Secretary of State should increase the num9 ber of fellows from Africa participating in the Mandela 

10 Washington Fellowship above the current 700 projected 

11 for fiscal year 2021. 

12 SEC. 276. AFRICA BROADCASTING NETWORKS. 

13 Not later than 180 days after the date of the enact14 ment of this Act, the CEO of the United States Agency 

15 for Global Media shall submit to the appropriate congres16 sional committees a report on the resources and timeline 

17 needed to establish within the Agency an organization 

18 whose mission shall be to promote democratic values and 

19 institutions in Africa by providing objective, accurate, and 

20 relevant news and information to the people of Africa and 

21 counter disinformation from malign actors, especially in 

22 countries where a free press is banned by the government 

23 or not fully established, about the region, the world, and 

24 the United States through uncensored news, responsible 

25 discussion, and open debate. 


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1 SEC. 277. EXPANSION OF AUTHORITIES OF THE UNITED 

2 STATES INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT FI3 NANCE CORPORATION IN SUB-SAHARAN AF4 RICA. 

5 (a) PROMOTION OF AND SUPPORT FOR PRIVATE IN6 VESTMENT OPPORTUNITIES.— 

7 (1) IN GENERAL.—The United States Inter8 national Development Corporation (in this section 

9 referred to as the ‘‘Corporation’’) shall carry out 

10 feasibility studies for the planning, development, and 

11 management of, and procurement for, potential bi12 lateral and multilateral development projects eligible 

13 for support under title II of the Better Utilization 

14 of Investments Leading to Development Act of 2018 

15 (22 U.S.C. 9621 et seq.) in sub-Saharan Africa in 

16 accordance with the provisions described in section 

17 1421(e) of such Act (22 U.S.C. 9621(e)). 

18 (2) INAPPLICABILITY OF CONTRIBUTIONS TO

19 COSTS REQUIREMENT.—The requirements relating 

20 to contributions of costs described in paragraph (2) 

21 of section 1421(e) of such Act shall not apply with 

22 respect to any person receiving funds under the au23 thorities of paragraph (1). 

24 (b) SPECIAL PROJECTS AND PROGRAMS.—The Cor25 poration shall administer and manage special projects and 

26 programs in support of specific transactions undertaken 


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1 by the Corporation or others in sub-Saharan Africa in ac2 cordance with the provisions described in section 1421(f) 

3 of the Better Utilization of Investments Leading to Devel4 opment Act of 2018 (22 U.S.C. 9621(f)). 

5 (c) ENGAGEMENT WITH INVESTORS.— 

6 (1) IN GENERAL.—The Corporation, acting 

7 through the Chief Development Officer, shall, in co8 operation with the Administrator of the United 

9 States Agency for International Development, carry 

10 out the activities described in paragraphs (1) 

11 through (5) of section 1445(a) of the Better Utiliza12 tion of Investments Leading to Development Act of 

13 2018 (22 U.S.C. 9655(a)) with respect to sub-Saha14 ran Africa. 

15 (2) ASSISTANCE.—To achieve the goals de16 scribed in paragraph (1), the Corporation shall carry 

17 out the activities described in paragraphs (1) 

18 through (10) of section 1445(b) with respect to sub19 Saharan Africa. 

20 (3) TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE.—The Corporation 

21 shall coordinate with the United States Agency for 

22 International Development and other agencies and 

23 departments, as necessary, on projects and programs 

24 supported by the Corporation that include technical 

25 assistance with respect to sub-Saharan Africa. 


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1 (d) EMPLOYEES STATIONED IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRI2 CA.— 

3 (1) IN GENERAL.—Subject to the availability of 

4 appropriations, the Corporation shall take steps to 

5 ensure that at least 6 full-time employees of the Cor6 poration, which may include personnel detailed to 

7 the Corporation from other Federal agencies, are 

8 stationed in sub-Saharan Africa and whose sole du9 ties are to support the functions of the Corporation 

10 as described in subsections (a), (b), and (c) or under 

11 any provision of the Better Utilization of Invest12 ments Leading to Development Act of 2018 with re13 spect to sub-Saharan Africa. 

14 (2) PROHIBITION ON CONFLICTS OF INTER15 EST.—The Corporation may not hire or retain any 

16 contractor or subcontractor to support the functions 

17 of the Corporation as described in paragraph (1) if 

18 the contractor or subcontractor has any equity or 

19 other financial interest in any specific transactions 

20 undertaken by the Corporation or others in sub-Sa21 haran Africa as described in this section. 

22 (e) DEFINITIONS.—In this section, the term ‘‘sub-Sa23 haran Africa’’ has the meaning given that term in section 

24 107 of the African Growth and Opportunity Act (19 

25 U.S.C. 3706). 


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1 PART V—MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA 

2 SEC. 281. STRATEGY TO COUNTER CHINESE INFLUENCE IN, 

3 AND ACCESS TO, THE MIDDLE EAST AND 

4 NORTH AFRICA. 

5 (a) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con6 gress that— 

7 (1) the People’s Republic of China is upgrading 

8 its influence in the Middle East and North Africa 

9 through its energy and infrastructure investments, 

10 technology transfer, and arms sales; 

11 (2) the People’s Republic of China seeks to es12 tablish military or dual use facilities in geographi13 cally strategic locations in the Middle East and 

14 North Africa to further its Belt and Road Initiative 

15 at the expense of United States national security in16 terests; and 

17 (3) the export of certain communications infra18 structure from the People’s Republic of China de19 grades the security of partner networks, exposes in20 tellectual property to theft, threatens the ability of 

21 the United States to conduct security cooperation 

22 with compromised regional partners, and furthers 

23 China’s authoritarian surveillance model. 

24 (b) STRATEGY REQUIRED.— 

25 (1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days 

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1 retary of State, in consultation with the Secretary of 

2 Defense, the Administrator of the United States 

3 Agency for International Development, and the 

4 heads of other appropriate Federal agencies, shall 

5 jointly develop and submit to the appropriate con6 gressional committees and the Committees on Armed 

7 Services of the Senate and the House of Representa8 tives a strategy for countering and limiting the 

9 PRC’s influence in, and access to, the Middle East 

10 and North Africa. 

11 (2) ELEMENTS.—The strategy required under 

12 paragraph (1) shall include— 

13 (A) an assessment of the People’s Republic 

14 of China’s intent with regards to increased co15 operation with Middle East and North African 

16 countries and how these activities fit into its 

17 broader global strategic objectives; 

18 (B) an assessment of how governments 

19 across the region are responding to the People’s 

20 Republic of China’s efforts to increase its mili21 tary presence in their countries; 

22 (C) efforts to improve regional cooperation 

23 through foreign military sales, financing, and 

24 efforts to build partner capacity and increase 

25 interoperability with the United States; 


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1 (D) an assessment of the People’s Republic 

2 of China’s joint research and development with 

3 the Middle East and North Africa, impacts on 

4 the United States national security interests, 

5 and recommended steps to mitigate the People’s 

6 Republic of China’s influence in this area; 

7 (E) an assessment of arms sales and weap8 ons technology transfers from the People’s Re9 public of China to the Middle East and North 

10 Africa, impacts on United States national secu11 rity interests, and recommended steps to miti12 gate the People’s Republic of China’s influence 

13 in this area; 

14 (F) an assessment of the People’s Republic 

15 of China’s military sales to the region including 

16 lethal and non-lethal unmanned aerial systems; 

17 (G) an assessment of People’s Republic of 

18 China military basing and dual-use facility ini19 tiatives across the Middle East and North Afri20 ca, impacts on United States national security 

21 interests, and recommended steps to mitigate 

22 the People’s Republic of China’s influence in 

23 this area; 


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1 (H) efforts to improve regional security co2 operation with United States allies and partners 

3 with a focus on— 

4 (i) maritime security in the Arabian 

5 Gulf, the Red Sea, and the Eastern Medi6 terranean; 

7 (ii) integrated air and missile defense; 

8 (iii) cyber security; 

9 (iv) border security; and 

10 (v) critical infrastructure security, to 

11 include energy security; 

12 (I) increased support for government-to13 government engagement on critical infrastruc14 ture development projects including ports and 

15 water infrastructure; 

16 (J) efforts to encourage United States pri17 vate sector and public-private partnerships in 

18 healthcare technology and foreign direct invest19 ment in non-energy sectors; 

20 (K) efforts to expand youth engagement 

21 and professional education exchanges with key 

22 partner countries; 

23 (L) specific steps to counter increased in24 vestment from the People’s Republic of China 

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1 matic efforts to stress the political, economic, 

2 and social benefits of a free and open internet; 

3 (M) efforts to promote United States pri4 vate sector engagement in and public-private 

5 partnerships on renewable energy development; 

6 (N) the expansion of public-private part7 nership efforts on water, desalination, and irri8 gation projects; and 

9 (O) efforts to warn United States partners 

10 in the Middle East and North Africa of the 

11 risks associated with the People’s Republic of 

12 China’s telecommunications infrastructure and 

13 provide alternative ‘‘clean paths’’ to the Peo14 ple’s Republic of China’s technology. 

15 (c) FORM.—The strategy required under section (b) 

16 shall be submitted in an unclassified form that can be 

17 made available to the public, but may include a classified 

18 annex as necessary. 

19 SEC. 282. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON MIDDLE EAST AND 

20 NORTH AFRICA ENGAGEMENT. 

21 (a) FINDINGS.—Congress makes the following find22 ings: 

23 (1) The United States and the international 

24 community have long-term interests in the stability, 


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1 security, and prosperity of the people of the Middle 

2 East and North Africa. 

3 (2) In addition to and apart from military and 

4 security efforts, the United States should harness a 

5 whole of government approach, including bilateral 

6 and multilateral statecraft, economic lines of effort, 

7 and public diplomacy to compete with and counter 

8 PRC influence. 

9 (3) A clearly articulated positive narrative of 

10 United States engagement, transparent governance 

11 structures, and active civil society engagement help 

12 counter predatory foreign investment and influence 

13 efforts. 

14 (b) STATEMENT OF POLICY.—It is the policy of the 

15 United States that the United States and the international 

16 community should continue diplomatic and economic ef17 forts throughout the Middle East and North Africa that 

18 support reform efforts to— 

19 (1) promote greater economic opportunity; 

20 (2) foster private sector development; 

21 (3) strengthen civil society; and 

22 (4) promote transparent and democratic gov23 ernance and the rule of law. 


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1 PART VI—ARCTIC REGION 

2 SEC. 285. ARCTIC DIPLOMACY. 

3 (a) SENSE OF CONGRESS ON ARCTIC SECURITY.— 

4 It is the sense of Congress that— 

5 (1) the rapidly changing Arctic environment— 

6 (A) creates new national and regional secu7 rity challenges due to increased military activity 

8 in the Arctic; 

9 (B) heightens the risk of the Arctic emerg10 ing as a major theater of conflict in ongoing 

11 strategic competition; 

12 (C) threatens maritime safety as Arctic lit13 toral nations have inadequate capacity to patrol 

14 the increased vessel traffic in this remote re15 gion, which is a result of diminished annual lev16 els of sea ice; 

17 (D) impacts public safety due to increased 

18 human activity in the Arctic region where 

19 search and rescue capacity remains very lim20 ited; and 

21 (E) threatens the health of the Arctic’s 

22 fragile and pristine environment and the unique 

23 and highly sensitive species found in the Arc24 tic’s marine and terrestrial ecosystems; and 

25 (2) the United States should reduce the con26 sequences outlined in paragraph (1) by— 


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1 (A) carefully evaluating the wide variety 

2 and dynamic set of security and safety risks un3 folding in the Arctic; 

4 (B) developing policies and making prep5 arations to mitigate and respond to threats and 

6 risks in the Arctic, including by continuing to 

7 work with allies and partners in the Arctic re8 gion to deter potential aggressive activities and 

9 build Arctic competencies; 

10 (C) adequately funding the National Earth 

11 System Prediction Capability to substantively 

12 improve weather, ocean, and ice predictions on 

13 the time scales necessary to ensure regional se14 curity and trans-Arctic shipping; 

15 (D) investing in resources, including a sig16 nificantly expanded icebreaker fleet, to ensure 

17 that the United States has adequate capacity to 

18 prevent and respond to security threats in the 

19 Arctic region; and 

20 (E) pursuing diplomatic engagements with 

21 all states in the Arctic region to reach an agree22 ment for— 

23 (i) maintaining peace and stability in 

24 the Arctic region; 


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1 (ii) fostering cooperation on steward2 ship and safety initiatives in the Arctic re3 gion; 

4 (iii) ensuring safe and efficient man5 agement of commercial maritime traffic in 

6 the Arctic; 

7 (iv) promoting responsible natural re8 source management and economic develop9 ment; 

10 (v) countering China’s Polar Silk 

11 Road initiative; 

12 (vi) examining the possibility of recon13 vening the Arctic Chiefs of Defense 

14 Forum; and 

15 (vii) reducing black carbon and meth16 ane emissions in the Artic Region, includ17 ing by working with observers of the Arctic 

18 Council, including India and the PRC, to 

19 adopt mitigation plans consistent with the 

20 findings and recommendations of the Arc21 tic Council’s Framework for Action on 

22 Black Carbon and Methane. 

23 (b) STATEMENT OF POLICY.—It is the policy of the 

24 United States— 


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1 (1) to recognize only the states enumerated in 

2 subsection (c)(1) as Arctic states, and to reject all 

3 other claims to this status; and 

4 (2) that the militarization of the Arctic poses a 

5 serious threat to Arctic peace and stability, and the 

6 interests of United States allies and partners. 

7 (c) DEFINITIONS.—In this section: 

8 (1) ARCTIC STATES.—The term ‘‘Arctic states’’ 

9 means Russia, Canada, the United States, Norway, 

10 Denmark (including Greenland), Finland, Sweden, 

11 and Iceland. 

12 (2) ARCTIC REGION.—The term ‘‘Arctic Re13 gion’’ means the geographic region north of the 

14 66.56083 parallel latitude north of the equator. 

15 (d) DESIGNATION OF AMBASSADOR AT LARGE FOR

16 ARCTIC AFFAIRS.—There is established within the De17 partment of State an Ambassador at Large for Arctic Af18 fairs (referred to in this section as the ‘‘Ambassador’’), 

19 appointed in accordance with paragraph (1). 

20 (1) APPOINTMENT.—The Ambassador shall be 

21 appointed by the President, by and with the advice 

22 and consent of the Senate. 

23 (2) DUTIES.— 

24 (A) DIPLOMATIC REPRESENTATION.—Sub25 ject to the direction of the President and the 


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1 Secretary of State, the Ambassador is author2 ized to represent the United States in matters 

3 and cases relevant to the Arctic Region in— 

4 (i) contacts with foreign governments, 

5 intergovernmental organizations, and spe6 cialized agencies of the United Nations, 

7 the Arctic Council, and other international 

8 organizations of which the United States is 

9 a member; and 

10 (ii) multilateral conferences and meet11 ings relating to Arctic affairs. 

12 (B) CHAIR OF THE ARCTIC COUNCIL.—The 

13 Ambassador shall serve as the Chair of the Arc14 tic Council when the United States holds the 

15 Chairmanship of the Arctic Council. 

16 (3) POLICIES AND PROCEDURES.—The Ambas17 sador shall coordinate United States policies related 

18 to the Arctic Region, including— 

19 (A) meeting national security, economic, 

20 and commercial needs pertaining to Arctic af21 fairs; 

22 (B) protecting the Arctic environment and 

23 conserving its biological resources; 


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1 (C) promoting environmentally sustainable 

2 natural resource management and economic de3 velopment; 

4 (D) strengthening institutions for coopera5 tion among the Arctic Nations; 

6 (E) involving Arctic indigenous people in 

7 decisions that affect them; 

8 (F) enhancing scientific monitoring and re9 search on local, regional, and global environ10 mental issues; 

11 (G) integrating scientific data on the cur12 rent and projected effects of climate change in 

13 the Arctic Region and ensure that such data is 

14 applied to the development of security strategies 

15 for the Arctic Region; 

16 (H) making available the methods and ap17 proaches on the integration of climate science 

18 to other regional security planning programs in 

19 the Department of State to better ensure that 

20 broader decision-making processes may more 

21 adequately account for the effects of climate 

22 change; and 

23 (I) reducing black carbon and methane 

24 emissions in the Arctic Region. 


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1 (e) ARCTIC REGION SECURITY POLICY.—Arctic Re2 gion Security Policy shall assess, develop, budget for, and 

3 implement plans, policies, and actions— 

4 (1) to bolster the diplomatic presence of the 

5 United States in Arctic states, including through en6 hancements to diplomatic missions and facilities, 

7 participation in regional and bilateral dialogues re8 lated to Arctic security, and coordination of United 

9 States initiatives and assistance programs across 

10 agencies to protect the national security of the 

11 United States and its allies and partners; 

12 (2) to enhance the resilience capacities of Arctic 

13 states to the effects of environmental change and in14 creased civilian and military activity by Arctic states 

15 and other states that may result from increased ac16 cessibility of the Arctic Region; 

17 (3) to assess specific added risks to the Arctic 

18 Region and Arctic states that— 

19 (A) are vulnerable to the changing Arctic 

20 environment; and 

21 (B) are strategically significant to the 

22 United States; 

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1 ability assessments into the decision-making process 

2 on foreign assistance awards with Greenland; 

3 (5) to advance principles of good governance by 

4 encouraging and cooperating with Arctic states on 

5 collaborative approaches— 

6 (A) to responsibly manage natural re7 sources in the Arctic Region; 

8 (B) to share the burden of ensuring mari9 time safety in the Arctic Region; 

10 (C) to prevent the escalation of security 

11 tensions by mitigating against the militarization 

12 of the Arctic Region; 

13 (D) to develop mutually agreed upon mul14 tilateral policies among Arctic states on the 

15 management of maritime transit routes through 

16 the Arctic Region and work cooperatively on the 

17 transit policies for access to and transit in the 

18 Arctic Region by non-Arctic states; and 

19 (E) to facilitate the development of Arctic 

20 Region Security Action Plans to ensure stability 

21 and public safety in disaster situations in a hu22 mane and responsible fashion; 

23 (6) to evaluate the vulnerability, security, sur24 vivability, and resiliency of United States interests 

25 and non-defense assets in the Arctic Region; and 


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1 (7) to reduce black carbon and methane emis2 sions in the Arctic. 

3 PART VII—OCEANIA 

4 SEC. 291. STATEMENT OF POLICY ON UNITED STATES EN5 GAGEMENT IN OCEANIA. 

6 It shall be the policy of the United States— 

7 (1) to elevate the countries of Oceania as a 

8 strategic national security and economic priority of 

9 the United States Government; 

10 (2) to promote civil society, the rule of law, and 

11 democratic governance across Oceania as part of a 

12 free and open Indo-Pacific region; 

13 (3) to broaden and deepen relationships with 

14 the Freely Associated States of the Republic of 

15 Palau, the Republic of the Marshall Islands, and the 

16 Federated States of Micronesia through robust de17 fense, diplomatic, economic, and development ex18 changes that promote the goals of individual states 

19 and the entire region; 

20 (4) to work with the governments of Australia, 

21 New Zealand, and Japan to advance shared alliance 

22 goals of the Oceania region concerning health, envi23 ronmental protection, disaster resilience and pre24 paredness, illegal, unreported and unregulated fish25 ing, maritime security, and economic development; 


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1 (5) to participate, wherever possible and appro2 priate, in existing regional organizations and inter3 national structures to promote the national security 

4 and economic goals of the United States and coun5 tries of the Oceania region; 

6 (6) to invest in a whole-of-government United 

7 States strategy that will enhance youth engagement 

8 and advance long-term growth and development 

9 throughout the region, especially as it relates to pro10 tecting marine resources that are critical to liveli11 hoods and strengthening the resilience of the coun12 tries of the Oceania region against current and fu13 ture threats resulting from extreme weather and se14 vere changes in the environment; 

15 (7) to deter and combat acts of malign foreign 

16 influence and corruption aimed at undermining the 

17 political, environmental, social, and economic sta18 bility of the people and governments of the countries 

19 of Oceania; 

20 (8) to improve the local capacity of the coun21 tries of Oceania to address public health challenges 

22 and improve global health security; 

23 (9) to help the countries of Oceania access mar24 ket-based private sector investments that adhere to 

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1 ability, and environmental and social safeguards as 

2 an alternative to state-directed investments by au3 thoritarian governments; 

4 (10) to ensure the people and communities of 

5 Oceania remain safe from the risks of old and de6 grading munitions hazards and other debris that 

7 threaten health and livelihoods; 

8 (11) to cooperate with Taiwan by offering 

9 United States support for maintaining Taiwan’s dip10 lomatic partners in Oceania; and 

11 (12) to work cooperatively with all governments 

12 in Oceania to promote the dignified return of the re13 mains of members of the United States Armed 

14 Forces that are missing in action from previous con15 flicts in the Indo-Pacific region. 

16 SEC. 292. OCEANIA STRATEGIC ROADMAP. 

17 (a) OCEANIA STRATEGIC ROADMAP.—Not later than 

18 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the 

19 Secretary of State shall submit to the appropriate congres20 sional committees a strategic roadmap for strengthening 

21 United States engagement with the countries of Oceania, 

22 including an analysis of opportunities to cooperate with 

23 Australia, New Zealand, and Japan, to address shared 

24 concerns and promote shared goals in pursuit of security 

25 and resiliency in the countries of Oceania. 


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1 (b) ELEMENTS.—The strategic roadmap required by 

2 subsection (a) shall include the following: 

3 (1) A description of United States regional 

4 goals and concerns with respect to Oceania and in5 creasing engagement with the countries of Oceania. 

6 (2) An assessment, based on paragraph (1), of 

7 United States regional goals and concerns that are 

8 shared by Australia, New Zealand, and Japan, in9 cluding a review of issues related to anticorruption, 

10 maritime and other security issues, environmental 

11 protection, fisheries management, economic growth 

12 and development, and disaster resilience and pre13 paredness. 

14 (3) A review of ongoing programs and initia15 tives by the governments of the United States, Aus16 tralia, New Zealand, and Japan in pursuit of those 

17 shared regional goals and concerns, including with 

18 respect to the issues described in paragraph (1). 

19 (4) A review of ongoing programs and initia20 tives by regional organizations and other related 

21 intergovernmental structures aimed at addressing 

22 the issues described in paragraph (1). 

23 (5) A plan for aligning United States programs 

24 and resources in pursuit of those shared regional 

25 goals and concerns, as appropriate. 


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1 (6) Recommendations for additional United 

2 States authorities, personnel, programs, or resources 

3 necessary to execute the strategic roadmap. 

4 (7) Any other elements the Secretary considers 

5 appropriate. 

6 SEC. 293. OCEANIA SECURITY DIALOGUE. 

7 (a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than one year after the 

8 date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State 

9 shall brief the appropriate committees of Congress on the 

10 feasibility and advisability of establishing a United States11 based public-private sponsored security dialogue (to be 

12 known as the ‘‘Oceania Security Dialogue’’) among the 

13 countries of Oceania for the purposes of jointly exploring 

14 and discussing issues affecting the economic, diplomatic, 

15 and national security of the Indo-Pacific countries of Oce16 ania. 

17 (b) REPORT REQUIRED.—The briefing required by 

18 subsection (a) shall, at a minimum, include the following: 

19 (1) A review of the ability of the Department 

20 of State to participate in a public-private sponsored 

21 security dialogue. 

22 (2) An assessment of the potential locations for 

23 conducting an Oceania Security Dialogue in the ju24 risdiction of the United States. 


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1 (3) Consideration of dates for conducting an 

2 Oceania Security Dialogue that would maximize par3 ticipation of representatives from the Indo-Pacific 

4 countries of Oceania. 

5 (4) A review of the funding modalities available 

6 to the Department of State to help finance an Oce7 ania Security Dialogue, including grant-making au8 thorities available to the Department of State. 

9 (5) An assessment of any administrative, statu10 tory, or other legal limitations that would prevent 

11 the establishment of an Oceania Security Dialogue 

12 with participation and support of the Department of 

13 State as described in subsection (a). 

14 (6) An analysis of how an Oceania Security 

15 Dialogue could help to advance the Boe Declaration 

16 on Regional Security, including its emphasis on the 

17 changing environment as the greatest existential 

18 threat to countries of Oceania. 

19 (7) An evaluation of how an Oceania Security 

20 Dialogue could help amplify the issues and work of 

21 existing regional structures and organizations dedi22 cated to the security of the Oceania region, such as 

23 the Pacific Island Forum and Pacific Environmental 

24 Security Forum. 


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1 (8) An analysis of how an Oceania Security 

2 Dialogue would help with implementation of the 

3 strategic roadmap required by section 292 and ad4 vance the National Security Strategy of the United 

5 States. 

6 (c) INTERAGENCY CONSULTATION.—To the extent 

7 practicable, the Secretary of State may consult with the 

8 Secretary of Defense and, where appropriate, evaluate the 

9 lessons learned of the Regional Centers for Security Stud10 ies of the Department of Defense to determine the feasi11 bility and advisability of establishing the Oceania Security 

12 Dialogue. 

13 SEC. 294. OCEANIA PEACE CORPS PARTNERSHIPS. 

14 (a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than one year after the 

15 date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of the 

16 Peace Corps shall submit to Congress a report on strate17 gies for to reasonably and safely expand the number of 

18 Peace Corps volunteers in Oceania, with the goals of— 

19 (1) expanding the presence of the Peace Corps 

20 to all currently feasible locations in Oceania; and 

21 (2) working with regional and international 

22 partners of the United States to expand the presence 

23 of Peace Corps volunteers in low-income Oceania 

24 communities in support of climate resilience initia25 tives. 


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1 (b) ELEMENTS.—The report required by subsection 

2 (a) shall— 

3 (1) assess the factors contributing to the cur4 rent absence of the Peace Corps and its volunteers 

5 in Oceania; 

6 (2) examine potential remedies that include 

7 working with United States Government agencies 

8 and regional governments, including governments of 

9 United States allies— 

10 (A) to increase the health infrastructure 

11 and medical evacuation capabilities of the coun12 tries of Oceania to better support the safety of 

13 Peace Corps volunteers while in those countries; 

14 (B) to address physical safety concerns 

15 that have decreased the ability of the Peace 

16 Corps to operate in Oceania; and 

17 (C) to increase transportation infrastruc18 ture in the countries of Oceania to better sup19 port the travel of Peace Corps volunteers and 

20 their access to necessary facilities; 

21 (3) evaluate the potential to expand the deploy22 ment of Peace Corps Response volunteers to help the 

23 countries of Oceania address social, economic, and 

24 development needs of their communities that require 

25 specific professional expertise; and 


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1 (4) explore potential new operational models to 

2 address safety and security needs of Peace Corps 

3 volunteers in the countries of Oceania, including— 

4 (A) changes to volunteer deployment dura5 tions; and 

6 (B) scheduled redeployment of volunteers 

7 to regional or United States-based healthcare 

8 facilities for routine physical and behavioral 

9 health evaluation. 

10 (c) VOLUNTEERS IN LOW-INCOME OCEANIA COMMU11 NITIES.— 

12 (1) IN GENERAL.—In examining the potential 

13 to expand the presence of Peace Corps volunteers in 

14 low-income Oceania communities under subsection 

15 (a)(2), the Director of the Peace Corps shall con16 sider the development of initiatives described in 

17 paragraph (2). 

18 (2) INITIATIVES DESCRIBED.—Initiatives de19 scribed in this paragraph are volunteer initiatives 

20 that help the countries of Oceania address social, 

21 economic, and development needs of their commu22 nities, including by— 

23 (A) addressing, through appropriate resil24 ience-based interventions, the vulnerability that 

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1 treme weather, severe environmental change, 

2 and other climate related trends; and 

3 (B) improving, through smart infrastruc4 ture principles, access to transportation and 

5 connectivity infrastructure that will help ad6 dress the economic and social challenges that 

7 communities in Oceania confront as a result of 

8 poor or nonexistent infrastructure. 

9 (d) OCEANIA DEFINED.—In this section, the term 

10 ‘‘Oceania’’ includes the following: 

11 (1) Easter Island of Chile. 

12 (2) Fiji. 

13 (3) French Polynesia of France. 

14 (4) Kiribati. 

15 (5) New Caledonia of France. 

16 (6) Nieu of New Zealand. 

17 (7) Papua New Guinea. 

18 (8) Samoa. 

19 (9) Vanuatu. 

20 (10) The Ashmore and Cartier Islands of Aus21 tralia. 

22 (11) The Cook Islands of New Zealand. 

23 (12) The Coral Islands of Australia. 

24 (13) The Federated States of Micronesia. 

25 (14) The Norfolk Island of Australia. 


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1 (15) The Pitcairn Islands of the United King2 dom. 

3 (16) The Republic of the Marshal Islands. 

4 (17) The Republic of Palau. 

5 (18) The Solomon Islands. 

6 (19) Tokelau of New Zealand. 

7 (20) Tonga. 

8 (21) Tuvalu. 

9 (22) Wallis and Futuna of France. 

10 PART VIII—PACIFIC ISLANDS 

11 SEC. 295. SHORT TITLE. 

12 This part may be cited as the ‘‘Boosting Long-term 

13 U.S. Engagement in the Pacific Act’’ or the ‘‘BLUE Pa14 cific Act’’. 

15 SEC. 296. FINDINGS. 

16 Congress finds the following: 

17 (1) The Pacific Islands— 

18 (A) are home to roughly 10 million resi19 dents, including over 8.6 million in Papua New 

20 Guinea, constituting diverse and dynamic cul21 tures and peoples; 

22 (B) are spread across an expanse of the 

23 Pacific Ocean equivalent to 15 percent of the 

24 Earth’s surface, including the three sub-regions 

25 of Melanesia, Micronesia, and Polynesia; and 


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1 (C) face shared challenges in development 

2 that have distinct local contexts, including cli3 mate change and rising sea levels, geographic 

4 distances from major markets, and vulnerability 

5 to external shocks such as natural disasters. 

6 (2) The United States is a Pacific country with 

7 longstanding ties and shared values and interests 

8 with the Pacific Islands, including through the Com9 pacts of Free Association with the Freely Associated 

10 States, the Republic of the Marshall Islands, the 

11 Federated States of Micronesia, and the Republic of 

12 Palau. 

13 (3) The United States has vital national secu14 rity interests in the Pacific Islands, including— 

15 (A) protecting regional peace and security 

16 that fully respects the sovereignty of all nations; 

17 (B) advancing economic prosperity free 

18 from coercion through trade and sustainable de19 velopment; and 

20 (C) supporting democracy, good govern21 ance, the rule of law, and human rights and 

22 fundamental freedoms. 

23 (4) Successive United States administrations 

24 have recognized the importance of the Pacific region, 


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1 including the Pacific Islands, in high-level strategic 

2 documents, including the following: 

3 (A) The 2015 National Security Strategy, 

4 which first declared the rebalance to Asia and 

5 the Pacific, affirmed the United States as a Pa6 cific nation, and paved the way for subsequent 

7 United States engagement with the Pacific Is8 lands, including several new policies focused on 

9 conservation and resilience to climate change 

10 announced in September 2016. 

11 (B) The 2017 National Security Strategy, 

12 which includes a commitment to ‘‘shore up 

13 fragile partner states in the Pacific Islands re14 gion to reduce their vulnerability to economic 

15 fluctuations and natural disasters’’. 

16 (C) The 2019 Indo-Pacific Strategy Re17 port, which identified the Pacific Islands as 

18 ‘‘critical to U.S. strategy because of our shared 

19 values, interests, and commitments’’ and com20 mitted the United States to ‘‘building capacity 

21 and resilience to address maritime security; Ille22 gal, Unreported, and Unregulated fishing; drug 

23 trafficking; and resilience to address climate 

24 change and disaster response’’. 


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1 (5) The United States has deepened its diplo2 matic engagement with the Pacific Islands through 

3 several recent initiatives, including— 

4 (A) the Pacific Pledge, which provided an 

5 additional $100,000,000 in 2019 and 

6 $200,000,000 in 2020, on top of the approxi7 mately $350,000,000 that the United States 

8 provides annually to the region to support 

9 shared priorities in economic and human devel10 opment, climate change, and more; and 

11 (B) the Small and Less Populous Island 

12 Economies (SALPIE) Initiative launched in 

13 March 2021 to strengthen United States col14 laboration with island countries and territories, 

15 including in the Pacific Islands, on COVID-19 

16 economic challenges, long-term economic devel17 opment, climate change, and other shared inter18 ests. 

19 (6) The Boe Declaration on Regional Security, 

20 signed by leaders of the Pacific Islands Forum in 

21 2018, affirmed that climate change ‘‘remains the 

22 single greatest threat to the livelihoods, security, and 

23 wellbeing of the peoples of the Pacific’’ and asserted 

24 ‘‘the sovereign right of every Member to conduct its 


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1 national affairs free of external interference and co2 ercion’’. 

3 (7) The Asian Development Bank has estimated 

4 that the Pacific Islands region needs upwards of 

5 $2.8 billion a year in investment needs through 

6 2030, in addition to $300 million a year for climate 

7 mitigation and adaptation over the same period. 

8 (8) The Pacific Islands swiftly enacted effective 

9 policies to prevent and contain the spread of the 

10 Coronavirus Disease 2019 (commonly referred to as 

11 ‘‘COVID–19’’) pandemic to their populations. The 

12 United States has provided over $130,000,000 in as13 sistance to the Pacific Islands for their COVID-19 

14 response. However, priorities must be met to ensure 

15 continued success in preventing the spread of the 

16 COVID–19 pandemic, achieving swift and wide17 spread vaccinations, and pursuing long-term eco18 nomic recovery in the Pacific Islands, including 

19 through— 

20 (A) expanding testing capacity and acquisi21 tion of needed medical supplies, including avail22 able COVID-19 vaccines and supporting vac23 cination efforts, through a reliable supply chain; 

24 (B) planning for lifting of lockdowns and 

25 reopening of economic and social activities; and 


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1 (C) mitigating and recovering from the im2 pacts of the COVID-19 pandemic on the health 

3 system and the reliance on food and energy im4 ports as well as lost tourism revenue and other 

5 economic and food security damages caused by 

6 the pandemic. 

7 (9) Since 1966, thousands of Peace Corps vol8 unteers have proudly served in the Pacific Islands, 

9 building strong people-to-people relationships and 

10 demonstrating the United States commitment to 

11 peace and development in the region. Prior to the 

12 COVID–19 pandemic, the Peace Corps maintained 

13 presence in four countries of the Pacific Islands. 

14 Peace Corps volunteers continue to be in high de15 mand in the Pacific Islands and have been requested 

16 across the region. 

17 SEC. 297. STATEMENT OF POLICY. 

18 It is the policy of the United States— 

19 (1) to develop and commit to a comprehensive, 

20 multifaceted, and principled United States policy in 

21 the Pacific Islands that— 

22 (A) promotes peace, security, and pros23 perity for all countries through a rules-based 

24 regional order that respects the sovereignty and 

25 political independence of all nations; 


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1 (B) preserves the Pacific Ocean as an open 

2 and vibrant corridor for international maritime 

3 trade and promotes trade and sustainable devel4 opment that supports inclusive economic growth 

5 and autonomy for all nations and addresses so6 cioeconomic challenges related to public health, 

7 education, renewable energy, digital 

8 connectivity, and more; 

9 (C) supports regional efforts to address the 

10 challenges posed by climate change, including 

11 by strengthening resilience to natural disasters 

12 and through responsible stewardship of natural 

13 resources; 

14 (D) improves civil society, strengthens 

15 democratic governance and the rule of law, and 

16 promotes human rights and the preservation of 

17 the region’s unique cultural heritages; 

18 (E) assists the Pacific Islands in pre19 venting and containing the spread of the 

20 COVID–19 pandemic and in pursuing long21 term economic recovery; and 

22 (F) supports existing regional architecture 

23 and international norms; 

24 (2) to support the vision, values, and objectives 

25 of existing regional multilateral institutions and 


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1 frameworks, such as the Pacific Islands Forum and 

2 the Pacific Community, including— 

3 (A) the 2014 Framework for Pacific Re4 gionalism; 

5 (B) the 2018 Boe Declaration on Regional 

6 Security; and 

7 (C) the Boe Declaration Action Plan; 

8 (3) to extend and renew the provisions of the 

9 Compacts of Free Association and related United 

10 States law that will expire in 2023 for the Republic 

11 of the Marshall Islands and the Federated States of 

12 Micronesia and in 2024 for the Republic of Palau 

13 unless they are extended and renewed; and 

14 (4) to work closely with United States allies 

15 and partners with existing relationships and inter16 ests in the Pacific Islands, including Australia, 

17 Japan, New Zealand, and Taiwan, in advancing 

18 common goals. 

19 SEC. 298. DEFINITIONS. 

20 In this Act: 

21 (1) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMIT22 TEES.—Except as otherwise provided, the term ‘‘ap23 propriate congressional committees’’ means— 

24 (A) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of 

25 the House of Representatives; and 


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1 (B) the Committee on Foreign Relations of 

2 the Senate. 

3 (2) PACIFIC ISLANDS.—The terms ‘‘Pacific Is4 lands’’ means the Cook Islands, the Republic of Fiji, 

5 the Republic of Kiribati, the Republic of the Mar6 shall Islands, the Federated States of Micronesia, 

7 the Republic of Nauru, Niue, the Republic of Palau, 

8 the Independent State of Papua New Guinea, the 

9 Independent State of Samoa, the Solomon Islands, 

10 the Kingdom of Tonga, Tuvalu, and the Republic of 

11 Vanuatu. 

12 SEC. 299. AUTHORITY TO CONSOLIDATE REPORTS; FORM 

13 OF REPORTS. 

14 (a) AUTHORITY TO CONSOLIDATE REPORTS.—Any 

15 reports required to be submitted to the appropriate con16 gressional committees under this Act that are subject to 

17 deadlines for submission consisting of the same units of 

18 time may be consolidated into a single report that is sub19 mitted to appropriate congressional committees pursuant 

20 to such deadlines and that contains all information re21 quired under such reports. 

22 (b) FORM OF REPORTS.—Each report required by 

23 this Act shall be submitted in unclassified form but may 

24 contain a classified annex. 


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1 SEC. 299A. DIPLOMATIC PRESENCE IN THE PACIFIC IS2 LANDS. 

3 (a) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con4 gress that— 

5 (1) the strategic importance of the Pacific Is6 lands necessitates an examination of whether United 

7 States diplomatic, economic, and development en8 gagement and presence in the Pacific Islands region 

9 is sufficient to effectively support United States ob10 jectives and meaningful participation in regional 

11 fora; 

12 (2) improving shared understanding of and 

13 jointly combatting the transnational challenges perti14 nent to the Pacific Islands region with countries of 

15 the Pacific Islands and regional partners such as 

16 Australia, New Zealand, Japan, and Taiwan is vi17 tally important to our shared long-term interests of 

18 stability, security, and prosperity; 

19 (3) the United States should seek to participate 

20 in and support efforts to coordinate a regional re21 sponse toward maritime security, including through 

22 continued United States and Pacific Islands partici23 pation in the Pacific Fusion Centre in Vanuatu and 

24 Information Fusion Centre in Singapore, and robust 

25 cooperation with regional allies; and 


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1 (4) the United States Government should com2 mit to sending appropriate levels of representation to 

3 regional events. 

4 (b) REPORT.— 

5 (1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days 

6 after the date of the enactment of this Act, and an7 nually thereafter for 5 years, the Secretary of State, 

8 in consultation with the Secretary of Commerce and 

9 the Administrator of the United States Agency for 

10 International Development, shall submit to the ap11 propriate congressional committees a report on the 

12 diplomatic and development presence of the United 

13 States in the Pacific Islands. 

14 (2) ELEMENTS.—The report required by para15 graph (1) shall include the following: 

16 (A) A description of the Department of 

17 State, United States Agency for International 

18 Development, United States International De19 velopment Finance Corporation, Millennium 

20 Challenge Corporation, and United States Com21 mercial Service presence, staffing, program22 ming, and resourcing of operations in the Pa23 cific Islands, including programming and 

24 resourcing not specifically allocated to the Pa25 cific Islands. 


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1 (B) A description of gaps in such presence, 

2 including unfilled full-time equivalent positions. 

3 (C) A description of limitations and chal4 lenges such gaps pose to United States stra5 tegic objectives, including— 

6 (i) gaps in support of the Pacific Is7 lands due to operations being conducted 

8 from the United States Agency for Inter9 national Development offices in Manila and 

10 Suva; and 

11 (ii) gaps in programming and 

12 resourcing. 

13 (D) A strategy to expand and elevate such 

14 presence to fill such gaps, including by estab15 lishing new missions, expanding participation in 

16 regional forums, and elevating United States 

17 representation in regional forums. 

18 (c) AUTHORITY TO ENHANCE DIPLOMATIC AND ECO19 NOMIC ENGAGEMENT.—The Secretary of State and the 

20 Secretary of Commerce are authorized to hire locally em21 ployed staff in the Pacific Islands for the purpose of pro22 moting increased diplomatic engagement and economic 

23 and commercial engagement between the United States 

24 and the Pacific Islands. 


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1 (d) REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION STRAT2 EGY.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enact3 ment of this Act, and every 5 years thereafter, the Admin4 istrator of the United States Agency for International De5 velopment shall submit to the appropriate congressional 

6 committees a regional development cooperation strategy 

7 for the Pacific Islands. 

8 SEC. 299B. COORDINATION WITH REGIONAL ALLIES. 

9 (a) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary of State shall con10 sult and coordinate with regional allies and partners, in11 cluding Australia, Japan, New Zealand, Taiwan, and re12 gional institutions such as the Pacific Islands Forum and 

13 the Pacific Community, with respect to programs to pro14 vide assistance to the Pacific Islands, including programs 

15 established by this Act, including for purposes of— 

16 (1) deconflicting programming; 

17 (2) ensuring that any programming does not 

18 adversely affect the absorptive capacity of the Pa19 cific Islands; and 

20 (3) ensuring complementary programs benefit 

21 the Pacific Islands to the maximum extent prac22 ticable. 

23 (b) FORMAL CONSULTATIVE PROCESS.—The Sec24 retary of State shall establish a formal consultative proc25 ess with such regional allies and partners to coordinate 


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1 with respect to such programs and future-years program2 ming. 

3 (c) REPORT.—Not later than 180 days after the date 

4 of the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter, the 

5 Secretary of State shall submit to the appropriate congres6 sional committees a report that includes— 

7 (1) a review of ongoing efforts, initiatives, and 

8 programs undertaken by regional allies and part9 ners, including multilateral organizations, to advance 

10 priorities identified in this Act; 

11 (2) a review of ongoing efforts, initiatives, and 

12 programs undertaken by non-allied foreign actors 

13 that are viewed as being potentially harmful or in 

14 any way detrimental to one or more countries of the 

15 Pacific Islands; 

16 (3) an assessment of United States programs in 

17 the Pacific Islands and their alignment and 

18 complementarity with the efforts of regional allies 

19 and partners identified in paragraph (1); and 

20 (4) a review of the formal consultative process 

21 required in subsection (b) to summarize engage22 ments held and identify opportunities to improve co23 ordination with regional allies and partners. 


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1 SEC. 299C. CLIMATE RESILIENT DEVELOPMENT IN THE PA2 CIFIC ISLANDS. 

3 (a) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con4 gress that— 

5 (1) the United States Government should lever6 age the full range of authorities and programs avail7 able to assist the Pacific Islands in achieving their 

8 development goals; 

9 (2) United States development assistance 

10 should seek to build on existing public and private 

11 sector investments while creating new opportunities 

12 toward a favorable environment for additional such 

13 investments; and 

14 (3) United States development efforts should be 

15 coordinated with and seek to build on existing ef16 forts by like-minded partners and allies and regional 

17 and international multilateral organizations. 

18 (b) STRATEGY.—The Secretary of State, in coordina19 tion with the Administrator of the United States Agency 

20 for International Development, the Secretary of the Treas21 ury, and the Chief Executive Officer of the United States 

22 International Development Finance Corporation, shall de23 velop and implement a strategy to— 

24 (1) invest in and improve critical infrastructure, 

25 including transport connectivity, information and 

26 communications technology, food security, coastal 


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1 zone management, marine and water resource man2 agement, and energy security and access to elec3 tricity in the Pacific Islands, with an emphasis on 

4 climate resiliency and sustainable development; 

5 (2) provide technical assistance to assist local 

6 government and civil society leaders assess risks to 

7 local infrastructure, especially those posed by climate 

8 change, consider and implement risk mitigation ef9 forts and policies to strengthen resilience, and evalu10 ate proposed projects and solutions for their efficacy 

11 and sustainability; and 

12 (3) support investment and improvement in eco13 system conservation and protection for the long-term 

14 sustainable use of ecosystem services, especially 

15 those that mitigate effects of climate change and 

16 those that support food security and livelihoods. 

17 (c) CONDUCT OF STRATEGY.—The strategy devel18 oped under this section shall be coordinated with like19 minded partners and allies, regional and international 

20 multilateral organizations, and regional frameworks for 

21 development in the Pacific Islands. 

22 (d) INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS.— 

23 The Secretary of the Treasury shall direct the representa24 tives of the United States to the World Bank Group, the 

25 International Monetary Fund, and the Asian Development 


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1 Bank to use the voice and vote of the United States to 

2 support climate resilient infrastructure projects in the Pa3 cific Islands. 

4 (e) REPORT.— 

5 (1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days 

6 after the date of the enactment this Act, and annu7 ally thereafter, the Secretary of State shall submit 

8 to the appropriate congressional committees a report 

9 on foreign infrastructure developments in the Pacific 

10 Islands. 

11 (2) MATTERS TO BE INCLUDED.—The report 

12 required by paragraph (1) shall include— 

13 (A) a review of foreign infrastructure de14 velopments in the Pacific Islands by non-United 

15 States allies and partners; 

16 (B) assessments of the environmental im17 pact and sustainability of such developments; 

18 and 

19 (C) an analysis of the financial sustain20 ability of such developments and their impacts 

21 on the debt of host countries in the Pacific Is22 lands. 

23 (3) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMIT24 TEES DEFINED.—In this subsection, the term ‘‘ap25 propriate congressional committees’’ means— 


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1 (A) the Committee on Foreign Affairs and 

2 the Committee on Natural Resources of the 

3 House of Representatives; and 

4 (B) the Committee on Foreign Relations 

5 and the Committee on Energy and Natural Re6 sources of the Senate. 

7 (f) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—There 

8 are authorized to be appropriated $50,000,000 for each 

9 of the fiscal years 2022 through 2026 to carry out this 

10 section. 

11 TITLE III—INVESTING IN OUR 

12 VALUES 

13 SEC. 301. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON THE CONTINUED VIOLA14 TION OF RIGHTS AND FREEDOMS OF THE 

15 PEOPLE OF HONG KONG. 

16 (a) FINDINGS.—Congress finds the following: 

17 (1) Despite international condemnation, the 

18 Government of the People’s Republic of China 

19 (‘‘PRC’’) continues to disregard its international 

20 legal obligations under the Joint Declaration of the 

21 Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain 

22 and Northern Ireland and the Government of the 

23 People’s Republic of China on the Question of Hong 

24 Kong (‘‘Joint Declaration’’), in which the PRC com25 mitted that— 


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1 (A) Hong Kong would enjoy a high degree 

2 of autonomy; 

3 (B) for at least 50 years the ‘‘social and 

4 economic systems in Hong Kong’’ would remain 

5 unchanged; and 

6 (C) the personal rights and freedoms of 

7 the people of Hong Kong would be protected by 

8 law. 

9 (2) As part of its continued efforts to under10 mine the established rights of the Hong Kong peo11 ple, the PRC National People’s Congress Standing 

12 Committee (‘‘Standing Committee’’) passed and im13 posed upon Hong Kong oppressive and intentionally 

14 vague national security legislation on June 30, 2020, 

15 that grants Beijing sweeping powers to punish acts 

16 of ‘‘separating the country, subverting state power, 

17 and organizing terroristic activities’’. 

18 (3) The legislative process by which the Stand19 ing Committee imposed the national security law on 

20 Hong Kong bypassed Hong Kong’s local government 

21 in a potential violation of the Basic Law of the 

22 Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the 

23 People’s Republic of China (‘‘Basic Law’’), and in24 volved unusual secrecy, as demonstrated by the fact 

25 that the legislation was only the second law since 


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1 2008 that the Standing Committee has passed with2 out releasing a draft for public comment. 

3 (4) On July 30, 2020, election officials of the 

4 Hong Kong Special Administrative Region 

5 (HKSAR) disqualified twelve pro-democracy can6 didates from participating in the September 6 Legis7 lative Council elections, which were subsequently 

8 postponed for a year until September 5, 2021, by 

9 citing the public health risk of holding elections dur10 ing the COVID–19 pandemic. 

11 (5) On July 31, 2020, in an attempt to assert 

12 extraterritorial jurisdiction, the HKSAR Govern13 ment announced indictments of and arrest warrants 

14 for six Hong Kong activists living overseas, includ15 ing United States citizen Samuel Chu, for alleged 

16 violations of the national security law. 

17 (6) On November 11, 2020, the HKSAR Gov18 ernment removed four lawmakers from office for al19 legedly violating the law after the Standing Com20 mittee passed additional legislation barring those 

21 who promoted or supported Hong Kong independ22 ence and refused to acknowledge PRC sovereignty 

23 over Hong Kong, or otherwise violates the national 

24 security law, from running for or serving in the Leg25 islative Council. 


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1 (7) On December 2, 2020, pro-democracy activ2 ists Joshua Wong, Agnes Chow, and Ivan Lam were 

3 sentenced to prison for participating in 2019 pro4 tests. 

5 (8) Ten of the twelve Hong Kong residents 

6 (also known as ‘‘the Hong Kong 12’’) who sought to 

7 flee by boat from Hong Kong to Taiwan on August 

8 23, 2020, were taken to mainland China and sen9 tenced on December 30, 2020, to prison terms rang10 ing from seven months to three years for illegal bor11 der crossing. 

12 (9) On December 31, 2020, Hong Kong’s high13 est court revoked bail for Jimmy Lai Chee-Ying, a 

14 pro-democracy figure and publisher, who was 

15 charged on December 12 with colluding with foreign 

16 forces and endangering national security under the 

17 national security legislation. 

18 (10) On January 4, 2021, the Departments of 

19 Justice in Henan and Sichuan province threatened 

20 to revoke the licenses of two lawyers hired to help 

21 the Hong Kong 12. 

22 (11) On January 5, 2021, the Hong Kong Po23 lice Force arrested more than fifty opposition fig24 ures, including pro-democracy officials, activists, and 

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1 formal July 2020 primary to select candidates for 

2 the general election originally scheduled for Sep3 tember 2020, despite other political parties having 

4 held similar primaries without retribution. 

5 (b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con6 gress that Congress— 

7 (1) condemns the actions taken by the Govern8 ment of the People’s Republic of China (‘‘PRC’’) 

9 and the Government of the Hong Kong Special Ad10 ministrative Region (‘‘HKSAR’’), including the 

11 adoption and implementation of national security 

12 legislation for Hong Kong through irregular proce13 dures, that violate the rights and freedoms of the 

14 people of Hong Kong that are guaranteed by the 

15 Joint Declaration and its implementing document, 

16 the Basic Law; 

17 (2) reaffirms its support for the people of Hong 

18 Kong, who face grave threats to their rights and 

19 freedoms; 

20 (3) calls on the governments of the PRC and 

21 HKSAR to— 

22 (A) respect and uphold— 

23 (i) commitments made to the inter24 national community and the people of 


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1 Hong Kong under the Joint Declaration; 

2 and 

3 (ii) the judicial independence of the 

4 Hong Kong legal system; and 

5 (B) release pro-democracy activists and 

6 politicians arrested under the national security 

7 law; and 

8 (4) encourages the President, the Secretary of 

9 State, and the Secretary of the Treasury to coordi10 nate with allies and partners and continue United 

11 States efforts to respond to developments in Hong 

12 Kong, including by— 

13 (A) providing protection for Hong Kong 

14 residents who fear persecution; 

15 (B) supporting those who may seek to file 

16 a case before the International Court of Justice 

17 to hold the Government of the PRC accountable 

18 for violating its binding legal commitments 

19 under the Joint Declaration; 

20 (C) encouraging allies and partner coun21 tries to instruct, as appropriate, their respective 

22 representatives to the United Nations to use 

23 their voice, vote, and influence to press for the 

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1 date holder to monitor and report on human 

2 rights developments in Hong Kong; 

3 (D) ensuring the private sector, particu4 larly United States companies with economic in5 terests in Hong Kong, is aware of risks the na6 tional security legislation poses to the security 

7 of United States citizens and to the medium 

8 and long-term interest of United States busi9 nesses in Hong Kong; 

10 (E) continuing to implement sanctions au11 thorities, especially authorities recently enacted 

12 to address actions undermining the rights and 

13 freedoms of the Hong Kong people such as the 

14 Hong Kong Autonomy Act (Public Law 116– 

15 149) and the Hong Kong Human Rights and 

16 Democracy Act of 2019 (Public Law 116–76), 

17 with respect to officials of the Chinese Com18 munist Party, the Government of the PRC, or 

19 the Government of the HKSAR who are respon20 sible for undermining such rights and freedoms; 

21 and 

22 (F) coordinating with allies and partners 

23 to ensure that such implementation of sanctions 

24 is multilateral. 


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1 SEC. 302. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS FOR PRO2 MOTION OF DEMOCRACY IN HONG KONG. 

3 (a) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—There is 

4 authorized to be appropriated $10,000,000 for fiscal year 

5 2022 for the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and 

6 Labor of the Department of State to promote democracy 

7 in Hong Kong. 

8 (b) ADMINISTRATION.—The Secretary of State shall 

9 designate an office with the Department of State to ad10 minister and coordinate the provision of such funds de11 scribed in subsection (a) within the Department of State 

12 and across the United States Government. 

13 SEC. 303. HONG KONG PEOPLE’S FREEDOM AND CHOICE. 

14 (a) DEFINITIONS.—For purposes of this section: 

15 (1) JOINT DECLARATION.—The term ‘‘Joint 

16 Declaration’’ means the Joint Declaration of the 

17 Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain 

18 and Northern Ireland and the Government of the 

19 People’s Republic of China on the Question of Hong 

20 Kong, signed on December 19, 1984, and entered 

21 into force on May 27, 1985. 

22 (2) PRIORITY HONG KONG RESIDENT.—The 

23 term ‘‘Priority Hong Kong resident’’ means— 

24 (A) a permanent resident of Hong Kong 

25 who— 


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1 (i) holds no right to citizenship in any 

2 country or jurisdiction other than the Peo3 ple’s Republic of China (referred to in this 

4 Act as ‘‘PRC’’), Hong Kong, or Macau as 

5 of the date of enactment of this Act; 

6 (ii) has resided in Hong Kong for not 

7 less than the last 10 years as of the date 

8 of enactment of this Act; and 

9 (iii) has been designated by the Sec10 retary of State or Secretary of Homeland 

11 Security as having met the requirements of 

12 this subparagraph, in accordance with the 

13 procedures described in subsection (f) of 

14 this Act; or 

15 (B) the spouse of a person described in 

16 subparagraph (A), or the child of such person 

17 as such term is defined in section 101(b)(1) of 

18 the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 

19 1101(b)(1)), except that a child shall be an un20 married person under twenty-seven years of 

21 age. 

22 (3) HONG KONG NATIONAL SECURITY LAW.— 

23 The term ‘‘Hong Kong National Security Law’’ 

24 means the Law of the People’s Republic of China on 

25 Safeguarding National Security in the Hong Kong 


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1 Special Administrative Region that was passed 

2 unanimously by the National People’s Congress and 

3 signed by President Xi Jinping on June 30, 2020, 

4 and promulgated in the Hong Kong Special Admin5 istrative Region (referred to in this Act as ‘‘Hong 

6 Kong SAR’’) on July 1, 2020. 

7 (4) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMIT8 TEES.—The term ‘‘appropriate congressional com9 mittees’’ means— 

10 (A) the Committee on Foreign Affairs and 

11 the Committee on the Judiciary of the House of 

12 Representatives; and 

13 (B) the Committee on Foreign Relations 

14 and the Committee on the Judiciary of the Sen15 ate. 

16 (b) FINDINGS.—Congress finds the following: 

17 (1) The Hong Kong National Security Law pro18 mulgated on July 1, 2020— 

19 (A) contravenes the Basic Law of the 

20 Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (re21 ferred to in this Act as ‘‘the Basic Law’’) that 

22 provides in Article 23 that the Legislative 

23 Council of Hong Kong shall enact legislation re24 lated to national security; 


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1 (B) violates the PRC’s commitments under 

2 international law, as defined by the Joint Dec3 laration; and 

4 (C) causes severe and irreparable damage 

5 to the ‘‘one country, two systems’’ principle and 

6 further erodes global confidence in the PRC’s 

7 commitment to international law. 

8 (2) On July 14, 2020, in response to the pro9 mulgation of the Hong Kong National Security Law, 

10 President Trump signed an Executive order on 

11 Hong Kong normalization that, among other policy 

12 actions, suspended the special treatment of Hong 

13 Kong persons under U.S. law with respect to the 

14 issuance of immigrant and nonimmigrant visas. 

15 (3) The United States has a long and proud 

16 history as a destination for refugees and asylees flee17 ing persecution based on race, religion, nationality, 

18 political opinion, or membership in a particular so19 cial group. 

20 (4) The United States also shares deep social, 

21 cultural, and economic ties with the people of Hong 

22 Kong, including a shared commitment to democracy, 

23 to the rule of law, and to the protection of human 

24 rights. 


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1 (5) The United States has sheltered, protected, 

2 and welcomed individuals who have fled authori3 tarian regimes, including citizens from the PRC fol4 lowing the violent June 4, 1989, crackdown in 

5 Tiananmen Square, deepening ties between the peo6 ple of the United States and those individuals seek7 ing to contribute to a free, open society founded on 

8 democracy, human rights, and the respect for the 

9 rule of law. 

10 (6) The United States has reaped enormous 

11 economic, cultural, and strategic benefits from wel12 coming successive generations of scientists, doctors, 

13 entrepreneurs, artists, intellectuals, and other free14 dom-loving people fleeing fascism, communism, vio15 lent Islamist extremism, and other repressive 

16 ideologies, including in the cases of Nazi Germany, 

17 the Soviet Union, and Soviet-controlled Central Eu18 rope, Cuba, Vietnam, and Iran. 

19 (7) A major asymmetric advantage of the 

20 United States in its long-term strategic competition 

21 with the Communist Party of China is the ability of 

22 people from every country in the world, irrespective 

23 of their race, ethnicity, or religion, to immigrate to 

24 the United States and become American citizens. 


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1 (c) STATEMENT OF POLICY.—It is the policy of the 

2 United States— 

3 (1) to reaffirm the principles and objectives set 

4 forth in the United States-Hong Kong Policy Act of 

5 1992 (Public Law 102–383), namely that— 

6 (A) the United States has ‘‘a strong inter7 est in the continued vitality, prosperity, and 

8 stability of Hong Kong’’; 

9 (B) ‘‘support for democratization is a fun10 damental principle of United States foreign pol11 icy’’ and therefore ‘‘naturally applies to United 

12 States policy toward Hong Kong’’; 

13 (C) ‘‘the human rights of the people of 

14 Hong Kong are of great importance to the 

15 United States and are directly relevant to 

16 United States interests in Hong Kong and 

17 serve as a basis for Hong Kong’s continued eco18 nomic prosperity’’; and 

19 (D) Hong Kong must remain sufficiently 

20 autonomous from the PRC to ‘‘justify treat21 ment under a particular law of the United 

22 States, or any provision thereof, different from 

23 that accorded the People’s Republic of China’’; 


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1 (2) to continue to support the high degree of 

2 autonomy and fundamental rights and freedoms of 

3 the people of Hong Kong, as enumerated by— 

4 (A) the Joint Declaration; 

5 (B) the International Covenant on Civil 

6 and Political Rights, done at New York Decem7 ber 19, 1966; and 

8 (C) the Universal Declaration of Human 

9 Rights, done at Paris December 10, 1948; 

10 (3) to continue to support the democratic aspi11 rations of the people of Hong Kong, including the 

12 ‘‘ultimate aim’’ of the selection of the Chief Execu13 tive and all members of the Legislative Council by 

14 universal suffrage, as articulated in the Basic Law; 

15 (4) to urge the Government of the PRC, despite 

16 its recent actions, to uphold its commitments to 

17 Hong Kong, including allowing the people of Hong 

18 Kong to govern Hong Kong with a high degree of 

19 autonomy and without undue interference, and en20 suring that Hong Kong voters freely enjoy the right 

21 to elect the Chief Executive and all members of the 

22 Hong Kong Legislative Council by universal suf23 frage; 

24 (5) to support the establishment of a genuine 

25 democratic option to freely and fairly nominate and 


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1 elect the Chief Executive of Hong Kong, and the es2 tablishment of open and direct democratic elections 

3 for all members of the Hong Kong Legislative Coun4 cil; 

5 (6) to support the robust exercise by residents 

6 of Hong Kong of the rights to free speech, the press, 

7 and other fundamental freedoms, as provided by the 

8 Basic Law, the Joint Declaration, and the Inter9 national Covenant on Civil and Political Rights; 

10 (7) to support freedom from arbitrary or unlaw11 ful arrest, detention, or imprisonment for all Hong 

12 Kong residents, as provided by the Basic Law, the 

13 Joint Declaration, and the International Covenant 

14 on Civil and Political Rights; 

15 (8) to draw international attention to any viola16 tions by the Government of the PRC of the funda17 mental rights of the people of Hong Kong, as pro18 vided by the International Covenant on Civil and Po19 litical Rights, and any encroachment upon the au20 tonomy guaranteed to Hong Kong by the Basic Law 

21 and the Joint Declaration; 

22 (9) to protect United States citizens and long23 term permanent residents living in Hong Kong, as 

24 well as people visiting and transiting through Hong 

25 Kong; 


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1 (10) to maintain the economic and cultural ties 

2 that provide significant benefits to both the United 

3 States and Hong Kong, including the reinstatement 

4 of the Fulbright exchange program with regard to 

5 Hong Kong at the earliest opportunity; 

6 (11) to coordinate with allies, including the 

7 United Kingdom, Australia, Canada, Japan, and the 

8 Republic of Korea, to promote democracy and 

9 human rights in Hong Kong; and 

10 (12) to welcome and protect in the United 

11 States residents of Hong Kong fleeing persecution or 

12 otherwise seeking a safe haven from violations by 

13 the Government of the PRC of the fundamental 

14 rights of the people of Hong Kong. 

15 (d) TEMPORARY PROTECTED STATUS FOR HONG

16 KONG RESIDENTS IN THE UNITED STATES.— 

17 (1) DESIGNATION.— 

18 (A) IN GENERAL.—For purposes of section 

19 244 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 

20 U.S.C. 1254a), Hong Kong shall be treated as 

21 if it had been designated under subsection 

22 (b)(1)(C) of that section, subject to the provi23 sions of this section. 

24 (B) PERIOD OF DESIGNATION.—The initial 

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1 paragraph (A) shall be for the 18-month period 

2 beginning on the date of enactment of this Act. 

3 (2) ALIENS ELIGIBLE.—As a result of the des4 ignation made under subsection (a), an alien is 

5 deemed to satisfy the requirements under paragraph 

6 (1) of section 244(c) of the Immigration and Nation7 ality Act (8 U.S.C. 1254a(c)), subject to paragraph 

8 (3) of such section, if the alien— 

9 (A) was a permanent resident of Hong 

10 Kong at the time such individual arrived into 

11 the United States and is a national of the PRC 

12 (or in the case of an individual having no na13 tionality, is a person who last habitually resided 

14 in Hong Kong); 

15 (B) has been continuously physically 

16 present in the United States since the date of 

17 the enactment of this Act; 

18 (C) is admissible as an immigrant, except 

19 as otherwise provided in paragraph (2)(A) of 

20 such section, and is not ineligible for temporary 

21 protected status under paragraph (2)(B) of 

22 such section; and 

23 (D) registers for temporary protected sta24 tus in a manner established by the Secretary of 

25 Homeland Security. 


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1 (3) CONSENT TO TRAVEL ABROAD.— 

2 (A) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary of 

3 Homeland Security shall give prior consent to 

4 travel abroad, in accordance with section 

5 244(f)(3) of the Immigration and Nationality 

6 Act (8 U.S.C. 1254a(f)(3)), to an alien who is 

7 granted temporary protected status pursuant to 

8 the designation made under paragraph (1) if 

9 the alien establishes to the satisfaction of the 

10 Secretary of Homeland Security that emergency 

11 and extenuating circumstances beyond the con12 trol of the alien require the alien to depart for 

13 a brief, temporary trip abroad. 

14 (B) TREATMENT UPON RETURN.—An alien 

15 returning to the United States in accordance 

16 with an authorization described in subpara17 graph (A) shall be treated as any other return18 ing alien provided temporary protected status 

19 under section 244 of the Immigration and Na20 tionality Act (8 U.S.C. 1254a). 

21 (4) FEE.— 

22 (A) IN GENERAL.—In addition to any 

23 other fee authorized by law, the Secretary of 

24 Homeland Security is authorized to charge and 

25 collect a fee of $360 for each application for 


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1 temporary protected status under section 244 

2 of the Immigration and Nationality Act by a 

3 person who is only eligible for such status by 

4 reason of paragraph (1). 

5 (B) WAIVER.—The Secretary of Homeland 

6 Security shall permit aliens to apply for a waiv7 er of any fees associated with filing an applica8 tion referred to in subparagraph (A). 

9 (e) TREATMENT OF HONG KONG RESIDENTS FOR

10 IMMIGRATION PURPOSES.—Notwithstanding any other 

11 provision of law, during the 5 fiscal year period beginning 

12 on the first day of the first full fiscal year after the date 

13 of enactment of this Act, Hong Kong shall continue to 

14 be considered a foreign state separate and apart from the 

15 PRC as mandated under section 103 of the Immigration 

16 and Nationality Act of 1990 (Public Law 101–649) for 

17 purposes of the numerical limitations on immigrant visas 

18 under sections 201, 202, and 203 of the Immigration and 

19 Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1151, 1152, and 1153). 

20 (f) VERIFICATION OF PRIORITY HONG KONG RESI21 DENTS.— 

22 (1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days 

23 after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Sec24 retary of State, in consultation with the Secretary of 

25 Homeland Security, shall publish in the Federal 


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1 Register, an interim final rule establishing proce2 dures for designation of Priority Hong Kong Resi3 dents. Notwithstanding section 553 of title 5, United 

4 States Code, the rule shall be effective, on an in5 terim basis, immediately upon publication, but may 

6 be subject to change and revision after public notice 

7 and opportunity for comment. The Secretary of 

8 State shall finalize such rule not later than 1 year 

9 after the date of the enactment of this Act. Such 

10 rule shall establish procedures— 

11 (A) for individuals to register with any 

12 United States embassy or consulate outside of 

13 the United States, or with the Department of 

14 Homeland Security in the United States, and 

15 request designation as a Priority Hong Kong 

16 Resident; and 

17 (B) for the appropriate Secretary to verify 

18 the residency of registered individuals and des19 ignate those who qualify as Priority Hong Kong 

20 Residents. 

21 (2) DOCUMENTATION.—The procedures de22 scribed in paragraph (1) shall include the collection 

23 of— 

24 (A) biometric data; 


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1 (B) copies of birth certificates, residency 

2 cards, and other documentation establishing 

3 residency; and 

4 (C) other personal information, data, and 

5 records deemed appropriate by the Secretary. 

6 (3) GUIDANCE.—Not later than 90 days after 

7 the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary 

8 of State shall issue guidance outlining actions to en9 hance the ability of the Secretary to efficiently send 

10 and receive information to and from the United 

11 Kingdom and other like-minded allies and partners 

12 for purposes of rapid verification of permanent resi13 dency in Hong Kong and designation of individuals 

14 as Priority Hong Kong Residents. 

15 (4) REPORT.—Not later than 90 days after the 

16 date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of 

17 State shall submit a report to the House Committees 

18 on Foreign Affairs and the Judiciary and the Senate 

19 Committees on Foreign Relations and the Judiciary 

20 detailing plans to implement the requirements de21 scribed in this subsection. 

22 (5) PROTECTION FOR REFUGEES.—Nothing in 

23 this section shall be construed to prevent a Priority 

24 Hong Kong Resident from seeking refugee status 

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1 ality Act (8 U.S.C. 1157) or requesting asylum 

2 under section 208 of such Act (8 U.S.C. 1158). 

3 (g) REPORTING REQUIREMENTS.— 

4 (1) IN GENERAL.—On an annual basis, the Sec5 retary of State and the Secretary of Homeland Secu6 rity, in consultation with other Federal agencies, as 

7 appropriate, shall submit a report to the appropriate 

8 congressional committees, detailing for the previous 

9 fiscal year— 

10 (A) the number of Hong Kong SAR resi11 dents who have applied for U.S. visas or immi12 gration benefits, disaggregated by visa type or 

13 immigration benefit, including asylum, refugee 

14 status, temporary protected status, and lawful 

15 permanent residence; 

16 (B) the number of approvals, denials, or 

17 rejections of applicants for visas or immigration 

18 benefits described in subparagraph (A), 

19 disaggregated by visa type or immigration ben20 efit and basis for denial; 

21 (C) the number of pending refugee and 

22 asylum applications for Hong Kong SAR resi23 dents, and the length of time and reason for 

24 which such applications have been pending; and 


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1 (D) other matters deemed relevant by the 

2 Secretaries relating to efforts to protect and fa3 cilitate the resettlement of refugees and victims 

4 of persecution in Hong Kong. 

5 (2) FORM.—Each report under paragraph (1) 

6 shall be submitted in unclassified form and pub7 lished on a text-searchable, publicly available website 

8 of the Department of State and the Department of 

9 Homeland Security. 

10 (h) STRATEGY FOR INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION

11 ON HONG KONG.— 

12 (1) IN GENERAL.—It is the policy of the United 

13 States— 

14 (A) to support the people of Hong Kong by 

15 providing safe haven to Hong Kong SAR resi16 dents who are nationals of the PRC following 

17 the enactment of the Hong Kong National Se18 curity Law that places certain Hong Kong per19 sons at risk of persecution; and 

20 (B) to encourage like-minded nations to 

21 make similar accommodations for Hong Kong 

22 people fleeing persecution by the Government of 

23 the PRC. 

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1 propriate, shall develop a plan to engage with other 

2 nations, including the United Kingdom, on coopera3 tive efforts to— 

4 (A) provide refugee and asylum protections 

5 for victims of, and individuals with a fear of, 

6 persecution in Hong Kong, either by Hong 

7 Kong authorities or other authorities acting on 

8 behalf of the PRC; 

9 (B) enhance protocols to facilitate the re10 settlement of refugees and displaced persons 

11 from Hong Kong; 

12 (C) identify and prevent the exploitation of 

13 immigration and visa policies and procedures by 

14 corrupt officials; and 

15 (D) expedite the sharing of information, as 

16 appropriate, related to the refusal of individual 

17 applications for visas or other travel documents 

18 submitted by residents of the Hong Kong SAR 

19 based on— 

20 (i) national security or related 

21 grounds under section 212(a)(3) of the Im22 migration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 

23 1182(a)(3)); or 

24 (ii) fraud or misrepresentation under 

25 section 212(a)(6)(C) of the Immigration 


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1 and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 

2 1182(a)(6)(C)). 

3 (3) REPORT.—Not later than 90 days after the 

4 date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of 

5 State, in consultation with the heads of other Fed6 eral agencies, as appropriate, shall submit a report 

7 on the plan described in paragraph (2) to the appro8 priate congressional committees. 

9 (i) REFUGEE STATUS FOR CERTAIN RESIDENTS OF

10 HONG KONG.— 

11 (1) IN GENERAL.—Aliens described in para12 graph (2) may establish, for purposes of admission 

13 as a refugee under sections 207 of the Immigration 

14 and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1157) or asylum 

15 under section 208 of such Act (8 U.S.C. 1158), that 

16 such alien has a well-founded fear of persecution on 

17 account of race, religion, nationality, membership in 

18 a particular social group, or political opinion by as19 serting such a fear and a credible basis for concern 

20 about the possibility of such persecution. 

21 (2) ALIENS DESCRIBED.— 

22 (A) IN GENERAL.—An alien is described in 

23 this subsection if such alien— 

24 (i) is a Priority Hong Kong Resident 

25 and— 


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1 (I) had a significant role in a 

2 civil society organization supportive of 

3 the protests in 2019 and 2020 related 

4 to the Hong Kong National Security 

5 Law and the encroachment on the au6 tonomy of Hong Kong by the PRC; 

7 (II) was arrested, charged, de8 tained, or convicted of an offense aris9 ing from their participation in an ac10 tion as described in section 206(b)(2) 

11 of the United States-Hong Kong Pol12 icy Act of 1992 (22 U.S.C. 

13 5726(b)(2)) that was not violent in 

14 nature; or 

15 (III) has had their citizenship, 

16 nationality, or residency revoked for 

17 having submitted to any United 

18 States Government agency a nonfrivo19 lous application for refugee status, 

20 asylum, or any other immigration ben21 efit under the immigration laws (as 

22 defined in section 101(a) of that Act 

23 (8 U.S.C. 1101(a))); 


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1 (ii) is a Priority Hong Kong Resident 

2 spouse or child of an alien described in 

3 clause (i); or 

4 (iii) is the parent of an alien described 

5 in clause (i), if such parent is a citizen of 

6 the PRC and no other foreign state. 

7 (B) OTHER CATEGORIES.—The Secretary 

8 of Homeland Security, in consultation with the 

9 Secretary of State, may designate other cat10 egories of aliens for purposes of establishing a 

11 well-founded fear of persecution under para12 graph (1) if such aliens share common charac13 teristics that identify them as targets of perse14 cution in the PRC on account of race, religion, 

15 nationality, membership in a particular social 

16 group, or political opinion. 

17 (C) SIGNIFICANT ROLE.—For purposes of 

18 subclause (I) of paragraph (2)(A)(i), a signifi19 cant role shall include, with respect to the pro20 tests described in such clause— 

21 (i) an organizing role; 

22 (ii) a first aid responder; 

23 (iii) a journalist or member of the 

24 media covering or offering public com25 mentary; 


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1 (iv) a provider of legal services to one 

2 or more individuals arrested for partici3 pating in such protests; or 

4 (v) a participant who during the pe5 riod beginning on June 9, 2019, and end6 ing on June 30, 2020, was arrested, 

7 charged, detained, or convicted as a result 

8 of such participation. 

9 (3) AGE OUT PROTECTIONS.—For purposes of 

10 this subsection, a determination of whether an alien 

11 is a child shall be made using the age of the alien 

12 on the date an application for refugee or asylum sta13 tus in which the alien is a named beneficiary is filed 

14 with the Secretary of Homeland Security. 

15 (4) EXCLUSION FROM NUMERICAL LIMITA16 TIONS.—Aliens provided refugee status under this 

17 subsection shall not be counted against the numer18 ical limitation on refugees established in accordance 

19 with the procedures described in section 207 of the 

20 Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1157). 

21 (5) REPORTING REQUIREMENTS.— 

22 (A) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 90 days 

23 after the date of the enactment of this Act, and 

24 every 90 days thereafter, the Secretary of State 

25 and the Secretary of Homeland Security shall 


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1 submit a report on the matters described in 

2 subparagraph (B) to— 

3 (i) the Committee on the Judiciary 

4 and the Committee on Foreign Relations 

5 of the Senate; and 

6 (ii) the Committee on the Judiciary 

7 and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of 

8 the House of Representatives. 

9 (B) MATTERS TO BE INCLUDED.—Each 

10 report required by subparagraph (A) shall in11 clude, with respect to applications submitted 

12 under this section— 

13 (i) the total number of refugee and 

14 asylum applications that are pending at 

15 the end of the reporting period; 

16 (ii) the average wait-times for all ap17 plicants for refugee status or asylum pend18 ing— 

19 (I) a prescreening interview with 

20 a resettlement support center; 

21 (II) an interview with U.S. Citi22 zenship and Immigration Services; 

23 and 

24 (III) the completion of security 

25 checks; 


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1 (iii) the number of approvals, referrals 

2 including the source of the referral, denials 

3 of applications for refugee status or asy4 lum, disaggregated by the reason for each 

5 such denial; and 

6 (iv) the number of refugee circuit 

7 rides to interview populations that would 

8 include Hong Kong SAR completed in the 

9 last 90 days, and the number planned for 

10 the subsequent 90-day period. 

11 (C) FORM.—Each report required by sub12 paragraph (A) shall be submitted in unclassi13 fied form, but may include a classified annex. 

14 (D) PUBLIC REPORTS.—The Secretary of 

15 State shall make each report submitted under 

16 this paragraph available to the public on the 

17 internet website of the Department of State. 

18 (j) ADMISSION FOR CERTAIN HIGHLY SKILLED

19 HONG KONG RESIDENTS.— 

20 (1) IN GENERAL.—Subject to subsection (c), 

21 the Secretary of Homeland Security, or, notwith22 standing any other provision of law, the Secretary of 

23 State in consultation with the Secretary of Home24 land Security, may provide an alien described in sub25 section (b) with the status of a special immigrant 


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1 under section 101(a)(27) of the Immigration and 

2 Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(27)), if the 

3 alien— 

4 (A) or an agent acting on behalf of the 

5 alien, submits a petition for classification under 

6 section 203(b)(4) of such Act (8 U.S.C. 

7 1153(b)(4)); 

8 (B) is otherwise eligible to receive an im9 migrant visa; 

10 (C) is otherwise admissible to the United 

11 States for permanent residence (excluding the 

12 grounds for inadmissibility specified in section 

13 212(a)(4) of such Act (8 U.S.C. (a)(4)); and 

14 (D) clears a background check and appro15 priate screening, as determined by the Sec16 retary of Homeland Security. 

17 (2) ALIENS DESCRIBED.— 

18 (A) PRINCIPAL ALIENS.—An alien is de19 scribed in this subsection if— 

20 (i) the alien— 

21 (I) is a Priority Hong Kong Resi22 dent; and 

23 (II) has earned a bachelor’s or 

24 higher degree from an institution of 

25 higher education; and 


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1 (ii) the Secretary of Homeland Secu2 rity determines that such alien’s relocation 

3 to the United States would provide a sig4 nificant benefit to the United States. 

5 (B) SPOUSES AND CHILDREN.—An alien is 

6 described in this subsection if the alien is the 

7 spouse or child of a principal alien described in 

8 paragraph (1). 

9 (3) NUMERICAL LIMITATIONS.— 

10 (A) IN GENERAL.—The total number of 

11 principal aliens who may be provided special 

12 immigrant status under this section may not 

13 exceed 5,000 per year for each of the 5 fiscal 

14 years beginning after the date of the enactment 

15 of this Act. The Secretary of Homeland Secu16 rity may, in consultation with the Secretary of 

17 State, prioritize the issuance of visas to individ18 uals with a bachelor’s or higher degree in 

19 science, technology, engineering, mathematics, 

20 medicine, or health care. 

21 (B) EXCLUSION FROM NUMERICAL LIMITA22 TIONS.—Aliens provided immigrant status 

23 under this section shall not be counted against 

24 any numerical limitation under section 201, 

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1 tionality Act (8 U.S.C. 1151, 1152, 1153, and 

2 1157). 

3 (4) ELIGIBILITY FOR ADMISSION UNDER OTHER

4 CLASSIFICATION.—No alien shall be denied the op5 portunity to apply for admission under this section 

6 solely because such alien qualifies as an immediate 

7 relative or is eligible for any other immigrant classi8 fication. 

9 (5) TIMELINE FOR PROCESSING APPLICA10 TIONS.— 

11 (A) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary of State 

12 and the Secretary of Homeland Security shall 

13 ensure that all steps under the control of the 

14 United States Government incidental to the ap15 proval of such applications, including required 

16 screenings and background checks, are com17 pleted not later than 1 year after the date on 

18 which an eligible applicant submits an applica19 tion under subsection (a). 

20 (B) EXCEPTION.—Notwithstanding para21 graph (1), the relevant Federal agencies may 

22 take additional time to process applications de23 scribed in paragraph (1) if satisfaction of na24 tional security concerns requires such additional 

25 time, provided that the Secretary of Homeland 


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1 Security, or the designee of the Secretary, has 

2 determined that the applicant meets the re3 quirements for status as a special immigrant 

4 under this section and has so notified the appli5 cant. 

6 (k) TERMINATION.—Except as provided in section 6 

7 of this Act, this Act shall cease to have effect on the date 

8 that is 5 years after the date of the enactment of this 

9 Act. 

10 SEC. 304. EXPORT PROHIBITION OF MUNITIONS ITEMS TO 

11 THE HONG KONG POLICE FORCE. 

12 Section 3 of the Act entitled ‘‘An Act to prohibit the 

13 commercial export of covered munitions items to the Hong 

14 Kong Police Force’’, approved November 27, 2019 (Public 

15 Law 116–77; 133 Stat. 1173), is amended by striking ‘‘on 

16 December 31, 2021.’’ and inserting the following: ‘‘on the 

17 date on which the President certifies to the appropriate 

18 congressional committees that— 

19 ‘‘(1) the Secretary of State has, on or after the 

20 date of the enactment of this paragraph, certified 

21 under section 205 of the United States-Hong Kong 

22 Policy Act of 1992 that Hong Kong warrants treat23 ment under United States law in the same manner 

24 as United States laws were applied to Hong Kong 

25 before July 1, 1997; 


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1 ‘‘(2) the Hong Kong Police have not engaged in 

2 gross violations of human rights during the 1-year 

3 period ending on the date of such certification; and 

4 ‘‘(3) there has been an independent examina5 tion of human rights concerns related to the crowd 

6 control tactics of the Hong Kong Police and the 

7 Government of the Hong Kong Special Administra8 tive Region has adequately addressed those con9 cerns.’’. 

10 SEC. 305. SENSE OF CONGRESS CONDEMNING THE ONGO11 ING GENOCIDE AND CRIMES AGAINST HU12 MANITY AGAINST UYGHURS AND OTHER MI13 NORITY GROUPS. 

14 (a) FINDINGS.—Congress finds the following: 

15 (1) On December 9, 1948, the United Nations 

16 General Assembly unanimously adopted the Conven17 tion on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime 

18 of Genocide (the Genocide Convention) signifying a 

19 commitment in response to the Holocaust and other 

20 crimes against humanity committed in the first half 

21 of the twentieth century. 

22 (2) The Genocide Convention entered into force 

23 on January 12, 1951, and declares that all state 

24 parties ‘‘confirm that genocide, whether committed 

25 in time of peace or in time of war, is a crime under 


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1 international law which they undertake to prevent 

2 and to punish’’. 

3 (3) The Genocide Convention defines genocide 

4 as ‘‘any of the following acts committed with intent 

5 to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, 

6 racial or religious group, as such: (a) Killing mem7 bers of the group; (b) Causing serious bodily or 

8 mental harm to members of the group; (c) Delib9 erately inflicting on the group conditions of life cal10 culated to bring about its physical destruction in 

11 whole or in part; (d) Imposing measures intended to 

12 prevent births within the group; (e) Forcibly trans13 ferring children of the group to another group’’. 

14 (4) The United States ratified the Genocide 

15 Convention with the understanding that the commis16 sion of genocide requires ‘‘the specific intent to de17 stroy, in whole or in substantial part, a [protected] 

18 group as such’’. 

19 (5) The People’s Republic of China (PRC) is a 

20 state party to the Genocide Convention. 

21 (6) Since 2017, the PRC Government, under 

22 the direction and control of the Chinese Communist 

23 Party (CCP), has detained and sought to indoctri24 nate more than one million Uyghurs and members 

25 of other ethnic and religious minority groups. 


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1 (7) Recent data indicate a significant drop in 

2 birth rates among Uyghurs due to enforced steriliza3 tion, enforced abortion, and more onerous birth 

4 quotas for Uyghurs compared to Han. 

5 (8) There are credible reports of PRC Govern6 ment campaigns to promote marriages between 

7 Uyghurs and Han and to reduce birth rates among 

8 Uyghurs and other Turkic Muslims. 

9 (9) Many Uyghurs reportedly have been as10 signed to factory employment under conditions that 

11 indicate forced labor, and some former detainees 

12 have reported food deprivation, beatings, suppression 

13 of religious practices, family separation, and sexual 

14 abuse. 

15 (10) This is indicative of a systematic effort to 

16 eradicate the ethnic and cultural identity and reli17 gious beliefs, and prevent the births of, Uyghurs, 

18 ethnic Kazakhs and Kyrgyz, and members of reli19 gious minority groups. 

20 (11) The birth rate in the Xinjiang region fell 

21 by 24 percent in 2019 compared to a 4.2 percent de22 cline nationwide. 

23 (12) On January 19, 2021, the Department of 

24 State determined the PRC Government, under the 

25 direction and control of the CCP, has committed 


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1 crimes against humanity and genocide against 

2 Uyghurs and other ethnic and religious minority 

3 groups in Xinjiang. 

4 (13) Secretary of State Antony Blinken and 

5 Former Secretary of State Michael Pompeo have 

6 both stated that what has taken place in Xinjiang is 

7 genocide and constitutes crimes against humanity. 

8 (14) Article VIII of the Genocide Convention 

9 provides, ‘‘Any Contracting Party may call upon the 

10 competent organs of the United Nations to take 

11 such action under the Charter of the United Nations 

12 as they consider appropriate for the prevention and 

13 suppression of acts of genocide’’. 

14 (15) The International Court of Justice has 

15 stated that it is the obligation of all state parties to 

16 the Genocide Convention to ‘‘employ all means rea17 sonably available to them, so as to prevent genocide 

18 so far as possible’’. 

19 (16) The United States is a Permanent Mem20 ber of the United Nations Security Council. 

21 (b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con22 gress that Congress— 

23 (1) finds that the ongoing abuses against 

24 Uyghurs and members of other ethnic and religious 

25 minority groups constitute genocide as defined in the 


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1 Genocide Convention and crimes against humanity 

2 as understood under customary international law; 

3 (2) attributes these atrocity crimes against 

4 Uyghurs and members of other ethnic and religious 

5 minority groups to the People’s Republic of China, 

6 under the direction and control of the Chinese Com7 munist Party; 

8 (3) condemns this genocide and these crimes 

9 against humanity in the strongest terms; and 

10 (4) calls upon the President to direct the 

11 United States Permanent Representative to the 

12 United Nations to use the voice, vote, and influence 

13 of the United States to— 

14 (A) refer the People’s Republic of China’s 

15 genocide and crimes against humanity against 

16 Uyghurs and members of other ethnic and reli17 gious minority groups to the competent organs 

18 of the United Nations for investigation; 

19 (B) seize the United Nations Security 

20 Council of the circumstances of this genocide 

21 and crimes against humanity and lead efforts to 

22 invoke multilateral sanctions in response to 

23 these ongoing atrocities; and 

24 (C) take all possible actions to bring this 

25 genocide and these crimes against humanity to 


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1 an end and hold the perpetrators of these atroc2 ities accountable under international law. 

3 SEC. 306. PREVENTION OF UYGHUR FORCED LABOR. 

4 (a) STATEMENT OF POLICY.—It is the policy of the 

5 United States— 

6 (1) to prohibit the import of all goods, wares, 

7 articles, or merchandise mined, produced, or manu8 factured, wholly or in part, by forced labor from the 

9 People’s Republic of China and particularly any such 

10 goods, wares, articles, or merchandise produced in 

11 the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region of China; 

12 (2) to encourage the international community 

13 to reduce the import of any goods made with forced 

14 labor from the People’s Republic of China, particu15 larly those goods mined, manufactured, or produced 

16 in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region; 

17 (3) to coordinate with Mexico and Canada to ef18 fectively implement Article 23.6 of the United 

19 States-Mexico-Canada Agreement to prohibit the im20 portation of goods produced in whole or in part by 

21 forced or compulsory labor, which includes goods 

22 produced in whole or in part by forced or compul23 sory labor in the People’s Republic of China; 

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1 sault on human dignity and to restore the lives of 

2 those affected by human trafficking, a modern form 

3 of slavery; 

4 (5) to regard the prevention of atrocities as in 

5 its national interest, including efforts to prevent tor6 ture, enforced disappearances, severe deprivation of 

7 liberty, including mass internment, arbitrary deten8 tion, and widespread and systematic use of forced 

9 labor, and persecution targeting any identifiable eth10 nic or religious group; and 

11 (6) to address gross violations of human rights 

12 in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region through 

13 bilateral diplomatic channels and multilateral insti14 tutions where both the United States and the Peo15 ple’s Republic of China are members and with all 

16 the authorities available to the United States Gov17 ernment, including visa and financial sanctions, ex18 port restrictions, and import controls. 

19 (b) PROHIBITION ON IMPORTATION OF GOODS MADE

20 IN THE XINJIANG UYGHUR AUTONOMOUS REGION.— 

21 (1) IN GENERAL.—Except as provided in para22 graph (2), all goods, wares, articles, and merchan23 dise mined, produced, or manufactured wholly or in 

24 part in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region of 

25 China, or by persons working with the Xinjiang 


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1 Uyghur Autonomous Region government for pur2 poses of the ‘‘poverty alleviation’’ program or the 

3 ‘‘pairing-assistance’’ program which subsidizes the 

4 establishment of manufacturing facilities in the 

5 Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, shall be 

6 deemed to be goods, wares, articles, and merchan7 dise described in section 307 of the Tariff Act of 

8 1930 (19 U.S.C. 1307) and shall not be entitled to 

9 entry at any of the ports of the United States. 

10 (2) EXCEPTION.—The prohibition described in 

11 paragraph (1) shall not apply if the Commissioner of 

12 U.S. Customs and Border Protection— 

13 (A) determines, by clear and convincing 

14 evidence, that any specific goods, wares, arti15 cles, or merchandise described in paragraph (1) 

16 were not produced wholly or in part by convict 

17 labor, forced labor, or indentured labor under 

18 penal sanctions; and 

19 (B) submits to the appropriate congres20 sional committees and makes available to the 

21 public a report that contains such determina22 tion. 

23 (3) EFFECTIVE DATE.—This section shall take 

24 effect on the date that is 120 days after the date of 

25 the enactment of this Act. 


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1 (c) ENFORCEMENT STRATEGY TO ADDRESS FORCED

2 LABOR IN THE XINJIANG UYGHUR AUTONOMOUS RE3 GION.— 

4 (1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 120 days 

5 after the date of the enactment of this Act, the 

6 Forced Labor Enforcement Task Force, established 

7 under section 741 of the United States-Mexico-Can8 ada Agreement Implementation Act (19 U.S.C. 

9 4681), shall submit to the appropriate congressional 

10 committees a report that contains an enforcement 

11 strategy to effectively address forced labor in the 

12 Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region of China or 

13 products made by Uyghurs, Kazakhs, Kyrgyz, Tibet14 ans, or members of other persecuted groups through 

15 forced labor in any other part of the People’s Repub16 lic of China. The enforcement strategy shall describe 

17 the specific enforcement plans of the United States 

18 Government regarding— 

19 (A) goods, wares, articles, and merchandise 

20 described in subsection (b)(1) that are imported 

21 into the United States directly from the 

22 Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region or made 

23 by Uyghurs, Kazakhs, Kyrgyz, Tibetans, or 

24 members of other persecuted groups in any 

25 other part of the People’s Republic of China; 


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1 (B) goods, wares, articles, and merchan2 dise described in subsection (b)(1) that are im3 ported into the United States from the People’s 

4 Republic of China and are mined, produced, or 

5 manufactured in part in the Xinjiang Uyghur 

6 Autonomous Region or by persons working with 

7 the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region gov8 ernment or the Xinjiang Production and Con9 struction Corps for purposes of the ‘‘poverty al10 leviation’’ program or the ‘‘pairing-assistance’’ 

11 program; and 

12 (C) goods, wares, articles, and merchandise 

13 described in subsection (b)(1) that are imported 

14 into the United States from third countries and 

15 are mined, produced, or manufactured in part 

16 in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region or 

17 by persons working with the Xinjiang Uyghur 

18 Autonomous Region government or the 

19 Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps 

20 for purposes of the ‘‘poverty alleviation’’ pro21 gram or the ‘‘pairing-assistance’’ program. 

22 (2) MATTERS TO BE INCLUDED.—The strategy 

23 required by paragraph (1) shall include the fol24 lowing: 


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1 (A) A description of the actions taken by 

2 the United States Government to address 

3 forced labor in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autono4 mous Region under section 307 of the Tariff 

5 Act of 1930 (19 U.S.C. 1307), including a de6 scription of all Withhold Release Orders issued, 

7 goods detained, and fines issued. 

8 (B) A list of products made wholly or in 

9 part by forced or involuntary labor in the 

10 Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region or made 

11 by Uyghurs, Kazakhs, Kyrgyz, Tibetans, or 

12 members of other persecuted groups in any 

13 other part of the People’s Republic of China, 

14 and a list of businesses that sold products in 

15 the United States made wholly or in part by 

16 forced or involuntary labor in the Xinjiang 

17 Uyghur Autonomous Region or made by 

18 Uyghurs, Kazakhs, Kyrgyz, Tibetans, or mem19 bers of other persecuted groups in any other 

20 part of the People’s Republic of China. 

21 (C) A list of facilities and entities, includ22 ing the Xinjiang Production and Construction 

23 Corps, that source material from the Xinjiang 

24 Uyghur Autonomous Region or by persons 

25 working with the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous 


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1 Region government or the Xinjiang Production 

2 and Construction Corps for purposes of the 

3 ‘‘poverty alleviation’’ program or the ‘‘pairing4 assistance’’ program, a plan for identifying ad5 ditional such facilities and entities, and facility6 and entity-specific enforcement plans, including 

7 issuing specific Withhold Release Orders to sup8 port enforcement of subsection (b), with regard 

9 to each listed facility or entity. 

10 (D) A list of high-priority sectors for en11 forcement, which shall include cotton, tomatoes, 

12 polysilicon, and a sector-specific enforcement 

13 plan for each high-priority sector. 

14 (E) A description of the additional re15 sources necessary for U.S. Customs and Border 

16 Protection to effectively implement the enforce17 ment strategy. 

18 (F) A plan to coordinate and collaborate 

19 with appropriate nongovernmental organizations 

20 and private sector entities to discuss the en21 forcement strategy for products made in the 

22 Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region. 

23 (3) FORM.—The report required by paragraph 

24 (1) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may 

25 include a classified annex, if necessary. 


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1 (4) UPDATES.—The Forced Labor Enforcement 

2 Task Force shall provide briefings to the appropriate 

3 congressional committees on a quarterly basis and, 

4 as applicable, on any updates to the strategy re5 quired by paragraph (1) or any additional actions 

6 taken to address forced labor in the Xinjiang 

7 Uyghur Autonomous Region, including actions de8 scribed in this Act. 

9 (5) SUNSET.—This section shall cease to have 

10 effect on the earlier of— 

11 (A) the date that is 8 years after the date 

12 of the enactment of this Act; or 

13 (B) the date on which the President sub14 mits to the appropriate congressional commit15 tees a determination that the Government of 

16 the People’s Republic of China has ended mass 

17 internment, forced labor, and any other gross 

18 violations of human rights experienced by 

19 Uyghurs, Kazakhs, Kyrgyz, and members of 

20 other Muslim minority groups in the Xinjiang 

21 Uyghur Autonomous Region. 

22 (d) DETERMINATION RELATING TO CRIMES AGAINST

23 HUMANITY OR GENOCIDE IN THE XINJIANG UYGHUR AU24 TONOMOUS REGION.— 


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1 (1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 90 days after 

2 the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary 

3 of State shall— 

4 (A) determine if the practice of forced 

5 labor or other crimes against Uyghurs, 

6 Kazakhs, Kyrgyz, and members of other Mus7 lim minority groups in the Xinjiang Uyghur 

8 Autonomous Region of China can be considered 

9 systematic and widespread and therefore con10 stitutes crimes against humanity or constitutes 

11 genocide as defined in subsection (a) of section 

12 1091 of title 18, United States Code; and 

13 (B) submit to the appropriate congres14 sional committees and make available to the 

15 public a report that contains such determina16 tion. 

17 (2) FORM.—The report required by paragraph 

18 (1)— 

19 (A) shall be submitted in unclassified form 

20 but may include a classified annex, if necessary; 

21 and 

22 (B) may be included in the report required 

23 by subsection (e). 


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1 (e) DIPLOMATIC STRATEGY TO ADDRESS FORCED

2 LABOR IN THE XINJIANG UYGHUR AUTONOMOUS RE3 GION.— 

4 (1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 90 days after 

5 the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary 

6 of State, in coordination with the heads of other ap7 propriate Federal departments and agencies, shall 

8 submit to the appropriate congressional committees 

9 a report that contains a United States strategy to 

10 promote initiatives to enhance international aware11 ness of and to address forced labor in the Xinjiang 

12 Uyghur Autonomous Region of China. 

13 (2) MATTERS TO BE INCLUDED.—The strategy 

14 required by paragraph (1) shall include— 

15 (A) a plan to enhance bilateral and multi16 lateral coordination, including sustained en17 gagement with the governments of United 

18 States partners and allies, to end forced labor 

19 of Uyghurs, Kazakhs, Kyrgyz, and members of 

20 other Muslim minority groups in the Xinjiang 

21 Uyghur Autonomous Region; 

22 (B) public affairs, public diplomacy, and 

23 counter-messaging efforts to promote awareness 

24 of the human rights situation, including forced 


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1 labor in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Re2 gion; and 

3 (C) opportunities to coordinate and col4 laborate with appropriate nongovernmental or5 ganizations and private sector entities to raise 

6 awareness about forced labor made products 

7 from the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region 

8 and to provide assistance to Uyghurs, Kazakhs, 

9 Kyrgyz, and members of other Muslim minority 

10 groups, including those formerly detained in 

11 mass internment camps in the region. 

12 (3) ADDITIONAL MATTERS TO BE INCLUDED.— 

13 The report required by paragraph (1) shall also in14 clude— 

15 (A) to the extent practicable, a list of— 

16 (i) entities in the People’s Republic of 

17 China or affiliates of such entities that di18 rectly or indirectly use forced or involun19 tary labor in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autono20 mous Region; and 

21 (ii) Foreign persons that acted as 

22 agents of the entities or affiliates of enti23 ties described in clause (i) to import goods 

24 into the United States; and 


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1 (B) a description of actions taken by the 

2 United States Government to address forced 

3 labor in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Re4 gion under existing authorities, including— 

5 (i) the Trafficking Victims Protection 

6 Act of 2000 (Public Law 106–386; 22 

7 U.S.C. 7101 et seq.); 

8 (ii) the Elie Wiesel Genocide and 

9 Atrocities Prevention Act of 2018 (Public 

10 Law 115–441; 22 U.S.C. 2656 note); and 

11 (iii) the Global Magnitsky Human 

12 Rights Accountability Act (22 U.S.C. 2656 

13 note). 

14 (4) FORM.—The report required by paragraph 

15 (1) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may 

16 include a classified annex, if necessary. 

17 (5) UPDATES.—The Secretary of State shall in18 clude any updates to the strategy required by para19 graph (1) in the annual Trafficking in Persons re20 port required by section 110(b) of the Trafficking 

21 Victims Protection Act of 2000 (22 U.S.C. 7107(b)). 

22 (6) SUNSET.—This section shall cease to have 

23 effect the earlier of— 

24 (A) the date that is 8 years after the date 

25 of the enactment of this Act; or 


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1 (B) the date on which the President sub2 mits to the appropriate congressional commit3 tees a determination that the Government of 

4 the People’s Republic of China has ended mass 

5 internment, forced labor, and any other gross 

6 violations of human rights experienced by 

7 Uyghurs, Kazakhs, Kyrgyz, and members of 

8 other Muslim minority groups in the Xinjiang 

9 Uyghur Autonomous Region. 

10 (f) IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS RELATING TO

11 FORCED LABOR IN THE XINJIANG UYGHUR AUTONOMOUS

12 REGION.— 

13 (1) REPORT REQUIRED.— 

14 (A) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 

15 days after the date of the enactment of this 

16 Act, and not less frequently than annually 

17 thereafter, the President shall submit to the ap18 propriate congressional committees a report 

19 that identifies each foreign person, including 

20 any official of the Government of the People’s 

21 Republic of China, that the President deter22 mines— 

23 (i) knowingly engages in, is respon24 sible for, or facilitates the forced labor of 

25 Uyghurs, Kazakhs, Kyrgyz, and members 


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1 of other Muslim minority groups in the 

2 Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region of 

3 China; and 

4 (ii) knowingly engages in, contributes 

5 to, assists, or provides financial, material 

6 or technological support for efforts to con7 travene United States law regarding the 

8 importation of forced labor goods from the 

9 Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region. 

10 (B) FORM.—The report required under 

11 subparagraph (A) shall be submitted in unclas12 sified form, but may contain a classified annex. 

13 (2) IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS.—The President 

14 shall impose the sanctions described in paragraph 

15 (3) with respect to each foreign person identified in 

16 the report required under paragraph (1)(A). 

17 (3) SANCTIONS DESCRIBED.—The sanctions de18 scribed in this subsection are the following: 

19 (A) ASSET BLOCKING.—The President 

20 shall exercise all of the powers granted to the 

21 President under the International Emergency 

22 Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.) 

23 to the extent necessary to block and prohibit all 

24 transactions in property and interests in prop25 erty of a foreign person identified in the report 


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1 required under paragraph (1)(A) if such prop2 erty and interests in property— 

3 (i) are in the United States; 

4 (ii) come within the United States; or 

5 (iii) come within the possession or 

6 control of a United States person. 

7 (B) INELIGIBILITY FOR VISAS, ADMISSION, 

8 OR PAROLE.— 

9 (i) VISAS, ADMISSION, OR PAROLE.— 

10 An alien described in paragraph (1)(A) 

11 is— 

12 (I) inadmissible to the United 

13 States; 

14 (II) ineligible to receive a visa or 

15 other documentation to enter the 

16 United States; and 

17 (III) otherwise ineligible to be 

18 admitted or paroled into the United 

19 States or to receive any other benefit 

20 under the Immigration and Nation21 ality Act (8 U.S.C. 1101 et seq.). 

22 (ii) CURRENT VISAS REVOKED.— 

23 (I) IN GENERAL.—An alien de24 scribed in paragraph (1)(A) is subject 

25 to revocation of any visa or other 


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1 entry documentation regardless of 

2 when the visa or other entry docu3 mentation is or was issued. 

4 (II) IMMEDIATE EFFECT.—A rev5 ocation under subclause (I) shall— 

6 (aa) take effect immediately; 

7 and 

8 (bb) automatically cancel 

9 any other valid visa or entry doc10 umentation that is in the alien’s 

11 possession. 

12 (4) IMPLEMENTATION; PENALTIES.— 

13 (A) IMPLEMENTATION.—The President 

14 may exercise all authorities provided under sec15 tions 203 and 205 of the International Emer16 gency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1702 

17 and 1704) to carry out this section. 

18 (B) PENALTIES.—The penalties provided 

19 for in subsections (b) and (c) of section 206 of 

20 the International Emergency Economic Powers 

21 Act (50 U.S.C. 1705) shall apply to a foreign 

22 person that violates, attempts to violate, con23 spires to violate, or causes a violation of para24 graph (1) to the same extent that such pen25 alties apply to a person that commits an unlawVerDate Sep 11 2014 22:42 Jun 24, 2021 Jkt 019200 PO 00000 Frm 00313 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\H3524.IH H3524

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1 ful act described in subsection (a) of such sec2 tion 206. 

3 (5) WAIVER.—The President may waive the ap4 plication of sanctions under this section with respect 

5 to a foreign person identified in the report required 

6 under paragraph (1)(A) if the President determines 

7 and certifies to the appropriate congressional com8 mittees that such a waiver is in the national interest 

9 of the United States. 

10 (6) EXCEPTIONS.— 

11 (A) EXCEPTION FOR INTELLIGENCE AC12 TIVITIES.—Sanctions under this section shall 

13 not apply to any activity subject to the report14 ing requirements under title V of the National 

15 Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3091 et seq.) 

16 or any authorized intelligence activities of the 

17 United States. 

18 (B) EXCEPTION TO COMPLY WITH INTER19 NATIONAL OBLIGATIONS AND FOR LAW EN20 FORCEMENT ACTIVITIES.—Sanctions under 

21 paragraph (3)(B) shall not apply with respect 

22 to an alien if admitting or paroling the alien 

23 into the United States is necessary— 

24 (i) to permit the United States to 

25 comply with the Agreement regarding the 


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1 Headquarters of the United Nations, 

2 signed at Lake Success June 26, 1947, 

3 and entered into force November 21, 1947, 

4 between the United Nations and the 

5 United States, or other applicable inter6 national obligations; or 

7 (ii) to carry out or assist law enforce8 ment activity in the United States. 

9 (7) TERMINATION OF SANCTIONS.—The Presi10 dent may terminate the application of sanctions 

11 under this section with respect to a foreign person 

12 if the President determines and reports to the ap13 propriate congressional committees not less than 15 

14 days before the termination takes effect that— 

15 (A) information exists that the person did 

16 not engage in the activity for which sanctions 

17 were imposed; 

18 (B) the person has been prosecuted appro19 priately for the activity for which sanctions 

20 were imposed; 

21 (C) the person has credibly demonstrated a 

22 significant change in behavior, has paid an ap23 propriate consequence for the activity for which 

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1 mitted to not engage in an activity described in 

2 paragraph (1)(A) in the future; or 

3 (D) the termination of the sanctions is in 

4 the national security interests of the United 

5 States. 

6 (8) SUNSET.—This section, and any sanctions 

7 imposed under this section, shall terminate on the 

8 date that is 5 years after the date of the enactment 

9 of this Act. 

10 (9) DEFINITIONS OF ADMISSION; ADMITTED; 

11 ALIEN.—In this section, the terms ‘‘admission’’, 

12 ‘‘admitted’’, and ‘‘alien’’ have the meanings given 

13 those terms in section 101 of the Immigration and 

14 Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1101). 

15 (g) DISCLOSURES TO THE SECURITIES AND EX16 CHANGE COMMISSION OF CERTAIN ACTIVITIES RELATED

17 TO THE XINJIANG UYGHUR AUTONOMOUS REGION.— 

18 (1) POLICY STATEMENT.—It is the policy of the 

19 United States to protect American investors, 

20 through stronger disclosure requirements, alerting 

21 them to the presence of Chinese and other compa22 nies complicit in gross violations of human rights in 

23 United States capital markets, including American 

24 and foreign companies listed on United States ex25 changes that enable the mass internment and popuVerDate Sep 11 2014 22:42 Jun 24, 2021 Jkt 019200 PO 00000 Frm 00316 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\H3524.IH H3524

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1 lation surveillance of Uyghurs, Kazakhs, Kyrgyz, 

2 and other Muslim minorities and source products 

3 made with forced labor in the Xinjiang Uyghur Au4 tonomous Region of China. Such involvements rep5 resent clear, material risks to the share values and 

6 corporate reputations of certain of these companies 

7 and hence to prospective American investors, par8 ticularly given that the United States Government 

9 has employed sanctions and export restrictions to 

10 target individuals and entities contributing to human 

11 rights abuses in the People’s Republic of China. 

12 (2) DISCLOSURE OF CERTAIN ACTIVITIES RE13 LATING TO THE XINJIANG UYGHUR AUTONOMOUS

14 REGION.— 

15 (A) IN GENERAL.—Section 13 of the Secu16 rities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78m) 

17 is amended by adding at the end the following 

18 new subsection: 

19 ‘‘(s) DISCLOSURE OF CERTAIN ACTIVITIES RELAT20 ING TO THE XINJIANG UYGHUR AUTONOMOUS REGION.— 

21 ‘‘(1) IN GENERAL.—Each issuer required to file 

22 an annual or quarterly report under subsection (a) 

23 shall disclose in that report the information required 

24 by paragraph (2) if, during the period covered by 

25 the report, the issuer or any affiliate of the issuer— 


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1 ‘‘(A) knowingly engaged in an activity with 

2 an entity or the affiliate of an entity engaged 

3 in creating or providing technology or other as4 sistance to create mass population surveillance 

5 systems in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous 

6 Region of China, including any entity included 

7 on the Department of Commerce’s ‘Entity List’ 

8 in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region; 

9 ‘‘(B) knowingly engaged in an activity with 

10 an entity or an affiliate of an entity building 

11 and running detention facilities for Uyghurs, 

12 Kazakhs, Kyrgyz, and other members of Mus13 lim minority groups in the Xinjiang Uyghur 

14 Autonomous Region; 

15 ‘‘(C) knowingly engaged in an activity with 

16 an entity or an affiliate of an entity described 

17 in section 7(c)(1) of the Uyghur Forced Labor 

18 Prevention Act, including— 

19 ‘‘(i) any entity engaged in the ‘pair20 ing-assistance’ program which subsidizes 

21 the establishment of manufacturing facili22 ties in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous 

23 Region; or 

24 ‘‘(ii) any entity for which the Depart25 ment of Homeland Security has issued a 


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1 ‘Withhold Release Order’ under section 

2 307 of the Tariff Act of 1930 (19 U.S.C. 

3 1307); or 

4 ‘‘(D) knowingly conducted any transaction 

5 or had dealings with— 

6 ‘‘(i) any person the property and in7 terests in property of which were sanc8 tioned by the Secretary of State for the de9 tention or abuse of Uyghurs, Kazakhs, 

10 Kyrgyz, or other members of Muslim mi11 nority groups in the Xinjiang Uyghur Au12 tonomous Region; 

13 ‘‘(ii) any person the property and in14 terests in property of which are sanctioned 

15 pursuant to the Global Magnitsky Human 

16 Rights Accountability Act (22 U.S.C. 2656 

17 note); or 

18 ‘‘(iii) any person or entity responsible 

19 for, or complicit in, committing atrocities 

20 in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Re21 gion. 

22 ‘‘(2) INFORMATION REQUIRED.— 

23 ‘‘(A) IN GENERAL.—If an issuer described 

24 under paragraph (1) or an affiliate of the issuer 

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1 graph (1), the information required by this 

2 paragraph is a detailed description of each such 

3 activity, including— 

4 ‘‘(i) the nature and extent of the ac5 tivity; 

6 ‘‘(ii) the gross revenues and net prof7 its, if any, attributable to the activity; and 

8 ‘‘(iii) whether the issuer or the affil9 iate of the issuer (as the case may be) in10 tends to continue the activity. 

11 ‘‘(B) EXCEPTION.—The requirement to 

12 disclose information under this paragraph shall 

13 not include information on activities of the 

14 issuer or any affiliate of the issuer activities re15 lating to— 

16 ‘‘(i) the import of manufactured 

17 goods, including electronics, food products, 

18 textiles, shoes, and teas, that originated in 

19 the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region; 

20 or 

21 ‘‘(ii) manufactured goods containing 

22 materials that originated or are sourced in 

23 the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region. 

24 ‘‘(3) NOTICE OF DISCLOSURES.—If an issuer 

25 reports under paragraph (1) that the issuer or an 


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1 affiliate of the issuer has knowingly engaged in any 

2 activity described in that paragraph, the issuer shall 

3 separately file with the Commission, concurrently 

4 with the annual or quarterly report under subsection 

5 (a), a notice that the disclosure of that activity has 

6 been included in that annual or quarterly report that 

7 identifies the issuer and contains the information re8 quired by paragraph (2). 

9 ‘‘(4) PUBLIC DISCLOSURE OF INFORMATION.— 

10 Upon receiving a notice under paragraph (3) that an 

11 annual or quarterly report includes a disclosure of 

12 an activity described in paragraph (1), the Commis13 sion shall promptly— 

14 ‘‘(A) transmit the report to— 

15 ‘‘(i) the President; 

16 ‘‘(ii) the Committee on Foreign Af17 fairs and the Committee on Financial 

18 Services of the House of Representatives; 

19 and 

20 ‘‘(iii) the Committee on Foreign Rela21 tions and the Committee on Banking, 

22 Housing, and Urban Affairs of the Senate; 

23 and 

24 ‘‘(B) make the information provided in the 

25 disclosure and the notice available to the public 


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1 by posting the information on the Internet 

2 website of the Commission. 

3 ‘‘(5) INVESTIGATIONS.—Upon receiving a re4 port under paragraph (4) that includes a disclosure 

5 of an activity described in paragraph (1), the Presi6 dent shall— 

7 ‘‘(A) make a determination with respect to 

8 whether any investigation is needed into the 

9 possible imposition of sanctions under the Glob10 al Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act 

11 (22 U.S.C. 2656 note) or section 8 of the 

12 Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act or wheth13 er criminal investigations are warranted under 

14 statutes intended to hold accountable individ15 uals or entities involved in the importation of 

16 goods produced by forced labor, including under 

17 section 545, 1589, or 1761 of title 18, United 

18 States Code; and 

19 ‘‘(B) not later than 180 days after initi20 ating any such investigation, make a determina21 tion with respect to whether a sanction should 

22 be imposed or criminal investigations initiated 

23 with respect to the issuer or the affiliate of the 

24 issuer (as the case may be). 


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1 ‘‘(6) ATROCITIES DEFINED.—In this subsection, 

2 the term ‘atrocities’ has the meaning given the term 

3 in section 6(2) of the Elie Wiesel Genocide and 

4 Atrocities Prevention Act of 2018 (Public Law 115– 

5 441; 22 U.S.C. 2656 note).’’. 

6 (3) SUNSET.—Section 13(s) of the Securities 

7 Exchange Act of 1934, as added by paragraph (2), 

8 is repealed on the earlier of— 

9 (A) the date that is 8 years after the date 

10 of the enactment of this Act; or 

11 (B) the date on which the President sub12 mits to the appropriate congressional commit13 tees a determination that the Government of 

14 the People’s Republic of China has ended mass 

15 internment, forced labor, and any other gross 

16 violations of human rights experienced by 

17 Uyghurs, Kazakhs, Kyrgyz, and members of 

18 other Muslim minority groups in the Xinjiang 

19 Uyghur Autonomous Region. 

20 (4) EFFECTIVE DATE.—The amendment made 

21 by paragraph (2) shall take effect with respect to re22 ports required to be filed with the Securities and Ex23 change Commission after the date that is 180 days 

24 after the date of the enactment of this Act. 

25 (h) DEFINITIONS.—In this Act: 


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1 (1) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMIT2 TEES.—The term ‘‘appropriate congressional com3 mittees’’ means— 

4 (A) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the 

5 Committee on Financial Services, and the Com6 mittee on Ways and Means of the House of 

7 Representatives; and 

8 (B) the Committee on Foreign Relations, 

9 the Committee on Banking, Housing, and 

10 Urban Affairs, and the Committee on Finance 

11 of the Senate. 

12 (2) ATROCITIES.—The term ‘‘atrocities’’ has 

13 the meaning given the term in section 6(2) of the 

14 Elie Wiesel Genocide and Atrocities Prevention Act 

15 of 2018 (Public Law 115–441; 22 U.S.C. 2656 

16 note). 

17 (3) CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY.—The term 

18 ‘‘crimes against humanity’’ includes, when com19 mitted as part of a widespread or systematic attack 

20 directed against any civilian population, with knowl21 edge of the attack— 

22 (A) murder; 

23 (B) deportation or forcible transfer of pop24 ulation; 

25 (C) torture; 


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1 (D) extermination; 

2 (E) enslavement; 

3 (F) rape, sexual slavery, or any other form 

4 of sexual violence of comparable severity; 

5 (G) persecution against any identifiable 

6 group or collectivity on political, racial, na7 tional, ethnic, cultural, religious, gender, or 

8 other grounds that are universally recognized as 

9 impermissible under international law; and 

10 (H) enforced disappearance of persons. 

11 (4) FORCED LABOR.—The term ‘‘forced labor’’ 

12 has the meaning given the term in section 307 of the 

13 Tariff Act of 1930 (19 U.S.C. 1307). 

14 (5) FOREIGN PERSON.—The term ‘‘foreign per15 son’’ means a person that is not a United States 

16 person. 

17 (6) PERSON.—The term ‘‘person’’ means an in18 dividual or entity. 

19 (7) MASS POPULATION SURVEILLANCE SYS20 TEM.—The term ‘‘mass population surveillance sys21 tem’’ means installation and integration of facial 

22 recognition cameras, biometric data collection, cell 

23 phone surveillance, and artificial intelligence tech24 nology with the ‘‘Sharp Eyes’’ and ‘‘Integrated Joint 

25 Operations Platform’’ or other technologies that are 


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1 used by Chinese security forces for surveillance and 

2 big-data predictive policing. 

3 (8) UNITED STATES PERSON.—The term 

4 ‘‘United States person’’ means— 

5 (A) a United States citizen or an alien law6 fully admitted for permanent residence to the 

7 United States; or 

8 (B) an entity organized under the laws of 

9 the United States or any jurisdiction within the 

10 United States, including a foreign branch of 

11 such an entity. 

12 SEC. 307. UYGHUR HUMAN RIGHTS PROTECTION. 

13 (a) SHORT TITLE.—This section may be cited as the 

14 ‘‘Uyghur Human Rights Protection Act’’. 

15 (b) FINDINGS.—Congress makes the following find16 ings: 

17 (1) The Government of the People’s Republic of 

18 China (PRC) has a long history of repressing Turkic 

19 Muslims and other Muslim minority groups, particu20 larly Uyghurs, in Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Re21 gion (‘‘Xinjiang’’ or ‘‘XUAR’’), also known as East 

22 Turkestan. Central and regional PRC government 

23 policies have systematically discriminated against 

24 these minority groups by denying them a range of 

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1 gion. Senior Chinese Communist Party officials bear 

2 direct responsibility for these gross human rights 

3 violations. 

4 (2) PRC government abuses include the arbi5 trary detention of more than 1,000,000 Uyghurs, 

6 ethnic Kazakhs, Kyrgyz, and members of other Mus7 lim minority groups, separation of working age 

8 adults from their children and elderly parents, and 

9 the integration of forced labor into supply chains. 

10 Those held in detention facilities and internment 

11 camps in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region 

12 have described forced political indoctrination, tor13 ture, beatings, food deprivation, sexual assault, co14 ordinated campaigns to reduce birth rates among 

15 Uyghurs and other Turkic Muslims through forced 

16 sterilization, and denial of religious, cultural, and 

17 linguistic freedoms. Recent media reports indicate 

18 that since 2019, the PRC government has newly 

19 constructed, expanded, or fortified at least 60 deten20 tion facilities with higher security or prison-like fea21 tures in Xinjiang. 

22 (3) The Government of the People’s Republic of 

23 China’s actions against Uyghurs, ethnic Kazakhs, 

24 Kyrgyz, and members of other Muslim minority 


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1 groups in Xinjiang violate international human 

2 rights laws and norms, including— 

3 (A) the International Convention on the 

4 Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimina5 tion, to which the People’s Republic of China 

6 has acceded; 

7 (B) the Convention against Torture and 

8 Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment 

9 or Punishment, which the People’s Republic of 

10 China has signed and ratified; 

11 (C) The Convention on the Prevention and 

12 Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, which 

13 the People’s Republic of China has signed and 

14 ratified; 

15 (D) the International Covenant on Civil 

16 and Political Rights, which the People’s Repub17 lic of China has signed; and 

18 (E) the Universal Declaration of Human 

19 Rights and the International Labor Organiza20 tion’s Force Labor Convention (no. 29) and the 

21 Abolition of Forced Labor Convention (no. 

22 105). 

23 (c) REFUGEE PROTECTIONS FOR CERTAIN RESI24 DENTS OF THE XINJIANG UYGHUR AUTONOMOUS RE25 GION.— 


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1 (1) POPULATIONS OF SPECIAL HUMANITARIAN

2 CONCERN.—The Secretary of State, in consultation 

3 with the Secretary of Homeland Security, shall des4 ignate, as Priority 2 refugees of special humani5 tarian concern— 

6 (A) aliens who were nationals of the Peo7 ple’s Republic of China and residents of the 

8 Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region on Janu9 ary 1, 2021; 

10 (B) aliens who fled the Xinjiang Uyghur 

11 Autonomous Region after June 30, 2009, and 

12 reside in other provinces of China or in a third 

13 country where such alien is not firmly resettled; 

14 and 

15 (C) the spouses, children, and parents (as 

16 such terms are defined in subsections (a) and 

17 (b) of section 101 of the Immigration and Na18 tionality Act (8 U.S.C. 1101)) of individuals de19 scribed in subparagraphs (A) and (B), except 

20 that a child shall be an unmarried person under 

21 27 years of age. 

22 (2) PROCESSING OF XINJIANG UYGHUR AUTON23 OMOUS REGION REFUGEES.—The processing of indi24 viduals described in paragraph (1) for classification 

25 as refugees may occur in China or a third country. 


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1 (3) ELIGIBILITY FOR ADMISSION AS A REF2 UGEE.— 

3 (A) IN GENERAL.—Aliens described in sub4 paragraph (B) may establish, for purposes of 

5 admission as a refugee under section 207 of the 

6 Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 

7 1157) or asylum under section 208 of such Act 

8 (8 U.S.C. 1158), that such alien has a well9 founded fear of persecution on account of race, 

10 religion, nationality, membership in a particular 

11 social group, or political opinion by asserting 

12 such a fear and asserting a credible basis for 

13 concern about the possibility of such persecu14 tion. 

15 (B) ALIENS DESCRIBED.—An alien is de16 scribed in this subsection if such alien has been 

17 identified as a person of special humanitarian 

18 concern pursuant to paragraph (1) and— 

19 (i) has experienced persecution in the 

20 Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region by 

21 the Government of the People’s Republic of 

22 China including— 

23 (I) forced and arbitrary detention 

24 including in an internment or re-edu25 cation camp; 


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1 (II) forced political indoctrina2 tion, torture, beatings, food depriva3 tion, and denial of religious, cultural, 

4 and linguistic freedoms; 

5 (III) forced labor; 

6 (IV) forced separation from fam7 ily members; 

8 (V) other forms of systemic 

9 threats, harassment, and gross human 

10 rights violations; or 

11 (VI) has been formally charged, 

12 detained, or convicted on account of 

13 their peaceful actions as described in 

14 the Uyghur Human Rights Policy Act 

15 of 2020 (Public Law 116–145); and 

16 (ii) is currently a national of the Peo17 ple’s Republic of China whose residency in 

18 the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, 

19 or any other area within the jurisdiction of 

20 the People’s Republic of China, was re21 voked for having submitted to any United 

22 States Government agency a nonfrivolous 

23 application for refugee status, asylum, or 

24 any other immigration benefit under 

25 United States law. 


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1 (C) ELIGIBILITY FOR ADMISSION UNDER

2 OTHER CLASSIFICATION.—An alien may not be 

3 denied the opportunity to apply for admission 

4 as a refugee or asylum under this section solely 

5 because such alien qualifies as an immediate 

6 relative of a national of the United States or is 

7 eligible for admission to the United States 

8 under any other immigrant classification. 

9 (4) PRIORITY.—The Secretary of State shall 

10 prioritize bilateral diplomacy with third countries 

11 hosting former residents of the Xinjiang Uyghur Au12 tonomous Region and who face significant diplo13 matic pressures from the Government of the Peo14 ple’s Republic of China. 

15 (5) REPORTING REQUIREMENTS.— 

16 (A) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 

17 days after the date of the enactment of this 

18 Act, and every 90 days thereafter, the Secretary 

19 of State and the Secretary of Homeland Secu20 rity shall submit a report on the matters de21 scribed in subparagraph (B) to— 

22 (i) the Committee on the Judiciary 

23 and the Committee on Foreign Relations 

24 of the Senate; and 


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1 (ii) the Committee on the Judiciary 

2 and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of 

3 the House of Representatives. 

4 (B) MATTERS TO BE INCLUDED.—Each 

5 report required by subparagraph (A) shall in6 clude, with respect to applications submitted 

7 under this section— 

8 (i) the total number of applications 

9 that are pending at the end of the report10 ing period; 

11 (ii) the average wait-times and num12 ber of applicants who are currently pend13 ing— 

14 (I) a pre-screening interview with 

15 a resettlement support center; 

16 (II) an interview with U.S. Citi17 zenship and Immigration Services; 

18 (III) the completion of security 

19 checks; and 

20 (IV) receipt of a final decision 

21 after completion of an interview with 

22 U.S. Citizenship and Immigration 

23 Services; and 


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1 (iii) the number of denials of applica2 tions for refugee status, disaggregated by 

3 the reason for each such denial. 

4 (C) FORM.—Each report required by para5 graph (1) shall be submitted in unclassified 

6 form, but may include a classified annex. 

7 (D) PUBLIC REPORTS.—The Secretary of 

8 State shall make each report submitted under 

9 this subsection available to the public on the 

10 internet website of the Department of State. 

11 (d) STATEMENT OF POLICY ON ENCOURAGING AL12 LIES AND PARTNERS TO MAKE SIMILAR ACCOMMODA13 TIONS.—It is the policy of the United States to encourage 

14 allies and partners of the United States to make accom15 modations similar to the accommodations made in this Act 

16 for residents of the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region 

17 who are fleeing oppression by the Government of the Peo18 ple’s Republic of China. 

19 (e) TERMINATION.—This Act, and the amendments 

20 made by this Act, shall cease to have effect on the date 

21 that is 10 years after the date of the enactment of this 

22 Act. 


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1 SEC. 308. REMOVAL OF MEMBERS OF THE UNITED NATIONS 

2 HUMAN RIGHTS COUNCIL THAT COMMIT 

3 HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES. 

4 The President shall direct the Permanent Represent5 ative of the United States to the United Nations to use 

6 the voice, vote, and influence of the United States to— 

7 (1) reform the process for removing members of 

8 the United Nations Human Rights Council that 

9 commit gross and systemic violations of human 

10 rights, including— 

11 (A) lowering the threshold vote at the 

12 United Nations General Assembly for removal 

13 to a simple majority; 

14 (B) ensuring information detailing the 

15 member country’s human rights record is pub16 licly available before the vote on removal; and 

17 (C) making the vote of each country on the 

18 removal from the United Nations Human 

19 Rights Council publicly available; 

20 (2) reform the rules on electing members to the 

21 United Nations Human Rights Council to ensure 

22 United Nations members that have committed gross 

23 and systemic violations of human rights are not 

24 elected to the Human Rights Council; and 

25 (3) oppose the election to the Human Rights 

26 Council of any United Nations member— 


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1 (A) currently designated as a country en2 gaged in a consistent pattern of gross violations 

3 of internationally recognized human rights pur4 suant to section 116 or section 502B of the 

5 Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 

6 2151n, 2304); 

7 (B) currently designated as a state sponsor 

8 of terrorism; 

9 (C) currently designated as a Tier 3 coun10 try under the Trafficking Victims Protection 

11 Act of 2000 (22 U.S.C. 7101 et seq.); 

12 (D) the government of which is identified 

13 on the list published by the Secretary of State 

14 pursuant to section 404(b) of the Child Soldiers 

15 Prevention Act of 2008 (22 U.S.C. 2370c–1(b)) 

16 as a government that recruits and uses child 

17 soldiers; or 

18 (E) the government of which the United 

19 States determines to have committed genocide 

20 or crimes against humanity. 

21 SEC. 309. POLICY WITH RESPECT TO TIBET. 

22 (a) RANK OF UNITED STATES SPECIAL COORDI23 NATOR FOR TIBETAN ISSUES.—Section 621 of the Ti24 betan Policy Act of 2002 (22 U.S.C. 6901 note) is amend25 ed— 


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1 (1) by redesignating subsections (b), (c), and 

2 (d), as subsections (c), (d), and (e), respectively; and 

3 (2) by inserting after subsection (a) the fol4 lowing: 

5 ‘‘(b) RANK.—The Special Coordinator shall either be 

6 appointed by the President, with the advice and consent 

7 of the Senate, or shall be an individual holding the rank 

8 of Under Secretary of State or higher.’’. 

9 (b) TIBET UNIT AT UNITED STATES EMBASSY IN

10 BEIJING.— 

11 (1) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary of State shall 

12 establish a Tibet Unit in the Political Section of the 

13 United States Embassy in Beijing, People’s Republic 

14 of China. 

15 (2) OPERATION.—The Tibet Unit established 

16 under paragraph (1) shall operate until such time as 

17 the Government of the People’s Republic of China 

18 permits— 

19 (A) the United States Consulate General 

20 in Chengdu, People’s Republic of China, to re21 open; or 

22 (B) a United States Consulate General in 

23 Lhasa, Tibet, to open. 

24 (3) STAFF.— 

25 (A) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary shall— 


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1 (i) assign not fewer than 2 United 

2 States direct-hire personnel to the Tibet 

3 Unit established under paragraph (1); and 

4 (ii) hire not fewer than 1 locally en5 gaged staff member for such unit. 

6 (B) LANGUAGE TRAINING.—The Secretary 

7 shall make Tibetan language training available 

8 to the personnel assigned under subparagraph 

9 (A), consistent with the Tibetan Policy Act of 

10 2002 (22 U.S.C. 6901 note). 

11 SEC. 310. UNITED STATES POLICY AND INTERNATIONAL EN12 GAGEMENT ON THE SUCCESSION OR REIN13 CARNATION OF THE DALAI LAMA AND RELI14 GIOUS FREEDOM OF TIBETAN BUDDHISTS. 

15 (a) REAFFIRMATION OF POLICY.—It is the policy of 

16 the United States, as provided under section 342(b) of di17 vision FF of the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2021 

18 (Public Law 116–260), that any ‘‘interference by the Gov19 ernment of the People’s Republic of China or any other 

20 government in the process of recognizing a successor or 

21 reincarnation of the 14th Dalai Lama and any future 

22 Dalai Lamas would represent a clear abuse of the right 

23 to religious freedom of Tibetan Buddhists and the Tibetan 

24 people’’. 


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1 (b) INTERNATIONAL EFFORTS TO PROTECT RELI2 GIOUS FREEDOM OF TIBETAN BUDDHISTS.—The Sec3 retary of State should engage with United States allies 

4 and partners to— 

5 (1) support Tibetan Buddhist religious leaders’ 

6 sole religious authority to identify and install the 

7 15th Dalai Lama; 

8 (2) oppose claims by the Government of the 

9 People’s Republic of China that the PRC has the 

10 authority to decide for Tibetan Buddhists the 15th 

11 Dalai Lama; and 

12 (3) reject interference by the Government of the 

13 People’s Republic of China in the religious freedom 

14 of Tibetan Buddhists. 

15 SEC. 311. DEVELOPMENT AND DEPLOYMENT OF INTERNET 

16 FREEDOM AND GREAT FIREWALL CIR17 CUMVENTION TOOLS FOR THE PEOPLE OF 

18 HONG KONG. 

19 (a) FINDINGS.—Congress makes the following find20 ings: 

21 (1) The People’s Republic of China has repeat22 edly violated its obligations under the Joint Declara23 tion by suppressing the basic rights and freedoms of 

24 Hong Kongers. 


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1 (2) On June 30, 2020, the National People’s 

2 Congress passed a ‘‘National Security Law’’ that 

3 further erodes Hong Kong’s autonomy and enables 

4 authorities to suppress dissent. 

5 (3) The Government of the People’s Republic of 

6 China continues to utilize the National Security Law 

7 to undermine the fundamental rights of the Hong 

8 Kong people through suppression of the freedom of 

9 speech, assembly, religion, and the press. 

10 (4) Article 9 of the National Security Law au11 thorizes unprecedented regulation and supervision of 

12 internet activity in Hong Kong, including expanded 

13 police powers to force internet service providers to 

14 censor content, hand over user information, and 

15 block access to platforms. 

16 (5) On January 13, 2021, the Hong Kong 

17 Broadband Network blocked public access to HK 

18 Chronicles, a website promoting pro-democracy view19 points, under the authorities of the National Secu20 rity Law. 

21 (6) On February 12, 2021, internet service pro22 viders blocked access to the Taiwan Transitional 

23 Justice Commission website in Hong Kong. 

24 (7) Major tech companies including Facebook, 

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1 ing requests for user data from Hong Kong authori2 ties. 

3 (8) On February 28, 2021, 47 pro-democracy 

4 activists in Hong Kong were arrested and charged 

5 under the National Security Law on the charge of 

6 ‘‘conspiracy to commit subversion’’. 

7 (b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con8 gress that the United States should— 

9 (1) support the ability of the people of Hong 

10 Kong to maintain their freedom to access informa11 tion online; and 

12 (2) focus on investments in technologies that 

13 facilitate the unhindered exchange of information in 

14 Hong Kong in advance of any future efforts by the 

15 Chinese Communist Party— 

16 (A) to suppress internet access; 

17 (B) to increase online censorship; or 

18 (C) to inhibit online communication and 

19 content-sharing by the people of Hong Kong. 

20 (c) DEFINITIONS.—In this section: 

21 (1) APPROPRIATE COMMITTEES OF CON22 GRESS.—The term ‘‘appropriate congressional com23 mittees’’ means— 

24 (A) the Committee on Foreign Relations of 

25 the Senate; 


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1 (B) the Committee on Appropriations of 

2 the Senate; 

3 (C) the Select Committee on Intelligence of 

4 the Senate; 

5 (D) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of 

6 the House of Representatives; 

7 (E) the Committee on Appropriations of 

8 the House of Representatives; and 

9 (F) the Permanent Select Committee on 

10 Intelligence of the House of Representatives. 

11 (2) WORKING GROUP.—The term ‘‘working 

12 group’’ means— 

13 (A) the Under Secretary of State for Civil14 ian Security, Democracy, and Human Rights; 

15 (B) the Assistant Secretary of State for 

16 East Asian and Pacific Affairs; 

17 (C) the Chief Executive Officer of the 

18 United States Agency for Global Media and the 

19 President of the Open Technology Fund; and 

20 (D) the Administrator of the United States 

21 Agency for International Development. 

22 (3) JOINT DECLARATION.—The term ‘‘Joint 

23 Declaration’’ means the Joint Declaration of the 

24 Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain 

25 and Northern Ireland and the Government of the 


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1 People’s Republic of China on the Question of Hong 

2 Kong, done at Beijing on December 19, 1984. 

3 (d) HONG KONG INTERNET FREEDOM PROGRAM.— 

4 (1) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary of State is 

5 authorized to establish a working group to develop 

6 a strategy to bolster internet resiliency and online 

7 access in Hong Kong. The Secretary shall establish 

8 a Hong Kong Internet Freedom Program in the Bu9 reau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor at 

10 the Department of State. Additionally, the President 

11 of the Technology Fund is authorized to establish a 

12 Hong Kong Internet Freedom Program. These pro13 grams shall operate independently, but in strategic 

14 coordination with other entities in the working 

15 group. The Open Technology Fund shall remain 

16 independent from Department of State direction in 

17 its implementation of this, and any other Internet 

18 Freedom Programs. 

19 (2) INDEPENDENCE.—During the period begin20 ning on the date of the enactment of this Act and 

21 ending on September 30, 2023, the Program shall 

22 be carried out independent from the mainland China 

23 internet freedom portfolios in order to focus on sup24 porting liberties presently enjoyed by the people of 

25 Hong Kong. 


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1 (3) CONSOLIDATION OF DEPARTMENT OF

2 STATE PROGRAM.—Beginning on October 1, 2023, 

3 the Secretary of State may— 

4 (A) consolidate the Program with the 

5 mainland China initiatives in the Bureau of De6 mocracy, Human Rights, and Labor; or 

7 (B) continue to carry out the Program in 

8 accordance with paragraph (2). 

9 (4) CONSOLIDATION OF OPEN TECHNOLOGY

10 FUND PROGRAM.—Beginning on October 1, 2023, 

11 the President of the Open Technology Fund may— 

12 (A) consolidate the Program with the 

13 mainland China initiatives in the Open Tech14 nology Fund; or 

15 (B) continue to carry out the Program in 

16 accordance with paragraph (2). 

17 (e) SUPPORT FOR INTERNET FREEDOM TECH18 NOLOGY PROGRAMS.— 

19 (1) GRANTS AUTHORIZED.— 

20 (A) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary of State, 

21 working through the Bureau of Democracy, 

22 Human Rights, and Labor, and the Open Tech23 nology Fund, separately and independently 

24 from the Secretary of State, are authorized to 

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1 tions to support and develop programs in Hong 

2 Kong that promote or expand— 

3 (i) open, interoperable, reliable and 

4 secure internet; and 

5 (ii) the online exercise of human 

6 rights and fundamental freedoms of indi7 vidual citizens, activists, human rights de8 fenders, independent journalists, civil soci9 ety organizations, and marginalized popu10 lations in Hong Kong. 

11 (B) GOALS.—The goals of the programs 

12 developed with grants authorized under sub13 paragraph (A) should be— 

14 (i) to make the internet available in 

15 Hong Kong; 

16 (ii) to increase the number of the 

17 tools in the technology portfolio; 

18 (iii) to promote the availability of such 

19 technologies and tools in Hong Kong; 

20 (iv) to encourage the adoption of such 

21 technologies and tools by the people of 

22 Hong Kong; 

23 (v) to scale up the distribution of such 

24 technologies and tools throughout Hong 

25 Kong; 


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1 (vi) to prioritize the development of 

2 tools, components, code, and technologies 

3 that are fully open-source, to the extent 

4 practicable; 

5 (vii) to conduct research on repressive 

6 tactics that undermine internet freedom in 

7 Hong Kong; 

8 (viii) to ensure digital safety guidance 

9 and support is available to repressed indi10 vidual citizens, human rights defenders, 

11 independent journalists, civil society orga12 nizations and marginalized populations in 

13 Hong Kong; and 

14 (ix) to engage American private indus15 try, including e-commerce firms and social 

16 networking companies, on the importance 

17 of preserving internet access in Hong 

18 Kong. 

19 (C) GRANT RECIPIENTS.—Grants author20 ized under this paragraph shall be distributed 

21 to multiple vendors and suppliers through an 

22 open, fair, competitive, and evidence-based deci23 sion process— 

24 (i) to diversify the technical base; and 


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1 (ii) to reduce the risk of misuse by 

2 bad actors. 

3 (D) SECURITY AUDITS.—New technologies 

4 developed using grants from this paragraph 

5 shall undergo comprehensive security audits to 

6 ensure that such technologies are secure and 

7 have not been compromised in a manner detri8 mental to the interests of the United States or 

9 to individuals or organizations benefitting from 

10 programs supported by the Open Technology 

11 Fund. 

12 (2) FUNDING SOURCE.—The Secretary of State 

13 is authorized to expend funds from the Human 

14 Rights and Democracy Fund of the Bureau of De15 mocracy, Human Rights, and Labor of the Depart16 ment of State during fiscal year 2020 for grants au17 thorized under paragraph (1) at any entity in the 

18 working group. 

19 (3) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.— 

20 (A) OPEN TECHNOLOGY FUND.—In addi21 tion to the funds authorized to be expended 

22 pursuant to paragraph (2), there are authorized 

23 to be appropriated to the Open Technology 

24 Fund $5,000,000 for each of fiscal years 2022 

25 and 2023 to carry out this subsection. This 


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1 funding is in addition to the funds authorized 

2 for the Open Technology Fund through the Na3 tional Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal 

4 Year 2021 (Public Law 116–92). 

5 (B) BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HUMAN

6 RIGHTS, AND LABOR.—In addition to the funds 

7 authorized to be expended pursuant to para8 graph (2), there are authorized to be appro9 priated to the Office of Internet Freedom Pro10 grams in the Bureau of Democracy, Human 

11 Rights, and Labor of the Department of State 

12 $10,000,000 for each of fiscal years 2022 and 

13 2023 to carry out this section. 

14 (C) AVAILABILITY.—Amounts appro15 priated pursuant to subparagraphs (A) and (B) 

16 shall remain available until expended. 

17 (f) STRATEGIC PLANNING REPORT.—Not later than 

18 120 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the 

19 Secretary of State and the working group shall submit a 

20 classified report to the appropriate committees of Con21 gress that— 

22 (1) describes the Federal Government’s plan to 

23 bolster and increase the availability of Great Fire24 wall circumvention and internet freedom technology 

25 in Hong Kong during fiscal year 2022; 


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1 (2) outlines a plan for— 

2 (A) supporting the preservation of an 

3 open, interoperable, reliable, and secure internet 

4 in Hong Kong; 

5 (B) increasing the supply of the technology 

6 referred to in paragraph (1); 

7 (C) accelerating the dissemination of such 

8 technology; 

9 (D) promoting the availability of internet 

10 freedom in Hong Kong; 

11 (E) utilizing presently-available tools in the 

12 existing relevant portfolios for further use in 

13 the unique context of Hong Kong; 

14 (F) expanding the portfolio of tools in 

15 order to diversify and strengthen the effective16 ness and resiliency of the circumvention efforts; 

17 (G) providing training for high-risk groups 

18 and individuals in Hong Kong; and 

19 (H) detecting analyzing, and responding to 

20 new and evolving censorship threats; 

21 (3) includes a detailed description of the tech22 nical and fiscal steps necessary to safely implement 

23 the plans referred to in paragraphs (1) and (2), in24 cluding an analysis of the market conditions in 

25 Hong Kong; 


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1 (4) describes the Federal Government’s plans 

2 for awarding grants to private organizations for the 

3 purposes described in subsection (e)(1)(A); 

4 (5) outlines the working group’s consultations 

5 regarding the implementation of this section to en6 sure that all Federal efforts are aligned and well co7 ordinated; and 

8 (6) outlines the Department of State’s strategy 

9 to influence global internet legal standards at inter10 national organizations and multilateral fora. 

11 SEC. 312. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS FOR PRO12 TECTING HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE PEOPLE’S 

13 REPUBLIC OF CHINA. 

14 (a) IN GENERAL.—Amounts authorized to be appro15 priated or otherwise made available to carry out section 

16 409 of the Asia Reassurance Initiative (Public Law 115– 

17 409) include programs that prioritize the protection and 

18 advancement of the freedoms of association, assembly, re19 ligion, and expression for women, human rights activists, 

20 and ethnic and religious minorities in the People’s Repub21 lic of China. 

22 (b) USE OF FUNDS.—Amounts appropriated pursu23 ant to subsection (a) may be used to fund nongovern24 mental agencies within the Indo-Pacific region that are fo25 cused on the issues described in subsection (a). 


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1 (c) CONSULTATION REQUIREMENT.—In carrying out 

2 this section, the Assistant Secretary of Democracy, 

3 Human Rights and Labor shall consult with the appro4 priate congressional committees and representatives of 

5 civil society regarding— 

6 (1) strengthening the capacity of the organiza7 tions referred to in subsection (b); 

8 (2) protecting members of the groups referred 

9 to in subsection (a) who have been targeted for ar10 rest, harassment, forced sterilizations, coercive abor11 tions, forced labor, or intimidation, including mem12 bers residing outside of the People’s Republic of 

13 China; and 

14 (3) messaging efforts to reach the broadest pos15 sible audiences within the People’s Republic of 

16 China about United States Government efforts to 

17 protect freedom of association, expression, assembly, 

18 and the rights of ethnic minorities. 

19 SEC. 313. REPEAL OF SUNSET APPLICABLE TO AUTHORITY 

20 UNDER GLOBAL MAGNITSKY HUMAN RIGHTS 

21 ACCOUNTABILITY ACT. 

22 Section 1265 of the Global Magnitsky Human Rights 

23 Accountability Act (Subtitle F of title XII of Public Law 

24 114–328; 22 U.S.C. 2656 note) is repealed. 


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1 SEC. 314. SENSE OF CONGRESS CONDEMNING ANTI-ASIAN 

2 RACISM AND DISCRIMINATION. 

3 (a) FINDINGS.—Congress makes the following find4 ings: 

5 (1) Since the onset of the COVID–19 pan6 demic, crimes and discrimination against Asians and 

7 those of Asian descent have risen dramatically 

8 worldwide. In May 2020, United Nations Secretary9 General Antonio Guterres said ‘‘the pandemic con10 tinues to unleash a tsunami of hate and xenophobia, 

11 scapegoating and scare-mongering’’ and urged gov12 ernments to ‘‘act now to strengthen the immunity of 

13 our societies against the virus of hate’’. 

14 (2) Asian American and Pacific Island (AAPI) 

15 workers make up a large portion of the essential 

16 workers on the frontlines of the COVID–19 pan17 demic, making up 8.5 percent of all essential 

18 healthcare workers in the United States. AAPI 

19 workers also make up a large share—between 6 per20 cent and 12 percent based on sector—of the bio21 medical field. 

22 (3) The United States Census notes that Amer23 icans of Asian descent alone made up nearly 5.9 per24 cent of the United States population in 2019, and 

25 that Asian Americans are the fastest-growing racial 


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1 group in the United States, projected to represent 

2 14 percent of the United States population by 2065. 

3 (b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con4 gress that— 

5 (1) the reprehensible attacks on people of Asian 

6 descent and concerning increase in anti-Asian senti7 ment and racism in the United States and around 

8 the world have no place in a peaceful, civilized, and 

9 tolerant world; 

10 (2) the United States is a diverse nation with 

11 a proud tradition of immigration, and the strength 

12 and vibrancy of the United States is enhanced by 

13 the diverse ethnic backgrounds and tolerance of its 

14 citizens, including Asian Americans and Pacific Is15 landers; 

16 (3) the United States Government should en17 courage other foreign governments to use the official 

18 and scientific names for the COVID–19 pandemic, 

19 as recommended by the World Health Organization 

20 and the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention; 

21 and 

22 (4) the United States Government and other 

23 governments around the world must actively oppose 

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1 propriate tools to combat the spread of anti-Asian 

2 racism and discrimination. 

3 SEC. 315. ANNUAL REPORTING ON CENSORSHIP OF FREE 

4 SPEECH WITH RESPECT TO INTERNATIONAL 

5 ABUSES OF HUMAN RIGHTS. 

6 Section 116(d) of the Foreign Assistance Act (227 

7 U.S.C. 2151n(d)) is amended— 

8 (1) in paragraph (11)(C), by striking ‘‘and’’ at 

9 the end; 

10 (2) in paragraph (12)(C)(ii), by striking the pe11 riod at the end and inserting a semicolon; and 

12 (3) by adding at the end the following: 

13 ‘‘(13) wherever applicable, instances in which 

14 the government of each country has attempted to 

15 extraterritorially intimidate or pressure a company 

16 or entity to censor or self-censor the speech of its 

17 employees, contractors, customers, or associated 

18 staff with regards to the abuse of human rights in 

19 such country, or sought retaliation against such em20 ployees or contractors for the same, including any 

21 instance in which the government of China has 

22 sought to extraterritorially censor or punish speech 

23 that is otherwise legal in the United States on the 

24 topics of— 


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1 ‘‘(A) repression and violation of funda2 mental freedoms in Hong Kong; 

3 ‘‘(B) repression and persecution of reli4 gious and ethnic minorities in China, including 

5 in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region 

6 and the Tibet Autonomous Region; 

7 ‘‘(C) efforts to proliferate and use surveil8 lance technologies to surveil activists, journal9 ists, opposition politicians, or to profile persons 

10 of different ethnicities; and 

11 ‘‘(D) other gross violations of human 

12 rights; and 

13 ‘‘(14) wherever applicable, instances which a 

14 company or entity located in or based in a third 

15 country has censored or self-censored the speech of 

16 its employees, contractors, customers, or associated 

17 staff on the topic of abuse of human rights in each 

18 country or sought to retaliate against such employ19 ees for the same, due to intimidation or pressure 

20 from or the fear of intimidation by the foreign gov21 ernment.’’. 


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1 TITLE IV—INVESTING IN OUR 

2 ECONOMIC STATECRAFT 

3 SEC. 401. SENSE OF CONGRESS REGARDING THE PRC’S IN4 DUSTRIAL POLICY. 

5 It is the sense of Congress that— 

6 (1) the challenges presented by a nonmarket 

7 economy like the PRC’s economy, which has cap8 tured such a large share of global economic ex9 change, are in many ways unprecedented and re10 quire sufficiently elevated and sustained long-term 

11 focus and engagement; 

12 (2) in order to truly address the most detri13 mental aspects of CCP-directed mercantilist eco14 nomic strategy, the United States must adopt poli15 cies that— 

16 (A) expose the full scope and scale of intel17 lectual property theft and mass subsidization of 

18 Chinese firms, and the resulting harm to the 

19 United States, foreign markets, and the global 

20 economy; 

21 (B) ensure that PRC companies face costs 

22 and consequences for anticompetitive behavior; 

23 (C) provide options for affected United 

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1 reasonable and discriminatory CCP-directed in2 dustrial policies; and 

3 (D) strengthen the protection of critical 

4 technology and sensitive data, while still fos5 tering an environment that provides incentives 

6 for secure but open investment, innovation, and 

7 competition; 

8 (3) the United States must work with its allies 

9 and partners and multilateral venues and fora— 

10 (A) to reinforce long-standing generally ac11 cepted principles of fair competition and market 

12 behavior and address the PRC’s anticompetitive 

13 economic and industrial policies that undermine 

14 decades of global growth and innovation; 

15 (B) to ensure that the PRC is not granted 

16 the same treatment as that of a free-market 

17 economy until it ceases the implementation of 

18 laws, regulations, policies, and practices that 

19 provide unfair advantage to PRC firms in fur20 therance of national objectives and impose un21 reasonable, discriminatory, and illegal burdens 

22 on market-based international commerce; and 

23 (C) to align policies with respect to curbing 

24 state-directed subsidization of the private sec25 tor, such as advocating for global rules related 


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1 to transparency and adherence to notification 

2 requirements, including through the efforts cur3 rently being advanced by the United States, 

4 Japan, and the European Union; 

5 (4) the United States and its allies and part6 ners must collaborate to provide incentives to their 

7 respective companies to cooperate in areas such as— 

8 (5) the United States should develop policies 

9 that— 

10 (A) insulate United States entities from 

11 PRC pressure against complying with United 

12 States laws; 

13 (B) together with the work of allies and 

14 partners and multilateral institutions, counter 

15 the potential impact of the blocking regime of 

16 the PRC established by the Ministry of Com17 merce of the PRC on January 9, 2021, when 

18 it issued Order No. 1 of 2021, entitled ‘‘Rules 

19 on Counteracting Unjustified Extraterritorial 

20 Application of Foreign Legislation and other 

21 Measures’’; and 

22 (C) plan for future actions that the Gov23 ernment of the PRC may take to undermine the 

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1 thorities, including with respect to the use of 

2 sanctions. 

3 SEC. 402. ECONOMIC DEFENSE RESPONSE TEAMS. 

4 (a) PILOT PROGRAM.—Not later than 180 days after 

5 the date of the enactment of this Act, the President shall 

6 develop and implement a pilot program for the creation 

7 of deployable economic defense response teams to help 

8 provide emergency technical assistance and support to a 

9 country subjected to the threat or use of coercive economic 

10 measures and to play a liaison role between the legitimate 

11 government of that country and the United States Govern12 ment. Such assistance and support may include the fol13 lowing activities: 

14 (1) Reducing the partner country’s vulnerability 

15 to coercive economic measures. 

16 (2) Minimizing the damage that such measures 

17 by an adversary could cause to that country. 

18 (3) Implementing any bilateral or multilateral 

19 contingency plans that may exist for responding to 

20 the threat or use of such measures. 

21 (4) In coordination with the partner country, 

22 developing or improving plans and strategies by the 

23 country for reducing vulnerabilities and improving 

24 responses to such measures in the future. 


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1 (5) Assisting the partner country in dealing 

2 with foreign sovereign investment in infrastructure 

3 or related projects that may undermine the partner 

4 country’s sovereignty. 

5 (6) Assisting the partner country in responding 

6 to specific efforts from an adversary attempting to 

7 employ economic coercion that undermines the part8 ner country’s sovereignty, including efforts in the 

9 cyber domain, such as efforts that undermine cyber10 security or digital security of the partner country or 

11 initiatives that introduce digital technologies in a 

12 manner that undermines freedom, security, and sov13 ereignty of the partner country. 

14 (7) Otherwise providing direct and relevant 

15 short-to-medium term economic or other assistance 

16 from the United States and marshalling other re17 sources in support of effective responses to such 

18 measures. 

19 (b) REPORTS REQUIRED.— 

20 (1) REPORT ON ESTABLISHMENT.—Upon estab21 lishment of the pilot program required by subsection 

22 (a), the Secretary of State shall provide the appro23 priate committees of Congress with a detailed report 

24 and briefing describing the pilot program, the major 

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1 tions involved, and the degree to which the program 

2 incorporates the elements described in subsection 

3 (a). 

4 (2) FOLLOW-UP REPORT.—Not later than one 

5 year after the report required by paragraph (1), the 

6 Secretary of State shall provide the appropriate com7 mittees of Congress with a detailed report and brief8 ing describing the operations over the previous year 

9 of the pilot program established pursuant to sub10 section (a), as well as the Secretary’s assessment of 

11 its performance and suitability for becoming a per12 manent program. 

13 (3) FORM.—Each report required under this 

14 subsection shall be submitted in unclassified form, 

15 but may include a classified annex. 

16 (c) DECLARATION OF AN ECONOMIC CRISIS RE17 QUIRED.— 

18 (1) NOTIFICATION.—The President may acti19 vate an economic defense response team for a period 

20 of 180 days under the authorities of this section to 

21 assist a partner country in responding to an unusual 

22 and extraordinary economic coercive threat by an 

23 adversary of the United States upon the declaration 

24 of a coercive economic emergency, together with no25 tification to the Committee on Foreign Relations of 


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1 the Senate and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of 

2 the House of Representatives. 

3 (2) EXTENSION AUTHORITY.—The President 

4 may activate the response team for an additional 

5 180 days upon the submission of a detailed analysis 

6 to the committees described in paragraph (1) justi7 fying why the continued deployment of the economic 

8 defense response team in response to the economic 

9 emergency is in the national security interest of the 

10 United States. 

11 (d) SUNSET.—The authorities provided under this 

12 section shall expire on December 31, 2026. 

13 (e) RULE OF CONSTRUCTION.—Neither the authority 

14 to declare an economic crisis provided for in subsection 

15 (d), nor the declaration of an economic crisis pursuant to 

16 subsection (d), shall confer or be construed to confer any 

17 authority, power, duty, or responsibility to the President 

18 other than the authority to activate an economic defense 

19 response team as described in this section. 

20 (f) APPROPRIATE COMMITTEES OF CONGRESS DE21 FINED.—In this section, the term ‘‘appropriate commit22 tees of Congress’’ means— 

23 (1) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the 

24 Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Af25 fairs, the Committee on Commerce, Science, and 


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1 Transportation, the Committee on Energy and Nat2 ural Resources, the Committee on Agriculture, Nu3 trition, and Forestry, and the Committee on Finance 

4 of the Senate; and 

5 (2) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the 

6 Committee on Financial Services, the Committee on 

7 Energy and Commerce, the Committee on Agri8 culture, and the Committee on Ways and Means of 

9 the House of Representatives. 

10 SEC. 403. COUNTERING OVERSEAS KLEPTOCRACY. 

11 (a) FINDINGS.—Congress finds the following: 

12 (1) Authoritarian leaders in foreign countries 

13 abuse their power to steal assets from state institu14 tions, enrich themselves at the expense of their coun15 tries’ economic development, and use corruption as 

16 a strategic tool both to solidify their grip on power 

17 and to undermine democratic institutions abroad. 

18 (2) Global corruption harms the competitiveness 

19 of United States businesses, weakens democratic 

20 governance, feeds terrorist recruitment and 

21 transnational organized crime, enables drug smug22 gling and human trafficking, and stymies economic 

23 growth. 

24 (3) Illicit financial flows often penetrate coun25 tries through what appear to be legitimate financial 


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1 transactions, as kleptocrats launder money, use shell 

2 companies, amass offshore wealth, and participate in 

3 a global shadow economy. 

4 (4) The Government of the Russian Federation 

5 is a leading model of this type of kleptocratic sys6 tem, using state-sanctioned corruption to both erode 

7 democratic governance from within and discredit de8 mocracy abroad, thereby strengthening the authori9 tarian rule of Vladimir Putin. 

10 (5) Corrupt individuals and entities in the Rus11 sian Federation, often with the backing and encour12 agement of political leadership, use stolen money— 

13 (A) to purchase key assets in other coun14 tries, often with a goal of attaining monopolistic 

15 control of a sector; 

16 (B) to gain access to and influence the 

17 policies of other countries; and 

18 (C) to advance Russian interests in other 

19 countries, particularly those that undermine 

20 confidence and trust in democratic systems. 

21 (6) Systemic corruption in the People’s Repub22 lic of China, often tied to, directed by, or backed by 

23 the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party and 

24 the Chinese Government is used— 


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1 (A) to provide unfair advantage to certain 

2 People’s Republic of China economic entities; 

3 (B) to increase other countries’ economic 

4 dependence on the People’s Republic of China 

5 to secure greater deference to the People’s Re6 public of China’s diplomatic and strategic goals; 

7 and 

8 (C) to exploit corruption in foreign govern9 ments and among other political elites to enable 

10 People’s Republic of China state-backed firms 

11 to pursue predatory and exploitative economic 

12 practices. 

13 (7) Thwarting these tactics by Russian, Chi14 nese, and other kleptocratic actors requires the 

15 international community to strengthen democratic 

16 governance and the rule of law. International co17 operation in combating corruption and illicit finance 

18 is vital to such efforts, especially by empowering re19 formers in foreign countries during historic political 

20 openings for the establishment of the rule of law in 

21 those countries. 

22 (8) Technical assistance programs that combat 

23 corruption and strengthen the rule of law, including 

24 through assistance provided by the Department of 

25 State’s Bureau of International Narcotics and Law 


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1 Enforcement Affairs and the United States Agency 

2 for International Development, and through pro3 grams like the Department of Justice’s Office of 

4 Overseas Prosecutorial Development, Assistance and 

5 Training and the International Criminal Investiga6 tive Training Assistance Program, can have lasting 

7 and significant impacts for both foreign and United 

8 States interests. 

9 (9) There currently exist numerous inter10 national instruments to combat corruption, 

11 kleptocracy, and illicit finance, including— 

12 (A) the Inter-American Convention against 

13 Corruption of the Organization of American 

14 States, done at Caracas March 29, 1996; 

15 (B) the Convention on Combating Bribery 

16 of Foreign Public Officials in International 

17 Business Transactions of the Organisation of 

18 Economic Co-operation and Development, done 

19 at Paris December 21, 1997 (commonly re20 ferred to as the ‘‘Anti-Bribery Convention’’); 

21 (C) the United Nations Convention against 

22 Transnational Organized Crime, done at New 

23 York November 15, 2000; 


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1 (D) the United Nations Convention against 

2 Corruption, done at New York October 31, 

3 2003; 

4 (E) Recommendation of the Council for 

5 Further Combating Bribery of Foreign Public 

6 Officials in International Business Trans7 actions, adopted November 26, 2009; and 

8 (F) recommendations of the Financial Ac9 tion Task Force comprising the International 

10 Standards on Combating Money Laundering 

11 and the Financing of Terrorism and Prolifera12 tion. 

13 (b) DEFINITIONS.—In this section: 

14 (1) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMIT15 TEES.—The term ‘‘appropriate congressional com16 mittees’’ means— 

17 (A) the Committee on Foreign Relations of 

18 the Senate; 

19 (B) the Committee on Banking, Housing, 

20 and Urban Affairs of the Senate; 

21 (C) the Committee on Finance of the Sen22 ate; 

23 (D) the Committee on the Judiciary of the 

24 Senate; 


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1 (E) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of 

2 the House of Representatives; 

3 (F) the Committee on Financial Services 

4 of the House of Representatives; 

5 (G) the Committee on Ways and Means of 

6 the House of Representatives; and 

7 (H) the Committee on the Judiciary of the 

8 House of Representatives. 

9 (2) FOREIGN ASSISTANCE.—The term ‘‘foreign 

10 assistance’’ means foreign assistance authorized 

11 under the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 

12 U.S.C. 2251 et seq.). 

13 (3) FOREIGN STATE.—The term ‘‘foreign state’’ 

14 has the meaning given such term in section 1603(a) 

15 of title 28, United States Code. 

16 (4) INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY.—The term 

17 ‘‘intelligence community’’ has the meaning given 

18 such term in section 3(4) of the National Security 

19 Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3003(4)). 

20 (5) PUBLIC CORRUPTION.—The term ‘‘public 

21 corruption’’ includes the unlawful exercise of en22 trusted public power for private gain, such as 

23 through bribery, nepotism, fraud, extortion, or em24 bezzlement. 


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1 (6) RULE OF LAW.—The term ‘‘rule of law’’ 

2 means the principle of governance in which all per3 sons, institutions, and entities, whether public or 

4 private, including the state, are accountable to laws 

5 that are— 

6 (A) publicly promulgated; 

7 (B) equally enforced; 

8 (C) independently adjudicated; and 

9 (D) consistent with international human 

10 rights norms and standards. 

11 (c) STATEMENT OF POLICY.—It is the policy of the 

12 United States— 

13 (1) to leverage United States diplomatic en14 gagement and foreign assistance to promote the rule 

15 of law; 

16 (2)(A) to promote international instruments to 

17 combat corruption, kleptocracy, and illicit finance, 

18 including instruments referred to in subsection 

19 (a)(9), and other relevant international standards 

20 and best practices, as such standards and practices 

21 develop; and 

22 (B) to promote the adoption and implementa23 tion of such laws, standards, and practices by for24 eign states; 


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1 (3) to support foreign states in promoting good 

2 governance and combating public corruption; 

3 (4) to encourage and assist foreign partner 

4 countries to identify and close loopholes in their 

5 legal and financial architecture, including the misuse 

6 of anonymous shell companies, free trade zones, and 

7 other legal structures, that are enabling illicit fi8 nance to penetrate their financial systems; 

9 (5) to help foreign partner countries to inves10 tigate, prosecute, adjudicate, and more generally 

11 combat the use of corruption by malign actors, in12 cluding authoritarian governments, particularly the 

13 Government of the Russian Federation and the Gov14 ernment of the People’s Republic of China, as a tool 

15 of malign influence worldwide; 

16 (6) to assist in the recovery of kleptocracy-re17 lated stolen assets for victims, including through the 

18 use of appropriate bilateral arrangements and inter19 national agreements, such as the United Nations 

20 Convention against Corruption, done at New York 

21 October 31, 2003, and the United Nations Conven22 tion against Transnational Organized Crime, done at 

23 New York November 15, 2000; 

24 (7) to use sanctions authorities, such as the 

25 Global Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act 


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1 (subtitle F of title XII of the National Defense Au2 thorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017 (Public Law 

3 114–328; 22 U.S.C. 2656 note)) and section 

4 7031(c) of the Department of State, Foreign Oper5 ations, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 

6 2020 (division G of Public Law 116–94), to identify 

7 and take action against corrupt foreign actors; 

8 (8) to ensure coordination between relevant 

9 Federal departments and agencies with jurisdiction 

10 over the advancement of good governance in foreign 

11 states; and 

12 (9) to lead the creation of a formal grouping of 

13 like-minded states— 

14 (A) to coordinate efforts to counter corrup15 tion, kleptocracy, and illicit finance; and 

16 (B) to strengthen collective financial de17 fense. 

18 (d) ANTI-CORRUPTION ACTION FUND.— 

19 (1) ESTABLISHMENT.—There is established in 

20 the United States Treasury a fund, to be known as 

21 the ‘‘Anti-Corruption Action Fund’’, only for the 

22 purposes of— 

23 (A) strengthening the capacity of foreign 

24 states to prevent and fight public corruption; 


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1 (B) assisting foreign states to develop rule 

2 of law-based governance structures, including 

3 accountable civilian police, prosecutorial, and 

4 judicial institutions; 

5 (C) supporting foreign states to strengthen 

6 domestic legal and regulatory frameworks to 

7 combat public corruption, including the adop8 tion of best practices under international law; 

9 and 

10 (D) supplementing existing foreign assist11 ance and diplomacy with respect to efforts de12 scribed in subparagraphs (A), (B), and (C). 

13 (2) FUNDING.— 

14 (A) TRANSFERS.—Beginning on or after 

15 the date of the enactment of this Act, if total 

16 criminal fines and penalties in excess of 

17 $50,000,000 are imposed against a person 

18 under the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 

19 1977 (Public Law 95–213) or section 13, 30A, 

20 or 32 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 

21 (15 U.S.C. 78m, 78dd–1, and 78ff), whether 

22 pursuant to a criminal prosecution, enforcement 

23 proceeding, deferred prosecution agreement, 

24 nonprosecution agreement, a declination to 

25 prosecute or enforce, or any other resolution, 


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1 the court (in the case of a conviction) or the At2 torney General shall impose an additional pre3 vention payment equal to $5,000,000 against 

4 such person, which shall be deposited in the 

5 Anti-Corruption Action Fund established under 

6 paragraph (1). 

7 (B) AVAILABILITY OF FUNDS.—Amounts 

8 deposited into the Anti-Corruption Action Fund 

9 pursuant to subparagraph (A) shall be available 

10 to the Secretary of State only for the purposes 

11 described in paragraph (1), without fiscal year 

12 limitation or need for subsequent appropriation. 

13 (C) LIMITATION.—None of the amounts 

14 made available to the Secretary of State from 

15 the Anti-Corruption Action Fund may be used 

16 inside the United States, except for administra17 tive costs related to overseas program imple18 mentation pursuant to paragraph (1). 

19 (3) SUPPORT.—The Anti-Corruption Action 

20 Fund— 

21 (A) may support governmental and non22 governmental parties in advancing the purposes 

23 described in paragraph (1); and 

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1 sistance, diplomacy, and anti-corruption activi2 ties. 

3 (4) ALLOCATION AND PRIORITIZATION.—In 

4 programming foreign assistance made available 

5 through the Anti-Corruption Action Fund, the Sec6 retary of State, in coordination with the Attorney 

7 General, shall prioritize projects that— 

8 (A) assist countries that are undergoing 

9 historic opportunities for democratic transition, 

10 combating corruption, and the establishment of 

11 the rule of law; and 

12 (B) are important to United States na13 tional interests. 

14 (5) TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE PROVIDERS.—For 

15 any technical assistance to a foreign governmental 

16 party under this section, the Secretary of State, in 

17 coordination with the Attorney General, shall 

18 prioritize United States Government technical assist19 ance providers as implementers, in particular the Of20 fice of Overseas Prosecutorial Development, Assist21 ance and Training and the International Criminal 

22 Investigative Training Assistance Program at the 

23 Department of Justice. 

24 (6) PUBLIC DIPLOMACY.—The Secretary of 

25 State shall announce that funds deposited in the 


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1 Anti-Corruption Action Fund are derived from ac2 tions brought under the Foreign Corrupt Practices 

3 Act to demonstrate that the use of such funds are— 

4 (A) contributing to international anti-cor5 ruption work; and 

6 (B) reducing the pressure that United 

7 States businesses face to pay bribes overseas, 

8 thereby contributing to greater competitiveness 

9 of United States companies. 

10 (7) REPORTING.—Not later than 1 year after 

11 the date of the enactment of this Act and not less 

12 frequently than annually thereafter, the Secretary of 

13 State shall submit a report to the appropriate con14 gressional committees that contains— 

15 (A) the balance of the funding remaining 

16 in the Anti-Corruption Action Fund; 

17 (B) the amount of funds that have been 

18 deposited into the Anti-Corruption Action 

19 Fund; and 

20 (C) a summary of the obligation and ex21 penditure of such funds. 

22 (8) NOTIFICATION REQUIREMENTS.—None of 

23 the amounts made available to the Secretary of 

24 State from the Anti-Corruption Action Fund pursu25 ant to this section shall be available for obligation, 


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1 or for transfer to other departments, agencies, or en2 tities, unless the Secretary of State notifies the 

3 Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate, the 

4 Committee on Appropriations of the Senate, the 

5 Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Rep6 resentatives, and the Committee on Appropriations 

7 of the House of Representatives, not later than 15 

8 days in advance of such obligation or transfer. 

9 (e) INTERAGENCY ANTI-CORRUPTION TASK

10 FORCE.— 

11 (1) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary of State, in 

12 cooperation with the Interagency Anti-Corruption 

13 Task Force established pursuant to paragraph (2), 

14 shall manage a whole-of-government effort to im15 prove coordination among Federal departments and 

16 agencies and donor organizations with a role in— 

17 (A) promoting good governance in foreign 

18 states; and 

19 (B) enhancing the ability of foreign states 

20 to combat public corruption. 

21 (2) INTERAGENCY ANTI-CORRUPTION TASK

22 FORCE.—Not later than 180 days after the date of 

23 the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State 

24 shall establish and convene the Interagency Anti25 Corruption Task Force (referred to in this section as 


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1 the ‘‘Task Force’’), which shall be composed of rep2 resentatives appointed by the President from appro3 priate departments and agencies, including the De4 partment of State, the United States Agency for 

5 International Development, the Department of Jus6 tice, the Department of the Treasury, the Depart7 ment of Homeland Security, the Department of De8 fense, the Department of Commerce, the Millennium 

9 Challenge Corporation, and the intelligence commu10 nity. 

11 (3) ADDITIONAL MEETINGS.—The Task Force 

12 shall meet not less frequently than twice per year. 

13 (4) DUTIES.—The Task Force shall— 

14 (A) evaluate, on a general basis, the effec15 tiveness of existing foreign assistance programs, 

16 including programs funded by the Anti-Corrup17 tion Action Fund, that have an impact on— 

18 (i) promoting good governance in for19 eign states; and 

20 (ii) enhancing the ability of foreign 

21 states to combat public corruption; 

22 (B) assist the Secretary of State in man23 aging the whole-of-government effort described 

24 in paragraph (1); 


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1 (C) identify general areas in which such 

2 whole-of-government effort could be enhanced; 

3 and 

4 (D) recommend specific programs for for5 eign states that may be used to enhance such 

6 whole-of-government effort. 

7 (5) BRIEFING REQUIREMENT.—Not later than 

8 1 year after the date of the enactment of this Act 

9 and not less frequently than annually thereafter 

10 through the end of fiscal year 2026, the Secretary 

11 of State shall provide a briefing to the appropriate 

12 congressional committees regarding the ongoing 

13 work of the Task Force. Each briefing shall include 

14 the participation of a representative of each of the 

15 departments and agencies described in paragraph 

16 (2), to the extent feasible. 

17 (f) DESIGNATION OF EMBASSY ANTI-CORRUPTION

18 POINTS OF CONTACT.— 

19 (1) EMBASSY ANTI-CORRUPTION POINT OF CON20 TACT.—The chief of mission of each United States 

21 embassy shall designate an anti-corruption point of 

22 contact for each such embassy. 

23 (2) DUTIES.—The designated anti-corruption 

24 points of contact designated pursuant to paragraph 

25 (1) shall— 


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1 (A) coordinate, in accordance with guid2 ance from the Interagency Anti-Corruption 

3 Task Force established pursuant to subsection 

4 (e)(2), an interagency approach within United 

5 States embassies to combat public corruption in 

6 the foreign states in which such embassies are 

7 located that is tailored to the needs of such for8 eign states, including all relevant Federal de9 partments and agencies with a presence in such 

10 foreign states, such as the Department of State, 

11 the United States Agency for International De12 velopment, the Department of Justice, the De13 partment of the Treasury, the Department of 

14 Homeland Security, the Department of De15 fense, the Millennium Challenge Corporation, 

16 and the intelligence community; 

17 (B) make recommendations regarding the 

18 use of the Anti-Corruption Action Fund and 

19 other foreign assistance funding related to anti20 corruption efforts in their respective countries 

21 of responsibility that aligns with United States 

22 diplomatic engagement; and 

23 (C) ensure that anti-corruption activities 

24 carried out within their respective countries of 

25 responsibility are included in regular reporting 


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1 to the Secretary of State and the Interagency 

2 Anti-Corruption Task Force, including United 

3 States embassy strategic planning documents 

4 and foreign assistance-related reporting, as ap5 propriate. 

6 (3) TRAINING.—The Secretary of State shall 

7 develop and implement appropriate training for the 

8 designated anti-corruption points of contact. 

9 (g) REPORTING REQUIREMENTS.— 

10 (1) REPORT OR BRIEFING ON PROGRESS TO11 WARD IMPLEMENTATION.—Not later than 180 days 

12 after the date of the enactment of this Act, and an13 nually thereafter for the following 3 years, the Sec14 retary of State, in consultation with the Adminis15 trator of the United States Agency for International 

16 Development, the Attorney General, and the Sec17 retary of the Treasury, shall submit a report or pro18 vide a briefing to the appropriate congressional com19 mittees that summarizes progress made in com20 bating public corruption and in implementing this 

21 Act, including— 

22 (A) identifying opportunities and priorities 

23 for outreach with respect to promoting the 

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1 national law and standards in combating public 

2 corruption, kleptocracy, and illicit finance; 

3 (B) describing— 

4 (i) the bureaucratic structure of the 

5 offices within the Department of State and 

6 the United States Agency for International 

7 Development that are engaged in activities 

8 to combat public corruption, kleptocracy, 

9 and illicit finance; and 

10 (ii) how such offices coordinate their 

11 efforts with each other and with other rel12 evant Federal departments and agencies; 

13 (C) providing a description of how the pro14 visions under paragraphs (4) and (5) of sub15 section (d) have been applied to each project 

16 funded by the Anti-Corruption Action Fund; 

17 (D) providing an explanation as to why a 

18 United States Government technical assistance 

19 provider was not used if technical assistance to 

20 a foreign governmental entity is not imple21 mented by a United States Government tech22 nical assistance provider; 

23 (E) describing the activities of the Inter24 agency Anti-Corruption Task Force established 

25 pursuant to subsection (e)(2); 


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1 (F) identifying— 

2 (i) the designated anti-corruption 

3 points of contact for foreign states; and 

4 (ii) any training provided to such 

5 points of contact; and 

6 (G) recommending additional measures 

7 that would enhance the ability of the United 

8 States Government to combat public corruption, 

9 kleptocracy, and illicit finance overseas. 

10 (2) ONLINE PLATFORM.—The Secretary of 

11 State, in conjunction with the Administrator of the 

12 United States Agency for International Develop13 ment, should consolidate existing reports with anti14 corruption components into a single online, public 

15 platform that includes— 

16 (A) the Annual Country Reports on 

17 Human Rights Practices required under section 

18 116 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 

19 U.S.C. 2151n); 

20 (B) the Fiscal Transparency Report re21 quired under section 7031(b) of the Depart22 ment of State, Foreign Operations and Related 

23 Programs Appropriations Act, 2019 (division F 

24 of Public Law 116–6); 


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1 (C) the Investment Climate Statement re2 ports; 

3 (D) the International Narcotics Control 

4 Strategy Report; 

5 (E) any other relevant public reports; and 

6 (F) links to third-party indicators and 

7 compliance mechanisms used by the United 

8 States Government to inform policy and pro9 gramming, as appropriate, such as— 

10 (i) the International Finance Corpora11 tion’s Doing Business surveys; 

12 (ii) the International Budget Partner13 ship’s Open Budget Index; and 

14 (iii) multilateral peer review anti-cor15 ruption compliance mechanisms, such as— 

16 (I) the Organisation for Eco17 nomic Co-operation and Develop18 ment’s Working Group on Bribery in 

19 International Business Transactions; 

20 (II) the Follow-Up Mechanism 

21 for the Inter-American Convention 

22 Against Corruption; and 

23 (III) the United Nations Conven24 tion Against Corruption, done at New 

25 York October 31, 2003. 


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1 TITLE V—ENSURING STRATEGIC 

2 SECURITY 

3 SEC. 501. COOPERATION ON A STRATEGIC NUCLEAR DIA4 LOGUE. 

5 (a) STATEMENT OF POLICY.—It is the policy of the 

6 United States— 

7 (1) to pursue, in coordination with United 

8 States allies, arms control negotiations and sus9 tained and regular engagement with the PRC— 

10 (A) to enhance understanding of each oth11 er’s respective nuclear policies, doctrine, and ca12 pabilities; 

13 (B) to improve transparency; and 

14 (C) to help manage the risks of miscalcula15 tion and misperception; 

16 (2) to formulate a strategy to engage the Gov17 ernment of the People’s Republic of China on rel18 evant issues that lays the groundwork for a con19 structive arms control framework, including— 

20 (A) fostering dialogue on arms control 

21 leading to the convening of strategic security 

22 talks; 

23 (B) negotiating norms for outer space; 


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1 (C) developing pre-launch notification re2 gimes aimed at reducing nuclear miscalculation; 

3 and 

4 (D) expanding lines of communication be5 tween both governments for the purposes of re6 ducing the risks of conventional war and in7 creasing transparency; 

8 (3) to pursue relevant negotiations in coordina9 tion with our allies and partners to ensure the secu10 rity of United States and allied interests to slow the 

11 PRC’s military modernization and expansion, includ12 ing on— 

13 (A) ground-launched cruise and ballistic 

14 missiles; 

15 (B) integrated air and missile defense; 

16 (C) hypersonic missiles; 

17 (D) intelligence, surveillance, and recon18 naissance; 

19 (E) space-based capabilities; 

20 (F) cyber capabilities; and 

21 (G) command, control, and communica22 tions; and 

23 (4) to ensure that the United States policy con24 tinues to reassure allies. 


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1 (b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con2 gress that— 

3 (1) it is in the interest of both nations to co4 operate in reducing risks of conventional and nuclear 

5 escalation; 

6 (2) a physical, cyber, electronic, or any other 

7 PLA attack on United States early warning sat8 ellites, other portions of the nuclear command and 

9 control enterprise, or critical infrastructure poses a 

10 high risk to inadvertent but rapid escalation; 

11 (3) the United States and its allies should pro12 mote international norms on military operations in 

13 space, the employment of cyber capabilities, and the 

14 military use of artificial intelligence, as an element 

15 of risk reduction regarding nuclear command and 

16 control; and 

17 (4) United States allies and partners should 

18 share the burden of promoting and protecting norms 

19 regarding the weaponization of space, highlighting 

20 unsafe behavior that violates international norms, 

21 such as in rendezvous and proximity operations, and 

22 promoting responsible behavior in space and all 

23 other domains. 


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1 SEC. 502. REPORT ON UNITED STATES EFFORTS TO EN2 GAGE THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA ON 

3 NUCLEAR ISSUES AND BALLISTIC MISSILE 

4 ISSUES. 

5 (a) REPORT ON THE FUTURE OF UNITED STATES6 CHINA ARMS CONTROL.—Not later than 180 days after 

7 the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of 

8 State, in coordination with the Secretary of Defense and 

9 the Secretary of Energy, shall submit to the appropriate 

10 committees of Congress a report, and if necessary a sepa11 rate classified annex, that outlines the approaches and 

12 strategies they will pursue to engage the Government of 

13 the People’s Republic of China on arms control and risk 

14 reduction, including— 

15 (1) areas of potential dialogue between the Gov16 ernments of the United States and the People’s Re17 public of China, including on ballistic, hypersonic 

18 glide, and cruise missiles, conventional forces, nu19 clear, space, and cyberspace issues, as well as other 

20 new strategic domains, which could reduce the likeli21 hood of war, limit escalation if a conflict were to 

22 occur, and constrain a destabilizing arms race in the 

23 Indo-Pacific; 

24 (2) how the United States Government can en25 gage the Government of the People’s Republic of 

26 China in a constructive arms control dialogue; 


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1 (3) identifying strategic military capabilities of 

2 the People’s Republic of China that the United 

3 States Government is most concerned about and how 

4 limiting these capabilities may benefit United States 

5 and allied security interests; 

6 (4) mechanisms to avoid, manage, or control 

7 nuclear, conventional, and unconventional military 

8 escalation between the United States and the Peo9 ple’s Republic of China; 

10 (5) the personnel and expertise required to ef11 fectively engage the People’s Republic of China in 

12 strategic stability and arms control dialogues; and 

13 (6) opportunities and methods to encourage 

14 transparency from the People’s Republic of China. 

15 (b) REPORT ON ARMS CONTROL TALKS WITH THE

16 PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA.—Not later than 180 

17 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Sec18 retary of State, in consultation with the Secretary of De19 fense and the Secretary of Energy, shall submit to the 

20 appropriate committees of Congress a report that de21 scribes— 

22 (1) a concrete plan for arms control talks with 

23 the People’s Republic of China; 

24 (2) if a bilateral arms control dialogue does not 

25 arise, what alternative plans the Department of 


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1 State envisages for ensuring the security of the 

2 United States and its allies through international 

3 arms control negotiations; 

4 (3) effects on the credibility of United States 

5 extended deterrence assurances to allies and part6 ners if arms control negotiations do not materialize 

7 and the implications for regional security architec8 tures; 

9 (4) efforts at engaging the People’s Republic of 

10 China to join arms control talks, whether on a bilat11 eral or international basis; and 

12 (5) the interest level of the Government of 

13 China in joining arms control talks, whether on a bi14 lateral or international basis, including through— 

15 (A) a formal invitation to appropriate offi16 cials from the People’s Republic of China, and 

17 to each of the permanent members of the 

18 United Nations Security Council, to observe a 

19 United States-Russian Federation New START 

20 Treaty on-site inspection to demonstrate the se21 curity benefits of transparency into strategic 

22 nuclear forces; 

23 (B) discussions on how to advance inter24 national negotiations on the fissile material cut25 off; 


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1 (C) an agreement with the People’s Repub2 lic of China that allows for advance notifica3 tions of ballistic missile launches, through the 

4 Hague Code of Conduct or other data ex5 changes or doctrine discussions related to stra6 tegic nuclear forces; 

7 (D) an agreement not to target or interfere 

8 in nuclear command, control, and communica9 tions (commonly referred to as ‘‘NC3’’) infra10 structure; or 

11 (E) any other cooperative measure that 

12 benefits United States-People’s Republic of 

13 China strategic stability. 

14 (c) APPROPRIATE COMMITTEES OF CONGRESS DE15 FINED.—In this section, the term ‘‘appropriate commit16 tees of Congress’’ means— 

17 (1) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the 

18 Committee on Armed Services, and the Committee 

19 on Energy and Natural Resources of the Senate; 

20 and 

21 (2) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the 

22 Committee on Armed Services, and the Committee 

23 on Energy and Commerce of the House of Rep24 resentatives. 


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1 SEC. 503. COUNTERING CHINA’S PROLIFERATION OF BAL2 LISTIC MISSILES AND NUCLEAR TECH3 NOLOGY TO THE MIDDLE EAST. 

4 (a) MTCR TRANSFERS.—Not later than 30 days 

5 after the date of the enactment of this Act, the President 

6 shall submit to the appropriate committees of Congress 

7 a written determination, and any documentation to sup8 port that determination detailing— 

9 (1) whether any foreign person in China know10 ingly exported, transferred, or engaged in trade of 

11 any item designated under Category I of the MTCR 

12 Annex to any foreign person in the previous three 

13 fiscal years; and 

14 (2) the sanctions the President has imposed or 

15 intends to impose pursuant to section 11B(b) of the 

16 Export Administration Act of 1979 (50 U.S.C. 

17 4612(b)) against any foreign person who knowingly 

18 engaged in the export, transfer, or trade of that item 

19 or items. 

20 (b) CHINA’S NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE COOPERA21 TION.—Not later than 30 days after the date of the enact22 ment of this Act, the President shall submit to the appro23 priate committees of Congress a report detailing— 

24 (1) whether any foreign person in China en25 gaged in cooperation with any other foreign person 

26 in the previous three fiscal years in the construction 


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1 of any nuclear-related fuel cycle facility or activity 

2 that has not been notified to the IAEA and would 

3 be subject to complementary access if an Additional 

4 Protocol was in force; and 

5 (2) the policy options required to prevent and 

6 respond to any future effort by China to export to 

7 any foreign person an item classified as ‘‘plants for 

8 the separation of isotopes of uranium’’ or ‘‘plants 

9 for the reprocessing of irradiated nuclear reactor 

10 fuel elements’’ under Part 110 of the Nuclear Regu11 latory Commission export licensing authority. 

12 (c) FORM OF REPORT.—The determination required 

13 under subsection (b) and the report required under sub14 section (c) shall be unclassified with a classified annex. 

15 (d) DEFINITIONS.—In this section: 

16 (1) The term ‘‘appropriate committees of Con17 gress’’ means— 

18 (A) the Select Committee on Intelligence of 

19 the Senate; 

20 (B) the Committee on Foreign Relations of 

21 the Senate; 

22 (C) the Select Committee on Intelligence of 

23 the House of Representatives; and 

24 (D) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of 

25 the House of Representatives. 


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1 (2) FOREIGN PERSON; PERSON.—The terms 

2 ‘‘foreign person’’ and ‘‘person’’ mean— 

3 (A) a natural person that is an alien; 

4 (B) a corporation, business association, 

5 partnership, society, trust, or any other non6 governmental entity, organization, or group, 

7 that is organized under the laws of a foreign 

8 country or has its principal place of business in 

9 a foreign country; 

10 (C) any foreign governmental entity oper11 ating as a business enterprise; and 

12 (D) any successor, subunit, or subsidiary 

13 of any entity described in subparagraph (B) or 

14 (C). 

15 TITLE VI—INVESTING IN A 

16 SUSTAINABLE FUTURE 

17 SEC. 601. ENSURING NATIONAL SECURITY AND ECONOMIC 

18 PRIORITIES WITH CHINA AND OTHER COUN19 TRIES ACCOUNT FOR ENVIRONMENTAL 

20 ISSUES AND CLIMATE CHANGE. 

21 (a) FINDINGS.—Congress finds the following: 

22 (1) The Special Report: Global Warming of 

23 1.5°C, published by the Intergovernmental Panel on 

24 Climate Change on October 8, 2018, and the Fourth 

25 National Climate Assessment, first published by the 


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1 United States Global Change Research Program in 

2 2018, concluded that— 

3 (A) the release of greenhouse gas emis4 sions, most notably the combustion of fossil 

5 fuels and the degradation of natural resources 

6 that absorb atmospheric carbon from human 

7 activity, are the dominant causes of climate 

8 change during the past century; and 

9 (B) changes in the Earth’s climate are— 

10 (i) causing sea levels to rise; 

11 (ii) increasing the global average tem12 perature of the Earth; 

13 (iii) increasing the incidence and se14 verity of wildfires; and 

15 (iv) intensifying the severity of ex16 treme weather, including hurricanes, cy17 clones, typhoons, flooding, droughts, and 

18 other disasters that threaten human life, 

19 healthy communities, and critical infra20 structure. 

21 (2) An increase in the global average tempera22 ture of 2 degrees Celsius compared to pre-industri23 alized levels would cause— 

24 (A) the displacement, and the forced inter25 nal migration, of an estimated 143,000,000 


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1 people in Latin America, South Asia, and Sub2 Saharan Africa by 2050 if insufficient action is 

3 taken (according to the World Bank); 

4 (B) the displacement of an average of 

5 17,800,000 people worldwide by floods every 

6 year (according to the Internal Displacement 

7 Monitoring Centre) because of the exacerbating 

8 effects of climate change; 

9 (C) more than $500,000,000,000 in lost 

10 annual economic output in the United States (a 

11 10 percent contraction from 2018 levels) by 

12 2100 (according to the Fourth National Cli13 mate Assessment); 

14 (D) an additional 100,000,000 people 

15 worldwide to be driven into poverty by 2030 

16 (according to the World Bank); 

17 (E) greater food insecurity and decreased 

18 agricultural production due to climate change’s 

19 effects on the increased frequency and intensity 

20 of extreme weather events; 

21 (F) the proliferation of agricultural pests 

22 and crop diseases, loss of biodiversity, degrad23 ing ecosystems, and water scarcity; and 


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1 (G) more than 350,000,000 additional peo2 ple worldwide to be exposed to deadly heat 

3 stress by 2050. 

4 (3) According to the International Energy 

5 Agency, the United States, China, India, and the 

6 European Union (including the United Kingdom) ac7 count for more than 58 percent of global greenhouse 

8 gas emissions. China, which is the world’s top green9 house gases emitter and has an outsized impact on 

10 the United States core interest in climate stability— 

11 (A) is likely to achieve its carbon emissions 

12 mitigation pledge to the Paris Agreement, con13 tained in its 2015 nationally determined con14 tribution, to ‘‘peak’’ emissions around 2030 

15 ahead of schedule; 

16 (B) announced, on September 22, 2020, 

17 and restated on April 22, 2021, a pledge to 

18 achieve carbon neutrality by 2060; 

19 (C) announced on April 22, 2021, its in20 tent to strictly control coal fired power genera21 tion projects, as well as strictly limit the in22 crease in coal consumption over the 14th five 

23 year plan period and phase it down in the 15th 

24 five year plan period; and 


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1 (D) however, remains uncommitted to 

2 internationally recognized metrics for achieving 

3 these goals. 

4 (b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con5 gress that— 

6 (1) to address the climate crisis, the United 

7 States must leverage the full weight of its diplomatic 

8 engagement and foreign assistance to promote our 

9 national security and economic interests related to 

10 climate change; 

11 (2) in the absence of United States leadership 

12 on global issues driving international climate-related 

13 policymaking, it would lead to a substantial and 

14 harmful decline in the Nation’s global competitive15 ness; 

16 (3) promoting international instruments on cli17 mate action and other relevant international stand18 ards and best practices, as such standards and prac19 tices develop, serve the interests of the American 

20 people and protect United States environmental re21 sources and the planet; 

22 (4) promoting the adoption and implementation 

23 of international climate-related agreements, stand24 ards, and practices by foreign states ensures a level 


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1 playing field for United States businesses and other 

2 stakeholders; 

3 (5) working with international allies and part4 ners to promote environmental justice and climate 

5 justice serves the American people’s interests; 

6 (6) finding common ground with China on cli7 mate action where possible is important, but the 

8 United States must also continue to hold China ac9 countable where its actions undermine the interests 

10 of the United States, its allies, and partners; and 

11 (7) in furtherance of the previous clauses, the 

12 United States should— 

13 (A) explore opportunities for constructive 

14 cooperation on climate action initiatives with 

15 China and other countries while ensuring the 

16 United States maintains its competitive advan17 tage in climate-related fields of expertise and 

18 industry, including— 

19 (i) support for international coopera20 tive policies, measures, and technologies to 

21 decarbonize industry and power, including 

22 through circular economy, energy storage 

23 and grid reliability, carbon capture, and 

24 green hydrogen; and 


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1 (ii) increased deployment of clean en2 ergy, including renewable and advanced 

3 nuclear power; green and climate resilient 

4 agriculture; energy efficient buildings; 

5 green, and low-carbon transportation; 

6 (B) cooperate on addressing emissions of 

7 methane and other non-CO2 greenhouse gases; 

8 (C) cooperate on addressing emissions 

9 from international civil aviation and maritime 

10 activities; 

11 (D) reduce emissions from coal, oil, and 

12 gas; 

13 (E) implement the Paris Agreement that 

14 significantly advances global climate ambition 

15 on mitigation, adaptation, and support; 

16 (F) coordinate among relevant federal, 

17 state, and local departments and agencies on 

18 climate action related initiatives; 

19 (G) provide resources, authorities and sup20 port for enhancing United States ambition and 

21 commitment to solving the climate crisis includ22 ing climate action specific assistance and multi23 lateral fund contributions; and 

24 (H) integrate considerations for climate 

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1 icy decision making and the United States na2 tional security apparatus. 

3 (c) PURPOSE.—The purpose of this Act is to provide 

4 authorities, resources, policies, and recommended adminis5 trative actions— 

6 (1) to restore United States global leadership 

7 on addressing the climate crisis and make United 

8 States climate action and climate diplomacy a more 

9 central tenet of United States foreign policy; 

10 (2) to improve the United States commitment 

11 to taking more ambitious action to help mitigate 

12 global greenhouse gas emission and improve devel13 oping countries’ resilience and adaptation capacities 

14 to the effects of climate change; 

15 (3) to ensure the United States maintains com16 petitive advantage over global strategic competitors 

17 in diplomacy and new technological development; 

18 (4) to encourage the pursuit of new bilateral co19 operation agreements with other world powers on 

20 initiatives to advance global clean energy innovation 

21 and other measures to mitigate global greenhouse 

22 gas emissions and improve climate change adapta23 tion capacities; 

24 (5) to ensure that the United States national 

25 security apparatus integrates critically important 


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1 data on the compounding effects that climate change 

2 is having on global security risks by enhancing our 

3 understanding of how, where, and when such effects 

4 are destabilizing countries and regions in ways that 

5 may motivate conflict, displacement, and other driv6 ers of insecurity; and 

7 (6) to authorize funding and programs to sup8 port a reaffirmation of the United States commit9 ments to international cooperation and support for 

10 developing and vulnerable countries to take climate 

11 action. 

12 (d) DEFINITIONS.—In this Act: 

13 (1) CLEAN ENERGY.—The term ‘‘clean energy’’ 

14 means— 

15 (A) renewable energy and related systems; 

16 (B) energy production processes that emit 

17 zero greenhouse gas emissions, including nu18 clear power; 

19 (C) systems and processes that capture 

20 and permanently store greenhouse gas emis21 sions from fossil fuel production and electricity 

22 generation units; and 

23 (D) products, processes, facilities, or sys24 tems designed to retrofit and improve the en25 ergy efficiency and electricity generated from 


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1 electrical generation units, while using less fuel, 

2 less or fewer power production resources, or less 

3 feedstocks. 

4 (2) CLIMATE ACTION.—The term ‘‘climate ac5 tion’’ means enhanced efforts to reduce greenhouse 

6 gas emissions and strengthen resilience and adaptive 

7 capacity to climate-induced impacts, including— 

8 (A) climate-related hazards in all coun9 tries; 

10 (B) integrating climate change measures 

11 into national policies, strategies and planning; 

12 and 

13 (C) improving education, awareness-rais14 ing, and human and institutional capacity with 

15 respect to climate change mitigation, adapta16 tion, impact reduction, and early warning. 

17 (3) CLIMATE CRISIS.—The term ‘‘climate cri18 sis’’ means the social, economic, health, safety, and 

19 security impacts on people, and the threats to bio20 diversity and natural ecosystem health, which are at21 tributable to the wide-variety of effects on global en22 vironmental and atmospheric conditions as a result 

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1 sions or reduce natural resource capacities to absorb 

2 and regulate atmospheric carbon. 

3 (4) CLIMATE DIPLOMACY.—The term ‘‘climate 

4 diplomacy’’ means methods of influencing the deci5 sions and behavior of foreign governments and peo6 ples through dialogue, negotiation, cooperation, and 

7 other peaceful measures on or about issues related 

8 to addressing global climate change, including— 

9 (A) the mitigation of global greenhouse gas 

10 emissions; 

11 (B) discussion, analysis, and sharing of 

12 scientific data and information on the cause 

13 and effects of climate change; 

14 (C) the security, social, economic, and po15 litical instability risks associated with the ef16 fects of climate change; 

17 (D) economic cooperation efforts and trade 

18 matters that are related to or associated with 

19 climate change and greenhouse gas mitigation 

20 from the global economy; 

21 (E) building resilience capacities and 

22 adapting to the effects of change; 

23 (F) sustainable land use and natural re24 source conservation; 


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1 (G) accounting for loss and damage attrib2 uted to the effects of climate change; 

3 (H) just transition of carbon intense 

4 economies to low or zero carbon economies and 

5 accounting for laborers within affected econo6 mies; 

7 (I) technological innovations that reduce or 

8 eliminate carbon emissions; and 

9 (J) clean energy and energy systems. 

10 (5) CLIMATE SECURITY.—The term ‘‘climate 

11 security’’ means the effects of climate change on— 

12 (A) United States national security con13 cerns and subnational, national, and regional 

14 political stability; and 

15 (B) overseas security and conflict situa16 tions that are potentially exacerbated by dy17 namic environmental factors and events, includ18 ing— 

19 (i) the intensification and frequency of 

20 droughts, floods, wildfires, tropical storms, 

21 and other extreme weather events; 

22 (ii) changes in historical severe weath23 er, drought, and wildfire patterns; 

24 (iii) the expansion of geographical 

25 ranges of droughts, floods, and wildfires 


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1 into regions that had not regularly experi2 enced such phenomena; 

3 (iv) global sea level rise patterns and 

4 the expansion of geographical ranges af5 fected by drought; and 

6 (v) changes in marine environments 

7 that effect critical geostrategic waterways, 

8 such as the Arctic Ocean, the South China 

9 Sea, the South Pacific Ocean, the Barents 

10 Sea, and the Beaufort Sea. 

11 (6) RESILIENCE.—The term ‘‘resilience’’ means 

12 the ability of human made and natural systems (in13 cluding their component parts) to anticipate, absorb, 

14 cope, accommodate, or recover from the effects of a 

15 hazardous event in a timely and efficient manner, in16 cluding through ensuring the preservation, restora17 tion, or improvement of its essential basic structures 

18 and functions. It is not preparedness or response. 

19 SEC. 602. ENHANCING SECURITY CONSIDERATIONS FOR 

20 GLOBAL CLIMATE DISRUPTIONS. 

21 (a) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary of State, in con22 sultation with other relevant agencies, shall conduct bien23 nial comprehensive evaluations of present and ongoing dis24 ruptions to the global climate system, including— 


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1 (1) the intensity, frequency, and range of nat2 ural disasters; 

3 (2) the scarcity of global natural resources, in4 cluding fresh water; 

5 (3) global food, health, and energy insecurities; 

6 (4) conditions that contribute to— 

7 (A) intrastate and interstate conflicts; 

8 (B) foreign political and economic insta9 bility; 

10 (C) international migration of vulnerable 

11 and underserved populations; 

12 (D) the failure of national governments; 

13 and 

14 (E) gender-based violence; and 

15 (5) United States and allied military readiness, 

16 operations, and strategy. 

17 (b) PURPOSES.—The purposes of the evaluations con18 ducted under subsection (a) are— 

19 (1) to support the practical application of sci20 entific data and research on climate change’s dy21 namic effects around the world to improve resilience, 

22 adaptability, security, and stability despite growing 

23 global environmental risks and changes; 

24 (2) to ensure that the strategic planning and 

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1 velopment and diplomatic missions adequately ac2 count for heightened and dynamic risks and chal3 lenges associated with the effects of climate change; 

4 (3) to improve coordination between United 

5 States science agencies conducting research and 

6 forecasts on the causes and effects of climate change 

7 and United States national security agencies; 

8 (4) to better understand the disproportionate 

9 effects of global climate disruptions on women, girls, 

10 indigenous communities, and other historically 

11 marginalized populations; and 

12 (5) to inform the development of the climate se13 curity strategy described in subsection (d). 

14 (c) SCOPE.—The evaluations conducted under sub15 section (a) shall— 

16 (1) examine developing countries’ vulnerabilities 

17 and risks associated with global, regional, and local18 ized effects of climate change; and 

19 (2) assess and make recommendations on nec20 essary measures to mitigate risks and reduce 

21 vulnerabilities associated with effects, including— 

22 (A) sea level rise; 

23 (B) freshwater resource scarcity; 

24 (C) wildfires; and 


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1 (D) increased intensity and frequency of 

2 extreme weather conditions and events, such as 

3 flooding, drought, and extreme storm events, in4 cluding tropical cyclones. 

5 (d) CLIMATE SECURITY STRATEGY.—The Secretary 

6 shall use the evaluations required under subsection (a)— 

7 (1) to inform the development and implementa8 tion of a climate security strategy for the Bureau of 

9 Conflict and Stabilization Operations, the Bureau of 

10 Political-Military Affairs, embassies, consulates, re11 gional bureaus, and other offices and programs oper12 ating chief of mission authority, including those with 

13 roles in conflict avoidance, prevention and security 

14 assistance, or humanitarian disaster response, pre15 vention, and assistance; and 

16 (2) in furtherance of such strategy, to assess, 

17 develop, budget for, and (upon approval) implement 

18 plans, policies, and actions— 

19 (A) to account for the impacts of climate 

20 change to global human health, safety, govern21 ance, oceans, food production, fresh water and 

22 other critical natural resources, settlements, in23 frastructure, marginalized groups, and eco24 nomic activity; 


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1 (B) to evaluate the climate change vulner2 ability, security, susceptibility, and resiliency of 

3 United States interests and non-defense assets 

4 abroad; 

5 (C) to coordinate the integration of climate 

6 change risk and vulnerability assessments into 

7 all foreign policy and security decision-making 

8 processes, including awarding foreign assist9 ance; 

10 (D) to evaluate specific risks to certain re11 gions and countries that are— 

12 (i) vulnerable to the effects of climate 

13 change; and 

14 (ii) strategically significant to the 

15 United States; 

16 (E) to enhance the resilience capacities of 

17 foreign countries to the effects of climate 

18 change as a means of reducing the risks of con19 flict and instability; 

20 (F) to advance principles of good govern21 ance by encouraging foreign governments, par22 ticularly nations that are least capable of cop23 ing with the effects of climate change— 

24 (i) to conduct climate security evalua25 tions; and 


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1 (ii) to facilitate the development of cli2 mate security action plans to ensure sta3 bility and public safety in disaster situa4 tions in a humane and responsible fashion; 

5 (G) to evaluate the vulnerability, security, 

6 susceptibility, and resiliency of United States 

7 interests and nondefense assets abroad; 

8 (H) to build international institutional ca9 pacity to address climate security implications 

10 and to advance United States interests, regional 

11 stability, and global security; and 

12 (I) other activities that advance— 

13 (i) the utilization and integration of 

14 climate science in national security plan15 ning; and 

16 (ii) the clear understanding of how 

17 the effects of climate change can exacer18 bate security risks and threats. 

19 (e) REPORT.—Not later than 180 days after the date 

20 of the enactment of this Act and every two years there21 after for the following 20 years, the Secretary of State, 

22 in consultation with other departments and agencies shall 

23 submit to the Committee on Foreign Relations and the 

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1 priations of the House of Representatives an unclassified 

2 report, with a classified annex if necessary, that in3 cludes— 

4 (1) a review of the efforts, initiatives, and pro5 grams in support of the strategy in subsection (c), 

6 as well as— 

7 (A) an assessment of the funding expended 

8 by relevant Federal departments and agencies 

9 on emerging events exacerbated by climate 

10 change and the legal, procedural, and resource 

11 constraints faced by the Department of State 

12 and the United States Agency for International 

13 Development throughout respective budgeting, 

14 strategic planning, and management cycles to 

15 support the prevention of and response to 

16 emerging events exacerbated by climate change; 

17 (B) current annual global assessments of 

18 emerging events exacerbated by climate change; 

19 (C) recommendations to further strengthen 

20 United States capabilities described in this sec21 tion; and 

22 (D) consideration of analysis, reporting, 

23 and policy recommendations by civil society, 

24 academic, and nongovernmental organizations 

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1 vent and respond to emerging events exacer2 bated by climate change; 

3 (2) recommendations to ensure shared responsi4 bility by— 

5 (A) enhancing multilateral mechanisms for 

6 preventing, mitigating, and responding to 

7 emerging events exacerbated by climate change; 

8 and 

9 (B) strengthening regional organizations; 

10 and 

11 (3) the implementation status of the rec12 ommendations included in the review under para13 graph (1). 

14 (f) REPORT BY THE DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTEL15 LIGENCE.—The Director of National Intelligence is en16 couraged to include, in his or her annual (or more often 

17 as appropriate) unclassified testimony, accompanied by a 

18 classified annex, if necessary, to Congress on threats to 

19 United States national security— 

20 (1) a review of countries and regions at risk of 

21 emerging events exacerbated by climate change; and 

22 (2) whenever possible, specific identification of 

23 countries and regions at immediate risk of emerging 

24 events exacerbated by climate change. 


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1 SEC. 603. BALANCING ACCOUNTABILITY AND COOPERA2 TION WITH CHINA. 

3 It is the sense of Congress that— 

4 (1) successful mitigation of global greenhouse 

5 gas emissions and changes to the environment re6 quire global cooperation and coordination of efforts, 

7 as well as holding other countries like the People’s 

8 Republic of China accountable for their actions and 

9 commitments to ensure a level playing field with the 

10 United States, its allies, and partners; 

11 (2) other countries look towards the United 

12 States and China, as the world’s largest emitters 

13 and largest economies, for leadership by example to 

14 effectively mitigate greenhouse gas emissions, de15 velop and deploy energy generation technologies, and 

16 integrate sustainable adaptation solutions to the in17 evitable effects of climate change; 

18 (3) given the volume of China’s greenhouse gas 

19 emissions and the scientific imperative to swiftly re20 duce global greenhouse gas emissions to net-zero 

21 emissions around 2050, China should— 

22 (A) revise its long-term pledge; 

23 (B) seek to immediately peak its emissions; 

24 (C) begin reducing its greenhouse gas 

25 emissions significantly to meet a more ambi26 tious long-term 2050 reductions target; and 


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1 (D) update its nationally determined con2 tribution along a trajectory that aligns with 

3 achieving a more ambitious net-zero by 2050 

4 emissions target; 

5 (4) it is in the United States national interest 

6 to emphasize the environment and climate change in 

7 its bilateral engagement with China, as global cli8 mate risks cannot be mitigated without a significant 

9 reduction in Chinese domestic and overseas emis10 sions; 

11 (5) the United States and China, to the extent 

12 practicable, should coordinate on making and deliv13 ering ambitious pledges to reduce greenhouse gas 

14 emissions, with aspirations towards achieving net 

15 zero greenhouse gas emissions by 2050; 

16 (6) the United States and its allies should work 

17 together, using diplomatic and economic tools, to 

18 hold China accountable for any failure by China— 

19 (A) to increase ambition in its 2030 na20 tionally determined contribution, in line with 

21 net zero greenhouse gas emissions by 2050 be22 fore the 26th Conference of the Parties to the 

23 UNFCCC scheduled for November 2021 and 

24 meeting a more ambitious nationally determined 

25 contribution; 


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1 (B) to work faithfully to uphold the prin2 ciples, goals, and rules of the Paris Agreement; 

3 (C) to avoid and prohibit efforts to under4 mine or devolve the Paris Agreement’s rule or 

5 underlying framework, particularly within areas 

6 of accountability transparency, and shared re7 sponsibility among all parties; 

8 (D) to eliminate greenhouse gas intensive 

9 projects from China’s Belt and Road Initiative 

10 and other overseas investments, including— 

11 (i) working with allies and partners of 

12 the United States to eliminate support for 

13 coal power production projects in China’s 

14 Belt and Road Initiative; 

15 (ii) providing financing and project 

16 support for cleaner and less risky alter17 natives; and 

18 (iii) undertaking ‘‘parallel initiatives’’ 

19 to enhance capacity building programs and 

20 overseas sustainable investment criteria, 

21 including in areas such as integrated en22 ergy planning, power sector reform, just 

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1 port low-emissions growth in developing 

2 countries; and 

3 (E) to phase out existing coal power plants 

4 and reduce net coal power production; 

5 (7) the United States should pursue confidence6 building opportunities for the United States and 

7 China to undertake ‘‘parallel initiatives’’ on clean 

8 energy research, development, finance, and deploy9 ment, including through economic and stimulus 

10 measures with clear, mutually agreed upon rules and 

11 policies to protect intellectual property, ensure equi12 table, nonpunitive provision of support, and verify 

13 implementation, which would provide catalytic 

14 progress towards delivering a global clean energy 

15 transformation that benefits all people; 

16 (8) the United States should pursue cooperative 

17 initiatives to reduce global deforestation; and 

18 (9) the United States should pursue appro19 priate scientific cooperative exchanges and research 

20 that align with United States interests and those of 

21 its international partners and allies, provide reci22 procity of access, protect intellectual property rights, 

23 and preserve the values and human rights interests 

24 of the American people. 


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1 SEC. 604. PROMOTING RESPONSIBLE DEVELOPMENT AL2 TERNATIVES TO THE BELT AND ROAD INITIA3 TIVE. 

4 (a) IN GENERAL.—The President should seek oppor5 tunities to partner with multilateral development finance 

6 institutions to develop financing tools based on shared de7 velopment finance criteria and mechanisms to support in8 vestments in developing countries that— 

9 (1) support low carbon economic development; 

10 and 

11 (2) promote resiliency and adaptation to envi12 ronmental changes and natural disasters. 

13 (b) PARTNERSHIP AGREEMENT.—The Chief Execu14 tive Officer of the United States International Develop15 ment Finance Corporation should seek to partner with 

16 other multilateral development finance institutions and de17 velopment finance institutions to leverage the respective 

18 available funds to support low carbon economic develop19 ment, which may include clean energy including renewable 

20 and nuclear energy projects, environmental adaptation, 

21 and resilience activities in countries. 

22 (c) CO-FINANCING OF INFRASTRUCTURE

23 PROJECTS.— 

24 (1) AUTHORIZATION.—Subject to paragraph 

25 (2), the Secretary of State, the Administrator of the 

26 United States Agency for International Development 


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1 and other relevant agency heads are authorized to 

2 co-finance infrastructure, resilience, and environ3 mental adaptation projects that advance the develop4 ment objectives of the United States overseas and 

5 provide viable alternatives to projects that would 

6 otherwise be included within China’s Belt and Road 

7 Initiative. 

8 (2) CONDITIONS.—Co-financing arrangements 

9 authorized pursuant to paragraph (1) may not be 

10 approved unless— 

11 (A) the projects to be financed— 

12 (i) promote the public good; 

13 (ii) promote United States national 

14 security or economic interests; 

15 (iii) promote low carbon emissions, in16 cluding clean energy renewable and nuclear 

17 energy projects; and 

18 (iv) will have substantially lower envi19 ronmental impact than the proposed Belt 

20 and Road Initiative alternative; and 

21 (B) the Committee on Foreign Relations of 

22 the Senate and the Committee on Foreign Af23 fairs of the House of Representatives are noti24 fied not later than 15 days in advance of enter25 ing into such co-financing arrangements. 


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1 SEC. 605. USING CLIMATE DIPLOMACY TO BETTER SERVE 

2 NATIONAL SECURITY AND ECONOMIC INTER3 ESTS. 

4 (a) IN GENERAL.—The President and the Secretary 

5 of State shall prioritize climate action and climate diplo6 macy in United States foreign policy by— 

7 (1) ensuring diplomacy, support, and inter8 agency coordination for bilateral and multilateral ac9 tions to address the climate crisis; and 

10 (2) improving coordination and integration of 

11 climate action across all bureaus and United States 

12 missions abroad. 

13 (b) CLIMATE ACTION INTEGRATION.—The Secretary 

14 of State, through the Under Secretary of State for Eco15 nomic Growth, Energy, and the Environment and any 

16 other designees, shall— 

17 (1) prioritize climate action and clean energy 

18 within the bureaus and offices under the leadership 

19 of the Under Secretary for Economic Growth, En20 ergy, and the Environment; 

21 (2) ensure that such bureaus and offices are co22 ordinating with other bureaus of the Department of 

23 State regarding the integration of climate action and 

24 climate diplomacy as a cross-cutting imperative 

25 across the Department of State; 

26 (3) encourage all Under Secretaries of State— 


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1 (A) to assess how issues related to climate 

2 change and United States climate action are in3 tegrated into their operations and programs; 

4 (B) to coordinate crosscutting actions and 

5 diplomatic efforts that relate to climate action; 

6 and 

7 (C) to make available the technical assist8 ance and resources of the bureaus and offices 

9 with relevant expertise to provide technical as10 sistance and expert support to other bureaus 

11 within the Department of State regarding cli12 mate action, clean energy development, and cli13 mate diplomacy; 

14 (4) manage the integration of scientific data on 

15 the current and anticipated effects of climate change 

16 into applied strategies and diplomatic engagements 

17 across programmatic and regional bureaus of the 

18 Department of State and into the Department of 

19 State’s decision making processes; 

20 (5) ensure that the relevant bureaus and offices 

21 provide appropriate technical support and re22 sources— 

23 (A) to the President, the Secretary of 

24 State, and their respective designees charged 


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1 with addressing climate change and associated 

2 issues; 

3 (B) to United States diplomats advancing 

4 United States foreign policy related to climate 

5 action; and 

6 (C) for the appropriate engagement and 

7 integration of relevant domestic agencies in 

8 international climate change affairs, including 

9 United States participation in multilateral fora; 

10 and 

11 (6) carry out other activities, as directed by the 

12 Secretary of State, that advance United States cli13 mate-related foreign policy objectives, including glob14 al greenhouse gas mitigation, climate change adapta15 tion activities, and global climate security. 

16 (c) RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE UNDER SECRETARY

17 OF STATE FOR POLITICAL AFFAIRS.—The Under Sec18 retary of State for Political Affairs shall ensure that all 

19 foreign missions are— 

20 (1) advancing United States bilateral climate 

21 diplomacy; 

22 (2) engaging strategically on opportunities for 

23 bilateral climate action cooperation with foreign gov24 ernments; and 


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1 (3) utilizing the technical resources and coordi2 nating adequately with the bureaus reporting to the 

3 Under Secretary of State for Economic Growth, En4 ergy and the Environment. 

5 (d) REPORT.—Not later than 200 days after the date 

6 of the enactment of this Act, the Under Secretary of State 

7 for Economic Growth, Energy, and the Environment, in 

8 cooperation with the Under Secretary of State for Political 

9 Affairs, shall submit a report to the appropriate congres10 sional committees that— 

11 (1) assesses how climate action and United 

12 States climate diplomacy is integrated across the 

13 Bureaus of the Department of State; and 

14 (2) includes recommendations on strategies to 

15 improve cross bureau coordination and under16 standing of United States climate action and climate 

17 diplomacy. 

18 (e) EFFECT OF ELIMINATION OF POSITIONS.—If the 

19 positions of Under Secretary of State for Economic 

20 Growth, Energy, and the Environment and the Undersec21 retary of State for Political Affairs are eliminated or un22 dergo name changes, the responsibilities of such Under 

23 Secretaries under this section shall be reassigned to other 

24 Under Secretaries of State, as appropriate. 

25 (f) CLIMATE CHANGE OFFICERS.— 


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1 (1) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary of State shall 

2 establish and staff Climate Change Officer positions. 

3 Such Officers shall serve under the supervision of 

4 the appropriate chief of mission or the Under Sec5 retary for Economic Growth, Energy, and the Envi6 ronment of the Department of State, as the case 

7 may be. The Secretary shall ensure each embassy, 

8 consulate, and diplomatic mission to which such Of9 ficers are assigned pursuant to paragraph (2) has 

10 sufficient additional and appropriate staff to support 

11 such Officers. 

12 (2) ASSIGNMENT.—Climate Change Officers 

13 shall be assigned to the following posts: 

14 (A) United States embassies, or, if appro15 priate, consulates. 

16 (B) United States diplomatic missions to, 

17 or liaisons with, regional and multilateral orga18 nizations, including the United States diplo19 matic missions to the European Union, African 

20 Union, Organization of American States, Arctic 

21 Council, and any other appropriate regional or22 ganization, and the United Nations and its rel23 evant specialized agencies. 

24 (C) Other posts as designated by the Sec25 retary. 


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1 (3) RESPONSIBILITIES.—Each Climate Change 

2 Officer shall— 

3 (A) provide expertise on effective ap4 proaches to— 

5 (i) mitigate the emission of gases 

6 which contribute to global climate change 

7 and formulate national and global plans 

8 for reducing such gross and net emissions; 

9 and 

10 (ii) reduce the detrimental impacts at11 tributable to global climate change, and 

12 adapt to such impacts; 

13 (B) engage and convene, in a manner that 

14 is equitable, inclusive, and just, with individuals 

15 and organizations which represent a govern16 ment office, a nongovernmental organization, a 

17 social or political movement, a private sector 

18 entity, an educational or scientific institution, 

19 or any other entity concerned with— 

20 (i) global climate change; the emission 

21 of gases which contribute to global climate 

22 change; or 

23 (ii) reducing the detrimental impacts 

24 attributable to global climate change; 


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1 (C) facilitate engagement by United States 

2 entities in bilateral and multilateral cooperation 

3 on climate change; and 

4 (D) carry out such other responsibilities as 

5 the Secretary may assign. 

6 (4) RESPONSIBILITIES OF UNDER SEC7 RETARY.—The Under Secretary for Economic 

8 Growth, Energy, and the Environment of the De9 partment of State shall, including by acting through 

10 the Bureau of Oceans and International Environ11 mental and Scientific Affairs of the Department of 

12 State— 

13 (A) provide policy guidance to Climate 

14 Change Officers established under subsection 

15 (a); 

16 (B) develop relations with, consult with, 

17 and provide assistance to relevant individuals 

18 and organizations concerned with studying, 

19 mitigating, and adapting to global climate 

20 change, or reducing the emission of gases which 

21 contribute to global climate change; and 

22 (C) assist officers and employees of re23 gional bureaus of the Department of State to 

24 develop strategies and programs to promote 

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1 mate change, or reducing the emission of gases 

2 which contribute to global climate change. 

3 (g) ACTIONS BY CHIEFS OF MISSION.—Each chief of 

4 mission in a foreign country shall— 

5 (1) develop, as part of annual joint strategic 

6 plans or equivalent program and policy planning, a 

7 strategy to promote actions to improve and increase 

8 studying, mitigating, and adapting to global climate 

9 change, or reducing the emission of gases which con10 tribute to global climate change by— 

11 (A) consulting and coordinating with and 

12 providing support to relevant individuals and 

13 organizations, including experts and other pro14 fessionals and stakeholders on issues related to 

15 climate change; and 

16 (B) holding periodic meetings with such 

17 relevant individuals and organizations relating 

18 to such strategy; 

19 (2) hold ongoing discussions with the officials 

20 and leaders of such country regarding progress to 

21 improve and increase studying, mitigating, and 

22 adapting to global climate change, or reducing the 

23 emission of gases which contribute to global climate 

24 change in a manner that is equitable, inclusive, and 

25 just in such country; and 


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1 (3) certify annually to the Secretary of State 

2 that to the maximum extent practicable, consider3 ations related to climate change adaptation and 

4 mitigation, sustainability, and the environment were 

5 incorporated in activities, management, and oper6 ations of the United States embassy or other diplo7 matic post under the director of the chief of mission. 

8 (h) TRAINING.—Not later than 180 days after the 

9 date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State 

10 shall establish curriculum at the Department of State’s 

11 Foreign Service Institute that supplements political and 

12 economic reporting tradecraft courses in order to provide 

13 employees of the Department with specialized training 

14 with respect to studying, mitigating, and adapting to glob15 al climate change, or reducing the emission of gases which 

16 contribute to global climate change. Such training shall 

17 include the following: 

18 (1) Awareness of the full range of national and 

19 subnational agencies, offices, personnel, statutory 

20 authorities, funds, and programs involved in the 

21 international commitments of the United States re22 garding global climate change and the emission of 

23 gases which contribute to global climate change, the 

24 science of global climate change, and methods for 

25 mitigating and adapting to global climate change. 


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1 (2) Awareness of methods for mitigating and 

2 adapting to global climate change and reducing the 

3 emission of gases which contribute to global climate 

4 change that are equitable, inclusive, and just. 

5 (3) Familiarity with United States agencies, 

6 multilateral agencies, international financial institu7 tions, and the network of donors providing assist8 ance to mitigate and adapt to global climate change. 

9 (4) Awareness of the most frequently an10 nounced goals and methods of the entities specified 

11 in subsection (a)(3)(B). 

12 (i) CONTRACTING.—Contracting and agreements offi13 cers of the Department of State, and other United States 

14 embassy personnel responsible for contracts, grants, or ac15 quisitions, shall receive training on evaluating proposals, 

16 solicitations, and bids, for considerations related to sus17 tainability and adapting to or mitigating impacts from cli18 mate change. 

19 (j) REPORTING.—Not later than 180 days after the 

20 date of the enactment of this Act and biennially thereafter, 

21 the Secretary of State shall submit to the Committee on 

22 Foreign Relations of the Senate and the Committee on 

23 Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives a report 

24 that includes a detailed breakdown of posts at which staff 

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1 sponsibilities to which they have been assigned, and the 

2 strategies developed by the chief of mission, as applicable. 

3 (k) CLIMATE CHANGE SUPPORT AND FINANCING.— 

4 The Secretary of State shall facilitate the coordination 

5 among the Department of State and other relevant depart6 ments and agencies toward contributing technical coopera7 tion, engagement, development finance, or foreign assist8 ance relevant to United States international climate action 

9 and in support of United States climate diplomacy. 

10 (l) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Congress 

11 that climate diplomacy tools as described in this section 

12 are critical for demonstrating the commitment to include 

13 climate changes issues as core tenets of foreign policy pri14 orities, as well as preserving the United States role as a 

15 global leader on climate change action. 

16 SEC. 606. DRIVING A GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE RESIL17 IENCE STRATEGY. 

18 (a) AMENDMENT.—Section 117 of the Foreign As19 sistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2151p) is amended— 

20 (1) in subsection (b)— 

21 (A) by inserting ‘‘(1)’’ after ‘‘(b)’’; and 

22 (B) by adding at the end the following: 

23 ‘‘(2)(A) The President is authorized to furnish 

24 assistance to programs and initiatives that— 


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1 ‘‘(i) promote resilience among communities 

2 facing harmful impacts from climate change; 

3 and 

4 ‘‘(ii) reduce the vulnerability of persons af5 fected by climate change. 

6 ‘‘(B) There shall be, in the Department of 

7 State, a Coordinator of Climate Change Resilience.’’; 

8 and 

9 (2) by adding at the end the following: 

10 ‘‘(d)(1) The Secretary of State, in coordination with 

11 the Administrator of the United States Agency for Inter12 national Development, shall establish a comprehensive, in13 tegrated, 10-year strategy, which shall be referred to as 

14 the ‘Global Climate Change Resilience Strategy’, to miti15 gate the impacts of climate change on displacement and 

16 humanitarian emergencies. 

17 ‘‘(2) The Global Climate Change Resilience Strategy 

18 shall— 

19 ‘‘(A) focus on addressing slow-onset and rapid20 onset effects of events caused by climate change, 

21 consider the effects of events caused by climate 

22 change, and describe the key features of successful 

23 strategies to prevent such conditions; 


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1 ‘‘(B) include specific objectives and multisec2 toral approaches to the effects of events caused by 

3 climate change; 

4 ‘‘(C) promote our national security and eco5 nomic interests while leading international climate6 related policymaking efforts, on which the absence of 

7 United States leadership would lead to a substantial 

8 and harmful decline in the nation’s global competi9 tiveness; 

10 ‘‘(D) promote international instruments on cli11 mate action and other relevant international stand12 ards and best practices, as such standards and prac13 tices develop, that serve the interests of the Amer14 ican people and protect United States environmental 

15 resources and the planet; 

16 ‘‘(E) promote the adoption and implementation 

17 of such international climate-related agreements, 

18 standards, and practices by foreign states; 

19 ‘‘(F) work with our allies and partners to en20 sure a level playing field exists when it comes to cli21 mate action; to encourage and assist foreign coun22 tries to make similar or even greater commitments 

23 than the United States; 

24 ‘‘(G) describe approaches that ensure national 

25 leadership, as appropriate, and substantively engage 


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1 with civil society, local partners, and the affected 

2 communities, including marginalized populations and 

3 underserved populations, in the design, implementa4 tion, and monitoring of climate change programs to 

5 best safeguard the future of those subject to dis6 placement; 

7 ‘‘(H) assign roles for relevant Federal agencies 

8 to avoid duplication of efforts, while ensuring that— 

9 ‘‘(i) the Department of State is responsible 

10 for— 

11 ‘‘(I) leading the Global Climate 

12 Change Resilience Strategy; 

13 ‘‘(II) establishing United States for14 eign policy; 

15 ‘‘(III) advancing diplomatic and polit16 ical efforts; and 

17 ‘‘(IV) guiding security assistance and 

18 related civilian security efforts to mitigate 

19 climate change threats; 

20 ‘‘(ii) the United States Agency for Inter21 national Development is— 

22 ‘‘(I) responsible for overseeing pro23 grams to prevent the effects of events 

24 caused by climate change; 


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1 ‘‘(II) the lead implementing agency 

2 for development and related nonsecurity 

3 program policy related to building resil4 ience and achieving recovery; and 

5 ‘‘(III) responsible for providing over6 seas humanitarian assistance to respond to 

7 international and internal displacement 

8 caused by climate change and to coordi9 nate the pursuit of durable solutions for 

10 climate-displaced persons; and 

11 ‘‘(iii) other Federal agencies support the 

12 activities of the Department of State and the 

13 United States Agency for International Devel14 opment, as appropriate, with the concurrence of 

15 the Secretary of State and the Administrator of 

16 the United States Agency for International De17 velopment; 

18 ‘‘(I) describe programs that agencies will under19 take to achieve the stated objectives, including de20 scriptions of existing programs and funding by fiscal 

21 year and account; 

22 ‘‘(J) identify mechanisms to improve coordina23 tion between the United States, foreign govern24 ments, and international organizations, including the 


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1 World Bank, the United Nations, regional organiza2 tions, and private sector organizations; 

3 ‘‘(K) address efforts to expand public-private 

4 partnerships and leverage private sector resources; 

5 ‘‘(L) describe the criteria, metrics, and mecha6 nisms for monitoring and evaluation of programs 

7 and objectives in the Global Climate Change Resil8 ience Strategy; 

9 ‘‘(M) describe how the Global Climate Change 

10 Resilience Strategy will ensure that programs are 

11 country-led and context-specific; 

12 ‘‘(N) establish a program to monitor climate 

13 and social conditions to anticipate and prevent cli14 mate and environmental stressors from evolving into 

15 national security risks; 

16 ‘‘(O) include an assessment of climate risks in 

17 the Department of State’s Quadrennial Diplomacy 

18 and Development Review; and 

19 ‘‘(P) prioritize foreign aid, to the extent prac20 ticable, for international climate resilience in support 

21 of this Global Climate Change Resilience Strategy. 

22 ‘‘(3) Not later than 270 days after the date of the 

23 enactment of this subsection, and annually thereafter, the 

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1 eign Affairs of the House of Representatives, based in part 

2 on the information collected pursuant to this section, that 

3 details the Global Climate Change Resilience Strategy. 

4 The report shall be submitted in unclassified form, but 

5 may include a classified annex, if necessary. 

6 ‘‘(4) Not later than 180 days after the date of the 

7 enactment of this subsection, the Secretary of State and 

8 the Coordinator of Global Climate Change Resilience shall 

9 brief the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate 

10 and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of 

11 Representatives regarding the progress made by the Fed12 eral Government in implementing the Global Climate 

13 Change Resilience Strategy. 

14 ‘‘(5)(A) Not later than 270 days after the date of 

15 the enactment of this subsection, and annually thereafter, 

16 the Comptroller General of the United States, in coopera17 tion and consultation with the Secretary of State, shall 

18 produce a report evaluating the progress that the Federal 

19 Government has made toward incorporating climate 

20 change into department and agency policies, including the 

21 resources that have been allocated for such purpose. 

22 ‘‘(B) The report required under subparagraph (A) 

23 shall assess— 


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1 ‘‘(i) the degree to which the Department of 

2 State and the United States Agency for Inter3 national Development (USAID) are— 

4 ‘‘(I) developing climate change risk assess5 ments; and 

6 ‘‘(II) providing guidance to missions on 

7 how to include climate change risks in their in8 tegrated country strategies; 

9 ‘‘(ii) whether the Department of State and 

10 USAID have sufficient resources to fulfill the re11 quirements described in paragraph (2); and 

12 ‘‘(iii) any areas in which the Department of 

13 State and USAID may lack sufficient resources to 

14 fulfill such requirements.’’. 

15 (b) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—There 

16 are authorized to be appropriated such sums as may be 

17 necessary to carry out this Global Climate Change Resil18 ience Strategy. 

19 SEC. 607. ADDRESSING INTERNATIONAL CLIMATE CHANGE 

20 MITIGATION, ADAPTATION, AND SECURITY. 

21 (a) DEFINITIONS.—In this section: 

22 (1) CONVENTION.—The term ‘‘Convention’’ 

23 means the United Nations Framework Convention 

24 on Climate Change, done at New York May 9, 1992, 

25 and entered into force March 21, 1994. 


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1 (2) MOST VULNERABLE COMMUNITIES AND

2 POPULATIONS.—The term ‘‘most vulnerable commu3 nities and populations’’ means communities and pop4 ulations that are at risk of substantial adverse ef5 fects of climate change and have limited capacity to 

6 respond to such effects, including women, impover7 ished communities, children, indigenous peoples, and 

8 informal workers. 

9 (3) MOST VULNERABLE DEVELOPING COUN10 TRIES.—The term ‘‘most vulnerable developing 

11 countries’’ means, as determined by the Adminis12 trator of the United States Agency for International 

13 Development, developing countries that are at risk 

14 of substantial adverse effects of climate change and 

15 have limited capacity to respond to such effects, con16 sidering the approaches included in any international 

17 treaties and agreements. 

18 (4) PROGRAM.—The term ‘‘Program’’ means 

19 the International Climate Change Adaptation, Miti20 gation, and Security Program established pursuant 

21 to subsection (c). 

22 (b) PURPOSE.—The purpose of this section is to pro23 vide authorities for additional, new, current, and ongoing 

24 bilateral and regional international development assist25 ance, and, as appropriate, to leverage private resources, 


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1 in support of host country driven projects, planning, poli2 cies, and initiatives designed to improve the ability of host 

3 countries— 

4 (1) to primarily produce reliable renewable en5 ergy and reduce or mitigate carbon emissions from 

6 the power sector while facilitating the transition in 

7 key global markets from electricity generated from 

8 fossil fuel power to low-cost clean energy sources, in 

9 a manner that is equitable for workers and commu10 nities; 

11 (2) to adapt and become more resilient to cur12 rent and forecasted effects of climate change; and 

13 (3) to employ— 

14 (A) sustainable land use practices that 

15 mitigate desertification and reduce greenhouse 

16 gas emissions from deforestation and forest 

17 degradation; and 

18 (B) agricultural production practices that 

19 reduce poverty while improving soil health, pro20 tecting water quality, and increasing food secu21 rity and nutrition. 

22 (c) ESTABLISHMENT OF PROGRAM.—The Secretary 

23 of State, in coordination with the Secretary of the Treas24 ury and the Administrator of the United States Agency 

25 for International Development, shall establish a program, 


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1 to be known as the ‘‘International Climate Change Adap2 tation, Mitigation, and Security Program’’, to provide bi3 lateral and regional assistance to developing countries for 

4 programs, projects, and activities described in subsection 

5 (e). 

6 (d) SUPPLEMENT NOT SUPPLANT.—Assistance pro7 vided under this section shall be used to supplement, and 

8 not to supplant, any other Federal, State, or local re9 sources available to carry out activities that fit the charac10 teristics of the Program. 

11 (e) POLICY.—It shall be the policy of the United 

12 States to ensure that the Program provides resources to 

13 developing countries, particularly the most vulnerable 

14 communities and populations in such countries, to support 

15 the development and implementation of programs, 

16 projects, and activities that— 

17 (1) reduce greenhouse gas emissions through 

18 the integration and deployment of clean energy, in19 cluding transmission, distribution, and interconnec20 tions to renewable energy, while facilitating the tran21 sition from electricity generated from fossil fuel 

22 power to low-cost renewable energy sources, in a 

23 manner that is equitable for workers and commu24 nities; 


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1 (2) address financial or other barriers to the 

2 widespread deployment of clean energy technologies 

3 that reduce, sequester, or avoid greenhouse gas 

4 emissions; 

5 (3) improve the availability, viability, and acces6 sibility of zero emission vehicles, including support 

7 for design and development of transportation net8 works and land use practices that mitigate carbon 

9 emissions in the transportation sector; 

10 (4) support building capacities that may in11 clude— 

12 (A) developing and implementing meth13 odologies and programs for measuring green14 house gas emissions and verifying emissions 

15 mitigation, including building capacities to con16 duct emissions inventories and meet reporting 

17 requirements under the Paris Agreement; 

18 (B) assessing, developing, and imple19 menting technology and policy options for 

20 greenhouse gas emissions mitigation and avoid21 ance of future emissions, including sector-based 

22 and cross-sector mitigation strategies; 

23 (C) enhancing the technical capacity of 

24 regulatory authorities, planning agencies, and 

25 related institutions in developing countries to 


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1 improve the deployment of clean energy tech2 nologies and practices, including through in3 creased transparency; 

4 (D) training and instruction regarding the 

5 installation and maintenance of renewable en6 ergy technologies; and 

7 (E) activities that support the development 

8 and implementation of frameworks for intellec9 tual property rights in developing countries; 

10 (5) improve resilience, sustainable economic 

11 growth, and adaptation capacities in response to the 

12 effects of climate change; 

13 (6) promote appropriate job training and access 

14 to new job opportunities in new economic sectors 

15 and industries that emerge due to the transition 

16 from fossil fuel energy to clean energy; 

17 (7) reduce the vulnerability and increase the re18 silience capacities of communities to the effects of 

19 climate change, including effects on— 

20 (A) water availability; 

21 (B) agricultural productivity and food se22 curity; 

23 (C) flood risk; 

24 (D) coastal resources; 

25 (E) biodiversity; 


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1 (F) economic livelihoods; 

2 (G) health and diseases; 

3 (H) housing and shelter; and 

4 (I) human migration; 

5 (8) help countries and communities adapt to 

6 changes in the environment through enhanced com7 munity planning, preparedness, and growth strate8 gies that take into account current and forecasted 

9 regional and localized effects of climate change; 

10 (9) conserve and restore natural resources, eco11 systems, and biodiversity threatened by the effects of 

12 climate change to ensure such resources, ecosystems, 

13 and biodiversity are healthy and continue to provide 

14 natural protections from the effects of climate 

15 change such as extreme weather; 

16 (10) provide resources, information, scientific 

17 data and modeling, innovative best practices, and 

18 technical assistance to support vulnerable developing 

19 countries to adapt to the effects of climate change; 

20 (11) promote sustainable and climate-resilient 

21 societies, including through improvements to make 

22 critical infrastructure less vulnerable to the effects 

23 of climate change; 

24 (12) encourage the adoption of policies and 

25 measures, including sector-based and cross-sector 


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1 policies and measures, that substantially reduce, se2 quester, or avoid greenhouse gas emissions from the 

3 domestic energy and transportation sectors of devel4 oping countries; 

5 (13) reduce deforestation and land degradation 

6 to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and implement 

7 sustainable forestry practices; 

8 (14) promote sustainable land use activities, in9 cluding supporting development planning, design, 

10 and construction with respect to transportation sys11 tems and land use; 

12 (15) promote sustainable agricultural practices 

13 that mitigate carbon emissions, conserve soil, and 

14 improve food and water security of communities; 

15 (16) foster partnerships with private sector en16 tities and nongovernmental international develop17 ment organizations to assist with developing solu18 tions and economic opportunities that support 

19 projects, planning, policies, and initiatives described 

20 in subsection (b); 

21 (17) provide technical assistance and strengthen 

22 capacities of developing countries to meet the goals 

23 of the conditional nationally determined contribu24 tions of those countries; 


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1 (18) establish investment channels designed to 

2 leverage private sector financing in— 

3 (A) clean energy; 

4 (B) sustainable agriculture and natural re5 source management; and 

6 (C) the transportation sector as described 

7 in paragraph (3); and 

8 (19) provide technical assistance and support 

9 for non-extractive activities that provide alternative 

10 economic growth opportunities while preserving crit11 ical habitats and natural carbon sinks. 

12 (f) PROVISION OF ASSISTANCE.— 

13 (1) IN GENERAL.—The Administrator of the 

14 United States Agency for International Develop15 ment, in consultation with other departments and 

16 agencies, shall provide assistance under the Pro17 gram— 

18 (A) in the form of bilateral assistance pur19 suant to the requirements under subsection (g); 

20 (B) to multilateral funds or international 

21 institutions with programs for climate mitiga22 tion or adaptation in developing countries con23 sistent with the policy described in subsection 

24 (e); or 


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1 (C) through a combination of the mecha2 nisms specified in subparagraphs (A) and (B). 

3 (2) LIMITATION.— 

4 (A) CONDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION TO MUL5 TILATERAL FUNDS OR INTERNATIONAL INSTI6 TUTIONS.—In any fiscal year, the Adminis7 trator of the United States Agency for Inter8 national Development may provide up to 40 

9 percent of the assistance available to carry out 

10 the Program to 1 or more multilateral funds or 

11 international institutions that meet the require12 ments of subparagraph (B). 

13 (B) MULTILATERAL FUND OR INTER14 NATIONAL INSTITUTION ELIGIBILITY.—A multi15 lateral fund or international institution is eligi16 ble to receive assistance under subparagraph 

17 (A)— 

18 (i) if— 

19 (I) such fund or institution is es20 tablished pursuant to— 

21 (aa) the Convention; or 

22 (bb) an agreement nego23 tiated under the Convention; or 

24 (II) the assistance is directed to 

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1 national development institutions, 

2 pursuant to an agreement negotiated 

3 under the Convention; and 

4 (ii) if such fund or institution— 

5 (I) specifies the terms and condi6 tions under which the United States is 

7 to provide assistance to the fund or 

8 institution, and under which the fund 

9 or institution is to provide assistance 

10 to recipient countries; and 

11 (II) ensures that assistance from 

12 the United States to the fund or insti13 tution and the principal and income of 

14 the fund or institution are disbursed 

15 only— 

16 (aa) to support projects, 

17 planning, policies, and initiatives 

18 described in subsection (b); 

19 (bb) consistent with the pol20 icy described in subsection (e); 

21 and 

22 (cc) in regular consultation 

23 with relevant governing bodies of 

24 the fund or institution that— 


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1 (AA) include represen2 tation from countries among 

3 the most vulnerable devel4 oping countries; and 

5 (BB) provide public ac6 cess. 

7 (C) CONGRESSIONAL NOTIFICATION.—The 

8 Secretary of State, the Administrator of the 

9 United States Agency for International Devel10 opment, or the Secretary of the Treasury shall 

11 notify the appropriate congressional committees 

12 not later than 15 days before providing assist13 ance to a multilateral fund or international in14 stitution under this subsection. 

15 (3) LOCAL CONSULTATIONS.—Programs, 

16 projects, and activities supported by assistance pro17 vided under this subsection shall require consulta18 tions with local communities, particularly the most 

19 vulnerable communities and populations in such 

20 communities, and indigenous peoples in areas in 

21 which any programs, projects, or activities are 

22 planned to engage such communities and peoples 

23 through adequate disclosure of information, public 

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1 nities and ecosystems to promote the resilience of 

2 local communities. 

3 (g) BILATERAL ASSISTANCE.— 

4 (1) IN GENERAL.—Except to the extent incon5 sistent with this subsection, the administrative au6 thorities under the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 

7 (22 U.S.C. 2151 et seq.) shall apply to the imple8 mentation of this subsection to the same extent and 

9 in the same manner as such authorities apply to the 

10 implementation of such Act in order to provide the 

11 Administrator of the United States Agency for 

12 International Development with the authority to pro13 vide assistance to countries, including the most vul14 nerable developing countries, for programs, projects, 

15 and activities consistent with the purposes described 

16 in subsection (b) and the policy described in sub17 section (e). 

18 (2) CONSIDERATIONS.—In carrying out this 

19 subsection, the Administrator shall ensure that— 

20 (A) the environmental impact of proposed 

21 programs, projects, and activities is considered 

22 through adequate consultation, public participa23 tion, and public disclosure of relevant informa24 tion; and 


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1 (B) programs, projects, and activities 

2 under this subsection— 

3 (i) avoid environmental degradation, 

4 to the maximum extent practicable; and 

5 (ii) are aligned, to the maximum ex6 tent practicable, with broader development, 

7 poverty alleviation, or natural resource 

8 management objectives and initiatives in 

9 the recipient country. 

10 (3) COMMUNITY ENGAGEMENT.—The Adminis11 trator shall seek to ensure that— 

12 (A) local communities, particularly the 

13 most vulnerable communities and populations in 

14 areas in which any programs, projects, or ac15 tivities are carried out under this subsection, 

16 are engaged in the design, implementation, 

17 monitoring, and evaluation of such programs, 

18 projects, and activities through disclosure of in19 formation, public participation, and consulta20 tion; and 

21 (B) the needs and interests of the most 

22 vulnerable communities and populations are ad23 dressed in national or regional climate change 

24 adaptation plans developed with USAID sup25 port. 


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1 (4) CONSULTATION AND DISCLOSURE.—For 

2 each country receiving assistance under this sub3 section, the Administrator shall establish a process 

4 for consultation with, and disclosure of information 

5 to, local, national, and international stakeholders re6 garding any programs, projects, or activities carried 

7 out under this subsection. 

8 (h) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—There is 

9 authorized to be appropriated to carry out this section 

10 $2,000,000,000 for fiscal year 2022 and each fiscal year 

11 thereafter. 

12 SEC. 608. REDUCING THE NEGATIVE IMPACTS FROM BLACK 

13 CARBON, METHANE, AND HIGH-GWP 

14 HYDROFLUOROCARBONS. 

15 (a) DEFINITION.—The term ‘‘high-GWP HFC’’ 

16 means newly manufactured hydrofluorocarbons with a 

17 global warming potential calculated over a 100-year period 

18 of greater than 150, as described in the Fifth Assessment 

19 Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 

20 Change. 

21 (b) IN GENERAL.—The President shall direct the 

22 United States representatives to appropriate international 

23 bodies and conferences to use the voice, vote, and influence 

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1 icy goals of the United States, to advocate that each such 

2 body or conference— 

3 (1) commit to significantly increasing efforts to 

4 reduce black carbon, methane, and high-GWP 

5 hydrofluorocarbons; 

6 (2) invest in and develop alternative energy 

7 sources, industrial and agricultural processes, appli8 ances, and products to replace sources of black car9 bon, methane, and high-GWP hydrofluorocarbons; 

10 (3) enhance coordination with the private sec11 tor— 

12 (A) to increase production and distribution 

13 of clean energy alternatives, industrial proc14 esses, and products that will replace sources of 

15 black carbon, methane, and high-GWP 

16 hydrofluorocarbons; 

17 (B) to develop action plans to mitigate 

18 black carbon, methane, and high-GWP 

19 hydrofluorocarbons from various private sector 

20 operations; 

21 (C) to encourage best technology, methods, 

22 and management practices for reducing black 

23 carbon, methane, and high-GWP 

24 hydrofluorocarbons; 


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1 (D) to craft specific financing mechanisms 

2 for the incremental costs associated with miti3 gating short-live climate pollutants; and 

4 (E) to grow economic opportunities and 

5 develop markets, as appropriate, for reducing 

6 black carbon, methane, tropospheric ozone, and 

7 hydrofluorocarbons; 

8 (4) provide technical assistance to foreign regu9 latory authorities and governments to remove unnec10 essary barriers to investment in short-lived climate 

11 mitigation solutions, including— 

12 (A) the use of safe and affordable clean 

13 energy; 

14 (B) the implementation of policies requir15 ing industrial and agricultural best practices for 

16 capturing or mitigating the release of methane 

17 from extractive, agricultural, and industrial 

18 processes; and 

19 (C) climate assessment, scientific research, 

20 monitoring, and technological development ac21 tivities; 

22 (5) develop and implement clear, accountable, 

23 and metric-based targets to measure the effective24 ness of projects described in paragraph (4); and 


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1 (6) engage international partners in an existing 

2 multilateral forum (or, if necessary, establish 

3 through an international agreement a new multilat4 eral forum) to improve global cooperation for— 

5 (A) creating tangible metrics for evaluating 

6 efforts to reduce black carbon, methane, and 

7 high-GWP hydrofluorocarbons; 

8 (B) developing and implementing best 

9 practices for phasing out sources of black car10 bon, methane, and high-GWP 

11 hydrofluorocarbons, including expanding capac12 ity for innovative instruments to mitigate black 

13 carbon, methane, and high-GWP 

14 hydrofluorocarbons at the national and sub15 national levels of foreign countries, particularly 

16 countries with little capacity to reduce green17 house gas emissions and deploy clean energy fa18 cilities, and countries that lack sufficient poli19 cies to advance such development; 

20 (C) encouraging the development of stand21 ards and practices, and increasing transparency 

22 and accountability efforts for the reduction of 

23 black carbon, methane, and high-GWP 

24 hydrofluorocarbons; 


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1 (D) integrating tracking and monitoring 

2 systems into industrial processes; 

3 (E) fostering research to improve scientific 

4 understanding of— 

5 (i) how high concentrations of black 

6 carbon, methane, and high-GWP 

7 hydrofluorocarbons affect human health, 

8 safety, and our climate; 

9 (ii) changes in the amount and re10 gional concentrations of black carbon and 

11 methane emissions, based on scientific 

12 modeling and forecasting; 

13 (iii) effective means to sequester black 

14 carbon, methane, and high-GWP 

15 hydrofluorocarbons; and 

16 (iv) other related areas of research the 

17 United States representatives deem nec18 essary; 

19 (F) encouraging the World Bank, the 

20 International Monetary Fund, and other inter21 national finance organizations— 

22 (i) to prioritize efforts to combat 

23 black carbon, methane, and high-GWP 

24 hydrofluorocarbons; and 


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1 (ii) to enhance transparency by pro2 viding sufficient and adequate information 

3 to facilitate independent verification of 

4 their climate finance reporting; 

5 (G) encouraging observers of the Arctic 

6 Council (including India and China) to adopt 

7 mitigation plans consistent with the findings 

8 and recommendations of the Arctic Council’s 

9 Framework for Action on Black Carbon and 

10 Methane; 

11 (H) collaborating on technological ad12 vances in short-lived climate pollutant mitiga13 tion, sequestration and reduction technologies; 

14 and 

15 (I) advising foreign countries, at both the 

16 national and subnational levels, regarding the 

17 development and execution of regulatory poli18 cies, services, and laws pertaining to reducing 

19 the creation and the collection and safe man20 agement of black carbon, methane, and high21 GWP hydrofluorocarbons. 

22 (c) ENHANCING INTERNATIONAL OUTREACH AND

23 PARTNERSHIP OF UNITED STATES AGENCIES INVOLVED

24 IN GREENHOUSE GAS REDUCTIONS.— 


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1 (1) FINDING.—Congress recognizes the success 

2 of the United States Climate Alliance and the green3 house gas reduction programs and strategies estab4 lished by the Environmental Protection Agency’s 

5 Center for Corporate Climate Leadership. 

6 (2) AUTHORIZATION OF EFFORTS TO BUILD

7 FOREIGN PARTNERSHIPS.—The Secretary of State 

8 shall work with the Administrator of the Environ9 mental Protection Agency to build partnerships, as 

10 appropriate, with the governments of foreign coun11 tries and to support international efforts to reduce 

12 black carbon, methane, and high-GWP 

13 hydrofluorocarbons and combat climate change. 

14 (d) NEGOTIATION OF NEW INTERNATIONAL AGREE15 MENTS AND REASSERTION OF TARGETS IN EXISTING

16 AGREEMENTS.—Not later than 1 year after the date of 

17 the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall sub18 mit a report to Congress that— 

19 (1) assesses the potential for negotiating new 

20 international agreements, new targets within existing 

21 international agreements or cooperative bodies, and 

22 the creation of a new international forum to mitigate 

23 globally black carbon, methane, and high-GWP 

24 hydrofluorocarbons to support the efforts described 

25 in subsection (b); 


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1 (2) describes the provisions that could be in2 cluded in such agreements; 

3 (3) assesses potential parties to such agree4 ments; 

5 (4) describes a process for reengaging with 

6 Canada and Mexico regarding the methane targets 

7 agreed to at the 2016 North American Leaders’ 

8 Summit; and 

9 (5) describes a process for reengaging with the 

10 countries of the Arctic Council regarding the meth11 ane and black carbon targets that were negotiated in 

12 2015 through the Framework for Action. 

13 (e) CONSIDERATION OF BLACK CARBON, METHANE, 

14 AND HIGH-GWP HYDROFLUOROCARBONS IN NEGOTI15 ATING INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS.—In negotiating 

16 any relevant international agreement with any country or 

17 countries after the date of the enactment of this Act, the 

18 President shall— 

19 (1) consider the impact black carbon, methane, 

20 and high-GWP hydrofluorocarbons are having on the 

21 increase in global average temperatures and the re22 sulting global climate change; 

23 (2) consider the effects that climate change is 

24 having on the environment; and 


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1 (3) ensure that the agreement strengthens ef2 forts to eliminate black carbon, methane, and high3 GWP hydrofluorocarbons from such country or 

4 countries. 

5 (f) PLAN TO REDUCE BLACK CARBON EMISSIONS

6 FROM SHIPS.—Consistent with strategies adopted by the 

7 International Maritime Organization to reduce greenhouse 

8 gas emissions from ships, the Secretary of State, in con9 sultation with the Secretary of Transportation, the Sec10 retary of Commerce, the Administrator, and the Com11 mandant of the Coast Guard, shall develop a comprehen12 sive plan to reduce black carbon emissions from ships 

13 based on appropriate emissions data from oceangoing ves14 sels. The plan shall provide for such reduction through— 

15 (1) a clean freight partnership; 

16 (2) limits on black carbon emissions; and 

17 (3) efforts that include protection of access to 

18 critical fuel shipments and emergency needs of 

19 coastal communities. 

20 (g) ESTABLISHMENT OF INTERAGENCY WORKING

21 GROUP ON SHORT-LIVED CLIMATE POLLUTANT MITIGA22 TION.— 

23 (1) ESTABLISHMENT.—Not later than 90 days 

24 after the date of enactment of this Act, the Presi25 dent shall establish a task force, to be known as the 


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1 Interagency Working Group on Short-Lived Climate 

2 Pollutant Mitigation. 

3 (2) MEMBERSHIP.—The members of the Work4 ing Group shall include the head (or a designee 

5 thereof) of each relevant Federal agency. 

6 (3) DUTIES.—The Working Group shall— 

7 (A) not later than 180 days after the date 

8 of enactment of this Act, submit to the appro9 priate congressional committees a report that 

10 includes specific plans of each relevant Federal 

11 agency; 

12 (B) look for opportunities with other coun13 tries to promote alternatives to high-GWP 

14 HFC, and transition over time to equipment 

15 that uses safer and more sustainable alter16 natives to high-GWP HFC; 

17 (C) review the policy recommendations 

18 made by— 

19 (i) the Intergovernmental Panel on 

20 Climate Change; 

21 (ii) the United States Climate Alli22 ance; 

23 (iii) the Interagency Strategy to Re24 duce Methane Emissions; 


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1 (iv) the Council on Climate Prepared2 ness and Resilience; 

3 (v) the Clean Cooking Alliance; 

4 (vi) the International Maritime Orga5 nization; and 

6 (vii) other relevant organizations and 

7 institutions; and 

8 (D) develop an action plan to reduce black 

9 carbon, methane, and high-GWP 

10 hydrofluorocarbons that incorporates any ap11 propriate proposals or recommendations made 

12 by the entities referred to in subparagraph (C). 

13 SEC. 609. BUILDING UNITED STATES ECONOMIC GROWTH 

14 AND TECHNOLOGICAL INNOVATION 

15 THROUGH THE GREEN CLIMATE FUND. 

16 (a) GREEN CLIMATE FUND.— 

17 (1) Congress finds that— 

18 (A) climate change most severely impacts 

19 vulnerable and disadvantaged communities in 

20 the United States and around the world; 

21 (B) it is the responsibility of the United 

22 States Government to work with and press 

23 other countries to address environmental justice 

24 and climate justice; 


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1 (C) the report of the United Nations Envi2 ronment Programme entitled ‘‘Climate Change 

3 and the Cost of Capital in Developing Coun4 tries’’, dated May 2018, found that, in the 10 

5 years prior to the publication of the report, cli6 mate vulnerability has cost the 20 nations most 

7 affected by catastrophes rooted in climate 

8 change an additional $62,000,000,000 in inter9 est payments alone; 

10 (D) individuals and families, particularly 

11 communities of color, indigenous communities, 

12 and low-income communities, that are on the 

13 frontlines of climate change across the globe are 

14 often in close proximity to environmental 

15 stressors or sources of pollution; 

16 (E) the communities described in subpara17 graph (D)— 

18 (i) are often the first exposed to the 

19 causes and impacts of climate change; and 

20 (ii) have the fewest resources with 

21 which to mitigate those impacts or to relo22 cate; 

23 (F) all efforts to adapt to and mitigate cli24 mate change must include specific protections 

25 for and acknowledgment of the harm of climate 


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1 change to communities of color, indigenous peo2 ples, women, and other frontline communities 

3 and marginalized peoples around the world; 

4 (G) in Paris, on December 12, 2015, the 

5 parties to the United Nations Framework Con6 vention on Climate Change adopted the Paris 

7 Agreement, a benchmark agreement— 

8 (i) to combat climate change; 

9 (ii) to accelerate and intensify the ac10 tions and investments needed for a sus11 tainable low carbon future; and 

12 (iii) that acknowledges, ‘‘Parties 

13 should, when taking action to address cli14 mate change, respect, promote and con15 sider their respective obligations on human 

16 rights, the right to health, the rights of in17 digenous peoples, local communities, mi18 grants, children, persons with disabilities 

19 and people in vulnerable situations and the 

20 right to development, as well as gender 

21 equality, empowerment of women and in22 tergenerational equity’’; 

23 (H) the Paris Agreement— 


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1 (i) notes the importance of ‘‘climate 

2 justice’’ when mitigating and adapting to 

3 climate change; and 

4 (ii) recognizes ‘‘the need for an effec5 tive and progressive response to the urgent 

6 threat of climate change’’; 

7 (I) it is imperative for all countries to un8 dertake mitigation activities to rapidly meet the 

9 goal of limiting global warming to not more 

10 than 1.5 degrees Celsius; 

11 (J) developed countries have the greatest 

12 capacity to mitigate their greenhouse gas emis13 sions, while— 

14 (i) developing countries have the least 

15 capacity to engage in mitigation activities; 

16 and 

17 (ii) the capacity of developing coun18 tries to engage in mitigation activities is 

19 less than the national mitigation potential 

20 of those developing countries; 

21 (K) the determination for the fair share of 

22 mitigation and adaptation activities for each 

23 country must take into account— 

24 (i) the historic greenhouse gas emis25 sions of each country; and 


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1 (ii) the current capacity of each coun2 try to both mitigate greenhouse gas emis3 sions and adapt to climate impacts; 

4 (L) developed countries that have histori5 cally emitted a disproportionately high share of 

6 greenhouse gas emissions, and reaped the eco7 nomic benefits of those polluting activities, have 

8 a corresponding disproportionately greater re9 sponsibility to engage in global mitigation and 

10 adaptation activities, as compared to less indus11 trialized countries that have historically polluted 

12 far less; 

13 (M) the only realistic way for less industri14 alized countries to meet their full mitigation po15 tential is through international climate financ16 ing by more developed countries; 

17 (N) in the 2009 Copenhagen Accord, devel18 oped countries committed to jointly mobilize, 

19 starting in 2020, $100,000,000,000 per year in 

20 public climate financing (as well as private in21 vestment and other alternative forms of fi22 nance), for developing countries, a commitment 

23 reaffirmed in 2015 in Decision 1/CP.21 of the 

24 United Nations Framework Convention on Cli25 mate Change, Adoption of the Paris Agreement; 


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1 (O) the $100,000,000,000 commitment de2 scribed in subparagraph (N) was a political 

3 compromise that falls short of the actual fi4 nancing needs for climate action in developing 

5 countries; 

6 (P) Bloomberg New Energy Finance has 

7 estimated that the transition to renewable en8 ergy sources in developing countries will require 

9 hundreds of billions of dollars annually; 

10 (Q) the United Nations Environment Pro11 gramme has estimated that adaptation needs 

12 relating to climate change in developing coun13 tries may be as much as $300,000,000,000 an14 nually by 2030; 

15 (R) the Green Climate Fund was created 

16 in 2010 by 194 countries to serve as a crucial 

17 financing mechanism to help developing coun18 tries limit or reduce greenhouse gas emissions 

19 and adapt to climate change; 

20 (S) in 2015, the United Nations Frame21 work Convention on Climate Change agreed 

22 that the Green Climate Fund should serve the 

23 goals of the Paris Agreement, which states that 

24 ‘‘developed country Parties shall provide finan25 cial resources to assist developing country ParVerDate Sep 11 2014 22:42 Jun 24, 2021 Jkt 019200 PO 00000 Frm 00465 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\H3524.IH H3524

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1 ties with respect to both mitigation and adapta2 tion in continuation of their existing obligations 

3 under the Convention’’; 

4 (T) the Green Climate Fund is an essential 

5 institution for climate financing, as the Green 

6 Climate Fund ensures— 

7 (i) balanced governance between de8 veloped and developing countries; 

9 (ii) stakeholder engagement and dis10 course; 

11 (iii) a balanced approach between 

12 mitigation and adaptation; 

13 (iv) fair and equal labor and working 

14 conditions; 

15 (v) conservation of biodiversity and 

16 critical habitats; and 

17 (vi) strong environmental, social, and 

18 gender protections; 

19 (U) the Green Climate Fund— 

20 (i) promotes and protects human 

21 rights and the rights of marginalized 

22 groups, including indigenous peoples, 

23 women, children, and people with disabil24 ities; 


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1 (ii) continues to take steps to 

2 strengthen protection for marginalized 

3 groups; and 

4 (iii) the United States committed 

5 $3,000,000,000 of the first 

6 $10,000,000,000 raised for the initial re7 source mobilization period of the Green 

Climate Fund, though only 1 8 ⁄3 of this 

9 pledge was fulfilled, leaving the United 

10 States the only country to fall substantially 

11 short of a commitment of a country to the 

12 Green Climate Fund; and 

13 (V) the Green Climate Fund is a fully 

14 operational and proven institution supporting 

15 well over 100 projects and programs in devel16 oping countries around the world. 

17 (2) It is the policy of the United States to pro18 vide climate financing— 

19 (A) as an essential part of the global effort 

20 to combat climate change; and 

21 (B) that— 

22 (i) upholds the principles of environ23 mental justice and climate justice; 


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1 (ii) supports programs and projects 

2 developed by recipient countries and com3 munities; 

4 (iii) is designed and implemented with 

5 the free, prior, and informed consent of in6 digenous peoples and other impacted com7 munities; 

8 (iv) promotes gender equality as es9 sential in all of the projects and programs 

10 supported by climate financing; 

11 (v) includes best practices for environ12 mental and social safeguards to ensure 

13 that projects and programs supported by 

14 climate financing respect fundamental 

15 human rights; and 

16 (vi) addresses both mitigation and ad17 aptation as essential aspects of responding 

18 to climate change. 

19 (b) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—There 

20 are authorized to be appropriated for contributions to the 

21 Green Climate Fund $1,400,000,000 for fiscal year 2022; 

22 $2,600,000,000 for fiscal year 2023; and $4,000,000,000 

23 for fiscal year 2024. 

24 (c) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con25 gress that the climate financing needs to achieve the 


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1 greenhouse gas emissions reductions required to keep the 

2 planet at or below 1.5 degrees Celsius of global warming 

3 are significantly greater than the amount of funds author4 ized to be appropriated under subsection (a). 

5 (d) DEFINITIONS.—In this Act: 

6 (1) CLIMATE FINANCING.—The term ‘‘climate 

7 financing’’ means the transfer of new and additional 

8 public funds from developed countries to developing 

9 countries for projects and programs that— 

10 (A) reduce or eliminate greenhouse gas 

11 emissions; 

12 (B) enhance and restore natural carbon se13 questration; and 

14 (C) promote adaptation to climate change. 

15 (2) GREEN CLIMATE FUND.—The term ‘‘Green 

16 Climate Fund’’ means the independent, multilateral 

17 fund— 

18 (A) established by parties to the United 

19 Nations Framework Convention on Climate 

20 Change; and 

21 (B) adopted by decision as part of the fi22 nancial mechanism of the United Nations 

23 Framework Convention on Climate Change. 

24 (3) PARIS AGREEMENT.—The term ‘‘Paris 

25 Agreement’’ means the annex to Decision 1/CP.21 


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1 adopted by the 21st Conference of Parties of the 

2 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 

3 Change in Paris, France, on December 12, 2015. 

Æ 


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