If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to 

revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.

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S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N

C O U R T O F A P P E A L S

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

UNPUBLISHED

June 25, 2020

v No. 346036

Ionia Circuit Court

TREVOR THOMAS LADEWIG, LC No. 2018-017423-FH

Defendant-Appellant.

Before: BORRELLO, P.J., and RONAYNE KRAUSE and RIORDAN, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

Following a jury trial, defendant was convicted of operating while intoxicated—third 

offense, MCL 257.625(1), and was sentenced as a fourth-offense habitual offender, MCL 769.12,

to 46 months to 25 years of incarceration. Defendant appeals as of right and argues that there was 

insufficient evidence presented to support his conviction. We affirm.

I. FACTS

While driving, defendant made a turn without signaling and was stopped by a Lake Odessa 

Police Department officer. The officer first noticed defendant’s vehicle because of its unusually 

loud exhaust, but pulled over defendant because of his failure to use a turn signal. After 

approaching the vehicle and contacting defendant, the officer smelled alcohol through defendant’s 

open window and noticed that defendant’s “speech was slurred, and his eyes were red and glossy.” 

Defendant claimed he had been driving back from a bar where he consumed two drinks, two hours 

ago. The officer requested that defendant exit the vehicle and began administering a series of 

sobriety tests. The officer observed that defendant was swaying side to side. Defendant struggled 

to follow the instructions for the field sobriety test. Ultimately, he failed the test and was arrested 

for operating while intoxicated. Defendant complied with the officer’s request for a breath test at 

the jail and the DataMaster returned a blood alcohol level of “.08 grams of alcohol per 210 liters 

of breath” (0.08%). Defendant was charged with operating while intoxicated (operating while 

under the influence of alcoholic liquor and/or having an alcohol content of 0.08 grams or more per 

210 liters of breath)—third offense, MCL 257.625(1).
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Defendant’s case proceeded to trial where the jury heard testimony from the arresting 

officer. In addition, an Ionia County Sherriff’s Department officer testified extensively about the 

DataMaster’s functioning, regular inspections, and tests. He testified that none of the tests leading 

up to its use in the current case returned results that were so irregular as to undermine the results 

during an actual test. Defendant was convicted of operating while intoxicated, and this appeal 

followed. Defendant now argues that there was insufficient evidence to sustain his conviction. 

We disagree. 

II. ANALYSIS

“The test for determining the sufficiency of evidence in a criminal case is whether the 

evidence, viewed in a light most favorable to the people, would warrant a reasonable juror in 

finding guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” People v Nowak, 462 Mich 392, 399; 614 NW2d 78 

(2000). The standard of review is deferential; we are required to draw all reasonable inferences

and make credibility choices in support of the jury verdict. Id. at 400. Circumstantial evidence 

and reasonable inferences arising from the evidence can constitute satisfactory proof of the 

elements of the crime. Id. The prosecution need not negate every reasonable theory of innocence; 

instead, it need only prove the elements of the crime in the face of whatever contradictory evidence 

is provided by the defendant. Id.

MCL 257.625(1) provides:

(1) A person, whether licensed or not, shall not operate a vehicle upon a 

highway or other place open to the general public or generally accessible to motor 

vehicles, including an area designated for the parking of vehicles, within this state 

if the person is operating while intoxicated. As used in this section, “operating 

while intoxicated” means any of the following:

(a) The person is under the influence of alcoholic liquor, a controlled 

substance, or other intoxicating substance or a combination of alcoholic liquor, a 

controlled substance, or other intoxicating substance.

(b) The person has an alcohol content of 0.08 grams or more per 100 

milliliters of blood, per 210 liters of breath, or per 67 milliliters of urine or, 

beginning October 1, 2021, the person has an alcohol content of 0.10 grams or more 

per 100 milliliters of blood, per 210 liters of breath, or per 67 milliliters of urine.

(c) The person has an alcohol content of 0.17 grams or more per 100 

milliliters of blood, per 210 liters of breath, or per 67 milliliters of urine.

Therefore, there are two alternative theories of criminal liability under this statutory 

scheme: (1) that the defendant’s blood alcohol level exceeded the legal limit, MCL 257.625(1)(b), 

(c); or (2) that regardless of defendant’s blood alcohol level, the defendant was “under the 

influence” of alcohol, MCL 257.625(1)(a). Under the latter theory, known as “OUIL,” “the 

prosecution must prove that a defendant’s ability to operate a vehicle “was substantially and 

materially affected by consumption of intoxicating liquor.” People v Lambert, 395 Mich 296, 305; 

235 NW2d 338 (1975) (quotation marks omitted). A driver is under the influence of alcohol when 
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the driver’s “ability to operate a motor vehicle in a normal manner [is] substantially lessened” or 

the driver’s “mental or physical condition [is] significantly affected” and the driver is “no longer 

able to operate a vehicle in a normal manner.” M Crim JI 15.3(2); see also People v Walters, 160 

Mich App 396, 402; 407 NW2d 662 (1987); People v Raisanen, 114 Mich App 840, 844; 319 

NW2d 693 (1982).

Defendant contends that there was insufficient evidence that he was driving under the 

influence because the officer admitted that defendant’s driving was normal and that the only reason 

he noticed defendant’s vehicle was because of defendant’s loud exhaust. Evidence of a 

defendant’s ability to drive normally is relevant and exculpatory, but does not mandate a verdict 

of acquittal. Walters, 160 Mich App at 402. Although the officer first noticed defendant’s vehicle 

because of its loud exhaust, he testified that the reason for his traffic stop was defendant’s 

subsequent failure to use a turn signal. Failing to use a turn signal is a traffic infraction that is 

against Michigan law. See MCL 257.648(2). Therefore, because his driving was not “normal,” 

defendant’s contention is without merit.

Defendant argues that the field sobriety tests were flawed because defendant sustained a 

hip injury that interfered with his ability to pass the leg-based tests, and the flashing lights on the 

patrol vehicle interfered with his ability to pass eye-based tests. These alleged flaws do not 

inherently undermine the validity of defendant’s conviction. 

The officer testified that he stopped defendant’s one-legged test because he believed it was 

unsafe and that defendant “couldn’t do it because of his hip,” but thought defendant struggled with 

test because of his intoxication rather than his injury. The officer stated that the effect of the hip 

injury applied solely to the one-legged stand test, not the walk-and-turn test and that defendant 

struggled with following the verbal directions for the test because of his intoxication. This 

evidence supports that it was defendant’s intoxication, rather than his hip, that impeded his abilities 

to take the tests. Insofar as there were inconsistencies in the dexterity tests, these inconsistencies 

go to the weight of the evidence and are appropriate for a jury to decide. See People v Wolfe, 440 

Mich 508, 517-518; 489 NW2d 748 (1992) (holding that credibility determinations are ultimately 

the jury’s decision), amended 441 Mich 1201 (1992). Even assuming that defendant’s dexterity 

tests were impacted by his hip condition, the jury credited the officer’s opinion that defendant’s 

difficulties resulted from his intoxication as opposed to the hip injury. When taken in the light 

most favorable to the prosecution, this is sufficient to affirm defendant’s conviction. See Nowak, 

462 Mich at 399.

Regarding the visual tests, the officer testified that the flashing lights would have only 

affected the administration of the examination if defendant was facing those lights, and because 

defendant was 10 feet away from the flashing lights and was not directly facing them, only his 

periphery vision would have been affected. The officer opined that at a 10-foot distance, it was 

unlikely defendant’s periphery vision was impacted by the flashing lights. When presented with 

evidence undermining the weight of the evidence supporting defendant’s conviction, we resolve 

all ambiguities of credibility and the weight of testimony in favor of the prosecution. See People 

v Jackson, 292 Mich App 583, 587-588; 808 NW2d 541 (2011). The jury credited the officer’s

testimony that the lights would not impact the visual testing. Resolving any ambiguity about the 

lights in favor of the prosecution, this evidence was sufficient to convict defendant.
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Defendant next argues that because the officer did not attend the recommended 

recertification training for field sobriety tests within the recommended four years, his tests were 

deficient. The arresting officer explained that while refresher courses are recommended, they are 

not required, and that he remained certified despite his failure to take this refresher course. Thus, 

the officer’s failure to take the refresher course only effects the weight of his testimony. See id. 

The jury reasonably credited the officer’s testimony notwithstanding these irregularities. See 

Nowak, 462 Mich at 399.

Defendant contends that the DataMaster may have been defective and that the certified 

inspector’s failure to testify undermines the sufficiency of defendant’s conviction with regard to 

the evidence of defendant’s blood alcohol level. However, caretaker for the DataMaster 

instrument testified extensively about the workings of the DataMaster instrument, how it 

functioned, and how the DataMaster was calibrated with weekly tests. Although no testimony was 

provided about the 120-day tests conducted by the inspector, there was sufficient testimony 

supporting the accuracy of the DataMaster and its proper functioning. The caretaker testified that 

if the inspector discovered anything defective with the DataMaster after the previous 120-day test, 

it would have been marked as out of service, and he explained that the DataMaster would not 

operate if a weekly test performed on it indicated an error. Defendant does not offer any evidence 

on appeal to undermine this testimony.

Thus, under either theory of operating while intoxicated, blood alcohol level or under the 

influence, sufficient evidence was presented to sustain defendant’s conviction.

III. CONCLUSION

Sufficient evidence was presented to sustain defendant’s conviction of operating while 

intoxicated—third offense, MCL 257.625(1). Accordingly, we affirm.

/s/ Stephen L. Borrello 

/s/ Amy Ronayne Krause 

/s/ Michael J. Riordan