COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Judges Benton, Clements and Kelsey 

Argued at Salem, Virginia 

RANDALL LEE PATTERSON 

 MEMORANDUM OPINION*

 BY 

v. Record No. 1707-05-3 JUDGE JAMES W. BENTON, JR. 

 FEBRUARY 21, 2006 

VALLEY PROTEINS, INC. AND 

 ROYAL INDEMNITY COMPANY 

 FROM THE VIRGINIA WORKERS’ COMPENSATION COMMISSION 

 Timothy E. Kirtner (Gilmer, Sadler, Ingram, Sutherland & Hutton, 

on brief), for appellant. 

 Robert M. Himmel (Frith Anderson & Peake, PC, on brief), for 

appellees. 

 The Workers’ Compensation Commission ruled that Randall Lee Patterson’s claim for 

workers’ compensation benefits was barred by his “willful misconduct.” See Code § 65.2-306. 

Patterson contends the evidence was insufficient to support the commission’s decision. For the 

reasons that follow, we affirm the commission’s denial of benefits. 

I. 

 Randall Lee Patterson filed a claim for compensation benefits and medical costs for 

injuries he suffered while driving a tractor-trailer in the employ of Valley Proteins, Inc. Shortly 

before the accident, Patterson stopped on the right shoulder of the highway, exited his vehicle, 

and urinated. When Patterson drove the tractor-trailer back onto the highway, another 

tractor-trailer hit him from behind. Valley Proteins filed a notice of intent to rely upon a defense 

under Code § 65.2-306, which provides, in pertinent part, as follows: 

 *

 Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, this opinion is not designated for publication. 
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A. No compensation shall be awarded to the employee or his 

dependents for an injury or death caused by: 

1. The employee’s willful misconduct or intentional self-inflicted 

injury; 

2. The employee’s attempt to injure another; 

3. The employee’s intoxication; 

4. The employee’s willful failure or refusal to use a safety 

appliance or perform a duty required by statute; 

5. The employee’s willful breach of any reasonable rule or 

regulation adopted by the employer and brought, prior to the 

accident, to the knowledge of the employee; or 

6. The employee’s use of a nonprescribed controlled 

substance . . . . 

In its notice of defense, Valley Proteins specifically alleged that Patterson “willfully failed and/or 

refused to perform a duty required by statute” when he “illegally stopped his vehicle on the side 

of the road . . . and re-entered the roadway . . . without his lights being on.” Later, at the 

evidentiary hearing, Valley Proteins asserted that Patterson’s claim was barred by “willful 

misconduct under [Code § 65.2-]306” but specifically alleged that Patterson acted in violation of 

both a state statute and the employer’s safety rules. 

 The circumstances surrounding the accident were in dispute at the hearing. Patterson’s 

testimony at the hearing and on deposition was that he stopped his tractor-trailer on the shoulder 

of an interstate highway at the top of a hill about 10:00 p.m. in February 2003. He said he 

activated the emergency flasher lights on the vehicle, exited the vehicle, and urinated. Before 

re-entering the vehicle, he checked the lights and tires. He said everything was working at that 

time except for one light, which he had earlier reported to his supervisor. 

 According to Patterson, he activated his signal light when he re-entered his vehicle, 

looked into his mirrors, and drove onto the highway. He descended the hill and had ascended 

three-quarters of the next hill, about a mile from where he entered the highway, when he felt an 
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impact. Patterson said the impact to the truck rendered him unconscious. When he regained 

consciousness, he set up emergency markers and called his company to inform them of the 

accident. Patterson testified he did not speak with anyone before medical assistance personnel 

arrived. Patterson also testified that the investigating police officer gave him a summons for 

reckless driving and that a judge later convicted him of improper driving. 

 Other evidence before the deputy commissioner materially contradicted Patterson’s 

testimony. When Trooper Joe Crowder arrived at the site of the accident, he found Patterson in 

the back of an ambulance and somewhat disoriented. Trooper Crowder interviewed Roy Poe, the 

driver of the other tractor-trailer involved in the accident. Poe said he was traveling 60 to 65 

miles per hour when Patterson drove his vehicle onto the highway. He applied his brakes and hit 

the rear of Patterson’s vehicle. Trooper Crowder said Poe later testified in court that Patterson’s 

vehicle’s lights were not illuminated. 

 Trooper Crowder interviewed another truck driver, Thorston Bendzka, who was traveling 

northbound behind Poe’s vehicle. Bendzka “saw [Patterson’s] tractor come off the shoulder, pull 

off into the highway and noticed that it didn’t have any hazards or any lights on at the time.” 

Bendzka said Patterson “turned his lights on” after Poe’s vehicle hit Patterson’s vehicle. 

Bendzka also told Trooper Crowder that, shortly after the collision, Patterson asked Bendzka “to 

tell the trooper this is what happened.” 

 Trooper Crowder talked to Patterson later that night at the hospital. Patterson said he had 

stopped to urinate on the shoulder of the highway, returned to the highway, and was driving up 

the hill when another tractor-trailer hit the rear of his vehicle. Trooper Officer Crowder told 

Patterson that witnesses said the lights on his truck were not illuminated, Patterson said the lights 

were illuminated. Trooper Crowder issued a citation to Patterson for reckless driving “based on 

his movements into the highway and the traffic conditions.” 
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 Trooper Crowder testified that “signs on the interstate indicate . . . emergency stopping 

only.” He also testified that stopping on the shoulder of the highway to urinate is a violation of 

Code § 46.2-830, which provides that “[a]ll drivers of vehicles shall obey lawfully erected 

signs.” He said “the statute allows you to stop for . . . an emergency, a medical condition of 

some sort . . . or . . . a mechanical breakdown.” Trooper Crowder testified that he decided not to 

give Patterson a summons for violating Code § 46.2-830 but, instead, elected to charge reckless 

driving based upon Bendzka’s observations of Patterson’s driving. 

 Hobie Halterman, general manager of a Valley Proteins facility, testified that the 

employer considered Patterson’s act of stopping his vehicle on the shoulder of the highway to 

urinate to be a non-emergency stopping. He cited company guidelines that prohibit “[c]areless 

or willful acts by an employee which endanger or cause injury to another person or employee” 

and require “vehicles [to] be operated in a careful, safe manner at all times according to all 

federal, state and local laws and prevailing road conditions.” In addition, he testified that Valley 

Proteins’s rules mandate compliance with federal and state traffic laws and that Patterson’s act of 

stopping to urinate on the shoulder of the highway violated state statute. 

 Thomas Harris, Patterson’s supervisor, echoed Halterman’s testimony that Patterson’s 

stop was a violation of Valley Proteins’s rules. Harris explained that “you only use the 

emergency shoulders for emergencies,” but he also testified that “[i]f you want to you go up to 

off ramps and you can pull over there where the space is bigger and stuff.” 

 Halterman and Harris also testified that Valley Proteins has a computerized logging 

system in its trucks, and they identified the printed report of the data that tracked the activity of 

Patterson’s truck. Harris explained that the computer tracking system indicates intervals when 

the vehicle is moving or stopped and that, once a truck stops, the system will not register an end 

to the stop until the truck has travelled at least two-tenths of a mile. Reviewing the data, Harris 
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testified Patterson stopped for seventeen minutes and then drove back onto the highway, but the 

data also indicated the vehicle stopped again due to the accident before the vehicle travelled 

two-tenths of a mile. Harris testified that the distance between the place where Patterson claimed 

to have stopped to urinate and the place where the collision occurred is further than two-tenths of 

a mile. He also testified that the tracking data indicates Patterson stopped at the bottom of the 

hill, rather than the top. 

II. 

 Resolving contradictory evidence, the deputy commissioner found Patterson to be not 

credible and rejected his version of the events. The deputy commissioner found that Patterson’s 

stop to urinate was not the result of an emergency or a medical condition and that Patterson 

“failed to turn his rig’s lights on” before returning to the highway. Upon an assessment of the 

evidence, the deputy commissioner ruled that Patterson’s “injury was occasioned by his ‘willful 

failure . . . to . . . perform a duty required by statute’ as well as his concurrent ‘willful breach of’ 

various [company] safety rules.” This ruling expressly tracked the language of Code 

§ 65.2-306(A)(4) and (5). 

 On Patterson’s request for review, the commission affirmed the deputy commissioner’s 

denial of benefits. In its findings, the commission noted the “two specific acts at issue: 

(1) [d]riving with no lights; and (2) pulling off onto a shoulder.” Parsing the evidence, the 

commission found as follows: 

[T]he computerized activity report, and Trooper Crowder’s 

testimony, showed that the accident was caused by merging into 

highway traffic, from the shoulder, without lights. We have little 

doubt that [Patterson’s] merging into highway traffic from a 

shoulder at night, without vehicle lights, constituted a failure to 

“perform a duty required by statute.” Code § 65.2-306(A)(4). 

Similarly, while it was less clear that [Patterson] violated an 

employer’s safety rule for pulling onto the shoulder, as Harris 

implied that it was the width of the shoulder, and not the act itself, 
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that was improper, there was no assertion that driving at night 

without lights was not a violation of the employer’s policies. 

The commission found, however, that Patterson did not “deliberately [keep] his lights off” but, 

rather, “carelessly drove without his lights.” It concluded, therefore, that this was not a “willful” 

act. 

Addressing the other act at issue, the commission ruled that Patterson was not entitled to 

compensation because his deliberate use of the shoulder of the highway violated state law. Its 

findings included the following: 

The evidence showed that [Patterson] pulled over to urinate. 

Officer Crowder stated that the particular statute in question 

concerned a failure to obey road signs, and that pulling onto a 

shoulder, except in an emergency, was prohibited on the interstate. 

This was not contradicted. We agree with the deputy 

commissioner that [Patterson] did not pull over because of an 

emergency. Pulling back onto the Interstate caused the accident, 

and thus we find that [Patterson’s] injuries were the result of his 

willful misconduct. 

III. 

 Patterson raises four issues on this appeal: the evidence was not sufficient to support the 

finding that he breached a safety rule or violated a state statute; the evidence did not prove that 

any alleged violation was “willful”; Valley Proteins did not strictly enforce its safety rules; and 

no causal link existed between any violation and Patterson’s injury. Valley Proteins responds 

that it presented sufficient evidence to support its defense and that the commission correctly 

found that Patterson’s willful failure to perform a statutory duty barred him from receiving 

workers’ compensation benefits. Valley Proteins does not argue that the commission’s decision 

rests upon a breach of its safety rule. 

 Code § 65.2-306(A) provides six defenses an employer can raise in response to a 

workers’ compensation claim. Although three of these defenses expressly use the term “willful,” 

these three defenses address distinct circumstances. See Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. v. Hagins, 
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32 Va. App. 386, 389 n.1, 528 S.E.2d 162, 163 n.1 (2000). They provide that compensation is 

barred by (i) an “employee’s willful misconduct,” (ii) an “employee’s willful failure to use a 

safety appliance or to perform a duty required by statute,” or (iii) an “employee’s willful breach 

of . . . [an employer’s] rule or regulation” that has been communicated to the employee. Code 

§ 65.2-306(A)(1), (4), and (5). 

 At the outset, we note that, at the evidentiary hearing, Valley Proteins raised the defenses 

provided in Code § 65.2-306(A)(4) and (5), and it argued that Patterson “willfully failed and/or 

refused to perform a duty required by statute” and “willfully failed and/or refused to follow the 

employer’s company policy and/or safety rules.” The deputy commissioner found that Valley 

Proteins prevailed on both issues. On its review, the commission relied upon the officer’s 

testimony about the highway signs barring non-emergency stopping and it denied Patterson’s 

claim for benefits, finding that he stopped in disregard of the signs― a violation of the state 

statute. In its decision, however, the commission used the language “willful misconduct,” which 

is pertinent to Code § 65.2-306(A)(1). 

Because the employer defended the claim under Code § 65.2-306(A)(4) and (5), not Code 

§ 65.2-306(A)(1), we hold that the issues in the case were Patterson’s alleged violation of statute 

and breach of company rules, and we interpret the commission’s opinion as limited to these 

issues. See Hagins, 32 Va. App. at 389 n.1, 528 S.E.2d at 163 n.1. We conclude that the text of 

the commission’s decision expressly referenced only Code § 65.2-306(A)(4) and barred 

Patterson’s claim for violation of a statute, that the commission did not rest its decision upon a 

willful violation of the company’s safety rule, and further that the commission’s use of the term 

“willful misconduct” was intended to be a generic reference to the “willful” act of failing to 

perform in accordance with the statute. 
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VIOLATION OF STATUTE 

 Patterson contends Valley Proteins did not prove he violated a state statute by stopping to 

urinate on the shoulder of the highway. He argues that the commission did not cite which statute 

he violated, that “emergency” has not been defined by statute or case law, and that he did not 

impede traffic when parked on the shoulder of the highway. Valley Proteins argues that 

Patterson violated both Code § 46.2-830 and Code § 46.2-888 when he stopped on the shoulder 

of the highway to urinate. 

Code § 65.2-306(A)(4) bars compensation benefits for an employee’s injury caused by 

“the employee’s willful failure or refusal to . . . perform a duty required by statute.” Viewed in 

the light most favorable to Valley Proteins, the prevailing party below, see R.G. Moore Bldg. 

Corp. v. Mullins, 10 Va. App. 211, 212, 309 S.E.2d 788, 788 (1990), the evidence proved that 

numerous signs were posted limiting the highway’s shoulder for emergency use only. Trooper 

Crowder testified without contradiction that use of the shoulder for other purposes violates Code 

§ 46.2-830, which provides in part that “drivers of vehicles shall obey lawfully erected signs.” 

At the evidentiary hearing, Patterson acknowledged knowing that the shoulder of the 

interstate highway is designated for emergency use and that using it for non-emergency purposes 

is a violation of the statute. Patterson testified, however, that he stopped because the urge to 

urinate suddenly “hit [him] . . . and [he] had to go.” 

The commission “agree[d] with the deputy commissioner that [Patterson] did not pull 

over because of an emergency.” The word “emergency” has a well-recognized meaning; it 

“imports ‘immediate necessity.’” City of Portsmouth v. City of Chesapeake, 205 Va. 259, 266, 

136 S.E.2d 817, 823 (1964). The dictionary defines it as “an unforeseen combination of 

circumstances or the resulting state that calls for immediate action.” Webster’s Third New Int’l 
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Dictionary 741 (1993); see also Garnot v. Johnson, 239 Va. 81, 86, 387 S.E.2d 473, 476 (1990) 

(applying the dictionary definition of “emergency” when reviewing a jury instruction). 

The evidence in the record proved that shortly before Patterson stopped to urinate he had 

passed an exit from the highway where a truck stop and several service stations were located. 

Patterson testified he was “sure that . . . if [he] had to go at that time [he] would have pulled off 

[at that exit],” indicating that he did not need to urinate when he passed this exit. Patterson’s 

testimony, unsupported by any evidence of a medical condition that produced a sudden urgency, 

was a matter for the commission to determine based upon an assessment of the evidence and 

Patterson’s credibility. 

The commission’s rejection of Patterson’s testimony is manifested in its analysis of the 

evidence. Contrary to Patterson’s testimony, the commission found that the lights on his vehicle 

were not illuminated. The opinion expressly states that “the evidence showed . . . the accident 

. . . more likely than not resulted from . . . entering the highway . . . with his lights off.” 

Although the commission ruled that this was merely a negligent act, the finding, nevertheless, is 

a rejection of Patterson’s express testimony. Likewise, the commission accepted Harris’s 

testimony concerning the vehicle’s tracking data. That evidence established, contrary to 

Patterson’s testimony, that Patterson’s vehicle had not traveled more than two-tenths of a mile 

when it was hit. 

The rejection of specific portions of Patterson’s testimony brought into question 

Patterson’s version of the entire incident. Disbelieving Patterson’s testimony, the commission 

found no circumstances constituting a medical emergency or any other emergency. We hold that 

the commission’s finding that Patterson’s stop was not the result of an unforeseen combination 

of circumstances is based upon a rejection of his explanation and upon other credible evidence. 
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Although Trooper Crowder mentioned Code § 46.2-888, which provides that “[n]o 

person shall stop a vehicle in such manner as to impede or render dangerous the use of the 

highway by others, except in the case of an emergency, accident, or a mechanical breakdown,” 

he indicated this statute had no bearing in this case because Patterson did not stop on the 

highway. Because the commission did not discuss Code § 46.2-888 or impeding traffic by 

stopping on the highway, we need only address the violation of Code § 46.2-830. See Hot Shot 

Express, Inc. v. Brooks, 264 Va. 126, 133-34, 563 S.E.2d 764, 768 (2002) (noting that Code 

§ 46.2-888 pertains to stopping on the highway). We hold, therefore, that credible evidence 

supports the commission’s finding that Patterson’s use of the shoulder of the highway was not an 

emergency and violated Code § 46.2-830. 

WILLFULNESS 

 Patterson contends that because he did not have a “wrongful intention” in stopping on the 

shoulder, his conduct could not be considered “willful.” Patterson argues that he believed his 

need to urinate constituted an emergency and that this misunderstanding means he did not 

willfully violate the statute. The employer responds by pointing to the commission’s references 

to Patterson’s lack of credibility and argues that this is a factual issue because the commission 

did not believe that Patterson considered his situation to be an emergency. 

 The statute requires the employer to show the act was willful in order to succeed on this 

defense. “In common usage the word ‘willful’ is considered synonymous with such words as 

‘voluntary,’ ‘deliberate,’ and ‘intentional.’” McLaughlin v. Richland Shoe Co., 486 U.S. 128, 

133 (1988) (citation omitted). Thus, the principle is well established that in the civil context 

“willful” denotes “an act which is intentional, knowing, or voluntary.” Angstadt v. Atl. Mut. Ins. 

Co., 254 Va. 286, 293, 492 S.E.2d 118, 122 (1997); see also RF&P Corporation v. Little, 247 

Va. 309, 320, 440 S.E.2d 908, 915 (1994) (holding that “[c]onduct is ‘willful’ when it is 
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intentional”). Equally well established is the rule that the commission’s finding that conduct is 

willful is a fact determination. Ivey v. Puckett Constr. Co., 230 Va. 486, 488, 338 S.E.2d 640, 

641 (1986).

The commission found that Patterson “acted deliberately in pulling onto the shoulder” of 

the highway. In an early workers’ compensation case, involving a safety rule, the Supreme 

Court equated “willful” and “deliberate.” 

 “The meaning of the word (wilful) . . . is ‘with deliberate 

intent.’ If the employee knows the rule, and yet intentionally does 

the forbidden thing, he has ‘wilfully failed to obey’ the rule. It is 

not necessary for the employer to show that the employee, having 

the rule in mind, determined to break it; it is enough to show that, 

knowing the rule, he intentionally performed the forbidden act.” 

Riverside & Dan River Cotton Mills v. Thaxton, 161 Va. 863, 872, 172 S.E. 261, 264 (1934) 

(citations omitted). 

Patterson testified that he knew that state law limited the use of the emergency lane. The 

evidence proved, therefore, he knew the law and intentionally stopped on the shoulder. When he 

stopped on the shoulder without an emergency need and then drove back onto the interstate 

highway, this conduct was a deliberate action and was a sufficient basis upon which the 

commission could find he acted willfully. See King v. Empire Collieries Co., 148 Va. 585, 590, 

592, 139 S.E.2d 478, 479-80 (1927) (applying the statutory term “willful” in the context of a 

failure or refusal to perform a duty required by statute); see also VEPCO v. Kremposky, 227 Va. 

265, 269-70, 315 S.E.2d 231, 233-34 (1984) (explaining the holding in King). It is in this 

context that the commission found that Patterson’s injuries “were the result of his willful 

misconduct.” Thus, we hold the evidence was sufficient to support the commission’s finding 

that Patterson’s act in stopping was “willful” and a failure to perform in accordance with the 

statute. 
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CAUSATION 

 Patterson contends that his merger onto the highway caused the accident, not his stopping 

on the shoulder. Valley Proteins argues that Patterson’s improper stop at the bottom of a hill in 

the emergency lane proximately caused the accident because the accident was the foreseeable 

result of the stop. 

 Whether Patterson’s misconduct proximately caused the accident is an issue of fact. See

Uninsured Employer’s Fund v. Keppel, 1 Va. App. 162, 165, 335 S.E.2d 851, 852 (1985). 

Proximate cause is the “‘act or omission which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by 

an efficient intervening cause, produces the event, and without which that event would not have 

occurred.’” Coleman v. Blankenship Oil Corp., 221 Va. 124, 131, 267 S.E.2d 143, 147 (1980) 

(quoting Beale v. Jones, 210 Va. 519, 522, 171 S.E.2d 851, 853 (1970)). Thus, the question on 

appeal is whether there was sufficient evidence for the commission to find that the accident was 

the natural result of parking unlawfully on the shoulder of the road. 

 Patterson correctly argues that the accident occurred while his truck was moving. One of 

the risks that parking on the shoulder of the highway creates, however, is that a collision with 

fast-moving vehicles will occur when the driver accelerates from a stop to merge with traffic. 

Patterson’s act of merging into traffic necessarily followed his act of deliberately stopping on the 

side of the road. Therefore, we hold sufficient evidence supports the commission’s finding that 

stopping on the side of the road began a natural and continuous sequence that proximately 

caused the accident. 

 In summary, the evidence was sufficient to support the commission’s findings that 

Patterson violated the statute by using the shoulder of the highway for a non-emergency despite 

posted signs designating the shoulder for emergency use only, that this violation was willful, and 
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that it was the proximate cause of his accident. Accordingly, we affirm the commission’s 

decision. 

 Affirmed.