### IN THE S UP REME COURT OF TENNESS EE AT NAS HVILLE June 4, 200 8 S es sio n
STA TE OF TEN NES SEE v. DE VIN BA NKS

Aut om at ic App e al fr om th e Co ur t o f Cr im ina l A ppe als

Crim inal Cou rt for Shelby Coun ty No. 03-01956 Joseph B. Dailey, Jud ge

No. W2005-02213-SC- DDT-DD - F iled Novem ber 7, 2008

This appea l involves a defe ndant who shot two persons dur ing a robber y at the home of

one of the vic ti ms
. O n e o f th e v ic ti ms d ie d

. A Sh e lb y Co un ty g r an d ju r y in d ic te d th e d e f

e ndant for ( 1) preme ditated and intentional murder, (2) murder dur ing the perpe tration of a r obbery , (3) attempted fi rs t de g re e mur de r, and (4 ) es pe c ia lly a g g ra vate d rob be ry
. A jur

y fo un d the de fe nd ant guil ty on a ll
coun ts

. A t t

h e p e n a lt y p h a s e o f

th e tr ia l, th e ju

r y f o un d th e p r e s e n c e o f

th e a g g rava ting
c ir c ums tanc e s in Te nn
. Cod e Ann. § 39 -1 3- 20 4( i) (6 ) and (7 ) ( 20 06 ) a

nd se nte nc e d th e de fe nd ant t o death. In a separ ate sentenc ing hear ing, the trial court sentenc ed the de fenda nt to twenty -five year s for the attempted first deg ree murder a nd espec ially

ag g ravat ed robber

y convictions and orde red these sente nces to be served consecutively to eac h other a nd to the sentenc e of de ath. The de fenda nt appea led hi s co n v i ct i ons and sentenc es to the Court of Criminal Appea ls. The Court of Criminal Appea ls, after

concluding that the trial court’s submissi on of the Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13- 204(i)(6) ag g ravating circ umstance to the jury was ha rmless err or, af

firmed the de fenda

nt’s convictions and the s en t en ces. State v. Bank s , N o. W20 05 -0 22 13 -C CA -R 3- DD , 2 00 7 WL 19 66 03 9 ( Te nn . Cr im. App. J uly 6, 2007).
We have c oncluded that the Court of C riminal Appea ls err ed by holding that the evidenc e did not
s u p p o rt su b mi tt in g th e T e n n
. Co d e A n n
. § 3 9

- 1 3

- 2 0 4 ( i) ( 6 ) a g g r av a ti n g c ir c u ms ta n c e to th e ju

r y
. We also hold as follows: (1) the tr ial court c ommitt ed no er rors with reg ard to the a dmission or
e xclu sio n o f e vid e nc e , ( 2) the tr ia l c ourt did no t e rr wi th r e g ard

to its han dl ingof

the Ar a bic langua g e int e rp re te r o r t

he dis mis sa l of on e of the jur or s, (3 ) t he pr os e c uto r’ s c los ingargume nts did not result in reve rsible er ror, ( 4) the trial c ourt did not commit reversible e rror with reg ard to the instructions for lesser -included of fense s, (5) the evidenc e supports the defe ndant’s convic tions for
a tte mpt e d f

ir st d e g re e mur de r an d esp e c ia lly a g g ra vate d rob be ry , (6) the se nte nc e s o f atte mpt e d f ir st deg ree murder a

nd espec ially

ag g ravated robber

y are not e x cessive, and the trial cour t did not err by order ing them to be serve d consec utively , (7) the e vidence supports the defe ndant’s first de g ree murder convictions, as we ll as the jury ’s findingthat the Tenn. Code A nn. § 39-13-204( i)(6) a nd (7) ag g ravating circ umstances apply in this ca se, (8) the def endant’ s multi ple constitutional challeng es to Tennesse e’s de ath pena lty proce dures a

re w ithout merit, and (9) the de fenda nt’s constitutional challeng e to Tenne ssee’ s lethal injection protocol is without merit. W e al s o ag ree with the Court of Criminal Appe als’s conclusion with r espec t to the rema ining issues and attach to this opinion as an appe ndix the re levant portions of that c ourt’s opinion. Finally , in the discharg e of our obligation under Tenn. C ode Ann. § 39-13-306 ( 2006), we have thor oug hly revie wed the r ecor d in this case andM ar y H ug hes , M r
. At i l ebawi ’ s gi r l f r i end and car et ake r , expl ai ned t hat M r
. Al

- M ai l y was ni ckn amed “ U ncl e” 1 “[ b ]ecause he was

. . . t he U ncl e o f t he who l e group
. I f

t hey need ed s o m et hi ng, he’ l l hel p t hem

. H e was a r eal goo d guy like tha t. If yo u ’re hu n g ry, h e ’ll

. . . ge t yo u so m e thin g to e a t .

. . . [H ]e w a s a re a l go o d p e rs o n .”
-2- have de termined (1) that the defe ndant’s death sentenc e wa s not imposed in an arbitrar y fashion, (2) that the evidence fully supports the ag g ravating c ircumstance s in Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-3- 204(i)(6) and (7) , (3) that these ag g ravating c ircumstance s outweig h the mitigating circ umstances offe red by the def endant, a nd (4) that the de fenda

nt’s death se ntence , taking into consideration the nature of the offe nses and th e d e f

e n d a nt h im s e lf , is ne ither excessive nor dispropor tionate to the pena lties imposed in s imi lar ca se s. Ac c or din g ly , th e jud g me nt o f t he Cou rt of Cr imi na l App e a ls, a s c or re c te d b y thi s opinion, is affirmed.

Te nn. C ode Ann . § 39 -1 3- 20 6( a) (1 ) ( 20 06 ); Judg m e ntof t he Co ur t o f Cr im ina l A ppe als Reve rsed in Par t and Af fi rm ed
W I L L I AM C. K O CH , J R ., J ., deli v ered the opinion of the cour t, in which J ANI CE M. H OL DER , C.J ., W I L L I AM M. B ARKE R , C OR NE L I A A. C LARK , and G AR Y R. W ADE , J J ., joined.
Rob e rt Jone s, She lby

County Pub lic De fe nd e r; Phy

lli s Al uk o and

To ny N. B ra y ton , A ssi sta

nt P ub lic De fe nders ( on appea l); Kathy Kent and L atony a B urrow, A ssistant P ublic Def ender s (at trial); Memphis, Tennesse e, for the appe llant, Devin B anks. Robert E. Cooper, Jr., Attorney Gene ral and Reporter ; Michae l E. Moore, Solicitor Gene ral; Mar k A

. F u l k s , S e n i o r

C o un s e l ; C l ar e n c e Lu t z , A s s i s t an t A t t o rn e y G e n e r a l ( o na

p p e a l ) ; W i l l i amL. G i b b o n s , D i s tr i c tA t t o r

n e y G e n e r a l ; S t a c y M c E n dr e e an d K ar e nC o o k , A s s i s t an tD i s tr i c tA t t o r n e ys Gene ral (at trial); Memphis, Tennesse e, for the appe llee, State of Te nnessee
. OP IN ION

I. T HE C R I ME , A R R EST , AND I NVE S T I GAT I ON
Kadh e m A l- M a il y an d H u s s a in A ti le b aw i immi g r a te d to th e U n it e d St a te s f r o m Ir a qand
e ve ntu a lly

se ttl e d in Me mph is, Te nn e sse e. Th ey wer e a c qu a int e d w ithe a c h o the r i n th e ir ho me country , and they b ec ame c lose frie nds in Memphis because neither of their families had
acc ompanied them to the United States. Mr. Al-Maily , who was c alled “Uncle” by those who knew him, was widely

known and r espec ted amongthe Iraqi c omm u n i t y i n M em phis beca use he ha d a
re putatio n o f h e lpi ngpe rs on s in ne e d a nd of makin g e ve ry

bo dy ha pp y
. Whe n Mr. At ile ba

wi fi rs t 1 moved to Memphis, he worke d in a g ro ce ry store. L ater , he oper ated a body shop and also ra

n s ev er al o th er

b u s i n es s es o u to f h i s h o m e, i n cl u d i n g s el l i n g u s edau t o m o b i l es an d m en ’s cl o th i n g.
Af te r t he y mov e d to Me mph is, bo th Mr. Al -Ma ily and Mr . A til e ba

wi be fr ie nd e d D e vin Ba nks, who lived nea

r Mr. Atilebawi. Mr. Ba

nks, whose nickname was “B oo,” was much y oung er tha n M r. Al -M a ily

and Mr . A til e ba

wi . M r. At ile ba

wi wa s v e ry

g e ne ro us to M r. B ank s. He wo uld hire Mr. B anks to perf

orm “odd jobs,” suc h as construc ting a fenc e around his house. Mr. Atilebaw iM r. B a n k s was dati ng So nd ra T ho m p son i n Sep t em b er 20 0 1

. O ne ni ght , duri ng a vi si t t o M r. A t i le b a w i’s 2 ho m e, M r. B anks, M s. T ho m p son, a nd M r. A t i l eb awi f el l a sl eep in M r. A t i l eb awi’ s l i vi ng ro o m
. A l l o f them end ed up s pendi ng t he ni gh t i n t he l i vi ng r oo m. W hen s he awoke, M s
. T homp s on di s cover ed t hat t he s i de of t he s hor t s s he was weari ng had be en cut whi l e she was s l eep i ng, and s he d eci d ed t hat M r. A t i l eb awi m ust ha ve d o ne i t

. W hen M r. B anks awake ned , M s. T ho m p son showe d hi m her s ho rt s and t o l d hi m t hat s he t ho ught M r. A t i l eb awi had cut t hem

. M r. B anks di d not appear t o be s ur pri s ed or c oncer ned. H e s i mp l y cont i nu ed wal ki ng M s
. T homp s on t o her ca r an d t hen r et ur ned t o t he hous e t o go back t o s l eep. T he po l i ce wer e n eve r ca l l ed, an d, at l eas t as f ar as t hi s r ecor d s hows , M r
. B ank s ne ver con f r on t ed M r
. At i l eba wi a bou t t h e i n ci den t

. M s
. T h omps on br ok e u p w i t h M r
. B an k s i n D ec embe r 2001 bec au s e of the ve rb a l an d p h ysic a l ab u se sh e re c e ive d fro m M r. B a n k s.

T he rec o rd co ntains l i t t l e e vid en ce reg ard i ng ho w M r. A t i l eb aw i ha d all eg ed l y che ated M r. B an ks. 3
-3- also sold severa l used ca

rs to Mr

. Ba

nks on very favor able terms. Mr. Ba nks was we lcome in Mr. Atilebawi’s home, a

nd he occ asionally

spent the nig ht at Mr. Atilebawi’ s house. By September 2002, the relationship between Mr. B anks and Mr. Atilebawi had cha ng ed, at least fr om Mr. Ba

nks’s point of view. Mr. Ba nks was appar ently upset about an incident that ha d
occur red one y ear

ear lier involving a

former g irlfriend, and he a lso believed that Mr. A tilebawi had

2
c h e a te d h im o u t o f a la

r g e s u m o f mo n e y
. O n T hur s d ay , Se p te mb e r 1 2 , 2 0 0 2 , h e told his friend, 3 Mic ha e l H ill iard , th a t he “ wa nte d to pa y [Mr . A til e ba

wi ] ba c k. ” Mr . B ank s a sk e d Mr. Hi lli ard to obtain a handgun for him an d to assist him in killi ng Mr. Atilebawi. The two men discussed dumping Mr. A tilebawi’s body in the Wolf Ri ver to avoid detection. Around 11:00 p.m. on Sun d ay , S eptember 15, 2002, Mr. B anks drove his white Ford Ex plorer to Sher

ry Tomason’s house to drop o ff her son. Ms. Tomason lived ne ar Mr . Ba nks’s brother’ s house wher e Mr. B anks wa s staying. The Ex plorer had a flat tire, and Ms. T omason g ave Mr. B anks per

mission t o leave the vehicle in her y ard. She a lso offer ed to g ive Mr. Ba nks a ride, but Mr . B ank s to ld h e r that he wa s g oin g to s e e the man w ho ha d s old him the ve hic le and

that th is man lived nea

rby . Ms. Tomason noted that it seemed to be l ate in the e veningto do that, but Mr. B ank s w a s in sis te nt.
After leavingMs. Tomason’s house, Mr. B anks met up with Mr. Hil liard, and the two men proce eded to Mr. A tilebawi’s house. Mr . Ba nks was ar

med with a .22 ca liber semi-a utomatic pistol provided by Mr. Hil liard. They decide d that Mr. B anks would ar rive at Mr. Atilebawi’s house alone and th a t M r
. H il li ar d w o u ld w a it f o r a te le p h o n e c a ll f

r o m M r
. B an k s s u mm o n in g him to Mr. Atilebawi’s house

. That same e vening , Mr. Al-Maily was visiting Mr. A tilebawi. The two men w ere eng ag ed in conver sat i on and watching television when Mr. B anks ar rived at Mr. Atilebawi’s f ront door betwee n midnight and 2:00 a.m. on the mor ning of September 16, 2002. Mr. Atilebawi we lcomed Mr. B anks into his home, and Mr. B anks wa s surprised whe n he saw M r. Al -Maily sitti ng in Mr. Atilebawi’s living room. Mr. Ba nks and Mr. Atilebawi talked awhile, and th ei r “ general
conver sation” touche d on Mr. B anks’s be lief that Mr. At i l ebawi owed him money and on Mr. Ba nks’s relationship wit h Ms. Thompson. At some point during the c onversation, Mr. Ba nks asked permission to use Mr. Atilebawi’ s cordless tele phone and ste pped outside to ca ll Mr. Hilliard.-4-

Mr. Atilebawi thoug ht that Mr. Ba nks was ac ting suspiciously

. He joined Mr. B anks outside beca use he w anted to che ck on the use d vehicle s t h at we re p arked in the front of his house. Mr

. Atilebawi walked down his drivewa y to inspect the vehic les, and, a s he turned a round to walk ba ck to the house, Mr. B anks sh o t h i m wi th the .22 caliber pistol. After Mr. Atileba wi fell to the drivewa y , Mr. B anks shot him three more ti mes. Two bul lets struck Mr. Atilebawi in t he hea d, one in t he sh ou lde r, and

on e in the le g
. Mr

. At ile ba wi wa s ble e din g pr of

us e ly , a nd it b e c ame dif

fi c ult for Mr. A tilebawi to see be cause his ey es we re c overe d with blood.

Mr. B anks t ried to drag Mr. Ati lebawi’ s body from the dr iveway

but was unable to move Mr. Atile b aw i beca

use he w as too heavy . Mr. B anks later confe ssed, “I

was sca red a nd didn’t want nobody to see him,” a

nd “I tried to pull him awa

y but he was too heavy

for me to move.” He lef

t Mr. Atilebawi in the drive way and returned to the house. De spite the blood cover ing his fa ce, Mr

. Atilebawi saw Mr. Banks enter his house. He was also able to faintly see another person with Mr. B ank s. Th is p e rs on

wa s Mr . H ill iard

wh o, by that ti me , h a d jo ine d M r. B ank s.
Whe n M r. B ank s r e -e nte re d M r. At ile ba wi ’s ho us e , h e c onfro nt e d M r. Al -M a ily . M r. Al

Ma ily tur ne d o ve r thr e e hund

re d do lla rs in c a sh to Mr

. B ank s. Mr

. B ank s the n or de re d Mr . A l- Ma ily int o M r. At ile ba

wi ’s be dr oo m and

c omm and e d h im t o li e fa c e do wn on the fl oo r. Mr . A l- Maily complied. Messrs. B anks and Hilliard then bega n rummag ing throug h Mr. Atilebawi’ s bedroom and living room lookingfor items to steal. Eve ntually , they decide d to steal a red Jeep Cheroke e and a C h ev ro l et C aprice fr om among the ca rs in the front yard. The y loaded a udio speake rs and many shirts and hats in their orig inal packa g ing into the J eep. Mr. Ba nks also pockete d sever al thousand dollars in cash. The cash – mostly one hundred dollar bills and possibly in e x cess of six thousand do lla rs – w a s th e pr oc e e ds fr om t he sa le of on e of Mr . A til e ba

wi ’s us e d c ars
. After all the stolen proper

ty had bee n loaded i n t o t h e Jeep, Mr. B anks re -ente red Mr

. Atilebawi’s house , and wa lked throug h the living room and the short hallway to the bedroom whe re Mr. Al-Maily

was still ly ing f

ace -down on the f

loor. Mr. Al-Maily had coopera ted full y with Mr. At ile ba wi during th e rob bery . He ha d n ot i nte rf e re d o r r e sis te d in

any wa y , a nd he ha d q uic kly
surr e nd e re d a ll the c a shhe ha d w ithhim to M r. B ank s.
Nonethele ss, Mr. Ba

nks drew his .22 c aliber pistol, place d it not more than twenty -four inches fr om Mr. Al-Maily ’s head, and shot him behind the rig ht e ar. The bullet r icoche ted into the le ft po rtio n of Mr . A l- Ma ily ’s br a in. Th e fo rc e of the g un sh ot c a

us e d M r. Al -M a ily

to v omi t reflexi vely , and Mr. B anks watched the blood a nd vomit flow from Mr. Al-Ma ily ’s mouth. Mr. Ba nks walked out of the house and r eturne d the pistol to Mr. Hill iard. Messr s. Ba nks and Hilliard then left the sc ene, Mr . Ba nks driving the red J eep and M r. Hil liard driving t he Chevrole t Caprice. Th e y late r ab and on e d the Ca pr ic e a t an a

pa rtme nt c omp le x, and

Mr . B ank s d

ro ve Mr . H ill iard

ho me in the red Jeep.

Mr . A til e ba

wi c on tin ue d to lie ble e din g in t

he dr ive wa

y wh e re he ha d f

a lle n a ft e r M e ssr s. B ank s and

Hi lli ard e nte re d his hous e . H e did no t da re mov e be c a

us e he wa s a fr a id t

hat he wo uld attrac t Mr. Ba

nks’s attention and that Mr. B anks would shoot him ag ain. Mr. B anks later stated that he tho ug ht M r. At il ebaw i was sti ll a liv e wh e n h e le ft be c a us e he he ard

Mr . A til e ba

wi c a ll h is nickname, “ Boo.”-5-

After droppingoff Mr. H illiard, Mr. Ba nks picked up his br other in the stolen red Jeep and went on an e arly

mo rn i n g s h o pping spr ee w ith the money he had taken fr om Mr. Atilebawi. He p u rc h ased men’s clothing at a ne arby K-Mar t store, a c amer a and some hair produc ts at a nea rby Walgr eens dr

ug store, and some brake pads and a n air fr eshene r for the white For d Ex plorer at an Auto Z one store. A long the way , Mr. Banks and his brother stopped for br eakf

ast at a Waff

le House,
and Mr . B ank s e ve n p ic ke d u p a n e mploy ment a pp lic a tio n at Wa lg re e ns . M r. B ank s b ro ug ht h is br oth e r h ome a t a

pp ro ximate ly

6:3 0 a .m. At approximately

7:00 a.m., Mr. Ba

nks drove the red Jeep to Ms. Tomason’s house. B efor e driving Ms. T omason’s son to sc hool, he talked with Ms. Tomason awhile a nd retrie ved a c ompact dis c fr om h is F or d E xplor e r t hat w a s st ill pa

rk e d in her f ron t y ard. A ft e r d

ro pp ingof

f M s. Tomason’s son at s chool, M r. Banks drove to Maco Tir es and Auto Care whe re he purcha sed custom rims and new tire s for the J ee p fo r ap proxi mately $1,500. Mr. B anks paid c ash, and the manag er reme mbere d that he “pulled out quite a bit of money

and . . . started pe eling off one hundred dollar bills.” When the manag er put the old rims and tires in the bac k of the Jeep, he notice d a sig nificant amount of matching shirts a nd hats in their orig inal packa g ing. When he asked Mr . Ba nks about the clo th ing , M r. B ank s to ld t he mana g e r t

hat he so ld c lot

hin g and that he ha d ju st r e tur

ne d f ro m St. L ouis. Mr. Ba

nks sold the manag er two se ts of matchingshirts and hats for te n dollars ea ch.

In the m eantime, despite multipl e gunshot wounds and sig nificant blood loss, Mr. Atilebawi manag ed to dra g himself to the telephone in his house. He was appar ently able to press the redial butto n on the te le ph on e and c onne c t with a fr ie nd in De tr oit , Mic hig an. What Mr . A til e ba wi tol d his friend in De troit is unclea r. Howeve r, t hat call prompted Mr. Atil ebaw i’s friend to c all some of Mr. Atilebawi’ s friends in Te nnessee , including Moha mmed Al-B urkar

t and Aade l Alkhafa

ji. Mr. Al-B urkar

t and his wife drove to Mr. Atilebaw i’s house and te lephoned the police as soon as they saw what had taken pla ce.
Of fi c e r S te ve n Jon e s wa s the fi rs t of fi c e r t o a rr ive a t Mr . A til e ba

wi ’s ho us e a t a

pp ro ximate ly 7:00 a.m. He f

ound Mr. Atilebawi lying in a pool of blood on a sofa in the living room and obser ved that there was blood all over the living room. Eve n though Mr . Atilebawi wa s disoriented and da zed, he told Of

fice r J ones what had happene d and identified “B oo” as the person who ha d shot him. He de sc ri be d “ B oo ” a s an A fr ic an- Am e ri c an mal e in his late te e ns or e arl y tw e nti e s. Mr . A til e ba wi a lso tol d O ff ic e r Jon e s that “ Un c le ” wa s in t he oth e r r oo m. O ff

ic e r Jon e s th e n d isc ov e re d M r. Al -M a ily dead in the bedroom. Offic er J ones summoned medical assistance , crime sc ene inve stigators, and homicide detec tives to the scene . The e merg ency medical r esponder s arr ived at Mr. Atileba wi’s house a shor

t time later.
The office rs at the scene beg an to inter view neig hbors to learn who “B oo” wa s. They lear ned quickly that “B oo” wa s Mr. Ba

nks’s nickname and t hat they should be on the lookout for a red Jeep. Serg eant M ar k M i l l er w as in the neig hborhood followingup on these lea ds when he saw a J eepM r. B anks was o n hi s way f rom M aco T i res and A ut o C are t o hi s b rother ’ s ho use t o get s o m e sl eep when he 4

w a s sp o tted b y O ff

ic e r M ill e r. -6- matchingthe desc ription of the J eep stolen from Mr. Atilebawi tra veling in his direction. When the 4 J eep made an abrupt turn and he aded down another street, Ser g eant Miller g ave c hase a nd stopped t h e J ee p
. When Serg eant Miller a scer tained that Mr. B anks wa s driving the J eep, he place d Mr. Ba nks under a

rre st at approximately

9:30 a.m. Duringhis searc h of Mr. Ban k s an d t h e J eep, Serg eant Miller f

ound $1,253 in cash (inc luding ten one hundred dollar bills), the stolen clothing a nd audio speakers, a

nd the re ceipts for

the purc hases Mr. Ba

nks had made during the shopping spree with his brother.

Mr. B anks did not appea

r to be injured when he w as ar rested. H e ac ted i n a lac kadaisica l
manner and said nothingat the sce ne of the arr est. Mr. B anks wa s transport ed to the Homicide Offic e of the Memphis Poli ce D epar tment, and the Jeep wa s i m p o u nded. At 1:42 p.m., Serg eant Mil le r a nd L ie ute na

nt Mic ha e l Williams ad

vis e d Mr. B ank s of h is Miranda rig hts, and Mr. B anks signe d a wr itten waiver

of his rig hts and g ave the first of two conf essions.

In h is f ir st con fe ssi on , M r. B ank s a dmi tte d th a t he wa s p re se nt a t Mr . A til e ba

wi ’s ho us e when Mr. A tilebawi was shot, but he c laimed that a man na med B rian Winters h ad shot Mr. At ile ba wi . M r. B ank s c on fe sse d that he ha d sto le n th e re d Jee p, the c lot hin g , a nd the a ud io s pe ake rs
. He also confe ssed t hat he had tried to hide Mr. Atilebawi’ s body . In addition, he stated that he and Mr. Atilebawi ha d discussed his be lief that Mr. Atilebawi owed him money and his be lief that Mr. Atilebawi had moleste d Ms. Thompson in S eptember 2001. Following Mr. Banks’s first confe ssion, the authoriti es arrested Mr. Wint ers at his house and also rec overe d a .25 ca liber pistol and a .22 caliber pistol that later prove d to be the pistol that shot both M e s s r s
. A ti le b a

w i a n d A l- M a il y
. Co in c id e n tl y , M r
. H il li ar d w a s a t M r
. Wi n te r s ’ s r e sidence when Mr. Winters wa s arr ested, but he w as not a pe rson of intere st to the authorities at that time. Once in custody , Mr. Winters denied that he ha d been involved with the shootings or the robber y at Mr. Atilebawi’s house and provided the authorities with the names a nd telephone numbe rs of seve ral
a lib i w itn e sse s. On September

17, 2002, while in the proc ess of c onfirming Mr. Winters’s al i bi, Serg eant Miller talked with both Mr. Winters’s g irlfriend and Mr. Hilliard on the telephone . He a sked Mr. Hi lli ard to c ome do wn to the po lic e statio n to g ive a state me nt r e g ard ingMr . Win te rs ’s wh e re a bo uts when the c rimes wer e committed. When Mr. Hilliard stated that he ha d no means of transportation, Serg eant Mil ler off ere d to send a
car for him. Whe n M r. Hi l l iard a rrived at the police station, he g ave Ser g eant Miller what he believed to be an owne r’s manua l for a Jenning s .22 caliber semi-automatic pistol.
The same day , afte r Mr. Banks tol d the authoriti es t hat he wanted to rec ant porti ons of the confe ssion he had g iven to Serg eant Miller a nd L ieut en ant W illiams on S eptember 16, 2002, Serg eant James L . Fitzpatrick obtained a second c onfession fr om Mr. Ba nks. Mr. Ba

nks was br ou g ht b a c k to the Ho mic ide Of fi c e , and S e rg e ant F itzp a tr ic k a g a in i nf or me d M r. B ank s o f h is Miranda rig hts and obtained a signe d written wa iver of the se rig hts on September 17, 2002, at 4:05-7-

p.m. Mr. Ba

nks then g ave a

second c onfession which w as re duced to wr iting. Mr. B anks wa s g iven an opp o rt u n i t y t o review and to cor rec t his written confe ssion. He made no c hang es and the n initialed eac h pag e and sig ned the c onfession at 5:06 p.m.

In his s ec o nd confe ssion, Mr. Ba nks admitted that he had shot Mr. Al- Maily and Mr. Atilebawi with a blac k .22 or .25 ca liber automatic pistol that belong ed to Mr. Hilliard. He state d that he obtained the pistol from Mr. Hilliard on Sunday night be fore he we nt to Mr. Atilebawi’s house. He told Serg eant F i t z p at rick that he shot Mr. Atilebawi in reve ng e for Mr. Atilebawi’ s c he a tin g him

out of a larg e sum of

mon e y and be c a us e of the Se pte mbe r 2 00 1 in c ide nt i nv olv ingMs. Thompson. Mr. Ba

nks admitted that he had e x plained to Mr. Hilliard three day s befor e the shooting why he wa nted the pistol and that at that time the y had discussed disposing of Mr. Atileba wi’s body in the Wolf Ri ver.
Mr. B anks provided the details of the c rime duringhis second conf ession. He a dmitted
arr iving at Mr. Atilebawi’s house alone ear ly on the morning of September 16, 2002. He state d that he eng ag ed Mr. Atileba

wi in c onversation a

nd then called Mr. Hilliard to c ome to Mr . Atilebawi’s house. He admitted that he shot Mr. A t i l eb awi. He admitted robbingMr. Al-Maily and Mr. Atilebawi and taking more than three thousand dollars in ca sh, two automobiles, men’s clothing , and audio speakers. Finally , he admitted returning to the house and executing Mr . Al-Maily afte r he a nd M r
. H i l l i ar d

h a d f i l l e d th e J e e p w i ths t o l e np r o p e rty.
The fa ct that Mr. B anks re mained in the area after shooting Messrs. Al-Maily and Atilebaw i prompted S er g e an t F it zp a tr ic k to a s k M r
. B an k s a

b o u t h is s h o p p in g s p r e e imme d iate ly a f te r he committed the crimes. When Ser g eant Fitzpatrick aske d him why he had pur chase d new r ims and tires for the J eep, Mr . Ba

nks stated simply , “I fi gu re d t h at I would keep the J eep.” He of fer ed no
e xplanatio n f

or pic kin g up the job a

pp lic a tio n at Wa lg re e ns
. The tw o h e a d w o un d s th a t M r
. A ti le b aw i r e c e iv e d a t th e h an d s o f M r
. B anks were devastating a

nd serious. B ullet and bone frag ments were surg ically remove d from Mr. Atileba wi’s br a in, and surg e on s w e re re qu ir e d to re mov e a po rt ion of Mr . A til e ba

wi ’s te mpo ra l lo be that c on tr ols sp e e c h, me mor

y , a nd pe rs on a lity
. As a re su lt of his inj ur ie s, Mr . A til e ba wi wa s r e nd e re d s us c e pti ble to seizures and was left with cog nitive problems, which manife st themselves in the form of spe ech difficulties and me mory

problems. Mr. Atilebaw i was hospitalized for appr ox imately one month. When he re t u rn ed home, he discove red that property with an estimated va lue of for ty thousand dollars had be en stolen, includinghis furniture, a stereo, a nd a bigscre en television.

II. T HE I NDI CT M E NT AND T RI AL
In Marc h 2003, a g rand jury in Shelby County returne d a four -count indictment ag ainst Mr. Ba nks. The indictment cha

rg ed Mr. B anks with (1) the preme ditated and intentional killing of Mr.T enn. C o d e A nn. § 3 9

- 1 3

- 2 0 2 (a)( 1 ) ( Sup p
. 20 0 2 ). 5

T enn. C o d e A nn. § 3 9

- 1 3

- 2 0 2 (a)( 2 ) ( Sup p
. 20 0 2 ). 6

T enn. C o d e A nn. § 3 9

- 1 2

- 1 0 1 (19 9 7 ). 7

T enn. C o d e A nn. § 3 9

- 1 3

- 4 0 3 (a) (19 9 7 ). 8

T enn. C o d e A nn. § 3 9

- 1 3

- 2 0 4 (i )( 6 ) ( Sup p
. 20 0 2 ). 9

T enn. C o d e A nn. § 3 9

- 1 3

- 2 0 4 (i )( 7 ) ( Sup p
. 20 0 2 ). 10
-8- Al -M a ily ; (2 ) t

he kil lin g of

Mr . A l- Ma ily

in t he pe rp e tr a tio n o f r ob be ry ; (3 ) t he a tt e mpt e d f

ir st 5 6 deg ree murder of Mr. Atilebaw i; and (4) the espe cially ag g ravated ar

med robbe ry

of prope rty

over 7 the va lue of

te n th ou sand

do lla rs fr om M r. At ile ba

wi

. 8
One month later , on April 7, 2003, Mr. B anks filed a mot ion to require the State of Te nnessee to a nn ounc e wh e the r i t in te nd e d to se e k the de a th p e na lty or ano the r e nh anc e d p un ish me nt. On Ap ri l 10 , 2 00 3, the State ann ounc e d it s inte nti on to s e e k th e de a th p e na lty . In a c c or da nc e wi th T e nn . R. Crim. P. 12.3, the State also notified Mr. Ba nks that it intende d to r ely upon th e f o l l o wi n g t wo agg r a v a t i n g ci rc u m s t an ce s : fi rs t , th att h e m urd er wa s co m m i t t edfo r t h e p urp o s e o f a v o i d i n g, interfe ringwith, or preve nti n g a l awf ul arre st or prosec ution, and sec ond, that the murder was 9
c o m m i t t e d

w h i l e M r
. B an k s w a s e n g a g i n g i nc o m m i t t i n g a f i r s td e g r e e mur d e r

o r r o b b e r y. 10

Mr. B anks’s trial be g an on Apr il 4, 2005. After three day s of voir dire, the State prese nted numerous witnesses ove r the c ourse of three day s of testimony . These w itnesses included Mr. At ile ba wi , th e ne ur olo g ist

wh o tr e a te d M r. At ile ba

wi , n e ig hb or s and

fr ie nd s w ho kn e w the pa

rt ie s, the po lic e of

fi c e rs and fo re ns ic wi tne sse s wh o ha d b e e n invo lve d in the inv e sti g a tio n, the patho log ist who p er fo rm edM r. Al -M ai l y ’s au t o p s y , an d th e s t o re m an age r f

ro mwh o mM r. Ban k s h adp urcha sed the ri ms and tir e s f

or the Jee p. Af

te r M r. B ank s in dic a te d th a t he did no t de sir e to t e sti fy , th e de fe ns e rested w ithout presenting any evidenc e. The jury beg an it s deliberations on Fr iday , April 8, 2005, and on Saturda

y , April 9, 2005, returne d a verdict finding Mr. Banks guilty on all four c ounts of the indictment. The pe nalty

phase of the t rial bega

n on Saturday , April 9, 2005, afte r t he guilt phase of the trial conc luded. The State called Mr. Atilebawi and his partne r, Mar y Hug hes, to testify

reg arding the impact of Mr

. Ba

nks’s crimes on the vi ctims. Mr. Banks did not testify duringthe punishment phase ; h o w e v e r , h e c a ll e d e le v e n mi ti g a ti o n w it n e s s e s
. T h e s e w it

n e s s e s p r e s e n te d a p o s it iv e and sy mpathetic imag e of Mr . Ba nks. The implicit, and at times expl icit, underc urre nt of their testimony
w a s th e yo u tho f

M r
. B an k s w h o w a s o n l y n i n e t e e nye ar s o l d w h e nh e mur d e r e d

M r
. A l

- M a i l y.
F ive e mpl oy e e s o f t

he Of fi c e of the She lby

County She ri ff te sti fi e d a

bo ut h is c on du c t in prison and his eff

orts to reha

bilitate himself. They

descri b ed Mr. B anks as a model prisoner who ha d tw o mi no r ble mis he s on his dis c ipl ina

ry re c or d a nd re po rt e d th a t he ha d p art ic ipate d in pr og ra ms inv olv ingre lig iou s st

ud ie s, ang e r m ana g e me nt, dr ug and a lc oh ol a bu se , a nd oth e r s kil ls p ro g ra

ms. Thre e me mbe rs of the L e e wo od B a pti st C hurc h a lso te sti fi e d a bo ut M r. B ank s’ s c omm itm e nt t o h is churc h an d h is c hur c h

- r e late d a c ti v it ie s
. Se v e r a l o f th e s e w it n e s s e s e xp r e s s e d d is b e li e f that Mr.Sp eci f i cal l y , t he jur y de t erm i ned t hat “ [t ]he murd er was co m m i t t ed f o r t he p urpo se of

avo i d i ng, i nt erf

eri ng 11

w ith, o r p re v e n ting a la w ful a rr e st o r p ro se c u tio n o f t h e d e fen d a n t o r a n o the r” a n d tha t “[t]h e m u rd e r w a s k n o w ing ly commi t t ed, s o l i ci t ed , d i re ct ed, or a i ded by t h e def en dan t , w h i l e t h e def

en dan t h ad a s u bs t an t i al r ol e i n c ommi t t i n g or a ttem p ting to c o m m it, o r wa s flee ing a fter ha v ing a su b sta n tial ro le in c o m m itt ing o r a ttem p ting to c o m m it, a n y ro b b e ry.” -9- Ba nks could have committed the crimes for whic h he had be en convic ted and plea ded with the jury to spare his life.
Thre e me mbe rs of Mr

. B ank s’ s imm e diate fa mil y , his mot

he r, an old e r s ist e r, and

his old e st brother, a lso testified during the sentenc ing pha se of the tr ial. They descr ibed Mr. B anks’s home life when he was g rowing up, including the challeng es of being one of ten children of a mother who was in a nd out of pr iso n b e c a

us e of va ri ou s fo rg e ry c on vic tio ns and wh os e fa the rs we re g e ne ra lly

a bs e nt. They al s o p o rt rayed Mr. B anks as a g entle child who e njoy ed cooking , playing w ith cars, wr iting poetry , and dra

wing pictures. I n addition, the y descr ibed the difficulties that Mr. B anks experienc ed when, at the age of si x teen, he lear ned that he wa s HI V- positive. These family members testified that th e y lov e d an d miss e d Mr. B ank s and that th e y int e nd e d to c on tin

ue to c or re sp on d w ithand

vis it Mr. B anks while he was inca rce rate d. Throug h cross-e x amination of Mr. B anks’s witnesse s, the State established that Mr. B anks ha d b e e n a ssi gned to a prison un it whe re the pr iso ne rs we re a ff or de d s pe c ia l pr ivi le g e s and that, wh i l e Mr. B anks’s disciplinary history compar ed fa

vorably to the g ener al inmate population, the number of his disciplin ar y offe nses was hig h when c ompare d with the offe nses of other prisoners
o nth e un i t

. T h e S t a t e a l s o e s t a b l i s h e d th a tM r
. B an k s h a d

b e e ns u p p o rt e d d ur i n g h i s yo u thb y a l oving grandmother , older siblings, a nd members of

his church a

nd that his older siblings did not mis tr e a t hi m. The State pre sented to the jury that Mr. Banks’s criminal rec ord i ncluded assault, battery , and domestic violence . In addition, the S tate called Ms. Thompson, Mr. Ba nks’s forme r g irlfriend, a s a re buttal wit

ne ss. Ms. Th omp so n p a int e d a sta rk ly dif fe re nt p ic tur e fr om t

he on e pa int e d b y

his family and chur ch fr iends. She testified that Mr. B anks neve r told her that he was HI V-positive and that sh e le arn e d a

bo ut h is m e dic a l c on dit ion fr om a no the r o ne of

his fo rm e r g ir lf

ri e nd s. She a lso testified that Mr. Ba

nks regularly abused her phy sically and verba lly , and she de scribed a n incident wh e n M r. B ank s p ointe d a g un to h e r s tom a c h w he n s he wa s e ig ht m on ths pr e g na nt. The jury returne d its verdict on Monday , April 11, 2005. I t concluded that the State had pr ov e d th e e xiste nc e of bo th ag g ra vatin g c ir c ums tanc e s beyon d a re a so na ble do ub t. Th e jur

y a lso 11 found unanimously

and beyond rea sonable doubt that the ag g ravating c ircumstance s outweig hed the mitigatingcirc umstances. Ac cording ly , the jury unanimously

sentenc ed Mr. B anks to death.
At a late r se nte nc inghe ari ng , th e tr ia l c ourt me rg e d th e fi rs t tw o c ounts of the ind ic tme nt – the two ca

pital convictions – and sentenced Mr. B anks to death. I t imposed a twenty -five year sentenc e for

the attempt to commit f

irst de g ree murder conviction and a twe nty -five year sentenc e fo r t he e sp e c ia lly a g g ra

vate d ro bb e ry c on vic tio n and de te rm ine d th a t Mr . B ank s sh ou ld s e rv e the se sentenc es conse cutively

to eac h other a

nd to the merg ed ca

pital conviction.-10-

Mr . B ank s a

pp e a le d to the Court

of Cr imi na l App e a ls, ra isi ngnume ro us c ha lle ng e s to his convictions and sente nces. On J uly 6, 2007, the Court of Criminal Appea ls affirme d Mr. B anks’s convictions for f

irst de g ree murder and the resulting sentenc e of de ath. State v. Bank s , No. W2005- 02 21 3- CCA -R 3- DD , 2 00 7 WL 19 66 03 9, a t *5 9 ( Te nn . Ct. App

. J ul y 6, 20 07 ). Th e c ourt a lso
a ff ir me d M r. B ank s’ s c onvic tio ns fo r e sp e c ia lly a g g ra vate d r ob be ry

and c ri min a l atte mpt

to c omm it preme ditated murder , as well as their r esulting se ntence s. State v. Bank s , 2007 WL1966039, at *59. The a ffirma

nce of Mr. Banks’s capital convictions and death sentenc e trigg ere d an automatic r eview by this Court i n acc ordanc e with Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-206( a)( 1) (20 0 6). Mr. B anks ra ises
numerous ar g uments relate d to his convictions and sentenc es which w e will addre ss in turn.

III
. T HE F AI L URE T O I N C LUD E A GGR AVAT I NG C IRC U M STA N C ES I N THE I NDI CT M E NT
After car eful study

of the parties’ briefs with r eg ard to the issue of the failure to include the ag g ravating c ircumstances in the indictment, we ar e per suaded that the decision of the Court of Criminal Appeals on this issue should be aff irmed. Moreover, because we find that the opinion of the C ourt of Criminal Appea ls, State v. Bank s , 20 07 WL 19 66 03 9, a t *3 8 a de qu a te ly state s th e fa c ts and the law

on this iss ue, we adopt this portion of the o p i n i o n as t h e o p i nion of this Court and include it as an a

ppendix t o this opini on.
IV. T HE A D M I SS I ON OF THE P H O TO G R A PH O F M R . A T I L E B A WI
After car eful study

of the pa rt i es ’ b ri efs with re g ard to the issue of the admission of the ph oto g ra phof Mr . A til e ba

wi , w e are pe rs ua de d that the de c isi on of the Court of Cr imi na l App e a ls
o n th is is s u e s h o u ld b e a f f ir me d

. M o r e o v e r , b e c a

u s e w e f in d th a t th e o p in io n o f the Court of Criminal Appeals, State v. Bank s , 2007 WL1966039, at *14-16 adequately states the fa cts and the law on this issue, we a dopt this portion of the opinion as the opinion of this C ourt and include it as an appe ndix to this opi nion.

V.

T HE A D M IS SI O N O F M R . B ANKS ’ S S TATEM ENTS TO TH E P OLICE B E F ORE

R UL I NG O N H IS M OT I ON T O S U PPRE SS
After car eful study

of the pa rties’ brie fs with reg ard to the issue of Mr. B anks’s suppre ssion motion, we are persua ded that the de cision of the Court of Criminal Appea ls on this i ssue should be aff irmed. More over, be cause we f ind that the opinion of the Court of Criminal Appeals, Sta t e v. Banks , 2007 WL1966039, at *16-19, a dequate ly states the fa cts and the law on thi s issue, we a dopt this portion of the opinion a s the opinion of this C ourt and include it as an appe ndix to this opi nion.

VI
. T HE A D M IS SI O N O F M R . A T I L E B A WI ’ S S T AT E M E NT T O O F F I CE R J O N ES A S A N E X C I TED U T T E RANCEM r
. B ank s i s cor r ect t hat t he s t at ement does not qual i f y f or t he dy i ng decl ar at i on ex cept i on t o t he hea r s ay r ul e. 12 M r. A til e b a w i’s state m e n t ca n n o t q u a lif y a s a d ying d e c la ra tio n b e c a u se he su r v iv e d t h e a tt a c k

. S ta te v . L e w is , 235 S. W

. 3d 136 , 1 49 (T enn
. 2 00 7) (n ot i ng t hat o ne el ement o f t he dy i ng decl ar at i on ex cept i on i s t hat t he decl ar ant i s “ dead at t h e t i me of

t h e t r i al ”)

. T en n es s ee e vi d ence l aw pr ov i des t h at t h e ex ce pt i on f or s t at eme n t s ma de “ u n der be l i ef of i m p end i ng de at h” o nl y ap p l i es where t he d ecl arant is una vai l ab l e b ecause he o r she has d i ed

. T enn. R

. E vi d

. 80 4 (b)(2); T e n n . R . E v id . 8 0 4 (b )( 2 ) a d v iso ry c o m m ’n c m t.; see a lso N e il P

. C o h e n e t al., Tenness ee Law of E vi dence § 8.35 [2][b], at 8-15 6 (5t h ed

. 20 0 5 ) ( “ Tenn es s ee Law of E vi dence ”).
-11- Mr. B anks asse rts that the trial c o u rt err ed by admitting into evidenc e stateme nts made by M r
. A t i l e b aw i t o O f

f i c e r J o n e s
. M r
. B an k s s p e c i f i c a l l y t ak e s i s s u e w i thth e f o l l o w i n g t e s t i m o n y:
PROS ECUTOR: Office r Jones, when y ou asked Mr. Atilebawi what happene d, what did he tell you?
OFF I CER JONES: He told me that a person that he knew as Boo asked to use his phone. As he wa s talking on the phone he w as ac ting very suspicious. And at that time he wa lked out. He f elt a ver y sharp pain t o his head and t o his shoulder and hear d a couple pops and he ran ba ck inside the house.
PROS ECUTOR: . . . Who ran back inside the house ?
OFF I CER J ONES: The . .

. suspect did. . . . They wer e outside talking beca use he wa l k ed back outside w ith the phone. And as the y ran back inside the house, he f elt another

– he heard another pop and he felt a sha rp pain to his shoulder.

Mr . B ank s o bje c te d at tr ia l th a t th is t e sti mony c on sti tut e d in a dmi ssi bl e hear say . T he tr ia l c ourt , ho we ve r, c on c lud e d th a t th e te sti mony wa s adm iss ibl e a s an e xcit e d utte ra nc e and a lso state d it

c ou ld possibly be admitted as a

dying de clar ation. The Court of Criminal Appe als conc luded that the trial 12 court did not err

by admitting the state ment as an e x cited uttera nce. Mr . Ba

nks appea ls from the Court of Criminal Appeals’s c onclusion. He c ontends that the statement d o es n ot fall within the excited utteranc e exception bec ause ( 1) the statemen t wa s m ade in r esponse to a que stion, (2) the state me nt w a s g ive n se ve ra l ho ur s a ft e r Mr . A til e ba wi wa s sh ot, and

(3 ) M r. At ile ba

wi wa s n ot s til l under the stress of a

startling e vent. W e af

firm the Court of Criminal Appea ls’s determination that the trial cour

t did not err in admitting the statement as a n excited utteranc e.
Dec isions reg ardingthe admission or exclusion of evidence are entrusted to the trial court’ s discretion. Thus, reviewing courts will not disturb these dec isions on appeal unless the tria l court has abused its discretion. State v. Robinson , 1 46 S.W. 3d 46 9, 49 0 ( Te nn . 2 00 4) ; State v. Jam es , 81 S.W .3d 751, 760 (Tenn. 2002) . Reviewingcourts will find an a buse of discr etion only

when the tr ial court a pplied incorre ct leg al standar ds, rea che d an i l l og ical conc lusion, based its decision on a clea rly err oneous asse ssment of the evide nce, or employ ed re asoning that cause s an injustice to the complaining party

. Konvalinka v. Chattanooga-Hamilton County Hosp. Auth. , 249 S.W .3d 346, 358 (Tenn. 2008)

.F re d e ric k S c h a u e r, O n t he Suppos ed Jur y- D epe ndenc e of

Evi denc e Law , 155 U

. Pa. L. Rev

. 16 5 , 17 6

- 77 13 (20 0 6 ).

T he evi d ence d o es not pe rmit an exact d et erm i nat i o n o f the l engt h o f

the i nt erval be t ween M r. A t i l eb awi b ei ng 14

s h ot and O f

f i cer Jon e s a r r i v i n g on t h e s c e n e
. F or t h e pu r po s e of t h i s op i n i on , w e a c c e pt M r
. Ban k s ’ s s u g g e s t e d t i me fra m e tha t ap p ro x im a te ly six h o u rs p a sse d b e tw e e n M r. A til e b a w i b e ing sh o t a n d h is re sp o n se to O ff ic e r J o n e s’s inq u iry.
-12- Hea rsay is “a stateme nt, other than one made by the decla rant while testifying at the trial or hear ing, of

fer ed in evidenc e to prove the trut h o f t h e matter a sserted.” Tenn. R. Evid. 801(c)

. Hea rsay evidenc e is inadmissible unless permitted by the rules of

evidenc e or othe rw i s e b y law. Tenn. R. Evid. 802. Tenne ssee law rec og nizes numerous exceptions to the bar on the admission of hear say evidenc e. See ge nerally Tenn. R. Evid. 803; Tenn. R. Evid. 804. Despite the sig nificant number of e x ceptions, “it would be a m i s t ak e t o u n dere stimate the forc e of the basic rule , which
e sp e c ia lly but by no me ans on ly in cr imi na l tr ia ls, pla inl y e xclu de s a

su bs tanti a l amou

nt o f o the rw ise rele vant evidenc e.” 13
Well-rooted among the my riad of exceptions to the g ener al rule barr ing hear say evidenc e ar e excited utteranc es. Ex cited uttera nces a re state ments “re lating to a startling e vent or c ondition made wh ile the de c lara

nt w a s und e r t

he str e ss o f e xcit e me nt c a us e d by the e ve nt or

c on dit ion .” Te nn . R. Evid. 803(2). To qua lify as an e x cited utt er an ce , t h ree criter ia must be met: (1) ther e must be a startling e vent or condition that cause s the stress or e x citement; (2) the statement must relate to the startling e vent or c ondition; and (3) the stateme nt must be made while the decla rant wa s under the stress or excitement cause d by the s tartling event or condition. State v. Gordon , 952 S.W .2d 817, 82 0 ( Te nn . 1 99 7) ; State v. Samue l , 2 43 S.W. 3d 59 2, 60 0 ( Te nn . Cr im. Ap p. 20 07 ); se e als o TennesseeLaw of

Evidenc e §8.07[3] [b] to [ 3][ d], at 8-75 to 8-78.

Mr. B anks conte nd s that Mr. Atilebawi’ s statements to Offic er Jones cannot qua lify as excited utteranc es bec ause the y wer e made in response to O ff i cer J ones inquiring into what had happene d. We find litt le merit in this arg ument beca use “state ments made in re sponse to questions may still b e ad m i s s i b l e if the declar ant is under the e x citement or stre ss of the eve nt.” State v. Gordon , 9 52 S.W. 2d

a t 82 0-2 1; se e als o S

tate v . S mi th , 8 57 S.W. 2d

1, 9 ( Te nn . 1 99 3) . Si mpl y state d, “ [t]he fa c t that a qu e sti on pr omp te d the e xcit e d ans we r i s a c ir c ums tanc e re le va

nt t o s tr e ss, but it does not automatically bar the statement’s a dmission” as an excited utteranc e. TennesseeLaw of Evidenc e §8.07[3] [d] , at 8-78.

Mr. B anks also ar g ues that the stateme nts c annot qualify as excited utteranc es bec ause the y wer e made by

Mr. Atilebawi to Of

fice r J o n es ap proxi mately four to six hours af

ter the star

tling event. We find littl e merit in t his argument beca use the “ leng th of time betwee n a startlingevent 14 and the state ment does not automatica lly prec lude the stateme nt’s beingadmissible as an e x cited utteranc e.” W

i l l i a m s v . Stat e , No. W 2006-00605-CCA-R3-PC, 2007 WL 2120174, at *7 (Te nn. Crim. App. J uly 24, 2007). I n fac t, “[t] he ti me interva l is material only as a c ircumstance bear ing on the issue of c ontinuing stress.” TennesseeLaw of Evidenc e §8.07[3] [d] , at 8-77. Finally , Mr. B anks ar g ues that Mr. Atileba wi did not ma k e h i s s t atement to Officer J ones wh ile sti ll und e r t

he str e ss o f a

sta rt lin g e ve nt. As pr e vio us ly no te d, if a state me nt i s n ot m a de wh ile the d e c la r an t i s un d e r

th e s tr e s s o f

a s ta rtl in g e v e n t, th e nit

c an n o t q u a li f y a s ane xc it e d

u tt erance.-13-

State v. Gordon , 952 S.W. 2d a t 82 0; State v. Samue l , 2 43 S.W. 3d a t 60 0; se e als o TennesseeLaw of Evidenc e §8 .0 7[3][d ], at 8-7 7 to 8-7 8. Whil e the state me nts are no t pe r s e ina dmi ssi ble be c a us e they wer e made sever al hours af ter the star

tling eve nt in response to Off icer J ones’s que stions, the fac ts that they

wer e re sponses to questions and that they wer e made sever al hours af ter the shooting
are rele vant m atters for t he trial court to consider in assessing whether Mr. Atilebawi r emained unde r the stress or excitement c aused by his be ing shot f our times by Mr. Ba

nks. Whil e not a

n exclusive list, ot her r eleva

nt fac tors “include the nature and ser iousness of the eve nt o r co n d i t i o n ; the appea ranc e, beha

vior, outlook, and circumstance s of t he declara nt, including such cha

rac teristics as ag e and phy sical or mental conditi on; and the contents of the statement itself.” State v. Gordon , 952 S.W. 2d a t 82 0; Sta tev . S

mi th , 8 70 S.W. 2d

56 1, 57 4 ( Te nn . 1 99 3) ; Tennessee La w o f Evidenc e §8.07[3] [d] , at 8-77.
The trial court offe red a

detailed a nd persua sive ana ly sis for its admission of Mr. Atilebawi’s statements to Offic er Jones as an e x cited uttera nce:
I don’t know how much more of a situation y ou could desc ribe than to have be en shot four or

five times and have y our Uncle in the other
ro om s ho t, b loo d p ouri ngout of y our h e a d a

nd be inga sk e d w ho did this.

Ithink it’s st i l l i n the purviewof all of the e vents that wer e tr ans pir ing , th e sp on tane ity of it may c e rt a inl y sti ll be the re . T his is the first off

icer on the s ce n e. He’ s g oing up to the guy saying what happene d, who di d this. This certainly [i s an] ex cited uttera

nce . . . . [I ]f a pe rs on

in g oo d h e a lthha s h a d 3 0 mi nute s to sit and po nd e r i t, it may not be an e x cited uttera nce. B ut if an individual who has underg one thi s sort of t raumatic event is asked by the first off

icer on th e s ce ne what happene d, Ithink that the spontaneity and trustworthiness and re liability [are] there . . . . Although w e conc lude that the dying decla ration exception to the he arsa y rule is not applicable , the trial court’ s analy sis of the applica bi l i t y o f t h at exception bolsters its finding that this statement
co n s t i tu t edan ex ci t edu t t er an ce
. T h e t ri al co urt s t at edth e f o l l o wi n g: [T] his g uy had jus t been shot three times in the head. His Unc le had been shot e x ecution sty le in the other room and he had blood gushing out of his head a

nd h e wa s underg oing a ll of this. . . . Ithink the injuries we re so sever e . . . to the bra in, to the head, . . . a nd to the sk ull that it ’s e nti re ly

pla us ibl e
. . . th a t th is p e rso n was giv ingthi s information to a law e nforc ement off icer , contemplating[t he] likelihood that he may

not pull through.
Offic er Jones also offe red the following testimony reg ardingMr. Atilebawi’ s condition:T enn. C o nst

. art. I , § 9 ( “[t] hat i n al l cri m i nal pro secut i o ns, t he accused hat h t he ri ght

. . . t o m eet t he 15

w itne sse s fac e to fac e ” ); U .S . C o n st. am e n d V I (th a t “[i]n a ll c rim ina l p ro se c u tio n s, the a c c u se d sh a ll e n jo y the rig h t .

. . to b e c o n fro n te d w ith the w itne sse s a g a ins t him ” ).
-14-

Whe n w e a c tua lly

g ot t he re , h e wa s st ill on

the c ou c h an d kind

of in
a da zed , co nf

us e d state

. An d we sa

w al l th e blo od

and imm e diate ly
we we nt ahea d and starte d the para medics to g et over

to treat him. . . . He was just in shock and

. . . just ve ry , very disoriented and tr

ying to tell us that his Uncle was still in the other room . . . .
The de terminati on of whe ther to admit the statements made by Mr. Atilebawi to Of

fice r Jone s is a dis c re tio na

ry on e . O ur re vie w is limit e d to det e rm ini ngwh e the r t he tr ia l c ourt

a bu se d it s discretion re g ar d in g th a t p arti c u la r in qu ir y
. T h e n a tu

r e o f th e e v e n t ( b e in g s h o t a

n d le f t f o r d ead wh ile havin g a

c los e a sso c iate sh ot an d kill e d in one ’s ho me ), the c on dit ion of the Mr . A til e ba

wi (i n shock and r e q u ir ing ur g ent medica l attention), and the nature of the statement (a nsweringan off

icer ’s inq uir y a bo ut what ha d h a

pp e ne d) a ll s tr on g ly

su pp or t the c on c lus ion

that Mr . A til e ba

wi wa s st ill under the stress c au sed by the startling event. Unde r the fa cts and c ircumstance s of this case, w e c ann ot c on c lud e that th e tr ia l court a bu se d it s d isc re tio n in

a dmi tti ngMr . A til e ba

wi ’s state me nts to Offic er Jones under the e x cited uttera nce e x ception to the hea

rsay rule.

VI I. T HE C ONF RONT AT I ON C LAU SE A N D THE A D M IS SI O N O F M R . A T I L E B A WI ’ S S TATEM ENTS T O O F F I CE R J ON ES
Mr. B anks insists that the trial court violated his constitutional rights under the Confrontation Cla us e s o f t he state and

fe de ra l c on sti tut ion s by

a dmi tti ngint o e vid e nc e Mr . A ti l e b a w i ’ s s t a te me nts 15 to Office r Jones. Mr. Ba

nks argues t hat t he st atements were te stimoni al and that Mr. A tilebawi was available to testify , thus the admission thereof violate d his constituti onal rig ht of confr ontation as
c o n s tr u ed in C rawford v. W

ashington , 541 U.S. 36 (2004). The State responds that Mr. B anks’s ri g hts to c on fr on tatio n w e re no t vi olate d b e c a us e the state me nts we re no n- te sti mon ia l and be c a us e Mr. Atilebawi, the decla

rant, testified at trial. The Court of Criminal Appe als found that there was no violation of Mr. Ba

nks’s rig ht to confront the witnesse s ag ainst him. W e af firm the dete rmination of the Court

of Cr imi na l App e a ls. The United States Supre me Court, interpre ting the Sixt h Amendment in Crawf ord v. W ashington , noted that “when t he declara nt appea rs for cross-e x amination at trial, the Confrontation Clau s e plac es no constra ints at all on the use of his prior testimonial statements.” Crawf ord v. W ashington , 541 U.S. at 59 n. 9. The Court adde d t h at t h e C onfrontation Clause “ does not bar admission of a statement so long as the decla rant is pre sent at trial to def end or e x plain it.” Cra wfo rd v. W ashington , 541 U.S. at 5 9 n
. 9

. Article I , section 9 of the T ennesse e Constituti on does not require a diffe rent conclusion. Mr. Ati lebawi was ava ilable and in fa ct was c ross-examined by Mr. B ank s “ fa c e to fa c e .” Mr . B ank s w a s n ot d e pr ive d o f h is r ig ht t o c on fr on t Mr . A til e ba wi , a nd his
c on te nti on

oth e rw ise is who lly

wi tho ut m e ri t.M r. B anks spec i f i cal l y q uest i o ns t he p o rt i o n o f the t rans l at i o n o f

M r. A t i l eb awi’ s t est i m o ny regardi ng M r. 16 At i l eba wi ’ s pe r s on al u s e of ma r i j u an a. H e i n s i s t s t h at h e h ad n o wa y t o ch al l en g e t h e i mpar t i al i t y of t h e i n t er pr et er or t he acc ur acy of

t he t r ans l at i on becau s e an A r abi c l ang uag e i nt er pret er had n ot been as s i gn ed s peci f i cal l y t o t he def

ens e. -15- VI II. T HE A RAB I C L A N GU A GE I N TERPRETER
Mr. B anks insists that the trial court’s use of a non-cr edentiale d Ara bic languag e interpr eter vio late d h is f

e de ra l and

state du e pr oc e ss r ig hts and his ri g ht to co nf ro nt the wi tne sse s a g a ins t hi m. 16 Specifica lly , he asser

ts that the trial court err ed by failing to f ollow the proce dures for the use of noncre dentialed inter

prete rs re quired by

Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 42, § 3(e) and ( f). Even thoug h Mr. B anks did not object to the interpre ter’s qua lifications at trial and f ailed to include this issue in his motion for ne w trial, the Court of Criminal Appea ls determined that the trial cour t did not commit plain err or with reg ard to the use of the Ar abic languag e interpr eter . We ag ree
. A.
Th e g uil t ph a se of

the tr ia l be g an o n April 6, 20 05 , w ithMr . A til e ba wi a s th e State ’s fi rs t witness. Be fore Mr. Atilebawi be g an to te stify , the following colloquy occur red betwee n the trial court a nd Alladin Ghane m, the Ara bic languag e interpr eter :
THE COURT: And let m e as k a couple of questions of you for the
re c or d. Yo ur

name is M r. Gh ane m; c or re c t?

TH E I NT ERP RET ER: Ye s.
TH E C O U R T : Y o u ar e c e rt i f i e d b y th e S t a t e o f T e n n e s s e e a s a tr ans lator /in te rp re te r f

or c ourt pr oc e e din g s; i s th a t c or

re c t?

THE I NTERPRETER: Yes. Yes, Your H onor. THE COURT: And spec ifically in Arabic languag e?

TH E I NT ERP RET ER: Ye s.
THE COURT: And in a va riety of dialec ts of th e Arabic languag e; c or re c t?

THE I NTERPRETER: Yes, sir.

TH E CO UR T: Inc lud ingthe I ra qi lang ua g e and dia le c t and

idi oms and re late d matte rs ?

THE I NTERPRETER: I have rec ord here also in the state of Shelby County of do ingthi s f

or ov e r 1 5 y e ars
.See http :// tsc a o c .tsc .sta te .tn.u s/g e n info /P ro g ra m s/In te rp re te rs /ro ste rin d e x .htm

. 17
-16- Mr. B anks did not reque st f urther voir dire r eg ardingMr. Ghane m’s qualifications, and he did not object to the us e of Mr. Ghanem as the interpr eter during the trial. In addition, Mr. Ba nks did not take iss ue wi th t

he qu a lif ic a tio ns or

us e of Mr . G ha ne m in his mot ion

fo r n e w tri a l.

B.
When a defe ndant raises an issue for the first time on appea l, the issue will g eneral l y be deeme d wa i v ed and will be conside red only within the limi ted par ameter s of an a ppellate c ourt’s discretionar

y plain err or re view. S

ta tev

. F a u lk n er , 15 4 S .W. 3d

48 , 5 8 ( Te nn . 2 00 5) ; State v. Ma dd in , 1 92 S.W. 3d

55 8, 56 1 ( Te nn . Cr im. Ap p. 20 05 ); see also Te nn . R. Ap p. P. 3 (e ); Te nn . R. App. P. 36(a); Te nn. R. Crim. App. 52(b). The de fenda nt bear s the burden of

pers uadingthe appe l l at e court that the trial cour t committed plain error

and that the e rror

was of suf

ficient mag nitude that it probably chang ed the outcome of the trial. State v. Bledsoe , 226 S.W .3d 349, 354- 55 (Tenn. 2007) . Under plain err or review, relief will only be g rante d when f

ive pre requisites ar e met: (1) the r ecor d clea

rly establishes what occur

red in the trial court, ( 2) a c lear and unequivoc al rule of la w was br eac hed, (3) a substantial rig ht of the ac cused w as adversely aff ecte d, (4) the
acc used did not waive the issue for tactica l r easons, and (5) consideration of the er ror is nec essar

y to do substantial just ice. State v. Gome z , 239 S.W .3d 733, 737 (Tenn. 2007)

. C.
Notwithstandin g

M r
. G h a n e m’ s s tatement that he w as a c ertified Arabic lang uag e interpr eter , M r. Ba n k s as serts on appe al that Mr. Gha nem is not a ce rtified or r eg istered Ar abic language interpre ter a

nd asks the appe llate cour t to take ju d i ci al n o t ice of this fact. The Court of Criminal Appe al s d id not address this argument direc tly . I nstead, the c ourt ac cre dited Mr. Ghane m’s uncontra dicted stateme nt that he was a cer tified Ara bic languag e interpr eter

and, ther efor e, held that the trial cour

t was not requir ed to c omply with the require ments of Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 42, § 3(e) a nd (f)

. Th e Ad

min istrativ e Of

fi c e of the C ourt s is su e s p ho togra ph ic ide nti fi c a tio n c ard s to int e rp re te rs wh o a

re e ith e r c e rt if

ie d o r r e g ist e re d in

a c c ordanc e Ten n. Sup . Ct . R. 42 and a lso
m a i n t a i n s a

c ur r e n t l i s t i n g o f a l l c e rt i f

i e d an d r e g i s t e r e d i n t e r

p r e t e r s o n i t s w e b s i t e
. A c c o r d i n g l y, 17 in ca s es requiring an interpr eter , it is advisable for the c ourts and the litiga nts to verify

the interpre ter’s status by

reque sting him or her

to produce the i dentification car d or by consulting the Administrative Offic e of the Courts’s website. I n circ umstances whe re a n interpre ter is either

noncre dentialed or

is unable to demonstrate that he or she is c rede ntialed, the cour t should then follow the proc edure s mandated by Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 42, § 3(e) and ( f).

B a se d o n th e re c or d in

thi s c a se , w e c ann ot f

ind that th e tr ia l c ourt

e rr e d, muc h le ss committed pla in e rror , by

failingto follow the proce dures se t forth in Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 42 § 3(e) and (f ). M r. Gh an em s t at ed th at h e wa s ce rt i fi ed b y th e S t at e of T en n es s ee
. M r. Ba n k s d i d n o tch al l en ge this assertion or re quest furthe r voir dire of Mr. Gha nem. The trial court be lieved that Mr. Gha nem was a cer tified interpre ter. Ac cording ly , based on the i nformation available at the time, Te nn. Sup.W hil e n o t crit i ca l to o ur ev alua t i o n o f t he arg um en t s p rese nted he rein, i t i s, ne ve rtheless, a m att er o f at l ea st 18

so m e re le v a n c e to the d isc u ssio n o f M r. G h a n e m a s a n inte rp re te r tha t t h e o v e rw h e lm ing m a jo rity o f M r. A til e b a w i’s
exa mi nat i ons , bot h by t he pros ecu t i on an d by t he def ens e, requi r ed no t r ans l at i on. T he exa mi nat i ons wer e c onduct ed i n E ngl i sh, i ncl ud i ng t he d i scus si o n of t he act ual off ense and i d ent i f

i cat i o n of M r. B anks as t he p erpe t rat o r.

T enn. Sup

. C t

. R

. 42 cm t

. s t at es t hat t wo i nt erpret ers m ay b e used i n l engt hy pro ce e d ings t o enab l e t he 19 i nt erpret ers t o t ake b reaks and t o f aci l i t at e at t o rney - cl i ent co m m uni cat i o ns d uri ng a co urt pro ceed i ng.

-17- Ct. R. 42 § 3(e) and ( f) we re ina pplicable. It would be utterly nonsensical to find that a trial c ourt err ed by failingto follow the proc edure s require d for utilizi ng a non-c rede ntialed interpre ter whe n the tr ia l c o urt b e li e v e d , w it h o u t a n y o b je c ti o nf r o m t h e d e f e n d an t, th a t i t w a s u ti li zi n g a c e rti fied interpre ter. 18
The use a n interpre ter who is ne ither cer tified nor reg istered is not reve rsible er ror in and of itself. I t may

rise to the level of reversible error only in circumstanc es whe re a cer tified or re g istered interpre ter wa s rea dily

available and whe re the use of the non-c rede ntialed interpre ter unde rmined the fa irness of the pr ocee ding in some w ay . This r ec o rd d o es n ot indicate that a c ertified or reg is tere d Ara

bic languag e interpr eter

was re adily

available or that Mr. Gha nem’s tra nslation somehow under

mined the fa irness of the pr ocee ding.

I t is dif fi c ult fo r t his Court to d isc e rn

wh e the r M r. B ank s is a lso mak ing the se pa rate argume nt i n h is a

pp e llate br ie f t

hat the tr ia l c ourt

e rr e d b y fa ili ngto a

pp oint a se c on d inte rp re te r t o verify the ac cura cy

of Mr. Gha

nem’s tra nslation for Mr. B anks and his att o rn ey , neither of whom speak A rabic . Nonethele ss, we have considere d this argument, and we conclude that the trial cour t’s failure to appoint a second interpre ter for this purpose was not er ror. While Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 42, § 3(g ) permits the use of multipl e interpre ters, the rule doe s not ex plicitly authorize the appointment of a se c on d inte rp re te r fo r the purp os e of a sse ssi ngthe a c c ur a c y

of the fi rs t in te rp re te r. B e c a us e 19 Mr. B anks neve r re quested a second inter

prete r for this purpose or any other purpose, the trial cour t did not err, much le ss commit plain error, by failing to appoint a seco n d i n t erp reter to revie w the translation of the f

irst interprete r.
IX. T HE T R I A L C OURT ’ S F AI L URE T O I N TERV I EW THE J URORS T O A S CE RT AI N W HETH ER

T HE Y HA D B E E N I NF L UE NCE D B Y A F ORMER J UROR
Mr. B anks take s issue with the trial court’s ha ndling of a juror who was e x cused be fore the jury beg an its deliberations on the penalty phase of the trial. Even thoug h he did not raise this issue in the trial court or

the Court of Criminal Appea ls, he insists t hat the trial c ourt committed plain err or by no t im me diate ly

re mov ingthe jur or and by fa ili ngto q ue sti on the re ma ini ngjur or s to a sc e rt a in wh e the r t he y ha d b e e n in fl ue nc e d by the fo rm e r j ur or . We have de te rm ine d th a t th e tr ia l c ourt did not commit plain error by failing to dismiss the juror immediately or by failingto interview the jury on its own motion as t o the ex istence of potential prejudice either a fter it excused the juror or af ter the jury returne d its verdict.
We reiterate that while the de ci s i o n s o f the Court of Criminal Appea ls and the Court of Appea ls may

require the par

ties to r efr ame their issues or to adjust their a rguments when they

seek-18-

re vie w b y thi s Court , lit ig ants are no t f re e sim ply to r e se rv e iss ue s unti l th e ir c a se re a c he s th is C ourt

. Whe n a de fe nd ant f

a ils to p re se nt a

n is su e on a pp e a l to the Cou

rt of Cr imi na l App e a ls, that is su e is not properly

befor e this Court and is, instead, waived

. See State v . Butler , 108 S.W .3d 845, 854 (T e nn . 2 00 3) ; Sta tev . H

all , 8 S.W. 3d

59 3, 59 6 n .1 (T e nn . 1 99 9) ; State v. Buggs , 995 S.W .2d 102, 10 9 ( Te nn . 1 99 9) . N on e the le ss, we have de te rm ine d th a t th e int e re sts of jus tic e pr omp t us to a dd

re ss th i s i s s u e t o d e t e r

m i n e w h e th e r

th e tr i a l c o urtc o m m i t t e d p l a i ne r r o r b y n o ti n t e r

v i e w i n g th e j u r

y.
A. Duringa bre ak in the trial on April 8, 2005, Mr. B anks’s trial c ounsel informed the trial court that Dorothy

Rooks, a member of

the jury venire for Mr. B anks’s trial who ha d not be en seated on the jury , informed one of the de fense investigators, a friend of Ms. Rooks, that juror Wil liam Stroud had made a disturbing comment to he r about the case prior to the trial. Acc ording to Mr. Ba nks’s lawy er, Ms. R o o k s told the investigator that Mr. Stroud commented that he was “ hoping that he would end up on this jury

so that he could c onvince pe ople to find him guilty and we’ d be out by the
wee kend.” T he trial c ourt expressed conce rn about the comment and decide d to c onduct a jury -out hear ing to he ar dire ctly

from Ms. Rooks.

L a te r t hat da y , a ft e r t he State re ste d it s c a se -i n- c hie f, Ms. Roo ks a pp e are d in court

and , w ith the jury excused, rec ounted what she had hea rd. Ms

. R o o k s stated that Mr. Stroud expressed disappointment about not having been se lecte d as a juror in a differ ent ca se in which she a nd Mr. Stroud had both been me mbers of the j ury venire

. Specifica lly , Ms. Rooks rec alled that Mr. Stroud stated “I was goingto drive that sucke r.” Ms. Rooks indicated that Mr. Stroud appea red to be adama nt, but she was not sur e exactly what Mr. Stroud me ant. She indicated that the other c ase w as also a fir st deg ree murder c ase but not a c apital ca se. Ms. Rooks stated that she bec ame c oncer ned when she lear

ned that Mr. Stroud had bee n selec ted as a juror in Mr. B anks’s c ase. She voluntee red t h at “I j u s t t h o ug ht that it didn’t seem like it was a jury of his peer s. Imean, ther e wa s only one black lady

there .”
After commenting on how it had bee n impressed with Mr. Stroud b as ed upon his answe rs duringvoir dire a

nd his attentiveness duringthe proc eedings , t h e trial c ourt asked the bailiffs whether they had observe d any

thing that sug g ested that Mr. Stroud wa s interested in ra ilroadingMr. B ank s. Af

te r t he ba ili ff s r e sp on de d in

the ne g a tive, th e tr ial c ourt inf or me d th e a tto rn e y s th a t it would need to consider how to a ddress this matter

. The trial court also stated that questioning Mr

. S tro u d ab o u ta “ ca s u al s t at em en th e m ad e [ ab o u tan o th er ca s e] o nth e s i d e w a l k w h i l e s m o k i n g a cig are tte” could be counter productive.

L ater the same da

y , the court ag ain addressed the matter of Mr. S troud. The trial court stated:

Ihave a little bit of c on c e rn , I have to be ho ne st w ithy ou , th a t [Ms

. Rooks’s] g reater c oncer

n might b e t h e ra cial make -up of the jur y beca use she let – she made t h at s t atement unde r oath whe n she testified today . And I

don’t know why

that statement would be
re le va nt t o th e iss ue we we re dis c us sin g and fo r whic h s he c ame down her e, unless it was rea lly bubbling rig ht be neath the surfa ce a nd-19- it finally came out when she took the stand. And that, perha ps, is the
overr idi n g re ason[] for he r lodg ing the complaint. I ’m conc erne d
a bo ut t hat.
Ne ve rt he le ss, the tr ia l court de c ide d the mor e pr ud e nt co ur se wo uld be to r e pla c e Mr . Stro ud wi th an alter nate juror . This took place whe n the trial cour t excused the other alternate jurors be fore the jur y de lib e ratio ns beg an. Outsi de the pr e se nc e of the oth e r j ur or s, the tr ia l c ourt e xpla ine d it s rea soning dire ctly

to Mr. Stroud:
There was a juror that was on this lar g er panel

. . . [who] overhe ard
a re mark t h at was attributed to y ou outside this buil ding a fter the close of c ourt o r y ’a ll had been e x cused [from the jury venire for a diff e r e n t t r ia l]

. . . . [T ]h e qu e s ti o nh av in g b e e nr a is e d b y th is juror
c on c e rn ingtha

t r e mark and ho w it may a ff

e c t y our i mpa

rt ia lity in t his
case was such that after

ag onizi ng over whether to remove you from the jury or not, I felt t hat j ust out of an abunda nce of caution so that no question could be ra ised in the event that the jury finds Mr. B anks g u i l ty, th a t I w o u l d

i n s e rtt h e a l t e r

n a t e an d r e m o v e yo uf

r o mt h e j ur

y.
Mr. S troud wa s e xc u s e d p r io r to an d d id n o t p arti c ip a te in

th e ju r y d e li b e r a ti o n s in

th is c ase. Essentially , he bec ame the equivalent of an ex cused alternate juror. Mr. Banks di d not reque st the trial co u rt t o interview the jury when it dismissed Mr. Stroud before deliberations started and, lik e wi se , d id n ot r e qu e st the tr ial cou rt to in ter vie w t he jur y a ft e r i t r e tur

ne d a g uil ty ve rd ic t to asce rtain whe ther the ve rdict had be en influenc ed by Mr. S troud’s presence . There fore , our re view of the proc ess the trial c ourt used to excuse Mr. Stroud is for plain e rror
. B.

Mr . B ank s’ s argume nts on thi s issu e pr ov ide ne ith e r a log ic a lly no r a le g a lly su pp or te d b a sis for f inding e rror , much less plain err or, in the trial court’s failure to immediately excuse Mr. Stroud afte r hea ringMs. Rooks’s testim ony reg arding his c omments in another , unrelated case
. As far as this recor d shows, the trial cour t had no basis to be conc erne d about Mr. Stroud’s pre sence on the jury befor e Mr. B anks’s trial c ounsel expressed conc ern a bout statements he had purportedly made to M s. Roo ks

. Be cause the re port of Mr. Stroud’s c omments was sec ond-hand, t h e tria l c o u

r t decided to he ar direc tly from Ms. Rooks before decidingwhether reme dial action wa s wa rra nted. When the trial court que stioned Ms. Rooks, i t became appa rent that the state ments attributed to Mr. Stroud did not inv olv e Mr . B ank s’ s c a se , a s w a s o ri g ina lly re pr e se nte d, but r a the r a n e arl ie r, unre late d c a se in
ano the r co ur

t. R a the r t

ha n e xcu sin g Mr . Stro ud

imm e diate ly , th e tr ia l c ourt a llo we d th e lawye rs to make the ir

fi na l argume nts and

the n c ha rg e d the jur

y be fo re it r e pla c e d M r. Str ou d w ithan a lte rn a te juror. We decline to find plain e rror with reg ard to the timing of Mr. Stroud beingexcused from th e j u ry
. T h e prese ntation of the evide nce w as esse ntially completed whe n the def ense r aised aM r. B a n k s ’s b r ie f use s the ve rb “p o ll” ra the r th a n the ve rb “inte rv ie w .” “P o lli n g ” the ju ry re la te s to 20
q u e stio n ing the ju ry a fter the ve rd ic t as to w h e the r the y c o n c u r w ith the v e rd ic t. T h e c o n te x t o f th e us e o f t h e ve rb “p o ll” in M r. B a n k s’s b rie f i n d ic a te s tha t t h e ter m c o n n o te s inte rv ie w ing the ju ry e ithe r b e fo re o r afte r t h e ve rd ic t. A c c o rd ing ly,
we hav e chos en t o s ubs t i t ut e t he ver b “ i nt er vi ew” f or “ po l l

. ” Lov el l v

. M cCul l ough , 222 T en n
. 567, 575- 78, 439 S. W

. 2d 1 0 5 , 1 0 8 -1 0 (1 9 6 9 ); D i

xon S t ave & H eadi ng Co

. v. A r cher , 4 0 T enn. A p p
. 32 7 , 33 4

- 4 0 , 29 1 S.W

. 2 d 60 3 , 60 7

- 1 0 (19 5 6 ); 6 W a yn e R . L a F a v e e t al., C ri m i n a lP ro ce d u re § 2 4

. 9 (e), at 52 2

- 2 4 (3d ed

. 20 0 7 ).
-20- conce rn about Mr. Stroud. Af ter the trial court interviewe d Ms. Rooks, the jury was a lone tog ether for only one additional brief brea k befor e the tria l court complete d its charg e to the jury and re place d Mr . Stro ud

wi th an a lte rn a te jur or
. Ac c or din g ly , we de c lin e to fi nd the tr ia l c ourt c omm itt e d p la in
err or by waiting to excuse Mr. Stroud until i mmediately befor e the jury

retire d to deliberate. By the same toke n, we de cl i n e t o fi nd that the trial cour t committed plain error

by not int ervi ewi ng the oth e r j ur or s, e ith e r b e fo re the y re tir e d o r f

oll ow ingthe ir

ve rd ic t to a sc e rt a in 20 wh e the r t he y ha d b e e n in fl ue nc e d by Mr . Stro ud ’s pr e se nc e on the jur y . M r. B ank s d id n ot r e qu e st the tr ia l c ourt

to i nte rv ie w the jur or s f oll ow ingMs

. Ro ok s’s tes tim ony and c ite s n o a

uth or ity requiringthe trial cour

t to do so on its own m otion. He has failed to demonstrate that the trial court’ s failure to interview the jurors prior to de liberations violated a c lear and unequivoc al rule of

law or adver sely aff

ecte d one of his substantial rig hts. Acc ording ly , we de cline to find that the trial c ourt c omm itt e d p la in e rr or

by fa ili ngto i nte rv ie w the jur or s p ri or to t he ir de lib e ra tio ns
. I n th e s ame v e in , w e d e c li n e to f in d th at th e tr ia l c o urt c o mm itte d p la in err or by not int e rv ie wi ngthe jur or s f oll ow ing th e verd ic t to de te rm ine wh e the r t he y ha d b e e n im

pr op e rl y influence d by

Mr. Stroud. Defe ndants in criminal ca ses have a statutory rig ht to have the jury

polled up on re qu e st. Te nn . Co de Ann. § 2 0- 9- 50 8 ( 19 94 ). Ho we ve r, the y wa ive thi s right i f t

he y fa il t o make a timely reque st that the jury

be polled. Ri c e v . S

tate , 4 Tenn. C ri m
. Ap p
. 600, 605, 475 S.W. 2d 17 8, 18 0 ( 19 71 ). Mr . B anks has fa ile d to de mon str a te that th e tr ia l c ourt ’s fa ilure to interview the jurors re g ardingMr. Stroud after they returne d their ver dict vio l at ed a clear and unequivoca l rule of law

or adve rsely

aff ecte d one of his substantial rig hts.

X. T HE T R I A L C OURT ’ S F AI L URE T O C HA R GE C E RT AI N L ESS ER -I NCL UDE D O FF ENSES
M r. Ban k s ar gu es th att h e t ri al co urt v i o l at edh i s co n s t i t u t i o n al ri gh t s b y fa i l i n g t o ch ar ge c e rt a in l e sse r- inc lud e d o ff e ns e s. Mr . B ank s r e qu e ste d s ome , b ut no t a ll, of the se c ha rg e s at tr ia l. The State a sserts t hat these a rguments have e ither bee n waived or are not meritorious. The Court of Criminal Appea ls found no reve rsible er ror. We af

firm that dec ision.
A.
Mr. B anks wa s indicted o n fo u r counts. He reque sted the trial cour t to charg e the jury reg arding forty -five lesser- included offe nses of these offe nses. In addition to char g ing t h e jury
re g ard ingthe fo ur

of fe ns e s f or wh ic h M r. B ank s w a s ind ic te d, the tr ia l c ourt c ha rg e d th e jur

y wi th nineteen of

the forty -five r equest ed l es s er -included of fense instructions. The jury convicted Mr

. Ba nks of the g reatest char g e for ea ch count of the f our-c ount indictment. On appea l, Mr. Ba nks i n s i s t s th a tth e tr i a l c o urt c o m m i t t e d r e v e r s i b l e e r r o r b y f a i l i n g t o g i v e i n s tr

u c t i o n s r e g ar d i n g tw e n ty--21-

six lesser- included off

enses. Mr. B anks re quested ten of these instructions at trial. He no long er takes issue on a

ppea l wi th the trial court’ s failure to char g e six teen lesse r-include d offe nses he reque sted at trial. Howe ver, f or the fir st tim e on appe al, he insists t h at the trial c ourt should have char g ed six teen other lesser- included offenses that he had not reque sted at trial. Our revie w of the trial court’ s failure to char g e the latter six teen instructions is for plain e rror
. Neither the State nor Mr. B anks have offe red de tailed legal arguments reg ardingwhether
eac h of the purpor

ted lesser -included of

fense s qualify

as lesser -included offense s under the Burns test. Thus, we will assume for purposes of this opinion that the offense s enumerated by Mr. B anks meet the r equire ments to qualify as lesser -included of

fenses

. Neve rtheless, we find that the trial court did not commit rever sible err or by failing to char g e the jury reg arding the twenty -six lesserincluded off

enses r efe renc ed in Mr. B anks’s brie f.

B. Whether a pa

rticular instruc tion reg ardinga lesser -included of fense should ha

ve been g iven is a mi x ed question of law and fa ct. Sta te v . H

atf ie ld , 130 S.W .3d 40, 41 (Tenn. 2004). We revie w mix ed questions of lawand fa ct de novo with no pre sumption of corre ctness. Car pe nte r v . S

tate , 126 S.W .3d 879, 892 (Tenn. 2004). When called upon to a ddress a purported f

ailure to c harg e lesser

in c lu d e d o f

f e n s e s , th e r e v ie w in g c o urt c o n s id e r s th e f o ll o w in g thr e e qu e s ti o n s : ( 1 ) w h e th e r the of fe ns e is a le sse r- inc lud e d o ff

e ns e ; ( 2) whe th er t

he e vid e nc e su

pp or ts a le sse r- inc lud e d o ff

e ns e instruction; and (3) whether the failure t o g ive t he ins truction is harmless er ror. State v. Allen , 69 S.W .3d 181, 187 (Tenn. 2002)

. Th is C ourt

fa sh ion e d the te st fo r d e te rm ini ngwh e the r a n o ff e ns e is a le sse r- inc lud e d o ff

e ns e in State v. Burns , 6 S.W .3d 453 (Tenn. 1999)

. An of fe ns e is a le sse r- inc lud e d o ff

e ns e if : (a) all of its statutory

elements a

re inc luded within the statutory elements of the offe nse cha rg ed; or (b ) it fa ils to me e t the de fi nit ion in pa rt (a ) o nly in t he re sp e c t th a t it contains a statutory

element or

elements e stablishing (1) a differ ent mental state indicat i n g a lesser kind of culpability ; and/or (2) a less serious har

m or risk of har

m to the same person, proper ty or public intere st; or (c) it consists of (1) f acilitation of the off

ense c harg ed o r o f an of fense that oth e rw ise me e ts the de fi nit ion of le sse r- inc lud e d o ff

e ns e in part (a ) or ( b); orA s d i scus sed b el o w, t hi s l i m i t at i o n ap p l i es t o at t em p t and s o l i ci t at i o n. 21

-22-

(2 ) a n a tte mpt to com mit

the of fe ns e c ha rg e d o r a n o ff e ns e that ot he rw ise me e ts the de fi nit ion of le sse r- inc lud e d o ff

e ns e in part (a ) or ( b); or (3 ) s oli c itatio n to c omm it the off e ns e c ha rg e d o r a n o ff e ns e that othe rw ise me e ts the de fi nit ion of le sse r- inc lud e d o ff

e ns e in part (a ) or ( b).
State v. Burns , 6 S.W .3d at 466-67. Where “ a lesser offe nse is not included in the offe nse cha rg ed, then an instruction should not be given, r eg ardle ss of whethe r evide nce suppor ts it.” State v. Burns , 6 S.W .3d at 467. Thus, if the purported lesser- included offe nse is not actua lly a lesser-included offe nse, then the c ourt’s inquiry ends.

I f, howe ver, “ a lesser

offe nse is included in the cha rg ed off ense, th e q u es tion remains whether the evidenc e justifies a jury instruction on such lesser of fense .” State v. Burns , 6 S.W .3d at 467. As for the standar d for a ssessing whether the evidenc e is sufficie nt to require a n instruction
on a le sse r- inc lud e d o ff

e ns e , T e nn . Co de Ann. § 4 0- 18 -1 10 (a ) ( 20 06 ) p ro vid e s th a t
the tri al j u dg e shall not instruct the jury as to any

lesser inc luded off e n s e un le s s th e ju d g e d e te r mi n e s th a t th e r e c o r d c o n ta ins any evidenc e which rea sonable minds c ould a cce pt a s to th e lesser inc lud e d o ff

e ns e . In ma

kin g thi s d e te rm inatio n, the tr ia l ju dg e sh a ll view the e vidence liberally in the light most fa

vorable to the exis tence of the lesse r in cl u d ed offense w ithout making any judgme nt on the
cre dibilit y

of evide nce. T he trial judge shall also deter mine whether the e vid e nc e , v ie we d in

thi s li g ht, is l e g a lly

su ff ic ie nt to su

pp or t a conviction for the lesser inc luded offe nse.
As a g e ne ra l matt e r, e vid e nc e that is su ff ic ie nt “t o w arr ant a

n in str uc tio n o n th e g re a te r o ff

e ns e a lso will support an instruction on a lesser offe nse under

Part (a) of the Burns test.” S ta te v

. Allen , 69 S.W .3d at 188.

In subsequent dec isions, this Court ha s narr owed the application of Part (c ) of the Burns te st by clar ifying that instructions are unnece ssary wher e the e vidence clea rly establishes completion of the cr iminal act or simply does not involve proof of solicitation or fac ilitation. State v. W ilson , 211 21 S.W. 3d 71 4, 72 1 n .2 (2 00 7) ; State v. Robinson , 1 46 S.W. 3d a t 48 7 n .7 ; see also State v. M arcum , 109 S.W .3d 300, 303-04 (Te nn. 2003); Sta te v . E ly , 48 S.W. 3d 71 0, 71 9 (T e nn
. 20 01 ). Th is r e su lt follows beca

use for the “lesse r off

enses unde r par

t (c), pr oof of t h e gre ater offe nse will not
nece ssarily

prove the lesser of

fense .” State v. Allen , 69 S.W .3d at 188.
The failure to g ive an instruction on an of fense that is, in fact, a le sser-inc luded offe nse and is supported by

the evidence is a non-struc tural constitutional error

. State v. Page , 184 S.W .3d 223, 230 (Tenn. 2006) . When such a fa i l u re o ccurs, a new trial must be g rante d unless the re viewing court de termines that er

ror wa s harmless beyond a re asonable doubt. State v. Thomas , 158 S.W .3dSee Act of M ay 24, 2001, c h

. 338, 2001 T en n
. Pub. Act s 708, 709. 22

St at e v. Page , 184 S. W

. 3d a t 229. 23
-23- a t3 79 ; see also State v. R odriguez , 2 5 4 S

. W

. 3 d 3 6 1 , 3 7 1 (T en n
. 2 0 0 8 ). W h en un d ert ak i n g a harmless error analy sis in this context, the reviewingcourt “ should conduct a thorough examination of the re cord, including the e vidence prese nted at trial, the de fenda nt’s theory

of def ense, a nd the verdic t returne d by

the jury .” State v. Allen , 69 S.W .3d at 191.
There are two approa ches f or demonstrating that a failure to give an instruction on a lesse rincluded off

ense is har

mless error

. State v. Locke , 9 0 S. W .3 d 6 63 , 6 75 (T e nn . 2 00 2) . T he fi rs t ap p ro ac h is impl icated where the trial cour t instructs the jury

as to the cha

rg ed off ense a s well as other lesse r-include d offe nses there of but does not instruct t h e j u ry reg ardingall of the lesse rincluded off

enses supported by the evidence. When the j ury convicts t he def endant of the g reater char g ed off

ense rather

than the lesser -included of fense or off

enses, the jur

y nece ssarily

reje cts all of the ot her lesser off

enses. State v. Locke , 90 S.W .3d at 672; State v. Allen , 69 S.W .3d at 191; Sta te v. W illiams , 977 S.W .2d 101, 106 (Tenn. 1998). Where one of the char g ed but r eje ct ed l es s erincluded off

enses is an inter

mediate or buffe r offe nse standing betwee n the er rantlyomitted lesserincluded off

ense a nd the offe nse for which the de fenda nt was convic ted, the cha

rg ing e rror

is shown t o b e h ar m l ess bey ond a re asonable doubt. State v. Locke , 9 0 S. W.3 d at 67 5; State v. Allen , 69 S.W .3d at 190.
The sec ond approa ch re quires the r eviewingcourt to consider the evide nce a nd then to decide

“ w h e th e r a r e a s o n a b l e j u r y wou ld have c onvicted the de fenda nt of the lesser -included of fense instead of the c harg ed off

ense.” State v. Richm ond , 9 0 S. W.3 d 6 48 , 6 62 (T e nn . 2 00 2) (e mph a sis in orig inal). I f no rea sonable jury would have convicted the defe ndant of the uncha rg ed lesser -included of fe ns e rathe r t

ha n th e of fe ns e fo r whic h th e de fe nd ant w a s c on vic te d, the n the fa ilure to c ha rg e is harmless be y ond a re asonable doubt. State v. Locke , 90 S.W .3d at 675.

F or a ll tri a ls c on du c te d o n o r a ft e r Janu ary 1, 20 02 , the de fe nd ant mus t f ile a wr itt e n r e qu e st 22 for a n instruction on a lesser -included of fe n s e as a prer equisite to taking issue on appea l with the failure to give an instruction on the offe nse. Fa ilure to r equest in writingan instruction on a lesse rincluded off

ense r esults in a waiver of a right t o take issue on appea l with the omissi on of the c harg e. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40- 18-110(c ).

Howeve r, because defe ndants have a consti tutional rig ht to a correc t and complete c harg e of the law applicable to the ir case , a revie wing court may revie w the instructions to determine whether 23 the trial cour

t com m i t t ed p l ai n error by failing to instruct on a lesser -included of fense , even if

an instruction on the offe nse wa s not requeste d in writing. State v. W ilson , 2 11 S.W. 3d

a t 72 0- 21 ; Sta te v. Page , 184 S.W .3d at 230 -3 1

. Under plain err or re view, re lief will be g rante d only wher e five prer equisites are met: (1) the r ecor d clea rly establishes what occur

red in the trial court; (2) a clea r and un e qu ivo c a l r

ule of law w a s b re a c he d; ( 3) a su bs tanti a l r ig ht o f t

he a c c us e d w a s a dv ers ely aff ecte d; (4) the a ccuse d did not waive the issue f or tac ti cal r easons; and ( 5) consider ation of the
err or is ne cessa

ry to do substantial just ice. State v. Gome z , 239 S.W .3d at 737. Fur thermore , on a revie w for pla in error , the def endant be ars the burden of persua ding the appe llate cour t that the err or“I f t he o f f en se s o licite d did o ccur,
. . . t he d ef end ant m ay no t be co nvi ct ed of b o t h t he sol i ci t at i o n and t he 24

c o m p le te d o f

f ense. T he sol i ci t at i o n i s m erged wi t h t he co m p l et ed off ense, and t he o f

f end er may be guil t y of t he
co m p l et ed off

ense under § 39

- 1 1

- 4 0 2

. ” T enn. C o d e A nn. § 3 9

- 1 2

- 1 0 2 (19 9 7 ) ( T enn. Sentenci ng C o m m ’ n cm t

. ).
-24- was of suf

fi ci ent m ag nitude that its commiss ion probably chang ed the outcome of the trial. Sta te v. Bledsoe , 226 S.W .3d at 354-55. To rise to the l evel of plain err or, “[a]n error would have to [be] espec ially eg reg ious in nature , striking at the very hear t of the fairne ss of

the judicial proc eeding .” State v. Page , 184 S.W .3d at 231.
C. The Atte m pt or Solicitation Of fenses
Mr. B anks conte nds that th e t ri al co u rt committed reve rsible er ror by failing to char g e ten a tte mpt or so lic itatio n off

e ns e s as l e sse r- inc lud e d o ff e ns e s o f p re me dit a te d f

ir st d e g re e mur de r, fi rs t de g re e mur de r i n th e pe rp e tr a tio n o f a ro bb e ry , an d esp e c ia lly a g g ra vate d rob be ry
. With re g ard to his first deg ree preme ditated murder conviction, M r. B anks asse rts that the jury should have be en instructed re g ardingattempted first de g ree murder, attempted sec ond deg ree murder, a nd attempted voluntary manslaug hter. As to his first deg ree murder in the perpe tration of a r obbery conviction, Mr . B ank s c la im s e rr or

in f a ili ngto c ha

rg e the “ re qu isi te a tte mpt of fe ns e s. ” In r e latio n to his espec ially ag g ravated robbery conviction, M r. Banks arg ues that the trial c ourt should have c harg ed the jur y a s to so lic itatio n to c omm it atte mpt e d e sp e c ia lly a g g ra vate d ro bb e ry , s oli c itatio n to c omm it
a tte mpt e d a g g ra

vate d r ob be ry , s oli c itatio n to c omm it at tem pted ro bb e ry , atte mpt e d e sp e c ia lly ag g ravated robbe ry , attempted ag gr a v a te d r o b b e r y , a n d a tt e mp te d robber

y . He r equeste d instructions for thre e of the se ten off enses: attempted e specia lly ag g ravated robbe ry , attempted ag g ravated
ro bb e ry , a nd a tte mpt e d rob be ry
. Our re vie w of the re ma ini ng se ve n att e mpt /so lic itatio n c ha

rg e s w ill be limited to a revie w for pla in error

. In o ur po st- Bu rn s deci si ons, thi s Co ur t ha s n arr ow e d th e c ir c ums tanc e s w he n it is e rr or to not char g e attempt, solicitation, a nd fac ilitation offenses which qua lify as lesser -included of

fense s under Par t (c) of the Bu rn s te st. Withre g ard to atte mpt

and so lic itatio n, bo th o f whic h a re inc ho a te 24 offe nses, wher e the e vidence clea rly establishes the c ompletion of the crime, it is u n n ec es sary for the t rial court to char g e the jury as t o attempt or solicitation. State v. Robinson , 146 S.W .3d at 487 n.7 (noting that “instructions are not require d on either solicitation or attem p t wh ere the evide nce c le arl y e sta bli sh e s c omp le tio n o f t

he c ha rg e d o ff e ns e ” ); see also State v. W ilson , 211 S.W .3d at 721
n. 2; State v. Marc um , 1 09 S.W. 3d a t 30 3- 04 ; Sta te v . E ly , 48 S.W .3d at 719. The State p r e sented e vidence that clea rly established the c ompletion of all four of the char g ed of fe ns e s. Mr . A l- Ma ily

wa s d e a d. Mr . A til e ba

wi su sta ine d s e ri ou s b od ily injuri es. Me ssr s. Al

Maily ’s and Atileb aw i ’s p ro p erty was take n. Mr. B anks neither prese nted evidenc e nor e licited test i m ony on cross-e x amination sug g esting the applica bility of attempt or solicitation to the pr e me dit a te d f

ir st d e g re e mur de r, fi rs t de g re e mur de r i n th e pe rp e tr a tio n o f a ro bb e ry , o r e sp e c ia lly ag g ravated robbe ry

counts. In other words, the evidenc e did not involve crimes that we re attempted or solicited but wer e not completed. Acc ording ly , we f ind no error , much less plain er ror, in the tria l court’s failure to g ive the ten attempt and solicitation c harg es ref ere nced by Mr. Ba

nks on appea l asIn add i t i o n t o c hargi ng the j ury as t o f i rs t de gree prem ed i t at ed m urder, t he t ri al co urt al so charged t he jur y 25

as t o f ac i l i t at i on of f

i r s t deg r ee mu r der , mu r der i n t h e s ec on d deg r ee , f ac i l i t at i on of s ec on d deg r ee mu r d er, volunt ary m a n sla u g h te r, fac ili ta tio n o f v o lun ta ry m a n sla u g h te r, a n d re c k le ss h o m ic id e . W ith re g a rd to the fi rs t d e g re e m u rd e r in t he p erpe t rat i o n of a rob b ery co unt , t he t ri al co urt al so charged t he jur y as t o f aci l i t at i o n of f

i rs t de gree murd er, s eco nd degr ee murder , an d re ckl ess ho m i cid e. A s f or t he cha r ge of

cr i mi nal at t emp t t o com mi t f i r s t degr ee murder , t he t r i al
co urt al so charged the jury w i t h faci l i t at i o n to co m m i t a t t em p t ed fi rs t de gree murd er, at t em p t ed s eco nd de gree murd er, fac ili ta tio n to c o m m it se c o n d d e g re e m u rd e r, c rim ina l atte m p t t o c o m m it v o lun ta ry m a n sla u g h te r , a n d f a c il itatio n to
com mi t vol un t ar y mans l aug ht er
. Fi nal l y , i n a dd i t i on t o cha r gi ng t he j ur y as t o e s peci al l y agg r ava t ed r ob bery , t he t r i al
c o u rt a lso c h a rg e d the ju ry a s to e sp e c ia lly a g g ra v a te d r o b b e ry, a g g ra v a te d ro b b e ry, fac ili ta tio n o f ag g ra v a te d ro b b e ry, ro b b e ry, a n d fac ili ta tio n to c o m m it ro b b e ry. -25- lesser- included off

enses of preme ditated first degree murder, f irst deg ree murder in the per petration
o f a r o b b e r y, an d e s p e c i a l l y a g g r av a t e d

r o b b e r y, r e s p e c t i v e l y.
D. The Om iss ion of Le sse r -I nc lude d Offe nse s R e nde r e d Ha r m le ss

by t he Co nvi c ti on o f the G r e at e r Offen se
M r. Ban k s al s o co n t en d s t h att h e t ri al co urt co m m i t t edre v er s i b l e e rr o r b y fa i l i n g t o ch ar ge the jur y re g ard ing (1 ) cr imi na lly ne g lig e nt hom ic ide and re c kle ss e nd ang e rm e nt, (2 ) f a c ili tatio n to commit second deg ree murder, r ec k l ess homicide, and c riminally neg lige nt homicide as we ll as
rec kless endang erme nt and cr iminally neg lige nt homi cide, (3) ag g ravated assault, fa cilitation of
a g g ra vate d a ssa

ult , a tte mpt e d a g g ra

vate d a ssa

ult , a ssa ult , an d re c kle ss en da

ng e rm e nt, and

(4 ) t he ft , as lesser -included of

fense s of first degree preme ditated murder , first deg ree murder in the perpe tration of a robber

y , criminal attempt to commit first deg ree murder, or espec ially

ag g ravated assault. Mr. B anks requested inst ructions reg arding six of t hese thirteen offenses. S pecif ically , he
re qu e ste d th e tr ia l c ourt

to i ns tr uc t th e jur

y re g ard ingc ri min a lly

ne g lig e nt h omi c ide and

re c kle ss e nd ang e rm e nt w ithre g ard to t he fi rs t de g re e pr e me dit a ted mu rder c ount, fa c ili tatio n to c omm it second deg ree murder and criminally neg lige nt homicide in relation to the first degree murder in the pe rp e tr ati on of a r ob bery

cou nt , rec kl ess end angerm ent wi th regard t o t he cr im in al a tt emp t t o co mm it fi rs t de g re e mur de r c ount, and the ft a s a le sse r- incl ud e d o ff

e ns e of e sp e c ia lly

a g g ra vate d a ssa

ult

. Be cause Mr. B anks did not reque st the trial court to charg e the other lesse r-include d offe nses, our revie w re g ardingthese off enses will be f

or plain er

ror.
F or e a c h o f t he fo ur c ou nt s charg e d in

the ind ic tme nt, the tr ia l c ourt c ha rg e d th e jur

y wi th l es s er -i n cl u d ed

o ff en s e s i n c l u d i n g i n t e r

m e d i a t e o f

f e n s e s , b u f f e r o f fe n s es s t an d i n g b etwe ent

h e c h ar ge Mr. B anks asse rts the trial court err ed by failing to instruc t the jury upon and the c harg e for

which Mr. B anks wa s convicted. Acc ording ly , any potential err or i n failing to char g e the e leven a bove- 25 ref ere nced le sser-inc luded offe nses was shown to be harmless e rror beyond a re asonable doubt throug h the jury ’s findingthat Mr. B anks wa s g uilty of the g rea t er offense and re jection of the intermediate lesser- included off enses. State v. Locke , 90 S.W .3d at 675; State v. Allen , 69 S.W .3d
a t 19 0; State v. W

illiams , 977 S.W .2d at 106.

E. The Omission of

Lesser- Includ ed Of

fenses ForWhich No Re as ona ble Jur y W oul d Ha ve Co nvi c te d M r . Ba nksT enn. C o d e A nn. § 3 9

- 1 3

- 2 0 2 (d). 26

T e n n . C o d e A n n . § 3 9 -1 3 -2 1 1 (1 9 9 7 ). 27
-26- Mr. Ban k s als o contends that the tria l court er red by failing to char g e the jury reg arding voluntary manslaug h t erand fa cilitation to commit voluntary manslaug hter a s lesser- included offe nses of fir st deg ree murder in the pe rpetration of a robbe ry . He did not request either instruc tion. Thus, our re view of the failure to char g e these offe nses is limi ted to plain err or re view.

Mr. B anks bea

rs the burde n of demonstrating the f ailure to g ive the voluntary manslaug hter and fa cilitation to commit voluntary manslaug hter c harg es wa s an er ror of sufficie nt mag nitude that it probably chang ed the outcome of trial. State v. Bledsoe , 226 S.W .3d at 354-55. He ha s not carr ied this burden, and, in fa ct, the re cord de monstrates conc lusive l y that these instructions would have been of no conseque nce.
The trial c ourt ch ar ged the jury reg ardingthe lesser -included of fense char g es of voluntar y mans la ug hte r a nd fa c ili tatio n o f v olu

nta ry mans la ug hte r i n c onne c tio n wi th t he pr e me dit a te d f

ir st deg ree murder count. The jury reje cted these lesser- included off enses in fa

vor of f inding Mr. B anks g uilty of pr em ed i t at ed first deg ree murder. T hus, the jury conclude d that Mr. B anks wa s “suff iciently fre e fr om excitement an d p assion as to be c apable of pre meditation,” when he shot 26 Mr. Al-Maily

rathe r than a cting with “ade quate pr ovocation sufficient to lead a r easona ble per son to act in an irrational manner .” Acc ording ly , the t rial court did not commit plain err or in failing 27 to instruct the jury

as to voluntary

manslaug hter a

nd fac ilitation t o commit voluntary manslaug hter
a s l e s s e r - i n c l u d e d

o f f e n s e s o f f i r s td e g r e e mur d e r

i nth e p e r

p e tr a t i o no f

a r o b b e r y.
F in a ll y , M r
. B an k s ar g u e s th a t th e tr ia l c o urt e r r e d b y f a il in g to in s tr

u c t th e jury

reg arding
a g g ra vate d a ssa

ult a s a le sse r- inc lud e d of fe ns e of e sp e c ia lly

a g g ra vate d r ob be ry . H e re qu e ste d th is instruction. There fore , our re view asse sses whethe r a r easona ble jury would have c onvicted Mr. B ank s o f a g g ra

vate d a ssa

ult ins te a d o f e sp e c ia lly

a g g ra vate d r ob be ry . O n th is q

ue sti on, th e State be ars the burd e n o f d e mon str a tin g that th e e rr or wa s h arm le ss b e y on d a

re a so na ble do ub t.
The trial c ourt instructed the jury re g ardingsever al under lying of fense s relate d to robbery which the jury

reje cted in fa

vor of the gr eate r cha

rg e, espe cially

ag g ravated robbe ry . The va riation betwee n these lesser- included offe nses, the offe nse for which Mr. Ba nks was convicted, an dthe offe nse to which Mr. Ba

nks assig ns err or i n the t rial court’s failure to char g e the jury is the robber y component. Robbery , under Te nnessee law, “is the intentional or know ing the ft of pr operty from the per son of another by

violence or

putting the pe rson in fea

r.” Te nn. Code Ann. § 39-13- 401(a) (1 99 7) . B a se d o n th e ov e rwhe lmi nge vid e nc e of Mr

. B ank s’ s de pr ivatio n of Mr

. At ile ba wi of his pr op e rt y thr ou g h v iol e nc e inc lud ingMr . A til e ba wi ’s te stimo ny , b oth

of Mr . B ank s’ s c on fe ssi on s, the police r ecove ringMr. Atilebawi’ s proper ty in Mr. Ba

nks’s p o ssession, and the abse nce of
c ounte rv a ili nge vid e nc e , w e c on c lud e that no re a so na ble jur y wo uld have fo un d M r. B ank s guil ty of ag g rava

ted assault rathe r than espec ially ag g ravated robbe ry . Acc ording ly , we c onclude that a ny e rr or in f a ili ngto c ha

rg e thi s le sse r- inc lud e d o ff e ns e wa s h arm le ss b e y on d a re a so na ble do ub t.T he St at e i s mi s t ake n on t hi s poi nt

. I n h i s amended mo t i on f or n ew t r i al , M r. B ank s as s er t ed t hat t he t r i al 28

c o u rt e rr e d “in n o t p ro v id ing a c u ra tive in stru c tio n d u rin g th e p e n a lty p h a se c o rr e c ting the p ro se c u to r’s m issta te m e n ts
r ega r di ng mi t i gat i ng f

act ors dur i ng t he s t at e’ s cl osi ng ar gu ment

. ”

T he U ni t ed St at es Supr eme C our t has not ed t hat arg ument b et ween t he def endan t and couns el f

or t he C r own 29

was an es sent i al pa rt of E ngl i sh cri m i nal t ri al s. A s o t her pro ced ural pro t ect i o ns d evel o p ed , t he i m p o rt ance o f argument
was nei t her d i scarded no r di l ut ed

. R at her, t he p ri m ary f unct i o n of argum ent s hi f t ed t o s um m at i o n of t he evi d ence at t he
c lo se o f t h e trial. H errin g v. N ew Y o rk , 422 U

. S. a t 860- 61.

-27- XI
. T HE J URY I NS T RUCT I ON WI T H RE GARD T O V I C T I M I M PAC T E VI DE NCE
After car eful study

of the pa rties’ brie fs with reg ard to the i ssue of the coercive eff ect of the instruction reg ardingthe consider ation of victim impact evidenc e, we are persua ded that the de cision of the Court of Crimi nal Appeals on this issue should be affirmed. Moreove r, bec ause w e find that th e o p in io n o f th e Co urt o f Cr im in al Appea ls, State v. Bank s , 2007 WL 1966039, at *38-40 adequately

states the fa cts and the la w on t h i s i s s u e, we adopt this portion of the opinion as the opinion of this C ourt and include it as an appe ndix to this opi nion.

XI I. T HE P ROS E CUT ORS ’ C L OS I NG A R G U M EN TS D U R I N G TH E G U I LT P HA SE OF THE T RI AL
Mr . B ank s c la ims tha

t the pr os e c uto rs ma de six st a te me nts duri ngthe ir c los ingargume nts that require a re versa l of his convictions. The State responds that Mr. Ba nks did not object to severa l of the se state me nts duri ng tr ial an d th a t Mr . B ank s d id n ot m e nti on any of the se state me nts in h is motion for new tria l. The Court of Criminal Appea l s re v i ew ed each of these statements and 28 deter mined either ( 1) that they wer e not er

ror, ( 2) that the trial co u rt g ave a ppropriate curative instructions, or (3) that the instruc tion was not so pr ejudicial as to r equire reve rsal of the conviction.
A.
Clo sin g argume nts have sp e c ia l imp or tanc e in t he a dv e rs ari a l pr oc e ss. Th e ir purp os e is t o sharpe n and to c larify the issues that must be resolved in a criminal ca se. He rri ng v . Ne w York, 422 U.S. 853, 862 (1975). The y acc omplish t his purpose by enablingthe opposing lawy ers to present th e i r th e o r y o f th e c a s e an d

t o p o i n to u t t h e s t r e n g th s an d w e akn e s s e s i nt h e e v i d e n c e t o t h e j u r y. Chr ist ian v . S

tate , 555 S.W .2d 863, 866 (Tenn. 1977) ; 11 David L . Ray bin, Tennessee Practice: Criminal Practice and Procedure § 29.01, at 72 (1985) ( “ TennesseeCriminal Practice and Pr ocedure ” )

. T hu s , b o th th e St a te an d

th e d e f e n d an t h av e anan c ie n t r igh t to ma k e c lo sing 29 arguments. SeeTenn. R. Crim. P. 29.
The lawy ers r epre senting the def endant an d t h e State in a cr iminal trial are e x pecte d to be zealous advocates. Bu rli

so n v . S tate , 5 01 S.W. 2d

80 1, 80 6 ( Te nn . 1 97 3) (n oti ngthat “ the State is entitled to advoca cy , as we ll as the defe ndant”) . Their c l o s i n g arguments provide them with an
o p p o rtun i ty t o p e r s u a d e th e j ur y, TennesseeCriminal Practice and Procedure § 29.2, at 73, and thus they should be g iven g re at l at i t u d e in both the sty le and the substanc e of the ir arguments. Post v.-28-

Sta te , 580 S.W .2d 801, 808 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1978); 6 W ay ne R. L aF ave e t al. Cri mi na l P ro c e du re § 24.7(b), at 456 (3d ed. 2007) ( “ Cri mi na l P ro c e du re ”). Closing arguments in criminal case s have a “r oug h and tumble quality ” about them, State v. Skak el , 888 A.2d 985, 1060-61 (Conn. 2006), be c a us e the y are tr a dit ion a lly

the on e pla c e in t

he tr ia l where th e law y ers are g ive n th e g re a te st leewa y in their manner

of expression. Criminal Procedure § 24.7(b), at 456-57.

Prosecutors a

re e x pecte d to pursue their c a s e s w ith thoroughne ss and vig or within the bounds of the lawand prof

essional conduc t. Sta te v . Cu lbr e ath , 30 S.W. 3d 30 9, 31 4 ( Te nn . 2 00 0) ; Judge
v . S tate , 5 39 S.W. 2d

34 0, 34 4 ( Te nn . Cr im. Ap p. 19 76 ). Whil e th e int e re sts of the State are the ir pa ra mount c on c e rn , th e ir

a c tio ns mus t be te mpe re d b y the ir imp art ia l se arc h f

or jus tic e and

the ir obligatio n to see to it that the defe ndant re ceive s a fa ir trial. Sta te v . W hite , 114 S.W .3d 469, 477 (T e nn . 2 00 3) ; Bu rli

so n v . S tate , 501 S.W. 2d

a t 80 6; W atk ins v . S tate , 140 Tenn. 1, 5, 203 S.W. 344, 345 (1918). In the words of J ustice Sutherland, while pr osecutors “ may strike har d blows,

. . . [t hey
are ] not at liberty

to strike foul ones.” Berger v . United States , 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935). A prosecut o r’ s closing a

rguments have great weig ht on jurors. Kni gh t v . S tate , 190 Tenn. 32 6, 33 2, 22 9 S. W.2 d 5 01 , 5 03 (1 95 0) ; Tur ne r v . S tate , 72 Tenn. 206, 210 (1879). Ac cording ly , a pr os e c uto r’ s c los ingargume nt mus t be te mpe rate , mus t be ba se d on the e vid e nc e int

ro du c e d at tr ia l, and mus t be pertinent to the issues in the case

. State v. Middlebrook s , 995 S.W .2d 550, 557 (Tenn. 19 99 ); Ru sse ll v . S

tate , 532 S.W .2d 268, 271 (Tenn. 1976) . Howeve r, eve n though the scope a nd tenor of the ir arguments m ay be limited, State v. Thomas , 158 S.W .3d 361, 413 (Tenn. 2005) (a pp e nd ix), pr os e c uto rs , n o le ss t ha n d e fe ns e c ouns e l, m ay

us e c olo rf

ul a nd fo rc e fu l l a

n g ua g e in t

he ir
c los ingargume nts , a s long a s the y do no t stra y fr om the e vid e nc e and

the re a so na

ble inf e re nc e s to be dra wn from the e vidence , United States v. Mullins , 446 F.3d 750, 759 ( 8th Cir. 2006), or make derog atory

rema rks or a ppeal to the juror s’ pre

judices, Sta te v . R e id , 164 S.W .3d at 320-21.
A cr iminal conviction should not be lightly overturne d solely

on the basis of the pr osecutor’ s closing argument. United States v. Y oung , 470 U. S. 1 , 1 1- 13 (1 98 5) ; State v. Bane , 57 S.W .3d 411, 42 5 ( Te nn . 2 00 1) (h old ingthat a pr os e c uto r’ s im

pr op e r c los ing ar gumen t doe s n ot a uto matic a lly
wa rr ant r e ve rs a l)

. An imp ro pe r cl os ing argume nt w ill no t c on sti tut e re ve rs ibl e e rr or un le ss i t is so inflammatory

or improper

that if aff ecte d the outcome of

the trial to the defe ndant’s pre judice. Sta te v. Thacke r , 1 64 S.W. 3d

20 8, 24 4 ( Te nn . 2 00 5) (a pp e nd ix); State v. Cribbs , 9 6 7 S. W. 2 d 7 7 3 , 786 (T e nn . 1 99 8) ; se e als o S

tate v . R e id , 1 64 S.W. 3d

a t 32 1. Whe n c a lle d u

po n to re vie w the pr op ri e ty of a pr osecutor’ s closing a rgument, the cour

t should consider: (1) the conduct at issue in light of the fac ts and circ umstances of the case , (2) the curative measure s undertake n by the trial cour

t and the prosec ution, (3) the intent of the pr osecutor in makingthe improper ar g ument, (4) the c umulative eff ect of the improper a

rgument and any

other e rror s in the rec ord, and ( 5) the re lative s treng ths and
weaknesses of the c ase. Sta tev . R e id , 1 64 S.W. 3d a t 32 1; State v. Middlebrook s , 995 S.W .2d at 559- 60 ; see also Tennesse e Criminal Practice and Proce dure § 29.61, at 112.
Trial co u rt s h ave significa nt discretion to control closingarguments. State v. Stephe nson , 19 5 S. W.3 d 5 74 , 6 03 (T e nn . 2 00 6) (a pp e nd ix); Te rry

v . S tate , 4 6 S

. W

. 3 d 1 4 7 , 156 (Tenn. 2001)

. Ordinar ily , counsel mu s t object conte mporane ously to a per ceive d improper a rgument. State v. Thomas , 1 58 S.W. 3d

a t 41 3 ( a

pp e nd ix); State v. Kee n , 926 S

. W

. 2 d 7 2 7 , 736 (Tenn. 1994)

. Howeve r, whe n flag rantly improper a

rguments are made, the trial court, with or without objection,U n o b je c te d to c lo sin g a rg u m e n ts w a rr a n t re v e rs a l o n ly i n e x c e p tio n a l circ u m sta n c e s. Un ited S ta te s v . S m ith , 30 5 0 8 F.3d 86 1 , 86 4 (8t h C i r. 2 0 0 7 ). A cco rdingl y , l i ke t he U ni t ed Stat es Co urt of A p p eal s f o r t he E i ght h C i rcui t , “ [w]e b e a r in m ind tha t f

le e ting c o m m e n ts tha t p a sse d w itho u t o b je c tio n d u rin g the ro u g h -an d -tum b le o f c lo sin g a rg u m e n t i n t he tria l c o urt s ho ul d not b e und ul y m agni f i ed when t he p ri nt ed t rans cri p t i s subject ed t o pa i nst aki ng revi ew i n t he
r ef l ect i ve qui et of

an appel l at e j udge’ s ch amb er s
. ” Uni t ed St at es v

. M ul l i ns , 446 F. 3d a t 758. -29- s h o u l dstep in and take proper curative action. W

atk ins v . S tate , 1 4 0 T e n n
. a t 9 , 2 0 3 S. W. a t 3 46 (holding that the trial cour t should have g iv en a “stern r ebuke” “promptly and voluntarily” to a pr os e c uto r who made a

g ro ssl y imp ro pe r a

rgume nt) ; Tur

ne r v . S tate , 7 2 T e nn . at 21 0; Sparks v. Sta te , 56 3 S.W. 2d 56 4, 56 9 (T e nn
. Cr im. Ap p. 19 78 ). Som e argume nts may be s o ex cept io na lly flag rant that th ey co n s t itute plain error and provide g rounds for r ever sal eve n if they wer e not objected to. Sta tev . R e id, 91 S.W .3d at 283-84. 30

B. The Pr osecutor ’s Argum ent Re garding the Jury’s Role with Regard to

Mitigating Circum stances
Th e fi rst st ateme nt c ha lle ng e d b y Mr . B ank s r e late s to the jur y ’s ro le wi th r e g ard

to mit ig a tin g c ir c ums tanc e s. Th e pr os e c uto r a rgue d th e fo llo wi ngto t

he jur y : [Y] ou’re g oin g t o get a whole list of 17 or 18 of them [(mit iga

ting circ umsta n ce s )] , a whole sle w of them. B ut the Court is not t elling y ou that any

of those ar e mitigating c ircumstance s. The C ourt ca n’t do that beca

use that’s your job. That’s y o u r fu n ction. And y ou g et to d e c id e w h e th e r

an y o f th e s e 1 7 o r

1 8 d e c is io n s ar e mi ti g ating
c ir c ums tanc e s.
Mr. B anks objec ted to this statement and re quested a cu ra t i v e instruction. Duringa benc h confe renc e, the trial court explained that this statement wa s incorre ct and pe rmitted the prosec utor to c or re c t he r o wn

e rr or . F oll ow ingthe be nc h c on fe re nc e , th e pr os e c uto r a rgue d to the jur

y that:
I n a fe w moments, the C ourt will prese nt y ou with a list of things that
are labeled ‘ mitigatingcirc umstances.’ And it is up to y ou to acc ept or re ject which one s apply

in this case, if a

ny
. And after you deter mine whether

any o f these a

re to be considere d, duringy our deter mi n a ti o n y o u a ls o h av e to a s s e s s th e w e igh t to g iv e e a c hand
e v e r y s i n g l e o n e o f

th e s e m i t i g a t i n g c i r c u m s t an c e s , i f an y.
Mr. B anks did not object to this description of the jury ’s role with re g ard to mitigating circ umstances. Following the closing arguments, the trial cour t ga ve the f ollowing instruction with re g ard to a sse ssi ngmit ig a tin g c ir c ums tanc e s a s p art of its g e ne ra l in str

uc tio ns :
Mit ig a tin g c ir c um st ance s. Te nn e sse e law p ro vid e s th a t in
arr ivi ng a t th e punis hme nt, the jur y sh a ll c on sid e r a s p re vio us ly-30- indicated a

ny mitigatingcirc umstances raised by the evidenc e which shall include but are not limi ted to the following : . . . [ O]ne, the d e f e n d an th a s n o s i g n i f

i c an t h i s t o r

y o f p r i o r c r i m i n a l a c t i v i ty. C o n v i c t i o n s f

o r t h e c r i m e s o f

a g gr a v a t e d a s s a u l t , a g g r av a t e d

b ur g l ar y, domestic violence assault, and attempted aggravated burglar y are not ag g ravating c ircumstance s to be consider ed in de t ermining the pe na lty but a c onvic tio n o f t

hat c ri me may

be c on sid e re d .

. . in deter mining whether or not the defe ndant has a signific ant history

of p r i o r c r i m i n a l a c t i v i ty. Two, the youth of the def endant at the time of the cr ime. Three , the def

en d an t was an a ccomplice in the murder committed by

another person a

nd the def

endant’ s conduct wa s relatively minor. F our, the de fe nd ant i s H I V p os iti ve and as a r e su lt o f h is illness, the defe ndant has attempted to take his own life. F ive , th e de fe nd ant ha s hel d sev e ra l jobs in s pit e of his ill ne ss. Six , the def

endant transfe rre d from school to sc hool a nd was unable t o m aintain frie ndships established at school and did not
c omp le te high s c ho ol. Seven, the de fenda

nt was one of

ten childre n and he r ece ived only limit ed support fr om his mot her a nd fathe r. Ei g ht, the defend ant’ s f

amil y mov e d a ro un d f ro m pl a c e to place and we re ne ver rea lly toge ther. Additionally , some of the children w ere remove d from the home. Nine, the de fenda

nt’s two y oung er sisters w ere rape d. Ten, the defenda

nt’s mother i s curr ently

incar cer ated a

nd has been inc arc erated for the majority of the defe ndant’s life. In addition, th e d ef en d an t ’s b ro t h e rR o b ertHi l l wa s i n ca rc er at edd uri n g a majority of the de fenda

nt’s life. Eleven, . . . the defe ndant was the y oung est of seve n brothers and the br others beat the defe ndant an d picked on him to the point that others had to inter

vene. Twelve , despite lac k of family support, the def

endant wa s an a c ti v e m e mb e r

o f L e e w o o d

C hur c han d

p art i c i p a t e d

i nt h e y ou th activities. Th ir te e n, the de fe nd ant c are d f or his pe ts, tr ie d to imp ro ve his d o m es t i c s k i l l s b y

l ea rn i n g t o co o k

an d h as a t al en tfo r d ra wi n g. Four teen, the de fenda

nt has bee n a g ood inmate. Fifte en, while inca

rce rate d the def

endant ha s com p l eted numerous programs aimed at reha bilitation. Six teen, the de fenda

nt has touched the lives of others in a p o s i t i v e w ay. Seventee n, both the defe nd an t ’s family and fr iends from churc h will continue to keep in conta ct with the def endant a nd support him while he is incarc erated.-31- And [eighte en], any other mi tigating f actor which is raise d by the evidenc e produc ed either by the prosec ution or the defe nse at either the g uilt or the sentencing hear ing. T hat is, y ou shall consider any aspec t of defen d an t ’s char acte r or r ecor d or any aspec t of the
c ir c umstan ces of

the of fe ns e fa vo ra ble to t he de fe nd ant whic h is supported by

the evidenc e. No d istinction shall be made betwe en mitigating circ umstances listed a

nd those otherwise raised by the evidenc e. The defe ndant does not have the burd en o f provingmitigating circ umstances. The re is no re quirement of jury unanimity as to any pa rt ic ula r miti g a tin g c ir c ums tanc e or that you a g re e on the same mitigatingcirc umstance.
Tenne ssee law provides that the j ury shall consider any mitigatingcirc umstances whic h may include, but ar e not limited to, those specifie d in T enn. Code Ann. § 39-13-204( j) (2006). Whil e the jury must consider these c ircumstance s, the ultimate determination of whe ther “ mitigatingevidenc e exis ts and the we ight to be g iven to a g g ravating and mitigating circ umstances a re issues f or the jury .” Sta tev . M orris , 2 4 S. W.3 d 7 88 , 7 99 (T e nn . 2 00 0) ; se e als o , e.g. , State v. Pike , 978 S.W .2d 904, 918 (T e nn . 1 99 8) ; State v. Mann , 959 S.W .2d 503, 512 (Tenn. 1997)

. In acc o rd an ce with the catc h-all provision in Tenn. Code Ann. § 39- 13-204(j)( 9), the defe n d an t m ay identify

any other mitigation raised by the evidenc e as a

mitigatingcirc umstance. Howeve r, the jury

is then fre e to de termine whether the sug g ested circ umstance is a pplicable to the
case and the we ight that should be g iven to that particula r circ umstance. F or example, Mr. B anks
asser ted that the fa ct that he c an cook should be considere d as a mitig ating circ umstance. Ac c or d i n g l y , th e tr i a l c o urt i n s tr u c t e d th e j ur

y th a t M r
. B an k s o f

f e r e d h i s a

b i l i ty t o c o o k a s a mitigatingcirc umstance a nd that they

wer e re quired to consider it. However , the jury

rema ined fre e to determine whether , in fac t, Mr. Ba nks had lea

rned to c ook and, if so, whe ther be ing a ble to cook has any particula r mitigation value.
We h ave fo un d s tate me nts sim ila r t o th e pr os e c uto r’ s o ri g ina l st ate me nt i n thi s c a se to f a ll
w it h in th e r e a lm o f p e r

mi s s ib le f o r ms of ar g ument. State v. Brimme r , 876 S.W .2d 75, 85 (Tenn. 1994) (de clining to f

ind that arguing that “there wer e n o mitigatingstatements in the ca se” w as reve rsible err or). I n addition, the prosec utor immediately corr ecte d her state ment, and the tria l court g ave the jury

a complete and prope r instruction r eg ardingits role when c onsideringthe mitigating evidenc e. Juries are pr esumed to follow the trial court’s instructions. State v. Y oung , 196 S.W .3d 85 , 11 1 (Tenn . 2 00 6); State v. Shaw , 37 S.W .3d 900, 904 (Tenn. 2001) . Wit h the trial cour t’s instructions requiringthe j ury to consider the mitigating circ umstances, there is no basis t o conclude that the prosec utor’s orig inal statement rises to leve l of beingreve rsible er ror.
C. The Pr osecutor ’s Refer ence t o a P rior Convict ion f or Theft of

P ropert y
In h e r ar g u m e n tc h a l l e n g i n g M r
. B an k s ’ s a s s e r t i o n t h a th e h a d n o s i g n i f i c an tc r i m i n a l h i s t o r

y, the prosec utor mentioned an inc ident involving a theft of prope rty that occur

red when Mr. B anks wa s-32-

a juvenile. Mr. B anks objec ted, and dur ing a b en ch co n fe re n ce, the trial court instructe d the prosec utor to expl ain to the jury that it could not consider this incident. Followingthe benc h
c on fe re nc e , th e pr os e c uto r s tate d to the jur y :
Iapolog ize. Imis[ -]spoke. The theft of prope rty that y ou hear d about
was one that wasn’t sustained or handled non-

judicial ly , which mea

ns it did not s tay

on the def

endant’ s criminal bac kg round.
Wit hout further

objection by

Mr. B anks, t he prose cutor de tailed other c riminal offe nses committed by Mr . B ank s, inc lud inga g g ra vate d a ssa

ult , a g g ra vate d b ur g lary , c ri min a l atte mpt to c omm it ag g ravated burg lary , and domestic a ssault.

Mr. B anks insists that the prosecutor’ s corr ection of he r improper stat em en t re garding the juvenile theft of pr operty

offe nse did not cure the er ror. We disag ree . The trial c ourt did not list the juvenile theft c onviction among the of fe n ses that the jury

could consider

in asce rtainingthe applicability

and we ight of

the claimed mitig ating circ umstance t h at Mr. B anks did not have a signific ant cr iminal hist ory
. I n light of the number of a nd seriousness of the other off enses that Mr. B ank s h a d c omm itt e d, a s w e ll a s th e fa c t th a t th e tr ia l c ourt did no t inc lud e the juv e nil e the ft of fe ns e amongthose that the jury

could consider , we decline to find that the prosecutor’s orig inal err oneous statement re quires a r ever sal of Mr. B anks’s c onviction.

D. The Pr osecutor ’s Refer ence t o Giving Weight to Other

Mitigating Circum stances
Mr. B anks also ar g ues that the prose cutor c ommitt ed re versible e rror when she argued: [W ]hen y ou look at th o s e m itigatingcirc umstances a nd when you thi nk a bout whe the r o r n ot t o g ive the m any we ig ht, Iwa

nt you to eac h ask yourself if I

g ive this one weig ht, what else do I have to g ive
we ig ht? I f I

g ive we ig ht t o th e fa c t that he ’s HIV [pos iti ve ], wh a t e lse do Ig ive weig ht to those that have c ancer a nd other disea ses and tum or s and

high b loo d p re ssu

re ? Th at’ s wha

t I wa nt you to a sk y ourself. Even thoug h he did not obje ct to this argument or include it in his mot ion for new trial, Mr. B anks now insists t hat this argument “violated . . . [his] state and f eder al consti t u t i o n al rig hts to due proce ss, to a fair j ury

trial and prote ctions ag ainst crue l and unusual punishment.” We will review thi s is su e us ingthe pla in e rr or ana ly sis

.M r
. B ank s ’ s bri ef s t at es t hat “ [ t ] he pros ecu t or i mp r op er l y i mp l i ed t hat t he j ur y s houl d d ec i d e w het her an 31
ag gravat i ng ci r cum s t an ce d eserves any wei ght ba sed up o n whet her t he jur y w o ul d then have t o give ot her aggravat i ng ci r cum st an ce s a ny wei gh t ” ( emp has i s added). B as ed on t he s ubs t anc e a nd cont ext of t he ar gu ment , M r
. B ank s was cl ear l y r ef

er r i ng t o “ mi t i gat i ng ci r cums t anc es ” r at her t han “ agg r ava t i ng ci r cums t anc es
. ” -33- The State is per

mitted to ar g ue that mitigating circ umstances are not a pplicable based upon 31 the evidenc e or that a c ircumstance is of littl e or no w eig ht in terms of ac tual mitigation value. See , e.g. , Sta tev . H

all , 976 S.W. 2d 12 1, 17 0 ( Te nn . 1 99 8) ; State v. Brimme r , 8 76 S.W. 2d a t 85 ; State v. Ho we ll , 868 S.W .2d 238, 258 (Tenn. 1993). The S tate’s argument here is neither inflammatory nor improper, thus we find no err or, much less plain e rror
. E. The P r os e c ut or ’s Re fer e nc e to M it iga ti ng C ir c um st anc e s

as Spe c ialTr e at m e nt
Mr. B anks conte nds that his constitut ional rig hts were also violated by the prosec utor’s argument that application of the m itigating fac tors would g ive the def endant spe cial tre atment. The p ro s ec u t o r s t at edth e f

o l l o wi n g:
I t’s sad but wi t h y our eve ryday common lifetime experience s, y ou kn ow that it is co mmo n for so me kid s to pi c k o n o the rs , e sp e c ia lly in sibling situations. Does it set him apart fro m an y other de fenda

nt wh o c omm its mur de r? Do e s it make him

sp e c ia l? Doe s it

make him differ ent? Be cause a mitigatingcirc umstance, la dies and g entlemen, is one that sets it a

part, something that makes this offense some thing that deser ves this defe ndant - - this defe ndant deserved to be treate d differ ently

than eve ry

body else, spec ial consideration.

Mr. B anks objec ted t o this statement on the g round that the prose cutor wa s sugg esting that consideration of miti g ating fac tors constituted special tre atment. The t ri al co urt responde d as fo llo ws : [I ]t ’s not so much that he’s g oing to be g iven spec ial treatment. He’s

g oin g to b e tr e a te d li ke any bo dy e lse un de r t

he law a nd the jur y is
e nti tle d to c on side r t

he se thi ng s. Iun de rs tand y our o bje c tio n. I ’l l simply state that y ou should - - since y ou do have your ar g ument y et to c ome , th a t y ou

sh ou ld r e sp on d to it i n your ar g ume nt. Th a t w ou ld be a be tter cour se.
T h e p ro s ec u t o r t h en co n t i nu edwi thh er ar gu m en tb y

s t at i n g: So whether you’ve be en bullied or picke d on, y o u d i d n ’t hear any p r o o f o f to rtu r e
. Y o ud id

n ’ t h e ar an y p r o o f th a t h e h a d

to g o a hospital. You didn’t hear any proof that it was any

thing outside the norm of any

bod y el s e’ s childhood g rowingup experience s. So do-34- y ou se t th a t a pa rt ? I s that any

thi ng dif fe re nt fr om wh a t any

bo dy e lse has had to endure ? I s it a

ny thing differ ent than what any of you have ha d to e nd

ur e ? Do e s it

jus tif y or e xcuse or

sh ou ld i t be g ive n le ss culpability

for e x ecution bec ause you had that li fe t i m e childhood experience ?
Th e pr os e c uto r’ s argume nt w a s n ot t hat c on sid e ra

tio n o f t he mit ig a tin g c ir c ums tanc e s w ou ld aff ord Mr. B anks spec ial treatment. Rather, the pr osecutor was de scribingmitigatingcirc umstances as those that re nder a

particula r off ender less culpable tha

n the ave rag e per son. Reg ardle ss of how these a rguments are char acte rized, they fall safely within the dom ain of legitimate a rgument that the jur y sh ou ld a ff

or d li ttl e or

no we ig ht t o a

pa rt ic ula r m iti g a tin g c ir c ums tanc e a sse rt e d b y Mr . B ank s, specific ally

that Mr. B anks wa s picked on and beate n by his brothers. See , e.g. , Sta te v . H all , 976 S.W. 2d a t 17 0; State v. Brimme r , 8 76 S.W. 2d a t 85 ; Sta te v . H

owe ll , 868 S.W .2d at 258.

F. The Pr osecutor ’s Statem ent that the Wr ong Punishme nt Would Negat e a Guilty Ve rdict

Mr . B ank s a lso take s is su e wi th the pr os e c uto r’ s ar g ume nt that th e wr on g punis hme nt w ou ld neg ate a g uilty verdic t and insists t hat the trial court committed reve rsible error by failing to gr ant a mistrial. Whil e he c oncede s that the trial cour t ga ve a c urative instruc tion, he insists that the instruction did not remove the taint of the pr osecutor ’s implication that the statutorily authorized punishments were wrong
. Duringher c losing a

rgument, the prosec utor argued:

No w w e ’r e
. . . w ra

pp ingup wh a t is

. . . the pe na lty ph a se . A nd

it i s consid e r a b ly s h o rte r th an th e f

ir s t p h a s e o r th e r e s t o f th e tr ia l. But make no mi s t ak e, i t is no less im portant. And in fa ct, it’s more imp or tant b e c a us e the wr on g punis hme nt n e g a te s th e pr op e r v e rd ic t. An d th e wr on g punis hme nt n e g a te s a g uil ty ve rd ic t.
Mr . B ank s o bje c te d to th e a sse rt ion that th e ve rd ic t w ou ld b e ne g a te d. Th e tr ia l c ourt re sp on de d to Mr . B ank s’ s o bje c tio n a s f oll ow s:
Iag ree
. . . . W h ateve r the ve rdict is, whateve r sentenc e the jury imposes, whicheve r one of the three options, that will be the pr oper verdic t beca

use the jury ’s consider ation and ultimate dec ision is t he pr op e r d e c isi on
. . . . I t wi ll no t ne g a te wh a t th e y ’v e do ne thu s f ar. So Ido thi nk tha t w e nt b e y on d w hat is a

pp ro pr iate

. Wou ld you

lik e me to offer a cur ative instruction?
Th e pr os e c uto r t

he n sou ght cla

ri fi c a tio n o f h owsh e ha d e rr e d. Th e tr ia l c ourt re ite ra te d it s e xplanatio n a

nd ind ic a te d th a t it wo uld pr ov ide a c ur a tiv e ins tr uc tio n. Th e tr ia l c ourt

the n s tate d to th e j ury th e f o l l o wi n g:-35- L adies and g entlemen, let me i nstruct y ou that the last comment made by [ t he prose cutor] is not t o be conside red, that whateve r your decision is ultimately

will be the rig ht decision. And it will not in any way neg ate the ve rdict you’ve r eac hed or the decis i o n y o u’ve ma de thus far.

Mr . B ank s o ff

e re d n o f ur the r o bje c tio n a

nd did no t r e qu e st a

mis tr ia l.

J uri es ar e pre sumed to follow the trial cour t’s instructions. State v. Y oung , 196 S.W .3d at 11 1; State v. Shaw , 37 S.W .3d at 904. The trial court’s curative instruc tion adequate ly reme died the potential prejudice cause d by the prosec utor’s er

roneous a rgument.
Mr. B anks n ev er requeste d a mistrial following this comment and did not include the trial court’s f ailure to g rant a

mistrial as one of the grounds of his motion for new trial. Acc ording ly , he ha s w a ive d th is i ssu e . We wi ll, ne ve rt he le ss, re vie w this iss ue us ingthe pla in e rr or ana ly sis

. The de cision of whethe r to g rant or deny a mi strial rests within the sound discretion of the trial court. Sta tev . S

mi th , 871 S.W. 2d 66 7, 67 2 (T e nn . 199 4) . A mis tr ia l sh ou ld b e de c lare d o nly upon a s h o wi ng of manife st nece ssity

. State v. Saylor , 117 S.W .3d 239, 250 (Tenn. 2003)

. Acc ording ly , a mistrial i s an appropr iate re medy when a trial ca nnot continue or a

miscarr iag e of justice would result if it did. State v. Robinson , 146 S.W .3d at 494. An appe llate cour t should not
reve rse a trial court’ s decision deny ing a request for a mistrial absent a clea r showing that the trial court a bused its discretion. Sta tev . R e id , 9 1 S.W. 3d a t 27 9. Th e burd e n o f e sta bli sh ingthe ne c e ssi ty of a mistrial lies with the party seeking it. Sta te v . R e id , 164 S.W .3d at 342. W e find no e rror , much less plain err or in the t rial court utiliz ing a curative i nstruction instead of de clar ing a mistrial. The instruction adequately

addre ssed any conce rns reg arding the impact on the jury of the prosec utor’s state me nt.
G.

The Pr osecutor ’s Refer ence t o F acts Not in E vidence

In his final challeng e to t h e prosec utor’s closingarguments, Mr. Ba nks contends that the prosec utor committed reve rsible er ror by stating that Mr. Al-Maily had witnessed the robber y and ha d b e g g e d f

or his li fe. He di d no t obje c t to the se state me nts a t tr ia l, a nd he did no t c ite the se state me nts in his mot ion

fo r n e w tri a l. A c c or din g ly , h e ha s w a ive d th is i ssu e . We wi ll, ne ve rt he le ss, re vie w this iss ue us ingthe pla in e rr or ana ly sis

. There is nothing improper in the prosec ution’s argument that M r. Al -M aily witnessed the
ro bb e ry . T he e vid e nc e fu lly su pp or ts this c on te nti on . H ow e ve r, the re is no e vid e nc e tha t Mr . A lM a il y b e g g e d f o r h is li f e
. T h e ju r y w a s in s tr u c te d th a t t h e ar g u me n ts o f

c o un s e l a

r e n o t e v idence
and are to b e dis re g ard e d if

no t su pp or te d b y the e vid e nc e
. We p re sume that th e jur or s f oll owthe ir instructions. State v. Y

oung , 1 96 S.W. 3d

a t 11 1; State v. Shaw , 3 7 S. W.3 d at 90 4. Re vie we d in its context in the prosec ution’s closing a rgument, this comment had no eff ect on the ve rdict in this case. We decline to conc lude the prose cutor’s state ment rises to the leve l of plain err or.-36- XI II. T HE S U FF I C I ENC Y OF THE E VI DE NCE
Mr . B ank s c ha lle ng e s the su ff ic ie nc y of the e vid e nc e to sup po rt his c on vic tio ns . Te nn . R. App. P. 13(e) pr ovides that “[f]indi ng s of guilt in criminal actions whether by the trial court or jury sh a ll b e se t a sid e if

the e vid e nc e is i ns uf

fi c ie nt t o s up po rt

the fi nd ing s b y

the tr ie r o f f

a c t of g uil t be y on d a re a so na ble do ub t.” Whe n a sse ssi ngwh e the r t he re is s uf

fi c ie nt e vid e nc e to s up po rt a c ri min a l c onvic tio n, a

jur y ’s ve rd ic t of

g uil t r e mov e s th e pr e sumpt ion of inn oc e nc e re pla c ingit w ith a pre sumption of guilt. State v. W ilson , 211 S.W. 3d a t 71 8; State v. Scarborough , 201 S.W .3d 607, 62 4 ( Te nn . 2 00 6) . T hu s, a de fe nd ant b e ars the burd e n of dem on stratin g that th e e vid e nc e is insufficient to sustain a g uilty verdic t. State v. Dotson , 2 54 S.W. 3d 37 8, 39 5 ( Te nn . 2 00 8) ; State v. Cam pb e ll , 245 S.W .3d 331, 335 (Tenn. 2008)

. When review ing the evidenc e in a c riminal case , appellate courts must aff ord the State the str on g e st l e g it im ate vie w o f t he e vid e nc e a s w e ll a s g ive the State the be ne fi t of a ll r e a so na

ble i n fe re n ce s that may

be dra wn there from. State v. Mc Gouey , 229 S.W .3d 668, 671 (Tenn. 2007) ; State v. Vasques , 221 S.W .3d 514, 521 (Tenn. 2007). The responsibility for deter mining the weig ht and cr edibility

to be given witnesse s’ testimony and the r esponsibility

to rec oncile conf

licts in the testimony are entrusted to the triers of fac t. Sta te v . Ca mp be ll , 2 45 S.W. 3d a t 33 5; Sta te v . La ng

for d , 994 S.W .2d 126, 127 (Tenn. 1999). Wit h this framew ork firmly in mind, the ulti mate question for
an ap p ellate c ourt “is whethe r, af ter view ing the evidenc e in the lig ht most favorable to the prosec ution, anyrational trier of fa ct could have found the e ssential elements of the crime be y ond
a re asonable doubt.” J

ac k so n v . V irg ini a , 4 43 U. S. 3 07 , 3 19 (1 97 9) ; se e als o State v. Dotson , 254 S.W. 3d a t 39 5; Sta tev . Ca mp be ll , 2 45 S.W. 3d a t 33 5; Sta te v . B e rry , 141 S.W .3d at 564.
A. The Pr em editated F irst De gree Murder C onviction
Mr. B anks ar g ues that the ev i d ence is insufficient to support his conviction for the preme ditated first deg ree murder of Mr. Al-Maily

. He argues that the State failed to prove that he acte d with p reme ditation. I nstead, Mr. B anks conte nds that he shot Mr. Al-Maily in “the heat of pa ssi on ” and that he wa s n ot a wa re pr ior to a rr ivi nga t Mr . A til e ba

wi ’s re sid e nc e that Mr . A l- Ma ily would be ther e. Mr. Ba

nks also argues that the State failed to pr esent suff icient evidenc e to prove that he wa s the shooter. The State insists that the evidence is sufficie nt to prove that Mr. B anks shot Mr. Al-Maily

and that he a cted with pre meditation. The Court of Criminal Appea ls concluded that the evidenc e was sufficie nt to support Mr. B anks convic tion for first degree preme ditated murder

. We concur

with the deter

mination of the Court of Criminal Appeals.

Mr. B anks wa s convicted on the first count of the i ndictment, a cha rg e of f irst deg ree murder fo r t he pr e me dit a te d kil lin g of Mr . A l- Ma ily . Purs ua

nt t o T e nn . Co de Ann. § 3 9- 13 -2 02 (a )( 1) , f ir st deg ree m u rd er includes the “pr emeditated a nd intentional killi ng of anothe r.” The Tenne ssee Ge ne ra l A sse mbl y

ha s d e fi ne d p re me dit a tio n f or purp os e s o f f

ir st d e g re e mur de r a s f

oll ow s: “[P] reme ditation” is an ac t done af ter t he exerc ise of re flec tion and judgme nt. “Premeditation” me ans that t h e i n t ent to kill mus t have-37- be e n f or me d p ri or to t he a c t it se lf

. It is no t ne c e ssa

ry that the purp os e to kill pre-exist in the mind of the ac cused f or any definite pe riod of time. The mental state of t h e accused at the time the acc used
a lle g e dly de c ide d to ki ll must

be c are fu lly

c on sid e re d in

or de r t o deter mine whether the accused was s ufficie ntly fre e fr om excitement and passion as to be capa ble of pre meditation. Tenn. Code Ann. § 39- 13-202(d)

. “Preme ditation may

be infe rre d from the manne r and c ircumstance s of the killing.” Finch
v . S tate , 226 S.W .3d 307, 318 (Tenn. 2007). Tenne ssee courts have identified a numbe r of f actor s that tend to demonstrate a homicide was pr emeditated. These f actor s include, but are not limi ted to, (1 ) t he us e of a de a dly we a po n to kil l an un arm e d vic tim , (2 ) the pr oc ur e me nt of we a po ns us e d to commit a murder, ( 3) dec larations of intent to kill the victim, (4) prepa rations for the conce alment of a c ri me , (5) la c k of pr ov oc a tio n by the vic tim , (6) fa ilure to pr ov ide a id o r a ssi sta nc e to t he vic tim , and (7) calmness a fter the killing. State v. Brooks 249 S.W .3d 323, 329 (Tenn. 2008)

. Mr. B anks used a

deadly we ap o n , killed an unar med victim who g ave no pr ovocation, pr ov ide d n o a id o r a ssi sta nc e to h is v ic tim , a

nd wa s c a lm a ft e rw ard s. F ur the rm or e , M r. Al -M a ily had fully cooper ated with Mr. Banks during t he robbery

. Instead of resisting, Mr . Al-Maily handed over thre e hundre d dollars to Mr. B anks. He also rema ined in the bedroom lying fac edown on the floor as order ed while Messrs. Banks and Hilliard stole clothing, a udio speake rs, and c ash fr om Mr. Atilebawi’s home.
Mr. Banks t ook the t ime to sear ch the living room and bedroom for items to steal and the n to load the J eep w ith speaker s and clothes. W ith Mr. Al-Maily lying f ace down on the floor, ha

ving fully complied wit h his direc tions, Mr. Banks could simply have left the premises with his i ll-g otten g ains. Instead, he returne d to the house, wa lked up to a per son whom he consider ed a f riend who
wa s ly ingon the fl oo r, and sh ot him in the ba c k o f t he he a d f ro m c los e ra

ng e . V ie wi ngthe fa c ts i n a lig ht most f

av o r a b le to th e St a te , a r e a s o n a b le ju r y c o u ld h av e e a s il y h av e f o un d b e y o nd a
rea sonable doubt that Mr. B anks ac ted with preme ditation when he shot Mr. Al-Ma ily

. We n owturn to th e qu e sti on of wh e the r t

he State pr e se nte d s uf

fi c ie nt e vid e nc e to de mon str a te tha

t Mr

. B ank s sh ot Mr

. Al -M a ily

. We c on c lud e that, vie wi ng the fa c ts in the lig ht m os t favor able to the State, the te stimony of Mr. Atileba

wi, the phy sical evide nce, the fac t that Mr. Ba nks was found dr iving the stolen Jeep conta ining the pr operty sto l en fr o m M r. Atilebawi, and Mr

. Ba nks’s confe ssion that he shot Mr

. Al-Maily provide suff

icient evidenc e to per

mit a rea sonable jury to find beyond a re asonable doubt that Mr. Ba nks shot Mr. Al-Maily

. B. The Murder in the P erpet ration of a Robb ery C onviction
Mr. B anks also conte nds that the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction for mur der in the perpe tration of a r obbery . He a rgues that any

robber y that occur

red w as a se parate and distinct event f rom the shooting of

Mr. Al-Maily . Additionally , Mr. B anks ar g ues t here was no evidence thatT h e te rm “ c o rp u s d e licti” is o ften c o n fus e d fo r th e “d e a d b o d y.” B rya n A . G a rn e r, A D i cti o n a ry of M o d ern 32 Lega l U s ag e 226 ( 2n d ed. 1995 ) ( “A D i ct i onar y of M oder n Le gal U

s age ” ). H o w e v e r, it re fer s to “[t]h e fac t o f a t rangres si o n” and wi l l g e n e rall y be est ab l i shed i n a cri m i nal hom i ci d e case t hrough t he evi d ence o f t he d eat h of t he vi ct i m joi ned wi t h s o m e evi d ence t hat t he d eat h res ul t ed no t f rom an accident b ut a cri m i nal act

. B l ack’ s La w D i ct i o nary 3 4 6 (7 th e d . 1 9 9 9 ); A D i ct i on ary of M od er n Lega l U

s ag e 2 2 6

. -38- he intended to r ob Mr. Al-Maily and that owner ship of the money and the red Jeep that we re f ound i nh i s p o s s es s i o nwa s n o tco n cl u s i v el y es t ab l i s h ed

. C i t i n g Sta te v . S mi th , 24 S.W .3d 274 (Tenn. 2000), Mr. B anks also points ou t t h at a conviction cannot be f ounded solely

on a def endant’ s confe ssion. The State contends that it pre sented suff icient evidenc e to support t he conviction. The Court of Criminal Appeals conc luded that the evide nce w as suffic ient to support a conviction for murder in the pe rpetration of a robbe ry . We ag ree
. Under Tenne ssee law , first deg ree murder includes “[a] killing of another committed in the perpe tr ation of or attempt to perpetrate any . . . robber

y .” Te nn. Code Ann. § 39-13- 202(a) (2). Robbery , under Tenne ssee law, “is the intentional or knowing theft of proper ty from the pe rson of another by violence or

putting the pe rson in fea

r.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-401( a). The Tenne ssee Gene ral Asse mbly

has expressly

provided that “ [n] o culpable me ntal state is require d for c onviction under subdivision (a) (2) . . . e x cept the intent to commit the enumer ated of fense s or ac ts” in that subdivision. Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-202( b).

I t is a long- standing rule of Tenne ssee law that to f all within the definition of felony murder, a killing must have been “done in pur suance of the unlawful act, and not c ollatera l to it . . . . [ In other words,] [ t] he killing must have had an intimate relation and close connec tion with the felony . . . and not be separate , distinct, and independe nt from it.” State v. Rice , 184 S.W .3d 646, 663 (Tenn. 2006) (q u o t i n g Fa rm e r v . S

tate , 2 0 1 T e n n
. 1 0 7 , 1 1 5

- 1 6 , 2 9 6 S

. W

. 2 d 8 7 9 , 8 8 3 ( 1 9 5 6 ) )

. Ina

p p l yi n g thi s require ment, this Court has concluded that “ [t ]he killing ‘may prec ede, coincide with, or follow the felony and still be considere d as occ urring‘in the per petration of’ the felony offe nse, so l ong as there is a conne ction in time, place, a nd continuity

of ac tion.’” State v. T

hacke r, 164 S.W .3d at 223 (q u o t i n g State v. Buggs , 995 S.W .2d at 1 0 6). The de fenda nt must have the intent to commit the
un d e r ly in g f e lo n y e it h e r p r io r to o r c o n c ur

r e n t w it h th e a c t c a

u s in g th e v ic ti m’ s d e a th. State v. Thacker, 16 4 S. W.3 d at 22 3; State v. Buggs , 9 95 S.W. 2d a t 10 7. A d e fe nd ant’ s a c tio ns imm e diate ly
a ft e r t he kil lin g c an p ro vid e a basis f ro m w hic h th e jur

y may re a so na bly inf e r t hat th e de fe nd ant, e ith e r p ri or

to o r c on c ur

re nt w ithc omm itt ing the a c t th a t c a us e d th e vic tim ’s de a th, ha d a n inte nt t o commit the underlying f

elony

. State v. Thacke r, 16 4 S. W.3 d at 22 3; State v. Buggs , 995 S.W .2d at 108. We have longrec og nized that a conviction ca nnot be base d solely

on a def

endant’ s confe ssion and, there fore , that the S tate mus t prese nt some corr oborating evidenc e to establish the corpus de licti. State v. Sm ith , 24 S.W .3d at 281. The “ corpus de licti” ref ers to the “ body

of the crime – e vidence that a cr ime was c ommitt ed at the pla ce a lleg ed in the indictment.” Van Zandt v. State, 218 Tenn. 187, 202, 402 S.W .2d 130, 136 (1966). The thre shold for establishing the cor pus 32 d e li c ti is “ lo w ” an d r e qu ir e s o n ly “ s li g h t e v id e n c e , ” w h ic h c an b e me t thr o u g h r e li an c e upon circ umstantial evidence

. State v. Housler , 193 S.W .3d 476, 490-91 (Tenn. 2006). Th u s , “[ a] confe ssion may

sustain a conviction wher e there is other evidenc e suff icient to show the commission-39-

of the cr ime by

someone.” State v. Jone s , 15 S.W .3d 880, 891 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1999) (quoting Tay lor v . S tate , 479 S.W .3d 659, 661-62 (Te nn. Crim. App. 1972)).
After shooting Mr. A tilebawi, Mr. B anks ente red Mr

. Atilebawi’s house and, alongwith Mr. Hi lli ard , s e arc he d thro ug h M r. At ile ba wi ’s liv ing roo m and be dr oo m lo ok ingfo r i te ms t o s te a l. Having just sh o t M r
. A ti le b aw i a n d w it hth e g uns ti ll in

h is p o s s e s s io n , M r
. B an k s to o k three hun dre d d o l l ar s i n ca s h fr o m M r. Al -M ai l y
. M es s rs
. Ban k s an d Hi l l i ar d gat h er edp ac k age d

cl o th i n g, a ud io s pe ake rs , a

nd c a shand loa de d th e m in to t

he red J eep. M r. B ank s th e n s ho t Mr . A l- Ma ily befor e leaving. Mr . Ba

nks used violence and fe ar to rob Me ssrs. Atilebawi and A l-Maily . Viewing the fa c ts i n th e lig ht m os t f avo ra ble to t he State , th e re is s uf

fi c ie nt e vid e nc e fr om whic h a re a so na ble jury could have found beyond a re asonable doubt that there w as a c onnection in time, place , and continuity of ac tion between the shooting of Mr . Al-Maily and the r obbery

. As for ownership of the proper ty , Mr. Atilebawi testified that Mr. B anks stole his cash, silver key ring s, and his r ed J eep. Mr. Ba nks confe ssed that he stole the ca sh from Messrs. Atileba wi and Al-Maily as we ll as audio speake rs, clothing , and a r ed Jeep. He w as found in possession of all of the a bo ve wh e n ar

re ste d b y the po lic e . V ie wi ngthe fa c ts i n th e lig ht m os t f avo ra ble to t he State , th is evidenc e provide s a suffic ient b asi s from which a rea sonable juror

could conc lude beyond a
r e a s o n a b l e d o u b tth a tth e p r o p e rty w a s o w n e d b y M e s s r s
. A t i l e b aw i an d A l

- M a i l y.
As fo r M r. B ank s’ s argume nt t hat a c on fe ssi on

a lon e is i ns uf

fi c ie nt e vid e nc e up on

wh ic h to convict a de fenda

nt, he is corr ect insofa

r as ther e must be some slig ht evidence in addition to a confe ssion in order to establish the cor pus delicti. I n this case, the disc overy of Mr. Al-Ma ily ’s dea d bo dy wi th a g un sh ot wo un d in the ba c k of his he a d and no fi re arm ne xt t o him wou ld a de qu a te ly meet t h is standard by

providing evidenc e that a homicide occur red in a manner other than by
acc ident. The e vidence bolstering Mr. B anks’s c onfession, howe ver, e x tends signific antly beyond th e di sco very

of th e bo dy

wi th a guns ho t w ou nd– as do es t he ev id ence o f hi s gui lt in general . By way of illustration, Mr. Ba

nks was ar

rested after the shootings in a ve hicle stolen fr om Mr. Atilebawi with Mr. Atilebawi’s pr operty inside.
C. The Cr im ina l A tt e m ptto Co m m itF ir stDe gr e e M ur de r Co nvi c ti on
Mr. B anks asse rts that the S tate presented insufficient evidenc e to support his conviction for criminal attempt to commit first deg ree murder. H e ar g ues t h at t h e shooting oc curr ed following provocation during a

n argument reg ardingMr. B anks havingbeen cheated out of a la rg e sum of
mon e y and the a lle g e d s e xua l ass a

ult on his fo rm e r g ir lf

ri e nd

. He a sse rt s that the e vid e nc e su pp or ts only an intent to cause bodily injury beca use he left the sce ne without “finish[ing] the victim off.” Th e State argue s t hat th e evide nc e pr e se nte d w a s su ff ic ie nt. Th e Court

of Cr imi na l App e a ls conclude d t h at a r easona

ble jury could have found that Mr. B anks ac ted with preme ditation and intended to kill Mr. Atilebawi. We ag ree
. Th e Te nn e sse e Ge ne ra l A sse mbl y ha s d e fi ne d c ri min a l atte mpt a s f oll ow s:-40- (a) A per son commits criminal attempt who, actingwith the kind of culpability

otherwise r equire d for the of fense : (1) Intentionally

eng ag es in ac tion or cause s a re sult that would constitute an off

ense, if the circ umstances surr ounding the conduc t were as the pe rson believe s them to be; (2) Ac ts with int ent to cause a re sult that is an element of the offe nse, and believes the conduct will cause the re sult without further conduct on the pe rson’s par t; or (3) Acts with intent to complete a c ourse of action or c ause a result that would consti t u t e the of fense , under the circ umstances surr ounding the conduct as the per son believes them to be, and the c onduct constitutes a substantial step toward the commission of the offe nse. (b) Conduct doe s not c onstitut e a substantial step under subdivision (a) (3), unless the person’s entire course of action is corr oborative of the intent to commit the offense

. (c ) It is no de fe ns e to pr os e c uti on fo r c ri min a l atte mpt

that th e of

fe ns e attempted wa s actua lly

committed. Tenn. Code Ann. § 39- 12-101. As noted above, first deg ree murder inc ludes the “pr emeditated a nd intentional killi ng of another,” Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-202( a)( 1), and pr emeditation for pur poses of fi rs t de g re e mur de r h a s b e e n d e fi ne d a s f oll ow s: “[P] reme ditation” is an ac t done af ter the e x erc ise of re flec ti o n and judgme nt. “Premeditation” me ans that the intent t o k i l l must have be e n f or me d p ri or to t he a c t it se lf

. It is no t ne c e ssa

ry that th e purp os e to kill pre-exist in the mind of the ac cused f or any definite pe riod of time. The mental state of the accu s ed at the time the ac cused
a l l e g e d l y d e c i d e d t o k i l l mu s t b e c ar e f u l l y c o n s i d e r e d i n or de r t o deter mine whether

the acc used was sufficie ntly fre e fr om excitement and passion as to be capa ble of pre meditation. Tenn. Code Ann. § 39- 13-202(d)

. Th e e vid e nc e e sta

bli sh e s th a t se ve ra l day s befor e the mur de r M r. B ank s b e g an q uit e deliberately

plotting his reve ng e upon Mr. Atileba wi. Be cause the firea

rm that he kept in his For d Ex plorer w as not working , Mr. Banks obt ained a nother fir ear

m from Mr. Hilliard. Messr s. Hilliard and B anks discussed disposi ng of Mr. Atilebawi’s dead body in the Wolf River. Mr. Ba nks shot Mr. Atilebawi four

times, including twice in the head. He trie d to conce al the body , but Mr. Atilebawi was too hea

vy to move.-41-

Mr. B anks off

ers no leg al support for his a rgument that his decision to leave Mr . Atilebawi on the drivew ay , cover ed in blood and still bleeding from four differ ent g unshot wounds, including tw o s ho ts t o h is h e a d, neg ate s hi s int e nt t o k ill Mr . A til e ba wi . V ie wi ngthe fa c ts i n a lig ht m os t favor able to the State, ther e is sufficie nt evidence from which a rea sonable jury could find beyond
a re asonable doubt that Mr. Ba nks acte d with premeditation in shooting Mr. A tilebawi.

D. The Esp ecially Aggravat ed Robbery Conviction Finally , Mr. Banks contends that the S tate presented insuff icient evidenc e to prove that he committed an espe cially ag g ravated robber y
. Specifica lly , he takes issue with the sufficie ncy of the evidenc e that the Jeep wa s stolen or that the shooting of Mr. Atilebawi wa s relate d to robbery . Mr. Ba nks asserts that the r obbery and the shooting wer e not conne cted. The State responds that the
rec ord conta ins ample evidenc e to support Mr. B anks’s c onviction for the e spec i al l y ag g ravated robber y o f M r. At i l ebaw i. The Court of Criminal Appea ls concluded that the evidenc e pre sented was suff icient for a reasonable jur y to conclude that the elements of e specia lly ag g ravated robbe ry had bee n proven be y ond a re asonable doubt. We ag ree
. Robbery “is the intentional or knowingtheft of pr operty from the pe rson of a

nother by violence or

putting the pe rson in fea r.” Te nn. Code Ann. § 39-13- 401(a) . Especia lly ag g ravated
ro bb e ry is a ro bb e ry tha t is “ (1 ) [a ]cc omp lis he d wi th a de a dly we a po n; and (2 ) [w]he re the vic tim suffe rs serious bodily

injury .” Te nn. Code Ann. § 39-13- 403(a)

. Wit h reg ard to evidenc e of the J eep belong ing to Mr. Ati lebawi, Mr. A tilebawi testified that Mr. B anks stole his J eep. Mr . Ba nks admitted in both of his confe ssions to st ealingMr. Atilebawi’ s J eep, a nd a neig hbor of Mr. B anks testifi ed t h at s h e had never seen him in a re d J eep until the
mor nin g a ft e r t

he sh oo tin g s.
Mr. B anks ca

me to Mr. Atilebawi’ s house wit h a loade d semi-automatic pistol. He shot Mr. Atilebawi with that pistol four tim es. As a result, part of Mr . Atilebawi’s br ain had to be r emoved,
and he sp e nt a mo nt h in

the ho sp ita l. M r. At ile ba wi su ff e re d p e rm ane nt c og nit ive imp a ir me nts

. Th is sho oti ng of

Mr . A til e ba

wi wa s c los e ly

c onne c te d in

tim e , p la c e , a

nd c on tin uit y of a c tio n w ith the robber

y
. Viewing the fac ts in the light most fa vorable to the State, a re asonable jury could find b e yo n d a r e a s o n a b l e d o u b tth a tM r
. B an k s c o m m i t t e d e s p e c i a l l y a g g r av a t e d

r o b b e r y.
XIV. T HE T R I A L C OURT ’ S RE F US AL T O P ERM I T M R . B ANKS T O C A LL O FF I C ER M I KE B ART L E T T AS A W ITN ESS D U R I N G TH E P E NAL T Y P H A SE
Mr. B anks take s issue with the trial court’s r efusa l to allow him to call one of its own court office rs to testify

duringthe pena lty phase of the trial re g ardinghis good c onduct as a prisoner. Eve n tho ug h h e c on c e de s th a t he did no t in c lud e thi s pe rc e ive d e rr or in h is m oti on fo r n e w tri a l or

ra ise it before the Court of C riminal Appea ls, Mr. Banks asserts that the denial of his request to ca ll the
c ourt of fi c e r c on sti tut e d p la in e rr or be c a us e it inf ri ng e d on h is r ig ht t o c a ll w itn e sse s und e r t he Sixth Amendment to the United States Constituti on and violated his constitu t i o n al d u e process of law-42-

protec tions. W e have deter mined th at the trial cour

t did not commit plain err or by denying Mr

. B ank s’ s r e qu e st t o c a ll o ne of its c ourt of fi c e rs to t e sti fy

a bo ut M r. B ank s’ s g oo d c on du c t.
Be fore the pre sentation of evide nce in the pe nalty phase o f t h e t ri al beg an, the tria l court
announce d that Offic er Mike B artlett, one of the four de puties assig ned to s afe g uard a nd attend the jur y wh ile it w a s sequ est ered , had re po rt e d to him

tha t th e de fe ns e ha d a sk e d h im t o te sti fy a s a mit ig a tio n w itn e ss. Th e tr ia l c ourt state d o n th e re c or d th a t
Absent extraordinar

y circ umstances, I ’m not g oing to a llow that to happen. I

don’t think it’s appropriate

. Ithink for bailiffs who have been sworn and cha rg ed with the
re sp on sib ili ty

of gu ard ingthe jur or s a

nd e sta bli sh inga ra pp or t w ith the m a ll w e e k lo ng , to then be c a lle d to te sti fy fo r e ith e r s ide is inappropriate. I

think there a

re ma ny other jailer s and law enfor ceme nt personne l that have had contact with this defenda nt over the past two and a half y ear s and over the past we ek that could testify to the same thing that Offic er B artlett would be a vailable to testify

on. And i t ’s almos t a betra

y al of the trust be tween the deputy and the j ur o r s t o th e ns t artc a l l i n g th o s e d e p u t i e s t o th e s t an d t o t e s t i f y.

. . . I t ’ s j u s t n o t a

p p r o p r i a t e
. A n d s o i f th e r e w e re so me extraordinary

ci r c u ms ta n c e , if some phenomena l event occ urre d, then that might be differ ent. But if it’s just to gene rally testify to the g ood conduct o f t h e d efendant as he came and we nt from the cour troom eac h day , no, that’s not appropr iate. And it would be cumulative a nd fo r a ll tho se re a so ns
. Mr. B anks’s lawy er tha

nked the c ourt “for

putting that on the rec o rd” but did not object or take
e xce pti on to t he tr ia l c ourt ’s de c isi on
. Dur in g t he p e na lty ph a se , M r. B ank s c a lle d mu lti ple witnesses who a ddresse d his conduct while in jail pendingtrial including Offic er Micha el Conner, Offic er Char lene Compton, Offic er Way man Thomas, Of

fice r L atosha Na dia, and Commander Roy L . Roge rs. B eca

use Mr. B anks did not make a n offe r of pr oof regar d i n g wh at Officer Ba rtlett’s testimony would have been, the rec ord contains no indication that Offic er Ba rtlett had any

additional testimony that would be any

thing more than cumulative to that of the other witnesse s.
The trial c ourt’s dec ision not t o allow the bailiff c harg ed with safe g uardingthe jury to testify duringthe sentenc ing phase of the trial was e ntirely corr ect. In para llel circumstanc es this Court has previous ly

d is a p p r o v e d o f th e p r a c ti c e o f

ano f f ic e r w h o h a s te s ti f

ie d in a c r im in a l c a s e having
c h ar g e o f th e ju

ry
. El li s v. State , 218 Tenn. 297, 306, 403 S.W.2d 293, 297 (1966). We find no
e rr or , p la in o r o the rw ise , in the tr ia l c ourt ’s de c isi on to e xclu de Of fi c e r B art le tt a s a

pe na lty ph a se wi tne ss.Un ited S ta te s v . H ig h E lk , 4 4 2 F .3 d 6 2 2 , 6 2 6 ( 8 th C ir. 2 0 0 6 ); D o u g la s A . B e rm a n & S te p h a n o s B ib a s, M aki ng 33 S e n te n c in g S e n sib le , O hi o St. J. C ri m
. L. 3 7 , 52

- 5 4 (20 0 6 ).

See St at e v

. G om ez , 239 S. W

. 3d a t 739. 34

St at e v

. Ca r t er , 25 4 S.W

. 3 d 33 5 , 34 3 (T enn. 20 0 8 ). 35

See Act of

M ay 18, 2005, c h

. 353, 2005 T en n
. Pub. Act s 788. 36
-43- XV. T HE S E NT E NCE S F OR A T T E M P T E D F I R ST D EGR EE M URDE R AND

E S P E CI AL L Y A GGR AVAT E D R OB B E RY
Mr. B anks cha lleng es his consec utive twenty -five year sentenc es for attempted first de g ree m u rder and espe cially

ag g ravated robbe ry

on three g rounds. Fir st, he asser ts that these sentenc es violate Blakely

v. W ashington , 542 U.S. 296 (2004) a nd that he wa s entitled to a presumptive sentenc e in the absenc e of a finding of enhanc ement fac tors by the jury . Second, he a sserts that ea ch of the se se nte nc e s w a s e xce ssi ve . T hir d, he a sse rt s th a t th e tr ia l c ourt e rr e d b y orde ri ngthe se se nte nc e s to be se rv e d c on se c uti ve ly . T he Court of Cr imi na l App e a ls fo un d ea c h o f t he se c la ims to be without merit. We ag ree
. A.

In Blakely v. W ashington , the United States Supreme Court held that the Six th Amendment require d sentenc es in criminal ca ses t o be base d on the fa cts either a dmitted by the def endant or found by the jury

. Blakely v. W ashington , 542 U.S. a

t 303- 04. There fore , the Court held that trial courts could not impose a sentenc e hig her tha n the statutory

maxi mum sentence if their dec ision was b a s e d o nf a c t s th a tw e r e n e i th e r

a dm i t t e d b y th e d e f e n d an tn o r

f o un d b y th e j ury. B l a ke l

y v. W ashington , 542 U.S. at 304. Howeve r, in the re medial portion of its decision in United States v. Booke r , 5 43 U. S. 2 20 , 2 45 -6 8 ( 20 05 ), the Un ite d St a te s c onc lud e d th a t ju dic ia l f a c t- fi nd ingin
s e n t e n c i n g w a s p e r

m i s s i b l e s o l o n g a s s e n t e n c i n gg u i d e l i n e s w e r e a dv i s o r y r a th e r t h anm an d a t o r

y. 33 As they exis ted prior to 2005, Te nn e s s e e c rim in a l s e nte n c in g s ta tu tes established a

sentenc ing rang e and a

“pre sumptive sentence ” for eac h class of f elonies other tha

n capital murde r. Under the 34 sentenc ing pr ocedur es re quired by these statutes, a

trial court c ould not increa se a de fenda n t ’s sentenc e above the pre sumptive sentence unless it found that enhanc ement factors e x isted. I f the trial court de termined that e nhance ment fa ct o rs ex i sted, it then had the a uthority to increa se a defe ndant’s sente nce up to the max imum sentence pr ovided for that rang e. 35
The de cision in Blakely

v. W ashington place d a constit utional cloud over the power of trial
c ourt s in Te nn e sse e to s e nte nc e de fe nd ants be y on d the statut or y pr e sumpt ive se nte nc e ba se d o n f a c ts not refle cted in the jury ’s ver dict. Acc ording ly , in 2 0 0 5 , the Tenne ssee Ge nera l Assembly amende d 36 the sentenc ing statutes to make the statutory sentenc ing guidelines advisory and to re m ove the presumptive sente nces f

or eac h class of f

elonies other tha

n capital murde r. SeeTenn. Code Ann. § 40 -3 5- 21 0( c ) ( 20 06 ); State v. Carter , 254 S.W .3d at 343. The re moval of the pre sumptive sentence s and re nderingthe guidel i n es advis ory cure d the Six th Amendment def ect noted in Blakely

v.T hes e pr i nci pl es ca n be f ound i n T enn
. Co de Ann. §§ 4 0- 35

- 10 2, - 10 3 (2006 & Supp. 200 7). T he T enn es s ee 37 G eneral A ss em b l y cho se “B o o keri zat i o n” rat her t han “B l akel y i zat i o n” when i t replaced t he f o rm e rly p res um p t i ve g u id e line in fav o r o f a d v iso ry g u id e line s. S te p h a n ie W a tso n , Fi xi ng Cal i f or ni a Se nt enc i ng Law , 39 M cG eo rge L. R ev. 5 8 5 , 59 3 n. 8 9 (20 0 8 ) ( herei naf t er “ W at so n ” ) (quo t i ng M o d el P enal C o d e: Sent enci ng (P rel i m
. D raf t

. N o
. 4 2 0 0 5 ))

. T enness ee was t he f

i rs t s t at e i n whi ch t he l egi sl at ure conve rt ed a form er presump t i ve gui d el i nes s y st em i nt o an ad vi sory sy st em
. M o d el P enal C o d e: Sent enci ng, R ep o rt er’ s Int rod uct o ry M em o randum xxxvi i & n. 1 9 (T ent

. D raf t N o
. 1 2 0 0 7 ); W a tso n a t 5 9 3

. In 2 0 0 7 , th e C a lif o rn ia S ta te L e g islatu re a lso o p te d fo r “B o o k e riz a tio n ” ra the r th a n “B la k e lyiza tio n .” W at s on a t 591- 97.

M r. B a n k s’s law ye r q u e stio n e d he r c lien t wh e n the se n te n c ing he a rin g b e g a n . A fter d isc u ssin g the “o ld 38

s e n t e n c i n g l a w ” a n d t h e “ n e w s e n t e n c i n g l a w , ” s h e a s k e d M r
. B a n k s “ w h i c h l a w d o y o u w i s h t o g o u n d e r ? ” He
r es po nded, “ [ t ] he new one. ”

M r
. B ank s ac kn owl edged h i s un ders t andi ng t hat he was not ent i t l ed t o a p r es umpt i ve s ent enc e when he ag r eed 39 tha t his la w ye r h a d “ e x p la ine d to

. . .[h im ] tha t un d e r th e ne w se n te n c ing law tha t t h e c o u rt is re q u ire d to sta rt a t t h e
. . . m inim u m ti m e in the ra n g e fo r th e p a rtic u la r o ff e n se a s o p p o se d to w h e re the y us e d to sta rt a t t h e m id d le o f t h e ra n g e .”
-44- W ashington using the United States v. Book er re me dy and e na ble d T e nn e sse e ’s tr ia l cour ts t o sentenc e a def

endant to any

sentenc e within the applica ble ra ng e as longas the leng th of the sentenc e is “consistent with t he purpose s and principles of the sentenc ing statutes.” SeeTenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-210( d). 37

M r. Ba n k s k nowing ly

exercised his rig ht to be sentenc ed under the sentenc ing la

ws as amende d in 2005. As a re sult of this dec i s i o n , h e d id not have the r ight to a pr esumptive 38 sentenc e. Acc ording ly , Mr. B anks’s objec tions to his sentenc es for attempted first deg ree murder

39 and espe cially

ag g ravated robbe ry

based on Blakely

v. W ashington and his purporte d rig ht to be sentenc ed at the pr esumptive sentenc e ar e without merit.

B.
Mr. B anks also take s issue with the leng th of his sentence s for attempted first degree murder and espe cially

ag g ravated robbery

. He asserts (1) that these sentences a re e x cessive, ( 2) that the trial court relied on enhanc ement fac tors that wer e not suppor ted by the evidenc e, (3) that the trial cour t “er red in his treatment of the mitigating f actor s,” and ( 4) that t h e t ri al cour t violated Blakely

v. W ashington by considering“enha nceme nt fac tors [t hat] were not de termined by a jury .” The Court of Criminal Appea ls found that the leng th of these se ntence s was not excessive. We ag ree
. Mr. B anks has a

statutory rig ht to take issue on appea l w ith the leng th of his sentence s on the gro un d th att h ey ar e e x ce s s i v e
. T e n n
. C o d e A n n
. § 4 0 -3 5 -4 0 1 (b )( 2 ) ( 2 0 0 6 ). W h en re v i ew i n g a sentenc e, an a

ppellate c ourt mu s t revie w the re cord de novo and must presume that the deter minations made by the court from which the appea l is taken – in this case the Court of Criminal Appea ls – are c orre ct. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-401( d). We have inter prete d this statutory

standard of re view to mean that a

n appellate court is “ bound by a trial c ourt’s dec ision as to the leng th of the sentenc e imposed so long as it is imposed in a manner consistent with the purposes a nd principles set out in sections -102 and - 103 of the Sentenc ing A ct.” State v. Carter , 254 S.W .3d at 346. Mere dis a g re e me nt w ithho w the tr ia l court we ig he d enha nc ing and mit ig a tin g fa c tor s is no t an a de qu a te basis for r ever sing a

sentenc e. State v. Carter , 254 S.W .3d at 345-46.T enn. C o d e A nn. § 4 0

- 3 5

- 1 1 4 (1) (20 0 6 ). 40

T enn. C o d e A nn. § 4 0

- 3 5

- 1 1 4 (2). 41

T enn. C o d e A nn. § 4 0

- 3 5

- 1 1 4 (6). 42

T en n
. Code An n
. § 40- 35- 114( 8) 43

T enn. C o d e A nn. § 4 0

- 3 5

- 1 1 4 (13 )( C ). 44

T enn. C o d e A nn. § 4 0

- 3 5

- 1 1 4 (14 ). 45

I n t he bri ef

f i l ed i n t hi s Co ur t , t he St at e s eek s t o s i de- s t ep i t s conce s s i on i n t he C our t of Cri mi nal Ap peal s t hat 46
t he t ri al co urt s ho ul d not have co nsi d ered t he enhancem ent f act o rs i n T enn. C o d e A nn. § 4 0

- 3 5

- 1 1 4 (6), (14 ). T hi s t he S ta te c a n n o t d o b e c a u se o f th e d o c trine o f j u d ic ia l es to p p e l. See M ar cus v

. M ar cus , 993 S. W

. 2d 596, 602 ( T en n
. 1999) (quo t i ng O b io n C o u n ty v . M c K in n is , 211 T en n
. 183, 186, 364 S. W

. 2d 356, 357 ( 1962) ) (h ol di n g t h at “ a par t y w i l l n ot be per mi t t ed t o occ u py i n con s i s t en t pos i t i on s or t o t ak e a pos i t i on i n r eg ar d t o a ma t t er w h i ch i s di r ec t l y c on t r ar y t o, or inc o n siste n t with , o n e p re v io u sly a ssu m e d b y him ” ).
-45- The twe nty -five year

sentenc es imposed on Mr. Ba nks by the trial cour

t and af firmed by the Court of Criminal Appeals ar e the maximum s entenc es for convictions for at t em p t ed first deg ree murder and espec ially ag g ravated robber y
. As the Court of Criminal Appe als noted, the trial court’ s sentenc ing de cision with reg ard to Mr. Ba nks’s convictions for attempted first deg ree murder a nd espec ially ag g ravated robbe ry

wer e base d on the followingsix enhanc ement fac tors: ( 1) Mr. B anks h ad a p revious his tory

of cr iminal convictions or criminal beha vior in addition to those necessa ry to establish the appropr iate ra ng e, (2) Mr. Ba

nks was the leade r in the commission of the offe nse, 40 41 (3) the pe rsonal injuries inflicted upon a nd the amount of damag e to prope rty sustained by

or take n from Mr. Atilebawi were pa rticularly g reat, (4) Mr. B anks fa iled to comply with the conditions of 42 a sente nce involvingrele ase into the c ommunity , (5) the f elony was committed while Mr. B anks 43
wa s r e le a se d o n p ro batio n, and (6 ) M r. B ank s a

bu se d a po sit ion of pr ivate tr us t. State v. Bank

s , 44 45 20 07 WL 19 66 03 9, a t *45- 46

. Th e tr ia l court a lso c on sid e re d M r. B ank s’ s a pp are nt l a c k o f r e mor se and his da ng e ro us ne ss.
Be fore the Court of Criminal Appea ls, Mr. Ba nks took issue with the trial court’ s relianc e on the three enhanc ement fac tors in T enn. Code Ann. § 40-35-114( 2), (6), (14). He a lso asserted that the trial cour

t had er red b y d i s re garding a ll his m itigatingfac tors solely beca use of his lac k of
remorse . The State c oncede d that the evidenc e did not support the trial cour t’s relianc e on the
e nh anc e me nt f

a c tor s in Te nn . Co de Ann. § 4 0- 35 -1 14 (6 ), (1 4) but in sis te d th a t th e e vid e nc e fu lly 46 supported the trial court’s r eliance on the enha nceme nt fac tor in Tenn. Code Ann. § 40- 35-114(2)
and that th e tr ia l c ourt

ha d n ot i mpr op e rl y

dis re g ard e d M r. B ank s’ s mi tig a tin g fa c tor s.
The trial c ourt focuse d its a naly sis on the nature and char acte ristics of Mr. B anks’s c riminal conduct in this case , the weig ht of the evidenc e supporting the enhanc ement fa ctors, and the relative lack of weig ht of Mr. B anks’s mitigation evidence . The trial c ourt considere d all of the c riteria se t out in Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-210( b) and then imposed a sentenc e within the applica b l e r an g e. The trial c ourt explained its rea sons f or imposing the sentenc es, and most of the trial court’ s releva nt finding s are adequa

tely supported by

the re cord. See State v. Carter , 254 S.W .3d at 346.-46-

Th e tr ia l c ourt ’s s e nt e n c i n g d i s c re tio n w a s b ro a de ne d w he n th e Te nn e sse e Ge ne ra l A sse mbl y enac ted the 2005 amendments to the sentenc ing statutes. State v. Carter , 2 5 4 S. W. 3 d a t 3 4 5

. We have c onducted a detailed, de novo revie w of the r ecor d with reg ard to the twe nty -five year sentenc es Mr. B anks re ceive d for attempted first deg ree murder a nd espec ially

ag g ravated robbe ry , and we have de te rm ine d th a t th e e vid e nc e su pp or ts t he tr ia l c ourt ’s fi nd ingof the e nhancem e nt f

a c tor s in Tenn. Code Ann. § 40- 35-114(1) , (2), ( 8), and ( 13)(c ). Acc ording ly , despite the trial court’s r eliance on two inapplicable e nhance ment fac tors, we, like the Court of Criminal Appe als, have c oncluded that the trial cour

t considere d and we ighe d all the matters that Te nn
. C o d e Ann. § 40-35-210 require d it to consi d er a

nd that the four r emainingenhanc ement fa ctors more than ade quately support the tr ia l c ourt ’s dis c re tio na ry de c isi on to i mpo se tw e nty -f

ive y e ar s e nte nc e s f

or the se tw o c ri me s.
C.

In his final challeng e to his non-ca pital sentenc es, Mr. Banks a rgues that the trial c ourt err ed by order ing the se sentenc es to be ser ved conse cutively

. S p ec i fi ca lly , he insists that his criminal his tor y a ft e r he be c ame e ig hte e n y e ars old wa s n ot e xten siv e e no ug h to inf lue nc e wh e the r h e sh ou ld
serve his non-capital se ntence s concur rently or conse cutively

. The Te nnessee Gene ral Asse mbly has provided the courts with t he fa ctors to consider when deter mining whe ther sente nces should be se rved c oncurr ently or conse cutively

. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-115( b) (2006) . A trial cour t may order multipl e sente nces to be serve d consec utively upon finding that any

one of the seven f

actor s contained in Te nn. Code Ann. § 40-35- 115(b) a pply

. Ho we ve r, if

the tr ia l c ourt

ba se s it s d e c isi on

to r e qu ir e se nte nc e s to be s e rv e d c on se c uti ve ly on its finding that the def

endant is a da

ng erous of

fende r, it must make add i t i onal finding s reg ardingthe
se ve ri ty of the c ri me s committe d an d th e ne c e ssi ty to p ro te c t th e pu

bli c fr om f

ur the r c ri min a l a c ts by the def endant. State v. Allen , 259 S.W. 3d 67 1, 68 9 ( Te nn . 2 00 8) ; State v. Robinson , 146 S.W .3d
a t 52 4 ( a pp e nd ix); State v. Lane , 3 S.W .3d 456, 460-61 (Te nn. 1999). Although it is only

nece ssary

for the tr ial court to find one of the fa ctors in Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-115( b) in order

to r equire Mr. Ba

nks to se rve his non-c apital sentenc es conse cutively , the trial court found that three fac tors wer e applicable. In acc ordanc e with Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35- 115(b)( 2), the trial c ourt found that Mr. B anks’s re cord of criminal ac tivity was e x tensive, particula rly for someone so y oung . The trial court also found, in acc ordanc e with Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-115( b)(4) , that M r. Ba n k s wa s a dang erous of fende r. F inally , the trial cour t had alre ady deter mined that Mr. Ba

nks had committed his crimes while on probation. SeeTenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-115( b)(6)

. Mr. Banks arg ues t hat t he trial court should not have consider ed his juvenile re cord a nd that he did not have a particula rly extensive criminal record after his eig hteenth birthday . Neither the law
no r t he fa c ts s up po rt

thi s argume nt. Whe n de te rm ini ng wh e the r se nte nc e s sh ou ld r un c on se c uti ve ly
or conc urre ntly , trial courts a re not limited to consideringthe def endant’s criminal ac tivity or conduct that oc curr ed af

ter the defe ndant’s eightee nth birthday

. State v. Stock ton , 733 S.W .2d 111, 11 2 ( Te nn . Cr im. Ap p. 19 86 ); se e als o Te nn . Code Ann. § 3 7- 1- 13 3( b) (2 00 5) (a uth or izin g the us e of juvenile re cords in the pr epar ation of pre -sentenc e re ports).T he agg r ava t i ng ci r cums t anc e i n T enn
. C od e A nn
. § 3 9- 13

- 20 4(i ) ( 6) ar i s es when “ [ t ] he mur der i s comm i t t ed 47 fo r the p u rp o se o f a v o id ing , i n te rfe rin g w ith, o r p re v e n ting the law ful a rr e st o r p ro se c u tio n o f t h e d e fen d a n t o r a n o the r.”

T he agg r ava t i ng ci r cums t anc e i n T enn
. Co de Ann. § 39

- 13

- 20 4(i ) ( 7) a r i s es wh en “[t ]he mur der was 48 kno wi ngl y co m m i t t ed

. . . by t he d ef end ant , whi l e t he d ef

end ant had a s ub st ant i al rol e i n co m m i t t i ng .
. . any
. . . rob b ery

. . . . ” -47- Mr. B anks’s presentenc e report and other evidenc e in this case pr ovides ample e vidence of his ex tensive cr iminal recor d and of his dang erousne ss. He has prior convictions on two counts of
a ssa ult , o ne of

wh ic h invo lve d b od ily

ha rm . H e ha s b e e n c on vic te d o f a g g ra vate d b urgl ary . His criminal conduc t in this case demonstrates a lack of reg ard f or human life and a lack of hesitation to resort to violence to commit crimes that cre ate a high risk to huma n life. B ased on our

de novo
re vie w o f t

he re c or d, we have c on c lud e d, lik e the Cou rt of Cr imi na l App e a ls, that th e tr ia l c ourt , in
a c c or da nc e wi th T e nn . Co de Ann. § 4 0- 35 -1 15 , d id n ot e rr by or der ingMr . B ank s to se rv e his sentenc es for

attempted first de g ree murder a nd espec ially

ag g ravated robbe ry

consec utively

. XV I. T HE S U FF I C I ENC Y OF THE E V I D ENC E REGA R D I N G TH E S T AT UT ORY A GGR AVAT I NG C IRC U M STA N C ES RE QUI RE D B Y T E NN . C OD E A NN . § 39 -1 3- 20 4( i) (2006)
Th e de a th p e na lty

c ann ot b e imp os e d unle ss t he jur y de te rm ine s una

nim ou sly that th e State has prove d beyond a re asonable doubt one or more of the a g g ravating c ircumstance s in Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-204( i) (2006). I n Mr. Ba nks’s case , the jury deter

mined that the State had prove d the exis tence of t wo agg ravating circumstance s – Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-204(i)( 6) and Te nn. Code 47 Ann. § 39-13-204( i)(7). 48

In the Court of

Cr imi na l App e a ls, Mr . B ank s c ha lle ng e d th e a de qu a c y of the e vid e nc e wi th reg ard to both of these ag g ravating c ircumstance s. The Court of Criminal Appea ls concluded that the evidenc e supported the jury ’s findi ng with reg ard to the agg ravating circumstance in Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-204( i)(7) but not the ag g ravating circ umstance in T enn. Code Ann. § 39- 13-204(i)( 6). Howeve r, the Court of Criminal Appe als also deter mined that the trial cour

t’s err or in submitti ng the ag g ravating c ircumstance in T enn. Code Ann. § 39-13-204( i)(6) to the jury was harmless beyond a
rea sonable doubt.

In this Court, Mr. Banks a sserts that the evide nce is insuff icient to suppor

t the finding of an ag g ravating c ircumstance under either Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-204( i)(6) or Tenn. Code Ann. § 39- 13-204(i)( 7) and that the trial court’s err or with r eg ard to the ag g ravating circ umstance i n T enn. Cod e Ann. § 3 9- 13 -2 04 (i )( 6) wa s n ot h arm le ss. Th e State arg ues that the e vid e nc e su

pp or ts b oth ag g ravating c ircumstance s and, in the alternative, that the er ror, if a ny , with reg ard to the a g g ravating circ umstance in Te nn. Code Ann. § 39-13- 204(i)(6) was ha rmless. We have det er m i n ed that the evidenc e fully supports the j ury ’s findi ng with reg ard to both ag g ravating circumstance s. There fore , we r ever se the Court of Criminal Appea ls’s decision that the evide nce doe s not support the finding of an a g g ravating c ircumstance under Te nn. Code Ann. § 39-13- 204(i)(6)

. A.-48-

In addre ssing whe ther the e vidence is sufficient to support a jury ’s findingof the exist ence of an a g g ra vatin gc ir c ums tanc e , o ur

sta nd ard of re vie w i s f

ra me d b y takin g the fa c ts i n a

lig ht m os t favor able to the State a

nd by consideringwhether

a rational trier of f

act c ould h av e fo u nd the exis tence of an a g g ravating c ircumstance beyond a re asonable doubt. Sta te v . R e id , 164 S.W .3d at 31 4; Te rry

v . S tate , 46 S.W .3d at 1 6 0 -61. Even if a def endant ha s not ex pressly

challeng ed the
su ff ic ie nc y of an a g g ra vatin g c ir c ums tanc e fo un d b y the jur y , it is, ne ve rt

he le ss, t he du ty of this Court to determine whe ther “ [t ]he evidence supports the jury ’s findingof statut ory ag g ravating
c ir c ums tanc e or c ir c ums tanc e s. ” Te nn . Code Ann. § 3 9- 13 -2 06 (c )( 1) (B ); se e als o S tate v . R e id , 164 S.W .3d at 314.

B.

The Tenn . Code Ann. § 39-13-204 (i)( 6) Aggr avating Circum stance The jury found unanimously

that the State had proven beyond a rea sonable doubt that “[t] he
mur de r w a s c omm itt e d f

or the purp os e of

avo idi ng , inte rf

e ri ngwi th, or

pr e ve nti nga

lawf ul a rr e st or prose cution of t he defenda nt or another .” Te nn. Code Ann. § 39-13- 204(i)(6) . This ag g ravating
c ir c ums tanc e ari se s w he re on e of the de fe nd ant’ s mo tiv a tio ns fo r k ill ingthe vic timwa s to avo id
arr est or prose cution. State v. Iv y , 188 S.W

. 3 d 1 3 2 , 149 (Tenn. 2006) . Whil e this ag g ravating cir cum st ance is n ot l imi te d to kil lin g of e y e wi tne sse s o r t

ho se wh o c ou ld i de nti fy

the de fe nd ant, Sta tev . R e id , 164 S.W .3d at 315, the ki lling of a witness to a crime bec ause that person witnessed
a cr ime may , dependingon the circ umstances, c onstitut e a killi ng for pur pose of avoiding a

rre st or prosec ution. Sta tev . R e id , 21 3 S.W. 3d 79 2, 81 8 ( Te nn . 2 00 6) ; State v. Rollins , 188 S.W .3d 553, 572 (T e nn . 2 00 6) ; Sta tev . D av is , 141 S.W .3d 600, 618-19 (Te nn. 2004).
The Court of Criminal Appe als conclude d that the evidenc e was insuffic ient to support the Te nn . Co de Ann. § 3 9- 13 -2 04 (i )( 6) a g g ra vatin g c ir c ums tanc e . It r e a so ne d a s f oll ow s:
T h e p r o o f

e s t a b l i s h e s t h a tt h e v i c t i m , K a dh e mA l

- M a i l y, ob se rv e d o r ove rh e ard the sh oo tin g and ro bb e ry of his fr ie nd , H us sa in At ile ba wi . A ft e r r e vie w, it i s a

pp are nt t hat th e pr oo f, re le va

nt t o th is iss ue , f a ils to s up po rt a

pp lic a tio n of the (i )( 6) fa c tor

. We a re un a ble to conclude that the Appellant’s c ourse of action, bef

ore and afte r the homicid e of the victim, is consist ent with or cor roborative of the motive that he killed the victim to preven t h i s ar rest. I ndeed, a s a sse rt e d by

the Ap pe lla

nt, a ft e r t he pe rp e tr a tio n o f t

he c ri me , h e did
n o t f l e e th e ar e a , b u t , r a th e r , h e r e m a i n e d i n th e c o m m u n i ty. Mo re ov er, the Ap pe lla

nt m a de no e ff

or t to mov e his vic tim s o r t o c on c e a l evi de nc e of

the c ri me s. Th e Ap pe lla nt a rgue s th a t, t o a

pp ly the (i)( 6) fa ctor in this case , without more proof, w ou l dmake the f a c t o r i n h e r e n ti nan y mu r d e r

i n v o l v i n g t h e p e r

p e tr a t i o n o f

a r o b b e r y. We ag ree . The only other possible the ory supporting the exis tence of the (i)( 6) ag g ravating c ircumstance is the argument that, beca use the Appellant knew the vi ctim, it could be inferr ed that the victim might
re c og nize h im . The e vid e nc e , h ow e ve r, do e s n ot s up po rt thi s inf er en ce b ey o n d

a r ea s o n ab l e d o u

b t

. In d ee d , th e e v i d en ce s h o ws thatM r
. B ank s ’ s pre ci s e wor ds wer e “ I t r i ed t o pul l hi m away but he was t oo he avy t o m ove. ” 49
-49- the Appellant lef

t a witness who could identify him, Atilebawi, and that he knew

when he left t hat Ati lebawi was alive. Ac cording ly , we c on c lud e that th e jur

y ’s fi nd ingof

the (i )( 6) a g g ra

vatin g fa c tor

mus t be vac ated.
State v. Bank

s , 2007 WL1966039, at *53. We respe ctfully disag ree with this finding. View ing the evidenc e in the lig ht most favorable to the State, we have conclude d that the evidenc e shows beyond
a re a so na ble do ub t th a t Mr . B ank s k ill e d M r. Al -M a ily to el imi nate him

a s a wi tne ss t o h is c ri me s.
Th e Court

of Cr imi na l App e a ls’ s f

ind ingthat Mr . B ank s “ ma de no e ff or t to mov e his victims” is not supported by the rec ord. Mr. B anks conf essed to attemptingto move Mr. Atilebawi’ s bod y
. He s t at ed in hi s first confe ssion that he “wa s scar ed and didn’ t want nobody to see [Mr. Atilebawi].” Mr. B anks also told the pol ice that he had tried t o conce al M r. Atilebaw i’s body but that Mr. Atilebawi wa s too heavy to move. I n addition to his admission t hat he trie d to conce al Mr.

49 At ile ba wi ’s bo dy a ft e r sho oti ng him , Mr. B ank s a lso a dmi tte d th a t he and Mr . H ill iard

ha d a c tua lly discussed throwingMr. Atilebawi’ s body in the Wolf River to conce al their c rime. This evidenc e is more than suff

icient to enable a re asonable juror to conc lude that Mr. B anks wa s pla n n ing the way s that he would conce al his c rimes sever al day s befor e he committed the m a nd that he was intent
on conce aling his crimes af ter he arr ived at Mr. Atileba wi’s house.
As e vid e nc e that he wa s n ot atte mpt ingto c on c e a l hi s c ri me s wh e n he kil le d M r. At ile ba wi , Mr. B anks points to the f

act that Mr. Atilebawi wa s still alive whe n he lef t the scene . Howeve r, the fac ts of this case would a lso enable a rea sonable juror

to conclude that Mr. B anks believe d that Mr. At ile ba wi wa s e ith e r de a d or dying wh e n he le ft the sc e ne . H e ha d s ho t Mr . A til e ba wi fo ur tim e s, tw ic e in t he he a d. Mr . A til e ba

wi wa s ly ing ble e din g in his dr ive wa y . M r. At ile ba

wi wa s c on sc iou sly trying to avoid moving or attractingMr. Ba n k s’s attention bec ause he was a fra id that Mr. Ba nks
wo uld sh oo t hi m a g a in. Mr . B ank s o ff e re d n o a id o r a ssi sta

nc e to M r. At ile ba

wi . O n th e se fa c ts, a re asonable juror could e asily conclude that Mr. B anks left Mr. A tilebawi for de ad.

Mr. B anks also points to the fac t that he stay ed in the neig hborhood of the crime and did not attempt to flee as further evidenc e that he w as not attempting to conce al what he and Mr. Hilliard had done the night be fore . I f any thing, this evidenc e would prompt a r easona ble juror to conc lude t h at M r. Ba n k s did not attempt to flee bec ause he believed that he had killed the only two ey ewitne s s e s to th e c r im e
. T h is c o n c lu s io n is b u tt r e s s e d b y M r
. B an k s ’ s o w n c o n f e s s io n. When asked to e x plain his early

morning spending spree afte r leaving Mr . Atilebawi’s house , Mr. B anks’s
answe rs re flec ted his belief that he was unde r no dange r of be ing a rre sted bec ause he assumed that Messrs. Atilebaw i and Al-Maily wer e dea d or would die befor e they had a chanc e to ta lk w ith the police. When aske d why

he purc hased ne w rims and tires f or the stolen re d J eep, Mr. B anks re plied that he purc hased the se items beca use he pla nned to kee p the J eep. H e also voluntee red that he had pic ke d u p a job a pp lic a tio n at Wa lg re e ns
. Most importantly , howeve r, the c ircumstance s surroundingMr. Al- M ai l y ’s death provide persua sive evidenc e re g ardingMr. B anks’s motivation for shooting him. From Mr. B anks’s point-50-

of vie w, the on ly re ma ini ng wi tne ss wh o c ou ld ide nti fy him wa s h is f ri e nd , M r. Al -M a ily . M r. Al

Ma ily ha d h and e d o ve r h is m on e y wi tho ut r e sis tanc e , h a d n ot i nte rf e re d i n any way with M e ssr s. Ba nks and Hilliard, and ha d complied with the orde r to lie fac e down on the f loor of Mr. Atileba

wi’s bedroom. Af

ter Messr s. Ba

nks and Hilliard loaded the stolen proper ty in the J eep, the y

could have simply left the s ce n e. Instead, Mr. B anks wa lked bac k into Mr. Atilebawi’s house, w ent into Mr. Atilebawi’s be droom, and c almly and deliber ately

shot Mr. Al-Maily

in the h ead. Mr . Ba

nks had no persona l animus toward Mr. Al-Maily

. The manner in which he shot Mr. A l-Maily would prompt
any re a so na ble jur or to c on c lud e that Mr . B ank s sh ot h is f ri end no t to c omp le te the c ri me s b ut t o cover them up. Simpl y stated, viewingthe fa cts in the light most fa vorable to the State, a rea sonable juror could have found beyond a re asonable doubt that Mr. Ba nks killed Mr. Al-Maily

to el i minate a witness to his crimes. Acc ording ly , we r ever se the Court of Criminal Appe als’s conc lusion that the Tenn. Code Ann. § 39- 13-204(i)( 6) aggravating circumstance was not sufficiently supported by

the evidence. Furthermore , beca use the a g g ravating c ircumstance was suff iciently supported by

the evidenc e, we prete rmit any discussion of whether an er ror in cha rg ing this circ umstance w ould have be e n h arm le ss.
C.

The Tenn . Code Ann. § 39-13-204(i)( 7) Aggr avating Circum stance
Mr

. B an k s c h a ll e n g e s th e f in d in g o f th e T e n n
. Co d e A n n
. § 3 9

- 1 3

- 2 0 4 ( i) ( 7 ) a g g r av a ting
c ir c ums tanc e on thr e e fr on ts. F ir st, he argue s that the State pr e se nte d ins uf fi c ie nt evi den ce to su pp or t th e a pp lic a tio n o f thi s a g g ra

vatin g c ir c ums tanc e . Se c on d, he c la ims tha t it is i mpo ssi ble to deter mine whether

this a g g ravating circ umstance applied to his premeditated murde r convic tion or his felony murder c onviction. Third, he insists that apply ing the aggra vating fac tor to his felony
mur de r c onvic tio n v iol a te s State v. Middlebrook s , 840 S.W .2d 317 (Tenn. 1992) beca use the fa ctor is alrea dy inhere nt in any

conviction for m urder

in the perpe tration of a r obbery . The Court of Criminal Appeals found Mr. B anks’s c halleng e to the Te nn. C o d e An n
. § 39-13-204( i)(7) ag g ravating f

actor to be without merit. State v. Bank s , 2007 WL 1966039, at *55. We ag ree
. We need not tarry long with Mr

. Ba nks’s claim that the re cord c ontains insufficient evide nce to support the invocation of the Te nn. Code Ann. § 39-13-204(i)(7) ag g ravating f actor . The jury conclude d unanimously that the State had proved beyond a rea sonable doubt that “ [t ]he murde r wa s knowing ly

committ ed , s o l i cit ed, dire cted, or aided by the def endant, while the defe ndant had a
su bs tanti a l r ole in c omm itt ingor a tte mpt ingto c omm it, or

wa s fl e e ing a ft e r havin g a su bs tanti a l r ole in committi ng or attemptingto commit, any robber y .” For the reasons discussed i n aff irming Mr

. Ba nks’s conviction for first deg ree murder in the perpetration of a robbe ry and pre meditated murde r, we f ind that this aggravating c ircumstance is sufficiently supported by

the evidenc e.
Mr. B anks’s a

rguments reg ardingthe ambiguity of the application of the Te nn. Code Ann. § 39-13-204( i)(7) ag g ravating circ umstance and the violation of Sta te v . M idd le br oo k s are lik e wi se without merit. The j u ro rs addre ssed one murde r in this case – the killing of Mr. A l-Maily by Mr. Ba nks. The jurors w ere asked to de termine whether the State prove d its two asserted a g g ravating
c ir c ums tanc e s b e y on d a

re a so na ble do ub t. Th e y un anim ou sly fo un d that the State ha d p ro ve d b othSee Act of M ay 22, 1995, c h

. 377, 1995 T en n
. Pub. Act s 587. 50

E ven p ri o r t o t hi s l egi sl at i ve am end m ent , M r. B anks’ s argum ent wo ul d have b een unavail i ng f o r, as t hi s C o urt 51 ind ic a te d in S ta te v . Ha ll , 958 S. W

. 2d 679, 692- 93 ( T en n
. 1997) , “ appl i ca t i on of t h e f el on y mu r der a g g r av at i ng ci r cu ms t an ce i s i n appr opr i at e on l y i f t h e def en dan t i s c on v i ct ed so le ly on t he b asis o f f el ony mur der. I mp l i ci t i n t hat
s t at ement i s t he r ecogn i t i on t hat t he ci r cums t anc e pr op er l y may be ap pl i ed i f a def endan t i s co nv i ct ed of

pre med i t at ed f i r s t degr ee murder

. ” S e e a lso C a rte r v . S ta te , 9 5 8 S .W .2 d 6 2 0 , 6 2 4 -2 5 (T e n n . 1 9 9 7 ); St at e v

. P r i ce , 46 S. W

. 3d 785, 8 2 6 -2 7 (T e n n . C rim . A p p . 2 0 0 0 ).

H e as s er t s t h at al l t h e ch al l en g ed pr ov i s i on s “ [ e] x ce pt wh er e ot h er wi s e n ot ed, ” v i ol at e U

. S. Cons t

. a men d. 52 V, VI , VI I , a n d XI V.

L ike w ise , he a sse rts th a t t h e c h a llen g e d p ro v isio n s “[e ]x c e p t wh e re o the rw ise no te d ,” vio la te T e n n . C o n st. 53

ar t

. I , §§ 8, 9, 16, 17 a n d T en n Cons t

. a r t

. I I , § 2. -51- the Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-204( i)(6) ag g ravating circumstance and the Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13- 20 4( i) (7 ) a g g ra

vatin g c ir c ums tanc e be y on d a re a so na ble do ub t. I t is ne ith e r ratio na l no r c on c e iva ble that the jurors c oncluded that these fac ts w ere true as to one of the counts of Mr. B anks murder ing Mr. Al-Maily

but not the other. Mr. B anks either killed Mr. Al-Maily

to avoid arr est or prose cution
or he did no t. H e e ith e r kn ow ing ly kil le d Mr . A l- Ma ily in t he pe rp e tr a tio n o f a

ro bb e ry or he did no t.
In 1992, this Court held that Tennessee ’s broa d definitio n o f fe l ony murder a

nd the d u p li c a ti v e la

n g u a g e o f

th e f e lo n y mu r d e r a g g r av a ti n g c ir c u ms ta

n c e r e qu ir e d

it to h o ld th at Te nn e sse e ’s fi rs t de g re e mur de r statut e , as it e xiste d at th a t ti me , d id n ot s uf fi c ie ntl y na rr owthe c la ss of per sons eligible f

or the de ath pena lty

to comply

with the Eig hth Amendment to the United States Constit ution. State v. Middlebrook s , 8 40 S.W. 2d

a t 34 6. Th e Te nn ess ee G e ne ra l A sse mbl y responde d to this decision in 1995 by amendingthe ag g ravating circ umstance in Te nn. Code Ann. § 39-13-204( i)(7) to re quire that the murder “wa s knowing ly

committed, solicited, directed, or aided by the de fe nd ant, wh ile the de fe nd ant ha d a subs tanti a l r ole in c omm itt ingor a tte mpt ingto c omm it” one of the enumer ated f

elonies. Th i s amendment narrowe d the class of offe nders to whom the 50 death penalty could be applied suff iciently so as to leave no Sta te v . M idd le br oo k s pr ob le m e ve n in
case s where Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-204( i)(7) was the only ag g ravating circ umstance e stablished and the c onviction was for felony murder. Sta te v . R e id , 91 S.W .3d at 306 n.13 (a ppendix). 51

XV II. T HE C O N STITU TIO N A LITY O F T ENN ESS EE ’ S D E AT H P ENA LTY

S T AT UT ORY S C H E ME
Mr. Ba nks also makes nine other g ener al ar g uments that Tennesse e’s de ath pena lty statutes violate v ar i o u s p rovisions of the Constitut ion of the United States and the Constitution of 52 Tenne ssee. We will address ea ch of the se ar g uments in turn.

53

A. The Vagueness and Overbre adth of the Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-204(i)(6) Aggravat ing Circum stance-52-

Mr . B ank s in sis ts that th e Te nn
. Cod e Ann. § 39 -1 3- 20 4( i) (6 ) a g g ra vatin g c ir c ums tanc e is vague or ove rbroa d. This Court has consistently rec og nized that this aggravating circ umstance require s that a motive for the killing m ust have be en avoiding , interfe ring with, or preve nting a n arr est or prose cution. See , e.g. , State v. Iv y , 188 S.W .3d at 149. There is nothing vague or over broad about this ag g ravating c ircumstance

. B. The Dup lic at ion Be twe e n t he Ag gr av at ing Ci r c um st anc e s in T e nn. C ode Ann
.

§ 39-13-204( i)(6) and Tenn. Cod e Ann. § 39-13-204(i)( 7)
Mr. B anks ar g ues that the ag g ravating circ umstances in Te nn. Code Ann. § 39-13- 204(i)(6) and Te nn. Code Ann. § 39-13- 204(i)(7) are unconstitutio n al b eca use they duplicate e ach othe r. Th e se a g g ra

vatin g c ir c ums tanc e s hav e the po te nti a l to ov e rl a p, pa rt ic ula rl y wh e n a d e fe nd ant k ill s a per son in order to e liminate a witness to one of the enumer ate d fe l o nies set forth in Te nn. Code Ann. § 39-13-204( i)(7) where there ex i s t s co nnection in time, place , and continuity of ac tion betwee n the fe lony

and the murde r.
No tw ith sta

nd ing the fa c t that the se tw o a g g ra vatin g c ir c ums tanc e s c ou ld c on c e iva bly a pp ly to t he same e ve nt, it d oe s n ot necess ari ly followthat th e y are du pli c a te s. I t is no t di ff

ic ult to conce ive of nu m er o u s fac tual circ umstances in which the defe ndant could commit a murde r that would fall within on e aggr av at i n g circ umstance but not the other . For example, a def

endant who
mur de rs a

wi tne ss s ho rt ly

be fo re tr ia l or

mu rd e rs a

wi tne ss t o a

c ri me no t in c lud e d amon g tho se enumer ated in Te nn. Code Ann. § 39-13-204( i)(7) would fall under the Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13- 204(i)(6) ag g ravating c ir cumstance but not the Tenn. Code Ann. § 39- 13-204(i)( 7) ag g ravating
c ir c ums tanc e . Si mil arl y , a de fe nd ant who kil ls a pe rs on wh om he or sh e wa s ro bb ing e ith e r b e c a us e the victim refuse d to hand-ove r ca sh or bec ause of some persona l animus would fall under the Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13- 204(i)(7) ag g ravating c ircumstance but not t h e T en n. Code Ann. § 39-13- 204(i)(6) ag g ravating c ircumstance

. Even assuming, for the sake of ar g ument, that the ag g ravating circ umstances a

re duplicative, Mr. B anks has f ailed to de monstrate or explain why this dupli cation
w o u l d un d e r m i n e th e i r

c o n s t i tu t i o n a l i ty.
C
. The Vagueness and Overbre adth of the Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-204(i)(5) Aggravat ing Circum stance
Mr. Ba nks also insists that the Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-204( i)(5) a g g ravating c ircumstance is u nc on sti tut ion a lly

va g ue and

ov e rb ro a d. Ho we ve r, the State ne ve r atte mpt e d to inv ok e thi s ag g ravating c ircumstance in this case , and the jury cer tainly never addre ssed it. Accor dingly , Mr. Ba nks has not demonstrated that he has standingto challeng e this ag g ravating c ircumstance

. D. Tennessee’s Aggr avating Circum stances’ C om plian ce with the Na r r owing Re quir e m e nt s o f the Eig ht h Am e ndm e nt-53-

In addition to the death penalty not be ing applicable to a ny crime that does not result in death, Tenne ssee na

rrowly circ umscribes the homicide offenses to which the death pena lty is applicable. A con vi ction f

or ve hic ula r h omi c ide , a g g ra

vate d v e hic ula

r h omi c ide , a ssi ste d s uic ide , r e c kle ss homicide, cr iminally

neg lige nt homicide, voluntary manslaug hter, or se cond

d eg ree murder doe s not rende r a de fenda n t d ea t h p enalty elig ible. Even pe rsons convicte d of first degree murder c annot become death pe nalty

elig ible until a jury

finds unanim o u s l y

that the State had pr oved beyond a
rea sonable doubt the e x istence of one of the fifteen agg ravating circumstance s enumerated in Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13- 204(i).

Mr . B ank s argue s, de sp ite his c on c e ssi on that he ha s no e vid e nc e to s up po rt his argume nt, that most homi cides that occur in T ennesse e fall within the a g g ravating c ircumstance s in Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-204( i)(5), ( 6), & (7). He also argues that the c oncentr atio n o f ca p i t al case s in three ag g ravating f

actor s proves that Tenne ssee’ s death penalty statutes fail to meaning fully narr ow the class of de fe n dants who ar e death penalty elig ible as re quired by

the Eig hth Amendment to the United States Constit ution.
Th e Un ite d St a te s Su

pr e me Court

ha s h e ld t hat “ an a g g ra

vatin g c ir c ums tanc e mus t g e nu ine ly
narr ow the class of pe rsons elig ible for the de ath pena lty and must rea sonably

justify the impositi on of a more sever e sente nce on the defe ndant compar ed to others f ound gu i l t y o f m urder .” Zant v. Stephens , 462 U.S. 862 , 8 7 7 (1983). I n addition to providing a public decla

ration of the state’s policies reg arding the offenses deemed to war rant the use of the de ath pena lty , leg islatively cre ated g uid e lin e s c an a lso se rv e to c ha nn e l th e dis c re tio n of

jur or s in de te rm ini ngwh e the r t he de a th p e na lty is appropriate in a par

ticular c ase. Zant v. Stephens , 462 U.S. at 876-78. Thus, they preve nt the wanton and f

rea kish imposi tion of the death penalty

. Zant v. Stephens , 462 U.S. at 876. Throug h its statutory

definition of first degree murder a nd its statutory

enum er at ion of
a g g ra vatin g c ir c ums tanc e s, the Te nn e sse e Ge ne ra l A sse mbl y ha s n arr ow e d th e c la ss o f d e fe nd ants to whom the death pe nalty may be applied. W e h av e repe atedly found that these a g g ravating
c ir c ums tanc e s me e t th e c on sti tut ion a l re qu ir e me nts of na rr ow ing the c la ss of de a th p e na lty e lig ibl e p e r s o n s an d c h an n e li n g ju r o r d is c r e ti on. See , e.g. , State v. Bane , 5 7 S. W.3 d at 42 6- 27 ; Terry v. Sta te , 4 6 S. W.3 d at 16 1- 62 ; State v. Kee n , 926 S.W .2d at 742. Mr. B anks’s ar gu m en t has not persua ded us that this determination is in error

. E.

P rosec utorial Discre tion to Seek the De ath P enalty
Mr. B anks asse rts that Tenne ssee’ s death pe nalty statutes are unconstitutional beca use they confe r unlimited discretion upon Tenne ssee’ s district attorney s g ener al to de cide whether to seek the de a th p e na lty

. He argue s that the dif fe re nt va lue s, mot ivatio ns , a nd inf lue nc e s o f t

he se pr os e c uto rs , as we ll as an abse nce of clea r guidelines to d i re ct t h eir de cision-makingproce ss, rende rs Tenne ssee’ s death pe nalty statutes unconstitutionally arbitra ry and ca pricious.
Whil e Te nn e sse e ’s dis tr ic t atto rn e y s g e ne ra l ha ve be e n e ntr

us te d w ithbr oa d d iscret io n in
makin g c ha

rg ingde c isi on s, it w ou ld b e ina c c urat e to char a c te ri ze t he ir dis c re tio n a s e nti re ly unfetter ed. The Tenne ssee Gener al Assembly has def ined the ele ments of the off ense of first deg reeSee gener al l y J o a n E . Ja c o b y, The A m er i can P r ose cut or: A Searc h f or I dent i t y 4 7 (1 9 8 0 ); W ill ia m T . P iz z i, 54 Unders t andi ng Pr os ec ut or i al D i s cr et i on i n t he Uni t ed St at es : The Li m i ts of Com par at i ve Cr i m i nal P roce dur e as an In st ru m en t o

f R efo rm , 5 4 O h io S t. L .J

. 1 3 2 5 , 1 3 3 7 -4 0 (1 9 9 3 ); K e v in K . W a sh b u rn , Am er i can I ndi ans , C r i m e, and t he Law , 10 4 M i ch. L. R ev. 70 9 , 72 5

- 2 9 (20 0 6 ).

F ra n k W . M ill e r, P r ose cut i on : The D eci s i on t o C ha r ge a Su s pect Wi t h a C r i m e 2 9 4

- 9 5 (19 6 9 ). 55
-54- mur d e r an d h a s p r o v i d e d

th a ti ti s th e o n l y

o f f e n s e f o r w h i c ht h e d e a thp e n a l ty m ay b e s o u g h t

. In addition, the Gene ral Asse mbly h as prescribed f

ifteen a g g ravating c ircumstance s – at least one of which must be established beyond a re asonable doubt – before the death penalty can be considere d. Whe n d e c idi ngwh e the r t o p urs ue the de a th p e na lty , a dis tr ic t atto rn e y

g e ne ra l mu st t ake the se statutory require ments into account. In addition to these statutory require ments, a district attorney g ene r a l m ay

n o t p ur s u e th e d e a th

p e n a lt y w it h o u t p r o b a

b le c a u s e to b e li e v e th a t t

h e d e f e n d ant committed the offe nse. The dist rict attorney g ener al must also make sure that all char g ing de cisions fully comply with the Equal Protection Clause of the Four teenth Amendm ent. United States v. Armstrong , 517 U.S. 456, 464-65 (1996).

Te nn e sse e ’s dis tr ic t atto rn e y s g e ne ra l are e le c te d by the vo te rs of the ir dis tr ic ts. Te nn . Co ns t. art. VI , § 5; T enn. Code Ann. § 8-7-102 (2002). L ocal control over prosec utors is a core component of the Ame rica

n criminal justice sy stem beca use prose cu t o rs reflect the va lues of their loc al
c omm un iti e s. Th e fa c t th a t th e y are e le c te d b y

the vo te rs of

the ir dist ri c ts a ssu

re s th e ir
acc ountability

. Simpl y

stated, “no one else is in a better position to make char g ing de cisions which 54 ref lect community

values a s acc urate ly

and ef fec tively as the prose cutor.” 55

Fur thermore , the United States Supreme Court has r ecognized that prosecutoria l discretion provides a ve hicle for

individualiz ed justice. McClesk ey v . Kemp , 48 1 U.S. 279, 311-12 (1987). District attorney s g ener al are officers of the ex ecutive br anch of g overnme nt. Accor dingly , in the absenc e of a violation of l aw, the courts may not interfe re with the free ex erc ise of their discr etionary authority over the criminal prose cutions in their respe ctive districts. State v. Gilliam , 901 S.W .2d 385, 389 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995)

. The c onstitut ionality

of Tenne ssee’ s death penalty statutes is not undermined bec ause loc al elec ted district attorney s g ener al may m ak e d i s cretionary

char g ing de cisions with the statutory framework e stablished by the Gene ral Asse mbly . We have r ep ea t ed l y reje cted the a rgument that such discre tion raises a c onstitut ional problem. State v. Hines , 919 S.W .2d 573, 582 (Tenn.1995) ; State v. Brimme r , 8 76 S.W. 2d a t 86 ; State v. Cazes , 8 75 S.W. 2d 25 3, 26 8 (Tenn . 1 99 4) ; se e als o McClesk ey v . Kemp , 481 U.S. at 311-12; Gr e gg v . G e or gia , 428 U.S. 153, 199 (1976). Mr. B anks has not provided a

ny argument that persua des us that these de cisions are in error

. F. The Allegedly Discrim inatory Im position of the Death P enalty
Mr. B anks asse rts for the fi rs t t i m e on appe al that the death penalty in Tennesse e is being imposed in a discriminat o ry m an n er ba sed on ra ce, g ender , and g eog raphy . Whil e the r ecor d contains no evide nce o f d i s cr i m i n ation specific to his own case, Mr . Ba nks relies on va

riousS e e , e.g ., Cas t aneda v. Par t i da , 4 3 0 U .S . 4 8 2 , 4 9 5 -9 6 (1 9 7 7 ); Tur ner v

. Fouche , 396 U

. S. 346, 35 8

- 59 56 (1 9 7 0 ).

See , e. g. , W

a tso n v. F o rtW

o rt h B a n k & T

ru st , 4 8 7 U .S . 9 7 7 , 9 8 7 (1 9 8 8 ); Bas emor e v

. Fr i day , 478 U

. S. 385, 57 4 0 0 -0 1 (1 9 8 6 ) (B re n n a n , J., c o n c u rr ing in p a rt); I nt ’ l B hd

. of

Team s t er s v. Uni t ed St at es , 4 3 1 U

. S. 3 2 4 , 33 7

- 4 2 (19 7 7 ).

T he “ B al d us st ud i es” at i ss ue i n M cCl es ke y v. Kemp con s i s t ed of t wo s t at i s t i ca l s t u di es ex ami n i n g ov er 2, 000 58

m u rd e r c a se s tha t o c c u rr e d in G e o rg ia d u rin g the 1 9 7 0 s. T h e se stu d ie s su g g e ste d tha t b la c k d e fen d a n ts w h o k ill w h ite
v ic tim s h a d th e g re a te st lik e liho o d o f re c e ivin g th e d e a th p e n a lty. Mc C l e s k e y v

. K e mp , 481 U

. S. at 286

- 87

. T he U ni t ed Stat es D i st ri ct C o urt f

o und t he st ud i es’ m et ho d o l o gy f l awed and de cl i ned t o c o nsi d er t hem

. T he U ni t ed Stat es Co urt of Ap peal s as s umed t hat t he B al dus s t udi es s howed r aci al di s pari t i es i n t he i mp osi t i on of t he deat h pen al t y i n G eorg i a. T h e U n ited S ta te s S u p re m e C o u rt d id no t ad d re ss th e stud ie s’ m e tho d o lo g y. -55- statistical studies to support his belated discrimination claims. We find that these cla ims came too late and that Mr. Ba

nks’s evidenc e prove s too lit tle.
A def endant in a c riminal proce edingwho asser ts a n equal protec tion violation must prove (1) the e x isten ce o f p u rp o seful discrimination and ( 2) that this purposeful discr imination had a discriminatory eff

ect on him or

her. McClesk

ey v . Kemp , 4 81 U. S. at 29 2; see also State v. Irick , 762 S.W .2d 121, 129 (Tenn. 1988)

. A di scriminatory purpose “ implies more than intent as volition or i ntent as aw are ness of c onsequenc es. I t impli es that the de cisionmaker . . . se lected or rea ffirme d
a pa rt ic ula r c ours e of

a c tio n at lea st in part ‘b e c a us e of ,’ no t mer e ly

‘i n s pit e of

,’ its a dv e rs e e ff

e c ts upon an identifiable g roup.” Mc C l es ke y v. Ke mp , 4 8 1 U. S

. at2 9 8 (q u o t i n g Personnel Adm’r of Mass. v. Fe eney , 442 U.S. 256, 279 (1979)). Thus, the defe ndant must prove that a disc riminatory purpose was one of the fac tors that motivated the decision-make r. Ar lin gto n He igh ts v . M e tro . H ou s. Dev . Corp. , 429 U.S. 252, 265-66 (1977).
Statist ical proof

may be used to prove the exis tence of a discriminatory purpose in limited circ umstances. I n rar e case s, it c an provide the sole evide nce of discriminatory

purpose, but to do so, it must depict a sta

rk patter n of discrimination that is unexplainable on other g rounds. McClesk ey v. Kemp , 48 1 U. S. a t 29 3- 94 ; Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. De v. Corp. , 429 U.S. at 266. The United States Supreme Court has a lso permitted the use of statisti cal e vidence to prove dis c ri min a tor

y int e nt i n ju

ry se le c tio n and

in T itl e VI Ic a se s. 56 57

Howeve r, in McClesk

ey v . Kemp , the United Stat es S u preme Court determined that two particula r st atistical studies of murder case s in Georg ia wer e insuffic ient to prove discr iminatory 58 inte n t in th e c o n te xt o f d e c is io n s r e lati n g to th e im p o s it io n o f th e d e a th p e n a lt y in G e org ia. The Court ga ve four rea sons f

or its conclusion. First, the Court de termined that infe renc es dra wn from g ener al statistics are not a pplicable to unique juri es whos e dec isions rest on a consider ation of innumerable fac tors that vary acc ording to the char acte ristics of the defe ndant and the fa cts of the particula r off ense. McClesk

ey v . Kemp , 4 8 1 U. S

. at 2 9 4

. Second, the Court pointed out that the State ha d n o p ra c tic a l op po rt un ity to e xpla in any of

the statis tic a l di sp ari tie s su g g e ste d b y the stu die s. McClesk ey v . Kemp , 4 81 U. S. a t 29 6. Th ir d, e mph a sizi ng the e sse nti a l ro le that dis c re tio n p lay s in the cr iminal just ice pr ocess, the Court de termined that “ exceptionally clea r proof ” of discriminatory purpose is require d befor e the c ourts will infer that this discretion has be en abuse d. McClesk ey v

. Kemp , 48 1 U. S. at 29 7. F ourt h, a state le g isl a tur e , e xer c isi ngits br oa d d isc re tio n w ithre g ard to criminal pena lties, has leg itimate rea sons to maintain capital punishment, and there was no showingM r
. B an k s ma k es s pec i f i c r ef er en ce t o a “ n at i on wi de s t u dy pu bl i s h ed i n t h e D al l as T i mes H er al d, J u n e 17, 59 1985, ” i n f

or mat i on compi l ed by t h e N AAC P a n d f ou n d on t h e D ea t h Pen al t y I n f or mat i on Cen t er ’ s w ebs i t e, a n d a 1990 R ep o rt o f

t he G en era l A cc o un t i ng O f f i ce t o t he H o use an d S en ate J ud i ciary C o m m i t t ee s.
Sc ho l arl y anal y si s o f cri m e and co nvi ct i o n da t a i nd i cat es t hat t he d i f f erence b et ween t he num b er of m en and 60

wom en s ent enc ed t o deat h can be at t r i but ed t o n on- di s cr i mi nat ory f act ors
. T her e i s , f

or exa mp l e, a s i gn i f

i can t va r i anc e b e t w e e n t h e n u m b e r o f m u r d e r s c o m m i t t e d b y m e n a n d t h e n u m b e r o f m u r d e r s c o m m i t t e d b y w o m e n
. L a w r e n c e M. Fri ed m an, D ead Han ds: P ast an d Pre s ent i n Cr i m i na l Jus t i ce P ol i cy , 2 7 C u m b . L . R e v . 9 0 3 , 9 1 1 (1 9 9 6 -1 9 9 7 ); D a v id M c C o rd , I

m agi ni ng a Ret r i but i vi s t Al t er nat i ve t o Capi t al Puni s hm ent , 5 0 F la

. L

. R e v
. 1 , 1 2 3 n.4 5 9 (1 9 9 8 ). S im ilar ly, the re is a w e ll- d o c u m e n te d v a ria n c e b e tw e e n the typ e s o f m u rd e rs g e n e ra lly c o m m itt e d b y m e n a n d th o s e g e n e r a lly
c o m m itt e d b y w o m e n . E liza b e th R a p a p o rt, E q u a l i t y o f t h e D a m n ed : T

h e E xe cu t i o n o

f Wo m en o n t h e C u sp o

f t h e 2 1 st C en t u ry , 2 6 O h io N .U

. L

. R e v . 5 8 1 , 5 8 2 -8 3 (2 0 0 0 ); E liza b e th R a p a p o rt, The D eat h P enal t y and G ende r D i s cr i m i nat i on , 2 5 L a w & S o c ’y R e v . 3 6 7 , 3 6 9 -7 4 (1 9 9 1 ); V ic to r L . S tre ib , G en d eri n g t he D eat h Penal t y: Count er i ng Se x Bi as i n a

(c o n tinu e d ...)
-56- that th e legisl a tur e ma int a ine d c a pit a l pu nis hme nt b e c a

us e of a ra c ia lly dis pr op or

tio nate imp a c t. McClesk ey v . Kemp , 481 U.S. at 298-99.
1.

Discrim ination Based on Race Mr. Banks arg ues t hat t he very same statistical study discredited in McClesk

ey v . Kemp and
sever al other g ener al s tudies “demonstrate t he ex istence of rac ial discrimination in the imposi tion 59 of t he sentence of death” and that “T ennesse e lac ks any means of e nsuring that discrimination does not infest the death sentencingproce ss.” Howe ver, he prese nt s no evidenc e of imprope r dis c ri min a tor

y purp os e wi th r e g ard

to h is p ro se c uti on

on the pa rt of the Di str ic t A tto rn e y

Ge ne ra l, the tr ia l c ourt , o r t

he jur y that c onvic te d h im, and

he pr ov ide s no st a tis tic a l in fo rm a tio n s pe c if ic a lly reg ardingrac ial discrimination in c onnection with the imposition of the death pena lty in Tennesse e.
In the abse nce of

other, more direc t evidence of a r acia lly discriminatory

intent, the evidenc e offe red by

Mr. B anks fa lls far short of the sort of exceptionally clea r pro o f t h at wo u l d enable the courts to conc lude that the ac tions of the decision-make rs in his case w ere motivated by an improper d i s c r i m i n a t o r

y p ur p o s e b a s e d o n M r
. B an k s ’ s r a c e o r th e r a c e o f M r
. B an k s ’ s v i c t i m
. A c c o r d i n g l y, we concur with the conclusion of the Court of Criminal Appeals that Mr. B anks fa iled to prove that the impositi on of the de ath pena lty in his case wa s the result of a rac ially discriminatory

purpose.
2. Discrim ination Based on Gender
Mr. B anks’s a

rgument reg ardingdiscrimination based on g ender consists of three sentenc es and inc lud e s n o c itatio ns to autho ri ty

. He a sse rt s that Tenne sse e mus t disc ri min a te a g a ins t men in the impositi on of t he death penalty beca use “[t] here are 92 men on death row [in Tennessee ], but there are only two women.” This evidenc e, by itself, does not provide the sor t of exceptionally

clea r proof upon whic h to conclude that the decision-make rs in Mr. B anks’s c ase w ere motivated by an improper de sire to discriminate a g ainst Mr. Ba nks beca use he is a male. The diff

ere nce be tween the number of me n and the number of women on de ath row c an re adily be at t ri b u t ed to t he fa ct that few er w omen commit crimes that ar e death penalty elig ible. 60(

. . . con t i n u ed) 60 M a scu l i n e S a n ctu a ry , 6 3 O h io S t. L . J. 4 3 3 , 4 5 9 (2 0 0 2 ); see a lso La wr en ce A. G r ee n f el d & T r ac y L. Sn el l , B u r ea u of J u stice S t a tisti c s S p e c i a l R e p o rt W o m e n O f f e n d ers 4 (R e v ise d 2 0 0 0 ), avai l abl e a t h ttp :// w w w .o jp .us d o j.g o v /b js /p u b /p d f/wo .p d f (las t visite d O c t. 1 5 , 2 0 0 8 ).

R iley C . D a rn e ll, Te nnes s ee B l ue Book 2007- 2008 6 4 1 (2 0 0 8 ) (re p o rting d a ta c o llec te d b y the U n ited S ta te 61 C e n su s B u re a u ’s 2 0 0 0 c e n su s)

.

T h is info rm a tio n is av a ilab le thr o u g h a re v ie w o f th e a n n u a l C r i m e i n Tenn es s ee repo rt s avai l ab l e f rom t he 62 T e n n e sse e B u r e a u o f Inv e s t i g a t i o n S t a t i s t i c a l A n a lysis C e n t e r, avai l abl e a t h t t p: / / ww w. t bi

. s t at e. t n
. u s / di v i s i on s / i s d_cs u _s ac
. h t m ( l as t v i s i t ed O ct

. 17, 2008)

. T h e dat e f or t he pe r i od f

r om 2001 t h r ou g h 2007 s h ows t h at 39. 2% of t h e mu r der s r epor t ed i n T en n es s ee i n 2001 oc cu r r ed i n Sh el by Coun t y ; 38. 5% i n 2002; 3 4 .3 % in 2 0 0 3 ; 3 0 .9 % in 2 0 0 4 ; 3 3 .7 % in 2 0 0 5 ; 3 6 .7 % in 2 0 0 6 ; an d 3 4 .9 % in 2 0 0 7

.

T h e d a ta fo r th e p e rio d fro m 2 0 0 1 thr o u g h 2 0 0 7 sh o w s tha t 7 1 .1 % o f t h e m u rd e rs re p o rte d in T e n n e sse e in 63 2001 oc cu r r ed i n D av i ds on , H ami l t on , K n ox , M adi s on , Sh el by , a n d Su l l i v an Coun t i es ; 69. 8% i n 2002; 67. 0% i n 2003; 62. 6% i n 2004; 72. 6% i n 2005; 71. 9% i n 2006; a n d 68. 9% i n 2007.

T he homi ci des r eport ed i n t hes e s i x c ount i es ex cee ded 7 0% of t he t ot al nu mb er of

homi ci des r eport ed 64

s t at ew i de i n 2001, 2005, a n d 2006.
-57- 3. Di sc r im ina ti on Ba se d on L oc at ion of t he Offen se
Mr. B anks also insists that Tennes s ee ’s death pe nalty is unconstituti onal bec ause of the varia nce in its application among differ ent counties in the S tate of Tenne ssee. He specific ally notes that althoug h only

15% of the State’ s population resides in Shelby County , 40% of the population
o nd e a thr o w r e s u l t s f

r o mS h e l b y C o un ty p r o s e c u t i o n s
. A d d i t i o n a l l y, M r
. B an k s a s s e rt s th a tS h e l b y, Davidson, Knox, Madison, Hamilton, and Sul livan Counties, though re prese nting only 42% of the State ’s po pu latio n, are re sp on sib le fo r a pp ro ximate ly

69 % o f t he de a th s e nte nc e s.
Mr. B anks’s a

rgument on this po i n t erroneously assumes that var iance from a r andom demog raphic result is nec e s s a r ily arbitra ry . Howeve r, a c lear er inspec tion of the g eog raphic varia nce in the application of the death penalty in T ennesse e sug g ests that Mr. B anks’s statistical ar g ument i s m i s l e a d i n g
. W h i l e a

p p r o x i m a t e l y 1 6 % o f

th e S t a t e ’ s p o p u l a t i o nr e s i d e s i nS h e l b y C o u n ty, 61 consistently

more than 30% of all the m u rd ers r eporte d in Tennesse e betwe en 2001 and 2007 a re committed in Shelby County

. I n fac t, the number of murders repor ted in Shelby

County eac h y ear 62
aver ag ed over

35% of the murders repor ted in the entire State during that period. Thus, the a ctual number of murder s repor

ted in Shelby

County corr esponds with the 39% of de ath row inmate s from S h e l b y C o u n ty.
Simi larly , wh i l e only

approximately

42% of the State’ s population resides in Davidson, Hamilton, Knox, M adison, Shelby , and Sullivan Counti es, these c ounties consistently acc ount for more than 60% of the murde rs re ported in the S tate of Tenne ssee between 2001 and 2007. They 63 have oc casiona lly

acc ounted for more than 70% of the murders r eporte d in Tennesse e. Mr. B anks 64 estimates the numb er o f d ea t h ro w inmates fr om these counties a s 69%. I f that is the ca se, theB et we en 2001 an d 2007, t h e av er ag e per ce n t ag e of t h e r epor t ed h omi ci des i n t h es e s i x c ou n t i es w as 69. 1% 65

o f t h e sta te w id e to ta l.
-58- pe rc e nta g e of mur de rs re po rt e d in the se c ounti e s clo se ly a pp ro ximate s the pe rc e nta g e of de fe nd ants on de a th r owfr om t

he se c ounti e s. 65

Mr. B anks’s a

rguments based on the loc ation of the offe nse fa il to factor in the influe nce of pr os e c utorial dis c re tio n. As c an b e se e n, the y a lso su ff

e r f ro m a la c k o f f

a c tua l su pp or t. Acc ording ly , Mr. Ba

nks has failed to pr esent sufficie nt e vidence to demonstrate that he rec eived the death pe nalty

beca use he w as fr om Shelby

County

. To the contra

ry , the jury

sentenc ed Mr. B anks to death because he murdered Mr. Al-Maily in the perpetration of a robbe ry and for the purpose of avoiding , interfe ringwith, or preve nting a lawful a rre st or prosec ution.
G. The Requirem ent that the Jury A gree Unanimously to a Lif e Ve rdict
Mr. B anks ar g ues that re quiring the jury to ag ree unanimously upon a life ve rdict violates the United States Supreme Court’s r ulings in McKoy v . North C arolina , 494 U.S. 433 (1990) and Mi lls v. Mary land , 486 U.S. 367 (1988). This Court fully addre ssed and r ejec ted this argument in Sta te v. Brimme r , 8 76 S.W. 2d a t 87

. Mr

. B ank s h a s n ot o ff e re d a pe rs ua siv e argume nt s ho wi ngthat th is decision wa s in error

. H.

The P at te r n Jury I nst r uc ti on R e ga r ding th e Jur y’ s D e te r m ina ti on o f the

Existence of a Mitigating Circum stance
Mr. B anks asse rts t h at t h e Te nnessee Pattern Jury I nstructions are inconsistent with the United S tates Supreme Court’ s ruling in McKoy v . North C arolina , 494 U.S. 433 (1990) and Mi lls v. Mary land , 486 U.S. 367 (198 8 ). He a rgues that these instruc tions lead jurors to believe
err oneously

that they must unanimously ag ree on any mitigatingcirc umstance. While conc edingthat this argument was re

jected g ener ally

in State v. Thompson , 768 S.W .2d 239, 251-52 (Te nn. 1989), he ins ist s th a t th is c a se dif fe rs fr om State v. Thompson beca use t he trial court did not g ive the spec ial
a dd iti on a l in str

uc tio n th a t “ [b]e c a

us e dif fe re nt p e op le may have dif fe re nt v ie ws a

bo ut what te nd s to ameliorate o r mitigate . . . you may weig h and conside r any

and all cir cumstance s which y ou fee l tend t o mitigate the offe nse or de fenda nt in question.” See State v . Thompson , 768 S.W .2d at 251.

In this case, the trial court inst ructe d the j urors that “[t] he defenda nt does not have the burde n of provingmitigatingcirc umstances. The re is no re quirement of jur y unanimity as to any

particula r mit ig a tin g c ir c ums tanc e or tha t you a g re e on the same mit ig a tin g c ir c ums tanc e .” We f ind that th is instruction does not lead juror s to believe that they must unanimously

ag ree on the exist ence of a mitigatingcirc umstance. See , e.g. , Sta te v . H all , 958 S.W .2d at 718 (a ppendix).

I. The Pr ocess for Ensu ring P roportionality-59-

Mr . B ank s c or

re c tly a sse rt s that st a te s sh ou ld p ro vid e me anin g fu l a pp e llate pr op or

tio na lity re vie w o f d e a th s e nte nc e s to e ns ur e that th e de a th p e na lty is n ot b e ingarb itr ari ly

and c a pr ic iou sly imp os e d. He argue s th a t th e re vie w p ro c e ss c ur re ntl y be ingus e d b y Ten ness e e ’s a pp e llate c ourt s is inadequate beca

use (1) the jury

is not required to make written finding s conce rning mitigating circ umstances, ( 2) the informational base f or compa rative r eview of

first deg ree murder c onvictions is i na de qu a te and

inc omp le te , ( 3) the c ourt s’ me tho do logy fo r c on du c tin g com para ti ve r e vie w i s flawe d, and (4) the cour

ts allow defe ndants to waive pr esent ati on of mitigating e vidence without
re qu ir ingan o ff

e r of pr oo f as to wh a t mitig a tio n is ava ila ble

. He a lso ins ist s th a t th e pr oc e ss f a ils to m e e t th e sta

nd ard s r e qu ir e d f

or du e pr oc e ss.
Whil e compa

rative pr oportionality

revie w provides a

n important safe g uard ag ainst arbitra ry and ca pricious sentenc ing, it is not constitutionally require d. State v. Bland , 958 S.W .2d 651, 663 (Tenn. 1997)

. T h e T en n es see G ener al Assembly has direc ted the appe llate cour ts to determine whether “[t] he sente nce of

death is excessive or disproportionate to the penalty imposed in simi lar
case s, consideringboth the nature of the c rime and the defe ndant.” Te nn. C o d e An n. § 39-13-206( c)( 1)(D) . We have noted that the automatic revie w by this Court of every death se ntence is an integ ral pa

rt of Ten n es s ee ’s death pe nalty proce ss. Sta te v . Pritc he tt , 621 S.W .2d 127, 140 (Tenn. 1981)

. Th e re are no mor e se ri ou s ca se s that ar ri ve a t this Court ’s do or ste p th an d e a th p e na lty c a se s. They involve crimes of

the most serious impact, and they involve a penalty that is the most severe that c an b e imp os e d. Re vie wi ng any de a th p e na lty a pp e a l is g ive n th e utm os t atte nti on and highe st priority by eac h of the memb ers of this C ourt. Mr. B anks’s c halleng es to this Court’s means and methods o f re v iewingthe proportionality of a de ath sentenc e have been r epeatedly reje cted. See , e

. g. , S t a t e v. Reid, 91 S.W. 3d a t 28 6 n .9 ; State v. Rimme r , 250 S.W .3d 12, 43 (Tenn. 2008) (a pp e nd ix); State v. Vann , 9 76 S.W. 2d 93 , 1 18 -1 9 ( Te nn . 1 99 8) (a pp e nd ix); Sta t e v

. Keen , 926 S.W. 2d a t 74 3- 44 ; State v. Barber , 753 S.W .2d 659, 663-668 (Te nn. 1988).
The Te nnessee Gene ral Assembly has provided that “[t] he Te nnessee Supreme Court may promulg ate r

ules as it deems a

ppropriate to e stablish suc h proce dures as are nece ssary to enable the
r e v ie w in g c o urts to p r o p e r ly r e v ie wth e d e a th

s e n te n c e
. ” T e n n
. Co d e A n n
. § 3 9

- 1 3

- 2 0 6 ( c ) ( 2 )

. We continue to find the re view proc ess to be a sig nificant c ontributor to safeguarding a g ainst the arbit ra ry and capricious application of the death penalty . We also continue to find the existi ng pr oc e dure s to be a de qu a te to e na ble thi s Court to pr op e rl y c arr y out it s r e vie w i n d e a th p e na lty c a se s.
XV III
. T HE C O N STITU TIO N A LITY O F T ENN ESS EE ’ S L ETHA L I NJ E CT I ON P ROT OCO L
Mr . B ank s c on te nd s th a t th e State ’s le tha l inj e c tio n pr oto c ol vio late s his c on sti tut ion a l r ig hts ag ainst the i nfliction of cruel and unusual punishment under the Eig hth Amendment to the United State s Co ns tit

uti on . Sp e c if

ic a lly , M r. B ank s a sse rt s th at hi s f e de ra l and

state c on sti tut ion a l r ig hts would be violated throug h the use of Tenne ssee’ s execution method beca use the injec tions are not p re p ar ed , ad m i n i s t er edo r m o n i tored by m ed i ca l p ro fe s s i o n al s an d b ec au s e o f t h e u s e o f c ert ai ndru gs in Tennesse e’s c urre nt execution protocol. This Court rece ntly upheld Tenne ssee’ s lethal injectionW e al s o n ot e t h at t h e U n i t ed St at es Su pr eme Cour t h as dec l i n ed t o i n v al i dat e a s u bs t an t i al l y s i mi l ar e x ec u t i on 66
p ro to c o l tha t w a s c h a llen g e d o n e sse n tially the sa m e gr o u n d s. B aze v. R ees , ___ U

. S. ___, ___, 128 S. Ct

. 1520, 1528 (2 0 0 8 ).

T e n n . D e p ’t o f C o rr ., R e p o rt o n A d m inistra tio n o f D e a th S e n te n c e in T e n n e sse e (A p r. 3 0 , 2 0 0 7 ), a v a ila b le

67
at W orkm an v. B r edes en , 4 8 6 F .3 d 8 9 6 , 9 1 3 -9 2 1 ( 6 th C ir . 2 0 0 7 ) (A p p e n d ix A ); s ee al s o St at e v. Payne , N o. M 1 9 8 8

- 0 0 0 9 6

- SC

- D P E

- D D , (T enn. O ct

. 22 , 2 0 0 7 ) (o rd e r) , avai l abl e at ht t p: / / www. t s c. s t at e. t n. us / O P I N I O N S/ T SC / C ap C a se s/P a yn e /2 0 0 7 1 0 2 2 /P a yn e % 2 0 P e rv is% 2 0 O rd e r% 2 0 1 0 -2 2 -0 7 .p d f.
-60- protocol in Abdur’Rahman v. Brede sen , 181 S.W .3d 292 (Tenn. 2005)

. Both of the se fe ature s of 66 the dr ugpr oto c ol –

the us e of

th e th re e dr

ugpr oto c ol a

nd the a bs e nc e of me dic a l pr of

e ssi on a ls –
wer e pre sent in 2005 and remained when the protocol was further refined in 2007. Mr. Banks has 67 failed to p ersua de this Court that we should rec onsider our e arlier decision in Abdur’Rahman v

. Bredese n
. XIX.

T HE P ENO LOG I C A L O BJECTI V E OF THE D E AT H P E NAL T Y
Mr. B anks conte nds that the death penalty is unconsti t u t i o n al because it fa ils to serve any leg itimate penolog ical objec tive. The de ath pena lt y s er v es t he valid and le g itimate penolog ical objectives of de terre nce a nd retribution. Roper v. Simm ons , 54 3 U. S. 55 1, 57 1 (20 05 ); Atkins v. Vi rg ini a , 5 36 U. S. 3 04 , 3 19 (2 00 2) . T hu s, we re je c t Mr

. B ank s’ s argume nt that the de a th p e na lty is unconstituti onal bec ause it fa ils to serve any leg itimate penolog ical objec tive.

XX. C ON SI D ERA TI ON OF THE M ANDAT ORY RE V I E W F ACT ORS I N T E NN . C OD E A NN .

§ 39-13-206 WI T H RE GARD T O M R . B ANKS ’ S S E NT E NCE
When revie wi n g a c o n v i ct i o nfo r f i rs td egr ee murd er

an d an ac co mp an yi n g s en t en ce o f d eath, Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-206( c)( 1) require s the cour ts to review the r ecor d to determine whether (A) The sentenc e of death was imposed in a ny arb i t rary fashion; (B ) The e vidence supp o rt s the jury ’s finding of statutory
a g g ra vatin g c ir c ums tanc e or

c ir c ums tanc e s; (C) The e vidence supports t h e jury ’s finding that the ag g ravating c ircumstance or circ umstances outweigh a ny mitigatingcirc umstances; and (D ) Th e se nte nc e of de a th is e xce ssi ve or dis pr op or tio nate to the penalty imposed in similar case s, considering bot h t he
natur e of the c ri me and

the de fe nd ant.-61-

We have c are fully

revie wed the r ecor d in this case, and, a s we will discuss more fully , we have de te rm in ed that Mr . B ank s’ s se nte nc e wa s n ot i mpo se d in any a rb itr ary fa sh ion . We have a lso deter mined that the evidenc e supports the jury ’s finding s that the State proved the ag g ravating circ umsta nces in Te nn. Code Ann. § 39-13- 204(i)(6) and Te nn. Code Ann. § 39-13- 204(i)(7) beyond
a re asonable doubt and t hat t hese ag g ravating circumstance s outweig h the mitigatingcirc umstances offe red by

Mr. B anks. F inally , we ha ve conside red the nature of Mr. B anks ’s cr i m e and all the evidenc e in the re cord c oncer ning Mr . Ba

nks as a pe rson, and we have conclude d that the sentenc e o f d eath impos ed by

the jury in this case is neither e x cessive nor disproportionate to the pe nalties imposed for similar off

enses.
A. The Manner in w hich Mr. Bank s’s Sentence was Im posed
Th e jur y that im po se d Mr. B ank s’ s se nte nc e of de a th u na nim ou sly fo un d th a t th e State proved be y ond a re asonable doubt that Mr. B anks wa s g uilty of pre meditated first de g ree murder a nd fi rs t degre e mur de r in the pe rp e tr a tio n o f a ro bb e ry . In a dd iti on , th e jur y de te rm ine d th a t th e State proved be y ond a re asonable doubt that the manner in which th e m u rder

occur red suppor

ted the application of the ag g ravating circumstance s in Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-204( i)(6) a nd Tenn. Code Ann. § 39 -1 3- 20 4( i) (7 ). Our re vie w of the re c or d satis fi e s e a c h o f u s th a t th e tr ia l, a nd pa rt ic ula rl y the s ent e n c in g h e ar in g , w a s c o n d u c te d in a ma n n e r c o n s is te n t w it

hth e a p p li c a b le s tatutory provisions and the rules of criminal procedure . Acc ording ly , we c onclude that Mr. B anks’s sente nce of death was not imposed in an arbitra ry fashion. See , e.g. , State v. Y oung , 1 96 S.W. 3d

a t 11 5; Sta te v. Hugue ley , 1 85 S.W. 3d

35 6, 38 0 ( Te nn . 2 00 6) ; Sta te v . H all , 958 S.W .2d at 702.

B. The Evid entiary Supp ort for the A ggravating Circ um stances
We have a lrea dy

discussed in detail the e videntiary support for the two a g g ravating
c ir c ums tanc e s th a t th e ju ry fo un d to e xist in

thi s c a se . T he se a g g ra

vatin g c ir c ums tanc e s are fu lly supported by

the re cord.
C. The Relative We ight of

the Aggr avating and Mitigating Circum stances
In c arr yingout ou

r obl igat ion

un de r T e nn . Co de Ann. § 3 9- 13 -2 06 (c )( 1) (C ), we mus t deter mine whether

a re asonable juror could find bey ond a re asonable doubt that the ag g ravating circ umstances e stablished by t h e S t ate outwe igh the mitigatingcirc umstances pr esente d by the defe ndant. State v. Rimme r , 2 50 S.W. 3d a t 34 ; State v. Stephe nson ,195 S.W .3d 574, 593-94 (Te nn. 2006). Following a detailed review of this rec ord, we find that a reasonable jury could find, base d on the evidenc e in this case, that the ag g ravating c ircumst ance s outweig h the mitigating
c ir c ums tanc e s.
Mr. Ba nks prese nted and e stablished numerous mitigating c ircumstance s that were intended to present him in a sy

mpathetic lig ht. The ele ven witnesses testifying on his be half pointed out (1) that Mr. B anks wa s only nineteen year s old when he killed Mr. A l-Mai ly , (2) that Mr. B anks-62-

develope d HI V when he was sixt een year s old, ( 3) that Mr. Ba nks had re mained employ ed, (4) that Mr. B anks fr equently

transfe rre d from one sc hool to another duringhis ch i l d h o o d , (5) that Mr. Ba nks’s mother wa s o ft en ab s ent duringhis childhood beca use she wa s either in prison or in a halfwa y house, (6) that M r. Ba n k s ’s p are nts did not provide him adequate suppor t, (7) that Mr. Ba nks had nine siblings a

nd that he wa s the y ounges t o f s ev en brothers, ( 8) that Mr. B anks wa s picked on by

his older siblings when he was a child, (9) that Mr. Ba nks was a n active me mber of the L eew ood Ba

ptist C hurch, ( 10) that Mr. B anks’s a rtistic and culinar

y skills included dr awingpictures and cooking , (11) that Mr. Ba nks had been a model prisoner, (12) that while incar cer ated, Mr. B anks had par ticipated in and c ompleted numerous r ehabilitation cer tificate prog rams, (13) that membe rs of Mr. B anks’s c hurch a nd family wished to rema in in co n t act with him, (14) that two of Mr. Ba nks’s sisters wer e raped, (15) that Mr. Banks l oved animals, particula rly dog s, and (16) that Mr. Ba nks was a positive membe r of his chur ch and a g entle per son.
Th e State pr e se nte d e vid e nc e tha t un de rm ine d M r. B anks’s mitig a tio n e vid e nc e . T his evidenc e showe d that, despite the c onfinement of Mr . Ba nks’s mother, Mr. B anks and his mother ha d a c los e re latio ns hip

. I t a lso sh ow e d that Mr

. B ank s ha d a lov ingand

su pp or tiv e re latio ns hip wi th his gr andmother be fore her death and that he was a lso care d for by his older siblings and me mbers of the L eew ood Ba

ptist C hurch. In other wor d s , Mr. B anks ac tually had a great deal of suppor t duringhis childhood from his ext ended f amily and his churc h community

. The mitigation evidence reg arding his kind, g entle natur e wa s also undermined by evidenc e of his c riminal history which included assault, battery , and domestic violence. In contra s t t o the te sti mony re g ard ingMr . B ank s’ s g e ntl e natur e , h is f or me r g ir lf ri e nd de sc ri be d h owMr . B ank s c ou ld be extremely crue l a

nd violent. She rec ounted numerous incide nts of domestic violence , including one incid en t i n wh i ch M r. B anks pulled a gun and pointed it at her stomach whe n she wa s eig ht
months pr e g na

nt.
Ba s ed o n this evidence , a rational juror could ea sily have c oncluded that the a g g ravating circ umstances – killing a

witness to avoid arr est and prosecution and kil ling in the perpetra tion of
a ro bb e ry – o utw e ighe d th e va ri ou s mi tig a tin g c ir c ums tanc e s p re se nte d b y Mr . B ank s, pa

rt ic ula rl y his y outh, his health, his difficult family circ umstances, hi s ac tive involvement in his church community , and his ac tive involvement in reha bilitation certificate prog rams in prison.

D
. The Pr oportionality of

Mr. Banks’s Sentence
When this C ourt conduc ts the proportionality revie w re quired by

Tenn. Code Ann. § 39- 13- 206(c) (1)( D), we do not functio n as a “super jury ” that simply substitut es our judg ment for the sentenc ing jur

y
. State v. Godse

y , 60 S.W .3d 759, 782 (Tenn. 2001) . Rath er , o u r t as k i s to take a br oa de r p e rs pe c tiv e tha

n the jur or s wh o se nte nc e d M r. B ank s in or de r t o d e te rm ine wh e the r h is d e a th sentenc e “is disproportionate to the sentenc es imposed for similar c rimes and similar def endants.” State v. Thacke r , 1 6 4 S

. W

. 3 d at2 3 2 (q u o t i n g State v. Bland , 958 S.W .2d at 664). In doing so, the pool of ca ses upon which we drawin conducting this analy sis are “ first deg ree murder c ases in which the State soug ht the death pe nalty , a ca pital sentencinghear ing w as held, a n d t h e jury deter mined-63-

whether the sentenc e shoul d be li fe imprisonm ent, l ife im prisonment without possibili ty of par ole, or death.” State v. Rice , 184 S.W .3d at 679.
No two def

endants or the ir crimes a

re e ver ide ntical. Acc ording ly , the purpose of our r eview of other c apital ca ses is not to identify case s that corr espond pre cisely with the particulars of the one beinganaly

zed. State v. Copeland , 2 26 S .W .3 d 2 87 , 3 06 (T e nn . 2 00 7) ; State v. Thacke r , 164 S.W .3d at 233. I nstead, our task is to “identify and invalidate the abe rra nt death sente nce.” State v. Thacker , 1 6 4 S

. W

. 3 d

at 2 3 3 (q u o t i n g State v. Bland , 958 S.W .2d at 665). A se ntence is not dis pr op or tio nate be c a

u s e o t h e r d e fe nd ants have re c e ive d a lif e se nte nc e un de r s imi lar c ir c ums tanc e s. Sta tev . Ca rru the rs , 35 S.W .3d 516, 569 (Tenn. 2000)

. Rather, a death se ntence will be excessive or disproportionate where “the case taken as a whole is plainly lackingin circumstanc es consistent with those in case s wher e the death penalty has bee n imposed.” State v. Thacke r , 164 S.W .3d at 233 (q u o t i n g State v. Bland , 9 58 S.W. 2d a t 66 8) ; State v. Godse

y , 60 S.W .3d at 782.
Th is C ourt

us e s “ the pr e c e de nt- se e kin g me thod of c omp ara tiv e pr op or

tio na lity re vie w, in which we compar e a c ase w ith cases involving simil ar de fenda nt s an d s i m i l ar crimes.” State v. Copeland , 2 2 6 S

. W

. 3 d at3 0 5 (q u o t i n g State v. Dav is, 141 S.W .3d at 619 -620). We e x amine “the fac ts and circ umstances of the crime, the cha rac teristics of the de fenda nt, and the ag g ravating a

nd mitigat i n g ci rcumstances involved, and w e compa re this ca se with other c ases in which the defe ndants wer e convicted of the same or simil ar c rimes.” State v. Stev ens , 78 S.W .3d at 842. Our
a pp ro a c h d oe s n ot e mpl oy a ri g id, ob je c tiv e te st. Rathe r, e a c h mem be r of the Court dr aws up on his or her experience and judg ment in c omparingthe ca se beingrevie wed with other case s. See Sta te v. Bland , 958 S.W .2d at 668.
Whe n w e c on du c t th is c omp ari so n w ith re g ard to t he natur e of th e cri me , w e g e ne ra lly consider “ (1) the means of de ath; (2) the ma nner of death; (3) the motivation for the killing; (4) the place of death; (5) the victim’s ag e, phy sical condition, and psycholog ical condition; (6) the a bsence or pre sence of pre meditation; (7) the absenc e or prese nce of provocation; (8) the abse nce or prese nce of justification; and (9) the injury to and ef fec t upon non-dec edent victims.” State v. Rimme r , 250 S.W. 3d a t 35 ; se e als o State v. Rollins , 1 8 8 S

. W

. 3 d at 575. With reg ard to the de fenda nt, we g ener ally compar e the de fenda

nt’s “(1) prior criminal rec ord, i f any ; (2) a g e, ra ce, a nd g ender ; (3)
me nta l, e mot ion a l, a

nd phy sic a l c on dit ion ; ( 4) ro le in t he mur de r; (5 ) c oo pe ra

tio n wi th a

uth or iti e s; (6) leve l of remor se; (7) know ledg e of the victim’s he lplessness; a nd (8) potential f

or re habilitation.” State v. Rimme r , 2 50 S.W. 3d a t 35 ; se e als o State v. Rollins , 188 S.W .3d at 575.

We tur n first to the nature of Mr. Ba nks’s offe nse. Severa l da y s befor e Mr. B anks shot Mr. Atilebawi and the n shot and killed Mr. Al-Maily , he formulated a plan wit h Mr. Hil liard to extract
reve ng e on Mr. Atileba

wi for c onduct that had a lleg edly o cc u rr ed almost one y ear ear lier. He obtained a f

irea rm from Mr. H illiard and then wa ited for the oppor tunity to strike.
Th i s o p p o rt unity

came duringthe ea

rly morning hours of Septembe r 16, 2002 whe n Mr. B ank s w e nt t o M r. At ile ba wi ’s ho me fo r the purp os e of se e kin g re ve ng e . T he fa c t th a t Mr . A l- Ma ily was visiting Mr. Atilebawi did not deter Mr. Banks. Carry ing out the pla

n he had de vised with Mr. Hilliard, Mr. B anks shot Mr. Atilebawi f our times and then tried to c oncea l his body . After shooting Mr. Atilebawi, Mr. B anks robbe d Mr. Al-Maily and then order ed him to lie fa ce down on the floor-64-

of Mr. Atileba

wi’s bedr oom. Mr. Al-Maily did not resist. After looting Mr. Atileba

wi’s house a

nd loa din g the sto le n p e rs on a l pr op e rt y int o a sto le n Jee p Ch e ro ke e , M r. B ank s c a lml y and de lib e rate ly returne d to Mr. Atilebawi’s house , walked to Mr

. At i lebawi’ s bedroom whe re Mr . Al-Maily was lying on the floor, and f

atally shot Mr. Al-Maily in the back of the head. Mr . Ba nks and Mr. Hilliard then left the sc ene of

their cr imes with the st o l en p ro p erty and the stolen a

utomobiles. L ater

that morning , appar ently

believingthat both Mr. Atilebawi and Mr . Al-Maily wer e dea d, Mr. B anks we nt on a spendingspree with the money he had stolen f

rom Messrs. Atilebaw i and Al-Maily

. Mr . B ank s h a d no pe rs on a l anim os ity tow ard s Mr . A l- Ma ily . In f a c t, h e c ha

ra c te ri zed the ir
re latio ns hip a s f

ri e nd ly . Sh oo tin g Mr . A l- Ma ily wa s n ot p art

of Mr . Ba nk s’ s p lan o f r e ve ng e a g a ins t Mr. Atilebawi. Neither was it nec essar y to commit the offense , beca use Mr. Al-Ma ily

cooper ated fully with Mr. Banks during t he robbery and offere d no resistenc e whatsoever to either Mr. B anks
or Mr . Hill ia rd . M r
. B an k s s h o tM r
. A l

- M a i l y i nt h e b a c k

o f t h e h e a d b e c a u s e h e d i d

n o tw an tto leave behind any

live witnesses to his crimes.

We now turn to Mr. Ba

nks himself. Whil e he opted not to testify on his own behalf dur ing the sentenc ing pha se, he c alled ele ven mitigation witnesses. These w itnesses prese nted a positive and sy mpathetic imag e of Mr . Ba nks. An implicit, and at times e x plicit, undercur rent of muc h of the testimony focuse d on the fac t that Mr. Ba nks was only

nineteen year s old when he murde red Mr

. Al-Maily

. Mr . B ank s w a s pa

rt of a larg e fa

mil y that fa c e d sig nif

ic ant so c ia l and

fi na nc ia l c ha lle ng e s. De sp ite the le ng thy

pe ri od s whe n hi s mo th e r w a s in c us tod y , h e ha d a

c los e re latio ns hip wi th h is mother and r ece ived support from his gra ndmother, hi s older sibl ings, and members of his church. Whil e many

of his family

and fr iends saw Mr. B anks’s s o ft -h ear ted and g entle side, Mr. B anks beca me ca pable of resor ting to cr uelty and viol ence
. By the time he murde red Mr . Al-Maily , he had been c onvicted of assault, battery , and domestic violence. H e did not tell his former g irlfriend that he wa s HI V-positive, and he pointed a gun to her stomach when she w as eig ht months preg nant.
We find that the death sentence , as applied to Mr

. Ba nks in this case , is ne ither excessive nor disproportionate whe n compar ed to defe ndants in other ca ses. For example, in State v. Thacke r thi s Court expressly

noted that “[w]e have uphe ld the death pe nalty in severa l simi lar ca ses wher e the defe ndant stole from the vic tims and committ ed murde r t o avoid arrest or pr osecution.” State v. Thacker , 164 S.W .3d at 233. Additionally , in Sta te v . D av is we ob se rv e d th a t w e have “ fr e qu e ntl y upheld the death penalty in first deg ree murder c ases involving shooting off enses c ommitt ed in the
course of a r obbery

or other f elony .” Sta te v . D av is , 141 S.W .3d at 621.
The follow in g ar e amo n g th e c a s e s in w h ic h th is Co urt d e te r mi n e d th a t a

p p li c a ti o n o f

the death penalty was not di sproportionate in lig ht of other similar cir cumstance s. I n State v. Thacke r , the de fe nd ant sta

bb e d a wr e c ke r d

ri ve r who dis c ov e re d th a t th e de fe nd ant w a s u sin g a sto le n c re dit
car d. The de fenda

nt later re turned to concea l the body and to steal the vic tim’s credit ca rds and c ash. State v. Thacke r , 164 S.W .3d at 233. In Sta te v . R e id , the defe ndant shot a nd killed two unresisting employ ees while they

wer e lying f

ace down on the floor a s p ar t o f a p l anned and pre meditated robber y in order to a

void arre st or prosec ution. Sta te v . R e id , 91 S.W .3d at 287. In S tate v. Sims , the de fe nd ant sh ot the vic tim in the ba c k of he a d duri ng a burg lary of the vic tim ’s ho me in o rd e r t o-65-

preve nt identification. State v. Sims , 45 S.W .3d 1, 19 (Tenn. 2001) . In Sta te v . Ch alm e rs , the Court upheld a death sentenc e wher e a defe ndant shot the victim f ive times a s part of a

robber y
. State v. Cha lm e rs , 28 S.W .3d 913, 915, 919 (Tenn. 2000) . Finally , in State v. K i ng , the Court upheld the conviction of a

defe ndant who fatally

shot a taver

n owner who was not re sisting at the t ime. Sta te v. King , 694 S.W .2d 941, 943, 947 (Tenn. 1985)

. W e h av e a l s o c o n c l u d e d th a tth e m i t i g a t i n g c i r c u m s t an c e s i nth i s c a s e d o n o tc ar r y a dis pr op or tio nate ly he avie r w e ig ht t

ha n th e mit ig a tin g c ir c ums tanc e s in oth e r c a se s i n

wh i c h t h e de a th penalty has bee n approve d. The de ath pena lty has be en fo u n d p ro portional in a number of case s inv olv ingde fe nd ants wh o we re a s y oung a s or y oung e r tha n Mr. B ank s w he n th e y

mur de re d th e ir victims. Sta tev . D av is , 141 S .W .3 d at 62 1- 22 (e ig hte e n- y e ar- old de fe nd ant) ; Sta te v . B e rry , 141 S

. W.3 d at 57 1- 72 (n ine te e n- y e ar- old de fe nd ant) ; State v. Pike , 9 7 8 S

. W

. 2 d at 9 2 2 -2 3 (e i gh t ee n -y earold defe ndant). Application of the death p en al t y h as also bee n found not to be excessive in ca ses wh e re the de fe nd ant e xpe ri e nc e d a dif fi c ult fa mil y lif e wi th p are nts in p ri so n o r o the rw ise a bs e nt, resulting in being raised with and by siblings and a

g randmother

. Sta te v . D av is , 141 S.W .3d at 621- 22 ; Sta tev . B e rry , 141 S.W .3d at 571. In terms of be ing a model p ri s o n er , this Court has found evidenc e of be ing a

model inmate, including beinga positive uplifting membe r to the pri s o ner community , not to render application of the death pe nalty disproportionate. State v. Austin, 87 S.W. 3d 44 7, 45 7- 58 (T e nn . 2 00 2) . N or ha s su ff e ri ng fr om dis e a se or ma int a ini ng c los e c on ta c t w ith family members be en suff

icient to rende r a de ath sentenc e excessive. Sta te v . A us tin , 87 S.W .3d at 458. Considering the ag g ravating a nd m itigatingcirc umstances in this case in light of a ll the
e vid e nc e in t

his c a se , w e fi nd

that Mr . B ank s’ s c on vic tio n a nd se nte nc e are no t “ pla inl y la c kin g in circ umstances consistent with those in c ases wher e the death penalty has b ee n i m posed.” State v. T hacke r , 164 S.W .3d at 233 (quoting State v. Bland , 9 58 S.W. 2d a t 66 8) ; S

ta te v. Godse

y , 60 S.W .3d at 782. Acc ording ly , we f ind the application of the death sentenc e in this case to be neither disproportionate nor e x cessive.

XX I.

In s umm ary , w e have c on c lud e d th a t th e Court of Cr imi na l App e a ls d e a lt c orr ect ly wi th reg ard to all the issues raised by Mr. B anks on this appea l except the trial court’ s submissi on of the Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-204( i)(6) ag g ravating fac tor to the jury

. We ha ve deter mined t h at the Court of Criminal Appeals er red by co n cl u d i ng that Tenn. Code Ann. § 39- 13-204(i)( 6) wa s not supported by sufficie nt e vidence . There fore , we r ever se the Court of Criminal Appea ls’s disposit ion of that is su e , b ut a ff

ir m th e jud g me nt o f t

he Court of Cr imi na l App e a ls i n a ll o the r r e sp e c ts.
Mr . B ank s’ s se nte nc e of de a th sha ll be c arr ie d out o n D e c e mbe r 9 , 2 00 9, un le ss o the rw ise order ed by

this Court or ot her proper authority

. I t appea ring that Mr. Banks i s indige nt, the costs of this appeal a

re tax ed to the State of Te nnessee
.

______________________________ WI L L I AM C. K OC H, JR., JUST I CE-66- AP P EN DI X (E xce rp ts f

ro m th e De c isi on

of the Court of Cr imi na l App e a ls)

I N THE COURT OF CRI MI NAL APPEAL S OF TENN ESSEE AT JAC KSON April 10, 2007 Session
STATE OF TENNESSEE v. DEVI N B ANKS
Di re c t App e a l f

ro m th e Cr imi na l Co ur

t f or She lby County No

. 0 3 -0 1 9 5 6 J o s ep hB. Da i l ey , J u d ge
No. W2005-02213-CCA-R3-DD - F iled J uly 6, 2007 Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appea l as of Rig ht; J udg ment of the Criminal Court Affirme d

D AVI D G. H AYES , J ., delivere d t h e o p i n i o n of the c ourt, in which J OHN E VE R E TT W I LLI A M S and A L AN E. G L EN N , J J ., joined.

Ro ber t Jone s, She lby

County Pub lic De fe nd e r; Phylli s A luk o a nd To ny B ra y ton , A ssi sta

nt P ub lic Def ender s (on appe al); Kathy Kent and L atony a B urrow, A ssistant P u b l i c Def ender s (at trial), Me mph is, Te nn e sse e , f

or the Ap pe lla

nt, De vin B ank s. Robert E. Cooper, Jr., Attorney Gene ral a

nd Reporter ; Michael Moore , Solicitor Genera l; Cl are nce Lutz, Assi stant Attorney

Gene ral; Will iam L

. Gibbons, District Attorney Gene ral, S tacy McEndre e, Assistant District Attorney Gene ral, a

nd Kar en Cook, Assistant District At torney Gene ral, for

the Appellee , State of Tenne ssee.
OP IN ION [ S e c t i o nIII ]

F ail ur e to Cha r ge Ag gr av at ing Ci r c um st anc e s in I ndic tm e nt The Appe llant asserts that the “ imposit ion of the death penalty

. . . violated due pr ocess of law bec ause the ag g ravating circumstance s wer e not set forth in the i ndictment.” In this reg ard, he contends that “ [a] ny

fac t that increa ses the maximum penalty for a crime must be c harg ed in an ind ic tme nt, su

bmi tte d to a

jur y , an d pro ven bey on d a

re a so na ble do ub t in

or de r t o s a tis fy

the 5th Am e ndme nt’ s D ue Pr oc e ss C la us e and the 6th Am e ndme nt’ s noti c e and jur y tr ia l gua ra nte e s. ” With relianc e upon Apprendi v. New Je rsey and Ring v. Arizona , the Appellant submits that he was de nied du e pr oc e ss o f l aw b e c a

us e the ind ic tme nt r e tur

ne d b y the g ra

nd jur y did no t in c lud e fa c ts that w ou ld qu a lif y him fo r t he de a th p e na lty . In o the r w or ds , h e mai nt ain s th at f ir st d e g re e mur de r i s n ot a capital of fense unless acc ompanied by ag g ravating f

actor s. I n order

to elevate the cr ime to capital-67-

murder, he alleg es that the indictment must include lang uag e of the statutory ag g ravating circ umstance( s).
The Te nnessee Supreme Court has c onsistently reje cted this argument by holding that ag g ravating circ umstances need not be pled in the indictment. Sta te v . R e id , 164 S.W .3d 286, 312 (2 00 5) ; Leach , 14 8 S. W.3 d at 59 ; Be rry , 1 41 S.W. 3d a t 56 2; State v. Holton , 126 S.W .3d 845, 863 (T e nn . 2 00 4) ; State v. De llinger , 79 S.W .3d 458, 467 (Tenn. 2002). Our supre me cour t expl ained, “[t] he foc us in Apprendi , Ring , and Blakely was on the Six th Amendment rig ht to trial by jury ,” and “the Court expressly

declined to impose the F ifth A m endment right to prese ntment or g rand jury indictment upon the States.” Be rry , 141 S.W .3d at 560. The Appellant is not entitled to relief on this iss ue. [S ection IV]

Int r oduc ti on o f P hot og r aph o f the Vi c ti m Duringthe testimony

of L eonar d Porter, a c riminal investigator for the District Attorney Gene ral’s O ffice , the prosec uto r moved to admit a photog raph of Atilebawi’s injuries. The photogr aph, take n the wee k of the trial, de picted the r ight side of the victim’s head a

nd showed a larg e scar beg inning at his f orehe ad and continuing to the back of his he ad. The prosec utor stated that introduction of the photog raph w as re levant to “show a ll of these ele ments of the cr iminal attempt murder in the f

irst deg ree . . . .” She fur

ther e x plained that no photogr aphs of Atileba wi’s injuries wer e taken at either “the crime scene or the hospital because they wer e trying to save his life.

. . .” The Appellant objected stating that the victim ha d testified in person a nd that the photog raph failed to prove any

element of

the cr ime. The trial c ourt made the following ruling rega rd i n g the admission of the photog raph:

Well, my response to all of what all of y ou have sa id would be that as to releva nce, it’s ve ry

rele vant. I

mea n , there is no question it was
re le va nt. I t sh ows the ho rr if

ic natur e of

the se ve re inj ur

y that th is man sustained, and it t en d s t o corr oborate what he te stified to and what the doc tor from The Med testified to.

It ’ s n o tp r e

j u d i c i a l i nt h a t i t d o e s n ’ ts h o w – i t ’ s n o tg o r

y o r b l o o dy, and the jury

saw him when he was in her e y esterda y and saw
e sse nti a ll y th e same in

jur y . T he on ly

– I thi nk the on ly pla us ibl e argument ag ainst allowing it in would be that it would be cumulative. T h e v i c t i mw a s i nh e r e ye s t e r d ay.
But I think that the State’s burden to prove the ir ca se, I think gives the m th e ri g ht t o intr od

uc e on e ph oto g ra

ph . T he y ’r e no t a sk ingto introduce te n or [t wenty ] but to introduce one photogr aph that ca n be shown to the jury

to corr oborate the i njuries t hat were testified to by the victim himself and by the doctor from The Med . . . [t] o show the injuries in ge nera l. To show that this man was sever ely injured by the-68- g unshot wounds to the back of t he hea d, that half his hea d was blown off to show a ll of those things of c ourse.
The trial c ourt continued:

. . . I t is rel ev an t an d it’s not prejudicial. I t is perhaps somewhat c umu lativ e but that – fo r e xamp le , ha d the State offered i t into
ev i d en ce wh en this victim was on the stand, I would have le t them introduce it at that time bec ause I think it’s fair to allow at lea st one photogr aph of injuries, e ven thoug h the per son is sit ting he re live at thi s p oint in

tim e , to do c ume nt t

he re c or d, to r e min d th e jur y late r i n the trial, at c losin g argume nt, during deliberations, that thi s is what thi s ma n lo ok s li ke so that th e re is a n a c tua l ph oto g ra

phof it.

P ho to graphs are al way s b y th eir nat ure cum ul ati ve t o s om e ex ten t. By definition, a photog raph is g oing to be cumulative of somethingelse. Yo u c an alway s h ave a pe rs on c ome in a

nd te sti fy to what a photogr aph other

wise depic ts. . . .

. . . And a photog raph w ill provide [t he jury ] wit h that documented evidenc e that they

can look at of injuries that they saw in per son four or five da y s ear lier. . . . On appe al, the Appe llant contends that the trial c ourt err ed in permitting the introduction of the phot o gra p h of the survivingvictim, arguing that the trial court should have excluded the photogr aph bec ause of

the inevitable da

ng er of unfair pr ejudice. A d d i t i onally , he asse rts that the photogr aph exag g erated the victim’s injuries and wa s irrele vant, as the photog raph w as take n y ear s afte r the incide nt. Finally , the Appellant contends that, since the jury had alr eady

seen A tilebawi’s injuries during his testimony at trial, the a dmission of the photogra ph was pre

judicially cumulative. The State re sponds that the trial cour t’s ruling was prope r. Specific ally , the State contends that the ph oto g ra phwa s r e le va

nt t o e sta

bli shthe Ap pe lla

nt’ s inte nt t o mu

rd e r Atilebaw i and

that it establishes that Atilebaw i suffe re d serious bodily injury . Both e lements are nece ssary to support convictions of attempted first deg ree murder a nd espec ially

ag g ravated robbe ry
. See T.C.A. § 39-13- 202, -403. The State also contends that the phot og raph ill ustrated the testimony of Dr. T immons and At ile ba wi

. The a dmission of phot og raphs is g ener ally discretionar

y with the trial court a

nd, absent a

n abuse of that discretion, will not result in the g rant of a new tria l. State v. Bank s , 564 S.W .2d 947, 949 (Tenn. 1978) . Howeve r, a photog raph must be r eleva n t t o an i s s u e that the jury must decide befor e it may

be admitted into evidenc e. State v. Vann , 976 S.W .2d 93, 102 (Tenn. 1998) , c e rt

. denied, 5 26 U. S. 1 07 1, 11 9 S. Ct. 14 67 (1 99 9) ; State v. Braden , 8 67 S.W. 2d 75 0, 75 8 (T e nn . Cr im. Ap p. 19 93 ); see also Tenn. R. Evid. 401, 402. Evidence that is not relevant to prove some part of the pr os e c uti on ’s c a se sh ou ld n ot be a dmi tte d sole ly to inf lame the jur

y and pr e jud ic e the de fe nd ant. Additionally , the probative value of the phot og raph must outweig h any unfair pr ejudicial ef

fec t that it may have upon the t ri erof fa ct. Vann , 9 76 S.W. 2d a t 10 2- 03 ; see also Tenn. R. Evid. 403It is u n d isp u te d tha t, d u rin g the c o u rs e o f t h e A p p e llan t’s re p re se n ta tio n , ce rta in r e a ssig n m e n ts in the P u b lic 2 D ef ender ’ s O f

f i ce r es ul t ed i n At t orn ey T hac ker y bei ng r el i eve d f r om t hi s ca s e. At t orn ey W hi t e wa s appo i nt ed i n h er (c o n tinu e d ...) -69- (“[a]lthough relevant, evidence may be ex cluded if its probative value i s substantially outweig hed by the dang er of

unfair pr ejudice” ).
Whil e it can be said that photog raphs of crime vic tims who suffer se rious bodily injury are pr e jud ic ia l by

the ir ve ry natur e , a pr e jud ic ia l ph oto g ra

phis n ot per se excludable. What is ex cluded is e vid e nc e wh ic h is un fa ir ly pr e jud ic ia l, i n o the r wo rd s, e vid e nc e wh ic h h a s an und ue te nd e nc y

to sugges t a decision on an improper ba sis, freque ntly , though not ne cessa rily , an emotional one. Banks , 564 S.W .2d at 951.
The trial c ourt deter

mined that the photog raph w as re levant and not prejudicial. We ag ree that the phot og raph was relevant t o supplement the t estimony of Dr. T immons, as well as that of the victim hims elf. Se e Sta tev . Co le , 155 S.W .3d 885, 913 (Tenn. 2005) (Appe ndix ), c e rt

. denied, 546 U. S. 8 29 , 1 26 S. Ct . 4 7 ( 20 05 ). We a lso a g re e that the tr ia l c ourt ’s a c kn ow le dg me nt o f t he ne e d to pr e se rv e a re c or d f or the jur y is a c c ur a te . A dd iti on a lly , th e ph oto g ra phin q ue sti on is n ot p art ic ula

rl y g ru e so me . T hu s, we c on c lud e tha t the pr ob a tiv e va lue of the ph oto g ra phis n ot o utw e ig he d b y

its prejudicia l e ffe ct, and the trial court did not abuse its discre tion in allowing its admission. Further , it does not aff

irmatively appea

r t hat t he “admission of t he photog raph[] has affe cted the r esults of the trial.” See B anks , 564 S.W .2d at 953. The A ppellant is not entitled to relief on this issue. [S ection V]
Adm iss ion of t he App e lla nt ’s St at e m e nt
Th e Ap pe lla

nt ne xt a rgue s that the tr ia l c ourt e rr e d in pe rm itt ing int ro du c tio n o f s tate me nts ma de by the Ap pe lla

nt wi tho ut fi rs t ru lin g on the Ap pe lla nt’ s mot ion

to s up pr e ss t

ho se state me nts

. Th e Sta te r e s p o n d s th a t th e i s s u e i s w a i v e d b e c a u s e th e Ap p e l l an t f

a i l e d t o p ur s u e th e m o t i o n to suppress.
Th e re c or d b e fo re thi s c ourt re fl e c ts tha

t th e Ap pe lla

nt f ile d a mot ion to s up pr e ss h is statements on J uly

16, 2003, alleg ing that his statements wer e involuntarily g iven as he was unde r duress at the t i m e t h e statements wer e made . A hea ring was c onducted on July 25, 2003, during which time the Appellant reque sted and was g rante d a continuance until Oc tober 31, 2003. As the State corr ectly asser

ts, the rec ord is silent as to whether the Appellant a ctively pursued the motion to suppress af

ter this point. The rec ord does indicate that on April 4, 2005, before voir dir e of the jur y pa ne l c omm e nc e d, the Ap pe lla nt’ s c ouns e l ma de the fo llo wi ngre mark s:
J udg e, I lo oked throug h the cour

t jacket this morning , making sure since I was not on this case orig inally or at the time the motions wer e hear d and I

believe that all m o t i o n s that have be en filed ha ve bee n discuss ed an d ruled upon e x cept f or the 608, 609 motion that Your Ho no r t oo k und e r a dv ise me nt. 2(

. . . con t i n u ed) 2
p la c e . P rio r to trial, A tto rn e y W h ite w a s re liev e d , re su lti n g in the a p p o intm e n t o f A tto rn e y K e n t. -70- Duringthe State’s ca se-in-c hief, the A ppellant’s stateme nts to law enfor ceme nt offi c e r s w e re admitted without a

ny objection by the Appellant. Additionally , the Appellant, in his motion for new trial, raise d the issue of whe ther the tria l court err ed in denying the motion to s uppress, supporting the conc lusion that the moti on was in fa ct denied.

I t is clear f

rom the re cord be fore this court that, at the trial leve l, the Appellant procee ded under the assumption that the trial court had denied his motion to suppr ess. The Appellant, howe ver, now maintains on appe al that he did not aba ndon the suppression issue. He adds that the fa ct that the tr ia l c ourt

fa ile d to state its fi nd ing s on the re c or d v iol a te d h is c on sti tut ion a l r ig hts to d ue pr oc e ss and to a f air jury trial, in addition to viol ating Tenn. R. Crim. P. 12(e).

Fr om the actions of the parties and the tria l court during the trial, including the fa ilure of the Appellant to object to the introduction of the statements, it a ppear s that all parties believed that the mot ion to s up pr e ss h a d b e e n d e nie d. Mo st n ota bly , th e tr ia l c ourt ’s a dmi ssi on of the state me nts duringthe trial sug g ests that the t ri al court was under the assumption that it had overruled the Appellant’s motion. Whil e t h e rec ord pre sently befor e this court does not c ontain an orde r of the trial court ref

lecting its ruling upon the motion, we cannot conclude that its a bsence is disposi tive. I t is the burden of the Appellant to pre pare a full and c omplete r ecord for a ppellate r eview. See Tenn. R. App. P. 24(b). More over, the rec ord cle arly refl ec t s t h at n o o bjection was ma de by the Ap pe lla nt t o th e a dmi ssi on

of his state me nts a t tr ia l.

Even a ssuming for

argument’s sake that no ruling was ever made by the trial cour t, it was the Appellant who failed to obta in a rulingon that motion and failed to objec t when the e vidence was introduced at tri al. According ly , we a g ree with the State that the Appellant ha s abandone d the motion by

failing to c all to the trial court’s attention the lack of a rulingon his suppression motion and by failingto object to the admission of the statements at trial. SeeT e n n
. R

. Ap p
. P

. 3 6 ( a )

. If
a motion is not a cted upon, the litigant should rene w it. “He ma y not lull t he judg e into thinking that it has been a

bandoned a

n d t h en , af

t erhe has lost, pull a ra

bbit out of his pocket in the form of a forg otten motion.” Un ite d States v . Ta gli a , 922 F.2d 413, 416- 17 (7th Cir.), cert. de nied , 5 00 U. S. 927, 111 S. Ct . 2040 (1991). As note d, the Appellant failed to rene w hi s motion or ask for a ruling pr io r to v o ir d ir e
. L a te r , w h e n th e St a te s o u g h t intr o d u c ti o n o f h is s tate me n ts , the Appellant
rema ined silent and made no objection.
A simil ar issue was addre ssed by the Court of Appe als in Grandstaff v. Hawks , 36 S.W .3d 482 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2000). I n Gran ds taf

f , the t rial court did not unequivoca lly overr ule a motion in limi ne. The Court of Appea ls determined that the m otion in limine should have been renew ed by ob je c tio n a nd that the fa ilure to re ne w the mot ion in limi ne ha d wa ive d the iss ue . In r e a c hin g thi s conclusion, the Court of Appe als held:

Objections to the introduction of e viden ce must be timely and specific

. See Ove rstreet v. Shone y’s, I nc ., 4 S.W .3d 694, 702 (Tenn.-71- Ct. Ap p. 19 99 ). An

e vid e nti ary

ob je c tio n w ill be c on sid e re d ti me ly either if it is ma de in a

motion in l imine or if it is made at the time the objectionable e vidence is a b out to be introduced. See W right v. United Serv

s. Auto. Ass’n , 789 S.W .2d 911, 914 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1990). A party who files an unsuc cessf ul motion i n limine need not
rene w the motion when the evide nce is introduce d as longas the trial court “ clea

rly and def initively ” over

ruled the motion in limi ne whe n it was made. See State v . Brobeck , 751 S.W .2d 828, 833-34 (Te nn. 19 88 ); State v. Mc Ghee , 7 46 S.W. 2d 46 0, 46 2 (T e nn . 1 98 8) ; W right
v. Un i t ed Serv

s. Auto. Ass’n , 7 8 9 S. W. 2 d a t 9 1 4

. I f

, h o w e v e r , the trial court ha s not “clea

rly and def initively ” acte d on the motion, the moving pa

rty must renew t h e motion contemporane ously with the introd u ct ion of the objec tionable evidenc e. F ailure to re new the motion will prec lude the moving party from taking issue on ap p eal with the admission of the evidenc e.
Gran ds taf f, 36 S.W .3d at 488.

Te nn e sse e la

w i s w e ll- estab lis he d th a t a pa rt y wh o invit e s o r w a ive s e rr or , o r who fa ils to take rea sonable steps to c ure an err or, is not entitled to relief on a ppeal. See Tenn. R. App. P. 36(a)

. Moreove r, if wa ived, this court will not c onsider the issue on appea l unle ss it is clea r fr om the rec ord that plain err or wa s committed. The motion to suppress filed by the Appellant on July

15, 2003, prese nted two alleg ations in s up po rt of his c on te nti on that the state me nts we re take n in v iol a tio n o f h is c on sti tut ion a l r ig hts , name ly that: 1. The [ Ap p el l an t ] did not free ly , knowing ly and voluntarily

g ive
sa id s tate me nts

. 2. Th e [Ap pe lla

nt] m a de sa id s tate me nts wh ile un de r d ur e ss.
No additional fa cts or ar g u m en t were prese nted in support of the motion. At the J uly 25, 2003 motion to s uppress he aring , Serg eant Mark M iller testified that the Appe llant was advised of his rights a

nd signe d a wa iver of r ights for m. The Appe llant informed Serg eant Miller that he had
an e le ve nth

g ra de e du c a tio n. Se rg e ant M ill e r state d th a t th e Ap pe lla nt u nd e rs too d E ng lis h a

nd c ou ld
rea d and wr ite. In addition to the written wa iver, the A ppellant ver

bally indicated that he understood and wa ived his constitutional rights. Serg eant Miller testified that, at no t i m e, did he threaten, coer ce, or make pr omises to the Appellant. Serg eant James Fitzpatrick testified that, one day afte r the Appellant’s initial st atement, the Ap pe ll ant in for

me d la w e nf or c e me nt o ff

ic ia ls that he wa

nte d to c ha

ng e so me fa c ts r e late d in his ini tia l st a te me nt. Se rg e ant F itzp a tr ic k p e rm itt e d th e Ap pe lla nt t o ma ke c or re c tio ns to t

he state me nt. Se rg e ant F itzp a tr ic k o bs e rv e d th a t th e Ap pe lla nt h a d n o p ro ble ms c omm un ic a tin g and a

pp e are d to be of so un d mi nd . T he Ap pe lla nt n e ve r r e qu e ste d an a tto rn e y
. Se rg e ant F itzp a tr ic k te sti fi e d th a t, at no ti me , d id h e thr e a te n , c o e r c e , o r ma k e p r o mi s e s to th e Ap p e ll an t. H e a ls o r e c a ll e d th a t the-72-

Ap pe lla nt w a s p e rm itt e d to us e the re str oo m duri ng the int e rv ie w and that the Ap pe lla nt s top pe d to eat on two oc casions.

Inh e re nt i n th e a dmi ssi bil ity of the wr itt e n s tate me nt i s th at the state me nt w a s v olu nta ri ly g iven by a def endant knowle dg eable of his constit u t i o n al rig hts and ac companied by a valid and knowing waiver of t hose rights. Sta te v . B e rry , 1 4 1 S

. W

. 3 d 5 4 9 , 5 7 7 (T en n
. 2 0 0 4 ) ( qu o t i n g Miranda v. Arizona , 38 4 U .S. 43 6, 46 7, 86 S. Ct . 1 60 2, 16 24 (1 96 6) ; State v. Middlebrook s , 840 S.W .2d 317, 326 (Tenn. 1992) , cert. dismissed , 510 U.S. 124, 114 S. C t. 651 (1993 ))

. I n d et er mining the admissibili ty

of a confe ssion, the particular circ umstances of

eac h case must be examined as a whole. Be rry , 1 4 1 S

. W

. 3 d

at5 7 7 (c i t i n g Sta tev . S

mi th , 933 S.W .2d 450, 455 (Tenn. 1996) ). A de fenda nt’s subjective pe rce ption alone is not sufficient to justify a conc lusion of in v o l u n t ar i n ess i n the constitutional sense. Id . (citations omitted). The pri m ar y consideration in determining the admissibili ty

of t he evidence is whether the conf ession is an ac t of fre e will. Id

. at 5 7 8 (c i t i n g Sta te v. Chandler , 547 S.W .2d 918, 920 (Tenn. 1977)). A confe ssion is not voluntar y when “the be havior of t he st ate’ s law enforce ment officia ls was such a s to overbea r” the will of an ac cused a nd “bring about confessions not fre ely self-de termined.” Id

. (c i t i n g Sta te v . Ke lly , 603 S.W .2d 726, 728 (Tenn. 1980)). The testimony

reve aled t h a t t h e A p p e ll a nt’ s c o mm

u n ic a tion skills appea

red a dequate and that he wa s c a

pa ble of re a din g , w ri tin g , a

nd c omp re he ns ion . T he Ap pe lla nt w a s adv is ed of

his constitutional rights and, w ithout coerc ion or forc e, voluntarily waived his rig hts a

nd provided a

n inculpatory

statement. Ne ither off

icer indicated that the Appellant was under duress at the time he made his two statements. The off icer s provided the Appe llant with food and re stroom breaks during the interviewproce ss, and the Appellant never asked for an attorney

. There fore , we c onclude that the Appellant knowing ly waived his Mira nda rig hts and voluntarily provided the state ments to the police. Thus, the Appe llant is not entit led to relief on this iss ue. [ S e c t i o nX I]
Victim Im pact Jury Instruction was Coercive The Appe llant next contends that “[t] he jury instructions g iven by the trial judg e with re spect t o th e j ur y ’ s c o n s i d e r a t i o no f

v i c t i mi mp a c te v i d e n c e c o n s t i tu t e d a c o e r c i v e i n s tr u c t i o n
. ” In instructing the jury , the trial court provided the f ollowing instruction as to victim impact evide nce: The pr o s e c u ti o nh a s intr o d u c e d w h a t i s kn o w na s v ic ti m i mp act e vid e nc e . T his e vid e nc e ha s bee n intr od uc e d to show

the fi na nc ia l, emotional, psy cholog ical or phy sical ef fec ts of the victim’s death on the member s of the victim’s immediate fa mily and close friends. Y ou may c on sid e r t

his e vid e nc e in d e te rm ini ngan a pp rop ri a te punis hme nt.
Ho we ve r, y our c on sid e ratio n mu st b e lim ite d to a ratio na l in qu ir

y int o the culpability

of the [Appellant], not an emotional response to the evidenc e. Victim impact evidenc e is not the same as a n ag g ravating-73- circ umstance. Proof of an a dverse impact on the victim’s family or close fr iends is not proof of a n ag g ra v ating circ umstance. I ntr od uc tio n o f v ic timimp a c t e vid e nc e in n o w ay re lie ve s th e State of its burden to prove beyond a re asonable doubt to y ou at least one ag g ravating c ircumstance which has be en alleg ed.

You may consider this victim impact evidenc e in de termin i n g t he appropr iateness of t h e death penalty only if y ou first find the exis tence of one or more ag g ravating circ umstances has bee n proven be y on d a re a so na

ble do ub t by e vid e nc e ind e pe nd e nt fr om the vic tim impact evidenc e and f

ind th at the ag g ravating c ircumstance or circ umstances f

ound outweig h the finding of one or more mitigating
c ir c ums tanc e s b e y on d a

re a so na ble do ub t. The Appe llant, relying upon J oh ns on v . H

ar din , 92 6 S.W. 2d 23 6, 24 2 ( Te nn . 1 99 6) , a sse rt s that the trial cour

t’s instruction “amounts t o an u ndue intrusion into the exclusi ve provinc e of the jury .” He adds that “the re is a r ea s o nable pr obability that the instruction coer ced a finding by

the jury that the ag g rava

ting c ircumstance s outwei ghed the mitigating c ircumstance s beca use to find otherwise w ould require the jury to ignor e the emotional victim impact evidence prese nted by the State.” The Appellant’s r eliance upon Johnson is m isp la c e d b e c a us e inJohnson our supre me cour t addre ssed t he is sue of the t rial court’s delivera nce of a “dy

namite charg e” to a deadlocked jury . The instruction in Johnson “ra ised [to the deadloc ked jury ] the specte r of the time, e ffor t, a nd money that
a new trial would entail.” Johnson , 926 S.W .2d at 243. The c harg e sug g ested that the j urors ha d a duty to ag ree . In this reg ard, our supreme c ourt held “[n]ot hing should be done or sa id to a juror wh ic h c an in

any mann e r b e take n b y

that juro r t o in dic a te that he or sh e sh ou ld a

ba nd on an h on e stl y held conviction in or der to r eac h a verdic t so that tim e and mone y will be saved.” Id

. (q u o t i n g Ba ss v . B ar k sd ale , 671 S.W .2d 476, 486 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1984). S uch a situation is not presently befor e the cour t, as the fa ctual cir cumstance s i n J o h n s o n are clea rly distinguishable f

rom those in the prese nt case

. In fac t, the instruction provided to the jury in th e p re s ent case wa s rec ommended by our s u preme court in Sta tev . Ne sb it , 9 7 8 S

. W

. 2 d 8 7 2 , 8 9 2 ( T e n n
. 1 9 9 8 ) , an d w a s a g a i n a p p r o v e d in S ta t e v

. R e id , 9 1 S .W.3d 247, 283 (Tenn. 2002). Se e als o S tate v . R ie ls , 216 S.W .3d 737 (Tenn. 20 07 ); Re id , 1 64 S.W. 3d

a t 33 6- 37 (A

pp e nd ix); Col e , 155 S.W .3d at 914 (a pproving Ne

sb it vic tim impact instruction). More over, in Re id , our supre me court specific ally noted t hat any contra diction
ari sin g be tw e e n th e ins tr

uc tio n an d the statut e inu

re d to th e be ne fi t of

the de fe nd ant a

nd , th us , s ho uld not e ntitle a defe ndant to r elief. Re id , 91 S.W .3d at 283. Acc ording ly , the Appellant is not entitled to relief on this issue.