SUMMARY

June 2, 2022

2022COA60

No. 21CA0574, People in Interest of K.P. — Juvenile Court —

Dependency and Neglect — Civil Protection Orders; Civil 

Procedure — Remedial and Punitive Sanctions for Contempt; 

Collateral Bar Rule

A division of the court of appeals addresses the scope of the 

collateral bar rule in Colorado. Specifically, the division considers 

whether a parent, after being held in contempt for violating 

permanent protection orders in a dependency and neglect 

proceeding, may challenge those orders as unconstitutional prior 

restraints on her right to free speech despite failing to timely appeal 

the protection orders themselves. The division answers no. It 

concludes that, because the parent failed to timely appeal the 

protection orders, and because none of the exceptions to the 

collateral bar rule apply, the rule prevents the parent from bringing 

The summaries of the Colorado Court of Appeals published opinions 

constitute no part of the opinion of the division but have been prepared by 

the division for the convenience of the reader. The summaries may not be 

cited or relied upon as they are not the official language of the division. 

Any discrepancy between the language in the summary and in the opinion 

should be resolved in favor of the language in the opinion.
such a challenge. The division further concludes that the evidence 

was sufficient to support the contempt judgment.
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS 2022COA60

Court of Appeals No. 21CA0574 

Arapahoe County District Court No. 19JV158

Honorable Natalie T. Chase, Judge

The People of the State of Colorado,

Appellee,

In the Interest of K.P., L.P., and M.P., Children,

and Concerning C.P., a/k/a K.A.,

Appellant,

and C.P.,

Appellee.

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED

Division II

Opinion by JUDGE YUN

Grove and Graham*, JJ., concur

Announced June 2, 2022

Ronald Carl, County Attorney, Kristi Erickson, Assistant City Attorney, Aurora, 

Colorado, for Appellee the People of the State of Colorado

Alison A. Bettenberg, Guardian Ad Litem

Ascend Counsel, LLC, Edward Milo Schwab, Denver, Colorado, for Appellant

Sherman & Howard, L.L.C., Richard Bednarski, Colorado Springs, Colorado, 

for Appellee C.P.

*Sitting by assignment of the Chief Justice under provisions of Colo. Const. 

art. VI, § 5(3), and § 24-51-1105, C.R.S. 2021.
1

¶ 1 The juvenile court found C.P., a/k/a K.A. (K.A.), in contempt 

for violating permanent civil protection orders barring her from 

discussing her children’s dependency and neglect case with most 

third parties. At a hearing that occurred several months after it 

had issued the protection orders, the court entered its judgment of 

contempt and sentenced K.A. to six months in jail. K.A. now 

appeals only the contempt judgment, arguing that the protection 

orders violated her constitutional right to free speech and that 

insufficient evidence supported the court’s judgment of contempt.

¶ 2 This appeal therefore requires us to determine whether K.A., 

in appealing the contempt judgment, may collaterally attack the 

lawfulness of the underlying protection orders. We conclude that 

she may not. Under the collateral bar rule, a party must obey a 

court order — even an unconstitutional order — unless and until 

that order is stayed, set aside, or reversed on appeal. With rare 

exceptions, a party cannot challenge a court order by violating it. 

This is so because the orderly and efficient administration of justice 

would be jeopardized if parties could determine for themselves when 

and how to obey a court order.
2

¶ 3 Because K.A. did not timely appeal the protection orders, and 

because none of the exceptions to the collateral bar rule apply, we 

conclude that the rule precludes K.A. from collaterally challenging 

the lawfulness, and therefore the constitutionality, of the protection 

orders in an appeal of the contempt judgment. We also reject K.A.’s 

argument that insufficient evidence supported the contempt 

judgment. We thus affirm the judgment.

I. Background

¶ 4 This contempt proceeding followed K.A.’s contentious divorce 

from C.P., the father of their three daughters, K.P., L.P., and M.P., 

as well as the family’s involvement in two dependency and neglect 

cases.

A. Dependency and Neglect Proceedings

¶ 5 In 2017, the year before the divorce became final, the 

Arapahoe County Department of Human Services filed a petition in 

dependency and neglect alleging that the father was sexually 

abusing the two younger girls. A jury, however, found that the 

children were not dependent or neglected.

¶ 6 Two years later, the Department filed a second petition, this 

time asserting that K.A. had coached the oldest daughter into 
3

falsely reporting sexual abuse by her father as part of K.A.’s pattern 

of emotionally abusing the girls. A jury found all three girls 

dependent and neglected as to K.A., and the juvenile court ordered 

her to comply with a treatment plan designed to give her “insight 

into how [her] behaviors alienated and emotionally harmed her 

children.” K.A. appealed the adjudication, but a division of this 

court affirmed it. People in Interest of K.P., slip op. at ¶ 1 (Colo. 

App. No. 19CA1161, Feb. 27, 2020) (not published pursuant to 

C.A.R. 35(e)).

B. Protection Orders and Termination

¶ 7 Soon after, in April 2020, K.A. posted a “Petition to Protect 

CHILDREN!” on the website change.org. In this posting, K.A.

alleged that, despite her daughters’ disclosure of sexual abuse by 

their father, protective services, law enforcement, and mental health 

professionals had all insisted that the girls live with him. The 

petition included a video of the youngest daughter being interviewed 

by K.A. and making an outcry of sexual abuse, as well as a video of 

the oldest daughter’s journal entries disclosing sexual abuse by her 

father — evidence that K.A. had never disclosed to the Department 

or the police.
4

¶ 8 In May 2020, the Department moved for a protection order 

under section 19-1-114(2)(a), C.R.S. 2021. It alleged that K.A.’s 

posting invaded the children’s privacy and showed that “any 

progress in her treatment plan was feigned” and that she refused to 

“own[] that she coached her children” into making outcries of sexual 

abuse against their father. The court agreed that K.A. was not 

acting in the girls’ best interests and granted the protection order 

(the May protection order). Among other things, the court required 

K.A. to take down the petition, prohibited her “from posting on 

social media sites information related to the Minor Children and the 

allegations of abuse or neglect associated with this case” (including 

doing so through third parties), and obligated her to provide the 

Department with the videos attached to the change.org petition. 

The court warned that her failure to comply with the order could 

“result in contempt proceedings and up to six months in jail.”

¶ 9 But K.A. refused to take down the petition, added copies of the 

girls’ handwritten notes when the website hosting the video took it

down, and continued to post about the allegations on social media, 

as well as on her own website. As a result of K.A.’s defiance of the 

May protection order and her failure to engage in her treatment 
5

plan, the Department filed two motions: one for a contempt citation 

against K.A., and another to terminate her parental rights. The 

juvenile court scheduled a hearing on both matters over two days in 

late August 2020.

¶ 10 On the first day, the court found beyond a reasonable doubt 

that K.A. had willfully violated the May protection order. It delayed 

sentencing her for contempt until after the termination hearing, 

which was set to continue through the next day. K.A., however, 

failed to appear (or to have counsel appear on her behalf) the 

following morning, so the court issued a bench warrant and did not 

proceed with sentencing. At the end of the hearing, the court 

terminated K.A.’s parent-child legal relationships with her three 

daughters. The court also sealed the court records, stating that no 

party was to release any filing in the case to any third party or ask 

other people to post anything on the internet regarding the case.

¶ 11 Immediately after the termination hearing, the father moved 

for a civil protection order in the same case. The juvenile court 

issued a temporary protection order that same day and scheduled a 

hearing on a permanent protection order for September 2020. After 

the hearing, the court entered a permanent civil protection order 
6

under section 13-14-106, C.R.S. 2021, restraining K.A. from 

contacting the three girls or their father, who had custody (the 

September protection order). The order adds that K.A. is “not to 

talk to 3rd party about case except for [attorneys] or to use 3rd 

party to post on internet.”

¶ 12 K.A. then filed a C.R.C.P. 59 motion, asking the juvenile court 

to reconsider the breadth of the September protection order. 

Specifically, K.A. argued that the order’s “language prohibiting her 

from talking to any third party about th[e] case, other than her 

attorney,” was “excessively broad” and violated her “constitutionally 

protected rights.”

¶ 13 The juvenile court agreed — at least in part. It narrowed the 

September protection order so that K.A. could communicate about 

the case with her therapists and doctors, as well as her attorneys 

(the December protection order). The December protection order 

says,

Because this Court is certain that more harm 

will occur from future postings regarding the 

allegations of sexual abuse in this case, the 

Court first ORDERS that [K.A.] shall be 

restrained from posting any information 

related to the allegations of abuse or neglect 

which were investigated during this case on 
7

any website or social media outlet. This 

includes posting through a third party, which 

is subject to the provisions outlined above, as 

[K.A.] may be held liable for directing any third 

party to post such information. Further, the 

Court further ORDERS that [K.A.] shall be 

restrained from discussing the allegations of 

abuse or neglect which were investigated 

during this case or providing any case-related 

information, including but not limited to any 

documents within the case file, to any third 

party who does not have a legal duty of 

confidentiality to [K.A.] Thus, [K.A.] may 

discuss this case with her attorneys, 

therapists, or doctors, but she may not direct 

these third parties to release or disseminate 

case-related information to any other third 

party or to the public.

¶ 14 Though the court recognized K.A.’s First Amendment

concerns, it concluded that the December protection order passed 

constitutional muster. The order, the court explained, was the least 

intrusive means necessary to serve the government’s compelling 

interests in protecting domestic abuse victims and the privacy of 

children involved in dependency and neglect proceedings. The 

court further found that, “based on the history of this case and 

[K.A.’s] repeated and relentless dissemination of the false 

allegations of abuse, Father and all three children will undoubtedly 
8

suffer great, grave, and certain harm as a result of continued 

expression.”

C. Contempt Proceeding

¶ 15 On December 31, 2020, the father moved for a contempt 

citation against K.A. He alleged that an article published three days 

earlier in an online edition of the Colorado Springs Gazette includes 

details about the dependency and neglect case that K.A. must have 

shared, either directly with the author or through a third party, in 

violation of the juvenile court’s protection orders.

¶ 16 The article, titled “A sick mom, alone in a cell, on Christmas 

Eve,” does not include anyone’s name, but it does include, among 

other things, (1) K.A.’s experience of having COVID-19 in jail1; 

(2) K.A.’s “unwavering belief” that the father sexually abused the 

children; (3) that K.A. is in jail for seventeen months for violating a 

“gag order” in the case; and (4) that K.A. wrote to her friend, “A 

system shouldn’t be able to destroy someone’s life. Punished for 

protecting, for speaking truth, for loving my daughters so much — I 

would do anything for them.” Even though the case was sealed, the 

1 K.A. was serving time in jail on prior contempt citations that are 

not part of this appeal.
9

week after the article’s publication, the juvenile court received two 

voicemail messages urging it to release K.A. from jail.

¶ 17 The juvenile court held a hearing on the contempt citation over 

two days in March 2021. The father and K.A.’s friend testified. 

Over K.A.’s objection, the court admitted into evidence seven 

recordings of jail phone calls between K.A. and her friend during 

which, the father argued, K.A. had shared information in violation 

of the protection orders. The court also admitted the Gazette article 

and a letter K.A. had written to her friend from jail.

¶ 18 On the second day of the hearing, the court found, beyond a 

reasonable doubt, that K.A. had willfully disobeyed its orders not to 

speak about the case with any third party who did not owe a duty of 

confidentiality to K.A. As pertinent here, the court found the 

following:

 the Gazette article includes a quote from K.A., as well as 

information that the author could have learned only from 

K.A., namely the length of K.A.’s jail sentence;

 the article mentions the allegations of abuse;

 the article is not, as K.A. argued at the hearing, about 

the incidence of COVID-19 in the jail, which would have 
10

been “appropriate,” but, rather, is “about one 

individual[,] . . . about her circumstances of being in the 

jail”;

 several of the recorded phone calls imply either that the 

author of the Gazette article was in the room with K.A.’s 

friend or that the friend would pass information to the 

author;

 the recordings referred to K.A.’s attorneys moving to 

withdraw, “which is part of this case, [and] which is in 

direct violation of” the orders;

 K.A. talked about asking for in-home detention as an 

alternative to incarceration, “which is a direct pleading 

that was put into this case,” in violation of the orders;

 K.A. and her friend talked about “the unfairness of this 

case, . . . in direct violation of” the orders; and

 the two also talked about the court “specifically” 

“numerous” times, and they discussed that the court 

“specifically ha[d] violated the numerous rights of” K.A.
11

The juvenile court then sentenced K.A., who was already serving 

seventeen months in jail on three other contempt citations, to an 

additional six months.

¶ 19 K.A. now appeals the juvenile court’s judgment of contempt 

and her six-month jail sentence.

II. Analysis

¶ 20 K.A. argues that the juvenile court’s September and December 

protection orders violated her First Amendment rights and, 

therefore, that she cannot be punished for violating them. She also 

argues that insufficient evidence supports the juvenile court’s 

contempt judgment. After discussing the standard of review, we 

address each argument in turn.

A. Standard of Review

¶ 21 A finding of contempt is within the juvenile court’s discretion 

and may not be reversed absent an abuse of that discretion. People 

in Interest of K.S-E., 2021 COA 93, ¶ 18. A court abuses its 

discretion when its ruling is manifestly arbitrary, unreasonable, 

unfair, or contrary to law. Id.

¶ 22 “However, the lawfulness of a district court’s order — the 

violation of which may give rise to a finding of contempt — is 
12

subject to de novo review.” Id. And we review the record de novo to 

determine whether the evidence was sufficient to sustain the 

contempt judgment. Clark v. People, 232 P.3d 1287, 1291 (Colo. 

2010).

B. K.A.’s First Amendment Challenge

¶ 23 K.A. argues that the September and December protection 

orders were unlawful because they were impermissible prior 

restraints on her right to free speech. The father counters that K.A.

failed to timely appeal the September and December protection 

orders and, as a result, cannot now challenge their 

constitutionality. We agree with the father.

¶ 24 Although K.A. did not appeal the protection orders, she did 

timely appeal the contempt order. See C.R.C.P. 107(f) (“For the 

purposes of appeal, an order deciding the issue of contempt and 

sanctions shall be final.”). And because the juvenile court’s 

contempt judgment was based on its finding that K.A. willfully 

violated the protection orders, our review of the contempt judgment 

necessarily implicates the question of whether the protection orders 

were constitutional and thus lawful. See C.R.C.P. 107(a)(1) 
13

(defining contempt to include “disobedience . . . by any person 

to . . . any lawful . . . order of the court”).

¶ 25 But that does not end our inquiry regarding whether the 

protection orders are reviewable. Under the collateral bar rule, a 

party generally must comply with even an unlawful order or risk 

being held in contempt because

it is fundamental to our legal system that “all 

orders and judgments of courts must be 

complied with promptly. If a person to whom a 

judge directs an order believes that order is 

incorrect the remedy is to appeal, but, absent 

a stay, he must comply promptly with the 

order pending appeal. Persons who make 

private determinations of the law and refuse to 

obey an order generally risk criminal contempt 

even if the order is ultimately ruled incorrect.”

People v. Coyle, 654 P.2d 815, 820 (Colo. 1982) (quoting Maness v. 

Meyers, 419 U.S. 449, 458 (1975)); see also K.S-E., ¶ 35.

¶ 26 The United States Supreme Court’s decision in Walker v. City 

of Birmingham, 388 U.S. 307 (1967), illustrates this principle. 

There, Birmingham officials obtained an injunction prohibiting 

Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., and other civil rights protesters from 

parading without a permit. Id. at 308. Rather than appealing the 

injunction, the protesters disobeyed it. Id. They were subsequently 
14

charged with violating the injunction, fined, and sentenced to jail. 

Id. at 311-12. The Court noted that the ordinance, which provided 

the basis for the injunction, “unquestionably raise[d] substantial 

constitutional issues” and that “[t]he breadth and vagueness of the 

injunction itself would also unquestionably be subject to 

substantial constitutional question.” Id. at 316-17. Nonetheless, 

the Court ruled that the protesters could not collaterally raise those 

constitutional issues in the contempt proceedings. Id. at 317.

¶ 27 The Court found it significant that the protesters had not 

sought to appeal the order they violated. Id. at 318-19. The Court 

declared, “[t]his case would arise in quite a different constitutional 

posture if the [protesters], before disobeying the injunction, had 

challenged it in the Alabama courts, and had been met with delay 

or frustration of their constitutional claims.” Id. at 318. Thus, 

despite the potential illegality of the injunction, the Court upheld 

the protesters’ convictions because the protesters “were [not] 

constitutionally free to ignore all the procedures of the law and 

carry their battle to the streets.” Id. at 321. The Court observed 

that “no man can be judge in his own case, however exalted his 
15

station, however righteous his motives, and irrespective of his race, 

color, politics, or religion.” Id. at 320-21.

¶ 28 We similarly conclude that, because K.A. did not timely appeal 

the underlying protection orders when they became final, the 

collateral bar rule precludes her from challenging the 

constitutionality of the orders in her appeal of the contempt 

judgment. See § 19-1-104(7), C.R.S. 2021 (“If the civil protection 

order is made permanent pursuant to the provisions of section 

13-14-106, the civil protection order remains in effect upon 

termination of the juvenile court action.”). While we acknowledge

that K.A. has raised substantial constitutional issues regarding the 

protection orders, the juvenile court’s order “must be obeyed by the 

parties until it is reversed by orderly and proper proceedings.” 

United States v. United Mine Workers of Am., 330 U.S. 258, 293 

(1947); see also State v. Baize, 2019 UT App 202, ¶¶ 12-14 

(collateral bar rule precludes prior-restraint and vagueness 

challenges to a civil protection order in a prosecution for violating 

the order). Because K.A. decided to disobey the protection orders 

rather than challenge them on appeal, she cannot collaterally raise 

those constitutional issues in this appeal.
16

¶ 29 Nor can we conclude that this case falls under any of the 

exceptions to the collateral bar rule.

¶ 30 First, if the issuing court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction over 

the underlying controversy or personal jurisdiction over the parties 

to it, then its order may be violated without the imposition of a 

contempt sanction. In re Novak, 932 F.2d 1397, 1401 (11th Cir. 

1991). K.A. has raised no such argument here. And the juvenile 

court had subject matter jurisdiction to enter civil protection orders 

under section 19-1-104(7).

¶ 31 Second, if no “adequate and effective remedies exist for orderly 

review of the challenged ruling,” then “the accused contemnor may 

challenge the validity of the disobeyed order on appeal from his 

criminal contempt conviction and escape punishment if that order 

is deemed invalid.” Novak, 932 F.2d at 1401. But as discussed 

above, K.A. had an adequate and effective remedy to challenge the 

protection orders — an appeal. And K.A. was aware of this remedy 

in December 2020 because she discussed with her friend the 

possibility of hiring a First Amendment expert and appealing the 

protection orders. She just did not seek that remedy.
17

¶ 32 Third, the Supreme Court has recognized an exception to the 

collateral bar rule when compliance with an order “could cause 

irreparable injury.” Maness, 419 U.S. at 460; see also K.S-E., ¶ 37 

(“[I]f an order is found to be unlawful under the Fifth Amendment, 

and if obedience to the order carries with it a substantial risk of 

irreparable harm, a party’s failure to comply with the order cannot 

support a finding of contempt.”). “Although several commentators 

have argued for the application of the Maness exception to 

deliberate violations of ex parte injunctions restraining First 

Amendment speech rights, thus far, the exception has not [been]

extended beyond the limited confines of [the] self-incrimination 

[context].” In re Establishment Inspection of Hern Iron Works, Inc.,

881 F.2d 722, 728 (9th Cir. 1989) (citations omitted); see also 

United States v. Hendrickson, 822 F.3d 812, 819 (6th Cir. 2016) 

(Although “the order implicates [the contemnor’s] First Amendment 

rights, it does not present the type of scenario that might rise to the 

level of an irretrievable surrender of a constitutional guarantee.”).

¶ 33 Finally, “court orders that are transparently invalid or patently 

frivolous need not be obeyed.” Novak, 932 F.2d at 1402. But to 

protect the judiciary’s dignity and authority, “we must indulge . . . a 
18

heavy presumption in favor of the validity of every court order.” Id.

at 1403. “Only when there is no colorable, nonfrivolous argument 

to support the order being reviewed should a contemnor be excused 

from his disobedience of the order.” Id. We cannot say that no 

colorable, nonfrivolous argument supports the validity of the 

juvenile court’s protection orders. See In re Marriage of Newell, 

192 P.3d 529, 536 (Colo. App. 2008) (concluding that a parent’s 

exercise of free speech that “threatened the child with physical or 

emotional harm, or had actually caused such harm,” could 

establish a state interest sufficiently compelling to curtail the 

parent’s free speech rights).

¶ 34 For all these reasons, we conclude that K.A. cannot collaterally 

challenge the constitutionality of the protection orders.

D. K.A.’s Sufficiency of the Evidence Challenge

¶ 35 K.A. next argues that the evidence was insufficient to support 

the juvenile court’s contempt judgment. Specifically, K.A. argues 

that the evidence did not establish that she (1) had knowledge of 

the September and December protection orders or (2) willfully 

refused to comply with those orders. We are not persuaded.
19

¶ 36 Punitive sanctions — the type imposed against K.A. — “are 

criminal in nature and are designed to punish ‘by unconditional 

fine, fixed sentence of imprisonment, or both, for conduct that is 

found to be offensive to the authority and dignity of the court.’” 

K.S-E., ¶ 24 (quoting In re Marriage of Cyr, 186 P.3d 88, 91 (Colo. 

App. 2008); see also C.R.C.P. 107(a)(4). Punitive sanctions must be 

supported by factual findings establishing beyond a reasonable 

doubt that “(1) a lawful order existed; (2) the contemnor had 

knowledge of the order; (3) the contemnor had the ability to comply 

with the order; and (4) the contemnor willfully refused to comply 

with the order.” People ex rel. State Eng’r v. Sease, 2018 CO 91, 

¶ 23.

¶ 37 In analyzing the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the 

juvenile court’s contempt judgment, we consider “whether the 

relevant evidence, both direct and circumstantial, when viewed as a 

whole and in the light most favorable to the [father], is substantial 

and sufficient to support a conclusion by a reasonable mind that 

[K.A.] is guilty of the [contempt] charge beyond a reasonable doubt.” 

Clark, 232 P.3d at 1291 (citation omitted). We “may not ‘act as a 

trier of facts to ascertain the sufficiency of evidence to support a 
20

contempt charge. Where the trial court has jurisdiction, and 

regularly pursues its authority, and there is evidence of contempt,

its decision on the facts is conclusive.’” In re Marriage of Herrera, 

772 P.2d 676, 678 (Colo. App. 1989) (quoting Wall v. Dist. Ct., 

146 Colo. 74, 80, 360 P.2d 452, 455 (1961)).

¶ 38 Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the father, 

we conclude that the evidence was sufficient to support the court’s 

findings.

¶ 39 First, the record supports the juvenile court’s finding that K.A.

was informed of the protection orders through the court and her 

attorneys. K.A. was present at the hearing on September 23, 2020, 

when the court announced the terms of the September 2020 

protection order, and her attorneys sought reconsideration of that 

order under C.R.C.P. 59. The court’s ruling on K.A.’s Rule 59 

motion and the amended protection order were served on K.A.’s 

counsel in December 2020.

¶ 40 Additionally, K.A. repeatedly said during her phone 

conversations from jail that she “can’t talk about that” —

statements that K.A. asserts evidenced her attempt to comply with 

the protection orders. K.A. could not attempt to comply with orders 
21

of which she was unaware, so this evidence supports the juvenile 

court’s finding that she was in fact aware of the orders. And while 

K.A. claims these phone calls occurred before the issuance of the 

December protection order, and thus before she became aware of it, 

the record reflects that some of the conversations occurred after 

that order. The record therefore supports the juvenile court’s 

finding that K.A. was aware of the protection orders.

¶ 41 Second, the record supports the juvenile court’s finding that 

K.A. willfully violated the protection orders.2 The Gazette article 

includes a quote from K.A., as well as information that the author 

could have learned only from K.A. In several recorded phone calls 

from jail, K.A. talked with her friend about working with the author 

of the Gazette article. Specifically, K.A. told her friend to “[s]tay 

2 The September protection order prohibited K.A. from speaking 

with third parties (except for her attorneys) about the dependency 

and neglect case or from using third parties to post information 

about the case on the internet. That order was in effect and 

enforceable until the juvenile court issued the December protection 

order, which modified the earlier order only slightly. The December 

protection order contained the same proscriptions as the September 

order, except that the December order allowed K.A. to communicate 

with third parties with whom she had a confidential relationship 

(e.g., doctors, therapists, and attorneys). The court found that K.A.

violated these orders during several phone calls with her friend 

between mid-October and the end of December 2020.
22

with” the author and “see if maybe you can make that work.” In 

another call with K.A., the friend implied that she had the author of 

the Gazette article in the same room with her, saying that “good 

things” were happening. And K.A. discussed with her friend several 

filings in the case, such as her request for in-home detention and 

the withdrawal of her attorneys, in violation of the protection 

orders.

¶ 42 Although K.A. argues that her jail phone calls show that she 

was trying to comply with the protection orders, the record supports 

the juvenile court’s contrary conclusion. The court found that 

K.A.’s behavior was indicative of someone who was surreptitiously 

trying to get around the court’s orders. For instance, the court 

found that K.A.’s letter to her friend directed the friend to

communicate with her in a manner that would not be detected. 

When, as here, “the evidence is conflicting, a reviewing court may 

not substitute its conclusions for those of the trial court merely 

because there may be credible evidence supporting a different 

result.” In re Estate of Foiles, 2014 COA 104, ¶ 19.

¶ 43 We therefore conclude that the juvenile court did not abuse its 

discretion by finding K.A. in contempt.
23

III. Conclusion

¶ 44 For these reasons, we affirm the juvenile court’s judgment. 

The father’s request for costs must be sought in the juvenile court. 

See C.A.R. 39.

JUDGE GROVE and JUDGE GRAHAM concur.