# FILED
April 15, 1999 Cecil Crowson, Jr. Appellate C ourt Clerk IN THE COURT OF CR IMINAL A PPEALS OF TENN ESSEE AT JA CKSON APRIL SESSION, 1999

STATE OF TENN ESSEE, ) ) No. 02C01-9807-CC-00229 Appellee ) ) CARROLL COUNTY vs. ) ) Hon. C. Creed McGinley, Judge DONALD TA

LLIE, )

) (Sale of Cocaine less th an .5 grams) Appellant )
For the Appellant : For the Appellee : Guy T. Wilkinson Michael E. Moore District Public Defender Attorney General and Repor ter Billy R. Roe, J r. J. Ross Dyer Asst. District Publi c Defender Assistant Attorney Gener al 117 North Forrest Avenu e Criminal Justice Div ision Camden, TN 38320 425 Fifth Avenue North 2d Floor, Cordell Hul l Building Nashville, TN 37243-0493
G. Robert Radford District Attorney General Eleanor Cahill Asst. District Attor

ney General Post Office Box 686 Huntingdon, TN 38344

OPINION FILED: AFFIRMED
David G. Hay

es Judge1 The appe llant w as als o cha rged in the in dictm ent u nde r the a lias, S teven Tallie . 2 OPINION
The appellant, Donald Tallie, 1 was convicted by a jury in the Carr

oll County Circuit Co urt of on e count o f sale of cocaine l ess than .5 grams, a Class C fe lony, and one count of sale of cocaine great er than .5 grams, a Class B felony. The trial court imposed concurrent sent ences of eight years for the Class C felony and sixteen years for the Class B felony as a Range II multiple offender. The appellant’s sole challenge on appeal is the sufficiency of the convic ting evidence.

I. BACKGROUND
In conjunction with the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), the Drug Task Force for the 24th Judicial District conducted an under cover operation by placing a confidential informant in the pub lic housing projects in McKenzie. Testimony r elative to the appellant’s first sale established that on December 4, 1996, Steve Lee, the director of the Drug Task F orce, equipped Sylvester Island, the confidential informant, with a concealed bod y transmitter which permitted conversations t o be recorded. At the desig nated meeting place, Island was searched by Lee and g iven $100 to purchase cocai ne. Island was accompanied by his gir lfriend, Jaronda Parker, w ho was not a drug task force agent.
Lee followed Island and Parker to their residence in the housing project in McKenzie but remained at a d istance, unable to view the transaction or see the appellant. Island testified that he had met the appellant on December 3 at a local “crack house” where the appellant was “sell ing dope.” Island stated that the appellant called himself “Dee. ” Island related that the appel lant “just showed up” at his apartment on December 4. Is land went out to the appellant ’s car and informed the appellant that he wanted to buy some crack cocaine. The appellant followed3

Island into his apartment. The appel lant then cut the “rock” i nto a smaller piece, exchanged the “rock” for $100, and departed. This transaction was recorded. Island testified that the appellant drove the same car, a bla ck Probe SE with a tag number 01946-D, that he had seen at the “crack house ” the day before. Shortly thereafter, Island deliver ed the transmitter, cocaine, and license plate number to Lee. Forensic analysi s determined the substance to be to be .3 grams of cocaine.
The second drug transaction oc curred on December 5, 1996. Again, Island was searched and equipped with a body transmitt er to enable Lee to record the transaction. This transaction also took place at Islan d’s residence. Previ ously, the appellant had given Isl and his beeper number which Island used to page the appellant. The appellant responded by coming to Island’s resi dence. The appellant entered Island’s apartment, cut off a rock of crack cocaine, ex changed it for $100, and left. Island stated that, upon thi s occasion, the appellant pro vided him with more cocaine than in the first i nstance to reward him for not purchasing drugs from the other local dealers. I sland returned to meet with Lee and delivered the transmitter

and the subst

ance purchas

ed which w

as later det

ermined to be

.6 grams of cocaine. After checking the vehicle’s regis tration, the black Probe w as determined to be stolen.

Island testified that he had been an inf ormant for approximately eight years for various federal and state agencies and was paid $100 for each “buy.” At trial, Island testified that over ten years ago he had been convicted of f orgery in Kentucky and theft in Obion County, Tennessee.Island also testified that he had been charged with selli ng a counterfeit controlled substance in 1988. Both of the recorded transactions w ere played for the jury . Island identified the appellant as the person who sold him the coc aine and identified the appellant’s voice on the tape.

The def ense pre sented n o proof. The jury re turned a guilty verdic t on two4

counts of sale of cocaine.

II. SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE
In his only issue, the appellant challenges the suffici ency of the convicting evidence to sustain a v erdict of two counts of the sal e of cocaine. Specifically,the appellant contends that the only evidence identifying

him as the person selling cocaine was the “uncoll aborated [sic] testimony” of Island, a paid informant and convicted felon. Mo reover, th e appella nt argues that, be cause he did not te stify, “there was no way

for the jury to compare the a lleged voice of the defendant on the tapes to the actual voice of the defendant.” Thus, he contends that “ther e is no way to rationally deduce that it was the defendant on those tapes. ”
A jury conviction removes the presumption of innocence with which a defendant is initially cloaked and replaces it w ith one of guilt, so that on appeal , a convicted defendant has the burden of demonstrating that the evidence is insufficient. State v. Tuggle , 639 S.W.2d 913, 914 (Tenn. 1982). In determining the sufficiency of the evidence, thi s court does not reweig h or reevaluate the evi dence. State v. Cabbage , 571 S.W.2d 832, 83 5 (Tenn. 1978). On appeal, the State is entitled to the strongest l egitimate view of the e vidence and all reasonabl e or legitimate inferences w hich may be drawn there from. State v. Harris , 839 S.W.2d 54, 75 (Tenn. 1992), cert. denied , 507 U.S. 954, 113 S.Ct. 1368 (199 3). Viewing the evidence under these cr iteria, it is this c

ourt’s responsibility

to affirm the conviction if the proof w as sufficient for any rational trier of fact to have found the essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia , 443 U.S. 307, 317, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 2789 (1979); State v. Cazes , 875 S.W.2d 253,
259 (Tenn. 1994), cert. denied , 513 U.S. 1086, 115 S.Ct. 743 (199 5); Tenn. R. App. P. 13(e).5 In essence, the appellant chall enges the credibility of the State’s witnesses. A jury verdict accredits the testimony of the State’s witnesses and resolves all conflicts in favor of the State’ s theory. State v. Willia ms , 657 S.W.2d 405, 410 (Tenn. 1983). The weight and credibility of witnesses’ testimony are exclusively within the provinc

e of the jury as the trier of fact. State v. Locust , 914 S.W.2d 554, 558 (Tenn. Crim. App.), perm. to appeal denied , (Tenn. 1995). We conclude that the evidence was sufficient to support the appellant’s c onvictions for each sale of cocaine. Officer Lee monitored each transact ion via a transmitter and overheard each drug transaction. The r ecordings of both transactio ns, containing a descri ption of the appellant and referring to the person “Dee,” wer e played for the jury. Island identified the appellant as the person who sold cocaine on both occasions and also identified his voice on the recording as provi ded by Tenn. R. Evid. 901( a) and (b)(5). Accordingly, w

e find the evidence presented suffici ent proof from which a rational juror could reasonably

infer the appellant’s guil t beyond a reasonable doubt.
The judgment of the trial court i s affirmed.

____________________________________ DAVID G. HAYES, Jud ge6

CONCUR:

_____________________________________ JOSEPH M. TIPT ON, Judge

___________________________________ L. T. LAFFERTY, Senior Judge