Filed 3/27/23 English v. Noel Jones Ministries CA2/3

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on 

opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 

8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for 

purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

TONTANISHA ENGLISH et al.,

Plaintiffs and Appellants,

v.

NOEL JONES MINISTRIES, INC., et 

al.,

Defendants and Respondents.

B312959

(Los Angeles County

Super. Ct. No. 20STCV06808)

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of 

Los Angeles County, Cary Nishimoto, Judge. Affirmed.

Gansen Law Group and Christopher J. Gansen, for 

Plaintiffs and Appellants.

Fozi Dwork & Modafferi, Golnar J. Fozi and Michael V. 

Storti, for Defendants and Respondents.

 ̳ ̳ ̳ ̳ ̳ ̳ ̳ ̳ ̳ ̳ ̳ ̳ ̳ ̳ ̳ ̳ ̳ ̳ ̳ ̳ ̳ ̳ ̳ ̳ ̳ ̳ ̳ ̳
2

Patricia Harrison’s ex-boyfriend, Kevin Dickson, fatally 

stabbed Harrison in the parking lot of City of Refuge Church 

(Church). Harrison’s heirs sued City of Refuge Ministries, Inc.

and Noel Jones Ministries, Inc. (hereafter collectively Ministries), 

which operated and managed the Church, Noel Jones, the bishop 

and chief executive officer of Ministries, and Bryant Smith, the 

head of Church security (hereafter collectively Ministry 

defendants), for wrongful death, negligence, and related causes of 

action.

1 The trial court sustained the Ministry defendants’ 

demurrers to the first amended complaint without leave to 

amend and entered judgment in their favor. 

Harrison’s heirs contend the trial court mistakenly 

concluded that the Ministry defendants did not owe a legal duty 

to Harrison to maintain security guards adequate to have 

prevented her attack or to exclude Dickson from the Church. 

Because we agree with the trial court, and further conclude that 

Harrison’s heirs have not demonstrated how the complaint can be 

amended to establish such duties, we affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

I. Background

“This case comes to us at the demurrer stage, so for present 

purposes we assume the truth of the allegations in the 

complaint.” (Brown v. USA Taekwondo (2021) 11 Cal.5th 204, 

209–210 (Brown).) “ ‘[W]e treat as true all material facts 

properly pleaded, but not contentions, deductions or conclusions 

1 Dickson was also named as a defendant in the lawsuit. He 

is not a party to this appeal.
3

of fact or law.’ ” (Hanouchian v. Steele (2020) 51 Cal.App.5th 99, 

103 (Hanouchian).) 

The Ministries owned and operated the Church and the 

premises where the Church was located, including its parking lot. 

Defendant Jones was the bishop and chief executive officer of the 

Ministries. Defendant Smith was the head of Church security. 

The Church employed a 15-person security staff. 

Both Harrison and Dickson were members of the Church at 

the time of the incident. Harrison had been an active member of 

the Church for more than five years before her death. Harrison 

attended weekly services, which drew more than 4,500 members,

she attended bible study classes, which drew about 300 members,

and she volunteered at Church-sponsored community events and 

activities. At the time of the fatal stabbing, Dickson was 

Harrison’s ex-boyfriend.

The first amended complaint alleges that their relationship 

ended “badly, with violence on Dickson’s part and [Harrison’s] 

seeking a restraining order against him.” Both Smith and Jones

“had intimate knowledge of [the relationship between Dickson 

and Harrison] and of Dickson’s abusive, harassing, and 

threatening conduct towards [Harrison] prior to the incident.” 

For example, two months prior to the incident, “Dickson admitted 

to Smith that [Harrison] had accused him of ‘choking her out’ and 

that the authorities had to be called.” Dickson further informed 

Smith that as a result of that incident “there was an active 

restraining order against Dickson in favor of [Harrison].” “Smith 

casually told Dickson to ‘leave her alone’ and that there were 

‘more fish in the sea.’ ”

Jones and Smith were also informed about one occasion 

when Dickson harassed Harrison while she was volunteering at 
4

the Church. As a result of that incident, “a report was made to 

the Ministries, Jones and Smith explicitly instructing” that “they 

‘had to look out for the two of them having problems.’ ”

According to the first amended complaint, “[n]one of the 

Defendants took any additional steps to assist [Harrison] with 

her personal safety via-à-vis the Church, nor did they ask or 

inform Dickson that he was no longer invited at the Church, or 

take any steps to keep Dickson and [Harrison] from interacting 

on their property.” The first amended complaint further alleges 

that the “Ministries, Jones and Smith had knowledge of the high 

foreseeability that violent crime specific to Dickson could and 

would occur on the premises, thus establishing a duty to provide 

increased security to members of their congregation such as 

[Harrison] and prevent Dickson from accessing their premises at 

all.” Such measures could have included providing “additional or 

personal security.”

On April 18, 2018, at approximately 7:00 p.m., Dickson 

arrived at the Church parking lot and used his car to block 

Harrison’s car from leaving. After confronting Harrison for 

several minutes in the parking lot, Dickson stabbed Harrison 

repeatedly. 

Harrison’s granddaughter, who was in Harrison’s car and 

witnessed the attack, ran inside the Church and told a member of 

the Church’s security staff. The security guard then notified 

Smith, who was inside the Church’s sanctuary awaiting the 

arrival of Jones for a bible-study session. Upon being notified of 

the attack, Smith exited the back door of the Church into the 

parking lot and observed Dickson drive away. When Smith got to 

Harrison, she was bleeding from multiple stab wounds. Church 

members had already called 911. Harrison died from the attack.
5

II. Trial court proceedings

Harrison’s heirs Tontanisha English, Ashley Harrison, 

Eleseia Viverette, and Lailah Hardie (hereafter collectively 

English) filed a first amended complaint against the Ministry 

defendants and Dickson, alleging claims for wrongful death, 

negligence, negligent hiring, supervision, and retention,

intentional infliction of emotional distress, and negligent 

infliction of emotional distress.

English’s wrongful death claim alleged that the Ministry 

defendants negligently operated and supervised the Church 

parking lot on the day of Harrison’s murder “by failing to take 

action in response to the numerous warnings that Dickson 

presented a threat” to Harrison, “such as banning him from 

Church premises.”

English’s negligence claim similarly alleged that the 

Ministry defendants “had a duty to use reasonable care to secure, 

safeguard and protect” Church members, including Harrison, and 

breached that duty “by failing to take reasonable steps to ensure 

the safety” of Harrison “despite being on notice that Dickson had 

been violent towards her” in the past. The first amended 

complaint alleged that such “reasonable steps” included banning 

Dickson from the premises or posting a “security detail in the 

Church’s parking lot” to ensure parishioners could safely enter 

and exit the Church.

The first amended complaint also sought punitive damages.

The Ministry defendants filed demurrers to the first 

amended complaint and motions to strike the punitive damages 

allegations.

In their demurrer to the wrongful death and negligence 

claims, the Ministry defendants argued that they did not owe
6

Harrison a legal duty to prevent Dickson’s violent attack. They 

contended that the only level of security that could have 

prevented the attack “would have been something approaching 

personal security for every parishioner attending a Church 

service or event,” and that the “level of security necessary to 

protect up to 4,500 parishioners would be immensely burdensome 

for” them. They further argued that banning Dickson from the 

Church would have been ineffective given there already was a 

restraining order preventing him from making contact with 

Harrison. Last, they highlighted that the “level of foreseeability 

of intentional, targeted, violent assaults on the Church premises 

is practically nil.”

In their motions to strike, the Ministry defendants 

contended that the first amended complaint’s request for punitive 

damages against the Ministries was barred by Code of Civil 

Procedure section 425.14. That section bars a claim for punitive 

damages “against a religious corporation . . . unless the court 

enters an order allowing an amended pleading that includes a 

claim for punitive damages” to be filed. (Code Civ. Proc., 

§ 425.14.) They further argued that the first amended complaint 

failed to allege facts sufficient to show “oppression, fraud or 

malice” on the part of the Ministry defendants.2

In opposition to the demurrers, English contended that the 

first amended complaint alleged that the Ministry defendants 

knew about Dickson’s “violent propensities, and that his conduct 

2 Only the motion to strike of Noel Jones Ministries, Inc. is 

included in the clerk’s transcript. The Ministry defendants 

inform us that the other motions to strike are identical in all 

material respects.
7

in stabbing her to death violently was foreseeable” to them. 

English also reiterated the allegation in the first amended 

complaint that the Church’s security staff “did nothing to try to 

‘keep them apart,’ nor did they take any reasonable actions to 

prevent Dickson from harming [Harrison] at the Church, 

including additional or personal security.” English also 

requested leave to amend in the event the court sustained the 

demurrers, but did not identify the specific allegations she could 

offer in an amended complaint.

In opposition to the motions to strike, English conceded the 

applicability of Code of Civil Procedure section 425.14. Even so, 

she argued the allegations in the first amended complaint were 

sufficient to state a punitive damages claim. In particular, she 

argued that the Ministry defendants’ failure to keep Dickson off 

the Church premises or to provide Harrison with reasonable 

security demonstrated “malice” within the meaning of Civil Code 

section 3294.

The trial court sustained the demurrers without leave to 

amend. Regarding the wrongful death and negligence claims, it 

concluded that defendants did not owe a legal duty to Harrison to 

provide additional or personal security or to ban Dickson from 

the premises. The court determined that the allegations in the 

first amended complaint failed to show “that there was a 

heightened foreseeability” that “Dickson was going to commit a 

brutal criminal act by murdering [Harrison]” in the Church 

parking lot. The court further found that “the proposed security 

measures are vague (‘additional or personal security’), 

burdensome (security guard in parking lot), and lack efficacy 

against a person who violates a restraining order.” The court 

likewise concluded that English failed to allege facts sufficient to 
8

support her other causes of action against the Ministry 

defendants.

The trial court also granted the Ministry defendants’ 

motions to strike the punitive damages claims, concluding that 

the first amended complaint failed to allege anything rising “to 

the level of oppression, fraud, or malice.” The court also cited the 

absence of any order pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 

425.14 authorizing English to pursue punitive damages claims 

against the Ministries.

The court thereafter entered a judgment of dismissal in 

favor of the Ministry defendants. English timely appealed.

DISCUSSION

English contends the trial court erred by concluding that 

the Ministry defendants did not owe Harrison a legal duty to 

protect her from Dickson’s violent attack. In particular, English 

argues the Ministry defendants were liable for Harrison’s murder 

“as a result of inadequate security at the Church,” and their 

failure “to disinvite a congregant known to have committed” 

violence against Harrison in the past. According to English, the 

allegations in the first amended complaint demonstrated that the 

Ministry defendants knew about Dickson’s violent propensities

and that his attack of Harrison at the Church was foreseeable.

She emphasizes that two months prior to Harrison’s murder, 

Dickson told Smith that Harrison had accused Dickson of choking 

her; that the Ministry defendants knew Harrison had a 

restraining order against Dickson; and that the Ministry 

defendants knew Dickson had harassed Harrison at the Church

and had prepared a report indicating they “ ‘had to look out for 

the two of them having problems.’ ”
9

On appeal, English also offers the following additional 

allegations which she contends cure any defects with the first 

amended complaint. The Ministry defendants knew that 

“Dickson was not actually attending any of the functions or 

services at the Church around the time he killed Harrison, but 

that rather he was only showing up at the Church at certain 

times because he knew he would be able to see Harrison and 

would act violently or erratically at best, i.e., the Church knew in 

advance Dickson was stalking Harrison and did nothing.” For 

example, the Ministry defendants knew that Dickson would 

“often visit the youth services department of the Church because 

he knew Harrison volunteered with children” at the Church. The 

Ministry defendants also knew that Dickson had “stolen 

Harrison’s phone so he could look through her private photos and 

texts at the Church property—a guard . . . had to force Dickson to 

give it back.” 

Also, prior to Harrison’s murder the Ministry defendants 

had “arranged for their security staff to keep families separated 

while at the Church, in cases of custody disputes, harassment, or 

divorce.”

On the day of Harrison’s murder, a Church security guard 

sent Harrison a text message telling her to park her car “in the 

location where she was killed because, he said, that area of the 

parking lot would be monitored” by security guards. After 

Harrison’s murder, Smith and/or Jones told a Church security 

guard that they had discussed “disinviting Dickson from the 

premises prior to the attack because they knew he was a danger 

to Harrison.”
10

I. Demurrer

A. Standard of review

“We review a judgment of dismissal after an order

sustaining a demurrer de novo, exercising our independent 

judgment about whether the complaint states a cause of action as 

a matter of law. [Citation.] We ‘assume the truth of all facts

properly pleaded by the plaintiffs, as well as those that are

judicially noticeable.’ [Citation.] ‘We may affirm on any basis 

stated in the demurrer, regardless of the ground on which the 

trial court based its ruling.’ ” (Hanouchian, supra, 51 

Cal.App.5th at p. 106.)

“It is an abuse of discretion to sustain a demurrer without 

leave to amend if there is a reasonable probability that the defect 

can be cured by amendment. [Citation.] The burden is on the 

plaintiff to demonstrate how the complaint can be amended to 

state a valid cause of action. [Citation.] The plaintiff can make 

that showing for the first time on appeal.” (Chapman v. Skype, 

Inc. (2013) 220 Cal.App.4th 217, 226.) 

B. Applicable legal principles 

“To establish a cause of action for negligence, the plaintiff 

must show that the ‘defendant had a duty to use due care, that he 

breached that duty, and that the breach was the proximate or 

legal cause of the resulting injury.’ [Citation.] Recovery for 

negligence depends as a threshold matter on the existence of a 

legal duty of care.”

3 (Brown, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 213.) “The 

3 English’s appeal addresses only whether the Ministry 

defendants owed Harrison a legal duty to prevent Dickson’s 

assault, contending that her other causes of action “flow from 
11

existence of a duty is a question of law for the court.” (Ann M. v. 

Pacific Plaza Shopping Center (1993) 6 Cal.4th 666, 674 (Ann 

M.), disapproved on other grounds in Reid v. Google (2010) 50 

Cal.4th 512, 527, fn. 5.)

“In general, each person has a duty to act with reasonable 

care under the circumstances. [Citations.] However, ‘one owes 

no duty to control the conduct of another, nor to warn those 

endangered by such conduct.’ [Citation.] ‘A person who has not 

created a peril is not liable in tort merely for failure to take 

affirmative action to assist or protect another unless there is

some relationship between them which gives rise to a duty to 

act.’ ” (Regents of University of California v. Superior Court

(2018) 4 Cal.5th 607, 619 (Regents); Delgado v. Trax Bar & Grill 

(2005) 36 Cal.4th 224, 235 (Delgado) [“A defendant may owe an 

affirmative duty to protect another from the conduct of third 

parties if he or she has a ‘special relationship’ with the other 

person.”].)

Our Supreme Court has instructed us to apply a two-step 

inquiry to determine “whether a defendant has a legal duty to 

take action to protect the plaintiff from injuries caused by a third 

party.” (Brown, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 209.) “First, the court 

must determine whether there exists a special relationship 

between the parties or some other set of circumstances giving rise 

to an affirmative duty to protect. Second, if so, the court must 

consult the factors described in Rowland [v. Christian (1968) 69 

[her] negligence claim.” Thus, we do not separately analyze 

whether any other cause of action in English’s first amended 

complaint states a claim for relief. 
12

Cal.2d 108] to determine whether relevant policy considerations 

counsel limiting that duty.”4 (Ibid.) 

The two-step inquiry is based on the premise that “even 

when two parties may be in a special relationship, the 

unforeseeability of the kind of harm suffered by the plaintiff or 

other policy factors may counsel against establishing an 

affirmative duty for one party to protect another.” (Brown, supra, 

11 Cal.5th at p. 219.) “A court might conclude that duty should 

not be imposed because, for example, the type of harm the 

plaintiff suffered was unforeseeable, or because there was no 

moral blameworthiness associated with defendant’s conduct, 

notwithstanding the defendant’s special relationship to the 

plaintiff. Put differently, even when a special relationship gives 

rise to an affirmative duty to protect, a court must still consider 

whether the policy considerations set out in Rowland warrant a 

departure from that duty in the relevant category of cases.” (Id. 

at p. 222.)

The Ministry defendants do not dispute that the first 

amended complaint adequately alleges the existence of a special 

relationship between the Ministries and Harrison. Indeed,

“ ‘[t]he relationship between a possessor of land and an invitee is 

a special relationship giving rise to a duty of care.’ [Citations.] 

‘The duty of care includes a duty to take reasonable steps to 

protect persons on the property from physical harm caused by the 

foreseeable conduct of third parties,’ including foreseeable 

4 Rowland v. Christian, supra, 69 Cal.2d 108, was partially 

superseded by statute on a different issue as stated in CalvilloSilva v. Home Grocery (1998) 19 Cal.4th 714, 722, disapproved on 

other grounds in Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 

Cal.4th 826, 853.
13

criminal acts.” (Hanouchian, supra, 51 Cal.App.5th at p. 107; see 

Delgado, supra, 36 Cal.4th at p. 235 [“Courts have found such a 

special relationship in cases involving the relationship between 

business proprietors such as shopping centers, restaurants, and 

bars, and their tenants, patrons, or invitees.”]; Ann M., supra, 6 

Cal.4th at p. 674 [landlord owes duty to tenants and patrons “to 

take reasonable steps to secure common areas against foreseeable 

criminal acts of third parties that are likely to occur in the 

absence of such precautionary measures.”].)

As do the parties, we therefore focus our analysis on the 

second step of the two-step inquiry established by Brown. At that 

step, we determine a duty’s existence and scope by applying the 

Rowland factors: “ ‘[T]he foreseeability of harm to the plaintiff, 

the degree of certainty that the plaintiff suffered injury, the 

closeness of the connection between the defendant’s conduct and 

the injury suffered, the moral blame attached to the defendant’s 

conduct, the policy of preventing future harm, the extent of the 

burden to the defendant and consequences to the community of 

imposing a duty to exercise care with resulting liability for 

breach, and the availability, cost, and prevalence of insurance for 

the risk involved.’ ” (Ann M., supra, 6 Cal.4th at p. 675, fn. 5, 

quoting Rowland v. Christian, supra, 69 Cal.2d at p. 113; see 

Castaneda v. Olsher (2007) 41 Cal.4th 1205, 1213 (Castaneda).) 

“Foreseeability and the extent of the burden to the defendant are 

ordinarily the crucial considerations, but in a given case one or 

more of the other Rowland factors may be determinative of the 

duty analysis.” (Castaneda, at p. 1213.)

“With respect to the two most crucial considerations, our 

Supreme Court has instructed that ‘ “the scope of the duty is 

determined in part by balancing the foreseeability of the harm 
14

against the burden of the duty to be imposed. [Citation.] ‘ “[I]n 

cases where the burden of preventing future harm is great, a high 

degree of foreseeability may be required. [Citation.] On the 

other hand, in cases where there are strong policy reasons for 

preventing the harm, or the harm can be prevented by simple 

means, a lesser degree of foreseeability may be required.” ’ ” ’ ” 

(Hanouchian, supra, 51 Cal.App.5th at p. 108.) “The high court 

has described this analysis as a ‘sliding-scale balancing 

formula.’ ” (Ibid.)

The duty analysis requires us “to identify the specific action 

or actions the plaintiff claims the defendants had a duty to 

undertake. ‘Only after the scope of the duty under consideration 

is defined may a court meaningfully undertake the balancing 

analysis of the risks and burdens present in a given case to 

determine whether the specific obligations should or should not 

be imposed on the landlord.’ ” (Castaneda, supra, 41 Cal.4th at 

p. 1214.) Thus, “ ‘[f]irst, the court must determine the specific 

measures the plaintiff asserts the defendant should have taken to 

prevent the harm. This frames the issue for the court’s 

determination by defining the scope of the duty under 

consideration. Second, the court must analyze how financially 

and socially burdensome these proposed measures would be to a 

landlord, which measures could range from minimally 

burdensome to significantly burdensome under the facts of the 

case. Third, the court must identify the nature of the third party 

conduct that the plaintiff claims could have been prevented had 

the landlord taken the proposed measures, and assess how 

foreseeable (on a continuum from a mere possibility to a 

reasonable probability) it was that this conduct would occur. 

Once the burden and foreseeability have been independently 
15

assessed, they can be compared in determining the scope of the 

duty the court imposes on a given defendant.’ ” (Ibid.)

C. The trial court properly sustained the 

demurrers of the Ministry defendants

English’s first amended complaint alleged that the Ministry 

defendants had a duty to “provide increased security,” to provide 

“additional or personal security,” and to post a “security detail in 

the Church’s parking lot to ensure that parishioners like 

[Harrison] were able to enter their house of worship free of 

harassment and violence.” Her first amended complaint further 

alleged that the Ministry defendants had a duty to “ban[] 

[Dickson] from [the] Church premises.” We examine each 

proposed duty in turn, and conclude that the Ministry defendants 

were not required to undertake these duties.5

In doing so, we have considered both the allegations in the 

first amended complaint and those English raises on appeal. We 

therefore do not separately analyze whether English should be 

granted leave to amend her first amended complaint, as we 

conclude that the new allegations she raises on appeal are 

insufficient to cure the deficiencies in her first amended 

complaint.

5 Because we affirm the trial court’s decision sustaining the 

Ministry defendants’ demurrers on the merits, we need not 

address their argument that judgment should be affirmed due to 

English’s purported failure to analyze how the cases she cites 

apply to her arguments.
16

1. Duty to provide additional security 

guards

Our analysis of English’s claim that the Ministry 

defendants had a duty to provide additional security guards, 

including posting security guards in the Church parking lot, is 

guided by California Supreme Court cases examining a landlord’s 

duty to provide security guards to protect against third party 

violence. As explained below, these cases have concluded that 

because the duty to provide security guards imposes a significant 

burden, a heightened degree of foreseeability of third party 

criminal conduct is necessary to impose such a duty. 

In Ann M., the plaintiff was an employee of a photo 

business located in a shopping center who was sexually assaulted

at work by a man armed with a knife. (Ann M., supra, 6 Cal.4th 

at p. 671.) The plaintiff sued the shopping center for negligence, 

contending that the attack was a foreseeable result of the 

shopping center’s failure to provide security patrols to deter the 

presence of transients in common areas of the shopping center. 

(Id. at p. 673.) The trial court granted summary judgment in 

favor of the shopping center on the basis that it owed no such 

duty to the plaintiff. (Ibid.)

On appeal, our Supreme Court concluded that “[w]hile 

there may be circumstances where the hiring of security guards 

will be required to satisfy a landowner’s duty of care, such action 

will rarely, if ever, be found to be a ‘minimal burden.’ The 

monetary costs of security guards is not insignificant. Moreover, 

the obligation to provide patrols adequate to deter criminal 

conduct is not well defined. ‘No one really knows why people 

commit crime, hence no one really knows what is “adequate”

deterrence in any given situation.’ ” (Ann M., supra, 6 Cal.4th at 
17

p. 679.). Ann M. thus held that “a high degree of foreseeability is 

required in order to find that the scope of a landlord’s duty of care 

includes the hiring of security guards,” and stressed further that 

“the requisite degree of foreseeability rarely, if ever, can be 

proven in the absence of prior similar incidents of violent crime 

on the landowner’s premises.” (Ibid.)

The California Supreme Court examined a similar issue in 

Sharon P. v. Arman, Ltd. (1999) 21 Cal.4th 1181, 1191 (Sharon 

P.), disapproved on other grounds in Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield 

Co., supra, 25 Cal.4th at page 853, footnote 19, and Reid v. 

Google, Inc., supra, 50 Cal.4th at page 527, footnote 5. There, the 

plaintiff was sexually assaulted in an underground parking 

garage below her office building. (Id. at p. 1185.) She sued the 

garage owner and the garage parking service alleging that their 

“failure to provide adequate security for users of the parking 

garage resulted in” her attack. (Ibid.)

In affirming summary judgment in favor of the defendants, 

the California Supreme Court emphasized its conclusion in Ann 

M. that “in light of the vagueness of the obligation to provide

patrols adequate to deter crime and the significant monetary and 

social costs that are implicated in imposing such an obligation, a 

‘high degree of foreseeability’ is required in order to find that the 

scope of a landowner’s duty of care includes the hiring of security 

guards to protect against violent crime by third parties.” (Sharon 

P., supra, 21 Cal.4th at p. 1190.) Applying that analysis, our

Supreme Court concluded that the plaintiff failed to provide 

evidence of prior crimes in the area that were sufficiently like the 

plaintiff’s assault to “establish a high degree of foreseeability that 

would justify the imposition” of a duty by defendants to “provide 

security guards in their garage.” (Id. at p. 1191.) It likewise 
18

questioned whether other measures suggested by the plaintiff, 

including periodic walk-throughs of the garage by security 

personnel, were less burdensome, and applied the same 

heightened foreseeability test: “[A]bsent any prior similar 

incidents or other indications of a reasonably foreseeable risk of 

violent criminal assaults in that location, we cannot conclude 

defendants were required to secure the area against such crime.” 

(Id. at pp. 1195–1199.)

Delgado reaffirmed this approach to examining whether to 

impose a duty to provide security guards. There, the plaintiff, a 

bar patron who was attacked in the parking lot of the bar by a 

group of fellow patrons, sued the bar for negligence. (Delgado, 

supra, 36 Cal.4th at pp. 230–231.) The bar employed two 

security guards, one posted inside the bar and the other outside 

in the parking lot. (Id. at p. 230.) The plaintiff and his wife 

became uneasy after several bar patrons began staring at them, 

and before leaving the bar the plaintiff’s wife informed the 

security guard that “ ‘there was going to be a fight.’ ” (Id. at 

p. 231.) The security guard inside the bar did not escort them to 

their car, and the security guard normally posted outside was no 

longer present when the plaintiff was assaulted in the parking 

lot. (Ibid.)

On appeal from a verdict in favor of the plaintiff, the bar 

contended that in the absence of any evidence of prior similar 

criminal assaults on the premises or in the vicinity, it had no 

duty to provide a security guard to protect the plaintiff from the 

assault. (Delgado, supra, 36 Cal.4th at p. 232.) On that point, 

the California Supreme Court agreed. After discussing Ann M.

and Sharon P., it reaffirmed that “only when ‘heightened’ 

foreseeability of third party criminal activity on the premises 
19

exists—shown by prior similar incidents or other indications of a 

reasonably foreseeable risk of violent criminal assaults in that 

location—does the scope of a business proprietor’s specialrelationship-based duty include an obligation to provide guards to 

protect the safety of patrons.” (Id. at p. 240, italics omitted.) 

Concluding the plaintiff produced no such evidence, Delgado held 

that the bar did not have “an obligation to provide any guard, or 

additional guards, to protect against third party assaults.” (Id. at 

245.) 

English’s first amended complaint variously describes the 

duty she seeks to impose on the Ministry defendants as providing 

“increased security to members of their congregation,” “taking 

additional precautions to provide for [Harrison’s] security while 

she was on Church premises,” “posting [a] security detail in the 

Church’s parking lot to ensure that parishioners like [Harrison] 

were able to enter their house of worship free of harassment and 

violence,” and providing “personal security.” Regardless of how 

English specifically characterizes this duty, it seems clear it 

centers around providing security guards to protect parishioners 

like Harrison. We therefore find that the duty English seeks to 

impose here is no less burdensome or vague than the duty at 

issue in Ann M., Sharon P., and Delgado.

6 (See Delgado, supra, 

6 English’s opening brief acknowledges that requiring a 

landowner to provide security guards potentially imposes a 

significant burden. We do not believe that duty is any less 

burdensome here even if we account for the allegation in the first 

amended complaint that the Church had a 15-person security 

staff and English’s claim on appeal that the Ministry defendants 

had previously “arranged for their security staff to keep families 

separated while at the Church, in cases of custody disputes, 
20

36 Cal.4th at pp. 238–240; Sharon P., supra, 21 Cal.4th at 

p. 1190 [noting “the vagueness of the obligation to provide patrols 

adequate to deter crime and the significant monetary and social 

costs” implicated in imposing such an obligation]; Ann M., supra, 

6 Cal.4th at p. 679 [observing that “the hiring of security guards” 

“will rarely, if ever, be found to be a ‘minimal burden’ ” and that 

“the obligation to provide patrols adequate to deter criminal 

conduct is not well defined”]; see also Melton v. Boustred (2010) 

183 Cal.App.4th 521, 539 [“The California Supreme Court has 

repeatedly found ‘the burden of hiring security guards’ to be 

‘extremely high.’ ”].) 

English’s failure to define precisely what sort of additional 

security guards would have been adequate to deter the type of 

violent attack suffered by Harrison is emblematic of the problems

with imposing such a legal duty in the first place. As California 

cases have repeatedly recognized in evaluating a landowner’s

duty to prevent criminal acts, identifying adequate measures to 

protect against criminal conduct is difficult at best. (See Wiener 

v. Southcoast Childcare Centers, Inc. (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1138, 

harassment, or divorce.” A similar situation was presented in 

Delgado. At the time the plaintiff was attacked in the bar 

parking lot, the bar employed security staff and had instructed 

security to “patrol the parking lot outside the bar to ensure that 

persons did not congregate or consume intoxicating beverages 

there.” (Delgado, supra, 36 Cal.4th at p. 230.) The California 

Supreme Court continued to treat the duty to hire security 

guards as a “burdensome” one and did not indicate that the 

burden was any less given the fact that the bar already employed 

security. (See id. at pp. 241, 244–245.) We therefore treat the 

duty to provide security guards as burdensome, even accounting 

for the Church’s existing security staff.
21

1150 (Wiener) [“[I]f a criminal decides on a particular goal or 

victim, it is extremely difficult to remove his every means for 

achieving that goal.”]; Vasquez v. Residential Investments, Inc. 

(2004) 118 Cal.App.4th 269, 283 [“ ‘[H]ow can one know what 

measures will protect against the thug, the narcotic addict, the 

degenerate, the psychopath and the psychotic?’ ”]; Pamela W. v. 

Millsom (1994) 25 Cal.App.4th 950, 959 [“On the facts of this 

case, involving what appeared to be an attack by someone who 

had stalked the victim, it is wholly unclear what level of security 

short of armed guards could have been fully relied upon to 

prevent the crime.”]; 7735 Hollywood Blvd. Venture v. Superior 

Court (1981) 116 Cal.App.3d 901, 905 [“No one really knows why 

people commit crime, hence no one really knows what is 

‘adequate’ deterrence in any given situation.”].) 

Because the duty to maintain security guards adequate to 

have prevented Harrison’s attack imposes a significant burden on 

the Ministry defendants and is vague, English must point to 

allegations in the first amended complaint that sufficiently allege 

a high degree of foreseeability of third party criminal conduct at 

the Church premises. (See Ann M., supra, 6 Cal.4th at p. 679.)

However, the first amended complaint does not allege any prior 

similar incidents at the Church or its parking lot, the key

indicator of heightened foreseeability required to establish a duty

to provide security guards. (See Delgado, supra, 36 Cal.4th at 

p. 240; Sharon P., supra, 21 Cal.4th at p. 1191; Ann M., at p. 679

[“requisite degree of foreseeability rarely, if ever, can be proven in 

the absence of prior similar incidents of violent crime on the 

landowner’s premises”]; Melton v. Boustred, supra, 183 

Cal.App.4th at pp. 537–538 [“[I]n cases involving liability for 

third party criminal conduct, ‘the requisite degree of 
22

foreseeability rarely, if ever, can be proven in the absence of prior 

similar incidents.’ ”].) 

That leaves English having to show that the first amended 

complaint sufficiently alleges another indication of a highly 

foreseeable risk of violent criminal assault at the Church or its 

parking lot.

7 (See Wiener, supra, 32 Cal.4th at pp. 1151–1152 

[acknowledging that “some types of crime might be foreseeable 

without prior similar incidents”]; Delgado, supra, 36 Cal.4th at 

p. 240 [“ ‘heightened’ foreseeability” can be shown by “prior 

similar incidents or other indications of a reasonably foreseeable 

risk of violent criminal assaults in that location”]; Margaret W. v. 

Kelley R. (2006) 139 Cal.App.4th 141, 155 [“ ‘heightened 

foreseeability’ ” requires “knowledge of the perpetrator’s 

propensity to assault or knowledge of prior similar incidents in 

7 English contends the Ministry defendants mistakenly rely 

on cases involving a “random” criminal act such as Hanouchian.

(See, e.g., Hanouchian, supra, 51 Cal.App.5th at pp. 104–105 

[plaintiff attacked “ ‘suddenly, and without any provocation’ ” by 

other partygoers unknown to plaintiff].) Ann M., Sharon P., and 

Delgado likewise involved assailants who were unknown to their 

victims. English argues this case, by contrast, involves a 

targeted attack by someone who was “prone to violence against a 

particular decedent,” i.e., Harrison. (See, e.g., Barber v. Chang 

(2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 1456, 1466 [“the foreseeability question 

here does not involve the prospect of ‘endemic’ [citation] violence 

generally or a universe of ‘unknown assailants’ ” but instead “a 

particular tenant identified as a threat”].) Although we 

acknowledge that distinction, because of the burdensome nature 

of the duty English seeks to impose on the Ministry defendants,

we must still determine based on Ann M. and its progeny 

whether a violent attack at the Church or its parking lot was 

highly foreseeable under the circumstances presented here. 
23

that location”].) According to English, the allegations in the first 

amended complaint together with the new allegations she raises 

on appeal show the Ministry defendants knew about Dickson’s 

propensity for violent behavior towards Harrison, and thus 

establish the requisite degree of heightened foreseeability of a 

violent incident at the Church premises.

8

We disagree. The first amended complaint vaguely alleges 

an undated prior incident where Dickson “was harassing 

[Harrison] at the Church while she was volunteering,” and that 

“a report was made” to the Ministry defendants that they “ ‘had 

to look out for the two of them having problems.’ ” That alleged 

incident, vague as it is and apparently not involving violence or 

8 English’s focus on the foreseeability of Dickson’s attack 

against Harrison appears at odds with caselaw instructing that 

“a court’s task—in determining ‘duty’—is not to decide whether a 

particular plaintiff’s injury was reasonably foreseeable in light of 

a particular defendant’s conduct, but rather to evaluate more 

generally whether the category of negligent conduct at issue is 

sufficiently likely to result in the kind of harm experienced that 

liability may appropriately be imposed on the negligent party.” 

(Ballard v. Uribe (1986) 41 Cal.3d 564, 572 fn. 6; see also 

Regents, supra, 4 Cal.5th at pp. 629–630; Cabral v. Ralphs 

Grocery Co. (2011) 51 Cal.4th 764, 774–775; Vasquez v. 

Residential Investments, Inc., supra, 118 Cal.App.4th at p. 286

[“foreseeability depends not on whether a particular plaintiff’s 

injury was foreseeable as a result of a particular defendant’s 

conduct, but instead on whether the conduct at issue created a 

foreseeable risk of a ‘ “particular kind of harm” ’ ”].) We need not 

resolve that tension because even if we assume that English 

appropriately focuses on the foreseeability of Dickson’s attack on 

Harrison, we conclude that Dickson’s violent attack of Harrison 

in the Church parking lot was not highly foreseeable.
24

the threat of violence, fails to suggest, let alone make it highly 

foreseeable, that Dickson would violently attack Harrison at the 

Church. That remains so even coupled with the proposed new 

allegations on appeal that prior to Harrison’s murder Dickson 

took Harrison’s phone while the two were at Church to look 

through her photos, and had shown up to Church functions and 

services “because he knew he would be able to see” Harrison.9 

These new allegations likewise do not involve violence or the 

threat of violence, and thus similarly fail to show that it was 

highly foreseeable that Dickson would violently attack Harrison 

in the Church parking lot. Our conclusion is buttressed by the 

absence of allegations in the first amended complaint or on 

appeal that following Dickson’s harassment of Harrison, 

Harrison feared for her safety at the Church or had asked the 

9 According to English’s proposed new allegations, Dickson 

was “only showing up at the Church at certain times because he 

knew he would be able to see Harrison and would act violently or 

erratically at best, i.e., the Church knew in advance Dickson was 

stalking Harrison and did nothing.” The conclusory allegation 

that Dickson “would act violently or erratically” while at a 

Church service or function is not supported by any specific 

factual allegations. We therefore do not rely on it. (See 

Hanouchian, supra, 51 Cal.App.5th at p. 103 [on review of 

sustaining of demurrer we “ ‘treat as true all material facts 

properly pleaded, but not contentions, deductions or conclusions 

of fact or law’ ”]; Megeff v. Doland (1981) 123 Cal.App.3d 251, 259 

[disregarding conclusory allegations in complaint in evaluating 

duty to prevent violent attack].) We also do not rely on the 

conclusory allegation in the first amended complaint that the 

Ministry defendants had received “numerous warnings . . . from 

fellow parishioners” regarding Dickson, as it likewise is not

supported by any specific factual allegations.
25

Ministry defendants to take precautions to protect her from 

Dickson while on the Church premises.

Nor are we convinced that English demonstrates the 

requisite degree of heightened foreseeability with the allegations

in the first amended complaint that two months before her 

murder, “Dickson admitted to Smith that [Harrison] had accused 

him of ‘choking her out’ and that the authorities had to be called,” 

resulting in a restraining order against Dickson. Although this 

incident involved violence by Dickson, the allegation provides no 

detail about the circumstances surrounding the incident to 

suggest that further violence by Dickson was likely, let alone that 

it was highly foreseeable he would brutally murder Harrison in 

the Church parking lot two months later. (See Wiener, supra, 32 

Cal.4th at p. 1150 [“[I]t is difficult if not impossible in today’s 

society to predict when a criminal might strike.”]; Alvarez v. 

Jacmar Pacific Pizza Corp. (2002) 100 Cal.App.4th 1190, 1194, 

1211–1212 [affirming nonsuit and holding that verbal and 

physical altercation between patrons at restaurant, including “a 

pushing and shoving match” and one patron “punching [another] 

in the face,” did not make subsequent shooting of one patron by 

another inside the restaurant foreseeable]; compare Barber v. 

Chang, supra, 151 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1460, 1466–1467 [harm to 

plaintiff foreseeable where landlord knew that on prior occasion 

tenant aimed shotgun at plaintiff’s wife, yelled “ ‘leave my family 

alone,’ ” and told wife to “ ‘ “[b]ring [plaintiff] here” ’ ”]; Madhani 

v. Cooper (2003) 106 Cal.App.4th 412, 415–416 [foreseeability of 

harm “clear” where landlord knew tenant had “engaged in 

repeated acts of assault and battery” against plaintiff and her 

mother and received “at least six reports of [tenant’s] violent and 

threatening behavior”].) Again, we note that English does not 
26

allege in her first amended complaint or on appeal that Harrison 

alerted the Ministry defendants to the choking incident or 

restraining order, that Dickson had subsequently threatened 

Harrison with violence, that the Ministry defendants witnessed 

any violent or threatening conduct by Dickson, that Harrison 

feared further violence by Dickson, or that following the incident 

Harrison had asked the Ministry defendants to take precautions 

to protect her from Dickson while on the Church premises.

English raises two more allegations on appeal that she 

contends made Dickson’s violent attack at the Church highly 

foreseeable. First, on the day of Harrison’s murder, a Church 

security guard told “her to park in the location where she was 

killed because, he said, that area of the parking lot would be 

monitored by” security.10 Second, the Ministry defendants 

considered disinviting Dickson “from the premises prior to the 

attack because they knew he was a danger to Harrison.”

Given the absence of allegations supporting the conclusion 

that Dickson’s violent attack of Harrison in the Church parking 

lot was highly foreseeable, that the Ministry defendants

considered taking precautions to protect Harrison does not 

transform an otherwise unforeseeable violent act into a highly 

foreseeable one. As our high court emphasized in Delgado, 

“[c]ontrary to the suggestion that ‘the issue of foreseeability 

becomes irrelevant’ whenever a proprietor has employed a 

security guard [citation], the foreseeability of the criminal 

10 English does not discuss the doctrine of negligent 

undertaking or explain how it would apply here. (See 

Hanouchian, supra, 51 Cal.App.5th at pp. 114–115 [discussing 

negligent undertaking theory].) We therefore do not address it.
27

conduct in question remains relevant to the existence and scope

of a proprietor’s duty under the special relationship doctrine.”

(Delgado, supra, 36 Cal.4th at p. 248; see also id. at p. 249 

[“Merely because a supermarket or other similar enterprise 

‘chooses to have a security program’ that includes provision of a 

roving security guard does not signify that the proprietor has 

assumed a duty to protect invitees from third party violence.”]) 

To hold otherwise might deter landowners and proprietors from 

taking reasonable measures to protect tenants, invitees, and 

patrons; taking such measures would result in a duty of care to 

safeguard against otherwise unforeseeable criminal acts on their 

property. 

Finally, English does not point to any allegations in the 

first amended complaint or on appeal suggesting the Ministry 

defendants knew Dickson’s attack of Harrison was imminent, or 

that they failed to reasonably assist Harrison once they became 

aware of Dickson’s violent assault in the Church parking lot. 

Thus, this case does not involve the duty to assist an invitee 

facing “danger from imminent or ongoing criminal assaultive

conduct occurring upon the premises.” (Morris v. De La Torre

(2005) 36 Cal.4th 260, 270; see Delgado, supra, 36 Cal. 4th at 

pp. 245–247 [discussing bar’s “duty to respond to events 

unfolding in its presence by undertaking reasonable, relatively 

simple, and minimally burdensome measures”]; Marois v. Royal 

Investigation & Patrol, Inc. (1984) 162 Cal.App.3d 193, 201–202 

[triable issue of fact regarding security guards’ duty to intervene 

in ongoing physical altercation].) Rather, English’s appeal

focuses on the “duty to provide security guards or other similarly 

burdensome measures designed to prevent future criminal 
28

conduct,” which requires a showing of heightened foreseeability. 

(Morris v. De La Torre, supra, 36 Cal.4th at p. 270.)

Because English has failed to allege sufficient facts to 

establish the high degree of foreseeability necessary to charge the 

Ministry defendants with the duty to provide security guards, 

“we need not consider the other Rowland factors.” (Hanouchian, 

supra, 51 Cal.App.5th at p. 113.)

2. Duty to exclude Dickson from the Church

premises

We are likewise unpersuaded that the allegations in the 

first amended complaint or those English raises on appeal 

support the conclusion that the Church had a duty to exclude 

Dickson from the premises. We analyze this proposed duty under 

the same principles described above, primarily by balancing the 

“ ‘foreseeability of the harm against the burden of the duty to be 

imposed.’ ” (Hanouchian, supra, 51 Cal.App.5th at p. 108; see 

Castaneda, supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 1214.) 

Although English has not discussed a case involving a duty 

to ban a purportedly violent patron or invitee, we find Castaneda 

instructive. There, the plaintiff, shot while he was a bystander to 

a gang confrontation involving the residents of a mobilehome 

across the street from the plaintiff’s mobilehome, sued the owner 

of the mobilehome park. (Castaneda, supra, 41 Cal.4th at 

p. 1209.) The plaintiff alleged the owner had a duty to evict the 

residents involved in the gang confrontation “once they began to 

harass and annoy other residents of the park.” (Id. at p. 1219.) 

The California Supreme Court affirmed nonsuit in favor of 

the owner, analyzing the plaintiff’s claim under the principles of 

Ann M. and related cases. (Castaneda, supra, 41 Cal.4th at 

pp. 1213–1214 [discussing Ann M., Delgado, Sharon P., and 
29

Rowland].) It concluded that “undertaking eviction of a tenant 

cannot be considered a minimal burden,” noting that the expense 

of eviction proceedings “is not necessarily trivial,” and that 

“undertaking eviction of a hostile tenant, especially one involved 

in a violent street gang, could subject the landlord or property 

manager to retaliatory harassment or violence.” (Id. at p. 1219.) 

In light of those burdens, our high court looked “to the 

circumstances of this case to see if [the mobilehome park owner] 

was on notice of facts making a gang shooting” involving the 

residents “highly foreseeable.” (Id. at pp. 1220–1221.)

Unlike Castaneda, English contends that “disinvit[ing]

Dickson as a member of the Church and keep[ing] him off the 

property” imposes a minimal burden on the Ministry defendants. 

She likewise implies it would have been a minimal burden for the 

Ministry defendants “to impose some sort of separation policy” to 

keep Dickson away from Harrison.

Even assuming the Church could have easily “disinvited” 

Dickson as a member, keeping him off the Church premises 

would not have imposed a minimal or trivial burden. As noted 

already, it is unclear what level of reasonable protective 

measures would be adequate to protect someone against a 

determined violent criminal. (See Wiener, supra, 32 Cal.4th at 

p. 1150; Vasquez v. Residential Investments, Inc., supra, 118 

Cal.App.4th at p. 283; Pamela W. v. Millsom, supra, 25 

Cal.App.4th at p. 959; 7735 Hollywood Blvd. Venture v. Superior 

Court, supra, 116 Cal.App.3d at p. 905.) Dickson’s disregard of 

the restraining order against him underscores that point; 

tragically, it did nothing to stop him from confronting and fatally 

attacking Harrison in the Church parking lot. We thus fail to see 
30

how a “separation policy” imposed by the Church would have 

been any more effective.

The Ministry defendants therefore understandably 

emphasize that a landlord would have to take substantial

measures to fortify itself—for example, constant monitoring of 

entrances, hiring security guards to patrol the premises, or 

construction of fences or other barriers to control access to the 

property—to prevent a violent individual from entering its 

premises. Even for the Church, which employed a 15-person 

security staff and had previously “arranged for their security 

staff to keep families separated while at Church, in cases of 

custody disputes, harassment, or divorce”, requiring it to 

undertake those measures would impose a considerable burden. 

(See Vasquez v. Residential Investments, Inc., supra, 118 

Cal.App.4th at p. 285 [court must analyze how financially 

burdensome proposed measures “would be to a landlord, which 

measures could range from minimally burdensome to 

significantly burdensome under the facts of the case”]; compare 

Regents, supra, 4 Cal.5th at p. 633 [finding that “record reflects 

that colleges have already focused considerable attention on 

identifying and responding to potential threats, and have funding 

sources available for those efforts”].)

In response to the Ministry defendants’ argument, English 

counters that if the Ministry defendants had disinvited Dickson 

from the Church, they could have “instructed security staff to 

enforce this ban, call[ed] 911 immediately upon his arrival, or 

even responded to his presence with their security staff.”

Instead, the first amended complaint alleges that at the time of 

Dickson’s attack of Harrison in the Church parking lot, Smith 
31

was inside the Church’s sanctuary area and “distracted from his 

duties by the imminent arrival of Jones.”

English’s attempt to hold the Ministry defendants liable for 

failing to take these steps presupposes that security guards were 

constantly monitoring the Church parking lot or tracking 

Harrison’s whereabouts at the Church premises. They were not, 

at least according to the first amended complaint and the 

allegations English raises on appeal. And we have already 

rejected English’s claim that the Ministry defendants had these 

duties as a matter of law. Finally, as noted above, English has 

not alleged that the Ministry defendants were aware of Dickson’s 

presence at the Church parking lot but failed to call 911 or take 

other reasonable and minimally burdensome steps to separate 

him from Harrison. (See Morris v. De La Torre, supra, 36 Cal.4th 

at pp. 277–278; Delgado, supra, 36 Cal.4th at pp. 245–247; 

Marois v. Royal Investigation and Patrol, Inc., supra, 162 

Cal.App.3d at pp. 201–202.) Sadly, by the time the Ministry 

defendants learned of the attack, it was too late to save Harrison.

Having concluded that the duty to ban and exclude Dickson 

from the Church premises is a significant burden, English must 

demonstrate that Dickson’s attack of Harrison in the Church 

parking lot was highly foreseeable. (Castaneda, supra, 41 

Cal.4th at pp. 1220–1221.) We have already addressed that issue 

and concluded it was not. 

Thus, we do not address the remaining Rowland factors 

(Hanouchian, supra, 51 Cal.App.5th at p. 113), except to note 

that, in addition to the significant burdens on the Ministry 

defendants that would result from the duty English seeks to 

impose, we are also mindful of the potential social costs. (See 

Regents, supra, 4 Cal.5th at p. 633 [Rowland requires considering 
32

burden “that recognizing a tort duty would impose on the 

defendant and the community”].) Churches and other houses of 

worship are normally open and welcoming places, not 

strongholds. Also, imposing the sort of duties English proposes

here—banning and excluding parishioners who have acted 

violently against other parishioners in the past—could impair the 

relationship between parishioners and their religious community

or religious leaders. (Cf. Conti v. Watchtower Bible & Tract 

Society of New York, Inc. (2015) 235 Cal.App.4th 1214, 1228–1229 

[imposing duty on church to warn members when it “believe[s]

that a congregation member is capable of doing harm” could 

“discourage wrongdoers from seeking potentially beneficial 

intervention” and “contravene the public policy against disclosure 

of penitential communications”].)

II. Motion to strike

English contends the trial court mistakenly struck from the 

first amended complaint the punitive damages allegations 

against the Ministry defendants.

Because we affirm the trial court’s dismissal of the first 

amended complaint against the Ministry defendants without 

leave to amend, we need not address whether the first amended 

complaint sufficiently alleged punitive damages against the 

Ministry defendants. (See, e.g., Morningstar, Inc. v. Superior 

Court (1994) 23 Cal.App.4th 676, 697 [“Since we are sustaining 

the demurrer without leave to amend, we need not reach 

[defendant’s] motion to strike [plaintiff’s] request for punitive 

damages.”].)
33

DISPOSITION

The judgment in favor of City of Refuge Ministries, Inc., 

Noel Jones Ministries, Inc., Noel Jones, and Bryant Smith is 

affirmed. They are entitled to their costs on appeal.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL 

REPORTS

EDMON, P. J.

We concur:

LAVIN, J.

NGUYEN, J.*

* Judge of the Los Angeles Superior Court, assigned by the 

Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California 

Constitution.