UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA LEIGH GLASS, Plaintiff,
v. ANDREW M. SAUL, 1 Commissioner ofSocial Security, Defendant. Case No. 19-cv-1804-RCL

MEMORANDUM OPINION PlaintiffLeigh Glass brings this actionprosechallenging a Social Security Administration determination that she is ineligible for supplemental security income because she is not disabled under the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 401 et seq. Before the Court are plaintiffs Motion to Stay, ECF No. 88, and defendant Andrew M. Saul's Motion for Judgment ofAffirmance,2 ECF No. 86. After considering the motions and the entire record, the Court will DENY plaintiff's motion and GRANT defendant's motion. 

### I. BACKGROUND Through an adjudicatory process, the Social Security Administration ("SSA") provides benefits to individuals who cannot work because ofa physical ormental disability. On December 11, 2009, plaintiff filed an application with the SSA for supplemental security income for an alleged disability that began on October 1, 2008. Soc. Sec. Admin. Op. 31, ECF No. 80. Her claim
was initially granted in February 2010; however, following a report offraud by a private citizen,

1Andrew M. Saul, Commissioner ofSocial Security, is substituted for Nancy A. Berryhill, his predecessor. See Fed. R
. Civ. P. 25(d).

2 The motion is entitled Defendant's Motion for Judgment ofAffirmance and in Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion for Judgment ofReversal. The plaintiffnever filed a motion forjudgment ofreversal.the SSA's Cooperative Disability Investigations Unit ("CDI") began an investigation and recommended plaintiffs case be reopened in 2011. 

### Id. SSA reopened her case and subsequently deniedherclaim inFebruary2012, and againupon reconsideration inApril 2014. 

### Id. Plaintiffthen filed a request for a hearing, which was held on August 21, 2015, in front ofthe Honorable John Cusker, an Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ"). Op. 32. Plaintiffwaived herright to appear atthe hearing and instead appointed Ms. Kristine Allison as her non-attorney representative. 

### Id. At the hearing, Ms. Allison appeared and testified in person. 

### Id. Ms. Allison's testimony
was largely limited to describing her infrequent contact with plaintiffand howplaintiffhas "been very difficult, andhas continuedto ... do what shewants to do throughoutthis process."Tr. 1337, ECF No. 80-13. Ms. Cheryl R. Chandler, an impartial vocational expert, also testified at the hearing. Tr. 1339. Ms. Chandlerandthe ALJ confirmedthatplaintiffwas forty-three years old and had at least a high school education, and that she had no "substantial gainful activity within the last 15 years." Tr. 1342-43. The ALJ then gave Ms. Chandler a hypothetical individual and asked her whether there would be any jobs that the individual could perform in the national economy. Tr. 1343. The hypothetical individual had certain functional limitations; specifically: understanding and memory sufficient to understand and remember simple instructions. Shehas sustained concentrationandpersistence, with sufficient ability to carry out short instructions, perform activities without additional support once mastered, and ability to maintain adequate attention for simple one and two step tasks. In terms ofsocial interaction and environment, below interpersonal contact is required. In terms ofadaptation, this person has sufficient ability to be aware of normal hazards, and to utilize public transportation. Given limited coping skills, she requires low stress and a consistent environment.

2Id. Ms. Chandler testified that the individual could work in the national economy as a machine feeder, lumber straightener, box bender, or in other similar jobs. Tr. 1344-46. Plaintiffs representative declined to ask Ms. Chandler any questions. Tr. 1348. On September 15, 2015, the ALJ issued his decision denying plaintiffs application for supplemental security income
.Op. 34. The ALJ found thatplaintiffhad not engaged in substantial gainful activity since December 11, 2009, that she had the severe impairment ofa mood disorder, and that that severe impairment did not equal or exceed the criteria ofan impairment listed in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1 ("Appendix l"). Op. 35-36. The ALJ then considered plaintiffs residual functional capacity ("RFC") and found that plaintiffwas not disabled because she could perform a full range of work at all exertional levels, subject to the limitations of completing only simple repetitive tasks without public contact. Op. 37. After unsuccessfully seeking review by the agency's Appeals Council, plaintifftimely filed this suit under 42 U.S.C. §405(g). 3 

### II. LEGAL STANDARD The Court'sreview ofthe ALJ's decision is limitedto deciding whetherthe ALJ correctly applied the relevant legal standards and whether substantial evidence supports the ALJ's findings. Butler v. Barnhart, 353 F.3d 992, 999 (D.C. Cir. 2004). The substantial evidence standard "requires more than a scintilla, but
... less than a preponderance ofthe evidence," id. (internal quotation marks omitted), and can be satisfied by "such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion," Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971) (internal quotation marks omitted).

3 Plaintiffinitially filed her complaint in the United States District Comt for the Northern District ofIllinois; after SSA filed a motion to transfer, the United States District Court for the Northern District ofIllinois granted the motion and transferred the case to this Court. See ECFNos. 1, 71, 72, 74. 3To qualify for supplemental security income under the Social Security Act, plaintiffmust establish that she is "disabled." 42 U.S.C. § 1382(a)(l). The SSA has established a five-step sequential evaluation process for assessing whether an individual is disabled. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(a). The first three steps involve, respectively, the ALJ considering whether the individual is currently engaged in "substantial gainful activity," whether the medical impairment is "severe," and whetherthe severe medical impairment meets one ofthe "listings"in the relevant subpart Appendix. § 416.920(a)(4)(i)-(iii). If the severe medical impairment is not a listed impairment under the third step, the ALJ then assesses the individual's RFC before moving onto the fourth step. § 416.920(a)(4), (e). An individual's RFC is the most she can still do despite her limitations and is assessed based on all the relevant evidence in the record. §416.945(a)(l). Ifthe ALJ finds that the individual can adjust to other work based on her age, education, and the RFC assessment, she is not disabled under the Social SecurityAct. §416.920(h). III. DISCUSSION Plaintiff challenges the ALJ's decision in her Amended Complaint under 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g) and 1383(c)(3).4 However, Plaintiffalso filed a motion to stay on March 19, 2020, that

4 Plaintiffraises numerous other claims in her complaint, including for fraud, discrimination, and retaliation; she also asks for damages. See generally Am. Comp!. The Court lacksjurisdictionto address these claims, however. Sections 405(g) and (h) both conferjurisdiction on the Courtto review final decisions ofthe SSA and bar it from considering any actions that arise under the Social Security Act except for such final reviews and for constitutional claims. Schweiker v. Chi/icky, 487 U.S. 412, 424 (1988); Ganem v. Heckler, 746 F.2d 844, 848 (D.C. Cir. 1984). The Commissioner, acting through an ALJ, denied plaintiffs request for supplemental security income following a hearing. Op. 34. Thus, plaintiffsrequest for review ofthe ALJ's decision is the only claimthe Courtwill address. See § 405(h); Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99, 108 (1977); Ganem, 746 F.2d at 848. Further, to the extent plaintiffraises a due process claim, the entirety ofit is that "SSA is violating [plaintiffs] rights under the [Fifth] Amendment," because "everyone, (including [p]laintiff,) has a clear legal right to submit an application for Social Security Disability." Am. Comp!. 5. This Court will not address plaintiffs undeveloped constitutional claim. See Davis v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 734 F.3d 1161, 1166-67 (D.C. Cir. 2013). Finally, plaintiffs request for damages is unavailing, since the Court is limited to entering "ajudgment affirming, modifying, or reversing the decision ofthe Commissioner ofSocial Security." § 405(g). Damages are precluded. See Schweiker, 487 U.S. at 424. 4is pending before the Court. The Court will first address that motion before reviewing the ALJ's decision. Ultimately, the Courtdoes notfindplaintiffsarguments convincing, anditwill therefore grant defendant's motions. A. The CourtDenies Plaintiff's Requests in Her Motion to Stay Plaintiffmakes three requests in her motionto stay: that the Court should stay the case due to plaintiffs "incapacitated state and current enrollment in a treatment program and exposure to COVID-19," grant her request for a reasonable accommodation to access Electronic Case Files ("ECF"), and grant her request to have "all previously mailed items" re-mailed to her. Mot. Stay 1-3. None ofher arguments in support ofherrequests are persuasive.
a. Plaintiff's Stay Request The Court begins with plaintiffs stay request. Because this Court "must take pains to protect the rights ofpro se parties against the consequences oftechnical errors," Calloway v. Brownlee, 366 F. Supp. 2d 43, 55 (D.D.C. 2005), it looks to the substance and notthe form of pro
se filings, see, e.g., Washington v. Smith, 80 F.3d 555, 556 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (affirming decision of district courtto treatproseletters as motions for summaryjudgment);Duruv. UnitedStatesDep 't of Just., No. 17-cv-1005 (CKK), 2017 WL 6541266, at*1(D.D.C. Sept. 6, 2017)(treatingpro se motion for defaultjudgment as opposition to motion to dismiss for failure to serve); Nabaya v. Dudeck, No. 13-cv-1912 (RBW), 2014 WL 12539331, at 

### *1 (D.D.C. Jan. 31, 2014) (treatingpro

se motion for writ ofmandamus as motion for TRO). Plaintiffmoved for a "stay," averring that she is "incapacitated" and implying that she is unable to attend to legal proceedings and paperwork. See Mot. Stay 1-2. The reliefshe seeks, in essence, is more time due to her medical incapacity. While she does not say what she needs more time for, the only deadlines pending were her motion for reversal and her response to the government's motion. Thus, the Court will assume that she seeks more time to file those

5documents and treat her motion to stay as amotion for an extension oftime under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 6(b)(l)(B). 5 Unfortunately for plaintiff, an extension oftime is not warranted because she cannot show excusableneglect. Whether a delay constitutes excusable neglectrequires an equable balancing of "thedangerofprejudiceto the [otherparty], the length ofdelay and its potential impact onjudicial proceedings, the reason for delay, including whether it was within the reasonable control ofthe movant, andwhetherthe movantactedin good faith."PioneerInv. Servs. Co. v. BrunswickAssocs. Ltd. P 'ship, 507U.S. 380,395 (1993). Whilemedical emergencies often sufficeto showexcusable neglect, see, e.g., Halvonik v. Doll, 263 F.R.D. 13, 16-17 (D.D.C. 2009), they do so only ifthe emergencyprevents the party from meeting a deadline. Here, plaintiffclaims that she was exposed to the SARS-CoV-2 virus and that she was "in
apartiallyincapacitatedandinaheavilymedicated state"onFebruary27, 2020,the date she served hermotion onthe government. Mot. Stay 6. Bethat as it may, plaintiffsmedical emergencycame
one month after the Court's January 26, 2020 deadline for all dispositive motions. See Nov. 27, 2020 Order 2, ECF No. 84. Plaintiffis not claiming she was exposedto the SARS-CoV-2 virus in January 2020 or earlier, and therefore she has not actually explained why she missed the January 26, 2020 deadline. Thus, the Court does not see any excusable neglect warranting an extension of time for plaintiff.6

5 Plaintifffiled her motion to stay after the deadlines to file her motion for reversal and response had expired, so she should have moved for an extension oftime under Rule 6(b)(1)(B). To obtain reliefunder that provision, plaintiff would need to ask for more time to meet the deadlines because ofexcusable neglect. The Court construes plaintiff's declaration ofmedical incapacity in her motion as her attempting to show excusable neglect.
6 The Court also questions the good faith ofplaintiffin filing this motion. Plaintiffhas a history of"engaging in delay tactics" and "obstructingthe process" during court proceedings. United States v. Glass, 357 Fed. App'x 58, 60 (9th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). She already filed a motion to stay with this Court, which it denied on November 27, 2019. See ECF No. 84. Further, in her initial motion to stay with this Court plaintiffclaimed that she "has neverbefore asked for an extension," Oct. 4, 2019 Mot. Stay 2, ECFNo. 82, butthe record shows she previously asked for an extension oftime on November 1, 2018 and May 10, 2019, see ECFNos. 45, 66. In otherwords, plaintiff 6b. Plaintiff's Remaining Requests in Her Motion to Stay Plaintiffs other two requests in her motion to stay are similarly unsuccessful. Plaintiff requests access to the ECF filing system because, due to a visual imparity, she can only read court documents online with special computer software. Mot. Stay 2. Yet, this Court already granted plaintiffaccess to the ECF system, see ECFNo. 84, and instructions for obtainingECF credentials
were emailed to plaintiff on December 5, 2019, and April 1, 2020, at the email address she providedto the Court. As for herthird request, plaintiffasks that ifshe is not granted access to the ECF system, all court records in her case from July 2019 should be re-mailed to her. Mot. Stay 3. This request is moot, since plaintiffhas been given access to the ECF filing system. However, the Courtnotesthatthe defendant alreadymailed copies ofthe 1,351-pagerecordto plaintiffinAugust and December2019. See ECF Nos. 79, 85. Thus, the Courtwill not grantany ofplaintiffsrequests in her motion to stay and will proceed to the merits ofthe case. B. The ALJ Properly Evaluated Plaintiff's Case Plaintiff appeals "the [SSA's] most recent bogus cessation that ,stopped her disability payments" because the ALJ's decision was "not supported by substantial evidence in the record, and
... was based on numerous egregious legal errors." Am. Compl. 2, 4. Despite her lack of specificity, the Court construespro se plaintiffs argument liberally. See Calderon v. Berryhill, 322 F. Supp. 3d 137, 137 (D.D.C. 2018) (citing Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007)). Nevertheless, plaintiff does not prevail because the ALJ properly evaluated her supplemental security income application. Given that the ALJ found for plaintiffat steps one and two ofthe inquiry, the Court will considerthe ALJ's decisions at step three and plaintiffs RFC.

was either factually inaccurate ormisled the Court. This factor therefore weighs against plaintiff. The other excusable neglect factors are at best neutral, and certainly do not weigh in favor offinding for plaintiff. 7Regarding step three, the Court finds no error in the ALJ's analysis. At
.step three ofthe process, the ALJ determines whether any severe impairmentidentifiedat steptwo "meetsorequals
one of [the] listings" in Appendix 1. §416.920(a)(4)(iii). The listings in Appendix 1 "define impairments that would prevent an adult, regardless of [her] age, education, or work experience, from performing any gainful activity, not just substantial gainful activity," and "the medical criteria defining the listed impairments" are therefore set "at a higher level of severity than the statutory standard" because they "were designed to operate as a presumption of disability that makes further inquiry unnecessary." 

### Sullivan v. Zebley, 493 U.S. 521, 532 (1990) (internal quotation marks omitted). In order for a depressive, bipolar, or related severe impairment to meet
anAppendix 1listing, aclaimantmust satisfyall ofthe ParagraphA and all ofeitherthe Paragraph B or Paragraph C criteriafor aparticular listing. App. 1, § 12.00(A)(l)-(2). 7

7 At the time ofthe ALJ's analysis, the relevant listing (12.04) was referred to as an "affective disorder," and the relevantparagraphs were the following:

AND [Paragraph] A. Medically documentedpersistence, eithercontinuous orintermittent, ofone ofthe following: I. Depressive syndrome characterized by at least four ofthe following: a. Anhedonia orpervasive loss ofinterest in almost all activities; or b. Appetite disturbance with change in weight; or c. Sleep disturbance; or d. Psychomotor agitation orretardation; or e. Decreased energy; or f. Feelings ofguilt or worthlessness; or g. Difficulty concentrating orthinking; or h. Thoughts ofsuicide; or i. Hallucinations, delusions, orparanoid thinking; or 2. Manic syndrome characterized by at least three ofthe following: a. Hyperactivity; or b. Pressure ofspeech; or c. Flight ofideas; or d. Inflated self-esteem; or e. Decreased need for sleep; or f. Easy distractibility; or g. Involvement in activities thathave a high probability ofpainful consequences which are not recognized; or h. Hallucinations, delusions orparanoid thinking; or 3. Bipolar syndrome with a history ofepisodic periods manifested by the full symptomatic picture ofbothmanic and depressive syndromes (and currently characterized by either orboth syndromes); [Paragraph] B. Resulting in at least two ofthe following: 8The ALJfound thatplaintiffsmood disorderwas a severe impairment at step two, but that itdidnot meetthe criteria ofan impairment listed inAppendix 1at step three. Op. 36-37. To meet the listed mood disorder impairment ofthe Paragraph B regulation then in effect, plaintiffwould have to show an extreme limitationin one, oramarked limitation intwo, ofthe following areas of mental functioning: activities of daily living; maintaining social function; maintaining concentration, persistence, or pace; and repeated episodes of decompression. App. 1, §§ 12.04B(l)-(4) (2013). 8 However, the ALJ explained that plaintiffonly had a mild limitation in activities ofdailyliving, moderatelimitationsin socialfunctioning and maintainingconcentration, persistence, orpace, and no episodes ofdecompression. Op. 37. The ALJ specifically pointed to substantial evidence in the record, in the form ofthe medical opinion ofDr. Tashjian, as support for his findings. See Ex. 33F 26, ECF No. 80-12. The ALJ also found that plaintiffdid not meet

OR 1. Marked restriction ofactivities ofdaily living; or 2. Marked difficulties in maintaining social functioning; or 3. Marked difficulties in maintaining concentration, persistence, orpace; or 4. Repeated episodes ofdecompensation, each ofextended duration; [Paragraph] C. Medically documentedhistory ofachronic affective disorder ofat least 2 years' duration that has caused more than a minimal limitation ofability to do basic work activities, with symptoms or signs currently attenuated by medication orpsychosocial support, and one ofthe following: 1. Repeated episodes ofdecompensation, each ofextended duration; or 2. A residual disease process that has resulted in such marginal adjustment that even a minimal increase in mental demands orchange in the environmentwould be predictedto causethe individual to decompensate; or 3. Current history of 1 or more years' inability to function outside a highly supportive living arrangement, with an indication ofcontinued need for such an arrangement. App. 1, §§ 12.04(A)-(C) (2013).
8 Paragraph B ofListing 12.04 currently requires the ALJ to considerwhether a claimant's mental disorder shows: Extreme limitation ofone, ormarked limitation oftwo, ofthe following areas ofmental functioning: 1. Understand, remember, or apply information. 2. Interact with others. 3. Concentrate, persist, or maintain pace. 4. Adapt ormanage oneself. App. 1, §§ 12.04B(1)-(4)
. 9the Paragraph C criteria, the only other way plaintiff could have established that her mental limitationwas alisted impairment, and cited as substantial evidence Dr. Tashjian's evaluationthat directly said plaintiffs impairment did not meet Paragraph C. See Ex. 33F 27; App. 1, § 12.04C. Thus, the Court affirms the ALJ's step three conclusions. The Court next turns to the ALJ's RFC assessment. The ALJ determined that plaintiffhad the RFC "to perform a full range ofwork at all exertional levels but can perform only simple repetitive tasks, with no public contact." Op. 37. On the one hand, the ALJ did a thoroughjob analyzing the record to create plaintiffs RFC. He cited to objective medical opinions to support the various degrees oflimitationhe identified for plaintiff, and also explained why he gave certain medical opinions greater weight than others inhis assessment. See Op. 38-43; Butler, 353 F.3d at 1000 (noting that an ALJ errs by not explaining his or her reasons for rejecting medical opinions in conflictwiththe ultimate RFC determination). The ALJ also explained why he found plaintiffs subjective assessment ofher symptoms "notcredible."9 Op. 41. On the other hand, the ALJ erred in crafting plaintiffs RFC because it fails to adequately incorporate plaintiffs limitations in concentration, task persistence, or pace ("CPP"). In his RFC determination, the ALJ found that plaintiff could do all exertional levels of work, but could

9 Despite plaintiffs claims ofdisabling mental and physical impairments, the ALJ noted significant inconsistencies with her statements. In particular, the ALJ pointed out that plaintiffresided in Beverly Hills, Winnetka, and Fresno County, California at various points, but only provided the SSA with a post office box in Sacramento as her address, several hundred miles away; that she "drove a red Jaguar automobile with expired license tags"; that CDI investigations indicated thatplaintiffreferred to herselfas "Dr. Leigh Davis" and advertised herselfas a legal analyst, legal commentator, and law professor; that she appeared on the "Dr. Phil" television show as a "T.V. personality and legal analyst"; that she maintained a website for her entertainment business "Creative Endeavors" and paid her monthly rent with a check from her company; that she published a book in 2012 titled "Quotes from the 1960's: Sex, Love, and Rock & Roll"; that CDI investigations include interviews with plaintiff's Winnetka landlord, who stated plaintiffneverappeared to bephysical ormentally disabled and instead was "ahighly functioning person" who "shared stories ofher business ventures and high career aspirations" with the landlord; and that she received earnings as a consultant for Yuin University. See Op. 41--43. The ALJ was also troubled by plaintiffdenying she had a criminal history as part ofa mental health assessment in 2013, despite previously having been convicted and incarcerated for making a false declaration in court, bank fraud, and bankruptcy fraud. See Glass, 357 Fed. App'x at 61 (upholding sentencing).
10"perform only simple repetitive tasks." Op. 37. This RFC is insufficient, however, because it does not fully address the ALJ's finding that plaintiffhas a moderate limitation in CPP. See id. A moderate CPP limitation affects a plaintiffs "ability to sustain focused attention and concentration sufficientlylongto permitthe timely and appropriate completion oftasks commonly found in work settings." Petty v. Colvin, 204 F. Supp. 3d 196, 206 (D.D.C. 2016) (internal quotation marks omitted). As numerous courts have noted, however, the problem with finding a moderate CPP limitation by requiring "simple repetitive tasks" is that such a restriction, without more, does not actually addressplaintiffsmental impairments because the difficulty ofataskdoes notnecessarily say anything aboutherabilityto concentrate onit. "Putanotherway, someone with problems concentrating may not be able to complete a task consistently over the course of a workday, no matter how simple itmaybe."Martin v. Saul, 950 F.3d 369,374 (7th Cir. 2020); see also Crump v. Saul, 932 F.3d 567, 570 (7th Cir. 2019) ("[An] ALJ generally may not rely merely
on catch-all terms like 'simple, repetitive tasks' because there is no basis to conclude that they account for problems ofconcentration, persistence orpace....More to it, observing that aperson
can perform simple and repetitive tasks says nothing about whether the individual can do so on a sustained basis.") (internal citations omitted); Mascio v. Colvin, 780 F.3d 632,638 (4th Cir. 2015) ("[A]n ALJ does not account for a claimant's limitations in concentration, persistence, and pace by restricting the hypothetical question to simple, routine tasks or unskilled work."); Petty, 204 F. Supp. 3d at 206 n.3 (collecting cases). Given that plaintiff has '"moderate' difficulties in maintaining concentration," Op. 37, the ALJ erred by not providing a more complete explanation regarding plaintiffs ability to completetasks during a full workday. Nevertheless, the Court holds that the ALJ's error was harmless.

11To be sure, there is no need for a remand ifan ALJ's error is harmless. And in this case, the error would be harmless if"(1) 'medical evidence demonstrates that a claimant can engage in simple, routinetasks orunskilledworkdespite limitations in concentration, persistence, andpace,' and the challenged hypothetical [that the RFC is based on] i~ limited 'to include only unskilled work'; or (2) the hypothetical 'otherwise implicitly account[ed] for a claimant's limitations in concentration,persistence, and pace[.]"'Petty, 204 F. Supp. 3d at 206 (quotingMcIntyre v. Colvin, 758 F.3d 146, 152 (2d Cir. 2014)). The error was harmless under the first factor. The ALJ fully detailed in his opinion the medical evidence indicating that plaintiffcan engage in simple, routine tasks or unskilled work, despiteher CPP limitations. See Op. 38-41. And whiletheALJ did notexplicitly limitto unskilled work the hypothetical individual he gave Ms. Chandler at the hearing, the ALJ did so when he framed the analysis in his opinion as whether plaintiffs "limitations erode the occupational base ofunskilledwork at all exertional levels." Op. 44. Further, the three examplejobs Ms. Chandler gave the ALJ at the hearing, machine feeder, lumber straightener, and box bender, were all explicitly stated by her as being unskilled. See Tr. 1344, 1346. Thus, the hypothetical individual that plaintiffs RFC is based on was limited to unskilled work, making the ALJ's error harmless under the first factor. Separately, the error was also harmless under the second factor because the hypothetical "otherwise implicitly account[ed] for a claimant's limitations in concentration, persistence, and pace[.]" Petty, 204 F. Supp. 3d at 206 (internal quotation marks omitted). Unlike plaintiffs RFC inthe ALJ's opinion, the hypothetical was not merely limitedto "simple,repetitive tasks." Op. 37. Instead, the ALJ expanded on this definition by stating that the hypothetical individual "has understanding and memory sufficient to understand and remember simple instructions," and that

12she "has sustained concentration and persistence, with sufficient ability to carry out short instructions, perform activities without additional support once mastered, and
. . . maintain adequate attention for simple one and two step tasks." Tr. 1343. The ALJ also directed Ms. Chandler to consider Dr. Tashjian's medical opinion regarding plaintiffs RFC before giving examplejobsplaintiffcouldperform, 

### see id, and Dr. Tashjian'sopiniongoes into evenmore detail regarding plaintiffs CPP limitations thanthe ALJ's description atthe hearing, 

### see Ex. 32F 14-15, ECF No. 80-12. In short, the hypothetical individual that Ms. Chandlerhadbefore her sufficiently accounted for plaintiffs CPP limitations in a way that "simple, repetitive tasks" does not. Therefore, the ALJ's error in failing to adequately include plaintiffsmoderate CPP limitations in his RFC assessment was harmless and does not require a remand. 

## ***** In sum, the ALJ's error in failing to fully address plaintiffsmental limitations in his RFC analysis was harmless. In all otherrespects, substantial evidence supportedthe ALJ's conclusions. Thus, the Court affirms the ALJ's decision. IV. CONCLUSION For the reasons set forth above, the Court will DENY plaintiffLeigh Glass's Motion to Stay, ECFNo. 88, and GRANT defendantAndrewM. Saul'sMotionfor JudgmentofAffirmance, ECFNo. 86. A separate Order accompanies this Memorandum Opinion.

Date: April /tf,2021

13 Royce C. Lamberth United States District Judge