[Cite as In re J.C., 2021-Ohio-1874.]

COURT OF APPEALS 

DELAWARE COUNTY, OHIO 

FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT 

: JUDGES: 

: 

: Hon. John W. Wise, P.J. 

: Hon. Patricia A. Delaney, J. 

: Hon. Earle E. Wise, Jr., J. 

IN RE J.C. : 

: Case No. 20 CAF 12 0057 

: 

: 

: 

: 

: O P I N I O N 

CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING: Appeal from the Delaware County Court 

of Common Pleas, Juvenile Division, 

Case No. 19-01-0037AB 

JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED 

DATE OF JUDGMENT ENTRY: 

APPEARANCES: 

June 2, 2021 

For Mother-Appellant: For DCDJFS-Appellee: 

DONALD G. WORLY MEGAN A. HAMMOND 

43 E. Central Ave. 145 N. Union St., 3rd Floor

Delaware, OH 43015 Delaware, OH 43015 
[Cite as In re J.C., 2021-Ohio-1874.]

Delaney, J.

{¶1} Appellant-Mother appeals the November 30, 2020 judgment entry of the 

Delaware County Court of Common Pleas, Juvenile Division awarding permanent 

custody of her minor child, J.C. to the Appellee-Delaware County Department of Job and 

Family Services. 

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Union County Proceedings

{¶2} Appellant-Mother is the biological mother of J.C., born on October 14, 2018. 

At the time of J.C.’s birth, Mother was residing in Union County. On October 18, 2018, 

Union County Child Protective Services filed an ex-parte order to have J.C. placed in its 

temporary custody due to concerns about Mother’s ability to care for J.C. When Mother 

was a child, she was diagnosed with mild intellectual disability and post-traumatic stress 

disorder. Union County CPS observed that Mother was not able to properly meet the 

needs of J.C. in the areas such as feeding and diapering due to Mother’s cognitive delays. 

Familial placement was not possible because Mother’s family had prior involvement with 

Children’s Services and the biological Father of J.C. had a criminal history and admittedly 

used drugs. J.C. was placed with a foster family. Mother had supervised visitation. 

{¶3} The Union County Court of Common Pleas, Juvenile Division, held an 

adjudication hearing on January 7, 2019, where the court dismissed the case for lack of 

evidence on the issue of dependency. On January 8, 2019, J.C. was returned to Mother’s 

custody. At this time, she resided in Delaware County. 
[Cite as In re J.C., 2021-Ohio-1874.]

Delaware County Proceedings

{¶4} On January 8, 2019, Appellee-Delaware County Department of Job and 

Family Services (“DCDJFS”) received a referral regarding J.C. DCDJFS opened a case 

and two caseworkers visited with Mother in her home. Mother resided in the home with 

her boyfriend, W.L. and another couple. The caseworkers observed the home was in poor 

condition and Mother struggled to care for J.C. due to Mother’s cognitive delays and lack 

of support. After investigation, it was determined there was no familial placement 

available. DCDJFS made an oral motion for ex-parte removal and temporary custody of 

J.C. The Delaware County Court of Common Pleas, Juvenile Division granted the exparte removal. J.C. was placed in the care of the foster family residing in Union County. 

{¶5} On January 9, 2019, DCDJFS filed a Complaint of Dependency. The shelter 

care hearing was held on January 9, 2019. Counsel represented mother. The magistrate 

found there was probable cause for J.C.’s removal. The magistrate ordered a Guardian 

ad Litem be appointed for both Mother and J.C. 

{¶6} On January 11, 2019, the trial court appointed a Court Appointed Special 

Advocate (“CASA”) for J.C. 

{¶7} DCDJFS filed a case plan with the trial court on February 6, 2019. The case 

plan required Mother to engage in the following activities: (1) undergo an assessment 

with Delaware County Board of Developmental Disabilities to determine if she qualified 

for services; (2) follow any recommendations for ongoing services or community support; 

(3) find and maintain stable housing with the ability to ensure her financial needs; and (4) 

attending a parenting program of her choice or utilize the M.O.M.S. program. Mother was 
[Cite as In re J.C., 2021-Ohio-1874.]

given supervised weekly visitation with J.C. Father was also listed on the case plan, but 

he asked to be removed from the case plan in April 2019. 

{¶8} On February 22, 2019, counsel for Mother filed a motion to determine 

Mother’s competence to stand trial. The trial court denied the motion. 

{¶9} The adjudication hearing was held on April 4, 2019. The magistrate found 

J.C. was a dependent child under R.C. 2151.04(C). The case plan filed on February 6, 

2019 was adopted as a court order. Mother did not file objections to the April 4, 2019 

Magistrate’s Decision. 

{¶10} On April 5, 2019, J.C. was placed with a foster-to-adopt family located in 

Delaware County. 

{¶11} Mother’s GAL filed an Application for Appointment of Guardian of Alleged 

Incompetent on June 7, 2019 with the Delaware County Probate Court. On September 6, 

2019, the Delaware County Probate Court found Mother was incompetent and incapable 

of taking care of her individual activities of daily living due to a diagnosed mild 

developmental disability. It appointed Mother’s GAL as her Guardian. 

{¶12} Mother’s second child, H.L., was born on April 28, 2020. H.L.’s father was 

W.L., Mother’s boyfriend. DCDJFS was granted temporary custody of H.L. shortly after 

the child’s birth due to the same concerns underlying J.C.’s removal. H.L. is not the 

subject of this appeal. 

{¶13} DCDJFS filed a motion for permanent custody on June 2, 2020, and an 

amended motion for permanent custody on June 4, 2020. The motion stated that J.C. had 

been in the temporary custody of DCDJFS for 12 or more months of a consecutive 22- 

month period and that the child could not be placed with either Mother or Father within a 
[Cite as In re J.C., 2021-Ohio-1874.]

reasonable time. The motion further stated it was in the best interests of J.C. to be placed 

in the permanent custody of DCDJFS. 

{¶14} The trial court held a pretrial on the amended motion for permanent custody 

on June 8, 2020. At the pretrial, counsel for Mother requested a parenting assessment to 

help determine what Mother was capable of as a parent and the extent of her disabilities. 

Mother’s Guardian retained Dr. Jamie Adkins, a forensic psychologist, to perform a 

competency evaluation of Mother on July 29, 2020. Dr. Adkins filed her report with the 

trial court on September 9, 2020. 

Permanent Custody Hearing

{¶15} The trial court held the hearing on the amended motion for permanent 

custody on September 25, 2020 and November 23, 2020. The following evidence was 

adduced at the hearing. 

{¶16} Melissa Barber, ongoing caseworker with DCDJFS, testified as to her 

experiences working with Mother and J.C. Barber’s main concern for Mother was her 

cognitive ability to properly care for J.C. After developing the case plan, Barber testified 

the role of DCDJFS was to provide information and referral to services, but DCDJFS could 

not assist Mother in getting those services. For example, Barber referred Mother to the 

Delaware County Board of Developmental Disabilities (“DCBDD”) for an assessment to 

determine whether she was eligible for services. Mother did not have a driver’s license or 

stable housing and DCBDD could assist Mother obtaining transportation and housing. 

{¶17} Mother completed her assessment with DCBDD. It was determined that she 

was eligible for several services through DCBDD, including housing assistance, 

transportation, and in-home services to help with cooking and basic household tasks. 
[Cite as In re J.C., 2021-Ohio-1874.]

{¶18} Stable housing was of major concern for Mother. For Mother to engage in 

other services, Mother required stable housing. Barber was assigned as the case worker 

in February 2019. Since her time on the case, Mother had moved eight to ten times, 

residing with her biological family, J.C.’s original foster parents, or friends. Mother was 

working with Emily Froehlich, a service and support administrator with the DCBDD, to 

obtain housing and other services through DCBDD. Due to Mother’s needs, the housing 

through DCBDD included a health provider in the home 24/7 and roommates. With the 

help of Mother’s Guardian, they started looking for housing in December 2019 but could 

not find the appropriate housing situation and it was difficult coordinate with Mother due 

to her transportation limitations. When the pandemic started, housing became 

unavailable. Mother was disenrolled from DCBDD in May 2020, but she reenrolled in 

August 2020. 

{¶19} By the time of the hearing, Mother had not obtained stable housing. Froelich 

stated there was a housing available for Mother in Delaware, but she was not sure it 

would be appropriate for J.C. The goal of DCBDD was to get Mother into stable housing 

appropriate for Mother so she could start obtaining services, then they would work on 

finding housing that was appropriate for Mother and J.C. 

{¶20} The other important aspect of the case plan was Mother’s parenting skills. 

DCDJFS does not offer any parenting classes. DCDJFS referred Mother to the M.O.M.S. 

program, but the program was not tailored for her needs because she did not have stable 

housing or a child in her care. Mother was offered parenting classes through Early 

Intervention, but Mother declined. All parties agreed that due to Mother’s cognitive delays, 
[Cite as In re J.C., 2021-Ohio-1874.]

Mother needed one-on-one parenting training, but the DCDJFS, the DCBDD, and the 

CASA were not aware of any program offering that service. 

{¶21} After the permanent custody motion was filed, counsel for Mother requested 

a psychological evaluation to determine Mother’s cognitive ability to parent. The 

assessment conducted by Dr. Jamie Adkins was filed on September 9, 2020. Dr. Adkins 

testified as to her assessment of Mother and her ability to parent. Dr. Adkins first 

administered the Wechsler test, an adult intelligence scale. Mother’s full-scale score was 

65, which placed her in the middle intellectual functioning disability range. Her verbal 

comprehension was 61, which was in the middle intellectual functioning range; her 

perceptual reasoning was 81, which was in the range of a low average to borderline; her 

working memory was 58 and her processing speed was 79. 

{¶22} Dr. Adkins next attempted to administer the Parent Stress Inventory to 

Mother but was not able to complete the test. The test looks at how a parent handles the 

basic stresses of being a parent or navigate the nuances that come with parenting. It was 

a written test that was above Mother’s reading comprehension level. 

{¶23} Based on her assessment of Mother, it was Dr. Adkins’ opinion that at the 

time of the assessment, Mother did not have the current ability to independently care for 

her children. Mother had a traumatic childhood, complicated by her intellectual 

functioning, which prevented her from modeling what parenting should be and how to 

meet a child’s needs. Dr. Adkins recognized that Mother had the desire to be a good 

parent. Mother would need intensive intervention, training, and modeling on a continuous 

basis to learn to meet her children’s ever-developing needs. The parenting training 

sessions would be three to five times a week. Dr. Adkins felt that after six months of 
[Cite as In re J.C., 2021-Ohio-1874.]

intensive intervention, Mother should be reevaluated to determine if Mother had made 

any progress. In the best-case scenario, if Mother made progress after the six-month 

review, Dr. Adkins opined that it would be a minimum of one to two years of true 

interventions, learning, and monitoring to gain more time with supervision for Mother to 

be independent in certain roles. 

{¶24} Barber considered Dr. Adkins’ assessment and felt the case plan goals 

were like the recommendations in the assessment. When asked why the DCDJFS filed 

the motion for permanent custody before the two-year mark, Barber testified the motion 

was filed due to Mother’s lack of progress on the case plan and that Mother was no longer 

linked with services. 

{¶25} Barber and Foster Mother next testified as to their experiences with J.C. On 

April 5, 2019, J.C. was placed with a foster-to-adopt family when she was six months old. 

At the time of the hearing, J.C. was 23 months old. The family lived in Powell in Delaware 

County. Foster Mother and Foster Father have been married for 23 years and have a 9- 

year-old adopted son. The parents work outside the home. Barber has observed the 

foster family with J.C. at least 15 times. J.C. is bonded with the family and refers to her 

foster parents as “mommy” and “daddy.” The foster family has provided for J.C.’s medical 

care and therapeutic needs. 

{¶26} Mother has attended every supervised visitation with J.C., even during the 

pandemic. The foster family facilitated visitation with Mother during the pandemic by 

meeting in a park. Mother was appropriate and interacted with J.C. She brought her toys, 

fed her, and changed her diaper. J.C. was happy to see Mother and had no behavioral 
[Cite as In re J.C., 2021-Ohio-1874.]

issues after leaving visitation. There was no dispute that Mother loved J.C. and wanted 

to be her parent. 

{¶27} The Guardian ad Litem for J.C. was opposed to permanent custody. The 

GAL supported legal custody to foster parents and/or extending temporary custody for six 

months. Foster parents, however, did not want only legal custody of J.C. The GAL was 

appointed in January 2019, but she met with J.C. and the foster parents once in January 

2020 before issuing her report. 

{¶28} The CASA for J.C. testified that she observed Mother during two visitations, 

and she visited the foster home monthly. Her testimony regarding her observations was 

like Barber’s testimony. The CASA had requested a parenting assessment of Mother and 

Dr. Adkins’ assessment confirmed her observations of Mother. The CASA was concerned 

that Mother’s cognitive delays affected Mother’s ability to parent, especially in the ability 

to think ahead on how to handle the child’s needs in the future. The CASA recommended 

that permanent custody be awarded to DCDJFS. 

Judgment Entry

{¶29} On November 30, 2020, the trial court issued an extremely detailed and 

thoroughly analyzed 24-page judgment entry granting permanent custody of J.C. to the 

DCDJFS. The trial court first found that J.C. had been in the temporary custody of the 

DCDJFS for 12 or more months out of a 22-month period. 

{¶30} The trial court next analyzed whether the child could be placed with the 

parents in a reasonable time. The trial court acknowledged that this case was different 

than other permanent custody matters where the parent has a drug addiction or abuses 

their child. The trial court stated, 
[Cite as In re J.C., 2021-Ohio-1874.]

This case, and this factor in particular, turn on the potential timeline for a 

parent with a developmental disability who loves her child and wishes to 

parent. The Court must keep two things in mind in its decision-making 

process. First, a developmental disability does not prohibit a parent from 

caring for their child, and indeed, the Court has been involved in many 

cases with parents who have a diagnosis of a developmental disability and 

who are loving, successful parents, and who raise happy, healthy children 

in a safe environment. Conversely, while the presence of a developmental 

disability diagnosis changes the services that a parent may need, and the 

interventions that may be appropriate, it does not modify other

considerations in a case. That is, the Court must still consider whether a 

child is safe, whether the parent is capable of providing the appropriate 

environment, and perhaps most importantly in this case, does not affect the 

stated purpose under the law of providing permanency for a child and not 

keeping a young child in legal limbo indefinitely. 

(Judgment Entry, Nov. 30, 2020). 

{¶31} The trial court next found J.C. could not be placed with Mother in a 

reasonable time pursuant to R.C. 2151.414(D)(2). Mother had been referred to DCBDD, 

but Mother failed to utilize the services, resulting in her being removed from active service 

status. She recently reengaged with services through the DCBDD, but the trial court found 

her failure to take advantage of the services triggered R.C. 2151.414(E), which states the 

court “shall consider parental utilization of medical, psychiatric, psychological, and other 

social and rehabilitative services and material resources that were made available to the 
[Cite as In re J.C., 2021-Ohio-1874.]

parents for the purpose of changing parental conduct to allow them to resume and 

maintain parental duties.” 

{¶32} The trial court next considered Mother’s argument that she should be 

allowed time to work toward the goals outlined in Dr. Adkins’ assessment. The trial court 

found R.C. 2151.414(E)(4) provided that if a parent’s intellectual disability was so severe 

that it makes the parent unable to provide an adequate permanent home for the child at 

the present time and, as anticipated, within one year after the court holds the permanent 

custody hearing, the trial court must grant the requested relief. There was no dispute 

Mother’s developmental disability was severe enough that she could not parent at the 

current time. The trial court relied upon Dr. Adkins’ assessment that it would take a 

minimum of one to two years of intensive intervention for Mother to learn parenting skills. 

It found DCDJFS made reasonable efforts towards reunification by connecting Mother 

with services addressing her developmental disability, but Mother did not take advantage 

of the services to their fullest extent. 

{¶33} The trial court finally found it was in the best interests of J.C. to be placed 

in the permanent custody of DCDJFS. 

{¶34} It is from the trial court’s judgment entry that Mother now appeals. 

ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR

{¶35} Mother raises four Assignments of Error: 

{¶36} “I. WHETHER THERE WAS INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT 

THE TRIAL COURT FINDING J.C. DEPENDENT. THE TRIAL COURT DECISION IS 

NOT REFLECTED IN THE TRANSCRIPT. 
[Cite as In re J.C., 2021-Ohio-1874.]

{¶37} “II. WHETHER THE JUDGMENT ENTRY OF THE TRIAL COURT WAS AN

ABUSE OF DISCRETION AND AGAINST THE MANIFEST WEIGHT OF THE 

EVIDENCE WHEN IT DECIDED THAT THE DELAWARE COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF

JOB AND FAMILY SERVICES MADE REASONABLE EFFORTS TO PREVENT 

REMOVAL OF J.C. FROM ASHLEY CAUDILL AND/OR TO REUNIFY THE CHILD WITH 

HER MOTHER. THE TRIAL COURT DECISION IS NOT REFLECTED IN THE 

TRANSCRIPT. 

{¶38} “II. WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT DECISION IS AN 

UNCONSTITUTIONAL APPLICATION OF THE LAW. THE TRIAL COURT DECISION IS 

REFLECTED IN THE TRANSCRIPT AT T. PAGE 345, LINES 1-13. 

{¶39} “IV. THE TRIAL COURT DECISION WAS NOT IN THE BEST INTEREST 

OF THE CHILD AND AGAINST THE MANIFEST WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE IN THAT 

IT DID NOT EXTEND THE CASE FOR SIX MONTHS TO GIVE THE MOTHER TIME TO 

WORK WITH AN INDIVIDUAL PARENTING INSTRUCTOR AS HAD BEEN 

RECOMMENDED BY DR. ADKINS. T. PAGE 290, LINES 1-2 AND T. PAGE 283, LINES 

17-23. THE TRIAL COURT DECISION IS NOT REFLECTED IN THE TRANSCRIPT.” 

ANALYSIS

I. Dependency

{¶40} Mother contends in her first Assignment of Error that there was insufficient 

evidence to support the adjudication of dependency. We disagree. 

{¶41} The adjudication hearing on the complaint for dependency was held on April 

4, 2019. The magistrate issued the Magistrate’s Decision on April 19, 2019, which 

adjudicated J.C. a dependent child pursuant to R.C. 2151.04(C). The judge countersigned 
[Cite as In re J.C., 2021-Ohio-1874.]

the Magistrate’s Decision to approve the same as an order of the court but notified the 

parties that written objections to the Magistrate’s Decision must be filed within 14 days. 

Written objections would stay the enforcement of the order. 

{¶42} Mother did not file objections to the April 19, 2019 Magistrate’s Decision 

adjudicating J.C. a dependent child. Juv.R. 40(D)(3)(b) controls decisions by a magistrate 

in juvenile cases. The rule provides, in relevant part: 

(3) Magistrate's Decision; Objections to Magistrate's Decision.

* * * 

(b) Objections to Magistrate's Decision. 

(i) Time for Filing. A party may file written objections to a magistrate's 

decision within fourteen days of the filing of the decision, whether or not the 

court has adopted the decision during that fourteen-day period as permitted 

by Juv.R. 40(D)(4)(e)(i). If any party timely files objections, any other party 

may also file objections not later than ten days after the first objections are 

filed. If a party makes a timely request for findings of fact and conclusions 

of law, the time for filing objections begins to run when the magistrate files 

a decision that includes findings of fact and conclusions of law. 

(ii) Specificity of Objection. An objection to a magistrate's decision shall be 

specific and state with particularity all grounds for objection. 

(iii) Objection to Magistrate's Factual Finding; Transcript or Affidavit. An 

objection to a factual finding, whether or not specifically designated as a 

finding of fact under Juv.R. 40(D)(3)(a)(ii), shall be supported by a transcript 

of all the evidence submitted to the magistrate relevant to that finding or an 
[Cite as In re J.C., 2021-Ohio-1874.]

affidavit of that evidence if a transcript is not available. With leave of court, 

alternative technology or manner of reviewing the relevant evidence may 

be considered. The objecting party shall file the transcript or affidavit with 

the court within thirty days after filing objections unless the court extends 

the time in writing for preparation of the transcript or other good cause. If a 

party files timely objections prior to the date on which a transcript is 

prepared, the party may seek leave of court to supplement the objections. 

(iv) Waiver of Right to Assign Adoption by Court as Error on Appeal. Except 

for a claim of plain error, a party shall not assign as error on appeal the 

court's adoption of any factual finding or legal conclusion, whether or not 

specifically designated as a finding of fact or conclusion of law under Juv.R. 

40(D)(3)(a)(ii), unless the party has objected to that finding or conclusion as 

required by Juv.R. 40(D)(3)(b). 

{¶43} We find that except for a claim of plain error, Mother cannot assign as error 

the trial court’s adoption of the magistrate’s adjudication of dependency because Mother 

did not object to that finding or conclusion as required by Juv.R. 40(D)(3)(b). Mother does 

not raise plain error in her appellate brief, nor can Mother demonstrate plain error because 

she did not file a transcript of the April 4, 2019 adjudication hearing. Stanley v. Parker, 

5th Dist. Muskingum No. CT2020-0050, 2021-Ohio-1701, ¶ 46. 

{¶44} An appellant is required to provide a transcript for appellate review. Knapp

v. Edwards Laboratories, 61 Ohio St.2d 197, 199, 400 N.E.2d 384 (1980). Such is 

necessary because the appellant shoulders the burden of demonstrating error by 
[Cite as In re J.C., 2021-Ohio-1874.]

reference to matters within the record. See, State v. Skaggs, 53 Ohio St.2d 162, 163, 372 

N.E.2d 1355 (1978). 

{¶45} This principle is embodied in App.R. 9(B), which states in relevant part: 

If the appellant intends to urge on appeal that a finding or conclusion is 

unsupported by the evidence or is contrary to the weight of the evidence, 

the appellant shall include in the record a transcript of all evidence relevant 

to the findings or conclusion. App.R. 9(B). 

{¶46} Where portions of the transcript necessary for the resolution of assigned 

errors are omitted from the record, an appellate court has nothing to pass upon. As Mother 

cannot demonstrate those errors, the Court has no choice but to presume the validity of 

the lower court's proceedings. State v. Ridgway, 5th Dist. Stark No. 1998CA00147, 1999 

WL 100349 (Feb. 1, 1999), citing Knapp, supra. 

{¶47} On this record, we must presume there was sufficient evidence for the 

adjudication of dependency. Mother’s first Assignment of Error is overruled. 

II. and III. Reasonable Efforts and Mother’s Second Child

{¶48} In her second Assignment of Error, Mother contends the DCDJFS did not 

make reasonable efforts towards reunification with J.C. We also consider Mother’s third 

Assignment of Error that argues the trial court’s treatment of H.L., Mother’s second child, 

when compared to J.C., violates the Equal Protection Clause. She claims that in contrast 

to the reunification efforts for J.C., DCDJFS is making more effort to reunite Mother with 

H.L. 

{¶49} R.C. 2151.414(B)(1) states permanent custody may be granted to a public 

or private agency if the trial court determines by clear and convincing evidence at a 
[Cite as In re J.C., 2021-Ohio-1874.]

hearing held pursuant to division (A) of R.C. 2151.414, that it is in the best interest of the 

child and any of the following apply: 

(a) The child is not abandoned or orphaned * * * and the child cannot be 

placed with either of the child's parents within a reasonable time or should 

not be placed with the child's parents. 

(b) The child is abandoned. 

(c) The child is orphaned, and there are no relatives of the child who are 

able to take permanent custody. 

(d) The child has been in the temporary custody of one or more public 

children services agencies or private child placing agencies for twelve or 

more months of a consecutive twenty-two-month period* * * 

(e) The child or another child in the custody of the parent or parents from 

whose custody the child has been removed has been adjudicated an 

abused, neglected, or dependent child on three separate occasions by any 

court in this state or another state. 

{¶50} Therefore, R.C. 2151.414(B) provides a two-pronged analysis the trial court 

is required to apply when ruling on a motion for permanent custody. In practice, the trial 

court will determine whether one of the four circumstances delineated in R.C. 

2151.414(B)(1)(a) through (d) is present before proceeding to a determination regarding 

the best interest of the child. 

{¶51} A trial court's decision to grant permanent custody of a child must be 

supported by clear and convincing evidence. The Ohio Supreme Court has defined “clear 

and convincing evidence” as “[t]he measure or degree of proof that will produce in the 
[Cite as In re J.C., 2021-Ohio-1874.]

mind of the trier of fact a firm belief or conviction as to the allegations sought to be 

established. It is intermediate, being more than a mere preponderance, but not to the 

extent of such certainty, as required beyond a reasonable doubt, as in criminal cases.” 

Cross v. Ledford, 161 Ohio St. 469, 120 N.E.2d 118 (1954); In re: Adoption of Holcomb, 

18 Ohio St.3d 361, 481 N.E.2d 613 (1985). In reviewing whether the trial court based its 

decision upon clear and convincing evidence, “a reviewing court will examine the record 

to determine whether the trier of facts had sufficient evidence before it to satisfy the 

requisite degree of proof.” State v. Schiebel, 55 Ohio St.3d 71, 74, 564 N.E.2d 54 (1990); 

See also, C.E. Morris Co. v. Foley Constr. Co., 54 Ohio St.2d 279, 376 N.E.2d 578 (1978). 

If the trial court's judgment is “supported by some competent, credible evidence going to 

all the essential elements of the case,” a reviewing court may not reverse that judgment. 

Schiebel, 55 Ohio St.3d at 74. 

{¶52} Moreover, “an appellate court should not substitute its judgment for that of 

the trial court when there exists competent and credible evidence supporting the findings 

of fact and conclusion of law.” Id. Issues relating to the credibility of witnesses and the 

weight to be given the evidence are primarily for the trier of fact. As the court explained 

in Seasons Coal Co. v. Cleveland, 10 Ohio St.3d 77, 80, 461 N.E.2d 1273 (1984): The 

underlying rationale of giving deference to the findings of the trial court rests with the 

knowledge that the trial judge is best able to view the witnesses and observe their 

demeanor, gestures, and voice inflections, and use these observations in weighing the 

credibility of the proffered testimony. Moreover, deferring to the trial court on matters of 

credibility is “crucial in a child custody case, where there may be much evident in the 

parties' demeanor and attitude that does not translate to the record well.” Davis v.
[Cite as In re J.C., 2021-Ohio-1874.]

Flickinger, 77 Ohio St.3d 415, 419, 674 N.E.2d 1159 (1997); see, also, In re: Christian, 

4th Dist. Athens No. 04CA10, 2004-Ohio-3146; In re: C.W., 2nd Dist. Montgomery No. 

20140, 2004-Ohio-2040. 

{¶53} The trial court determined that pursuant to R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(d), J.C. had 

been in the temporary custody of DCDJFS for twelve months of a consecutive twentytwo-month period. Mother does not dispute this fact. This Court has adopted the position 

that proof of temporary custody with an agency for twelve or more months of a 

consecutive twenty-two-month period alone is sufficient to award permanent custody. 

Matter of O.M., 5th Dist. Coshocton No. 20CA0017, 2021-Ohio-1310, 2021 WL 1424200, 

¶ 33 citing In the Matter of A.S., V.S., and Z.S., 5th Dist. Delaware No. 13 CAF 050040, 

2013-Ohio-4018. Therefore, a finding that grounds existed for permanent custody cannot 

be against the manifest weight of the evidence. Matter of L.G., 5th Dist. Stark No. 2020- 

CA-00139, 2021-Ohio-743, ¶ 36. The trial court also determined that J.C. could not be 

placed with Mother within a reasonable time. As to both determinations, Mother argues 

DCDJFS did not make reasonable efforts to prevent the removal of J.C., eliminate the 

continued removal of J.C. from Mother’s home, and did not make it possible for Mother 

and child to reunify. 

{¶54} Prior to an award of permanent custody to a public children services 

agency, the trial court must determine whether the agency has made “reasonable efforts 

to prevent the removal of the child from the child's home, to eliminate the continued 

removal of the child from the child's home, or to make it possible for the child to return 

safely home.” R.C. 2151.419(A)(1). 
[Cite as In re J.C., 2021-Ohio-1874.]

{¶55} Although R.C. Chapter 2151 does not define “reasonable efforts,” courts 

construe the term to mean “ ‘[t]he state's efforts to resolve the threat to the child before 

removing the child or to permit the child to return home after the threat is removed[.]’ ” In 

re T.B.-W., 9th Dist. Summit No. 27544, 2015-Ohio-992, ¶ 15, quoting In re C.F., 113 

Ohio St.3d 73, 2017-Ohio-1104, ¶ 28, quoting Will L. Crossley, Defining Reasonable 

Efforts: Demystifying the State's Burden Under Federal Child Protection Legislation, 12 

B.U.Pub.Int.L.J. 259, 260 (2003). “In a reasonable efforts determination, the issue is not 

whether the agency could have done more, but whether it did enough to satisfy the 

reasonableness standard under the statute.” In re C.M., 9th Dist. Summit No. 24380, 

2009-Ohio-943, ¶ 21 (Citation omitted). Matter of A.H., 5th Dist. Licking No. 2020 CA 

00072, 2021-Ohio-1577, 2021 WL 1784353, ¶¶ 36-37 

{¶56} Mother argued before the trial court that the assessment of Dr. Adkins was 

proof that DCDJFS failed to make reasonable efforts towards unification. She also 

contended the failure to make reasonable efforts is evident when the case plan for J.C. 

and H.L., Mother’s second child, are compared. H.L. was born on April 28, 2020. The 

child was placed in the temporary custody of DCDJFS on April 29, 2020. Dr. Adkins 

completed her assessment of Mother on July 30, 2020 and it was filed on September 9, 

2020. An adjudication hearing on the complaint for dependency as to H.L. was held on 

October 7 and 12, 2020. On October 12, 2020, the Magistrate’s Decision adjudicated H.L. 

dependent under R.C. 2151.04(C). The Magistrate’s Decision ordered DCDJFS to 

investigate the availability of one-on-one parenting services like those recommended in 

Dr. Adkins’ assessment and assist Mother with referrals and enrollment into the programs 

once located. 
[Cite as In re J.C., 2021-Ohio-1874.]

{¶57} In its November 30, 2020 judgment entry, the trial court responded to 

Mother’s argument as to the reasonable efforts of the DCDJFS for reunification: 

Counsel for Mother, and the Guardian ad Litem, did their best to present 

the report of Dr. Adkins as a positive for the Mother, and as proof that the 

Department had failed to make reasonable efforts toward reunification. But 

the Department cannot have failed to comply with recommendations that 

were not made, nor even requested, until after the motion for permanent 

custody was filed, and after the child had been in foster care for nearly a 

year and a half. The parents, their counsel, Mother’s guardian, the GAL, 

and the CASA were all invited to case plan meetings, and provided notice 

of numerous hearings and case reviews, there was ample opportunity to 

request modifications, additions, and deletions to the reunification efforts 

outlined in the case plan. The lack of progress occasioned by the Mother’s 

frequent changes of residence (nine times since the birth of the child), 

declination of services offered through the DCBDD, and decision not to take 

advantage of housing opportunities presented to her. While the assessment 

of Dr. Adkins may have arrived in time to formulate different opportunities 

for [Mother’s] younger child, in this matter the report of Dr. Adkins is actually 

what conclusively makes the Department’s case for permanent custody as 

it nearly exactly mirrors the statutory findings that instruct the Court to grant 

the motion, namely that the child cannot be reunified at this time, and could 

not possibility [sic] be reunified within the next twelve months. 

* * * 
[Cite as In re J.C., 2021-Ohio-1874.]

DCDJFS has made reasonable efforts to reunite the child with the parents 

in the above captioned case. * * * DCDJFS diligently acted to remedy the 

reasons for removal in the above captioned case. The Court would be 

remiss if it did not highlight the testimony of the case worker that in 

situations involving a parent with developmental disabilities, the 

Department relies on outside organizations, particularly the DCBDD, to 

provide services. But the Court does not find that this affects the conclusion 

as to reasonable efforts. The Department cannot be all things to all persons, 

and routinely relies on outside providers in areas of mental health, drug and 

alcohol abuse, educational assistance, and more. The Department made 

efforts to connect Mother to the Board, to help with housing, to provide 

transportation vouchers, and to find the assessor when the Court ordered 

the assessment. 

(Judgment Entry, Nov. 30, 2020). We find the record in this case supports the trial court’s 

conclusion that the DCDJFS made reasonable efforts to reunite J.C. and Mother. 

{¶58} Mother points to the case plan for H.L., which incorporated Dr. Adkins’ 

suggestions, to argue the efforts towards reunification are different between the siblings 

and therefore unreasonable for J.C. “The equal protection requirement prevents the 

government from ‘treating differently persons who are in all respects alike.’” Taylor-Jones

v. Kettering Medical Center, 2021-Ohio-738, -- N.E.3d – , ¶ 21 (2nd Dist.) quoting Burnett 

v. Motorists Mut. Ins. Co., 118 Ohio St.3d 493, 2008-Ohio-2751, 890 N.E.2d 307, ¶ 30. 

While J.C. and H.L. are siblings, they are not in all respects alike. J.C. was born on 

October 14, 2018 and H.L. was born on April 28, 2020. When J.C. was born, Mother had 
[Cite as In re J.C., 2021-Ohio-1874.]

no permanent residence, she did not have a case plan, she was not working with DCBDD, 

and she did not have a Guardian. J.C. was placed in the temporary custody of DCDJFS 

on January 9, 2019. When H.L. was born, one year and three months after J.C. was 

placed in the temporary custody of DCDJFS, Mother had a case plan, she had been 

working with the DCBDD, she was working on obtaining stable housing, and she had a 

Guardian for support. 

{¶59} Dr. Adkins’ assessment was filed on September 9, 2020. The assessment 

stated that under a best-case scenario, Mother could possibly be ready to care for a child 

after one to two years of intensive intervention. At the time of the assessment, J.C. had 

been in the temporary custody of the DCDJFS for one year and eight months. H.L. had 

been in the temporary custody of DCDJFS for 134 days. DCDJFS did not treat the siblings 

differently. Time was the deciding factor in this case in all regards. 

{¶60} We find the record supports the trial court’s conclusion that DCDJFS made 

reasonable efforts to reunify Mother and J.C. Mother’s second and third Assignments of 

Error are overruled. 

IV. Best Interests

{¶61} Mother contends in her fourth Assignment of Error that record does not 

support the trial court’s finding it was in the best interests of J.C. to be placed in the 

permanent custody of DCDJFS. We disagree. 

{¶62} R.C. 2151.414(D) governs “best interests” and states the following: 

(D) In determining the best interest of a child at a hearing held pursuant to 

division (A) of this section or for the purposes of division (A)(4) or (5) of 

section 2151.353 or division (C) of section 2151.415 of the Revised Code, 
[Cite as In re J.C., 2021-Ohio-1874.]

the court shall consider all relevant factors, including, but not limited to, the 

following: 

(1) The interaction and interrelationship of the child with the child's parents, 

siblings, relatives, foster caregivers and out-of-home providers, and any 

other person who may significantly affect the child; 

(2) The wishes of the child, as expressed directly by the child or through the 

child's guardian ad litem, with due regard for the maturity of the child; 

(3) The custodial history of the child, including whether the child has been 

in the temporary custody of one or more public children services agencies 

or private child placing agencies for twelve or more months of a consecutive 

twenty-two month period ending on or after March 18, 1999; 

(4) The child's need for a legally secure permanent placement and whether 

that type of placement can be achieved without a grant of permanent 

custody to the agency; 

(5) Whether any of the factors in divisions (E)(7) to (11) of this section apply 

in relation to the parents and child. 

{¶63} There is no question in this case that Mother loves her child. Mother has 

attended all visitation with J.C. J.C. appears happy when she is with Mother during 

visitation and the witness described them as bonded. 

{¶64} J.C. is too young to express her wishes, but the witnesses testified that she 

was bonded with her foster family and adjusted to her foster home. The foster parents 

are meeting her medical and therapeutic needs. She has resided with her foster family 
[Cite as In re J.C., 2021-Ohio-1874.]

since April 5, 2019. She calls her foster parents “mommy” and “daddy.” The foster family 

was interested in adopting J.C. 

{¶65} The parties do not dispute that Mother could not immediately and 

independently care for J.C. due to her developmental disability. Mother may be able to 

independently care for J.C. after one to two years of intensive intervention. The GAL 

recommended that temporary custody be extended for six months or legal custody 

granted to the foster parents. The foster parents did not want legal custody of J.C.; they 

asked the trial court to determine whether the DCDJFS should be entitled to permanent 

custody. The trial court is not required to follow a GAL's recommendation; it has discretion 

to follow or reject it. In re A.M., 5th Dist. Licking No. 18-CA-83, 2019-Ohio-1578, 2019 WL 

1894488, ¶ 48 citing Pasco v. Pasco, 5th Dist. Delaware No. 2018 CAF 06 0047, 2019- 

Ohio-1099, citing Clyburn v. Gregg, 4th Dist. Ross No. 11CA3211, 2011–Ohio–5239, ¶ 

47; Hammons v. Hammons, 5th Dist. Delaware No. 13 CAF 07 0053, 2014–Ohio–221, ¶ 

12. In this case, the trial court stated it chose to follow the recommendation of the CASA. 

{¶66} The Court agrees this is a challenging case based on Mother’s 

developmental disability. Mother loves her child and wants to be her parent. The best 

interest determination, however, focuses on the child, not the parent. In re C.T., 5th Dist. 

Licking No. 2020 CA 00014, 2020-Ohio-4965, 2020 WL 6147171, ¶ 57 citing In re N.B., 

8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 101390, 2015-Ohio-314, at ¶ 59. The trial court’s judgment entry 

reflects the complexity of this case and the record supports the trial court’s decision that 

it was in the best interest of J.C. to grant permanent custody to the DCDJFS. 

{¶67} Mother’s fourth Assignment of Error is overruled. 
[Cite as In re J.C., 2021-Ohio-1874.]

CONCLUSION

{¶68} The judgment of the Delaware County Court of Common Pleas, Juvenile 

Division, is affirmed. 

By: Delaney, J., 

Wise, John, P.J. and 

Wise, Earle, J., concur.