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The Honorable Andrew W. Bogue, late a United States District Judge for the

District of South Dakota.

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

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No. 09-1634

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United States of America, *

*

Appellee, *

* Appeal from the United States

v. * District Court for the 

* District of South Dakota. 

Wesley Running Shield, *

* [UNPUBLISHED]

Appellant. * 

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Submitted: December 17, 2009

Filed: May 28, 2010

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Before BYE, BEAM, and COLLOTON, Circuit Judges.

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PER CURIAM.

After the district court revoked Wesley Running Shield’s supervised release for

the second time in less than two years, the court1

 sentenced him to thirty-six months

in prison with no further supervised release. The sentence exceeded the advisory

guideline range of eight to fourteen months’ imprisonment. Running Shield

complains that the district court committed procedural error, and that the sentence is

substantively unreasonable. We affirm.
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In July 2005, Running Shield pleaded guilty in the district court to first degree

burglary, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1153 and 2, and South Dakota Codified Laws

§ 22-32-1(3). The district court sentenced him to twenty-seven months in prison and

four years of supervised release. Running Shield commenced supervised release in

April 2007, but failed to reside in a community corrections facility as required. In

July 2007, the district court revoked the release and imposed a new sentence of eleven

months in prison followed by thirty-six months of supervised release. Running Shield

began a second term of supervised release in May 2008, but again violated the

conditions of the release, this time by failing to reside in a community corrections

facility, absconding from a drug and alcohol treatment center, consuming alcohol, and

assaulting a police officer.

At a revocation hearing on January 26, 2009, Running Shield admitted that he

violated three conditions of supervised release. He asked the district court to consider

sentencing him to no more than fourteen months in prison, the high end of the

advisory guideline range. The government recommended a sentence of at least

twenty-four months. The district court, which had presided over Running Shield’s

initial sentencing and first revocation hearing, imposed a statutory maximum sentence

of thirty-six months in prison, with no supervised release.

Running Shield argues that the district court committed procedural error by

neglecting to consider relevant sentencing factors and failing to provide an adequate

justification for the sentence. He also contends that the court imposed an

unreasonable sentence. 

Running Shield raised no procedural objection at sentencing, so we review only

for plain error, and we find none. We are satisfied that the district court was aware

of the relevant sentencing factors under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), and that the court

considered them. At the revocation hearing, the district court referred to the need to

deter Running Shield’s criminal conduct and to protect the public from his further
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crimes. See § 3553(a)(2)(B)-(C); United States v. White Face, 383 F.3d 733, 740 (8th

Cir. 2004) (noting that if the court “references some of the considerations contained

in § 3553(a), we are ordinarily satisfied that the district court was aware of the entire

contents of the relevant statute”) (internal quotation omitted). The district court,

having imposed Running Shield’s initial sentence and revoked his supervised release

once before, was aware of his history and characteristics. See United States v.

Franklin, 397 F.3d 604, 607 (8th Cir. 2005). The district court likewise knew about

the seriousness of Running Shield’s repeated violations, see § 3553(a)(2)(A), and his

failure to seek sustained substance abuse treatment while on supervised release. See

§ 3553(a)(2)(D). An express listing and discussion of each § 3553(a) consideration

is not required, particularly when there is no objection or request for elaboration.

Under a deferential abuse-of-discretion standard, we also conclude that the

sentence is not substantively unreasonable. The district court has wide latitude in

choosing an appropriate sentence within the statutory range, see United States v.

Feemster, 572 F.3d 455, 461-62 (8th Cir. 2009) (en banc), and there were aggravating

circumstances in Running Shield’s case that reasonably justified the statutory

maximum term of imprisonment. The district court did not abuse its discretion. See

United States v. Larison, 432 F.3d 921, 924 (8th Cir. 2006) (holding that, where the

advisory guideline range was five to eleven months’ imprisonment upon revocation

of supervised release, a sixty-month sentence was not unreasonable in light of

defendant’s repeated violations); United States v. Cotton, 399 F.3d 913, 916-17 (8th

Cir. 2005) (affirming a forty-six month sentence for continued violations where the

advisory range was seven to thirteen months). 

The judgment of the district court is affirmed.

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