FILED JANUARY 14, 2011
S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N
SUPREME COURT

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, Plaintiff-Appellee,
v No. 139969 DONALD ALLEN LOWN, Defendant-Appellant.

BEFORE THE ENTIRE BENCH (except M ARY B ETH K ELLY , J.)
C ORRIGAN , J. This case requires us to clarify the correct interpretation of the statutory “180-day rule” established by MCL 780. 131 and MCL 780.133. The obj ect of this rule is to dispose of new criminal charges against inma tes in Michigan correctional facilities; the rule requires dismissal of the case if the prosecutor fails to commence action on charges pending against an inmate w ithin 180 days after the Depa rtment of Corrections (DOC) delivers notice of the inmate’s imprisonment. We reaffirm that the rule does not require
that a trial be commenced or completed within 180 days of the date notice was delivered. Rather, as this Court has held for more than 50 years, it is sufficient that the prosecutor Michigan Supreme Court Lansing, Michigan 

# Opinion Chief Justice: Robert P. Young, Jr. Justices: Michael F. Cavanagh Marilyn Kelly Maura D. Corrigan Stephen J. Markman Diane M. Hathaway Mary Beth Kelly2 “proceed promptly” an d “move[] the case to the point of readiness for tr ial” within the 180-day period. People v Hendershot , 357 Mich 300, 304; 98 NW2d 568 (1959). Significantly, although a prosecu tor must proceed promptly a nd take action in good faith in order to satisfy the ru le, there is no good-faith exception to the rule. Instead, as originally articulated in Hendershot , good faith is an implicit component of proper action by the prosecutor, who may not sa tisfy the rule simply by taki ng preliminary steps toward trial but then delaying inexcusably. We fu rther clarify that the statutory 180-day period is, by the plain terms of the statute, a fixed period of consecutive days beginning on the date when the prosecutor receiv es the required notice from th e DOC. Thus, the relevant question is not whether 180 days of delay since that date may be attributable to the prosecutor, but whether action was commenced within 180 calendar days following the date the prosecutor received the notice. If so, the rule has been satisfied unless the prosecutor’s initial steps are “f ollowed by inexcusable dela y beyond the 18 0-day period and an evident intent not to bring the case to trial promptly . . . .” 1 Accordingly, a court
should not calculate the 180-day period by apportioning to each party any periods of delay after the DOC delivers notice. Finally , we note that a viol ation of the 180-day rule—which deprives the court of “jurisdict ion,” MCL 780.133—specifically divests the
court of personal jurisdiction over the defendant for the particular action. The statutory 180-day rule was satisfied here because the prosecutor commenced action well within 180 days after receiving notice from the DOC, “p roceed[ed] promptly and with dispatch thereafter to ward readying the case for tr ial,” and “[stood] ready for

1 Hendershot , 357 Mich at 303.3 trial within the 180-day period . . . .” 2 Moreover, the record contains no evidence that ensuing delays caused in part by docket congestion were without reason or otherwise inexcusable under the facts of this case; inde ed, defendant either requested or explicitly consented to each adjournment. For these reasons, we affirmthe judgment of the Court of Appeals.

I. FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS

A. SEPTEMBER 2 005 TO JULY 2006 Proceedings in this case began in Se ptember 2005 when the Saginaw County Prosecuting Attorney charged defendant, Dona ld Allen Lown, with second-degree home
invasion. 3 Defendant was arrested and held in the Saginaw County jail. Because defendant was on parole, the DOC issued a paro le violation hold; ac cordingly, defendant was ineligible for release on bond. Defend ant’s initial period of confinement in the county jail—from September 2005 through ear ly May 2006—is not the basis for his current claim that the statutory 180-day rule was violat ed. But the events of this period in part explain why de fendant still had not been tried as of August 8, 2008, when he filed this appeal. Defendant was arraigned in the Saginaw Ci rcuit Court on November 7, 2005. A joint trial with his codefendan t was scheduled to begin on Fe bruary 7, 2006. The trial was postponed after the court granted a motion for separate trials filed by defendant’s

2 Id. at 304.

3 MCL 750.110a(3).4 first appointed attorney, Keith Skutt. Defend ant subsequently offered to plead guilty. A plea hearing was scheduled for January 30, 2006 . By the time of the hearing, however, defendant had changed his mind about the pl ea and requested a new attorney. Skutt moved to withdraw from representation and st ated that defendant was “willing to waive his right to trial within 180 days” to await new counsel. The court denied the motion to withdraw. Without objection by either part y, the trial was ultimately rescheduled for May 9, 2006, in part becau se of docket congestion. On April 20, 2006, defendant moved for release on bond— or, in the alternative, for dismissal of the home-inva sion charge—because he had b een jailed for more than 180 days and the trial had yet to commence. On May 1, 2006, the co urt granted the motion for a personal recognizance bond under MCR 6.004(C), whic h allows for the release on bond of defendants who are jailed for more than 180 days as a result of pending charges. The court initially delayed ruling on defendant’s alternative argument that dismissal was required under the statutory 180-day rule an d MCR 6.004(D), which apply to inmates of
correctional facilities. 4 The prosecutor responded that th e statutory rule did not apply to defendants held in county jails or to parole detainees. Meanwhile, as a result of the court’s order releasing defendant on bond for the pending charge, the DOC took defendant into custody on May 4, 2006, for violating parole.
The court denied defendant’s motion to di smiss under the statutory 180-day rule in
an order entered on June 16, 2006, citing People v Chavies , 234 Mich App 274; 593

4 The rule requiring a personal recognizan ce bond, MCR 6.004(C)—which applies a 180- day period in certain felony cases—is distin ct from the statutory 180-day rule at issue here. The statutory rule, MCL 780.131 and MC L 780.133, is reflected in MCR 6.004(D).5 NW2d 655 (1999). 5 Defendant claims that, after he was reimprisoned by the DOC, no one took steps to ensure his availability for the Ma y 9, 2006, trial; he claims that this
failure to act caused the court to reschedule the trial for July 5, 2006. By stipulation of the parties, however, the July 5 date was adjourned and th e trial was rescheduled for September 19, 2006, to accommodate defens e counsel’s summer va cation plans. On July 17, 2006, Skutt filed another motion to withdraw as counsel, stating that defendant had filed a grievance against him with the At torney Grievance Commission. On July 28, 2006, the court granted Skutt’s motion to withdraw and appointed a second attorney, Timothy Lynch, to represent defendant.
Around this time the DOC sent cer tified written notice of defendant’s incarceration to the prosecutor as required by MCL 780.131. The pr osecutor received the

5 As we will discuss further, the court and par ties appear to have been unaware that, two days before the trial court’s June 16, 2006 , order, this Court overruled the relevant aspects of Chavies in People v Williams , 475 Mich 245; 716 NW2d 208 (2006). Defendant’s appellate counsel concedes, however, that the Williams opinion did not entitle defendant to dismissal under the 180-day ru le at the time of his first motion to dismiss.6 notification no later th an July 22, 2006. 6 Thus, the statutory 180-day period relevant to this appeal began on July 23, 2006. 7

B. SEPTEMBER 2 006 TO APRIL 2008 On the next scheduled trial date of Sept ember 19, 2006, defendant rejected a plea agreement offered by the pros ecutor. Lynch moved for an adjournment to allow more time for trial preparation. Defendant stated on the record that he had no objection to the adjournment. The trial was re scheduled for November 28, 2006 . On that date, the parties again appeared. Defendant rejected yet anot her plea offer from th e prosecutor, and both sides were prepared for trial. But, becau se defendant was impr isoned with the DOC on prior convictions as a result of his parole vi olation—that is, he was not incarcerated as a result of the pending charge—the court itself adjourned the trial so proceedings against local jail inmates could take precedence. Th e court stated that defendant “will be tried next year.” Neither party objected. The trial was next scheduled to begin on Ap ril 24, 2007. At a hearing on that date
the court denied defendant’s motion to dismis s Lynch and asserted that jury selection

6 Defendant states that the prosecutor rece ived notice no later th an July 22, 2006. July 22, 2006, is also the date employed by the Court of Appeals in its analysis. Accordingly, we rely on the July 22 date he re. Defendant nonetheless observes that the return receipt for the notice appears to have been signed by the prosecu tor’s office on July 19, 2006. Moreover, in its brief before the trial court, the prosecution admitted receiving notice on July 18, 2006, which was the date the trial c ourt used in its analysis. Using either of the earlier possible receipt da tes in our analysis would not change the outcome of this case.

7 Williams , 475 Mich at 256 n 4 (stati ng that the 180-day period begins the day after the prosecution receives the written no tice required by MCL 780.131).7 would begin later that week. Off the record, the trial was adjourned yet again to July 11, 2007, apparently as a result of docket cong estion. On July 11 , 2007, the case was adjourned to September 5, 2007. The cour t explained simply: “We’ve taken the time
here to determine when this case is going to be reset an d everybody is going to be
available.” The case was pushed to one day later, Septem ber 6, 2007, at which time the parties appeared and the prosecution stat ed that it was ready to procee d. But, in the meantime, Lynch had moved to withdraw as counsel, noting defendant’s “antagonistic, demeaning, denigrating attitude” towards him and stating that defendant had filed an unwarranted grievance against him with th e Attorney Grievance Commissi on. The court granted the motion. James Tiderington was appointed as replacement counsel for the defense on September 12, 2007. The trial was rescheduled for December 4, 2007. On that date, the court granted Tiderington’s motion for an adjournment in or der to file a motion to dismiss under the statutory 180-day rule. In a December 7, 2007, motion, Tiderington observed that the Court of Appeals’ opinion in Chavies —on which the trial court relied in its June 16, 2006, order denying defendant’s first motion to dismiss—had been ov erruled by the June 14, 2006, Williams decision. The court ordered brie fing and held two hearings to
consider the issue. In an April 15, 2008, opinion and order, th e court denied defendant’s motion. It noted that, although 180 days had passed si nce the prosecutor r eceived notic e from the8 DOC, the “good faith exception” to the 180-day rule precluded dismissal. 8 The prosecution had taken good-faith action toward preparing for trial within the 180-day period—indeed it was, “at all times, ready, w illing and able to procee d with trial of this case”—and “[a]ll adjournments were made at the Defendant’s request or otherwise beyond the Prosecution’s control.” Over the prosecutor’s objection, the court also granted defendant’s motion to st ay the proceedings while defendant appealed its ruling in the Court of Appeals.

C. APPELLATE PROCEEDINGS The Court of Appeals 9 affirmed in part, concluding that the statutory 180-day rule did not require dismissal of the home-invasion charge. 10 Citing People v Crawford , 232 Mich App 608, 613-615; 591 NW2d 669 (1998), the Court began by calculating the period of delay specifically attributable to the prosecution or the court, and not

8 The court cited caselaw that included Hendershot

. 9 People v Lown , unpublished opinion per curiam of the Court of Appeals, issued October 1, 2009 (Docket No. 287033). Th e Court of Appeals had initially denied defendant’s application for leave to appeal “for failure to pe rsuade the Court of the need for immediate appellate review.” People v Lown , unpublished order of the Court of Appeals, entered October 30, 2008 (Docket No . 287033). Defendant a pplied for leave to appeal in this Court and we re manded, directing the Court of Appeals to consider the case as on leave granted. People v Lown , 483 Mich 893 (2009).

10 The Court of Appeals remanded for furt her proceedings before the trial court concerning defendant’s separate claim—which was not addressed by the trial court—that the delays deprived him of his constitutional right to a speedy trial under the United States and Michigan Constitutio ns and related statutory and court rule provisions. US Const, Am VI; Const 1963, art 1, § 20; MC L 768.1; MCR 6.004(A). This issue is not currently before us.9 attributable to defendant, beginning on July 23, 2006. The Court concluded that more than 180 days of the total de lay were caused by docket cong estion or unexplained factors
that must be attributed to the prosecution under People v England , 177 Mich App 279, 285; 441 NW2d 95 (1989). Nonetheless, the Court concluded that dismissal was not re quired because the prosecution was “ready and willi ng to go to trial at least as early as September 19,
2006.” 11 The Court observed that this date was “well within the initial 180-day period, and it appears from the record that the prosecution had ma de a good-faith effort to proceed to trial at that time.” 12 Thus, the Court concluded that the 180-day rule was not violated, applying the reasoning of People v Michael Davis , 283 Mich App 737; 769 NW2d 278 (2009). Davis relied on this Court’s decision in Hendershot to conclude that “‘trial or completion of trial’” within the 180-day period is unnecessary to satisfy the statutory rule; rather, if “‘apparent good-fa ith action is taken well within the [180-day] period and the people proceed promptly and with dispatch th ereafter toward readying the case for trial, the condition of the statute fo r the court’s retention of jurisdiction is
met.’” 13 Defendant petitioned this Court to review the Court of Appeals’ judgment. We granted his application for leave to appeal and directed the parties to include among the
issues to be briefed

11 Lown , unpub op at 4.

12 Id.

13 Davis , 283 Mich App at 741, quoting Hendershot , 357 Mich at 304.10 (1) whether the 180-day rule, MCL 780. 131 and 780.133, is jurisdictional, and if so, whether it permits any dela y in trial beyond 180 days from the date of the Department of Correc tions notice; (2) whether a strict jurisdictional reading of the rule viol ates a defendant’s constitutional rights when a delay in trial beyo nd the 180 days is sought by the defendant, as occurred in this case; (3) whether, if so me delay in trial beyond 180 days is permitted by the statutory provisions, any such de lay should be evaluated by attributing it to the defendant or the prosecution, and if so, whether action of the circuit court, such as delay due to docket management concerns, should automatically be attr ibuted to the prosecution; (4) whether a prosecutor’s good-faith efforts to bring a defend ant to trial within the initial 180-day period is of any relevance in the app lication of the statutory provisions, and if so, whether the pros ecutor must remain prepared at all times to go to trial in order to av oid dismissal of the case under the rule; and (5) if this Court were to determine that the 180-day rule is jurisdictional and does not permit any delays in the commencement of trial, whether and to what extent that determinati on should be applied retroactively. [14]

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW This case requires us to consider the meaning and proper application of MCL
780.131 and MCL 780.133. We review de novo questions of statutory interpretation. 15 Our goal when interpreting a statut e is to “ascertain and give effect to the intent of the Legislature” as manifested in th e plain language of the statute. 16 If the language is “clear and unambiguous,” we need go no further; courts will not en gage in additional judicial construction of an unambiguous statute. 17

14 People v Lown , 485 Mich 1036 (2010).

15 People v Charles Davis , 468 Mich 77, 79; 658 NW2d 800 (2003).

16 Id.

17 Id.11 III. DISCUSSION

A. INTERPRETATION OF THE STATUTORY 180-DAY RULE

The relevant subsection of MCL 780.131 provides: Whenever the department of correcti ons receives notice that there is pending in this state any untried wa rrant, indictment, information, or complaint setting forth against any inmate of a correctional facility of this state a criminal offense for which a pr ison sentence migh t be imposed upon conviction, the inmate shall be brought to trial within 180 days after the department of corrections causes to be delivered to the prosecuting attorney of the county in which the warrant, indi ctment, information, or complaint is pending written notice of the place of imprisonment of the inmate and a request for final disposition of the wa rrant, indictment, information, or complaint. The request shall be acco mpanied by a statement setting forth the term of commitment under which the prisoner is being held, the time already served, the time re maining to be se rved on the sent ence, the amount of good time or disciplinary credits ea rned, the time of pa role eligibility of the prisoner, and any decisions of the parole board relating to the prisoner. The written notice and statement shall be delivered by certified mail. [18] Thus, MCL 780.131(1) states the general rule requiring that an inmate housed in a state correctional facility who has criminal charges pending agai nst him “shall be brought to trial within 180 days after” the DOC delivers written notic e of information concerning the inmate’s imprisonment to the prosecu ting attorney. The 18 0-day period begins running on the day after the prosec utor receives the required notice. 19 MCL 780.133 governs failure to co mply with the 180-day rule: In the event that, with in the time limitation set forth in [MCL 780.131], action is not commenced on the matter for which request for disposition was made, no court of this state shall any longer have

18 MCL 780.131(1).

19 Williams , 475 Mich at 256 n 4.12 jurisdiction thereof, nor sh all the untried warrant, indictment, information or complaint be of any further force or effect, and the court shall enter an order dismissing the same with prejudice. This provision specifies that if “action is not commenced on the ma tter” within the 180- day period, the court loses jurisdiction and mu st dismiss the matter with prejudice. It does not employ the same word used in MCL 780.131(1); it does not state that the court loses jurisdiction if the trial has not begun. It also does not state that the court loses jurisdiction if the action is not complete . Rather, it requires the commencement—or beginning —of “action.” In this context, the word “action” has complementary and relatively uncontroversial meanings. “Action” may encompass, for example, the “process of doing something; conduct or behavi or,” an act or a “thing done,” or, in the context of court proceedings, a “civ il or criminal judicial proceeding.” 20 A “proceeding,” in turn, generally includes the “regular and or derly progression of a lawsuit, including all
acts and events between the time of commenc ement and the entry of judgment”; it may also mean an “act or step that is part of a larger action.” 21 Thus, this Court has long held
that to commence action within the 180-day peri od, a prosecutor need not ensure that the
trial actually begins, or is completed, within that period. Rather, the prosecutor must have undertaken action—or, put otherwise, begun proceedings—against the defendant on the charges (or the “matter”). 22 As we explained in Hendershot :

20 Black’s Law Dictionary (7th ed).

21 Id.

22 Contrast People v Swafford , 483 Mich 1, 3; 762 NW2d 902 (2009), in which we had “no choice” but to dismiss the charges with pr ejudice on the basis of the language of the Interstate Agreement on Detainers (IAD), MCL 780.601, which expressly premises dismissal on a prisoner not being “brought to trial within” 180 days of notice. Swafford13 The statute does not require the ac tion to be commenced so early within the 180-day period as to insure tr ial or completion of trial within that period. If . . . apparent good-faith ac tion is taken well w ithin the period and the people proceed promp tly and with dispatch th ereafter toward readying the case for trial, the co ndition of the statute for the court’s retention of jurisdiction is met. [23] Accordingly, [w]hen the people have moved the case to the point of readiness for trial and stand ready for trial within the 180-day period, defe ndant’s delaying motions, carrying the matter beyond that period before the trial can occur, may not be said to have brought the statute into operation, barring trial thereafter. [24] On the other hand, if the prosecutor takes no action or delays inexcusably after taking preliminary steps, the rule may be violated: Clearly, if no action is taken and no trial occurs within 180 days, the statute applies. If some preliminary st ep or action is taken, followed by inexcusable delay beyond the 180-day pe riod and an eviden t intent not to bring the case to trial promptly, the statute opens the door to a finding by the court that good-faith action wa s not commenced as contemplated by [MCL 780.133], thus requiring dismissal. [25] In this case, the Court of Appeals co rrectly relied on these propositions from
Hendershot , as quoted by the Court of Appeals’ decision in Davis. 26 The 180-day period explained that “[h]owever hars h and inflexible a remedy for failure to comply with the IAD this may be adjudged, it is plai nly what our Legislature requires.” Swafford , 483 Mich at 17. The distinct langua ge of MCL 780.133 plainly does not require dismissal although a prisoner was not brought to trial w ithin 180 days if the prosecutor nonetheless commenced action in the ca se within that period.

23 Hendershot , 357 Mich at 304.

24 Id.

25 Id. at 303-304.

26 Lown , unpub op at 4, quoting Davis , 283 Mich App at 741-742.14 began July 23, 2006, and ended January 19, 2 007. As the Court of Appeals concluded, the prosecutor not only commen ced action within this period but was prepared to proceed to trial at least by September 19, 2006, which was the first scheduled trial date after the 180-day period commenced. Trial was postpon ed that day as the result of defense counsel’s motion for adjournmen t; defendant himself expressly stated on the record that he did not object to the adjournment. Th e record further show s that the prosecutor remained ready for trial at subsequent resc heduled trial dates, including November 28, 2006; April 24, 2007; and September 6, 2 007. On the next sc heduled trial date, December 4, 2007, defendant mo ved to adjourn to bring the motion to dismiss under the 180-day rule that led to this appeal. In the words of the trial court, the prosecutor was, “at all times, ready, willing and able to proc eed with trial of this case.” Indeed, the record shows that the victims of the home invasion were also in the courtroom, ready to testify, on each of the numerous scheduled trial dates. Further, the court itself appears to have be en ready to proceed as of September 19, 2006, when defendant moved to adjourn. La ter adjournments were attributable both to the defense and to docket congestion. Th e Court of Appeals has observed that the “burden imposed” by MCL 780.1 31 and MCL 780.133 “rests as much upon the court as upon the prosecutor” because “the schedu ling of cases is not controlled by the prosecutor.” 27 Accordingly, the Court of Appe als here relied on cases, including England , for the proposition that “‘[a]ll adjournments without reason and unexplained delays are chargeable to the prosecution’” without regard to whether the prosecutor is

27 People v Wolak , 153 Mich App 60, 65; 395 NW2d 240 (1986).15 otherwise ready to proceed to trial. 28 As we will discuss further, the Court of Appeals erred when calculating the 180-day period by a ttributing individual periods of delay to the parties. But, to the ex tent that docket congestion could be relevant, clearly the congestion here was generally explained and excusable. At several hearings, the court explicitly confirmed that defe ndant would not be prejudiced by furt her adjournments because he was imprisoned as a result of se ntences for prior conv ictions to which any
new sentences would be consecutive. Inde ed, several adjournments were necessary because other defendants, who unlike defendant were jailed solely as a result of pending charges, would be prejudiced by additional delays. Finally, defendant did not object— and often explicitly consented—to the adjournments attributab le to docket congestion. Accordingly, even if the court was responsib le for delaying the proceedings after action was commenced, first, the reco rd does not reflect that th e delays were unexplained or without reason in the context of this case, an d, second, defendant wa ived or forfeited any error in this regard. For these reasons, the trial court properly denied defendant’s mo tion to dismiss the case under the 180-day rule, and the Court of Appeals properly affirmed that denial.
Action was commenced “well w ithin the period,” and the prosecution “proceed[ed] promptly and with dispatch thereafter toward readying the case for trial” and “[stood] ready for trial within the 180-day period.” 29 And there is no evidence that ensuing delays

28 Lown , unpub op at 2, quoting England , 177 Mich App at 285, which cited, among other cases, Wolak.

29 Hendershot , 357 Mich at 304.16 caused by docket congestion were without r eason or otherwise inexcusable under the
facts of this case. Moreover, this analysis alone was a sufficient basis for the lower courts’ conclusions that the 180-day rule was satisfi ed. It was unnecessary for the Court of Appeals to calculate the number of days of dela y attributable to the prosecutor, the court, or defendant beginning on July 23, 2006. The relevant statutory provisions do not describe the 180-day pe riod as 180 total days of delay attributable to the prosecutor or court, after which the court may lose jurisd iction of the case. Rather, they plainly describe the period as a single term consis ting of 180 consecutive da ys beginning at the time the DOC delivers the requ ired written notice to the pr osecutor. MC L 780.131(1)
states that the inmate “s hall be brought to trial within 180 days after ” the DOC delivers notice. (Emphasis added.) MC L 780.133 similarly deprives the court of jurisdiction if
“action is not commenced” “ within the time limitation set forth in [MCL 780.131].” (Emphasis added.) The practice of allocating periods of pretri al delay between the parties originates not from Michigan’s statutory 180-day ru le, but from jurispru dence governing the constitutional right to a speedy trial. 30 The necessary inquiries are distinct. The United

30 Periods of pretrial delay may also be allo cated in other circumstances when called for by the governing statute or rule. For exam ple, the statute governing Michigan’s 180-day rule stands in contrast to th e IAD, which, as previously noted, premises dismissal not on the failure to commence action within 180 days of notice, as in MCL 780.133, but solely on a prisoner not being “broug ht to trial within” 180 days of notice. Accordingly, the IAD expressly permits—and thus excludes from the 180-day period—“necessary or reasonable continuance[s]” for “good cause show n in open court . . . .” MCL 780.601, art III(a).17 States Supreme Court established a balancing test applicable to speedy trial cases in Barker v Wingo , 407 US 514; 92 S Ct 2182; 33 L Ed 2d 101 (1972), which this Court adopted in People v Grimmett , 388 Mich 590, 602-60 6; 202 NW2d 278 (1972). 31
Relevant factors under this test include the reasons for the pretrial delay and whether the defendant was prejudiced. 32 Accordingly, courts may c onsider which portions of the delay were attributable to each party when determining whether a defendant’s speedy trial rights have been violated 33 and may attribute unexplai ned delays—or inexcusable delays caused by the court—to the prosecution. 34

A day count and assignment of responsibility for peri ods of delay are also expressly required by Michigan ’s pretrial release rule, M CR 6.004(C), which applies to defendants who are incarcerated as a result of pending charges. Un der this rule, “[i]n computing the 28-day and 180-day periods” af ter which a defendant generally must be released on personal recognizance during the pendency of the proceedings, “the court is to exclude” delays caused by various events including, for example, “adjournment[s] requested or consented to by the defe ndant’s lawyer.” MCR 6.004(C)(3). The absence of any equivalent langua ge in MCL 780.131 or MCL 780.133 referring to apportioning delay or granting continuances is hi ghly significant. As noted, MCL 780.133 prescribes a harsh penalty—d ismissal of the criminal charge with prejudice. It is entirely rational for the Le gislature to have employed language that ensures that this penalty obta ins only when “action is not co mmenced,” rather than when the defendant is not “brought to trial,” when it drafted a se rious penalty provision that contains no mechanism for granting co ntinuances or apportioning delay.

31 See People v Chism , 390 Mich 104, 111; 211 NW2d 193 (1973); People v Collins , 388 Mich 680, 688; 202 NW2d 769 (1972).

32 See Barker , 407 US at 530; Chism , 390 Mich at 111.

33 See, e.g., Chism , 390 Mich at 112.

34 See, e.g., People v Ross , 145 Mich App 483, 491; 378 NW2d 517 (1985); People v Carner , 117 Mich App 560, 577; 324 NW2d 78 (1982).18 Some cases have employed th ese elements of the speedy trial test when reviewing
motions for dismissal under the statut ory 180-day rule. For example, in Crawford , 232 Mich App at 613, and England , 177 Mich App at 285—on which the Court of Appeals here relied—the Court applied the statutory 18 0-day rule in part by calculating how many days of delay were “chargeable” to the pr osecutor after the prosecutor received the required DOC notice. But neither case offe red a full explanation of why it imported the speedy trial test into this c ontext. Rather, each case primar ily cited portions of other cases that addressed speedy trial challenges. 35 We clarify that the 180-day period a ddressed in MCL 780.131 and MCL 780.133 consists of the consecutive 180 days beginni ng on the day after the prosecutor receives the required notice from the DOC. The releva nt threshold question is, therefore, not whether 180 days of delay since that date may be attributable to the prosecutor, but
whether action was commenced within this 180-day period as described earlier, in
accordance with Hendershot . If so, the rule has been sa tisfied unless the prosecutor’s initial steps were “followed by inexcusable delay beyond the 180-day period and an
evident intent not to bring the case to tr ial promptly . . . .” 36 Certainly, delays attributable to the prosecutor or the court both within and after the 180-da y period may be relevant to whether delay beyond the period is inexcusabl e or whether the prosecutor lacked an

35 England , 177 Mich App at 286, relied primarily on cases analyzing the constitutional right to a speedy trial, including Barker , 407 US at 527; People v Patterson , 170 Mich App 162; 427 NW2d 601 (1988 ), remanded on other grounds 437 Mich 895 (1990); and Ross , 145 Mich App 483. Crawford , 232 Mich App at 614, relied in part on England.

36 Hendershot , 357 Mich at 303.19 evident intent to bring the case to trial promptly. Accordingly, a court may find it necessary to consider the causes of delay. But doing so is unnecessary for calculating the statutory 180-day period, whic h is a fixed, consecutive period that, unlike periods of delay considered under a speedy trial anal ysis, is not subject to apportionment.

B. THE PROSECUTOR’S DU TY TO ACT IN GOOD FAITH We further clarify that, contrary to the tr ial court’s assertion, the statutory 180-day rule has no judicially created “good-faith exception.” The tria l court observed that a socalled good-faith exception to th e rule was created by the references to a prosecutor’s good-faith action in Hendershot . But Hendershot should be read c onsistently with the plain language of MCL 780.133—not to crea te an exception that has no basis in the statutory text. The text of MCL 780.133 clea rly contemplates that a court may retain jurisdiction although 180 days have passed after the DOC se nt the required notice as long as “action”
was “commenced on the matter” w ithin the 180-day period. Hendershot is best read as discussing good faith not as an exception to this requirement, but as an element of the action required within the 180 -day period to avoid dism issal under MCL 780.133. Indeed, Hendershot defined commencing action as “g ood-faith action . . . taken well within the period” in order to ready the case for trial. 37 Significantly, it di d so in part to explain that the trial itself need not take place within th e period for the court to retain

37 Id. at 304.20 jurisdiction under MCL 780.133. 38 Thus, it effectively disti nguished good-faith action to bring the case to trial from a mere “prelimin ary step or action” that is “followed by inexcusable delay beyond the 180-day period an d an evident intent no t to bring the case to trial promptly . . . .” 39 It concluded that, upon a show ing that the prosecutor merely took such a preliminary step and then delayed and did not genuinely intend to bring the case to trial promptly, “the stat ute opens the door to a finding by the court that good-faith
action was not commenced as contemplated by [MCL 780.133] . . . .” 40 In other words, a court may conclude that “action” was “com menced on the matter” within 180 days—and thus may maintain jurisdicti on under MCL 780.133—only if the action was genuinely (or in good faith ) taken to promptly bring the case to trial, not if the action was simply an initial step accompanied by a l ack of genuine intent to mo ve forward on the case, as evident in the prosecutor’s subsequent actio n or inaction within or beyond the 180-day period. Accordingly, we overrule interpretations of Hendershot that characterize its discussion of good faith as a judicially created exception to the 180-day rule. For example, we note People v Walker , 276 Mich App 52 8; 741 NW2d 843 (2007), vacated in part 480 Mich 1059 (2008), which the trial cour t in this case discussed. Walker cited Hendershot as creating a good-faith ex ception to the 180-day rule. 41 Walker

38 Id. (“The statute does not require the action to be commenced so early within the 180- day period as to insure trial or comp letion of trial within that period.”).

39 Id. at 303.

40 Id. at 303-304 (emphasis added).

41 Walker , 276 Mich App at 538-539.21 proceeded to conclude that this Court’s opinion in Williams “implicitly overruled the ‘good-faith’ exception.” 42 This Court vacated the Walker Court’s references to the socalled exception as dicta. 43 As a result, the trial court in this case concluded that our
order in Walker effectively indicated that the good-faith exception persisted , contrary to the Walker appeals panel’s conclusion. But nothing in Williams , in our order in Walker , or in the amendment of MCR 6.004(D) either condones or condemns a good-faith exception. Nor did this Court’s actions in thes e matters otherwise address whether the general requirement that a prosecutor ready hims elf for trial in good faith, as described in
Hendershot , is consistent with the statutory lang uage. Rather, as the Court of Appeals would later recognize in Davis , Williams declined to overrule Hendershot and, moreover, the good-faith issue was not di rectly before the Court in Williams. 44

42 Id. at 540. Walker stressed the Williams Court’s statement that a prior version of the court rule implementing the statutory 180- day rule—MCR 6.004(D), which, among other things, required the pros ecutor to “make a good faith effort to bring a criminal charge to trial” within the 180-day peri od—“was invalid to the extent that it improperly deviated from the statutory language.” Williams , 475 Mich at 259. Hence the Walker Court concluded that Williams rejected a good-faith exception.

43 People v Walker , 480 Mich 1059 (2008).

44 Davis , 283 Mich App at 743. Williams primarily overruled People v Smith , 438 Mich 715; 475 NW2d 333 (1991), which had held, co ntrary to the langua ge of MCL 780.131, that the statutory 180-day rule does not apply when the pending charge calls for mandatory consecutive sentencing. Williams , 475 Mich at 248. Williams also overruled People v Hill , 402 Mich 272; 262 NW2d 641 (1978), to the extent Hill wrongly established that the 180-day period begins when the pros ecutor knows, or when the DOC knows or has reason to know, th at a person with charges pend ing against him is a prison inmate; this conclusion wa s clearly incorrect given that MCL 780.131 unambiguously provides that the 180-period is triggered wh en the DOC sends noti ce to the prosecutor. Williams , 475 Mich at 259. Signif icantly, it was in overruling Hill that the Williams Court approved the 2006 amendm ent to MCR 6.004(D), which de leted the sections of the rule that had codified Hill , former MCR 6.004(D)(1)(a) a nd (b), and entirely rewrote22 Accordingly, as the Court of Appeals correctly held in Davis , Williams did not affect the general rule from Hendershot that dismissal is required under MCL 780.133 only if the prosecutor failed to take good-faith steps to commence action within 180 days of receiving notice from the DO C of an offender’s imprisonm ent. But, as we have explained, good-faith action by the prosecut or does not create an extrastatutory exception to the 180-day rule. Rather, a good-faith intent to ready the case for trial describes an implicit component of the steps that must be taken w ithin the 180-day pe riod in order for
the rule to be satisfied althou gh a trial is not completed w ithin that period. Good-faith action is invoked specifically in contrast to action that, a lthough it takes place within 180 days, consists merely of preliminary steps that are later followe d by inexcusable delay and the lack of a genuine intent to proceed to trial. Thus, the good-faith aspect of the 180-day rule protects defendants by making clear that merely any action by the prosecutor, without regard to whether the acti on is genuinely designed to promptly bring the case to trial, does not automa tically satisfy the rule’s inte nt as expressed by its plain terms; good-faith action does not create an exception benefitting the prosecutor.
C. THE JURISDICTIONAL ASPECT OF THE 180-DAY RULE Finally, we address defendant’s argumen t that MCL 780.131 and MCL 780.133 create a strict jurisdic tional rule requiring dismissal with prejudice 180 days after delivery subrule (D) to track the language of MCL 780.131 and MCL 780.133. When Williams stated that the prior version of MCR 6.004( D) “was invalid to the extent that it improperly deviated from the statutory la nguage,” 475 Mich at 259, it was not considering that MCR 6.004(D)(1) also no longer stated that the prosecutor “must make a good faith effort to bring a cr iminal charge to trial” within the 180-day period, as had the prior version.23 of the DOC’s notice unless a defendant requir es a delay to vindicate his constitutional rights. This argument fails, first and fore most, because it depends on defendant’s claim that the 180-day rule is violated if a trial does not take place within the 180-day period. As we have explained, such a conclusion runs directly contrary to the plain language of MCL 780.133, which deprives th e court of jurisdiction only if “action is not commenced” within the 180-day period; the jurisdictional as pect of the rule does not hinge on whether
the trial has begun or has been completed within the period. Wh ether action has been commenced remains governed by the analysis of this question in Hendershot. In concluding that Hendershot is no longer good law on th is subject, defendant relies primarily on statements in Williams that he nonetheless admits are dicta. The Williams Court stated, for example, that the 180-day ru le “provides that a prison inmate who has a pending criminal charge must be tried within 180 days” after the DOC delivers notice and “requires dismissal with prejudice if a prisoner is not brought to trial within the 180-day
time limit . . . .” 45 As discussed earlier, this elemen t of the rule was not before the Williams Court and the statements were, indeed, nonbinding obiter dicta. 46 The Williams opinion was not intended to make—nor di d it make—pronouncements concerning what constitutes commencing action for pur poses of the 180-day rule.

45 Williams , 475 Mich at 247, 252 (emphasis added).

46 Obiter dicta, or “dicta,” are not binding prece dent. Rather, they ar e statements that are not essential to determination of the case at hand and, therefore, “lack the force of an adjudication.” Wold Architects & Engineers v Strat , 474 Mich 223, 2 32 n 3; 713 NW2d 750 (2006) (citations and quotation marks omitted).24 Second, defendant’s argument implicitly presumes th at MCL 780.133 deprives the
court of subject matter jurisdiction when the 180 -day rule is violat ed. Subject matter jurisdiction “concerns a court’s ‘abstract power to try a case of the kind or character of the one pending’ and is not dependent on the particular facts of the case. ” 47 Because it concerns the court’s power to hear a case, it is not subject to waiver. 48 But the court’s jurisdiction over a particular person is anothe r matter; a party may s tipulate to, waive, or implicitly consent to personal jurisdiction. 49 The circuit court here had subject matter jurisdiction over the home invasion charge; Mich igan circuit courts are courts of general jurisdiction and unquestionably have jurisdiction over felony cases. 50 Because the

47 Travelers Ins Co v Detroit Edison Co , 465 Mich 185, 204; 631 NW2d 733 (2001), quoting Campbell v St John Hosp , 434 Mich 608, 613-614; 455 NW2d 695 (1990) (emphasis in Travelers ).

48 Travelers , 465 Mich at 204.

49 Burger King Corp v Rudzewicz , 471 US 462, 473 n 14; 105 S Ct 2174; 85 L Ed 2d 528 (1985) (“[B]ecause the personal jurisdiction requirement is a waivable right, there are a variety of legal arrangements by which a litigant may give ex press or implied consent to the personal jurisdiction of the court. ”) (citations and quotation marks omitted); People v Phillips , 383 Mich 464, 470; 175 NW2d 740 (1970) (“[N]o reason appears why an accused could not subject himself to the cour t’s personal jurisdiction. The procedural safeguards spelling out the method whereby a court obtains jurisdiction over the person of an accused are all designed for his protection. If he elects not to avail himself of the established procedural rights there appear s to be none who should be heard to complain.”); see also People v Eaton , 184 Mich App 649, 652-6 53; 459 NW2d 86 (1990) (discussing the 180-day rule and helpfully summarizing: “J urisdiction involves the two different concepts of subject-matter jurisdic tion and personal jurisdiction. Subject-matter jurisdiction encompasses those matters upon which the court ha s power to act. Personal jurisdiction deals w ith the authority of the co urt to bind the parties to the action. Subjectmatter jurisdiction is never waivable nor may it be stipulated to by the parties. Personal jurisdiction, however, is always waivable and defects may be corrected by stipulation.”).

50 Const 1963, art 6, §§ 1 and 13; MCL 6 00.151; MCL 600.601; MCL 767.1.25 jurisdictional aspect of the 180 -day rule, MCL 780.133, require s dismissal of a particular defendant in a particular ca se when the rule is violat ed, however, the rule governs personal jurisdiction and thus is waivable.
Justice B OYLE reached this very result followi ng a well-reasoned analysis in her concurring opinion in People v Smith 51 when she concluded that a violation of the 180- day rule is waived by an unconditional guilty pl ea. Observing that th e term “jurisdiction” is “susceptible of various meanings within th e realm of criminal procedure,” she opined that the term as employed in MCL 780.133 “cannot be said to unambiguously refer to the power of the court to entertain a class of cases, i.e., subject-matter jurisdiction.” 52 “Rather, the statute represents a limitati on on the power to prosecute in specified circumstances, viz., where an existing warrant, information or charge against a prisoner is not disposed of in a timely ma nner as provided in MCL 780.131.” 53 Because “the statute decrees that a court loses its power over a particular matter in specified circumstances,” personal jurisdiction—which “deals with th e authority of the court over particular persons”—is at issue; and it is “a fundame ntal principle that defects in personal jurisdiction may be waived . . . .” 54 We adopt Justice B OYLE ’s analysis on these points.

51 Smith , 438 Mich at 719-729 (B OYLE , J., concurring), overru led on other grounds by Williams , 475 Mich 245.

52 Smith , 438 Mich at 724, 725 (B OYLE , J., concurring).

53 Id. at 725.

54 Id. at 724-725. The Co urt of Appeals reached the same conclusion in Eaton , 184 Mich App 649. The Prosecuting Attorneys Association of Mi chigan as amicus curiae also helpfully describe the jurisdictional aspect ofthe 180-day rule as an “inflexible claimprocessing rule.” Such rules have been dis tinguished from rules affecting subject matter jurisdiction by the United States Supreme Court. That Court has obse rved that the word26 Our conclusion that a violation of the stat utory 180-day rule does not deprive the court of subject matter jurisdiction is signifi cant because it further defeats defendant’s argument that if the 180-day period is exc eeded for a reason other than vindication of a defendant’s constitutional rights, the court is forever deprived of the power to hear the case. To the contrary, because subject matter jurisdiction is not at issue, a defendant may forfeit the rule requiring commencement of action within 180 days by requesting or consenting to delays, as defendant did ma ny times throughout the proceedings in this
case. Our conclusion also rein forces the text of the statut e, which clearly conveys that the 180-day period does not describe an au tomatic cut-off point when the court loses jurisdiction, no matter what even ts have transpired in the meantime, unless the defendant sought a continuance to protect a constitutiona l right. Rather, as long as good-faith action was commenced within th e 180-day period in order to rea dy the case for trial, the trial court is not deprived of jurisdiction alth ough the trial itself is not commenced or completed within the period.

“jurisdiction” is one “of many, too many, meanings” that is “more than occasionally” used not in a strict sense, but to “describe emphatic time prescriptions in rules of court.” Kontrick v Ryan , 540 US 443, 454; 124 S Ct 906; 1 57 L Ed 2d 867 (2004) (citation and quotation marks omitted). No ting a “critical difference betw een a rule governing subjectmatter jurisdiction and an inflexible claim-pr ocessing rule,” the Court stressed that a claim-processing rule can be forfeited by the parties, whereas, “[ c]haracteristically, a court’s subject-matter jurisdiction cannot be expanded to account for the parties’ litigation conduct; a claim-proces sing rule, on the ot her hand, even if unalterable on a party’s application, can nonetheless be forfeite d if the party asserting the rule waits too long to raise the point.” Id. at 456.27 IV. RESPONSE TO THE DISSENT The dissent premises its discussion on its conclusion that, “[e]ven though the [180- day] rule does not expressly require a da y count and assignment of responsibility for periods of delay, both requirements are implicit in the statute.” We reject this premise
because it is based not on th e explicit text of the statut e, but on judicially created “implicit” requirements. The statutory text could not be clearer. The relevant time limit—“within 180 days after” the DOC delivers the require d notice, MCL 780.131(1)— describes a single term of 180 consecutive da ys following the DOC’s delivery of the notice. It does not describe a j udicially calculated total period of delay attributable to the prosecutor or the court. Further, defendants are not prejudiced by th is statute, as the dissent fears. A defendant may agree to delay pr oceedings in the case at will; he is not prejudiced by the fixed 180-day period. Rather, th e statute places the burden on the state ; only the prosecutor is bound and must commence action— and remain ready to proceed to trial— within 180 days. Although a defendant may consent to delay the proceedings, the prosecutor must remain ready to proceed to trial—and to avoid inexcusable delay—when the agreed upon peri od of delay expires. 55

55 Moreover, we do not hold that inexcusable docket congestion or other causes of delay not directly attributable to the prosecutor are irrelevant to the inquiry. Rather, as discussed, the docket congestion here was expl ained and excusable. The court was ready to proceed on September 19, 2006 , when defendant moved to adjourn. Defendant did not object—and often directly consented—to the later adjournments, and the court considered whether defendant would be prejudiced by the further delays.28 The dissent’s fears of prejudice to the defendant arise, moreover, primarily from
its incorrect assertion that the trial must begin or be comple ted within 180 days. But a
defendant is only prejudiced by the inability to raise pretrial constitutional issues or prepare for trial if the pros ecutor is forced to commence trial —as opposed merely to commencing action —within 180 days, as the dissent suggests. The dissent wrongly focuses on MCL 780.131(1 ), which refers to a defendant’s being “brought to trial.” But MCL 780.133, not MCL 780.131, governs when jurisdiction is lost as the result of a violation of the 180-day rule. We underscore the Legislature’s choice of a broader word in MCL 780.133, which does not refer to the commencement of “trial,” but refers to
commencement of “acti on” on the matter. Finally, for these reasons, our historical precedent in Hendershot is consistent with the plain statutory language. Accordingly, Hendershot was not wrongly decided and
should not be overruled.

V. CONCLUSION The statutory 180-day rule, MCL 780.1 31 and MCL 780. 133, may be invoked to require dismissal of a criminal case only if action is not commenced in the case within 180 days after the prosecutor receives the required notice from the DOC. The rule does not deprive the court of its power to hear the case simply because the trial has not commenced within that period, let alone be cause the trial has no t been completed. Rather, as this Court has held for more than 50 year s, the rule requires the prosecutor to proceed promptly within 180 days to move the ca se to the point of read iness for trial. As long as the prosecutor does so, dismissal is not required under MCL 780.133 unless, after29 some preliminary step in the case occurs, that initial action is followed by inexcusable delay beyond the 180-day period and an eviden t intent not to bring the case to trial promptly. Under such circumstances, the cour t may conclude that action was not in fact meaningfully or genuinely commenced as re quired by MCL 780.133; put otherwise, the court may conclude that action was not commenc ed in good faith. But good-faith action
should not be viewed as an exception to the rule; in this cont ext, the requirement that a prosecutor proceed in “good fa ith” means simply th at he must in fact commence action and cannot satisfy the rule by taking preliminar y steps without an ongo ing, genuine intent to promptly proceed to trial, as might be evident from subs equent inexcusable delays. Finally, the 180-day period is a fixed period of consecutiv e days; a court should not calculate the period by allocating only the num ber of days’ delay attributable to the prosecutor, although the reasons underlying sp ecific periods of dela y might be otherwise
relevant to a court’s determination of wh ether action was in go od faith commenced during the requisite period. In this case, the prosecution commenced action to bring defe ndant to trial well within the 180-day period, was actually ready to proceed to trial during this period, and remained ready to proceed with the trial at all times ther eafter. Further, the record reflects no evidence of subseq uent inexcusable delays under the facts of this case. Indeed, defendant requested or consented to most of the adjournments. Therefore, the trial court was not deprived of personal juri sdiction for the purpose of adjudicating the home invasion charge against defendant.30 Accordingly, we affirm the result reached by both lower courts and the judgment of the Court of Appeals. Maura D. Corrigan Robert P. Young, Jr. Stephen J. Markman Diane M. HathawayS T A T E O F M I C H I G A N
SUPREME COURT

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, Plaintiff-Appellee,
v No. 139969 DONALD ALLEN LOWN, Defendant-Appellant.

M ARILYN K ELLY , J. ( dissenting ).
I would reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals. I believe that compliance with the 180-day rule established by MCL 780 .131 and MCL 780.133 requires more than a prosecuting attorney’s good-faith effort to promptly bring an inmate to trial. I would hold that the statutory rule requires an inmate actually to be brought to trial within 180 days.
JURISDICTION UNDER THE 180-DAY RULE I agree with the majority that the 180-day rule is jurisdic tional. This is clear from the language of MCL 780.133, which states: In the event that, with in the time limitation set forth in [MCL 780.131], action is not commenced on the matter for which request for disposition was made, no court of this state shall any longer have jurisdiction thereof . . . . [Emphasis added.] Thus, if “action is not commenced” within 1 80 days, as set forth in MCL 780.131, the court is divested of jurisdiction.2 I further agree with the majority that MC L 780.133 presents an issue of personal, rather than subject-matter, jurisd iction. Therefore, I concur in the majority’s adoption of
Justice B OYLE ’s analysis on this issue. 1 Notably, if the 180-day rule concerned subjectmatter jurisdiction, nonco mpliance with the rule would not be waivable. 2 Yet it must be waivable, at least when a defendant asserts ce rtain constitutional rights. Were the statute viewed as preventing defense-initiated adj ournments, the constitu tional rights of the defendant might well be violated. Therefore, interpreting the 180-day rule as referring to subject-matter jurisdiction would potentially render the en tire statute unconstitutional. And it is a fundamental rule of statutory interpretation that if two cons tructions are possible, one constitutional and one unconstitutional, the constitutiona l construction should be adopted. 3 It follows that the 180-day rule is jurisdictional only with regard to personal jurisdiction, which is waivable by a defendant. I agree with the majority that the 180-day rule divests a court of personal jurisdiction over a defendant if “action is not commenced” within 180 days of the required notice from the Department of Corr ections (DOC). My disagreement regards

1 People v Smith , 438 Mich 715, 724-725; 475 NW2d 333 (1991) (B OYLE , J., concurring in the result), overruled on other grounds by People v Williams , 475 Mich 245; 716 NW2d 208 (2006).

2 See United States v Cotton , 535 US 625, 630; 122 S Ct 1781; 152 L Ed 2d 860 (2002) (stating that subject matter jurisdiction “can never be forfeited or waived”).

3 Ford Motor Co v State Tax Comm , 400 Mich 499, 518; 255 NW2d 608 (1977) (W ILLIAMS , J., dissenting), citing State Bar of Mich v City of Lansing , 361 Mich 185, 195; 105 NW2d 131 (1960).3 three matters: (a) the calculatio n of the 180 days, (b) the type of “action” that must be commenced within the statutory time limit, and (c) the precedential effect of People v
Hendershot

. 4 I address each of these in turn.
CONSTRUING AND ATTRIBUTING DE LAY UNDER THE 180-DAY RULE The majority claims that, in calculating th e 180-day period, identifying the source of periods of pretrial delay is not necessary. It believes th at such a practice was imported improperly into 180-day-rule jurisprudence from caselaw de aling with the constitutional right to a speedy trial. I disagree the importa tion was improper. It is true that, when determining whether a defendant’s constitutional right to a speedy tria l has been violated, the “reason for the delay” is one of the factors taken into account. 5 However, the allocation of pretrial delay is a necessary corollary of the 180-day rule, as well. Even though the rule does not expressly require a day count and assignme nt of responsibility for periods of delay, both requirem ents are implicit in the statute. MCL 780.131 specifically states the numb er of days that may pass between the time the DOC certifies notice and the time the de fendant must be bro ught to trial. The specification in the statute of a set number of days implies that a day count is necessary. Furthermore, one must ascribe responsibility for the periods of delay in order to determine which the defendant caused, and thus waived.

4 People v Hendershot , 357 Mich 300; 98 NW2d 568 (1959).

5 Four factors to be balanced when determ ining whether a defendant’s constitutional right to a speedy trial has been violated are: the “‘[l]ength of delay, th e reason for the delay, the defendant’s assertion of his right and prejudice to the defendant.’” People v Collins , 388 Mich 680, 687-688; 2 02 NW2d 769 (1972), quoting Barker v Wingo , 407 US 514, 530; 92 S Ct 2182; 33 L Ed 2d 101 (1972).4 A violation of the 180-day rule divests a court of personal jurisdiction. Significantly, only a defendant may waive app lication of the rule. A prosecutor’s goodfaith efforts to prepare for trial or even a trial court’s or der to adjourn trial may not waive it. Thus, when it comes to attr ibuting pretrial delay, the ma jority is correct that it is unnecessary to attribute delay to the prosecuto r. The more pertinent inquiry is whether a period of delay may be attributed to and then waived by the defendant. When a defendant requests an adjour nment, the delay occasioned by the adjournment should be attribut ed to the defendant and not considered when calculating the 180 days that the statute allots. This is because, in requesting an adjournment, a defendant is effectively waivi ng that period of delay. But by requesting or consenting to a delay, a defendant is not forfeiting the ru le requiring action to commence within 180 days; he or she is not forever relinquishing the totality of his or her rights under the 180- day rule. This would have the undesirable e ffect of permitting a court or prosecutor to delay for an indefinite amount of time after a defendant knowingly requests an adjournment. Rather, by requesting or cons enting to a certain period of delay, a defendant is waiving that speci fic period of delay. Effectiv ely, a defendant may toll the 180-day period. Hence, any delay that the court grants and that the defendant consents to must not contribute to the 180 days a llotted. This interpretation is necessary because defendants cannot be permitted to deliberatel y create periods of delay an d then use those periods to argue that they were denied their statutory ri ght to a speedy trial. On the other hand, a delay attributable to a person or entity other than a defe ndant cannot be excepted from the 180-day period. Hence, when a trial is unreasonably de layed for reasons outside a5 defendant’s control, the length of the delay should be coun ted when calculating whether 180 days have elapsed. Examples are adj ournments requested by the prosecution and those caused by a judge because of docke t congestion. If 180 days of delay not attributable to a defendant transpire and “a ction” has not yet commenced, the court is divested of jurisdiction to try the charge. THE “ACTION” REQUIRED BY THE 180-DAY RULE In 1959, in the case of People v Hendershot , this Court held that MCL 780.131 allowed the 180-day period to be exceeded if “apparent good-faith action is taken well within the period and the peop le proceed promptly and with dispatch thereafter toward readying the case for trial . . . .” 6 The majority rallies behind this interpretation of the 180-day rule. However, the wording of MCL 780.131 and MCL 780.133 does not support it. The relevant portion of MCL 780.131 provides: Whenever the department of correcti ons receives notice that there is pending in this state any untried wa rrant, indictment, information, or complaint setting forth against any inmate of a correctional facility of this state a criminal offense for which a pr ison sentence migh t be imposed upon conviction, the inmate shall be brought to trial within 180 days after the department of corrections causes to be delivered to the prosecuting attorney of the county in which the warrant, indictment, information, or complaint is pending written notice of the place of imprisonment of the inmate and a request for final dis position of the warrant, indictment, information, or complaint . The request shall be accompanied by a statement setting forth the term of co mmitment under whic h the prisoner is being held, the time already served, th e time remaining to be served on the sentence, the amount of good time or disciplinary credits earned, the time of parole eligibility of the prisoner, and any decisions of the parole board

6 Hendershot , 357 Mich at 304.6 relating to the prisoner. The written no tice and statement shall be delivered by certified mail. [Emphasis added.] Thus, the statute requires that an inmate with pending criminal charges “shall be brought to trial within 180 days after” the DO C delivers written notice of the inmate’s imprisonment to the prosecuting attorney. The use of th e word “shall” indicates a mandatory and imperative directive. 7 The penalty for failure to co mply with this statutory ma ndate is set forth in MCL
780.133: In the event that, with in the time limitation set forth in [MCL 780.131], action is not commenced on the matter for which request for disposition was made , no court of this state shall any longer have jurisdiction thereof, nor sh all the untried warrant, indictment, information or complaint be of any further force or effect, and the court shall enter an order dismissing the same with prejudice. [Emphasis added.] Thus, if “action is not commenced” within 1 80 days, as set forth in MCL 780.131, the court is divested of jurisdiction. Contrary to the majority’s approach, I question the need to go beyond the words in
the statute and the need to consult a dicti onary to discern the Legislature’s intended meaning of commencing “action.” MCL 780.131 mandates that the inmate be “brought to trial” within 180 days, an d MCL 780.133 divests the cour t of jurisdiction over the untried warrant, indictment, information, or complaint when “ac tion is not commenced on the matter” within 180 days . Read together, MCL 780. 131 and MCL 780.133 indicate
that the “action” to be commen ced within 180 days is “trial,” not some undefined effort by the prosecutor or some preliminary proceeding leading to trial. To read the statutes

7 Oakland Co v State , 456 Mich 144, 154; 566 NW2d 616 (1997).7 otherwise would be to contra dict the Legislature’s mandate in MCL 780.131 that “the inmate shall be brought to tria l within 180 days.” As the Court of Appeals has noted, “All questions concerning the 180-day rule begin and end with the statute, the key words of which are ‘such inma te shall be brought to trial within 180 days.’ Simp ly, this statute is mandatory and means that an inmate is entitled to a trial within 180 days.” 8 The majority admits that the 180-day rule consists of both MCL 780.131 and MCL 780.133. However, it ignores MCL 780.131 when interpreting the requirements of the rule and the punishment for noncom pliance. Instead, relying on Hendershot , it holds that the statutes allow the 180-day period to be exceeded if “‘ apparent good-faith action is taken well within the period and the peopl e proceed promptly and with dispatch thereafter toward readying the case for trial[.]’” 9 But this strained interpretation is far disconnected from the lang uage of the statute. Not only does the majority’s interpretation ignore the cl ear legislative mandate in MCL 780.131 that an inmate must be brought to trial within 180 da ys, it effectively adds nonexistent language to the statute. The text of the statute contains no reference to “good faith.” The majority claims that good faith is not an “exception” to the 180-day rule. Rather, it asserts that good fa ith is an implicit requirement that the 180-day rule imposes

8 People v Wolak , 153 Mich App 60, 64-65 ; 395 NW2d 240 (1986).

9 Ante at 12, quoting Hendershot , 357 Mich at 304.8 on the prosecuting attorney; all that is require d of the prosecuting atto rney under the rule is a good-faith effort to br ing the case to trial. Good-faith efforts on behalf of the prosecu tion must be categorized as a judicially created exception to the 18 0-day rule, stemming from Hendershot . The 180-day rule requires a trial to begin within 180 days. Anything that a llows a trial to be postponed beyond the 180 days allotted is necessarily an exception to the rule. No amount of rationalizing can change the fact that the Legislature wrote in no such exception. The majority’s interpretation is that if “apparent good-faith action is taken well within the period and the peop le proceed promptly and with dispatch thereafter toward readying the case for trial, the condition of the statute fo r the court’s retention of jurisdiction is met.” This interpretation contai ns a second fundamental flaw: it places the burden of good-faith action solely on the prosecu tion, not on the trial court. Its practical effect is that the judge could indefinitely po stpone trial in defian ce of MCL 780.131 and
MCL 780.133. The scheduling of cases is within the sole discretion of the court. The prosecutor does not control it. Even if prosecuting atto rneys do everything within their power to bring cases to trial, they cannot force courts to schedule trials within 180 days of notice. A court can delay any trial from commencing, citing docket congesti on or other reasons. If this type of delay is not taken into acco unt by the 180-day rule, an inmate could be forced to sit in prison inde finitely awaiting trial.9 This problem is effectively illustrated by the procedural history of the instant case. The 180-day period relevant to this appeal began on July 23, 2006. 10 On the next scheduled trial date, September 16, 2006 , defendant’s recently appointed counsel requested an adjournment to allow him to prepare, and de fendant agreed. The next scheduled trial date was November 28, 2006. On that date, defendant and counsel were present in court and prepared to proceed to trial. However, the court adjourned the case, and a new trial date of April 24, 2007, was set. There is no explanat ion in the record for the 147-day delay caused by this adjournment. On April 24, 2007, the court, on its own motion off the record, adjourned defendant’ s trial an additional 77 days, apparently because of docketing concerns. Next, a new trial date wa s set for July 11, 2007. On that date, the case was adjourned 56 days to September 5, 2007. The court simply explained: “We’ve taken the time here to determine when this case is going to be reset and everybody is going to be available.” Thus, from November 28, 2006, to Septem ber 5, 2007, the court alone adjourned defendant’s trial well in excess of 180 days. Yet the majority concludes that no violation of the 180-day rule occurred. Under its interpretation and under Hendershot , as long as the prosecutor stands ready for trial, the court may adjourn a trial date as many times as it wi shes. It need give no explanation for the length of the adjour nments. Thus, even if no “action is
commenced” for an indefinite tim e, a court may retain its juri sdiction over the matter, as

10 Williams , 475 Mich at 256 n 4 (holdi ng that the 180-day period begins the day after the prosecuting attorney receives the wr itten notice required by MCL 780.131).10 long as there is some undefi ned good-faith effort by the pr osecutor. This interpretation strips the 180-day requirement of any practical meaning. And it denies many inmates the legal recourse that the Legislatur e specifically provided them.
HENDERSHOT AND STARE DECISIS The majority justifies its interpretation of the 180-day rule with the fact that this Court previously sanctioned such an interpretation in Hendershot . For the reasons I have described, I believe that Hendershot was wrongly decided. If an opinion is wrongly decided, we must apply the doctr ine of stare decisis when deci ding whether to overrule it. Our analysis always should begin with a pr esumption that upholding precedent is the preferred course of action. 11 That presumption should pr evail unless effectively rebutted by the conclusion that a compelling ju stification exists to overturn it. 12 In determining whether a compelling justif ication exists to overturn precedent, the Court may consider numerous evaluative criteri a, none of which, standing alone, is dispositive. These criteria include, but ar e not limited to, whether (1) the precedent has proved to be intolerable because it defies practical workability, (2) reliance on the precedent is such that overru ling it would cause a special hardship and inequity, (3) related principles of law have so far developed since the precedent was pronounced that
no more than a remnant of it ha s survived, (4) facts and circumstances have so changed, or have come to be seen so differently, that the precedent no longer has significant

11 Petersen v Magna Corp , 484 Mich 300, 317; 773 NW2d 564 (2009) (opinion by K ELLY , C.J.).

12 Id.11 application or justification, (5) other juri sdictions have decided similar issues in a different manner, (6) upholding the precedent is likely to re sult in serious detriment prejudicial to public interests, and (7) th e prior decision was an abrupt and largely unexplained departure from then-existing precedent. 13 First, I consider whether Hendershot has proved intolerable because it defies practical workability. I believe that this factor weighs stro ngly in favor of overruling
Hendershot . Under Hendershot , it is unclear what constitutes a sufficient basis for a court to determine that the prosecution has acted in good faith to bring a defendant to trial. Making that determination requires an inherently subj ective and effectively standardless inquiry. The answer may va ry widely from judge to judge. What constitutes a good-faith effort in the eyes of one judge may not reach the mark in the eyes of another. For example, if a prosecutor delays trial for 180 days while diligently searching for a witness, is that su fficient good faith for a court to excuse the delay and retain jurisdiction? The answ er is unclear. Further compounding the impracticability of Hendershot is the question of how a court is to make such a
determination from the record . Whether a prosecutor has made good-faith efforts often
will not be discernabl e from the re cord.
Hendershot contorted the 180-day rule into a c onfusing and ambiguous test. It left
unclear what would constitute a prosecutor’s good-faith effo rts and when, if ever, the prosecutor’s efforts would violate the 180- day rule. Ascertaining when a prosecutor

13 Univ of Mich Regents v Titan Ins Co , 487 Mich 289, 303-304; __ NW2d __ (2010), citing Adarand Constructors, Inc v Peña , 515 US 200, 233-234; 115 S Ct 2097; 132 L Ed 2d 158 (1995).12 should have been ready to proceed to trial w ill often be an insurmountable feat. Accordingly, Hendershot is innately unworkable. Second, I consider whether reliance in terests weigh in favor of upholding
Hendershot . I conclude that this fact or slightly favors upholding Hendershot . The Court decided that case more than 50 years ago, and there has been reliance on its holding. However, the reliance has been limited. Even after the Hendershot decision, Michigan courts have interpreted MCL 780.133 inconsistently, causi ng confusion about what must be done to prevent a court from losing juri sdiction over the defendant on the untried charge. For example, the Cour t of Appeals has held that th e language of the 180-day rule requires an inmate to be bro ught to trial within 180 days. 14 Language from this Court has further compounded the confusion. 15
Given that the caselaw on this issue is conflicting, a careful prosecutor or trial judge would not unconditionally rely on Hendershot as foolproof justification for delay in commencing a trial. Furthermore, MCL 780. 131 unequivocally states that an inmate “shall be brought to trial within 180 days.” Third, I consider whether related pr inciples of law have developed since
Hendershot was decided that have undermined its authority. As I pointed out, both this Court and the Court of Appeals have held that the 180-day rule requires an inmate to be

14 Wolak , 153 Mich App at 64 (“All questions c oncerning the 180-day rule begin and end with the statute, the key words of which are ‘s uch inmate shall be brought to trial within 180 days.’ Simply, this statute is mandatory and means that an inmate is entitled to a trial within 180 days.”).

15 See Williams , 475 Mich at 252 (“MCL 780.133 requires dismissa l with prejudice if a prisoner is not brought to tr ial within the 180-day time li mit set forth in the act.”).13 brought to trial within 180 days notwithstanding Hendershot

. 16 Thus, subsequent caselaw has chipped away at the holding in Hendershot , undermining its authority. Fourth, I consider whether facts and circ umstances have so changed or have come
to be seen so differently that Hendershot has been robbed of significant justification. I discern no factual or circumstantial change s that weigh for or against overruling
Hendershot . Therefore, this factor is in applicable to my analysis. Fifth, I consider whether other jurisdic tions have decided similar issues in a
different manner. This factor also is inapplicable to my stare decisis analysis. Although other jurisdictions have statutorily supplemen ted the constitutional right to a speedy trial, the unique language of MCL 780.131 and MCL 780.133 renders other jurisdictions’ interpretations of similar statutes unhelpful to our analysis. Sixth, I consider whether upholding Hendershot is likely to result in serious detriment prejudicial to public interests. This factor weighs in favor of overruling
Hendershot . It is in the public interest to see that those accused of crimes are timely brought to trial. It is also in the public interest that both the United States Constitution and the Michigan Constitution be upheld. And both guarant ee the right to a speedy
trial. 17 Accordingly, the Legislature has statut orily guaranteed an inmate’s right to a speedy trial. Moreover, the 180-d ay rule furthers the public inte rest by ensuring that sentences run concurrently when appropriate. “‘The purp ose of the [180-day rule] is clear. It was

16 Wolak , 153 Mich App at 64; Williams , 475 Mich at 252.

17 US Const, Am VI; Const 1963, art 1, § 20.14 intended to give the inmate, who had pending o ffenses not yet tried, an opportunity to have the sentences run concurrently consiste nt with the principle of law disfavoring
accumulations of sentences.’” 18 Despite the public’s interest in seeing criminal charges disposed of in a timely

manner, Hendershot ’s holding permits criminal char ges to remain untried for an
indeterminate time. While oste nsibly protecting an inmate’s statutory right to a speedy trial, it leaves MCL 780. 131 devoid of effect in many cases. Thus, Hendershot is
detrimental to the public interests addresse d by the 180-day rule. Finally, I consider whether Hendershot represented an abrupt and largely unexplained departure from then-existing preceden t. This factor is inapplicable to my stare decisis analysis because Hendershot was the first case to decide the issue. Thus, no precedent existed from which Hendershot could depart. In summary, Hendershot (1) was wrongly decided, (2) defies practical workability, (3) has been unde rmined by subseque nt caselaw, (4) would not cause a special hardship or inequity if overruled , and (5) has resulted in serious detriment prejudicial to public interests. Accordingly, I conclude that a co mpelling justification exists for overruling Hendershot

. CONCLUSION The majority concludes that the 180-day rule is not violated if the prosecution takes some initial action to bring a defendant to trial, unless the action is followed by

18 Williams , 475 Mich at 252, quoting a nd overruling on other grounds People v Loney , 12 Mich App 288, 292; 162 NW2d 832 (1968).15 “inexcusable delay beyond the 180-day period and an evident intent not to bring the case to trial promptly.” The fl aws in this interpretation ar e breathtaking. First, the interpretation ignores the clear language of MCL 780.131 that requires an inmate to be brought to trial within 180 da ys. Second, it imports language into MCL 780.133 that the Legislature never put there by giving a convoluted definition to the word “action.” Third, it allows the trial judge to indefinitely dela y a trial by citing docket congestion or other

reasons. The majority relies for its interpretation of the 180-day rule on the holding in
Hendershot . However, Hendershot was wrongly decided, and compelling reasons exist
to overturn it. I would overrule Hendershot and hold that the st atutory 180-day rule requires that trial be commenced within 180 days of notice to the prosecution, excluding periods of delay that a defendant waived. Su ch a construction is faithful to the statutory language because it gives effect to the ma ndate of MCL 7 80.131 that an inmate be brought to trial within 180 days. In light of my analysis, I would reverse the Court of Appeals’ judgment. Marilyn Kelly Michael F. Cavanagh

M ARY B ETH K ELLY , J. I do not participate in the decision of this case, which the Court considered before I assumed office, in order to avoid unnecessary delay to the parties. MCR 2.003(B) and (D)(3)(b).