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STATE OF MICHIGAN 

COURT OF APPEALS 

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, 

 Plaintiff-Appellee, 

UNPUBLISHED 

May 12, 2015 

v No. 313857 

Macomb Circuit Court 

KENISHA LATORI FAISON, LC No. 2012-000991-FC 

 Defendant-Appellant. 

Before: BECKERING, P.J., and CAVANAGH and SAAD, JJ. 

PER CURIAM. 

 Defendant appeals her jury trial convictions for: (1) aiding or abetting the solicitation of 

murder under MCL 750.157b and MCL 767.39; and (2) conspiracy to commit first-degree 

premeditated murder under MCL 750.157a and MCL 750.316(1)(a). For the reasons stated 

below, we affirm. 

I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 

 This case involves a love triangle that involved codefendant Deon Taylor,1

 defendant, 

and defendant’s half-sister, Kia Faison. Taylor had a longstanding relationship with Kia, and is 

the father of one of her children. In 2005, Taylor was convicted of sexually abusing Kia’s niece 

and sent to prison. Nonetheless, Kia resumed her relationship with Taylor after his release, and 

the couple shared a residence. During this time period, Taylor also began a sexual relationship 

with defendant, which caused tension between her and Kia. In 2012, Taylor was charged with 

molesting Kia’s daughter, and incarcerated once again. 

 While in the Macomb County Jail, Taylor approached a former associate, and asked him 

to kill Kia and her two children so that Kia’s daughter could not accuse him of molesting her. 

 

1

 A jury convicted Taylor, who was tried separately from defendant, of solicitation to commit 

murder and conspiracy to commit first-degree premeditated murder. Our Court affirmed his 

convictions in People v Taylor, unpublished opinion per curiam of the Court of Appeals, issued 

March 25, 2014 (Docket No. 313677). The opinion also contains further information on the 

factual background of this case. 
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The former associate informed the Macomb County Sheriff’s Department of Taylor’s plans, and 

the Department gave him a small microphone to wear for subsequent meetings with Taylor. In 

February 2012, Taylor and the informant had a detailed and graphic discussion about how best to 

commit the murders. They also discussed payment (which would come from a large life 

insurance policy Kia had purchased, and of which Taylor was supposedly the beneficiary),2 and 

Taylor stressed that defendant would assist the informant by providing keys to Kia’s house and 

documentation related to the life insurance policy. 

 At the instruction of the sheriff’s department, the informant contacted defendant via a cell 

phone number that Taylor supplied. He arranged to meet with defendant in the jail lobby, before 

defendant visited Taylor. At the meeting, which was monitored by the sheriff’s department,3

defendant and the informant discussed the logistics of carrying out the murders,4 and defendant 

expressed approval of the plan to kill her half-sister and her niece and nephew.5

 She also stated 

that she would accompany defendant into the home prior to the shootings, and help him retrieve 

documentation on the life insurance policy. At some point during the meeting, defendant 

removed three keys from a ring and handed them to the informant, and explained which doors 

they opened at Kia’s home. 

 The prosecutor subsequently charged defendant with: (1) aiding or abetting the 

solicitation of murder under MCL 750.157b and MCL 767.39; and (2) conspiracy to commit 

 

2

 Kia testified that she actually removed Taylor as a beneficiary of her life insurance policy in 

January 2012, a fact of which Taylor and defendant were apparently not aware. 

3

 The prosecutor introduced the recording of the informant’s meeting with defendant as evidence, 

and played the audio recording for the jury. 

4

 Among other things, defendant explained the layout of Kia’s house to the informant, and told 

him of the family’s sleeping arrangements and schedule. Defendant also made suggestions about 

how best to carry out the murders, and told defendant to: (1) tie Kia’s legs together because she 

practiced kickboxing; (2) exercise discretion at all times because of “nosey” neighbors and the 

proximity of the Eastpointe police station to Kia’s home; (3) not park his car in Kia’s driveway. 

5

 Specifically, the informant testified that he asked defendant whether she knew that he intended 

to murder Kia and her family, and defendant explained that she approved of his plans. The 

informant and defendant went on to discuss the potential murders in great detail, which did not 

dissuade defendant, as noted, from offering her own suggestions on how best to carry out the 

shootings. 

The prosecution also presented the jury a handwritten letter bearing defendant’s signature, and 

with her return address. Guards found the document in a search of Taylor’s cell effected soon 

after defendant told Taylor during a jail visit that she had sent him a letter and some photographs. 

In the letter, defendant states: 

I will never leave your side. . . . I’m going to have someone take care of Kia. I 

promise you that. She means nothing to me. And she is a liar, sneaky and don’t 

deserve to be living [sic]. I’m just so outraged about everything. 
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first-degree premeditated murder under MCL 750.157a and MCL 750.316(1)(a). At trial, the 

jury heard exhaustive testimony from the informant, Kia, and defendant, who denied that she 

approved of the plan to murder her family members. A detective with the sheriff’s department 

testified to his work with the informant, and voiced his belief that the informant saved the lives 

of Kia and her children. He also informed the jury that the sheriff’s department possessed 

numerous audio recordings of weekly visits between Taylor and defendant in which defendant 

expressed approval of the murders and a willingness to help the informant facilitate them.6

 In October 2012, the jury found defendant guilty as charged. On appeal, she argues that: 

the prosecution presented insufficient evidence to sustain her conviction of solicitation to commit 

murder. In her standard 4 brief, defendant also makes the unsupported assertions that: (1) the 

prosecution presented insufficient evidence to sustain her conviction of conspiracy to commit 

murder; and (2) she was denied due process because the trial court issued improper jury 

instructions, to which her counsel did not object. 

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW 

 A challenge to the sufficiency of evidence is reviewed de novo. People v Solmonson, 

261 Mich App 657, 661; 683 NW2d 761 (2004). When it determines whether sufficient 

evidence exists “to sustain a conviction, a court must view the evidence in a light most favorable 

to the prosecution and determine whether any rational trier of fact could have found that the 

essential elements of the crime were proven beyond a reasonable doubt.” People v Nowack, 462 

Mich 392, 399-400; 614 NW2d 78 (2000) (internal quotation and citation omitted). “It is for the 

trier of fact, not the appellate court, to determine what inferences may be fairly drawn from the 

evidence and to determine the weight to be accorded those inferences.” People v Hardiman, 466 

Mich 417, 428; 646 NW2d 158 (2002). 

III. ANALYSIS 

 Criminal solicitation of murder under MCL 750.157b is a “specific intent crime” that 

 . . . requires proof that the defendant intended that a murder would occur. 

Solicitation to commit murder occurs when (1) the solicitor purposely seeks to 

have someone killed and (2) tries to engage someone to do the killing. 

Solicitation is complete when the solicitation is made. A contingency in the plan 

may affect whether the victim will be murdered, but does not change the 

solicitor’s intent that the victim be murdered. Actual incitement is not necessary 

for conviction. [People v Crawford, 232 Mich App 608, 616; 591 NW2d 669 

(1998).] 

 “To place the issue of aiding and abetting before a trier of fact, the evidence need only 

tend to establish that more than one person committed the crime, and that the role of a defendant 

 

6

 The prosecutor introduced the audio recordings of these visits between defendant and Taylor as 

evidence and played them for the jury. 
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charged as an aider and abettor amounts to something less than the direct commission of the 

offense.” People v Vaughn, 186 Mich App 376, 382; 465 NW2d 365 (1990). “The phrase ‘aids 

or abets’” encompasses “any type of assistance given to the perpetrator of a crime by words or 

deeds that are intended to encourage, support, or incite the commission of that crime.” People v 

Moore, 470 Mich 56, 63; 679 NW2d 41 (2004). “In determining whether a defendant assisted in 

the commission of the crime, the amount of advice, aid, or encouragement is not material if it 

had the effect of inducing the commission of the crime.” Id. at 71. “[W]hether the defendant 

performed acts or gave encouragement that assisted” must be determined “on a case-by-case 

basis.” Id. (internal quotation and citations omitted). “An aider and abettor’s state of mind may 

be inferred from all the facts and circumstances.” People v Carines, 460 Mich 750, 758; 597 

NW2d 130 (1999). 

 Here, the underlying crimes that defendant is accused of aiding and abetting—solicitation 

to commit murder and conspiracy to commit murder—were unquestionably committed by 

Taylor, who “engaged” the informant to murder Kia and her children.7

 Crawford, 232 Mich App 

at 616. The prosecution presented ample evidence that defendant also solicited the informant to 

commit murder, by aiding and abetting Taylor’s efforts to do so. Again, she met with the 

informant in the Macomb County Jail, discussed the logistics of the murder, and indicated her 

approval for the violent plans—demonstrating intent to have Kia and her children killed. 

Carines, 460 Mich at 758. She also provided the informant with keys to Kia’s home, and offered 

to assist him in obtaining documentation on the life insurance policy with which Taylor planned 

to pay the informant for carrying out the killings. In addition, she “encourage[d] [and] 

support[ed]” Taylor in his plans to engage the informant to murder Kia and her children. Moore, 

470 Mich at 63. 

 The prosecution therefore provided more than sufficient evidence for a jury to find 

beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant was guilty of aiding and abetting solicitation to 

commit murder pursuant to MCL 750.157b.8

 Nowack, 462 Mich at 399-400. 

 

7

 As noted in n 1, see our Court’s opinion affirming Taylor’s convictions for further background 

on his efforts to have Kia and her children murdered. People v Taylor, unpublished opinion per 

curiam of the Court of Appeals, issued March 25, 2014 (Docket No. 313677). 

8

 Defendant’s arguments in her standard 4 brief are frivolous and unsupported. As recounted 

above, the prosecution provided substantial evidence that defendant participated in a conspiracy 

to commit first-degree, premeditated murder. Defendant’s argument to the contrary is disjointed 

and unsupported. A litigant may not merely announce his position and leave it to our Court to 

discover and rationalize the basis for his claims. People v Watson, 245 Mich App 572, 587; 629 

NW2d 411 (2001). 

As for her unpreserved complaint regarding the jury instructions, the record indicates that the 

trial court, though it made a minor mistake in its explication of renunciation as affirmative 

defense to the charge of solicitation in its preliminary instructions, correctly recited the elements 

of renunciation during the final jury instructions. Jury instructions are not erroneous if they 

fairly present to the jury the issues to be tried and sufficiently protect the defendant’s rights. 
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 Affirmed. 

/s/ Jane M. Beckering 

/s/ Mark J. Cavanagh 

/s/ Henry William Saad 

People v Knapp, 244 Mich App 361, 376; 624 NW2d 227 (2001). The trial court’s instructions 

achieved both objectives and defendant’s assertions otherwise are without merit. Defendant’s 

counsel cannot be held ineffective for failure to make a meritless objection. People v Ericksen, 

288 Mich App 192, 201; 793 NW2d 120 (2010).