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10-1868-cr 

United States v. Paredes-Cordova 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT 

SUMMARY ORDER 

 Rulings by summary order do not have precedential effect. Citation to a summary order filed 

on or after January 1, 2007, is permitted and is governed by Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 

32.1 and this Court’s Local Rule 32.1.1. When citing a summary order in a document filed with this 

Court, a party must cite either the Federal Appendix or an electronic database (with the notation 

“summary order”). A party citing a summary order must serve a copy of it on any party not 

represented by counsel. 

At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held at the 

Daniel Patrick Moynihan United States Courthouse, 500 Pearl Street, in the City of New York, on 

the 7th day of December, two thousand twelve. 

PRESENT: 

 

JOSÉ A. CABRANES, 

REENA RAGGI, 

 SUSAN L. CARNEY, 

Circuit Judges.

_____________________________________ 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Appellee, 

 

 v. No. 10-1868-cr 

JORGE MARIO PAREDES-CORDOVA, 

 Defendant-Appellant, 

BYRON BERGANZA, MARCO ANTONIO LARA PAIZ, ISAIAS TURCIOS, 

AKA Lico, AKA Lico Medina, OTONIEL TURCIOS-MARROQUIN, 

AKA Otto, AKA Tio, HECTOR EDUARDO MORATAYA-OLIVA, AKA 

Jeto, MYVA LORENA ORELLANA-MORALES, CARLOS LEMUS DORION, 

 Defendants.

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 The Clerk of Court is directed to amend the caption of this case to conform to the listing of the parties shown above. 
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FOR DEFENDANT-APPELLANT: CARMEN D. HERNANDEZ, Law Office of 

Carmen Hernandez, Washington, DC.

FOR APPELLEE: JOCELYN E. STRAUBER (Justin S. Weddle, on 

the brief), for Preet Bharara, United States 

Attorney, United States Attorney’s Office for 

the Southern District of New York.

Appeal from a judgment of the United States District Court for the Southern District of 

New York (Deborah A. Batts, Judge). 

UPON DUE CONSIDERATION WHEREOF, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, 

ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the May 3, 2010 judgment of conviction is AFFIRMED. 

 Defendant-appellant Jorge Mario Paredes-Cordova appeals from a May 3, 2010 judgment of 

the District Court convicting him on two counts: (1) participating in a dual-object cocaine 

importation conspiracy, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 963, with the objects of importing five kilograms 

and more of cocaine and distributing five kilograms and more of cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. 

§§ 952(a), 960(a)(1), 960(b)(1)(B), and 21 U.S.C. §§ 959(a), 960(b)(1)(B), respectively; and (2) 

participating in a conspiracy to distribute five kilograms and more of cocaine in violation of 21 

U.S.C. §§ 846, 841(a)(1), and 841(b)(1)(A). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying 

facts, and the procedural history of this case. 

DISCUSSION 

 On appeal, Paredes-Cordova makes four arguments as to why we should reverse the District 

Court and remand for a new trial. First, he argues that the District Court’s jury instructions were 

erroneous because they did not include a multiple conspiracy, voice identification, or alibi 

instruction, and because the “reasonable doubt” jury instruction was deficient. Second, he contends 

that certain belated disclosures by the government violated Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), and 

denied him a fair trial. Third, he asserts that the District Court erred in denying his motion to 

suppress his post-arrest statements. Finally, Paredes-Cordova argues that a new trial is warranted 

because the indictment was duplicitous. We address each argument and conclude that each is 

without merit. 

A. The Jury Instructions Were Proper 

We generally review challenges to jury instructions de novo. See United States v. Ford, 435 F.3d 

204, 209-10 (2d Cir. 2006). On appeal, a defendant must establish that the requested charge below 

“accurately represented the law in every respect” and that the charge delivered was erroneous and 

caused prejudice. United States v. Wilkerson, 361 F.3d 717, 732 (2d Cir. 2004) (quotation marks 
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omitted). However, when a defendant fails to contemporaneously object, jury instructions are 

reviewed only for plain error. See United States v. Schultz, 333 F.3d 393, 413 (2d Cir. 2003). 

i. A Multiple Conspiracy Instruction Was Not Required 

 As an initial matter, the multiple conspiracy instruction requested by Paredes-Cordova was 

erroneous in that it stated that “[i]f you find that there were two or more conspiracies then you must 

acquit the defendant on the conspiracy charge.” We have held that “[a]cquittal is not automatically 

required if the jury finds multiple conspiracies because the jury can plausibly decide that one of 

those conspiracies is the single conspiracy charged in the indictment . . . .” United States v. Berger, 224 

F.3d 107, 114 (2d Cir. 2000) (citation omitted). 

 Moreover, the District Court’s decision not to give a multiple conspiracy instruction was 

supported by the facts of this case. Even though the criminal organization went through changes in 

membership and spheres of operation, the record evidence suggests that it had the singular and 

common goal of obtaining cocaine in Colombia and transporting it into the United States to 

distribute. See, e.g., United States v. Williams, 205 F.3d 23, 33 (2d Cir. 2000) (“‘[A] single conspiracy is 

not transposed into a multiple one simply by lapse of time, change in membership, or a shifting 

emphasis in its locale of operations.’” (quoting United States v. Cambindo Valencia, 609 F.2d 603, 625 

(2d Cir. 1979))). Thus, as the government charged a single conspiracy, no multiple conspiracy 

instruction was required. 

But even assuming a multiple conspiracy instruction was warranted, Paredes-Cordova 

suffered no prejudice because “there was ample proof before the jury for it to find beyond a 

reasonable doubt that [the] defendant was a member of the conspiracy charged in the indictment.” 

United States v. Vazquez, 113 F.3d 383, 386 (2d Cir. 1997). The District Court properly concluded 

that because Paredes-Cordova stood trial alone, “the risk of confusion over multiple conspiracies 

and attendant prejudicial ‘spillover’ is not relevant.” Special App’x 67 (quoting United States v. Corey, 

566 F.2d 429, 431 n.3 (2d Cir. 1977)). Thus, a multiple conspiracy instruction was not required. 

ii. A Voice Identification Instruction Was Not Required 

 At trial, Paredes-Cordova argued that the voice on the recorded phone calls admitted into 

evidence was not his. In such circumstances, we have held that “it [i]s within the district court’s 

discretion to regard [a voice identification instruction] as superfluous.” United States v. Ulerio, 859 

F.2d 1144, 1146 (2d Cir. 1988); see United States v. Sliker, 751 F.2d 477, 500 (2d Cir. 1985); see also e.g.,

United States v. Moyhernandez, 17 F. App’x 62, 70 (2d Cir. 2001) (non-precedential order). 

Accordingly, we find no error in the District Court’s refusal to give the proposed voice identification 

instruction. 
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iii. An Alibi Instruction Was Not Required 

Paredes-Cordova argues that an alibi instruction was warranted because “he was elsewhere 

on certain dates when he was alleged to have been speaking on the phone with a cooperating 

witness.” We have repeatedly held, however, that an alibi instruction is inappropriate in the context 

of a charged conspiracy that encompasses a significant time period and numerous predicate acts. See 

United States v. Bryser, 954 F.2d 79, 87-88 (2d Cir. 1992); United States v. Guillette, 547 F.2d 743, 751 (2d 

Cir. 1976). In sum, no alibi instruction was required. 

iv. The “Reasonable Doubt” Instruction Was Not Erroneous, Much Less “Plainly 

Erroneous” 

On appeal, Paredes-Cordova also takes issue with the District Court’s “reasonable doubt” 

instruction. Because Paredes-Cordova raises this objection for this first time on appeal, we review 

the district court’s instruction for “plain error.” See FED. R. CRIM. P. 52(b). The instruction stated, 

inter alia, that: 

If, after fair and impartial consideration of all of the evidence on the count you are 

considering, you have a reasonable doubt about the guilt of the defendant on that 

count, it is your duty to acquit the defendant on that count. On the other hand, if . . . 

you are convinced of the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, you must convict

the defendant on that count. 

App’x 268 (emphasis supplied). Later in the charge, the District Court, in describing the elements in 

Count One, stated that “[i]f the government fails to prove that either of the charged objects of the 

conspiracy in Count One was an object of the conspiracy in which the defendant participated, then 

you must find the defendant not guilty on Count One.” Id. at 276 (emphasis supplied). 

 After reviewing the jury instructions “as a whole,” see Victor v. Nebraska, 511 U.S. 1, 5 (1994), 

we are convinced that the District Court “‘instruct[ed] the jury on the necessity that the defendant’s 

guilt be proven beyond a reasonable doubt,’” United States v. Birbal, 62 F.3d 456, 462 (2d Cir. 1995) 

(quoting Victor, 511 U.S. at 5). While we have not specifically held that the phrase “it is your duty” 

is sufficiently mandatory, this Circuit and others have approved the use of that phrase in “reasonable 

doubt” jury instructions. See United States v. Carr, 424 F.3d 213, 219-21 (2d Cir. 2005) (upholding 

“reasonable doubt” instruction that used the phrase “it is your duty”); see also United States v. Pierre, 

974 F.2d 1355, 1356-57 (D.C. Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 1012 (1993). In any event, the District 

Court’s “reasonable doubt” instruction was not erroneous, much less “plainly erroneous.” 
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B. The Brady Disclosures During Trial Do Not Warrant a New Trial 

 Paredes-Cordova argues that two mid-trial disclosures―(1) the October 18, 2009 disclosure 

of a confidential source’s statements in an April 9, 2003 DEA report, and (2) the October 27, 2009 

disclosure about statements made by two cooperating witnesses, Rodrigo Mora-Mondragon and 

Gerardo Cardenas-Procopio―warrant a new trial.2 We disagree. 

 To violate Brady, the undisclosed material evidence “must be favorable to the accused, either 

because it is exculpatory, or because it is impeaching; that evidence must have been suppressed . . . 

either willfully or inadvertently; and prejudice must have ensued.” Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 

281-82 (1999). Evidence is “material” for the purposes of Brady if “there is a reasonable probability 

that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been 

different.” United States v. Madori, 419 F.3d 159, 169 (2d Cir. 2005) (quotation marks omitted). 

 The October 18, 2009 disclosure about the confidential source’s statements was favorable to 

Paredes-Cordova because it indicated that someone other than the defendant owned the 265-

kilogram cocaine shipment that was seized by law enforcement officials in January 2003; the 

confidential source’s statements also were inconsistent with the testimony of two government 

witnesses. Nevertheless, even though this disclosure was belated, it was not “suppressed” by the 

government within the meaning of Brady because the government’s disclosure during trial was a 

“sufficient disclosure in sufficient time to afford the defense an opportunity to use.” Leka v. 

Portuondo, 257 F.3d 89, 103 (2d Cir. 2001). 

Not only did the government make a full disclosure of the statements, the accompanying 

DEA Report, and other information obtained in follow-up interviews, but the District Court also 

granted an adjournment so that defense counsel could explore this evidence, restructure its crossexamination of another government witness, recall two government cooperating witnesses, and 

interview other potential witnesses. After defense counsel was given this additional time, it assured 

the District Court that it was prepared to proceed. 

Under these circumstances, the government’s belated disclosure on October 18, 2009 did 

not violate Brady. 

 Similarly, Paredes-Cordova was not prejudiced by the October 27, 2009 disclosure regarding 

certain statements Cardenas made about who was involved with cocaine that was seized in Panama 

on July 21, 2005. Indeed, after it made this disclosure, the government transported Cardenas to 

New York and took steps to ensure that he could be called as a defense witness at trial. Cardenas 

 

2 While the government disclosed certain statements made by Rodrigo Mora-Mondragon and Gerardo CardenasProcopio, Paredes-Cordova’s argument focuses solely on the evidence relating to Cardenas’s testimony. 
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was called by the defense at trial and testified. Thus, despite its belated disclosure, we find no Brady 

violation with regard to Cardenas’s statements.3 

C. Paredes-Cordova’s Post-Arrest Statements Were Properly Admitted 

 Paredes-Cordova next argues that the District Court erred by admitting post-arrest 

statements he made. In particular, he argues that: (1) he did not knowingly and voluntarily waive his 

Miranda rights because Agent Weil (the DEA agent who gave the Miranda warning to ParedesCordova) was not “conversant” in Spanish, and (2) his Sixth Amendment rights were violated 

because Agent Weil continued to question him after he was appointed counsel. These arguments 

are without merit for at least two reasons. 

 First, Paredes-Cordova waived both arguments by not raising them in his pre-trial motion to 

suppress. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 12(b)(3), 12(e); United States v. Yousef, 327 F.3d 56, 125 (2d Cir. 2003). 

His pre-trial suppression motion never mentioned that Agent Weil was unable to communicate the 

Miranda waiver effectively. Furthermore, his pre-trial suppression motion did not discuss any Sixth 

Amendment violation. 

 In any event, a review of the record reveals that Paredes-Cordova knowingly and voluntarily 

waived his Miranda rights, both before and after he was afforded the services of appointed counsel. 

App’x 60-63, 168-70, 191-92. Accordingly, his Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights were not violated. 

See Montejo v. Louisiana, 556 U.S. 778, 786 (2009) (“The defendant may waive the [Miranda] right 

whether or not he is already represented by counsel; the decision to waive need not itself be 

counseled.”). 

D. The Indictment Was Not “Duplicitous” 

 Finally, Paredes-Cordova argues that the operative indictment was “duplicitous” within the 

meaning of Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 8(a) because it charged a single cocaine importation 

and distribution conspiracy instead of several different conspiracies. 

 

We have held that the application of the so-called duplicity doctrine poses “unique issues” in 

the context of conspiracy charges because “a single agreement may encompass multiple illegal 

objects.” United Sates v. Murray, 618 F.2d 892, 896 (2d Cir. 1980); see also United States v. Tutino, 883 

F.2d 1125, 1141 (2d Cir. 1989) (holding that a narcotics conspiracy count was not duplicitous even 

though it aggregated multiple narcotics transactions). And it is well established that “[t]he allegation 

in a single count of a conspiracy to commit several crimes is not duplicitous, for ‘[t]he conspiracy is 

 

3 Because we conclude that Paredes-Cordova was not prejudiced by the October 29, 2009 disclosure, we need not 

consider whether the information was exculpatory. 
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the crime, and that is one, however diverse its objects.’” Braverman v. United States, 317 U.S. 49, 54 

(1942) (quoting Frohwerk v. United States, 249 U.S. 204, 210 (1919)). 

As noted above in the discussion of the multiple conspiracy charge, the evidence supports 

the existence of a single conspiracy to import cocaine from Colombia into the United States and to 

distribute cocaine within the United States. Even though the narcotics scheme spanned six years 

and involved multiple methods, locations, and participants, the conspiracy maintained this single, 

overarching purpose. See Williams, 205 F.3d at 33. On this record, Paredes-Cordova’s argument 

regarding duplicity does not warrant a new trial. 

CONCLUSION 

 We have considered all of Paredes-Cordova’s arguments on appeal and find them to be 

without merit. For the reasons stated above, we AFFIRM the District Court’s May 3, 2010 

judgment of conviction. 

 FOR THE COURT: 

 Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk