United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

Chicago, Illinois 60604

Submitted April 13, 2005

Decided April 20, 2005

Before

Hon. Richard D. Cudahy, Circuit Judge

Hon. Daniel A. Manion, Circuit Judge

Hon. Ilana Diamond Rovner, Circuit Judge

No. 04-3984

Bart H. Dye,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

United States of America

Farm Services Agency,

Defendant-Appellee.

Appealfrom the United States District

Court for the Southern District

of Indiana, Evansville Division.

No. 04 C 187

Richard L. Young, 

Judge.

O R D E R

On June 21, 1984, Bart Dye and his wife conveyed by General Warranty Deed

farmland they owned in Martin County, Indiana, to the Farm Services Agency

(“FSA”) of the United States, in lieu of foreclosure of the property. “As part of this

conveyance, Dye received a credit of $525,000 for his interest in the farm and the

FSA forgave the balance of a loan to Dye of $321,764.23 in principal and $33,110.63

in interest.” Dye v. United States, 360 F.3d 744, 746 (7th Cir. 2004). Dye later

filed for bankruptcy and in the bankruptcy proceedings asserted an equitable

interest in the farm. The bankruptcy court rejected Dye’s claimed interest in the

land, and the district court affirmed. Dye then appealed to this court. This court

also affirmed, upholding the district court’s finding that Dye conveyed his entire

interest in the farm to the FSA in 1984. Id.

UNPUBLISHED ORDER

Not to be cited per Circuit Rule 53
No. 04-3984 Page 2

Dye responded by filing a new complaint in the Circuit Court for Martin County,

Indiana on October 29, 2004, captioned: “Complaint to Compel Mortgage

Foreclosure with Owner’s Right of Redemption on Real Estate.” The FSA removed

the case to federal court and then filed a Motion to Dismiss for lack of jurisdiction,

or alternatively a Motion for Summary Judgment. The district court granted the

FSA’s motion to dismiss, holding that Dye’s action was barred by the twelve-year

statute of limitations set forth in the Quiet Title Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2409a(g), or

alternatively was barred by the doctrine of res judicata. Dye appeals.

The district court properly dismissed Dye’s complaint as barred by the Quiet

Title Act’s twelve-year statute of limitations. Section 2409a(g) of that Act provides

that “[a]ny civil action under this section, except for action brought by a State, shall

be barred unless it is commenced within twelve years of the date upon which it

accrued. Such action shall be deemed to have accrued on the date the plaintiff or

his predecessor in interest knew or should have known of the claim of the United

States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2409a(g). In this case, the United States has claimed title to

the land at issue since 1984 by virtue of Dye’s absolute conveyance by General

Warranty Deed. On that date, Dye knew the United States not only claimed an

interest in the land, but considered itself the owner of the property. Therefore,

since Dye did not file suit within twelve years of this conveyance, his suit is barred

by the statute of limitations.

Dye responds that he did not know of the FSA’s interest in his property until the

bankruptcy proceedings in 2001. Given that Dye conveyed the property by signing

a General Warranty Deed in 1984, we find this assertion unsupportable. However,

even assuming that Dye’s claim is not barred by the statute of limitations, it is

barred by the doctrine of res judicata. Res judicata bars suits where there is a final

judgment on the merits; an identity of the issues of the lawsuit; and an identity of

the parties or their privies. Prochotsky v. Baker & McKenzie, 966 F.2d 333, 334

(7th Cir. 1992). In this case, all three elements are present. This court entered a

final decision in 2004 on the same issue presented here—ownership of the farm

land—and that suit involved the same parties. Dye, 360 F.3d 744. Therefore, even

if the statutory period had not run, Dye’s present suit would still be barred by res

judicata. We AFFIRM.