NO T R EC OM M EN DE D F OR F UL L- TEX T P UB LIC AT ION F ile Nam e: 09a0395n.06 07-5414 UN ITED STA TES C OU RT OF AP P EA LS F OR THE SI XT H C IR CU IT
UNI TED STATES OF AMERI CA, Plaintiff-Appellee , v. DE L MA N D AV I S, De fe nd ant- Ap pe lla

nt. )

) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ON APPEALFROM THE U NI TED STATES DI STRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DI STRI CT OF TEN NESSEE

B e fo re : MA RTI

N, RY ANand

SUT TO N, Cir c uit

Judg e s.
SUT TO N, Cir c uit

Judg e . D e lma

n D a vis c ha lle ng e s hi s convic tio n f or c on sp ir ingto dis tr ibute c oc a ine . We a ff ir m.
I.
A fe dera l gr and jury indicted Davis for conspiring with e ight other individuals to possess and distribute more than five kilogr ams of coc aine. See 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a) (1), 846. A jury convicted him of c on sp ir ing to dis tr ibute a so me wh a t sma lle r a mou nt: be tw e e n 5 00 g ra

ms a nd fi ve kil og ra

ms of c oc a ine . A ft e r t

he dis tr ic t c ourt

de nie d D a vis ’s mot ion

to a c qu it, it s e nte nc e d h im t o a 26 2- mon th prison term.07-5414

Un ite d S tates v . D av is

- 2 - II.
A.
Davis first ar g ues that the district cour t erre d in permitting the g overnme nt to introduce a n out-of-c ourt statement under the co- conspirator

exception to the hear say rule. F ed. R. Evid. 801(d)( 2)(E) . We give fre sh review to the district court’s leg al conc lusions regardingthe admissibili ty

of evide nce a

nd clea r-e rror revie w to its underlying f actua l conclusions. United States v. Childs , 539 F.3d 552, 559 ( 6th Cir. 2008). Richard Moselsky , a witness for the pr o s ec u t i o n, testified that he sold drug s with some of the c o- c on sp ir a tor s indi c te d w ithDa vis
. When a sked if he “ha[d] any involvement with Mr. Davis,” he testified:
On on e oc c a sio n . . . [Ma the s] c a lle d me up and tol d me to g o ove r to [D a vis ’s ] hou se beca use [Butler] had some coc aine f or me ove r there . . . and w hen I g ot there, [Davis’s] apar

tment, [ Davis and B utler we re] brea king up a kilo of coca ine.
J A 549. Davis c ontends that the cour t should not have admitted Mathes’s hear say statement about the pre sence of coc aine at Davis’s home.
A c o- c on sp ir a tor’s state me nt i s n ot h e ars ay if it w a s ma de “ duri ngthe c ours e and in fu rt he ra nc e of [a] c on sp ir a c y ” wi th t

he de fe nd ant. F e d R. Ev id. 80 1( d) (2 )( E) ; see United States v. W ilson , 168 F.3d 916, 920–21 (6th Cir. 1999)
. Ample evidenc e showed that Davis and Mathes wer e pa rt of the same c on sp ir a c y . M os e lsk y te sti fi e d th a t he ha d “ wo rk e d o ut a de a l” wi th M a the s in07-5414

Un ite d S tates v . D av is

- 3 - which Moselsky

would acquir e coc aine that the two w ould divide and sell. J A 548. Moselsky ’s t es t i m o n y al s o l i n k edM at h es an d

Da v i s : I nh i s ro l e a s a dru g b u y er , M o s el k s y h adac qu i re d

dru gs from B utler, who was working with Davis. And Mathes’ s statement itself—instructing Moselsky t o “ g o o v e r

t o [D av i s ’ s ] h o u s e b e c a u s e [B u t l e r ] h a [s] so m e c o c a i n e . . . o v e r t h e r e , ” JA 549—confirme d the conspirac y ’s exis tence and g oals. See W ilson , 168 F .3 d at 92 1 ( no tin g that, i n de te r mi n in g w h e th e r a s tate me n t f a ll s w it h in th e c o - c o n s p ir a to r h e ar s a y e xc e p ti o n , a

court c an
c on sid er the s tate me nt i n d e te rm ini ngwh e the r a c on sp ir a c y

e xiste d) . A mpl e e vid e nc e , in sh or t, supported the district cour t’s decision t o admit the evidenc e bec ause ( 1) a “ conspirac y exis ted,” ( 2) Davis “w as a me mber of the conspirac y ,” and ( 3) Mathes’s statement was “made in further ance of the conspira cy .” Id. at 920. Davis’s arg uments to the contrary are wrong . He first questi o n s wh ether a pre pondera nce of the e vidence shows that he “ha d any knowledg e of the c onspiracy .” Appe llant’s Br . at 13. B ut surely the fac t that he and Butler wer e “bre aking up a kilo of coc aine,” J A 549, par t of which B utler pr ov ide d to Mo se lsk

y , s uf fi c e s to sh owthat he kn e w h e wa s c on sp ir in g wi th ot hers to d istri bu te dr ug s. He po int s to no e vid e nc e a t any ra te that w ou ld d e fe a t th is n a tur a l in fe re nc e. Also underw helming is his sug g estion that “the conspiracy [was] over” befor e the statements were made. Ap pe lla nt’ s B r. a t 13 . M os e lsk

y , ke e p in mind , ar

ri ve d to pic k up his por

tio n of co c a ine fr om D a vis after Mathes made the statement at issue.07-5414

Un ite d S tates v . D av is

- 4 - B.
Da v i s n ex tco n t en d s t h at t h e e v i d en ce aga i n s th i m d o es n o ts u ff i ce t o s u p p o r t h i s dru gc on sp ir a c y

c on vic tio n. To the e xten t he pr e sse s th e po int that th e e vid e nc e wa s in su ff ic ie nt b e c a

us e it contained “ina dmissibl e hea rsay ,” Appellant’s Br
. at 16, that argument mere ly repr ises what we have just consider ed, and r ejec ted. I n addition to this retr eade d argument, Davis maintains that the prosec ution’s e vidence fell short beca use it consisted mostly

of the “ uncorr oborate d” testimony of multipl e drug co-c onspirators. Appellant’s Br
. at 16. But if multiple co-c onspirators testified a bout his ro le in t

he c on sp ir a c y , th e e vid e nc e wa s h ard ly “ un c or ro bo ra te d. ” To the e xten t he me ans to
c ha lle ng e the bo na

fi de s o f e a c h o f the se c o- c on sp ir a tor s, that is a matte r of c re dib ili ty that f a lls we ll within the province of

the jury to acc ept or re

ject. As we h ave sa id in one way or anothe r on too many occa sions to count, we “make all rea sonable infere nces and cre dibilit y choice s in support of the jury ’s ver dict” whe n co n sidering a suff iciency challeng e. United States v. Newsom , 452 F.3d 593, 608 (6th Cir. 2006). And in t his case , sever al wit nesses testified that Davis helped the m buy and sell larg e quantities of c ocaine
. See J A 164 (identify ing Dav i s as a d ru g purcha ser) , 224–25 (re lating that he sold Davis 25-30 kilog rams of c ocaine ), 423 (stating that he re ceive d money from Da vis in e xch ang e fo r a pr e vio us ly de liv e re d kil og ra m of c oc a ine ), 54 9– 50 (s tating that Da vis “[broke] up a kilo of coca ine” with B utler), a nd Davis himself admitted to an off icer that he had
c oll e c te d mo ne y

fo r d ru g de a le rs . Are a so na

ble jur y c ou ld con clu de that D a vis c on sp ir e d to distribute coca ine. 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)( 1), 846.07-5414

Un ite d S tates v . D av is

- 5 - C. Davis, finally , argues t hat hi s conviction m ust be overturned be cause the district judge failed to ask him whether he volunt arily declined to testify . But Da vis ga ve no indication to the trial c ourt that he wished to testify , so there w as no er ror: Althoug h a def

endant must waive his right to testify “knowing [l y ] and intelli g ent[ly ],” United States v. Stove r , 474 F.3d 904, 908 (6th Cir. 2007), a c ourt may presume that a knowing and intellige nt waiver has occ urre d if the def

endant “[ d o es ] nothing to alert the tria l court of his desire to testify ,” id. at 909. Absent some sug g estion that the defe ndant wishes to te stify , the trial cour t has no duty

to ask whethe r the wa iver is voluntary
. Id. ; United States v. W ebber , 208 F.3d 545, 551 ( 6th Cir. 2000).
III
. F or the se re a so ns , w e a ff

ir m.