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[Federal Register Volume 66, Number 248 (Thursday, December 27, 2001)]
[Notices]
[Pages 66949-66954]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 01-31803]

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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

Notice of Opportunity To Comment on Model Safety Evaluation on 
Technical Specification Improvement To Eliminate Post Accident Sampling 
Requirements for Boiling Water Reactors Using the Consolidated Line 
Item Improvement Process

AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

ACTION: Request for comment.

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SUMMARY: Notice is hereby given that the staff of the Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission (NRC) has prepared a model safety evaluation (SE) 
relating to the elimination of requirements on post accident sampling 
imposed on licensees through orders, license conditions, or technical 
specifications. The NRC staff has also prepared a model no significant 
hazards consideration (NSHC) determination relating to this matter. The 
purpose of these models is to permit the NRC to efficiently process 
amendments that propose to remove requirements for the Post Accident 
Sampling System [or Station] (PASS) for Boiling Water Reactors (BWRs). 
Licensees of nuclear power reactors to which the models apply could 
request amendments conforming to the models. In such a request, a 
licensee should confirm the applicability of the SE and NSHC 
determination to its reactor and provide the requested plant-specific 
verifications and commitments. The NRC staff is requesting comments on 
the model SE and model NSHC determination before announcing their 
availability for referencing in license amendment applications.

DATES: The comment period expires January 28, 2002. Comments received 
after this date will be considered if it is practical to do so, but the 
Commission is able to ensure consideration only for comments received 
on or before this date.

ADDRESSES: Comments may be submitted either electronically or via U.S. 
mail.
    Submit written comments to: Chief, Rules and Directives Branch, 
Division of Administrative Services, Office of Administration, Mail 
Stop: T-6 D59, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 
20555-0001.
    Hand deliver comments to: 11545 Rockville Pike, Rockville, 
Maryland, between 7:45 a.m. and 4:15 p.m. on Federal workdays.
    Copies of comments received may be examined at the NRC's Public 
Document Room, One White Flint North, 11555 Rockville Pike (first 
floor), Rockville, Maryland.
    Comments may be submitted by electronic mail to [email protected].

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: William Reckley, Mail Stop: O-8H1, 
Division of Licensing Project Management, Office of Nuclear Reactor 
Regulation, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-
0001, telephone 301-415-1389.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Background

    Regulatory Issue Summary 2000-06, ``Consolidated Line Item 
Improvement Process for Adopting Standard Technical Specification 
Changes for Power Reactors,'' was issued on March 20, 2000. The 
Consolidated Line Item Improvement Process (CLIIP) is intended to 
improve the efficiency and transparency of NRC licensing processes. 
This is accomplished by processing proposed changes to the Standard 
Technical Specifications (STS) in a manner that supports subsequent 
license amendment applications. The CLIIP includes an opportunity for 
the public to comment on proposed changes to the STS following a 
preliminary assessment by the NRC staff and finding that the change 
will likely be offered for adoption by licensees. This notice is 
soliciting comment on a proposed change to the STS that removes 
requirements for the PASS for BWRs. The CLIIP directs the NRC staff to 
evaluate any comments received for a proposed change to the STS and to 
either reconsider the change or to proceed with announcing the 
availability of the change for proposed adoption by licensees. Those 
licensees opting to apply for the subject change to technical 
specifications are responsible for reviewing the staff's evaluation, 
referencing the applicable technical justifications, and providing any 
necessary plant-specific information.

[[Page 66950]]

Each amendment application made in response to the notice of 
availability would be processed and noticed in accordance with 
applicable rules and NRC procedures.
    This notice involves the elimination of requirements for PASS and 
related administrative controls in technical specifications for BWRs. 
This proposed change was proposed for incorporation into the standard 
technical specifications by the BWR Owners Group (BWROG) participants 
in the Technical Specification Task Force (TSTF) and is designated 
TSTF-413. TSTF-413 is supported by the NRC staff's safety evaluation 
dated June 12, 2001, for the BWROG topical report NEDO-32991, 
``Regulatory Relaxation for BWR Post Accident Sampling Stations 
(PASS),'' which was submitted to the NRC on November 30, 2000. The 
BWROG request followed the staff's approval of similar requests for 
elimination of PASS requirements from the Combustion Engineering Owners 
Group (CEOG) and the Westinghouse Owners Group (WOG).

Applicability

    This proposed change to remove requirements for PASS from technical 
specifications (and other elements of the licensing bases) is 
applicable to BWRs.
    To efficiently process the incoming license amendment applications, 
the staff requests each licensee applying for the changes addressed by 
TSTF-413 using the CLIIP to address the following plant-specific 
verifications and regulatory commitments. The CLIIP does not prevent 
licensees from requesting an alternative approach or proposing the 
changes without the requested verifications and regulatory commitments. 
Variations from the approach recommended in this notice may, however, 
require additional review by the NRC staff and may increase the time 
and resources needed for the review. In making the requested regulatory 
commitments, each licensee should address: (1) That the subject 
capability exists (or will be developed) and will be maintained; (2) 
where the capability or procedure will be described (e.g., severe 
accident management guidelines, emergency operating procedures, 
emergency plan implementing procedures); and (3) a schedule for 
implementation. The amendment request need not provide details about 
designs or procedures.
    Each licensee should verify that it has, and make a regulatory 
commitment to maintain (or make a regulatory commitment to develop and 
maintain):
    a. Contingency plans for obtaining and analyzing highly radioactive 
samples from the reactor coolant system, suppression pool, and 
containment atmosphere;
    b. A capability for classifying fuel damage events at the Alert 
level threshold (typically this is 300 Ci/ml dose equivalent 
iodine). This capability may use a normal sampling system or 
correlations of radiation readings to coolant concentrations; and
    c. An I-131 site survey detection capability, including an ability 
to assess radioactive iodines released to offsite environs, by using 
effluent monitoring systems or portable sampling equipment.

Public Notices

    In a notice in the Federal Register dated August 11, 2000 (65 FR 
49271), the staff requested comment on the use of the CLIIP to process 
requests to delete post-accident sampling requirements from plants with 
Westinghouse and Combustion Engineering designs. Following the 
disposition of comments, the staff published a notice of availability 
of the staff's SE and NSHC determination for referencing using the 
CLIIP (65 FR 65018, October 31, 2000). Each request to eliminate PASS 
requirements by licensees for Westinghouse and CE plants using the 
CLIIP has also included notices prior to issuance of the subject 
license amendments and upon issuance.
    This notice requests comments from interested members of the public 
within 30 days of the date of publication in the Federal Register. 
Following the staff's evaluation of comments received as a result of 
this notice, the staff may reconsider the proposed change or may 
proceed with announcing the availability of the change in a subsequent 
notice (perhaps with some changes to the safety evaluation or proposed 
no significant hazards consideration determination as a result of 
public comments). If the staff announces the availability of the 
change, licensees wishing to adopt the change will submit an 
application in accordance with applicable rules and other regulatory 
requirements. The staff will in turn issue for each application a 
notice of consideration of issuance of amendment to facility operating 
license(s), a proposed no significant hazards consideration 
determination, and an opportunity for a hearing. A notice of issuance 
of an amendment to operating license(s) will also be issued to announce 
the elimination of the PASS requirements for each plant that applies 
for and receives the requested change.

Proposed Safety Evaluation

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
    Consolidated Line Item Improvement, Technical Specification Task 
Force (TSTF) Change TSTF-413, Elimination of Requirements for Post 
Accident Sampling System [or Station] (PASS)

1.0  Introduction

    In the aftermath of the accident at Three Mile Island (TMI), Unit 
2, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) imposed requirements on 
licensees for commercial nuclear power plants to install and maintain 
the capability to obtain and analyze post-accident samples of the 
reactor coolant and containment atmosphere. The desired capabilities of 
the Post Accident Sampling System [or Station] (PASS) were described in 
NUREG-0737, ``Clarification of TMI Action Plan Requirements.'' The NRC 
issued orders to licensees with plants operating at the time of the TMI 
accident to confirm the installation of PASS capabilities (generally as 
they had been described in NUREG-0737). A requirement for PASS and 
related administrative controls was added to the technical 
specifications (TS) of the operating plants and was included in the 
initial TS for plants licensed during the 1980s and 90s. Additional 
expectations regarding PASS capabilities were included in Regulatory 
Guide 1.97, ``Instrumentation for Light-Water-Cooled Nuclear Power 
Plants To Assess Plant and Environs Conditions During and Following an 
Accident.''
    Significant improvements have been achieved since the TMI accident 
in the areas of understanding risks associated with nuclear plant 
operations and developing better strategies for managing the response 
to potentially severe accidents at nuclear plants. Recent insights 
about plant risks and alternate severe accident assessment tools have 
led the NRC staff to conclude that some TMI Action Plan items can be 
revised without reducing the ability of licensees to respond to severe 
accidents. The NRC's efforts to oversee the risks associated with 
nuclear technology more effectively and to eliminate undue regulatory 
costs to licensees and the public have prompted the NRC to consider 
eliminating the requirements for PASS in TS and other parts of the 
licensing bases of operating reactors.
    The staff has completed its review of the topical report submitted 
by the Boiling Water Reactor (BWR) Owners Group (BWROG) that proposed 
the elimination of PASS. The justifications for the proposed 
elimination of PASS

[[Page 66951]]

requirements center on evaluations of the various radiological and 
chemical sampling and their potential usefulness in responding to a 
severe reactor accident or making decisions regarding actions to 
protect the public from possible releases of radioactive materials. As 
explained in more detail in the staff's safety evaluations for the 
topical report, the staff has reviewed the available sources of 
information for use by decision-makers in developing protective action 
recommendations and assessing core damage. Based on this review, the 
staff found that the information provided by PASS is either unnecessary 
or is effectively provided by other indications of process parameters 
or measurement of radiation levels. The staff agrees, therefore, with 
the owners group that licensees can remove the TS requirements for 
PASS, revise (as necessary) other elements of the licensing bases, and 
pursue possible design changes to alter or remove existing PASS 
equipment.

2.0  Background

    In its letter dated November 30, 2000, the BWROG submitted for the 
NRC staff's review Topical Report NEDO-32991, ``Regulatory Relaxation 
for BWR Post Accident Sampling Stations (PASS),'' for eliminating PASS 
requirements from BWRs. The NRC staff's safety evaluation for the BWROG 
topical report is dated June 12, 2001 (ADAMS Accession Number 
ML011630016). The BWROG proposed that relaxation of the PASS 
requirements be incorporated into the standard technical specifications 
by submitting TSTF-413.
    The NRC staff prepared this model safety evaluation (SE) relating 
to the elimination of requirements on post accident sampling for BWRs 
and solicited public comment [ FR ] in accordance with the CLIIP. The 
use of the CLIIP in this matter is intended to help the NRC to 
efficiently process amendments that propose to remove the PASS 
requirements from TS. Licensees of nuclear power reactors to which this 
model apply were informed [ FR ] that they could request amendments 
conforming to the model, and, in such requests, should confirm the 
applicability of the SE to their reactors and providing the requested 
plant-specific verifications and commitments.

3.0  Evaluation

    The ways in which the requirements and recommendations for PASS 
were incorporated into the licensing bases of commercial nuclear power 
plants varied as a function of when plants were licensed. Plants that 
were operating at the time of the TMI accident are likely to have been 
the subject of confirmatory orders that imposed the PASS functions 
described in NUREG-0737 as obligations. The issuance of plant specific 
amendments to adopt this change, which would remove PASS and related 
administrative controls from TS, would also supercede the PASS specific 
requirements imposed by post-TMI confirmatory orders.
    The technical evaluations for the elimination of PASS sampling 
requirements are provided in the safety evaluation dated June 12, 2001, 
for BWROG topical report NEDO-32991. As described in its safety 
evaluation for the topical report, the staff finds that the post-
accident sampling requirements for the following may be eliminated for 
BWR plants:

1. Reactor coolant dissolved gases.
2. Reactor coolant hydrogen.
3. Reactor coolant oxygen.
4. Reactor coolant chlorides.
5. Reactor coolant pH.
6. Reactor coolant boron.
7. Reactor coolant conductivity.
8. Radioisotopes in the reactor coolant.
9. Containment hydrogen.
10. Containment oxygen.
11. Radioisotopes in the containment atmosphere.
12. Suppression pool pH.
13. Chlorides in the suppression pool.
14. Boron in the suppression pool.
15. Radioisotopes in the suppression pool.

    The staff agrees that sampling of radioisotopes is not required to 
support emergency response decision making during the initial phases of 
an accident because the information provided by PASS is either 
unnecessary or is effectively provided by other indications of process 
parameters or measurement of radiation levels. Therefore, it is not 
necessary to have dedicated equipment to obtain this sample in a prompt 
manner.
    The staff does, however, believe that there could be significant 
benefits to having information about the radioisotopes existing post-
accident in order to address public concerns and plan for long-term 
recovery operations. As stated in the safety evaluation for the topical 
report, the staff has found that licensees could satisfy this function 
by developing contingency plans to describe existing sampling 
capabilities and what actions (e.g., assembling temporary shielding) 
may be necessary to obtain and analyze highly radioactive samples from 
the reactor coolant system (RCS), suppression pool, and containment 
atmosphere. (See item 4.1 under Verifications and Commitments.) The 
contingency plans for obtaining samples from the RCS, suppression pool, 
and containment atmosphere may also enable a licensee to derive 
information on parameters such as hydrogen concentrations in 
containment and the pH of water in the suppression pool. The staff 
considers the sampling of the suppression pool to be potentially useful 
in confirming calculations of pH and confirming that potentially 
unaccounted for acid sources have been sufficiently neutralized. The 
use of the contingency plans for obtaining samples would depend on the 
plant conditions and the need for information by the decision-makers 
responsible for responding to the accident.
    In addition, the staff considers radioisotope sampling information 
to be useful in classifying certain types of events (such as a 
reactivity excursion or mechanical damage) that could cause fuel damage 
without having an indication of a loss of reactor coolant inventory. 
However, the staff agrees with the topical report's contentions that 
other indicators of failed fuel, such as radiation monitors, can be 
correlated to the degree of failed fuel. (See item 4.2 under 
Verifications and Commitments.)
    In lieu of the information that would have been obtained from PASS, 
the staff believes that licensees should maintain or develop the 
capability to monitor radioactive iodines that have been released to 
offsite environs. This information would be useful for decision makers 
trying to assess a release of and limit the public's exposure to 
radioactive materials. (See item 4.3 under Verifications and 
Commitments.)
    The staff believes that the changes related to the elimination of 
PASS that are described in the topical report, related safety 
evaluation and this proposed change to TS are unlikely to result in a 
decrease in the effectiveness of a licensee's emergency plan. Each 
licensee, however, must evaluate possible changes to its emergency plan 
in accordance with 10 CFR 50.54(q) to determine if the change decreases 
the effectiveness of its site-specific plan. Evaluations and reporting 
of changes to emergency plans should be performed in accordance with 
applicable regulations and procedures.
    The staff notes that redundant, safety-grade, containment hydrogen 
concentration monitors are required by 10 CFR 50.44(b)(1), are 
addressed in NUREG-0737 Item II.F.1 and Regulatory Guide 1.97, and are 
relied upon to meet the data reporting requirements of 10 CFR part 50, 
Appendix E, Section VI.2.a.(ii)(3). The staff concludes that during the 
early phases of an accident,

[[Page 66952]]

the safety-grade hydrogen monitors provide an adequate capability for 
monitoring containment hydrogen concentration. The staff sees value in 
maintaining the capability to obtain grab samples for complementing the 
information from the hydrogen monitors in the long term (i.e., by 
confirming the indications from the monitors and providing hydrogen 
measurements for concentrations outside the range of the monitors). As 
previously mentioned, the licensee's contingency plan (see item 4.1) 
for obtaining highly radioactive samples will include sampling of the 
containment atmosphere and may, if deemed necessary and practical by 
the appropriate decision-makers, be used to supplement the safety-
related hydrogen monitors.

    Note 1: Each licensee should specify a desired implementation 
period for its specific amendment request. The implementation period 
would be that period necessary to develop and implement the items in 
4.1 through 4.3 and, as necessary, to make other changes to 
documentation or equipment to support the elimination of PASS 
requirements. As an alternative, the licensee may choose to have a 
shorter implementation period and include the scheduling of items 
4.1 through 4.3 as part of the regulatory commitments associated 
with this amendment request. Amendment requests that include 
commitments for implementation of the items in Section 4 within 6 
months of the implementation of the revised TS will remain within 
the CLIIP.

    Note 2: There may be some collateral changes to the TS as a 
result of the removal of the administrative controls section for 
PASS. The following paragraphs address three potential changes that 
the staff is aware of (editorial changes, mention of PASS as a 
potential leakage source outside containment, and revision of the 
bases section for post accident monitoring instrumentation).
    (A) The elimination of the TS and other regulatory requirements 
for PASS would result in additional changes to TS such as [e.g., the 
renumbering of sections or pages or the removal of references]. The 
changes are included in the licensee's application to revise the TS 
in order to take advantage of the CLIIP. The staff has reviewed the 
changes and agrees that the revisions are necessary due to the 
removal of the TS section on PASS. The changes do not revise 
technical requirements beyond that reviewed by the NRC staff in 
connection with the supporting topical reports or the preparation of 
the TS improvement incorporated into the CLIIP.
    (B) The TS include an administrative requirement for a program 
to minimize to levels as low as practicable the leakage from those 
portions of systems outside containment that could contain highly 
radioactive fluids during a serious transient or accident. The 
program includes preventive maintenance, periodic inspections, and 
leak tests for the identified systems. PASS is specifically listed 
in TS [5.5.2] as falling under the scope of this requirement. The 
applicability of this specification depends on whether or not PASS 
is maintained as a system that is a potential leakage path. [Note 
that several options (see following) exist for handling the impact 
that eliminating PASS requirements would have on the specification 
for the program to control leakage outside containment.

    (i) The licensee has stated that a plant change would be 
implemented such that PASS would not be a potential leakage path 
outside containment for highly radioactive fluids (e.g., the PASS 
piping that penetrates the containment would be cut and capped). The 
modification would be made during the implementation period for this 
amendment such that it is appropriate to delete the reference to PASS 
in TS [5.5.2]. Requirements in NRC regulations (e.g., 10 CFR part 50, 
Appendix J) and other TS provide adequate regulatory controls over the 
licensee's proposed modification to eliminate PASS as a potential 
leakage path.
    (ii) The licensee has stated that a plant change might be 
implemented such that PASS would not be a potential leakage path 
outside containment for highly radioactive fluids (e.g., the PASS 
piping that penetrates the containment might be cut and capped). The 
modification would not be made during the implementation period for 
this amendment. The licensee has proposed to add the following phrase 
to the reference to PASS in TS [5.5.2]:
    ``(until such time as a modification eliminates the PASS 
penetration as a potential leakage path).''
    The above phrase would make clear that TS [5.5.2] remains 
applicable to the PASS as long as it is a possible leakage path and 
reflects that the actual modification of the piping system may be 
scheduled beyond the implementation period for this amendment. 
Requirements in NRC regulations (10 CFR part 50, Appendix J) and other 
TS provide adequate regulatory control over the licensee's modification 
to eliminate PASS as a potential leakage path. Following the 
modification to eliminate PASS as a potential leakage path, the 
licensee may elect (in order to maintain clarity and simplicity of the 
requirement) to revise TS [5.5.2] to remove the reference to PASS, 
including the phrase added by this amendment.
    (iii) The licensee has stated that the configuration of the PASS 
will continue to be a potential leakage path outside containment for 
highly radioactive fluids (e.g., the PASS piping will penetrate the 
containment with valves or other components in the system from which 
highly radioactive fluid could leak). The licensee has [not proposed to 
change TS (5.5.2) or has changed TS (5.5.2) to revise the reference to 
this system from PASS to ( )]. The staff agrees [that TS 5.5.2 is not 
affected or that the change to revise the reference from PASS to ( )] 
is acceptable. A separate amendment request will be required if the 
licensee, subsequent to this amendment, decides to modify the plant to 
eliminate this potential leakage path and proposes to change the 
requirements of TS [5.5.2].
    (C) [Note-optional section if licensee provides markup of affected 
Bases pages] The elimination of PASS requires that the licensee revise 
the discussion in the Bases section for TS [3.3.3, ``Post Accident 
Monitoring Instrumentation']. The current Bases mention the 
capabilities of PASS as part of the justification for allowing both 
hydrogen monitor channels to be out of service for a period of up to 72 
hours. Although the licensee's application included possible wording 
for the revised Bases discussion for TS [3.3.3], the licensee will 
formally address the change to the Bases in accordance with [the Bases 
Control Program or its administrative procedure for revising Bases]. 
The staff does not believe that the Bases change will require prior NRC 
approval when evaluated against the criteria in 10 CFR 50.59, 
``Changes, tests, and experiments,'' and, therefore, agrees that the 
revision of the Bases to TS [3.3.3] should be addressed separately from 
this amendment and should be included in a future update of the TS 
Bases in accordance with [the Bases Control Program or the licensee's 
administrative controls].

4.0  Verifications and Commitments

    As requested by the staff in the notice of availability for this TS 
improvement, the licensee has addressed the following plant-specific 
verifications and commitments.
    4.1  Each licensee should verify that it has, and make a regulatory 
commitment to maintain (or make a regulatory commitment to develop and 
maintain), contingency plans for obtaining and analyzing highly 
radioactive samples of reactor coolant, suppression pool, and 
containment atmosphere.
    The licensee has [verified that it has or made a regulatory 
commitment to develop] contingency plans for obtaining and analyzing 
highly radioactive samples from the RCS, suppression pool, and 
containment atmosphere. The licensee has committed to maintain the 
contingency plans within its [specified document or

[[Page 66953]]

program]. The licensee has [implemented this commitment or will 
implement this commitment by (specified date)].
    4.2  Each licensee should verify that it has, and make a regulatory 
commitment to maintain (or make a regulatory commitment to develop and 
maintain), a capability for classifying fuel damage events at the Alert 
level threshold (typically this is 300 Ci/ml dose equivalent 
iodine). This capability may utilize the normal sampling system and/or 
correlations of radiation readings to radioisotope concentrations in 
the reactor coolant.
    The licensee has [verified that it has or made a regulatory 
commitment to develop] a capability for classifying fuel damage events 
at the Alert level threshold. The licensee has committed to maintain 
the capability for the Alert classification within its [specified 
document or program]. The licensee has [implemented this commitment or 
will implement this commitment by (specified date)].
    4.3  Each licensee should verify that it has, and make a regulatory 
commitment to maintain (or make a regulatory commitment to develop and 
maintain), an I-131 site survey detection capability, including an 
ability to assess radioactive iodines released to offsite environs, by 
using effluent monitoring systems or portable sampling equipment.
    The licensee has [verified that it has or made a regulatory 
commitment to develop] an I-131 site survey detection capability, 
including an ability to assess radioactive iodines released to offsite 
environs, by using effluent monitoring systems or portable sampling 
equipment. The licensee has committed to maintain the capability for 
monitoring iodines within its [specified document or program]. The 
licensee has [implemented this commitment or will implement this 
commitment by (specified date)].
    The NRC staff finds that reasonable controls for the implementation 
and for subsequent evaluation of proposed changes pertaining to the 
above regulatory commitments are provided by the licensee's 
administrative processes, including its commitment management program. 
Should the licensee choose to incorporate a regulatory commitment into 
the emergency plan, final safety analysis report, or other document 
with established regulatory controls, the associated regulations would 
define the appropriate change-control and reporting requirements. The 
staff has determined that the commitments do not warrant the creation 
of regulatory requirements, which would require prior NRC approval of 
subsequent changes. The NRC staff has agreed that NEI 99-04, Revision 
0, ``Guidelines for Managing NRC Commitment Changes,'' provides 
reasonable guidance for the control of regulatory commitments made to 
the NRC staff. (See Regulatory Issue Summary 2000-17, Managing 
Regulatory Commitments Made by Power Reactor Licensees to the NRC 
Staff, dated September 21, 2000 [ADAMS Accession Number ML003741774].) 
The commitments should be controlled in accordance with the industry 
guidance or comparable criteria employed by a specific licensee. The 
staff may choose to verify the implementation and maintenance of these 
commitments in a future inspection or audit.

5.0  State Consultation

    In accordance with the Commission's regulations, the [ ] State 
official was notified of the proposed issuance of the amendments. The 
State official had [(1) no comments or (2) the following comments--with 
subsequent disposition by the staff].

6.0  Environmental Consideration

    The amendments change a requirement with respect to the 
installation or use of a facility component located within the 
restricted area as defined in 10 CFR part 20 and change surveillance 
requirements. The NRC staff has determined that the amendments involve 
no significant increase in the amounts and no significant change in the 
types of any effluents that may be released offsite, and that there is 
no significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational 
radiation exposure. The Commission has previously issued a proposed 
finding that the amendments involve no significant hazards 
consideration, and there has been no public comment on such finding ( 
FR ). Accordingly, the amendments meet the eligibility criteria for 
categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(9). Pursuant to 10 
CFR 51.22(b) no environmental impact statement or environmental 
assessment need be prepared in connection with the issuance of the 
amendments.

7.0  Conclusion

    The Commission has concluded, based on the considerations discussed 
above, that (1) there is reasonable assurance that the health and 
safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the 
proposed manner, (2) such activities will be conducted in compliance 
with the Commission's regulations, and (3) the issuance of the 
amendments will not be inimical to the common defense and security or 
to the health and safety of the public.

Proposed No Significant Hazards Consideration Determination

    Description of Amendment Request: The proposed amendments delete 
requirements from the Technical Specifications (and, as applicable, 
other elements of the licensing bases) to maintain a Post Accident 
Sampling System [or Station] (PASS). Licensees were generally required 
to implement PASS upgrades as described in NUREG-0737, ``Clarification 
of TMI [Three Mile Island] Action Plan Requirements,'' and Regulatory 
Guide 1.97, ``Instrumentation for Light-Water-Cooled Nuclear Power 
Plants to Assess Plant and Environs Conditions During and Following an 
Accident.'' Implementation of these upgrades was an outcome of the 
lessons learned from the accident that occurred at TMI, Unit 2. 
Requirements related to PASS were imposed by Order for many facilities 
and were added to or included in the technical specifications (TS) for 
nuclear power reactors currently licensed to operate. Lessons learned 
and improvements implemented over the last 20 years have shown that the 
information obtained from PASS can be readily obtained through other 
means or is of little use in the assessment and mitigation of accident 
conditions.
    Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration 
determination: As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), an analysis of the issue 
of no significant hazards consideration is presented below:

Criterion 1--The Proposed Change Does Not Involve a Significant 
Increase in the Probability or Consequences of an Accident Previously 
Evaluated.

    The PASS was originally designed to perform many sampling and 
analysis functions. These functions were designed and intended to be 
used in post accident situations and were put into place as a result of 
the TMI-2 accident. The specific intent of the PASS was to provide a 
system that has the capability to obtain and analyze samples of plant 
fluids containing potentially high levels of radioactivity, without 
exceeding plant personnel radiation exposure limits. Analytical results 
of these samples would be used largely for verification purposes in 
aiding the plant staff in assessing the extent of core damage and 
subsequent offsite radiological dose projections. The system was not 
intended to and does not serve a function for preventing

[[Page 66954]]

accidents and its elimination would not affect the probability of 
accidents previously evaluated.
    In the 20 years since the TMI-2 accident and the consequential 
promulgation of post accident sampling requirements, operating 
experience has demonstrated that a PASS provides little actual benefit 
to post accident mitigation. Past experience has indicated that there 
exists in-plant instrumentation and methodologies available in lieu of 
a PASS for collecting and assimilating information needed to assess 
core damage following an accident. Furthermore, the implementation of 
Severe Accident Management Guidance (SAMG) emphasizes accident 
management strategies based on in-plant instruments. These strategies 
provide guidance to the plant staff for mitigation and recovery from a 
severe accident. Based on current severe accident management strategies 
and guidelines, it is determined that the PASS provides little benefit 
to the plant staff in coping with an accident.
    The regulatory requirements for the PASS can be eliminated without 
degrading the plant emergency response. The emergency response, in this 
sense, refers to the methodologies used in ascertaining the condition 
of the reactor core, mitigating the consequences of an accident, 
assessing and projecting offsite releases of radioactivity, and 
establishing protective action recommendations to be communicated to 
offsite authorities. The elimination of the PASS will not prevent an 
accident management strategy that meets the initial intent of the post-
TMI-2 accident guidance through the use of the SAMGs, the emergency 
plan (EP), the emergency operating procedures (EOP), and site survey 
monitoring that support modification of emergency plan protective 
action recommendations (PARs).
    Therefore, the elimination of PASS requirements from Technical 
Specifications (TS) (and other elements of the licensing bases) does 
not involve a significant increase in the consequences of any accident 
previously evaluated.

Criterion 2--The Proposed Change Does Not Create the Possibility of a 
New or Different Kind of Accident from any Previously Evaluated.

    The elimination of PASS related requirements will not result in any 
failure mode not previously analyzed. The PASS was intended to allow 
for verification of the extent of reactor core damage and also to 
provide an input to offsite dose projection calculations. The PASS is 
not considered an accident precursor, nor does its existence or 
elimination have any adverse impact on the pre-accident state of the 
reactor core or post accident confinement of radioisotopes within the 
containment building.
    Therefore, this change does not create the possibility of a new or 
different kind of accident from any previously evaluated.

Criterion 3--The Proposed Change Does Not Involve a Significant 
Reduction in the Margin of Safety.

    The elimination of the PASS, in light of existing plant equipment, 
instrumentation, procedures, and programs that provide effective 
mitigation of and recovery from reactor accidents, results in a neutral 
impact to the margin of safety. Methodologies that are not reliant on 
PASS are designed to provide rapid assessment of current reactor core 
conditions and the direction of degradation while effectively 
responding to the event in order to mitigate the consequences of the 
accident. The use of a PASS is redundant and does not provide quick 
recognition of core events or rapid response to events in progress. The 
intent of the requirements established as a result of the TMI-2 
accident can be adequately met without reliance on a PASS.
    Therefore, this change does not involve a significant reduction in 
the margin of safety.
    Based upon the reasoning presented above and the previous 
discussion of the amendment request, the requested change does not 
involve a significant hazards consideration.

    Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 18th day of December 2001.
    For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

William D. Beckner,
Chief, Technical Specification Branch, Division of Regulatory 
Improvement Programs, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.
[FR Doc. 01-31803 Filed 12-26-01; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7590-01-P
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