Michigan Supreme Court

Lansing, Michigan

Robert P. Young, Jr.,

 Chief Justice

Michael F. Cavanagh

Marilyn Kelly

Stephen J. Markman

Diane M. Hathaway

Mary Beth Kelly

Brian K. Zahra, Justices

Order 

December 21, 2011 

1/November 2011 

141624 

141629 

TRENDA JONES, Successor Personal 

Representative and Co-Personal 

Representative, BOOKER T. JONES, 

Co-Personal Representative, and 

MARGARET A. JONES, Co-Personal 

Representative, of the Estate of JAMAR 

CORTEZ JONES, 

Plaintiffs-Appellees, 

v SC: 141624 

 COA: 288710 

Wayne CC: 03-327528-NH 

DETROIT MEDICAL CENTER and 

SINAI-GRACE HOSPITAL, 

Defendants-Appellants, 

and 

DANNY F. WATSON, M.D., and 

WILLIAM M. LEUCHTER, P.C., 

Defendants-Appellees. 

_________________________________________/ 

TRENDA JONES, Successor Personal 

Representative and Co-Personal 

Representative, BOOKER T. JONES, 

Co-Personal Representative, and 

MARGARET A. JONES, Co-Personal 

Representative, of the Estate of JAMAR 

CORTEZ JONES, 

Plaintiffs-Appellees, 

v SC: 141629 

 COA: 288710 

Wayne CC: 03-327528-NH 

DETROIT MEDICAL CENTER and 

SINAI-GRACE HOSPITAL, 

Defendants-Appellees, 
2

and 

DANNY F. WATSON, M.D., and 

WILLIAM M. LEUCHTER, P.C., 

Defendants-Appellants. 

_________________________________________/ 

 On order of the Court, leave to appeal having been granted, and the briefs and oral 

arguments of the parties having been considered by the Court, we hereby REVERSE the 

May 20, 2010 judgment of the Court of Appeals and we REMAND this case to the 

Wayne Circuit Court for further proceedings consistent with this order. 

 Proximate causation involves examining the foreseeability of consequences and 

whether a defendant should be held legally responsible for such consequences given his 

negligent acts or omissions. See, e.g., Skinner v Square D Co, 445 Mich 153, 163 

(1994). This Court has defined proximate cause as “a foreseeable, natural, and probable 

cause.” Shinholster v Annapolis Hosp, 471 Mich 540, 546 (2004); accord Nielsen v 

Stevens, 368 Mich 216, 220 (1962). Such causation is distinct from factual or “but for” 

causation, and issues of proximate causation thus call for an independent, searching 

inquiry, the focus of which is whether the result of conduct that created a risk of harm 

and any intervening causes were foreseeable. Moning v Alfono, 400 Mich 425, 439 

(1977). Probability of harm is thus a relevant consideration to determine whether the 

defendant’s conduct was foreseeable or if the defendant should be held legally liable in 

light of the circumstances. Since there are risks that can be foreseen but would not be 

avoided by a reasonable person, for liability to attach the harm must be of a kind that 

defendant should have avoided or it must be shown that defendant’s actions presented an 

unreasonable risk of harm. 

 The lower courts erred by granting partial summary disposition to plaintiffs on the 

issue of proximate causation here. The lower courts presumed that because the 

development of Stevens-Johnson Syndrome is a known risk of prescribing tegretol, 

proximate causation is per se established. After presuming that plaintiff could prove 

negligence, the lower court “collapse[d]” factual and proximate causation such that the 

two were “essentially indistinguishable,” Jones v Detroit Medical Ctr, 288 Mich App 

466, 481 (2010), contrary to traditional standards for determining proximate causation. 

For a plaintiff to prevail on proximate cause at the summary disposition stage, it must be 

shown that reasonable minds cannot differ that injury was a foreseeable, natural, and 

probable consequence of the defendant’s negligence. Here, viewing the evidence in the 

light most favorable to defendants, there is a question of fact in this regard that should be 

submitted to the trier of fact rather than decided as a matter of law. 

 HATHAWAY, J., (dissenting). 
I, Corbin R. Davis, Clerk of the Michigan Supreme Court, certify that the 

foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court. 

 _________________________________________ 

 Clerk

December 21, 2011 

t1214 

 

3

 

 I believe that leave to appeal was improvidently granted because the result reached 

by the Court of Appeals in this case was correct. 

 CAVANAGH and MARILYN KELLY, JJ., join the statement of HATHAWAY, J.