In the

Court of Appeals

Second Appellate District of Texas

at Fort Worth

___________________________

No. 02-23-00269-CR

___________________________

On Appeal from the 43rd District Court

Parker County, Texas

Trial Court No. CR20-0026

Before Kerr, Womack, and Walker, JJ.

Memorandum Opinion by Justice Walker

DERRICK QUENTIN DONNELL MORGAN A/K/A DERRICK QUENTIN 

MORGAN DONNELL, Appellant

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS
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MEMORANDUM OPINION

I. INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND

In June 2020, Appellant Derrick Quentin Donnell Morgan a/k/a Derrick 

Quentin Morgan Donnell pleaded guilty to the state-jail felony offense of possession 

of less than one gram of methamphetamine. Pursuant to a plea agreement, the trial 

court placed Donnell on four years’ deferred adjudication. The State then moved to 

proceed with Donnell’s adjudication, alleging that he had violated numerous terms

and conditions of his community supervision. Donnell pleaded true to the allegations 

and asked the trial court to assess his punishment. After a hearing at which Donnell 

testified, the trial court found the allegations true, adjudicated Donnell guilty, and 

sentenced him to fifteen months’ confinement. Donnell appeals from that judgment. 

We will affirm.

II. DISCUSSION

In two issues, Donnell complains that the trial court abused its discretion by 

imposing a sentence that was cruel and unusual and grossly disproportionate to the

offense that he committed. He concedes that this sentence was within the range 

prescribed by the legislature for a state-jail felony offense, but he asks this court to 

“find as a matter of law that a 15[-]month sentence for a state[-]jail felony revocation 

where the range of punishment is 180 days to two years in state jail . . . is excessive 

and disproportionate.” The State contends that Donnell failed to preserve these 
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issues for appellate review because he did not object to the sentence at the hearing 

when it was imposed or later through a motion for new trial. We agree with the State.

Generally, an appellant may not complain about his sentence for the first time 

on appeal. Curry v. State, 910 S.W.2d 490, 497 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995); Mercado v. State, 

718 S.W.2d 291, 296 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986); Means v. State, 347 S.W.3d 873, 874 (Tex. 

App.—Fort Worth 2011, no pet.); Laboriel-Guity v. State, 336 S.W.3d 754, 756 (Tex. 

App.—Fort Worth 2011, pet. ref’d). This includes complaints that a sentence is cruel 

and unusual or grossly disproportionate. Kim v. State, 283 S.W.3d 473, 475 (Tex.

App.—Fort Worth 2009, pet. ref’d); see Vasquez v. State, No. 02-16-00194-CR, 2017 

WL 2178876, at *1 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth May 18, 2017, no pet.) (mem. op., not 

designated for publication). To preserve such complaints for appellate review, a

defendant must present to the trial court a timely request, objection, or motion stating 

the specific grounds for the ruling desired. Tex. R. App. P. 33.1(a); see Rhoades v. State, 

934 S.W.2d 113, 120 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996) (holding that complaint of cruel and

unusual punishment under Texas constitution was waived because defendant 

presented his argument for the first time on appeal); Noland v. State, 264 S.W.3d 144, 

151–52 (Tex. App.–Houston [1st Dist.] 2007, pet. ref’d) (holding that when appellant 

failed to object to his sentence at the punishment hearing or to complain about it in 

his motion for new trial, he failed to preserve his Eighth Amendment complaint that 

the punishment assessed was “grossly disproportionate and oppressive”); see also

Mercado, 718 S.W.2d at 296 (stating that as a general rule, appellant may not assert 
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error pertaining to his sentence or punishment when he failed to object or otherwise 

raise such error in the trial court).

Donnell concedes that he did not lodge an objection or file a motion for new 

trial to preserve any purported sentencing error, and our review of the record 

confirms this. Instead, he asks that we consider his issues “in the interest of justice.” 

But, preservation of error is a “systemic requirement”; it is axiomatic that an appellate 

court may not address unpreserved error. State v. Herndon, 215 S.W.3d 901, 909 (Tex. 

Crim. App. 2007); DeBlanc v. State, 799 S.W.2d 701, 709 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990); see 

Kim, 283 S.W.3d at 475; Ramos v. State, 819 S.W.2d 939, 943 (Tex. App.—Corpus 

Christi–Edinburg 1991, pet. ref’d).

Even if we could reach the merits of Donnell’s arguments, a punishment 

imposed within the statutory limits, as here, is generally not subject to challenge for 

excessiveness. See Kim, 283 S.W.3d at 475. Except under a very limited, “exceedingly 

rare,” and somewhat amorphous Eighth Amendment gross-disproportionality review, 

a punishment falling within the legislatively prescribed range and based on the 

sentencer’s informed normative judgment is unassailable on appeal. Id. at 475–76; see 

White v. State, No. 02-16-00158-CR, 2017 WL 1089691, at *8 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 

Mar. 23, 2017, pet. ref’d) (mem. op.) (not designated for publication).

For these reasons, we overrule Donnell’s two issues.

III. CONCLUSION

Having overruled Donnell’s issues, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.
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/s/ Brian Walker

Brian Walker

Justice

Do Not Publish

Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b)

Delivered: March 7, 2024