2002 Decisions

Opinions of the United

States Court of Appeals

for the Third Circuit

3-27-2002

Adams Parking Garage v. Scranton

Precedential or Non-Precedential:

Docket 01-3027

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Recommended Citation

"Adams Parking Garage v. Scranton" (2002). 2002 Decisions. Paper 214.

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 NOT PRECEDENTIAL 

 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

 FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 

 

 

 No. 01-3027 

 

 

ADAMS PARKING GARAGE, INC.; SCRANTON LIFE REALTY CO.; 

 ANTHONY J. RINALDI, 

 

 Appellants 

 v. 

CITY OF SCRANTON; JAMES CONNORS, Honorable, Individually and 

as Mayor of the City of Scranton; EDWARD WALSH; BRIAN REAP; 

 CHRISTOPHER DOHERTY; JOHN J. POCIUS; ALEX 

 HAZZOURI; PARNELL JOYCE; BOYD HUGHES; 

 SCRANTON REDEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY 

 

 

 

 On Appeal from the United States District Court 

 for the Middle District of Pennsylvania 

 (D.C. Civ. No. 99-1212) 

 District Judge: Honorable A. Richard Caputo 

 

 

 Argued March 7, 2002 

Before: SCIRICA and COWEN, Circuit Judges, 

RESTANI, Judge, United States Court of International Trade 

 

 (Filed: March 26, 2002) 

 Robert J. Sugarman (argued), 

Carl W. Ewald, Sugarman and Associates, P.C. 

 Counsel for appellants. 

 

 David E. Heisler (argued), 

Lenahan & Dempsey, P.C., 

 Counsel for all appellees except Boyd Hughes. 

 Jeffrey B. McCarron, Esq. (argued), 

Swartz, Campbell & Detweiler, 

 Counsel for appellee Boyd Hughes. 

 

 

 OPINION 

 

RESTANI, Judge. 

 This matter comes before the court on appeal from an order of the district court 

granting defendants’ motions for summary judgment and entering judgment in favor of 

defendants and against plaintiffs. It arises from a condemnation action concerning 

Adams Parking Garage, Inc.’s ("Adams Parking") leasehold interest in the Casey Parking 
Garage (the "Garage") located in Scranton, Pennsylvania. Anthony J. Rinaldi 

("Rinaldi") is the sole shareholder of Adams Parking. He is also the sole shareholder of 

the Scranton Life Realty Company ("Scranton Life"), which has offices in Scranton, 

Pennsylvania. 

 In 1989, Scranton Life sold certain properties, including the Garage, to the City of 

Scranton (the "City") in lieu of condemnation. The sales agreement included a lease 

provision, whereby the City, upon purchasing the Garage from Scranton Life, would 

lease the Garage back to Adams Parking, apparently so that Scranton Life could ensure 

parking for its tenants. The lease provided an initial five-year term and gave Adams 

Parking the right to renew for five additional five-year terms. The agreement contained a 

provision allowing either party to terminate the lease should the Garage be condemned 

by "any governmental authority." 2 app. at 53a. 

 Adams Parking operated the Garage pursuant to the terms of the parties’ 

agreement for nine years. During that period, however, City officials were engaged with 

developers and officials of the Scranton Redevelopment Authority (the "SRA") 

regarding the development of a blighted area that included the Garage. On September 9, 

1997, the SRA adopted a resolution approving a redevelopment proposal for the 

"Lackawanna East Redevelopment Area," a section of the City encompassing the 

Garage. Determining that the area was blighted, the SRA condemned the Garage and 

took ownership from the City on October 2, 1998. On December 9, 1998, the City 

terminated its lease with Adams Parking. 

 Adams Parking challenged the condemnation of the Garage in state court. On 

June 29, 1999, the Court of Common Pleas of Lackawanna County, finding that the 

Garage was "in a[n] extremely deteriorating condition," 2 app. at 243a, upheld the 

condemnation. Furthermore, the court found that the SRA’s certification of blight was in 

accordance with the law and not done arbitrarily, capriciously, or in bad faith. Id. at 

248a. On appeal, the Commonwealth Court affirmed and the Supreme Court of 

Pennsylvania denied allocatur. 

 On July 9, 1999, Rinaldi, Adams Parking and Scranton Life filed the instant suit 

in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania, alleging that 

the defendants conspired to deprive them of their constitutionally protected property 

interests in the Garage for various personal, political and economic reasons. See 2 app. 

at 38a. The second amended complaint, brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 1983, contains 

substantive and procedural due process claims, an equal protection claim, and a claim for 

breach of contract under Pennsylvania law. On April 26, 2001, the district court granted 

defendants’ motions for summary judgment and entered judgment in their favor and 

against plaintiffs. Rinaldi, Adams Parking and Scranton Life timely appealed. 

 As an initial matter, the issue as to whether the condemnation itself was lawful 

and done for the legitimate purpose of eradicating blight has already been determined 

and was upheld by the courts of the Commonwealth. Collateral estoppel, or issue 

preclusion, "prevents re-litigation of an issue in a later action, despite the fact that it is 

based on a cause of action different from the one previously litigated. The identical issue 

must have been necessary to final judgment on the merits, and the party against whom 

the plea is asserted must have been a party, or in privity with a party, to the prior action 

and must have had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue in question." Balent v. 

City of Wilkes-Barre, 669 A.2d 309, 313 (Pa. 1995) (citing Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 

90, 94-95, 101 S.Ct. 411, 414-15 (1980)). Collateral estoppel prevents a question of law 

or an issue of fact that has once been litigated and adjudicated finally in a court of 

competent jurisdiction from being relitigated in a subsequent suit. See Day v. 

Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft, 464 A.2d 1313, 1318 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1983) 

(citations omitted). 

 The propriety of the condemnation of the Garage was unsuccessfully challenged 

by Adams Parking’s preliminary objections in the Court of Common Pleas and appeals to 

the Commonwealth Court and the Pennsylvania Supreme Court. The issues asserted by 

Adams Parking in the state action included whether the Garage was, in fact, blighted, and 

whether the SRA acted arbitrarily, capriciously or in bad faith in determining that it was. 

In both actions, Adams Parking claimed that the condemnation was a "sham" contrived 

so that the City could break its lease and deny Adams Parking compensation. See 2 app. 

at 253a. After nine days of trial, the Court of Common Pleas found that the Garage was 

in an "extremely deteriorating condition" and that the SRA’s certification of blight was 
legitimate and not arbitrary, capricious, or done in bad faith or for an improper motive. 

Id. at 87a, 92a. The Commonwealth Court affirmed and the Pennsylvania Supreme 

Court denied allocatur. Thus, the district court properly found that "[t]he condemnation 

itself cannot be challenged" as "[i]t has already been fully litigated and conclusively 

determined in the courts of the Commonwealth." App. 12a. 

 Upon the lawful condemnation of the Garage, the City invoked the condemnation 

clause to terminate the parties’ lease. The lease itself states that it is terminable if the 

Garage is condemned by a "public authority created under [the Commonwealth’s] laws." 

2 App. at 53a. The SRA is such a public authority. See 35 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. 1704. 

Further, despite appellants’ assertions to the contrary, the SRA is an authority completely 

separate from the City. See Herriman v. Carducci, 380 A.2d 761, 763 (Pa. 1977) ("An 

authority under the Urban Redevelopment Law is an agent of the Commonwealth and 

not of the local government body. As can be seen, the legislature in no uncertain terms 

has made it clear that a redevelopment authority is a completely separate entity from the 

city.") (citations omitted). 

 The SRA’s condemnation triggered the clear and unambiguous lease provision 

that allowed the City to terminate upon condemnation of the Garage by "any 

governmental authority." 2 App. at 53a. Where the contractual language is clear and 

unambiguous, the court "must construe the contract only as written and may not modify 

the plain meaning under the guise of interpretation." App. at 11a (quoting Lobaugh v. 

Lobaugh, 753 A.2d 834, 836 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2000)). Accordingly, there was no breach 

when, pursuant to the condemnation provision, the City terminated its lease with 

appellants. 

 Next, claiming that their substantive and procedural due process rights were 

violated, appellants rely on Parkway Garage Inc. v. City of Philadelphia, 5 F.3d 685 (3d 

Cir. 1993), arguing that the City had an improper motive in terminating the lease. 

 However, "[t]o prevail on substantive and procedural due process claims, 

plaintiffs must have been deprived of a property interest because of either arbitrary and 

capricious government action or a denial of fair legal process." Taylor Inv., Ltd. v. 

Upper Darby Twp., 983 F.2d 1285, 1290 (3d Cir. 1993). Here, appellants’ substantive 

and procedural due process claims fail for lack of a property interest protected by the Due 

Process Clause. Adams Parking’s lease allowed the City to terminate upon the property’s 

condemnation, even where the condemnor was the SRA. See 2 App. at 53a. With no 

legitimate claim of entitlement to a longer lease under state law, appellants were deprived 

of no cognizable property interest. See Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 

U.S. 564, 577, 92 S.Ct. 2701, 2709 (1972) ("Property interests, of course, are not created 

by the Constitution. Rather they are created and their dimensions are defined by existing 

rules or understandings from an independent source such as state law . . . ."). 

 Appellants finally allege that other, similarly situated, property owners were 

compensated for the condemnation of their property. Appellants cite Village of 

Willowbrook v. Olech for the proposition that a "class of one" may bring an equal 

protection claim "where the plaintiff alleges that [it] has been intentionally treated 

differently from others similarly situated and that there is no rational basis for the 

difference in treatment." 528 U.S. 562, 564, 120 S.Ct. 1073, 1074 (2000). However, 

"[u]nlike Willowbrook, this case is at the summary judgment stage, and to survive 

summary judgment plaintiff must do more than merely state an equal protection claim; it 

must produce evidence to support its claims of disparate treatment." American Fabricare 

v. Township of Falls, 101 F. Supp. 2d 301, 309 n.14 (E.D. Pa. 2000). 

 Here, appellants presented no evidence that Adams Parking, which had a lease 

containing a termination clause, was similarly situated to the City’s other tenants on the 

parking garage property and no evidence of benefits that others allegedly received. 

Accordingly, because they presented no evidence that others, who were similarly 

situated, were treated differently, the district court properly entered summary judgment as 

to appellants’ equal protection claims. 

 Accordingly, the order of April 26, 2001 granting the defendants’ motions for 

summary judgment and entering judgment in their favor, will be affirmed. 

 ____ 

TO THE CLERK: 

 Please file the foregoing opinion. 
 /s/Jane A. Restani 

 Judge 

DATED: March 27, 200